Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-13285/USCOURTS-ca11-14-13285-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jimmy Cornell Terry
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-13285

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-00025-MEF-SRW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JIMMY CORNELL TERRY, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

________________________

(March 24, 2015)

Before HULL, JILL PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

USCA11 Case: 14-13285 Date Filed: 03/24/2015 Page: 1 of 9
2

Jimmy Cornell Terry appeals the district court’s revocation of his supervised 

release and imposition of a 24-month sentence, the statutory maximum, which he 

received based upon the terms of release the court found he violated. After careful 

review, and for the reasons below, we affirm.

I.

In May 2012 Mr. Terry pled guilty to one count of failing to register as a sex 

offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250. He received a prison sentence to be 

followed by 12 years of supervised release. As relevant here, under the terms of 

his supervised release, Mr. Terry was prohibited from committing any federal, 

state, or local crime, and he was required to notify his probation officer within 72 

hours of any arrest. In September 2012, Mr. Terry began his term of supervised 

release. Less than five months later, on January 31, 2013, Mr. Terry’s probation 

officer petitioned the district court for revocation of Mr. Terry’s supervised release, 

alleging that Mr. Terry committed five violations of the terms of his supervised 

release: (1) an arrest for and charge of domestic violence on January 26, 2013; (2) 

a charge of domestic violence on January 29, 2013; (3) a charge of violating 

Alabama’s identification requirement for convicted sex offenders; (4) a charge of 

failure to register as a convicted sex offender (specifically, by living at a location at 

which he was not registered); and (5) failure to notify his probation officer of his 

arrest within 72 hours. The district court conducted a revocation hearing on July 

USCA11 Case: 14-13285 Date Filed: 03/24/2015 Page: 2 of 9
3

17, 2014. At the hearing, Mr. Terry admitted the first two violations. The court 

dismissed the third but found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Terry 

had committed the fourth and fifth violations. The court sentenced Mr. Terry to 24 

months’ imprisonment, the statutory maximum,

1 to be followed by a lifetime term 

of supervised release. Mr. Terry now appeals.

II.

Mr. Terry argues the district court erred in determining he violated the terms 

of his supervised release by failing to report his arrest to his probation officer and 

by residing at an unapproved address. To revoke a defendant’s term of supervised 

release, the district court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that he

violated one or more conditions of his supervised release. United States v. 

Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3)). We review the district court’s revocation decision for an abuse of 

discretion, id., accepting the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir. 1993). When

the evidence could give rise to two reasonable but different factual constructions, 

 1 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), the maximum term of imprisonment Mr. Terry could serve for 

the violations the district court found he committed was two years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) 

(setting a two-year maximum sentence for Class C felonies and a one-year maximum for lesser 

felonies); Ala. Code § 15-20A-10(j) (making failure to register as a sex offender a Class C 

felony); id. § 13A-6-132(a)-(d) (making the domestic violence charges for which Mr. Terry was 

arrested a Class A misdemeanor or, for a third domestic violence charge, a Class C felony).

USCA11 Case: 14-13285 Date Filed: 03/24/2015 Page: 3 of 9
4

the district court’s choice between those two constructions is not clearly erroneous. 

See United States v. Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012). 

Mr. Terry’s terms of supervised release included a statement that “the 

defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being 

arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer . . . .” At the revocation 

hearing, Mr. Terry’s probation officer Chris Robertson testified that Mr. Terry 

never contacted him about the domestic violence arrest. Instead, Mr. Robertson 

testified, Mr. Terry’s brother and mother notified him of the arrest. The district 

court concluded that Mr. Terry violated this term of release because, although Mr. 

Robertson was notified of the arrest, Mr. Terry did not personally provide notice. 

Mr. Terry contends his family’s notification was sufficient, but we cannot say the 

district court’s literal interpretation of the term of supervised release, requiring “the 

defendant” to notify Mr. Robertson, was clearly erroneous. See Almand, 922 F.2d 

at 318. The district court, therefore, did not err in determining Mr. Terry violated 

this term of supervised release.

Pursuant to his judgment of conviction, Mr. Terry was also subject to 

revocation of supervised release if he “commit[ed] another federal, state or local 

crime.” Section 15-20A-10(b) of the Alabama Code requires sex offenders to 

register with local law enforcement any time they establish a new residence. A

location is a “residence” under the Alabama Code if the offender resides there for 

USCA11 Case: 14-13285 Date Filed: 03/24/2015 Page: 4 of 9
5

three or more consecutive days or 10 or more aggregate days during a calendar 

month. Id. § 15-20A-11(e). Violating the registration requirement is a felony 

under Alabama law. See id. § 15-20A-10(j). 

During the revocation hearing, Mr. Terry’s counsel entered into evidence the 

transcript of a state court’s April 2013 probation revocation hearing based on the 

same arrest at issue here. At that hearing, Mr. Terry’s girlfriend Dorothy Spivey

testified that Mr. Terry sometimes would “come and stay two or three days a 

week” from “September 2012 to January 2013.” Mr. Terry’s son testified that his 

father began staying at Ms. Spivey’s house “a couple days after he got out of jail” 

and stayed there “sometimes two or three days a week.” The government also 

called a local police sergeant who was familiar with Mr. Terry, Christ Hurley, to 

testify at the district court’s revocation hearing. Sergeant Hurley testified that, in 

2012, Mr. Terry expressed a desire to reside at Ms. Spivey’s house; in January 

2013, Ms. Spivey stated that Mr. Terry had stayed with her “one to three days” a 

week since his release from prison; and also in January 2013, Mr. Terry and Ms. 

Spivey’s daughter Carlisia Doster stated that Mr. Terry had been staying with Ms. 

Spivey. In response to Sergeant Hurley’s testimony, the defense introduced an 

affidavit from Ms. Spivey in which she stated: “Sometimes [Mr. Terry] spent the 

night, but he never stayed more than a day or two before he would go back to his 

USCA11 Case: 14-13285 Date Filed: 03/24/2015 Page: 5 of 9
6

brother’s house. He did not live with me. He lived with his brother [at his 

approved residence] over in Dale County.”

We conclude the district court heard sufficient evidence to find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that, by spending a significant number of nights 

away from his approved residence and at the home of his girlfriend, Mr. Terry 

established a new residence under the Alabama Code for which he failed to 

register.2

 Mr. Terry contends Ms. Spivey’s affidavit contradicts her testimony at 

the state revocation hearing and should have been credited over that testimony, but 

we do not see a necessary conflict. There is no indication that, in stating that Mr. 

Terry “did not live” with her, Ms. Spivey knew the Alabama Code’s specific 

definition of residence and meant to state Mr. Terry’s occupation of her home did 

not meet that definition. Her affidavit otherwise confirms the substance of her 

state court testimony: Mr. Terry sometimes stayed at her home for a couple of 

days at a time. The district court took this testimony, in addition to that of Mr. 

Terry’s son, to indicate that Mr. Terry stayed at Ms. Spivey’s home at least 10 days 

in a month between his release from prison and his arrest. Based on the testimony 

described above, we conclude the district court’s finding was not clearly 

 2 The district court apparently misspoke in making this finding, stating that Mr. Terry resided at 

Ms. Spivey’s home “more than 10 consecutive days and three or more days between September 

11, 2012, and . . . January 26, 2013,” rather than three consecutive days or more than 10 total 

days. Neither party asserts this actually was the court’s finding, however, and we are satisfied 

that it was merely a mistake.

USCA11 Case: 14-13285 Date Filed: 03/24/2015 Page: 6 of 9
7

erroneous.3 Thus, the court was within its discretion to sentence Mr. Terry based 

on a violation of the term of his supervised release that he must not commit any 

crime. See Almand, 922 F.2d at 318.

III.

Mr. Terry’s final contention is that his 24-month sentence, the statutory 

maximum for the violations with which he was charged, is substantively 

unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of a sentence, including one imposed 

upon the revocation of supervised release, for an abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. 

Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 2006). When imposing a sentence for 

violating terms of supervised release, a district court must consider the factors 

delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the nature and circumstances of the 

offense and history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence 

imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public 

from further crimes by the defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed 

educational or vocational training; and the kinds of sentences available and 

established sentencing ranges. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(5). The weight to be 

accorded any given factor generally is committed to the sound discretion of the 

 3 The state court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence from which to conclude Mr. Terry 

resided at Ms. Spivey’s home within the meaning of the Alabama Code does not persuade us 

otherwise. The district court’s construction of the evidence was reasonable, and we do not 

require it to be the only plausible interpretation. See Almedina, 686 F.3d at 1315.

USCA11 Case: 14-13285 Date Filed: 03/24/2015 Page: 7 of 9
8

district court. United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 

2014). A district court abuses its discretion by failing to afford consideration to 

relevant factors that were due significant weight, giving significant weight to an 

improper or irrelevant factor, or by committing a clear error of judgment in 

considering the proper factors. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189.

Mr. Terry argues the district court abused its discretion in imposing the 

statutory maximum sentence by giving too much weight to his criminal history —

the court emphasized that Mr. Terry had been arrested for 62 offenses during his 

adult life and was “not learning [his] lesson” — and to his problems with alcohol, 

while affording too little weight to other factors, such as the need to provide 

educational or vocational training. We disagree. First, although Mr. Terry argues 

to the contrary, ample evidence in the record supported the district court’s reliance 

on Mr. Terry’s problems with alcohol in imposing an appropriate sentence. Ms. 

Spivey’s testimony at the state court revocation hearing, entered into evidence in 

this case, included that Mr. Terry’s arrest for domestic violence occurred after he 

choked his son because he was drunk. The probation office’s presentence 

investigation report (“PSI”) contained Mr. Terry’s admission that he often got into 

fights while he was drinking but refused to seek treatment. The PSI also indicated 

that Mr. Terry’s mother said he had a drinking problem. These facts, part of Mr. 

Terry’s history and characteristics, properly were considered under § 3553(a). 

USCA11 Case: 14-13285 Date Filed: 03/24/2015 Page: 8 of 9
9

Also contrary to Mr. Terry’s contention, the district court considered a 

number of additional factors before imposing the sentence. The court stated that it 

needed to impose a sentence that would protect the public from any future criminal 

activity by Mr. Terry. And the court told Mr. Terry that its sentence needed to be 

appropriately tailored to “a number of factors, both for your benefit and society’s 

benefit.” Thus, it is clear that the district court considered a number of factors in 

arriving at an appropriate sentence, and we cannot say that the court’s heavy 

reliance upon Mr. Terry’s history and characteristics in this case was unreasonable. 

See Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1361-62. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s revocation of Mr. 

Terry’s supervised release and the sentence it imposed.

AFFIRMED.

 

USCA11 Case: 14-13285 Date Filed: 03/24/2015 Page: 9 of 9