Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-15766/USCOURTS-ca11-15-15766-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William V. May
Appellant
Kevin Sasser
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-15766

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cv-00256-MCR-CJK

WILLIAM V. MAY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KEVIN SASSER,

Defendant-Appellee,

DESTIN FIRE CONTROL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(November 15, 2016)

USCA11 Case: 15-15766 Date Filed: 11/15/2016 Page: 1 of 5
2

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

After termination as a firefighter in the Destin Fire Control District, William 

V. May sued both the fire district and Kevin Sasser, chief of the district. Arguing 

that the defendants retaliated against him for statements he made during a public 

meeting hosted by the Board of Fire Commissioners, May sued under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 alleging a violation of the First Amendment. On appeal, May argues that 

the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Sasser and the 

fire district. We affirm the summary judgment for Sasser and against May. 

However, because the district court dismissed the complaint without resolving the 

action against the fire district, we affirm in part and remand in part.

I.

We review de novo a grant of a motion for summary judgment, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. B/E 

Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is 

appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

The First Amendment prohibits a public employer from retaliating against 

an employee for exercising his protected free speech rights. Bryson v. City of 

Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989). “In cases where [a public 

employer] denies discharging the employee because of speech,” we apply a 

USCA11 Case: 15-15766 Date Filed: 11/15/2016 Page: 2 of 5
3

“four-stage analysis.” Id. In the first stage of the analysis, we consider “whether 

the employee’s speech may be ‘fairly characterized as constituting speech on a 

matter of public concern.’” Carter v. City of Melbourne, 731 F.3d 1161, 1168 

(11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Bryson, 888 F.2d at 1565). 

A de novo review of the record reveals that, even before May spoke at the 

public meeting, the defendants planned to terminate six firefighters, including 

May, who lacked seniority. More importantly, May spoke at the meeting because

he feared termination, and his comments concerned the prospect of his termination. 

Consequently, May’s speech concerned a personal employment matter, and cannot 

“be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.” 

See Bryson, 888 F.2d at 1565 (internal quotation marks omitted). A “public 

employee may not transform a personal grievance into a matter of public concern 

by invoking a supposed popular interest in the way public institutions are run.” 

Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting 

Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir. 1986)). Because May fails the 

first stage of the “four-stage analysis,” we need not consider the remaining stages.

1

 1 May argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration based 

on newly discovered evidence that another firefighter, Donald Watson, was not terminated in 

spite of “substantially more egregious behavior.” This argument assumes that May wins the 

third stage of the “four-stage analysis”—that “the employee’s speech played a ‘substantial part’ 

in the government’s decision to demote or discharge the employee.” Bryson, 888 F.2d at 1565. 

Because May fails the first stage, we need not consider the remaining stages and decline to 

assume May’s success on the third stage.

USCA11 Case: 15-15766 Date Filed: 11/15/2016 Page: 3 of 5
4

See Carter, 731 F.3d at 1168. We affirm the summary judgment for Sasser and 

against May.

II.

In a footnote in the order granting summary judgment for Sasser, the district 

court implied that the complaint fails to state a claim against the fire district 

because the complaint contains no claim “that a policy or custom of the [fire 

district] caused [May] harm.” Then, instead of sua sponte dismissing the action 

against the fire district or requiring May to amend the complaint,2 the district court 

determined that May intended to sue only Sasser and not the fire district. The 

footnote justifies this determination by noting that May sued Sasser in both his 

individual and official capacities and by stating, “An official-capacity suit is no 

more than a suit against the governmental entity.”

May failed to realize that the district court had used the “policy or custom”

argument to extinguish his action against the fire district. Instead, he mistakenly 

believed that in the footnote the district court criticized him for failing to assert the

argument against Sasser in his official capacity. Moving for reconsideration of the 

 

Also, May argues that the district court erred in concluding that Sasser is entitled to 

qualified immunity. Because we determine that May fails in his claim under the First 

Amendment, we need not consider whether Sasser is entitled to qualified immunity, an inquiry 

that involves a determination of whether Sasser’s conduct violated “clearly established statutory 

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Maggio v. Sipple, 

211 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2 Also, the district court failed to discuss whether May can sue a fire district rather than 

the municipality within which the fire district is located.

USCA11 Case: 15-15766 Date Filed: 11/15/2016 Page: 4 of 5
5

order that contains the footnote, May argued for an opportunity to assert that 

argument. The district court declined to clarify the footnote and denied the motion 

for reconsideration. Citing the footnote, May on appeal argues that “the district 

court erred by dismissing defendant in his official capacity.”

The plaintiff is the master of the complaint. And the complaint names both 

Sasser and the fire district as defendants. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 

482 U.S. 386, 394–95, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2431 (1987) (“It is true that 

respondents . . . could have brought suit under § 301. As masters of the complaint, 

however, they chose not to do so.”). The district court cannot assume knowledge 

of May’s intention in naming the fire district as a defendant and must either 

dismiss the action against the fire district for failure to state a claim or offer May 

an opportunity to amend the complaint. Therefore, we vacate the summary 

judgment as to the fire district and remand for reconsideration.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART.

USCA11 Case: 15-15766 Date Filed: 11/15/2016 Page: 5 of 5