Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01244/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01244-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City Limits
Plaintiff
City Limits of Northern Nevada, Inc.
Plaintiff
County of Sacramento
Defendant
David A. McKibbin
Plaintiff

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This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

All further references to Rules are to the Federal Rules of 1

Civil Procedure. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 )

)

CITY LIMITS OF NORTHERN )

NEVADA, INC., a Nevada )

Corporation, and DAVID A. )

MCKIBBIN, dba CITY LIMITS, )

) 2:06-cv-1244-GEB-GGH

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, )

a political subdivision )

of the State of California, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Defendant moves to dismiss this action under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs oppose the motion. 1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff City Limits of Northern Nevada, Inc. (“City

Limits”) is a Nevada corporation doing business in California. 

Plaintiff David A. McKibbin (“McKibbin”) is President of City Limits. 

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In 1993, City Limits began operating an adult cabaret

at 5809 Auburn Boulevard in unincorporated Sacramento County

(“County”), a location designated as land use zone General Commercial

(“GC”) by the County. (Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 10.) On November 29, 1995, the

County enacted Zoning Code section 325-51, which restricts the

operation of sexually oriented businesses to property designated by

the County as land use zone M-1 or M-2, making operation of City

Limits unlawful at its current location. (Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 14.) Under

County Zoning Code section 120-25, a nonconforming use of land may

continue for five years after the date on which the use became

nonconforming. (Id.) “According to the California Government Code an

ordinance adopted by a county . . . takes effect 30 days after its

adoption.” (Id. ¶ 16.) Therefore, Zoning Code section 325-51 became

legally effective on December 29, 1995. (Id.)

City Limits continued to apply for and receive yearly

renewals of its general business license after the five-year

amortization period concluded on December 29, 2000. (Pls.’ Compl.

¶¶ 19-20.) On October 25, 2005, Plaintiffs again applied for a

renewal of the general business license, but the County denied the

application based on Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with County zoning

ordinances. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) 

Plaintiffs filed an administrative appeal, which was heard

by Karyl L. Marsh (“Marsh”), a County hearing officer. (Pls.’ Compl.

¶¶ 25-26; Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 2.) Plaintiffs argued that the

County’s denial of their general business license renewal application

should be reversed, and that County Zoning Ordinance section 325-51 is

unconstitutional. (Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 28.) During the hearing,

Plaintiffs objected to Marsh acting as the hearing officer, arguing

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that she had a conflict of interest because she was a County employee

deciding a dispute involving the County. (Id. ¶ 25.) Marsh denied

Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify her as the hearing officer. (Def.’s

Mot. Dismiss at 2.) In her written decision, Marsh upheld the

County’s denial of Plaintiffs’ general business license renewal

application and determined that a County administrative hearing was

not the proper forum to decide Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. 

(Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs then appealed to the County Board of

Supervisors, which upheld the denial of their license renewal. (Id.

¶ 31.) 

Plaintiffs filed this federal lawsuit against Defendant,

asserting claims that County Zoning Ordinance section 325-51 is

unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and violates their free

speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶ 34.) 

Plaintiffs also assert that the administrative hearing violated their

due process rights and right to a fair hearing. (Id. ¶ 41.) Further,

Plaintiffs seek a writ of mandate setting aside the County’s decision

to deny their business license renewal. (Id. at 18 ¶ 7.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Standing

Defendant asserts that McKibbin does not have standing to

bring this suit because he has not alleged an injury distinct from

that of City Limits. (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 4-5.) McKibbin rejoins

that he has standing because he is subject to criminal prosecution for

the misdemeanors of operating an adult business in a prohibited zone

and operating a business without the required business license. 

(Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 2 (“Pls.’ Resp.”).) 

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The “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing

consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiff must have an injury in

fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or

imminent; (2) the injury and the conduct complained of must be

causally connected; and (3) it must be likely that the injury

complained of will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 

Defendant contends that McKibbin’s alleged injury is not

distinct from that of City Limits because it is City Limits’ business

license and property that are at issue, and any pecuniary loss

suffered will be that of City Limits. (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 5.) 

McKibbin alleges a threat of criminal prosecution for violating the

County zoning ordinance, which is a non-pecuniary injury distinct from

City Limits’ asserted pecuniary and constitutional harm. (Pls.’

Compl. ¶ 33.) 

Defendant rejoins McKibbin is not subject to prosecution

because he does not own the business license in question, City Limits

does. (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 5.) Since Plaintiffs’ allegations must

be construed in the light most favorable to McKibbin, Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), McKibbin survives Defendant’s

standing challenge. 

II. Abstention

Defendant argues the Court should abstain from hearing

Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims under the doctrine announced in

Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). 

(Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 5.) The Pullman abstention doctrine “allows

postponement of the exercise of federal jurisdiction when ‘a federal

constitutional issue . . . might be mooted or presented in a different

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posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law.’” 

Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(quoting C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375, 377 (9th

Cir. 1983)). The Ninth Circuit employs a three-prong test to

determine whether the application of Pullman abstention is

appropriate: 

(1) the complaint must touch a sensitive area of

social policy into which the federal courts should

not enter unless there is no alternative to

adjudication; (2) a definitive ruling on the state

issues by a state court could obviate the need for

constitutional adjudication by the federal court;

and (3) the proper resolution of the potentially

determinative state law issue is uncertain. 

Kollsman, 737 F.2d at 833 (citing Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911,

915 (9th Cir. 1982)). “The absence of any one of these three factors

is sufficient to prevent the application of Pullman abstention.” 

Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 492 (9th Cir. 2003). 

A. Sensitive Area of Social Policy 

Defendant contends that because Plaintiffs’ claim challenges

the denial of City Limits’ general business license renewal and the

validity of a County Zoning ordinance restricting the location of

adult businesses, it is a claim based on land-use planning issues. 

(Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5-6.) However, Plaintiffs allege County

Zoning Code section 325-51 violates their First and Fourteenth

Amendment free speech rights. (Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 34.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that in First Amendment cases,

the first Pullman factor “will almost never be present because the

guarantee of free expression is always an area of particular federal

concern.” Porter, 319 F.3d at 492. “[C]onstitutional challenges

based on the [F]irst [A]mendment right of free expression are the kind

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of cases that the federal courts are particularly well-suited to hear.

That is why abstention is generally inappropriate when [F]irst

[A]mendment rights are at stake.” Id. 

Since Plaintiffs allege a violation of their First Amendment

rights and Defendant has not shown why abstention is appropriate in

this context, the first Pullman factor is not satisfied. Therefore,

Defendant’s request for abstention is denied.

III. Ripeness

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ as-applied free speech

claim is not ripe because Plaintiffs have not sought a variance under

the zoning regulations and therefore, the agency decision is not

final. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 15.) Plaintiffs agree the decision

is not yet final, but contend they are currently risking criminal

prosecution by operating City Limits in violation of County law and

therefore, the claim is ripe. (Pls.’ Resp. at 4-5.) 

When a plaintiff faces enforcement of an allegedly

unconstitutional ordinance, the plaintiff’s claim is ripe for

adjudication. See Patel and Patel v. City of South San Francisco, 606

F. Supp. 666, 669 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that since the city of San

Francisco sought to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional ordinance,

the plaintiff’s claim was ripe). Since Plaintiffs’ allegations must

be construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Scheuer, 416

U.S. at 236, Plaintiffs’ free speech claim survives Defendant’s

ripeness challenge. 

IV. State Law Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ state claim presents novel

and complex issues of state law and requests that this Court decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1367(c) (“section 1367"). (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 16.) Defendant

argues Plaintiffs’ “administrative mandamus proceedings under

California state law raise novel issues of interpretation of local

zoning laws which the state [courts] have not yet adjudicated.” (Id.) 

“Plaintiffs agree that this Court can decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction. Plaintiffs do not object if this Court wishes to

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction[,]” but Plaintiffs argue

if the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “this

Court should nevertheless issue a preliminary injunction or a

temporary stay of any enforcement by the County.” (Pls.’ Resp. at 6.) 

This request is inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ assertion that “the

decision of the County is not yet final” because of Plaintiffs’ state

mandamus claim. (Id. at 4.) In light of this assertion, Plaintiffs

have not shown that an injunction is necessary. Since Plaintiffs’

state claim involves mandamus proceedings “that are uniquely in the

interest and domain of state courts,” Clemes v. Del Norte County

Unified Sch. Dist., 843 F.Supp. 583, 596 (N.D. Cal. 1994), and the

parties do not dispute that the Court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction, Plaintiffs’ state claim is dismissed under

section 1367(c)(1). 

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, except for the portion of the motion

under section 1367, Defendant’s motion is denied. Plaintiffs’ state 

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mandamus claim is dismissed under section 1367(c)(1) as of the date on

which this Order is filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 5, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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