Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01766/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01766-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bobcat Company
Defendant
Jayme Bruce
Plaintiff
Jessica Bruce
Plaintiff
Tina Bruce
Plaintiff
Clark Equipment Company
Defendant
Ingersoll-Rand Company
Defendant
Melroe Company
Defendant
Samuel Wilds
Defendant
Wilds Horticultural Services, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

TINA BRUCE, JAYME BRUCE, a NO. CIV. S-05-01766 WBS KJM

minor, by and through her 

Guardian Ad Litem, Tina ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

Bruce, and JESSICA BRUCE, a JUDGMENT

minor, by and through her 

Guardian Ad Litem, Tina 

Bruce,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY,

BOBCAT COMPANY, MELROE

COMPANY, INGERSOLL-RAND

COMPANY, WILDS HORTICULTURAL

SERVICES, INC., SAMUEL WILDS,

and Does 1 through 50,

inclusive, 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs brought this diversity action seeking

damages for the wrongful death of Jerry Bruce (“decedent”),

alleging that he fatally injured himself while operating a

defective Bobcat skid-steer loader manufactured and/or sold by

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Clark originally named the unincorporated business unit 1

Melroe Company, but changed the name to Bobcat Company in 2000.

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defendants. Defendants now bring three motions for summary

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant Ingersoll Rand Company (“Ingersoll”) is a

corporation incorporated under the laws of the state of New

Jersey. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Docket No. 26 (“MSJ 1”) at 1.) 

On May 31, 1996, Ingersoll became the sole shareholder of

defendant Clark Equipment Company (“Clark”), a corporation

incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its principle place

of business being in New Jersey. (Not. of Removal 2.) Defendant

Bobcat Company (formerly known as Melroe Company) (“Bobcat”) is

an unincorporated business unit of Clark, responsible for the

design, assembly, manufacture, and sale of Bobcat products,

including Bobcat skid-steer loaders. (MSJ 1 at 1.) 1

The Bobcat skid-steer loader is a small vehicle used to

dig and move landscaping and building materials, grade,

jackhammer cement, load trucks, and perform other constructionrelated tasks. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Docket No. 28 (“MSJ 3”)

Ex. G.) It consists of a partially-enclosed “operator cab,”

where a user sits and operates the controls, as well as handcontrolled hydraulic “lift arms” with a “bucket” attached, that

can be manipulated via controls in the operator cab. (Id.)

In order to avoid injury while operating the heavymachinery, the loader has a variety of safety features. There is

a seat belt to keep the operator in their seat, as well as a

“Bobcat Interlock Control System (BICS)” seat bar going across

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Notably, in 1994 Bobcat introduced a “seat sensor” 2

safety mechanism, which prevented operation of the lift arms

unless sufficient pressure was applied to the seat, i.e. by an

operator being seated. (Opp’n to MSJ 3 at 3.) Four years later,

however, this feature was discontinued in favor of the “PRESS TO

OPERATE” button, because the seat sensor mechanism occasionally

malfunctioned when debris or loose objects rolled under the seat

and prevented it from lowering. (Id.)

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the driver’s lap, which must be in the fully lowered position in

order for the loader’s lift arm controls to function. (MSJ 3 at

8.) In addition, the loader has a “PRESS TO OPERATE” button

inside the operator cab, which functions as a track (hydraulic)

lock device--if the button is not pressed, the hydraulic lift arm

controls will not function. (Id. at 9.) Finally, the loader 2

also has a “lift arm stop,” which is an orange-colored, steel

attachment designed to lock the lift arms in the up position,

preventing them from accidentally lowering during maintenance. 

(Id. at 3.)

The loader also has numerous warning decals affixed

prominently to the body, indicating various dangers that can lead

to injury or death. On one side of the loader, a decal reads:

!DANGER

AVOID DEATH

* Attachment can be forced against the ground and cause

front wheels to raise.

* Never go under or reach under lift arms or lift

cylinder without an approved lift arm stop installed.

(MSJ 3 at 3.) On the other side of the loader, a similar decal

reads:

!DANGER

AVOID DEATH

* Keep out of this area when lift arms are raised

unless supported by lift stop.

* Moving lift arm control or failure of a part can

cause lift arms to drop.

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The handbook warns (in part): 3

!WARNING

AVOID INJURY OR DEATH

4

(Id. at 4.) Both of these warning decals are accompanied by

diagrams depicting the dangers described. (Id. at 3-4.) The

loader also contains an instruction decal regarding proper

procedures for operation of the vehicle, which reads:

TO OPERATE LOADER:

1. Fasten seat belt and lower seat bar.

2. Put hand controls in neutral.

3. Start engine.

4. Activate green “PRESS TO OPERATE” button on left

instrument panel.

* Both green lights on left hand control must be on

* If hydraulic functions do not operate, stop engine.

(Id. at 5.)

Finally, the loader has attached to it a weatherresistant Operator’s Handbook, which contains detailed

instructions and further safety warnings. (MSJ 3 at 4.) The

cover of the handbook reads:

!WARNING

AVOID INJURY OR DEATH

* Never use the loader without instructions. Read

loader signs (decals), Operation & Maintenance Manual,

this Handbook and the EMI Safety Manual.

* Always fasten seat belt and lower the seat bar before

operating the loader. Keep feet on foot rests.

* Before leaving the operator seat:

- Lower lift arms.

- Put attachment flat on ground.

- Stop the engine. Remove the key.

- Engage the parking brake.

- Raise the seat bar.

(Mechanical Hand Controls:) - Move the

hydraulic controls until both lock.

( Advanced Hand Controls:) - Move the

hydraulic controls to neutral.

(Id.) The handbook contains warnings, similar to those on the

decals, as well as detailed instructions for safely getting 3

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* Never go under or reach under the lift arms or lift

cylinder without an approved lift arm support device

installed. Replace if damaged.

(MSJ 3 Ex. G.)

“It looked like a rag that had moved, but as I got 4

closer I noticed it was his head that had moved and it was his

hair.” (MSJ 2 Ex. 1 (Deposition of Jayme Bruce).)

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into, and out of, the loader.

Samuel Wilds owns a Bobcat skid-steer loader, which he

purchased used from an unnamed third-party. (MSJ 3 at 1.) Mr.

Wilds, having known decedent for fifteen years, and knowing him

to be an experienced equipment operator, loaned his loader to

decedent for personal use. (Id.) On January 19, 2003, decedent

was using the loader outside of his house. (Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J. Docket No. 27 (“MSJ 2”) at 1.) His daughter, plaintiff

Jayme Bruce, was indoors watching television, and did not hear

the loader’s engine. (Id.) At some point, Jayme went outside to

speak with her father, calling to him but receiving no response. 

(Id.)

As Jayme got within ten to fifteen feet of the loader,

she noticed something move, and from five or six feet away, she

realized that it was her father who had been seriously injured by

the loader. (MSJ 2 at 1-2.) Jayme ran across the street to get 4

help from a neighbor, Gardner Dockum. (Id. at 2.) Mr. Dockum

ran across the street and observed the scene, noting that Mr.

Bruce’s head was “squashed and his face was nearly black,” and

immediately instructed his wife to call 911. (Id. Ex. 2

(Deposition of Gardner Dockum).) 

The first emergency medical technician (EMT) to respond

was Mark Beldon, an EMT paramedic and Operations Supervisor with

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Plaintiffs filed a dismissal of defendants Wilds 5

Horticultural Services and Samuel Wilds on or about August 4,

2005.

The fourth cause of action is brought solely by Jayme 6

Bruce.

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American Medical Response, an ambulance transport company. (MSJ

2 at 2.) Mr. Beldon arrived approximately ten to fifteen minutes

after the call, and upon examining Mr. Bruce determined that he

was dead. (Id.) According to the Deputy Coroner Michael Booth,

the official cause of death was “traumatic asphyxiation,” and

decedent died within a matter of “minutes.” (Declaration of

Monique Grandaw Ex. D.)

On January 19, 2005, plaintiff Jayme Bruce, along with

plaintiff Tina Bruce (decedent’s wife) and plaintiff Jessica

Bruce (decedent’s youngest daughter), filed a complaint for

wrongful death in Shasta County Superior Court, which was removed

to this court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Compl.; Not. of 5

Removal.) Plaintiffs allege: (1) strict products liability; (2)

negligence; (3) breach of implied warranty; and (4) negligent

infliction of emotional distress. 

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Defendants now bring three motions for summary

judgment: (1) the first motion (“MSJ 1”) contends that Ingersoll

was merely a shareholder in Bobcat, and thus cannot be held

liable under any theory; (2) the second motion (“MSJ 2”) seeks

summary adjudication on the negligent infliction of emotional

distress cause of action, arguing that Jayme Bruce did not

contemporaneously perceive the injury; and (3) the third motion

(“MSJ 3”) asserts that the loader was not, by any definition,

defective, and therefore plaintiffs cannot recover.

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II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ [and] designate ‘specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The non-movant “may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135,

1137 (9th Cir. 1989). However, any inferences drawn from the

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underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to

the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

B. Ingersoll’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ 1”)

It is a fundamental rule of corporate formation that a

shareholder, be it another corporation or an individual, is not

liable for the actions of the corporation. See e.g. Mesler v.

Bragg Mgmt. Co., 39 Cal.3d 290, 300 (1985). Plaintiffs do not

propose that the court should disregard the corporate form and

pierce the corporate veil, but argue that Ingersoll participates

directly in placing the Bobcat loaders into the stream of

commerce.

California’s “stream of commerce” approach “imposes

strict liability in tort on all of the participants in the chain

of distribution of a defective product.” Bostick v. Flex Equip.

Co., Inc., 147 Cal. App. 4th 80, 88 (2007). Liability extends to

all parties who are part of the “overall producing and marketing

enterprise.” Fortman v. Hemco, Inc., 211 Cal. App. 3d 241, 251

(1989). Thus, in assigning strict liability, “[i]t is the

defendant’s participatory connection, for his personal profit or

other benefit, with the injury-producing product and with the

enterprise that created consumer demand for and reliance upon the

product (and not the defendant’s legal relationship (such as

agency) with the manufacturer or other entities involved in the

manufacturing-marketing system) which calls for imposition of

strict liability.” Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior

Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 275-276 (1980) (citing Kasel v.

Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 724 (1972)).

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However, garnering economic benefit from putting one’s

brand name on a defective product is not sufficient to result in

strict liability. See e.g. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal.

App. 2d 680, 683 (1969) (holding that one who endorses a

particular product for economic gain may be held liable if the

product is defective, but only based on a claim of negligent

misrepresentation). There is, implicit in the strict liability

standard, a requirement that the defendant have some ability to

control the manufacturing or distribution of the product. See

id. at 687 (refusing to find strict liability because there was

no indication the endorser had any involvement in the

“manufacturing and supplying process”); see also Bay Summit Cmty.

Ass’n v. Shell Oil Co., 51 Cal. App. 4th 762, 778 (1996) (noting

the importance, in assigning strict liability, of whether

“defendant’s role was integral to the business enterprise such

that the defendant’s conduct was a necessary factor in bringing

the product to the initial consumer market; and the defendant had

control over, or a substantial ability to influence, the

manufacturing or distribution process”). 

The “marketing” activities which plaintiffs assert as

the basis for Ingersoll’s liability are limited to: 1) brief

mention of Bobcat products on Ingersoll’s website, with a link to

the Bobcat website; and 2) labeling Bobcat products with the

Ingersoll-Rand name. However, mere endorsement of a product by

affixing a corporate name or logo is not sufficient to make a

party part of the “overall producing and marketing enterprise.” 

Hanberry, 276 Cal. App. 2d at 683; see also Kasel v. Remington

Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711 (1972). Plaintiffs’ proposed

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definition of “marketing” would potentially expand strict

products liability to include any and all endorsers, well beyond

the scope permissible under California law.

While receiving direct financial benefit from such

activities may be a factor to consider, a defendant must also

have an ability to influence and control the product

manufacturing and distribution process. Bay Summit, 51 Cal. App.

4th at 778. Plaintiffs argue that the branding of Bobcat

loaders, in conjunction with the fact that Ingersoll is the sole

shareholder of Clark, is sufficient to raise an inference of

Ingersoll’s control over the loader’s production process. 

However, Ingersoll’s uncontroverted evidence shows that Ingersoll

does not in fact exercise any such control over the manufacturing

and distribution of Bobcat loaders, or over the day-to-day

business operations of Clark. (Ihringer Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8.) It is

undisputed that Clark, and not Ingersoll, is directly responsible

for designing, manufacturing, and distributing Bobcat products. 

(Ihringer Decl. ¶ 6.) The two are separate corporations and,

while Ingersoll is the sole shareholder of Clark, it has no say

in these business functions. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs offer no

evidence to refute this fact. 

Ultimately, because Ingersoll does not exercise control

over the Bobcat loader’s design, manufacturing, and distributing

process, it cannot be liable under the strict liability “stream

of commerce” standard. Accordingly, the court will grant summary

judgment for defendant Ingersoll on strict liability. Plaintiffs

do not oppose dismissal of the negligence cause of action as to

Ingersoll. Accordingly, the court will also grant defendant

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Given that the claim for negligence fails, a claim for 7

negligent infliction of emotional distress must also fail as a

matter of law. “There is no independent tort of negligent

infliction of emotional distress,” but merely the tort of

“negligence, a cause of action in which the duty to the plaintiff

is an essential element.” Gu v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 132 Cal.

App. 4th 195, 204 (2005) (citing Potter v. Firestone Tire &

Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 984 (1993)). If there is no duty owed

to plaintiffs, the fourth claim thus must also be dismissed. 

Accordingly, the court will grant summary adjudication for

Ingersoll on claim four as well.

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Ingersoll’s motion for summary judgment on the second claim of

negligence.7

C. Claim Four (“MSJ 2”)

In an action for negligent infliction of emotional

distress brought by a bystander, the court must consider: 1)

whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident; 2)

whether “the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon

plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the

accident;” and 3) whether plaintiff and the victim were closely

related. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41 (1968); see also

Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 667-68 (1989). The parties do

not dispute that Jayme Bruce was located near the scene of the

accident and that she was closely related. Defendants, however,

argue that Jayme Bruce was not present at the scene of the

accident at the time it occurred, and had no contemporary

observance of the event, and thus plaintiff’s claim fails the

second prong.

As a general rule, a bystander plaintiff in an action

for negligent infliction of emotional distress must have a

contemporary sensory awareness of the accident--being informed of

the event after it occurs is not sufficient. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d

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at 688. However, when an injury-producing event continues for a

period of time, and the plaintiff observes the event while it is

still occurring, then recovery is possible. Ortiz v. HPM Corp.,

234 Cal. App. 3d 178, 185 (1991) (allowing recovery for negligent

infliction of emotional distress when plaintiff came across her

husband pressed between the cylinder and the body of a plastic

injection molding machine, because the event causing the injury

(oxygen deprivation from being trapped) was still occurring).

Jayme Bruce’s claim thus turns on whether she observed

her father while the “injury-producing event was still

occurring.” Defendants contend that when Jayme came upon her

father, he was already deceased and the “event” was no longer in

progress. As evidence of this fact, defendants cite the

deposition of Mark Beldon, the first EMT to arrive on the scene,

who consoled Jayme by telling her that at the moment she found

him “he was most likely already dead.” (MSJ 2 Ex. 3 (Deposition

of Mark Beldon 68).) On the other hand, Jayme Bruce testified

that she “noticed that it was his head that had moved” when she

first observed her father trapped in the loader. (Depo. of Jayme

Bruce 36:2.) While not dispositive, evidence that decedent was

still moving supports the inference that he was still alive. 

Jayme indicates that, to this day, she is unsure whether her

father was dead or alive when she saw him. (Id. 37:16.) 

Plaintiff additionally highlights the official coroner’s report,

which lists the cause of death as “traumatic asphyxia” and

indicates that it likely took “minutes” for death to occur.

(Grandaw Decl. Ex. D; MSJ 3 Ex.B (Deposition of Michael Booth).) 

Because the evidence lends itself to a plausable

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inference that Jerry Bruce was still being asphyxiated by the

loader when Jayme Bruce found him, this court cannot rule as a

matter of law that she did not observe the injury-producing event

while it was still occurring. Accordingly, defendants’ motion

for summary adjudication on claim four must be denied.

D. Claims One, Two, and Three (“MSJ 3”)

1. Claim One - Strict Liability

Under California law, “there are three ways to hold a

manufacturer strictly liable for injuries caused by its product:

(1) if the product is defectively manufactured; (2) if it is

defectively designed; or (3) if it is distributed without

sufficient warnings or instructions about its potential for

harm.” Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co., 140 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 1208

(2006). In this case, plaintiffs argue that the loader was

defectively designed.

There are two theories in California by which a

plaintiff may establish a design defect. Under the “consumer

expectations” test, if a product fails to perform “as safely as

an ordinary consumer would expect when using the product in an

intended or reasonably foreseeable manner,” then it is defective. 

Id.; Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 550 (1994). The

risk-benefit test, on the other hand, seeks to “balance the risk

of danger inherent in the challenged design versus the

feasibility of a safer design, the gravity of the danger, and the

adverse consequences to the product of a safer design.” 

Karlsson, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 1208; Barker v. Lull Eng’g, Co.,

20 Cal. 3d 413, 417 (1978).

///

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a. Consumer Expectations Test

The consumer expectations test is more properly applied

when “‘ordinary knowledge as to [the product’s] characteristics’

may permit an inference that the product did not perform as

safely as it should.” Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 566; Jones v. John

Crane, Inc., 132 Cal. App. 4th 990, 1001 (2005) (noting that this

test is proper when “everyday experience” of the product’s users

permits a conclusion that the design violated safety

expectations, “regardless of expert opinion about the merits of

the design”). The test is less appropriate, however, for “a

complex product . . . [that] may often cause injury in a way that

does not engage its ordinary consumers’ reasonable minimum

assumptions about safe performance.” Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 566-

67.

In this case, the consumer expectations test is not

appropriate because of the unusual circumstances that led to

decedent’s injury. It is undisputed that Mr. Bruce was operating

the loader while standing on the ground, outside of the cab, with

the BICS seat bar lowered and the “lift arm stop” not engaged. 

An ordinary Bobcat user’s minimum assumptions about loader safety

are unlikely to extend to operating the loader in this unusual

manner. See Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 430 (“[I]n many situations . .

. the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would

have no idea how safe the product could be made.”). As in Soule,

plaintiffs’ “theory of design defect [is] one of technical and

mechanical detail” and seeks “to examine the precise behavior of

several obscure components . . . under the complex circumstances

of a particular accident.” Id. at 570. Under these

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circumstances, the court will consider the loader’s design under

the risk-benefit test.

b. Risk-Benefit Test

Under the risk-benefit test, the first step of the

analysis requires plaintiff to demonstrate that “the injury was

proximately caused by the product’s design.” Barker, 20 Cal. 3d

at 431. Once plaintiff has satisfied that burden, the defendant

must then show that the product is not defective in light of

considerations such as “the gravity of the danger posed by the

challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur,

the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the

financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse

consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result

from an alternative design.” Id. Defendants, of course, do not

have to prove that the current, challenged design is the safest

or best design in existence, merely that it is not defective. 

See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431. Thus, while evidence of a better

design is a legitimate factor to be considered, it is not

dispositive of a design defect. Id.

To establish that a product’s design was the proximate

cause of injury, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that “the

defendant’s conduct substantially contributed to the injury and

the circumstances make it just to hold the defendant responsible

for the consequences of the accident.” Bunch v. Hoffinger

Indus., Inc., 123 Cal. App. 4th 1278, 1302 (2004). In this case,

it is undisputed that decedent was operating the loader while

standing under the lift arms, outside of the operator’s cab. It

is also undisputed that, while operating the loader in this

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position, the lift arms lowered, pinning decedent such that he

was unable to raise them. The design of the product, defective

or not, played a substantial part in Mr. Bruce being pinned in

this manner. Accordingly the burden falls to defendants to

demonstrate that the benefits of the design outweigh the risks.

The current design for the Bobcat loader contains a

number of safety features designed to prevent injury to the

operator, including a seat belt to keep the operator in their

seat, the BICS seat bar and “PRESS TO OPERATE” button to prevent

manipulation of the lift arm controls while the operator is not

seated, and a lift arm stop which can be engaged to prevent the

lift arms from lowering. The loader also has numerous warnings,

both in the instruction manual and in decals affixed on the

machine, indicating proper and improper operating techniques. 

Based on these safety features, defendants contend that the

injury very unlikely to occur. 

Plaintiffs, however, argue that these features are too

easy to circumvent, and that without a safety feature that makes

it more difficult to operate the loader while not in the

operator’s seat, the design is too dangerous and thus defective.

Plaintiffs’ expert, certified engineer Al Ferrari, testifies that

Bobcat received numerous injury reports of users being hurt while

operating the loader from outside of the cab, and was therefore

aware of this common and dangerous misuse. (Ferrari Decl. ¶ 5.) 

To combat this, in 1994 Bobcat installed a “seat sensor,” a

safety feature which prevented the loader’s lift arms from

operating unless a sufficient amount of pressure was applied to

the seat. (Id. ¶ 6.) According to Ferrari, the seat sensor was

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effective in lowering the incidence of accidents among loader

operators not properly seated, because it “prevent[ed] operation

of the lift arms if the operator is not in the operator’s seat.” 

(Ferrari Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 19.) Ferrari concludes that the seat

sensor is a feasible alternative design, which does not

appreciably interfere with the functioning of the product and

would better prevent injuries such as decedent’s. (Id. ¶ 19.)

The seat sensor, however, was not a flawless feature. 

Mr. Ferrari also testifies that after installing the seat sensors

in Bobcat loaders, the company received occasional complaints of

the seat sensor malfunctioning. (Id. ¶ 9.) Lose objects or dirt

could collect under the seat, preventing it from lowering,

thereby making it impossible to operate the lift arms. (Id.) 

Despite some improvements in the seat sensor, which reduced the

incidence of these problems, the malfunction still remained a

“nuisance.” (Id.) The parties dispute, however, exactly how

prevalent these difficulties were, or how much they affected the

performance of the loader.

Defendants also assert that a seat sensor can be

circumvented just as easily as the other, current safety

features, for example by pushing down or placing a weight on the

seat. Defendants, however, cite no specific evidence of this

fact. Bobcats were manufactured with seat sensors for

approximately four years, and defendants do not present a single

accident report of a user being injured after successfully

bypassing the seat sensor. Of course, circumventing a seat

sensor might be technically possible, but if the practical effect

of the safety feature is to eliminate or dramatically reduce a

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particular sort of foreseeable injury, then a genuine benefit

exists. Indeed, Mr. Ferrari’s testimony states that, while the

seat sensor may not have always operated perfectly, it had the

legitimate and practical effect of preventing users from

operating the loader while outside the cab. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 17.) 

Accordingly, on the facts presently before it, this

court cannot say as a matter of law that the design is not

defective. Because disputes still exist regarding the relative

risks and benefits of the current and alternate designs, summary

judgment on strict liability must be denied.

2. Negligence

To maintain a negligence cause of action, plaintiff

must show: (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal

duty; (2) that the defendant breached that duty; and (3) that the

breach was a proximate or legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury. 

Baptist v. Robinson, 143 Cal. App. 4th 151, 170 (2006). 

Negligent design, as opposed to strict liability, focuses on the

“reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct” as opposed to the

“condition of the product itself.” Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 434. 

The analysis parallels the “risk-benefit” test, in that the test

of negligent design “‘involves the balancing of the likelihood of

harm to be expected from a machine with a given design and the

gravity of harm if it happens against the burden of the

precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm.’” Merrill

v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 465, 479 (2001) (quoting Pike v.

Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 470 (1970)). Thus, under a

negligence theory a plaintiff “must [still] prove that a defect

caused an injury,” but “must also prove ‘an additional element,

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namely, that the defect in the product was due to negligence of

the defendant.” Id. 

The existence and scope of a defendant’s duty is a

legal question to be decided by the court. Butcher v. Gay, 29

Cal. App. 4th 388, 400 (1994); Romito v. Red Plastic Co., 38 Cal.

App. 4th 59, 65 (1995). However, “the law now requires a

manufacturer to foresee some degree of misuse and abuse of his

product, either by the user or by third parties, and to take

reasonable precautions to minimize the harm that may result from

misuse and abuse.” Huynh v. Ingersoll-Rand, 16 Cal. App. 4th

825, 833 (1993) (citation omitted). “[T]he extent to which

designers and manufacturers of dangerous machinery are required

to anticipate safety neglect presents an issue of fact.” Id.

(citing Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633,

645 (1973)).

Defendants argue that decedent’s intentional

circumvention the loader’s safety features was unforeseeable and

beyond the scope of any duty that could be imposed in law. This

contention is contradicted, however, by plaintiff’s expert

Ferrari, who testifies that Bobcat was aware, as far back as

1990, that users would occasionally operate Bobcat machines while

standing outside of the cab. (Ferrari Decl. ¶ 7.) Indeed, the

safety decal on the side of the loader depicts exactly such

behavior, i.e. a user being injured while standing under the lift

arms. The parties continue to dispute whether defendants were

aware that users would operate the loader while standing outside

of the cab. Moreover, to the extent that a material dispute of

fact exists with regard to whether the product is defective (see

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Section II(D)(1), supra) this also precludes summary judgment on

a theory of negligence. See Merrill, 26 Cal.4th at 479. 

Accordingly, the court will deny defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on claim two.

E. Breach of Warranty

At oral argument, plaintiffs concede that they have

abandoned their breach of warranty claim against all defendants. 

Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on claim three.

III. Conclusion 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

(1) summary judgment on all claims, as to defendant

Ingersoll, be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

(2) summary judgment on claim three, as to all

defendants, be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

(3) in all other respects, defendants’ motions for

summary judgment be, and same hereby are, DENIED.

DATED: March 26, 2007

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