Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-22-10819/USCOURTS-ca11-22-10819-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald H. Bailey
Appellee
Kai Hansjurgens
Appellant

Document Text:

[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10819

____________________

In re: DONALD H. BAILEY

Debtor.

________________________________________

KAI HANSJURGENS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DONALD H. BAILEY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00105-RSB-CLR,

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10819

Bkcy No. 4:07-bk-41381-EJC

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and ABUDU, 

Circuit Judges.

ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:

Baseball Hall of Famer Frank Robinson famously said that 

“[c]lose only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades.”1 To that 

list we add one more thing: close—as long as it’s close enough to 

qualify as “substantial compliance”—also counts when it comes to 

following a state’s rules for reviving a judgment in federal court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a). 

More than a decade ago, Appellee Donald Bailey obtained a 

bankruptcy judgment against Appellant Kai Hansjurgens for tortious interference with contract. That judgment included punitive 

damages based on Hansjurgens’s “malice and intent to injure” and

“cavalier attitude toward [his] duties as [a] litigant[].” Bailey v. HakoMed USA, Inc., No. 09-4002, at 8–9 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Apr. 7, 2011). 

Hansjurgens has not paid Bailey a cent.

Georgia state law gave Bailey ten years to collect. But before 

Bailey’s judgment expired irretrievably, Bailey filed—and the bankruptcy court granted—a motion to revive that judgment. Hansjurgens does not dispute that the underlying judgment is valid, but he 

1 Nick Acocella, More Info on Frank Robinson, ESPN CLASSIC (last visited Jan. 12, 

2024), https://www.espn.com/classic/000728frankrobinsonadd.html

[https://perma.cc/5ATF-87HL]. 

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22-10819 Opinion of the Court 3

still seeks to keep his streak of dodging payment intact. This time, 

Hansjurgens claims that Bailey didn’t strictly comply with Georgia 

state-law procedures to revive his judgment. But the district court 

found—and Bailey argues on appeal—that Bailey did enough to satisfy the Georgia judgment-revival procedure under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 69(a). We agree. So after careful consideration, 

and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Original Bankruptcy Proceedings and Related Appeals

Bailey and Hansjurgens’s dispute originated with a business 

arrangement. Bailey leased medical equipment to physicians. To 

obtain some of his leasing inventory, Bailey entered into a distributorship agreement with Hansjurgens and his medical device company Hako-Med USA, Inc. Bailey v. Hako-Med USA, Inc. (In re Bailey), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 6300, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010). Under 

this agreement, Bailey bought several Hako-Med PRO Elec DT 

2000 and VasoPulse 2000 devices. Healthcare professionals use 

these machines to non-invasively treat lower back pain. Id. Unfortunately for Bailey, though, he had trouble selling the devices. In 

Bailey’s view, his sales problem arose because Hansjurgens and 

Hako-Med recommended billing codes that resulted in lower reimbursement rates than they had touted. Id. at *3–4.

After the distributorship agreement expired, a medicalequipment rental company, New River, offered to pay Bailey $1,000 

each month per device to lease the devices to physicians’ offices. 

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Id. at *5. But Hansjurgens and Hako-Med threatened (unfounded)

legal action against physicians who were negotiating with Bailey 

and New River. Id. at *6. So Bailey stopped marketing the devices, 

and New River shut down its operations. Id. at *9. 

Bailey filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In bankruptcy court, 

Bailey brought an adversary proceeding against Hansjurgens and 

Hako-Med for tortious interference with contract. 

The bankruptcy court held a trial and entered an interlocutory order in favor of Bailey. Id. at *27. It concluded that Hansjurgens had indeed tortiously interfered “to bully the Potential Purchasers out of negotiations” and “to advance his own pecuniary interest.” Id. at *18–19. 

After finding that Hansjurgens and Hako-Med “acted with 

malice and intent to injure,” the bankruptcy court ordered postjudgment discovery on punitive damages and attorney’s fees. Id. 

at *21, *27. Bailey’s post-judgment discovery requests went 

“largely unanswered,” so Bailey moved to compel. Bailey, No. 09-

4002, at 2. The bankruptcy court ordered Hansjurgens and HakoMed to submit discovery responses for the court’s inspection, but 

they did not do so. Id. at 2–3.

In the meantime, the bankruptcy court proceeded with its 

trial on punitive damages and attorney’s fees. In April 2011, the

bankruptcy court entered judgment for Bailey and awarded 

$893,973.64 total: $277,336.13 in compensatory damages, 

$554,672.26 in punitive damages, and $61,965.25 in attorney’s fees. 

Id. at 12. In support of its ruling, the court characterized 

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Hansjurgens’s trial testimony as “evasive and uncooperative” and 

noted his “cavalier attitude toward [his] duties as [a] litigant[]”

throughout the discovery process. Id. at 3, 9. And it found that 

Hansjurgens’s failure to produce post-judgment discovery was “intentional” and “possibly motivated by a desire to perpetrate a fraud 

on the Court.” Id. at 10.

Hansjurgens repeatedly and unsuccessfully appealed. 

First, before the bankruptcy court entered final judgment, 

Hansjurgens sought to appeal the partial-liability determination to 

the district court. But the district court dismissed the appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction because Hansjurgens never obtained leave to 

appeal the interlocutory order. Hansjurgens v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 

489 F. App’x 425, 425 (11th Cir. 2012). We affirmed. Id. 

Hansjurgens then moved to reopen his appeal. The district 

court denied the motion. Because the bankruptcy court later issued a final judgment, we dismissed as moot Hansjurgens’s appeal 

of that denial. Hansjurgens v. Bailey, No. 12-12465, at 4 (11th Cir. 

2013).

In his third effort on appeal, Hansjurgens appealed the final 

judgment to the district court. But the district court found that 

Hansjurgens’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, and he failed to 

show excusable neglect as Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 

8002(c)(2) requires. Hansjurgens v. Bailey, No. CV411-202, 2012 WL 

3289001, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2012). We affirmed the dismissal 

for lack of jurisdiction. In re Bailey, 521 F. App’x 920, 922 (11th Cir. 

2013).

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Around the same time, Bailey moved the bankruptcy court 

to hold Hansjurgens in contempt based on his and Hako-Med’s 

continued failure to produce post-judgment discovery. Hansjurgens did not appear at the contempt hearing. So the bankruptcy 

court submitted a proposed contempt order to the district court. 

Bailey v. Hako-Med USA, Inc. (In re Bailey), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5424 

(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011). The proposed order directed that Hansjurgens “be placed under arrest and imprisoned for his continuing 

noncompliance” and that Hansjurgens reimburse Bailey’s reasonable expenses incurred. Id. at *19. 

The district court eventually adopted the bankruptcy court’s 

proposed order in its entirety, specifying that an arrest warrant 

would issue after 30 days if Hansjurgens did not comply with the 

discovery order. Bailey v. Hako-Med USA, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

119697, at *3 (S.D. Ga. 2014). The court also ordered Hansjurgens 

to pay Bailey’s reasonable expenses arising from the contemptible 

conduct, including attorney’s fees, but it left calculation of those 

expenses to the bankruptcy court. Id. at *3–4. Once again, 

Hansjurgens did not comply. But the district court never issued an 

arrest warrant. 

Hansjurgens again appealed to this Court, and we dismissed 

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In re Bailey, No. 14-14905 (11th 

Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 820 (2016). In our opinion, we noted 

that both we and the U.S. Marshals “tried and failed to contact”

Hansjurgens about his own appeal. Id. at 5.

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B. Revival Proceedings

Under Georgia state law, the judgment against Hansjurgens

became dormant on April 7, 2018, and was due to become unenforceable on April 7, 2021. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-61 (2020).2 

Before that could happen, though, in November 2020, Bailey requested a status conference with the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court set the conference for March 18, 2021. To inform 

Hansjurgens of the status conference, the Bankruptcy Noticing 

Center sent notice of the telephonic status conference to Hansjurgens’s Hawaii address and to Hako-Med’s registered agent 

On March 12, 2021, Bailey filed an “Emergency Motion to 

Revive Dormant Judgment” in the same adversarial proceeding as 

the original judgment. In his motion, Bailey alleged that the judgment “remains unsatisfied,” as Hansjurgens and Hako-Med “have 

refused to pay any of the award.” 

The bankruptcy court conducted its status conference, set a 

telephonic hearing on the motion for March 30, and determined 

that process would be served by mail. Bailey and the Bankruptcy 

Noticing Center mailed notice of the hearing to Hansjurgens, 

Hako-Med, and Hako-Med’s registered agent at their Nevada and 

Hawaii addresses. At the court’s direction, Bailey filed an amended 

certificate of service attesting that he had mailed the motion and 

2 Throughout this opinion, we cite the 2020 statute, the version in effect when 

the judgment against Hansjurgens became dormant and Bailey filed the motion to revive. 

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notice of hearing to Hansjurgens, Hako-Med, registered agents 

(EastBiz.com, Inc. and Alive, Inc.), and Hansjurgens’s attorney, 

Craig Marc Rappel, at additional addresses in Nevada, Hawaii, and 

Florida. Bailey’s counsel also called Rappel the day before the hearing. But Hansjurgens failed to appear at the hearing or otherwise 

contact the court. 

On April 1, 2021, the bankruptcy court granted Bailey’s motion. It found that the judgment remained unpaid and that Bailey 

timely moved to revive within the limitations period. As a result, 

the bankruptcy court concluded, Bailey had satisfied Georgia’s procedural requirements and was entitled to revival of the judgment 

against Hansjurgens.

Hansjurgens, proceeding pro se, appealed to the district 

court. He raised four objections: (1) the bankruptcy court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over him; (2) Bailey failed to comply with 

Georgia procedures for revival of judgments;3 (3) Bailey did not 

state good cause to warrant issuance of an “emergency” order; and 

(4) Bailey failed to properly notify him of the proceedings and serve 

him with a summons, violating his due-process rights.

3 Hansjurgens contends that Bailey did not strictly comply with Georgia’s scire 

facias procedures. We discuss Georgia’s scire facias procedures in more detail 

later in this opinion, but for now, we note simply that scire facias “resembles 

a summons and directs the” judgment debtor “to appear in the issuing court 

on a certain date and to show cause why the identified judgment should not 

be revived and an execution be issued.” Popham v. Jordan, 628 S.E.2d 660, 662 

(Ga. Ct. App. 2006); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-63.

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The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order. 

Hansjurgens now appeals to this Court. 

II. JURISDICTION

The district court exercised bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). We have appellate jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291 because the revival judgment is a 

final order. 

To be final, an order “must end the litigation on the merits, 

leaving nothing to be done but execute the judgment.” Barben v. 

Donovan (In re Donovan), 532 F.3d 1134, 1136 (11th Cir. 2008). We 

take a functional approach to the finality inquiry, “looking not to 

the form of the” order “but to its actual effect.” Thomas v. Blue Cross 

& Blue Shield Ass’n, 594 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). And we treat finality more flexibly in 

the bankruptcy context. Donovan, 532 F.3d at 1136. To that end, a 

final order generally must resolve the adversary proceeding or controversy in question but need not resolve the bankruptcy proceedings in their entirety. Id.

For postjudgment proceedings, we determine finality 

through a two-step inquiry. First, we “‘treat the postjudgment proceeding as a free-standing litigation, in effect treating the final judgment as the first rather than the last order in the case.’” Mayer v. 

Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc., 672 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Thomas, 594 F.3d at 829). Second, we ask whether the order 

“disposes of all the issues raised in the motion that initially sparked 

the postjudgment proceedings” and whether the order is 

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“apparently the last order to be entered in the action.” Id. (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

Under this framework, the revival judgment is a final order 

over which we have appellate jurisdiction. Bailey’s emergency motion to revive the judgment “initially sparked the postjudgment 

proceedings,” and the bankruptcy court’s order granting that motion “dispose[d] of all the issues raised” therein. See id. At the same 

time, the district court’s order “dispose[d] of all the issues” in the 

revival proceedings and was “the last order to be entered in the action.” See id. And there is no further merits determination to be 

made, since scire facias proceedings do not permit review on the 

merits. See Heslen v. Heslen, 404 S.E.2d 592, 592 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)

(“A grant of a writ of scire facias does not authorize the examination of the original judgment’s validity.” (citation omitted)). In 

short, the revival judgment qualifies as a final order over which we 

have appellate jurisdiction. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In bankruptcy cases, we sit as a “‘second court of review.’” 

Ga. Dep’t of Revenue v. Mouzon Enters., Inc. (In re Mouzon Enters., Inc.), 

610 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Finova Cap. Corp. v. Larson Pharm. Inc. (In re Optical Techs., Inc.), 425 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th 

Cir. 2005)). In this capacity, we “‘examine[] independently the factual and legal determinations of the bankruptcy court and employ[] the same standards of review as the district court.’” Id. We 

review the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and 

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factual findings for clear error. Carrier Corp. v. Buckley (In re Globe 

Mfg. Corp.), 567 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The district court retained personal jurisdiction over Hansjurgens 

for the revival proceedings.

First, Hansjurgens claims that the bankruptcy court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over him for the revival proceedings.4 The 

threshold question we must address in considering this issue is 

whether the bankruptcy court needed to re-establish personal jurisdiction. We conclude that it did not.

Bailey did not file a new action against Hansjurgens. Rather, 

he filed, with the same bankruptcy court and under the same case 

caption as the adversary proceeding, an emergency motion for revival that the bankruptcy court and district court construed as a 

motion seeking revival in the form of scire facias. “Scire facias to 

revive a judgment is not an original action but is the continuation 

of the action in which the judgment was obtained.” GA. CODE

ANN. § 9-12-62; see also Mitchell v. Chastain Fin. Co., 233 S.E.2d 829, 

832 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (scire facias to revive a judgment “is merely 

a supplementary step in the original action”). So if the bankruptcy 

court had personal jurisdiction over Hansjurgens for the adversary 

proceeding—and neither party contests that it did—the 

4 Bailey moved to dismiss based on the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine. We 

carried that motion with the case. But because the merits require affirmance 

in any case, we DENY AS MOOT Bailey’s motion to dismiss.

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bankruptcy court did not need to re-establish that jurisdiction for 

the continuation of that proceeding. In other words, the bankruptcy court retained personal jurisdiction over Hansjurgens from 

the original bankruptcy adversary proceeding for the purposes of 

the revival judgment.

B. The district court properly revived the judgment against 

Hansjurgens.

Hansjurgens raises two objections to how Bailey revived the 

judgment against him: (1) the procedure failed to strictly comply 

with Georgia law governing scire facias proceedings; and (2) it violated due process. We find neither availing.

1. Rule 69 does not require strict compliance with

Georgia scire facias procedures.

We begin by identifying the relevant rules of procedure in a 

judgment-revival proceeding in federal bankruptcy court. Rule 

81(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., makes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

applicable to bankruptcy proceedings “to the extent provided by 

the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.” And Federal Rule of 

Bankruptcy Procedure 7069, in turn, provides that Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 69 “applies in adversary proceedings.” Fed. R. 

Bankr. P. 7069.

So we turn to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69. Rule 69

provides that the execution of judgments in adversary proceedings 

“and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or 

execution . . . must accord with the procedure of the state where 

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the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it 

applies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1) (incorporated into bankruptcy adversary proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7069).5 That requires us to 

reconsider the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. But no 

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure “governs” revival of judgments. So under Rule 69, the creation, dormancy, and execution 

of the judgment against Hansjurgens must “accord with” Georgia 

state procedures.

We begin, as always, with the Rule’s text. See United States v. 

Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). Rule 69’s key phrase 

is “accord with.” 

In its original form, Rule 69 provided,

5 The bankruptcy and district courts concluded that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(b) abolishes scire facias in federal court, and under that rule, Bailey 

could obtain relief previously available through scire facias by “appropriate 

action or motion.” So the courts determined that Bailey needed to substantially comply with Georgia’s scire facias procedures, and filing the motion to 

revive sufficed. On appeal, for the first time, Hansjurgens objects to the application of Rule 81(b), relying on our decision in Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, 

LLC, 818 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2016). Rosenberg held that the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure “only apply” in bankruptcy cases “to the extent they have 

been explicitly incorporated by the Federal Bankruptcy Rules,” id. at 1288, and 

Hansjurgens asserts that Rule 81 has not been explicitly incorporated. We 

need not decide this issue regardless of whether Hansjurgens preserved it. 

Hansjurgens argues that the bankruptcy court should have issued an adversarial summons after Bailey initiated the revival proceeding by motion. Although 

bankruptcy courts may issue adversarial summonses, see Fed. R. Bankr. 

P. 7004, we reject the argument that the failure of the bankruptcy court to 

issue one here violated Rule 69(a).

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The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid of execution shall be in accordance 

with the practice and procedure of the state in which 

the district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought, except that any statute of the United 

States governs to the extent that it is applicable.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a) (1938) (emphasis added). In 2007, Rule 69(a) 

was amended as part of a broader effort to simplify the language 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without changing their substance. Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 advisory committee’s note to 2007 Amendment; see also Mills v. Foremost Ins., 511 F.3d 1300, 1308 n.11 (11th 

Cir. 2008). The phrase “accord with” replaced the phrase “in accordance with.” Because these phrases are substantially the same, 

we look to dictionary definitions from the time of initial adoption 

of the “accordance” language, 1938. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 

140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738–39 (2020); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 40, at 257 (2012) (explaining that “new language” in a “legislative restyling exercise[]” 

like the revised Rule 69(a) “does not amend prior enactments unless it does so clearly”).

At that time, “accord” meant “to agree or concur,” Accord, 

Black’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933), or “to agree, be in harmony, 

be consistent,” Accord, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1933). See 

also Accord, Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1938) 

(“To bring into agreement; to reconcile; to . . . harmonize”). Those 

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definitions do not require revival proceedings in federal court to

strictly follow state-law procedures, however impractical or arcane. 

Rather, they suggest that revival proceedings in federal court must 

only “agree” or “be in harmony”—in other words, substantially 

comply—with state-law procedures. And “when the meaning of 

the [Rule’s] terms is plain, our job is at an end.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 

at 1749.6

Still, though, as we explain after we describe Georgia’s scire 

facias procedures, practicalities reinforce the natural meaning of 

“accord.” Under Georgia law, a “judgment shall become dormant 

and shall not be enforced . . . [w]hen seven years shall elapse after 

the rendition of the judgment before execution is issued 

thereon[.]” GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-60. The judgment creditor may 

“renew[] or revive[]” the dormant judgment “by an action or by 

scire facias, at the option of the holder of the judgment, within 

three years from the time it becomes dormant.” Id. § 9-12-61. 

These two statutory provisions “operate in tandem as a ten-year 

statute of limitation for the enforcement of Georgia judgments.” 

Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 636 S.E.2d 39, 40 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 

The 2011 judgment against Hansjurgens became dormant on April 

7, 2018, and would have expired on April 7, 2021. 

6 Even if we look to dictionary definitions from 2007, when the current version 

of the Rule was adopted, our interpretation does not change. See, e.g., Accord, 

Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (“To agree”); Accord, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2007) (“to be consistent or in harmony: 

AGREE”); Accord, American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed. 2006) (“To be in 

agreement, unity, or harmony”).

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Scire facias “resembles a summons and directs the” judgment debtor “to appear in the issuing court on a certain date and 

to show cause why the identified judgment should not be revived 

and an execution be issued.” Popham, 628 S.E.2d at 662. “Scire facias to revive a judgment is not an original action but is the continuation of the action in which the judgment was obtained.” GA.

CODE ANN. § 9-12-62. To that end, “[i]n no case and under no circumstances can the merits of the original judgment be inquired 

into” in scire facias proceedings. Mitchell, 233 S.E.2d at 833.

If the judgment debtor resides outside the state, the “judgment may be revived . . . by such process as is issued in cases in 

which the defendant resides in this state, provided that” he “shall 

be served with scire facias by publication in the newspaper in which 

the official advertisements of the county are published[.]” GA.

CODE ANN. § 9-12-67. Neither “record[ing] the judgment on the 

general execution docket” nor “mak[ing] any efforts to collect the 

judgment” is a “prerequisite to reviving a dormant judgment.”

Bowers v. Jim Rainwater Builder & Props., Inc., 416 S.E.2d 832, 832

(Ga. Ct. App. 1992).

Hansjurgens asserts that Bailey and the bankruptcy court 

did not strictly comply with these state-law procedures. He is right 

about that. It is undisputed that Bailey did not file a new judgment 

to seek revival. It is also undisputed that Bailey did not strictly follow traditional scire facias procedures. These traditional procedures include issuance from “the court of the county in which the 

judgment was obtained” and service “by the sheriff of the county 

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in which [the judgment debtor] resides” twenty days prior to the 

hearing, or service by publication for two months before the hearing. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-12-63, 9-12-67.

But, again, we do not interpret Rule 69(a) to require strict 

compliance—only that federal revival proceedings “accord,” or 

substantially comply, with state procedures. See Chambers v. Blickle 

Ford Sales, Inc., 313 F.2d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that an enforcement hearing in lieu of a state scire facias action “accords with 

the spirit of the Rules and seems to be a sufficiently close adherence 

to state procedures”); Thomas, Head & Greisen Emps. Tr. v. Buster, 95 

F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1996); 12 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 3012 (3d ed. 2023); 13 

Moore’s Federal Practice Civil § 69.03[3]. As the Seventh Circuit has 

opined, “[w]e do not think the draftsmen of Rule 69 meant to put 

the judge into a procedural straitjacket, whether of state or federal 

origin.” Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Ruiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 

1993) (citation omitted). And as we’ve explained, the Rule’s plain 

text does not compel a “procedural straitjacket” in the form of a 

strict-compliance requirement. We will not impose one here.

What’s more, Georgia scire facias procedures do not 

squarely fit within the federal court system. Under Georgia state 

law, the clerk of the state court in which the judgment was obtained must issue scire facias, and that county’s sheriff must serve

it. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-63. But Georgia federal courts do not 

control county sheriffs. Requiring strict compliance with scire facias procedures in a federal forum that cannot order the stateUSCA11 Case: 22-10819 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 01/12/2024 Page: 17 of 22
18 Opinion of the Court 22-10819

mandated relief makes little sense. And insisting on county-specific 

procedures in federal court, especially in a state with 159 counties, 

is impractical. Rather, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 

apply uniformly in federal court, require one procedure for obtaining relief: filing a motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (incorporated 

into bankruptcy adversary proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007). 

That is exactly what Bailey did here.

We conclude that Bailey substantially complied with Georgia’s scire facias statute, so revival was proper. Scire facias provides 

notice of court proceedings and the opportunity “to show cause 

why the identified judgment should not be revived and an execution be issued.” Popham, 628 S.E.2d at 662. Service here accomplished the same goal. Hansjurgens received at least twelve notices 

of the revival hearing, and his participation in these proceedings 

has provided him an opportunity to object to the revival judgment. 

In other words, the purposes of scire facias have been served. Cf.

Sanderford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 902 F.2d 897, 900 (11th Cir. 

1990) (upholding a default judgment when the summons omitted 

a return date but substantially complied with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b) 

and the defendant was not prejudiced by the defect); Chambers, 313 

F.2d at 256. 

Indeed, as a purely practical matter, there is nothing more 

that can be accomplished by remanding for strict compliance. Remanding would not change the ultimate result of the revival proceedings. To be sure, the district court could require personal service on Hansjurgens. But a revival motion may be timely even if 

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service is not perfected during the dormancy period, so long as the 

motion is filed before the judgment expires. Stahle v. Jones, 3 S.E.2d 

861, 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939). And here, Bailey timely filed his revival motion. So even if the district court ordered Bailey to personally serve it on Hansjurgens, the revival proceedings would still go 

forward. 

Personal service could not accomplish more than what this 

record demonstrates has already occurred: Hansjurgens’s actual 

notice of the proceedings. Plus, under Georgia law, parties may 

not challenge “the merits of the original judgment” in scire facias

proceedings to revive it. Bowers, 416 S.E.2d at 832–33. So since Bailey’s revival motion was timely, and since we dispose of Hansjurgens’s procedural objections in this appeal, Hansjurgens has no 

other basis for a challenge to the revival proceedings.

Put simply, the only outcome on remand would be to reach

the same result: the entry of a valid revival judgment, though after

even more time and expense. Because service here was in “accord” 

with Georgia’s scire facias procedures, and because remanding for 

personal service would not change the outcome of the revival proceedings, we hold that the bankruptcy court properly revived the 

dormant judgment.

2. The revival proceedings did not violate due process.

Finally, Hansjurgens argues that the bankruptcy court violated his due-process rights when it did not require personal service 

through an adversarial summons, contrary to Georgia state law. 

Hansjurgens does not claim that Bailey mailed the revival motion 

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-10819

and notice of hearing to the wrong addresses—addresses that 

Hansjurgens had provided to the court. Instead, Hansjurgens complains that, despite delivery to the addresses he provided and a call 

to his former (and later) attorney advising him of the proceeding, 

Hansjurgens was unaware of the proceeding until after the judgment was revived. 

Our precedent does not require service in one particular 

form to satisfy due process—rather, “[d]ue process is a flexible concept that varies with the particular circumstances of each case, and 

myriad forms of notice may satisfy” its requirements. Arrington v. 

Helms, 438 F.3d 1336, 1350 (11th Cir. 2006). Under this “flexible” 

framework, “notice must be ‘reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 

action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” 

Id. at 1349–50 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 

U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 

Both the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize service by mail. First, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 applies in bankruptcy adversary proceedings. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7005. Under that rule, “mailing” the 

motion and notice of hearing “to the person’s last known address—

in which event service is complete upon mailing”—accomplishes

service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). Separately, the Federal Rules of 

Bankruptcy Procedure authorize service by mail “to the individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode or to the place where 

the individual regularly conducts a business or profession” or to “an 

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22-10819 Opinion of the Court 21

agent of such defendant authorized by appointment or by law to 

receive service of process.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(b)(1), (8). 

Bailey certified that he mailed the motion to revive and notice of hearing to Hansjurgens at three Hawaii and Nevada addresses, including the address that Hansjurgens has since used in 

his appellate filings. Bailey also mailed the motion and hearing notice to two registered agents of Hako-Med (EastBiz.com, Inc. and 

Alive, Inc.) and Hansjurgens’s attorney, Craig Marc Rappel.7 The 

Bankruptcy Noticing Center certified that it too mailed notice to 

of the hearing to three Nevada addresses. Not only that, but Bailey’s counsel called Rappel in yet another attempt to inform 

Hansjurgens of the revival proceedings. And as Hansjurgens’s participation in the appellate process reflects, Hansjurgens had actual 

notice of the revival proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.

To be sure, Bailey could have attempted service personally 

or by publication, but due process did not require him to do so. See

Arrington, 438 F.3d at 1350 (due process does not require notice that 

is “ideal under all the circumstances, but rather” notice that “is reasonable under all the circumstances”). We conclude that service by 

mail to the six addresses here was “reasonably calculated . . . to apprise” Hansjurgens of the revival proceedings and to allow him to

present objections. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.

7 At the time, Hansjurgens was proceeding pro se, but Rappel had represented 

him in prior proceedings. Rappel resumed representing Hansjurgens for his 

appeal in this Court until Rappel passed away in January 2023 and current 

counsel took over.

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22 Opinion of the Court 22-10819

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons we have explained, we affirm the district 

court’s revival order.

AFFIRMED.

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