Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03012/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03012-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Talib D. Watson
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 27, 2006 Decided February 23, 2007

No. 06-3012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

TALIB D. WATSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00314-01)

Stacy D. Belf argued the cause for appellant. With her on

the briefs were Peter M. Brody and Kevin J. Post.

Valinda Jones, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and

Roy W. McLeese III and D. Ames Jeffress, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE and

TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

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GINSBURG, Chief Judge: A jury found Talib D. Watson

guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm and of

possession of marijuana. The United States Sentencing

Guidelines, which at that time were thought to be mandatory,

called for the district court to increase Watson’s sentence

above what it would have been for those crimes alone because

of his prior convictions. Watson appealed and this court

remanded the matter to the district court for sentencing de

novo in light of the intervening decision of the Supreme Court

in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that

because enhancement of sentence, pursuant to mandatory

sentencing guidelines, based upon facts not submitted to jury

would violate defendant’s right to trial by jury, Guidelines are

advisory only). The district court adhered to its prior sentence

and Watson appealed again, arguing the district court (1)

failed to sentence him de novo, (2) misunderstood the

maximum sentence and as a result did not give Watson

adequate credit for mitigating factors, as required by 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a), and, (3) by relying upon conduct of which

he was acquitted in prior cases, violated Watson’s

constitutional rights to trial by jury and to due process. 

In resentencing Watson the district court plainly erred in

thinking the statutory maximum to which he could be

sentenced was 20 years when in fact it was 10 years. As a

result, the court was under the misimpression it was imposing

a relatively lenient sentence, presumably in order to take into

account certain mitigating factors. Because the mistake

affected Watson’s substantial rights, we reverse his sentence

and, without reaching his other arguments, remand the matter

to the district court for resentencing.

I. Background

The facts surrounding Watson’s trial and conviction are

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fully recounted in our decision affirming his conviction and

remanding the case for resentencing in light of Booker. See

United States v. Watson, 409 F.3d 458, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

(Watson I). In brief, police officers stopped Watson because

the windows of the car he was driving were “tinted

excessively.” Id. at 460. When the police determined there

was an outstanding warrant for his arrest, they took him into

custody and searched the car. Id. There they found a semiautomatic handgun, a pistol, ammunition, and marijuana. Id.

Watson was indicted for being a felon in possession of

firearms and ammunition, and for possession of marijuana.

Id. at 461. A jury found him guilty of the firearms and drug

offenses but acquitted him on the ammunition charge. Id. at

462.

In its Presentence Investigative Report (PSR) the

Probation Office determined the sentencing range under the

Guidelines was from 92 to 115 months of imprisonment,

based upon the instant firearms and drug convictions and

upon Watson’s prior convictions and criminal history,

including charges of which Watson was acquitted. In its

sentencing memorandum, the Government urged the court to

impose the maximum sentence of 115 months, arguing that, in

addition to Watson’s prior convictions, the prior prosecutions

in which Watson was acquitted “demonstrated ‘his obvious

recalcitrance to rehabilitation.’”

At sentencing, Watson argued the court’s proposed

reliance upon his prior convictions and upon charges of which

he was acquitted was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s

then recent decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004), which held that the jury — not the judge — must find

any fact to be used in a scheme of state sentencing guidelines

to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory

maximum. Blakely thereby extended the reach of Apprendi v.

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New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), a non–guidelines case

holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the

prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,

and proved beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. at 490. Watson

also asked that his sentence be made to run concurrently with

the sentence imposed in D.C. Superior Court for violating the

terms of his probation by engaging in the conduct for which

he was convicted in this case. The district court rejected

Watson’s Blakely argument because the principle laid down in

Apprendi had not yet been held applicable to the United States

Sentencing Guidelines; sentenced Watson to 108 months in

prison; and declined to make Watson’s sentence concurrent

with his Superior Court sentence. 

After this court affirmed Watson’s conviction but

remanded his sentence for reconsideration in light of Booker,

see Watson I, 409 F.3d at 466, the district court ordered the

parties to submit supplemental memoranda addressing the

sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and said it

would schedule a sentencing hearing based upon those

memoranda “if necessary.” The district court later scheduled

a “status conference” after Watson — apparently concerned

there might be no sentencing hearing — filed a Motion for

Sentencing De Novo and Request for Hearing.

In his memorandum and at the status conference Watson

argued his sentence could not be enhanced upon the basis of

findings about his criminal history made by the judge rather

than the jury. Watson also argued his willingness to admit to

drug addiction and to seek treatment were mitigating factors

that had to be considered under § 3553(a).

The district court clarified, when asked by Watson’s

counsel, that the status conference was indeed the sentencing

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hearing and that the court would grant Watson’s motion for

sentencing de novo. The parties presented their arguments

concerning the appropriate sentence, after which the court

said that, because the Guidelines were no longer mandatory,

there was no need to determine the applicable Guidelines

range, but added, “If I were going to make [such a finding], it

would be the same guidelines range ....” The court also stated

— incorrectly — that the maximum sentence under the statute

was 240 months when, in fact, it was — as the Government

now concedes — only 120 months. The court

understandably, therefore, characterized Watson’s 108-month

sentence as being “considerably less than the statutorilyavailable sentencing maximum.” The court also alluded to

the two prior cases, each more than a decade earlier, in which

Watson was ultimately acquitted as reflecting a “lengthy

career” in the “criminal justice system”: “There were close

calls, very serious offenses for which you were tried and

acquitted in two cases. And I didn’t focus my [original

sentence] back then completely on those. Obviously I took

them into consideration.” Finally, the court recognized

Watson had since his conviction sought drug treatment and

improved his behavior in prison: “I am ... pleased to hear that

you’ve been changing and making adjustments or whatever.”

The district court rejected Watson’s arguments against

considering charged conduct of which he had been acquitted,

and imposed a sentence of the same length as his original

sentence (108 months), again consecutive to Watson’s

sentence in Superior Court for violating the terms of his

probation. Watson again appeals his sentence. 

II. Analysis

This court reviews de novo issues of law related to

sentencing. United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 375

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(D.C. Cir. 2006). Under Booker, we also review the sentence

itself for reasonableness, 543 U.S. at 260-61, “in light of the

sentencing factors that Congress specified in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Price, 409 F.3d 436, 442 (D.C.

Cir. 2005). And, as we recently held, a sentence within “a

properly calculated Guidelines range is entitled to a rebuttable

presumption of reasonableness.” Dorcely, 454 F.3d at 376;

accord United States v. Rita, 177 F. App’x 357, 2006 WL

1144508, at *1 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551

(2006) (No. 06-5754); United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d

479 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding sentence 22-months below

Guidelines range unreasonable), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551

(2006) (No. 06-5618).

A. A Hearing by Any Other Name

Watson first argues the district court failed to sentence

him de novo, as required by our decision in Watson I. This

argument is ultimately based upon the district court’s having

first denominated the hearing a “status conference” and

having initially told Watson’s counsel the proceeding would

not include his resentencing. 

This terminological objection is of no substantive

moment: The parties had submitted supplemental sentencing

memoranda analyzing the § 3553(a) factors, and when

Watson’s counsel asked whether the hearing was for

sentencing and was told it was and that the court would grant

his motion for sentencing de novo, she expressed no

reservation about going forward. The defendant was clearly

prepared to argue the matter and did so. In substance, the

proceeding, whatever it was called, was a sentencing hearing

at which the district court sentenced Watson de novo.

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B. The Case of the Mistaken Maximum

In the course of resentencing Watson, the district court

stated, incorrectly, that Watson was subject to a statutory

maximum sentence of 240 months. In fact, the maximum

under the felon-in-possession statute was 120 months. See 18

U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Watson contends this mistake led the

district court to conclude his sentence of 108 months was, as

the district court put it, “considerably less than the statutorilyavailable sentencing maximum.” The Government responds

that Watson’s failure to disabuse the district court — indeed,

counsel expressed agreement with the court’s misstatement of

the maximum — makes the error “subject to review for plain

error, if at all.” Further, the Government contends, the error

“did not substantially affect the court’s choice of sentence

within the recommended sentencing range,” and therefore was

not prejudicial.

We agree with the Government in part: Because counsel

for Watson did not object, we will review the record only for

plain error. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Under this standard,

“there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s]

substantial rights.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,

466-67 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);

cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (error harmless if it “does not affect

substantial rights”). “If all three conditions are met, an

appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a

forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). 

In this case there was an error, it was plain, and we have

no trouble seeing its effect upon Watson’s substantial rights:

The district court’s misimpression that a sentence of 108

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months was “considerably less than the statutorily-available

sentencing maximum” was apparently the basis upon which

the court suggested it had taken the relevant mitigating factors

into account and was imposing a significantly lesser sentence.

Thus, it appears there might have been a “materially different

result, more favorable to the defendant,” United States v.

Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2005), had the district

court had the proper sentencing range — either the 115-month

Guidelines maximum or the 120-month statutory maximum

— rather than the supposed 240-month statutory maximum as

its frame of reference. In short, it appears the district court

thought it was imposing a sentence “considerably less” than,

but instead imposed a sentence quite close to, the maximum. 

We conclude the district court’s erroneous premise gave

it the mistaken impression it was being lenient and the error

thus infected Watson’s sentence. Cf. United States v.

Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 461 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[L]eaving in

place an error-infected sentence that would have been

materially different absent error and that could be readily

corrected would ‘seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ Indeed, it would

seriously affect all three.” (footnote and citation omitted)).

We therefore reverse Watson’s sentence.

C. The Roads Not Taken

As we have seen, the district court did not make a finding

regarding the advisory Guidelines range applicable to

Watson’s sentence. The Government concedes this was a

mistake. See, e.g., United States v. Coumaris, 399 F.3d 343,

351 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (under post-Booker sentencing regime,

“a sentencing court is required ‘to consider Guidelines ranges’

applicable to the defendant” (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at

245)). Because, as seen in Part II.B above, we reverse and

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remand for the district court to correct a plain error, we need

not decide the effect (if any) this error had upon Watson’s

sentence.

Nor need we resolve the issue raised by the district

court’s reliance upon the defendant’s acquitted conduct. In

Dorcely, upon which the Government relies, we upheld a

sentence enhanced by the judge applying the “preponderance

of the evidence” standard to acquitted conduct. In that case,

however, the sentencing judge had presided over the trial and

thus seen and heard the evidence supporting the charges of

which the defendant was acquitted by the jury pursuant to the

standard of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 454 F.3d at

370-71. In this case the sentencing judge did not preside over

the defendant’s prior trials; indeed, as far as the record

reveals, the judge had not seen any evidence introduced to

prove the charges of which the defendant had been acquitted

in prior cases. Upon resentencing, we trust the district court

will explore the significance of this distinction. 

III. Conclusion

The defendant was duly resentenced de novo, but the

district court’s error concerning the statutory maximum gave

the court the misimpression it was being lenient. The error

was plain and, because it apparently affected the sentence,

was prejudicial. Accordingly, the judgment of the district

court is reversed and the case is remanded for resentencing.

 So ordered.

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