Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06588/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06588-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Sutton
Respondent
Michael Eugene Wyatt
Petitioner

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL EUGENE WYATT, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JOHN SUTTON, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 18-cv-06588-PJH 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

GRANTING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

Re: Dkt. No. 40 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent filed an answer and lodged exhibits with the court and petitioner filed several 

responses that the court has reviewed. For the reasons set out below, the petition is 

denied. 

BACKGROUND 

A jury found petitioner guilty of first-degree murder. People v. Wyatt, No. 

A144872, 2018 WL 1633816, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. April 5, 2018). Petitioner was 

sentenced to 56 years to life in prison. Id. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the 

conviction and the California Supreme Court denied review. Id.; Answer, Exs. J, L. 

Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the California Supreme Court, which denied review. 

Ex. M. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

The California Court of Appeal set forth the relevant facts: 

An information charged [petitioner] with the 2012 murder of 

James Nobles (Pen. Code, § 187) and alleged that he 

personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the 

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offense (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The information 

also alleged that [petitioner] had a prior serious felony 

conviction for his 1995 voluntary manslaughter of Titus 

Crowder in 1995 for purposes of Penal Code section 667, 

subdivisions (a) and (e). 

A. Prosecution Case 

On February 8, 2012, the Alameda County Sheriff's office 

received a report that a dead body had been discovered near 

the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) tracks in Hayward. 

Detective Joshua Armijo of the Alameda County Sheriff's Office 

responded to the scene and observed the body of an African–

American male at the bottom of a dirt embankment, near the 

support pillar of the elevated BART tracks. The body and 

clothing were relatively clean, leading Armijo to conclude that 

the victim had been killed elsewhere. The victim had two 

incised puncture wounds on his left chest, a swollen area on 

his left temple, a blackened eye, jawline swelling, and blood 

from his nostrils. 

1. Investigation 

The police did not find identification or personal effects on the 

body, but used fingerprints to identify the victim as James 

Nobles. Officers contacted Nobles's cousin, Ioma Nobles. She 

told them that Nobles had been living with “Mike” in Hayward. 

Although she did not have the exact address, she gave officers 

Mike's telephone number, which she would call if she wanted 

to reach Nobles. Police traced the phone number to 

[petitioner], who lived on Hampton Road, approximately a 

quarter-mile from where Nobles's body was discovered. They 

also determined this to be Nobles's last known address. 

Police obtained a warrant to search [petitioner’s]'s apartment 

on February 10, 2012. Officers executing the warrant observed 

blood drops inside the doorway and bloodstains on a mattress. 

Forensic evidence specialists found trace amounts of blood 

throughout the apartment. The search lasted approximately 12 

hours until the morning of February 11; [petitioner] was not 

there. 

2. Forensic Pathologist 

 Dr. Thomas Rogers conducted an autopsy on Nobles's body. 

He observed several blunt force injuries, including a bruise to 

the right eye, a laceration on the right side of the nose, and a 

bruise on the right arm. There were superficial incised wounds 

on Nobles's face, neck, and lower right leg, as well as six 

deeper stab wounds—two in the chest, one in the neck, one 

near the jawline, and two in the leg—that had been inflicted 

recently. The two chest wounds penetrated his left lung and 

caused life-threatening injuries. Dr. Rogers opined that 

multiple stab wounds and incised wounds were the cause of 

Nobles's death. 

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3. Ioma's Testimony 

Ioma testified that Nobles was mentally disabled and could be 

“slow” and “childish.” He took medications to control his 

symptoms, but had trouble remembering to take them. When 

he did not take his medication, he would behave oddly and 

mumble things that did not make sense. Even then, however, 

Nobles was not violent, and Ioma had never seen him behave 

aggressively or assault anyone. 

4. [Petitioner’s] Confession 

[Petitioner] surrendered to police on February 12, 2012. His 

shoes and pants had apparent bloodstains. He waived his 

Miranda rights and agreed to be interviewed by Detective 

Armijo and Alameda County Sheriff's Sergeant Dave Dixon. 

(See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.) A redacted 

recording of the interview was played for the jury. 

[Petitioner] told the officers that he was self-employed and took 

care of people in their homes. Years earlier he became friends 

with Nobles, who moved in with him in mid-2010. Nobles 

usually used his disability checks to pay the rent on the 

apartment. [Petitioner] denied they had any romantic 

involvement, but acknowledged that Nobles may have been 

interested in one. 

[Petitioner] generally did not have any conflict with Nobles. 

However, sometimes Nobles would “go off the deep end” and 

talk to himself, behave in a childlike manner, and at times 

urinate on himself. [Petitioner] would let him act out, and 

Nobles would come back around. Most of the time, “[Nobles] 

was a gentle, easy-goin' guy regardless of what the 

circumstances,” “he would not harm a fly,” and he was “never 

a threatening person.” 

[Petitioner] claimed he did not know Nobles's whereabouts and 

had not done anything to him. After police said they could 

prove that Nobles was killed in [petitioner’s] apartment, 

however, [petitioner] admitted to killing Nobles during a fight. 

He claimed that Nobles “flipped out,” [petitioner] tried to subdue 

him, and “the next thing you know, it just got outa hand and I 

lost it.” 

[Petitioner] recounted the events as follows. Two weeks before 

the homicide, Nobles started acting out consistently. Nobles 

acted out so much—every day with constant movement or 

incessant babbling—that [petitioner] asked him to move to a 

board and care home. Nobles did so for a while, but [petitioner] 

let him return to the apartment. 

Around 2:00 a.m. on Sunday, February 5, 2012, [petitioner] 

received a text from a male friend. Nobles knew it was from a 

man, and he became upset. Nobles started breathing hard and 

was constantly moving, making noises, and “acting real bad.” 

[Petitioner] asked Nobles to “chill out,” to no avail. [Petitioner] 

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repeatedly asked him to “just take it easy” and lie down, but 

Nobles did not stop. [Petitioner] told Nobles it would be best 

for him to leave at the end of the month, “[b]ecause this is gettin' 

outa hand here . . . [a]nd you constantly makin' it uncomfortable 

where I'm livin' at.” Nobles “rant[ed] and rave[d].” [Petitioner] 

was unable to sleep during Nobles's disruption, which 

continued until around 6:00 a.m. on Sunday. 

[Petitioner] awoke around 9:00 a.m. on Sunday. Nobles also 

awoke and was fine for a while, but then restarted his barrage 

of noise and movement. [Petitioner] repeatedly asked Nobles 

to calm down, but Nobles didn't relent, which “got [petitioner’s] 

nerves in a frenzy.” 

[Petitioner] described Nobles's behavior as “nagging,” 

explaining it as follows: “Words, there was a lot of movements 

. . . constant—he would get up and then he would write on the 

floor and then he would kick. It was just a lot of—I—I mean it 

may seem petty. You know, but it was just a lot of irritation. 

Just—just talking and you know and just moving around. . . . It 

just didn't—it just didn't let up.” 

Around 2:00 or 2:30 that afternoon, thing s “came to boil.” 

[Petitioner] was watching basketball on television. Nobles 

“started actin' crazy,” and [petitioner] asked for quiet. Nobles 

continued with his “madness” and “just kept on goin' and kept 

on and just kept on goin.” 

[Petitioner] duct-taped Nobles's hands together, duct-taped his 

ankles, and put duct-tape over his mouth. He also put Nobles 

in a corner and placed a mattress over him. Nobles broke free, 

untaping his hands and mouth. [Petitioner] unwrapped his 

ankles, but Nobles “started back at his theatrics again.” 

[Petitioner] told Nobles it was best for him to “leave next month,” 

but Nobles said he did not want to. Nobles's nagging persisted. 

[Petitioner] grabbed him by the shoulders and shook him; 

Nobles flailed around, “‘doin' his little strikin' and, you know, 

kickin,’” and refused to “act like a civilized person.” In 

[petitioner’s] words, “it was just a naggin' thing” and “it was just 

pressin' me and then it blew me up.” [Petitioner] grabbed a 

container of clear blue cleaning liquid and threw the liquid in 

Nobles's face. Nobles swallowed some of it, and it began to run 

out of his nose. 

Nobles “seemed like he was just [losin'] it.” Nobles kicked and 

slapped at [petitioner]—which [petitioner] agreed was Nobles 

defending himself—and [petitioner] punched Nobles in the chin. 

Nobles came at [petitioner] again, and [petitioner] punched him 

in the right eye. Nobles “went to the bathroom” and then 

“jumped and [ ] attacked again.” Nobles had no weapon, but 

he was “tryin' to swing and tryin' to grab.” [Petitioner] claimed 

that Nobles “flipped out” and it “scared” him, although he 

acknowledged that Nobles never threatened him or 

approached him in a threatening manner. 

[Petitioner] grabbed a small “folding-knife” and, in “panic” and 

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“rage,” stabbed Nobles twice in the chest. [Petitioner] heard a 

“poof” as the air exited Nobles's lungs. Nobles fell down, 

voided his bowels and bladder, and stopped moving. 

[Petitioner] believed Nobles was dead; he attempted chest 

compressions, but he did not consider calling 911. [Petitioner] 

knew, however, that he was in the wrong. 

Confronted with the fact that Nobles had six stab wounds rather 

than two, [petitioner] initially maintained he stabbed Nobles 

only twice, but eventually agreed he had reached a boiling point 

and might not have realized all that he did. He acknowledged 

that a “few times in the past” he had become so angry that he 

did not remember what he was doing. 

Roughly 12 hours after he killed Nobles, [petitioner] put 

Nobles's corpse into one of the apartment building's garbage 

cans and wheeled it over to the BART tracks, where he dumped 

it around 3:00 a.m. He also burned some clothing and 

household items to get rid of the evidence, and threw the knife 

down a gutter near the apartment. The next day, [petitioner] 

left the apartment and did not return until the search warrant 

had been executed. 

[Petitioner] admitted to the officers that he “went too far” and 

stated repeatedly that Nobles did not deserve what happened 

to him. When asked if he premeditated the homicide, 

[petitioner] responded “No, no, no, I didn't.” 

Police later found the knife [petitioner] used to kill Nobles in the 

storm drain system, as [petitioner] had described. Police also 

found duct tape and the clear blue cleaning liquid in 

[petitioner’s] apartment, as well as the garbage can used to 

transport Nobles's dead body. 

5. Evidence of [petitioner’s] Killing of Crowder in 1995 

In 1995, the body of Titus Crowder, an African–American man 

who lived in an Oakland care home for men suffering from HIV, 

was found face down, bloody, and lifeless in his living room. 

Crowder was transported to a hospital and pronounced dead. 

Officers had recovered nine bullet casings near the body. They 

also found mail and other paperwork bearing [petitioner’s] 

name, as well as photographs belonging to [petitioner] in a 

bedroom dresser drawer. 

About three weeks after the homicide, [petitioner] was arrested 

and interviewed by David Politzer, at the time a sergeant with 

the Oakland Police Department. [Petitioner] told Politzer that 

he did not have a romantic relationship with Crowder but they 

were friends. They had not had previous arguments, but 

Crowder was “agitated” on the day he was killed. 

[Petitioner] recounted that, on the day of the homicide, he and 

Crowder spent time together at a friend's home and then went 

to Crowder's apartment, where Crowder cooked dinner. After 

midnight, as [petitioner] got ready to leave, he asked Crowder 

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about $200 that Crowder owed him. Crowder became angry, 

hit [petitioner] in the jaw, and pulled out a gun and pointed it at 

[petitioner]. [Petitioner] wrestled the gun away from Crowder, 

aimed it at him, and fired until the gun was out of bullets. 

[Petitioner] fled with the gun, walking from Crowder's apartment 

near Oakland's Lake Merritt to a friend's house in Emeryville. 

[Petitioner] threw the gun off of his friend's balcony, where it 

was later discovered. 

[Petitioner] pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and served 10 

years in prison for killing Crowder. 

B. Defense Evidence 

Defense investigator Kingston Farady testified that he 

interviewed Ioma, who told him Nobles was a kind, gentle, and 

humble person, but he was also a “fighter” who “wouldn't take 

crap from anyone” and she had seen him become angry and 

aggressive. In her testimony at trial, however, Ioma denied 

making such statements. 

Dr. David Howard, a forensic psychologist, opined that Nobles 

suffered from schizophrenia. He explained that schizophrenics 

can display aggression and hostility and frequently suffer from 

delusions, hallucinations, and speech disorders. They are 

more likely than an average person to be violent and to be the 

victim of violence. Although medications can be used to treat 

the symptoms of schizophrenia, the symptoms can reoccur if 

the patient stops taking the medications. 

Dr. Howard noted that Nobles had numerous involuntary 

psychiatric holds and hospitalizations due to his symptoms. 

According to medical records, when Nobles stopped taking his 

medication, he would hear voices, his speech and behavior 

would become disordered, and he would exhibit paranoid 

delusions, inappropriate affect, fragmented thought processes, 

impaired speech, and disturbed sleep. After reviewing a 

transcript of [petitoner’s] interview, Dr. Howard found the 

descriptions of Nobles's behavior—constant words, writing on 

the floor, kicking, moving around, and saying nonsensical 

things—consistent with psychosis. 

The parties stipulated that Nobles had been convicted of 

misdemeanor battery in 2002, based on his assault of a 

hospital admitting clerk. 

Wyatt, 2018 WL 1633816, at *1-5. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence 

on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state 

court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

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involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions 

of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 

362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 

determinations, see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under 

the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to 

that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a 

case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable 

facts.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable 

application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), 

if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions 

but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the 

application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual 

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable 

in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. 

at 340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” 

of the state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. 

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion 

from the highest state court to consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last 

reasoned opinion. See Nunnemaker at 801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 

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1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). The court looks to the California Court of Appeal opinion for 

claims one and two. 

The standard of review under AEDPA is somewhat different where the state court 

gives no reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner’s federal claim and there is 

no reasoned lower court decision on the claim. In such a case, as with claim three, a 

review of the record is the only means of deciding whether the state court’s decision was 

objectively reasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado 

v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). When confronted with such a decision, a 

federal court should conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether 

the state court’s decision was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982. 

DISCUSSION 

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) the trial court erred 

by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense and imperfect self-defense; (2) there was 

insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation for first-degree murder; and (3) 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to jury instructions and failing to present a 

claim of self-defense. 

 I. SELF-DEFENSE 

 Petitioner first argues that the trial court erred by refusing to give jury instructions 

regarding self-defense and imperfect self-defense. 

BACKGROUND 

 The California Court of Appeal set forth the relevant background: 

Defense counsel asked the trial court to instruct the jury with 

CALCRIM No. 505 (self-defense) and CALCRIM No. 571 

(unreasonable or imperfect self-defense). Relying on 

testimony from Dr. Howard that Nobles [the victim] was 

suffering a psychotic break, and on [petitioner’s] statement to 

police that Nobles “snapped,” defense counsel argued that 

[petitioner] acted in self-defense because he reasonably 

believed he was in imminent danger. Counsel also argued that 

[petitioner] acted in unreasonable self-defense because his 

statement to police demonstrated that he was in actual fear, 

even if such a fear was unreasonable. 

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The trial court declined to give the requested instructions, 

observing that [petitioner] had not indicated in his statement to 

police that he actually believed Nobles posed a danger to him. 

[Petitioner] contends the court erred. 

Wyatt, 2018 WL 1633816, at *11-12. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A state trial court's refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground 

cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 

110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). The error must so infect the trial that the defendant was 

deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. 

Due process requires that “‘criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful 

opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 

2006) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). Therefore, a criminal 

defendant is entitled to adequate instructions on the defense theory of the case. See 

Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (error to deny defendant's request for 

instruction on simple kidnaping where such instruction was supported by the evidence). 

Due process does not require that an instruction be given unless the evidence 

supports it. See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982); Menendez v. Terhune, 422 

F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005). The defendant is not entitled to have jury instructions 

raised in his or her precise terms where the given instructions adequately embody the 

defense theory. United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend upon the evidence in 

the case and the overall instructions given to the jury. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 

734, 745 (9th Cir. 1995). An examination of the record is required to see precisely what 

was given and what was refused and whether the given instructions adequately 

embodied the defendant's theory. See United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1040 

(9th Cir. 1979). In other words, it allows a determination of whether what was given was 

so prejudicial as to infect the entire trial and so deny due process. See id. 

The omission of an instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of 

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the law. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Henderson v. 

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977)). Thus, a habeas petitioner whose claim involves a 

failure to give a particular instruction bears an "'especially heavy burden.'" Villafuerte v. 

Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155). The 

significance of the omission of such an instruction may be evaluated by comparison with 

the instructions that were given. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 971 (9th Cir. 

2001) (quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 156). 

ANALYSIS 

The California Court of Appeal set forth the relevant state law and denied this 

claim: 

No evidence supported [petitioner’s] claim of self-defense, 

because there was no evidence that any belief he had of being 

in danger of imminent harm was reasonable. Nobles [the 

victim] did not have a weapon, and although he approached in 

a “rage,” he was merely “doin' his little strikin' and you know, 

kickin',” and “tryin' to swing and tryin' to grab.” There was no 

evidence of any significant force in Nobles's attempted blows, 

or any reasonable basis for believing that Nobles was about to 

cause [petitioner] great bodily injury. 

Furthermore, no evidence supported [petitioner’s] claim of selfdefense or imperfect self-defense, because there was no 

evidence that [petitioner’s] had any actual belief, reasonable or 

not, that he was in danger of imminent harm. [Petitioner] 

repeatedly told officers that Nobles did not have a weapon and 

that Nobles had not threatened him. Although [petitioner] 

claimed he “felt threatened” at the particular moment when 

Nobles “snapped,” there was no evidence that [petitioner] 

believed he was in imminent threat of death or great bodily 

injury. To the contrary, when asked “what about his behavior” 

of Nobles made him feel threatened, [petitioner] said that 

Nobles was “unstoppable” in his “noise, talking and rambling 

and . . . writing on the floor.” (Italics added.) [Petitioner] 

insisted that Nobles never approached him in a threatening 

manner, never threatened him verbally, and “was never a 

threatening person.” 

Finally, [petitioner] was not entitled to an instruction on selfdefense or imperfect self-defense because he was the initial 

aggressor in the fight. (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 768, 

773 fn. 1 [neither self-defense nor imperfect self-defense may 

be invoked by a defendant who by wrongful conduct such as 

initiation of a physical assault has created circumstances under 

which his adversary's attack is legally justified].) Although 

[petitioner] stabbed Nobles to death after Nobles approached 

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him and kicked and slapped him, that occurred only after 

[petitioner] had bound Nobles with duct tape, taped over his 

mouth, put a mattress over him, and threw cleaning solution 

into his face. Indeed, [petitioner] agreed in his interview with 

police that Nobles's kicking and slapping, before [petitioner] 

punched him, was Nobles defending himself against 

[petitioner]. 

[Petitioner] contends his acts of binding Nobles with duct tape 

and throwing a cleaning solution at him were lawful attempts to 

resist Nobles's misdemeanor offense of disturbing the peace. 

(See Pen. Code, § 415, subd. (2); § 693.) But Penal Code 

section 693 only allows “[r]esistance sufficient to prevent the 

offense.” [Petitioner’s] binding Nobles with duct tape, dousing 

him with a cleaning solution, and other acts were more than 

that. 

[Petitioner] also argues that he was not the initial aggressor 

because, before [petitioner] bound him with duct tape, Nobles 

had made noise for hours. But he provides no authority that 

Nobles's level of disruption made him the initial aggressor in 

their fight. In fact, [petitioner] characterized Nobles's behavior 

as “nagging” and conceded that others might consider it petty. 

Wyatt, 2018 WL 1633816, at *12-13. 

 The state court’s denial of this claim was not an unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court authority or an unreasonable determination of the facts. Petitioner has 

failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to give the jury instruction so infected the 

trial that he was denied a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

While petitioner is entitled to jury instruction for his theory of the case, the 

evidence in the case must support the theory. See Conde at 734; Hopper at 605. As set 

forth in detail by the California Court of Appeal, there was no evidence to support a jury 

instruction of self-defense or unreasonable self-defense. According to petitioner’s 

statement to law enforcement, the victim had no weapon and had not threatened 

petitioner. Petitioner further told law enforcement that the victim had been making noise, 

rambling and writhing on the floor and that it was only after petitioner had bound the 

victim with duct tape, taped over his mouth, put a mattress over him, and threw a 

cleaning solution onto his face that the victim approached petitioner to kick and slap him. 

The state court found that petitioner was the initial aggressor and, looking at all the 

evidence determined that he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction under state 

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law. Petitioner had even conceded to law enforcement that the victim was defending 

himself at that time. The denial of this claim by the state court was not unreasonable. 

Even assuming the trial court erred by failing to give the instructions, any error was 

harmless and did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury’s verdict.” See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). For the same 

reasons as set forth above, there was overwhelming evidence of petitioner’s guilt and 

that the victim was not a threat to him. Petitioner has failed to show the state court 

opinion was objectively unreasonable. This claim is denied. 

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to find premeditation and 

deliberation to support first-degree murder. 

BACKGROUND 

Pursuant to state law, three kinds of evidence are used to determine whether 

premeditation and deliberation exist: preexisting motive, planning activity and manner of 

killing. People v. Brady, 50 Cal. 4th 547, 561-62 (2010). These factors “are merely a 

framework for appellate review; they need not be present in some special combination or 

afforded special weight, nor are they exhaustive.” Id. In this case, the California Court of 

Appeal noted there was no evidence of planning activity. Wyatt, at *5. The state court 

then set forth the evidence that did support premeditation and deliberation: 

1. Preexisting Motive 

In his confession to police, [petitioner] explained that he killed 

Nobles after hours of Nobles moving, making noise, babbling 

incoherently, acting out, and failing to cease this activity no 

matter how many times [petitioner] asked. Despite [petitioner] 

duct-taping Nobles's mouth, hands and ankles, throwing 

cleaning liquid in his face, telling him to move out, grabbing him 

by the shoulders and shaking him, and punching him twice in 

the face, Nobles's “nagging” appeared unstoppable. From this 

evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Nobles had 

become so annoying to [petitioner], and [petitioner’s] efforts to 

quiet him and convince him to stop or move out had proven so 

fruitless, that [petitioner] decided he had to kill Nobles in order 

to get him to stop. 

[Petitioner] acknowledges that Nobles's conduct gave 

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[petitioner] a reason to try to make Nobles stop his behavior, 

but he argues it was not a motive for [petitioner] to actually kill 

him. Whether it was reasonable for [petitioner] to want to kill 

Nobles under the circumstances is not the point, however; the 

point is that the evidence suggested that [petitioner] had 

determined in his own mind a reason to kill Nobles, even if it 

was not what most people would consider a good one. 

 

2. Manner of Killing 

Evidence indicating that a killing was carried out in a particular 

and exacting manner may, in combination usually with 

evidence of planning or motive, support a finding of 

premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Anderson (1968) 70 

Cal.2d 15, 27.) 

Here, [petitioner’s] killing of Nobles was the culmination of an 

escalating, hours-long incident, in which [petitioner] had ample 

time for reflection before he inflicted the fatal stab wounds. 

After binding Nobles with duct tape, throwing cleaning liquid in 

his face, grabbing him by the shoulders, shaking him, and 

punching him to no avail, [petitioner] picked up the folding knife 

(it is unclear if he had to unfold it) and plunged the blade twice 

into Nobles's chest. [Petitioner] conceded that he might have 

lost count of how many times he really stabbed Nobles, and 

indeed, the coroner observed six recent stab wounds on 

Nobles's body. From the manner in which [petitioner] killed 

Nobles—multiple stab wounds to the chest—along with 

[petitioner’s] motive for killing him, the jury could reasonably 

conclude that [petitioner] had weighed the considerations and 

decided to end Nobles's life. FN. 4 

FN. 4. Alternatively, the jury could have reasonably 

inferred that [petitioner] decided to kill Nobles when he 

continued his barrage of noise and movement as 

[petitioner] tried to watch the basketball game on 

Sunday afternoon, before duct-taping him; if so, 

[petitioner’s] acts of duct-taping, throwing cleaning liquid 

in Nobles's face, and punching Nobles over a span of 

time could be viewed as acts of torture leading up to the 

fatal stabbing. Acts of torture may support a conclusion 

of premeditation and deliberation. (See People v. 

Proctor (1992) 4 Cal. 4th 499, 529–530.) 

3. [Petitioner’s] Actions after the Killing 

After [petitioner] stabbed Nobles at least twice in the chest, he 

heard a “poof” of air exit Nobles's lungs and watched as Nobles 

collapsed and voided his bladder and bowels. He did not call 

911, either for medical assistance or to summon the police. 

Instead, he waited in the apartment with Nobles's dead body 

for approximately 12 hours—until around 3:00 a.m. when he 

would less likely be seen by police or witnesses—and then 

wheeled the corpse in a garbage can to the BART tracks and 

dumped it. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer 

that [petitioner’s] callousness toward Nobles's body reflected 

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not only his state of mind after the stabbing, but his state of 

mind toward Nobles before and during the stabbing, consistent 

with his deliberative decision to end Nobles's life. 

Based on the evidence of motive, the manner of the killing, and 

[petitioner’s] conduct after Nobles's death, there was 

substantial evidence that the murder of Nobles was perpetrated 

with premeditation and deliberation—even without 

consideration of the fact that [petitioner] had also killed Crowder 

in 1995, which we consider next. 

4. 1995 Homicide 

The trial court admitted evidence of [petitioner’s] 1995 homicide 

of Crowder under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) 

and the doctrine of chances, and subsequently instructed the 

jury that, if it found that [petitioner] committed this uncharged 

offense, “you may, but are not required to” consider the 

evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether or not 

[petitioner] “acted with the specific intent and/or mental state

required by the charged offense or any lesser offense” and 

whether [petitioner’s] explanation for the killing of Nobles was 

true. (Italics added. See People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 

1230, 1244 (Steele).) The court further instructed the jury to 

“consider the similarity or lack of similarity between the 

uncharged and the charged offense” in evaluating the 

evidence. From the proof that [petitioner] perpetrated the two 

homicides, it was permissible for the jury to infer that 

[petitioner’s] killing of Nobles was intended and premeditated. 

(Ibid.) 

Wyatt, 2018 WL 1633816, at *5-7 (footnote omitted). 

LEGAL STANDARD 

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 

which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who 

alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized 

as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 

therefore states a constitutional claim, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), 

which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas relief, see id. at 324. 

The Supreme Court has emphasized that “Jackson claims face a high bar in 

federal habeas proceedings . . . .” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per 

curiam) (finding that the 3rd Circuit “unduly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder” and 

failed to apply the deferential standard of Jackson when it engaged in “fine-grained 

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factual parsing” to find that the evidence was insufficient to support petitioner’s 

conviction). A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does not 

determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 843 

(1993); see, e.g., Coleman, 566 U.S. at 656 (“the only question under Jackson is whether 

[the jury’s finding of guilt] was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare 

rationality”). The federal court "determines only whether, 'after viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof 

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has there been a due process violation. Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338.

ANALYSIS 

The California Court of Appeal set forth the relevant state law and denied this 

claim: 

[Petitioner] insists that the evidence showed he did not act with 

premeditation and deliberation. In his view, he tried “low-level 

physical efforts to stop” Nobles's disruptions, which led to 

Nobles charging [petitioner] to kick and slap him; immediately 

before the homicide, Nobles “attacked again,” “snapped” “in a 

rage,” and was swinging his hands and trying to grab 

[petitioner]; and [petitioner] reacted in a state of “panic” and 

“rage” by grabbing the knife and stabbing Nobles twice, trying 

thereafter to revive him. But even if the evidence was 

reasonably subject to an inference that [petitioner] did not 

premeditate or deliberate, it was also reasonably subject to an 

inference that he did, choosing to end Nobles's nagging once 

and for all by stabbing him repeatedly in the chest until he was 

dead. It is not our role to reweigh the evidence or choose 

between permissible inferences; we merely determine whether 

there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict, and 

in this case there was. 

[Petitioner] told the police he did not premeditate the killing and 

claimed he acted “out of the heat of rage.” The jury, however, 

did not have to believe [petitioner’s] self-serving depictions of 

his mental state. To the contrary, the jury could have 

reasonably concluded that [petitioner’s] use of a legalistic 

phrase such as “out of the heat of rage” was a disingenuous 

attempt to minimize his crime, and that [petitioner’s] story was 

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so similar to the one he gave police with respect to killing 

Crowder—a good relationship with his victim until the victim 

suddenly lashed out—that he lied to police about his mental 

state in killing Nobles to obtain a deal based on a non-malice 

killing like he received with respect to Crowder. The jury heard 

the audiotape of [petitioner’s] confession, and it was for the jury 

to determine the credibility of [petitioner’s] assertions. 

[Petitioner] argues that, if the jury did not believe him, there was 

“no evidence of what happened” and therefore no evidence of 

first degree murder. Not so. The jury could have rejected 

[petitioner’s] depiction of his state of mind, while accepting his 

depiction of what occurred to the extent it was consistent with 

the physical evidence. From the evidence of what occurred, 

the jury could reasonably conclude that, contrary to 

[petitioner’s] claims, [petitioner] killed Nobles with deliberation 

and premeditation. 

[Petitioner] contends the jury should have believed him, 

because his account of the killing of Nobles was borne out by 

the evidence: his description of the punches he threw to 

Nobles's jaw and eye corresponded to Detective Armijo's 

observation of those injuries; his description of stabbing Nobles 

twice in the chest corresponded with Dr. Rogers's testimony 

that the fatal wounds were two stab wounds to the same area 

of the chest; and his description of Nobles's disruptive behavior 

was consistent with Dr. Howard's testimony of the symptoms 

Nobles exhibited as a schizophrenic. But that's the point: the 

jury could have accepted [petitioner’s] version of what 

happened to the extent consistent with other testimony, but 

concluded that these events and the other evidence 

demonstrated his premeditation and deliberation. 

[Petitioner] fails to establish that the evidence was insufficient 

for first degree murder. 

Wyatt, 2018 WL 1633816, at *7-8 (footnote omitted) 

Petitioner’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to find premeditation and 

deliberation to support first-degree murder was rejected by the state court. To the extent 

petitioner argues that the state court was incorrect in its analysis of state law and 

premeditation and deliberation, he is not entitled to habeas relief. The Jackson standard 

must be applied with reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as 

defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; see, e.g., Boyer v. Belleque, 659 

F.3d 957, 968 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding it was not unreasonable, in light of Oregon 

case law, for Oregon court to conclude that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that petitioner intended to kill his victim based on proof that he anally penetrated 

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several victims with knowledge that he could infect them with AIDS). The state court’s 

ruling on the state law issue is binding on this court. 

The “minimum amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause requires to prove 

the offense is purely a matter of federal law,” Coleman, 566 U.S. at 655, and petitioner 

has not shown that the state court was objectively unreasonable in finding sufficient 

evidence to support the conviction in light of the high bar for Jackson claims. While there 

was not overwhelming evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support first-degree 

murder, the state court decision finding that jurors could have concluded that the act was 

premeditated and deliberate was not objectively unreasonable. A review of the record 

supports the determination the state court made after considering evidence of a 

preexisting motive, the manner of the killing, the actions afterwards and the facts of the 

1995 homicide. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court decision was objectively 

unreasonable in light of the high bar for sufficiency of the evidence claims on habeas 

review. This court does not determine whether it is satisfied that there was sufficient 

evidence, only that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable 

doubt. A review of the evidence demonstrates that jurors could have determined that 

there was premeditation and deliberation to support first-degree murder. The state court 

decision was not unreasonable, and therefore this claim is denied. 

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to erroneous 

jury instructions and for failing to present a defense of self-defense. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of 

the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but 

effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 

The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 

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conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 

cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id. 

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim, 

petitioner must establish two things. First, he must establish that trial counsel's 

performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of 

reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient 

performance, i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. 

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome. Id. 

ANALYSIS 

This claim was summarily denied by the California Supreme Court. Answer, Ex. 

M. This court has conducted an independent review of the record to determine whether 

the state court’s decision was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982. Petitioner’s 

argument on how counsel was ineffective is not exactly clear. In his petition to the 

California Supreme Court that he attached to this federal habeas petition, petitioner 

stated that counsel was ineffective because of improper jury instructions and for “let[ting] 

the prosecutor charge him with first-degree murder instead of manslaughter. Docket No. 

19 at 9-10. 

To the extent petitioner argues in this federal petition that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to argue self-defense and for failing to request jury instructions for self-defense 

and unreasonable self-defense, he is not entitled to relief. As discussed above, trial 

counsel did request jury instructions for self-defense and unreasonable self-defense, but 

the request was denied because there was no evidence to support giving these 

instructions. Petitioner’s own statements to police, along with other evidence, 

contradicted any argument that could have been made for self-defense and provided 

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support for premeditation and deliberation. In addition to requesting jury instructions on 

self-defense and unreasonable self-defense, trial counsel tried to bolster a self-defense 

claim by obtaining an expert witness and presenting testimony to show that the victim 

was acting violently towards petitioner. Wyatt, 2018 WL 1633816, at *4-5. However, the 

jury did not credit these arguments and evidence. Petitioner does not describe what 

other actions counsel should have taken. Petitioner’s conclusory allegations that counsel 

was ineffective with no support are insufficient to warrant habeas relief. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 690 (“A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must 

identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of 

reasonable professional judgment.”) The California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim 

was not objectively unreasonable. The claim is denied.1

APPEALABILITY 

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a 

district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) in the ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. 

§ 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 

To obtain a COA, petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” See Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Section 2253(c)(3) requires a court granting a COA 

to indicate which issues satisfy the COA standard. Here, the court finds that the second 

claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence meets the above standard and 

 

1 Petitioner has also attached a few pages from a hearing to replace his counsel pursuant 

to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970). Docket No. 19 at 13-15. This does not 

support his argument for ineffective assistance of counsel, and he has not presented or 

exhausted a separate claim that the trial court erred in denying the request to replace 

counsel. 

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accordingly GRANTS the COA solely for that claim. See generally Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 

327. 

Accordingly, the clerk shall forward the file, including a copy of this order, to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); United States v. Asrar, 116 

F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997).

CONCLUSION 

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. A certificate of

appealability is GRANTED. See Rule11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

Petitioner is cautioned that the court's ruling on the certificate of appealability does not 

relieve him of the obligation to file a timely notice of appeal if he wishes to appeal. 

2. Petitioner’s motion to enlarge (Docket No. 40) is DENIED.

3. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2019 

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 

United States District Judge 

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton 

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