Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01850/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01850-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Office of Personnel Management
Respondent
Teodora L. Owen
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TEODORA L. OWEN,

Petitioner

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-1850

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-0831-15-0543-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: September 12, 2016

______________________ 

TEODORA L. OWEN, Zambales, Philippines, pro se.

JEFFREY LOWRY, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BENJAMIN C.

MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., DEBORAH A. BYNUM. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, DYK, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Case: 16-1850 Document: 26-2 Page: 1 Filed: 09/12/2016
2 OWEN v. OPM

Teodora L. Owen is the widow of John E. Owen, a 

former federal government employee. In 2008, she filed 

an application with the Office of Personnel Management 

for survivor benefits under the Civil Service Retirement 

System (CSRS) based on her late husband’s federal service. OPM denied the application in 2010, the Merit 

Systems Protection Board affirmed the same year, and we 

dismissed Mrs. Owen’s appeal in early 2011 for failure to 

prosecute.

In 2015, Mrs. Owen filed the application at issue in 

the present appeal. She applied to OPM for permission to 

make a deposit into the CSRS fund on behalf of her late 

husband as a step toward receiving CSRS survivor benefits. OPM declined to consider the application because, in 

rejecting Mrs. Owen’s earlier application in the 2008–

2011 proceeding, it had already found that Mr. Owen’s 

service was not a permissible basis for CSRS benefits. 

The Board affirmed. We now affirm that decision.1

BACKGROUND

Mr. Owen was a federal civil-service employee in the 

competitive service from April 9, 1945, through August 

30, 1945. After leaving that post, he requested and received a refund of the retirement deductions that had 

been deposited into the CSRS fund. Many years later, 

starting in 1969, Mr. Owen held a position with a NonAppropriated Fund Instrumentality (NAFI), the U.S. 

Navy Exchange, in Subic Bay, Philippines—a position he 

lost on September 4, 1991, based on a federal reduction in 

force. During his NAFI service, Mr. Owen declined to 

participate in the NAFI’s retirement and insurance plans. 

Mr. Owen died on July 13, 1996.

 

1 We grant Mrs. Owen’s motion to file a supplemental memorandum in lieu of oral argument.

Case: 16-1850 Document: 26-2 Page: 2 Filed: 09/12/2016
OWEN v. OPM 3

On September 2, 2008, Mrs. Owen filed her first

application with OPM for survivor benefits based on her 

late husband’s federal service. OPM found that Mrs. 

Owen was not entitled to benefits because the Civil Service Commission had refunded Mr. Owen’s retirement 

deductions in 1946. After an initial remand from the 

Board for further consideration of Mr. Owen’s federal 

employment between 1969 and 1991, see Owen v. Office of 

Pers. Mgmt., No. SF-0831-09-0452-I-1, 2009 WL 3379697

(MSPB Aug. 6, 2009) (Owen I), OPM found that the 1969–

1991 service likewise did not entitle Mrs. Owen to the 

requested CSRS benefits, because the Civil Service Retirement Act did not cover Mr. Owen’s NAFI service. See

5 U.S.C. § 2105(c).

The Board affirmed. Owen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 

No. SF-0831-10-0366-I-1 (MSPB Nov. 2, 2010) (Owen II). 

The Board specifically considered and rejected Mrs. 

Owen’s argument that 5 U.S.C. § 8334(h) entitled her to 

make a CSRS deposit on behalf of her husband based on 

his 1969–1991 service. Id. at 2. The Board ruled that 

§ 8334(h) applied only to covered positions and that a 

retroactive deposit could not “convert” Mr. Owen’s noncovered NAFI service in 1969–1991 “into a covered position.” Id. Mrs. Owen appealed the Board’s decision to 

this Court, but in January 2011, we dismissed the appeal 

for failure to prosecute. Owen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 

453 F. App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

On March 1, 2015, Mrs. Owen filed her second survivor-benefit application with OPM, seeking again to qualify by requesting the opportunity to make a deposit into

the CSRS fund based on her late husband’s service from 

1969 to 1991. OPM declined to consider the application. 

It stated that the agency had previously found that Mrs. 

Owen was not eligible to make a CSRS deposit because 

Mr. Owen’s NAFI service was not covered for federal civil 

service retirement purposes. 

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4 OWEN v. OPM

On appeal to the Board in 2015, Mrs. Owen argued 

that her appeal “should be reopened for due process” 

because Mr. Owen was misinformed, or relied on misinformation, when he requested a refund of his 1945 CSRS 

deposits and when he refused to participate in the NAFI 

retirement plan. J.A. 14. She also argued that Mr. Owen 

was disabled and hospitalized when his NAFI position 

ended and that she “inadvertently” neglected “to file for 

disability or immediate retirement” at that time. Id. And

she argued that she was entitled to benefits under the 

Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities Employees’ 

Retirement Credit Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-638, 100 

Stat. 3535 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 8332(b)(16)). 

The administrative judge held that claim preclusion 

barred Mrs. Owen’s application. Specifically, the administrative judge found that, in Owen II, Mrs. Owen had 

received a final decision from a forum with jurisdiction 

over the merits of all the issues that she raised in her 

appeal, and that the same parties were involved in both 

cases. Alternatively, the administrative judge ruled that 

issue preclusion would bar Mrs. Owen’s application even 

if claim preclusion did not apply.

On review, the Board affirmed the administrative 

judge’s finding of claim preclusion. Owen v. Office of Pers. 

Mgmt., No. SF-0831-15-0543-I-1 (MSPB Feb. 1, 2016) 

(Owen III). The Board also rejected Mrs. Owen’s argument that the administrative judge was biased, concluding that Mrs. Owen “offer[ed] no evidence or argument 

that the administrative judge’s comments or actions 

evidenced ‘a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that 

would make fair judgment impossible.’” J.A. 10.

Mrs. Owen appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

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OWEN v. OPM 5

DISCUSSION

We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is “(1) 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been 

followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 

U.S.C. § 7703(c). We review the Board’s legal conclusions 

on claim preclusion de novo. See Phillips/May Corp. v. 

United States, 524 F.3d 1264, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Under the doctrine of claim preclusion applied by the 

Board (and federal courts), “a valid, final judgment on the 

merits of an action bars a second action involving the 

same parties or their privies based on the same cause of 

action.” Peartree v. U.S. Postal Serv., 66 M.S.P.R. 332, 

337 (1995); see also Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 

452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 

334 F.3d 1052, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Where it applies, 

claim preclusion prevents “the parties or their privies 

from relitigating issues that were or could have been 

raised in the prior action.” Peartree, 66 M.S.P.R. at 337. 

According to the Board’s claim-preclusion standard, a 

prior judgment bars a subsequent action if (1) the prior 

judgment was rendered by a forum with competent jurisdiction; (2) the prior judgment was a final judgment on 

the merits; and (3) the same cause of action and the same 

parties or their privies were involved in both cases. Id. 

The Board properly held that claim preclusion, based 

on the 2010 Board decision (Owen II), barred Mrs. Owen’s 

new appeal. Owen II was a valid, final judgment on the 

merits of Mrs. Owen’s claim for CSRS survivor benefits 

based on Mr. Owen’s federal service. See Peartree, 66 

M.S.P.R. at 337. Claim preclusion therefore applied to 

any issues that Mrs. Owen raised or could have raised in 

Owen II. See id. 

That bar covers each of the issues Mrs. Owen has 

raised in supporting her second application, brought to 

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6 OWEN v. OPM

the Board in 2015 and now before us. For example, in 

Owen II, the Board found that “Mr. Owen consistently 

rejected the retirement plan offered by the Navy Exchange to NAFI employees” and “withdrew the retirement 

deductions covering his 1945 employment.” J.A. 17. Mrs. 

Owen could have raised in Owen II her current allegations about misinformation affecting Mr. Owen’s 1946 

withdrawal of his CSRS deposits and about his decisions 

not to participate in the NAFI retirement plan. Likewise, 

the Board in Owen II considered and rejected Mrs. Owen’s 

argument that her late husband’s disability entitled him 

to benefits and excused her failure to file. Finally, the 

Board in Owen II considered and rejected Mrs. Owen’s 

argument that the Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities Employees’ Retirement Credit Act of 1986 supported 

the benefits claim—concluding that the 1986 Act applies 

only to certain civil service employees who held NAFI 

positions between 1952 and 1966, see 5 U.S.C. 

§ 8332(b)(16), a period in which Mr. Owen did not hold 

such a position.

Mrs. Owen’s allegations of misconduct do not undermine the entitlement of Owen II to preclusive effect. Mrs. 

Owen alleges that “there was concealment of the facts and 

misinformation that the agency was concealing the right 

of a widow.” Pet. Br. 1. But she has not offered, and we 

do not ourselves see, any meaningful evidence to support 

those allegations. In these circumstances, the Board’s 

ruling here properly rests on claim preclusion. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Board 

is affirmed.

No costs.

AFFIRMED

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