Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06072/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06072-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin L. Bencheck
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

OBITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

KEVIN L. BENCHECK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TRN'l'H CIRCUIT 

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FILED 

United Stat~ Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 2 7 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-6072 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR 'l'HB WBSTERH DIS'rRICT OF OXLAHOliA 

(D. C. No. CR-89-165-W) 

Leslie M. Kaestner (Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney for 

the District of Oklahoma; Melissa L. Pappamichiel, Captain, United 

States Army, Judge Advocate General's Corps, with her on the 

briefs), Assistant United States Attorney for the District of 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Jill M. Wichlens (Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, with 

her on the briefs), Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before BRORBY, ~. and BBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-6072 Document: 01019726622 Date Filed: 02/27/1991 Page: 1 
In this case we revisit the question of whether a defendant 

is entitled by constitutional command to a jury trial when he 

faces only an actual maximum of six months' imprisonment stemming 

from charges for multiple petty offenses. We affirm the district 

court's decision that a defendant has no such entitlement. 

The appellant (hereinafter Defendant) is Kevin L. Bencheck; 

the appellee is the United States (hereinafter Government). Mr. 

Bencheck was stopped by military police at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in 

June 1989, for not having any face protection while riding his 

motorcycle, a minor Oklahoma traffic offense. The stop grew 

complicated because Mr. Bencheck, who is a civilian, vigorously 

refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the military police to 

detain him. The differences of opinion ultimately led to Mr. 

Bencheck's arrest and to various charges he violated Oklahoma law, 

including: 1) operating a motorcycle without a windshield, face 

shield or goggles; 1 2) failing to obey a lawful order of a law 

enforcement officer; 2 3) operating a motor vehicle without a valid 

operator's license; 3 4) malicious injury to property; 4 and 5) 

assault and battery of a police officer. 5 The state charges were 

assimilated into federal law for trial in the district court 

1 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 40-1058 (West 1988). 

2 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 11-103 (West 1988) . 

3 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 6-101 (West 1988) . 

4 Okla . Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1760 (West 1983). 

5 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 649 (West 1983). 

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through the Assimilative Crimes Act. 6 

Before trial the malicious injury to property charge was 

dismissed. At trial the district court refused to impanel a jury 

after promising not to sentence Mr. Bencheck to more than six 

months' imprisonment if he was found guilty; the court did not 

mention a possible fine. The Government's attorney and Mr. 

Bencheck's attorney agreed trial without a jury was appropriate. 

Mr. Bencheck, however, objected and requested a jury trial. The 

court nevertheless proceeded to try Mr. Bencheck itself. 7 The 

6 18 u.s.c. §§ 7, 13 (1988). "The purpose of the Assimilative 

Crimes Act is to provide a method of punishing a crime committed 

on [ federal ] government reservations in the way and to the extent 

that it would have been punishable if committed within the 

surrounding [state] jurisdiction." United States v. Sain, 795 

F.2d 888, 890 (lOth Cir. 1986). Whether Defendant is 

constitutionally entitled to a jury trial is a question of federal 

law because there is a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 19 (1988), 

defining a petty offense as "a Class B misdemeanor, a Class C 

misdemeanor, or an infraction, for which the maximum fine is no 

greater than the amount set forth for such an offense in section 

3571(b)(6) or (7) in the case of an individual .... " The maximum 

fine set forth for an individual in 18 u.s.c. § 357l(b)(6)-(7) is 

$5,000. The maximum imprisonment term for a Class B misdemeanor 

is six months or less, and for a Class C misdemeanor thirty days 

or less. 18 u.s.c. § 3559(7)-(8) (1988). 

Under Sain, "state law which is inconsistent with federal 

policies expressed in federal statutes is not assimilated by the 

Act." 795 F.2d at 891. Therefore, we apply federal law if there 

is a conflict between state and federal law on whether Defendant 

could successfully demand a jury trial. See also United States v. 

Garner, 874 F.2d 1510, 1512 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[T)he relevant 

inquiry is whether he is entitled under federal law to a jury 

trial because of the potential severity of punishment--i.e., the 

'seriousness' of the offense--as prescribed by state law." 

(Emphasis in original)). 

7 The discussion in the district court about whether 

Defendant was entitled to a jury trial is found in the record: 

THE COURT: Let the record reflect that this matter 

is being tried to the Court with the understanding and 

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the 

Appellate Case: 90-6072 Document: 01019726622 Date Filed: 02/27/1991 Page: 3 
parties agree on the accuracy of the foregoing facts. 

The four crimes at issue here are all misdemeanors. The 

maximum penalty upon conviction for each one is six months' 

imprisonment, a fine up to $500, or both. 8 An individual tried 

agreement by the parties that in the event of a 

conviction of the Defendant, no greater incarceration 

can be compelled than a total of six months. Is that 

your understanding and is that your agreement? 

MS. PAPPAMICHIEL: Yes. 

MR. EARLY: I have read all of the 

your law clerk has provided me, and it 

a petty offense based upon the Supreme 

that there is no right to a jury trial. 

case law that 

appears that for 

Court decision, 

Also, I have also read the Fifth Circuit case that 

was pointed out to me and there appears to be a ruling 

that if a stipulation is entered that no more than six 

months, no matter how many charges would be imposed, 

that there is not a right to a jury trial. 

I would just like to state that Mr. Bencheck, of 

course, wanted to have a jury trial and I would like to 

state that. 

THE COURT: You are in agreement that under the law 

the Defendant is not entitled to a jury trial under the 

facts and circumstances? 

MR. EARLY: Under the Supreme Court precedents. 

THE DEFENDANT: If I may, I would like to object to 

that because of the fact that I would like to stand for 

my Constitutional right to have a jury trial. 

THE COURT: Let the record so reflect. 

8 Repeat offenses are required to reach the maximum penalty for 

failure to obey a police officer and for failure to have a 

windshield, face shield or goggles. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, 

§§ 11-103, 40-lOSB (West 1988). The penalties for these crimes 

are found in Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, S 17-101 (West 1988). The 

penalty for failure to have a valid operator's license, Okla. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 6-101 (West 1988), is found in Okla. Stat. 

Ann. tit. 47, § 6-308 (West 1988). The penalty for assault and 

battery upon a police officer is found in the statute defining the 

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Appellate Case: 90-6072 Document: 01019726622 Date Filed: 02/27/1991 Page: 4 
for all four crimes faces up to two years imprisonment if he is: 

1} convicted of each crime; 2} sentenced to the maximum term of 

imprisonment for each crime; and 3) if all of the prison sentences 

run consecutively rather than concurrently. The statutory 

penalties, as applied to Defendant herein, exposed him to a 

potential imprisonment of eighteen months and ten days. 

A motion for dismissal or for judgment of acquittal was 

granted for the charge of operating a motor vehicle without a 

valid license, but Defendant was convicted of the remaining three 

charges. Adhering to its promise not to sentence him to more than 

six months, the district court sentenced Defendant to concurrent 

terms of six months on the separate convictions of assault and 

battery of a police officer, and for operating his motorcycle 

without a windshield, face shield or goggles. The court then 

further sentenced Defendant to ten days for failure to obey the 

lawful order of a police officer. This sentence was also to run 

concurrently with the first two sentences, meaning Defendant would 

actually spend no more than ten days in jail. Defendant was 

placed on probation for the remainder of the six-month concurrent 

sentences. 

The only issue on appeal is whether Mr. Bencheck was 

unconstitutionally denied a jury trial after the 1989 Supreme 

crime. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 649 (West 1988). 

Some of the Oklahoma statutes referred to herein have been 

amended. The amendments were not law when Defendant was charged 

and therefore are not relevant to this case. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6072 Document: 01019726622 Date Filed: 02/27/1991 Page: 5 
Court decision in Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 u.s. 

538(1989). Defendant asserts Blanton overruled Tenth Circuit 

precedent established in Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547 (lOth 

Cir. 1983). The Government, on the other hand, contends Haar is 

still good law and argues it is consistent wit h Blanton . Both 

par ties agree our review of this questi on is de novo. Rife v. 

Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563, 564 (9th Cir . 1987). 

II. 

The right to a jury trial derives from the Constitution. 

"The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be 

by Jury .... " U.S. Const. art. III,§ 2, cl. 3. "In all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 

public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 

whe rein the crime shall have been committed ...• " u.s. Canst. 

amend. VI. The Supreme Court, as interpreter of the Constitution, 

has never read this language in absolute terms. The Court has 

instead construed it to except from its coverage a "category of 

petty crimes or offenses " Duncan v. Louisi ana, 391 u.s. 145, 

159 (1968). Recognizing the task of defining the breadth of this 

exception for petty crimes or offenses fal ls to the judiciary, id. 

at 160, the Court has discussed the exception as it applies to 

single petty offense, contempt of court and fines. See Blanton, 

489 U.S. at 529 (right to a jury trial when charged with single 

offense of driving 

Hoffman, 422 u.s. 

Pennsylvania, 418 

under the influence of alcohol); Muniz v. 

(1975) (fine); Codispoti v . 

512-13 (1974) (criminal contempt). 

454, 

u.s. 

477 

506, 

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See also Frank v. United States, 395 u.s. 147 (1969) (criminal 

contempt), aff'g 384 F.2d 276 (lOth Cir. 1967). 

At the outset we acknowledge, following Supreme Court 

teachings, that drawing constitutional lines between petty and 

serious offenses is not easy. Also, we recognize that an 

individual who is threatened with imprisonment, even for a 

relatively short time, will not view the potential incarceration 

as a petty matter. The implications from even a short prison stay 

on an individual's psyche, personal relationships, reputation and 

career cannot be discounted. Thus, an individual has an important 

personal interest in a jury trial. This interest runs with the 

settled constitutional function of the jury as a body of peers 

that properly interposes itself between an accused and the 

accusing government. See, ~~ Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147-56; 

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) (plurality opinion). 

While we accept these teachings, we also note there are concerns 

and debate over the use of juries. Among the concerns is the time 

involved in administering a jury system. For example, 83,092 

petty offenses, 56,763 of which were traffic offenses, were 

disposed of by United States Magistrates in 1987. Administrative 

Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director, 

Tables M-lA, M-2, at 393, 397 (1987). The federal judiciary, as 

it is presently constituted, cannot conduct over 83,000 jury 

trials in one year for this one class of cases in addition to the 

jury trials that are required for serious criminal cases and civil 

cases. Thus, the practical necessity for limiting the number of 

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jury trials, so long as the Constitution is respected, is obvious. 

We adhere, as we must, to the precedents set by the Court, 

and it is not our function to even question the validity of the 

petty-offense exception. United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 

772, 773 (lOth Cir. 1980). However, because the Court has never 

directly addressed the exception as i t applies in the case of a 

defendant charged with multiple petty offenses, our difficult task 

is to square the Court's evolving theory with pur own precedents. 

Suffice it to say, Defendant's argument that a recent decision of 

the Court calls into doubt one of our past holdings carries great 

force. In addressing this argument, we apply the Court's 

pronouncement to our prior law to test whether our views retain 

their vitality. 

III. 

The Blanton defendants were charged with the single offense 

of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The state 

courts denied their respective pretrial demands for a jury trial 

since the maximum term of i ncar ceration for the offense was only 

six months and the maximum possible fine was only $1,000. 489 

u.s. at 540. For purposes of analysis, the Court assumed the 

defendants would receive the maximum authorized prison sentence, 

id. at 544, and then focused on the maximum penalty authorized by 

the legislature as the "most relevant criteria" for 

determining whether an offense is petty. Id. at 541 (quoting 

Baldwin, 399 U.S . at 68). In voicing its evolving preference for 

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using legislative enactments as an objective standard by which to 

measure whether an offense is petty or serious, the Court said: 

In fixing the maximum penalty for a crime, a legislature 

"include[s] within the definition of the crime itself a 

judgment about the seriousness of the offense." The 

judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to the 

seriousness for that of a legislature, which is "far 

better equipped to perform the task, and [is] likewise 

more responsive to changes in attitude and more amenable 

to the recognition and correction of their 

misperceptions in this respect." 

Id. at 541-42 (citations omitted). See also Frank, 395 U.S. at 

148 ("In determining whether a particular offense can be 

classified as 'petty,' this Court has sought objective indications 

of the seriousness with which society regards the offense. The 

most relevant indication of the seriousness of an offense is the 

severity of the penalty authorized for its commission.") (citing 

District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937)); 

Duncan, 391 u.s. at 161 ("In determining whether the length of the 

authorized prison term or the seriousness of other punishment is 

enough in itself to require a jury trial, we ..• refer to 

objective criteria .••. ") (citing Clawans, 300 U.S. at 617). 

Before Blanton, the Court decided a prison sentence exceeding 

six months is "sufficiently severe by itself" to take an offense 

out of the petty category, thereby triggering for "an accused the 

important right to trial by jury .... " Baldwin, 399 u.s. at 69 

9 n.6., 74. In Blanton, the Court traveled a bit closer to the 

9 The conclusion that "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for 

purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more 

than six months is authorized" connnanded a majority in Baldwin. 

Id. at 69. Justice White's opinion was joined by Justices Brennan 

and Marshall. Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the 

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converse conclusion that a crime carrying a maximum prison term of 

six months or less is automatically petty. 489 u.s. at 543. 

However, the Court expressly stopped short of an absolutist 

result, holding instead there is only a Sixth Amendment 

presumption that society views an offense with a prison term of 

six months or less as a petty one. Describing 

presumption for a unanimous Court, Justice Marshall wrote: 

A defendant is entitled to [a] jury trial in such 

circumstances only if he can demonstrate that any 

additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction 

with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are 

so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative 

determination that the offense in question is a 

"serious" one. 

the 

Id. The Court predicted it would be a "rare situation" where an 

offense is serious because of "onerous penalties that nonetheless 

'do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line. 1 " Id. (citation 

omitted). 

There has been only one federal court decision since Blanton 

where the presumption was punctured. The defendant in Richter v. 

Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1990), faced jail, a $700 fine 

and a fifteen-year revocation of his driver's license for driving 

while intoxicated and for refusing to take a breathalyzer test. 

Id. at 1203. If sentenced consecutively, the defendant could have 

been jailed for six months and seven days. However, the court did 

judgment, but would have gone further and required jury trials in 

all criminal prosecutions. Id. at 74-76. Thus, at least five 

members of the Court believed a jury trial is required when the 

potential punishment is greater than six months. In addition, 

Justices Harlan and Stewart apparently reached the same conclusion 

as to jury trials in federal court. See 399 u.s. 120-21 (Harlan, 

J., dissenting); id. at 143 {Stewart, J., dissenting). 

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not reach the issue of consecutive jail time because it concluded 

a sentence consisting of six months' imprisonment and a fifteenyear license revocation is sufficiently serious by itself to 

warrant a jury trial. Id. at 1204 . 

More typical are decisions like United States v. Garner, 874 

F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1989), where the court said the Blanton 

presumption is not overcome even though the defendant charged with 

DUI faces collateral consequences upon conviction, including "a 

potential increase in liability insurance premiums, public 

opprobrium, and the potential for an enhanced sentence upon a 

second or subsequent conviction " Garner, 874 F.2d at 1511. 

In United States v. Musser, 873 F.2d 1513 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 

denied, 110 s. Ct. 518 (1989), no jury trial was required where 

the defendant's arrest on a petty charge allegedly ran afoul of 

the First Amendment. The defendant was arrested for violating a 

minor sign regulation while demonstrating in Lafayette Park in 

Washington, D.C. Id. at 1514. The court said taking issue with a 

minor violation arrest is not a valid reason for a jury trial 

because " (t]he right to jury trial under Blanton focuses on the 

charge and the sentence it carries, not matters in defense." Id. 

at 1516. In another case, a lawyer-defendant charged with 

criminal contempt was not entitled to a jury trial when he was 

fined $600 and ordered to accept five criminal pro bono cases. 

United States v. Kozel, 908 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1991) (No. 90-1030). 

Neither the work Kozel was ordered to perform, nor the fact he was 

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subject to attorney discipline for the contempt, 

constitutional concern about his jury trial right. 

triggered any 

Id. at 207-0B. 

Defendant in this appeal points to a state law decision in 

support of his jury trial demand. New Mexico, in State v. 

Sanchez, 109 N.M. 428, 786 P.2d 42 (1990), relying on its 

interpretation of the United States Constitution, opted for the 

"objective measure" in "determining the constitutional right to 

jury trial of a defendant charged with more than one petty crime 

arising from a single incident." Sanchez, 786 P.2d at 43. The 

court, in light of Blanton, said whether a defendant is entitled 

to a jury trial is to be determined by referencing legislatively 

set statutory penalties and not the actual potential sentence. 

Id. at 46. Of course, Defendant here recognizes we are not bound 

by the New Mexico Supreme Court decision and we respectfully 

decline to follow it to the extent it interprets federal law. Our 

holding in Sain properly allows us to focus on our independent 

application of federal law when determining whether there will be 

a jury trial in federal court. Sain, 795 F.2d at 890. In 

addition, we note the Blanton Court refused an invitation to 

survey and rely on state law regarding "the potential term of 

imprisonment or amount of fine that trigger(s) a jury trial 

regardless of the particular offense involved." 489 u.s. at 545 

n.ll. 

To the extent we examined state law, including New Mexico's 

decision in Sanchez, we find there is no national consensus on 

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what makes one offense petty and another serious. The differences 

among the states are profound. For example, Arizona reads its 

Constitution as labeling DUI a serious offense; thus, there is a 

jury trial right in Arizona even though the DUI defendant may only 

be fined up to $300 and imprisoned for no more than six months. 

Rothweiler v. Superior Court of Pima Co., 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d 

479, 481, 484-85 (1966). However, the right does not extend to 

other traffic offenses, such as running a red light, because they 

are labeled petty. State v. Harrison, 164 Ariz. 316, 792 P.2d 779 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 59 u.s.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Feb. 

19, 1991) (No. 90-6184). New Jersey, on the other hand, refuses 

to call DWI a crime and recognize a jury trial right even for the 

third-time offender who may be jailed for 180 days, fined $1,000 

and lose his driver's license for ten years. State v. Hamm, 121 

N.J. 109, 112, 577 A.2d 1259, 1261 (1990). See generally 

Annotation, Right to Trial by Jury in Criminal Prosecution for 

Driving While Intoxicated or Other Similar Offenses, 16 A.L.R. 3d 

1373 (1967). Traffic offenses are, of course, merely one aspect 

of the larger petty versus serious offense issue as it implicates 

the jury trial right. Because there is no national consensus 

among the states, we believe a single state court decision is not 

sufficiently persuasive in identifying offenses as either petty or 

serious. 

Moreover, our decision in Haar, read today in light of 

Blanton, achieves the uniformity Defendant obviously desires when 

he argues only a pure "objective" standard is appropriate for 

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determining when someone gets a jury trial. But before addressing 

this point, we first briefly review what was said in Haar. 10 

Haar, who was charged with aggravated battery and criminal 

damage to property in New Mexico, was tried and convicted by a 

jury in state magistrate court. 708 F.2d at 1547-48. He asserted 

his right under state law to a second trial de novo in state 

district court, again demanding a jury on retrial. That court, 

however, denied the jury request and convicted him again. Haar 

ultimately received two concurrent terms of ninety days on the two 

convictions. The matter reached us on his habeas corpus petition 

following an unsuccessful attempt to reverse the state district 

court on direct appeal. Id. at 1548. Haar's habeas argument, 

which we rejected, reasserted his view "that since he faced 

conviction in the district court for two crimes arising out of the 

same transaction, and since the aggregate of the potential 

sentences exceeded six months, he was entitled to a jury trial." 

Our discussion of Supreme Court precedents to that point in 

time, including the decisions in Duncan and Baldwin, acknowledged 

10 Two decisions from this court predate Haar. In United States 

v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 383 (lOth Cir. 1973), a jury trial was 

required where the defendants were charged with two or more petty 

offenses and the potential aggregate penalty on all counts was in 

excess of six months' imprisonment. Somewhat to the contrary is 

the comment in United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 942 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 843 (1979), that no jury trial is 

required where the actual sentence for multiple petty offenses is 

less than six months. Since Haar adequately discusses the points 

expressed in these earlier cases, particularly after Blanton, 

further reference to Potvin or Smyer is unnecessary. 

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the Court's growing use of "objective criteria in resolving the 

reach of the constitutional right to a jury trial. " Id. at 1550. 

But we also "recognized that the actual penalty that will be 

imposed is of primary importance to the defendant." Id. We 

labeled this recognition a "'subjective' factor to the 

constitutional calculus of the right to a jury trial." Id. 

We found merit to both approaches. The objective method, 

which determines "the right to a jury trial on the basis of the 

aggregate of the statutorily prescribed penalties imparts a 

pragmatic temper to the Supreme Court's concept of a 'serious 

offense.'" Id. at 1552. Alternatively, what we called the 

subjecti ve approach focuses on "the potential penalty actually 

faced by the defendant." Id. We did not see this approach as 

broadening the definition of a serious offense; rather, it is a 

corollary to the objective method. It establishes the "right to a 

jury trial where a defendant faces the consequences, as well as an 

actual charge, of a serious offense." Id. After weighing both 

approaches, we held: "a defendant is entitled to a jury trial for 

multiple petty offenses arising out of the same act, transaction, 

or occurrence only if he is actually threatened at the 

commencement of trial with an aggregate potential penalty of 

greater than six months' imprisonment." Id. at 1553. 

Although Haar speaks of subjectivity, its holding clearly 

shows the linchpin of our standard to be the readily identifiable , 

measurable and uniform objective six months' imprisonment. Our 

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approach, following Duncan, Baldwin, and now Blanton, is penaltyoriented and requires a jury trial for the whole group of cases 

where the defendant is actually threatened with potential 

incarceration of more than six months. For example, the state may 

not circumvent the right to a jury trial by charging someone with 

a serious crime like murder, and then stipulate before trial that, 

if convicted, the accused will receive no more than six months. 

Such a tactic, if tried by the state, would run up against the 

policy that no single offense "can be deemed 'petty' for purposes 

of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six 

months is authorized" by the legislature. Baldwin, 399 u.s. at 

69. Nor may the right to a jury trial be denied when the state 

files charges for petty offenses that individually do not carry a 

possibility of more than six months' incarceration, but carry "an 

[actual] aggregate potential penalty of greater than six months' 

imprisonment." Haar, 708 F.2d at 1553. Finally, the presumption 

announced in Blanton allows an accused to successfully claim the 

right to a jury trial in that "rare situation" where the offense 

or offenses are serious because of "onerous penalties that 

nonetheless 'do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line.'" 

Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543 (citation omitted). See Fairbanks, 903 

F.2d at 1204. See generally Annotation, Right to Jury Trial Under 

Federal Constitution Where Two or More Petty Offenses, Each Having 

Penalty of Less Than 6 Months' Imprisonment, Have Potential 

Aggregate Penalty in Excess of 6 Months When Tried Together, 26 

A.L.R. Fed. 736 (1976). 

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Moreover, the penalty-oriented approach is consistent with 

Supreme Court cases concerning jury trials in criminal contempt 

proceedings. In this arena the length of the sentence determines 

whether there is a jury trial. Codispoti v. Penn§ylvania, 418 

u.s. 506, 512 (1974) ("[T]hose crimes carrying a sentence of more 

than six months are serious crimes and those carrying a sentence 

of six months or less are petty crimes."); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 

u.s. 488, 495 (1974) ("[C]ontempt of court is a petty offense when 

the penalty actually imposed does not exceed six months or a 

longer penalty has not been expressly authorized by statute."). 

In Taylor, the Court approved of trying a criminal contempt case 

without a jury where, absent legislative penalties making the 

contempt a serious offense, the state "determines not to impose a 

sentence longer than six months." 418 u.s. at 496. This is 

exactly the approach followed here regarding Defendant and the 

presumptively petty crimes with which he was charged. 

In addition, the recently amended Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure (the "Rules") are further support for the penaltyoriented approach. The Rules do not apply to petty offense cases 

"as to which the court determines, that, in the event of 

conviction, no sentence of imprisonment will actually be imposed." 

Fed. R. Crirn. P. 58(a)(3). Thus, the trial judge is free to 

announce before trial how the sentence will be limited in the 

event of conviction, and then may determine based on that 

announcement whether to use the Rules. The same logic applies 

here, where the trial judge announced that the sentence, in the 

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event of conviction, would be no more than six months' 

incarceration and because of that limitation no jury was 

constitutionally required. 11 Congress also sets the dividing line 

between a petty and serious offense at six months' imprisonment. 

18 u.s.c. s 19 (1988). 

Finally, as already mentioned, the Supreme Court believes 

there may be a rare case where the crime is serious even though 

its penalties do not include more than six months' incarceration. 

Blanton, 489 u.s. at 543. Such a crime will most easily be 

spotted by referencing the legislature's statute to ascertain what 

additional penalties besides incarceration qualify the offense as 

serious. ~ However, the Court further acknowledges that this 

standard is "somewhat imprecise," and with that in mind we think 

it is broad enough to encompass the equally scarce case where the 

state attempts to conduct a "vindictive prosecution" of one or 

more petty offenses by denying a defendant a jury trial. 

708 F.2d at 1552. 

Haar recognizes if "the defendant faces multiple charges at 

trial but does not actually face a serious penalty, the risk of 

prosecutorial abuse is small.'' Id. at 1552-53. We agree, but 

also recognize the risk is not zero. Accordingly, there is a need 

for interposing the common sense judgment of a jury between the 

11 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended on 

December 1, 1990, and now include the substance of the former 

Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Misdemeanors before United 

States Magistrates. See 58 U.S.L.W. 3722 (U.S. May 15, 1990). 

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government and the defendant where the defendant demonstrates to 

the trial judge that there is a reasonable probability the state 

is undertaking the prosecution of the petty charge, or charges, 

out of spite or vindictiveness. Because these cases are rare, we 

believe it will be obvious to the trial judge when the state is 

acting from a motive driven by the constitutionally impermissible 

desire to oppress the defendant. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155 ("A 

right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to 

prevent oppression by the Government.") (footnote omitted). 

In this case, there is no evidence in the record hinting the 

Government was "corrupt or overzealous" in charging the Defendant. 

Duncan, 391 u.s. at 156. Nor is there any indication the judge 

was "compliant, biased, or eccentric." Id. In fact, one charge 

was dismissed before trial without any objection from the 

Government, and Defendant was found innocent by the court of 

another charge. What is clear from the record is Defendant's 

mistaken belief the military police at Fort Sill have no authority 

to stop a civilian unless "martial law has been declared," for a 

state traffic offense occurring on federal property. The trial 

court rejected that explanation when it found Defendant guilty of 

three of the four charges that went to trial. The court 

recognized it was Mr. Bencheck's steadfast adherence to his 

position about the jurisdiction of the military police that led to 

his "terribly escalated and misguided resistance to a lawful 

arrest." We do not disagree with these observations. 

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IV. 

In conclusion, Defendant was not at risk of serving more than 

six months when he was tried on the four 

from a single occurrence. Haar, 708 

petty 

F.2d 

charges 

at 1553. 

stemming 

Nor did 

Defendant show that any additional penalties he faced, including 

statutory penalties, were so serious a jury trial was required 

even though he faced limited jail-time. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543-

44. Therefore, the decision of the district court denying 

Defendant a jury trial on the multiple petty charges is not 

repugnant to the United States Constitution. 

AFFIRMED. 

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No. 90-6072 - United States v. Bencheck 

EBEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

Based upon the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Blanton v. 

City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) and the Tenth 

Circuit's long-standing decision of United States v. Potvin, 481 

F.2d 380 (lOth Cir. 1973), I conclude that defendant here was 

denied his right to a jury trial. 

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 

public trial, by an impartial jury . . . n U.S. Canst. amend. 

VI. Although the Supreme Court has long recognized "that there is 

a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the 

Sixth Amendment jury trial provision," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 

U.S. 145, 159 (1968), courts generally have held that crimes 

carrying a penalty in excess of six months imprisonment are not 

petty and therefore entitle the defendant to a jury trial. See 

Baldwin v. New York, 399 u.s. 66, 68 (1970); United States v. 

Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 942 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 843 

(1979). 

In this case, defendant was charged with four misdemeanor 

offenses, each carrying a maximum penalty upon conviction of six 

months imprisonment. Taken in the aggregate, the statutory 

penalties exposed the defendant to a potential imprisonment of two 

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Appellate Case: 90-6072 Document: 01019726622 Date Filed: 02/27/1991 Page: 21 
years. However, as the majority points out, the trial judge 

promised before trial not to sent ence defendant to more than six 

months incarceration. Therefore, in orde r to resolve defendant's 

Sixth Amendment claim, we must first determine: 1) whether it is 

appropriate to aggregate the penalties faced by defendants charged 

with multiple petty offenses; and 2) whet her the right to a jury 

trial should be dete rmined on the basis of the potential penalties 

provided in the statutory definitions of the crimes (an objective 

standard), or on the basis of the potential penalties as they may 

be limited by the judge before commencement of trial (subjective 

standard). 

AGGREGATION 

Although the Supreme Court has yet to address the right to a 

jury trial when a defendant is charged with multiple petty 

offenses, the Tenth Circuit has held that "a person charged with 

two or more petty offenses arising out of the same act, 

transaction, or occurrence, is entitled to a trial by jury when 

the potential aggregate penalty on all counts is in excess of six 

months imprisonment." Potvin, 481 F.2d at 381. The Potvin court 

reasoned that "defendants can view as no less serious a possible 

penalty of a year in prison when charged with two offenses arising 

out of the same act • • • than if charged with one offense having 

a potential penalty of one year's imprisonment ... Id. at 382. 

However, while there can be no doubt that Potvin expressly 

directed courts to aggregate the penalties of petty offenses for 

Sixth Amendment purposes, "the Potvin opi nion [did] not reveal 

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whether the right to a jury trial should be determined on the 

basis of the potential penalties provided in the statutory 

definition of the crimes, or on the basis of the actual penalties 

faced by the defendant," Haar v, Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1552 

(lOth Circuit 1983). This issue was not addressed until ten years 

later with the case of Haar v. Hanrahan. 

SUBJECTIVE vs. OBJECTIVE TEST 

In Haar, the court faced a situation similar to the one we 

face today. Defendant, who was charged with several "petty" 

offenses, demanded a jury trial on the reasoning that the 

aggregate statutory penalty for his offenses exceeded six months 

imprisonment. The state court rejected defendant's request, 

concluding that defendant was not entitled to a jury trial since 

he had been assured before trial t hat his sentence would not 

exceed six months. The Tenth Circuit carefully weighed the 

"choice between the 'objective' penalty provided by statute and 

the 'subjective' penalty actually faced by the defendant," and 

observed that "[b]oth choices have merit in terms of the values 

that Potvin seeks to protect." Id. However, the court ultimately 

opted for the subjective test, holding that 11 a defendant is 

entitled to a jury trial for multiple petty offenses • • • only if 

he is actually threatened at the commencement of trial with an 

aggregate potential penalty of greater than six months' 

imprisonment." Id. at 1553 (emphasis added). 

"[G]iven the absence of Supreme Court guidance on this 

issue," id., the Haar rule was a perfectl y acceptable and workable 

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extension of Potvin's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. However, in 

1989 the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Blanton v. City of 

North Las Vegas, 489 u.s. 538 (1989). Although not a case 

involving multiple petty offenses, Blanton stated in no uncertain 

terms that courts are to apply an objective standard when 

considering the Sixth Amendment claims of criminal defendants. 

Specifically, the Court stated: 

In determining whether a particular offense should be 

categorized as "petty," our early decisions focused on 

the nature of the offense and on whether it was triable 

by a jury at common law. In recent years, however, we 

have sought more objective indications of the 

seriousness with which society regards the offense. We 

have found the most relevant such criteria in the 

severity of the maximum authorized penalty. In fixing 

the maximum penalty for a crime, a legislature includes 

within the definition of the crime itself a judgment 

about the seriousness of the offense. The judiciary 

should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for 

that of the legislature, which is far better equipped to 

perform the task, and is likewise more responsive to 

changes in attitude and more amenable to the recognition 

and correction of their misperceptions in this respect. 

Id. at 541-542 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis 

added). 

To my mind, the subjective test announced in Haar cannot be 

squared with this language in Blanton. By hinging a defendant's 

Sixth Amendment rights on the pre-trial sentence pronouncements of 

the trial judge, Haar clearly invites "the judiciary ••• [to] 

substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that of the 

legislature. " Blanton, 489 u.s. at 541. Such a standard directly 

contravenes the Supreme Court's admonition to look to "objective 

indications of the seriousness with which society regards the 

offense." Id. I therefore conclude that Blanton overrules Haar 

and directs us to look to the "'objective' penalty provided by 

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statute." 1 Haar, 708 F.2d at 1552. Coupled with the aggregation 

policy set forth in Potvin, Blanton requires us to make a 

"determination of the right to a jury trial on the basis of the 

aggregate of the statutorily prescribed penalties •••• " Id. 

Applying this standard to the case at hand, I must conclude that 

appellant was denied his right to a jury trial. 

CONCLUSION 

Blanton and Potvin require a jury trial for defendants who, 

based on the aggregate of the statutorily prescribed penalties, 

face more than six months incarceration. Since appellant here 

faced such a penalty, he was entitled to a trial by jury. 

Although I am mindful of the majority's concerns regarding "the 

practical necessity for limiting the number of jury trials," 

supra, I am also mindful of our obligation to follow the clear 

directives of the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. Should the 

prospect of additional jury trials become truly overwhelming, it 

may be necessary for this court to reconsider en bane the policy 

of aggregating petty offenses as set forth in Potvin. Prosecutors 

and legislatures might also address this potential problem by 

1 Although the majority finds support for its "subjective" test 

in the Supreme Court's criminal contempt cases, Haar itself 

acknowledged that these cases are "of limited precedential value." 

Haar, 708 F.2d at 1550 n.14. As the Supreme Court noted in Duncan 

v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 n.35, "criminal contempt is unique 

in that legislative bodies frequently authorize punishment without 

stating the extent of the penalty which can be imposed." That is, 

the statutes are open-ended and do not define minimum or maximum 

penalties. Thus, " .•. where no legislative penalty is 

specified and sentence is left to the discretion of the judge, as 

is often true in the case of criminal contempt, the pettiness or 

seriousness of the contempt will be judged by the penalty actually 

imposed." Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511 (1974). 

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tailoring their criminal charges and by statutorily precluding 

aggregation. For the time-being, however, we are bound to adhere 

to both Potvin and Blanton and therefore should reverse the lower 

court's ruling. 

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