Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01373/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01373-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alex Leonard Azevedo
Plaintiff
Department of State Hospital Coalinga
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEX LEONARD AZEVEDO,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITAL 

COALINGA,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:24-cv-01373-EPG 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS 

CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS 

DUPLICATIVE

RESPONSE DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(ECF No. 1)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Alex Leonard Azevedo is a prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action 

filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff filed his complaint on November 4, 2024, 

complaining that Defendant failed to protect him from the attack of a mental health patient when 

Plaintiff was formerly located at Coalinga State Hospital.

Upon review of the allegations in the complaint, it appears that Plaintiff’s claims are 

duplicative of an earlier lawsuit filed on October 28, 2024, Azevedo v. Department of State 

Hospital Coalinga, 1:23-cv-01345-KES-HBK. Accordingly, the Court will order Plaintiff to 

show cause why this case should not be dismissed as duplicative. See Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. 

Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that a court should give notice and an 

opportunity to respond before dismissing a case on claim preclusion grounds).

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Referred to as the doctrine of claim-splitting, “[p]laintiffs generally have ‘no right to 

maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same 

court and against the same defendant.’” Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977)), overruled on 

other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008). 

“To determine whether a suit is duplicative, we borrow from the test for claim 

preclusion.”1 Adams, 487 F.3d at 688. “‘[T]he true test of the sufficiency of a plea of ‘other suit 

pending’ in another forum [i]s the legal efficacy of the first suit, when finally disposed of, as ‘the 

thing adjudged,’ regarding the matters at issue in the second suit.’” Id. (second alteration in 

original) (quoting The Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. 118, 124 (1894)). “Thus, in assessing whether 

the second action is duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes of action and relief 

sought, as well as the parties . . . to the action, are the same.” Adams, 487 F.3d at 689; see also 

Serlin v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 3 F.3d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A] suit is duplicative if the 

claims, parties, and available relief do not significantly differ between the two actions.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). The following transaction test is used to determine whether the causes 

of action are the same:

(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be 

destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether 

substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the 

two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits 

arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.

Adams, 487 F.3d at 689 (quoting Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201–02 

(9th Cir.1982)). The last criterion—whether the two suits arise out of the same transaction 

nucleus of facts—is the most important. Id. “After weighing the equities of the case, the district 

court may exercise its discretion to dismiss a duplicative later-filed action, to stay that action 

pending resolution of the previously filed action, to enjoin the parties from proceeding with it, or 

1 The primary difference between dismissing a case as duplicative and dismissing a case under the doctrine 

of claim preclusion is that a final judgment need not have been entered to dismiss a case as duplicative 

while claim preclusion requires a final judgment on the merits. See Cook v. C.R. England, Inc., 2012 WL 

2373258, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2012) (noting that determination of whether suit is duplicative assumes 

that the first suit was final). 

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to consolidate both actions.” Id. at 688. The claim-splitting doctrine is a discretionary one, 

intended to give judges flexibility to “promote[] judicial economy.” Id. at 692; see Kerotest Mfg. 

Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952) (“Wise judicial administration, giving 

regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation, does not 

counsel rigid mechanical solution of such problems.”).

III. ANALYSIS

With these standards in mind, in both cases Plaintiff sues the Department of State 

Hospitals, Coalinga. Both cases allege that this Defendant failed to protect Plaintiff from the 

attack of a mental health patient. 

The Court notes that, not only does Plaintiff sue the same Defendant, allege the same facts 

and claims, and seek the same relief, his complaints in the two cases appear to be a photocopy of 

each other.2

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

As explained above, it appears that Plaintiff’s case is duplicative of his earlier-filed case, 

1:24-cv-01345. However, Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to explain why his case should 

not be dismissed. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. Within thirty (30) days of being served with a copy of this order, Plaintiff shall show 

cause why this case should not be dismissed as duplicative of 1:24-cv-01345. 

2. Alternatively, Plaintiff is advised that he may file a notice stating that he wishes to 

voluntarily dismiss this case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

3. If Plaintiff fails to file anything, he is warned that this case may be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 15, 2024 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2 There are some immaterial and minor differences. For example, in 1:24-cv-01345, Plaintiff attaches 

additional documents to his complaint and signed it with a different date. 

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