Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-03-41244/USCOURTS-ca5-03-41244-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Noelia Campos Madrigal
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 20, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 03-41244

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

NOELIA CAMPOS MADRIGAL,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(C-03-CR-109-1)

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

On January 24, 2005, the Supreme Court granted Madrigal’s

petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the prior judgment of

this court, and remanded this appeal to this court for

“consideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.___ [,

125 S. Ct. 738] (2005).” In its remand order the Supreme Court did

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2

not specify which of the two majority opinions set forth in Booker

was the basis for its remand decision. The Supreme Court did make

clear in its Booker decision that both opinions would be applicable

to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final as of

January 12, 2005. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769 (citing Griffith

v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)). Madrigal’s appeal

satisfies those conditions. 

In her original appeal to this court, Madrigal claimed two

grounds of error: first, erroneous application of the safety valve

provision of the Sentencing Guidelines; and second, her assertion

that 21 U.S.C. § 841 was unconstitutional on the basis of Apprendi

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Nothing in Booker addresses

either of these claims of error, and Madrigal failed to object in

the district court on either of the grounds addressed in Booker,

i.e., (i) a Sixth Amendment violation resulting from an enhancement

of a sentence based on facts (other than a prior conviction) found

by the sentencing judge, which were not admitted by the defendant

or found by the jury; or (ii) that the Sentencing Guidelines were

unconstitutional because they were mandatory and not advisory.

Consequently, we review for plain error. Because the district

court did not enhance Madrigal’s sentence on the basis of any facts

found solely by the court, we conclude that Booker’s Sixth

Amendment holding is not applicable to this case. However, under

the Booker holding that Congress originally intended the Guidelines

to be advisory and not mandatory, there is error in this case

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because the district court viewed and acted under the Sentencing

Guidelines as mandatory and not discretionary. Applying our plain

error analysis, we conclude: (1) there was error because the

district court operated under a mandatory scheme and not an

advisory scheme; and (2) such error is now plain under Johnson v.

United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)(holding it is enough that

error be plain at the time of appellate review). However, under

the third prong of our plain error methodology, i.e., whether the

error affects substantial rights, it is Madrigal’s burden to show

that, but for the error of acting on the premise that the

Guidelines are mandatory and not advisory, the district court would

have made a different decision. In United States v. Mares, 2005

U.S. App. LEXIS 3653, at *27-*28 (5th Cir. Mar. 4, 2005), we said

that “the pertinent question is whether [the defendant] demonstrated that the sentencing judgeSSsentencing under an advisory

scheme rather than a mandatory oneSSwould have reached a

significantly different result.” That is, the plain error standard

places the

burden of proof [on the defendant] and requires “the defendant to show that the error

actually did make a difference: if it is

equally plausible that the error worked in

favor of the defense, the defendant loses; if

the effect of the error is uncertain so that

we do not know which, if either, side it

helped the defendant loses.” 

Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th

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Cir. 2005)).

In fact, the record affirmatively supports the proposition

that the district court, if given the opportunity to treat the

Guidelines as discretionary only, would likely have imposed the

same sentence because the court expressly denied Madrigal’s request

for a sentence at the bottom of the Guideline range. The district

court’s remarks at sentencing demonstrate that the court also

explicitly considered the objectives of sentencing identified in

subsections (A)-(D) of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Accordingly, we

determine that Madrigal has failed to satisfy the third prong of

our plain error analysis, i.e., that the sentence imposed by the

district court violated her substantial rights.

We conclude, therefore, that nothing in the Supreme Court’s

Booker decision requires us to change our prior affirmance in this

case. We therefore affirm the conviction and sentence as set by the

trial court. AFFIRMED.

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