Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02714/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02714-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Keisha Leighann Boyd
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2714

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Keisha Leighann Boyd

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

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 Submitted: January 16, 2015

 Filed: July 2, 2015

____________

Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Keisha Leighann Boyd appeared before the district court at a sentencing

revocation hearing. Boyd faced revocation based on multiple technical violations of

her supervised release and based on an allegation of burglary or theft. The district

court determined that Boyd had committed a Grade A violation and sentenced her to

19 months imprisonment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Appellate Case: 14-2714 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/02/2015 Entry ID: 4291193 
I.

Boyd was convicted of aiding and abetting the distribution of

methamphetamine. After one unsuccessful attempt at supervised release that resulted

in additional prison time, Boyd was again placed on supervised release in January

2014. In May 2014, the government sought to revoke Boyd’s supervised release. At

the revocation hearing, Jay Hudson, Boyd’s supervising probation officer, testified he

had been assigned only in May 2014 to supervise Boyd after Michelle Sims, Boyd’s

previous supervising probation officer, retired. 

Officer Hudson began testifying about Boyd’s alleged violations of supervised

release. Boyd objected under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.2 because

Hudson testified based on the file maintained by the probation office. Boyd argued

“just because the probation officer [Sims] is not working there does not mean she is

not available” and “this witness [Hudson] has no personal knowledge of whether [the

underlying violations] did or did not happen.” (Revoc. Tr. at 11 and 13.) The district

court overruled the objections, holding that because Officer Hudson, the nowsupervising probation officer, was available to testify concerning the contents of

Boyd’s probation file, it was unnecessary to “go get Michelle Sims off retirement and

subpoena her a couple of hundred miles away to come into the courtroom and testify

about it.” (Revoc. Tr. at 28.) 

Jonesboro Police Officer Brandon King testified that Jonesboro police officers

conducted a traffic stop of Boyd’s vehicle based on a tip Officer King had received

indicating Boyd was involved with stolen property. During the stop, Boyd admitted

to Officer King that there was stolen property in the vehicle. She also admitted

knowing additional stolen property was at a local motel. Boyd escorted the officers

to the motel where they recovered additional stolen property. Boyd was charged in

state court with burglary and theft of property. 

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After hearing Officer King’s testimony, the district court determined Boyd’s

personal knowledge of the stolen property “would indicate that she was involved with

it in some way.” (Revoc. Tr. at 27.) After hearing arguments from the parties

concerning whether the government had proven burglary or just theft, the district court

found that Boyd had committed a Grade A violation of her supervised release, which

has a recommended revocation range of 15-21 months imprisonment. See United

States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 7B1.4(a) (stating range of

imprisonment for a Grade A violation with a Category II criminal history is 15-21

months). Based on that violation, the district court sentenced Boyd to 19 months

imprisonment. 

Boyd appeals, arguing (1) the district court violated her confrontation rights

when it permitted Officer Hudson to testify in the place of Officer Sims without first

determining that Officer Sims was unavailable, and (2) the district court abused its

discretion in determining Boyd committed a Grade A violation when there was no

evidence she had committed a burglary and no evidence as to the value of the

property, which would be necessary for a felony theft conviction.1

 We reject Boyd’s

first argument but agree with her second. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s

finding of a revocation violation and remand for further proceedings. 

II.

The district court has the discretion to revoke supervised release if the

government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a

condition of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (“The court may . . . revoke

a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of

the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in

1

Boyd also argues the district court abused its discretion when it declined her

motion to continue the hearing to allow her time to subpoena a witness. As we reverse

her revocation on other grounds, this issue is moot. 

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such term of supervised release . . . if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.”). “We review

the district court’s decision to revoke supervised release for an abuse of discretion.”

United States v. Ahlemeier, 391 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir. 2004). “[T]he court’s

subsidiary factfinding as to whether or not a violation occurred is reviewed for clear

error.” United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003) (quotation

omitted). “Under clear error review, we may reverse only if we have a definite and

firm conviction that the District Court was mistaken.” United States v. Willis, 433

F.3d 634, 636 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). 

A.

First, we consider Boyd’s argument that the district court erred in allowing

Officer Hudson to testify in substitution for Office Sims, who had retired, thus

depriving Boyd of her right to question adverse witnesses. A supervised release

defendant is not entitled to a trial during a revocation hearing, the rules of evidence

are inapplicable, and the government has a lower burden of proof. See United States

v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 2013). However, “[a] defendant is entitled to

‘an opportunity to appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witness unless

the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to

appear.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C)). When making this

determination, the district court “must balance the probationer’s right to confront a

witness against the grounds asserted by the government for not requiring

confrontation.” United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 642 (8th Cir. 1986). Although

there are no set rules for conducting this balancing of interests, as we stated in

Johnson, there are several common concerns to consider:

“First, the court should assess the explanation the government offers of

why confrontation is undesirable or impractical.” Second, a trial court

should consider “the reliability of the evidence which the government

offers in place of live testimony.” Ultimately, if “the government neither

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shows that presenting live testimony would be unreasonably burdensome

nor offers hearsay evidence that bears indicia of reliability, the

probationer is entitled to confrontation.”

Johnson, 710 F.3d at 789 (citations omitted) (quoting Bell, 785 F.2d at 643). 

In Johnson, we reversed the district court when it allowed a probation officer

to read a police report into the record, reasoning “the lack of an explanation for a

witness’s unavailability against the reliability of the police report” balanced in favor

of the defendant’s right to confront an adverse witness. Id.

This case presents a closer question than the one we addressed in Johnson. 

First, the government does offer an explanation for Officer Sims’s absence—she had

retired from the probation office. While retirement alone should not always excuse

an officer from testifying in a revocation hearing, it does bear on the officer’s

availability. Second, Officer Hudson’s testimony was based on a probation document

produced by his agency, whereas in Johnson, the probation officer was seeking to

testify about a police report prepared by officers of a separate law enforcement

agency. See id. at 786. The testimony here concerned a document designed to report

on the status of a supervised release defendant, and Officer Hudson is personally

familiar with the processes for creating that document. And as Officer Hudson now

serves as Boyd’s supervising probation officer, the reliability of his testimony is more

certain than that of a probation officer testifying about a police report created by

another agency and designed to report on possible criminal activity. While the court

should have inquired further about Officer Sims’s present residence, whereabouts, and

availability to testify, we cannot say the court abused its discretion when it allowed

Officer Hudson to testify in substitution for Officer Sims. 

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B.

Next, we address Boyd’s argument that the government failed to present

sufficient evidence to support the district court’s determination that she committed a

Grade A violation of her supervised release. The Sentencing Guidelines classify

supervised release violations as one of three “grades”: A, B, or C. See USSG

§ 7B1.1. Grade A violations are, as relevant here, for “conduct constituting (A) a

federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one

year that (i) is a crime of violence, . . . or (B) any other federal, state, or local offense

punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding twenty years.” USSG § 7B1.1(a)(1). 

The district court determined that Boyd committed a Grade A violation. At the

hearing, counsels’ argument and the district court’s comments focused on whether

Boyd committed burglary, theft of property, or theft by receiving of property.2

 The

district court did not, however, state which offense it found Boyd committed. The

government contends the district court determined Boyd was involved in a burglary,

and burglary is normally considered to be a crime of violence, see United States v.

Bearden, 780 F.3d 887, 896 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding generic burglaries constitute

crimes of violence for purposes of USSG § 4B1.2(a)), which constitutes a Grade A

violation, while, under Arkansas law, the highest penalty for theft of property or theft

by receiving stolen property is 20 years as Class B felonies, which would only qualify

under the Sentencing Guidelines as a Grade B violation. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-

103(b)(1)(a) (theft of property exceeding $25,000 constitutes a Class B felony); Ark.

Code Ann. § 5-36-106(e)(1) (theft by receiving of property exceeding $25,000

constitutes a Class B felony); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(3) (“For a Class B felony,

the sentence shall be not less than five (5) years nor more than twenty (20) years.”);

USSG § 7B1.1(a)(2) (Grade B violations for “conduct constituting any other federal,

state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year”). 

2

Questions also arose concerning the value of the stolen property, however the

district court prohibited the government from presenting testimony about the value.

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The only evidence about the stolen property came from the testimony of Officer

King. He testified that when officers stopped a vehicle in which Boyd was a

passenger” (1) she admitted to knowing the property in the vehicle was stolen, (2) she

denied involvement in a burglary and claimed another person had stolen the property,

(3) she had knowledge of additional property that had been stolen at the same time as

the property in the vehicle, and (4) she knew the location of that additional stolen

property. 

“‘[T]he basic elements’ of generic burglary” are “‘unlawful or unprivileged

entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.’” 

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013) (quoting Taylor v. United

States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990)). Under Arkansas law, “[a] person commits

residential burglary if he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a residential

occupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing in the

residential occupiable structure any offense punishable by imprisonment.” Ark. Code

Ann. § 5-39-201(a)(1); see Young v. State, 288 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Ark. 2008)

(recognizing the statute does not require that property actually be stolen). The

government did not present any evidence that Boyd entered a structure (residential or

otherwise) or even that the stolen property in question came from a residence,

building, or structure. At best, the evidence presented at the revocation hearing could

show only that Boyd had knowledge that the property was stolen. Accordingly, the

district court, even under the low preponderance of the evidence standard, was without

sufficient evidence to find that Boyd participated in a burglary, and thus the

determination that Boyd had committed a Grade A violation was clearly erroneous and

warrants remand. 

III.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s finding of a supervised release

violation and remand this matter to the district court. On remand, the record as it

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pertains to a claim of burglary may not be expanded because the government knew of

its obligation to present sufficient evidence of burglary and inexcusably failed to

comply with this obligation. See Johnson, 710 F.3d at 790. Because the district court

prohibited the government from presenting evidence as to the value of the stolen

property, the government may expand the record on that issue. 

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