Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01316/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01316-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO
Petitioner
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent
Michael P. Huerta
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 10, 2014 Decided May 8, 2015

No. 13-1316

ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA, AFL-CIO,

PETITIONER

v.

MICHAEL P. HUERTA AND FEDERAL AVIATION 

ADMINISTRATION,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review from the 

Federal Aviation Administration

Amanda C. Dure argued the cause for petitioner. With 

her on the briefs was Michael J. Pangia.

Jeffrey E. Sandberg, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the 

brief were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, 

Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief 

was filed, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney.

Before: ROGERS, Circuit Judge, BROWN, Circuit Judge, 

and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #13-1316 Document #1551454 Filed: 05/08/2015 Page 1 of 15
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EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: On October 31, 2013, 

the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) issued FAA 

Notice N8900.240, Expanded Use of Passenger Portable 

Electronic Devices (“Notice N8900.240” or “the Notice”). 

The Notice is an internal guidance document issued to FAA 

aviation safety inspectors concerning the use and stowage of 

portable electronic devices (“PEDs”) aboard commercial and 

other aircraft. On December 30, 2013, the Association of 

Flight Attendants (“AFA”) filed a petition for review with this 

court challenging Notice N8900.240 on the ground that “the 

FAA impermissibly and substantially altered and effectively 

amended 14 C.F.R. § 121.589, the regulation that pertains to 

carry-on baggage on an aircraft,” without adhering to the 

notice and comment requirements of the Administrative 

Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 553. Petitioner’s Br. 5.

The AFA seeks to invoke this court’s jurisdiction under 

49 U.S.C. § 46110(a), which provides that “a person 

disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued by” the 

FAA “may apply for review” in this court “not later than 60 

days after the order is issued.” The FAA claims that this court 

lacks jurisdiction over the petition for review because the 

Notice does not constitute final agency action. See, e.g., Vill. 

of Bensenville v. FAA, 457 F.3d 52, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(noting that jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) is limited 

to review of “final order[s]”). We agree.

In order for an agency action to be viewed as “final 

agency action” it “must mark the ‘consummation’ of the 

agency’s decisionmaking process,” rather than being 

“tentative or interlocutory.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 

177–78 (1997) (citation omitted). And it must determine 

“rights or obligations,” or produce “legal consequences.” Id. 

at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted). Notice N8900.240 

does not satisfy these requirements. The Notice is nothing 

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more than an internal guidance document that does not carry 

the “force and effect of law.” Perez v. Mortgage Bankers 

Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015). Therefore, the Notice 

does not reflect final agency action.

It does not matter that Notice N8900.240 may reflect a 

change in the FAA’s interpretation of the regulation embodied 

in 14 C.F.R. § 121.589. In Perez, the Supreme Court 

explained that:

Not all “rules” must be issued through the noticeand-comment process. Section 4(b)(A) of the APA 

provides that, unless another statute states otherwise, the 

notice-and-comment requirement “does not apply” to 

“interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or 

rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” 5 

U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). . . . [T]he critical feature of 

interpretive rules is that they are “issued by an agency to 

advise the public of the agency’s construction of the 

statutes and rules which it administers.” The absence of a 

notice-and-comment obligation makes the process of 

issuing interpretive rules comparatively easier for 

agencies than issuing legislative rules. But that 

convenience comes at a price: Interpretive rules “do not 

have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that 

weight in the adjudicatory process.”

Id. at 1203–04 (citations omitted). As Perez makes clear, the 

APA “permit[s] agencies to promulgate freely [interpretive] 

rules – whether or not they are consistent with earlier 

interpretations” of the agency’s regulations. Id. at 1207; see 

also Hudson v. FAA, 192 F.3d 1031, 1035–36 (D.C. Cir. 

1999) (holding that an agency may change its policy 

statements as it sees fit without following APA notice and 

comment procedures). Such agency interpretations and policy 

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statements do not “amend” the regulations to which they 

refer. As noted in Perez, “[o]ne would not normally say that a 

court ‘amends’ a statute when it interprets its text. So too can 

an agency ‘interpret’ a regulation without ‘effectively 

amend[ing]’ the underlying source of law.” Id. at 1208

(alteration in original).

On the record before us, it is clear that Notice N8900.240 

does not purport to amend any FAA regulation, and it does 

not otherwise carry the force of law. FAA regulations prohibit 

the use of most PEDs during flight unless an airline 

determines that they will not interfere with the aircraft’s 

navigation or communications. 14 C.F.R. § 121.306. The 

FAA has long advised that PED use be allowed during the 

main portion of flights, but barred during takeoff and landing. 

Although the agency’s recommendations are nonbinding, 

most airlines followed this approach. In 2012, the FAA 

reconsidered its stance. The agency created a streamlined 

procedure for airlines to use to determine whether expanded 

PED use poses a safety risk. Although the FAA’s guidance on 

PEDs remained nonbinding, many airlines have adopted new 

procedures that permit passengers to use PEDs for the entire 

duration of their flights. 

Notice N8900.240 does not alter this regulatory regime. 

The Notice merely provides guidance to aviation safety 

inspectors who enforce FAA regulations. Moreover, Notice 

N8900.240 creates no rights or obligations, and generates no 

legal consequences. No airline need alter any policy in 

response to it. The Notice does not eliminate the discretion of 

safety inspectors or require that any particular carry-on 

baggage program be approved or denied. And the Notice does 

not contradict existing regulations regarding stowage of carryon baggage.

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In sum, because the disputed Notice does not determine 

any rights or obligations, or produce legal consequences, it 

does not reflect “final action” by the FAA. Therefore, this 

court has no jurisdiction to consider AFA’s challenge to 

Notice N8900.240.

I. BACKGROUND

The FAA requires airlines to have an agency-approved 

carry-on baggage program to control the size and amount of 

luggage that passengers can bring aboard their planes. 14 

C.F.R. § 121.589(a). Passenger aircraft cannot take off unless 

each article of baggage is stowed in an appropriate 

compartment or under a seat. Id. § 121.589(b), (c). The 

regulations do not define carry-on baggage, however. Instead, 

FAA guidance documents instruct airlines to describe “what 

you include in the term ‘Carry-On Baggage’” as part of a

carry-on baggage program. FAA Advisory Circular No. 121-

29B, Carry-On Baggage (2000), at 2.

FAA regulations nominally ban the operation of most 

PEDs during flight, save for portable voice recorders, hearing 

aids, pacemakers, and electric shavers. 14 C.F.R. § 121.306. 

However, this regulation contains a broad exception allowing 

for the use of any device that the airline determines “will not 

cause interference with the navigation or communication 

system of the aircraft.” Id. § 121.306(b)(5). Since the late 

1950s, the FAA has worked with the airline industry to study 

the risks involved in PED use and produce guidance 

documents to assist airlines in making safety determinations

about device usage during flight. Prior to 2012, the FAA 

recommended that airlines allow passengers to use devices 

during the main portion of a flight, but prohibit use during 

takeoff and landing. This guidance was nonbinding; however,

most airlines followed the FAA recommendation because the 

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agency provided no direction on how to demonstrate that 

devices could be used safely during takeoff and landing. 

The FAA decided to reevaluate its safety 

recommendations in 2012. The agency published a notice in 

the Federal Register seeking public comment on its guidance 

to airlines regarding how to determine whether and when 

electronic devices are safe for in-flight use. In the notice, the 

agency “stress[ed] that the existing regulations allow 

[airlines] to authorize the use of PEDs, and that no specific 

FAA approval is required.” Passenger Use of Portable 

Electronic Devices on Board Aircraft, 77 Fed. Reg. 53,159-

02, 53,160 (Aug. 31, 2012). More than a thousand comments 

were submitted, including one by the AFA. As promised in 

the notice, the FAA assembled an Aviation Rulemaking 

Committee (“Committee”) to review the comments and 

recommend changes to the agency’s policies. The Committee 

was composed of representatives from a variety of 

stakeholder groups, including the AFA.

The Committee’s report, issued on September 30, 2013, 

made technical and operational recommendations aimed at 

helping airlines safely expand passenger use of PEDs. The 

Committee designed a method for airlines to use in assessing 

whether passengers can safely keep their devices on during 

takeoff and landing. The AFA representative dissented from 

the method recommended by the Committee, advocating 

instead for a more conservative approach. The Committee 

also recommended that the FAA update its policy and 

guidance documents on the stowage of baggage and other 

items to accommodate expanded use of PEDs. This 

recommendation was unanimous.

In response to the report, the FAA produced two sets of 

guidance documents. The first, FAA Information for 

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Operators 13010, Expanding Use of Passenger Portable 

Electronic Devices (PED) (2013), and its supplement, are 

directed at airlines interested in allowing passengers to use 

PEDs during takeoff and landing. These documents lay out a 

roadmap, based on the Committee’s recommendations, for 

evaluating aircraft and revising policies so that an airline can 

safely permit expanded PED use. Among other things, the 

guidance instructs airlines to write policies ensuring that 

devices are “properly secured and stowed” during takeoff and 

landing. FAA Information for Operators 13010 Supplement

(2014), at 6. “Secured” and “stowed” are not synonyms. The 

guidance explains that “stowed” means placing an object in 

an approved carry-on stowage location certified to hold its 

mass during an emergency landing. Id. at 14. “Secured” 

means restrained in an area that is not so certified. Id. The 

guidance instructs that large devices like laptops must be 

stowed in approved carry-on locations. Id. However, small 

devices can simply be secured in armbands, garment pockets, 

or in hand. Id. The AFA has not challenged this guidance.

The second guidance document, Notice N8900.240, is 

addressed to the FAA’s aviation safety inspectors. The Notice 

explains the new guidance to airlines, and states that the 

agency does not need to approve an airline’s finding that 

expanded PED use will not interfere with flight safety. Notice 

8900.240 at 1–2. The Notice also observes that expanding 

PED use may necessitate revisions to an airline’s policies and 

documentation, including carry-on baggage programs. The 

Notice lists some “general concerns” that a modified carry-on 

baggage program “should address.” Id. at 3. For example, 

“[l]arge PED, such as full-size laptops, must be safely stowed 

so as not to present a hazard in the event of severe turbulence, 

crash forces, or emergency egress.” Id. The Notice thus gives 

guidance to aviation safety inspectors to assist them in 

addressing issues that airlines may face in connection with

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expanded passenger use of PEDs. It does not, however, 

compel the airlines to do anything.

On December 30, 2013, the AFA filed a petition for 

review of the Notice in this court. The AFA asks that the 

Notice be set aside on the grounds that the portion allowing 

small PEDs to remain secured (rather than stowed) during 

takeoff and landing is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to 

existing regulations, and was improperly promulgated without 

notice and comment.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

As noted above, the AFA seeks to invoke this court’s 

jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). Section 46110(a)

permits “a person disclosing a substantial interest in an order 

issued by the Secretary of Transportation . . . [to] apply for 

review of the order by filing a petition for review” in the court 

of appeals. However, in order for us to entertain a petition 

under this section, the challenged order “must possess the 

quintessential feature of agency decisionmaking suitable for 

judicial review: finality.” City of Dania Beach v. FAA, 485 

F.3d 1181, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Vill. of 

Bensenville, 457 F.3d at 68). A final order has two key 

qualities. First, it “must mark the ‘consummation’ of the 

agency’s decisionmaking process,” rather than being 

“tentative or interlocutory.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78

(citation omitted). Second, it must determine “rights or 

obligations,” or produce “legal consequences.” Id. at 178

(internal quotation marks omitted).

In litigation over guidance documents, the finality inquiry 

is often framed as the question of whether the challenged 

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agency action is best understood as a non-binding action, like 

a policy statement or interpretive rule, or a binding legislative 

rule. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety 

Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A policy 

statement “explains how the agency will enforce a statute or 

regulation – in other words, how it will exercise its broad 

enforcement discretion or permitting discretion under some 

extant statute or rule.” Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 

F.3d 243, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2014). It serves to “appris[e] the 

regulated community of the agency’s intentions as well as 

informing the exercise of discretion by agents and officers in 

the field.” Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 

(D.C. Cir. 1987). Policy statements “are binding on neither 

the public nor the agency,” and the agency “retains the 

discretion and the authority to change its position . . . in any 

specific case.” Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Policy statements are 

excepted from the requirements of notice and comment 

rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).

The same is true with respect to interpretive rules, which 

are “issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s 

construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.” 

Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204 (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l

Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)). Interpretive rules do not carry 

the force and effect of law, and they need not be promulgated 

pursuant to notice and comment procedures under the APA. 

Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203–04. And “[b]ecause an agency is not 

required to use notice-and-comment procedures to issue an 

initial interpretive rule, it is also not required to use those 

procedures when it amends or repeals that interpretive rule.” 

Id. at 1206. Thus, under Perez, it is clear that an agency does 

not “amend” an established regulation merely by issuing a 

new interpretation of the regulation. Id. at 1207–08.

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In this case, it really does not matter whether Notice 

N8900.240 is viewed as a policy statement or an interpretive 

rule. The main point here is that the Notice is not a legislative 

rule carrying “the force and effect of law.” Perez, 135 S. Ct. 

at 1204. A legislative rule “modifies or adds to a legal norm 

based on the agency’s own authority” flowing from a 

congressional delegation to engage in supplementary 

lawmaking. Syncor, 127 F.3d at 95. The APA requires such 

rules to be promulgated pursuant to notice and comment. Id.

“A properly adopted substantive rule establishes a standard of 

conduct which has the force of law.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. 

Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 

Agency actions that “impose legally binding obligations or 

prohibitions on regulated parties” or “set[] forth legally 

binding requirements for a private party to obtain a permit or 

license” are legislative rules. Nat’l Mining, 758 F.3d at 251–

52.

The point at which a purported guidance document 

crosses over from being a non-binding policy statement or 

interpretive rule to a legislative rule sometimes may be

“enshrouded in considerable smog.” Cmty. Nutrition, 818 

F.2d at 946 (internal quotation marks omitted). The most 

important factor in differentiating between binding and nonbinding actions is “the actual legal effect (or lack thereof) of 

the agency action in question.” Nat’l Mining, 758 F.3d at 252. 

Agency action that creates new rights or imposes new 

obligations on regulated parties or narrowly limits 

administrative discretion constitutes a legislative rule. See

Cmty. Nutrition, 818 F.2d at 948; accord Auto Safety, 452 

F.3d at 806. The language employed by the agency may play 

an important role in this analysis: a document that reads like 

an edict is likely to be binding, while one riddled with caveats 

is not. See Nat’l Mining, 758 F.3d at 252–53. Courts also 

consider how an agency has characterized a purported 

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guidance, and whether it was published in the Federal 

Register or the Code of Federal Regulations. Auto Safety, 452 

F.3d at 806. 

In following these principles, we have little trouble in 

concluding that the Notice is not a legislative rule.

B. The Challenged Notice Is Nothing More Than a 

General Statement of Agency Policy or an Interpretive 

Rule

The guidance offered in Notice N8900.240 reflects 

nothing more than a statement of agency policy or an 

interpretive rule. The Notice is therefore unreviewable. The 

Notice does not impose any obligation or prohibition on 

regulated entities. Neither does it create a new basis for 

enforcement or liability. Any carry-on baggage plan that was 

or would have been approved prior to the Notice is still 

permissible today. In other words, airlines “are free to ignore”

the Notice. Nat’l Mining, 758 F.3d at 252 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

This lack of legal effect matches the agency’s description 

of the document’s purpose: “This notice provides guidance to 

aviation safety inspectors . . . and [airlines] implementing 

policy that allows expanded use of [PEDs] throughout various 

phases of flight.” Notice N8900.240 at 1. The quoted 

language describes the archetypal aim of a policy statement:

to apprise the public of the agency’s intentions, and to inform 

the decisions of those who exercise the agency’s discretion. 

See Cmty. Nutrition, 818 F.2d at 949. 

The Notice instructs aviation safety inspectors on what to 

look for when evaluating revised carry-on baggage programs, 

but it does not limit their discretion. In other words, “the 

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document as a whole does not read as a set of rules.”

Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 595 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). Moreover, the Notice does not require airlines to revise 

their policies and documentation as a condition of allowing 

device usage during takeoff and landing. Instead, it states that 

such an expansion “may require” revised policies. Notice 

N8900.240 at 3. The airlines still have substantial leeway to 

establish PED policies under the applicable regulations.

Similarly, the Notice does not mandate specific changes 

to carry-on baggage programs, merely stating that airlines 

“may need to” make alterations. Id. This preserves the 

aviation safety inspectors’ discretion to evaluate whether such 

changes are necessary in an individual case. And rather than 

listing explicit requirements that such modified carry-on 

baggage programs must meet, the Notice simply says that 

updated plans “should address the following general 

concerns.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added).

The use of language like “may” and “should” instead of 

“shall” or “must” suggests that the provisions that follow are 

meant to be “precatory, not mandatory.” See Judd v. 

Billington, 863 F.2d 103, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Even if the 

Notice arguably inclines aviation safety inspectors towards 

certain outcomes when evaluating carry-on baggage 

programs, it does not constrain their discretion enough to 

create a binding norm. See Panhandle Producers & Royalty 

Owners Ass’n v. Econ. Regulatory Admin., 822 F.2d 1105, 

1110 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that policy statements can 

create rebuttable presumptions). “An agency pronouncement 

is not deemed a binding regulation merely because it may 

have some substantive impact, as long as it leave[s] the 

administrator free to exercise his informed discretion.” Id.

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Courts draw a line only when a purported guidance 

document “so fills out the statutory scheme that upon 

application one need only determine whether a given case is 

within the rule’s criterion.” Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. United 

States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1983). The FAA has 

made it clear that the Notice is not intended to be a legislative 

rule – it is merely a non-binding guidance document of the 

sort that the agency routinely issues to offer advice to 

regulated parties and safety inspectors. There is nothing in the 

document to contradict the FAA’s stated purpose. Because the 

Notice leaves aviation safety inspectors “free to consider the 

individual facts in the various cases that arise,” id., and it does 

not command any action by the airlines, it is clear that it does 

not establish a binding norm.

C. The Challenged Notice Is Not Contrary to Existing 

Regulations

The AFA argues that Notice N8900.240 must be a 

legislative rule because it “effectively dismantled 14 C.F.R. 

§ 121.589, a regulation that is still in effect and good law.” 

Petitioner’s Br. 9. It is true enough that “if a second rule 

repudiates or is irreconcilable with a prior legislative rule, the 

second rule must be an amendment of the first; and, of course, 

an amendment to a legislative rule must itself be legislative.” 

Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 

1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (brackets and internal quotation 

marks omitted). However, we see no contradiction between 

the Notice and any FAA regulation. And, as noted above, it 

does not matter that the Notice may amend existing guidance 

documents. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1207–08; Hudson, 192 F.3d at 

1035–36.

14 C.F.R. § 121.589 requires airlines to have an approved 

carry-on baggage program. It also requires that each article of 

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carry-on baggage be properly stowed in an appropriate 

location prior to takeoff and landing. But the regulation does 

not define carry-on baggage. That task is left to the airlines 

themselves as part of their responsibility to develop a carry-on 

baggage program. Advisory Circular No. 121-29B at 2. 

Longstanding FAA guidance instructs airlines to devise and 

submit “[a] list of specific items passengers can carry in the 

cabin and stow outside of specified carry-on baggage 

compartments” as part of their carry-on baggage program. Id.

As a result, the regulation leaves airlines free to write carryon baggage programs that do not include smartphones and 

similar devices in the definition of carry-on baggage.

The AFA points to a 2009 guidance document which they 

interpret to imply that the FAA previously considered small 

devices to be carry-on baggage. See FAA Information for 

Operators 09018, Stowage of Items in Seat Pockets (2009). 

This is irrelevant because the guidance document is simply a 

non-binding policy statement. Even if the AFA’s reading is 

correct, the FAA is not obliged to continue following it. See 

Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1206; Hudson, 192 F.3d at 1035–36.

The PED Committee’s report provides further evidence 

that FAA regulations do not require small devices to be 

treated as carry-on baggage. The Committee found that “there 

is a lack of guidance regarding passenger personal items that 

must be stowed for takeoff and landing (i.e., a hard cover 

book can be held by a passenger, while a purse must be 

stowed).” PED Aviation Rulemaking Committee, 

Recommendations on Expanding the Use of Portable 

Electronic Devices During Flight (2013), at 16; see also id. at 

22. And it is uncontested by the parties that airlines do not 

force passengers to stow small items like keys, smartphones, 

or books in approved carry-on baggage locations like 

overhead bins or under the seat. Instead, passengers are 

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generally allowed to hold such items in hand, on their laps, or 

in clothes pockets.

This court’s jurisdiction to review FAA orders under 49 

U.S.C. § 46110(a) extends only to those orders that constitute 

final agency action. Because Notice N8900.240 is nonbinding guidance that does not conflict with existing 

regulations, this court is without jurisdiction to address AFA’s 

challenge to the Notice. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition is dismissed.

So ordered.

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