Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01115/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01115-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fortuna Enterprises, LP
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 17, 2015 Decided June 12, 2015

No. 14-1099

FORTUNA ENTERPRISES, LP,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

UNITE HERE LOCAL 11,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 14-1115

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of

the National Labor Relations Board

Stephen R. Lueke argued the cause for petitioner. With 

him on the briefs was Stefan H. Black.

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Edward D. Swidriski III, Attorney, National Labor 

Relations Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him 

on the brief were Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, 

John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda 

Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Kira 

Dellinger Vol, Supervisory Attorney.

Eric B. Myers was on the brief for intervenor Unite Here,

Local 11, in support of respondent.

Before: GRIFFITH and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Fortuna Enterprises, 

L.P., petitions for review of a National Labor Relations Board 

order finding that Fortuna violated § 8(a)(1) of the National 

Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), by suspending 

seventy-seven employees for participating in an on-site work 

stoppage. See Fortuna Enters., L.P., 360 NLRB No. 128

(May 30, 2014), 2014 WL 2448880. The Board filed a crossapplication for enforcement of the challenged order; and labor 

union Unite Here, Local 11, intervenes in favor of 

enforcement. For the reasons stated below, we will deny 

Fortuna’s petition to review the Board’s order and grant the 

Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Petitioner Fortuna Enterprises operates the Los Angeles 

Airport Hilton Hotel and Towers (hereinafter “Hilton”). 

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Beginning in January 2006, intervenor union, Unite Here, 

Local 11, conducted a public campaign to organize Fortuna’s 

employees at the Hilton. On May 10, 2006, Fortuna 

suspended employee Sergio Reyes pending an investigation 

of allegations of theft. Suspecting that Reyes’s suspension 

was related to his union activities, several employees decided 

to meet the following morning in the staff cafeteria to induce 

management (specifically, Hilton’s general manager Grant 

Coonley or Hilton’s food and beverage director Tom Cook) to 

address the employees’ concerns over Reyes’s suspension.

At 8:00 a.m. on May 11, 2006, seventy to one hundred 

employees gathered in the cafeteria. Upon arriving at the 

cafeteria, the employees asked a security guard to inform 

Coonley and Cook that the employees wanted to meet with 

them. When housekeeping director Anna Samayoa arrived at 

the cafeteria at approximately 8:13 a.m., the security guard 

notified Samayoa that the employees had requested a meeting 

with Cook or Coonley. The guard told Samayoa that Cook 

was on his way, but Coonley was not at the hotel. Samayoa 

attempted to reach Cook by telephone, but received no 

answer.

At approximately 8:26 a.m., Samayoa ordered the 

employees gathered in the cafeteria to return to work if they 

were not on break. Employee Michael Vargas responded that 

the employees were not leaving until they spoke to Coonley 

or Cook. Samayoa told Vargas that Coonley was not 

available, and Vargas responded, “Then we need to speak to 

[Cook].” Fortuna, 2014 WL 2448880, at *2. At 8:32 a.m., 

Samayoa again ordered the employees to return to work if 

they were not on break. The employees did not comply. At 

8:57 a.m., Samayoa reiterated her order, this time adding that 

employees would be suspended if they remained in the 

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cafeteria. Vargas then asked Samayoa to try to reach Coonley 

on his cell phone; Samayoa responded that she would try.

A few minutes after the third warning, Samayoa began 

suspending employees one by one. Vargas intervened and

asked Samayoa to “focus on contacting Mr. Coonley.” 

Samayoa responded, “Yes, I will try,” and left the cafeteria. 

Id. About this time, Hilton’s chief of security Grant Taylor 

announced that he was going to call the police if the 

employees failed to leave. Despite this threat, however, 

Taylor also promised Vargas that he would try to contact 

Coonley. A half an hour later, at approximately 9:30 a.m., 

Vargas asked Samayoa if she had contacted Coonley. 

Samayoa responded, “No, we’re still waiting just like you 

are.” Id. Vargas also asked hotel chief steward Rogelio de la 

Rosa to contact Coonley, Cook, or human resources manager 

Sue Trobaugh. De la Rosa responded, “Okay, let me go and 

see what I can do.” Id. 

At approximately 10:15 a.m., having received no 

response from Coonley or Cook, a delegation of eight to ten 

employees informed management that they wanted to return 

to work. Kitchen supervisor David Aragon, after speaking 

with Cook, informed the employees that they were suspended 

and could not return to work. Shortly thereafter, Samayoa, 

accompanied by a police officer, confirmed to the delegation 

that the employees who participated in the work stoppage 

were suspended and could not return to work. Having been 

informed of their suspensions by the returning employee 

delegation, the remaining employees left the cafeteria at 

approximately 10:30 a.m. Ultimately, seventy-seven

employees who participated in the work stoppage were 

suspended for five days for “[i]nsubordination” and “[f]ailure 

to follow instructions.” Id. at *3.

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B. Procedural Background

The National Labor Relations Board’s general counsel 

issued a complaint against Fortuna based on the May 11 

suspensions and other alleged anti-union conduct. An 

Administrative Law Judge found the suspensions violated 

§ 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 158(a)(1), because the employees participating in the work 

stoppage were engaged in concerted action for “mutual aid or 

protection” under § 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157. Fortuna 

Enters., L.P., 354 NLRB 202, 211 (2009) (Board adopting 

and appending ALJ’s decision). In determining whether the 

concerted activity was protected under § 7, the ALJ undertook 

to apply the Board precedent set forth in Quietflex 

Manufacturing Co., 344 NLRB 1055 (2005). See id.

In Quietflex, the Board identified ten factors “that the 

Board ha[d] considered in determining” whether the 

organizational rights of employees engaged in a work 

stoppage outweighed the property rights of the employer. 344 

NLRB at 1056. The factors listed by the Board in Quietflex

are: 

(1) the reason the employees have stopped working; 

(2) whether the work stoppage was peaceful; 

(3) whether the work stoppage interfered with 

production, or deprived the employer access to its property; 

(4) whether employees had adequate opportunity to 

present grievances to management; 

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(5) whether employees were given any warning that they 

must leave the premises or face discharge; 

(6) the duration of the work stoppage; 

(7) whether employees were represented or had an 

established grievance procedure; 

(8) whether employees remained on the premises beyond 

their shift; 

(9) whether the employees attempted to seize the 

employer’s property; and 

(10) the reason for which the employees were ultimately 

discharged.

Id. at 1056–57; see also Fortuna Enters., L.P. v. NLRB, 665 

F.3d 1295, 1300 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

The ALJ in the Fortuna dispute expressly considered 

each of the ten Quietflex factors and concluded that each 

factor either weighed in favor, or did not weigh against, 

protection of the work stoppage. 354 NLRB at 211–12. 

Thus, the ALJ determined that Fortuna violated § 8(a)(1) of 

the National Labor Relations Act by suspending the 

employees. The National Labor Relations Board ultimately 

affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, subject to minor modifications. Id. at 203 

& n.3; see also Fortuna Enters., L.P., 355 NLRB 602 (2010) 

(reinstating and incorporating by reference Board’s earlier 

decisions which were issued by a two-member Board in 

contravention of New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 

674 (2010)).

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Fortuna petitioned this Court for review. Fortuna, 665 

F.3d at 1298. Fortuna asked the Court to set aside the Board’s 

order with respect to the May 11 suspensions on the ground 

that the Board’s assessment of nine of the ten Quietflex

factors was flawed. Id. at 1300. After rejecting Fortuna’s 

objection to the Board’s assessment of the first Quietflex

factor (why the employees stopped working), we held that 

“[w]ith two exceptions, there is nothing to the balance of 

[Fortuna’s] arguments against the Board’s application of the 

Quietflex factors.” Id. at 1301. “The exceptions are the 

Board’s treatment of factor (3)—‘whether the work stoppage 

interfered with production,’ and factors (4) and (7)—‘whether 

employees had adequate opportunity to present grievances to 

management’ or access to ‘an established grievance 

procedure.’” Id. (quoting Quietflex, 344 NLRB at 1057).

With respect to the third factor, interference with 

production, Quietflex stated in a footnote, “It is not considered 

an interference of production where the employees do no 

more than withhold their own services.” 344 NLRB at 1057 

n.6. We were “not quite sure what to make of this” footnote. 

Fortuna, 665 F.3d at 1301. Indeed, “the point of this 

Quietflex factor is unclear” given that “[s]ome protected 

activities,” such as strikes, “exert economic pressure on the 

employer by interfering with production.” Id. (emphasis in 

original). We thus remanded to the Board for an explanation 

of the third Quietflex factor and an assessment of how this

factor relates to the May 11 work stoppage. Id. at 1303.

We then turned to the Board’s consideration of the fourth 

and seventh Quietflex factors (whether employees had 

adequate opportunity to present grievances to management or 

access to an established grievance procedure). Considering 

these factors, “the Board adopted the ALJ’s determination 

that the complaint procedure [Fortuna] had in place 

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‘addressed only individual complaints and not group 

grievances like the one presented in the instant case.’” Id. at 

1302 (quoting Fortuna, 354 NLRB at 212). We held that this 

finding was “not supported by substantial evidence,” id. at 

1303, as the record demonstrates that Fortuna’s “open door” 

policy was well known, widely used, and effective in the past 

at addressing group grievances, id. at 1302–03. Noting that 

“the Board never quantified the weight to be given to any one 

of the Quietflex factors” we “grant[ed] the petition for review 

with respect to the Board’s assessment of the May 11 protest 

and remand[ed] this issue for reconsideration by the Board.” 

Id. at 1303.

On remand, the Board determined that the May 11 work 

stoppage was protected and that Fortuna violated the Act by 

suspending the participating employees. Fortuna, 2014 WL 

2448880, at *10. As noted by the Board, we “affirmed the 

Board’s findings and conclusions with respect to Quietflex

factors 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10.” Id. at *5. Pursuant to the 

remand, the Board determined how much weight to give to 

each of those factors. The Board concluded that “factors 1, 2, 

6, 8, and 9 strongly support a conclusion that the employees 

were engaged in protected activity at the time they were 

suspended;” that “factor 5 ([Fortuna’s] warning to employees) 

is entitled to little weight;” and “that factor 10 (the reasons for 

the discipline, here insubordination) does not weigh against 

protection.” Id. at *6.

Given our concern with the Board’s articulation of 

Quietflex factor three (interference with production), the 

Board undertook “to clarify this factor.” Id. at *7. The Board 

explained that the “focus of the Board and the courts when 

applying this factor is on whether striking employees interfere 

with production or the provision of services by preventing 

other employees who are working from performing their 

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duties.” Id. (emphasis in original). Applying the clarified 

test, the Board found that this factor “weighs strongly in favor 

of protection,” as “there is no suggestion that the striking 

employees attempted to prevent other employees from 

working.” Id.

With respect to Quietflex factor four (whether employees 

had an adequate opportunity to present grievances to 

management), the Board accepted our determination that 

employees had access to an established grievance procedure. 

Nevertheless, the Board “conclude[d] that this factor weighs 

slightly in favor of protection” given “the repeated assurances 

given the employees by Samayoa and other managers that 

they were trying to contact Coonley and Cook on the 

employees’ behalf.” Id. at *8. The employees’ reasonable 

belief “that Coonley or Cook might yet meet with them and 

listen to their grievance...contributed to the employees’ 

decision to persist in the work stoppage for as long as they 

did.” Id.

With respect to Quietflex factor seven (access to 

established grievance procedure), the Board accepted our

“determination that the employees had access to an 

established procedure through [Fortuna’s] ‘open door’ policy

for addressing group grievances” then gave “that factor due 

weight, but not decisive weight.” Id. The fact that an 

established grievance procedure may cut against protection 

“does not mean...that the Act affords no protection to 

employees who engage in peaceful, nondisruptive, on-site 

work stoppages without first attempting to resolve their 

complaint through approved channels.” Id. (emphasis in 

original).

“Considering all the relevant factors,” the Board 

“conclude[d] that the work stoppage was protected for its 

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entire duration.” Id. at *10. This conclusion was based 

“primarily on the following factors: the purpose of the work 

stoppage was clearly protected; it was peaceful and did not 

disrupt the work of nonstriking employees; it was of a limited 

duration; and no employees remained on [Fortuna’s] premises 

beyond their shift or attempted to seize [Fortuna’s] property.” 

Id. The Board determined that “[t]hese factors, taken 

together, substantially outweigh the significance of the 

availability of a grievance procedure in the circumstances of

this case.” Id. As the Board summarized its decision:

[T]he employees were entitled to continue their 

on-site work stoppage for a reasonable period 

of time in a legitimate effort to meet with 

senior-level managers, despite the existence of 

an established grievance procedure and despite 

[Fortuna’s] directive that the employees return 

to work or leave the Hotel, less than an hour 

after the peaceful work stoppage began and 

while employees were waiting to hear whether 

senior management would meet with them.

Id. Fortuna petitions for review of that order, and the Board 

has filed a cross-application for enforcement. For the reasons 

stated below, we will deny Fortuna’s petition and grant the 

Board’s cross-application.

II. ANALYSIS

This Court will “uphold the Board’s legal determinations 

so long as they are neither arbitrary nor inconsistent with 

established law.” Tualatin Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 714, 

717 (D.C. Cir. 2001). “Determining whether activity is 

concerted and protected within the meaning of Section 7 is a 

task that ‘implicates [the Board’s] expertise in labor 

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relations.’” Citizens Inv. Servs. Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.3d 

1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting NLRB v. City Disposal 

Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984)) (alteration in original). 

Thus, “[t]he Board’s determination that an employee has 

engaged in protected concerted activity is entitled to 

considerable deference if it is reasonable.” Id. “The Board’s 

findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the 

record considered as a whole, are conclusive even if a 

reviewing court on de novo review would reach a different 

result.” Id.

A. The Board’s Explanation of Quietflex Factor 

Three

Under the third Quietflex factor, the Board is to consider 

whether the work stoppage interfered with production or 

deprived the employer access to its property. Explaining what 

it meant when it previously stated that “it is not considered an 

interference with production where employees do no more 

than withhold their own labor,” Fortuna, 354 NLRB at 211, 

the Board on remand clarified that the proper focus is on 

“whether striking employees interfere with production or the 

provision of services by preventing other employees who are 

working from performing their duties,” Fortuna, 2014 WL 

2448880, at *7 (emphasis in original). Applying this 

standard, the Board found that factor three weighed in favor 

of protection. Fortuna contends that the Board erred by 

imposing an unworkable standard for the third Quietflex

factor, and that this factor should weigh against protection

because the withdrawal of the services of the striking 

employees affected the non-striking employees’ ability to do 

their jobs. We disagree.

Fortuna’s primary complaint is that the Board’s clarified 

third factor “is completely impracticable in the service 

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industry.” Fortuna Br. 32. Fortuna contends that unlike 

factory owners who can simply shut down a production line if 

part of the workforce strikes, employers in the service 

industry “must re-task non-striking employees away from 

their normal duties to ensure that the services normally 

performed by the striking employees are in fact carried out.” 

Id. at 33. Thus, “at least in the service industry, the 

withdrawal of services by striking employees necessarily

impacts the work performance of non-striking employees.” 

Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).

While Fortuna’s proposed industry distinction is certainly 

not frivolous, it is not sufficiently powerful to carry the day. 

The Board’s clarification of the third Quietflex factor, made at 

the direction of this Court, is at least reasonable and therefore

entitled to deference. The Board was not obligated to create 

special rules for the service industry. One possible purpose of 

a work stoppage, whether at a factory or at a hotel, is to exert 

economic pressure on the employer. By reassigning nonparticipating workers, Hilton management sought to mitigate 

the economic effects of the work stoppage employees 

withholding their own services. The stoppage impacted the 

work performance of other employees because Fortuna strove

to maintain full service at full capacity. In this respect, 

Fortuna is like a factory owner who, after half of his 

workforce engages in a work stoppage, attempts to continue 

operating the factory at full capacity and reassigns other

employees to keep every production line operating. Hilton 

management could have, in effect, “shut down a production 

line” by cancelling room and restaurant reservations and not 

accepting additional guests. This would have had an 

economic impact on Fortuna, but that would be because 

employees withheld their own services, not because 

employees interfered with the ability of other employees to do 

their jobs. In short, the Board’s clarification of the third 

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factor is reasonable and the Board was not required to create 

different rules for the service industry.

Fortuna further contends that, even accepting the Board’s 

clarification of the third factor, “there is ample evidence in the 

record that demonstrates that the employees engaged in the 

work stoppage adversely affected the working conditions of 

the non-striking employees beyond simply the withholding of 

their services.” Fortuna Br. 34. Fortuna argues that the 

occupation of the employee cafeteria prevented nonparticipating employees from eating their lunch, forced 

Fortuna to reassign three separate Hilton managers to oversee 

the work stoppage, and resulted in some guest rooms being 

left uncleaned. Id. at 34–35.

Again, Fortuna’s argument is not unreasonable, and we 

are not suggesting that the Board would have erred had it 

adopted it. However, neither are we convinced that the Board 

has erred in reaching the opposite conclusion. First, in 

contending that the “record” shows that other employees were 

prevented from eating lunch, Fortuna relies on testimony by 

Hilton managers that the presiding ALJ rejected as hearsay. 

See Hr’g Tr. 1548:4–11, In re Fortuna Enters., L.P. (NLRB), 

No. 31-CA-27837, May 13, 2008. Based on the admissible 

evidence, the Board reasonably determined that Fortuna “did 

not present the testimony of a single employee that the work 

stoppage interfered with their ability to use the cafeteria.” 

Fortuna, 2014 WL 2448880, at *6 n.19. Second, Fortuna 

made the decision to assign three separate Hilton managers to 

oversee the work stoppage. “Whatever losses [Fortuna] 

sustained...were caused by its own response to the work 

stoppage, not by the work stoppage itself.” Accel, Inc., 339 

NLRB 1052, 1053 (2003). Third, the Board reasonably 

determined that “although [Fortuna] contends that there were 

some rooms that were not cleaned, it does not assert that it 

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was unable to provide a clean room to any guest.” Fortuna, 

2014 WL 2448880, at *6 n.19. In sum, while the record 

“shows that the work stoppage did disrupt some of Hilton’s 

operations,” Fortuna, 665 F.3d at 1302, it does not compel a 

finding that the work stoppage interfered with the provision of 

services by other employees in the relevant sense. We hold 

that the Board’s clarification of Quietflex factor three and its 

application thereof were reasonable and supported by 

substantial evidence.

B. The Board’s Analysis of Quietflex Factors 

Four and Seven

Under the fourth and seventh Quietflex factors, the Board 

is to consider whether employees had adequate opportunities 

to present grievances to management, and whether employees 

were represented or had an established grievance procedure. 

Analyzing these factors in its 2009 order, the Board 

erroneously concluded that the procedure Hilton had in place 

“addressed only individual complaints and not group 

grievances.” Fortuna, 354 NLRB at 212. We found that 

conclusion unsupported by the record, and remanded the 

matter to the Board to reconsider these factors in light of our

holding that the employees had access to Hilton’s “open 

door” policy, which served as “an established procedure for 

handling ‘group grievances.’” Fortuna, 665 F.3d at 1302. On 

remand, the Board found that factor four (opportunity to 

present grievances to management) weighs slightly in favor of 

protection given “the context of the repeated assurances given 

the employees by Samayoa and other managers that they were 

trying to contact Coonley and Cook on the employees’ 

behalf.” Fortuna, 2014 WL 2448880, at *8. The Board gave 

factor seven (existence of established grievance procedure) 

“due weight, but not decisive weight.” Id. The Board 

concluded that the existence of an established grievance 

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procedure is but one factor in the analysis, which may be 

outweighed by competing factors. See id.

Fortuna contends that the Board erred in its analysis of 

factors four and seven, and the Board failed to give proper 

weight to the Hilton’s “open door” policy. As Fortuna argues, 

“[b]ecause an established grievance procedure allows 

employees to exercise their Section 7 rights without infringing 

upon the employer’s private property rights, the existence of 

such a grievance procedure weighs heavily against protecting 

an on-site work stoppage.” Fortuna Br. 24. Fortuna points to 

Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969), and 

Cambro Manufacturing Co., 312 NLRB 634 (1993), as

examples of cases where “on-site work stoppages were held 

not to be protected in large part because the employees failed 

to take advantage of an effective existing grievance 

procedure.” Fortuna Br. 25 (emphasis in original). Fortuna 

maintains that the employees could have addressed their 

concerns through availing themselves of the open door policy, 

or through an off-site strike; either action would have 

addressed their concerns while respecting the private property 

interests of Fortuna. Fortuna further contends that the Board 

erred when it concluded that factor four weighed in favor of 

protection. In considering this factor, the Board relied on the 

assurances by management that Coonley or Cook might speak 

with the gathered employees. This, Fortuna argues, 

contradicts our statement that Fortuna “had no obligation to 

inform the employees in the cafeteria that it would hear and 

consider their concerns in the future.” Fortuna, 665 F.3d at 

1302.

Fortuna’s argument does not succeed. The Board 

addressed the terms of the remand and came to a reasoned 

conclusion that other “factors, taken together, substantially 

outweigh the significance of the availability of a grievance 

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procedure in the circumstances of this case.” Fortuna, 2014 

WL 2448880, at *10. Nothing in the National Labor 

Relations Act, the Quietflex test, or judicial and Board 

opinions analyzing on-site work stoppages mandates that the 

existence of an alternative group grievance procedure prevails 

over the other Quietflex factors. On remand, the Board 

carefully distinguished Cone Mills and Cambro, id. at *9, 

showing that the existence of an established grievance 

procedure was not decisive in those cases, but that “the 

tribunals relied on a combination of factors in concluding that 

the work stoppages at issue were unprotected,” id. at *8.

It is true that management “had no obligation to inform 

the employees in the cafeteria that it would hear and consider 

their concerns in the future.” Fortuna, 665 F.3d at 1302. The 

Board’s consideration of factor four, however, was not 

premised on management’s failure to notify the employees 

“that a meeting with senior managers was not immediately 

possible” or failure to offer “a future opportunity to meet.” 

Id. It was premised on the repeated assurances by Samayoa 

and other managers that they were reaching out to Coonley 

and Cook. The Board reasonably determined that “[t]he 

employees thus reasonably believed that Coonley or Cook 

might yet meet with them” and this “belief demonstrably 

contributed to the employees’ decision to persist in the work 

stoppage for as long as they did.” Fortuna, 2014 WL 

2448880, at *8. This conclusion does not contradict anything 

in our prior opinion, and there is substantial evidence in the 

record demonstrating that Hilton management repeatedly 

assured the gathered employees that there were ongoing 

efforts to reach Coonley and Cook. See id. at *1–*3. While 

Hilton management had no affirmative obligation to promise 

a future meeting (or inform employees that there would be no 

such meeting), once Hilton management induced the 

gathering employees to stay in the cafeteria with the 

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implication that a meeting was possible, this inducement may 

favor protection. The Board complied with our remand, and 

came to a reasoned conclusion supported by substantial 

evidence, in its analysis of factors four and seven.

C. Fortuna’s Remaining Challenges to the 

Board’s Decision

In its earlier 2009 order, “the Board never quantified the 

weight to be given to any one of the Quietflex factors.” 

Fortuna, 665 F.3d at 1303. Since the Board found that none 

of the Quietflex factors weighed against protection, the Board 

found no need to assign any particular weight to each factor. 

Having held that the Board’s analysis of factors three, four, 

and seven was inadequate, we remanded the matter to the 

Board to analyze and weigh all the factors in a manner 

consistent with our opinion. Fortuna contends that the Board 

erred in weighing these factors, arguing that each factor does

not weigh strongly in favor of protection. We disagree.

Fortuna contends that “the Board erred by rebalancing 

the Quietflex factors in a manner that is plainly result-driven.” 

Fortuna Br. 36. Fortuna cites Board Member Johnson’s 

concurring opinion, which states that the Quietflex “test is

fraught with difficulty for remand purposes.” Fortuna, 2014 

WL 2448880, at *12 n.3 (Johnson, concurring). As Member 

Johnson stated:

An obvious problem posed by reweighting 

factors under any multifactor test, much less a 

10 factor one, after a case has been remanded to 

us is the susceptibility to results-oriented 

analysis. In other words, colloquially speaking, 

the Board’s reweighting the factors to achieve 

the same result may seem to the impartial 

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observer more like some analytical version of 

Whac-A-Mole than reasoned decisionmaking.

Id. Fortuna further notes that this Court, in remanding to the 

Board, held that the “apparently decisive consideration” 

underlying the Board’s 2009 order (the finding that there was 

not an effective group grievance procedure) was not 

supported by substantial evidence. Fortuna, 665 F.3d at 

1302. Fortuna argues that the Board erroneously weighed 

other factors to overcome the fact that the evidence does not

support the “decisive consideration” of its prior opinion, in an 

example of “result-driven decision-making.” Fortuna Br. 19.

Member Johnson’s concerns about the nebulousness of a 

ten-factor balancing test may be well-taken. Balancing tests 

in general are susceptible to results-driven application. As 

this Court stated previously, “the sort of multi-factor 

balancing ‘test’ suggested in Quietflex may be incapable of 

predictable application.” Fortuna, 665 F.3d at 1300. 

However, as we did before, “we shall assume [the Quietflex 

test’s] validity.” Id. While Quietflex may be subject to 

abuse, the record does not demonstrate that the Board abused 

the test in this case. The fact that the Board reaffirmed its 

prior decision does not mean that its analysis was resultsdriven. The Board’s weighing of the remaining Quietflex

factors was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.

In challenging how the Board specifically weighed each 

remaining Quietflex factor, Fortuna largely repackages its 

prior, unsuccessful arguments regarding the Board’s analysis 

of those factors. “When there are multiple appeals taken in 

the course of a single piece of litigation, law-of-the-case 

doctrine holds that decisions rendered on the first appeal 

should not be revisited on later trips to the appellate court.” 

Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. 

USCA Case #14-1115 Document #1557174 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 18 of 19
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Cir. 1995). When this matter was previously before this 

Court, Fortuna challenged the Board’s analysis of nine of the 

ten Quietflex factors. With the exceptions noted above, we 

rejected Fortuna’s arguments without much comment. See 

Fortuna, 665 F.3d at 1301. There was “nothing 

to...[Fortuna’s] arguments against the Board’s application of 

[those] Quietflex factors” then, and there is nothing to them 

now. Id. We will thus deny Fortuna’s petition for review and 

grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

III. CONCLUSION

When this matter was previously before this Court, we 

issued a limited remand directing the National Labor 

Relations Board to clarify one factor of the Board’s ten-factor 

balancing test, re-analyze two factors in light of our holding 

that Fortuna had an established group grievance procedure, 

and weigh all of the factors to determine whether the 

employees’ work stoppage remained protected under the 

National Labor Relations Act. The Board complied and 

issued a reasonable order, supported by substantial evidence, 

concluding that the May 11 work stoppage was protected and 

Fortuna’s suspension of participating employees violated the 

Act. We deny Fortuna’s petition for review and grant the 

Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

 So ordered.

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