Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00908/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00908-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arcelia Castaneda
Defendant
Michael B. Williams
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL B. WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

ARCELIA CASTANEDA,

Defendant.

CASE No. 1:16-cv-0908- MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF NO. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s June 24, 2016, complaint is before the Court for screening. 

I. Screening Requirement

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. Pleading Standard

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is an uncommitted civil detainee housed at Coalinga State Hospital 

(“CSH”). Though Plaintiff’s prison sentence was completed on December 24, 2000, he 

has since been held over for civil commitment trial pursuant to California's Sexually 

Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”). Arcelia Castaneda is a Psychiatric Technician employed 

at CSH and is named as a defendant in her official and individual capacities.

Plaintiff’s claims can be summarized as follows:

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Pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6606(b),

1 Plaintiff refuses 

to participate in evaluations, hospital care and treatment programs, or group hospital 

sessions at CSH. In retaliation for this refusal, Defendant Arcelia Castaneda accessed 

Plaintiff’s confidential medical files to prepare a fraudulent and unfavorable current 

psychological assessment report. 

Plaintiff brings claims for a violation of his First Amendment and Due Process 

rights, as well as state law claims for defamation of character and false imprisonment. 

He seeks $16,000,000 in damages. 

IV. Analysis

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendant, who is named in both her individual and 

official capacities. Plaintiff’s claim for damages from Defendant in her official capacity, 

however, is barred because “[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages 

in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials in their official capacities.” 

Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations 

omitted). However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages 

against state officials in their personal capacities, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); 

Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003), or suits for declaratory or injunctive 

relief brought against state officials in their official capacities, Austin v. State Indus. Ins. 

System, 939 F.2d 676, 680 fn.2 (9th Cir. 1991). 

B. First Amendment Retaliation

 

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The Court takes judicial notice of this statute, which provides as follows: 

Amenability to treatment is not required for a finding that any person is a 

person described in Section 6600, nor is it required for treatment of that 

person. Treatment does not mean that the treatment be successful or 

potentially successful, nor does it mean that the person must recognize 

his or her problem and willingly participate in the treatment program. 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §6606(b); Fed. R. Evid. 201. 

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Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights may support 

a § 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also

Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir.1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 

802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995).

A retaliation claim requires five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor 

took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that inmate’s protected 

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment 

rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watson v. Carter, 

668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 

2009).

Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim fails because the conduct that he 

describes—namely, the exercise of his statutory right to decline participation in certain 

programs at CSH—does not amount to protected conduct under the First Amendment.

Further, Plaintiff asserts no facts suggesting that Defendant’s conduct was motivated by 

Plaintiff’s refusal to participate in the programs and, lastly, there are no allegations that 

the assessment that he challenges was prepared other than in accordance with and 

furtherance of commitment proceedings under the SVPA. 

This is not the first time that Plaintiff has been informed that he does not state a 

First Amendment retaliation claim based on these allegations. See Williams v. Madrid, 

Case No. 1:13-cv-2104-MJS, 2014 WL 814730 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2014) (dismissing 

complaint asserting identical allegations against a CSH social worker), and 2014 WL 

1600569 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2014) (dismissing first amended complaint without leave to 

amend for failure to state a claim), aff’d Williams v. Madrid, 609 Fed. Appx. 421 (9th Cir. 

2015). 

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim will therefore be dismissed, but out of an abundance of 

caution he will be granted leave to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must allege

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specific facts from which the Court can conclude that Defendant took an adverse act 

against him because of his protected activity and not for a legitimate correctional goal. 

C. Due Process

Civil detainees are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protections. See Jones v. 

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Civil status means civil status, with all the 

Fourteenth Amendment rights that accompany it.”). 

Plaintiff’s due process claim is so factually deficient that the Court is unable to 

determine if he states a claim. He does not link Defendant’s conduct to any due process 

violation, he does not assert any harm arising from Defendant’s conduct, and he does 

not indicate how the due process clause is implicated merely because Defendant 

accessed his confidential mental health information. Insofar as Plaintiff claims that 

Defendant prepared a fraudulent mental health assessment, he does not explain how 

this assessment is substantively false and fraudulent or so lacking in support as to 

violate due process. Young v. King County, 70 Fed. Appx. 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2003, citing 

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982); Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 611 

(7th Cir. 2010), citing McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 579-81 (7th Cir. 2010). Of course, 

if Plaintiff’s due process claim is premised on his continued detention at CSH in 

anticipation of a civil commitment trial, that claim, as he acknowledges, must be asserted 

in a habeas petition, not in this civil rights action. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 

500 (1973). Again, Plaintiff has been informed of these deficiencies when he last 

asserted this same claim against another defendant. See Williams v. Madrid, supra.

The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has failed to assert any facts suggesting a due 

process violation. This claim will also be dismissed with leave to amend.

D. State Law Claims

Plaintiff also asserts two state law claims against Defendant: defamation of 

character and false imprisonment. In the absence of a cognizable federal claim, 

however, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claim. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 

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(9th Cir. 2001); see also Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th 

Cir. 1994). “When . . . the court dismisses the federal claim leaving only state claims for 

resolution, the court should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them 

without prejudice.” Les Shockley Racing v. National Hot Rod Ass’n, 884 F.2d 504, 509 

(9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff may amend his state law claims, but if he fails to allege a viable 

federal claim in his amended complaint, the Court will not exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over his state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family Revocable 

Trust, 254 F.3d at 805. 

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against 

Defendant. Plaintiff will, however, be granted leave to amend. If Plaintiff files a first 

amended complaint, it must state what Defendant did that led to the deprivation of his 

constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. Plaintiff should carefully read this 

Screening Order and focus his efforts on curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an 

“amended complaint supersedes the original” complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First 

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff’s June 24, 2016, Complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed for failure to 

state a claim; 

2. Plaintiff shall file a First Amended Complaint within thirty days from the 

date of this Order; and

3. Plaintiff’s failure to file an amended complaint within thirty days will result in 

a dismissal of this action without prejudice for failure to prosecute and failure to comply 

with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 30, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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