Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-24-11105/USCOURTS-ca11-24-11105-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Codey Allen Bates
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11105

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CODEY ALLEN BATES, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:23-cr-80123-RLR-1

____________________

USCA11 Case: 24-11105 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2025 Page: 1 of 5
2 Opinion of the Court 24-11105

Before BRANCH,GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Codey Allen Bates appeals his sentence of 324 months’ imprisonment for production of child pornography. On appeal, Bates 

argues that the court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence because it ignored relevant § 3553(a) factors, such as his history and characteristics, including his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) and borderline intellectual functioning diagnoses, the kinds of sentences available, and his likelihood to 

reoffend.

We consider the substantive reasonableness of a sentence 

under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Where, as here, procedural reasonableness is not at issue, we will measure substantive reasonableness 

by considering the totality of the circumstances and whether the 

sentence achieves the sentencing purposes stated in § 3553(a). 

United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009). The 

weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the 

sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Clay, 483 

F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). However, “a district court abuses its 

discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to 

an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of 

judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 

612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks 

USCA11 Case: 24-11105 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2025 Page: 2 of 5
24-11105 Opinion of the Court 3

omitted). The court “commits a clear error of judgment when it 

considers the proper factors but balances them unreasonably.” Id. 

Under § 3553(a), the district court must impose a sentence 

“sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence, and protect 

the public from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the district court 

must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the 

history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences 

available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy 

statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). The court, however, need 

not “discuss or state each factor explicitly” and must only 

acknowledge that it considered the § 3553(a) factors in its decision. 

United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). The 

failure to discuss mitigating factors cited by the defendant does not 

indicate that the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider 

this evidence.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 

2007).

We will not second guess the weight that the district court 

gave to a § 3553(a) factor so long as the sentence is reasonable in 

light of all the circumstances. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 

1191 (11th Cir. 2008). The district court is permitted to attach great 

weight to one § 3553(a) factor over others. United States v. 

USCA11 Case: 24-11105 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2025 Page: 3 of 5
4 Opinion of the Court 24-11105

Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013). After evaluating for 

reasonableness, we will only vacate a defendant’s sentence if we 

are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court 

committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 636 (quotation marks omitted). “The party challenging a sentence has the 

burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the 

entire record, § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 

F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).

Furthermore, we “ordinarily expect a sentence within the 

Guidelines range to be reasonable.” Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. A

sentence that is below the statutory maximum punishment is an 

indicator of reasonableness. United States v. Hunt, 941 F.3d 1259, 

1264 (11th Cir. 2019). The maximum sentence for production of 

child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) is 360 months. 

18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Bates to 324 months’ imprisonment because it properly 

weighed the § 3553(a) factors. Overstreet, 713 F.3d at 636; Pugh, 515 

F.3d at 1191. Bates’s argument that the district court ignored relevant § 3553(a) factors such as his history and characteristics and the 

kinds of sentences available is unavailing, as the court expressly 

considered Dr. Brannon’s analysis of Bates’s condition when it discussed “[his] history and characteristics,” and weighed Bates’s 

USCA11 Case: 24-11105 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2025 Page: 4 of 5
24-11105 Opinion of the Court 5

requested 180-month sentence against the severity of the crime. 

Overstreet, 713 F.3d at 636. Specifically, the court explained that it 

did not find Bates’s characteristics to be grounds for a downward 

variance from a child-pornography crime “for all of the reasons that 

are set forth under the law in the [§] 3553 factors.” Even if the court 

had not addressed the mitigating factors that Bates cited in his argument, the court’s silence would not have resulted in his sentence 

being unreasonable. Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 833. Bates’s argument 

that the court was unreasonable in imposing a 324-month sentence 

when a 180-month sentence would suffice also fails, as the court 

found that the requested 180-month sentence did not reflect the 

seriousness of his crime. Overstreet, 713 F.3d at 638. Finally, Bates’s 

324-month sentence was the low end of his guideline range and below the 360-month statutory maximum, both of which are indicative of its reasonableness. Hunt, 941 F.3d at 1264; Gonzalez, 550 

F.3d at 1324. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s imposition of 

Bates’ sentence. 

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 24-11105 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2025 Page: 5 of 5