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Parties Involved:
Arminta Mohundro Russell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

United St11tei; C:ourc of Appeals 

ienth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JUN ?.. 0 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ARMINTA MOHUNDRO RUSSELL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

89-6142 

89-6219 

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On Appeal From The 

United States District Court 

For The Western District 

Of Oklahoma 

(D. C. No. CR-88-268-T) 

Don J. Gutteridge, Jr. of Kerr, Irvine & Rhodes, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Ted A. Richardson, Assistant United States Attorney (Timothy D. 

Leonard, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, SETH and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-6219 Document: 01019867895 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 1 
Defendant-appellant, Arminta Mohundro Russell, was convicted 

by a jury on one count of bank fraud, 18 u.s.c. § 1344, two counts 

of transporting in interstate commerce stolen goods, 18 u.s.c. 

§ 2314, one count of conspiracy to commit fraud, 18 u.s.c. § 371, 

and two counts of falsely representing her social security number 

in violation of 42 u.s.c. § 408(g)(2). Pursuant to the 

United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines (Guidelines), a 

presentence investigation report was compiled for defendant 

assigning her at a total offense level of 14 with a criminal 

history category of VI. Under those calculations, the Guidelines 

sentencing range was 37 to 46 months. At sentencing, the trial 

judge departed upward 14 months on the ground that defendant's 

criminal history category underrepresented her criminal history 

and the likelihood she would commit further crimes. Defendant was 

sentenced to 60 months on Counts I, V, VI and X (to run 

concurrently with each other), 60 months on Counts II and III (to 

run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentence 

imposed on Counts I, v, VI and X), for a total sentence of 10 

years all within the statutory maximums. On appeal, defendant 

objects to the sufficiency of evidence to support her convictions 

under 42 u.s.c. § 408(g)(2) and 18 u.s.c. § 2314, the trial 

court's upward departure and the court's imposition of consecutive 

sentences. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. 

Defendant was named in a 10-count indictment for numerous 

charges arising from a scheme in which she fraudulently obtained 

merchandise using various deceitful tactics. This scheme began on 

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May 20, 1988 when defendant and April Smith drove from Dallas, 

Texas to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Upon arrival, defendant applied 

for and received an Oklahoma driver's license using a false name 

and social security number. Later, she opened a commercial bank 

account in Oklahoma City at Liberty National Bank and Trust using 

her Oklahoma driver's license, a false name and social security 

number. Defendant proceeded to go on an expensive shopping spree 

charging numerous items (100 tires, a Rolex watch, cameracorder, 

jewelry) to this account. Defendant's checks were later 

dishonored. 

I • 

Defendant first contends that the district court erred in 

denying her motion of acquittal on two counts of violating 42 

U.S.C. § 408(g)(2) on grounds of insufficient evidence. In our 

review of the trial court's denial of defendant's motion of 

acquittal we must view the evidence and reasonable inferences to 

be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the government to 

decide whether there was sufficient evidence from which the jury 

could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

United States v. Darrell, 828 F.2d 644 (10th Cir.). Under these 

standards, we find ample evidence to support defendant's 

conviction on both counts. 

Defendant urges us that she obtained "nothing of value'' 

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 408(g) by providing a false 

social security number when she opened her commercial bank account 

and applied for a driver's license. Defendant's argument is 

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Appellate Case: 89-6219 Document: 01019867895 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 3 
undercut by the clear language of the statute which states, in 

relevant part: 

"Whoever--

"(g) •.• for the purpose of obtaining 

anything of value from any person, or for any 

other purpose--

"(2) with intent to deceive, falsely 

represents a number to be the social security 

account number assigned by the Secretary to 

him or to another person, when in fact such 

number is not the social security account 

number assigned by the Secretary to him or to 

such other person; ..• 

" •.. shall be guilty of a felony " 

42 u.s.c. § 408(g)(2). In this case, a jury could infer that the 

defendant's use of a false social security number was for the 

purpose of concealing her true identity, which in turn, allowed 

her to obtain a driver's license and a commercial bank account. 

Armed with these items, defendant was able to deceive numerous 

businesses and obtain valuable merchandise, which she did not pay 

for. Clearly, this falls within the statutory ambit of 42 u.s.c. 

§ 408(g). See Darrell, 828 F.2d 644, 647. 

Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in denying 

her motion for acquittal on one count of transporting in 

interstate commerce a Rolex watch in violation of 18 u.s.c. 

§ 2314. Defendant urges that the evidence fails to establish that 

she participated in the actual transportation of the watch in 

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Appellate Case: 89-6219 Document: 01019867895 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 4 
interstate commerce. After reviewing the record, however, we 

disagree. 

The parties concede there is no direct evidence establishing 

that defendant transported the watch from Oklahoma to Texas. A 

criminal conviction, however, can rest on circumstantial evidence. 

See United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 673 (10th Cir.). 

The evidence in this case shows that defendant purchased a Rolex 

watch in Oklahoma City for $15,921.60 and left with it the same 

day. Record Vol. II at 135-137. A check for this amount was 

deposited in defendant's bank account. Ms. Smith, who accompanied 

defendant from Texas to Oklahoma, testified that L. O. Kaiser 

wanted a Rolex watch. Record Vol. II at 102. On July 8, 1989 the 

watch was recovered at L. o. Kaiser's house during an execution of 

a search warrant. We believe this is sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to infer that the defendant transported the watch 

from Oklahoma to Texas. 

II. 

Appellant next contends that the district court improperly 

departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines when it imposed a 

60-month sentence on each count. Departures upward are 

exceptional. Our review of the district court's upward departure 

consists of three steps. See United States v. White, 893 F.2d 

276, 277 (10th Cir.). In the first step: 

"we determine whether the circumstances cited 

by the district court justify a departure from 

the Guidelines. The sentencing court may 

depart from the Guidelines only if it 'finds 

that there exists an aggravating or mitigating 

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Appellate Case: 89-6219 Document: 01019867895 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 5 
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 

adequately taken into consideration by the 

Sentencing Commission in formulating the 

guidelines that should result in a sentence 

different from that described.'" 

Id. at 277-78 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). Second, we ascertain 

whether the circumstances cited by the district court to justify 

the departure actually exist in the instant case. Id. at 278. 

That assessment involves fact-finding and will be overturned only 

if clearly erroneous. Id. See 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e). Third, we 

review the district court's degree of departure measured by a 

reasonableness standard. Id. See 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e)(3). 

We review de nova whether the circumstances cited by the 

district court justify departure. White, 893 F.2d 276, 279. 

Defendant's presentence investigation report contained a detailed 

summary of her criminal hi~tory including five prior convictions 

for theft related offenses, 10 prior convictions of conduct 

excluded in the computation, eight pending criminal state charges 

and seven charges of worthless checks which were dismissed in 1989 

after she made restitution. Defendant's prior state convictions 

occurred between 1977 and 1982; however, they are not stale under 

the Guidelines. Defendant's prior convictions which resulted in a 

sentence exceeding one year and one month were imposed within 15 

years of the instant offense, see§ 4Al.2(e)(l), while her 

sentences under one year were imposed in 1982, within 10 years of 

the instant offense. See§ 4Al.2(e)(2). Defendant's total 

"criminal history score,"§ 4Al.l, was computed at 16 which 

includes 13 points assessed for her prior convictions and three 

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Appellate Case: 89-6219 Document: 01019867895 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 6 
points added because the instant offense was committed while on 

parole and less than two years following release from confinement. 

See§ 4Al.l(d). This score placed defendant in the highest 

criminal history category (VI). 

Appellant contends that the trial court's upward departure is 

not justified on any grounds listed in§ 5K2.l-14. A review of 

the record, however, reveals that the court's upward departure was 

based on§ 4Al.3, not§ 5K2.l-14. The trial judge stated that in 

his judgment: 

"reliable information in this case indicates 

that the criminal history category does not 

adequately reflect the seriousness of 

Ms. Russell's past criminal conduct, and that 

the likelihood that she will commit other 

crimes is a very real one based on the 

momentum that she has clearly established thus 

far and her apparent lack of control to slow 

down her propensity to do so ..•• 

11 ••• [Category VI] significantly 

underrepresents the seriousness of her 

criminal history and the likelihood of her 

further criminal conduct, and I would refer 

you and any reviewing court to the presentence 

report which itemizes the remarkable criminal 

history in this case on which these 

conclusions are based. 

"The sentencing commission ... recognized 

that on occasion there might be an egregious 

serious criminal record which ••• [category 

VI] is not adequate to reflect the seriousness 

of the defendant's criminal history, and in 

such a case ... a departure from the 

guidelines may be warranted." 

Record Vol. II (Supp.) at 9-10. See§ 4Al.3. 

Defendant next challenges the trial court's use of her 

criminal record in determining to depart upward. At the 

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Appellate Case: 89-6219 Document: 01019867895 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 7 
sentencing hearing, the court gave explicit grounds for its upward 

departure stating: 

"Not only the established conviction history 

in this case is remarkable and significant, I 

do recognize that Ms. Russell incurred charges 

while on probation--or rather on parole in 

North Carolina, and those charges were 

dismissed upon her payment of restitution, 

and, indeed, ..• there are some charges 

still pending in North Carolina. 

"Not only the seriousness of the crimes, but 

the fact that they were various and numerous, 

which, while some were consolidated for 

sentencing purposes, it should be understood 

that the crimes were committed separately and 

on separate occasions. And so the 

consolidation for sentencing purposes should 

not suggest that they were arising out of one 

act or occasion. I think that is significant 

in Ms. Russell's case and, under the 

guidelines, justifies the departure that I'm 

about to announce." 

Record Vol. II (Supp.) at 10. Defendant's presentence 

investigation report, as mentioned, shows that in 1982 she was 

sentenced on 16 separate counts; however, because they were 

consolidated for sentencing only three criminal history category 

points were assessed. Section 4Al.2, comment (n.3), specifically 

recognizes this as a circumstance which may warrant a departure 

under§ 4Al.3. The commentary cautions with respect to 

consolidated sentences: 

"The court should be aware that there may be 

instances in which this definition is overly 

broad and will result in a criminal history 

score that underrepresents the seriousness of 

the defendant's criminal history and the 

danger that he presents to the public. For 

example, if the defendant commits a number of 

offenses on independent occasions separated by 

arrests, and the resulting criminal cases are 

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Appellate Case: 89-6219 Document: 01019867895 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 8 
consolidated and result in a combined sentence 

of eight years, counting merely three points 

for this factor will not adequately reflect 

either the seriousness of the defendant's 

criminal history or the frequency with which 

he commits crimes. In such circumstances, the 

court should consider whether departure is 

warranted. See§ 4Al.3." 

Since the defendant's consolidated sentence involved 16 

separate counts, each occurring on independent occasions, it was 

proper for the sentencing court to rely on this as a factor in its 

decision to depart. See also White, 893 F.2d 276, 279; 

United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 606-607 (5th Cir.) 

(sentencing court was merely complying with the Guidelines when it 

considered defendant's consolidated sentence as a factor 

warranting an upward departure from criminal history category VI). 

In addition, the court stated that its upward departure was 

based on its recognition that the defendant incurred the instant 

offense while other charges were pending. The Guidelines 

expressly list this as a factor warranting consideration of an 

upward departure. Section 4Al.3 states, in a non-exhaustive list, 

that an example of "reliable information" warranting a departure 

is information concerning: 

"(d) whether the defendant was pending trial, 

sentencing, or appeal on another charge at the 

time of the instant offense." 

The presentence investigation report, as mentioned, indicates that 

defendant is currently awaiting trial in North Carolina on eight 

criminal charges filed between September 1987 and January 1988. 

These charges were not considered in calculating her criminal 

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Appellate Case: 89-6219 Document: 01019867895 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 9 
history category because she has not yet been convicted or 

sentenced. Since defendant's charges were pending when she was 

indicted in the instant offense, § 4Al.3(d) is an additional 

justification for the court's departure. See White, 893 F.2d 276, 

279-80; United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 50-51 (1st 

Cir.) (sentencing judge can consider the pendency of defendant's 

criminal charges as a factor warranting an upward departure under 

§ 4Al.3). 

The court also considered seven charges of worthless checks 

mentioned above which were dismissed in January 1989 because 

defendant made restitution to the victims. This too is a 

justifiable factor under§ 4Al.3(e) of "prior similar adult 

criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction." 

The trial court's cited reasons are explicit circumstances 

under the Guidelines which warrant a departure. Therefore, we 

find ample justification for the court's upward departure on the 

ground that defendant's criminal history category manifestly 

underrepresented the seriousness of her past criminal involvement 

and her propensity to commit future crimes. 

Turning to the second step, we have no difficulty concluding 

that the grounds cited by the district court had a factual basis 

in this case. There is no dispute that the circumstances cited by 

the trial court existed. Moreover, defendant did not dispute the 

accuracy of the presentence investigation report or point to any 

evidence suggesting the trial court was clearly erroneous. 

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We must finally determine whether the trial court's degree of 

departure from the Guidelines was reasonable. White, 893 F.2d 

276, 280. This determination requires us to consider the district 

court's proffered justifications as well as such factors as: the 

seriousness of the offense, the need for just punishment, 

deterrence, protection of the public, correctional treatment, the 

sentencing pattern of the Guidelines, the policy statements 

contained in the Guidelines and the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentencing disparities. Id. at 278; 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e)(3). With 

these factors in mind, we should not lightly overturn 

determinations of the appropriate degree of departure. Id. at 

279. 

We have recognized that§ 4Al.3 provides specific procedures 

for the court where the defendant's criminal history score 

underrepresents past criminal conduct. United States v. Keys, 899 

F.2d 983, 990-991 (10th Cir.). However, in the case before us the 

defendant is already in the highest criminal history category 

(VI). 

To be sure, determining the reasonableness of the degree of 

departure from category VI is troublesome. In United States v. 

Brown, 899 F.2d 94 (1st Cir.), the trial court departed upward 

from the defendant's criminal history category VI on the ground 

that category VI did not adequately reflect the seriousness of 

defendant's past criminal conduct. § 4Al.3. The First Circuit, 

engaging in a three-step procedure for review, stated that with 

respect to the reasonableness of the degree of departure: 

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"Generally, the district court has a greater 

familiarity with the nooks and crannies of a 

particular case. Therefore, appellate courts 

should 'not lightly disturb decisions to 

depart, or not, or related decisions 

implicating degrees of departure.' Given how 

much [defendant's] criminal history was 

underrepresented by the guidelines, we cannot 

say that the district court's departure was 

outside the realm of reasonableness." 

Brown, 899 F.2d at 98 (citations omitted}. See also, DiazVillafane, 874 F.2d 43, 51-52 (rejecting contention that an 

assessment of the "reasonableness" of the degree of departure is 

"merely a matter of arithmetic" and refusing to turn 

"idiosyncratic departure decisions into mechanistic beancounting"}. 

We agree with the First Circuit and hold that in determining 

the reasonableness of the degree of departure from category VI, we 

should afford the trial judge due deference and not "lightly 

overturn determinations of the appropriate degree of departure." 

White, 893 F.2d at 279; see also, United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 

491 (6th Cir.}; Roberson, 872 F.2d 597. Our approach is 

consistent with the policy and structure of the Guidelines. No 

graduations in the Guideline grid exist above category VI. An 

offender reaches this category with a criminal history score of 13 

or more. The Sentencing Commission recognized that circumstances 

may exist warranting a departure above category VI, see§ 4Al.3 

(policy statement}; however, it does not impose any mechanics for 

the trial judge to reference when determining the degree of 

departure from category VI. This is significant. We do not 

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believe the Commission intended to impose any particular formula 

upon the trial judge, although the trial court is not free to 

disregard the Guideline requirements of proportionality and 

uniformity just because it determined that a departure is 

warranted. The court in Roberson stated: 

"The Guidelines, however, instruct the court 

to move only between criminal history 

categories when it finds the applicable 

category inadequate. Guidelines§ 4Al.l. The 

factors relevant to the offense levels are 

distinct from those pertinent to the criminal 

history categories. Each recommended range 

reflects the appropriate sentence for each 

combination of offense level and criminal 

history factors. Arbitrarily moving to a new 

offense level when the highest criminal 

category proves inadequate would skew the 

balancing of factors which the Commission 

created in the Sentencing Table." 

872 F.2d at 607-608 (emphasis added). 

This issue is within ·the ar~a obviously left within the 

"retention of considerable discretion" by the trial judge, White, 

893 F.2d at 279, although not unfettered discretion. Because the 

departure cases will often involve unique and unusual 

circumstances, this is beyond any suitable application of strict 

uniformity or formula. The Commission would have provided such a 

formula had one been intended. Although we cannot anticipate all 

of the ways in which district courts may seek to provide· for 

upward departures from criminal history category VI, we are 

unwilling to improvise some mechanical extension of the criminal 

offense categories as a means of extending the criminal history 

categories as was suggested in United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 

1057 (7th Cir.). 

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Given our deference to.the trial judge's determination of the 

degree of departure and the defendant's extensive past criminal 

conduct, exemplified by numerous pending criminal charges and a 

myriad of past criminal convictions, we cannot conclude that the 

degree of departure was unreasonable. 

III. 

Finally, we also reject defendant's contention that the 

district court erred in directing that her sentence for 

transporting in interstate commerce 100 tires fraudulently 

obtained, 18 U.S.C. § 2314, shall run consecutively to her 

sentence imposed for conspiracy to defraud Joe Esco Tire Company 

under 18 u.s.c. § 371. As support, defendant urges that the facts 

and allegations contained in 18 u.s.c. § 2314 and 18 u.s.c. § 371 

and the evidence produced at trial "clearly indicate that the 

elements necessary for conviction under both counts were 

identical." Appellant's Brief at 20. Thus, under Pinkerton v. 

United States, 328 U.S. 640, the principle of merger prevents the 

trial court from imposing consecutive sentences. 

Defendant's reliance on Pinkerton is misplaced. To implicate 

the merger principle under Pinkerton an agreement must be an 

essential element to the substantive offense. See Ianelle v. 

United States, 420 U.S. 770, 781-85; United States v. Davis, 793 

F.2d 246 (10th Cir.). In this case, even though the conspiracy 

and the substantive count are closely related factually, there is 

no need to prove that an agreement existed to sustain a conviction 

for transportation in interstate commerce of stolen goods, 18 

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Appellate Case: 89-6219 Document: 01019867895 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 14 
U.S.C. § 2314. Therefore, the merger principle does not prevent 

the trial court from imposing consecutive sentences. 

Whether to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence is 

within the discretion of the trial court, and the court is 

directed to take into consideration the factors set forth in 18 

u.s.c. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b). We find nothing in 

the record to indicate that the district court erred in imposing 

consecutive sentences. 

AFFIRMED. 

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