Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50636/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50636-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Miguel Osuna-Alvarez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MIGUEL OSUNA-ALVAREZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50636

D.C. No.

3:12-cr-04477-LAB-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 6, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed June 10, 2015

Before: John T. Noonan, Kim McLane Wardlaw,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

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2 UNITED STATES V. OSUNA-ALVAREZ

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for aggravated identity

theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, in a case in which

the defendant contended that because he had permission to

use his twin brother’s passport, he did not use the passport

“without lawful authority,” as required by the statute.

The panel rejected that contention and held that § 1028A

does not require theft as an element of the offense. The panel

held that regardless of whether the means of identification

was stolen or obtained with the knowledge and consent of its

owner, the illegal use of the means of identification alone

violates § 1028.

COUNSEL

Richard Dale Rome (argued), Law Offices of Richard D.

Rome, Van Nuys, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney; Bruce R. Castetter,

Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division; Randy K. Jones

(argued), Peter Ko, and Lara Stingley, Assistant United States

Attorneys, San Diego, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. OSUNA-ALVAREZ 3

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In this opinion, we resolve Miguel Osuna-Alvarez’s

challenge to his conviction for aggravated identity theft, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Osuna-Alvarez (“Osuna”)

contends that because he had permission to use his twin

brother’s passport, he therefore did not use the passport

“without lawful authority,” as required by the statute. See

18 U.S.C. § 1028A. As set forth below, we reject this

argument. The remaining issues in this appeal are resolved

in a contemporaneously filed memorandum disposition.

I.

On October 13, 2012, Osuna was arrested while

attempting to enter the United States from Mexico at the Otay

Mesa, California Port of Entry. Osuna was the driver and

sole occupant of his vehicle. At the border crossing, a canine

alerted to the vehicle’s dashboard. When questioned, Osuna

claimed he was headed for San Ysidro and denied having

anything to declare. He presented a United States passport in

the name of “Hector Alejandro Osuna-Alvarez.”

Following inspection, Customs and Border Protection

discovered ten packages containing over three kilograms of

methamphetamine and two packages containing over two

kilograms of cocaine, hidden inside the vehicle’s airconditioning unit. Osuna was arrested and advised of his

Miranda rights.

During a post-arrest interview, Osuna again identified

himself as Hector Osuna, a United States citizen. When an

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4 UNITED STATES V. OSUNA-ALVAREZ

agent informed Osuna that his fingerprint search revealed that

his claimed identification was false, Osuna admitted that his

name was actually Miguel Osuna, that he was a Mexican

citizen, and that he was using his twin brother Hector’s name

and passport to enter the United States.

Later that month, Osuna was charged by indictment with

aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A,

among other charges not at issue in this opinion. Osuna

proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, Osuna’s twin brother

Hector testified that he had lost his passport several months

earlier, and denied knowing how the passport came into

Osuna’s possession. Hector expressly denied giving Osuna

permission to use his passport. However, the court deemed

Hector’s testimony not credible, and found that Hector was

“complicit in turning over the passport” to Osuna.

Following trial, the district court found Osuna guilty.

II.

Osuna argues that he should not have been convicted of

violating 18 U.S.C. § 1028A as a matter of law because he

did not steal his twin brother’s passport and therefore did not

use the passport “without lawful authority.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1028A. This is a question of statutory interpretation, which

we review de novo. See United States v. Thompson, 728 F.3d

1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2013).

III.

Section 1028A, “Aggravated IdentityTheft,” provides, in

relevant part:

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UNITED STATES V. OSUNA-ALVAREZ 5

Whoever, during and in relation to any felony

violation enumerated in subsection (c),

knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses,

without lawful authority, a means of

identification of another person shall, in

addition to the punishment provided for such

felony, be sentenced to a term of

imprisonment of 2 years.

18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (emphasis added). Osuna argues

that the phrase “without lawful authority” excludes cases

where, as here, the fact finder determined that the defendant

used another person’s means of identification with the other

person’s consent or permission. Osuna specifically contends,

and the district court agreed, that Osuna had permission to

use his brother’s passport and, therefore, no violation

occurred. Thus, Osuna urges the court to construe literally

the section’s title, “Aggravated Identity Theft,” so as to

require actual theft or misappropriation of the means of

identification. Our sister circuits have universally rejected

this argument. See United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 434

(D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Lumbard, 706 F.3d 716

(6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Spears, 697 F.3d 592 (7th

Cir. 2012), vacated, 729 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc);

United States v. Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d 496 (1st Cir.

2011); United States v. Retana, 641 F.3d 272 (8th Cir. 2011);

United States v. Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 2010);

United States v. Carrion-Brito, 362 F. App’x 267 (3d Cir.

2010); United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603 (11th Cir.

2007), abrogated in part on other grounds by FloresFigueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009); United States

v. Hines, 472 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2007). We agree with this

authority and now hold that, despite its title, § 1028A does

not require theft as an element of the offense.

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6 UNITED STATES V. OSUNA-ALVAREZ

“[O]ur inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends

there as well if the text is unambiguous.” Satterfield v. Simon

& Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

By its terms, § 1028A explicitly covers a defendant who

“uses” a means of identification “without lawful authority.” 

18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). This language clearly and

unambiguously encompasses situations like the present,

where an individual grants the defendant permission to

possess his or her means of identification, but the defendant

then proceeds to use the identification unlawfully. See

Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 436. Black’s Law Dictionary defines

“lawful” as “[n]ot contrary to law,” and defines “authority”

as “[t]he right or permission to act legally on another’s

behalf.” Black’s Law Dictionary 152 & 965 (9th ed. 2009);

see also Lumbard, 706 F.3d at 723; Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d

at 499. “Combining these definitions, § 1028A(a)(1)

reasonably proscribes the transfer, possession, or use of

another person’s means of identification, absent the right or

permission to act on that person’s behalf in a way that is not

contrary to the law.” Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d at 499. Thus,

regardless of whether the means of identification was stolen

or obtained with the knowledge and consent of its owner, the

illegal use of the means of identification alone violates

§ 1028A. Although the district court found that Hector was

complicit in Osuna’s use of the passport, Osuna nonetheless

made “use” of the passport to falsely identify himself as a

United States citizen—hence, he used the passport “without

lawful authority.” See, e.g., Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 436;

Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d at 499.

Because we conclude that the statutory text is

unambiguous, consistent with the majority of our sister

circuits, we reject Osuna’s argument that § 1028A requires

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UNITED STATES V. OSUNA-ALVAREZ 7

evidence that the defendant stole the means of identification

at issue.

AFFIRMED.

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