Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01543/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01543-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ken Clark
Defendant
Richard Gonzales
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD GONZALES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

KEN CLARK, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:07-cv-01543-OWW-TAG HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 

FOR VIOLATION OF THE ONE-YEAR

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (Doc. 1)

ORDER TO FILE RESPONSE WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

October 23, 2007. A preliminary review of the Petition, however, reveals that the petition may be

untimely and should therefore be dismissed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.

2001).

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The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-1042. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 325-327, 117 S.Ct.

2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (holding that the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed

after statute’s enactment). The instant petition was filed on October 23, 2007, and thus, it is

subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, judgment was rendered on April 17, 1997. Petitioner was convicted

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2. Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus relief is

non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal

denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may instead

file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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based upon a plea of guilty and the Court has been unable to find any record of an appeal. Pursuant

to Rule 31(a) of the California Rules of Court, Petitioner had sixty days from April 17, 1997, or until

June 16, 1997, within which to file a notice of appeal. Rule 31(a), Cal.R.Ct.; People v. Mendez, 81

Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 302, 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1086, 969 P.2d 146, 147 (1999). Because it does not appear

that Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, his direct review concluded on June 16, 1997, when the sixtyday period for filing a notice of appeal expired. Thus, Petitioner had one year thereafter, or until

June 16, 1998, within which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir.2001).

As discussed, the instant petition was filed on October 23, 2007, over nine years after the

one-year limitations period had expired. Thus, the petition is untimely unless Petitioner is entitled to

some kind of tolling of the limitations period.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 1

557, 560-561 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court

reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file

at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will

prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end

before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. However, the limitations

period is not tolled for the time such an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker,

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533 U.S. 167, 181-181, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001); Fail v. Hubbard, 272 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir.2001). 

 Here, Petitioner has alleged that he filed a state habeas petition in both the California Court

of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. (Doc. 1, p. 3). The petition in the Court of Appeal was

filed on April 23, 2007, and denied on May 3, 2007, while the petition in the high court was filed on

May 14, 2007, and denied on September 19, 2007. Further review by the Court of the California

court system’s electronic database indicates that Petitioner has filed numerous other state petitions,

the earliest of which was filed on October 19, 2005 in the Court of Appeal and denied on October

28, 2005. Thereafter, it appears that Petitioner filed no less than six other state habeas petitions, all

of which were either denied or are still pending. 

Petitioner’s state habeas petitions, however, are not entitled to statutory tolling under the

AEDPA. A petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run prior to

filing a state habeas petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000); see Webster v.

Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000)(same); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8th

Cir. 1999) (petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the

one-year limitations period). Here, as mentioned, the limitations period expired on June 16, 1998,

approximately seven and one-half years before Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition.

Accordingly, he cannot avail himself of the statutory tolling provisions of the AEDPA. 

Even if, however, those petitions did entitle Petitioner to statutory tolling, it would appear

that the petition is still untimely. As mentioned, the period expired in 1998. There is nothing in the

record to indicate that Petitioner is entitled to tolling for that entire period of time. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Roy v. Lampert, 465

F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)(citing Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir.

1997)). “When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Petitioner does not contend that equitable tolling

applies here. 

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Thus, it appears to the Court that the instant petition is untimely by over seven years. 

However, in perhaps an excess of caution, the Court will permit Petitioner to present any further

information regarding the issues discussed in this Order. If Petitioner has additional information that

he has not supplied to the Court that he believes would entitle him to further statutory or equitable

tolling, he may include that information in his response to this Order to Show Cause. If Petitioner is

submitting additional information regarding his entitlement to statutory tolling, he should include the

dates of filing and dates of decision, and the name of the courts, for any state habeas he has filed in

connection with the 1997 conviction. If possible, Petitioner should also include photocopies of any

decisions by those courts.

 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of service

of this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for violation of the one-year

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in Findings and 

Recommendations recommending that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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