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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Jerome D. Washington
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 31, 2003 Decided January 6, 2004

No. 02-3077

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JEROME D. WASHINGTON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cr00355–01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee and

Shawn Moore, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, entered

appearances.

David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Thomas J.

Tourish, Jr., and Stephen J. Pfleger, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, GARLAND, Circuit Judge,

and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: A jury found Jerome Washington

guilty of (1) conspiracy to commit carjacking and to sell or

possess a stolen motor vehicle; (2) four counts of carjacking;

(3) four counts of armed kidnaping; (4) four counts of armed

robbery; (5) two counts of sale or possession of a stolen

motor vehicle; (6) assault with intent to kidnap while armed;

(7) assault with intent to rob while armed; (8) and thirddegree sexual abuse. Washington challenges his conviction

upon the grounds that the district court (1) erred in denying

his motion to suppress testimony regarding one victim’s outof-court identification of him; and (2) abused its discretion in

denying Washington’s motion to deliver his own closing argument. We conclude the district court’s denial of Washington’s motion to suppress, if an error, was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt; and the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Washington’s motion to deliver his own

closing argument. We therefore affirm Washington’s conviction.

I. Background

According to the testimony adduced at trial, Washington

and a co-conspirator, Daniel Neal, committed a series of

carjackings and attempted carjackings in April 2001. In one

instance Washington and Neal, armed with steak knives,

carjacked and robbed Katherine Layne and her passenger,

Melissa Mayne. After Washington and Neal forced their way

into Layne’s car and put Mayne in the back seat, Washington

drove them to an alley, where the two men stole Mayne’s

credit cards and Layne’s driver’s license. Washington then

drove Neal and the two women to a parking lot behind a

grocery store, near an ATM machine. Washington got out of

the car and used Mayne’s ATM card to withdraw $300.

Washington then released the two women and drove off with

Neal in Layne’s car.

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Nine days later, police detectives showed Layne an array of

nine photographs, including Washington’s. Layne did not

identify any of the subjects as her assailant. Approximately

five months later Layne viewed a lineup of seven African–

American men, again including Washington. This time

Layne said she was not certain, but her assailant ‘‘might be

number two,’’ that is, Washington. Unfortunately, Washington was the only person who had appeared in both the photo

array and the subsequent lineup.

Washington moved to suppress the lineup identification as

‘‘the unreliable product of a suggestive identification procedure.’’ The district court denied Washington’s motion, without prejudice, noting the prosecution had not yet turned over

the photo array it had shown to Layne. The court invited

defense counsel to renew the motion ‘‘if, as, or when we get to

the array question.’’ Tr. 2/7/02, at 17. Defense counsel then

argued, ‘‘there’s no one else who’s displayed to her on both

occasionsTTTT [T]hat, to me, would indicate a suggestive

identification procedure.’’ Id. at 18. The district court stated

Washington would ‘‘just TTT have to have [the] record [for

appeal] on that point,’’ but observed:

[I]t may be that there’s a continuum here, that if she had

been shown an array in the morning and spent an hour

with it, TTT couldn’t identify anybody, TTT and that

afternoon had been shown a lineup and Mr. Washington

were the only person in the lineup who was also in the

array, you might have a much better case than you do on

the face of the record today when there was a passage of

some five months between the viewing of the array [and

the lineup]. We don’t know how much time she spent

with the array. We don’t know TTT what the array

looked like. And accordingly, the denial is TTT without

prejudiceTTTT You will get the array, and you will have

a chance to renew the motion if you choose to.

Id. at 18–19.

As it happened, the Government could not locate for trial

the photo array Layne had been shown nine days after the

crime. Defense counsel, in arguing the identification proceUSCA Case #02-3077 Document #794696 Filed: 01/06/2004 Page 3 of 8
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dure was suggestive, eventually introduced an array of six

photographs the FBI had shown to other witnesses. Counsel

never renewed the motion to suppress Layne’s identification.

On the last day of trial — after the Government had rested

its case and the defense had announced that Washington

would not take the stand — defense counsel informed the

district court that Washington ‘‘wanted to do his own closing

argument.’’ Tr. 5/17/02, at 3. The Government objected,

arguing that Washington’s request was merely an attempt to

argue to the jury while evading cross-examination. The court

agreed and denied Washington’s request.

On appeal Washington first argues the district court should

have excluded testimony regarding Layne’s having identified

him in the lineup; he maintains the identification process was

impermissibly suggestive and the admission of the testimony

therefore violated his right to due process of law under the

Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The Government counters (1) Washington has forfeited this

argument because he did not renew his motion to suppress;

(2) the lineup was not suggestive; (3) the identification was

reliable; and (4) any error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. Washington also argues — and the Government

denies — he had the right, under the Sixth Amendment to

the Constitution of the United States, to deliver his own

closing argument.

II. Analysis

Preliminarily, we reject the Government’s argument that

Washington did not properly preserve his objection to the

admission of Layne’s identification. Upon denying Washington’s motion to suppress, the district court invited him to

renew the motion ‘‘if, as, or when’’ the Government provided

him with the photo array it had shown to Ms. Layne. The

Government never produced the array; it cannot now fault

Washington for failing to renew his motion.

A. Suggestive Identification

In considering whether evidence of an identification runs

afoul of the Due Process Clause, we must first determine

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whether the identification process was impermissibly suggestive. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 197 (1972). If it was,

then the court must ‘‘examine whether, under the totality of

the circumstances, the identification was sufficiently reliable

to preclude a substantial likelihood of misidentification.’’

United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1134 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 99, 113–16

(1977)). To that end, the court must consider ‘‘the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime,

the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the

confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.’’ Id. (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 197). The identification may be admitted if its ‘‘reliability outweigh[s] its

suggestiveness.’’ Id.

Washington argues the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive and the district court therefore erred in

foregoing ‘‘any inquiry into reliability.’’ To be sure, the use

of a photo array prior to a lineup identification may be

impermissibly suggestive where there is only one ‘‘repeat

player.’’ See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383–84

(1968) (use of photographs prior to lineup may create risk of

false identification because witness ‘‘is apt to retain in his

memory the image of the photograph,’’ but ‘‘convictions based

on eye witness identification at trial following a pretrial

identification by photograph will be set aside TTT only if the

photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly

suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of

irreparable misidentification’’); Foster v. California, 394 U.S.

440, 443 (1969) (identification obtained after victim viewed

defendant in two lineups and one-on-one violated due process

where defendant was only person in both lineups); United

States v. Sanders, 479 F.2d 1193, 1197–98 (D.C. Cir. 1973)

(‘‘In the totality of the circumstances TTT the suggestive

confrontations of the witnesses with the photographs and

lineup gave rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification’’). In this case, however, we need not decide

whether the district court erred in failing to evaluate the

reliability of the identification under Neil v. Biggers because

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the admission of Layne’s testimony was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.

B. Harmless Error

‘‘Error is harmless if it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt

that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict

obtained.’ ’’ United States v. Green, 254 F.3d 167, 170 (D.C.

Cir. 2001) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967)). ‘‘[I]t is the evidence before the jury that determines

whether a conviction survives harmless error review.’’ Id. at

173.

Here, there was abundant evidence of Washington’s guilt

apart from Layne’s identification. Co-conspirator Neal testified in detail about Washington’s participation in the carjackings and attempted carjackings. Another co-conspirator,

Shekita Williams, testified that Washington had told her he

had robbed Layne and another woman. Significant physical

evidence connected Washington to the crimes of which he was

convicted. For example, a credit card belonging to one of the

victims was found in Washington’s pocket at the time of his

arrest. Upon searching the motel room shared by Washington, Neal, and Williams police found other physical evidence,

including two steak knives, Layne’s driver’s license, and

Mayne’s ATM card.

Moreover, the potential impact on the jury of Layne’s

lineup identification was slight because it was, at best, equivocal; she said only that her assailant ‘‘might be number two.’’

Washington’s counsel further denigrated Layne’s identification, suggesting both in his cross-examination of Layne and in

his closing argument that it was the unreliable product of a

suggestive procedure. Finally, in its closing argument the

Government did not rely substantially upon Layne’s identification to make its case. The prosecutor devoted most of his

closing argument to a discussion of the testimony of Neal and

Williams, mentioning Layne’s identification only briefly.

In these circumstances it appears ‘‘beyond a reasonable

doubt’’ that admission of Layne’s out-of-court identification of

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Washington ‘‘did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’’

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

C. Request to Deliver Closing Argument

A person accused of a crime has an absolute right, under

the Sixth Amendment, to represent himself only if he asserts

that right before trial. See United States v. Dougherty, 473

F.2d 1113, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (‘‘[T]he fundamental right to

conduct the case pro se is one that must be claimed timely,

before the trial begins’’); see also United States v. Bishop,

291 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002) (‘‘A demand for selfrepresentation is timely if made before meaningful trial proceedings have begun’’). A defendant does not have a right to

combine self-representation with representation by counsel.

See United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1420 (D.C.

Cir. 1988) (no constitutional right to hybrid representation);

cf. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984) (‘‘A defendant does not have a right to choreograph special appearances by counsel’’). We therefore review only for abuse of

discretion the district court’s denial of Washington’s motion to

deliver his own closing argument. See Dougherty, 473 F.2d

at 1124 (‘‘When the pro se right is claimed after trial has

begun, the court exercises its discretion’’).

The district court clearly did not abuse its discretion in

denying Washington’s request, which came at the close of

trial, after the Government had rested its case and the

defense had announced that Washington would not testify on

his own behalf. In view of the timing and the specific nature

of the request — not to take over from counsel for the

remainder of the case but rather ‘‘to do his own closing

argument’’ — the district court was reasonably concerned

with preventing Washington from ‘‘basically TTT testify[ing]

without having to be cross-examined.’’ Tr. 5/17/02, at 4; see

Bishop, 291 F.3d at 1114 (affirming trial court’s denial of

defendant’s request to deliver closing argument).

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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Washington’s conviction is

Affirmed.

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