Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-07066/USCOURTS-caDC-07-07066-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Krishna Muir
Appellant
Navy Federal Credit Union
Appellee
Patricia L. Dearing, L.L.C.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 14, 2008 Decided June 20, 2008

No. 07-7066

KRISHNA MUIR,

APPELLANT

v.

NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION AND

PATRICIA L. DEARING, L.L.C.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv01193)

C. Sukari Hardnett argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Justin M. Flint argued the cause for appellee Patricia L.

Dearing, L.L.C. With him on the brief was Aaron L.

Handleman.

Kirsten E. Keating argued the cause for appellee Navy

Federal Credit Union. With her on the brief was F. Joseph

Nealon.

USCA Case #07-7066 Document #1122680 Filed: 06/20/2008 Page 1 of 19
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Before: ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Appellant Krishna Muir

deposited $29,019.55 into a joint account that he held with his

father at the Navy Federal Credit Union. The Credit Union

refused to return the funds, using them instead to satisfy a debt

owed to it by Muir’s father. Muir then sued the Credit Union

and a debt collection firm, Patricia L. Dearing, LLC, seeking

return of his deposit and additional damages. The district court

held the Credit Union liable for tortious conversion in the

amount of the deposit but denied Muir’s other claims. 

Muir now appeals. We affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment for the Credit Union on Muir’s breach of

fiduciary duty claim, as well as its denial of his request for

punitive damages. We reverse the court’s dismissal of Muir’s

claim against the Credit Union for tortious interference with a

business expectancy, and its dismissal of his claims against

Dearing under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. We also

reverse the court’s summary denial of Muir’s claims for interest

and lost profits with respect to the tortious conversion. 

I

In November 1986, Krishna Muir’s father opened a joint

share account at the Navy Federal Credit Union with Krishna,

who at the time was a minor. Ten years later, Muir’s father

obtained a consolidation loan of $28,705.47 from the Credit

Union, with his joint share account as collateral. He stopped

making payments on the loan after a year, at which point the

principal balance was $25,125.42 and accrued interest

approximately $12,000. 

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1

When the Credit Union removed Muir’s funds, his account

balance was $27,027.90 due to an earlier cash withdrawal. The setoff, which covered the balance of Muir’s father’s loan plus part of the

accrued interest, left only $5.00 in the account.

On October 2, 2002, Krishna Muir deposited $29,019.55

into the joint share account. According to his complaint, Muir

needed those funds to pursue a business opportunity, and he so

advised the Credit Union agent who accepted his deposit. When

Muir later contacted the Credit Union to withdraw his funds,

however, he learned that the Credit Union had removed

$27,022.90 from the account, without notice, in order to satisfy

his father’s debt.1 Despite Muir’s repeated requests, the Credit

Union refused to return the money, and a Credit Union

employee informed him that Patricia L. Dearing, LLC, a debt

collection firm, was counseling and directing the Credit Union

in the matter. 

Muir filed a complaint in the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia against the Credit Union for tortious

conversion, tortious interference with a business expectancy,

and breach of fiduciary duty; and against Dearing for tortious

conversion, tortious interference with a business expectancy,

and violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. For each of his tort claims,

Muir sought return of his deposit, interest, lost profits, and

punitive damages. He demanded a jury trial on all issues. 

After the Credit Union moved for summary judgment on

tortious conversion and breach of fiduciary duty, and Muir filed

a cross-motion on the former, the district court granted summary

judgment for Muir on his tortious conversion claim. The court

noted the Credit Union’s argument that, because its Joint

Account Agreement provides that all deposits are owned jointly

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by the account owners, Muir’s father was beneficially entitled

to the funds Muir deposited and the Credit Union was entitled to

set them off to satisfy his father’s debt. But the court further

noted that the Account Agreement, which was not signed by

Muir, also states: “[T]his agreement not valid without signature

of member-owner.” Muir v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 2005 WL

486034, at *1 n.3 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2005) (quoting Credit Union

Ex. B). Because the Agreement was thus “not enforceable

against Mr. Muir,” the court held that the Credit Union had

wrongfully set off his deposit and entered judgment against it in

the amount of the set-off. Id. at *1.

Although the court entered judgment for Muir on his

tortious conversion claim, it granted summary judgment for the

Credit Union on his claim of breach of fiduciary duty,

concluding that there was no fiduciary relationship between the

parties. Id. at *2. The Credit Union then moved to dismiss

Muir’s remaining claim -- for tortious interference with a

business expectancy -- and the district court granted that motion

as well, finding that Muir had not alleged sufficient facts

regarding the business expectancy and his probability of

realizing it. Muir v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 2005 WL

3276281, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2005).

Meanwhile, Dearing, the debt collection firm, moved to

dismiss all of Muir’s claims against it for lack of standing.

Without addressing Muir’s tort claims, the district court held

that Muir lacked standing to pursue his FDCPA claims. Muir v.

Navy Fed. Credit Union, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. Mar. 1,

2005). Although the court found that Muir had suffered an

injury when he was deprived of his deposit, it ruled that Muir

lacked constitutional standing because the injury could not “be

fairly traced to Defendant Dearing’s conduct.” Id. at 3. The

court further held that Muir lacked prudential standing under the

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FDCPA because he did not fall within the zone of interests the

statute protects. Id.

Muir then appealed, and this court remanded the case to the

district court for three reasons. Muir v. Navy Fed. Credit Union,

204 Fed. Appx. 896 (D.C. Cir. 2006). First, the court observed

that there was no final judgment with respect to Muir’s tortious

conversion claim against the Credit Union because the district

court had not considered Muir’s requests for additional

damages, each of which constituted a distinct claim. Id. at 897.

Second, the court noted that the district court had not considered

Muir’s tort claims against Dearing for conversion and

interference with a business expectancy. Id. Finally, the court

found that the judgment did not comply with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 58(a), which requires that each judgment be set

forth in a separate document. Id. Accordingly, the court held

that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal and instructed the

district court to issue a final judgment.

On remand, the district court dismissed all of Muir’s claims

against Dearing, holding that Muir lacked standing to pursue his

tort claims as well as his statutory claims. Muir v. Navy Fed.

Credit Union, 2007 WL 81962, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2007). In

the same order, the court vacated its earlier judgment against the

Credit Union for $27,022.90 and indicated that it would “hold

a hearing to establish the damages and fees owed to plaintiff.”

Id. The court set a hearing date and ordered each party to

“submit a proposed schedule of damages” in advance. Id. In

response, Muir submitted a schedule setting out the amounts of

actual damages, interest, lost profits, and punitive damages that

he was seeking. At the hearing, Muir proffered his damages

evidence and requested a jury trial on the issue. Following the

hearing, the court again entered judgment against the Credit

Union for $27,022.90 in actual damages, but it denied Muir’s

claims for interest, lost profits, and punitive damages. Muir v.

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Navy Fed. Credit Union, 484 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. Mar. 20,

2007). 

Muir now appeals several of the district court’s rulings.

With respect to Dearing, Muir challenges the court’s ruling that

he lacked standing to bring his statutory claims under the

FDCPA; he does not appeal the court’s decision that he lacked

standing to bring his tort claims. With respect to the Credit

Union, Muir challenges the court’s adverse rulings on his claims

for breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with a business

expectancy, and additional damages for the tortious conversion

in the form of interest, lost profits, and punitive damages. The

Credit Union does not appeal the district court’s entry of

judgment for Muir on his tortious conversion claim or the award

of actual damages.

II

Muir brought claims against Dearing under four sections of

the FDCPA. He alleged that Dearing: engaged in conduct that

was harassing, oppressive, and abusive, in violation of 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692d; used false and deceptive means to collect a debt, in

violation of § 1692e; used unfair and unconscionable means to

collect a debt, in violation of § 1692f; and failed to provide Muir

the notice required by § 1692g. Based on the allegations of the

complaint alone, the district court dismissed all of Muir’s

FDCPA claims for lack of both constitutional and prudential

standing, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

Muir, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 3. We review a dismissal for lack of

standing de novo, Information Handling Servs., Inc. v. Defense

Automated Printing Servs., 338 F.3d 1024, 1029 (D.C. Cir.

2003). 

1. To establish constitutional standing, a plaintiff must

show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged

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conduct and that will likely be redressed by a favorable decision

on the merits. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560-61 (1992). In “reviewing the standing question, the

court must be careful not to decide the questions on the merits

for or against the plaintiff, and must therefore assume that on the

merits the plaintiffs would be successful in their claims.” City

of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (“For purposes of

ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial

and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations

of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the

complaining party.”). 

Muir’s allegations are sufficient, at this pre-discovery stage,

to meet the requirements of constitutional standing. He alleges

that Dearing and the Credit Union worked together to

unlawfully remove $27,022.90 from his account (injury and

traceability), and he contends that the FDCPA provides

monetary relief for that action (redressability). Although the

district court agreed that Muir suffered an injury when he was

deprived of $27,022.90, it ruled that the injury could not “be

fairly traced to Defendant Dearing’s conduct because there are

no allegations that Defendant Dearing made any direct, or

indirect, attempt to collect the debt from Mr. Muir. To the

contrary, Defendant Dearing’s communications, according to the

complaint, were limited to the bank and Mr. Muir’s father.”

Muir, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 3. The court thus treated

communications between Dearing and Muir as necessary to

establish traceability. Given the complaint’s allegation that

Dearing and the Credit Union “worked in concert . . . to convert

[funds] from the Plaintiff’s Account,” Compl. ¶ 30, however,

Muir’s injury can be fairly traced to Dearing regardless of

whether Dearing communicated with Muir about the matter.

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In basing its ruling on the ground that there were no

allegations of communication between the two parties, the

district court appears to have accepted Dearing’s contention that

a plaintiff can only recover against a defendant under the

FDCPA if the defendant communicated with him. In response,

Muir points to several provisions of the FDCPA that do not

expressly require communication to establish liability. Compare

15 U.S.C. § 1692d (providing that a “debt collector may not

engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to

harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the

collection of a debt”), and id. § 1692f (providing that a “debt

collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect

or attempt to collect any debt”), with id. § 1692e(11) (specifying

what a debt collector must disclose in its initial communication),

and id. § 1692g(a) (specifying what a debt collector must

include in subsequent communications). Moreover, Muir

contends that the statute’s definition of “communication,” as

“the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or

indirectly to any person through any medium,” id. § 1692a(2),

is broad enough to cover what he says were indirect

communications from Dearing to him through the Credit Union

and his father, see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 29-31.

All of this, however, speaks not to standing but to the

merits. As we explained in Louisiana Energy & Power

Authority v. FERC, whether a statute has been violated “is a

question that goes to the merits . . . and not to constitutional

standing,” because a “party need not prove that the . . . action it

attacks is unlawful . . . in order to have standing to level that

attack.” 141 F.3d 364, 367-68 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Rather, in

determining whether plaintiffs have standing, we must “assume

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2

On appeal, Dearing further argues that Muir lacks standing under

certain sections of the FDCPA because he “cannot sustain . . . causes

of action” under those sections that are violated by conduct toward a

“consumer.” Appellee Dearing’s Br. 11 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)

and § 1692g). Muir responds that, although the cited sections do

mention conduct toward a “consumer,” most FDCPA provisions do

not and that, in any event, he readily qualifies as a “consumer” under

the Act. See Appellant’s Reply Br. 3 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3)

(defining “consumer” as “any natural person obligated or allegedly

obligated to pay any debt” (emphasis added))). Once again, however,

whether Muir can sustain a cause of action is a merits question, not

one of standing.

that on the merits [they] would be successful in their claims.”

City of Waukesha, 320 F.3d at 235.2

2. The district court also found that Muir lacked prudential

standing because “Dearing’s conduct does not fall within the

zone of interests protected by the FDCPA.” Muir, 366 F. Supp.

2d at 3. As we noted in National Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers, “[p]rudential standing requires ‘that

a plaintiff’s grievance must arguably fall within the zone of

interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision.’” 417

F.3d 1272, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (quoting

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)). “The

zone-of-interest test, however, is intended to ‘exclude only those

whose interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with

the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be

assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.’” Id.

(quoting Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399

(1987)). 

The district court ruled that, because the FDCPA “was

enacted ‘to eliminate abusive debt collection practices,’” Muir,

366 F. Supp. 2d at 3 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)), “an

individual who is not subjected to the practices of a debt

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collector does not fall within the zone of interests intended to be

protected by the statute,” id. But the statutory purpose the

district court quoted is quite broad, and what the court meant by

the phrase “subjected to the practices of a debt collector” --

other than Dearing’s contention that there must have been

communication between the plaintiff and the defendant -- is

unclear. The statute provides for civil liability against “any debt

collector who fails to comply with any provision of [the

FDCPA] with respect to any person,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)

(emphases added), and, as noted above, several of those

provisions do not contain an express “communication”

requirement. Muir thus “arguably” falls within the statute’s

compass. While “the merits inquiry and the statutory standing

inquiry often ‘overlap,’” Louisiana Energy & Power, 141 F.3d

at 367 n.5 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523

U.S. 83, 97 n.2 (1998)), the question of whether Muir has a

cause of action under the FDCPA is a merits question, and one

that is not before us on the instant appeal.

III

Although the district court granted Muir summary judgment

on his tortious conversion claim against the Credit Union, it

found no breach of fiduciary duty to Muir and granted the Credit

Union summary judgment on that claim. Muir, 2005 WL

486034, at *2. We review de novo a grant of summary

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and we may

affirm only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)

(quoting FED.R.CIV. P. 56(c)). “A dispute about a material fact

is ‘genuine’ if a reasonable jury, drawing all reasonable

inferences in [Muir’s] favor, could return a verdict against the

defendant[].” Gilvin v. Fire, 259 F.3d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir.

2001).

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The district court held that a financial institution does not

generally have a fiduciary duty to its depositors. Muir, 2005

WL 486034, at *2. Muir brought his tort claims pursuant to our

diversity jurisdiction, and we must therefore apply the choiceof-law rules of the forum state. Republican Nat’l Comm. v.

Taylor, 299 F.3d 887, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Klaxon Co.

v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)). The

district court concluded, and the parties do not dispute, that

District of Columbia courts would apply the law of Virginia.

See Muir, 2005 WL 486034, at *1 & n.1 (noting, inter alia, that

the Credit Union’s Membership/Share Savings Disclosure

Statement states that the account is governed in accordance with

the law of Virginia). Although neither party cites any of that

state’s cases, under Virginia law “[t]he relation between a bank

and a depositor is that of debtor and creditor. The deposit

creates an ordinary debt, not a privilege or right of a fiduciary

character.” Deal’s Adm’r v. Merchs. & Mechs. Sav. Bank, 91

S.E. 135, 135 (Va. 1917); see also Daisy J., Inc. v. First Bank &

Trust Co., 50 Va. Cir. 596, 1998 WL 888946, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct.

1998) (“[U]nder normal circumstances, the existence of the

debtor-creditor relationship does not create a privilege or right

of a fiduciary character.”). Muir contends that credit unions

should be treated differently than other financial institutions for

this purpose because their depositors are part owners of the

institutions. The law of Virginia, however, is to the contrary.

See Pleasant v. Haynes, 70 Va. Cir. 396, 2006 WL 1911401, at

*2 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2006) (holding that the relationship between an

account beneficiary and a federal credit union “is that of debtor

and creditor”); see also McCray v. Commonwealth, 556 S.E.2d

50, 51-52 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that the Virginia

Commercial Code “includes ‘credit union’ within the definition

of a ‘bank,’” and rejecting -- as “a distinction without a

difference” -- the appellant’s contention that the court should

distinguish a credit union from a bank because “a credit union

is for members only”).

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The district court also found that Muir had failed to allege

any other fact -- beyond the insufficient fact that he was a

depositor -- that might establish a fiduciary relationship between

him and the Credit Union. Muir, 2005 WL 486034, at *2. The

district court was again correct. Accordingly, “there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact,” and the Credit Union was

“entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 247 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).

IV

The district court also granted the Credit Union’s motion to

dismiss Muir’s claim for tortious interference with a business

expectancy, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Muir, 2005 WL 3276281. As with summary judgment

under Rule 56, we review a dismissal for failure to state a claim

under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. See Gilvin, 259 F.3d at 756. To

survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only include in his

complaint “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief. Specific facts are not necessary;

the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson

v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “when ruling on

a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all

of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Id.; see

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (“[W]e

do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.”).

Muir’s complaint alleged that he “was in need of a portion

of the funds he deposited in his Account for a then existing

business opportunity,” Compl. ¶ 10, and that the Credit Union’s

withholding of the deposit caused “the loss of that business

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“To prevail on a claim of tortious interference with business

expectancy under Virginia Law, a plaintiff must prove: ‘(1) the

existence of a business relationship or expectancy, with a probability

of future economic benefit to plaintiff; (2) defendant’s knowledge of

the relationship or expectancy; (3) a reasonable certainty that absent

defendant’s intentional misconduct, plaintiff would have continued in

the relationship or realized the expectancy; and (4) damage to the

plaintiff.’” Muir, 2005 WL 3276281, at *1 (footnote omitted)

(quoting Williams v. Dominion Tech. Partners, LLC., 576 S.E.2d 752,

757 (2003)). 

expectancy,” id. ¶ 140. As the district court acknowledged,

Muir alleged “that he had a ‘viable business expectancy with a

probability of future economic benefit,’” and he averred “to a

reasonable certainty that absent the [d]efendant’s intentional

misconduct, he would have realized that expectancy.” Muir,

2005 WL 3276281, at *1 (quoting Compl. ¶¶ 137, 139). The

court nonetheless granted the motion to dismiss, on the ground

that Muir had “not provided any additional information about

the business expectancy and his probability of realizing it.” Id.

But Muir was not required to provide specific information

regarding the business expectancy in his complaint (although he

would, of course, be required to do so in response to a motion

for summary judgment). The allegations in Muir’s complaint --

which we must take as true -- stated a cause of action for

tortious interference under Virginia law.3

 He alleged that he had

an existing business opportunity with a probability of future

benefit, that he was relying on the money he deposited at the

Credit Union to pursue the opportunity, that the Credit Union

knew of the business opportunity, that he would have realized

the opportunity but for the Credit Union’s unlawful conduct, and

that by withholding the deposit the Credit Union deprived him

of that opportunity and caused him injury. Compl. ¶¶ 10-34,

136-145. Those factual allegations were sufficient to survive a

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motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Swierkiewicz v.

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).

The district court also suggested that Muir “had an

opportunity to flesh out [his] allegations in greater detail after

receiving Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, but failed to do so.”

Muir, 2005 WL 3276281, at *1. The Credit Union’s motion to

dismiss did not, however, dispute that Muir had sufficiently

stated a claim for tortious interference. Instead, it argued that

Muir’s claim should be dismissed because he had pled the same

damages for all of his claims, because he had filed an appeal that

terminated the case before the district court, and because he had

not sufficiently pled punitive damages. Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss

Count XII of Pl.’s Compl. at 3-4. Muir responded to all of those

arguments in his opposition. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. To Dismiss

Count XII of Pl.’s Compl. Nothing about the defendant’s

motion required him to proffer any additional facts in order to

show that he had sufficiently stated a claim for tortious

interference. We therefore reverse the dismissal of that claim.

V

In the final order that it issued following our remand, the

district court again entered judgment for Muir for the actual

damages he sustained because of the Credit Union’s tortious

conversion of his funds, and it directed the Credit Union to

return Muir’s withheld deposit. But it denied Muir’s claims for

interest, lost profits, and punitive damages. Under Virginia law,

whether to award interest is a matter within the trial court’s

discretion, see Skretvedt v. Kouri, 445 S.E.2d 481, 487 (Va.

1994), and we therefore review the district court’s denial of

interest for abuse of discretion. 

Whether to award lost profits or punitive damages, by

contrast, is a question for the jury. See, e.g., Hamilton Dev. Co.

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v. Broad Rock Club, Inc., 445 S.E.2d 140, 144 (Va. 1994);

Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 740 (Va. 1985). At the

post-remand hearing, Muir sought a jury trial on the issue of

damages, Status Hr’g Tr. 15 (Feb. 6, 2007), but the district court

ultimately disposed of Muir’s damage requests on its own, see

Muir, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 5-6. Although the court did not specify

the nature of that disposition, it appears to have granted

summary judgment for the Credit Union with regard to lost

profits and punitive damages. See id. at 5 (noting that a plaintiff

“is required to show sufficient facts and circumstances to permit

a [fact-finder] to make a reasonable estimate” of damages for

lost profits, and holding that Muir “offered no evidence of

malice or a conscious disregard for plaintiff[’]s rights” to

support punitive damages (first alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). We review that grant de novo,

bearing in mind that summary judgment is appropriate only

when there is no genuine dispute as to material facts. 

1. After this court remanded the case for the district court

to consider Muir’s additional damages claims, the court ordered

each party to “submit a proposed schedule of damages” and

indicated that it would hold a “hearing to establish the damages

and fees owed to plaintiff.” Muir, 2007 WL 81962, at *1.

Muir’s schedule stated that he sought $4,365.41 in interest,

calculated at 6% per year for 2 years, 6 months, and 25 days.

Pl.’s Schedule of Damages (J.A. 311). At the hearing, he

explained that this was the period of time his money was

withheld from him by the Credit Union. Status Hr’g Tr. 12-13

(Feb. 6, 2007). The district court denied Muir’s claim for

interest, stating that he had “provided no explanation or

argument in support of this award of interest in his pleadings, or

. . . in his Schedule of Damages.” Muir, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 6.

But there was no more that Muir needed to say. Muir

deposited money in a credit union, which was obligated to pay

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interest on that deposit. Instead, the credit union withheld both

the deposit and the interest. Return of the deposit alone could

not have made him whole. Muir clearly specified both the

interest rate and the time period over which it should be applied.

The Credit Union objected to neither. Under these

circumstances -- and in the absence of any further explanation

as to why interest should not be awarded -- denial of an award

of interest exceeded the scope of the court’s discretion.

2. In the same schedule of damages, Muir requested

$110,750 in lost profits. Although the Credit Union maintains

that Muir “made no proffer of evidence during [the damages]

hearing,” Appellee Credit Union’s Br. 13, that is simply not true.

At the hearing, Muir’s counsel explained that Muir had intended

to use his deposit as a downpayment on the purchase of real

estate, which he had an opportunity to fix up and resell at a

profit. Counsel further proffered that Muir had “already

engaged in an agreement with a young woman whose property

was in foreclosure,” Status Hr’g Tr. 11 (Feb. 6, 2007), and that

he had several other opportunities “lined up,” id. at 10.

Moreover, counsel advised the court that Muir had “a witness

here today” to testify in support of his claims. Id. at 10-11. The

court, however, adjourned the proceeding without hearing from

the witness. In a subsequent order, the court denied Muir’s

request for recovery of lost profits, stating that he had “failed to

provide any factual or legal grounds for any lost profits” and had

“provided no basis to demonstrate that [the Credit Union’s]

actions were the proximate cause of any lost profits.” Muir, 484

F. Supp. 2d at 5. The court indicated that the absence of

“supporting argument” in Muir’s schedule of damages meant

that he had failed to make out his claim. Id.

We disagree. Muir reasonably assumed that the schedule of

damages the court directed him to file was to contain only a list

of the types and amounts of damages he sought, and that he

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The term “schedule of damages” is not defined in any court rule.

Perhaps the closest reference is Local Civil Rule 16.5, which calls on

each party to present “an itemization of damages” in its Pretrial

Statement. D.D.C. CIV. R. 16.5. The Rule states that this itemization

“shall set forth separately each element of damages, and the monetary

amount thereof, the party claims to be entitled to recover of any other

party, including prejudgment interest, punitive damages and attorneys’

fees.” Id. That is what Muir’s schedule of damages set forth. 

would have an opportunity to present supporting evidence and

argument at the hearing the court set “to establish the damages

and fees owed to plaintiff.” Muir, 2007 WL 81962, at *1.4 In

light of the offer of evidence that Muir made at that hearing, the

court could not -- without hearing that evidence -- have

concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact on the

question of lost profits.

3. Finally, we consider the district court’s denial of Muir’s

request for punitive damages. Muir, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 5. The

court noted that, to qualify for punitive damages for a tortious

conversion under Virginia law, a plaintiff must show: (1)

“misconduct or malice, or such recklessness or negligence as

evinces a conscious disregard of the rights of others,” and (2)

that the defendant’s conduct imports “knowledge and

consciousness that injury will result.” Id. (quoting PGI, Inc. v.

Rathe Prods., Inc., 576 S.E.2d 438, 444 (Va. 2003)). The court

found that Muir could not satisfy this standard because: (1) he

offered no evidence of malice or of conscious disregard for his

rights, and (2) the facts and circumstances of the case did not

suggest that the Credit Union had the requisite knowledge or

consciousness that injury would result. Id.

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment

for the Credit Union on the former ground. The court held the

Credit Union responsible for tortious conversion solely because

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Muir had not signed the joint account agreement that otherwise

would have permitted the Credit Union to set off his deposit to

satisfy his father’s debt. Muir, 2005 WL 486034, at *1. The

Credit Union’s normal practice was to require joint account

holders to sign an agreement allowing such set-offs, and it

simply assumed that Muir had signed such an agreement. There

was no evidence that the Credit Union knew that it did not have

a signed document from Muir when it set off his account. 

At the hearing on damages, the only argument that Muir

made to support punitive damages was that the Credit Union

knew he needed the money to pursue a business opportunity

when it wrongfully withheld his funds. Status Hr’g Tr. 6-7 (Feb.

6, 2007). Although this may have been sufficient to create a

genuine issue as to the defendant’s “knowledge and

consciousness that injury w[ould] result,” it was not sufficient

to create a genuine issue on the question of malice or conscious

disregard of rights. Muir did not contend that the Credit Union

knew it did not have a signed document from Muir or otherwise

knew it was not entitled to set off his account. There was

therefore no genuine issue of material fact on the required

element of malice or conscious disregard of the rights of others,

and the district court appropriately granted summary judgment

for the Credit Union.

VI

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

dismissal of Muir’s claim against the Credit Union for breach of

fiduciary duty and its denial of his request for punitive damages

for tortious conversion. We reverse and remand the court’s

rulings that Muir lacked standing to bring his statutory claims

against Dearing, that Muir failed to state a claim against the

Credit Union for tortious interference with a business

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expectancy, and that Muir was not entitled to interest or lost

profits with respect to the Credit Union’s tortious conversion.

So ordered.

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