Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01635/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01635-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Boston Scientific Neuromodulation Corporation
Appellant
Nevro Corp.
Cross-Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BOSTON SCIENTIFIC NEUROMODULATION 

CORPORATION,

Appellant

v.

NEVRO CORP.,

Cross-Appellant

ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF 

COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 

AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES 

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2019-1582, 2019-1635

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2017-

01812, IPR2017-01920.

______________________ 

Decided: May 29, 2020

______________________ 

MATTHEW WOLF, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, 

Washington, DC, for appellant. Also represented by

ANDREW TUTT; DAVID A. CAINE, Palo Alto, CA. 

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2 BOSTON SCIENTIFIC v. NEVRO CORP. 

 CHING-LEE FUKUDA, Sidley Austin LLP, New York, NY, 

for cross-appellant. Also represented by SHARON LEE; 

RYAN C. MORRIS, Washington, DC; JON WRIGHT, Sterne 

Kessler Goldstein & Fox, PLLC, Washington, DC. 

 MAI-TRANG DUC DANG, Office of the Solicitor, United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for 

intervenor. Also represented by THOMAS W. KRAUSE,

FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED. 

 ______________________ 

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge. 

This is an appeal from a consolidated inter partes review proceeding requested by Nevro Corp. (“Nevro”). The 

U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board”) concluded that certain claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,895,280 

(“the ’280 patent”), claims 8, 18, 22–24, and 27, are unpatentable as obvious. J.A. 39–66, 73–97,103–151. The 

Board concluded that claims 26 and 28–30 are not unpatentable as obvious. Patent Owner Boston Scientific 

Neuromodulation Corp. (“Boston Scientific”) appeals the 

Board’s invalidity findings. Nevro cross-appeals the 

Board’s conclusion that claims 26 and 28–30 are not unpatentable as obvious. Because we agree with the Board’s 

claim constructions and conclude that substantial evidence 

supports the Board’s underlying factual findings, we affirm

the Board’s conclusions as to all challenged claims. 

I. BACKGROUND

Resolution of this appeal does not require a detailed 

recitation of the various prior art references and grounds 

of unpatentability addressed in the Board’s decisions. Accordingly, only the facts relevant to this appeal are discussed below.

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A. The ’280 Patent

The ’280 patent, entitled, “Rechargeable Spinal Cord 

Stimulator System,” relates to the use of a spinal cord stimulation (“SCS”) system to reduce a patient’s chronic pain. 

’280 patent, col. 1 ll. 13–17. The ’280 patent states that 

prior art SCS systems struggled with a host of problems, 

such as internal power storage and memory issues, large 

physical size, and the need to utilize unwieldy surgical 

techniques and tools. Id., col. 2 ll. 10–24. The inventors of 

the ’280 patent developed a SCS system with “(1) a recharging system, (2) a system for mapping current fields, (3) optional pulse ramping control, and (4) electrode impedance 

measurements.” Id., col. 1 ll. 19–22. The disclosed system 

also “offers a simple connection scheme for detachably connecting a lead system thereto.” Id., col. 2 ll. 62–64. Although “the lead system [(comprising lead extension 120 

and electrode array 110)] is intended to be permanent, the 

IPG may be replaced should its power source fail, or for 

other reasons.” Id., col. 27 ll. 26–38. 

As relevant to this appeal, claims 8, 22, 26, and 27 recite an SCS system and method for implanting an SCS system with the above-recited features. Independent claim 8 

recites:

8. A spinal cord stimulation system comprising:

a multi-channel implantable pulse generator (IPG) 

having a replenishable power source, the IPG having a housing which contains IPG processing circuitry;

an implantable electrode array detachably connected to the IPG, the electrode array having a 

multiplicity of n electrodes (En) thereon;

a multiplicity of m stimulation channels provided 

by the IPG, wherein each stimulation channel is independently programmable with different stimulation parameters,

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wherein m is equal to or less than n, and m is 2 or 

greater;

an external trial stimulator (ETS); and

a percutaneous extension which temporarily couples the ETS with the implantable electrode array.

’280 patent, col. 53 ll. 3–18. Independent claim 22 recites:

22. A spinal cord stimulation system comprising:

an implantable, multi-channel implantable pulse 

generator (IPG) having a replenishable power 

source;

an implantable electrode array detachably connected to the IPG, the electrode array having a 

multiplicity of n electrodes (En) thereon;

a secondary, implanted coil coupled electrically to 

the replenishable power source;

an external battery charger including:

a primary coil;

a rechargeable battery contained in the 

charger, electrically coupled to the primary 

coil; and

a power amplifier for applying alternating 

current derived from the rechargeable battery in the charger to the primary coil,

whereby the alternating current in the primary coil 

is transcutaneously transferred to the secondary 

implanted coil to the replenishable power source 

contained in the IPG; and

alignment circuitry for detecting alignment between the primary and secondary coils, the alignment circuitry including a back telemetry receiver 

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for monitoring the magnitude of the ac voltage at 

the primary coil as applied by the power amplifier,

wherein reflected impedance associated with energy magnetically coupled through the primary coil 

is monitored.

’280 patent, col. 55 l. 62–col. 56 l. 21. Independent claim 

26 recites:

26. A method for implanting a spinal cord stimulator system into a patient for stimulation therapy, 

the method comprising:

(a) implanting a nerve stimulation lead 

with a distally located, multi-electrode array placed near target tissue, said lead having a lead connector on the proximal end;

(b) connecting the lead connector to a percutaneous extension;

(c) externalizing the percutaneous extension through the skin;

(d) connecting an external trial stimulator 

(ETS) to the externalized lead extension;

(e) programming the stimulation parameters at first optimal values;

(f) waiting a specified period of time and reprogramming the stimulation parameters 

to second optimal values; 

(g) disconnecting the percutaneous extension from the lead connector;

(h) connecting a multi-channel, implantable pulse generator to the lead connector;

(i) implanting the implantable pulse generator, while programmed to the second, optimal stimulation parameters.

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’280 patent, col. 57 ll. 13–36. Independent claim 27 recites:

27. A method of charging a rechargeable battery 

contained within an implantable pulse generator 

(IPG), which IPG is connected to an implanted, secondary coil antenna, the method employing an external battery charger, which charger contains a 

rechargeable battery electrically connected to an 

external, primary antenna coil, the method comprising:

(a) charging the rechargeable battery in the 

eternal battery charger using an external 

power source;

(b) aligning the primary antenna coil with 

the implanted secondary coil;

(c) broadcasting electromagnetic energy 

through the primary antenna coil;

(d) receiving the broadcast electromagnetic 

energy through the secondary antenna coil, 

whereby an alternating current is produced 

in the secondary coil;

(e) rectifying the induced, alternating current received by the secondary coil;

(f) charging the rechargeable battery carried within the IPG, while monitoring the 

charging current or voltage across the battery as the battery is being charged to prevent overcharging; and

(g) stopping the charging at the battery 

charger when the current or voltage at the 

battery in the IPG reaches a prescribed 

level. 

’280 patent, col. 57 l. 37–col. 58 l. 20.

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B. Asserted Prior Art References

i. Holsheimer

Holsheimer is a U.S. patent entitled, “Multichannel 

Apparatus for Epidural Spinal Cord Stimulation,” and discloses a pulse generator that drives a plurality of electrodes 

implanted near a patient’s spinal cord. J.A. 2136–37. The 

implanted apparatus uses a “multi-channel neurological 

pulse generator which provides independently controlled 

voltage or current pulses.” J.A. 2156, col. 2 ll. 21–26; J.A. 

2157, col. 3 ll. 56–59. The pulse generator is connected to 

a lead with electrodes at the distal end, corresponding to 

the number of channels. J.A. 2156, col. 2 ll. 26–29. 

ii. Schulman

Schulman is a U.S. patent entitled, “Battery-Powered 

Patient Implantable Device,” and discloses a device that 

may be implanted under the skin of a patient for nerve or 

muscle stimulation. J.A. 2293. An embodiment of the invention includes a charging circuit that is capable of producing a “charging current in response to an externally 

produced AC magnetic field.” J.A. 2307, col. 2 ll. 1–3. 

iii. Loeb

Loeb is a U.S. patent entitled, “Implantable Multichannel Stimulator.” Loeb discloses an implantable multichannel stimulator that includes a microstimulator array and 

an electrode array “sealed or molded in a body compatible 

material” to form an “integral implantable multichannel 

stimulator unit.” J.A. 2621; J.A. 2636–37, col. 8 l. 66–col. 

9 l. 3. The microstimulator array 45 is powered through 

inductive coupling with an external power source. J.A. 

2637, col. 9 ll. 33–58. Loeb discloses that the stimulator 50 

includes “alignment means, such as a magnet or marker 

48, that helps align the implanted microstimulator array 

45, and more particularly the coils 30 . . . of the implanted 

microstimulator arrays, with an external coil . . . connected 

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to an external source that generates the modulated power 

signal.” Id., col. 9 ll. 20–27.

iv. Alo

Alo is an article entitled, “Computer Assisted and Patient Interactive Programming of Dual Octrode Spinal 

Cord stimulation in the Treatment of Chronic Pain.” J.A. 

2221. Also discloses a study comparing two types of multielectrode stimulation systems with continuous stimulation 

(“C-stim”): “patient controlled SCS” (“PC-stim”) and “multistim SCS” (“M-stim”). J.A. 2223. The study involved patients with low-back pain, wherein electrodes were placed 

at the T9 and T10 intervertebral disc spaces. J.A. 2224. 

Patients tried different C-stim programs over a five- to 

seven-day trial period. J.A. 2224–25. 

C. The Board Proceedings

After Boston Scientific sued Nevro for patent infringement in the District of Delaware, Nevro filed two separate 

petitions, requesting inter partes review of claims 8, 18, 

22–24, and 26–30 of the ’280 patent. J.A. 2. On February 

5, 2018, the Board instituted review on the grounds challenging claim 27 in both petitions and consolidated the two 

proceedings. Id. The Board, however, denied institution 

on the grounds challenging claims 8, 18, 22–24, 26, and 28–

30. J.A. 2–3. After the Supreme Court issued its decision 

in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018), the 

Board modified its institution decisions to review all challenged claims, on all grounds presented in the petitions. 

J.A. 3.

On February 1, 2019, the Board issued its Final Written Decision in the consolidated action. J.A. 1. The Board 

concluded that Nevro had established, by a preponderance 

of evidence, that challenged claims 8, 18, 22–24, and 27 of 

the ’280 patent are unpatentable as obvious. J.A. 39–66, 

73–97, 103–151. The Board did not find claims 26 and 28–

30 unpatentable, however. J.A. 66–72, 97–103. 

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Boston Scientific timely appeals the Board’s final written decision, challenging its obviousness determinations on 

claims 8, 18, 22–24, and 27 of the ’280 patent. Nevro cross

appeals, challenging its non-obviousness determinations 

on claims 26 and 28–30. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

II. DISCUSSION

Boston Scientific appeals: (1) the Board’s findings that 

the prior art discloses “detachable leads”; (2) the Board’s 

claim construction of “aligning” and “alignment”; (3) the 

Board’s claim construction of “back telemetry receiver”; 

(4) the Board’s finding that a person of ordinary skill in the 

art (“POSA”) would have been motivated to combine the 

Schulman and Loeb references; and (5) the Board’s refusal 

to consider Exhibit C of Dr. Lipson’s declaration. Appellant 

Br. 29–32. Nevro cross-appeals the Board’s construction of 

“waiting” and its factual findings with respect to the Alo 

reference. Appellee Br. 87. We address each issue in turn.

A. Substantial Evidence Supports

the Board’s Factual Findings 

Regarding “Detachable Leads”

We review the Board’s legal determination of obviousness de novo, and its underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical 

Commc’ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 

2000).

In holding that claims 8, 18, and 22–24 would have 

been obvious over a combination of Holsheimer, Schulman, 

and Loeb, prior art U.S. patents, the Board concluded that 

both Holsheimer and the combination of Schulman and 

Loeb disclose “detachable leads.” Boston Scientific argues 

that the Board’s factual findings are erroneous because 

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10 BOSTON SCIENTIFIC v. NEVRO CORP. 

they are unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree. 

The Board reasoned that Holsheimer discloses “detachable leads” based on its findings that: (1) Holsheimer discloses an SCS system; and (2) “all known SCS systems at 

the time of the ’280 patent used detachable leads.” J.A. 79–

80. Substantial evidence supports both findings. The 

claimed invention in Holsheimer “provides a number of superimposed current generated electrical fields for epidural 

spinal cord stimulation.” J.A. 2156 at col. 2 ll. 21–23; J.A. 

2157 at col. 3 ll. 54–55 (“a neurological stimulation system 

employing the present invention to stimulate spinal cord 

12 of the patient”). Four inventors of the ’280 patent testified, moreover, that prior to the critical date, “all SCS systems known to them employed detachable leads.” J.A. 80; 

J.A. 3127; J.A. 3318; J.A. 3679–3680; J.A. 3899. And Boston Scientific’s expert, Dr. Lipson, testified that he is not 

aware of any SCS systems that do not utilize detachable 

leads, and that he had never implanted an SCS lead while 

it was attached to an implantable pulse generator (“IPG”). 

J.A. 81; J.A. 6506. 

The Board further explained why, at the time of the invention, all SCS systems required detachable leads. Relying on Dr. Lipson’s testimony, the Board explained that, 

during the SCS system implantation process for percutaneous leads, “the lead is not attached to the IPG and, in 

fact, could not be so attached, because the lead’s distal end 

must remain free so that the needle can be removed by sliding it back and over the free distal end of the lead.” J.A. 82 

(citing J.A. 2960–61). Dr. Lipson also testified that even 

implantation of SCS systems with paddle electrodes—like 

those described in Holsheimer—required the use of detachable leads. J.A. 82–83 (citing 2961–62 at col. 30 ll. 2–7, col. 

30 l. 24–col. 31 l. 10, col. 32 l. 3–col. 33 l. 9). The Board 

properly relied on this substantial evidence to conclude 

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that Holsheimer’s SCS system discloses “detachable 

leads.”1

Similarly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

finding that a POSA “would have found it obvious” to combine Schulman and Loeb into an SCS system that uses detachable leads. In determining that a POSA would have 

been motivated to combine the disclosures of both patents, 

the Board relied on evidence that it had discussed in its 

findings regarding Holsheimer. J.A. 113 (“Much of the evidence considered in Section V.C.3.iii., above, is relevant 

here.”). For example, the Board cited to the testimony from 

four inventors of the ’280 patent that, prior to the critical 

date, “all SCS systems known to them employed detachable leads.” J.A. 113 (emphasis included). The Board explained that this evidence “documents the knowledge a 

POSITA would bring to bear in evaluating the appropriate 

lead arrangement for an SCS system, e.g., that rendered 

obvious by Schulman.” Id. The Board again considered the 

testimony of Boston Scientific’s expert, Dr. Lipson, who testified that he was not aware of any SCS systems that do 

1 Appellant argues that the Board’s finding is “legally erroneous” because it “rests on a conclusion that Holsheimer inherently discloses detachable leads.” Appellant 

Br. 37. But the Board made no such finding. The Board 

concluded that a POSA, at the time of the invention, would 

have concluded that Holsheimer’s SCS system discloses 

“detachable leads”—its conclusion did not rely on our inherency precedent. J.A. 79–83. In any event, even if the 

Board concluded that Holsheimer discloses detachable 

leads inherently (as opposed to expressly), for the reasons 

stated above, we conclude that substantial evidence supports such a finding. See Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Whether a 

claim limitation is inherent in a prior art reference for purposes of anticipation is . . . a question of fact.”).

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12 BOSTON SCIENTIFIC v. NEVRO CORP. 

not utilize detachable leads, and that “the process by which 

an SCS system is implanted requires a detachable connection to the IPG.” Id. (citing J.A. 6506). And, the Board 

considered the testimony of Nevro’s expert, Dr. Kroll, who

also testified that a POSA would have found it obvious to 

use detachable leads. J.A. 114–115 (“We also do not agree 

with Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Kroll’s analysis involves hindsight reasoning . . . record evidence also demonstrates that, in an SCS system, detachability is required 

and expected by those skilled in the art.”). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the Board’s findings 

with respect to the prior art’s disclosures of “detachable 

leads” are supported by substantial evidence.

B. The Board’s Construction of 

“Aligning” and “Alignment” is Not Erroneous

This court reviews the Board’s ultimate construction of 

a claim de novo, with subsidiary factual findings involving 

extrinsic evidence reviewed for substantial evidence. 

Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Cirrus Logic, Inc., 883 F.3d 1358, 

1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The broadest reasonable interpretation standard applies in this IPR proceeding. Personalized Media Commc’ns., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 952 F.3d 1336, 

1340 (Fed. Cir. 2020). See also Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. 

Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 

42.100(b)). Thus, the Board’s interpretation must be reasonable in light of the specification, prosecution history, 

and the understanding of one skilled in the art. See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015), overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. 

v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc).

Claims 22 and 27 recite an “alignment circuitry for detecting alignment between the primary and secondary 

coils” and “aligning the primary antenna coil with the implanted secondary coil.” J.A. 12–13. In the underlying 

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BOSTON SCIENTIFIC v. NEVRO CORP. 13

proceedings, Boston Scientific proposed construing these 

“alignment” and “aligning” limitations as: “achieving a spatial arrangement of the primary and secondary coils such 

that charging efficiency is optimized based on measurement of an electrical parameter.” J.A. 12. The Board rejected this construction and instead construed the terms to 

mean “achieving a relative position between the primary 

and secondary coils to permit energy transfer.” J.A. 12–13. 

We find no error in the Board’s construction. 

Intrinsic evidence supports the Board’s construction. 

The plain language of the claims does not require positioning that achieves optimal charging efficiency. ’280 patent, 

col. 55 l. 62–col. 56 l. 21; col. 57 l. 37–col. 58 l. 20. Rather, 

the claim language simply identifies that the primary and 

secondary coils must be aligned. Id.2 The ’280 patent specification, moreover, uses the phrase “in terms of a relative 

position between two elements, for example between electrodes or between inductive coils.” J.A. 14 (citing ’280 patent, col. 1 ll. 51–55, col. 10 ll. 58–61, col. 41 ll. 12–17). And 

although the specification addresses “efficient” charging or 

“maximum power transfer,” it discusses this optimized 

charging efficiency in the context of proper alignment, as 

opposed to alignment generally. See J.A. 14–15 (citing ’280 

patent, col. 5 ll. 6–9, col. 41, ll. 14–17, col. 44 ll. 27–28). 

Thus, the ’280 patent supports the Board’s determination 

that “alignment” only requires a relative position between 

the two coils to allow some energy transfer. 

2 We do not agree, however, that the Board’s construction of “alignment” and “aligning” is broad enough to 

include “misalign[ment].” See J.A. 14. After all, misalignment suggests that the coils have not achieved a “relative 

position . . . to permit energy transfer.” J.A. 12. That being 

said, we agree with the Board that the proper construction 

of the limitation covers concepts that fall short of “perfect” 

or “optimized” alignment.

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Beyond the intrinsic evidence, the Board also cited to 

dictionary definitions that are consistent with its construction of the “alignment” and “aligning” limitations. J.A. 16. 

Thus, extrinsic evidence further supports the Board’s construction that “align” requires coil placement in “relative 

position” to permit energy transfer. J.A. 16 (citing J.A. 

4572).

Accordingly, we agree with the Board that the broadest 

reasonable interpretation of the “alignment” and “aligning” 

limitations is “achieving a relative position between the 

primary and secondary coils to permit energy transfer.” 

C. The Board’s Construction of 

“Back Telemetry Receiver” is Not Erroneous

Claim 22 recites “alignment circuitry” that includes a 

“back telemetry receiver for monitoring the magnitude of 

the ac voltage” and “reflected impedance.” ’280 patent, col. 

56 ll. 15–21. In its Final Written Decision, the Board did 

not explicitly construe the “back telemetry receiver” limitation, but it rejected Boston Scientific’s argument that the 

receiver “must, at a minimum, receive transmitted data or 

information.” J.A. 17, 20–21. The Board’s determination 

that a “back telemetry receiver” need not receive transmitted data or information—only that it must monitor voltage 

or impedance, or transmitting power—is not erroneous. 

First, the claim language supports the Board’s construction. Claim 22 recites that a “back telemetry receiver” 

is part of the “alignment circuitry,” and its role is “monitoring the magnitude of the ac voltage at the primary coils as 

applied by the power amplifier.” ’280 patent, col. 56 ll. 14–

18. Therefore, “claim 22 already specifies what the ‘back 

telemetry receiver’ is and what it does—it is circuitry that 

monitors voltage and impedance.” J.A. 18 (emphasis included). We agree with the Board that the claim does not 

require the “back telemetry receiver” to additionally “receive transmitted data or information.” J.A. 18 (“[E]ven if 

we agree that ‘back telemetry receiver . . . must, at a 

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minimum, receive transmitted data or information,’ we disagree in light of Patent Owner’s argument that monitoring 

voltage or impedance, or transmitting power, is not ‘receiv[ing] transmitted data or information.’”). 

Second, the ’280 patent specification supports the 

Board’s construction. Like the claim language, the specification states that the “back telemetry receiver” “monitor[s] 

the magnitude of the ac power . . . thereby monitoring reflected impedance.” ’280 patent, col. 4 l. 64–col. 5 l.1, col. 

42 ll. 36–43. Boston Scientific cites to portions of the ’280 

patent that allegedly compel a different conclusion. Appellant Br. 51, 53–54. But these portions describe the back 

telemetry transmitter, not the back telemetry receiver. For 

example, the specification explains that the back telemetry 

transmitter 690 transmits information regarding changes 

in rectification, while the back telemetry receiver 692 monitors voltage and reflected impedance. ’280 patent, col. 42 

ll. 33–43. None of these passages suggest that the “back 

telemetry receiver” must receive transmitted data or information, other than monitoring voltage or impedance, or 

transmitting power.

Accordingly, we agree with the Board that the broadest 

reasonable interpretation of “back telemetry receiver” does 

not require that the element “receive transmitted data or 

information,” other than monitoring voltage or impedance, 

or transmitting power. 

D. Substantial Evidence Supports the 

Board’s Factual Findings 

that a POSA Would Have Been 

Motivated to Combine Schulman and Loeb

In its obviousness determination for claims 8, 18, 22–

24, and 27, the Board found that a POSA would have been 

motivated to combine Schulman and Loeb to create an SCS 

system. J.A. 108–09. Substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s factual findings.

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The Board first relied on Schulman’s teachings that its 

tissue stimulation system may be used for stimulating 

nerves and neural pathways to relieve pain. J.A. 107 (citing J.A. 2293 (Abstract). It then credited Dr. Kroll’s unrebutted testimony that SCS systems fall into the category of 

systems described in Schulman, and that “it would have 

been obvious to a POSA that Schulman’s system could be 

used for SCS.” J.A. 107 (citing 2450 ¶ 22, J.A. 2476 ¶ 73).

The Board concluded that a POSA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Schulman and Loeb 

based on the disclosures in those references, and Dr. Kroll’s 

testimony. J.A. 108–110. Schulman and Loeb are both directed to tissue stimulation systems, J.A. 109 (citing J.A. 

2293 (Abstract), J.A. 2636), and Schulman expressly incorporates Loeb, describing it as a known “[i]mplantable device for tissue stimulation.” J.A. 110 (citing J.A. 2307, col. 

1, ll. 15–19.). And while Loeb discloses an “exemplary” 

cochlear electrode array, the reference clarifies that this is 

“one of many possible types of implantable electrode arrays 

that may be used with the invention.” J.A. 2636, col. 8 ll. 

1–6. Dr. Kroll, moreover, testified that a POSA would have 

found it obvious to arrange Schulman’s microstimulators 

in Loeb’s array configuration because: “(1) the array is less 

likely to migrate from its implantation site, which provides 

better control in stimulating a targeted area, and (2) the 

array allows for better alignment of the charging coils of 

the implanted and external components of the system, thus 

allowing more efficient charging of the rechargeable power 

sources.” J.A. 109 (citing J.A. 2472–73). We conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s factual findings 

regarding a POSA’s motivation to combine. 

E. The Board Did Not Abuse its 

Discretion When it Excluded 

Exhibit C of Dr. Lipson’s Declaration

37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) provides that “[a]rguments must 

not be incorporated by reference from one document into 

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another document.” The Board’s determination that a 

party improperly incorporated arguments by reference 

from another document in violation of 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) 

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Intelligent Bio-Sys., 

Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016). 

Boston Scientific argues that the Board’s decision to exclude Exhibit C of Dr. Lipson’s declaration was an abuse of 

discretion because the excluded document was allegedly 

“evidence not argument.” Appellant Br. 63. Boston Scientific alleges that the Board “faulted Boston Scientific for 

not putting more words in its brief (which is not evidence) 

rather than simply citing to testimony from an expert directly showing why its argument is correct.” Id. We disagree with Boston Scientific’s characterization of the 

Board’s determination. 

In the “Objective Indicia of Non-Obviousness” section 

of its Patent Owner Response, Boston Scientific alleged 

that certain products practice claim 27 of the ’280 patent. 

J.A. 601–604. In support of these assertions, Boston Scientific cited to Dr. Lipson’s declaration. Id. As the Board 

noted, however, the Patent Owner Response failed to address “certain elements of claims 8, 18, and 22–24 that are 

not present in exemplary claim 27.” J.A. 56. For example:

[W]ith respect to claim 8, the Response does not address “a multi-channel implantable pulse generator having a replenishable power source, the IPG 

having a housing which contains IPG processing 

circuitry,” “wherein m is equal to or less than n, 

and m is 2 or greater,” or “a percutaneous extension.” With respect to claim 18, the Response does 

not address the “soft ramping circuit” limitation. 

And with respect to claim 22–24, the Response does 

not address the “alignment circuitry” limitation. 

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18 BOSTON SCIENTIFIC v. NEVRO CORP. 

J.A. 56 (citations omitted). These missing elements are 

only addressed in Exhibit C of the Lipson Declaration. See

J.A. 7062–91. 

Boston Scientific’s reliance on Exhibit C for its objective indicia arguments for claims 8, 18, and 22–24 is clearly 

an attempt to incorporate arguments by reference. Thus, 

we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in 

excluding Exhibit C of Dr. Lipson’s declaration. 

F. The Board’s Construction of “Waiting” is 

Not Erroneous and Substantial Evidence 

Supports the Board’s Factual 

Findings Regarding Alo

Having considered the issues Boston Scientific raises 

on appeal, we now turn to Nevro’s cross-appeal.

Independent claim 26 recites, inter alia, “(e) programming the stimulation parameters at first optimal values; 

(f) waiting a specified period of time and re-programming 

the stimulation parameters to second optimal values.” ’280 

patent, col. 57 ll. 25–29. In concluding that claim 26 is not 

obvious over the combined teachings of Holsheimer and 

Alo, the Board concluded that claim 26 requires sequential 

steps of “programming,” then “waiting,” and then “re-programming,” and that Alo does not disclose these limitations. We conclude that the Board’s construction of the 

“waiting” limitation is not erroneous, and that substantial 

evidence supports its factual finding regarding the Alo reference. 

The broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 26 

supports a construction wherein the steps of “programming,” “waiting,” and “re-programming” must be completed in that specific order. Claim 26 recites sequential 

steps of programming the stimulation parameters, waiting 

a specified period of time, and re-programming the parameters to “second optimal values.” ’280 patent, col. 57 ll. 25–

29. And as the Board noted, the prefix “re-,” in step (f) of 

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BOSTON SCIENTIFIC v. NEVRO CORP. 19

the claim suggests that the recited “re-programming” is a 

“new, second occurrence of programming that occurs after

the first ‘programming’ occurrence, recited in step (e).” J.A. 

101. Therefore the “waiting” limitation must occur after 

the first “programming” step (e) and before the second “reprogramming” step (f). J.A. 100–101. To hold otherwise 

would render the “waiting” element superfluous and effectively obviate the need to “re-program” the stimulation parameters. 

Substantial evidence also supports the Board’s conclusion that Alo does not disclose the “waiting” limitation, 

much less for a “specified period of time.” Alo discloses a 

study in which two electrodes were placed in the epidural 

spaces of eighty patients. J.A. 2224. The electrode leads 

were connected to a trial stimulator, which was programmed with various options, to be tested over a five to 

seven-day trial period. J.A. 2224–25. In particular, 

[t]he patient was sent home for the first 24 hours 

of the trial with a simple C-stim program. This allowed the patient to become familiar with the basic 

controls of amplitude and the sensation of paresthesia. The next day the patient was given up to 

24 programs to choose from (PC-stim) . . . . These 

24 programs could be activated individually by the 

patient at home using the transmitter. The patient 

was instructed to try each program one at a time 

and to rate each of the programs . . . .

Programs that did not provide effective paresthesias were deleted. Treatment evolved via this direct interactive approach to a set of optimal 

programs that were stored in the transmitter.

J.A. 2225. The reference explains that, even on the first 

day of the trial period, while in “C-stim” mode, the patient 

may immediately re-program stimulation parameters, e.g., 

amplitude and frequency, to second optimal values, without waiting for any period of time. J.A. 2225, 2227

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20 BOSTON SCIENTIFIC v. NEVRO CORP. 

(“Patient control is limited to turning the single program 

on or off and control of amplitude and frequency”). In the 

“PC-stim” mode, moreover, the patient may immediately 

re-program stimulation parameters, e.g., amplitude and 

frequency, to second optimal values, without waiting for 

any period of time. J.A. 2227. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the Board’s construction 

of the “waiting” limitation in claim 26, and its factual finding that Alo does not disclose the “waiting” limitation, are 

not erroneous.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s conclusions that 

(1) claims 8, 18, 22–24, and 27 are unpatentable as obvious; 

and (2) claims 26 and 28–30 are not unpatentable as obvious are affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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