Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03040/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03040-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric A. Hicks
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 1, 2002 Decided March 26, 2002

No. 01-3040

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Eric A. Hicks, a/k/a Fat Eric,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cr00097-02)

Mary Manning Petras, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Valinda Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher,

Assistant United States Attorney. Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 1 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Edwards and Sentelle,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Circuit Judge: Eric Hicks received a Certificate

of Appealability ("COA") to challenge a District Court decision striking his motion to supplement an application for

collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. s 2255. After being convicted in federal court on various drug distribution and conspiracy offenses, Hicks filed a s 2255 motion claiming that, by

offering leniency to some of its witnesses in exchange for

their testimony, the Government had tainted his trial and

made his continued incarceration unlawful. While this motion

was still pending before the District Court, the Supreme

Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

Hicks believed that the Court's decision offered him another

possible avenue of relief, so he sought to supplement his

s 2255 application with an Apprendi claim. He failed, however, to submit this claim until after the trial court had denied

his original motion. Hicks' proposed supplement was therefore stricken as untimely.

Hicks then asked the District Court to reconsider its

decision. It did so, but only to strike the supplementary

pleading again, this time on a different ground: because it did

not "relate back" to Hicks' original s 2255 motion. See

United States v. Hicks, Order, Crim. No. 93-0097-02 (Feb.

22, 2001) ("Reconsideration Order"), reprinted in Record

Material for Appellee ("RMA")-J. This ruling formed the

basis for Hicks' COA and, accordingly, it is this ruling that is

at issue here. Hicks' challenge, however, fails.

Hicks did not file his Apprendi motion until more than a

year after his criminal conviction became final. Therefore,

that motion is barred by s 2255's one-year "period of limitation" unless, under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, it can be said to "relate back" to the date on which

Hicks' original (and timely) application for relief was filed.

Rule 15 prescribes how civil pleadings may be amended and

supplemented, and it applies to s 2255 proceedings. Hicks'

amendment is better classified as an "amendment" under

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 2 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

15(a) than as a "supplemental pleading" under 15(d). In

either event, however, it does not meet the standards for

"relation back" to his original application for relief. Hicks'

attempt to amend his s 2255 motion raised an entirely new

legal claim arising from a new set of facts; therefore, his

application was untimely unless it independently satisfied the

statute's one-year limitations period. It did not, and therefore was properly disallowed.

I. Background

Hicks, a member of the notorious "First Street Crew," was

convicted in February 1994 on an assortment of drug distribution and criminal conspiracy charges. He was sentenced to

two life terms, along with two terms of 240 months and one of

480 months, all to run concurrently. His direct appeal,

challenging both his conviction and his sentence, was rejected

by this court. See United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C.

Cir. 1997). Hicks' conviction was final on November 3, 1997,

when the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of

certiorari. See Hicks v. United States, 522 U.S. 960 (1997).

On November 2, 1998, the day on which the one-year statute

of limitations on motions for collateral relief was to expire,

Hicks filed such a motion under s 2255.

An application for relief under s 2255 is properly termed a

"motion," rather than a "petition," the term used in habeas

corpus proceedings challenging state court criminal judgments under 28 U.S.C. s 2254. See Advisory Committee

Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings For the United States District Courts. In his motion,

Hicks relied on United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343

(10th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en

banc), to argue that the Government violated 18 U.S.C.

s 201(c)(2) by promising leniency to its witnesses in exchange

for their trial testimony. Hicks also adopted any arguments

advanced in the s 2255 motions of his co-defendants, Antone

White and Ronald Hughes, insofar as those arguments were

applicable to him.

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 3 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Whatever arguable merit Hicks' s 201(c)(2) claim had when

he originally made it was obviated by this court's decision in

United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 986-91 (D.C. Cir.

1999). Hicks' motion nevertheless languished in the District

Court; indeed, the Government did not even file an opposition to the motion until February 1, 2000. On June 26, 2000,

while Hicks' motion was still pending, the Supreme Court

issued its decision in Apprendi. The Court held that any fact

other than a prior conviction that increases the penalty for an

offense beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

530 U.S. at 490.

On November 6, 2000, the District Court ruled on, and

denied, Hicks' original application for collateral relief. The

court rejected Hicks' s 201(c)(2) argument on the strength of

Ramsey, and held that neither of the "incorporated" claims

advanced by Hicks' co-defendants offered him any basis for

relief. See United States v. Hicks, Memorandum Order

(Nov. 6, 2000), reprinted in RMA-F.

A week later, on November 13, 2000, Hicks filed a new

motion, contending that Apprendi applied to his case, because

the drug quantities on which his sentence was based had not

been found by his jury but rather by the trial judge. This

new motion was presented as a supplement to Hicks' s 2255

motion that had been denied a week earlier.

On November 28, 2000, the District Court struck Hicks'

Apprendi motion. The trial court held that there was nothing to supplement, because the original s 2255 motion had

been denied. The trial court instructed Hicks that, if he

wished to press his Apprendi argument, he would have to file

a "second or successive motion," one subject to the strict

gatekeeping rules imposed by s 2255. See Hicks v. United

States, Order (Nov. 28, 2000) ("Order Striking Supplement"),

reprinted in RMA-H. Rather than do so, however, Hicks

urged the District Court to reconsider its decision. Hicks

argued that his Apprendi claim should be addressed, because

Hughes, whose s 2255 arguments Hicks had incorporated,

had added such a claim to his own motion before the trial

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 4 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

judge denied the one made by Hicks. Hicks also asserted

that his attorney never received a copy of the court's November 6 Order, and, therefore, did not know that her client's

original application had been denied when she filed the later

motion on November 13.

On February 22, 2001, the District Court accepted Hicks'

request for reconsideration. At the same time, however, the

court once again decided to strike the Apprendi motion. In

the decision denying Hicks' request for relief, the District

Court rested primarily on Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and concluded that any claim filed after

February 1, 2000, when the Government responded on the

merits to Hicks' s 2255 motion, "had to relate back to the

original petition." The District Court then held that the

Apprendi claim could only be presented in a separate motion,

because it did not relate back to the original motion. See

Reconsideration Order, RMA-J.

Following the District Court's rejection of his request for

relief, Hicks sought a COA on the grounds that the District

Court had confused Rule 15(d), which covers supplements,

with Rule 15(a), which concerns amendments. Alternatively,

he argued that his Apprendi claim did sufficiently relate back

to his original motion, because both grew out of the same

criminal conviction and sentence. On April 10, 2001, the

District Court judge granted Hicks' motion for a COA on the

question of "whether an amendment to a Section 2255 petition

is supplemental under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure." United States v. Hicks, Order (April 10, 2001),

reprinted in RMA-L. Hicks now pursues that issue in this

court.

II. Discussion

While the COA that serves as the basis for this appeal is

hardly a model of clarity, it does invite us to consider the

circumstances under which a s 2255 applicant may amend or

supplement his original motion in an attempt to raise new

claims or clarify existing ones. We must therefore consider

the intersection of Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 5 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Procedure and 28 U.S.C. s 2255, and, in particular, the strict

time limits that Congress has placed on prisoners seeking

collateral relief.

A. The Distinction Between Amendments and Supplemental Pleadings under Rule 15

The first issue that we must resolve is whether Hicks'

Apprendi motion is an "amendment" under Rule 15(a) or a

"supplemental pleading" under Rule 15(d). Both Hicks and

the Government have assumed the motion to be supplementary. We disagree.

It is true that these labels are often confused in practice

and that the distinction is in most instances of little moment.

There are, however, at least two ways in which the nomenclature might matter. First, while a party may freely offer an

amendment at any time before a responsive pleading is

served, supplements always require leave of the court. See

6A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure s 1504, at 186 (2d ed. 1990) ("Wright

& Miller"); Young-Henderson v. Spartanburg Area Mental

Health Center, 945 F.2d 770, 775 (4th Cir. 1991). Second,

while it is clear that the relation back of an amendment to the

filing date of the original pleading is governed by the terms of

Rule 15(c), the circumstances under which supplements may

relate back have not been codified. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d)

advisory committee notes (1963 Amendment) (indicating that

this issue was left "for decision in accordance with the

principles applicable to supplemental pleading generally");

6A Wright & Miller s 1508, at 200 ("Neither the federal

rules nor the case law indicates whether or under what

circumstances a supplemental pleading will relate back to the

date of the original pleading to avoid the effect of the

governing statute of limitations.").

This said, we acknowledge that courts often simply apply

the principles of 15(c) to supplemental pleadings. See, e.g.,

FDIC v. Knostman, 966 F.2d 1133, 1138-39 (7th Cir. 1992);

Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 609 n.3 (4th Cir.

1980); cf. 6A Wright & Miller s 1508, at 201-02 (endorsing

this approach on the ground that, "if [a party] is given

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 6 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

sufficient notice of the nature of the claim being asserted at

the outset of the action, the policy underlying the statute of

limitations is in no way compromised by allowing a supplemental pleading to relate back").

Nevertheless, insofar as the difference may be meaningful,

we believe that Hicks' motion seeking to add an Apprendi

claim to his pending s 2255 request is better understood as

an amendment than as a supplemental pleading. The distinguishing feature of the latter is that it sets forth "transactions

or occurrences or events which have happened since the date

of the pleading sought to be supplemented." Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(d); see also, e.g., Weeks v. New York State (Div. Of

Parole), 273 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that supplemental pleadings relate to events that "have transpired since

the date of the party's most recent pleading"). Supplements

therefore contrast with amendments, which typically rest on

matters in place prior to the filing of the original pleading.

See 6A Wright & Miller s 1504, at 184.

The question in this case is whether intervening judicial

decisions are the sort of "occurrences or events" to which

Rule 15(d) refers. We think not. The purposes to which the

rule is typically put support the conclusion that the appropriate bases for supplemental pleadings are new facts bearing on

the relationship between the parties, rather than merely

changes in the law governing those facts. See id. s 1504, at

177-83 (Rule 15(d) is used to set forth new facts that update

the original pleading or provide the basis for additional relief;

to put forward new claims or defenses based on events that

took place after the original complaint or answer was filed; to

include new parties where subsequent events have made it

necessary to do so); see also, e.g., Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872

F.2d 935, 941 (10th Cir. 1989) ("The supplement concerned

events which took place after he filed the complaint, to wit:

defendants went beyond freezing plaintiff's account and removed funds therefrom ...").

Accordingly, given that none of the factual occurrences set

forth in Hicks' Apprendi motion - in particular, the Government's failure to submit drug quantities to the jury - took

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 7 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

place after he filed his initial s 2255 application, we hold that

Rule 15(d) is not implicated. The only effect of Apprendi

itself was to alter the legal significance of these prior events.

Although Hicks' motion surely invoked that case, its true

focus was on the old facts that the Supreme Court's decision

had suddenly made more relevant. And because those matters had already transpired at the time of his original motion,

Hicks' subsequent motion was merely an attempt to "amend"

his original motion. See 6 Wright & Miller s 1473, at 520

(suggesting that the function of amendments under Rule 15(a)

is to allow a party "to assert matters that were overlooked or

were unknown at the time he interposed the original [motion]").

B. The Application of Rule 15 in s 2255 Proceedings

Because the District Court apparently abandoned its original basis for refusing to consider Hicks' amendment - i.e.,

that his original s 2255 motion had been dismissed - we do

not review that reasoning here. Instead, in its Reconsideration Order, the District Court rejected the amendment because it did not "relate back to the original petition," a

determination that requires us to consider when amendments

to s 2255 motions are permitted, and how such amendments

interact with the statute of limitations that Congress has

imposed on motions for collateral relief.

Under Rule 12 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, in the absence of a procedure specified either in the

rules or in the statute, a district court "may apply the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, whichever it deems most appropriate, to

motions filed under these rules." While both s 2255 and its

governing rules are silent as to amendments, 28 U.S.C.

s 2242 provides that an application for a writ of habeas

corpus "may be amended or supplemented as provided in the

rules of procedure applicable to civil actions." We hold, in

agreement with all of the other circuits that have considered

the issue, that this principle applies to s 2255 proceedings as

well, and, therefore, that such motions may be amended

under the terms set by Rule 15(a). See United States v.

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 8 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Saenz, __ F.3d __, 2002 WL 206340, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 11,

2002); United States v. Pittman, 209 F.3d 314, 317 (4th Cir.

2000); United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 336-37 (3d Cir.

1999); cf. Fama v. Comm'r of Correctional Servs., 235 F.3d

804, 815-16 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that ss 2254 and 2255

should be construed in pari materia with respect to "the

timeliness of motions for leave to amend"). Accordingly, the

"permissive approach" evinced by Rule 15(a) to the amendment of pleadings applies with equal force to s 2255 motions.

United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 435-36 (3d Cir. 2000);

cf. 6 Wright & Miller s 1471, at 505-06 (observing that the

purpose of 15(a) "is to provide maximum opportunity for each

claim to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural

technicalities").

That said, however, it does not follow that the District

Court erred in striking Hicks' amendment. When Congress

enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132 s 105, 110 Stat. 1214

(Apr. 24, 1996), it imposed a one-year "period of limitation" on

all motions made under s 2255. That period begins to run on

"the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final."

28 U.S.C. s 2255(1). Although the statute does not define

when finality occurs, our sister circuits have uniformly concluded that, if a prisoner petitions for certiorari, the contested

conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court either

denies the writ or issues a decision on the merits. See

Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1300-01 (11th

Cir. 2001) (citing cases). If no petition is filed, most courts

have held that the clock begins to run when the 90-day period

for seeking certiorari expires. See Kaufmann v. United

States, __ F.3d __, 2002 WL 246563, at *2 (11th Cir. Feb. 21,

2002) (so holding, and in the process siding with the Third,

Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and rejecting the contrary

conclusion of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits that the period

begins with the issuance of the mandate by the Court of

Appeals). Because Hicks did seek certiorari after losing his

direct appeal, his conviction became final when that petition

was denied on November 3, 1997.

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 9 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

While his original s 2255 motion came within the limitation

period, filed as it was on November 2, 1998, Hicks did not

offer his subsequent Apprendi motion until November 13,

2000. That amendment was therefore time-barred, and properly struck by the District Court, unless it was subsumed by

the timely first motion pursuant to the "relation back" doctrine. While s 2255 and its governing rules say nothing

about relation back, that doctrine is well-established in ordinary civil procedure, through Rule 15(c). The rule provides

that, under certain circumstances, an amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading, thereby

avoiding statute of limitations problems that otherwise might

have beset the amendment. See 6A Wright & Miller

s 1496, at 64; Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Rule 15(c) can

ameliorate the running of the statute of limitations on a claim

by making the amended claim relate back to the original,

timely filed complaint.").

Our sister circuits agree that the basic principles of Rule

15(c) apply to amendments of s 2255 motions. See United

States v. Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d 501, 503-05 (10th Cir.

2000); Davenport v. United States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1344-46

(11th Cir. 2000); Pittman, 209 F.3d at 317; United States v.

Craycraft, 167 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 1999). They have thus

rejected the argument that the legal changes imposed by

AEDPA preclude the relation back of amendments that otherwise would be time-barred. See Anthony v. Cambra, 236

F.3d 568, 576-78 (9th Cir. 2000); Fama, 235 F.3d at 815-16;

Thomas, 221 F.3d at 434-37. Section 2255's "period of limitation" is a statute of limitations like any other, and like any

other is subject to the principles of relation back. Cf. Dunlap

v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1004 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2001)

(joining every other circuit to have considered the question in

holding that "the one-year limitation period under s 2255 (or

s 2244) is a statute of limitations, subject to the doctrine of

equitable tolling, rather than a jurisdictional requirement").

At least in this respect, then, prisoners seeking collateral

relief stand on an equal footing with ordinary civil claimants.

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 10 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

This, however, does not mean that Hicks' amendment may

avail itself of the filing date of his original s 2255 motion.

Under Rule 15(c)(2), an amendment is permitted to relate

back only when "the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original

pleading." Accordingly, while amendments that expand upon

or clarify facts previously alleged will typically relate back,

those that significantly alter the nature of a proceeding by

injecting new and unanticipated claims are treated far more

cautiously. See 6A Wright & Miller s 1497, at 84; Bowles

v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 762 (9th Cir. 1999) ("If the amended

complaint alleged a new claim for relief that arose out of

different conduct or transactions it would not relate back to

the original complaint."); FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376,

1385-86 (5th Cir. 1994).

In the context of s 2255 amendments, the courts have

taken a relatively consistent approach to relation back. Although Rule 15(c) could be read to mean that the relevant

"occurrence" is the claimant's trial and sentencing, this interpretation has been resisted, and with good reason. In most

cases, a prisoner's claims for collateral relief will arise out of

the same criminal conviction; therefore, if the defendant's

trial and sentencing are construed to be the "occurrence,"

virtually any purported amendment will relate back. Such a

result would be difficult to square with Congress' decision to

expedite collateral attacks by placing stringent time restrictions on s 2255 motions. See Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d at

505; Davenport, 217 F.3d at 1345-46; Pittman, 209 F.3d at

318.

Therefore, like our sister circuits, we agree that Rule 15(c)

does not apply where the prisoner's proposed amendment

makes claims or is based on occurrences "totally separate and

distinct, 'in both time and type' from those raised in his

original motion." Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d at 505 (quoting

Craycraft, 167 F.3d at 457); see also Davenport, 217 F.3d at

1344 (suggesting that, in order to relate back, an untimely

claim must have arisen from the "same set of facts" as the

timely claim). In such circumstances, the Government would

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 11 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

be deprived of "sufficient notice of the facts and claims giving

rise to the proposed amendment," thus subverting the central

policy of the relation-back doctrine. Anthony, 236 F.3d at

576.

In contrast, in cases in which such notice has been afforded,

for example where the prisoner's amendment seeks merely to

elaborate upon his earlier claims, this effort should not generally be barred by the statute of limitations. See Dean v.

United States, 278 F.3d 1218, 1222 (11th Cir. 2002) ("When

the nature of the amended claim supports specifically the

original claim, the facts there alleged implicate the original

claim, even if the original claim contained insufficient facts to

support it. One purpose of an amended claim is to fill in facts

missing from the original claim."); Duffus, 174 F.3d at 337

("Certainly the court could have permitted an amendment to

clarify a claim initially made.").

Thus, while an amendment offered for the purpose of

adding to or amplifying the facts already alleged in support of

a particular claim may relate back, see Thomas, 221 F.3d at

436 (observing that an amendment seeking "to correct a

pleading deficiency by expanding the facts but not the claims

alleged in the petition" would clearly fall within Rule 15(c)),

one that attempts to introduce a new legal theory based on

facts different from those underlying the timely claims may

not, see Dean, 278 F.3d at 1221 ("Congress did not intend

Rule 15(c) to be so broad as to allow an amended pleading to

add an entirely new claim based on a different set of facts.").

These principles are faithful both to the underlying purposes

of Rule 15(c) and to the concerns about drawn-out and

unlimited collateral attacks on federal criminal judgments

evinced by the passage of AEDPA. They ensure that relation back will be allowed only where the original motion

provides adequate notice of the prisoner's claims and the

proposed amendment would neither change the fundamental

nature of those claims nor prejudice the Government's defense by requiring it to prepare its case anew. See 6A

Wright & Miller s 1497, at 84-85.

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 12 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Applying the foregoing analysis to the present case, we

have little trouble concluding that Hicks' Apprendi motion

cannot be allowed to relate back. The claim raised by this

amendment is completely different from that asserted in the

original s 2255 motion. The amendment advances an entirely new legal theory that arises from an entirely different set

of facts and type of conduct - the Government's failure to

prove the quantity of drugs at trial - than did the timely

motion, which was based on the Government's willingness to

grant leniency in exchange for testimony. Therefore, Rule

15(c) does not permit Hicks' amendment to take shelter in the

filing date of his initial application for collateral relief. And

because that subsequent motion was made more than a year

after the prisoner's conviction became final, it is time-barred.

It is true of course that s 2255's period of limitation has an

alternative trigger: "the date on which the right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." 28

U.S.C. s 2255(3). Hicks, however, has nowhere asserted this

as a basis for the timeliness of his motion. Thus, the issue of

whether Apprendi applies retroactively under the rules enunciated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), is not properly

before us. Moreover, it is not even clear that s 2255(3)

confers the power on a circuit court to make a right retroactive where the Supreme Court has not yet done so itself. See

Pryor v. United States, 278 F.3d 612, 615-16 (6th Cir. 2002)

(noting the various positions staked out by the circuits on this

issue).

Finally, we note that the four circuits that have directly

confronted the question have all concluded that Apprendi

does not apply retroactively. See McCoy v. United States,

266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moss,

252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Sanders,

247 F.3d 139, 151 (4th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d

1227, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000). No court of appeals has held

otherwise, although some circuit judges and district courts

have articulated reasons why one might do so. See United

States v. Clark, 260 F.3d 382, 383-89 (5th Cir. 2001) (Parker,

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 13 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

J., dissenting); United States v. Shark, 158 F. Supp.2d 43, 62-

64 (D.D.C. 2001); United States v. Hernandez, 137

F. Supp.2d 919, 927-32 (N.D. Ohio 2001). This court has yet

to consider the issue, and we need not do so here.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons given above, we hold that the District

Court properly struck Hicks' November 13, 2000 amendment.

Because that amendment was filed more than a year after

Hicks' conviction became final, and cannot be deemed to

relate back to the filing date of his original s 2255 motion, it

was untimely. If Hicks seeks to pursue a new collateral

attack on his sentence, he must do so by presenting a "second

or successive motion" subject to AEDPA's gatekeeping rules.

It is so 

ordered.

USCA Case #01-3040 Document #667268 Filed: 03/26/2002 Page 14 of 14