Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10116/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10116-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Todd Russell Fries
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TODD RUSSELL FRIES, AKA Todd

Burns,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10116

D.C. No.

4:11-cr-01751-

CKJ-CRP-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 11, 2014

Submission Withdrawn and Deferred February 12, 2014

Resubmitted February 13, 2015

San Francisco, California

Filed March 30, 2015

Before: Richard C. Tallman and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District

Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson

* The Honorable Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the defendant’s convictions and

sentence for using a chemical weapon in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 229(a) and making false statements to the FBI in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

The panel held that the prosecution pursuant to § 229,

which was enacted as part of the Chemical Weapons

Convention Implementation Act of 1998, was within the

federal government’s prosecutorial authority, and that

Congress has the constitutional authority to proscribe the

conduct in which the defendant engaged. The panel wrote

that unlike the defendant in Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct.

2014), the defendant did not engage in purely local criminal

activityresulting in minor injury to a single individual; rather,

his detonation of chlorine bombs requiring the evacuation of

an entire neighborhood had “the potential to cause severe

harm to many people.”

Interpreting the plain language of the statute, the panel

held that the district court properly rejected the defendant’s

requested jury instruction that § 229(c) required the

government to prove that defendant’s criminal act was against

property owned, leased, or used by the United States. The

panel explained that the requested instruction was legally

untenable because § 229(c) states the jurisdictional elements

in the disjunctive. 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 3

The panel held that the district court properly denied the

defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to

a search warrant. The panel wrote that the information

supporting probable cause to search was not stale because it

was based on the defendant’s continuing pattern of criminal

conduct, and that the warrant application sufficiently limited

the agents’ discretion in conducting their search of the

defendant’s residence, computers, and business records.

The panel held that the district court correctly held that

the statements of the defendant’s co-participant were

admissible pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) as coconspirator statements even though the indictment did not

allege a conspiracy count. The panel held that the district

court also acted within its discretion in rejecting the

defendant’s proffered missing evidence instruction as lacking

the requisite legal and factual support.

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that

application of a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 constituted impermissible

double-counting, where the chemical-weapons count and the

false-statement count were properly grouped pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, the enhancement was applied to the

defendant’s conviction for use of chemical weapons, and the

defendant’s conviction for making a false statement did not

fully encompass his obstructive conduct.

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4 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

COUNSEL

Richard C. Bock, Tucson, Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney, District of

Arizona, Robert L. Miskell and Peter D. Sax (argued),

Assistant United States Attorneys, Tucson, Arizona, for

Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Todd Russell Fries (Fries) challenges his

convictions for using a chemical weapon in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 229(a) and making false statements to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1001. Fries contends that Congress exceeded its authority

when it passed 18 U.S.C. § 229(a) to criminally enforce

provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Relatedly,

Fries asserts that the district court erred in rejecting his

proffered jury instruction on the jurisdictional requirements

of 18 U.S.C. § 229(a).

Fries also maintains that the district court erred in denying

his motion to suppress evidence seized at his residence

pursuant to a stale and overbroad search warrant. In addition,

Fries contends that a new trial is warranted because the

district court erred in admitting a co-conspirator’s statements,

and in rejecting his proffered instruction premised on the

FBI’s failure to record the phone call serving as the basis for

the false statements charge.

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 5

Finally, Fries posits that the district court erred in

applying a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction

of justice. We affirm Fries’ convictions and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Indictment

Count One of the second superseding indictment alleged

that Fries:

did knowingly develop, produce, and

otherwise acquire, transfer directly or

indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own,

possess, use, and threaten to use a chemical

weapon, namely a combination of a

chlorinated cyanuric acid and an unknown

reactive chemical component, which when

combined, created airborne toxic chemicals,

including chlorine not intended for peaceful

purposes, protective purposes, unrelated

military purposes or law enforcement

purposes as described in 18 U.S.C. § 229F(7),

by placing a device on the driveway in front

of the garage and on the back porch of [a]

residence . . . [i]n violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 229(a) and 2.

Count Two alleged that Fries “did knowingly and

willfully make false, fraudulent, and fictitious material

statements and representations, in a matter within the

jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation” in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). According to the

indictment, Fries “while impersonating another individual

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6 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

(initials M.F.) called the Federal Bureau of Investigation and

falsely implicated a third person (initials J.C.N.) for the use

of chemical weapons . . . knowing that J.C.N. had no

connection to the offense . . . when, in fact, [Fries] was

responsible for the use of the chemical weapons.”1

B. Pre-Trial Motions

1. Motion To Dismiss Counts One and Two of the

Indictment

Fries sought dismissal of Counts One and Two for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Fries asserted that the federal

government lacked jurisdiction over the alleged conduct

because the requisite interstate commerce nexus was absent. 

Fries also maintained that he had been charged with “a state

court criminal offense, that is miscast as a federal crime. . . .”

The district court rejected Fries’ challenge, holding that

18 U.S.C. § 229 “is constitutional pursuant to the federal

government’s Treaty Power under Article II, § 2 of the

United States Constitution in conjunction with the Necessary

and Proper Clause, Article I, § 8.” (citation omitted).

1 Counts Three and Four charged Fries with the knowing possession of

destructive devices that were not registered in the National Firearms

Registration and Transfer Record in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and

5871. The district court granted Fries’ motion to sever Counts Three and

Four. Fries challenged his conviction on these counts in a separate appeal,

No. 13-10654.

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 7

2. Motion To Suppress

In his motion to suppress evidence seized from his

residence, Fries maintained that the information supporting

the search warrant was impermissibly stale. Fries noted that

he was charged with use of a chemical weapon at the

residence of a former customer on August 2, 2009, and the

search warrant was not sought until May 11, 2011. Fries also

attacked the search warrant as overbroad, because the items

to be seized included all of Fries’ computers and computer

equipment, although Fries was not charged with a computerrelated offense.

According to the search warrant affidavit, prepared by

FBI Special Agent Brian Nowak, Myles and Karen Levine

first encountered Fries when they utilized his company to

resurface their driveway. The Levines were dissatisfied with

the resurfacing and “stopped payment on a check made

payable to Fries in the amount of $200.00.” Thereafter, on

August 2, 2009, the Pima County Sheriff’s Department

received emergency calls reporting a “strong chemical smell”

emanating from a residential area in Tucson, Arizona. 

“Investigators found a large pile of burning, gas emitting

debris in front of the closed garage door at the front of the

Levine’s [sic] home, and a bucket containing burning, oozing

debris on the back patio.” “The two burning devices together

created a very large, thick plume of grayish, white colored

cloud. Spread throughout the front driveway, sidewalk and

walkway leading to the front door was a thick, viscous, slimy

material, which appeared to be a combination of paint and

motor oil, plus foam peanuts.” “Also strewn in the front of

the home were dead animal carcasses including a rabbit, cat,

coyote and numerous woodpeckers.” Offensive graffiti was

painted on the front of the house, including a swastika. “The

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8 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

front door, windows and garage door of the Levine’s [sic]

home were all sealed shut with a foam expanding seal,

thereby preventing the Levine’s [sic] from escaping through

the front of the house.”

Special Agent Nowak conveyed that two days after the

incident, a person purporting to be Michele Fuentes,

contacted the FBI in Tucson professing to have information

about the incident. The individual stated that, when she was

working for the Levines, Mr. Levine asked her “to engage in

sex acts.” She declined the request and informed Mrs.

Levine. She also stated that the Levines failed to pay her for

her cleaning services and that Mrs. Levine threatened to

report her to “Immigration Services.” Upset with the

Levines, Fuentes reportedly informed her cousin Joaquin

Contreras-Navarette about the situation. She described

Joaquin as an extremely violent person, who had admitted

stealing a large amount of chlorine tablets and placing them

in buckets around the Levines’ residence. Although Fuentes

described herself as a Mexican National, she spoke perfect

English without an accent. It also appeared to the agent that

the caller was a man attempting to sound like a female.

According to Special Agent Brian Nowak, “[a] nearly

identical attack occurred [previously] on November 1, 2008.” 

“[M]otor oil, paint, grease, feces, dead animals and foam

packing peanuts had been strewn on the driveway leading up

to the front door of [the Levine] home . . .” That attack also

included offensive and racist graffiti painted on the house and

curb area. “A woman’s wallet, covered with paint, was found

next to the driveway. Inside was a drivers license issued to

Kayln Hovey . . . and other personal items.” When

investigators interviewed Hovey, she identified the drivers’

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 9

license and other items as hers, but not the wallet. Agents

confirmed that Hovey’s wallet was stolen in October, 2005.

Agent Nowak added that on April 28, 2011, an attack

similar to the 2008 and 2009 attacks on the Levines was

perpetrated on another of Fries’ former customers who was

dissatisfied with Fries’ work and refused to pay. Present at

the scene was a small black wallet containing business cards

and a driver’s license. When Agents interviewed the female

whose license was found at the scene, they learned that she

had lost her driver’s license in December, 2010.

Agent Nowak also related that confidential sources had

provided information concerning Fries’ frequent use of a

laptop and his stockpiling of “buckets, used oil, feces and

dead animals at his home for future attacks” similar to those

described in the search warrant affidavit.

Based on the information in his affidavit, Agent Nowak

sought a search warrant for Fries’ residence and for vehicles

that Fries utilized in his business. The items to be seized

included “[a]ny written material that describes how to

produce, make or manufacture bombs, chemical weapons or

destructive devices,” as well as Fries’ computers and

computer equipment. After the search warrant was executed,

Fries filed a motion to suppress the seized evidence.

The magistrate judge recommended denying Fries’

motion to suppress. The magistrate judge concluded that the

information supporting the search warrant was not stale,

because Fries was alleged to have engaged in a continuing

pattern of criminal conduct involving similar incidents of

harassment of former customers. The magistrate judge also

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10 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

determined that the search warrant was not overbroad and

that the good faith exception applied in any event.

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report

and recommendation and denied Fries’ motion to suppress. 

The district court held that the supporting information for the

search warrant was not stale because it was premised on three

similar incidents in which Fries’ “dissatisfied customers . . .

found their homes vandalized,” and “[a] similar modus

operandi was used each time. . . .” The district court

determined that Fries engaged in a pattern of conduct that

continued “until two weeks prior to the date of the search

warrant . . .” The district court also opined that the search

warrant was reasonably specific because it sufficiently

delineated each item to be seized, and that seizure of the

delineated items was supported by probable cause.

C. Trial Testimony and Verdict

Myles Levine testified regarding the details of the

incidents that occurred in 2008 and 2009.

Deputy Sheriff Edward Muszala testified that when he

responded to the 2008 incident, he observed that the driveway

was covered with motor oil and packing peanuts and that

there was graffiti on the curb area. The garage door had

“additional graffiti” including “spray painting, male and

female genitals, plus the swastikas and anarchy sign.” 

Officer Muszala also noticed “a very bad smell of dead

animals, and motor oil . . .” As Officer Muszala approached

the front door, he observed “a pile of dead animals.”

John Bradley, a crime scene specialist, described his

discovery of a paint can that contained three latent

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 11

fingerprints, one of which belonged to Fries. Bradley also

found a driver’s license issued to Kayln Hovey in a wallet

near the Levines’ residence.

As previously noted, although Hovey recognized her

driver’s license, she conveyed that the wallet did not belong

to her. Hovey testified that she was in a car accident in

October, 2005, and that when she was in the hospital, her

wallet went missing from her purse.

Two days after interviewing Hovey, Officer James Paul

described receiving a 911 telephone call from an individual

who identified herself as Hovey. Detective Paul did not

believe that the person was actually Hovey.

Mr. Levine informed the jury that after the 2008 incident,

they moved to a different gated community. On August 2,

2009, Mr. Levine went to sleep at approximately 6:00 p.m.

after receiving kidney dialysis. Mr. Levine was awakened by

his wife “screaming hysterically . . .” The Levines were

unable to “get out the front door” of their residence and called

the police. The Levines were also unable to open their garage

door. After detecting a chemical smell, the Levines exited

their home through the back patio, where they “saw

something burning . . .” Mr. Levine also noticed that the

front of the residence was “on fire.” Mr. Levine was forced

to seek medical attention due to the burning in his eyes and

throat.

Deputy Kenneth Atwell of the Pima County Sheriff’s

Department testified that in 2009 he responded to a “public

hazard call” describing “a chemical pool smell, chlorine smell

in the air . . .” When he approached the area in his vehicle,

Deputy Atwell noticed a strong chemical smell even though

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12 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

the windows of his vehicle were closed. Deputy Atwell

subsequently received “a criminal damage call” at the

Levines’ residence. When Deputy Atwell arrived, he noticed

“graffiti all over the garage, on the walls . . . expanding foam

sealant around the garage, a big bucket, like a chlorine bucket

in the driveway [and] foam peanuts all over the whole front

of the yard and the walkway and everywhere in the front.” 

The bucket in the front driveway was “popping and oozing”

and emitting smoke. When Deputy Atwell went to the back

of the residence, Mrs. Levine opened the back door and

screamed for help. As Deputy Atwell approached a small

fence at the back of the residence, he noticed another bucket

in the backyard that was “oozing and [ ] popping” with “a

little smoke trail . . . very scary looking.” While he was

assisting the Levines over a wall in the back of their

residence, Deputy Atwell observed “a massive grayishyellow-white cloud” near the front of the residence. Deputy

Atwell subsequently donned a gas mask and assisted with

evacuating the entire neighborhood.

Deputy Christopher McCracken of the Pima County

Sheriff’s Department also responded to the 2009 incident. 

Deputy McCracken observed “a very dark cloud” at the front

of the residence that “was increasing in size dramatically.” 

He also noticed that the cloud had covered the entire cul de

sac and that there was a “very strong, chlorine smell.” 

Deputy McCracken donned a gas mask and also assisted in

evacuating the neighborhood. During the evacuation, Deputy

McCracken suffered irritation to his eyes, nose, and throat.

Sergeant Stephen Carpenter of the Pima County Sheriff’s

Department observed “a cloud of an enormous proportion that

basically had enclosed and enveloped [the] whole area” near

the Levines’ residence. From an elevated position, Sergeant

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 13

Carpenter observed that the cloud was “moving slowly” and

spreading into other parts of the neighborhood. When

Sergeant Carpenter approached the area near the Levines’

residence, his “throat started to burn, [his] eyes burned. The

skin on [his] face burned,” and he experienced difficulty

breathing.

Bert Rucker, who was a member of the fire district’s

hazardous material unit, was dispatched to the Levines’

residence. Rucker stopped before reaching the Levines’

home because he observed a dense cloud that “was

approximately 30 feet high, 40 feet wide, and several hundred

feet long, and hanging close to the ground.” Rucker related

that, after he observed on the back porch “a large five-gallon

bucket that was fuming,” his captain “initiated . . . a

HAZMAT alarm” for additional emergency resources,

including a battalion chief, a safety officer, “two or three

more fire engines,” and a “hazardous materials truck . . .”

Levi Cranford, a firefighter, accompanied Rucker to the

Levines’ residence. Cranford observed a chlorine bucket that

was still smoking at the back of the Levines’ home. 

Approximately two hours after being dispatched, Cranford

donned a protective suit that prevented “any exposure . . . to

the outside atmosphere” and entered the back of the Levines’

residence to take samples. Cranford related that his testing

equipment did not register any chlorine readings inside the

house. However, when he entered the garage, the alarms on

his equipment for chlorine gas went off. The alarm “meant

. . . that the environment . . . was higher than the

recommended level that any person should be in outside of a

Level A suit.”

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14 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

Sergeant Christopher Rogers, a bomb technician with the

Pima County Sheriff’s Department, was also dispatched. 

Utilizing a robot with chemical detection equipment, Sergeant

Rogers confirmed the positive reading for chlorine near the

Levines’ garage. According to Sergeant Rogers, the use of a

sealed chlorine bucket intensified the dispersion of chlorine

gas as the bucket exploded. Sergeant Rogers observed that the

“multiple five-gallon containers” had “the great potential to

cause serious physical injury or death.”

Battalion Chief Heath Evans tracked the chemical cloud

and described it as approximately “1,000 feet long, 100 feet

high, and roughly 200 feet deep.” There was no visibility

through the cloud. It was “one big solid mass . . . [that] was

just kind of hanging over the neighborhood.” Chief Evans

tracked the cloud for “roughly an hour” until “it ended up in

the Santa Cruz River about three and a half miles away.”

Dr. Frank Walter, a medical toxicologist and emergency

medical physician, testified that chlorine gas is toxic and

qualifies as a chemical that may be immediately dangerous to

life and health at certain levels.

Detective Alexander Tisch testified that he found a black

day planner near the Levines’ residence. The day planner

contained a driver’s license for Michele Fuentes, business

cards for Debbie’s Cleaning Service, and a check from

Fuentes made out to Karen Levine with a notation “refund

customer unhappy.” Fries’ latent fingerprint was found on

the check.

On August 4, 2009, FBI Agent Jon Edwards, the

complaint duty agent for the FBI’s Tucson office, received an

“unusual phone call” from “a male trying to impersonate a

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 15

female voice.” Although Agent Edwards attempted to record

the call, “[t]he recording volume was turned all the way off

to zero, so the recording was essentially ineffective.” The

caller identified himself as “Michelle [sic] Fuentes” and

stated that he had information concerning the incident at the

Levines’ residence. The caller stated that Mr. Levine had

approached Fuentes in “a sexual manner,” and Mrs. Levine

“threatened to call Immigration” when Fuentes reported Mr.

Levine’s conduct to her. The caller stated that her cousin,

Joaquin Contreras-Navarette, was responsible for the chlorine

attack on the Levines’ residence.

Agent Edwards traced the call to a Tucson hospital. A

nurse at the hospital informed FBI agents that she had noticed

an unauthorized individual on the floor from which the phone

call was made. The FBI agents showed the nurse a

photograph of Fries’ driver’s license and the nurse identified

Fries as the man she saw in the hospital. Fries’ latent

fingerprint was also found on the hospital telephone.

Fuentes testified that, in 2007, her purse was stolen while

she was attending college. The purse contained her driver’s

license, social security card, checks, and a day planner. 

Fuentes related that the check found at the Levines’ residence

was not in her handwriting. Fuentes did not know anyone

with the name “Joaquin Navarette” and she had never worked

for a cleaning service.

Edward Trujillo testified that he worked for Fries from

2006 to 2008. Trujillo related that Fries was “very upset”

when a check from the Levines was cancelled. Fries told

Trujillo that “he wanted to make [the Levines] pay for not

paying him.” According to Trujillo, Fries “started collecting

materials” including motor oil to pour on the Levines’

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16 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

driveway. Fries asked his employees “to defecate in buckets

so he could use it for the Levine’s [sic] driveway, also.” Fries

showed Trujillo “road kill” Fries had collected, including a

coyote. Fries informed Trujillo that “[h]e wanted to pour oil

all over the [Levines’] driveway and . . . spray paint on the

house itself and put dead animals around the windows.” Fries

referred to his plans as “the Levine project.” According to

Trujillo, Fries called the Levines and thanked them for their

payment so the Levines would not suspect him of the

vandalism.

Austreberto Montiel testified that he worked for Fries

from 2006 to 2009. Montiel confirmed that Fries was upset

that the Levines had not fully paid him. Fries asked Montiel

and other workers to collect motor oil and dead animals to

place at the Levines’ residence. Montiel had a conversation

with Dan Jordan about “road kill” and that Fries instructed

Jordan to collect a dead coyote from the road. Fries offered

Montiel $100 to participate in the vandalism at the Levines’

residence, but Montiel declined. Montiel conveyed that

Jordan and Fries discussed vandalizing the Levines’ home on

Halloween night.

After vandalizing the Levines’ home, Fries told Montiel

that he had spray painted the Levines’ residence with

swastikas and “[s]omething about Jews” so that the

appearance of a hate crime would divert the investigation. 

Fries also informed Montiel that he had left someone else’s

identification atthe residence “to throw off the investigation.”

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Fries of

Counts One and Two of the indictment.

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 17

D. Sentencing

The total offense level for Fries’ offense was 34. A twolevel enhancement for obstruction of justice was

recommended because Fries “willfully obstructed or

attempted to obstruct the administration of justice by

impersonating another individual during a telephone call to

authorities about the instant offense, knowing the individual

had no involvement in the matter.” An obstruction of justice

enhancement was also recommended because Fries “willfully

obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede,

the administration of justice with respect to the investigation,

prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of

conviction, and the obstructive conduct related to [Fries’]

offense of conviction and relevant conduct; or a closely

related offense . . .”

Fries objected to imposition of an enhancement for

obstruction of justice. Fries maintained that the enhancement

constituted improper double-counting because the substantive

offense alleged in Count Two of the indictment was also

premised on Fries’ phone call to the FBI.

The district court overruled Fries’ objection to the

obstruction of justice enhancement. The district court held

that the enhancement was warranted irrespective of Fries’

false statement conviction due to Fries’ obstruction of the

investigation.

The district court adopted the presentence report and

calculated a base offense level of 28 and an adjusted offense

level of 34, with a criminal history category of one. The

corresponding Sentencing Guidelines range was 151 to 188

months and the district court sentenced Fries to “151 months

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18 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

on Count 1, and 60 months on Count 2 to run concurrently.” 

Fries filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review de novo the constitutionality of a statute.” 

United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2013)

(citation omitted). “We also review de novo constitutional

challenges to a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss.” 

Id. (citation omitted).

“We review the district court’s denial of a motion to

suppress de novo.” United States v. Arreguin, 735 F.3d 1168,

1174 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “We review the

district court’s factual findings underlying the denial for clear

error . . .” Id. (citation omitted).

“We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion,

though we review de novo the district court’s interpretation

of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” United States v. Kahre,

737 F.3d 554, 565 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and alteration

omitted).

“We review the language and formulation of a jury

instruction for an abuse of discretion. However, when jury

instructions are challenged as misstatements of law, we

review them de novo.” United States v. Cortes, 757 F.3d 850,

857 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended (citations, alteration, and

internal quotation marks omitted).

“We review a district court’s refusal to give an adverse

inference instruction, when properly raised by the appellant,

for abuse of discretion. . . .” United States v. Sivilla, 714 F.3d

1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 19

“We review the district court’s interpretation of the

Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for

clear error. . . .” United States v. Huang, 687 F.3d 1197, 1202

(9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdictional Challenge

Fries contends that the district court erred in denying his

motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of federal

jurisdiction. Fries asserts that the government improperly

applied 18 U.S.C. § 229(a) to Fries’ crimes against another

person’s private property.

2

18 U.S.C. § 229 was enacted as part of the Chemical

Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998. See Bond

v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2083, 2085 (2014). The

Chemical Weapons Convention evolved from a consensus in

the international community after World War Ithat the use of

chemical weapons should be forever banned. See id. at 2083. 

The resulting 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of

chemicals as weapons of war. See id. Unfortunately, the

Geneva Protocol did not curb the use of chemical weapons as

envisioned. Thus, the international community reconvened

 

2

 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 229(a) (1998):

it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly– (1) to

develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or

indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or

use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon; or (2) to

assist or induce, in any way, any person to violate

paragraph (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate

paragraph (1).

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20 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

“to update the Geneva Protocol’s protections and to expand

the prohibition on chemical weapons beyond state actors in

wartime. . . .” Id. at 2084 (citation omitted). Because the

Convention was not self-executing, legislative action was

required to implement the provisions of the Convention in

this country. See United Nations Convention on the

Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and

Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, art. 7(1),

Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800, 810, available at 1993 WL

720503 (“Each State Party shall, in accordance with its

constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to

implement its obligations under this Convention . . .”).

Congress executed the provisions of the Convention by

enacting 18 U.S.C. § 229. As noted by the Supreme Court,

the provisions of § 229 track the Convention provisions. See

Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085. The Convention prohibits each

State Party from developing, producing, acquiring,

stockpiling, retaining, transferring or using chemical

weapons. See Convention, art. 1(1)(a), (b), 32 I.L.M. at 804;

cf. 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1). Chemical weapons are defined in

the Convention as “[t]oxic chemicals and their precursors

. . .” Convention, art. 2(1)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 804; cf. 18 U.S.C.

§ 229F. In turn, a toxic chemical is defined as “[a]ny

chemical which through its chemical action on life processes

can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm

to humans or animals. . . .” See Convention, art. 2(2), 32

I.L.M. at 805; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 229F.

In United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir.

2012), rev’d sub nom. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077

(2014), the Third Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction

under 18 U.S.C. § 229. The defendant, an employee of a

chemical manufacturer, sought revenge upon a romantic rival. 

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 21

See id. Bond acquired “highly toxic chemicals, stealing

10–chlorophenoxarsine from her employer and purchasing

potassium dichromate over the Internet.” Id. “She then

applied those chemicals to [the victim’s] mailbox, car door

handles, and house doorknob. . . .” Id.

Relying on Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), the

Third Circuit rejected Bond’s argument that “neither the

Commerce Clause, nor the Necessary and Proper Clause in

connection with the Treaty Power, could support the

expansive wording of the statute, let alone her

prosecution. . . .” Id. (citation omitted).3 The Third Circuit

observed that it was “bound to take at face value the Supreme

Court’s statement [in Holland] that if the treaty is valid there

can be no dispute about the validity of the statute as a

necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the

Government. . . .” Id. at 162 (citation, alteration, and internal

quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit opined that

“because the [Chemical Weapons] Convention falls

comfortably within the Treaty Power’s traditional subject

matter limitation, the Act is within the constitutional powers

of the federal government under the Necessary and Proper

Clause and the Treaty Power, unless it somehow goes beyond

the Convention. . . .” Id. at 165. The Third Circuit concluded

3

In Holland, the Supreme Court rejected Missouri’s Tenth Amendment

challenge to the federal government’s enforcement of the Migratory Bird

Treaty Act. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 430–31, 435. The Supreme Court

held that “[a]s most of the laws of the United States are carried out within

the States and as many of them deal with matters which in the silence of

such laws the State might regulate, such general grounds are not enough

to support Missouri’s claim.” Id. at 434. “Valid treaties . . . are as binding

within the territorial limits of the States as they are elsewhere throughout

the dominion of the United States. . . .” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

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22 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

that “because the Convention pertains to the proliferation and

use of chemical weapons, which are matters plainly relating

to war and peace, we think it clear that the Convention falls

within the Treaty Power’s core. . . .” Id. at 166 (citation

omitted).

We agree and adopt the Third Circuit’s reasoning in

upholding the constitutionality of § 229. In doing so, we

acknowledge that the Supreme Court, overturning Bond’s

conviction on narrower grounds, did not need to address the

statute’s constitutionality. Because Fries squarely raised the

issue on appeal, and we conclude that the statute applies to

his conduct, we are required to decide the issue of the

statute’s constitutionality.

In Bond, the Supreme Court considered whether § 229

“reaches a purely local crime: an amateur attempt by a jilted

wife to injure her husband’s lover, which ended up causing

only a minor thumb burn readily treated by rinsing with

water. . . .” Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083. The Supreme Court

declined to consider the constitutionality of § 229, but held

that the statute was inapplicable to Bond’s conduct. See id.

at 2087. The Supreme Court observed that “in this curious

case, we can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant

to reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s

expansive language in a way that intrudes on the police power

of the States.” Id. at 2090 (citation and footnote reference

omitted). The Supreme Court explained that “[c]hemical

weapon is the key term that defines the statute’s reach, and it

is defined extremely broadly. But that general definition does

not constitute a clear statement that Congress meant the

statute to reach local criminal conduct.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Instead, “[t]he natural meaning of

chemical weapon takes account of both the particular

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 23

chemicals that the defendant used and the circumstances in

which she used them.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Supreme Court cautioned that, speaking naturally,

Bond’s conduct could not be fairly described as combat. See

id. Indeed, none of the circumstances of the crime, including

the infliction of only “a minor thumb burn” suggested

deployment of a chemical weapon. Id. at 2090–91. The

Court clarified that the chemical compounds “might be

chemical weapons if used, say, to poison a city’s water

supply. But Bond’s crime is worlds apart from such

hypotheticals, and covering it would give the statute a reach

exceeding the ordinary meaning of the words Congress

wrote.” Id. at 2091. The Supreme Court described the Bond

case as “unusual,” and calling for limited analysis. Id. at

2093. The Court concluded that this “exceptional

convergence of factors gives us serious reason to doubt the

Government’s expansive reading of section 229, and calls for

us to interpret the statute more narrowly.” Id.

Notably, the Supreme Court observed that “with the

exception of this unusual case, the Federal Government itself

has not looked to section 229 to reach purely local crimes. 

The Government has identified onlya handful of prosecutions

that have been brought under this section.” Id. at 2092

(citation omitted). “Most of those involved either terrorist

plots or the possession of extremely dangerous substances

with the potential to cause severe harm to many people.” Id.

(citations omitted). Citing specifically to Fries’ prosecution

in which Fries “set off a homemade chlorine bomb in the

victim’s driveway, requiring evacuation of a residential

neighborhood,” the Supreme Court reasoned:

The Federal Government undoubtedly has a

substantial interest in enforcing criminal laws

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24 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

against assassination, terrorism, and acts with

the potential to cause mass suffering. Those

crimes have not traditionally been left

predominantly to the States, and nothing we

have said here will disrupt the Government’s

authority to prosecute such offenses.

Id.

In view of the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of the

government’s authority to prosecute Fries’ criminal conduct

despite its narrow interpretation of § 229, we conclude that

Fries’ conviction is entirely distinguishable from prosecution

of the purely local crime at issue in Bond. See id. at 2087. 

The evidence presented at Fries’ trial belies any notion that

Fries was involved in purely local criminal activity. As

contrasted with the “minor thumb burn readily treated by

rinsing with water” in Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083, Fries’ use of

a chlorine bomb produced a dense chlorine gas cloud

estimated to have been “1,000 feet long, 100 feet high, and

roughly 200 feet deep” that injured several people including

first responders, and required the evacuation of an entire

neighborhood and implementation of HAZMAT procedures. 

Fries’ conduct constituted “possession of extremely

dangerous substances with the potential to cause severe harm

to many people.” Id. at 2092 (citations omitted). Our

conclusion is consistent with Dr. Walter’s testimony that

chlorine gas is toxic and qualifies as a chemical that is

immediately dangerous to life and health. Moreover,

Sergeant Rogers testified that Fries’ utilization of multiple

sealed chlorine containers had “the great potential to cause

serious physical injury or death” based on the intensity of the

explosions and widespread dispersion of chlorine gas. Thus,

the federal prosecution of Fries’ criminal use of chlorine gas

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 25

in violation of § 229 was entirely proper because “[t]he

Federal Government undoubtedly has a substantial interest in

enforcing criminal laws against . . . acts with the potential to

cause mass suffering. . . .” Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2092. Taking

account of the chemicals used by Fries and the circumstances

under which he used them, see id. at 2090, we conclude that

§ 229 applies to Fries’ criminal conduct, and is a

constitutional exercise of congressional authority.

B. Challenged Jury Instruction (18 U.S.C. § 229)

As part and parcel of his jurisdictional challenge, Fries

requested a jury instruction containing a requirement that the

charged criminal act be committed against property owned,

leased, or used by the United States to confer jurisdiction

under § 229(a).

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 229(c):

Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) is within

the jurisdiction of the United States if the

prohibited conduct– (1) takes place in the

United States; (2) takes place outside of the

United States and is committed by a national

of the United States; (3) is committed against

a national of the United States while the

national is outside the United States; or (4) is

committed against any property that is owned,

leased, or used by the United States or by any

department or agency of the United States,

whether the property is within or outside the

United States.

(emphasis added).

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26 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

According to Fries, because only one of the subsections

of § 229(c) applies to property damage, that subsection must

be relied upon to confer jurisdiction over this case. We

disagree. Fries’ requested instruction was legally untenable

because 18 U.S.C. § 229(c) sets forth the jurisdictional

provisions in the disjunctive and the government was not

required to satisfy each jurisdictional clause. See United

States v. Sheldon, 755 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2014)

(holding that “Congress’s use of the word ‘or’ at the

beginning of the final clause indicates that these are three

independent alternatives” and that “[i]n construing a statute,

a court should interpret subsections written in the disjunctive

as setting out separate and distinct alternatives”) (citation

omitted). Fries’ resort to the rule of statutory construction

that a more specific provision controls over a more general

provision does not carry the day. We apply rules of statutory

interpretation only when assistance is needed to tease out the

meaning of ambiguous legislation. See Woods v. Carey,

722 F.3d 1177, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2013). In this case, the

statute is clear and unambiguous, conferringjurisdiction upon

the court if any one of the distinct jurisdictional alternatives

is satisfied. See Sheldon, 755 F.3d at 1050. The district

court, therefore, properly rejected Fries’ requested

instruction.

C. Motion To Suppress

Now that we have determined that § 229 was properly

applied to Fries’ criminal conduct, we address Fries’ motion

to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. 

Fries’ challenge premised on the staleness of the search

warrant is unavailing. “Probable cause for a search requires

a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will

be found in a particular place, based on the totality of the

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 27

circumstances.” United States v. Grant, 682 F.3d 827, 832

(9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). “The most convincing proof that the property was

in the possession of the person or upon the premises at some

remote time in the past will not justify a present invasion of

privacy. . . .” Id. (citation omitted). However, “[i]nformation

underlying a warrant is not stale if there is sufficient basis to

believe, based on a continuing pattern or other good reasons,

that the items to be seized are still on the premises. . . .” 

United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2013)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that Fries’ “continuing pattern” of

vandalizing the homes of former customers militates against

a finding that the information supporting probable cause was

impermissibly stale. Id. Agent Nowak’s affidavit delineated

in great detail the similarities among the three incidents of

vandalism in 2008, 2009, and 2011. Notably, the alleged

modus operandifor each of the incidents was nearlyidentical. 

In particular, each incident involved the use of motor oil,

animal carcasses, and other substances to vandalize the

former customers’ residences, as well as attempts to divert

blame to uninvolved individuals. Although Fries attempts to

distinguish the 2011 incident as an act of vandalism rather

than a federal crime involving the use of chemicals, a pattern

of conduct is readily discerned from consideration of the

related incidents. This continuing pattern of criminal

conduct, as well as the evidence of Fries’ stockpiling of items

for future acts of retribution, supports an inference that Fries

continued to possess items related to ongoing criminal

conduct. See United States v. Crews, 502 F.3d 1130, 1140

(9th Cir. 2007) (“One may infer that equipment acquired to

accomplish a crime will be kept for some period of

time. . . .”) (citation omitted). The search warrant was issued

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28 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

approximately two weeks after the April 28, 2011, incident,

thus further undermining Fries’ staleness argument. See

United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1997)

(underscoring the relationship between the timing of the

relevant conduct and issuance of the warrant).

Fries’ argument that the search warrant was

impermissibly overbroad in permitting a search of Fries’

computers and business records is similarly unpersuasive. 

“The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant particularly

describe both the place to be searched and the person or

things to be seized.” United States v. Smith, 424 F.3d 992,

1004 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation and emphasis omitted). “The

description must be specific enough to enable the person

conducting the search reasonably to identify the things

authorized to be seized. The purpose of the breadth

requirement is to limit the scope of the warrant by the

probable cause on which the warrant is based. . . .” Id.

(citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the search warrant sufficiently circumscribed

the agents’ discretion with respect to Fries’ computers and

records. The search warrant affidavit sufficiently explained

that seizure of Fries’ computers was required because of the

difficulty in analyzing the computers on-site and the potential

for alteration or destruction of the computers’ components. 

According to Agent Nowak, a confidential source revealed

that Fries had “a laptop that he carries with him at all times

and uses frequently” and that Fries “has a computer at his

home that he uses very frequently . . .” Additionally, Agent

Nowak delineated in great detail that Fries’ alleged criminal

conduct and the corresponding probable cause stemmed from

Fries’ harassment of former business customers. See United

States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 29

a search under similar circumstances). As a result, the search

warrant was not impermissibly overbroad. See Kahre,

737 F.3d at 567 (holding that “[t]he search warrant affidavits

furnished probable cause to search for the enumerated

items”).

D. Co-Conspirator Statements

Fries contends that the district court erred in admitting

statements pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) that were

made by Jordan, an employee and co-participant. Fries

argues that the statements were not admissible as non-hearsay

testimonybecause the indictment did not contain a conspiracy

count.

Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (2011) provides:

A statement that meets the following

conditions is not hearsay: The statement is

offered against an opposing party and . . . was

made by the party’s coconspirator during and

in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Contrary to Fries’ assertion, we have held that, under Fed. R.

Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), “[a] coconspirator’s statement is

admissible upon proof that it was made in furtherance of a

conspiracy, notwithstanding the fact that the indictment does

not contain a conspiracy count. The question is merely

whether there was proof of a sufficient concert of action to

show the individuals to have been engaged in a joint

venture. . . .” United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1197

(9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see also United States v.

Gonzalez, 715 F.2d 1411, 1412 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that

“[i]t is clear that statements of a co-defendant are admissible

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30 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

even in the absence of a conspiracy count where there is

independent evidence of a concert of action”) (citations,

alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). Because

the trial testimony reflected that Jordan conspired in Fries’

criminal acts, the district court did not err in admitting the

statements attributable to Jordan as a co-conspirator. See id.

In any event, any error was harmless given the

overwhelming evidence of Fries’ guilt, irrespective of

Jordan’s statements. See United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d

1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying the harmless error

doctrine).4

E. Challenged Jury Instruction (Missing Evidence)

Fries contends that the district court erroneously rejected

his proffered jury instruction premised on the government’s

failure to record the telephone call that prompted the false

statement charge.

Fries proffered the following instruction:

Ladies and gentleman of the jury the phone

call that forms the basis [sic] count two,

which you must consider in your deliberation

was not recorded by the FBI and will not be

available for you during your deliberation.

4 To the extent Fries asserts a Confrontation Clause violation, we are

similarly unpersuaded. See United States v. Grasso, 724 F.3d 1077, 1085

n.9 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting Confrontation Clause challenge because

“[a]lthough the Sixth Amendment limits the admissibility of testimonial

evidence, co-conspirator statements in furtherance of a conspiracy are not

testimonial”) (citations omitted).

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 31

The district court rejected Fries’ proffered instruction because

the case did not involve failure to preserve existing evidence

or the destruction of evidence. However, the district court

permitted Fries to argue that the government’s failure to

record the call resulted in insufficient evidence to convict him

on Count Two.

To warrant a missing evidence instruction, a criminal

defendant must establish that evidence was lost or destroyed

in bad faith, and he suffered prejudice as a result. See United

States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Under this standard, the district court properly rejected Fries’

proffered instruction because no evidence was lost or

destroyed. Instead, the FBI agent merely failed to record the

telephone call. Under Fries’ theory, a similar instruction

would be warranted whenever law enforcement officials

failed to record a statement, or experienced technical

difficulties during a recording session. Fries has failed to

provide any legal support for this proposition and we are

aware of none. Cf. id. (explaining that an instruction

permitting the jury to draw an adverse inference against the

prosecution “usually makes sense only where the evidence

permits a finding of bad faith destruction; ordinarily,

negligent destruction would not support the logical inference

that the evidence was favorable to the defendant”) (citation

omitted) (emphasis in the original).

Fries’ reliance on our decision in Sivilla is misplaced. In

Sivilla, the defendant was charged after cocaine was found in

the jeep he was driving. See Sivilla, 714 F.3d at 1170. Prior

to trial, the district court ordered the government to preserve

the vehicle as evidence. See id. Despite the order, the

vehicle was auctioned and “stripped for parts.” Id. at 1171. 

The defendant had “sought to use his inspection of the Jeep

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32 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

to rebut the prosecution’s argument that he must have known

that the drugs were in the Jeep because of how long and

involved a process it was to remove them from the car. . . .” 

Id. at 1174. We distinguished between dismissal of a case

due to bad faith destruction of evidence and the giving of a

remedial instruction when evidence is destroyed but no bad

faith exists. See id. at 1170. We opined that “[b]ad faith is

the wrong legal standard for a remedial jury instruction. . . .” 

Id. at 1173. Instead, “[c]ourts must balance the quality of the

Government’s conduct against the degree of prejudice to the

accused, where the government bears the burden of justifying

its conduct and the accused of demonstrating prejudice.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under that

standard, we held that a remedial jury instruction was

warranted based on the government’s destruction of evidence

that may have been pivotal to the defense.5See id. at

1173–74.

In stark contrast, Fries’ prosecution did not involve

evidence that was lost or destroyed. Even under our

reasoning in Sivilla, the government’s conduct in failing to

record the telephone call did not warrant a remedial

instruction. The most obvious difference between this case

and Sivilla is that in Sivilla evidence was destroyed in direct

violation of a court order. See id. at 1170–71. In addition,

unlike in this case, Sivilla specified how the destroyed

evidence would have been used by the defense. See id. at

1174. Finally, in Sivilla, because the district court found a

lack of bad faith, it declined to give a remedial instruction,

and it does not appear that Sivilla was allowed to press the

5 The government suggests that Romo-Chavez and Sivilla are in tension

with respect to application of the bad faith standard. We need not resolve

any conflict because Fries’ challenge fails under either standard.

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 33

destruction of evidence point during trial. See id. at 1172–73. 

In this case, Fries was permitted to argue insufficient

evidence due to the failure to record the telephone call. For

these reasons, we are persuaded that the district court

committed no error.

F. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement

Fries asserts that the district court erred in applying a twolevel obstruction of justice enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1 based on Fries’ August 4, 2009, phone call to the FBI

giving false information regarding the attack on the Levines. 

Fries maintains that the district court engaged in

impermissible double-counting because his conduct was also

“charged and punished as a substantive offense.”

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1:

If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or

impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede,

the administration of justice with respect to

the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing

of the instant offense of conviction, and

(2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the

defendant’s offense of conviction and any

relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related

offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (2012).6

“Impermissible double counting occurs when one part of

the Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant’s

 

6

 The 2012 Guidelines Manual was utilized for Fries’ sentencing.

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34 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already

been fully accounted for by application of another part of the

Guidelines.” United States v. Gallegos, 613 F.3d 1211, 1216

(9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “But it is not always

impermissible to enhance . . . the base offense level multiple

times for the same criminal act: It is sometimes authorized

and intended by the Sentencing Guidelines when each

invocation of the behavior serves a unique purpose under the

Guidelines.” Id. (citation, alteration, and internal quotation

marks omitted).

Fries’ base offense level was calculated premised on his

conviction for Count One of the indictment, the chemical

weapons charge. His false statement conviction on Count

Two was grouped with Count One in accordance with

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c). See Application Note 8, U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1 (2012) (“If the defendant is convicted both of an

obstruction offense . . . and an underlying offense (the offense

with respect to which the obstructive conduct occurred), the

count for the obstruction offense will be grouped with the

count for the underlying offense under subsection (c) of

§ 3D1.2 (Groups of Closely Related Counts). The offense

level for that group of closely related counts will be the

offense level for the underlying offense increased by the

2-level adjustment specified by this section, or the offense

level for the obstruction offense, whichever is greater.”).7

7 Although we have not extensively addressed double-counting relative

to an obstruction of justice enhancement, other courts have rejected

analogous challenges. See United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 717

(8th Cir. 2011) (observing that grouping “is designed to prevent doublecounting by ensuring that the obstructive conduct is taken into account

only once: as a two-level adjustment to the base offense level for the

underlying offense, or as the offense level provided for the obstruction

offense itself”) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Fiore,

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 35

Moreover, the obstruction of justice enhancement was not

limited to the false statement offense alleged in Count Two of

the indictment. Rather, the evidence at trial reflected that

Fries’ attempts to obstruct the investigation extended well

beyond the telephone call to the FBI, such as leaving the

identifications of other individuals at the Levines’ residence

to divert attention and thwart the ensuing investigation. 

Because Fries’ conviction for making a false statement did

not fullyencompass his obstructive conduct, the enhancement

was justified. See United States v. Albritton, 622 F.3d 1104,

1108 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Double counting is permissible if

it accounts for more than one type of harm caused by the

defendant’s conduct, or where each enhancement of the

defendant’s sentence serves a unique purpose under the

guidelines.”) (citation omitted); see also United States v.

Cabaccang, 481 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2007) (“There is

. . . nothing wrong with double counting when it is necessary

to make the defendant’s sentence reflect the full extent of the

wrongfulness of his conduct.”) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). The district court, therefore, did

not err in applying the obstruction of justice enhancement.

381 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that “this [grouping] formula

ensures the two-point enhancement does not constitute double-counting

because when closely related counts are grouped under section 3D1.2(c),

the offense level used is that for the most serious counts”) (citation,

alterations, and internal quotationmarks omitted); United States v. Maggi,

44 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the “implication that the

enhancement somehow imposed duplicative punishment for . . .

obstructive conduct. The enhancement is used merely to determine the

applicable Guidelines range”) (citation omitted).

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36 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

IV. CONCLUSION

Taking our cue from the Supreme Court’s decision in

Bond, we conclude that the prosecution of Fries pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 229 was within the federal government’s

prosecutorial authority. We also hold that Congress has the

constitutional authority to proscribe the conduct in which

Fries engaged. Unlike the defendant in Bond, Fries did not

engage in purely local criminal activity resulting in minor

injury to a single individual. Rather, his detonation of

chlorine bombs requiring the evacuation of an entire

neighborhood had “the potential to cause severe harm to

many people.” Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2092 (citation omitted).

Interpreting the plain language of the statute, the district

court properly rejected Fries’ requested jury instruction that

§ 229(c) required the government to prove that Fries’

criminal act was against property owned, leased, or used by

the United States. The requested instruction was legally

untenable because § 229(c) states the jurisdictional elements

in the disjunctive.

The district court properly denied Fries’ motion to

suppress evidence seized as the result of a search warrant. 

The information supporting probable cause to search was not

stale because it was based on Fries’ continuing pattern of

criminal conduct. The search warrant application sufficiently

limited the agents’ discretion in conducting their search of

Fries’ residence, computers, and business records.

Consistent with our precedent, the district court correctly

held that the statements of Fries’ co-participant were

admissible pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) as coconspirator statements even though the indictment did not

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 37

allege a conspiracy count. The district court also acted within

its discretion in rejecting Fries’ proffered missing evidence

instruction as lacking the requisite legal and factual support.

Finally, the district court did not err in applying a twolevel obstruction of justice enhancement because Counts One

and Two were properlygrouped pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2

and the enhancement was applied to Fries’ conviction for use

of chemical weapons. Fries’ conviction for making a false

statement did not fully encompass Fries’ obstructive conduct.

AFFIRMED.

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