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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Harvey Zitron
Appellant

Document Text:

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-10009

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cr-60080-RNS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

HARVEY ZITRON, 

Defendant - Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(January 21, 2016)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN, Circuit Judge, and WALTER,

*

District Judge.

 * Honorable Donald E. Walter, United States District Judge for the Western District of 

Louisiana, sitting by designation.

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PER CURIAM: 

After a five-day jury trial, Harvey Zitron was convicted of five counts of 

filing false tax returns, three counts of using an unauthorized access device, and 

two counts of aggravated identity theft. He challenges his convictions and 

sentence.

I.

Zitron operated a company called Millennium Republic that sold chemical 

products. In 2002, he suggested to one of Millennium’s employees, Cynthia 

Gentner, that she take over the company. She agreed. Gentner operated the 

business under the names of two corporations that she formed, Cyn-Lex and 

Granite Industries. Despite the apparent change in ownership, Gentner testified 

that she still “did everything [Zitron] asked [her] to do.” From 2002 to 2003, at 

Zitron’s behest, Gentner deposited company checks into her personal account, took

out cash, and gave that cash to Zitron.1 

Zitron came up with another check-cashing scheme in 2003. He instructed 

Gentner to write checks from Cyn-Lex and Granite Industries to a man named 

“Charles Sohrabel.” “Charles Sohrabel” was the alias of Zitron’s friend, Charles 

 1 That arrangement ended because Gentner feared the effect it might have on her tax 

returns. 

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Schnabel.2 Gentner agreed, even though she knew that “Charles Sohrabel” was 

Schnabel’s alias and that Schnabel did not work for either company. Zitron then 

told Gentner and Schnabel to go to a convenience store that offered a checkcashing service. Schnabel initially cashed the checks in person, but he later called 

the storeowner and told him that Gentner was authorized to cash the checks on his 

behalf.3

 

Between January 2003 and December 2005, Gentner cashed 265 checks for 

Zitron at that store, totaling $2,566,981.60. Gentner then gave that cash to Zitron. 

The scheme ended after the storeowner told Gentner that he would not cash any

more checks unless Schnabel accompanied her and provided valid identification 

(which he never did). 

Zitron did not report a penny of that $2,566,981.60 on his income tax filings, 

even though it was taxable income (according to the government’s tax expert who 

testified at trial). Instead, on income tax forms that he filed for 2003, 2004, and 

2005, he reported negative amounts of adjusted gross income. But during those 

years, he deposited a total of $820,513.75 in cash into several bank accounts: 

$425,728.00 into an account held in his own name; $202,277.00 into a joint 

 2 Schnabel had used another person’s social security number to obtain a fake Virginia 

driver’s license in the name of “Charles Sohrabel.”

3 Schnabel did not live in Florida, but every time he visited he would pre-sign 10 to 20 

checks each for Cyn-Lex and Granite Industries. 

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checking account he owned with a friend; and $192,508.75 into an account he 

controlled but held in his son Jordan’s name (even though Jordan barely 

remembered opening it and never put any of his own money into it). 

Zitron not only failed to report any of the income from his check scheme, he 

also misused his ex-wife’s and son’s names and social security numbers to obtain 

credit cards: one in his ex-wife’s name in 2006, and two in his son’s name in 

2009. He did not have their permission to use their personal identifying 

information in that way. They discovered the existence of the credit cards only

after Zitron had racked up substantial amounts of debt on them. 

Zitron was initially charged with two counts of filing false tax returns. The 

government eventually added more charges, bringing the total to five counts of 

filing false tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), three counts of using an 

unauthorized access device, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2), and two counts 

of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Zitron 

moved to sever the tax counts from the access device and identity theft counts, but 

the district court denied the motion. After a five-day trial, the jury found Zitron 

guilty on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 81 months in prison. This is 

his appeal. 

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II.

Zitron contends that the tax counts were improperly joined with the access 

device and identity theft counts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a).

4

 

Alternatively, he contends that even if joinder was proper, the tax counts should 

have been severed from the others under Rule 14(a) because of the joinder’s 

prejudicial effect on him.

5

 

We will reverse a conviction based on improper joinder under Rule 8(a) only 

if it “affects substantial rights and . . . results in actual prejudice because it had 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

United States v. Watson, 866 F.2d 381, 385 (11th Cir. 1989) (alteration in original) 

(quotation marks omitted). Similarly, we will reverse a conviction based on the 

district court’s refusal to sever counts under Rule 14(a) only if the defendant 

“received an unfair trial and suffered compelling prejudice.” United States v. 

Walser, 3 F.3d 380, 386 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted).

Zitron argues that the trial of the access device and identity theft counts with 

the tax counts together was prejudicial because it allowed the government to 

 4 Rule 8(a) provides that the indictment “may charge a defendant in separate counts 

with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged — whether felonies or misdemeanors or both —

are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected 

with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.”

5 Rule 14(a) provides that if “the joinder of offenses . . . appears to prejudice a 

defendant . . . the court may order separate trials of counts.” 

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present evidence that he furtively used his family members’ personal identifying 

information for his own financial advantage and the jury may not have been able to 

consider the evidence of the different crimes separately. The evidence of the 

family-related credit card crimes, he asserts, left the jury confused, hostile toward 

him, and more likely to convict him on the tax counts. We are not persuaded. 

Zitron has not shown that he suffered actual prejudice that affected his 

substantial rights, as would be necessary to find reversible error under Rule 8(a). 

There is nothing in the record indicating that the jury was confused, hostile, or 

more likely to convict on the tax counts because of the evidence of the other 

crimes. See Watson, 866 F.2d at 385–86. The evidence presented to convict him 

on the identity theft and access device counts would have been admissible against 

him in a separate trial on the tax counts. See id.

Zitron also has not shown that he suffered compelling prejudice from the 

joinder of the claims, as would be required under Rule 14(a) in order to find that 

the district court abused its discretion in refusing to sever the tax counts from the 

other counts. The evidence was sufficient to convict Zitron on all of the counts. 

Cf. Walser, 3 F.3d at 387 (concluding that a defendant did not suffer compelling 

prejudice partly because “the evidence as to each count fully supported a finding of 

guilt”). Finally, the court instructed the jury that each count “charg[ed] a separate 

crime,” that it “must consider each crime and the evidence relating to it 

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separately,” and that its finding of guilty or not guilty on one count “must not 

affect [its] verdict for any other crime.” See United States v. Pierce, 733 F.2d 

1474, 1477–78 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding no prejudice because the district court 

“properly instructed the jury” on how to use the evidence and because the 

government presented sufficient evidence to convict the defendant). And “[a]fter 

all, we must presume that juries follow their instructions.” Johnson v. Breeden, 

280 F.3d 1308, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002). The instructions cured any error in trying 

the counts together. Cf. United States v. Barsoum, 763 F.3d 1321, 1337–38 (11th 

Cir. 2014) (noting that the district court “properly instructed the jury to consider 

each count separately” in finding that it did not abuse its discretion in denying a 

motion to sever); Walser, 3 F.3d at 387 (“[I]f the possible prejudice may be cured 

by a cautionary instruction severance is not required.”). 

Because Zitron has not shown actual prejudice, we will not reverse for 

improper joinder under Rule 8(a). He has also not shown compelling prejudice, 

and we will not reverse for failure to sever under Rule 14(a). 

III.

Zitron next contends that two statements made by the government’s tax 

expert during his testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent

and also improperly shifted the government’s burden of proof. 

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One of those statements was made on Zitron’s cross-examination of the 

witness. Defense counsel asked him: “[I]f the cash that was deposited into 

the . . . joint account and the Jordan Zitron joint account didn’t come from the 

Charles Sohrabel checks, that would also change your expert opinion, correct?” 

The witness replied that if the cash “didn’t come from the Sohrabel checks, usually 

I would ask the question, well, where is this money coming from? And if the 

defendant can explain it — cannot explain it, it still would be income unless he can 

say otherwise.” 

The other statement was made on the government’s re-direct examination of 

that witness. The prosecutor asked him if there was any indication during trial that 

Zitron “disclosed to his CPA the cash deposits to his bank accounts.” The witness 

replied: “Nothing as far as I heard in this trial has shown that the CPA — you 

know, that the taxpayer disclosed the cash deposits in the bank, in his own bank 

account that he was aware of.” 

A.

A witness impermissibly comments on a defendant’s right to remain silent 

if the “remark was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily 

take it to be a comment on the defendant’s silence.” United States v. Guerra, 293 

F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). To determine the 

“natural and necessary effect of allegedly impermissible comments, we must 

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examine the comments in the context within which they were made.” Williams v. 

Wainwright, 673 F.2d 1182, 1184 (11th Cir. 1982). 

The witness, in one of his answers, did raise the question of whether the 

defendant could explain where the money came from, if not from the Sohrabel 

checks. But he did so in answer to a question during cross-examination. And his 

answer was, in effect, that absent some other explanation the cash would be treated 

as income. The witness did not directly refer to Zitron failing to testify. Cf.

Williams, 673 F.2d at 1185 (deciding that the jury would not have necessarily 

taken a prosecutor’s statement as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify

because no “direct mention was made of the [defendant’s] failure to testify”). The 

other statement, which came during re-direct examination, was more on the 

absence of any evidence that Zitron had disclosed the cash deposits to his CPA, 

something the CPA could have testified about. That was about the failure of the 

defense to produce evidence, not the failure of Zitron to testify. See Watson, 866 

F.2d at 386 (“A comment on the failure of the defense, as opposed to the 

defendant, to counter or explain the testimony presented or evidence introduced 

does not violate the defendant’s [Fifth Amendment] right not to testify.”). Taken 

in context, neither statement was an impermissible comment on Zitron’s right to 

remain silent.

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B.

Nor did the comments improperly shift the burden of proof. Prosecutors 

“must refrain from making burden-shifting arguments which suggest that the 

defendant has an obligation to produce any evidence or to prove innocence.” 

United States v. Simon, 964 F.2d 1082, 1086 (11th Cir. 1992). A comment that is 

“so prejudicial as to shift the burden of proof” sometimes requires reversal. Id. 

But any potential prejudice can be cured by an appropriate instruction. Id. at 1087 

(“This [C]ourt has held that the prejudice from the comments of a prosecutor 

which may result in a shifting of the burden of proof can be cured by a court’s 

instruction regarding the burden of proof.”). Putting aside the obvious fact that the 

witness was not a prosecutor, the court’s instruction that Zitron did “not have to 

prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all” and that the government had to 

“prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” cured any prejudice that may have 

resulted from the witness’s comments. 

IV.

Zitron’s final challenge to his conviction is that the evidence was insufficient 

to convict him of the two counts of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1028A(a)(1). That statute provides that “[w]hoever, during and in relation to any 

felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or 

uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person” shall be 

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punished for the underlying felony and receive a two-year term of imprisonment. 

18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).6

 Arguing that “knowingly” modifies the phrase “without 

lawful authority,” Zitron asserts that the government presented insufficient 

evidence that he knowingly acted without lawful authority when he used his son 

Jordan’s personal identifying information because it was a common family practice 

for him to take out credit cards in his children’s names. 

Although we normally review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we review “unpreserved objections . . . to the sufficiency of the 

evidence” only for plain error. United States v. Joseph, 709 F.3d 1082, 1093 (11th 

Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Zitron moved for judgment of acquittal under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 based on insufficiency of the evidence,

7 but 

he did not make the specific argument in that Rule 29 motion that he makes here. 

Because Zitron “did not clearly object to the trial court on this insufficientevidence basis,” we review only for plain error. Id. at 1103 (quotation marks 

omitted).

 6 The underlying felony here is the use of an unauthorized access device (based on 

Zitron’s use of his ex-wife’s and son’s personal identifying information), in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2). See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(4).

7 Rule 29(a) provides that “[a]fter the government closes its evidence or after the close of 

all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any 

offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.”

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The Supreme Court has held that “§ 1028A(a)(1) requires the [g]overnment 

to show that the defendant knew that the means of identification at issue belonged 

to another person.” Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 657, 129 S. Ct. 

1886, 1894 (2009) (emphasis added). Though we have not clarified the exact 

application of the knowledge requirement to the “without lawful authority” 

element, we have found that “the phrase ‘without lawful authority’ prohibits 

methods of obtaining another person’s identification beyond stealing.” United 

States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 607 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds 

by Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. 646, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009). The government 

established the “without lawful authority” element in two ways — with testimony 

from Jordan that Zitron did not have permission to use his identity, and with 

evidence that Zitron used Jordan’s means of identification for an unlawful purpose. 

This evidence provides sufficient support that Zitron acted “without lawful 

authority,” so that any error cannot be considered plain. Because there was no 

error that was plain, we need not address the other requirements of the plain error 

rule.

V.

Zitron challenges his sentence as procedurally unreasonable, contending that 

the district court erred in calculating the amount of tax loss and in imposing a twolevel role enhancement. 

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A.

The presentence investigation report calculated the amount of tax loss using 

the full amount of the Sohrabel checks — $2,566,981.60. Under the sentencing 

guidelines, that amount yielded a tax loss figure of $973,249.00 and a base offense 

level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1(H). Over Zitron’s objection, the district court 

adopted that tax loss figure. Zitron argues that using the full amount of the 

Sohrabel checks to calculate the tax loss figure was error because the government

proved that Zitron actually deposited only $820,513.75.

8

 

We review the district court’s calculation of the tax loss figure for clear 

error. United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003). The court 

must “simply make a reasonable estimate” of the tax loss “based on the available 

facts.” U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 cmt. n.1. The “tax loss is the total amount of loss that 

was the object of the offense (i.e., the loss that would have resulted had the offense 

been successfully completed).” Id. § 2T1.1(c)(1).

The “object” of Zitron’s check-cashing scheme was the full amount of the 

Sohrabel checks, not just the $820,513.75 that ended up in the bank accounts he 

owned or controlled. The government’s tax expert testified at trial that he 

examined Cyn-Lex’s and Granite Industries’ bank records, as well as the checks

 8 Using $820,513.75 to calculate the tax loss figure would have yielded a base offense 

level of 18 under the guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1(G).

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themselves, to calculate the amount of those checks. He also presented check 

schedules to show that the total amount of the checks was $2,566,981.60. Nothing 

in the guidelines required the district court to consider only the checks that Zitron

actually deposited. And it does not matter (as Zitron alleges) that some of the 

$2,566,981.60 might later have gone to Schnabel as a “commission” for his help in 

the scheme, since Gentner testified that she gave all the cash to Zitron. See id. § 

2T1.1 cmt. n.2 (“In determining the total tax loss attributable to the offense . . . all 

conduct violating the tax laws should be considered as part of the same course of 

conduct or common scheme or plan . . . .”). The district court did not clearly err in 

finding that Zitron received the full $2,566,981.60, even if only a portion of that 

money went into his account. 

B.

Zitron argues that the district court erroneously applied a two-level 

enhancement based on his role as an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in 

[a] criminal activity” involving at least one “participant.” Id. § 3B1.1(c), cmt. n.1–

2. He asserts that because he was the only one who actually filed false tax returns, 

no one else was a “participant” for purposes of that enhancement. 

“A defendant’s role as an organizer or leader is a factual finding that we 

review for clear error to determine if the enhancement . . . was applied 

appropriately.” United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1355 (11th Cir. 2005). 

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The government must prove the facts supporting the enhancement by a 

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 

(11th Cir. 2007). 

A “participant” under § 3B1.1 is “a person who is criminally responsible for 

the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.1 cmt. n.1. In assessing whether Gentner and Schnabel were “criminally 

responsible,” we can consider any of their acts directed by Zitron that were “part of 

the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of 

conviction.” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2); id. § 3B1.1 introductory cmt.

9

 In other words, it 

makes no difference that Gentner and Schnabel did not actually help Zitron file the 

false tax returns — it is enough that they knowingly assisted in some way in 

Zitron’s criminal tax scheme. See United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d 1324, 

1336–37 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding a § 3B1.1 enhancement because the 

participant in the scheme “knew that the money was the proceeds of an unlawful 

activity”); see also United States v. Hall, 101 F.3d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996) 

(“[A] party who gives knowing aid in some part of the criminal enterprise is a 

‘criminally responsible’ participant under the [g]uidelines.”); United States v. 

Boutte, 13 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 1994) (same).

 9 Section 1B1.3(a)(2) applies only to offenses “for which [U.S.S.G.] § 3D1.2(d) would 

require grouping of multiple counts.” Tax offenses under § 2T1.1 fall under that category of 

offenses. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d).

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The government showed by a preponderance of the evidence that Gentner 

and Schnabel knowingly assisted Zitron in committing the tax crimes. The checkcashing arrangement was part of the same “common scheme or plan,” U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.3(a)(2), as the tax crimes. Indeed, Zitron’s failures to report the cash from 

those checks were the tax crimes. Gentner and Schnabel played integral roles in 

that scheme. Gentner wrote the Cyn-Lex and Granite Industries checks to “Charles 

Sohrabel,” even though she knew that was Schnabel’s alias and that he did not 

work for either company. She wrote the checks and cashed them whenever Zitron 

told her to. And Schnabel agreed to use his alias for the checks and, at least at the 

beginning of the scheme, cashed the checks in person. Given all of that evidence, 

the district court did not clearly err in finding that at least one (and probably both) 

of them knew that Zitron was engaged in a scheme to hide the source of his income 

for tax purposes and that they helped him do it. For those reasons, the court did 

not clearly err in applying the organizer or leader enhancement. 

AFFIRMED.

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