Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04036/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04036-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey C. Cooper
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL .L. v 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAlisited States CO\,rt of Appea1- rrenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JEFFREY C. COOPER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APR 2;; 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

No. 92-4036 

{D. Utah) 

{D.C. No. 91-CR-154-S) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34{a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Jeffrey C. Cooper appeals his conviction and sentence for 

distributing crack cocaine in violation of 21 U. S.C. § 841 {a ) (1 ) . 

As to his conviction, he contends that the district court erred in 

denying his motion for a mistrial based on the grounds t hat the 

government improperly introduced evidence of other crimes, wrongs 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel . 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-4036 Document: 010110212835 Date Filed: 04/22/1993 Page: 1 
or acts prohibited under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), and that such 

evidence affected the outcome of the trial . The government has 

conceded on appeal that the district court erred in imposing 

sentence. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee at 7-8, 12. The remaining 

question is whether we should remand with directions that the 

district court impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 

months , or whether a full sentencing hearing, at which evidence 

can be offered, is permitted. 

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying the motion for a mistrial, and that the district court 

should conduct a new sentencing hearing at which objections, 

evidence, and argument may be heard as fully as in an original 

sentencing hearing . Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of 

conviction, but vacate the sentence and remand for a resentencing 

hearing and resentencing. 

I. 

BACKGROUND 

Detective Edward Lucas is an undercover officer with the 

Murray City, Utah Police Department, assigned to the Metropolitan 

Narcotic Strike Force, a coordinated drug interdiction effort of 

law enforcement agencies in the Salt Lake City area. On May 3, 

1991, he went to the home of Patricia Jones in Salt Lake City to 

purchase cocaine base. While Detective Lucas was in the living 

room, Patricia Jones paged her distributor and received a return 

call which was broadcast into the living room over a speaker phone 

and was clearly audible to Detective Lucas. The distributor said 

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that he was on his way to Patricia Jones's house. In response to 

a second page a few moments later, the distributor said he was 

outside the house. Detective Lucas, who could hear both sides of 

the conversations over the speaker phone, recognized the voice as 

that of a person who, at some unidentified previous time, had 

identified himself over the phone as "J.C." Detective Lucas gave 

Patricia Jones the money for the drugs, and she went outside to 

purchase the cocaine base. 

Meanwhile, Agent Kelly Call, who was backing up Detective 

Lucas in surveillance, saw a blue Chevrolet van arrive at a 

parking l ot adjacent to Patricia Jones's house. He saw a man 

fitting Mr. Cooper's description and wearing a black and red plaid 

shirt and blue jeans get out of the van, talk on a mobile phone, 

and put the mobile phone back into the van before walking to the 

other side of the van, out of sight. Agent Call was in auditory 

contact with Detective Lucas through a "bug." Through the "bug," 

over the speaker phone's broadcast in the house, he heard the 

distributor tell Patricia Jones that he (the distributor) had 

arrived at the house. At the same time, the man beside the blue 

van in the parking lot was speaking on his mobile phone. 

A third police officer, Detective James Evans, was also in 

the same parking lot in back-up and surveillance. He observed the 

arrival of a blue Chevrolet van, bearing Utah license plate number 

708 DTT. He observed the van's driver with a mobile phone beside 

the van during this time period, wearing a red and black plaid 

shirt and blue jeans. He identified the driver as Mr. Cooper. 

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Patricia Jones left the house, and from inside the house 

through the window Detective Lucas saw her approach a man in her 

driveway. Detective Lucas did not get a view of the man's face, 

but he did see that the man was wearing a red and black plaid 

shirt and blue jeans and that he fit the description of Mr . 

Cooper. There were other individuals in the house, and Detective 

Lucas did not want to arouse their suspicions, so he did not 

linger by the window, moving across the room to a couch instead. 

When Patricia Jones returned to the house, Detective Lucas 

accepted 11.7 grams of cocaine base from her, paid her additional 

money for her part of the transaction, and left the house. 

Detective Lucas was driving out of the neighborhood when he 

saw a blue Chevrolet van with Utah license plate number 780 DTT . 

When he drove up beside the van, he saw that the driver was 

wearing a red and black plaid shirt. Detective Lucas recognized 

the driver as Mr . Cooper from photos he had seen previously. 

Evidence introduced at trial established that the blue 

Chevrolet van's license plates were registered to a woman named 

Darlene Cooper, who gave the address for a Salt Lake City 

apartment as part of the van's state motor vehicle registration. 

The lease for that apartment during that period of time was signed 

by Darlene and Jeffrey Cooper. 

The pivotal issue at Mr. Cooper's trial was the identification of Mr. Cooper as the individual from whom Patricia J ones 

received the 11.7 grams of c ocaine base on May 3, 1991. Neither 

Agent Cal l nor Detective Evans saw Patricia Jones purchase t he 

cocaine base because the van blocked their view. Detective Lucas 

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did not see the sale because he withdrew from the window area of 

the living room, not wanting to arouse suspicion. However, there 

were three common elements in the identification testimony of 

Detective Lucas, Agent Call, and Detective Evans: (1) their 

descriptions of the distributor all matched that of Mr. Cooper; 

(2) their descriptions of the shirt that the distributor was 

wearing at the sale matched that worn by Mr. Cooper while driving 

the blue van, as observed after the sale by Detective Lucas; and 

(3) the notes of the license plate number of the blue van at the 

scene of the sale (708 DTT) was nearly identical to that of the 

blue Chevrolet van Mr. Cooper was driving shortly after the sale 

(780 DTT). In addition, the state motor vehicle department's 

records revealed that the van was registered to a woman with whom 

Mr. Cooper was apparently living at that time. 

II. 

MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 

Mr. Cooper contends that" [t]he district court abused its 

discretion in denying the defe ndant's motion for mistrial, after 

the government agent made repeated references to his prior 

criminal contacts with the defendant." Defendant/ Appellant's 

Opening Brief at 19. Based on this claim of error, he requests 

that we reverse his conviction and remand for new trial. Id. at 

25. 

The specific testimony to which Mr. Cooper objects on appeal 

was as follows: (1 ) Detective Lucas was asked h ow he knew the 

person driving the blue van after the sale was the same person 

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that transferred the cocaine base to Patricia Jones. He replied 

that he recognized the large block red and black plaid shirt the 

distributor was wearing, and added, "I also knew that I was 

dealing with J.C. or J.C. Cooper from my investigative work II 

R. Vol. II at 19. Mr. Cooper's counsel objected at trial, and the 

objection was sustained . (2) Detective Lucas admitted that he 

could not see the face of the man who delivered the cocaine base 

to Patricia Jones and was asked how he identified the man as Mr. 

Cooper. He responded, "I had seen photographs of this individual 

before and after the investigation." Id. at 23. Counsel made no 

objection at trial. (3 ) Detective Lucas was asked whether Mr. 

Cooper looked any different on the day he was driving the van than 

he looked in court on the day of trial. He responded, "Judging 

from the previous photos, his hair was either shorter or tucked 

under his hat." Mr. Cooper's counsel's objection at trial was 

again sustained. Id. at 36. No curative instruction was 

requested or given. Shortly thereafter, counsel moved for 

mistrial, stating, 

Detective Lucas, on at least three occasions .. had 

made several references to the prior contact that he has 

had with Mr. Cooper. There is clear indication here, 

given the background of what he has been doing here, in 

this period of time that he has had contact -- there is 

clear indication that those contacts that he was making 

with other unindicted drug charges, other attempts, I 

think that is clearly improper. 

And because that is the main issue in this case, 

the identification, that becomes even more important as 

we -- the prejudice that gives the jury now to have 

before it evidence of prior crimes. 

Id. at 44-45. The district court responded that it did not "think 

there [was] sufficient here to taint trial for a mistrial." Id. 

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at 45. Mr. Cooper renewed his motion for mistrial after the close 

of evidence, R. Vol. III at 39-40, which the district court 

denied. Id. He cited denial of his motion for mistrial as 

grounds for his motion for new trial, R. Vol. I tabs 57, 59, which 

motion the district court also denied, stating: 

Detective Lucas, in his testimony, made no 

references to prior drug activity of defendant Cooper. 

He made references to having seen Cooper's 

picture, but did not testify as to the . . contents of 

the picture. Therefore, the Court concludes Detective 

Lucas' testimony could not have created a prejudicial 

inference. Moreover, there was sufficient identification of Cooper by other witness [sic] on which the jury 

could have based its verdict. 

Id. tab 65 at 2. 1 

Mr. Cooper's contemporaneous, sustained objections at trial 

were based on Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), which provides, in pertinent 

part: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order 

to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, 

On appeal, Mr. Cooper again relies on Rule 404(b) and argues that 

United States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285, 291 (10th Cir. 1978 ) 

1 At trial, Mr. Cooper's counsel also objected to Detective 

Lucas's testimony that he recognized the voice he heard over the 

speaker phone at Patricia Jones's house when she was talking with 

the distributor from whom she received the 11.7 grams of cocaine 

base. Detective Lucas stated that the person on the speaker phone 

had identified himself as "J.C." when Detective Lucas had heard 

the voice on the phone previously. R. Vol. II at 14-15 . Mr. 

Cooper's counsel's objection to this testimony was overruled. Id. 

at 15. This piece of evidence was apparently referred t o in Mr. 

Cooper's oral motion for mistrial . Id. at 44 ( "and also in 

connection with my objection which you overruled in the first 

instance"). Mr. Cooper does not include this matter i n his 

obj ections on appeal. 

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( "evidence of illegal activities other than those charged is 

ordinarily inadmissible"), overruled on other grounds, United 

States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1984), is controlling. 

The government argues on appeal that 11 there was no evidence 

of other crimes introduced. 11 Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee at 9. 

It contends that Detective Lucas's testimony was "simply 

completely neutral statements," without reference to prior crimes. 

Id. at 10. 

We review denial of motion for mistrial for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549, 1554 (10th 

Cir. 1992). "This claim of error is evidentiary, not constitutional." United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1454 (10th Cir. 

1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1680 (1992). However, we do 

review the record "to determine whether appellants' right to a 

fair and impartial trial was impaired." United States v. Pinelli, 

890 F.2d 1461, 1473 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 960 

(1990). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it 

denied Mr. Cooper's motion for mistrial. It is clear that none of 

the testimony of which Mr. Cooper complains was evidence of 

another crime, wrong, or act. The testimony makes no description 

of such activity. In addition, the evidence was not introduced to 

define Mr. Cooper's character in order to show that he was a 

person capable of participating in drug distribution. To the 

contrary, Detective Lucas was attempting to substantiate his own 

identification of Mr. Cooper as the individual who distributed the 

cocaine base to Patricia Jones. While it might be reasonable, 

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considering that the witness was an undercover policeman, for the 

jury to infer from the disputed testimony that the defendant had 

been involved with the police to the extent that his voice and 

face were known to them, this inference does not fall within the 

prohibition of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). We perceive no abuse of 

discretion in the district court's denial of Mr. Cooper's motion 

for mistrial. 

Even if we agreed with Mr. Cooper's assessment of error in 

the way the district court handled Detective Lucas's testimony, 

such error would have been harmless. See United States v. 

Jefferson, 925 F . 2d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir.) ( "A harmless nonconstitutional error is one that did not have a 'substantial influence' 

on the outcome in trial nor does it 'leave[] one in "grave doubt" 

as to whether it had such effect."') (quoting United States v. 

Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990)), cert. denied, 112 

S. Ct. 238, and 112 S . Ct. 239 (1991). In the case before us, we 

agree with the district court that the disputed testimony did not 

have a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial. See R. 

Vol. I tab 65 at 2. There was strong testimony independent of 

that given by Detective Lucas establishing the elements of the 

charge. 

III. 

MISAPPLICATION OF THE GUIDELINES 

Mr. Cooper was charged with Patricia Jones and a woman named 

Vickie Cooper under a five-count superseding indictment. The 

first two counts of the superseding indictment involved sales by 

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Patricia Jones of a total of 3.2 grams of cocaine base; the third 

count was the charge for which Mr. Cooper was convicted, aiding 

and abetting the sale of 11.7 grams of cocaine base on May 3, 

1991; the fourth count, which was dismissed on the government's 

motion before trial, charged Patricia Jones and Mr. Cooper with 

selling 5 . 4 grams of cocaine base; and the fifth count charged 

Patricia Jones and Vickie Cooper with selling 10.7 grams of 

cocaine base. Mr. Cooper's conviction carried a statutory 

mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months. 21 u.s.c. 

§ 841(b) (1) (B) (mandatory minimum for conviction of distribution 

of more than five grams of cocaine base by a defendant with a 

previous conviction). 

Under the guidelines, a drug distribution conviction carries 

a sentencing range calculated from the weight of the drugs the 

defendant was convicted of distributing, plus the weight of 

additional drugs for which the court finds the defendant 

responsible as part of a common scheme or plan with the offense of 

conviction, U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.3 (a) (1), if there are "sufficient 

indicia or reliability to support its probable accuracy." 

U.S.S.G. § 6Al.3; United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 573 

(10th Cir. 1992). This weight determines the baseline offense 

level (BOL), U.S . S.G. § 2Dl.1, from which a convicted drug 

distributor's sentence is computed from the Sentencing Table, 

U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, pt. A. Disputed factors concerning sentencing are 

resolved under the procedure set forth in Fed. R. Crim. P. 

3 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) . U . S . S . G . § 6Al . 3 . 

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Mr. Cooper's presentence report calculated his BOL to be 28, 

including responsibility for the weight of the cocaine base 

involved with the third count of the indictment, for which he was 

convicted (11.7 grams), plus the weight of the cocaine base 

involved in all four other counts (an additional 19.3 grams) . 

When combined with Mr. Cooper's criminal history of IV, this 

translated to a sentencing range from 110-137 months. Because the 

statutory mandatory minimum sentence was 120 months, the effective 

sentencing range under the presentence report was thus 120-137 

months. 

Mr. Cooper submitted a written objection to the presentence 

report, arguing that there was insufficient evidence, United 

States v. Bernaugh, 969 F.2d 858, 864 (10th Cir. 1992 ) ( "The 

government must prove the quantity of drugs by a preponderance of 

the evidence."), or information with sufficient indicia of 

reliability in the presentence report, United States v. Padilla, 

947 F.2d 893, 896 (10th Cir. 1991), to connect Mr. Cooper with 

counts I, II, IV, or V of the indictment. Mr. Cooper argued that 

he should be sentenced under a BOL of 26, the appropriate level 

for the distribution of 11 . 7 grams of cocaine base, the quantity 

which he was convicted of distributing. With a criminal history 

level of IV, the sentencing range for a BOL of 26 is 92 - 115 

months. Because this sentencing range is less than the statutory 

minimum mandatory, had the district court adopted Mr. Cooper's 

objections, his sentence would have been required to have been the 

statutory minimum mandatory sentence of 120 months . 

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However, at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Cooper's counsel, 

counsel for the government, and the district court judge all 

operated under the erroneous impression that the sentencing range 

for a BOL of 2 8 was 92- 115 months. The two attorneys and the 

district court judge agreed that, under this (erroneous) 

interpretation of the Sentencing Table, Mr. Cooper's objections t o 

the inclusion of relevant conduct were moot because the statutory 

minimum was greater than the longest sentence in that sentencing 

range. R. Supp. Vol . III at 3-5. 2 Because of this ruling, no 

evidence was o ffered to the court at the sentencing hearing to 

support the presentence report's inclusion of counts I, II, IV, 

2 The colloquy at the sentencing hearing was as follows : 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] My objection to the presentence 

report -- and I wanted to get those in the record. 

[includes] the relevant conduct enhancements that went 

into the probation [department's] calculation. 

But as it stands n ow it is sort of a moot question. 

Because with these enhancements I think the probation 

[department's] calculation brought it up to nine years 

and one month [sic]. The minimum is a hundred 

twenty-nine . [sic] So we are ten months more than that 

calculation in any event. So that is a moot question. 

[ASS'T U.S. ATTORNEY:] 

c ounsel] has covered it. 

I think [defense 

We are looking at a minimum mandatory of ten. And 

whether Mr . Cooper is responsible for any of the other 

offenses is n ot a factor t hat the Court has to consider. 

THE COURT: Ye s, that was my view as I reviewed 

this matter counsel. Except I believe [defense counsel] 

has accurately stated the fact that this is a minimum 

mandatory sentence. And so I think his position with 

respect t o sentencing factors would be made moot. 

R. Supp. Vo l . III at 3 - 5. 

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and Vas relevant conduct or to support Mr. Cooper's objections to 

the presentence report. 

The district court then immediately proceeded to sentence Mr. 

Cooper under the correct sentencing range for a BOL of 28, 110 -137 

months, without any comment or objection from either of the 

attorneys, and without making findings as to relevant conduct or 

as to Mr. Cooper's filed objections to the presentence report. 

The court stated: 

The Court finds or adopts the factual findings and 

guideline application in the presentence report. I am 

going to find that the total offense level in this 

matter is twenty-eight. The criminal history category 

is four. The guideline sentencing table is one hundred 

ten to one hundred thirty-seven months. But because of 

the minimum mandatory in this matter it is one twenty to 

one hundred thirty-seven months. 

Id. at 6. The court imposed the maximum sentence within that 

range, 137 months. Id. at 7. 

Thus, Mr. Cooper's sentence was based on the quantity of 

drugs listed in the presentence report as relevant conduct. The 

presentence report, in turn, was unsupported by evidence and Mr. 

Cooper's objections to it were not addressed by the court because 

of a simultaneous misinterpretation of the sentencing guidelines 

by the assistant United States attorney, the defense counsel, and 

the district court judge. 

"We review factual findings of the district court as to the 

amount of drugs involved in the defendant's criminal conduct for 

clear error. " Padilla, 947 F.2d at 896. "A trial court's finding 

will be deemed clearly erroneous when, although there is s ome 

eviden ce to support it, upon review of the entire record the 

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appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that 

a mistake has been made." Daemi v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 

931 F .2d 1379, 1384 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Anderson v. City of 

Bessemer City. 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). 

In light of the mistaken basis for the agreement among 

counsel for the government, counsel for the defendant, and the 

district court judge, the court's adoption of the facts in the 

presentence report was clearly erroneous. This error resulted in 

a misapplication of the guidelines and a fundamentally unfair 

sentence. See United States v. Smith, 919 F.2d 123, 124 {10th 

Cir. 1990 ) {" [B] asing a sentence on the wrong Guideline range 

constitutes a fundamental error affecting substantial rights 

within the meaning of Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) ."); accord United 

States v. Washington-Williams, 945 F.2d 325, 326 (10th Cir. 1991) . 

We are required by statute to remand the case for resentencing 

under these circumstances. 28 U. S . C. § 3742 (f) (1) ("If the court 

of appeals determines that the sentence [] was imposed in 

violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect 

application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand 

the case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions 

as the court considers appropriate."). The government concedes 

that Mr. Cooper's sentence should be vacated and the case remanded 

f . 3 or resentenc1.ng. 

3 On appeal, the government also notes that inclusion of t h e 

weight of cocaine base involved in counts I, II, and IV would not 

enhance Mr. Cooper's BOL from level 26. However, it continues to 

assert that Mr. Cooper should be held responsible for the weight 

o f the cocaine base involved in count V, as the only disputed 

factor in the presentence report that would determine whether Mr. 

{continued on next page) 

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The only remaining issue is the parties' disagreement about 

the procedure in the district court on remand for resentencing. 

The government requests that we remand "to allow the court to have 

a sentencing hearing and then impose the proper sentence under the 

Guidelines." Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee at 8. The government 

urges the court to hold a hearing at least in part because it 

admits and concedes that the sources of information the 

court considered [at sentencing] were not set forth in 

the [presentence report] and so the indicia of 

reliability was not evident and on the record. The 

statements in the [presentence report] were indeed 

conclusory and did not set forth the sources of the 

information to enable the court below to determine their 

probable accuracy. 

Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee at 8 (emphasis in original). 

Mr. Cooper, while not abandoning his previous objections to 

the presentence report, contends that the government should not 

now be entitled to "produce the evidence it chose not to present 

at the original hearing." Defendant/Appellant's Reply Brief at 2. 

Mr. Cooper relies on a theory of double jeopardy, drawing an 

analogy between the sentencing hearing and the government's single 

opportunity to present evidence at a suppression hearing. I d. at 

2-3. He terms the government's lack of presentation of evidence 

at the sentencing hearing a "strategic decision," id. at 2, which 

it should be forced to abide with on remand. 

We disagree. It is clear from the record that the decisions 

of both counsel and of the district court at the sentencing 

hearing originated in a mutual error which was made before the 

(continued from previous page) 

Cooper were assigned a BOL of 26 or a BOL of 28 on resentencing. 

Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee at 6-7. 

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government had the opportunity to present any evidence in support 

of the BOL calculation in the presentence report. On remand, the 

parties should be in the position they were in at the time the 

mutual error occurred, when sentencing hearing began. At that 

time, Mr. Cooper's objections to the presentence report had been 

filed with the district court, and the government had yet to have 

the opportunity to present evidence to support the recommendations 

of the presentence report. Upon remand, then, the district court 

shall hold a sentencing hearing to resolve Mr. Cooper's objections 

to the presentence report, prior to the imposition of sentence. 

We AFFIRM Mr. Cooper's conviction, VACATE his sentence , and 

REMAND this matter to the district court for resentencing. Judge 

Seymour concurs in the result only. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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