Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00613/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00613-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terris L. French
Plaintiff
United Parcel Service, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

TERRIS L. FRENCH, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CASE NO.: 2:16-cv-613-MHT-WC 

 ) 

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 

ORDER & 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 Before the court is Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 

Claim (Doc. 6) and Memorandum in support thereof (Doc. 6-1), and Defendant’s Motion 

to Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, or in the Alternative, Renewed Rule 12(b)(6) 

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 13). On July 29, 2016, the United 

States District Judge referred the case to the undersigned “for consideration and disposition 

or recommendation on all pretrial matters as may be appropriate.” Doc. 4. 

On August 23, 2016, the undersigned entered an Order (Doc. 8) directing Plaintiff 

to show cause, on or before September 13, 2016, as to why Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s original complaint should not be granted. Plaintiff did not file a response with 

the court during that time. The court then entered an Order (Doc. 11) directing Plaintiff to 

file a status report regarding whether he intended to pursue his case. Plaintiff did not file 

a status report, but instead filed an “Amended Complaint and Answer to Defendant’s Rule 

12(B)(6) Partial Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. 12) on November 3, 2016. That filing makes 

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no argument as to why Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss should not be granted, but 

instead, it provides the court with an amended complaint that contains minor alterations 

and that asserts an additional claim of retaliation, which was not part of the original 

complaint. Compare, generally, Doc. 1 with Doc. 12. On November 11, 2016, Defendant 

filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s amended complaint as untimely, or in the alternative, to 

renew its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s amended complaint. See Doc. 

13. The undersigned entered an Order (Doc. 14) directing Plaintiff to show cause as to 

why Defendant’s motion should not be granted on or before December 5, 2016. Plaintiff 

did not file a response. Defendant’s motions are ripe for recommendation to the District 

Judge. 

 Before discussing the merits of Defendant’s motions, the court first turns to 

Plaintiff’s filing entitled: “Amended Complaint and Answer to Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) 

Partial Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. 12). In that filing, Plaintiff presents no argument as to 

why Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s original complaint should not be granted. 

Instead, the content of the filing is an amended complaint, which is largely the same as the 

original complaint. Plaintiff’s original complaint contains two claims: (1) a racial 

discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII, and (2) a pattern and practice claim pursuant to 

Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Doc. 1 at 3. Plaintiff’s amended complaint contains 

the aforementioned claims, adds a claim for retaliation pursuant to Title VII, see Doc. 12 

at 6-7, asserts the racial discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 

see id. at 4-5, and alleges that the pattern and practice claim is based upon Defendant’s 

creation of a hostile work environment in addition to the previous basis of disparate 

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treatment, see id. at 6. Otherwise, Plaintiff asserts the same factual matter in both 

complaints, and requests the same relief.1

 Compare Doc. 1 at 2-3 with Doc. 12 at 2-4, 7. 

Notably, Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint is filed outside of the allotted time for 

amendment as a matter of course. Plaintiff did not request permission from the court to 

amend his complaint prior to his filing, and he did not receive written consent from 

Defendant as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. 

Having considered Plaintiff’s filing, the undersigned construes it as a motion to 

amend his complaint. Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend “shall be freely given when 

justice so requires.” Thus, 

[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a 

proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his 

claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such 

as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, 

undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 

amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the 

rules require, be “freely given.” 

Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Patel v. Georgia Dep’t BHDD, 485 

F. App’x 982, 982 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Despite the rule that leave to amend should be given 

freely, the court may deny leave to amend on numerous grounds, including the futility of 

the amendment. Futility justifies the denial of leave to amend where the complaint, as 

amended, would still be subject to dismissal.”). The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly 

adopted the principle that “a pro se litigant generally must be given at least one opportunity 

 

1

 With regards to requested relief, Plaintiff’s amended complaint also asks the court to “allow Plaintiff 

additional time to properly remedy and cure all defects.” Doc. 12 at 7. 

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to amend his complaint.” Cornelius v. Bank of Am., NA, 585 F. App’x 996, 1000 (11th 

Cir. 2014). While there are exceptions to this principle, as noted above, the undersigned 

concludes that none apply.2

 As such, the undersigned will grant Plaintiff’s motion, as 

construed to amend his complaint, and will proceed to examine Defendant’s renewed 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint. 

 Defendant argues that Count Two of Plaintiff’s amended complaint, which alleges 

a claim for “pattern and practice” under Title VII and 28 U.S.C. § 1981, should be 

dismissed. Doc. 6-1 at 2-4; Doc. 13-1 at 9-10. Defendant asserts that “[s]uch a claim is 

not recognized in the Eleventh Circuit in the context of a single-private-plaintiff case. . . .” 

Doc. 6-1 at 2; see also Doc. 13-1 at 10 (“[A]s stated above and previously in [Defendant’s] 

Partial Motion to Dismiss [ ], Plaintiff’s claim for pattern and practice is not a viable legal 

theory under these circumstances in the Eleventh Circuit.”). The undersigned agrees. 

 “A plaintiff may not bring a pattern and practice claim solely on his own behalf.” 

Garrett v. Day and Zimmerman, NPS, Case No.: 5:13-cv-1297-SGC, 2016 WL 4942070, 

at *12 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2016); see also Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 

965 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that “[a] pattern or practice claim for [declaratory and 

injunctive relief against an ongoing act of intentional discrimination] may also be brought 

under Title VII as a class action, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), by 

one or more similarly situated employees.”); Mims v. Tenn. Valley Auth. Bd. of Dirs., No. 

 

2

 Defendant argues that allowing amendment would be futile and would cause undue delay. Doc. 13-1 at 

5-9. The undersigned disagrees, considering that one of Plaintiff’s changes to his complaint adds 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981 as a basis of relief for his racial discrimination claim. 

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5:13-cv-672-CLS, 2014 WL 3689789, at *5 (N.D. Ala. July 22, 2014) (noting that Eleventh 

Circuit caselaw supports the argument that a private litigant is not permitted to maintain a 

pattern or practice claim unless the claim is brought and certified as a class action); Rollins 

v. Ala. Cmty. Coll. Sys., 814 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1316 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (“In Davis v. CocaCola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955 (11th Cir. 2008), the Eleventh Circuit held that a private 

litigant cannot maintain a pattern or practice claim unless it is brought as a class action and 

the class is ultimately certified.”). Here, it is clear that Plaintiff brings his claim on his own 

behalf, and not as a class action.3

 Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot assert a pattern or practice 

claim against Defendant, and Plaintiff has not provided the court with argument to the 

contrary. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s pattern and practice claim is due to be 

granted. 

Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim should be dismissed 

because he “has supplied no factual allegations to show that he engaged in any statutorilyprotected activity, a necessary prerequisite to filing a retaliation claim.” Doc. 13-1 at 9-

10. 

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to file a “short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

 

3

 Section 707(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also empowers the Government to bring a pattern or practice 

claim on behalf of a class of similarly-situated employees. Davis, 516 F.3d 955, 964-65. Obviously, 

Plaintiff does not fit within that provision. 

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me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In general, then, a pleading is insufficient if it offers 

only mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557) (a complaint does not suffice under Rule 8(a) “if it tenders ‘naked 

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”). Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint 

“‘must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief which 

is plausible on its face.’” Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 1051 (11th Cir. 

2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “A claim is factually plausible where the facts 

alleged permit the court to reasonably infer that the defendant’s alleged misconduct was 

unlawful. Factual allegations that are ‘“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability,’ 

however, are not facially plausible.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal citations 

omitted). 

 As a general matter, “[i]n the case of a pro se action . . . the court should construe 

the complaint more liberally than it would formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Powell 

v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990). Although district courts must apply a 

“less stringent standard” to the pleadings submitted by a pro se plaintiff, such “‘leniency 

does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an 

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 

760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 

132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)). 

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 Here, Plaintiff has asserted no factual matter that would suggest a Title VII 

retaliation claim. In order to assert a claim for retaliation, Plaintiff must assert: 

(1) that he engaged in statutorily protected activity; 

(2) that he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and 

(3) that there was a causal relation between the protected activity and the adverse 

action. 

Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). As to element 

one, a plaintiff engages in statutorily protected activities when he complains to the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) or to his supervisor about illegal 

discrimination. Ambus v. AutoZoners, LLC, 71 F. Supp. 1280, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2014) 

(citing Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms. Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 715 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(emphasis added)). 

Plaintiff’s pertinent factual assertions are as follows. Plaintiff asserts that he was 

having a conversation with a company driver when he was approached by an African 

American co-worker, who became upset with Plaintiff because he believed Plaintiff and 

the driver were talking about him. Doc. 12 at 2, ¶¶ 7, 8. An altercation between Plaintiff 

and his co-worker ensued, and Plaintiff was injured. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 9-11. Plaintiff reported 

the incident to Mr. Aaron Coleman, who then reported the incident to a manager. Id. at 3, 

¶ 12. Subsequently, Plaintiff and his co-worker were terminated from their employment. 

Id. at 3, ¶ 15, 16. After termination of his employment, Plaintiff alleges that he filed “a 

discrimination charge of racial discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission.” Id. at 4, ¶ 21. 

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Upon review of Plaintiff’s allegations, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has 

failed to allege a claim for Title VII retaliation. First, while Plaintiff alleges that he filed a 

complaint with the EEOC, which could be considered statutorily protected activity, 

Plaintiff’s complaint was filed after Plaintiff’s termination. Therefore, Plaintiff could not 

have “suffered a materially adverse employment action,” as required by the second element 

of a retaliation claim, as a result of his complaint to the EEOC. Second, Plaintiff alleges 

that he made a report to management, which, once again, could be considered statutorily 

protected activity. However, there is no indication that Plaintiff’s report to management 

regarded illegal discrimination. Instead, Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that he reported the 

physical altercation that occurred between himself and an African American co-worker 

that caused injury to Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff did not engage in statutorily protected 

activity by reporting the incident to management, as required by the first element of a 

retaliation claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support a Title VII 

retaliation claim.4

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned ORDERS that Plaintiff’s “Amended 

Complaint and Answer to Defendant’s Rule 12(B)(6) Partial Motion to Dismiss” be 

CONSTRUED as a Motion to Amend. The undersigned ORDERS that such motion, as 

construed, be GRANTED. 

 

4

 Although Plaintiff requests, in his amended complaint, that the court allow him “additional time to 

properly remedy and cure all defects,” see Doc. 12 at 7, the undersigned does not find that allowing Plaintiff 

to amend his complaint for a second time would cure the defect in his retaliation claim. Therefore, such 

amendment would be futile, and, to the extent that Plaintiff is requesting an opportunity to amend his 

complaint a second time, such request is denied. Furthermore, as Plaintiff will be permitted to file 

objections to the findings set forth in this Recommendation, he is afforded the requisite opportunity to be 

heard about the deficiencies in his retaliation claim prior to any dismissal of the claim. 

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The undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) be DENIED, and that, in the alternative, Defendant’s 

Renewed Rule 12(b)(6) Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be 

GRANTED (Doc. 13). Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s 

pattern and practice claim (Count Two) and Plaintiff’s retaliation claim (Count Three) be 

DISMISSED. The undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s original Motion to 

Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 6) be DENIED as MOOT. Further, the 

undersigned 

RECOMMENDS that this matter, with respect to Count One of the amended 

complaint, be referred back to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for further proceedings. 

It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file any objections to the 

said Recommendation on or before January 3, 2016. A party must specifically identify 

the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is 

made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file 

written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance 

with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo determination 

by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives 

the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjectedto factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon 

grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 

1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Stein v. Lanning Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Plaintiff is 

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advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not 

appealable. 

Done this 19th day of December, 2016. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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