Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-01152/USCOURTS-caDC-01-01152-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc.
Petitioner
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2002 Decided June 18, 2002

No. 01-1152

BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc.,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Aviation Administration,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Aviation Administration

Michael S. McCarthy argued the cause for the petitioner.

Michael S. Freeman was on brief.

Jeffrica Jenkins Lee, Attorney, United States Department

of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent. Robert S.

Greenspan, Attorney, United States Department of Justice,

was on brief. Christine N. Kohl, Attorney, United States

Department of Justice, entered an appearance.

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Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

Circuit Judge Tatel.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: BFI Waste

Systems of North America, Inc. (BFI), petitions for review of

a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) decision, see Appendix for Petitioner (JA) at 5-9 (Affirmation), affirming the

FAA's earlier determination that BFI's proposed expansion

of a landfill near Denver International Airport (DIA) would

be a hazard to air navigation, see id. at 207-09 (Hazard

Determination or Determination). BFI claims, inter alia,

that the Affirmation and Determination are arbitrary, capricious and otherwise unlawful and that the substantive findings underlying them are unsupported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. We agree and therefore

grant the petition for review.

I.

The following factual recitation is divided into two sections--the first explaining the regulatory regime of the FAA

and the second detailing how BFI's landfill proposal was (or

was not) processed within that regime.

A.

Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Act), the FAA is

authorized to determine whether a proposed construction or

alteration project will present a hazard to air navigation. The

Act states that the FAA "[b]y regulation ... shall require a

person to give adequate public notice [of] ... the proposed

construction, alteration, establishment, or expansion, of a

structure or sanitary landfill when the notice will promote ...

(1) safety in air commerce; and (2) the efficient use and

preservation of the navigable airspace and of airport traffic

capacity at public-use airports." 49 U.S.C. s 44718(a). Pursuant to its statutory authority, the FAA has promulgated

regulations requiring a project sponsor to notify the FAA

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when the sponsor proposes, inter alia, any alteration resulting in a sanitary landfill "of more than 200 feet in height

above the ground level at its site." 14 C.F.R. s 77.13(a)(1).

Under the regulations, "[e]ach person who is required to

notify the [FAA] under s 77.13(a) shall send [to it] one

executed form set (four copies) of FAA Form 7460-1, Notice

of Proposed Construction or Alteration." 14 C.F.R.

s 77.17(a). The information contained in the Form 7460-1 is

meant to provide the FAA with a basis for determining "the

possible hazardous effect of the proposed construction or

alteration on air navigation." 14 C.F.R. s 77.11(b)(2).

In addition to setting out notice requirements, the regulations provide the standards by which alteration proposals are

evaluated. For instance, Subpart C of the regulations "establishes standards for determining obstructions to air navigation" and "applies to existing and proposed manmade objects,

objects of natural growth, and terrain." 14 C.F.R. s 77.21(a).

Subpart C states that a proposed manmade object, like a

landfill, is "an obstruction to air navigation" if it is "500 feet

above ground level at the site of the object," 14 C.F.R.

s 77.23(a)(1), or if it is "200 feet above ground level ...

within 3 nautical miles of the established reference point of an

airport, excluding heliports," 14 C.F.R. s 77.23(a)(2). Under

FAA Order 7400.2D, "Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters" (Sept. 16, 1993) (FAA Handbook)--a binding set of FAA

guidelines, see D&F Afonso Realty Trust v. Garvey, 216 F.3d

1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (FAA Handbook is "controlling")--a proposed object that exceeds the standards of Subpart C is presumed to have a substantial adverse effect on the

use of airspace and is therefore "presumed to be [a] hazard[ ]

to air navigation unless an aeronautical study determines

otherwise." FAA Handbook p 7-1(b).

The Act and the regulations require the FAA, in certain

circumstances, to conduct an aeronautical study to determine

the extent of any adverse impact on the use of airspace. The

relevant provision of the statute provides that

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[u]nder regulations prescribed by the Secretary [of

Transportation], if the [FAA] decides that constructing

or altering a structure may result in an obstruction of the

navigable airspace or an interference with air navigation

facilities and equipment or the navigable airspace, [it]

shall conduct an aeronautical study to decide the extent

of any adverse impact on the safe and efficient use of the

airspace, facilities, or equipment.

49 U.S.C. s 44718(b)(1). Pursuant to this statutory authority,

the Secretary has prescribed Subpart D, which provides that

[t]he Regional Manager, Air Traffic Division of the region in which the proposed construction or alteration

would be located ... conducts [an] aeronautical study

[that] ... may include the physical and electromagnetic

radiation effect the proposal may have on the operation

of an air navigation facility....

To the extent considered necessary, the Regional Manager ... [s]olicits comments from all interested persons;

... [e]xplores objections to the proposal and attempts to

develop recommendations for adjustment of aviation requirements that would accommodate the proposed construction or alteration; [and] ... [c]onvenes a meeting

with all interested persons for the purpose of gathering

all facts relevant to the effect of the proposed construction or alteration on the safe and efficient utilization of

the navigable airspace.

14 C.F.R. s 77.35(a), (b). Once an aeronautical study has

been initiated, the FAA applies all of its "operational, procedural and electronic" standards (including those pertaining to

radar coverage) to "determine if the object being studied

would actually be a hazard to air navigation." FAA Handbook p 7-1(b); see id. p 7-3 ("An object to be considered for

adverse aeronautical effect must first exceed the obstruction

standards of Subpart C ... and/or be found to have physical

or electromagnetic radiation effect on the operation of air

navigation facilities."). Upon the study's conclusion, the ReUSCA Case #01-1152 Document #684050 Filed: 06/18/2002 Page 4 of 17
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gional Manager issues a hazard/no-hazard determination.

See 14 C.F.R. s 77.35(c). In order to issue a hazard determination, the Regional Manager "must find by a clear showing

that the [object] in question will have a 'substantial adverse

effect' on air navigation." D&F Afonso, 216 F.3d at 1195

(citing FAA Handbook p p 7-2 to 7-5, 8-2); see also FAA

Handbook Fig. 4-23[9]. The Regional Manager's determination is final unless the FAA grants discretionary review. See

14 C.F.R. s 77.37.

A hazard/no-hazard determination has "no enforceable legal

effect." Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, 600 F.2d

965, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The FAA lacks authority to

prohibit a construction or alteration it believes to be hazardous to air navigation.1 See id. at 967. Nonetheless, a hazard

determination can hinder the project sponsor in acquiring

insurance, securing financing or obtaining approval from state

or local authorities. See id.

B.

BFI is a waste disposal company that operates solid waste

landfills in Colorado, including the Tower Road landfill at

issue here. The Tower Road landfill is located approximately

two miles west of DIA in Commerce City, Colorado. Before

1999 BFI had permission from state and local authorities to

extend the landfill vertically to 119 feet above ground level

(AGL) at its tallest point. In February 1999 BFI obtained

state and local authorization to increase the landfill's height

by 157 feet (to 276 feet AGL) over a period of 40-60 years.

Thus, as of March 1999, the FAA's regulatory approval was

the final approval needed in order to expand.

On March 16, 1999 BFI representatives met with an official

from the FAA's Denver Airports District Office (ADO). At

the meeting, BFI submitted a preliminary FAA Form 7460-1

to the FAA and the attendees discussed the proposal's potential impact on airport traffic and radar operations. Emphasizing "the need to perform analysis" before drawing conclu-

__________

1 We must therefore resolve the question whether on the record

before us BFI has Article III standing to challenge the Hazard

Determination and the Affirmation. See infra Part II.

sions, the ADO informed BFI that "[t]he degree of impact to

the [airport surveillance radar] line of sight will need to be

studied and no commitments [are being] made at this time."

JA 47. On April 16 BFI formally submitted a Form 7460-1

to the FAA's Northwest Mountain Region regarding the 157-

foot alteration proposal. The FAA received the form, at the

earliest, on April 22. On April 26 the FAA's Northwest

Mountain Region issued a notice that it intended to conduct

an aeronautical study to determine the effect of the landfill

expansion on air navigation. At no time did the FAA "circularize" the aeronautical study notice to interested parties or

even to BFI.2 On May 26 Tower Road landfill officials met

with ADO representatives who briefly toured the landfill.

Although the record recites that potential radar effects were

"currently being reviewed," id. at 83, it does not state that

radar issues were in fact discussed at the meeting.

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On August 30, 1999 the FAA's Northwest Mountain Region

issued the Hazard Determination, which consisted of a form

cover letter and a one-page summary of findings. The Determination identified five adverse impacts on the safe and

efficient use of navigable airspace at DIA: (1) birds attracted

to the landfill could interfere with aircraft; (2) large dump

trucks and other heavy equipment operating on the landfill

could block or reflect radar signals; (3) the increased size of

the landfill could cause interference with radar coverage for

aircraft executing "missed approaches" on Runway 29 at

nearby Jefferson County Airport; (4) the increased size of

the landfill could cause interference with radar coverage of

the missed approach points for DIA Runway 26 and, during

certain weather conditions, DIA Runways 35L and 35R; and

(5) the increased size of the landfill could cause interference

with radar coverage for lifeguard, police, media and business

helicopters operating in downtown Denver, 20 miles southwest of the landfill. Because DIA "currently handles more

than 1.5 million aircraft operations a year," the Determination

__________

2 The FAA generally "circulariz[es] a notice of aeronautical

study" by "notify[ing] interested persons of the study being conducted" via FAA Form 7460-8. FAA Handbook p 5-21. Circularization "provides the opportunity for interested persons to participate [in the study] by submitting comments for consideration." Id.

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stated, "the impacts, taken individually or cumulatively," have

a substantial adverse effect on the use of airspace and "are

determined to be Hazards to Air Navigation." Id. at 209.

On September 28, 1999 BFI filed a petition for administrative

review of the Hazard Determination. On March 3, 2000 the

FAA granted review. The FAA's notice of review invited

interested persons to submit comments to the FAA and BFI

did so.

On July 25, 2000 the FAA affirmed its initial Hazard

Determination. The Affirmation first abandoned several of

the findings made in the Determination, concluding that

neither bird problems nor interference with radar coverage of

Jefferson County Airport or of DIA Runways 26, 35L or 35R

would result from BFI's landfill alteration. The Affirmation

did, however, affirm two of the Determination's five findings

of adverse effect: (1) vehicles on top of the landfill at its

maximum height could cause radar reflections; and (2) radar

coverage of helicopters could be limited. Furthermore, the

FAA based its Affirmation on two adverse effects not mentioned in the Determination, i.e., the possibility that BFI's

proposal would affect radar coverage of (1) DIA Runway 25

and (2) proposed but unbuilt DIA Runway 25L.

On September 22, 2000 BFI timely petitioned for review.

II.

On March 1, 2002 we ordered the parties to submit simultaneous briefs addressing the question of BFI's constitutional

standing to pursue its claims in light of the advisory nature of

the FAA's Hazard Determination and Affirmation. We now

conclude that on the record before us BFI has satisfied

Article III's standing requirements--i.e., it has shown that it

has suffered or will suffer "an injury in fact" which is

"concrete and particularized," "actual or imminent," "fairly

... trace[able] to the challenged action" and "redress[able]

by a favorable decision," Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal quotations omitted); see

D&F Afonso, 216 F.3d at 1193-94.

Pursuant to Colorado law, see C.C.R. 1007-2, s 1.6.1, BFI

applied to the city council of Commerce City for a "certificate of designation" permitting it to expand the Tower

Road landfill. Under C.C.R. 1007-2, s 1.6.2-.6, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment

(CDPHE) provided Commerce City with a required report

on BFI's proposal, stating that the expansion would comply

with applicable environmental laws, provided that "[a]ny restriction of elevation imposed by FAA under applicable federal law ... [is] honored." JA 454. Relying on the

CDPHE report, the city council approved BFI's expansion

proposal with the express caveat that if the FAA determined "there is a problem," the council "has authority to

review the certificate of designation to determine if the

approval needs to be reconsidered, and changes made as

necessary." Id. at 457. Because, as we noted earlier, an

FAA hazard determination itself has "no enforceable legal

effect," Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n, 600 F.2d at 966, it

does not function as a "restriction" on landfill elevation in

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the same way that a binding federal statute or regulation

would. Nonetheless, a hazard determination is the only

means by which the FAA can "restrict[ ]," within the meaning of the CDPHE report, the elevation of the Tower Road

landfill. Accordingly, we conclude that the CDPHE report,

which was incorporated into the city council's approval, expressly conditioned BFI's certificate of designation on the

FAA's non-issuance of a hazard determination. We therefore credit BFI's allegation--supported by the declaration

of its regional vice-president in charge of the Tower Road

landfill--that it faces a concrete, imminent injury from the

reopening and modification of the state and local approvals

as a result of the Hazard Determination. Plainly, the injury is "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action"--that

is, the FAA's alleged arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking--and it is "redress[able] by a favorable decision,"

one vacating and remanding the Determination and Affirmation. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.

III.

Having determined that BFI's petition for review is properly before us, we now turn to the FAA's Determination and

Affirmation to determine whether, based on the administraUSCA Case #01-1152 Document #684050 Filed: 06/18/2002 Page 8 of 17
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tive record, they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5

U.S.C. s 706(2)(A). The FAA's determinations are arbitrary

and capricious if, inter alia, they are "not supported by

substantial evidence" in the record as a whole. Motor Vehicle

Mfrs. Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 719 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir.

1983); see 49 U.S.C. s 46110(c). We address BFI's two

major claims in turn.

A.

First, BFI contends that the Determination and Affirmation were arbitrary, capricious and otherwise unlawful because the FAA violated its own standards in (1) conducting an

aeronautical study without "circularizing" notice thereof and

without negotiating with BFI to identify mitigation measures

that could eliminate purported adverse effects; and (2) failing

to give BFI notice of the two new issues it relied on in

affirming the Determination. Both prongs of BFI's first

contention are meritorious.

When the FAA conducts an aeronautical study, it must

[t]o the extent considered necessary ... [s]olicit[ ] comments from all interested persons; ... [e]xplore[ ] objections to the proposal and attempts to develop recommendations for adjustment of aviation requirements that

would accommodate the proposed construction or alteration; [and] ... [c]onvene[ ] a meeting with all interested

persons for the purpose of gathering all facts relevant to

the effect of the proposed construction or alteration on

the safe and efficient utilization of the navigable airspace.

14 C.F.R. s 77.35(b) (emphasis added). Here, the FAA

performed none of these tasks.3 Nor did it explain its

reasons for declining to do so. The government argues that

the "to the extent considered necessary" language of section

__________

3 The only point at which the FAA invited comments--in its

notice of review--occurred after it issued the Hazard Determination, i.e., after it had already acted arbitrarily in failing to solicit

comments.

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77.35 gives the agency discretion not to perform the tasks.

Its argument, however, ignores the Act, the FAA Handbook

and the relevant case law. As the Eighth Circuit has held,

section 77.35 "must be interpreted to require the FAA to

provide interested persons with an opportunity to comment

upon proposed construction where notice would promote air

safety and efficiency." White Indus., Inc. v. FAA, 692 F.2d

532, 535 (8th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). The White holding

is unsurprising given that the FAA's authority derives from

its statutory mandate "to insure the safe and efficient use of

airspace." Id. (emphasis added); see 49 U.S.C. s 44718.

The Handbook states that "[n]ormally, any propos[al] that

would affect an airport or require a change in aeronautical

operations or procedures should always be circularized" and

it then enumerates six specific circumstances, not applicable

here, in which "[c]ircularization should not be necessary."

FAA Handbook p 5-20 (emphasis added). Because circularization helps "[e]xplain the probable effects of [a] proposal in

sufficient detail to assist interested persons in formulating

comments on how the proposal would affect aeronautical

operations," id. p 5-21, it is an essential step in determining

how to tailor the sponsor's proposal to strike a proper balance

between safety interests and efficiency interests. See Greater Orlando Aviation Auth. v. FAA, 939 F.2d 954, 961 (11th

Cir. 1991) (FAA obliged "to do more than just pay lip service"

to comments endorsing potential non-aviation uses of navigable airspace).

The FAA's unexplained failure to solicit comments as directed by the Handbook was arbitrary and capricious, see

D&F Afonso, 216 F.3d at 1195 ("[T]he requirement that

agency action not be arbitrary and capricious includes a

requirement that the agency adequately explain its result."

(quotations omitted)), especially in light of the fact that FAA

staff members themselves believed it would be helpful if BFI

suggested possible solutions to the agency's radar coverage

concerns, see JA 89. The brief March 16, 1999 meeting--

which occurred before BFI formally filed its proposal and

before the FAA's decision to conduct an aeronautical study--

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does not substitute for an opportunity, open to all interested

parties, to submit written comments on the proposal.

Moreover, the FAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in

failing to negotiate with BFI, pursuant to 14 C.F.R.

s 77.35(b), a compromise "accommodat[ion]" plan that would

resolve anticipated impacts of the proposal. The Handbook

explicitly requires the FAA, in circumstances where the

"proposed structure may create harmful electromagnetic interference," to "meet and informally discuss alternatives"

with the project sponsor and to provide the sponsor "adequate time to consider the problems and alternatives." FAA

Handbook p 7-35(f); see id. p 5-12 (FAA must "attempt to

negotiate a solution to any adverse effect on aeronautical

operations ... with the construction sponsor"). The FAA

correctly observes that "neither the regulations nor the

[Handbook] prescribe any set number of meetings or negotiation sessions that the FAA must conduct with a proponent."

Br. of Resp't at 21. Therefore, it asserts, the March 16, 1999

meeting itself satisfied any duty the FAA might have. The

agency is mistaken. The March meeting occurred before BFI

formally submitted a Form 7460-1 and, therefore, before the

FAA's duty to negotiate even arose. Indeed, the March

meeting took place several weeks before the FAA studied the

landfill's impact on radar coverage and, therefore, well before

any meaningful give-and-take with BFI would have been

possible. In any event, nothing in the record suggests that a

substantive discussion ever came to pass, either on March 16

or at any time thereafter.

Finally, the FAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing, without explanation, to inform BFI in the notice of review

of two issues it ultimately relied on in affirming the initial

Hazard Determination. Where, as here, the FAA decides to

conduct review without a hearing, the Handbook requires it

to advise interested parties of the specific issues to be considered. See FAA Handbook p 8-58. Pointing to the notice of

review as well as a telephone call from the FAA to counsel for

BFI,4 the agency claims that it "substantially complied" with

__________

4 The FAA is referring to its "contact[ing] petitioner's counsel by

telephone to inquire whether [a scientific study] submitted as an

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the Handbook's requirement and properly notified BFI that

the adverse impact on radar coverage of DIA Runway 25 and

proposed Runway 25L were issues it planned to consider.

See Br. of Resp't at 23-27. The record belies the FAA's

assertion. The notice of review states that the FAA was to

"consider all material relevant to the question whether the

proposed construction would have a substantial adverse effect

on the safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace." JA

102. Notice at such a high level of generality is not notice at

all, cf. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 197

(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Ambiguity lurks in generality and may thus become an instrument of severity."); the

Handbook states that "the notice of review shall ... advise of

the specific issues which are to be considered." FAA Handbook p 8-58 (emphasis added). And the FAA's telephone

conversation with BFI, whatever its content, is insufficient as

a matter of law to put BFI on notice; the Handbook states

that "the notice of review shall ... advise of the specific

issues which are to be considered." Id. (emphasis added).

B.

Next, BFI contends that the "FAA's factual conclusions

about the landfill's continued operation are as flawed as the

procedures [it] used to reach them." Br. of Pet'r at 20. We

agree. A hazard determination must be based on "a clear

showing of substantial adverse effect" and, in the determination itself (not simply in its appellate brief), the FAA must

"adequately explain its result." D&F Afonso, 216 F.3d at

1195-96; see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943)

("[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the

grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers

were those upon which its action can be sustained."). This it

failed to do. The two findings of adverse impact upon which

the Affirmation was based and of which BFI had notice--

__________

attachment to petitioner's April 20, 2000 comments 'took into consideration the plans on file to build new runways at Denver International Airport.' " Br. of Resp't at 26 (quoting JA 25).

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first, vehicles at the top of the landfill at its maximum height

could cause radar reflections and, second, radar coverage of

helicopters could be limited--are unsupported by substantial

evidence in the record.

In the Hazard Determination and Affirmation, the FAA

found that the Tower Road landfill at its proposed height

"would be in the radar line of sight and vehicles [i.e., dumptrucks and graders] operating at the landfill may cause radar

reflection and consequently create false targets." JA 7. The

Determination and Affirmation themselves provide no evidentiary basis for the "false target" finding. Indeed, we can find

at most only two pages in a 462-page record to support it--

the FAA's aeronautical study reports that

Airways Facility radar technicians have ... identified

the potential for false targets. At the current elevation

of 5,423' AMSL [above mean sea level], the landfill is

below the radar line-of-sight. At the new height of 5,542'

AMSL, the large dump trucks, graders, and other heavy

equipment create the potential for reflecting the radar

and causing false targets.... The impact in this circumstance would be an erroneous position indication for the

aircraft.

JA 32, 38. The foregoing "evidence" amounts to little more

than a conclusion. In light of the equally plausible evidence

BFI presented--an Ohio University aeronautical study concluding that "[a]nalysis of movement of a truck on top of the

landfill at the proposed maximum height does not show any

appreciable effect on radar operations due to signal reflections," JA 445--we cannot say that the FAA made "a clear

showing" that BFI's proposal will have a substantial adverse

impact on air navigation because of radar reflections. See

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)

("The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.").

Nor can we conclude that the FAA has clearly shown or

adequately explained why "the landfill would have a substantial adverse effect on visual flight rules (VFR) operations in

Class B airspace" in that DIA "would no longer have the

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ability to provide safety and traffic advisory services to"

helicopters and law enforcement aircraft. JA 6-7. Once

again, the FAA's aeronautical study provides only conclusory

evidence; it reports that "[t]he increase in the height of the

landfill will raise radar coverage to 7000' MSL, resulting in an

inability to provide safety advisory services" to these lowaltitude aircraft. JA 32. Once again, BFI furnishes credible

evidence to the contrary; its radar plots (along with the

FAA's) indicate that the rather limited area for which the

landfill would raise the radar coverage floor above 7000'

MSL--an area that is more than 20 miles from DIA--is not

even within DIA's Class B airspace because it is too far from

the airport. See JA 113, 126-27, 450-52.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the FAA acted

arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing the Hazard Determination and Affirmation.5 Accordingly, we grant the petition for

review, vacate the Determination and Affirmation and remand the case to the FAA with instructions to reconsider

BFI's proposal in accordance with the procedures set forth in

the Act, the FAA regulations and the FAA Handbook and in

accordance with this opinion.6

So 

ordered.

__________

5 We do not reach BFI's argument that the FAA violated the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution in basing its Affirmation on two adverse effects not

mentioned in the Determination, i.e., the possibility that BFI's

proposal would affect radar coverage of (1) DIA Runway 25 and (2)

proposed but unbuilt Runway 25L. Cf. United Auto., Aerospace &

Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Nat'l Right to Work Legal Def.

& Educ. Found., Inc., 590 F.2d 1139, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (practice

of avoiding constitutional questions "reflects a court's duty 'of not

needlessly projecting delicate issues for judicial pronouncement' "

(quoting United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1953))).

6 In light of our disposition, we dismiss as moot BFI's motion to

supplement the administrative record.

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Tatel, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part: I agree that the FAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously

by failing to provide BFI with adequate notice concerning the

two new grounds on which the agency rested its final hazard

determination and that the record lacks substantial evidence

to support two findings of adverse impact. See Maj. Op. at

11-14. In view of the considerable deference we owe the

agency, however, I do not agree that the FAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by "conducting an aeronautical study

without 'circularizing' notice thereof and without negotiating

with BFI to identify mitigation measures." Id. at 9. Because of this, and because the FAA may be able to explain its

decision, I would not vacate the order, but would instead

remand to the agency for further consideration. See AlliedSignal, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,

988 F.2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that "[a]n

inadequately supported rule ... need not necessarily be

vacated," particularly where the agency may well "be able to

explain" its decision).

My colleagues' conclusion that the FAA acted arbitrarily

and capriciously by failing to circularize notice rests on their

view that applicable regulations require the agency to solicit

comments from all interested persons. Maj. Op. at 9. The

regulation, however, calls for solicitation of comments only

"[t]o the extent considered necessary." 14 C.F.R. s 77.35(b).

Attempting to make this obviously discretionary provision

seem mandatory, the court places the word "must" before its

quotation of the regulation. Maj. Op. at 9. But even with

this judicially added imperative, the regulation remains entirely discretionary--the agency "must" circularize "[t]o the

extent considered necessary."

Were there any doubt about this, the FAA interprets its

regulation as "not mandat[ing] that the FAA solicit comments." Resp't's Br. at 15. We, of course, owe substantial

deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation,

see Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. FAA, __ F.3d __, 2002

WL 1071924 (D.C. Cir. May 31, 2002)--a principle recognized

nowhere in the court's opinion. Moreover, we have no indication that the FAA's interpretation reflects anything other

than its "fair and considered judgment," Auer v. Robbins, 519

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U.S. 452, 462 (1997); see also Drake v. FAA, __ F.3d __, 2002

WL 1071929 (D.C. Cir. May 31, 2002) (holding that we owe

deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations

expressed during litigation).

In support of their interpretation of the regulation, my

colleagues point to the Federal Aviation Act, an Eighth

Circuit decision, and the FAA Handbook. The only statutory

language they cite, however, is the generic requirement that

the FAA ensure "the safe and efficient use of ... airspace."

49 U.S.C. s 44718(b)(1). The Eighth Circuit did not reach its

decision in the face of a contrary agency interpretation--as

this court now has--nor did it mention the "to the extent

considered necessary" language. And the FAA Handbook's

recommendation that "normally, any proposal that would

affect an airport or require a change in aeronautical operations or procedures should always be circularized," FAA

Handbook p 5-20 (emphasis added), is consistent with the

agency's view that the obligation is discretionary.

Moreover, even if the regulation required circularization,

the record contains substantial evidence that the FAA did

just that. In April 1999, the FAA issued a notice to BFI

stating that "we are in the process of conducting an aeronautical study to determine the effect on air navigation."

Although it is true that the FAA failed to provide "an opportunity, open to all interested parties, to submit written comments," Maj. op. at 11, BFI nowhere raises the concerns of

any one other than itself, nor would it have standing to do

so, see Nat'l Capital Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 419

F.2d 668, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (rejecting a petition for

review based on CAB's failure to follow its own procedures

because that failure did not harm the petitioner).

As to the second basis for the court's arbitrary and capricious finding--that the FAA failed to negotiate with BFI over

possible mitigation measures--substantial record evidence indicates that even if the agency has such an obligation, the

required negotiation took place on not one but two occasions:

in March and May 1999. The record of the March meeting

expressly states that "[a]nticipating mitigation, potential options were discussed, [e.g.,] moving radar[.]" True, the

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March meeting occurred before the FAA issued its notice of

proposed study, see Maj. Op. at 10, but neither the FAA

regulation nor the handbook requires that negotiations take

place at any particular time. My colleagues, moreover, never

even mention the May meeting. Although the record might

support the conclusion that there was no "meaningful giveand-take" between BFI and the FAA, id. at 14, the evidence

is more than sufficient to support the opposite conclusion--

that the FAA "offer[ed] to meet ... informally" and "attempt[ed] to negotiate a solution," FAA Handbook p p 7-35(f),

5-12. That is enough. See Chritton v. NTSB, 888 F.2d 854,

856 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted) (explaining that an agency's "conclusion may be

supported by substantial evidence even though a plausible

alternative interpretation of the evidence would support a

contrary view").

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