Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-99005/USCOURTS-ca9-14-99005-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Chappell
Appellee
Richard Dean Clark
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD DEAN CLARK,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 14-99005

D.C. No.

3:97-cv-20618-WHA

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 16, 2019

Pasadena, California

Filed September 5, 2019

Before: Consuelo M. Callahan, Sandra S. Ikuta,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

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2 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty

The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district 

court’s denial of Richard Dean Clark’s habeas corpus 

petition challenging his California conviction and capital 

sentence for the first-degree murder and rape of a 15-yearold, and remanded to the district court for reconsideration of 

one issue in light of Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (en banc).

Because the habeas petition was filed before April 24, 

1996, the panel applied the standards in effect prior to the 

implementation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996.

The panel held that Clark’s five certified ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims are unavailing because (1) 

Clark did not show that trial counsel’s performance fell 

below an objective reasonableness standard at the time of 

trial or (2) in the few instances in which counsel’s conduct 

was deficient, Clark has not shown that there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome would have been different. In 

light of Godoy, the panel remanded for further proceedings 

on Clark’s certified claim that his rights to due process and 

an impartial jury were violated when a juror communicated 

with his minister.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 3

The panel rejected the state’s argument that three of 

Clark’s ten uncertified claims are procedurally barred from 

federal review, and granted a certificate of appealability on 

six of the uncertified claims. Affirming the district court’s 

denial of habeas relief on two claims, the panel concluded 

that Clark did not establish any actual conflict of interest that 

adversely affected his representation. Affirming the district 

court’s denial of Clark’s claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to present life history evidence at the 

penalty phase, the panel concluded that trial counsel’s 

presentation of life history evidence was not deficient. 

Affirming the district court’s denial of Clark’s claim that 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to rebut a jailhouse 

report, the panel concluded that counsel’s performance was 

not deficient. Affirming the district court’s denial of Clark’s 

claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to be 

present for critical stages of the proceedings, the panel 

concluded that Clark did not explain how his presence at two 

meetings regarding possible conflicts of interest with 

counsel had a reasonably “substantial relationship” to his 

ability to defend himself. Affirming the district court’s 

denial of Clark’s claim that habeas relief is warranted under 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because the 

prosecution failed to disclose two pieces of exculpatory 

evidence, the panel concluded that there is not a reasonable 

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 

different if the evidence had been disclosed to the defense. 

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on 

Clark’s claim that cumulative errors denied him a fair trial. 

The panel denied a COA on the remaining uncertified 

claims.

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of 

evidentiary hearings for all claims except the juror 

misconduct claim as to which the district court will 

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4 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

determine on remand whether an evidentiary hearing is 

warranted.

COUNSEL

John R. Grele (argued), San Francisco, California, for 

Petitioner-Appellant.

Alice B. Lustre (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Glenn 

R. Pruden, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Jeffrey M. 

Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Xavier 

Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, 

San Francisco, California; for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

California state prisoner Richard Dean Clark appeals 

from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and capital 

sentence for the first-degree murder and rape of fifteen-yearold Rosie Grover in 1985.

On appeal, Clark raises sixteen claims, of which six were 

certified: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 

advise Clark to accept a plea offer; (2) violation of Clark’s 

rights to due process and an impartial jury by juror 

misconduct; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for calling 

Dr. Mayland to testify at the pre-trial suppression hearing; 

(4) ineffective assistance of counsel in preparing and 

presenting expert testimony; (5) ineffective assistance of 

counsel for failing to investigate and present evidence of 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 5

Clark’s fetal alcohol exposure, traumatic birth, and the 

ensuing effects from both; and (6) ineffective assistance of 

counsel for failure to argue that Dean “Dino” Stevens was 

an alternative suspect or co-participant and prosecutorial 

misconduct in failing to disclose information about Dino. 

Clark also raises ten uncertified claims, six of which we 

grant a certificate of appealability (“COA”) and deny on the 

merits and three of which fail to satisfy the COA standard.

Because Clark’s federal habeas petition was filed before 

April 24, 1996, the habeas standards in effect prior to the 

implementation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) apply. Under pre-AEDPA 

standards, both questions of law and mixed questions of law 

and fact are subject to de novo review, which means that a 

federal habeas court owes no deference to a state court’s

resolution of such legal questions (in contrast with postAEDPA standards). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

400 (2000); see also Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 

1099 (9th Cir. 2010). But the state court’s factual findings 

are entitled to a presumption of correctness unless one of the 

exceptions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1991) is met.

Clark’s numerous ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims, governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984), are unavailing because Clark does not show that trial 

counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

reasonableness standard at the time of the trial in 1987. 

Furthermore, for the few instances where counsel’s conduct 

was deficient, Clark has not shown that there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome would have been different. His 

efforts to show prejudice are undercut by the extensive 

evidence presented at trial, including his two detailed 

confessions and the physical evidence confirming his 

involvement in the crimes. The post-conviction mitigating 

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6 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

evidence Clark marshals to support his argument that the 

penalty phase would have been different is cumulative of the 

mitigating evidence presented at the guilt and penalty phases 

of trial. We similarly find unpersuasive Clark’s conflict of 

interest claim under Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 

(2002), based on his first attorney’s election as District 

Attorney and his subsequent attorney’s representation of 

witnesses.

On one issue, juror misconduct, we remand to the district 

court to decide Clark’s claim in light of our recent decision 

in Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2017) (en 

banc).

We otherwise deny habeas relief. We also affirm the 

district court’s denial of evidentiary hearings for all claims 

(with the exception of the juror misconduct issue), 

concluding Clark has not shown that he would be entitled to 

relief on his proffered facts.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Crimes

Around 4:00 a.m. on July 19, 1985, fifteen-year-old 

Rosie Grover arrived at the Greyhound bus depot in Ukiah, 

California. After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain a ride, 

she started walking to her mother’s house. Several hours 

later, her body was found in a nearby creek-bed. Grover had 

been raped, stabbed with a sharpened screwdriver, and 

bludgeoned in the head and neck with two concrete blocks.

At the time of the crimes, Defendant-Appellant Richard 

Dean Clark, then twenty-one years old, was living with and 

caring for his paraplegic friend, David Smith, in Ukiah. On 

the day before the crimes, Clark and Smith spent the 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 7

afternoon drinking beer, ingesting cocaine, and smoking 

marijuana. Clark drank three or four beers at the local bar. 

Clark and Smith both ingested cocaine at the house of 

Smith’s stepsister, Michelle Stevens. Although Smith had 

seen Clark use methamphetamine in the past, he did not see 

Clark use methamphetamine that day. Clark smoked 

between two and five marijuana cigarettes.

Later that evening, a fight broke out between Clark and 

Michelle’s boyfriend, Matt Williams. According to 

Williams, Clark “looked like he was on something” and “got 

kind of violent, shadow boxing around the house and

throwing punches.” Around 10:00 p.m., Clark announced 

that he “was going to beat somebody up and rob them” and 

then he left with Dino Stevens—Michelle’s stepbrother.

Clark and Dino played pool at Munchie’s, a local pool 

hall, for approximately 30 to 40 minutes. After they left the 

pool hall, they went to the home of Robyn Boyd, who lived 

near the Ukiah bus depot. Clark and Dino left Boyd’s house 

around 12:30 a.m. Upon leaving, the men went their 

separate ways.

Little evidence, other than Clark’s statements to the 

police, establish Clark’s location and movements from the 

time that he left Boyd’s house until he entered a restaurant 

later that morning.

On July 19 at about 6:15 a.m., Clark walked into RonDee-Voo Restaurant near the Greyhound bus depot with a 

partially empty wine cooler bottle in his hand. He told Karen 

Mertle, a waitress, that he found a girl’s body in a nearby 

ditch who was hurt “real bad” and “maybe raped.” He 

handed Mertle the wine cooler bottle, which she saved to 

give to the police. Mertle testified that Clark did not appear 

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8 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

intoxicated. Several witnesses from the restaurant testified 

that Clark did not appear intoxicated or upset.

Officer Wayne McBride of the Ukiah Police Department 

arrived at the restaurant at around 6:34 a.m. Clark told 

Officer McBride that he found the body when he was taking 

a “shortcut” to buy cigarettes at a convenience store and that 

he checked the body for a pulse and may have touched the 

suitcase found near the body. Officer McBride testified that 

Clark was wearing sunglasses and spoke rapidly but did not 

appear to be intoxicated and did not smell of alcohol.

Detectives Fred Kelley and Edward Gall collected 

physical evidence at the crime scene. Grover’s body was 

partially clothed with her jeans buttoned, a cloth belt undone, 

her jacket and blouse open exposing her bra, and her shoes 

and tank-top lying on the ground nearby. Her duffle bag and 

suitcase were about ten feet away from her body, and inside 

her duffle bag was the same brand and flavor of wine coolers 

as the bottle Clark had given to Mertle. Two bloody concrete 

blocks—the heavier of the two weighing about 

18.5 pounds—were found near Grover’s body with traces of 

human blood and hair, consistent with Grover’s.

After searching the crime scene, Detectives Kelley and 

Gall went to Michelle’s house, where Clark and Smith were 

residing at the time, and received Smith’s permission to 

search Smith’s car. Detective Kelley found a pair of Levi’s 

jeans and a vest-jacket on the rear seat with blood splattered 

on the jeans and smeared on the vest. Smith and Michelle 

identified the clothing as having been worn by Clark the 

previous evening. The blood was found to be consistent with 

both Grover’s and Clark’s blood.

One week later, a hand-sharpened screwdriver with 

traces of human blood was found in Smith’s car. On the 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 9

shoes Clark wore when he was arrested, there was splattered 

human blood and a hair that was found to be consistent with 

Grover’s hair and inconsistent with Clark’s hair. Clark 

“could not be ruled out” as the source of the semen found in 

the victim’s underwear, and the pubic hair found in the 

victim’s underwear was consistent with Clark’s.

B. Clark’s Confessions

Clark gave three custodial statements to the police on the 

day of his arrest. First, at the police station and prior to his 

arrest, Clark waived his Miranda rights and spoke to 

Detectives Kelley and Gall, essentially repeating the same 

story he told Officer McBride earlier in the morning at the 

restaurant.

Second, after Clark’s arrest and booking, Detectives 

Kelley and Gall transported Clark to the hospital to obtain a 

sample of Clark’s blood. During the drive, Clark confessed 

to killing Grover. During the drive, Clark suddenly asked, 

“What can someone get for something like this, thirty 

years?” Detective Gall testified at trial that he had 

responded: “Probably not unless you were a mass murderer.” 

Fifteen to twenty-five seconds following this exchange 

Clark said, “I want this on the record. I’m guilty. I killed 

her. What do you want to know?” Clark told the officers 

that he was walking southbound on State Street when he met 

Grover. Clark told the officers that Grover “started to come 

on to him.” The officer recalled that Clark said that Grover 

“flashed” her breast at him. Clark said that he and Grover 

had consensual sexual intercourse, but that afterward Grover 

threatened “that she was going to cry rape.” Clark said that 

he thought that he would probably receive a less severe 

penalty for killing her than raping her and so then began to 

choke her. Clark said he found “what appeared to be a 

screwdriver, just the metal shaft part, . . . in the creekbed and 

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10 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

he said he stabbed [Grover] several times,” and “took a large 

piece of cement and hit [Grover] in the head with it.” Clark 

told the officers that he then went back to Michelle’s house 

and changed his clothing. Clark left a pair of Levi’s jeans 

and his jacket in the back of Smith’s car. Clark told the 

officers that he then returned to the crime scene because he 

thought that if he reported finding the body, no one would 

suspect that he killed Grover. In this confession, Clark did 

not mention blacking out during the crimes.

Third, upon returning to the police station, Clark waived 

his constitutional rights and agreed to provide a taperecorded statement to Detectives Kelley and Gall and 

Deputy District Attorney Al Kubanis. The recorded 

statement differed somewhat from the statement Clark gave 

in the patrol car. In the recorded statement, Clark explained 

that during the prior evening he had ingested eight or nine 

beers, several tablets of Valium, one-eighth gram of 

methamphetamine, and several marijuana cigarettes, and 

that he had “blacked out” during the course of the crimes. 

During this confession, Clark repeated that he was walking 

southbound on State Street when he met Grover. Clark said 

that “the next thing [he] kn[e]w [Grover had] her top off.” 

Clark again admitted to having sexual intercourse with 

Grover and claimed it was consensual. Clark said that, 

following the encounter, Grover “said she was going to cry 

rape” and “to put [him] in jail for 20, 30 years.” Clark stated 

that then he “grabbed her by the neck” and “started choking 

her.” In the recorded statement, unlike in the patrol car 

confession, Clark claimed he blacked out, and the next thing 

he remembered was that he was “bashing [a] rock” into 

Grover. Clark told the police that he believed he hit Grover 

in the head with the rock. Clark said that he “remember[ed] 

throwing a piece of metal” that “looked like an old broken 

screwdriver or something” but that he did not remember 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 11

stabbing Grover. When questioned about his earlier 

statement in the patrol car in which he said he had stabbed 

Grover, Clark said that was simply his assumption based on 

the officers telling him that she had stab wounds. The taped 

statement lasted about 35 minutes.

II. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

A. Pre-Trial Issues

Clark was arraigned on July 23, 1985, in Ukiah. Clark 

entered a not guilty plea. Although the crimes occurred in 

Mendocino County, the state court granted Clark’s motion 

to change venue to Santa Clara County for the trial.

1. Representation

At the arraignment, the Mendocino County Public 

Defender Susan Massini was appointed to represent Clark. 

In September 1985, Joseph Allen, an experienced capital 

defense attorney, became co-counsel at Massini’s request 

due to her inexperience with capital cases. Massini and 

Allen jointly represented Clark through June 1986.

In January 1986, Massini decided to run for Mendocino 

County District Attorney. On February 7, 1986, there was a 

pre-trial conference regarding the trial date. The deputy 

district attorney wanted the trial date set before June 1986 

because he was worried that Massini might be elected 

District Attorney and present conflict of interest problems. 

Massini and Allen objected, doubting that such problems 

would arise. However, Massini was elected as the District 

Attorney in June 1986 and took office in January 1987. 

After the election, Allen moved to recuse the District 

Attorney’s Office from prosecuting Clark’s case. The court 

granted the motion, and the Attorney General was 

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12 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

substituted as prosecutor. When Massini relinquished the 

position of Mendocino County Public Defender, Ronald 

Brown was promoted to that position and became co-counsel 

with Allen. Brown or his office had previously represented 

prosecution witnesses Robyn Boyd, David Smith, Dino 

Stevens, and Matt Williams in unrelated matters.

2. Psychiatric Evaluation

In late July 1985, Massini retained Dr. Peter Mayland, a 

practicing psychiatrist with a specialty in forensic 

psychiatry, as a mental health consultant to evaluate both 

Clark’s competency to stand trial and the possibility of a 

mental-health-related defense or mitigation at trial. 

Dr. Mayland first met with Clark at the Mendocino County 

Jail several days after Clark was arrested. Dr. Mayland 

recommended that Massini consult with his former 

colleague Dr. Rex Beaber to assess whether Clark had an 

impairment that might provide the basis of a viable mental 

defense.

Clark met with Dr. Beaber on November 23 and 24, 

1985. Dr. Beaber concluded that he probably could not be 

of assistance to the defense from a guilt standpoint. Massini 

requested that Dr. Beaber write a letter to summarize his 

findings. According to Dr. Mayland’s declaration, 

Dr. Beaber thought it might be best if he did not write a 

report of any sort, but Massini insisted that he generate a 

report that detailed his findings. In response to Massini’s

request, Dr. Beaber drafted a one-page letter detailing his 

findings. The letter indicates that “Clark does not appear to 

suffer from any organic brain dysfunction, psychosis, 

schizophrenia, or affective disorder.” According to 

Dr. Beaber, Clark did not evince any disorder that would 

impair his capacity to form the requisite intent for the crimes 

charged. Instead, Dr. Beaber’s letter indicates that Clark’s 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 13

“‘amnesia’ appears to be typical psychogenic post-homicide 

amnesia [that] is not, in itself, demonstrative of any 

particular disability regarding the usual mens rea issues.” 

Dr. Beaber’s letter concludes that Clark suffers from “a 

sociopathic personality disorder” and exhibits characteristics 

of a “sexual psychopath,” which resulted from “severe 

maternal deprivations throughout his childhood.” Allen, 

who became co-counsel after Massini received Dr. Beaber’s 

letter, was unaware of the nature of Dr. Beaber’s letter.

3. Plea Offer

At some point before the pre-trial suppression hearing, 

the state offered Clark a deal to plead guilty to first-degree 

murder with a sentence of life without parole. Dr. Mayland 

and Brown thought taking the plea deal was the best option, 

but Allen disagreed. Allen thought there was a good chance 

he could get a life sentence or even a second-degree verdict. 

Allen also thought that he could potentially get Clark’s 

statements to the police suppressed at the suppression 

hearing, but the state declined to leave the deal open through 

the litigation of the suppression issues. Allen informed 

Clark “that the only choice he had was life without parole or 

a trial.” Clark ultimately “decided to go to trial.”

4. The Pre-Trial Suppression Hearing

On October 20, 1986, the court conducted a lengthy 

hearing on Clark’s motion to suppress his confessions. The 

hearing included both documentary and testimonial 

evidence.

Dr. Mayland testified for the defense. By that time, 

Dr. Mayland had met with Clark regularly and developed a 

therapeutic relationship with him. Although Dr. Mayland 

regularly discussed the case with Allen, Allen did not know 

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14 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

that Dr. Mayland had talked to Clark about the facts of the 

crimes beyond Dr. Mayland’s initial interview with Clark.

Dr. Mayland testified that, based upon psychological 

factors arising from Clark’s childhood, lifestyle, and drug 

use, he possessed “serious doubt” regarding whether Clark 

could have understood and intelligently waived his Miranda

rights on July 19, 1985. During cross-examination, the 

prosecution asked Dr. Mayland what Clark told him about 

the crimes. Dr. Mayland testified that Clark told him details 

about the crimes on two separate occasions—first, in the 

initial interview at the Mendocino County Jail several days 

after Clark’s arrest, and second, in a meeting about a month 

after that initial interview. Dr. Mayland reviewed his notes 

and read them at the suppression hearing.

In Clark’s first account to Dr. Mayland, Clark told 

Dr. Mayland that he met Grover, that Grover performed oral 

sex on Clark, and that Grover and Clark had consensual 

sexual intercourse. According to Dr. Mayland’s notes, Clark 

told Dr. Mayland that Grover said, “If I don’t get pregnant, 

I won’t cry rape.” Clark then stated, “If you cry rape, this is 

what’s going to happen to you,” and he then “put [his] hands 

on her neck.” Then, Clark stated he “blacked out.” Clark 

woke up to Grover “all bloody” and got “scared.” He then 

“ran back to the car, [and] changed his pants and jacket” at 

Michelle’s house.

In Clark’s second account to Dr. Mayland, Clark stated 

that he grabbed Grover and pulled her behind a building and 

demanded of Grover, “Why don’t you show me some tit, 

bitch” and “suck my dick” (referred to herein as the “lewd 

statements”). Grover asked him what he wanted, and Clark 

pointed to his genital area. Grover said that she would give 

Clark one hundred dollars to come to her home. Clark said 

no because Grover would just turn him in. Clark told Grover 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 15

to take off her clothes. Clark said that Grover was scared 

and that Clark acted “mean.” Grover said to Clark, “Please 

don’t hurt me. I’ll do anything you want.” Clark then had 

sexual intercourse with Grover. Afterwards, Clark asked if

Grover was “going to cry rape.” Clark said, “If you say 

anything, . . . this is what’s going to happen to you if you cry 

rape.” Then, Clark began to choke Grover. According to 

Dr. Mayland’s notes, Clark stated: “I was scared she was 

going to suffer, so I— . . . I didn’t mean to. I lost control. 

She was still jittering. I stabbed her. I was trying to get it 

over. I figured I already killed her and didn’t want her to 

suffer. She totally stopped moving. I ran. Went back to the 

car and changed clothes.”

The state court ruled that the prosecutor could use at trial 

Clark’s statements to Dr. Mayland to impeach Clark’s 

experts, that “tendering of the psychiatric defense” waived 

any Fifth and Sixth Amendment privileges, and that Clark 

waived the statutory attorney-client and psychotherapistpatient privileges.

Allen and Brown both thought that the trial judge had 

assured them that Dr. Mayland’s testimony at the pre-trial 

suppression hearing would not be admissible at trial for any 

purpose. According to counsel, this agreement occurred in 

an unreported in-chambers conference during the 

suppression hearing. Clark was not present during this 

conference. Defense Investigator Howard McPherson also 

understood that the trial judge had assured Allen that 

Dr. Mayland’s testimony would not be admissible at trial for 

any purpose. The trial judge later stated that he did not recall 

any such discussion in chambers.

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B. The Trial

Voir dire on the case started on October 20, 1986, and 

the presentation of evidence began on March 9, 1987.

1. The Guilt Phase

a. The Prosecution’s Case at the Guilt Phase

At trial, the prosecution called experts to testify to the 

gruesome nature of the crimes. The prosecution also 

introduced evidence regarding Clark’s confessions by 

calling the detectives to testify regarding Clark’s confession 

in the patrol car and playing the recording of Clark’s taped 

confession at the police station.

The autopsy confirmed that Grover was raped, stabbed, 

and beaten. The autopsy was performed under the direction 

of Dr. Boyd Stephens, who testified at trial. Dr. Stephens 

opined that the lacerations to Grover’s vaginal area were 

consistent with nonconsensual sexual intercourse, and sperm 

was found inside and outside her vagina. Dr. Stephens could 

not make a conclusive finding on whether sodomy had 

occurred. No trauma to the anal opening was observed, but 

a “rare” sperm was found in the anus.

Dr. Stephens testified that, although two of the ten stab 

wounds penetrated Grover’s heart and lungs and could have 

independently killed her, the actual cause of death was blunt 

trauma to the head and neck. Dr. Stephens could not 

determine how many blows had been struck, but nineteen 

separate areas of blunt trauma were visible. Grover’s face 

was bludgeoned so extensively that her facial structure was 

collapsed and her brain tissue exuded through her skull 

fractures. There was no conclusive evidence of attempted 

strangulation, in large part because the blunt trauma injuries 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 17

were so extensive that they obscured any signs of 

strangulation that would have normally been present.

A criminalist testified about tests performed on the 

physical evidence. Analysis of the blood splatters on Clark’s 

jeans revealed enzymes consistent with both Clark’s and 

Grover’s blood. A hair found on one of Clark’s shoes was 

consistent with Grover’s hair. Clark could not be ruled out 

as the source of semen. The concrete blocks had traces of 

blood and hair consistent with Grover’s. The sharpened 

screwdriver found in Smith’s car approximately a week after 

the murder bore traces of human blood.

The prosecution’s strategy to fight Clark’s theory of 

“rage reaction” was, during cross-examination of the defense 

witnesses, to rely on Dr. Mayland’s second account of 

meeting with Clark, including the two lewd statements. The 

prosecution used the testimony to compel the defense 

experts to admit that Clark’s actions were goal-oriented, and 

thus is inconsistent with a rage reaction.

b. The Defense’s Case at the Guilt Phase

Clark did not dispute at trial that he killed Grover, but 

instead, the defense strategy at trial was to argue Clark 

lacked the intent to kill her. The defense asserted that Clark 

had emotional difficulties and chronic drug use that resulted 

in a “rage reaction” during the crimes. Defense counsel 

argued that “a person who goes into a rage [reaction] is not 

acting with intent.”

The defense’s case centered around disputing that Clark 

was able to form the requisite state of mind to kill based on 

his emotional difficulties, severe depression, and chronic 

drug use that culminated in a “rage reaction” on the night of 

the murder. The defense called several witnesses to testify 

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18 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

that Clark used drugs from an early age and regularly 

ingested alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine. 

Witnesses also testified that Clark was severely depressed, 

attempted suicide in February 1985, and increased his drug 

usage following the suicide attempt.

Clark also called numerous expert witnesses during the 

guilt phase to support the rage reaction theory. These 

included Dr. Randall Baselt, a forensic toxicologist, who 

testified regarding his analysis of the blood sample taken 

from Clark shortly after arrest. Dr. Baselt testified to traces 

of marijuana and Valium in Clark’s blood.

Dr. Ronald Roberts, a clinical psychologist for the 

defense, conducted testing on Clark to determine his thencurrent psychological functioning and whether he suffered 

from any neuropsychological deficits. Dr. Roberts testified 

about his test results. The prosecution cross-examined 

Dr. Roberts by using the two lewd statements in Clark’s 

second account to Dr. Mayland. Dr. Roberts testified that 

Clark had not mentioned making those statements to Grover, 

but had told Dr. Roberts that Grover tried to talk Clark out 

of forcing her to have sex.

Dr. David Smith, the medical director of the Haight 

Ashbury Free Medical Clinic, testified extensively about the 

effects of methamphetamine abuse and the phenomenon of 

a “rage reaction.” He also testified that the extent of 

debilitative drug effect cannot be determined by the level of 

methamphetamine in the blood, because the effect of 

dosages taken over time is cumulative. On direct 

examination, Dr. Smith testified that “[a] rational, goaloriented reaction to the sensory stimulus” was less likely to 

reflect impairment or a so-called rage reaction.

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 19

On cross-examination, the prosecution attempted to 

show that Clark was engaging in goal-oriented behavior and 

thus not having a rage reaction. The prosecution relied on 

testimony in the record and Dr. Mayland’s second account 

to create a hypothetical “goal.” The prosecution asked Smith 

to consider this hypothetical: “Assume that at about 

11:00 p.m. at night a man says to certain acquaintances of 

his I’m going to go out and steal something and I’m going to

screw somebody up or beat somebody up.” Dr. Smith agreed 

that this was a “rational goal-oriented statement.” The 

prosecution then asked if a series of hypothetical actions, 

such as stealing a battery, obtaining a sharpened screwdriver, 

and grabbing a woman and pulling her behind a building, 

were consistent with this hypothetical 11:00 p.m. goaloriented statement. Dr. Smith agreed they were.

The prosecution then asked about the two lewd 

statements that Dr. Mayland testified about: Clark’s 

statements to Dr. Mayland that he demanded of Grover 

“Why don’t you show me some tit, bitch” and “suck my 

dick.” The prosecution asked if these statements were 

consistent with the goal reflected in the hypothetical. Based 

on the defense’s objection and after the judge’s sidebar with 

counsel outside the presence of the jury, the judge ultimately 

concluded that both lewd statements could be used as 

hypotheticals in the cross-examination of Dr. Smith. The 

judge admonished the jury that it could not consider the 

statements for their truth, but “only as it may assist you in 

understanding the opinion of this expert now on the stand.” 

Dr. Smith agreed that both lewd statements were consistent 

with the goal reflected in the hypothetical. The prosecution 

also asked if, assuming hypothetically, some of the other 

details of Clark’s statements, including removing Grover’s 

clothing, reacting to her threat of reporting him for rape, and 

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killing Grover, were consistent with goal-oriented behavior. 

Dr. Smith agreed that they were.

Dr. Stephen Raffle, a psychiatrist for the defense, 

testified regarding Clark’s mental condition at the time of the 

murder. Dr. Raffle testified that Clark had suffered a rage 

reaction, and Dr. Raffle diagnosed Clark with a borderline 

personality disorder. The prosecution asked Dr. Raffle 

whether Clark admitted to Dr. Raffle that the sexual

intercourse was forced, and Dr. Raffle said yes. During the 

cross-examination of Dr. Raffle, Dr. Raffle agreed that Clark 

had been lying at some points in his rendition of the story. 

Dr. Raffle also agreed during cross-examination that Clark 

could be psychopathic and brilliant, rather than having a rage 

reaction, based on his lying.

Later in Dr. Raffle’s testimony, the prosecution asked 

Dr. Raffle to assume the truth of all of the details of 

Dr. Mayland’s testimony regarding Clark’s second account. 

After the prosecution went through Dr. Mayland’s

testimony, the prosecution asked Dr. Raffle whether he 

believed Clark’s statements about his remorse were genuine. 

Dr. Raffle testified that he believed they reflected true 

remorse at the time.

The prosecution also asked Dr. Raffle about Dr. Beaber’s 

letter. Dr. Raffle responded: “It does not give me any of his 

clinical data, nor do I have available to me any of his clinical 

data for analysis.”

c. The Verdict

On June 22, 1987, the jury convicted Clark of firstdegree murder and rape under California Penal Code § 187 

and § 261(2). The jury also found true the special 

circumstance allegations: (a) that Clark committed the 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 21

murder during the course of the rape under 

§ 190.2(a)(17)(iii); (b) that he inflicted bodily injury with the 

intent to do so under § 1203.075(a)(1); and (c) that he used 

a deadly weapon (a screwdriver) in the commission of the 

murder under § 12022(b).

2. The Penalty Phase

a. The Prosecution’s Case at the Penalty Phase

Relying on the circumstances of the murder, the 

prosecution presented no aggravating evidence during the 

penalty phase.

b. The Defense’s Case at the Penalty Phase

The defense presented the testimony of 23 witnesses in 

mitigation, including Clark’s family members, friends, 

scoutmasters, a teacher, and a mental health counselor. The 

mitigating evidence focused on Clark’s deteriorated family 

situation, Clark’s father’s death, and Clark’s drug use and 

mental health problems. The California Supreme Court’s 

decision on direct appeal provides a recitation of Clark’s life 

history presented by the defense at the penalty phase:

Defendant was the eldest child of Diane 

and Paul Dean Clark and the brother of 

Robert and Annette. Although some 

testimony indicated that defendant’s father 

drank and was abusive, defendant’s family 

life was relatively stable until his parents’ 

separation and his father’s subsequent death. 

While his parents were together, defendant 

was active in the Boy Scouts and his parents 

served as scoutmasters. Several witnesses 

remembered defendant as an “excellent” or 

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22 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

“good” scout, who interacted well with his 

peers.

Numerous witnesses recounted how 

defendant’s family situation deteriorated 

dramatically after his parents’ separation, 

which occurred when defendant was about 

10 years old. Defendant’s mother worked 

menial jobs, often at night. The children were 

generally left unsupervised. Defendant’s 

mother developed a drinking problem. After 

her shift, she would not go home to the 

children, but instead would stop to have a few 

drinks at the local tavern. Defendant’s 

mother failed to provide a sanitary home or 

nutritious food for the children. Extensive 

testimony described the filthy conditions of 

the home. Defendant tried to care for his 

younger sister in his mother’s absence and to 

subdue the aggressive behavior of his 

brother.

After his father’s death, which was 

followed closely by the deaths of both his 

paternal and maternal grandfathers, witnesses 

noticed a change in defendant’s behavior. 

Defendant became chronically depressed and 

stayed withdrawn in his room for extended 

periods of time.

About this time, defendant and his 

brother began to drink and use drugs. Their 

house became the neighborhood “party 

house” and was akin to a “riot area.” There 

was conflicting testimony regarding whether 

defendant would ingest intoxicants when he 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 23

was caring for his sister. Several of the 

friends who frequented the defendant’s house 

testified that he was not “the violent type” 

and frequently broke up physical fights.

During this period of time, defendant and 

his siblings would occasionally visit a ranch 

owned by his maternal grandmother. His 

grandmother and other relatives remembered 

defendant as a hard worker who volunteered 

to do tasks at the ranch.

Defendant and his family received 

counseling from the fall of 1980 through 

March of 1983. The counseling was 

precipitated by a fight between defendant and 

his brother. The counselor found defendant 

to be depressed and frustrated in school due 

to a reading problem. Defendant was 

cooperative during counseling and seemed to 

care for his family.

Eventually defendant was removed from 

his mother’s custody and placed in a foster 

home. He apparently thrived in the 

structured environment. Defendant had a 

“beautiful” relationship with the other 

children in the home. However, he 

occasionally drank beer and smoked 

marijuana with his foster mother’s son. 

While living at the foster home, defendant 

was enrolled in a special education program, 

which began to address his significant 

reading deficiency as well as his emotional 

problems. Defendant was a responsible 

student and did well in his classes. He was 

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24 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

popular and would defend other children. He 

continued to have a problem with drug usage 

during the school day, which his teacher 

attributed to a need to escape the pain and 

anger he felt about his mother and brother.

When defendant graduated from high 

school, he was forced to leave his foster 

home. He worked at the Aloha Saw and 

Mower Shop. The owner remembered him as 

a reliable worker with a good attitude. He 

lived for a time with Keith Michalek. Both 

Keith and his father recalled defendant as a 

good, trustworthy person, who was never 

“rowdy.” While he was living with Keith, he 

drank beer and smoked marijuana 

occasionally, but did not use “hard” drugs.

Defendant’s mother convinced defendant 

to quit his job and come live with her in 

Anderson. His mother later moved to Oregon 

without him. Prior to his mother’s move, 

defendant tried to commit suicide, apparently 

as the result of a failed romantic relationship.

While he was living in Anderson, 

defendant began to care for Smith. Robert 

Clark testified that Smith was a heroin addict. 

About three months before the murder, 

defendant injected methamphetamine for the 

first time.

Numerous witnesses testified that they 

could not believe that defendant had 

committed the crimes for which he was 

convicted.

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Finally, the jury heard that while he was 

awaiting his trial, defendant continued his 

attempt to overcome his reading deficiency 

by working with a counselor from the 

Mendocino County Adult Literacy Program.

People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099, 1145–46 (Cal. 1993).

c. The Penalty

On August 14, 1987, the jury imposed the death penalty 

upon Clark. On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court 

issued a reasoned decision on August 30, 1993, affirming 

Clark’s conviction and sentence. Clark, 857 P.2d at 1110.

In its decision, the court rejected Clark’s claims of conflict 

of interest (uncertified Claims 5 and 6). Id. at 1130–32. On 

June 30, 1994, the United States Supreme Court denied his 

petition for writ of certiorari. Clark v. California, 512 U.S. 

1253 (1994).

C. Post-Conviction

1. Post-Conviction Issues

a. Manda Report

On July 19, 1985 (the day of the murder), Deputy Glenn 

Manda of the Mendocino County Sheriff’s office prepared a 

coroner’s report (the “Manda Report”). Post-conviction, 

Clark contends that this is exculpatory evidence that was 

withheld by the prosecution during trial.

According to the report, which states it was filled out at 

11:00 a.m., Deputy Manda conducted an autopsy at the 

mortuary, which revealed puncture wounds on Grover’s 

upper back near the spine. The report also states that Deputy 

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Manda notified the Ukiah Police Department, and Detective 

Gall arrived at the mortuary to take photos of the body.

b. Jailhouse Report

On October 17, 1985, one of the guards at Mendocino 

County Jail wrote an “Inmate Safety Report,” expressing 

concern for Clark’s safety. The report states that “[i]nmates 

in [the] exercise yard hinted that Richard Clark may be 

assaulted tonight.” The report further relayed that inmates 

Barella, Hull, Brackett, and Strobridge “stated that Clark 

might not make it through the night” and “he should be 

moved or else he would be assaulted due to Clark’s cocky 

attitude and lack of remorse.” The report commented that 

“[t]he inmates would not be specific, but felt we should be 

warned.” The reporting guard advised his supervisor of the 

situation, and “Clark [was] moved to Isolation for his own 

protection.”

The jailhouse report was admitted into evidence during 

trial. The state asked Dr. Raffle questions about the report 

during cross-examination in an effort to impeach 

Dr. Raffle’s opinion that Clark was remorseful about his 

crimes. The only objection to this line of questioning was 

that the defendant had not received a copy of the report.

During post-conviction proceedings, the defense 

obtained declarations of two of the inmates named in the 

report. In his 1998 declaration, Inmate Robert Brackett 

stated: he was then in custody with Clark; he was at that time 

represented by Public Defender Brown; Clark “never said or 

did anything that indicated lack of remorse”; and Clark “did 

not act cocky or proud in any way.” In his 1998 declaration, 

Inmate John Strobridge stated: Clark never said or did 

anything or acted in any way that showed a lack of remorse; 

Strobridge never thought that Clark was cocky; Clark never 

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bragged about the crimes; and Clark once said: “I was so out 

of my mind on drugs. I wish it never happened.”

c. Juror Communication with a Minister

In 1996, about nine years after Clark’s conviction, one 

of the jurors, Frederick Barnes, declared that during the trial 

he had consulted with a minister about the death penalty. 

Specifically, Juror Barnes declared:

During the guilt phase of the trial, it became 

clear that the special circumstances would be 

found to be true and that there would be a 

penalty phase. I consulted with a minister 

about the propriety of imposing the death 

penalty. I explained to him my role in the 

trial and the facts of the case. He told me that 

in these circumstances the death sentence 

would be appropriate because the Bible says, 

“an eye for an eye.” The minister’s advice 

was useful. I had long believed that anyone 

who is guilty of murder and convicted with a 

special circumstance should be given the 

death penalty.

At oral argument in this appeal on April 16, 2019, the 

state’s attorney presented for the first time on appeal a 

declaration by Investigator Randall Wong, dated September 

3, 1997. The state’s attorney conceded at oral argument that 

the declaration was not in the excerpts of record. 

Subsequently, the state added the declaration as a 

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supplement to the excerpts of record.1 Investigator Wong 

stated in his declaration:

On August 4, 1997, Mr. Kaster and I 

interviewed Mr. Barnes at his residence in 

San Jose, California. Mr. Barnes was asked 

about that part of his declaration which states 

that he consulted with a minister during the 

guilt phase. The declaration states that Mr. 

Barnes explained to the minister his “role in 

the trial and the facts of the case.”

Mr. Barnes told Mr. Kaster and myself 

that he had asked the minister how the 

minister felt about the death penalty issue. 

The minister replied that the Bible says “an 

eye for an eye” and said he did not question 

the death penalty. Mr. Barnes also said that 

the minister’s statement did not settle the 

issue; the evidence in the case was the main 

thing that made Mr. Barnes decide on the 

death penalty.

1 In 1997, the state hired Investigator Randall Wong to interview 

Juror Barnes to obtain more information regarding the alleged 

conversation between Barnes and his minister. Investigator Wong 

prepared a declaration describing the results of the interview. According 

to the district court, the state put this declaration into evidence during 

Clark’s state habeas proceeding. Three years later, the state sought to 

introduce the declaration in the federal proceedings (over Clark’s 

objections) in support of its motion for summary judgment. The district 

court did not rule on Clark’s objections, but instead expressly declined 

to consider Wong’s declaration when it ruled on the summary judgment 

motion. The district court did not mention the Wong declaration in its 

April 2014 order.

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Mr. Barnes told us that he had not 

discussed the evidence from the trial with his 

minister. When the declaration was 

presented to him by Clark’s agents he had 

missed that part which refers to “the facts of

the case.” Also, Mr. Barnes said that the talk 

with the minister came not during the guilt 

phase but around the time the penalty phase 

was starting or about to start.

2. Post-Conviction Proceedings

a. State Habeas Corpus Petitions

Meanwhile, on February 18, 1993, Clark filed a state 

petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the California 

Supreme Court summarily denied on the merits on 

November 17, 1993. On May 1, 1997, Clark filed a second 

state habeas petition, which the California Supreme Court 

denied on August 13, 1998, finding several claims 

procedurally barred under California rules and also rejecting 

all the claims on the merits. In his first state petition, Clark 

raised the issues that have been designated in this federal 

proceeding as certified Issues 4, 5, and 6 and uncertified 

Claims 8, 11, and 36, and in his second state petition, Clark 

raised certified Issues 1, 2, and 3 and uncertified Claims 14F, 

14L, 15B, 18, and 20.

b. Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions

On April 19, 1995, Clark filed a federal petition for writ 

of habeas corpus in the Northern District of California under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. After he filed an amended federal petition 

in July 1996, unexhausted claims were identified and Clark 

was granted leave to return to state court to file an amended 

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state petition, and the federal proceedings were stayed 

pending exhaustion of state court remedies.

When Clark returned to federal court, he filed another 

amended federal habeas petition in 1998. The state filed a 

combined answer to the amended petition and motion for 

summary judgment on all claims. Clark opposed the motion 

for summary judgment and filed a cross-motion for summary 

judgment. A hearing was conducted on the issues. On May 

8, 2000, the district court (Judge Ware) granted summary 

judgment in favor of the state on the vast majority of the 

claims. Judge Ware also found an evidentiary hearing to be 

necessary on Claim 19 (a shackling question, which is not 

raised on appeal). On June 5, 2000, the district court filed 

an order permitting Clark to file a request for an evidentiary 

hearing for claims that included the claims for which the 

district court had already granted summary judgment.

Immediately after the court’s order, Clark filed a 400-

page motion for evidentiary hearing. After further 

extensions of time and briefings and after Clark filed another 

amended federal habeas petition in July 2005, the district 

court denied Clark’s motion for an evidentiary hearing 

without prejudice. From May 2006 through 2009, the 

proceedings were delayed further and the parties filed 

several status reports updating the court.2

On September 22, 2009, Clark filed his operative fifth 

amended federal habeas petition, alleging thirty-four claims 

for relief, including the six certified and ten uncertified 

2 From May 2006 until May 2007, the proceedings were stayed to 

allow Clark time to investigate the accuracy of declarations before the 

court, which may have been falsified by investigator Kathleen Culhane, 

who had been charged with falsifying declarations and witness 

statements. Several declarations were later withdrawn.

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 31

claims on appeal here. The state answered in May 2010, and 

the deadline for completing discovery was extended several 

times by request of both parties.

On August 1, 2012, Clark filed a renewed motion for an 

evidentiary hearing. On September 5, 2012, the case was 

reassigned from Judge Ware to Judge Alsup. On April 1, 

2014, the district court denied Clark’s motion for renewed 

evidentiary hearing, his writ of habeas corpus as to all of his 

claims for relief, and his request for a COA. Final judgment 

issued, and this appeal followed.

c. The Current Appeal

On September 4, 2015, we granted in part Clark’s motion 

for COA on six claims. Clark raised the ten uncertified 

claims in his opening brief. The parties filed supplemental 

briefs first in response to our order to address uncertified 

Claims 5, 6, 11, 14L, 18, and 20 with particularized focuses 

directed by the court. Subsequently, the parties filed 

supplemental briefs in response to our order to address the 

impact, if any, of Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 

2017) (en banc), and of Williams v. Filson, 908 F.3d 546 (9th 

Cir. 2018). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1294 

and § 2253.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

AEDPA, which implemented changes to statutes 

governing federal habeas corpus petitions for state and 

federal prisoners, applies only to those cases that were filed 

after its effective date of April 24, 1996. Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 481–82 (2000); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 326–27 (1997). Where a petitioner files an amended 

petition, the filing date of the original petition is the 

controlling date for purposes of determining whether 

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AEDPA applies. Thomas v. Chappell, 678 F.3d 1086, 1100–

01 (9th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 994–95 

(9th Cir. 2010). Here, Clark filed his original petition in 

1995, before AEDPA’s effective date. Pre-AEDPA 

standards thus govern his habeas petition.

Under pre-AEDPA standards, both questions of law and 

mixed questions of law and fact are subject to de novo 

review, which means that a federal habeas court owes no 

deference to a state court’s resolution of such questions. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 400; Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 

1195 (9th Cir. 1994) (reviewing conflict of interest claim in 

habeas petition as a mixed question of fact and law subject 

to de novo review). For factual findings under pre-AEDPA 

standards, the state court is entitled to a presumption of 

correctness unless one of the exceptions to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d) (1991) is met, including, as relevant here:

(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were 

not resolved in the State court hearing; 

(2) that the factfinding procedure employed 

by the State court was not adequate to afford 

a full and fair hearing; (3) that the material 

facts were not adequately developed at the 

State court hearing; . . . (6) that the applicant 

did not receive a full, fair, and adequate 

hearing in the State court proceeding; or 

(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied 

due process of law in the State court 

proceeding; (8) or unless that part of the 

record of the State court proceeding . . . is 

produced . . . and the Federal court on a 

consideration of such part of the record as a 

whole concludes that such factual 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 33

determination is not fairly supported by the 

record . . . .

Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 592 & n.1 (1982) (per 

curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1991)). The 

petitioner carries the burden to establish by convincing 

evidence that the state court’s factual determination was 

erroneous. Id.

Dismissals based on state procedural default are 

reviewed de novo. See Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1099; Griffin 

v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 2003). When “a state 

prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court 

pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural 

rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the 

prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, 

or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result 

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).

Under pre-AEDPA standards, we review a district 

court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of 

discretion. Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 

1999).

IV. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Clark raises sixteen claims, of which six were 

certified: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 

advise Clark to accept a plea offer; (2) violation of Clark’s 

rights to due process and an impartial jury by juror 

misconduct; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for calling 

Dr. Mayland to testify at the pre-trial suppression hearing; 

(4) ineffective assistance of counsel in preparing and 

presenting expert testimony; (5) ineffective assistance of 

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counsel for failing to investigate and present evidence of 

Clark’s fetal alcohol exposure, traumatic birth, and the 

ensuing effects on both; and (6) ineffective assistance of 

counsel for failure to argue that Dino Stevens was an 

alternative suspect or co-participant and prosecutorial 

misconduct in failing to disclose information about Dino. 

Clark also raises ten uncertified claims.

A. Evidentiary Hearing

Clark argues that the district court erred in denying his 

motion for an evidentiary hearing for all claims. The district 

court found that Clark had not “presented . . . colorable 

claim[s] of” relief and that all subsequently certified claims, 

as well as all of the uncertified claims could be “resolved on 

the record.” Furthermore, the district court reasoned that 

denial of an evidentiary hearing was warranted for Claim 36 

(cumulative error) because “none of the errors alleged in the 

fifth amended petition[] warrant relief.”

Under pre-AEDPA standards, a petitioner is entitled to 

an evidentiary hearing if he can show: (1) the allegations, if 

proven, would entitle him to relief, and (2) the state court 

trier of fact had not reliably found the relevant facts after a 

full and fair hearing. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 

312–13 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. TamayoReyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); see also Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 

1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). We have found that the first 

prong requires that a petitioner “establish[] a colorable claim 

for relief,” based on allegations of “specific facts which, if 

true, would entitle him to relief.” Earp, 431 F.3d at 1167 & 

n.4 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998), overruling on other grounds 

recognized by Apelt v. Ryan, 878 F.3d 800, 827–28 (9th Cir. 

2017)). And, for the second prong, we have held that the 

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petitioner must show that he “has never been afforded a state 

or federal hearing on this claim.” Id. at 1167.

However, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is not required on 

allegations that are ‘conclusory and wholly devoid of 

specifics’” or “on issues that can be resolved by reference to 

the state court record.” Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 679 

(9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting Boehme v. Maxwell, 

423 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1970)). Nor is an evidentiary 

hearing required if “there are no disputed facts and the claim 

presents a purely legal question.” Hendricks v. 

Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992).

As subsequently explained, reference to the state court 

record resolves Issues 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and Claims 5, 6, 11, 

14L, and 20. See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 679. Clark’s Claims 

8, 14F, and 18 raise allegations that are conclusory and 

wholly devoid of specifics. See id. Claim 15B, fails on the 

second prong of Townsend because Clark has already been 

“afforded a state . . . hearing on this claim.” Earp, 431 F.3d 

at 1167. Furthermore, even viewed cumulatively (Claim 

36), Clark has not shown that relief is warranted, and thus an 

evidentiary hearing is not needed to resolve this claim. See 

id. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of an 

evidentiary hearing for all of these listed claims because 

Clark has not presented a colorable claim of relief. We 

reserve for the district court to determine on remand whether 

Issue 2 warrants an evidentiary hearing in light of Godoy v. 

Spearman, 861 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

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B. Certified Claims

1. Issue 1: We deny Clark’s claim that trial counsel 

was ineffective by advising him to reject the plea 

offer.

Clark argues that trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel because he recommended Clark reject 

the state’s plea offer for life without parole. Specifically, 

Clark argues that Allen’s recommendation constituted 

ineffective assistance because Allen gave unsound advice 

that Clark was likely to get second-degree murder.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed 

by Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. To prevail, the defendant’s 

burden is two-pronged. “First, the defendant must show that 

counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id. at 687. “Second, 

the defendant must show that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense.” Id. Even in a pre-AEDPA case, 

“[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 

deferential.” Id. at 689.

To show deficient performance, the defendant must 

show that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. This requires 

“showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 

was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. “A fair 

assessment of attorney performance requires that every 

effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Thus, “a court 

must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.” Id. “[T]he defendant must overcome the 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 37

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id.

(quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

The Supreme Court has extended the Sixth Amendment 

right to effective assistance of counsel to plea negotiations. 

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012); Lafler v. 

Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012). In Padilla v. Kentucky, 

where counsel failed to inform his client of the consequence 

of deportation from accepting a plea, the Supreme Court held 

that “a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to 

reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 

circumstances.” 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010). The defendant, 

though, has “the ultimate authority” to determine “whether 

to plead guilty.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 

Counsel’s role, then, is to “both consult with the defendant 

and obtain consent to the recommended course of action.” 

Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). In other words, 

the “role of counsel” under the Sixth Amendment is to 

“advis[e] a client about a plea offer and an ensuing guilty 

plea” and to provide “legal aid and advice [to] help” a 

criminal defendant exercise his ultimate authority in making 

a decision. Frye, 566 U.S. at 140, 144 (quoting Massiah v. 

United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964)).

We need not reach Clark’s argument that Allen’s 

performance was constitutionally deficient. Even if Allen’s 

performance could have been construed as constitutionally 

deficient, Clark had the benefit of multiple attorneys. We 

read the Sixth Amendment “not [to] include the right to 

receive good advice from every lawyer a criminal defendant 

consults about his case.” United States v. Martini, 31 F.3d 

781, 782 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). We share the Sixth 

Circuit’s perspective that as the Sixth Amendment’s 

“recitations have been framed and phrased, they encompass 

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38 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

an affirmative right (the right to effective assistance of 

counsel at critical proceedings), not a negative right (the 

right to be completely free from ineffective assistance).” 

Logan v. United States, 910 F.3d 864, 870 (6th Cir. 2018), 

cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1589 (2019). When a “petitioner 

receive[s] both competent and deficient advice on whether 

to accept [a] plea offer . . . [s]uch conflicting advice 

undercuts [the petitioner]’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.” Id. at 869–70.

Clark not only received informative advice from Allen 

but also from his other attorney, Brown. As noted in Dr. 

Mayland’s 2005 declaration: “Mr. Brown and I tried very 

hard to get [Clark] to accept the plea offer.” Having been 

advised by both counsel, Clark ultimately “decided to go to 

trial.” “[W]hen a defendant receives the necessary 

information to make a call, the fact that the ultimate decision 

is left to him does not render counsel absent or ineffective.” 

Id. at 871. Here, as Allen declared, “[t]here was a division 

in the defense camp” with Allen recommending trial and 

“Brown [thinking] the plea was the best option.” “Such 

conflicting advice undercuts [Clark]’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” Id. at 870.

Because Clark received adequate assistance at the pleabargain stage, we conclude that he “received his Sixth 

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, 

regardless of [Allen’s and Brown’s] contradictory advice.” 

Id. We deny relief on Issue 1.

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 39

2. Issue 2: In light of Godoy v. Spearman, we 

remand for further proceedings on Clark’s claim 

that his rights to due process and an impartial jury 

were violated when a juror communicated with 

his minister.

Clark argues that his rights to due process and an 

impartial jury trial were violated because one of the jurors 

consulted with his minister about the case during trial.

The Sixth Amendment ensures a right to an impartial 

jury. Claims of improper juror contact with a third party are 

governed by the Mattox/Remmer framework. In Mattox v. 

United States, the Supreme Court underscored that “[i]t is 

vital in capital cases that the jury should pass upon the case 

free from external causes tending to disturb the exercise of 

deliberate and unbiased judgment.” 146 U.S. 140, 149 

(1892), called into doubt on other grounds by Warger v. 

Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 526–27 (2014). The Court 

emphasized that: “Private communications, possibly 

prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, 

or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and 

invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is 

made to appear.” Id. at 150 (granting a new trial where a 

bailiff remarked to jurors that the defendant had killed two 

other people and where a newspaper article discussing the 

trial and the defendant’s criminal history was brought into 

the jury room).

The Supreme Court in Remmer v. United States built 

upon Mattox, holding that “[t]he presumption is not 

conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the 

Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the 

defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to 

the defendant.” 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). The Court 

explained that “a hearing with all interested parties” should 

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40 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

be conducted to “determine the circumstances, the impact 

thereof upon the juror, and whether or not [the contact] was 

prejudicial.” Id. at 230 (remanding for a hearing where FBI 

agents contacted a juror regarding an alleged attempt to bribe 

the juror and where the district court and prosecution ex 

parte determined that the communication was harmless 

without hearing from or informing the defendant).

In Godoy, we combined the analyses of Mattox and 

Remmer into a “two-step framework”:

When a defendant alleges improper contact 

between a juror and an outside party, the 

court asks at step one whether the contact was 

“possibly prejudicial.” Mattox, 146 U.S. 

at 150. If so, the contact is “deemed 

presumptively prejudicial” and the court 

moves to step two, where the “burden rests 

heavily upon the [state] to establish” the 

contact was actually “harmless.” Remmer, 

347 U.S. at 229. If the state does not prove 

harmlessness, the court sets aside the verdict. 

When the presumption arises but the 

prejudicial effect of the contact is unclear, the 

trial court must hold a “hearing” to 

“determine the circumstances [of the 

contact], the impact thereof upon the juror, 

and whether or not it was 

prejudicial.” Id. at 229–30.

861 F.3d at 962 (alterations in original) (parallel citations 

omitted) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing where a juror 

allegedly communicated with a “judge friend” about the case 

while it was ongoing).

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As an initial matter, even before triggering the 

presumption, Godoy stresses that a determination must be 

made into the type of contact at issue. “We recognize the 

practical impossibility of shielding jurors from all contact

with the outside world, and also that not all such contacts 

risk influencing the verdict.” Id. at 967 (emphasis added). 

“[D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror 

has been placed in a potentially compromising 

situation.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982); see 

also Tarango v. McDaniel, 837 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 

2016). For example, “chance contacts between witnesses 

and jury members—while passing in the hall or crowded 

together in an elevator,” do not trigger the presumption 

because they are “[t]hreadbare or speculative allegations” of 

misconduct. Godoy, 861 F.3d at 967 (quoting Tarango, 

837 F.3d at 947, 951); see also United States v. Hendrix, 

549 F.2d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that “not every 

incident of juror misconduct or bias requires a new trial”). 

Thus, folded into defendant’s burden at step one, before 

triggering the presumption, is a showing that the juror’s 

contact with the non-juror was “sufficiently improper.” 

Godoy, 861 F.3d at 967 (emphasis added).

Once the contact has been determined to be sufficiently 

improper, the court moves on to the second half of the first 

step: determining whether the sufficiently improper contact 

gives rise to a “credible risk of affecting the outcome of the 

case.” Id. at 967 (emphasis added). Godoy instructs that 

“the defendant’s burden at step one to show a possibility of 

prejudice is not onerous.” Id. at 968. Because “highly 

troubling contacts do not necessarily raise a presumption of 

prejudice,” courts “consider[] the full context of the contact 

to determine whether a credible risk of prejudice exists.” Id. 

at 967. For example, was the communication significant 

because it was with a non-juror who was “deeply entangled 

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42 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

in [the] case” (such as a bailiff, law enforcement agent, 

victim, or witness), or was the communication “innocuous”? 

Id. at 967–68 (alteration in original) (quoting Tarango, 

837 F.3d at 949). To determine “whether the 

communication raised a risk of influencing the verdict,” the 

court may consider factors such as “the length and nature of 

the contact, the identity and role at trial of the parties 

involved, evidence of actual impact on the juror, and the 

possibility of eliminating prejudice through a limiting 

instruction.” Caliendo v. Warden of Cal. Men’s Colony, 

365 F.3d 691, 697–98 (9th Cir. 2004). Taking the 

“surrounding circumstances” into consideration, when the 

juror’s improper communication with a non-juror interferes 

with the juror’s role as a juror and infects the jury as a whole, 

it raises a credible risk of affecting the outcome. Godoy

establishes that when the juror’s communication is 

sufficiently improper to raise a credible risk of affecting the 

outcome, then there is a presumption of prejudice. 861 F.3d 

at 968.

Once the presumption of prejudice is triggered, the 

burden shifts to the state “to disprove prejudice.” Id. at 959. 

Godoy illustrates a cautionary tale in its finding that the 

California Court of Appeal erred by “not requir[ing] the state 

to make any showing at step two.” Id. at 964. The state must 

present “contrary evidence” and “[i]t is not enough, as the 

state court did [in Godoy], to draw contrary inferences from 

the same statement that established the presumption in the 

first place.” Id. at 959; see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs 

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (finding that, upon the 

burden shifting, when the defendant “is silent in the face of 

the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the 

plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case”). We 

provided an instructive, non-exhaustive list of examples in 

Godoy, including that the prosecution could point to 

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“contrary evidence elsewhere in the existing record that 

sheds new light on the potentially prejudicial 

communication.” Godoy, 861 F.3d at 969. Or, if the 

prejudicial effect is “unclear from the existing record,” a 

hearing may allow the court to “determine the circumstances 

[of the improper contact], the impact thereof upon the juror, 

and whether or not it was prejudicial.” Id. at 959 (quoting 

Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229–30).

Almost a decade after Clark’s conviction, the defense 

obtained a declaration from Juror Barnes. In his 1996 

declaration, Barnes explained that, during the guilt phase of 

trial, he met with his “minister about the propriety of 

imposing the death penalty.” After “explain[ing] to [the 

minister his] role in the trial and the facts of the case,” the 

minister told him “that in these circumstances the death 

sentence would be appropriate because the Bible says, ‘an 

eye for an eye.’” According to Juror Barnes’ declaration, 

“[t]he minister’s advice was useful,” and Barnes affirmed 

that he “had long believed that anyone who is guilty of 

murder and convicted with a special circumstance should be 

given the death penalty.”

Although the district court found that “the contact 

between Barnes and his minister was insufficient to raise a 

presumption of a substantial and injurious effect on the 

verdict,” the district court did not have the benefit of our 

decision in Godoy to determine whether the contact was 

“sufficiently improper” and raised “a credible risk of 

affecting the outcome of the case.” Godoy, 861 F.3d at 967. 

When faced with a determination of applying a new legal 

principle, “[a] standard practice, in habeas and non-habeas 

cases alike, is to remand to the district court for a decision in 

the first instance.” Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1248 

(9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). “[W]e operate more effectively as 

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44 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

a reviewing court than as a court of first instance.” Id. at 

1248–49. Because “we are without the benefit of the district 

court’s analysis” on the new standard, Shirk v. U.S. ex rel. 

Dep’t of Interior, 773 F.3d 999, 1007 (9th Cir. 2014), we 

remand to the district court to apply in the first instance our 

Godoy framework.

By remanding, we are not opining that the district court 

was incorrect in its conclusion or reasoning but only 

directing it to apply the new standard. For guidance, we 

emphasize that Godoy does not say that all juror 

communications with a non-juror require that the verdict or 

sentence be set aside.3 Inherent in the first step of Godoy is 

first determining whether the contact was “sufficiently 

improper” and then determining whether that improper 

contact had a “credible risk of influencing the verdict.” If, 

and only if, the court finds that these steps are satisfied is the 

presumption triggered and the subsequent steps reached. We 

do not opine whether now, over 30 years after Clark’s trial, 

an evidentiary hearing is required. However, if the district 

court finds the presumption triggered, the state must address 

its burden of showing that Barnes’ contact with his minister 

was harmless—in other words, that there was “no reasonable 

possibility that the communication . . . influence[d] the 

verdict,” Godoy, 861 F.3d at 968 (quoting Caliendo, 

365 F.3d at 697), including the communication impacting 

the jury’s deliberations, id. at 970. Investigator Wong’s 

declaration, which was previously before the district court 

but which the state’s counsel inexplicably failed to address 

on appeal, might support such a conclusion. However, 

because we remand for the district court to apply Godoy, we 

do not reach the evidentiary issues raised by the parties, 

3 If the contact occurred after the jury found Clark guilty but before 

sentencing, it would have affected the sentence, not the verdict.

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 45

including the admissibility of the Wong declaration. We 

leave it to the district court on remand to consider this 

evidence and any other evidence proffered by the parties 

when making the determination whether or not to hold an 

evidentiary hearing in fulfilling its responsibility to 

determine whether Barnes’ meeting with his minister was 

harmless. Again, we emphasize that the district court should 

read nothing more into our opinion than to apply the new 

standard in the first instance.

3. Issue 3: We deny Clark’s claim that trial counsel 

was ineffective for calling Dr. Mayland to testify 

at the pre-trial suppression hearing.

Clark argues that trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel by calling Dr. Peter Mayland to testify 

at the pre-trial suppression hearing. In particular, Clark 

argues that trial counsel was ineffective in three ways: 

(1) trial counsel called Dr. Mayland to testify without full 

knowledge of what Dr. Mayland would say; (2) trial counsel 

failed to obtain a court order assuring that Dr. Mayland’s 

pre-trial testimony would not be used at trial; and (3) trial 

counsel failed to ensure that the trial experts were not 

exposed to inculpatory information from Dr. Mayland’s pretrial testimony. In holding that Allen did not act deficiently, 

the district court found that it was not unreasonable for Allen 

to rely on his belief that the trial court had stated that the 

statements from the suppression hearing would not be 

admissible at trial. Although we agree that Allen’s reliance 

may not have been unreasonable, it was deficient for Allen 

to call Dr. Mayland to testify at the suppression hearing 

without Allen having fair knowledge of his testimony. 

Nonetheless, we conclude that Clark fails to show that he 

was prejudiced by Allen’s performance.

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a. Allen’s performance was deficient. 

Allen’s calling Dr. Mayland to testify at the pre-trial 

suppression hearing without having fair knowledge of his 

testimony constitutes representation that “fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 688; see also supra Part IV(B)(1).

Allen’s 2005 declaration indicates that Dr. Mayland’s 

testimony was intended to establish that “as a result of 

Mr. Clark’s background and psychological disabilities, there 

was a substantial doubt as to whether Mr. Clark knowingly 

and intelligently waived his rights” when he confessed to the 

police. Dr. Mayland’s 2005 declaration indicates that his 

role was focused on “Mr. Clark’s traumatic history, 

deprivations, inadequate institutional responses, and 

substance abuse background.” Clark argues, however, that 

Allen should have been aware that Dr. Mayland had 

developed a therapeutic relationship with Clark and had 

questioned Clark extensively about the particular facts of the 

crimes. In particular, at the suppression hearing, 

Dr. Mayland testified on cross-examination that Clark had 

discussed the details of the crimes with Dr. Mayland not just 

once in the initial interview at the Mendocino County Jail 

after his arrest (which Allen knew about), but also in an 

interview about a month after the initial interview (which 

Allen apparently was not informed). Dr. Mayland then 

testified to the detailed facts of the crimes that Clark relayed 

to him, including the two lewd statements made by Clark to 

Grover, Clark’s admission of rape, and Clark’s account of 

the crimes that appears to undercut the defense theory of a 

rage reaction. Allen’s declaration acknowledges that he was 

“surprised to learn that Dr. Mayland had discussed the facts 

of the crime with [Clark] beyond his initial interview, and 

what information Dr. Mayland had obtained from [Clark].”

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 47

Allen’s unawareness of the extent to which his own 

expert witness would testify is deficient performance under 

Strickland. Trial counsel is not required to personally 

interview each witness, especially “if the witness’s account 

is fairly known to counsel.” LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 

1253, 1274 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Eggleston v. United 

States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986)). However, 

counsel must have a fair knowledge of the witness’s account 

before calling the person as a witness. Here, the record 

indicates that Allen was unaware that Dr. Mayland had 

discussed the facts of the crimes with Clark beyond the 

initial interview. However, Allen regularly discussed the 

case with Dr. Mayland and had a definite defense strategy of 

using Dr. Mayland as an expert. This highlights the 

unreasonableness of Allen failing to ascertain Dr. Mayland’s 

account before calling him as a witness. Because Allen 

called Dr. Mayland to testify without Dr. Mayland’s account 

being “fairly known to counsel,” id. at 1274, Allen’s conduct

was objectively unreasonable.4

b. Clark fails to establish prejudice.

Although Allen’s conduct was deficient, Clark fails to 

establish that Allen’s performance was prejudicial. To show 

prejudice, Clark must establish that “counsel’s errors were

so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 

whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “An 

error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does 

not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal 

proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. 

4 Clark raises several arguments for why trial counsel acted 

deficiently in regard to Dr. Mayland’s testimony. Because we conclude 

Allen acted unreasonably by calling Dr. Mayland without fair knowledge 

of his testimony, we need not reach these additional arguments.

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48 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

at 691. Accordingly, a defendant must show “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id.

When a defendant challenges a death sentence, the 

question is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, 

absent the errors, the sentencer—including an appellate

court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence—

would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. at 695. 

To answer that question, we must “compare the evidence 

that actually was presented to the jury with the evidence that 

might have been presented had counsel acted differently,” 

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 834 (9th Cir. 1995), and 

“evaluate whether the difference between what was 

presented and what could have been presented is sufficient 

to ‘undermine confidence in the outcome’ of the 

proceeding,” Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 694).

Clark fails to meet his burden. Clark focuses on the two 

lewd remarks that Clark told Dr. Mayland he made to 

Grover,5 which, according to Clark, were the “main 

statements that were to infect the trial later.” However, the 

same or similar information was admitted at trial through 

Clark’s two confessions and defense expert testimony. 

Detective Kelley testified: “[Clark] said that, this is in his 

5 At the pre-trial suppression hearing, Dr. Mayland testified that 

Clark admitted to him that Clark demanded of Grover, “Why don’t you 

show me some tit, bitch” and “suck my dick.”

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 49

words, ‘she flashed a titty at me.’” Clark admitted similar 

information in his taped confession, in which he talks about 

Grover exposing her breasts to him. Defense expert 

Dr.Raffle testified at trial, summarizing that Clark admitted 

to him that he told Grover “to take off her clothes, suck [his] 

dick.” Clark fails to establish that the lewd statements he 

admitted to Dr. Mayland differ from any of the lewd 

statements he admitted during his confessions to the police 

and during his sessions with Dr. Raffle, which were 

disclosed to the jury without any objection by Clark.

Furthermore, to the extent that Clark argues prejudice 

from the prosecution using Dr. Mayland’s statements to 

impeach the defense witnesses’ theory of a rage reaction by 

showing that Clark was goal-oriented in his behavior, Clark 

also fails to meet his burden. Almost all of the details that 

were included in Dr. Mayland’s testimony came in through 

the two police confessions. In Clark’s first confession to the 

police, he did not discuss blacking out during the crimes. 

However, Clark admitted choking Grover, stabbing her, and 

hitting her with the concrete block. The primary detail not 

included in Clark’s confession to the police was Clark’s 

admission of rape. But in addition to the physical evidence 

presented at trial that indicated rape (e.g., vaginal lacerations 

and semen and pubic hair consistencies), defense experts 

Drs. Roberts and Raffle testified that Clark admitted to them 

that he raped Grover.

Given the gruesome nature of the crimes and that Clark 

never asserted innocence, Clark is hard-pressed to establish 

that Dr. Mayland’s testimony prejudiced him. To 

demonstrate prejudice, Clark must show that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th 

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50 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

Cir. 2002) (quoting Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 

1173 (9th Cir. 1998)). Because Clark fails to demonstrate a 

reasonable probability that Dr. Mayland’s reference to 

Clark’s lewd statements or his statements concerning Clark 

being goal-oriented affected the jury’s balance of 

aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances, we 

conclude he fails to establish prejudice necessary to show 

ineffective assistance of counsel on this claim.

We deny habeas relief on Issue 3.

4. Issue 4: We deny Clark’s claim that trial counsel 

was ineffective in preparing and presenting 

expert testimony.

Clark argues that trial counsel was ineffective in the 

preparation and presentation of expert testimony. 

Specifically, Clark argues that counsel failed to adequately 

prepare: (a) experts regarding Dr. Beaber’s letter and 

Dr. Mayland’s statements; (b) expert witness Dr. Roberts; 

and (c) expert witness Dr. Raffle.

Strickland governs this ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim: Clark must show that trial counsel’s performance was 

both deficient and prejudicial. See 466 U.S. at 687; see also

supra Part IV(B)(1), (B)(3)(b). “[T]he duty to investigate 

and prepare a defense” is flexible, but it “is not limitless: it 

does not necessarily require that every conceivable witness 

be interviewed or that counsel must pursue ‘every path until 

it bears fruit or until all conceivable hope withers.’” United 

States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 584 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting 

Lovett v. Florida, 627 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1980)).

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a. Allen’s conduct regarding Dr. Beaber’s 

letter did not prejudice Clark.

Clark first argues that Allen failed to adequately prepare 

the testifying experts regarding Dr. Beaber’s letter. Clark 

does not argue that counsel was deficient for failing to seek 

suppression of Dr. Beaber’s letter or in having Dr. Beaber’s 

letter prepared in the first instance. Instead, Clark asserts 

that Allen was unaware of the existence of Dr. Beaber’s 

letter and that he unintentionally gave Dr. Beaber’s letter to 

Dr. Raffle. In essence, Clark argues had counsel not given 

the letter to the testifying experts or had Allen discussed the 

letter with the experts in detail, the outcome of trial would 

have been different. Because we conclude that Clark fails to 

establish prejudice, we need not address whether Allen’s 

conduct was deficient.

Clark fails to establish prejudice because his arguments 

are contradicted by the record. When confronted with 

Dr. Beaber’s letter during cross-examination, Dr. Raffle 

responded:

It does not give me any of his clinical data, 

nor do I have available to me any of his 

clinical data for analysis. That is to say his 

testing data.

It would be—it’s kind of equivalent to a 

radiologist taking a series of X-rays and 

sending me a three-paragraph summary but 

not sending the X-rays so that I could have 

another radiologist look at them myself.

Dr. Raffle’s testimony indicates that he found the contents 

of the letter unhelpful. Given that Dr. Raffle responded by 

noting the lack of underlying clinical data and the report’s 

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52 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

brevity, Clark fails to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by 

Allen’s performance.

b. Allen’s preparation of Dr. Roberts to testify 

did not prejudice Clark.

Second, Clark argues that the outcome of trial would 

have been different had Allen better prepared Dr. Roberts to 

testify. The defense called Dr. Roberts as an expert witness 

during the guilt phase to testify to Clark’s impulsivity under 

stress and Clark’s drug use. Clark asserts that trial counsel 

should have never called Dr. Roberts to testify because his 

opinion that Clark’s depression was “situational” was 

contrary to the use of Clark’s depression as mitigation. He 

also asserts that counsel failed to provide Dr. Roberts with 

an adequate clinical history in order to render a proper 

diagnosis.

The record, however, indicates that Dr. Roberts 

interviewed Clark and conducted extensive psychological 

testing in preparation for trial. Based on the tests Dr. Roberts 

conducted, Dr. Roberts reported a diagnosis of anti-social 

personality disorder (“ASPD”), as well as some indications 

of borderline personality disorder. Although Dr. Roberts 

requested more information regarding Clark’s mental health 

history, trial counsel referred Dr. Roberts only to the history 

contained in Dr. Raffle’s report. Trial counsel apparently 

was not aware at the time that the historical data portion of 

Dr. Raffle’s report was incomplete. But Dr. Roberts has not 

indicated that his testimony regarding Clark’s various test 

scores was incorrect or would have changed in light of any 

additional information that could have been provided. 

Clark’s primary argument seems to be that, if Dr. Roberts 

had more complete information about Clark’s history than 

was contained in Dr. Raffle’s report, Dr. Roberts may have 

been able to offer reasons why a borderline personality 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 53

disorder was a better diagnosis than ASPD. But even then, 

trial counsel’s tactical decision to put on a witness who had 

diagnosed Clark with ASPD, rather than stress a possible 

borderline personality disorder, is entitled to great deference. 

Mitchell v. United States, 790 F.3d 881, 892 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(rejecting Mitchell’s argument that “counsel should have 

had Mitchell examined again by yet another doctor in search 

of a less damning diagnosis”). The record does not support 

Clark’s argument that had Allen acted differently in calling 

and preparing Dr. Roberts to testify, the result of trial would 

have been different.

c. Allen’s conduct in preparing Dr. Raffle to 

testify was not deficient.

Third, Clark argues that trial counsel was deficient in the 

preparation of defense expert Dr. Raffle, who was asked to 

render an opinion regarding Clark’s psychological state at 

the time of the crimes. In particular, Clark argues that 

Dr. Raffle did not have sufficient information regarding 

Clark’s background and history to render an opinion.

The record, however, indicates that, while Dr. Raffle did 

not have all the documents related to Clark’s history, counsel 

did provide Dr. Raffle with substantial background 

materials, including school psychologists’ evaluations and 

state mental health records. Clark emphasized Dr. Raffle’s 

lack of information about the jailhouse report that Clark had 

been “boastful and cocky” about the crimes and about drug 

levels in Clark’s blood at the time of the crimes. But the 

record provides a reasonable explanation for Dr. Raffle’s 

lack of awareness of these matters. The trial transcript 

reflects that counsel did not even know about the jailhouse 

report when Dr. Raffle testified. Given that counsel did not 

have the report at the time, he could not have given the report 

to Dr. Raffle. Regarding the drug levels in Clark’s blood at 

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54 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

the time of the crimes, trial counsel’s declaration indicates 

that witnesses Drs. Baselt and Smith were the experts 

charged with testifying about Clark’s level of intoxication at 

the time of the crimes, not Dr. Raffle. Moreover, although 

Dr. Raffle had some training in psychopharmacology, this 

was not Dr. Raffle’s specialty. Counsel’s tactical decision 

to have different witnesses testify regarding the level of 

methamphetamine and other drugs in Clark’s blood at the 

time of the crimes is entitled to deference. Mitchell, 

790 F.3d at 892. We find that Clark has not shown that 

Allen’s performance was deficient in preparing Dr. Raffle to 

testify.6

We therefore conclude that Clark has not established 

ineffective assistance of counsel in the preparation and 

presentation of expert testimony. We deny habeas relief on

Issue 4.

5. Issue 5: We deny Clark’s claim that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to investigate and 

present evidence, at the penalty phase, of Clark’s 

fetal alcohol exposure, traumatic birth, and the 

effects of both.

Clark argues that trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel for failing to investigate, prepare, and 

present evidence of Clark’s alcohol exposure as a fetus, 

traumatic birth, and the enduring effects of both on Clark’s 

development. Clark asserts that four experts’ postconviction declarations show that his “medical records 

contained evidence that he had a difficult birth and that his 

mother was heavily medicated”; “that his mother was 

6 However, even if we determined that Clark could show deficiency, 

Clark has not shown prejudice.

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 55

drinking alcohol during her pregnancy and suffering 

beatings by Mr. Clark’s father”; and “that Mr. Clark’s 

difficulties in this area continued into childhood, with 

developmental delays.”

Again, under Strickland, Clark must show that trial 

counsel’s performance was both deficient and prejudicial. 

See 466 U.S. at 687; see also supra Part IV(B)(1). Counsel’s 

duty to investigate is “not limitless.” Tucker, 716 F.2d 

at 584. “[A] tactical decision may constitute constitutionally 

adequate representation even if, in hindsight, a different 

defense might have fared better.” Bemore v. Chappell, 

788 F.3d 1151, 1163 (9th Cir. 2015). We conclude that trial 

counsel’s performance was not deficient.

To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must 

show that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; 

see also supra Part IV(B)(1).

During trial, Clark’s counsel presented a defense theory 

that centered around disputing that he was able to form the 

requisite state of mind to kill based on his emotional 

difficulties, severe depression, and chronic drug use that 

culminated in a “rage reaction” on the night of the murder. 

The defense called several witnesses to testify that he used 

drugs from an early age and regularly ingested alcohol, 

marijuana, and methamphetamine. Witnesses also testified 

that Clark was severely depressed, attempted suicide in 

February 1985, and increased his drug usage following the 

suicide attempt. During the penalty phase, the defense 

presented testimony of 23 witnesses in mitigation—

including family members, friends, scoutmasters, a teacher 

and a mental health counselor—who testified to the 

circumstances of Clark’s life and character.

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While Clark’s counsel did not present evidence of the 

trauma Clark may have suffered in utero and during birth, 

Allen did investigate and make a substantial presentation of 

evidence of Clark’s childhood, his abuse, and the resulting 

effects of both on Clark’s mental and psychological 

development. Clark is essentially arguing on appeal that his 

trial counsel should have investigated further and presented 

a more complete picture of his life history or presented it in 

a different manner—beginning with his mother’s pregnancy. 

But Allen did present extensive evidence of Clark’s parents’ 

alcohol use, his father’s abuse, Clark’s early use of drugs and 

alcohol, his difficulties in school, his severe depression, and 

how his family life drastically deteriorated after the deaths 

of his father and grandfathers—including his mother’s 

neglect and the filthy home conditions. Allen painted a 

bleak picture of Clark’s home life as a child and teenager and 

its effects on Clark’s development, arguably mitigating the 

heinousness of the crimes. Perhaps, Allen could have done 

more—as indicated by Dr. Roberts’s declaration that his 

request for additional information was denied by Allen. But 

a showing of deficient performance turns not on whether 

Allen could have done more but on whether his conduct was 

deficient according to professional “standards in effect at the 

time of [Clark’s] trial.” Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 

1129 (9th Cir. 2009).

The standards in effect at the time of Clark’s trial in 1987 

recognized that “[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a 

prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to 

explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of 

the case and the penalty in the event of conviction.” Id. 

(quoting 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4–4.1 (2d ed. 

1980)); see also id. (“As the Supreme Court has long 

recognized, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice provide 

guidance as to what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ performance.” 

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(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89)). Unlike cases 

where we have found deficient performance for failing to 

investigate and present mitigating evidence, here Allen 

presented extensive evidence of Clark’s childhood abuse, 

early use of drugs and alcohol, difficulties in school, and 

severe depression. Cf. Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 

631 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that counsel “utterly 

failed in his duty to investigate and develop potential 

mitigating evidence for presentation at the penalty phase” by 

not conducting any investigation into family or social history 

and “even a minimal investigation” would have uncovered a 

childhood with severe abuse). Much of the evidence that 

Clark argues, post-conviction, should have been presented 

goes to explain why Clark was the way that Allen presented 

him to the jury, not that Clark was presented in an incorrect 

or incomplete light to the jury. The evidence developed 

post-conviction does not suggest that Allen’s presentation of 

Clark’s troubled background was objectively unreasonable. 

Allen presented the jury with substantial evidence of Clark’s 

difficult childhood, his depression, and his drug use. The 

later-developed evidence does not dispute this, but rather 

offers an additional perspective on Clark’s character. But 

this does not establish unreasonable performance. See 

Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980) 

(“Mere criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in itself 

sufficient to support a charge of inadequate 

representation.”).

We conclude that Clark fails to establish that Allen’s 

performance was deficient in not investigating, preparing, 

and presenting evidence of Clark’s alcohol exposure as a 

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fetus, traumatic birth, and the enduring effects of both.7 We 

deny habeas relief on Issue 5.

6. Issue 6: We deny Clark’s claim that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to argue that Dino 

Stevens was an alternative suspect and that the 

state committed prosecutorial misconduct for 

failing to disclose information about Dino.

Clark argues that: (a) his trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and 

present evidence that Dino Stevens was an alternative 

suspect or co-participant in the crimes; and (b) the state 

committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose 

information about Dino to the defense.

Strickland governs this ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim: Clark must show that trial counsel’s performance was 

both deficient and prejudicial. See 466 U.S. at 687; see also

supra Part IV(B)(1). We conclude that Clark does not meet 

his burden of showing that Allen’s conduct was deficient or 

that he was prejudiced by the prosecution’s failure to 

disclose information about Dino.

a. Counsel’s performance was not deficient.

Deficient performance requires showing that “counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

Clark’s arguments that trial counsel was deficient in 

failing to investigate and present evidence that Dino was an 

7 However, even if we determined that Clark could show deficiency, 

Clark has not shown prejudice.

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alternative suspect or involved in Grover’s murder, are 

unavailing. Clark argues that Dino was the last person with 

him before Grover was murdered, had a history of drug use 

and violence towards women, gave contradicting stories to 

the police about his whereabouts during the murder, and 

claimed to have known Grover. In support, Clark points to 

post-conviction declarations by: (a) his brother Robert 

Clark, who stated Dino admitted to being present during the 

murder; (b) his ex-girlfriend Debra Dilman, who stated Dino 

admitted that he and Clark met Grover at the bus station; and 

(c) Dino’s ex-girlfriend Tami Scribner, who stated that Dino 

asked her to lie about him staying at her home on the night 

of the murder and that Dino told her that he found the 

screwdriver in the car. Based on this evidence, Clark argues 

that Allen acted unreasonably in not investigating Dino 

because this information would have cast doubt on Clark 

committing the crimes, would have undermined his 

confessions, and would have supported the defense theory at 

trial that Clark was so intoxicated that he could not 

accurately remember what transpired.

At best, Clark has offered a different trial strategy that, 

in hindsight, he claims could have been more fruitful than 

the strategy taken at trial. See Gustave, 627 F.2d at 904 

(“Mere criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in itself 

sufficient to support a charge of inadequate 

representation.”). According to his 2005 declaration, Allen 

looked into pursuing a third-party defense theory but 

discarded it in light of Clark’s confessions. Asserting that 

Dino had been present would have contradicted Clark’s 

confessions. However, the sincerity and truthfulness of 

Clark’s confessions was an integral part of the defense’s 

strategy to avoid the death penalty.

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Furthermore, given the extent of physical evidence 

linking Clark to the crimes, the record shows Allen acted 

reasonably in not pursuing a defense based on Dino’s alleged 

involvement. Even taking the most egregious declaration—

Robert Clark’s declaration that Dino admitted being present 

during Grover’s murder—and assuming its admissibility and 

credibility, the record is silent on any evidence to support 

this assertion. The hair, blood, and semen linked Clark and 

Grover, not Dino and Grover. The pubic hair found on 

Grover’s body was consistent with Clark’s and the analysis 

of semen found on Grover’s body could not rule out Clark 

as a source. The blood and hair found on Clark’s jeans and 

shoes were consistent with both Clark’s and Grover’s. 

Moreover, Clark never once mentioned Dino’s involvement, 

including in his report to the police at the Ron-Dee-Voo 

restaurant, his two police confessions, or to any of the mental 

health experts. Based on the overwhelming evidence, it was 

reasonable to view Dino’s involvement as a weak theory, at 

best, and to decide to pursue other avenues. Clark, thus, has 

not shown Allen’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness.8

b. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

Clark also argues that the prosecution engaged in 

misconduct by failing to disclose that Dino: (1) had 

“favorable resolutions” for pending charges and offered to 

“make a deal”; and (2) gave statements to the prosecution 

during pre-trial investigations that were inconsistent with his 

trial testimony regarding drug use.

8 However, even if we determined that Clark could show deficiency, 

Clark has not shown prejudice.

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Under Brady v. Maryland, “suppression by the 

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 

request violates due process where the evidence is material 

either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith 

or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see 

also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (explaining 

that post-Brady case law has made “clear that a defendant’s 

failure to request favorable evidence [does] not leave the 

Government free of all obligation”). “[T]here are three 

elements to a Brady violation: (1) ‘the evidence at issue must 

be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, 

or because it is impeaching,’ (2) ‘that evidence must have 

been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 

inadvertently,’ and (3) ‘prejudice must have ensued.’” ReisCampos v. Biter, 832 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999)). “With 

respect to the prejudice element, ‘evidence is material only 

if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 

been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). “A ‘reasonable 

probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. 

at 682).

First, Clark asserts that, although the prosecution 

provided a criminal history report with most of Dino’s 

arrests, the prosecution failed to disclose the “favorable 

resolutions” of Dino’s multiple pending cases, one of his 

arrests, and a request by Dino to “make a deal.” Clark 

contends that this information could have been used to 

impeach Dino to show that he was self-interested in 

testifying favorably for the prosecution in order to receive 

more lenient treatment in his own pending criminal charges. 

We find this argument unpersuasive. In light of Clark’s 

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confessions and the overwhelming physical evidence against 

Clark connecting him to the murder and rape, Dino’s role at 

trial was so minimal that to impeach him would have been 

inconsequential to the verdict.

Second, Clark’s assertion that the prosecution failed to 

disclose its pre-trial investigative notes that indicate Dino 

made a statement regarding drug use, which would have 

contradicted his trial testimony, is also unavailing. At trial, 

Dino denied his own drug use and claimed not to recall 

knowing of any drug use by Clark and Robyn Boyd, 

including on the night of the murder, other than some 

occasional marijuana. Clark, in contrast, argues that the 

prosecution failed to disclose investigation notes indicating 

that Dino said that Boyd did not want to admit that Dino 

stayed at her home on the night of the murder because of her 

involvement with drugs. Clark contends that this 

information would have impeached Dino’s drug use 

testimony and would have raised doubts about Clark’s 

confessions and his intent, and thus would have resulted in a 

different verdict and sentence.

However, the prosecutor’s notes provide minimal 

support for Clark’s intoxication defense beyond the 

extensive evidence already presented on Clark’s drug use. 

During Clark’s taped confession at the police station, he 

described his drug use. Clark’s drug use on the night of the 

murder was the subject of testimony of several witnesses, 

including David Smith, who testified that he and Clark used 

cocaine on the night of the murder, and Matt Williams, who 

testified that at 10:00 p.m. on the night of murder, Clark 

appeared to be under the influence of something other than 

alcohol. In light of this evidence, Clark has not shown a 

reasonable probability that, had the prosecutor’s notes been 

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disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.

We deny habeas relief on Issue 6.

C. Uncertified Claims

In addition to the certified claims, Clark raises a number 

of uncertified claims. First, we reject the state’s argument 

that certain claims are procedurally barred from federal 

review. Second, we grant a COA on seven of the ten

uncertified claims, and deny a COA on the others. Third, we 

deny habeas relief on all seven newly certified claims.

1. We reject the state’s argument that Claims 14L, 

18, and 20 are procedurally barred from federal 

review.

Based on the California Supreme Court’s denial of 

Clark’s second state habeas petition, the state argues that 

portions of certain claims are procedurally barred from 

federal court review because Clark failed to overcome the 

procedural default. In particular, the state argues that the 

California Supreme Court denied relief as untimely because 

the claims could have been, but were not, raised on direct 

appeal and because the claims were not filed in a timely 

manner. See In re William Clark, 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993); 

Ex parte Dixon, 264 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1953). The state argues 

that California’s procedural bars were adequate and 

independent state grounds sufficient to preclude federal 

review. See Johnson v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 1802, 1804 (2016) 

(per curiam) (reversing the Ninth Circuit “[b]ecause 

California’s procedural bar is longstanding, oft-cited, and 

shared by habeas courts across the Nation”); see also

Johnson v. Montgomery, 899 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 

2018) (recognizing that California’s Dixon and timeliness 

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64 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

procedural bars are adequate and independent state law 

grounds to bar federal habeas review). In response, Clark 

argues that these procedural defaults are not applicable 

because any default occurred before the California Supreme 

Court issued its decisions in In re William Clark and In re 

Robbins, 959 P.2d 311 (Cal. 1998).

The procedural bar doctrine is “a subcategory of the 

independent and adequate state ground doctrine” designed 

“to protect the state’s interests by giving it the opportunity 

to correct its own errors.” Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100; see 

also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749 (1991) 

(“[W]e emphasize[] the important interests served by state 

procedural rules at every stage of the judicial process and the 

harm to the States that results when federal courts ignore 

these rules[.]”). “Under this doctrine, a federal court 

ordinarily will not review a state court ruling if the state court 

would find that the claim was barred pursuant to an 

independent and adequate state procedural rule.” Robinson, 

595 F.3d at 1100. However, we have recognized exceptions 

to the general rule for when “the petitioner can show either 

cause and prejudice, see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, or a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice, see Murray v. Carrier, 

477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986), or [when] the government 

waive[s] the procedural default, see Franklin v. Johnson, 

290 F.3d 1223, 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 2002).” Robinson, 

595 F.3d at 1100 n.10 (parallel citations omitted); see also 

Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d 757, 763 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(discussing the exceptions that have been developed by the 

California Supreme Court following Dixon and In re Harris, 

855 P.2d 391, 398–407 (Cal. 1993)).

In California, “[t]he courts themselves have developed a 

number of ‘procedural bars’ in an attempt to put reasonable 

limits on collateral attacks by way of habeas corpus.” Briggs 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 65

v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29, 47 (Cal. 2017) (quoting In re William 

Clark, 855 P.2d at 763–70). Two such limits include 

procedural bars based on direct appeal (known as the Dixon

rule) and on timeliness (known as the Clark rule). The 

bedrock to these principles is that “habeas corpus may not 

be employed as a substitute for appeal.” Id. (citing In re 

Waltreus, 397 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Cal. 1965)).

Under Dixon, a claim raised during habeas proceedings 

is barred when the petitioner could have, but failed to, raise 

the claim on direct appeal. See 264 P.2d at 513. We have 

emphasized that “Dixon stands for the proposition that an 

inexcusable failure to bring a trial-error claim on direct 

appeal normally bars consideration of that claim on habeas.” 

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, if “the state court of last resort . . . exercise[d] its 

opportunity to act on [petitioner’s] federal constitutional 

claims, then no procedural default occurred that would bar 

federal review of those claims.” Id. at 1151.

A second procedural default rule under California law 

was established in In re William Clark related to timeliness. 

855 P.2d at 751. There is “a presumption of timeliness for 

habeas petitions filed ‘within 90 days of the final due date 

for the filing of an appellant’s reply brief’” or “filed without 

substantial delay, that good cause justified a substantial 

delay, or that the petition fits within several enumerated 

exceptions.” Bradford v. Davis, 923 F.3d 599, 610–11 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (quoting In re William Clark, 855 P.2d at 751). 

We have recognized that California’s timeliness rule for 

procedural default must “be analyzed at the time the 

petitioner filed his [applicable] state habeas petition” and 

“not . . . when the California Supreme Court denied his 

petition” or “he filed a [subsequent] state petition.” Id. 

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66 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

at 611 (citing Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 103 F.3d 72, 75 (9th 

Cir. 1996)).

Here, the state has not met its burden of articulating the 

basis for us to determine that Claims 14L, 18, and 20 are 

procedurally barred. As Clark notes, the state’s procedural 

bar argument on Claim 18 was not actually decided by the 

district court who rejected procedural default only on 

“Claims 14, 15, 20, 26 and 30.” Furthermore, although the 

parties cite to the pertinent California Supreme Court 

decision, none of these claims (Claims 14L, 18, 20) are listed 

as such in that decision. If they are listed as different 

numbered claims, the parties have not so argued. “[J]udges 

are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” 

Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 

1991) (per curiam)). The state does not provide the clarity 

needed to reach this argument.

Because the state has not clearly shown that these three 

claims are procedurally barred and because it appears that 

the California Supreme Court rejected the claims on their 

merits, we reject that Claims 14L, 18, and 20 are 

procedurally barred, and we elect to address the merits on 

these claims.9

2. We grant in part a COA.

When a habeas petitioner seeks to initiate an appeal, the 

petitioner must obtain a COA under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), 

regardless of whether the petition was filed pre- or post9 We do not find that a clear showing of a procedural bar would not 

bar us from addressing the merits of a claim, but only no such showing 

was made here.

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AEDPA. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 478, 480–81; see also 

United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). 

In pre-AEDPA cases, as here, we must consider whether the 

petitioner is entitled to a COA under AEDPA’s provisions, 

but we apply pre-AEDPA law to the merits of the petition if 

a COA is granted. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 482.

To obtain a COA, a petitioner must make “a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). This requires that a petitioner “demonstrate 

that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a 

court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that 

the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further.” Lambright, 220 F.3d at 1025 (alteration in 

original) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 

(1983)). Whether to grant a COA is a “threshold inquiry” to 

entertaining an appeal, and we cannot consider the merits of 

a claim until a COA has been issued on that claim. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 482; see also Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773 

(2017); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).

Clark has raised ten uncertified claims in his opening 

brief on appeal, as permitted under our rules. See 9th Cir. R. 

22-1(e). We treat Clark’s discussion of an uncertified issue 

as a request to expand our grant of a COA. United States v. 

Blackstone, 903 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018). Because 

Clark has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), for Claims 8, 

14F, and 15B, we deny a COA on these claims.10 However, 

10 Clark argues that Claim 22 (the use of Dr. Mayland’s testimony 

from the pre-trial suppression hearing violated Clark’s right against selfincrimination) should be certified because it is inextricably related to 

certified Issue 3. Because Clark does not make arguments regarding 

self-incrimination in his discussion of Issue 3 in his opening brief, this 

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68 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

Clark has met this threshold standard for Claims 5, 6, 11, 

14L, 18, 20, and 36, and we grant a COA for these claims. 

For the reasons below, we deny the claims on their merits.

3. Claims 5 and 6: We deny Clark’s claims that 

trial counsel had conflicts of interest that 

adversely affected Clark’s representation.

Clark argues that trial counsel had a conflict of interest 

based on: (1) Public Defender Susan Massini representing 

Clark while she was running for District Attorney; and 

(2) Public Defender Ronald Brown or his office previously 

represented a large number of prosecution and potential 

defense witnesses. Clark argues, in particular, that these 

conflicts deprived him of effective assistance of counsel 

because there were several plausible alternative defense 

strategies that were foreclosed due to the alleged conflicts of 

interest.

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected 

Clark’s conflict of interest arguments in a reasoned opinion. 

Clark, 857 P.2d at 1130–31. Quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 

446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980), the court determined that because 

Clark did not raise any objection to Massini’s representation, 

Clark must “demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest 

adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Clark, 

857 P.2d at 1126. First, the state court found no actual 

conflict: “we do not find that Massini’s personal interest in 

winning the election for district attorney threatened her 

loyalty to defendant.” Id. at 1127. Second, the state court 

found Massini’s alleged conflict did not adversely affect her 

argument is unavailing. Clark does not otherwise discuss or appeal 

Claim 22. Accordingly, we reject Clark’s attempt to incorporate Claim 

22 into Issue 3.

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representation of Clark because Allen was co-counsel during 

Massini’s campaign, Allen did not have a conflict, and Allen 

was not an employee of Massini. Id. at 1128. The state court 

also rejected Clark’s argument that there was an adverse 

effect based on Massini’s failure to adequately advocate for 

the suppression of evidence pre-trial. Id. The state court 

further found that the trial court did not commit error in 

violation of Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981), which 

requires the trial court to inquire about the alleged conflict 

and to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver from the 

defendant. Clark, 857 P.2d at 1129.

Addressing Clark’s allegations that Brown had a conflict 

of interest, the California Supreme Court concluded that 

there was no actual or potential conflict in the Public 

Defender’s Office’s representation of witnesses Smith, 

Boyd, and Dino, and no adverse effect on Clark’s 

representation. Id. at 1130. Brown represented to the court 

that he possessed no confidential information relating to any 

of these three witnesses. Id. at 1131. Brown and Allen each 

attested that the cross-examination of these witnesses would 

not be affected by the Public Defender’s Office’s prior 

representations of these witnesses. Id. The court found that 

Brown had no interest in shielding these witnesses from 

impeachment. Id.

The California Supreme Court did, however, find 

Brown’s representation of Williams “more troubling” 

because Brown personally represented Williams and 

possessed confidential information from their attorney-client 

relationship. Id. at 1131. Brown represented Williams on 

charges of receiving stolen property in February 1986—

before Brown became the Public Defender and co-counsel 

on Clark’s case. Id. The court found that there was an actual 

conflict but it did not adversely affect the representation of 

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70 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

Clark because (1) Brown terminated representation of 

Williams; (2) Brown and Allen each made sworn 

representations to the court that Brown did not disclose to 

Allen any confidential information from Brown’s 

representation of Williams; and (3) only co-counsel Allen 

conducted the cross-examination of Williams. Id.

The district court, agreeing with the California Supreme 

Court, found that Clark failed to show actual conflict 

because he could not establish that Massini’s political 

agenda adversely affected her performance. The district 

court also found that Clark waived his conflict claims against 

Brown, and even if the claims were valid, he failed to make 

a colorable claim that the alleged conflicts adversely affected 

counsel’s performance.

Ordinarily, a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of 

counsel must show under Strickland both deficient 

performance and prejudice. See supra Part IV(B)(1) and 

(B)(3)(b). But the Supreme Court in Mickens prescribes “an 

exception to this general rule” where prejudice is presumed, 

when there is an “actual conflict of interest.” Mickens, 

535 U.S. at 166, 171. The Court defined “an actual conflict 

of interest” to mean “precisely a conflict that affected 

counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical 

division of loyalties[,]” which is a two-step inquiry that a 

defendant must show a conflict of interest and that the 

conflict actually affected counsel’s performance. Id. at 171.

a. Massini: No Actual Conflict

Clark argues that Massini’s election to District Attorney 

created a conflict of interest that deprived him of effective 

assistance of counsel. Future employment plans do not alone 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 71

create an “actual conflict.”11 Garcia, 33 F.3d at 1198–99 

(future job with the prosecutor’s office); see also Maiden v. 

Bunnell, 35 F.3d 477, 480–81 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that 

crossing the line from prosecution to defense does not 

necessarily create a conflict of interest); United States v. 

Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1379 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that 

defense counsel’s application for employment as an 

Assistant United States Attorney did not constitute an actual 

conflict).

Thus, Massini’s future employment as the District 

Attorney did not by itself create an actual conflict. Clark has 

not specified how Massini’s political agenda adversely 

affected her representation of Clark. Rather, he offers only 

general criticisms: Massini did “not interview a single 

witness”; she “hid her conflict from Mr. Clark;” and “closely 

controlled the case to protect her electoral position.” The 

record, however, does not support Clark’s assertions. 

Massini, recognizing her own inexperience on capital 

defense, requested that Allen, an experienced capital defense 

attorney, join the case. Allen, who was not associated with 

the Public Defender’s Office, joined as co-counsel, almost 

five months before voir dire began. Allen attested to the 

state court that he did not have any conflicts with witnesses. 

See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987) (“[W]e 

generally presume that the lawyer is fully conscious of the 

overarching duty of complete loyalty to his or her client.”). 

Allen zealously advocated for Clark with an extensive 

defense throughout trial and a substantial presentation of 

mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Nothing in the 

record suggests that Massini allowed her possible election to 

11 Once Massini became the District Attorney, her office was 

recused in this case and replaced by the Attorney General, so Clark’s 

claim is necessarily premised on Massini’s future employment.

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affect her representation of Clark. We therefore find that 

Clark fails to establish that Massini running for District 

Attorney was more than “a mere theoretical division of 

loyalties.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171.

b. Brown: No Adverse Effect

Clark argues that Brown’s representation of witnesses 

created a conflict of interest that foreclosed Brown’s ability 

to present sufficient evidence to support plausible, 

alternative defense theories. In particular, Clark contends 

that Brown could not (a) rebut the jailhouse report; 

(b) establish that heavy drug use caused Clark to suffer a 

rage reaction and/or to blackout; and (c) assert a “third party 

defense” that Dino was also involved in the murder.

Conflicts of interest can arise from concurrent 

representation of clients in separate matters. See Mickens, 

535 U.S. at 175. But Clark must show that Brown “actively 

represented conflicting interests,” Earp, 431 F.3d at 1182–

83 (emphasis added) (quoting Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166), and 

that Brown “was influenced in his basic strategic decisions 

by the [conflicted] interests.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 170 

(quoting Wood, 450 U.S. at 272).

First, Clark’s argument concerning the jailhouse report 

is not persuasive.12 The evidence that Clark relies on—

declarations by two inmates and a corrections officer opining 

favorably on Clark’s character—fails to establish an actual 

conflict that affected counsel’s performance. Although 

Inmate Brackett’s 1998 declaration states that Brown 

12 See also infra Part IV(C)(7) addressing Clark’s argument that his 

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 

rebut the jailhouse report (Claim 14L).

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represented him in 1985, the record is silent on any further 

supporting evidence and Clark does not demonstrate an 

actual conflict. Furthermore, although Investigator 

McPherson’s 2005 declaration states that he “could not 

interview the inmates who reported this because they were 

Public Defender clients,” he does not specify that Brown 

directly represented the inmates during Clark’s trial. The 

record does not support an actual conflict of Brown with the 

inmates named in the report—Barella, Hull, Brackett, and 

Strobridge. Clark fails to establish an actual conflict, let 

alone that Brown’s role as the public defender affected his 

representation of Clark.

Second, we also reject Clark’s argument that Brown’s 

and the Public Defender’s Office’s prior representation of 

the prosecution witnesses prevented the defense from 

impeaching the prosecution witnesses or calling potential 

defense witnesses. The defense’s case revolved around the 

theory that Clark’s heavy drug use caused him to suffer a 

“rage reaction,” thus negating the requisite mens rea. Clark 

claims that the testimony of certain prosecution witnesses—

Williams, Smith, Dino, and Boyd—minimized the defense’s 

theory of heavy drug use, thus adversely affected Clark’s 

representation.

Although Brown’s personal representation of Williams 

created a conflict, as Brown concurrently represented 

Williams and Clark, nothing in the record indicates that the 

conflict adversely affected Clark’s representation. Rather, 

Brown took steps to eliminate any adverse effect: Brown 

terminated representation of Williams; Brown and Allen 

each attested that Brown did not disclose to Allen any 

confidential information from Brown’s representation of 

Williams; and only co-counsel Allen conducted the crossexamination of Williams. The record does not indicate that 

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Brown was influenced in his basic strategic decisions by his 

representation of Williams.

The Public Defender’s Office represented witnesses 

Smith, Dino, and Boyd, but Brown did not personally 

represent them. Clark argues that these witnesses’ extensive 

involvement with the criminal justice system with their own 

convictions and charges prevented the defense team from 

impeaching them and that these witnesses minimized or 

denied Clark’s drug use and its effects. These arguments are 

meritless in the context of the entire defense case that 

extensively stressed Clark’s heavy drug use. Furthermore, 

Brown represented to the court that he possessed no 

confidential information relating to any of these three 

witnesses, and both Brown and Allen each represented to the 

court that the cross-examination of these witnesses would 

not be affected by the Public Defender’s Office’s prior 

representations of these witnesses. See Holloway v. 

Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485 (1978) (“An ‘attorney 

representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the 

best position professionally and ethically to determine when 

a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the 

course of a trial.’” (quoting State v. Davis, 514 P.2d 1025, 

1027 (Ariz. 1973)); see also Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 

860, 870 (9th Cir. 2006). Clark has failed to establish that 

any alleged conflict with witnesses adversely affected 

Clark’s representation.

Third, Clark’s assertion that Dino Stevens’s pending 

charges created “multiple, interlocking conflicts” is not 

persuasive. Brown did not personally represent Dino; 

Brown represented to the court that he possessed no 

confidential information relating to Dino; and both Brown 

and Allen each represented to the court that the crossexamination of Dino would not be affected by the Public 

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Defender’s Office’s prior representations of Dino. Clark 

fails to articulate more than “a mere theoretical division of 

loyalties.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171.

We conclude that Clark has not established any actual 

conflict of interest that adversely affected trial counsel’s 

representation of Clark, and thus we deny habeas relief on 

Claims 5 and 6.

4. Claim 8: We deny a COA on Clark’s claim that 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the methamphetamine drug level 

testimony.

Clark argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance of counsel by failing to challenge the 

methamphetamine drug level testimony offered at trial. In 

particular, Clark asserts that trial counsel did not consult 

with an independent forensic toxicologist about the effect of 

the drug levels on Clark nor investigate the collection, 

storage, transportation, and analysis of the blood sample.

However, the jointly-hired forensic toxicologist testified 

to the low level of drugs in Clark’s blood and another 

defense expert testified that any debilitating effect could not 

be determined due to the low levels. We conclude that Clark 

has not demonstrated that this claim raises “questions [that] 

are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” 

Lambright, 220 F.3d at 1025 (quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. 

at 893 n.4). Because Clark cannot make “a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2), we therefore deny Clark’s request for a COA 

on Claim 8 and do not address the merits of this claim.

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5. Claim 11: We deny Clark’s claim that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to present life 

history evidence at the penalty phase.

Clark argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance at the penalty phase by failing to investigate, 

prepare, and present more evidence about Clark’s life 

history.13 Specifically, Clark contends that his trial counsel 

failed to present additional mitigating evidence regarding: 

(1) Clark’s genetic predisposition for depression and 

substance abuse; (2) Clark’s father’s violence toward 

Clark’s mother, Clark, and his siblings; (3) Clark’s mother’s 

drinking problem, abandonment, and physical abuse of her 

children; (4) Clark’s longstanding learning disability; 

(5) Clark’s longstanding mental health issues; and (6) the 

nature and extent of Clark’s drug use. In support of these 

arguments, Clark relies on post-conviction declarations of 

psychologist Dr. Sanislow, defense mental health experts 

Drs. Roberts and Raffle, and other experts, to give a more 

detailed account of Clark’s life history than provided during 

trial. Clark argues that this additional information would 

have “paint[ed] a much more sympathetic picture.”

To assess Clark’s claim, we must take into account the 

substantial life history evidence Clark’s counsel did present 

at the penalty phase. Clark’s trial counsel presented to the 

jury extensive testimony that Clark’s mother developed a 

drinking problem and abandoned her children, leaving the 

home in extreme disrepair and Clark to care for his younger 

siblings until Clark was ultimately placed in foster care. See 

Clark, 857 P.2d at 1145–46. Counsel presented evidence 

13 See supra Part IV(B)(5) for the portion of Claim 11 (Issue 5) that 

addresses Clark’s argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to investigate Clark’s traumatic birth and its effects.

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that Clark’s mother beat her children with Hot Wheels tracks 

and other items. Also, counsel proffered evidence about 

Clark’s longstanding learning disability with reading, 

including testimony from one of his special education 

teachers. See id.

In addition, counsel investigated and presented evidence 

during both the guilt and penalty phases about Clark’s 

longstanding mental health issues. See id. at 1145. Clark’s 

family members and a county counselor who had treated 

Clark’s family testified that Clark was severely and 

chronically depressed and withdrawn following the death of 

his father when Clark was twelve years old.

Counsel also presented testimony about Clark’s drug use 

at both the guilt and penalty phases. Clark began 

experimenting with drugs and alcohol around the age of 

twelve following the death of his father and started regularly 

using harder drugs like methamphetamine within the year 

before the murder. Counsel showed the jury that blood tests 

supported that Clark had a “high therapeutic” or “low abuse” 

amount of methamphetamine at the time of the murder. Id.

at 1114.

Clark’s counsel, though, did not present all of Clark’s 

life history evidence. As the state acknowledges, the defense 

did not present evidence that Clark was genetically 

predisposed to mental illness and substance abuse based on 

his family background. Additionally, it appears that the 

defense did not present to the jury that as part of his 

depression, Clark was self-destructive (e.g., electrocuting 

himself by putting his hand in the toaster). Clark concedes 

on appeal, though, that counsel proffered evidence to the 

jury that Clark attempted suicide a few months before 

Grover’s murder. Clark contends that the evidence 

presented at trial relating to his drug use failed to capture the 

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“degree” of his escalating methamphetamine addiction and 

“its effect on his functioning” leading up to and at the time 

of Grover’s murder.

Also, Clark’s father’s violence towards his children was 

not presented at trial. The jury heard that Clark’s father was 

an alcoholic, that he beat Clark’s mother, and that she got a 

restraining order against him. Clark’s mother testified at the 

penalty phase that Clark’s father was “[v]erbally” abusive 

with his children “when he was drinking.” But the jury did 

not hear that Clark’s father also physically abused his 

children. For example, the jury was not informed that 

Clark’s drunken father first struck Clark at eight months old, 

or that he frequently beat Clark and his brother. Further, 

although counsel generally proffered evidence that Clark’s 

father “physically abused” or “beat” Clark’s mother, counsel 

did not present the details, including that he raped her, which 

prompted her to finally leave him when Clark was about ten 

years old.

However, most of the additional mitigating evidence that 

Clark argues should have been presented is cumulative of the 

evidence presented during the guilt and penalty phases. 

Although additional evidence of Clark’s early childhood and 

Clark’s father’s violence could have been presented, Allen 

proffered extensive evidence to illustrate that Clark suffered 

a traumatic, abusive childhood and experienced its effects on 

his development, mental health, and substance use. See also 

supra Part IV(B)(5). The record supports our finding that 

Allen’s presentation of Clark’s life history evidence during 

the guilty and penalty phases was adequate under 1987 

standards and not objectively unreasonable. See Hamilton, 

583 F.3d at 1129 (“As the Supreme Court has long 

recognized, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice provide 

guidance as to what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ performance.” 

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(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89)). Clark’s 

objections that Allen should have presented more life history 

evidence are more akin to “[m]ere criticism of a tactic or 

strategy.” Gustave, 627 F.2d at 904.

We, therefore, conclude that Clark has not shown that 

trial counsel’s presentation of life history evidence was 

deficient.14 We deny habeas relief on Claim 11.

6. Claim 14F: We deny a COA on Clark’s claim 

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge pathologist and criminalist testimony.

Clark argues that trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel by failing to challenge the state’s 

pathologist and criminalist testimony. The state’s 

pathologist testified that, after Clark choked Grover, she was 

alive and breathing at the time of the stabbing and of the 

blunt force blows to her head and neck. Clark argues that 

this conclusion was incorrect because there was no evidence 

of aspirated blood. Clark also argues that the pathologist’s 

testimony and the prosecution’s closing argument 

incorrectly implied sodomy of the victim. In essence, Clark 

argues that the sequence of events leading to Grover’s death 

was misrepresented at trial and that she was unconscious or 

already dead prior to the administration of blunt force.

Clark, however, does not dispute that he choked Grover, 

stabbed her with a screwdriver, and threw concrete blocks 

on her head. Because Clark fails to show that the relevance 

of when Grover died is “debatable among jurists of reason,” 

Lambright, 220 F.3d at 1025 (quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. 

14 However, even if we determined that Clark could show 

deficiency, Clark has not shown prejudice.

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at 893 n.4), he cannot make “a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). We 

deny Clark’s request for a COA on Claim 14F, and do not 

address the merits of this claim.

7. Claim 14L: We deny Clark’s claim that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to rebut the 

jailhouse report.

Clark argues that trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance for failing to rebut the jailhouse report that 

indicated that Clark had a “cocky attitude” by presenting 

evidence during the penalty phase of Clark’s remorse and 

positive adjustment to prison.

Clark’s argument that any reasonable counsel, given the 

powerful mitigation of remorse and positive adjustment to 

prison, would have rebutted the jailhouse report is 

unconvincing. In support of his arguments, Clark relies on 

post-conviction declarations from two of the inmates named 

in the jailhouse report that indicated statements in the report 

were false, and from a corrections officer who “spoke with 

other officers who knew [Clark] and his reputation in the jail 

[as] one of being peaceful, obedient, and non-violent.”

Counsel, however, presented extensive mitigating 

evidence at the penalty phase, including 23 witnesses who 

testified to Clark’s character. See supra Parts IV(B)(5) and 

IV(C)(5). To insist that counsel should have presented 

additional evidence that Clark was “remorseful,” amounts to 

“[m]ere criticism of a tactic or strategy [that] is not in itself 

sufficient to support a charge of inadequate representation.” 

Gustave, 627 F.2d at 904. Allen proffered extensive 

mitigating evidence on Clark’s behavior as a protective older 

brother to his younger sister, a caregiver to his paraplegic 

friend, a considerate person who would break up fights as a 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 81

teenager, a reliable worker with a good attitude in his jobs, 

and a non-rowdy, good person as a tenant. The postconviction evidence that Clark argues should have been 

presented did not exist at the time of the trial. At most, the 

evidence developed post-conviction suggests that Allen 

could have taken a different tactic during the penalty phase 

but does not suggest that Allen’s presentation of mitigating 

evidence on Clark’s behavior was objectively unreasonable. 

We conclude that Allen’s performance was not deficient,15

and we therefore deny habeas relief on Claim 14L.

8. Claim 15B: We deny a COA on Clark’s claim 

that habeas relief is warranted under Batson v. 

Kentucky because the prosecutor discriminatorily 

used its peremptory challenges.

Clark argues that he was denied his rights to equal 

protection and due process by the prosecution’s 

discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to exclude 

prospective jurors based on their race. See Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Specifically, Clark argues 

that the prosecutor exercised five preemptory challenges to 

remove all but one of the Latino prospective jurors.

However, defense counsel conceded during trial that the 

prosecutor offered race-neutral reasons that met the 

prosecution’s Batson burden. Clark therefore fails to 

establish that this claim is “debatable among jurists of 

reason,” Lambright, 220 F.3d at 1025 (quoting Barefoot, 

463 U.S. at 893 n.4), and thus does not make “a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. 

15 However, even if we determined that Clark could show 

deficiency, Clark has not shown prejudice.

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§ 2253(c)(2). We deny Clark’s request for a COA on Claim 

15B and do not address the merits of this claim.

9. Claim 18: We deny Clark’s claim that he was 

denied his constitutional right to be present for 

critical stages of the proceedings.

Clark argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 

right to be present at two meetings regarding possible 

conflicts of interest with counsel: (a) an “off-the-record” 

meeting on February 7, 1986, between the state court and 

counsel to discuss Massini’s candidacy for District Attorney; 

and (b) an “in-chambers conversation” regarding the 

admissibility at trial of Dr. Mayland’s testimony from the 

pre-trial suppression hearing.

The right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment, 

“taken together with the right to due process, includes a right 

of . . . defendant[] and [his] counsel to be present at all stages 

of the trial from arraignment to verdict and discharge of the 

jury.” Polizzi v. United States, 550 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 

1976) (concluding that a defendant’s presence was not 

required during the judge’s questioning of the jurors after the 

verdict). This right, however, “is not absolute.” Id. The 

defendant “has a due process right ‘to be present in his own 

person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably 

substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend 

against the charge.’” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 

(1987) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105–

06 (1934), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 

(1964)). However, it is not a guaranteed right “when 

presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow,” id. 

at 745 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106–07), or when the 

defendant “could have done nothing had [he] been at the 

conference, nor would [he] have gained anything by 

attending,” United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 527 

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 83

(1985) (per curiam) (concluding that a defendant’s presence 

was not required at an in camera discussion between the 

judge and a juror). “Thus, a defendant is guaranteed the right 

to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is 

critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the 

fairness of the procedure.” Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745. The 

“exclusion of a defendant from a trial proceeding should be 

considered in light of the whole record.” Gagnon, 470 U.S. 

at 526–27.

We reject Clark’s argument that, if he were present at the 

meeting about Massini’s conflict, he would have insisted on 

a full hearing and removal of counsel. The discussions at 

this meeting were later described by defense counsel in open 

court for the trial judge in Clark’s presence, and Clark made 

no objections or requests for a further hearing. Moreover, 

when the conflicts were explained to Clark, he stated on the 

record that he wanted Brown and Allen to continue to 

represent him. Clark therefore has not shown that he would 

“have gained anything by attending.” Gagnon, 470 U.S. 

at 527.

We also are unpersuaded by Clark’s argument that his 

constitutional right was infringed by being excluded from 

the in-chambers conference regarding the admissibility of 

Dr. Mayland’s pre-trial testimony. Clark asserts that this 

meeting constituted a critical stage because “it was there that 

counsel believed he had extracted a promise the statements 

could not be used,” and Clark had expressly stated that he 

did not wish for these statements to come before the jury. 

But defense counsel believed that the judge ruled favorably 

for the defense at the in-chambers conference by excluding 

Dr. Mayland’s testimony at trial. See supra Part IV(B)(3). 

Moreover, on direct appeal, the California Supreme Court 

found that the in-chambers conference concerned “the length 

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84 CLARK V. CHAPPELL

of time for a hearing and the possible defense witnesses to 

be called,” which did “not implicate defendant’s opportunity

to defend himself.” Clark, 857 P.2d at 1138. Clark has not 

explained how he could have done anything differently or 

what he would have gained had he been at the in-chambers 

conference. Cf. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526–27. We thus find 

that Clark has not demonstrated that his constitutional right 

to be present was infringed.

We conclude that Clark has not explained how his 

presence at these two meetings had a reasonably “substantial 

relationship” to his ability to defend himself, Stincer, 

482 U.S. at 746, and we deny habeas relief on Claim 18.

10. Claim 20: We deny Clark’s claim that habeas 

relief is warranted under Brady v. Maryland

because the state failed to disclose the Manda 

Report and the prosecutor’s interview notes.

Clark argues that the prosecution failed to disclose two 

pieces of exculpatory evidence: (a) the Manda Report and 

(b) the prosecutor’s interview notes from a conversation with 

the officers regarding Clark’s confession in the patrol car.

a. The Manda Report

Under Brady, “suppression by the prosecution of 

evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process 

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 

punishment.” 373 U.S. at 87; see supra Part IV(B)(6)(b). 

The petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable 

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Reis-Campos, 832 F.3d at 975 (quoting Bagley, 

473 U.S. at 682).

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Clark argues that he was prejudiced by the prosecution’s 

failure to disclose the coroner’s report prepared by Deputy 

Manda (Manda Report) because it would have contradicted 

the officers’ testimony. At the preliminary hearing, 

suppression hearing, and trial, Detectives Kelley and Gall 

testified that they learned of Grover’s several stab wounds to 

her back after Clark’s patrol car confession. Clark argues 

that Detective Gall’s testimony that he went to the mortuary 

and learned of the stab wounds at approximately 2:00 p.m. 

would have been contradicted by the Manda Report, which 

indicates that Detective Gall viewed the stab wounds at the 

mortuary prior to 11:00 a.m., which occurred before Clark’s 

patrol car confession. Clark argues that he knew of the stab 

wounds only because the officers had told him, which would 

have supported his drug-induced blackout and rage reaction 

theories and would have refuted the prosecution’s 

characterization during the penalty phase that Clark was a 

sociopathic liar.

Even if the Manda Report supported the possibility that 

the officers could have told Clark that Grover had been 

stabbed in the back, there is nothing in the Manda Report 

suggesting that the officers knew that the weapon was a 

screwdriver. The screwdriver, which bore traces of human 

blood, was not found in David Smith’s car until

approximately a week after the murder. Therefore, Clark’s 

statement in the patrol car that he had stabbed Grover several 

times with “what appeared to be a screwdriver, just the metal 

shaft part” had to be based on his personal knowledge, and 

could not have come from the officers.

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In addition, testimony by Michelle Stevens undermines 

Clark’s claim.16 Michelle testified that when Clark returned 

to the house early in the morning after the murder, Clark told 

her that he had found the body of a teenage girl. Michelle 

testified that Clark told her the girl’s head was swollen and 

it looked like she had been raped and “stabbed by something 

like a screwdriver.” Clark’s conversation with Michelle 

occurred before Clark’s meeting with Detectives Kelley and 

Gall. Clark argues that Michelle’s testimony is unreliable 

and that she did not mention the screwdriver when 

interviewed by officers that morning. But Michelle’s 

testimony nonetheless suggests that Clark had personal 

knowledge that Grover was stabbed with a screwdriver. 

Thus, the Manda Report would not have undermined the 

prosecution’s argument that Clark had personal knowledge 

that Grover had been stabbed and that Clark did not learn 

this information from the officers.

We therefore conclude that there is not a “reasonable 

probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have 

been different” if the Manda Report had been disclosed to 

the defense. Reis-Campos, 832 F.3d at 975 (quoting Bagley, 

473 U.S. at 682).

b. Prosecutor’s Interview Notes

Clark also argues that the prosecution withheld interview 

notes by Deputy District Attorney Robert Hickok that 

contradicted the testimony of Detectives Kelley and Gall that 

Clark was calm during his patrol car confession. The notes 

indicate that the officers told Hickok that the reason for 

Detective Gall’s response to Clark’s 30-years question was 

16 Michelle was unavailable to testify at trial, so the parties agreed 

that her preliminary hearing testimony would be read to the jury.

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CLARK V. CHAPPELL 87

“we were attempting to consol [sic] [Clark] at that time, 

cooling out the situation so that he wouldn’t ‘freak out’ at 

the hospital.” Clark argues that the notes support that Clark 

was in distress at the time of his patrol car confession and 

that Detective Gall’s 30-years statement was a promise to 

Clark of leniency. Clark asserts that the disclosure of the 

notes would have led to the suppression of his patrol car 

confession, and without the patrol car confession, the 

prosecution would not have been able to use it to undermine 

his taped statement that he had blacked out during the 

murder. We disagree.

Clark fails to show a reasonable probability that the 

result of trial would have been different. His taped 

confession would still be admissible, in which he admitted 

to choking Grover, “bashing one rock into her,” and 

“throwing a piece of metal” that “looked like an old broken 

screwdriver” after she “said she was going to cry rape.” He 

also admitted that after the murder he changed his clothes 

and pretended to find the body as a cover up. Given the 

overwhelming evidence against Clark, the prosecutor’s 

notes would not have changed the jury’s rejection of Clark’s 

claim that he had blacked out during the murder. We 

therefore conclude that Clark has not shown, even if the 

prosecutor’s notes were disclosed to the defense, that there 

is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Reis-Campos, 832 F.3d at 975 (quoting Bagley, 

473 U.S. at 682).

We thus deny habeas relief on Claim 20.

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11. Claim 36: We deny Clark’s claim that habeas 

relief is warranted because cumulative errors 

denied Clark’s right to a fair trial.

Finally, Clark argues that his habeas claims must be 

analyzed for cumulative error. “Although individual errors 

looked at separately may not rise to the level of reversible 

error, their cumulative effect may nevertheless be so 

prejudicial as to require reversal.” United States v. 

Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993). “In 

reviewing for cumulative error, the court must review all 

errors preserved for appeal and all plain errors.” Id. “[T]he 

combined effect of multiple trial court errors violates due 

process where it renders the resulting criminal trial 

fundamentally unfair.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 

(9th Cir. 2007); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 

284, 302 (1973). Cumulative error warrants habeas relief 

where the errors “so infected the trial with unfairness,” 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974), as to 

have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict,” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (citation omitted).

In analyzing all of Clark’s claims on appeal, we conclude 

that cumulative error does not warrant reversal. Given the 

overwhelming evidence against Clark at trial, any error that 

may have occurred did not infect the trial with unfairness.

We deny habeas relief on Claim 36.

V. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas corpus 

relief on Issues 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. We VACATE the district 

court’s denial of habeas corpus relief on Issue 2, and we 

REMAND to the district court for the limited purpose to 

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reconsider Issue 2 in light of our decision in Godoy v. 

Spearman, 861 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

We extend a COA to Claims 5, 6, 11, 14L, 18, 20 and 36, 

and we DENY habeas corpus relief on these claims. We 

DENY a COA on Claims 8, 14F, and 15B.

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