Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02526/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02526-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bekins International Lines, Inc.
Appellee
Larry D. Dennett
Appellant

Document Text:

F 1 LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Unire<l States Co~rt ~f Appeals 

Ttmh Cro.1:.~ 

r~ov 2 J 1989 

LARRY D. DENNETT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

BEKINS INTERNATIONAL LINES, 

INC. 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-2526 

(D.C. No. 87-1584-K) 

(D. Kansas) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, and SETH and McWILLIAMS, Circuit 

Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Larry D. Dennett brought suit against Bekins International 

Lines, Inc. to recover the value of Dennett's household goods damaged while in transit in the possession of Bekins. Bekins filed a 

motion for summary judgment which the district court granted. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2526 Document: 01019989528 Date Filed: 11/20/1989 Page: 1 
Dennett appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing his 

cause of action. 

Dates are important. The district court dismissed Dennett's 

claim on September 1, 1988. On September 12, 1988, Dennett filed 

a motion for reconsideration and amendment of judgment. 

Contemporaneous therewith Dennett also filed a memorandum in 

support of his motion 

On September 23, 1988, Dennett filed a notice of appeal from 

the September 1, 1988 judgment of the district court. As of that 

date the district court had not ruled on Dennett's motion to 

reconsider and amend. It was not until October 13, 1988, that the 

district court denied Dennett's motion to reconsider. Dennett did 

not thereafter file a second notice of appeal. 

After the parties had briefed the appeal on its merits, the 

parties were advised that this court was considering summary 

dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction caused by an absence 

of a notice of appeal. The parties thereafter filed supplemental 

briefs on the jurisdictional issue. We are now convinced that 

this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and accordingly 

we dismiss the appeal. 

Both parties agree that a timely notice of appeal is a 

prerequisite for appellate review. Both parties also agree that a 

notice of appeal filed while a motion to reconsider and amend a 

judgment is pending is a nullity. Dennett agrees that a second 

notice of appeal should have been filed after the district court 

denied his motion for reconsideration. However, Dennett's contention is that his brief in the premature appeal, which was filed in 

-2-

Appellate Case: 88-2526 Document: 01019989528 Date Filed: 11/20/1989 Page: 2 
this court within thirty days after the district court denied the 

motion for reconsideration, was the equivalent of a timely notice 

of appeal. We reject this contention. Such, in our view, -would 

bend the applicable rules completely out of shape. 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) provides that if a timely motion is 

filed in the district court by any party under Rule 50(b), Rule 

52(b), Rule 59(e), or Rule 59(a), the time for appeal shall run 

from the entry of an order denying a new trial or granting or 

denying any other such motion and the rule goes on to declare that 

"a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the 

above motions shall have no effect." In Griggs v. Provident 

Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982), the Supreme Court 

enforced the foregoing rule and held tnat a premature notice of 

appeal is not merely defective, it is a nullity, and it is as 

though no notice of appeal was filed at all. In which 

circumstance, the Supreme Court held that a court of appeals lacks 

jurisdiction to review. See also, Dalton v. First Interstate Bank 

of Denver, 863 F.2d 702 (10th Cir~ 1988) and Allen v. Horinek, 827 

F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Counsel concedes that his notice of appeal was premature 

b~cause of Dennett's pending motion to reconsider and amend. 

Relying on Fed. R. App. P. 3(c), which provides, inter alia, that 

"an appeal shall not be dismissed for informality of form or title 

of the notice of appeal," counsel suggests that his opening brief 

filed in this court within the time he could have filed a notice 

' 

of appeal after the district court denied his motion to reconsider 

and amend should serve as a timely notice of appeal. 

-3-

We reject 

Appellate Case: 88-2526 Document: 01019989528 Date Filed: 11/20/1989 Page: 3 
the suggestion. To hold that a brief filed in a premature appeal 

is the equivalent of a timely notice of appeal would give our 

stamp of approval to what, in our view, would be a bootstrap 

operation in its purest form. 

In support of our dismissal of the appeal, see Munden v. 

Ultra-Alaska Associates, 849 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1988) and Van Wyk 

El Paso Inv. v. Dollar Rent-A-Car Systems, 719 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 

1983). In both cases a notice of appeal was filed at a time when 

a motion enumerated in Rule 4(a)(4) was pending. In both cases 

the Court of Appeals held that such notice was a nullity. In 

Munden the appellant argued that the filing in the Court of 

Appeals of a Civil Appeals Docketing Statement was the equivalent 

of a timely notice of appeal. In Van Wyk, the appellant argued 

that the filing in the Court of Appeals of a "Form of Appearance 

for Counsel," the district court '•s record of filing the transcript 

with the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals' record of receipt 

and filing of transcript, and a letter from the Clerk of the Court 

of Appeals transmitting original record to appellants' counsel 

were the equivalent of a timely notice of appeal. In both cases 

the Ninth and Fifth Circuits respectively rejected these suggestions and dismissed the appeal because of the lack of a timely 

notice of appeal. In Van Wyk the Fifth Circuit spoke as follows: 

3(a) 

Rule 

have 

A liberal construction of the requirements of Rule 

cannot be allowed to nullify the plain provision of 

4(a)(4) that a premature notice of appeal "shall 

no effect." 

Appeal dismissed. 

-4-

Entered for the Court 

Robert H. McWilliams 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-2526 Document: 01019989528 Date Filed: 11/20/1989 Page: 4