Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06122/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06122-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alfred Montoya
Appellant
United States Parole Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

ALFRED MONTOYA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

P J LID 

U.Ured i'lifff Colttf oi App~U Teftfh Circuit 

JUll2 1900 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

} 

} 

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No. 89- 6122 

v. 

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

D. C. No. CIV-89-79-P 

Alfred Montoya, Pro Se. 

Robert E. Mydans, Interim United St ates Attorney, and Debra A. 

Woods, Asst. u.s. Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the briefs 

for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before MCKAY , SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Ci rcui t Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit JudgeQ 

Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 1 
Alfred Montoya brought this application for habeas corpus 

relief challengi ng the decision of the United States Parole 

Conunission to set his parole date outside the applicable guideline 

range. The district court denied relief. Montoya appeals and we 

reversee 1 

The Parole Commission is mandated by statute to pr·ornulgate 

guidelines for the exercise of its parole powers. See 18 u.s.c. § 

4203(a) (l} (1982}, reeealed effective Nov . 1, 1987, by the 

Sentencing Refo rm Act of 1984, Title II, §§ 218(a)(5), 235, 98 

Stat. 2027, 2031 . 2 These guidelines are meant to reduce the 

disparity in treatment of similarly situated inmates by providing 

"a fundamental gauge by which parole deterrninations _are made. 11 

HoR. Conf. Rep. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 

1976 u.s. Code Cong. & Admin. News 335, 359. Congress thus 

intended that the guidelines "serve as a national parole policy 

which seeks to achieve both equi t y between individual cases and a 

uniform measure of justice." Id. To do so, 

1 After exam~n~ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a): lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 The statut es c ited in this opinion, now repealed, apply to 

the determination of Montoya's parole release date. See Lewis v. 

Martin, 880 F.2d 288 (lOth Cir. 1989}. 

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.. [t]he guidelines take into account the circumstances of 

the individual both in his personal life and with 

respect to the offense which he has committed, as well 

as measuring the severity of the offense involved so as 

to significantly reduce the area of discretion which the 

Parole Commission, in fact, has in any given case. The 

guidelines give definiteness to the indefinite nature of 

most federal criminal cases by reducing the opportunity 

for sentencing disparity and abuse of discretion and by giving to parole an aura of fairness for both victim and 

offender .. " 

S. Rep~ No. 369, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1976 u.s. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 335, 340. 

The Commission is authorized to "deny release on parole 

notwithstanding the guidelines ••• if it determines that there 

is good cause for so doing: Provided, that the prisoner is 

furnished written notice stating with particularity the reasons· 

for its determination, including a summary of the information 

relied upon. 11 18 u.s.c. § 4206(c) (1982), repealed effective Nov. 

1, 1987, by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Title II, §§ 

218(a)(5), 235, 98 Stat. 2027, 2031. However, if the guidelines 

are to perform their function of promoting both equality of 

treatment and the appearance of equity, departures must be the 

exception. 11 lf decisions to go above or below parole guidelines 

are frequent, the Commission should reevaluate its guidelines. 11 

S. Rep. No. 369, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 360. 

Congress has cautioned that good cause for departure "means 

substantial reason and includes only those grounds put forward by 

the Commission in good faith and which are not arbitrary, 

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Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 3 
irrational, unreasonable, irrelevant or capricious." Id. at 359. 

The Commission's decision to set a release date outside the 

guidelines under this provision will be affirmed if "'there is a 

rational basis in the record for the Commission's conclusions 

embodied in its statement of reasons.' 11 Misasi v. United States 

Parole Comm'n, 835 F.2d 754, 758 (lOth Ci r. 1987) (quoting Solomon 

v. Elsea, 676 F.2d 282, 290 (7th Cir. 1982)}. 

The guidelines establish a presumptive parole date by rating 

the severity of an offender's crime and his salient factor score, 

which is the risk that he will violate parole. See 28 C.P.R. 

§ 2.20 (1989). An offender's salient factor score, or parole 

prognosis, is determined by considering the following factors: the 

number of prior convictions, from none to four or more; prior 

commitments of more than thirty days, from none to three or more; 

the offender's age at the time of committing the current offense: 

whether the offender had been released from commitment for three 

years prior to the current offense; whether the offender was on 

probation, parole or in confinement; and the offender's history of 

drug dependence. Id. 

In 1983, Montoya was convicted on a guilty plea to one count 

of conspiracy to import cocaine and one count of transporting a 

firearm in interstate commerce after a former felony conviction. 

He received a seven-year term on the conspiracy count and a fiveyear concurrent sentence on the firearm count. Montoya was on 

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Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 4 
parole from a 1967 conviction at the time these crimes were 

committed and his sentences on these crimes were to run 

consecutively to his parole violation term. 

The Parole Commission informed Montoya that a decision to go 

outside the guidelines with respect to his 1983 convict i ons was 

warranted because: 

"(Y}ou are a more serious risk than indicated by your salient factor score in that you have a history of 

assaultive/aggressive behavior, specifically: 

1958 - robbery; and 1967 - murder. Your criminal 

behavior began in 1953 and has continued until the 

present time~ Less than three years subsequent to your 

release in 1980, after 13 years of confinement, you 

involved yourself in new serious criminal behavior 

involving drugs and possession of a firearm." 

Rec., vol. 1, doc. 1, ex. E, at 2. Montoya cont~nds that the 

record contains no support for the Commission's conclusion that, 

due to his history of assaultive/aggressive behavior, he was a 

more serious r i sk than i ndicated by the guidelines. We agree. 

The Commission relied on two prior offenses in fi nding that 

Montoya had a history of assaultive/aggressive behavior, a 1958 

robbery conviction and a 1967 murder conviction. The p r esentence 

report prepared in connection with the 1983 convictions describes 

the 1958 robbery conviction as follows: 

"Onder Long Beach Superior Court case #205747, Montoya 

was sentenced to State Prison as noted after he and his 

brother, Harold, were convicted of entering an apartment 

where a poker game was in progress and robbing the 

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Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 5 
participants. Alfred Montoya had a gun in his hand 

while his brother, Harold, had a lug wrench in his hand. 

While robbing the victims, Harold Montoya hit one of 

them on the head twice because he refused to give up the 

money in his pockets. Alfred Montoya explains that this 

robbery occurred because the individuals whom he and his 

brother robbed on this date had robbed the Montoya 

brothers on a prior occasion." 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 3, def. ex. 19, at 8. The 1967 murder 

conviction arose out of an attempt by Montoya, his brother, and 

two others to import marijuana across the border from Mexico. 

When they were stopped by two border patrol agents, the agents 

were taken prisoner by the other defendants. Montoya was 

instructed to take the vehicle contai ning the marijuana to his 

home, which he did. The remaining defendants took the agents to a 

remote area and shot them. Id. at 10. 

Montoya points out that the 1967 conviction was on a charge 

of felony murder and that, as set out above, the undisputed facts 

in the record establish that he had no part in the actual killings 

and was not present when they were committed. In denying Montoya 

relief, the district court concluded that the Commission's 

decision was supported by some evidence because the record 

includes "presentencing reports that contained conflicting 

versions of whether the petitioner was present at the time of the 

1967 murders." Id., vol. I, doc. 9, at 6. our review of the 

record reveals only one presentence report, which was prepared for 

sentencing on the 1983 crimes. It states unequivocally in 

describing the 1967 murders that although Montoya was present when 

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Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 6 
the victims were taken prisoner by Montoya's co-defendants, those 

co-defendants sent Montoya horne before the killings occurred. See 

id. at doc. 3, ex. 19, at 10. Other Commission documents likewise 

state that Montoya did not shoot the victims, and was not present 

at the scene when they were shot. Id. at doc. 3, def. ex. 4, def. 

ex. 5. Accordingly, the 1967 conviction does not support the 

i 

Commission's find.ing that Montoya has a history of assaultive/ I 

I 

aggressive behavfor. 

The dissent ~isagrees, arguing that the record contains 

evidence of Montoya's knowing participation in the 1967 murders. 

In support of this conclusion, the dissent relies on the language 

of 18 u.s.c. § 1111, the statute under which Montoya was convicted 

in 1967, which defines murder as 11 the unlawful killing of a human 

being with malice aforethought." The dissent believes that the 

term "malice aforethought" is some indication that Montoya 

knowingly participated in the murders. That inference is not 

valid given the undisputed facts in the record. Malice 

aforethought as used in section 1111 is a common law term and is 

therefore interpreted by reference to the common law. See United 

States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 947 n.2 (4th Ci r . 1984). The 

Commission does not dispute that Montoya's murder conviction under 

section llll was premised on the felony-murder doctrine, see 

Appellee's Brief at 7, under which one is guilty of murder if a 

death occurs during t he commission of a felony, ~' ~' Model 

Penal Code S 210.2 comment 6 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 

~7-

Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 7 
1962). Under the common law, felony murder is in essence a strict 

liability crime, allowing conviction for a death that was 

unintended and unforeseen. See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, 

Jr., Criminal Law§§ 67, 71 (1972)3; Model Penal Code § 210.2 

comments 1, 6. 

When, as here, a defendant has been convicted of felony 

murder, a judgment of conviction stating "murder with malice 

aforethought" indicates only that the murder occurred in 

conjunction with a felony. Because the element of malice is 

supplied by the conwission of the felony, the order of judgment 

and conviction cannot be read to indicate that Montoya knowingly 

participated in the murders. 

The dissent also attempts to distill from this record some 

support for its assertion that Montoya's conduct during the 1967 

crimes was itself aggressive/assaultive behavior. In so doing, 

3 LaFave also notes: 

"Murder is a common law crime whose complete 

development required several centuries. Though murder 

is frequently defined as the unlawful killing of another 

•living human beingc with 'malice aforethought," in 

modern times the latter phrase does not even approximate 

its literal meaning. Hence it is preferable not to rely 

upon that misleading expression for an understanding of 

murder but rather to consider the various types of 

murder (typed according to the mental element) which the 

common law came to recognize and which exist today in 

most jurisdictions." 

LaFave at 528. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 8 
the dissent ignores the record in critical respects. First, the 

dissent disagrees with our assumption that Montoya's conviction 

rested on the felony murder doctrine. However, as stated above, 

the government has conceded this fact. Second, we cannot agree 

with the dissent's assertion that, even if Montoya's 1967 

convictions rest on the felony murder doctrine, the record can be 

read to support Montoya's active involvement in the underlying 

felony. The indictment reveals that the two co-defendants who 

actually disarmed the Border Patrol Agents, sent Montoya on his 

way with the marijuana, and then took the Agents away and shot 

them, were charged with robbing the Agents in violation of 18 

u.s.c. S 2112, as well as with murder. Significantly, Montoya was 

not charged with robbery, and there is no evidence that he played 

any part in that crime, knew it was going to occur, or was present 

when it was completed. 4 Indeed, the record reveals that Montoya's 

relatively early parole date on the 1967 convictions was based on 

the Board's belief that Montoya was the least culpable of the 

defendants. See rec., vol. I, doc. 3, defendant's ex. 5. In sum, 

the dissent's assertion that the record can be read to support 

4 The indictment distinguishes between Montoya and the 

co-defendants in the murder counts as well. The murder counts 

against the co-defendants charged them with murder 11 by means of 

shooting" and "with premeditation," rec., supp. vol. I at 1, 

phrases missing from Montoya's charge. This omission indicates 

the felony murder basis of Montoya•s conviction. In addition the 

co-defendants were sentenced to 30 years plus life, while Montoya 

was sentenced to two 30 year concurrent terms and paroled after 13 

years. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 9 
Montoya's knowing and active participation in the violent aspects 

of the 1967 crimes is utterly unsupported. 

Although the Commission also relied on a 1958 conviction for 

robbery, we do not believe that one incident, standing alone, is 

sufficient to establish a history of assaultive/aggressive 

behavior, particularly when the evidence is undisputed that while 

Montoya carried a gun during that crime, it was his co-defendant 

who assaulted the victim with a wrench. 

As we stated in Misasi, 835 F.2d at 758, when a reason given 

by the Commission for going above the guidelines is factually 

incorrect or unsupported by the record material upon which the 

Commission specifically relies, it does not constitute a rational 

basis for the Commission's action. Here the primary reason stated 

by the Commission for departing from the guidelines is Montoya's 

history of assaultive/aggressive behavior, a reason we conclude 

has no rational basis in the record.s 

5 Montoya also argues that the Commission failed to specify 

with particularity why his prior criminal history justified the 

decision to go above the guidelines, asserting that he is no 

poorer a parole risk than the typical offender in his guideline 

rangeo In a related argument, Montoya contends that the 

Commission used impermissible double-counting. The Commission 

relied on the fact that the 1983 offenses occurred less than three 

years after his release from commitment, even though this fact is 

considered in determining an offender's salient factor score. In 

view of our rejection of the Commission's primary reason for going 

outside the guidelines and our conclusion that Montoya 0 S 

eligibility for parole must therefore be reconsidered, we do not 

address these arguments in detail. However, because of the 

Commission's mandate to state its reasons with particularity and 

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Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 10 
In addition, we conclude that the Commission's action is 

arbitrary and capricious for another reason. As discussed above, 

the Commission relied only on the 1958 robbery conviction and the 

1967 murder convictions to conclude that Montoya•s history of 

aggressive/assaultive behavior made him a more serious parole risk 

than indicated by his salient factor score. However, these same 

crimes were before the Commission when it considered Montoya's 

parole on the 1967 convictions. At that time, the Commission did 

not believe that these crimes dictated an upward departure from 

the guidelines: to the contrary, the Commission granted Montoya a 

relatively early parole within the guidelines based on its 

conclusion that Montoya was the ·least culpable participant in the 

1967 murders. The Commission has failed to explain why the same 

two crimes justify two diametrically opposed parole decisions. 6 

this court's condemnation of double-counting, ~, ~! Castaldo 

v. United States Parole Comm'n, 725 F.2d 94, 96 (lOth C~r. 1984), 

Montoya's arguments are not without some support in the law and 

the record. Accordingly, if on remand the Con~ission chooses to 

go above the guidelines on the basis of Montoya's prior criminal 

history and the length of his commitment-free period, it should 

explain how these factors shed light on Montoya's parole prognosis 

in a way different from the way they function in setting his 

salient factor score. See id. at 96-97. --- --- 6 We note some indication in the record that a factor in the 

Commission's decision here challenged may have been not the 

aggressive/assaultive history upon which the Commission purport<:d 

to rely, but the fact that Montoya "was given the opportunity to 

amend his ways by a parole grant and has chosen to resume his 

activity in trafficking in narcotics." Rec., vol. I, doc. 3, 

defendant•s ex. 5, at 1-2. Even if this is a legitimate 

consideration in the parole determination not adequately 

considered in setting Montoya's salient factor score; but see note 

5 supra, our review must be based on the reasons actually provided 

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Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 11 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions that the 

district court vacate its judgment and order, and remand the case 

to the Parole Commission with directions that it vacate its 

decision and order and that further proceedings it may conduct be 

consonant with the views expressed herein. 

REVERSED. 

Montoya by the Commission. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 12 
REVERSED. 

No. 89-6122, Montoya v. United States Parole Commission 

TACHA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I 

find a rational basis in the record for the Parole Commission's 

determination that Montoya has a history of assaultive and 

aggressive behavior. I therefore would uphold the Parole 

Commission 1 s decision to go above the parole guidelines and deny 

parole. 

The Parole Commission stated the following reasons for going 

above the parole guidelines: 

Retroactivity does not apply. Neither your recalculated 

severity rating (old category - Category Six; new 

category - Category Six) nor your recalculated salient 

factor score risk category {old category - Poor, old 

score - 1; new category - Poor, new score - 1) is more 

favorable. 

Your new offense/parole violation has been rated as new 

criminal conduct of Category Six severity because of 

your non-peripheral role in the intended distribution of 

at least 1 kilogram of pure cocaine. You were also 

convicted of interstate transportation of firearms by a 

convicted felon. Your new salient factor score is 1. 

The adult guidelines are applicable to your case. You 

have been in federal confinement as a result of your 

violation behavior for a total of 38 months. Reparole 

guidelines indicate a customary range of 78-100 months 

to be served before re-release. ·After review of all 

relevant factors and information presented, a decision 

above the guidelines appears warranted because you are a 

more serious risk than indicated by your salient factor 

score in that you have a history of assaultive/ 

aggressive behavior, specifically: 1958 - robbery; and 

1967 - murder. Your criminal behavior began in 1953 and 

has continued until the present time. Less than three 

years subsequent to your release in 1980, after 13 years of confinement, you involved yourself in new serious 

criminal behavior involving drugs and possession of a 

firearm. 

Our inquiry must begin with the appropriate standard of 

review in mind. "Judicial review of Parole Board decisions is 

Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 13 
narrow. The standard of review of action by the Parole Commission 

is whether the decision is arbitrary and capricious or is an abuse 

of discretion." Nunez-Guardado ~Hadden, 722 F.2d 618, 620 (lOth 

Cir. 1983). Our review of the Parole Commission's decision 

necessarily requires some inquiry into the evidence relied upon by 

the Parole Commission to support its expressed reasons for denying 

parole~ This factual inquiry, however, is limited. 

A court of review need only determine whether the 

information relied on by the Commission is sufficient to 

provide a factual basis for its reasons. The inquiry is 

not whether the Commission's decision is supported by 

the preponderance of the evidence, or even by 

substantial evidence; the inquiry is only whether there 

is a rational basis in·the record for the Commission's 

conclusions embodied in its statement of reasons. 

Misasi ~United States Parole Com 0 n, 835 F.2d 754, 758 (10th Cir. 

1987) (quoting Solomon v. Elsea, 676 F.2d 282, 290 (7th Cir. 

1982)). 

I disagree with the majority•s conclusion that Montoya•s 1967 

second degree murder convictions are not evidence of aggressive 

and assaultive behavior. Montoya 0 s November 1967 order of 

judgment and conviction for second degree murder states: 

On or about the 17th day of June, 1967, in Riverside 

County, in the Central District of California, the 

defendant, with malice aforethought, killed and murdered 

George Azrak and Theodore Newton, Jr., who were the 

immigrat1on officers, to wit, Border Patrol Inspectors 

in the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the 

Department of Justice, engaged in the performance of 

their official duties ••• in violation of Title 18, 

United States Code, sections 1111, 1114 

{emphasis added.) 

Section lll(a) of title 18 defines Montoya•s 1967 offenses as 

follows: 

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by 

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poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, 

deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or 

committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to 

perpetrate, any arson, rape, burglary, or robbery; or 

perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and 

maliciously to effect the death of any human being other 

than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree. 

Any other murder is murder in the second degree. 

18 u.s.c. S llll(a) (1948) (current version at 18 u.s.c. § llll(a) 

(1984)). The definition of "mali ce aforethought" under federal 

law is well established: 

"Mali ce aforethought" means an intent, at the time 

of a killing, willfully to take the life of a human 

being, or an intent willfull y to ·act in callous and 

wanton disregard of the consequences to human life. 

United States ~Harrelson, 766 F.2d 186, 189 n.5 (5th Cir. 1985) 

(quoting 2 E. Devitt & c. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and 

Instructions 215 (1977)), cert. denied, 474 u.s. 908; see United 

States~ Chagra, 807 F.2d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying 

definition to 18 U.S.C. section l l ll(a)), cert. denied 469 u.s. 

1193; United States~ Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 947-48 (4th Cir. 

1984) (same}. This court also has discussed the meaning of 

"malice aforethought" in section lll(a), and held that "[m]alice 

aforethought may be established by evidence of conduct which is 

reckless and wanton, and a gross deviation from a reasonable 

standard of care, of such a nature that a jury is warranted in 

inferring that the defendant was aware of a serious risk of death 

~bodily harm." United States~ Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 1232, 

1237 (lOth Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (citing United States·v. 

Black Elk, 579 F.2d 49, 51 {8th Cir. 1978)). Montoya entered a 

guilty plea, therefore a jury never passed on the evidence of his 

conduct. However, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, 

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which was in effect at the time of the 1967 convictions, the court 

was obligated to inquire and satisfy itself that there was a 

factual basis for Montoya's guilty plea before entering judgment. 

See 18 u.s.c. § ll(f) (current version). 

As LaFave and Scott explain, at least four modern types of 

murder are included under the penumbra of murder defined as the 

unlawful killing of another living human being with "malice 

aforethought:" (1) intent to kill murder; (2) intent to do 

serious bodily injury murder; (3) depraved heart murder; and (4) 

felony murder. See 2 w. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal 

Law§ 7.1 at 181-83 (1986) (hereinafter 2 LaFave & Scott). The 

first three types of murder all have a mens rea requirement 

related to the killing. Felony murder is included under this 

definition of "malice aforethought" because the element of malice, 

usually "callous and wanton disregard of the consequences to human 

life," is supplied by intent to commit the underlying felony. At 

common law and today the underlying crimes for felony murder are 

limited to those felonies involving a danger to life, such as 

where the felony involves an act of violence or where death is a 

natural and probable consequence of the defendant's conduct in 

committing the felony. See 2 LaFave & Scott at § 7.5(a}-(b). All 

four types of murder are theoretical possibilities for a second 

degree murder conviction under section llll(a). 

My first point of disagreement is with the majority's 

assumption that Montoya•s conviction was a form of strict 

liability imposed under the felony murder doctrine. Of the four 

theoretically possible types of second degree murder under section 

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llll(a), the majority ignores without explanation the three types 

of murder requiring mens rea and assumes that simply because 

Montoya was not present for the execution of the two border patrol 

agents, he could not have intended or foreseen their deaths. 

It is undisputed that Montoya was present when the two border 

patrol agents were kidnapped and disarmed. However, the Parole 

Commission reports and the presentence report are silent on the I 

guest ion of Montoya's knowledge and state of mind at the; time of 

the kidnapping. Montoya argued before the Parole Commisfion that 

he left the scene with no knowledge that the murders were going to 

take place, but the Parole Commission did not speak to this issue 

except to say that of the four defendants, Montoya was the "least 

culpable." From this equivocal record the majority infers that 

Montoya's 1967 conv"ictions were strict liability offenses, and 

concludes that the convictions therefore do not show aggressive 

and assaultive behavior. However, an equally likely inference 

from the record is that Montoya knew, or should have known, that 

his coconspirators were going to kill or seriously injure the two 

border patrol agents after he left to complete the marijuana 

delivery. Montoya's knowledge or reckless disregard of the danger 

to the victims and his acquiescence would satisfy the mens rea 

requirement for, at a minimum, depraved heart murder. Montoya•s 

1967 murder convictions would be possible on this ground under an 

accomplice theory of liability even though he was not actually 

present when the murders took place. See 2 LaFave & Scott at 

§ 6o7. In short, I see two equally likely inferences from this 

record regarding Montoya's mens rea for the 1967 murder 

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. ' 

convictions, one of which supports the Parole Commission's 

conclusion that Montoya has a history of assaultive and aggressive 

behavior. 

However, assuming arguendo that Montoya's 1967 murder 

convictions were based on the felony murder doctrine, my second 

point of disagreement is that the majority fails to explain why 

the felony underlying the murder conviction is not indicative of 

assaultive and aggressive behavior. Although the 1967 murder 

conviction does not specify an underlying felony, the 

presentencing report shows that Montoya was involved in the 

kidnapping of the two agentso 

Kidnapping was perceived at common law and is still perceived 

by legislatures today as a dangerous offense involving a 

significant prospect of violence. For these reasons it is 

included in most modern felony murder statutes. See 2 LaFave & 

Scott at S 7.5{b). Indeed, in 1984 Congress amended section 

llll(a) to include kidnapping as an underlying felony supporting 

first degree murder. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 

Stat. 2138 (1984). Congress's inclusion of kidnapping in the list 

of felonies supporting murder in the first degree without any 

reference to the particular circumstances is a strong indication 

of the assaultive and aggressive nature of this crime, and in my 

mind forecloses any potential debate that we should look to see 

whether under the facts of a particular case there was a 

foreseeable danger to human life. See 2 LaFave & Scott at 

§ 7.5(b). If Montoya's 1967 murder convictions were for felony 

murder, it is improper to collaterally attack the factual basis 

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for those convictions in a subsequent parole proceeding by denying 

that Montoya's actual role in the kidnapping constitutes evidence 

of assaultive and aggressive behavior. 

No matter which way I read this equivocal record, evidence of 

Montoya's aggressive and assaultive behavior appears at every 

option. The record is silent on Montoya's mens rea at the time of 

the kidnappings. We cannot know and we should not assume which 

one of the four potential types of murder was the basis for 

Montoya ' s second degree murder convictions. However, if we 

assume, as the majority does, that Montoya's convictions were for 

felony murder and that Montoya did not intend and could not 

foresee that his cohorts would murder the border patrol agents, 

his undisputed involvement in the ir kidnapping of the agents is 

sufficient evidence of Montoya's assaultive and aggressive 

behavior. 

I find that a rational basis exists in the record to support 

the Parole Commission's determination that Montoya's 1958 robbery 

offense, coupled with his involvement in the 1967 murders, show a 

history of assaultive and aggressive behavior. Accordingly, I 

would hold that the Parole Commission's action was not arbitrary, 

capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 89-6122 Document: 01019654382 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 19