Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01652/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01652-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carl Gordon, Jr.
Petitioner
Hartley
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARL GORDON, JR., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

HARTLEY, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

___________________________________)

1:07-cv-01652-LJO-TAG HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TO DISMISS THE PETITION AS

UNTIMELY (Doc. 1)

ORDER TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN

TWENTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

November 16, 2007. (Doc. 1). The Court has conducted a preliminary review of the petition and

has determined that it is untimely and therefore should be dismissed.

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir.2001).

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The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 325-327, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (holding that the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute’s

enactment). The instant petition was filed on November 16, 2007, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

///

///

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas

corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court

of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or

may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. The AEDPA, however, is silent on how the one year limitation period affects

cases where direct review concluded before the enactment of the AEDPA. The Ninth Circuit has

held that if a petitioner whose review ended before the enactment of the AEDPA filed a habeas

corpus petition within one year of the AEDPA’s enactment, the Court should not dismiss the petition

pursuant to § 2244(d)(1). Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1286 (9th 

Cir. 1997, overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d

530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Woodford v. Garceau, 

538 U.S. 202, 123 S. Ct. 1398 (2003). In such circumstances, the limitations period would begin to

run on April 25, 1996. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-1246 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner

would then have until April 25, 1997, absent statutory tolling, to file his petition.

Here, Petitioner was charged with a disciplinary violation while in state prison on July 1,

1994, and was found guilty of the violation on July 6, 1994. (Doc. 1, p. 2). His conviction

necessarily pre-dated his incarceration and subsequent disciplinary conviction. Thus, once the

AEDPA was enacted, the one-year statute would have expired, absent tolling, on April 25, 1997. 

The instant petition was filed on November 16, 2007, over ten years later. Thus, unless Petitioner is

entitled to either equitable or statutory tolling, the petition is untimely and must be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 S. Ct. 1104 1

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(2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321,

1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a

petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all

claims to the state courts first and will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern

that the limitation period will end before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at

1005. However, the limitations period is not tolled for the time such an application is pending in

federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001); Fail v. Hubbard,

272 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir.2001). 

Here, Petitioner alleges that he filed several state habeas petitions in recent years attempting

to obtain review of the 1994 disciplinary decision. The Court’s own review of the California court

system’s electronic database indicates that Petitioner filed a state petition in the California Court of

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“5 DCA”) on December 28, 2004, which was denied on January

th

13, 2005. He also filed to petitions in the California Supreme Court. The first was filed on March 4,

2005, and denied on August 10, 2005; the second was filed on May 19, 2006 and denied on June 21,

2006. Assuming without deciding that Petitioner would have been entitled to statutory tolling from

December 28, 2005 until June 21, 2006, he still waited over a year after that date to file the instant

petition. Thus, it would be untimely.

Moreover, Petitioner would not be entitled to statutory tolling for the aforementioned state

petitions because the statute of limitations would already have expired over seven years before the

first state petition was filed. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) (petitioner is not

entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run prior to filing state habeas

proceedings); see Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.2000)(same); Jackson v.

Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed

after expiration of the one-year limitations period.). 

Thus, under any scenario, the petition is untimely. Indeed, it seems that the only reason

Petitioner is now challenging the 1994 disciplinary hearing is because on July 2, 2003, he was

convicted of a subsequent crime and sentenced based on an enhancement pursuant to California

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Penal Code § 667.5(b), which contains a five-year washout period if the defendant remains free from

prison custody or another felony conviction. (Doc. 1, pp. 15-16). Because of the 1994 disciplinary

conviction, which resulted in a significant loss of good-time credits, Petitioner did not qualify for the

washout period on his subsequent conviction and was sentenced to an additional term of

imprisonment consecutive to his base term. (Id.). Thus, Petitioner did not pursue any remedies

regarding his 1994 disciplinary conviction from 1995 until 2004, when suddenly the washout period

became relevant to a potential sentence enhancement. 

That fact, however, provides no basis for excusing an untimely petition. The AEDPA

provides no such exception. Unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the petition must be

dismissed.

D. Equitable Tolling.

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Roy v. Lampert, 465

F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)(citing Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1283). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely

claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)(citations omitted). A habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that

equitable tolling should apply to avoid dismissal of an untimely petition. Miranda v. Castro, 292

F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner has made no allegation of entitlement to equitable tolling, and, under the

circumstances outlined above, the Court sees no basis on which such an allegation could be made. 

Thus, the Court will recommend that the petition be dismissed as untimely.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the habeas corpus petition be

DISMISSED for Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one-year limitation

period.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

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of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The District Judge will then review the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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