Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01566/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01566-24/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kim Erb
Defendant
David French
Defendant
Marty Heath
Defendant
John Murray
Defendant
Ernie Peters
Defendant
Deborah Stampfli
Plaintiff
Steve J. Stump
Defendant
Susanville Sanitary District
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DEBORAH STAMPFLI, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUSANVILLE SANITARY DISTRICT, a 

political subdivision of the 

State of California; STEVE J. 

STUMP, in his individual and 

official capacities; JOHN 

MURRAY, in his individual and 

official capacities; ERNIE 

PETERS, in his individual and 

official capacities; DAVID 

FRENCH, in his individual and 

official capacities; KIM ERB, in 

his individual and official 

capacities; MARTY HEATH, in his 

individual and official 

capacities; DOES I-V, inclusive; 

BLACK & WHITE CORPORATIONS I-V; 

and ABLE & BAKER COMPANIES, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-01566 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES1

1 The motion is decided on the papers without oral 

argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). The scheduled January 6, 

2025 hearing on the motion is hereby VACATED.

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 160 Filed 12/18/24 Page 1 of 4
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----oo0oo----

On May 16, 2024, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this 

court’s order, which denied qualified immunity to defendant Steve 

Stump and granted plaintiff’s request for partial summary 

judgment. (Docket No. 136.) The Ninth Circuit also granted 

plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, but 

denied her request for attorney’s fees incurred in the district 

court without prejudice to seeking those fees before this court. 

(Docket No. 152.) Plaintiff now requests both the attorney’s 

fees incurred on appeal and those incurred in the district court 

up to this point in the litigation. (Docket No. 154.)

I. District Court Fees

It is premature to address attorney’s fees incurred in 

the district court as the dispositive motion deadline has not 

even passed, nor has there been a final disposition on the 

merits. The motion appears to presume that plaintiff is a 

prevailing party. However, neither this court nor the Ninth 

Circuit has determined that plaintiff is a prevailing party for 

purposes of attorney’s fees in the district court.

This court’s order, which was affirmed by the Ninth 

Circuit, did not grant summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on 

the procedural due process claim; rather, the order granted 

partial summary judgment, concluding only that plaintiff was not 

an at-will employee and had procedural due process protections. 

(Docket No. 113.) This limited finding did not “[alter] the 

legal relationship of the parties” and certainly does not 

constitute a “judgment on the merits” entitling plaintiff to 

attorney’s fees. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. 

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Virginia Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001).

Because plaintiff has not acquired prevailing party 

status, the request for fees incurred in the district court will 

be denied. Plaintiff may renew her request for district court 

fees at the appropriate time if and when the issue of attorneys’ 

fees in this court becomes ripe.

II. Ninth Circuit Fees

The fees incurred on appeal are appropriate to address 

at this stage given the Ninth Circuit’s order, which instructed 

this court to determine the reasonable amount of plaintiff’s 

attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal. (Docket No. 152.) However, 

this issue is separate from the issue of district court fees 

discussed above. Prevailing party status on appeal is based on 

the relative success of the appellate litigation, see Corder v. 

Gates, 104 F.3d 247, 248–50 (9th Cir. 1996), while prevailing 

party status in the district court depends on whether relief on 

the merits has been awarded, see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.

While plaintiff has not achieved prevailing party 

status at the district court level, she was the prevailing party 

on appeal. Accordingly, the only attorneys’ fees she is entitled 

to at this juncture are fees incurred in defending defendants’ 

appeal before the Ninth Circuit. Yet plaintiff’s motion 

commingles the requests for fees incurred in both courts. The 

billing records provided fail to differentiate between hours 

incurred in the district court, hours incurred in the appellate 

court, and hours incurred in preparing the fees motion. It is 

not up to the court to scrutinize plaintiff’s billing records 

line by line in an attempt to discern which items are relevant to 

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the request for appellate fees.

Accordingly, the request for fees incurred on appeal 

will be denied without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a new 

request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal that provides 

argument and documentation addressing only the appellate fees.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for 

attorney’s fees (Docket No. 154) be, and the same hereby is,

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Dated: December 17, 2024

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 160 Filed 12/18/24 Page 4 of 4