Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00027/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00027-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Freeman Bonnet
Defendant
Mark W. Herder
Defendant
Toni Deward Levingston
Plaintiff
Stockton Police Department
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONI DEWARD LEVINGSTON, No. CIV S-06-0027-FCD-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

PAUL FREEMAN BONNET, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1), filed on January

5, 2006.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

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This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are

satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds

upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff

must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which

support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it

is impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are

vague and conclusory. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff names as defendants Paul Bonnet, an officer with the Stockton Police

Department. Plaintiff also names the Stockton Police Department itself, the County of San

Joaquin, and Mark W. Herder, the chief of police. Plaintiff claims that defendant Bonnet used

excessive force during the course of his arrest. Plaintiff also claims that defendant Bonnet

offered false testimony at his parole revocation hearing. 

II. DISCUSSION

Based on plaintiff’s allegations, the complaint presents an excessive force claim

and a claim relating to plaintiff’s parole revocation hearing. It appears that the complaint states a

cognizable excessive force claim against defendant Bonnet. The complaint is defective with

respect to the claim relating to the parole revocation hearing and all claims against the Stockton

Police Department, the County of San Joaquin, and Mark W. Herder (collectively “municipal

defendants”). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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A. Parole Revocation Hearing Claim

When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks

is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not

cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda,

131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir.

1995) (per curiam). Similarly, where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory

relief alleges constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the

prisoner’s underlying conviction or sentence, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless

the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through

some similar proceeding. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1987) (holding that 

§ 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural defects and a biased hearing

officer implied the invalidity of the underlying prison disciplinary sanction); Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 not cognizable because allegations were

akin to malicious prosecution action which includes as an element a finding that the criminal

proceeding was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th

Cir. 1997) (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural

defects were an attempt to challenge substantive result in parole hearing); see also Neal, 131

F.3d at 824 (concluding that § 1983 claim was cognizable because challenge was to conditions

for parole eligibility and not to any particular parole determination). In particular, where the

claim involves loss of good-time credits as a result of an adverse prison disciplinary finding, the

claim is not cognizable. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997).

If a § 1983 complaint states claims which sound in habeas, the court should not

convert the complaint into a habeas petition. See id.; Trimble, 49 F.3d at 586. Rather, such

claims must be dismissed without prejudice and the complaint should proceed on any remaining

cognizable § 1983 claims. See Balisok, 520 U.S. at 649; Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Trimble, 49

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F.3d at 585.

In this case, plaintiff alleges that defendant Bonnet offered false testimony at his

parole hearing. If true, plaintiff would be entitled to a new parole revocation hearing. Therefore,

such an allegation of a procedural defect is necessarily an attempt to challenge the substantive

decision to revoke parole. See Butterfield, 120 F.3d at 1024-25. This deficiency cannot be

cured by amendment. 

B. Municipal Defendants

Plaintiff names as the municipal defendants one individual and two local

agencies. As to the individual, the complaint does not link defendant Herder, who is the chief of

police, to any alleged constitutional deprivation. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the

plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the

alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional

right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's

affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights

violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in

the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, the complaint contains no specific allegations as to defendant Herder. It is possible that

this defect may be cured through amendment.

As to the local agencies, plaintiff has not alleged the necessary elements to

establish municipal liability. Municipalities and other local government units are among those

“persons” to whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Counties and

municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 691; see

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also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local

government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials

under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not

of the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the

plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or

custom of the municipality. See id. A claim of municipal liability under § 1983 is sufficient to

withstand dismissal even if it is based on nothing more than bare allegations that an individual

defendant’s conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice. See Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). As with defendant Herder, the

complaint does not contain any allegations as to either the County of San Joaquin or the Stockton

Police Department. This defect is also subject to amendment. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule,

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer

to the prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule

15-220. An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. See id. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As to the claim

relating to plaintiff’s parole revocation hearing, such claim is not cognizable as a matter of law

and, therefore, plaintiff is not entitled leave to amend as to this claim. If such a claim continues

to appear in an amended complaint filed pursuant to this order, the court will issue appropriate

findings and recommendations that the claim be dismissed.

Because the complaint appears to otherwise state a cognizable excessive force

claim against defendant Bonnet, if no amended complaint is filed within the time allowed

therefor, the court will issue findings and recommendations that the claims identified herein as

defective be dismissed, as well as such further orders as are necessary for service of process as to

the cognizable claims.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that may file a first amended complaint

within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

DATED: April 27, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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