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Parties Involved:
Darren Harris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

U 'ted States Court ~f Appea.lB 

nl Tenth Ci'l'CU1t 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 111991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DARREN HARRIS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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No. 90-5038 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-91-C) 

James L. Swartz, Assistant United States Attorney (Tony M. Graham, 

u.s. Attorney, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

C. W. Hack of Flowers, Harman, Hack & Finlayson, P.A., Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, MOORE, and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-5038 Document: 01019293526 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 1 
Darren Harris and five others were charged with conspiring 

with each other, and others, from August 1, 1988, to July 20, 

1989, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846 as 

follows: (1) to knowingly and intentionally distribute a mixture 

or substance which contained cocaine base, a Schedule II 

controlled substance, in an amount in excess of fifty grams, in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii); and (2) 

to knowingly and intentionally possess with an intent to 

distribute cocaine in an amount in excess of five hundred grams, 

in violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). 

Harris was tried jointly with four of the other five 

defendants and the jury found him guilty of conspiring to 

knowingly and intentionally distribute in excess of fifty grams of 

a mixture or substance which contained cocaine base, in violation 

of 21 u.s.c. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). The 

district court sentenced Harris under the Sentencing Guidelines to 

360 months imprisonment. 

The conspiracy for which Harris was convicted allegedly took 

place from August 1, 1988, to July 20, 1989. Harris was born on 

June 19, 1971, and became eighteen years of age on June 19, 1989. 

Before trial, as well as during trial, counsel argued that the 

district court had no jurisdiction over Harris because he was a 

juvenile when all acts occurring before June 19, 1989, were 

committed, 1 and that after June 19, 1989, Harris himself did 

1 18 u.s.c. § 5032 provides in pertinent part that "[a] 

juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency 

• • • shall not be proceeded against in any court of the United 

States" except when the Attorney General certifies, inter alia, 

that "the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State 

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Appellate Case: 90-5038 Document: 01019293526 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 2 
nothing in furtherance of the conspiracy. The government's 

position on this matter was that Harris did commit acts in 

furtherance of the conspiracy after reaching his eighteenth 

birthday. The district court agreed with the government, as do 

we. 

There is much evidence that Harris was a member of the 

conspiracy from March, 1989, until his eighteenth birthday on June 

19, 1989. One Willie Junior Louis testified that he left his 

apartment in Tulsa, Oklahoma in charge of a girlfriend when he 

made a trip to Oklahoma City in March, 1989. Louis went on to 

testify that on his return, he found out that the defendants, 

including Harris, had moved their "crack cocaine" business into 

his apartment. According to Louis, during the ensuing five or six 

weeks the defendants ran their business out of his apartment. 

Louis described how the defendants, including Harris, would cut up 

rock cocaine with a razor, sell it directly to customers who came 

to the door, and give it to "runners" who would then sell it to 

passing motorists on the nearby streets. Louis further testified 

that these "runners" would later return to the apartment with the 

money received from the sales made. Additionally, Louis testified 

as to some weapons possessed by Harris. 

does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over 

said juvenile . . . If the Attorney General does not so 

certify, such juvenile shall be surrendered to the appropriate 

legal authorities of [the] State." 18 u.s.c. § 5031 defines 

"juvenile" as "a person who has not attained his eighteenth 

birthday " That same statute defines "juvenile 

delinquency" as "the violation of a law of the United States 

committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would 

have been a crime if committed by an adult." 

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Appellate Case: 90-5038 Document: 01019293526 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 3 
On June 19, 1989, Harris moved from Tulsa, Oklahoma, to 

Denver, Colorado, his mother desiring to get him out of his poor 

environment in Tulsa. On July 6, 1989, Harris, however, returned 

to Tulsa for a visit. 

Two foot-patrol officers assigned to the North Tulsa area 

testified that on July 9, 1989, they saw Harris, Reggie LeRoy (a 

co-defendant), and others in the vicinity of Louis' apartment 

complex, flagging down cars, going to the stopped vehicles, 

putting their hands toward the persons in the car, and then 

pulling their hands back. One officer testified that in his 

experience this type of activity indicates "cocaine dealing." 2 

Harris was arrested at the time of this incident. No drugs were 

found on him, although he had some $600 in currency on his person. 

We think the testimony of these two officers was sufficient 

to show participation by Harris in the conspiracy after he became 

eighteen years of age. Such was also corroborated by the 

statements made by Ward Price, a leader in the conspiracy, to 

Officer Witt. In this latter regard, Price, in June and July, 

1989, attempted to draw Officer Witt, posing as a "crooked cop," 

into the conspiracy. In the course of Price's conversations with 

Officer Witt, many of which were audio-taped, Darren Harris' name 

was mentioned. We have this date held in companion appeals that 

Price's statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy. In 

those conversations Price said that although the conspiracy was a 

2 At trial, all concerned apparently thought that the words 

"cocaine" and "crack" and the phrase "cocaine base" were synonyms. 

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Appellate Case: 90-5038 Document: 01019293526 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 4 
profitable one, there were problems and he offered Witt money in 

exchange for his assistance. 

In United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1986), 

cert. denied, 481 u.s. 1006, cert. denied, 482 U.S. 930 (1987), 

the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction 

to try the defendant, who had been charged with conspiracy to 

possess cocaine with intent to distribute, even through he was a 

juvenile at the time he entered into that conspiracy, since the 

government had presented evidence from which the jury could infer 

that the defendant's involvement continued after he turned 

eighteen. Id. at 1475-77. See also, United States v. Gjonaj, 861 

F.2d 143, 144 (6th Cir. 1988); and United States v. Spoone, 741 

F.2d 680, 687 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 1162 (1985). 

There being evidence that Harris committed acts in furtherance of 

the conspiracy after attaining the age of eighteen, the district 

court in the instant case had jurisdiction to try him. Further, 

the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 

Harris' remaining argument in this court is that in imposing 

sentence the district court did not comply with the Sentencing 

Guidelines. Prior to sentencing, a presentence report was 

prepared, and, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3), was given 

Harris and his counsel. Counsel filed several specific objections 

to statements contained in the presentence report, the first of 

which was directed at the statement in the presentence report that 

"the organization was responsible for the distribution of at least 

seven (7) kilograms of crack-cocaine at various locations in the 

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Appellate Case: 90-5038 Document: 01019293526 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 5 
Tulsa area." 3 In response to those objections, the probation 

officer filed an addendum in which he basically stood by the 

challenged statements. At sentencing, the district court listened 

to the statements of counsel and, in effect, overruled the 

objections and accepted the report. 4 

On appeal, Harris complains that the district court did not 

follow the mandate of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D), which provides 

that if a defendant challenges the factual accuracy of statements 

contained in the presentence report, "the court shall, as to each 

matter controverted, make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or 

(ii) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the 

matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing" 

(emphasis added). That same rule also provides that a written 

record of such finding or determination shall be appended to the 

presentence report. 

From the record before us it would appear that the district 

court did not make the findings or determinations required by Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D). In United States v. Alvarado, 909 F.2d 

1443, 1445 (lOth Cir. 1990), decided after sentence was imposed in 

the instant case, we held that Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D) 

3 The amount of the drug involved bears on the base offense 

level. Insofar as our review of the record has revealed, there is 

no indication, either in the trial transcript or in the 

presentence report, that Harris was involved in the conspiracy in 

question prior to March, 1989. As indicated, Harris was arrested 

on July 9, 1989. 

4 The record before us does 

Harris' sentencing hearing. 

not 

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contain the transcript of 

Appellate Case: 90-5038 Document: 01019293526 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 6 
requires that when a defendant challenges information in his 

presentence report the district court must either make a factual 

finding regarding the accuracy of the challenged information or 

expressly state that in imposing sentence he is not taking into 

consideration the challenged statement. In Alvarado we remanded 

for resentencing, commenting that such findings or determinations 

must be made not only for use by the correctional system, but also 

so that "we know the facts upon which the district judge 

relie[d]." Id. at 1445. See also United States v. Forker, 928 

F.2d 365 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Alvarado). 

Harris' objections to the presentence report were not 

perfunctory but were specific. The court did not comply with Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D) and its counterpart, u.s.s.G. § 6A1.3. 

Judgment of conviction affirmed, but sentence is vacated and 

case remanded for resentencing. 

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