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Parties Involved:
Warren Ballentine
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 21, 2016

Decided December 22, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐2585

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

WARREN BALLENTINE,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 CR 88

Matthew F. Kennelly,

Judge.

O R D E R

For his role as a lawyer assisting in two separate mortgage‐fraud schemes, a jury

found Warren Ballentine guilty of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, wire fraud, id. § 1343,

two counts of financial institution fraud, id. § 1344, and two counts of making false

statements to financial institutions, id. § 1014. The district court then sentenced him on

all counts below the guidelines range to concurrent one‐day terms of imprisonment

with time served and concurrent three‐year terms of supervised release. The court also

ordered restitution of $140,940 and a $600 assessment. Ballentine filed a notice of

appeal, but his newly appointed attorney has concluded that the appeal is frivolous and

seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Ballentine has not

responded to our invitation to comment on counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Counsel’s brief adequately explains the nature of the case and discusses potential issues

that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve, and thus we limit our review

to the subjects that counsel identifies. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir.

2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

In 2004 and 2005 Ballentine was involved in two schemes that used straw buyers

to obtain mortgage loans and purchase rental properties in Chicago and surrounding

suburbs. To obtain those mortgages on more favorable terms—100% financing and

lower interest rates—the straw buyers lied on their loan applications that they intended

to reside in the properties, among other falsehoods. Ballentine’s role was the same in

both schemes: He represented straw buyers at closings, which entailed going over the

closing documents with them. Among these documents was an occupancy affidavit that

required the buyer to affirm—falsely, in this case—that he or she would live in the

home. The offenses charged in the indictment focused on Ballentine’s representation of

straw buyers at the closings for two Chicago properties, at 1506 S. Spaulding and 912

W. 86th Place.   

Counsel first considers whether Ballentine could challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the jury’s verdict on the offenses concerning the 1506 S. Spaulding

transaction—mail fraud, financial institution fraud, and making a false statement to a

financial institution. But counsel properly concludes that the evidence, viewed in the

light most favorable to the government, would enable a rational jury to find each

element of the charged offenses. See United States v. Cooper, 767 F.3d 721, 727 (7th Cir.

2014). The government presented evidence that at the closing Ballentine represented the

straw buyer, Marilyn Claiborne, and instructed her to sign an occupancy affidavit, even

though she told him that she would not be using the property as her residence.

Regarding mail fraud, the parties stipulated that the scheme involved the use of an

interstate commercial carrier, UPS. See United States v. Useni, 516 F.3d 634, 648 (7th Cir.

2008). As for financial institution fraud, the parties stipulated that the scheme concerned

an FDIC‐insured institution, and the government introduced evidence that Ballentine

instructed Claiborne to sign the affidavit knowing it was false. See United States v.

Parker, 716 F.3d 999, 1008 (7th Cir. 2013). And as for the charge of making a false

statement, the government introduced evidence that Ballentine counseled Claiborne to

make the false statement in order to influence the lender’s decision to extend the loan.

See United States v. Phillips, 731 F.3d 649, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).

Counsel also properly concludes that it would be frivolous to challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence regarding the offenses pertaining to the purchase of 912 W.

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No. 15‐2585    Page 3

86th Place—wire fraud and additional counts of financial institution fraud and making

a false statement to a financial institution. Like Claiborne, the straw buyer, Dina Dunn,

testified that Ballentine represented her at a closing, at which she falsely affirmed in an

occupancy affidavit that she would make the property her primary residence. A rational

jury could infer that Ballentine knew that the statement was false because just three

days earlier he represented Dunn at another closing, at which she had signed another

occupancy affidavit. Also at that closing, Dunn added, Ballentine had hushed her when

she inadvertently mentioned renovating her actual residence, and he told her that, if

anyone asked, she should say that she would be moving into the home she was

purchasing. This evidence supported the conclusion that Ballentine knowingly and

intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud the lender by counseling Dunn to

falsely state her intention to occupy the property, and the parties stipulated that the

lender was an FDIC‐insured institution and that it financed the purchase through an

interstate wire transfer.

Counsel next considers whether Ballentine could challenge the district court’s

calculation of the guidelines range but rightly concludes that any argument would be

frivolous. In its calculation, the court accepted each of Ballentine’s objections to the

presentence report—lowering the loss amount substantially and declining to apply two‐

level adjustments for the use of a special skill and the use of sophisticated means in the

offense. The court properly calculated a guidelines range of 30 to 37 months, based on a

total offense level was 19 (a base offense level of 7 plus a 12‐level increase for the loss of

$341,000), U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1), (b)(1)(G), and a criminal history category of I.

Counsel also considers whether Ballentine could challenge the reasonableness of

his sentence, but properly concludes that such a challenge would be frivolous.

Ballentine received a term of just a single day of imprisonment, and a sentence below

the guidelines range is presumptively reasonable on appeal, see Rita v. United States, 551

U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Purham, 795 F.3d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 2015). Counsel

does not identify any reason to challenge that presumption here, and we perceive none.

And the district court adequately considered the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

addressing, among other things, Ballentine’s lack of criminal history, the deterrent effect

of his likely disbarment, his inexperience as a lawyer at the time of his actions, and his

relatively minimal role in the schemes. See id. § 3553(a)(1), (2).   

Counsel does not mention any of the conditions of supervised release that the

district judge imposed, but these include one condition that we have criticized. The

condition that prohibits Ballentine from leaving the judicial district without permission

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No. 15‐2585    Page 4

may improperly impose strict liability. See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2016). Nevertheless, we have no reason to believe that Ballentine wants to

challenge this condition because counsel did not identify it as a potential issue and

Ballentine—who currently is serving his supervised‐release term—did not respond to

the Anders brief. See United States v. Bryant, 754 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2014). Moreover, if

Ballentine finds the condition to be vague, confusing, or burdensome, he is free to seek

modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). See Brown, 823 F.3d at 395; United States v.

Neal, 810 F.3d 512, 518–20 (7th Cir. 2016).

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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