Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02988/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02988-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Beth Adams
Appellee
Alliance Defending Freedom
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
Connie Frisch
Appellee
Craig Keefe
Appellant
Kelly McCalla
Appellee
National Coalition Against Censorship
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
Student Press Law Center
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2988

___________________________

Craig Keefe

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Beth Adams; Connie Frisch; Kelly McCalla

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

------------------------------

Foundation for Individual Rights in Education; Alliance Defending Freedom;

Student Press Law Center; Electronic Frontier Foundation; American Booksellers

Foundation for Free Expression; National Coalition Against Censorship;

American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota

lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: June 10, 2015

 Filed: October 26, 2016 

____________

Appellate Case: 14-2988 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/26/2016 Entry ID: 4462779 
Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 1

____________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

After Central LakesCollege (CLC) received student complaints about posts on

Craig Keefe’s Facebook page, he was removed from the Associate Degree Nursing

Programfor behavior unbecoming ofthe profession and transgression of professional

boundaries. Keefe filed suit against several CLC administrators, alleging violations

of his First Amendment and due process rights. After some defendants were

dismissed, the district court granted the remaining defendants summary judgment. 2

Keefe v. Adams, Civ. No. 13-326, Order (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2014). Keefe appeals. 

Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, we affirm. See Richmond v.

Fowlkes, 228 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2000) (standard of review).

I. Background

A. The Events Leading to Removal. Keefe completed the practical nursing

program at CLC and became a licensed practical nurse in June 2011. He enrolled in

the Associate Degree Nursing Program in the fall of 2011, seeking to become a

registered nurse. He was dismissed at the end of that semester for failing to maintain

the required grade levels in all nursing courses. He reapplied, was admitted to the

Program, and again began classes in the fall of 2012. 

Judge Kermit E. Bye was initially assigned to this panel when the case was 1

submitted but has resigned from active participation. Judge Bobby E. Shepherd was

randomly selected to replace Judge Bye on the panel. 

The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District 2

of Minnesota.

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In late November, a student complained to Keefe’s instructor, KimScott, about

several posts Keefe had made on his public Facebook page. She provided Scott

printouts of five posts she felt were threatening and related to the classroom. A few

days later, a second student approached Scott at the start of a clinical class in which

she was enrolled with Keefe. She told Scott that Keefe made statements on Facebook

that “made her feel extremely uncomfortable and nervous,” and that “she didn’t feel

she could function in the same physical space with Craig at the clinical site.” 

Concerned about patient care and safety in the clinic, Scott separated Keefe and the

student during the shift. The student forwarded the posts to Scott later that day. 

After receiving the two complaints, Scottforwarded the posts to her supervisor,

Connie Frisch, CLC’s Director of Nursing. Frisch read the posts and verified they

came from Keefe and were accessible to anyone on the internet. Frisch then

contacted the Vice President of Academic Affairs, Kelly McCalla, who told her to

meet with Keefe. Frisch contacted Keefe and set up a meeting, without explaining

its purpose. Keefe sent Frisch an email asking for more detail about the meeting. 

Frisch responded that she would prefer to review the topic in person rather than via

phone or email, advising Keefe he did not need to prepare for the meeting and noting

that “the topic of professional boundary is central to the role of the nurse and I am

sure that you appreciate the delicacy of the topic.” 

Frisch then received an email from Kim Scott relaying a student’s concern that

Keefe had told someone there would be “hell to pay for whoever complained about

me.” Frisch called Keefe and moved the meeting up one day, so that he would not

be in his next clinical class with the concerned student. Keefe again asked what the

meeting was about. Frisch again said she would prefer to discuss it in person but that

due process would be followed.

On the agreed day, Keefe met with Frisch and Beth Adams, CLC’s Dean of

Students. McCalla did not attend because he would be responsible for reviewing any

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academic appeal. Frisch began the meeting by reviewing the steps of the Due Process

Policy from the Student Handbook. She told Keefe that his Facebook posts raised

concerns about his professionalismand boundary issues. She did not give him copies

of the posts, but she read aloud portions of the posts that she considered most

significant. We will reproduce only the posts that Frisch and Adams testified gave

them particular concern. A more extensive recital of the offensive posts that Scott

forwarded to Frisch can be found at pages 5-6 of the district court’s Order:

Glad group projects are group projects. I give her a big fat F for

changing the group power point at eleven last night and resubmitting. 

Not enough whiskey to control that anger.

Doesnt anyone know or have heard of mechanical pencils. Im going to

take this electric pencil sharpener in this class and give someone a

hemopneumothorax with it before to long. I might need some anger

3

management.

LMAO [a classmate], you keep reporting my post and get me banded. 

I don’t really care. If thats the smartest thing you can come up with than

I completely understand why your going to fail out of the RN program

you stupid bitch....And quite creeping on my page. Your not a friend of

mine for a reason. If you don’t like what I have to say than don’t come

and ask me, thats basically what creeping is isn’t it. Stay off my page...

Frisch, who testified she was most disturbed by the statement about giving

someone a hemopneumothorax, then gave Keefe an opportunity to respond. He told

her there were a lot of jokes on his page, his page had been hacked, and he did not

know it was public. Frisch testified that Keefe was not receptive to her concern that

the posts were unprofessional. Based on Keefe’s “lack of remorse, lack of concern,

Keefe testified that a hemopneumothorax is a “trauma” where the lung is 3

punctured and air and blood flood the lung cavity; it is not a medical procedure.

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not recognizing, not saying he wanted to change,” Frisch decided to remove himfrom

the Associate Degree Program:

Clearly there was a lot of confusion about the professionalism . . . I

didn’t believe I could teach him. He was not responsive to what I said. 

You know, nursing programs have an obligation to graduate students

who are not just able to pass the classes, but to be safe and to have all of

the soft skills, including professionalism . . . . I could not see that he

had it. In fact he convinced me that I wasn’t going to be able to teach

him that.

At the end of the meeting, Frisch told Keefe he could finish the semester and

his credits would transfer as electives to a different course of study within CLC. She

also advised Keefe he could appeal the decision to Vice President McCalla. Beth

Adams testified that Keefe appeared not to understand the seriousness ofthe problem;

he was defensive and did not seem to feel responsible or remorseful. She was

concerned about the “whiskey for anger management” post because Keefe became

argumentative during the discussion.

Keefe testified he asked Frisch which posts she was referring to, and she

mentioned the comment about using whiskey for anger management, the swearing,

and calling a fellow student a “stupid bitch.” When she gave him an opportunity to

respond, Keefe told her that his Facebook page had been hacked, but he confirmed

in his deposition that he wrote each of the posts in question. He also told Frisch that

many of his comments were jokes. She responded that his comments were quite

disturbing and that she felt he had anger issues. Keefe testified that, when he

mentioned his First Amendment rights, Frisch said that she understood his rights but

this was about professionalism. 

B. The Relevant Nursing Program Standards. As part of enrolling in the

Associate Degree Program, Keefe acknowledged receipt, review, and understanding

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ofthe Nursing ProgramStudent Handbook. The handbook statesthat “all current and

future students are expected to adhere to the policies and procedures of this student

handbook.” Following the meeting, Frisch wrote a letter to Keefe, stating: “As we

discussed, the decision has been made to remove you from the Associate Degree

Nursing Programat CLC as a consequence of behavior unbecoming of the profession

and transgression of professional boundaries” based on the contents of his Facebook

page. The letter reviewed the appeal process and stated he was being removed

pursuant to the following section of the Nursing Program’s handbook:

Student Removal from Nursing Program

Integral to the profession of nursing is a concern for the welfare of the

sick, injured, and vulnerable and for social justice; therefore students

enrolled in the Associate Degree (AD) Nursing Program and Central

Lakes College (CLC) accept the moral and ethical responsibilities that

have been credited to the profession of nursing and are obligated to

uphold and adhere to the professional Code of Ethics. The American

Nurses Association (2001) Code for Nurseswith Interpretive Statements

outlines the goals, values, and ethical principles that direct the

profession of nursing and is the standard by which ethical conduct is

guided and evaluated by the profession. The AD Nursing Program at

Central Lakes College has an obligation to graduate students who will

provide safe, competent nursing care and uphold the moral and ethical

principles of the profession of nursing. Therefore, students who fail to

meet the moral, ethical, or professional behavioral standards of the

nursing program are not eligible to progress in the nursing program. 

Students who do not meet academic or clinical standards and/or who

violate the student Code of Conduct as described in the Central Lakes

College catalog and the AD Nursing Student Handbook are also

ineligible to progress in the AD Nursing Program. Behaviors that

violate academic, moral, and ethical standards include, but are not

limited to, behaviors described in the College Catalog Student Code of

Conduct as well as:

. . . 

! transgression of professional boundaries;

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! breaching of confidentiality/HIPAA (including any type of

social media breach);

! behavior unbecoming of the Nursing Profession.

Students who fail to adhere to the CLC Student Code of Conduct and

the moral and ethical standards outlined in the handbook are ineligible

to progress in the Nursing Program.

The Nurses Association Code of Ethics, which the Handbook states students are

“obligated to uphold and adhere to,” emphasizes professionalism and personal and

professional boundaries: 

1.5 Relationships with colleagues and others -- The principle of

respect for persons extends to all individuals with whom the nurse

interacts. The nurse maintains compassionate and caring relationships

with colleagues and others with a commitment to the fair treatment of

individuals, to integrity-preserving compromise, and to resolving

conflict. Nurses function in many roles, including direct care provider,

administrator, educator, researcher, and consultant. In each of these

roles, the nurse treats colleagues, employees, assistants, and students

with respect and compassion. This standard of conduct precludes any

and all forms of prejudicial actions, any form of harassment or

threatening behavior, or disregard for the effect of one’s actions on

others.

2.4 Professional Boundaries -- When acting within one’s role as a

professional, the nurse recognizes and maintains boundaries that

establish appropriate limits to relationships. . . . In this way, nursepatient and nurse-colleague relationships differ from those that are

purely personal and unstructured, such as friendship. . . . In all

encounters, nurses are responsible for retaining their professional

boundaries.

5.3 Wholeness of character -- Nurses have both personal and

professional identities that are neither entirely separate, nor entirely

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merged, but are integrated. In the process of becoming a professional,

the nurse embraces the values of the profession, integrating them with

personal values.

4

C. Keefe’s Administrative Appeal. Keefe spoke with Vice President McCalla

the next day to discuss the appeal process. McCalla reviewed the substance of the

posts with Keefe and referred him to a student advocate, who helped write the appeal. 

Before filing the appeal, Keefe sent Frisch a lengthy email identifying procedures in

CLC’s Due Process Policy he had not been provided. Frisch forwarded the email to

McCalla, who then emailed Keefe that his appeal had been received and warned

Keefe that he should not contact the nursing faculty, the Dean of Nursing, or his

former nursing classmates. Keefe testified that he did not attend further classes or

take the exams because he believed McCalla meant that he was to have no contact

with anyone in the Nursing Program. As a result, he failed his classes.

On December 11, 2012, Keefe submitted a lengthy “Due Process Appeal”

letter, stating he had removed offensive comments from his Facebook page and

“removed myself from the social media network.” Keefe petitioned that he be

allowed to finish the Associate Degree Nursing Program because “I don’t believe the

punishment fits the crime.” The letter concluded:

I took a huge risk participating in the social media network as a nursing

student and nurse, both professionally and unethically and have learned

a valuable lesson and will not participate in such activity in the future

to risk my professional image as well as CLC’s professional image. I

would like to Thank You for this opportunity to express my sincere

American Nurses Association, Code of Ethics for Nurses with Interpretive

4

Statements 4-6, 10 (2001), https://courseweb.pitt.edu/bbcswebdav/institution/

Pitt%20Online/Nursing/NUR%202008/Module%2001/Readings/ANA_ethics.pdf. 

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apology for my unethical and unprofessional behavior and giving me the

opportunity to possibly finish . . . my education.

McCalla left a phone message in early January informing Keefe that his appeal was

being denied. Keefe emailed McCalla requesting a contested case hearing. McCalla

responded that a contested case hearing was only available for a student disciplinary

action, whereas Keefe had been removed for an academic program violation. This

lawsuit followed.

II. First Amendment Issues 

Keefe argues that defendants violated his First Amendment right to free speech

by removing him from the Nursing Program at a public college “for comments on the

internet which were done outside of class and unrelated to any course assignments or

requirements, and did not violate any specific rules.” Keefe’s Reply Brief framesthis

contention categorically -- a college student may not be punished for off-campus

speech, he contends, unless it is speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment,

such as obscenity. To our knowledge, no court has adopted this extreme position, and

we decline to do so. 

A. The first question raised by Keefe’s claim is significant -- whether the First

Amendment precludes a public university from adopting, as part of its curriculum for

obtaining a graduate degree in a health care profession, the Code of Ethics adopted

by a nationally recognized association of practicing professionals. Without question, 

the Supreme Court does not favor creating new First Amendment exceptions that

could be used to restrict protected speech. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559

U.S. 460, 468 (2010). But these decisions involved a question not at issue here --

whether to recognize new categories of unprotected speech. To paraphrase Chief

Justice Roberts, writing for the Court in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct.

1656, 1657 (2015), “nobody argues that [Keefe’s Facebook postings are] a category

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of unprotected speech. . . . [T]he First Amendment fully applies to [that] speech. The

question is instead whether that Amendment permits the particular regulation of

speech at issue here.” 

Many courts have upheld enforcement of academic requirements of

professionalism and fitness, particularly for a program training licensed medical

professionals. See Oyama v. Univ. of Hawaii, 813 F.3d 850, 866-68 (9th Cir. 2015);

Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733-34 (6thCir. 2012); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664

F.3d 865, 875-76 (11th Cir. 2011); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1169 (2006); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277,

1286-90 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 947-49 (9thCir. 2002) (opinion

of Graber, J.), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 908 (2003). Fitness to practice as a health care

professional goes beyond satisfactory performance of academic course work. As the

Supreme Court said in Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,

91 n.6 (1978), “Personal hygiene and timeliness may be as important factors in a

school’s determination of whether a student will make a good medical doctor as the

student’s ability to take a case history or diagnose an illness.” 

Given the strong state interest in regulating health professions, teaching and

enforcing viewpoint-neutral professional codes of ethics are a legitimate part of a

professional school’s curriculum that do not, at least on their face, run afoul of the

First Amendment. See Al-Dabagh v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 777 F.3d 355, 359-60

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2817 (2015); Ward, 667 F.3d at 732; Keeton, 664

F.3d at 876. Because professional codes of ethics are broadly worded, they can be 5

cited to restrict protected speech. For example, a university may violate the First

Courts have long recognized that the state has a particular interest in 5

regulating health care to protect the public health. States may insist that practitioners

demonstrate that they possess not only the requisite skills and knowledge, but also the

requisite character. See Hawker v. N.Y., 170 U.S. 189, 192 (1898); State ex rel

Powell v. State Med. Examining Bd., 20 N.W. 238, 240 (Minn. 1884). 

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Amendment if it invokes a curriculum-based code of ethics as a pretext to punish a

student’s religious views and speech. See Ward, 667 F.3d at 735; Axson-Flynn, 356

F.3d at 1292-93. But that is an as-applied inquiry. Here, Keefe made no allegation,

and presented no evidence, that defendants’ reliance on the Nurses Association Code

of Ethics was a pretext for viewpoint, or any other kind of discrimination. 

B. If compliance with professional ethicalstandards is a permissible academic

requirement, then determinations of non-compliance will almost always be based at

least in part on a student’s speech. See, e.g., Oyama, 813 F.3d at 870 (“the University

could look to what Oyama said as an indication of what he would do once certified”)

(emphasis in original). That a graduate student’s unprofessional speech leads to

academic disadvantage does not “prohibit” that speech, or render it unprotected; the

university simply imposes an adverse consequence on the student for exercising his

right to speak at the wrong place and time, like the student who receives a failing

grade for submitting a paper on the wrong subject. 

A serious question raised by Keefe in this case is whether the First Amendment

protected his unprofessionalspeech fromacademic disadvantage because it wasmade

in on-line, off-campus Facebook postings. On appeal, Keefe framed this contention

categorically, arguing that a college student may not be punished for off-campus

speech unless it is speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment, such as

obscenity. We reject this categorical contention. A student may demonstrate an

unacceptable lack of professionalism off campus, as well as in the classroom, and by

speech as well as conduct. See Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 526 F. App’x 537, 545-

46 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 790 (2013); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816

N.W.2d 509, 521 (Minn. 2012). Therefore, college administrators and educators in

a professional school have discretion to require compliance with recognized standards

of the profession, both on and off campus, “so long as their actions are reasonably

related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484

U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 

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As the issue in Hazelwood was censorship of a school-sponsored campus

newspaper, the Court’s reference to “legitimate pedagogical concerns” was made in

the context of school-sponsored speech. But the concept has broader relevance to

student speech. The Hazelwood dissenters noted that an “educator may, under

Tinker, constitutionally ‘censor’ poor grammar, writing, or research because to

6

reward such expression would ‘materially disrupt’ the [student] newspaper’s

curricular purpose.” 484 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Likewise, because

compliance with the Nurses Association Code of Ethics is a legitimate part of the

Associate Degree Nursing Program’s curriculum, speech reflecting non-compliance

with that Code that is related to academic activities “materially disrupts” the

Program’s “legitimate pedagogical concerns.” See Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876 (“under

the Hazelwood framework, we find that ASU has a legitimate pedagogical concern

in teaching its students to comply with the ACA Code of Ethics”). 

As our sister circuits have recognized, a college or universitymay have an even

stronger interest in the content of its curriculum and imposing academic discipline

than did the high school at issue in Hazelwood. See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727,

733-34 (6th Cir. 2012); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875-76 (11th Cir.

2011); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S.

1169 (2006); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1286-90 (10th Cir. 2004);

Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 947-49 (9th Cir. 2002) (opinion of Graber, J.), cert.

denied, 538 U.S. 908 (2003). “When a university lays out a program’s curriculum or

A reference to the landmark school speech case, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 6

Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 504 (1969). This court, like other circuits, has held that

Tinker permits disciplining public school students for off-campus postings “where

it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach the school community and

cause a substantial disruption to the educational setting.” S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v.

Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2012), citing Kowalski v.

Berkeley Cnty. Schools, 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011), and Doninger v. Niehoff,

527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008).

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class’s requirementsfor all to see, it isthe rare day when a student can exercise a First

Amendment veto over them.” Ward, 667 F.3d at 734. 

C. In addition to urging an overbroad categoricalstandard, Keefe’s contention

is factually flawed in asserting that his offensive Facebook posts were “unrelated to

any course assignments or requirements.” The summary judgment record

conclusively established that the posts were directed at classmates, involved their

conduct in the Nursing Program, and included a physical threat related to their

medical studies -- “Im going to . . . give someone a hemopneumothorax.” Two

victims of Keefe’s tirades complained to instructor Kim Scott, one saying she could

not function in the same clinical space with Keefe. Keefe’s disrespectful and

threatening statements toward his colleagues had a direct impact on the students’

educational experience. They also had the potential to impact patient care. As Scott

testified, “when [students] are in the clinical setting taking care of patients, if we are

creating [a] situation where they are not obviously communicating and collaborating,

that can result in poor outcomes for the patients.” 

D. Keefe’s threats could have prompted a disciplinary proceeding. Instead,

CLC’s administrators concluded that the posts, combined with Keefe’s failure to

appreciate the seriousness of the problem when given an opportunity to respond,

reflected a lack of professionalism that warranted his removal from the Associate

Degree Nursing Program. That decision can of course be questioned, but the First

Amendment did not bar educator Frisch from making the determination that Keefe

was unable to meet the professional demands of being a nurse. Keefe argues that

defendants violated his First Amendment rights by failing to cite specific professional

standards that he violated. The district court expressly rejected this contention:

Part of the program is devoted to instilling in students the standards of

the nursing profession. The associate degree nursing program

incorporated nationally established nursing standards. Its ability to

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discipline students for “behavior unbecoming oftheNursing Profession”

or “transgression of professional boundaries” reflects the ability of the

Minnesota Board of Nursing to “deny, revoke, suspend, limit, or

condition the license and registration of any person to practice

professional, advanced practice registered, or practical nursing” for

“[e]ngaging in unprofessional conduct.” Greater specificity is not

required.

Order at 23 (statute and regulation citations omitted). We agree. Studentsin the CLC

Nursing Program consent in writing to be bound by the national Nursing Code of

Ethics, and the Program Handbook states that a violation of moral, ethical, or

professionalstandards may result in dismissal fromthe program. These standards are

necessarily quite general, but they are widely recognized and followed. 

“[F]oremost among a school’s speech is its selection and implementation of a

curriculum-- the lessons students need to understand and the best way to impart those

lessons -- and public schools have broad discretion in making these choices.” Ward,

667 F.3d at 732. The decision to dismiss Keefe occurred only after Frisch met with

Keefe and determined, not only that he had crossed the professional boundaries line,

but that he had no understanding of what he did or why it was wrong, and he

evidenced no remorse for his actions. The First Amendment did not bar educator

Frisch from making the determination that Keefe was unable to meet the professional

demands of being a nurse. See Oyama, 813 F.3d at 866-68; Keeton, 664 F.3d at 875. 

“Considerations of profound importance counsel restrained judicial review of the

substance of academic decisions.” Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,

225-26 (1985); see Keeton, 664 F.3d at 875-76, and cases cited. Courts should be

particularly cautious before interfering with the “degree requirements in the health

care field when the conferral of a degree places the school’s imprimatur upon the

student as qualified to pursue his chosen profession.” Doherty v. S. Coll. of

Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989). 

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For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

Defendants on Keefe’s First Amendment claims. 

III. Due Process Issues

A. Keefe argues that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process when they removed him from the Associate Degree Nursing Program. 

He first argues that his removal from the Nursing Program was arbitrary and

capricious. This is a substantive due process claim seeking federal court review of

the merits of defendants’ removal decision. The claim is without merit. 

In two decisions, the Supreme Court has “assumed, without deciding, that

federal courts can review an academic decision of a public educational institution

under a substantive due process standard.” Ewing, 474 U.S. at 222, citing Horowitz,

435 U.S. at 91-92. In Horowitz, the Court agreed with the district court that “no

showing of arbitrariness or capriciousness has been made,” noting that “[c]ourts are

particularly ill-equipped to evaluate academic performance.” 435 U.S. at 92. In

Ewing, the Court was even more deferential to educators, rejecting the dismissed

student’s substantive due process claim because “his dismissal from the [university]

program rested on an academic judgment that is not beyond the pale of reasoned

academic decision-making.” 474 U.S. at 227-28. Following the Supreme Court’s

lead, we have repeatedly assumed without deciding that an academic dismissal may

be challenged on substantive due process grounds but upheld the summary rejection

of those claims, applying the Supreme Court’s deferential standard. See Monroe v.

Ark. State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594-97 (8th Cir. 2007); Richmond v. Fowlkes, 228

F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2000); Schuler v. Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 510, 515-16 (8th

Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987). 

In this case, we doubt there is a cause of action because, though Keefe was

removed from the Nursing Program, he was allowed to remain at CLC and transfer

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his credits to another academic program. But even if a substantive due process claim

is cognizable in these circumstances, there is no violation of substantive due process

unless misconduct of government officials that violates a fundamental right is “so

egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary

conscience” of federal judges. Cnty. of Sacremento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8

(1998) (quotation omitted). 

In our view, it is clear that defendants’ decision to remove Keefe from the

Nursing Program “rested on an academic judgment that is not beyond the pale of

reasoned academic decision-making.” Defendants’ action in quietly removing Keefe

from Central Lakes’ Nursing Program for behavior he admitted was “unethical and

unprofessional,” while allowing him to remain in school, was far from conscience

shocking. Cf. Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 426 n.8 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 966 (1999). “When judges are asked to review the substance of a

genuinely academic decision . . . they should show great respect for the faculty’s

professional judgement.” Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225. We affirm the dismissal of

Keefe’s substantive due process claim.

B. Keefe further argues that Defendants violated his right to procedural due

process, a more difficult issue. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975), the

Supreme Court held that even a short disciplinary suspension requiresthat the student

“be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an

explanation ofthe evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side

of the story.” In Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 80-82, a student was dismissed from medical

school following extensive review by a Council on Evaluation in accordance with

established university procedures that did not include a pre-dismissal hearing. The

Supreme Court granted certiorari to review our decision that the dismissal was

“effected without the hearing required by the fourteenth amendment.” The student

argued that procedural due process also required “the fundamental safeguards of

representation by counsel, confrontation, and cross examination of witnesses.” Id.

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at 86 n.2. AllJustices agreed that the university’s elaborate procedures had complied

with the procedural requirements of Goss. The Court further noted that “far less

stringent procedural requirements” apply to an “academic” dismissal. Id. at 86. This

dicta addressed a reality that did not affect the Court’s procedural due process

decision in Horowitz -- that academic dismissals, though accompanied by extensive

procedural safeguards, often do not include a pre-dismissal face-to-face hearing

between the student and academic decision-makers. 

In this case, Keefe argues that he was removed from the Nursing Program for

disciplinary reasons. Defendants respond, and the district court agreed, that the

removal is properly characterized as academic, and therefore that “less stringent

procedural requirements” apply -- namely, that due process was satisfied because

CLC “fully informed [Keefe] of the faculty’s dissatisfaction” and the ultimate

academic decision was “careful and deliberate.” Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 85; see

Monroe, 495 F.3d at 595. In our view, while the distinction is important, as in

Horowitz it has no bearing on whether Keefe was afforded procedural due process. 

He was removed from the Program for conduct that could have been the subject of

a disciplinary proceeding, the kind of inquiry where “requiring effective notice and

informal hearing permitting the student to give his version of the events will provide

a meaningful hedge against erroneous action.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 583; see

Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 88-89. Thus, there is merit in Keefe’s contention that

procedural due process required more than the “careful and deliberate” decisionmaking Horowitz mandates for a strictly academic decision. However, Defendants

afforded him a pre-removal, informal, face-to-face hearing that included an

opportunity to respond. Whether that hearing led to an academic or a disciplinary

removal is procedurally irrelevant. 

“Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the

particular situation demands.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)

(quotation omitted). When conduct that leads to an adverse academic decision is of

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a disciplinary nature, due process may require the procedural protections of Goss v.

Lopez in determining whether the student was guilty of the misconduct in question. 

Goss involved ten-day suspensions of public high schoolstudents. TheCourt’s focus

was necessarily on determining what pre-suspension process was due. 419 U.S. at

581 n.10. But where a public school provides additional, post-removal procedures,

as here, the due process requisites for the pre-removal hearing “can vary, depending

upon . . . the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985) (quotation omitted). Where post-removal

proceedings are available, a timely pre-removal meeting that affords the student an

opportunity to be heard “serve[s] as the initial check against mistaken decisions that

Loudermill requires.” Sutton v. Bailey, 702 F.3d 444, 448 (8th Cir. 2012).

Viewed from this perspective, we conclude that Keefe, like the student in

Horowitz, was “awarded at least as much due process as the Fourteenth Amendment

requires.” 435 U.S. at 85. Even if this was a purely disciplinary decision, as Keefe

contends, he was entitled to “oral or written notice of the charges against him, an

explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the

story.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546. Keefe complainsthat Frisch did not inform him

of her concerns before the meeting and did not let him read the posts at the meeting. 

But the constitutional requirement of procedural due process does not turn on such

formalities. See Larson v. City of Fergus Falls, 229 F.3d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 2000). 

Due process does not require “a delay between the ‘notice’ and the ‘opportunity to

respond.’” Sutton, 702 F.3d at 448 (quotation omitted). Here, as in Sutton, Frisch

met with Keefe, informed him that there were concerns regarding his Facebook, read

from the posts of greatest concern, explained that his posts implicated the

professionalismand professional boundary requirements ofthe Nursing Program, and

gave him an opportunity to respond. 

What is important is that Keefe admitted for summary judgment purposes that

he authored the offensive posts -- meaning there were no material fact disputes-- and

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was given an opportunity to respond -- which provided the predicate for Frisch’s

academic decision to dismiss himfromthe Program. Moreover, the notion that Keefe

had inadequate notice of what the meeting would concern does not withstand

scrutiny. After Keefe sent Frisch an email asking for more detail about the meeting,

Frisch responded that “the topic of professional boundary is central to the role of the

nurse and I am sure that you appreciate the delicacy of the topic.” Keefe then made

known to his clinical classmates there would be “hell to pay for whoever complained

about me.” When Frisch called Keefe and moved the meeting up one day, so that he

would not be in his next clinical class with a student concerned about this threat,

Keefe again asked what the meeting was about. Frisch again said she would prefer

to discuss it in person but that due process would be followed. This was adequate

informal notice.

Keefe also complains that he was not informed of the specific academic rules

or standards the CLC administrators believed he had violated. This contention is

factuallywithout merit. Frisch explained at the meeting that his posts raised concerns

about professionalism and professional boundaries that were clearly laid out in the

student handbook, with cross-references to the Nurses’ Code of Ethics -- codes and

rules Keefe acknowledged receiving. Frisch knew that Keefe was entitled to appeal

her initial decision; indeed, she advised Keefe of his appeal rights at the meeting. 

Frisch could reasonably assume that an appeal would include complete disclosure of

the Facebook posts, if that became important to a procedurally adequate appeal

process. See Sutton, 702 F.3d at 449. In these circumstances, the meeting at which

Frisch advised Keefe there were concerns regarding specific Facebook posts that

implicated professionalism and professional boundary requirements of the Nursing

Program, and gave him an opportunity to respond, provided Keefe the “initial [preremoval] check against mistaken decisions” that due process requires. Loudermill,

470 U.S. at 545. 

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After the meeting, Keefe filed an appeal in which he admitted “unethical and

unprofessional behavior” without claiming he did not know the standards he had

violated. On appeal, Keefe argues only that the pre-removal meeting with Frisch and

Adams afforded him procedurally inadequate due process. Therefore, he failed to

preserve any separate due process claim that his post-removal appeal to Vice

President McCalla was procedurally inadequate. See Sutton, 702 F.3d at 449. 

Moreover, a claim of insufficient appeal procedures was foreclosed when Keefe

admitted during the appeal that Frisch had properly found him guilty of “unethical

and unprofessional behavior.” See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972)

(“If it is determined that petitioner admitted parole violations to the Parole Board . . .

and if those violations are found to be reasonable grounds for revoking parole under

state standards, that would end the [procedural due process] matter.”).

Viewing the summary judgment record as a whole, we conclude that Keefe was

provided sufficient notice of the faculty’s dissatisfaction, an explanation of why his

behavior fell short of the professionalism requirements of the Program, an

opportunity to respond to the initial decision-maker, and an opportunity to appeal her

adverse decision. Nothing in the record suggests that Keefe’s removal from the

Nursing Program was not a careful and deliberate, genuinely academic decision.

Numerous prior decisions confirm that due process requires no more. See, e.g., Fenje

v. Feld, 398 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2005) (student dismissed from anesthesiology

residency program for failing to disclose prior program dismissal after being “given

the opportunity to respond and state his position”); Ku v. Tenn., 322 F.3d 431, 437

(6th Cir.) (student “was given -- and he took -- every opportunity to appeal the

[academic] decision to the highest authorities at the College”), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

880 (2003); Richmond, 228 F.3d at 856-57 (same); Schuler, 788 F.2d at 514 (student

had “prior notice offaculty dissatisfaction” and informal hearing before departmental

grievance committee). 

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Finally, we reject Keefe’s contention that “CLC’s policies create an

expectation” that he was entitled to a formal hearing process. If true, that expectation

is an issue of state law, not of federal constitutional due process. See Horowitz, 435

U.S. at 92 n.8; Schuler, 788 F.2d at 516. Even if CLC’s policies required a formal,

contested case hearing under state law, “All that Goss required was an ‘informal giveand-take’ between the student and the administrative body dismissing himthat would,

at least, give the student the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what

he deems the proper context.” Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 85-86 (quotation omitted).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Because we reject Keefe’s

constitutional claims on the merits, we need not address Defendants’ alternative claim

that they are entitled to a qualified immunity defense. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

This case highlights the evolving nature of students’ First Amendment

protection for speech on social media. While I disagree with the court’s determination that Keefe was afforded procedural due process, I would affirm the district court

on that issue because defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. However,

because I think there is a genuine issue of material fact asto whether the school could

constitutionally regulate Keefe’s off-campus, non-academic speech, I would reverse

the district court’s grant ofsummary judgment in favor of defendants on Keefe’s First

Amendment claim.

I. Due Process Claim

A. Academic v. Disciplinary Dismissals

The court declines to characterize Keefe’s dismissal as either academic or

disciplinary, explaining that the distinction is procedurally irrelevant because Keefe

received due process under either standard. I disagree. The Supreme Court has

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explained that “[t]here is a clear dichotomy between a student’s due process rights in

disciplinary dismissals and in academic dismissals.” Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo.

v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 87 n.4 (1978) (quoting Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.3d

448, 450 (5th Cir. 1976)). The Due Process Clause imposes “less stringent

procedural requirements in the case of an academic dismissal,” id. at 86, recognizing

that judges are ill-equipped to second-guess the academic judgment of school

administrators.

But this hands-off approach is appropriate only when the school’s decision is,

in fact, academic. If, as the administrators contend, the reason for the dismissal was

“the violation by a student of valid rules of conduct”—here, the College’s Code of

Conduct—the Supreme Court has said the dismissal is properly characterized as

disciplinary, not academic. Id. at 86–90 (characterizing sanctions for “disruptive or

insubordinate behavior” as disciplinary); see also Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 495

F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that a dismissal for “alleged, but not

conceded drug use, might constitute a disciplinary dismissal”); Pugel v. Bd. of Trs.

of Univ. of Ill., 378 F.3d 659, 663–64 & n.4 (7th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases

analyzing dismissals for academic dishonesty as disciplinary and assuming the same);

Henson v. Honor Comm. of U. Va., 719 F.2d 69, 73–74 (4th Cir. 1983) (analyzing

investigation of law student for alleged Honor Code violations as disciplinary). Both

Frisch and the College’s Dean of Students, Beth Adams, characterized a prior

incident involving a verbal threat by another student against an instructor as nonacademic. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90.

The cases where we have characterized a dismissal as academic illustrate why

Keefe’s dismissal was not. The students in those cases were dismissed based at least

in part on issues related to the school’s curriculum, like failing to complete

coursework, Monroe, 495 F.3d at 592–93; failing exams, lack of preparation, and

absenteeism, Richmond v. Fowlkes, 228 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2000); or cheating

on an exam and then lying about it, Corso v. Creighton Univ., 731 F.2d 529, 532 (8th

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Cir. 1984). These cases are consistent with Horowitz, which described an academic

dismissal as one based on “failure to attain a standard ofscholarship.” Horowitz, 435

U.S. at 87 n.4 (quoting Mahavongsanan, 529 F.2d at 449–50). Keefe was dismissed

as a result of a conflict with classmates on Facebook. Case law does not support

classifying as “academic” dismissals based on off-campus speech that merely

happened to be about the school or its students. 

Furthermore, administrators treated Keefe’s dismissal like a disciplinary one:

They dismissed him immediately after learning of his Facebook posts, with no

attempt to work with him to improve his conduct. Academic dismissals receive less

stringent procedural protections in part because they involve an educational process

that is “not by nature adversary.” Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90. In Horowitz, the

decision to expel a medical student “rested on the academic judgment of school

officials that she did not have the necessary clinical ability to perform adequately as

a medical doctor and was making insufficient progress toward that goal,” based on

the fact that faculty had for two years expressed dissatisfaction with her clinical

performance. Id. at 89–90. In contrast, Frisch reported that she was unaware of any

prior professionalism problems involving Keefe. There is nothing in the record to

suggest he had been told to improve his relations with his classmates or was

reprimanded for previous behavior that his instructors thought unbecoming of a

nurse. Rather than a cooperative, non-adversarial effort to improve Keefe’s

professionalism that proved unsuccessful over time, the dismissal was an immediate

imposition of discipline for misbehavior.

The College’s Code of Conduct sets forth such ostensibly academic goals as

“Human Flourishing, Nursing Judgment, Professional Identity, and Spirit ofInquiry.” 

It goes on to state that the College aims to instill in its graduates qualities like

“evidence-based practice, life-long learning, service learning/civic engagement,

caring, advocacy, excellence, and safe quality care for diverse patients within a family

and community context.” The Code of Conduct also requires students to uphold the

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American Nurses Association Code of Ethics, which sets forth similar requirements.

These goals are admirable, and describe commendable traits for a person entering the

nursing profession. Yet with such general requirements of character, excellence, and

virtue, it is difficult to imagine any type of misconduct that would not, in some way,

violate one or more of these requirements. The court’s holding allows the school to

treat any action it deems violative of the Code of Conduct as an academic problem

rather than a disciplinary problem. This interpretation collapses the distinction

between academic and disciplinary dismissals, and I am not inclined to signal the end

of the latter as a meaningful category.

7

No doubt Keefe’s attitudes toward his classmates left something to be desired. 

And no doubt all educational institutions, perhaps professional degree programs in

particular, want to make sure that their future alumni treat their colleagues, clients,

and the general public with respect. But a public college cannot transform a

punishment for “disruptive orinsubordinate behavior,” Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90, into

an academic decision simply by declaring it an academic goal of the school to

cultivate civility in its students. I would categorize Keefe’s dismissal disciplinary,

rather than academic, and therefore turn to the question of whether Keefe received

sufficient process throughout his disciplinary expulsion proceedings.

To be sure, I do not suggest that a dismissal must be based on poor grades or 7

other objective indicia ofsubpar scholarship in order to qualify as “academic.” As the

Supreme Court has noted, “[p]ersonal hygiene and timeliness may be as important

. . . in a school’s determination of whether a student will make a good medical doctor

as the student’s ability to take a case history or diagnose an illness.” Horowitz, 435

U.S. at 91 n.6. The concept of “professionalism” as a program requirement muddies

the distinction between academic and disciplinary decisions. See, e.g., Al-Dabagh

v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 777 F.3d 355, 359–60 (6th Cir. 2015); Ku v. Tenn., 322

F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2003); Hennessy v. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 250–51

(1st Cir. 1999). Therefore, the basis for a school’s dismissal must have some

connection to the qualities traditionally regarded as scholastic—not simply moral—

before the laxer protections afforded to academic dismissals will apply. 

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B. Process Required for Disciplinary Dismissal

In Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that even a short disciplinary

suspension requires that the student “be given oral or written notice of the charges

against himand, if he deniesthem, an explanation ofthe evidence the authorities have

and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). 

Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to Keefe—as we must on an appeal

from a grant of summary judgment against him—I think the notice he received was

inadequate.

Timely and clear notice is a fundamental guarantee of the Due Process Clause,

which “requiresthatsome kind of prior notice be given.” Navato v. Sletten, 560 F.2d

340, 345 (8th Cir. 1977). Even in the context of academic dismissals, which have less

stringent procedural requirements than disciplinary dismissals, a student must have

“prior notice of faculty dissatisfaction with his or her performance and of the

possibility of dismissal.” Schuler v. Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 510, 514 (8th Cir.

1986). Consistent with this principle, the College’s Code of Conduct statesthat even

for informal hearings, “[p]rior to th[e] meeting, the student shall be given written

notice of the specific complaint against him/her and the nature of the evidence

available to support the complaint and provided with a copy of the code of conduct.”

(emphasis added.) Formal hearings carry with them even more extensive requirements.

Keefe did not receive sufficient prior notice. He was not told the purpose of

his meeting with Frisch prior to the time of meeting, much less the evidence against

him. The decision to dismiss him was made at the meeting itself—if not before—without giving him time to review the posts and formulate a considered

defense. Frisch did not allow Keefe to read copies of the offending Facebook posts

at the meeting. And McCalla conceded that he provided Keefe with printed copies

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of the Facebook posts only after Keefe had appealed his dismissal. Since those

present at the initial disciplinary meeting disagree as to which posts were discussed

there, it is possible that Keefe went through the entire disciplinary process without

8

knowing exactly which Facebook posts led to his dismissal. Finally, the undisputed

facts do not establish that anyone told Keefe which specific rule or Code provision

he allegedly violated.

It is true that in Goss the Supreme Court stated that “[t]here need be no delay

between the time ‘notice’ is given and the time of the hearing.” 419 U.S. at 582. But,

it also cautioned that it was addressing itself “solely to the short suspension, not

exceeding 10 days” and that “the timing and content of the notice and the nature of

the hearing will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests

involved.” Id. at 579, 584. It went on to elaborate that “[l]onger suspensions or

expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more

formal procedures.” Id. at 584. Here, Keefe faced expulsion from the nursing

program, and he was entitled to adequate notice before the hearing unless the school 9

Indeed, the parties dispute whether Frisch brought up the post she later

8

testified she was “most disturbed by” during the meeting—the post referencing a

hemopneumothorax.

The court cites Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 9

545 (1985), and Sutton v. Bailey, 702 F.3d 444, 448 (8th Cir. 2012), for the

proposition that Goss’s procedural protections may be required in the event of “an

academic decision of a disciplinary nature,” but that the extent of the pre-dismissal

procedure required depends on whether additional, post-dismissal procedure is

provided. However, Loudermill and Sutton do not address due process in the context

of school disciplinary action, and do not abrogate the “clear dichotomy between a

student’s due process rights in disciplinary dismissals and in academic dismissals,”

Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 87 n.4 (quoting Mahavongsanan, 529 F.2d at 450)—a

distinction that made a significant difference in the process available to Keefe. 

Specifically, Keefe was not afforded a formal appeal hearing precisely because the

school deemed his dismissal “academic” rather than “disciplinary.” Loudermill and

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can provide good reasons why that would have been inadvisable. See Mathews v. 10

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that “the fiscal and administrative

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail” must

be considered in determining what due process requires).

These flaws in the disciplinary process were not rendered harmless by Keefe’s

admission on appeal that he wrote at least some of the Facebook posts in question and

concession that they were unprofessional. Keefe asserts he only knew about the

administration’s concerns with two of his posts at the time he appealed; he may well

have declined to make similar concessions with respect to any other posts on which

Frisch based her decision. Also, the fact that Keefe admitted wrongdoing on appeal

does not necessarily mean he would have done the same at the initial meeting, had he

been given adequate notice and time to deliberate. With sufficient opportunity to

prepare, he might have presented evidence in support of another defense: for

example, that it was clear from the context that his Facebook posts were meant to be

humorous, that other students had made similar posts without being disciplined, or

that the printouts used by Frisch and McCalla did not accurately reflect what he had

written. But more fundamentally, the idea that the problems with the constitutionally

inadequate process Keefe received are excusable simply because it happened to arrive

Sutton do not affect the “rudimentary procedures” mandated by Goss. Goss, 419 U.S.

at 584. Defendants were obligated to provide Keefe with pre-removal notice and

opportunity to be heard. Here, in a case involving a punishment more severe than the

suspensions in Goss, they failed to provide that notice. 

The only reasons Frisch gave for not telling Keefe the purpose of the meeting

10

beforehand were that she had never done so with other students—which, of course,

simply raises the question of why not—and that she was concerned that Keefe would

change his Facebook page before the meeting. Yet Frisch had already received

printed copies of the posts from Scott (who got them from one of the students who

complained about Keefe) and accessed the Facebook page to verify that the posts did

in fact exist. 

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at the correct result mistakes the right that the Due Process Clause protects. “[T]he

right to procedural due process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon

the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions . . . .” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,

266 (1978). It is the fairness of the process that was deficient here, even if the

substantive outcome of the process was correct.

C. Qualified Immunity

Nevertheless, I would hold that the administrators are entitled to qualified

immunity on Keefe’s due process claim, and are thus shielded from Keefe’s claim to

money damages, though not his request for an injunction. See Burnham v. Ianni, 119

F.3d 668, 673 n.7 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A government official “is entitled to

qualified immunity unless (1) the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, establishes a violation of a federal constitutional orstatutory right,

and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Robinson v.

Payton, 791 F.3d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 2015). In order to be “clearly established,” a

right’s contours must have been “sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in

the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff v.

Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014). While there need not be a prior case finding

a constitutional or statutory violation on identical facts in order for the right to be

clearly established, Williams v. Jackson, 600 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir. 2010), the

Supreme Court has enjoined us not to “define clearly established law at a high level

of generality,” but rather to ask whether “existing precedent . . . placed the statutory

or constitutional question beyond debate,” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,563 U.S. 731, 741–42

(2011).

What precludes a finding that the administrators violated clearly established

due process rights is the dearth of prior decisions classifying expulsions of

professional students as academic or disciplinary, and the lack of uniformity in the

decisions that do exist. As the preceding discussion and the cases cited therein

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suggest, student dismissals are not self-categorizing, and there was no controlling

authority in this jurisdiction or a “consensus of cases of persuasive authority” in

others on which the administrators could have relied to determine whether they

should be held to the standards of disciplinary, as opposed to academic, dismissals. 

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999). “Officials are not liable for bad guesses

in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Scott v. Baldwin, 720

F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 712 (8th Cir.

2004)).

Accordingly, I would hold that the administrators are not entitled to summary

judgment on the merits of Keefe’s due process claim, but that they are entitled to

summary judgment on their qualified immunity defense. 

II. First Amendment Claim

Colleges and universities are free to encourage professionalism by adopting

codes of conduct that impose restrictions on student speech, provided those

restrictions do not run afoul of the First Amendment. “[T]he precedents of [the

Supreme] Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need

for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college

campuses than in the community at large.” Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180

(1972); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,

828–30 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1981); Papish v. Bd. of

Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 669–70 (1973) (per curiam). 

Restrictions on student speech do not violate the First Amendment when

educators exercise “editorial control over the style and content ofstudent speech” that

is “school-sponsored,” provided “their actions are reasonably related to legitimate

pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273

(1988). Here, Keefe’s speech was off-campus, was not school-sponsored, and cannot 

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be reasonably attributed to the school. Hazelwood’s “reasonably related to 11

legitimate pedagogical concerns” test istherefore inapplicable in this case. See Morse

v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (holding that Hazelwood “does not control

this case because no one would reasonably believe that [a student’s] banner bore the

school’s imprimatur”); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 882 (11th Cir.

2011) (Pryor, J., concurring) (“Hazelwood does not allow retaliation against

disfavored speech that occurs outside the classroom.”); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d

359, 408–09 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“Like all exceptions to the First Amendment’s

protections, the Hazelwood exception should be construed narrowly.”); Saxe v. State

Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.) (“Hazelwood’s

permissive ‘legitimate pedagogical concern’ test governs only when a student’s

school-sponsored speech could reasonably be viewed as speech of the school

itself[.]”).

However, even when speech is not school-sponsored orreasonably attributable

to the school, institutions may regulate some student speech that occursin class or on

campus without violating the First Amendment. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 405

(distinguishing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)) (“Had

Fraser delivered the same [offensively lewd and indecent] speech in a public forum

outside the school context, he would have been protected.”); Oyama, 813 F.3d at 872

The fact that Keefe was a college student also cautions against too lenient an 11

interpretation of his First Amendment protections. Restrictions permissible in

secondary schools may be impermissible at post-secondary institutions because

“[f]ew college students are minors, and colleges are traditionally places of virtually

unlimited free expression.” Bystrom ex rel. Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d

747, 750 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 (reserving question

of whether greater deference is appropriate at the college and university level);

Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 871–72 (9th Cir. 2015); McCauley v. Univ.

of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 242, 242–47 (3d Cir. 2010); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d

342, 346 n.5, 352 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of

Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989). 

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(permitting denial of student’s application “based . . . only upon statements [the

student] made in the context ofthe certification program—in the classroom, in written

assignments, and directly to the instructors responsible for evaluating his suitability

for teaching”).12

The court relies heavily on the school’s ability to impose a code of ethics as an

“academic” requirement, and explains that, “because compliance with the Nurses

Association Code of Ethics is a legitimate part of the Associate Nursing Program’s

curriculum, speech reflecting non-compliance with that Code that is related to

academic activities ‘materially disrupts’ the Program’s ‘legitimate pedagogical

concerns.’” Supra at 12 (citing Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876, for reliance on Hazelwood’s

framework). However, we are not faced with a situation where the school is 13

punishing a student’s failure to abide by rules of conduct akin to a professor’s

marking down a student for what he says as part of an academic assignment. Cf.

Healy, 408 U.S. at 191–94 (permitting college to withhold recognition from groups

unwilling “to be bound by reasonable school rules governing conduct”); C.H. ex rel.

Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining that

because a classroom can be thought of as a government-owned forum, “if a student

is asked to solve a problem in mathematics or to write an essay on a great American

poet, the student clearly does not have a right to speak or write about the Bible

instead”). Keefe’s Facebook posts were not made as part of fulfilling a program

requirement and did not express an intention to break specific curricular rules. See

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Oyama wasissued after this appeal wastaken. 12

While I agree Keefe could have been disciplined for speech that qualified as 13

a “true threat” or a “substantial disruption,” the district court made no findings with

respect to whether Keefe’s Facebook posts qualified for these categorical exceptions

to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)

(per curiam) (true threat); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.

504, 514 (1969) (substantial disruption of school activities or invasion of the rights

of others). 

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Keeton, 664 F.3d at 868–71, 873–75 (permitting university to require student to

complete remediation plan before participating in clinical practicumbecause she told

classmates and professors she planned to violate practicum rules); Axson-Flynn v.

Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding Hazelwood’s framework

“applicable in a university setting for speech that occurs in a classroom as part of a

class curriculum.” (emphasis added)); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 947–52 (9th Cir.

2002) (opinion of Graber, J.) (concluding in an opinion not joined by other panel

members that Hazelwood permits an educator to “require that a student comply with

the terms of an academic assignment” while acknowledging that courts “have held

that Hazelwood deference does not apply” to extracurricular activities). Furthermore,

Oyama affirmatively rejects the notion that students can be disciplined based on

speech unrelated to the fulfillment of a curricular requirement. See Oyama, 813 F.3d

at 872 (emphasizing the fact that “[t]here [was] no evidence that the University relied

upon any statements Oyama may have made outside [the context of his certification

program] or communicated to a broader audience” in denying his student teaching

application).

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Morse and Fraser foreclose the court’s

contention that Keefe’s posts are equivalent to curricular speech simply because they

were directed at classmates and involved their conduct in the Nursing Program. 

Fraser involved a speech by a high school student nominating a fellow student for

student elective office, during which he “referred to his candidate in terms of an

elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78. 

Although this speech was clearly directed at classmates and school-related, the

Supreme Court went out of its way in Morse to underscore that Fraser’s speech would

have been protected if it had been delivered outside of school. Morse, 551 U.S. at

405; see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925–33

(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that First Amendment barred schoolfrompunishing

student for vulgar MySpace post concerning principal because it was off-campus

speech); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 211–19

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(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (same). Similarly, Keefe’s mere use of a word we associate

with medical training does not make his post equivalent to curricular speech—such

a finding would sweep far too broadly. 

The College and the district court felt that Keefe’s Facebook posts constituted

“behavior unbecoming of the profession and transgression of professional boundaries,” in violation of the Code of Conduct. Keefe’s statements may indeed violate

the administrators’ interpretation of certain provisions of the College’s professionalism Code, but that does not answer the question of whether that interpretation is

consistent with the First Amendment. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537,

2544 (2012) (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470

(2010)) (The Supreme Court “has rejected as ‘startling and dangerous’ a

‘free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc balancing

of relative social costs and benefits.’”) (alteration in original). Quite simply, Code

requirements that nurses treat others with “respect and compassion” and avoid “any

and all forms of prejudicial actions” or “disregard for the effect of one’s actions on

others” could easily be used to restrict protected speech. See, e.g., McCauley, 618

F.3d at 247–52 (concluding that provisions of university’s Code of Conduct that

prohibited “conduct which causes emotional distress” and “offensive signs” were

unconstitutionally overbroad); DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 317–20 (3d

Cir. 2008) (public university’s policy that sought to forbid “gender-motivated”

conduct that had the purpose of “creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

environment” held unconstitutional); Papish, 410 U.S. at 667–70 & n.2 (holding that

university violated First Amendment by expelling student for printing indecent

newspaper despite student code prohibiting “indecent conduct or speech”). In

addition, when a college applies a generalized Code of Conduct to speech after the

fact, I question whether studentslike Keefe are provided sufficient notice of what the

Code prohibited and what it allowed. Cf. Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist.

R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 723–24 (8th Cir. 1998).

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A number of long-standing First Amendment doctrines leave public schools

and universities ample room to discipline students based on what they say on campus

or in academic assignments. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 422–23 (Alito, J., concurring)

(listing these doctrines). The majority of the cases relied on by the court involve

14

discipline of this sort. See Oyama, 813 F.3d at 872; Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727,

733 (6th Cir. 2012); Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876. But see Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816

N.W.2d 509, 521 (Minn. 2012). But these traditional exceptions do not apply to 15

off-campus speech unrelated to academic assignments, like Keefe’s Facebook posts. 

See Bystrom, 822 F.2d at 750 (explaining that in comparison with regulating speech

on school grounds, the burden to justify restrictions on off-campus speech “would be

much greater, perhaps even insurmountable”).

Based on the record before us, I think that summary judgment was improperly

granted to the administrators on Keefe’s First Amendment claim. Genuine issues of

The votes of Justices Alito and Kennedy were necessary to the majority

14

opinion and expressly conditioned on the understanding of the majority opinion laid

out in Justice Alito’s concurrence, so the concurrence is controlling. See Marks v.

United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that when “no single rationale

explaining the result [of a case] enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the

Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the

judgments on the narrowest grounds’”) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169

n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). 

While Tatro is factually similar to this case in some ways, I question whether 15

it is consistent with binding Supreme Court precedent. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida

Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666–67 (2015) (“[A] history and tradition of regulation are

importantfactors in determining whether to recognize ‘new categories of unprotected

speech.’”) (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Assn., 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011)); Reed

v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229 (2015) (rejecting notion that more

permissive First Amendment standard was justified by state’s interest in the

“regulation of professional conduct”) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438

(1963)).

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materialfactremain concerning whether the administrators could permissibly restrict

the speech at issue in this case in the manner that they did. 

______________________________

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