Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00312/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00312-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sandra Dale
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

The plaintiff docketed the document as a motion for default judgment.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0312-WS-C

 )

SANDRA DALE, )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff’s request for entry of default

judgment, (Doc. 6), which the Court construes as a motion for entry of default and entry

of default judgment.1

The file reflects that the defendant executed a waiver of service on May 8, 2007,

which correctly informed her that her responsive pleading was due on or before July 2,

2007, failing which default judgment could be entered against her. (Doc. 4). Because the

defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules,” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 55(a), the plaintiff is entitled to entry of default. The motion for entry of default is

thus granted. The clerk is directed to enter default against the defendant.

A defendant who has “appeared” in the action is entitled to three days’ notice

before default judgment is entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). The plaintiff did not serve the

defendant with its motion and so has not given this notice. The question becomes

whether the defendant’s return of an executed waiver of service constitutes an appearance

for purposes of Rule 55(b). 

 An appearance under this rule is “not limited to a formal court appearance,”

Charlton L. Davis & Co. v. Fedder Data Center, Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1977),

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but it must be “responsive to plaintiff’s formal Court action.” Baez v. S.S. Kresge Co.,

518 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 1975). The defendant’s return of an executed waiver of

service may satisfy the minimum threshold of Baez, but it does not thereby necessarily

satisfy Rule 55(b). 

In Charlton L. Davis, the Court found it important that the plaintiff, from letters

and telephone calls after default was entered, “knew [the defendant] had a clear purpose

to defend the suit.” 556 F.2d at 309. This is consistent with the prevailing view that, in

order to constitute an appearance under Rule 55(b), “[t]he defendant’s actions must, at

least, ... give the plaintiff a clear indication that the defendant intends to pursue a

defense.” 10 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 55.21[2][b] at 55-35

(3rd ed. 2007). Various courts have relied on this proposition to conclude that an executed

waiver of service reflects no such intent, any more than a defendant’s receipt of formal

process does so. Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co., 167 F.3d 933, 937-

38 (5th Cir. 1999); Sylvester, Ruud, Petrie & Cruzen v. Halpern, 1992 WL 144689 at *1

(9th Cir. 1992); Rogers v. ITT Hartford Life & Accident Co., 178 F.R.D. 476, 478-79 (S.D.

Miss. 1997). The Court agrees with these authorities. Thus, the defendant is not entitled

under Rule 55(b) to notice of the plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment.

The Court may not enter default judgment against an infant or incompetent unless

appropriately represented in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Here, the defendant

acknowledged in her executed waiver of service that she is neither. Likewise, the

defendant declared under penalty of perjury that she is not in the military service of the

United States (and plaintiff’s counsel repeated this representation in a declaration filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746), thereby satisfying the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act,

50 U.S.C. app. § 521. The procedural predicates for entry of default judgment being

satisfied, the Court turns to the amount of the judgment to be entered.

“A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount

that prayed for in the demand for judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). The complaint

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November 29, 2006 through July 17, 2007 represents 231 days, or $226.38

interest.

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demands $6,804.98 in principal, $1,465.81 in interest through November 28, 2006, and

additional prejudgment interest at the rate of 5.25% per annum, or $0.98 per day.2

 The

motion for default judgment requests precisely this amount, and a declaration from the

Department of Education pursuant to Section 1746 confirms the indebtedness and how it

is calculated. 

Accordingly, the motion for entry of default judgment is granted. Judgment shall

be entered accordingly by separate order in the amount of $8,497.17, plus post-judgment

interest as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of July, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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