Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_04-cv-00275/USCOURTS-ared-3_04-cv-00275-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lisa Clark
Plaintiff
Department of Agriculture
Defendant

Document Text:

1

Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, a party moving for summary judgment must submit a

“statement of the material facts as to which it contends there is no genuine issue to be tried” and

the non-moving party must submit a “short and concise statement of the material facts as to

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

JONESBORO DIVISION

LISA CLARK

Plaintiff

VS. 

ANN VENEMAN, SECRETARY OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA

Defendant

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NO: 3:04CV00275 SWW

ORDER

Plaintiff Lisa Clark (“Clark”) brings this employment discrimination lawsuit pursuant to

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, claiming that

her former employer, the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), failed to renew her

temporary employment appointment based on her gender and in retaliation for her connection to

another employee’s discrimination claim. Clark also alleges supplemental claims under the

Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Before the Court are the USDA’s motion for summary judgment

(docket entry #8), Clark’s response (docket entry #13), and the USDA’s reply (docket entry #20). 

After careful consideration, and for the reasons that follow, summary judgment will be granted in

favor of the USDA.

I. 

The following facts are undisputed.1 In August 1999, Clark received an appointment to a

Case 3:04-cv-00275-SWW Document 24 Filed 11/07/05 Page 1 of 13
which it contends a genuine issue exists to be tried.” Under the Local Rule, all material facts set

forth in the statement filed by the moving party “shall be deemed admitted unless controverted by

the statement filed by the non-moving party . . . . ”

temporary position with the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration

(“GIPSA”), a division of the USDA, at the GIPSA’s office in Jonesboro, Arkansas. The

Jonesboro office is suboffice of the GIPSA’s field office located in Stuttgart, Arkansas. Bill

Strickland serves as the supervisor of the Jonesboro office, and Clyde Steves, Strickland’s

supervisor, serves as the field officer of the Stuttgart office. 

Clark was hired as a “temporary, intermittent” agricultural commodity aid. Her job duties

included inspecting samples of grain and insuring that they complied with government standards. 

Docket entry #13, Ex. D, at 23. Clark’s temporary appointment was limited to 1,040 hours, not

to exceed one year, and it was classified “intermittent” because her work hours were irregular

and scheduled on a “as needed” basis. See docket entry #9, Ex. 2, at 1. According to USDA

policy, temporary, intermittent appointments are not automatically renewed, and renewal is at the

agency’s discretion. 

In April 2000, Clark informed Strickland that she had accepted a full-time job with the

Frito-Lay Company, to begin April 9, 2000. On April 10, 2000, Clark gave Strickland a note

stating that she would be unavailable to work from April 9, 2000 through May 6, 2000, and that

after May 6, 2000, she would be available to work for the USDA only on Mondays. Docket

entry #9, Ex. 2, AH.B. 

On April 11, 2000, Jackie Stevens, a male who worked at the GIPSA’s Jonesboro office,

submitted a letter, dated March 24, 2000, to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) office in Washington, D.C. Stevens’ letter states as follows:

Dear Mr. Bass:

Case 3:04-cv-00275-SWW Document 24 Filed 11/07/05 Page 2 of 13
This letter is to inform you that I am starting an EEO complaint against my first line

supervisor, Bill Strickland, for sexual harassment.

On Monday March 20, 2000, I was assigned duty at Riceland/Parboiled with Lisa

Clark, a part-time sampler Mr. Strickland had hired. At about 11:00 in the morning,

I called Mr. Strickland to let him know that Ms. Clark and I were not busy and that

the mill would not be needing us for the rest of the day. Mr. Strickland instructed me

and Ms. Clark to come to the office. I was to help Mike Clem grade through rice and

milled rice. Ms. Clark was to process rough samples and help with the sampling. In

the afternoon Mr. Strickland dispatched Ms. Clark to Gulf/Rice Harrisburg . . . . Ms.

Clark had just left the office when Mr. Strickland came into the lab and tried to start

a conversation with this sexist remark: “I believe this is the smartest thing I’ve done

yet, hiring these two ugly samplers. None of you guys want to stay with these two

in those labs when the work is slow. I could not have gotten any of you to come in

like this if I had hired a good looking blond.” At that moment I asked Mr. Strickland

not to say any more, that I did not want to hear this. He then turned to Darren

Harpole and repeated his remark again. I told him again I did not want to hear any

of this. He repeated the same remark a third time and Mike Clem heard him.

I am of the understanding that Mr. Strickland has attended a sensitivity training

course. Therefore I contend there is no excuse for his action in this matter and it

should have never occurred. 

I contend that Mr. Strickland is to be held accountable for his action.

EEO is the law. All people are equal under the law.

Respectfully, 

Jackie Stevens

Docket entry #8, Ex. 3, AH.C. 

The EEOC processed Stevens’ grievance in accordance with EEOC regulations, which

require that the agency refrain from revealing the identity of an aggrieved employee except when

authorized to do so by the employee or until the employee files a formal complaint. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.105. Stevens did not authorize that the EEOC reveal his identity--in fact, he

requested that his grievance remain anonymous. 

In May 2000, the EEOC contacted Steves and requested that he counsel Strickland

Case 3:04-cv-00275-SWW Document 24 Filed 11/07/05 Page 3 of 13
regarding the USDA’s policy prohibiting sexual harassment. Steves granted the EEOC’s request

and reminded Strickland of the agency’s anti-harassment policy. An EEO counselor reported to

Stevens that Strickland had been counseled, and Stevens stated that he did not wish to take

additional action regarding his grievance.

Four part-time employees working in the Jonesboro office had temporary appointments

that were set to expire in August or September of 2000. They included: Clark, appointment

expiration date 8/15/00; Phillip Northcutt, appointment expiration date 9/21/00; Sandra Carr,

appointment expiration date 9/21/00; and Charles Higgins, appointment expiration date 8/29/00. 

In August 2000, Strickland recommended to Steves that the temporary appointments of Clark,

Carr, and Northcutt should not be renewed. Strickland also requested the addition of two career,

intermittent positions in the Jonesboro office. 

Steves adopted Strickland’s recommendation that Clark’s, Carr’s, and Northcutt’s

temporary positions go unrenewed. Accordingly, Clark’s appointment expired on August 15,

2000. Steves also granted Strickland’s request for two additional career positions. Applicants

for the positions included Clark, Carr, Northcutt, Higgins, and Lucretia Hall, an intermittent

employee hired on May 15, 2000. A panel of four, including Strickland and Steves, reviewed the

applications and selected Higgins, a male, and Hall, a female, to fill the career positions. 

The first week of September 2000, Riceland Foods requested that the Jonesboro office

supply inspection services for 600 truckloads of rice. To fill the unexpected need for additional

inspectors, Strickland appointed two males to temporary, intermittent positions on September 13,

2000. Clark did not apply for the temporary positions that became available in September 2000.

On August 6, 2004, Clark commenced this lawsuit, alleging that the USDA discriminated

against her on the basis of gender by failing to extend her temporary appointment in August

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2000. Docket entry #1, ¶ 5. She also charges that the USDA retaliated against her based on

Stevens’ letter to the EEOC. Id. 

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As a prerequisite to summary judgment, a moving party must

demonstrate “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for

summary judgment, the non-moving party must “do more than simply show there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

The non-moving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading but

must “come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at

587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “[A] genuine issue of material fact exists if: (1) there is a

dispute of fact; (2) the disputed fact is material to the outcome of the case; and (3) the dispute is

genuine, that is, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party.” RSBI Aerospace, Inc.

v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1995). 

II.

Retaliation

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Clark must show (1) that she participated in

a statutorily protected activity, (2) that the USDA took an adverse employment action against

her, and (3) that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse

Case 3:04-cv-00275-SWW Document 24 Filed 11/07/05 Page 5 of 13
2

In his letter to the EEOC, Stevens complains about statements Strickland made, which

apparently offended Stevens. Nothing in the letter indicates that Stevens submitted his letter on

Clark’s behalf. Nonetheless, Clark claims that Stevens’ letter to the EEOC was actually filed “on

her behalf.” Docket entry #16, ¶ 60. Clark cites a portion of Stevens’ EEO hearing testimony

in which he answers “yes” to the question, “Now, you personally filed a Complaint against Mr.

Strickland on behalf of Ms. Clark. Correct?” Docket entry #15, Ex. D, at 75. 

Clark’s citation to only a portion of Steves’ testimony is somewhat misleading. Later in

his testimony, Stevens made clear that he submitted an EEO complaint on his own behalf. The

pertinent testimony follows: 

Q. Why didn’t you file a Complaint against Mr. Strickland on your own behalf?

A. I’m sorry?

Q. Why didn’t you file a Complaint for yourself?

A. I still didn’t understand what you said.

Q. I said why did you not file a Complaint on you, for yourself?

A. It was for me.

Q. But my understanding is you filed it for her.

A. I filed it on my behalf because I didn’t want to tolerate him doing that to those

women.

Q. So let me make sure I understand what you’re staying. You did not file a

Complaint, EEO Complaint on her behalf.

A. It was an informal complaint.

Q. On whose behalf?

A. It’s got my name on it.

Docket entry #15, Ex. D, at 78.

employment action. See Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1998). The

USDA asserts the Clark cannot show that she participated in activity protected under Title VII.

The Court agrees.

It is undisputed that Clark took no part in activity protected under Title VII.2

 In fact, she

acknowledges that she learned about Stevens letter after her temporary appointment expired in

August 2000. Docket entry #12, Ex. 4, Clark Dep. at 18. 

Clark contends that Strickland retaliated against her because he thought that she filed the 

anonymous complaint, actually filed by Stevens. The purpose of Title VII’s anti-retaliation

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In Clark’s statement of material facts in dispute, she states that Steves testified at an

EEOC hearing that “the complaint [Stevens’ April 2000 letter to the EEOC] appeared to be based

on some kind of derogatory remarks to a woman [and] he could assume normally that it would

have been one of the two women working out of the 20 men who filed the complaint.” Docket

entry #15. Clark has misrepresented Steves’ actual testimony, which follows:

Q. Mr. Steves, if the Complaint appeared to be based on some kind of derogatory

remarks to a woman, and it appeared the Complaint was filed by a woman or the

woman was the one who had been grieved, and you only had one or two women

working out of 20 men, it would be pretty easy to narrow it down to who filed the

Complaint, would it not? At least in some people’s minds.

A. I would assume that’s correct.

Docket entry #13, Ex. D, at 100-200(emphasis added). Steves’ answer pertains to the

hypothetical circumstances posed by the question. Steves did not testify that he had knowledge

of the contents of Steven’s complaint or that it appeared to be based on derogatory remarks to a

woman. 

provision is to protect the employee who actually utilizes the Title VII process to protect her

rights. Brower v. Runyon, 178 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 1999)(citing Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118

F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997)(citation omitted). The Eighth Circuit has made clear that, in order

to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, it is essential that a plaintiff show that she personally

participated in activity protected under Title VII. See Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d

813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998). Even if Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision encompassed situations

where an employer mistakenly perceives that an employee has engaged in protected activity,

Clark provides no evidence that Strickland thought that she filed the anonymous complaint.3

 

The Court finds no genuine issues for trial regarding Clark’s retaliation claim.

Discrimination

Clark shoulders the burden to show, with circumstantial or direct evidence, that the

USDA’s failure to renew her temporary appointment was motivated by gender discrimination. 

Because Clark presents no evidence that directly points to the presence of a discriminatory

Case 3:04-cv-00275-SWW Document 24 Filed 11/07/05 Page 7 of 13
motive, the Court will analyze her discrimination claim under the three-stage order of proof set

forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972). 

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Clark must first establish a prima facie case of

gender discrimination. If she establishes a prima facie case, the USDA must articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to renew her temporary appointment. Rothmeier 

v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1332 (8th Cir. 1996). Finally, the burden shifts back

to Clark to show that the proffered reasons are pretextual and that her gender was the real reason

for the nonrenewal of her appointment. 

The USDA asserts that, even if Clark can establish a prima facie case of discrimination,

she is unable to rebut its proffered reason for not renewing her appointment. The USDA asserts

that it did not renew Clark’s appointment because in August 2000, Strickland determined that

three temporary, intermittent positions that were set to expire should not be renewed, and,

instead, the USDA should add two career positions at the Jonesboro office. According to the

declaration of Clyde Steves, “if the need for [labor] is expected to be recurring over a long period

of time, the agency prefers that the position be filled by a career, intermittent appointment [rather

than a temporary, intermittent appointment].” Docket entry #9, Ex. 1, at 3. Strickland states that

he chose Clark for nonrenewal because her full-time employment limited her availability to

work. See docket entry #9, Ex. 2, at 3; docket entry #20, Ex. 1, at 3. 

Because the USDA has articulated nondiscriminatory reasons for Clark’s nonrenewal, to

survive summary judgment, Clark must (1) discredit the USDA’s asserted reasons and (2) show

that the circumstances permit a reasonable inference that her gender was the real reason for her

nonrenewal. Johnson v. AT & T Corp., 2005 WL 2138808, at *5 (8th Cir. Sept. 7, 2005)(citation

omitted). 

Case 3:04-cv-00275-SWW Document 24 Filed 11/07/05 Page 8 of 13
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The pertinent portion of Strickland’s affidavit reads as follows: “When determining

what intermittent positions will be renewed we look at the office staffing levels in comparison to

the projected workload. When the workload indicates that we will continue using intermittent

[employees] to supplement our staffing, we normally announce for career appointments. . . .

[Clark’s] position . . . was not renewed. I sent an email to Mr. Steves on August 8, 2000,

recommending that we announce for two career intermittent positions due to an ongoing need of

intermittent staffing.” Docket entry #19, Ex. 1. 

The pertinent portion of Steves’ affidavit states: “[Clark] was not renewed for the

intermittent position . . . because we felt that the Jonesboro suboffice was going to continue

needing intermittent employees and that it would best be filled by career employee[s].” 

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In an attempt to discredit the USDA’s proffered reason, Clark points out that in the course

of administrative proceedings concerning Clark’s claims, Strickland and Steves filed affidavits

stating that Clark’s appointment was not renewed because they projected that the Jonesboro

office would continue needing intermittent employees, and it would be best to hire career

employees.4 Clark asserts that Steves’ and Strickland’s affidavit testimony is inconsistent with

“subsequent sworn statements [in which] they allege that they were unaware that Plaintiff Clark

wanted to renew her intermittent position because she failed to reapply and failed to

communicate her desire to continue her employment . . . . ” Docket entry #19, ¶4.

The USDA has never altered its stated reasons for not renewing Clark’s appointment. 

Furthermore, neither Strickland nor Steves has testified that Clark’s appointment went

unrenewed because she failed to submit an application. The USDA does, however, present

evidence that it is the agency’s policy that when an employee’s temporary appointment expires

without being renewed, the employee must submit a new application in order to be considered

for a second temporary appointment. Evidence of the policy is relevant because Clark was not

considered for a second temporary appointment in September 2000, when Strickland hired two

males for temporary appointments. 

Case 3:04-cv-00275-SWW Document 24 Filed 11/07/05 Page 9 of 13
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Docket entry #13, Ex. D at 19-20, 47. Clark acknowledges that she never asked

Strickland, the person who actually scheduled her hours, whether he intended to cut her hours. 

Id. at 47. 

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Clark claims that she took a job with Frito-Lay because Stevens and Danny Harpole, 

another GIPSA employee, advised her that her hours were going to be cut and she should look

for another job.5

 She also states that Stevens and Harpole “hinted that [Strickland] was mad at

her because of the EEO complaint that was filed.” Docket entry #13, at 5. 

Stevens denies that he told Clark that Strickland would retaliate against her, and Harpole

has no recollection that he told Clark her hours would be reduced or that she should look for

another job. See docket entry #13, Ex. D., at 80, 164. Clark’s claim that Stevens and Harpole

“hinted” that Strickland was mad at her because of an EEOC complaint lacks credulity

considering that Clark had no knowledge of Stevens’ letter to the EEOC until her employment

with the USDA ended. 

Next, Clark argues that even though she informed Strickland that she could work

Mondays only, she worked at Frito-Lay at night, and Strickland knew she was available to work

for him during the day. To support her argument, Clark notes that she worked 7 hours on May

13, 2000 and 6 1⁄2 hours on May 27, 2000, at Strickland’s request. May 13, 2000 and May 27,

2000 fell on Saturdays. In his testimony before the EEOC, Strickland testified that Clark told

him she would be able to work “some on weekends.” Docket entry #13, Ex. D, at 211. 

Strickland testified that after Clark began working full time, there were “some weekend

opportunities where some work came up where she was available. . . . There’s not very much

weekend work but occasionally there’s some.” Id. at 216. In sum, evidence that Clark worked

for the USDA on two Saturdays fails to show that Strickland knew she was available to work

Case 3:04-cv-00275-SWW Document 24 Filed 11/07/05 Page 10 of 13
6

In Clark’s brief in opposition to summary judgment, she suggests that the Court should

analyze her claim according to precedent governing hostile work environment claims. See

docket entry #13, at 24-29. However, in her pretrial information sheet she makes clear that she is

not proceeding under a hostile environment theory, stating: “Plaintiff contends that although the

hostile work environment is not a claim per se, it is evidence of a discriminatory sexual animus

on the part of her supervisors.” Docket entry #22, at 2. 

11

during the day, Tuesday through Friday. 

Even if Clark could discredit the USDA’s proffered reasons, she must also show that the

circumstances permit an inference unlawful discrimination. In an effort to make such a

showing, Clark presents evidence that Strickland once told a male employee, in Clark’s presence,

that his sandwich smelled like his girlfriend (referring to female genitalia). Additionally, Clark

claims that Strickland stated that she and other female employees were ugly and that he needed to

start hiring pretty employees.6

 Clark presents no evidence linking Strickland’s alleged comments to his decision not to

extend her appointment. Evidence that Strickland made vulgar, rude statements, without more, is

insufficient to establish that gender discrimination motivated his decision. See Gartman v.

Gencorp, Inc., 120 F.3d 127, 130 (8th Cir. 1997)(holding that statements by decisionmakers that

have no relation to the decisional process fail to support an inference that illegitimate criterion

motivated an employment decision). 

Finally, Clark claims that Strickland accommodated and extended the appointments of

male employees who had other jobs or circumstances that limited their availability to work. 

However, she provides no details regarding the positions, work schedules, or availability of male

employees whose appointments were renewed. There is simply no evidence that Clark was

similarly situated to male employees who received favorable treatment. See Harvey v. AnheuserCase 3:04-cv-00275-SWW Document 24 Filed 11/07/05 Page 11 of 13
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Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994)(noting that instances of disparate treatment can

support a claim of pretext, but the plaintiff has the burden of proving that she and employees

who received favorable treatment were “similarly situated in all relevant respects”). 

Strickland made the decision to hire Clark, and nothing in the record indicates that he

became averse to employing females during Clark’s one-year appointment. See Lowe v. J.B.

Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 175 (8th Cir.1992) (“It is simply incredible, in light of the

weakness of plaintiff's evidence otherwise, that the company officials who hired him at age fiftyone had suddenly developed an aversion to older people less than two years later.”). The Court

concludes that Clark’s evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to allow a reasonable

factfinder to infer intentional discrimination based on gender. 

Arkansas Civil Rights Act

The USDA asserts that Clark’s discrimination and retaliation claims brought under the

Arkansas Civil Rights Act are preempted under Title VII. The Court agrees. Title VII provides

the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment. Gergick v.

Austin, 997 F.2d 1237, 1239 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Brown v. General Serv. Admin., 425 U.S.

820, 835 (1976)). The Eighth Circuit has held that “[w]hen the same set of facts supports a Title

VII claim and a non-Title VII claim against a federal employer, Title VII preempts the non-Title

VII claim.” Mathis v. Henderson, 243 F.3d 446, 451 (8th Cir. 2001)(citation omitted). 

Accordingly, Clark’s claims brought pursuant to the Arkansas Civil Rights Act must be

dismissed. 

III.

For the reasons stated, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (docket entry #8) is

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GRANTED. Pursuant to the judgment entered together with this order, this case is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 7TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2005.

/s/Susan Webber Wright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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