Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00456/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00456-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clausings
Defendant
D. Daley
Defendant
M. Hacker
Defendant
J. Huchins
Defendant
Daniel Manriquez
Plaintiff
C. Morse
Defendant
C. Munoz
Defendant
Omos
Defendant
Paz
Defendant
R. Perez
Defendant
J. Reynoso
Defendant
R. Roberson
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL MANRIQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. HUCHINS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-00456-OWW-SKO PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Doc. 16)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN 30 DAYS

Plaintiff Daniel Manriquez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On December 7, 2009, Defendants

J. Huchins, J. Reynoso, M. Hacker, R. Roberson, C. Munoz, D. Daley, R. Perez, Paz, C. Morse,

Omos, and Clausings (“Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. #16.) Defendants argue that

they are entitled to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff’s

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Section 1983. On February

1, 2010, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. #23.) On February

17, 2010, Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. (Doc. #26.)

I Background

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint

This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s complaint filed on March 11, 2009. (Doc. #1.) Plaintiff

is suing Defendants under Section 1983 for the violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth

Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that on February 28, 2007, he refused to relinquish his food tray,

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covered up his cell door, and refused to cuff up. (Compl. 4. ) Plaintiff claims that he did not pose 1 2

a threat to anyone or pose a threat to damage any property. (Compl. 4.) Nonetheless, Defendants

Hutchins and Reynoso ordered their subordinates to use physical force to extract Plaintiff from his

cell. (Compl. 4.) Defendants Munoz, Clausings, and Omos sprayed Plaintiff’s cell with a chemical

similar to pepperspray. (Compl. 4.) Plaintiff claims that Hutchins, Reynoso, Hacker, and Roberson

supervised Munoz, Clausings, and Omos during the incident. (Compl. 4.) Plaintiff experienced

overwhelming pain from the chemical. (Compl. 4.) Plaintiff uncovered his cell door and windows

and voluntarily removed his clothing so that he could be searched, restrained, and removed from his

cell. (Compl. 4.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Morse, Clausings, Omos, Munos, and Daleydid not remove

Plaintiff from his cell and instead deliberately prolonged Plaintiff’s pain by refusing to remove

Plaintiff from his cell and “seeing certain body parts [such as his genitals underarms and feet]

slowly.” After restraints were placed on Plaintiff, “each defendant” prolonged Plaintiff’s pain by 3

“waiting until Defendant Perez put leg restraints on Plaintiff” before removingPlaintifffrom his cell. 

(Compl. 5.)

Plaintiff was then decontaminated by Defendants Paz and Morse who “simply just ran water

on Plaintiff.” (Compl. 5.) Defendants did not decontaminate Plaintiff’s cell and put Plaintiff back

in his cell which was still drenched with the chemical. (Compl. 5.) Plaintiff began choking and

experienced burning in his eyes and body from the chemical. (Compl. 5.) Plaintiff claims that

Defendants Paz, Morse, Clausings, Daley, Perez, Omos, made no effort to decontaminate Plaintiff’s

cell. (Compl. 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hacker, Roberson, Reynoso, Hutchins, and

Munoz ordered Plaintiff to be placed in his contaminated cell knowing that Plaintiff would suffer

There is no explanation as to why Plaintiff refused to give up his food tray, why he covered his cell door or

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what he covered it with, or why he refused to cuff up.

Citations to Plaintiff’s complaint refer to the page numbers as electronically docketed. The page

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numbering used by Plaintiff differs from the page numbers as electronically docketed because Plaintiff numbered the

pages of his form complaint, the first two pages as electronically docketed, separately from the body of his

complaint.

Plaintiff alleges “each defendant” prolonged his pain. Presumably, Plaintiff means “each defendant” that

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was present at the time, as opposed to “each defendant” named in this lawsuit.

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pain from the chemical.

Plaintiff also alleges that Hacker, Roberson, Reynoso, Hutchins, and Munoz ordered that

Plaintiff be deprived of tooth paste, a tooth brush, soap, toilet paper, clothing, bedding, and a

mattress. Plaintiff was not provided with cleaning supplies to clean the chemical, or clothing other

than Plaintiff’s “chemically drenched underwear.” (Compl. 5-6.)

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move for dismissal on the ground that Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim

for relief under Section 1983. Defendants also argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars liability

against Defendants in their official capacities, that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hutchins

and Reynoso are not cognizable because there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983,

and that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants also state that in the event that

the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Defendants request for a more definite statement

of Plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for the use of excessive force because

Plaintiff has admitted to causing disorder by failing to relinquish his food tray and by covering his

cell door and windows. (Notice of Mot. and Mot. to Dismiss First Am. Compl. or in the Alternative,

for a More Definite Statement; Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. Thereof 10:2-6. ) Defendants contend that 4

the amount and type of force used was appropriate in light of the circumstances. (Mot. to Dismiss

10:6-10.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has only alleged a “de minimis injury” which is not

serious enough to warrant protection under the Eighth Amendment. (Mot. to Dismiss 10:11-13.) 

Defendants also argue that the disturbance caused by Plaintiff could have resulted in a significant

threat to the safety and security of the correctional officers and other inmates and that Plaintiff was

decontaminated prior to being returned to his cell, “appropriately neutralizing any harm that might

have been caused by the pepper-spray like substance.” (Mot. to Dismiss 10:13-20.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for the use of excessive force because

Citations to Defendants’ motion to dismiss refer to the page numbers as electronically docketed. The page

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numbering used by Defendants differs from the page numbers as electronically docketed because Defendants

separately numbered the table of contents in their motion.

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the facts alleged do not support the conclusion that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. 

(Mot. to Dismiss 11:12-16:26.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts suggesting

deliberate indifference because “[a]t most, plaintiff offers his own subjective interpretations of the

officers’ conduct in delaying his removal from the cell but pleads no criminally reckless behavior

on the part of the officer-defendants. . . .” (Mot. to Dismiss 13:19-23.) Defendants characterize

Plaintiff’s allegations as “exaggeration,” and argue that when viewed in light of the totality of the

circumstances, Defendants’ actions “were an instantaneous reaction to the plaintiff’s aggressive

behavior, not deliberate indifference . . . .” (Mot. to Dismiss 15:8-18.)

Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Hutchins and Renyoso

are insufficient because there is no allegation that Hutchins or Reynoso were deliberately indifferent

and that Plaintiff is attempting to hold them vicariously liable for the conduct of their subordinates. 

(Mot. to Dismiss 17:6-12.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged that Hutchins or Reynoso

implemented a policy repugnant to the constitution that caused the alleged constitutional violations,

personally participated in the alleged violations, or knew about the violations and failed to prevent

them. (Mot. to Dismiss 17:19-18:8.)

Finally,Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities

are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because

their actions did not violate clearly established constitutional law. (Mot. to Dismiss 19:14-21:15.)

On February 1, 2010, Plaintiff filed an opposition arguing that his complaint does state

sufficient facts to support a claim under Section 1983. (Doc. #23.) Defendants filed a reply on

February 17, 2010. (Doc. #26.)

II. Discussion

Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) on the ground that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted under Section 1983. When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll

allegations and reasonable inferences are taken as true, and the allegations are construed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). However,

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“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to

dismiss.” Id. “Dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) if it appears beyond doubt that the nonmovant can prove no set of facts to support its claims.” Id. If matters outside the pleadings are

considered, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is treated as one for summary judgment under

Rule 56. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d); Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916,

921-22 (9th Cir. 2004)).

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet the

pleading standard set by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as true all factual

allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. 

Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for the violation of his

rights under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and

unusual punishments and “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,

humanity and decency.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop,

404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two

requirements aremet: (1) the objective requirement that the deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” and

(2) the subjective requirement that the prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” 

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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).

The objective requirement that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious” is met where the

prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). The subjective

requirement that the prison official has a “sufficientlyculpable state of mind” is met where the prison

official acts with “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S.

at 302-303). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when he or she “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. “[T]he official must both be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

Where prison officials are accused of using excessive physical force, “[t]he ‘core judicial

inquiry’ . . . [is] not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather ‘whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.’” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). Factors relevant to the analysis are the need for the application of force, the

relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used and the extent of the injury

inflicted. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986). Other factors to be considered are the extent

of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials

on the basis of the facts known to them, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful

response. Id. The infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure “does not amount to

cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force

authorized or applied was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary.” Id. at 319. Prison administrators

“should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices

that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain

institutional security.” Id. at 321-322 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1970)).

1. Use of Excessive Force

Defendants raise a number of arguments in support of their contention that Plaintiff has failed

to state a claim based on the use of excessive force. Defendants argue that (1) Plaintiff created a

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disturbance that justified the use of force, (2) the type and degree of force used was appropriate, (3)

Plaintiff has only suffered “de minimis injury,” (4) the disturbance caused by Plaintiff was

significant enough to justify the use of force, and (5) that Plaintiff was ultimately decontaminated

by Defendants Paz and Morse.

Defendants’ first, second, and fourth arguments all relate to the issue of whether Defendants’

response was appropriate in light of Plaintiff’s admitted disobedience. First, Defendants argue that

Plaintiff created a disturbance that justified the use of force by refusing to relinquish his food tray,

covering his cell doors and windows, and refusing to submit to restraints. Second, Defendants argue

that the type and degree of force used was proportionate to the need for the use of force. Defendants’

fourth argument is that the disturbance caused by Plaintiff was significant enough to justify the use

of force. 

Defendants’ arguments are not supported by the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint when

construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff admits to being disobedient,

he also alleges that he did not pose a threat to other correctional officers or to any property. The

Court will not conclude at the pleading stage that Plaintiff’s disobedience justified the use of the

pepperspray-like chemical substance. Further, Plaintiff has alleged facts that raise serious questions

regarding whether Defendants’ response was appropriate. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

deliberately delayed the extraction of Plaintiff from his cell after Plaintiff submitted to restraints in

order to sadistically expose Plaintiff to the burning effects of the chemical. Plaintiff alleges that the

extraction itself was done in a malicious and sadistic manner by unnecessarily instructing Plaintiff

to expose his genitals and other body parts for inspection and conveying pointless, time consuming 5

demands before Plaintiff was removed from his cell. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants 6

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ demands to see certain body parts, such as his genitals, underarms, and

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feet, were unnecessary. Defendants may dispute Plaintiff’s conclusion regarding the necessity of the inspections, but

any dispute would rely on matters outside the pleadings, which would be inappropriate at this stage in litigation.

Plaintiff describes an exchange where Defendants asked to see the bottom of Plaintiff’s feet before they

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extracted him. Plaintiff picked up his left foot first and Defendant Daley responded by saying “No I said right foot,

not left foot.” (Compl. 4-5.) Plaintiff contends it made no difference because both feet were in plain sight. The

inference from Plaintiff’s allegations is that Daley was merely playing games with Plaintiff in a sadistic effort to keep

Plaintiff exposed to the chemical agent.

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deliberately failed to decontaminate Plaintiff’s cell before placing Plaintiff back into the cell. 

Defendants then deprived Plaintiff of hygiene items such as clothing, soap, toilet paper, a tooth

brush, and bedding, which Plaintiff alleges was a calculated effort to expose Plaintiff to the painful

effects of the chemical agent. Even if Plaintiff’s disobedience justified some use of force, Plaintiff’s

allegations plausibly support the conclusion that the degree of force used went far beyond that which

would be justifiable under Eighth Amendment standards.

Defendants’ third argument is that Plaintiff has only suffered a “de minimis injury” that does

not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Defendants misconstrue the law. Plaintiff’s

failure to allege substantial or long-term injury is not fatal to his Eighth Amendment claim. See

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (core judicial inquiry is not whether a certain

quantum of injurywas sustained, but whetherforce was applied in a malicious and sadistic manner). 

It is de minimis uses of physical force that is excluded from recognition under the Eighth

Amendment, not de minimis injuries: “Injury and force . . . are only imperfectly correlated, and it

is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his

ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without

serious injury.” Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. at 1178-79. 

Here, the use of the pepper spray-like chemical agent is alleged to be clearly malicious and

sadistic. The use of the chemical agent was not de minimis, particularly in light of the brazenly

sadistic deprivation of personal hygiene items.

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff was decontaminated by Paz and Morse, effectively

“neutralizing any harm that might have been caused by the pepper-spray like substance.” (Mot. to

Dismiss 10:16-18.) Paz and Morse’s actions do not negate the potential liability for the alleged

constitutional violations. Defendants have cited no authority to support their position that prison

officials are not liable for the use of excessive force if they provide treatment for the force after

inflicting the force. The decontamination does not negate the inference that Defendants acted

sadistically and maliciously by purposefully exposing Plaintiff to the chemical agent for an extended

period of time. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support the plausible conclusion that the use

of the chemical agent was excessive by Eighth Amendment standards.

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2. Deliberate Indifference

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference. Defendants contend that “[t]here was no known risk to inmate health or safety of

which the officers were aware of and consciously disregarded.” (Mot. to Dismiss 13:17-19.) The

claim that Defendants were somehow unaware of the substantial pain and discomfort caused by the

chemical agent they sprayed into Plaintiff’s cell is not plausible. While use of the chemical agent

may be justified in certain scenarios, the allegation that Defendants deliberately forced Plaintiff to

wallow in the chemically drenched cell while Defendants maliciously delayed his extraction by

slowly asking Plaintiff to expose certain body parts and make pointless demands regarding the order

in which Plaintiff shows them clearly falls within the realm of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff then

describes how Defendants sadistically confiscated Plaintiff’s personal hygiene items, leaving

Plaintiff unable to clean himself while in the chemically contaminated cell. The Court is unable to

conclude that Defendants’ subjective state-of-mind while engaging in this type of activity was

anything other than sadistic and malicious. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is merely “attempt[ing] to transform by exaggeration, a shortlived event into a deliberate indifference claim.” (Mot. to Dismiss 15:8-10.) To the extent that

Plaintiff is exaggerating, it is Defendants’ obligation to prove the exaggeration through extrinsic

evidence on a motion for summary judgment or at trial. Plaintiff has met the pleading standard for

the purposes of defeating a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s conclusion that Defendants acted with

deliberate indifference is plausibly supported by the factual allegations. Plaintiff’s allegations are

sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

B. Claims Against Defendants Hutchins and Reynoso

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot hold Defendants Hutchins and Reynoso vicariously

liable for the actions of their subordinates. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations do not

demonstrate that Hutchins or Reynoso acted with deliberate indifference. Defendants contend that

Hutchins or Reynoso did not implement a policy repugnant to the Constitution that was the moving

force behind anyconstitutional violations, did not personallyparticipate in anyalleged constitutional

violation, and did not know about any constitutional violations and failed to act to prevent them. 

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Defendants argue that Plaintiff is merely attempting to hold Hutchins and Reynoso liable as

supervisors responsible for overseeing the operations of prison staff.

Plaintiff alleged that Hutchins and Reynoso directed Munoz, Clausings, and Omos to spray

the chemical agent into Plaintiff’s cell. Plaintiff also alleges that Hutchins and Reynoso failed to

order their subordinates to decontaminate Plaintiff’s cell before Plaintiff was placed in it “knowing

Plaintiff would suffer unbearable pain given that the chemicals were all over the bunks, floors, &

walls, and hence dripping on Plaintiff’s bearly[sic] clothed body.” (Compl. 5.) Hutchins and

Reynoso also ordered that Plaintiff be deprived of his personal hygiene items and refused to provide

Plaintiff with supplies to clean the chemical agent in his cell. In Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d

410, 418, (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit stated that a supervisor’s “order to use the pepper spray

against an allegedly complaint [detainee] is sufficient involvement in [an] alleged constitutional

violation.” Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Hutchins and Reynoso’s orders are sufficient to support

an Eighth Amendment claim against them on the theory that they personally participated in the

violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against them in their official capacities are barred

by the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff indicates that he is suing Defendants in both their individual

and official capacities. (Compl. 3.) Defendants correctly argue that Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendants in their official capacities are treated as claims against the state of California. 

See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). State officials sued in their

official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983 and are generally not liable. 

Id.; Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). There is

a limited exception to this general rule that permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against a

state official in his/her official capacity. See Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 131 F.3d

at 839 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). However, Plaintiff has not alleged a

continuing constitutional violation and therefore is not requesting any prospective injunctive relief. 

Plaintiff is requesting compensatory relief for a constitutional violation that occurred in the past. 

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Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.

However, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their personal or individual capacities are

still viable. The Eleventh does not bar damages suits against state officials sued in their individual

or personal capacities under Section 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991).

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable prison

official would not have known that Defendants’ conduct was unlawful under clearlyestablished law. 

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearlyestablished statutoryor constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “The protection of qualified immunity applies

regardless of whether the government official’s error ‘is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a

mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,

567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). Questions regarding qualified immunity should be resolved

at the earliest possible stage in litigation because qualified immunity serves as an immunity from suit

rather than a mere defense to liability. Id.

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court mandated a two-step sequence

for resolving claims of qualified immunity. First, a court must decide whether the facts alleged by

a plaintiff set forth a violation of a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Second, if the

plaintiff has satisfied the first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was “clearly

established” at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct. Id. If the defendant did not violate a

clearly established constitutional right, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from

plaintiff’s claims. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987)). However, the Supreme Court has since held that the Saucier sequence is not mandatory in

all cases and courts may resolve the “clearly established” question first when the Saucier sequence

would result in a “substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that have

no effect on the outcome of the case.” Id. at 818.

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The Court finds that the right asserted by Plaintiff to be free from the deliberately indifferent

use of pepper spray-like chemicals was clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged

misconduct. The incident in question allegedlyoccurred on February28, 2007. Bythat time, Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (“prison officials’ ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk

of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment”), Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,

6 (1992) (malicious and sadistic use of force to inflict unnecessary and wanton pain violates the

Eighth Amendment), and Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986) (same) had all been decided.

The Ninth Circuit has held that the failure to decontaminate prisoners or otherwise provide

medical treatment for prisoners exposed to pepper spray can support a claim for the violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit

concluded that the right at issue was clearly established. Id. at 906. The Ninth Circuit has also held

that a supervisor’s order to use pepper spray against an allegedly complaint prisoner is sufficient to

state an Eighth Amendment claim. Lolli, 351 F.3d at 418. The Ninth Circuit also held that a

prisoner’s allegation that prison officials pepper sprayed prisoner six times with 7-8 second bursts

in response to the prisoner’s refusal to turn over his food tray was sufficient to state a claim under

the Eighth Amendment. Vlasich v. Reynoso, 117 Fed. Appx. 568, 570 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court 7

finds that the law prohibiting the excessive use of pepperspray and pepperspray-like chemicals was

clearly established at the time of the incidents alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. Thus, Defendants are

not entitled to qualified immunity.

E. Motion for More Definite Statement

Defendants argue that in the event that the Court does not dismiss Plaintiff’s claims,

Defendants move for a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Rule

12(e) provides:

A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to

which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or

ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The

motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must

point out the defects complained of and the details desired.

In determining whether a right was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes, the Court may look

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at unpublished decisions. Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 701-702 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Defendants state that they:

seek clarification of plaintiff’s claims against each and every

defendant in both their individual and official capacities to expedite

both discovery and law and motion. A reading of the complaint,

especially with regard to the third and fourth causes of action

indicates that the complaint is ambiguous and confusing in terms of

what legal claims plaintiff is proceeding.

(Mot. to Dismiss 22:3-7.) The Court will deny Defendants’ motion. The Court acknowledges that

Plaintiff’s pro se pleading is organized in a slightlyconfusingmanner. Plaintiff delineates his claims

into four separate causes of actions, “excessive force,” “unnecessaryprolonging of pain,” “hazardous

living conditions,” and “life’s basic necessities.” (Compl. 6-9.) Conceptually, Plaintiff is attempting

to raise separate causes of action for Defendants’ decisions: (1) to utilize the chemical agent, 

(2) to delay Plaintiff’s extraction from his cell, (3) to place Plaintiff back in the cell without

decontaminating it, and 4) to deprive Plaintiff of certain personal hygiene items, clothing, and

bedding to exacerbate his exposure to the chemical agent. Whether Plaintiff’s allegations are

construed as four separate “causes of action” or as a single “cause of action” has little practical

significance, as either way, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the federal pleading

requirements. Plaintiff is suing Defendants for the violation of his rights guaranteed by the Eighth

Amendment stemming from an incident involving the use of a pepperspray-like chemical agent that

allegedly occurred on February 28, 2007.

Plaintiff’s complaint has pleaded sufficient facts to provide Defendants with fair notice of

Plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007). Further, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and his pleading is to be liberally construed and is

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Id. The Court will

recommend that Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement be denied.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint states a claim for relief under Section 1983 for the

violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff has alleged that the force used

by Defendants was clearly excessive in light of the circumstances and that Defendants acted with

deliberate indifference. The Court also finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim

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against Defendants Hutchins and Reynoso for their personal involvement in the alleged

constitutional violations. The Court finds that the conduct alleged violated clearly established law

and that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court finds that Defendants are not

entitled to a more definite statement of Plaintiff’s claims. Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

claims, to the extent that they can be construed as suing Defendants in their official capacities,

should be dismissed and that this action should proceed against Defendants only in their

individual/personal capacities.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed on December 7, 2009, should be PARTIALLY

GRANTED and PARTIALLY DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities should be

DISMISSED;

3. This action should proceed on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against

Defendants in their individual/personal capacities; and

4. Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) should be

DENIED.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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