Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_00-cr-01015/USCOURTS-azd-2_00-cr-01015-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sergio Leyva-Solano
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

 v.

Sergio Leyva-Solano, 

Defendant. 

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CR 00-1015-PHX-SMM

CR 04-0149-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

 

 This case comes before the Court on a limited remand from the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals. On December 12, 2005, the Ninth Circuit ordered the case remanded pursuant to

United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1973 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Ameline III). See United

States v. Leyva-Solano, No. 04-10359 (9th Cir. 2005). On remand, this Court must determine

“whether the sentence imposed would have been materially different had the district court

known that the Guidelines were advisory.” Id. at 2. After reviewing the record and the

written arguments of counsel, the Court issues the following ruling.

I. BACKGROUND

In April 2004, this Court presided over a two-day jury trial which resulted in

Defendant’s conviction on one count of Illegal Reentry After Deportation, in violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). At sentencing, the Court proceeded with an admit/deny hearing on the

supervised release violation in CR-00-1015. Defendant agreed to submit the supervised

release violation to the Court based on judicial notice of the record at Defendant’s Illegal

Reentry After Deportation trial. (Certified Transcript (“CT”) at 13-14.)

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Based on a total offense level of 16 and a criminal history category of III, the guideline

range of imprisonment on the illegal reentry conviction was 27 to 33 months, which did not

include a 3-level deduction for acceptance of responsibility that the Court acknowledged it

had discretion to award. (Id. at 14, 18.) The guideline range for imprisonment on the

supervised release violation was a potentially-consecutive term of 4 to 10 months. (Id. at 7.)

If the facts of the supervised release violation were severe enough, the Court was permitted

to sentence Defendant to the statutory maximum term of 24 months. (Id. at 8-9.) 

On the illegal reentry charge, the Government request that Defendant be sentenced to

the middle of the guideline range because of his “limited criminal history.” (Id. at 18.)

Defense counsel urged the Court to sentence Defendant to the “least sentence possible,” and

to run the two sentences concurrently, rather than consecutively. (Id. at 17, 22.)

For the reasons detailed below, the Court sentenced Defendant to 30 months

imprisonment for the illegal reentry conviction and 10 months for the supervised release

violation, and ordered both sentences to run concurrently. (Id. at 19, 28-29.) 

Defendant appealed his sentence to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth

Circuit remanded the case back to this Court in accordance with Ameline III. In an Order

dated February 10, 2006, this Court required written briefs by both parties regarding the

remanded issue. (Dkt. 41.) The Government opined that the Court would not have imposed

a materially different sentence had it known that the Guidelines were advisory. (Dkt. 44 at

1-2.) Defendant agreed that “the Court, in fact did use its discretion in sentencing

[Defendant], and that its sentence would not have been different had the Court known that the

guidelines were advisory.” (Dkt. 45 at 4.)

II. DISCUSSION

This Court’s June 14, 2004 Sentence would not have materially differed 

 if the Court had known then that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory

For two reasons, the Court concludes its sentence would not have materially differed

had it known that the Guidelines were advisory at the time of sentencing.

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First, as shown above and agreed to by both parties, the Court exercised its discretion

in sentencing Defendant in four different ways: (i) by choosing the middle of the guidelines

range on the illegal reentry conviction; (ii) by choosing not to award Defendant a three-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility; (iii) by choosing the high end of the guidelines

range on the supervised release violation; and (iv) by ordering both terms to run concurrently,

rather than consecutively. By exercising its discretion in these ways, the Court tailored the

sentence specifically to Defendant. Thus, as both parties’ recognize, the sentence imposed

on Defendant would not have been materially different if the Court had known at sentencing

that the guidelines are advisory. 

Second, the Court’s analysis of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) demonstrates

that the sentence imposed on Defendant would not have been materially different if the Court

had known at the time of sentencing that the Guidelines are advisory.

The first factor is “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The Court found that a concurrent

sentence of 30 months imprisonment on the illegal reentry conviction and the supervised

release violation was appropriate given the nature of the offense committed and Defendant’s

limited criminal history. The Court chose not to award Defendant a 3-level deduction for

acceptance of responsibility because the Defendant elected to go to trial on the illegal reentry

charge, but then admitted all of the elements of the offense when he testified at trial. (CT at

18.) The Court chose to run both terms concurrently, rather than consecutively, because a

concurrent sentence would have been “unduly harsh.” (CT at 22.) 

The second factor the Court must consider is “the need for the sentence imposed (A)

to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just

punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to

protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with

needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the

most effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). A total of 30 months imprisonment

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accurately reflects the seriousness of Defendant’s offense, promotes respect for the law, and

provides just punishment for the offense. Also, such a sentence aids in deterring Defendant

and others from illegally reentering the United States. The term imposed adequately protects

the public from any possible reentry by Defendant during imprisonment and provides

Defendant an opportunity to participate in correctional education courses.

Next, the Court must consider “the kinds of sentences available.” Id. at § 3553(a)(3).

For the illegal reentry conviction, the possible sentences are a maximum of 20 years

imprisonment and/or fines. 8 U.S.C. §1326(b)(2). For the supervised release violation, the

possible sentences is a maximum of 24 months imprisonment consecutive to any term. (CT

at 8.) The sentence imposed in this case was 30 months imprisonment followed by three years

of supervised release. (Dkt. 29; CT 19-20.) Fines were not imposed because the Defendant

did not have the ability to pay them.

The fourth factor the Court shall consider is “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing

range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category

of defendant as set forth in the guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A). Here, the Guidelines

suggest a range of 27 to 33 months on the illegal reentry and a range of 4 to 10 months on the

supervised release violation. The Court sentenced Defendant to a total of 30 months.

The Court must next consider “any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing

Commission.” Id. at § 3553(a)(5). The Court is not aware of any policy statements that apply

to this situation. Rather, section 2L1.2 and its commentary, which addresses the specific

offense at issue here, sufficiently address sentencing in this case.

The sixth factor to be addressed by the Court is “the need to avoid unwarranted

sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of

similar conduct.” Id. at § 3553(a)(6). The Court finds that this factor does not warrant a

sentence different than what was imposed. Defendant was sentenced to the middle range of

the suggested illegal reentry range and the high end of the supervised release range, but both

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sentences were ordered to run concurrently due to the Court’s finding that it would be “unduly

harsh” to run the sentences consecutively. (CT at 22.)

Lastly, the Court must consider “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the

offense.” Id. at § 3553(a)(7). This factor does not apply because there are no victims.

As shown above, the sentence imposed by this Court on June 14, 2004, would not have

materially differed had the Court known at the time of sentencing that the Sentencing

Guidelines are advisory. 

 III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, re-sentencing is not warranted in this case. Defendant

may appeal this Order by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with Rule 4(b) of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Ameline III, 409 F.3d at 1085.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Judgment and Commitment issued on June

14, 2004 (Dkt. 29) is AFFIRMED. 

DATED this 21st day of March, 2006.

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