Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01057/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01057-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Prairie Island Indian Community
Petitioner
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Respondent
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 16, 2012 Decided June 8, 2012

No. 11-1045

STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

RESPONDENTS

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with 11-1051, 11-1056, 11-1057

On Petitions for Review of Orders

 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Monica Wagner, Deputy Bureau Chief, Office of the

Attorney General for the State of New York, argued the cause

for petitioners States and Prairie Island Indian Community

Petitioners. With her on the briefs were Eric T. Schneiderman,

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State

of New York, John J. Sipos and Janice A. Dean, Assistant

Attorneys General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General,

Brian A. Sutherland, Assistant Solicitor General of Counsel,

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Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General for the State of New Jersey, Kevin P. Auerbacher,

Assistant Attorney General, Ruth E. Musetto, Deputy Attorney

General, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the State of Vermont, Thea Schwartz,

Assistant Attorney General, George Jepsen, Attorney General,

Office of the Attorney General for the State of Connecticut,

Robert Snook, Assistant Attorney General, and Joseph F.

Halloran.

Geoffrey H. Fettus argued the cause for petitioners the

Environmental Groups. With him on the briefs were Andres J.

Restrepo and Diane Curran.

Robert M. Rader, Senior Attorney, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the

brief were John E. Arbab, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

Stephen G. Burns, General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, and John F. Cordes Jr., Solicitor.

David A. Repka argued the cause for intervenors Nuclear

Energy Institute, et al., in support of respondents. With him on

the brief were Brad Fagg and Jerry Bonanno. Anne W.

Cottingham entered an appearance.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, TATEL and GRIFFITH,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Chief Judge: Fourstates, an Indian community,

and a number of environmental groups petition this Court for

review of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC” or

“Commission”) rulemaking regarding temporary storage and

permanent disposal of nuclear waste. We hold that the

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rulemaking at issue here constitutes a major federal action

necessitating either an environmental impact statement or a

finding of no significant environmental impact. We further hold

that the Commission’s evaluation of the risks of spent nuclear

fuel is deficient in two ways: First, in concluding that permanent

storage will be available “when necessary,” the Commission did

not calculate the environmental effects of failing to secure

permanent storage—a possibility that cannot be ignored. 

Second, in determining that spent fuel can safely be stored on

site at nuclear plants for sixty years after the expiration of a

plant’s license, the Commission failed to properly examine

future dangers and key consequences. For these reasons, we

grant the petitions for review, vacate the Commission’s orders,

and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

This is another in the growing line of cases involving the

federal government’s failure to establish a permanent repository

for civilian nuclear waste. See, e.g., In re Aiken County, 645

F.3d 428, 430–31 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (recounting prior cases). We

address the Commission’s recent rulemaking regarding the

prospects for permanent disposal of nuclear waste and the

environmental effects of temporarily storing such material on

site at nuclear plants until a permanent disposal facility is

available. 

After four to six years of use in a reactor, nuclear fuel rods

can no longer efficiently produce energy and are considered

“spent nuclear fuel” (“SNF”). Blue Ribbon Commission on

America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy

10–11 (2012). Fuel rods are thermally hot when removed from

reactors and emit great amounts of radiation—enough to be fatal

in minutes to someone in the immediate vicinity. Id. Therefore,

the rods are transferred to racks within deep, water-filled pools

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for cooling and to protect workers from radiation. After the fuel

has cooled, it may be transferred to dry storage, which consists

of large concrete and steel “casks.” Most SNF, however, will

remain in spent-fuel pools until a permanent disposal solution is

available. Id. at 11. 

Even though it is no longer useful for nuclear power, SNF

poses a dangerous, long-term health and environmental risk. It

will remain dangerous “fortime spans seemingly beyond human

comprehension.” Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. Envtl. Prot.

Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam). 

Determining how to dispose of the growing volume of SNF,

which may reach 150,000 metric tons by the year 2050, is a

serious problem. See Blue Ribbon Commission, supra, at 14. 

Yet despite years of “blue ribbon” commissions, congressional

hearings, agency reports, and site investigations, the United

States has not yet developed a permanent solution. That failure,

declared the most recent “blue ribbon” panel, is the “central flaw

of the U.S. nuclear waste management program to date.” Id. at

27. Experts agree that the ultimate solution will be a “geologic

repository,” in which SNF is stored deep within the earth,

protected by a combination of natural and engineered barriers. 

Id. at ix, 29. Twenty years of work on establishing such a

repository at Yucca Mountain was recently abandoned when the

Department of Energy decided to withdraw its license

application for the facility. Id. at 3. At this time, there is not

even a prospective site for a repository, let alone progress

toward the actual construction of one.

Due to the government’s failure to establish a final resting

place for spent fuel, SNF is currently stored on site at nuclear

plants. This type of storage, optimistically labeled “temporary

storage,” has been used for decades longer than originally

anticipated. The delay has required plants to expand storage

pools and to pack SNF more densely within them. The lack of

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progress on a permanent repository has caused considerable

uncertainty regarding the environmental effects of temporary

SNF storage and the reasonableness of continuing to license and

relicense nuclear reactors.

In this case, petitioners challenge a 2010 update to the

NRC’s Waste Confidence Decision (“WCD”). The original

WCD came as the result of a 1979 decision by this court

remanding the Commission’s decision to allow the expansion of

spent-fuel pools at two nuclear plants. Minnesota v. NRC, 602

F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In Minnesota, we directed the

Commission to consider “whether there is reasonable assurance

that an off-site storage solution [for spent fuel] will be available

by . . . the expiration of the plants’ operating licenses, and if not,

whether there is reasonable assurance that the fuel can be stored

safely at the sites beyond those dates.” Id. at 418. The WCD is

the Commission’s determination of those risks and assurances.

The original WCD was published in 1984 and included five

“Waste Confidence Findings.” Briefly, those findings declared

that: 1) safe disposal in a mined geologic repository is

technically feasible, 2) such a repository will be available by

2007–2009, 3) waste will be managed safely until the repository

is available, 4) SNF can be stored safely at nuclear plants for at

least thirty years beyond the licensed life of each plant, and 5)

safe, independent storage will be made available if needed. 

Waste Confidence Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,658, 34,659–60

(Aug. 31, 1984). The Commission updated the WCD in 1990 to

reflect new understandings about waste disposal and to predict

the availability of a repository by 2025. See Waste Confidence

Decision Review, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,474, 38,505 (Sept. 18, 1990). 

The Commission reviewed the WCD again in 1999 without

altering it. See Waste Confidence Decision Review: Status, 64

Fed. Reg. 68,005, 68,006–07 (Dec. 6, 1999).

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In 2008, the Commission proposed revisions to the Waste

Confidence Findings, and, after considering public comments,

made revisions in 2010. Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75

Fed. Reg. 81,037 (Dec. 23, 2010). That decision, under review

in this case, reaffirmed three of the Waste Confidence Findings

and updated two. First, the Commission revised Finding 2,

which, as of 1990, expected that a permanent geologic

repository would be available in the first quarter of the twentyfirst century. As amended, Finding 2 now states that a suitable

repository will be available “when necessary,” rather than by a

date certain. Id. at 81,038. In reaching that conclusion, the

Commission examined the political and technical obstacles to

permanent storage and determined that a permanent repository

will be ready by the time the safety of temporary on-site storage

can no longer be assured. Id. 

Finding 4 originally held that SNF could be safely stored at

nuclear reactor sites without significant environmental effects

for at least thirty years beyond each plant’s licensed life,

including the license-renewal period. Id. at 81,039. In revising

that finding, the Commission examined the potential

environmental effects from temporary storage, such as leakages

from the spent-fuel pools and fires caused by the SNF becoming

exposed to the air. Concluding that previous leaks had only a

negligible near-term health effect and that recent regulatory

enhancements will further reduce the risk of leaks, the

Commission determined that leaks do not pose the threat of a

significant environmental impact. Id. at 81,069–71. The

Commission also found that pool fires are sufficiently unlikely

as to pose no significant environmental threat. Id. at 81,070–71. 

As amended, Finding 4 now holds that SNF can be safely stored

at plants for at least sixty years beyond the licensed life of a

plant, instead of thirty. Id. at 81,074. In addition, the

Commission noted in its final rule that it will be developing a

plan for longer-term storage and will conduct a full assessment

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of the environmental impact of storage beyond the sixty-year

post-license period. Id. at 81,040. Based on the revised WCD,

the Commission released a new Temporary Storage Rule

(“TSR”) enacting its conclusions and updating its regulations

accordingly. See Consideration of Environmental Impacts of

Temporary Storage of Spent Fuel after Cessation of Reactor

Operation, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,032 (Dec. 23, 2010); 10 C.F.R.

§ 51.23(a). Petitioners challenge the amended 10 C.F.R.

§ 51.23(a) based on both Finding 2 and Finding 4. 

II. The Commission’s Obligations Under NEPA

The National Environmental PolicyAct of 1969 (“NEPA”),

42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., requires federal agencies such as the

Commission to examine and report on the environmental

consequences of their actions. NEPA is an “essentially

procedural” statute intended to ensure “fully informed and wellconsidered” decisionmaking, but not necessarily the best

decision. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435

U.S. 519, 558 (1978). Under NEPA, each federal agency must

prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) before

taking a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 

An agency can avoid preparing an EIS, however, if it conducts

an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) and makes a Finding of

No Significant Impact (“FONSI”). See Sierra Club v. Dep’t of

Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Theodore

Roosevelt Conservation P'ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 503–04

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining NEPA procedures in detail). The

issuance or reissuance of a reactor license is a major federal

action affecting the quality of the human environment. See New

York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 589 F.3d 551, 553 (2d Cir.

2009).

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The parties here dispute whetherthe WCD itself constitutes

a major federal action. To petitioners, the WCD is a major

federal action because it is a predicate to every decision to

license or relicense a nuclear plant, and the findings made in the

WCD are not challengeable at the time a plant seeks licensure. 

The Commission contends that because the WCD does not

authorize the licensing of any nuclear reactor or storage facility,

and because a site-specific EIS will be conducted for each

facility at the time it seeks licensure, the WCD is not a major

federal action. To the Commission, the WCD is simply an

answer to this court’s mandate in Minnesota to ensure that plants

are only licensed while the NRC has reasonable assurance that

permanent disposal of the resulting waste will be available. The

Commission also contends that the WCD constitutes an EA

supporting the revision of 10 C.F.R. § 51.23(a), and because the

EA found no significant environmental impact, an EIS is not

required. 

We agree with petitioners that the WCD rulemaking is a

major federal action requiring either a FONSI or an EIS. The

Commission’s contrary argument treating the WCD as separate

from the individual licensing decisions it enables fails under

controlling precedent.

We have long held that NEPA requires that “environmental

issues be considered at every important stage in the decision

making process concerning a particular action.” Calvert Cliffs'

Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d

1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The WCD makes generic findings

that have a preclusive effect in all future licensing decisions—it

is a pre-determined “stage” of each licensing decision. NEPA

established the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”)

“with authority to issue regulations interpreting it.” Dep’t of

Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757 (2004). The CEQ

has defined major federal actions to include actions with 

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“[i]ndirect effects, which are caused by the action and are later

in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably

foreseeable.” 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8, 1508.18; Public Citizen, 541

U.S. at 763; see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358

(1979) (holding that the CEQ’s NEPA interpretations are

entitled to substantial deference); accord CTIA-Wireless Ass’n

v. FCC, 466 F.3d 105, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2006). It is not only

reasonably forseeable but eminently clear that the WCD will be

used to enable licensing decisions based on its findings. The

Commission and the intervenors contend that the site-specific

factors that differ from plant to plant can be challenged at the

time of a specific plant’s licensing, but the WCD nonetheless

renders uncontestable general conclusions about the

environmental effects of plant licensure that will apply in every

licensing decision. See 10 C.F.R. § 51.23(b).

Petitioners’ argument continues by suggesting that the

WCD lacks an EIS and must be reversed on that basis. Not

necessarily. No EIS is required if the agency conducts an EA

and issues a FONSI sufficiently explaining why the proposed

action will not have a significant environmental impact. Public

Citizen, 541 U.S. at 757–58. Though we give considerable

deference to an agency’s decision regarding whether to prepare

an EIS, the agency must 1) “accurately identif[y] the relevant

environmental concern,” 2) take a “hard look at the problem in

preparing its EA,” 3) make a “convincing case for its finding of

no significant impact,” and 4) show that even if a significant

impact will occur, “changes or safeguards in the project

sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum.” Taxpayers of

Michigan Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 861 (D.C.

Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). An agency’s decision

not to prepare an EIS must be set aside if it is “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.” Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 763 (quoting

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). 

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III. Availability of a Permanent Repository

With these NEPA obligations in mind, we turn to the

Commission’s conclusion that a permanent repository for SNF

will be available “when necessary.” In so concluding, the

Commission examined the historical difficulty—now measured

in decades rather than years—in establishing a permanent

facility. See, e.g., Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed.

Reg. at 81,049. Though a number of commenters suggested that

the social and political barriers to building a geologic repository

are too great to conclude that a facility could be built in any

reasonable timeframe, the Commission believes that the lessons

learned from the Yucca Mountain program and the Blue Ribbon

Commission on America’s Nuclear Future will ensure that,

through “open and transparent” decisionmaking, a consensus

would be reached. Id. Further, the Commission noted that the

Nuclear Waste Policy Act mandates a repository program,

demonstrating the continued commitment and obligation of the

federal government to pursue one. The scientific and

experiential knowledge of the past decades, the Commission

explained, would enable the government to create a suitable

repository by the time one is needed. Id. 

A.

Petitioners argue that the Commission’s conclusion

regarding permanent storage violates NEPA in two ways: First,

it fails to fully account for the significant societal and political

barriers that may delay or prevent the opening of a repository. 

Second, the Commission’s conclusion that a permanent

repository will be available “when necessary” fails to define the

term “necessary” in any meaningful way and does not address

the effects of a failure to establish a repository in time.

Petitioners further contest the Commission’s claim that the

WCD constitutes an EA for permanent disposal, let alone the

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EIS they contend is required here. 

The Commission responds by contending that it “candidly

acknowledged” the societal and political challenges, and crafted

the WCD to account for those risks. Overcoming political

obstacles is not the responsibility of the Commission, it

contends, and the NRC’s conclusion that institutional obstacles

will not prevent a repository from being built is entitled to

substantial deference. The Commission contends that the

selection of a precise date for Finding 2 is not required by NEPA

or any other laws governing the NRC, and the Commission used

the “when necessary” formulation as far back as 1977. See

NRDC v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 582 F.2d 166, 170, 175

(2d Cir. 1978). 

As for examining the environmental effects of failing to

establish a repository, the Commission contends that the WCD

is an EA supporting the revision of 10 C.F.R. § 51.23(a). No

EIS is necessary regarding permanent disposal because, the

Commission argues, the WCD is not a major federal action, and

conducting an EIS for this issue would be the sort of “abstract

exercise” the Supreme Court declined to require in Baltimore

Gas and Electric Company v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 100 (1983). 

Further, the Commission’s existing “Table S-3” already

considers the environmental effects of the nuclear fuel cycle

generally and found no significant impacts. Therefore, the

Commission believes, no EIS is required.

B.

The Commission’s “when necessary” finding is already

imperiled by our conclusion that the WCD is a major federal

action. We hold that the WCD must be vacated as to its revision

to Finding 2 because the WCD fails to properly analyze the

environmental effects of its permanent disposal conclusion.

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While we share petitioners’ considerable skepticism as to

whether a permanent facility can be built given the societal and

political barriers to selecting a site, we need not resolve whether

the Commission adequately considered those barriers. 

Likewise, we need not decide whether, as the Commission

contends, an agency’s interpretation of the political landscape

surrounding its field of expertise merits deference. Instead, we

hold the WCD is defective on far simpler grounds: As we have

determined, the WCD is a major federal action because it is used

to allow the licensing of nuclear plants. See supra Part II. 

Therefore, the WCD requires an EIS or, alternatively, an EA

that concludes with a finding of no significant impact. The

Commission did not supply a suitable FONSI here because it did

not examine the environmental effects of failing to establish a

repository. 

Even taking the Commission’s word that the WCD

constitutes an EA for the permanent storage conclusion, see

Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,042, the

EA is insufficient because a finding that “reasonable assurance

exists that sufficient mined geologic repository capacity will be

available when necessary,” id. at 81,041, does not describe a

probability of failure so low as to dismiss the potential

consequences of such a failure. Under NEPA, an agency must

look at both the probabilities of potentially harmful events and

the consequences if those events come to pass. See, e.g.,

Carolina Envtl. Study Grp. v. U.S., 510 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir.

1975). An agency may find no significant impact if the

probability is so low as to be “remote and speculative,” or if the

combination of probability and harm is sufficiently minimal. 

See, e.g., City of New York v. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.2d 732,

738 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The concept of overall risk incorporates the

significance of possible adverse consequences discounted by the

improbability of their occurrence.”). Here, a “reasonable

assurance” that permanent storage will be available is a far cry

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from finding the likelihood of nonavailability to be “remote and

speculative.” The Commission failed to examine the

environmental consequences of failing to establish a repository

when one is needed. 

The Commission argues that its “Table S-3” already

accounts for the environmental effects of the nuclear fuel cycle

and finds no significant impact. Not so. Table S-3, like the

Commission itself, presumes the existence of a geologic

repository. Therefore, it cannot explain the environmental

effects of a failure to secure a permanent facility. The

Commission also complains that conducting a full analysis

regarding permanent storage would be an “abstract exercise.”

Perhaps the Commission thinks so because it perceives the

required analysis to be of the effects of the permanent repository

itself. But we are focused on the effects of a failure to secure

permanent storage. The Commission apparently has no longterm plan other than hoping for a geologic repository. If the

government continues to fail in its quest to establish one, then

SNF will seemingly be stored on site at nuclear plants on a

permanent basis. The Commission can and must assess the

potential environmental effects of such a failure. 

IV. Temporary On-Site Storage of SNF

In concluding that SNF can safely be stored in on-site

storage pools for a period of sixty years after the end of a plant’s

life, instead of thirty, the Commission conducted what it

purports to be an EA, which found that extending the time for

storage would have no significant environmental impact. See

Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,074. 

This analysis was conducted in generic fashion by looking to

environmental risks across the board at nuclear plants, rather

than by conducting a site-by-site analysis of each specific

nuclear plant. Two key risks the Commission examined in its

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EA were the risk of environmental harm due to pool leakage and

the risk of a fire resulting from the fuel rods becoming exposed

to air. See id. at 81,069–71. We conclude that the

Commission’s EA and resulting FONSI are not supported by

substantial evidence on the record because the Commission

failed to properly examine the risk of leaks in a forward-looking

fashion and failed to examine the potential consequences of pool

fires.

A.

Petitioners challenge the finding of no significant impact on

two bases: First, petitioners argue that a generic analysis is

simply inappropriate and that the Commission was required to

look at each plant individually. A site-by-site analysis is

necessary, petitioners argue, because the risks of leaks and fires

are affected by site-specific factors such as pool configuration,

leak detection systems, the nature of SNF stored in the pool, and

the location of the pool within the plant. Overall, petitioners

argue that NEPA requires the Commission to fully analyze the

environmental effects of on-site storage, and a generic analysis

cannot fulfill that statutory mandate. 

Second, petitioners argue that even if generic analysis is

appropriate, the Commission’s generic EA in this case was

insufficient. They maintain that the Commission did not

adequately account for leaks from on-site pools because the

Commission only looked at past leaks to see if they caused

environmental damage, rather than examining the risks of future

leaks. Also, as petitioners point out, the Commission’s own

studies have shown that previous leaks “did, or potentially

could, impact ground-water resources relative to established

EPA drinking water standards.” NRC, Liquid Radioactive

Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report 13 (2006). 

Petitioners also argue that the Commission’s analysis of the

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effects of pool fires was deficient because the Commission

declined to examine the consequences of pool fires due to the

low probability of such an occurrence. In petitioners’ view, the

Commission could only avoid examining the consequences of

pool fires in a full EIS if it found the risk so low as to be

“remote and speculative”—a finding the Commission did not

make. Finally, Petitioners contend that the Commission

completely failed to look at non-health environmental factors

such as effects on the Prairie Island Indian Community’s

homeland, which is located near one of the plants governed by

the rule. 

The Commission responds bystating that its examination of

past leaks properly demonstrated that the potential for

environmental harm from leakage is negligible. The

Commission argues that the effects of past leaks have been

shown to be quite minimal, and the Commission’s leakage task

force has recommended twenty-six specific measures to

minimize the risk even further. Also, the NRC exercises

oversight over the pools and will ensure that they do not become

unsafe over the sixty-year period. With regard to fires, the

Commission contends that it engaged in an “exhaustive

consideration” of the risk and found that such an event is

extremely unlikely. In the Commission’s view, a site-by-site

analysis of pool-fire risk is unnecessary because the

Commission relied on studies which accounted for all of the

variations cited by petitioners and essentially looked at the most

dangerous combinations of site-specific factors. Even looking

to a worst-case scenario, the Commission says, the risk of fires

was still extremely low.

Responding to petitioners’ argument that the Commission

failed to determine that the risk of fires was “remote and

speculative,” the Commission suggests that it did not dismissthe

risk out of hand as “remote and speculative” but rather examined

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it thoroughly and found it to be so low that the consequences

could not possibly overcome the low probability. Therefore, the

Commission did not need to conduct a full EIS for pool fires. 

Finally, the Commission argues that petitioners did not raise the

issue of non-health impacts during the rulemaking, and thus they

cannot raise that issue on petition now. 

B.

Both the Supreme Court and this court have endorsed the

Commission’s longstanding practice of considering

environmental issues through general rulemaking in appropriate

circumstances. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 100 (“The

generic method chosen by the agency is clearly an appropriate

method of conducting the hard look required by NEPA.”); see

also Minnesota, 602 F.2d at 416–17. Though Baltimore Gas

dealt with the nuclear fuel cycle itself, which is generally

focused on things that occur outside of individual plants, we see

no reason that a comprehensive general analysis would be

insufficient to examine on-site risks that are essentially common

to all plants. This is particularly true given the Commission’s

use of conservative bounding assumptions and the opportunity

for concerned parties to raise site-specific differences at the time

of a specific site’s licensing. Nonetheless, whether the analysis

is generic or site-by-site, it must be thorough and

comprehensive. Even though the Commission’s application of

its technical expertise demands the “most deferential” treatment

by the courts, Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 103, we conclude that

the Commission has failed to conduct a thorough enough

analysis here to merit our deference. 

1.

The Commission admits in the WCD Update that there have

been “several incidents of groundwater contamination

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originating from leaking reactor spent fuel pools and associated

structures.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,070. The Commission brushes

away that concern by stating that the past leaks had only a

negligible near-term health impact. Id. at 81,071. Even setting

aside the fact that near-term health effects are not the only type

of environmental impacts, the harm from past leaks—without

more—tells us very little about the potential for future leaks or

the harm such leaks might portend. The WCD Update seeks to

extend the period of time for which pools are considered safe for

storage; therefore, a proper analysis of the risks would

necessarily look forward to examine the effects of the additional

time in storage, as well as examining past leaks in a manner that

would allow the Commission to rule out the possibility that

those leaks were only harmless because of site-specific factors

or even sheer luck. The WCD Update has no analysis of those

possibilities other than to say that past leaks had “negligible”

near-term health effects. Id. A study of the impact of thirty

additional years of SNF storage must actually concern itself with

the extra years of storage.

The Commission also notes that a taskforce has made

recommendations for improvements to spent-fuel pools, which

the NRC “has addressed, or is in the process of addressing.” Id. 

But those improvements are thus far untested, and we have no

way of deferring to the Commission’s conclusion that they will

ensure the absence of environmental harm. Finally, the

Commission refers to its monitoring and regulatory compliance

program as a buffer against pool degradation. Id. That

argument is even less availing because it amounts to a

conclusion that leaks will not occur because the NRC is “on

duty.” With full credit to the Commission’s considerable

enforcement and inspection efforts, merely pointing to the

compliance program is in no way sufficient to support a

scientific finding that spent-fuel pools will not cause a

significant environment impact during the extended storage

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period. This is particularly true when the period of time covered

by the Commission’s predictions may extend to nearly a century

for some facilities.

Despite giving our “most deferential” treatment to the

Commission’s application of its technical and scientific

expertise, we cannot reconcile a finding that past leaks have

been harmless with a conclusion that future leaks at all sites will

be harmless as well. The Commission’s task here was to

determine whether the pools could be considered safe for an

additional thirty years in the future. That past leaks have not

been harmful with respect to groundwater does not speak to

whether and how future leaks might occur, and what the effects

of those leaks might be. The Commission’s analysis of leaks,

therefore, was insufficient. 

2.

Even though the Commission engaged in a more substantial

analysis of fires than it did of leaks, that analysis is plagued by

a failure to examine the consequences of pool fires in addition

to the probabilities. Petitioners, citing Limerick Ecology Action,

Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 869 F.2d 719, 739 (3d

Cir. 1989), argue that the Commission could only avoid

conducting an EIS if it found the risk of fires to be “remote and

speculative.” The Commission, citing Carolina Environmental

Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d at 799, argues that it did

not need to examine the consequences of fires because it found

the risk of fires to be very low. 

We disagree with both parties. As should be clear by this

point in our opinion, an agency conducting an EA generally

must examine both the probability of a given harm occurring

and the consequences of that harm if it does occur. Only if the

harm in question is so “remote and speculative” as to reduce the

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effective probability of its occurrence to zero may the agency

dispense with the consequences portion of the analysis. See

Limerick Ecology Action, Inc., 869 F.2d at 739. But, contra

petitioners, the finding that the probability of a given harm is

nonzero does not, by itself, mandate an EIS: after the agency

examines the consequences of the harm in proportion to the

likelihood of its occurrence, the overall expected harm could

still be insignificant and thus could support a FONSI. See

Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 510 F.2d at 799 (“Recognition of

the minimal probability of such an event is not equatable with

nonrecognition of its consequences.”). Here, however, the

Commission did not undertake to examine the consequences of

pool fires at all. Depending on the weighing of the probability

and the consequences, an EIS may or may not be required, and

such a determination would merit considerable deference. C.f.,

City of New York, 715 F.2d at 751–52 (deferring to an agency’s

weighing of a “catastrophic” harm against an “infinitesimal

probability”). But unless the risk is “remote and speculative,”

the Commission must put the weights on both sides of the scale

before it can make a determination.

3.

Asfor petitioners’ remaining argument that theCommission

did not consider non-health environmental effects, we agree

with the Commission that petitioners did not properly raise those

issues in the rulemaking. Petitioners essentially present two

non-health impacts: decrease in property values and risk of harm

to the Prairie Island Indian Community’s homeland. The Tribe

did mention its small size and close proximity to the Prairie

Island Nuclear Generating Plant, but it did not assert specifically

how it might be harmed by either the rulemaking itself or the

licensing the rulemaking enables. With regard to property

values, petitioners point to a study considering the economic

impact of the Indian Point plant. But that study actually

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assumes a diminution in values caused by current plant

operation and simply extends it mathematically—it in no way

asserts whether or how any harm to property values might occur

nor how that harm is related to a change in the physical

environment. Petitioners’ failure to raise these objections to the

agency waives them. See Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 764. We

note, as did the Supreme Court in Public Citizen, that primary

responsibility for compliance with NEPA lies with the

Commission, not petitioners; nonetheless, the non-health effects

alluded to here are not “so obvious that there is no need for a

commentator to point them out.” Id. Given, however, that we

are invalidating the Commission’s conclusions as a whole,

petitioners will have the opportunity to properly raise and clarify

these concerns on remand.

* * *

Overall, we cannot defer to the Commission’s conclusions

regarding temporary storage because the Commission did not

conduct a sufficient analysis of the environmental risks. In so

holding, we do not require, as petitioners would prefer, that the

Commission examine each site individually. However, a

generic analysis must be forward looking and have enough

breadth to support the Commission’s conclusions. Furthermore,

as NEPA requires, the Commission must conduct a true EA

regarding the extension of temporary storage. Such an analysis

must, unless it finds the probability of a given risk to be

effectively zero, account for the consequences of each risk. On

remand, the Commission will have the opportunity to conduct

exactly such an analysis.

 V. Conclusion

We recognize that the Commission is in a difficult position

given the political problems concerning the storage of spent

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nuclear fuel. Nonetheless, the Commission’s obligations under

NEPA require a more thorough analysis than provided for in the

WCD Update. We note that the Commission is currently

conducting an EIS regarding the environmental impacts of SNF

storage beyond the sixty-year post-license period at issue in this

case, and some or all of the problems here may be addressed in

such a rulemaking. In any event, we grant the petitions for

review, vacate the WCD Update and TSR, and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered.

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