Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01507/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01507-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rafael Newton Aguila
Appellant
Axia MedSciences
Appellee
Edge Systems LLC
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

EDGE SYSTEMS LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED 

LIABILITY COMPANY, AXIA MEDSCIENCES, A 

DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

RAFAEL NEWTON AGUILA, AKA RALPH AGUILA, 

DBA HYDRADERMABRASION SYSTEMS,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1507

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida in No. 1:14-cv-24517-KMM, 

Judge K. Michael Moore.

______________________ 

Decided: December 21, 2015

______________________ 

 BRENTON R. BABCOK, Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear, 

LLP, Irvine, CA, for appellees. Also represented by ALI S.

RAZAI. 

RAFAEL NEWTON AGUILA, Rottenburg am Neckar, 

72108, Germany, pro se.

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2 EDGE SYS. LLC v. AGUILA

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Appellant Rafael Newton Aguila (“Mr. Aguila”) d/b/a 

Hydradermabrasion Systems appeals the decision of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of 

Florida granting a preliminary injunction to Edge Systems LLC (“Edge”) and Axia Medsciences LLC (“Axia”) 

(together, “Appellees”) to enjoin Mr. Aguila from infringing upon their trademarks and trade dress and from 

infringing U.S. Patent No. 6,299,620 (“the ’620 patent”) 

that covers an integral component of Appellees’ machine. 

See Edge Sys. LLC v. Aguila, No. 14-24517-CIVMOORE/MCALILEY (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2015) (Preliminary Injunction Order) (Appellees’ Suppl. App. 34–36).1

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Products at Issue 

Edge manufactures and sells a hydradermabrasion 

machine marketed as HydraFacial MD. “This machine 

utilizes a ‘wet system’ that exfoliates facial skin tissue by 

using an abrasive tip in combination with the application 

of serums, followed by a vacuum source to extract dead 

skin cells.” Appellees’ Suppl. App. 2. This machine 

“incorporates technology . . . claimed in six U.S. patents 

owned by [] Axia and exclusively licensed to Edge.” Id. 

Mr. Aguila “sells a hydradermabrasion machine 

known as HydraDerm MD or Hydradermabrasion MD.” 

1 Appellees filed a Supplemental Appendix because 

“Appellant declined to cooperate with Appellees to prepare a Joint Appendix.” Appellees’ Br. 2 n.1. 

 

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EDGE SYS. LLC v. AGUILA 3

Id. Mr. Aguila’s machine “incorporates the use of serums 

that have the same or very similar names as the serums 

used in [Edge’s machines], and [Mr. Aguila] sells his 

machines using the same name as [] Edge—‘Edge Systems’—and the same logo that . . . Edge uses.” Id. 

II. The ’620 Patent 

Edge’s HydraFacial MD incorporates technology from, 

inter alia, the ’620 patent. Axia owns the ’620 patent, 

which is entitled “Instruments and Techniques for Inducing Neocollagenesis in Skin Treatments.” 

Independent claim 1 is the only claim in dispute, it recites:

A system for treating surface layers of a patient’s 

skin, comprising:

(a) an instrument body with a distal working end 

for engaging a skin surface; 

(b) a skin interface portion of the working end 

comprising an abrasive fragment composition secured thereto; 

(c) at least one inflow aperture in said skin interface in fluid communication with a fluid reservoir; 

and 

(d) at least one outflow aperture in said skin interface in communication with a negative pressurization source. 

’620 patent col. 9 ll. 54–63.

III. Proceedings 

In November 2014, Appellees filed a complaint

against Mr. Aguila alleging, inter alia, patent, trademark, 

and trade dress infringement. The next month, Appellees’ 

Emergency Motion for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining 

Order and Order to Show Cause Regarding Preliminary 

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Injunction was granted. The district court referred consideration of Appellees’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

to Magistrate Judge Chris McAliley, who later held an 

evidentiary hearing on the matter. 

In January 2015, Mr. Aguila filed a Motion to Dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting lack of jurisdiction due to forum non 

conveniens, among other things. Edge Sys. LLC v. Aguila, 

No. 14-24517-CIV-MOORE/MCALILEY (S.D. Fla. Jan. 

29, 2015) (Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations on Motion for Preliminary Injunction) (Appellees’ 

Suppl. App. 1–33). Later that month, while Mr. Aguila’s 

Motion to Dismiss remained pending, the Magistrate 

Judge issued a Report and Recommendation on Appellees’ 

Motion, recommending the district court grant the preliminary injunction. Mr. Aguila filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation in February 2015. In 

consideration of Mr. Aguila’s objections, the district court 

conducted a de novo review of the record and determined 

the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings were supported by 

the record and ultimately adopted in full the Report and 

Recommendation. The district court subsequently granted Appellees’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 

In March 2015, Mr. Aguila filed a Notice of Interlocutory Appeal regarding the Order Adopting Report and 

Recommendations and Granting the Preliminary Injunction. In June 2015, the district court denied Mr. Aguila’s 

12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to

forum non conveniens. 

We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s 

grant of a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(a)(1), (c)(1) (2012).

DISCUSSION

Mr. Aguila argues the district court erred: (1) in not 

dismissing the case under forum non conveniens; (2) in 

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EDGE SYS. LLC v. AGUILA 5

granting a preliminary injunction for patent infringement; (3) in granting a preliminary injunction for trademark infringement; and (4) in granting a preliminary 

injunction for trade dress infringement. We address each 

argument in turn. 

I. The Issue of Forum Non Conveniens Is Not Properly 

Before This Court

“Whether a notice of appeal has adequately presented 

an issue to this court is a question of Federal Circuit law.” 

Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 

1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Rule 3(c)(1)(B) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) requires the notice 

of appeal to “designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). “[T]he 

purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the filing 

provides sufficient notice to other parties and the courts.” 

Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248–49 (1992) (citations 

omitted). “[F]ailure to designate the judgment appealed 

from under FRAP 3(c)(1)(B) would lead to uncertainty as 

to the scope of an appellate decision.” Durr v. Nicholson, 

400 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that, “[a]lthough courts should 

construe Rule 3 liberally when determining whether it 

has been complied with, noncompliance is fatal to an 

appeal.” Smith, 502 U.S. at 248. 

Mr. Aguila’s Notice of Appeal stems from the district 

court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. The district 

court did not take up the issue of forum non conveniens2

2 Forum non conveniens is “nothing more or less 

than a supervening venue provision, permitting displacement of the ordinary rules of venue when, in light of 

certain conditions, the trial court thinks that jurisdiction 

ought to be declined.” Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 

U.S. 443, 453 (1994). Application of this doctrine is 

 

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until after the evidentiary proceeding that ultimately led 

to the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction. Compare 

Appellees’ Suppl. App. 50 (Docket Entry 97 listing Notice 

of Interlocutory Appeal regarding Docket Entry 89 Order 

Adopting Report and Recommendations and Docket Entry 

90 Preliminary Injunction), with id. at 48 (Docket Entry 

77 Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure), and id. at 55 (Docket Entry 110 

Order denying Docket Entry 77 Motion to Dismiss for 

Lack of Jurisdiction). 

Even with a liberal construction of the notice requirement in this case, a finding of no jurisdiction to hear 

Mr. Aguila’s forum non conveniens argument is warranted. Mr. Aguila provided notice that the issue on appeal 

was the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, 

not forum non conveniens. Expanding the scope of the 

specifically limited interlocutory Notice of Appeal would 

be improper. See Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 

912 F.2d 1423, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“Durango did not 

misdescribe or ‘forget’ to mention the ’246 [patent] issues. 

Durango clearly and specifically intended to confine its 

notice in 90–1100 only to the ’944 [patent] issues. Durango cannot now expand the scope of its specifically limited 

notice of appeal.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Cybersettle, Inc. 

v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., 243 F. App’x 603, 606 

(Fed. Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“NAF’s reference to the 

injunction does not negate its reference to the district 

court’s judgment as the subject of appeal, especially given 

entrusted to “‘the sound discretion of the trial court. It 

may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse 

of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant 

public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves 

substantial deference.’” Id. at 455 (quoting Piper Aircraft 

Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981)). 

 

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EDGE SYS. LLC v. AGUILA 7

the principle that notices of appeal are to be liberally 

construed.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also id. at 606 n.1 (“NAF did not confine its 

notice to the propriety of injunctive relief, but instead 

designated the district court’s final judgment for appeal 

and then added a statement specifically referring to the 

injunction.”). 

Further, Mr. Aguila has not filed a motion for leave to 

amend his Notice of Appeal to include the issue of forum 

non conveniens. Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction 

to hear Mr. Aguila’s arguments on matters beyond what 

is stated in his Notice of Appeal—i.e., the District Court’s 

Order granting a Preliminary Injunction against Mr. 

Aguila. 

II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Granting the Preliminary Injunction

A. Standard of Review 

We apply the law of the regional circuit, the Eleventh 

Circuit in this instance, when we review the district 

court’s grant, denial, or modification of a preliminary 

injunction. Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech Co., 727 F.3d 1375, 

1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The Eleventh 

Circuit “review[s] a district court’s order granting or 

denying a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.” 

McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th 

Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). We must affirm the district 

court’s decision unless “we at least determine that the 

district court has made a ‘clear error of judgment,’ United 

States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 745 (11th Cir. 1989), or has 

applied an incorrect legal standard, Cheney v. Anchor 

Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848, 849 n.2 (11th Cir.

1996).” SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 

77 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 1996). 

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B. The Winter Factors Support Granting a Preliminary 

Injunction for Patent Infringement

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish (1) “he is likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) “he is 

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief”; (3) “the balance of equities tips in his favor”; 

and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. 

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations omitted). We refer to these considerations as the

Winter Factors and examine them in turn.

Under the first Winter Factor, a patentee “must 

demonstrate that it will likely prove infringement of one 

or more claims of the patents-in-suit, and that at least one 

of those same allegedly infringed claims will also likely 

withstand the validity challenges presented by the accused infringer.” AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 

1042, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). A court’s patent infringement analysis 

involves two steps: (1) “the court determines the scope 

and meaning of the asserted claims”; and (2) “the properly 

construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing 

device.” Mas-Hamilton Grp. v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 

1206, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). 

However, the preliminary injunction “should not issue if 

an alleged infringer raises a substantial question regarding either infringement or validity, i.e., the alleged infringer asserts an infringement or invalidity defense that 

the patentee has not shown lacks substantial merit.” 

AstraZeneca LP, 633 F.3d at 1050 (citation omitted). 

Appellees alleged in their Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction that Mr. Aguila infringed claim 1 of the ’620 

patent. During the preliminary injunction proceedings, 

Mr. Aguila did not dispute the meaning of claim 1 nor did 

he dispute that his allegedly infringing machines contained every element of claim 1. Appellees’ Suppl. App. 

25–26. The Magistrate Judge construed the terms of 

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EDGE SYS. LLC v. AGUILA 9

claim 1 consistent with their ordinary and customary 

meanings. Id. at 25. The Magistrate Judge also determined Appellees “established the element of infringement.” Id. at 26. Given this finding, Mr. Aguila has not 

raised a substantial question regarding infringement.

The court then turned to the validity of the ’620 

patent, which was disputed by Mr. Aguila. Id. He argued 

that U.S. Patent No. 6,241,739 (“the ’739 patent”) anticipated the ’620 patent; however, Mr. Aguila “offered no 

testimony or other evidence to demonstrate how the ’739 

[p]atent anticipates the ’620 [p]atent.” Id. at 27; see also 

id. (citing Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 

1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (failing to articulate how a 

prior art reference anticipates the patent in question is 

insufficient evidence of invalidity)). The Magistrate 

Judge determined Mr. Aguila “failed to rebut the presumption of patent validity” and Appellees made a “strong 

showing that the ’620 [p]atent is valid.” Id. 

Mr. Aguila argues the district court erred in reaching 

its determination that Appellees were likely to succeed on 

the merits. He contends the district court erred: (1) 

“legally and factually in concluding that [Mr.] Aguila did 

not establish substantial questions of validity that cannot 

be characterized as substantially meritless”; (2) “legally 

and factually in concluding that [Mr.] Aguila’s accused 

products infringed [A]ppellees’ [’620 patent]”; (3) “legally 

and factually in concluding that the [A]ppellees’ device is 

based on the first claim of the [’620 patent]”; (4) “in ruling 

that the [A]ppellees are likely to withstand [Mr.] Aguila’s 

obviousness challenge”; and (5) in finding the asserted 

claims were not obvious “despite the evidence that a 

person of ordinary skill in the art would have . . . modified 

a prior art patent to include the . . . inventive feature” and 

despite Appellees’ “failure to show any nexus between any 

secondary indicia of non-obviousness and the allegedly 

inventive feature.” Appellant’s Br. 8–9. 

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Mr. Aguila did not present Arguments (2)–(5) to the 

Magistrate Judge. These arguments are therefore 

waived. See Gant v. United States, 417 F.3d 1328, 1332 

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Arguments not made in the court or 

tribunal whose order is under review are normally considered waived.”). We address Mr. Aguila’s remaining 

arguments below.

1. The District Court Did Not Err in Finding Appellees 

Were Likely to Prevail on Aguila’s Patent Invalidity 

Challenge

Mr. Aguila contends the ’620 patent is anticipated by 

the ’739 patent and is therefore invalid. Appellant’s Br. 

25–27. Additionally, Mr. Aguila reproduces a claim chart 

that compares claim 1 of the ’620 patent to disclosures of 

the ’739 patent, emphasizing portions of the ’739 patent’s 

disclosure.3 Id. at 26–27. However, he does not offer any 

argument in connection with the claim chart. Mr. Aguila 

further asserts that U.S. Patent Nos. 4,378,804 (“the ’804 

patent”) and 5,037,431 (“the ’431 patent”) anticipate the 

’620 patent as well. Id. at 27. The record, as presented to 

this court, does not demonstrate that Mr. Aguila sufficiently developed and presented his ’804 and ’431 patent 

validity arguments to the Magistrate Judge.4 According3 Mr. Aguila submitted this exact claim chart to the 

district court in his Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees’ Motion for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order 

and Order to Show Cause Regarding Preliminary Injunction, Docket Entry 35. Compare Appellant’s Br. 26–27 

(claim chart presented to this court), with Appellant’s 

Suppl. App. 78–79 (claim chart presented to the district 

court). 4 Appellees acknowledge in their brief that Mr. 

Aguila argued to the district court that the ’620 patent 

was invalid over the ’804 and ’431 patents. See Appellees’ 

Br. 22. The record evidence submitted to this court 

 

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EDGE SYS. LLC v. AGUILA 11

ly, these validity arguments are waived and will not be 

considered. See Gant, 417 F.3d at 1332. 

Mr. Aguila also asserts the district court erred in 

rejecting his ’739 patent validity argument; however, this 

argument does not advance any theory explaining how 

the district court abused its discretion in rejecting Mr. 

Aguila’s invalidity argument. He presented the ’739 

patent to the Magistrate Judge, but “offered no testimony 

or other evidence” to support his invalidity argument. 

Appellees’ Suppl. App. 27. “[A]n alleged infringer who 

raises invalidity as an affirmative defense has the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove invalidity by clear 

demonstrates Mr. Aguila made conclusory statements 

regarding the validity of the ’804 patent in his Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees’ Motion for Ex Parte 

Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause 

Regarding Preliminary Injunction. See Appellees’ Suppl. 

App. 43 (Docket Entry 35); Appellant’s Suppl. App. 78–79 

(excerpt from Docket Entry 35). Except for changing the 

name of the party, Mr. Aguila copied these conclusory 

arguments into his appeal brief. Compare Appellant’s Br. 

27 (anticipation argument presented to this court), with 

Appellant’s Suppl. App. 79 (anticipation argument presented to the district court). However, the record does not 

demonstrate the Magistrate Judge considered these 

arguments. See Appellees’ Suppl. App. 1–33. Assuming 

Appellant’s arguments are not waived for failure to sufficiently develop these arguments below, we find these

arguments are waived for failure to present more than 

conclusory arguments on appeal. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. 

Cir. 2006) (holding that when “a party includes no developed argumentation on a point . . . we treat the argument 

as waived” (quoting Anderson v. City of Boston, 375 F.3d 

71, 91 (1st Cir. 2004)).

 

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and convincing evidence, as well as the initial burden of 

going forward with evidence to support its invalidity 

allegation.” Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 

566 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (footnote and citation 

omitted). “‘[T]estimony concerning anticipation must be 

testimony from one skilled in the art and must identify 

each claim element, state the witnesses’ interpretation of 

the claim element, and explain in detail how each claim 

element is disclosed in the prior art reference.’” Koito 

Mfg. Co., 381 F.3d at 1152 (quoting Schumer v. Lab. 

Comput. Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir.

2002)). Testimony that is “‘merely conclusory’” is insufficient. Id. (quoting Schumer, 308 F.3d at 1315–16). “It is 

not our task, nor is it the task of the district court, to 

attempt to interpret confusing or general testimony to 

determine whether a case of invalidity has been made 

out . . . .” Schumer, 308 F.3d at 1316. “Indeed, to accept 

confusing or generalized testimony as evidence of invalidity is improper.” Id. This is exactly what Mr. Aguila 

asked the Magistrate Judge to do and, in turn, asks us to 

do. He offered into evidence only the patents themselves, 

without any expert testimony or anticipation analysis. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in finding that Mr. Aguila failed to raise a substantial 

question regarding validity. 

2. The District Court Did Not Err in Finding Appellees 

Were Likely to Prevail on Their Patent Infringement 

Claim

Mr. Aguila argues the district court erred: (1) in 

“ruling that the [A]ppellees’ handpiece meets every limitation of [c]laim 1 of the [’]620 patent without making any 

kind of claim construction analysis”; (2) in “construing 

[A]ppellees’ handpiece to contain an ‘abrasive fragment’ 

when it has no abrasive materials that make contact with 

the skin”; and (3) in “relying on the [declaration] of 

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EDGE SYS. LLC v. AGUILA 13

Lealani Irby[5] for an example of [Mr.] Aguila’s infringing 

handpiece (i.e. handle).” Appellant’s Br. 21–22. 

The Magistrate Judge did not err in construing terms 

in claim 1. Claim 1 was construed “consistent with the 

ordinary and customary meaning of the terms used.” 

Appellees’ Suppl. App. 25; see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 

F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Mr. Aguila’s 

additional contentions as to claim construction are irrelevant on appeal, as these arguments were not made in the 

proceeding below and are therefore waived. See Gant, 417 

F.3d at 1332.

Mr. Aguila’s third assertion is also incorrect. The 

Magistrate Judge explicitly stated “a court may rely on 

affidavits at the preliminary injunction stage if the evidence is ‘appropriate given the character and objectives of 

the injunctive proceeding.’” Appellees’ Suppl. App. 3 

(quoting Levi-Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 

51 F.3d 982, 984 (11th Cir. 1995)). While the district 

court has the authority to consider declarations at the 

evidentiary hearing, the Magistrate Judge elected “to not 

do so here. The core issue in dispute . . . raise[s] questions 

of credibility, which is best evaluated when presented 

with live testimony.” Id. As a result, the Magistrate 

Judge required live testimony in lieu of affidavits. The 

Magistrate Judge explicitly stated he was not relying on 

any written declaration, which was within his proscribed 

power. Any error alleged by Mr. Aguila regarding the 

content of Ms. Irby’s declaration is irrelevant. 

C. The Winter Factors Support Granting a Preliminary 

Injunction for Trademark Infringement

5 Ms. Irby filed a declaration in support of Appellees’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Appellees’ Br. 26 

n.5. 

 

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Establishing a prima facie case under the Lanham 

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012), requires a plaintiff to 

show “(1) that the plaintiff had enforceable trademark 

rights in the mark or name, and (2) that the defendant 

made unauthorized use of it ‘such that consumers were 

likely to confuse the two.’” Custom Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. 

Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647–48 (11th Cir. 

2007) (quoting Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. 

Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 106 F.3d 355, 358 (11th Cir.

1997)). 

During the preliminary injunction proceedings, Mr. 

Aguila did not dispute that his use of Appellees’ marks 

was likely to cause confusion. Appellees’ Suppl. App. 16. 

Rather, he claimed he was the first to use the trademarks 

in dispute and Appellees therefore could not claim ownership over those marks. In order to prevail, Appellees 

must “establish their ownership of the trademark by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” SM Licensing Corp. v. 

U.S. Med. Care Holdings, LLC, No. 07-20293-CIV, 2007 

WL 2051009, at * 9 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 

The Magistrate Judge determined Appellees proved 

ownership for three marks registered with the United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, which is “prima 

facie evidence of the mark’s validity and of the registrant’s ownership of . . . the trademark . . . .” Appellees’ 

Suppl. App. 17 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a)). Appellees 

assert a common law right to the remaining eight marks 

in dispute. Id. 

Ownership of a common law mark is demonstrated by 

showing “(1) it is the prior user of the unregistered mark 

in the area and (2) it acquired a protectable interest in the 

mark because the mark is either inherently distinctive or 

has acquired a secondary meaning.” Pandora Jewelers 

1995, Inc. v. Pandora Jewelry, LLC, 703 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 

1312 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (citation omitted). During the 

preliminary injunction proceedings, Mr. Aguila only 

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disputed the prior use of the marks. Appellees’ Suppl. 

App. 18. The Magistrate Judge determined Appellees 

provided evidence that “firmly establishes” that they were 

“the first to use the trademarks in dispute.” Id. The 

Magistrate Judge determined that the Appellees’ testimony was more persuasive than Mr. Aguila’s uncorroborated testimony. Id. at 19. 

The Magistrate Judge also rejected evidence submitted by Mr. Aguila (i.e., two invoices) several weeks after 

the evidentiary hearing. Id. The Magistrate Judge stated 

that he held a “telephonic status conference” before the 

evidentiary hearing. Id. at 20. During that meeting, the

Magistrate Judge “made clear that [he] expected [the 

parties] to present all their evidence that bore on any 

issues in dispute at that hearing.” Id. The Magistrate 

Judge also observed Mr. Aguila’s reliance on his pro se 

status and his alleged lack of familiarity with the Federal 

Rules of Evidence was disingenuous because he displayed 

a familiarity with these rules. Id. at 20. The Magistrate 

Judge disregarded Mr. Aguila’s rationale for leaving the 

original invoices in Germany—i.e., that he lacked an 

understanding of the evidentiary rules and thought they 

would be inadmissible hearsay—because Mr. Aguila was 

explicitly informed before the hearing, and before flying 

from Germany to Miami for the hearing, that all evidence 

was expected to be presented at that hearing. Id. at 20–

21. The Magistrate Judge concluded his analysis by 

noting the authenticity of the untimely-submitted invoices would have been at issue: “[t]here is nothing inherent 

about the documents to suggest they are authentic. I 

would not have admitted these documents into evidence 

at the hearing without first having [Mr. Aguila] questioned, under oath, about their creation and preservation.” Id. 

Mr. Aguila argues the district court erred in excluding 

“into evidence the two old invoices from [Mr.] Aguila that 

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tems[’] and the ‘E’ logo before the [A]ppellees.” Appellant’s Br. 28. Mr. Aguila contends “[t]he Magistrate 

Judge provide[d] no reason[] not to believe neither [Mr.] 

Aguila’s declaration nor [Mr.] Aguila’s invoices.” Id. 

However, this statement is inapposite because the documents were excluded as untimely. Mr. Aguila cites no 

precedent supporting his assertion that the district court 

abused its discretion in excluding his untimely evidence. 

See Appellees’ Suppl. App. 21 (The Magistrate Judge 

asserted that “[s]imple notions of fairness counsel to not 

accept these [] documents after both parties rested their 

case and the hearing concluded.”).

In reviewing the district court’s application of local 

procedural rules, we give broad deference to the district 

court. SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 

1278, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “[W]hen reviewing that 

exercise of discretion this court determines whether (1) 

the decision was clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

fanciful; (2) the decision was based on an erroneous 

conclusion of law; (3) the court’s findings were clearly 

erroneous; or (4) the record contains no evidence upon 

which the court rationally could have based its decision.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Based on the reasoning provided by the Magistrate 

Judge, we find that there was no abuse of discretion. The 

Magistrate Judge informed the parties of his expectations 

for evidence before the evidentiary hearing. The Magistrate Judge’s decision to exclude the untimely evidence 

was consistent with his order and the local evidentiary 

rules. We find no error in the Magistrate Judge’s decision. 

1. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Rejecting Mr. Aguila’s Laches Defense to the Claim of 

Trademark Infringement

The doctrine of laches is an affirmative defense, Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(c), based on a party’s unexcused delay that 

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EDGE SYS. LLC v. AGUILA 17

prevents that party from asserting a claim after too much 

time has passed. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 

Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1967 (2014) (describing laches as 

“unreasonable, prejudicial delay in commencing suit”). 

During the preliminary injunction proceeding, Mr. 

Aguila asserted Appellees’ trademark infringement claim 

was barred by laches. The Magistrate Judge determined 

that Mr. Aguila “base[d] his laches defense on the cease 

and desist letter that [Appellees] sent him in January 

2010. . . . Shortly after this cease and desist letter, [Mr. 

Aguila] formally dissolved DiamondSkin Systems by filing 

Articles of Dissolution with the Florida Secretary of 

State.” Appellees’ Suppl. App. 22 (citation omitted). The 

Magistrate Judge determined Mr. Aguila “did not offer 

any contemporaneous evidence that he continued sales 

between 2010 and 2014, nor did he demonstrate that 

[Appellees] knew or should have known of such ongoing 

infringement years before they filed this suit.” Id. at 239.

The Magistrate Judge found the Appellees’ witnesses 

credible and determined Appellees’ response of taking no 

further action after the 2010 letter was reasonable because they believed the matter was closed once Mr. Aguila’s company was dissolved. Id. Appellees’ delay was 

excusable. 

Mr. Aguila bears the burden of proving the affirmative defense of laches. Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 

F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984). Proving laches requires 

demonstrating: “(1) a delay in asserting a right or claim; 

(2) that the delay was not excusable; and (3) that the 

delay caused the defendant undue prejudice.” Id. at 1517 

(footnote and citation omitted). In the trademark context,

“[d]elay is measured from the time the plaintiff knew or 

should have known that it had a provable claim for infringement, but it is under no obligation to sue until the 

likelihood of confusion looms large.” Buccellati Holding 

Italia SPA v. Laura Buccellati, LLC, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1368, 

1375 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (citation omitted); see AmBrit, Inc. 

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18 EDGE SYS. LLC v. AGUILA

v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1546 (11th Cir. 1986) (discussing laches and delay in asserting rights). “The 

amount of prejudice suffered by the defendant is weighed 

against the public interest in avoiding confusion.” Buccellati Holding Italia SPA, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 1375 (citation 

omitted). 

On appeal, Mr. Aguila asserts that laches should equitably estop Edge from asserting its trademark rights, 

and that therefore Mr. Aguila should be allowed to continue his use of “Edge Systems” and “E” trademarks. Mr. 

Aguila’s arguments are mere restatements of what he 

previously argued to the Magistrate Judge. His arguments are ipse dixit, failing to provide any reasoned 

analysis of the applicable law to the facts of this case. Mr. 

Aguila also does not point to any error the Magistrate 

Judge made. Accordingly, we find there was no abuse of 

discretion. 

D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Granting a Preliminary Injunction for Trade Dress Infringement

“Trade Dress involves the total image of a product and 

may include features such as size, shape, color or color 

combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales 

techniques.” AmBrit, Inc., 812 F.2d at 1535 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]o prevail on a 

trade dress infringement claim under § 43(a) [of the 

Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)], the plaintiff must 

prove three elements: 1) its trade dress is inherently 

distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning, 2) its 

trade dress is primarily non-functional, and 3) the defendant’s trade dress is confusingly similar.” Id. (citation 

and footnote omitted). 

During the preliminary injunction proceeding, Mr. 

Aguila’s only challenge to Appellees’ claim of trade dress 

infringement was that Aguila “was the first to use the 

trade dress in dispute.” Appellees’ Suppl. App. 24. The 

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EDGE SYS. LLC v. AGUILA 19

Magistrate Judge determined the only evidence submitted 

by Mr. Aguila to support his argument was uncorroborated testimony, which the Magistrate Judge found not 

credible. Id. Thus, the Magistrate Judge determined 

Appellees had a likelihood of success on its claim of trade 

dress infringement. Id. at 23–24. 

On appeal, Mr. Aguila presents conclusory statements 

regarding trade dress infringement. He does not advance 

developed arguments nor does he cite to legal precedent in

support of his position. Accordingly, Mr. Aguila has 

waived his trade dress infringement argument. See 

SmithKline Beecham Corp., 439 F.3d at 1320. 

Additionally, Mr. Aguila argues, for the first time on 

appeal, that Appellees’ trade dress is only functional. “[I]t 

is the general rule . . . that a federal appellate court does 

not consider an issue not passed upon below.” Golden 

Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Nokia, Inc., 527 F.3d 1318, 1322 

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Mr. Aguila has not proffered any argument to 

warrant deviation from this general rule and has waived 

this issue. See id. (listing circumstances where arguments not raised below may be heard on appeal). 

E. The Remaining Winter Factors Favor Appellees

The Magistrate Judge concluded its opinion by analyzing the remaining Winter Factors of irreparable injury, 

balance of the hardships, and the public interest. The 

Magistrate Judge concluded: (1) Appellees are likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary 

injunction; (2) an analysis of the balance of the hardships 

favors issuing the preliminary injunction; and (3) the 

public interest is best served by protecting consumers 

from being misled about the source of the manufacturer of 

the machines and serums in question. Appellees’ Suppl. 

App. 28–31. 

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20 EDGE SYS. LLC v. AGUILA

On appeal, Mr. Aguila contends that the district court 

erred “legally and factually in concluding that the 

[A]ppellees are [] likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 

absence of preliminary relief.” Appellant’s Br. 8. Mr. 

Aguila also contends the district court erred “in finding 

irreparable harm, despite the [A]ppellees’ failure to show 

a specific nexus between its alleged harm and . . . [Mr. 

Aguila’s] practice of the purportedly inventive feature.” 

Id. at 9. 

Mr. Aguila fails to further discuss these statements 

later in his brief or analyze them against the operative 

legal framework. Accordingly, we deem these arguments 

waived. See SmithKline Beecham Corp., 439 F.3d at 

1320. Based on the record before the Magistrate Judge, 

we find the court did not abuse its discretion in granting 

Appellees a preliminary injunction for patent infringement, trademark infringement, and trade dress infringement. 

CONCLUSION 

We have considered Mr. Aguila’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the 

decision of the of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida is 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

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