Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14188/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14188-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Florida Department of Corrections
Appellee
Tharas E. Moore
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-14188

D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-21528-ASG

THARAS E. MOORE,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

(December 8, 2015)

Before MARCUS and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,

* Judge.

PER CURIAM: 

 * Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by 

designation.

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Tharas Moore (“Moore”), a Florida state prisoner who pleaded guilty in four 

separate, consolidated cases, appeals through counsel the district court’s denial of 

his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Upon careful review and 

with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.

I.

On May 8, 2001, Moore, having entered into a consolidated plea agreement 

with the State Attorney for Miami-Dade County, Florida, pleaded guilty in the 

Miami-Dade County Circuit Court (“Circuit Court”) to four informations charging 

him with various criminal offenses, including robbery, burglary, aggravated 

assault, possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal, and battery on a lawenforcement officer. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms totaling twenty 

years. The judgment in each of the four cases stated:

The defendant in Open Court was advised of his right to appeal from 

this sentence by filing notice of appeal within thirty days from this 

date with the Clerk of this Court, and the defendant’s right to the 

assistance of counsel in taking said appeal at the expense of the State 

upon showing indigence.1

DE 13-5 at 5; DE 13-8 at 5; DE 13-11 at 3; DE 13-14 at 3. Moore was 

subsequently resentenced in three of his cases. Moore contends that, contrary to 

this recital in the four judgments, the Circuit Court did not actually inform him of 

 1 This statement was required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986, which prescribes the 

“Forms Related to Judgment and Sentence.”

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his right to appeal his sentences.2 He asserts that it was only at one of his

resentencing hearings, on December 24, 2008, that he learned of his right to appeal 

when the Circuit Court informed him that he had a right to appeal the sentence 

within thirty days. 

In November 2009, Moore petitioned the Florida Third District Court of 

Appeal (“Third DCA”), pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141, for 

a writ of habeas corpus granting him a belated appeal in each of the four cases. 

Moore’s petition, filed under oath, stated that he was entitled to belated appeals in 

the four cases because the Circuit Court failed to inform him of his right to appeal 

and that such failure denied him the due process and equal protection of the law 

guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution. The Third DCA summarily denied Moore’s petition and subsequent 

motion for rehearing. Moore v. State, 23 So.3d 1193, 1193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 

2010).

 2 In Florida, the right of a defendant convicted pursuant to a plea of guilty to appeal is 

circumscribed by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140, which, in relevant part, states: 

A defendant who pleads guilty . . . may otherwise directly appeal only 

(a) the lower tribunal’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction; 

(b) a violation of the plea agreement, if preserved by a motion to withdraw plea; 

(c) an involuntary plea, if preserved by a motion to withdraw plea; 

(d) a sentencing error, if preserved; or 

(e) as otherwise provided by law.

Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii).

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On May 11, 2010, Moore petitioned the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254, claiming that both the Circuit Court’s failure to inform him of his right to 

appeal his sentences and the Third DCA’s denial of his petition for belated appeals

operated to deny him due process of law. The district court denied the petition on 

August 28, 2014.3

 In doing so, the district court assumed Moore was not informed 

of his right to appeal, but agreed with the State that the Third DCA properly denied 

Moore’s petition for a belated appeal as time-barred.4

 The district court also 

determined that contrary to Moore’s argument, Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 

23 (1999), “does not establish an overarching constitutional rule that courts must 

 3 This was in fact the second time the district court denied Moore’s petition. The district court 

originally denied the petition because the judgments in each of Moore’s state cases indicated that 

he was informed of the right to appeal. Moore appealed and we vacated and remanded, holding 

that the district court could not have given meaningful review without the transcripts from 

Moore’s plea colloquy and sentencing hearing. See Moore v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 486 F. 

App’x 810, 811–12 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). We ordered the State to “produce the plea 

colloquy and sentencing hearing transcripts prior to considering the [merits] of Moore’s claim.” 

Id. The transcripts could not be located. 

4 The rule governing belated appeals in Florida at the time of Moore’s petition was Florida Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c)(4)(A), which provided that such a belated appeal 

shall not be filed more than 2 years after the expiration of time for filing the 

notice of appeal . . . unless it alleges under oath with a specific factual basis that 

the petitioner (i) . . . was not advised of the right to an appeal . . .; and (ii) should 

not have ascertained such facts by the exercise of reasonable diligence.

In denying Moore’s petition, the district court cited Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure

9.141(c)(5)(A), rather than 9.141(c)(4)(A). Rule 9.141(c)(5)(A) is currently in effect and

includes a four-year as well as a two-year limitation for belated appeals. Fla. R. App. P. 

9.141(c)(5)(A) (“In no case shall a petition for belated appeal be filed more than 4 years after the 

expiration of time for filing the notice of appeal.”). The district court correctly held that Moore 

had not satisfied either the two or four year limits. 

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advise defendants of their right to appeal.” DE 62 at 8 n.8.5 The district court 

granted Moore a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the following issue:

[W]hether the State of Florida violated Moore’s due process rights by 

failing to advise him of his right to appeal his sentence at his May 8, 

2001 sentencing hearing and summarily denying his request for a 

belated appeal when the request was filed more than two years after 

the expiration of time for filing the notice of appeal and did not state 

that Moore could not have ascertained such facts by the exercise of 

reasonable diligence, and when the request was filed more than four 

years after the expiration of time for filing the notice of appeal.

DE 62 at 8.

II.

We review a district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition de novo. 

McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005). Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 

a federal court may grant a state prisoner a writ of habeas corpus when his federal 

constitutional claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court” if the 

adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

 5 We agree with the district court that Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23 (1999), did not 

establish a constitutional rule applicable to the factual setting presented by this case. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Although the Third DCA denied Moore’s petition for belated appeal and 

motion for rehearing summarily, the Third DCA adjudicated his claim on the 

merits. See Shelton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 691 F.3d 1348, 1353 (11th Cir. 2012) 

(holding that a per curiam affirmance without an opinion is an adjudication on the 

merits absent a statement by the state court that the decision was based solely on a 

state procedural rule); see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013); 

Harrison v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). As there was no indication that the 

decision was based solely on a state procedural bar, the Third DCA’s decision is 

entitled to deference. See Shelton, 691 F.3d at 1353. When a state court 

summarily denies a claim, a federal court will grant habeas only if there is no 

reasonable explanation for the state court’s decision. See Harrison, 562 U.S. at 98. 

In Griffin v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that although states are not 

required by the U.S. Constitution to provide the right to appellate review, once 

states grant such a right, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses apply. 351 

U.S. 12, 18–20 (1956). Florida provides a right to appeal and requires its judges, 

after sentencing a defendant, to inform the defendant personally, in open court, of 

the right to appeal. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.986. If a judge fails to 

so inform the defendant, the defendant has two years in which to petition the court

in which the appeal would lie for a belated appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(4). 

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If more than two years have passed, Florida requires defendants to have exercised 

reasonable diligence in attempting to ascertain whether they had the right to 

appeal. Id. There is no controlling Supreme Court precedent holding that such 

rules do not provide adequate relief when a defendant is not informed of his right 

to appeal as required by state law.6

 Where there is no on point Supreme Court 

precedent, a state court’s conclusion cannot be contrary to clearly established 

Federal law. Washington v. Crosby, 324 F.3d 1263, 1265 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus,

in denying Moore’s petition, which was filed more than two years after the time for 

filing a notice of appeal had run, and which did not allege that he exercised 

reasonable diligence to determine whether he had the right to appeal, the Third 

DCA neither acted contrary to clearly established Federal law nor applied such law 

unreasonably. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

 6 That the Florida District Courts of Appeals have granted some defendants’ motions for belated 

appeals based on a trial judge’s failure to inform the defendant at sentencing of his or her right to 

appeal does not render the Third DCA’s decision to deny Moore’s belated appeal erroneous. See

Battles v. State, 930 So. 2d 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Byrd v. State, 916 So. 2d 926 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Bowden v. Singletary, 805 So. 2d 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 

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