Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05330/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05330-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Venita Colbert
Appellant
John E. Potter
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 13, 2006 Decided December 15, 2006

No. 05-5330

VENITA COLBERT,

APPELLANT

v.

JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv00996)

Judith L. Walter argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Peter S. Smith, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R. Craig

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Michael J. Ryan, Assistant

U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant Venita Colbert

seeks review of the District Court’s dismissal of her complaint

against appellee John E. Potter in his official capacity as

Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service

(“USPS”). The complaint alleges that appellant’s supervisor

discriminated against her on the basis of her race, sex, age, and

disability and also improperly retaliated against her for initiating

a discrimination complaint, in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000), the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29

U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796l (2000). 

Under Title VII, USPS employees are required to file

lawsuits seeking relief for employment discrimination within 90

days of receipt of notice of final administrative action. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) regulations also require a claimant

“under title VII, the ADEA and the Rehabilitation Act to file a

civil action in an appropriate United States District Court . . .

[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of the final action on an individual or

class complaint.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(a) (2006). There is no

dispute here that appellant’s counsel received a copy of USPS’s

Final Agency Decision (“Final Decision”) against Colbert. Nor

do the parties dispute the filing date of appellant’s complaint.

The question at issue here concerns the date when appellant

received notice of the Final Decision denying her administrative

claims. The District Court, relying on the date stamped on the

back of a USPS Form 3811 (the “Domestic Return Receipt”),

found that “the name and signature of Colbert’s counsel clearly

appears, just above a postmark of ‘Mar 18 2004.’” Colbert v.

Potter, Civ. A. No. 04-996, 2005 WL 3273571, at *4 (D.D.C.

USCA Case #05-5330 Document #1011385 Filed: 12/15/2006 Page 2 of 19
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July 28, 2005). On the basis of this evidence, the District Court

agreed with USPS “that Colbert’s counsel received the Final

Agency Decision on March 18, 2004 – 92 days before Colbert

filed suit, which would render her action untimely.” Id.

Before both the District Court and this court, appellant

“challenges the March 18, 2004 postmark on the return receipt

card, arguing that ‘the postmark showing the date of mailing

would appear on the reverse side of the card in the area where

the postage is to be affixed,’ and that because USPS ‘has not

provided an image of the reverse side of the card,’ it should be

presumed that the reverse of the card bears a postmark with a

later date.” Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Opposition (“Opposition

Memorandum”), reprinted in App. 53-73). The District Court

rejected this argument, noting that appellant “neither dispute[d]

that the return receipt card bears her attorney’s signature nor

challenge[d] the legitimacy of the postmark on the card.” Id.

Because appellant offered no “affidavit or other evidence that

would contravene the return receipt postmark,” the District

Court granted USPS’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative for

summary judgment. Id.

Following oral argument before this court, USPS filed a

motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

10(e)(2)(C), for leave to submit a complete copy of the

Domestic Return Receipt. On the same day, on its own motion,

the court directed USPS to submit a copy of the front half of the

Domestic Return Receipt. Appellant then filed a response to

USPS’s submission, after which the court ordered USPS to file

the original Domestic Return Receipt. Upon examination, the

front half of the receipt positively confirms that appellant’s

counsel received USPS’s Final Decision on or before March 18,

2004, making this action untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the District Court.

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I. BACKGROUND

The background facts in this case are carefully set forth in

the District Court’s unpublished Memorandum Opinion.

Because there is nothing to add to the District Court’s statement,

we have incorporated it as a part of our Background section: 

Colbert is an African-American woman over 40 years

old who suffers from degenerative disk disease, “a painful

back ailment which is aggravated by certain types of

physical activity.” Compl. ¶ 5. She began her employment

with the United States Postal Service on June 10, 1985. By

1992, Colbert had been promoted to Supervisor of the

Telephone Operators, at an EAS-15 grade and pay level,

within USPS’ national headquarters at L’Enfant Plaza in

Washington, D.C. Id. ¶ 7. In this position, she received

favorable performance reviews, promotions and increases

in pay until 1995. Id. ¶ 8. In 1994, USPS hired Billy

Wesson as Manger of Headquarters Facility Services. His

responsibilities included telephone operations, placing

Colbert under his supervision. Id. ¶ 9. Shortly after

Wesson arrived, Colbert allegedly began experiencing

discriminatory treatment at his hands.

According to Colbert, Wesson “favored and handed out

promotional opportunities to males, who like himself, had

a military background,” while treating Colbert and other

African-American women under his management

unfavorably. Id. ¶ 11. Colbert further alleges that Wesson

was hypercritical of her work, consistently made demeaning

comments, questioned her use of leave, praised others but

not her for good performance, and imposed conditions on

her that were not imposed on other employees. Id. ¶ 12.

Colbert perceived that Wesson was either trying to

harass her into resigning or setting her up for termination,

so she began to explore opportunities to be “detailed” to

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other departments at USPS headquarters. Id. ¶ 14. When

Colbert discussed her desire for a work detail and its

associated promotional and training opportunities with

Wesson, he responded that “he could demote her to a

custodial position on the night shift” at a lower grade and

pay level. Id. ¶ 15. Colbert persisted in her efforts, and in

early 1998 she found a detail to the Employment

Development office as a training development specialist.

Colbert needed to get Wesson’s approval in order to take

the detail. Wesson, however, bristled at this idea, and

ordered Colbert not to contact the manager in Employee

Development. A few days later, on April 7, 1998, Wesson

gave Colbert a “developmental assignment” to the mail

room as “Supervisor, Mail Messenger,” telling Colbert that

she would have to take this assignment before she could be

considered for the Employee Development detail. At the

same time as he assigned Colbert to the mail room, Wesson

appointed four African-American men, younger than

Colbert and with military backgrounds, to “higher positions

at higher pay levels.” Id. ¶¶ 16-20.

After completing the mail room assignment, mostly

consisting of physical labor which aggravated her

degenerative disk disease, Colbert obtained her detail to

Employee Development in August 1998. She received

higher pay at the EAS-21 level, and acquired job duties in

line with her education, experience, and desires. Wesson,

however, interfered with Colbert’s prospects for permanent

employment with Employee Development, and in February

1999 demanded that she return to his department. Id. ¶¶ 22-

23. Upon Colbert’s return, Wesson immediately sent her

out on a detail to the purchasing department, recalled her

once more, and then assigned her to work in Operating

Services, “the manual labor-custodial-maintenance section

of Headquarters Facility Services.” Id. ¶¶ 23-25. Colbert’s

responsibilities there included restocking first aid kits and

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cleaning supplies, taking walking tours of the building, and

checking the expiration date on fire extinguishers. Id.

¶¶ 26-27. Once again, the job involved physical exertion

which inflamed Colbert’s back condition. This shuffling of

work assignments was “designed and intended . . . to harass

her into quitting,” id. ¶ 28, and effectively “divested

[Colbert] of her supervisory responsibilities,” id. ¶ 24.

During July and August 1999, Weston subjected

Colbert to a higher level of scrutiny and discipline than he

applied to her co-workers, and which “had no basis in

official Postal Service personnel policies.” Id. ¶ 29.

Wesson obtained Colbert’s work telephone records and

accused her of making excessive personal calls while on the

job. For this offense, on September 3, 1999 Wesson issued

Colbert a proposed Letter of Warning in lieu of a seven day

time off suspension. Id. ¶¶ 29-33. When Colbert appealed

this disciplinary action on September 15, 1999, Wesson

“became angry and loud,” id. ¶ 33. On September 23, 1999

he sustained the Letter of Warning and threatened Colbert

with further discipline if she “continued to use Postal

property for personal reasons.” Id. ¶ 34.

On September 7, 1999, Colbert initiated precomplaint

counseling with the Postal Service’s [Equal Employment

Opportunity (“EEO”)] office. Id. ¶¶ 35. When the EEO

counselor sent questions to Wesson as part of the

investigation into Colbert’s filing, Wesson called Colbert

into his office and handed her a memorandum stating that

she was now assigned to the position of Purchasing

Assistant. Id. ¶ 36. The effect of this “retaliatory”

reassignment was to deprive Colbert of the supervisory

duties of her previous job and “the benefits that inure to

such positions.” Id. ¶¶ 37-38. On November 5, 1999,

Colbert initiated a second round of precomplaint counseling

for her forced move to the Purchasing Department. On

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November 16, 1999, USPS’ EEO office notified Colbert of

“the unsuccessful results of the precomplaint counseling

process” and advised her that she could file a formal

complaint. Colbert did so on December 22, 1999, raising

both her initial discrimination complaint and her subsequent

charge of retaliation. The Postal Service issued its Final

Agency Decision, denying Colbert’s claims, in March 2004,

and notified her of her right to seek judicial review in

federal district court. Id. ¶ 39.

Colbert, 2005 WL 3273571, at *1-2.

On June 18, 2004 appellant filed a lawsuit in the District

Court. USPS responded with a Motion to Dismiss or, in the

Alternative, for Summary Judgment, arguing that appellant’s

claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which

relief could be granted. In a memorandum supporting its

motion, USPS argued that appellant had failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies before filing suit in District Court,

failed to timely file her complaints with the USPS EEO office,

failed to allege facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case of

discrimination and, most relevant to this appeal, failed to file a

timely complaint in the District Court. USPS attached to the

memorandum a black-and-white copy of the back half of a

Domestic Return Receipt that was sent with the Final Decision

to elicit confirmation from appellant that she had received a

copy of the Final Decision. The copy of the receipt showed the

printed name and signature of Judith L. Walter, appellant’s

attorney, and the imprint of a round stamp with the words

“USPS . . . Silver Spring . . . Takoma Park” and “Mar 18 2004.”

On the basis of this evidence, USPS argued to the District Court

that “Colbert’s counsel received the Final Agency Decision on

March 18, 2004 – 92 days before Colbert filed suit, which would

render her action untimely.” Id. at *4.

Appellant responded with the Opposition Memorandum, in

which she argued that a grant of summary judgment would be

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premature and improper, because numerous material facts were

in dispute. Appellant claimed further that she received USPS’s

Final Decision, through her attorney, on March 20, 2004, not on

March 18, 2004, and, therefore, that her lawsuit was timely

filed. In support of this claim, appellant submitted a copy of the

Final Decision date stamped “Received – Mar 20 2004.” No

affidavit accompanied this submission. Rather, appellant merely

claimed that her attorney, “[p]er her practice,” stamped the date

on the first page of the document upon receiving USPS’s Final

Decision. App. 64. Appellant also challenged the significance

of the date stamp imprint on the copy of the reverse side of the

Domestic Return Receipt proffered by USPS, arguing that a date

stamp imprint “showing the date of mailing would appear on the

[front side] of the card in the area where the postage is to be

affixed.” Id. at 65.

The District Court, having considered materials outside of

the pleadings, treated USPS’s motion as one for summary

judgment, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b). Colbert, 2005 WL 3273571, at *3. The parties did not

dispute that the Final Decision was issued in March 2004 and

that appellant received a copy of the decision that month. The

only question at issue before the District Court was the precise

date in March when appellant’s counsel received the Final

Decision. The District Court concluded that there were no

material facts in dispute concerning this question and that the

evidence before the court made it clear that appellant had

received the Final Decision on March 18, 2004. In rejecting

appellant’s claims, the District Court said:

Colbert challenges the March 18, 2004 postmark on the

return receipt card, arguing that the postmark showing the

date of mailing would appear on the reverse side of the card

in the area where the postage is to be affixed, and that

because USPS has not provided an image of the reverse

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side of the card, it should be presumed that the reverse of

the card bears a postmark with a later date.

Colbert’s argument is unpersuasive. She neither

disputes that the return receipt card bears her attorney’s

signature nor challenges the legitimacy of the postmark on

the card. Instead, she relies only on her attorney’s practice

of date-stamping mail upon receipt to support her assertion

that the complaint is timely. In the absence of any affidavit

or other evidence that would contravene the return receipt

postmark, the court deems Colbert’s counsel to have

received the Final Agency Decision on March 18, 2004,

making this action untimely. Colbert presents no argument

to support equitable tolling of the 90-day statute of

limitations, so her complaint must be dismissed.

Id. at *4 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). The

District Court accordingly granted summary judgment in favor

of USPS and dismissed appellant’s complaint as untimely.

Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal.

During the course of oral argument before this court,

USPS’s counsel was asked why appellee had neglected to

submit a copy of the front half of the Domestic Return Receipt

in support of its motion for summary judgment. Counsel

responded, without explanation, that “time constraints”

prevented USPS from filing both sides of the Domestic Return

Receipt. Recording of Oral Argument at 12:59. On October

13, 2006, following oral argument, USPS filed a motion,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e)(2)(C), for

leave to file a complete copy of the Domestic Return Receipt.

On the same day, on its own motion, the court directed USPS

to submit a copy of the front half of the Domestic Return

Receipt, and to furnish appellant’s counsel with a copy of same.

Colbert v. Potter, No. 05-5330 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 13, 2006). On

October 27, 2006, pursuant to an order of the court allowing a

reply, appellant filed a response to USPS’s submission.

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Appellant’s Response to Appellee’s Post-Argument Submission,

Colbert v. Potter, No. 05-5330 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 27, 2006).

In her response, appellant noted that “the original of the return

receipt ha[d] never been provided.” Id. at 3. On October 31,

again on its own motion, the court ordered USPS to submit “the

original Return Receipt form at issue in this case.” Colbert v.

Potter, No. 05-5330 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 31, 2006). On November 1,

2006, USPS filed the original Form 3811 Domestic Return

Receipt. Review of the original Domestic Return Receipt

reveals that the front side of the form bears a cancellation

postmark. This cancellation postmark, like the date stamp

imprint appearing on the reverse of the form, bears the date “18

Mar 2004.”

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. See DynaQuest Corp. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 12 F.3d

1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is warranted

only where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

. . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). See also Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. “[S]ubstantive law will

identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id.

If, in considering a motion to dismiss for failure of the

complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

“matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded

by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary

judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties

shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material

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made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.” FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b). We review a district court’s alleged failure to comply

with these requirements of Rule 12(b) for an abuse of discretion.

See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d

156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003). However, if the District Court errs

in applying the requirements of Rule 12(b), we will not reverse

if the complaining party has suffered no prejudice and the error

is determined to be harmless. Id. at 165-66.

B. Appellant’s Complaint Was Not Timely Filed in District

Court

The dispute in this case is straightforward and simple. If

appellant received USPS’s Final Decision on March 20, 2004,

as she contends, her complaint is timely. If, on the other hand,

as USPS claims and the District Court found, appellant received

the Final Decision on March 18, 2004, then her complaint is

untimely. 

“[A] statute of limitations defense under Title VII is an

affirmative defense.” Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155

F.3d 575, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Therefore, USPS “bears the

burden of pleading and proving it.” Bowden v. United States,

106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In support of its motion to

dismiss or for summary judgment, USPS submitted a photocopy

of the back half of the Domestic Return Receipt, bearing the

printed name and signature of appellant’s attorney and stamped

“Mar 18 2004.” App. 51. Appellant does not dispute the

authenticity of the name and signature on the Domestic Return

Receipt. Rather, raising the same arguments that she raised

before the District Court, appellant claims that the date stamp

imprint relied upon by USPS establishes neither the date on

which she received the Final Decision nor the date that the

Domestic Return Receipt was mailed back to the USPS EEO

office. Appellant argues both that the document “does not have

any date of delivery indicated in [the] space where the date is to

be inserted,” Appellant’s Br. at 7, and that, per USPS mailing

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standards, the postmark indicating the date that the return receipt

was mailed appears on the front of a Domestic Return Receipt,

not the reverse, id. at 8-9. The District Court rejected

appellant’s arguments, because she “neither dispute[d] that the

return receipt card bears her attorney’s signature nor

challenge[d] the legitimacy of the postmark on the card.”

Colbert, 2005 WL 3273571, at *4. 

It is hard to fathom why USPS failed to submit the original

Domestic Return Receipt, with both the front and back sides of

the form showing, in support of its motion before the District

Court. This would have avoided any confusion over precisely

when appellant’s counsel received USPS’s Final Decision.

Counsel’s explanation to this court – that “time constraints”

prevented USPS from filing both sides of the Domestic Return

Receipt – did little to address the questions raised by appellant.

After argument, however, USPS moved to supplement the

record pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

10(e)(2)(C), seeking leave to file a complete copy of the

Domestic Return Receipt. Without addressing this motion, the

court, on its own motion, ordered USPS to submit the original

Domestic Return Receipt. 

Appellate courts do not ordinarily consider evidence not

contained in the record developed at trial. In re AOV Indus.,

Inc., 797 F.2d 1004, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Singleton v.

Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976)). “It is within the discretion of the

court of appeals, however, to make limited exceptions to this

rule when ‘injustice might otherwise result.’” Id. (quoting

Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121). See also CSX Transp., Inc. v.

Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[Courts of

appeals] have the inherent equitable power to allow

supplementation of the appellate record if it is in the interests of

justice.”). In this case, appellant (1) clearly challenged the

sufficiency and significance of USPS’s evidence in the trial

court, and (2) made a compelling argument that dispositive

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evidence appeared on the front side of the Domestic Return

Receipt, which was in the possession and control of USPS.

Appellant’s concerns were well-founded. Therefore, we

concluded that, as the entire Domestic Return Receipt “go[es] to

the heart of the contested issue, it would be inconsistent with

this court’s own equitable obligations . . . to pretend that [it

does] not exist.” In re AOV Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1013. 

There is no real dispute between the parties over the fact

that “acceptance of the proffered material into the record would

establish beyond any doubt the proper resolution of the pending

issues.” CSX Transp., Inc., 235 F.3d at 1330. Indeed, after oral

argument before this court, in response to appellant’s concerns,

USPS moved to submit the Domestic Return Receipt for review

by this court. We agreed with the parties that the record should

be supplemented to include the original receipt and therefore

ordered USPS to file the original Domestic Return Receipt with

the court.

Normally, supplementation of the record is effected by

remanding the case to the District Court to allow that court to

order the introduction of new evidence. See, e.g., Trans-Pacific

Policing Agreement v. U.S. Customs Serv., 177 F.3d 1022, 1028

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[I]t makes sense to remand so that the District

Court–which is already familiar with the record in this case–can

supplement the record and make factual findings in the first

instance on appellants’ claims.”). Certainly, we could have

remanded this case to the District Court with instructions to

obtain and review the front side of the original Domestic Return

Receipt. However, remand for such a ministerial task, which

this court easily can perform itself, would serve no good purpose

and would ultimately amount to a waste of judicial resources.

See Dickerson v. Alabama, 667 F.2d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir.

1982) (“[A] decision to remand this case for the sole purpose of

allowing the district court to review the several additional

significant facts contained in the transcript would be contrary to

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both the interests of justice and the efficient use of judicial

resources.”).

It is also worth noting that this is not a situation in which a

party that failed to offer evidence is relieved from the

consequences of its neglect. Even assuming that USPS was

neglectful, the worst consequence of that neglect would have

been a remand to the District Court that necessarily would have

led to the result we reach here.

Our review of the original Domestic Return Receipt reveals

that the front side of the form does in fact bear a cancellation

postmark in the area where the postage is affixed. This

cancellation postmark, like the date stamp imprint appearing on

the reverse side of the receipt, bears the date March 18, 2004.

The receipt offers conclusive evidence that appellant’s attorney

signed the domestic return receipt no later than March 18, 2004.

And appellant does not challenge the authenticity of the original

receipt. 

Appellant proffered a copy of the Final Decision bearing the

imprint “Received – Mar 20 2004,” suggesting that this is the

date when counsel received USPS’s decision. This proffer was

attached to the Opposition Memorandum, but with no

accompanying affidavit. Appellant offered nothing else, save

argument, to support her claim that the Final Decision was

received on March 20, 2004. This was not enough to create a

genuine issue of material fact sufficient to avoid summary

judgment. Appellant correctly reminds us that, on review of

summary judgment, we must “view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable

inferences in its favor.” Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,

447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). However, even in

the most favorable light, it would be patently unreasonable for

this court to infer that appellant’s attorney received the Final

Decision on March 20, 2004, when the Domestic Return Receipt

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document, indisputably associated with the Final Decision and

bearing the attorney’s signature, was mailed back to the USPS

EEO office on March 18, 2004. Counsel submitted no affidavit

to suggest otherwise.

The filing time limit imposed by Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-16(c), “is not a jurisdictional requirement but rather is

similar to a statute of limitations.” In re James, 444 F.3d 643,

647 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,

498 U.S. 89 (1990)); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (recognizing that Title VII’s

jurisdictional statutes do not limit jurisdiction to timely filed

complaints). Therefore, “like a statute of limitations, [the

statutory time requirement] is subject to waiver, estoppel, and

equitable tolling.” Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393. “‘Federal courts have

typically extended equitable relief only sparingly,’” Commc’ns

Vending Corp. of Ariz. v. FCC, 365 F.3d 1064, 1075 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96), and appellant has

articulated no sound reason for this court to consider equitable

tolling of the 90-day filing time limit. Indeed, in her brief,

appellant merely says that “[t]he ninety-day limitation period for

filing suit under Title VII is subject to equitable tolling,

however, as Ms. Colbert filed her suit ninety days after her

attorney received the notice of right to sue embodied in the

[Final Decision], there is no argument available to her for

equitable tolling in this case.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. Appellant

does not suggest that there are grounds for equitable tolling in

the current posture of the case, i.e., with the court’s rejection of

her claim that her suit was timely filed. And we can discern no

grounds.

In light of the foregoing considerations and on the basis of

the record before us, we conclude that appellant received the

Final Decision no later than March 18, 2004 and that her

complaint, filed at least 92 days following receipt of the Final

Decision, was untimely.

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C. The District Court’s Treatment of USPS’s Motion As One

for Summary Judgment Does Not Constitute Reversible

Error

Rule 12(b) provides:

If, on a motion . . . to dismiss for failure of the pleading to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters

outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by

the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary

judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all

parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all

material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b). Appellant contends that the District Court

erred when it converted USPS’s motion to dismiss into a motion

for summary judgment without first allowing her reasonable

time to present evidence in opposition to the alternative motion.

Appellant’s Reply Br. at 7. USPS responds that, because its

motion was filed in the alternative (as a “Motion To Dismiss or,

in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment”) and USPS asked

the District Court to dispose of the case pursuant to summary

judgment, appellant had adequate notice and could have

presented evidence in opposition to the motion for summary

judgment. Appellee’s Br. at 16-17. USPS has the better of this

disagreement.

We have previously held that a trial court abuses its

discretion when it “fail[s] to comply with the procedures set

forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” by considering

materials outside of the pleadings “without converting the

proceeding to a Rule 56 proceeding and permitting [the

nonmoving party] to either conduct discovery or come forward

with additional evidence.” Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 165.

We find no such error here. Appellant had notice that USPS’s

motion was, at least potentially, one for summary judgment.

The fact that she proffered her copy of the Final Decision

USCA Case #05-5330 Document #1011385 Filed: 12/15/2006 Page 16 of 19
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bearing a date stamp affixed by her attorney makes clear that she

had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to present pertinent

evidence as required by Rule 12(b). Had appellant needed time

to gather more supporting evidence, she could have moved,

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), for the trial court

to defer its ruling on summary judgment and allow her

additional time to take discovery. See Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d

at 579.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the District Court abused its

discretion in failing to allow appellant a reasonable opportunity

to present pertinent material to refute USPS’s claim that the

complaint was untimely, the error would be harmless. Holy

Land Found., 333 F.3d at 165 (holding that when the failure

results in no prejudice to the nonmoving party, “we find [that]

error to be harmless.”). When a nonmoving party could not

have produced any “evidence sufficient to create a substantial

question of fact material to the governing issues of the case,” id.,

we have no basis upon which to reverse the judgment of the

District Court. That is the situation here.

In her Response to Appellee’s Post-Argument Submission,

appellant acknowledges that, “[n]ormally the Postal Service is

a neutral actor in producing and providing . . . [a] document

[like the Domestic Return Receipt].” Appellant’s Response to

Appellee’s Post-Argument Submission at 3. And then, with

commendable candor and forthrightness, the submission adds:

Appellant’s counsel is not accusing Appellee or its counsel

of fraudulently manipulating the images of the domestic

return receipt. Nor is it suggested that it is impossible for

Appellant’s counsel to have made a mistake with regard to

the date she received the [Final Decision]. If Appellant’s

counsel did make a mistake, however, she would accept that

and move on if it could be proven conclusively.

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Id. at 3. Appellant’s principal concern in this case has been that

the original Domestic Return Receipt had never been produced.

That concern was addressed when this court ordered USPS to

file the original receipt. And, upon review of the original

Domestic Return Receipt, it has been proven conclusively that

appellant received USPS’s Final Decision on or before March

18, 2004.

We have no reason to suspect that the original Domestic

Return Receipt submitted by USPS is anything other than

genuine. Absent fraud, appellant can produce no evidence to

controvert the fact that a Domestic Return Receipt bearing the

signature of appellant’s attorney was mailed to the USPS EEO

office on March 18, 2004. Thus, if any error was committed by

the District Court in converting USPS’s motion to dismiss to a

motion for summary judgment, it was harmless. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of USPS is hereby affirmed.

So ordered.

USCA Case #05-5330 Document #1011385 Filed: 12/15/2006 Page 18 of 19
SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur in the

majority’s disposition and in most of the opinion which supports

it. I write separately only because I cannot join in that portion

of the opinion based on evidence not before the district court.

I do not think it was necessary or appropriate to accept the

evidence on appeal. The district court record included a copy of

the date-stamped Domestic Return Receipt, unrebutted by any

evidence or affidavit. The district court properly granted

summary judgment on the record evidence. 

It is not the role of appellate courts to accept new evidence.

In stepping into that role, the majority relies on In re AOV

Industries, Inc., 797 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1986). That case

involved extraordinary circumstances. Specifically, while the

case was on appeal, the appellant produced newly-discovered

evidence of a conflict of interest. As the case involved a fee

determination in a bankruptcy, the court, mindful that a fee

determination affects all creditors and is equitable in nature,

remanded the case for additional consideration. Id. at 1012-13.

Even in those unusual circumstances, one judge disagreed with

the panel majority. Id. at 1014-15 (Starr, J., dissenting in part).

And on the facts in this case, I would follow Judge Starr’s

recommendation: “This court should not carve out an exception

to the general rule that an appellate court cannot receive new

evidence from the parties.” Id. at 1015. I would further note

that Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976), relied upon by

the majority in AOV Industries, is not to the contrary, and indeed

is not on point. The quotation used by the AOV Industries

majority dealt with the ability of an appellate court to resolve an

issue not passed upon below, not with the question of the court

taking new evidence on appeal.

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