Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-05039/USCOURTS-ca10-15-05039-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tammie Robinson
Appellant
St. John Health System, Inc.
Appellee
St. John Medical Center, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

TAMMIE ROBINSON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

ST. JOHN MEDICAL CENTER, INC.; 

ST. JOHN HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-5039 

(D.C. No. 4:12-CV-00109-JED-FHM) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before GORSUCH, MATHESON, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Tammie Robinson appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of her former employer, St. John Medical Center, Inc., and St. John Health 

System, Inc. (collectively, “SJMC”), on her claims alleging race discrimination, 

retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Exercising 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

April 13, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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I. Background 

 Robinson is an African American woman and a registered nurse. She worked 

for SJMC, a hospital in Tulsa, Oklahoma, at different times during her nursing 

career, most recently from December 2008 through March 15, 2011. In 2010, 

Robinson applied for the position of registered nurse case manager, a job that didn’t 

involve providing primary nursing care to patients. The director of case 

management, Sammye Valenzuela, interviewed and hired Robinson for this position. 

 In March 2011, SJMC admitted a patient with sickle cell anemia (“the 

patient”). The patient’s treatment team included the attending physician, 

Dr. Ali Mohammad, and several resident physicians. Dr. Mohammad asked the 

palliative care team—consisting of a physician, a registered nurse, and a social 

worker—to consult with the patient after she complained of pain and asked for 

intravenous (“IV”) pain medication. Due to concerns about the patient’s potential 

opioid abuse and a need for better pain management, the palliative care team 

recommended the patient transition to oral medication. After several meetings with 

the palliative care team, the patient indicated she wanted to discontinue receiving 

treatment from that team. 

 Robinson, a case manager in the unit where the patient was being treated, 

became concerned that the patient’s physicians and palliative care team weren’t 

adequately treating the patient’s pain, and she took several actions regarding the 

patient’s treatment without first obtaining physician approval. Six physicians and 

one nurse ultimately complained about Robinson’s conduct. 

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 On Friday, March 11, 2011, Dr. Mohammad requested a meeting with 

Valenzuela and Robinson concerning Robinson’s involvement in the patient’s 

treatment. During that meeting, which two resident physicians also attended, 

Dr. Mohammad complained that Robinson had repeatedly questioned the resident 

physicians as to why the patient wasn’t on antibiotics, why she didn’t have an IV 

pain pump, and why a hematologist hadn’t been consulted. Dr. Mohammad also 

indicated his awareness that, without any direction from a physician, Robinson had 

contacted a sickle cell treatment facility in Texas and obtained information about a 

physician at that facility. Robinson responded that she also had asked an SJMC 

infectious disease specialist, who was not on the patient’s treatment team, whether 

the patient needed IV antibiotics. Dr. Mohammad replied that it was his decision, not 

Robinson’s, whether to consult other physicians. After Robinson volunteered that 

she had asked the patient whether she was willing to have an IV pain pump, 

Dr. Mohammad reacted angrily, characterizing Robinson’s behavior as unacceptable 

and stating that her actions had undermined his role as a physician. 

 After Dr. Mohammad left the meeting, Valenzuela advised Robinson of the 

seriousness of the situation and indicated she would follow up with Dr. Mohammad 

and the human resource department (“HR”), and speak to Robinson again the 

following Monday. That same day, Valenzuela spoke to an HR representative about 

Robinson’s conduct with respect to the patient. The HR representative responded 

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that SJMC’s progressive disciplinary policy permitted Valenzuela to either apply the 

last step before termination1

 or terminate Robinson’s employment. 

 Valenzuela spoke to Dr. Mohammad again on Monday, March 14. 

Dr. Mohammad reiterated that Robinson had worked against the patient’s treatment 

plan and he also reported that the patient was refusing to take medication she didn’t 

want and had asked why she wasn’t receiving IV medication. Dr. Mohammad 

indicated that Robinson’s actions had placed a wedge between the patient and the 

hospital. 

 Later that day, Valenzuela met with a physician and nurse from the palliative 

care team. They reported that without a request from any SJMC physician, Robinson 

had looked into obtaining a hematologist for the patient in Oklahoma City and asked 

a social worker to determine whether transportation to Oklahoma City could be 

arranged for the patient. The team felt that Robinson’s actions had given the patient 

conflicting options and disrupted the patient’s care. Valenzuela also met with 

SJMC’s medicine section chair and director of inpatient services, who agreed that 

Robinson’s actions had been disruptive and interfered with the patient’s care. At 

some point on March 14, Valenzuela conferred again with the HR representative 

regarding Robinson’s actions. The next day, Valenzuela spoke to an additional 

resident physician who hadn’t attended the March 11 meeting. The resident repeated 

some of the previous complaints regarding Robinson’s conduct. 

 1

 The record indicates the last step before termination is a “Decision-Making 

Leave.” At that step, “[t]he employee is instructed to take the day off with pay to 

make a decision about his/her commitment to his/her job.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 400. 

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 In a meeting with Robinson on March 15, Valenzuela terminated Robinson’s 

employment. SJMC’s standard progressive disciplinary action form, completed by 

Valenzuela, indicated Robinson had acted outside the scope of her position by taking 

the following actions without first discussing them with a physician and without a 

physician’s order: 1) asking the patient if she was willing to have an IV pain pump; 

(2) arranging for the patient to consult with a Texas physician; (3) seeking a 

hematologist for the patient in Oklahoma City and asking a social worker to look into 

transportation; and (4) asking an infectious disease physician at SJMC whether the 

patient needed IV antibiotics. The disciplinary action form also identified several 

business reasons for terminating Robinson, including the need to (1) maintain 

appropriate physician-patient relationships, (2) avoid disruptions in the patient’s care 

and treatment plan, (3) avoid extending the patient’s stay; and (4) promote positive 

patient outcomes and satisfaction. Id.

Robinson filed this action asserting claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 2000e-2(a)(1) & 2000e-3(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and state law, claiming that SJMC 

terminated her based on her race, in retaliation for her complaining about race 

discrimination, and in violation of Oklahoma public policy. The district court 

granted summary judgment in favor of SJMC on all claims. Robinson appeals. 

II. Discussion 

 A. Standard of Review 

 “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying 

the same standard used by the district court.” Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 

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497 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In making this 

determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to [Robinson], the 

non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.” Riggs, 497 F.3d 

at 1114. 

 B. Race Discrimination and Retaliation Claims 

Robinson alleges SJMC terminated her employment because of her race and in 

retaliation for her report of race discrimination. Specifically, in support of her 

retaliation claim, Robinson asserts that approximately five weeks before her 

termination, another nurse said to her “you could never be a dumb blond, play the 

dumb blond” and also asked “isn’t there another black case manager who’s loud and 

assertive?”2

 Id. at 304. Robinson asserts that she reported these comments to 

Valenzuela and that Valenzuela reacted negatively to her report. Valenzuela denies 

that Robinson ever complained about race discrimination. 

The district court concluded that Robinson and SJMC met their respective 

burdens of establishing a prima facie case and articulating a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. See Lobato v. N.M. Env’t Dep’t, 

733 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (10th Cir. 2013). But the court granted SJMC summary 

judgment after finding Robinson failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to 

 2

 Robinson doesn’t describe the context in which these statements were made. 

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whether SJMC’s proffered reasons for terminating her employment were pretext for 

discrimination or retaliation.

“Pretext can be shown by such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 

incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its 

action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence 

and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory 

reasons.” Id. at 1289 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e examine the facts as 

they appear to the person making the decision, not the plaintiff’s subjective 

evaluation of the situation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

“Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether the employer’s proffered reasons were 

wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good 

faith upon those beliefs.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

Moreover, a plaintiff generally “must proffer evidence that shows each of the 

employer’s justifications are pretextual.” Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 427 F.3d 

1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Robinson contends that the district court didn’t address some of her pretext 

evidence, erred in assessing other evidence, and failed to consider her evidence as a 

whole. We address each of her assertions of error below. 

1. Evidence that Robinson’s Conduct was Consistent with her 

Job Description 

 Robinson contends that a jury could conclude, based on the terms of her job 

description, that she never acted outside the scope of her case manager position; 

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therefore, SJMC’s reasons for terminating her were false. See Kendrick v. Penske 

Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir 2000) (noting a plaintiff can 

show pretext “with evidence that the defendant’s stated reason for the adverse 

employment action was false”). But Robinson fails to point to any evidence 

suggesting SJMC didn’t honestly believe she acted outside the scope of her position. 

Moreover, the record amply demonstrates otherwise. Dr. Mohammad 

complained to Valenzuela that Robinson’s actions undermined the physician’s role, 

interfered with the physicians’ treatment plan, and drove a wedge between the patient 

and the hospital. The medical director of the palliative care team complained to 

Valenzuela that Robinson had given the patient conflicting options and disrupted the 

patient’s care. Yet another physician advised Valenzuela that Robinson’s conduct 

disrupted and interfered with the patient’s care. Further, Valenzuela testified that 

Robinson’s conduct fell outside her scope of practice because, according to “[t]he 

fundamentals of nursing,” a nurse works under a physician’s direction. Id., Vol. III 

at 491. While Robinson characterized her job description differently, Valenzuela 

disagreed with that description. More importantly, Robinson’s contrary interpretation 

fails to demonstrate that SJMC did not sincerely believe that she acted outside the 

scope of her position. 

2. SJMC’s Failure to Cite Any Written Rules Violated by 

Robinson 

 

 Robinson next argues that SJMC’s failure to suggest that her conduct violated 

any written rule or policy demonstrates that its proffered reasons for terminating her 

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were pretextual. We are not persuaded. Although SJMC admitted it cited no written 

rule precluding Robinson’s specific conduct here, we have rejected the premise upon 

which Robinson bases her argument—i.e., “that an otherwise reasonable justification 

for a business decision somehow loses its legitimacy simply because it reflects an 

exercise of managerial judgment rather than a ministerial execution of written 

policy.” Medlock v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 608 F.3d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010) 

(questioning the plaintiff’s assertion that an employer cannot legitimately fire an 

employee for misconduct “absent a formal company policy specifically addressing 

such misconduct,” id. at 1193.). As we explained in Medlock, “this facially 

untenable idea . . . is belied by countless employment discrimination cases decided 

on the basis of legitimate business justifications without any reference to formal 

policies necessarily legitimizing those justifications.” Id. 

3. Evidence that SJMC Failed to Follow its Progressive Disciplinary 

Policy 

 Robinson additionally contends that SJMC’s failure to follow its progressive 

disciplinary policy, which she claims forbids immediate termination, is evidence of 

pretext. See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1230 (noting a plaintiff can show pretext “with 

evidence that the defendant acted contrary to a written company policy prescribing 

the action to be taken by the defendant under the circumstances”). But SJMC’s 

policy explicitly allows for termination without prior discipline in cases involving 

“[a]ctions or displayed conduct detrimental to job performance or patient care.” 

Aplt. App., Vol. II at 408. Although Robinson now maintains that SJMC never relied 

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on this provision to justify her termination, she ignores Valenzuela’s testimony 

establishing otherwise. See id., Vol. III at 489-90 (citing this provision of the 

progressive disciplinary policy). 

 Robinson also contends that SJMC’s progressive disciplinary policy required 

Valenzuela, during the termination meeting, to provide her with a written statement 

of the reasons for her termination and an opportunity to comment. She claims that 

Valenzuela did neither and that, given the opportunity, she would have denied the 

allegations. She reasons that SJMC’s failure to allow her to respond resulted in an 

incomplete investigation, which she argues is evidence of pretext. 

But the record shows that the physicians directly confronted Robinson in the 

March 11 meeting with most of the allegations supporting her termination. See id. at 

423-25. She argues she had no opportunity to respond at that time because Dr. 

Mohammad dictated the order of who would speak and then walked out before she 

could speak. Yet Robinson’s notes regarding the meeting show that she not only 

spoke during the meeting but that she had an opportunity to address the allegations 

with Valenzuela even after Dr. Mohammad left. See id., Vol. I at 225-26. Moreover, 

although Robinson claims she would have denied the allegations, she doesn’t dispute 

that she engaged in the conduct that led to the physicians’ complaints. Instead, she 

disagrees only with SJMC’s business judgment that her actions were outside the 

scope of her position. Thus, she fails to demonstrate that SJMC’s investigation was 

so inadequate as to support an inference of pretext. Compare Smothers v. Solvay 

Chems., Inc., 740 F.3d 530, 543 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding employer’s failure to 

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obtain the plaintiff’s account of “what transpired” during a quarrel with a 

co-employee, resulting in an inadequate investigation of the reason for his 

termination, could permit a jury to infer pretext when combined with evidence of 

disparate treatment of a similarly situated employee), with Riggs, 497 F.3d at 1119 

(holding employer’s failure to allow plaintiff to respond regarding a customer 

complaint was not a “disturbing procedural irregularity” tending to show pretext 

where employer had previously addressed the customer incident with the plaintiff and 

she was the only employee fitting the customer’s description). 

4. Evidence that SJMC Treated Robinson Differently than 

Similarly Situated Employees 

Robinson next argues the district court improperly resolved factual issues in 

concluding that her evidence of disparate treatment didn’t support a finding that other 

employees’ situations were sufficiently similar or that they had “violated work rules 

of comparable seriousness.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1232. 

 Robinson points to evidence that she says establishes that five other caucasian 

employees supervised by Valenzuela each committed offenses similar to hers but 

were not treated similarly. Two of those individuals were disciplined for alleged 

HIPAA3

 violations (J.M. and P.E.) and three were disciplined for 

performance-related actions (J.H., J.E., and again, P.E.). Robinson also points to a 

fifth individual, R.M., who although she was terminated for performance-related 

issues, was first disciplined. 

 3

 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 

104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. 

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Regarding J.M. and P.E., Robinson suggests that their actions in disobeying a 

federal law were more serious than any of her conduct. Thus, she argues the district 

court erred in concluding her allegations would not permit an inference of pretext. 

But Robinson misplaces the focus of her argument on her own evaluation of the 

seriousness of other employees’ conduct. 

While a plaintiff may show pretext on a theory of disparate treatment, id., the 

ultimate question is whether SJMC considered the other employees’ offenses to be 

comparable to Robinson’s conduct, see Riggs, 497 F.3d at 1121 (rejecting plaintiff’s 

contention that other employees’ infractions were “egregious and immediately 

terminable” where there was no evidence the employer considered them as egregious 

as plaintiff’s conduct involving customer mistreatment). “A company must be 

allowed to exercise its judgment in determining how severely it will discipline an 

employee for different types of conduct. Our role is to prevent unlawful hiring 

practices, not to act as a super personnel department that second guesses employers’ 

business judgments.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1233 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Moreover, SJMC’s progressive disciplinary policy provides that coaching is an 

appropriate level of discipline for some HIPAA violations. See Aplt. App., Vol. II at 

409. 

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Robinson has failed to present evidence that Valenzuela considered the other 

case managers’ HIPAA violations to be similar to or as serious as her conduct and 

this argument also fails.4

 

Robinson also maintains that several case managers (P.E., J.H. and J.E.) acted 

similarly to her but they were not immediately terminated. But Robinson fails to 

acknowledge the significant factual distinctions between the other employees’ 

circumstances and her own. See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1232-34 (noting substantial 

differences in the plaintiff’s and another employee’s circumstances, although both 

violated arguably comparably serious work rules). For instance, while Robinson 

points out that Valenzuela disciplined J.E. for failing to carry out a physician’s order, 

she fails to point out that J.E. disputed receiving that order. And she doesn’t develop 

an argument as to the similarity, if any, between her circumstances and those of P.E. 

and J.H. It is not sufficient for Robinson to simply assert that other employees had 

performance issues but weren’t terminated. See id. at 1234 (holding that substantial 

differences between plaintiff’s and other employee’s circumstances precluded a 

finding there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact 

concerning pretext). 

 4

 Robinson points out that witness Mary Martin testified that she views 

misconduct violating federal law as more serious than other misconduct. See Aplt. 

App., Vol. II at 360-61. Robinson doesn’t identify Martin’s role or position, but it 

appears from the cited testimony that she is a “nurse manager” at SJMC. See id. at 

360. Robinson fails to suggest, however, that Valenzuela shared Martin’s opinion. 

Nor does she show that any employee who reported to Martin and was treated 

differently would have been similarly situated to herself. See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 

1232 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating employees are similarly situated if they “deal[] with 

the same supervisor”). 

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As evidence of Valenzuela’s inconsistent actions towards her, Robinson points 

out that Valenzuela terminated R.M. for altering a physician’s order, but did so only 

after coaching her over two previous incidents—the first after R.M. gave prescribed 

medicine valued at $350 to a patient who could not afford to pay for it without 

obtaining appropriate approval, and the second when she made racial comments to a 

co-worker. Importantly, Robinson ignores the considerable distinguishing 

circumstances of R.M.’s previous incidents of misconduct. And Robinson fails to 

point to any evidence that SJMC considered these incidents to be as serious as her 

own actions, which SJMC concluded were outside the scope of her position and 

detrimental to the patient’s care. More importantly, Robinson acknowledges that 

Valenzuela terminated R.M. after a physician complained that R.M. had altered the 

physician’s written order regarding hospice care for a patient without first obtaining 

the physician’s permission. Thus, the bottom line is that Valenzuela terminated R.M. 

for conduct similar to Robinson’s, and SJMC’s treatment of R.M. “is close enough to 

be comparable,” id. at 1233. 

Simply stated, Robinson points to no evidence that comes even close to 

approaching the circumstances here—that is, a case manager who acted outside of her 

position in multiple and distinct ways and in a manner that resulted in six physicians 

and one nurse complaining to Valenzuela about her conduct. Under these 

circumstances, the district court did not err in holding that Robinson failed to show 

that similarly situated employees were treated differently. 

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5. Evidence of Inconsistencies in SJMC’s Reasons for 

Terminating Robinson 

Next, Robinson contends SJMC made false and inconsistent statements that 

would allow a jury to infer that its reasons for terminating her were pretextual. In 

support, Robinson maintains that the disciplinary action form documenting her 

termination indicated she had not been coached,5

 but that SJMC later falsely 

asserted—in a filing with the EEOC and in Valenzuela’s deposition testimony—that 

she had been coached. Robinson denies any previous coaching, and she argues that 

SJMC’s changed position on this issue is evidence of pretext. See Jaramillo, 

427 F.3d at 1309-10 (discussing circumstances when employer’s changed explanation 

for the adverse employment action is evidence of pretext). 

But the record doesn’t support Robinson’s claim that SJMC changed its 

position after the fact. It is true, as Robinson points out, that the disciplinary action 

form documenting Robinson’s termination indicated “None” in response to a 

question asking for “[d]ates of previous discussions concerning this issue.” Aplt. 

App., Vol. II at 390 (emphasis added). But the coaching Valenzuela referred to in 

her deposition, using her own historical notes, didn’t concern Robinson’s 

termination. Instead, it concerned Valenzuela’s conversation with Robinson 

regarding Robinson’s working relationship with the nursing staff in a specific unit of 

the hospital. See id., Vol. III at 485-86. SJMC attached Valenzuela’s notes 

 5

 Coaching is an informal disciplinary action under SJMC’s progressive 

disciplinary policy involving “a planned discussion between a manager and employee 

about the need to correct a problem and improve performance.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 

395. 

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regarding the alleged coaching to its EEOC filing and noted that Valenzuela had 

counseled Robinson not to cross boundaries and to take a team approach. Although 

Robinson denies that any such coaching occurred, whether formally or informally, 

the evidence she cites doesn’t show a contradiction between Valenzuela’s testimony 

and notes and the disciplinary action form documenting her termination. 

Robinson also asserts that SJMC falsely stated in its EEOC filing that “the 

patient ‘fired’ the palliative care team because they were not giving her the 

medication recommended by” Robinson. Id., Vol. II at 439. Robinson points to 

evidence that the patient dismissed the palliative care team before Robinson talked to 

the patient about an IV pain pump. She contends this false statement is evidence of 

pretext because a jury could see it as evidence that SJMC attempted to exaggerate 

Robinson’s misconduct. 

But Robinson doesn’t identify where in the record she raised this issue, as 

required by our local rule. See 10th Cir. R. 28.2(C)(2) (“For each issue raised on 

appeal, all briefs must cite the precise reference in the record where the issue was 

raised and ruled on.”). And our review of the record indicates she didn’t raise this 

particular pretext contention in the argument section of her brief in opposition to 

summary judgment. Thus, Robinson didn’t sufficiently raise this issue in the district 

court to preserve it for appellate review. Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distribs., 

Inc., 686 F.3d 1144, 1150 (10th Cir. 2012). Nor does Robinson make any effort to 

show plain error as to this issue. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 

1130 (10th Cir. 2011)(noting we will reverse based on new issue raised for first time 

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on appeal only if appellant satisfies plain error standard of review). This failure 

“marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the 

district court.” Id. at 1131.6

6. Evidence that Valenzuela Denied that Robinson Complained 

About Race Discrimination 

Robinson claims that about five weeks before SJMC terminated her 

employment, she reported to Valenzuela that another employee had said to her “you 

could never be a dumb blond, play the dumb blond” and “isn’t there another black 

case manager who’s loud and assertive.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 304. Robinson 

contends that when she reported these comments Valenzuela told her to “forget about 

what she said.” Id. According to Robinson, Valenzuela “seemed angry with me, as 

if I’d done something wrong for telling her that.” Id. Valenzuela denied that 

Robinson ever reported a racial comment made by another employee. See id., 

Vol. III at 493. Robinson argues that a jury could infer pretext based upon 

Valenzuela’s hostility toward her discrimination complaint and her later assertion 

that Robinson had not reported any racial comments. 

We are not persuaded. “To raise an inference of pretext in the face of the 

employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation, the plaintiff must undermine 

 6

 In a related argument, Robinson argues the disciplinary action form 

inaccurately stated that she clearly understood the rule or policy she violated. But 

regardless of whether Robinson misunderstood the rule or policy she violated, she 

fails to point to any evidence indicating that SJMC didn’t sincerely believe she 

understood the most basic fundamentals of nursing—i.e., that a nurse acts under the 

direction of a physician. 

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the employer’s credibility to the point that a reasonable jury could not find in its 

favor.” Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1310. Here, SJMC’s proffered overall reason for 

Robinson’s termination—that she acted outside the scope of her position on 

numerous occasions, as reported by multiple physicians and one nurse—is supported 

by the record. See id. at 1312. And notably, SJMC has consistently offered this 

explanation. See id. at 1310-11 (noting employer had not pursued a “shotgun 

approach” by proffering “a significant number of pretextual reasons”). Moreover, the 

fact that Valenzuela both hired and terminated Robinson in a relatively short time 

frame gives rise to “a strong inference” (but not a presumption) that SJMC’s stated 

reasons for her termination are not pretextual. Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 

458 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).7

 On this 

record, Robinson’s attack on Valenzuela’s credibility doesn’t raise a genuine 

question of pretext such that a reasonable jury could not find in SJMC’s favor. See 

Jaramillo, 427 F.3d. at 1310. 

To summarize, whether considered individually or as a whole, Robinson’s 

pretext evidence doesn’t show “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 

incoherencies, or contradictions” in SJMC’s proffered legitimate reasons for her 

termination. Lobato, 733 F.3d at 1289 (internal quotation marks omitted). Robinson 

has failed to raise a genuine issue as to whether SJMC’s stated and consistent reasons 

 7

 Robinson argues a court can’t draw this so-called “same actor inference” in 

favor of an employer on summary judgment. Antonio, 458 F.3d at 1183 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). But we have recognized this inference in a summary 

judgment case and concluded that the employee’s pretext evidence didn’t dispel it. 

See id., at 1183-84. 

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for her termination are “an attempt to mask an illegitimate motive.” Jaramillo, 

427 F.3d at 1312. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to SJMC on Robinson’s race discrimination and retaliation claims. 

C. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Oklahoma Public Policy 

 Finally, Robinson contends that SJMC terminated her employment in 

retaliation for reporting to Valenzuela and others her concern that physicians were 

withholding treatment from the patient because, as stated by one of the resident 

physicians, the patient didn’t “warm their hearts.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 314. She 

argues her termination thus violated a clear mandate of public policy and constituted 

an actionable state tort claim under the rationale of Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 

24 (Okla. 1989). 

Burk recognized a “public policy exception to the at-will termination rule in a 

narrow class of cases in which the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public 

policy as articulated by constitutional, statutory or decisional law.” Id. at 28. But 

Burk further recognized that “the vague meaning of the term public policy,” requires 

that this exception to at-will employment “be tightly circumscribed.” Id. at 28-29; 

see also Vasek v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Noble Cty., 186 P.3d 928, 932 (Okla. 2008) 

(setting out elements of viable Burk claim). 

 The district court granted summary judgment to SJMC on this claim, holding 

that Robinson failed to point to evidence that she reported a concern that physicians 

were withholding care from the patient. On appeal, Robinson maintains that she told 

Valenzuela that a physician was conditioning treatment on the patient’s ability to 

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warm their hearts. But as the district court noted, the testimony she relies on is 

rambling and vague, and doesn’t clearly support her contention. Nor did Robinson 

make any effort in the district court to clarify her statements. Instead, she filed an 

affidavit opposing summary judgment that didn’t mention much less clarify her 

allegation that she reported a concern that physicians were withholding treatment 

from the patient. 

Robinson thus failed to meet her burden to come forward with evidence that 

she “refus[ed] to act in violation of an established and well-defined public policy 

or . . . perform[ed] an act consistent with a clear and compelling public policy.” 

Burk, 770 P.2d at 29.8

 We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

SJMC on Robinson’s wrongful termination claim. 

 8

 In any event, even if Robinson could point to evidence that she reported a 

concern to Valenzuela that physicians were withholding care from the patient, she 

has not identified “a specific, well-established, clear and compelling public policy” 

that SJMC violated by terminating her. Barker v. State Ins. Fund, 40 P.3d 463, 

468-69 (Okla. 2001). She cites two sections of the Oklahoma Nursing Practice Act 

that define a nurse’s general duty of care and penalties for failure to meet that 

standard. See Okla. Stat. tit. 59, §§ 567.8, 567.9. But these provisions don’t support 

her Burk claim. See Barker, 40 P.3d at 470 (“Unless a statute specifically articulates 

an established and well-defined Oklahoma public policy, the statute may not be relied 

upon to support a common law Burk tort.”); see also Prince v. St. John Med. Ctr., 

957 P.2d 563, 566 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (holding decisional law that “clearly 

placed a duty of care” on a hospital was nonetheless insufficient to support a Burk

tort claim because “what that duty entails in a particular circumstance is not as 

clear”). In light of Burk’s explicit admonition that the public policy exception be 

tightly circumscribed and reserved for violations of established and well-defined 

public policy, we conclude Robinson’s reliance on the cited statutes “is far too 

slender a reed upon which to base a public policy tort.” McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 

94 F.3d 1478, 1488 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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 The district court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

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