Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_13-cv-00901/USCOURTS-alnd-4_13-cv-00901-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
DM
Defendant
DeKalb County Board of Education
Plaintiff
Denita Manifold
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

DEKALB COUNTY BOARD OF

EDUCATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

DENITA MANIFOLD, as

Parent/Guardian of A.M., a minor,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 4:13-CV-901-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is an appeal by plaintiff DeKalb County Board of Education (“the

Board”) of an administrative due process hearing decision under the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act1(“IDEA”). (Doc. 1 at 1). In that decision, issued on March

19, 2012, Due Process Hearing Officer Steve Morton, Jr. (“hearing officer”) found in

favor of plaintiff Denita Manifold (“D.M.”) on several claims brought as guardian of

A.M., a minor, against the Board. (See Doc. 11-1 at 89).

The case is now before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment by

D.M. (doc. 47) and the Board (doc. 48). Each party has filed a response (doc. 49, 50)

1

. 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et. seq.

FILED

 2015 Jun-16 PM 02:39

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:13-cv-00901-VEH Document 53 Filed 06/16/15 Page 1 of 24
to the other’s motion for summary judgment and a brief (doc. 51, 52) replying to the

other’s response. Having considered the motions, briefs, and administrative record,

the court concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of defendant

D.M.2

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A. The IDEA

The statutorily defined purposes of IDEA are:

(1) 

(A) to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to

them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special

education and related services designed to meet their unique needs

and prepare them for further education, employment, and

independent living;

(B) to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and

parents of such children are protected; and

(C) to assist States, localities, educational service agencies, and

Federal agencies to provide for the education of all children with

disabilities;

(2) to assist States in the implementation of a statewide, comprehensive,

coordinated, multidisciplinary, interagency system of early intervention

services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families;

(3) to ensure that educators and parents have the necessary tools to

improve educational results for children with disabilities by supporting

2

 The case was reassigned to the undersigned on October 7, 2014, due to the prior judge’s

taking inactive senior status. (See, Order, Doc. 35).

2

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system improvement activities; coordinated research and personnel

preparation; coordinated technical assistance, dissemination, and

support; and technology development and media services; and 

(4) to assess, and ensure the effectiveness of, efforts to educate children

with disabilities.

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (emphasis supplied). See also Cory D. ex rel. Diane D. v. Burke

County School District, 285 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental

objective of the IDEA is to empower disabled children to reach their fullest potential

by providing a free education tailored to meet their individual needs.”).

A “child with a disability” is a child —

(I) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments (including

deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments

(including blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this

chapter as “emotional disturbance”), orthopedic impairments, autism,

traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning

disabilities; and

(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A). Every child with a disability is guaranteed a “free appropriate

public education” (FAPE), which means 

special education and related services that —

(A) have been provided at public expense, under public

supervision and direction, and without charge;

(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;

(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or

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secondary school education in the State involved; and

(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education

program required under section 1414(d) of this title.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).

“Special education” is defined as “specially designed instruction, at no cost to

parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability, including — (A)

instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and

in other settings; and (B) instruction in physical education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29).

“Related services” include:

transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive

services (including speech-language pathology and audiology services,

interpreting services, psychological services, physical and occupational

therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work

services, school nurse services designed to enable a child with a

disability to receive a free appropriate public education as described in

the individualized education program of the child, counseling services,

including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services,

and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for

diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a

child with a disability to benefit from special education, and includes the

early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(26). Each disabled student receiving special education and related

services receives an “Individualized Education Program” (IEP), which is “a written

statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in

accordance with section 1414(d)” of IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14).

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B. Administrative And Judicial Review

Any party who has a complaint regarding a local education agency’s provision

of a FAPE to a disabled child may file a complaint with the local education agency

or state education agency, and that party will be entitled to an impartial

administrative due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6)(A) &

1415(f)(1)(A). “The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP

is properly placed upon the party seeking relief.” Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast

546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005).

Any party aggrieved by the administrative decision of a due process hearing

officer may file a civil action in the nature of an appeal in a United States District

Court within 90 days. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) & (B). In such an action, the court—

(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings;

(ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and

(iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant

such relief as the court determines is appropriate.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).

In considering the administrative record and any other evidence submitted, the

district court does not apply the usual Rule 56 summary judgment standards. Loren F.

ex rel. Fisher v. Atlanta Independent School System, 349 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir.

2003) (“[T]he usual F. R. Civ. P. 56 summary judgment principles do not apply in an

5

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IDEA case.”). Instead,

“summary judgment [in IDEA cases] has been deemed appropriate even

when facts are in dispute, and is based on a preponderance of the

evidence.”BethB. v. VanClay, 282 F.3d 493, 496 n. 2 (7thCir. 2002).That

iswhy the district court’s decision “is perhaps better described asjudgment

on the record.” Id.; see also Slama v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2580, 259 F.

Supp. 2d 880, 882 (D. Minn. 2003)(On motion forjudgment on the record

in an IDEA suit, the district court “maymake a decision on themerits, even

ifthere exist, upon the stipulated [r]ecord, disputed issues ofmaterialfact”)

(citation omitted).

Fisher, 349 F.3d at 1313 (alterations in original).

TheEleventhCircuit hassummarized the appropriate standard for a district court’s

review of an administrative hearing officer’s IDEA decision as follows:

Whether an educational programprovided an adequate education underthe

Act “is a mixed question of law and factsubject to de novo review.” CP v.

Leon County Sch. Bd. Fla., 483 F.3d 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing

Sch.Bd. v.K.C., 285 F.3d 977, 982-83 (11thCir. 2002)). “Specific findings

of fact are reviewed for clear error.” Id. (citing K.C., 285 F.3d at 983). “To

the extent that this issue involves the interpretation of a federal statute, it

is a question of law which we review de novo.” Id. (citing Walker County

Sch. Dist. v.Bennett ex rel.Bennett, 203 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11thCir. 2000)).

Draper v. Atlanta Independent School System, 518 F.3d 1275, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

Within that framework, the district court “has discretion to determine the level of

deference it will give to the ALJ’sfindings.” CP, 483 F.3d at 1156 n.4 (citing K.C., 285

F.3d at 983).

If the district court finds a violation of IDEA, it also has “‘broad discretion’” to

fashion an appropriate remedy. Draper, 518 F.3d at 1284 (quoting School Committee of

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Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985)).

III. DEFECTS IN THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

Before reaching the substance of the dispute, the court notesthat the Board failed

to file any of the evidentiary materials cited in its motion for summary judgment along

with the motion. This violates the court’s order on January 7, 2015, which states the

following requirement for summary judgment motions,

The parties must file with the Clerk of Court, simultaneously with their

briefs, all evidentiary materials (e.g., affidavits, exhibits, depositions, or

other products of discovery) relied upon in support of or opposition to

summary judgmentmotions except thosematerialsincluded in themoving

party’s initial evidentiary submission may be referenced by any party

opposing the motion.

(Doc. 43 at 7). The order also stated “Except for good cause shown, briefs and

evidentiary materials that do not conform to the following requirements may be

stricken.” (Id. at 2).

3

Even more significantly, there are substantial deficiencies in the citations given

by the Board in its motion for summary judgment. The Board cites most often to the

administrative record (see, e.g., Doc. 48-1 at 1 ¶ 1 (citing to “AR 2679-2680")), which

it earlier filed with the court (Doc. 24). However, the motion also hasrepeated citations

3

 The entire administrative record was filed into the record on April 15, 2014. (Doc. 24).

However, the administrative record is nearly 4,000 pages and subdivided into 57 documents.

(See Doc. 24-1 through 24-57). Therefore, the court does not consider this previous filing to be

an acceptable substitute that satisfies the requirement laid out in the January 7, 2015 order.

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to some otherset of materials marked as “Tr.”

4

It is not apparent to the court what “Tr.”

is or whetherit has even been filed,making it impossible forthe court to evaluate several

of the plaintiff’s claims. On account of its failure to comply with the court’s January 7,

2015, order, and repeated serious defects in its citation to evidence, the Board’s brief in

support of its motion for summary judgment

5

is due to be STRUCK.

6

IV. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

7

A. D.M.’s Due Process Complaints

D.M. filed a complaint for due process on August 18, 2011. She alleged that the

Board denied A.M. a free, appropriate public education (“FAPE”) under the IDEA.

Specifically, she contended that the Board had

4

 (See, e.g., Doc. 48-1 at 10 ¶ 62 (citing to “Tr. 1467" as well as “AR 3760-3777), and at

17 (citing to “Tr. 2060")). 

5

 This applies only to the brief in support of the Board’s motion for summary judgment.

(Doc. 48-1). The court will still consider the Board’s response to D.M.’s motion for summary

judgment. (Doc. 50).

6

 However, the court has reviewed the arguments in the Board’s motion and notes that

they address the same issues as D.M.’s motion for summary judgment, merely arguing for the

opposite conclusion. Therefore, striking the Board’s motion for summary judgment does not

result in any arguments in this case going unaddressed.

7

 This statement of material facts is based upon the court’s review of the parties’ filings

and evidence. Contrary to its usual practice, the court will not address individual statements of

fact provided in the parties’ briefs, for several reasons. First, the plaintiff’s “statements of fact”

often are actually arguments or legal conclusions. (See, e.g., Doc. 48-1 at 4 ¶ 23, Doc. 50 at 15 ¶

74) . Second, the plaintiff’s “additional undisputed facts,” of which there are 78, repeat many

(but not all) of the statements verbatim from the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (See,

e.g., Doc. 48-1 at 2 ¶ 9-13 and Doc. 50 at 6 ¶ 9-12).

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(1) failed to develop and implement an IEP that complied with state and

federal law;

(2) failed to consider A.M.'s guardian as an equal participant in the

development of A.M.'s educational program;

(3) failed to provide A.M. with assistive devices to allow her to

communicate with teachers and peers;

(4) failed to provide A.M. with an oral interpreter;

(5) failed to implementthe recommendationsin the assistive technology

report dated June 29, 2011;

(6) failed to equip A.M.'sschool with a phone with close captioning for

A.M. to communicate with her parents and legal guardian if

necessary;

(7) failed to provide A.M. with a safe environment free from bullying

and harassment;

(8) failed to continue to provide A.M. with occupational therapy; and,

(9) failed to understand the role of special education for children who

have disabilities and legal procedures required for its

implementation.

D.M. amended her due process complaint on July 26, 2012 to add as an additional

violation thattheBoard had not providedA.M.with computer-aided realtime translation

(“CART”) or other similar speech-to-text technology in every class, between classes,

during assemblies, and/or during emergencies. She filed a second due process complaint

due to the Board’s failure to implement the April 10, 2012 assistive technology report.

That complaint was consolidated with the underlying due process complaint thatserves

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as the basis of this appeal. A hearing was conducted over a period of twelve

non-consecutive days from November 15, 2011 through December 18, 2012. B .

A.M.’s Difficulties In School

A.M. is enrolled in the DeKalb County School System. Dennis G. Pappas, Jr.,

M.D. diagnosed A.M. with progressive sensorineural hearing loss and a history of

chronic otitis media. She has been a patient of Dr. Pappassince she wasthree years old.

Dr. Pappas stated that A.M. “meets the legal definition of deafness” and that “she has

always demonstrated a profound sensorineural hearing loss, profound by definition.” At

an appointment on February 13, 2012, Dr. Pappa noted that A.M. had regressed in her

ability to discriminate speech. She had a forty percent understanding score with the use

of her hearing aids, meaning thatshe did not understand sixty percent of what was said.

A.M. relies on lip reading and facial expressions to communicate. If someone is

talking but not facing A.M., she cannot understand what is being said. It is difficult for

A.M. to determine what the teacher is saying and take notes at the same time.

Consequently, her handwriting is difficult to read. Due to frequent problems with her

hearing aids and the FM system in the classroom, she hears buzzing noises or beeping

sounds. When problems existed with her hearing aids,she tried to lip read. There was no

consistency in the operation of the FM system and the hearing aids: one day the FM

system and the hearing aids worked, the next day they did not. Carolyn Phillips

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(“Phillips”), an expert on assistive technology, testified that the FM system was not

working effectively in helping A.M.

A.M.'s audiologist, Kimberly Payne (“Payne”), believed that it is extremely tiring

for A.M. to lip read for long periods of time. In the classroom, it was next to impossible

for herto comprehend all the important information through aided hearing orlip reading.

A.M. testified thatshe spent three to five hours per night with her grandmother and legal

guardian, D.M., being retaught material thatshe was unable to learn atschool due to her

hearing deficits. She had an extra set of books at home to use. If another student asked

a question in class, A.M. had no opportunity to understand the information unless that

student wassitting right next to her. Priorto filing the due process complaint,CART was

not being utilized in any of A.M.'s classes. A.M. believed that theCARTsystemallowed

her to access classroom information and decreased the amount of time that her guardian

would have to spend re-teaching her.

A.M. also had trouble making friends at school because she could not

communicate with them effectively. The other kids did not like to repeat what they said

to her. She had overhead the teachers saying unpleasant things about her because they

forgot to cover their mouths when they talked about her or they left the FM operating.

The hearing officer noted, that during her testimony, her demeanor revealed intense

focus when listening or talking, showing a need for visual cues to properly engage in

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communication or to participate in a classroom setting.

Payne recommended that A.M. receive as much visual instruction as possible,

including closed-captioning in real-time in order for her to fully participate in her

education. Laura Parks (“Parks”), an expert with Technology Assistance for Special

Consumers (TASC), completed an evaluation at the request of the Board on June 29,

2011. Parks was directed to determine which tools would assist A.M. in being more

successful in her classes. Parks noted the school had amplification in some of its

classrooms, but it was not always working properly. Additionally, A.M.'s hearing aids

were not always working properly.

Parks recommended CART for A.M. She recommended that a specialist in

CART, Alan Peacock, perform the real-time transcription. Parks believed that CART

would allow A.M. to obtain an education in her least restrictive environment by letting

her access the information and ask questions instantly. Parks did not believe that a

transcription of the class, provided after the class was completed, would provide A.M.

with access to the curriculum in the least restrictive environment. Parks stated that

providing a transcription after class would not allow A.M. to be educated with her peers.

Further, software programs like Dragon Naturally Speaking would not work in the

classroom environment due to the noise level. It did not have enough accuracy and ease

of use to be an acceptable accommodation for a student with hearing impairments.

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C. Introduction And Removal Of CART

Prior to August 18, 2011, the Board had not provided any speech-to-text in the

classroom even though it was recommended in the TASC report. CART was not

implemented by the Board until mid-October 2011. Kimberly Maddox, A.M.'s biology

teacher, testified that after the introduction of CART, A.M.'s grades increased

substantially. The IEP team decided that CART would not be implemented any further

in August 2012, prior to A.M.'s tenth grade year. D.M. testified that A.M. had a better

comprehension of her class materials after the introduction of CART, and that after

CART was removed, her grades regressed.

Phillips, an expert in assistive technology, was requested by A.M. and the Board

to perform an independent evaluation of assistive technology for A.M. She served as an

unbiased, neutral third party to evaluate A.M.'s need for assistive technology. Phillips

performed comprehensive interviews,reviewedmedical and therapeutic documentation,

and made on-site observations. She interviewed and evaluated A.M. for an entire day.

Phillips's opinion was that A.M. missed sixty percent of what is being said in the

classroom even when utilizing her hearing aids. Phillips observed that A.M. does not

hear announcements on the loudspeaker in the classroom and had no way of receiving

alertsin the classroom ifthere had been an emergency. Phillips's expert opinion wasthat

A.M. needed a pagerfor emergency announcements.She also believed thatA.M. needed

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speech-to-text in every class and would also possibly benefit from C-Print.

Her report concluded that speech-to-text was necessary for A.M. to achieve her

educational goals as established in her IEP by her IEP team. Speech-to-text was also

recommended for all announcements. A two-week trial period was needed to determine

which speech-to-text method would be best for A.M. Phillips observed that the Board

had not implemented any of her recommendations, except that it, at most, had provided

about thirty minutes of CART per school day. Phillips reviewed the TASC report and

agreed that A.M. needed a speech-to-text solution in her classes.

On March 19, 2012, the hearing officer issued a decision finding that the Board

had failed to provide a free, appropriate public education to A.M. He also found that the

Board failed to continue to provide Defendant with occupational therapy and speech

therapy. On April 12, 2013, Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to file a civil action

contesting the decision. The Board failed to implement any of the hearing officer’s

findings after appealing this case to federal court.A.M.filed threemotions with the court

to compel the Board to comply with the hearing officer's rulings. Finally, on or about

August 29, 2014, theBoard agreed to provide speech-to-text to A.M. by utilizingCART

and InterAct AS.

V. ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court dictated a two-part inquiry for courts evaluating whether a

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school district has provided a student with a FAPE:

First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And

second, is the individualized educational program developed through the

Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive

educational benefits? Ifthese requirements are met, the State has complied

with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no

more.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07 (footnotes omitted). Unfortunately for the court, the parties

do not classify the alleged violations of the IDEA as procedural or substantive (i.e.

inadequaciesin the IEP). Therefore, the court has done its best to classify the violations

in order to adhere to the analysis mandated by the Supreme Court in Rowley.

A. Procedural Requirements

“In evaluating whether a procedural defect has deprived a student of a FAPE, the

Court must consider the impact of the procedural defect, and not merely the defect per

se.” Weiss by Weiss v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., 141 F.3d 990, 994 (11th Cir.

1998). The hearing officer held that theBoard had committed five procedural violations.

First, the IEP team failed to review and revise the contents of A.M.’sIEP aftershe failed

to make progresstoward her goals. (Doc. 11-1 at 81-82). Second, the IEP team included

goals that were non-measurable, which failed to meet the state law requirement of

“measurable annual goals” that would address “the child’s needs that result from the

disability.” (Id. at 83-85) (emphasis added). Third, the IEP team failed to consider

A.M.’s communication needs by providing her ameansto hear orread the school’s daily

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announcements.(Id. at 85-86). Fourth, the teamfailed tomodify hermath objective even

after she stopped taking a math class. (Id. at 86). Fifth, the IEP team did not provide

adequate documentation for why A.M. was missing several mandated classes at various

times. (Id. at 86-88).

In this case, the claimant, A.M., no longer seeks injunctive or other prospective

relief from the court. At the status conference held on January 7, 2015, counsel for both

parties represented to the court that they sought summary judgment solely to determine

whether A.M. would be eligible to seek an award of attorney’s fees. (See also Doc. 34

(stating that the parties had resolved A.M.’s third, and most recent, Motion to Compel,

and laying out the terms of the resolution)). Therefore, it is not necessary for the court

to determine individually whether each procedural violation had the substantive effect

of denying a FAPE to A.M. Rather, the court need only determine whether the

procedural violations had a cumulative effect of denying a FAPE. See Weiss, 141 F.3d

990 at 996 (stating that claimant “mustshow harm to [claimant] as a result ofthe alleged

procedural violations” (emphasis added)).

The Board’s response to A.M.’s motion does not object to the hearing officer’s

factualfindings concerning the alleged procedural violations(seeDoc. 50 at 17-27), and,

following de novo review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the court finds no clear

error in these factual findings. Rather than argue that the hearing officer erred in these

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factual findings, the Board argues that the hearing officer made a legal error: he “failed

to undertake the required analysis underthe IDEAof determiningwhetherthis purported

procedural error actually resulted in the denial of FAPE to A.M.” (Doc. 50 at 19).

However, to whatever extent the hearing officer failed to analyze the procedural errors’

detrimental impact on A.M.’s education, his factual findings provide a sufficient basis

for concluding that the Board’s errors denied a FAPE to A.M..

Only one of the five procedural violations — the failure to modify A.M.’s math

objective after she stopped taking a math class — appears to be inconsequential. Of the

other violations, the court finds two to have been especially detrimental to A.M.’s

education. First, the IEP’s use of goals without any measurable component meant that

therewas no reliableway to assessA.M.’s progressin these areas.These non-measurable

goals included completing homework and class work, studying for tests, and

demonstrating appropriate body language and voice tone. (Doc. 11-1 at 84). All of these

concern basic skillsthat are criticalfor a child’s educationalsuccess, and since they were

not written to be measurable, it was impossible to determine A.M.’s progress (or lack

thereof) in those areas. Second, the IEP team failed to react adequately after A.M.’s

2009-2010 progress report indicated that she had not mastered the goal of “personal

management” and was “not completing homework and classwork which [was] causing

her to make low grades.” (Id. at 83). The team simply responded by “carr[ying] over”

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(id.) the goal into her IEP for the nextschool year verbatim, rather than revising the goal

or formulating additional steps to promote A.M.’s progress in that area. This goal “was

implemented to help [A.M.] use her time more effectively to completing incomplete

homework, classwork, and studying for tests” — basic academic skills in which A.M.,

by the IEP team’s own admission, lacked proficiency. (Id.).

The two other procedural violations — requiring A.M. to go to the office each

morning to view a copy of all the school’s announcements, and a failure to adequately

document why and towhat extent A.M. was being removed fromsome classes(Doc. 11-

1 at 85-88) — found by the hearing officer also necessarily detrimentally affected

A.M.’s academic progress, although the extent of such detrimental impact cannot be

evaluated on thisrecord.It is not clearfromthe record howmuch classtimeA.M.missed

as a result of these violations, but it is clear that missing instruction impedes learning.

Therefore, the court affirms the hearing officer’sruling that these procedural violations

had the effect of denying A.M. a FAPE.

B. Adequacy Of The IEP

1. Speech and Occupational Therapy

The hearing officer also found that the Board committed two substantive

violations of the IDEA. First, he found that the Board failed to continue to provide A.M.

with occupational therapy and speech therapy. (Doc. 11-1 at 79-80). The Board raises

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both factual and legal objectionsto thisfinding.(Doc. 50 at 21-22). Factually, theBoard

argues that A.M. “was appropriately evaluated out of speech therapy” in a process that

complied with the IDEA, and that, contrary to the hearing officer’s finding, A.M. did

receive occupational therapy when she was due to receive it. (Id. at 21-22).

As for speech therapy, the record shows that it was removed from A.M.’s IEP

prior to the 2010-2011 school year. (Doc. 24-52 at 30, 24-42 at 3). Ellen Bowman, a

deaf-blind specialist, recommended on December 20, 2010, that the school reinstate

speech therapy. (Doc. 24-52 at 31). Speech services were then added back to her IEP

beginning onMarch 11, 2011.(Doc. 24-42 at 40).The hearing officer concluded thatthis

seven month period (August 2010 to March 2011) without speech therapy violated the

IDEA (doc. 11-1 at 80), but the court cannot find support for that conclusion in the

record. Rather, according to A.M.’s IEP for the 2010-2011 school year, test results and

teacher observation found that her “speech sound production [was] comparable to her

peers.” (Doc. 24-42 at 3). Therefore, the Board does not appear to have violated the

IDEA when it removed A.M. from speech therapy for those seven months.

As for occupational therapy, the hearing officer wrote that “there is no provision

within the profile page of the 8th grade IEP as to the status of OT services.” (Doc. 11-1

at 80). Thisfinding appears correct, as A.M.’s eighth grade IEP states only “[A.M.] also

received OT for the 09-10 school year,” which was her seventh grade. (Doc. 24-42 at

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Case 4:13-cv-00901-VEH Document 53 Filed 06/16/15 Page 19 of 24
29).TheBoard does not point to any evidence showing that A.M. wasfound to no longer

require occupationaltherapy, norto any evidence that occupationaltherapywas provided

during her eighth grade. (See Doc. 50 at 21-22). Therefore, the court concurs with the

hearing officer’s finding as to occupational therapy.

2. Failure to Provide Appropriate Assistive Devices

The second, andmostimportant,substantiveviolation found by the hearing officer

is a failure to provide appropriate assistive devices to A.M. (Doc. 11-1 at 80-82). He

stated that the Board had not performed adequate testing to determine if CART was

appropriate and necessary for A.M, and that there was insufficient data to support the

Board’s assertion that other assistive technology had been sufficient for A.M.’s

educational needs. (Id. at 81). The hearing officer also wrote that the Board had not

adequately considered the testimony and reports of the two outside experts (Parks and

Phillips) who had stated that A.M. required speech-to-text technology. (Id. at 82).

The Board objectsto thisfinding on the basis of a supposed failure by the hearing

officerto follow the correct legal analysis.The argument issomewhat difficult to follow,

but as best asthe court can tell, the Board allegesthat the hearing officer failed to follow

a two-step analysis. First, the officer was supposed to determine whether A.M. had

shown that the IEPs provided to her were not reasonably calculated to provide her a

FAPE. (Doc. 50 at 23). If A.M.satisfied thatstep, the officer would then reach the issue

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of whether A.M.required assistive technology and services.(Id. at 24).The only citation

provided by the Board for the supposed requirement of a two-step analysis is not on

point.

8 Regardless, the Board is incorrect when it alleges that the officer failed to make

specific findings that the Board’s IEP failed to provide a FAPE. He found that the

Board’s technology of choice, an FM system, “was not reliable enough” and that there

“was not sufficient evidence presented that it was used across the entire spectrum of

[A.M.’s] classes.” (Doc. 11-1 at 81).

The Board also contends that the hearing officer erred in his finding by utilizing

a standard from the ADA for determining the need for assistive technology, rather than

the IDEA standard. (Doc. 50 at 24-25). The court does not see any proof for this claim.

The Board does not point to, and the court cannot find, any use by the hearing officer of

language fromthe ADA standard, which requires public entitiesto provide “appropriate

auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an individual with a disability an

equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of” services or programs

provided by the entity. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1). Rather, all of the hearing officer’s

discussion of law in this section comes from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rowley that

the IDEA requires schools to provide sufficient services for a “basic floor of

opportunity.” (See Doc. 11-1 at 80).

8

See 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2)(v) (listing factors that an IEP team must consider when

formulating a child’s IEP).

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As to the facts, just as it did in administrative proceedings before the hearing

officer, theBoard comparesthis case toK.M. v. Tustin Unified School District, 2011WL

2633673 (C.D. Cal. 2011),rev'd in part on other claims, 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013).

(See Doc. 50 at 25). In K.M., the court affirmed an ALJ decision rejecting a hearingimpaired student’s claim that the school district violated IDEA by refusing to provide

CART. Id at *9-13. Although there are certain factualsimilarities, the court agrees with

the analysis ofthe hearing officer asto how K.M. differsfromthe present case.(See Doc.

11-1 at 81-82). In K.M., although there were expert opinions stating that the student

needed CART, those experts had not personally observed the student in the classroom

or considered all the data available to the IEP team. 2011 WL 2633673 at *4, *12. In the

present case, two outside experts, Phillips

9

and Parks,

10

observed A.M. atschool, and, in

Phillips’s case,in the classroom, before concluding thatthe school’s assistive technology

was inadequate and recommending CART or a similar technology. Another difference

is that, in K.M., testimony from the student’s teachers and other third parties who had

observed her in the classroom had revealed no trouble in comprehension, note-taking,

or participation in discussions, which suggested that she was receiving an adequate

education without CART. Id. at *12. Here, on the other hand, Phillips and Parks found

9

 (See Doc. 24-10 at 17-18).

10

 (See Doc. 24-23 at 16-18).

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that A.M. was performing poorly in all of those tasks under her IEP. (Doc. 24-10 at 17-

19, 22-23; 24-23 at 16-19).

Therefore, because apreponderanceofthe evidence indicatesthattheBoard failed

to provide appropriate assistive technology to A.M. by offering only FM service and

denying CART, the court affirms the hearing officer’s finding. The court finds it

especially persuasive that both outside experts brought to observe A.M. at school were

in agreement with A.M. and D.M.’s beliefthat an IEP withoutCART or anotherspeechto-text method was not providing her sufficient access to lectures, discussions, and

classroom materials. The Board has not pointed to any other facts to contradict those

experts and show that the IEPs it provided were sufficient for A.M.’s needs.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the forgoing reasons, summary judgment is due to be GRANTED to

defendant D.M., affirming the hearing officer’s findings

11

of IDEA violations by the

Board. For the same reasons, the court DENIES the Board’s motion for summary

judgment. The court will enter a separate final judgment order consistent with this

memorandum opinion.

11

 With the exception of the officer’s finding of a violation by a failure to provide speech

therapy, as discussed supra, V.B.1.

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DONE and ORDERED this the 16th day of June, 2015.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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