Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03060/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03060-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andre P. Williams
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 6, 2014 Decided July 22, 2014

No. 12-3037

IN RE: ANDRE P. WILLIAMS,

PETITIONER

Consolidated with 13-3060

On Motions for Authorization to File a

Second or Successive Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(No. 1:91-cr-00559-9)

Elisabeth S. Theodore, appointed by the court, argued the

cause for petitioner. On the briefs were Justin S. Antonipillai,

appointed by the court, Christopher S. Rhee, appointed by the

court, and Arthur Luk.

James M. Perez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for respondent. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen

Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman and Suzanne Grealy

Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, SRINIVASAN, Circuit

Judge, and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

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SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Petitioner Andre Williams

has filed with us two motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h),

seeking certification to file successive motions in the district

court to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. For the

reasons stated below, we certify and authorize the district court

to consider the motions.

BACKGROUND

In 1993 Williams was found guilty of conspiring, from May

1983 through March 1991, to participate in a racketeer

influenced corrupt organization (RICO) and to distribute illegal

drugs. He was acquitted of several other charges. During the

early years of the conspiracies Williams was a juvenile, turning

eighteen in May 1987. He was sentenced to life without parole. 

In 1998 Williams filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), in the district court. Section 2255(a) states that “[a]

prisoner in custody . . . may move the court which imposed the

sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” The

district court denied this first challenge by Williams to his

sentence.

On May 24, 2012, this court received from Williams a

motion for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255

motion based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). On June 24, 2013, he filed another

motion for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255

motion based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v.

Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). We subsequently

consolidated these motions and now consider both. Before a

second or successive motion “to vacate, set aside or correct [his]

sentence” is filed in the district court, the “motion must be

certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the

appropriate court of appeals . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Section

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2244 states that

[t]he court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second

or successive application [in the district court] only if it

determines that the application makes a prima facie

showing that the application satisfies the requirements of

this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C). The relevant requirement of that

subsection is the same requirement found in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(h)(2), i.e., that the second or successive motion

“contain[s]— a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable.”

Williams has now filed two successive motions with this

court, seeking certification that each motion meets the

requirements of § 2255(h).

DISCUSSION

The first of the two motions before us asserts that we should

certify the motion because a new rule of constitutional law

became available to Williams when, in 2010, the Supreme

Court, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. at 82, stated that “[t]he

Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole

sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” 

The second motion argues that it should be certified because in

2012 a new rule of constitutional law also became available to

Williams when, in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, the

Supreme Court “h[e]ld that the Eighth Amendment forbids a

sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without

possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” We must now

determine whether either or both of Williams’ § 2255(h)

motions makes a prima facie showing that it contains a new rule

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of constitutional law, made retroactive on collateral review by

the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.

Before making these determinations, however, we first will

address the government’s argument that we should deny

Williams’ Graham motion on timeliness grounds.

Timeliness

Subsection 2255(f)(3) states:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion

under this section. The limitation period shall run from

the latest of — the date on which the right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court . . .

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Graham was decided on May 17, 2010. 

That date is thus “the date on which the right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court.” Consequently,

Williams had one year from that date, until May 17, 2011, to file

his § 2255(h) motion based on Graham. Williams signed his

Graham motion and dated it May 2, 2011; at the end of the

motion he included a “Certificate of Service” which stated that

he served the court of appeals on the same date. May 2, 2011,

is within one year of the Supreme Court’s May 17, 2010,

Graham decision. The government, however, argues that the

motion was untimely, pointing to this court’s “received” date

stamped on the motion, May 24, 2012, more than 2 years

beyond the Graham decision and therefore outside the one-year

filing limitation of § 2255(f)(3).

Williams argues that this court should reserve the timeliness

issue for the district court. He contends that the applicability of

a statute of limitations defense is a non-jurisdictional affirmative

defense under the AEDPA and should not be considered at this

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stage, but rather should be considered in the first instance by the

district court. In support of this contention, Williams cites a

case from the Sixth Circuit, In re McDonald, 514 F.3d 539 (6th

Cir. 2008), in which, according to Williams, the court

considered the same timeliness issue and held that the one-year

statute of limitations is not within the purview of the court of

appeals’ consideration at the certification stage. In response the

government, citing cases from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,

counters that the Circuits are divided on the issue of whether

courts of appeals have discretion to consider the timeliness of a

motion under § 2255(f). See In re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793, 796-98

(5th Cir. 2007); In re Wilson, 442 F.3d 872, 874-78 (5th Cir.

2006); In re Hill, 437 F.3d 1080, 1082-83 (11th Cir. 2006). The

government goes on to note that although the Supreme Court has

not addressed this specific issue, in Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct.

1826 (2012), the Court held that where neither the district court

nor the government addressed the timeliness of an initial habeas

petition, “courts of appeals, like district courts, have the

authority–though not the obligation–to raise a forfeited

timeliness defense on their own initiative,” id. at 1834. The

government argues that although Wood addresses “initial”

petitions for collateral relief, nothing prohibits courts of appeals

from undertaking the same analysis when exercising their

gatekeeping roles under § 2244(b)(3)(C). We agree, and will

exercise our discretion to consider whether Williams has made

a prima facie showing of timeliness.

In response to the government’s argument that his motion

was untimely, Williams contends that the motion satisfies

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(C), “Inmate

filing,” also known as the “prison mailbox rule.” Rule

25(a)(2)(C) states in pertinent part:

A paper filed by an inmate . . . is timely if deposited in the

institution’s internal mailing system on or before the last

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day for filing. . . . Timely filing may be shown by a

declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or by a

notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date

of deposit and state that first-class postage has been

prepaid.

Williams argues that the deposit of his Graham motion with

prison officials satisfies the prison mailbox rule, and thus was

timely filed with this court, because both the signature date and

the certificate of service indicate that it was given to prison

officials for mailing on May 2, 2011, before the statute of

limitations period closed on May 17, 2011. Williams further

argues that he satisfies the prison mailbox rule because he

subsequently filed an affidavit in which he swore under penalty

of perjury that he deposited his Graham motion into the prison

mailing system on May 2, 2011, and did so with correct prepaid

first class postage.

In response the government, relying on a case from the

Ninth Circuit, argues that even if Williams’ filings comply with

the prison mailbox rule, we should not excuse his lack of

diligence in following up on his petition after he gave it to

prison officials. See Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th

Cir. 2001) (“A prisoner who delivers a document to prison

authorities gets the benefit of the prison mailbox rule, so long as

he diligently follows up once he has failed to receive a

disposition from the court after a reasonable period of time.”). 

The government contends that Williams was not sufficiently

diligent when he stood silent for more than a year after he failed

to receive any response from either the court or the government. 

But at oral argument the government did not dispute that

Williams’ affidavit was sufficient to establish Williams’ filing

under the prison mailbox rule. In other words, the government

does not contest that Williams has offered proof of filing that

complies with the prison mailbox rule, rendering the filing

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timely at the time it was made. Because the government has

effectively conceded that Williams’ motion was prima facie

timely, we need not decide whether we agree with the Ninth

Circuit’s recognition and application of a diligence requirement. 

Cf. Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993, 1012 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We

. . . reject the Ninth Circuit’s ‘diligence’ requirement.”).

Prima facie Showing

As noted, Williams has filed two successive § 2255

motions, the first based on Graham and the second based on

Miller. Pursuant to § 2244, as incorporated by § 2255, for this

court to certify a successive motion the motion must make a

prima facie showing that it contains a previously unavailable

new rule of constitutional law made retroactive on collateral

review by the Supreme Court. In arguing that his Graham

motion should be certified, Williams emphasizes that he needs

only to make a prima facie showing in order for certification to

be given. He proposes that such a showing is a low hurdle. See

In re McDonald, 514 F.3d 539, 544 (6th Cir. 2008). According

to Williams, Graham created a new constitutional rule in that for

the first time it rendered a categorical ban on life-without-parole

sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders. Williams further

argues that this new constitutional rule was unavailable to him

because at the time of both his conviction and his first § 2255

motion in 1998, juvenile life-without-parole sentences had not

yet been declared unconstitutional.

The government responds that it agrees with Williams that

Graham is retroactive to cases on collateral review. But the

government contends that because Williams’ offenses of

conviction extended into adulthood, he does not actually rely on

Graham but instead relies on an extension of Graham. Noting

that Williams was convicted for participating in a conspiracy

that he joined in his juvenile years and which continued into his

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adulthood, the government argues that nothing in Graham

suggests that the Supreme Court was considering juveniles

whose criminal conduct extended into adulthood. The

government contends that Williams cannot rely on Graham, and

therefore is not entitled to relief on the basis of Graham, because

Graham’s holding does not extend to conspiracies straddling the

age of majority.

Williams counters that a review of the merits at this stage

of the proceedings is not required, but if this court decides to

proceed with a review of the merits there is at least a prima facie

basis for finding that Williams’ sentence is unconstitutional

under Graham. In support of this argument Williams contends

that, contrary to the government’s argument that Graham does

not extend to inmates whose criminal conduct continued into

their adult years, Graham’s categorical rule applies to all nonhomicide criminal acts that occur while the offender is under the

age of eighteen. Graham, according to Williams, neither

explicitly nor implicitly carved juvenile continuing crimes out

of its holding.

We agree with Williams that a review of the merits at this

stage is not required. We further agree that the government’s

argument that we should refuse certification of Williams’

Graham motion goes to the merits of the motion, asking us in

effect to make a final determination of whether the holding in

Graham will prevail for Williams. But our inquiry is limited to

whether Williams’ motion has made a prima facie case that it

“contain[s] — a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable.” As the Fifth Circuit noted, “Graham

clearly states a new rule . . . that was not previously available:

the case was certainly the first recognition that the Eighth

Amendment bars the imposition of life imprisonment without

parole on non-homicide offenders under age eighteen.” In re

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Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, the

government agrees that Graham is retroactive to cases on

collateral review. Consequently, we conclude that Williams has

made a prima facie showing that his Graham motion satisfies

the necessary requirements for our certification. The

government’s argument concerning the application of the new

rule in Graham to this case, i.e., how Graham applies to a case

concerning a crime that straddled the age of majority, is a

question for the district court in the first instance, not the court

of appeals.

* * * * *

Williams filed a second successive § 2255 motion based on

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Williams notes that

in Miller, which involved a juvenile sentenced to life without

parole for homicide, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth

Amendment categorically forbids mandatory life-without-parole

sentences for offenses committed by juveniles. As he did in his

Graham argument above, Williams argues that this court should

grant his Miller motion because it establishes, on a prima facie

basis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2), that it is premised on

“a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable.” 

First, Williams contends that the Miller rule is a new

constitutional rule because the Supreme Court held for the first

time that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme

that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for

juvenile offenders. Second, Williams argues that the Miller rule

was previously unavailable because both at the time of his final

conviction in 1997 and his first § 2255 petition in 1998,

mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders

had not yet been declared unconstitutional. Third, Williams

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asserts that the Supreme Court announced the Miller rule’s

retroactivity by applying it on collateral review. Also as he did

in his Graham argument, Williams contends that the sole

question at this stage is whether he has made a sufficient prima

facie showing that Miller meets the elements of § 2255(h)(2) so

as to warrant a fuller exploration by the district court. But he

claims that if this court decides on a merits analysis, it will

conclude that his sentence is unconstitutional under Miller. In

support of this claim, he notes that he received a mandatory lifewithout-parole sentence and that he was sentenced for juvenile

conduct.

As we noted in our Graham discussion above, our sole task

is to determine whether Williams has made a prima facie

showing that his Miller motion satisfies the necessary

requirements of § 2255(h). The government agrees that Miller

is retroactive to cases on collateral review. But the government

argues that Williams cites Miller only to the extent it reaffirmed

Graham, and no more. The government implies that Miller is a

new rule with respect to juvenile homicide offenders, but that

with respect to non-homicide juvenile offenders, such as

Williams, Miller is not a new rule that was previously

unavailable. In any event, argues the government, just as

Williams does not actually rely on Graham, he does not actually

rely on Miller because that case did not address life-withoutparole sentences for defendants who entered a conspiracy in

their juvenile years and exited in adulthood. 

We do not agree that Williams has not made a prima facie

showing that he relies on Miller. The government acknowledges

that in Miller the Court noted that the cases at bar “implicate two

strands of precedent”: the Graham line of cases, i.e., life without

the possibility of parole for juveniles, and the mandatory

imposition of sentencing cases. 132 S. Ct. at 2463. Since

Graham concerned life-without-parole sentences and not, as in

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Miller, mandatory life-without-parole sentences, we conclude

that Williams has made a prima facie showing that in relying on

Miller he is relying on a new rule of constitutional law as

required by § 2255(h). Williams has therefore made a prima

facie showing that his Miller motion satisfies the necessary

requirements for our certification. Again, the government’s

question of whether the new rule in Miller extends to a prisoner

like Williams, who entered a conspiracy in his juvenile years

and exited it in adulthood, goes to the merits of the motion and

is for the district court, not the court of appeals.

CONCLUSION

Williams’ motions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) are

certified for filing in the district court. We express no opinion

as to the merits of either motion.

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