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Parties Involved:
Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma
Appellee
Derek Kyle Freeman
Appellant
John Grubbs
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED ST ATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

June 6, 2005 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

DEREK KYLE FREEMAN, 

Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

JOHN GRUBBS, Warden; THE 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents - Appellees. 

No. 04-6008 

(D.C. No. 02-CV-863-HE) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT" 

Before LUCERO, McKAY, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

State prisoner Derek Kyle Freeman appeals the federal district court's 

denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief filed under 28 U .S.C. § 2254. Upon 

jury trial, Freeman was convicted in Oklahoma state court of first-degree 

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court 

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order 

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination 

of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34. I (G). The case is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 04-6008 Document: 010110646573 Date Filed: 06/06/2005 Page: 1
manslaughter, unlawful possession of a controlled substance and unlawful 

possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced to twenty years, ten years 

and one year of imprisonment, respectively. On direct appeal he argued, among 

other things, that ( 1) the State· s failure to arrest him before taking a blood sample 

rendered the sample and its test results inadmissible under Okla. Stat. tit. 4 7, 

§ 7 51, and admission of the evidence violated his constitutional rights; 

(2) admission of various testimony violated the physician-patient privilege and 

denied him due process and a fair trial; and (3) cumulative error denied him due 

process and a fair trial. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) 

rejected these arguments and summarily affirmed Freeman's convictions and 

sentences. In post-conviction proceedings, the state court modified Freeman's 

sentence by suspending the sentences imposed for the possession offenses. The 

OCCA affirmed. 

Freeman then sought federal habeas corpus relief, raising the same 

arguments he raised in his direct appeal. The federal district court, adopting the 

magistrate judge's recommendation, denied habeas relief. The district court also 

denied Freeman's request for a certificate of appealability (COA). We granted a 

COA on only three of the issues Freeman sought to assert on appeal: (1) Did the 

presence of two officers in the emergency room during Freeman's medical 

treatment result in the unauthorized taking of his blood? (2) Were Freeman's 

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constitutional rights violated by the admission of statements he made to medical 

personnel? and (3) Was there cumulative error? Exercising jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, we AFFIRM the denial of habeas relief. 

The incidents leading to Freeman's arrest began about 9:00 p.m. on 

March 16, 1998, when Freeman was driving a vehicle that crossed the center line 

of a Norman, Oklahoma street and collided head-on with another vehicle driven 

by the victim, Elizabeth Boyls. Freeman was unconscious for about ten minutes 

after the accident, and Boyls was also unconscious and injured. Both were 

transported by ambulance to Norman Regional Hospital, with Freeman riding in 

the front seat of the ambulance. Boy ls later died from a heart rupture caused by 

the impact of the accident. 

Norman Police Officers Paul Swanner and Matthew Hart met the 

ambulance at the hospital. The officers testified that, when the ambulance 

arrived, they saw Freeman make motions with his hands suggesting he was 

putting something down his pants. When asked what he was doing, Freeman 

replied that he was taking off his seat belt. When Freeman got out of the 

ambulance, the officers observed that he was unsteady on his feet, was 

unresponsive to their questions, had a distant look in his eyes, and spoke in a 

thick and gravelly voice. Believing that he was under the influence of 

intoxicants, and in light of the serious nature of the accident, the officers decided 

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to obtain a blood sample for analysis. 

While Officer Hart was out of the room, Officer Swanner read Freeman the 

Implied Consent Test Request. The request advised Freeman that he had been 

arrested and that the arresting officer believed that he had been under the 

influence of intoxicants when operating his motor vehicle. The form used also 

requested Freeman's agreement to submit to a test for the presence of intoxicants 

and specifically precluded him from consulting with a lawyer before deciding 

whether to take the test. It further informed Freeman that failure to consent 

would result in revocation of his driver's license. After hearing the entire Implied 

Consent Test Request read to him, Freeman agreed to the blood test. The blood 

tests later showed both morphine and methadone in Freeman's blood. 

Officer Swanner testified that Freeman's blood was drawn at 10:48 p.m. 

When Officer Hart returned to the room, he filled out the Oklahoma Department 

of Public Safety form concerning the blood test, noting a later arrest time of 

I 0:54 p.m. At trial, Officer Swanner could not explain the time discrepancy. 

HO\vever, Officer Hart testified that he noted the arrest time after consulting his 

watch and that Officer Swanner had told him that he had already read the Implied 

Consent Test Request to Freeman. 

After Freeman had agreed to take the test, Nurse Brigitte Squyres was 

preparing to draw Freeman's blood when she noticed marks on Freeman's arm. 

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On questioning by her, he admitted to prior drug use, as recently as a year before. 

Nurse Squyres also noticed Freeman had slurred speech and reacted slowly to her 

questions. When she asked him to disrobe, she observed that he became nervous 

and agitated. When Freeman removed his underwear, two syringes and a Tic-Tac 

container containing fourteen morphine tablets fell out. Officer Swanner took 

possession of these items, as well as a spoon, cotton balls and a green pill found 

in Freeman's clothing. 

Eventually, Freeman admitted to Nurse Squyres that he was on morphine, 

and he told another nurse, Bryan O'Rourke, that he had injected opium. Nurse 

O'Rourke believed that Freeman was intoxicated because of the appearance of his 

eyes, his slow functioning, his slow or slurred speech, and his intermittent 

incoherence. 

At 1 :00 a.m., during a break in Freeman's medical treatment, Officer 

Swanner read Freeman his Miranda 1 rights. Freeman then agreed to discuss the 

accident and later gave a written statement. His statement indicated that earlier 

that day, he had purchased morphine and had injected eighty-five milligrams of 

the drug. He also stated that he had slept only five hours in the prior three days 

and admitted that due to his lack of sleep he had had difficulty staying awake 

while he was driving his vehicle that night, that he had faded out, that he had 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

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drifted across the center line, and that he had awakened only after the accident 

had occurred. 

If a claim is adjudicated on the merits in state court, we grant habeas relief 

only if the state-court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established" Supreme Court precedent or "resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l), 

(2 ). Federal courts presume that state court factual findings are correct, and place 

the burden on the petitioner to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing 

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(l). If the state court did not decide a claim on its 

merits, a federal appellate court reviews the district court's legal conclusions de 

novo and its factual findings for clear error. Darks v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1001, 

1007 (10th Cir. 2003 ). 

Before us, Freeman argues that the blood test evidence was inadmissible 

under state law because he had not been arrested at the time the blood was drawn. 

See Post v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safetv, 889 P .2d 1290, 1291-92 (Okla. Ct. 

App. I 995) ("Oklahoma law requires, and appellate decisions of this state have 

consistently held, a valid arrest is necessary to authorize a police officer to 

request submission to chemical tests for blood alcohol."). He maintains that, 

because the affidavit prepared by Officer Hart showed a 10:54 p.m. arrest time, he 

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had not actually been arrested at 10:48 p.m. when his blood was drawn. In 

addition to the state law argument, Freeman also argues that his due process right 

was violated when the State failed to follow its rule requiring an arrest before 

taking blood. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980). 

Federal courts do not grant habeas relief for state-law errors. Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991 ). If a state fails to follow its own rules, the 

failure gives rise to habeas relief only if the failure also was a violation of the due 

process guaranteed by the Constitution. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346. To prove a 

denial of due process under Hicks, a habeas petitioner must show "the deprivation 

occasioned by the state's failure to follow its own law [is] arbitrary in the 

constitutional sense; that is, it must shock the judicial conscience." Aycox v. 

Lvtle, 196F.3d 1174, 1180(10thCir.1999)(quotationomitted). 

On direct criminal appeal, Freeman argued both that admission of the blood 

test evidence violated Okla. Stat. tit. 4 7, § 7 51 and that it violated his right to due 

process. The OCCA denied the claim, finding that Freeman was lawfully arrested 

prior to the extraction of his blood for testing. 2 

2 Freeman argues that we should review this claim de novo. We disagree. In 

I isting the issues, the OCCA recognized that Freeman had raised a constitutional 

claim. Although the court did not discuss the constitutional claim specifically 

when addressing this issue, its ruling encompasses it, and we still give deference 

to its decision. See Paine v. Massie, 339 F .3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003) ("Even 

if a state court resolves a claim in a summary fashion with little or no reasoning, 

( continued ... ) 

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We conclude that there was no due process violation. In order to prevail on 

his habeas claim, Freeman must show by clear and convincing evidence that the 

OCCA' s factual determination that he was arrested prior to his blood draw was in 

error. § 2254(e)(l). To the contrary, in his appellate briefs statement of facts, 

Freeman acknowledges the following sequence of events. Nurse Squyres went to 

get the blood kit, Officer Swanner read the Implied Consent Test Request, 

Freeman consented to the blood draw, and Nurse Squyres drew his blood. The 

Implied Consent Test Request, which was read to Freeman, clearly stated that he 

was under arrest. In light of Officer Hart's testimony that he noted the arrest time 

by looking at his watch after his return to the ER bay and after Officer Swanner 

had read the Implied Consent Test Request to Freeman, the record evidence does 

not support a conclusion that OCCA · s factual finding is in error. Furthermore, 

Freeman does not argue that his blood was drawn before Officer Swanner read the 

Implied Consent Test Request or before he had actually given his consent. 

Because the record shows that Freeman was arrested before his blood was drawn 

2

( ••• continued) 

we owe deference to the state court's result.''); Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 

831 (10th Cir. 2003) (recognizing federal courts give deference to state-court 

decisions even if state court did not discuss and may not have been aware of 

Supreme Court precedent; relying on Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per 

curiam)). Even if we were to conclude that the OCCA did not address the 

constitutional claim on its merits, on de novo review, see Darks, 327 F .3d at 

1012, we would still affirm. 

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and because there was no failure of the State to follow its own rules, there was no 

due process violation. See generally Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-

70 ( 1966) ( concluding police were justified in requiring person to submit to blood 

test because person was under arrest and circumstances indicated likelihood of 

success of test for alcohol). Accordingly, we conclude the OCCA' s decision was 

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent; nor 

was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l), (2). 

Freeman also argues to us that his statements were protected by the 

physician/patient privilege set forth in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2503 and that their 

admission violated his constitutional right to due process. He maintains that his 

constitutional rights were violated because, although he made statements in the 

officers' presence, he had never consented to their presence, but had merely 

acquiesced because he had no choice in order to obtain medical treatment. 

The OCCA rejected this argument. The court found that Freeman's 

statements to the nurses were not privileged communications under Okla. Stat. tit. 

12, § 2503. Citing§ 2503(A)(4), the court found that, because Freeman made the 

statements in the presence of officers who clearly were not involved in the 

medical diagnosis or treatment, Freeman did not intend for his comments to be 

confidential. Lastly, the court found that the nurses' testimony about Freeman· s 

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demeanor was properly admitted and relevant to the intoxication issue. 3 

"[S]tate court rulings on the admissibility of evidence may not be 

questioned in federal habeas proceedings unless they render the trial so 

fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights." 

Walker v. Gibson, 228 F.3d 1217, 1239 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted), 

overruled on other grounds by Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1057 n.5 (10th Cir. 

2001 ). Nothing in the record indicates Freeman was deprived of a fair trial. He 

knew of the officer's presence, but he did not ask them to leave before making his 

statements or indicate that his statements were being made in confidence. 

As for Freeman's argument that he has a due process right to have the state 

courts follow state procedural and substantive rules, see Hicks, 44 7 U.S. at 346, 

because there was no violation of state rules, it follows that there was no violation 

of his due process rights. Accordingly, we conclude Freeman cannot show by 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent that admission of his statements 

resulted in any fundamental unfairness or denied him due process of law. 

Finally, Freeman argues that the cumulative errors in this case denied him a 

3 Freeman also argues that this claim should be reviewed de novo. Again, we 

disagree. The OCCA recognized that Freeman raised a constitutional claim. 

Because that court found no state-law error, it follows that the court decided there 

could be no constitutional error. Under these circumstances, see n.2 supra, we 

give deference to the OCCA's decision. But even if we were to review de novo, 

we would affirm. 

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fundamentally fair proceeding and due process. Finding no individual error, the 

OCCA decided there can be no accumulation of error. "A cumulative-error 

analysis merely aggregates all the errors that individually have been found to be 

harmless, and therefore not reversible, and it analyzes whether their cumulative 

effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be 

determined to be harmless." United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 

(10th Cir. 1990). "Cumulative error analysis applies where there are two or more 

actual errors; it does not apply to the cumulative effect of non-errors." Moore v. 

Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1113 (10th Cir. 1998). Because there was no error, the 

OCCA's conclusion that there was no cumulative error was not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

11 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

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