Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01458/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01458-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sourav Bhattacharya
Appellant
Sandeep Seshadrijois
Appellant
Thomas Steed
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IN RE: THOMAS STEED, SOURAV

BHATTACHARYA, SANDEEP SESHADRIJOIS, 

Appellants

______________________ 

2014-1458

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board, in No. 10/819,600.

______________________ 

Decided: October 1, 2015

______________________ 

SOURAV BHATTACHARYA, Fountain Hills, AZ, pro se. 

NATHAN K. KELLEY, Office of the Solicitor, United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for 

appellee Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by JAMIE 

LYNNE SIMPSON, AMY J. NELSON. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, CLEVENGER, and DYK, Circuit Judges.

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Steed, Sourav Bhattacharya, and Sandeep 

Seshadrijois (collectively “Steed” or “Applicants”) appeal 

the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirming 

the rejection of claims 37 and 39–51 of United States

Patent Application No. 10/819,600 (“the ’600 Application”) 

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2 IN RE: STEED

on the ground of obviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103.1 Remaining claims 52–54 were subject to a restriction requirement 

at the time of the Board proceeding and were not considered by the Board. Bd. Op. at 4–5. We now affirm the 

Board’s decision. 

The Invention

The ’600 Application, entitled “Web-Integrated OnLine Financial Database System and Method for Debt 

Recovery,” was filed on April 6, 2004, with priority 

claimed to a provisional application filed on November 13, 

2003. The invention is described in the specification as

directed to “a debt records and debt collection system and 

database, and in particular to a web integrated debt 

records and debt collection system that can be accessed 

and operated across the Internet by a variety of users in a 

variety of user roles.” ’600 Application, col.1, ll.16–19. 

Claim 37 is stated to be representative: 

37. A fully automated and web-integrated 

debt recovery system including a user interface, 

comprising different screen layouts for:

an administrator web page; and

a collector web page; and

a cross-bar switch, where the cross-bar switch 

can turn on/off a

connection between any pair of databases; and 

wherein:

the system is configured to aid an administrator in a first plurality of roles; 

the system is configured to aid a collector in a 

second plurality of roles different from said first 

plurality of roles; 

1 Ex parte Steed, No. 2012-005735 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 

23, 2014) (“Bd. Op.”). 

 

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IN RE: STEED 3

the administrator web page has first interface 

elements specific to the first plurality of roles; 

and the collector web page has second interface elements specific to the second plurality of 

roles, 

wherein certain data is assigned to only the 

first plurality of roles, the second plurality of roles 

and/or an intersection of the first plurality of roles 

and second plurality of roles.

The Examiner rejected all of the claims as obvious in 

view of U.S. Pre-Grant Publication No. 2004/0019560 

(“Evans”), alone or in combination with other references 

(“the Evans Rejections”). The Evans publication is entitled “System and Method for Debt Presentment and 

Resolution” and was found by the Examiner to anticipate 

the ’600 Application’s web-integrated debt recovery system. After unsuccessfully attempting to distinguish the 

Evans Rejections on the merits, Steed undertook to remove Evans as a reference in accordance with 37 C.F.R. 

§ 1.131, a procedure called “swearing back” or “swearing 

behind” “under Rule 131,” whereby the Applicant establishes that it was in possession of the claimed subject 

matter before the effective date of the reference. The 

Evans effective date is December 23, 2002.

To this end, during examination Steed submitted a 

Rule 131 Declaration that included four exhibits, as well 

as statements from Steed that Exhibit A showed “conception of the invention prior to the date of the Evans et al. 

reference,” and that Exhibits B, C, and D showed “diligence continuing to the constructive reduction to practice.” Rule 131 Decl., Paper No. 12 at ¶¶ 4–5 (Sept. 1, 

2009). The Examiner found the Declaration and the 

exhibits insufficient, stating that the evidence relied on to 

show conception was “a high level presentation that does 

not include any specifics of the actual invention, only a 

broad overview of the idea” and that it “fail[ed] to disclose 

any of the key elements of independent claim 37.” Office 

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Action, Paper No. 17 at 3 (Dec. 12, 2009). The Examiner 

found Exhibits B, C, and D to be insufficient for demonstrating diligence, for “there are significant gaps of time 

between each of the appendices A–D that amount to 

entire years of diligence being omitted” with “a total of 

about 63 months’ worth of time unaccounted for to show 

due diligence with respect to the invention.” Id. at 4.

The Applicants filed two new exhibits consisting of 

pages from the notebook of co-inventor Bhattacharya and 

the diary of co-inventor Steed. These exhibits consisted of 

over 150 pages of documents that Steed stated established 

“both the inventive act and reduction to practice prior to 

the publication date of Evans et al.” and “due diligence of 

nearly 63 months.” Pet. for Revival and Amendment, 

Paper No. 23 at 22, 28 (Sept. 14, 2010). The Examiner 

found these exhibits, considered together with the Declaration and earlier-filed exhibits, to be insufficient to show 

conception or reduction to practice, and that the additional documents “only succeed in accounting for a total of 6 

months of time from the originally deficient 63 months.” 

Examiner’s Action, Paper No. 34 at 4–6 (March 3, 2011). 

Steed appealed to the Board. The appeal brief included a Table entitled “Due Diligence/Continued Improvement Track Record.” Bd. Appeal Br. 5. The Table is a 

chronological listing of entries in the “Inventor Activity 

Logs” and “Inventor Intranet Site Activity Logs,” stated to 

show “diligence/continued improvement” supported by 

“Additional Evidence (by Affidavit & Testimony).” Id. 

The “Inventor Activity Logs” referred to various “notebook 

copies and computer dated files” included in Exhibit B-I 

and B-II of the Board Appeal Brief. Id. at 28. The “Inventor Intranet Site Activity Logs” refer to “proof of 

monthly payment to keep the intranet site up, which 

hosted the software,” and the “Additional Evidence” refers 

to “evidence by testimony or affidavit, which can of course 

be enjoined as/when required” to prove diligence during 

every week over a period of seven years. Id. at 28–29. 

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During the Board hearing, the Board stated that it 

could not consider any evidence not already of record

before the Examiner, referring specifically to the Table 

and other materials presented at the hearing. Following 

the hearing but before the Board’s decision, Steed filed 

several motions, including: a “Motion to Set Oral Arguments Summary on Record,” consisting of a summation of 

points and arguments presented at the hearing; a “Motion 

to Set Appeal Exhibits on Record (Post Oral Arguments)”

which asked the Board to accept and include in the record 

the new material that Steed had brought to the oral 

argument (viz., a PowerPoint presentation, inventor 

logbooks, and two additional affidavits); and a “Motion for 

Default (Post Oral Arguments)” stating that the Examiner had not submitted a responsive Answer to Steed’s

Briefs, and that Steed is therefore entitled to a default 

judgment. 

Steed states, on appeal to this court, that the Board 

did not rule on these motions and this failure warrants 

judgment in favor of Steed, for Steed states that a favorable ruling on any of these motions would have resulted in 

sufficient evidence to demonstrate reduction to practice or 

conception and diligence, before the effective date of the 

Evans reference. In its decision, the Board stated that it 

could not consider any new argument or new evidence

without a showing of good cause why the argument or 

evidence was not previously presented to the Examiner, 

citing 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011) (“Any arguments 

or authorities not included in the brief . . . will be refused 

consideration . . . unless good cause is shown”) and

§ 41.47(e)(1) (“[A]ppellant may only rely on evidence that 

has been previously entered and considered by the primary examiner and present argument that has been relied 

upon in the brief.”). Referring to the Table, the Board 

stated: 

[B]ecause neither the chart itself nor the contents 

of the chart are set forth in the Declaration, it is 

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considered argument insufficient to establish specific facts to support due diligence.

Furthermore, even if the Chart was set forth in 

the Declaration, the chart merely identifies that a 

piece of evidence corresponds to a certain date, 

but does not explain what fact that piece of evidence is meant to support as having occurred on 

that date.

Bd. Op. at 15. The Board ruled that Steed had not set 

forth specific facts to establish dates and acts of either 

conception or reduction to practice. The Board stated that 

the reduction to practice assertions at oral argument “are 

not set forth in the Appeal Brief or the Reply Brief, and 

are thus considered waived . . . . Appellants have not set 

forth sufficient facts to support an actual reduction to 

practice.” Bd. Op. at 7–8.

The Board then reviewed and affirmed the Examiner’s rejection on the ground of obviousness based on the 

Evans reference. This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

The principal issue on appeal is whether Steed antedated the Evans reference in accordance with the requirements and law implemented by Rule 131, for Steed 

bears the burden to establish “facts . . . in character and 

weight, as to establish reduction to practice prior to the 

effective date of the reference, or conception of the invention prior to the effective date of the reference coupled 

with due diligence from prior to said date to a subsequent 

reduction to practice or to the filing of the application.” 

37 C.F.R. § 1.131(b). Steed argues that the Declaration 

and exhibits meet the requirements of either actual 

reduction to practice or conception plus diligence.

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Standard of Review

When the issue of priority concerns the antedating of 

a reference, the applicant is required to demonstrate, with 

sufficient documentation, that the applicant was in possession of the later-claimed invention before the effective 

date of the reference. Demonstration of such priority 

requires documentary support, from which factual findings and inferences are drawn, in application of the rules 

and law of conception, reduction to practice, and diligence. 

The purpose is not to determine priority of invention—the 

province of the interference practice—but to ascertain 

whether the applicant was in possession of the claimed 

invention sufficiently to overcome the teachings and effect 

of an earlier publication of otherwise invalidating weight.

Thus, the facts and law of conception focus on whether the evidence presented by the applicant demonstrates 

that the inventor had a definite idea of the invention, as it 

would thereafter be applied in practice. The principles 

are legal, but the conclusions of law focus on the evidence, 

for which the Board’s factual findings are reviewed for 

support by substantial evidence.

Similarly, actual reduction to practice under Rule 131 

is a question of law, and depends on the evidence that the 

invention, as conceived, was shown to work for its intended purpose, before the date of the adverse reference. The 

Board applies the standards of precedent. See, e.g.,

Holmwood v. Sugavanam, 948 F.2d 1236, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 

1991) (“[A]n applicant must show that ‘the embodiment 

relied upon as evidence of priority actually worked for its 

intended purpose.’”) (citation omitted). 

On appellate review, we review the Board’s underlying findings for support by substantial evidence, and give 

plenary review to the Board’s conclusions of law based on 

those findings. See In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002) (“If the evidence in record will support several 

reasonable but contradictory conclusions, we will not find 

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8 IN RE: STEED

the Board’s decision unsupported by substantial evidence 

simply because the Board chose one conclusion over 

another plausible alternative.”).

Issues of diligence concern the period just preceding 

the effective date of the adverse reference, to the actual or 

constructive reduction to practice. Diligence turns on the 

factual record, and we review Board determinations as to 

diligence for support by substantial evidence in the record. While stating that it did not need to reach the issue 

of diligence because conception had not been demonstrated, the Board nonetheless found the evidence demonstrating diligence to be insufficient.

The Ruling of Waiver

The Board held that “assertions that the claimed invention was actually reduced to practice in December of 

1997, and at the latest by August of 2000 are not set forth 

in the Appeal Brief or the Reply Brief, and are thus 

considered waived.” Bd. Op. at 6. We discern no such 

waiver. To the contrary, the appeal briefs included well 

over a hundred pages of exhibits and arguments, all 

directed to actual reduction to practice. Although the 

Board concluded that the evidence did not establish an 

actual reduction to practice, the issue was not omitted 

from the appeal briefs. 

Steed’s briefs before the Board are clear that Steed 

was attempting to establish conception, diligence, and 

actual reduction to practice. The flaw in Steed’s proofs 

was in the content of the documentary evidence, not in 

any purported waiver. It is beyond debate that Steed was

attempting to swear back of Evans, and that this was the 

focus of the evidence and argument presented to the 

Examiner and the additional documents and affidavits 

presented to the Board.

Steed stated in the Board Appeal Brief that “Applicants are also able to establish the invention date, to 

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IN RE: STEED 9

1997.” Bd. Appeal Br. 17. In the Board Reply Brief Steed 

stated: “Appellants invention . . . has been and continues 

to be real-world software that was executed on an internal 

hosting website beginning in 1997.” Bd. Reply Br. 19. 

These assertions are grounded in the Rule 131 Declaration filed with the Examiner, where Steed averred that 

“we . . . constructively2 reduced to practice before December 23, 2002.” Rule 131 Decl., Paper No. 12 (Sept. 1, 

2009).

Steed’s references to activity earlier than the Evans 

effective date negate the Board’s ruling that Steed waived 

the issue of actual reduction to practice. Steed pressed

this issue before the Board during oral argument, arguing

that the inventors conceived the invention and actually 

reduced it to practice “about five years before” the Evans 

date, in “the second half of ’97.” Bd. Hr’g Tr. at 9. Despite its charge of waiver, the Board appears to have 

considered the relevant information.

Actual Reduction to Practice

The burden of showing actual reduction of practice is 

on the party seeking its benefit. In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 

1279, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011). To demonstrate an actual 

reduction to practice, the applicant must have: (1) constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met 

all the limitations of the claim and (2) determined that 

the invention would work for its intended purpose. In re 

Omeprazole Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1361, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). 

2 At that time Steed was acting pro se and misstated the usage “constructively,” but the intended meaning is 

clear. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A 

document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed.’”).

 

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In examining the substance of Steed’s assertions of 

reduction to practice, the Board found that Steed did not

provide, with the Rule 131 Declaration, evidence adequate 

to demonstrate an actual reduction to practice before the 

Evans effective date. Steed argues that the Board ignored 

two statements in the appeal briefs, which Steed states 

set forth proof of an actual reduction to practice. Steed 

had stated in the appeal brief that the “Evans et al application file date is in December 2002, while Applicants had 

a working prototype much before December 2002.” Bd. 

Appeal Br. 16. Steed had also stated in the Reply Brief, 

responding to the Examiner’s Answer, that “Appellants 

invention . . . has been and continues to be real-world 

software that was executed on an internal hosting website 

beginning in 1997.” Bd. Reply Br. 19. 

The Board held that Steed did not provide facts showing any specific dates or events of actual reduction of 

practice but only presented statements of generalized 

activity. Steed responds that these statements were 

supported by two independent third-party witnesses, 

whose affidavits were offered and discussed during the 

Board hearing. Steed states that these witnesses corroborate the inventors’ activities and support the asserted 

reduction to practice, and complains that the Board 

refused to receive the affidavits into evidence because 

they were not provided until the Board hearing. Steed 

states that these “two non-inventor witness affidavits . . . 

place the ARTP [actual reduction to practice] at a date no 

later than June 2000 and August 2000.” Appeal Br. 8.

The Board declined to rely on these two affidavits or 

other materials presented for the first time at the Board 

hearing, telling Dr. Bhattacharya, who argued on behalf 

of the Applicants, that “we cannot rely on any information 

in [the materials presented for the first time at the Board 

hearing] in rendering our decision . . . . I’m sorry sir, you 

cannot submit evidence here. That’s the problem.” Bd. 

Hr’g Tr. 3, 7; see 37 C.F.R § 41.47(e)(1) (“[A]ppellant may 

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IN RE: STEED 11

only rely on evidence that has been previously entered 

and considered by the primary examiner and present 

argument that has been relied upon in the brief or reply 

brief.”)

Steed argues that these third-party affidavits were

not new evidence because they were listed on the Table

included in the Appeal Brief to the Board. Steed states 

that the two affidavits “were presented in [the Table]. 

Rightmost column for the row of the year 2000, in the 

Appeal brief, and also hand carried during the Oral 

Hearing.” Appeal Br. 10. Steed states that the Table 

shows work “[d]uring every week of 2000.” Bd. Appeal Br.

5. The Board stated that it did not consider the Table 

because it had not previously been provided to the Examiner. The Board also stated that the Table appears to be

directed to diligence starting in 1997 and does not explicitly describe the claimed system. The Board found that

the Table does not identify any specific activity on any 

specific date or provide any details to relate such activity 

to the claims on appeal. Bd. Op. at 15.

A note to the Table stated: “If Examiner or Appeal 

Board has any question re: the above data and how they 

can be traced to the Exhibits, please call the Inventors.” 

Bd. Appeal Br. 29. Steed criticizes the Examiner and the 

Board for not having called the Inventors as requested. 

We do not discern a breach of agency duty, for although it 

might indeed have assisted this pro se applicant to be 

advised of the insufficiencies in the evidence, the Examiner had already responded that specific dates and activities 

were lacking from the materials provided. See, e.g., Office 

Action, Paper No. 34 at 4–6 (March 3, 2011). The Board 

criticized the “hundred pages” of documents as being 

“replete with shorthand notations, incomplete records of 

phone conversations, and technical terminology spread 

out over many years . . . we find many of these documents 

almost completely incomprehensible without the AppelCase: 14-1458 Document: 30-1 Page: 11 Filed: 10/01/2015
12 IN RE: STEED

lants providing context.” Bd. Op. at 8. On our review, 

this criticism is accurate. 

No specific dates or acts tied to the several elements 

of the claims are referenced in the inventors’ Declaration 

and the exhibits. The Declaration states that the invention was “reduced to practice before December 23, 2002” 

and that “from about November 26, 1997 through April 6, 

2004 (the filing date of the . . . application) . . . we engaged 

in a diligent and reasonably continuous effort . . . to 

develop, market, manufacture, and seek patent protection 

for the invention.” Rule 131 Declaration, Paper No. 12 

(Sept. 1, 2009). The Board observed that although Steed 

provided many exhibits, they did not identify any specific 

pages or text as showing an actual reduction to practice. 

The Board stated that it was “incumbent upon Appellants 

to explain the content of the Exhibits, and any relevant 

relationships between different portions of the Exhibits.” 

Bd. Op. at 9–10; see In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 719 

(CCPA 1974) (“It was appellants’ burden to explain the 

content of these notebook pages as proof of acts amounting to reduction to practice.”).

We agree that the exhibits are not self-explanatory, 

and the Examiner had adequately warned the applicant, 

stating in the Final Office Action that “most of the notes 

included for the [year] 2000 are all notes to call people 

without actually including what phone calls were being 

made about and what was being accomplished with 

reference to the invention” and “there are 57 months of 

time unaccounted for in applicant’s attempt to show due 

diligence,” among other things. Office Action, Paper No. 

34 at 5–6 (March 3, 2011). In an earlier Office Action, the 

Examiner stated that “Appendix A . . . does not include 

any specifics of the actual invention” and “there are 

significant gaps of time between each of the Appendices 

A-D that amount to entire years of diligence being omitted.” Office Action, Paper No. 17 at 3–4 (Dec. 9, 2009). 

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IN RE: STEED 13

On this appeal, Steed argues that there were “multiple, unambiguous and irrefutable statements” that 

showed actual reduction to practice in 1997 and no later 

than mid-2000, based on the Declaration and exhibits and 

the Table and the two third-party affidavits. Appeal Br.

8. Steed points to the “tabular summary, with a footnote 

inviting USPTO examiner to engage in detail discussion.” 

Appeal Br. 15–16. Steed does not offer or identify specific 

dates or events in relation to the claims and the various 

steps thereof.

Steed argues that the two third-party affidavits were 

properly before the Board, stating that 37 C.F.R. 

§ 41.47(e)(2) permits new evidence for good cause. This 

regulation does not so provide. Section 41.47(e)(1) states 

that appellants before the Board shall “only rely on evidence that has been previously entered and considered by 

the primary examiner and present argument that has 

been relied upon in the brief or reply brief.” The exception stated in § 41.47(e)(2) only allows appellants to rely 

on a new argument when it is based upon a recent decision of either the Board or a court. See 37 C.F.R. 

§ 41.33(d)(2) (“All other affidavits or other evidence filed 

after the date of filing an appeal . . . will not be admitted.”).

We agree with the PTO argument, on this appeal, 

that

[T]he Board cannot be faulted for not reviewing 

evidence that was not presented to it or to the Examiner. To the extent Appellants have better 

proof of an earlier actual reduction to practice or 

conception date, the proper remedy is to file a continuation application and present the evidence to 

the Examiner in the first instance.

PTO Br. 24. We conclude that substantial evidence 

supports the Board’s findings, and the ruling that Steed 

did not establish an actual reduction to practice before the 

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Evans effective date of December 23, 2002. That ruling is 

sustained.

Conception and Diligence

An inventor can antedate a Section 103 reference by 

showing that the invention was conceived before the 

effective date of the reference, with diligence to actual or 

constructive reduction to practice. 37 C.F.R. § 131(b).

Conception is “the formation, in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete 

and operative invention, as it is thereafter to be applied in 

practice.” Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276 

(D.C. Cir. 1897); see Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 

(Fed. Cir. 1985). The Board found that the evidence that 

Steed provided did not establish conception before the 

Evans effective date, and that Steed did not adequately 

explain the exhibits and how they showed conception of 

the claimed subject matter, or when such conception 

occurred. The Board recognized that the Table “identifies 

that a piece of evidence corresponds to a certain date” but 

criticized the absence of evidence to “explain what fact 

that piece of evidence is meant to support as having 

occurred on that date.” Bd. Op. at 15.

The Board found that the exhibits did not provide information sufficient to establish that the inventors conceived the claimed invention before the Evans date, or to 

establish diligence to reduction to practice. See MPEP 

§ 715.07(a) (Feb. 2003) (“Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(a), the 

critical period in which diligence must be shown begins 

just prior to the effective date of the reference or activity 

and ends with the date of a reduction to practice, either 

actual or constructive.”). Although the claimed invention 

is a method conducted by computer software, this does not 

avoid the need for sufficient evidentiary specificity. 

The Board’s conclusion that conception or reduction to 

practice before the Evans date was not established is 

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IN RE: STEED 15

based on findings that are supported by substantial 

evidence and must be sustained. Thus the Evans publication remains as a reference. The PTO held that this 

reference served to invalidate the Steed claims on the 

ground of obviousness.

Obviousness

On this appeal Steed simply states that Evans “significantly non-overlaps with the current invention.” The 

PTO points out that Steed advances no substantive arguments of non-obviousness. PTO Br. 8. This is correct. 

In the absence of a reasonable showing that the Examiner 

and the Board erred in deeming the Steed system obvious 

in view of the Evans Rejections, the rejection must be 

sustained.

Due Process

Steed states that the Examiner and the Board violated due process by not contacting the Applicant as requested by the footnote to the Table, by not considering

the third-party affidavits, and by failing to respond, in the 

Examiner’s Answer, to all of the arguments presented by 

Steed. Appeal Br. 16–17. We do not discern a failure of 

due process, or unfairness, on the record of the PTO 

proceedings. The appropriate issues were raised, and 

Steed’s submissions appear to have been fairly considered 

by the Examiner and the Board.

Steed also argues that the Board erred in failing to 

rule on Steed’s three post-hearing motions. Steed states 

that these motions would have “set the correct evidences 

on record, as well as led to a Summary Judgment against 

the USPTO (due to USPTO Examiner failing to comply 

with MPEP rules.” Appeal Br. 22–23. In the circumstances, and recognizing that the motions relate to the 

Board hearing and did not conform to Board regulations, 

we do not discern reversible error in the Board’s omission 

of reference to or specific action on these motions. 

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CONCLUSION

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s factual 

findings, and the Board correctly applied the law in ruling

that Steed did not establish possession of the invention

described and claimed in the ’600 Application before the 

effective date of the Evans reference. Thus the claims 

were properly rejected on the ground of obviousness in 

view of the Evans Rejections. The Board’s decision is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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