Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04269/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04269-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Horel
Respondent
Gregory Williams
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT HOREL,

Respondent.

NO. C07-4269 TEH

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner Gregory Williams is currently incarcerated by the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation at Pelican Bay State Prison in Crescent City, California. 

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, before

this Court on August 20, 2007. After conducting an initial review of the petition, the Court

ordered Respondent Robert Horel to show cause as to why the petition should not be granted. 

Respondent filed an answer on October 19, 2007, and Petitioner filed a traverse on

November 12, 2007. After carefully reviewing the parties’ written arguments, the record,

and governing law, the Court now DENIES Petitioner’s request for a writ of habeas corpus

for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner does not dispute the underlying facts of this case. Petitioner lived with his

mother and a friend in the Willow Glen neighborhood of San Jose, next door to the Bauers, a

couple with two children. Early in the morning on October 24, 2002, Mrs. Bauer heard

footsteps on the roof of their house, which was under construction. Mrs. Bauer awakened

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her husband, who, upon investigating, heard a radio that the construction workers had left on

the roof and what sounded like a person running and jumping off of the roof. Mr. Bauer

advised his wife to call the police. When the police arrived, they searched the house for

several minutes before concluding that the intruder had left. All officers left the scene,

except for one officer who remained to speak with a neighbor across the street.

Mrs. Bauer then went to check on her children in their bedroom. While walking

towards the bedroom, she saw someone enter the hallway. Mrs. Bauer ran to her children’s

bedroom and placed a chair under the door handle. She then instructed her daughter to open

the window and call for Mr. Bauer. Both Mr. Bauer and the remaining police officer heard

the child’s scream and returned to the house, where Petitioner was located in the master

bedroom, lying on the bed with his hands behind his head. The officer then arrested

Petitioner and took him into custody.

Four officers working in pairs interrogated Petitioner consecutively. Richard Bravo, a

San Jose police officer, testified at trial that he believed Petitioner to be under the influence

of methamphetamine, which can cause delusional thinking and erratic speech patterns. 

Bravo testified that he sought to obtain information from Petitioner about his specific intent

in entering the Bauers’ residence. Petitioner had been convicted of misdemeanor child

molestation ten years prior, and Bravo’s interview focused on the possibility that Petitioner

intended to commit a sexual offense against either Mrs. Bauer or her ten-year-old daughter. 

At trial, the tapes and transcripts of the police interviews with Petitioner, as well as

Petitioner’s prior conviction for a misdemeanor sexual offense, were admitted into evidence

over Petitioner’s objections.

On March 15, 2004, a jury in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County convicted

Petitioner of one felony count of first degree burglary, Cal. Penal Code §§ 459-60, and one

misdemeanor count of being under the influence of methamphetamine, Cal. Health & Safety

Code § 1150(a). In a separate proceeding the following day, the trial court found two prior

strike allegations to be true. On November 22, 2004, the court sentenced Petitioner to a state

prison term of twenty-five years to life.

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On December 6, 2004, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the California Court of

Appeal, Sixth District. On June 29, 2006, the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in an

unpublished opinion. On August 1, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court, which denied review on October 11, 2006. The grounds raised in

the petition filed before this Court are the same as those raised in Petitioner’s direct appeal.

II. EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge their confinement in federal habeas

proceedings must first exhaust state judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through

collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with a fair opportunity

to rule on the merits of their claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not dispute

that Petitioner has exhausted state remedies as to all of the claims presented in this petition.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), this

Court cannot grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d). The Court must presume the

correctness of the state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the burden of

rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C § 2254(e)(1).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established United States Supreme

Court law if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling

authority to a case involving materially indistinguishable facts but reaches a different result. 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-14 (2000). A decision is an “unreasonable

application” of United States Supreme Court law if “the state court identifies the correct

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governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 414.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must be objectively

unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (citation and internal

quotations omitted). “While the ‘objectively unreasonable’ standard is not self-explanatory,

at a minimum it denotes a great[] degree of deference to the state courts.” Clark v. Murphy,

331 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003).

Holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision are the only

definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA. Williams, 529 U.S. at

412. “While circuit law may be ‘persuasive authority’ for purposes of determining whether a

state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, only the Supreme

Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be reasonably

applied.” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1070 (citation omitted).

Even if a petitioner meets the requirements of § 2254(d), habeas relief is warranted

only if the constitutional error at issue had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). Under this

standard, petitioners “are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can

establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Id. (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S.

438, 439 (1986)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Claim 1: Invocation of Miranda Rights

In his first claim, Petitioner asserts that the police interrogations following his arrest

violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (1966). He further contends that the trial court erroneously denied Petitioner’s

motion to suppress the tapes and transcripts of the interrogation.

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Officer Richard Bravo and Sergeant Frank Aviles began interrogating Petitioner at

6:30 AM on the morning of his arrest. Resp. Ex. F at 5 (People v. Williams, No. H028263,

2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5713 (June 29, 2006)). The officers had the following

exchange with Petitioner, as documented in the police interview tapes and transcripts that

were entered into evidence at trial:

Bravo: My name is Detective Bravo. This is Sergeant Aviles. 

Okay. But, so, we’re talking about ah, what happened out there

this morning. How do you feel about that? Do you want to talk

to us this morning? You sure? Okay. Just so we’re all clear and

everything, what I’m gonna do is read you your rights. Okay. So

there’s no misunderstanding between us. You have the right to

remain silent. Do you understand?

Williams: Yes.

Bravo: Anything you say may be used against you in court. Do

you understand?

Williams: I do.

Bravo: You have the right to the presence of an attorney before

and during any questioning. Do you understand?

Williams: Yes.

Bravo: If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to

you free of charge before any questioning if you want. Do you

understand that?

Williams: Yeah.

Bravo: And having all that in mind, basically what I want to do is

just find out from you what was going on this morning. Sounds

like there was a lot of running around, some yelling and

screaming, and I just want to know why you were in that house.

Williams: Ah, well, I think first, um, I should have a lawyer. And

ah, second, I’m trying to figure out. Well, trying to do God’s

will.

Bravo: Trying to do God’s will.

Aviles: What do you mean by that? You have me thrown

(inaudible) that one.

. . . .

Aviles: Yeah. Now you said, the first thing you said, you wanted

a lawyer? Is that the first thing you said?

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Williams: Right. Well, it was, because . . . .

Aviles: Help, help us.

Williams: I (inaudible), because . . . .

Aviles: I just want to understand. But if you want a lawyer, we’ll

walk out of this room. You can’t talk to me if you want a lawyer.

Williams: Oh.

Aviles: I just want to understand that, that’s a statement you

made. You want a lawyer. . . .

Williams: (Inaudible).

Aviles: or do you want to talk to us?

Williams: I want, hell, I’ll just talk to you then.

Aviles: Okay. Well, I won’t change your mind, no. That . . . .

Williams: Yeah. No, I’m, no, I’m not trying to . . . .

Aviles: You understand? Okay.

Williams: I, I mean, you read the, read . . . .

Aviles: Ah, we read . . . .

Williams: the card, . . .

Aviles: you your rights.

Williams: cards . . . .

Bravo: Right.

Williams: said . . . .

Aviles: Did, did . . . .

Williams: that you can have a lawyer.

Aviles: Yeah, and, and . . . .

Williams: It’s an intelligent thing to do, isn’t it?

Aviles: Yeah, it is. Yeah. So if you want a lawyer . . . .

Bravo: But we’re looking for clarification. Because you said you

did want to talk to us. But then you said, well, I think I should

have a lawyer. So, it’s up to you. And then you can talk to us

right now or not. (Inaudible), because right now, obviously,

there’s not gonna be (inaudible).

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Williams: (Inaudible) work on getting a lawyer, right?

Bravo: Not right now.

Williams: Oh. Well, yeah, I think that later.

Bravo: Will I personally do it? No.

Aviles: You know how the system works, right? Right?

Williams: I’ll, I’ll, I’ll . . . .

Bravo: Do you want, do you want to talk to us? Gregg [sic].

Aviles: You sure you want to talk to us?

Williams: Yeah.

Aviles: Okay. Maybe one (inaudible)-

Williams: I don’t even need a lawyer though. I’ll just let God

handle it. (Italics added.)

Resp. Ex. F at 5-9 (emphases in original). Following this exchange with Bravo and Aviles,

Petitioner proceeded to speak with the officers.

Petitioner subsequently filed a motion before trial to suppress his statements to the

police on grounds that they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The trial court

denied Petitioner’s motion, and the appellate court affirmed.

In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981), the Supreme Court held that when a

suspect requests counsel at any time during a custodial interrogation, he cannot be subjected

to further questioning unless a lawyer has been made available or the suspect reinitiates

conversation. To invoke the “prophylactic rule” established in Edwards, however, a court

must first “determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.” Smith v.

Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (emphasis added). To meet that standard, “the suspect must

unambiguously request counsel”; that is, he or she “must articulate his desire to have counsel

present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would

understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.

452, 459 (1994). “If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does

not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect.” Id.

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The state appellate court did not unreasonably apply the above clearly established law,

nor was its decision contrary to such law. Petitioner’s initial statement – “I think . . . I should

have a lawyer,” Resp. Ex. F at 6 – was ambiguous and equivocal, and Aviles and Bravo were

not required to cease questioning at that time. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 462 (holding that

saying “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer” was not an unambiguous request for counsel). 

When the officers attempted to clarify if Petitioner was invoking his right to counsel,

Petitioner said, “I want, hell, I’ll just talk to you then.” Resp. Ex. F at 7. When the officers

inquired further as to Petitioner’s intent, he provided a number of confusing and disjointed

responses. Ultimately, Petitioner told the officers, “I don’t even need a lawyer though. I’ll

just let God handle it.” Id. at 9. Given Petitioner’s statements, the state court’s conclusion

that Petitioner did not make a clear request for counsel was a reasonable determination of

facts and application of law. While Petitioner might have been requesting counsel with his

first statement, that is insufficient to invoke his right to counsel under clearly established

Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Davis, 512 U.S. at 462 (explaining that the Supreme

Court was “unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent police questioning

when the suspect might want a lawyer”).

Petitioner attempts to distinguish Davis on grounds that the suspect in that case had

already waived his right to counsel before issuing his ambiguous statement regarding an

attorney. However, the fact that Petitioner did not waive his right to counsel prior to making

the statements at issue does not alter the Court’s threshold inquiry as to whether Petitioner’s

request for counsel met “the requisite level of clarity.” Id. at 459.

Petitioner also seeks to rely on Alvarez v. Gomez, 185 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 1999), to

demonstrate that the state court’s decision was an unreasonable application of law. Alvarez,

however, is distinguishable from Petitioner’s case. First, Alvarez filed his habeas petition

prior to the enactment of AEDPA, and the Ninth Circuit reviewed his claim de novo. Id. at

997. After AEDPA, this Court may only reverse the state appellate court’s findings if its

application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Andrade, 538

U.S. at 75-76. In addition, when the investigating officers informed Alvarez of his Miranda

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rights and inquired if he wished to invoke those rights, Alvarez stated, “Can I get an attorney

right now, man?” followed by, “You can have attorney right now?” and “Well, like right now

you got one?” Alvarez, 185 F.3d at 996-97. Petitioner’s single ambiguous response is not

the equivalent of the cumulative effect of Alvarez’s three questions. Moreover, Alvarez is

merely persuasive authority while the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis was binding on the

state court. See Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); see also Clark, 331 F.3d at 1070

(explaining that “our own precedent is not much help since it is somewhat inconsistent on

what constitutes an equivocal request for a lawyer”). For all of these reasons, the Court finds

Petitioner’s reliance on Alvarez to be unpersuasive.

In short, for the reasons discussed above, the appellate court’s affirmation of the trial

court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s motion to suppress pursuant to a Miranda violation was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Miranda claim.

B. Claim 2: Voluntariness of Petitioner’s Statements to Police

Petitioner asserts in his second claim that his statements to police during the

interrogation were involuntary, and that the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the

transcripts and recordings of the interrogation therefore violated his due process rights under

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court of Appeal denied this claim on the merits. 

Resp. Ex. F at 14-17.

Following Petitioner’s arrest, four police officers working in pairs interrogated

Petitioner consecutively at the San Jose Police Department, and Officer Bravo estimated that

each pair of officers interviewed Petitioner for approximately one hour each, for a total of

two hours. Resp. Ex. B., Vol. V at 977 (Reporter’s Tr.). The interview room was

approximately twelve feet by twelve feet and contained a metal table and two stools. Resp.

Ex. F at 14. Police used a “surreptitious microphone” to record the interrogation, but

Petitioner appeared aware that the interview was being recorded, as he asked at one point

during the interview, “You’ve been recording the conversation, right?” Id. at 14 & n.4. 

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Petitioner testified that, at the time of the interview, he had not slept for approximately

twenty-four hours and was suffering the effects of methamphetamine consumption. Id. at 14. 

Petitioner also testified that, in the years preceding his arrest at the Bauers’ home, he had

been read his Miranda rights, and that he had understood those warnings, “around 30 times.” 

Id. at 15. During the questioning, officers asked multiple questions of a sexual nature – e.g.,

“you weren’t there to rape the little boy?” and “You tend to like young girls when you’re on

crank,” Resp. Ex. A at 128, 157 (Clerk’s Tr. on Appeal) – but these questions followed

Petitioner’s answer to one of the officers’ first questions of why Petitioner went next door to

the Bauers’: “Ahh, looking for girls,” id. at 117. As he argued on appeal, Petitioner now

contends that the failure of the police to grant his request for an attorney, his weakened

mental state due to methamphetamine consumption and sleep deprivation, and the coercive

nature of the officers’ repeated sexual insinuations rendered his statements involuntary and

therefore inadmissible. 

Before a criminal defendant’s statement can be admitted into evidence, due process

requires the government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was

voluntary. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1986). A defendant’s statement is

voluntary if it is “the product of a rational intellect and a free will.” Blackburn v. Alabama,

361 U.S. 199, 209 (1960). The Supreme Court has held that “coercive police activity is a

necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. In cases

of alleged psychological coercion, the court must carefully evaluate the totality of the

circumstances of the interrogation and their impact on the defendant’s will. Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973). The pivotal question is whether a defendant’s

will was “overborne” when he confessed. Id. at 225-26. In evaluating the totality of the

circumstances of a defendant’s confession, the Supreme Court has considered many factors,

including the extent of physical or psychological coercion, length of the interrogation, its

location, its continuity, and the defendant’s maturity, education, physical condition, and

mental health. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693 (1993) (citing cases).

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After reviewing the transcript of the police interviews, this Court does not find the

state appellate court’s decision to be unreasonable. Although Petitioner displayed effects of

methamphetamine consumption and his behavior was erratic, nothing in the record suggests

that the interviewing officers’ tactics caused Petitioner’s will to be “overborne.” 

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. In addition, Petitioner was experienced with the criminal

justice system, and the interviewing officers’ questions cannot be described as threatening,

manipulative, or coercive. As demonstrated by his ability to discuss the events at the Bauers’

home, albeit in a circuitous fashion, Petitioner was neither incapacitated nor incoherent as a

result of his drug use and sleep deprivation. Moreover, the interrogation totaled

approximately two hours of questioning, which is not excessive in duration. The officers

also offered Petitioner coffee and candy at the beginning of the second interview before

proceeding, which undermines a claim of unduly harsh treatment. Perhaps most

significantly, Petitioner never indicated that he was unable to respond to the interviewing

officers’ questions or that he wished to end the interview.

Based on all of the above, the state appellate court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s

statements to police were voluntary was not an unreasonable determination of the facts or an

unreasonable application of law. Consequently, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s claim that

his statements were inadmissible because they were not made voluntarily.

C. Claim 3: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support a Burglary Conviction

In his third claim, Petitioner challenges his conviction for burglary, which requires a

defendant to have unlawfully entered a dwelling with the intent to commit larceny or any

felony. Cal. Penal Code § 459. Petitioner was convicted of entering the Bauers’ home with

the intent to violate California Penal Code section 220, which prohibits assault with the intent

to commit mayhem, rape, sodomy, oral copulation, rape in concert with another, lascivious

acts upon a child, or penetration of the genitals or anus with a foreign object. Resp. Ex. F at

18. He now argues that his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

were violated because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a burglary

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Petitioner argues, for example, that he created substantial noise before entering the

Bauers’ house, which is inconsistent with the necessary surprise required to commit assault. 

Similarly, Petitioner observes that, after he entered the Bauers’ residence, he made no effort

to harm anyone, he did not possess any weapons or tools, and no items from the house were

disturbed or missing. Petitioner also contends that due to his mental state during the

interrogation, his statements to police are unreliable and have minimal probative value.

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conviction. The state appellate court rejected this argument in its written decision. Id. at

17-19.

 The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A federal court collaterally reviewing a

state court conviction does not determine if the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt, but “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in

original). Thus, a petitioner’s writ may be granted only if no rational trier of fact could have

found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 324. The reviewing court must also

presume that the trier of fact resolved any conflicting inferences “in favor of the prosecution

and must defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326. Pursuant to AEDPA, the court’s inquiry is

limited to whether the state court’s decision was “an unreasonable application of” Jackson

and Winship to the facts of the case. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005).

After reviewing the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

this Court concludes that, notwithstanding Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary,1

 a “rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. During his police interrogation, Petitioner made numerous

statements that could constitute evidence of his intent to commit a sexual assault. While

Petitioner’s responses were erratic when questioned by police as to his motive for entering

the Bauers’ residence, he made a number of suggestive statements, including that “my

primary goal when I went in that house was to get pussy . . . .” Resp. Ex. F at 19. Petitioner

also told police that he was “trying to have a marathon sport fuck” and repeatedly explained

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Petitioner also challenges whether evidence relating to his prior conviction should

have been admitted at trial. As discussed in section D below, this Court finds no merit to this

challenge.

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his presence at the Bauers’ as being “a pussy thing.” Id. Although many of Petitioner’s

statements to police involved a CIA conspiracy or invoked the presence of God, that does not

render his other comments of a sexual nature unreliable or devoid of probative value. To the

contrary, Petitioner’s suggestive sexual statements to police, coupled with his prior

misdemeanor conviction for annoying or molesting a child, are sufficient to allow a rational

trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner intended to commit a

sexual assault when he entered the Bauers’ residence.2

Therefore, the state appellate court reasonably applied clearly established Supreme

Court law in finding sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s burglary conviction. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s claim that the trial court violated his due

process right to be convicted by evidence proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

D. Claim 4: Admission of Evidence Relating to Prior Conviction

Petitioner argues in his fourth claim that the trial court violated his due process rights

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting evidence of his prior misdemeanor

sexual conviction and related statements to police. After the trial court denied Petitioner’s

motion to suppress his statements to police on Miranda and voluntariness grounds, Petitioner

sought to exclude specific portions of the interview. Resp. Ex. F at 19-20. The trial court

and defense counsel engaged in a lengthy discussion regarding deleting portions of the

interrogation transcript, which totaled over 100 pages, before presenting this evidence to the

jury. Id. at 20. The court deleted numerous portions of the transcript, including discussions

of Petitioner’s sex offender status, prior strikes, prison time, robbery conviction, and whether

he was considered a violent person. Id. The court, however, ruled that the entire discussion

of Petitioner’s prior misdemeanor conviction under California Penal Code section 647.6 was

admissible. Id. at 20-21. Under California Evidence Code section 1108, the trial court is

permitted to consider “other sexual offenses as evidence of the defendant’s disposition to

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commit such crimes, and for its bearing on the probability or improbability that the defendant

has been falsely or mistakenly accused of such an offense.” People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th

903, 912 (1999) (citation omitted).

The state appellate court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the trial court’s

evidentiary rulings violated his due process rights. Resp. Ex. F at 24-28. The court held that

“the tapes and transcripts of the interrogation supported permissible inferences as to

appellant’s intent at the time he entered the Bauer’s [sic] home, and the admission of this

evidence did not render appellant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 28.

A federal court’s habeas review of a state conviction does not include an inquiry into

whether the trial court violated state evidence law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-

68 (1991) (“it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions”). Instead, the question for the federal court is

“whether the admission of the evidence so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them

fundamentally unfair.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). A trial

court’s admission of evidence violates due process “[o]nly if there are no permissible

inferences the jury may draw from the evidence.” Id. at 920.

In this case, the Court does not find that admitting evidence of Petitioner’s prior

misdemeanor sex conviction rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. As discussed above,

Petitioner’s statements to police were not rendered unreliable by his repeated references to a

CIA conspiracy and God’s presence, and his statements were probative as to his motive for

entering the Bauers’ residence. The jury could therefore draw a permissible inference from

the admitted evidence.

Petitioner also maintains that frequent redactions in the transcript and inaudible

portions of the tape compromised the reliability of his statements to police. The trial court,

however, instructed the jury to ignore any redactions in the transcript or inaudible portions of

the tape and, more specifically, not to infer any significance from these omissions. Id. at 27-

28. The trial court also properly redacted portions of the transcript to prevent the jury from

learning facts about Petitioner’s criminal history that were potentially prejudicial or unrelated

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to his specific intent in entering the Bauers’ residence. These redactions and inaudible

portions of the tape, coupled with the court’s instructions to the jury, would not cause the

transcript or tape to be overly confusing or prejudicial to a reasonable juror.

Petitioner next argues that evidence of his prior sexual conviction under California

Penal Code section 647.6 is inadmissible. The prior offense, however, is probative of

Petitioner’s motive for entering the Bauers’ house. The potential for prejudice or misuse was

limited because the prior sexual offense was a misdemeanor and evidence of the conviction

was countered by Petitioner’s exculpatory version of the incident in the transcript of the

police interview. Resp. Ex. F at 25. Therefore, the trial court did not violate Petitioner’s due

process rights by admitting evidence of his prior misdemeanor conviction.

Thus, admitting Petitioner’s statements to police and his prior misdemeanor

conviction was not fundamentally unfair because the jury could permissibly infer from the

evidence that Petitioner intended to commit a sexual felony at the Bauers’ residence. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s claim that the trial court’s admission of the

contested evidence violated his due process rights.

E. Claim 5: Prosecutorial Misconduct

In his fifth and final claim, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor engaged in

misconduct, thus violating Petitioner’s due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor’s mischaracterization and misuse of

evidence rendered the trial fundamentally unfair – an argument the state appellate court

rejected on the merits. Resp. Ex. F at 33-41.

The facts and Petitioner’s arguments are accurately summarized in the state appellate

court’s opinion:

During the interrogation, Aviles said to appellant, “You tend to

like young girls when you’re on crank. Not when you’re normal. 

When you’re on crank” to which appellant responded “Yeah.” 

Appellant said he could not “even fathom a ten or twelve year

old girl being able to have sex” and Aviles asked him “How ‘bout

a 15 year old?” and commented “that’s no problem if she's

willing. Appellant said “take away the psychological issues” and

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“the diseases” and Aviles added “just normal sex.” Appellant

said “Well, yeah.”

During closing argument, the prosecutor referred the jury to this

part of the interrogation and argued, “Then he talks about having

sex with a 15-year-old at the bottom of Page 55. Where he hmms

and haws about it, middle of Page 56. But ultimately he says oh,

yeah, yeah. Well, yeah. Excuse me, I misspoke. Well, yeah, sex

with a 15-year-old.” Appellant argues that in this passage the

prosecutor mischaracterized appellant’s statements, implying

“that appellant had engaged in sex with a fifteen-year-old and

that he is not averse to sex with minors, even though the passage

does not support those interpretations.”

In argument, the prosecutor said, “You can absolutely use the fact

that this individual’s a convicted sex offender, infer that he had

the disposition to do it again. And he tells you when I’m under

the influence of meth, I like girls; the younger the better.” 

Appellant argues that this mischaracterized the evidence because

during the interrogation appellant said that when he was under

the influence of methamphetamine he likes girls “the younger, the

better, provided they’re old enough.”

Appellant complains that the prosecutor argued “in the second

interview, he comes close to telling the officer the real reason

may not have been for Terry.” Appellant argues that because

“[t]he prosecutor did not identify any portion of the second

interview that would warrant that characterization” the prosecutor

invited the jury “to speculate about what appellant might have

come ‘close to telling the officer.’” Appellant complains that the

prosecutor misstated the evidence in arguing “Did he have a

specific intent? He tells you that on the tape: Why did you go

over there? I went over there for sex. I went over there for the P

word. I went over there because I hadn’t been getting laid. That’s

why I took the dope in the first place.”

Appellant fails to observe that the prosecutor said, “We also

know a couple of things about this. This begs the scrutiny of the

transcript, not just – the tape itself. You get to decide what you

find to be credible on that tape, . . . what statements you do not.”

. . . .

Appellant contends that the prosecutor misused evidence that was

admitted for a limited purpose. During cross-examination,

defense counsel asked Detective Pierce whether, when he saw

that appellant was under the influence of methamphetamine and

talking about the CIA and God, the detective could have had a

mental health professional observe the interview. Defense

counsel questioned Detective Pierce about a portion of the

interview during which Detective Moore told appellant, “You’re

just using crank because you’re fucking crazy and it’s fucking up

your head.” Defense counsel established that the detectives did

not use the interview to explore possible psychological issues

appellant may have had and did not “feel there was a need” to

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talk to appellant again once he was no longer under the influence

of methamphetamine. On re-direct examination, the prosecutor

asked Detective Pierce why he did not “call a doctor or

psychiatrist” during the interview. Detective Pierce testified over

defense objection, “I didn’t think there was any need for a

psychologist or doctor.” He said that he believed that during the

interrogation appellant was “trying to manipulate the situation”

and “it was obvious to us he’s been in the situation before, and he

was just trying to control the situation, control the interview to go

the way he wanted it to go.” The trial court instructed the jury,

“You should consider the officer’s opinions of the defendant’s

veracity, responsiveness and mental state only as it helps you to

understand the officer’s actions, if you find that helpful, and not

for any other reason. Specifically, it’s entirely up to you to gauge

the truthfulness of the defendant’s statements made during the

course of the interview.”

In closing argument, defense counsel said, “One reasonable

explanation for his behavior is that he was delusional.” He said

that in listening to the interrogation tapes the jury “will hear that

[appellant’s] thinking is disorganized and dysfunctional. You

will hear that at times, he’s answering a question that they ask

him, two or three questions later.” In rebuttal, in response to

these arguments, the prosecutor pointed to the absence of any

expert testimony that appellant was delusional and argued, “As I

said, every officer that had contact with him in the tapes, they

keep saying, You have the scenario played out; sounds like you

thought this one through; you’re going off on this tangent, and

Officer Moore in particular is saying that’s ridiculous. Come

back. Moreover, none of that occurs in any kind of detail. The

whole thing about the CIA is ridiculous. . . . Detective Pierce:

Lucid, aware, knew what he was doing. We were focusing him

back because we didn’t believe he was being forthright with us. 

He was playing games.”

Appellant argues, “The prosecutor exploited the objectionable

quality of this evidence – the likelihood that the jury would treat

the officers’ statements in the transcripts as expert evidence about

appellant’s mental state and credibility.” Respondent argues that

this claim of misconduct “fails because the court’s limiting

instruction applied to the in-court testimony of Detective Pierce;

it never purported to limit the prosecutor’s argument based on

statements made by officers during the interrogation, or the jury’s

consideration of the text of the interrogation.”

Resp. Ex. F at 36-37.

When evaluating whether a petitioner’s due process rights have been violated by a

prosecutor’s statements during argument, the court inquires if “the prosecutors’ comments

‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process.’” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v.

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DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). The prosecutor is permitted to argue reasonable

inferences that follow from the evidence presented. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 8 n.5

(1985).

After carefully reviewing the record, the Court finds no support for Petitioner’s

argument that the prosecutor misstated and mischaracterized Petitioner’s statements to

police. The tape and transcript of Petitioner’s statements to police, including the numerous

sexual references, could support the reasonable inference that Petitioner had the specific

intent to commit a sexual felony at the Bauers’ residence. During his argument, the

prosecutor urged the jury to scrutinize the transcript themselves to determine the credibility

of the tape. The Court does not find that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by drawing

the jury’s attention to Petitioner’s statements supporting the prosecution’s theory of the case.

The Court also finds no support for Petitioner’s argument that the jury treated

Detective Pierce’s observations of Petitioner’s behavior during the police interrogation as

expert evidence of Petitioner’s mental state and credibility. The prosecutor was entitled to

highlight the absence of expert testimony regarding Petitioner’s mental health to combat

Petitioner’s defense that he was delusional at the time of the crime. The Court agrees with

the state appellate court’s conclusion that no reasonable probability suggests that the jury

misused the prosecutor’s argument, especially when considered with the trial court’s limiting

instruction. 

Consequently, the Court concludes that the appellate court’s decision to deny

Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. The Court therefore DENIES

Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim.

//

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//

//

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V. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has failed to show that he is entitled

to habeas relief in this case. Accordingly, with good cause appearing, Petitioner’s petition

for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 03/05/08 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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