Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01818/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01818-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert L. Erickson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1818

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Robert L. Erickson, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 11, 2010

Filed: July 12, 2010

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Robert L. Erickson was charged with multiple counts of assault with a

dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1153. Erickson was convicted and he now appeals, arguing that the district

court1

 erred in admitting hearsay testimony and in denying his motion to sever one of

the assault charges. We affirm. 

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Sherry Erickson is the appellant’s aunt, and many of the witnesses in this case

are related to one another. Throughout this opinion we use the parties’ full names

when necessary to avoid confusion.

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I.

The charges in this case stemmed from two separate incidents that occurred at

Sherry Erickson’s2

 residence in Mission, South Dakota, between approximately

November or December 2007 and January 2, 2008. On an evening in November or

December 2007, Robert Erickson and his girlfriend, Kendra Small Bear, were

drinking at Sherry Erickson’s residence when they got into an argument. Small Bear

became tired of arguing, so she went outside and began walking down an alley that

was adjacent to the residence. Erickson followed her and a physical altercation

ensued, in the course of which Erickson pulled out a knife and poked Small Bear in

the ear and stabbed her in the leg. Erickson and Small Bear returned to the residence

and Erickson apologized for stabbing her. Small Bear wrapped her leg wound with

gauze and a bandage but did not seek medical treatment.

On January 1, 2008, Erickson attended a party at Sherry Erickson’s residence

at which some eight people had gathered and were drinking heavily throughout the

night. Most of the individuals at the party were intoxicated, with the exception of

Samantha Kitteaux, Erickson’s cousin, who, because of her pregnancy, was not

drinking. Erickson became increasingly agitated as the evening wore on, expressing

anger that someone had stolen liquor from him and claiming that members of the

group wanted to “jump him.” At about 3:00 a.m. on January 2, Erickson became

involved in an argument with Anthony Kitteaux. Erickson walked out of the

residence and onto a front porch area. Anthony Kitteaux followed after him to see

what Erickson was doing. In order to step outside, the parties had to pull back a

blanket that had been hung over the doorway to provide additional insulation. As

Anthony Kitteaux pulled back the blanket to look outside, Erickson slashed him

across the face with a knife, leaving a large flap of skin hanging from Kitteaux’s

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cheek. Kitteaux yelled, “ow, that mother f---er cut me” as he retreated back inside.

Eli Antoine, who had been sitting inside, went to the door, whereupon Erickson swung

the knife again, slashing Antoine across the palm of his left hand and lacerating the

tendons and nerves connecting several of his fingers. 

Erickson fled the residence on foot and several of the individuals who had been

present at the party chased after him. Samantha Kitteaux and another individual,

Frank Swalley, remained behind and made two 911 emergency calls as they attempted

to help with the victims’ wounds. During the second 911 call, Frank Swalley got on

the phone and identified Erickson as the assailant. After arriving on the scene and

briefly speaking with the witnesses, the police began searching for Erickson and

apprehended him within walking distance of the residence. Erickson was arrested and

taken to the local jail, where the officers took pictures of what appeared to be blood

on his hands. 

The government charged Erickson with three counts of assault with a deadly

weapon—one for the attack on Small Bear and two others for the incident in which

he assaulted Anthony Kitteaux and Eli Antoine. In connection with the latter incident,

the government also charged Erickson with two counts of assault resulting in serious

bodily injury. The district court permitted the government to join all the offenses in

a single trial and denied Erickson’s motion to sever the assault charge involving Small

Bear.

At trial, Small Bear testified about the first assault, and a number of individuals

who had been present at the party on January 1, 2008, testified about the second

incident. Samantha Kitteaux was the government’s principal witness. She testified

that, unlike the others, she had not been drinking and had been in a back bedroom

watching television when she heard loud voices. She testified that she came into the

living area in time to see Erickson walk outside and Anthony Kitteaux follow him

through the door. Although she testified that she did not see a knife, Samantha

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Kitteaux saw Erickson swing and hit Anthony Kitteaux and she observed immediately

afterward that his face had been cut. She also testified that she heard Anthony

Kitteaux exclaim, “ow, that mother f---er cut me,” and observed Eli Antoine go to the

door, exclaim that “he has a knife,” and back away with his hand bleeding. According

to Samantha Kitteaux’s testimony, Erickson was the only person standing on the other

side of the door who could have caused the injuries. Samantha Kitteaux also testified

that Erickson called her later from jail and apologized for cutting Anthony and Eli.

 Isaiah Swalley, another individual who had been present at the party, testified

about Erickson’s angry demeanor throughout the evening and also testified that he had

observed the assault. He testified that from his point of view, it looked like Erickson

punched Anthony Kitteaux and that Kitteaux immediately grabbed his cheek. Other

witnesses, however, expressed unwillingness to testify against a family member and

claimed that they could not remember what had happened. Neither Anthony Kitteaux

nor Eli Antoine was able to recall details about the assault. Anthony Kitteaux testified

that Erickson had become angry at the party and was trying to fight everyone, and that

he later called from jail and apologized for cutting Kitteaux’s cheek. Anthony

Kitteaux stated, however, that he could not identify the individual who had cut him.

Frank Swalley testified that Erickson became agitated during the evening and was

hollering about someone trying to jump him. But Frank Swalley had no recollection

of the stabbing or making a 911 call. Rather, he claimed that he had passed out from

drinking and was awakened only after the assaults had already taken place. He

testified that after he woke up he saw blood gushing from Eli Antoine’s wound and

used his belt as a makeshift tourniquet to stop the bleeding.

The government introduced testimony from the police officer who had arrested

Erickson and also introduced photographs showing what appeared to be blood on

Erickson’s hands. For impeachment purposes, the government introduced testimony

from a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation who had interviewed

Anthony Kitteaux and Eli Antoine shortly after the attack. According to the agent,

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both victims had initially identified Erickson as the assailant. Over defense counsel’s

hearsay objection, the government introduced testimony from a 911 dispatcher that

an individual named “Frankie”—recognized now as Frank Swalley—had identified

Erickson as the attacker. The district court overruled the objection, later clarifying

that the testimony was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay

rule.

The jury found Erickson guilty of all four counts related to his assaults of

Anthony Kitteaux and Eli Antoine. With respect to the assault of Small Bear, the jury

found Erickson not guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon, but guilty of the lesser

included offense of simple assault.

II.

 Erickson first argues that the district court erred in permitting the 911

dispatcher to testify about Frank Swalley’s out-of-court statement identifying

Erickson as the assailant. The government responds that the statement was properly

admitted as an excited utterance. 

We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

United States v. James, 564 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2009). Under Federal Rule of

Evidence 803(2), an out-of-court statement is admissible as an excited utterance if the

statement “relat[es] to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was

under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” The government

argues that Frank Swalley’s identification of the assailant while he was still

experiencing trauma from the aftermath of a knife assault falls within this rule.

Certainly Swalley could have been startled by awakening to the chaos that erupted

after the assault, with a group of people chasing Erickson and others attempting to

respond to a medical emergency. Swalley’s testimony also indicated that the event

was traumatic, as he saw blood gushing from Eli Antoine’s hand and attempted to stop

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the bleeding. And Swalley’s statement to the 911 dispatcher identifying Erickson

was related to the startling event of the assault. The problem with the government’s

argument, however, is that the trial testimony did not make it clear how Swalley

obtained the information that he related over the phone. The trial testimony indicated

that Frank Swalley had passed out from drinking and was awakened only after the

attack had already occurred. As related above, Frank Swalley testified that he had no

recollection of the 911 call. The lack of detail in the trial record thus makes his

statement difficult to evaluate because it is not clear how he came to the conclusion

that Erickson had committed the crime.

Erickson argues that this case is analogous to Meder v. Everest & Jennings,

Inc., 637 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1981), in which we held that the trial court erred in

admitting a police officer’s testimony about a statement in his police report because

it was uncertain who had made the statement to the officer. The statement related to

the cause of an accident, and the defendant argued that it was admissible as an excited

utterance. Id. at 1186. We held, however, that because the officer could not say who

had made the statement, it was “impossible for us to determine whether the maker of

the statement was an eyewitness of what occurred at the scene,” and thus it was

improper for the district court to admit the statement as an excited utterance. Id.

Erickson contends that we face a similar difficulty in evaluating the statement at issue

here. The government counters that this case is more like Greene v. B.F. Goodrich

Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2005), in which the court considered the

admissibility of a helicopter pilot’s exclamation that “I think my gyro just quit” made

immediately before a fatal crash. In concluding that the statement was admissible as

an excited utterance, the court rejected the argument that the pilot needed to have

physically observed the failure of the instrument. Id. at 790-91. Rather, the court

determined that the pilot could have made a logical inference based on his training and

observation of the instrument control panel. Id. The government likewise contends

that, even if Frank Swalley did not observe the assault firsthand, he could have made

a reasonable inference based on everything that he saw and heard following the attack.

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Neither of the cases cited by the parties involved the exact situation we face

here. In Meder, the declarant’s identity was unknown, whereas both Erickson and the

government acknowledge that the statement to the 911 dispatcher came from Frank

Swalley. The question is not who made the statement, but instead how the

information was obtained, which distinguishes the present case from Greene, in which

it was obvious that the pilot’s inference about the failure of his gyroscope was based

on his observation of the instrument panel and the aircraft’s behavior. In this case

there are a number of conceivable explanations for Frank Swalley’s belief that

Erickson was the assailant—for example, someone who witnessed the attack could

have told him; he might have observed people leaving the residence to chase after

Erickson; or he could have based his conclusion on his earlier observation of

Erickson’s erratic, aggressive behavior. Because there is no way to identify the basis

of the statement with any certainty, however, it is problematic whether it was properly

admitted as an excited utterance. 

We are nevertheless convinced that any error in admitting the statement was

harmless given the overwhelming evidence against Erickson. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

52(a); see also United States v. Stenger, 605 F.3d 492, 503 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding

that admission of hearsay does not constitute reversible error when the evidence did

not affect the defendant’s substantial rights and had at most only a very slight

influence on the verdict). As recounted above, two eyewitnesses—Samantha Kitteaux

and Isaiah Swalley—described the series of events in which Anthony Kitteaux walked

up to the door and was slashed across the face by Erickson. Neither witness testified

to seeing the knife, but the evidence left no doubt that the victims suffered knife

wounds and that Erickson had caused the injuries. Although several of the other

witnesses expressed unwillingness to testify against a family member, they still

corroborated the basic facts that Erickson attended the party, became intoxicated and

angry, and fled the scene after the assault. Moreover, when the police apprehended

Erickson, he had what appeared to be blood on his hands, despite the lack of any

apparent injury. Finally, Samantha Kitteaux and Anthony Kitteaux both testified that

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Erickson called from jail and apologized for causing the injuries. Accordingly, we

conclude that any error in admitting Frank Swalley’s out-of-court statement was

harmless.

III.

 Erickson also argues that the charge stemming from the assault on Small Bear

was improperly joined with the other charges and that the district court erred in

denying his motion to sever.

We review de novo the initial question whether offenses were properly joined.

United States v. McCarther, 596 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 2010). Offenses may be

properly joined if the offenses are “of the same or similar character, or are based on

the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common

scheme or plan.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). We construe this rule broadly in favor of

joinder to promote judicial efficiency. McCarther, 596 F.3d at 441-42. The offenses

joined in this case were similar in that they all involved knife assaults by Erickson

after he had been drinking with other individuals at Sherry Erickson’s residence.

Small Bear testified that Erickson had assaulted her in November or December of

2007, meaning that the joined crimes occurred at most approximately two months

apart. Given the similarities between the offenses and their spacial and temporal

proximity to one another, as well as the presumption in favor of the efficiency

achieved through joinder, we conclude that the offenses were properly joined.

Even when offenses have been properly joined, however, the district court

retains the discretion to order separate trials if it appears that a defendant will

otherwise be unduly prejudiced. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). We review a district

court’s denial of a motion to sever for abuse of discretion and will reverse only when

the denial of severance severely prejudiced the defendant. McCarther, 596 F.3d at

442. We have held that a defendant cannot show prejudice when evidence of the

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joined offense would be properly admissible in a separate trial for the other crime.

See United States v. Taken Alive, 513 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 2008). 

The government maintains that evidence of each of the knife assaults would

have been admissible in a separate trial on the other offenses to establish Erickson’s

intent, among other things. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (stating that evidence of other

crimes, though not admissible to prove the defendant’s criminal character, may be

admissible to show intent, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake); see also

James, 564 F.3d at 963 (explaining that Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than

exclusion). Erickson argues that the evidence of other assaults would not have been

admissible to show intent because he did not contest the issue of intent at trial, citing

United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274 (8th Cir. 1996), in which we held that

evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual abuse of a minor was not admissible to show

his intent with respect to a charge of abusive sexual contact with a different minor.

We observed that intent was not a serious issue in the case because if the jury believed

that the defendant had engaged in the sexual conduct for which he was charged, it

could “hardly doubt that [the defendant] intended criminal sexual contact.” Id. at 279.

We further stated that such seriously prejudicial evidence should not be admitted to

prove a nominally contested issue. Id. 

Unlike the sexual conduct at issue in LeCompte, an inference of intent does not

automatically follow from the fact that a victim sustains a knife injury during a party

at which nearly everyone is intoxicated. Thus, we do not agree with Erickson’s

assertion that his intent was merely a nominal issue at trial. Moreover, our postLeCompte holdings have clarified that the government generally has wide latitude in

deciding how to present its case. See United States v. Walker, 428 F.3d 1165, 1169-

70 (8th Cir. 2005). “The mere fact that [a defendant] did not actively dispute motive

or intent [does not] preclude the government from offering otherwise admissible

evidence as to these factors.” Id. at 1170. Evidence of other recent knife assaults

sharing a number of common characteristics would likely have been admissible in a

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We also note that Erickson’s acquittal on the charge of assault with a

dangerous weapon stemming from the incident with Small Bear suggests that the jury

was able to consider separately each charge.

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separate trial, and Erickson was therefore not prejudiced by the district court’s denial

of severance.

This case is also similar to several other cases in which we have affirmed the

district court’s denial of a severance motion. In United States v. Steele, for example,

we affirmed the district court’s refusal to sever a charge of assaulting a federal officer

from several other assault charges involving a different victim. 550 F.3d 693, 702

(8th Cir. 2008). The assault that the defendant sought to sever occurred within four

months of the other assaults, and we held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying severance because, “[h]ad separate trials been held, the evidence

of each alleged assault would likely have been admissible under Rule 404(b) in the

other trial.” We reached a similar conclusion in Taken Alive, affirming the district

court’s denial of severance for separate assaults that occurred approximately one

month apart and involved separate victims. 513 F.3d at 903. As here, both offenses

were “assaults in which the person assaulted was an acquaintance of [the defendant]

and had been drinking with [the defendant] at the time of the assault.” Id. We held

that “admitting the other assault to show absence of mistake or accident or to show

intent would not be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, and the separate juries

would likely know about both assaults.” Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Erickson’s motion to sever in this

case.3

 

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IV.

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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