Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-00005/USCOURTS-ca4-07-00005-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carlos David Caro
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Volume 1 of 2

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 07-5

CARLOS DAVID CARO,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon.

James P. Jones, Chief District Judge.

(1:06-cr-00001-JPJ)

Argued: October 30, 2009

Decided: March 17, 2010

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DUNCAN,

Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the

majority opinion, in which Judge Shedd concurred. Judge

Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Denise Charlotte Barrett, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 1 of 69
Appellant. David E. Hollar, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Sarah S. Gannett, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

FEDERAL COMMUNITY DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Julia Campbell Dudley,

United States Attorney, Anthony P. Giorno, Assistant United

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from a death sentence imposed under the

Federal Death Penalty Act (the "FDPA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-

98, following a conviction for murder in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1111. Appellant Carlos David Caro challenges the

district court’s voir dire; denial of motions under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure 16(a)(1)(E) and 17(c); refusal to give Caro’s proposed mercy instruction; and various decisions concerning

admissibility. Caro also argues that the jury instruction and

government’s argument about lack of remorse violated his

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, that the

government’s closing argument violated the Due Process

Clause, and that 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(10) and (12) violate the

Eighth Amendment. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I. Background

At about 6:40 p.m. on December 17, 2003, a prison guard

discovered inmate Roberto Sandoval strangled to death inside

his cell in the Special Housing Unit (the "SHU") at United

States Penitentiary Lee ("USP Lee") in Jonesville, Virginia.

He lay dead with a towel knotted around his neck. His cellmate Caro had been the only other person inside the locked

2 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 2 of 69
cell. Caro later explained, "[Sandoval] called me mother

fucker, that whore, that’s why I fucked him up." J.A. 781.

A.

Caro comes from a poor neighborhood in Falfurrias, Texas,

where he lived with his siblings and an abusive, alcoholic

father. While still young, Caro began helping his uncles transport illegal drugs into the United States. He was later convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in

April 1988, conspiracy to possess over one hundred kilograms

of marijuana with intent to distribute in January 1994, and

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in November

2001.1 Following his third conviction, Caro was sentenced to

thirty years imprisonment.

In prison, Caro became a leader in the Texas Syndicate, a

violent prison gang. In that role, Caro was involved in two

violent incidents prior to Sandoval’s murder. In the summer

of 2002 at Federal Correctional Institute Oakdale ("FCI Oakdale"), a prison official asked Caro to maintain the peace

because members of another gang were scheduled to arrive.

Caro responded that "the Texas Syndicate were going to do

what they had to do." J.A. 908. Soon after, Caro and fellow

Texas Syndicate members violently attacked the new arrivals.

Taking responsibility, Caro commented: "I don’t give a fuck

if they send me to the United States Penitentiary. My brothers

follow orders. They know what they’re getting into. It doesn’t

even matter if we’re prosecuted. I have 30 years to do. I certainly don’t care about myself." J.A. 911.

Following the FCI Oakdale incident, the Bureau of Prisons

(the "BOP") transferred Caro to USP Lee, a more secure facility. There, in August 2003, Caro and another inmate violently

1These convictions were for violations of Title II or III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.

§§ 801-971. 

UNITED STATES v. CARO 3

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 3 of 69
attacked fellow Texas Syndicate member Ricardo Benavidez.

Using "shanks," i.e., homemade knives, they stabbed Benavidez twenty-nine times. Five other Texas Syndicate members

stood nearby with identical shanks.2 In November 2003, after

pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit homicide, Caro was

sentenced to another twenty-seven years imprisonment. He

was then transferred to the SHU at USP Lee.

Sandoval’s murder occurred only weeks later. Sandoval

was placed in Caro’s cell at around 9:00 p.m. on December

16, 2003. The next day, Sandoval and Caro were served

breakfast in their cell at 6:10 a.m. They later took one hour

of recreation outside and were last observed by prison staff at

6:17 p.m.3 Soon after, inmate Sean Bullock, whose cell faced

Caro’s, noticed Caro standing behind Sandoval and apparently choking him. Bullock watched them fall to the ground

and assumed they were tussling. At about 6:40 p.m., a prison

guard came to deliver mail. Caro yelled to him several times,

"Come get this piece of shit out of here," and pointed at Sandoval lying by the door. J.A. 676. Peering inside the cell, the

guard observed Sandoval lying motionless with blood on him

and a towel knotted around his neck. Blood was also splattered against the wall.

Other guards quickly arrived and handcuffed Caro. When

asked whether Sandoval was still breathing, Caro responded:

"No. At this time he’s stinking up the room, get him out." J.A.

684. Caro later received Miranda warnings and was interviewed. He denied that Sandoval’s murder had any connection to the Texas Syndicate. Instead, Caro explained that he

had eaten Sandoval’s breakfast that morning; that Sandoval

had awakened, cursed him, and threatened to eat Caro’s

2

In January 2004, Caro sent a letter to one Gomez requesting that Caro,

Benavidez, and others who had been involved remain in good standing

within the Texas Syndicate. 

3

Inmates housed in the SHU at USP Lee spend twenty-three hours per

day in their cell and are allowed one hour of recreation outside per day.

4 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 4 of 69
breakfast the next morning; and that Caro, using a towel tied

with one overhand knot, had later strangled Sandoval for four

or five minutes until he stopped breathing.

The next day Caro taunted a prison guard, grinning and

calling out, "When [are] you . . . going [to] assign [me] a new

cellie?" J.A. 601. Several days later, again grinning, Caro

requested fellow inmate Ortiz for his next "cellie." J.A. 680.

Caro later mentioned Sandoval in two telephone conversations and a letter. The letter stated, "I killed a guy two weeks

ago . . . [f]or being a fool." J.A. 790. Caro told his wife,

laughing, "[Sandoval] called me a mother fucker." J.A. 782.

Caro also assured her, "But I’m all right." J.A. 783. Finally,

Caro told another Texas Syndicate member Roel Rivas, "I

also have a death," and explained, "It’s because they gave me

a cell mate and he disrespected me, so I took him down." J.A.

785. When Rivas proposed claiming self-defense, Caro said,

"That is what I’m going to do . . . . That is what I’m going

for." J.A. 786-87.

B.

On January 3, 2006, Caro was charged in an indictment

with first-degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 for

the killing of Sandoval. Soon after, pursuant to § 3593(a), the

government filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty

under the FDPA. This statute established a procedure

whereby a jury can decide whether to impose the death penalty after considering aggravating and mitigating factors properly alleged and proved during a sentencing hearing.4

 The

4The FDPA provides that a defendant convicted of any offense listed in

§ 3591 "shall be sentenced to death" if the sentencing body determines

that "imposition of a sentence of death is justified" after considering the

factors listed in § 3592. 18 U.S.C. § 3591. Specifically, the sentencing

body must consider "whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to

exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to

UNITED STATES v. CARO 5

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 5 of 69
FDPA requires consideration of specific aggravating factors

("statutory aggravating factors") but also allows the government to allege other aggravating factors ("non-statutory

aggravating factors").

Following a jury trial, Caro was convicted of premeditated

murder in violation of § 1111. The same jury decided Caro’s

sentence under the FDPA. His sentencing hearing was divided

into two phases, an "eligibility" phase and a "selection" phase.

The first phase involved determining whether Caro had committed a capital offense under § 3591 and whether the government had proved at least one statutory aggravating factor

beyond a reasonable doubt, together making Caro eligible for

the death penalty. The second phase involved determining the

mitigating and non-statutory aggravating factors and selecting

either a death sentence or life imprisonment.

During the eligibility phase, the jury decided that Caro was

eligible for the death penalty because § 3591 covered his

offense of premeditated murder under § 1111, and two statutory aggravating factors had been proved beyond a reasonable

doubt. These factors were (1) that Caro was previously conexist to justify a sentence of death, or, in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify

a sentence of death." 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e). 

Regarding the sentencing factors, § 3592(a) lists eight mitigating factors

that must be considered, including a catch-all factor covering any relevant

mitigating circumstance. Conversely, § 3592(c) lists sixteen aggravating

factors that must be considered for a homicide offense, assuming notice

has been given, and adds that "any other aggravating factor for which

notice has been given" may be considered. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). A defendant has the "burden of establishing the existence of any mitigating factor

. . . by a preponderance of the information," whereas the government has

the "burden of establishing the existence of any aggravating factor . . .

beyond a reasonable doubt." 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). Because a death sentence cannot be imposed unless at least one statutory aggravating factor

has been proved, statutory aggravating factors are determined before any

alleged mitigating or non-statutory aggravating factors are considered. 

6 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 6 of 69
victed of two offenses involving distribution of illegal drugs

committed on different occasions and punishable by imprisonment for over one year, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(10), and (2)

that Caro was previously convicted of a federal drug offense

punishable by five or more years, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(12).

During the selection phase, the jury heard information and

argument about the existence of mitigating factors, the existence of non-statutory aggravating factors, and whether aggravating factors sufficiently outweighed mitigating factors to

justify a death sentence.5 The government had alleged three

non-statutory aggravating factors: (1) the impact of Caro’s

offense on Sandoval’s friends and family; (2) Caro’s future

dangerousness to other people, including inmates; and (3) that

Caro "has not expressed remorse for his violent acts, including (but not limited to) the murder of Sandoval, the stabbing

of Benavidez and the gang-based assault in Oakdale." J.A. 57.

After closing arguments, the jury found that each alleged

non-statutory aggravating factor had been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. The jury also found unanimously that

twelve mitigating factors had been proved.6 Some jurors

5We use the term "information" rather than "evidence" to conform to the

FDPA’s language and because here the Federal Rules of Evidence are

inapplicable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (allowing presentation of most

information relevant to sentencing factors and providing that

"[i]nformation is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules

governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that information

may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury"). 

6The jury found that Caro (1) was exposed to domestic violence growing up, (2) was not encouraged in school, (3) came from an impoverished

community, (4) was well-behaved growing up, (5) failed to reach high

school after needing special education, (6) was shy and respectful compared to his brothers, (7) was brought into illegal drug trafficking by his

uncles, (8) never abused his wife or daughter, (9) was not violent or

aggressive until his thirty-year prison sentence, (10) has never attacked

prison staff, (11) has never tried to escape, and (12) has been securely

detained since December 18, 2003. 

UNITED STATES v. CARO 7

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 7 of 69
found that four other mitigating factors had also been proved.7

After considering whether the aggravating factors sufficiently

outweighed the mitigating factors, the jury imposed the death

penalty. This appeal followed.

Caro now challenges (1) the district court’s voir dire process; (2) the denial of motions under Brady and Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E) and 17(c); (3) the constitutionality of § 3592(c)(10) and (12), the statutory aggravating

factors that made Caro eligible for the death penalty; (4) the

government’s closing argument during the selection phase;

(5) the district court’s jury instruction and the government’s

argument concerning lack of remorse; (6) the rejection of

Caro’s proposed mercy instruction; and (7) decisions about

whether to admit testimony offered under Federal Rule of

Evidence 608(a), certain information about Sandoval, and

Caro’s offer to plead guilty. We consider each matter in turn.

II. Voir Dire

We begin by considering Caro’s challenge to the voir dire

conducted by the district court. We review voir dire for abuse

of discretion. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976);

United States v. Brown, 799 F.2d 134, 135-36 (4th Cir. 1986).

A.

Prior to Caro’s trial, the district court summoned one hundred fifty prospective jurors to the courthouse in groups of

fifty. The government and Caro proposed questions for them,

but the court determined what questions would be asked. Voir

dire then occurred in two phases. First, prospective jurors

completed written questionnaires. Second, the court divided

7One juror voted that Caro’s father had a corrupting influence, five

voted that Caro’s execution would grieve his family, eight voted that

Caro’s life benefited his family, and nine voted that during a life sentence

Caro would be "incarcerated in a secure federal institution." J.A. 1460. 

8 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 8 of 69
them into groups of ten and questioned them orally. When a

prospective juror’s response was unsatisfactory, the court

recalled him individually and asked follow-up questions.

To inform prospective jurors about the case, the written

questionnaire stated, "The defendant, Carlos David Caro, is

accused of murdering Roberto Sandoval in the United States

Prison." J.A. 156. It continued, "Are your feelings about the

death penalty such that you would always vote for a sentence

of death as a punishment for someone convicted of a death

penalty eligible offense, regardless of the facts and circumstances?" J.A. 161-62 (emphasis omitted). When prospective

jurors convened for oral voir dire, the district court explained,

"The defendant is charged with the first degree murder of

Roberto Sandoval while both of them were inmates at the

United States Penitentiary." J.A. 464.

For the oral voir dire, Caro proposed two questions that the

district court declined to ask. Question fourteen of his proposed questions read: "Do you feel that anyone convicted of

intentional and pre-meditated murder deserves to get the death

penalty? If not, what kind of case does or does not deserve the

death penalty?" J.A. 429. Instead, the court asked the following questions or some close variation: "[W]ould you automatically vote to impose the death penalty? . . . . In other words,

would you consider life in prison without possibility of

release, depending on the circumstances?" J.A. 502-03. The

court also informed the parties: "I will consider in appropriate

circumstances additional questions along the line that the

defendant has suggested if I find it appropriate." J.A. 458. The

court thus asked two seated jurors whether they could consider a life sentence for someone convicted of pre-meditated

murder.

Question twenty-two of Caro’s proposed questions read:

"Do you believe that factors in a defendant’s background,

such as mental health issues, family background, childhood

abuse or neglect, or a history of drug or alcohol abuse would

UNITED STATES v. CARO 9

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 9 of 69
be important factors for a juror to consider in determining

whether to impose the death penalty . . . ?" J.A. 430. The

court declined to ask this proposed question, and instead

explained: "If the case . . . goes to the penalty phase, then the

jury would hear evidence in aggravation and mitigation; that

is, evidence about circumstances that favor the death penalty,

and circumstances that suggest that the death penalty would

not be appropriate." J.A. 484.

B.

To enforce the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury, district courts must conduct "adequate voir dire" to

enable them "to remove prospective jurors who will not be

able impartially to follow the court’s instructions and evaluate

the evidence." Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182,

188 (1981) (emphasis omitted). Because "[a]ny juror who

would impose death regardless of the facts and circumstances

of conviction cannot follow the dictates of law," the Supreme

Court has held that "[a] defendant on trial for his life must be

permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective

jurors function under such misconception." Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 735-36 (1992). However, "federal judges

[are] accorded ample discretion in determining how best to

conduct the voir dire." Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189; see

United States v. Barber, 80 F.3d 964, 967 (4th Cir. 1996)

(noting that voir dire "must be committed to the good judgment of the trial judge whose immediate perceptions determine what questions are appropriate for ferreting out relevant

prejudices" (internal quotations omitted)).

Caro contends that the district court failed to satisfy Morgan because, although prospective jurors were asked whether

they would automatically impose a life or death sentence for

"a death penalty eligible offense" or "first degree murder,"

they were not asked this question regarding "intentional and

pre-meditated murder." In other words, Caro believes the voir

dire was inadequate because prospective jurors were never

10 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 10 of 69
told that "death penalty eligible offense" or "first degree murder" meant "intentional and pre-meditated murder." Caro also

contends that, because prospective jurors were never told that

information regarding Caro’s personal background could be

considered mitigating, the court’s voir dire could not weed out

prospective jurors who would refuse to consider any mitigating information about his troubled personal background.8

United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996),

addressed similar issues. There, the district court asked prospective jurors, "Do you have strong feelings in favor of the

death penalty?" Id. at 878. To those who failed to answer "no"

unequivocally, the court then asked whether "[they] would

always vote to impose the death penalty in every case where

a defendant is found guilty of a capital offense." Id. We found

this questioning satisfactory.

We explained that Morgan established "the right, grounded

in the Sixth Amendment, to a voir dire adequate to assure a

defendant a jury all of whose members are able impartially to

follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence," that

is, "the right to an inquiry sufficient to ensure——within the

limits of reason and practicality——a jury none of whose

members would unwaveringly impose death after a finding of

guilt and hence would uniformly reject any and all evidence

of mitigating factors, no matter how instructed on the law."

8Caro also claims that the district court erred by not questioning prospective jurors individually. Because he never raised this issue below, we

review for plain error. See United States v. Rolle, 204 F.3d 133, 138 (4th

Cir. 2000). We conclude that the court did not err because the Constitution

does not require individual questioning of prospective jurors. See Mu’Min

v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431-32 (1991) (finding no error where a trial

court denied a motion for individual questioning, questioned prospective

jurors in small groups, and asked follow-up questions of prospective jurors

who showed possible bias); United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 734

(4th Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is well established that a trial judge may question

prospective jurors collectively rather than individually. . . . This is especially true where . . . the trial court provides for individual questioning of

a juror whose initial responses prove less than satisfactory . . . ."). 

UNITED STATES v. CARO 11

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 11 of 69
Tipton, 90 F.3d at 878 (internal quotations omitted). We then

added: "Just how an inquiry adequate for this specific purpose

should be conducted is committed to the discretion of the district courts." Id. However, we also pointed out, "Obviously,

the most direct way to get at the possibility that a prospective

juror would always impose death following conviction is to

put that very ‘reverse-Witherspoon’ question directly to him,"

i.e., to ask whether the person would be irrevocably committed to voting for the death penalty regardless of the facts and

circumstances.9Id.

Here, the district court asked, "Are your feelings about the

death penalty such that you would always vote for a sentence

of death as a punishment for someone convicted of a death

penalty eligible offense, regardless of the facts and circumstances?" J.A. 161-62 (emphasis omitted). This is precisely

the type of "reverse-Witherspoon" question that Tipton

approved. Because this question, standing alone, adequately

enabled the district court to weed out prospective jurors irrevocably committed to imposing the death penalty, the district

court’s decision not to adopt Caro’s proposed question fourteen was not an abuse of discretion. See also Oken v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 259, 266 n.4 (4th Cir. 2000) ("We . . . reject the

suggestion that the trial court was required to ask potential

jurors whether they would automatically impose the death

penalty in rape-murder cases because . . . Morgan does not

require crime-specific voir dire questions.").

For the same reason, the district court’s failure to adopt

Caro’s proposed question twenty-two about mitigation also

was not an abuse of discretion. The above "reverse9Tipton was referring to Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968),

where the Supreme Court found that excluding a juror who was "irrevocably committed to . . . vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts

and circumstances" does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 523.

Thus, a "reverse-Witherspoon" question asks prospective jurors whether

they are irrevocably committed to voting for the death penalty. 

12 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 12 of 69
Witherspoon" question adequately enabled the district court to

weed out prospective jurors who would not consider mitigating evidence relating to Caro’s personal background. The

mere conjecture that more detailed questioning would have

elicited information useful to Caro does not suggest that the

district court erred. See Tipton, 90 F.3d at 878 (affirming the

district court’s decision not to make "inquiries into the prospective jurors’ willingness to consider factors such as a

defendant’s ‘deprived, poor background,’ ‘emotional, physical abuse,’ ‘young age,’ ‘limited intelligence,’ and ‘brain disfunction’"). "The undoubted fact that such detailed

questioning might have been somehow helpful to [Caro] in

exercising peremptory challenges does not suffice to show

abuse of the district court’s broad discretion in conducting the

requisite inquiry." Id. at 879.

III. Discovery

Next we review the district court’s denial of Caro’s

motions under Brady and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E) and 17(c). Because no factual findings were

made, we review the Brady decision de novo.10 See United

States v. Mejia, 82 F.3d 1032, 1036 (11th Cir. 1990) (reviewing a Brady decision de novo); United States v. Kennedy, 890

F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). We review the decision under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Afrifa, No. 95-5753, 1996 WL 370180, at *1 (4th

Cir. July 3, 1996); see United States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49,

54 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that Rule 16 "plac[es] the decision

regarding pre-trial disclosure of witness lists within the sound

discretion of the trial court"). And we also review the decision

under Rule 17(c) for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Fowler, 932 F.2d 306, 311 (4th Cir. 1991).

10We reviewed for clear error in United States v. Trevino, 89 F.3d 187,

190 (4th Cir. 1996), but there the district court had reviewed the requested

material in camera before denying the defendant’s motion to compel. The

court’s findings were thus factual rather than purely legal. 

UNITED STATES v. CARO 13

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 13 of 69
A.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) the government alleged a nonstatutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness. In

response, Caro hired risk-assessment expert Mark Cunningham to testify that Caro would be unlikely to endanger anyone

during a life sentence because the BOP would adequately

secure Caro in the Control Unit at the Administrative Maximum United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado

("Florence ADMAX"), the BOP’s most secure facility,11 until

concluding that Caro was no longer dangerous. In turn, the

government planned to have former warden of Florence

ADMAX Gregory Hershberger testify that Florence ADMAX

could not fully secure Caro and that the BOP would likely

transfer him to another facility about three years after his

arrival.

To inform Cunningham’s testimony, Caro requested information from BOP records relating to whether inmates like

Caro are housed at Florence ADMAX, how well Florence

ADMAX prevents violence, and when inmates like Caro normally are transferred from Florence ADMAX to other facilities with less security. Specifically, Caro requested the

following:

A. Data showing median length of stay, range of

length of stay and standard deviation of the distribution of length of stay at Florence ADMAX for all

inmates since it was opened in 1994 to the present

time;

11Called the "Alcatraz of the Rockies," Florence ADMAX houses the

BOP’s most dangerous inmates. See Dan Eggen, New Home is "Alcatraz

of the Rockies," Wash. Post, May 5, 2006, at A6. Guinness World Records

has dubbed Florence ADMAX the most secure prison in the world. Guinness World Records 2001 53 (Mint Publishers, Inc. 2001); see Scarver v.

Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 2006) (calling Florence ADMAX

"the most secure prison in the federal system"). 

14 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 14 of 69
B. Data showing how many inmates who were

admitted to Florence ADMAX in 1994 or 1995 continue to be confined there, broken down by offense

conduct that caused them to be transferred to Florence ADMAX;

C. Movement sheets from the central inmate file on

every inmate who has killed another inmate within

the Bureau of Prisons, ("BOP"), within the last 20

years;

D. Investigative reports on all inmate homicides

within the BOP within the last 20 years including

any "after action reports" indicating any operational

or institutional changes in response to each killing

and any final memoranda from Special Investigative

Services to the Warden of each institution regarding

each killing;

E. Regarding each inmate involved in an inmate killing within the BOP within the last 20 years, the

respective inmate’s "Chronological Disciplinary

Record" and Inmate History ADM-REL and/or

movement Sheets within the Bureau of Prisons;

F. Records on any assaultive conduct by an inmate

in the "Control Unit" at Florence ADMAX from

November 1994 to present date, showing the inmate

involved, inmate number of the inmate involved,

date of occurrence and description of the conduct,

and the staff member victim of each assault;

G. Names, prison numbers, assignment rationale and

tenures of all inmates in the Control Unit at Florence

ADMAX since opening in 1994 to present date

showing date assigned, the reason assigned and date

exiting the Control Unit to lesser security or release

from BOP;

UNITED STATES v. CARO 15

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 15 of 69
H. Disciplinary Incident Reports on all inmates in

the Control Unit at Florence ADMAX from 1994 to

present date showing inmate name, number, date of

offense and details of disciplinary incident; and

I. Correctional Services Significant Incidents Data

on levels and frequency of violence at each security

level at Florence ADMAX by year from 2001

through 2006.

J.A. 396-97.

After the government denied this request, Caro filed various motions. Two motions requested subpoenas duces tecum

under Rule 17(c) compelling the BOP’s director and Florence

ADMAX’s warden to produce the information. Another

motion requested a court order compelling the government to

produce the information under Rule 16(a)(1)(E). The final

motion requested a court order compelling the government to

produce the information under Brady.

Following an evidentiary hearing,12 a magistrate judge concluded that Rule 16(a)(1)(E) and Brady did require the government to produce the information that Caro had requested.

The court emphasized that, "despite . . . [its] inquiries at the

November 3 hearing, the government ha[d] produced no evidence through affidavit or otherwise as to its argument that

production of the documents and information requested would

be burdensome to the BOP." J.A. 290.

The government objected to this order. On November 20,

2006, the district court denied all four motions. It reasoned

that the information requested was immaterial to Caro’s

12During this hearing, the government represented that "it d[id] not

intend to use any of the documents sought in the Discovery Motions in its

case-in-chief during either the guilt or the penalty phase of this case." J.A.

289. 

16 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 16 of 69
defense. See United States v. Caro, 461 F. Supp. 2d 478, 481

(W.D. Va. 2006). However, the court commented:

I point out, however, that I do so in light of the government’s representation that it does not intend to

introduce any of the requested data in its own case.

Otherwise, Rule 16 might very well require its prior

disclosure to the defendant. Accordingly, absent

proper disclosure, the government may not rely on

specific instances of inmate violence (other than the

defendant’s own) in seeking to prove his future dangerousness.

Id. at 481-82. Although Caro’s requested information was

withheld, Cunningham visited Florence ADMAX, spoke with

BOP personnel, and received information not covered by

Caro’s initial request, including Caro’s inmate file and Florence ADMAX’s official policies.

During Caro’s sentencing hearing, the government, anticipating Cunningham’s testimony, offered evidence that Florence ADMAX could not fully secure Caro. This evidence

included descriptions of specific instances of violence by

inmates other than Caro. For example, Daniel Olsen, a code

breaker for the government, testified about an inmate at Florence ADMAX who sent a coded message ordering a homicide. Former warden Hershberger testified that inmates killed

two guards at the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, the predecessor to Florence ADMAX. He also testified

that Florence ADMAX inmates lashed out against prison

staff, using any weapons they could find. Finally, Hershberger

asserted that "no system that the Bureau of Prisons has been

able to devise to control the inmates is completely failsafe."

J.A. 1341. He indicated that the BOP could not guarantee that

someone like Caro would never make a weapon or send a

coded message to fellow gang members.

Hershberger further described the "step down" program at

Florence ADMAX designed to channel inmates back into

UNITED STATES v. CARO 17

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 17 of 69
general prison populations at other facilities. Hershberger

stated that this could be done in three years; Cunningham testified that the average was five years. Hershberger further

explained that inmates sentenced to death are housed at Federal Correctional Complex Terre Haute, which has very high

security, and are never transferred to other facilities.

By contrast, Cunningham testified that Caro would not

likely endanger anyone while serving a life sentence because,

given his personal characteristics, the BOP would probably

house him at Florence ADMAX until he stopped being dangerous. Cunningham admitted, however, that "for the next

five to ten years [Caro] would pose a significant risk if at

large in a U.S. penitentiary." J.A. 1268.

On cross-examination, the government questioned Cunningham using the affidavit he submitted for Caro’s discovery

motions. This affidavit listed forty-seven inmates who committed homicide in prison and argued that Caro needed more

information about these inmates to prepare his defense. The

government asked whether Cunningham knew those inmates’

current locations. Defense counsel objected, saying the government had withheld this information, but the district court

overruled the objection. Using the Inmate Locator on the

BOP’s public website, the government then showed that, for

example, Bruce Pierce had committed homicide in prison and

been transferred away from Florence ADMAX. Cunningham

admitted this but chafed:

The critical issue is what happened to him between

the time he was guilty of the killing, and . . . now

that he’s at Lewisburg[,] . . . where did he go for

how long, why did they decide to put him in Lewisburg, at what level of Lewisburg is he in with what

disciplinary history. So just to put his name up and

show where he is is misleading, at best, in the face

of the data that I requested from you that would have

fully informed this issue for me and for the jury.

18 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 18 of 69
J.A. 1298. The government then made the same point for

another inmate, David Fleming, and implied that other

inmates listed in Cunningham’s affidavit also had been transferred away from Florence ADMAX.

During their closing arguments, both sides debated whether

the BOP would adequately secure Caro during a life sentence.

The jury ultimately found unanimously that the government

had proved Caro’s future dangerousness beyond a reasonable

doubt; only nine jurors found that during a life sentence Caro

would be "incarcerated in a secure federal institution." J.A.

1460. Caro now challenges the district court’s denial of his

motions under Brady and Rules 17(c) and 16(a)(1)(E). See

Caro, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 481.

B.

We first review the district court’s denial of Caro’s motion

under Brady. In Brady, the Supreme Court announced that the

Due Process Clause requires the government to disclose "evidence favorable to an accused upon request . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment." 373 U.S.

at 87. Favorable evidence is material "if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). "A

‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. We have often noted

that Brady requests cannot be used as discovery devices. As

the Supreme Court remarked, "There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not

create one." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).

The district court denied Caro’s motion under Brady

because Caro failed to establish that the information requested

would be favorable to him. We agree. Because Caro can only

speculate as to what the requested information might reveal,

he cannot satisfy Brady’s requirement of showing that the

UNITED STATES v. CARO 19

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 19 of 69
requested evidence would be "favorable to [the] accused."

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.

97, 109-10 (1976) ("The mere possibility that an item of

undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or

might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.").

C.

We next review the denial of Caro’s motions requesting

Rule 17(c) subpoenas. Rule 17(c) "implements the Sixth

Amendment guarantee that an accused have compulsory process to secure evidence in his favor." In re Martin Marietta

Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 621 (4th Cir. 1988). Rule 17(c) lets a

defendant subpoena information, but provides that "the court

may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be

unreasonable or oppressive." Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(2). The

Supreme Court has held that a Rule 17(c) subpoena is "unreasonable or oppressive" unless the party requesting it demonstrates:

(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevent

[sic]; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for

trial without such production and inspection in

advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such

inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial;

and (4) that the application is made in good faith and

is not intended as a general "fishing expedition."

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-700 (1974).

Accordingly, a defendant seeking a Rule 17(c) subpoena

"must clear three hurdles: (1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; (3)

specificity." Id. at 700. We have emphasized that "Rule 17(c)

. . . is not a discovery device." Fowler, 932 F.2d at 311 (citing

Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 220

(1951)).

20 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 20 of 69
The district court denied Caro’s motions for Rule 17(c)

subpoenas because "a Rule 17 subpoena duces tecum cannot

substitute for the limited discovery otherwise permitted in

criminal cases and the hope of obtaining favorable evidence

does not justify the issuance of such a subpoena." Caro, 461

F. Supp. 2d at 481. This decision was not an abuse of discretion. Caro can only speculate as to what the requested information would have shown. Moreover, his requested Rule

17(c) subpoenas cast a wide net that betokens a "general ‘fishing expedition,’" Nixon, 418 U.S. at 700, and they merely

duplicate Caro’s discovery motion under Rule 16(a)(1)(E).

D.

Finally, we consider the district court’s denial of Caro’s

motion under Rule 16(a)(1)(E). Rule 16 differs from Brady,

which rests upon due process considerations, and provides the

minimum amount of pretrial discovery granted in criminal

cases. See United States v. Baker, 453 F.3d 419, 424 (7th Cir.

2006) ("Rule 16 . . . is broader than Brady."); United States

v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 911 (6th Cir. 1970) ("We are . . . of

the view that the disclosure required by Rule 16 is much

broader than that required by the due process standards of

Brady."). Setting out the discovery to which defendants are

entitled, section (a)(1)(E) provides:

Upon a defendant’s request, the government must

permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, documents, data, photographs,

tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or

portions of any of these items, if the item is within

the government’s possession, custody, or control

and:

(i) the item is material to preparing the defense;

(ii) the government intends to use the item in its

case-in-chief at trial; or

UNITED STATES v. CARO 21

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 21 of 69
(iii) the item was obtained from or belongs to the

defendant.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). The government does not dispute that the information requested by Caro is "within the

government’s possession, custody, or control,"13 and Caro

does not assert that subsection (ii) or (iii) applies.14 Id. Therefore, we focus on subsection (i).

Under subsection (i), the government must make available

to the defendant any requested items that are "material to preparing the defense." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i). For the

defendant to show materiality under this rule, "[t]here must be

some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the disputed

evidence would have enabled the defendant significantly to

alter the quantum of proof in his favor." United States v. Ross,

511 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836.15

13We note that certain discovery requests that Caro made may fall outside Rule 16 because they apparently call for data processing. For example, Caro requested "[d]ata showing median length of stay, range of length

of stay and standard deviation of the distribution of length of stay at Florence ADMAX." J.A. 396. Assuming that here Caro requests statistical

analysis, the government would not have been obliged to comply under

Rule 16, which requires only that "the government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph" requested items. Fed. R. Crim.

P. 16(a)(1)(E). However, the government never raised this argument. 

14When asked during oral argument whether Caro asserted any claim

arising from the government having violated the district court’s order that

it "may not rely on specific instances of inmate violence (other than the

defendant’s own) in seeking to prove his future dangerousness," Caro, 461

F. Supp. 2d at 482, counsel for Caro stated that she noted the government’s misconduct merely to bolster her argument about subsection (i).

Regardless of whether subsection (ii) would apply, we cannot grant relief

that Caro plainly failed to request. 

15Although we have not adopted this Ross standard in any published

opinion, we have in two unpublished opinions. See United States v. Farah,

No. 06-4712, 2007 WL 2309749, at *4 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2007); United

States v. Kirk, No. 88-5095, 1989 WL 64139, at *2 (4th Cir. June 2, 1989).

Numerous other circuits also follow Ross. See Baker, 453 F.3d at 425;

22 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 22 of 69
"[E]vidence is material as long as there is a strong indication

that it will play an important role in uncovering admissible

evidence, aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony,

or assisting impeachment or rebuttal." United States v. Lloyd,

992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citations and internal

quotations omitted).

The district court denied Caro’s motion upon finding no

indication that the information requested by Caro would support Cunningham’s testimony. The information was relevant

to future dangerousness and might have allowed Cunningham

to formulate scientifically more reliable opinions about Caro

and to test various government allegations, e.g., that gang

membership made Caro more dangerous. However, Caro

presented no facts whatsoever indicating that the information

would have actually helped prove his defense. See United

States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 1990)

("Neither a general description of the information sought nor

conclusory allegations of materiality suffice; a defendant must

present facts which would tend to show that the Government

is in possession of information helpful to the defense."). No

one can say, for example, whether Cunningham’s more reliable opinions would have actually favored Caro or whether

Cunningham would have found any government allegations

unsupported. For this reason, the district court did not abuse

its discretion by finding that the requested information was

not "material to preparing the defense." Fed. R. Crim. P.

16(a)(1)(E)(i).

United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003); United

States v. Marshall, 132 F.3d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Marshall, 532

F.2d 1279, 1285 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Scott, No. 92-6272, 1993

WL 411596, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 8, 1993); see also United States v. RMI

Co., 599 F.2d 1183, 1188 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting the Ross standard in

another context). Like our sister circuits, we believe Ross provides an adequate formula for applying Rule 16. Having said that, we stress that "materiality" in Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) differs from "materiality" under Brady,

which is grounded in the Due Process Clause. 

UNITED STATES v. CARO 23

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 23 of 69
IV. Statutory Aggravating Factors

We next consider Caro’s constitutional challenge to 18

U.S.C. § 3592(c)(10) and (12), the statutory aggravating factors that made him eligible for the death penalty. Caro preserved this challenge below by unsuccessfully moving to

strike. "We review de novo a properly preserved constitutional claim." United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 266 (4th

Cir. 2009).

As we have noted, the government had to establish at least

one statutory aggravating factor to make Caro eligible for the

death penalty. Moreover, the jury had to consider all aggravating and mitigating factors in determining whether imposing a death sentence was justified. For homicide defendants,

the FDPA enumerates sixteen statutory aggravating factors.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). During the eligibility phase of

Caro’s sentencing hearing, the jury found that the following

two had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

(10) Conviction for two felony drug offenses.—The

defendant has previously been convicted of 2 or

more State or Federal offenses punishable by a term

of imprisonment of more than one year, committed

on different occasions, involving the distribution of

a controlled substance.

* *

(12) Conviction for serious Federal drug

offenses.—The defendant had previously been convicted of violating title II or III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970

for which a sentence of 5 or more years may be

imposed or had previously been convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise.

18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(10), (12). Both aggravating factors were

based on Caro’s previous convictions for nonviolent drug

24 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 24 of 69
offenses. Caro had stipulated to being convicted of possession

with intent to distribute marijuana in 1988, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana in 1994, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine in 2001. He had

stipulated that these offenses met § 3592(c)(10) and (12).

Having unsuccessfully moved to strike, Caro now argues that

these two statutory aggravating factors violate the Eighth

Amendment because they are not "rationally relate[d] to the

question who should live or die." Appellant’s Br. at 130.

The Eighth Amendment requires that a capital sentencing

scheme must limit "[c]apital punishment . . . to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes

and whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568

(2005) (internal quotations omitted). The FDPA establishes

various safeguards intended to meet this standard. Among

them are the following:

• § 3591 authorizes the death penalty only for certain crimes;

• § 3593(e) requires that at least one statutory

aggravating factor be established before a death

sentence may be considered;

• § 3592(a) mandates consideration of mitigating

factors when selecting a death sentence; and

• § 3595(c) calls for reconsidering any death sentence influenced by arbitrary factors, resulting

from insufficient evidence, or involving legal

error not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Regarding the second safeguard, i.e., that at least one statutory aggravating factor must be established before a death

sentence may be considered, the Supreme Court has said that

"each statutory aggravating circumstance must satisfy a conUNITED STATES v. CARO 25

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 25 of 69
stitutional standard derived from the principles of Furman,"

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876 (1983), which reversed

death sentences because Georgia had "permit[ted] this unique

penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed," Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)

("[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life

should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably

directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action"); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.

349, 358 (1977) ("It is of vital importance to the defendant

and to the community that any decision to impose the death

sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than

caprice or emotion."). Specifically, the Court articulated two

requirements: "an aggravating circumstance [1] must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty

and [2] must reasonably justify the imposition of a more

severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found

guilty of murder." Zant, 462 U.S. at 877. See, e.g., id. at 879

(approving the aggravating factors of having "escaped from

lawful confinement" and having "a prior record of conviction

for a capital felony" because they "adequately differentiate

this case in an objective, evenhanded, and substantively rational way from . . . murder cases in which the death penalty

may not be imposed"); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433

(1980) (reversing a death sentence because the narrowing factor did not reflect "a consciousness materially more

‘depraved’ than that of any person guilty of murder").

Caro argues that § 3592(c)(10) and (12) do not satisfy these

two requirements. We find his argument unpersuasive.

Regarding the first requirement, the Supreme Court explained

that "the [aggravating] circumstance may not apply to every

defendant convicted of [the offense]; it must apply only to a

subclass of defendants." Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967,

972 (1994). Section 3592(c)(10) and (12) clearly meet this

forgiving standard. Although some drug offenses are quite

26 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 26 of 69
common, not all homicide defendants have prior convictions

that satisfy § 3592(c)(10) or (12). Furthermore, these aggravating factors differ markedly from ones the Supreme Court

has invalidated for not genuinely narrowing the class of

defendants eligible for the death penalty. See Godfrey, 446

U.S. at 428-29 (reviewing the factor, "that the offense was

outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman," and

concluding that "[a] person of ordinary sensibility could fairly

characterize almost every murder as outrageously or wantonly

vile, horrible and inhuman" (internal quotations omitted));

Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64 (1988) (reviewing the factor, "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," and

concluding that "an ordinary person could honestly believe

that every unjustified, intentional taking of human life is especially heinous" (internal quotations omitted)).

Regarding the second requirement, one can hardly dispute

the congressional wisdom that recidivism justifies harsher

sentencing. Defendants with significant criminal histories

demonstrate unwillingness or inability to follow the law. This

justifies imposing harsher sentences to provide increased retribution and deterrence. Prior convictions are thus properly

and routinely considered in federal sentencing. See

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230

(1998) ("[P]rior commission of a serious crime . . . is as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine."). Moreover, the

felony drug offenses described by § 3592(c)(10) and (12) are

serious indeed, however common may be their commission.

See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000)

("There is no doubt that traffic in illegal narcotics creates

social harms of the first magnitude."). Although Caro’s prior

convictions satisfying § 3592(c)(10) and (12) might be considered "nonviolent" by themselves, illegal drugs have long

and justifiably been associated with violence. See United

States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that

Congress "made the policy determination that recidivism for

drug dealing, without more, is especially dangerous"); United

States v. Ward, 171 F.3d 188, 195 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Guns are

UNITED STATES v. CARO 27

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 27 of 69
tools of the drug trade."). Therefore, we find that these statutory aggravating factors reasonably justify imposing a more

severe sentence on Caro compared to others.

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that

§ 3592(c)(10) and (12) do not violate the Eighth Amendment.16

In so concluding, we follow the only other circuit to have considered this issue. See United States v. Bolden, 545 F.3d 609,

616-17 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding § 3592(c)(10)).

V. Closing Argument

We next consider Caro’s challenge to the government’s

closing argument during the selection phase. Caro asserts that

various remarks by the government violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In assessing alleged prosecutorial

misconduct, we ask "whether the [misconduct] so infected the

16The dissent presupposes that each statutory aggravating factor standing alone must narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty

to include only those who deserve a death sentence. Specifically, the dissent invokes the "pyramid" metaphor Zant adopted to describe Georgia’s

capital sentencing scheme, "with the death penalty applying only to those

few cases which are contained in the space just beneath the apex," 462

U.S. at 871 (internal quotations omitted), and concludes that "the question

raised by Caro’s appeal is whether the two [statutory] aggravating factors

found by the jury are constitutionally sufficient to move him from the base

to the apex . . . ." Dis. Op. at 56. Existing Supreme Court precedent does

not impose such a requirement. A capital sentencing scheme as a whole

must limit "[c]apital punishment . . . to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose extreme culpability

makes them the most deserving of execution." Roper, 543 U.S. at 568

(internal quotations omitted). However, it does not follow that a statutory

aggravating factor alone must satisfy that requirement. (Indeed, the FDPA

contains various safeguards intended to satisfy that requirement when

taken together.) Instead, the Supreme Court stated that a statutory aggravating factor need only "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for

the death penalty and . . . reasonably justify the imposition of a more

severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant, 462 U.S. at 877. For the reasons stated above, § 3592(c)(10)

and (12) plainly satisfy this standard. 

28 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 28 of 69
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a

denial of due process." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,

181 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). To prove reversible

error, the defendant must show (1) "that the prosecutor’s

remarks or conduct were improper" and (2) "that such

remarks or conduct prejudicially affected his substantial rights

so as to deprive him of a fair trial." United States v. Scheetz,

293 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2002).

A.

The government’s closing argument during the selection

phase stressed that only a death sentence could "control"

Caro. Particularly, the government indicated that a death sentence should be imposed because the BOP would not secure

Caro adequately to prevent future violence. The government

argued, "[E]very time the Bureau of Prisons has attempted to

control Carlos Caro, to, to bring whatever pressure they had

to bear, whatever security they had to bear on him, . . . he has

defeated those attempts." J.A. 1395. It added, "[C]an he be

controlled in the Bureau of Prisons? I suspect the answer to

that question is no. . . . The reason he can’t be controlled is

because the system is not failsafe." J.A. 1399. Responding to

Cunningham’s testimony that during a life sentence Caro

would be incapacitated at Florence ADMAX until the BOP

found him no longer dangerous, the government remarked:

"[W]hat about this classification system that the BOP has?

The question is can we rely on the BOP to send Caro to a

place where he won’t kill? . . . [W]e know that the system for

classification is not failsafe." J.A. 1401-02.

The government later asserted, "There is simply nothing the

Bureau of Prisons can do to deter [Caro]," but explained,

"There is one thing that we can do." J.A. 1404. The government continued, "[W]hat is the way that we can deter Carlos

Caro? When I say we, this is something I can’t do, the judge

can’t do it, because the question of the death penalty, ladies

UNITED STATES v. CARO 29

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 29 of 69
and gentlemen, is left exclusively to you, the jury. It’s your

decision." J.A. 1404. The government concluded:

So, ladies and gentlemen, we now come to you.

You’re it. I’m the United States Attorney, powerless

to control Caro. United States District Judge, federal

judge, powerless to do it. The law allows one last

option, and that is you. And only you. Judge Jones

will do what you say. You go back there and find a

unanimous verdict for life, that’s what he will

impose. You find death, that’s what he’ll do. The

authority and the responsibility for the control of

Carlos David Caro is in your hands. We have done

all we can do. And so we come to you.

J.A. 1438-39.

B.

Caro’s principal challenge here relates to the government’s

argument that only a death sentence could control Caro.17

Although we find this argument troubling for the reasons discussed below, we cannot conclude that Caro suffered such

prejudice as to warrant reversal.

17Caro makes other challenges that are unpersuasive, but only one merits discussion. He challenges the government’s argument that a life sentence would send bad messages. The government stated that a life

sentence would tell the Texas Syndicate, "[Y]ou can kill and it’s okay,"

J.A. 1436; would tell prison staff and inmates, "It’s open season because

in this community there’s no punishment for murder," J.A. 1436; and

would tell Sandoval’s parents "that their son’s life was meaningless," J.A.

1435. Because the decision whether to impose the death penalty should

involve "an individualized determination on the basis of the character of

the individual and the circumstances of the crime," Zant, 462 U.S. at 879

(emphasis omitted), the government’s comments about messages sent to

anyone other than Caro might have been improper. Regardless whether we

found them improper, however, these comments did not prejudice Caro

enough to violate the Due Process Clause because they were isolated and

unlikely to mislead the jury. See Scheetz, 293 F.3d at 175. 

30 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 30 of 69
The FDPA created an analytical framework for considering

the death penalty clearly designed to minimize arbitrariness.

The Supreme Court explained that the decision whether to

select the death penalty should involve "an individualized

determination on the basis of the character of the individual

and the circumstances of the crime." Zant, 462 U.S. at 879

(emphasis omitted). The suggestion that the BOP would not

secure Caro adequately to prevent future violence implicates

policy and resource considerations that are quite different. See

Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1508 (11th Cir. 1985) (en

banc) ("Neither the future diligence of an appellate court nor

the possibility of future incompetence of corrections and

parole personnel should be invoked to alter the jury’s perception of its role at capital sentencing."). Moreover, calling upon

the jury to "control" Caro gives them a role more akin to law

enforcement than to impartial arbitration between the defendant and government. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1,

18 (1985) ("The prosecutor was . . . in error to try to exhort

the jury to ‘do its job’; that kind of pressure . . . has no place

in the administration of criminal justice.").

Our concerns notwithstanding, on these facts we cannot

find such prejudice as to warrant reversal. We reach that conclusion based on various factors we have found relevant when

assessing prejudice:

(1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s remarks had

a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the

defendant; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or

extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of

competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of

the defendant; (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to

extraneous matters; (5) whether the prosecutor’s

remarks were invited by improper conduct of

defense counsel; and (6) whether curative instructions were given to the jury.

UNITED STATES v. CARO 31

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 31 of 69
Scheetz, 293 F.3d at 186.

The government’s comments about the jury’s role were isolated and not extensive. More significantly, regarding the government’s comments about whether the BOP would

adequately secure Caro to prevent future dangerousness,

Caro’s own argument opened the door. Caro’s expert Cunningham acknowledged that Caro remained dangerous, but

testified that Caro would not endanger anyone because the

BOP would incapacitate him at Florence ADMAX.18 This

plainly invited the government to respond that, actually, the

BOP would not secure Caro adequately to prevent future violence.

Furthermore, the district court’s instructions counterbalanced any improper comments. The court stated that the jury

should "make a unique, individualized judgment about the

justification for and appropriateness of the death penalty

. . . ." Trial Tr. 105, Doc. 687, June 19, 2004. The court also

cautioned, "I remind you that the statements, questions, and

arguments of counsel are not evidence." Trial Tr. 102.

Finally, each alleged non-statutory aggravating factor was

well supported by the record. Most notably, Caro’s previous

violent conduct, his statements evincing indifference to punishment, and Cunningham’s own admission about Caro’s

future dangerousness certainly sufficed to establish the nonstatutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness. Therefore, we cannot say that the government’s closing argument

"prejudicially affected [Caro’s] substantial rights so as to

deprive him of a fair trial." Scheetz, 293 F.3d at 185.

18Cunningham admitted, "[I]n the general population of a U.S. penitentiary, there is a very high risk that Mr. Caro would seriously injure someone else." J.A. 1267. 

32 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 32 of 69
VI. Lack of Remorse

We next consider Caro’s Fifth Amendment claim regarding

lack of remorse. Caro argues that the government and district

court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination by having the jury consider Caro’s failure to

speak words of remorse. The government admits referring to

Caro’s silence during closing argument but contends that the

Fifth Amendment permitted using silence to prove the nonstatutory aggravating factor of lack of remorse. "We review

de novo a properly preserved constitutional claim." Hall, 551

F.3d at 266. Given the court’s cautionary instruction and

overwhelming information showing Caro’s lack of remorse,

we conclude that any error would have been harmless under

18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2).

A.

The government’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty

under the FDPA asserted a non-statutory aggravating factor of

lack of remorse. Cases in which the government has properly

established this non-statutory aggravating factor have generally involved affirmative words or conduct. See, e.g., United

States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 334 (4th Cir. 2009) (deeming

evidence of drug use and sexual encounters during a crime

spree highly probative of lack of remorse); Emmett v. Kelly,

474 F.3d 154, 170 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that a statement,

made in response to police questioning about a murder, that

the victim "was ‘an asshole’ who ‘wouldn’t loan me no

money’" showed lack of remorse). Here, however, the government alleged that "Carlos David Caro has not expressed

remorse for his violent acts, including (but not limited to) the

murder of Sandoval, the stabbing of Benavidez and the gangbased assault in Oakdale." J.A. 57 (emphasis added).

Caro objected and moved to strike the government’s allegation, arguing that "[e]vidence of lack of remorse must be more

than mere silence on the part of the defendant and must not

UNITED STATES v. CARO 33

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 33 of 69
implicate his constitutional right to remain silent." J.A. 75.

Caro also objected to the district court’s proposed jury

instruction, which referred to the government’s allegation but

cautioned, "[M]ere silence, alone, by the defendant should not

be considered as proof of lack of remorse." J.A. 1449. Caro

proposed the following alternative:

The government has alleged as a non-statutory

aggravating factor that Carlos David Caro has not

expressed remorse for the killing of Roberto Sandoval. . . . To find this aggravating factor, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Carlos David Caro, by his words or his actions, indicated a pervading and continuing lack of remorse for

the killing of Roberto Sandoval. Mere silence on his

part or the absence of an affirmative expression of

remorse on his part may never be the basis of a lack

of remorse because Carlos David Caro has a Constitutional right to remain silent which cannot be used

against him for any purpose.

J.A. 459. The district court declined to give this proposed

instruction. The court also overruled Caro’s objection and

denied his motion to strike, reasoning that the government

intended to prove Caro’s lack of remorse "by his actions and

statements, not by mere silence." United States v. Caro, No.

06-1, 2006 WL 1594185, at *7 (W.D. Va. June 2, 2006).

The government’s closing argument during the selection

phase addressed this issue. The government pointed out

Caro’s failure to apologize:

We talk about lack of remorse as being an aggravator. You know, a lot of times we do things, and you

sit around and you say, "Gee, boy, I shouldn’t have

done that. I’m sorry I did that." All of us do things

like that. We, many times we apologize to our family

members, our friends, and say "Gee, what was I

34 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 34 of 69
thinking? I didn’t mean to do that." Have we seen

any remorse at all from Carlos Caro with regard to

any of the bad stuff that he’s ever done? No.

J.A. 1397. The government also mentioned Caro’s callous

remarks following Sandoval’s death; Cunningham’s testimony, "Well, I’m assuming Carlos Caro has no remorse," J.A.

1398; and Caro’s January 2004 letter to Gomez showing more

concern about Caro’s standing among Texas Syndicate members than about Benavidez’s suffering. The government also

mentioned Caro’s failure to apologize to Gomez for killing

Sandoval.

At the close of argument, the district court gave the following jury instruction:

C, lack of remorse. The Government has alleged that

Carlos David Caro has not expressed remorse for his

violent acts, including the murder of Roberto Sandoval, the stabbing and attempted murder of Ricardo

Benavidez, and the gang based assault at Oakdale.

Remember that the defendant has a constitutional

right to remain silent, and mere silence, alone, by the

defendant should not be considered as proof of lack

of remorse.

J.A. 1448-49. The court later cautioned: "The defendant did

not testify. The law gives him that right. . . . Accordingly, the

fact that the defendant did not testify must not be considered

by you in any way, or even discussed in arriving at your decision." Trial Tr. 115-16.

The verdict form stated: "Do you, the jury, unanimously

find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant has not expressed remorse for killing

Roberto Sandoval?" J.A. 1459. Beside this question, the

foreperson checked a blank labeled "Yes." J.A. 1459.

UNITED STATES v. CARO 35

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 35 of 69
B.

The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination

guarantees every criminal defendant "the right ‘to remain

silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of

his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such silence.’"

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981) (quoting Malloy v.

Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)). Thus it "forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt."

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); see Miranda

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966) (noting that a prosecutor may not "use at trial the fact that [a defendant] stood

mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation").

The Supreme Court has recognized that the Fifth Amendment applies during sentencing hearings. See Mitchell v.

United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327 (1999); see also Estelle, 451

U.S. at 463 (applying the Fifth Amendment to capital sentencing). In Mitchell, the defendant pleaded guilty to distributing

cocaine but during her plea colloquy refused to admit the

quantity involved. Following a sentencing hearing where her

codefendants testified about how much cocaine the defendant

usually distributed each week, the district court found that she

had distributed enough kilograms to mandate a minimum sentence of ten years. In making this finding, the court expressly

considered the defendant’s refusal to testify. Finding error, the

Supreme Court concluded that "[b]y holding petitioner’s

silence against her in determining the facts of the offense at

the sentencing hearing, the District Court imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise of the constitutional right

against compelled self-incrimination." Mitchell, 526 U.S. at

330.

Importantly, Mitchell avoided the issue of whether a defendant’s silence may be considered regarding a non-statutory

aggravating factor of lack of remorse. The Court stated:

"Whether silence bears upon the determination of a lack of

36 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 36 of 69
remorse . . . is a separate question. It is not before us, and we

express no view on it." Id. Furthermore, our sister circuits are

divided over whether the Fifth Amendment prohibits using

silence to show lack of remorse inviting a harsher sentence.

Compare United States v. Mikos, 539 F.3d 706, 718 (7th Cir.

2008) (holding that during a capital sentencing a defendant’s

silence may be considered regarding lack of remorse), with

Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1544-45 (3d Cir. 1991)

(holding that during a capital sentencing a defendant’s failure

to apologize may not be considered regarding lack of

remorse), United States v. Roman, 371 F. Supp. 2d 36, 50

(D.P.R. 2005) (holding that during a capital sentencing lack

of remorse may not be proved using "information that has a

substantial possibility of encroaching on the defendants’ constitutional right to remain silent"), and United States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 90, 112-13 (D.D.C. 2000) (barring the

inference of lack of remorse from a defendant’s "unwillingness to acknowledge in his post-arrest statements that he is

blameworthy for the crimes to which he admitted" (internal

quotations omitted)). Despite Mitchell having reserved the

question of whether silence bears upon lack of remorse, that

decision may resolve the question we face today when read in

conjunction with Estelle.

19

19The government maintains that we should follow two Seventh Circuit

decisions. In Burr v. Pollard, the court reasoned that "silence can be consistent not only with exercising one’s constitutional right, but also with a

lack of remorse . . . [which] is properly considered at sentencing because

it speaks to traditional penological interests such as rehabilitation . . . and

deterrence . . . ." 546 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2008). This rationale overlooks the implications of remaining silent. Because remorse implies consciousness of guilt, speaking words of remorse for conduct prevents a

defendant from later denying that conduct. Likewise, choosing to deny

guilt prevents a defendant from speaking words of remorse for the charged

offense. Exercising one’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent therefore

entails failure to speak words of remorse. Accordingly, penalizing a capital defendant for failure to articulate remorse burdens his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 

In United States v. Mikos, the court later reasoned that sentencing courts

routinely consider silence in determining failure to accept responsibility

UNITED STATES v. CARO 37

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 37 of 69
Sentencing involves findings about (1) circumstances of

criminal conduct and (2) characteristics of the defendant. See

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (requiring a sentencing court to consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant"); Zant, 462 U.S. at

879 (requiring that a selection decision during capital sentencing be "an individualized determination on the basis of the

character of the individual and the circumstances of the

crime" (emphasis omitted)). Following Griffin and its progeny, Mitchell held that a defendant’s silence cannot be considered "in determining the facts of the offense at the sentencing

hearing," 526 U.S. at 330, but the Court avoided mentioning

whether silence could be considered regarding the defendant’s

character. For this reason, the government argues that Mitchell permits considering silence regarding the non-statutory

aggravating factor of lack of remorse, which relates to character.

This argument, however, is in tension with Estelle. There,

the Supreme Court found that the Fifth Amendment prohibited using a defendant’s unwarned statements to prove the

non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness. See

Estelle, 451 U.S. at 468. Future dangerousness and lack of

remorse are similar factors that pertain to character rather than

to circumstances of criminal conduct.20 Accordingly, at least

under Section 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, providing

a sentencing discount for acceptance of responsibility. 539 F.3d at 718.

But we previously held that withholding a sentencing discount under section 3E1.1, unlike a sentence enhancement, does not penalize the defendant for remaining silent. See United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936-

37 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[F]or section 3E1.1 of the guidelines to apply, a

defendant must first accept responsibility for all of his criminal conduct.

. . . However, a defendant is not penalized for failing to accept responsibility. Rather, acceptance of responsibility is a mitigating factor available

under appropriate circumstances." (citations omitted)). 

20The government originally alleged lack of remorse as one of three

considerations supporting the non-statutory aggravating factor of future

dangerousness. The record does not make clear when lack of remorse

became its own non-statutory aggravating factor, but the jury instruction

treats them separately. 

38 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 38 of 69
for the purpose of capital sentencing, Estelle belies any supposed distinction created by Mitchell between circumstances

of criminal conduct and characteristics of the defendant. See

also Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding

"no logical basis for drawing such a line within the sentencing

phase" (emphasis omitted)). Estelle might have been distinguishable as involving unwarned statements rather than

silence, but Mitchell itself forecloses that argument. See

Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 329 ("Although Estelle was a capital

case, its reasoning applies with full force here, where the

Government seeks to use petitioner’s silence . . . ."). Thus,

Estelle and Mitchell together suggest that the Fifth Amendment may well prohibit considering a defendant’s silence

regarding the non-statutory aggravating factor of lack of

remorse.21

Although we recognize Estelle and Mitchell’s guidance, we

ultimately find that any error would have been harmless. See

18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2) ("The court of appeals shall not

reverse or vacate a sentence of death on account of any error

which can be harmless, including any erroneous special finding of an aggravating factor, where the Government establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was

harmless."). Any prejudice Caro suffered was greatly mitigated by the district court’s cautionary jury instruction. The

court stated, "Remember that the defendant has a constitutional right to remain silent, and mere silence, alone, by the

defendant should not be considered as proof of lack of

remorse." J.A. 1449. This indicated that silence could never

be considered regarding the non-statutory aggravating factor

21Furthermore, Mitchell reasoned that "[t]he Government retains the

burden of proving facts relevant to the crime at the sentencing phase and

cannot enlist the defendant in this process at the expense of the selfincrimination privilege." 526 U.S. at 330. This reasoning applies a fortiori

to the non-statutory aggravating factor of lack of remorse. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3593(c) ("The burden of establishing the existence of any aggravating

factor is on the government, and is not satisfied unless the existence of

such a factor is established beyond a reasonable doubt."). 

UNITED STATES v. CARO 39

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 39 of 69
of lack of remorse, and "we presume that a properly instructed

jury has acted in a manner consistent with the instruction[ ]."

United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 692 (4th Cir. 2005); see

also Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (recognizing "the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors

follow their instructions").

Furthermore, Caro’s affirmative conduct displaying lack of

remorse was significant and telling. Just after killing Sandoval, Caro yelled, "Come get this piece of shit out of here."

J.A. 676. When asked whether Sandoval was breathing, Caro

replied: "No. At this time he’s stinking up the room, get him

out." J.A. 684. He also explained, "[Sandoval] called me a

mother fucker, that whore, that’s why I fucked him up." J.A.

781. And Caro boasted, "I killed a guy two weeks ago . . .

[f]or being a fool." J.A. 790. In short, Caro exhibited lack of

remorse quite clearly until deciding to plead not guilty and

claim self-defense. Even without considering Caro’s silence,

the jury could not reasonably have reached another conclusion

regarding lack of remorse.

VII. Mercy Instruction

Next we review the district court’s failure to give Caro’s

proposed jury instruction about mercy. See United States v.

Caro, 483 F. Supp. 2d 513, 517-18 (W.D. Va. 2007). "We

review the district court’s decision to give or refuse to give a

jury instruction for abuse of discretion." United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 221 (4th Cir. 2009). "A district court

commits reversible error in refusing to provide a proffered

jury instruction only when the instruction (1) was correct; (2)

was not substantially covered by the court’s charge to the

jury; and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so important,

that failure to give the requested instruction seriously

impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct his defense." Id.

(internal quotation omitted). "Moreover, we do not view a single instruction in isolation; rather we consider whether taken

as a whole and in the context of the entire charge, the instruc40 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 40 of 69
tions accurately and fairly state the controlling law." Id.

(internal quotations omitted).

A.

Caro requested the following jury instruction, indicating

that mercy alone could justify a life sentence:

[W]hatever findings you make with respect to the

aggravating and mitigating factors, you are never

required to impose a sentence of death. For example,

there may be something about this case or about Carlos David Caro that one or more of you are not able

to identify as a special mitigating factor, but that

nevertheless creates a reasonable doubt about the

need for Carlos David Caro’s death. In such a case,

the jury should render a decision against a death sentence. Moreover, even when a sentence of death is

fully supported by the evidence, Congress has nevertheless given each of you the discretion to temper

justice with mercy. Any one of you is free to decide

that a death sentence should not be imposed in this

case for any reason that you see fit. You will not

have to explain the reason. Indeed, I am specifically

required by law to advise you that you have this

broad discretion.

J.A. 461.

The district court rejected Caro’s proposal. It found the

"proposed mercy instruction . . . improper because it would

have told the jury that it could base its determination on factors not specified in the FDPA." Caro, 483 F. Supp. 2d at

517-18. The court explained that, although the jury could

exercise mercy while weighing sentencing factors, it could

not find a death sentence "justified" under 18 U.S.C. § 3591

and thereafter fail to recommend a death sentence. Id. at 518.

UNITED STATES v. CARO 41

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 41 of 69
Instead of Caro’s proposed instruction, the district court

gave the following jury instruction:

Whatever findings you make with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, the result of the weighing process is never decided in advance. For that

reason, a jury is never required to impose a sentence

of death. At this last stage of your deliberation . . .

it is up to you to decide whether, for any proper reason established by the evidence, you choose not to

impose such a sentence on the defendant.

What constitutes sufficient justification for [a] sentence of death in this case is exclusively left to you.

Your role is to be the conscience of the community

in making a moral judgment about the worth of an

individual life balanced against the societal value of

what the Government contends is deserved punishment for the defendant’s offense. Whatever aggravating and mitigating factors are found, a jury is

never required to conclude the weighing process in

favor of a sentence of death, but your decision must

be a reasoned one, free from the influence of passion, prejudice, or arbitrary consideration.

J.A. 1442-43, 1451.

B.

Caro challenges the district court’s failure to give his proposed mercy instruction. The issue turns on how the decision

whether to select the death penalty rather than a life sentence

should be made according to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591 and 3593(e).

Section 3591 provides that an eligible defendant "shall be sentenced to death if, after consideration of the factors set forth

in section 3592 . . .[,] it is determined that imposition of a sentence of death is justified." 18 U.S.C. § 3591. Section 3593(e)

elaborates as follows:

42 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 42 of 69
[T]he jury . . . shall consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently

outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to

exist to justify a sentence of death, or, in the absence

of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating factor

or factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of

death. Based upon this consideration, the jury by

unanimous vote . . . shall recommend whether the

defendant should be sentenced to death, to life

imprisonment without possibility of release or some

other lesser sentence.

18 U.S.C. § 3593(e). Caro argues that § 3593(e)’s twosentence structure creates a two-step process whereby (1) the

death penalty might be found justified, with aggravating factors sufficiently outweighing mitigating factors, but (2) the

jury might nonetheless impose a lesser sentence out of mercy.

Conversely, the district court interpreted §§ 3591 and 3593(e)

together to mean that, once the death penalty has been found

justified because aggravating factors sufficiently outweigh

mitigating factors, the death penalty must be imposed.

We find Caro’s interpretation unpersuasive. First, the opening clause of § 3593(e)’s second sentence, namely, "Based on

this consideration," refers back to the preceding sentence and

thereby implies that when selecting a sentence the jury may

consider only whether the death penalty is justified. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3593(e) (emphasis added). Second, § 3591 states plainly

that an eligible defendant "shall be sentenced to death if . . .

it is determined that imposition of a sentence of death is justified," 18 U.S.C. § 3591, and we are obliged to read §§ 3591

and 3593(e) in harmony, see Smith v. United States, 508 U.S.

223, 233 (1993) ("Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of a statute."); King v. St.

Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (noting "the cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context"

(citations omitted)). See United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741,

UNITED STATES v. CARO 43

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 43 of 69
780-81 (8th Cir. 2001) (interpreting § 3593(e) the same way

based on § 3591), vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953

(2002). Because Caro’s proposed instruction was legally

incorrect, the district court’s refusal to give that instruction

was not an abuse of discretion.

VIII. Admissibility

Next we review decisions about whether to admit testimony

offered under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a), certain information about Sandoval, and Caro’s offer to plead guilty. "We

review evidentiary rulings of the district court for abuse of

discretion." Basham, 561 F.3d at 325.

Decisions to admit or exclude information during an FDPA

sentencing hearing are not governed by normal rules of evidence. Instead, the FDPA provides that a "defendant may

present any information relevant to a mitigating factor" and

that "[i]nformation is admissible regardless of its admissibility

under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal

trials except that information may be excluded if its probative

value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury." 18 U.S.C.

§ 3593(c). We still review for abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 674 (7th Cir. 2000).

A.

First we review the admission of certain testimony during

Caro’s murder trial. Sean Bullock occupied the cell directly

across from Caro’s cell when Sandoval was killed. During

trial, Bullock testified about that event as follows: "Well, I’m

standing in my door . . . and I seen out of my rear view someone like being choked. I looked . . . and I seen Caro standing

behind the guy." J.A. 707. Bullock also noted seeing "an

orange towel" around Sandoval’s neck. J.A. 707. Finally, Bullock described several occasions where he assisted prison

guards by providing information about other inmates. Cross44 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 44 of 69
examination showed that Bullock used aliases, had prior convictions, and testified with much greater detail than his earlier

statements. In response, the government tried to rehabilitate

Bullock by calling prison guard Gregory Bondurant. After

explaining that Bullock had been a confidential informant,

Bondurant testified: "In my opinion [Bullock] was truthful in

the dealings he had with me." J.A. 779. Caro objected to

Bondurant’s testimony but never objected to Bullock’s testimony.

Caro now challenges the district court’s admission of

Bondurant’s testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a) provides:

The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence

may refer only to character for truthfulness or

untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character

is admissible only after the character of the witness

for truthfulness has been attacked . . . .

Fed. R. Evid. 608(a). However, Rule 608(b) provides in part:

"Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ character for

truthfulness, . . . may not be proved by extrinsic evidence."

Fed. R. Evid. 608(b).

Because Bullock’s character for truthfulness was clearly

attacked during cross-examination, no one contests that

Bondurant’s opinion testimony about Bullock’s character was

admissible under Rule 608(a). Caro asserts, however, that

Bondurant’s testimony that Bullock had been a confidential

informant violated Rule 608(b). The district court did not

abuse its discretion by rejecting this argument. Bondurant was

allowed to provide a foundation for his opinion testimony by

explaining his relationship with Bullock, see United States v.

Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 322 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that "testiUNITED STATES v. CARO 45

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 45 of 69
mony that . . . Brown [had been] a confidential informant on

‘numerous occasions’ . . . was necessary to establish . . . a

basis on which to offer . . . opinion as to Brown’s character

for truthfulness"), and Bondurant’s statement that Bullock had

been a confidential informant did nothing more.22

B.

We next review the exclusion of certain information about

Sandoval. Caro has suggested that Sandoval might have targeted him and intentionally provoked a scuffle. Anticipating

this argument, the government moved in limine to exclude

evidence that Sandoval was placed in the SHU after being

found carrying a shank. The district court denied the motion,

reasoning that such evidence could be relevant to Sandoval’s

alleged "motive for being placed in the prison’s Special Housing Unit where he would likely be celled together with

[Caro]." J.A. 550. Notwithstanding, the court warned that

Caro "might not be able to lay a proper foundation for the relevancy of this evidence." J.A. 550-51. Caro waited until the

sentencing hearing to offer information about why Sandoval

was placed in the SHU. The district court excluded this information, however, because Caro had laid no foundation for its

relevance.

Because this decision was made during the sentencing hearing, we apply 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) rather than normal rules of

evidence. Although usually more generous than normal evidentiary rules, § 3593(c) likewise requires that information be

relevant to some mitigating or aggravating factor. We agree

that Caro never laid any foundation for his theory that Sandoval was following a plan to gain access to Caro. Caro points

to nothing in the record to support this theory, and we could

22Caro argues that testimony giving details about Bullock’s assistance

to prison officials violated Rule 608(b). Such testimony, however, came

not from Bondurant but from Bullock himself. And Caro never objected

to Bullock’s testimony. 

46 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 46 of 69
find nothing. Moreover, the information offered does not

appear relevant to any sentencing factor. We thus conclude

that the district court’s exclusion of that information was not

an abuse of discretion.

C.

Finally, we review the exclusion of Caro’s offer to plead

guilty. Hoping to rebut the alleged non-statutory factor of lack

of remorse, Caro sought to present at sentencing a letter he

had written to the government offering to plead guilty. Caro

explained, "[W]e would like . . . for the jury to know that Mr.

Caro was willing to accept responsibility for his conduct, and

accept a life sentence." J.A. 1313. The government objected

under Federal Rule of Evidence 410.23 The district court then

excluded the letter as irrelevant and "for the reasons stated by

the Government." J.A. 1314.

Caro contends that the district court erred for two separate

reasons. First, he argues that the letter was admissible under

§ 3593(c) because it supported the mitigating factor of acceptance of responsibility. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) ("The defendant may present any information relevant to a mitigating

factor."). He claims to have proceeded to trial only because

the government rejected his offer. Second, Caro argues that

his due process "right of fair rebuttal" required admitting the

letter to rebut the alleged non-statutory aggravating factor of

lack of remorse. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1,

5 n.1 (1986) ("Where the prosecution specifically relies on a

prediction of future dangerousness in asking for the death

penalty . . . the defendant [must] be afforded an opportunity

to introduce evidence on this point . . . [given] the elemental

23Rule 410 provides that, with two exceptions, "any statement made in

the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty

later withdrawn" is "not . . . admissible against the defendant who made

the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions." Fed. R. Evid. 410(4).

UNITED STATES v. CARO 47

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 47 of 69
due process requirement that a defendant not be sentenced to

death on the basis of information which he had no opportunity

to deny or explain." (internal quotations omitted)).

The government responds by arguing that a failed plea

negotiation does not show acceptance of responsibility or

rebut alleged lack of remorse. Caro’s letter offering to plead

guilty requested a promise not to seek the death penalty.

Because Caro’s letter was calculated to persuade the government not to seek the death penalty, rather than expressing

unqualified remorse, we cannot agree with Caro’s argument

that the letter shows acceptance of responsibility. Therefore,

we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion or

violated due process by excluding it as irrelevant.24 See Owens

v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399, 420 (6th Cir. 2008) (indicating that

a conditional plea offer does not show acceptance of responsibility).

IX. Cumulative Error

Finally, Caro argues that cumulative error warrants reversal. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03

(1973) (finding that exclusion of critical evidence coupled

with inability to cross-examine violated due process by denying a fair trial). "Pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine, the

cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless errors

24In addition, Caro challenges the district court’s denial of his motion

for allocution (unsworn testimony without cross-examination) prior to sentencing. Caro moved for allocution under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Sixth

Amendment. We have said that neither Rule 32 nor the Constitution provides a "right to make an unsworn statement of remorse before the jury

which was not subject to cross examination" during a capital sentencing.

United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 820 (4th Cir. 2000). Accordingly,

the decision of whether to allow the allocution fell within the district

court’s discretion. Because the court could reasonably have concluded that

such information would be unduly prejudicial, confusing, or misleading

under § 3593(c), we see no abuse of discretion. 

48 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 48 of 69
has the potential to prejudice a defendant to the same extent

as a single reversible error." Basham, 561 F.3d at 330 (internal quotations omitted). "To satisfy this requirement, such

errors must so fatally infect the trial that they violated the

trial’s fundamental fairness." Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Although we recognized several possible errors, they were

not widespread or prejudicial enough to have fatally infected

Caro’s trial or sentencing hearing. The proceeding below

adhered to fundamental fairness. Each aggravating factor

determined by the jury was well supported by the record.

Finally, we cannot see how cumulative error could have

caused the jury to weigh sentencing factors any differently.

For the reasons explained above, we

AFFIRM.

UNITED STATES v. CARO 49

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 49 of 69
Volume 2 of 2

UNITED STATES v. CARO 51

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 50 of 69
GREGORY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Today the majority blesses with constitutional imprimatur

a death sentence that could only have been imposed after the

jury found that Carlos Caro had previously been convicted of

relatively minor, nonviolent drug offenses. If his sentence is

ultimately carried out, Caro might well be the first, and as yet

only, defendant executed after a jury found him death-eligible

solely due to this type of nonviolent conduct. To reach this

result, the majority applies the wrong test for deciding

whether eligibility factors sufficiently narrow the class of

defendants who can be executed and renders an important

step in capital jurisprudence virtually useless. In doing so, my

colleagues uphold statutory provisions that distinguish those

who live from those who die in a wholly arbitrary and capricious way. I respectfully dissent.1

I.

At the outset, it is important to be clear about what conduct

the eligibility factors in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592(c)(10) and (12)

cover and how those subsections apply to Caro. Subsection

ten provides that a convicted murderer is eligible for death if

that defendant "has previously been convicted of 2 or more

State or Federal offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year, committed on different occasions, involving the distribution of a controlled substance."

§ 3592(c)(10). Subsection twelve makes a convicted murderer

death-eligible if "[t]he defendant had previously been convicted of violating title II or III of the Comprehensive Drug

Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 for which a sentence of 5 or more years may be imposed." § 3592(c)(12).

Titles II and III, as amended, prescribe five-or-more years in

prison for, among other things, simple possession of "a mix1My dissent is limited to the judgment and the majority’s holding in

Part IV that the eligibility factors in this case pass Eighth Amendment

scrutiny. I concur with the rest of the Court’s analysis. 

52 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 51 of 69
ture or substance which contains cocaine base," 21 U.S.C.

§ 844(a), and distribution of controlled substances, including

possession with intent to distribute, § 841.

It is clear from the statute’s structure that Congress

intended to target relatively minor drug offenders for deatheligibility, and not simply the worst of the worst. Congress

could have crafted eligibility factors that covered the worst

offenders — those, for example, who operate through violence and intimidation, drug kingpins, and those who target

children and schools — in fact, Congress did so in other parts

of the FDPA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(1) (authorizing death

for a defendant who was part of a "continuing criminal enterprise" to distribute drugs), § 3591(b)(2) (authorizing death for

the leader of a drug conspiracy who kills or attempts to kill

a public officer, juror, or witness to further the conspiracy),

§ 3592(c)(13) (authorizing death for murder defendants who

were part of a continuing enterprise to distribute drugs to

minors). But in subsections ten and twelve, Congress opted to

target offenders at the bottom of the drug-offender ladder:

individuals convicted of crimes carrying prison sentences as

low as one year; street-level distributors, drug mules, and

even some possessors.

Caro was precisely this kind of low-level, nonviolent

offender. He was a drug mule, recruited by his father and

uncles at a young age to smuggle drugs across the border

from Mexico, who in the process was twice convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana and once of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Caro was by no means

a high-ranking member of a drug conspiracy and by all

accounts was never violent before going to prison. Under the

FDPA, however, Caro’s drug history is sufficient to make him

eligible for death in the absence of any other aggravating factor relating to his character or crime. This is unacceptable

under the Eighth Amendment and the majority is wrong to

find otherwise.

UNITED STATES v. CARO 53

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 52 of 69
II.

The majority first errs by fundamentally misconstruing the

nature and purpose of statutory eligibility factors in the death

penalty schema. It claims that eligibility factors are constitutional so long as they do not apply to every murder defendant

and so long as they are supported by some conceivable legislative goal. Maj. Op. at 26-28. By substituting rational basis

review for the appropriate Eighth Amendment analysis, the

majority glosses over the very serious way in which the eligibility factors challenged by Caro fail to narrow the class of

death-eligible offenders in the way required by the Constitution.

Under the Eighth Amendment, only the government’s interest in deterring and punishing violence implicates its interest

in imposing the death penalty. Consequently, to perform their

constitutionally required narrowing function, eligibility factors must limit the jury’s focus to the defendant’s violent conduct. Because the factors challenged here plainly do not do so,

they cannot be the basis for Caro’s death sentence.

A.

By now it is axiomatic in capital jurisprudence that "where

discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave

as the determination of whether a human life should be taken

or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited

so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious

action." Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980)

(plurality) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189

(1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).

Statutory eligibility factors "play a constitutionally necessary

function" in this process by "circumscrib[ing] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." Zant v. Stephens, 462

U.S. 862, 878 (1983).

In order for eligibility factors to serve this constitutional

function, they must "adequately differentiate . . . in an objec54 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 53 of 69
tive, even-handed, and substantively rational way" those

whom a jury may consider for death and those whom it may

not. Id. at 879; see Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993)

(aggravating factors must distinguish defendant sentenced to

death from others convicted of murder in a "principled" way);

Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (eligibility

factors are "a means of genuinely narrowing the class of

death-eligible persons"); Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433 (invalidating death sentence based upon eligibility factor where "[t]here

is no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the

death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it

was not").

The Supreme Court has helped illustrate the narrowing process, and statutory eligibility factors’ role within it, by

describing it as a pyramid. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 870-71; Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 716-18 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). At the first point above the base of this pyramid lies

the specific category of crimes for which the legislature, and

subsequently the jury, may prescribe death. Zant, 462 U.S. at

871. As the law stands today, this category is limited to murder or other crimes that result in the death of the victim. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2665 (2008) ("Difficulties

in administering the penalty to ensure against its arbitrary and

capricious application require adherence to a rule reserving its

use . . . for crimes that take the life of the victim."). At the

pyramid’s apex is the particular crime for which a jury ultimately sentences a defendant to die. Zant, 462 U.S. at 871. In

order to move from the base to the apex, however, a defendant must pass through the eligibility plane.

In that eligibility plane, a jury must decide whether legislatively prescribed factors exist that separate murderers generally from death-eligible murderers. Id. Importantly, where a

jury convicts a defendant of murder but does not convict him

of special circumstances or aggravating factors in conjunction

with that murder, then that defendant does not move from the

base to the apex and therefore cannot be constitutionally exeUNITED STATES v. CARO 55

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 54 of 69
cuted. Id. at 878 (aggravating factors, which move the defendant from the base to the second plane, are "constitutionally

necessary"); see Arave, 507 U.S. at 474 (aggravating factors

are constitutionally infirm if they apply "to every defendant

eligible for the death penalty" (emphasis in original)).

B.

Properly framed, the question raised by Caro’s appeal is

whether the two aggravating factors found by the jury are

constitutionally sufficient to move him from the base to the

apex, or whether the aggravators so fail to distinguish him

from other defendants that they are not constitutionally significant. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 879. The factors here fail to sufficiently distinguish Caro from the general offender population

because they do not involve violence.

A review of Supreme Court jurisprudence illustrates why

only the nature or extent of a defendant’s violent conduct can

be a basis for moving him up the death penalty pyramid. We

know, for instance, that because the death penalty is a punishment different in-kind in its severity and finality from other

punishments, it is warranted only to the extent that it punishes

conduct that is itself fundamentally distinct from other crimes

— hence the aphorism "death is different." Lockett v. Ohio,

438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Furman v. Georgia,

408 U.S. 238, 287-88 (Brennan, J., concurring), 306 (Stewart,

J., concurring) (1972). How the death penalty is imposed must

be tailored to the unique penological goals that justify the

state’s extraordinary power to take human life in the first

instance.

When the state renounces a defendant’s humanity by putting him to death, Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring), it does so only to deter potential defendants from

renouncing that humanity in others and to express appropriate

moral outrage at the disrespect the condemned defendant has

56 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 55 of 69
shown towards human life by extinguishing it, e.g., Kennedy,

128 S. Ct. at 2661-62; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 483 (joint opinion

of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Only violence — specifically that which results in another’s death — implicates the

state’s interest in imposing capital punishment in the first

instance. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2661-62. It follows that if the

state’s interest in imposing death is implicated initially by

violence, then the constitutionally required narrowing function used to select the most deserving to receive that sentence

must focus on the relative severity of that violent crime or

past conduct. In other words, for the state’s interest to be sufficient to impose death — to move from the base at which the

interest is first implicated to the apex where the interest is sufficiently acute — the condemned’s conduct must be sufficiently aggravated by concurrent or past violence. Eligibility

factors must focus on this interest in order to narrow the

jury’s discretion in a genuine and "substantively rational

way." Zant, 462 U.S. at 879.

This is clear when considering those aggravators that distinguish offenders by the nature of their specific offense, as

opposed to the factors here that focus on the defendant’s past

conduct or behavior. The former must show that the defendant

used violence in a particularly horrible way that is not typical

even to murder. See id. at 877; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433. The

resulting eligibility factors distinguish murderers based on

whether their violent acts were committed for particularly

abhorrent reasons, e.g., § 3592(c)(8) (murder committed for

pecuniary gain), whether those acts were committed in a particularly horrible way, e.g., § 3592(c)(6) ("especially heinous,

cruel, or depraved" conduct), § 3592(c)(5) (grave risk of danger to multiple victims), or whether those acts targeted individuals who deserve added protection from violence, e.g.,

§ 3592 (c)(11) (vulnerable victims), § 3592(c)(14)(D) (law

enforcement officials and police officers). Each of these categories distinguish defendants on the basis of their violent conduct, and not external factors — like whether the defendant

unrelatedly had a bag of cocaine in his car at the time of the

UNITED STATES v. CARO 57

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 56 of 69
murder or whether the defendant was contemporaneously

delinquent in filing his tax returns — that have no bearing on

the defendant’s culpability for capital punishment purposes.

The same logic applies to aggravators that distinguish

death-eligible defendants based on their prior conduct. Priorconduct eligibility factors must show that a murder defendant

is more violent than other murder defendants in order to justify imposing death on that defendant. Otherwise, that eligibility cannot be said to distinguish defendants in a "substantively

rational" way. Zant, 462 U.S. at 879.

This rule is most consistent with how the states and federal

government generally use prior-conduct factors to distinguish

defendants. The most common prior-conduct aggravators in

death penalty statutes are prior convictions for murder or

other violent felonies.2 Indeed, the other aggravators in the

FDPA that relate to a defendant’s history and character all

involve prior convictions for violent crimes. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3592(c)(2) (prior conviction for violent felony involving a

firearm), (3) (prior conviction for crime that resulted in death

of another person), (4) (prior conviction of serious offense

resulting in death or serious bodily injury). Except when it

comes to drug offenses, the states and federal government

agree that prior, nonviolent conduct is insufficient to make a

murder defendant death-eligible. It is this rule, not its exception embraced by the majority today, which comports with the

Eighth Amendment.

C.

Rather than revamp the entire capital-sentencing structure

developed by the Supreme Court over the last four decades,

I would find that Caro’s death sentence violates the Eighth

2

See The Death Penalty Information Center, Aggravating Factors for

Capital Punishment by State (2009), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/

aggravating-factors-capital-punishment-state. 

58 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 57 of 69
Amendment because the eligibility factors under which the

jury sentenced him fail to narrow the class of offenders eligible for death in a "principled" or "substantively rational" way.

See Arave, 507 U.S. at 474; Zant, 462 U.S. at 879. Caro was

a low-level drug mule, convicted of possession with intent to

distribute marijuana and cocaine. These convictions do not

distinguish him from other murderers in a constitutionallysignificant way because they do not implicate the state’s qualitatively different interest in taking human life to deter future

violence or impose retribution for escalating violence resulting in murder. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2661-62; Gregg,

428 U.S. at 483 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The government’s interest in punishing minor drug

offenders is different in-kind from its interest in punishing the

most violent and heinous murderers and therefore does not

usefully distinguish Caro from other murderers. The same

would be true were Caro or any other defendant made deatheligible for tax evasion, wire fraud, or driving while under the

influence; none of this prior, nonviolent conduct would implicate the government’s interest in the death penalty and therefore would not constitutionally narrow the class of deatheligible offenders.

The majority disagrees. Instead of holding that any eligibility factor relating to a defendant’s history or prior conduct

must involve violence, the majority subjects the factors at

issue here to rational basis review. Maj. Op. at 26-28. But

rational basis scrutiny has no bearing on whether or not a statutory provision complies with the Eighth Amendment. As the

Supreme Court recently explained:

[R]ational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we

have used when evaluating laws under constitutional

commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws. In those cases, "rational basis" is not just

the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of

the constitutional guarantee. Obviously, the same

test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which

UNITED STATES v. CARO 59

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 58 of 69
a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated

right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee

against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the

right to keep and bear arms.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 n.27

(2008) (internal citations omitted). Rational basis, therefore,

cannot be used to evaluate whether a statutory provision complies with the specific proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment.3

In holding otherwise, the majority effectively avoids the

Eighth Amendment problem by pretending that Eighth

Amendment standards do not apply. Rather than require the

government to show that the FDPA suitably narrows a jury’s

discretion in a way that advances capital punishment’s legitimate goals, the majority demands that Caro rebut every rea3The majority apparently confuses the Eighth Amendment’s requirement to review death sentences for arbitrariness with rational basis review.

Maj. Op. at 28. This is a clear mistake. 

Rational basis is a term of art; a method by which courts review almost

all state action to ensure that there is at least some conceivable, nondiscriminatory or rational purpose for that action. See United States v.

Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938). The Eighth Amendment’s arbitrary-and-capricious review is quite different. When reviewing

a death sentence under the Eighth Amendment, a court looks to whether

the sentence was imposed under conditions that create a substantial risk

that the decision to execute a defendant was reached arbitrarily and capriciously. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Essentially, rational basis review is the opposite of arbitraryand-capricious review. The former assumes that the government is acting

appropriately and will accept almost any explanation to support that

assumption. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153. The latter places the

burden on the state to show that where it decides to take a human being’s

life, it has reached that decision in the most scrupulous and principled way

possible. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2665 ("In most cases justice is not

better served by terminating the life of the perpetrator rather than confining him"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and

Stevens, JJ.). 

60 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 59 of 69
son for these eligibility factors that is conceivably related to

a legislative goal, no matter how attenuated from the limited

interests that justify the state’s executing a human being. The

majority recognizes the Eighth Amendment requirement that

eligibility factors genuinely and substantively narrow deatheligible defendants, but it robs this requirement of meaning by

declaring that any factor is sufficient so long as there is some

plausible legislative consideration behind it. This renders the

Eighth Amendment rhetoric without content.4

In practice, the rule proposed by the majority today transforms the pyramid created by the Supreme Court into a rhombus, in which eligibility factors serve no narrowing function

whatever. Though it concedes that the eligibility factors here

do not involve violence, the majority insists that they survive

its limited, deferential review because drug offenses are "associated with violence." Maj. Op. at 27. It is hardly clear what

it means to be associated with violence, but whatever it does

mean, the associated-with-violence test cannot be a genuinely

narrowing construct in practice. Among the many factors considered by those in the psychiatric and public-health fields to

be "associated with violence" are: fire-setting, truancy, family

conflict, recent humiliation, history of bullying or being bul4The majority’s unabashed embrace of this position is startling. It

admits, as it must, that in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment,

statutory aggravating factors must "genuinely narrow the class of persons

eligible for the death penalty," but in the same paragraph chastises me for

"presuppos[ing] that each statutory aggravating factor standing alone must

narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty to include only

those who deserve a death sentence." Maj. Op. at 28 n.16 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The logical inconsistency in this statement is obvious. If the Supreme Court says that aggravating factors must

genuinely narrow the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty, it

is hardly a great presupposition to conclude that the factors, themselves,

must narrow in accordance with the Eighth Amendment. The majority can

insist all it wants that the aggravating factors here "plainly" satisfy the ad

hoc standard it invents today, but it cannot pretend that its standard is

derived from the Eighth Amendment or flows from the decisions of the

Supreme Court. 

UNITED STATES v. CARO 61

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 60 of 69
lied, poverty, unstructured time, and community disorganization.5

 How can the majority reasonably argue that any of the

above factors could serve as statutory eligibility factors? If the

majority admits, which it must, that eligibility factors must

perform at least some narrowing function, surely its

associated-with-violence test must fail.

Likewise, the majority claims that the eligibility factors

before us today are justified by the government’s interest in

punishing recidivists. Who could doubt, the majority asks,

that Congress could reasonably decide that repeat offenders

deserve harsher treatment than first-timers? Maj. Op. at

27-28. This very question, though, conflates the government’s

general interest in deterring socially detrimental conduct with

its interest in deterring death-eligible conduct. Recidivism in

the abstract of course justifies escalating punishment. But the

"death is different" principle underlying all capital jurisprudence illustrates that conduct must be different in kind, not

just degree in order to trigger the government’s interest in putting a defendant to death. See, e.g., Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.

This is precisely why we are charged with analyzing death

penalty claims under the Eighth Amendment and not generalized rational basis review. Nonviolent drug recidivists, like all

other nonviolent, repeat offenders do not meet that Eighth

Amendment criterion.

5New York State Office of Mental Health, Violence Prevention: Risk

Factors, http://www.omh.state.ny.us/omhweb/sv/risk.htm. See Erica

Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 Cardozo L. Rev.

1845, 1867-68 (2003) (listing mental illness, family dysfunction, poverty,

and living in high crime or urban areas as potential risk factors for violence and then explaining that the presence of a risk factor does little to

predict whether or not an individual with that risk factor will actually be

violent in the future). 

62 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 61 of 69
III.

Because the majority applies a test that in no way narrows

the class of death-eligible offenders, the result is a sentence

reached without properly distinguishing Caro from all other

murderers. But of all the non-violent offenses the government

could have chosen to distinguish death-eligible defendants,

drug offenses create perhaps the greatest risk that a defendant

will be executed arbitrarily.

A.

It has long been settled that a death penalty provision that

applies to a vast offender population but is applied inconsistently or sparingly violates the proscription against cruel and

unusual punishment. E.g., Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433 (plurality); Furman, 408 U.S. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring), 276

(Brennan, J., concurring), 309 (Stewart, J., concurring), 312

(White, J., concurring), 366 (Marshall, J., concurring). This is

so largely because when the government selects so few

offenders from such a large pool for execution, it cannot further its legitimate penological interests; instead it merely

inflicts gratuitous pain and suffering. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at

183 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see

also Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1551 (2008) (Stevens, J.,

concurring).

According to a Department of Justice report, 54 percent of

federal inmates in 2007 were in prison for nonviolent drug

offenses6 — by far the highest percentage of offenders in any

category.7 That same report also found that nearly 20 percent

6The Report does not explicitly state that the drug offenders are nonviolent; however, the report does distinguish miscellaneous, violent offenders

from drug offenders and organizes the statistics by most serious offenses,

illustrating that the drug offenders were very likely nonviolent. 

7Heather C. West & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2007 App. 12

(2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p07.pdf. 

UNITED STATES v. CARO 63

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 62 of 69
of inmates in state prison were also there for drug crimes,8

 of

which 60 percent were low-level and nonviolent.9

Of all the nonviolent offenses Congress could have made

death eligible, it is clear, then, that it targeted the class of

offenses with the largest number of offenders. And when

these reports are viewed in conjunction with the 8.6 million

people who reported using crack cocaine as of 2007,10 and the

number of persons convicted of applicable drug offenses who

are no longer in prison, the eligibility factors used to make

Caro death-eligible potentially apply to several million people. This makes subsections ten and twelve functionally

catchall provisions, which a prosecutor can choose to use or

not use arbitrarily and in a way that leads to "standardless sentencing discretion." See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Even if they could theoretically be applied reasonably,

courts and juries use the factors so rarely that they gravely

risk doing so arbitrarily in practice. The government cites to

one case in which an appellate court previously upheld a

death sentence under subsection (c)(10). See United States v.

Bolden, 545 F.3d 609, 617 (8th Cir. 2008). I am aware of only

one other case in which a defendant was sentenced to die after

a jury found him death-eligible under the provisions challenged by Caro. See United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 295

(4th Cir. 2003). In both Bolden and Higgs, however, the jury

also found that the defendants were eligible under other provisions, and not just because of prior nonviolent drug offenses.

8

Id. at App. 11. 

9Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, A 25 Year Quagmire: The War on

Drugs and its Impact on American Society 2 (2007), available at

http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp_25yearquagmire.

pdf. 

10National Institute of Drug Abuse, NIDA InfoFacts: Crack and

Cocaine 4 (2009), http://www.drugabuse.gov/pdf/infofacts/ Cocaine09.

pdf. 

64 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 63 of 69
That, to the best of my knowledge, makes Caro the only

defendant who was deemed death eligible only under one or

both of these FDPA provisions.

The result is the same when considering any analogous

state law provisions. By my count, only two states, Louisiana

and New Hampshire, have provisions that arguably apply as

broadly as the FDPA’s;11 yet I am aware of no case in which

either of those states’ courts considered a death sentence for

an offender who was selected for death eligibility because of

a prior nonviolent drug conviction.

The government, therefore, cannot claim that executing

Caro will further its legitimate interests in deterrence or retribution. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649-50. Low-level drug

offenders are so rarely selected for death and ultimately executed for their prior offenses alone that the FDPA cannot be

said to deter them from murder. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 311

(White, J., concurring). Likewise, murderers are so infrequently and inconsistently selected to die on the bases

asserted here that it is "very doubtful that any existing general

need for retribution would be measurably satisfied" by Caro’s

execution. Id. Executing Caro would therefore be "the pointless and needless execution of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes." Id. It

11N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:1 (2009); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

905.4(A)(11) (2009). The one case of which I am aware in which the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted its provision, it did so only in the context

of a capital defendant who killed during the course of a drug deal and not

a defendant who was made death-eligible for a past offense. See Louisiana

v. Neal, 796 So. 2d 649, 661 (La. 2001). 

Furthermore, Florida authorizes a defendant’s prior drug conviction,

carrying a sentence of more than one year, to be used as a statutory aggravator, but only if the defendant’s underlying capital conviction was for

drug trafficking. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.142(6)(b) (LexisNexis 2009). This

provision is almost surely unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s

decision in Kennedy. See 128 S. Ct. at 2665. 

UNITED STATES v. CARO 65

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 64 of 69
would consequently be irreconcilable with the Eighth Amendment.

B.

The inherent arbitrariness in subsections ten and twelve is

exacerbated by the way in which they can work to prevent a

jury from giving meaningful consideration to relevant, mitigating evidence. Our justice system, reflecting broader concerns of society at-large, takes an often ambivalent view of

minor drug offenders; one that recognizes their criminality but

simultaneously accepts their own victimhood. Because drug

offenses can so often be part-and-parcel of otherwise mitigating circumstances, making these offenses eligibility factors

limits a defendant’s ability to present mitigating evidence and

increases the likelihood of an arbitrary sentence.

Not only must a capital defendant be allowed to present

mitigating evidence at his sentencing, but the jury must be

able to give meaningful effect to that evidence. Abdul-Kabir

v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 262 (2007); Penry v. Lynaugh,

492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Atkins

v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Courts must closely scrutinize evidence that can be used as a "two-edged sword" against

a capital defendant, i.e., mitigating evidence that a jury might

also consider aggravating, to ensure that juries can give

appropriately mitigating weight to that evidence. AbdulKabir, 550 U.S. at 255; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573

(2005) (abolishing death penalty for juveniles, in part because

juries might inappropriately consider youth an aggravating,

rather than a mitigating factor); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (creating a bright-line rule barring execution of mentally retarded,

in part because of the risk that juries would consider evidence

of mental retardation aggravating, not mitigating).

A defendant’s history of drug abuse is classic mitigating

evidence, which the Supreme Court has held a jury must be

able to consider and give effect to when sentencing a defen66 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 65 of 69
dant. E.g., Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1784 (2009). Likewise, evidence that a defendant was induced into criminal

behavior at a young age by close relatives is precisely the type

of "troubled childhood" evidence to which jurors must be

allowed to give meaningful, mitigating effect. See AbdulKabir, 550 U.S. at 262. Indeed, the FDPA itself acknowledges

specifically that juveniles induced into drug trafficking by

adults are victims who are presumably less blameworthy for

their conduct. See § 3592(d)(7) (making it an aggravating factor to use minors in drug trafficking).

Jurors in Caro’s case could not be expected to give meaningful effect to Caro’s drug use and troubled background

because they were forced to consider both as the reasons he

should be death-eligible in the first place. The record reveals

that Caro was a cocaine addict12 and that he dropped out of

school to become a drug mule at his father and uncles’ behest.

Caro’s attorneys were therefore faced with a modern Sophie’s

Choice: either forcefully present this evidence, thereby

emphasizing to the jurors the basis for which they selected

Caro for death-eligibility, or hardly mention the evidence at

all to avoid further aggravating Caro’s crime in the jurors’

eyes.

It is rare, indeed, that an attorney’s decision not to present

or emphasize mitigating evidence can truly be characterized

as a strategic choice. But here it is not surprising that Caro’s

lawyers opted to focus on Caro’s future dangerousness to the

jury, rather than his drug addiction or his early introduction

to drug smuggling by his father and uncles. Even if his lawyers had emphasized it, at best, the jury could not be expected

to give any meaningful effect to the same evidence that aggravated Caro’s crime to death-eligible murder. At worst the evidence would have only reinforced their initial finding that

Caro was worthy of the ultimate punishment. Caro’s sentence

12It does not appear in the record whether Caro was addicted to cocaine

powder or cocaine base. 

UNITED STATES v. CARO 67

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 66 of 69
quite possibly was "imposed in spite of factors which may

[have] call[ed] for a less severe penalty," Lockett, 438 U.S. at

605, because the FDPA prevented the jury from considering

relevant, mitigating evidence. The risk that the resulting sentence was imposed arbitrarily "is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments." Id.

IV.

Today’s decision comes on the heels of an interesting

report regarding the state of capital punishment in this country, and particularly in our circuit. According to the report, the

number of death sentences handed down nationally over the

past year has decreased to the lowest level since the Supreme

Court reinstated capital punishment in 1976.13 This is particularly true in Virginia, which traditionally uses the death penalty more than all-but-one other state in the union.14

Among the reasons suggested for this phenomenon are the

response to recent Supreme Court decisions prohibiting executions for certain offender classes, jurors’ concerns about

executing innocent people, and legislative and prosecutorial

concerns about overusing the death penalty in the current economic climate.15 Ironically, one of the reasons given for the

reduction of death sentences in Virginia is that prosecutors are

increasingly not seeking death for drug-related murders —

apparently because they do not view these offenders as the

worst of the worst.16 This reduction in prosecutors’ pursuing

death sentences and juries’ imposing them has not correlated

13Robert Barnes & Maria Glod, Number of Death Sentences Falls to a

Historic Low, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 2009, available at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/17/ 

AR2009121704299.html. 

14Id.

15Id.

16Id.

68 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 67 of 69
with a similar reduction in executions, nor has it hampered the

states’ ability to execute the most heinous offenders.17

All of which suggests that the decades-long dialogue

between courts and the political branches about capital punishment is finally starting to achieve a constitutionallynecessary equilibrium; one that accommodates the government’s interest in punishing murderers and the Constitution’s

command that the government not do so arbitrarily. As the

judiciary has tried to implement the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment by requiring

that death sentences be imposed only after a process that

selects, in a non-arbitrary way, the worst-of-the-worst offenders, the political branches have responded by recalibrating

their notion of which offenders are death eligible and proceeding accordingly. The apparent upshot is that those

charged with the awesome power of seeking and imposing

death have sought to limit that power to those most deserving,

and in so doing, have made the death penalty more effective

and efficient, even as they have limited the class of offenders

to whom it may be applied.18

This decision threatens to undermine that constitutionally

necessary equilibrium. Carlos Caro’s death sentence was

imposed because he had previously committed relatively

minor, nonviolent drug crimes. Of all similarly situated defendants, it appears that only Caro now faces the prospect of

17See id.

18Despite the dramatic reduction in death sentences in Virginia, the last

person executed in the Commonwealth was put to death within six years

of his sentence and conviction. Josh White & Maria Glod, Muhammad

Executed for Sniper Killing, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 2009, available at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/10/

AR2009111001396.html. Conversely, since the Supreme Court reinstated

capital punishment, the average condemned inmate has spent over a

decade on death row before the sentence has been implemented. See The

Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death Row,

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row. 

UNITED STATES v. CARO 69

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 68 of 69
being executed after being chosen because of factors so completely divorced from the state’s legitimate penological interests in taking human life. Whatever Caro’s prior conduct says

about his character, under the Eighth Amendment, it cannot

serve as the sole reason for his death eligibility as compared

to other defendants. Even the government’s attorney had to

allow at oral argument that Caro’s sentence seemed "anachronistic" in light of evolving death penalty jurisprudence. Yet

the majority disagrees.

Justice Stewart spoke in Furman of the way in which some

"death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that

being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." 408 U.S. at

309 (Stewart, J., concurring). Thirty-eight years later, I can

think of no more apt way to describe Caro’s sentence. The

FDPA provisions that prescribe such a random and unprincipled sentence do not withstand Eighth Amendment scrutiny.

Had the majority applied that level of scrutiny, I have little

doubt that it would have reached the same conclusion. I

respectfully dissent.

70 UNITED STATES v. CARO

Appeal: 07-5 Doc: 140 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pg: 69 of 69