Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02742/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02742-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald T. Talbott
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2742

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

v. * of Nebraska.

*

Donald T. Talbott, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 10, 2005

Filed: May 19, 2005

___________

Before MURPHY, FAGG, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Donald T. Talbott pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possession

with intent to distribute methamphetamine. In the written plea agreement, Talbott

agreed that he “should be held responsible beyond a reasonable doubt for at least 1.5

kilograms but less than 5 kilograms of a substance containing methamphetamine.”

In the agreement, Talbott also admitted “that he possessed a firearm in connection

with the felony offense . . . and that such conduct qualifie[d] him for a two level

upward adjustment to his base offense level.” 

Appellate Case: 04-2742 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/19/2005 Entry ID: 1904580
-2-

Talbott now appeals his sentence arguing that his sentence violates his Sixth

Amendment rights under Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), because the

sentence is based on facts not admitted by him or proven to a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt. We disagree. Blakely states that when a defendant pleads guilty,

the Government is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements if the defendant

stipulates to the relevant facts. Id. at 2541. Because Talbott was sentenced based

solely on facts he admitted as part of his guilty plea, Blakely is not implicated.

United States v. Lucca, 377 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Talbott acknowledges that a defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right

to a jury determination of facts, but contends he did not validly waive the right

because he signed his plea agreement before Blakely clarified the right. At the time

of Talbott’s plea agreement, however, defendants could argue the Sixth Amendment

and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), required a jury to find facts used

to enhance a sentence. Talbott did not do so, and instead chose to plead guilty in

exchange for the Government’s agreement to drop some of the charges against him.

Besides, in the district court, Talbott raised no sentencing issue under Blakely

or United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), so any review would be for plain

error. United States v. Pirani, 2005 WL 1039976, at *3 (8th Cir. May 5, 2005). To

establish plain error, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that but for

the error, he would have received a more favorable sentence. Id. at *6. Talbott has

not tried to make this showing. Thus, there is no plain error under Booker. In any

event, we are satisfied Talbott’s sentence is reasonable. 

Accordingly, we affirm Talbott’s sentence.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-2742 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/19/2005 Entry ID: 1904580