Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-70657/USCOURTS-ca9-14-70657-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Jose Juan Medina-Nunez
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE JUAN MEDINA-NUNEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 14-70657

B.I.A. No.

A070-736-545

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

April 13, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed June 8, 2015

Before: Alex Kozinski and Susan P. Graber, Circuit

Judges, and Michael A. Ponsor,* Senior District Judge.

Per Curiam Opinion

* The Honorable Michael A. Ponsor, Senior United States District Judge

for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

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2 MEDINA-NUNEZ V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied Jose Juan Medina-Nunez’s petition for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of his

application for cancellation of removal for failure to meet the

statutory residency requirement.

The panel deferred to the BIA’s published opinion in

Matter of Reza-Murillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 296 (BIA 2010), to

hold that Medina-Nunez’s acceptance into the Family Unity

Program (“FUP”) did not constitute an admission into the

United States for purposes of cancellation. The panel held

that deference was proper despite this court’s prior opinion to

the contrary in Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006

(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that acceptance into the FUP did

constitute an admission), because the holding in GarciaQuintero did not follow from the unambiguous terms of the

statute and thus left no room for the agency’s discretion.

COUNSEL

Gary A. Watt and Stephen R. Tollafield, Supervising

Counsel, Dorothy C. Yamamoto (argued) and Gregory R.

Michael, Student Counsel, Hastings Appellate Project, San

Francisco, California, for Petitioner.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MEDINA-NUNEZ V. LYNCH 3

Rebekah Nahas (argued), Trial Attorney, and Joyce R.

Branda, Acting Assisting Attorney General, Civil Division,

Douglas E. Ginsburg, Assistant Director, and Karen L.

Melnik, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for

Respondent.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Jose Juan Medina-Nunez petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his

application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(a). The BIA held that Petitioner did not meet the

statutory seven-year residency requirement because, under In

re Reza-Murillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 296 (B.I.A. 2010), his

acceptance into the Family Unity Program (“FUP”) did not

constitute an admission into the United States for purposes of

§ 1229b(a)(2). That BIA decision conflicts directly with our

decision in Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006 (9th

Cir. 2006). But, applying the rule announced in National

Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet

Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), we defer to the BIA’s later

published decision in In re Reza-Murillo. We therefore deny

the petition.1

1 Petitioner also seeks review of the BIA’s determination that he is

removable. In an unpublished disposition filed concurrently with this

opinion, we conclude that the BIA correctly held that Petitioner is

removable.

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Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. In 1985, he

entered the United States without inspection. In 1996,

Petitioner was accepted into the FUP. Persons accepted into

the FUP receive significant benefits, including protection

from removal, authorization to work in the United States,

authorization to travel outside the country, and the option of

voluntary departure. See Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at

1009–10 (describing the program in detail). In 2007,

Petitioner became a legal permanent resident. He was

convicted of various crimes in August 1995, August 2000,

March 2004, June 2004, and December 2011. In 2012, the

government issued him a notice to appear.

Petitioner then sought cancellation of removal under

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) which, among other things, requires the

applicant to have resided in the country for “7 years after

having been admitted in any status,” id. § 1229b(a)(2)

(emphasis added). Petitioner argued that he had been

“admitted” in 1996, when he was accepted into the FUP. 

Citing its published decision directly on point, In re RezaMurillo, the BIA held that Petitioner’s acceptance into the

FUP was not an admission for purposes of § 1229b(a)(2). 

Accordingly, the BIA denied Petitioner’s application for

cancellation of removal. Petitioner timely seeks review.

In 2005, we confronted the question whether acceptance

into the FUP constitutes an admission for purposes of

cancellation of removal. Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1009. 

We noted that this was “an issue of first impression” because

neither we nor the BIA had addressed the issue in a published

decision. Id. We held that, because the BIA’s decision in

Garcia-Quintero was unpublished, it was not entitled to

deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Garcia-

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MEDINA-NUNEZ V. LYNCH 5

Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1014. Moreover, because the BIA’s

reasons were unpersuasive, we “conduct[ed] a de novo review

of the question.” Id. at 1015. Over a dissent, we held that

acceptance into the FUP constituted an admission for

purposes of § 1229b(a)(2). Id. at 1018–19. In reaching that

conclusion, we consulted the text of the statute, the legislative

purpose, the legislative history, decisions by the BIA, and a

decision by this court, Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d

1013 (9th Cir. 2005). Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1015–19.

Five years later, the BIA addressed the same issue again,

but this time in a published decision. The BIA held that

acceptance into the FUP did not constitute an admission for

purposes of § 1229b(a)(2). In re Reza-Murillo, 25 I. & N.

Dec. at 297–300. The Immigration and Nationality Act

“defines the term ‘admitted’ as ‘the lawful entry of the alien

into the United States afterinspection and authorization by an

immigration officer.’” Id. at 297 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(13)(A)). Acceptance into the FUP does not require

entry, inspection, or authorization. Id. “Therefore, the

respondent’s grant of FUP benefits did not itself involve his

‘entry . . . into the United States after inspection and

authorization by an immigration officer’ under section

101(a)(13)(A) of the Act.” Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)). Accordingly,

acceptance into the FUP did not mean that the alien had been

“admitted” for purposes of § 1229b(a)(2). Id. Looking to its

own decisions and to decisions by this court, the BIA

explained at length why our decision in Garcia-Quintero was

“not persuasive.” Id. at 298–300.

In sum, we confront a conflict between our own precedent

and the BIA’s later published precedent to the contrary. The

Supreme Court has instructed us on the proper outcome in

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precisely this situation: “A court’s prior judicial construction

of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled

to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds

that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of

the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.” 

Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982.

Our prior decision did not “follow[] from the

unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leave[] no room

for agency discretion.” Id. Indeed, as noted above, in

addition to interpreting the statutory text, we consulted

legislative history, legislative purpose, decisions by the BIA,

and our own decision in Cuevas-Gaspar (which since has

been overruled by Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct.

2011 (2012)). Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1015–19.

We also have no trouble concluding that the BIA’s

decision in In re Reza-Murillo is “otherwise entitled to

Chevron deference.” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982. It is

reasonable for the BIA to apply the statutory definition of the

term “admitted.” Nothing in the statutory text, the BIA’s

cases, or our own cases precludes the BIA from relying on

that definition.

Pursuant to Brand X, we must afford Chevron deference

to the BIA’s decision in In re Reza-Murillo holding that

acceptance into the FamilyUnity Program does not constitute

an admission for purposes of § 1229b(a)(2). The BIA

therefore correctly denied Petitioner’s application for

cancellation of removal.

Petition DENIED.

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