Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04150/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04150-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gerald Dacre
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-4150

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Gerald Dacre, * Southern District of Iowa.

*

Appellant. * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

___________

Submitted: December 5, 2007

Filed: December 7, 2007

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Federal inmate Gerald Dacre appeals the district court’s1

 denial of his 18 U.S.C.

§ 983 motion to set aside an administrative forfeiture of a total of $4,880 in currency

(two amounts of $3,900 and $980) seized from him by the Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) incident to his 2005 arrest. Dacre admits to receiving notice

of the administrative forfeiture instructing him to contest the forfeiture through the

DEA and that he instead contacted the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO), but

Appellate Case: 06-4150 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/07/2007 Entry ID: 3380059
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he contends that the administrative forfeiture should be set aside based on equitable

or promissory estoppel because statements made by the USAO encouraged him to

believe he was correctly proceeding to contest the administrative forfeiture. 

As relevant, 18 U.S.C. § 983(e) provides that any person entitled to written

notice in an administrative forfeiture who does not receive such notice may file a

motion to set aside the forfeiture, and the motion will be granted if the agency failed

to “take reasonable steps” to provide notice. Section 983 further provides it is the

“exclusive remedy for seeking to set aside a declaration of forfeiture under a civil

forfeiture statute.” See 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1), (5). We find that the district court

correctly denied Dacre’s motion to set aside the administrative forfeiture: because

Dacre received timely notice of the forfeiture from the DEA, he was not entitled to

relief under section 983(e). See Mesa Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189,

1196 (11th Cir. 2005) (where petitioner received notice of administrative forfeiture,

he is not entitled to relief under § 983--which is exclusive remedy); United States v.

United Sec. Sav. Bank, 394 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (district court’s

denial of motion for return of property in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 context is reviewed for

clear error with regard to its factual findings and de novo for its legal findings). 

We further find that the facts as recited by Dacre and his counsel do not show

misleading conduct by the USAO sufficient to violate due process or to provide an

independent basis for relief under equitable estoppel, assuming such relief would be

available. See generally Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005)

(in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) proceeding, courts have jurisdiction to review de novo

whether DEA’s notice procedures complied with due process); Varela v. Ashcroft,

368 F.3d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 2004) (elements of equitable estoppel).

Accordingly, we affirm. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-4150 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/07/2007 Entry ID: 3380059