Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02151/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02151-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Baland
Defendant
Robert Davis
Defendant
Kevin Kish
Defendant
Julie Su
Defendant
United Indian Health Services, Inc.
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED INDIAN HEALTH SERVICES, 

INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

JULIE SU, Labor Commissioner, 

California Division of Labor Standards 

Enforcement; KEVIN KISH, Director of 

the California Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing; RICHARD 

BALAND; and ROBERT DAVIS,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-02151-TLN-KJN

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED 

COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF A 

JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY

All of the above Defendants have moved this Court for dismissal of Plaintiff United 

Indian Health Services, Inc.’s (UIHS’s) First Amended Complaint (FAC), in which UIHS seeks 

declaratory and injunctive relief. (ECF Nos. 12, 15–17. ) UIHS opposes each motion. (ECF Nos. 

18–20.) The Court has reviewed the FAC and the parties’ moving papers, and finds the FAC 

does not contain factual allegations demonstrating a justiciable case or controversy over which 

the federal court has jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The following factual allegations in the FAC concern the motions. “UIHS is formed by a 

consortium of nine federally-recognized Native American tribes to provide health services to 

members of the tribes.” (FAC ¶ 8.) Defendants Davis and Baland “entered into an employment 

relationship with UIHS” and were “terminated by UIHS on July 22, 2014.” (Id. ¶¶ 9–12.) “After 

they were terminated, [Defendants] Davis and Baland each filed a retaliation complaint with the 

Case 2:15-cv-02151-TLN-KJN Document 29 Filed 02/23/16 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

[California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement] (DLSE) alleging that UIHS violated 

provisions of the California Labor Code.” (Id. ¶ 13.) “The DLSE Retaliation Complaint 

Investigation Unit opened an investigation . . . .” (Id.) “Davis filed a discrimination complaint 

with DFEH alleging that UIHS violated provisions of the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act . . . . DFEH opened an investigation . . . .” (Id. ¶ 19.)

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant Su seeks dismissal of UIHS’s FAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1), arguing in pertinent part: “UIHS’[s] claimed injury—participating in the DLSE inquiry 

into [Defendants] Davis[’s] and Baland’s complaints and potentially defending a suit by DLSE—

is not the type of injury that makes its case a justiciable one.” (Def. Su’s P. & A. ISO Mot. to 

Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (“Su Mot.”) 7:14–16, ECF No. 17-1.) Defendant 

Kish argues in pertinent part that the DFEH “has not asserted jurisdiction over UIHS, and 

therefore, has not violated UIHS’s sovereignty.” (Def. Kish’s Mem. of P. & A. ISO Mot. to 

Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (“Kish Mot.”) 9:12–13, ECF No. 15-1.) Kish

further argues: “UIHS’s contention that the DFEH could ‘potentially assert damages against 

[UIHS],’ [FAC] ¶ 33, is too speculative to constitute an injury-in-fact. . . . And any costs UIHS 

will incur during the investigation are insufficient harm to establish an injury.” (Kish Mot. 9:19–

22.) 

UIHS counters: 

The “concrete and particularized” harm [UIHS] faces is the 

compulsory participation in an investigative forum which [UIHS] 

asserts has no jurisdiction over the matter. [UIHS] cannot risk that 

its participation will constitute a waiver of its sovereign immunity. 

Alternatively, [UIHS] can refuse to participate and face penalties 

without presenting a defense to [Defendants] Davis’[s] and 

Baland’s complaints. Once waived, sovereign immunity cannot be 

regained.

(Opp’n to Su Mot. 5:16–20, ECF No. 18; see also Opp’n to Kish Mot. 5:15–19, ECF No. 19

(same).) 

Article III standing has three elements: 

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an 

Case 2:15-cv-02151-TLN-KJN Document 29 Filed 02/23/16 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 

particularized, . . . and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 

‘hypothetical,’” . . . Second, there must be a causal connection 

between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has 

to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 

defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of 

some third party not before the court.” . . . Third, it must be 

“likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be 

“redressed by a favorable decision.”

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (alterations in original) (internal 

citations omitted). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these 

elements.” Id. “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the 

defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presum[e] that general allegations 

embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Id. at 561 (alteration in 

original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether the question is viewed as one 

of standing or ripeness, the Constitution mandates that prior to our exercise of jurisdiction there 

exist a constitutional ‘case or controversy,’ that the issues presented are ‘definite and concrete, 

not hypothetical or abstract.’” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 

1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Ry. Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945)).

UIHS does not support its allegation that its participation in DLSE’s and DFEH’s 

investigation into Defendants Davis’s and Baland’s complaints would constitute waiver of its 

sovereign immunity. (E.g., FAC ¶¶ 34, 41.) “It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity 

cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 

U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see generally Quileute Indian 

Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] tribe[]’s participation in an 

administrative proceeding does not waive tribal immunity in an action filed by another party 

seeking review of the agency’s decision.”). 

Further, UIHS’s allegation that it could face penalties if DLSE and DFEH find that UIHS 

violated the California Labor Code does not satisfy the case or controversy requirement. (See

FAC ¶¶ 14, 18, 33.) “Such unasserted . . . and unknown claims do not present an immediate or 

real threat to [UIHS] such that declaratory [and/or injunctive] relief is proper[,]” Orix Credit All., 

Case 2:15-cv-02151-TLN-KJN Document 29 Filed 02/23/16 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 896 (5th Cir. 2000), since “the mere existence of . . . a generalized 

threat of prosecution [does not] satisf[y] the ‘case or controversy’ requirement.” Thomas, 220 

F.3d at 1139.

III. CONCLUSION

Because UIHS has not demonstrated a justiciable case or controversy, this action is 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 23, 2016

Case 2:15-cv-02151-TLN-KJN Document 29 Filed 02/23/16 Page 4 of 4