Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00986/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00986-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
K.C.S.O.
Defendant
Jody Morehouse
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JODY MOREHOUSE,

Plaintiff,

v.

KERN COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, 

et. al.,

Defendants.

 CASE NO. 1:16-cv-00986-MJS (PC)

 ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

 (ECF NO. 1)

 THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE TO AMEND

Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His July 11, 2016 complaint is before 

the Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction. (ECF No. 4.) No other parties have appeared in the action.

I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners and pretrial

detainees seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a 

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 

portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” 

that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

Case 1:16-cv-00986-MJS Document 7 Filed 09/22/16 Page 1 of 6
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“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court 

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

II. Pleading Standard

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “are 

not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 

677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible 

claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to 

have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), but nevertheless, 

the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff’s claims stem from his incarceration in the Lerdo Pretrial Facility of the 

Kern County Jail in Bakersfield, California. He brings this action against the Kern County 

Sheriff’s Office (“KCSO”) and “Kern County Mental Health.” 

His allegations may be summarized essentially as follows:

Plaintiff is diagnosed with bipolar disorder and an anxiety disorder. He has not 

received his medications, namely klonopin and remeron, since he was incarcerated, and 

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as such has suffered anxiety and depression.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages.

IV. Analysis

A. Municipal Entity Liability

Plaintiff sues only the KCSO and Kern County Mental Health; he names no 

individual defendants. He thus appears to make a Monell claim.

“[S]ection 1983 imposes liability only on ‘persons’ who, under color of law, deprive 

others of their constitutional rights, [and] the Supreme Court has construed the term 

‘persons’ to include municipalities such as the County.” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 

797 F.3d 654, 670 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 

690-91 (1978)). Counties may not be held liable for the actions of their employees under 

a theory of respondeat superior, but they may be held liable for a constitutional violation if 

an action taken pursuant to a policy, be it a formal or informal policy, caused the 

underlying violation. Castro, 797 F.3d at 670 (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 

U.S. 112, 131 (1989) and Monell, 436 U.S. at 691) (quotation marks omitted); see also

Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010) (municipal liability 

claim cannot be maintained unless there is an underlying constitutional violation). 

Municipal liability may also be imposed where the local government unit’s 

omission led to the constitutional violation by its employee. Gibson v. Cty. Of Washoe, 

Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002). Under this route to municipal liability, the 

“plaintiff must show that the municipality’s deliberate indifference led to its omission and 

that the omission caused the employee to commit the constitutional violation.” Id. This 

kind of deliberate indifference is found when the need to remedy the omission is so 

obvious, and the failure to act so likely to result in the violation of rights, that the 

municipality reasonably can be said to have been deliberately indifferent when it failed to 

act. Id. at 1195.

In this case, Plaintiff has not linked the underlying violation of his rights by 

Defendants to a policy or practice attributable to the county, nor has he provided any 

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facts showing that the county knew of, and blatantly ignored, constitutional violations 

committed by its employees. Therefore, all claims against the KCSO and Kern County 

Mental Health will be dismissed with leave to amend.

B. Linkage

In the event Plaintiff intends to make a claim against individual defendants for the 

violation of his rights, he must adhere to the requirements set forth below.

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676-7; Simmons, 609 

F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th 

Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff may not 

attribute liability to a group of defendants, but must “set forth specific facts as to each 

individual defendant’s” deprivation of his rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th 

Cir. 1988); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Liability may not 

be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior, as each 

defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing, 

588 F.3d at 1235. Supervisors may only be held liable if they “participated in or directed 

the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Lemire v. Cal. 

Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013).

C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment under the Eighth Amendment when Plaintiff did not receive his medications. 

As Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, however, his claims are properly evaluated under the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The standard applicable to a pretrial detainee’s claim for inadequate medical care 

under the Fourteenth Amendment is presently not clear. In the past, such claims were 

subject to the same state of mind requirement as an Eighth Amendment violation, i.e., 

subjective and deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. See Clouthier 

v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2010). However, that holding was 

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called into question by the United States Supreme Court in a Fourteenth Amendment 

excessive force case, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). Most 

recently, the Ninth Circuit extended the Kingsley rationale to a Fourteenth Amendment 

failure-to-protect claim. Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, No. 12-56829, 2016 WL 4268955, 

at *7 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2016) (en banc) (slip op). Although Castro did not expressly 

extend its holding to other Fourteenth Amendment violations, the Court sees no reason 

why the same rationale should not apply to other Fourteenth Amendment conditions of 

confinement claims.

Accordingly, in order to proceed on such a claim, Plaintiff must allege “(1) the 

defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the 

plaintiff was confined; (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering 

serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that 

risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the 

high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct 

obvious; and (4) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's 

injuries.” Id. With respect to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be 

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citing Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473).

Plaintiff has provided no more than nonspecific and conclusory allegations to 

support his medical care claim. He has not explained whether he requested his 

medications, whether any personnel was aware of his medical needs, whether or how the 

denial of his medications puts him at substantial risk of suffering serious harm, or any 

reasons given for denying his treatment. There are no facts upon which the Court could 

conclude that any individuals responded to Plaintiff’s needs in an objectively 

unreasonable manner. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend.

V. Conclusion 

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. The Court will provide Plaintiff 

the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if he believes, in good faith, he can cure the 

identified deficiencies. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. 

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Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 

(9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff amends, he may not change the nature of this suit by adding 

new, unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

The Court advises Plaintiff an amended complaint supersedes the original 

complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), 

and it must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” 

Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form and 

a copy of his complaint filed July 11, 2016;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in 

this order or a notice of voluntary dismissal;

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal, 

the undersigned this action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to 

state a claim and failure to obey a court order, subject to the “three strikes” 

provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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