Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01159/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01159-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Advertising Company
Appellant
The City and County of Denver
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Co~rt ~f Appeals ·remh Ctrcult 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

11 .. !J G 1 G 1990 

:ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 88-1159 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 85-Z-2437) 

Alan A. Armour, Attorney, Littleton, Colorado (Darrell L. 

Campbell, Attorney, Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief), for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Stan M. Sharoff, Assistant City Attorney (Stephen H. Kaplan, City 

Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS,* 

District Judge. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Layn R. Phillips, United States District Judge for 

the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1159 Document: 01019381909 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff National Advertising Company (National), a seller 

of billboard advertising space, seeks a declaratory judgment, 

injunctive relief, and damages stemming from two ordinances 

enacted by defendant City and County of Denver (Denver) that 

restricted billboards along freeways. National claimed that it 

was entitled to relief for violations of the First Amendment, the 

Just Compensation Clause as incorporated into the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal 

protection clauses. In a grant of partial summary judgment and a 

bench trial, the district court rejected all of National's claims. 

We affirm. 

I. 

For many years, Denver had on its books Section 46-4 (the old 

ordinance) prohibiting advertising within 660 feet of the edge of 

the right-of-way of a freeway, "unless such signs advertise or 

pertain wholly to a business conducted on the premises." Rec., 

vol. I, doc. 5, exh. A at 2. Although the old ordinance permitted 

on-site signs with messages concerning the business conducted 

there, no similar exception existed for noncommercial messages. 

The old ordinance was still in effect when the Supreme Court in 

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), ruled 

that a similar ordinance favoring commercial speech over 

noncommercial speech violates the First Amendment. Denver took no 

immediate action respecting the old ordinance, however. 

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Several years later, National's attorney began to talk with 

Denver officials about amending the old ordinance to cure the 

alleged constitutional defect and to allow off-site advertising 

along freeways. Presumably in expectation of such an amendment, 

in 1984 National began to lease space alongside freeways, useable 

solely for erecting and maintaining billboards. Ultimately, 

National entered into thirty-four such leases, with terms of up to 

ten years. 

By July 1985, Denver was responding to various pressures for 

reform of the old ordinance. National sponsored and submitted 

proposed legislation to Denver on July 9, 1985. See Appellee's 

Exhibit Addendum to Answer Brief, Def.'s exh. Cat 2. 

Anti-billboard forces also contemplated submitting their own 

proposal. 

On July 17, 1985, Dorothy Nepa, Denver's Zoning 

Administrator, notified the various billboard companies operating 

in Denver, including National, of proposed legislation amending or 

replacing the old ordinance. In her letter she announced: 

"Should this legislation be approved by City Council, 

applications for permits for such devices will be 

accepted in the Department of Zoning Administration on 

the effective date of the ordinance. Review and 

processing of these applications will commence after 

this date." 

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Appellate Case: 88-1159 Document: 01019381909 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 3 
Id. Def.'s exh. B. At trial, the district court interpreted this 

letter as an implicit indication that new applications would not 

be accepted pending enactment of a new ordinance. See rec., vel. 

VII, at 7. The district court also found that, as of July 17, 

Denver had ceased enforcing the old ordinance. Shortly 

thereafter, on August 1, National submitted fifteen applications 

for billboard permits along freeways, all of which were simply 

returned. 

By September 25 and 26, the efforts of the various pro- and 

anti-billboard forces resulted in the submission to City Council 

of two different bills repealing the old ordinance. National 

supported and lobbied for CB 560, which would have permitted 

off-site commercial billboards along freeways subject to certain 

spacing and other limitations. See Appellee's Exhibit Addendum, 

Pl.'s exh. 36. The anti-billboard groups in Denver supported 

CB 561, which would have continued the prohibition of off-site 

commercial billboards. See id. at Pl.'s exh. 37. At hearings 

before the City Council on October 28, at which National's counsel 

testified extensively, CB 560 passed by one vote and CB 561 failed 

by an equal margin. 

On November 1, Denver's mayor vetoed CB 560. In his veto 

message, he supported the prompt repeal of the old ordinance and 

urged City Council to replace it with an ordinance preventing any 

increase in billboards. He also instructed the City Council 

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Appellate Case: 88-1159 Document: 01019381909 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 4 
sponsors of CB 561 to work with the City Attorney's office in 

drafting a suitable replacement. That same day National submitted 

thirty-four applications for off-site billboards along freeways. 

Other companies submitted approximately sixty more. 

On November 12, National filed this lawsuit seeking an 

injunction, declaratory relief, and damages arising from the 

alleged enforcement of the old ordinance, which it claimed 

violated the First Amendment under Metromedia and the due process 

and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

National also sought just compensation for an alleged 

unconstitutional taking of its thirty-four leaseholds. 

On November 14, two weeks after National submitted its 

applications, Denver denied all of them, stating: 

"Reason for Denial: Within 660 ft. of [freeway] ... Pending legislation, if passed, will repeal Section 46-4 

and enact restrictions on freeways which will require 

the denial of this application under zoning ordinances." 

Id. at Pl.'s exh. 1. The district court found that the city 

attorney's office and at least two city council members were 

actively pursuing a follow-up to the narrowly-defeated CB 561 in 

the time period between the veto of CB 560 and submission of the 

applications, on November 1, and their denial on November 14. The 

court also found that a proposed replacement ordinance identical 

to CB 561 was filed in City Council on November 14. Finally, the 

district court concluded that National was aware of the status of 

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Appellate Case: 88-1159 Document: 01019381909 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 5 
CB 561 and its successor during this period through the 

involvement of its counsel, Gil Goldstein. 

On November 22, notice was given that a public hearing on the 

proposed replacement ordinance, CB 712, was set for December 16. 

Both traffic safety and aesthetic justifications were debated at 

the hearing, and CB 712 (the new ordinance), 1 was enacted. In 

addition to repealing the old ordinance, the new ordinance bans 

all off-site commercial signs within 660 feet of a freeway " 

Within this area, on-site commercial signs under a certain size 

and noncommercial signs are permitted. Both parties agree that 

application of the new ordinance requires that a distinction be 

made between off-site noncommercial signs and off-site commercial 

signs. To aid in this distinction, the new ordinance defined an 

"off-site commercial sign" as follows: 

"A sign which directs attention to a business, 

commodity, service, entertainment or attraction sold, 

offered or existing elsewhere than upon the same zone 

lot where such sign is displayed. This definition does 

not include noncommercial signs." 

Id. at Pl.'s exh. 38. 

When the new ordinance passed, National amended its complaint 

to add claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as 

for damages under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982) based on the new 

ordinance's alleged facial unconstitutionality. National premised 

1 The new ordinance was in all respects identical to CB 561, 

which earlier had failed by one vote. 

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its new claims not only on the First Amendment, but also on the 

due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and the proscription against taking property without 

just compensation. National retained the claims concerning the 

now-repealed old ordinance. 

On summary judgment, the district court held the new 

ordinance facially constitutional and concluded that National's 

requests for declaratory and injunctive relief arising from the 

unconstitutionality of the old ordinance were mooted by its 

repeal. After a bench trial on the section 1983 claim for damages 

and the inverse condemnation claim involving the old ordinance, 

the district court ruled for Denver. In its oral findings of fact 

and conclusions of law, the district court held that the "pending 

ordinance doctrine" foreclosed these claims. National has 

appealed all of the district court's rulings. 

II. 

In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, 

we apply the same standard as the court below, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c), and examine the district court's conclusions de novo. See 

United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. Gold Star Sausage 

Co., 897 F.2d 1022, 1024 (lOth Cir. 1990). We review a district 

court's findings of fact at trial under the clearly erroneous 

standard, under which we will uphold a fact-finding unless we are 

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"'left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.'" Everaard v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 842 F.2d 

1186, 1191 (lOth Cir. 1988)(quoting United States v. United States 

Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). The district court's 

conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See In re 

Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

III. 

A. Constitutionality of the New Ordinance 

Denver's new ordinance prohibits off-site commercial signs 

within 660 feet of a freeway. On-site commercial and 

noncommercial signs are permitted. National first argues that 

this partial ban illegally regulates commercial speech. 

Commercial speech receives less First Amendment protection 

than other constitutionally safeguarded expression. See Central 

Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 u.s. 557, 563 

(1980). To determine whether regulation of commercial speech is 

consistent with the First Amendment, the Court in Central Hudson 

has provided a four-part inquiry: (1) the speech must concern 

lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) the asserted 

governmental interest in regulating must be substantial; (3) the 

regulation must directly advance the governmental interest 

asserted; and (4) the regulation may not be more extensive than is 

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necessary to serve that interest. Id. at 566. See also Oklahoma 

Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490, 499-500 (lOth Cir. 1983) 

{applying Central Hudson four-part test), rev'd on other grounds, 

Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984). 

National's facial attack does not implicate the first part of 

the Central Hudson test since we deal here with no particular 

example of commercial speech. The governmental interests 

asserted, preserving aesthetic values and traffic safety, are 

clearly "substantial" within the meaning of the second part. See 

Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08 (traffic safety and appearance of 

city are substantial governmental interests). National contends, 

however, that these interests are not "directly advanced" under 

the third part because permitting on-site commercial and 

noncommercial signs next to freeways already frustrates the 

asserted regulatory purposes. The Court in Metromedia addressed 

this argument: 

"[F]irst ... , the prohibition of offsite advertising 

is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic 

safety and esthetics. This is not altered by the fact 

that the ordinance is underinclusive because it permits 

onsite advertising. Second, the city may believe that 

offsite advertising, with its periodically changing 

content, presents a more acute problem than does onsite 

advertising." 

Id. at 511. In addition, the preference for noncommercial over 

commercial advertising under the new ordinance is the kind of 

underinclusiveness the First Amendment tolerates. 

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The final inquiry in Central Hudson is whether the 

prohibition is more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted 

interests. Rejecting a strict "least restrictive means" standard, 

the Court in Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. 

Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989), noted that the Central Hudson test 

must reflect the relatively limited measure of protection afforded 

commercial speech. Id. at 3033. The Court therefore required 

only a "reasonable fit" between legislative ends and means. Id. 

at 3033-35. The fit need "not necessarily [be] perfect, . but 

one whose scope [must be] 'in proportion to the interest served.'" 

Id. at 3035 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 u.s. 191, 203 (1982)). A 

"narrowly tailored" regulation which does "not 'burden 

substantially more speech than is necessary to further the 

government's legitimate interests'" will suffice. Id. at 3034 

(quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 s. Ct. 2746, 2758 

(1989)). 

Denver's new ordinance easily satisfies this requirement by 

prohibiting substantially less speech than a total ban, which 

National concedes is a constitutional alternative. 2 Even if 

something less than the prohibition of off-site commercial 

2 The Court in Metromedia observed that a content-neutral total 

ban may be permissible as a time, place and manner restriction, so 

long as other avenues of communication are available. See 

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 u.s. 490, 516 (1981) 

(quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 

Council, Inc., 425 u.s. 748, 771 (1976)); National Advertising Co. 

v. City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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billboards might serve the same safety and aesthetic purposes, the 

limited prohibition here is certainly the "most direct and perhaps 

the only effective approach." Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508. We 

therefore conclude that the new ordinance, considered facially, 

permissibly regulates commercial speech. 

National also contends that the distinction between 

noncommercial and commercial speech which Denver must make to 

apply the new ordinance makes it invalid on its face. According 

to National, the new ordinance's failure to make a clear 

distinction between the two types of speech will result in the 

unconstitutional prohibition of noncommercial speech. The new 

ordinance also gives Denver's zoning authorities unfettered 

discretion to make content-based decisions, National maintains, 

concerning where to draw the line between commercial and 

noncommercial speech. 

We agree with National that Denver's attempt to distinguish 

the two types of speech is not a model of clarity. Denver first 

defined commercial speech by adopting language implicitly approved 

by the Supreme Court in Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 

439 U.S. 808 (1978)(dismissed for want of substantial federal 

question); see also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 499 (approving Suffolk 

language). 3 Noncommercial speech was then defined as embracing 

3 The ordinance in Suffolk defined a prohibited billboard as " 1 [a] sign which directs attention to a business, commodity, 

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any speech not within the definition of commercial speech. We 

cannot agree, however, that the new ordinance's failure to define 

the distinction with total clarity makes the ordinance facially 

invalid. 

The Supreme Court and other courts have approved of statutes, 

orders, ordinances and the like which require a distinction 

between commercial and noncommercial speech. See, ~, Board of 

Trustees, 109 S. Ct. at 3034-35 (resolution prohibiting only 

commercial speech subject to less constitutional scrutiny); 

Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 

U.S. 328, 344 (1986)(validating regulations prohibiting 

advertising aimed at residents); National Advertising Co. v. City 

of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir. 1988)(billboard ordinance 

construed as limiting only off-site commercial messages valid); 

Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 

173-74 (4th Cir. 1988)(same); Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. 

City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1987)(same); Major 

Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 

1272 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 1102 (1987)(same). 

Furthermore, Supreme Court decisions have provided ample 

guidance concerning the "common-sense distinction" between 

service, entertainment, or attraction sold, offered or existing 

elsewhere than upon the same lot where such sign is displayed.'" 

Metromedia, 453 u.s. at 499. The new ordinance adopts this 

language except for the addition of the word "zone" before "lot." 

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commercial and noncommercial speech. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 

Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug 

Prods. Corp. 463 u.s. 60, 66 (1983)(defining commercial speech). 

We agree with the Fourth Circuit that 

"sufficient guidance is given for such determination by 

City officials by the various decisions of the Court 

relating to billboards and commercial speech. . '[N]o codification of these terms is necessary, since 

the Supreme Court has already defined them .... ' 

Although an occasional marginal case might arise raising 

the question of whether on the particular facts the 

definition of commercial speech would be correct, such 

an infrequent possibility should not in itself justify a 

generalized charge that the ordinance itself is vague, 

given the guidance afforded by court decisions in the 

area." 

Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1272-73 (citation omitted). 

Our conclusion that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally 

vague also forecloses National's argument concerning city 

officials' "unfettered discretion" to determine what is regulated 

commercial speech. Far from being unfettered, Denver is bound by 

judicial precedent in determining what is commercial speech. Cf. 

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 u.s. 104, 110 (1972)(judicial 

precedent relevant in construing words of statute in vagueness 

challenge) . 

National's argument that the ordinance will overreach to 

prohibit noncommercial speech also cannot stand. "Where 

expressive conduct is involved, 'the overbreadth of a statute must 

not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to 

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the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 

835 F.2d 735, 742 (lOth Cir. 1987)(quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 

413 U.S. 601, 605 (1973)). The requirement of substantial 

overbreadth avoids invalidation of a statute "where, despite some 

possibly impermissible application, the 'remainder of the statute 

• . • covers a whole range of easily identifiable and 

constitutionally prescribable • conduct • • f II Secretary 

of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 u.s. 947, 964-65 

(1984)(quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-581 

(1973)). Even with the guidance contained in the judicial 

definitions, some speech admittedly will be difficult to 

categorize. 4 But National has failed to show in this case that 

more than a small percentage of conceivable applications will 

raise serious definitional questions. Absent such a showing, 

National must demonstrate that the ordinance as applied to it is 

unconstitutional. ACORN, 835 F.2d at 742. National has not 

attempted to launch an "as applied" attack. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the new ordinance is facially consistent with the 

First Amendment. 5 

4 "It will always be true that the fertile legal 'imagination 

can conjure up hypothetical cases in which the meaning of 

[disputed] terms will be in nice question.'" Grayned v. City of 

Rockford, 408 u.s. 104, 110 n.l5 (1972)(quoting American 

Communications Ass'n v. Dauds, 339 u.s. 382, 412 (1950)). 

5 National argues on appeal for the first time that the 

district court erred in deciding the constitutionality of CB 712 

on summary judgment because plaintiff was denied an evidentiary 

hearing to demonstrate the statute's facial invalidity. We 

disagree. We said in ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 835 F.2d 735, 740 

(lOth Cir. 1987) that "a first amendment challenge to the facial 

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B. Requests for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 

from Enforcement of the Old Ordinance 

In its amended complaint, National requested a declaration 

that the old ordinance was unconstitutional, and an injunction 

prohibiting its enforcement or an order requiring Denver to grant 

its applications for off-site advertising permits. Approximately 

one month after National filed its amended complaint, the old 

ordinance was repealed. On the basis of that repeal, the district 

court dismissed as moot National's claims for declaratory and 

injunctive relief on summary judgment. On appeal, National argues 

that the district court should not have dismissed the claims for 

prospective relief because it had a right to issuance of the 

permits before the repeal of the old ordinance. 

Regardless of the propriety of Denver's denial of National's 

permit applications, the district court was correct in dismissing 

National's claims for prospective relief as moot. Federal court 

jurisdiction depends on the existence of a case or controversy 

"'admitting of specific relief through a decree of a 

conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion 

advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state 

of facts.' The controversy must exist at all stages of 

the proceedings, 'not merely at the time the complaint 

validity of a statute is a strictly legal question; it does not 

involve the application of the statute in a specific factual 

setting . . . . (T]he facial validity of a statute is decided by 

reference to all of the conduct that is proscribed by the 

statute." The issue was properly decided on summary judgment. 

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is filed.' The relief sought must be capable of 

addressing the alleged harm." 

Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 748 

F.2d 1415, 1418 (lOth Cir. 1984)(citations omitted), cert. denied, 

471 u.s. 1125 (1985). 

At the time the district court held the claims moot, the new 

ordinance had been enacted and the old ordinance repealed. A 

declaratory judgment on the validity of a repealed ordinance is a 

textbook example of "'advising what the law would be upon a 

hypothetical state of facts.'" !do;~ also United States Dep't 

of the Treasury v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1986)(amendment 

of federal statute excising portion under constitutional attack 

moots appeal); Taxpayers for the Animas-La Plata Referendum v. 

Animas-La Plata Water Conservancy Dist., 739 F.2d 1472, 1478-79 

(lOth Cir. 1984)(enactment of superseding state law mooted actions 

for injunctive and declaratory relief). 

The district court's holding that the new ordinance is 

constitutional similarly renders meaningless any injunctive relief 

National seeks. Even if the permits had been issued, Denver could 

have revoked them under the new ordinance in effect at the time 

the district court ruled. See Cline v. City of Boulder, 168 Colo. 

112, 450 P.2d 335, 338 (Colo. 1969) (en banc)(municipality may 

revoke permit where zoning changed to prohibit use absent material 

change in reliance on issued permit). Thus, even assuming 

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National was entitled to a permit before enactment of the new 

ordinance, it would have been immediately revocable from the time 

the new ordinance was enacted. Because the requested injunctive 

relief after enactment of the new ordinance would be meaningless, 

National's claim for injunctive relief is also moot. 6 

C. National's Damages Claims 

National sought damages under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 arising from 

Denver's alleged enforcement of an unconstitutional ordinance. 

National also brought a claim for inverse condemnation of its 

thirty-four billboard leaseholds alongside freeways. After a 

bench trial on these issues, the district court dismissed the 

damage claims and the condemnation claim on the theory that 

National's applications were denied not by virtue of enforcement 

of the old ordinance, but because of the pending new ordinance. 

National takes issue not only with the district court's 

fact-findings, but also with its application of the "pending 

ordinance doctrine." According to this doctrine, a municipality 

may deny an application for a license or permit on the basis of a 

pending ordinance prohibiting the requested use. See 8 

E. McQuillan, Municipal Corporations§ 25.155 (3d ed. 1983). The 

6 The enactment of the new ordinance makes meritless National's 

argument that Denver's action is "capable of repetition, yet 

evading review" within the meaning of Southern Pac. Terminal Co. 

v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 u.s. 498, 515 (1911). 

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rule is subject to two provisos: (1) the municipality cannot 

unreasonably or arbitrarily refuse or delay issuance of a permit, 

and (2) the ordinance must be "pending" when the application is 

denied. "Pending" in this context does not require that the 

proposal be before the city council, but only that "the 

appropriate administrative department of the city must be actively 

pursuing it." Id. 

Colorado joined the majority of jurisdictions7 when it 

applied a variant of the pending ordinance doctrine in the case of 

Crittenden v. Hasser, 41 Colo. App. 235, 585 P.2d 928 (Colo. Ct. 

App. 1978). In Crittenden, the plaintiff applied for a fermented 

malt beverage outlet license while a proposed zoning change 

prohibiting such a use was under review. The proposed zoning 

change was adopted and the application was denied. In affirming 

the denial of the license on the basis of the zoning resolution, 

the court stated: 

"This authority to enact a zoning resolution, and 

thereby restrict the use of property, exists even though 

an application for a license involving that use is 

pending, the only proviso being that the Board had not 

unreasonably or arbitrarily refused or delayed issuance 

of the license. See 8 E. McQuillan, Municipal 

Corporations § 25.155 (3rd ed. J. Kightlinger 1976 

rev.); ••. This is particularly so where, as here, 

adoption of the zoning resolution was pending at the 

7 See Annotation, Retroactive Effect of Zoning Regulation, 

Absence of Saving Clause, on Pending Application for Building 

Permit, 50 A.L.R. 3d 596, 607 (1972)("zoning regulation may be 

retroactively applied to deny an application for a building 

permit, even though the permit could have been lawfully issued 

the time of application"), and cases cited therein. 

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time the application for the fermented malt beverage 

license was made." 

Id. at 929. Significantly, the court invoked the pending 

ordinance doctrine as stated in McQuillan to justify its result. 

The district court specifically found that National was 

deeply involved in proposing new legislation to Denver to replace 

the old ordinance. At the time National's applications were 

submitted, the old ordinance was not being enforced, and Denver 

had notified National of this fact and that applications would be 

considered based only on proposed replacement legislation. 8 When 

CB 560 was vetoed -- the same day National submitted its 

applications -- the Mayor specifically urged the proponents of the 

narrowly-defeated CB 561 (later CB 712, the new ordinance) to 

resubmit it. At least two city counci,l members continued with 

this effort to fill the void left by CB 560's veto. The district 

court found that National was aware of these developments. The 

district court also found that CB 712 was filed in City Council 

8 National challenges the findings of the district court that 

the July 17 letter to the billboard companies implicitly 

communicated that no application would be accepted pending 

enactment of a new ordinance and that the old ordinance was no 

longer enforced. The findings are not clearly erroneous. To the 

contrary, Denver's July 17 letter clearly communicates its 

intention to consider permits only under the proposed replacement 

legislation. National's argument that Denver's written response 

in denying its permit applications belies this intention is 

without substance. The old ordinance was mentioned only in the 

context of its repeal: "Pending legislation, if passed, will 

repeal Section 4-64." That Denver mentioned the 660 foot boundary 

as a "reason for denial" is similarly inconclusive, since both the 

old ordinance and the proposed new ordinance contain the identical 

660 foot boundary limitation. 

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two weeks after the veto, the same day the applications were 

denied. 

We agree with the .district court's conclusion that Denver 

properly denied the permits under the pending ordinance doctrine. 

Denver was actively pursuing enactment of CB 561 (later CB 712) 

well before National submitted its applications. During the time 

the applications were filed with Denver, CB 561 was in the process 

of being resubmitted. Denver acted promptly on National's 

November 1 applications, delivering responses in two weeks. The 

responses referred to proposed legislation which, at the time of 

denial, was before the city council. CB 712 was enacted into law 

approximately one month later. None of these developments 

unfairly surprised National, since it knew of the status of CB 

561, later CB 712, at all relevant times. As we have held the new 

ordinance constitutional, the applications were lawfully denied 

and National's section 1983 claims accordingly fail. 

D. Inverse Condemnation 

The district court held that because the permits were 

properly denied under the pending new ordinance, the denial did 

not result in an inverse condemnation. National claims on appeal 

that the denial rendered its billboard leaseholds worthless. 

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Regardless of the basis for the denial of the permits, or of 

whether a taking occurred, National's claim for a regulatory 

taking based on a zoning ordinance must be dismissed as unripe. 

See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 

473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985). In Williamson County, the Court 

indicated that "a property owner has not suffered a violation of 

the Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully 

attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures 

provided by the State for obtaining such compensation." Id. at 

195. National has not indicated in this case that it has 

unsuccessfully sought compensation under the eminent domain 

procedures of Colorado. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-1-101 et seq. 

(1982). These procedures are available to an inverse condemnee to 

obtain compensation for an alleged "taking." See Linnebur v. 

Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 716 P . 2d 1120, 1123 (Colo. 1986){en 

banc){citing Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 184 Colo. 

360, 520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974)(inverse condemnation action to be 

tried as if eminent domain proceeding)). We accordingly affirm 

the district court. 

IV. 

To summarize, we hold that the new ordinance is facially 

valid under the First Amendment. We hold further that National ' s 

claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. National's 

damage claims for deprivation o f constitutional rights ari sing 

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from denial of its applications for permits to construct signs 

fail in light of our conclusion that the denials were properly 

based on a facially valid pending ordinance. Finally, National's 

inverse condemnation claim is unripe. 

The district court is AFFIRMED. 

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