Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01053/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01053-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Full Value Advisors, LLC
Petitioner
Securities and Exchange Commission
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 22, 2010 Decided February 4, 2011 

No. 10-1053 

FULL VALUE ADVISORS, LLC, 

PETITIONER

v. 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of Orders 

of the Securities & Exchange Commission 

 Douglas R. Hirsch argued the cause for petitioner. With 

him on the briefs was Charles H. Dufresne. 

 Tracey A. Hardin, Senior Counsel, Securities and 

Exchange Commission, argued the cause for respondent. 

With her on the brief were David M. Becker, General 

Counsel, Jacob H. Stillman, Solicitor, Michael A. Conley, 

Deputy Solicitor, and Benjamin L. Schiffrin, Senior Counsel. 

USCA Case #10-1053 Document #1291623 Filed: 02/04/2011 Page 1 of 14
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 Before: GINSBURG and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Full Value Advisors, L.L.C. (Full 

Value or the Fund) is an institutional investment manager, as 

defined by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), 

see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f), subject to the disclosure requirements 

of section 13(f) of the Act,1

 which applies to institutional 

investment managers holding at least $100,000,000 in 

securities.2

 See id. § 78m(f)(1). As an “active investing” 

hedge fund, Full Value seeks to purchase stock in publicly 

traded companies and to influence management to take 

actions that increase stock price. In 2006, Full Value 

accumulated over $100,000,000 in securities holdings. 

Full Value challenges the Act’s disclosure requirements 

because they allegedly compel speech in violation of the First 

Amendment and constitute an uncompensated taking in 

violation of the Fifth Amendment. According to Full Value, 

public disclosure of its investment positions would drive up 

the price of a target company’s stock, making it harder for 

Full Value to acquire a large enough stake in the company to 

pursue proxy contests and effect other changes in corporate 

management. Public disclosure is not the only injury Full 

 

1

 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 

Act renumbered paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5) of Section 13(f) as 

paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6). Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929X, 124 

Stat. 1376, 1870 (2010). This opinion uses the pre-Dodd-Frank 

numbering. 

2

 Section 13(f)(5)(A) defines “institutional investment manager” as 

“any person, other than a natural person, investing in or buying and 

selling securities for its own account, and any person exercising 

investment discretion with respect to the account of any other 

person.” 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(5)(A). 

USCA Case #10-1053 Document #1291623 Filed: 02/04/2011 Page 2 of 14
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Value anticipates. Full Value also claims disclosure to the 

Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) is 

unconstitutional. To the extent Full Value seeks to avoid 

public disclosure, its claims are not ripe. To the extent Full 

Value seeks to avoid disclosure to the Commission, its claims 

fail on the merits. Accordingly, we dismiss in part and deny 

in part Full Value’s petition for review. 

I 

 To comply with § 13(f) of the Act, institutional 

investment managers such as Full Value file quarterly 

reports—a “Form 13F Report”—with the Commission, 

disclosing, among other things, the names, shares, and fair 

market value of the securities over which the institutional 

managers exercise control. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(a)(1) 

(requiring quarterly disclosure on Form 13F); 15 U.S.C. § 

78m(f)(1) (2010) (delineating disclosure requirements). 

The Commission must make 13F information publicly 

available unless either of two exemptions applies. First, 

under paragraph 13(f)(2), “[t]he Commission, by rule, or 

order, may exempt, conditionally or unconditionally, any 

institutional investment manager . . . .” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 78m(f)(2); see also id. § 78m(f)(4) (requiring subsection 

13(f)(2) exemptions to be consistent with the purposes of 

section 13(f) and the protection of investors). Second, under 

paragraph 13(f)(3), the Commission “may delay or prevent 

public disclosure” “as it determines it to be necessary or 

appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 

investors.” Id. § 78m(f)(3). Managers seeking a permanent 

exemption under paragraph 13(f)(2) or temporary confidential 

treatment under paragraph 13(f)(3) must submit enough 

information on Form 13F for the Commission to make an 

informed judgment as to the merits of the request. Letter 

USCA Case #10-1053 Document #1291623 Filed: 02/04/2011 Page 3 of 14
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from Douglas Scheidt, Assoc. Dir. & Chief Counsel, Div. of 

Inv. Mgmt, SEC to Section 13(f) Confidential Treatment 

Filers, at 1 (June 17, 1998), available at 

http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/13fpt2.ht

m (last visited Dec. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Scheidt, SEC 

Letter]; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2(b)(2)(ii) (requiring “a 

statement of the grounds of objection referring to, and 

containing an analysis of, the applicable exemption(s) from 

disclosure under the Commission’s rules and regulations 

adopted under the Freedom of Information Act”).3

 For 

example, when seeking temporary confidential treatment, 

managers must provide a description of their investment 

strategy and explain why disclosure would be detrimental. 

See SEC Order Denying Full Value’s Request for 

Confidential Treatment, No. 34-61328, at 2 (issued Jan. 11, 

2010), 2010 SEC LEXIS 46, at *4–5 (citing Form 13F 

instructions). 

In October 2006, Full Value filed a request for an 

exemption under paragraph 13(f)(2), asserting its investment 

positions were trade secrets for which paragraph 13(f)(1) 

effectuated an unconstitutional taking by providing the 

Commission discretion to place the information in the public 

domain. Soon thereafter, Full Value also filed a request for 

confidential treatment under paragraph 13(f)(3), seeking 

confidential treatment of all securities “that [it] would 

otherwise be required to disclose.” Rather than provide the 

requisite Form 13F information, however, Full Value asked 

“to be excused from complying with certain instructions that 

are applicable to routine confidential treatment requests.” In 

addition, Full Value claimed the Commission’s filing 

 

3

 Under the regulations and Form 13F instructions, information 

subject to confidential treatment is nonpublic pending review of the 

application. See Scheidt, SEC Letter at n. 4. 

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requirements compelled it to speak, in violation of the First 

Amendment. 

On January 11, 2010, the Commission denied both Full 

Value’s request for a paragraph 13(f)(2) exemption and its 

request for paragraph 13(f)(3) confidential treatment of its 

investment positions. The Commission held Full Value did 

not provide the factual support necessary for an informed 

judgment on the merits of Full Value’s confidential treatment 

request and therefore denied it. The Commission further held 

“absent extraordinary circumstances” an institutional 

investment manager may not seek an exemption pursuant to 

§ 13(f)(2) in order to avoid public disclosure of its holdings 

unless it first seeks in good faith confidential treatment 

pursuant to § 13(f)(3). As Full Value did not meet that 

requirement, the Commission also denied Full Value’s 

request for exemption. 

Full Value makes two arguments on appeal. First, the 

Fund argues subsection 13(f) compels speech in violation of 

the First Amendment. Second, Full Value argues subsection 

13(f) constitutes an uncompensated taking in violation of the 

Fifth Amendment. Full Value alleges each constitutional 

violation with respect to both public disclosure of its 

investment position by the Commission and its own 

preliminary disclosure to the Commission. Full Value 

disclaims any challenge to the Commission’s interpretation of 

the Act or any regulation promulgated thereunder. 

Appellant’s Reply Br. 2. Thus, we review Full Value’s 

petition only insofar as it presents constitutional claims. 

II 

 Article III courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, must 

first consider whether authority exists to hear a case before 

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moving on to the merits. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). 

The judicial power extends only to a cognizable case or 

controversy. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Therefore, “article III 

does not allow a litigant to pursue a cause of action to recover 

for an injury that is not ‘certainly impending,’” Wyo. Outdoor 

Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 

(quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 

F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996)), and courts have developed 

doctrines to “test the fitness of controversies for judicial 

resolution,” La. Envtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 

1379, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The ripeness doctrine is one 

example. 

Ripeness, along with the prohibition against advisory 

opinions, stems from the constitutional case or controversy 

requirement and “requires us to consider ‘the fitness of the 

issues for judicial review and the hardship to the parties of 

withholding court consideration.’” Vill. of Bensenville v. 

FAA, 376 F.3d 1114, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Abbott 

Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), overruled on 

other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)); 

see Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 138 

(1974); accord Harris v. FAA, 353 F.3d 1006, 1011–12 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004). “In determining the fitness of an issue for judicial 

review [after agency action], we look to see whether the issue 

is purely legal, whether consideration of the issue would 

benefit from a more concrete setting, and whether the 

agency’s action is sufficiently final.” Clean Air 

Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998). In evaluating hardship, we do not consider “direct 

hardship, but rather whether postponing judicial review would 

impose an undue burden on [the parties] or would benefit the 

court.” Harris, 353 F.3d at 1012 (quotation marks omitted); 

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accord Bensenville, 376 F.3d at 1120; see also AT&T Corp. v. 

FCC, 349 F.3d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Because of the 

prudential considerations which innervate the ripeness 

doctrine, at times, we “dismiss[] even if there is not a 

constitutional bar to the exercise of our jurisdiction.” Wyo. 

Outdoor Council, 165 F.3d at 48. 

A 

Full Value claims the public disclosure mandated by 

§ 13(f)(1) compels speech in violation of the First 

Amendment. This presents a purely legal question and might 

be otherwise “fit for review.” Prudence, however, “restrains 

courts from hastily intervening into matters that may best be 

reviewed at another time or in another setting, especially 

when the uncertain nature of an issue might affect a court’s 

‘ability to decide intelligently.’” La. Envtl. Action Network, 

87 F.3d at 1382 (citation omitted) (quoting Am. Trucking 

Ass’ns v. ICC, 747 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). This is 

especially true when the issue is one of constitutional import. 

See Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2010). 

It is not yet certain Full Value will be required to comply with 

paragraph 13(f)(1); the Commission may yet grant Full Value 

an exemption under paragraph 13(f)(2). If Full Value does 

not have to comply with 13(f)(1), the constitutional issue will 

not have to be resolved. Cf. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 

408 (1792) (declining to issue an advisory opinion). 

Moreover, delaying the constitutional decision will 

impose no hardship on Full Value. So far, Full Value has 

filed only an application for exemption under paragraph 

13(f)(2) and a request for confidential treatment under 

paragraph 13(f)(3). Because those filings did not reveal 

investment positions, the Commission has not yet produced a 

13(f)(1) report. Hence, Full Value’s allegedly proprietary 

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information has not been disclosed publicly, and Full Value 

has not yet suffered any hardship as a result of the Act’s 

disclosure requirements. Full Value may avoid public 

disclosure of its holdings in the future by submitting the 

requisite information and obtaining confidential treatment or, 

thereafter, an exemption from the reporting requirements. 

When and if relief is denied, Full Value will be able to seek 

judicial review of the Commission’s decision before its filings 

are made public. See La. Envtl. Action Network, 87 F.3d at 

1381. In sum, Full Value’s First Amendment claim satisfies 

neither condition for ripeness and we will not consider it at 

this time. See Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 585–

87 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

B 

 Full Value’s Fifth Amendment claim is not ripe either. 

As we have seen, Full Value might avoid the harm it alleges 

will follow inevitably from public disclosure of its investment 

positions, and avoid the regulatory taking it argues paragraph 

13(f)(1) effects, if it obtains confidential treatment or an 

exemption. A claim is not ripe where the “possibility that 

further consideration will actually occur before 

[implementation] is not theoretical, but real.” Ohio Forestry 

Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 735 (1998); see 

Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank 

of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 190–91 (1985). Here, the 

Commission is free to consider whether Full Value’s 

investment positions constitute a trade secret or other 

cognizable property interest under the Fifth Amendment 

before disclosing the information to the public. Indeed, the 

paragraph 13(f)(3) confidential treatment process, and the 

procedures established by the Commission thereunder, 

specifically contemplate further evaluation. See 17 C.F.R. 

§ 240.24b-2(b)(2). Full Value’s takings claim cannot 

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possibly be in a “concrete and final form,” Eagle-Picher 

Indus., Inc. v. U.S. EPA., 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 

unless and until the Commission denies the Fund’s 

satisfactorily detailed request and threatens public disclosure 

of its purported property. Only at that juncture will Full 

Value’s claims become ripe for review. 

C 

Before proceeding to the merits, we pause to consider the 

intersection between the ripeness and exhaustion doctrines in 

this case. As stated above, ripeness concerns the fitness of 

issues for review. Exhaustion, on the other hand, focuses on 

process—in particular, the process a litigant must go through 

at the agency level to ensure the agency has ample 

opportunity to “crystallize[] its policy before that policy is 

subjected to judicial review.” Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 

F.2d 731, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1987). At times, we have described 

these two doctrines as both “analytically distinct,” Unity08 v. 

F.E.C., 596 F.3d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2010), and yet “difficult 

to distinguish,” John Doe, Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin.,

484 F.3d 561, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2007), or “complementary.” 

Ticor Title Ins. Co., 814 F.2d at 735. Our inconsistent 

description underscores the simple fact that in certain contexts 

the two doctrines remain distinct, and in others they blend 

together. Full Value arguably exhausted its claim in this case 

by filing requests for an exemption under paragraph 13(f)(2) 

and confidential treatment under paragraph 13(f)(3). But the 

company complied with the form of the exemption rather than 

its substance. The agency had no more opportunity to 

“crystallize its policy” than had Full Value proceeded directly 

to this Court. So, did Full Value fail to exhaust or are its 

claims simply unripe? We need not finally decide. Full 

Value’s failure to fully comply with the Commission’s 

process (i.e. exhaust) has left some of its claims unfit for 

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review (i.e. unripe) and that is perhaps not surprising given 

the two doctrines’ common origins; they are both “prudential 

doctrines” designed to “respond to pragmatic concerns about 

the relationship between courts and agencies.” John Doe, 

Inc., 484 F.3d at 567. 

III 

A 

 Full Value views its inability to control what the 

Commission does with investment information divulged in 

the course of an application for confidential treatment or an 

exemption request as a form of compelled speech. If the 

Commission determines the information is not entitled to 

confidential treatment or Full Value does not qualify for an 

exemption, the Commission is required to publicly disclose it. 

15 U.S.C. S 78m(f)(3). 

The freedom of thought protected by the First 

Amendment against state action “includes both the right to 

speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” 

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). First 

Amendment concerns are paramount when the Government 

compels a speaker to endorse a position contrary to his 

beliefs, or to “affirm[] a belief and an attitude of mind” he 

opposes. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 

(1943) (requiring schoolchildren to salute the flag is 

unconstitutional); see also, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. 

Util. Comm’n of Ca., 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986) (requiring a 

utility company to distribute a third party’s newsletter in its 

own billing envelopes is unconstitutional); Wooley, 430 U.S. 

at 705, 717 (requiring a citizen to display the state motto is 

unconstitutional); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 

U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (requiring newspapers to publish replies 

USCA Case #10-1053 Document #1291623 Filed: 02/04/2011 Page 10 of 14
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from political candidates is unconstitutional). First 

Amendment concerns may even be present when the state 

compels speech in a content-neutral manner. See Turner 

Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) 

(“regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are 

subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, because in most 

cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas 

or viewpoints from the public dialogue.”) (citation omitted); 

C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 188 (3d Cir. 

2005). 

The disclosure required under paragraphs 13(f)(2) and 

13(f)(3) does not raise the same constitutional concerns. Here 

the Commission—not the public—is Full Value’s only 

audience. The Act is an effort to regulate complex securities 

markets, inspire confidence in those markets, and protect 

proprietary information in the process. It is not a veiled 

attempt to “suppress unpopular ideas or information or 

manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than 

persuasion.” Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 641. In this respect, 

paragraphs 13(f)(2) and 13(f)(3) are indistinguishable from 

other underlying and oft unnoticed forms of disclosure the 

Government requires for its “essential operations.” W. Va. 

Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring) 

(rejecting First Amendment claim when “essential operations 

of government may require [disclosure] for the preservation 

of an orderly society,—as in the case of compulsion to give 

evidence in court.”) For example, without violating the First 

Amendment, the Government requires individuals to submit 

income tax information to the IRS. United States v. Sindel, 

53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 1995) (First Amendment is not 

implicated by requirement of disclosure to IRS that entails no 

public dissemination of a political or ideological message). 

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Securities regulation involves “a different balance of 

concerns” and “calls for different applications of First 

Amendment principles.” Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 

678 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of 

certiorari as improvidently granted) (noting Ohralik v. Ohio 

State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“Numerous 

examples could be cited of communications that are regulated 

without offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange 

of information about securities . . . .”)). This principle applies 

a fortiori when disclosure is to the Commission alone. 

Congress enacted paragraphs 13(f)(2) and 13(f)(3) to protect 

an institutional investor’s confidential information when 

doing so is warranted. Compelling disclosure to the 

Commission alone so the Commission may determine 

whether confidential treatment is warranted is a rational 

means of achieving that goal. See Zauderer v. Office of 

Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (rejecting argument 

that disclosure requirements are subject to a “strict ‘least 

restrictive means’ analysis”); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. 

Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 316 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing the 

applicable constitutional scrutiny for government disclosure 

as “akin to the general rational basis test governing all 

government regulations under the Due Process Clause”). 

B 

 In a similar vein, Full Value argues disclosure to the 

Commission is an unconstitutional taking. The Fifth 

Amendment prohibits the taking of private property for public 

use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. A 

“regulatory taking” is one in which a government regulation 

is “so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct 

appropriation or ouster.” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 

U.S. 528, 537 (2005). To constitute a regulatory taking, the 

Government action must (1) affect a property interest and (2) 

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go “too far” in so doing (i.e. amount to a deprivation of all or 

most economic use or a permanent physical invasion of 

property). Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 

1000–01, 1005 (1984). In determining how far is too far, we 

consider several factors, including “the character of the 

governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference 

with reasonable investment-backed expectations.” Id. at 1005 

(quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 

(1980)). 

Even if we assume the compilation of Full Value’s 

securities holdings constitutes a property interest, disclosure 

to the Commission does not constitute a taking because the 

regulations requiring disclosure do not go “too far.” First, 

paragraphs 13(f)(2) and 13(f)(3) have a legitimate public 

purpose—to promote competition and decrease volatility in 

the markets, and to mitigate the potential harm in doing so by 

“grant[ing] confidential treatment to an ongoing investment 

strategy of an investment manager.” S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 87 

(April 14, 1975). Second, disclosure to the Commission 

produces no economic harm. The Commission ensures that 

sensitive information submitted pursuant to paragraph 

13(f)(2) or paragraph 13(f)(3), such as trade secrets, remains 

confidential, and the value of a trade secret is not destroyed if 

it is disclosed to a party that is under obligation to protect it. 

Cf. Ruckleshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002 (“[I]f an individual 

discloses his trade secret to others who are under no 

obligation to protect the confidentiality of the information . . . 

his property right is extinguished.”). Lastly, because 

paragraphs 13(f)(2) and 13(f)(3) were in effect before Full 

Value reached the $100,000,000 statutory threshold triggering 

its paragraph 13(f)(1) disclosure requirement, Full Value 

could not have reasonable investment-backed expectations. 

See Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 315 (1st Cir. 2005) (no reasonable 

expectation because disclosure statute’s effective date 

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predated contract); cf. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 

24, 39–41 (1st Cir. 2002) (reasonable expectation because no 

prior regulation). 

IV 

To the extent Full Value’s claims rest on potential public 

disclosures of its investment positions, they are not ripe. Full 

Value will not have to disclose its positions to the public if 

the Commission grants an exemption or provides confidential 

treatment. Of course, for the Commission to properly 

consider Full Value’s confidential treatment and exemption 

requests, Full Value must provide the Commission with 

sufficient information to make an informed judgment. Mere 

disclosure to the Commission does not raise First Amendment 

concerns. Paragraphs 13(f)(2) and 13(f)(3) have a rational 

basis and do not require Full Value to endorse or 

acknowledge positions that are anathema to its managers. 

There is no public audience Full Value must address. Nor 

does disclosure to the Commission raise Fifth Amendment 

concerns under Ruckleshaus even assuming Full Value has a 

cognizable property interest in knowledge of its investment 

positions. 

So ordered. 

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