Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01972/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01972-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Debra D. Baker
Appellant
Denis McDonough
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

DEBRA D. BAKER,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________

2023-1972

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 21-7626, Judge Grant Jaquith.

______________________

Decided: December 19, 2024

______________________

N. ALBERT BACHARACH, JR., N. Albert Bacharach, Jr., 

P.A., Gainesville, FL, argued for claimant-appellant. 

 MATTHEW JUDE CARHART, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. 

Also represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, MARTIN F.

HOCKEY, JR., PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY; JONATHAN KRISCH, Y.

KEN LEE, Office of General Counsel, United States 

Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

Case: 23-1972 Document: 54 Page: 1 Filed: 12/19/2024
2 BAKER v. MCDONOUGH

 ______________________

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, CHEN, Circuit Judge, and 

MURPHY, District Judge.

1

MOORE, Chief Judge.

Debra Baker appeals a decision of the United States 

Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) 

affirming the denial by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals 

(Board) of Ms. Baker’s motion to revise a prior Board 

decision on the basis of clear and unmistakable error 

(CUE). We vacate and remand.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Baker served in the United States Air Force from 

1979 until 1992. During service, she was treated for 

dizziness, nausea, and vomiting. In September 1991, Ms. 

Baker was referred to a medical evaluation board (MEB). 

Based on spinal fluid analysis and magnetic resonance 

imaging (MRI) of Ms. Baker’s head, a military neurologist 

opined that she “most likely represented multiple sclerosis, 

but did not meet all the criteria” and diagnosed Ms. Baker 

with “probable multiple sclerosis.” Appx. 26 (emphases 

added). In December 1991, the MEB issued a report that 

diagnosed Ms. Baker with “[p]robable multiple sclerosis” 

and recommended placing her on a “temporary disability 

retirement list (TDRL) for further evaluation and 

treatment.” Appx. 28 (emphasis added). In March 1992, 

Ms. Baker was discharged from service based on her 

placement on TDRL. Appx. 30.

Directly after discharge, Ms. Baker filed for benefits 

with the United States Department of Veterans Affairs 

1 Honorable John F. Murphy, District Judge, United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 

Case: 23-1972 Document: 54 Page: 2 Filed: 12/19/2024
BAKER v. MCDONOUGH 3

(VA), requesting disability compensation based on several 

conditions, including multiple sclerosis. In April 1992, a 

VA physician examined Ms. Baker and concluded she did 

not “show any clinical symptoms to suggest” multiple 

sclerosis. Appx. 32. The physician noted he had not been 

provided with Ms. Baker’s claim file or the results of her 

MRI and spinal fluid analysis, and then stated that the 

prior diagnosis had been “possible multiple sclerosis.” Id.

at 31 (emphasis added); see Appx. 26. There is no dispute 

that the prior diagnosis was “probable,” not “possible,” 

multiple sclerosis. Appx. 26. The same physician was 

subsequently provided a copy of Ms. Baker’s claim file and 

concluded Ms. Baker did not “clinically, or physically, have 

enough information to prove the diagnosis of multiple 

sclerosis.” Appx. 34. 

In September 1992, a VA Regional Office (RO) denied 

service connection for multiple sclerosis. Ms. Baker did not 

appeal the denial of service connection for multiple 

sclerosis, and the claim became final. In May 2009, Ms. 

Baker sought to reopen her previously denied claim for 

benefits based on multiple sclerosis. In 2014, the RO 

granted service connection for multiple sclerosis and 

assigned an effective date of May 8, 2009, the date of Ms. 

Baker’s claim to reopen.

Ms. Baker appealed the RO’s effective date 

determination, arguing the September 1992 denial of 

service connection was clearly and unmistakably 

erroneous. See Appx. 11. The Board held Ms. Baker had 

not established CUE in the September 1992 decision. The 

Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision, but it did not 

address Ms. Baker’s argument that the September 1992 

decision failed to apply the statutory benefit of the doubt

rule. See Brief for Appellant at 13–14, Baker v. 

McDonough, No. 21-7626, 2023 WL 2259740 (Vet. App. 

Feb. 28, 2023). Ms. Baker appeals. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292.

Case: 23-1972 Document: 54 Page: 3 Filed: 12/19/2024
4 BAKER v. MCDONOUGH

DISCUSSION

“At any time, a veteran may ask the Board or regional 

office to revise a final benefits decision on grounds of ‘clear 

and unmistakable error.’” George v. McDonough, 596 U.S. 

740, 744 (2022) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5109A). The elements 

of CUE are well-established: (1) either the correct facts, as 

they were known at the time, were not before the 

adjudicator or the statutory or regulatory provisions extant 

at the time were incorrectly applied; (2) the error was 

“undebatable” and of the sort that, had it not been made, 

would have manifestly changed the outcome at the time; 

and (3) a determination of CUE must be based on the 

record and law at the time of the prior adjudication.

Willsey v. Peake, 535 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The 

party challenging a final decision based on CUE bears the 

burden of establishing CUE. Pierce v. Principi, 240 F.3d 

1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Under 38 U.S.C. § 5109A(a), 

“[i]f evidence establishes [clear and unmistakable] error, 

the prior decision shall be reversed or revised.”

We have jurisdiction to review “all relevant questions 

of law” and “any regulation or any interpretation thereof 

(other than a determination as to a factual matter) that 

was relied upon” by the Veterans Court that is, inter alia, 

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1)(A). In 

cases that do not implicate constitutional rights, our review 

does not extend to factual determinations or to “a challenge 

to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular 

case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). As to CUE challenges 

specifically, we can review the Veterans Court to determine 

whether the correct legal standards were applied, but we 

cannot review the Veterans Court’s conclusion as to 

whether a particular set of facts constitutes CUE. Willsey,

535 F.3d at 1372 (“[T]he issue before this court is whether 

the Veterans Court applied its decision in Russell to the 

question of whether there was CUE in [the relevant 

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BAKER v. MCDONOUGH 5

decision], not whether the application of that rule to the 

particular facts of this case was correct.”).

Ms. Baker argues the September 1992 RO decision

failed to apply the correct legal standard and is therefore 

the result of CUE. Ms. Baker argues her records at the 

time of the RO decision show a diagnosis of “probable 

multiple sclerosis,” Appx. 26; Appx. 28, which satisfies the 

correct legal standard and therefore should have resulted 

in a grant of service connection for multiple sclerosis as it 

would have manifestly changed the outcome at the time. 

Because the RO erroneously heightened the applicable 

legal standard in its September 1992 decision and required 

Ms. Baker to show a definitive diagnosis of multiple 

sclerosis, Ms. Baker argues the decision denying service 

connection is invalid on CUE grounds.

The VA is statutorily required to find in favor of a 

claimant when the evidence of record is in equipoise. The 

statute at the time of the September 1992 decision stated:

When, after consideration of all evidence and 

material of record in a case before the [VA] with 

respect to benefits under laws administered by the 

Secretary, there is an approximate balance of 

positive and negative evidence regarding the 

merits of an issue material to the determination of 

the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving 

each such issue shall be given to the claimant.

38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (Supp. III 1992). The RO was therefore 

required to find in Ms. Baker’s favor if the positive and 

negative evidence were in approximate balance, that is, 

when the evidence was in equipoise. Skoczen v. Shinseki, 

564 F.3d 1319, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he evidence must 

rise to a state of equipoise for the claimant to ‘win.’”).

Ms. Baker’s argument on appeal, as it was, in part, to 

the Veterans Court, is that the September 1992 RO 

decision did not apply this correct legal standard. At the 

Case: 23-1972 Document: 54 Page: 5 Filed: 12/19/2024
6 BAKER v. MCDONOUGH

time of the decision, Ms. Baker’s records reflected mixed 

conclusions on a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis. On the one

hand, a military neurologist concluded that Ms. Baker 

“most likely represented multiple sclerosis, but did not 

meet all the criteria.” Appx. 26 (emphases added). The 

military neurologist, as well as the MEB, rendered a 

diagnosis of “probable multiple sclerosis.” Id.; Appx. 28.2 

Ms. Baker argues that “probable” indicates that it was 

more likely than not that, in September 1992, Ms. Baker 

had multiple sclerosis. On the other hand, a VA physician 

evaluated Ms. Baker and determined that she did “not 

show any clinical symptoms to suggest” multiple sclerosis. 

Appx. 32. It is undebatable that the RO was required to 

find in her favor if the evidence was in equipoise, but 

nothing in the RO’s rating decision suggests whether it

made that determination. This is not a question of fact, but 

rather a question of the correct legal standard that depends 

on the factual finding of whether the evidence was in 

equipoise. Willsey, 535 F.3d at 1372 (assessing whether the 

correct legal standard was applied may require 

2 The VA physician’s April 1992 report incorrectly 

lists Ms. Baker’s earlier diagnosis as “possible multiple 

sclerosis.” Appx. 31. Though the examining physician 

performed his own neurological assessment of Ms. Baker, 

this statement is not indicative of that assessment, but

instead inaccurately recites Ms. Baker’s prior diagnosis

based on previous test results, to which the physician 

expressly stated he had not been provided access. Compare 

id. (“The results of [the spinal fluid analysis and MRI scans 

of the brain] are not available. I do not have her C-file but 

the diagnosis of possible multiple sclerosis was made.”

(emphasis added)), with Appx. 26 (explaining results of Ms. 

Baker’s head MRI and lumbar puncture and concluding

her “[d]iagnosis at this time is probable multiple sclerosis”

(emphasis added)).

Case: 23-1972 Document: 54 Page: 6 Filed: 12/19/2024
BAKER v. MCDONOUGH 7

“address[ing] the facts of the case, and the court’s analysis 

of those facts, in some detail”).

In adjudicating Ms. Baker’s CUE claim, the Board held 

Ms. Baker had not established CUE in the September 1992 

RO decision because she did not show that the record 

before the RO reflected an undebatable diagnosis of 

multiple sclerosis at the time. Appx. 13 (“[T]here was no 

clear and unmistakable error in the September 1992 rating 

decision that denied service connection for multiple 

sclerosis. Critically, based on the record that existed at the 

time of the September 1992 rating decision, the evidence 

was unclear as to whether the Veteran had multiple 

sclerosis . . . .”); see id. at 14–15 (“At the time of the 

September 1992 rating decision, the record was ambiguous 

as to whether the Veteran actually had multiple 

sclerosis.”). But Ms. Baker is not required to prove that she 

definitively had multiple sclerosis in September 1992 to 

succeed in her CUE claim. She must show only that the 

RO in September 1992 used the incorrect legal standard 

and that this error manifestly changed the outcome of her 

claim. Willsey, 535 F.3d at 1371. The Board—and the 

Veterans Court—erred by failing to evaluate whether it 

was undebatable that the facts before the RO were in 

equipoise. By evaluating only whether there was a clear 

diagnosis and failing to address the benefit of the doubt 

rule, the Board and the Veterans Court applied the wrong 

statutory standard. This was a legal error, regardless of 

how the evidence in Ms. Baker’s case was ultimately 

weighed.

While we do not review factual findings made by the 

Board or Veterans Court, we note that the Board found “the 

medical evidence available in September 1992 primarily 

showed that the Veteran possibly did or possibly did not 

have multiple sclerosis” and “reasonable minds did differ 

as to whether the Veteran had multiple sclerosis at the 

time of the September 1992 rating decision.” Appx. 15. 

This suggests that the Board did find the evidence at the 

Case: 23-1972 Document: 54 Page: 7 Filed: 12/19/2024
8 BAKER v. MCDONOUGH

time of the September 1992 RO decision undebatably was

in equipoise, such that the RO was required to apply the 

benefit of the doubt rule, but the Board failed to expressly 

make that determination, and we may not make the 

underlying fact finding ourselves. Ms. Baker would argue 

she proved even more than equipoise as the record reflected 

a diagnosis of “probable” multiple sclerosis. Again, we may 

not make this fact finding in the first instance. 

The VA frames Ms. Baker’s arguments as contesting a 

factual finding over which we lack jurisdiction. We do not 

agree. Ms. Baker argues the RO applied an incorrect legal 

standard in September 1992, citing 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b), the 

applicability of which depends on whether the evidence 

was undebatably in equipoise—a question that the

Veterans Court and the Board failed to consider. For the 

reasons above, we agree with Ms. Baker.

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. We vacate the Veterans 

Court’s decision and remand for the Veterans Court to 

remand Ms. Baker’s CUE claim to the Board for further 

adjudication.

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to Ms. Baker.

Case: 23-1972 Document: 54 Page: 8 Filed: 12/19/2024