Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-03455/USCOURTS-ca7-19-03455-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Antwon Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 11, 2020

Decided May 11, 2020

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 19‐3455

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JAMES ANTWON JOHNSON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:16‐CR‐30021‐SMY‐1

Staci M. Yandle,

Judge.

O R D E R

After serving 37 months in prison for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1), James Antwon Johnson began a three‐year term of supervised release. Only

three months later, he began violating the terms of his supervision: As he later

admitted, he possessed a gun and ammunition, endangered a child’s welfare,

unlawfully possessed marijuana, failed to report to probation, failed to notify probation

that he had been questioned by law enforcement, and failed to make monthly payments

towards his financial penalty. The government charged him separately under

§ 922(g)(1) for possessing the gun and ammunition. The district court revoked his

supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and (g), and imposed a 14‐month prison term

to run consecutive to his anticipated sentence on the new felon‐in‐possession charge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 19‐3455    Page 2

Johnson filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is

frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).   

At the outset we note that the Constitution does not provide a right to counsel in

a revocation proceeding when, as here, the defendant does not contest the grounds for

revocation or assert substantial and complex arguments in mitigation of the sentence.

See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–90 (1973); United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930,

932–33 (7th Cir. 2006). The Anders safeguards therefore need not govern our review, but

it is our practice to apply them nonetheless. See United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856,

857 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the

issues that an appeal of this kind might involve, and Johnson has not responded to

counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Because the analysis appears thorough, we limit our

review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776

(7th Cir. 2014).   

Counsel begins by telling us that Johnson does not wish to challenge his

admissions to the violations underlying the revocation of his supervised release. For

that reason, counsel appropriately refrains from discussing whether Johnson’s

admissions were knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Wheaton, 610 F.3d 389, 390

(7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002).   

Counsel next questions whether Johnson could challenge the calculation of his

imprisonment range but rightly concludes that this challenge would be frivolous. As

counsel explains, the district court correctly determined that Johnson’s most serious

violation (possessing a weapon and ammunition as a felon, an offense punishable under

both state and federal law by a prison term exceeding one year) was a Class B violation,

see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1, and that the applicable policy‐statement range for the violation—

based on the Category III criminal history at the time of Johnson’s original sentencing—

was 8 to 14 months’ imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). The court’s order that

Johnson serve this prison term consecutive to his anticipated sentence on his new

charge is also consistent with the relevant policy statement. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f).   

Counsel also considers but rightly rejects a challenge to the reasonableness of the

14‐month prison term. As required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583, the district court took into

account the relevant sentencing factors in § 3553(a), including the nature and

circumstances of the violations (noting that Johnson had returned to dangerous

behavior “right out of the gate” after his release from prison), Johnson’s background

and personal characteristics (discussing his history of domestic abuse and other violent

acts), and the need to deter Johnson from future criminal acts and protect the public

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No. 19‐3455    Page 3

(explaining that imprisonment at the low end of the guidelines would be insufficient to

achieve those goals). It then permissibly selected a sentence within the policy‐statement

range. Under these circumstances, we would not find the new prison term to be plainly

unreasonable. See United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2014).   

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.   

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