Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-13-01488/USCOURTS-ca13-13-01488-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
ALPS South, LLC
Cross-Appellant
Ohio Willow Wood Company
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ALPS SOUTH, LLC,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

THE OHIO WILLOW WOOD COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2013-1452, -1488, 2014-1147, -1426

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Middle District of Florida in No. 08-CV-1893, Judge Mary 

S. Scriven.

______________________ 

Decided: June 5, 2015

______________________ 

 RONALD A. CHRISTALDI, Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, 

LLP, Tampa, FL, argued for plaintiff-cross-appellant. Also 

represented by MINDI M. RICHTER; DAVID WAYNE 

WICKLUND, Toledo, OH. 

 JOHN DAVID LUKEN, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Cincinnati, OH, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by JOSHUA LORENTZ, BRIAN S. SULLIVAN. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

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2 ALPS SOUTH, LLC v. OHIO WILLOW WOOD CO. 

CHEN, Circuit Judge.

Alps South, LLC (Alps) sued The Ohio Willow Wood 

Company (OWW), asserting infringement of U.S. Patent 

No. 6,552,109 (the ’109 patent). Among other pre- and 

post-trial motions, OWW filed an unsuccessful motion to 

dismiss contending that Alps lacked standing to sue 

under the Patent Act. At trial, a jury found that the ’109 

patent was valid and that OWW had willfully infringed. 

OWW now appeals the denial of its motion to dismiss for 

lack of standing. In addition, OWW appeals the denial of 

its motion for judgment as a matter of law of invalidity 

and no willful infringement and the decisions relating to 

enhanced damages, permanent injunction, attorneys’ fees, 

and contempt. Alps cross-appeals the decision declining 

to further enhance the damages award as well as the 

decision relating to OWW’s absolute intervening rights

defense. Because the district court erred when it denied 

OWW’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, we now 

reverse, vacate the judgment below, and remand with 

instructions to dismiss this action.

BACKGROUND

Alps and OWW both make and sell “liners” that are 

used as a cushioning and protective layer between the 

residuum of an amputated limb and a prosthetic limb. 

The ’109 patent, entitled “Gelatinous Elastomer Compositions and Articles,” is directed to composite articles of a 

thermoplastic gel and a substrate, such as foam or fabric. 

According to the ’109 patent, prosthetic liners that incorporate the claimed composite articles are not only comfortable and skin-friendly, but are also more durable than 

previous liners. The patented articles, however, are not 

limited to any particular application or use. 

After the ’109 patent issued, the inventor assigned 

the patent to Applied Elastomerics, Inc. (AEI), a company

created by the inventor. On August 31, 2008, Alps signed 

a license agreement with AEI covering a number of AEI’s 

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ALPS SOUTH, LLC v. OHIO WILLOW WOOD CO. 3

patents, including the ’109 patent. Shortly thereafter, on 

September 23, 2008, Alps, without naming the patent 

owner, AEI, as a co-plaintiff, filed a patent infringement 

suit against OWW. Because Alps declined to join AEI as 

a co-plaintiff, OWW filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 

standing. While the motion was pending, Alps and AEI 

executed an amended license agreement that eliminated 

several limitations on Alps’s rights and removed certain 

rights retained by AEI. Although the amended agreement was executed on January 28, 2010, almost sixteen 

months after Alps commenced the action, the parties 

apparently intended this to be a nunc pro tunc agreement 

that lists the effective date as the date of the original 

agreement, August 31, 2008.

The district court rejected OWW’s standing argument 

and denied the motion to dismiss. The court concluded 

that the terms of the original agreement, giving Alps the 

right to exclude, transfer, and sue, sufficed to provide 

Alps with standing. The district court further explained 

that none of the rights retained or reserved by AEI were 

“substantial enough under the language of the agreement 

or case law construing similar agreements to require that 

[AEI] be joined as a co-plaintiff.” Order on Motion to 

Dismiss 2, Alps South, LLC v. The Ohio Willow Wood Co., 

No. 8:08-cv-01893-T-33MAP (M.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2010), 

ECF No. 73. Alternatively, the district court noted that 

under the nunc pro tunc amended agreement, Alps “clearly possesses the substantial rights to proceed without 

[AEI] in the case.” Id.

Shortly before trial, the district court sua sponte reconsidered the standing issue and expressed concern 

about Alps’s standing to maintain the action. The court 

indicated that, although it had come to believe that Alps 

lacked standing when it filed the action, it had not found 

any binding authority that precluded a party from curing 

a standing defect through a post-filing agreement. Based

on these concerns, the district court invited Alps to join 

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4 ALPS SOUTH, LLC v. OHIO WILLOW WOOD CO. 

the patent owner as a co-plaintiff. Alps declined to do so, 

however, and the case proceeded to trial, after which a 

jury found the ’109 patent valid and infringed.

OWW now appeals, arguing, among other things, that 

the original license did not convey sufficient rights in the 

’109 patent to provide Alps with standing to pursue this 

infringement litigation in its own name, without AEI. 

OWW also argues that the nunc pro tunc agreement could 

not cure this defect. We agree with OWW and therefore 

reverse the district court’s denial of OWW’s motion to 

dismiss for lack of standing, vacate the judgment entered 

against OWW, and remand with instructions to dismiss 

the action for lack of jurisdiction. 

DISCUSSION

Standing is a jurisdictional question, which we review 

de novo. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551 

(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Neither party disputes that 

Alps possessed standing under Article III. Before we may 

exercise jurisdiction over a patent infringement action, 

however, we must also satisfy ourselves that, in addition 

to Article III standing, the plaintiff also possessed standing as defined by § 281 of the Patent Act. Under 35 

U.S.C. § 281, a “patentee” has standing to pursue a patent 

infringement action. H.R. Techs., Inc. v. Astechnologies, 

Inc., 275 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The word 

“patentee” is not limited to the person to whom the patent 

issued, but also includes “successors in title to the patentee.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(d); see also H.R. Techs., 275 F.3d at 

1384 (“In order to have standing, the plaintiff in an action 

for patent infringement must be a ‘patentee’ pursuant to 

35 U.S.C. §§ 100(d) and 281 . . . .”). The parties in this 

case dispute whether Alps was a “patentee” under § 281.

In addition to the patent owner, our case law provides 

that “[a]n exclusive licensee has standing to sue in its own 

name, without joining the patent holder where ‘all substantial rights’ in the patent are transferred.” Int’l 

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ALPS SOUTH, LLC v. OHIO WILLOW WOOD CO. 5

Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games, Inc., 504 F.3d 1273, 

1276 (Fed. Cir. 2007). When a patent owner transfers all 

substantial rights, “the transferee is treated as the patentee and has standing to sue in its own name.” Propat

Int’l Corp. v. Rpost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 

2007); see also Int’l Gamco, 504 F.3d at 1276 (observing 

that a licensee with all substantial rights “is effectively an 

assignee”); Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 

1250 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that an entity “that has 

been granted all substantial rights under the patent is 

considered the owner regardless of how the parties characterize the transaction that conveyed those rights.”). If, 

however, the transferee or licensee does not hold all 

substantial rights, it may “sue third parties only as a coplaintiff with the patentee.” Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. 

Device Alliance, Inc., 240 F.3d 1016, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(quotation marks omitted). 

I 

OWW first argues that Alps’s original license agreement with AEI did not convey all substantial rights in the 

’109 patent to Alps. In response, Alps asserts that it did 

possess all substantial rights in the ’109 patent because it 

held the right to exclude and the right to pursue infringement litigation under its own control and at its own 

cost. 

“To determine whether an exclusive license is tantamount to an assignment, we ‘must ascertain the intention 

of the parties [to the license agreement] and examine the 

substance of what was granted.’” Alfred E. Mann Found. 

for Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 

1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Mentor, 240 F.3d at 1017). Here, the original agreement 

was an exclusive license covering numerous patents, 

including the ’109 patent. The license also granted Alps 

the right to enforce the ’109 patent and provided that AEI 

would cooperate “to the extent necessary . . . , including 

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6 ALPS SOUTH, LLC v. OHIO WILLOW WOOD CO. 

(without assignment of ownership to any Patent Rights) 

transferring of such rights to [Alps] as are necessary to 

enable [Alps] to enforce the PATENT RIGHTS in its own 

name.” Joint Appendix (J.A.) 18373. 

At the same time, however, the original agreement 

restricted Alps’s rights in significant ways and provided 

that AEI would retain certain rights for itself. For example, the original agreement prohibited Alps from settling 

any infringement actions without AEI’s prior written 

consent. AEI also retained the right to pursue infringement litigation if Alps declined to do so within six months 

of learning of suspected infringement. Most importantly,

the license agreement limited Alps’s right to “develop, 

make, have made, use, sell, offer to sell, distribute, lease, 

and import” products covered by the ’109 patent, J.A. 

18367, to a particular “field of use”: 

1.2 “FIELD” shall mean prosthetic products.

1.3 “LICENSED PRODUCTS” shall mean prosthetic liners, suspension sleeves, knee braces, and 

related health care gel products limited to said 

FIELD, which are covered by a VALID CLAIM of 

any patent listed in Schedule A hereof. 

J.A. 18364. The license similarly limited Alps’s right to 

pursue patent infringement to the same field of use:

So long as [Alps] remains the exclusive licensee 

under [this agreement] of any PATENT RIGHTS 

with respect to LICENSED PRODUCTS in the 

FIELD IN THE territory . . . , [Alps] shall have 

the exclusive right, under its own control and at 

its own expense, to prosecute any third party infringement of any patents within PATENT 

RIGHTS with respect to LICENSED PRODUCTS 

in the FIELD in the TERRITORY . . . .

J.A. 18373 (emphasis added). To establish standing, Alps 

relies solely on its receipt of the right to exclude and the 

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ALPS SOUTH, LLC v. OHIO WILLOW WOOD CO. 7

right to sue. Yet, because the license restricted these 

rights to a field of use, the end result is that AEI retained 

the exclusive right to make, use, and sell products covered 

by the ’109 patent in all areas outside the field of prosthetic products.

Precedent dictates that the original agreement’s field 

of use restriction is fatal to Alps’s argument that it had 

standing to file this action. The Supreme Court has long 

recognized that an exclusive licensee cannot sue for 

infringement without joining the patent owner if the 

license grants merely “an undivided part or share of th[e] 

exclusive right [granted under the patent].” Waterman v. 

Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891); see also Pope Mfg. 

Co. v. Gormully & Jeffery Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. 248, 252 

(1892) (explaining a licensee may not file suit in its own 

name, without joining the patent owner, when the owner 

has conveyed only one part of the exclusive rights to 

make, use, and sell as conferred by the patent). More 

recently, in International Gamco, we explained that

finding that a field of use licensee has standing “to sue in 

its own name alone poses a substantial risk of multiple 

suits and multiple liabilities against an alleged infringer 

for a single act of infringement.” 504 F.3d at 1278. 

Accordingly, we concluded that our standing jurisprudence “compels an exclusive licensee with less than all 

substantial rights, such as a field of use licensee, to join 

the patentee before initiating suit.” Id. (emphasis added); 

see also A123 Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213, 

1217 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Our case law thus establishes a 

clear rule for cases involving licenses with field of use 

restrictions. Because the license restricted Alps’s rights 

in the ’109 patent to the field of prosthetic products, Alps 

lacked standing to pursue this litigation without naming 

AEI as a co-plaintiff. 

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8 ALPS SOUTH, LLC v. OHIO WILLOW WOOD CO. 

II

Alps next argues that, even if it lacked standing under the original agreement, it cured this defect by executing a nunc pro tunc amended agreement. Specifically, on 

January 28, 2010, while the motion to dismiss was pending, Alps and AEI executed an amended license agreement, which eliminated the field of use restriction and 

instead covered “any products that are covered by a 

VALID CLAIM . . . , including, but not limited to, prosthetic liners, suspension sleeves, knee braces, and related 

health care gel products.” J.A. 18397 (emphasis added). 

The amended agreement also eliminated the provision 

permitting AEI to pursue litigation against potential 

infringers if Alps declined to do so. Importantly, the 

amended agreement purported to be effective as of August 

31, 2008, the same date as the original license agreement. 

Neither party seems to dispute that if the amended 

agreement had been executed prior to Alps filing suit, 

Alps would have had standing to sue without joining AEI. 

The parties’ dispute focuses on whether a nunc pro tunc

agreement may cure a defect in standing that existed 

when the suit was initiated. Alps urges us to conclude 

that the nunc pro tunc nature of the agreement cured the 

jurisdictional defect. OWW, on the other hand, asserts 

that Alps cannot correct a jurisdictional defect that existed at the time the complaint was filed by post-filing 

activity. OWW is correct.

“[N]unc pro tunc assignments are not sufficient to 

confer retroactive standing.” Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. 

Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In 

Enzo, the licensee filed a patent infringement suit, but 

the written license agreement that existed at the time of 

filing did not include any rights to the asserted patent. 

134 F.3d at 1092. After the licensee filed the action, the 

licensee sought to retroactively acquire title to the asserted patent by executing an amended license agreement 

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with an effective date that predated the initiation of the 

suit. Id. The licensee argued that this agreement provided a basis for standing. We disagreed and concluded that 

this standing defect could not be cured by a retroactive 

license agreement. Id. at 1093–94. We further noted that 

a party may not vindicate rights in court before the party 

actually possesses the rights. Id. (citing Procter & Gamble Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 305, 

310 (D. Del. 1995)); see also Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. 

Navinta LLC, 625 F.3d 1359, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 

(recognizing that a plaintiff could not execute a nunc pro 

tunc assignment of the asserted patent to remedy the fact 

that the plaintiff lacked legal title to that patent at the 

time it filed the lawsuit).

Alps misinterprets Enzo by describing it as a case 

about Article III standing. Enzo addressed whether the 

licensee possesses “all substantial rights” at the time the 

complaint was filed, in other words, whether a licensee 

may be considered a “patentee” under § 281. Consequently, the reasoning and holding of Enzo are binding on the 

present case.

Alps also broadly argues that we have routinely permitted plaintiffs to cure this type of standing defect 

during the course of a lawsuit. The cases cited by Alps, 

however, involve our practice of endorsing joinder of 

patent owners, under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, in order to avoid dismissal for lack of standing. 

See Mentor, 240 F.3d at 1019 (recognizing that defects in 

standing ordinarily require dismissal, but Rule 21 permits courts to drop or add parties at any stage of the 

litigation and on such terms as are just); Intellectual Prop. 

Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 

1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]his court has recognized the 

principle that a patent owner may be joined by an exclusive licensee” without dismissing the case for lack of 

jurisdiction.). But Enzo precludes us from expanding this 

practice to permit a plaintiff to cure a standing defect by 

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10 ALPS SOUTH, LLC v. OHIO WILLOW WOOD CO. 

executing a nunc pro tunc license agreement after filing a 

case. 

Alps also relies on its supplemental complaint, which 

it filed after the reexamination certificate issued on the 

’109 patent. Alps argues that, because the trial proceeded 

on the patent claims that emerged from reexamination—

the subject matter of the supplemental complaint—the 

supplemental complaint’s reference to the nunc pro tunc

agreement also cured any defect in standing. We disagree. The party asserting patent infringement is “required to have legal title to the patents on the day it filed 

the complaint and that requirement can not be met retroactively.” Abraxis, 625 F.3d at 1366. Finally, although 

the supplemental complaint refers to an August 31, 2008, 

exclusive license agreement, nothing in the supplemental 

complaint mentions the amended nunc pro tunc agreement. 

Alps’s attempt to characterize its supplemental complaint as an amended complaint fares no better. To be 

sure, 28 U.S.C. § 1653 permits parties to amend their 

complaints to correct “[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction.” But the Supreme Court has explained that this 

provision is drafted in terms of “allegations of jurisdiction,” which means that the ability to amend applies only 

to “incorrect statements about jurisdiction that actually 

exists, and not defects in the jurisdictional facts themselves.” Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 

826, 830–32 (1989) (emphasis added) (“[E]very Court of 

Appeals that has considered the scope of § 1653 has held 

that it allows appellate courts to remedy inadequate 

jurisdictional allegations, but not defective jurisdictional 

facts.”); see also Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Cont’l Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889, 893 

(2d Cir. 1983) (“[W]e have never allowed [§ 1653] to create 

jurisdiction retroactively where none existed.”); Field v. 

Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293, 306 (3d Cir. 1980) 

(“[Section] 1653 . . . allow[s] amendment only of defective 

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ALPS SOUTH, LLC v. OHIO WILLOW WOOD CO. 11

allegations of jurisdiction; it does not provide a remedy for 

defective jurisdiction itself.”). Here, when Alps filed its 

complaint, it was merely an exclusive field of use licensee 

that lacked all substantial rights in the ’109 patent. 

There were no errors in the jurisdictional facts as pleaded 

in the original complaint. Thus, Alps could not avail itself 

of § 1653 to amend the jurisdictional allegations that 

appeared in its original complaint. 

CONCLUSION

Because Alps possessed neither legal title nor all substantial rights at the outset of this litigation, our standing 

jurisprudence required that Alps join the patent owner, 

AEI, as a co-plaintiff. Because Alps failed to do so, we 

reverse the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss 

for lack of standing. We therefore vacate the judgment 

below and remand with instructions for the district court 

to dismiss Alps’s complaint without prejudice. Because 

the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the 

parties’ dispute, we need not reach the parties’ remaining 

arguments.

REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED

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