Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01884/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01884-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Curtis T. Ellison
Appellant
Dushan Zatecky
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1884

CURTIS T. ELLISON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DUSHAN ZATECKY,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:12CV597 — James T. Moody, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 11, 2016 — DECIDED APRIL 19, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and WILLIAMS,

Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. A disciplinary officer found inmate Curtis Ellison guilty of possessing heroin at Pendleton 

Correctional Facility in Indiana. The officer punished Ellison 

by stripping him of 90 days’ good-time credit. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Ellison petitioned the district court for collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and 

he now appeals the denial of that petition. Because Ellison 

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was prevented from defending against the accusation that he 

possessed a controlled substance, we vacate the district 

court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.

Correctional Officer Guffey presented Ellison with a 

screening report (the notice given an inmate about an impending disciplinary proceeding) asserting that, slightly 

more than a week earlier, Correctional Officer Bynum had 

confiscated heroin during a search of Ellison’s cell. Ellison 

told Guffey that Bynum (whom Ellison knew) had not 

searched his cell that day. Two unfamiliar guards conducted 

the search, he said, and found nothing. Indeed, although a 

conduct report from Bynum does say that he found heroin in 

cell 10-5D, which is assigned to Ellison, a photo of the heroin 

discovered during the search is labeled “Cell 10-6D.” That 

cell is located on the other side of the building from Ellison. 

He explained to Guffey that Bynum’s conduct report mistakenly attributes to him the heroin found in Cell 10-6D, and 

he asked Guffey to identify the two guards who actually had 

searched his cell that day. He requested in writing that those 

guards, as well as Officer Bynum, appear as witnesses at his 

disciplinary hearing. Ellison also requested the surveillance 

video and the test results for the substance.

According to Ellison, three days after receiving the 

screening report, he recognized and spoke with one of the 

guards who had searched his cell. The guard identified himself as Correctional Officer Dorethery, confirmed that he had 

searched Ellison’s cell on the day in question (but not with 

Officer Bynum), and stated that no contraband had been 

found during the search. Dorethery also said that his name 

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No. 15-1884 3

would have been included in the conduct report as a witness 

if heroin had been found during the search. Dorethery said 

he was willing to provide Ellison with a statement for his 

hearing and recommended contacting Sergeant Easton, his 

supervisor, to obtain a copy of the search log identifying the 

guards who had searched each cell. Ellison wrote to Officer 

Guffey the same day, explaining that he had identified 

Dorethery and wished to use his testimony and the search 

log to show that Bynum had found the heroin in Cell 10-6D, 

as noted on the photo of the contraband.

No witnesses showed at Ellison’s hearing the following 

day. Not even Officer Bynum was present, even though Ellison had requested him by name at screening and he presumably could have addressed the discrepancy between Ellison’s cell number included in the conduct report and a different inmate’s cell number on the photo of the heroin. The 

hearing officer refused to call Officer Dorethery because, Ellison was told, his request had not been made at screening 

(this despite the fact that Ellison had been explicit at screening that he wanted to call as witnesses “the officers who 

shook down the cell” and had notified Officer Guffey 

promptly upon learning Dorethery’s name). No explanation 

was given for the hearing officer’s failure to call Bynum. Ellison was not permitted to watch the video of the search, and 

though the hearing officer viewed the video herself, she 

simply noted in her written decision, “Ofc. seen going into 

Ofds. cell,” without naming the guard in the video or even 

saying she would recognize Bynum if it was him. At the 

hearing Ellison testified that he had never used drugs, emphasized that the cell number written on the photo shows 

that the heroin was found in a different inmate’s cell, and 

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characterized the contradictory conduct report as a case of 

“clear human error.” The hearing officer still found Ellison 

guilty.

In the district court Ellison claimed that he was denied 

due process because, he argued, the evidence of guilt was 

inadequate, the disciplinary hearing was not conducted fairly, and the evidence that the seized substance was heroin (an 

e-mail to Officer Guffey from “Tom Francum” saying that 

the substance had tested positive) was unreliable. Ellison 

elaborated that he had identified Officer Dorethery and requested both Dorethery’s testimony and the search log in 

advance, and that the evidence he requested had been essential to show that the photograph, not Officer Bynum’s later 

conduct report, correctly identifies the cell where the heroin 

was found. But the district judge understood Ellison to be 

challenging only the sufficiency of the evidence on which the 

hearing officer relied, and denied the § 2254 petition. The 

court reasoned that, although “there was contradictory evidence presented at his hearing, there is no indication that the 

decision was arbitrary.” The conduct report, the court continued, provided some evidence on which to sustain the 

finding of guilt.

As an initial matter, we agree with Ellison that the district court read his petition too narrowly. True enough, the

petition and Ellison’s supporting memorandum do focus, as 

far as legal theories, on the sufficiency of the evidence generally and the reliability of the particular proof used to establish that the substance was heroin. But Ellison’s detailed factual allegations confirm his pursuit of the claim that he was 

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No. 15-1884 5

denied due process by the hearing officer’s refusal to allow 

him to present evidence. The respondent (despite now contending otherwise) understood Ellison’s petition to include a 

claim about the hearing officer’s restrictions on presenting 

evidence and defended that claim on the merits. In the district court the respondent never suggested, as he argues 

now, that Ellison procedurally defaulted this claim, so that 

defense has been waived. See Buggs v. United States, 153 F.3d 

439, 444 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. DeRobertis, 798 F.2d 

1062, 1066 (7th Cir. 1986). Indeed, in reply to the respondent’s opposition, Ellison confirmed that the respondent had 

correctly understood him to be complaining about the restrictions on his presentation of evidence. That is our reading of the petition as well. 

Indiana prisoners have a liberty interest in earned goodtime credits and must be afforded due process before those 

credits may be taken away. See Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 

922, 924 (7th Cir. 2002); Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 

641, 644–45 (7th Cir. 2001). Although inmates are not entitled 

to the “full panoply of rights” due a defendant in a criminal 

proceeding, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 566 (1974), 

they must be allowed to present relevant evidence, including 

witness testimony, unless it is cumulative or unduly threatens the security of the facility. See Piggie, 277 F.3d at 925; 

Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 315–19 (7th Cir. 1992); Miller v. 

Duckworth, 963 F.2d 1002, 1004–05 (7th Cir. 1992). Moreover, 

a hearing officer cannot refuse to consider an inmate’s evidence simply because other evidence supports a finding of 

guilt.

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The issue here is not whether Officer Bynum’s conduct 

report provided a sufficient basis to find Ellison guilty, since 

a hearing officer’s decision need only rest on “some evidence” logically supporting it and demonstrating that the 

result is not arbitrary. See Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. 

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 

652 (7th Cir. 2000). But when a prisoner contends that he was 

denied access to evidence necessary to defend against a disciplinary charge, his claim is properly understood as “one of 

procedural due process rather than sufficiency of the evidence.” Viens v. McDaniel, 871 F.2d 1328, 1336 n.2 (7th Cir. 

1989). 

Ellison was entitled to present evidence refuting Officer Bynum’s conduct report, and given the conflict between 

that report and the location of the heroin identified on the 

photo, the hearing officer’s refusal to permit Ellison to exercise that right is particularly troubling. See Pannell v. 

McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 2002); Meeks v. McBride, 

81 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996). The hearing officer could not 

have known whether Officer Bynum erred in labeling the 

photo or the conduct report, and that is precisely why Ellison’s explicit request to have Bynum present at the hearing 

should have been honored. Ellison also was entitled to have 

his written request to call Officer Dorethery honored; testimony from Dorethery that he searched Ellison’s cell with 

help from a guard other than Bynum would have directly 

undermined the validity of the conduct report. See Meeks, 

81 F.3d at 720.

The hearing officer’s treatment of the video is equally 

problematic: Her cursory statement that the video shows 

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No. 15-1884 7

an officer entering Ellison’s cell misses the point, because unless it is Officer Bynum seen in the video going into Ellison’s 

cell, the disciplinary case against Ellison falls apart. Given 

these errors—along with the respondent’s failure to offer 

any explanation for the conflicting evidence or challenge Ellison’s version of events—we conclude that Ellison was denied due process.

Because remand is necessary to correct these errors, we 

need not address Ellison’s final challenge regarding the reliability of the test results identifying the substance as heroin. 

We note, however, that the record contains nothing more 

than an e-mail to the hearing officer stating that the substance “did test positive” with no information about who 

performed the test, the type of test which was used, or the 

chain of custody. Administrative decisions resting on chemical analysis typically require both the test results and a chain 

of custody linking those results to the particular prisoner. 

Webb, 224 F.3d at 652–53. Perhaps chemical testing would’ve 

been superfluous had Officer Bynum testified that, based on 

his training and experience, he recognized the substance as 

heroin, United States v. Sapanaw, 366 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 

2004), but given that he didn’t testify, Ellison was essentially 

required to accept the hearing officer’s word that the substance was actually tested.

Ellison is entitled to a disciplinary hearing comporting 

with Wolff or else his good time must be restored. Accordingly, the district court’s decision is VACATED, and the case 

is REMANDED for further proceedings.

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