Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01467/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01467-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Air Line Pilots Association International
Appellee
John L. Lancaster
Appellant
United Air Lines, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOHN L. LANCA."~TER, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL; ) 

UNITED AIRLINES, INC., ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

No. 94-1467 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 93-N-2647) 

Robert F. Gore (Jerre W. Dixon of Dixon & Snow, Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs), 

National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Springfield, Virginia, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

James K. Lobsenz (Gary Green with him on the brief), Air Line Pilots Association, International, 

Washington, D.C., for Defendant-Appellee Air Line Pilots Association, International. 

Chris A. Hollinger (Robert A. Siegel of O'Melveny & Myers, Los Arlgeles, California; Paul F. Lewis 

and Jerry N. Jones ofMoye, Giles, O'Keefe, Vermeire & Gorrell, Denver, Colorado, with him on 

the brief), O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee United Air Lines, 

Inc. 

Before BALDOCK, BRORBY and SETH, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff John L. Lancaster appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 1 
favor of defendants United Airlines, Inc. (hereafter "United") and the Air Line Pilots Association 

(hereafter "ALPA") on his claims ALPA and United violated§ 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor 

Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, and the First and Fifth Amendments by requiring, as a condition of 

employment, that he pay an assessment to support ALP A members working at Eastern Airlines 

(hereafter "Eastern") while they were striking in sympathy with members of the International 

Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Union (hereafter "the Machinists") at Eastern, 

and by terminating him for failing to pay the assessments within the time allowed. We exercise 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reverse. 

I 

The collective bargaining agreement between ALP A and United creates an agency shop. 

"An 'agency shop' agreement generally provides that while employees are not required to join the 

union, they are required to pay the union an amount equal to union dues." Pilots Against lllegal 

Dues v. Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, 938 F.2d 1123, 1126 & n.l (lOth Cir. 1991). Mr. Lancaster joined 

ALPA shortly after he began working for United in the 1960's, but later resigned his membership. 

Throughout the period relevant to this litigation, he continued to pay the agency fees required under 

the collective bargaining agreement. 

In 1989, members of the Machinists Union and its subordinate unions at Eastern went on 

strike. ALP A authorized its members at Eastern to strike in sympathy with the Machinists. From 

May 1989 to March 1990, ALP A levied a monthly strike assessment on all its members, including 

those working at United. ALP A also required Mr. Lancaster and the other nonunion pilots at United 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 2 
to pay strike assessments pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement with United. Mr. 

Lancaster continued to pay his other obligations to ALP A, but did not pay the strike assessment. 

In January 1993, ALPA asked United to terminate Mr. Lancaster for failing to pay the strike 

assessment. Mr. Lancaster learned of ALP A's request and delivered a check for the full amount due. 

ALP A refused to accept the check because it was untimely and returned it to Mr. Lancaster. United 

then informed Mr. Lancaster he was to be terminated "purSuant to United's contractual obligations" 

under the collective bargaining agreement. Mr. Lancaster filed a timely grievance with United's 

Senior Vice President of Human Resources, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Mr. 

Lancaster did not contend in his grievance that the Eastern sympathy strike assessment violated the 

Railway Labor Act or the First and Fifth Amendments. United rejected Mr. Lancaster's grievance. 

(!d.) Mr. Lancaster timely appealed the matter to arbitration before a neutral referee, again pursuant 

to the collective bargaining agreement. He again failed to raise his Railway Labor Act and 

constitutional challenges to the Eastern sympathy strike assessment. After a hearing, the referee 

denied Mr. Lancaster's appeal, and, shortly thereafter, United terminated Mr. Lancaster's 

employment. 

Mr. Lancaster then filed a complaint in district court alleging (1) ALP A breached its duty of 

fair representation, (2) United breached his employment contract, (3) ALPA and United violated § 2, 

Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, by requiring him to pay the strike 

assessment and terminating him for failing to do so, and (4) ALPA and United violated his First 

Amendment right to freedom of speech and association and his Fifth Amendment right to due 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 3 
process by requiring him to pay the strike assessment and terminating him for failing to do so within 

the time allowed. The district court granted swnmary judgment in favor of ALP A and United. This 

appeal followed. 

II 

Mr. Lancaster contends the district court erred in granting swnmary judgment in favor of 

ALPA and United on his claim they violated§ 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 

§ 152, Eleventh, and the First and Fifth Amendments by terminating him for failing to pay the 

Eastern sympathy strike assessment. 1 Congress added § 2, Eleventh, to the Railway Labor Act in 

part: 

1 Section 2, Eleventh, ofthe Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, provides in pertinent 

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute or law 

of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or carriers as defined 

in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations duly designated and 

authorized to represent employees in accordance with the requirements of this chapter shall 

be permitted--

(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that 

within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such 

agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of the labor 

organization representing their craft or class: Provided, That no such agreement shall 

require such condition of employment with respect to employees to whom membership is 

not available upon the same terms and conditions as are generally applicable to any other 

member or with respect to employees to whom membership was denied or terminated for 

any reason other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, 

and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of 

acquiring or retaining membership. 

(b) to make agreements providing for the deduction by such carrier or carriers from the 

wages of its or their employees in a craft or class and payment to the labor organization 

representing the craft or class of such employees, of any periodic dues, initiation fees, and 

assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of 

acquiring or retaining membership: Provided, That no such agreement shall be effective 

with respect to any individual employee until he shall have furnished the employer with a 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 4 
1951. Pub. L. No. 81-914, 64 Stat. 1238. The purpose of the amendment was to 

permit a carrier and a labor organization ... to enter into an agreement requiring, as 

a condition of continued employment, that within 60 days following the beginning 

of such employment, or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, 

all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing the craft 

or class of such employees. 

S. Rep. No. 2262, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950). This arrangement is commonly referred to as a 

"union shop." Id. Since 1951, § 2, Eleventh, has been interpreted as allowing "agency shop" 

arrangements as well. See, e.g., Brotherhood ofRy. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 116 & n.2 

(1963); Pilots Against Illegal Dues, 938 F.2d at 1126 & n.1 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

By its terms, § 2, Eleventh, gives unions broad authority to exact "periodic dues, initiation 

fees, and assessments" from involuntary members, in the case of a union shop, or nonmembers, in 

the case of an agency shop, and prohibits only "fmes and penalties." 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh(b). 

As Senator Hill, one of the sponsors of the 1951 amendment, explained during the debates before 

the full Senate, the limitation on "fines and penalties" was included so that "if an individual member 

is fined for some infraction of the union bylaws or constitution, the union cannot obtain his discharge 

under a union shop agreement in the event that the member refuses or fails to pay the fine imposed." 

96 Cong. Rec. 15736 (1950). The legislative history of § 2, Eleventh, also suggests no other 

limitation was intended. "Indeed, several witnesses appearing before the congressional Committees 

objected to the absence of any explicit limitation on the scope or amount of fees and dues that could 

written assignment to the labor organization of such membership dues, initiation fees, and 

assessments, which shall be revocable in writing after the expiration of one year or upon the 

termination date of the applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner. 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 5 
be compelled. That Congress enacted the provision over these objections arguably indicates that it 

was willing to tolerate broad exactions from objecting employees." Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., 

Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,445-446 (1984) (footnote omitted). 

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held both § 2, Eleventh, and the First and Fifth 

Amendments prohibit certain assessments from objecting nonmember employees. It first suggested 

§ 2, Eleventh, limited more than exaction of "fmes and penalties" in Railway Employes' Dept. v. 

Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). In that decision, the Supreme Court rejected a facial constitutional 

challenge to § 2, Eleventh, but stated in dictum that "[i]f 'assessments' are in fact imposed for 

purposes not germane to collective bargaining, a different problem would be presented" under the 

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because the assessment might unduly interfere with 

the objecting employee's "liberty" interest in earning a living. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 235 (footnote 

omitted). The Court also stated in dictum that "if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments 

is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First 

Amendment," those assessments might be unconstitutional under that Amendment. Id at 238. The 

high court bore out the dicta in Hanson a short time later in International Ass 'n of Machinists v. 

Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), and Allen, 373 U.S. 113. In these cases, the Supreme Court held§ 2, 

Eleventh, bars unions from using funds exacted from objecting nonmember employees to support 

political causes which the employee opposes. Allen, 3 73 U.S. at 118-19; Street, 367 U.S. at 769-70. 

The Court read the Railway Labor Act in this way because "[f]ederal statutes are to be so construed 

as to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality." Street, 367 U.S. at 749. For the first time, in 

Ellis, the Supreme Court devised a test for determining whether a particular assessment violates § 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 6 
2, Eleventh. It held: 

[f]he test must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably 

incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the 

employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues. Under this 

standard, objecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share of not only 

the direct costs of negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining contract and 

of settling grievances and disputes, but also the expenses of activities or undertakings 

normally or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the duties of the union 

as exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. 

Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448. 

Most recently, inLehnertv. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507,519 (1991), the Supreme 

Court relied on Hanson, Street, Allen, and Ellis for the proposition that courts charged with deciding 

whether an assessment by a public sector union is constitutional must apply a "case-by-case 

analysis" using three "guidelines." To be constitutional, the assessments "must (1) be 'germane' to 

collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor peace 

and avoiding 'free riders'; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is 

inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop." /d. We have since harmonized Lehnert's 

three-part test for public-sector union assessments with Ellis's test for private-sector union 

assessments, because "[t]hese same characteristics presumably are required for chargeable expenses 

under the Railway Labor Act, since the Court has consistently interpreted the RLA to avoid serious 

doubt of the statute's constitutionality." Pilots Against fllega/ Dues, 938 F.2d at 1127 (citing Street, 

367 U.S. at 749). Thus, we apply the Lehnert three-part test both to determine whether an 

assessment violates § 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act and to determine whether an assessment 

violates the First and Fifth Amendments. 

7 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 7 
III 

Having placed the matter in context, we now tum to Mr. Lancaster's contention the district 

court erred in granting summary judgment in favor ofUnited and ALPA on his claim the Eastern 

sympathy strike assessment violated§ 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, and 

the First and Fifth Amendments. "We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, 

applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c)." Wolf 

v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 50 FJd 793, 796 (lOth Cir. 1995). "Summary judgment is 

appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( C)."' Universal Money 

Ctrs., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 FJd 1527, 1529 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 655 

(1994) (quoting Fed. R Civ. P. 56( c)). "When applying this standard, we examine the factual record 

and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary 

judgment." Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (lOth 

Cir.1990). 

As the district court recognized, whether the Eastern sympathy strike assessment levied 

against United's pilots was "germane to collective bargaining activity" depends on two fairly discrete 

subissues: first, whether the assessment was germane even though it financed a strike by ALP A 

members at Eastern, not United; and second, whether it was germane even though the sympathy 

strike was designed to support striking members of another union, the Machinists, rather than to 

further directly the Eastern pilots' own interests in collective bargaining. After deciding each 

8 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 8 
subissue in ALPA's and United's favor, the district court stated with virtually no analysis that 

"though the parties' arguments focus almost exclusively on the germaneness issue, I find that the 

assessments by ALP A satisfy the two remaining Lehnert requirements." 

The district court was correct to conclude that the first subissue in the germaneness inquiry 

must be resolved in ALP A's and United's favor. We have read Lehnert as holding that, at least as 

a general principle, a union can require employees in one collective bargaining unit to pay a share 

of the chargeable expenses incurred on behalf of another collective bargaining unit represented by 

the same union, even though the activities giving rise to the expenses "were not performed for the 

direct benefit of the objecting employees' bargaining unit." Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 524; Pilots Against 

lllegal Dues, 938 F.2d at 1127-29. This is so because "to require a direct relationship between the 

expense at issue and some tangible benefit to the dissenter's bargaining unit ... would 'ignore the 

unified-membership structure under which so many unions ... operate."' Pilots Against fllegal Dues, 

938 F.2d at 1128 (quoting Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 523). "The essence of the affiliation relationship is 

the notion that the parent will bring to bear its often considerable economic, political, and 

informational resources when the local is in need of them." Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 523. Because of 

this affiliation relationship, a fee assessed from an objecting employee at one company "contributes 

to the pool of resources potentially available ... for the bargaining unit's protection." !d. 

The Fourth Circuit's decision in Crawford v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 992 F.2d 1295 (4th 

Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 195 (1993), further supports the district court's resolution of 

the first subissue. Among other things, the employee plaintiffs in Crawford challenged an 

9 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 9 
assessment intended to support ALP A members striking at another airline. The Fourth Circuit, 

sitting en bane, affirmed the district court's finding the fees were germane under Lehnert. Crawford, 

992 F.2d at 1300. It reasoned that 

/d. 

ALP A's 'unified-membership structure,' [Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 523], is even tighter 

than that of the union in Lehnert. As the district court found, negotiations at other 

airlines were not only germane to the bargaining process at each airline bargaining 

unit, but in essence determined the result of the bargaining process. Expenditures to 

prevent the extraction of concessions from ALP A by individual airlines handily meet 

the·Lehnert test. Because support for the striking pilots was of crucial importance 

in establishing the union's bargaining position in each airline unit, the requirement 

that agency-fee objectors provide funds for the strike benefits was clearly justified 

by the bargaining pattern and practice in the airline industry. 

In light of Lehnert, Pilots Against Illegal Dues, and Crawford, the mere fact the sympathy 

strike assessment levied against United's pilots financed ALP A's activities at Eastern rather than 

United does not, in itself, make it nongermane. This conclusion brings us to the second, and more 

important, subissue: whether the assessment was germane even though the sympathy strike was 

designed to support members of another union, the Machinists, rather than to further directly the 

Eastern pilots' own interest in collective bargaining. The Supreme Court has made it clear that 

unions do not have "carte blanche to expend dissenters' dollars for bargaining activities wholly 

unrelated to the employees in their unit[, but that t]here must be some indication that the payment 

is for services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union by virtue 

of their membership in the parent organization." Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 524. Thus, we must determine 

whether the Eastern sympathy strike assessments ultimately would have "inure[ d] to the benefit" of 

Mr. Lancaster. 

10 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 10 
The District of Columbia Circuit considered this very issue in Beckett v. Air Line Pilots 

Ass'n, 59 F.3d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1995), in which the plaintiff employee challenged the same Eastern 

sympathy strike assessment. The District of Columbia Circuit first emphasized that 

[a] sympathy strike differs from other kinds of strikes and a union's participation 

therein may be intended merely to express solidarity with the primary striking union 

rather than to advance its own collective bargaining objectives. If that was the case 

here, as may reasonably be inferred, then the sympathy strike assessments were not 

'gennane to collective-bargaining activity' or chargeable to the nonunion pilots. 

Beckett, 59 F.3d at 1279-80 (citations omitted). Because the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the objecting employees, would support a judgment in their favor, the court reversed 

the grant of summary judgment in ALP A's favor and remanded for trial. /d. It also reversed the 

district court's conclusion the sympathy strike assessment satisfied Lehnerfs third requirement, 

because it may have "significantly add[ed] to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the 

allowance of an agency or union shop," Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519, "[g]iven the inherently expressive 

nature of a sympathy strike." Beckett, 59 F .3d at 1280. 

We agree with the Beckett court's analysis. Therefore, the case turns on whether, in light of 

the evidence introduced in support of and in opposition to the cross-motions for summary judgment, 

there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the Eastern sympathy strike and the assessment that 

supporting it were intended merely to express solidarity with the Machinists, support unionism 

generally, or to advance some other goal not gennane to collective bargaining, or whether the 

Eastern strike assessment was designed to advance, and was reasonably likely to advance ALP A's 

own collective bargaining objectives at United. Beckett, 59 F.3d at 1279-1280. In the district court, 

ALP A introduced uncontroverted evidence in the fonn of an affidavit by its president, J. Randolph 

11 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 11 
Babbitt, explaining the Eastern sympathy strike assessment as follows: Texas Air Corporation, 

controlled by Frank Lorenzo, took over Eastern in 1986. After Mr. Lorenzo took over Eastern, "the 

events at Eastern ... followed a pattern Lorenzo established at Continental Airlines when [Texas Air] 

acquired [Continental]." /d. At Continental, Mr. Lorenzo had repudiated collective bargaining 

agreements with ALP A and the Machinists, and other unions, reduced wages and benefits by fifty 

percent, and eventually eliminated the major unions from Continental. /d. Mr. Lorenzo also 

transfered work and assets from Eastern to nonunion employer Continental, "thereby jeopardizing 

the job security of all Eastern employees as well as the survival of the airline as a separate entity." 

At Continental, the unions had failed to support each other, and that had contributed 

significantly to their inability to resist Lorenzo's actions. The unions at Eastern were 

determined not to repeat that mistake. In particular, we at ALP A were convinced that 

if the [Machinists], the largest union at [Eastern], were to be unsuccessful in [their] 

collective bargaining efforts, then ALP A would have little chance of success in its 

own negotiations, which were pending at the same time. 

Even if we accept Mr. Babbitt's affidavit at face value and conclude the sympathy strike 

furthered the Eastern pilots' collective bargaining efforts at Eastern, this would not, in itself, support 

a conclusion the Eastern sympathy strike would have ultimately "inure[ d] to the benefit" of Mr. 

Lancaster's collective bargaining unit at United. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 524. Notably, there is no 

indication in Mr. Babbitt's affidavit that because the Eastern pilots struck in sympathy with the 

Eastern Machinists, the United Machinists might one day strike in sympathy with the United pilots, 

thereby possibly improving their chances of obtaining concessions from United. Rather, the only 

testimony Mr. Babbitt gave in his affidavit suggesting the Eastern sympathy strike might inure to 

the benefit of Mr. Lancaster's collective bargaining unit was the following: 

The Eastern Air lines strike was important to collective bargaining at all airlines, not 

12 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 12 
merely Eastern. Lorenzo's success at cutting wages and eliminating the unions at 

Continental had a direct impact on the ability of ALP A to maintain or improve labor 

standards throughout the industry. The low-wage competition of Continental led to 

wage cutting on many other carriers, as well as the introduction of a reduced wage 

scale (called the "B scale") for newly hired pilots on most major air carriers. Indeed, 

the 1985 United strike resulted in large part from United management demanding a 

reduced wage scale similar to the "B scale" that Lorenzo had obtained at Continental. 

We knew that if Eastern were to go the way of Continental, the pressure on other 

carriers to reduce labor costs would be further intensified. 

The mere possibility that an unfavorable ALP A or Machinist Union contract at Eastern might 

decrease costs at Eastern, cause Eastern to reduce fares, and ultimately force other carriers to reduce 

costs and fares at the expense of ALP A members is simply too tenuous. This chain of events could 

easily be influenced, and perhaps broken, by any number of factors, including the overall economy, 

trends in consumer and business spending and travel habits, whether Eastern chose to reduce fares 

or merely retain profits generated because of its increased profit margin, whether other airlines were 

able to remain competitive by offering better flight schedules and service or were actually forced to 

reduce fares, etc. We read Lehnert as requiring more than the speculative nexus ALPA asserts. 

Mr. Babbitt's affidavit is the only evidence ALP A cites in its brief on appeal to support its 

contention it was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether the Eastern sympathy strike 

assessment was germane as a matter of law. ALP A's argument therefore stands or falls on this one 

affidavit, because without a specific reference in the brief on appeal, '"we will not search the record 

in an effort to determine whether there exists dormant evidence which might require submission of 

the case to a jury."' Gross v. BurggrafConstr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (lOth Cir. 1995) (quoting 

Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1025 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 

1013 (1992)). Because Mr. Babbitt's affidavit is inadequate to establish the Eastern sympathy strike 

13 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 13 
assessment was germane as a matter of law for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, we 

conclude it was error for the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of ALP A and United 

on Mr. Lancaster's Railway Labor Act and constitutional claims. Thomas, 968 F.2d at 1024 ("A 

movant need only point to those portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact given the relevant substantive law.... If a movant establishes its entitlement 

to judgment as a matter of law given uncontroverted, operative facts contained in the documentary 

evidence, summary judgment will lie."). Given this conclusion, we must also determine whether the 

district court erred when it denied Mr. Lancaster's cross-motion for summary judgment on his 

Railway Labor Act and constitutional claims on the ground the Eastern sympathy strike assessment 

was nongermane as a matter of law. As the nonmoving party, ALP A bore the burden of specifying 

evidence in the record sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Thomas, 968 F .2d 

at 1024-1025. Not surprisingly, Mr. Babbitt's affidavit is the only evidence ALPA has identified in 

its brief on appeal to sustain this burden. As we have explained, this evidence is simply too tenuous 

to support a jury verdict that the Eastern sympathy strike assessment was germane under Lehnert. 

Mr. Lancaster is therefore entitled to summary judgment on his Railway Labor Act and 

constitutional claims. 

IV 

ALP A and United remind us that even if we conclude the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment on the merits of Mr. Lancaster's Railway Labor Act and constitutional claims, 

" [ w ]e are free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient 

to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court." United States v. 

14 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 14 
Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537,542, n.6 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted). They first contend they are 

entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Lancaster's constitutional claims because they are not state 

actors. This contention is unavailing. In Hanson, 351 U.S. at 232, the Supreme Court agreed with 

the Supreme Court ofNebraska's holding that the adoption of union shop agreements, and ostensibly 

agency shop agreements as well, under § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act amounted to state 

action because Congress' enactment of § 2, Eleventh, "'is a necessary part of every union shop 

contract entered into on the railroads ... for without it such contracts could not be enforced,"' 

Hanson, 351 U.S. at 232. 

In other words, the federal statute is the source of the power and authority by which 

any private rights are lost or sacrificed. The enactment of the federal statute 

authorizing union shop agreements is the governmental action on which the 

Constitution operates, though it takes a private agreement to invoke the federal 

sanction. 

I d. Because union and agency shop agreements have "the imprimatur of the federal law" upon them, 

companies and unions entering into such agreements are state actors. ld. The Court focussed on the 

Railway Labor Act's express preemption of state laws prohibiting union and agency shops. !d.; 45 

U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (authorizing union security agreements "[n]otwithstanding any other 

provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute or law of the United States, or Territory thereof, 

or of any State"); Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting Hanson Court 

based its decision largely on the fact the Railway Labor Act preempts state law). The high court 

continued to treat unions and employers as state actors in Ellis, 466 U.S. at 455-57, its most recent 

Railway Labor Act decision involving a private-sector union. 

We agree with ALP A's and United's contention that it is difficult to reconcile Hanson and 

15 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 15 
Ellis with certain other high court decisions regarding state action. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 

U.S. 991, 1002-12 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978); Jackson v. 

Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,350-59 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 

171-77 (1972). Even in comparatively clear cut cases, "the question whether particular conduct is 

'private,' on the one hand, or 'state action,' on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer,'' 

Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349-50, and this case is no exception. Nevertheless, we are bound by Hanson 

and Ellis until and unless they are overruled. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 

Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet 

appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should 

follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own 

decisions."). We therefore adhere to the rule that unions and employers are state actors for the 

pwposes of§ 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act. Accord, Pilots Against fllegal Dues, 938 F.2d 

at 1127; Beckett, 59 F.3d at 1280 (triable issue whether ALPA violated the First Amendment by 

levying the Eastern sympathy strike assessment); Crawford, 992 F.2d at 1301 (rejecting ALP A's 

contention Hanson has been implicitly overruled).2 

Second, ALP A and United contend Mr. Lancaster's Railway Labor Act and constitutional 

claims are barred by res judicata and/or waiver because he failed to raise them during arbitration. 

2 Although Hanson made it clear unions and employers could violate a dissenting employee's right 

to due process under the Fifth Amendment by charging nongermane agency fees, because such charges 

would unduly interfere with the employees' protected "liberty" interest in earning a living, Hanson, 351 U.S. 

at 234-35, neither Ellis nor Lehnert discuss this ground for relief. Although we find this omission rather 

conspicuous, we remain bound by Hanson and continue to apply the interpretation of the Fifth Amendment 

contained in that decision. 

16 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 16 
In the alternative, they contend even if the claims are not barred by res judicata, they cannot be raised 

in federal court because Mr. Lancaster failed to exhaust his nonjudicial remedies as to those claims.3 

Mr. Lancaster concedes he did not raise these claims during arbitration, but contends he was not 

3 In June 1985, ALPA and United added a provision to their collective bargaining agreement 

requiring United to terminate any pilot who fails to pay agency fees. The Supplemental Agreement provided 

C. A protest by a pilot who is to be discharged as the result of an interpretation or 

application of the provisions of this Agreement shall be subject to the following procedures: 

1. A pilot who believes that the said provisions have not been properly interpreted 

or applied as they pertain to him, may submit his request for review in writing within ten 

(10) days after receipt of the notification from the Senior Vice President - Human 

Resources, as provided in paragraph C above. The request must be sent ... to the Senior 

Vice President- Human Resources or his designee, who will review the protest and render 

a decision in writing, not later than ten ( 1 0) days following receipt of the protest. 

2. The Senior Vice President- Human Resources or his designee shall forward his 

decision to the pilot, with a copy to [ALPA]. ... Said decision shall be final and binding on 

all interested parties, unless appealed as hereinafter provided. If the decision is not 

satisfactory to either the pilot or [ALPA], then either may appeal within ten (10) days from 

the receipt of the decision, by filing a notice of appeal. Such notice shall be sent to the other 

party and the Company .... Appeal shall be directed to a Neutral Referee who shall be agreed 

upon by the pilot and [ALPA] within ten (10) days after receipt of the notice of appeal.... 

The hearing before the Neutral Referee shall be held as soon as possible and.... The 

decision of the Neutral Referee shall be final and binding on all parties to the dispute .... 

ALPA and United later renewed the Supplemental Agreement, and it remained in force throughout the entire 

period relevant to this case. 

In addition, ALPA revised its Policies and Procedures Applicable to Agency Fees in 1987 and 

distributed copies to United's nonmember employees. ALPA also attached copies to its annual Statements 

of Germane and Nongermane Expenses. The Policies and Procedures require ALPA to "prepare a 'Statement 

of Germane and Nongermane Expenses' (SGNE) which will disclose, in reasonable detail, the year's 

expenditures, segregating those theat were germane to collective bargaining from those that were not." They 

also establish a nonjudicial procedure for nonmember employees to object to ALPA's designation of 

particular agency fees as germane or nongermane in the SGNE. Because, as we discuss in more detail post, 

ALPA did not include the Eastern sympathy strike assessment in the SGNE's for the relevant periods, the 

SGNE objection procedures in the Policies and Procedures Applicable to Agency Fees are irrelevant to this 

case, and the matter is governed instead by the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, 

quoted ante. 

17 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 17 
reqUired to do so because the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction over them, and therefore it would have 

been futile to do so. In the alternative, Mr. Lancaster contends ALPA failed to provide him with 

sufficient information about the nature and purpose of the Eastern sympathy strike assessment, either 

in its SGNEs or otherwise, so that he could "present a meaningful case to the arbitrator" in support 

of his Railway Labor Act and constitutional claims. 

The courts have had no small difficulty untying the Gordian knot binding the judicial and 

nonjudicial procedures for challenging the germaneness of agency shop assessments. The Railway 

Labor Act itself does not specifically require that unions establish nonjudicial procedures to resolve 

disputes regarding such assessments. The first indication such a requirement existed came in 

Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, Local No. 1, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), in which the high court 

considered whether a public employees' union, the Chicago Teachers Union, had developed 

adequate procedural safeguards to minimize its infringement on dissenting nonmember employees' 

First Amendment rights. The Court held the union's procedure was inadequate in part because it did 

not provide for prompt, nonjudicial resolution of disputes before an impartial decision maker. !d. 

at 307. "Since the agency shop itself is 'a significant impingement on First Amendment rights,' Ellis, 

466 U.S., at 455, the government and union have a responsibility to provide procedures that 

minimize that impingement and that facilitate a nonunion employee's ability to protect his rights." 

!d. In Pilots Against Illegal Dues, we assumed Hudson also applies to agency shop arrangements 

involving private-sector unions, but declined to decide the issue. Pilots Against Rlegal Dues, 938 

F.2d at 1132. We now join our sister Circuits in holding Hudson applies in this context. See 

18 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 18 
Abrams, 59 F.3d at 1379 & n.7; Crawford, 992 F.2d at 1301. 

Contrary to ALP A's and United's contention, and contrary to the language of the collective 

bargaining agreement, the arbitrator's decision is not "final and binding on all parties to the dispute," 

i.e., it is not res judicata. Rather, the Hudson Court made it clear "[t]he arbitrator's decision would 

not receive preclusive effect in any subsequent ... action" asserting a constitutional violation, and 

ostensibly a Railway Labor Act violation as well, Hudson, 475 U.S. at 308 n.21, but that "the courts 

[would] remain available as the ultimate protectors of constitutional rights," and ostensibly the rights 

secured under the Railway Labor Act, id at 307 n.20. 

In Hudson, the high court gave no guidance on whether an objecting employee must exhaust 

the nonjudicial remedies available to him before suing in federal court.4 The only discussion of this 

issue came in Justice White's brief concurrence, in which Chief Justice Burger joined. Justice White 

wrote: 

[A ]s I understand the Court's opinion, the complaining nonmember need only 

complain; he need not exhaust internal union hearing procedures, if any, before going 

to arbitration. However, if the union provides for arbitration and complies with the 

other requirements specified in our opinion, it should be entitled to insist that the 

arbitration procedure be exhausted before resorting to the courts. 

4 The high court also gave no guidance regarding the standard of review courts should use to 

evaluate an arbitrator's decision. ALPA draws our attention to an unpublished decision from the District 

Court for the District of Columbia holding courts should review an arbitrator's factual findings for clear 

error, just as they do when reviewing decisions of magistrates, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2), and review legal 

issues de novo. Miller v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, No. 91-3161, slip op. at 12 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 1995). We 

have no occasion to decide the matter in this case, given that Mr. Lancaster concedes he failed to raise his 

Railway Labor Act and constitutional claims during arbitration, and hence there is no decision to review. 

19 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 19 
!d. at 311. The Courts of Appeals have since divided on the question. Beckett v. Air Line Pilots 

Ass'n., Int'l, 995 F.2d 280, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting split but not deciding the issue). After 

remand from the Supreme Court in Hudson, the Seventh Circuit held a dissenting employee must 

exhaust all available nonjudicial remedies provided those remedies are adequate under the criteria 

established by the Supreme Court. Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union, Int'l, 922 F .2d 1306, 1314 

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1230 (1991). Although we have never squarely decided the issue, 

we expressed our general agreement with the Seventh Circuit's position in Pilots Against fllegal 

Dues by observing that "[t]he Hudson procedural scheme evidently contemplates that challenges to 

agency fee determinations will be reviewed initially through an arbitration procedure." Pilots 

Against Illegal Dues, 938 F.2d at 1133. The Sixth Circuit, however, struck down a union's 

requirement that dissenting employees exhaust nonjudicial remedies as a condition precedent to their 

right to file an action in federal court, because the requirement "unduly imp lie[ d] a limitation" on 

the employees' constitutional rights. Tierneyv. City ofToledo, 917 F.2d 927,939-40 (6th Cir. 1990). 

We now conclude the Seventh Circuit's holding in Hudson was correct and adopt it as the 

law of this Circuit. First, because a unanimous Supreme Court joined Justice Stevens' opinion in 

Hudson, it is this opinion only that is binding on this court. Accord, United States v. Harpole, 263 

F.2d 71, 80 (5th Cir.) (where the majority has spoken, dissenting opinions are "of course, entitled 

to no weight as a precedent"), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 838 (1959). Nevertheless, although we are not 

bound by the concurring opinion of Justice White, in which Chief Justice Burger joined, we view 

it as carrying the same precedential weight as Supreme Court dicta to the extent it is consistent with 

the majority opinion. As such, we will not disregard it without a significant reason for doing so. 

20 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 20 
Gajlor v. United States,_ F.3d __, 1996 WL 23149 *2 (lOth Cir. Jan. 23, 1996) ("this court 

considers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court's outright holdings, 

particularly when the dicta is recent and not enfeebled by later statements"); Alston v. Redman, 34 

F.3d 1237, 1246 (3d Cir. 1994) (although language in Supreme Court's opinion is dicta, "we must 

consider it with deference, given the High Court's paramount position in our 'three-tier system of 

federal courts,' ... and its limited docket"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1122 (1995); Hendricks County 

Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. NL.R.B., 627 F.2d 766,768 n.l (7th Cir. 1980) ("A dictum in a 

Supreme Court opinion may be brushed aside by the Supreme Court as dictum when the exact 

question is later presented, but it cannot be treated lightly by inferior federal courts until disavowed 

by the Supreme Court."), rev'd on other grounds, 454 U.S. 170 (1981). We find no such reason here. 

Second, the practical appeal of the Seventh Circuit's approach is obvious and compelling. Were we 

to hold there is no exhaustion requirement, "the procedure spawned by the Supreme Court [in 

Hudson would be] largely a waste of time and money." Bromley v. Michigan Educ. Ass 'n-NEA, 843 

F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (E.D. Mich. 1994). Furthermore, we would more often be forced to 

micromanage the fee calculation in every case challenging a union assessment, which "would place 

an overwhelming and unrealistic burden on the courts," Hudson, 922 F.2d at 1314, and force us to 

entangle ourselves in disputes which the union itself might have been able to resolve without judicial 

intervention, De troy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F .2d 75, 79 (2d Cir.) ("The possibility 

that corrective action within the union will render a member's complaint moot suggests that, in the 

interest of conserving judicial resources, no court step in before the union is given its opportunity. 

Moreover, courts may find valuable the assistance provided by prior consideration of issues by 

appellate union tribunals."), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961). 

21 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 21 
Our conclusion that a dissenting employee must exhaust available nonjudicial remedies, 

provided they satisfy the criteria the high court announced in Hudson, is only the beginning of our 

inquiry. We must now determine whether a dissenting employee who, like Mr. Lancaster, has not 

fully exhausted the available nonjudicial remedies is barred from raising his unexhausted claims in 

federal court. We took a very pragmatic approach to the question in Pilots Against fllegal Dues. 

In that case, ALP A failed to provide a nonjudicial procedure for challenging agency fees, as required 

under Hudson, for 1984. We held it would be "redundant ... to order the matter to be submitted to 

an arbitrator" because the district court had already considered and resolved the germaneness issue 

on the merits and there was no indication the dissenting employees had incurred damages because 

of the lack of arbitration. Pilots Against fllegal Dues, 938 F.2d at 1133. In Beckett, the District of 

Columbia Circuit cited Pilots Against fllegal Dues with approval and rejected ALP A's contention 

the plaintiff employees were barred from raising their unexhausted claims in federal court, because 

"[w]hile this position may have merit, to remand for arbitration at this late stage would only yield 

futile swink." Beckett, 59 F.3d at 1278 n.3. 

The clear teaching of Pilots Against fllegal Dues and Beckett is that an employee who fails 

to exhaust the nonjudicial remedies available to him is not absolutely barred from asserting his 

unexhausted claims in federal court, but that the courts have discretion to decide those claims on the 

merits under appropriate circumstances. There is nothing novel about this conclusion. It is well 

established that the courts have discretion to excuse an employee's failure to exhaust nonjudicial 

remedies before filing an action alleging breach of a collective bargaining agreement under § 301 

of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Clayton v. International Union, 451 U.S. 

22 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 22 
679, 689 (1981 ). In deciding whether to do so, courts should consider, among other things, 

first, whether the union officials are so hostile to the employee that he could not hope 

to obtain a fair hearing on his claim; second, whether the internal union appeals 

procedures would be inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or to 

award him the full relief he seeks ... ; and third, whether exhaustion of internal 

procedures would unreasonably delay the employee's opportunity to obtain a judicial 

hearing on the merits of his claim. 

Clayton, 451 U.S. at 689. The courts also have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement in 

actions by employees to determine their pension rights under the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. 

Co., 40 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing cases), and in actions under§ 101(a) of the Labor 

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, commonly referred to as the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 

U.S.C. § 411(a), see, e.g., Chapa v. Local18, 737 F.2d 929,931 (11th Cir. 1984); Bright v. Taylor, 

554 F.2d 854,860 (8th Cir. 1977); Simmons v. Avisco, Local713, 350 F.2d 1012, 1016 & n.7 (4th 

Cir. 1965) (noting ample precedent for excusing exhaustion requirement); Detroy, 286 F.2d at 81. 

There is also an extensive body of authority in the state courts holding there are exceptions to the 

exhaustion requirement in actions alleging a union breached its bylaws or constitution. Martin H. 

Malin, Individual Rights Within the Union 28-30 (1988) (summarizing exceptions and citing cases). 

We see no reason to apply a different rule in cases like the one now before us. Accord Frandsen v. 

Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 782 F.2d 674, 684-86 & n.IO (7th Cir. 1986) ("the 

exhaustion of intra-union remedies by a railroad employee is governed by the same general 

principles set forth by the Supreme Court in other labor cases."). 

ALP A and United urge us to conclude the Railway Labor Act itself precludes the courts from 

23 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 23 
excusing a dissenting nonmember employee's failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies. We reject 

this contention for a number of reasons. First, the issue in this case is not whether the Railway Labor 

Act requires objecting nonmember employees to exhaust available nonjudicial remedies, but whether 

such a procedural requirement is consistent with the First Amendment as interpreted in Hudson. 

Therefore, although we consider the statutory and federal common law governing the exhaustion of 

nonjudicial remedies in the labor context to be highly relevant, that law is not directly applicable to 

this case. Second, ALP A's and United's contention would overly limit the courts' authority, which 

would conflict with the Supreme Court's designation of them as the "ultimate protectors of 

constitutional rights" in cases such as the one now before us. Hudson, 415 U.S. at 307 n.20. Third, 

ALP A's and United's position directly conflicts with the pragmatic, discretionary approach we used 

in Pilots Against Illegal Dues and that the District of Columbia Circuit used in Beckett. Finally, 

even if the Railway Labor Act's procedural requirements applied, ALP A's and United's contention 

would remain unavailing. The Railway Labor Act establishes a nonjudicial procedure for resolving 

disputes between an employee and a carrier that arise out of the interpretation or application of the 

collective bargaining agreement "concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." 45 U.S.C. 

§ 153, First (i); 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-185 (providing§ 3 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153, 

does not apply to air carriers but prescribing comparable procedures); Frandsen, 782 F.2d at 685; 

Kaschak v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 707 F.2d 902, 904-905 (6th Cir. 1983). Such disagreements 

are commonly referred to as "minor disputes." The board of adjustment has exclusive jurisdiction 

over minor disputes, Slocum v. Delaware L. & WR. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 244 (1950), and "an 

employee may not forego resort to the Board and opt to have a dispute with a carrier considered, in 

the first instance, by a federal court." Kaschak, 101 F.2d at 905; see Bowe v. Northwest Airlines, 

24 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 24 
Inc.~ 974 F.2d 101, 103 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 992 (1993). Under certain 

circumstances, however, courts may take jurisdiction over nonminor disputes without requiring 

exhaustion of nonjudicial remedies. Frandsen, 782 F .2d at 685. Although, as we discuss more fully 

post, the collective bargaining agreement applies to this dispute in the sense that it requires United 

to terminate nonmember employees who fail to pay chargeable assessments and gives the arbitrator 

jurisdiction to determine whether a given assessment is legally chargeable, the dispute actually arises 

not out of the collective bargaining agreement, but out of the Railway Labor Act and the federal 

Constitution. At least in this narrow context, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that a dispute arising 

out of the statutory and constitutional relationship between an employee and a carrier, rather than 

the collective bargaining agreement, is "by definition 'non-minor."' Frandsen, 782 F.2d at 685. 

Although the adjustment board is "[a]n agency especially competent and specifically designated to 

deal with" minor disputes arising out of collective bargaining agreements, Order of Ry. Conductors 

of America v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 567 (1946); see Slocum, 339 U.S. at 243-244, in cases like that 

now before us, which are governed by the statutes and Constitution of the United States, the 

adjustment board's expertise in such matters is not needed. 

In light of the foregoing, the issue in this case is whether Mr. Lancaster's failure to exhaust 

available remedies should be excused. Mr. Lancaster contends his failure to exhaust should be 

excused because it would have been futile for him to raise his Railway Labor Act and constitutional 

claims during arbitration, given that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction over his claims. This 

contention lacks merit for two reasons. First, although Mr. Lancaster's Railway Labor Act and 

constitutional claims are not minor disputes over which the adjustment board had exclusive 

25 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 25 
jurisdiction, the arbitrator did indeed have jurisdiction over them. The question is not whether the 

dispute was minor, but whether Mr. Lancaster contracted to arbitrate his claims, because it is well 

established a party cannot be required to arbitrate a matter unless he has contracted to do so. First 

Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,_ U.S._,_, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995); AT & T 

Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). Although 

Mr. Lancaster is not a member of ALPA, the collective bargaining agreement, including the 

Supplemental Agreement governing agency fee arbitration, quoted in footnote 3 ante, is binding on 

him. Martin H. Malin, The Legal Status of Union Security Fee Arbitration After Chicago Teachers 

Union v. Hudson, 29 B.C. L. Rev. 857, 878 (1988) ("The collective bargaining agreement ... binds 

all employees, regardless of membership status."). Mr. Lancaster does not argue to the contrary. 

The Supplemental Agreement specifically provides that "[a] protest by a pilot who is to be 

discharged as the result of an interpretation or application of the provisions of this Agreement shall 

be subject to" the arbitration procedures prescribed therein. The Supplemental Agreement requires 

United to terminate any pilot "who is required under this Agreement to make payment of a service 

charge." United obviously cannot terminate a pilot for failing to pay an assessment he is not legally 

required to pay. Thus, the arbitrator has the authority to determine whether the pilot can legally be 

required to pay the assessment in question under the Railway Labor Act and the Constitution. In our 

view, this language is unambiguous, and therefore we need look no further to determine its meaning. 

See Volkman v. United Transportation Union, 73 F.3d 1047, _, 1996 WL 10926, *3 (lOth Cir. 

1996) ("If the language of the [collective bargaining] agreement is unambiguous, it may be construed 

as a matter of law without resort to extrinsic evidence of intent."). Indeed, even if the Supplemental 

Agreement were susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we would be required to 

26 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 26 
choose an interpretation that would make the agreement constitutional. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. 

Delmar Co., 283 U.S. 686,691 (1931) ("where two constructions of a written contract are possible, 

preference will be given to that which does not result in violation of law"); Moffat Tunnel 

Improvement Dist. v. Denver & Salt Lake Ry. Co., 45 F.2d 715, 733 (lOth Cir. 1930) ("it is 

fundamental that if a clause in a contract is fairly susceptible of two constructions, the court will not 

give it that construction which devitalizes the clause or the contract"), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 837 

(1931 ); 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 546, at 170 (1960) ("it is very commonly stated that 

when the terms of agreement have two possible interpretations, by one of which the agreement 

would create a valid contract and by the other it would be void or illegal, the former will be 

preferred") (footnote omitted). Unless ALPA's arbitration procedures provide a nonjudicial 

mechanism for dissenting nonmember employees to object to the chargeability of an assessment 

under the Railway Labor Act and the Constitution, they would run afoul of Hudson. We would 

therefore be required to interpret it as giving the arbitrator the authority to decide such issues. 

Second, even if the arbitrator had lacked jurisdiction to provide Mr. Lancaster complete relief as to 

all ofhis claims, Mr. Lancaster would not necessarily be excused from presenting all of his claims 

to the arbitrator. Frandsen, 782 F.2d at 683. An employee should ~rdinarily place his entire case 

before the arbitrator because doing so "may produce genuine compromise" between the employee 

and the union despite the arbitrator's inability to provide complete relief, because it may persuade 

the employee "that a claim is not is not so strong as it might have seemed" and dissuade him from 

undergoing the expense of litigation, and because it may, if the procedure is perceived as fair, "have 

a conciliatory or therapeutic value that lessens the employee's perceived need to file suit." Id 

27 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 27 
Mr. Lancaster also contends he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement because 

ALP A failed to provide him with sufficient information about the nature and purpose of the Eastern 

strike assessment, either in its SGNE or otherwise, so that he could "present a meaningful case to 

the arbitrator" in support of his Railway Labor Act and constitutional claims. Both the First 

Amendment and "[b]asic considerations of fairness" require unions to provide employees with 

enough information so that they can determine whether to object to a given assessment. Hudson, 

475 U.S. at 306-07; Pilots Against fllegal Dues, 938 F.2d at 1132. "The Union need not provide 

nonmembers with an exhaustive and detailed list of all its expenditures, but adequate disclosure 

surely would include major categories of expenses." Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307 n.l8. To illustrate 

the degree of specificity required, the high court stated that in order to provide adequate notice 

regarding a union's payment to its affiliated labor organizations, the notice must, at the very least, 

contain "either a showing that none of it was used to subsidize activities for which nonmembers may 

not be charged, or an explanation of the share that was so used." /d. In a related context, one Court 

of Appeals has held that Hudson requires unions to inform employees that they have a right to object 

to an agency fee under federal law, not merely under applicable union policies, and to correctly 

inform the employees what agency fees are chargeable under the applicable federal law. Abrams v. 

Communications Workers of America, 59 F.3d 1373, 1379-1380 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Tierney 

v. City of Toledo, 824 F.2d 1497, 1506 (6th Cir. 1987) ("The plan is also procedurally deficient ... 

because it does not contain adequate constitutional procedures enabling non-members to make their 

objections known. A non-union member reading the proposed rules would simply not know how 

to make a prompt and effective objection."). 

28 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 28 
ALP A concedes it did not account for the Eastern sympathy strike assessments in its SONEs 

for 1989 and 1990. It contends, however, that "[n]onmembers did not require ... a description of the 

Eastern Assessment because, beginning in May 1989, ALPA sent each nonmember monthly 

statements stating, as a separate item, exactly how much the nonmember owed for the assessment." 

This monthly statement, however, described the charge merely as the "EAL ASSESSMENT" and 

specified the month to which the assessment applied. The statement gave no indication whether the 

assessment was germane to collective bargaining. ALP A also asserts it "repeatedly informed pilots, 

including [Mr. Lancaster], that the Eastern Assessment would fund strike benefits to the Eastern 

pilots and that ALP A considered the benefits (as well as expenses relating to the Eastern strike) to 

be chargeable." We view this contention as specious. ALP A provided this assertedly 

constitutionally sufficient notice to nonmember employees not through an official notice 

summarizing the purpose and germaneness of the assessment and instructing them how and when 

to object, but through a series of short news blurbs in Air Line Pilot magazine. These news blurbs 

fall well short of the constitutional and "fairness" requirements of Hudson, and, perhaps more 

glaringly, fall well short of the thorough and carefully crafted notice contained in ALP A's SONEs 

for the relevant periods. Because ALP A failed to comply with the notice requirement of Hudson, 

it would be unfair to penalize Mr. Lancaster for failing to comply with Hudson's requirement that 

he exhaust available nonjudicial remedies before bringing his action in federal court. 

Third, ALPA and United contend Mr. Lancaster is not entitled to relief because he failed to 

notify ALP A of his objection to the sympathy strike assessment as required in its "Policies and 

Procedures Applicable to Agency Fees." We have held, however, that ALPA's Policies and 

29 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 29 
Procedures do not apply to the Eastern strike assessment, but only to assessments accounted for in 

its SGNEs, and that the procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreement apply instead. 

See footnote 3, ante. Even if we recast ALP A's contention as being that Mr. Lancaster failed to 

provide it with adequate notice of his objection by not raising his Railway Labor Act and 

constitutional claims during arbitration in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, it 

remains unavailing. It is true that a dissenting employee must notify the union of his objection. 

Allen, 373 U.S. at 118-19; Street, 367 U.S. at 774. However, "[t]he nonmember's 'burden' is simply 

the obligation to make his objection known." Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306 n.16. The Supreme Court 

addressed the notice requirement in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 241 (1977), 

in which the Michigan Court of Appeals held the objecting employee plaintiffs were not entitled to 

recover any portion of their agency fees used to further the union's political goals because they had 

failed to allege that they notified the union of the political candidates and issues to which they 

objected. Abood, 431 U.S. at 215. The Supreme Court disagreed and held: 

[I]n holding that as a prerequisite to any relief each [objecting employee] must 

indicate to the Union the specific expenditures to which he objects, the Court of 

Appeals ignored the clear holding of Allen. As in Allen, the employees here 

indicated in their pleadings that they opposed ideological expenditures of any sort 

that are unrelated to collective bargaining. To require greater specificity would 

confront an individual employee with the dilemma of relinquishing either his right 

to withhold his support of ideological causes to which he objects or his freedom to 

maintain his own beliefs without public disclosure. It would also place on each 

employee the considerable burden of monitoring all of the numerous and shifting 

expenditures made by the Union that are unrelated to its duties as exclusive 

bargaining representative. 

Abood, 4 31 U.S. at 241 (emphasis in the original). Mr. Lancaster identified the assessment to which 

he objected-- the Eastern sympathy strike assessment-- in his federal complaint. Therefore, it 

would seem, under Abood, his failure to notify ALPA of his objection during arbitration, in itself, 

30 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 30 
does not bar his action in federal court. 

There is one crucial distinction between Abood and the case now before us: the union in 

Abood had not established a nonjudicial procedure for challenging agency fees at the time the federal 

complaint was filed, Abood, 431 U.S. at 240 & n.41, while ALP A did so in the collective bargaining 

agreement. A number of post-Hudson decisions have held dissenting employees must notify the 

union of their objection before filing suit if such a procedure is in place. See, e.g., Lowary v. 

Lexington Local Bd. ofEduc., 903 F.2d 422,430 (6th Cir.) ("Normally, assuming valid objection 

procedure, dissent will not be presumed--it must be affirmatively asserted to the union."), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990). We agree that if the union establishes a constitutionally adequate 

objection procedure, which it must after Hudson, and the procedure requires employees to notify the 

union of their objection within a specific time or lose the right to take advantage of it, the employee 

must either comply or risk dismissal of a subsequent federal action for failure to exhaust nonjudicial 

remedies. To borrow a phrase from then Justice Rehnquist, dissenting employees "must take the 

bitter with the sweet." Arnettv. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974) (plurality opinion ofRehnquist, 

J.). In all events, however, an employee is not obligated to comply with the union's notice 

requirement until and unless the employee himself receives adequate notice under Hudson. Weaver 

v. University of Cincinnati, 970 F.2d 1523, 1532 (6th Cir. 1992) ("Until Hudson's requirements are 

satisfied, an employee who does not object to paying for nonchargeable items will be allowed 

subsequent opportunities to object."), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 917 (1993); Lowary, 903 F.2d at 430 

(employee's failure to object excused because union's procedures were inadequate under Hudson); 

Tierney, 824 F .2d at 1506 (procedure violated Hudson in part because it requires members "to object 

31 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 31 
... whether or not there has been a constitutionally adequate disclosure"). Because Mr. Lancaster did 

not receive adequate notice under Hudson before he began pursuing his nonjudicial remedies, he is 

excused from exhausting ALP A's nonjudicial procedures, including the requirement he notify the 

union of his objection before filing suit. 

Finally, ALPA and United contend Mr. Lancaster's claims are barred by the applicable statute 

of limitations, because his cause of action accrued in May 1989, but he did not file his action in 

district court until December 1993. The six-month statute of limitations governing actions for 

breach of the duty of fair representation applies to actions under § 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor 

Act and the First and Fifth Amendments. Pilots Against Illegal Dues, 938 F.2d at 1134; Crawford 

v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 870 F.2d 155, 159 (4th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 992 F.2d 1295, 1302 (4th Cir. 

1993) (en bane). We stated in Pilots Against illegal Dues that the limitation period begins to run 

when the objecting employee is "in possession of the facts underlying a possible claim against the 

union." Pilots Against fllegal Dues, 938 at 1134. Reading Pilots Against lllegal Dues together with 

Hudson's requirement that unions provide nonmember employees with enough information that they 

can determine whether to object to a given assessment, Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306-307, and our 

conclusion ante that an employee is not required to pursue nonjudicial remedies until and unless he 

receives constitutionally sufficient notice under Hudson, we conclude the statute of limitations 

period does not begin to run until the employee receives such notice. If the objecting employee 

thereafter pursues his nonjudicial remedies in good faith, the limitations period is tolled until the 

nonjudicial proceedings are completed. Crawford, 870 F.2d at 159; see Volkman, 73 F.3d at_, 

1996 WL 10926, *8 ("ordinarily, a plaintiff must exhaust internal union appeals before filing suit, 

32 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 32 
and the statute oflimitations is tolled during those appeals"); Lucas v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 

909 F.2d 419,421-422 (lOth Cir. 1990) ("in duty-of-fair-representation cases in which the alleged 

breach of duty arises outside the context of processing a grievance, courts have held that accrual of 

such a claim can be tolled by an employee's good faith attempt to exhaust the grievance 

procedures"). This is so even if the employee's arbitration claim was futile because the arbitrator 

lacked authority to provide complete relief. Frandsen, 782 F.2d at 681-84 (7th Cir. 1986). Thus, 

even if we accept ALP A's and United's contention the limitation period began running in May 1989, 

it was tolled until July 1993, when the arbitrator issued his decision, and Mr. Lancaster's federal 

action was timely.5 

v 

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the cause is 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

s Neither ALPA nor United contend Mr. Lancaster acted in bad faith or that his grievance was 

untimely under the procedures outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. We therefore express no 

opinion whether the limitation period would have been tolled under such circumstances. 

33 

Appellate Case: 94-1467 Document: 01019277332 Date Filed: 02/21/1996 Page: 33