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Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Appellee
Wendy M. Graham
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-10047

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cv-01334-BJD-JBT

WENDY M. GRAHAM, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(August 5, 2015)

Before HULL, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Wendy Graham appeals the district court’s affirmance of the Social Security 

Administration’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits (DIB), 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and supplemental security income (SSI), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1383(c)(3). Graham asserts the administrative law judge (ALJ) erred by 

determining she had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform all light 

duty work, despite also concluding her migraine and tension headaches were 

severe impairments. After review,1 we affirm. 

Eligibility for SSI or DIB requires that the claimant is under a disability. 42 

U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1), 1382(a)(1)-(2). In order to determine whether a claimant is 

disabled, the SSA applies a five-step sequential evaluation. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a) (five-step evaluation for DIB); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (five-step 

evalution for SSI). Under the first step, the claimant has the burden to show she is 

not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 

416.920(a)(4)(i). At the second step, the claimant must show she has a severe 

impairment or combination of impairments. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 

416.920(a)(4)(ii). At step three, the claimant has the opportunity to show she has

an impairment that meets or equals the criteria contained in one of the Listings. Id.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). At the fourth step, if the claimant’s 

 1

 We review the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence, and the ALJ’s application of 

legal principles de novo. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). We may not 

decide the facts anew, make credibility determinations, or re-weigh the evidence. Id. 

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impairment cannot meet or equal the criteria in one of the Listings, the ALJ 

considers the claimant’s RFC and the claimant’s past relevant work to determine if 

she has an impairment that prevents her from performing her past relevant work. 

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). Finally, once a claimant establishes 

she cannot perform her past relevant work due to some severe impairment, the 

burden shifts to the Commissioner to show significant numbers of jobs exist in the 

national economy the claimant can perform. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 

416.920(a)(4)(v). 

Further, a three-part “pain standard” applies when a claimant attempts to 

establish disability through her own testimony of pain or other subjective 

symptoms. Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). The pain 

standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition; and either 

(2) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain; or, 

(3) that the objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be expected 

to give rise to the claimed pain. Id. 

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination Graham was not 

under a disability and, therefore, not entitled to DIB or SSI. Although the ALJ 

concluded, at step two of the evaluation, that Graham’s migraine and tension 

headaches were severe impairments, the existence of these impairments did not 

undermine the ALJ’s determination, at step four, that Graham retained the RFC to 

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perform the full range of light exertional work. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 

1208, 1213 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating the mere existence of a “severe” 

impairment, as determined in step two, does not reveal the extent to which the 

impairment limits a claimant’s ability to work); see also McCruter v. Bowen, 791 

F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir. 1986) (concluding “the ‘severity’ of a medically 

ascertained disability must be measured in terms of its effect upon ability to work, 

and not simply in terms of deviation from purely medical standards of bodily 

perfection or normality”). 

Substantial evidence supports the conclusion Graham could perform all or 

substantially all the exertional demands for the light exertional level. The ALJ 

granted great weight to the RFC assessment and opinions affirming the assessment 

after determining they were well-supported by medically acceptable evidence, and 

adequately accounted for Graham’s subjective allegations of symptoms. Nothing 

in the medical records contradicts the conclusion in the RFC assessment that 

Graham could (1) lift or carry 10 to 20 pounds; (2) walk, sit, or stand for 6 hours in 

an 8-hour workday; or (3) push or pull without limitation, excepting the 10 to 20 

pound limitation. Although the ALJ commented during the hearing that Graham’s 

condition included light sensitivity and insomnia, this comment did not amount to 

a formal determination. Rather, the ALJ explained to Graham there were jobs 

available to accommodate these claimed symptoms, and the ALJ concluded the 

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“nightmare” scenario would be to allow Graham to “languish.” The ALJ 

articulated the reasons for determining Graham’s subjective complaints of pain 

were not fully credible, explaining the medical record was devoid of any objective 

clinical or laboratory findings to corroborate her subjective complaints. See Foote

v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating if the ALJ does not 

credit a claimant’s testimony as to her pain, the ALJ must articulate explicit and 

adequate reasons for doing so). 

Because the ALJ found Graham’s subjective complaint of pain not fully 

credible, there was no error in relying exclusively on the Medical-Vocational 

Guidelines as the ALJ did not find Graham had a nonexertional impairment. See 

id. at 1559 (stating exclusive reliance on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines is 

inappropriate when a claimant has a nonexertional impairment, such as pain, that 

significantly limits the claimant’s basic work activities). Thus, the ALJ did not err 

by relying solely upon the Medical-Vocational Guidelines to establish a 

determination of “not disabled.” See id. (stating if a claimant primarily suffers 

from an exertional impairment, without significant nonexertional factors, an ALJ 

may satisfy the fifth step through a straightforward application of the MedicalVocational Guidelines). 

AFFIRMED.

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