Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00873/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00873-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Yuba City, Department of Public Works
Defendant
Dean Scott
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEAN SCOTT,

NO. CIV. S-08-873 LKK/GGH 

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

CITY OF YUBA CITY, 

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS,

and DOES 1 through 50,

inclusive,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff Dean Scott has brought a complaint against his

former employer, defendant Yuba City, alleging disability

discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with

Disabilities Act, violation of Title VII, failure to engage in an

interactive process in determining reasonable accommodations,

wrongful termination in violation of public policy, intentional

misrepresentation, and violation of California Labor Code section

201. Pending before the court is defendant’s motion to dismiss.

The court resolves the matter upon the parties’ papers and after

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All allegations are derived from plaintiff’s complaint. 1

Plaintiff alleges that he sought and obtained from defendant 2

an extension of time for this six month period. Compl. ¶ 14. 

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oral argument. For the reasons explained below, the motion is

granted in part and denied in part. 

I. Factual Background1

 Plaintiff, who has Type I diabetes, began working for

defendant Yuba City on April 3, 2006 as a Public Works

Maintenance Worker I. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10. Plaintiff’s job duties

included the operation of specialized vehicles and power

equipment, the use of hand tools, and assistance with

maintenance and repair of fire hydrants. Id. In order to

operate heavy mechanical equipment, plaintiff was required to

obtain a commercial driver’s license from the State of

California Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) within six

months of his initial hire date. Compl. ¶ 13. 2

On October 2, 2006, the DMV informed plaintiff that because

he was insulin-dependent, his employer had to submit additional

paperwork. Compl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor

refused to complete the paperwork out of a fear of liability and

instead forwarded it to the department director. Compl. ¶ 17. 

The department director completed the paperwork for plaintiff

but only after first speaking with the department’s insurance

provider. Compl. ¶ 19. In addition, plaintiff alleges that the

department director checked inappropriate boxes and fabricated

job requirements to make plaintiff’s work duties appear more

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strenuous. Compl. ¶ 21.

On October 9, 2006, plaintiff met with his immediate

supervisor and received his Quarterly Couching Evaluation Form. 

Compl. ¶ 25. The evaluation scored Plaintiff at 2.57 out of 5,

which fell in the “Satisfactory” range. Id. The evaluation

also contained a number of negative comments about plaintiff’s

work history and performance. Id. Plaintiff’s previous

quarterly evaluation was positive. Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff

complained to both his immediate supervisor and department

director that he believed he was being discriminated against

because of his diabetes. Compl. ¶ 30. The department director

denied having knowledge of plaintiff’s diabetes “until

recently.” Id.

On October 12, 2006, plaintiff went to Yuba City Hall and

spoke with the city’s human resources manager. Compl. ¶ 31. 

The manager said that he would meet with plaintiff’s supervisors

in order to discuss plaintiff’s complaint. Id. Plaintiff

alleges that he never heard back from human resources. Id.

In November 2006, plaintiff received two written

complaints, both of which he contested. Compl. ¶¶ 36-38. On

November 27, 2006, one day before plaintiff’s DMV hearing

regarding his commercial driver’s license, plaintiff was

terminated. Compl. ¶ 41. Plaintiff did not receive his final

paycheck until almost three weeks later, on Friday, December 8,

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Following the termination, plaintiff also applied for 3

unemployment benefits. Compl. ¶ 44. Defendant contested the

application on the grounds that it terminated plaintiff for

misconduct. Id. Specifically, defendant claimed that plaintiff’s

DMV record revealed that he had a history of “Using Motor Vehicle

in Connection with Illegal Activity Other than a Felony,” which had

disqualified him from driving commercially. Id. Plaintiff alleges

that he has never been involved in any illegal activity. Compl.

¶ 45.

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2006. Compl. ¶ 42. 3

II. Standard 

 In order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim, plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, -- U.S. --, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). While a

complaint need not plead "detailed factual allegations," the

factual allegations it does include "must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 1964-65. 

The Supreme Court recently held that Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a "showing" that the plaintiff is

entitled to relief, “rather than a blanket assertion” of

entitlement to relief. Id. at 1965 n.3. Though such assertions

may provide a defendant with the requisite "fair notice" of the

nature of a plaintiff's claim, the Court opined that only

factual allegations can clarify the "grounds" on which that

claim rests. Id. "The pleading must contain something more. .

. than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Id. at

1965, quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

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The holding in Twombly explicitly abrogates the well 4

established holding in Conley v. Gibson that, "a complaint should

not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957); Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968.

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Procedure, § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004).4

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Int’l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). In general, the

complaint is construed favorably to the pleader. See Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Nevertheless, the

court does not accept as true unreasonable inferences or

conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual

allegations. W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th

Cir. 1981).

III. Analysis

A. Receipt of Federal Funds Under the Rehabilitation Act

The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination on the

basis of disability “under any program or activity receiving

Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity

conducted by any Executive agency.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 

Receipt of financial assistance is an element of a cause of

action under the Rehabilitation Act. See Darcy v. Lippman, No.

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 The standards for ascertaining discrimination under the ADA 5

and the Rehabilitation Act are the same. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(b).

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03-6898, 2008 WL 629999, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2008) (holding

that to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff

must allege facts showing that “that the employer receives

federal financial assistance”); Spencer v. Dawson, No. 04-5048,

2005 WL 643331, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2005) (holding that to

state a claim plaintiff must allege that the “program or

activity in question receives federal financial assistance”)

(citing Grzan v. Charter Hosp. Of Nw. Indiana, 104 F.3d 116, 119

(7th Cir. 1997)). While plaintiffs “will seldom be able to

specifically allege the intricacies of the defendants’ use of

federal assistance,” these types of detailed allegations are

unnecessary as long “some federal funding is alleged.” Spencer,

2005 WL 643331, at *5.

Here, plaintiff fails to allege that defendant receives

federal assistance. Accordingly, the Rehabilitation Act claim

is dismissed with leave to amend. 

B. “Disability” Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act

Under the ADA, a person is disabled if he or she has : 1) 5

a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a

major life activity; 2) a record of such an impairment; or 3) is

regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 

Major life activities are those “that are of central

importance to daily life,” Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.

Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2000), such as “‘caring for one’s

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self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,

speaking, breathing, learning, and working,’” Mahon v. Crowell,

295 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 45 C.F.R

84.3(j)(2)(ii)). The impairment must cause a substantial

limitation of the individual’s ability to perform the activity;

moderate interruptions in the performance of the activity are

insufficient. See Mahon, 295 F.3d at 590-91. Furthermore, “[a]

person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by

medication or other measure does not have an impairment that

presently ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity.” Sutton

v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 2147-48 (1999). 

“Before determining whether a person’s impairment is

substantially limiting, the court considers the nature,

severity, duration, and impact of the impairment” on a

particular individual. Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1038

(9th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii)). 

Whether a person has an disability under the ADA is an

individualized inquiry. Id.

Here, plaintiff alleges that he was diagnosed with Type I

diabetes in 1988. Compl. ¶ 8. In Fraser, the Ninth Circuit had

“little difficulty in concluding that diabetes is a ‘physical

impairment’ under the ADA” because it is a “physical condition

affecting the digestive, hemic, and endocrine systems.” 342

F.3d at 1038. Having alleged an impairment, the plaintiff is

not required at the pleading stage to assert a substantially

limited major life activity if the court can infer the major

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life activity that is affected. See Rohm v. Homer, 367 F. Supp.

2d 1278, 1283. (N.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that a plaintiff who

pleads an impairment with clarity need not explicitly identify a

substantially limited major life activity); EEOC v. J.H. Routh

Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 852-55 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[a]

plaintiff would be wise to mention her specific limited major

life activity, but failing to do so is not fatal to her

complaint”). The purpose of Rule 8 is to give defendant fair

notice, and “when a plaintiff claims to be impaired, it is not

too difficult to infer which life activities the impairment

affects.” Rohm, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 1283. 

In Fraser, for example, the Ninth Circuit found that

plaintiff had presented triable issues of fact as to whether her

diabetes limited the major life activity of eating. 342 F.3d at

1040-43. While not all physical impairments may self-evidently

reveal which major life activities are affected (if any), see,

e.g., Ward v. Kaiser Hosp., No. C-06-2645, 2006 WL 2529479, at

*3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 31, 2006) (allegation of alcoholism

insufficient to put defendant on notice of affected life

activities, where plaintiff alleged that alcoholism did not

affect his ability to work), affording plaintiff all reasonable

inferences, the court infers that plaintiff has alleged at least

a substantial limitation on eating.

In Sutton, the court acknowledged that individuals can take

medication to “lessen the symptoms of an impairment so that they

can function but nevertheless remain substantially limited.” 

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 If plaintiff amends to allege federal funding, the pleading 6

also suffices to allege disability under the Rehabilitation Act.

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527 U.S. at 489 (finding that myopic plaintiffs were not

disabled because they could use eyeglasses or contact lenses to

achieve 20/20 vision). Even though the plaintiff alleges that

he has always “managed his [d]iabetes adequately and properly,”

Compl. ¶ 3, a diabetes regimen can be so “perpetual, severely

restrictive, and highly demanding,” Fraser, 342 F.3d at 1041,

that it amounts to a substantial limitation on a major life

activity. Plaintiffs’ allegation that he properly manages his

diabetes is not mutually exclusive from a finding that he is

also substantially limited from a major life activity. 

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently

pled disability under the ADA.6

C. Title VII Claims

Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for

an employer to “discharge any individual, or otherwise

discriminate against any individual . . . because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim and claim for

harassment are both related to his disability or requested

accommodation for his disability. Disability is not a protected

class under Title VII. See William v. Holiday Inn, No. C-95-

0832, 1996 WL 162992 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996) (dismissing all

of the employee's disability discrimination claims under Title

VII). Accordingly, plaintiff’s Title VII claim is dismissed. 

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Even if the court were to construe plaintiff’s visit with 7

the city’s human resources manager as constituting the presentation

of his claim, the only adverse action complained of at that point

in time was his negative performance evaluation. The conduct

giving rise to his state law claims at issue in this motion did not

occur until later.

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D. Compliance with the California Tort Claims Act

Under the California Tort Claims Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 900

et seq., the “failure to timely present a claim for money or

damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a

lawsuit against that entity.” State v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.

4th 1234, 1239 (2004). “The failure to allege facts

demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation

requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to

[dismissal] for failure to state a cause of action.” Id. The

purpose of the California Tort Claims Act is to provide the

public entity with sufficient information to enable it to

investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without

litigation. Phillips, 49 Cal. 3d at 705.

Plaintiff concedes that he “has failed to allege facts

sufficient to show compliance with the Government Claims Act”

but argues that he can comply with the act if granted leave to

amend. Opp’n at 4. The argument is misplaced. California 7

Government Code section 911.2 requires a claim for injury to a

person to be presented “not later than six months after the

accrual of the cause of action.” If a party fails to file a

timely claim, he or she may seek permission from the entity to

file a late claim, but only if permission is sought “within a

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The court therefore need not address arguments specific to 8

the claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy,

intentional misrepresentation, and violation of California Labor

Code sections 201 through 203.

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reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the

cause of action.” Cal. Gov. Code § 911.4(b). The events giving

rise to the state law claims at issue here occurred in November

2006. Accordingly, plaintiff is unable to comply with the

Government Claims Act, and the state law causes of action at

issue in this motion are dismissed without leave to amend.8

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the motion to dismiss is

granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff is granted twenty

days leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 3, 2008.

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