Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01388/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01388-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Justice
Intervenor
Cameron L. Holland
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

CAMERON L. HOLLAND,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Intervenor

______________________

2019-1388

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DE-0752-18-0332-I-1.

______________________

Decided: January 6, 2020

______________________

LOUIS FRANCIS ROBBIO, Law Office of Louis F. Robbio, 

North Port, FL, argued for petitioner. 

 JEFFREY GAUGER, Office of General Counsel, United 

States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, 

argued for respondent. Also represented by KATHERINE 

MICHELLE SMITH, TRISTAN LEAVITT.

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2 HOLLAND v. MSPB

 REBECCA SARAH KRUSER, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for intervenor. Also represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, CLAUDIA BURKE, ROBERT 

EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR. 

 ______________________

Before MOORE, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

TARANTO, Circuit Judge.

Cameron Holland worked as a Special Agent in the 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), a part of the 

United States Department of Justice, under an exceptedservice appointment. Just over a year into his employment, the DEA terminated Mr. Holland from his position, 

without having given him notice of the proposed basis of 

termination or a pre-decision opportunity to provide the deciding official a response. Mr. Holland appealed to the 

Merit Systems Protection Board, seeking review of the termination. But the Board dismissed the appeal, concluding 

that the request for review is not within any grant of jurisdiction to the Board. We agree that the Board lacks jurisdiction, and we therefore affirm, leaving the termination 

unreviewed. 

I

Before he began working for the DEA in 2017, Mr. Holland served as a local police officer. Between 2009 and 

2015, his police department employer issued him three letters of corrective action and three letters of disciplinary action. In May 2016, when Mr. Holland applied to be a 

special agent with the DEA, he completed an electronic 

questionnaire as part of the application. The questionnaire 

asked whether, in the last seven years, he had “received a 

written warning, been officially reprimanded, suspended, 

or disciplined for misconduct in the workplace, such as a 

violation of security policy.” J.A. 159. Mr. Holland responded “[n]o.” Id.

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On February 9, 2017, the DEA sent Mr. Holland a letter indicating that he had qualified for an interim clearance and offering him a position as a special agent. The 

letter indicated that Mr. Holland could begin working before the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) completed 

his background investigation but that he would be removed 

from the position if “[o]nce the background investigation 

ha[d] been received and reviewed . . . any previously unknown or discrepant information [wa]s uncovered that 

would have had a negative impact on [his] selection.” J.A. 

143. Mr. Holland accepted the offer.

On May 14, 2017, Mr. Holland began work as a Special 

Agent in the DEA “serving under an excepted service appointment” that “may be converted to a career appointment 

in not less than three years and not more than four years.” 

J.A. 137. Mr. Holland’s appointment was also subject to a 

two-year probationary period.

OPM completed Mr. Holland’s background investigation on January 3, 2018. While performing the investigation, the OPM investigator learned of the corrective and 

disciplinary actions taken against Mr. Holland while he 

was employed as a police officer. In the report based on the 

“Enhanced Subject Interview,” the investigator wrote that 

Mr. Holland “did not list all of his employment disciplinary 

actions because he asked a friend if he should list all of the 

contact cards/disciplinary action[s] and [the] friend told 

him he was not required to list [them].” J.A. 117. The investigator wrote that Mr. Holland “was not trying to hide”

the disciplinary actions, which were “common knowledge.” 

Id.

On May 31, 2018, the DEA terminated Mr. Holland 

from his position. There had been no notice of proposed 

removal or an opportunity for Mr. Holland to submit to the 

deciding official a response to such a proposal. Citing as 

authority 5 U.S.C. chapter 23 (§§ 2301−2306), the termination letter states that the decision was based on Mr. 

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Holland’s “failure to provide complete and truthful information in [his] background investigation.” J.A. 107. The 

DEA also completed OPM’s Standard Forms 50 and 52, 

which show that Mr. Holland was terminated during the 

probation/trial period of his excepted-service employment. 

The initial Standard Forms 50 and 52, approved June 5, 

2018, cited legal authority for the termination, 5 C.F.R. 

§ 315.805, different from the authority cited in the termination letter.

On June 30, 2018, Mr. Holland appealed his termination to the Board. In early July, the administrative judge 

assigned to the matter issued orders calling for submissions on the issue of Board jurisdiction. On July 26, 2018, 

the Department of Justice submitted a letter seeking dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Attached to the 

letter was a replacement version of Standard Form 52, approved July 26, 2018, changing the authority citation from 

5 C.F.R. § 315.805 to 5 U.S.C. chapter 23, consistent with 

the termination letter.

On October 5, 2018, an administrative judge issued an

initial decision holding that the Board lacks jurisdiction to 

hear Mr. Holland’s appeal. The administrative judge explained that Mr. Holland was not an “employee” under 5 

U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) and that the Board lacked jurisdiction 

over “constructive suitability determinations.” Holland v. 

Dep’t of Justice, 2018 WL 4914095 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 5, 2018); 

J.A. 3, 5. The administrative judge also determined that 

the Board has no jurisdiction over Mr. Holland’s claims 

that he was subject to a prohibited personnel practice 

where, as here, there was no otherwise-appealable action. 

J.A. 5. The initial decision became the final Board decision 

(which we hereafter call it) when the time for full Board 

review passed without Mr. Holland seeking such review.

Mr. Holland timely appealed to this court. Although 

before the Board he made reference to a discrimination 

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HOLLAND v. MSPB 5

allegation, he has dropped that allegation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

II

We affirm the Board’s findings or conclusions unless 

they are “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 

or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 

been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 

5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). “The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary, 

but is limited to adverse personnel actions expressly made 

appealable to it by law, rule, or regulation.” Herman v. 

Dep’t of Justice, 193 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing

5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)). We decide de novo whether the Board 

has jurisdiction, while accepting Board findings of fact if 

they are supported by substantial evidence. Parrott v. 

M.S.P.B., 519 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Johnston v. 

M.S.P.B., 518 F.3d 905, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

Mr. Holland advances several alternative bases on 

which, he contends, the Board has jurisdiction. We address 

each basis in turn. We then address his due process claim. 

A

Mr. Holland contends that the Board has jurisdiction 

over his appeal under 5 C.F.R. part 731 because his termination was a “suitability action.” We disagree, concluding 

that the DEA did not actually find him unsuitable for the 

position. The termination decision does not on its face 

make, and should not be understood as making, such a 

finding. 

A “suitability determination” is “a decision by OPM or 

an agency with delegated authority that a person is suitable or is not suitable for employment in covered positions 

in the Federal Government or a specific Federal agency.” 5 

C.F.R. § 731.101(b). As relevant here, a “covered position” 

is “a position in the excepted service where the incumbent 

can be noncompetitively converted to the competitive 

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service.” Id. In making a suitability determination, OPM 

or an agency with delegated authority must rest its determination on a ground specified in an exclusive list of permissible bases, of which the only one placed in issue before 

this court is that the individual involved made a 

“[m]aterial, intentional false statement, or deception or 

fraud in examination or appointment.” § 731.202(b)(3). 

If a suitability determination is made, OPM or an 

agency with delegated authority may take a suitability action against that person. § 731.203(c). A “suitability action” is a cancellation of eligibility, a removal, a 

cancellation of reinstatement eligibility, or a debarment, 

§ 731.203(a), and “may be taken only by OPM or an agency 

with delegated authority,” § 731.101(b). A person against 

whom an agency has taken a suitability action may “appeal 

the action to the . . . Board.” § 731.501(a).

It is undisputed that Mr. Holland was in a “covered position,” but appealability would require more—namely, 

that a suitability action was taken against him. 

§ 731.501(a). But nowhere did the DEA characterize its 

termination of Mr. Holland as a suitability action or cite 

the suitability regulations of 5 C.F.R. part 731. The DEA 

instead cited 5 U.S.C. chapter 23 as its legal authority

(and, initially, another regulation unrelated to suitability). 

Further, in a declaration filed before the Board, the DEA’s 

Section Chief for the Suitability Section of Human Resources stated that the “DEA did not perform a suitability 

review of Cameron Holland or make a negative suitability 

determination of Cameron Holland” and that OPM “did not 

issue a negative suitability determination of Cameron Holland.” J.A. 286–87. 

Nevertheless, Mr. Holland argues that his termination 

was effectively a suitability action because it rested on a 

determination that he had made a “[m]aterial, intentional 

false statement, or deception or fraud in examination or 

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HOLLAND v. MSPB 7

appointment.” § 731.202(b)(3). We reject Mr. Holland’s recharacterization of his termination.

Section 731.202(b)(3) requires “intentional” falsity, deception, or fraud, but the DEA, in terminating Mr. Holland, 

did not find or assert that Mr. Holland had the intent specified in that standard. Whereas the regulation is addressed 

to a “[m]aterial, intentional false statement, or deception 

or fraud,” § 731.202(b)(3), all that the DEA found was that 

Mr. Holland “fail[ed] to provide complete and truthful information” in [his] background investigation,” J.A. 107. 

The declared “failure” does not imply an intent to make a 

false statement or to deceive or commit fraud. And the record evidence does not indicate that Mr. Holland had such 

intent but, rather, suggests otherwise, as reflected in the 

investigator’s summary of the interview with Mr. Holland, 

discussing Mr. Holland’s reliance on advice from a friend. 

J.A. 117. 

Indeed, the Department of Justice agreed at oral argument that the DEA, in terminating Mr. Holland, did not

charge him with the “mens rea” required by the particular 

suitability-regulation provision at issue, but was “simply 

looking at the discrepant information.” Oral Argument at 

25:25–25:48 (“[Mr. Holland] was terminated for a failure to 

provide complete and truthful information on his background investigation, so they weren’t giving him any sort 

of mens rea of that. They were simply looking at the discrepant information.”). The Department added that the 

statement in the termination letter that Mr. Holland’s 

“conduct is incompatible with the critical duties and responsibilities of a Criminal Investigator,” J.A. 107–108, 

also should not be read to suggest the presence of the intent

required by the suitability-regulation provision at issue. 

Oral Argument at 26:05–26:34.

The substantive lack of fit between the suitability-regulation at issue and what the DEA decided is confirmed by 

the fact that the DEA did not have delegated authority 

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8 HOLLAND v. MSPB

from OPM to make a suitability determination or take a 

suitability action against Mr. Holland. “OPM [has] retain[ed] jurisdiction to make final determinations and take 

actions in all suitability cases where there is evidence that 

there has been a material, intentional false statement, or 

deception or fraud in examination or appointment.” 5 

C.F.R. § 731.103(g). And “[a]gencies must refer these cases 

to OPM for suitability determinations and suitability actions under this authority” or notify OPM “if the agency

wants to take, or has taken, action under its own authority.” Id. The DEA did not do so here, which reinforces the 

conclusion that it was not making a suitability determination or taking a suitability action.

The Department of Justice asserts an additional 

ground for concluding that the DEA made no suitability determination and took no suitability action. In 2008, OPM 

promulgated suitability regulations and, in doing so, recognized that certain agency actions might be subject to being 

characterized as coming within both the suitability regulation’s authority and another source of authority. OPM 

noted that the Board may not “hold the agency to standards 

relating to a legal authority that the agency did not invoke.” Suitability, Supplementary Information, 73 Fed. 

Reg. 20,149, 20,152 (Apr. 15, 2008); see Upshaw v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 2009 M.S.P.B. 74, ¶ 8 (2009) 

(“OPM explained that its new regulations were issued, in 

part, to correct Board case law which had held that ‘what 

matters is the substance of the action, not the form,’ which 

OPM determined to be erroneous and beyond the intent of 

Congress.”). The Department argues that those comments 

show that the DEA has plenary power to determine the authority under which it terminates an employee, regardless 

of whether the termination substantively fits under some 

other authority that would give the Board jurisdiction it 

would otherwise lack. But we do not reach that contention, 

because we reject the applicability of the suitability regulations for the separate, sufficient reason that the DEA did 

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HOLLAND v. MSPB 9

not actually find that Mr. Holland engaged in the intentional conduct to which the suitability-regulation provision 

at issue is limited.

B

Mr. Holland contends that the Board has jurisdiction 

over his appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 7513 because he met the 

definition of an “employee” under the statute. That contention is incorrect.

“[A]n employee against whom [a removal or suspension 

action under § 7512] is taken . . . is entitled to appeal to the 

Merit Systems Protection Board.” 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d). Under § 7511(a)(1), there are three categories of individuals 

who qualify as “employees”: (1) individuals in the competitive service who either do not have a probationary period 

under their initial appointment or have completed one year 

of similar service under another appointment, 

§ 7511(a)(1)(A); (2) veteran’s preference eligible individuals

in the excepted service who have completed one year of service in a similar position in an executive agency, 

§ 7511(a)(1)(B); or (3) individuals in excepted-service positions who are either not subject to a probationary period or 

have completed two years of current continuous service in 

a similar position in an executive agency, § 7511(a)(1)(C). 

It is undisputed that Mr. Holland was not an employee 

under § 7511(a)(1)(A) or (B): he was neither in the competitive service, see, e.g., J.A. 19 (noting that Mr. Holland’s appointment was in the excepted service), nor a veteran’s 

preference eligible individual, see, e.g., id. (noting that Mr. 

Holland was not entitled to veteran’s preference). Thus, for 

Mr. Holland to be an employee, he would have had to come

under either of the two categories in § 7511(a)(1)(C). But 

he did not. Mr. Holland was not an employee under 

§ 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) because his excepted-service appointment was subject to a two-year probationary period that he 

had not completed; and he was not an employee under 

§ 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii) because he lacked the necessary prior 

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10 HOLLAND v. MSPB

service in a federal executive agency. Thus, Mr. Holland 

was not an “employee” under § 7511 and had no right of 

appeal under § 7513. 

C

Mr. Holland next contends that the Board has jurisdiction over his appeal under 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.805 and 315.806. 

He argues that his position was “some form of ‘hybrid’ appointment between excepted service and competitive service,” Appellant’s Br. at 35, due to the nature of his hiring:

the “competitive and thorough process with multiple interviews, physical testing, psychological testing, polygraph 

testing, reference checks, credit checks, internal affairs investigations, law enforcement checks and background 

checks” that he went through “prior to being hired,” id. at 

36−37. We reject Mr. Holland’s invocation of 5 C.F.R. 

§§ 315.805 and 315.806.

The Board had an ample basis for finding that Mr. Holland’s position was in the excepted service. See, e.g., J.A. 

19 (Mr. Holland’s appeal form with type of appointment 

marked as “excepted”); J.A. 93 (termination notice with 

“position occupied” marked as “excepted service”). That 

fact makes §§ 315.805 and 315.806 inapplicable to his termination. We have explained that sections 315.805 and 

315.806 “grant to a terminated probationary employee, but 

only one in the competitive service, certain procedural 

rights and a right of appeal to the Board where the employee makes a non-frivolous allegation that the termination rested wholly or partly on conditions arising before 

appointment.” De Santis v. M.S.P.B., 826 F.3d 1369, 1372 

(Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). Accordingly, exceptedservice employees, such as Mr. Holland, “cannot invoke 5 

C.F.R. §§ 315.805 and 315.806(c) to appeal [their] termination because those regulations apply only to competitiveservice employees,” and not to excepted-service employees. 

Id., 826 F.3d at 1376; see also 5 C.F.R. § 210.101(b) (“Parts 

315 through 339 of this chapter apply to all positions in the 

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HOLLAND v. MSPB 11

competitive service . . . and, except as specified by or in an 

individual part, these parts do not apply to positions in the 

excepted service.”). 

Mr. Holland also points to the DEA’s citation of

§ 315.805 as the legal authority for terminating his employment in the initially prepared Standard Forms 50 and 

52. But “[t]he Board’s jurisdiction cannot be expanded by 

an agency’s alleged misstatements or erroneous notice of 

appeal rights.” Campion v. M.S.P.B., 326 F.3d 1210, 1215 

(Fed. Cir. 2003). Here, the DEA’s citation to § 315.805 in 

the cited Forms was a mistake. It was counter to Mr. Holland’s clear actual status and to the termination letter, 

which cited only 5 U.S.C. chapter 23. And the DEA issued

a corrected notification to invoke only 5 U.S.C. chapter 23.

Thus, the Board lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr. Holland’s appeal under 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.805 and 315.806. 

D

Mr. Holland’s last jurisdictional contention relies on 5 

U.S.C. § 2302(b), which prohibits certain personnel practices. But prohibited personnel practices of the type asserted by Mr. Holland (who, we note, does not allege 

reprisal for whistleblowing) “do not, in themselves, provide 

a basis for review by the Board” unless they are paired with 

an otherwise-appealable personnel action. Brodt v. 

M.S.P.B., 11 F.3d 1060, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Mr. Holland 

has failed to present a separate claim to the Board over 

which it has jurisdiction. Thus, the Board properly dismissed the prohibited personnel action allegations for lack 

of jurisdiction.

E

In addition to arguing for Board jurisdiction, Mr. Holland asserts that his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights 

were violated. In making this contention, Mr. Holland focuses on the absence of a pre-decisional notice of and opportunity to address the basis for the termination. He 

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12 HOLLAND v. MSPB

might also be suggesting that he had a due process right to 

Board review after the termination.

Even if we read Mr. Holland’s constitutional contention 

broadly, we must reject it. In this court, both the Board 

and the Department of Justice address the due process contention on its merits. They do not assert that, just because

we find lack of a statutory or regulatory grant of jurisdiction to the Board, we must reject the due process contention without regard to the substantive constitutional 

standards for when due process is required. Rather, they 

assert that due process was not required here because a 

constitutional prerequisite to Mr. Holland’s having due 

process rights is shown to be missing by the analysis 

demonstrating lack of Board jurisdiction. We agree.

Mr. Holland’s “federal constitutional due process claim 

depends on his having a property right in continued employment.” Stone v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 179 F.3d 1368, 

1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Cleveland Board of Education. v. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (finding state employed security guards’ “federal constitutional claim depend[ed] on their having had a property right in continued 

employment.”).1 And “[p]roperty interests are not created 

by the Constitution; ‘they are created and their dimensions 

are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem 

from an independent source [such as a statute].’” Stone, 

179 F.3d at 1374 (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). Here, our analysis 

above, in discussing Board jurisdiction, demonstrates that 

Mr. Holland did not have a property interest in continued 

employment at the time he was terminated. He therefore 

 

1 “A Federal agency may not, consistently with the 

Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, do that which a 

State is forbidden to do by the Fourteenth Amendment Due 

Process Clause.” Stone, 179 F.3d at 1374 n.2 (citing 

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–335 (1976)).

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HOLLAND v. MSPB 13

was not entitled to due process protection for his termination.

One core rationale for providing due process is that it 

reduces the chance of error and thus adds to the reliability 

of the decision at issue. See, e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 

543; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 343 (1976). 

The absence of due process for Mr. Holland thus means 

that the termination decision lacks the measure of reliability that is conferred when due process is provided. That 

consequence may well affect how the termination is viewed 

in the future, but it does not alter our conclusion that Mr. 

Holland lacked a protected property interest that would entitle him to due process. His due process challenge fails.

III

Mr. Holland has not established that the Board erred 

in determining that he lacked appeal rights under 5 C.F.R. 

§ 731, 5 U.S.C. § 7511, or 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.805 or 315.806. 

Relatedly, he has not established a property interest that 

is a prerequisite for his due process claim. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is affirmed.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

AFFIRMED

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