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Parties Involved:
Jose Geraldo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 6, 2001 Decided November 27, 2001

No. 00-3105

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Jose Geraldo, a/k/a Fifio,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cr00391-02)

Stephen C. Leckar, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Jeffrey W. Bellin, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr. and Arvind Lal, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Henderson, Randolph, and Rogers, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: Searches carried out by federal

agents at two District of Columbia residences--one at 1430

Newton Street, the other at 1823 Newton Street--led to the

arrest, indictment and conviction of Jose Geraldo. In this

appeal Geraldo claims the 1430 Newton Street search violated

the federal knock and announce statute, 18 U.S.C. s 3109,

and exceeded the scope of the search warrant. As to 1823

Newton Street, he maintains that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he did not assert Geraldo's

privacy interest in the premises, thus disabling him from

challenging the search of those premises.

I.

We begin with the Sixth Amendment ineffective counsel

claim. On November 12, 1998, FBI agents executed a search

warrant at Apartment 12 at 1823 Newton Street. A special

agent's affidavit supporting the search warrant gave details of

the FBI's investigation of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine

involving Geraldo, Luis Elias Ortiz and Jesus Antonio Leo.

The affidavit concentrated on three transactions. The first

occurred on August 3, 1998, when Ortiz and Geraldo sold

$1,600 worth of cocaine to two informants. On that day, the

informants met Geraldo at 1430 Newton Street. Geraldo told

one of the informants that he had to go to another location

about 15 minutes away to cook the cocaine, and he asked

them to return in about 45 minutes. FBI agents followed

Geraldo as he walked to 1823 Newton and back to 1430

Newton. Upon his return to 1430 Newton, Geraldo was seen

pulling a bag of crack cocaine out of his pants as he climbed

the stairs. Geraldo then gave the cocaine to Ortiz, who sold

it to one of the informants in the first floor bathroom at 1430

Newton.

The second sale took place on September 14, 1998, when

Geraldo and Leo sold 44.4 grams of cocaine base to the same

two informants for $1,200 in the kitchen at 1430 Newton.

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According to the affidavit, prior to the sale one of the

informants saw Leo cooking the cocaine into a cocaine base in

the kitchen on the second floor at 1430 Newton and saw

Geraldo weigh the crack on a scale in the kitchen.

The third sale occurred on October 5, 1998. The affidavit

stated that on this date, Geraldo sold an informant approximately 60 grams of cocaine base for $1,580 in the hallway

inside the main entrance at 1430 Newton.

The affidavit also provided information about telephone

calls linking 1430 and 1823 Newton Street. A pen register

covering a telephone number at 1430 Newton Street disclosed

more than 60 calls between that number and a number

subscribed to Apartment 12 at 1823 Newton Street.

Based on this information, a magistrate issued a search

warrant for both 1430 Newton Street and Apartment 12 at

1823 Newton Street. The agents also obtained arrest warrants for several individuals, including Geraldo. When agents

executed the search warrant at 1823 Newton Street on November 12, 1998, they found 69.3 grams of crack cocaine, 242

grams of powder cocaine in a padlocked closet, four kilogram

wrappers used for packaging cocaine, and a pot recently used

to cook crack cocaine.

Geraldo, having been charged with a variety of narcoticsrelated crimes, filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained at 1823 Newton. The district court denied the motion

on the ground that Geraldo had not even suggested that he

possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in 1823 Newton, Apartment 12. See Memorandum Order at 4; Rakas v.

Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).

Geraldo now complains that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance in failing to prove his privacy interest in

Apartment 12 at 1823 Newton, an interest Geraldo thinks

could easily have been established. He points to transcripts of

a hearing on a motion to suppress by one of his codefendants, Eligio Pool, and transcripts from the severed trial

of Pool. The transcripts indicate the following: Pool resided

at Apartment 12; Geraldo paid him to use the closet at 1823

Newton to store drugs; Geraldo put a padlock on the closet;

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and Geraldo had a key to enter both Apartment 12 and the

closet within the apartment.

When a defendant first raises a Sixth Amendment claim of

ineffective counsel on direct appeal of his conviction, other

courts of appeals usually refuse to adjudicate it, leaving open

to the defendant the alternative of bringing a collateral

attack. See Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J.

King, Criminal Procedure s 11.7(e) at 631 (2d ed. 1999); see

also United States v. Petty, 1 F.3d 695, 696 (8th Cir. 1993);

United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 651 (4th Cir. 1995);

United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1347 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996). Our practice has been

different. We too generally decline to resolve the issue on

direct appeal, but rather than requiring the defendant to

raise the claim collaterally, we remand to the district court

for an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Fennell, 53

F.3d 1296, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Two exceptions to our

general practice have arisen: when the trial record conclusively shows that the defendant is entitled to no relief; and

when the trial record conclusively shows the contrary. See

id.; United States v. Richardson, 167 F.3d 621, 626 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 895 (1999); United States v.

Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529

U.S. 1005 (2000). We do not remand Geraldo's claim because

it is clear that he cannot prevail.

The defendant bears the burden of proving that his lawyer

made errors "so serious that counsel was not functioning as

the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment" and that

counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Courts "must

indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."

Id. at 689. Geraldo cannot overcome this "strong presumption."

Sound tactical considerations weighed in favor of counsel's

decision not to assert Geraldo's privacy interest in Apartment

12 at 1823 Newton. If Geraldo had testified at the suppression hearing about his interest in the premises, his testimony

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could have been used to impeach him at trial if he took the

stand. See, e.g., United States v. Jaswal, 47 F.3d 539, 543 (2d

Cir. 1995); United States v. Beltran-Gutierrez, 19 F.3d 1287,

1290-91 (9th Cir. 1994). And he would have gained nothing

because his attack on the search would have been frivolous.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984),

evidence will not be suppressed when a police officer reasonably relies in good faith on a warrant issued by a magistrate,

even if the warrant is later determined to be lacking in

probable cause. The affidavit underlying the search warrant

for 1823 Newton did not so clearly lack indicia of probable

cause--indeed, it clearly showed probable cause--to make it

objectively unreasonable for the agents to rely on it. Prejudice cannot result from an attorney's failure to pursue a

frivolous claim. Geraldo's suppression motion amounted to

nothing more, and establishing his privacy interest ran the

risk of damaging his usefulness as a trial witness.

II.

Geraldo's claims relating to the search of 1430 Newton

Street are more serious. On November 12, 1998--the same

day the FBI executed the search warrant at 1823 Newton--

agents sent two informants into 1430 Newton to place a

$3,000 order for 125 grams of cocaine. About five to ten

minutes after the informants placed their order and left the

residence (ostensibly to later return with payment for the

drugs), Geraldo left the townhouse. Agents followed Geraldo,

arrested him and seized several keys in his possession.

A SWAT team then moved in on 1430 Newton pursuant to

a search warrant: one group entered through the basement,

another through the front door. At the basement level, an

FBI agent knocked on the door, yelled "FBI, Search Warrant," and simultaneously used a battering ram to break the

door before throwing a "flash bang" device into the home. (A

"flash bang" is a cylindrical pyrotechnic device that creates a

loud bang when it goes off, diverting the attention of those

nearby.) At the main entrance, agents used Geraldo's keys

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to enter. One of the agents yelled "FBI, Search Warrant" as

the front door was swinging open, and a flash bang device

was then thrown through the open door.

Before entering 1430 Newton, the agents had limited information about the interior of the townhouse. Informants had

told them that it was a large home in which several people

lived, each with access to the common areas, as opposed to a

multi-unit apartment building with distinct apartments inside.

In addition, informants had told agents that there were no

numbers on individual doors inside and that the doors on the

second floor of the townhouse did not have separate locks.

Once inside 1430 Newton Street, the agents learned that

the house did in fact consist of several individual rooms with

locks on the doors. Agents entered all bedrooms, including

those that were locked, in order to locate any persons hiding

within the residence. After locating four persons and speaking with them about which rooms belonged to the persons

named in the warrant, the agents limited their search to

common areas and the rooms of persons, including Geraldo,

named in arrest warrants the agents had obtained.

On the second floor, agents searched the kitchen because

that was an area where a controlled buy had taken place.

They also searched Geraldo's bedroom, as well as a room next

to Geraldo's believed to belong to another man suspected of

drug sales. While searching Geraldo's bedroom, the agents

found a razorblade with cocaine residue hidden between the

mattress and boxsprings of the bed, as well as a key to a

padlock, a passport, and other documents. The key was later

determined to fit a lock on the closet at 1823 Newton Street

containing drugs.

Geraldo's motion to suppress this evidence was on the

grounds that the agents failed to comply with the federal

knock and announce statute and exceeded the scope of the

search warrant. After an evidentiary hearing, the district

court denied the motion, finding that exigent circumstances

warranted the agents' entrance into the home without fully

complying with the federal knock and announce statute and

that the scope of the agents' search was reasonable. In

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executing a federal search warrant, an officer "may break

open any outer or inner door or window of a house ... if,

after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused

admittance...." 18 U.S.C. s 3109. In this case, the

agents--acting pursuant to a predetermined entry plan--did

not wait for a refusal. They announced their presence as

they simultaneously entered the home. The question therefore is not whether they complied with s 3109, but rather

whether exigent circumstances excused compliance.

We put to one side the fact that Geraldo was not at 1430

Newton when the search occurred. Although the Ninth

Circuit has held that the defendant must be present in order

to enjoy the protection of the knock and announce statute, see

Mena v. Simi Valley, 226 F.3d 1031, 1035 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000);

United States v. Valencia-Roldan, 893 F.2d 1080, 1081 n.1

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935 (1990), and the First

Circuit has expressed "serious doubt" whether an absentee

owner may raise a s 3109 claim, United States v. DeLutis,

722 F.2d 902, 908 (1st Cir. 1983), the issue is unnecessary for

us to decide.

The knock and announce procedure need not be followed if

officers have a "reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances,

would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the

effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing

the destruction of evidence." United States v. Ramirez, 523

U.S. 65, 70 (1998). Some courts hold that the presence of a

firearm may not in itself create an exigency sufficient to

excuse compliance with the statute. See, e.g., United States

v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96, 97 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.

Bates, 84 F.3d 790, 795 (6th Cir. 1996). Whatever the merits

of this position, there is agreement that the presence of a

firearm coupled with information such as a suspect's violent

tendencies, criminal record, or specific violent threats is

enough to create an exigency because the weapon might be

used. See, e.g., Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71; United States v.

Harris, 435 F.2d 74, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.

986 (1971); United States v. Nabors, 901 F.2d 1351, 1354 (6th

Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).

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In this case, the agents were not aware before they entered

1430 Newton that any residents had criminal records or

violent tendencies. But they did have information that 1430

Newton had been robbed months earlier and that one man

residing there (Elias Ortiz) had been seen wearing a revolver,

allegedly to protect the residence from additional robberies.

Because the agents had specific knowledge that Ortiz kept a

firearm to protect against intruders and therefore might be

quick to use it, the agents had reason to suspect danger. The

fact that they assembled a SWAT team and took the precaution of using a "flash bang" tends to show that they so viewed

the situation. Because the officers' belief that they were

entering a dangerous situation was objectively reasonable,

they were not required to knock and wait for a response.

Geraldo's remaining argument is that the agents exceeded

the scope of the search warrant at 1430 Newton Street by

continuing to search the townhouse after determining that

there were individual, locked bedrooms within the home,

indicative of a multi-unit dwelling. There is nothing to this.

Upon discovering that 1430 Newton consisted of several

individual rooms secured by padlocks, the agents properly

limited their search to common areas and those rooms inhabited by persons named in the arrest warrants and in the

affidavits accompanying the search warrant. See Maryland

v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987). This was a reasonable

response to protect against an overbroad search of third

persons' rooms not intended to be included within the warrant. Even if the Fourth Amendment rights of third parties--who were not named in the search warrant--were

violated by the agents' entrance into their rooms, see Mena v.

Simi Valley, 226 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2000), the agents did not

infringe upon Geraldo's Fourth Amendment rights when they

searched other individuals' rooms within 1430 Newton. See

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978). In any event,

the cocaine encrusted razor blade, the documents, and the

key to the padlocked closet at 1823 Newton were found in

Geraldo's room.

Affirmed.

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