Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-00737/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-00737-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
Defendant
Eric Dippel
Defendant
Lisa Dippel
Defendant
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
Defendant
Quality Loan Service Corporation
Defendant
Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.
Defendant
Yvonne Zivanic
Plaintiff

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United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

YVONNE ZIVANIC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, F.A.; ERIC 

DIPPEL; LISA DIPPEL; JPMORGAN 

CHASE BANK, N.A.; DEUTSCHE BANK 

NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY; QUALITY 

LOAN SERVICE CORPORATION; and DOES 

1-50, inclusive, 

Defendants. 

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Case No. 10-737 SC 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

REMAND

I. INTRODUCTION

 Now before the Court is a Motion to Remand and Request for 

Attorney's Fees and Costs ("Motion to Remand") filed by Plaintiff 

Yvonne Zivanic ("Plaintiff" or "Zivanic"). Docket No. 8.1

 

Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPMorgan"), and Deutsche 

Bank ("Deutsche") filed an Opposition. Docket No. 14. Plaintiff 

did not file a Reply. For the reasons described below, the Court 

DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and DENIES Plaintiff's request 

 

1

 Zivanic submitted the Motion to Remand twice. Docket Nos. 8, 9. 

Because the second docket entry appears to contain only a new cover 

page (appending the word "AMENDED" to the title of the motion, and 

listing a different hearing date), and a handful of seemingly 

random pages from the earlier docket entry, the Court will refer 

only to the first docket entry (Docket No. 8) in this Order. 

Case 3:10-cv-00737-SC Document 17 Filed 05/07/10 Page 1 of 7
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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

for attorney's fees. 

II. BACKGROUND

 By this action, Zivanic challenges alleged misconduct that 

took place during the origination of a housing loan that she used 

to purchase her current home, during her subsequent efforts to 

modify that loan, and during the procedures that lead to the recent 

foreclosure of her home. See Docket No. 1 ("Notice of Removal") 

Ex. 1 ("Compl."). 

 Zivanic claims that in late 2004, she and her husband began 

working with Defendants Eric Dippel and Lisa Dippel, who were 

allegedly employed as brokers/salespersons by Defendant Washington 

Mutual Bank, F.A. ("WaMu"). Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 16-17. The Dippels were 

assisting Zivanic in securing finance for the purchase of her 

current house, which is located in Santa Clara County, California. 

Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. Zivanic and her husband received a loan for $885,000 

pursuant to a Deed of Trust. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. According to the 

Complaint, the Dippels "led Plaintiff and her husband to believe 

that she would be approved for a loan with certain terms. However, 

the NOTE contained a higher interest rate than what had been 

originally represented to Plaintiff, wrapped unearned fees into 

Plaintiff's monthly mortgage payment, and contained other less 

favorable terms." Id. ¶ 22. Zivanic also complains that she and 

her husband should have never been approved for the loan, because 

they would be unable to afford the fully amortized payment rates. 

Id. ¶ 23. The Deed of Trust originally named WaMu as the lender 

and beneficiary, and California Reconveyance Company was named as 

the trustee. Id. Ex. A ("DoT") at 1. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

 In early 2008, Zivanic and her husband began experiencing 

difficulties making their monthly loan payments, and "they began to 

talk to WAMU representatives regarding forbearance." Compl. ¶ 29. 

However, Defendants began taking measures to foreclose upon 

Plaintiff's residence. By an "Assignment of Deed of Trust" dated 

July 1, 2008 (and recorded on August 15, 2008), WaMu assigned the 

Deed of Trust to "DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE 

FOR WAMU 05-AR6 G2." Id. Ex. E ("DoT Assignment") at 1. By a 

"Substitution of Trustee" dated July 1, 2008 (and recorded on 

August 27, 2008), Deutsche then designated Defendant Quality Loan 

Services Corporation ("Quality") as the trustee. Compl. Ex. F 

("Substitution of Trustee") at 5-6. On the following day, July 2, 

2008, Quality filed a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under 

Deed of Trust ("Notice of Default") with the recorder for the 

County of Santa Clara. Compl. ¶ 30, Ex. D. 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant JPMorgan assumed the WaMu's 

assets and liability when WaMu went bankrupt in September of 2008. 

Compl. ¶ 33. In October of 2008, Zivanic and her husband 

contracted with Amerivest "to assist in negotiating a forbearance 

plan with WAMU," and on November 19, 2008, she was informed by 

Gwendolyn Smith "of WMU's Loss Mitigation Department" that they had 

been approved for a "Special Forbearance Agreement" ("SFA"). Id.

¶ 37, Ex. H. Zivanic and her husband signed the SFA, which 

required a program entrance fee as well as three debt reduction 

payments scheduled to take place in late 2008 and early 2009. 

Compl. ¶¶ 37-38. Zivanic made these payments. Id. ¶ 39. 

 Zivanic and her husband received a letter from WaMu on 

December 18, 2008, which informed them that their payments would be 

Case 3:10-cv-00737-SC Document 17 Filed 05/07/10 Page 3 of 7
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set at $3938.64 per month, starting in February of 2009. Id. ¶ 41. 

However, "[w]hen Mr. Zivanic attempted to make the first payment, 

he was advised that the letter was sent in error," and after 

calling his contact at WaMu, he "was told not to pay anything 

because they had not determined the final loan modification 

payment." Id. ¶¶ 41-42. Zivanic and her husband continued to work 

with WaMu to modify their loan, and continued to provide 

information as requested. Id. ¶¶ 43-44. Nevertheless, on August 

6, 2009, Quality sold Zivanic's residence to Deutsche at public 

auction. Id. ¶ 45, Ex. J. Deutsche then filed an unlawful 

detainer action against Zivanic and her husband on September 21, 

2009. Compl. ¶ 48. Zivanic apparently still possesses the 

property, and filed this action in an attempt to retain possession. 

See id. ¶ 51. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

 "Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," and a 

cause of action is presumed to lie outside of this limited 

jurisdiction until the party asserting jurisdiction establishes the 

contrary. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). An action that might have originally been brought in 

federal court is removable to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

A plaintiff may bring a motion to remand to challenge whether the 

removal procedures were proper. Id. § 1447(c). "The removal 

statute is strictly construed, and the court must reject federal 

jurisdiction if there is any doubt as to whether removal was 

proper. The defendants bear the burden of proving the propriety of 

removal." Simpson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 

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1153 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (citation omitted). 

IV. DISCUSSION

 None of the Complaint's thirteen causes of action are 

explicitly framed as federal claims. However, in their Notice of 

Removal, Defendants refer to the fact that the Complaint makes 

references to Defendants' alleged violation of the Real Estate 

Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., the 

Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq., and the 

Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), id. §§ 1691 et seq. See

Notice of Removal ¶ 4. 

Plaintiff claims that she does not list these statutes as 

grounds for independent causes of action; rather, she argues that 

they are only included to support her contention that Defendants 

have violated California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), codified 

in section 17200 et seq. of the California Business & Professions 

Code. The UCL forbids "unfair competition" which "include[s] any 

unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . . ." 

Cal. Bus. & Prof Code §§ 17200, 17203. 

 Plaintiff argues that she is the "master of her complaint" and 

"has patently declined to state causes of action based on those 

[TILA, RESPA, and ECOA] violations. Instead, Plaintiff simply 

mentions those violations in passing." Mot. to Remand at 6. This 

argument ignores the explicit language of the Complaint itself. 

Immediately after Plaintiff sets out the basis for her UCL claim, 

including alleged violations of TILA, RESPA, and ECOA, the 

Complaint states a demand "for actual, compensatory, statutory, 

consequential, and punitive damages (in an amount to be proven at 

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trial) in favor of Plaintiff." Compl. ¶¶ 94-97. However, "[a] UCL 

action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered." In re 

Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 312 (2009). As Defendants point 

out, Plaintiff's broad request for damages goes well beyond the 

scope of remedies authorized by the UCL. Opp'n at 6. 

 While it is true that "there is no 'basic' or 'pivotal' 

federal question that impinges on [plaintiff's] right to relief" 

under the UCL, Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 

1033, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003), Plaintiff is not simply bringing a UCL 

claim that is partially predicated on federal law. Instead, she is 

seeking remedies that are clearly beyond those authorized by the 

UCL, and the Complaint is explicitly demanding relief based on 

several federal statutes. Although Plaintiff's federal claims are 

not clearly labeled, she is unambiguously requesting remedies that 

are only available to her under federal law, and she has thereby 

conferred jurisdiction upon this Court. See Medina v. Ramsey Steel 

Co., 238 F.3d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of motion 

to remand where plaintiff sought remedies authorized by federal law 

but not available under state law). Although Plaintiff had an 

opportunity to disclaim any intent to recover under federal law, 

she failed to take advantage of that opportunity by failing to file 

a Reply brief. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

V. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is 

DENIED. Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 7, 2010 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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