Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02113/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02113-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eugene M. Lonsdale
Appellant
Patsy R. Lonsdale
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

/ 

PUBLISH FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals Tent.h r.ir,,11it 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

EUGENE M. LONSDALE; PATSY 

R. LONSDALE, his wife in Propria 

Persona Sui Juris, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

and DOES 1 through 100, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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NOV 2 0 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-2113 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CV 89-1263-SC) 

SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS:* 

Eugene M. Lonsdale and Patsy R. Lonsdale, prose. 

Shirley D. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, Gary R. ·Allen, 

Kenneth L. Greene and Joan I. Oppenheimer, Attorneys, Tax Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D. c., William L. Lutz, 

United States Attorney, of Counsel, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-2113 Document: 01019955906 Date Filed: 11/20/1990 Page: 1 
Eugene M. Lonsdale, Sr. and Patsy R. Lonsdale commenced this 

suit against the United States1 seeking to prevent Internal 

Revenue Service levies on their wages and a credit union account, 

for unpaid income taxes on wages for the years 1981 through 1987. 

The complaint, styled as a quiet title action, asserts that the 

government has no power to tax wages and, therefore, lacks the 

right to collect unpaid income taxes assessed against the 

Lonsdales. It further asserts that the Internal Revenue Service 

has no power to impose levies because orders delegating such power 

were not published in the Federal Register as required by law, and 

because the relevant IRS forms do not carry an Office of Management and Budget control number allegedly as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980,· 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520. 

The government moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, 

and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district 

court granted the motion without specifying the basis upon which 

it relied. The Lonsdales' subsequent motion for reconsideration 

was denied. On appeal the Lonsdales reassert the arguments which 

they made in the district court and raise other issues as well. 

However, because the dismissal below was necessarily based upon 

1 The complaint also referred to "Does 1 through 100". 

However, it pleads no cognizable cause of action against any 

individual, and seeks no relief against any individuals with the 

sole exception of a requested injunction against the United States 

and "its representatives and its agents and agencies from their 

unlawful Unconstitutional seizing of the Plaintiff(s) LABOR 

PROPERTY •.• " R. Vol. I, Tab 1 at 13-14. Such claims against 

individuals in their official capacities are claims against the 

United States. Accordingly, we treat this action as one solely 

against the United States. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2113 Document: 01019955906 Date Filed: 11/20/1990 Page: 2 
the complaint itself, we address only those matters pled in the 

complaint. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the dismissal 

of the Lonsdales' action. 

I. 

JURISDICTION 

We agree with the government that this suit is barred by the 

Anti-Injunction Act, 26 u.s.c. § 7421(a), which provides that "no 

suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection 

of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person •••. " 

The statute excepts petitions to the United States Tax Court for a 

redetermination of a proposed deficiency, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6212(a) and 

(c), 6213(a), and certain civil suits in the district court, 26 

u.s.c. § 7426(a) and (b)(l), 6672(b), 6694(c) and 7429(b). Taxpayers may also sue in the proper district court or the United 

States Claims Court for a refund of taxes paid. 26 u.s.c. § 7422. 

A judicial exception to the act permits an injunction 

if the taxpayer demonstrates that: 1) under no circumstances could the government establish its claim to the 

asserted tax; and 2) irreparable injury would otherwise 

occur. Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 

737, 94 s.ct. 2038, 2046 (1974); Enochs v. Williams 

Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 6-8, 82 s.ct. 

1125, 1128-29 (1962). 

Souther v. Mihlbachler, 701 F.2d 131, 132 (10th Cir. 1983). 

The Lonsdales' complaint states that it seeks injunctive and 

declaratory relief as well as a refund of amounts collected pursuant to the levies in question. But their complaint is 

essentially an attempt to prevent the collection of assessed taxes 

by challenging the underlying tax assessments. That challenge 

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Appellate Case: 90-2113 Document: 01019955906 Date Filed: 11/20/1990 Page: 3 
violates the Anti-Injunction Act on its face. The ways to 

challenge assessments and collections are set forth above. This 

suit is not one of them. 

The Lonsdales seek to avoid the jurisdictional restrictions 

of the Anti-Injunction Act by characterizing their action as one 

to quiet title and alleging jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 2410(a) 

which provides in relevant part: 

[T]he United States may be named a party in any civil 

action or suit in any district court ... having 

jurisdiction of the subject matter to quiet title to 

.•. real or personal property on which the United 

States has or claims a mortgage or other lien. 

We reject the proposition that 28 U.S.C. § 2410 provides jurisdiction for an action essentially contesting liability for assessed 

taxes, where the taxpayers have had the elective opportunity 

described above--whether or not used--to seek a redetermination in 

the tax court or a refund of contested payments in the district 

court. The Anti-Injunction Act begins with the phrase "no suit." 

The intent behind the statute is the protection of the 

government's need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible without preenforcement judicial 

interference and to require that disputed sums of taxes 

due be determined in suits for refund. 

Lowrie v. United States, 824 F.2d 827, 830 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Thus, this and other courts have rejected attempts by taxpayers to invoke the waiver of sovereign immunity for the purpose 

of circumventing the time honored "pay first, litigate later" 

rule, by framing their contest of the Government's tax assessment 

or collection actions in the guise of a quiet title action. See 

Schmidt v. Kingf 913 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1990); Pollack v. United 

States, 819 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1987); Laino v. United States, 633 

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Appellate Case: 90-2113 Document: 01019955906 Date Filed: 11/20/1990 Page: 4 
F.2d 626, 633 n.8 (2d Cir. 1980); Mulcahy v. United States, 388 

F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1968); Falik v. United States, 343 F.2d 38 (2d 

Cir. 1965); Pipola v. Chicco, 274 F.2d 909, 913-914 (2d Cir. 

1960); Quinn v. Hook, 231 F. Supp. 718, 720 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd 

per curiam, 341 F.2d.920 (3d Cir. 1965); Mccann .v. United States, 

248 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Broadwell v. United States, 234 

F. Supp. 17 (E.D. N.C. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1965), 

cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965); Shaw v. United States, 321 F. 

Supp. 1267 (D. Vt. 1970), aff'd, 71-1 u.s.T.C., para. 9220 (2d 

Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971). The bulk of the 

complaint in this case, which simply contests the assessment of 

income taxes, falls within the category and the prohibitions 

described. 

The Lonsdales argue that§ 2410 at least confers jurisdiction 

upon the part of their suit that challenges the levies in question 

on the grounds that the Internal Revenue Service has no lawful 

delegation of authority to issue levies, and that the Paperwork 

Reduction Act has been violated. We have recognized that "[w]hen 

the taxpayer challenges the procedural regularity of [a] tax lien 

and the procedures used to enforce the lien, and not the validity 

of the tax assessment, sovereign immunity is waived." Schmidt v. 

King, 913 F.2d at 839; National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. 

Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1246, n.6 (10th Cir. 1989). 2 But such 

waiver must be narrowly construed, id., and whatever narrow 

2 Other circuits have permitted challenges to the validity of 

IRS levies and sales of assets to be brought under§ 2410, in 

limited circumstances. See Agua Bar & Lounge, Inc. v. United 

States, 539 F.2d 935 (3rd Cir. 1976); Elias v. Connett, 908 F.2d 

521 (9~h Cir. 1990). 

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Appellate Case: 90-2113 Document: 01019955906 Date Filed: 11/20/1990 Page: 5 
jurisdiction may lie under§ 2410 does not extend to an omnibus 

challenge to the authority of the Internal Revenue Service to 

function. See generally United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285, 

290 (5th Cir. 1957) (the primary application of Section 2410(a)(l) 

is to allow joinder of the Government to settle "the traditional 

controversy in which a private party asserts an ownership which is 

superior to the claimed lien of the United States Government."); 

Quinn v. Hook, 231 F. Supp. at 720 ("the purpose of the amendment, 

as clearly stated in the House and Senate reports, is to permit 

the United States to be made a party defendant in cases involving 

foreclosure of mortgages or liens on personal property and to 

provide a method to clear real estate titles of questionable or 

valueless Government liens.'·'). 

The Lonsdales' argument concerning the regularity of the levies must be tested under the judicial exception to the AntiInjunction Act referred to above, relating to cases where it is 

clear that under no circumstance could the government ultimately 

prevail. For practical purposes, the Lonsdales would face the 

same burden with respect to these purely legal questions if jurisdiction was founded on§ 2410 rather than on the judicial exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, but here they must also show irreparable injury. In any event, for the reasons set forth below, 

we reject the Lonsdales' delegation of authority and Paperwork 

Reduction Act claims as a matter of law. It follows that the 

exception to the Anti-Injunction Act cannot apply to avoid the 

jurisdictional bar here. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2113 Document: 01019955906 Date Filed: 11/20/1990 Page: 6 
Finally, the Lonsdales cite numerous other statutes in their 

complaint as conferring jurisdiction--28 u.s.c. §§ 1331, 1340, 

1361, 2463; 5 u.s.c. §§ 301, 556(d), 558, 559, 701-706; 26 u.s.c. 

§§ 7412(a)(l), (2) and (7) (R. Vol. I, Tab 1 at 3). None of those 

statutes waive the government's sovereign immunity here. 

Sovereign immunity is not waived by general jurisdictional 

statutes such as 28 u.s.c. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 

28 u.s.c. § 1340 (jurisdiction over actions arising under the 

Internal Revenue Code), and 28 u.s.c. § 1361 (action to compel a 

government officer to perform his duty). See Coggeshall Development Corp. v. Diamond, 884 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1989); Estate of 

Watson v. Blumenthal, 586 F.2d 925, 932 (2d Cir. 1978); Carelli v. 

Internal Revenue Service, 668 F.2d 902, 904 (6th Cir. 1982). 

Rather, the taxpayer must find an explicit waiver of sovereign 

immunity. Section 2463 of Title 28, which provides that property 

taken or detained under any federal revenue law shall be subject 

only to the orders of the courts of the United States having 

jurisdiction thereof, similarly does not constitute the necessary 

explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. See Nehf v. United States, 

302 F. Supp. 356, 359 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Furthermore, § 2463 was 

not intended to confer jurisdiction on the federal district courts 

over property levied upon and seized under the Internal Revenue 

Laws. Morris v. United States, 303 F.2d 533, 535 (1st Cir.), 

cert. denied, 371 U.S. 827 (1962). See also New Hampshire Fire 

Insurance Co. v. Scannlon, 362 U.S. 404, 408 (1960). 

Most of the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 

cited by the Lonsdales---5 U.S.C. §§ 556(d), 558, 559, 701, 703-

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Appellate Case: 90-2113 Document: 01019955906 Date Filed: 11/20/1990 Page: 7 
706--do not deal with jurisdiction or waiver of sovereign 

immunity. Nor does§ 7214 of the Internal Revenue Code, which 

provides criminal penalties for unlawful acts of revenue officers 

or agents. 

Nor does 5 u.s.c. § 702 waive sovereign immunity here. The 

Administrative Procedure Act itself is not a grant of jurisdiction 

for the review of agency actions. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 

99, 105 (1977). The language of this section and the amendments 

thereto merely suggest that sovereign immunity will not be a 

defense in an action in which jurisdiction already exists. Watson 

v. Blumenthal, 586 F.2d 925, 932 (2d Cir. 1978); Lee v. 

Blumenthal, 588 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1979). Section 702 by 

its very terms disclaims any "authority to grant relief if any 

other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly 

forbids the relief which is sought." 5 u.s.c. § 702 (2). As 

explained above, Congress.has provided express methods by which 

proposed deficiencies, assessments, or collections of taxes may be 

challenged, and express prohibition in the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 

u.s.c. § 7421(a) against suits brought for the purpose of 

restraining the assessment or collection of any tax except in the 

- prescribed manner. 

II. 

FEDERAL REGISTER ACT, FOIA, PAPERWORK REDUCTION 

ACT, AND SIMILAR CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY 

OF IRS EMPLOYEES 

The Lonsdales argue that the IRS lacked the authority to 

issue summons or impose levies or liens because the Treasury 

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Appellate Case: 90-2113 Document: 01019955906 Date Filed: 11/20/1990 Page: 8 
Department Orders delegating that authority to the Commissioner of 

the IRS were never published in the Federal Register, as required 

by the Federal Register Act, 44 u.s.c. §§ 1501-1511 ("FRA") and 

the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 u.s.c. §§ 552, et .§.filL.., 

("APA"), and because the relevant IRS forms did not contain an 

Office of Management and Budget Control Number allegedly as 

required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 u.s.c. 

§§ 3501-3520. 

We easily dispose of the Lonsdales' claim under the Paperwork 

Reduction Act. The Act provides in pertinent part: 

... no person shall be subject to any penalty for 

failing to maintain or provide information to any agency 

if the information collection request involved was made 

after December 31, 1981, and does not display a current 

control number assigned by the Director [of the Office 

of Management and Budget], or fails to state that such 

request is not subject to this chapter. 

44 U.S.C. § 3512. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. § 3518(c)(l)(B)(ii) "this 

chapter does not apply to the collection of information ..• during the conduct of .•• an administrative action or investigation 

involving an agency against specific individuals or entities." We 

agree with those courts that have relied upon section 

3518(c)(l)(B)(ii) to hold that the Paperwork Reduction Act is inapplicable to "information collection request" forms issued during 

an investigation against an individual to determine his or her tax 

liability. See Neumann v. United States, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

8312 (W.D. Mich. 1990); United States v. Nat'l Commodity and 

Barter Assoc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5177 (D. Colo. 1990); Van 

Sant v. United States, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2843 (D. Colo. 1990), 

aff'd 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 14191 (10th Cir.); United States v. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2113 Document: 01019955906 Date Filed: 11/20/1990 Page: 9 
Particle Data, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 272, 275-76 (N.D. Ill. 1986); 

Snyder v. Internal Revenue Service, 596 F. Supp. 240, 250 (N.D. 

Ind. 1984); Cameron v. Internal Revenue Service, 593 F. Supp. 

1540, 1556 (N.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd 773 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1985); 

see also Hatcher v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 218, 221 (M.D. Pa. 

1990) ("While Hatcher may be correct that the Act states that 

nobody may be punished for failure to file an 'information collection request' which does not comply with the Act, the Act does not 

allow an individual to ignore a summons."). Thus, any alleged 

failure to comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act provides no 

basis for avoiding the levies imposed on the Lonsdales' wages and 

credit union account. 

The Lonsdales next argue that the failure to publish Treasury 

Department Orders (TDOs) 150-37 (1955) and 150-10 (1982) in the 

Federal Register rendered all action taken by the IRS against them 

unlawful. TDO 150-37 and TDO 150-10 delegated authority from the 

Secretary of the Treasury to the Commissioner of the IRS to take 

various actions to administer and enforce the Internal Revenue 

laws. 3 Apart from the publication argument, the Lonsdales do not 

3 TDO 150-10, which superseded TDO 150-37, is as follows: 

DATE: April 22, 1982 NUMBER: 

SUBJECT: Delegation--Responsibility for Internal 

Revenue Laws 

150-10 

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Secretary of 

the Treasury, including the authority in the Internal 

Revenue Code of 1954 and Reorganization Plan No. 26 of 

1950, it is hereby ordered: 

1. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall be 

responsible for the administration and enforcement of 

[footnote continued] 

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Appellate Case: 90-2113 Document: 01019955906 Date Filed: 11/20/1990 Page: 10 
appear to challenge the existence of that delegation authority, 

nor do they specifically challenge the validity of any subdelegations of authority from the Commissioner to subsidiary officials. 

They challenge only the validity of the TDOs because they were 

unpublished. We reject that argument. 

Under section 1505(a) of the FRA, the following must be 

published in the Federal Register: 

(1) Presidential proclamations and Executive orders, 

except those not having general applicability and legal 

ef feet . . . 

(2) documents or classes of documents that the 

President may determine from time to time have general 

applicability and legal effect; and 

(3) documents or classes of documents that may be 

required so to be published by Act of Congress. 

44 u.s.c. § 1505(a). The Act further provides that "every document or order which prescribes a penalty has general applicability 

and legal effect." Id. 44 u.s.c. § 1507 provides: 

A document required by section 1505(a) of this title to 

be published in the Federal Register is not valid as 

against a person who has not had actual knowledge of it 

until the duplicate originals or certified copies of the 

document have been filed with the Office of the Federal 

[footnote continued] 

the Internal Revenue laws. 

2. Commissioner Order No. 190 and General Counsel 

Order No. 4 state the powers delegated to the Chief 

Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service. 

3. All outstanding orders and delegations of authority 

relating to the above are modified accordingly. 

This order supersedes Treasury Department Order No. 

150-37 dated March 17, 1955. 

/s/ Donald T. Regan 

Secretary of the Treasury 

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Register and a copy made available for public inspection 

as provided by section 1503 of this title. 

The TDOs are not "Presidential proclamations" or "Executive 

orders," arid they are not documents that the President has determined to have general applicability and legal effect. Subsection 

(3), "documents that may be required so to be published by Act of 

Congress," is only applicable if Congress has prescribed publication elsewhere. The Administrative Procedure Act is the only apparent source of such a prescription. As shown by our discussion 

below the APA contains no requirement to publish TDO's; accordingly, we hold that the FRA did not require publication of TDO 

150-37 or 150-10. See Murdock v. United States, 1990 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 9269 (D. Utah 1990); United States v. Nat'l Commodity and 

Barter Assoc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5177 (D. Colo. 1990); Van 

Sant v. United States, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2843 (D. Colo. 1990) 

("A Treasury Department order--such as the one at issue in this 

case--need not be published in the Federal Register.") (citing 44 

U.S.C. § 1505(a)); Reimer v. United States, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

1167 (D. Haw. 1990) ("the court is not convinced that such 

publication [of TDO 150-37] is required by the statute cited [44 

U.S.C. § 1505(a)]"); but see Hatcher v. United States, 733 F. 

Supp. 218 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 

The Lonsdales next argue that section 552 of the APA, more 

commonly known as the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") required 

publication of TDO 150-37 and TDO 150-10. The FOIA provides in 

pertinent part: 

Each agency shall separately state and currently publish 

in the Federal Register for the guidance of the public--

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(A) descriptions of its central and field organization 

.. . . 

(B) statements of the general course and method by 

which its functions are channeled and determined, 

including the nature and requirements of all formal and 

informal procedures available; 

(C) rules of procedure. 

(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted 

as authorized by law, and statements of general policy 

or interpretations of general applicability formulated 

and adopted by the agency; 

Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely 

notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any 

manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the 

Federal Register and not so published. 

5 u.s.c. § 552(a)(l). We conclude, as have other courts, that the 

APA does not require publication of TDOs such as 150-37 and 150-10 

which internally delegate authority to enforce the Internal 

Revenue laws. See United States v. Goodman, 605 F.2d 870, 887-88 

(5th Cir. 1979) (court held that unpublished delegation of authority from Attorney General to Acting Administrator of the DEA did 

not violate either the FRA or the APA, relying on APA cases to the 

effect that internal delegations of authority need not be 

published and do not "adversely.affect" the public.); Hogg v. 

United States, 428 F.2d 274, 280 (6th Cir. 1970) ("We hold that 

the Administrative Procedure Act does not require that all 

internal delegations of authority from the Attorney General must 

be published in order to be effective."), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 

910 (1971); Neumann v. United States, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8312 

(W.D. Mich. 1990) (applying 5 u.s.c. § 552(a)(l) the court noted 

that "[a]n internal delegation of administrative authority does 

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Appellate Case: 90-2113 Document: 01019955906 Date Filed: 11/20/1990 Page: 13 
not adversely affect members of the public and need not be 

published in the Federal Register to be valid."); United States v. 

McCall, 727 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ind. 1990) ("It is well-settled 

that 'rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice' need 

not be published to be effective. D & W Food Centers, Inc. v. 

Block, 786 F.2d 751 (6th Cir. 1986); 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). The 

court finds the delegation orders at issue here to be such rules 

of internal agency procedure, obviating their publication in the 

Federal Register."). 

Finally, the Lonsdales raise arguments regarding the alleged 

nonpublication of the central organization of the Internal Revenue 

Service by the Treasury Department, and failure to publish IRS 

forms such as form 1040. These arguments are specious. At the 

very least, taxpayers have actual notice of form 1040 and similar 

forms; and descriptions permitting an understanding of the 

organization of the Internal Revenue Service are published by 

statute and in the Code of Federal Regulations. See,~, 26 

u.s.c. §§ 7801-7810; 26 C.F.R. Part 600, et seq. The tax laws, 

including their administration and enforcement by the Internal 

Revenue Service, a division of the Department of the Treasury, are 

probably the best publicized and indexed area of federal law, 

consisting of a separate title of the United States Code, Title 

26, and the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (spanning 

eighteen volumes), plus extensive commercial compilations and 

explanations. For example, Vol. 12 CCH Federal Tax Reporter, 

~r 44-254-44,920, sets out IRS organization, practice and procedure 

in great detail. 

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In short, the Lonsdales' publication arguments are utterly 

meritless. 

III. 

SANCTIONS 

The government has sought sanctions against the Lonsdales, 

and they have had an opportunity to respond. See Braley v. 

Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, (10th Cir. 1987). With respect to the 

Lonsdales' claims relating to delegations of authority and the 

Paperwork Reduction Act and similar arguments, we deny the request 

for sanctions. Although the issues are meritless, we cannot say 

that the law with respect to them is so well settled, at least 

prior to this case in this circuit, that they can be deemed 

frivolous where prose litigants are concerned; and the record 

does not indicate that the Lonsdales have previously attempted to 

litigate these points. 

However, as indicated above, the bulk of the Lonsdales' suit 

constitutes a refrain about the federal government's power to tax 

wages or to tax individuals at all, which the Lonsdales have been 

pursuing for at least fourteen years. See Lonsdale v. Smelser, 

709 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1983); Lonsdale v. Commissioner, 661 F.2d 

71 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'g 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1106 (1981); Lonsdale v. 

Smelser, 553 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Lonsdale v. Egger, 525 

F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 4 After exercising considerable 

4 The following quote is a representative sample of assertions 

repeated over and over in the complaint: 

The Defendant United States through its Internal Revenue 

[footnote continued] 

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patience and tolerance, the Fifth Circuit finally imposed money 

sanctions totaling $1,445.55 on the Lonsdales for their repeated 

attempt to relitigate issues already adjudicated by the courts. 

Lonsdale v. Smelser, 709 F.2d at 911. Furthermore, since this 

circuit has made itself clear on these and similar issues numerous 

times, the Lonsdales cannot by any stretch of the imagination 

assert that their arguments regarding the taxability of wages have 

any support in this circuit. See United States v. Christensen, 

1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 17594 (10th Cir.); United States v. Mann, 884 

F.2d 532, (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746, 

750-51 (10th Cir. 1989); Charczuk v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 471, 

[footnote continued] 

Service employees erroneously illegally unlawfully and 

unconstitutionally made an Amendment 4 seizure of the 

Plaintiff(s) PROPERTY PERSONAL AND REAL in the form of 

their LABOR PROPERTY/LABOR SERVICES PROPERTY and their 

WAGE COMPENSATION PAYCHECK MONEY INCOME SPECIALIZED TYPE 

OF PROPERTY they receive directly from their OCCUPATION 

OF COMMON RIGHT by their LABOR PROPERTY and/or LABOR 

SERVICES PROPERTY the United States tax laws at the 

Federal Code of Tax Regulations at 26 C.F.R. 301.6331-1 

and TITLE 26 u.s.c. Sec. 6331 since they have no lawful 

color of Constitutional taxing and tax collecting 

authority and jurisdiction to apply any Article 1, Sec. 

8 INDIRECT EXCISE TAXES upon the Plaintiffs OCCUPATION 

OF COMMON RIGHT, their LABOR PROPERTY, their LABOR 

SERVICES PROPERTY, and their WAGE COMPENSATION PAYCHECK 

MONEY INCOME SPECIALIZED TYPE OF PROPERTY WITHOUT 

APPORTIONMENT., or with any 16th Amendment INDIRECT 

EXCISE INCOME TAX upon the Plaintiff(s) OCCUPATION OF 

COMMON RIGHT, their LABOR PROPERTY, their LABOR SERVICES 

PROPERTY, or their WAGE COMPENSATION PAYCHECK MONEY 

INCOME SPECIALIZED TYPE OF PROPERTY WITHOUT APPORTIONMENT., or with any 1939 PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SALARY TAX ACT 

"WITllllOLDING" DIRECT TAX which pertains strictly to 

federal government officers, employees, and elected 

officials., and; which is absolutely unconstitutional as 

shown by SECTION #4 of the ACT and TITLE 4 U.S.C. Sec. 

111., without APPORTIONMENT. 

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472-73 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Stillhammer, 706 F.2d 

1072, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 1983). 

As the cited cases, as well as many others, have made 

abundantly clear, the following arguments alluded to by the 

Lonsdales are completely lacking in legal merit and patently 

frivolous: (1) individuals ("free born, white, preamble, 

sovereign, natural, individual common law 'de jure' citizens of a 

state, etc.") are not "persons" subject to taxation under the 

Internal Revenue code; (2) the authority of the United States is 

confined to the District of Columbia; (3) the income tax is a 

direct tax which is invalid absent apportionment, and Pollock v. 

Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, modified, 158 U.S. 601 

(1895), is authority for that and other arguments against the 

government's power to impose income taxes on individuals; (4) the 

Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution is either invalid or applies only to corporations; (5) wages are not income; (6) the 

income tax is voluntary; (7) no statutory authority exists for 

imposing an income tax on individuals; (8) the term "income" as 

used in the tax statutes is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite; (9) individuals are not required to file tax returns 

fully reporting their income; and (10) the Anti-Injunction Act is 

invalid. 

To this short list of rejected tax protester arguments we now 

add as equally meritless the additional arguments made herein that 

(1) the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and employees of the 

Internal Revenue Service have no power or authority to administer 

the Internal Revenue laws, including power to issue summons, liens 

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and levies, because of invalid or nonexistent delegations of 

authority, lack of publication of delegations of authority in the 

Federal Register, violations of the Paperwork Reduction Act, and 

violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, including the 

Freedom of Information Act; and (2) tax forms, including 1040, 

1040A, 1040EZ and other reporting forms, are invalid because they 

have not been published in the Federal Register. 

We are confronted here with taxpayers who simply refuse to 

accept the judgments of the courts. As the Lonsdales already know 

from their experiences in the Fifth Circuit, the courts are not 

powerless in these circumstances and are not required to expend 

judicial resources endlessly entertaining repetitive arguments. 

Nor are opposing parties required to bear the burden of meritless 

litigation. See United States v. Christensen, 1990 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 17594; Charczuk v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d at 474-76; Van 

Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1437 (10th Cir. 1986). See 

also Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 353 {10th Cir. 1989). This 

case is similar to the situation which we recently considered in 

United States v. Christensen, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 17594, in which 

we imposed sanctions. 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 17666. Sanctions are 

equally appropriate here and are imposed as follows: (1) double 

costs; and (2) $500.00 as an award to the government to defray a 

portion of its legal costs in responding to the frivolous issues 

raised in the Lonsdales' complaint. The government is directed to 

present a properly itemized statement of recoverable costs on appeal within 10 days. 

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CONCLUSION 

We have considered all of the arguments made by the Lonsdales 

relative to issues raised in their complaint and reject them all. 

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court 

dismissing the.action.in this case is AFFIRMED, and sanctions are 

imposed. 

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