Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03790/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03790-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lee Careaga
Defendant
Ignatius Chinn
Defendant
Blake Graham
Defendant
William Lockyer
Defendant
Marriott of San Francisco
Defendant
John Marsh
Defendant
Sam Snowden
Defendant
Richard E. Wilmshurst
Plaintiff
Kisu Yo
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD E. WILMSHURST,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MARRIOTT OF SAN FRANCISCO, SAM

SNOWDEN, IGNATIUS CHINN, WILLIAM

LOCKYER, BLAKE GRAHAM, LEE

CAREAGA, JOHN MARSH, KISU YO, and

DOES 1–100,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-03790 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS AND VACATING

HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this civil-rights action, pro se plaintiff Richard Wilmshurst alleges false arrest and

excessive force against defendants in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. Defendants are state law

enforcement officials Ignatius Chinn, Blake Graham, Lee Careaga, John Marsh, and Kiso Yo,

former Attorney General William Lockyer, Marriott International, Inc., and Marriott employee

Sam Snowden. Because they are represented by different counsel, defendants have filed three

motions to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, this order GRANTS the motions to dismiss.

STATEMENT

On June 29, 2005, plaintiff attended an annual Legal Community Against Violence

dinner at the Marriott Hotel in San Francisco. After he checked into the hotel, plaintiff walked

through the lobby to the dinner but was detained by police officer Ignatius Chinn. “After a

limited contact [plaintiff] went to the prior EVENT cocktail party and attended the dinner”

Case 3:07-cv-03790-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/07/08 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

(Compl. ¶¶ 2–4). The complaint did not provide further details about the initial encounter

between Chinn and plaintiff.

After dinner, plaintiff was on his way back to his hotel room when he was “attacked”

by Chins, Graham, Careaga, Marsh, and Yo. “The five men with Sam Snowmen in attendance

knocked Richard to the floor injuring him. While on the floor [plaintiff] was arrested and hand

cuffed. [Plaintiff] was cited by Ignatius Chinn for resisting arrest.” The officers booked

plaintiff in the San Francisco City jail, charging him with a violation of California Penal Code §

148. Plaintiff’s court appearance was set for July 14, 2005 (id. at ¶¶ 5–6). 

On July 14, 2005, plaintiff appeared in state court. The district attorney decided not to

prosecute the case and it was dismissed by the court (id. at ¶ 7). Plaintiff filed the instant

complaint on July 16, 2007. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges the following claims against

defendants (and the claims are reproduced in their entirety in this order):

(i) Richard’s Federal Civil Rights were violated by the conspiracy

of the arrest and removal of Richard from the Marriott Hotel in

violation of his Fourth, Fifth, First, and 14th Amendment rights by

all parties including William Lockyer. Richard is entitled to a

minimum of $500,000 from each defendant in violation of Title 42

USCA § 1983.

(ii) The employees of the San Francisco Marriott conspired with

the other named parties to violate Richard’s Federal Civil Rights

and applied excessive force without reason or probable cause in

violation of Title 42 USCA § 1983. Each employee participating

in the false arrest and excessive force are [sic] subject to penalties

of $500,000 each.

(iii) The Marriott Hotel is responsible for the safety of Richard and

his person while a guest of the Hotel. The Hotel allowed Richard

to be falsely arrested and participated in the arrest. The Marriott

Hotel is responsible to Richard for $10,000,000 in damages.

(iv) Each defendant is subject to punitive damages according to

proof and assessment by the jury to each party’s individual acts. 

The amount awarded [is] subject to the discretion of the jury.

ANALYSIS

Defendants move for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests for the legal

sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Business v. Symington,

51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). All material allegations of the complaint are taken as true

Case 3:07-cv-03790-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/07/08 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 Unless indicated otherwise, internal citations are omitted from all cites.

3

and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1996). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

127 S.Ct. 1255, 1264–65 (2007).1

This order finds that dismissal is warranted because plaintiff’s claims are barred by the

applicable two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleges false arrest and use of excessive

force in violation of his First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. With respect to

the false-arrest claim, the applicable statute of limitations is two years. “Section 1983 does not

contain its own limitations period, but the Supreme Court has held that the appropriate period is

that of the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts.” Elliott v. City of Union

City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994). According to the California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 335.1, the statute of limitations is two years for “[a]n action for assault, battery, or injury to,

or for the death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another.” 

Plaintiff himself concedes that “[d]efendant is correct; the statute of limitations for a Federal

Civil Rights action is two years” (Opp. Br. 5).

The parties disagree over the date the limitations clock started ticking. “[T]he accrual

date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to

state law . . . Aspects of § 1983 which are not governed by reference to state law are governed

by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort principles. Under those principles,

it is ‘the standard rule that [accrual occurs] when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause

of action, that is, when ‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’” Wallace, 127 S. Ct. 1091,

1095 (2007). In Wallace, the Supreme Court held that for false imprisonment and its subspecies

false arrest, the statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged false imprisonment ends. 

Id. at 1093. With respect to the excessive-force and conspiracy claims, accrual generally occurs

Case 3:07-cv-03790-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/07/08 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” 

Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying this rule to an

excessive force claim); Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1996) (claim based on alleged

conspiracy accrues when plaintiffs learned of conspiracy).

Plaintiff argues that his complaint was timely filed. He reasons, “This action was filed

within two years after the San Francisco arrest on June 29, 2005, was dismissed in the

San Francisco Superior Court on July 14, 2005, and since July 14, 2007 fell on a Saturday,

the 2 year Statute of Limitations would expire on Monday July 15, 2007. Until the arrest is

found to be unlawful, a complaint based upon the unlawful incident cannot be made”

(Opp. Br. 5). He cites no authority in support of his position.

This order rejects plaintiff’s argument. The time of accrual for false arrest occurs when

the alleged false arrest ends, not when charges are later dismissed. For excessive force and

conspiracy, accrual begins when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury that served

as the basis of the action. Here, plaintiff experienced the allegedly false arrest, excessive force,

and conspiracy to violate his rights on June 29, 2005, when the false arrest ended. He also

knew or had reason to know of the injury that constituted the basis of the instant action on that

date. He nonetheless filed the complaint on July 16, 2007, which fell outside the two-year

limitations period. This order holds that plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. This is dispositive. 

Defendants’ other arguments need not be reached.

CONCLUSION

Because the statute of limitations lapsed before this action was commenced, defendants’

motions to dismiss are hereby GRANTED without leave to amend. Judgment will be entered and

the clerk shall close the file. The hearing is unnecessary and is therefore VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2008. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-03790-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/07/08 Page 4 of 4