Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-01301/USCOURTS-ca3-14-01301-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General United States of America
Respondent
Di Li Li
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 14-1301

________________

DI LI LI

a/k/a FA DU

a/k/a DE LI LI,

 Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Respondent 

____________________________________

 On Petition for Review of an Order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A077-341-145)

Immigration Judge: Donald V. Ferlise

Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 12, 2015

BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and

SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 15, 2015)

________________

OPINION*

________________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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McKEE, Chief Judge.

Di Li Li has filed a petition for review of the January 14, 2014, order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals denying his motion to reopen his immigration 

proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the BIA’s order and 

remand for proceedings consistent with the opinion.1

I.

There is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen with the BIA where the 

motion is based on changed country conditions and the supporting evidence could 

not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 

1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). The BIA found that Li’s untimely motion did not meet this 

exception and that Li had not established a prima facie case for protection under 

the CAT. It also declined to exercise its discretionary powers to sua sponte reopen 

the removal proceedings.

Li alleges that, since his final order denying his application for relief, he has 

become a devout Christian and would face religious persecution should he be returned to 

China. Li’s decision to convert to Christianity is a change in his personal circumstances, 

which is insufficient by itself to excuse the 90-day time limit on the motion to reopen. 

 

1 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Guo v. 

Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004). The BIA abuses its discretion when its 

decision is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d 

Cir. 1994). “An abuse of discretion may be found in those circumstances where the 

Board’s decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established 

policies, is devoid of reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements; that 

is to say, where the Board has acted in an arbitrary of capricious manner.” Shardar v. 

Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 2007). 

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See Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2009). His “choice to engage in 

such [religious] activities after being ordered deported does not support application of the 

changed country conditions exception.” Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 497 (3d Cir. 

2012). Therefore, the relevant inquiry is whether Li has presented sufficient evidence 

which was previously unavailable or undiscoverable to demonstrate a material change in 

the treatment of Christians in China since his asylum hearing. See Liu, 555 F.3d at 150-

51.

Although Li bears the burden of proof, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), the Board “ha[s] a 

duty to explicitly consider any country conditions evidence submitted by an applicant that 

materially bears on his claim,” and “[a] similar, if not greater, duty arises in the context 

of motions to reopen based on changed country conditions.” Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 

F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). To support his contention that country 

conditions have changed since 2004, Li provided numerous State Department Country 

and International Religious Freedom Reports, China Aid Association reports, and 

research articles, as well as a 2005 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Penalties 

for Administration of Public Security, a 2008 Notice from the Ministry of Public 

Security, and a 2008 Church Order of Protestant Churches in China. In his motion, Li 

relied heavily on country reports from 2003 through 2011, highlighting specific 

information from each report which he argued demonstrated changed conditions over 

time.

Li argues that the Board failed to meaningfully consider all of the evidence in the 

record. In its opinion, the Board stated that Li “cites the 2003-2009 Country Reports on 

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China, but he does not offer those documents to support his motion.” Op. at 2. It is 

unclear from this statement, nor is it clear from the opinion, whether the Board 

considered these reports – which were quoted at length in Li’s motion to reopen – despite 

its conclusion that Li failed to provide them. Moreover, we are hard pressed to 

understand the BIA’s statement that this evidence was presented, but Li did not rely on it. 

In Liu v. Holder, the Board’s opinion contained nearly an identical comment 

regarding citations to reports which were not offered as evidence. Liu, 718 F.3d 706, 710

(7th Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit determined the petitioner in that case had submitted 

the evidence, but opined that she did not have to, noting that “it was enough for her to 

cite them since they are public documents to which the Board has ready access.” Id. In 

Abassi v. INS, 305 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2002), the petitioner made references to 

“Country Reports,” but failed to provide them. The Ninth Circuit held that, although the 

petitioner has the burden of proof, he is not required “to attach a government report that 

is easily available to the BIA.” Id. Given these cases, it is arguable here that, where the 

petitioner has quoted at length information which the Board could easily verify from 

readily available public documents, the Board erred in not taking administrative notice of 

the missing reports.

Moreover, it does not appear that the Board appreciated the extent of the evidence. 

Country Reports for 2003 and 2004 were part of the administrative record. See A.R. at 

550-81 & 582-633. Failure to consider these reports could be a denial of due process. 

See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549-50 (3d Cir. 2001). This is particularly true 

because the Board had a duty to compare the most recent conditions with the country 

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conditions that existed at the time of Li’s 2005 hearing. See Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 

241, 252-54 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that the Board’s point of reference when evaluating 

whether country conditions have changed is the time of the hearing before the IJ). 

Although the Board need not “write an exegesis on every contention” raised, it 

must provide sufficient analysis to allow us to conclude that it “has heard and thought 

and not merely reacted.” Id. at 256. Here, the Board failed to address Li’s arguments as 

to how conditions have worsened over time, and that mistreatment of church members 

has not been limited to harassment. Specifically, inter alia, Li outlined the following 

from State Department reports:

In 2003-2006: “leaders of unauthorized groups were 

sometimes the targets of harassment, interrogation, detention,

and physical abuse.”

In 2006 & 2008: “Authorities disrupted church meetings and 

retreats; detained, beat, and harassed leaders and church 

members; and confiscated the personal property of church 

leaders and members. . . . [T]here were numerous reports of 

detention and harassment of unregistered Protestant groups.”

In 2010: “The government detained, arrested, or sentenced to 

prison a number of religious leaders and adherents for 

activities related to their religious practice. These activities 

included assembling for religious worship, expressing 

religious beliefs in public and in private, and publishing 

religious texts.

 “Local authorities often used administrative 

detention, such as confinement at reeducation through labor 

(RTL) camps, to punish members of unregistered religious 

groups.”

 “Unregistered religious believers and Falun Gong 

adherents were among those housed with mentally ill patients 

in [high-security psychiatric hospitals].”

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A.R. 23-27. The failure to address this evidence is magnified by the fact that the Board 

quite correctly acknowledged that “reports on country conditions are highly probative 

evidence and are usually the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations.” 

Op. at 2. Because, at a minimum, the Board failed to adequately explain its decision that 

conditions had not materially worsened, we cannot meaningfully review the petition. See 

Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268-69 (vacating the Board’s decision where it failed to sufficiently 

explain the basis for its decision). 

Finally, in support of his motion to reopen, Li provided an affidavit from a fellow 

church member alleging that the member had been persecuted by Chinese authorities for 

attending an underground church. The Board discounted this evidence, stating: 

“[C]onsidering in part [Li’s] previous lack of candor, we do not find it to have been 

shown to be of sufficient evidentiary worth to support reopening these proceedings.” Op. 

at 3. However, the prior adverse credibility determination related to Li’s family planning 

claim. That was “utterly unrelated” to his religious persecution claim. Guo v. Ashcroft, 

386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding each adverse credibility finding must be 

justified with statements or record evidence “specifically related to the issue under 

consideration”); see also Lin v. Att’y Gen., 700 F.3d 683, 688 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Prior 

adverse credibility determinations are not always relevant on motions to reopen.”). 

Therefore, the Board erred in allowing the prior determination to taint its view of his 

evidence of changed country conditions. See Guo, 386F.3d at 562. Since we cannot 

determine the extent to which the Board relied on this prior determination in denying the 

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motion to reopen, we cannot conclude that the error is harmless. See Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 

642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying harmless error on immigration review “when 

it is highly probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the case”). 

II.

For all the reasons stated above, we will remand to the BIA to allow it to 

reconsider Li’s motion to reopen.2 See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (holding 

that a court of appeals should remand rather than decide the “changed circumstances” 

matter on its own). 

 

2 The Board did not reach the question of whether Li had made prima facie case for 

asylum. See Shardar, 503 F.3d at 312 (noting the two distinct inquiries in evaluating 

motions to reopen). The Board did find that Li had failed to establish prima facie 

eligibility for relief under the CAT; however, it provided no basis for that decision. 

However, because we find that the Board abused its discretion in addressing the evidence 

of changed country conditions, we need not address the CAT claim.

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