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Parties Involved:
Roy J. Pogue
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, } 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

ROY J. POGUE, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 1 21989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

87-2286 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 85-CR-289) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Robert N. Miller, United States Attor ney , Bruce F. Black, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Roy J. Pogue, prose . 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and HIGGINBOTHAM,* Circuit Judges. 

*The Honorabl e Pat rick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge, United 

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by 

designation. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 87-2286 Document: 01019678447 Date Filed: 01/12/1989 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate recOrd, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiall y 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.8. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument . 

On October 22, 1985, defendant pled guilty to two counts of 

wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. At that time, he was informed 

by the district court that he faced a maximum possible sentence of 

ten years imprisonment and a $2,000 fine. One month later, the 

district court imposed a sentence of four and one-half years 

prison time and five years probation on the respective counts. As 

a condition of probation, the court ordered defendant to make 

restituti on to two of the banks he had defrauded in the total 

amount of $1,758,091.14, pursuant to the Victim and Witness 

Protection Act, 18 u.s.c. § 3579 (renumbered as 18 u.s.c. § 3663 

effective Nov. 1, 1986). 

In June 1987, defendant filed a motion to vacate or correct 

his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising the following 

grounds in support of the relief requested: 

(l) Breach of defendant•s plea agreement, which did not 

include any provision regarding restitution; 

(2) Failure to inform defendant prior to pleadi ng that 

restitution could be a part of the sentence imposed~ and 

(3) Failure to give proper consideration to the factors 

governing calculation of restitution. 

The district court denied defendant•s motion, and thi s appeal 

followed. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2286 Document: 01019678447 Date Filed: 01/12/1989 Page: 2 
I. 

When the government obtains a guilty plea based upon an 

agreement between the defendant and the u.s. Attorney, the 

agreement must be fulfilled in order to maintain the integrity of 

the plea. United States v . Stemm, 847 F.2d 636, 637 (lOth Cir. 

1988}. In considering any claim that such an agreement has been 

breached, we must first determine the nature of the prosecutor's 

promise. Id. This determination must be based upon "what the 

defendant reasonably understood when he entered his plea," without 

"resort[ing] to a rigidly literal approach in the construction of 

language." United States v. Greenwood, 812 F.2d 632, 635 (lOth 

Cir. 1987). The plea agreement in this case provided only that 

the government would bring no further charges in return for 

defendant's agreement to plead guilty. The agreement contained no 

provision regarding sentenc ing, and the government was free at 

sentencing to "make any statements in ••• aggravation." See 

Plea Agreement, Exhibit A. Therefore, the government ' s 

recommendation and the Court's imposition of restitution could not 

have been contrary to defendant's reasonable understanding 

regarding sentencing. See United States v. Pomazi, 851 F.2d 244, 

250-51 (9th Cir. 1988) (government did not breach plea agreement 

by recommending restitution where plea agreement silent as to 

sentencing). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2286 Document: 01019678447 Date Filed: 01/12/1989 Page: 3 
·• II. . 

The second ground advanced in the motion is more problematic. 

At the time defendant changed his plea to _guilty, he was entitled 

to an explanation of the consequences of conviction, including the 

court's authority to order restitution. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

ll{c)(l), as amended effective August 1, 1985; see~, United 

States v. Corn, 836 F.2d 889, 893 (5th Cir. 1988). Both the 

record of defendant's plea hearing and his written statement in 

advance of plea corroborate defendant's claim that he was not 

informed by the district court of the possibility of restitution 

prior to entering his plea. Indeed, absent testimony from former 

defense counsel, who has never been called upon to relate what 

information, if any, he.provided defendant on the sub ject, the 

earliest we can say defendant knew he could be ordered to pay 

restitution was thirty minutes before sentencing, when the 

government first served defendant with its motion for the 

$1,758,061.14 in restitution. 

The government essentially concedes that Rule 11 was 

violated, but argues that neither vacatur of defendant's 

conviction nor correction of his sentence is warranted at this 

late stage in the proceedings. The government relies on United 

States v. Timmreck, 441 u.s. 780 {1979), in which the Supreme 

Court indicated that a violation of Rule 11 that does not 

implicate constitutional or jurisdictional concerns will not 

support a collateral attack on a guilty plea unless the error 

resulted in a "complete miscarriage of jus.tice" or in a proceeding 

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Appellate Case: 87-2286 Document: 01019678447 Date Filed: 01/12/1989 Page: 4 
11 inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure ... 

Id. at 783-84. In the government's view, such exceptional 

circumstances do not obtain here, and the rejection of defendant's 

Rule 11 claim should therefore be affirmed. The government 

emphasizes ·that defendant admittedly knew about the potential for 

restitution prior to imposition of sentence but, despite that 

knowledge, persisted with his guilty plea and took no appeal from 

his sentence. The district court agreed with the government's 

position, and summarily denied defendant's motion on this basis . 

Before we address defendant's explanation for not abruptly 

wi thd rawing his plea at sentencing or at least raising some 

objection to restitution on a direct appeal, we note several 

important facto rs that distinguish this case from Timmreck . First 

and foremost, the sentence actually imposed in Timmreck did not 

exceed the maximum penalty the defendant had been {inaccurately) 

warned about, so the Court could properly conclude tha t the 

defendant had not suffered any prejudice as a result of the 

initial understatement of the maximum potential sentence. See id. 

a t 782-83 . This is also true of the several cases from this 

circuit that have denied relief under § 2255 for Rule 11 

violations. See United States v. Sisneros, 599 F.2d 946, 948-50 

(lOth Cir . 1979} ; United States v . Eaton, 579 F . 2d 1181, 1183 

(lOth Cir. 1978) ; Evers v. United States, 579 F.2d 71, 72-3 (lOth 

Cir. 1978), cert . denied, 440 u.s. 924 (1979}; United States v. 

Hamilton, 553 F .2d 63, 66 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 834 

(1977)i see also Hicks v. Oliver, 523 F. Supp. 64, 67 (D. Kan. 

1981) (summarizing the thrust of Tirnrnreck and Eaton as follows: 

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Appellate Case: 87-2286 Document: 01019678447 Date Filed: 01/12/1989 Page: 5 
~ "Courts may grant relief • • • only where the total custodial time 

[actually imposed] . exceeds the maximum possible sentence 

which the court told the defendant he might receive"). In the 

instant case, however, the $2,000 fine defendant was advised about 

prior to his plea is not remotely comparable in amount to the 

$1,758,091.14 restitution ultimately ordered by the district 

court. And this is not just a matter of money, because defendant 

may serve his five-year probation term in prison if he fails to 

make restitution. In short, defendant can realistically claim 

prejudice not presented in Timmreck or similar cases from this 

circuit. 

Second, the Court found it significant in Timmreck that t he 

defendant "[did] not argue that he was actually unaware of the 

[potential sentence] or that, if he had been properly advised by 

the trial judge, he would not have pleaded guilty. His only claim 

was of a technical violation of the Rule." United States v. 

Timmreck, 441 u.s. at 784. By contrast, defendant here maintains, 

not without credibility on this record, that he was unaware of the 

possibility of restitution until he heard about it at sentencing 

and that, had he been told of his immense exposure to financial 

liability, he would not have agreed to plead guilty. 

Finally, in Timmreck, the defendant's § 2255 motion was 

denied only after an evidentiary hearing at which former defense 

counsel testified that it was his routine practice to inform his 

clients about the very aspect of the defendant's potential 

sentence that the trial court had failed to explain (i.e., the 

mandatory special parole term under 21 U.S.C. § 841). Id. at 782. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2286 Document: 01019678447 Date Filed: 01/12/1989 Page: 6 
This consideration is absent in the pres~nt case, where 

defendant•s § 2255 motion was denied without a hearing or 

comparable evidentiary development, and therefore without an 

opportunity to examine the possibility of prejudice. 

All of these distinctions would be beside the point, however, 

if, as the government contends, defendant was given an opportunity 

to withdraw his plea after he was told about restitution at the 

sentencing hearing. In that case, we could confidently say that 

defendant suffered no prejudice from the omission of any reference 

to restitution at the time of his plea. See United States v. 

Grewal, 825 F.2d 220, 222 (9th Cir. 1987)(failure to inform 

defendant about restitution prior to guilty plea did not justify 

collateral relief where defendant declined opportunity to withdraw 

his plea after becoming aware of this potential consequence). The 

government points out that defendant responded affirmatively when 

the district court inquired, during the opening moments of 

sentencing, whether he was "persisting or continuing" in his plea. 

However, defendant argues, with some force, that repeated 

admonishmen t s from the bench at his plea hearing, to the effect 

that he would not thereafter be allowed to change his plea or 

appeal from his conviction, had misled him to believe his guilty 

plea was no longer open to alteration by the time he learned of 

the possibility of restitution. Absent evidence that counsel 

cleared up this alleged misunderstanding, it cannot be said that 

defendant was given a realistic opportunity to withdraw his plea 

after being informed restitution could be ordered. we therefore 

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Appellate Case: 87-2286 Document: 01019678447 Date Filed: 01/12/1989 Page: 7 
cannot conclude that defendant waived objection to restitution 

under the principles discussed in Grewal. 

For the above reasons, we believe defendant has demonstrated 

a sufficiently substantial Rule 11 violation to be cognizable in a 

proceeding under 28 u.s.c. § 2255. Defendant has advanced a 

credible, largely undisputed factual claim of prejudice, as well 

as a facially sufficient explanation for his failure to raise the 

issue before. We note, however, that the summary nature of the· 

district court's disposition of defendant's § 2255 motion left the 

government no occasion to present evidence potentially 

demonstrating that defendant actually had notice prior to 

pleading, from some source other than the court, that restitution 

could be ordered as part of his sentence, or that he was in fact 

aware of his right to seek withdrawal of his guilty plea after 

learning of this possibility. Defendant's claims would be 

significantly undercut if the government established either of 

these alternatives. With this in ·mind, we believe the government 

should be permitted to attempt such a showing on remand, if it so 

wishes. Accordingly, the denial of defendant's § 2255 motion is 

vacated with respect to the second ground asserted therein and the 

cause remanded to enable the district court to undertake one of 

the following courses of action: (1) further evidentiary 

development to determine when defendant was first made aware that 

restitution could be ordered and whether defendant understood that 

he was entitled to seek leave to withdraw his plea at that time; 

(2} resentencing without reference to restitution; or (3) vacatur 

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Appellate Case: 87-2286 Document: 01019678447 Date Filed: 01/12/1989 Page: 8 
of defendant's conviction to permit him to withdraw his plea and 

face trial. 

III. 

Finally, we turn to defendant's contention that the district 

court's calculation of restitution constituted an abuse of its 

substantial discretion in this area of sentencing. See generally 

United States v . Richard, 738 F.2d 1120, 1122 {lOth Cir. 1984). 

We need not address defendant's specific arguments on this issue, 

because defendant and defense counsel stipulated on the record to 

the amount of restitution imposed and expressly waived any 

evidentiary hearing on the issue at sentencing. See United States 

v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 1983)(district court 

authorized to order restitution in any amount up to the sum 

defendant and counsel agreed to at sentencing hearing); see also 

United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1055 (7th Cir. 1982) 

{denial of Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 challenge to size of restitution 

order affirmed in part because the order had been limited to "the 

amount of ..• defendant's admitted depredations"); see generally 

Unit ed States v. Franks, 723 F.2d 1482, 1487 (lOth Cir. 1983) (in 

criminal prosecution for violation of tax laws, defendant may not 

be required to pay specific sum for unpaid taxes as condition for 

parole unless the amount has been conclusively established in the 

criminal proceeding, finally determined in civil proceedings, or 

acknowledged~ defendant), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 817 (1984). 

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The order of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado denying defendant's § 2255 motion is AFFIRMED 

as it relates to the first and third grounds raised by defendant 

but VACATED as to ground two, and the cause is REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent herewith. 

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