Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05216/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05216-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christine M. Holcomb
Appellant
Donald E. Powell
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 7, 2005 Decided January 10, 2006

No. 04-5216

CHRISTINE M. HOLCOMB,

APPELLANT

v.

DONALD E. POWELL, CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL DEPOSIT

INSURANCE CORPORATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv01550)

Ellen K. Renaud argued the cause for appellant. With her

on the briefs were David H. Shapiro and Richard L. Swick.

Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, Diane M. Sullivan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and

Lawrence H. Richmond, Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

entered an appearance.

Before: ROGERS and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

USCA Case #04-5216 Document #941701 Filed: 01/10/2006 Page 1 of 24
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WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Christine Holcomb filed

suit against her employer, the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation (FDIC), alleging two violations of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964: first, discrimination against her on the

basis of race when the corporation failed to select her for a

promotion; and second, retaliation against her in the form of

reduced work responsibilities when she filed a discrimination

complaint following the non-promotion. The district court

granted summary judgment for FDIC on both the discrimination

and retaliation claims. We conclude the record does not contain

sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that FDIC

engaged in prohibited racial discrimination when it selected a

white applicant for the disputed position, and we affirm the grant

of summary judgment on Holcomb’s discrimination claim.

Contrary to the district court, however, we conclude Holcomb

has established a prima facie case of retaliation, and we reverse

the grant of summary judgment on her retaliation claim. 

I

In 1991, Christine Holcomb, an African-American woman,

began working for the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) as a

Grade 7 Secretary. In late 1995, after RTC merged with FDIC,

Holcomb moved to FDIC, and her career prospered. Within

three years, she was a Grade 11 Program Specialist in the Office

of Diversity and Economic Opportunity (ODEO). 

In early 1999, ODEO underwent a series of reorganizations

initiated by Vijay Deshpande, the acting director, in an effort to

streamline the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint

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3

process. In February of that year, Anna Mergele, an AsianAmerican female attorney from FDIC’s legal division, began a

detail to ODEO to serve as acting chief of the Complaints branch

in order to reduce a backlog of unresolved EEO complaints. For

about six weeks, Mergele was Holcomb’s immediate supervisor,

but Holcomb was in transition, having applied for and been

selected to serve on a year-long detail to FDIC’s Division of

Compliance and Consumer Affairs (DCA) to work on Y2Krelated issues. Despite needing Holcomb’s help with the ODEO

backlog, Mergele approved the detail. Holcomb had indicated

a strong interest in the position and Mergele viewed it as a

unique opportunity. 

When Holcomb left for DCA, Mergele requested Amy Del

Valle, a certified paralegal within FDIC’s legal division, where

Mergele had previously been employed, be detailed to ODEO.

Del Valle, a white female, had joined RTC in March 1991 as a

Grade 9 Paralegal and, in 1992, was promoted to Grade 11

Paralegal, her position at the time Mergele made her request.

Mergele had worked with Del Valle before and requested the

detail because Holcomb’s departure exacerbated the need for

assistance with the complaint backlog. 

Meanwhile, Holcomb sought to cut short her DCA tenure

and return to ODEO. Mergele was amenable to Holcomb’s

request but lacked authority to make the decision; however, the

ODEO director insisted that Holcomb fulfill ODEO’s obligation

to DCA. Holcomb remained at DCA until March 2000 but

would, on her own initiative, work on ODEO matters during

lunch breaks or after regular business hours. 

In August 1999, Holcomb received a disappointing annual

performance evaluation, covering the period from September

1998 to August 1999 — a period during which she had worked

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at both ODEO and DCA. Because Mergele’s period of supervision had been so brief, Gregory Cofer actually completed the

evaluation, which Mergele signed. Holcomb’s DCA supervisor

proposed a 3 rating for “analytical/technical skills”; Cofer

reduced that rating to a 2, which lowered Holcomb’s overall

rating from “outstanding” to “superior.”

In October 1999, ODEO advertised for a new position,

Grade 12 Program Specialist. Both Holcomb, on detail to DCA

at the time, and Del Valle applied for the job, and the personnel

department identified them as the only two candidates who met

the minimum qualifications. Mergele, the selecting official,

interviewed both women and ultimately selected Del Valle.

Shortly after learning of Del Valle’s selection, on January 19,

2000, Holcomb filed a formal administrative discrimination

complaint, primarily alleging discrimination because of race,

age, and disability based on ODEO’s failure to promote her. The

complaint also alleged the repeated denials of Holcomb’s

requests to return to ODEO from her DCA detail and the 1998-

99 job evaluation that rated Holcomb’s performance as merely

“superior” rather than “outstanding” were motivated by illegal

discrimination. 

When Holcomb’s DCA detail ended in March 2000 and she

returned to ODEO, she was assigned to a reorganized Formal

Complaints section, where Michael Moran, an Asian-American

male, served as her supervisor. Holcomb, still a Grade 11

Program Specialist, quickly became dissatisfied with the low

level of her job responsibilities, which were primarily clerical.

Moran’s attempts to assign suitable tasks failed. Holcomb

objected to certain tasks, believing they were not commensurate

with her grade, and lacked familiarity with other tasks requiring

greater skill and experience. 

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By this time, Holcomb had also engaged in lengthy 1

correspondence with various government agencies about the status of

In approximatelyMay 2001, Holcomb expressed apprehension to Vincent Johnson, an African-American male and Deputy

Director of ODEO, that her job was being eroded and she feared

a demotion. Johnson sought to give Holcomb assignments more

commensurate with her grade but remained concerned about

Holcomb’s lack of meaningful work. Accordingly, Johnson

supervised a desk audit in February 2002, which ultimately

revealed Holcomb was performing Grade 5 work. Subsequently,

Johnson and Moran, with input from Mergele, wrote a new

Grade 11 Equal Opportunity Specialist position description for

Holcomb covering duties available within the Complaints

section, which was approved in August 2002 and remediated

Holcomb’s under-utilization. At no time was Holcomb ever

threatened with demotion, nor did management ever discuss the

possibility. 

Holcomb filed a second formal administrative complaint on

April 8, 2002. In alleging discrimination, harassment, and

hostile work environment, the complaint charged that Mergele

and Moran deliberately withheld duties from Holcomb to the

detriment of her career; that they provided Del Valle with

assignments designed to enhance her opportunities for promotion; and that Mergele unfairly criticized Holcomb during a

March 2002 meeting reviewing a report Holcomb had helped to

assemble. 

Holcomb had already filed a complaint on July 17, 2001, in

the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,

alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title

VII, based, in part, on FDIC’s failure to select her for the Grade

12 Program Specialist position. On April 17, 2003, Holcomb 1

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her first administrative complaint. In February and March of 2000,

she complained to senior FDIC officials via email and letter that

proper EEOprocedures were not being followed. In July, August, and

December of 2000, and in January, March, and May of 2001, she

wrote seven letters to EEOC officials and administrative judges about

other purported procedural deficiencies. Holcomb copied FDIC

officials on several of these letters. 

filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint again

alleged racial discrimination and retaliation but supplemented

Holcomb’s claims with the results of the desk audit and the

treatment received from Mergele at the March 2002 meeting.

FDIC moved for summary judgment on both counts. The

district court granted the motion, and Holcomb appealed. 

II

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Carter

v. George Wash. Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits filed

pursuant to discovery show that, first, “there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact” and, second, “the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).

In making this determination, we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to Holcomb and draw all reasonable inferences

in her favor; we are not to make credibility determinations or

weigh the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530

U.S. 133, 150 (2000). 

“The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute

between the parties” will not defeat summary judgment; “the

requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. A fact is “material” if a dispute

over it might affect the outcome of a suit under governing law;

factual disputes that are “irrelevant or unnecessary” do not affect

the summary judgment determination. Id. at 248. An issue is

“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. If there are no

genuine issues of material fact, the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving party “fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

A

We begin with Holcomb’s discrimination claim. Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits federal agencies,

including government corporations like FDIC, from discriminating in employment on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16

(2000); Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Where, as here, the record contains no direct evidence that the

adverse employment action of which the plaintiff complains was

caused by prohibited discrimination, we turn to the the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973), to analyze the claim. Lathram v.

Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Under this

framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of

discrimination by showing that: (1) she is a member of a

protected class; (2) she applied for and was qualified for an

available position; (3) despite her qualifications, she was

rejected; and (4) either someone filled the position or it remained

vacant and the employer continued to seek applicants. Id. 

FDIC does not dispute, and we agree, that with respect to

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her non-promotion to the Grade 12 Program Specialist position,

Holcomb has established a prima facie case of discrimination.

An African-American woman, Holcomb applied for the position,

and personnel identified her as one of two candidates with the

minimum qualifications. Holcomb was not promoted; the

position went to Del Valle. Thus, Holcomb satisfied the purpose

of the initial step of the McDonnell Douglas framework: neither

an absolute or relative lack of qualifications nor the absence of

a vacancy in the job sought prevented her promotion. See Int’l

Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44

(1977); Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 328 F.3d

647, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the

burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence that the

plaintiff was rejected for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; Lathram, 336 F.3d at 1088. FDIC has

met its burden in this case. In an affidavit, Mergele, the selecting official for the disputed position, stated she chose Del Valle

“because she was the best applicant” and “the person with the

best skills and abilities to do the job should be selected.”

Mergele explained what she sought in a successful applicant,

including the ability to track EEO investigations, follow up with

contract investigators as problems arose, and coordinate the

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) program and related

issues. She was looking for an individual who had an in-depth

understanding of “the entire administrative EEO complaint

process” and could “coordinate all phases of ADR and investigations.” The skills Mergele cited in her affidavit align with those

in the job description, such as “[c]oordinat[ing] Branch responses to discovery requests from the Legal Division for cases

pending before the administrative tribunal and in district court,”

“[s]erv[ing] as the technical monitor for all contracting activity

of the Branch,” and “[s]erv[ing] as the principal contact and

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coordinator of the Agency’s Mediation Program.”

In Mergele’s view, Del Valle was more qualified for the

position than Holcomb because Del Valle’s background as a

paralegal and EEO counselor gave her a broader understanding

of the administrative EEO complaint and district court process

as well as more hands-on experience than Holcomb. Since

beginning her ODEO detail, Del Valle had assisted in processing

EEO complaints, begun coordinating the ADR program, and

helped to develop a method to track EEO investigations.

Moreover, during her time at FDIC’s Legal Division, she worked

on all phases of EEO complaints before the administrative

agency and the district court. By contrast, Mergele stated in her

affidavit, Holcomb had not worked on the ADR program or EEO

investigations while under Mergele’s supervision, nor did her

application indicate any related work experience. Mergele’s

qualifications-based justification constitutes a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory action,

and as FDIC’s burden is merely one of production, it has

satisfied the second prong of McDonnell Douglas. 

FDIC having offered a nondiscriminatory explanation for its

actions, the presumption of discrimination “simply drops out of

the picture.” Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 520 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

511 (1993)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Morgan,

328 F.3d at 651 (“If the defendant produces such evidence [of a

nondiscriminatory reason], the McDonnell Douglas framework

— with its presumptions and burdens— disappears, and the sole

remaining issue is discrimination vel non.” (quoting Reeves, 530

U.S. at 142-43) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).

At this point, “to survive summary judgment the plaintiff must

show that a reasonable jury could conclude from all of the

evidence that the adverse employment decision was made for a

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discriminatory reason.” Lathram, 336 F.3d at 1088. By “all of

the evidence,” we mean any combination of (1) evidence

establishing the plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) evidence the

plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation

for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination

that may be available to the plaintiff, such as independent

evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part of

the employer. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).

1

Although Holcomb might have relied on any of these three

categories of evidence, she primarily challenges Mergele’s

qualifications-based explanation for hiring Del Valle. We have

consistently declined to serve as a “super-personnel department

that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.” Barbour v.

Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Dale

v. Chi. Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986)) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of

Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Title VII liability

cannot rest solely upon a judge's determination that an employer

misjudged the relative qualifications of admittedly qualified

candidates.”). In Aka, however, we concluded a factfinder could

infer discrimination if the evidence showed a reasonable

employer would have found the plaintiff significantly better

qualified for the job but nevertheless failed to offer the position

to her. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1295. We did not require a plaintiff to

establish this disparity in order to survive a motion for summary

judgment, though, and the district court erred by doing so here.

Indeed, we emphasized that a plaintiff attacking a qualificationsbased explanation is expressly not limited to comparing her

qualifications against those of the successful applicant; she may

seek to expose other flaws in the employer’s explanation,

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including, inter alia, showing the employer has misstated her

qualifications. Id. Here, Holcomb attempts to establish not only

that she is significantly better qualified than Del Valle, but also

that her employer substantively misstated her qualifications. 

“In a close case, a reasonable juror would usually assume

that the employer is more capable of assessing the significance

of small differences in the qualifications of the candidates, or

that the employer simply made a judgment call.” Id. at 1294. In

order to justify an inference of discrimination, the qualifications

gap must be great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination. See Lathram, 336 F.3d at 1091 (citing a “wide and

inexplicable gulf” between candidates). In Aka, for example, we

determined the evidentiary record was sufficient for a reasonable

jury to conclude the plaintiff, who was denied a pharmacy

technician job, was “markedly more qualified” than the applicant

who received the position. 156 F.3d at 1299. There, the

plaintiff presented undisputed evidence that he had nineteen

years of experience as a hospital assistant as well as bachelor’s

and master’s degrees; the other applicant had no college education, had worked in the hospital laundry for slightly over a year,

and had spent only two months as a pharmacy volunteer. Id. at

1286, 1295-96. Furthermore, in Lathram, we accepted an

inference of discrimination where the plaintiff, who possessed

several years’ experience in public affairs, was “substantially

more qualified” than the unemployed former journalist who was

hired for a higher position. 336 F.3d at 1092. Although

Holcomb’s qualifications are impressive — she has worked her

way up to a Grade 11 position, earned “superior” and “outstanding” performance evaluations in recent years, and garnered

positive comments from co-workers, including Mergele — the

evidence fails to establish that Holcomb’s qualifications were

sufficiently superior to those of Del Valle to allow a jury to infer

discrimination. Cf. Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 429 (D.C.

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12

Cir. 2003) (comparing rejected plaintiff’s credentials with those

of successful applicant, and finding plaintiff “simply not

discernibly better” than applicant). 

In her briefs and at oral argument, Holcomb placed great

emphasis on three supposed “misstatements” by Mergele that,

she argues, would permit a jury to infer Mergele’s explanation

is incorrect or fabricated and her hiring decision thus motivated

by discrimination. But closer examination of the record reveals

no actual evidence Mergele misstated Holcomb’s qualifications

as she understood them at the time of her hiring decision. 

Holcomb first alleges Mergele misstated her familiarity with

the EEO complaint process. She notes that Mergele’s affidavit

underscores Del Valle’s “broader understanding of the administrative EEO complaint process,” but she points out that in

Holcomb’s own 1998-99 performance evaluation, Mergele

lauded Holcomb’s penchant for “stay[ing] abreast of the latest

changes in EEO complaint processing.” This evidence does not

establish Mergele misstated Holcomb’s qualifications on this

point. The complimentary comments Mergele wrote in

Holcomb’s 1998-99 evaluation neither contradict nor are

inconsistent with her belief that Del Valle nevertheless possessed “broader understanding” of the EEO complaint process.

Second, Holcomb objects to Mergele’s purported claim she

did not hire Holcomb because of a lack of experience processing

EEO complaints. Holcomb challenges this characterization of

her experience by calling attention to two pieces of evidence to

the contrary: an overtime slip authorizing work related to

complaint processing, which Mergele signed; and testimony by

Michael Moran that Holcomb processed complaints under his

supervision. 

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Again, however, the record does not bear out Holcomb’s

claim Mergele misstated her qualifications. To begin with,

Mergele never said she rejected Holcomb because she had never

processed complaints; she said Holcomb acknowledged during

the interview never actually processing anyEEO complaints. In

addition, the single overtime slip indicated Holcomb was to

“assist w/processing complaints.” “Assisting with” a task is not

the same as having ultimate responsibility. Compare, for

example, Holcomb’s own Grade 11 Program Specialist job

description to the disputed Grade 12 Program Specialist job

description, which recognizes that the difference between the

two activities amounts to at least one pay grade. Compare Grade

11 Program Specialist description, R.47, ROI No. 000005 Tab

25, at 2 (successful applicant “[a]ssists senior specialists in

responding to Congressional inquiries”), and id. (successful

applicant “[a]ssists in the development of key reports”), with

Grade 12 Program Specialist description, R.47, ROI No. 000005

Tab 24, at 2 (successful applicant “[r]esponds to Congressional

inquiries”), and id. (successful applicant “[d]evelops statistical

reports”). Last, while Moran did testify that Holcomb processed

some complaints under his supervision, Holcomb did not work

for Moran until she had returned from her detail in March 2000

— after Mergele made her hiring decision in late 1999.

Holcomb offers no evidence to show Mergele relied on

Holcomb’s lack of experience processing complaints to justify

her decision not to promote; nor is there evidence Holcomb

possessed the requisite experience when the decision was made.

The third “misstatement” Holcomb cites is her purported

lack of experience writing accept/dismiss letters. To show

otherwise, Holcomb points to her application package, in which

she noted that she “composed letters accepting or dismissing

allegations of discrimination,” as well as to the affidavit of a coworker, Constance Mullins, who stated Holcomb drafted and

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reviewed acceptance/dismissal letters. But what Mergele

actually said in her testimony was that Holcomb had not written

such letters while Mergele was Holcomb’s direct supervisor.

Mergele also said that during Holcomb’s interview, Holcomb

said she had reviewed accept/dismiss letters written by others.

The two pieces of evidence Holcomb advances do not give rise

to the level of contradiction or “misstatement” that could be the

basis for a reasonable jury to find unlawful animus.

None of Mergele’s alleged “misstatements” approaches the

level of “adequate evidence” we identified in Aka, where we

posited a rather explicit misstatement as the type that might

permit an inference of discrimination. See Aka, 156 F.3d at

1295 (“[I]f the employer says that it did not hire the plaintiff

because he did not speak Portuguese, the plaintiff can show that

he did speak Portuguese, and that the employer knew it.”). In

sum, Holcomb has failed to produce any evidence to rebut

Mergele’s explanation for hiring Del Valle that would permit a

reasonable jury to infer discrimination. 

2

A plaintiff in a Title VII case is not limited to challenging

the employer’s explanation; she can also avoid summary

judgment by presenting other evidence, direct or circumstantial,

that permits an inference of discrimination. Id. at 1295 n.11.

Examples of such evidence include discriminatory statements by

the employer, id. at 1289, or other attitudes suggesting the

decisionmaker harbors discriminatory animus, Carter, 387 F.3d

at 880; Morgan, 328 F.3d at 654, as well as data showing that

the defendant employs members ofthe plaintiff’s protected class

at rates far below their numbers in the applicant pool and the

general population, Aka, 156 F.3d at 1295 n.11. See also

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Another employee had filed an informal complaint but withdrew 2

it soon thereafter.

Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 996 (D.C.

Cir. 2002).

Holcomb recites a litany of allegations purporting to show

unlawful animus on the part of Mergele and FDIC. Some of

these propositions are purely conclusory: for example, Holcomb

submits as evidence of animus the mere allegation that Mergele

“froze Holcomb out of her own position” in order to promote

Del Valle. Others mischaracterize the record and are without

evidentiary support. For example, Holcomb maintains that

Mergele “refused” to help her return to ODEO from her DCA

detail; however, the record shows Mergele would have welcomed Holcomb’s return but lacked the authority to make this

decision, and her supervisor vetoed the proposal out of a sense

of obligation to DCA. Holcomb also argues that nearly all of the

duties of the Grade 12 position duplicated Holcomb’s Grade 11

position; but a comparison of all of the responsibilities of each

job — not just those Holcomb points out — clearly explains the

one-grade difference between the two positions. 

In addition, Holcomb alleges four African-American

employees have complained of race discrimination by Mergele.

But the record reveals that with the exception of Holcomb, two

employees, at most, have filed discrimination complaints against

Mergele, both of which are in the informal stages. We are not 2

persuaded that the mere filing of two informal discrimination

complaints against Mergele, where nothing more is known about

the nature, merit, or outcome of those complaints, can be used as

a proxy to establish Mergele’s discriminatory animus in the

present case. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); Carter v. District of

Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 128-29, 131-32 (D.C. Cir. 1986);

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Holcomb also claims that other employees have approached 3

Vincent Johnson about behavior on Mergele’s part they claim is

discriminatory. Johnson did testify that three African-American

employees approached him expressing unhappiness with Mergele’s

“method of supervising.” He suggested these individuals voice their

concerns to Mergele, which they did, and no complaints were ever

filed. We are reluctant to infer invidious discrimination from what

appears to be an amicable resolution of differences between

supervisor and employee.

DiRico v. City of Quincy, 404 F.3d 464, 467-68 (1st Cir. 2005);

Berkovich v. Hicks, 922 F.2d 1018, 1022 (2d Cir. 1991).3

Holcomb also alleges a jury could infer discrimination

because ODEO officials lowered her 1998-99 performance

rating despite being unfamiliar with her work. The record

indicates Mergele asked her supervisor, Gregory Cofer, to take

responsibility for rating Holcomb because Cofer had worked

with Holcomb for a longer period and could perform a fairer

evaluation. There is no evidence suggesting that Cofer was

“unfamiliar” with Holcomb’s work. Moreover, there is no

evidence Cofer played any role in Mergele’s decision to hire Del

Valle. In Carter v. George Washington University, we rejected

a finding of discriminatory intent where the plaintiff alleged

discriminatory intent by an official who “was not a decisionmaker” with respect to the disputed hiring. 387 F.3d at 880.

Therefore, even if Holcomb could show Cofer possessed

discriminatory animus in lowering her rating, it would not

suggest Mergele displayed the requisite discriminatory intent. 

Similarly, there is no evidence to support Holcomb’s

contention a jury could infer discrimination because Mergele’s

arrival at ODEO coincided with the reassignment and retirement

of a number of African-American employees, or because

Mergele selected Del Valle, an FDIC employee from another

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division, for the Grade 12 position at the same time ODEO was

downsizing. The record indicates ODEO underwent a series of

reorganizations that began when Vijay Deshpande became

Acting Director. In fact, the first reorganization took place only

three days after Mergele arrived at ODEO, and she testified that

she was caught off-guard by the new structure. The record

contains no evidence Mergele played a role in any of the

decisions that led to the retirements and reassignments of many

ODEO workers. Even were Holcomb to provide evidence that

discriminatory animus motivated Deshpande’s actions, which

she does not, no reasonable jury could impute discriminatory

intent on Mergele’s part for Deshpande’s actions. It is also

worth noting that while Holcomb provides evidence of the races

of various individuals who retired or were reassigned, she

proffers no statistics or other data describing the demographic

composition of ODEO or FDIC as a whole. Thus we are unable

to determine whether the reorganizations adversely affected one

race to the benefit of others or whether they affected employees

of all races in proportion to their overall makeup within the

corporation. Cf. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1295 n.11 (“[I]f a female

plaintiff claims sex discrimination, evidence that the defendant

employs women at rates far below their numbers in the applicant

pool and the general population may well help her case.”).

Several of Holcomb’s many allegations do find some

grounding in the record. For example, as Holcomb notes,

Mergele testified she and Moran decided Holcomb would be

assigned to his section following her return from DCA detail; yet

only a few seconds later, she stated she and Moran had no role

in this decision, which was “made as a part of the reorganization” by Deshpande. As Holcomb also points out, Moran

testified Mergele told him she was writing a letter in support of

an appeal of a desk audit for Del Valle; but Mergele did not

mention that letter in describing the extent to which she assisted

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Del Valle in the appeal. Even giving Holcomb the benefit of all

reasonable inferences, as we must at the summary judgment

stage, we conclude a reasonable jury could not infer discriminatory intent based on these few inconsistencies, which are both

trivial and remote. 

We need not address Holcomb’s remaining contentions,

except to note she marshals no evidence of the sort this court has

previously considered probative of establishing discriminatory

animus. In Dunaway v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

310 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2002), for instance, we addressed, in

part, a plaintiff’s contention that illegal discrimination prompted

her termination. Reversing the district court’s entry of summary

judgment for the employer on the plaintiff’s gender and national

origin claims, we recognized evidence that her immediate

supervisors had leveled crude, derogatory, and highly offensive

remarks about her gender and ethnicity toward both the plaintiff

and in general around the workplace, including statements

directly connected to the employer’s desire to terminate her

employment. Id. at 764-66. Holcomb proffers no evidence

along these lines or even close to it. To conclude that discriminatory animus motivated the remaining claims to which

Holcomb alludes is to go far beyond reasonable inference and

into the realm of unfettered speculation. 

Examination of the record reveals that Holcomb, despite her

numerous allegations, has not produced sufficient other evidence

to satisfy her “burden of showing that a reasonable jury could

conclude” she failed to receive the Grade 12 Program Specialist

position on account of her race. Waterhouse, 298 F.3d at 997

(quoting Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In combination with her failure to produce evidence

rebutting Mergele’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

selecting Del Valle, we conclude Holcomb has failed to satisfy

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her burden at the summary judgment stage. We therefore affirm

the district court’s entry of summary judgment for FDIC on her

discrimination claim. 

B

Holcomb contends the drastic reduction in her work

responsibilities when she returned from the DCA detail constitutes retaliation. Title VII prohibits federal agencies from

retaliating against employees for asserting their rights. Forman

v. Small, 271 F.3d 285, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Ethnic

Employees of the Library of Cong. v. Boorstin, 751 F.2d 1405,

1413 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Evaluation of Title VII retaliation claims follows the same burden-shifting template as

discrimination claims. Cones, 199 F.3d at 520. First, a plaintiff

must establish a prima facie case of retaliation; if she meets that

burden, the employer must articulate a legitimate nonretaliatory

reason for its action; finally, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden

of establishing that the reason asserted by the employer is pretext

for retaliation. Id. 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff

must present evidence that (1) she engaged in activity protected

by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse employment

action against her; and (3) the adverse action was causally

related to the exercise of her rights. Id. at 521; Forkkio v.

Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Brown v. Brody,

199 F.3d 446, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1999). By filing a formal

complaint of discrimination on January 19, 2000, Holcomb

engaged in protected activity. 

The district court concluded Holcomb was not the subject

of an adverse employment action. We disagree. Adverse

employment actions are not confined to hirings, firings, promoUSCA Case #04-5216 Document #941701 Filed: 01/10/2006 Page 19 of 24
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One reading of Cones suggests that a plaintiff makes out an 4

adverse employment action once she has shown that she has been

“aggrieved” by the action. As Brown makes clear, however, the

purpose of meeting the “aggrieved” requirement is to ensure that a

plaintiff has suffered the necessary injury for her to state a claim. 199

F.3d at 455. In other words, being “aggrieved” is necessary to state

a claim for retaliation, but it is not sufficient to demonstrate that a

particular employment action was adverse. Accordingly, we read

Cones as standing simply for the proposition, previously espoused in

Passer and reiterated here, that employment actions need not fall into

cognizable categories to be considered adverse. 

tions, or other discrete incidents. Cones, 199 F.3d at 521. So

long as a plaintiff meets the statutory requirement of being

“aggrieved” by an employer’s action, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)

(2000), we do not categorically reject a particular personnel

action as nonadverse simply because it does not fall into a

cognizable type, Cones, 199 F.3d at 521 (citing Brown, 199 F.3d

at 455); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc’y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C.

Cir. 1992). At the same time, our cases have established some 4

limits to what constitutes an adverse employment action.

Although “purely subjective injuries,” such as dissatisfaction

with a reassignment, public humiliation, or loss of reputation,

are not adverse actions, the threshold is met when an employee

“experiences materially adverse consequences affecting the

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future

employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact

could find objectively tangible harm.” Forkkio, 306 F.3d at

1130-31 (citing Brown, 199 F.3d at 457); see also Stewart, 352

F.3d at 427. We have also expressly recognized that “reassignment with significantly different responsibilities . . . generally

indicates an adverse action.” Forkkio, 306 F.3d at 1131 (quoting

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). 

After her return to ODEO, Holcomb never suffered a

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reduction in grade, pay, or benefits, nor does the evidence

suggest her superiors ever considered these actions. She did,

however, experience an extraordinary reduction in responsibilities that persisted for years, from which a reasonable jury could

conclude Holcomb suffered “objectively tangible harm.” The

record includes uncontroverted testimony that her duties

dramatically declined in both quantity and quality. Most

tellingly, the February 2002 desk audit revealed Holcomb was

performing tasks commensurate with a Grade 5 position — six

grades below Holcomb’s Grade 11 Program Specialist position.

FDIC concedes Holcomb was performing work well below

her grade level but counters that the reduction was the inadvertent result of a reorganization, was merely “temporary,” and was

remedied when management ordered a desk audit and rewrote

her position to give her duties commensurate with her classification. FDIC fails to acknowledge, though, that the desk audit did

not take place until February 2002 — almost two years after

Holcomb was assigned to Moran’s section and found herself

doing mostly clerical work. Additionally, it was not until

August 2002 — six months later — that personnel finally

approved her new job description. We conclude Holcomb

suffered an adverse employment action based on the precipitous

reduction in the complexity of her work and the substantial

amount of time it took to correct these deficiencies — even after

management became aware of the problem. Holcomb was

assigned duties not only far below her grade level but below the

level at which she had entered federal employment ten years

earlier. Moreover, she was mired in this professional purgatory

for over two years. These extraordinary circumstances rise to

the level of materially adverse consequences that inflict objectively tangible harm. Accordingly, we find that Holcomb has

suffered an adverse employment action. 

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We also conclude that the adverse employment action

Holcomb experienced was causally related to her exercise of

statutorily protected activity. A plaintiff may satisfy this third

element of a prima facie case by showing “the employer had

knowledge of the employee’s protected activity, and . . . the

adverse personnel action took place shortly after that activity.”

Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also

Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 

Although, viewed in isolation, Holcomb’s January 2000

complaint would not establish the “close temporal proximity” we

have previously required to give rise to an inference of causation,

Cones, 199 F.3d at 521; see also Singletary v. District of

Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (requiring a “close

temporal relationship”), Holcomb engaged in other protected

activity throughout her post-DCA tenure. She traded correspondence with senior FDIC personnel in March 2000, sent numerous

letters to EEOC between July 2000 and May 2001 (copying

FDIC officials on many of them), filed a complaint against FDIC

in the district court in July 2001, and filed a second administrative complaint in April 2002. All of these actions occurred while

Holcomb languished in her ODEO netherworld. At the prima

facie stage of a retaliation claim, a plaintiff’s burden “is not

great; [she] merely needs to establish facts adequate to permit an

inference of retaliatory motive.” McKenna v. Weinberger, 729

F.2d 783, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Because Holcomb repeatedly

engaged in protected activity during the period when she also

experienced reduced work assignments, we believe she has met

this minimal burden and made out a prima facie case of retaliation. 

In their briefs and at oral argument, both parties addressed

only the prima facie aspect of Holcomb’s retaliation claim.

Neither before this court nor before the district court on the

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motion for summary judgment did either party speak to the

remaining elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework,

including whether FDIC could offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its presumptively retaliatory action or whether

Holcomb could show that any such explanation was pretextual.

Nor did the district court reach these issues in its decision. We

are therefore discinclined to proceed further in our analysis of

Holcomb’s retaliation claim. “An appellate court normally does

not give consideration to issues that were neither raised nor

decided below.” Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 789

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556-

57 (1941)). This general rule is especially acute in the present

context, for were we to divine a nondiscriminatory explanation

on FDIC’s part based on the evidence it has produced, Holcomb

would be left in the lurch, having no way to rebut an explanation

never before articulated to her. See Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d

74, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[C]ourts have properly been reluctant

to address an issue where the opposing party has not had a fair

and adequate opportunity to dispute the material issues.”). The

appropriate response is therefore to reverse the district court’s

grant of summary judgment, since Holcomb has established a

prima facie case of retaliation, cf. Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d

815, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and, on remand, permit the parties to

address these heretofore unconsidered matters before the district

court. 

III

The district court properly granted summary judgment on

Holcomb’s discrimination claim, but it erred in granting summary judgment on her retaliation claim. Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in

part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

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