Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-10016/USCOURTS-ca11-14-10016-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
T. Deemer
Appellee
V. King
Appellee
Glenn R. Morris
Appellee
C. Garrett Sanchez
Appellee
Glenn C. Smith
Appellant
G. Wellhausen
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-10016

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-02148-SDM-TGW

GLENN C. SMITH, 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

SGT. T. DEEMER,

in his individual capacity, 

C. GARRETT SANCHEZ, 

in her individual and official capacities, 

V. KING, 

in his individual and official capacities, 

G. WELLHAUSEN, 

in his individual and official capacities, 

GLENN R. MORRIS, 

in his individual and official capacities, 

 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(January 11, 2016)

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Glenn Smith, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s 

sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging procedural and 

substantive due process violations. He argues that the district court improperly 

analyzed his claims. After careful consideration, we affirm. 

I.

We review de novo a 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) sua sponte dismissal for 

failure to state a claim,1 taking the allegations in the complaint as true. Leal v. Ga. 

Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). To avoid 

dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). 

However, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard. Tannenbaum v. 

United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).

To prevail on a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate both (1) that the 

defendant deprived [him] of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law 

and (2) that such a deprivation occurred under color of state law.” Bingham v. 

 1 The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires courts to screen in forma pauperis prisoner litigation

and dismiss any action that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b).

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Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quotation omitted) 

(alteration adopted). In turn, a claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

Due Process Clause must concern a protected interest, such as the deprivation of 

liberty. See Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1317–18 (11thCir. 1999). This is a 

threshold inquiry in considering a due process claim.

A prisoner’s liberty interest under the Due Process Clause is necessarily 

circumscribed “by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully 

committed.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2975 (1974). 

Thus, an inmate validly claims the violation of a protected liberty interest when he 

identifies state actions that unexpectedly alter his term of imprisonment or impose 

an atypical and significant hardship relative to ordinary prison life. See Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995).

A hallmark example of action that unexpectedly alters an inmate’s term of 

imprisonment is the revocation of good-time credit. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555–

58, 94 S. Ct. at 2974–76 (holding that loss of good-time credit implicates a 

protected liberty interest). Atypical and significant hardship exists when the 

confinement at issue presents a dramatic departure from the ordinary conditions of 

prison life. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485–86, 115 S. Ct. at 2301.

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II.

Smith claimed procedural and substantive due process violations related to a 

prison disciplinary hearing for “disorderly conduct” and a resulting fifteen-day 

period of disciplinary confinement.2

 He alleged that both (1) Florida 

Administrative Code Rule 33-601.307(3), which restricts the presentation of live 

witness testimony in prison disciplinary hearings, and (2) Florida Administrative 

Code Rule 33-601.314, 9-17, which outlines the acceptable punishment for 

“disorderly conduct” by prisoners, are facially unconstitutional, and their 

application violated his substantive due process rights. In addition, Smith alleged 

the following procedural due process claims: (1) he was denied live witness 

testimony at the disciplinary hearing without a valid explanation; (2) he was not 

allowed to introduce testimony developed after the hearing; (3) the written finding 

of guilt from the hearing was legally inadequate; and (4) insufficient evidence

supported the guilty finding.

After the hearing, Smith was sentenced to 15 days of disciplinary 

confinement. Though a Florida inmate may lose up to 60 days of good-time credit

for “disorderly conduct,” see Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-601.314, 9-17 (2015), Smith 

did not lose any credit. Thus, in order to show that a protected liberty interest was 

 2 Smith mixes a period of administrative confinement just before his disciplinary hearing into his 

claims. His combined stay in both administrative and disciplinary confinement lasted

approximately thirty days.

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threatened, Smith alleged various hardships associated with his confinement. He 

asserted that he was confined to a relatively small cell with a cellmate who had not 

been screened for compatibility; the cell felt cold, partly because he is “particularly 

cold sensitive”; cell lighting generally remained on from early morning until late at 

night; he was deprived of some personal property, including medicated shampoo; 

he had fewer changes of clothing and opportunities to shower than the regular 

prison population; he was not provided a toothbrush and toothpaste; the meals 

were mostly no longer hot when they arrived; he could not lock a storage area in 

the cell; out-of-cell time was limited; library access was restricted; he had no 

telephone or television access; and he had no writing surface in his cell.

The district court sua sponte dismissed Smith’s complaint for failure to state 

a claim. The court applied the liberty-interest analysis prescribed by Sandin—

rather than the Wolff requirements—because Smith had not lost any good-time 

credit. It concluded that the conditions alleged by Smith did not rise to the sort of 

“atypical, significant deprivation” of liberty outlined by Sandin, and that no liberty 

interest protected by the Due Process Clause was therefore implicated.

Smith moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied on the 

same reasoning. Smith timely appealed.

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III.

As to the legal standard, the district court properly applied the Sandin

analysis rather than using the procedures described in Wolff. Wolff states that a 

set of procedures must accompany disciplinary hearings when they result in a loss 

of good-time credit. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556–58, 563–71, 94 S. Ct. at 2975–76, 

2978–82. However, when a prisoner has not lost any good-time credit (as here), 

Wolff does not apply. Instead, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process 

Clause may be alleged as described in Sandin. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S. 

Ct. at 2300. But the Due Process Clause “does not protect every change in the 

conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner.” 

Id. at 478, 115 S. Ct. at 2297.

Smith has failed to allege conditions that impose an “atypical and significant 

hardship” relative to ordinary prison life. Id. at 484, 115 S. Ct. at 2300. His 

complaints, though numerous, are neither severe enough nor of such duration as to 

constitute violations of a protected liberty interest. Most amount to mere 

inconveniences, especially viewed in light of their short duration. See Hutto v. 

Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 2571 (1978) (“[T]he length of 

confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets 

constitutional standards.”).

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Generally, atypical and significant hardships must exist for a significant 

period of time. Compare Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, 115 S. Ct. at 2301 (30 days of 

administrative confinement was not an atypical and significant hardship), and

Rodgers v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (60 days

of administrative confinement was not an atypical and significant hardship), with

Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1282 (11th Cir. 2004) (500 days of solitary 

confinement was sufficient), and Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 n.3 (11th 

Cir. 1996) (one year of solitary confinement was sufficient). The conditions 

alleged by Smith continued for, at most, approximately 30 days. Indeed, his 

disciplinary confinement lasted for only 15 days.

Atypical and significant hardships must also be severe relative to regular 

prison. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223–24, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 

2394 (2005) (prisoner was confined indefinitely in a cell illuminated twenty-four 

hours per day, deprived of almost all human contact, allowed to exercise for only 

one hour per day in a small indoor room, and disqualified from parole 

consideration); Magluta, 375 F.3d at 1282 (prisoner was kept in “an extremely 

small, closet-sized space” and deprived of almost any human contact). Smith’s 

alleged deprivations—of things like a writing surface, a lock for his storage bin, 

and a television—do not represent such “dramatic departure[s]” from ordinary 

prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S. Ct. at 2301.

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Smith’s complaint did not allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for

relief. His disciplinary hearing resulted in no loss of good-time credit, and the 

conditions he alleged do not constitute an atypical and severe hardship. Thus, 

Smith’s substantive and procedural due process claims fail to implicate a 

constitutionally protected liberty interest. We AFFIRM the district court’s ruling. 

AFFIRMED.

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