Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-02392/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-02392-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Beard
Respondent
Bruce Joseph Clemmons
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE JOSEPH CLEMMONS,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-02392-HSG (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Re: Dkt. No. 18

Petitioner, a pro se prisoner, filed this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition as untimely. Petitioner has filed an 

opposition, and respondent has filed a reply. 

BACKGROUND

On May 28, 2009, in Monterey County Superior Court, petitioner pleaded no contest to 

rape of a victim incapable of giving consent, and admitted one prior strike conviction. Motion to 

Dismiss (“MTD”) Ex. A. On December 31, 2009, the trial court sentenced petitioner to twelve 

years in prison. MTD Ex. B. Petitioner did not appeal. Petitioner filed multiple habeas petitions 

in the state courts, all of which were denied. MTD Exs. C-G.

Petitioner then filed this action, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The petition has a 

signature date of May, 15 2014 and was stamped “filed” at the Court on May 23, 2014. As a pro 

se prisoner, petitioner receives the benefit of the prisoner mailbox rule, which deems most 

documents filed when the prisoner gives them to prison officials to mail to the court. See Stillman 

Case 4:14-cv-02392-HSG Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court will assume he gave the petition to 

prison officials for mailing on the date he signed it, i.e., May 15, 2014, and deem the federal 

petition filed as of that date. 

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) became law on 

April 24, 1996, and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of 

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state 

convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the 

judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct 

review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was 

removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and 

made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during 

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending is 

excluded from the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2).

The one-year period generally will run from “the date on which the judgment became final 

by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). If a petitioner could have sought review by the state court of appeals or the state 

supreme court, but did not, the limitation period will begin running against him the day after the 

date on which the time to seek such review expired. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653-54 

(2012). Here, petitionerʼs conviction became final on March 1, 2010, sixty days after his 

sentencing on December 31, 2009. See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(because California prisoner did not appeal his conviction, process of direct review became final 

60 days after conviction); Cal. Rule of Court 8.104(a)(1). Thus, the limitation period began 

running March 2, 2010, giving petitioner until March 1, 2011 to file his federal habeas petition. 

See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitionerʼs instant petition, filed 

on May 15, 2014, is therefore untimely, absent tolling. 

Case 4:14-cv-02392-HSG Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The one-year limitations period is tolled for the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitionerʼs first state habeas petition 

after the conviction became final was filed in Monterey County Superior Court on August 25, 

2011, more than a year after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Petitioner will not receive 

statutory tolling for this state habeas petition or for his later state petitions, as they were all filed 

after the expiration of the statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 

(9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that 

has ended before the state petition was filed,” even if the state petition was timely filed). 

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling in appropriate 

circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). “[A] petitioner is entitled to 

equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioner does not argue he was prevented from 

filing his petition on time. Nor is there anything in the record to support such a finding.

Petitioner here acknowledges that his habeas corpus petition is untimely, and asserts that 

he meets the actual innocence exception to the statute of limitations. Opp’n at 1. A showing of 

actual innocence can provide a gateway to federal habeas review of a petition filed after AEDPA’s 

statute of limitation expired. Mcquiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931-32 (2013). The actual 

innocence standard is set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). See McQuiggin, 13 S. Ct. 

at 1928. In Schlup, the Supreme Court held that a claim of actual innocence “requires petitioner to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence —

that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Further, “the petitioner must show that it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new 

evidence.” Id. at 327. Under Schlup, a petitioner must establish his factual innocence of the 

crime, and not mere legal insufficiency. Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

Case 4:14-cv-02392-HSG Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The Supreme Court has stressed that this exception is limited to “certain exceptional cases 

involving a compelling claim of actual innocence.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 522 (2006). 

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has noted that, because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually 

every case the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998). 

In support of his actual innocence claim, petitioner contends that the victim was in fact 

capable of giving consent, and that his trial counsel should have hired an adult mental health 

expert to test the victimʼs ability to give consent. Petition at 6B; Opp’n. at 2. At the time of the 

alleged assault, the victim, the 27-year-old niece of petitionerʼs now-wife, was living with them 

due to her mental incapacity. Reply Ex. 1 at 19; Petition Ex. C at C4. The prosecutionʼs child 

psychologist found she had the mental capacity of a ten-year-old child or younger. Reply Ex. 1 at 

9. Petitioner claims that the victim was mentally capable of giving consent, and his defense 

counsel should have obtained an adult psychologist to counter the prosecutionʼs expert. Petition at 

6B; Opp’n. at 2. Petitioner refers to several letters sent to the court by his now-wife and her 

family which allude to the victimʼs purported sexual past. Id.

Petitionerʼs allegations regarding ineffective counsel do not rise to the high level required 

to state a claim of actual innocence. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328 (noting the need to present 

“evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after 

the trial”). Here, petitioner has not presented new credible evidence. He simply claims his trial 

counsel was ineffective, a claim of legal rather than factual innocence. Furthermore, the letters 

from petitionerʼs wife and wife’s family existed and were known to petitioner at the time he 

entered his plea, and thus are not new evidence. See Petition Ex. C. In any event, the letters are 

unsworn statements from family members who do not purport to possess mental health expertise. 

Petitioner only speculates as to what a psychologist would determine regarding the victim’s ability 

to consent. Thus, petitioner has not presented new evidence or shown that no reasonable juror 

would have convicted him had counsel presented an adult psychologist.

Case 4:14-cv-02392-HSG Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition as untimely is GRANTED. 

2. Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

6/10/2015

Case 4:14-cv-02392-HSG Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 5 of 5