Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02578/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02578-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dwight Steven Barry
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

P U B L I S H 

f=°EB G 1990 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L 1-IOECf<'.ER 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DWIGHT STEVEN BARRY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 88-2578 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR-THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 88-40012-05) 

Charles Szekely, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Colorado (Michael G Katz, Federal Public Defender, 

Colorado, was also on the brief) for Defendant-Appellant 

Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., United States Attorney, Topeka, 

(Kurt J. Shernuk, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Kansas, was also on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Clerl, 

Denver, 

Denver, 

Kansas 

Topeka, 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and MOORE, Circuit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-2578 Document: 010110153920 Date Filed: 02/05/1990 Page: 1 
I. 

Appellant Dwight Steven Barry was charged in two counts of a 

Five Count Indictment. On July 25, 1988, appellant pleaded guilty 

to Count 5 of the indictment charging him with violating 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846, attemped possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 

In return for appellant's plea of guilty to Count 5 of the 

indictment, the government dismissed Count l of the indictment at 

the time of sentencing. The government also recommended the low 

end of the applicable sentencing guideline range at the time of 

sentencing. 

At the time he entered his plea, appellant had been advised 

pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 that the maximum penalty for the 

crime was 40 years' imprisonment and a $2 million fine. Appellant 

was also advised that he would be required to pay a special 

assessment of $50 to the victims' impact fund. Supp. Tr. I, p.15. 

Appellant was not advised, however, that if he was sentenced to 

prison, he would be subject to a term of supervised release 

pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 3583(b)(l) and Sentencing Guidelines 

§§ 5D3.l(a) & 5D3.2(b)(l). 1 

On September 28, 1988, appellant was sentenced to a term of 

six years' imprisonment and placed on supervised release for an 

additional period of five years. Appellant now argues that he 

should be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty because the 

district court failed to advise him of the effect of the term of 

supervised release as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(c)(l). The 

1 

Citations to the Sentencing Guidelines are to United States 

Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (May 1988), in effect at 

the time appellant was sentenced. Section 5D3 of· the Guidelines 

was renumbered section 5D1 effective November 1989. 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-2578 Document: 010110153920 Date Filed: 02/05/1990 Page: 2 
sole issue on appeal, therefore, is whether the district court's 

failure to advise appellant at his plea hearing of the mandatory 

period of supervised release provided by Sentencing Guideline 

§ 5D3.l(a) requires us to set aside the guilty plea in the 

circumstances of this case. We hold that it does not and affirm. 

II. 

A. 

We must first determine whether the district court's failure 

to advise appellant of the period of supervised release was 

contrary to the mandatory requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. At 

the time appellant entered his guilty plea, Rule ll(c)(l) provided 

that, before accepting such a plea, the court must inform 

appellant of, among other things: 

(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is 

offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by 

law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty 

provided by law, including the effect of any 

special parole term .... 

Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(c)(l). Subsection (c)(l) was subsequently 

amended, effective November 18, 1988, to add the phrase ''or term 

of supervised release" after the phrase "special parole term". 

Pub. L. 100-690, § 7076, 102 Stat. 4181, 4406. It is clear from 

the transcript of the plea proceedings that the district court 

failed to advise appellant that his sentence would include a term 

of supervised release. The parties do not dispute that point. 

The government argues, however, that because the plea hearing 

occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment to 

subsection (c)(l), the district court was not required to advise 

appellant of ~he term of "superviseq release" before accepting his 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2578 Document: 010110153920 Date Filed: 02/05/1990 Page: 3 
guilty plea. Appellant argues that the terms "special parole'' and 

"supervised release" are synonymous, that the 1988 amendment to 

the Rule was not intended to change existing law, and therefore 

that the district court failed to comply with the requirements of 

the Rule. 

Prior to the effective date of the new Sentencing Guidelines, 

drug violation laws authorized imposition of "special parole 

terms" in connection with prison sentences for some substantive 

drug offenses. See generally United States v. Molina-Uribe, 853 

F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (5th Cir. 1988). The Sentencing Reform Act of 

1984, Pub. L. 98-473, abolished parole and, in its place, 

substituted supervised release. Accordingly, the statute with 

which we are concerned here was amended to reflect this change. 

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 substituted "term of supervised 

release" for "term of special parole" in 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b), 

effective November 1, 1987, Pub. L. 99-570, § 1004(a), (b). 

For purposes of determining the district court's 

responsibilities under Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(c)(l), we believe that 

the distinction between the terms "special parole" and "supervised 

release" is insignificant. Accord Molina-Uribe, 853 F.2d at 1197-

98; United States v. Smith, 840 F.2d 886, 890 n.3 (11th Cir. 

1988). We are persuaded that the 1988 amendment to subsection 

(c)(l) reflects a change in terminology only, not a change in the 

substantive requirements of Rule 11. 

to the 1988 amendment to subsection 

The Advisory Committee notes 

(c)(l) indicate that the 

additional language was intended to accommodate the new Sentencing 

Guidelines and not to change existing law. 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2578 Document: 010110153920 Date Filed: 02/05/1990 Page: 4 
The Committee believes that a technical change, 

adding the words 'or supervised release' is 

necessary to recognize that defendants sentenced 

under the Guidelines approach will be concerned 

about supervised release rather tnan special 

parole. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583 and 3624(e). The 

words special parole are left in the rule, since 

the district courts continue to handle preguideline cases. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee notes. In any event, for 

our purposes we conclude that the sentence of a five-year period 

of supervised release may be considered a "special parole term" 

within the meaning of the version of Rule 11 applicable to this 

case. A special parole term operates in essentially the same way 

that a period of supervised release does. Both forms of 

supervision can lead to additional confinement beyond the original 

sentence. See Moore v. United States, 592 F.2d 753, 755 (4th Cir. 

1979); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (3) (West Supp. 1989). Thus, there is 

no reason to distinguish between special parole and supervised 

release for purposes of a Rule 11 analysis. We conclude, 

therefore, that the district court erred in not informing 

appellant at the plea hearing that appellant, if sentenced to 

prison, would be subject to a term of supervised release. 

B. 

Although the court erred in failing to inform appellant of 

this penalty, we need not vacate appellant's conviction and 

sentence unless appellant's "substantial rights" have been 

affected. Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(h) ("Any variance from the 

procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial 

rights shall be disregarded."). On the facts of this case, we are 

convinced that appellant's substantial rights were not 

detrimentally affected. 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2578 Document: 010110153920 Date Filed: 02/05/1990 Page: 5 
Before accepting appellant's plea, the district court advised 

appellant that the new Sentencing Guidelines applied, and that it 

would therefore sentence appellant under those Guidelines. Supp. 

Tr. I, pp. 7-9. The statute appellant violated in this case, 21 

u.s.c. § 846, is punishable by not less than 5 and not more than 

40 years' imprisonment. Therefore,· ·appellant's offense was a 

Class B felony. See 18 u.s.c. § 3559(a)(l)(B) (1988). When an 

accused is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the commission 

of a Class B felony, the guidelines require the sentencing court 

to impose a period of supervised release of at least three and not 

more than five years. See Sentencing Guidelines §§ 5D3.l(a) & 

5D3.2(b)(l). The court specifically asked appellant's attorney 

whether he had discussed the Guidelines with his client and 

whether he understood how the Guidelines might apply to his case. 

Appellant's attorney replied affirmatively. Supp. Tr. I, p.9. 

We are convinced that the district court's error could not 

have had a •significant influence on appellant's decision to plead 

guilty. See United States v. Reyes-Ruiz, 868 F.2d 698, 703 (5th 

Cir. 1989) (the failure to fully comply with the requirements of 

Rule 11 does not warrant reversal if the failure was not "likely 

to have been a material factor affecting the petitioner's decision 

to plead guilty.") (quoting Keel v. United States, 585 F.2d 110, 

116 (5th Cir. 1979) (en bane) (Rubin J., concurring)). Appellant 

was correctly advised that the maximum penalty for the crime was 

40 years' imprisonment and a $2 million fine. The court also 

informed appellant that parole had been abolished and that if he 

was sentenced to prison he would not be released on parole. 

Appellant acknowledged that he understood that advice. Supp. Tr. 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2578 Document: 010110153920 Date Filed: 02/05/1990 Page: 6 
[ 

I, p. 10. Since Barry's total sentence--including the term of 

supervised release--is only a fraction of the maximum penalty of 

which he was advised, we do not understand how the court's failure 

to advise Barry of the term of supervised release in any way 

prejudiced his decision to plead guilty. 

On these facts we conclude that the district court's failure 

to fully comply with the requirements of Rule 11 does not warrant 

reversal. Cf. United States v. Hamilton, 553 F.2d 63 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977) (even though failure to advise a 

defendant of the effect of mandatory parole requirements violated 

Rule 11, collateral relief was not warranted where the total 

sentence did not exceed the term of imprisonment which the court 

had advised the defendant he might receive for the offense); see 

also United States v. Sisneros, 599 F.2d 946, 948-49 (10th Cir. 

1979) (failure to advise defendant of possible lifetime special 

parole term did not warrant collateral relief where sentence 

imposed--ten years' imprisonment and three years of special 

parole--did not exceed the total fifteen years' imprisonment of 

which defendant had been advised). 2 

We do not apply the harmless error rule of subsection ll(h) 

lightly. The safeguards of rule 11 are no less important today 

than they were when the Supreme Court decided McCarthy v. United 

2 

Appellant argues that the Fifth Circuit, on facts similar to 

those before us here, set aside a plea of guilty because the 

sentencing court failed to advise the defendant of the effect of a 

term of supervised release. See United States v. Molina-Uribe, 

853 F.2d 1193, 1199-1200 & n.11 75th Cir. 1988). We are not 

persuaded to apply that rule here. Appellant simply has not 

demonstrated to us that the district court's failure to advise him 

of the effect of a term of supervised release resulted in a 

deprivation of his substantial rights. 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2578 Document: 010110153920 Date Filed: 02/05/1990 Page: 7 
States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). As the Advisory Notes to the 1983 

amendment to rule 11 (adding subsection ll(h)) indicate, "[i]t is 

still true, as the Supreme Court pointed out in McCarthy, that 

thoughtful and careful compliance with rule 11 best serves the 

fair and efficient administration of criminal justice . . " 

Appellant correctly notes that McCarthy has been faithfully 

followed in this Circuit where fundamental error in the plea 

colloquy requires that a plea be vacated and the defendant be 

allowed to plead anew. See~' United States v. Keiswetter, 866 

F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (guilty plea vacated because 

record did not contain an adequate factual basis for the plea, as 

required by Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(f)). However, as the Advisory 

Committee notes to Rule ll(h) point out, the McCarthy per se rule 

was no longer justified following the extensive amendments to Rule 

11 which took place in 1975; when McCarthy was decided in 1969, 

Rule 11 was much shorter and simpler than the present version. 

See United States v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 857 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

AFFIRMED. 

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