Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01161/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01161-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Glen Lamar Bailey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Donald J. Stohr, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1161

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Glen Lamar Bailey, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 17, 2004

Filed: August 8, 2005 

___________

Before MURPHY, McMILLIAN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Glen Lamar Bailey of being a felon in possession of a firearm,

possessing more than five grams of cocaine base with an intent to distribute, and

possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The district court1

sentenced him to 360 months. Bailey appeals, arguing that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress physical evidence and statements obtained from him

as the result of an investigatory stop conducted without reasonable suspicion. We

affirm.

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On May 29, 2003, uniformed St. Louis police officers Duane Wells and

Anthony Wozniak were patrolling in a marked squad car in the Walnut Park West

neighborhood. Officer Wells, who had worked in the area for eleven years, knew it

as a high crime neighborhood due to the prevalence of drug trafficking, robbery,

burglary, and assault. Three days before Wells had investigated an attempted armed

carjacking at an area Shell station, and he knew that the two carjacking suspects,

described by the victim as black males in their early to middle twenties, remained at

large. Earlier in the month, he had arrested a woman at the same station for using

crack cocaine.

Around 1:00 a.m. officers noticed several individuals standing in the parking

lot of an open Phillips 66 station which was located across the street from the Shell

station where the carjacking had been attempted. They noticed that a young black

male later identified as Bailey appeared to be using a pay phone under a broken light

at the lot entrance. Officer Wells knew that for some three years the phone had been

disconnected between 9:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., but he was unaware that regular

service had recently been restored to it. He believed that the phone Bailey was

talking into was inoperable and that he was only pretending to be having a

conversation. 

The officers pulled into the parking lot to investigate. When Officer Wells got

out of the squad car, the individuals in the lot dispersed except for Bailey who

remained at the pay phone with the receiver to his ear. As Wells approached him,

Bailey turned toward the telephone, leaning against it and concealing the left side of

his body. Wells had previously seen individuals make similar movements to conceal

contraband or weapons from officers, and he suspected Bailey was trying to hide

something from him. Wells asked Bailey what he was doing, and Bailey answered

that he was using the telephone. Wells believed Bailey was lying and merely

pretending to use it while casing the area or waiting to deal drugs. Because he feared

for his safety and that of his partner, he patted Bailey down on the side he had

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The Honorable Terry I. Adelman, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

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concealed from view. The officer felt an object in Bailey's waistband and asked if it

was a handgun. When Bailey admitted that it was, Wells handcuffed him, placed him

under arrest, and removed the weapon. The semiautomatic pistol was fully loaded

with a bullet in the chamber.

Officer Wells advised Bailey of his Miranda rights and Bailey said he

understood them. When asked why he was carrying the pistol, Bailey said that he had

previously been robbed and required the gun for his own protection. Wells then

conducted a search incident to Bailey's arrest and found more than 11 grams of crack

cocaine in his left pocket, separated into 23 baggies. Bailey was informed again of

his Miranda rights before being asked why he had the cocaine. He responded that it

was to "make ends meet." The officers took him to the police station where he

declined to make a written statement.

On July 2, 2003, a federal grand jury returned a three count indictment

charging Bailey with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); possessing more than five grams of cocaine base with intent to

distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a); and possessing a firearm in furtherance

of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Before trial, Bailey

moved to suppress the physical evidence and statements obtained as a result of the

frisk, arguing that Officer Wells had acted without reasonable suspicion. The motion

was referred to a magistrate judge2

 who found after an evidentiary hearing that the

officer had reasonable suspicion to pat Bailey down; he recommended that the motion

to suppress be denied. Bailey filed objections to the report and recommendation

which the district court overruled. The district court found that reasonable suspicion

had been raised by the late hour, the frequency of crime in the neighborhood, the

officer's reasonable belief that Bailey was pretending to use an inoperable phone, and

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Bailey's apparent attempt to conceal something from the police. The district court

denied the motion and admitted the evidence at trial over Bailey's renewed objections.

On October 15, 2003, a jury found Bailey guilty of all three counts charged in the

indictment. He was sentenced to 360 months imprisonment, five years supervised

release, and a $300 special assessment. 

Bailey appeals, contending that Officer Wells lacked reasonable suspicion to

justify a protective frisk. He points out that the Phillips 66 station was well lit and

open for business despite the lateness of the hour, the phone he was using had always

been capable of placing 911 calls even when otherwise inoperable, and his turning

away from the officer to lean his left side on the pay phone could have been wholly

innocent. Wells lacked reasonable suspicion to support the frisk Bailey argues, and

the district court should not only have suppressed evidence of the gun, but also the

crack and post arrest statements which were the fruits of the unlawful search. 

The government responds that Wells had reasonable suspicion based on the

time of night, his awareness of frequent crimes in the neighborhood, poor lighting in

the area of the pay phone, similarity in Bailey's appearance and the description of the

carjackers, the officer's reasonable belief that Bailey was pretending to speak into an

inoperable phone and was lying when he claimed to be using it, and Bailey's apparent

attempt to conceal the left side of his body when a uniformed officer approached. 

When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we examine

findings of fact for clear error, "giving 'due weight' to the inferences of the district

court and law enforcement officials." United States v. Replogle, 301 F.3d 937, 938

(8th Cir. 2002). We review the district court's application of law to the facts de novo.

United States v. Williams, 359 F.3d 1019, 1020 (8th Cir. 2004). "We must affirm an

order denying a motion to suppress unless the decision is unsupported by substantial

evidence, is based on an erroneous view of the applicable law, or in light of the entire

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record, we are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made."

United States v. Rodriguez-Hernandez, 353 F.3d 632, 635 (8th Cir. 2003). 

"The Fourth Amendment prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures' by the

Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons...that

fall short of traditional arrest." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).

Such investigatory stops, permitting only a limited search of outer clothing aimed at

discovering weapons, are not subject to the probable cause requirement of the Fourth

Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 30 (1968). Instead, protective frisks are

constitutionally reasonable "when a police officer 'observes unusual conduct which

leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may

be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently

dangerous.'" United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). 

In determining whether an investigating officer had the requisite "reasonable

suspicion" for a protective frisk, we are not guided by a "neat set of legal rules."

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996) (internal quotations omitted).

Rather, we must examine the "totality of the circumstances" in every case to see if the

officer conducting the search had a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting

legal wrongdoing." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). This analysis

looks at such facts as the "time of day or night, location of the suspect parties, and the

parties' behavior when they become aware of the officer's presence." United States

v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1429 (8th Cir. 1995). Also relevant are those inferences and

deductions made by officers under the particular circumstances, since law

enforcement officials are "trained to cull significance from behavior that would

appear innocent to the untrained observer." United States v. Poitier, 818 F.2d 679,

683 (8th Cir. 1987). While reasonable suspicion is a "less demanding standard than

probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the

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evidence," Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000), an officer may not rest on

"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 123.

Considering the observations of Officer Wells "as a whole, rather than as

discrete and disconnected occurrences," Poitier, 818 F.2d at 683, we cannot say that

he lacked reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative search of Bailey. The

encounter occurred in an neighborhood marked by frequent crimes involving

firearms. This was a relevant fact to consider, especially in light of the attempted

armed carjacking at an adjacent gas station a few days before. See United States v.

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1999); United States v. Abokhai, 829 F.2d 666, 670 (8th

Cir. 1987) (officer's observations "heightened" due to armed robbery at another area

gas station several days before). Also relevant was that the encounter occurred at

1:00 a.m. in an area of the parking lot the officer described as poorly lit.

Reasonable and particularized suspicion arose from these and other observed

facts. Although Wells was unaware that regular service had been restored to the

phone used by Bailey, a reasonable but mistaken belief may justify an investigative

stop. See United States v. Johnson, 326 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. 2003) (officer's

reasonable if mistaken belief that the suspect was about to commit an assault); United

States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 1994) ("A mistaken premise

can furnish grounds for a Terry stop, if the officers do not know that it is mistaken

and are reasonable in acting upon it."). Wells suspected that Bailey was only

pretending to make a call while preparing to commit a drug or theft crime. Bailey's

reaction to his approach reasonably heightened the experienced officer's suspicion,

for he turned in a manner that suggested he was attempting to conceal contraband.

Bailey also told Wells that he was speaking on the telephone, a statement the officer

reasonably believed was untrue based on his knowledge. Bailey's apparent attempt

to conceal something provided Wells additional reason to suspect criminal activity.

See Arvizu, 524 U.S. at 275-76 ("driver's slowing down, stiffening of posture, and

failure to acknowledge a sighted law enforcement officer" relevant in determining

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reasonable suspicion); Gordon, 231 F.3d at 756 ("nervous, evasive behavior is a

pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion"). 

In combination these factors left Officer Wells with a reasonable and

particularized suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot" and that Bailey " may

be armed and presently dangerous.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. We conclude that Wells'

protective frisk, narrowly limited to a search of Bailey's outer clothing for weapons,

satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

Bailey argues that Officer Wells' mistaken belief that the pay phone was

inoperable for all but 911 calls did not justify the search. He first observes that

feigning use of an inoperable pay phone is "hardly illegal and by itself does not

justify stopping an individual." Only a mistaken belief that a suspect is engaged in

undeniably criminal behavior can justify a protective frisk contends Bailey, citing

Johnson, 326 F.3d at 1022 (investigating officer mistakenly believed the suspect was

about to assault his companion), and United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491 (10th

Cir. 1996) (officer given incorrect information that the suspect had outstanding

federal warrants and was considered armed and dangerous). Bailey's argument fails

to recognize that a combination of innocent conduct can provide officers with

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9 (series of

actions consistent with innocent travel amounted to reasonable suspicion). Officer

Wells' belief that Bailey was pretending to use an inoperable phone was only one in

a series of observations that led him reasonably to suspect criminal activity. 

Bailey's reliance on United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2000) is

similarly misplaced. In that case officers were in an area to serve warrants during

daylight hours when they noticed the defendant standing by a pay phone in front of

a convenience store. They asked him to identify himself even though they had no

reason to suspect criminal activity at the time. Id. at 526, 528. After the defendant

failed to respond to their requests or to remove his hand from his pocket, an officer

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reached into the defendant's coat and found a handgun. Id. at 526. The Fourth

Circuit held that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion at the time of the frisk; the

defendant's presence at the telephone and his lack of cooperation were insufficient

basis for suspicion. Id. at 529. The facts in Burton are in contrast to those here,

where the search was conducted at night in a high crime area in which there had been

an attempted armed carjacking a few nights before, where it appeared that the suspect

was pretending to use an inoperable telephone, and where the suspect turned in an

apparent attempt to conceal part of his body from the officers.

Bailey also suggests that it was unreasonable for Officer Wells to suspect that

he was lurking to commit a crime since the officer admitted that an inoperable phone

could be used to place a 911 call. The officer could reasonably have concluded that

Bailey was not using the phone to notify authorities of an emergency, however, either

because of the amount of time he was at the phone or because he turned away from

the officer instead of welcoming his assistance. Officer Wells' suspicion of criminal

activity was not unreasonable under all of the circumstances.

Because Officer Wells acted with reasonable suspicion in conducting the

protective frisk, the district court did not err by admitting the immediate product of

his search or its subsequent fruits. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I believe that the facts, considered together, are not

sufficiently significant to constitute reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The

facts are either not particularized (time of day and character of the neighborhood,

partially matching description of suspects in recent crime), not especially suspicious

(pretending to use the pay telephone) or not supported by an articulated reason for

suspicion (turning movement).

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For example, even though Bailey was present in a high-crime neighborhood at

1:00 a.m., he was not alone. The gas station was open and busy. In addition, the pay

telephone Bailey was using was located close to relatively bright overhead lights

above the gas pumps, as well as the lights of the gas station convenience store.

Although the government argues that Bailey matched the general description the

Shell station carjackers, who were described as black males in their twenties,

matching that description in the predominately African-American Walnut Park West

neighborhood is not meaningful. "Too many people fit this description for it to

justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." United States v. Eustaquio, 198

F.3d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir. 1999). Even if Wells reasonably believed that Bailey was

pretending to use the pay telephone, such conduct is not criminal. As to Bailey's

turning away as Wells approached, Wells did not point to any facts supporting a

conclusion that Bailey's movement was furtive or evasive or suggestive of criminal

activity. 

In my view, Wells had a hunch that Bailey was engaged in criminal activity.

However, a stop cannot be validated by "'what it turns up.'" United States v. Yousif,

308 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,

484 (1963)). An "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'" is not enough

for the Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Thus, I dissent.

______________________________

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