Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03015/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03015-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carl Michael Taylor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 7, 2014 Decided February 28, 2014

No. 13-3015

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CARL MICHAEL TAYLOR,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cr-00171-1)

Tony Axam Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was A.J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. 

Sarah G. Boyce, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were

Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman

and Elizabeth Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. SuzAnne C.

Nyland, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, SRINIVASAN, Circuit

Judge, and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #13-3015 Document #1481959 Filed: 02/28/2014 Page 1 of 5
2

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: “[I]n the case of a defendant who has been

sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing

range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing

Commission,” Congress has authorized the sentencing court to

“reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if such a reduction is

consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the

Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In January

2009, appellant Carl Taylor was sentenced to 180 months in

prison for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to

distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 846. In November 2011, the U.S. Sentencing

Commission gave retroactive effect to an amendment to the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines lowering base offense levels for offenses

involving crack cocaine. Shortly thereafter, Taylor moved the

district court to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 

The district court denied Taylor’s motion. It did so on the

ground that it was bound by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), a

Sentencing Commission policy statement, which provides that,

except in a circumstance not relevant here, “the court shall not

reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) . . . to a term that is less than the minimum

of the amended guideline range.” Because the lower bound of

the applicable amended range was 188 months, greater than

Taylor’s original 180-month sentence, no reduction was

available. The district court also rejected Taylor’s arguments

that § 1B1.10(b)(2) is invalid because it was promulgated

without notice and comment as allegedly required by the

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et

seq., 28 U.S.C. §§ 991 et seq., and because it violated

nondelegation and separation of powers principles. 

USCA Case #13-3015 Document #1481959 Filed: 02/28/2014 Page 2 of 5
3

Taylor then filed the instant appeal, raising the same

contentions that he advanced in the district court. All seven

circuit courts that have considered similar challenges have

upheld § 1B1.10 as a lawful exercise of the Sentencing

Commission’s powers. See generally United States v. Davis,

739 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Erskine, 717

F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Colon, 707 F.3d 1255

(11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514 (3d

Cir. 2012); United States v. Harris, 688 F.3d 950 (8th Cir.

2012); United States v. Anderson, 686 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2012);

United States v. Horn, 679 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2012); United

States v. Garcia, 655 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2011). We now do the

same.

 Taylor first argues that § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) is invalid under

the SRA because it is binding on courts and was not

promulgated through notice-and-comment procedures. The

SRA, however, requires such procedures only for sentencing

guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 994(x). Because the challenged

provision is a policy statement, not a guideline, the SRA’s

notice-and-comment requirement does not apply. See id. 

Recognizing this problem, Taylor further argues that the

Sentencing Commission cannot bind courts in sentence

reduction proceedings through a policy statement; a binding

pronouncement must be a guideline, he says, and therefore must

go through notice and comment. 

But the language of the SRA says just the opposite. The

SRA expressly provides that policy statements, not guidelines,

govern sentence reduction proceedings under 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C). Moreover,

§ 3582(c)(2) itself states that a court may reduce a defendant’s

sentence in such a proceeding only to the degree that the

“reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued

by the Sentencing Commission,” rendering such policy

USCA Case #13-3015 Document #1481959 Filed: 02/28/2014 Page 3 of 5
4

statements binding. The SRA further requires that, where

sentencing guidelines have been lowered, the Sentencing

Commission “shall specify in what circumstances and by what

amount the sentences of prisoners serving terms of

imprisonment . . . may be reduced.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(u). This

necessarily implies that the Commission will also define the

circumstances in which sentences may not be reduced, again

compelling the conclusion that Congress expected -- indeed,

required -- that binding policy statements would govern sentence

reduction proceedings. See generally Dillon v. United States,

560 U.S. 817 (2010).

Taylor next raises two constitutional concerns. First, he

contends, albeit inconsistently, that Congress did not lay down

an “intelligible principle” to guide the Commission’s

promulgation of § 1B1.10, and that it thus effected an invalid

delegation of legislative power. He concedes, as he must, that

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), held that

Congress did validly delegate authority to the Commission to

promulgate the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as a whole. Oral

Arg. Recording at 14:40-46; see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374-79

(holding that Congress articulated intelligible principles in

delegating authority to the Commission to regulate sentencing). 

But he contends that the specific area of resentencing

proceedings remains without sufficient guidance. We disagree. 

Given the overall constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines

scheme, and given that § 1B1.10 governs its application in only

the narrow context of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction

proceedings, § 1B1.10 is also an exercise of validly delegated

authority. See also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (authorizing the

Sentencing Commission to promulgate policy statements that

“further the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18”).

Second, Taylor argues that the Commission’s promulgation

of a binding policy statement without notice and comment

USCA Case #13-3015 Document #1481959 Filed: 02/28/2014 Page 4 of 5
5

violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers. For

this, he relies on the fact that Mistretta, in the course of

upholding the constitutionality of the SRA, noted the Act’s

notice-and-comment requirement for guidelines. Mistretta, 488

U.S. at 394. But the fact that guidelines are subject to noticeand-comment procedures was but one of three reasons the

Supreme Court gave for finding that the Commission is not a

court and does not exercise judicial power, which in turn was

but one of several sets of reasons it gave for finding that the

Commission’s location in the judicial branch does not

undermine the integrity of that branch or expand the power of

the judiciary beyond constitutional bounds. Id. at 393-97. 

Nothing in Mistretta suggested that notice-and-comment

procedures are essential to the constitutionality of the

Sentencing Guidelines scheme as a whole, let alone to the

constitutionality of policy statements applicable to sentence

reduction proceedings.

Because § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) bars sentence reductions below

the applicable amended guideline range, and because Taylor’s

sentence was already below that range, the district court

properly held that a reduction in his sentence was unavailable. 

Rejecting Taylor’s challenges to the validity of

§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), we affirm the judgment of the district court.

So ordered.

USCA Case #13-3015 Document #1481959 Filed: 02/28/2014 Page 5 of 5