Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-02889/USCOURTS-ca7-19-02889-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Olusola Arojojoye
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 19, 2020*

Decided March 20, 2020

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2889

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

OLUSOLA AROJOJOYE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 09-CR-365-3

Ronald A. Guzmán,

Judge.

O R D E R

Raising an argument that this court has twice rejected, Olusola Arojojoye moved 

for a reduction in his sentence under the “compassionate release” provision of the First 

Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court construed Arojojoye’s challenge 

to the length of his sentence as a successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 19-2889 Document: 16 Filed: 03/20/2020 Pages: 4
No. 19-2889 Page 2

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. That was appropriate, and so we deny Arojojoye’s 

implied request for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

For his part in a fraudulent check-cashing operation, Arojojoye pleaded guilty in 

2011 to one count of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1433, and one count of aggravated identity 

theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The court imposed a sentence of 109 months’ 

imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. Arojojoye had contested adjustments to 

his offense level including a 4-level increase for defrauding 50 victims or more. After 

resolving the disputes, however, the district court explained that the prison term was 

“the appropriate sentence in this case regardless of whether the guideline range is that 

being argued by the government or that being argued by the defense”; it was “based 

more on the [§] 3553 factors ... than on any particular guideline range.” 

On direct appeal, Arojojoye challenged his conviction and sentence. He argued, 

among other things, that the district court erroneously increased his offense level based 

on 50 or more victims under the guidelines in effect on the date of his sentencing rather 

than when he committed his crimes (the latter had a narrower definition of “victim”). 

United States v. Arojojoye, 753 F.3d 729, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2014). Arojojoye asserted that,

after the Supreme Court’s decision in Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013), this

adjustment violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it resulted in a higher guidelines 

range. Arojojoye, 753 F.3d at 736. He further argued that this violation resulted in a 

fundamentally unfair sentencing disparity between him and a co-defendant who was 

sentenced after Peugh and under the correct guidelines. But we concluded that this error 

was harmless because Arojojoye’s sentence was not tied to a guidelines range. Id. at 737.

Arojojoye then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, again arguing that his 

sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause in light of Peugh and resulted in an 

unwarranted sentencing disparity under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The district court denied 

the motion and did not issue a certificate of appealability, noting that we had rejected 

this argument on direct appeal. Furthermore, the district court explained, Peugh does 

not provide a basis for relief under § 2255. Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915, 918 

(7th Cir. 2013). We, too, denied a certificate of appealability.1 

1 The district court later denied Arojojoye’s post-judgment motion that

challenged the amount of restitution, concluding it was barred as a successive § 2255

motion. We affirmed, but noted that, because Arojojoye’s motion challenged restitution 

rather than custody, it was not successive but rather not cognizable under § 2255 at all.

Arojojoye v. United States, Nos. 17-2397, 17-2972 (Mar. 30, 2018).

Case: 19-2889 Document: 16 Filed: 03/20/2020 Pages: 4
No. 19-2889 Page 3

In May 2019, Arojojoye moved to modify his term of imprisonment under the 

compassionate release provision of the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The 

provision allows a court to reduce a defendant’s prison sentence if “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and “such a reduction is consistent with 

the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

Arojojoye argued that his sentence violates the policy of avoiding “unwarranted 

sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 

guilty of similar conduct.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The disparity between his sentence 

and his co-defendant’s, he argued, was an extraordinary and compelling reason to 

reduce his sentence. The government disagreed, arguing that the compassionate release 

provision is not a vehicle for raising “a legal sentencing argument.” 

The district court found another problem with Arojojoye’s motion. It recognized 

that although Arojojoye nominally requested relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), he was 

really attacking the length of his sentence—again. When “properly construed,” the 

motion arose under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and, because it was a successive motion filed 

without prior authorization from this court, the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

review it. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Adams v. United States, 911 F.3d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 

2018). Alternatively, the district court ruled that Arojojoye’s motion failed on the merits. 

On appeal, Arojojoye argues that § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) permits him to request a 

compassionate release “because of the disparity issue” and that the disparity “was 

never addressed” in his first motion under § 2255.2 We need not reach the dubious 

argument that this is the kind of “compelling and extraordinary” circumstance

contemplated by the First Step Act and the applicable policy statements of the 

Sentencing Commission. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. The district court correctly

construed Arojojoye’s request as an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion.

Arojojoye’s “compassionate release” motion expressly sought a modification of 

his prison sentence based on his argument that the disparity between his sentence and 

his co-defendant’s was unwarranted. This is a challenge to the length of the prison 

2 Arojojoye was released from custody on March 6, 2020. But because his 

sentence includes a five-year term of supervised release, this appeal is not moot. Pope v. 

Perdue, 889 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 2018) (“When a former inmate still serving a term of 

supervised release challenges the length or computation of his sentence, his case is not 

moot so long as he could obtain ‘any potential benefit’ from a favorable decision.” 

(quoting United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir. 2001)).

Case: 19-2889 Document: 16 Filed: 03/20/2020 Pages: 4
No. 19-2889 Page 4

sentence that was made on direct appeal and in the first § 2255 motion. And “any 

post-judgment motion in a criminal proceeding that fits the description of a motion to 

vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence set forth in the first paragraph of section 2255 

should be treated as a section 2255 motion.” United States v. Carraway, 478 F.3d 845, 848

(7th Cir. 2007). Only one such motion is permitted; successive motions must be 

authorized in advance by the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255(h). Because we 

did not authorize its filing, the district court lacked jurisdiction to review what it 

properly construed as a successive § 2255 motion. See Adams, 911 F.3d at 403. To the 

extent that Arojojoye complains that his sentencing disparity argument has not been 

addressed in a § 2255 proceeding, that is irrelevant. There is a bar not only on 

previously decided claims but also on “any claim that has not already been 

adjudicated,” except in limited circumstances not present here. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(b)(1),(2).

Furthermore, because the district court’s dismissal was “a final order in a 

proceeding under section 2255,” Arojojoye must obtain a certificate of appealability to

appeal it. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); see Carraway, 478 F.3d at 849. Arojojoye did not 

expressly seek one, so we construe his appellate filings as such a request. West v. 

Schneiter, 485 F.3d 393, 394–95 (7th Cir. 2007).3 But Arojojoye has not made “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), so 

the request is DENIED, and we DISMISS the appeal. 

3 Were we to construe them, alternatively, as an implied application for leave to 

commence a second collateral attack, we would deny it. Arojojoye does not point to any 

new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court nor any “newly 

discovered evidence” bearing on his guilt. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); United States v. Evans, 

224 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2000).

Case: 19-2889 Document: 16 Filed: 03/20/2020 Pages: 4