Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04073/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04073-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Farnsworth
Appellee
Terry E. MacKay
Appellant
Tuttle
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

TERRY E. MACKAY, 

Plaintiff-Apellant, 

v. 

OFFICER FARNSWORTH and OFFICER TUTTLE, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appa:ls 

Tenth Circuit 

APPEALS 

FEB 2 3 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerlt 

No. 94-4073 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 92-CV-198) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Terry MacKay, pro se. 

Nancy L. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, Jan Graham, Utah 

Attorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before KELLY and SETH, Circuit Judges, and KANE,* District Judge. 

*Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-4073 Document: 01019283510 Date Filed: 02/23/1995 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Terry E. MacKay, an inmate at the Utah State 

Prison, appeals a district court order granting the defendant 

prison officers' motion for summary judgment.l Plaintiff brought 

this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he alleged 

defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from 

cruel and unusual punishment by not physically intervening in a 

fight between him and another inmate. We affirm, although on 

different grounds than those relied on by the district court. See 

United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de 

novo applying the same legal standard used by the district court 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See James v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 

21 F.3d 989, 997-98 (lOth Cir. 1994). We will affirm the district 

court's order if no material facts are disputed and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c). 

The material facts are undisputed. During the fight, the 

other inmate was armed with a 11 Shank 11 with which he stabbed 

plaintiff several times inflicting minor wounds. The shank bent 

each time plaintiff was hit. See Rec. Vol. 1, tab 33 at 4 

(memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for summary 

judgment) (other inmate 11 repeatedly attempted to make the shank an 

effective weapon by 'straightening it out' to stab again 11 ). 

Defendants observed the fight through a window while ordering both 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 94-4073 Document: 01019283510 Date Filed: 02/23/1995 Page: 2 
inmates to "rack in" to their cells. The fight ended prior to 

defendants' physical intervention. 

Defendants asserted they did not immediately intervene for 

several reasons which plaintiff does not contest. In accordance 

with prison policy directing the number of officers who must be 

present before they may physically intervene in an inmate 

altercation, defendants summoned back-up help. This policy was 

enacted to address safety concerns based on the high security 

level of inmates at the prison and the fact that an inmate 

disturbance might be a ruse designed to draw officers into a 

dangerous situation. Defendants further observed that the inmates 

appeared evenly matched and the shank was ineffective. Because 

plaintiff was bleeding, defendants summoned medical assistance. 

The district court held that defendants' conduct should be 

evaluated under the malicious and sadistic standard employed when 

examining prison officials' conduct in responding to emergency 

situations, i.e., whether defendants' nonintervention amounted to 

a malicious, tacit approval of brutality. See Whitley v. Albers, 

475 U.S. 312, 318-26 (1986). The court determined an emergency 

situation existed because defendants were responding to an 

unanticipated disruption which had the potential to jeopardize the 

safety of other individuals as well as the inmates involved. 

Therefore, defendants had to react immediately and under pressure. 

The court concluded that the fact that the fight terminated before 

defendants physically intervened did not mandate use of the lesser 

deliberate indifference standard. 

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Appellate Case: 94-4073 Document: 01019283510 Date Filed: 02/23/1995 Page: 3 
On appeal, plaintiff argues, as he did below, that the 

deliberate indifference standard should apply. We agree. 

"[P]rison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from 

violence at the hands of other prisoners." Farmer v. Brennan, 114 

S. Ct. 1970, 1976 (1994) (quotation omitted). "[T]he failure to 

protect inmates from attacks by other inmates may rise to an 

Eighth Amendment violation if the prison officials conduct amounts 

to an obdurate and wanton disregard for the inmate's safety." 

Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1525 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

The Supreme Court has identified two standards by which 

prison officials' conduct may be evaluated in determining whether 

an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights were violated. The deliberate 

indifference standard is employed in conditions of confinement 

cases, i.e., cases in which the officials' conduct "ordinarily 

[does not] clash with other equally important governmental 

responsibilities." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319-20. 

In cases where officials must take measures to resolve 

disturbances the "deliberate indifference standard does not 

adequately capture the importance of" the competing obligations of 

ensuring the safety of both the prison staff and the inmates 

themselves, nor does it "convey the appropriate hesitancy to 

critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under 

pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance." 

Id. In such a setting a court must look at whether the officials' 

actions were taken only to restore discipline or whether they 

acted "'maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of 

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Appellate Case: 94-4073 Document: 01019283510 Date Filed: 02/23/1995 Page: 4 
causing harm.'" Id. at 320-21 {quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 

1028, 1033 {2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 {1973)). 

Thus, while the Eighth Amendment imposes the requirement on 

prison officials to restore control in tumultuous situations, see 

Buckner v. Hollins, 983 F.2d 119, 121 {8th Cir. 1993), "officials 

. who fail to prevent an injury inflicted by fellow prisoners are 

liable only where those officials possess the requisite mental 

state," Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1992). 

"' [A]pplication of the deliberate indifference standard is 

inappropriate' in one class of prison cases: when 'officials stand 

accused of using excessive physical force.'" Farmer, 114 S. Ct. 

at 1978 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, , 112 S. Ct. 

995, 998-99 (1992)); see also Buckner, 983 F.2d at 122 (Whitley 

malicious and sadistic standard applies only in cases in which 

prison officials are accused of physically using excessive force) . 

Therefore, we hold that the requisite mental state in situations 

where prison officials do not respond with the physical use of 

force is that of deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 114 S. Ct. 

at 1977; Buckner, 983 F.2d at 122; Duane, 959 F.2d at 676. 

Under the deliberate indifference standard, "a prison 

official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying 

humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates 

face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk 

by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer, 114 

s. Ct. at 1984. 

Here, the undisputed facts show no deliberate indifference on 

the part of prison officials. Defendants knew plaintiff faced a 

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Appellate Case: 94-4073 Document: 01019283510 Date Filed: 02/23/1995 Page: 5 
risk of harm. The measures they took to abate that harm were 

reasonable. Plaintiff admitted the guards were successful in 

attempting to break up the fight verbally. In deciding not to 

physically intervene immediately, the guards observed that 

plaintiff and the other inmate were evenly matched and that the 

shank was ineffective. Finally, defendants called for additional 

staff and medical personnel and thus were preparing to intervene 

when sufficient staff was available in accordance with prison 

policy. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (we accord 

prison administrators wide-ranging deference in adoption of 

policies that "in their judgment are needed to preserve internal 

order and discipline and to maintain institutional security"). 

Plaintiff also argues the district court was biased against 

him because he had sent threatening letters to a magistrate judge 

on a different matter and he was improperly denied leave to amend 

his complaint. These issues were not raised below and we will not 

address them here, see Walker v. Mather (In re Walker), 959 F.2d 

894, 896 (lOth Cir. 1992) (this court will not consider an issue on 

appeal that was not raised below) , other than to note that they 

are without apparent merit. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Utah is AFFIRMED. 

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