Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-08-03919/USCOURTS-ca8-08-03919-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Supt. Michael Bowersox
Appellee
Troy N. Polson
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-3919

___________

Troy N. Polson, *

*

 Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Supt. Michael Bowersox, *

*

 Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: November 19, 2009

Filed: February 23, 2010

___________

Before MELLOY, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Troy Polson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his habeas corpus petition

as untimely. We hold that the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency

of Polson’s petition for relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91 and that

Polson’s federal habeas petition was therefore timely. 

I.

In August 2003, Polson was sentenced in Clay County, Missouri for convictions

of first-degree assault, armed criminal action, possession of a controlled substance

with intent to distribute, possession of a chemical with intent to create a controlled

Appellate Case: 08-3919 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/23/2010 Entry ID: 3637053
1

The dispositive nature of this question is undisputed. If the statute of

limitations was tolled for the seventy days while Polson’s Rule 91 petition was

pending, then Polson’s federal habeas petition was filed 324 non-tolled days after the

issuance of the appellate mandate on his direct appeal. If the Rule 91 petition did not

toll the limitations period, then Polson’s federal habeas petition was filed with 394

days elapsed, or thirty-nine days late. 

-2-

substance, and possession of a methamphetamine precursor drug with intent to

manufacture methamphetamine. On direct appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals

affirmed in part, vacated in part, and ordered re-sentencing on one count. Polson did

not appeal the subsequent re-sentencing. 

On December 9, 2004, thirty-six days after the Missouri Court of Appeals

issued its mandate on his direct appeal, Polson filed a motion for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15. The circuit court denied relief, and

the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, issuing its mandate on April 4, 2007. Then,

174 days later, on September 25, 2007, Polson filed a petition for habeas corpus relief

in Texas County, Missouri pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91 (“Rule 91”).

Polson’s Rule 91 petition was pending for seventy days. On December 4, 2007, the

circuit court dismissed Polson’s Rule 91 petition without prejudice and noted the

petition did not “allege facts on which relief can be granted.” 

On March 27, 2008, Polson commenced this action in federal district court by

filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Appellee moved to dismiss Polson’s petition as untimely. The district court granted

the motion to dismiss, concluding that the statute of limitations expired nearly one

month before Polson filed his federal habeas petition. We granted a certificate of

appealability to determine whether Polson’s petition was time-barred. The dispositive

question is whether Polson’s petition for state habeas relief tolled the statute of

limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).1

 We review de novo the district court’s

Appellate Case: 08-3919 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/23/2010 Entry ID: 3637053
-3-

construction and application of § 2244(d)(2). Wright v. Norris, 299 F.3d 926, 927

(8th Cir. 2002). 

II.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

established a one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations is tolled for “[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending . . . .” Id. § 2244(d)(2). Appellee concedes

that Polson’s Rule 91 petition was a “properly filed application” for relief. Therefore,

the focus of our inquiry is whether Rule 91 proceedings are “other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” 

Our Court has held that other forms of collateral review under Missouri’s

appellate procedure qualify for statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2). See Streu v.

Dormire, 557 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 2009) (prisoner’s motion to reopen

post-conviction relief proceedings); Bishop v. Dormire, 526 F.3d 382, 384 (8th Cir.

2008) (prisoner’s motion to recall a mandate from the Missouri Court of Appeals on

the prisoner’s post-conviction relief petition); Marx v. Gammon, 234 F.3d 356, 357

(8th Cir. 2000) (prisoner’s third motion to recall a mandate). We see no meaningful

difference between the post-conviction proceedings in Streu, Bishop, and Marx and

the Rule 91 proceedings in this case. We conclude that Polson’s Rule 91 proceedings

were “other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.”

Therefore, Polson’s federal habeas petition was timely because the statute of

limitations was tolled for the time period that Polson’s Rule 91 petition was pending

in Missouri state court. 

Appellee argues that we should read Bishop and Streu “narrowly” to prevent

prisoners from evading the AEDPA statute of limitations by filing “repetitive

Appellate Case: 08-3919 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/23/2010 Entry ID: 3637053
-4-

post-conviction motions in state court.” However, Appellee’s suggested interpretation

would ignore the purpose of § 2244(d)(2), which is to “‘encourage petitioners to seek

relief from state courts in the first instance,’ thereby giving ‘an opportunity to the

state courts to correct a constitutional violation.’” Streu, 557 F.3d at 963–64 (quoting

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274, 276 (2005)). If a prisoner has “properly filed

[an] application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim,” the statutory tolling inquiry ends there. We decline to

limit § 2244(d)(2) to one post-conviction proceeding, as Appellee suggests. 

In holding that Polson’s federal habeas petition was time-barred, the district

court relied on Gray v. Gammon, 283 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). In

Gray, a Missouri prisoner filed two Rule 91 petitions more than three years after his

state court conviction. Id. at 917–18. Shortly after state courts denied relief under

Rule 91, the prisoner filed a federal habeas petition. Id. at 918. The district court

dismissed the federal petition as time-barred, and we affirmed. Id. Importantly, the

Rule 91 petitions had no bearing in that case because the AEDPA statute of limitations

expired before the prisoner filed any petition for collateral review. Gray is inapposite

here because Polson’s statute of limitations had not elapsed when he filed a Rule 91

petition on September 25, 2007. Indeed, Gray reserved the question presented

squarely in this case—whether a prisoner’s Rule 91 proceedings qualified for statutory

tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Id. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is reversed. We

remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 08-3919 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/23/2010 Entry ID: 3637053