Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03017/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03017-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesus Rodriguez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 6, 2011 Decided March 9, 2012 

 Reissued April 11, 2012 

No. 10-3017 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

JESUS RODRIGUEZ, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:08-cr-00344-1) 

 A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause 

for the appellant. 

 Peter S. Smith, Assistant United States Attorney, argued 

the cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen Jr., United 

States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Chrisellen R. 

Kolb, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief. 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 1 of 17
2 

 Before: HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS and 

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

 KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Jesus 

Rodriguez (Rodriguez) appeals his sentence of 72-months’ 

imprisonment resulting from his conviction on one count of 

distributing 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). For the reasons set 

forth below, we remand to the district court for further 

sentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I.

On October 23, 2008, Rodriguez offered to sell a 

confidential source (CS) of the Narcotics and Special 

Investigations Division of the Metropolitan Police 

Department (MPD) one kilogram of cocaine for $28,000. The 

next day, Rodriguez met the CS in a parking lot in Northeast 

Washington, D.C., entered his vehicle and handed him a black 

plastic bag full of 1,004 grams of cocaine. Rodriguez was 

promptly arrested by a MPD surveillance team. 

On April 20, 2009, pursuant to a plea agreement and 

proffer of evidence, Rodriguez pleaded guilty to a one-count 

indictment charging him with the distribution of 500 grams or 

more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 

841(b)(1)(B)(ii). The United States Probation Office prepared 

a presentence report (PSR) calculating Rodriguez’s baseoffense level at 26, with a three-level downward adjustment 

for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to section 3E1.1(b) 

of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or 

Guidelines), lowering his offense level to 23. His Criminal 

History Category was I. Given the adjustments and 

Rodriguez’s criminal history, the PSR recommended a 

Guidelines range of 46-57 months. The offense, however, by 

statute carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months’ 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 2 of 17
3 

imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). In his initial 

sentencing memorandum filed on June 10, 2009, Rodriguez 

argued for a “sentence below the statutory minimum 

sentence” because “[he] has met the five requirements of the 

safety[-]valve provision.” Def.’s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing 

at 2-3, United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. 

June 10, 2009). The safety-valve provision, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(f), incorporated into the Guidelines at section 5C1.2, 

permits the district court to impose a sentence below the 

statutory minimum if it finds: 

(1) the defendant does not have more than 

1 criminal history point . . . ; 

(2) the defendant did not use violence or 

credible threats of violence or possess a 

firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce 

another participant to do so) in connection with 

the offense; 

(3) the offense did not result in death or 

serious bodily injury to any person; 

(4) the defendant was not an organizer, 

leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the 

offense . . . and was not engaged in a 

continuing criminal enterprise . . . ; and 

(5) not later than the time of the 

sentencing hearing, the defendant has 

truthfully provided to the Government all 

information and evidence the defendant has 

concerning the offense or offenses that were 

part of the same course of conduct or of a 

common scheme or plan, but the fact that the 

defendant has no relevant or useful other 

information to provide or that the Government 

is already aware of the information shall not 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 3 of 17
4 

preclude a determination by the court that the 

defendant has complied with this requirement. 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).1

 In response, the Government argued 

that, while Rodriguez met the first four requirements, he had 

failed to fully and truthfully debrief and thus was not entitled 

to safety-valve relief. Gov’t’s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 

4-8, United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. July 

15, 2009). Specifically, the Government averred that 

Rodriguez withheld information regarding Gumesindo 

Maldunado (Maldunado), who was also arrested at the scene 

of the crime and who, the MPD believed, was Rodriguez’s 

supplier.2

 

Because of the safety-valve dispute, the district court set 

an evidentiary hearing for July 28, 2009 to determine whether 

Rodriguez had in fact truthfully disclosed all information and 

evidence to the Government. During the hearing, Rodriguez 

testified that Maldunado had nothing to do with the drug deal. 

Rodriguez explained that Maldunado was his boss in a 

landscaping business and had followed Rodriguez to the 

parking lot so that Rodriguez could collect money from a 

friend and then follow Maldunado to a job site immediately 

thereafter. Rodriguez said that Maldunado had no idea that 

Rodriguez had entered the CS’s car to sell cocaine. 

 

1

 For a drug offender like Rodriguez, the provision carries 

another important benefit—namely, the relevant drug guideline 

(U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(16)) grants a defendant who meets the safety 

valve requirements a two-point decrease in the offense level. 

2

 On the day of the arrest, Maldunado, who was driving a Nissan 

Altima, followed Rodriguez’s work truck into the parking lot. 

Maldunado parked the car almost directly behind the CS’s car. He 

then exited his vehicle and paced behind the CS’s car during the 

drug deal until he was arrested by MPD officers. 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 4 of 17
5 

The Government presented testimony from MPD 

Detective Erick Alvarado (Alvarado) and Officer Derrick 

Starliper (Starliper) which cast doubt on the veracity of 

Rodriguez’s testimony. Alvarado and Starliper both testified 

that Rodriguez had told the CS that his cocaine supplier 

would accompany him to the sale because the supplier did not 

trust Rodriguez with such a large sum of money. Both officers 

further testified that Maldunado had exited his car and paced 

behind the CS’s car while Rodriguez was inside. Starliper also 

testified that MPD officers recovered a loaded pistol and 

approximately $4,000 in cash from Maldunado’s vehicle on 

the day of his arrest. 

The district court credited the officers’ description of 

Maldunado’s conduct: “I think that all of the circumstances 

leading up to the arrest suggest that Mr. Maldunado was there 

to make sure . . . that Mr. Rodriguez didn’t run off with his 

drugs and . . . that he receive the [money].” Tr. of Sentencing 

at 62, United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. 

July 28, 2009). It then found that Rodriguez had not fully and 

truthfully debriefed and was not entitled to safety-valve relief. 

It further suggested that an increase in the offense level for 

obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 might be 

warranted given Rodriguez’s false testimony during the 

sentencing hearing and asked both parties to submit 

supplemental sentencing memoranda on the obstruction of 

justice issue. 

On August 12, 2009, the Probation Office prepared a 

revised PSR, recommending a two-point increase in the 

offense level and raising the applicable Guidelines range to 

60-71 months based on Rodriguez’s obstruction of justice 

during the safety-valve hearing. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.3

 The 

 

3

 The notes to this section state that the “adjustment applies if 

the defendant’s obstructive conduct . . . occurred with respect to the 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 5 of 17
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Government filed a supplemental sentencing memorandum, 

arguing that, in light of Rodriguez’s false testimony, he 

should also lose the acceptance of responsibility decrease. 

According to the Government, then, his adjusted Guidelines 

range should be 78-97 months. Rodriguez responded that the 

obstruction of justice increase should not apply but that the 

acceptance of responsibility decrease should so that the 

Guidelines range should be 46-57 months. 

At some point thereafter, Rodriguez met with the 

Government for a final debriefing. Although neither the exact 

date nor the content of the discussion is in the record, the 

meeting prompted the Government to submit an additional 

supplemental sentencing memorandum to the court. In the 

memorandum, the Government explained: 

[A]fter more than nine months of dissembling, 

the [D]efendant finally debriefed truthfully 

with law enforcement authorities. Though this 

information was not particularly useful for law 

enforcement purposes, the [D]efendant does 

deserve some credit for finally being truthful. 

Gov’t’s Second Supplemental Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 

2, United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. Nov. 

10, 2009) (emphases added). The Government further noted 

that Rodriguez was eligible for a so-called Smith departure 

because of his status as a deportable alien—reducing his 

 

investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the defendant’s instant 

offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.1 (2009). Covered 

conduct includes “providing materially false information to a judge 

or magistrate.” Id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(f). Information is considered 

“material” when “if believed, [it] would tend to influence or affect 

the issue under determination.” Id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.5. 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 6 of 17
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sentence by “up to six months of incarceration.” Id.

4

 Given 

Rodriguez’s “truthful, albeit late, debriefing” and his “status 

as a deportable alien,” the Government asked for “a period of 

incarceration of 72 months.” Id.

 On November 17, 2009, the district court held a hearing 

at which it appeared ready to impose sentence. See Minute 

Order, United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. 

Nov. 17, 2009) (“sentencing scheduled for this day [] 

rescheduled”). The court first asked the Government if 

Rodriguez had been “successfully debriefed.” See Hearing at 

4, United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. Nov. 

17, 2009). The Government responded: “I wouldn’t say he 

successfully debriefed. I think he finally accepted 

responsibility and came clean about all aspects of the 

transaction.” Id. (emphasis added). The district court then 

asked the Government its position on the acceptance of 

responsibility adjustment. The Government opposed the 

adjustment “in light of the perjured testimony during the 

sentencing hearing.” Id. Nonetheless, given that Rodriguez 

finally “came clean” and was eligible for a Smith departure, 

the Government recommended a sentence of 72 months—the 

bottom end of the 78-97 range it had originally proposed with 

the six-month downward departure as a deportable alien. The 

court then discovered that Rodriguez had not yet read the 

revised PSR because it was provided to him in English, which 

he could neither speak nor read. The court elected to postpone 

sentencing so that the PSR could be translated into Spanish, 

Rodriguez’s native language. 

 

4

 See United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 

(because deportable alien is not eligible for supervised release and 

other programs under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c), court may depart 

downward to account for “fortuitous increase in the severity of his 

sentence”). 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 7 of 17
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On February 19, 2010, the district court held a longpostponed sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the 

Government renewed its request for a 72-month sentence. It 

explained that it had held four debriefing sessions with 

Rodriguez. During the first three sessions, Rodriguez had 

repeatedly lied to the Government. But shortly after the July 

28, 2009 safety-valve hearing, Rodriguez told the 

Government that “he wanted to come clean and he wanted to 

tell [] the truth.” Sentencing Hearing at 6-7, United States v. 

Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2010). At that 

time, “[w]e had a fourth debriefing where we believe he was 

more forthcoming but he still was not providing us the 

information we felt was credible and necessary [so] that we 

could use him as a cooperator.” Id. at 7. The Government 

recognized Rodriguez was a deportable alien eligible for a 

Smith departure but argued that his eleventh-hour truthful 

debriefing and the Smith departure should be balanced against 

Rodriguez’s perjury during the safety-valve hearing and his 

failure to accept responsibility for his crime. 

 Rodriguez’s counsel countered that, although Rodriguez 

had been “less than fully forthcoming in earlier debriefings,” 

he had done so out of concern for his safety and that of his 

family. Id. The lawyer emphasized that Rodriguez was ready 

and willing to cooperate further with the Government: “[A]t 

this rather late time, for whatever it’s worth, [Rodriguez is] 

willing to come forward with further debriefing perhaps [to] 

try to undo some of the less than full debriefing that he was 

party to in the past.” Id. at 7-8. The Court then asked for 

Rodriguez’s allocution and Rodriguez declared: 

First, I would like to apologize to you and to 

everyone present, to the American government 

for having made this mistake . . . . And on my 

part, I wanted to cooperate but perhaps it was a 

bit too late, but . . . I couldn’t do that because 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 8 of 17
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there were people who were very close to me 

and one always has the fear that something 

might happen to you and now I know that it’s 

too late. There’s nothing to be done about it, 

but as I said to the prosecutor, if my help is 

required, I am here, and that’s all. 

Id. at 13. 

 With no mention of the safety valve or corresponding 

two-level decrease under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16), the court 

imposed Rodriguez’s sentence. It found that Rodriguez had 

provided “materially false” testimony on a “critical issue” 

during the July 28, 2009 safety-valve hearing and that his 

offense level should be increased two points for obstruction of 

justice. Id. at 15. Because of Rodriguez’s less than truthful 

debriefings as well as his testimony during the safety-valve 

hearing, the district court denied the acceptance of 

responsibility decrease. It thus adopted the Government’s 

suggested 78-97 month Guidelines range, applied the sixmonth Smith departure and sentenced Rodriguez to 72 

months’ imprisonment. 

Rodriguez now appeals. 

II. 

Rodriguez raises four arguments on appeal. First, 

Rodriguez argues that his lawyer’s failure to argue for safetyvalve relief amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel in 

violation of his Sixth Amendment right. Second, he claims the 

district court erred when it failed to raise and apply the safetyvalve provision sua sponte notwithstanding the court had 

considered and rejected it at the July 28, 2009 safety-valve 

hearing. Third, Rodriguez argues that his sentence is 

procedurally defective because the court failed to adequately 

outline the applicable U.S.S.G range before imposing 

sentence and because it failed to adequately explain the basis 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 9 of 17
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of its decision. Finally, he argues that the district court erred 

by not decreasing his offense level for acceptance of 

responsibility. 

We address first whether Rodriguez’s lawyer’s failure to 

raise the safety valve issue at the February 19, 2010 

sentencing hearing constitutes ineffective assistance of 

counsel. We review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

under the two-part test set out by the United States Supreme 

Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 

succeed on such a claim, Rodriguez must show: “(1) ‘that 

[his] counsel’s performance was deficient,’ and (2) ‘that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’ ” United States 

v. Shabban, 612 F.3d 693, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “Deficient” means that 

“ ‘ “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness.” ’ ” United States v. Goodwin, 594 F.3d 1, 

4 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. Spisak, 130 S.Ct. 676, 

685 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)). “Prejudice” 

means “ ‘that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s . . . errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Smith, 130 S.Ct. at 685 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)). Ordinarily, an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot be resolved on 

direct appeal; there is, however, an exception “in those rare 

circumstances where the record is so clear that remand is 

unnecessary.” United States v. Soto, 132 F.3d 56, 59 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 

1303-04 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim may be decided on appeal “when the trial record alone 

conclusively shows that the defendant is entitled to no relief 

. . . [or] when the trial record conclusively shows the 

contrary”). On our review, the record conclusively shows that 

Rodriguez’s lawyer’s failure to reassert Rodriguez’s 

eligibility for safety-valve relief after Rodriguez truthfully 

debriefed constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 10 of 17
11 

 As a threshold matter, it seems plain to us that Rodriguez 

met all five elements of the safety-valve provision by the time 

of the February 2010 sentencing hearing. The Government 

concedes that Rodriguez satisfied the first four criteria for 

safety-valve relief. Gov’t’s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 5, 

United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. July 15, 

2009) (“The defendant meets the first four requirements of the 

safety-valve provision, and thus, it is the fifth requirement 

which is at issue in this case.”). The fifth criterion requires 

that: 

not later than the time of the sentencing 

hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided 

to the Government all information and 

evidence the defendant has concerning the 

offense or offenses that were part of the same 

course of conduct or of a common scheme or 

plan. 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (emphasis added). According to the 

Government’s open-court admission during the November 17, 

2009 hearing, Rodriguez eventually “came clean about all 

aspects of the transaction.” Hearing at 4, United States v. 

Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2009) (emphasis 

added). In its second supplemental sentencing memorandum 

filed shortly before the November hearing, the Government 

noted repeatedly that Rodriguez had fully and truthfully 

debriefed: (1) “the defendant . . . debriefed truthfully with law 

enforcement authorities”; (2) “defendant does deserve some 

credit for finally being truthful”; and (3) defendant should 

receive some downward adjustment “[i]n light of . . . the 

defendant’s truthful, albeit late, debriefing.” Gov’t’s Second 

Supplemental Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 2, United States 

v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2009). 

Accordingly, “not later than the [February 2010] sentencing 

hearing,” Rodriguez had “truthfully provided . . . . all 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 11 of 17
12 

information and evidence [he] ha[d] concerning the offense,” 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5), and had therefore satisfied the final 

element of the safety-valve provision. 

 We are not persuaded by the Government’s attempt to 

use the statements of Rodriguez and his lawyer during the 

February 2010 hearing to suggest that Rodriguez was 

continuing to withhold information from the Government. See 

Appellee’s Br. 28 (“Appellant’s response to the prosecutor 

during the sentencing hearing simply underscores the fact that 

he had failed to provide the government with complete 

information about his offense.”). The statements were made in 

arguing for Rodriguez’s eligibility for either an acceptance of 

responsibility decrease or substantial assistance reduction 

under the Guidelines.5

 Both Rodriguez and his lawyer 

acknowledged that Rodriguez’s past lies could affect his 

eligibility for both.6 But neither Rodriguez’s lawyer nor the 

Government tied Rodriguez’s past conduct to the safety-valve 

provision. The fact that Rodriguez waited “until the last 

minute” to provide the information or that he was “tardy” in 

doing so does not preclude him from obtaining safety-valve 

relief. United States v. Tournier, 171 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 

1999). The provision does not distinguish “between 

defendants who provide the authorities only with truthful 

information and those who provide false information before 

finally telling the truth.” United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 

103, 106 (2d Cir. 1999). It expressly states that a defendant 

 

5

 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 permits, on the Government’s motion and in 

the court’s discretion, a reduction for certain defendants who have 

provided “substantial assistance” to the Government. 

6

 As the Government argued, although Rodriguez had come 

clean about the transaction, he was no longer “credible” and thus 

could not be used as a “cooperator.” Sentencing Hearing at 6-7, 

United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2010). 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 12 of 17
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must truthfully provide all information “not later than the time 

of the sentencing hearing.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); U.S.S.G. 

§ 5C1.2(a)(5). Nor does it matter whether the information 

provided is particularly useful. See, e.g., United States v. 

Gales, 603 F.3d 49, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (safety valve 

available to defendant who does “not possess information of 

substantial assistance”). When Rodriguez “came clean about 

all aspects of the transaction,” he met all five elements of the 

safety-valve provision. 

 It is the defendant’s burden to establish safety-valve 

eligibility, see United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 29 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000) (defendant “bears the burden to establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to safety[-

]valve relief”); United States v. Stephenson, 452 F.3d 1173, 

1179 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The defendant bears the burden of 

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled 

to the safety-valve adjustment.”); United States v. Montanez, 

82 F.3d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 1996) (“It is up to the defendant to 

persuade the district court that he has ‘truthfully provided’ the 

required information and evidence to the government.”), and 

Rodriguez’s lawyer failed to request safety-valve relief after 

Rodriguez truthfully debriefed. Indeed, Rodriguez’s lawyer 

suggested that the district court had rejected the safety valve 

and that it was off the table. See Sentencing Hearing at 5, 

United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 

2010) (“[T]his is a case that’s had a sort of long history . . . 

post-plea. . . . [T]here was a safety valve issue. The Court had 

a hearing on that and found Mr. Rodriguez not to be credible 

on that point.”). Familiarity with the Guidelines is “ ‘a 

necessity for counsel who seek to give effective 

representation.’ ” United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 

1512 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. 

Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992). When a lawyer fails to 

raise an applicable provision of the Guidelines, he fails to 

provide effective assistance. Soto, 132 F.3d at 59 (“Whether 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 13 of 17
14 

lawyers get the Guidelines wrong by misinterpreting the 

implication of a particular provision . . . or by failing 

altogether to raise a potentially helpful provision . . . such 

drastic missteps clearly satisfy Strickland’s first test: They 

amount to errors so serious that counsel was not functioning 

as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment.” (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)); see, e.g., Bellizia v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 614 F.3d 

1326, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2010) (failure to make argument that 

would have resulted in below minimum sentence constitutes 

deficient performance). Rodriguez’s lawyer was (or should 

have been) aware that his client had fully and truthfully 

debriefed and there was no “objectively reasonable” or 

strategic reason not to argue its applicability. 

 Moreover, given the applicability of the safety-valve 

provision, we believe there is at least a “reasonable 

probability” that, had Rodriguez’s lawyer raised it, Rodriguez 

would have received a lower sentence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. Our sister circuits have held that once a defendant 

satisfies the five requirements, the “district court has no 

discretion to withhold its application,” United States v. 

Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984, 994 (9th Cir. 2002), and that the 

safety-valve provision is “mandatory,” United States v. 

Quirante, 486 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The safetyvalve provision . . . is not discretionary. Its plain terms are 

plainly mandatory.”). 

The post-Booker sentencing scheme, which requires the 

district court to determine the Guidelines range before 

exercising its discretion, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

51 (2007), presupposes that the appropriate range is an 

important guide in the exercise of that discretion. Here, 

Rodriguez’s offense level adjustment under the safety-valve 

provision and corresponding two-point decrease under the 

drug guideline would reduce his Guidelines range from 78-97 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 14 of 17
15 

months to 63-78 months. Although Rodriguez received a 

sentence of 72 months’ imprisonment—the middle of the 63-

78 months range—the Government’s previous 

recommendation had been for a sentence at the bottom of the 

original 78-97 months range (and, in fact, six months below 

that due to the Smith departure). The court itself noted that it 

“normally” reduces the sentence of a deportable alien by six 

months under Smith. Sentencing Hearing at 10, United States 

v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 08-344 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2010) 

(“[G]iving consideration to the Smith departure, six months is 

something I normally do.”). On this record, we believe there 

is a “reasonable probability” that Rodriguez would have 

received a lower sentence had his Guidelines range factored 

in the safety valve. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable 

probability” is all Rodriguez “need show” in order to establish 

prejudice. United States v. Weathers, 493 F.3d 229, 238 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007). 

We next turn to Rodriguez’s claim that the district court 

erroneously denied Rodriguez an acceptance of responsibility 

decrease. See Appellant’s Br. 26. Because Rodriguez 

preserved this claim at the sentencing hearing, our review is 

for abuse of discretion. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 46 (issue raised 

at sentencing reviewed for abuse of discretion). We review a 

purely legal question de novo and the district court’s findings 

of fact for clear error, according “due deference” to the 

district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts. Id. at 

51; see also United States v. Berkeley, 567 F.3d 703, 711 

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Because the sentencing judge is in a 

unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of 

responsibility[,] . . . the determination of the sentencing judge 

is entitled to great deference on review.” (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted, alterations in original)). 

Section 3E1.1(a) of the Guidelines provides for a twopoint offense level decrease if “the defendant clearly 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 15 of 17
16 

demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” If, 

however, the defendant obstructed justice, he is entitled to an 

acceptance of responsibility adjustment in an “extraordinary 

case[]” only. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.4. Here, neither 

party disputes that Rodriguez obstructed justice by testifying 

falsely during the July 28, 2009 safety-valve hearing but 

Rodriguez argues that his is an “extraordinary case.” We 

disagree. 

That Rodriguez finally came clean in his fourth 

debriefing does not necessarily mean that he accepted 

responsibility for his role in the crime. Rodriguez may have 

decided to cooperate with the Government to get a sentencing 

benefit without fully accepting responsibility for the crime. 

See, e.g., United States v. Galbraith, 200 F.3d 1006, 1016 (7th 

Cir. 2000) (defendant who testified falsely before finally 

pleading guilty at “eleventh hour” did not accept 

responsibility). Additionally, the Government’s passing 

statement during the November 2009 hearing that Rodriguez 

“finally accepted responsibility” for his crime is not 

dispositive. Hearing at 4, United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 

08-344 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2009). Immediately after making 

this statement, the Government argued against awarding 

Rodriguez an acceptance of responsibility decrease. See id. at 

4-5 (Court: “And you’re still seeking a forfeiture of his 

acceptance of responsibility adjustment because of the 

testimony I didn’t credit.” Government: “Yes, Your Honor, 

the earlier sentencing.”). And during the February 2010 

sentencing hearing, the Government reminded the court that 

Rodriguez had repeatedly lied and dissembled for months 

before finally agreeing to cooperate, supporting its argument 

that Rodriguez had come clean only in an effort to obtain a 

sentencing advantage. It was well within the district court’s 

discretion to agree. 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 16 of 17
17 

For the foregoing reasons, we remand to the district court 

so that it can reconsider Rodriguez’s sentence in light of the 

applicability of the safety-valve provision set forth in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G § 5C1.2.7

 So ordered.

 

7

 Because we conclude that Rodriguez’s lawyer rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to request safety-valve relief, we do 

not reach Rodriguez’s claims that the district court should have 

applied the safety valve sua sponte or that his sentence was 

procedurally defective. 

USCA Case #10-3017 Document #1368281 Filed: 04/11/2012 Page 17 of 17