Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02173/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02173-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bruce W. Betcher
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2173

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff – Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Bruce W. Betcher, *

*

Defendant – Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 11, 2008

Filed: July 22, 2008

___________

Before BYE, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Bruce W. Betcher of twenty-four counts of Production of

Child Pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (b), one count of Receipt of Child

Pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and one count of Possession of Child

Pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). On appeal, Betcher argues: (1) 18

U.S.C. § 2251 is unconstitutional due to an insufficient link with interstate commerce;

(2) the district court1

 erred by admitting evidence not charged in the indictment

because it was cumulative and the probative value was substantially outweighed by

Appellate Case: 07-2173 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/22/2008 Entry ID: 3453698
-2-

unfair prejudice; (3) the testimony of the government's child abuse expert was

irrelevant and prejudicial and the district court abused its discretion by admitting it;

and (4) the district court abused its discretion when sentencing him because it failed

to properly weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Having jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I

In 1997, Betcher and his wife obtained custody of their three young

grandchildren: two girls, born in 1993 and 1995, and one boy, born in 1996. The

children called Betcher "Dad." In 2004, Betcher took numerous pornographic and

erotic pictures of his two young granddaughters and their three girlfriends. At the

time the pictures were taken, the girls ranged in age from eight to eleven years old.

Betcher was apprehended after law enforcement found the pictures on a laptop

computer in Georgia and subsequently discovered Betcher was the photographer and

had transmitted the photos over the internet to the person in Georgia. Further

investigation revealed Betcher had additional images of child pornography on his

personal computer, including ninety-six pictures and sixteen videos. In his interview

with Burnsville Police Department Detective Steve Adrian, Betcher admitted to

having a preference for child pornography of prepubescent girls and to receiving and

possessing child pornography on his personal computer. He denied having produced

any such pictures. Investigators determined it was Betcher's digital Olympus camera,

which was manufactured in Indonesia, which recorded the pornographic pictures.

At trial, Betcher's defense was the young girls – not he – had taken the

photographs of each other. Each of the five girls testified Betcher took the

photographs. Betcher's best friend testified to Betcher admitting to him he took the

pictures of the young girls. The jury found him guilty on all counts.

Appellate Case: 07-2173 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/22/2008 Entry ID: 3453698
2

For a first time offender, the statutory maximum imprisonment is thirty years

for each count of production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), twenty years

for each count of receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1), and ten years

for each count of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2).

-3-

Before sentencing, Betcher submitted a position paper arguing against a life

sentence, contending it would be unreasonable because of his allegedly low risk of

reoffending and because the Sentencing Commission erred when it crafted the

sentencing guidelines for child pornography offenses. After a lengthy sentencing

hearing, the district court rejected Betcher's arguments, calculated the appropriate

guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) factors and concluded a life

sentence was reasonable. Because statutory maximums prevented the court from

imposing a sentence of life, the court sentenced Betcher to consecutive terms of

imprisonment for the statutory maximum term on all counts of conviction, for a total

of 9000 months or 750 years.2

II

Betcher challenges the constitutionality of the statute under which he was

convicted for production of child pornography, raises two evidentiary issues, and

attacks the reasonableness of his sentence.

A

Betcher argues 18 U.S.C. § 2251 is unconstitutional and, therefore, the district

court should have dismissed the production of child pornography charges (Counts 1-

24) for lack of federal jurisdiction. We review a challenge to the constitutionality of

a federal statute de novo. United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397, 1400 (8th Cir.

1997). However, "[i]t is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the

decision of a prior panel." Owsley v. Luebbers, 281 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 2002)

(citing United States v. Prior, 107 F.3d 654, 660 (8th Cir. 1997)).

Appellate Case: 07-2173 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/22/2008 Entry ID: 3453698
3

The Mugan judgment was vacated because of United States v. Booker, 543

U.S. 220 (2005), but the discussion concerning the constitutionality of the child

pornography statutes is nonetheless persuasive.

4

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (holding Commerce

Clause did not provide Congress with the authority to enact the civil remedy provision

of the Violence Against Women Act because "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence

are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity" that substantially affects

interstate commerce and the statute did not contain a "jurisdictional element

establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power to

regulate interstate commerce.").

5

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

-4-

Betcher argues the mere transportation across state or international lines of

cameras used in the manufacture of child pornography does not constitute an impact

upon interstate commerce sufficient to form a jurisdictional basis upon which

Congress could validly prohibit the charged conduct under its Commerce Clause

powers. More than one panel of this Court has already rejected this precise

constitutional attack. United States v. Mugan, 394 F.3d 1016, 1020-24 (8th Cir. 2006)

(holding 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2252A(a)(5)(B) both require proof that the child

pornography was produced with materials transported in interstate commerce and are

thus tied to interstate commerce and constitutional);3

 United States v. Hampton, 260

F.3d 832, 834-35 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding, even after Morrison,

4

 the federal

criminalization of child pornography produced with materials that have traveled in

interstate commerce is constitutional); United States v. Hoggard, 254 F.3d 744, 746

(8th Cir. 2001) (upholding a conviction under § 2251(b) when child pornography was

produced with interstate materials and distinguishing Morrison and Lopez5

 because

in neither of those cases "did the statute involved contain an express jurisdictional

element, requiring the government to prove, in each case, a concrete connection with

interstate commerce"); United States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1998)

(affirming a conviction for possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §

2252(a) and rejecting defendant's claim that his prosecution was unconstitutional

Appellate Case: 07-2173 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/22/2008 Entry ID: 3453698
-5-

under the Commerce Clause); see also United States v. Koenen, 230Fed. App'x 631

(8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding defendant's admission that the camera he used

to produce the child pornography had traveled in interstate commerce is by itself

sufficient to satisfy the analysis of whether there is an impact upon interstate

commerce sufficient to prohibit the charged conduct under Congress's Commerce

Clause powers).

B

Betcher contends the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of

Evidence 403 when it admitted as evidence an additional twenty-six photographs and

a video, none of which were charged as production counts in the indictment. Betcher

argues the probative value of such evidence was low and was outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice. We review a district court's evidentiary rulings for clear

abuse of discretion. United States v. Cannon, 475 F.3d 1013, 1023 (8th Cir. 2007).

"We will reverse a conviction only when an improper evidentiary ruling has affected

substantial rights or had more than a slight effect on the verdict." Id. (internal

quotation omitted).

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides relevant evidence "may be excluded if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."

Fed. R. Evid. 403. "Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely

prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party's case. The rule protects against

evidence that is unfairly prejudicial." United States v. McCourt, 468 F.3d 1088, 1092

(8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 463 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 2006)

(emphasis added in McCourt)). Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest

decision on an improper basis. United States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 899-900 (8th

Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Lupino, 301 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2002)).

Evidence which is "so inflammatory on its face as to divert the jury's attention from

the material issues in the trial" is unfairly prejudicial. Johnson, 463 F.3d at 809.

Appellate Case: 07-2173 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/22/2008 Entry ID: 3453698
-6-

The challenged evidence is probative to undermine Betcher's defense that the

girls took the pictures of themselves and distributed them over the internet. The video

depicts Betcher and one of his granddaughters sitting at separate computers. Betcher

adjusts a web camera to focus on the girl, who is dressed in a long t-shirt and

underwear. Betcher reaches toward her inner thigh, at which time she pushes his hand

away and says, "Quit." He responds, "I was videotaping," and adds, "We’ll try to send

it shortly." This video is relevant to show Betcher was in control of production and

distribution, yet does not itself contain pornography or any representation of sexual

assault such as would improperly inflame the jury.

The twenty-six uncharged photographs are part of a series of seventy-eight

photographs taken of the same five children, on the same fifteen dates, with the same

model of camera, in the same home, and transmitted to the same computer in Georgia.

From this series, twenty-nine photographs constituting child pornography were

charged in the indictment. When viewed together with the charged photographs, the

uncharged photographs corroborate the victims' testimony that Betcher manufactured

the pornographic pictures in his home. Some of the uncharged photographs show all

five girls together, which indicates someone other than one of the girls took the

photographs. In addition, contextual clues in the uncharged photographs – such as the

type of underwear worn – assisted in identifying the victims in some charged photos,

where the girls' faces are not visible. As with the video, the uncharged photographs

do not contain graphic depictions of child pornography such as would improperly

inflame the jury.

We find no danger of unfair prejudice in either the video or the uncharged

photographs. Cf. United States v. Becht, 267 F.3d 767, 774 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding

even "the admission of still images of child pornography does not rise to the level of

unfair prejudice."). Because we find no danger of unfair prejudice, it is not necessary

for us to evaluate the availability of evidentiary alternatives. See Old Chief v. United

States, 519 U.S. 172, 182-83 (1997) (prescribing a Rule 403 balancing test whereby

Appellate Case: 07-2173 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/22/2008 Entry ID: 3453698
6

In fact, Betcher was charged with a crime related to child abuse; he was

charged with manufacturing child pornography using children under the age of twelve

years. See United States v. Bentley, 475 F. Supp. 2d 852, 858 n.5 (N.D. Iowa 2007)

(explaining child pornography is one form of child abuse, which is evidenced by

Congress's decision to define "offense of child molestation" for purposes of Federal

Rule of Evidence 414 to include both acts of physical sexual abuse as well as child

pornography).

-7-

if the court decides a particular item of evidence raises a danger of unfair prejudice,

it should proceed to evaluate the degrees of probative value and unfair prejudice for

the item in question as well as for any available evidentiary substitutes).

C

Betcher next contends the district court erred under Federal Rules of Evidence

401 and 403 when it admitted the testimony of Dr. Carolyn Levitt, an expert in child

abuse offered by the prosecution. We review a trial court’s decision to allow expert

testimony for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 765 (8th

Cir. 2001).

Evidence is not admissible if it is not relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Relevant

evidence is that "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable." Fed.

R. Evid. 401. Dr. Levitt testified on three topics, which Betcher argues were

irrelevant: (1) age appropriate sexual behavior, (2) delayed disclosure, and (3) sexual

abuse. In addition to being irrelevant because he claims he "was not charged with any

crime related to child abuse," Betcher argues the topic of sexual abuse should also

have been excluded because it was unfairly prejudicial, particularly Dr. Levitt's

testimony that child pornography is a form of child abuse.6

 See Fed R. Evid. 403.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits the district court to admit the testimony

of a witness whose knowledge, skill, training, experience, or education will assist a

Appellate Case: 07-2173 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/22/2008 Entry ID: 3453698
-8-

trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. Kirkie, 261

F.3d at 765. See Fed R. Evid. 702. In the context of child abuse cases, a qualified

expert can inform the jury as to behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children

in general. Kirkie, 261 F.3d at 765. In this case, Dr. Levitt's testimony as to delayed

disclosure helped the jury understand why the girls did not reveal they had been

photographed until they were confronted with the images. Her testimony also helped

explain why one granddaughter initially denied any photographs had been taken, and

would not disclose who else was involved. Dr. Levitt's testimony regarding age

appropriate sexual knowledge and conduct assisted the jury in evaluating the sexual

content of the photographs and the victims' testimony as to who directed their poses.

The paramount question for the jury was who produced the pornographic

photographs of the young girls. Betcher's defense was that the girls themselves took

the photographs and he argued there were inconsistencies in their accounts regarding

who produced them. Dr. Levitt's testimony was relevant because it educated the jury

on issues necessary to their determination of who manufactured the photographs.

With regard to her testimony regarding child pornography being a form of child abuse,

the comment was used to explain the relevance of her expertise in the area of child

sexual abuse. By characterizing child pornography as a form of child abuse, Dr.

Levitt was able to show the jury how observations from her work with sexually

abused children applied also to Betcher's victims. Defense counsel did not object at

trial to the statement, and the district court did not commit plain error in not striking

it sua sponte.

D

Betcher challenges his sentence, arguing it is unreasonable. We review the

reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bonahoom, 484

F.3d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 2007). "A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it fails

to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives

Appellate Case: 07-2173 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/22/2008 Entry ID: 3453698
7

Specifically, Betcher's contention with regard to his sentencing range is that

Sentencing Commission policy statements indicate the guidelines are fashioned so a

first time offender committing an ordinary offense will face a sentencing range

beginning with the statutory minimum. In the case of average child pornography

offenses, the sentencing range starts much higher than the statutory minimum. 

-9-

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the

appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors."

Id. An appellate court "may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court

sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines," Rita v.

United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007), and this court does so, United States v.

Roberson, 517 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2008). Betcher bears the burden of proving his

sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Otterson, 506 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir.

2007).

Betcher concedes the district court properly calculated his advisory sentencing

range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. He also concedes the court addressed

every issue raised in his position paper. In essence, Betcher argues the district court

abused its discretion because it rejected his arguments for a sentence of imprisonment

for a term less than life.

The district court properly calculated an offense level of 52, which it

acknowledged is higher than the maximum level of 43 the guidelines contemplate.

With no criminal history points and a maximum offense level, the advisory sentence

is life imprisonment. Betcher argued to the district court, and again to this Court on

appeal, he deserved a sentence less than life because of low risk of recidivism and

because he did not physically harm the children. He also alleged the sentencing range

for his offenses was overstated when viewed in the context of the policy goals of the

Sentencing Commission; he contends the district court should have imposed a lower

sentence to counterbalance this incongruity.7

Appellate Case: 07-2173 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/22/2008 Entry ID: 3453698
-10-

After a careful review of the sentencing transcript, we are satisfied the district

court "considered the parties' arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising his

own legal decisionmaking authority." Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468. The district court

explained it was not bound by the guidelines, but was called upon to calculate them

because they were advisory. Sent. Tr. 79. It correctly calculated the applicable

sentencing range and articulated its analysis of the factors provided in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a), addressing each of Betcher's arguments for a lower sentence. The district

court held a sentencing hearing, during which it heard expert testimony from both

sides regarding the risk of recidivism. The court concluded neither expert presented

numbers suggesting an insubstantial risk and it determined the probability of

reoffending was "a pretty high percentage." Id. at 80. It also addressed Betcher's

argument regarding the disproportion of child pornography sentences, concluding

Congress – as well as a sense of justice and reason – called for serious punishment for

a person who knowingly victimizes children. Id. at 81. After considering the relevant

factors, the district court determined life was an appropriate sentence. The court

explained, since each statute under which Betcher was convicted contained a statutory

maximum, it imposed consecutive maximum sentences on all counts to ensure Betcher

served a term of lifetime imprisonment.

We are mindful that a sentence should be sufficient, but not greater than

necessary, to accomplish the goals of sentencing. Betcher's sentence – for practical

purposes – is a life sentence, and that is how we view it. The district court

emphasized incapacitation among its various sentencing goals and stressed the

importance of a life sentence in achieving that result. The absurdity of a 750 year 

Appellate Case: 07-2173 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/22/2008 Entry ID: 3453698
-11-

sentence, or even a 10,000 year sentence, should not detract from the gravity of

Betcher's crimes.

III

Because of the foregoing, we affirm Betcher's conviction and his sentence.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 07-2173 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/22/2008 Entry ID: 3453698