Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03214/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03214-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vernon Klaire Coffman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeala Tenth circuit 

JUN 1 1 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 89-3214 

VERNON KLAIRE COFFMAN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D,C. No. 88-3434-T) 

Stephen M. Joseph, of Joseph, Robison & Anderson, P.A., Wichita, 

Kan., for defendant-appellant. 

Emily B, Metzger (Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., U.S. Attorney, with 

her on the brief), Asst. U.S. Attorney, Wichita, Kan., for 

plaintiff-appellee. 

Before TACHA * and SETH, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District Judge. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-3214 Document: 01019865205 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 1 
This is an appeal from the order of the district court 

denying defendant Vernon Coffman's motion to correct sentence 

pursuant to 28 μ.s.c. section 2255. Coffman contends that the 

district court erred in failing either to dismiss the indictment 

for alleged violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers or 

to order an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim. We affirm. 

I. 

Coffman was indicted by a federal grand jury in 1987 on two 

counts of making false written statements to a licensed firearms 

dealer in connection with the acquisition of firearms and two 

counts of unlawfully receiving firearm9 that had traveled in 

interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 922(a)(6) 

and 18 U.S.C. section 922(h)(l), respectively. At the time the 

indictment was issued, Coffman was incarcerated in the Pratt 

County Jail pending trial on state criminal charges. On August 2, 

1985, the United States marshal lodged a detainer with the Pratt 

County sheriff on the federal charges. After release from 

confinement, Coffman was arraigned on the federal charges and 

released on bond. 

After his arraignment but before his federal trial, Coffman 

was sentenced on the state criminal charges. The state court 

sentenced Coffman to the custody of the Kansas State Industrial 

Reformatory (KSIR). On September 16, 1985, Coffman was 

transferred to federal custody and appeared for a change of plea 

hearing on September 22, 1985, at which time he pleaded guilty to 

counts I and III of the federal indictment. Coffman was then 

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Appellate Case: 89-3214 Document: 01019865205 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 2 
returned to KSIR on September 29th, pending sentencing on the 

federal offenses. On November 20, 1986, Coffman was again 

transferred to federal custody for sentencing. The district court 

sentenced him to five years on count I and five years on count 

III, with the two sentences to run concurrently. Following 

sentencing, Coffman was returned immediately to KSIR. 

Coffman filed two motions to vacate, set aside or correct 

sentence with the federal district court. In an amendment to the 

second motion, Coffman contended that the United States had 

violated the anti-shuttling provisions of the Interstate Agreement 

on Detainers ("IAD"), 18 U.S.C. app 2, § 2, art. IV(e), by 

returning him to state custody at KSIR before sentencing. Coffman 

also contended that he was deprived of effective assistance of 

counsel when his trial counsel failed to raise the IAD violation. 

Coffman demanded an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim. The district court denied both 

motions, and this appeal followed. 

II. 

The issue before us is the narrow question of whether "trial" 

in the IAD anti-shuttling provisions includes sentencing. Coffman 

contends that it does, relying on the Ninth Circuit's case of 

Tinghitella ~ California, 718 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1983) (per 

curiam). We disagree with Tinghitella and hold that "trial" does 

not include sentencing for purposes of the IAD anti-shuttling 

provisions. 

The IAD is a compact among 48 states, the United States, and 

the District of Columbia. Its purpose is 

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Appellate Case: 89-3214 Document: 01019865205 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 3 
to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of 

[outstanding] charges and determination of the proper 

status of any and all detainers based on untried 

indictments, informations, or complaints. The party 

States also find that proceedings with reference to such 

charges and detainers, when emanating from another 

jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of 

cooperative procedures. It is the further purposes of 

this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures. 

IAD art. I, 18 u.s.c. app. 2, § 2, art. I. To effectuate these 

purposes, the IAD provides for two methods of disposing of 

"untried indictments, informations, or complaints'' and their 

related detainers. The first method, invoked by the prisoner, is 

a request for final disposition under article III. The second 

method, invoked by a party state, is a request for temporary 

custody or availability under article IV. 

In this case, the United States, as a party state under the 

IAD, brought a request under article IV(a), which states: 

The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in 

which an untried indictment, information, or complaint 

is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against 

whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term 

of imprisonment in any party State made available in 

accordance with article V(a) hereof upon presentation of 

a written request for temporary custody or availability 

to the appropriate authorities of the State in which the 

prisoner is incarcerated . 

IAD art. IV(a), 18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, art. IV(a). Coffman, who 

was then serving time in Kansas, a party state to the IAD, see 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4401 (1988), was transferred to federal 

custody for trial pursuant to articles IV and v. After trial, but 

before sentencing, Coffman was retransferred to Kansas custody. 

He was then returned to federal custody for sentencing. 

Coffman contends that these transfers violated the antishuttling provision of IAD article IV(e), which provides: 

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If trial is not had on any indictment, information, 

or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's 

being returned to the original place of imprisonment 

pursuant to article V{e) hereof, such indictment, 

information, or complaint shall not be of any further 

force or effect, and the court shall enter an order 

dismissing the same with prejudice. 

IAD art. IV{e), 18 u.s.c. app. 2, § 2, art. IV{e). Coffman 

asserts that the term "trial" in article IV(e) includes 

sentencing, see Tinghitella, 718 F.2d at 311, and that because he 

was returned to Kansas custody before sentencing, there was no 

trial on the indictment as required by article IV{e). The Ninth 

Circuit reached its result in Tinghitella by analogizing the term 

"trial" in the IAD to "trial" under the sixth amendment, which 

includes sentencing. Id. at 311 (citing Walsh~ United States, 

423 F.2d 687, 688 (9th Cir. 1970)). We find no authority for this 

analogy. 

The express statutory framework of the IAD refutes the 

appropriateness of the Ninth Circuit's analogy. Applying the 

statutory framework, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that the 

IAD's use of the term "final disposition" includes sentencing. 

The use of the term "final disposition," however, when juxtaposed 

against the use of the word "trial" makes clear that the IAD 

differentiates between the trial phase of a proceeding and all 

post-trial procedures, including sentencing. But see Carchman v. 

Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 744 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The 

term 'trial' is plainly used in the [IAD) to represent the broader 

concept of 'final disposition.'"); Tinghitella, 718 F.2d at 311 

{"trial" and "final disposition" in IAD encompass sentencing). 

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The IAD draws a clear distinction between "disposition," 

"final disposition," and "prosecution" on the one hand and "trial" 

on the other. Disposition refers to the final determination of 

charges. See IAD art. I, 18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, art. I ("the 

purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly 

disposition of such charges"). Final disposition, primarily used 

in the context of article III, specifically includes imposition 

and service of sentence. See IAD art. III(e), 18 u.s.c. app. 2, 

§ 2, art. III(e). Similarly, prosecution refers to the total 

proceedings based on an "untried indictment, information, or 

complaint." See IAD art. V(d), 18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, art. V(d) 

("[T]emporary custody ... shall be only for the purpose of 

permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one 

or more untried indictments, informations, or complaints which 

form the basis of the detainer."). In articles III(d) and IV(e), 

however, the drafters of the IAD chose to use the term "trial" 

rather than "disposition," "final disposition," or "prosecution." 

In our view this change in terminology reflects a decision to 

limit the scope of the anti-shuttling provisions to pre-conviction 

transfers. If the drafters had wished to extend the IAD's antishuttling provisions to incidences occurring after trial but 

before sentencing, they could have used the term "disposition," 

"final disposition," or "prosecution." They did not. Isolating 

the sentences containing the word "trial," as the Ninth Circuit 

and Carchman dissent apparently did, renders meaningless the use 

of the words "disposition," "final disposition," and "prosecution" 

in t;.J1e other articles of the IAD. We therefore hold that trial 

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under the IAD's anti-shuttling provisions does not include 

sentencing. 

Further, we reject equating the anti-shuttling provision's 

use of the word "trial" with the use of the words "untried 

indictment, information, or complaint." The ''untried indictment, 

information, or complaint" language defines the reach and scope of 

the IAD, while the term "trial" establishes the limits of the 

anti-shuttling provision's application to cases within the scope 

of the IAD. Cf. Carchman, 473 U.S. at 724-26 (IAD's reach limited 

to charges based on "untried indictments, informations, or 

complaints"). This distinction is clearly borne out by the 

language and structure of the IAD. On the one hand, the IAD by 

its express terms authorizes proceedings that "encourage the 

expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and 

determinations of the proper status of any and all detainers based 

on untried indictments, informations, or complaints." IAD art. I, 

18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, art. I (emphasis added). The reference to 

"untried indictments, informations, or complaints" throughout the 

IAD refers back to this basic enabling language authorizing the 

disposition of charges based on or related to untried indictments, 

informations, and complaints. The use of the term "trial" in 

article IV(e), on the other hand, makes clear it is a limitation 

on the application of the anti-shuttling provision. "Trial" is 

simply not synonymous with "untried indictment, information or 

complaint." 

Our interpretation gives full weight to the purpose of the 

IAD to facilitate the interjurisdictional transfer of prisoners 

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and to promote prisoner rehabilitation. See IAD art. I, 18 u.s.c. 

app. 2., S 2, art. I. Transferring a prisoner after trial but 

before sentencing does not implicate the prisoner rehabilitation 

concerns animating the IAD to the same degree as pre-trial 

transfers. The IAD is designed to reduce prisoner uncertainty 

caused by untried indictments, informations, or complaints that 

may have little basis. See Carchman ~ Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 729-30 

(1985). Although "[a) prisoner with foreknowledge of a time 

certain for imprisonment in the receiving state . . presumably 

will more easily undergo rehabilitation than one with knowledge 

merely of a range of possible sentences," Tinghitella, 718 F.2d at 

311 n.5, "[t]he uncertainty caused by the delay in sentencing is 

minimal when compared with the uncertainty resulting from untried 

charges," People~ Housewright, 268 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Mich. Ct. 

App. 1978). Certainly the prisoner's guilt or innocence on 

pending charges is a major factor considered by state parole 

authorities. 

We note that transfers for purposes of sentencing are 

frequently brief and present minimal interruptions in 

rehabilitative programs. Indeed, Coffman was removed from KSIR 

for less than one day for his sentencing proceeding. We decline 

to adopt a mechanical reading of the IAD that would require a 

receiving state to retain custody of the prisoner until the 

completion of sentencing. Such retained custody, which might last 

for a period of several weeks or months, could seriously disrupt 

the prisoner's rehabilitative program in the sending state. Given 

the IAD's policy of facilitat4ng rehabilitation-and the diminished 

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Appellate Case: 89-3214 Document: 01019865205 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 8 
uncertainty resulting from unsentenced versus untried charges, we 

refuse to hold that trial includes sentencing and require 

receiving states to retain custody at the expense of the 

prisoner's rehabilitation program in the sending state. 

Many of the state courts interpreting the IAD have reached 

similar results. Because the IAD is a compact among the party 

states created to promote cooperation in resolving 

interjurisdictional custody matters, we accord the view of the 

courts of the party states substantial weight in construing the 

agreement's provisions. Two such courts have held that "trial" 

under the IAD does not include sentencing, see Housewright, 268 

N.W.2d at 403-04; State~ Lewis, 422 N.W.2d 768, 771-72 {Minn. 

Ct. App. 1988), while several courts have held that the IAD has no 

application to sentencing at all, see People~ Castoe, 150 Cal. 

Rptr. 237, 238-39 (Ct. App. 1978); People~ Barnes, 287 N.W.2d 

282, 283-84 {Mich. Ct. App. 1979); State~ Sparks, 716 P.2d 253, 

255-57 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 715 P.2d 71 (N.M. 1986); 

People~ Randolph, 381 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 {Sup. Ct. 1976); State 

~ Barnes, 471 N.E.2d 514, 516-17 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); State v. 

Barefield, 756 P.2d 731, 733-34 (Wash. 1988) (en bane), rev'g 

State v. Barefield, 735 P.2d 1339, 1343-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). 

I I I. 

We hold that "trial" in the IAD anti-shuttling provisions 

does not include sentencing. Accordingly, we do not reach 

Coffman's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his request 

for an evidentiary hearing on that issue because they are based 

upon Coffman's counsel's failure to raise the alleged IAD 

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violation. Because there was no such violation, however, the 

district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the indictment 

or otherwise grant Coffman's section 2255 motion. 

Appellant's motion to strike portions of the government's 

brief for citing facts not in the record and an unpublished Tenth 

Circuit opinion in violation of 10th Cir. R. 36.3 is GRANTED. The 

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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