Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cr-01115/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cr-01115-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Francis Chischilly
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Francis Chischilly, 

Defendant. 

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CR 05-1115 PCT DGC

ORDER

Defendant Francis Chischilly has filed a motion to suppress inculpatory statements

he made during an interview with law enforcement officers on September 14, 2005.

Doc. #28. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 20, 2006. Three witnesses testified.

Following the hearing, counsel for Defendant and the Government made oral arguments

concerning the motion to suppress. 

The motion, as expanded at the hearing, presents five issues for resolution by the

Court: (1) whether Defendant’s arrest for public intoxication on September 13, 2005 was

supported by probable cause; (2) if the arrest was not lawful, whether the passage of time and

other factors removed the taint of the unlawful arrest from Defendant’s subsequent

statements to law enforcement; (3) whether the FBI agent procured Defendant’s continued

detention on the morning of September 14, 2005, and, if so, whether the continued detention

was supported by probable cause; (4) whether Defendant’s statements to law enforcement

officers during the September 14 interview were voluntary; and (5) whether the interview

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 Defense counsel suggest at the hearing that Officer Deya was at Defendant's property

for only four or five minutes, implying that this was not long enough to develop probable

cause. The Court concludes, however, that four minutes is long enough to observe

Defendant, conduct two simple field sobriety tests, observe the surrounding area, and

conclude that Defendant was intoxicated in public. Moreover, Officer Deya had made such

arrests on many previous occasions and certainly understood what he was looking for.

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should have been terminated when Defendant expressed his desire to speak with his mother

who, in turn, was planning to talk to a lawyer. The Court will address each issue separately.

I. September 13, 2005 Arrest.

Defendant was arrested on the evening of September 13, 2005, by Navajo Tribal

Police Officer Alejandro Deya. Officer Deya arrested Defendant for public intoxication.

The Court must resolve two issues: Did Officer Deya have a reasonable basis for believing

Defendant was intoxicated, and did Officer Deya have a reasonable basis for believing

Defendant was intoxicated in a public place?

Officer Deya had a reasonable basis for concluding Defendant was intoxicated.

Officer Deya was dispatched to Defendant’s house based on a call from FBI Agent Nicholas

Manns. Agent Manns had arrived at the house for the purpose of questioning Defendant

regarding the assault at issue in this case, and, upon seeing that Defendant appeared to be

intoxicated, had called for a tribal police officer. Upon arriving at the house, Officer Deya

detected the smell of alcohol and marijuana on Defendant’s person and saw that Defendant

had bloodshot eyes. Officer Deya asked Defendant to accompany him to the side of Officer

Deya's patrol car and there conducted two field sobriety tests – a horizontal gaze test and a

one-legged stand. Defendant failed both tests. His eyes jerked while attempting to follow

the movement of a horizontal object and he could not balance himself with one foot raised

six inches off the ground. From Defendant’s appearance and his performance on these tests,

Officer Deya reasonably concluded that Defendant was intoxicated.1 

The second question is whether Defendant was intoxicated in a public place. The

Navajo Tribal Code provides the following definition of a public place for purposes of public

intoxication:

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[A] place to which the public or a substantial group of persons has access and

includes but is not limited to highways, schools, parks, places of business,

playgrounds and hallways, lobbies and other portions of motels or hotels not

constituting rooms or apartments designed for actual residence. A public place

shall include the immediate area, both inside and outside a structure, wherein

traditional Navajo religious practices, ceremonies, or services are being held.

Section 480, Title 17, Navajo Nation Code.

Officer Deya arrested Defendant at his mother's mobile home. The house was located

on a parcel of property with two other mobile homes occupied by relatives. A wire fence

enclosed the entire perimeter of the property. A gravel driveway entered the property

through an open gate. A sign posted on one of the gate posts said “Private Property.”

Defendant was standing with his mother and Agent Manns outside the house and near some

parked trucks when Officer Deya arrived. 

Photographs placed in evidence show that the property is surrounded by other homes,

is next to a business known as “Cool Runnings,” and is near a major thoroughfare. Officer

Deya testified that he is familiar with the area and routinely has seen people cross the wire

fence that separated the property from Cool Runnings and an adjacent trailer court. He also

testified that he has seen people congregate in the open space on the property near the home

where Defendant was arrested. Agent Manns testified that he too is familiar with the area,

has conducted surveillance of the adjacent trailer court on five or six different occasions, has

seen juveniles crossing the wire fence onto Defendant’s property on three to five occasions,

and has seen 10 to 12 juveniles congregate in the open area on the property. Defendant’s

mother testified that there is a gate in the wire fence between her home and the Cool

Runnings and trailer court properties.

Probable cause exists when the officer knows of “facts and circumstances ‘sufficient

to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an

offense.’” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,

91 (1964)); see De Anda v. City of Long Beach, 7 F.3d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating

that the probable cause determination “depends on whether ‘the facts and circumstances

within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are

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 The Court also notes that the offence of public intoxication includes a component

of concern for the intoxicated person's welfare. Section 488 of the Navajo Nation Code

defines the offense as intoxication to “the degree that he . . . is unable to care for . . . his own

safety.” Doc. #28 at 8. Officer Deya testified that he was concerned about leaving

Defendant in his obviously intoxicated state given the accessible nature of the property and

the proximity of a major thoroughfare. Agent Manns testified that Defendant had not been

at the house earlier in the day, and that Defendant's mother had called Agent Manns when

he returned, suggesting Defendant had become intoxicated away from the residence.

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sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense

has been or is being committed’”) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n.8

(1979)). The Court concludes that Officer Deya had reasonable grounds for believing that

Defendant had committed the offense of public intoxication. Defendant's appearance and his

failure of the field sobriety tests provided reasonable grounds for believing he was

intoxicated. He was found in a residential area, on property readily accessible from the road

and from a nearby business and trailer court, within plain view of surrounding houses. The

gate on the driveway was not closed. Officer Deya previously had observed individuals

crossing fences into and congregating on the property, as had Agent Manns. The Court finds

that Officer Deya had a reasonable basis for concluding not only that Defendant was

intoxicated, but also that the property on which he was found was “a place to which the

public or a substantial group of persons has access.” Section 480, Title 17, Navajo Nation

Code. The arrest, therefore, was supported by probable cause.2

II. If the Arrest was Unlawful, was the Taint Removed?

Even if the arrest of Defendant for public intoxication lacked probable cause, the

Court concludes that the unlawful arrest did not taint the statements made by Defendant to

law enforcement officers the following day. When inculpatory statements would not have

been made but for an unlawful arrest, courts must ask whether circumstances occurring

between the arrest and the statements sufficiently attenuate the statements so as to remove

any taint from the unlawful arrest. The Supreme Court has instructed that three factors

should be considered: (1) the time between the illegality and the statements, (2) the presence

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of intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the third

factor is “particularly” important. United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th

Cir. 1980).

A. Passage of Time.

Defendant was held overnight at the Navajo tribal jail due to his arrest for public

intoxication. Defendant was interviewed at the jail by Agent Manns and Officer Boye the

next morning, approximately thirteen hours after his arrest, when he was sober and able to

understand the conversation. Although this amount of time is not alone sufficient to

conclude that there was no causal connection between the arrest and Defendant’s statements,

other factors lead the Court to this conclusion.

B. Intervening Circumstances.

Between the time of his arrest and the time of his interview, Defendant regained his

sobriety. Defendant understood that he had been arrested for public intoxication, not the

offense on which he was questioned by Agent Manns the next morning. Although Agent

Manns was present when the arrest was made the night before, he did not arrest Defendant.

Navajo Tribal Police arrested Defendant for the unfortunately-common offense of public

intoxication. Officer Deya testified that he makes such arrests daily and that he had made

four such arrests on September 13, 2005, before his arrest of Defendant. Defendant’s mother

testified that she is familiar with intoxication because it is common on the reservation.

Moreover, Defendant understood such arrests from his own prior experience. Defendant’s

booking record, introduced into evidence by the defense at the hearing, showed that

Defendant had been arrested for public intoxication only four days earlier, held overnight at

the jail, and released the following morning when he was sober. 

The following morning, Agent Manns told Defendant why he wanted to talk – to

discuss the assault at issue in this case. He fully apprized Defendant's of his rights,

confirmed that Defendant understood them and was willing to talk, and conducted the

interview in a non-coercive manner. Defendant argued in his motion that Agent Manns

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promised Defendant he would be released from jail if he cooperated in the interview, but the

hearing produced no evidence to support this claim. Agent Manns testified that he made no

such promise, and the Court found his testimony credible. Defendant understood from his

previous personal experience that those arrested for public intoxication were released once

sober. Thus, the interview was separate from the public intoxication charge for which

Defendant was arrested and jailed, a distinction the Court finds that Defendant understood.

More will be said below on the nature of the interview.

The Court concludes that Defendant’s intervening night in the jail, his sobriety the

next morning, his familiarity with jail procedures, Agent Mann's explanation of the reasons

for the interview, Agent Mann's explanation of Defendant's rights, and Defendant's knowing

waiver of those rights and consent to interview eliminated any risk that Defendant's

statements during the interview were the result of the prior night’s arrest. 

C. Purpose and Flagrancy of the Official Misconduct.

As already noted, the Ninth Circuit has stated that this factor is “particularly”

important. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d at 1289. The Court concluded above that Defendant’s

arrest for public intoxication was supported by probable cause. If it was not, the Court finds

that it was a close question and that Officer Deya’s arrest cannot be viewed as either flagrant

or for an improper purpose. The Court found Officer Deya’s testimony to be credible and

concludes that he was acting in good faith when he arrested Defendant for the crime of public

intoxication. 

The Court finds no basis for concluding that the arrest of Defendant was a coordinated

attempt to subject Defendant to an in-custody interrogation concerning this case. Officer

Deya testified that he made an independent assessment of Defendant’s public intoxication

and arrested Defendant on that basis, just as he had arrested numerous other individuals

during his law enforcement career, including four other individuals the same day. Officer

Deya did not know the purpose of Agent Manns’ visit to Defendant’s house, was not told by

Agent Manns to arrest Defendant, and did not make the arrest in order to facilitate Agent

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 Defendant's mother testified that Agent Manns arrested Defendant and, upon the

arrival of Officer Deya, placed Defendant in Officer Deya's car. This testimony contradicts

the testimony of both Officer Deya and Agent Manns, testimony the Court found credible.

Moreover, Defendant's mother's testimony concerning the arrest was inaccurate in other

respects. She testified, for example, that Officer Deya and a second officer arrived in

separate patrol cars and that the other officer left immediately, when in fact the second

officer was a trainee riding in Officer Deya's car that night.

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Manns’ interview. Likewise, Agent Manns testified that he did not direct Officer Deya to

arrest Defendant.3

The Court concludes that the arrest was not flagrant or for an improper purpose. The

Court can find no need in this case to deter improper law enforcement conduct. Given this

finding and the other considerations addressed above, the Court concludes that Defendant’s

statements to Agent Manns were not tainted by his arrest for public intoxication.

III. Probable Cause on the Morning of September 14, 2005.

During the hearing, Defendant argued that Agent Manns’ request that the tribal jail

hold Defendant on the morning of September 14, 2005, constituted a separate act of restraint.

Even if true, the Court concludes that Agent Manns had probable cause.

Prior to September 13, 2005, Agent Manns had learned that the juvenile victim of the

assault had specifically identified Defendant as one of his assailants. Agent Manns had also

personally interviewed Myron David Wilson, the co-assailant of the victim. Wilson had also

identified Defendant as participating in the assault. These two eyewitness identifications

provided Agent Manns with a reasonable basis for believing that Defendant had participated

in the assault. Agent Manns thus had probable cause to detain and question Defendant on

the morning of September 14, 2005. 

IV. Voluntariness of the Confession.

Defendant argues that Agent Manns applied psychological coercion in obtaining

Defendant’s statement. Specifically, Defendant argues that he was young (18 years old),

frightened, had just spent a long night in jail, and was interviewed under circumstances

suggesting that he could only be released from jail if he cooperated. As indicated above, the

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Court cannot accept this view of the interview. Defendant was arrested and jailed for public

intoxication. He had been arrested, jailed, and released on just such charges only four days

earlier. Defendant understood from this experience that tribal practices – as confirmed by

the testimony of Officer Deya at the hearing – include releasing intoxicated persons the

following morning when they were sober. 

Agent Manns explained his purpose for speaking with Defendant, explained

Defendant’s right to remain silent, explained Defendant’s right to an attorney, and confirmed

that Defendant understood each of these rights. Defendant not only signed a written

statement acknowledging these rights, but initialed each of the specific rights he had

discussed with Agent Manns to show he understood them. 

Although Agent Manns stated that he would leave the cell and terminate the interview

if Defendant desired to speak with his mother or an attorney, the Court does not find this

statement to be psychologically coercive. As noted above, Defendant understood that the

tribal jail would release him from custody on the public intoxication charge. Agent Manns’

suggestion that the interview might be terminated cannot be viewed as suggesting coercively

that Defendant would somehow remain imprisoned.

A confession is involuntary if circumstances are sufficiently coercive to overbear the

will of the defendant. United States v. Leon-Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988).

Such circumstances did not exist in this case. In addition to the facts discussed above,

evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that the interview was cordial, Defendant was

cooperative, Agent Manns and Officer Boye were not armed, threats were not made, physical

coercion was not used, and Defendant’s rights were understood and waived. 

V. Defendant’s Mention Of Counsel.

At the beginning of the interview, Defendant stated that he wanted to speak with his

mother because his mother was going to talk to a lawyer. Agent Manns confirmed that

Defendant had the right to speak to an attorney and stated that he would leave if Defendant

wanted to speak with either his mother or a lawyer. Defendant then indicated that he wanted

to proceed with the interview. He signed the statement that he understood his right to

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 Defendant's mother testified that she asked Agent Manns about her son's need for

an attorney when her son was arrested on September 13, 2005. Agent Manns testified that

she asked him about a lawyer when he returned to the house to arrest Defendant on the

present charges in October 2005, but that she did not mention a lawyer on September 13.

The Court finds Agent Mann's testimony to be credible on this point.

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counsel and was voluntarily waiving it. Agent Manns took the extra step of writing the

circumstances of Defendant’s request to speak with his mother on the bottom of the consent

form, as well as Defendant’s affirmative statement that he wanted to proceed with the

interview without first speaking to a lawyer. Defendant initialed these handwritten

statements to confirm their accuracy.

The Court finds that Defendant did not request counsel and was not denied a right to

counsel. Although Defendant expressed an initial interest in speaking with his mother, he

promptly agreed to proceed with the interview, was explained and understood his right to

counsel, and knowingly waived that right. Defendant does not claim that he subsequently

expressed any interest in speaking with an attorney.4

VI. Conclusion.

The Court concludes that Defendant’s arrest on September 13, 2005, was supported

by probable cause to believe he had committed the offense of public intoxication, that his

interview on September 14, 2005, was sufficiently attenuated so as not to be tainted by the

prior evening’s arrest (if unlawful), that Agent Manns had probable cause for requesting that

Defendant be held at the jail on the morning of September 14, 2005, that Defendant’s

statements to Agent Manns that morning were voluntary, and that Defendant was not denied

his right to speak with counsel. Defendant’s motion to suppress will therefore be denied.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. #28) is

denied. 

DATED this 25th day of April, 2006.

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