Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00696/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00696-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dorian Davis
Plaintiff
Wali At-Taqi Davis
Plaintiff
A. Hedgpeth
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DORIAN DAVIS aka

WALI AT-TAQI DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. HEDGPETH,

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-00696-OWW-SMS PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING ACTION PROCEED ON

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AGAINST

DEFENDANT HEDGPETH ON EIGHTH

AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCESS CLAIMS

(Docs. 1 and 11)

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Dorian Davis aka Wali At-Taqi Davis (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this

action on May 9, 2007. On September 11, 2007, the court issued an order finding that plaintiff’s

complaint states cognizable claims for relief under section 1983 against defendant Hedgpeth for

violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but

does not state any other legal claims. The court ordered plaintiff to either to file an amended

complaint or notify the court of his willingness to proceed only on his cognizable claims. On

October 19, 2007, plaintiff filed a notice stating his willingness to proceed only on his cognizable

claims. Based on plaintiff’s notice, this Findings and Recommendations now issues.

II. Screening Requirement 

 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Case 1:07-cv-00696-LJO -SKO Document 12 Filed 10/23/07 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

III. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff is an inmate housed at Kern Valley State Prison in Delano, where the events at issue

in this action are allegedly occurring. Plaintiff alleges that since his arrival at Kern Valley on

October 26, 2005, he has been continuously deprived of outdoor exercise pursuant to lock-downs,

Case 1:07-cv-00696-LJO -SKO Document 12 Filed 10/23/07 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

which occur on a monthly basis. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Hedgpeth, the warden, is the policy

maker at Kern Valley and signs off on all policies, and has failed to protect plaintiff’s right to

outdoor exercise. Plaintiff seeks money damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiff sets forth three

separately enumerated claims for relief arising out of the deprivation of outdoor exercise.

A. Claim One

1. Eighth Amendment Claim

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials

must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.

Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,

1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of

confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to

a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The

deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged

deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994) (citingWilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must

“know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837. 

“‘[S]ome form of regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the psychological and

physical well being of the inmates,’” and “[the] deprivation of outdoor exercise [can] constitute cruel

and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087

(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979)). However, the

temporary denial of outdoor exercise with no medical effects is not a substantial deprivation. May

v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983

against defendant Hedgpeth for violation of the Eighth Amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Erickson

v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). 

Case 1:07-cv-00696-LJO -SKO Document 12 Filed 10/23/07 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

2. Due Process Claim

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause itself does not

confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.”

Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). Under state law, the

existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature

of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state

law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983

against defendant Hedgpeth for violation of the Due Process Clause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Erickson

v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). 

B. Claims Two and Three

Plaintiff alleges legal claims for violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under the label of “Claim 1.” (Doc. 1, 5:1-7.) However,

neither Claim 2 nor Claim 3 sets forth any recognizable legal claim. Therefore, neither claim is

cognizable. 

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable claims for relief under section 1983 against defendant

Hedgpeth for violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. However, plaintiff’s complaint does not state any other legal claims. Plaintiff was

provided with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, but opted to proceed only on his

cognizable Eighth Amendment and Due Process claims. Accordingly, it is HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that:

Case 1:07-cv-00696-LJO -SKO Document 12 Filed 10/23/07 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

1. This action proceed on plaintiff’s complaint, filed May 9, 2007, against defendant

Hedgpeth for violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment; and

2. Claims two and three, which do not articulate recognizable legal claims, be dismissed

for failure to state a claim.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00696-LJO -SKO Document 12 Filed 10/23/07 Page 5 of 5