Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01347/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01347-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bachow Communications, Inc.
Petitioner
Federal Communications Commission
Respondent
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 1, 2000 Decided February 6, 2001

No. 99-1346

Bachow Communications, Inc., et al.,

Appellants/Petitioners

v.

Federal Communications Commission

and United States of America,

Appellees/Respondents

Columbia Millimeter Communications, L.P., et al.,

Intervenors

Consolidated with

Nos. 99-1347, 99-1360, 99-1361, 99-1362, 99-1363,

99-1364, 99-1365, 99-1391, 99-1392, 99-1393,

99-1394, 99-1533

On Appeals From and Petitions for Review of Orders of the

Federal Communications Commission

---------

Robert L. Corn-Revere argued the cause for appellants/petitioners. With him on the briefs were Catherine E. Stetson,

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Walter H. Sonnenfeldt, Robert J. Keller, Thomas J. Dougherty, Jr., Christa M. Parker, Louis Gurman, and E. Ashton

Johnston. Doane F. Kiechel III entered an appearance.

Pamela L. Smith, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued the cause for appellees/respondents. With

her on the briefs were Christopher J. Wright, General Counsel, Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General Counsel, Joel I.

Klein, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Robert B. Nicholson and Andrea Limmer, Attorneys.

Roberta L. Cook, Counsel, entered an appearance for appellee

Federal Communications Commission.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Sentelle and Randolph,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: The issues in these consolidated

cases center on the Federal Communications Commission's

conversion of its system for awarding licenses in the 39 GHz

(gigahertz) band from a comparative application process to a

public auction. The 39 GHz band, comprising the 38.6 to 40.0

GHz frequencies on the electromagnetic spectrum, appears to

have attracted little commercial interest until the mid-1990s,

when newly developed technology became available. Until

late 1995, the Commission processed non-mutually exclusive

applications (that is, applications having no competition for

the same frequency and territory),1 but resolved mutually

exclusive applications by holding a comparative hearing.

Increased commercial interest in the 39 GHz band rendered the comparative application system impracticable.

From January to November 1995 alone, the Commission

received more than 2,100 applications for licenses. In late

__________

1 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. s 101.45(a) ("the Commission will consider

applications to be mutually exclusive if their conflicts are such that

the grant of one application would effectively preclude by reason of

harmful electrical interference, or other practical reason, the grant

of one or more of the other applications").

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1994 the Commission also received a telecommunications industry association petition for rulemaking. In response to

the petition and the growing number of applications, the

Commission considered changing its method of allocating

licenses and eventually adopted a competitive bidding system.

The Commission commenced the transition on November

13, 1995, by imposing, without notice and opportunity for

comment, an application freeze. See 11 F.C.C.R. 1156 (Nov.

13, 1995). In the course of two Notices of Proposed Rulemaking and two reconsideration orders issued between December 1995 and July 1999, the Commission implemented

interim licensing procedures and disposed of applications still

pending under the comparative application system. It dismissed without prejudice applications that were not filed at

least 30 days before the November 13, 1995, freeze date, or,

in Commission parlance, that were not "ripe." It also dismissed "ripe" applications--those filed at least 30 days before

the freeze date--that were mutually exclusive with other

applications on the freeze date and whose mutual exclusivity

had not been resolved by amendment or voluntary dismissal

by December 15, 1995, the cut-off date for amendments. See

11 F.C.C.R. 4930 (Dec. 15, 1995); 12 F.C.C.R. 2910 (Jan. 17,

1997); 12 F.C.C.R. 18,600 (Nov. 3, 1997); 14 F.C.C.R. 12,428

(July 29, 1999). Conversely, the Commission processed applications filed at least 30 days before November 13, 1995, and

that were not mutually exclusive on that date or that had

their mutual exclusivity resolved by amendment or voluntary

dismissal by December 15, 1995.2

I.

The private parties--the appellants and petitioners--object

to the Commission's dismissal of their pending applications, to

the 30-day ripeness period, and to the amendment cut-off.

They do not contest the application freeze itself or the

Commission's adoption of a competitive bidding system.

__________

2 The Commission made other changes to the licensing system

not relevant to this appeal. For example, it replaced applicantdefined rectangular service areas with Commission-defined geographic areas. See 12 F.C.C.R. at 18,610.

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A. Dismissal of Applications

Once the Commission decided to adopt new licensing rules

for the 39 GHz band, it had to choose the effective date of the

rules and dispose of applications still pending under the old

regime. As appellants see it, the Commission's decision to

dismiss all pending mutually exclusive applications was arbitrary and capricious. Naturally, they hoped to avoid having

to start the application process all over again in a public

auction. We have, however, recognized the Commission's

authority to change license allocation procedures midstream.

See Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1551 (D.C.

Cir. 1987) (upholding change from comparative application

system to lottery); DIRECTV, Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding change from pro rata distribution

policy to competitive bidding).

In deciding to dismiss applications that either did not

satisfy the 30-day ripeness requirement or were mutually

exclusive, the Commission balanced the need to implement

the new regulatory regime against the effect of upsetting the

expectations of appellants and others. We perceive no error

in its resolution of these opposing interests. The Commission

reasonably feared that processing mutually exclusive applications under an antiquated and burdensome comparative application system would diminish the efficiency gains expected

from competitive bidding. See 12 F.C.C.R. at 18,642.

In appellants' view, their side of the balance weighs much

heavier because they obtained rights against prospective competitors who were foreclosed from applying by the Commission's cut-off rules. Under rules existing when appellants

filed, public notice of the filing of the first application for a

given license triggered a 60-day filing window; that is,

competing applicants had to file within 60 days of the public

notice or lose their right to file. See 47 C.F.R.

s 21.31(b)(2)(i) (1995).3 Several applicants for 39 GHz licens-

__________

3 The filing rule also provided a shorter time period, but not less

than 30 days, in cases where the Commission "takes final action on

the previously filed application." 47 C.F.R. s 21.31(b)(2)(ii) (1995).

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es filed more than 60 days before the freeze order, yet saw

their applications dismissed because of mutual exclusivity.

Upon reaching the sixtieth day following public notice of the

first application but before the freeze order, the filing rule

theoretically should have closed the application pool to competing filers, protecting these applications from additional

competition. Appellants complain that the application freeze

and subsequent dismissal of pending mutually exclusive applications defeated the cut-off rule by permitting people who

would have been closed out of applicant pools in the comparative application system to bid for the same licenses in the

public auction.4 In their words, "the Commission's decision

effectively required pending mutually exclusive applicants to

bid against new applicants filing years after the established

cut-off dates." Brief for Appellants at 58.

Appellants claim that McElroy Electronics Corp. v. FCC,

86 F.3d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1996), renders the Commission's

actions arbitrary. See Brief for Appellants at 57-60. In

McElroy, we recognized that "as against latecomers, timely

filers who have diligently complied with the Commission's

requirements have an equitable interest in enforcement of the

cut-off rules." 86 F.3d at 257. That equitable interest arose

in circumstances not present here. The appellants in McElroy filed cellular applications even though the Commission

had not yet formulated rules for those licenses. See id. at

250. The Commission dismissed the applications as premature and later established a one-day filing window. On the

__________

4 We doubt whether 39 GHz licenses in the public auction are

really the same as the licenses in the comparative application

system. As noted previously, the Commission changed the manner

in which it designated service areas for those licenses, in part to

reduce mutual exclusivity problems. See supra note 2; 12 F.C.C.R.

at 18,610. Because an application pool consists of a set of mutually

exclusive applications or chains of mutually exclusive applications,

see 47 C.F.R. s 21.31(b) (1995), licensing changes that alter mutual

exclusivity presumably will also alter application pools. In any

event, we find the Commission's dismissal of pending mutually

exclusive applications lawful regardless of the identity of licenses in

the comparative application and competitive bidding systems.

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filing date, which was approximately five years after the

appellants had filed, 517 applicants filed for the Los Angeles

licenses and 494 filed for the Minneapolis licenses. See id. at

251. The first time McElroy came to this court, we ordered

the Commission to reinstate, nunc pro tunc, the applications

previously dismissed as premature. See McElroy Elec. Corp.

v. FCC, 990 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Commission

then decided that the reinstated applicants would have to

enter a lottery with those who filed under the later one-day

window, reasoning that the public notices announcing appellants' applications did not establish a deadline for competing

applications. See 86 F.3d at 252. We reversed, citing the

Commission's "notice and cut-off procedure under which the

applications at issue ... were filed, [wherein] competing

applicants were entitled to participate in a comparative hearing or lottery only if they filed their applications within 'sixty

(60) days after the date of the public notice listing the first of

the conflicting applications as accepted for filing'." Id. at 253.

The issue was "whether the public notices gave sufficient

notice of [the Commission's acceptance of appellants' applications for filing] to cut off third parties' rights." Id. We

found the public notice sufficient to trigger the 60-day cut-off

period. See id. at 257.

McElroy stands for the proposition that the Commission

must follow its own rules. See, e.g., Reuters Ltd. v. FCC, 781

F.2d 946, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1986). It does not create some

generalized right to exclude competitors. The "equitable

interest" in McElroy was the applicants' interest in the

Commission enforcing its filing and notice rules, not an

interest in preventing the Commission from changing them.

As we have recognized before, the Commission may make

midstream rule adjustments, even though it disrupts expectations and alters the competitive balance among applicants.

See Maxcell, 815 F.2d 1551; DIRECTV, 110 F.3d 816.

Moreover, any interest in enforcement of cut-off rules is

just that--an interest, not a vested right: "timely applicants

have no 'vested right against challenge from untimely competitors,' in the sense of precluding the FCC from ever

granting a cut-off waiver, but they certainly have an equitable

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interest whose weight it is 'manifestly within the Commission's discretion to consider'." Florida Inst. of Tech. v. FCC,

952 F.2d 549, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The Commission's authority to change rules that affect pending applications is bounded

by principles of retroactivity, not by an abstract interest in

excluding competitors. McElroy holds only that if the Commission decides to process timely applications, it generally

may not also process competing applications filed out of time.

The case does not govern the present situation in which the

Commission decides, without violating its rules, not to process

pending mutually exclusive applications at all.5

Even if McElroy stood for all that appellants read into it,

they could not have obtained any "equitable interest" to

immunize their applications against dismissal. The most they

could have obtained is the relief we granted in McElroy--an

order requiring dismissal of applications filed after the cut-off

date. See 86 F.3d at 259. McElroy does not require the

Commission to process all applications pending under an

obsolete license allocation system just because applicants who

were otherwise cut off might re-apply in a new system.6

__________

5 In Title III of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress

amended the Communications Act to include a right to exclude

competitors. See Pub. L. No. 105-33, s 3002(a)(3), 111 Stat. 251,

260 (1997) (codified at 47 U.S.C. s 309(l )). That provision states:

"With respect to competing applications for initial licenses or construction permits for commercial radio or television stations that

were filed with the Commission before July 1, 1997, the Commission

shall (1) have the authority to conduct a competitive bidding proceeding pursuant to subsection (j) to assign such license or permit;

[and] (2) treat the persons filing such applications as the only

persons eligible to be qualified bidders for purposes of such proceeding." 47 U.S.C. s 309(l ). Neither party cited this provision.

In any event, it would not affect our analysis because appellants

have not alleged that the Commission has permitted entities who

did not apply before July 1, 1997, to bid for licenses.

6 We also reject appellants' argument that the Commission departed from its own precedents in dismissing pending applications.

See Brief for Appellants at 62-65. Prior instances in which the

Commission has adopted a new license allocation system yet proUSCA Case #99-1347 Document #574290 Filed: 02/06/2001 Page 7 of 15
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B. The Ripeness Period

The Commission imposed a ripeness period co-extensive

with the time period in which competitors had the right to file

competing applications. The point apparently was to avoid

granting applications under the old system when the time

period for others to file a mutually exclusive application had

not yet expired. The Commission originally used a 60-day

period, representing the period during which prospective

applicants could file competing applications under the Commission's rules. See 47 C.F.R. s 21.31(b) (1995); but see

supra note 3 (contemplating shorter filing period under some

circumstances). It later shortened the period to 30 days,

explaining that "it is our practice to process applications as

soon after the close of the 30-day public notice period as

possible." See 14 F.C.C.R. at 12,430 & 12,449; see also 47

C.F.R. s 101.37(c) (1998) (Commission cannot grant application until 30 days after application appears on public notice).

The Communications Act, with a few exceptions not relevant here, forbids the Commission to grant an application

"earlier than thirty days following issuance of public notice by

the Commission of the acceptance for filing of such applica-

__________

cessed applications pending under the old one rested on different

fact-specific cost/benefits balances the Commission drew under

Maxcell. See 815 F.2d at 1554; Brief for Appellee/Respondents at

20-21. In the wireless cable services order appellants cite, the

Commission expressly premised its decision "on the basis of this

record." 10 F.C.C.R. 9589 (1995) (para. 92). Significantly, that

order involved a small number of pending applications. Id. at para.

89; cf. Kessler v. FCC, 326 F.2d 673, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("Nor do

we dispute the Commission's judgment in this instance that equitable considerations required or at least justified the processing of

pending applications where an analysis showed that they involved

potential grants not so numerous as to frustrate the ends sought in

the rule making proceeding."). Similarly, in the commercial broadcast and ITFS proceedings, the Commission found that "the reopening of filing windows would certainly not expedite the disposition of the pending applications or the commencement of service to

the public, but would produce further delays." 13 F.C.C.R. 15,920

(1998) (para. 108).

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tion or of any substantial amendment thereof." 47 U.S.C.

s 309(b). The Commission reasonably determined that its

ripeness period "will assure fairness to potential applicants

who were precluded by the freeze from filing competing

applications in time to be entitled to comparative consideration." 11 F.C.C.R. at 4989 n.197. Had the Commission

granted applications filed less than 30 days before the freeze

date, it would have denied potential competing applicants the

30-day filing period the Act guarantees them.

The Supreme Court long ago recognized the procedural

rights the Communications Act guarantees to those who file

mutually exclusive applications. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v.

FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), held that the Commission could not

grant one mutually exclusive application without holding the

comparative hearing required by the Communications Act.

See also McElroy, 86 F.3d at 253. In Kessler v. FCC, 326

F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1963), we decided that Ashbacker procedural rights apply also to potential applicants whose applications would have been mutually exclusive but for an application freeze. In Kessler, the Commission froze applications

effective close-of-business on May 10, 1962. Appellants in

that case filed applications between May 11 and June 15,

1962. Some of the late applicants claimed their applications

were mutually exclusive with applications on file. Unlike the

present case, the Commission employed no ripeness period;

it processed all applications pending on the freeze date. We

held that the Commission's refusal to process mutually exclusive applications filed after the freeze but that were otherwise

timely denied those applicants their Ashbacker rights: "those

appellants who tendered applications which are, or become, in

fact mutually exclusive with an application pending on May

11, 1962, or one accepted for filing since that date, are

entitled to participate in a comparative hearing on that application under the Ashbacker case--if any grant is to be

made--and [ ] the Commission may not deprive them of this

right when their applications were timely but were rejected

only because of a temporary freeze on accepting new applications." 326 F.2d at 687-88. We reasoned that "the substantial effect of a contrary view would be not only to freeze the

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acceptance for filing of a timely application but to freeze new

applicants permanently out of a right of substance--the comparative hearing on the pending application to which they are

entitled when their application is timely." Id. at 688.

Kessler's reasoning applies here. Without the ripeness

period, the Commission could have granted applications filed

less than 30 days before the freeze date, abrogating the

Ashbacker rights of prospective applicants who could have

filed timely competing applications but for the freeze. The

ripeness period quite sensibly guarantees that all applications

that are granted were on public notice for the 30 days

required by the Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C.

s 309(b).7

C. The Amendment Cut-Off

The Commission apparently intended the November 13,

1995, freeze to cut off amendments as well as applications.

But the freeze order specified only the latter. See 11

F.C.C.R. 1156. Despite this oversight, the Commission, in

the first Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Order it issued

on December 15, 1995, stated that the November 13 freeze

applied to amendments, except for a limited class of license

modification amendments. See 11 F.C.C.R. at 4988-90. In

its first Reconsideration Order, issued on January 17, 1997,

the Commission changed the cut-off date for amendments of

__________

7 Appellants cite the principle that Ashbacker "applies not to

prospective applicants, but only to parties whose applications have

been declared mutually exclusive." Brief for Appellants at 28

(quoting Reuters Ltd. v. FCC, 781 F.2d 946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).

We have held that not everybody interested in a telecommunications license has a right to a comparative hearing, that the right

inheres in those who actually file timely, mutually exclusive applications. See Reuters, 781 F.2d at 951. But we have also held that

Ashbacker rights inhere in potential applicants whose right to file a

timely competing application is frustrated by a Commission freeze

order. See Kessler, 326 F.2d at 686-88. There is such a class of

potential applicants in this case--those whose timely applications

would be mutually exclusive with applications filed in the 30 days

preceding November 13, 1995--and Ashbacker applies to them.

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right from November 13, 1995, the application freeze date, to

December 15, 1995, the date it promulgated the interim

licensing procedures.8 The Commission recognized that it

was the December 15 order, not the November 13 order, that

"suspended any further action on these amendments." 12

F.C.C.R. at 2918.

The amendment cut-off precluded private resolution of

mutual exclusivity after December 15, 1995. It was no longer

possible for amendments (or, apparently, voluntary dismissals) to cure mutual exclusivity and render an application

eligible for processing under the old regime. Appellants

claim they had a substantive right to cure mutual exclusivity

that may not be abrogated without notice and comment.

Relying on Ashbacker, they insist that "the right of competing

applicants to simultaneous consideration under Ashbacker is a

'right of substance' " and that "equally of substance is an

applicant's right to avoid consolidated treatment and its unintended consequences by means of conflict-resolving minor

amendments and voluntary dismissals." Brief for Appellants

at 46.

The "right to avoid consolidated treatment" finds no support in Ashbacker or any other authorities the appellants

have brought to our attention. The right to amend is no

more substantive than the right to file an application in the

first place, which we have previously held the Commission

may suspend without notice and comment. See Kessler, 326

F.2d at 682; Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 637

(D.C. Cir. 1984). Like the rules governing the filing of

applications, rules permitting (or suspending) amendments

are "rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice"

exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act's notice and

comment requirement. See 5 U.S.C. s 553(b)(A); James V.

Hurson Assocs., Inc. v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 280-82 (D.C.

Cir. 2000); JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 326-28

__________

8 Commission rules at the time defined an amendment of right as

an amendment that "cures a mutually exclusive situation without

creating a new one." 12 F.C.C.R. at 2918; 47 C.F.R. ss 101.29 &

101.45 (1997).

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(D.C. Cir. 1994) (FCC "hard look" rules prohibiting amendment did not require notice and comment: "we conclude that

a license applicant's right to a free shot at amending its

application is not so significant as to have required the FCC

to conduct notice and comment rulemaking, particularly in

light of the Commission's weighty efficiency interests.");

Maxcell, 815 F.2d at 1561 (stating but not deciding that a

"cut-off rule arguably may be understood as an 'interpretive'

rule, a rule of agency 'procedure' or of agency 'practice', any

of which is exempt from the notice and comment requirements").

We also reject appellants' claim that the amendment cut-off

was arbitrary and capricious.9 Appellants' panoply of arguments in this regard reduce to a central premise: refusal to

accept amendments after December 15, 1995, "artificially

preserved mutual exclusivity with respect to [39 GHz] applications, creating the fiction that applications that were mutually exclusive before December 15, 1995, remained so even

after their frequency conflicts had been resolved" in violation

of Ashbacker. Brief for Appellants at 49-50 (emphasis omitted). Appellants read Ashbacker far too broadly.10 In the

__________

9 Contrary to appellants' assertion, the Commission provided a

reasoned basis for its action. The Commission adequately explained that "accepting and processing such amendments would

burden Commission resources and could lead to results inconsistent

with our intent in this proceeding to update the regulatory structure of the 39 GHz band in light of contemporary market conditions." 14 F.C.C.R. at 12,437-38; see also id. at 12,447 (The

Commission "froze new applications for 39 GHz licenses because of

its concern that applications filed under the former rules may not

conform to the technical and service requirements being considered.

For the same reason, it froze certain amendments to pending 39

GHz applications...."); Maxcell, 815 F.2d at 1555 (accepting Commission's efficiency justification for change from comparative application system to lottery).

10 The right to a hearing recognized in Ashbacker applies only in

a comparative application system. See 47 U.S.C. s 309(a) & (e)

(Communications Act hearing provision for applications to be granted on the basis of "public interest, convenience, and necessity"). It

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Court's words: "We only hold that where two bona fide

applications are mutually exclusive the grant of one without a

hearing to both deprives the loser of the opportunity which

Congress chose to give him." Ashbacker, 326 U.S. at 333;

see also Maxcell, 815 F.2d at 1561 ("Ashbacker therefore

simply is irrelevant to a situation where a license applicant

complains that its application was not considered due to a

'regulation' that 'for orderly administration, requires an application ... to be filed within a certain date'."); Reuters, 781

F.2d at 951 (criticizing an attempt to bootstrap a fairness

argument onto Ashbacker's narrow holding). Ashbacker constrains only the grant of mutually exclusive applications; it

does not touch the Commission's authority to dismiss or

suspend amendments of mutually exclusive applications.

II.

Appellants contend that the Commission's treatment of

their applications violated 47 U.S.C. ss 309(j)(6)(E) and

309(j)(7). We hold the former was not violated and the latter

does not apply.

A. Section 309(j)(6)(E)

The Communications Act permits the Commission to adopt

a system of competitive bidding to resolve mutually exclusive

applications subject to "obligations described in paragraph

(6)(E)." 47 U.S.C. s 309(j)(1). Paragraph (6)(E) of subsection 309(j) states that "nothing in [the subsection authorizing

competitive bidding], or in the use of competitive bidding,

shall be construed to relieve the Commission of the obligation

in the public interest to continue to use engineering solutions,

negotiation, threshold qualifications, service regulations, and

other means in order to avoid mutual exclusivity in application and licensing proceedings." 47 U.S.C. s 309(j)(6)(E).

In appellants' view, subsection (j)(6)(E) requires the Commission to permit private resolution of mutual exclusivity.

__________

does not apply when licenses are allocated by lottery or auction.

See 47 U.S.C. s 309(i) & (j); McElroy, 86 F.3d at 253 n.5.

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We think the obligation that provision imposes on the Commission in designing a competitive bidding system is something less than allowing license applicants to file applications

or amend them at will under an obsolete licensing system.

Subsection (j)(6)(E) affirms Congress' view that statutory

competitive bidding authority does not wholesale replace "engineering solutions, negotiation ... and other means" to

avoid mutual exclusivity; it does not, as appellants would

have it, forbid resort to competitive bidding unless no other

means to resolve mutual exclusivity are available. In Benkelman Telephone Co. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 601, 606 (D.C. Cir.

2000), we rejected the argument that the Commission created

"artificial" mutual exclusivity in adopting a competitive bidding system: "having found the policy changes in the public

interest, the Commission was authorized to implement them

without regard to section 309(j)(6)(E)[,] which imposes an

obligation only to minimize mutual exclusivity 'in the public

interest' and 'within the framework of existing policies'."

Orion Communications Ltd. v. FCC, 213 F.3d 761 (D.C. Cir.

2000), also refutes appellants' contention. There we held that

the Commission is not required to allow bidders to use

negotiated settlements to reduce mutual exclusivity; settlements may be " 'other means' of avoiding mutual exclusivity,

but the statute cannot be read to direct the FCC to adopt all

other means available." Id. at 763. As we stated in DIRECTV, "nothing in s 309(j)(6)(E) requires the FCC to adhere to a policy it deems outmoded 'in order to avoid mutual

exclusivity in ... licensing proceedings'; rather, that provision instructs the agency, in order to avoid mutual exclusivity,

to take certain steps, such as the use of an engineering

solution, within the framework of existing policies." 110 F.3d

at 828; see also Orion, 213 F.3d at 763; Benkelman, 220 F.3d

at 605.

B. Section 309(j)(7)

Title 47, U.S.C. s 309(j)(7) restricts consideration of the

public fisc in certain of the Commission's decisions.11 As the

__________

11 Section 309(j)(7)(A) states: "In making a decision pursuant to

section 303(c) of this title to assign a band of frequencies to a use

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introductory clauses of s 309(j)(7)(A) & (B) indicate, the

restriction pertains only to three types of decisions, none of

which is implicated here. The covered decisions concern

assignment of bands of frequencies to classes of stations

under 47 U.S.C. s 303(c), development of alternative payment

methods under 47 U.S.C. s 309(j)(4)(A), and area designations and bandwidth assignments under 47 U.S.C.

s 309(j)(4)(C). Section 309(j)(7) does not restrict the Commission's choice of an overall license allocation mechanism.

* * *

The Commission's dismissal of pending 39 GHz applications, use of a 30-day "ripeness" period, and imposition of an

amendment cut-off date were reasonable and in accordance

with law. We therefore deny the petitions for review and

affirm the Commission's orders.12

So ordered.

__________

for which licenses or permits will be issued pursuant to this

subsection, and in prescribing regulations pursuant to paragraph

4(C) of this subsection, the Commission may not base a finding of

public interest, convenience, and necessity on the expectation of

Federal revenues from the use of a system of competitive bidding

under this subsection." Section 309(j)(7)(B) states: "In prescribing

regulations pursuant to paragraph (4)(A) of this subsection, the

Commission may not base a finding of public interest, convenience,

and necessity solely or predominantly on the expectation of Federal

revenues from the use of a system of competitive bidding under this

subsection."

12 We have considered appellants' other contentions and reject

them.

USCA Case #99-1347 Document #574290 Filed: 02/06/2001 Page 15 of 15