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Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 18, 2003 Decided November 25, 2003

No. 02-3065

IN RE: SEALED CASE

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00425–21)

Stephen C. Leckar, appointed by the court, argued the

cause for the appellant.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.,

United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Kenneth F.

Whitted, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Following an

undercover investigation into a cocaine distribution network

in the Washington Metropolitan area, the appellant was ar-

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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rested in October 2000 on a parole violation and was charged

in December 2000 along with twenty-four other people in a

seventy-one count indictment. In July 2001, he pleaded

guilty to conspiring to possess and distribute between 50 and

150 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 & 846, a

crime that carries a mandatory minimum sentence of ten

years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). In June 2002, the district

court sentenced the appellant to a 65–month term of imprisonment, after granting the government’s motion for a downward departure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and section

5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines

or U.S.S.G.). On appeal, the appellant claims that the sentencing court erred by failing to make sufficient findings

regarding his requests for a downward adjustment to his base

offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 and for a downward departure from his criminal history category pursuant

to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. We reject both claims and affirm the

district court’s sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

In the December 2000 indictment, the appellant was

charged with four separate offenses: conspiring to distribute

cocaine base, cocaine and marijuana; unlawfully possessing

with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of cocaine base;

unlawful possession of ammunition by a fugitive; and unlawful possession of marijuana. In June 2001, he reached an

agreement with the government to plead guilty to conspiring

to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, between

50 and 150 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 846. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant agreed

to cooperate with the government and, depending on the

nature of that cooperation, the government agreed to move

for a downward departure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)

and/or U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The appellant further agreed not to

seek any downward adjustment or departure from his applicable sentencing range other than one based on his role in the

offense pursuant to section 3B1.2 and the government maintained the right to oppose such an adjustment at sentencing.

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On July 17, 2001, the appellant pleaded guilty to conspiring

to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, between

50 and 150 grams of cocaine base. The presentence report

calculated his base offense level at 32 and awarded him a 3–

point downward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1

based on his guilty plea. The report did not recommend any

role-in-the-offense adjustment to the appellant’s offense level.

Because his ‘‘involvement in the conspiracy was a pro-active

and profitable one’’ and he actively conspired to distribute

over 50 grams of cocaine base in the Washington Metropolitan area, the probation officer did not find the appellant

qualified for a role-in-the-offense downward adjustment. Appellant’s App. (App.) 133. On the other hand, because he did

not ‘‘exercise[ ] any managerial or supervisory role within the

conspiracy,’’ the report concluded that his ‘‘level of participation [in the conspiracy] d[id] not warrant an aggravating

TTT role [upward] adjustment’’ pursuant to section 3B1.1 App.

132.

In calculating the appellant’s criminal history category, the

report noted that he had two prior criminal convictions, one in

1994 for possession of cocaine and one in 1995 for carrying a

firearm without a license. The convictions gave the appellant

a criminal history score of four, which placed him in criminal

history category III. The report also noted numerous other

arrests from the time the appellant was 10 years old. Based

on an adjusted offense level of 29 and a criminal history

category of III, the appellant’s guideline range stood at 108 to

135 months’ imprisonment. Because the statutory mandatory

minimum sentence for the appellant’s base offense is 10

years, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), however, his minimum

guideline range could not go below 120 months; thus his

applicable sentencing range was 120 to 135 months. U.S.S.G.

§ 5G1.1(c)(2).

In an undated letter to the probation officer, then-defense

counsel1

 made several objections to the presentence report.

In addition to correcting various factual errors, she claimed

that the appellant deserved a four-level downward adjustment

1 The appellant is represented by a different lawyer on appeal.

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pursuant to section 3B1.2(a) because he sold drugs for the

conspiracy’s principal distributor ‘‘to pay off a drug debt and

later forwarded street buyers to [the distributor] and in

return received small quantities of crack cocaine for his

personal use.’’ App. 93. Because, she argued, ‘‘[r]ole in the

offense determinations are based on a comparison between a

defendant and the other persons in the instant offense[, a]s

compared to others in the charged conspiracy, [the appellant]

was at the very bottom.’’ App. 94. She concluded: ‘‘No way

[the appellant] could be seen as having anything but [a] minor

role in the instant offense.’’ Id.

In addition, defense counsel claimed the appellant’s ‘‘criminal history points significantly over-represent ‘the seriousness

of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the

defendant will commit further crimes’ ’’ and therefore proposed a downward departure from criminal history category

III pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. App. 95. She also asked

the court to consider a downward departure based on his

difficult childhood (U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0) and on threats his drug

distributor allegedly made to him (U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12). All

told, defense counsel requested a ‘‘sentence of time served’’—

which at the time amounted to roughly 20 months—plus

probation. App. 96.

In an addendum to the presentence report dated June 13,

2002, the probation officer noted the appellant’s proposed

revisions regarding his role in the offense and criminal history but maintained that none was appropriate. With regard to

the section 3B1.2 adjustment, the addendum stated that the

appellant ‘‘actively engaged in a conspiracy to distribute

cocaine base for over two years. Furthermore, the defendant

acknowledged during the presentence interview that he continued to sell drugs for [the conspiracy’s wholesale distributor], beyond just paying off a drug debt. The defendant

engaged in repeated, ongoing drug distribution activities for

one of the main players in this conspiracy.’’ App. 148. With

regard to the section 4A1.3 criminal history departure, the

officer concluded that the appellant’s ‘‘criminal history category accurately reflects the seriousness of [his] criminal history,

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and most especially in this case, the likelihood that he will

commit further crimes.’’ App. 148.

Shortly after the presentence report was finalized, the

government filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)

and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a downward departure based on the

appellant’s ‘‘substantial assistance’’ to the government. According to the government, the appellant had participated in

approximately three meetings with its investigators and ultimately provided information regarding the identity of the

assailant in an unsolved, 1999 homicide. Based on the appellant’s information, the motion stated, the Metropolitan Police

Department was subsequently able to confirm the assailant’s

identity and close that investigation.

Before sentencing and by undated letter to the court,

defense counsel requested that the court sentence the appellant to time served plus five years of probation and repeated

her objections to the presentence report. The letter conceded that the appellant’s ‘‘limited participation in the conspiracy limited his ‘usefulness’ to the government’’ but also

highlighted the fact that the appellant was ‘‘eventually TTT

able to provide the government information about an unrelated crime’’ and that the government had filed a motion for a

downward departure based on his assistance. App. 99. The

letter also repeated the appellant’s request for a downward

adjustment pursuant to § 3B1.2 as well as for the downward

departures originally sought. Relying on caselaw from other

federal circuits, defense counsel claimed that because the

appellant was ‘‘peripheral to the success of the [overarching]

conspiracy,’’ the ‘‘low man on the indictment,’’ and just ‘‘a

crack head,’’ a four-level downward adjustment pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a) was appropriate. App. 100–01 (emphasis

in original). Under a heading labeled ‘‘factors that may

warrant a departure,’’ defense counsel argued that the appellant was entitled to a criminal history downward departure

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(e)—because his criminal history

score of 4 was the result of two misdemeanor convictions—as

well as downward departures pursuant to §§ 5K2.0 and

5K2.12. App. 101–02. The government did not respond to

the letter.

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The appellant appeared for sentencing before the district

court on June 21, 2002. The court began by granting the

government’s substantial assistance motion. The ruling appeared to take defense counsel by surprise for she addressed

the court as follows: ‘‘Your honor, as we stand here today,

the Court having granted the motion for departure, I guess

the only thing we’re really talking about is whether [the

court] would go as low as [the appellant] would like which

would be the time served or to some interim position.’’ App.

158. She appealed for leniency based on the appellant’s

difficult upbringing and the changes that he had made in his

life since being incarcerated. She concluded by stating that

he ‘‘was a minor player in this conspiracy and I know he does

have a number of arrests but all and all he is not the person I

normally see with criminal history of three. Thank you.’’

App. 163. During her extended argument, she never mentioned a section 3B1.2 adjustment, a section 4A1.3 criminal

history departure or downward departures pursuant to sections 5K2.0 and 5K2.12.

After defense counsel finished and before the government

took its turn, the court interjected that, while the government

could proceed as it intended, the court sought specific guidance regarding where the appellant stood in relation to the

several other people involved in the overall conspiracy, including one defendant who had gone to trial and one defendant

whom the court had already sentenced. The court stated

that it sought some ‘‘rationality’’ in sentencing so many

people and that it wanted to avoid ‘‘the possibility’’ that, in

applying the Guidelines, ‘‘a bigger fish could be sentenced to

less punishment than a smaller fish.’’ App. 164. The court

therefore directed the government ‘‘in this case as well as all

others’’ to ‘‘express based upon the evidence TTT [where] on

that continuum each defendant is.’’ Id.

The government responded that the appellant ‘‘was an

average player in this conspiracy. He was neither at the top

nor at the bottom.’’ Id. According to the government, the

evidence at trial would have shown that the appellant was

‘‘somewhere in the middle’’ of the broad conspiracy, which the

government then summarized: ‘‘There were several individuUSCA Case #02-3065 Document #787177 Filed: 11/25/2003 Page 6 of 12
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als at the top who we would call suppliers of the organization

who didn’t actually stand on the street and distribute hand-tohand. Then there were some individuals involved who were

merely one or two time couriers who would probably fall at

the bottom of the conspiracy.’’ Id. The appellant ‘‘was

average in that he was a regular customer of [the wholesale

distributor] and that he distributed street level quantities of

crack cocaine but on a regular basis to make him the average

conspirator.’’ App. 164–65.

The government then proceeded as it had ‘‘intended,’’

which ‘‘was to address several of the issues that [defense

counsel had] raised in her sentencing memo[randum].’’ App.

165. It stated that to the extent the appellant sought a

section 3B1.2 adjustment, the government had already addressed that claim, adding that the appellant ‘‘was not a

minor or minimal player’’ ‘‘in the conspiracy’’ but instead ‘‘he

was average.’’ Id. It also noted that a comparison of the

appellant to the conspiracy’s wholesale distributor might

make the appellant appear to be a minor participant but that

under the Guidelines the distributor deserved an upward

role-in-the-offense adjustment pursuant to section 3B1.1

whereas an average player like the appellant qualified for

neither an upward nor downward adjustment. The government also noted that the appellant’s plea agreement specifically precluded him from seeking any departures. It then

highlighted his criminal history and the fact that he had been

charged with other crimes in the indictment. The extent of

the court’s substantial assistance departure, the government

urged, should be based on the nature of the appellant’s

cooperation, which was limited to helping to close a homicide

case. It concluded by recommending a sentence range of 78

to 96 months.

In response, defense counsel minimized the appellant’s

criminal record, highlighted that he had cooperated as best he

could and repeated that the time that he had already spent in

prison had allowed him to turn around his life. There was,

she argued, no ‘‘reason to continue his incarceration.’’ App.

173. The court then heard from the appellant and his wife

who both described how incarceration had changed him.

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After a short recess, the court sentenced the appellant to a

65–month term of imprisonment followed by a five-year term

of supervised release. In determining the sentence, the court

noted several factors, including that it had taken ‘‘into consideration where in this conspiracy [the appellant] stood’’ and

concluded that ‘‘the prosecutor is right, that is, that [the

appellant was] about the middle.’’ App. 181. The court

noted that it was not the first time the appellant had been in

criminal court and that, regardless of the impressive statements from his wife or his difficult upbringing, he had

nonetheless committed criminal acts.

The court then inquired of all parties whether there was

anything else that needed to be addressed. Defense counsel

answered no. The government, however, noted that defense

counsel had requested a downward adjustment pursuant to

section 3B1.2 and that the government objected to it. The

government presciently stated that it ‘‘would hate for [the

section 3B1.2 adjustment issue] to come back if for some

reason it was raised on appeal.’’ App. 185. The court,

however, rejected the notion: ‘‘All I can say is that I can’t

imagine how it would matter on appeal. I really can’t. And,

frankly, I don’t look for workTTTT I hear what you’re saying.

But I’m not making any findings with respect to this [adjustment]—as a matter of fact, I’m not saying anything more

about that.’’ Id. On the government’s request and with the

appellant’s agreement, the court sealed the record for two

years based on the circumstances of the appellant’s cooperation.

II. DISCUSSION

The appellant claims that the district court erred by failing

to explain its reasoning for rejecting his requests for a fourpoint, minimal-participant adjustment to his base offense level

pursuant to section 3B1.2(a) and for a downward departure in

his criminal history category pursuant to section 4A1.3. The

appellant also challenges the court’s denial of a two-point,

minor-participant adjustment to his base offense level pursuant to section 3B1.2(b). We reject his challenges and affirm.

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We have previously held that plain error review is appropriate when the appellant fails to raise a claim at his sentencing hearing or when he fails to object to the district court’s

ruling. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Dozier, 162

F.3d 120, 125–26 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (‘‘plain error’’ review of

district court’s failure to explain denial of adjustment where

appellant did not object to district court’s ruling); United

States v. Dawson, 990 F.2d 1314, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per

curiam) (‘‘We have consistently declared that if a defendant

fails to except to the district court’s ruling on a specific

ground, we will review the district court’s ruling only for plain

error.’’); see United States v. Draffin, 286 F.3d 606, 607–08

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (‘‘plain error’’ review for unrequested downward departure). Here, not only did defense counsel fail to

raise the claims now on appeal at sentencing or object to the

district court’s rulings, she remained silent even after the

government brought up the section 3B1.2 issue at the close of

the hearing. United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) (‘‘[A]ppellant, not [the appellate court], has the

initial responsibility to ensure that the district court explains

its reasoning for the record, and appellant neglected that

responsibility when he failed to object to the district court’s

ruling.’’).2

 Instead, once the court granted the government’s

2 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51 requires a party to

‘‘preserve a claim of error by informing the court–when the court

ruling or order is made or sought–of the action the party wishes the

court to take, or the party’s objection to the court’s action and the

grounds for that objection.’’ The rule enables ‘‘the trial judge [to]

make[ ] an informed decision, and allows the judge and opposing

counsel to take whatever corrective action is needed.’’ United

States v. Walker, 449 F.2d 1171, 1173 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In doing

so, it helps ‘‘to achieve efficiency and expedition’’ in the administration of justice. Jackson v. United States, 386 F.2d 641, 643 (D.C.

Cir. 1967) (per curiam); see also United States v. Yeh, 278 F.3d 9,

14 (D. C. Cir. 2002) (noting that ‘‘it would be both anomalous and

inefficient to place the appellant in a better position [on appeal] for

having neglected to raise a relevant sentencing argument in district

court’’) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). It also prevents the district court from being caught off guard, as it apparentUSCA Case #02-3065 Document #787177 Filed: 11/25/2003 Page 9 of 12
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substantial assistance motion, defense counsel focused her

argument exclusively on the extent of that departure. Her

reference to the appellant’s role in the conspiracy and to his

criminal record in the course of requesting a ‘‘time-served’’

sentence was wholly insufficient to invoke the specific Guideline provisions the appellant raises before us. United States

v. Foster, 988 F.2d 206, 209–10 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (defense

counsel’s general reference to other sentencing claims in

context of extent of court’s downward departure insufficient

to preserve claims); see United States v. Bolla, 346 F.3d

1148, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2003), United States v. Soto, 132 F.3d

56, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we review for plain

error.3

Under plain error review, ‘‘there must be (1) error, (2) that

is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three

conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its

discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of judicial proceedings.’’ United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S.

625, 631 (2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Leaving aside the issue of whether the district court’s failure

to specifically explain its rejection of the appellant’s claims

was, if error at all, ‘‘ ‘so ‘‘plain’’ the trial judge and prosecutor

ly was here when the government brought up the section 3B1.2

adjustment at the conclusion of the hearing.

3 The government does not contend that the appellant’s claims

are unreviewable based on waiver. Cf. Foster, 988 F.2d at 209–10

(concluding departure and adjustment claims not raised at sentencing ‘‘not reviewable’’ and ‘‘waived’’); see also In re Sealed Case, 108

F.3d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting strategic decision by

defense counsel at sentencing unreviewable). Relying on this

court’s decision in Pinnick, 47 F.3d at 439, it does assert that his

section 4A1.3 claim is unreviewable because we can presume that

the district court recognized its authority to depart and declined to

do so. See Appellee’s Br. at 42–43. As we recently explained in

Draffin, 286 F.3d at 609–10, however, we will review an unrequested departure claim for plain error even though, ‘‘as a practical

matter,’’ the result will be the same because it will be ‘‘almost

impossible’’ to show plain error ‘‘in the departure setting.’’

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were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant’s

timely assistance in detecting it,’ ’’ United States v. Saro, 24

F.3d 283, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v.

Frady, 456 U.S. 162, 163 (1982)), those claims cannot succeed

because he cannot ‘‘show a reasonable likelihood that the

sentencing court’s obvious errors affected his sentence.’’

Saro, 24 F.3d at 288; Bolla, 346 F.3d at 1153 (noting ‘‘somewhat relaxed standard for showing prejudice under third

prong of the plain error test’’). For starters, once the

sentencing court granted the government’s substantial assistance motion, the appellant sought a ‘‘time-served’’ sentence—roughly 22 months—one far below the applicable adjusted 120–135 month range irrespective of any role-in-theoffense adjustment or criminal history departure. Moreover,

such an adjustment or criminal history departure would have

gained the appellant nothing because, with his criminal record, he did not qualify for the ‘‘safety valve provision’’ in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2—which allows certain

first time offenders to avoid a statutory mandatory minimum

sentence. United States v. Robinson, 158 F.3d 1291, 1293–94

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (‘‘[A] court may not sentence a

defendant under the ‘safety valve’ provision when that defendant has more than 1 criminal history point.’’). Thus, regardless of any vertical base-offense level adjustment or horizontal shift in the appellant’s criminal history category, he

nevertheless would have faced a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months.4

 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A);

U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(1). The government’s substantial assistance motion provided the only way for him to avoid a tenyear sentence.5

 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); see United States v.

Melendez, 518 U.S. 120, 126–27 (1996); id. at 133–34 (Breyer,

J.) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

4 Indeed, the court specifically informed the appellant at the plea

hearing that ‘‘in the absence of a [substantial assistance motion by

the government] the Court will be required to sentence you to at

least ten years in prison.’’ Appellee’s App. at Tab 3, 18–19.

5 Although in his sentencing memorandum the appellant had also

sought downward departures pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.0 and

5K2.12, he has not pursued those claims on appeal.

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Furthermore, to the extent the district court may have

considered and rejected a role-in-the-offense adjustment in

deciding the extent of the substantial assistance departure,

any error it committed inured to the appellant’s benefit. We

have held that the correct measure of a section 3B1.2 downward adjustment to a defendant’s base offense level is the

relevant conduct that establishes his base offense level.

United States v. Olibrices, 979 F.2d 1557, 1560 (D.C. Cir.

1992); see id. at 1561 (‘‘[A] defendant is not entitled to have

her sentence reduced for a minimal role in relevant conduct

that had no part in the calculation of the base level.’’); United

States v. Graham, 317 F.3d 262, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (‘‘The

determination of whether a defendant is eligible for a downward adjustment under Section 3B1.2 depends in large part

on a determination of the amount of relevant conduct for

which the defendant is being held responsible.’’). The appellant’s relevant conduct is the conspiracy to which he pleaded

guilty—conspiring to distribute between 50 and 150 grams of

cocaine base—and not the conduct of all of the other participants in the broad conspiracy charged in the indictment.

That the district court concluded the appellant was in ‘‘the

middle’’ of the larger conspiracy could only mean that it

would have also concluded he was more than a minimal or

minor participant in the conspiracy for which he was being

held criminally responsible. App. 181. The larger conspiracy

involved the distribution of large quantities of illegal drugs,

multiple firearms, stolen goods and hundreds of thousands of

dollars of cash. If the appellant was an average player in

that conspiracy, he could hardly be a bit player in the smaller

conspiracy.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is

Affirmed.

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