Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01796/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01796-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nancy Alcantar
Respondent
Michael Chertoff
Respondent
Alberto Gonzales
Respondent
Samih Hussein Zabadi
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMIH HUSSEIN ZABADI,

Petitioner,

 v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, in his Official

Capacity, Secretary, Department of

Homeland Security; ALBERTO

GONZALES, in his Official Capacity,

Attorney General, Department of Justice;

and NANCY ALCANTAR, Field Office

Director, San Francisco, CALIFORNIA,

United States Bureau of Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, 

Respondents. /

No. C 05-01796 WHA

ORDER GRANTING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

In this petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner Samih Hussein Zabadi challenges

the lawfulness of his detention by the Department of Homeland Security pending the outcome

of his deportation proceedings. Petitioner asserts that he is currently being detained in violation

of the federal Due Process Clause by virtue of the automatic stay of his bail pursuant to

8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(2). This order agrees, and the petition is GRANTED.

* * *

The issue presented is whether 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(2) violates the Due Process Clause

of the Fifth Amendment and/or is ultra vires. This order finds 8 C.F.R. 1003(i)(2)

unconstitutional because the regulation invoked by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Case 3:05-cv-01796-WHA Document 21 Filed 06/17/05 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Enforcement (BICE) for an automatic stay of Immigration Judge Dana L. Marks’ bond decision

violates both petitioner’s substantive and procedural due process rights under the

Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, this order finds the regulation ultra vires because it eliminates

the discretionary authority of immigration judges to determine whether an individual may be

released, thereby exceeding the authority bestowed upon BICE by Congress under Chapter

236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1226(a). See Morales-Izquierdo v.

Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 2004).

The following decisions have held the automatic-stay regulation unconstitutional: 

Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d

662, 668–75 (D.N.J. 2003); Uritsky v. Ridge, 286 F. Supp. 2d 842, 846–47 (E.D. Mich. 2003);

Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446, 450 (D. Conn. 2003); and Altamonte-Vargas v.

Elwood, 2002 WL 1471555 (E.D. Prior art. June 28, 2002). The government has appealed none

of these decisions. 

 Other decisions found the automatic-stay regulation constitutional: Pisciotta v.

Ashcroft, 311 F. Supp. 2d 445 (D.N.J. 2004); Marin v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-675 (D.N.J.

Mar. 17, 2004); Perez-Cortez v. Maurer, No. 03-–2244 (D. Colo. Nov. 20, 2003);

Inthathirath v. Maurer, No. 03-–2245 (D. Colo. Nov. 20, 2003); and Alameh v. Ashcroft,

No. 03-6205 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2004). 

The Court agrees with the reasoning of Judge Jeffrey White of the Northern District of

California in Zavala and disagrees with the court in Pisciotta. The Pisciotta court was under

the misimpression that 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(2) provides a finite time frame in which the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) must resolve a case. See Pisciotta, 311 F. Supp. 2d at

455. Pisciotta mistakenly found that “the BIA has a 90 or 180 day deadline by which it must

resolve the case” (ibid. emphasis added). The 90– or 180–day period in fact provides the

government only with a guideline by which it should resolve a case. Likewise, the Marin and

Alameh courts were mistakenly under the impression that the automatic-stay regulation

provides a definite termination point. See Marin, No. 04-CV-675 at 3; Alameh, No. 03-6205 at

21. Perez-Cortez and Inthathirath provided no analysis. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In addition to what was said earlier and the reasoning set forth in Zavala, the order

addresses the government’s arguments below.

First, this order rejects the government’s argument that 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(2) does not

violate substantive due process because the government is not required to employ the least

burdensome means to accomplish its goal pursuant to Kim. This order acknowledges that Kim’s

holding provides that the government need not apply the least restrictive means when dealing

with deportable aliens. Insisting on some outside time limit is not the same as insisting on the

least restrictive means. In this Court’s view, for example, the present regulation would be

constitutional if detention at the behest of the prosecutor was limited to a period short enough,

such as a week, perhaps more, to allow the prosecutor to seek emergency relief under 8 C.F.R.

1003.19(i)(1).

Second, the government argument argues that 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(2) does not violate

procedural due process because the IJ is a delegate of the Attorney General who has decided by

regulation that additional safeguards may be necessary to protect the public from potentially

dangerous aliens. Here the prosecutor who argued to IJ Marks that Zabadi should be detained is

the same individual who determined that Zabadi’s bond determination should be automatically

stayed pursuant to Section 1003.19(i)(2). This procedure impermissibly merges the functions of

adjudicator and prosecutor. See Marcello v. Bonds, 39 U.S. 302, 305-06 (1955). 

Third, this order disagrees with the government’s assertion that the implementation of

Section 1003.19(i)(2) does not run a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation. The government

contends that the limited duration of detainment and the opportunity to fully brief arguments in

support of the IJ’s decision to the BIA significantly reduces deprivation of liberty (Opp. 17). 

Nonetheless, the order agrees with Zavala that the ability of the government to overturn or

nullify an IJ’s bail determination pending appeal without having to make a showing creates a

risk of erroneous deprivation of the liberty interest (Zavala, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1078).

Fourth, this order rejects the government’s argument that holding Section 1003.19(i)(2)

invalid will effectively bar United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement in immigration

cases proceeding on the West Coast, “from filing a stay request due [sic] the time difference and

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United States District Court

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this significantly increases the period during which the alien may be released” (Chertoff Opp.

17). The government has presented no authority for this argument. Moreover, the Zavala court

considered, but rejected the government’s safety concerns, noting that the government may still

seek an emergency stay under 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(1) (Zavala, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1079).

Fifth, regarding the ultra vires issue, the government asserts that 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(2)

creates no new class of mandatory detention and is therefore not invalid. The government

argues that the Immigration and Nationality Act places no limits on the Attorney General’s and

the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security’s authority to make discretionary

judgments with respect to whether an alien may be detained for the BIA to review a bond

appeal. Zabadi, however, is not challenging the Attorney General’s and Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security’s discretionary authority. Rather, he is arguing that 8 C.F.R.

1003.19(i)(2) is ultra vires because Congress requires only certain immigrants, those falling

under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), to be subject to mandatory detention and places all other immigrants

under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), entitling them to an individualized bond determination by the

immigration court. Because Zabadi falls under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), the automatic-stay regulation

in his case deprives the immigration court of its congressionally-conferred power to determine

bond, and is therefore ultra vires. 

* * *

On a completely different point, the government argues that the Court must dismiss the

habeas petition because Zabadi has not named the proper respondent. Specifically, the

government contends that because Zabadi is in the custody of the Santa Clara County Jail, as a

contract facility with respondents, the only proper respondent in this habeas petition is the

warden of that facility, Captain Toby Wong, a county employee (Opp. 7; Reply 14–15). This

order finds that the proper custodians were named in accordance with Rumsfeld v. Padilla,

124 S. Ct. 2711, 2718 (2004). Padilla found that “the default rule is that the proper respondent

is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held” (ibid.), but “left open” the issue of

proper respondent when a habeas petition is filed by an alien detained pending deportation. The

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key is that one district director has been named. There is no risk of forum shopping. The

district director has full authority to direct the local warden to release petitioner. 

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the instant petition for habeas corpus relief is GRANTED. 

This order adopts the reasoning set forth in Zavala v. Ridge. Accordingly, this Court finds the

automatic-stay provision 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(2) unconstitutional. This ruling does not leave the

government without an administrative remedy. The government may still seek emergency-stay

relief under 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(1). 

This Court therefore VACATES the automatic stay of IJ Mark’s bail determination dated

April 25, 2005. The automatic stay will be dissolved effective Friday, June 24, 2005 at

12:00 p.m. This one-week stay of this order will afford the government an opportunity to seek

from the BIA an emergency stay under 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(1). Alternatively, the government

may appeal to the Ninth Circuit. If the government does not obtain an emergency stay by

Friday, June 24, 2005, respondents are ORDERED to release petitioner immediately upon the

posting of the $2,500 bond set forth by Judge Marks. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 17, 2005. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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