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Parties Involved:
John Timothy Singer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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FI LED 

United States Court of AppeaJs 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Cirruit 

'J.•B.R'f'H CIRCUIT SEP 2 6 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JONATHAN SWAPP and 

JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

and 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Cross-Appellant, 

v. 

ADDAM SWAPP, 

Defendant-Appellant 

Cross-Appellee, 

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Nos. 88-2433 and 

88-2435 

(D.C. Nos. 88CR-006-03J 

and 88CR-006-04J) 

(Dist. of Utah) 

Nos. 88-2516, 89-4090 

and 89-4095 

(D.C. No. 88CR-006-01J) 

(Dist. of Utah) 

1lr 

ORDER Alfl) .JODGIIBNT 

Before TACBA, BARRE'l'T and BALDOCJt, Circuit Judges. 

In these consolidated appeals we review the convictions of 

co-defendants Addam Swapp (Addam), Jonathan Swapp (Jonathan), and 

John Timothy Singer (Timothy). A fourth co-defendant, Vickie 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2433 Document: 010110053451 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 1 
f 

Singer (Vickie), mother of Timothy and mother-in-law of Addam, 

appealed, but that appeal was later voluntarily dismissed. The 

government cross-appeals, challenging Addam's sentence under 18 

u.s.c. § 924(c). 

Background 

In the early morning hours of January 16, 1988, a stake house 

owned by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints at 

Marion, Utah, was extensively damaged when a dynamite device 

exploded inside it. Addam admitted that he had created the 

device, placed it in the building, and set it to explode. After 

setting the device, Addam returned to the Singer property located 

approximately one mile east of the stake house where he observed 

the explosion with others residing at the property. Addam resided 

at the property with his wives, Vickie's daughters (Charlotte and 

Heidi), Jonathan, Vickie, Timothy, and six children. 

After an initial investigation of the stake house, which 

included observing several sets of footprints to and from the 

stake house to the Singer property, federal agents initiated two 

phone calls to the Singer residence and spoke with Addam and 

Vickie. The calls were made to assess the needs of the families 

and to determine if there were any hostages. Addam related that 

he had expected the call. Both Addam and Vickie quoted extensively 

from the Old Testament and indicated that all of the events had 

been revealed to them by God. Both refused to leave the property. 

During the course of the following thirteen days, law 

enforcement agents (agents or officers) surrounded the Singer 

property. High intensity lights and high powered speakers were 

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set up around the property. The agents played loud noises over 

the speaker systems and deployed flares in the area of the 

property in an effort to force the defendants and other 

inhabitants to leave the property. Shots were fired at the lights 

and speakers from Vickie's house. Throughout the thirteen-day 

period, Jonathan and Addam were observed walking around the 

property with rifles. Several agents testified that Addam and 

Jonathan pointed their rifles at them. 

The officers attempted to negotiate with the defendants 

through Roger Bates, Timothy's brother-in-law, and Ogden Kraut, a 

friend of the family. After Bates visited with the defendants, he 

related to the agents that none of the defendants or other 

occupants of the house wanted to leave. The officers subsequently 

dropped a letter (from a helicopter) to the defendants. The 

letter indicated that Addam and Vickie had been indicted by a 

grand jury for the bombing of the stake house and that there were 

outstanding arrest warrants for both of them. The letter 

encouraged the family to surrender peacefully. 

Thereafter, Kraut offered to act as an intermediary. During 

his first visit with the family, Addam told Kraut that they were 

expecting John Singer (Vickie's deceased husband) to be resurrected from the dead as a result of their confrontation with the 

authorities. During his second visit 

delivered a letter from Utah's Governor 

with the family, Kraut 

Bangerter urging the 

family to surrender peacefully. During his third visit, Kraut 

picked up two letters from Addam and Vickie to Governor 

Bangerter. 

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Within his letter to Governor Bangerter, Addam stated, inter 

alia, that: he did not recognize the governor as having any 

authority or jurisdiction over him or his family; the most hideous 

murderers in this country are the judges, lawyers and doctors; 

John Singer was murdered by the church and government of Utah; and 

"we the people on this property are now a nation under God--and 

are independent and separate 

changing laws and dark councils 

781) . 

from your wicked society of ever 

.... " (R., Vol. XII at p. 

Within her letter to Governor Bangerter, Vickie stated, inter 

alia: "I am John Singer's faithful wife. Prophet of God was 

persecuted and martyred because he would not compromise the truths 

of Heaven. . . . We will not give ourselves under the hands of 

the authorities. They will not take our children for they are an 

heritage of the Lord and they are children of Zion, the covenant 

children of the Lord with a promise and the world can't give them 

anything better than what the Lord has promised." (R., Vol. XII at 

pp . 7 7 5-7 7 ) . 

The agents subsequently determined that it would be best to 

attempt to arrest Addam on the belief that if Addam were captured, 

the other family members would surrender. A plan was developed 

which included using trained dogs to subdue Addam. Early on 

January 28, 1988, Adam and Jonathan, both of whom were armed, left 

the Singer home to milk a goat. After they finished milking and 

began walking from the goat pen back to the Singer home, the 

agents released two dogs. Before the dogs could reach Addam and 

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Jonathan, three shots were fired from the Singer house. One shot 

killed Lt. Fred House, a dog handler, instantly. 

When the shots were fired, Addam pulled his rifle off his 

shoulder and brought it into firing position. Two agents fired at 

Addam. One bullet hit Addam's .wrist, traveled into his chest and 

lodged in his back. Additional shots were fired from the Singer 

residence. Although a bullet struck FBI Agent Don Roberts in 

the chest, he escaped injury when the bullet was deflected by his 

bullet-proof vest. Addam surrendered a few minutes later and 

shortly thereafter the entire family surrendered. 

Timothy was taken into custody and transported to Salt Lake 

City by two federal agents. During the trip, Timothy gave a 

lengthy oral statement. He stated, inter alia, that: the church 

was blown up because no one was listening or cared about the death 

of his father (John Singer); he believed it was a revelation from 

the Lord for the church to be blown up; after the church bombing 

they knew there were a lot of officers surrounding their home 

because they had seen the reports on television; he did not 

surrender because to have done so would have meant that he did not 

believe in the Lord; he had fired ten shots from the Singer house 

at the dogs but did not know if he hit them; and he did not need 

to be a marksman because the Lord guided him. (R., Vol. XIII, pp. 

1602-06). 

Addam, Jonathan, Timothy and Vickie were subsequently charged 

in an eight-count amended superseding indictment. The eight 

counts and those charged thereunder were: I, knowingly and 

maliciously damaging and attempting to damage a building with an 

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explosive (Addam and Vickie); II, use of a deadly and dangerous 

weapon (a bomb) in relation to Count I (Addam and Vickie); III, 

attempting to kill officers and employees of the FBI (Addam, 

Jonathan, Timothy, Vickie); IV, use of a deadly and dangerous 

weapon in .. relation to Count III (Addam, Jonathan, Timothy, 

Vickie); V, assaulting, resisting, impeding, intimidating and 

interfering with officers and employees of the FBI while said 

employees and officers were engaged in the performance of their 

official duties (Adam, Jonathan, Timothy, Vickie); VI, use of a 

deadly and dangerous weapon, i.e., a firearm, in relation to Count 

V (Addam, Jonathan, Timothy, Vickie); VII, knowingly possessing 

and aiding and abetting in the possession of a destructive device 

(a bomb) that had not been registered (Addam, Vickie); VIII, knowingly possessing and aiding and abetting in the possession of a 

destructive device (a sawed-off shotgun) that had not been 

registered (Vickie). 

At trial, the government presented detailed evidence relative 

to the bombing of the stake house, the thirteen days following the 

bombing, attempts to persuade the defendants and other family 

members to surrender peaceably, and the arrests of the defendants. 

' 

The government's evidence included testimony relative to Timothy's 

comments to two agents during his transfer to Salt Lake City 

following his arrest; the twenty-three weapons (handguns, 

shotguns, and rifles) and 8,304 rounds of ammunition seized from 

the Singer home and property; and statements of a ballistics 

expert relative to three rifle shots from a position near the 

place that Jonathan was observed kneeling and shouldering his 

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weapon, and the recovery of seven projectiles which had been fired 

from the rifle which Timothy admitted using on the morning of 

January 28, 1988, including a projectile which hit Lt. House. 

Addam was the only defendant to testify. Before Addam testified, his counsel .and the court voir dired Addam extensively (out 

of the presence of the jury) relative to his desire to testify, 

his right not to testify, and the effect thereof. 

tion included the following colloquy: 

This examinaQ. (Defense Counsel) You understand the nature of 

the proceedings here today? 

A. (Addam Swapp) Yes, I do. 

Q. And the consequences of your action and the 

possible imprisonment that you may have? 

A. I understand more than you give me credit for 

at this time. 

* * * 

The Court: You're conscious of the choices that 

are available. 

The Witness: Yes, I am. 

The Court: And you understand that you can stand 

mute, remain silent, say nothing and simply put the 

United States to its proof? 

The Witness: Yes. 

The Court: You've considered the alternatives not 

only with your attorneys but with those who are close to 

you? 

The Witness: Yes. I have discussed it with each 

one of the other defendants in great length. Their attorneys are quite opposed to it, but Timothy, Jonathan, 

and Vickie are all one hundred percent behind me. 

(R., Vol. XIV, pp. 1867-69). 

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During his testimony, Addam admitted that he bombed the stake 

house. Addam also testified, inter alia, that: in bombing the 

stake house he did not make an effort to hurt or physically harm 

any person; after the bombing they listened to the mobilization of 

the law enforcement officials over a bearcat scanner which they had 

set to the frequencies of the sheriff, highway patrol, and local 

police department; they had no thoughts of surrendering peacefully 

because "this people" (law enforcement officials) had proven to be 

their known enemies; they had received notification from the law 

enforcement agents to surrender peacefully; he attempted to disable 

the lights and speakers erected around the property because they 

tortured him and the others in the house; he never aimed at or 

tried to shoot any of the law enforcement officials although he had 

plenty of chances; and he knew the siege was over after he had been 

shot. (R., Vol. XIV, pp. 1870-79). 

During cross-examination, Addam repeatedly refused to comply 

with the orders of the court to answer the questions of the 

prosecutor. Addam did testify, inter alia, that: he designed the 

bomb which was comprised of 87 sticks of dynamite and 50 pounds of 

prill ("like fertilizer"); the bomb weighed between 130 and 140 

pounds; the truth was within him but it was not for the 

prosecutor's ears nor was it for the rest of the prosecution (in 

response to who went with him to bomb the stake house); when the 

bomb went off, it looked as if many evil spirits were rising above 

the chapel; the bombing of the stake house was just the beginning 

of the destruction of the church, state, and nation; God had told 

him to stand and fight like a man; he called KUTV on the morning of 

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the bombing and gave a statement in which he related that the 

Singer property was the last place where God had established a 

stronghold of the daughter of Zion and that they would not 

compromise; he and the other defendants had taken a "stand" 

( " ( i) t' s something that burns within all four of us. " ) ( R. , Vol. 

XIV, p. 1901) not to compromise; he had approximately twenty guns 

in Vickie's home during the thirteen days in question; some of 

weapons in the house included sawed off shotguns which he had 

"sawed off" himself; most of the weapons were assembled in 

Vickie's house on January 15 and 16, 1988, and that he owned the 

weapons; he had fired numerous shots from the house during the 

thirteen days in question; he never fired at the speakers when the 

officers were nearby; in his letter to Governor Bangerter he had 

related that any man crossing the boundary of his property would be 

treated as an aggressor and that it did not matter if the person 

had a warrant for his arrest because he did not recognize such 

warrants; he had declared the Singer compound a sovereign nation; 

no one ever shot at him or his family while they were out walking 

around on the property during the thirteen days; and although he 

heard news reports indicating that the law enforcement authorities 

wanted a peaceful solution, he couldn't believe it. (R., Vol. XIV, 

pp . 18 91-19 3 2 ) . 

In response to several questions whether he and Jonathan or 

Timothy had engaged in certain activity, Addam responded, "I stand 

mute. If you want to know, ask him." (R., Vol. XIV. at pp. 1912, 

1914, 1915). Defense counsel did not object to these questions. 

However, when the prosecutor inquired of Addam whether he had 

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talked with Timothy about the need for a larger caliber gun, 

Addam's counsel objected and the court responded that "[w]e'll 

strike that and we'll indicate to the jury that they should ignore 

all of such responses here. " ( R. , Vol. XIV, p. 1916) . 

During cross examination, the prosecutor asked Addam to 

explain his statement to a reporter that it was "the shot heard 

around the world". (R., Vol. XIV, p. 1933). Addam responded, "The 

bombing of the church. It was compared to the shot heard around 

the world." Id. The prosecutor inquired further as to whether his 

statement concerned the death of Officer House. Addam's counsel 

objected. The court sustained the objection and admonished the 

jury to forget the question. Id. 

On May 9, 1988, the jury returned its verdicts against the 

four co-defendants, finding: Addam guilty on Counts I, II, IV, V, 

VI, and VII, and as to Count III, guilty of attempted murder in the 

second degree; Vickie guilty on Counts I, II, V, VI, and VII; 

Jonathan guilty on Counts IV, v, and VI, and as to Count III, 

guilty of attempted murder in the second degree; Timothy guilty on 

Counts IV, V, and VI, and as to Count III, guilty of attempted 

murder in the second degree. 

Contentions on Appeal 

a. 

Addam contends that the district court erred in: (1) denying 

his motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct; (2) 

denying him the right to interrogate a juror; and (3) denying his 

motion for a new trial based on comments made by Vickie's defense 

counsel. 

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( i. ) 

During the government's case, detailed evidence was presented 

that to Lt. House was struck by a bullet fired from a rifle which 

Timothy had acknowledged using, that House was rendered unconscious 

and had gone into cardiac arrest, and that House had received 

emergency treatment and was thereafter taken to a hospital. (R., 

Vol. XII, pp. 853, 856, 859, 944, 961-65, 979-82, 988, 1014, 1026, 

1047, 1083; Vol. XIII, pp. 1088, 1093, 1121, 1131). 

Near the end of the trial, the court ruled that additional 

comment on Lt. House would not be permitted. In so doing the court 

noted: 

The Court: Now there isn't a count relating to 

Fred House. Fred House is simply not part of this 

indictment. 

* * * 

[T]he fact that Fred House died is simply irrelevant . . . . 

* * * 

You can separate it, and we're through talking 

about Lt. House in this courtroom. The prejudicial 

effect other than what's in the record already is of 

such a nature as to render, it seems to me, the 

probative value far less than it should be. 

(R., Vol. XIV at pp. 1769, 1771). 

Notwithstanding these admonitions, the prosecutor did comment 

on Lt. House's death while cross-examining Addam: 

Q. (Prosecutor) Now, Mr. Swapp, you told Mr. Wagner, did 

you not, the Tribune reporter, that you considered a 

shot to be the shot heard around the world, didn't you? 

A. (Addam) Yes. 

Q. What shot was that? 

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A. The bombing of the church. It was compared to the 

shot heard around the world. 

Q. Isn't it true that the conversation which you made 

that statement concerned the death of Officer House? 

MR. BUCHER: Objection, Your Honor. 

MR. METOS: I'll object. 

THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection and I'll strike 

the question, admonish the jury to forget the question. 

And counsel should direct his questions in an 

appropriate fashion. Put your next question. 

(R., Vol. XIV, pp. 1933-34). 

Addam argues that the prosecutor's question was particularly 

prejudicial with respect to Count III (attempting to kill officers 

and employees of the FBI) because none of the officers testified 

that he (Addam) fired his weapon or that he (Addam) requested any 

member of his family to fire on the officers. Addam argues that 

this question, when taken in context with the other questions 

propounded to him during cross-examination, was irrelevant and 

inflammatory and that the combined effect was so prejudicial that 

no limiting instruction could cure it. 

The government responds that the question did not assume or 

imply that Addam was responsible for House's death; Addam had 

previously testified during direct examination that he had not 

aimed at or attempted to shoot anyone on January 28, 1988; the 

question was relevant in establishing Addam's intent; without the 

armed defiance of Addam, Jonathan, and Timothy, there would have 

been no bloodshed, forcible resistance, or attempted murder; and, 

if the question constituted error, it was harmless error which was 

not sufficient to influence the jury in any appreciable way. 

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Prosecutorial misconduct is not per se reversible error. 

United States Y.!.. Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1296 (10th Cir. 1988), 

quoting United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 

1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 838 (1987). We follow the general 

rule that not all misconduct requires reversal; it is only when 

such conduct can be said to have influenced the verdict that it 

becomes prejudicial. Id. It is the duty of the reviewing court 

to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that 

are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, including most of those 

involving constitutional violations, United States v. Kornegay, 

885 F. 2d 713, 718 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, U.S. 

(1990), citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 

Applying these standards, we hold that the question did not give 

rise to reversible error. 

Prior to this question, the government had presented detailed 

evidence, without objection, establishing that Lt. House had been 

struck by a bullet fired from the Singer house, that he fell to 

the floor unconscious, went into cardiac arrest and was 

subsequently taken to the hospital. Moreover, prior to the 

question, Addam had testified that: he had bombed the stake 

center; they had no thoughts of surrendering peacefully because 

the law enforcement agents were their "known enemies;" the bombing 

of the stake house was just the beginning of the destruction of 

the church, state and nation; he had approximately twenty guns in 

Vickie's house during the thirteen days in question; most of the 

weapons were assembled in Vickie's house on January 15 and 16, 

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1988, and he owned all the weapons; and he had declared the Singer 

property a sovereign nation. 

When asked what the statement meant, Addam responded that it 

referred to the bombing of the church. The prosecutor's subsequent 

inquiry as to whether the statement concerned the death of Lt. 

House was argumentative and improper. It was objected to and the 

court immediately instructed the jury to ignore the question. The 

record fails to establish that Addam was prejudiced by the 

question. The totality of the government's evidence was strong. 

Where the evidence against the accused is strong, the appellant 

must show that the prejudice he claims constitutes plain error. 

United States v. Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. 

denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Hall v. United States, 404 F.2d 1367 

(10th Cir. 1969). 

(ii.) 

Addam contends that that court erred in disallowing him 

"leave to interrogate a jury who may have been influenced by 

extraneous matter and not granting a mistrial on that basis." 

(Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, p. 18.) 

On August 30, 1988, Ronald Miller, a criminal investigator 

for the Utah Attorney General's Office executed an affadavit in 

which he stated that juror Fred Lacey had "done some research on 

his own" the weekend before the jury returned its verdicts. Addam 

filed a motion for a mistrial based on the affidavit. Two days 

later the court held a special hearing for the purpose of 

questioning Lacey: 

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THE COURT: MR. LACEY, let me ask you rather 

directly: Did you talk with anyone about this case 

during the days that the jury was deliberating, other 

than your fellow Jurors? 

JUROR LACEY: No, I did not. 

THE COURT: And let me ask you: Did you look at 

any material relating to this case during the days that 

the Jury was deliberating, other than that presented in 

evidence? 

JUROR LACEY: I did not. 

(R . , Vol. XV at p. 5) 

Thereafter, the following colloquy occurred between the court 

and Addam's counsel: 

THE COURT: What are you going to do with your 

Motion. Are you withdrawing your Motion? 

MR BUCHER: I'm withdrawing my Motion. The Motion 

was filed after I read the Affidavit,--

THE COURT: Okay. 

MR. BUCHER: 

Evidentiary Hearing 

matter. So it's 

groundless. 

(R., Vol. xv at p. 9.) 

and in order to call it for an 

in what we've just done in this 

mooted; or it's not mooted, but it's 

Counsel for Addam subsequently filed a motion for new trial 

and evidentiary hearing based on his allegations that "it has come 

to the attention of counsel, that one, or more jury members may 

have been exposed to extraneous and prejudicial material during or 

before their deliberations". (R., Vol. VI, Tab 387, p. 1). No 

evidence or facts were proffered to support the motion. The court 

denied the motion finding that "the defendant has not even made a 

sufficient preliminary showing to justify further inquiry into 

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possible extrinsic influences on the jury in this case". Id. at 

p. 2. 

On appeal Addam does not challenge the court's finding that 

he failed to make "a sufficient preliminary showing to justify 

further inquiry." Rather, Addam argues only that the court did 

not allow an extensive examination of the juror. 

A trial court has a great responsibility and wide discretion 

in dealing with a motion for new trial based on allegations of 

juror misconduct. United States v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385, 1390 

(10th Cir. 1986), quoting United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 

1173 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983). 

Something more than unverified conjecture is necessary to justify 

the grant of a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct where 

only potentially suspicious circumstances are shown; the trial 

court's decision will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion. 

Id. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Addam's motion. 

(iii.) 

Addam contends that the court erred in denying his motion for 

a new trial based on the comments of Vickie's defense counsel that 

Addam was responsible for acts of vandalism in the neighborhood of 

Marion, Utah, prior to October 1987. 

During the closing arguments, counsel for Vickie stated: 

For all Vickie Singer knows, Addam was planning to 

erect the red pole on the Main Street of the town and 

perhaps leave some additional signs or grafitti to attract attention to the anniversary of John Singer's 

death. After all, he had been doing this type of thing 

before October 29th. 

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(Tr. Final Argument, p. 118, lines 18-22). 

Addam did not object to the remarks. On appeal, Addam 

contends that the comments, "together with the damaging affect 

[sic] of the prejudicial cross-examination of Addam Swapp 

put the burden of the whole incident with Addam Swapp." (Opening 

Brief of Defendant-Appellant, p.21). 

The government responds that under Rule 52(b), Fed. R. Crim. 

P., "plain error or defects effecting substantial rights may be 

noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the 

court;" Addam did not object to the comments at the time they were 

made; and that unless Addam can demonstrate that the comments 

constituted plain error, the court's denial of his motion for new 

trial on this ground must stand. 

In analyzing the plain error doctrine under Rule 52(b) in 

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985), the Supreme Court 

opined: 

The plain-error doctrine of Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure 52(b) tempers the blow of a rigid 

application of the contemporaneous-objection requirement. The Rule authorizes the Court of Appeals to correct only 'particularly egregious errors' . those 

errors that 'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings'. . In 

other words, the plain-error exception to the 

contemporaneous-objection rule is to be 'used sparingly, 

solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of 

justice would otherwise result.' 

Applying this standard to the facts herein, we hold that the 

court did not err in denying Addams' motion for a new trial based on 

the comments of Vickie's counsel. The evidence of Addam's guilt was 

overwhelming. We are unable to ascertain how, under any conditions, 

the comments first objected to on appeal could be 

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Appellate Case: 88-2433 Document: 010110053451 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 17 
"particularly egregious" or errors which would "seriously affect the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." On 

the contrary, it is more likely that the jury 

attention to the comments as did Addam's trial counsel. 

paid as little 

b. 

Jonathan contends that the court erred in: (1) failing to 

order further psychological evaluation before declaring him competent 

to stand trial; (2) admitting extrajudicial statements of Vickie and 

failing to grant his motion to sever; and (3) denying his motion for a 

mistrial. 

( i. ) 

Prior to trial, Jonathan's defense counsel filed several 

motions which raised the issue of Jonathan's ability and competency to 

stand trial. Jonathan vehemently opposed the motions. Thereafter, 

Dr. Groesbeck, a psychiatrist, was retained to examine Jonathan. 

Jonathan was examined for approximately four and one-half hours over 

the course of two days. A competency hearing was later held during 

which Dr. Groesbeck testified that Jonathan was incompetent to stand 

trial. (R., Vol. IX, p.398). 

After Dr. Groesbeck testified, the court allowed Jonathan to 

personally respond. During his response Jonathan testified that he 

felt he deserved the opportunity to be examined by another 

psychiatrist; he understood fully what "is going on here" and the 

implications; he understood what could and might happen to him; he had 

the right to stand and face the charges against him; Dr. Groesbeck did 

not have the right to say, based on his (Jonathan's) religion, that he· 

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(Jonathan) was mentally ill; just because a man has faith and believes 

in God does not mean that he is crazy or does not understand; and Dr. 

Groesbeck was taking his (Jonathan's) religion and twisting it into a 

mental illness. 

After hearing and considering all of the evidence, the court 

found Jonathan competent to stand trial. 

found, inter alia: 

In so doing, the court 

[T]he court is satisfied as to the ability of the young 

man to be of assistance in his own defense. The court 

is in a position to observe, to interrogate, and while 

giving some interested deference to the material that 

you presented, the fact that one understands what one is 

doing and manifests that with what appears to be 

adequate recognition as to consequences, and even though 

one may disagree with those who are in a position to 

advise him, the fact that he may disagree and fail to 

follow suggestions in and of itself, in my opinion, 

doesn't rise to the level of the status that you suggest 

it might ... I think under the circumstances there's 

an adequate manifestation as to an understanding as to, 

one, the charges. Two, the consequences. And three, 

perhaps some basic disagreement as to the manner in 

which particular items ought to be treated. 

(R., Vol. IX at pp. 528-529). 

Where the district court has held a hearing and thereafter 

found that a defendant is competent to stand trial, that finding 

will not be set aside unless it is determined to be clearly 

erroneous or arbitrary. United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 833 

(10th Cir. 1986). 

Jonathan's responses to the court were clear, direct, and to 

the point. Moreover, Dr. Groesbeck acknowledged that Jonathan 

functioned fairly well with respect to his ability to record, 

recall, and relate. Dr. Groesbeck also testified that "in terms of 

memory and ordinary day-to-day activities I think he functions 

quite well. In fact I think that he's super sensitive." (R., 

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.-

Vol. IX at p. 416). Under these circumstances, we hold that the 

court's finding that Jonathan was competent to stand trial was not 

clearly erroneous or arbitrary. 

(ii.) 

Jonathan contends that the court erred in admitting 

extra judicial statements of Addam and Vickie and that the 

admission of the statements violated his constitutional right of 

confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. In particular, Jonathan 

challenges the admission of Vickie's statement to Doug Palmer, a 

newspaper reporter, and Addam's statement to Charles Gibbs, an 

editor with KUTBV. 

During her conversation with Doug Palmer, Vickie related: 

We are not going to make peace with them. We will not 

surrender. We've gone beyond talk. We are going into 

battle. This is serious .... I have talked my guts 

out for years. Talking is over with. We're going into 

battle. Yes, there will be death, killing. Nothing we 

can do but protect ourselves. The Lord means what he 

says. 

(R., Vol. XI, p. 425). 

During his conversation with Charles Gibbs, 

related: 

Addam 

We are making a stand against this corruption and 

wickedness. Our liberties and our God given rights have 

been tramped on long enough .... The stand that we 

are making is greater than the stand of the signers . of 

the Declaration of Independence. The Lord has given a 

commandment that we should stand and fight manfully, and 

we have been assured that the Lord will fight our 

battles .... [w]e will be victorious. These people will 

not believe their eyes. 

(R., Vol. XI, pp. 451-452). 

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Jonathan argues that inasmuch as both statements used the 

terms "we," "our" and "us," the jury could reasonably infer that 

Addam and Vickie were talking about, representing, and describing 

the acts of all the defendants. This, according to Jonathan, allowed the jury to infer that he had concurred in and participated 

"in the incriminating actions expressed in the co-defendants' 

statements," in violation of his constitutional right of 

confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. (Appellant's Opening 

Brief, p. 26) . The government responds that Jonathan's 

constitutional rights were not violated when, as here, Addam 

testified and was available for cross-examination, the statements 

of Addam and Vickie did not directly refer to or inculpate 

Jonathan, and much of Jonathan's criminal conduct occurred after 

the statements were made. 

Both parties rely on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 

(1968) and Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987). In Bruton, a 

non-testifying co-defendant's confession inculpating the defendant 

was admitted into evidence in a joint trial. The trial court 

instructed the jury to disregard the confession in determining the 

defendant's guilt or innocence. The Supreme Court held that the 

admission of "powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements" 

violated the defendant's right of cross-examination under the 

Sixth Amendment. 391 U.S. at p. 135. In so holding, the Court 

recognized, however: 

Not every admission of inadmissable hearsay or other 

evidence can be considered to be reversible error 

unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances 

occur in almost every trial where inadmissable evidence 

creeps in, usually inadvertently. 'A defendant is 

entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.' It is 

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,-' 

not unreasonable to conclude that in many cases they 

jury can and will follow the trial judge's instructions 

to disregard such information. (Citations omitted). 

Id. 

Bruton is applied only where the extrajudicial comments are 

"clearly inculpatory as to the complaining co-defendants and [are] 

vitally important to the government's case." United States v. 

Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1399 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 

U.S. 1023 (1985). Bruton was clarified in Richardson v. Marsh, 

481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987), where the Court held that "the 

Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a 

nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting 

instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate 

not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her 

existence." 

Applying Bruton and Richardson to the case at bar, we hold 

that the admission of the statements was not in violation of 

Jonathan's rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth 

Amendment. Initially, the court instructed the jury (prior to the 

receipt of the statements) that the statements were to be 

considered only in reference to Vickie and Addam. ( R. , Vol . XI, 

pp. 421 and 450). Neither statement was a confession. Neither 

statement made any reference to Jonathan's name or existence. 

Moreover the statements were not "vitally important to the 

government's case" against Jonathan. Rather, the statements were 

no more than pronouncements of Addam's and Vickie's personal and 

religious beliefs. 

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Included within Jonathan's argument that Addam's and Vickie's 

statements violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment 

confrontation clause, is his contention that the cumulative impact 

of Addam's and Vickie's statements justified his severance motion 

and that the court erred in denying it. Severance is justified 

only in extreme cases. United States v. Rogers, 899 F.2d 917, 926 

(10th Cir. 1990). A trial court's decision to deny a motion for 

severance will not be disturbed on appeal absent an affirmative 

showing of an abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 897 

F.2d 1034 (10th Cir. 1990). This is not an extreme case 

warranting severance and 

affirmative showing that 

Jonathan has failed 

the court abused its 

denying his motion for a severance. 

(iii.) 

to make an 

discretion in 

Jonathan contends that the court erred in denying his motions 

for a mistrial based on Addam's comments. As set forth supra, 

Addam was the only defendant who testified. During the course of 

cross-examination, Addam refused to answer several questions 

about whether he and Jonathan or Timothy had engaged in certain 

activities. (R., Vol XIV, pp. 1912, 1914-15). Addam also 

suggested, in response to several questions, that the prosecutor 

should ask the co-defendants, including Jonathan, directly about 

their involvement. Addam further testified that he had discussed 

taking "a stand" with all the defendants and that "[i]t's 

something that burns within all four of us." 

1901). 

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(R., Vol XIV, p. 

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Jonathan argues that Addam's responses and testimony amounted 

to impermissible comments on his decision not to testify and 

that the appropriate "remedy to cure a constitutional violation of 

this magnitude is reversal." (Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 

31). 

The government responds that Addam's testimony did not give 

rise to a violation of Jonathan's decision not to testify, that 

Addam did not attempt to blame Jonathan for any wrongdoing, and 

that there was no comment by Addam, the prosecution, or anyone 

else relative to Jonathan's decision not to testify. We agree. 

The assertion "of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'is properly 

no part of the evidence submitted to the jury, and no inferences 

whatever can be legitimately drawn from them from the legal 

assertion by the witness of his constitutional right.'" United 

States v. McClure, 734 F.2d 484, 491 (10th Cir. 1984), quoting 

Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196 (1943). The Fifth 

Amendment's prohibition against commenting to the jury upon the 

defendant's decision not to testify is violated only when "the 

language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character 

that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a 

comment on the failure of the accused to testify." United States 

v. Gomez-Olivas, 897 F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1990), quoting 

Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955). 

Moreover, a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect 

one. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953). 

Applying these standards to the facts herein, we hold that 

Addam's comments and responses can not be considered or construed 

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as impermissible comments on Jonathan's decision not to testify. 

None of Addam's responses and comments "would naturally and 

necessarily ... [be interpreted by the jury as a] comment on the 

failure of the accused to testify." 

( C • ) 

Timothy contends that the court erred in (1) denying his 

motion to suppress evidence of his confession to law enforcement 

agents and (2) failing to grant a mistrial based on Addam's 

responses during cross-examination. 

(i.) 

Timothy contends that the court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress his confession. 

As set forth, supra, following his arrest, Timothy was 

transported from the Singer property to Salt Lake City. At the 

outset of the trip, Timothy was advised of his Miranda rights. 

Thereafter, he signed a waiver of rights form and began answering 

questions about the bombing. Within a short period of time, 

however, Timothy related to the agents that he did not feel like 

talking about the bombing further. All discussion ceased for 

thirty to sixty seconds. Then one of the agents indicated that 

the siege had been very stressful for him and that he wanted to 

get back to his family in Texas. Timothy expressed surprise that 

that some of the agents were from out of state. He also related 

that the siege had been a long ordeal for himself and his family. 

Subsequent thereto, Timothy agreed to describe the background 

leading up to the bombing. 

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Once Timothy arrived at the United States Marshall's office, 

he was reminded of his Miranda rights. Thereafter Timothy gave a 

detailed confession which was tape recorded. Prior to trial, 

Timothy moved to suppress his confession. During a motion hearing 

Timothy testified, inter alia, that: he had been confined to a 

wheelchair since he was seventeen when a tree fell on him; he was 

removed from public schools when he was five and thereafter 

educated by his mother and father at home; his father was shot and 

killed during an attempted arrest; he had no prior experience or 

education in relation to criminal law; he was angry and upset at 

the time of his arrest; and he did not understand his Miranda 

rights and did not realize that his statements could be used 

against him. 

Michael DeCaria, a psychologist, testified that: he had 

examined Timothy; as a result of his interview, tests, and 

examinations, he had concluded that Timothy was very susceptible 

to coercion; Timothy was unable to make decisions based on 

rational intellect; Timothy was unable to excercise his own free 

will; and Timothy would have been unable to make a knowing and 

intelligent waiver of a constitutional right. 

The government presented the testimony of the agents who had 

transported Timothy to Salt Lake City along with the testimony of 

Doris Read, a clinical psychologist who had examined Timothy. 

Read testified, contrary to DeCaria, that there was no evidence to 

suggest that Timothy was unable to comprehend the warnings that he 

had received from the agents. Read also testified that Timothy 

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\ . 

had told her that he had read and understood the Miranda form 

which he signed. 

In denying Timothy's motion to suppress, the court found: 

Now, John Timothy Singer's motion to suppress ... 

Examining the testimony again of those who had 

physical custody of him, there's no question as to the 

event of the Mirandizing, the execution of the document, 

the subsequent reminding. There were other questions 

raised, but I after looking at all of the material and 

examining the material that's been furnished to the 

court in all of its forms, and in listening as well as 

observing that material, I'm of the opinion that I 

should deny the motion. 

* * * 

I'm perfectly satisfied that they [agents] were 

very, very careful. That they were careful on the 

manner in which they proceeded. I was impressed with 

that. I'm also satisfied that there was good 

understanding that what was done was knowingly done and 

voluntarily done with good understanding. And I had 

some concerns in that area, but I've satisfied myself. 

(R., Vol. IX at p. 525). 

Timothy contends that. his confession was involuntary and was 

not the product of his free and unrestrained choice. Timothy argues 

that his confession should not have been admitted when, as here, the 

agents failed to honor his assertion of his privilege against selfincrimination, and that he is entitled to a new trial. 

A confession is admissible only if it is voluntarily made. 

If a confession is the product of "an essentially free and 

unrestrained choice by its maker ... if he has willed to confess, 

it may be used against him". Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 

602 (1961). The constitutional guarantee is only that the witness 

not be compelled to give self-incriminating testimony; the test is 

whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the free 

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will of the witness was overborne. United States v. Washington, 431 

U.S. 181, 187 (1977). Furthermore, once an accused in police 

custody terminates his interview, further interrogation should not 

take place "unless the accused himself initiates further 

communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police" or 

unless the "suspect himself initiates dialogue with the 

authorities." Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983), 

quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981) and Wyrick v. 

Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 46 (1982). 

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial 

court's findings of fact must be accepted unless they are clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Ellison, 791 F.2d 821-22 (10th Cir. 

1986), citing United States v. Leach, 749 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Evidence deduced at the suppression hearing must be viewed in the 

light most favorable to the government. Id. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, we hold that the district court's findings in support of 

its denial of Timothy's motion to suppress were not clearly 

erroneous. Although the evidence was conflicting, there was 

sufficient evidence from which the district court could find, as it 

did, that Timothy's confession was knowingly and voluntarily made 

with an understanding of the effect of the confession. 

(ii.) 

Timothy contends that the court erred in failing to grant a 

mistrial based on Addam's responses during cross-examination. This 

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.. . . . 

contention is identical to Jonathan's third allegation of error, 

(b)(iii), supra. 

During Addam's cross-examination, he was asked several 

questions relative to Jonathan's and Timothy's actions during the 

siege. (R., Vol. XIV, pp. 1913, 1915-16). In each instance, Addam 

declined to answer and suggested that the prosecutor "ask him," 

referring to Jonathan and/or Timothy. Timothy argues that these 

comments constituted a negative comment on the exercise of his 

constitutional right not to testify and that his conviction should 

be reversed. 

We hold that Addams's responses did not constitute an 

improper comment on Timothy's decision not to testify. See (b)(iii), 

supra. 

Cross-Appeal 

The government contends that the district court erred in not 

sentencing Addam to a five year term under Count II in accordance 

with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). We agree. 

Addam was convicted on seven counts, including Count I, 

knowingly and maliciously damaging and attempting to damage a 

building with an explosive, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(i) and 

(ii), and Count II, use of a deadly and dangerous weapon in relation 

to Count I, in violaton of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l). § 924(c)(l) 

provides in part: 

Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence . for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the 

United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in 

addition to the punishment provided for such crime of 

violence ... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years . Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

the court shall not place on probation or suspend the 

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.. 

. 

. 

' .. 

sentence of any person convicted of a violation of this 

subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed 

under this subsection run concurrently with any other 

term of imprisonment including that imposed for the 

crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in which the 

firearm was used or carried. (emphasis supplied). 

Notwithstanding Addam's convictions under both Counts I and 

II, the district court determined that Addam should only be 

sentenced under Count I for violation of § 844(i) and (ii). In 

finding that Addam should not be sentenced under Count II for 

violation of§ 924(c)(l) the district court found, inter alia: 

It is fundamental that a defendant may only be 

convicted of two separate offenses arising from a single 

act if each offense requires proof of a fact not 

essential to the other In the original 

sentencing the court imposed a sentence of five years as 

to Count I and stayed sentence as to Count II on the 

grounds that to sentence on Count II would be unlawfully 

cumulative or duplicative of the sentence imposed on 

Count I. It seemed to the court inappropriate at the 

time of the original sentencing to sentence twice on the 

same event, supported by identical proof. It seems even 

more inappropriate now . where the pleadings as 

written require the same proof--where one is to be 

punished for destroying a building through the use of a 

bomb and then further punished for destroying the same 

building through the use of the same bomb--to sentence 

on both counts is unlawfully cumulative. To do so would 

impose double punishment. 

(R., Supp. Vol. I, Tab 456, p. 5). 

It is uncontested that, under 18 u.s.c. § 924(c)(l), the 

explosive used to bomb the stake house was a "firearm" and that the 

bombing of the stake house constituted an "act of violence." 

The government argues that the language and intent of§ 

924(c) is clear and unmistakable, i.e., a mandatory five year 

imprisonment term without the possibility of parole for anyone who 

uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 

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. .. violence. The government argues, quoting United States v. 

Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1316 (10th Cir. 1987), that§ 924(c) and its 

legislative history "indicate that a sentence for violation of§ 

924(c) should never run concurrently with any other sentence." The 

government also argues that sentencing Addam under§ 924(c) will 

not violate the double jeopardy clause as interpreted in 

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (defendant may 

not be punished twice for the same offense) when, as here, Congress 

has specifically authorized cumulative punishment. 

Addam responds that the court did not err in refusing to 

sentence him under Count II when the same evidence was introduced 

for both counts. Addam argues that, under Blockburger, the double 

jeopardy clause is violated if a defendant is sentenced for two 

offenses predicated on the same facts; such is the situation in the 

case at bar inasmuch as there is no added fact or element differing 

Count I and Count II; and under the rule of lenity, the district 

court should be afforded the discretion to defer a cumulative 

sentence. 

We hold that the court erred in failing to sentence Addam 

under§ 924(c) following his conviction of Count II. A sentence 

under § 924(c) is not discretionary; "[a defendant] shall, in 

addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence . 

be sentenced to imprisonment for five years .... " See United 

States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d at p. 1315. Nor does the imposition of 

a five-year sentence under S 924(c) violate the double jeopardy 

clause as interpreted in Blockburger. 

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• 

' . In Blockburger, the Court held that multiple punishments can 

not be imposed for two offenses arising out of the same criminal 

transaction unless each offense requires proof of a fact that the 

other does not. 

Blockburger was clarified in Whalen v. United States, 445 

U.S. 684, 691-693 (1980) in which the Court held: 

The assumption underlying the rule [in Blockburger] 

is that Congress does not intend to punish the same 

offense under two different statutes. Accordingly, 

where two statutory provisions proscribe the 'same 

offense,' they are construed not to authorize cumulative 

punishments in the absence of a clear indication of 

contrary legislative intent. 

* * * 

[w]here the offenses are the same ... cumulative sentences 

are not permitted unless elsewhere specifically 

authorized by Congress. (emphasis added). 

Blockburger was further clarified in Albernaz v. United 

States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) in which the court noted that 

inasmuch as the "Blockburger test is a 'rule of statutory 

construction,' and because it is serves as a means of discerning 

congressional purpose, the rule should not be controlling where, for 

example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." 

' 

Albernaz and Whalen were cited with approval in Missouri v. Hunter, 

459 U.S. 359, 368-369 (1983) in which the Court held: 

Where, as here, a legislature specifically 

authorizes cumulative punishments under two statutes, 

regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the 

'same' conduct under Blockburger, a court's task of 

statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor 

may seek and the trial court or jury may impose 

cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single 

trial. 

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Inasmuch as Congress specifically directed cumulative 

punishment under§ 924(c), the district court was, following Addam's 

conviction under Count II, obligated to sentence him to an additional 

five years imprisonment, without probation, to run consecutively with 

his other terms of imprisonment. 

The convictions of Addam Swapp, Jonathan Swapp, and Timothy 

Singer are AFFIRMED. The case of Addam Swapp is REMANDED for further 

sentencing pursuant to§ 924(c)(l). 

-33-

Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

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