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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Jesus Valdez
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED 

v. 

FILED 

PUBLISH tJ,nittd Sta~cs Court of Appe~ls 

•r. ~ .. h C'r'"'l: • .r.. er... .. ·-... ~·- UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) 

) 

MAR 3 0 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

NO. 89-4026 

SILVERIO CORRAL, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) NO. 89-4030 

) 

JESUS VALDEZ, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 88 CR 131 G) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Richard D. McKelvie, Special Assistant United states Attorney (Dee 

V. Benson, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Salt 

Lake City, Uta h, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

William A. Swano, Chicago, Illinois, for Defendant- Appellant 

Corral. 

Charles B. Lauer, Chicago, Illinois, fo r Defendant-Appellant 

Valdez. 

Before ANDERSON 1 BARRETT, Circuit Judges 1 and THEIS,* District 

Judge. 

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Appellate Case: 89-4030 Document: 01019748664 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 1 
THEIS 1 District Judge 

*The Honorable Frank G. Theis 1 District Judge 1 United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

This is an appeal from a final judgment and commitment in a 

criminal case. Appellants Silverio Corral and Jesus Valdez were 

indicted for possession of a controlled substance wi th intent to 

distribute, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a) (1). The appellants• 

motion to suppress was denied. Following the denial of the motion 

to suppress, both appellants entered conditional guilty pleas, 

reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. 

The issues presented by Corral's appeal are: whether there 

was reasonable suspicion to detain h im by stopping Valdez' vehicle ; 

whether the misdemeanor traffic stop was a pretext to stop and 

arrest him; whether there was probable cause to arrest him; and 

whether the evidence seized is tainted by the illegal stop and 

arrest. Brief of Appellant Corral at 1. The issues presented by 

Valdez' appeal are: whether there was reasonable suspicion to 

detain him by stopping his vehicle; whether the misdemeanor traffic 

stop was a pretext to search for drugs; whether there was probable 

cause to search the vehicle; and whether he consented to the 

search. Brief of Appellant Valdez at 1 . 

The testimony at the suppression hearing revealed the 

following. On August 2, 1988 1 at approximately 8:10 a.m., Utah 

Highway Patrol Sgt. Paul V. Mangelson was in a stationary, marked 

patrol car on Interstate Highway 15, monitoring northbound traffi c 

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Appellate Case: 89-4030 Document: 01019748664 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 2 
with a .radar unit. Mangelson observed a white Mercury travelling 

northbound. Mangelson thought the vehicle appeared suspicious, 

since the occupants did not "match" the car. Mangelson pulled out 

and followed the vehicle for a short distance. After he noted the 

vehicle 1 s California license plate had expired in April 1988, 

Mangelson pulled the vehicle over. R. Vol. II, at 9-11, 46. 

Mangelson approached the vehicle and asked the driver of the 

vehicle for a driver 1 s license and registration. Valdez, the 

driver, produced an Illinois driver's license and showed it to 

Mangelson. Mangelson then requested a.registration . ~n response, 

Valdez pointed to a folded piece ~f paper taped in the rear window. 

Mangelson thought the paper was a California temporary 

registration, which normally is displayed in the right front cor ner 

of the windshield. Because the piece of paper was folded, 

Mangelson could not see who was listed as the purchaser of the 

vehicle. R. Vol. II, at 11-15. 

Mangelson then asked Valdez to open the hatchback so Mangelson 

could unfold the paper. In response, Valdez exited the car and 

opened the hatchback. Mangelson unfolded the registration, which 

reflected that Valdez had purchased the car the day before in 

Cal ifornia. Before Valdez had opened the hatchback, Mangelson 

observed that the spare tire was not in the tire compartment under 

the floor, but was lying on the floor of the hatch. The floor of 

the hatch was slightly bulged. Mangelson asked both Valdez and 

corral whether they were carrying any contraband, specifically guns 

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Appellate Case: 89-4030 Document: 01019748664 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 3 
or drugs, in their vehicle. Valdez responded that they_were not 

carrying d~gs or weapons. R. Vol. II, at 16-20. 

At that point, Mangelson asked Valdez and Corral, who were 

both standing at the rear of the car, whether they objected to a 

search of the vehicle. Valdez stated, "Yeah, you can look" and / 

picked up a duffel bag from the vehicle, unzipped it, and showed 

it to Mangelson. After looking through the duffel bag, Mangelson 

lifted up the carpet and cardboard covering the spare tire well and 

saw several bundles which he believed to contain cocaine. 

Mangel son then arrested and handcuffed the appellants. R. Vol. I I, 

at 20-21. 

During the course of the search, both defendants stood at 

Mangelson's side on the shoulder of the road. R. Vol. II, at 40-

41, 54. At no time did either Valdez or Corral attempt to stop or 

restrict the search. R. Vol. II, at 53-54. The search of the 

spare tire compartment revealed a quantity of cocaine. 

Mangelson testified that Valdez appeared to understand the 

questions asked of him in English. R. Vol. II, at 12-13. 

Mangelson further testified that during the initi al stop of the 

vehicle, he asked Valdez and Corral where they had been and where 

they were going. Valdez responded in English that they had been 

in California working and that they were returning to Chicago, 

Illinois, from where they had come. R. Vol. II, at 18-19. 

Valdez and Corral testified at the suppression hearing. 

Valdez testified that Mangelson motioned Valdez out of the car, 

took Valdez' keys, opened the trunk, handcuffed Valdez and Corral, 

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Appellate Case: 89-4030 Document: 01019748664 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 4 
and began to search the car. Valdez denied that Mangelson asked 

for permission to search and denied consenting to the: search. 

Valdez testified that he understood no English. R. Vol. II, at 62-

63, 66-67. Valdez denied having any conversation with Mangelson 

and claimed that he did not underst~nd anything Mangelson said to 

him. R. Vol. II, at 74-75. Corral testified and generally 

corroborated Valdez' testimony. R. Vol. II, at 84-89. Corral 

testified that he understood very little English. R. Vol. II, at 

92-93. 

Special Agent curtis D. Fillmore of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) testified 

appellants' knowledge of English. 

in rebuttal regarding the 

Fillmore testified that Valdez 

responded in English to Fillmore's questions regarding his personal 

history, i.e., name, address, date of birth, place of birth, and 

the like~ In one instance, Corral answered a question for V~ldez 

which Valdez did not understand. R. Vol. II, at 94-95. Fillmore 

testified that Valdez and Corral complied with verbal commands 

(e.g., sit down; stand against the wall). R. Vol. II, at 110-11. 

Following the hearing, the district court ruled that the 

initial stop of Valdez' vehicle was a valid investigatory stop. 

The district court specifically found Mangelson•s testimony that 

he obtained Valdez• consent to be believable. The court found 

that Valdez voluntarily consented to the search and that he had at 

least a working knowledge of English. The court then denied both 

appellants• motions to suppress. R. Vol. II, at 131-33. 

The standard of review is well established: 

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In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the trial 

court's finding of fact must be accepted by this court 

unless clearly erroneous, United States v. Cooper, 733 

F.2d 1360, 1364 (lOth Cir. 1984), with the evidence 

viewed in the light most favorable to the district 

court's finding. United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 

1371, 1376 (lOth Cir. 1984). 

United States v. Espinosa, 782 . F.2g' 888, 892 (lOth Cir. 1986) 

(quoting United states v. LQpez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (lOth Cir. 

1985)) • 

Valdez and corral argue that there was no reasonable suspicion 

to support the investigatory detention of vehicle and its 

occupants. An investigatory detent.ion need not be based on 

probable cause, only reasonable suspicion: 

An investigative detention is justified where specific 

and articulable facts and rational inferences from those 

facts give rise to reasonable suspicion that a person 

has committed or is committing a crime. 

United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 890 (lOth cir. 1986). The 

district court found reasonable suspicion existed for the initial 

stop from the expired license plate and ·the apparent lack of a 

temporary registration. R. Vol. II, at 131. The district court 

found reasonable suspicion for the continued detention to question 

Valdez regarding suspicious circumstances, especially the bulge in 

the floor of the hatch where the spare tire should have been. R. 

Vol. II, at 131-32. These fact findings are supported by the 

record and are not clearly erroneous. 

Valdez and Corral argue that the initial stop of the vehicle 

was a pretext. The district court specifically found that the stop 

was not pretextual. R. Vol. II, at 131. This court has recently 

stated that: 

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Appellate Case: 89-4030 Document: 01019748664 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 6 
(a] pretextual stop occurs when the police use a legal 

justification to make the stop in order to search a 

person or place, or to interrogate a person, for: an 

unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the 

reasonable suspicion necessary to support a stop. 

United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (lOth Cir. 1988). In 

Guzman, decided after the district co11rt ruled in the present case, 

we adopted an objective test to determine whether a traffic stop 

was pretextual. Id. at 1515-18. In the present case, the district 

court conducted an objective inquiry and found that, although 

Mangelson had some suspicions, he did observe an expired l icense 

plate which made the initial stop valid, not pretextual. R. Vol. 

II, at 131. While appellants argue that the stop was pretextual, 

since Valdez possessed a valid driver's license and temporary 

registration, appellants do not disclose how the o.fficer could have 

determined these facts absent an investigatory stop. Appellants 

do not challenge ~he fact that the license plate on Valdez' vehicle 

had expired several months before. We find that the initial stop 

of the vehicle was not pretextual. 

Valdez argues that he did not consent to the search and that 

he could not consent, since he does not u nderstand English. 

Whether a consent to search is voluntary or was a product of duress 

or coercion is a question of fact to be determined from the 

totality of the circumstances. United sta tes v. Mendenhall, 446 

U.S. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 227 

(1973.). This court has previously set forth the three-tiered 

analysis for determining whether the government has sustained its 

burden of showing that consent to search was voluntary: 

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Appellate Case: 89-4030 Document: 01019748664 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 7 
First, there must be clear and positive testimony -that 

the consent was unequivocal and specific, and freely_and 

intelligently given. second, the Government must 

establish that consent was given without duress or 

coercion. Finally, we evaluate the first two standards 

with the traditional indulgence of the courts against a 

presumption of waiver of constitutional rights. 

United States y. Recalde, 761 F.2d_.:l448, 1453 (lOth Cir. 1985) 

(citing United states v. Abbott, 546 F. 2d 883, 885 (lOth Cir. 

1977); Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (lOth Cir. 

1962)). 

Applying these standards to the facts of the case, we conclude 

that Valdez voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. 

Mangelson testified that Valdez was able to respond in English to 

the trooper's questions. DEA Agent Fillmore, who interviewed 

Valdez after his arrest, testified that Valdez was able to relate 

the needed information in English. The district court made its own 

observation of Valdez• ability to understand English based on the 

its observation of Valdez 1 . conduct at the hearing. The court found 

as a fact that Valdez had a working knowledge of English. 

There was clear testimony at the suppression hearing that 

Valdez freely consented to a search of the vehicl e, both through 

his words and his conduct. There was no evidence of any coercion. 

Both Valdez and Corral stood by and watched the search. Neither 

requested Mangelson to stop. The district court 1 s f i nding that 

Valdez could understand English and did in fact consent to the 

search is amply supported by the record. 

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Appellate Case: 89-4030 Document: 01019748664 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 8 
Valdez next argues that there was no probable cause to search. 

Since Valdez consented to the search of the car, probable cause was 

not required. 

Corral contends that he was unlawfully placed under arrest and 

handcuffed immediately after the ve~icle was stopped . Mangelson 

testified that he arrested appellants after find ing the cocaine. 

The district court resolved this credibility issue against Corral . 

The court found as a fact that Valdez and Corral were arrested 

after the d iscove ry of the cocaine. R. Vol. II, at 132 . This 

finding o f fa c t is supported by the record and is not clearl y 

erroneous . 

Corral argues that the evidence seized is ta inted by the 

illegal arrest. Sinc e we have found the arr est to be lawful, this 

argument is without merit. 

The initial stop of the v ehicle was not p retextua l, but was 

based upon a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle's license plate 

was expired. Valdez consented to the search, which l ed to the 

discove ry of the cocaine. The discovery of the cocaine p rovided 

probable cause to arre st Valdez and Corral. Finding nothing 

clearly erroneous in its ruling, we affirm the district court' s 

denial of the appellants' motion to suppress and the appellants' 

convictions and sentences i n these cases. 

AFFIRMED. 

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