Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01576/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01576-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Todd Alan Scofield
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1576

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* 

v. * 

* 

Todd Alan Scofield, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Appeals from the United States

No. 05-1577 District Court for the 

___________ District of South Dakota.

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* 

v. * 

* 

Robert George Worshek, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 13, 2005

Filed: January 4, 2006

___________

Before BYE, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

Appellate Case: 05-1576 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/04/2006 Entry ID: 1992834
1

Scofield was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess

methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,

841(a)(1); two counts of distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1); and one count of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Worshek was convicted of one count

of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1); and two counts of distribution of methamphetamine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

-2-

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Todd Alan Scofield and Robert George Worshek of crimes

stemming from the distribution of methamphetamine.1

 Following post-verdict motions

for acquittal by both defendants, the district court granted Worshek's motion for

acquittal with regard to his conspiracy conviction and the first count of distribution,

finding that there was insufficient evidence to support those convictions. The court

denied Scofield's motion. Both defendants now appeal their convictions and their

sentences. We affirm Scofield's conviction and sentence in all respects. However, we

reverse Worshek's remaining distribution count for insufficiency of evidence. 

I. Background

Todd Alan Scofield dealt methamphetamine from a small house with a detached

garage in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Wayne Johnson was a small-time drug dealer in

the area. On at least three occasions before Johnson was arrested, Scofield provided

or "fronted" Johnson with approximately one-ounce quantities of methamphetamine.

Johnson would then resell the drugs, repay his debt to Scofield, and receive another

fronted ounce.

Following his arrest on drug charges, Johnson became a confidential informant

and told investigators that he had purchased methamphetamine from Scofield on

several occasions. Johnson told police that he still owed Scofield money for the last

transaction. Johnson also stated that Worshek was present during each transaction but

Appellate Case: 05-1576 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/04/2006 Entry ID: 1992834
2

In fact, Johnson testified that he had trouble hearing anything that took place

in the kitchen, stating that "I was actually trying to listen, but I couldn't hear."

3

Johnson's inability to see what took place in the kitchen was supported by his

own trial testimony, as well as the testimony of Officer Duprey. In a police report

about the second controlled buy, Duprey wrote that the informant never actually saw

Worshek bring in any box from outside. 

-3-

made no statements regarding the level of Worshek's involvement. Cooperating with

police, Johnson went to Scofield's house to pay for the previous purchase and to make

a controlled drug buy for the police. Following payment, Scofield fronted Johnson an

additional 28 grams of methamphetamine. Johnson stated that Scofield went into a

bedroom to retrieve the methamphetamine and then went into the bathroom to weigh

it. Johnson saw Worshek in Scofield's residence at the time of the transaction but did

not see Worshek directly involved in the transaction. 

When Johnson arrived at Scofield's house for a second controlled buy, Worshek

answered the door and let in Johnson, explaining that Scofield was bathing his dog.

While waiting to conduct the transaction with Scofield, Johnson sat in the living room

and watched television with Worshek. Scofield then came out and asked Johnson what

he wanted. Johnson followed Scofield into the bedroom and paid Scofield $2,000 for

the two buys. Johnson told Scofield that he wanted two ounces of methamphetamine,

explaining that "I have a guy who wants another one." 

According to Johnson, he returned to the living room and resumed watching

television. Johnson noticed Scofield enter the kitchen and begin to get dressed to go

outside, presumably to the garage. Johnson surmised that Worshek entered the kitchen

upon seeing Scofield dressing, commented that Scofield was getting sick and had wet

hair, and offered to help. Johnson did not hear what Scofield said in response to

Worshek.2

 Because Johnson was in the living room facing east, he could not see into

the kitchen, which was behind him.3

 However, after the brief exchange between

Scofield and Worshek, Johnson believed someone went outside but did not know if

Appellate Case: 05-1576 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/04/2006 Entry ID: 1992834
-4-

it was Worshek or Scofield. Although unable to see the back door located in the

kitchen, Johnson heard the bells on the door ring, indicating that someone had left. A

few minutes later, the bells rang again presumably as someone came back into the

house. Worshek then returned to the living room. Scofield then came into the living

room and tossed a large box containing several plastic bags of methamphetamine to

Johnson. Johnson handed the box back to Scofield, who measured out two ounces of

methamphetamine and gave it to Johnson. The police intervened and received over

58.6 grams of methamphetamine from Johnson. 

On direct-examination, Johnson testified that Worshek had gone to the garage

and retrieved the box of methamphetamine that Scofield brought into the living room.

However, on cross-examination, Johnson admitted that he could not hear the entire

conversation between Scofield and Worshek in the kitchen, that he could not see who

went out or came in the kitchen door, and that he could not see whether the person

who entered through the kitchen door was even carrying a box. Johnson candidly

admitted he assumed Worshek went to the garage and returned with the box. 

The next day, law enforcement executed a search warrant on Scofield's house.

Both defendants were present and were arrested. During the search, law enforcement

officers seized scales, methamphetamine paraphernalia, cash, and 447.2 grams of

methamphetamine. The officers also discovered a Glock pistol. A subsequent search

of a storage unit rented by Worshek uncovered a container of dimethylsulfone powder

or MSM. Chemical analysis of the methamphetamine purchased from Scofield and

seized during the search of his house showed that it had been diluted by being mixed

with MSM. 

Thomas Skinner, the government's fingerprint expert, analyzed the box

containing the methamphetamine, as well as the bags inside the box and one extra bag.

Skinner testified that he found only two latent fingerprints—one on the box and the

other on a bag—and that both prints belonged to Scofield. Upon further questioning,

Appellate Case: 05-1576 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/04/2006 Entry ID: 1992834
-5-

Skinner testified that he was never asked to check for fingerprints on the safe, the

paraphernalia, or either of the scales.

The government filed a four-count indictment against Scofield and a threecount indictment against Worshek. The jury found both defendants guilty on all

counts. However, the district court granted, in part, Worshek's motion pursuant to

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29(c), entering an order that affirmed his guilt

with respect to Count IV (distribution of methamphetamine during the second

controlled buy) but acquitted him with respect to Count I (conspiracy to possess

methamphetamine) and Count III (distribution of methamphetamine during the first

controlled buy). The district court denied Scofield's Rule 29(c) motion, finding

sufficient evidence on the conspiracy count.

The district court sentenced Scofield to 240 months' imprisonment on Counts

I, III, and IV to run concurrently with his sentence of 120 months' imprisonment for

Count II. Worshek was sentenced to 97 months' imprisonment on Count IV. 

On appeal, Scofield contends that the district court committed two reversible

errors: (1) the denial of his Rule 29(c) motion; and (2) evidentiary error by allowing

the admission of certain evidence against him. For the reasons stated below, we affirm

the denial of Scofield's Rule 29(c) motion because there was sufficient evidence of his

guilt. Similarly, we affirm with respect to his evidentiary arguments because we find

no plain error. 

Worshek raises several points on appeal, including the district court's denial of

his Rule 29(c) motion with respect to Count IV. Because we agree that Worshek's

Rule 29(c) motion should have been granted in full, Worshek's other arguments on

appeal, all of which relate to sentencing, are rendered moot and need not be addressed.

Appellate Case: 05-1576 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/04/2006 Entry ID: 1992834
-6-

II. Discussion

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Scofield and Worshek challenge the district court's denial of their respective

motions for post-verdict acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). Both defendants

argue that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions. Scofield

contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count I

(conspiracy to possess methamphetamine), and Worshek argues that there was

insufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count IV (distribution of

methamphetamine during the second controlled buy). The following standard of

review applies to both arguments: 

We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing evidence in

the light most favorable to the government, resolving conflicts in the

government's favor, and accepting all reasonable inferences that support

the verdict. This standard of review is strict; we will uphold the verdict

if there is any interpretation of the evidence that could lead a reasonableminded jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

United States v. Hamilton, 332 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotations and citation omitted). 

1. Sufficiency as to Scofield

Sufficient evidence supports Scofield's conviction of conspiracy. Scofield,

relying on United States v. Rios, 171 F.3d 565, 566 (8th Cir. 1999), contends that

Johnson's status as a confidential informant working for the government negates his

ability to have unlawfully conspired with Johnson. In Rios, we stated "[i]t is of course

a well-established rule that 'there can be no indictable conspiracy involving only the

defendant and government agents and informers.'" United States v. Rios, 171 F.3d

565, 566 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Nelson, 165 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th

Cir. 1999)). However, the very authority that he cites for support undermines

Scofield's argument. Scofield is correct that no conspiracy could have existed between

Appellate Case: 05-1576 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/04/2006 Entry ID: 1992834
-7-

him and the confidential informant during the two controlled buys. But, here, as in

Rios, the record contains ample evidence that Scofield knew of and participated in a

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine prior to the controlled buys. Id. 

In this case, Johnson testified that he purchased methamphetamine from

Scofield on several occasions prior to the controlled buys. Johnson testified that each

of these transactions involved approximately one ounce of methamphetamine. Each

time, Scofield would "front" the ounce to Johnson. Two weeks later, Johnson would

repay Scofield for the prior ounce and would receive another fronted ounce. The

continuing nature of these transactions establishes an agreement between Scofield and

Johnson that Johnson would resell the drugs to others in order to repay Scofield.

Moreover, evidence at trial showed that a mere user of methamphetamine commonly

purchases in quantities ranging up to half of a gram. Johnson received more than 50

times that amount in each transaction with Scofield. Combined with the credit

arrangement, a reasonable jury could conclude that there was an agreement to possess

and distribute methamphetamine to persons known or unknown to Scofield. 

Finally, evidence of such an agreement comes from Johnson's testimony that

he once made a partial payment to Scofield and explained that he could not pay in full

because "nobody was buying." This testimony, in conjunction with the regular

transactions involving large quantities of fronted methamphetamine, provides

sufficient evidence that there was an agreement between Scofield and Johnson to

possess and distribute methamphetamine before Johnson became an agent for the

government. See United States v. Ramirez, 350 F.3d 780, 783 (8th Cir. 2003) (setting

forth the essential elements of a conspiracy offense). Scofield attacks the credibility

and coherence of Johnson's testimony but such disputes are issues for the jury to

decide. United States Osuna-Zepeda, 416 F.3d 838, 842 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Appellate Case: 05-1576 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/04/2006 Entry ID: 1992834
4

While on one occasion Worshek stated that he and Scofield were the only

"importers" of methamphetamine, the district court concluded that the statement was

puffery in the context of the overwhelming lack of evidence that Worshek was

involved in a conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine to Johnson. The

district court pointed out the following in support of its conclusion: (1) there was no

-8-

2. Sufficiency as to Worshek

The evidence supporting Worshek's conviction is much less convincing. In fact,

we hold that the evidence was insufficient to support Worshek's conviction. The

evidence established that Worshek was a "lay about," or a "mooch," but did not prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally possessed or

distributed, or aided and abetted the possession or distribution of, methamphetamine.

The government proved Worshek was present but more is required to establish guilt

than "mere presence." "Mere physical proximity to contraband is insufficient to

convict a person of possession with intent to distribute." United States v. Cruz, 285

F.3d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 2002) (brackets omitted) (citing United States v. Lemon, 239

F.3d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 2001)). However, "[p]ossession of contraband can either be

actual or constructive." Id. Constructive possession occurs if there is (1) knowledge

of the presence of the contraband, combined with (2) control or dominion over either

the contraband itself or the premises in which the contraband is concealed. Cruz, 285

F.3d at 697; Lemon, 239 F.3d at 970. We have held that it takes more evidence of

knowledge and control to prove that a defendant constructively possessed contraband

found in someone else's residence, as opposed to his own abode. Cruz, 285 F.3d at

697 (citing United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir. 1989)).

While the evidence showed that Worshek had access to Scofield's home and

was often present, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Worshek had constructive

possession of the contraband. Johnson's assumption that Worshek retrieved a box from

the garage does not establish that Worshek was involved in a drug transaction.4

Appellate Case: 05-1576 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/04/2006 Entry ID: 1992834
evidence of Worshek selling, accepting, or delivering methamphetamine; (2) Worshek

did not direct the distribution activities of Scofield or anyone else; and (3) there was

no evidence that Worshek received any proceeds from the sale of methamphetamine.

-9-

Johnson acknowledged he did not see what happened in the kitchen. He could not see

who went outside, where that person went, and if that person brought anything back

into the house. Scofield, not Worshek, gave Johnson the box containing the

methamphetamine. The box of drugs and a bag from within it carried Scofield's

fingerprints but not Worshek's. The government presented no evidence that Worshek

knew the drugs were stored in the garage. Moreover, Johnson testified that he never

had any conversations with Worshek regarding the consummation of actual sales of

drugs. In fact, Johnson testified that he talked about drug transactions only with

Scofield. Proximity and association, without more, are insufficient to establish

Worshek's guilt. 

B. 404(b) Evidence

Scofield argues that testimony of (1) his possession of methamphetamine

paraphernalia; (2) his consumption of methamphetamine; and (3) Johnson's passing

reference to Scofield's "felonies" during cross-examination violated Federal Rules of

Evidence 404(b). Rule 404(b) prohibits admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs

or acts to show a defendant is a bad person. Scofield did not object to the admission

either (1) or (2) at trial so we review for plain error. Olano provides the following

four-part test that governs plain error review: 

before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there

must be (1) "error," (2) that is "plain," and (3) that "affects substantial

rights." If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then

exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error

"seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings." 

Appellate Case: 05-1576 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/04/2006 Entry ID: 1992834
-10-

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–467 (1997) (brackets and citations

omitted) (interpreting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734–35 (1993)). 

Scofield fails to meet his burden to show plain error in the admission of

evidence of his use of methamphetamine and his possession of methamphetamine

paraphernalia. The government contends that it used this evidence to prove that

Scofield knew that the substance he was distributing was indeed methamphetamine.

As the government correctly states, knowledge is one of the permissible purposes for

other-act evidence under Rule 404(b). The district court's admission of the evidence

for that purpose was not plain error.

Similarly, the district court did not err by refusing to grant a mistrial because

of Johnson's statement involving Scofield's prior "felonies." Scofield believes this

statement unfairly prejudiced him because he had, in fact, only been convicted of one

prior felony. Scofield did not object contemporaneously to Johnson's statement, but

his defense counsel did move for a mistrial the next day based upon the remark. The

district court denied the motion but issued a limiting instruction informing the jury

that the parties had stipulated that Scofield had been convicted of a felony. We hold

that this limiting instruction was sufficient to cure any error that may have occurred

as a result of Johnson's comment. 

III. Conclusion

We affirm the conviction of Scofield in all respects. The district court properly

denied his motion for acquittal on Count I as sufficient evidence supported Scofield's

knowing involvement in a conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine. We

further hold that Scofield's claims that there was plain error under Fed. R. Evid.

404(b) must fail. With respect to Worshek, we reverse the district court's order

Appellate Case: 05-1576 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/04/2006 Entry ID: 1992834
-11-

denying Worshek's motion to enter a judgment of acquittal on Count IV because we

find that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-1576 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/04/2006 Entry ID: 1992834