Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50533/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50533-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Israel Ornelas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ISRAEL ORNELAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50533

D.C. No.

3:13-cr-03313-JAH-3

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 6, 2016—Pasadena, California

Filed May 4, 2016

Before: Jerome Farris, Timothy M. Tymkovich*

,

and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tymkovich

* The Honorable Timothy M. Tymkovich, Chief Judge for the Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. ORNELAS

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel dismissed an appeal from a sentence imposed

in absentia in a case in which the defendant disappeared and

lost contact with his lawyer after he signed a plea agreement

and entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine. 

The panel observed that under Fed. R. Crim. P. 43, the

defendant’s right to be present at sentencing can be waived,

and that so long as the defendant’s absence is voluntary, the

district court may proceed in absentia. Seeing no reason for

departing from the standard in cases concerning trials

conducted in absentia, the panel reviewed the district court’s

sentencing decision for abuse of discretion, and reviewed the

district court’s factual determination that the defendant was

“voluntarily absent” from the proceedings for clear error.

The panel held that the facts in the record support both

the district court’s determination that the defendant was

voluntarily absent from the hearing and its decision to

proceed with sentencing, and that because the defendant

concedes that due process provides only the protections of

Rule 43 and no more, the district court’s actions did not

violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. The panel held

that the defendant’s waiver of his right to be present at

sentencing likewise waived his right under Fed. R. Crim. P.

32 to review the presentence report. 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. ORNELAS 3

The panel therefore concluded that the sentence imposed

by the district court was not unlawful, and, accordingly,

applied the valid appeal waiver contained in the defendant’s

plea agreement.

COUNSEL

David A. Schlesinger (argued), Jacobs & Schlesinger LLP,

San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Janet A. Cabral (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Peter Ko, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division; Laura

E. Duffy, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s

Office, San Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge:

Federal law gives defendants the right to be present at

their trials and sentencings unless they voluntarily waive this

right. In this case, after signing a plea agreement admitting

to drug distribution, but before sentencing, Israel Ornelas

disappeared and lost contact with his lawyer. The district

court proceeded with sentencing in absentia and imposed a

prison term of 120 months—the mandatory minimum for the

charged crimes.

Ornelas was subsequently arrested and now claims the

district court’s sentencing without his presence violated both

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process

Clause to the Constitution. Because we find the district court

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4 UNITED STATES V. ORNELAS

did not abuse its discretion or violate Ornelas’s constitutional

rights by sentencing him in absentia, we enforce the appeal

waiver and DISMISS this appeal.

BACKGROUND

Ornelas was arrested in 2013 by federal law enforcement

after DEA agents observed Ornelas’s involvement in the

purchase of methamphetamine in the parking lot of a store. 

At the time, Ornelas and four co-defendants had already been

indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. After his arrest,

Ornelas appeared before a magistrate judge for arraignment

and posted a $25,000 bond. During his release and after

several more proceedings before the magistrate judge, the

government and Ornelas agreed that he would undergo drug

testing and mental health counseling.

Prior to trial, the government informed Ornelas that it

would seek to double the five-year mandatory minimum for

his offenses because of his 1994 drug conviction in

California. Rather than proceed to trial, Ornelas agreed to

plead guilty to one of the counts and conceded his 1994

conviction was a “qualifying prior conviction within the

meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 851.” The plea agreement also stated

that the government would seek a “safety-valve reduction”

under U.S. SentencingGuidelines §§ 2D1.1(b)(11) and 5C1.2

if it deemed such a reduction appropriate, and that Ornelas

could qualify for an acceptance of responsibility reduction. 

But the government was not required to seek this last

reduction if Ornelas materially breached the agreement by,

among other things, failing to appear in court. Finally,

Ornelas agreed to waive his right to appeal unless the district

court imposed a sentence above the high end of the

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UNITED STATES V. ORNELAS 5

recommended Guidelines range. Ornelas appeared before a

magistrate judge on August 21, 2014, to change his plea to

guilty and agreed to appear at a sentencing hearing three

months later.

After his plea but before the sentencing hearing, DEA

agents served a search warrant at Ornelas’s residence and

found eight grams of methamphetamine in his living room. 

Ornelas then failed to report telephonically with pretrial

services—as required—and stopped living at his surety’s

home. As a result, the government filed a petition alleging

Ornelas had violated several of the supervisory conditions

associated with his bond and requested a warrant for his

arrest. A magistrate judge issued the warrant and ordered

Ornelas to appear at a bond revocation hearing. Ornelas did

not appear at the hearing.

The district court proceeded to the previously set

sentencing hearing on November 24, 2014. Ornelas’s

attorney attended, but Ornelas did not appear. His attorney

objected to the proceeding, arguing that sentencing Ornelas

in absentia would violate his due process rights and his right

to confer with counsel under the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure—especially since counsel and Ornelas did not

have the opportunity to discuss the presentence report. The

district court overruled the objections and sentenced Ornelas

in absentia to the ten-year mandatory minimum. The district

court also stated on the record that it would have sentenced

Ornelas to 120 months even without the mandatoryminimum

because he presented false information to the Probation

Office and failed to appear at the hearing.

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6 UNITED STATES V. ORNELAS

DISCUSSION

Ornelas acknowledges that his appeal waiver explicitly

covers the circumstances here because his sentence was not

above the high end of the guideline range recommended by

the government. He also concedes that his plea was entered

into voluntarily and knowingly.

Under such circumstances, we would generally apply the

appeal waiver and dismiss this appeal. See United States v.

Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 2007). But we have

recognized some exceptions to this general rule. The

exception relevant here is for unlawful sentences, which we

have defined as those that “exceed[] the permissible statutory

penalty for the crime or violate[] the Constitution.” Id.

While the bulk of Ornelas’s claims and briefing address his

claim that the sentencing court violated Rule 43 of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, he also claims his

constitutional due process rights were violated when he was

sentenced in absentia. We address whether the sentence was

lawful, and apply the appeal waiver if it was.

As an initial matter, Ornelas argues that the protections of

the Due Process Clause are coextensive with Rule 43’s

protections. The United States Constitution protects the right

to be present at one’s trial and sentencing. See U.S. Const.

amends. V, VI, XIV; Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338

(1970) (“One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the

Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in

the courtroom at every stage of his trial.”). And Rule 43

requires that “the defendant must be present at . . . every trial

stage,” including “sentencing.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(2)–(3). 

In fact, Rule 43 was intended to protect a swath of rights

broader than those protected by the Constitution alone. As

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UNITED STATES V. ORNELAS 7

the Third Circuit explained, “Rule 43 embodies the right to be

present derived from the Sixth Amendment Confrontation

Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments, and the common law privilege of presence. . . . 

[T]he scope of Rule 43 was intended to be broader than the

constitutional right.” United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d

131, 138 (3d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted); see also United

States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Rule

43 embodies the protections afforded by the sixth amendment

confrontation clause, the due process guarantee of the fifth

and fourteenth amendments, and the common law right of

presence.”).

But this right, like most rights, can be waived. Rule 43(c)

provides that a “defendant who was initially present at trial,

or who had pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, waives the

right to be present . . . in a noncapital case, when the

defendant is voluntarily absent during sentencing.” Thus,

under Rule 43, so long as the defendant’s absence is

“voluntary,” the district court may proceed with trial and

sentencing in absentia. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(1)(B); see

also Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 258 (1993).

We have never addressed the standard of review in an

appeal challenging a sentencing in absentia. But we see no

reason—and Ornelas has presented none—for departing from

the standard established in cases concerning trials conducted

in absentia. In the trial context, we review district court

decisions for abuse of discretion. See United States v.

Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975) (reviewing a trial

conducted in absentia for abuse of discretion); see also

United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 280 (8th Cir.

1996) (same); United States v. Guyon, 27 F.3d 723, 727 (1st

Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Camacho, 955 F.2d 950,

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8 UNITED STATES V. ORNELAS

953 (4th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Sanchez,

790 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 1986) (same). Accordingly, we

review the district court’s sentencing decision here under the

same abuse of discretion standard. In addition, the district

court’s factual determination that the defendant was

“voluntarily absent” from the proceedings is reviewed for

clear error. See United States v. Houtchens, 926 F.2d 824,

827 (9th Cir. 1991).

Applying this rule, we assume for purposes of this

opinion that due process and Rule 43 are coextensive, and

analyze whether the district court abused its discretion—and

thus violated Rule 43—when it sentenced Ornelas in absentia. 

It did not. The court made a fact finding that Ornelas had

“absented himself” from the proceedings, which is a finding

of voluntary absence required by Rule 43. That finding is

supported by the record. As explained above, Ornelas had

appeared at multiple hearings (at least four) prior to the

sentencing and acknowledged that his presence was required

at the sentencing hearing. In addition, he had ample motive

to flee once drugs were found in his home because he likely

knew his bail would be revoked. By contrast, Ornelas’s

counsel put forward no evidence or explanation for his

absence. On appeal, counsel argues that the absence might be

explained by Ornelas’s history of substance abuse or mental

illness,

1

but that was never mentioned to the court at

sentencing. Taken together, the facts in the record support

both the district court’s determination that Ornelas was

voluntarily absent from the hearing and its decision to

proceed with sentencing. And because Ornelas concedes that

due process provides only the protections of Rule 43 and no

1 Ornelas was a heavy user of methamphetamine, and was attending

mental heath classes as a result of the death of his mother.

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UNITED STATES V. ORNELAS 9

more, the district court’s actions likewise did not violate

Ornelas’s constitutional rights.

Ornelas urges we adopt a stricter standard, pointing to the

Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Achbani, 507

F.3d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 2007). In that case, the court agreed

that Rule 43 permits the court to proceed in the defendant’s

absence if he is “voluntarily absent” after the proceedings

have commenced. But the court further observed that district

courts “must explore on the record any ‘serious questions’

raised about whether the defendant’s absence was knowing

and voluntary.” 507 F.3d at 601–02 (quoting United States v.

Watkins, 983 F.2d 1413, 1419 (7th Cir. 1993)). It also

explained that this duty “varies to the extent that defense

counsel suggests circumstances that raise a plausible doubt

that the defendant’s absence was voluntary.” Id. at 602. 

Relying on this language, Ornelas claims his history of drug

abuse and ADHD in the record make it “plausible” his

absence was involuntary, triggering a requirement for the

district court—sua sponte—to explore and confirm the

reasons for his absence. But none of these explanations were

pointed out by defense counsel, and in light of Ornelas’s

attendance at other court proceedings, the sentencing court

had no reason to inquire further. So even under the Achbani

standard, the district court did not err.

Second, to the extent the Seventh Circuit’s standard

places the onus on the government or the district court to

present evidence of voluntariness, this reverses the

appropriate burden of proof. Under Rule 43, Ornelas,

through counsel, was required to provide some evidence that

his absence was involuntary. Only then could the district

court be expected to explore whether that evidence supported

postponing sentencing. Because Ornelas presented no

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10 UNITED STATES V. ORNELAS

evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

sentencing him in absentia.

Finally, Ornelas contends the district court’s sentencing

decision violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32,

which requires the district court to “verify that the defendant

and the defendant’s attorney have read and discussed the

presentence report and any addendum to the report.” Fed. R.

Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(A). By sentencing him before this

discussion could take place, Ornelas argues, the district court

acted unlawfully.

2 But Rule 43’s provisions regarding

sentencing in absentia would have almost no effect if Rule

32’s requirements did not yield in appropriate circumstances. 

As the court put it in United States v. Jordan, 216 F.3d 1248,

1250 (11th Cir. 2000), “[w]hen a district court makes a

finding that a defendant has not only fled but is also

voluntarily absent from sentencing and has thus waived his

right to be present at sentencing, the defendant has also

waived his right [under Rule 32 to review the presentence

report]. Otherwise, Rule 43 would be largely useless.” 

Indeed, a defendant could “delay his sentencing indefinitely

by his own misconduct.” Id. at 1251.

The district court did not err in this case.

2

It is not clear whether Ornelas alleges this violation—like the supposed

violation of Rule 43—deprived him of his due process rights under the

Constitution. Without some constitutional claim, the exception to the

general rule applying appeal waivers would not apply. Nonetheless, for

completeness we consider the argument.

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UNITED STATES V. ORNELAS 11

CONCLUSION

The sentence imposed by the district court was not

unlawful. We apply the valid appeal waiver contained in

Ornelas’s plea agreement and DISMISS this appeal.

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