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Parties Involved:
Gloria J. Galloway
Appellant
Louis W. Sullivan
Appellee

Document Text:

" 

u· FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

mred Stares Court of Apl'\,o> l 

APPEALS Tenth Cirn1it r .. a s 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

GLORIA J. GALLOWAY, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of ) 

Health and Human Services, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

APR 9 1991 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-5101 

(D.C. No. 88-C-1641-C) 

( N. D. Okla. ) 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App . P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Claimant Gloria J. Galloway appeals from the district court's 

judgment affirming the Secretary of Health and Human Services' 

denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5101 Document: 010110031884 Date Filed: 04/09/1991 Page: 1 
benefits. The application was denied initially and on 

reconsideration. Claimant subsequently requested and received a 

hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ denied 

claimant's application for benefits, and the Appeals Council 

denied her request for review. The district court affirmed the 

Secretary's decision denying benefits. Claimant appeals, 

asserting: (1) the decision of the Secretary was not based on 

substantial evidence, (2) the ALJ should have elicited the opinion 

and testimony of a vocational expert, and (3) the ALJ erred in his 

evaluation of her credibility as to her complaints of pain. We 

affirm. 

Our review 

determining whether 

evidence. Bernal 

of the Secretary's decision is limited to 

the decision is supported by substantial 

v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means 

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 

U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 

U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Evidence is not substantial if it is 

overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if it constitutes 

mere conclusion. Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 

1989). In order to determine whether the Secretary's decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, we must meticulously examine 

the record. However, we may not reweigh the evidence, nor 

substitute our discretion for that of the Secretary. Broadbent v. 

Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 414 (10th Cir. 1983). 

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Appellate Case: 90-5101 Document: 010110031884 Date Filed: 04/09/1991 Page: 2 
Claimant, a thirty-eight year old woman with a high school 

education, claims disability since December 1, 1983, due to 

problems with her back, pain and swelling in her knees, and 

headaches. Claimant, appearing at the hearing prose, was advised 

by the ALJ of the nature of the proceedings and of her right to 

counsel. Claimant's prose status places a duty on the ALJ to 

"scrupulously and conscientiously" develop the record so that 

claimant receives a "full and fair" hearing. 

750 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1984). 

Mimms v. Heckler, 

The ALJ ascertained, through claimant's testimony, that she 

had a very limited work history outside the home. She had worked 

as an electrician's helper for a period of approximately six 

months. She further reported working as a cook in 1987 for 

approximately one month. She testified that she terminated both 

jobs due to high blood pressure and swelling in her knee. 

Although there appears to be some confusion on claimant's part as 

to when she held these jobs, the ALJ concluded that both periods 

of employment took place during the period for which claimant 

claims disability. 

The ALJ questioned claimant regarding her daily activities 

and although she claimed she spent a majority of her time watching 

television, she did state that she tended to her own personal 

hygiene, washed dishes, did some cooking, and until the year 

before, had driven a car. During her application interview in 

December, 1987, she stated she also did laundry and cleaned house. 

Although the ALJ noted that claimant came into the hearing without 

a cane and appeared to have no trouble walking unassisted, she 

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Appellate Case: 90-5101 Document: 010110031884 Date Filed: 04/09/1991 Page: 3 
stated she needed the use of a cane for walking while at home. 

She reported to the ALJ that she had falling episodes which 

started approximately one and one-half years before, but there was 

no evidence that she had ever reported these episodes to a 

physician. 

Claimant stated that her 

Wright, had suggested she 

treating physician, Dr. Patricia 

seek evaluation and treatment at the 

mental health clinic because her problems were "all in her mind." 

Rec. Vol. I, Tr. at 38. However, there is no evidence that 

claimant ever sought such treatment. She stated that she wears a 

TNS unit for pain in her shoulder, but also uses it for pain in 

her knees. When asked by the ALJ whether she experiences pain 

frequently, she answered in the affirmative. The evidence showed 

that claimant takes Darvocet N-100, Sechral, Xanex, and Flexeril, 

all prescribed by Dr. Wright. 

When examined by a consulting physician on September 7, 1987, 

claimant stated she had not seen either of her treating 

physicians, Dr. Duncan or Dr. Wright, for over one year. Although 

claiming disability due to headaches, at the time of the 

examination by the consulting physician, claimant denied any 

history of headaches. She exhibited a normal range of motion to 

her shoulders, elbows, wrists, and fingers, and also to the lower 

joints of hips, knees, ankles, and feet. Although the consulting 

physician acknowledged her complaint of left knee pain and 

diagnosed a mild amount of crepitance, he found a full range of 

motion and no inflammation. He found the back and spine to be 

normal in all respects. He concluded that claimant suffered from 

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Appellate Case: 90-5101 Document: 010110031884 Date Filed: 04/09/1991 Page: 4 
a mild softening of the cartilage (chondromalacia) of the left 

knee. Rec. Vol. I, Exh. 15 at 88-89. 

On November 23, 1987, Dr. Wright wrote a one-page "to-whomit-may-concern" letter stating that claimant was currently 

suffering from hyperventilation syndrome, paresthesias in her 

extremities making ambulation for long distances difficult, and 

stated that claimant was in "urgent" need of evaluation and 

treatment by a mental health clinic. Rec. Vol. I, Exh. 16 at 91. 

Claimant was to have a follow-up appointment with Dr. Wright on 

December 22, 1987. Dr. Wright's records indicate claimant failed 

to keep this appointment. The record is also void of any evidence 

that claimant sought the mental health evaluation recommended by 

Dr. Wright. Dr. Wright's full physical examination of claimant in 

January, 1986, diagnosed claimant as suffering from lumbar strain, 

probably degenerative joint disease of the left knee, hiatal 

hernia, and low serum iron. None of these ailments comport with 

those listed by Dr. Wright in her letter in November, 1987. 

Although a treating physician's opinion must be given 

deference over that of a consulting physician employed by the 

government, it may be disregarded "if it is brief, conclusory, and 

unsupported by medical evidence." Frey v. Brown, 816 F.2d 508, 

513 (10th Cir. 1987). "If the opinion of the claimant's physician 

is to be disregarded, specific, legitimate reasons for this action 

must be set forth." Byron v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232, 1235 (10th 

Cir. 1984) . The ALJ in this case carefully and fully stated his 

reasons for not giving great weight to Dr. Wright's opinion. He 

correctly concluded that the only objective medical data completed 

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Appellate Case: 90-5101 Document: 010110031884 Date Filed: 04/09/1991 Page: 5 
by Dr. Wright, during the years that she treated claimant, was a 

laboratory finding of a hiatal hernia in 1985. Rec. Vol. I, 

Decision at 13. Dr. Wright never stated that it was her opinion 

that claimant was disabled, and no objective medical evidence was 

provided to support any of Dr. Wright's diagnoses as to claimant's 

alleged physical or mental impairments. 

The five steps which the Secretary must consider in 

determining disability are (1) whether claimant is engaged in 

substantial gainful activity; (2) whether claimant has a medically 

severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the 

impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments 

so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity; (4) whether 

the impairment prevents the claimant from performing work he 

performed in the past; and (5) whether claimant is able to do 

other work in the national economy in view of his age, education, 

and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f), 

§ 416.920(b)-(f). In this case, the ALJ determined that claimant 

did not have a medically severe impairment or combination of 

impairments, thus concluding his evaluation at step two. Claimant 

contends that this constituted error. 

recently stated, 

The Supreme Court has 

The claimant first must bear the burden at step one of 

showing that he is not working, at step two that he has 

a medically severe impairment or combination of 

impairments, and at step four that the impairment 

prevents him from performing his past work. If the 

process ends at step two, the burden of proof never 

shifts to the Secretary. 

Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 n.5 (1987)(emphasis added). 

As previously discussed, the claimant failed to meet this burden, 

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Appellate Case: 90-5101 Document: 010110031884 Date Filed: 04/09/1991 Page: 6 
and the ALJ was therefore correct in concluding his evaluation at 

step two. 

Claimant further contends that the ALJ was under a duty to 

obtain the opinion and testimony of a vocational expert regarding 

claimant's ability to work. We disagree. Only after a 

determination that claimant suffers from an impairment or 

combination of impairments severe enough to preclude her from 

returning to her prior work activity, is the ALJ under obligation 

to make an age, education, and experience inquiry to determine 

what other employment is available to the claimant in the national 

economy. See Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 

774, 776 (10th Cir. 1990); Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 577, 580 

(10th Cir. 1984). Due to the ALJ's determination that claimant 

could return to her former work activities or engage in other 

basic work activities, he was under no obligation to seek 

additional information from a vocational expert. 

Finally, claimant takes exception with the ALJ's assessment 

that her complaints of pain lacked credibility. "'To be 

disabling, pain must be so severe, by itself or in conjunction 

with other impairments, as to preclude any substantial gainful 

employment.'" Brown v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 361, 362-63 (10th Cir. 

1986)(quoting Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1552 (2d Cir. 

1983)). This court has stated, "if an impairment is reasonably 

expected to produce some pain, allegations of disabling pain 

emanating from that impairment are sufficiently consistent to 

require consideration of all relevant evidence." Luna v. Bowen, 

834 F.2d 161, 164 (10th Cir. 1987)(emphasis in original). "[T]he 

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Appellate Case: 90-5101 Document: 010110031884 Date Filed: 04/09/1991 Page: 7 
. . 

decision maker must consider all the evidence presented that could 

reasonably produce the pain alleged once~ claimant demonstrates 

~ pain-causing impairment." Id. at 165 (emphasis added). This 

court in Luna sets forth the factors to be considered when 

determining a claimant's credibility regarding subjective 

complaints of pain as ( 1) claimant's persistent attempts to find 

relief for his pain; ( 2) claimant's willingness to accept 

prescribed treatments; (3) claimant's use of aids in walking such 

as crutches or a cane; (4) claimant's regular visits to a doctor; 

and (5) possibility that claimant suffers some psychological as 

well as physical problem. Id. at 165-66. 

In his report, the ALJ acknowledged that since claimant 

failed to prove her claims of disability through objective medical 

evidence, her credibility, when considering her subjective 

complaints, was of "the utmost importance." Rec. Vol. I, 

Decision, at 15. The ALJ concluded that both of claimant's work 

periods, as an electrician's helper and as a cook, occurred after 

her alleged disability onset date of December 1, 1983. He further 

noted that claimant did not seek any medical treatment at all from 

August 1983, until September 1985, at which time she sought 

treatment for a jogging injury. As noted by the ALJ, jogging is 

not an activity normally engaged in by disabled persons or persons 

experiencing disabling pain. Claimant also did not seek any 

medical attention from April 1986 to August 1987. Although 

claimant accuses the ALJ of conducting a "sit and squirm" test at 

the time of claimant's hearing, the record indicates the ALJ 

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Appellate Case: 90-5101 Document: 010110031884 Date Filed: 04/09/1991 Page: 8 
. ' 

fairly considered claimant's complaints of pain in relation to her 

behavior and demeanor at the hearing. 

Claimant was observed closely during the hearing. She 

was articulate, had no observable difficulty in 

comprehending questions, paid close attention to the 

procedure, and no problems with concentration or memory 

were appreciated. She used her hands often and without 

difficulty in expressing herself during the hearing, did 

not complain of pain or appear to be experiencing pain 

or discomfort. In fact, she appeared to be relaxed and 

comfortable throughout the hearing. Claimant did not 

exhibit any signs of difficulty or discomfort in 

walking, standing, sitting, or arising from a seated 

position. She stood erect, walked with a normal gait, 

and although she stated she used a cane at home, did not 

require an assistive device to ambulate at the hearing, 

and did not display an observable limp. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, claimant arose from her chair 

without hesitation or assistance and walked from the 

hearing room. 

Rec. Vol. I, Decision at 15. 

The ALJ's observations were well-founded and comprised of the 

elements necessary to fully evaluate claimant's credibility. 

This, combined with the lack of objective medical evidence, 

supports the ALJ's conclusion that claimant's complaints of pain 

were not credible. See Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 585, 587 

(10th Cir. 1990). We thus conclude that the Secretary was correct 

in finding claimant not disabled and that his conclusion was amply 

supported by substantial evidence. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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