Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-24-01900/USCOURTS-ca7-24-01900-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Church Mutual Insurance Company
Appellant
Frontier Management, LLC
Appellee
Charles Nedoss
Appellee
Welltower Tenant Group
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

____________________ 

No. 24-1900 

CHURCH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, now known as 

CHURCH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, S.I., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

FRONTIER MANAGEMENT, LLC, WELLTOWER TENANT GROUP,

LLC, d/b/a THE AUBERGE AT ORCHARD PARK, and CHARLES 

NEDOSS, Independent Executor of the Estate of Bertrand Nedoss, Deceased,

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 23 C 0164 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 12, 2024 — DECIDED JANUARY 2, 2025 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

SYKES, Chief Judge. In January 2021, 87-year-old Bertrand 

Nedoss wandered out of his care facility in suburban Chicago, 

developed hypothermia, and died of cardiac arrest. His estate 

Case: 24-1900 Document: 46 Filed: 01/02/2025 Pages: 8
2 No. 24-1900 

filed suit in state court raising negligence and wrongful-death

claims against Welltower Tenant Group, the facility’s owner,

and Frontier Management, LLC, its operator.

Welltower and Frontier were insured under a “claims 

made” policy issued by Church Mutual Insurance Company. 

As the name implies, this type of insurance covers claims 

made against the insured during the policy period. The

Church Mutual policy was effective from July 1, 2020, 

through July 1, 2021. The estate filed suit in October 2021, 

more than three months after the policy expired. But nine 

days after Bertrand’s death—within the policy period—an attorney for the Nedoss family sent written notice that his firm

had been retained in connection with “personal injuries and

related malpractice” at the care facility. The letter claimed an 

attorney’s lien and demanded that evidence be preserved.

Coverage turned on whether the attorney’s letter qualified as 

a “claim” under the policy.

Church Mutual denied coverage but provided a defense 

while reserving the right to have a court determine its policy 

obligations. It then filed this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Welltower 

and Frontier. The district court entered partial summary judgment for Welltower and Frontier, ruling that the attorney’s 

letter was a claim under the policy. That triggered the insurer’s duty to defend. The judge stayed the rest of the federal 

case pending the outcome of the state lawsuit.

Church Mutual appealed the stay order and also asks us 

to review and reverse the partial summary judgment. On the 

eve of oral argument, however, Welltower and Frontier settled with the estate and the state-court case was dismissed. 

Case: 24-1900 Document: 46 Filed: 01/02/2025 Pages: 8
No. 24-1900 3 

That development moots this appeal. The stay order was

the only possible basis for appellate jurisdiction; the partial 

summary judgment is not a final order. Though the coverage 

dispute is ongoing, the dispute over the judge’s stay order 

evaporated with the dismissal of the state case. We therefore 

dismiss the appeal as moot.

I. Background

The Auberge at Orchard Park is an assisted-living facility 

in Morton Grove, Illinois, owned by Welltower and operated 

by Frontier. Bertrand Nedoss, age 87, was a resident. Early in 

the morning on January 5, 2021, Nedoss wandered away from 

the facility. More than two hours after he went missing, staff 

found him on the garage ramp of the building next door. It 

was 32 degrees outside. Nedoss was hospitalized and treated 

for hypothermia, but he died of cardiac arrest that afternoon. 

Welltower and Frontier were insured by Church Mutual 

under primary and umbrella policies providing defense and 

indemnity coverage on a claims-made basis from July 1, 2020, 

to July 1, 2021. The primary policy had a $1 million limit and

covered claims “first made ... during the policy period.” The 

term “claim” as defined in the policy is a “suit or demand

made by or for the injured person for monetary damages.” 

The umbrella policy provided $5 million of excess coverage 

for claims covered by the primary policy. 

On January 14, 2021—nine days after Bertrand’s death—a 

lawyer for the Nedoss family sent a letter to the care facility’s 

legal department giving notice of his retention for “personal 

injuries and related malpractice sustained at the Auberge.” 

The letter claimed an attorney’s lien under Illinois law and 

instructed the Auberge to preserve evidence.

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4 No. 24-1900 

Ten months later, on October 15, 2021, Charles Nedoss, the 

executor of Bertrand’s estate, filed suit in Illinois state court 

raising claims of negligence and wrongful death against 

Welltower and Frontier arising from Bertrand’s walkaway 

and death. By then the Church Mutual policy had expired. 

But the January 14 letter from the Nedoss family’s lawyer was 

within the policy period, so Welltower and Frontier tendered 

the suit to Church Mutual. The insurer denied coverage but

agreed to provide a defense until a court could determine its 

obligations under the policy. 

This federal coverage suit followed. Church Mutual sued

Welltower and Frontier under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 

28 U.S.C. § 2201, seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to 

defend or indemnify in connection with the estate’s lawsuit. 

The insurer argued that the January 14 letter from the Nedoss 

family’s attorney was not a claim as defined in the policy. 

Welltower and Frontier counterclaimed for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing. 

The federal coverage suit was assigned to District Judge 

Harry Leinenweber. Ruling on cross-motions for summary 

judgment, he concluded that the attorney’s letter qualified as 

a claim under the policy. The judge accordingly entered partial summary judgment for Welltower and Frontier, triggering Church Mutual’s duty to defend its insureds in the 

underlying state lawsuit. What remained for decision in the

federal litigation were issues concerning the extent of the insurer’s indemnification obligation and its liability on the 

counterclaims for breach of contract and the duty of good 

faith and fair dealing. Welltower and Frontier moved to stay 

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No. 24-1900 5 

the rest of the federal case pending the resolution of the estate’s case in state court. 

Soon after the stay motion was filed, Welltower and Frontier admitted liability in the state-court litigation, leaving only 

damages for trial. At a hearing on the stay motion a few weeks 

later, Church Mutual opposed a stay. Judge Leinenweber disagreed, reasoning that it made good sense to stay the federal 

case until the conclusion of the state-court trial, which would 

determine whether damages exceeded the limits of the 

Church Mutual policies. He stayed the case “until further order” of the court.

Church Mutual appealed the stay order. And although the 

partial summary judgment is a nonfinal order, Church Mutual asks us to review that ruling as well. 

II. Discussion

We begin with several developments that have occurred

since this appeal was filed, some of which affect jurisdiction. 

After the parties filed their opening and response briefs, we 

noted a potential defect in subject matter jurisdiction—

namely, the record lacks complete information about the parties’ citizenship for purposes of evaluating diversity jurisdiction. Specifically, Welltower and Frontier—both LLCs—had 

not complied with their obligation under Circuit Rule 28 to 

provide complete information about the citizenship of their 

members in the jurisdictional statement in their brief. 7TH CIR.

R. 28(a), (b). We ordered them to submit an amended jurisdictional statement.

They complied—but only partially. Their amended jurisdictional statement disclosed some additional information

about the citizenship of their members. But their attorney

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6 No. 24-1900 

explained that the information remained incomplete because

contractual confidentiality obligations to unit holders inhibited her ability to learn and disclose their identities. 

Then, two weeks before the scheduled date for oral argument, the parties notified us that Welltower and Frontier had 

settled with the Nedoss estate. A few days later, the statecourt judge approved the settlement and dismissed the estate’s case. The parties sent us notice of the dismissal order 

just one business day before the argument date, so we proceeded with oral argument as planned. 

There is one more notable development, though it has no 

effect on jurisdiction. On June 11, 2024—before the parties 

filed their appellate briefs—Judge Leinenweber died. The 

case was reassigned to District Judge Manish Shah.

So as the case came to us and has shifted on appeal, it presents a tangle of jurisdictional issues. Church Mutual appealed the stay order, but it has also asked us to review the 

partial summary judgment on the key coverage question. 

Both orders are interlocutory; the case remains unfinished below, which ordinarily precludes appellate jurisdiction. 

Church Mutual’s argument for immediate review proceeds in

two steps: first, it argues that the stay is a form of abstention 

and thus is immediately appealable as a final order under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291; second, the insurer argues that the partial summary judgment is immediately reviewable because it is encompassed within the final stay order or because it qualifies 

for review under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction.

There’s no need to decide if Church Mutual is right about

appellate jurisdiction. Nor is it necessary to wrestle with the 

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No. 24-1900 7 

complexities that surfaced on appeal regarding subject matter 

jurisdiction. The dismissal of the underlying state-court case 

moots this appeal. And “we can address jurisdictional issues 

in any order we choose.” Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 

U.S. 1, 4 (2023).

“Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to deciding live Cases or Controversies.” Ruggles v. Ruggles, 49 

F.4th 1097, 1098 (7th Cir. 2022). “The mootness doctrine implements Article III’s Case or Controversy requirement by 

preventing federal courts from resolving questions that cannot affect the rights of the parties before them.” Id. at 1099. An 

appeal becomes moot if an intervening event precludes any 

effectual relief in favor of the appellant. Finch v. Treto, 82 F.4th 

572, 578 (7th Cir. 2023); see also Orion Sales, Inc. v. Emerson Radio Corp., 148 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he case itself 

has not become moot, only the preliminary injunction under 

appeal has ... .”). 

For example, an appeal of a preliminary injunction becomes moot when the injunction expires or the event in question occurs. See, e.g., Finch, 82 F.4th at 578; Gjertsen v. Bd. of 

Election Comm’rs of City of Chi., 751 F.2d 199, 202 (7th Cir. 1984)

(dismissing as moot an appeal from a preliminary injunction 

regarding an election because the election had already been 

held). An appellate ruling regarding an expired preliminary 

injunction is purely advisory; the same is true when the injunction concerned an event that has already occurred. In either case, the appellate court cannot provide any meaningful 

relief. So too for a stay whose only justification has passed. 

Here the reason for the stay no longer exists, and nothing 

we might say about it would benefit Church Mutual. Judge 

Leinenweber stayed this case to await the determination of 

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8 No. 24-1900 

damages in the state-court case. The settlement accomplished

that, removing the only justification for the stay and mooting

this appeal. Cf. Lindstrom v. Graber, 203 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 

2000) (dismissing as moot an emergency stay of extradition 

because the appellant had been extradited); see also Meierhenry 

Sargent LLP v. Williams, 992 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 2021) (per 

curiam) (“With the conditions underlying the stay having 

now passed, there is no relief for us to order, making it the 

paradigm of a moot issue.” (internal quotation omitted))). 

Whatever we might decide about the propriety of the stay ruling is irrelevant now that the state case is over. 

Church Mutual resists this conclusion, arguing that Judge 

Leinenweber’s stay order did not automatically terminate 

with the dismissal of the state lawsuit but rather remains in 

effect “until further order.” It also observes that Judge Shah 

cannot lift the stay while the appeal is pending. True, but irrelevant. Judge Shah can dissolve the stay once we dismiss 

the appeal as moot. Church Mutual has offered no reason to 

think that he would leave the stay in place. Indeed, the insurer’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument that there is 

no conceivable basis for doing so. 

Finally, Church Mutual argues that it would be more efficient to proceed directly to an appellate ruling on the key coverage question now rather than waiting for final judgment. 

But efficiency cannot trump the requirements of Article III. 

Though the coverage dispute remains live, the dismissal of 

the state-court case moots this appeal.

DISMISSED

Case: 24-1900 Document: 46 Filed: 01/02/2025 Pages: 8