Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01798/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01798-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rebecca B. Duwell
Appellant
Donald G. Jones
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DONALD G. JONES, REBECCA B. DUWELL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1798

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-01044-EGB, Senior Judge Eric G. 

Bruggink.

______________________ 

Decided: July 11, 2016

______________________ 

DONALD G. JONES, REBECCA B. DUWELL, Tyrone, GA, 

pro se.

NATHANAEL YALE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

ROBERT C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., SCOTT D.

AUSTIN. 

______________________ 

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2 JONES v. US

Before PROST, Chief Judge, SCHALL, and CHEN, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM

The appellants in this case, Donald Jones and Rebecca Duwell, allege to have owned a portfolio of real estate 

that was damaged during Hurricane Katrina. They filed 

several lawsuits in the Northern District of Georgia and, 

over the course of litigating these suits, received several 

negative rulings. This appeal arises from a suit in the 

United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court), 

alleging a number of causes of action related to supposed

mistreatment during the course of Mr. Jones and Ms. 

Duwell’s litigation in the Northern District of Georgia. 

Specifically, they alleged that the clerk of the court erred 

in assigning their trial judges, that these assigned judges 

erred in not recusing themselves, and that these judges

erred in various rulings. Mr. Jones and Ms. Duwell bring 

claims under 5 U.S.C. §§ 2101–04; 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 

242; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, 2000d-1, and 2000d-2; unspecified 

conspiracies related to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455; unspecified whistleblower protections; Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4; and Article III and the 5th and 14th 

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. J.A. 47–48. The 

Claims Court found itself not to have jurisdiction over 

Mr. Jones and Ms. Duwell’s complaint, which it found to 

allege no claim within its jurisdiction. It further found the 

complaint to essentially call for the Claims Court to 

review the actions of another court, a matter outside of its 

jurisdiction. Because we agree with the Claims Court on 

both points, and because we find none of the appellants’ 

arguments persuasive, we affirm. 

DISCUSSION

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3).

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JONES v. US 3

The appellants filed an informal brief and the government responded to that brief. After this case was fully 

briefed informally, the appellants moved for leave to 

withdraw their informal brief and replace it with a formal 

brief. We granted that motion. The formal brief that the 

appellants filed is deficient. We waive those deficiencies 

and consider this formal brief in reaching our decision. 

Although the government has not yet had an opportunity 

to respond to the appellants’ formal brief, we find that the 

informal and formal briefing currently before us fully 

explains the issues the appellants raise such that we may 

dispose of this appeal now. 

We review the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Kam-Almaz v. United 

States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2012). We must 

accept as true all allegations of fact Mr. Jones and 

Ms. Duwell make and draw all reasonable inferences in 

their favor. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 

F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Mr. 

Jones and Ms. Duwell bear the ultimate burden of establishing jurisdiction; thus their complaint must allege facts 

sufficient to articulate a claim within the Claims Court’s 

jurisdiction. Kam-Almaz, 682 F.3d at 1367–68; Taylor v. 

United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

The Claims Court properly dismissed the appellants’ 

case. The appellants failed to allege any taking, any 

breach of contract, or any violation of a money-mandating 

statute or regulation as would be required for jurisdiction 

under the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); United 

States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983); United States 

v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 397 (1976). Additionally, they 

ground their claims in the proposition that they were 

wronged by various errors by federal judges. The Claims 

Court does not have jurisdiction to review other judges’ 

decisions, even when a plaintiff couches its challenge of 

those decisions as a claim for damages against the United 

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4 JONES v. US

States. Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. 

Cir. 1994).

Mr. Jones and Ms. Duwell make several attacks on 

the Claims Court’s dismissal. We find none persuasive. 

First, the appellants argue that the Claims Court improperly applied persuasive, not mandatory, precedent in 

reaching its conclusion. We have reviewed the precedent 

on which the Claims Court relied and conclude that it 

appropriately applied binding precedent of this court and 

the Supreme Court. We therefore reject this argument.

Second, the appellants argue that their case raises an 

issue over which the Claims Court has jurisdiction under 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau 

of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Even assuming that the 

appellants alleged a plausible Bivens claim, the Claims 

Court lacks jurisdiction over such claims. Brown v. United 

States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Third, Mr. Jones and Ms. Duwell argue that the 

Claims Court failed to take into account a supposed RICO 

claim in its dismissal of their case. None of their complaints, however, alleges any claim related to RICO over 

which the Claims Court could have jurisdiction. They 

therefore fail to identify any error in the Claims Court’s 

analysis.

Fourth, Mr. Jones and Ms. Duwell argue that the 

Claims Court failed to appropriately review de novo the 

supposedly erroneous actions of the district courts. Because the Claims Court has no jurisdiction over claims 

grounded in allegations that other courts erred, it appropriately determined itself to lack jurisdiction to review 

these district courts’ decisions, de novo or otherwise. See 

Joshua, 17 F.3d at 380. We therefore reject this argument.

AFFIRMED

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JONES v. US 5

COSTS

Not only did the appellants file numerous lawsuits 

that the court in the Northern District of Georgia found 

“vexatious,” J.A. 58; they also filed a frivolous case requesting that the Claims Court do something it plainly 

cannot do: review the decision of another court. After the 

Claims Court dismissed their case, they pursued an 

equally frivolous appeal to this court. In order to deter the 

appellants from filing further vexatious and frivolous 

litigation, and in order to help to defray the costs to the 

taxpayers of defending against the appellants’ baseless 

litigation, we award costs to the United States.

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