Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07326/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07326-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nancy A. Berryhill
Defendant
Victor Lee Daniels
Plaintiff

Document Text:

ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB

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28 United States District Court Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

San Francisco Division 

VICTOR LEE DANIELS,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 18-cv-07326-LB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Re: ECF No. 18 & 19 

INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff Victor Lee Daniels seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of 

the Social Security Administration denying his claim for disability benefits under Title II of the 

Social Security Act.1 The plaintiff moved for summary judgment,2 and the Commissioner opposed 

and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.3 

Under Civil Local Rule 16-5, the matter is submitted for decision by this court without oral 

argument. All parties have consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction.4

1

 Compl. – ECF No. 1. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint 

citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 

2

 Mot. – ECF No. 18. 

3

 Cross-Mot. – ECF No. 19. 

4

 Consent Forms – ECF Nos. 12, 13. 

Case 3:18-cv-07326-LB Document 20 Filed 03/23/20 Page 1 of 23
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 2

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The court denies the plaintiff’s motion, grants the Commissioner’s motion, and affirms the ALJ’s 

decision 

STATEMENT 

1. Procedural History 

On September 10, 2012, Mr. Daniels, then age 41, filed an application for social-security 

disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging “neck [pain] with 

left arm radiculopathy.”5 He alleged an onset date of April 14, 2008.6 He last met the insuredstatus requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2010.7

 The Commissioner initially 

denied his claim on December 27, 2012,8 and again on reconsideration on April 26, 2013.9 On 

May 10, 2013, the plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).10 On 

February 25, 2014, the ALJ held a hearing and heard testimony from the plaintiff (represented by 

Dr. Dan McCaskell, a non-attorney representative) and a vocational expert (“VE”).11 The ALJ 

issued an unfavorable decision on May 1, 2014.12 

The Appeals Council granted the plaintiff’s request for review.13 On March 11, 2016, the 

Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ for failure to adequately consider the medical 

evidence on the record.14 On April 25, 2017, the ALJ conducted a hearing on remand and heard 

testimony from the plaintiff, Dr. McCaskell, and another VE, Harlem Stock.15 The ALJ issued an 

5

 AR 123. Administrative Record (“AR”) citations refer to the page number in the bottom right hand 

corner of the Administrative Record. 

6

Id. 

7

Id. 

8

 AR 132. 

9

 AR 181. 

10 AR 187. 

11 AR 73–122. 

12 AR 147. 

13 AR 236–37. 

14 AR 166–71. 

15 AR 36–72. 

Case 3:18-cv-07326-LB Document 20 Filed 03/23/20 Page 2 of 23
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 3

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unfavorable decision on August 31, 2017.16 On October 4, 2018, the Appeals Council denied the 

plaintiff’s request for review, and the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner.17

Mr. Daniels timely filed this action on December 4, 2018 and moved for summary judgment.18

The Commissioner opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.19 

2. Summary of Record and Administrative Findings 

2.1 Medical Evidence 

The plaintiff originally alleged that he was disabled as a result of “neck [pain] with left arm 

radiculopathy.”20 At the administrative hearing, he also presented medical evidence of limited 

range of motion with his right arm due to a prior injury, obesity, and type II diabetes.21 The 

following records were submitted: records from Kent E. Yinger, M.D., who treated the plaintiff 

for a shoulder injury after he fell approximately 12 feet from the back of a dump truck and landed 

on his right side;22 records from John Canova, M.D., who was the plaintiff’s primary-care 

physician from 2007 to 2013, and treated him for back pain, diabetes, and coughs and other 

ailments unrelated to the disability claim;23 records from Hari Lakshmanan, M.D., a physiatrist at 

the Kaiser Occupational Facility who assessed the plaintiff for residual-functional capacity and 

provided physical therapy;24 documents from the Santa Rosa Imaging Center regarding the 

plaintiff’s cervical-spine MRI;25 records from Alan Hunstock, M.D., who evaluated the plaintiff 

16 AR 14–30. 

17 AR 1–8. 

18 Mot. – ECF 18. 

19 Cross-Mot. – ECF 19. 

20 AR 123, 153. 

21 AR 394–405. 

22 AR 627–52. 

23 AR 507–36. 

24 AR 406–94. 

25 AR 565–66. 

Case 3:18-cv-07326-LB Document 20 Filed 03/23/20 Page 3 of 23
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 4

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28 United States District Court Northern District of California

for an occupational injury to his cervical-spine;26 James P. O’Hara, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon 

who evaluated the plaintiff and provided a Medical Source Statement;27 records from Kevin 

Satow, M.D., who performed the plaintiff’s electrodiagnostic evaluation;28 records from Sharon 

Amon, M.D., who reviewed the plaintiff’s medical records and completed a Disability 

Determination Explanation (“DDE”);29 records from H. Jone, M.D., who reviewed the plaintiff’s 

medical records and completed a DDE;30 and records from Warren B. Chin, M.D., who completed 

the plaintiff’s cervical-spine Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) questionnaire.31

Because the plaintiff’s appeal involves his challenge to the ALJ’s assessment of treating 

physician Warren B. Chin, M.D.’s opinion, this order recounts that opinion fully. 

On December 6, 2013, Dr. Chin completed a cervical-spine RFC questionnaire.32 He 

diagnosed the plaintiff with cervicalgia, cervical degenerative disc disease, and left carpal-tunnel 

syndrome.33 The plaintiff had constant, chronic pain.34 The “signs, findings, and associated 

symptoms” of his impairment were tenderness, muscle spasm, impaired sleep, motor loss, 

dropping things, and reduced grip strength.35 The plaintiff had significant limitation of motion; 36

Dr. Chin said that he could move his neck for less than one hour per day in any direction. Dr. Chin 

noted that an “MRI of [the cervical] spine [showed] C5–6 disc herniation,” and “electrodiagnostic 

studies [were positive] for [left] carpal tunnel” syndrome.37 The plaintiff experienced drowsiness 

26 AR 567–70. 

27 AR 394–405. 

28 AR 571–74. 

29 AR 24, 123–33. 

30 AR 24, 135–45. 

31 AR 551–555. 

32 Id. 

33 AR 551. 

34 Id.

35 Id.

36 Id.

37 AR 552. 

Case 3:18-cv-07326-LB Document 20 Filed 03/23/20 Page 4 of 23
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 5

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as a side effect of amitriptyline (chronic nerve pain) and Robaxin (muscle spasms).38 Dr. Chin 

indicated that the plaintiff’s impairments had lasted (or could be expected to last) at least twelve 

months, and that he was not “a malingerer.”39

The plaintiff’s pain and other symptoms were frequently severe enough to interfere with his 

attention and concentration needed to perform simple work tasks.40 He was able to tolerate 

moderate stress.41 He could both sit and stand for more than two hours at one time, and for at least 

six hours in an eight-hour day.42 He required an unscheduled break approximately once a day for 

fifteen minutes to stretch his neck and arms.43 He was capable of frequently lifting ten pounds or 

less and occasionally lifting twenty pounds, but could never lift fifty pounds.44 He could rarely 

look up or down (“sustained flexion of neck”) and occasionally turn his head right or left or hold it 

in a static position.45 He could frequently twist, stoop or bend, and climb stairs, and he could 

occasionally crouch or squat, but could never climb ladders.46

The plaintiff had significant limitations with reaching, handling, and fingering.47 With his right 

arm, he could reach (including overhead) for less than four hours in a day. With his left arm and 

hand, he could reach for fewer than two hours, “grasp, turn, [and] twist objects” for less than one 

hour, and perform “fine manipulations” for less than one hour.48 His “impairments [were] likely to 

produce ‘good days’ and ‘bad days’” and he was “likely to be absent from work [three] or more 

38 Id. 

39 Id.

40 AR 553. 

41 Id.

42 AR 553–54. 

43 AR 554. 

44 Id.

45 Id.

46 AR 555. 

47 Id.

48 Id.

Case 3:18-cv-07326-LB Document 20 Filed 03/23/20 Page 5 of 23
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 6

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28 United States District Court Northern District of California

days per month.”49 Dr. Chin said that the plaintiff’s impairments were reasonably consistent with 

the symptoms and functional limitations described in this evaluation.50

From 2014 to 2017, Dr. Chin evaluated the plaintiff on a regular basis in support of his 

workers’ compensation claim.51 

2.2 Administrative Hearing 

The plaintiff appeared before the ALJ on April 25, 2017.52 He was represented by non-attorney 

Dr. McCaskell.53 Also present was VE Harlem Stock.54

2.2.1 Plaintiff’s testimony 

The plaintiff testified as follows. He was married and lived with his wife and two children, 

ages 15 and 18.55 He went to college and also had vocational training.56 He was not working and 

had not worked in any capacity since the date of his injury.57 When asked how he supported 

himself financially, he said his wife worked full time and his father had loaned him “quite a bit of 

money.”58 

Before his injury, he was working as a correctional deputy.59 His duties included lifting and 

carrying items “upwards of 100 pounds” and “over 200 pounds at times.”60 After his injury, he 

49 Id.

50 AR 553. 

51 AR 945–1007. 

52 AR 36–72. 

53 Id. 

54 Id.

55 AR 42. 

56 Id. Other sections of the record indicate that the plaintiff does not have a college degree; he attended 

college but did not graduate. 

57 AR 43. 

58 Id.

59 Id.

60 AR 44. 

Case 3:18-cv-07326-LB Document 20 Filed 03/23/20 Page 6 of 23
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 7

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looked for work in retail, seeking something with fewer physical requirements.61 No one was 

willing to hire him due to his limitations.62 

He had pain in his neck and shoulder, and his left arm was “numb with occasional spikes of 

pain that go down it.”63 He described himself as “primarily right handed.”64 The numbness was 

constant since the injury, and he also had a tingling sensation.65 The pain fluctuated randomly.66 It 

was improved by medication and rest, which the plaintiff described as “the only way [he could] 

get through it.”67 He also had pain and limited mobility in his right arm, “unrelated to this 

incident,” but caused by an earlier injury (around 2002) when he fell off a dump truck.68 Between 

the two arms, “the left [was] worse.”69 The plaintiff could use his right arm normally for the most 

part, except that he could not fully extend it overhead.70 With the left arm, he was “very limited in 

what [he could] do.”71 In order to “manipulate anything,” it “[had] to be close into [his] body,” and 

he “[had] to physically see what [he was] touching . . . because [he could not] tell how [he was] 

touching it.”72 

The plaintiff testified about how his symptoms affected his ability to perform self-care and 

household tasks. He was able to shampoo his own hair.73 He was able to get dressed on his own, 

but he “no longer [had] shoes that [he had] to tie,” and “buttons [took him] a long time.”74 He 

61 Id.

62 AR 45. 

63 Id.

64 Id.

65 AR 46. 

66 Id. 

67 Id.

68 AR 47. 

69 Id.

70 AR 47–48. 

71 AR 48. 

72 Id. 

73 Id.

74 AR 48–49. 

Case 3:18-cv-07326-LB Document 20 Filed 03/23/20 Page 7 of 23
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 8

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could start loads of laundry, “but [he did not] carry the baskets of laundry . . . [b]ecause it takes 

two hands.”75 He was able to wash dishes “if [he could] wash [them] and put [them] in the 

dishwasher with [his] right hand,” but not if the task required both hands.76 He explained that he 

had broken “too many dishes” because the numbness in his left arm left him unable to gauge the 

strength of his grip, stating “I can’t tell how heavy I’[m] gripping things. So I drop them or break 

them or I’ve squeezed them too tight and I break them.”77 He had also injured himself as a result 

of the numbness, sometimes burning or cutting himself without realizing it.78 He testified that he 

“[did not] cook anymore just because of safety.”79 

On a typical morning, the plaintiff would “[w]ake [his] kids up” and “make sure they [were] 

getting ready for school,” then “try and do whatever dishes [he could]” and “pick up the laundry 

they [had] left everywhere.”80 He spent the afternoons and evenings “trying to help [his] wife with 

whatever she need[ed],” such as “get[ting] something out of the cupboard or . . . put[ting] the 

dishes on the table [to get] ready for dinner.”81 

The plaintiff did not feel safe driving a car because his pain medications caused drowsiness 

and a “foggy” feeling.82 He “[tried] not to drive at all unless it [was] absolutely necessary,” which 

amounted to driving “three [to] four times a month” on average.83 If his children missed the bus 

and needed a ride to school, and he had already taken his medication, he had to call someone else 

to drive them.84 

75 AR 49. 

76 Id. 

77 Id.

78 AR 50. 

79 AR 54. 

80 AR 52. 

81 AR 54. 

82 AR 50–51. 

83 AR 50. 

84 AR 52–53. 

Case 3:18-cv-07326-LB Document 20 Filed 03/23/20 Page 8 of 23
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 9

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The plaintiff had an irregular sleep schedule. He “usually end[ed] up falling asleep” during the 

day due to the side effects of the pain medication.85 He “[did not] sleep well at night,” which he 

said “[threw] everything off,” probably contributing to his daytime tiredness.86 He slept in a 

recliner rather than in a bed.87 

The plaintiff felt that overall his condition was “about the same, maybe a little bit worse” since 

his injury.88 He had “a hard time recalling things,” which he attributed “mostly” to the 

medication.89 His medication “compound[ed] [his] diabetes” because the side effects kept him 

from being physically active, creating “a vicious little circle.”90 The plaintiff was on insulin for 

diabetes.91 He was insulin resistant.92 His blood sugar levels were consistently above 200 and had 

gone as high as 600.93 He was not “affected that badly” even when his blood sugar was 

dangerously high because his body had “acclimated” to those levels.94 

In response to his representative’s questions, the plaintiff testified as follows. He had been on 

medication since 2010.95 These medications made him drowsy and “have these same kinds of 

limitations.”96 When “manipulating [his] left hand,” he kept his “elbow[] close to [his] hip” 

because he “[could not] fully extend the arm” from the shoulder.97 He had purchased a 

85 AR 53. 

86 AR 55. 

87 Id. The plaintiff stated in the 2014 hearing that sleeping position was a focus of his physical therapy 

sessions. AR 98. 

88 AR 55. 

89 AR 55–56. 

90 AR 56. 

91 AR 57. 

92 Id. 

93 AR 57–58. 

94 Id. 

95 AR 59. 

96 Id. 

97 Id. 

Case 3:18-cv-07326-LB Document 20 Filed 03/23/20 Page 9 of 23
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 10

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touchscreen computer because he was able to use it one-handed.98 He “[had] problems using both 

hands together.”99 This had been the case since 2010, and he had not had any further injuries to the 

left shoulder since then.100 He formerly was a truck driver.101 He gave up his class A driver’s 

license and now had only a “regular” class C license.102

2.2.2 Vocational expert’s testimony 

VE Mr. Stock also testified at the hearing.103 He characterized the plaintiff’s prior jobs as 

Jailer (DOT code 372.367-014, very heavy as performed, SVP 4), operating engineer (DOT code 

859.683-010, heavy as performed, SVP 6), and construction worker (DOT code 869.687-026, 

heavy as performed, SVP 2).104 

The ALJ posed the first hypothetical: 

[A]n individual with the [plaintiff]’s age, education[,] and background . . . [who] can 

perform light work, but should not perform any climbing of ladders, ropes[,] or 

scaffolding; should not drive or deal with heavy or hazardous machinery or work at 

unprotected heights for safety reasons. . . . [T]here should be no overhead work. The 

hypothetical individual can up to frequently reach, handle, [and] finger. . . . And the job 

should be considered very simple and routine in nature with minimal changes from day to 

day.105 

The VE testified that this would rule out all past work.106 He listed three jobs that such a person 

could perform: cleaner, housekeeping (DOT code 323.687-014, light, SVP 2), with over 438,450 

jobs in the national economy; cashier II (DOT code 211.462-070, light, SVP 2), with over 

98 AR 60. 

99 Id. 

100 Id. The plaintiff stated that he had “fall[en] out of the shower and [broken] a couple of ribs.” Id.

This injury is not cited as part of his disability claims. 

101 Id. 

102 AR 60–61. 

103 AR 61. 

104 AR 62–63. The ALJ told the VE not to consider the plaintiff’s job as a grocery store cashier from 

1990 through 2001 as it was “too old.” AR 62. 

105 AR 63. 

106 AR 63–64. 

Case 3:18-cv-07326-LB Document 20 Filed 03/23/20 Page 10 of 23
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 11

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1,256,320 jobs in the national economy; and office helper (DOT 239.567-010, light, SVP 2), with 

over 82,250 jobs in the national economy.107

The ALJ posed a second hypothetical “reducing the reach, handle, finger, feel to occasional,” 

but keeping the other elements the same as the first hypothetical.108 The VE identified one job that 

fit this profile: counter clerk (DOT code 249.366-010, light, SVP 2), with 10,880 jobs in the 

national economy.109 He also listed two jobs at the sedentary level that otherwise fit the 

parameters: election clerk (DOT code 205.367-030, sedentary, SVP 2), with 31,980 jobs, and callout operator (DOT code 237.367-014, sedentary, SVP 2), with 14,630 jobs.110

 

The ALJ posed a third hypothetical: 

[A]n individual who is younger with a high school education, [with the] ability to sit at 

least six hours in an eight hour day, stand and walk at least six hours in an eight hour day. 

They can occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds, frequently 10 pounds. The ability to reach 

overhead is less than four on the right dominant upper extremity, and the ability to reach 

overhead with the nondominant left hand less than two hours. Otherwise, the dominant 

right hand does not have any restrictions in terms of hands and fingers. But the left side, 

the nondominant, is less than an hour for fine manipulation and gross manipulation.111 

The VE testified that he “would have trouble identifying any jobs” matching those parameters.112

In response to the ALJ’s questions, the VE confirmed that the DOT does not address bilateral 

dexterity.113 He testified that in his “experience as a vocational rehabilitation counselor,” it would 

be “very difficult” for an individual with limited use of one arm to start a new job.114

107 AR 64. 

108 Id.

109 AR 65. 

110 Id. 

111 AR 66. 

112 Id. 

113 AR 66–67. This means that the job descriptions cannot fully account for different restrictions on 

each arm or hand. 

114 AR 67–68. The VE’s testimony implied that the exception would be someone already familiar with 

the work, who might be able to adapt and create workarounds for their own limitation. 

Case 3:18-cv-07326-LB Document 20 Filed 03/23/20 Page 11 of 23
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 12

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2.2.3 ALJ findings 

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether the plaintiff 

was disabled and concluded that he was not.115

At step one, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during 

the period from his alleged onset date of April 14, 2008, through his last insured date of December 31, 

2010.116 

At step two, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had five severe impairments: degenerative disc 

disease of the cervical-spine, degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder, left carpal-tunnel 

syndrome, obesity, and diabetes mellitus.117 The ALJ found that these “impairments [were] severe as 

alleged because they more than minimally affect[ed] the [plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic work 

activities.”118 

The ALJ found that the plaintiff’s BMI was consistent with obesity and found the plaintiff’s 

obesity to be severe.119 The ALJ “considered the functional limitations resulting from the claimant’s 

obesity in the residual functional capacity assessment.”120

The ALJ considered the “paragraph B” criteria and found that the plaintiff had “mild limitation” in 

the area of “understanding, remembering and applying information” and no limitations in “social 

interaction with others,” “ability to concentrate, persist or maintain pace,” or “ability to adapt and 

manage oneself.”121 In making this finding, the ALJ noted that the plaintiff was able to perform 

household tasks, prepare meals, attend family events, take care of his kids, and drive a car.122

115 AR 18–20, 30. 

116 AR 20. 

117 Id. 

118 Id. 

119 Id. 

120 Id. 

121 AR 21. 

122 Id. 

Case 3:18-cv-07326-LB Document 20 Filed 03/23/20 Page 12 of 23
ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 13

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At step three, the ALJ found that the plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment.123 The plaintiff did not 

meet Listing section 1.02 (major dysfunction of a joint) because he did not demonstrate that he was 

unable to ambulate effectively or unable to perform fine and gross movements effectively with both 

arms.124 Specifically, the ALJ held the following: 

A major dysfunction of a joint. . . calls for evidence of a gross anatomical deformity . . . 

and chronic joint pain and stiffness with signs of limitation of motion or other abnormal 

motion of the affected joints, and findings on appropriate medically acceptable imaging of 

joint space narrowing, bony destruction, or ankylosis of the affected joints. In addition, 

there must be evidence of an involvement of one major peripheral weight-bearing joint 

(i.e., hip, knee, or ankle), resulting in inability to ambulate effectively, or involvement of 

one major peripheral joint in each upper extremity (i.e., shoulder, elbow, or wrist-hand), 

resulting in inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively (second emphasis 

added).125

The ALJ found that “[t]he medical evidence of record fail[ed] to provide . . . evidence” of these 

requirements.126 

The ALJ then determined the plaintiff’s RFC.127 In making this finding, the ALJ considered all the 

plaintiff’s symptoms and the extent to which they could be reasonably accepted as consistent with the 

objective medical evidence and other evidence.128 The ALJ followed a two-step process.129 First, the 

ALJ determined that the plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably cause the 

alleged symptoms.130 Second, the ALJ found that the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of 

these symptoms, as alleged by the plaintiff, were not consistent with the medical evidence in the 

123 Id. 

124 AR 22. 

125 Id. 

126 Id. 

127 AR 23–28. 

128 AR 23. 

129 Id. 

130 AR 23, 28. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 14

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record.131 The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work and “very simple 

and routine tasks with minimal changes from day-to-day equivalent to unskilled work.”132

At step four, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work.133 

At step five, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform light 

work that did not involve climbing, operating heavy machinery and only occasional reaching.134

The ALJ concluded that “there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national 

economy that the [plaintiff] could have performed,” considering his age, education, work experience, 

and RFC.135

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), district courts have jurisdiction to review any final decision of the 

Commissioner if the claimant initiates a suit within sixty days of the decision. A court may set 

aside the Commissioner’s denial of benefits only if the ALJ’s “findings are based on legal error or 

are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 

586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The reviewing court should uphold “such 

inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence.” Mark 

v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). If the evidence in the administrative record 

supports the ALJ’s decision and a different outcome, the court must defer to the ALJ’s decision 

and may not substitute its own decision. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“Finally, [a court] may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). 

131 AR 23, 28. 

132 AR 23. 

133 AR 28. 

134 AR 23. 

135 AR 29. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 15

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GOVERNING LAW 

A claimant is considered disabled if (1) [s]he suffers from a “medically determinable physical 

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months,” and (2) the “impairment 

or impairments are of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do h[er] previous work but 

cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) & 

(B). The five-step analysis for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of 

the Social Security Act is as follows. 

Step One. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, 

then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to benefits. If the claimant is 

not working in a substantially gainful activity, then the claimant case cannot be 

resolved at step one, and the evaluation proceeds to step two. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(i). 

Step Two. Is the claimant’s impairment (or combination of impairments) severe? If 

not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the evaluation proceeds to step three. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 

Step Three. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specified 

impairments described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is disabled and is 

entitled to benefits. If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal one of the 

impairments listed in the regulations, then the case cannot be resolved at step three, 

and the evaluation proceeds to step four. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 

Step Four. Considering the claimant’s RFC, is the claimant able to do any work that 

he or she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is not disabled and is not 

entitled to benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work he or she did in the past, then 

the case cannot be resolved at step four, and the case proceeds to the fifth and final 

step. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 

Step Five. Considering the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, is 

the claimant able to “make an adjustment to other work?” If not, then the claimant is 

disabled and entitled to benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant 

is able to do other work, the Commissioner must establish that there are a significant 

number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can do. There are two ways 

for the Commissioner to show other jobs in significant numbers in the national 

economy: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert or (2) by reference to the 

Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R., part 404, subpart P, app. 2. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 16

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For steps one through four, the burden of proof is on the claimant. At step five, the burden 

shifts to the Commissioner. Gonzales v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 784 F.2d 1417, 1419 

(9th Cir. 1986). 

ANALYSIS 

The plaintiff stipulated that the ALJ fairly and accurately summarized the medical and nonmedical evidence, except in two ways.136 First, at step five, he contends that the ALJ erred by 

failing to resolve an apparent conflict between the ALJ’s limitation to “very simple and routine” 

tasks and the duties of a call-out operator or elections clerk.137 Second, he contends that the ALJ 

improperly weighed the opinion of Dr. Chin, a treating physician.138 For the reasons set forth 

below, the court denies the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, grants the Commissioner’s 

motion for summary judgment, and affirms the ALJ’s order. 

1. Whether the ALJ Erred at Step Five 

The plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred at step five in two ways: (1) the ALJ failed to resolve 

an apparent conflict between the ALJ’s limitation in her hypothetical to “very simple and routine 

tasks” and the duties of a call-out operator or elections clerk;139 and (2) the only remaining job 

(counter clerk) did not exist in a significant number in the national economy.140 

At step five, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work did not involve climbing, operating heavy machinery and only occasional 

reaching.141 She recommended jobs as a counter clerk (DOT 249.366-010; light; svp 2: 10,880 

jobs), elections clerk (DOT 205.367-030; sedentary; svp 2; 31,980 jobs) and call-out operator 

136 Mot. – ECF No. 18 at 5. 

137 Id. at 6. 

138 Id. at 12. 

139 Id. at 6–7. 

140 Id. at 7–11. 

141 AR 23. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 17

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(DOT 237.367-014; sedentary; svp 2; 14,630 jobs).142 The elections clerk and call-out operator 

jobs require level-three reasoning. 

The issue — as the plaintiff puts it — is that level-three reasoning requirement conflicts with 

the ALJ’s finding that the plaintiff can only perform “very simple” work because “it may be 

difficult for a person limited to simple, repetitive tasks to follow instructions in ‘diagrammatic 

form’ as such instructions can be abstract.” Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(citation omitted). 

But this error is harmless. As the government argues, the record does not show any mental 

impairments or limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace and only mild limitations in 

understanding, remembering, and applying information.143 

The plaintiff also argues that the ALJ committed error because there are an insignificant 

number of counter-clerk positions (10,880 jobs) in the national economy.144 This argument fails. 

Claimants who fail to challenge a testifying VE’s job numbers during administrative 

proceedings forfeit such a challenge on appeal. Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 

2017). Moreover, an ALJ may rely on a VE’s testimony concerning the number of relevant jobs in 

the national economy, and need not inquire sua sponte into the foundation for the expert’s opinion. 

Id. at 1110 (citing Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Shalala, 

60 F.3d 1428, 1435–36 (9th Cir. 1995)). The plaintiff did not suggest that the VE’s job estimates 

might be unreliable at any point during administrative proceedings. Keifer v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

No. 17-cv-00332-EDL, 2018 WL 3398869, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2018) (“Because Plaintiff was 

vigorously represented by Dr. [Dan] McCaskell and failed to challenge the VE’s job numbers in 

any respect, the Court concludes that Plaintiff waived any arguments related to challenging those 

job numbers . . . .”). His claim is therefore forfeited. 

142 AR 29. 

143 Cross-Mot. – ECF No. 19 at 4 (citing AR 21, 29, 37). 

144 Mot. – ECF No. 18 at 10 (citing AR 29). 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 18

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2. Whether the ALJ Erred by Weighing Medical Opinions 

The plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by affording only partial weight to the opinion of his 

treating physician, Dr. Chin.145 The court affirms the ALJ’s decision because it was supported by 

substantial evidence. 

2.1 Legal Standard 

“‘The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving 

ambiguities.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 

1039 (9th Cir, 1995)). In weighing and evaluating the evidence, the ALJ must consider the entire 

case record, including each medical opinion in the record, together with the rest of the relevant 

evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(b); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] 

reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating 

a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“In conjunction with the relevant regulations, [the Ninth Circuit has] developed standards that 

guide [the] analysis of an ALJ’s weighing of medical evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 

F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Social Security regulations 

distinguish between three types of physicians (and other “acceptable medical sources”): (1) 

treating physicians; (2) examining physicians; and (3) non-examining physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.927(c), (e); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). “Generally, a treating 

physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining physician’s, and an examining 

physician’s opinion carries more weight than a reviewing [non-examining] physician’s.” Holohan 

v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830); Smolen v. 

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

An ALJ may disregard the opinion of a treating physician, whether or not controverted. Andrews, 

53 F.3d at 1041. “To reject [the] uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining doctor, an ALJ 

must state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan, 528 

F.3d at 1198 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). By contrast, if 

145 Id. at 12. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 20

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providing the opinion . . . .” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)–(6)); see also Magallanes v. 

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 1989) (ALJ need not agree with everything contained in the 

medical opinion and can consider some portions less significant than others). 

2.2 Application 

Dr. Chin’s opinion is contradicted by the state-agency consulting physicians’ DDEs.146 Thus, 

the ALJ was required to give specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Chin’s opinion. 

The ALJ gave Dr. Chin’s opinion partial weight after discussing the following factors: 

Dr. Chin’s finding that the claimant would need an unscheduled 15 minute break 

and have absences three days per month is not consistent with the claimant’s 

considerable activities of daily living. The claimant is able to care for his children 

and pets. These neck limitations are inconsistent with the claimant’s ability to 

drive. There is evidence of work activity in the record. The treatment for the 

claimant’s physical impairments has been largely conservative. A surgeon 

determined that the claimant was not a surgical candidate. 

. . . 

The undersigned also considered the statements submitted by the claimant’s father, 

Richard Daniels; the claimant’s wife, Jamie Daniels; and the claimant’s friend, Lori 

Babcock (15E, 16E, 17E). Ms. Babcock reports that the claimant takes care of kids 

and two dogs. The claimant prepared meals for the family. The claimant could 

perform basic cleaning and laundry. The claimant went shopping in stores for 

household items. He was able to drive a car and go to his children’s sporting events 

(17E). Ms. Daniels stated that the claimant did not sleep through the night due to 

pain (16E). Mr. Daniels stated that the claimant attended family gatherings. The 

claimant’s pain level kept him home more often (1SE). While the undersigned 

appreciates these perspectives, the undersigned notes that they are lay opinions 

based upon casual observation, rather than objective medical examination and 

testing. However, such lay opinions and observations of a claimant’s functioning 

must be considered (SSR-06-03p). The undersigned notes these statements are not 

consistent with allegations of disabling impairments and the medical record as a 

whole, which shows the claimant manages his symptoms with prescribed 

medication. The evidence of record, taken as a whole, is not consistent with these 

statements of disabling symptoms. For these reasons, there is no basis on which to 

afford these opinions more than little weight. 

. . . 

The allegations are inconsistent with the medical evidence of record and the 

claimant’s activities of daily living. The claimant does sweeping and dishes, drives, 

mows the lawn on a riding lawn mower, blows leaves and pulls weeds. During the 

146 Compare AR 123–134, 135–146 (DDEs) with AR 550–555, 575–602, 945–1007 (Chin). 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 21

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summer of 2013, the claimant was coaching baseball and gardening (7Fl-2). The 

claimant took his son fishing (2F91). The claimant cared for his children and two 

dogs (15E2, 17E2). He could drive a car – he replied that driving for more than one 

hour aggravated his neck pain (4E2, 17E3, 2F97). He testified that he shared 

picking up the children with his wife. The claimant shopped in stores ( 4E2, 17E4). 

He attended his children’s sporting events, went to movies, and went to dinners at 

the homes of friends and family (17E4). He had no reported problems with 

personal care tasks. 

The record reflects some evidence of work after the alleged onset date. On March 

7, 2014, the claimant reported that “work was slow.” He stated that he was doing 

odd jobs when he could find them (17F52). In 2011, the claimant stated he was 

starting a business with his father (3Fl 7). 

On April 13, 2016, the claimant’s physician noted that the claimant had been gone 

for approximately five months in Germany the month before (18F33). Although 

vacations and disability are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the claimant’s 

decision to go on a vacation, especially one requiring international travel, tends to 

further suggest that the claimant may have greater abilities. 147

“The Social Security Act does not require that claimants be utterly incapacitated to be eligible 

for benefits, and many home activities may not be easily transferable to a work environment where 

it might be impossible to rest periodically or take medication.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 

(9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that “disability claimants should not 

be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in the face of their limitations.” Reddick, 157 F.3d 

at 722. 

On this record, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 

evidence for giving partial weight to Dr. Chin’s opinion.148 

The ALJ reasonably found that Dr. Chin’s opinion was inconsistent with the plaintiff’s ability 

to drive, to complete household chores, and work activity, and an examining surgeon’s 

determination that the plaintiff was not suitable for surgery.149 See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (permitting the rejection of a medical opinion that is 

inconsistent with clinical findings); Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) 

147 AR 27–28. 

148 AR 26–27. 

149 AR 27. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-07326-LB 22

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(concluding that claimant’s testimony about her daily activities may be seen as inconsistent with 

the presence of a disabling condition). 

The ALJ pointed to inconsistencies between the medical record and the plaintiff’s daily 

activities.150 The medical evidence showed the plaintiff’s daily activities included the following: 

 Sweeping;151

 Driving for up to forty minutes;152

 Mowing the lawn on a riding lawn mower;153

 Blowing leaves and pulling weeds;154

 Gardening;155

 Coaching baseball;156

 Caring for his children and two dogs;157 and 

 Shopping.158

The record also reflects that the plaintiff was doing odd jobs when he could find them and 

attempted to start a business with his father.159 Finally, the ALJ found the plaintiff’s five-month 

trip to Germany suggested that he may have greater abilities.160

In sum, the overall record supports the ALJ’s decision. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. The ALJ’s 

weighing of Dr. Chin’s medical opinion was supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 

Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f evidence is susceptible of more than one 

rational interpretation, the decision of the ALJ must be upheld.”) (citation omitted). 

150 AR 28. 

151 AR 127. 

152 AR 329. 

153 AR 126. 

154 Id. 

155 AR 557. 

156 AR 556. 

157 AR 367. 

158 AR 369. 

159 AR 552, 776. 

160 AR 977. 

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