Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05819/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05819-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mike Knowles
Respondent
Tommy Ray Williams
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMY RAY WILLIAMS, )

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Petitioner, )

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v. )

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MIKE KNOWLES, Warden, )

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Respondent. )

 )

1:03-cv-05819-TAG HC 

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF

PRIOR ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS (Doc. 41)

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION (Doc. 41)

ORDER RE-SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have

consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 2, 2003, Respondent submitted his original Motion to Dismiss the petition

on the grounds it was submitted beyond the one-year statute of limitations. (Doc. 8). The Ninth

Circuit reversed this Court’s granting of that Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case “for

further factual development, and if determined appropriate by the district court, an evidentiary

hearing, to determine (1) whether petitioner satisfied the actual innocence test set forth in Schlup

v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); (2) whether the statute of limitations began to run on August 30,

2001, the date petitioner discovered the factual predicate for his claims; and (3) whether the

statute of limitations should be equitably tolled until August 30, 2001.” (Doc. 23). 

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On April 18, 2005, Respondent filed a renewed Motion to Dismiss, again raising a

purported violation of the one-year statute of limitations. (Doc. 28). In this motion, Respondent

addresses only “actual innocence” under Schlup, and tolling for newly discovered evidence under

sec. 2244(d)(1)(d); Respondent did not address the issue of equitable tolling. (Doc. 28, pp. 5-9). 

On September 27, 2005, Petitioner’s counsel filed her opposition to Respondent’s motion,

supported, inter alia, by a declaration from Petitioner, prison mail logs, and the case log of trial

counsel. (Doc. 37). Respondent filed no Reply.

On March 30, 2006, the Court denied the renewed Motion to Dismiss and ordered

Respondent to file an answer to the petition. (Doc. 40). On April 7, 2006, Respondent filed the

instant Motion for Reconsideration along with a request for oral argument of the issues contained

therein. (Doc. 41). On April 12, 2006, Petitioner filed an opposition to the Motion for

Reconsideration. (Doc. 42). 

DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Reconsideration.

Respondent contends that the Motion for Reconsideration should be granted and the

Motion to Dismiss granted as well because Petitioner’s allegations that he was not in possession

of the information contained in the autopsy report “were in direct opposition to his trial counsel’s

version of the events leading up to Petitioner’s guilty plea.” (Doc. 41-1, p. 3). In support of this

conclusion, Respondent proffers the declaration of Respondent’s attorney, which states that

counsel related the Court’s ruling to trial counsel, Karen Block-Davis, that Davis was “surprised”

and “dismayed” by the Court’s interpretation of her declaration, that she did not “envision that

interpretation at all,” and that Petitioner’s version of events was “a lie.” (Doc. 41-2, p 2). 

Counsel also declares that he was attempting to “synthesize” Davis’ statement into a brief

declaration, and that any ambiguity resulting therefrom was a “drafting error.” (Id.). 

Petitioner’s Opposition contends that the Motion for Reconsideration should be denied

because it neither provides any new evidence, demonstrates an intervening change in the law, or

shows a clear error or manifest injustice. (Doc. 42, p. 2). In the Court’s view, Petitioner is

correct; the Motion for Reconsideration must be denied.

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Local Rule 78-230(k), governing applications for reconsideration, provides that it is

moving counsel’s duty to provide an affidavit or brief setting forth grounds to support the

motion, including “what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did

not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion,”

and “why the facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.” Local Rule

78-230(k)(3) and (4).

Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered

evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is

an intervening change in controlling law. School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v.

ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9 Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the th

“overwhelming weight of authority is that the failure to file documents in an original motion or

opposition does not turn the late filed documents into “newly discovered evidence.” Id.; see

Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473-474 (5 Cir. 1989); Trentacosta v. th

Frontier Pac. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1557 & n. 4 (9 Cir. 1987); Frederick S. Wyle th

Professional Corp. v. Texaco, Inc., 764 F.2d 604, 609 (9 Cir. 1985). th

Here, to the extent that Respondent is complaining that the Court misinterpreted trial

counsel’s declaration, and specifically the word “shared,” or that the Court, in resolving the

controverted issues of fact regarding whether Petitioner had actual knowledge of the cause of

death specified in the autopsy report, erred in finding that Petitioner had established his lack of

knowledge by a preponderance of the evidence, the Motion for Reconsideration does not raise

new issues, but rather re-argues points already addressed by the Court in its Order of March 30,

2006.

To the extent that Respondent claims to now be presenting “new” evidence, i.e., Davis’

“surprise” and “dismay” to the Court’s March 30, 2006, ruling, as related in counsel’s

declaration, such evidence is both insufficient and unpersuasive. It is insufficient because it

Davis’ emotional reactions to the Court’s decision of March 30, 2006, is not probative of

whether the record established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner did not have

actual knowledge of the cause of death at the time of trial. It is also insufficient because, as

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mentioned above, it is not “new” evidence, but rather information that could have, but was not,

presented with the renewed Motion to Dismiss.

The evidence is unpersuasive because it still fails to clarify the central point, i.e.,

precisely what Davis told Petitioner at the time of trial regarding the autopsy report. In this

regard, Respondent had ample opportunity, when filing documents to support the renewed

Motion to Dismiss, to present a full and complete declaration by Davis detailing, to the best of

her recollection, the exact conversation that transpired between her and Petitioner when the

autopsy report was discussed. At that time, Respondent was well-aware that the question of

Petitioner’s actual knowledge of the cause of death was the critical question in determining

whether the equitable tolling provisions of the AEDPA should be applied. A detailed declaration

setting forth explicitly what Respondent is now suggesting implicitly would, conceivably, have

resolved the factual dispute in Respondent’s favor. Indeed, as the parties knew full well, the

matter was on remand from the Ninth Circuit expressly for the purpose of developing the factual

record regarding that critical issue. The Court has never, at any time, indicated any aversion to a

full and complete development of those facts by either side. Inexplicably, however, rather than

proffering a comprehensive and detailed declaration from Davis on the critical factual questions,

Respondent’s counsel chose to present instead an abbreviated and generalized “synthesis” of

Davis’ recollections that, in the Court’s view, was inherently ambiguous and that failed to

resolve the question of Petitioner’s actual knowledge of the autopsy report’s contents.

Furthermore, after the Court issued its March 30, 2006 ruling, Respondent, in the Motion

for Reconsideration, once again had an opportunity to present a detailed declaration from Davis

explaining precisely what she discussed with Petitioner at trial. Once again, however,

Respondent declined to present such evidence to the Court, relying instead on a hearsay

explanation by counsel of Davis’ emotional reactions of “surprise” and “dismay” rather than on

concrete facts that would have supported Respondent’s position. Although Respondent indicated

that such a declaration could be submitted within fifteen days, Respondent’s failure to file such a

seemingly dispositive declaration in either the renewed Motion to Dismiss or in the Motion for

Reconsideration, is fatal to any request for reconsideration. Given the failure of Respondent to

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Respondent also requests that, should the Motion for Reconsideration be denied, the Court should order 1

further factual development of the record in order “to clarify Ms. Davis’ declaration.” A reason for the remand was

for the very purpose of developing the record. Both parties had ample opportunity to develop the record during the

course of the proceedings on the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration. At some point, these

Motions must be resolved and the proceedings must move forward. This case has reached that point. 

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remedy the obvious evidentiary deficits in his position, the Court is now in no position to afford

Respondent relief.

In sum, the Court finds that Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration has failed to offer

any new persuasive evidence that the Court’s denial of the renewed Motion to Dismiss was

incorrect, nor has Respondent provided an adequate explanation for why such evidence was not

presented in the first instance in the renewed Motion to Dismiss, or subsequently, in the Motion

for Reconsideration. In light of these findings, the Court has no alternative but to deny the

Motion for Reconsideration.1

B. Request for Oral Argument.

Respondent has provided no legal basis for the Court to order oral argument regarding the

Motion to Reconsider. Indeed, given the several opportunities Respondent has had to “clarify”

Davis’ declaration and to “develop” the record, it does not appear to the Court that oral argument

would only serve as an opportunity to re-argue arguments already adequately presented in these

proceedings. Accordingly, the Court will deny the request for oral argument.

C. Re-scheduled Briefing.

Because of the time that has transpired since the original March 30, 2006 order, which not

only denied the Motion to Dismiss but established a briefing schedule, the Court will re-schedule

the briefing as indicated below.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 41), is DENIED; 

2. Respondent’s request for oral argument (Doc. 41), is DENIED; and,

3. Respondent SHALL FILE an ANSWER addressing the merits of the Petitioner’s

Petition within NINETY (90) days of the date of service of this order. Rule 4, Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases; Cluchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1473-1474

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(9 Cir. 1985) (court has discretion to fix time for filing an Answer.). th

4. Respondent SHALL INCLUDE with the Answer any and all transcripts or other

documents necessary for the resolution of the issues presented in the Petitioner’s Petition. 

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

5. Any argument by Respondent that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim(s)

SHALL BE MADE in an ANSWER that also addresses the merits of the claims asserted. 

This is to enable the Court to determine whether Petitioner meets an exception to

procedural default. See, Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385, 396 (9 Cir. 1997) (Procedurally th

defaulted claims may be reviewed on the merits to serve the ends of justice); Jones v.

Delo, 56 F.3d 878 (8 Cir. 1995) (the answer to the question that it is more likely than not th

that no reasonable juror fairly considering all the evidence, including the new evidence,

would have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt necessarily requires a

review of the merits). 

6. Petitioner’s TRAVERSE, if any, is due THIRTY (30) days from the date

Respondent’s Answer is filed with the Court. 

7. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to SERVE a copy of this order on the Attorney

General or his representative. 

All motions shall be submitted on the record and briefs filed without oral argument unless

otherwise ordered by the Court. Local Rule 78-230(h). All provisions of Local Rule 11-110 are

applicable to this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 18, 2006 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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