Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02242/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02242-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carl Morris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-2242

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CARL MORRIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:14-cr-00029-bbc-1— Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 31, 2014 — DECIDED JANUARY 5, 2015

Before POSNER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Carl Morris pled guilty to one count

of distribution of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). Although the district court sentenced him below

the guidelines range, it did so without addressing his principal

arguments in mitigation. Because we cannot determine from

Case: 14-2242 Document: 21 Filed: 01/05/2015 Pages: 11
2 No. 14-2242

this record whether the court considered those arguments in

fashioning the sentence, we vacate and remand for re-sentencing.

I.

Morris was with a friend one day when that friend sold

crack cocaine to another man. Not knowing that the buyer was

a confidential informant, Morris then called the man and

offered to sell him crack cocaine. The informant initially

requested a quarter ounce of crack from Morris. On

December 3, 2012, Morris delivered less than half that amount

(3.288 grams) to the informant but charged him for the full

amount. The informant then ordered another quarter ounce

and asked to be reimbursed for the earlier shortage. On

December 5, 2012, Morris delivered slightly more than a

quarter ounce (7.447 grams) of crack to the informant. At the

direction of his police handlers, the informant then substantially increased his order, asking for an ounce and a half of

crack cocaine. Morris agreed to the sale but on December 19,

2012, he delivered an ounce and a half (45 grams) of a counterfeit substance that contained no crack cocaine in exchange for

$1900. Morris was charged in a two-count indictment with the

first two deliveries. He eventually pled guilty to the charge

related to the second delivery.

A probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation

Report (“PSR”) calculating the guidelines range applicable to

the offense conduct (the December 5 delivery) as well as

relevant conduct (the December 3 delivery and the uncharged

December 19 delivery of a counterfeit substance). See U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3 and Application Note 9. Under Application Note 4 of

Case: 14-2242 Document: 21 Filed: 01/05/2015 Pages: 11
No. 14-2242 3

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, counterfeit substances are treated the same as

controlled substances when calculating the guidelines range,

and so the PSR held Morris accountable for 55.735 grams of

crack cocaine. Guidelines sentences for drug crimes are heavily

influenced by the quantity of drugs involved and so Morris’s

sentence was driven largely by the counterfeit substance,

which accounted for more than 80% of the drug weight.

Moreover, the guidelines tables penalize crack cocaine offenses

much more harshly than powder cocaine crimes, applying an

18:1 sentencing ratio. In Morris’s case, the PSR set forth a

guidelines range of 57 to 71 months of imprisonment. 

Morris filed a sentencing memorandum arguing first that

the government had engaged in sentencing entrapment by

directing the confidential informant to order a much greater

quantity of crack cocaine than Morris had previously sold. He

contended that the record contained no evidence that he had

a history of selling or an ability to sell such a large quantity of

drugs. That he never could have filled such a large order was

bolstered, he claimed, by his resort to delivering a counterfeit

substance that contained no crack cocaine at all. 

Morris next urged the court to apply a 1:1 crack-to-powder

cocaine ratio for his offense because the guidelines disparity

was the result of political compromise rather than for any

reason founded in medical, chemical, physiological, or other

scientific or social science evidence. If the court employed a 1:1

ratio, Morris calculated that his guidelines range would drop

to 21 to 27 months. Finally, Morris noted that, if the court

removed the counterfeit drugs from the equation, his advisory

sentencing range would be 15 to 21 months. In short, the

combination of a large quantity of counterfeit drugs, an

Case: 14-2242 Document: 21 Filed: 01/05/2015 Pages: 11
4 No. 14-2242

amount that was ordered at the government’s direction,

together with the crack/powder sentencing disparity, dramatically increased the advisory guidelines range from 15-to-21

months to 57-to-71 months. Morris argued that these factors

along with his recent efforts to rehabilitate himself warranted

a sentence of 18 months imprisonment.

At the sentencing hearing, the government agreed that a

sentence within the 57-to-71 month advisory guidelines range

might not be appropriate but characterized the 18 month

request as “woefully inadequate.” The government noted that

Morris initiated contact with the informant and offered to sell

him crack, negating any inference that Morris was entrapped.

The government characterized Morris’s use of a counterfeit

substance as an attempt to “rip off” the informant rather than

evidence that Morris could not deliver the larger amount of

crack. 

The district court judge, who had previously sentenced

Morris at aprobation revocation hearing, was well-versed with

his life story. The court noted and took into account Morris’s

difficult family history, his attempts at rehabilitation, his

failures at avoiding a return to crime, his attempts at employment and education, and other factors relevant under section

3553(a). But the court did not remark on his principal arguments in mitigation, which were raised in both the sentencing

memorandum and at the sentencing hearing. Namely, the

court did not address his claim that the weight of the counterfeit substance, combined with the crack/powder disparity

unfairly drove his sentencing range significantly higher. The

court ultimately decided on a below-guidelines sentence:

Case: 14-2242 Document: 21 Filed: 01/05/2015 Pages: 11
No. 14-2242 5

Taking into consideration the nature of the offense,

as well as your personal history and characteristics,

I’m persuaded that a custodial sentence of 48

months is reasonable and no greater than necessary

to hold you accountable, protect the community,

provide you the opportunity for rehabilitative

programs and achieve parity with the sentences of

similarly-situated offenders.

R. 28, Sent. Tr. at 12. Morris appeals.

II.

On appeal, Morris contends that the district court committed procedural error when it failed to address his principal

arguments in mitigation. He asks that we vacate and remand

for resentencing. Our review of sentencing decisions generally

is limited to whether they are reasonable, applying the abuse

of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46

(2007). We first must ensure that the district court committed

no significant procedural error, including, among otherthings,

incorrectly calculating the guidelines range, or failing to

explain adequately the chosen sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If

the district court erred in sentencing Morris, we will apply the

doctrine of harmless error in determining whether resentencing is necessary. United States v. Olson, 450 F.3d 655, 683

(7th Cir. 2006). An error related to the validity of a defendant's

sentence is harmless only if it did not affect the district court's

choice of sentence. Olson, 450 F.3d at 683; United States v.

Schlifer, 403 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2005).

Before turning to the merits of Morris’s claim, we must

address the government’s claim that he waived any challenge

Case: 14-2242 Document: 21 Filed: 01/05/2015 Pages: 11
6 No. 14-2242

to the adequacy of the district court’s treatment of his mitigation arguments. After imposing the sentence, the court asked,

“Anything further in this matter?” The government then

moved to dismiss the remaining count of the indictment and

the court granted that motion. The court then asked Morris’s

counsel if there was “anything further?” and she replied, “No,

Your Honor. Thank you.” The government cites our opinion in

Garcia-Segura for the proposition that counsel’s failure at that

point to ask for a specific ruling on the mitigation claims

operates as a waiver of those claims on appeal. See United States

v. Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.

667 (2013). We disagree. 

In Garcia-Segura, we noted that it was not uncommon for a

defendant to argue on appeal that the district court had not

adequately addressed a principal argument in mitigation. We

therefore encouraged district courts to address the adequacy

of the review on the record:

In order to ensure that defendants feel that they

have had such arguments in mitigation addressed

by the court and to aid appellate review, after

imposing sentence but before advising the defendant of his right to appeal, we encourage sentencing

courts to inquire of defense counsel whether they

are satisfied that the court has addressed their main

arguments in mitigation. If the response is in the

affirmative, a later challenge for failure to address a

principal mitigation argument under the reasoning

of Cunningham would be considered waived. If not,

the trial court would have the opportunity to clarify

whether it determined that the argument was “so

Case: 14-2242 Document: 21 Filed: 01/05/2015 Pages: 11
No. 14-2242 7

weak as not to merit discussion,” lacked a factual

basis, or has rejected the argument and provide a

reason why. See Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679. An

affirmative answer, however, would not waive an

argument as to the merits or reasonableness of the

court's treatment of the issue.

Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d at 569. In this case, the district court’s

generic inquiry of “anything further?” did not serve the

specific purpose we had in mind in Garcia-Segura. The point of

Garcia-Segura was to “make[] it possible to correct a genuine

Cunningham procedural error on the spot, at the end of the

sentencing hearing in the district court.” United States v.

Donelli, 747 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2014). A general inquiry of

whether the parties have any further business before the court

is certainly useful; in this instance, the government used that

opportunity to move to dismiss the remaining count of the

indictment. But that blanket query did not alert Morris’s

counsel that she needed to do something further to preserve

her sentencing arguments, as we envisioned in Garcia-Segura.

We again encourage courts to ask defense counsel “whether

they are satisfied that the court has addressed their main

arguments in mitigation.” Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d at 569. See

also Donelli, 747 F.3d at 940-41 (Cunningham procedural error

waived where the court asked whether counsel required

further elaboration of the court’s reasons for the sentence and

counsel replied in the negative). But there was no waiver here.

Morris’s lawyer did everything necessary to preserve the issue

for appeal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 51; United States v. Bartlett, 567

F.3d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that the rules do not

require a litigant to complain about a judicial choice after it has

Case: 14-2242 Document: 21 Filed: 01/05/2015 Pages: 11
8 No. 14-2242

been made; rather, a litigant preserves a contention for review

by informing the court before the decision is made of the action

the party wishes the court to take and the grounds for that

action).

We turn to the merits of Morris’s claim. Morris argued that

the court should reduce his guidelines sentence because the

informant’s police handlers directed the large size of the final

purchase, because most of the drug quantity attributed to him

was a counterfeit substance, and because he was subjected to

the 18:1 crack-to-powder cocaine ratio for that counterfeit

substance. In combination, these factors subjected him to a

significantly greater sentencing range, and yet the court did

not comment on these principal arguments in mitigation. A

judge need not comment on every argument the defendant

raises. United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d 785, 792 (7th Cir. 2007).

“[A]rguments clearly without merit can, and for the sake of

judicial economy should, be passed over in silence.” United

States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2005). But

when a court gives little or no attention to the defendant's

principal argument when that argument “was not so weak as

not to merit discussion,” we cannot have confidence that the

judge adequately considered the section 3553(a) factors.

Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679. “[I]f anyone acquainted with the

facts would have known without being told why the judge had

not accepted the argument,” then the judge need not specifically comment on that argument. Id. See also Garcia-Segura,

717 F.3d at 568 (a sentencing court must address a defendant's

principal arguments in mitigation unless they are too weak to

merit discussion); Miranda, 505 F.3d at 792 (same). 

Case: 14-2242 Document: 21 Filed: 01/05/2015 Pages: 11
No. 14-2242 9

We have twice held that a defendant’s argument for a

reduced ratio between crack and powder cocaine offenses is

“not so weak as to not merit discussion.” United States v.

Johnson, 643 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2011). See also United States v.

Arberry, 612 F.3d 898, 899 (7th Cir. 2010) (same). Indeed, the

Supreme Court indicated that district courts possessed the

discretion to conclude that the crack/powder sentencing ratio

was greater than necessary to achieve sentencing goals:

The crack cocaine Guidelines ... do not exemplify

the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role. In formulating Guidelines ranges for

crack cocaine offenses, as we earlier noted, the

Commission looked to the mandatory minimum

sentences set in the 1986 Act, and did not take

account of “empirical data andnational experience.”

See Pruitt, 502 F.3d, at 1171 (McConnell, J., concurring). Indeed, the Commission itself has reported

that the crack/powder disparityproducesdisproportionately harsh sanctions, i.e., sentences for crack

cocaine offenses “greater than necessary” in light of

the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a). See

supra, at 568. Given all this, it would not be an abuse

of discretion for a district court to conclude when

sentencing a particular defendant that the

crack/powder disparity yields a sentence “greater

than necessary” to achieve § 3553(a)'s purposes,

even in a mine-run case.

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109-10 (2007). See also

Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265-66 (2009) (“we now

Case: 14-2242 Document: 21 Filed: 01/05/2015 Pages: 11
10 No. 14-2242

clarify that district courts are entitled to reject and vary

categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a

policy disagreement with those Guidelines.”). Moreover,

Morris’s circumstances did not present a “mine-run case”

because he was subjected to a substantially increased penalty

not for delivering crack cocaine but for delivering a counterfeit

substance.

The government concedes that the district court failed to

address Morris’s argument that his sentence was unfairly

driven by the crack/powder disparity, by the inclusion of a

large amount of a counterfeit substance in the drug calculation,

and by the actions of the informant’s police handlers. Under

Johnson and Arberry, that was a procedural error. Although it

is true that the court granted Morris a below-guidelines

sentence, it is impossible to discern from this record whether

the court credited Morris’s principal arguments in fashioning

that sentence and so we must remand. Johnson, 643 F.3d at 549

(remand is necessary to consider the defendant’s argument

regarding the crack/powder disparity even when the court

sentencedthe defendant below the guidelines range).The court

may well have considered and rejected Morris’s arguments

and simply neglected to memorialize that analysis on the

record. Perhaps the court concluded, for example, that delivering a counterfeit substancepresented the same risk for violence

as delivering crack cocaine. We offer no opinion on the

reasonableness of Morris’s below-guidelines sentence should

the district court decide to reimpose it. But because we cannot

Case: 14-2242 Document: 21 Filed: 01/05/2015 Pages: 11
No. 14-2242 11

determine whether the error here affected the district court's

choice of sentence, it may not be characterized as harmless.

Olson, 450 F.3d at 683; Schlifer, 403 F.3d at 854.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

Case: 14-2242 Document: 21 Filed: 01/05/2015 Pages: 11