Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01231/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01231-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Frank
Appellee
Milton A. Manning
Appellant
United States Postal Service
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals 

Tench Ciraiit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MILTON A. MANNING, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ANTHONY FRANK, Postmaster General, and ) 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

FEB 19 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1231 

(D.C. No. 89-Z-1195) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without .· oral argument. 

Milton A. Manning appeals the district court's grant of 

summary judgment to defendant Anthony M. Frank, Postmaster 

General, based on its conclusion that Manning failed to file his 

formal complaint of discrimination under 42 u.s.c. S 2000e et seq. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1231 Document: 010110100005 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 1 
.. 

' 

within the fifteen-day filing limitation established by 29 C.F.R. 

S 1613.214(a)(l)(ii)(1990). We affirm. 

The appropriate standard for the equitable tolling of Title 

VII time limitations was set out in Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 

1107, 1110 (10th Cir. 1984) (cited with approval in Johnson v. 

United States Postal Service, 861 F.2d 1475, 1480-81 (10th Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 54 (1989)). In Martinez, we held 

that Title VII time limits would be tolled only where "the 

circumstances of the case rise to a level of 'active deception.'" 

738 F.2d at 1110 (citation omitted). We stated that active 

deception may include instances where the plaintiff: (1) has been 

lulled into inaction by her past employer, state or federal 

agencies, or the courts; (2) has been actively misled; or (3) has 

been prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting her 

rights. Id. (citations omitted). We have reviewed the record, 

including the Addendum to Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant, and 

we are convinced that Mr. Manning did not raise a genuine issue of 

fact on his contention that he was actively misled by Mr. Smith. 

We are not persuaded by Mr. Manning's other contentions. We, 

therefore, conclude that the district court properly granted 

summary judgment. See Rec., vol. III at 2-5. Mandate shall issue 

forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-1231 Document: 010110100005 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 2