Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00783/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00783-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gemma Grossi
Defendant
Gladys Moore
Defendant
Barbara Perry
Plaintiff
Solano County
Defendant
Jasmine Taggart
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASMINE TAGGART, a minor, by

and through her Guardian Ad

Litem, her custodial parent,

Barbara Perry, on behalf of

themselves and all those

similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

SOLANO COUNTY; SOLANO COUNTY

CHIEF PROBATION OFFICER GEMMA

GROSSI, in her individual and

official capacity; SOLANO

COUNTY JUVENILE HALL

SUPERINTENDENT GLADYS MOORE, in

her individual and official

capacity; and DOES 1 THROUGH

150,

Defendants. 

CIV-S-05-0783 DFL GGH

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jasmine Taggart brings this action on behalf of

herself and all those similarly situated against defendants

Solano County (the “County”), Solano County Chief Probation

Officer Gemma Grossi (“Grossi”), Solano County Juvenile Hall

Superintendent Gladys Moore (“Moore”), and Does 1 through 150 for

civil rights violations arising from the use of strip searches at

Case 2:05-cv-00783-RRB-GGH Document 17 Filed 12/08/05 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Defendants do not move to dismiss the Section 1983 claims. 1

2

the Solano County Juvenile Detention Center (the “Center”). 

Taggart seeks compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory and

injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, California Penal Code § 4030, and California Civil Code §

52.1. 

Defendants move to dismiss the state law claims on the

following grounds: (1) Taggart’s state law claims were not timely

presented; (2) California Civil Code § 52.1 does not authorize a

private citizen to bring a representative action; and (3) the

California Government Code shields all defendants from

liability. For the reasons stated below, defendants’ motion is 1

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

I.

Taggart was fourteen years old in October 2003 when she was

picked up as a runaway and transported to the Center. (Compl. ¶

12.) She alleges that upon her arrival at the Center, she was

strip searched in violation of California Penal Code § 4030. 

(Id.) Taggart reported the illegal strip search to her mother in

August 2004. (Opp’n at 3.)

Taggart presented her claim and an application for leave to

present a late claim to the Solano County Board of Supervisors

(the “Board”) on September 15, 2004. (Id.) On October 19, 2004,

the Board sent Taggart a letter denying her application to

present a late claim. (Id. at 4.) 

Case 2:05-cv-00783-RRB-GGH Document 17 Filed 12/08/05 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Following the Board’s rejection of her application to

present a late claim, Taggart petitioned the state court for

relief from the claim presentation requirement. (Id.) The state

court granted Taggart’s petition on February 23, 2005. (Id.) 

Taggart filed her complaint on April 21, 2005. (Id.)

II.

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint are

accepted as true. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733 

(1964). Claims may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim

“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no

set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957). 

Defendants have demonstrated that even under this liberal

standard, Taggart’s state law claims for damages cannot survive. 

A. State Law Claims for Damages

The California Tort Claims Act (Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810 et

seq.)(“CTCA”) prescribes the process for bringing a claim for

damages against a public entity in California. The CTCA requires 

that, before filing suit, an individual seeking to recover in

tort against a public entity must present her claim to the entity

“not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of

action.” Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4. If the claimant

fails to present her claim within six months of the accrual date,

the claimant can apply to the public entity for leave to file a

late claim. Id. § 911.4. If the public entity denies the

application, the claimant can petition a court for relief from

Case 2:05-cv-00783-RRB-GGH Document 17 Filed 12/08/05 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

the claim presentation requirement. Id. § 946.6. If the court

grants the petition, the claimant then must file the complaint

within thirty days of the court’s order, otherwise the action is

time-barred. Id. § 946.6(f); Mandjik v. Eden Township Hosp.

Dist., 4 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1498 (1992)(“The 30-day time limit set

forth in section 946.6, subdivision (f), is a statute of

limitations.”); Todd v. Los Angeles, 74 Cal.App.3d 661, 664-66

(1977) (court barred action brought more than thirty days after

plaintiff obtained relief under Section 946.6 despite minority of

claimant and negligence of attorney); Tuolomne Air Serv. v.

Turlock Irrigation Dist., 87 Cal.App.3d 248, 251-52 (1978) (court

granted demurrer against plaintiff who failed to file complaint

within thirty days of order granting relief under Section 946.6).

Defendants argue that Taggart’s state law claims are timebarred because she did not present them to the County within six

months of the date her cause of action accrued and she failed to

file the complaint within thirty days of the state court’s order

granting her petition. (Mot. at 4.) Taggart contends that her

state law claims are timely because she presented them in

accordance with the CTCA and she filed her complaint within two

years of the date her cause of action accrued. (Opp’n at 5-11.) 

Taggart is mistaken.

1. Taggart Did Not Present a Timely Claim to the County

Taggart was required to present her claim to the County

within six months of the date her cause of action accrued. Cal.

Gov’t Code § 911.2. Taggart presented her claim to the County in

Case 2:05-cv-00783-RRB-GGH Document 17 Filed 12/08/05 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

September 2004, almost eleven months after she was searched at

the Center. (Id. at 3.) However, Taggart argues that her claim

is timely because her cause of action did not accrue on the date

she was strip searched. (Id. at 6.) Instead, she contends that

it accrued in August 2004 when she notified her mother about the

strip search. (Id. at 6-8.) Based on this reasoning, Taggart

concludes that her claim met the six-month limitations period set

forth in Section 911.2. (Id.)

Taggart bases her argument on the “delayed-discovery

doctrine.” (Id.) Generally, a tort claim accrues on the date of

the injury. Soliman v. Philip Morris, Inc., 311 F.3d 966, 971

(9th Cir. 2002). However, the date of accrual may toll in

certain situations that are subject to the delayed-discovery

doctrine. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfund, 6

Cal.3d 176, 190 (1971); Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

62 Cal.App.3d 310, 314-15 (1976). Under this doctrine, the

accrual date for a cause of action is the date “the plaintiff

knows, or should know, all material facts essential to show the

elements of [the] cause of action.” Neel, 6 Cal.3d at 190.

Taggart claims that the delayed-discovery doctrine should be

applied here because she was too young to know that what had been

done to her was illegal. (Opp’n at 6-8.) To support this

assertion, she cites Curtis T. v. County of Los Angeles, 123

Cal.App.4th 1405 (2004). (Id.) In Curtis T., a guardian ad

litem brought a claim against Los Angeles County on behalf of an

8-year old child who had been molested at age five. 123

Case 2:05-cv-00783-RRB-GGH Document 17 Filed 12/08/05 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Unlike actions against private parties, the statute of 2

limitations for a minor’s claim against a public entity is not

automatically tolled until the minor reaches the age of majority. 

See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 352(b). 

6

Cal.App.4th at 1412-13. Although the injury occurred three years

before the guardian presented the child’s claim to the public

entity, the California Court of Appeal held that the claim was

timely. Id. at 1422-23. Applying the delayed-discovery

doctrine, the court found that the claim accrued on the date the

child’s guardian learned about the incident. Id. However,

because the California Supreme Court declined to apply the

delayed-discovery doctrine in John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch.

Dist., 48 Cal.3d 438 (1989), the Court of Appeal stressed that

its decision was limited to situations where, “given his youth,

ignorance, and inexperience,” a plaintiff can truthfully allege

“that he lacked a real awareness, until his mother’s discovery of

the alleged molestation, that what happened to him between the

ages of five and eight was wrong.” Id. at 1409. 

2

John R. involved a 14-year old boy who was molested by a

teacher. 48 Cal.3d at 442. The boy did not report the event to

his parents until after the claim presentation period had

elapsed. Id. at 443. The lower court held that the plaintiff’s

claim was timely under the delayed-discovery doctrine. Id. at

444. The California Supreme Court did not agree. Id. It stated

that the applicability of the delayed-discovery theory of accrual

“raised a serious question in our minds . . . on the facts of

this case.” Id. It declined to affirm the Court of Appeal’s

Case 2:05-cv-00783-RRB-GGH Document 17 Filed 12/08/05 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Curtis T. is further distinguishable on its specific 3

facts: the injury occurred to a very young child and was

inflicted in the presence of an adult foster parent. See Curtis

T. 123 Cal.App.4th at 1411-12.

7

approach and applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel instead. 

Id. 

Examining the facts of this case through the lens of John R.

and Curtis T. reveals that the delayed-discovery doctrine does

not apply to Taggart’s claim. Not only has the California

Supreme Court shown a reluctance to apply the doctrine to claims

brought on behalf of a minor against a public entity, but, even

if the holding of Curtis T. were the law in California, it would

not toll Taggart’s accrual date. 

Taggart does not state that she delayed reporting the strip

search to her mother because she lacked a real awareness that

what happened to her was “wrong” as that term is used in Curtis

T. Instead, she decided not to notify her mother because she did

not know that the searches were illegal and she “was embarrassed

and humiliated by the strip search procedure.” (Opp’n at 3.) 

Being unaware that an action is illegal is quite different from

being too young to comprehend that an action is wrong. Because

Taggart does not allege that, at the time of the strip search,

she was too young to comprehend the material facts constituting

her cause of action, and because she does allege that she was

embarrassed and humiliated by the search, the delayed-discovery

doctrine is inapplicable. Therefore, Taggart’s claim accrued 3

when she was strip searched. 

Case 2:05-cv-00783-RRB-GGH Document 17 Filed 12/08/05 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Taggart makes the further argument that her failure to 4

present her claim within six months of its accrual is not a bar

because the County did not reject her claim in writing and she

filed her complaint within two years of the date her cause of

action accrued. She relies on language in § 945.6(a)(2) which

states: “If written notice is not given in accordance with

section 913, within two years from the accrual of the cause of

action.” She also cites Jenkins v. County of Contra Costa, 167

8

The CTCA required Taggart to present her claim to the County

within six months of the date her cause of action accrued. Cal.

Gov’t Code § 911.2. Taggart failed to do so. Therefore, her

September 2004 claim was untimely.

However, as described above, the CTCA provides a process for

obtaining leave from the claim presentation requirement. Taggart

initiated this process by applying for leave to present a late

claim. The County denied her application. Taggart petitioned

the state court for relief from the presentation requirement. On

February 23, 2005, the state court granted Taggart’s petition.

(Id. at 4.) At that point, Taggart had thirty days to file her

complaint. Cal. Gov’t Code § 946.6(f). Taggart filed her

complaint on April 21, 2005, several weeks after the 30-day

deadline. Had Taggart filed her complaint within the 30-day

window established by the CTCA, then her failure to present a

timely claim would not have barred her suit against the County. 

But because Taggart did not timely present her state law claims

to the County and because, having initiated the process for

relief from the claim presentation requirement, she failed to

follow through with a timely filing, her state law claims must be

dismissed. See Todd 74 Cal.App.3d at 664-66. 4

Case 2:05-cv-00783-RRB-GGH Document 17 Filed 12/08/05 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Cal.App.3d 152 (1985), to support this proposition. 

Jenkins is inapplicable here. In that case, the claimant

presented a timely claim to the public entity. 167 Cal.App.3d at

156. Therefore, the claimant’s petition for relief from the

claim presentation requirement was unnecessary. Id. Moreover,

§ 945.6 begins “except as provided in Sections 946.4 and 946.6.” 

By this language the 30 day period in § 946.6 takes precedence

over the two year period in § 945.6(a)(2). Finally, the County

did not ignore plaintiff’s filing. Once it had denied her

request to file out of time, no further action by the County was

called for. The County’s failure to reach the merits of an

untimely claim does not convert an untimely claim into a timely

one. 

9

2. Claims That Are Barred Against a Public Entity Are

Barred Against Its Employees

Section 950.2 states that “a cause of action against a

public employee . . . for injury resulting from an act or

omission in the scope of employment as a public employee is

barred if an action against the employing public entity for such

injury is barred.” Taggart’s claim against the County is barred

because she failed to comply with the CTCA. Therefore, under the

settled law of California, Taggart’s claims for damages against

the individual public employees must be dismissed. See Williams

v. Horvath, 16 Cal.3d 834, 838 (1974) (holding that a claimant

must present a timely claim to the public entity before bringing

a tort action against the entity or its employee).

B. Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

The claim presentation requirement of the CTCA applies to

“all claims for money and damages.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 905. 

However, it does not apply to claims for declaratory and

injunctive relief. Minsky v. Los Angeles, 11 Cal.3d 113, 121

(1974). Therefore, Taggart’s request for declaratory and

Case 2:05-cv-00783-RRB-GGH Document 17 Filed 12/08/05 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

injunctive relief under California Civil Code § 52.1 is not

barred, even though she failed to timely present her claim to the

County.

Defendants argue that, even if the claims are not barred by

the CTCA, they are immune to suit under California Government

Code §§ 815.2, 818.2, 820.2, 820.8, 821, 844.6. This argument

fails because none of these sections applies to claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 814;

Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1138 (N.D.

Cal. 2000). Therefore, defendants are not shielded from

Taggart’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under

these statutes.

C. Representative Actions Under California Civil Code § 52.1

Taggart seeks to recover damages under California Civil Code

§ 52.1 on behalf of herself and all those similarly situated. 

(Compl. ¶ 21.) Defendants argue that individuals are not

authorized to bring a representative action under that section. 

(Mot. at 12.) Taggart contends that a class action is permissible

because all class members have standing to sue under Section

52.1, and class actions are a procedural device for joining real

parties in interest. (Opp’n at 23.)

Section 52.1(b) provides: 

Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or

laws of this state, has been interfered with or

attempted to be interfered with, as described in

subdivision (a), may institute and prosecute in his or

her own name and on his or her own behalf a civil

Case 2:05-cv-00783-RRB-GGH Document 17 Filed 12/08/05 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

action for damages, including, but not limited to,

damages under Section 52, injunctive relief, and any

other appropriate equitable relief to protect the

peaceable exercise of the enjoyment of the right or

rights secured.

Although neither party cites a case directly on point, a

plain reading of the statute reveals that Section 52.1(b) does

not encompass class actions. The statute specifies that an

individual may bring a civil action “on his or her own behalf.” 

In addition, Section 52.1(a) authorizes the Attorney General,

district attorneys, and city attorneys to bring claims “in the

name of the people of the State of California against a person

who interferes with the exercise or enjoyment of the rights of an

individual or individuals.” Thus, the legislation addresses

representative actions but only provides for such actions under

Section 52.1(a), not Section 52.1(b). Because the language and

structure of the statute reveal that Section 52.1(b) does not

authorize a representative action, the Section 52.1(b) class

claim is dismissed. Taggart’s individual claim for declaratory

and injunctive relief under Section 52.1(b) survives.

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-00783-RRB-GGH Document 17 Filed 12/08/05 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

III.

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to dismiss

Taggart’s state law claims for damages and her class claim under

Section 52.1 is GRANTED and defendants’ motion to dismiss the

state law claims for declaratory and injunctive relief is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/6/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

Case 2:05-cv-00783-RRB-GGH Document 17 Filed 12/08/05 Page 12 of 12