Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01514/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01514-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee
Appellee
Hilltop International
Appellant
Ocean Duke Corp.
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMMITTEE,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

HILLTOP INTERNATIONAL, OCEAN DUKE CORP.,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________

2014-1514

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:11-cv-00335-DCP, Senior Judge Donald C. 

Pogue.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMMITTEE,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

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2 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

HILLTOP INTERNATIONAL, OCEAN DUKE CORP.,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________

2014-1647

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:10-cv-00275-DCP, Senior Judge Donald C. 

Pogue.

______________________

Decided: October 5, 2015

______________________

NATHANIEL RICKARD, Picard Kentz & Rowe LLP, 

Washington, DC, for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented 

by ANDREW WILLIAM KENTZ.

JOSHUA E. KURLAND, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON,

PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY; MELISSA M. BREWER, Office of the 

Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compliance, 

United States Department of Commerce, Washington, 

DC.

MARK PARDO, Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellants. Also represented by ANDREW 

THOMAS SCHUTZ.

ALAN H. PRICE, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington, DC, for 

amicus curiae Nucor Corporation. Also represented by 

TIMOTHY C. BRIGHTBILL.

______________________

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AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES 3

Before REYNA, CLEVENGER, and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Hilltop International and Ocean Duke 

Corp. (collectively, “Hilltop”) appeal the decisions of the 

United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”) affirming the United States Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) determination that Hilltop is ineligible for an 

antidumping duty rate separate from the country-wide 

entity and its selection of the country-wide rate. See Ad 

Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States (Ad Hoc 

Shrimp II), 992 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014); 

Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States (Ad 

Hoc Shrimp I), 925 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (Ct. Int’l Trade 

2013). Because Commerce’s determinations were supported by substantial evidence and were not otherwise 

contrary to law, this court affirms.

BACKGROUND

I. Facts and Proceedings

These appeals involve the Fourth and Fifth Administrative Reviews1 of the antidumping duty order covering 

1 Appeal No. 2014-1647 involves the appeal of 

Commerce’s determinations in the Fourth Administrative 

Review (CIT Docket No. 10-275), while Appeal No. 2014-

1514 involves the appeal of Commerce’s determinations in 

the Fifth Administrative Review (CIT Docket No. 11-335). 

The CIT sustained Commerce’s findings regarding 

Hilltop’s separate rate status and the calculation of the 

country-wide rate for the Fourth Review in Ad Hoc 

Shrimp II, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1285. For the Fifth Review, 

the CIT sustained Commerce’s findings regarding 

Hilltop’s separate rate status in Ad Hoc Shrimp I, 925 F. 

 

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4 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

certain frozen warmwater shrimp (“subject merchandise”) 

from the People’s Republic of China (“China”). See Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the People’s Republic of China, 70 Fed. Reg. 5149 (Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 1, 

2005) (notice of amended final determination of sales at 

less than fair value and antidumping duty order). 

Hilltop, an exporter of subject merchandise from China, 

was a mandatory respondent in both the Fourth and Fifth 

Reviews.2 Appellee, the Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action 

Committee (the “Shrimp Trade Committee”), was a petitioner in the underlying antidumping duty investigation 

leading to the issuance of the antidumping duty order.

A. Fourth Administrative Review

On March 26, 2009, Commerce initiated the Fourth 

Administrative Review covering entries of subject merchandise made between February 1, 2008 and January 

31, 2009. Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the 

Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People’s Republic of 

China, 74 Fed. Reg. 13,178 (Dep’t of Commerce Mar. 26, 

2009) (initiation of administrative review). Hilltop was 

selected as one of two mandatory respondents in the 

review. At the beginning of the review, Hilltop filed a 

separate rate certification, representing that neither the 

company nor its affiliates were controlled by the Chinese 

government, and requested separate rate status, which 

Supp. 2d 1315, and sustained the calculation of the country-wide rate in the Fourth Review in Ad Hoc Shrimp II, 

992 F. Supp. 2d 1285. Because Commerce’s determinations in both reviews are substantially the same, and 

because the parties raise identical arguments, this court 

addresses both appeals in this opinion.

2 The Fourth and Fifth Reviews involved nearly 

identical facts except that in the Fourth Review, Commerce determined Hilltop had made sales of subject 

merchandise allegedly sourced from Cambodia.

 

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AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES 5

means it would receive a company-specific antidumping 

duty rate instead of the country-wide rate calculated for 

the China-wide entity.

As part of the review, Hilltop responded to a number 

of questionnaires3 from Commerce. In its Section A 

response, Hilltop informed Commerce that its sales and 

administrative facility is located in Hong Kong and it is 

affiliated with several Chinese shrimp producers and 

processors, as well as various companies in other third 

countries. The company also listed all of the shareholders 

and directors for each disclosed third-country affiliate. In 

response to Commerce’s request for a list of third parties 

in which Hilltop or its owners, either collectively or individually, owned five percent or more in stock, Hilltop 

stated that “[n]one of the Hilltop Group companies or 

their individual owners own 5 percent or more in stock in 

any third parties.” J.A.-1647, at 98f.4 In a supplemental 

questionnaire response, Hilltop also stated “[n]one of the 

princip[als] of the Chinese companies, Hilltop (HK) or the 

Taiwanese companies held any other business licenses 

3 During its administrative reviews, Commerce issues detailed nonmarket economy questionnaires to 

foreign respondents in the proceedings to gather information from which to calculate dumping margins. See 19 

C.F.R. §§ 351.221, 351.301(c)(1) (2009). These questionnaires are divided into sections: Section A covers general 

corporate information, including corporate and business 

structure, affiliations with other companies, and ownership details; Section C covers U.S. sales data; and Section 

D covers production data. Commerce may issue supplemental questionnaires if additional information is required.

4 The suffix -1514 denotes the record materials in 

Appeal No. 2014-1514, while the suffix -1647 denotes 

those in Appeal No. 2014-1647.

 

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6 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

during the [period of review] other than the ones provided 

in [Hilltop’s Section A questionnaire response].” J.A.-

1647, at 151i. The separate rate certification and questionnaire responses were certified by Hilltop’s general 

manager and part-owner To Kam Keung (“Mr. To”). J.A.-

1647, at 80, 86–87.

On March 12, 2010, Commerce published the Preliminary Results for the Fourth Administrative Review. 

Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the People’s 

Republic of China, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,855 (Dep’t of Commerce Mar. 12, 2010) (preliminary results, preliminary 

partial rescission of antidumping duty administrative 

review, and intent not to revoke, in part). In the Preliminary Results, Commerce found Hilltop was eligible for 

separate rate status. Id. at 11,859. In addition, Commerce calculated a de minimis dumping margin based on 

Hilltop’s reported sales and production data. Id. at 

11,861. These determinations were left unchanged in 

Commerce’s Final Results for the Fourth Review, published on August 13, 2010. Certain Frozen Warmwater 

Shrimp from the People’s Republic of China, 75 Fed. Reg. 

49,460, 49,463 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 13, 2010) (final 

results and partial rescission of antidumping duty administrative review).

On September 10, 2010, the Shrimp Trade Committee 

appealed these Final Results to the CIT, challenging 

Commerce’s selection of mandatory respondents and 

certain valuations. After a remand regarding the selection of mandatory respondents, the CIT affirmed Commerce’s determinations. Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action 

Comm. v. United States, 828 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (Ct. Int’l 

Trade 2012), appeal docketed, No. 2012-1416 (Fed. Cir. 

May 24, 2012). The CIT’s decision was appealed to this 

court. While the appeal was pending before this court, 

however, the Government moved for a voluntary remand 

to reconsider the Final Results in light of certain information that surfaced in the recently-concluded Sixth 

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AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES 7

Administrative Review. This information indicated 

Hilltop might have provided false or incomplete information regarding its affiliates in the Fourth Review. On 

May 24, 2013, this court granted the Government’s motion for voluntary remand and issued its mandate. On 

July 19, 2013, the CIT issued an order remanding the 

Fourth Review proceedings to Commerce pursuant to this 

court’s mandate.

B. Fifth Administrative Review

On April 9, 2010, Commerce initiated the Fifth Administrative Review, covering entries of subject merchandise made between February 1, 2009 and January 31, 

2010. Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People’s Republic of 

China, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,154 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 9, 

2010) (initiation of administrative review). Hilltop was 

selected as the sole mandatory respondent. The company 

requested and was granted permission to file information 

regarding its eligibility for separate rate status as part of 

its Section A questionnaire response, instead of through a 

separate rate certification. Thereafter, the company 

submitted its Section A response containing the same 

information as was reported in the Fourth Review. Specifically, Hilltop again reported its sales and administrative facility is located in Hong Kong and it is affiliated 

with several Chinese shrimp producers and processors, as 

well as various companies in other third countries. It also 

listed all of the shareholders and directors for each disclosed third-country affiliate. In response to Commerce’s 

request for a list of third parties in which Hilltop or its 

owners, either collectively or individually, owned five 

percent or more in stock, Hilltop again stated that “[n]one 

of the [Hilltop] Group companies or their individual 

owners own 5 percent or more in stock in any third parties.” J.A.-1514, at 94. These responses were certified by 

Mr. To.

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On February 14, 2011, Commerce published the Preliminary Results for the Fifth Administrative Review. 

Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the People’s 

Republic of China, 76 Fed. Reg. 8338 (Dep’t of Commerce 

Feb. 14, 2011) (preliminary results and preliminary 

partial rescission of fifth antidumping duty administrative review). In the Preliminary Results, Commerce again 

found Hilltop eligible for a separate rate and calculated a 

de minimis dumping margin based on Hilltop’s reported 

sales and production data. Id. at 8340–41, 8343. These 

determinations were left unchanged in Commerce’s Final 

Results for the Fifth Review, published on August 19, 

2011. Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the People’s Republic of China, 76 Fed. Reg. 51,940 (Dep’t of 

Commerce Aug. 19, 2011) (final results and partial rescission of antidumping duty administrative review).

On September 1, 2011, the Shrimp Trade Committee 

appealed the Final Results for the Fifth Review to the 

CIT, challenging Commerce’s selection of mandatory 

respondents and certain valuations and calculations. The 

CIT remanded certain aspects of the Final Results to 

Commerce for further consideration. While remand was 

pending, Commerce moved for permission to reopen the 

administrative record to consider new evidence from the 

Sixth Review that suggested Hilltop had filed false or 

incomplete information. “Because Commerce’s request to 

expand the scope of remand was based on a substantial 

and legitimate concern, the motion was granted.” Ad Hoc 

Shrimp I, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 1317.

C. Sixth Administrative Review

Hilltop was again selected as a mandatory respondent 

in the Sixth Review. In the Preliminary Results of that 

review, issued on March 2, 2012, Hilltop received separate 

rate status and a de minimis duty rate. See Certain 

Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the People’s Republic of 

China, 77 Fed. Reg. 12,801 (Dep’t of Commerce Mar. 2, 

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AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES 9

2012) (preliminary results, partial rescission, extension of 

time limits for the final results, and intent to revoke, in 

part, of the sixth antidumping duty administrative review).

On March 12, 2012, however, the Shrimp Trade 

Committee placed on the record public information it 

obtained following the convictions of several individuals 

associated with Hilltop and its United States affiliate, 

Ocean Duke Corp. (“Ocean Duke”). These materials 

indicate that in March 2011, Mr. Duke Chau-Shing Lin

(“Mr. Lin”), the president of Ocean Duke, and the Government entered into a written plea agreement wherein 

Mr. Lin pled guilty to two misdemeanor counts with 

respect to the misbranding of certain fish imports. The 

information includes the sentencing report prepared by 

the Government, which contains information about its 

five-year investigation into a scheme to transship shrimp 

illegally into the United States through Cambodia beginning shortly after the publication of the original antidumping duty order. The information also references 

Hilltop’s Cambodian affiliate, Ocean King (Cambodia) 

(“Ocean King”), and includes emails from 2004 between 

Mr. Lin and Mr. To discussing the establishment of a 

Cambodian shrimp processing factory and the shipment 

of shrimp from Vietnam to Cambodia for repackaging and 

relabeling.

The documents also include import data from U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection demonstrating that, 

between May 2004 and July 2005, Ocean Duke (Hilltop’s 

U.S. affiliate) imported over fifteen million pounds of 

shrimp declared as product of Cambodia, followed by an 

additional 143 entries attributable to Ocean King in the 

second half of 2005. Official production data from the 

Cambodian government, by contrast, indicates Cambodia 

produced less than 400,000 pounds of shrimp during all of 

2004 and 2005.

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In response to this information, Hilltop again insisted 

it was “not affiliated with any company producing shrimp 

in Cambodia. In other words, Hilltop is not affiliated with 

Ocean King. . . . Hilltop confirms that neither the company, nor its owners or officers, invested any funds in 

Ocean King.” J.A.-1647, at 3424; J.A.-1514, at 3343. Mr. 

To again certified these statements as “accurate and 

complete.” J.A.-1647, at 3426; J.A.-1514, at 3345. Commerce then issued another supplemental questionnaire to 

Hilltop asking, among other things, whether the company 

had a Cambodian affiliate called Ocean King. The questionnaire specifically warned Hilltop that non-cooperation 

could result in a rate calculated using “adverse facts 

available” (“AFA”). See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(A)–(D)

(2006). In its questionnaire response, Hilltop stated there 

was no valid basis for making inquiries regarding prior 

administrative reviews in the context of the present 

(sixth) review. Relying on that argument, it only provided 

information from the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Reviews,5

but declined to answer questions from earlier reviews, 

stating it would not be relevant to the Sixth Review. The 

company also responded it was improper to investigate 

transshipment allegations in an antidumping administrative review proceeding. Hilltop also restated it “had no 

Cambodian affiliate or Cambodian affiliates,” and “had no 

affiliation or business dealings with Ocean King (Cambodia).” J.A.-1647, at 3621, 3623; J.A.-1514, at 3809.

5 Because in the Sixth Review Hilltop sought a 

“three-zero revocation” from the Order, which allows the 

revocation of an antidumping order if, among other 

things, all covered exporters and producers “have sold the 

subject merchandise at not less than normal value for a 

period of at least three consecutive years,” 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.222(b)(1)(i)(A) (2009), Hilltop acknowledged the 

information from the Fourth and Fifth Reviews was 

relevant to the Sixth Review.

 

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Commerce then placed Ocean King’s Cambodian public registration documents on the record. These documents show Ocean King was established in 2005 by Mr. 

To, Hilltop’s general manager and part-owner, and two 

Cambodian individuals, and that Mr. To served as one of 

Ocean King’s board members and was a 35% shareholder. 

Commerce then issued Hilltop another supplemental 

questionnaire asking the company to reconcile its prior 

responses that it had no affiliation with any Cambodian 

companies with these registration documents, and again 

warned that non-cooperation could result in application of 

AFA.

In its response, Hilltop admitted it was affiliated with 

Ocean King until September 28, 2010 (about halfway 

through the Sixth Review) and that it had made “sales of 

Cambodian origin shrimp” during the Fourth Review. 

J.A.-1647, at 3703; J.A.-1514, at 3622. The company, 

however, continued to refuse to comment on the alleged 

transshipment activities. In a subsequent filing, Hilltop 

explained Mr. To’s “prior statements on affiliation may 

have been in error (e.g., due to his lack of operational 

involvement with Ocean King or for whatever reason).” 

J.A.-1647, at 2181; J.A.-1514, at 2112.

On September 4, 2012, Commerce published its Final 

Results for the Sixth Review. Certain Frozen Warmwater 

Shrimp from the People’s Republic of China, 77 Fed. Reg. 

53,856 (Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 4, 2012) (final results of 

administrative review). Commerce determined Hilltop 

impeded the Sixth Review by repeatedly failing to disclose 

its five-year affiliation with Ocean King and by denying 

the affiliation until Commerce placed irrefutable evidence 

on the record. Id. at 53,859. Further, Commerce found 

Hilltop’s misrepresentations rendered the entirety of its 

submissions unusable and therefore the company failed to 

rebut the presumption that it was part of the China-wide 

entity, as required for separate rate status. Accordingly, 

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instead of a separate rate, Hilltop was assigned the 

China-wide rate of 112.81%, which was based on AFA.

D. Further Proceedings in the Fourth and Fifth Administrative Reviews

On August 5, 2013, Commerce added the information 

from the Sixth Review to the Fourth Review’s record. On 

the basis of this information, Commerce determined in its 

Remand Results that Hilltop “provided false and incomplete information regarding its affiliates in the fourth 

administrative review” due to its omission of Ocean King 

from its list of third-country affiliates. Final Results of 

Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (Fourth 

Review), at 2 (Dep’t of Commerce Nov. 4, 2013) (J.A.-1647, 

at 4034) (“AR4 Remand Results”). Commerce also determined the omission of Ocean King from Hilltop’s list of 

affiliates rendered all other information submitted by 

Hilltop unreliable, and consequently Hilltop had not 

rebutted the presumption that it was part of the Chinawide entity. Id. Hilltop was therefore assigned the 

China-wide rate of 112.81%. Id.

Similarly, on February 14, 2013,6 Commerce placed 

the information from the Sixth Review on the record for 

the Fifth Review. On the basis of this information, Commerce concluded, as it did in the Fourth Review, that 

Hilltop “provided false and incomplete information re6 As is evident, the Fifth Review preceded the 

Fourth Review by several months and arrived at the CIT 

first. The remand on corroboration issues in the Fifth 

Review and the voluntary remand in the Fourth Review 

then proceeded roughly simultaneously, and the corroboration analyses in the Fourth Review Remand Results

and Fifth Review Second Remand Results are identical. 

For this reason, they were jointly addressed in the CIT’s 

opinion in Ad Hoc Shrimp II.

 

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garding its affiliates” due to its omission of Ocean King 

from its list of third-country affiliates. Final Results of 

Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (Fifth Review) (First Remand), at 2 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 1, 

2013) (J.A.-1514, at 3803) (“AR5 1st Remand Results”). 

Therefore, as in the Fourth Review, Commerce determined the omission of Ocean King from Hilltop’s list of 

affiliates rendered all other information submitted by

Hilltop unreliable, and the company failed to rebut the 

presumption that it was part of the China-wide entity. 

Id. Accordingly, Hilltop was assigned the China-wide 

rate of 112.81%. Id.

In Ad Hoc Shrimp I, Hilltop challenged Commerce’s 

First Remand Results for the Fifth Review as not supported by substantial evidence. Ad Hoc Shrimp I, 925 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1317. On July 23, 2013, the CIT sustained 

Commerce’s determination to deny Hilltop separate rate 

status, but remanded for review of Commerce’s selection 

of the antidumping duty rate for the China-wide entity 

(including Hilltop) because it found Commerce had failed 

to corroborate the rate as required by statute. Id. at 1327 

(“On remand, Commerce must either adequately corroborate the 112.81 percent [China]-wide rate and explain 

how its corroboration satisfies the requirements of [the 

statute], or calculate or choose a different countrywide 

rate that better reflects commercial reality, as supported 

by substantial evidence.”).

On a second remand, Commerce placed on the record 

information from the underlying antidumping duty investigation and a Section 129 Proceeding7 that followed 

7 “Section 129” refers to proceedings undertaken in 

response to a decision by the World Trade Organization’s 

(“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Body that a United States 

trade agency’s determination is inconsistent with the 

United States’s obligations as a member of the WTO’s 

 

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China’s appeal of the original antidumping investigation 

to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.8 The information 

included CONNUM9-specific margin data for a mandatory 

respondent in the original investigation, Shantou Red 

Garden Foodstuff Co., Ltd. (“Red Garden”), as recalculated after the Section 129 Proceeding. Hilltop submitted 

comments on this new data and requested additional 

Antidumping and/or Subsidies and Countervailing 

Measures Agreements. See 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b). The 

Section 129 determination at issue here is Certain Frozen 

Warmwater Shrimp from the People’s Republic of China 

and Diamond Sawblades and Parts Thereof from the 

People’s Republic of China, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,958 (Dep’t of 

Commerce Mar. 28, 2013) (notice of implementation of 

determinations under Section 129 of the Uruguay Round 

Agreements Act and partial revocation of the antidumping duty orders) (“Section 129 Determination”).

8 As discussed below, this information was also 

used to corroborate the selection of the 112.81% rate in 

the Fourth Review.

9 As described in Ad Hoc Shrimp II, 992 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1296, in its antidumping proceedings, Commerce uses 

different control numbers (“CONNUMs”) “to identify the 

individual models of products for matching purposes.” 

See, e.g., Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to 

Court Remand (Fifth Review) (Second Remand), at 5 n.18 

(Dep’t of Commerce Nov. 7, 2013) (J.A.-1514, at 4262–86) 

(“AR5 2nd Remand Results”). “Identical products are 

assigned the same CONNUM in both the comparison 

market sales database (or in a nonmarket economy context, the factors of production database) and U.S. sales 

database.” Id. (citing Antidumping Manual, ch. 4, at 10 

(Oct. 13, 2009)). “CONNUM-specific margins result in 

calculated margins that represent the pricing behavior 

related to groups of sales,” grouped by model type. Id. at 

13.

 

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information be placed on the record. In response, Commerce placed on the record additional information for Red 

Garden from the Section 129 Proceeding. On November 

4, 2013, Commerce issued its Second Remand Results, 

continuing to use the 112.81% rate as the China-wide rate 

as corroborated by the additional record evidence. See 

generally AR5 2nd Remand Results.

In Ad Hoc Shrimp II, the CIT addressed Commerce’s 

separate rate determination for the Fourth Review as well 

as its corroboration of the China-wide rate of 112.81% in 

both the Fourth and Fifth Reviews. The CIT affirmed 

(1) Commerce’s separate rate status determination in the 

Fourth Review for the reasons stated in affirming the 

Fifth Review’s First Remand Results in Ad Hoc Shrimp I, 

and (2) the selection of the China-wide rate based on AFA 

assigned to Hilltop for both the Fourth and Fifth Reviews.

Hilltop appeals the CIT’s affirmance of Commerce’s 

denial of separate rate status in the Fourth and Fifth 

Reviews as well as the CIT’s holding with respect to 

corroboration of the China-wide rate Hilltop received. 

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) 

(2012).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

This court reviews decisions of the CIT de novo, “apply[ing] anew the same standard used by the [CIT].” 

Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 548 F.3d 

1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under that standard, this 

court must uphold Commerce’s determinations unless 

they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the 

record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 

U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “Although such review 

amounts to repeating the work of the [CIT], we have 

noted that ‘this court will not ignore the informed opinion 

of the [CIT].’” Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal. v. United 

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16 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

States, 612 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United 

States, 44 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also Cleo 

Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1291, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 

(“When performing a substantial evidence review, . . . we 

give great weight to the informed opinion of the [CIT]. 

Indeed, it is nearly always the starting point of our analysis.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a mere 

scintilla,” as well as evidence that a “reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 217 (1938). 

This court’s review is limited to the record before Commerce in the particular proceeding at issue and includes 

all evidence that supports and detracts from Commerce’s 

conclusion. Sango Int’l L.P. v. United States, 567 F.3d 

1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009). An agency finding may still 

be supported by substantial evidence even if two inconsistent conclusions can be drawn from the evidence. 

Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).

II. Section 502 of the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 

2015 Does Not Apply to the Instant Appeals

After the court heard oral argument, President 

Obama signed the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 

2015 (“the Act”) on June 29, 2015. Pub. L. No. 114-27, 

129 Stat. 362 (2015). Section 502 of the Act amends 19 

U.S.C. § 1677e, the statute at the center of these appeals. 

Id. § 502, 129 Stat. at 383–84. In plain terms, it alters 

some of the standards that Commerce applies in selecting 

and corroborating AFA rates for uncooperative respondents. Id.

On July 10, 2015, counsel for the Shrimp Trade 

Committee filed a notice of supplemental authority, 

advising the court that section 502 of the Act “relates to 

the statutory corroboration requirements” associated with 

the appeals. Appellee’s Notice of Suppl. Authority at 2 

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(citation omitted). On August 10, 2015, Hilltop filed its 

own notice of supplemental authority, informing the court 

that Commerce recently issued an interpretive rule that 

“clearly demonstrates that [section 502 of] the Act does 

not apply to” the instant appeals. Appellants’ Notice of 

Suppl. Authority at 1 (citing Dates of Application of 

Amendments to the Antidumping and Countervailing 

Duty Laws Made by the Trade Preferences Extension Act 

of 2015, 80 Fed. Reg. 46,793 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 6, 

2015) (“Commerce Notice”)).

Because section 502 of the Act does not address explicitly its temporal reach, the court subsequently sought 

supplemental briefing from the parties. The court observed that, “applying normal rules of statutory construction, it appears that Congress intended amended 19 

U.S.C. § 1677e to have prospective effect.” Order Requesting Suppl. Briefing at 3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2015). As 

a result, the court asked the parties to focus on two questions: “(1) Whether the normal rules of statutory construction warrant finding that amended 19 U.S.C. § 1677e 

has prospective effect?” and “(2) If the normal rules of 

statutory construction do not necessitate a particular 

result, whether Commerce’s recent interpretive rule 

deserves deference and, if so, what degree of deference 

should be afforded?” Id. at 5.

The Shrimp Trade Committee, Hilltop, and the Government each filed a response on August 27, 2015. See 

generally Appellee’s Suppl. Br.; Appellants’ Suppl. Br.; 

Government’s Suppl. Br. Hilltop and the Government 

generally contend that normal rules of statutory construction support finding that section 502 of the Act has only 

prospective effect, such that it does not apply to the 

instant appeals. See Appellants’ Suppl. Br. 2–6;10 Gov10 The analysis in Hilltop’s supplemental brief mirrors the analysis that the court provided in its order 

 

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18 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

ernment’s Suppl. Br. 1–8.11 The Shrimp Trade Committee takes a different view, arguing that application of 

section 502 of the Act “to Hilltop’s appeals is prospective 

in nature with no impermissible retroactive effect” because section 502 of the Act is “ambiguous” with respect 

to its temporal reach and liquidation, the relevant triggering event, has not yet occurred. Appellee’s Suppl. Br. 3, 

10. For the reasons provided, the court finds that section 

502 of the Act does not apply to the Commerce determinations under review.

“‘[A] statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or 

by necessary implication.’” Fernandez–Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 37 (2006) (quoting United States v. St. 

Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 1, 3 (1926)). The 

court must first assess “‘whether Congress has expressly 

prescribed the statute’s proper reach,’ . . . and in the 

absence of language as helpful as that we try to draw a 

comparably firm conclusion about the temporal reach 

specifically intended by applying ‘our normal rules of 

construction.’” Id. (first quoting Landgraf v. USI Film 

Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994); then quoting Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). “If that effort fails, we 

ask whether applying the statute . . . would have a retroactive consequence in the disfavored sense of ‘affecting 

requesting supplemental briefing and, thus, does not 

warrant further discussion. Compare Appellants’ Suppl. 

Br., with Order Requesting Suppl. Briefing. The court 

addresses the Government’s arguments below.

11 Amicus Curiae Nucor Corporation also submitted 

a brief on the matter, but the court does not address its 

contents separately because they substantially overlap 

with the points raised by the Government and the Shrimp 

Trade Committee. Compare Nucor’s Suppl. Br., with 

Government’s Suppl. Br. and Appellee’s Suppl. Br.

 

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substantive rights, liabilities, or duties on the basis of 

conduct arising before its enactment.’” Id. (brackets 

omitted) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 278). “If the 

statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear 

congressional intent favoring such a result.” Landgraf, 

511 U.S. at 280.

As previously noted, section 502 of the Act does not 

state explicitly that it is retroactive or that it applies to 

final administrative determinations that remain subject 

to judicial review. The legislative history surrounding 

section 502 of the Act similarly fails to answer the precise 

question. See S. Rep. No. 114-45, at 37 (2015) (discussing 

section 501, ultimately enacted as section 502). However, 

applying normal rules of statutory construction, it is 

evident that Congress intended section 502 of the Act to 

apply only to Commerce determinations made on or after 

the date of enactment. Unlike with section 502 of the Act, 

Congress explicitly stated that other provisions in the Act

have retroactive effect. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 114-27, 

§ 201(b)(2), 129 Stat. at 371 (providing for retroactive 

application of the generalized system of preferences to 

certain entries entered prior to the date of enactment); id.

§§ 405, 407(g), 129 Stat. at 377–79, 383 (stating that the 

reauthorized trade adjustment assistance laws apply to 

certification petitions filed prior to the date of enactment). 

Congress also explicitly provided for the delayed implementation of other provisions in the Act. See, e.g., id.

§ 601(c), 129 Stat. at 412–13 (explaining that certain 

amendments to Chapter 62 of the Harmonized Tariff 

Schedule of the United States “take effect on the 180th

day after the date of enactment of this Act”); id. § 602(d), 

129 Stat. at 414 (explaining that certain amendments to 

Chapter 64 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the 

United States “take effect on the 15th day after the date 

of enactment of this Act”).

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The juxtaposition of section 502 of the Act with the 

legislation’s other provisions implies that, had Congress 

wanted section 502 of the Act to have retroactive effect or 

to apply to pending appeals, it would have said so. See, 

e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006) (“A 

familiar principle of statutory construction . . . is that a 

negative inference may be drawn from the exclusion of 

language from one statutory provision that is included in 

other provisions of the same statute.”), superseded by 

statute on other grounds, Military Commissions Act of 

2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 

(2006); Lindh, 521 U.S. at 327–30 (holding that, if legislation includes a provision that expressly applies to cases 

pending on the date of enactment and another provision 

that does not, the construction “indicat[es] implicitly” that 

the latter applies only to cases filed after the date of 

enactment); Gozlon–Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 

404 (1991) (“Congress’ silence [as to the effective date for 

the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (‘ADAA’) as a whole] contrasts 

with the express effective date provisions for other discrete sections of the ADAA.”); Russello v. United States, 

464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“‘[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 

another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed 

that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 

disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” (quoting United States 

v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)); cf.

Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions to Nonmarket Economy Countries, Pub. L. No. 112-99, §§ 1(b), 

2(b), 126 Stat. 265, 265–67 (2012) (explicitly providing 

retroactive and prospective effective dates for various 

provisions within same enactment). This inference finds 

further support in Congress’s simultaneous enactment of 

the provisions with different effective dates. See, e.g., 

Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75 (1995) (“The more apparently deliberate the contrast, the stronger the inference, 

as applied, for example, to contrasting statutory sections 

originally enacted simultaneously in relevant respects.”).

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The legislative history also supports the inference, 

given that six weeks before the Act’s passage Congress 

was cognizant that it would have to decide when trade 

remedy amendments under consideration would take 

effect. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 114-45, at 45 (explaining that 

a particular trade remedy amendment, which Congress 

ultimately did not enact, would apply to countervailing 

duty investigations and reviews initiated “(1) before the 

date of the enactment of this bill, if the investigation or 

review is pending a final determination as of such date of 

enactment; and (2) on or after such date of enactment”). 

By omitting an effective date for section 502 of the Act,

while explicitly providing for different effective dates for 

other provisions, Congress unambiguously intended

section 502 of the Act to apply prospectively only—i.e., to 

apply only to Commerce determinations made on or after 

the date of enactment. Thus, it does not govern the 

Commerce determinations under review.12

The parties’ contrary arguments are unpersuasive. 

The Shrimp Trade Committee contends that the court 

must find that the Act does not unambiguously identify 

the effective date of section 502 of the Act because the 

other provisions with retroactive effect “address circumstances where the relevant law had expired at the time 

the conduct occurred.” Appellee’s Suppl. Br. 2. The 

12 Because the court finds that section 502 of the Act 

applies only to Commerce determinations made after the 

date of enactment, and Commerce undoubtedly made the 

determinations under review before that date, left for 

another day is the question of whether Commerce’s application of section 502 of the Act after the effective date 

nevertheless has an impermissible retroactive effect

based upon events occurring prior to the effective date. 

Commerce has found that it would not. See Commerce 

Notice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 46,794.

 

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22 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

Government similarly “hesitate[s] to place too much 

emphasis on this juxtaposition because the other provisions are not part of the . . . trade remedies title to which 

section 502 belongs and substantively concern the extension of lapsed programs, which naturally requires Congress to deal with the status of an interim period.” 

Government’s Suppl. Br. 5 (citation omitted). These 

arguments support, rather than undermine, the court’s 

conclusion. That Congress knew it would have to address 

gaps in time as a result of its reauthorization of certain 

laws means that it was sensitive to the date that the Act’s 

provisions would take effect, including section 502 of the 

Act. Congress’s decision to delay implementation of other 

aspects of the Act confirms as much, see, e.g., Pub. L. No. 

114-27, § 601(c), 129 Stat. at 413; id. § 602(d), 129 Stat. at 

412–13, as does the legislative history, see S. Rep. No. 

114-45, at 45.

The Government contends that the subject of section 

502 of the Act—“the decision-making standards Commerce applies in selecting and corroborating [AFA] 

rates”—necessarily identifies the effective date because 

“by its nature it applies only to open Commerce proceedings.” Government’s Suppl. Br. 1. This tautology simply 

confirms the provision’s subject matter and fails to address the question regarding the temporal reach of section 

502 of the Act. It is undisputed that section 502 of the Act 

discusses “the decision-making standards Commerce 

applies” in its determination.13 As Commerce correctly 

13 The Government explains that the dates of Commerce’s determinations, not the dates of entry, are the 

relevant triggering events for purposes of a retroactive 

analysis. Government’s Suppl. Br. 1–2, 4. The Shrimp 

Trade Committee makes similar arguments. Appellee’s 

Suppl. Br. 7–9. A particular passage from the court’s 

order appears to have inspired the parties’ arguments. 

 

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AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES 23

recognized, “[t]he Act does not contain dates of application 

for any of these amendments,” Commerce Notice, 80 Fed. 

Reg. at 46,793, so the relevant question left to answer is 

the temporal reach of section 502 of the Act.

The Government’s view that a provision’s subject matter “by its nature” dictates its effective date does not 

appreciate how Congress legislates. In recently-enacted

legislation, Congress ably distinguished “decision-making 

standards” from the date that those standards would take

effect. See Pub. L. No. 112-99, §§ 1(a) (discussing decision-making standards), 1(b) (discussing effective date, 

including its application to pending appeals), 2(a) (discussing decision-making standards), 2(b) (discussing 

effective date), 126 Stat. at 265–67. Indeed, Supreme 

Court precedent teaches that, while it may be appropriate 

to discern whether a statute has an impermissible retroactive impact vis-à-vis the conduct that it regulates (i.e., 

Commerce’s decision-making standards), such an analysis 

comes only after a court determines that neither a statute’s express terms nor the normal rules of statutory 

construction address the question of its temporal reach. 

See Fernandez–Vargas, 548 U.S. at 37. But see Government’s Suppl. Br. 3 (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 

541 U.S. 677, 698 n.17 (2004)). Taken to its logical conclusion, the Government’s view would be that, absent an 

See Order Requesting Suppl. Briefing at 3 (stating that 

the court “must decide whether the amended statute 

applies to the past conduct (and, thus, past entries) at 

issue in this appeal”). By using the term “entries,” the 

court did not intend to suggest that entry dates, rather 

than the dates of Commerce’s determinations, served as 

the relevant points of inquiry. Instead, we meant only to 

convey the notion that Commerce’s determinations do not 

exist in a vacuum and necessarily affect entries that enter 

in a given period of time.

 

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24 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

express retroactivity provision, any change to decisionmaking standards necessarily means that legislation has 

prospective effect only. Supreme Court precedent and an 

examination of Congress’s past acts prevent us from 

adopting that view. See, e.g., Fernandez–Vargas, 548 U.S. 

at 40; Pub. L. No. 112-99, §§ 1(a)–(b), 126 Stat. at 265–67.

Finally, because the court determines that section 502 

of the Act unambiguously applies only to Commerce 

determinations made after the date of enactment, it need 

not address the second question that it posed to the 

parties. See Order Requesting Suppl. Briefing at 5 (asking “If the normal rules of statutory construction do not 

necessitate a particular result, whether Commerce’s 

recent interpretive rule deserves deference and, if so, 

what degree of deference should be afforded?”). The court 

now turns to the remaining issues on appeal.

III. Legal Framework

A. Separate Rate Status

The antidumping statute authorizes Commerce to impose duties on imported goods that are sold in the United 

States at less-than-fair value and that injure a domestic 

industry. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673. Once an antidumping 

duty order covering certain goods is in place, “Commerce 

periodically reviews and reassesses antidumping duties” 

during administrative reviews. Gallant Ocean (Thai.) Co. 

v. United States, 602 F.3d 1319, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 

(citing 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)).

In calculating antidumping margins, Commerce generally determines individual dumping margins for each 

known exporter or producer. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(1). If 

it is not practicable to calculate individual dumping 

margins for every exporter or producer, Commerce may 

examine a reasonable number of respondents (mandatory 

respondents), such as Hilltop. See id. § 1677f-1(c)(2). In 

antidumping duty proceedings involving merchandise 

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AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES 25

from a nonmarket economy country,14 however, Commerce presumes all respondents are governmentcontrolled and therefore subject to a single country-wide 

rate. See Sigma Corp. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1401, 

1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Respondents may rebut this presumption and become eligible for a separate rate by 

establishing the absence of both de jure and de facto 

government control. Id. If a respondent fails to establish 

its independence, Commerce relies upon the presumption 

of government control and applies the country-wide rate 

to that respondent. Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 294 

F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Under the [nonmarket 

economy] presumption, a company that fails to demonstrate independence from the [nonmarket economy] entity 

is subject to the countrywide rate, while a company that 

demonstrates its independence is entitled to an individual 

rate as in a market economy.”).

B. Adverse Facts Available

During its periodic administrative reviews, Commerce 

requests information from respondents and if a respondent “withholds information that has been requested by 

[Commerce],” “fails to provide such information by the 

14 A “nonmarket economy country” is “any foreign 

country that [Commerce] determines does not operate on 

market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that 

sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the 

fair value of the merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A). 

“Because it deems China to be a nonmarket economy 

country, Commerce generally considers information on 

sales in China and financial information obtained from 

Chinese producers to be unreliable for determining, under 

19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a), the normal value of the subject 

merchandise.” Dongtai Peak Honey Indus. Co. v. United 

States, 777 F.3d 1343, 1350 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

 

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26 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

deadlines . . . or in the form and manner requested,” 

“significantly impedes a proceeding,” or “provides such 

information but the information cannot be verified,” 

Commerce is permitted to use “facts otherwise available” 

in making its determinations. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(A)–

(D). If Commerce further finds a respondent has “failed to 

cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply 

with a request for information,” then it “may use an 

inference that is adverse to the interests of that party in 

selecting from among the facts otherwise available” (i.e., 

it may apply AFA). Id. § 1677e(b). “[T]he statutory 

mandate that a respondent act to ‘the best of its ability’ 

requires the respondent to do the maximum it is able to 

do.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 

1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

In selecting an AFA rate, Commerce may use information from the petition, investigation, prior administrative reviews, or “any other information placed on the 

record.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b); see Gallant Ocean, 602 F.3d 

at 1323 (“[I]n the case of uncooperative respondents,” 

Commerce has discretion to “select from a list of secondary sources as a basis for its adverse inferences.”); F.lli De 

Cecco di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 

216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000). However, when 

Commerce “relies on secondary information rather than 

on information obtained in the course of an investigation 

or review,” it “shall, to the extent practicable, corroborate 

that information from independent sources that are 

reasonably at [its] disposal.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). To 

corroborate secondary information, Commerce must find 

the information has “probative value,” KYD, Inc. v. United 

States, 607 F.3d 760, 765 (Fed. Cir. 2010), by demonstrating the rate is both reliable and relevant, Gallant Ocean, 

602 F.3d at 1323–25.

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IV. Commerce’s Decision to Deny Appellant Separate 

Rate Status Was Supported by Substantial Evidence and 

Was in Accordance with Law

A. Commerce’s AFA Determination

Hilltop argues Commerce’s determination that Hilltop 

was ineligible for a separate rate is unsupported by 

substantial evidence and contrary to law. It notes the 

decision “to reject all of Hilltop’s reported data and to 

treat Hilltop as part of the [China]-wide entity as total 

[AFA] . . . [was] predicated upon a single finding”: that 

Hilltop failed to report its affiliation with Ocean King on 

its questionnaire responses. Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 18;

Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 20. According to Hilltop, because

“the information regarding the Ocean King affiliation was 

not pertinent to Commerce’s margin calculation in [the 

Fourth and Fifth Reviews], there was no legitimate basis 

to apply facts available or an adverse inference for its 

omission.” Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 19; Appellants’ Br.-

1514, at 21 (capitalization omitted). In support, Hilltop 

contends “the application of facts otherwise available and 

an adverse inference requires that there be a ‘gap’ of 

necessary information missing from the record,” and “[i]f 

the unreported information is not necessary, then there is 

no valid basis for application of any adverse inference.” 

Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 24; Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 26. 

That is, Hilltop contends because information regarding 

third-country affiliates is “not pertinent to the calculation 

of Hilltop’s margin,” Commerce has failed to show there is 

a gap in the record. Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 23; Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 25.

Hilltop says that its omission is not relevant because

“information regarding a third country affiliate that is not 

involved in the production, sale or distribution of subject 

merchandise is of no consequence in the calculation of a 

dumping margin.” Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 27; Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 29 (emphasis added). In support, 

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28 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

Hilltop cites a prior administrative review and asserts, 

“Commerce has previously determined that the failure to 

disclose an affiliate does not require an adverse inference 

unless the affiliate was involved in the production or sale 

of the subject merchandise during the period under review.” Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 24; Appellants’ Br.-1514, 

at 26 (citing Certain Stainless Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from Taiwan, 70 Fed. Reg. 1870 (Dep’t of Commerce 

Jan. 11, 2005) (final results of administrative review)). 

Hilltop also cites the CIT’s decision in Ta Chen Stainless 

Steel Pipe Co. v. United States, 31 Ct. Int’l Trade 794, 

821–22 (2007) (unpublished), where it stated “[i]f, as the 

plaintiff and the defendant assert, the entities allegedly 

affiliated with Ta Chen within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677(33)(A)–(E) were in fact uninvolved with the subject 

merchandise, a finding on remand of affiliation would not 

have any impact thereon.”

Here, Hilltop argues, had the company disclosed its 

affiliation with Ocean King, this information would have 

“no impact on Commerce’s margin calculation.” Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 29; Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 30. This is 

because, Hilltop contends, “there were no shipments at all 

of shrimp from Cambodia during the [Fourth and Fifth 

Reviews]”; “Hilltop (through its US affiliate, Ocean Duke) 

made only a de minimis quantity of sales of shrimp originating from Cambodia in [the Fourth Review]”; and “had 

no sales of Cambodian shrimp in [the Fifth Review].” 

Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 27; Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 30.

Hilltop also argues “[e]ven if the record herein did 

contain substantial evidence to support allegations of 

transshipment or circumvention, it would be improper to 

address such allegations in the context of the [Fourth and 

Fifth Review] proceeding[s].” Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 42; 

Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 43. This is because, according to 

Hilltop, investigations into the circumvention of antidumping duty orders are “entirely separate proceeding[s]” 

with “separate procedures” than administrative reviews. 

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Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 42; Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 43–

44.

Finally, Hilltop argues there is no support for Commerce’s use of total, as opposed to partial, AFA. Hilltop 

claims Commerce “cannot support its use of total AFA 

against Hilltop by claiming that the omission of Ocean 

King from the list of third country affiliates justifies the 

rejection of all of Hilltop’s reported data.” Appellants’ Br.-

1647, at 33; Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 35. Hilltop says this 

court and the CIT “have repeatedly stated that a resort to 

total AFA is only permissible if the missing or unusable 

information is ‘core’ rather than ‘tangential’ to Commerce’s dumping determination or where the deficiencies 

are so pervasive that they permeate all aspects of the 

reported data.” Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 33; Appellants’ 

Br.-1514, at 35. In support, Hilltop cites, inter alia, 

Jiangsu Changbao Steel Tube Co. v. United States, 884 F. 

Supp. 2d 1295, 1305–06 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2012), where the 

CIT sustained the application of total AFA because the 

discovery of false statements and altered production and 

accounting records impeached the reliability of all reported data.

Substantial evidence supports Commerce’s determination that Hilltop’s withholding of information and its 

repeated misrepresentations rendered the company’s 

submissions unreliable, and therefore the company was 

unable to rebut the presumption that it is part of the 

China-wide entity. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2), if a 

respondent “withholds information that has been requested by [Commerce]” or “significantly impedes a proceeding,” Commerce is permitted to use “facts otherwise 

available” in making its determinations. Here, Hilltop 

repeatedly withheld and misrepresented information 

regarding its affiliation with Ocean King. Indeed, while 

the public registration documents for Ocean King identified Mr. To as “a board member and 35 percent shareholder beginning in July 2005 and ending in September 

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30 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

2010,” AR4 Remand Results at 8; AR5 1st Remand Results at 8, Hilltop misrepresented to Commerce that 

“[n]one of the [Hilltop] Group companies or their individual owners own 5 percent or more in stock in any third 

parties,” AR4 Remand Results at 11; AR5 1st Remand 

Results at 12, and none of Hilltop’s managers “held positions with any other firm, government entity, or industry 

organization during the [period of review],” AR4 Remand 

Results at 12 n.63; AR5 1st Remand Results at 13 n.65. In 

addition, the record shows Hilltop subsequently denied 

and concealed its affiliation with Ocean King until confronted with the public registration documents unequivocally revealing the affiliation. As the CIT found, 

Hilltop provided no explanation of its failure to 

disclose and subsequent repeated denial of its affiliation with Ocean King beyond a vague statement that the error may have been due to Mr. To’s 

lack of personal involvement with Ocean King 

(despite unequivocal record evidence of his personal involvement and substantial investment 

during Ocean King’s incorporation), “or for whatever reason.”

Ad Hoc Shrimp II, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 (emphasis 

added) (footnote omitted). Substantial evidence supports 

Commerce’s conclusion that “Hilltop’s failure to disclose 

its relationship with Ocean King . . . surely demonstrates 

that it impeded the proceeding by not disclosing the 

affiliation.” AR4 Remand Results at 19; AR5 1st Remand 

Results at 19.

In addition to “significantly imped[ing] a proceeding,” 

19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2), if Commerce further finds a 

respondent has “failed to cooperate by not acting to the 

best of its ability to comply with a request for information,” then it may apply AFA. Id. § 1677e(b). Here, 

Commerce properly applied an adverse inference because, 

through material misrepresentations and refusal to 

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respond to its inquiries, Hilltop “failed to cooperate by not 

acting to the best of its ability.” See Nippon Steel, 337 

F.3d at 1383 (“[I]ntentional conduct, such as deliberate 

concealment . . . , surely evinces a failure to cooperate.”).

Hilltop erroneously argues there was no gap in the information necessary to calculate its dumping margin. 

Commerce concluded that because Hilltop “provided false 

and incomplete information regarding its affiliates,” it 

could not “determine whether any other misrepresentations exist on the record with regard to Hilltop’s full 

universe of affiliates, corporate structure and sales process, or whether other information may be missing from 

the record,” and therefore it was “unable to rely upon any 

of Hilltop’s submissions in this segment.” AR4 Remand 

Results at 2; AR5 1st Remand Results at 2. As is evident, 

the necessary information missing from the record was 

information supporting Hilltop’s claim that it was eligible 

for a separate rate, including an accurate representation 

of Hilltop’s corporate structure and indications of government control exercised through the company’s Chinese 

affiliates. See Ad Hoc Shrimp II, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.

Equally unavailing is Hilltop’s argument that its affiliation with Ocean King was immaterial because Ocean 

King was not involved in the production of subject merchandise, so disclosure would have had no effect on the 

calculation of its duty rate. First, the CIT’s decision in Ta 

Chen does not stand for the proposition, as Hilltop suggests, that third-country affiliate information “is of no 

consequence” if the affiliate is not involved in the production, sale, or distribution of subject merchandise. Indeed, 

while the CIT recognized such information might not have 

an effect, it also stated “[Commerce] has discretion on 

remand to request and evaluate new data. And it is not 

absolutely certain that affirmative affiliation determinations on remand would have no effect upon the plaintiff’s 

antidumping-duty rate.” Ta Chen, 31 Ct. Int’l Trade at 

822 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Second, at 

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32 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

issue here is whether the nondisclosure affected Hilltop’s 

request for separate rate status, which it surely did. 

Indeed, Commerce’s decision to reject Hilltop’s submissions was based on its nondisclosure of its affiliate which 

called into question Hilltop’s credibility. When offered the 

opportunity to explain itself, moreover, Hilltop continued 

to deny its affiliation until faced with irrefutable evidence. That Ocean King may not have been involved in 

the production of subject merchandise is irrelevant.

Hilltop’s arguments regarding the transshipment evidence are also irrelevant. As the CIT noted, “Commerce’s 

decision to invalidate Hilltop’s separate rate representations as unreliable was not based on a definitive finding of 

transshipment, but rather on the impeachment of 

Hilltop’s credibility as a consequence of evidence reasonably indicating that Hilltop deliberately withheld and 

misrepresented information,” and these misrepresentations “may reasonably be inferred to pervade the data in 

the record beyond that which Commerce has positively 

confirmed as misrepresented.” Ad Hoc Shrimp II, 992 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1293 (footnote omitted). Indeed, Commerce 

properly determined both that Hilltop’s misrepresentations rendered the entirety of its submissions unreliable 

and that Hilltop’s failure to respond to the transshipment 

evidence prevented Commerce from evaluating the impact 

of Hilltop’s misrepresentations.

Commerce also properly applied total AFA, as opposed to partial AFA, because Hilltop’s failure to disclose 

its affiliates and its misrepresentations undermined all of 

Hilltop’s submissions regarding its ownership and corporate structure, as well as Commerce’s ability to rely on 

Mr. To’s certifications of those submissions. See Mukand, 

Ltd. v. United States, 767 F.3d 1300, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(“In general, use of partial facts available is not appropriate when the missing information is core to the antidumping analysis and leaves little room for the substitution of 

partial facts without undue difficulty.”). As the CIT 

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AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES 33

explained, information about Hilltop’s corporate structure 

“is core, not tangential, to Commerce’s analysis because it 

goes to the heart of Hilltop’s corporate ownership and 

control.” Ad Hoc Shrimp I, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 1324

(footnote omitted); see also Ad Hoc Shrimp II, 992 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1294–95. Here, “none of [Hilltop’s] reported 

data is reliable or usable” because the “submitted data 

exhibited pervasive and persistent deficiencies that cut 

across all aspects of the data.” See Zhejiang DunAn 

Hetian Metal Co. v. United States, 652 F.3d 1333, 1348 

(Fed. Cir. 2011).

B. Hilltop’s Claimed Exemption from the Separate Rate 

Analysis

Next, Hilltop argues it was “improper to consider 

Hilltop part of the [China]-wide entity because Commerce 

has repeatedly confirmed that exporters located in Hong 

Kong and other market economy locations are exempt 

from the separate rate test and are automatically granted 

separate rate status.” Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 46–47; 

Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 48 (emphasis added). The company says “Commerce’s established policy is that exporters who are 100% foreign-owned and/or exporters who are 

located in a market economy country are not subject to 

the separate rate analysis and receive separate rate 

status automatically.” Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 48; Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 49–50 (emphasis added).

Hilltop’s claim that its Hong Kong location automatically entitles the company to a separate rate is flawed

because it ignores the potential for government control 

through Hilltop’s affiliates. Thus, the company’s registration is not dispositive. While Hilltop points to examples 

where Commerce has accepted certifications that companies are free from government control without a full 

separate rate analysis, this does not mean Commerce 

must automatically grant separate rate status when a 

company’s false representations regarding its corporate 

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34 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

structure call its certification into question, particularly 

when the company has affiliates located in nonmarket 

economy countries. Accordingly, Commerce properly 

concluded “[a]lthough Hilltop claims that it is a Hong 

Kong-based exporter and therefore placement in the 

[China]-wide Entity is inappropriate, the undisclosed 

affiliation and unreliability of information on the record 

prevent us from determining with certainty the ownership 

and/or control of Hilltop.” AR4 Remand Results at 58; 

AR5 1st Remand Results at 36.

V. Commerce’s Selection of the Country-Wide Antidumping Duty Rate Was Supported by Substantial Evidence

Hilltop also challenges Commerce’s corroboration of 

the AFA rate applied to Hilltop as part of the China-wide 

entity as unsupported by substantial evidence and contrary to law. Commerce selected the 112.81% rate as the 

China-wide rate in both the Fourth and Fifth Reviews, 

noting it was the lowest rate listed in the original antidumping petition, and was subsequently assigned as the 

China-wide rate in the investigation and each successive 

administrative review of the order. 

As previously explained, Commerce sought to more 

fully explain its corroboration analysis on remand in both 

the Fourth and Fifth Reviews. Commerce began by 

reexamining its use of the petition rate as the China-wide 

rate in the underlying antidumping investigation. In the 

investigation, Commerce corroborated the petition rate by 

comparing it to the dumping margins calculated for a 

respondent called Allied Pacific Group (“Allied”), which 

Commerce found to be a significant producer of subject 

merchandise. In this analysis, Commerce found that “a 

significant percentage of Allied’s [CONNUMs] [had] 

positive margins and that a significant volume of those 

CONNUMs had margins which exceeded the lowest 

Petition margin of 112.81 percent.” AR4 Remand Results 

at 32; AR5 2nd Remand Results at 5. Accordingly, ComCase: 14-1514 Document: 103-2 Page: 34 Filed: 10/05/2015
AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES 35

merce found the petition rate of 112.81% was relevant to 

the investigation and had probative value.

For purposes of the Fourth and Fifth Reviews, Commerce acknowledged the margins of the mandatory respondents in the investigation had changed following 

litigation, so it “revisited the record of the [investigation] 

to determine whether margins calculated in the Petition, 

and vetted and revised by [Commerce] at that time, 

remain relevant to the investigation and have probative 

value.” AR4 Remand Results at 32; AR5 2nd Remand 

Results at 5. To this end, Commerce “examined the record 

evidence with respect to the revised margin calculations 

and . . . confirmed that although the final weightedaverage margins may have been downwardly revised, 

significant percentages of positive, CONNUM-specific 

margins remain” and “significant volumes of CONNUMspecific margins continue to be higher than the lowest 

Petition margin of 112.81 percent for one respondent.” 

AR4 Remand Results at 32–33; AR5 2nd Remand Results

at 5. 

Specifically, Commerce placed additional information 

on the record concerning margins calculated for Red 

Garden, a mandatory respondent in the investigation, 

which was also the largest single exporter of subject 

merchandise with the highest volume of sales during the 

period of investigation. The information consisted of a file 

(the “Red Garden Margin File”) created using Red Garden’s data from the original investigation as recalculated 

to reflect the changes resulting from both domestic litigation and the Section 129 Proceeding completed in March 

2013. AR4 Remand Results at 35; AR5 2nd Remand 

Results at 7–8; see also J.A.-1647, at 3938–40; J.A.-1514, 

at 4168–70. The Red Garden Margin File listed every 

CONNUM-specific margin calculated for Red Garden. 

Commerce also supplemented the Red Garden Margin 

File with an analysis memo (“Red Garden 129 Analysis 

Memo”) that accompanied Commerce’s recalculation of 

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36 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

Red Garden’s investigation margin for the Section 129 

Proceeding. The memo included the complete output of 

the statistical analysis software used in recalculating Red 

Garden’s margins. AR4 Remand Results at 35; AR5 2nd 

Remand Results at 8; see J.A.-1647, at 3963–4015; J.A.-

1514, at 4193–245. Based on this information, Commerce 

determined the updated Red Garden dumping margins 

were relevant for purposes of corroboration of the 112.81% 

petition rate.

Commerce then analyzed Red Garden’s sales data, 

factors of production data, and margin calculations, 

taking into account the revisions resulting from judicial 

review. This analysis revealed more than half of the 

CONNUMs in Red Garden’s margin calculation had 

positive margins. “Of those CONNUMs with positive 

margins,” Commerce found, “the percentage with dumping margins exceeding 112.81 percent is sufficient to 

demonstrate the probative value of the lowest Petition 

margin of 112.81 percent.” AR4 Remand Results at 34; 

AR5 2nd Remand Results at 7. In addition, Commerce 

found that, by quantity, the “CONNUMs accounting for a 

significant volume of merchandise under consideration 

were sold at prices that resulted in margins which exceed 

112.81 percent.” AR4 Remand Results at 34; AR5 2nd 

Remand Results at 7. Therefore, Commerce concluded 

“the Petition rate [of 112.81%] continues to be relevant to 

this investigation, even after taking into account subsequent changes to the original calculations pursuant to 

remand redetermination, and the rate to be corroborated 

for purposes of [these remands].” AR4 Remand Results at 

34; AR5 2nd Remand Results at 7.

Hilltop argues “neither the AFA rate from the petition 

nor the information Commerce used for its corroboration 

were probative of the commercial reality” during the 

Fourth and Fifth Reviews, and “Commerce disregarded 

record evidence demonstrating the unreliability of the 

small group of sales data from the original investigation 

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AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES 37

used for its corroboration.” Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 58; 

Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 60–61. The company contends 

Commerce continues to use the outdated margin from the 

2003 petition and corroborates that rate with equally 

outdated sales data from the original investigation. 

Furthermore, Hilltop contends there was “a wealth of 

information from more recent reviews (as well as recalculated margin results from the original investigation),” 

which demonstrate the 112.81% rate is not commercially 

reasonable. Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 60; Appellants’ Br.-

1514, at 63. Therefore, Hilltop argues, it was unreasonable for Commerce to rely on the outdated information 

from the investigation to corroborate the petition rate.

Hilltop further argues “the unbroken history of calculated margins that are, at best, a mere fraction of the 

112.81% petition rate” further undermines Commerce’s 

corroboration of the AFA rate. Appellants’ Br.-1647, at

61; Appellants’ Br.-1514, at 63. Hilltop points to cooperative respondents in the investigation who received zero or 

de minimis margins after recalculation pursuant to the 

Section 129 Proceeding, as well as cooperative respondents in the First through Fourth Administrative Reviews, 

who with one exception received zero or de minimis 

margins. The company also points out that Red Garden’s 

overall margin from the Section 129 Proceeding was zero. 

Therefore, to Hilltop, “[g]iven this history of extremely 

low margin results extending over multiple years, it is 

plainly evident that the 112.81% rate from the petition 

does not reflect commercial reality and is punitively 

high.” Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 61; Appellants’ Br.-1514, 

at 64; see also Appellants’ Br.-1647, at 62–63; Appellants’ 

Br.-1514, at 65 (“Commerce is applying an AFA rate 

based on outdated and cherry-picked data that is over

twelve times higher than the highest rate ever calculated 

for a cooperative respondent.”).

Commerce properly corroborated its selection of the 

petition rate as the China-wide rate based on AFA. As to 

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38 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

Hilltop’s claim that the relevancy of the information is 

undermined by its age, the age of information alone does 

not render the information unreliable, particularly when 

Commerce revisits that information with more recent 

data. Indeed, as the CIT noted, “Hilltop ignores judicial 

precedent holding that the continued reliability and 

relevance of data from prior segments of an antidumping 

proceeding is presumed absent rebutting evidence.” Ad 

Hoc Shrimp II, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1301 (citing KYD, 607 

F.3d at 764–68). Here, Commerce corroborated the petition rate using information from the more recent Section 

129 Proceeding and incorporated post-investigation 

changes due to domestic and international litigation. 

Thus, that the AFA rate was selected from the 2003 

petition does not undermine its relevance in light of 

Commerce’s detailed explanation of why the rate continues to be relevant based on updated record evidence. This 

is not to say that outdated data would continue to be 

reliable if there was available more recent data on the 

record for non-cooperating respondents, but here the data 

Hilltop points to is that of cooperative respondents. And 

the most recent China-wide rate was 112.81%, as it was 

used in the antidumping investigation and each successive administrative review of the antidumping duty order.

As to Hilltop’s argument regarding the availability of 

lower margins calculated for cooperating respondents, the 

company’s reliance on separate rates calculated for cooperative companies is unavailing. As the Government 

points out, “the fact that lower dumping margins have 

been calculated for respondents that have demonstrated 

their eligibility for a separate rate in certain segments of 

this proceeding has little bearing on the rate applied to 

the China-wide entity.” Government’s Br.-1647, at 67; 

Government’s Br.-1514, at 69. Indeed, as the CIT found, 

“[i]n the [nonmarket economy] context, . . . the inference 

that the countrywide entity as a whole may be dumping 

at margins significantly above the cooperating separate 

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AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES 39

rate market participants is not unreasonable.” Ad Hoc 

Shrimp II, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1300. Furthermore, this 

court has clarified that AFA rates can be significantly 

higher than rates calculated for cooperating respondents, 

see, e.g., KYD, 607 F.3d at 765–66 (affirming application 

of petition rate many times higher than those of cooperating respondents), particularly since such rates should 

reflect an “inference that is adverse to the interests of 

that party,” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). Indeed, “Commerce 

need not select, as the AFA rate, a rate that represents 

the typical dumping margin for the industry in question.” 

KYD, 607 F.3d at 765–66.

In addition, Hilltop’s argument that Commerce should 

rely on the rates assigned to mandatory respondents in 

the prior reviews ignores that these rates include those 

calculated for Hilltop itself during the time it concealed 

Ocean King, thus calling into question their reliability. 

Furthermore, Hilltop’s claim that Commerce should have 

considered Red Garden’s overall margin of zero would 

conflict with the stated purpose of AFA, which ensures an 

uncooperative “party does not obtain a more favorable 

result by failing to cooperate than if it had cooperated 

fully.” Statement of Administrative Action accompanying 

the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. Rep. No. 103-

316, vol. 1, at 870 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

4040, 4199. Indeed, as the Government states, “[t]he 

point of corroboration is to ensure that an adverse rate is 

relevant and probative, not to assign a rate to an uncooperative respondent as if it had cooperated.” Government’s

Br.-1647, at 71; Government’s Br.-1514, at 72; see De 

Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1032 (explaining that an AFA rate 

should be “a reasonably accurate estimate of the respondent’s actual rate, [here, the China-wide entity,] albeit with 

some built-in increase intended as a deterrent to noncompliance” (emphasis added)).

Accordingly, Commerce reasonably relied on the significant volume of sales by the largest cooperating exportCase: 14-1514 Document: 103-2 Page: 39 Filed: 10/05/2015
40 AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMM. v. UNITED STATES

er, Red Garden, to conclude a non-cooperative respondent 

could have made sales at the same rate. For this reason, 

substantial evidence supports Commerce’s determination 

that the Red Garden sales data establish “the commercial 

reality that a significant quantity and value of CONNUMs were sold at prices that resulted in [antidumping] 

margins exceeding 112.81 percent,” which “confirms the 

continued reliability of the 112.81 percent rate and relevance to the [China]-wide entity as a whole.” AR4 Remand Results at 41; AR5 2nd Remand Results at 14.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the decisions of the United States Court 

of International Trade are

AFFIRMED

Case: 14-1514 Document: 103-2 Page: 40 Filed: 10/05/2015