Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01328/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01328-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jaime Arias-Maldonado
Petitioner
Superior Court, County of Santa Clara
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAIME ARIAS-MALDONADO,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF 

SANTA CLARA,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-01328-EMC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Docket Nos. 1, 5, 9, 12, 13

I. INTRODUCTION

Jaime Arias-Maldonado, an inmate at the Santa Clara County Jail, filed this pro se civil 

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His initial pleading is now before the Court for review 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. His miscellaneous motions also are before the Court for review.

II. BACKGROUND

This action was opened when Mr. Arias-Maldonado filed a document entitled “Motion To 

Safeguard Civil Rights Of Pretrial Detainee.” Docket No. 1. Mr. Arias-Maldonado later filed a 

document entitled “Complaint Violation Of Civil Rights – Second Filing Attempt,” Docket No. 

14, in which he explains that he erroneously sent his original civil rights complaint to the Santa 

Clara County Superior Court’s criminal division and was now making a second attempt to file it in 

the correct court. Id. at 4. He also states that this Court already had a copy of his complaint filed 

on March 12, 2019, and therefore he did not attach a copy of it to his “Second Filing Attempt.” 

Id. The only document he filed on March 12, 2019, is the “Motion To Safeguard Civil Rights Of 

Pretrial Detainee.” Docket No. 1. The Court treats the “Motion To Safeguard Civil Rights Of 

Pretrial Detainee” as the operative pleading because the “Second Filing Attempt” document 

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explains an earlier filing error but does not contain any legal claims for relief. Mr. AriasMaldonado’s filings are hardly models of clarity.

Mr. Arias-Maldonado alleges in his “Motion To Safeguard Civil Rights Of Pretrial 

Detainee” that he is being denied his right to adequately represent himself in criminal proceedings 

now pending against him in the Santa Clara County Superior Court. Docket No. 1 at 1-2. The 

details as to how he is being denied his ability to engage in self-representation are confusing.

Mr. Arias-Maldonado alleges that he was arrested and charged with sexual battery of a 

minor, even though the child said that he was not the perpetrator. He also alleged that the charge 

was unfairly changed later to lewd or lascivious conduct on a minor, see Cal. Penal Code § 288(a). 

His demurrer to the new charge was overruled by the trial court; the California Court of Appeal 

and California Supreme Court denied his petitions challenging that ruling. Id. at 4. 

Mr. Arias-Maldonado further alleges that he is facing a charge of petty theft on “a totally 

different matter” in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, for which counsel was appointed to 

represent him. Id. Mr. Arias-Maldonado allegedly wanted to represent himself but his desire was 

not communicated to the court for a hundred days by the jail legal services coordinator, 

“result[ing] in the virtual denial of the pro se’s self-representation” rights and privileges. Id. The 

appointed attorney allegedly did an inadequate job representing Mr. Arias-Maldonado. Id. 

There allegedly were problems at the preliminary hearing on one of the charges. Mr. 

Arias-Maldonado’s several pro se motions have been denied without written comment. Id. at 5. 

Mr. Arias-Maldonado asks that the lewd-conduct charge be dismissed because of various 

problems in that case, such as the allegedly unlawful field show-up, the constructive amendment 

to the charges against him, the unavailability of a magistrate for a probable cause hearing, denial 

of adequate self-representation privileges, withholding of evidence, and denial of experts needed 

to aid the defense at trial. Id. at 9-10. 

In addition to his “Motion To Safeguard Civil Rights Of Pretrial Detainee,” Mr. AriasMaldonado has filed other documents that appear to seek federal court authorization to represent 

himself in the state court criminal proceedings and for pro per privileges at the jail to make that 

self-representation more effective. See Docket Nos. 8, 9, 10, 12. He also filed a motion to stay 

Case 3:19-cv-01328-EMC Document 16 Filed 09/04/19 Page 2 of 8
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which is difficult to understand; for example, the document alleges that the federal court document 

entitled “stay injunctive relief,” the purpose of which is unclear, but apparently seeks a stay of the 

state court criminal case. Docket No. 13. The document also alleges that his “pro se rights and 

privileges were terminated by a superior court clerk’s order,” id. at 2, which suggests he was not 

allowed to proceed pro per in his state court criminal proceedings. 

III. DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 

claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). 

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

A. Claims Seeking Interference With State Court Criminal Case

Under principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not interfere with 

ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief absent 

extraordinary circumstances. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). Requests for 

declaratory relief that would interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings are subject to the 

same restrictions that govern requests for injunctive relief. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 

71–74 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 86 n. 2 (1971). 

Younger requires that federal courts refrain from enjoining or otherwise interfering with 

ongoing state criminal proceedings where three conditions are met: (1) state judicial proceedings 

are ongoing; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the plaintiff has 

the opportunity to raise his federal constitutional concerns in the ongoing proceedings. Middlesex 

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County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Dubinka v. Judges of 

Superior Court of State of Cal. For County of Los Angeles, 23 F.3d 218, 223 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Here, all three prongs of the abstention test are met. First, the state criminal proceedings 

are ongoing in Santa Clara County Superior Court. Second, the criminal prosecution involves 

important state interests. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (“the States’ interest in 

administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most 

powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief”) 

(citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44–45). Third, Mr. Arias-Maldonado can present his claims in the 

state trial and appellate courts.1 (Not only can Mr. Arias-Maldonado’s claims be raised in state 

court, the state superior court is in a better position to determine whether he satisfies the criteria to 

be allowed to represent himself and to determine what special accommodations need to be 

provided in the local county jail for a self-represented criminal defendant.)

Even when the three-pronged test is satisfied, however, a party may avoid application of 

the abstention doctrine if he can show that he would suffer “irreparable harm” that is both “great 

and immediate” if the federal court declines jurisdiction, that there is bad faith or harassment on 

the part of the state in prosecuting him, or that the state tribunal is biased against the federal 

claim. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 437; Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124–25 (1975); Younger, 

401 U.S. at 46. Here, Mr. Arias-Maldonado does not make any plausible non-conclusory 

allegation of irreparable harm, bad faith, harassment, or bias of the tribunal. See generally 

Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 53–54 (cost, anxiety and inconvenience of criminal defense is not the 

kind of special circumstance or irreparable harm that would justify federal intervention). The 

Younger factors weigh strongly against interfering with California’s criminal justice system. 

Younger abstention is warranted. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 348 (1977) (where a district 

court finds Younger abstention appropriate, the court may not retain jurisdiction and should 

 

1 A fourth requirement has also been articulated by the Ninth Circuit: that “the federal court action 

would enjoin the state proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with 

the state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.” SJSVCCPAC v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing cases). That requirement is satisfied because the relief sought by 

Mr. Arias-Maldonado – dismissal of a state criminal charge – plainly would interfere with the state 

criminal case in a way that Younger disapproves.

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dismiss the action). 

Mr. Arias-Maldonado’s “Motion To Safeguard Civil Rights Of Pretrial Detainee” calls 

upon this Court to get very involved with the state court criminal proceedings against him. He 

wants this Court to dismiss the lewd conduct charge and to allow him to represent himself in a 

state court criminal case. This is just the sort of interference with state court criminal proceedings

that the Younger abstention doctrine seeks to prevent. Nothing in Mr. Arias-Maldonado’s 

pleading suggests there are extraordinary circumstances requiring this court’s interference in the 

state court criminal proceedings against him. Younger abstention thus requires the dismissal of his 

claims seeking interference in the state court criminal proceedings against him. 

B. Access To The Courts

Mr. Arias-Maldonado also wants this Court to require jail officials to provide pro per 

privileges to him so that he can better represent himself in the state court criminal case and in 

federal court. It may be that Younger abstention would bar some part or all of such claims, but 

that cannot be determined at this time due to the limited information now before the Court. Leave 

to amend will be granted so that Mr. Arias-Maldonado can attempt to allege one or more claims 

for denial of access to the courts.

Inmates have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 350 (1996). The Ninth Circuit has “traditionally differentiated between two types of access 

to court claims: those involving prisoners’ right[s] to affirmative assistance and those involving 

prisoners’ rights to litigate without active interference.” Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 

(9th Cir.2011) (emphasis in source), overruled on other grounds as stated by Richey v. Dahne, 807 

F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015). 

To allege a claim for denial of access to the courts of the first sort (i.e., denial of 

affirmative assistance), a plaintiff must allege facts showing that there was an inadequacy in the 

prison’s legal access program that caused him an actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 

350-51. To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show that the inadequacy hindered him in 

presenting a non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or conditions of confinement. See id. 

at 355. Examples of impermissible hindrances include: a prisoner whose complaint was dismissed 

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for failure to satisfy some technical requirement of which, because of deficiencies in the prison's 

legal assistance facilities, he could not have known; and a prisoner who had “suffered arguably 

actionable harm” that he wished to bring to the attention of the court, but was so stymied by the 

inadequacies of the prison’s services that he was unable even to file a complaint. See id. at 351. 

To allege a claim for a violation of the right to litigate without active interference, the 

plaintiff must identify the interference and allege that he has suffered an actual injury, such as the 

dismissal of his pending action. See Silva, 658 F.3d at 1103–04. Additionally, the “underlying 

cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, 

just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.” Christopher v. 

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). The underlying cause of action must be described by 

allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant, id. at 416, and to the court 

in a prisoner action that must be screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

The “Motion To Safeguard Civil Rights Of Pretrial Detainee” does not state a claim for 

denial of access to the courts against any defendant. Mr. Arias-Maldonado does not identify the 

specific “privileges” that he needed and was denied, nor does he allege how the failure to provide 

those privileges caused an actual injury to him. Leave to amend is granted so that Mr. AriasMaldonado may attempt to allege facts, if he has them, that plausibly show that defendants 

violated his right of access to the courts. For each claim of denial of access to the courts or denial 

of the right to litigate without interference, he must allege enough facts to state a claim that is 

plausible on its face. If he contends that there have been several violations of his right to access 

the courts, Mr. Arias-Maldonado must allege each one separately. 

Mr. Arias-Maldonado also must link one or more defendants to any access to the courts 

claim. He must identify each defendant who he proposes to hold liable on each claim and allege 

facts showing the basis for liability for each defendant. He should not refer to them as a group 

(e.g., “the defendants”); rather, he should identify each involved defendant by name and link each 

of them to his claim by explaining what each defendant did or failed to do that caused a violation 

of his constitutional rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (damages 

liability may be imposed on individual defendant under § 1983 only if plaintiff can show that 

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defendant proximately caused deprivation of federally protected right). If he wants to sue a 

supervisor, he must allege facts showing (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation 

or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 

constitutional violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011).

If he wants to sue a municipality, he needs to be aware of certain limitations. There is no 

respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is responsible 

for the actions or omissions of another, such as an employee. See Board of Cty. Comm'rs. of 

Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139, 

1144 (9th Cir. 2012). Local governments, such as the County of Santa Clara, are “persons” 

subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where official policy or custom causes a constitutional 

tort. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To impose municipal 

liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [the 

plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [he] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had 

a policy, [custom or practice]; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 

plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional 

violation.” See Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For municipal liability, a plaintiff must plead 

sufficient facts regarding the specific nature of the alleged policy, custom or practice to allow the 

defendant to effectively defend itself, and these facts must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is 

entitled to relief. See AE v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2012). It is not 

sufficient to merely allege that a policy, custom or practice existed or that individual officers’ 

wrongdoing conformed to a policy, custom or practice. See id. at 636-68.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the initial pleading, i.e., the “Motion To Safeguard Civil Rights 

Of Pretrial Detainee,” is dismissed because some claims are barred by Younger abstention and the 

document does not otherwise state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Leave to amend is 

granted so that Mr. Arias-Maldonado may file a complaint using this Court’s civil rights complaint 

form to attempt to allege any claims that are not precluded by the Younger abstention doctrine

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discussed in this order. The complaint must be filed no later than October 4, 2019, and must 

include the caption and civil case number used in this order. Failure to file the complaint on the 

Court’s civil rights complaint form by the deadline will result in the dismissal of the action.

The “petition in propria persona status” (Docket Nos. 8, 9), the requests for selfrepresentation (Docket Nos. 10, 12), and the motion to stay (Docket No. 13) are DENIED because 

they all improperly seek to have this Court interfere with the ongoing state court criminal case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 4, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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