Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02405/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02405-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Board of Trustees, Moraine Valley Community College, District No. 524
Appellee
William H. Silk
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2405

WILLIAM H. SILK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, MORAINE VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE,

DISTRICT NO. 524,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 01425 — John J. Tharp, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 12, 2015 — DECIDED JULY 30, 2015

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit 

Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. William H. Silk was an adjunct professor at Moraine Valley Community College. Silk underwent heart surgery in April of 2010. During the following 

semesters, Silk’s teaching course load was reduced, and his 

employment was ultimately terminated. Silk filed suit 

against the College alleging violations of the Americans with 

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2 No. 14-2405

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The district court granted summary judgment for the College on all claims. For the reasons 

below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

Silk began working in 1986 at Moraine Valley Community College in Illinois as an adjunct professor. Adjunct professors are part-time, non-tenure track, at-will employees. They 

are represented by the Cook County Teachers Union and 

covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Silk’s typical

teaching load included four courses during the fall and 

spring semesters and two or three classes during the summer. 

Walter Fronczek was the dean of the Department of Liberal Arts during the relevant period. The dean had ultimate 

supervisory authority over the faculty in the Department of 

Liberal Arts. Fronczek was on medical leave for much of the 

spring 2010 semester. Lisa Kelsay, who was the assistant 

dean of the Department of Liberal Arts, served as the acting 

dean during that time. Aileen Donnersberger was a full-time 

faculty member and the chair of the Social Sciences Department (a branch of Liberal Arts) through the spring of 2010. 

Ricky Cobb temporarily replaced Donnersberger as chair in 

the fall of 2010, when she took sabbatical leave. 

Donnersberger testified that, as department chair, she 

was responsible for organizing the course assignments for 

adjunct professors. Typically, mid-way (or so) through the 

semester, she would send a form asking the adjuncts to state 

which courses they would be interested in teaching during 

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No. 14-2405 3

the following semester. She would collect their responses 

and develop a tentative schedule.

Donnersberger did not have final approval over the proposed staffing—she would send her suggestions to the dean 

of Liberal Arts. Kelsay testified that the dean would typically 

defer to the department chair’s recommendations. After the 

dean’s approval, the schedule would remain open to any 

changes (necessitated by staffing issues or student enrollment) until shortly before the start of the semester. Donnersberger testified that the typical protocol of the College was to 

finalize written contracts with the adjuncts one or two weeks 

prior to the start of the semester.

In March 2010, Donnersberger sent Silk an offer to teach 

two sociology courses during the upcoming summer term, 

which Silk accepted. Beginning on April 19, 2010, however, 

Silk took a medical leave of absence to undergo heart surgery. He needed a triple bypass. This surgery was completed 

on April 21, and Silk was discharged from the hospital on 

April 26. Silk was on medical leave through the remainder of 

the spring semester, and the record evidence suggests that 

Silk did not inform the College of any anticipated return 

date. 

Because the remainder of Silk’s spring 2010 courses 

would need to be covered by other faculty during his absence, Fronczek and Donnersberger visited those classes to 

inform students of the change and to collect information for 

the incoming instructors. During those visits, they discovered several issues that they considered troubling. The students in at least one class expressed concerns that they had 

been given only one graded assignment (a quiz) during the 

semester. In addition, the classes suffered from low student 

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attendance. Moreover, Fronczek and Donnersberger became 

aware of problems with the syllabi for the courses: Fronczek 

characterized the syllabi as “inadequate,” and Donnersberger noted that in at least one class, the textbook referenced in the syllabus was not the book actually being used in 

the course. 

By late April, Silk had not yet returned from leave and 

had not notified the College of a possible return date. Donnersberger testified that she became concerned about coverage for Silk’s assigned summer school courses, because the 

summer session typically began in mid-May. Donnersberger 

testified that “by the time of April, I had to then—when he 

was not back yet, I had to find someone to cover his summer 

classes because it was already the end of April, and we were 

starting in two weeks for the summer ... I then looked for 

someone else to teach those classes that were scheduled.” 

Kelsay likewise testified that she, Donnersberger, or both determined that Silk should not be assigned summer classes, 

since they did not know when he would return. His courses 

were reassigned to other instructors.

In early May, Silk attempted to contact Donnersberger 

regarding his summer assignments, but he mistakenly sent 

the email to another College employee with the same last 

name. On May 5, 2010, Kelsay instructed Silk that before returning for work, he needed to provide the College with a 

doctor’s medical release. She also testified that she informed 

Silk that his summer classes had been reassigned to another 

instructor because the College did not know how long his 

medical leave would last. 

Silk received his medical release on May 10, and he provided it to the College on May 12. Silk testified that he wantCase: 14-2405 Document: 35 Filed: 07/30/2015 Pages: 21
No. 14-2405 5

ed to maintain his summer school course assignment, although the record is unclear as to whether (and if so, when) 

Silk communicated that desire to the College. Donnersberger 

testified that by the time she received Silk’s medical release,

she had already reassigned the summer school courses. 

Fronczek testified that he had nothing to do with the decision to reassign the summer courses, as he was on medical 

leave. On May 17, Silk sent Donnersberger an email stating 

that he was ready to resume teaching and would be able to 

take on a full course schedule for the fall 2010 semester. 

Fronczek, after returning from his medical leave, scheduled a July 15 meeting with Silk to discuss the issues that 

Donnersberger and Fronczek had discovered with Silk’s syllabi. Silk, Fronczek, Donnersberger, and Cobb participated in 

the meeting, and Silk’s union steward Donald Stewart attended to observe. Fronczek informed Silk that his syllabi 

contained inaccurate course objectives, no contact information, and no group exercises; in short, none of the elements that Fronczek considered the makings of “a solid 

class.” In addition, Fronczek noted that Silk was not using 

the correct textbook. Fronczek testified that he perceived Silk 

to be argumentative and uncooperative during this meeting. 

Fronczek testified that he decided on July 15 that Silk 

should be assigned no more than two courses for the fall 

2010 semester, because Fronczek was concerned about Silk’s 

teaching performance. Silk, however, had a different understanding of why Fronczek wanted to assign him fewer 

courses than normal. Silk testified that at the July 15 meeting, Donnersberger stated that “we” assigned Silk only two 

classes in the fall because “we didn’t think [he was] physically capable of handling them.” Donnersberger testified that 

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there was no discussion of Silk’s course assignments at that

meeting. 

Silk was assigned two courses for the fall 2010 semester. 

At the beginning of the semester, Fronczek and Cobb determined that they would each observe one of Silk’s classes. 

Fronczek did so on October 15, 2010. Silk testified that 

Fronczek entered the classroom late and interrupted Silk 

during an exchange with a student. Fronczek noted that only 

seven out of twenty-eight enrolled students were in attendance, and that few were paying attention, taking notes, or 

participating. He witnessed several students talking on their 

cellphones, playing video games, and talking amongst themselves. 

Fronczek had many criticisms of Silk’s performance, including Silk’s over-relying on his notes; providing misinformation; improperly citing sourceless statistics; not asking 

questions of the students; and appearing to base his lecture 

largely on personal experiences. Fronczek testified that after 

he left the class, several students approached him in the 

hallway to discuss the poor quality of Silk’s instruction. After 

speaking with them, Fronczek gave the students his business 

card and told them to contact him if they had any further 

concerns. 

Cobb also attended one of Silk’s classes and reported 

findings similar to Fronczek’s. He stated that “Silk’s classroom performance was below-average and not to the standards of the Social Sciences Department. Sadly, I consider it 

one of the poorest exhibitions of instruction I have witnessed 

at the collegiate level. I do not believe learning was taking 

place in that classroom.” Neither Fronczek nor Cobb made a 

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No. 14-2405 7

written report of their evaluations at that time, and they did 

not share this feedback with Silk. 

Fronczek testified that, at that point, he decided to fire 

Silk. On November 17, Fronczek instructed the College’s

human resources director to place Silk on the “do-not-hire

list.” Various College personnel testified that this list is 

maintained by the College and includes the names of prior 

instructors who the College had determined should not be 

rehired. On November 18, Fronczek informed Silk that there 

would be no classes “available” for him in subsequent semesters. 

In mid-December, a number of students from one of 

Silk’s courses filed a complaint with the College (and met 

with Fronczek) regarding Silk’s instruction. Among other 

complaints, they stated that Silk had given every student

identical comments and the same grade on an essay assignment. Fronczek reviewed the assignments, and he adjusted 

all of the students’ grades upward. 

Because Silk had been informed that no further courses 

would be available for him in Liberal Arts (and presumably 

because he was not informed that his name had been added 

to the do-not-hire list), he approached the dean of the Career 

Programs Department seeking work. He was ultimately assigned to teach two criminal justice courses in that department during the spring semester of 2011. 

Fronczek happened to see Silk on campus in January 

2011. Fronczek subsequently contacted the College’s human 

resources director to ask how Silk had been rehired, despite 

being on the do-not-hire list. He also called Peggy Machon, 

dean of the Career Programs Department, to describe his exCase: 14-2405 Document: 35 Filed: 07/30/2015 Pages: 21
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periences with Silk. Also in January 2011, Silk filed an EEOC 

complaint alleging that his Liberal Arts course load had been 

reduced, and ultimately eliminated, because of age and disability-based discrimination.

Sometime in January, the College’s president, Dr. Vernon 

Crawley, also became aware that Silk had been rehired. 

Crawley instructed Machon to observe one of Silk’s classes. 

After doing so, Machon reported that several students left 

immediately after attendance was taken, and others worked 

on other coursework during class. She also stated that Silk 

read from the textbook for an extended period of time and 

used no interactive techniques or instructional aides. She 

submitted to Crawley a written report of her evaluation. 

Crawley instructed Machon to fire Silk. Machon sent Silk a 

letter notifying him that his employment was terminated,

effective February 14, 2011. 

B. Procedural History

Silk filed this federal lawsuit against the College on February 8, 2012, alleging discrimination based on age and disability in violation of the ADEA and the ADA. Silk alleges 

that he suffered four adverse employment actions as a result 

of age- and disability-based discrimination: (1) the College 

“unlawfully rescinded” his summer 2010 course assignments; (2) the College curtailed his fall 2010 course assignments; (3) the College unlawfully terminated his employment by putting him on the do-not-hire list (or eliminating 

his courses in the Department of Liberal Arts); and (4) the 

College unlawfully terminated him from teaching in the Career Programs Department. Silk also alleges that the College 

unlawfully retaliated against him, in violation of both the 

ADA and ADEA, for having filed an EEOC complaint. 

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No. 14-2405 9

The College moved for summary judgment on all of Silk’s 

claims. The district court granted the motion in its entirety, 

and Silk appeals. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, “reviewing the record and the inferences drawn from it in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Grayson v. City 

of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A. The ADA Claims

1. Governing Standard for ADA Claims

We begin with the Supreme Court’s 1989 plurality decision in the Title VII case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 

228 (1989). That case involved what has come to be known as 

a “mixed-motives” discrimination claim. In a mixed-motives 

claim, an employer is alleged to have used both discriminatory and legitimate grounds in taking an adverse employment action against an employee. The question presented 

was whether such a mixed-motive action could violate Title 

VII. 

The Court concluded that it could. Price Waterhouse, 490 

U.S. at 241. In other words, to violate Title VII, a discriminatory motive need not be the sole basis for an employer’s adverse employment action. In 1991, Congress amended Title 

VII to add statutory language making clear that the statute 

permitted such mixed-motive claims. But, at the same time,

Congress limited the relief available to mixed-motive plaintiffs.

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In the wake of Price Waterhouse, we (along with other circuits) allowed mixed-motive cases to be brought under other 

anti-discrimination statutes such as the ADA, for example.

See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 959

(7th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). But in 2009, the Supreme 

Court decided Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 

(2009). In that case, the Court held that because the ADEA 

lacked the language found in Title VII expressly authorizing 

mixed-motive claims (the language added following Price 

Waterhouse), mixed-motive claims were not authorized under 

the ADEA. Gross, 557 U.S. at 173.

In light of Gross, we revisited our mixed-motive jurisprudence in Serwatka. In that case, we determined that because

the ADA, like the ADEA, did not include language comparable to Title VII’s expressly authorizing mixed-motive 

claims, those claims were not authorized under the ADA.

Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 962–63. We therefore concluded that in 

order to satisfy the “because of” standard expressed by the 

statute, a plaintiff would have to prove that his disability 

was the but-for cause of his adverse employment action. Id; 

see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (“no covered entity shall discriminate 

against a qualified individual because of disability”) 

(amended 2008).

But, in a final wrinkle, Congress enacted significant 

amendments to the ADA in 2008. As relevant here, the language prohibiting discrimination “because of” a disability 

was amended to prohibit discrimination “on the basis of” a 

disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Although Serwatka was argued after the relevant ADA amendment, the preamendment law was in effect at the time of the Serwatka defendant’s alleged violations. So we analyzed that case using

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the “because of” and not the “on the basis of” language that 

the statute now provides.

We noted in Serwatka, however, that because the postamendment ADA was not at issue, “[w]hether ‘on the basis 

of’ means anything different from ‘because of,’ and whether 

this or any other revision to the statute matters in terms of 

the viability of a mixed-motive claim under the ADA, are not 

questions that we need to consider in this appeal.” Serwatka, 

591 F.3d at 961 n.1. So it is an open question whether the butfor standard we announced in Serwatka survived the 

amendment to the ADA. 

Numerous district courts have noted the same uncertainty we identified in Serwatka. And while the College raises the 

question of whether Serwatka’s rule applies postamendment—i.e., whether the “on the basis of” language 

changes the analysis—it does so in a cursory footnote and 

without any briefing. Silk offers no meaningful guidance in 

his reply brief. Without the benefit of adequate briefing on 

the issue, we will not resolve this important question. Because Silk argues that his claims succeed even under the butfor standard announced in Serwatka, we apply that standard 

here. We reserve resolution of this question for a case in 

which the issue is squarely before us and adequately briefed.

2. Establishing the ADA’s Applicability

The ADA provides that “no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Disability is defined as (a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 

more major life activities of such individual; (b) a record of 

such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an 

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impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). In order to succeed on his 

claim, Silk must provide sufficient evidence “from which a 

reasonable jury could conclude that he was an individual 

with a disability within the meaning of the statute.” Miller v. 

Ill. Dept. of Transp., 643 F.3d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 2011). 

Silk raises his claims under prong (c)—he contends that 

the College regarded him as having an impairment. In satisfying the “regarded as” prong, Silk must show that the College perceived him as having an impairment, “whether or 

not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life 

activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). 

The “regarded as” prong does not apply, however, “to 

impairments that are transitory and minor. The statute specifies that a transitory impairment is one “with an actual or 

expected duration of 6 months or less.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102(3)(B). The statute does not define what constitutes a 

“minor” impairment. 

In an effort to head Silk off at the pass, the College argues

that Silk’s impairment qualifies as both transitory and minor, 

and thus that Silk is not covered by the ADA. This would 

block Silk’s claims from the outset. In raising this argument, 

the College bears the burden of establishing that the impairment was both transitory and minor. In addition, the 

College “may not defeat ‘regarded as’ coverage of an individual simply by demonstrating that it subjectively believed 

the impairment was transitory and minor.” 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1630.15(f). Instead, the standard is an objective one: the 

College must prove that the perceived impairment actually 

was transitory and minor. Id.

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No. 14-2405 13

We agree with the district court that the College has not 

demonstrated that Silk’s impairment was both transitory and 

minor. Absent a more precise definition from Silk, we assume that his impairment (or perceived impairment) was a 

heart condition severe enough to require triple bypass surgery. While the College seems to characterize the bypass 

surgery itself as the impairment, we agree with the district 

court that the surgery was the treatment, not the impairment. The College has therefore not established that such a 

heart condition is transitory, because it has provided no evidence as to how long such a condition would last. Likewise, 

the College has presented no evidence to establish that such 

a condition could be considered “minor.” 

Thus, Silk has passed the first hurdle en route to summary 

judgment. We consider Silk’s argument that the College regarded him as having an impairment in the course of evaluating each of his claims. 

3. Summer 2010 Course Reassignment

Silk does not attempt to prove his claim under the “indirect” McDonnell Douglas method of proof. See McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). So he necessarily 

proceeds under the “direct” approach. In doing so, he may 

provide either “smoking gun” evidence of discrimination, or

he may put forward circumstantial evidence that would 

permit an inference of discrimination. That evidence can include “(1) suspicious timing; (2) ambiguous statements or 

behavior towards other employees in the protected group; 

(3) evidence, statistical or otherwise, that similarly situated 

employees outside of the protected group systematically receive better treatment; and (4) evidence that the employer 

offered a pretextual reason for an adverse employment acCase: 14-2405 Document: 35 Filed: 07/30/2015 Pages: 21
14 No. 14-2405

tion.” Teruggi v. CIT Grp./Capital Fin., Inc., 709 F.3d 654, 659–

60 (7th Cir. 2013). Silk employs the direct method in each of 

his discrimination and retaliation claims.

Silk argues that the College impermissibly decided to reassign his summer 2010 courses because it regarded him as 

having a disability. In order to succeed on his claim, Silk 

must prove that (1) the decision-maker regarded him as having an impairment; and (2) she made her employment decision on the basis of that perception. We assume that Donnersberger, as department chair, and Kelsay, as acting dean,

were the decision-makers in this employment action.1 Silk’s 

claim fails because he cannot establish that the decisionmakers regarded him as having an impairment.

To demonstrate that the College regarded Silk as having 

a disability, he must show that the decision-maker perceived 

that Silk suffered (or would suffer from) an impairment at 

the time that he would be teaching the summer courses. Silk 

needed to be physically present in order to teach those

courses. Silk appears to concede that, at the time that he took 

leave, he did not alert the College as to a possible or probable return date. And Silk does not dispute Donnersberger’s 

or Kelsay’s testimony that as of two weeks prior to the start 

of the summer session, the College did not know whether he 

would return in time to teach the summer classes.

Donnersberger testified that she became concerned in 

late April about her staffing needs for the summer. She stated that, “by the time of April, I had to then—when he was 

 

1 Silk seems to suggest that Fronczek was also a decision-maker. We 

cannot draw that conclusion, however, because it is undisputed that 

Fronczek was on medical leave at the time that this decision was made.

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not back yet, I had to find someone to cover his summer 

classes because it was already the end of April, and we were 

starting in two weeks for the summer ... I then looked for 

someone else to teach those classes that were scheduled.” So, 

Donnersberger testified, she had already reassigned Silk’s 

courses prior to him informing the College that he could return in time to teach. 

This evidence suggests that Donnersberger, the decisionmaker, regarded Silk as absent during the relevant time period—not as suffering from a disability. Silk does not provide 

any evidence to contradict Donnersberger’s testimony on 

this point. 

In addition, Kelsay made clear to Silk that he would not 

be eligible to teach any courses until he provided the College 

with a medical release. Silk does not argue that the medical 

release requirement was improper, and he concedes that he 

would not have been permitted to return to work without it. 

He has provided no evidence to suggest that the course assignments were made after May 12, when he submitted his 

release. 

Because Silk cannot establish that the College regarded 

him as an individual with a disability, we affirm the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim.

4. Fall 2010 Course Assignment

Silk next claims that he was assigned only two courses 

during the fall semester of 2010, instead of his usual four, as 

the result of impermissible discrimination. By the time this 

decision was made, Fronczek had returned from medical 

leave. So we assume Fronczek and Donnersberger were the 

decision-makers in this employment action.

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Silk’s claim rests on one disputed fact. He alleges that 

during the July 15 meeting attended by Silk, Donnersberger,

Cobb, Fronczek, and Stewart, Donnersberger stated that 

“we” assigned Silk only two classes in the fall because “we 

didn’t think [he was] physically capable of handling them.” 

Silk alleges that “we” refers to Donnersberger and Fronzcek. 

Donnersberger denied having made any such statement, and 

she testified that there were no discussions of Silk’s fall 2010 

course assignments at that meeting.2

According to Silk, this statement demonstrates that 

Fronczek and Donnersberger both regarded him as having 

an impairment and reduced his course assignments on the 

basis of that perception. There is a genuine dispute over 

whether that statement was actually made: Donnersberger 

testified that she didn’t make the statement, and Silk testified 

that she did. In addition, that fact is material to Silk’s case: if 

a jury credited Silk’s testimony and not Donnersberger’s, it 

could reach the conclusion that the statement constituted an 

admission on the part of the College that it reduced Silk’s 

course load as the result of a perceived impairment. 

We therefore conclude that summary judgment was not 

appropriate on this claim. 

5. Terminations

Silk argues that the College twice terminated his employment based on the perception that he was an individual 

with a disability: first, when he was notified during the fall 

 

2 In his briefs, Silk erroneously claims that “there is no dispute” that this 

statement was made. The dispute is clear—Donnersberger attested that 

she never made the statement attributed to her.

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2010 semester that he would not be assigned any future 

courses in the Department of Liberal Arts (and was placed 

on the do-not-hire list); and second, when he was given a notice of termination by the Career Programs Department in 

February of 2011. Silk claims that the district court should 

have excluded any reference to the do-not-hire list, based on 

his contention that the list did not exist prior to his filing of 

an EEOC complaint. This claim is without merit.

As for the first termination, the parties agree that 

Fronczek was the decision-maker. Silk appears to argue that 

Donnersberger’s alleged statement regarding the reduction 

in Silk’s fall 2010 schedule constitutes evidence that Fronczek 

regarded Silk as an individual with a disability at the time 

that he was terminated. This claim is tenuous, at best. But 

even assuming that Silk could establish that Fronczek regarded him as having an impairment, his claim fails. Silk 

does not present any evidence that would permit an inference of discrimination. 

Silk must establish that his perceived impairment was a

but-for cause of his termination. Fronczek, however, testified 

that he terminated Silk’s employment solely because he believed the quality of Silk’s instruction to be poor. The record 

evidence amply supports that reason. Recall the problems 

with Silk’s syllabi, including the fact that he was using the 

wrong textbook in at least one course; poor attendance in 

Silk’s courses; a non-participatory classroom environment in 

which students played video games, talked amongst themselves and on the phone, and did other course work during 

class; problems with Silk’s lecture techniques; a variety of 

student complaints, including that Silk had given every student identical comments and grades on an essay assignment;

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and Cobb’s assessment that “Silk’s classroom performance 

was below-average and not to the standards of the Social 

Sciences Department, “ and that “it one of the poorest exhibitions of instruction [he had] witnessed at the collegiate 

level.” Cobb did not believe students were learning in Silk’s 

classroom.

Fronczek’s belief constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Silk’s employment. 

While Silk concedes some of those pieces of evidence, he argues that others were inaccurate. But “although [Silk] disagreed with his negative evaluations, that does not mean that 

the evaluations were the result of unlawful discrimination.” 

Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. of Comty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 

595, 603 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 

1266, 1273 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The question is not whether the 

employer’s performance ratings were right but whether the 

employer’s description of its reasons is honest.” (emphasis in 

original)). Silk argues that many of these negative assessments were wrong, but he puts forward no evidence to suggest that Fronczek did not honestly believe that Silk was a bad 

instructor. 

As for Silk’s second termination, in February of 2011, his 

claim cannot get off the ground. Indeed, Silk’s arguments on 

this claim are arguably waived for failure to develop. But, as 

best we can discern, Silk does not dispute that the College’s 

president (Crawley) directed the dean (Machon) to issue the 

letter of termination. Silk offers no evidence that Crawley (or 

Machon, for that matter) was aware that Silk had undergone 

bypass surgery or had a history of a heart condition. So Silk 

cannot establish that Crawley regarded him as an individual 

with a disability. 

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Silk contends that Fronczek wielded influence over 

Crawley (based on Fronczek’s own perception that Silk suffered from an impairment), and convinced Crawley to terminate Silk’s employment. We will not belabor the point—

Silk offers no evidence in support of such a contention, and 

summary judgment was properly granted on that claim.

B. ADEA Claims

In the district court, Silk raised ADEA claims that mirror 

the ADA claims described in Part A. He appeals summary 

judgment only on his claims that his employment was 

wrongfully terminated, in violation of the ADEA.

Apart from stating his claim for relief, Silk makes no argument in support of such a claim in his briefs to this court. 

As we have repeatedly held, “[t]he absence of any supporting authority or development of an argument constitutes a 

waiver on appeal.” Kramer v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 355 F.3d 

961, 964 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). Silk has waived his ADEA discrimination arguments.

C. Retaliation Claim

In January 2011, Silk filed an EEOC complaint, alleging 

discrimination based on age and disability. The only adverse 

employment action he suffered after this date was the termination of his employment in February 2011. He alleges that 

this termination occurred in retaliation for his having filed 

the EEOC complaint.

Both the ADA and the ADEA prohibit employers from retaliating against employees who exercise their rights under 

those statutes. In order to prove a claim of retaliation, the 

employee must show “(1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse action; and (3) a 

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causal connection between the two.” Dickerson, 657 F.3d at 

601. The parties agree that Silk engaged in a statutorily protected activity (his EEOC complaint), and that he suffered an 

adverse employment action (his termination). Again, Silk’s 

ADEA claim is waived for failure to develop.

As with his discrimination claim, Silk does not identify 

who was responsible for his termination. Assuming it was 

either Fronczek or Crawley, he provides no evidence that either was aware of his EEOC complaint. And even assuming 

they were aware, the College offers two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination: (1) that the Career Programs Department erred in hiring Silk, given that he 

had been added to the do-not-hire list; and (2) that the Career Programs Department, like Liberal Arts, made a negative assessment of the quality of Silk’s instruction. 

Silk does not offer any evidence that contradicts these legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. Silk contends, without 

offering any evidence in support, that the do-not-hire list 

didn’t exist prior to his EEOC complaint. He likewise offers 

no evidence to contradict the College’s evidence of the list’s 

existence. Second, while he again disputes the correctness of 

the College’s assessment of his teaching abilities (Machon’s 

evaluation, in this case), he does not offer any evidence to 

suggest that Crawley and Fronczek did not honestly believe 

that Silk was a poor instructor. 

The only piece of evidence that Silk offers in support of 

his claim is the “suspicious timing” between the filing of his 

EEOC complaint and his termination. It is true—Silk was 

fired within a few weeks of filing his complaint. But suspicious timing alone “will rarely be sufficient ... to create a triable issue.” Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 734 

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No. 14-2405 21

(7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Culver v. Gorman, 416 F.3d 540, 546 

(7th Cir. 2005)); see also Burks v. Wisconsin Dept. of Trans., 464 

F.3d 744, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “suspicious 

timing alone ... does not support a reasonable inference of 

retaliation” because the “mere fact that one event preceded 

another does nothing to prove that the first event caused the 

second” (internal citation omitted)).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE 

in part. We REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment on Silk’s “fall 2010” discrimination claim and 

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM the district court’s ruling on all other 

claims. 

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