Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-10-50072/USCOURTS-ca9-10-50072-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
Amicus Curiae
Stanford Law School Justice Advocacy Project
Amicus Curiae
United States of America
Appellee
Jesse Vasquez
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GILBERT OLIVA DIAZ, AKA

Chaparro, AKA Gilberto Oliva,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50029

D.C. No.

8:07-cr-00202-

DOC-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ARTURO CRUZ, AKA Art,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50052

D.C. No.

8:07-cr-00202-

DOC-4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ALBERTO HERNANDEZ, AKA

Cruiser, AKA Sugar,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50058

D.C. No.

8:07-cr-00202-

DOC-7

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2 UNITED STATES V. DIAZ

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSE GONZALEZ, AKA Black, AKA

Negro,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50059

D.C. No.

8:07-cr-00202-

DOC-5

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

NOE GONZALEZ, AKA Lil Black,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50062

D.C. No.

8:07-cr-00202-

DOC-6

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MANUEL HERNANDEZ, AKA Frog,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50064

D.C. No.

8:07-cr-00202-

DOC-9

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UNITED STATES V. DIAZ 3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JESSE VASQUEZ, AKA Pelon,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50072

D.C. No.

8:07-cr-00202-

DOC-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FRANCISCO FLORES, AKA Lil Frank,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50076

D.C. No.

8:07-cr-00202-

DOC-8

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LUIS A. AGUILAR, AKA Woody,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50113

D.C. No.

8:07-cr-00202-

DOC-23

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4 UNITED STATES V. DIAZ

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CESAR DELA CRUZ, AKA Thumper,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50115

D.C. No.

8:07-cr-00202-

DOC-16

ORDER AND

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 2, 2015

Pasadena, California

Filed April 20, 2016

Amended September 21, 2016

Before: Jerome Farris, Jay S. Bybee,

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Order;

Opinion by Judge Bybee

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UNITED STATES V. DIAZ 5

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel issued an amended opinion affirming a

sentence, denied a petition for panel rehearing, and denied on

behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, in a case

in which Jesse Vasquez received a sentence of life

imprisonment mandated under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)

because of his two prior felony drug convictions. 

Four years after his sentencing, California adopted

Proposition 47, which allowed California courts to reclassify

certain felony convictions as misdemeanors. Vasquez

successfully petitioned a California court to reclassify one

of his prior California felonies—on which his federal

enhancement was based—as a misdemeanor. 

The panel held that Proposition 47 does not undermine a

prior conviction’s felony status for purposes of § 841, and

that California’s later actions cannot change the historical fact

that Vasquez committed his federal offense “after two or

more convictions for a felony drug offense [had] become

final.”

The panel addressed other issues in a concurrently-filed

memorandum disposition.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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6 UNITED STATES V. DIAZ

COUNSEL

Karen Landau (argued), Oakland, California, for DefendantAppellant Manuel Hernandez.

Ethan Balogh (argued) and Jay Nelson, Coleman, Balogh &

Scott LLP, San Francisco, California, for DefendantAppellant Jesse Vasquez.

Kenneth Reed, Santa Ana, California, for DefendantAppellant Gilbert Oliva Diaz.

VernaWefald, Pasadena,California, for Defendant-Appellant

Arturo Cruz.

Wayne Young, Santa Monica, California, for DefendantAppellant Alberto Hernandez.

David Philips, Riverside, California, for Defendant-Appellant

Jose Gonzalez.

Thomas Wolfsen, Orange, California, for DefendantAppellant Noe Gonzalez.

Holly Sullivan, San Diego, California, for DefendantAppellant Francisco Flores.

Michael Khouri, Khouri Law Firm, Irvine, California, for

Defendant-Appellant Luis A. Aguilar.

Robison Harley, Santa Ana, California, for DefendantAppellant Cesar Dela Cruz.

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UNITED STATES V. DIAZ 7

Elana Shavit Artson (argued), Allison Westfahl Kong, and

Robert Dugdale,AssistantUnited States Attorneys; Stephanie

Yonekura, Acting United States Attorney; United States

Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles, California, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Donald M. Falk, Mayer Brown LLP, Palo Alto, California;

Travis Crum, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, D.C.; Michael

Romano, Stanford Law School Justice Advocacy Project,

Stanford, California; David M. Porter, Co-Chair, NACDL

Amicus Curiae Committee, Sacramento, California; for

Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense

Lawyers and Stanford Law School Justice Advocacy Project.

ORDER

The court’s opinion filed April 20, 2016, appearing at

821 F.3d 1051(9th Cir. 2016), is hereby amended. An

amended opinion is filed herewith.

With this amended opinion, the panel has voted to deny

the petitions for panel rehearing.

The full court has been advised of the petitions for

rehearing en banc, and no judge has requested a vote on

whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petitions for rehearing and the petitions for rehearing

en banc, filed June 2, 2016, June 3, 2016 and July 1, 2016 are

DENIED. No subsequent petitions for rehearing or rehearing

en banc may be filed.

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8 UNITED STATES V. DIAZ

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Jesse Vasquez was a mid-level leader in the Florencia

Trece gang who was convicted of drug-related crimes for his

part in the gang’s drug trafficking operations. The district

court sentenced Vasquez to life imprisonment because his

two prior California felonies qualified him for a mandatory

sentence enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841.

Four years after Vasquez’s sentencing, California adopted

Proposition 47, which allowed California courts to reclassify

certain felony convictions as misdemeanor convictions. 

Vasquez successfully petitioned a California court to

reclassify one of his prior California felonies—on which his

federal enhancement was based—as a misdemeanor. 

Vasquez now argues that his federal enhancement should be

invalidated because he no longer stands convicted of one of

the two prior felonies as § 841 requires.1

We hold that Proposition 47 does not change the

historical fact that Vasquez violated § 841 “after two or more

prior convictions for a felony drug offense [had] become

final.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). We therefore affirm.

I

In 2007, Vasquez was charged with multiple counts of

racketeering and drug related crimes. Shortly after, the

United States filed an information alleging that Vasquez

1 Other issues raised in this case are addressed in a memorandum

disposition filed concurrently with this opinion.

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UNITED STATES V. DIAZ 9

qualified for a sentence enhancement under the Controlled

Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841, because of his two prior

felony drug convictions—one of which was a 1996

conviction under California Health and Safety Code section

11350(a) for possession of a controlled substance. In 2009,

Vasquez was convicted. At sentencing in 2010, the district

court imposed life imprisonment, a sentence mandated under

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) because of Vasquez’s “prior

[California] convictions for a felony drug offense.”

In November 2014, California voters enacted Proposition

47, “the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act.” Cal. Penal

Code § 1170.18 (codifying Proposition 47); see People v.

Rivera, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 363 (Ct. App. 2015). Among

other things, Proposition 47 reduced future convictions under

§ 11350(a) from a felony to a misdemeanor. Proposition 47

also permits previously-convicted defendants to petition the

court for a “recall of sentence,” which, if granted, would

effectively reclassify their qualifying felonies as

misdemeanors. See Cal. Penal Code § 1170.18(a). In

February 2015 Vasquez did just that: He successfully

petitioned the Los Angeles County Superior Court to recall

his 1996 felony conviction, and the court resentenced him to

a misdemeanor.2

2 Vasquez’s petition, and the Superior Court’s action, took place

between the time the district court rendered Vasquez’s sentence and his

appeal was heard by this court. Vasquez filed a supplemental brief on the

issue and asked the panel to consider it as part of his appeal. The

government responded on the merits, but also suggested that the panel

should remand this question because it was not raised below. Because this

issue has arisen while the appeal is pending, and because it is a legal

question which has been fully briefed, we may decide it here for the first

time on appeal. See United States v. Carlson, 900 F.2d 1346, 1349 (9th

Cir. 1990) (holding that we may review a new issue on appeal where it

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10 UNITED STATES V. DIAZ

Proposition 47’s new statutory changes provide that

“[a]ny felony conviction that is recalled and resentenced . . .

or designated as a misdemeanor . . . shall be considered a

misdemeanor for all purposes.” Cal. Penal Code

§ 1170.18(k). However, the court need not recall a felony

sentence if it finds, in its discretion, that re-classifying the

defendant would pose an unreasonable danger to the

community. Cal. Penal Code § 1170.18(b). The statute also

provides that “[n]othing in this and related sections is

intended to diminish or abrogate the finality of judgments in

any case not falling within the purview of this act.” Cal.

Penal Code § 1170.18(n).

II

Section 841 imposes a mandatory life sentence if a

defendant “commits [a violation of § 841] after two or more

prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become

final.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). A “felony drug offense” is

“an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than

one year under any law of the United States or of a State or

foreign country.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(44). Vasquez argues that

because he successfully petitioned in 2014 to have his 1996

conviction re-designated as a misdemeanor, that conviction

no longer counts as a prior felony conviction for purposes of

§ 841. We disagree. California’s actions—taken long after

Vasquez’s state conviction became “final”—have no bearing

on whether § 841’s requirements are satisfied.

arose because of a recent change in law or other “exceptional”

circumstance); Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1407–08 (9th Cir.

1992) (exercising discretion to address defendants’ argument based on

change in law during pendency of appeal). We have determined to

exercise our discretion and decide this question.

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UNITED STATES V. DIAZ 11

A

Federal law, not state law, governs our interpretation of

federal statutes. See United States v. Norbury, 492 F.3d

1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Whether a defendant’s prior

state conviction was a ‘conviction’ [within the meaning of

§ 841] is a question of federal, not state, law.”); see also

Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 111–12

(1983) (noting that consulting federal law to determine the

meaning of “convicted” “makes for desirable national

uniformity unaffected by varying state laws, procedures, and

definitions”), holding superseded by statute, as stated in

Logan v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 475, 479–80 (2007). As

we explained when analyzing a defendant’s “convicted felon

status” under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets

Act: “Although the [state’s]statute [can] determine the status

of the conviction for purposes of state law, it [can]not rewrite

history for the purposes of the administration of the federal

criminal law or the interpretation offederal criminal statutes.” 

United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1979)

(quotation and citation omitted); see also United States v.

Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272, 1280 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e are not

bound by [state law’s] treatment of a felony conviction when

we apply the federal sentence-enhancement provisions.”

(quoting United States v. Morales, 854 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir.

1988)). We therefore apply federal law, not California law,

to determine the effect of California’s reclassification on

Vasquez’s federal sentence enhancement under § 841.

When a state grants post-conviction relief to a defendant

with respect to his state felony conviction, we do not

generally apply those changes retroactively for purposes of

determining whether a federal sentencing statute’s

requirements are met. See, e.g., Norbury, 492 F.3d at 1015;

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12 UNITED STATES V. DIAZ

see also United States v. Salazar-Mojica, 634 F.3d 1070,

1072–74 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding in the context of U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines that a defendant had still “previously

been deported after being convicted of a felony,” even though

his felony was later reduced to a misdemeanor). The

Supreme Court’s decision in McNeill v. United States,

563 U.S. 816 (2011), illustrates why we avoid undoing

federal sentences after the fact. Under the Armed Career

Criminal Act, the sentencing court had to determine whether

the defendant had “three previous convictions . . . for a

violent felony or a serious drug offense,” “for which a

maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is

prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(1), 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). 

McNeill had been convicted in the early 1990’s of violating

North Carolina drug laws for which the maximum penalty

was at least ten years. McNeill, 563 U.S. at 818. However,

in 1994 North Carolina reduced the maximum sentence for

his offense; as of 1994, the state offense no longer qualified

for the federal enhancement. Id. McNeill argued that,

because the state had changed its laws, his prior conviction

did not qualify as a “serious drug offense.” Id. The Court

disagreed, holding that the state’s changes to McNeill’s state

conviction had no affect on his federal sentence. Id. at 819. 

The Supreme Court explained that the ACCA asked a

“backward-looking question” and the “only way to answer

[this question] is to consult the law that applied at the time of

that conviction . . . [this] avoids the absurd results that would

follow from consulting current state law to define a previous

offense.” Id. at 819–20 (emphasis added).

Proposition 47 presents a slight variation on what effect,

if any, we must give to subsequent acts affecting a prior state

sentence. We have never specifically addressed whether a

state that permits reclassifying particular felony convictions

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UNITED STATES V. DIAZ 13

as misdemeanors requires a federal court to revisit a federal

sentence enhancement imposed under § 841. But we have

addressed whether dismissing or expunging a predicate state

conviction invalidates a federal enhancement under this

section. See Norbury, 492 F.3d 1012. In Norbury, we held

that a state’s later dismissal or expungement of a predicate

state conviction had no bearing on whether § 841’s

requirements were met. Id. at 1015. In other words, despite

the fact that the state felony conviction was now expunged,

this did not change the historical fact that, for purposes of

§ 841, the defendant had been convicted of the felony in the

past. Id. We noted one exception: where the dismissal or

expungement alters the legality of the original state

conviction—such as where there was a trial error or it appears

the defendant was actually innocent of the underlying crime. 

Id. (citing Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 115).3 Other than this

circumstance, we explained that a federal enhancement “does

not depend upon the mechanics of state post-conviction

procedures, but rather involves the [state] conviction’s

underlying lawfulness.” Id.

B

Like the ACCA provision at issue in McNeill, § 841 is a

“backward-looking,” McNeill, 563 U.S. at 821, inquiry

requiring only that a defendant have committed his federal

crime “after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug

offense have become final,” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)

(emphasis added). The statute tells us what event triggers the

enhancement: two state convictions that are “final.” Id. As

the Tenth Circuit has explained: “The question posed by

3 Proposition 47 did not make Vasquez innocent of his felony

possession of controlled substance. Rather, it downgraded the offense.

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14 UNITED STATES V. DIAZ

§ 841(b)(1)(A) is whether the defendant was previously

convicted, not the particulars of how state law later might

have” permitted relief from the defendant’s state conviction. 

United States v. Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282, 1293 (10th Cir. 2013),

cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 365 (2013). In other words, a state

making a change to a state conviction, after it has become

final, “does not alter the historical fact of the [prior state]

conviction” becoming final—which is what § 841 requires. 

Id. at 1292 (quoting Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 115). Even where

a state has fully eradicated a predicate state conviction by

dismissing it or expunging it—a more drastic change than

merely reclassifying it as a misdemeanor—“as a matter of

plain statutory meaning there [is] . . . no question” the

defendant committed his crime “after a [prior state felony]

conviction” has become final. Dyke, 718 F.3d at 1292.

Congress could, of course, give retroactive effect to

changes in state law for purposes of federal statutes “for

policy reasons unrelated to innocence or an error of law.” 

United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per

curium). Indeed, it has done so in other circumstances. See

United States v. Yepez, 704 F.3d 1087, 1090–91 (9th Cir.

2012) (per curium) (en banc) (discussing carve-outs in the

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines). But in § 841, Congress did not. 

One purpose for § 841 is to discourage repeat offenders. If a

state provides relief for a prior state drug conviction, after the

defendant has committed another, federal, drug crime, “it’s

unclear why a [federal]statute aimed at punishing recidivism

(as § 841(b)(1)(A) is) would afford the defendant” relief in

his federal sentence. Dyke, 718 F.3d at 1293.

Ignoring later state actions for purposes of federal

sentences also aligns with the Supreme Court’s repeated

admonishments that federal laws should be construed to

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UNITED STATES V. DIAZ 15

achieve national uniformity. See Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 112. 

As we explained in Bergeman, “[i]f a conviction were to be

determined by application of the different . . . statutes of each

state, then the application offederal criminal sanctions would

depend solely upon where the defendant’s previous

conviction had occurred.” 592 F.2d at 537. We doubted that

Congress would have “intended a federal criminal law to be

applied in such a patchwork fashion.” Id.; see also United

States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 350 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[W]e

note the confusion in sentencing likely to result if the

sentencing court had to analyze the status of every prior state

conviction in terms of the status of state law. . . . This would

entail applying changes in state law retroactively to final

convictions.”).

III

Vasquez argues his case is different because California

applies Proposition 47 retroactively, so we should treat his

1996 felony conviction as if it never existed. But there are

two problems with this argument. First, it is not clear that

even California would apply Proposition 47 retroactively in

a sentence enhancement case such as ours. Although

California’s new statute allows defendants to request

reclassification and a reduced sentence, the statute expressly

provides that “[n]othing in this and related sections is

intended to diminish or abrogate the finality of judgments in

any case not falling within the purview of this act.” Cal.

Penal Code § 1170.18(n). The California Supreme Court

previously addressed a state statute that permits California

courts to reclassify a “wobbler” offense—one that can be

punished as either a felony or a misdemeanor—to be a

misdemeanor upon completion of probation, even if the

defendant was originally convicted of a felony. And the

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16 UNITED STATES V. DIAZ

California Supreme Court observed that the reclassification

of a felony to a misdemeanor does not necessarily mean the

crime will be treated as a misdemeanor retroactively for the

purpose of other statutory schemes. See People v. Park,

56 Cal. 4th 782, 795–803 (2013) (finding that a felony

wobbler reduced to a misdemeanor would count as a prior

felony conviction for purposes of a sentencing enhancement

under Cal. Penal Code § 667(d)(1), but would not count as a

prior felony conviction for purposes of a sentencing

enhancement under Cal. Penal Code § 667(a)).

Second, even if California decided to give Proposition 47

retroactive effect for purposes of its own state law, that

would not retroactively make Vasquez’s felony conviction a

misdemeanor for purposes of federal law. As we have

explained, § 841 explicitly tells us when it applies: When a

defendant (1) commits a federal drug offense (2) after being

convicted of two or more felony drug offenses that have

“become final.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(a). There is no doubt

Vasquez committed a federal drug offense, nor is there any

doubt his state felony convictions “have become final.”

We thus hold that California’s Proposition 47, offering

post-conviction relief by reclassifying certain past felony

convictions as misdemeanors, does not undermine a prior

conviction’s felony-status for purposes of § 841. California’s

later actions cannot change the fact that Vasquez committed

his federal offense “after two or more convictions for a felony

drug offense [had] become final.”

AFFIRMED.

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