Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_12-cv-08051/USCOURTS-alnd-5_12-cv-08051-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Robert Dunn
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL ROBERT DUNN,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

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CASE NO. 5:12-CV-8051-SLB

CRIM.CASENO. 5:11-CR-0102-SLB-JEO

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is presently pending before the court on Dunn’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody [Motion

to Vacate]. (Doc. 1; Crim. Doc. 21.)1 Petitioner, Michael Robert Dunn, has filed the Motion

to Vacate, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asking the court for relief from his 97-month

sentence that the court imposed after he entered a guilty plea. (Doc. 1; see Crim. Doc. 12.) 

For the reasons stated below, Dunn’s Motion to Vacate is due to be denied. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 30, 2011, a federal grand jury returned a three-count Indictment against

Dunn. (Crim. Doc. 1.) The Indictment charged Dunn with the following counts: Count One

– receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2); Count Two –

1Citations to documents in the court’s record in petitioner’s Motion to Vacate appear

as “(Doc. __).” Citations to documents in the court’s record in the criminal proceedings

against petitioner, Case No. 5:11-CR-00102-SLB-JEO, appear as “(Crim. Doc. __).” Page

number citations refer to the page numbers assigned to the document by the court’s CM/ECF

electronic filing system.

FILED

 2016 Jan-12 PM 01:05

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:12-cv-08051-SLB Document 11 Filed 01/12/16 Page 1 of 23
possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B); and Count

Three – distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). (See

generally id.)

Dunn entered into a Plea Agreement with the Government on May 24, 2011, in which

he agreed to plead guilty to Count Two of the Indictment, possession of child pornography.

(Crim. Doc. 12 at 1, 12-13.) In return, the Government agreed to dismiss Counts One and

Three and to recommend a custodial sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range. (Id.

at 1.) The Factual Basis for the Plea, set forth in the Agreement, contained the following

facts that the Government was “prepared to prove . . . at the trial of this case:”

On February 6th, 2009, a federal search warrant was executed at 4401

Spartacus Drive SW, Apt 1, Huntsville, Madison County, Alabama, 35805. 

Two computers and a compact disc were located and found to belong to

Michael Robert Dunn. After waiving his rights pursuant to Miranda, Dunn

admitted to possessing images of child pornography.

A forensic examination was performed on Dunn’s computers and the

compact disc. Child pornography was found on one of the computers and the

compact disc. Thirteen videos2and 26 images of child pornography were

found on the computer. Of these, 15 images and five videos are identified and

are of real children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. They are from other

states and other countries, thus they have traveled in interstate and foreign

commerce. The compact disc contains eight images of child pornography. 

The disc was manufactured by Memorex, a brand owned by Imation. Imation

2Under the Sentencing Guidelines, each video is considered 75 images for purposes

of calculating the sentencing range. United States v. Hensley, 322 Fed. Appx. 776, 777 n.2

(11th Cir. 2009). Therefore, these 13 videos were considered to be the equivalent of 975

images, which added 5 levels to Dunn’s base offense level of 18. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(1), 

(b)(7)(D).

2

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and Memorex brand optical discs sold in the United States are manufactured

in Asia.

The defendant hereby stipulates that the facts stated above are

substantially correct and that the Court can use these facts in calculating the

defendant’s sentence. The defendant further acknowledges that these facts do

not constitute all of the evidence of each and every act that the defendant

and/or any co-conspirators may have committed.

(Id. at 2-3 [footnote added].) The Plea Agreement also contains a waiver provision, in which

Mr. Dunn “waive[d] and [gave] up [his] right to appeal [his] conviction and/or sentence,”

and “waive[d] and [gave] up the right to challenge [his] conviction and/or sentence . . . in any

post-conviction proceeding, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255,”3 except in two limited circumstances not at issue in this case.4 (Id. at 5-6.)

On June 2, 2011, the court held a Change of Plea Hearing. (Crim. Doc. 22 at 1.) At

the hearing, Dunn entered a guilty plea to Count Two of the Indictment. (Id. at 3.) During

the plea colloquy, the court reviewed with Dunn the Indictment and the Plea Agreement,

asking:

THE COURT: . . . So, Mr. Dunn, first, with regard to what the

Assistant U.S. Attorney stated with regard to the plea agreement; that is, if you

plead guilty to Count Two, they will recommend a sentence at the low end of

the Guideline range, as well as dismiss Counts One and Three, and then added

to that what your attorney said, that you are forever giving up any right to

3The Government has not asserted Dunn’s post-conviction waiver as a ground for

denying his Motion to Vacate. (See generally doc. 4.)

4Pursuant to the appeal waiver, Dunn could appeal and/or seek post-conviction relief

of his conviction and sentence if the sentence imposed exceeded the statutorymaximum, ten

years, or exceeded the Guideline range as determined by the court, also ten years. (Crim.

Doc. 12 at 5-6.)

3

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challenge the validity of the search warrant, do you understand those to be the

pertinent terms of the plea agreement in your case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Do you have any different understanding of the plea

agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma’am.

(Id. at 6-7.) Dunn testified, under oath, that he understood the charge against him to which

he was pleading guilty and that he understood the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty;

he also testified that he understood that the Plea Agreement included a waiver of his right to

appeal and his right to challenge his conviction and sentence collaterally except in limited

circumstances. (Id. at 8-11, 15-16.) The court asked Dunn if the facts set forth in the Plea

Agreement, which were also stated in open court by the Assistant United States Attorney,

were “substantially correct;” he testified that they were. (Id. at 17.) Based on the

proceedings, the court found Dunn’s “plea of guilty [was] freely and voluntarily entered and

the requisite factual basis for [his] plea exist[ed],” and it accepted his guilty plea. (Id. at 18.) 

On October 18, 2011, the court held a sentencing hearing. (See generally Crim. Doc.

23.) Counsel for Dunn stated in open court that he had reviewed the Presentence Report

[PSR] with Dunn and that he had no objections. (Id. at 3.) Therefore, the court adopted the

factual statements in the PSR and found, in accordance with the PSR, that “the Guidelines

4

Case 5:12-cv-08051-SLB Document 11 Filed 01/12/16 Page 4 of 23
Offense Level is 30.5 The Criminal History Category is I. The Advisory Guideline

Imprisonment Range is from 97 months to 120 months.6 The supervised release period is

from any term of years not less than five years and up to life, and the fine range is from

15,000 to $150,000. Restitution is not an issue in this case.” (Id. at 4 [footnote added].) 

Before imposing sentence, the court allowed Mr. Dunn to address the court, during which

the following occurred:

THE DEFENDANT: . . . Again, I want to apologize for this whole

situation. Years back when I first moved to Huntsville, I actually had three or

four roommates that I lived with at the time. And during that time, I found

those images, and I was actually trying to find out who was putting those

things on there. And because of ignorance, I –

. . . 

THE DEFENDANT: Because of my ignorance, I did not get rid of the

computer nor turn it into the authorities, because I was more afraid of what

they would do. So the only thing I did was try to find out who could have done

it and then apparently, that’s when the U.S. Marshals stepped in. They found

them on my computer. So I do take responsibility for them on the computer

because it was mine.

5The base level was 18. USSG § 2G2.2(a)(1). Two levels were added because the

material contained an image of a prepubescent minor and another four levels were added

because the “material . . . portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct.” Id. (b)(2), (b)(4). Two

levels were added because Dunn used a computer and two levels were added because he used

a file sharing program that allowed others to access these files. Id. (b)(3)(F), (b)(6). The

material consisted of over 600 images; therefore, the offense level was increased by five. Id.

(b)(7)(D). Thus his adjusted offense level was 33, 18+2+4+2+2+5= 33. Dunn received a

three level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. USSG § 3E1.1(a)-(b).

6Pursuant to the Sentencing Table an offense level of 30, together with a criminal

history of I, results in a guideline range of 97-121 months. USSG CH. 5, Pt. A. However,

because the statutory maximum was 10 years, 120 months, the upper end of the guideline

range was reduced to 120 months. See USSG § 5G1.1(c)(1).

5

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As Mr. Tuten said, after the investigation started, I mean, I did, I got

married just over a year ago or – actually, let me go back. I got married just

this past year, and my son was born a few months ago, and I was just trying to

take care of my family.

I mean, I can’t change what happened three or four years ago. The only

thing I can do is look to the future. And I know I’m going to have take some

kind of a sentence. Maybe the court can just give me what it sees fit.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Dunn, you’re not saying, are you, today that

you just happened to find those on your computer and just sat there with them

and then you were caught because theywere on your computer because just the

way you were actually caught is that you, according to the presentence report

– and I would have to look. I don’t have a copy of your plea agreement with

me. Do you have a copy? Can I have the plea agreement?

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL] MR. TUTEN: Yes.

THE COURT: That you were trying to share this information and –

that’s not in the plea agreement? I’m just saying down here, I’m talking about

here, “Based on the IP address, agents, during an authorized internet

undercover operation, identified a computer in the State of Alabama that was

offering to participate in the distribution of child pornography.”

THE DEFENDANT: It was utilized through LimeWire. The U.S.

Marshals that came to the apartment, they asked me if I knew what the

LimeWire program was, and I told them that I knew what LimeWire was. And

they told me that’s how they received the images was the transfer from the

LimeWire program, because it had an open share – there’s an open share

setting on that LimeWire. So any time that my computer was up and running

and that LimeWire program was running, anybody could access that computer

and grab the pictures.

THE COURT: I guess I’mconfused because I don’t understand all this. 

First of all, were these images you had on your own computer? Are you saying

that somebody came, a roommate, unbeknownst to you put these images on

there, and you were trying to figure out what needed to be done?

6

Case 5:12-cv-08051-SLB Document 11 Filed 01/12/16 Page 6 of 23
THE DEFENDANT: That’s what I’m trying to say, Your Honor. 

Because it was my computer and it was in my apartment, I’m taking

responsibility.

THE COURT: So you’re telling me that you’re willing to face a jail

sentence of over eight years in custody even though it wasn’t really your child

pornography?

THE DEFENDANT: My attorney and I talked on several occasions,

and I explained to him that situation. And he told me my best – the advice that

he gave me was to, you know, plea on possession, because the DA –

THE COURT: Let me hear from the government to explain about this

sharing and all that that’s in Paragraph 8. Can you explain that to me, Ms.

Burrell?

[AUSA] MS. BURRELL: Your Honor, he did have the file sharing

program on his computer and, at the time, admitted that he had the file sharing

computer, the LimeWire, and that he did use it to download music. He said

that he knew all of that child porn was on there, that his fiancé did not know

that he had it on there.

He did tell the agents at that time that somebody that had been his

roommate, a 19 year old, had downloaded it, but that he had kept it on there,

that he knew it was on there, and that he had kept it from his fiancé.

I don’t buy his standing up here now telling you that he did not know

how the LimeWire program worked because he admitted that he used it to

download and trade music.

THE DEFENDANT: But I did not know that the file, the way the

computer was set up, even what the U.S. Marshal said, there’s a setting on the

LimeWire program, that you could either have it where people could share it,

or you could have it just for your use only and nobody could take from the

computer, and I did not know that.

MS. BURRELL: Your Honor, that’s – I talked to his lawyer on

numerous occasions about this and other issues. And if you’ll notice, we

agreed to let him plead guilty just to the possession because he doesn’t dispute

7

Case 5:12-cv-08051-SLB Document 11 Filed 01/12/16 Page 7 of 23
that it was on there, and he knew it was on there and didn’t do anything to get

rid of it.

He’s not charged with receiving it or distributing or anything else

related to the file sharing, but he knew that it was on there regardless of who

put it on there. And I’m not so sure I buy that a roommate put it on there. But

let’s assume it is true, that he’s telling the truth, he still knew it was on there

and never did anything about it and looked at it and kept it from his fiancé.

THE COURT: Anything else you would like to say, Mr. Dunn?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

(Id. at 7-11.) After hearing from Dunn, the court found that the low-end Guidelines sentence

was a just sentence, and it sentenced Dunn to a custodial sentence of 97 months. (Id. at 13;

see also Crim. Doc. 19.) 

Dunn filed this Motion to Vacate on November 13, 2012, in which he raises three

grounds for relief:

A. Ground one: Conviction obtained by plea of guilty which was unlawfully

or made [involuntary] or with the understanding of the nature of the charge or

the consequences of the plea.

. . . Had the understanding that the guidelines of this charge [were]

from range of zero to ten years. I was told good chance of probation. That I

may not have to register depending on what the District Attorney would offer.

B. Ground two: Denial of effective assistance of counsel

. . . Was told I would get low end of the guidelines, I understood as that

being zero to ten years not a guideline set by a investigator. Also, my attorney,

Robert Tuten, did not want to appeal the search warrant on the grounds of

several clerical errors including the address. He did not want to research about

who all resided at residence at time of investigation.

C. Ground Three: Denial of Right to Appeal

8

Case 5:12-cv-08051-SLB Document 11 Filed 01/12/16 Page 8 of 23
. . . Was told by Judge Sharon Blackburn that I had 14 days to appeal

the length of the sentence. As soon as sentencing hearing was over, I talked

to Robert Tuten about appeal. I did not hear from him again until after the 14

day period was up. Never was told how and what to do about filing a appeal.

(Doc. 1 at 4.) The Government filed a Response to Dunn’s Motion to Vacate, together with

an affidavit from Dunn’s counsel, Robert Tuten. (Docs. 4, 4-1.) The court then notified

Dunn of “his right to file affidavits or other materials to show why the motion should not be

summarily denied or dismissed on the basis of the response by the Government.” (Doc. 6 at

1.) The Order gave Dunn thirty days “to supply any additional evidentiary materials or legal

arguments he may wish to offer with regard to whether the motion is subject to summary

disposition.” (Id.) Dunn asked the court for additional time to respond and this Motion was

granted. (Docs. 9, 10.) Nevertheless, Dunn has not filed anything in response to the

Government’s submission or otherwise shown why his Motion to Vacate should not be

summarily denied.

II. DISCUSSION

A. SECTION 2255 STANDARD

This court has held that the habeas petitioner “has the burden ofshowing he is entitled

to relief from his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is

reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other

injury that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a

complete miscarriage of justice.” Bryant v. United States, No. 5:07-CR-0205-SLB-PWG,

2014 WL 519619, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 10, 2014)(quoting Richards v. United States, 837

9

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F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir. 1988) and citing LeCroy v. United States, 739 F.3d 1297, 1321 (11th

Cir. 2014) and Greene v. United States, 880 F.2d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 1989))(internal

quotations and citations omitted).

B. GROUND ONE: GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY

Dunn contends his “[c]onviction obtained by plea of guilty . . . was [made] unlawfully

or . . . involun[t]arily or with[out] the understanding of the nature of the charge or the

consequences of the plea.” (Doc. 1 at 4.) He states that he understood “that the guidelines

of this charge [were] from . . . zero to ten years,” that he had a “good chance of probation,”

and that he “may not have to register” as a sex offender. (Id. [emphasis added].) The court

finds that Dunn’s conclusory contentions are not credible in light of the record before the

court. Moreover, the court finds that Dunn’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily

made. Therefore, his Motion to Vacate based on this Ground will be denied.7

The Supreme Court has held:

A plea of guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the

factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of

guilt and a lawful sentence. Accordingly, when the judgment of conviction

upon a guilty plea has become final and the offender seeks to reopen the

7The court notes, “A guilty plea, since it admits all the elements of a formal criminal

charge, waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings against a defendant. Thus,

only an attack on the voluntary and knowing nature of the plea can be sustained. Moreover,

even the voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea can be attacked on collateral review

only if first challenged on direct review.” Lacey v. United States, No. CIV.A. 13-00413-KD,

2015 WL 1778426, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 20, 2015)(internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Nevertheless, because the Government has not raised this procedural bar to any of Dunn’s

claims, the court will address the claims on their merits.

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proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea

was both counseled and voluntary. If the answer is in the affirmative then the

conviction and the plea, as a general rule, foreclose the collateral attack.

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). “A guilty plea involves the waiver of a

number of a defendant’s constitutional rights, and must therefore be made knowingly and

voluntarily to satisfy the requirements of due process.” United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d

1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005)(citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970);

Galbraith v. United States, 313 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2002)). Therefore, “[a] court

accepting a guilty plea must . . . specifically address three ‘core principles,’ ensuring that a

defendant (1) enters his guilty plea free from coercion, (2) understands the nature of the

charges, and (3) understands the consequences of his plea.” Id. (citing United States v.

Jones, 143 F.3d 1417, 1418-19 (11th Cir. 1998)). “If a defendant understands the charges

against him, understands the consequences of a guilty plea, and voluntarily chooses to plead

guilty, without being coerced to do so, the guilty plea . . . will be upheld on federal review.” 

Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1141 (11th Cir. 1991)(internal quotations and citations

omitted). “[A] defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea . . . must

show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” 

Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1020 (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83

(2004)). 

The inquiry into whether the plea is made intelligently does not mean that the

court must determine whether the defendant is making a “smart” decision by

pleading guilty. Instead, “[i]n order for a guilty plea to be entered knowingly

and intelligently, the defendant must have not only the mental competence to

11

Case 5:12-cv-08051-SLB Document 11 Filed 01/12/16 Page 11 of 23
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his plea but he also

must be reasonably informed of the nature of the charges against him, the

factual basis underlying those charges, and the legal options and alternatives

that are available.”

Stano, 921 F.2d at 1142 (quoting LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 753 (11th Cir. 1988)). 

A plea is not involuntary due to a defendant’s misunderstanding of the length of his sentence

when the district court tells the defendant the maximum penalty he is facing and that the

court will set the sentence. United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 941 (11th Cir. 2001); see

also United States v. Bradley, 905 F.2d 359, 360 (11th Cir. 1990)(“To the extent that Bradley

claimed his guilty plea was based on his attorney’s estimate of the sentence and offense level,

the claim did not warrant withdrawal of the guilty plea where Bradley acknowledged to the

court that he understood the possible maximum sentence for his crime to be greater than the

sentence the court ultimately imposed.” (citing United States v. Sweeney, 878 F.2d 68, 70

(2d Cir. 1989))); Wilborn v. United States, No. 4:11-CR-0470-VEH, 2014 WL 3385307, at

*8-9 (N.D. Ala. July 10, 2014)(“While significant misleading statements of counsel related

to the length of a potential sentence that prompt a defendant to plead guilty can amount to

ineffective assistance, where, as here, a court correctly advises a defendant at the plea

colloquy about his potential sentence, including its possible maximum and minimum, a

defendant generally cannot establish prejudice on an effective-assistance claim based on an

erroneous sentence prediction.”)(internal quotations and citations omitted).

During the plea colloquy, the court inquired of Dunn whether his plea was knowing

and voluntary: 

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THE COURT: . . . So, Mr. Dunn, first, with regard to what the

Assistant U.S. Attorney stated with regard to the plea agreement; that is, if you

plead guilty to Count Two, they will recommend a sentence at the low end of

the Guideline range, as well as dismiss Counts One and Three, and then added

to that what your attorney said, that you are forever giving up any right to

challenge the validity of the search warrant, do you understand those to be the

pertinent terms of the plea agreement in your case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Do you have any different understanding of the plea

agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma’am.

THE COURT: I want to go over some things in the plea agreement. 

The plea agreement references the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Have you

and your attorney discussed the Sentencing Guidelines and how they are going

to impact on a sentence resulting from a plea of guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Do you understand there’s no parole from any custodial

sentence imposed under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

. . .

THE COURT: Mr. Tuten, are you satisfied your client has a sufficient

understanding of the Guidelines to make his plea here today a knowing plea?

MR. TUTEN: Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Dunn and I have spent a lot of

time together discussing the issues of this case, in particular, the application

of the Guidelines. He obviously is very concerned about what the ultimate

sentence is going to be. 

THE COURT: Is this a case with a mandatory minimum or not?

[AUSA] MS. HODGE: No, Your Honor, on possession and access.

13

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THE COURT: I didn’t [think] so.

MR. TUTEN: One of the other counts would have been, but not Count

Two. But during the time that we spent together, Mr. Dunn had a lot of

questions, a lot of good questions, that led me to believe that he understood the

issues and was able to consider those and ponder those and understand how it

would affect him and his future as far as a possible conviction.

I answered all of his questions. And as far as I know, he has no other

questions about that now. So I do believe he has a full understanding of the

issues about this case, about any possible defenses, about the Sentencing

Guidelines and how this plea agreement is going to affect the future

proceedings in this matter.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. 

(Crim. Doc. 22 at 6-9.)

Dunn has not alleged that this testimony was false or why, if he thought he had been

promised probation, he did not say so.8 He has not alleged reasonably specific facts to rebut

Tuten’s statement at the plea colloquy that he had reviewed the Sentencing Guidelines with

Dunn and that Dunn knew the sentence he was facing by pleading guilty. 

The court notes that Dunn had at least 35 days to review the PSR before sentencing. 

(Crim. Doc. 23 at 3.) This report set forth the Advisory Guideline Imprisonment Range as

97 months to 120 months. (See id. at 4.) Despite having this information, Dunn never sought

to withdraw his plea of guilty or otherwise tell the court of his now-alleged confusion or

8

“There is a strong presumption that statements made during the plea colloquy are

true. Consequently, a defendant bears a heavy burden to show that his statements under oath

were false.” Patel v. United States, 252 Fed. Appx 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2007)(citing United

States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d 166,

168 (11th Cir. 1988))(internal citations omitted).

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misunderstanding regarding the Plea Agreement and the low-rangeGuideline sentence at any

time before filing the instant Motion. Cruz v. United States, 188 Fed. Appx. 908, 914 (11th

Cir. 2006)(“At the plea hearing, Cruz stated twice that she was fully satisfied with her

representation from counsel. Cruz also stated that no one had made any promises or

assurances to her, or coerced her into pleading guilty. The court also explained to her the

maximumpenalties and that the sentence imposed could be different fromanyestimate given

to her by her lawyer or anyone else. The court also informed her of her right to plead not

guilty and continue to trial. Cruz never mentioned that her counsel had coerced her into

pleading guilty or assured her that she would receive a lesser sentence. Furthermore, after

Cruz received the Presentence Investigation Report and moved to have counsel substituted,

she never openly complained about her counsel's ineffectiveness or attempted to withdraw

her guilty plea.”);9see also United States v. Liedke, 449 Fed. Appx. 44, 45-46 (2d Cir.

2011)(citing United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir.2005)); United States v.

Wright, 135 Fed. Appx. 222, 224-26 (11th Cir. 2005). Even assuming he was not informed

of the Sentencing Guideline range he was facing before sentencing, Dunn has failed to allege

that he would not have pled guilty and would have gone to trial if he had been informed of

the Sentencing Guideline range when he pled guilty.

9Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2 provides, in pertinent part, “An opinion shall be

unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it. Unpublished opinions are

not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.

R. 36-2 (emphasis added).

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The court finds that Dunn has not shown that he is entitled to relief based on his

alleged unlawful guilty plea. Therefore, his Motion to Vacate will be denied as to this

ground.

C. GROUND TWO: DENIAL OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

“[T]he two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas

based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 

Pursuant to Strickland, “An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the

defense.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 

Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction

or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that

renders the result unreliable.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

“A convicted defendant making a claimofineffective assistance mustidentifythe acts

or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional

judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent

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assistance.” Id. at 690. “An attorney’s responsibility is to investigate and to evaluate his

client’s options in the course of the subject legal proceedings and then to advise the client

as to the merits of each.” Stano, 921 F.2d at 1151.

. . . [C]ounsel owes a lesser duty to a client who pleads guilty than to one who

decides to go to trial, and in the former case counsel need only provide his

client with an understanding of the law in relation to the facts, so that the

accused may make an informed and conscious choice between accepting the

prosecution’s offer and going to trial. To impart such an understanding to the

accused, counsel must, after making an independent examination of the facts,

circumstances, pleadings and laws involved, offer his informed opinion as to

the best course to be followed in protecting the interests of his client. The

interest underlying [a defendant’s] claim is his interest in having, before he

judges the desirability of the plea bargain, a general knowledge of the possible

legal consequences of facing trial.

Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984)(internal citations omitted).

In the context of a collateral challenge to a guilty plea, “The second, or ‘prejudice,’

requirement [of Strickland] focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective

performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy the

‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going

to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 

The court finds it unnecessary to address whether counsel’s performance was outside

“the wide range of professionallycompetent assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, because

Dunn has not alleged any prejudice arising from counsel’s alleged deficient performance. 

Like the petitioner in Hill, Dunn has not alleged that he would have proceeded to trial if not

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for counsel’s alleged errors or that there are “special circumstances that might support the

conclusion that he placed particular emphasis on” counsel’s representation that he would

receive probation. Hill, 474 U.S. at 60. He alleges:

Was told I would get low end of the guidelines, [which] I understood as . . .

being zero to ten years not a guideline set by a investigator. Also, my attorney,

Robert Tuten, did not want to appeal the search warrant on the grounds of

several clerical errors including the address.10 He did not want to research

about who all resided at residence at time of investigation.11

(Doc.1 at 4 [footnotes added].)

Because Dunn has not alleged that but for counsel’s errors he would have proceeded

to trial, the court finds Dunn cannot show the prejudice required to prove a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the Motion to Vacate based on ineffective

assistance of counsel will be denied.

D. GROUND THREE: DENIAL OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Dunn contends that he was denied the right to appeal. (Doc. 1 at 4.) As supporting

facts, he contends:

[I w]as told by Judge Sharon Blackburn that I had 14 daysto appeal the length

of the sentence. As soon as sentencing hearing was over, I talked to Robert

10Tuten filed a Motion to Suppress, which was later withdrawn as part of the Plea

Agreement. (See Crim. Docs. 10, 22 at 6-7.)

11The court finds that whether or not someone other than Dunn placed the images of

child pornographyon Dunn’s computer while living with Dunn is irrelevant to the possession

charge. Dunn admitted in open court that he had viewed the images and downloaded some

of them to a CD that he kept. Under these facts, the initial source of the images would not

be a defense to the possession charge.

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Tuten about appeal. I did not hear from him again until after the 14 day period

was up. [I n]ever was told how and what to do about filing a appeal.

(Id.) Dunn did not allege that he directed Tuten to file an appeal and/or that he did not waive

his right to appeal his sentence under the terms of the Plea Agreement. Dunn makes no

mention of his appeal waiver or the fact that he could appeal only if the sentence violated the

law.12 During the plea colloquy, the court reviewed the appeal waiver in the Plea Agreement

with Dunn:

THE COURT: . . . I do want to ask you also about the section of the

plea agreement that’s entitled "Waiver ofRight to Appeal and Post-Conviction

Relief." In this section of the plea agreement, you’re giving up some important

rights.

The main thing that you’re giving up is the right to appeal your

conviction and sentence and file a petition for habeas corpus unless I impose

a sentence that is in excess of the applicable statutory Guideline sentence or

if it’s above the statutory maximum provided by statute.

. . .

THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, do you understand the rights that you’re

giving up in this section of the plea agreement about waiving your right to

appeal your conviction and sentence and to file a habeas corpus petition?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Have you discussed those rights with your attorney?

12In the Plea Agreement, Dunn waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence 

except if the court imposed a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum sentence – ten

years – or in excess of the guideline sentencing range – also ten years. (See doc. 12 at 5-6.) 

Neither of these two conditions occurred as Dunn was sentenced to the low end of the

guidelines range, 97 months, which was below the statutory maximum sentence.

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Tuten, are you satisfied he understands the

rights he’s giving up in this section of the plea agreement?

MR. TUTEN: Yes, Your Honor.

(Crim. Doc. 22 at 8-9.) Dunn has not alleged that his testimony regarding his knowledge of

the appeal waiver was false. Patel, 252 Fed. Appx at 975 (“a defendant bears a heavy burden

to show that his statements under oath were false”).

Contrary to Dunn’s assertion, the court did not tell Dunn that he could appeal the

length of his sentence within 14 days, (see doc. 1 at 4); rather, the court told Dunn,

“Although there is a waiver of right to appeal and that waiver is probably valid, nevertheless,

I always tell a defendant at sentencing that you have the right to appeal the sentence imposed

within 14 days if you believe the sentence is in violation of law.” (Crim. Doc. 23 at 18-19

[emphasis added].) Dunn has alleged no facts to support a finding that the appeal waiver is

invalid. Moreover, he has not alleged specific facts to demonstrate either that he directed

Tuten to file a notice of appeal or that Tuten failed to consult with him about an appeal. (See

doc. 1 at 4 [“As soon as sentencing hearing was over, I talked to Robert Tuten about appeal.

I did not hear from him again until after the 14 day period was up.”].)

In this Circuit – 

The Strickland test also applies to claims of ineffective assistance based on

counsel’s failure to file an appeal. Roe v. Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476-

77, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1034, 145 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2000). When counsel disregards

specific instructions from a convicted defendant to file a notice of appeal,

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counsel acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable. Id. at 477, 120

S. Ct. at 1035. In the absence of specific instructions, an attorney nonetheless

has a constitutional duty to consult with his client about an appeal, when (1)

a rational convicted defendant would want to appeal, or (2) the convicted

defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel an interest in appealing. Id. at

480, 120 S. Ct. at 1036.

In the “vast majority of cases,” the Supreme Court expects courts will

find “that counsel had a duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal.” 

Id. at 481, 120 S. Ct. at 1037. Factors we consider in determining whether a

rational defendant would want to appeal include whether the conviction

follows a guilty plea, whether the defendant received the sentence bargained

for as part of a plea agreement, whether the plea agreement waived appellate

rights, and whether there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Id. at 480, 120

S. Ct. at 1036; Otero v. United States, 499 F.3d 1267, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007). 

A guilty plea both “reduces the scope of potentially appealable issues” and

indicates “the defendantseeks an end to judicial proceedings.” Flores–Ortega,

528 U.S. at 480, 120 S. Ct. at 1036.

Fields v. United States, 577 Fed. Appx. 916, 919 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.

1878 (2015).

Dunn does not allege that he directed Tuten to file an appeal. Moreover, his

conviction followed a guilty plea, he received the sentence called for by the Plea Agreement,

and he waived his right to appeal any sentence below the statutory maximum that was within

the Guidelines range. During the plea colloquy, Dunn admitted that he had possessed

numerous images of child pornography and that he had downloaded some of those images

from his computer onto a CD. Under these circumstances, the court finds Tuten had no duty

to consult with Dunn following sentencing. See id. at 920. Moreover, even if the court were

to find such a duty existed, the court finds that Dunn has not alleged “there is a reasonable

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probability that, but for [Tuten’s] deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he

would have timely appealed.” Id. (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484).

Based on the foregoing, the court finds Dunn’s Motion to Vacate is due to be denied

as to his claim that he was denied the right to appeal.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, petitioner Michael Robert Dunn’s Motion under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, (Doc. 1),

is due to be denied. An order denying petitioner’s Motion will be entered contemporaneously

with this Memorandum Opinion. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Rule 11 of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, provides “The district court must

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the

applicant.” The applicant for § 2255 relief “cannot take an appeal unless a circuit justice or

a circuit or district judge issues a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. §2253(c).” Fed.

R. App. P. 22(b)(1). And, the “certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant

has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§2253(c)(2)(emphasis added). To make a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right, the applicant must show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether

(or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner

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or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)(citations and internal quotations omitted).

Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, (Doc. 1), does not demonstrate that he was denied any

constitutional right or that the issues he raises are reasonably debatable and/or deserve

encouragement to proceed further. Therefore, issuance of a certificate of appealability is not

warranted in this case. 

DONE this 12th day of January, 2016.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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