Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10103/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10103-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joshua Lucas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSHUA LUCAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10103

D.C. No.

3:14-cr-00197-EMC-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 16, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed November 8, 2016

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Kim McLane Wardlaw, 

and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman

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2 UNITED STATES V. LUCAS

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for being a felon in 

possession of a firearm and ammunition in a case in which 

the defendant, who was previously convicted in California 

state court for the same conduct, moved to compel 

information he contends will support a motion to dismiss the 

federal indictment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The panel held that the district court did not err in 

denying the defendant’s request for that information because 

the defendant failed to make the requisite showing of 

materiality under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 and failed to 

adequately challenge the government’s representation that it 

does not have any Brady material.

COUNSEL

Daniel Blank (argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender; 

Carmen A. Smarandoiu, Research and Writing Attorney; 

Steven G. Kalar, Federal Public Defender; Office of the 

Federal Public Defender, San Francisco, California; for 

Defendant-Appellant.

Anne M. Voigts (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; 

Barbara J. Valliere, Chief, Appellate Division; Brian J. 

Stretch, Acting United States Attorney; United States 

 * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. LUCAS 3

Attorney’s Office, San Francisco, California; for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Joshua Lucas appeals his federal conviction for being a 

felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition after his 

earlier California conviction for the same conduct. His 

appeal turns on a discovery issue: whether the district court 

erred by denying his motion to compel information he 

contends will support a motion to dismiss the federal 

indictment under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United 

States Constitution. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 

529, 530–31 (1960); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 

189–96 (1959). Because Lucas failed to either make the 

requisite showing of materiality under Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 16 or adequately challenge the 

government’s representation that it does not have any Brady

material, we affirm.

I

On October 15, 2013, two Bay Area Rapid Transit 

(“BART”) police officers saw Lucas and two others evade 

the fare to ride a BART train at the Powell Street Station in 

San Francisco, California. One of the officers approached 

Lucas, who admitted he did not have a BART ticket. When 

the officer turned to speak to the second officer, Lucas 

started to run. The officers chased after him and warned him 

that he would be tased if he did not stop. Lucas kept running. 

One of the officers then activated his taser, striking Lucas in 

the back. As Lucas fell to the ground, a Taurus PT738 .380-

caliber handgun fell out of his shorts. The pistol, the officers 

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4 UNITED STATES V. LUCAS

discovered, was loaded with four rounds of .380-caliber 

Hornady ammunition1 and two rounds of 7.65-millimeter 

ammunition. During the incidental search of Lucas 

following his arrest, officers found a second handgun—a 

stolen Colt firearm—loaded with one round of .380-caliber 

Hornady ammunition, five rounds of .32-caliber PAC 

ammunition, and one round of 7.65-millimeter ammunition. 

Subsequent investigation established that both firearms and 

the ammunition had previously traveled in interstate 

commerce.

California state authorities charged Lucas by 

information with being a felon in possession of a firearm in 

violation of California Penal Code section 29800. Lucas 

pleaded guilty to this charge on October 31, 2013. On 

December 9, 2013, he was given a two-year suspended 

sentence, one year in county jail, and three years of 

probation. Because he had earned good-time credits and 

credit for time served, Lucas was set for release from state 

custody on April 15, 2014.

On April 3, 2014, a federal grand jury returned a onecount indictment against Lucas, charging him with being a 

felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). The federal charge was based on the same 

October 15, 2013 BART incident for which Lucas had been 

prosecuted and punished in state court. On April 14, 2014, 

 1 The government describes this ammunition as “hollow point,” a 

type of ammunition that expands inside the target’s tissue to “increase 

its effective diameter” and “greatly increase[ ]” the “wounding 

performance” of a bullet. Tom Warlow, Firearms, the Law, and 

Forensic Ballistics 212 (3d ed. 2012), https://books.google.com/books/

about/Firearms_the_Law_and_Forensic_Ballistics.html?id=1jHNBQA

AQBAJ (book sample).

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UNITED STATES V. LUCAS 5

the district court issued a writ of habeas corpus ad 

prosequendum directing state authorities to bring Lucas 

before the district court to face his federal criminal charge. 

On April 16, 2014, Lucas completed his state sentence and 

was taken directly from state custody to the district court for 

an initial appearance on his federal charge.2

II

After Lucas was federally charged, his defense counsel 

asked the federal prosecutor whether she had obtained a 

waiver of the government’s Petite policy, which generally 

precludes a successive federal prosecution after a state 

prosecution based on the same conduct unless (1) the case 

involves a substantial federal interest; (2) the prior 

prosecution left that substantial federal interest 

unvindicated; (3) the defendant’s conduct constitutes a 

criminal offense and the government believes sufficient 

evidence exists to sustain a conviction; and (4) the 

subsequent prosecution has been approved by the 

appropriate Assistant Attorney General. See U.S. Attorneys’ 

Manual § 9-2.031 (1997) (“Petite policy”).3 The prosecutor 

replied that she had obtained a Petite waiver and that the 

substantial federal interest was two-fold: the incident had 

 2 Although the federal prosecutor at Lucas’s initial appearance 

represented that Lucas had three months remaining on his state sentence, 

she later confirmed and agreed with defense counsel that Lucas had 

served his entire state sentence.

3 The Petite policy is a set of internal guidelines promulgated by the 

Department of Justice “for the exercise of discretion by appropriate 

officers of the Department of Justice in determining whether to bring a 

federal prosecution based on substantially the same act(s) or transactions 

involved in a prior state or federal proceeding. See Rinaldi v. United 

States, 434 U.S. 22, 27 (1977); Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 

(1960).” U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-2.031.

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6 UNITED STATES V. LUCAS

taken place in a BART station, and Lucas had not received 

an adequate state sentence.

Lucas’s defense counsel later sent the prosecutor a 

discovery request, seeking information that he hoped would 

demonstrate that federal and state authorities had colluded in 

prosecuting Lucas in violation of the Double Jeopardy 

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Citing Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963), defense counsel specifically requested:

any and all information regarding the 

coordination of firearm investigations and 

prosecutions between the federal government 

here in the Northern District of California and 

state law enforcement authorities in the City 

and County of San Francisco, California, for 

the past 10 years and particularly in the 

instant case of Joshua Lucas.

The prosecutor refused to provide the information, asserting 

that neither Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 nor 

Brady authorized counsel’s request. She further contended 

that Rule 16 expressly barred the disclosure of internal 

memoranda and reports between the various authorities.

Lucas then moved to compel the production of five 

categories of evidence:

• Any formal policy or memorandum of 

understanding between the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office and the San Francisco 

District Attorney’s Office, Sheriff’s 

Department or Police Department 

regarding coordination in the 

investigation or prosecution of firearm 

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UNITED STATES V. LUCAS 7

cases, including the “Trigger Lock” 

program, that may have played a role in 

the successive charging of Mr. Lucas in 

this case. . . .

• All letters, emails, memoranda or other 

existing documentation regarding any 

informal agreement, understanding or 

practice of coordination between the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office and the San Francisco 

District Attorney’s Office, Sheriff’s 

Department or Police Department in the 

investigation or prosecution of firearm 

cases that may have played a role in the 

successive charging of Mr. Lucas in this 

case. . . .

• Any state/federal cross-designation4 of 

law enforcement officials involved in 

firearms cases in San Francisco, that may 

have played a role in the successive 

charging of Mr. Lucas in this case. . . .

• All letters, emails, memoranda or other 

existing documentation showing the 

point at which federal authorities became 

aware of the state prosecution against Mr. 

Lucas and what communications 

 4 “Cross-designation” refers to the practice of swearing in a state law 

enforcement officer as a special deputy United States marshal to assist 

in joint state/federal task forces. It also includes administering a similar 

oath to federal officers assisting in state prosecutions.

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8 UNITED STATES V. LUCAS

occurred between federal and state 

authorities, when they occurred and who 

initiated them. . . .

• Any record of the claimed Petite waiver 

in Mr. Lucas’s case, including when it 

was obtained.

A

The district court referred the motion to United States 

Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler, who denied it after a 

hearing. In her written order, Judge Beeler concluded that 

Lucas had failed to make a preliminary showing of 

inter-sovereign collusion to obtain discovery under Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, as required by United States 

v. Zone, 403 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2005).5 Judge Beeler also 

found that the first three categories of evidence Lucas sought 

would establish only cooperation and could not establish 

collusion. She further rejected Lucas’s argument that he was 

entitled to the requested evidence under Brady and noted in 

her written order that the government had represented that 

no Brady material existed. Lucas timely objected to the 

magistrate judge’s ruling.

 5 Prior to issuing her ruling, the magistrate judge reviewed the 

following discovery produced by the government: (1) a record of 

proceedings in state court; (2) the BART police reports, which identify 

the transit agency police officers involved in the investigation; 

(3) witness statements; (4) the indictment in the federal case; (5) Lucas’s 

criminal history; and (6) the firearm analysis showing that the firearms 

recovered from Lucas had an interstate commerce nexus.

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UNITED STATES V. LUCAS 9

B

District Judge Edward Chen then held a hearing on 

Lucas’s objections. At the hearing, Lucas’s counsel 

acknowledged that he had to make “some kind of threshold 

showing” to obtain the requested discovery. He contended, 

however, that he had made the required showing. His proffer 

included a 2005 news article on federal “intervention” into 

state firearm prosecutions, which described San Francisco’s 

initiative to lower gun violence by referring convicted felons 

who were caught with guns to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for 

prosecution under federal “Trigger Lock” laws that provided 

for extended sentences. See Jaxon Van Derbeken, ‘Trigger 

Lock’ Law Helps Cut Gang-Related Killings in Half, 

SFGATE (July 21, 2005, 4:00 AM) (“Trigger Lock”), 

http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/SAN-FRANCISCOTrigger-Lock-law-helps-cut-2621421.php.

Lucas also presented an affidavit attesting to the unique 

circumstances of his case and highlighting the fact that he 

was taken from state custody directly to federal court upon 

completing his state sentence. The prosecutor represented at 

the hearing that no state district attorney or law enforcement 

officer had been cross-designated in this matter. This 

representation was responsive to Lucas’s request for 

information about whether officers involved in the federal 

and state prosecutions were cross-designated. The 

prosecutor reported at the hearing that the case agent in 

Lucas’s federal case was an FBI agent.

Judge Chen overruled Lucas’s objections at the hearing 

and later in a written order, concluding that Lucas had failed 

to make a preliminary showing of inter-sovereign collusion 

under Rule 16 as required under Zone. The district court 

rejected Lucas’s claim that he was entitled to discovery 

under Brady, finding that Lucas had not shown a “substantial 

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10 UNITED STATES V. LUCAS

basis for claiming materiality exists” to justify his discovery 

requests under Brady. The court also found that Lucas was 

not entitled to an in camera review of the government’s files. 

The district court relied upon the government’s 

representation that no Brady material regarding 

inter-sovereign collusion existed and the government’s 

promise that such evidence would be produced if it were 

discovered.

To perfect the discovery issue for appeal, Lucas filed a 

motion to dismiss the indictment under the Double Jeopardy 

Clause. In his motion, Lucas conceded that he could not 

meet his burden to obtain relief without the requested 

discovery that the district court ostensibly denied him. The 

district court denied Lucas’s motion to dismiss.

On December 17, 2014, Lucas was convicted of being a 

felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) following a stipulated-testimony bench trial that 

preserved Lucas’s right to appeal the district court’s 

discovery ruling. On March 4, 2015, he was sentenced to 

twenty-two months’ imprisonment and three years’ 

supervised release. Lucas filed a timely appeal of his 

judgment and sentence. On January 26, 2016, Lucas was 

released from federal custody. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 

Inmate Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (results for 

“Joshua Lucas” or BOP Register Number 19687-111) (last 

visited Oct. 19, 2016); see also United States v. Basher, 

629 F.3d 1161, 1165 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) (taking judicial 

notice of publicly-available information from the BOP 

Inmate Locator).

III

We have jurisdiction to review the order denying Lucas’s 

discovery requests under 18 U.S.C. § 1291 because a final 

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UNITED STATES V. LUCAS 11

judgment has issued. See United States v. Doe, 705 F.3d 

1134, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2013). We review alleged Brady

violations de novo. Id. Lucas, however, does not present a 

standard Brady claim, which would require him to show that 

he was prejudiced by the government’s willful or inadvertent 

suppression of favorable evidence. Id. at 1152; see also 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) (“[S]trictly 

speaking, there is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the 

nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable 

probability that the suppressed evidence would have 

produced a different verdict.”). Here, Lucas cannot point to 

any existing favorable evidence to support his speculation. 

Instead, he asserts that he is entitled to more information to 

prove his suspicions under Brady or, in the alternative, under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.6 Lucas requests, 

however, that we remand to the district court to conduct 

further review to confirm that the government has 

discharged its Brady obligations.

Lucas’s appeal thus presents questions about a ruling on 

discovery, which we review for an abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1210 (9th Cir. 

2004) (“We review discovery questions, including alleged 

Brady and Jencks Act rulings, for abuse of discretion.”); see 

also United States v. Michaels, 796 F.2d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 

1986) (reviewing denial of request for discovery under 

Brady for abuse of discretion). “To find an abuse of 

discretion, we must ‘have a definite and firm conviction that 

 6 “Although we are dealing here with [Lucas’s] discovery request 

rather than his motion to dismiss, the two are clearly related: The 

purpose of the discovery request is to [find evidence to] provide a basis 

for the motion to dismiss. [Lucas] seeks information that, he hopes, will 

establish his right, by virtue of the Double Jeopardy Clause, not to be 

tried.” Zone, 403 F.3d at 1106.

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12 UNITED STATES V. LUCAS

the district court committed a clear error of judgment.’” 

Doe, 705 F.3d at 1150 (citation omitted). We cannot say this 

standard is met on the record before us.

IV

The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person 

shall be “subject for the same offence to be twice put in 

jeopardy of life and limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. This 

clause does not prohibit successive prosecutions by separate 

sovereigns—such as the federal government and the State of

California—arising out of the same acts:

“Every citizen of the United States is also a 

citizen of a State or territory. He may be said 

to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may 

be liable to punishment for an infraction of 

the laws of either. The same act may be an 

offence or transgression of the laws of both.”

Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131 (1959) (quoting Moore 

v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 20 (1852)). There is, however, a 

narrow exception to this dual-sovereign doctrine.

In Bartkus, the Supreme Court warned that the Double 

Jeopardy Clause might proscribe consecutive federal and 

state prosecutions when a later state prosecution is “a sham 

and a cover for a federal prosecution, and thereby in essential 

fact another federal prosecution.” Id. at 124. We have 

adopted the Bartkus exception and found that, while 

cooperation between prosecuting sovereigns does not 

implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause, “collusion between 

federal and state authorities could bar the second 

prosecution.” United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182 

(9th Cir. 1987); see also Zone, 403 F.3d at 1104.

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UNITED STATES V. LUCAS 13

In short: Cooperation is constitutional; collusion is not. 

Impermissible collusion may be found when the prosecutors 

of one sovereign “so thoroughly dominate[ ] or manipulate[ 

]” the prosecutorial machinery of the other sovereign “that 

the latter retains little or no volition in its own proceedings.” 

Zone, 403 F.3d at 1105 (alterations in original) (quoting 

United States v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 827 (1st Cir. 1996)). 

Such collusion may occur when a second prosecution “is not 

pursued to vindicate the separate interests of the second 

sovereign, but is merely pursued as a sham on behalf of the 

sovereign first to prosecute.” United States v. Guy, 903 F.2d

1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1990).

We have recognized that, under Bartkus, “it is extremely 

difficult and highly unusual” for a defendant to show that a 

prosecution by one government was a “tool, a sham or a 

cover for the other government.” United States v. FigueroaSoto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1991). Indeed, in 

Figueroa-Soto, we found that the Bartkus exception did not 

apply when: (1) the state prosecuted the defendant at the 

request of federal authorities; (2) federal agents assisted with 

the state prosecution, sitting at the prosecutor’s table at trial 

and testifying as witnesses; (3) the federal authorities 

provided evidence against the defendant for use during the 

state trial; (4) the federal sentencing hearing of a key witness 

was delayed until after the witness testified in the state trial 

against the defendant; (5) a federal forfeiture proceeding was 

delayed so the state prosecution would not be adversely 

affected; (6) federal agents contacted the state’s witnesses 

before trial; and (7) the state prosecutor was crossdesignated as a special assistant U.S. attorney to prosecute 

the defendant in federal court and was paid by the state for 

his role in the federal prosecution. Id. at 1018–19. We noted 

that Bartkus permits “very close coordination in the 

prosecutions, in the employment of agents of one sovereign 

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14 UNITED STATES V. LUCAS

to help the other sovereign in its prosecution, and in the 

timing of the court proceedings so that the maximum 

assistance is mutually rendered by the sovereigns.” Id. at 

1020. 

Defendants in other cases have faced similar difficulty in 

seeking remand for an evidentiary hearing on their double 

jeopardy defense. In United States v. Koon, for example, a 

defendant’s “conclusory allegations” of collusion were 

insufficient to obtain an evidentiary hearing despite evidence 

that:

(1) the federal investigation began when the 

crime occurred and remained active during 

the state investigation and prosecution; 

(2) federal and state authorities cooperated 

with each other, and the state delivered 

evidence and investigative reports to federal 

authorities after the state prosecution; 

(3) witnesses who testified in the federal trial 

were interviewed by the federal authorities 

soon after the incident; and (4) [a] videotape 

[recording of testimony in the state trial] was 

admitted into evidence in the federal trial.

34 F.3d 1416, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d in part on other 

grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). We held that such evidence 

“at most show[s] cooperation between federal and state 

authorities” and does not justify remand for an evidentiary 

hearing. Id.

A

Lucas contends that, to the extent it applies, Federal Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 16 authorizes his requests for 

discovery regarding the degree to which federal and state 

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UNITED STATES V. LUCAS 15

authorities cooperated in his case. Subject to the exemptions 

described in Rule 16(a)(2), Rule 16(a)(1)(E) requires that, 

upon a defendant’s request, the government must “disclose 

any documents or other objects within its possession, 

custody or control” that are “material to preparing the 

defense.” United States v. Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 

768 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)). 

“[T]o obtain discovery under Rule 16, a defendant must 

make a prima facie showing of materiality.” Zone, 403 F.3d 

at 1107 (quoting United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 

1219 (9th Cir. 1990)). This “low threshold” is satisfied if 

the information requested would have “helped” Lucas 

prepare a defense. Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d at 768. 

“Neither a general description of the information sought nor 

conclusory allegations of materiality suffice; a defendant 

must present facts which would tend to show that the 

[g]overnment is in possession of information helpful to the 

defense.” Mandel, 914 F.2d at 1219. Lucas’s assertion that 

he met this threshold for materiality under Rule 16 is 

foreclosed by Zone.

In Zone, we applied Rule 16 to facts nearly identical to 

those in Lucas’s case and found that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Zone’s request for discovery 

to develop his double jeopardy defense. 403 F.3d at 1107.7 

Similar to the facts here, after Zone pleaded guilty to a 

firearm charge in state court, he was indicted in federal court 

for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Id. at 1103. Like Lucas, Zone’s 

 7 We reject the government’s argument that Lucas waived any 

reliance on Rule 16 in his discovery efforts. The district court applied 

Zone and Rule 16 to Lucas’s discovery requests. Lucas contends on 

appeal that, if Rule 16 does apply, he has met the required showing of 

materiality. Therefore, the Rule 16 argument is properly before us.

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16 UNITED STATES V. LUCAS

federal charge was based on the same conduct as his state 

charge. Id. Suspecting that federal prosecutors had sought 

to secure a guilty plea in state court to use in the federal case, 

Zone asked for discovery to develop a double jeopardy 

defense. Id. at 1103–06. Specifically, Zone requested 

records from the weekly meetings of a federally-funded task 

force comprising the U.S. Attorney’s Office, federal agents, 

county deputy district attorneys, and local police department 

investigators. Id. at 1103. The task force was formed to 

address gun violence by “promot[ing] cooperation and 

information-sharing” and “discuss[ing] and coordinat[ing] 

participants’ activities” for gun-related offenses. Id.

The district court denied Zone’s discovery request and 

subsequently denied Zone’s motion to dismiss after 

concluding that he had not established a prima facie double 

jeopardy claim. See id. at 1105. In support of his motion to 

dismiss, Zone had proffered newspaper articles about the 

task force. Id. We held that Zone’s proffered articles 

contained “general information that at most suggest[ed] that 

federal and state prosecutors collaborate[d] as equal, 

independent partners in the task force’s weekly strategy 

sessions.” Id. We further held that Zone failed to “make a 

prima facie showing of materiality” under Rule 16 because 

he did not make “a preliminary showing of ‘inter-sovereign 

collusion,’ as opposed to mere ‘inter-sovereign 

cooperation.’” Id. at 1107 (quoting Mandel, 914 F.2d at 

1219). We therefore upheld the district court’s denial of 

Zone’s discovery request and motion to dismiss and denied 

Zone’s “request that we remand for an evidentiary hearing 

and further discovery.” Id.

Here, the district court properly found that Zone is

indistinguishable from Lucas’s case and that Lucas failed to 

make the threshold showing of materiality. Lucas’s 

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UNITED STATES V. LUCAS 17

arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. The Trigger 

Lock article that Lucas presented to the district court, like the 

news articles in Zone, merely describes the cooperation 

between federal and state authorities in attempting to reduce 

gun violence in San Francisco.8 Lucas’s defense counsel 

even acknowledged to the district court that the cooperation 

described in the article “seems benign and seems just 

cooperative.” See Trigger Lock, supra at 9 (“The number of 

killings in San Francisco attributed to gangs . . . has dropped 

by more than 50 percent so far this year from 2004, thanks 

in part to intervention by federal law enforcement . . . to 

identify the city’s most violent predators and subject them to 

federal prosecution . . . .”).

In addition to the Trigger Lock article, Lucas’s proffer 

included: (1) an affidavit from his defense counsel stating 

that it was exceedingly rare for a firearm case to be charged 

federally after an individual had completed a state court 

 8 Neither the appellate excerpts of record nor Lucas’s motions before 

the district court include the Trigger Lock article upon which Lucas 

relies. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a) (stating that the record on appeal 

includes original papers and exhibits filed in the district court, the 

transcript of proceedings, and a certified copy of the district court’s 

docket entries). At the hearing on Lucas’s motion to compel, however, 

the district judge asked to see a copy of the Trigger Lock article, noting 

that it had not been attached to Lucas’s motion to compel. Lucas’s 

defense counsel then gave a copy of the article to the court and discussed 

its contents with the court. Both the district court’s order denying the 

motion to compel and the government’s brief on appeal provide the 

website address for the article. The Trigger Lock article is thus part of 

the record and we may consider it here. See Townsend v. Columbia 

Operations, 667 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that documents 

were properly part of the appellate record when “they were submitted at 

the request of the district judge, were physically in the courtroom at the 

argument, were referred to and relied on by both sides in that argument, 

and were the basis of the opinion dictated by the court at the end of the 

argument”).

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18 UNITED STATES V. LUCAS

sentence for the same conduct; (2) an argument that the 

“weak” federal interest in this case—the incident’s 

occurrence at a mass transit station—demonstrated that the 

federal prosecution sought to vindicate state, rather than 

federal, interests in violation of the Petite policy; and (3) a 

claim that the federal prosecution’s “perfect timing” with the 

end of Lucas’s state sentence evidenced that federal and state 

authorities engaged in more than mere cooperation.

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in finding that Lucas’s proffer failed to meet the threshold 

for materiality under Rule 16. As the district court noted, the 

prosecutor represented that an informal poll of federal 

prosecutors in her office revealed that, in the previous five 

years, five federal cases like Lucas’s were prosecuted after 

the defendant had completed a state sentence for the same 

conduct. Lucas contends that this informal poll actually 

supports his argument that his prosecution was unusual. But 

an unusual prosecution is not enough to meet the threshold 

for materiality under Rule 16.

Lucas’s claim of collusion based on the “weakness” of 

the federal interest in this case and the inadequacy of his state 

sentence is similarly unavailing. As Lucas acknowledges, 

the Petite policy does not confer substantive rights upon him. 

See United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 

1979). Thus, while he may quarrel with the strength of the 

federal interest asserted in this case, our review does not 

extend to revisiting the wisdom of the internal prosecutorial 

decisions made by the Department of Justice. It is perfectly 

sensible that federal authorities sought to prosecute Lucas 

after his comparatively light state sentence for possessing a 

firearm as a convicted felon. Their decision to do so is not 

emblematic of any undue influence by state authorities.

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UNITED STATES V. LUCAS 19

The allegedly “perfect timing” of the federal prosecution 

also fails to establish the threshold materiality showing 

under Rule 16. Lucas argues on appeal that, because of 

California’s complicated scheme for awarding good-time 

credits, release dates for state inmates are difficult to predict. 

According to Lucas, the fact that he was transferred from 

state custody directly to federal court is “suspicious[ ]” and 

“indicates an unusually close relationship between the state 

and federal authorities.” We find nothing unusual about the 

federal prosecutor’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad 

prosequendum and the district court’s issuance of that writ 

just prior to Lucas’s release from state custody. 

Additionally, at the time, the federal prosecutor believed that 

Lucas had three months remaining on his state sentence. Her 

mistaken belief suggests that federal and state authorities 

were not operating as one collusive machine, but

permissively communicating—and even miscommunicating

—about Lucas’s release date.

We conclude on this record that, under Zone and the high 

evidentiary standard in double jeopardy claims, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Lucas failed 

to make a sufficient showing of materiality under Rule 16.

B

Seeking to avoid Rule 16’s materiality requirement, 

Lucas argues that he is not required to make a preliminary 

showing of materiality because he brought his discovery 

requests under Brady. However, Lucas has yet to identify 

any Brady material that supports his claim.

1

Under Brady, the government must disclose information 

favorable to the accused that “is material either to guilt or to 

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20 UNITED STATES V. LUCAS

punishment.” 373 U.S. at 87. Evidence is material for Brady

purposes if a “reasonable probability” exists that the result 

of a proceeding would have been different had the 

government disclosed the information to the defense. United 

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). A reasonable 

probability is one that is “sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome” of either the defendant’s guilty plea or trial. 

Id.; see Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1148 (9th Cir. 

2007) (en banc) (citing Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 

1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995)). “The government has a duty to 

disclose Brady material even in the absence of a request by 

the defense.” United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 387 

(9th Cir. 2004).

Here, the government affirmatively represented that it 

did not possess evidence of inter-sovereign collusion. Lucas 

contends that this “conclusory representation” did not 

discharge the government’s obligations under Brady

because the government must either produce information 

responsive to his discovery requests or submit whatever it 

possesses to the district court for an in camera review to 

confirm that no such evidence exists. Lucas’s argument, 

however, is flawed.

It is the government, not the defendant or the trial court, 

that decides prospectively what information, if any, is 

material and must be disclosed under Brady. While we have 

encouraged the government to submit close questions 

regarding materiality to the court for in camera review, the 

government is not required to do so. See Milke v. Ryan, 

711 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2013). And, as the Supreme 

Court has explained, Brady does not permit a defendant to 

sift through information held by the government to 

determine materiality:

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UNITED STATES V. LUCAS 21

A defendant’s right to discover exculpatory 

evidence does not include the unsupervised 

authority to search through the 

[government’s] files. Although the eye of an 

advocate may be helpful to a defendant in 

ferreting out information, this Court has 

never held . . . that a defendant alone may 

make the determination as to the materiality 

of the information. Settled practice is to the 

contrary. In the typical case where a 

defendant makes only a general request for 

exculpatory material under Brady, it is the 

State that decides which information must be 

disclosed. . . . Defense counsel has no 

constitutional right to conduct his own search 

of the State’s files to argue relevance.

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59–60 (1987) 

(footnote and citations omitted); see also Weatherford v. 

Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general 

constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and 

Brady did not create one.”).

“Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other 

exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the 

court’s attention, the prosecutor’s decision on disclosure is 

final.” Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60 (footnote omitted). To 

challenge the government’s representation that it lacks 

Brady information, Lucas must either make a showing of 

materiality under Rule 16 or otherwise demonstrate that the 

government improperly withheld favorable evidence. See, 

e.g., id. at 58 n.15 (“[Defendant], of course, may not require 

the trial court to search through [a statutorily-protected child 

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abuse] file without first establishing a basis for his claim that 

it contains material evidence.”). He has not done so here.9

For example, in United States v. Michaels, we upheld a 

denial of the defendant’s motion to compel certain interview 

notes under Brady where the defendant “offer[ed] no reason 

for believing that the notes contain[ed] significant material 

that [was] not contained in the typed [interview] summaries”

the government had already provided. 796 F.2d at 1116. We 

also observed that “Brady does not establish a ‘duty to 

provide defense counsel with unlimited discovery of 

everything known by the prosecutor’” or permit the 

defendant to “compel production of the notes so that he 

could search through them for anything useful.” Id. (citation 

omitted).

Similarly, in United States v. Mincoff, we affirmed the 

district court’s denial of a Brady motion where the defendant 

had “not identified any potentially exculpatory evidence that 

was not disclosed to him.” 574 F.3d 1186, 1199–2000 (9th 

Cir. 2009). We held that “‘mere speculation about materials 

in the government’s files’ [does] not require the district court 

to make those materials available, or mandate an in camera

inspection.” Id. at 1200 (quoting Michaels, 796 F.2d at 

1116).

By contrast, in United States v. Blanco, we remanded to 

the district court to “order full disclosure by the government 

of any and all potential Brady . . . material” related to a 

 9 Lucas correctly observes that we have yet to decide whether Brady

applies to evidence that is relevant to a double jeopardy claim. We need 

not decide that question here because, even assuming that Brady applies

to such evidence, Lucas still has not met the requisite showing to 

challenge the government’s contention that it does not possess evidence 

of inter-sovereign collusion.

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UNITED STATES V. LUCAS 23

particular trial witness where the defendant showed that the 

government had suppressed Brady material concerning that 

witness. 392 F.3d at 392–95. Likewise, in United States v. 

Doe, we remanded to the district court to determine whether 

the government violated its Brady obligations in responding 

to the defendant’s discovery requests after the defendant had 

made the required showing of materiality under Rule 16. 

705 F.3d at 1150–53.

2

Relying on United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), 

Lucas argues that the government must disclose all relevant 

material in response to a defendant’s specific request for 

information because Brady’s materiality standard is more 

lenient in this circumstance than it is when the defense 

makes no request or only a general request. Lucas 

recognizes, however, that although Agurs “suggested that 

the standard [of materiality] might be more lenient [where 

the defense makes a specific request and the prosecutor fails 

to disclose responsive evidence] than . . . [where] the 

defense makes no request or only a general request,” Bagley 

later set forth a single test for materiality that applies 

regardless whether there was a specific request, a general 

request, or no request for Brady material. Bagley, 473 U.S. 

at 681–82 (modifying Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106). Under 

Bagley’s standard, “evidence is material only if there is a 

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 

to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id. at 682. The government’s obligation under 

Brady thus does not change simply because Lucas made a 

“specific” request for information.

Lucas further attempts to redefine the government’s 

obligations under Brady by citing dicta discussing the 

difficulty that prosecutors face before trial in determining 

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what information will be material after trial. In United 

States v. Olsen, we stated in a footnote that a “prosecutor’s 

speculative prediction about the likely materiality of 

favorable evidence . . . should not limit the disclosure of 

such evidence, because it is just too difficult to analyze

before trial whether particular evidence ultimately will prove 

to be ‘material’ after trial.” 704 F.3d 1172, 1183 n.3 (9th 

Cir. 2013). Relying on this observation, Lucas asserts that 

the government here should not be permitted to speculate 

about whether the district court may find certain evidence 

sufficient to support a double jeopardy claim. Instead, Lucas 

argues that the government must disclose all of the evidence 

in its possession responsive to Lucas’s discovery requests.

While Olsen encouraged prosecutors to err on the side of 

disclosure, it did not alter the fundamental construct of 

Brady, which makes the prosecutor the initial arbiter of 

materiality and disclosure. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60. 

Thus, unless Lucas can make a showing of materiality or 

demonstrate that the government has withheld favorable 

evidence, he must rely on “the prosecutor’s decision 

[regarding] disclosure.” Id. Lucas has not made the 

requisite showing under Brady to contest the prosecutor’s 

assertion that the government lacks any evidence of intersovereign collusion.

Nor has Lucas shown that he is entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing regarding the degree of cooperation between federal 

and state authorities. In Zone, we denied the defendant’s 

“request for remand and an evidentiary hearing because [the 

defendant had] not presented any evidence of undue 

coercion or collusion by federal authorities.” 403 F.3d at 

1106 (citing Koon, 34 F.3d at 1439). Moreover, in Koon, we 

held that the defendants’ proffered evidence did not warrant 

remand for an evidentiary hearing where the defendants 

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UNITED STATES V. LUCAS 25

provided more evidence of cooperation between federal and 

state authorities than Lucas has here. Compare Koon, 

34 F.3d at 1439, and supra at 14, with supra at 16–18. 

Accordingly, the evidence Lucas has submitted does not 

warrant remand for an evidentiary hearing.

V

For nearly forty years, the Supreme Court has reminded 

us that “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery 

in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.” 

Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559. To obtain discovery under 

Rule 16, Lucas must make the requisite showing of 

materiality. And to challenge the government’s 

representation that it does not have Brady evidence, Lucas 

must do more than speculate that Brady material exists. 

Because Lucas’s proffer is insufficient to compel the 

government to provide the information he seeks, the district 

court did not err in denying his request for that information.

AFFIRMED.

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