Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01564/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01564-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Russell K. Hunt
Petitioner
People of the State of California
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSSELL K. HUNT,

Petitioner,

v.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

No. 2:15-cv-1564 KJN P

ORDER

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, has filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner paid the filing fee. 

For the following reasons, the undersigned finds that not all of the claims presented in the 

petition are exhausted.

The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). If exhaustion is to be waived, it must

be waived explicitly by respondents’ counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). A waiver of exhaustion, 

thus, may not be implied or inferred. A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by 

providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before 

presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v. 

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 

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The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal district court may not entertain a 

petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted state remedies with respect to each 

of the claims raised. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 

Petitioner raises the following claims: 1) denial of right to impartial jury; 2) perjury by 

Officer Harris; 3) insufficient evidence to support conviction (two claims—claims 3 and 8); 4) 

denial of counsel; 5) double jeopardy violation; 6) jury tampering by victim’s ex-husband; and 7) 

judicial misconduct when trial judge instructed jury to ignore petitioner’s argument. 

Petitioner states that he raised the following claims in both his direct appeal filed in the 

California Court of Appeal and his petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court: 1)

denial of right to an impartial jury; 2) perjury by Officer Harris; 3) insufficient evidence (claims 3 

and 8); 4) denial of counsel; and 5) double jeopardy violation. In other words, petitioner is 

claiming that these claims are exhausted. 

A copy of the opinion by the California Court of Appeal upholding petitioner’s conviction 

is attached to the petition. The opinion indicates that petitioner raised the following claims in the 

California Court of Appeal that he now raises in the instant petition: 1) denial of right to 

impartial jury; 2) insufficient evidence (claims 3 and 8); 3) denial of right to counsel; and 4) 

judicial misconduct. In his direct appeal before the California Court of Appeal, petitioner did not 

raise his claims alleging perjury and double jeopardy. 

Assuming petitioner raised the same claims in the petition for review filed in the 

California Supreme Court as he raised before the California Court of Appeal, it does not appear 

that petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies as to his claims alleging perjury, double 

jeopardy, and jury tampering. 

Because petitioner has filed a mixed petition, he may elect to dismiss his unexhausted 

claims and proceed on his exhausted claims only. In the alternative, petitioner may file a motion 

to hold this action in abeyance while he exhausts his unexhausted claims. There are two 

approaches for analyzing such motions: one is described in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th 

Cir. 2002), and the other in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 

1133, 1138-41 (9th Cir. 2009). 

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Kelly provides that a district court may stay a petition containing only exhausted claims 

and hold it in abeyance pending exhaustion of additional claims which may then be added to the 

petition through amendment. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070–71; King, 564 F.3d at 1135. If a petition 

contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, a petitioner seeking a stay under Kelly must 

dismiss the unexhausted claims from the petition and seek to add them back in through 

amendment after exhausting them in state court. King, 564 F.3d at 1138–39. However, the 

previously unexhausted claims, once exhausted, must be added back into the federal petition 

within the statute of limitations provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). King, 564 F.3d at 1140-

41. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), a one-year limitation period for seeking federal habeas 

relief begins to run from the latest of: (1) the date the judgment became final on direct review, 

(2) the date on which a state-created impediment to filing is removed, (3) the date the United 

States Supreme Court makes a new rule retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, or 

(4) the date on which the factual predicate of a claim could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1). A federal habeas petition does not toll the 

limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–82 

(2001).

Under Rhines, a district court may stay a mixed petition in its entirety, without requiring 

dismissal of the unexhausted claims while the petitioner attempts to exhaust them in state court. 

King, 564 F.3d at 1139–40. Unlike the Kelly procedure, however, Rhines requires that the 

petitioner show good cause for failing to exhaust the claims in state court prior to filing the 

federal petition. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277–78; King, 564 F.3d at 1139. In addition, a stay pursuant 

to Rhines is inappropriate where the unexhausted claims are “plainly meritless” or where the 

petitioner has engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” Id.

Accordingly, petitioner is granted thirty days to inform the court how he wishes to 

proceed. He may elect to proceed only on his exhausted claims, and request dismissal of his 

unexhausted claims. If petitioner wishes to stay this action while he exhausts his unexhausted 

claims in state court, he shall file a motion to stay this action pursuant to either the procedures set 

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forth in Kelly or Rhines, as discussed above. If petitioner does not respond to this order, this 

action will be dismissed on grounds that it is a mixed petition. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner is granted thirty 

days from the date of this order to inform the court how he wishes to proceed; petitioner shall 

either file a motion to dismiss his unexhausted claims and a request to proceed on his exhausted 

claims, or a motion to stay this action; failure to respond to this order will result in dismissal of 

this action.

Dated: July 29, 2015

Hu1564.ord

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