Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00742/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00742-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Janice Ramos
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JANICE RAMOS, *

 *

Plaintiff, *

 *

vs. * Civil Action No. 04-00742-BH-B

 *

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, *

Commissioner of * 

Social Security, *

 *

Defendant. *

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Janice Ramos (“Plaintiff”) brings this action

seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security denying her claim for supplemental security income

benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42

U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f. This action was referred to the undersigned

for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

Oral argument was held on October 18, 2005. Upon consideration of

the administrative record, oral argument and the memoranda of the

parties, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that the

decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED. 

I. Procedural History

In January 1999, Plaintiff protectively filed an application

for supplemental security income benefits alleging that she has

been disabled since October 16, 1998 due to nerves, migraine

headaches and “slow learning.” (Tr. 531-534, 573-576).

Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on May 21, 1999, and upon

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reconsideration on August 19, 1999. (Id. at 535-544). Plaintiff

filed a timely request for a hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 545-556). On March 9, 2000, a de novo

administrative hearing was held before ALJ Joseph J. Micare (“ALJ

Micare”) which was attended by Plaintiff, her representative, and

Dr. John William Davis, a medical expert. (Id. at 579-608). A

supplemental hearing was held on June 5, 2000, which was attended

by Plaintiff, her representative, Dr. John William Davis, a medical

expert, and Fred Shriber, a vocational expert (“VE”). (Id. at 557-

572, 609-634). 

On October 20, 2000, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s initial

application. (Id. at 442-454). On October 30, 2000, Plaintiff

again applied for supplemental security income and on December 15,

2000, filed an application for Child’s Insurance Benefits (“CIB”)

under Section 202(d)(1) of Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §

402(d)(1). (Tr. 24, 59-61). Plaintiff also requested review of

the ALJ’s October 20th decision, and on September 13, 2002, the

Appeals Council (“AC”) remanded the case for further proceedings.

(Id. at 474-476). The AC also consolidated Plaintiff’s appeal with

her second disability application. (Id.) A third administrative

hearing was conducted by ALJ Warren L. Hammond (“ALJ Hammond”) on

January 2, 2003. (Id. at 502-530). The hearing was attended by

Plaintiff, her representative and Richard Freeman, a VE. (Id.)

ALJ Hammond issued a decision on February 28, 2003, wherein he

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found that Plaintiff was not disabled, and therefore denied both of

her disability applications. (Id. at 21-32). Plaintiff filed an

appeal, and on October 25, 2004, the AC denied Plaintiff’s request

for review and the decision became final. (Tr. 3-5, 19-20). 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. The parties agree that this case is

now ripe for judicial review and is properly before this Court

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. Background Facts 

Plaintiff was born on May 22, 1979 and was 23 years of age at

the time of the third administrative hearing. (Tr. 507, 582, 612).

Plaintiff has an 11th grade special education and has no past

relevant work experience. (Id. at 64, 69, 486, 507-508, 583-584).

At the March 9, 2000 administrative hearing, Plaintiff

testified that she was not married and had no children. (Id. at

582). Plaintiff completed the 11th grade, and has been in EMR

special education classes since the 3rd grade. (Id. at 507-508,

582-584). According to Plaintiff, she learned to read and write “a

little bit;” however, she still requires assistance. (Id.) At the

hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had never worked, did not

have a driver’s license, and lived with her mother who provided

financial assistance to her. (Id.)

Plaintiff indicated that she was receiving treatment every 2

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Plaintiff testified that on a daily basis she suffers from depression,

lack of energy, sleep deprivation, bad nerves, dizziness, seeing shadows/black

spots floating out of the corners of her eyes, etc. (Id. at 591). She has

been prescribed Prozac and Risperdal for her depression and testified that the

medication helps “a little bit.” (Id.) She takes Risperdal to help her

sleep. (Id.)

2

Dr. Evans had Plaintiff checked for seizures and none were found. (Id.

at 585).

4

weeks, for problems due to nerves, depression1

 and migraine

headaches (with dizziness),2

 from Dr. Evans of the Mobile County

Health Department (“MCHD”), and was taking Zoloft and Vicoprofen for

her nerves. (Tr. 584-594). Plaintiff also reported that she had

been treated for depression at the Mobile Mental Health Center

(“MMHC”), with group therapy and counseling (once a month), since

October 14, 1999, and was seeing Dr. Joshie for her nerves. (Id.

at 587-594). 

According to Plaintiff, she spent most of her time at home,

although she would ride along with her mother to the store and other

places. (Id. at 592). Plaintiff indicated that she had neither

worked nor sought to work because she does not feel comfortable

working due to her nerve problems and her inability to read or

follow directions. (Id. at 592-593). She also indicated that while

she could probably wash dishes, she would be nervous and would

likely “break them.” (Id. at 594).

At the second administrative hearing conducted on June 5, 2000,

Plaintiff testified that she was being treated by Dr. Joshie at MMHC

once every 2-3 weeks for therapy/counseling, and by Dr. Evans at the

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Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s assertion, the record reflects only one

treatment note, dated April 3, 2000, was added to the record for this time

period. (Id. at 614).

5

County Board of Health. (Id. at 612-613, 615-617).3 Plaintiff

testified that there had been no change in her condition/medication,

that she takes Risperdal and Zoloft, and that she was living with

her cousins, who took care of the rent. (Tr. 614-615). Plaintiff

reported that her group therapy/medication helped sometimes,

although she still gets really nervous and does not feel well. (Id.

at 614-617). Plaintiff also reported that she continues to have

frequent visual hallucinations and that she talks with imaginary

friends. (Id. at 618-619). 

As for her daily activities, Plaintiff testified that she does

not leave the house much, except to go to her grandmother’s house

or the store. (Id. at 620). Plaintiff reported that she does not

have any friends; however, her cousin takes her to visit her family.

(Id. at 620-621). Plaintiff took issue with the reports of two

physicians who indicated that she had told them that she did not

want to work because her stepfather could support her, or that she

was only interested in getting a check. (Id. at 619). Plaintiff

also took issue with a report from MMHC indicating that she had bad

nerves because she was raped and/or abused by a roommate. (Tr. 621-

622). Plaintiff testified that she was actually abused by a family

member, not a roommate. (Id. at 622).

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At the third administrative hearing held on January 2, 2003,

Plaintiff testified that she does not have any vocational or

military training, that she has never worked or attempted to do so,

and that her family supports her. (Id. at 507-509). Plaintiff

reported that she cannot work because she is “real slow” and that

she is unable to count money, read or “catch on” to how to do

things. (Id. at 509). Plaintiff acknowledged that she knows how

to make a bed, clean a bathroom and sweep, but indicated that she

does not help out with household chores. (Id. at 509-511).

According to Plaintiff, she just lays around and watches television

all day or sleeps due to her headaches and “different stuff.” (Id.

at 510-511). At one point, Plaintiff indicated that she is not

capable of working, but later acknowledged that she does not know

why she could not work as a hotel maid making beds. (Tr. 511).

Plaintiff testified that she had stopped receiving any mental

health treatment, and that she was being treated at the MCHD for

headaches and bad nerves. (Id. at 512-513). Plaintiff reported

that she takes medicine when she can afford to do so; however, she

was unable to recall the last time she had taken any. (Id.) She

also reported that she had not been hospitalized in the past 12

months. (Id. at 513). Plaintiff indicated that she saw Dr. Smith

at the Franklin Clinic in March for back pain, but could not afford

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Plaintiff acknowledged that she smokes 2-3 packs of cigarettes each

day. (Id. at 518).

7

the medicine he prescribed.4 (Id. at 513-515).

Plaintiff also testified that she is able to feed, bathe and

dress herself. (Id. at 516). She also indicated that she can empty

the trash, walk to the store across the street, do some grocery

shopping and cook a little. (Tr. 516-517). She does not have a

license and does not know how to drive a car. (Id. at 517). She

reported that she cannot stand on her feet for more than 2-3 hours,

and is not sure how long she can sit. (Id. at 519-520).

In his decision dated February 28, 2003, ALJ Hammond

determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity and that she has the impairments of mild mental

retardation/borderline intellectual functioning, which is severe

within the meaning of the Act. (Id. at 31, Findings 2-3). The ALJ

further found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairment

does not meet or medically equal the Listings and that her

allegations regarding her limitations are not totally credible.

(Id. at 31, Findings 4-5). Specifically, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff’s condition does not meet the severity requirements of

Listing 12.05 because while her IQ most likely falls within the 60

to 70 range, she does not have another severe impairment which

imposes an additional and significant work-related limitation of

function. (Id. at 29). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retains

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At the October 18, 2005 oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded

that there was no issue on appeal with regard to any alleged physical

impairments; thus, Plaintiff’s appeal is limited to issues surrounding her

alleged mental impairments.

8

the residual functional capacity to perform a broad range of simple,

unskilled work at all exertional levels, has no past relevant work,

and is a younger individual with a limited education. (Tr. 31,

Findings 7-10). Utilizing the testimony of a vocational expert, the

ALJ concluded that considering the types of work that Plaintiff is

still functionally capable of performing, in combination with her

age, education and work experience, she can be expected to make a

vocational adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in

the national economy, such as cafeteria attendant, laundry worker,

hotel housekeeper and room service clerk. (Id., Finding 11).

Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not been under a

disability at any time. (Id., Finding 12).

III. Issues on Appeal5

A. Whether the ALJ erred by failing to find that Plaintiff’s

impairments meet, equal or medically equal the requirements of

Listing 12.05C?

B. Whether the ALJ erred by failing in his obligation to develop

a full and fair administrative record regarding the vocational

opportunities available to Plaintiff, in violation of SSR 00-

4p, by failing to ask the vocational expert (“VE”) whether the

evidence provided conflicts with the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (“DOT”) and obtain a reasonable

explanation for any apparent conflict?

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This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal

principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

9

IV. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s role

is a limited one. This Court’s review is limited to determining 1)

whether the decision of the Secretary is supported by substantial

evidence, and 2) whether the correct legal standards were applied.

Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).6 A court

may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute

its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Sewell v. Bowen, 792

F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986). The Commissioner’s findings of

fact must be affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence.

Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth

v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that

substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla but less

than a preponderance,” and consists of “such relevant evidence as

a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a

conclusion[]”). In determining whether substantial evidence exists,

a court must view the record as a whole, taking into account

evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the Commissioner’s

decision. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986);

Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 10163 (S.D. Ala. 1999). 

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The claimant must first prove that he or she has not engaged in

substantial gainful activity. The second step requires the claimant to prove

that he or she has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. If, at

the third step, the claimant proves that the impairment or combination of

impairments meets or equals a listed impairment, then the claimant is

automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or work experience. 

If the claimant cannot prevail at the third step, he or she must proceed to

the fourth step where the claimant must prove inability to perform their past

relevant work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In

evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the examiner must

consider the following four factors: (1) objective medical facts and clinical

findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; (4) the

claimant’s age, education and work history. Id. at 1005. Once a claimant

meets this burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the fifth

step that the claimant is capable of engaging in another kind of substantial

gainful employment which exists in significant numbers in the national

economy, given the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education,

and work history. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834 (11th Cir. 1985). If the

Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such jobs the claimant can

perform, the claimant must prove inability to perform those jobs in order to

be found disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). See

also Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v.

Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).

10

B. Discussion

An individual who applies for Social Security disability

benefits must prove her disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912.

Disability is defined as the “inability to do any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The Social Security regulations

provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining

if a claimant has proven her disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920.7 See, e.g., Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th

Cir. 1997). As noted supra, utilizing the five-step sequential

evaluation process, ALJ Hammond found that Plaintiff’s mild mental

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retardation/borderline intellectual functioning is a severe

impairment, but that it does not meet or medically equal one of the

Listings. (Tr. 31). The ALJ further determined that Plaintiff has

the residual functional capacity to perform a broad range of simple,

unskilled work at all exertional levels, and that she could be

expected to make a vocational adjustment to work that exists in the

national economy. (Id.)

1. Whether the ALJ erred by failing to find that Plaintiff’s

impairments meet, equal or medically equal Listing 12.05C?

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that her

impairments do not meet, equal or medically equal Listing 12.05C for

mental retardation. (Doc. 14). Specifically, Plaintiff argues

that: 1) given the ALJ’s finding that she is mentally retarded, with

valid IQ scores between 60-70, and 2) given the findings of the

consultative and reviewing State Agency physicians that she suffers

from additional severe mental impairments (i.e., personality

disorder, anxiety and depression), the ALJ erred in concluding that

she did not meet Listing 12.05C. (Id.) In support of her

contention, Plaintiff relies upon the March and June 2000 hearing

testimony of John W. Davis, Ph.D. (“Dr. Davis”), and the findings

of State Agency physicians Drs. Hinton and Eno. (Tr. 183-196, 208-

227, 601, 603, 627). 

Listing 12.05C falls under § 12.00 MENTAL DISORDERS and

provides that:

Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage

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Cobb v. Barnhart, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Davis v.

Shalala, 985 F.2d 531 (11th Cir. 1993)(quoting Listing 12.05C). When

considering whether the plaintiff has a physical or mental impairment imposing

significant work-related limitation of function in addition to a low verbal

scale I.Q., the Commissioner must consider the plaintiff's impairments in

combination. Davis, 985 F.2d at 533. The issue of what constitutes “a

physical or other mental impairment imposing additional and significant workrelated limitation of function” was addressed in Edwards by Edwards v.

Heckler, 755 F.2d 1513, 1515-1516 (11th Cir. 1985) (considering whether the

presence of chronic obstructive lung disease and exercise induced asthma

provided a sufficient additional impairment to meet the second prong of

Listing 12.05C):

An impairment imposes significant limitations when its effect on a

claimant's ability to perform “basic work activities” is more than

slight or minimal. The question under Listing 12.05C, however, is

not whether the impairment is in and of itself disabling, thus,

“significant” requires something less than severe within the meaning

of § 404.1520(c) [of the Commissioner's Regulations].

12

general intellectual functioning with deficits in

adaptive functioning initially manifested during the

developmental period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or

supports onset of the impairment before age 22. The

required level of severity for this disorder is met when

the requirements in A, B, C, or D are satisfied ···· C.

A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60

through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment

imposing an additional and significant work-related

limitation of function. 

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.05.8 The regulations

further explain that the required level of severity is satisfied

when the following is demonstrated:

C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60

to 69 inclusive and a physical or other mental

impairment imposing additional and significant workrelated limitation of function. 

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1, § 12.05C. As such, a claimant

meets the criteria for presumptive disability under Section 12.05(c)

when the claimant presents a valid IQ score of 60-70 inclusive and

evidence of an additional mental/physical impairment that has more

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than “minimal effect” on the claimant’s ability to perform basic

work activities. Edwards by Edwards v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1513, 1516

(11th Cir. 1985). The Eleventh Circuit, however, has recognized

that “a valid I.Q. score need not be conclusive of mental

retardation where the I.Q. score is inconsistent with other evidence

in the record on the claimant’s daily activities and behavior.”

Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992). Thus, to

prove that she meets Listing 12.05C, Plaintiff must establish a

valid verbal, performance or full scale IQ of 60-70, must

demonstrate that retardation is a lifelong condition which

manifested itself before the age of 22, and must establish the

existence of a physical or mental impairment which imposes

additional and significant work-related limitations on her ability

to function. Id. at 837-838.

 Based upon a review of the record, the undersigned finds that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff

does not meet Listing 12.05C because she does not fulfill the second

requirement of having “a physical or other mental impairment

imposing additional and significant work-related limitation of

function.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. App. 1, § 12.05C. Here, the

ALJ concluded that:

. . . medical evidence indicates that the claimant has

mild mental retardation/borderline intellectual

functioning, an impairment that is severe . . . . The

claimant has also alleged that migraine headaches and a

nervous problem contribute to her disability. However,

the undersigned finds that these alleged impairments are

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From 1999-2002, Plaintiff was treated by Rajani Joshi, M.D. (“Dr.

Joshi”) and others at the MMHC for allegations of a personality disorder,

neurological evaluation (possible seizure disorder), diagnosis of borderline

intellectual functioning, caffeine-induced sleep disorder with anxiety, and

possible malingering. (Id. at 235-237). Notably, in January 2002, treatment

notes reveal that she was discharged with a final diagnosis of caffeine

induced sleep disorder with anxiety, r/o malingering, personality disorder

with mixed trait and past urinary tract infection. (Id.) She was admitted

for poor sleep, energy, concentration and appetite, and was given individual

therapy, psychological evaluation, medical monitoring and prescribed

hydroxyzine. (Id.) At discharge, she was current with her treatment goals

but was referred out because of non-SMI diagnosis malingering and because she

was not keeping her appointments on a regular basis. (Id.) Her “behavior was

reserved and had a smirk on her face. Did not say much and questioned her Dx

in a somewhat smart-eleck tone.” Plan: “canceled appt. scheduled . . . for

2/18/02 close file.” (Id.)

10On March 6, 1999, Dr. McCleary examined Plaintiff (accompanied by her

fiancé), upon DDS referral, and noted as follows:

She was alert, oriented to time, place and person, attentive, “only

marginally motivated” (was administered a 15 item test to detect

malingering of which she was only able to get 6 of 15 items

suggestive of malingering such that the evaluation is “an

underestimate of her current level of functioning”), demonstrated a

stable affect, euphoric mood, absence of anxiety, clear and coherent

thought processes, absence of loose associations, denied

hallucinations (although she said she sees her dead grandmother and

hears her calling her name), absence of circumstantial thinking or

confusion, absence of indication of delusional ideation, no

delusional ideation, normal speech rate and form, absence of

fine/gross motor skill deficits, absence of evidence of pain-related

behaviors, ability to follow simple auditory commands,

reads/understands what is read, can copy a cube and complex cross

from a model without severe distortions; however, she described

herself as sad and angry with thoughts of suicide often, noting many

overdoses in her past yet exhibited no anxiety to testing and has

never had psychological treatment.

The results of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-revised (WAISR) revealed a verbal IQ 62, performance IQ 65 and full IQ 62,

indicating mild mental retardation; however, Dr. McCleary concluded

that this was an underestimate of her actual level of functioning

due to malingering and “very poor motivation.” 

She was diagnosed with r/o malingering and a personality disorder

14

non-severe because the record contains no credible

evidence to show that these impairments significantly

interfere with the claimant’s ability to perform work

activity. Dr. Joshi,[9

] the claimant’s treating

psychiatrist, has diagnosed her with a personality

disorder but declined to provide any information as to

how this disorder impacts the claimant’s ability to

function. Dr. McCleary[10] diagnosed the claimant with a

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NOS; and it was noted that she appears to have a life-long history

of mental slowness, may have problems with work pressure because she

has never worked before, but that she should respond appropriately

to supervision/coworkers.

(Id. at 96-98, 297-299).

11While the undersigned recognizes that the record reveals that there

were problems or questions surrounding the validity of Plaintiff’s IQ test

scores and whether or not she was malingering, (Id. at 96-98, 142-144, 180,

15

factitious disorder and indicated that this disorder

significantly impacts her daily activities and social

functioning. However, the Administrative Law Judge

assigns little evidentiary weight to this opinion by Dr.

McCleary in light of the claimant’s clear pattern of

malingering and poor credibility. Moreover, at the

previous hearing, Dr. John Davis, psychological expert,

testified that the claimant’s malingering could possibly

be misdiagnosed as a personality disorder. Thus, the

undersigned concludes that the claimant’s personality

disorder and/or factitious disorder are non-severe

impairments, since the record contains no credible

evidence showing how or to what extent these impairments

affect the claimant’s ability to perform the mental

demands of simple, unskilled work.

* * * 

. . . . the claimant’s mild mental retardation/borderline

intellectual functioning is not severe enough to meet or

medically equal one of the impairments . . . . Her

condition does not meet the severity requirements of any

Listing in section 12.05. Since Dr. McCleary opined that

the claimant’s IQ scores are valid, the Administrative

Law Judge, for purposes of this decision, has given the

claimant the benefit of the doubt and finds that her true

IQ most likely falls within the 60 to 70 range. However,

for the reasons, discussed hereinabove, the undersigned

has concluded that the claimant does not have another

severe impairment imposing additional and significant

work-related limitation of function. Moreover, the

undersigned is not persuaded that the claimant’s

condition results in marked restriction of daily living

activities, social functioning, concentration, etc.

Thus, her impairment does not meet or equal a Listing. 

(Tr. 28-29). As such, while the ALJ agreed that Plaintiff’s true

IQ falls between 60-70,11 he concluded that she did not meet the

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 15 of 35
596-599, 606), given that the ALJ gave her the benefit of the doubt in his

decision, accepting that her IQ falls between 60-70, her IQ is a “non-issue”

for purposes of this appeal.

16

second prong of Listing 12.05C because she did not have another

severe mental impairment that imposed an additional and significant

work-related limitation of function and her mental condition does

not result in a marked restriction of activities of daily living,

social functioning or concentration (i.e., that her personality

disorder, anxiety and depression claims, lack merit). (Id.) 

Put simply, there is no evidence that she suffers from an

additional mental impairment that imposes significant work-related

limitations. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she can make

beds, sweep and clean up and admitted she probably could work as a

hotel housekeeper. See supra. Plaintiff also admitted that she can

feed and dress herself, shop, cook, stand, walk, sit, lift up to 20

pounds, push/pull, bend, stoop, climb stairs, reach overhead and

pick up small objects. (Id.)

Additionally, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, Dr. Davis’

hearing testimony does not support her claims. During the March 9,

2000 and June 5, 2000 hearings, Dr. Davis testified that:

• Plaintiff received only “[a] few incidences of

treatment” for anxiety; 

• Plaintiff’s records showed no appreciable evidence

of having any kind of major mental, psychological or

psychiatric disorder(s);

• Plaintiff’s other psychiatric diagnoses lack

supporting evidence;

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 16 of 35
12On July 28, 1999, D. Kent Welsh, Ph.D., (“Dr. Welsh”), conducted a

psychological evaluation of Plaintiff in which he noted as follows: 

[s]he described herself as having problems with her nerves and

“being sick.” She has apparently been able to have other people

meet her needs by assuming the sick role. At present, there is an

economic incentive for “being sick,” but prior to her application

for Social Security benefits, there was no apparent economic

incentive. Therefore, her symptoms are consistent with the

diagnosis of a Factitious Disorder with Combined Psychological and

Physical Signs and Symptoms (DSM-IV, 300.19). This disorder has

caused Ms. Ramos to withdraw from contact with others and to have

difficulty maintaining the social functioning. She also shows a

marked restriction in her range of daily activities. She has not

demonstrated good judgment in making decisions in work related

activities. She lacks the arithmetic skills to manage her own

financial affairs. 

(Id. at 178-181, 389-392). 

17

• Plaintiff has an “undeveloped work ethic” and “poor

motivation;” 

• He agreed that while the State Agency mental RFC

assessment (that Plaintiff is moderately limited in

her ability to understand, remember and carry out

detailed instructions, maintain attention and

concentration, to set realistic goals, respond

appropriately to changes in a work setting and

interact appropriately with the general public), was

consistent with her medical records, it would merely

limit her to a simple, routine, repetitive work

setting. 

• He agreed with Dr. Hincken’s finding of “no evidence

of a sign or cluster syndrome”

• He found no evidence in the record showing that

Plaintiff had been systematically treated for

anxiety.

• He noted that while Dr. Welsh’s report12 found that

there was a marked restriction in Plaintiff’s range

of daily activities, the records reflect that she

has some social activities. Also, he questioned how

Dr. Welsh could make a judgment about Plaintiff’s

ability to perform work-related activities since he

did not see any evidence that she had ever worked.

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 17 of 35
18

(Tr. 596-607). Dr. Davis then concluded, in response to a question

regarding the Listing 12.05C requirement that Plaintiff have a

physical or mental impairment imposing additional and significant

work-related limitations of function, that “[f]rom a psychological

point of view, other than any mental limitations, I don’t find any

significant psychological features, past treatment, or any type of

limitation or restriction[]” (i.e., that she did not meeting Listing

12.05C). (Id. at 605). Likewise, Dr. Davis testified at the June

2000 hearing, that there was nothing in the medical records and

reports showing that Plaintiff would be unable to perform simple,

repetitive type of work activity, noting that: 

• Multiple, or a series of, inconsistencies exist in

Plaintiff’s treating physicians’ records and in the

MMHC records; and, that he found her allegations of

hallucinations unreliable. He concluded that her

medical records reveal nothing more than someone

with mild mental retardation.

• While she “could” have a personality disorder, the

record did not definitively establish a personality

disorder: “I think there’s just a series of

inconsistences[]” and malingering (or fictitious

disorder) would be “an attempt to imitate a

personality disorder” which “did not really exist[-

]” [t]hat the person was just faking a personality

disorder.”

• Plaintiff’s DDS mental residual functional capacity

assessments and psychiatric review technique forms

were correct and valid. 

• While she was prescribed medications (Risperdal and

Zoloft), she did not have her prescriptions filled.

(Id. at 624-630). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s reliance on Dr. Davis’

testimony is misplaced. Contrary to her assertion, Dr. Davis did

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 18 of 35
13On April 27, 1999, Plaintiff was examined by consultative clinical

psychologist Dr. Williams, who found: 

Plaintiff was oriented in all four spheres, well groomed and

appropriately dressed, demonstrated euthymic mood, had normal

affect, lacked anxiousness, speech abnormalities, loose

associations, tangential or circumstantial thinking and confusion,

hallucinations/delusions, had intact thought processes, normal fine

and gross motor skills, normal general activity levels, social

confidence and comfort, general ability to readily understand

instructions, a bored attitude toward evaluation tasks, poor to fair

interest and effort and a poor general approach to assessment tasks;

No hallucinations or delusions were noted, Plaintiff’s affect is

flat to normal, she is not anxious, mood seems euthymic, current

suicidal ideation was denied (but she reported taking pills when she

was younger), her own insight and understanding was poor as was her

judgment, and she is not able to manage her own funds. 

Plaintiff was not motivated to do her best; 

19

not admit that she had a personality disorder and, while he agreed

with certain findings of the State Agency physicians, he concluded

that she did not have any mental, psychiatric or psychological

impairment that would meet the second prong of Listing 12.05C.

Moreover, while Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to

consider other mental findings of record and that his decision does

not contain an explanation of the weight given to State Agency

physicians Drs. Hinton and Eno, who reviewed her case file and

assigned mental limitations based on her impairments, the ALJ’s

decision expressly notes that he reviewed all of the evidence of

record. Plaintiff even acknowledges that the ALJ “detailed

examinations completed by [other] State Agency physicians in his

decision[.]” (Doc. 14 at 8 (referencing the findings of

consultative clinical psychologist Gerald McCleary, Lucile

Williams13 and Kent Welsh)). Also, the record reveals that Dr.

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 19 of 35
Plaintiff was “limitedly cooperative with the evaluation process[]”

and as such, her statements “might be viewed as questionable.”

(Id. at 141-144).

20

Hinton’s August 17, 1999 psychiatric review technique form for

Plaintiff concluded that when considering mental retardation and

autisim, anxiety related disorders, somatoform disorders and

personality disorders, there was no evidence of an organic mental

disorder, schizophrenic, paranoid and other psychotic disorder,

affective disorders, somatoform disorders, personality disorders or

substance addiction disorders. (Tr. 183-192). Dr. Hinton found

that Plaintiff suffers from Listing 12.05 for mental retardation

given Plaintiff’s WAIS-III IQ scores (verbal 68, performance 73,

full scale 67) and Listing 12.06 anxiety related disorder (diagnosed

with anxiety). (Id. at 187). Relevant to Listings 12.05, 12.06,

12.07 and 12.08, Dr. Hinton concluded that she has a slight degree

of restriction of activities of daily living, a moderate degree of

difficulty maintaining social functioning and “often” deficiencies

of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in failure to

complete tasks in a timely manner (in work settings or elsewhere),

and that there was insufficient evidence of episodes of

deterioration or decompensation in work or work like settings. (Id.

at 190). Dr. Hinton also completed a mental residual functional

capacity assessment, concluding that Plaintiff had no significant

limitations in her abilities to:

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 20 of 35
21

• remember locations and work-like procedures;

• understand, remember and carry out very short and

simple instructions; 

• perform activities within a schedule, maintain

regular attendance and be punctual within customary

tolerances; 

• sustain an ordinary routine without special

supervision;

• work in coordination with or proximity to others

without being distracted by them; 

• make simple work-related decisions; 

• complete a normal workday and workweek without

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms

and perform at a consistent pace without an

unreasonable number and length of rest periods; 

• ask simple questions or request assistance; 

• accept instructions and respond appropriately to

criticism from supervisors; 

• get along with coworkers or peers without

distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes;

• maintain socially appropriate behavior and adhere to

basic standards of neatness and cleanliness;

• be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate

precautions; and

• travel in unfamiliar places or use public

transportation.

 

(Id. at 193-194). Dr. Hinton found, however, that Plaintiff had

moderate limitations in her abilities to:

• understand, remember and carry out detailed

instructions;

• maintain concentration and attention for extended

periods; 

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 21 of 35
22

• interact appropriately with the general public; 

• respond appropriately to changes in the work

setting; and

• set realistic goals or make plans independently of

others. 

(Id.) Dr. Hinton added that detailed instructions should be limited

in the workplace, she can attend for two hours with regular breaks,

changes in the workplace should be minimal, she will need assistance

setting goals and routine contact with the general public should not

be a usual job assignment. (Id. at 195).

On May 30, 2001, State Agency clinical psychologist Ellen N.

Eno (“Dr. Eno”) concurred with Dr. Hinton’s August 17, 1999 mental

residual functional capacity assessment, finding that Plaintiff has

the ability to understand, remember and carry out very short/simple

instructions, attend for two hour periods, ask simple questions,

accept instructions, maintain socially appropriate behavior and is

aware of normal hazards and can travel in unfamiliar places or use

public transportation. (Tr. 209-211). Dr. Eno also completed a

psychiatric review technique form on Plaintiff, evaluating Listings

12.02, 12.05 and 12.08, noting that:

• she has a borderline IQ, a diagnosis of a

personality disorder, a mild limitation in

activities of daily living and a moderate limitation

in maintaining social functioning and maintaining

concentration, persistence or pace, but no episodes

of decompensation.

• her medical treatment/history (including prior

diagnoses of caffeine induced sleep disorder and

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 22 of 35
23

anxiety, personality disorder with mixed traits,

borderline dependent, borderline intellectual

functioning, and r/o malingering), test results,

education, allegations of being a slow learner and

having depression with the effects of not feeling

good around people, being unable to read and feeling

sad, were all evaluated. 

• it was found that while she can perform personal

hygiene, make social contacts when she desires, shop

with assistance in making change, concentrate on

television shows, she does not perform household

chores due to fatigue and headaches; she can also

cook some things and knows how to make the bed and

wash dishes but is too tired to do so, and she has

limited socialization.

• her MMHC notes were assessed, which stated she did

not want to work, wanted to “get a check,” declined

offers of vocational rehabilitation, had a desire

for monetary gain and had a lack of interest in

treatment and work.

(Id. at 213-227).

Additional objective medical evidence of record also confirms

that Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing that she

meets or equals the requirements of Listing 12.05C. Plaintiff

failed to establish an additional mental impairment imposing

additional and significant work-related functional limitations and

thus, failed to meet the second requirement of Listing 12.05C

insofar as her examinations revealed that she was frequently:

• alert (Id. at 96, 179), oriented (Id. at 97, 143,

179, 206, 246-249, 251-252, 258-260, 263, 265-267,

416-418, 421, 423-426, 431-434, 497-501) and

attentive (Id. at 96)

• demonstrated appropriate appearance and grooming

(Id. at 142-143, 206, 238, 241-242, 244-247, 249,

251, 258-262, 265-268, 416-421, 423-426, 431-434,

470, 472-473, 497, 499-501)

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 23 of 35
14While Plaintiff claimed auditory hallucinations and playing with

imaginary friends, more often than not, she denied any hallucinations or

delusions in her reports medical professionals. See supra.

24

• had normal behavior and euthymic to normal mood (Tr.

97, 144, 206, 238, 240-242, 244-247, 251, 258-261,

267-268, 431-433, 470-473, 492, 497, 499, 501), a

stable appropriate affect (Id. at 97, 144, 206, 238,

240-242, 244-247, 249, 258, 260-262, 266-268, 433-

434, 470-473, 492, 494, 497, 499-501) and the

absence of anxiety (Id. at 97, 144)

• normal and/or spontaneous and coherent speech (Id.

at 97, 142-144, 206, 238, 240-242, 244-249, 251,

258-260, 262, 266-268, 416-417, 420, 424-426, 431-

434, 492, 494-495, 497-499, 501)

• normal/unimpaired memory (Id. at 238, 240-242, 245,

247-249, 251, 258-259, 266, 416-417, 424, 431-433,

492, 495, 498, 500-501)

• normal, clear, logical, coherent thought processes

(Id. at 97, 144, 206, 238, 241-242, 244-245, 247-

249, 251, 258, 260, 266-267, 416, 418, 424-425, 431,

433-434, 492, 494-495, 497-501), fair insight (Tr.

247-248, 251, 258, 260, 266, 433-434, 501), fair

judgment (Id. at 247-248, 251, 258, 260, 266, 433-

434, 501), and normal concentration (Id. at 238,

242-242, 245, 247-249, 258, 260, 266, 268, 432-434,

501)

• absence of loose associations, tangential or

circumstantial thinking or confusion (Id. at 97,

144, 206) and absence of indications of

hallucinations14 or delusions (Id. at 97, 144, 179,

206, 238, 240-242, 244-245, 247, 249, 251, 258, 260,

266-267, 416, 418, 424-425, 431, 433-434, 494-495,

497-501)

• normal fine and gross motor skills (Id. at 97, 142,

206), normal general activity levels (Tr. 142),

average energy (Id. at 251, 258-259, 261, 432-433,

499, 501), and absence of evidence of pain-related

behaviors (Id. at 97)

• ability to follow simple and complex verbal commands

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 24 of 35
25

(Id. at 206), read and understand what is read, and

copy a cube and copy a cross without severe

distortions (Id. at 97), social confidence and

comfort (Id. at 142), ability to generally readily

understand instructions (Tr. 142)

• her mental status was found to be stable (Id. at

246, 258, 260-261, 266-268, 416, 418-419, 424-426,

431, 434, 497, 499)

While Dr. Davis acknowledged that Plaintiff “might” suffer from

a personality disorder, the record does not reflect such, and as

noted supra, Dr. Davis testified that other psychiatric diagnoses

including that of a personality disorder, simply lacked support in

the record. (Tr. 596-607, 628-629). Dr. Davis also testified that

Plaintiff did not meet the requirements of a Listing and that the

record did not support disabling impairments for her. (Id. at 624-

630). In so finding, he noted many inconsistences in the records

of her treating physicians and that her allegations of

hallucinations were simply unreliable. (Id.)

To be considered disabling, a mental disorder impairment must

be accompanied by work-related limitations (i.e., medical evidence

of demonstrable clinical signs and laboratory findings concerning

restrictions of daily activities, constriction of interests,

deterioration of personal habits and an impaired ability to relate

to others). 20 C.F.R. Listing 12.00A. In this case, the record

reveals, first, that Plaintiff is able to understand, carry out and

remember short and simple instructions, and respond appropriately

to supervision, coworkers and work pressure in a work setting, which

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 25 of 35
26

supports the ALJ’s finding that she has the capacity to perform

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(c), 416.945(c).

Second, Dr. McCleary concluded that Plaintiff could respond

appropriately to supervision and coworkers and might have difficulty

with work pressure only because she had never worked before. See

supra. 

Third, two State Agency clinical psychologists concluded that

Plaintiff had no significant limitations in her abilities to:

remember locations and work-like procedures; understand, remember

and carry out short/simple instructions; perform activities within

a schedule; maintain regular attendance and be punctual within

customary tolerances; sustain an ordinary routine without special

supervision; work in coordination with, or proximity to, others

without being distracted by them; make simple work-related

decisions; complete a normal workday and workweek without

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and perform at a

consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest

periods; ask simple questions or request assistance; accept

instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from

supervisors; get along with coworkers or peers without distracting

them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; maintain socially

appropriate behavior and adhere to basic standards of neatness and

cleanliness; be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate

precautions; and travel in unfamiliar places or use public

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 26 of 35
15Plaintiff was noncompliant with her medications at times, and she also

failed to regularly attend appointments, and on once occasion was described as

displaying a “smart aleck” attitude. (Id. at 205, 236-237, 239, 241, 250,

432, 512-513).

27

transportation. See supra. The State Agency physicians found that

Plaintiff had moderate limitations only in her abilities to:

understand, remember and carry out detailed instructions; maintain

concentration and attention for extended periods; interact

appropriately with the general public; respond appropriately to

changes in the work setting; and set realistic goals or make plans

independently of others. (Id.) 

Furthermore, Richard Freemen, the VE, was questioned regarding

these mental residual functional capacity assessments at the

administrative hearing, and he testified that the assessments would

not preclude Plaintiff from performing the jobs he identified. (Tr.

524). Likewise, Dr. Davis testified that these assessments were

consistent with the medical record and would merely limit Plaintiff

to simple, routine, repetitive work. (Id. at 599-603). Similarly,

it was noted that Plaintiff has an economic incentive for being

sick, as she reported that she did not want to work, that she

thought her step-father could support her and declined vocational

rehabilitation assistance in searching for employment. (Tr. 180,

250, 259, 261-262). See also supra. Also, when Plaintiff took her

medication15 and complied with prescribed treatment, she reported

that she was doing well, feeling better, experiencing an improved

mood and that her medication was somewhat effective. (Tr. 241, 258,

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 27 of 35
28

261, 434, 591). 

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 28 of 35
29

Finally, at the January 2, 2003 administrative hearing,

Plaintiff testified that she knew how to make a bed, clean a

bathroom, sweep with a broom and empty the garbage. She also

acknowledged that she could probably work as a hotel maid. (Id. at

509-511, 517). Additionally, the record evidence establishes that

Plaintiff is able to engage in significant daily activities such as

caring for her own personal needs, cleaning house, maintaining her

home, limited cooking, sitting around and watching television,

visiting with others, attending parades, going to the mall to pay

a bill, shopping with assistance, and attending her examinations

without assistance/unaccompanied. (Id. at 76-77, 96, 142, 144, 205-

207, 249, 273-275, 283-284, 510-511, 516-517, 592). Plaintiff is

also able to maintain a relationship, as she reported that she

planned to be married. (Id. at 96, 141). Accordingly, the

undersigned finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

decision that Plaintiff does not meet, equal or medically equal

Listing 12.05C, due to the absence of a severe mental impairment

imposing additional and significant work-related limitations of

function on her.

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 29 of 35
16Requires an ALJ to affirmatively inquire about "any possible conflict"

between the evidence offered by a VE and information provided in the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”).

30

2. Whether the ALJ erred by failing in his obligation to

develop a full and fair administrative record regarding

the vocational opportunities available to Plaintiff in

violation of SSR 00-4p, by failing to ask the vocational

expert (“VE”) whether the evidence conflicts with the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), and by failing

to obtain a reasonable explanation for any apparent

conflict?

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ violated SSR 00-4p16 because he

failed to fully develop the record with regard to the vocational

opportunities available to her, as well as ask the VE whether the

evidence conflicted with the DOT, and if so, obtain a reasonable

explanation for any apparent conflict. (Doc. 14 at 10-14). Because

an administrative hearing is not adversarial, an ALJ has a duty to

develop the record fully and fairly. Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d

1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420,

1422-1423 (11th Cir. 1997)); Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735

(11th Cir. 1981). While the ALJ has a duty to develop the record

and is bound to make every reasonable effort to obtain all the

medical evidence necessary to make a determination, 20 C.F.R. §

416.912(d), he is not charged with making Plaintiff’s case for her.

Plaintiff has the burden of proving she is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §

416.912(a) and (c). See also Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011

(11th Cir. 1987); Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240. Upon a review of

the record evidence, the undersigned finds that the ALJ had

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 30 of 35
31

sufficient evidence to assess Plaintiff’s abilities. 

Specifically, because Plaintiff had no past relevant work, the

burden shifted to the ALJ at step five of the sequential evaluation

process to determine whether there was a significant number of jobs

in existence in the regional and national economy which she could

perform - given her age, education, previous work experience and

residual functional capacity. Hale, 831 F.2d at 1011. At step

five, the ALJ is guided by the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the

“Grids”). The ALJ found that Plaintiff retains the residual

functional capacity to perform work reduced by a limitation to

simple, unskilled work and thus, a VE was called to testify

regarding the jobs that she could perform with this limitation.

(Tr. 31, 522-530). Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1077-1078 (11th

Cir. 1996).

At the administrative hearing, VE Freeman testified that an

individual of Plaintiff’s age, education, past relevant work

experience and residual functional capacity could perform jobs in

the national/regional economies, in numbers the ALJ found to be

significant, citing the jobs of cafeteria attendant, clothing

launderer, hotel maid/housekeeper and room service clerk as

examples. (Tr. 522-523). Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ

adopted the VE’s testimony without asking him about any possible

conflict, the non-disability determination cannot be supported by

substantial evidence as a matter of law. Her argument, however, is

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 31 of 35
17The DOT is not the sole source of admissible information concerning

jobs and is not dispositive. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1230 (11th Cir.

1999) (holding that when the VE's testimony conflicts with the DOT, it

“trumps” the DOT). An ALJ may rely solely on the VE's testimony over the DOT;

reliance on the DOT is within the discretion of the ALJ. Id. at n. 2.

32

unavailing.

Here, SSR 00-4p was simply not triggered and can accordingly

provide no ground for error. Plaintiff cannot look to SSR 00-4p as

a source of relief because it provides that when an apparent

unresolved conflict between VE evidence and the DOT exists, the ALJ

must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying

upon the VE evidence to support a disability decision. Although the

VE did provide testimony that identified certain jobs, he did not

violate SSR 00-4p because he did not provide evidence about the

requirements of these jobs. SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 (S.S.A. Dec.

4, 2000). Thus, the ALJ was not required to ask the VE about any

DOT conflict.17 See, e.g., Jackson v. Barnhart, 120 Fed. Appx. 904

(3rd Cir. Jan. 6, 2005) (unpublished). Additionally, Plaintiff has

not alleged any specific conflict, and a review of the record does

not reveal the existence of any apparent conflict. Accordingly,

under the circumstances, the ALJ’s failure to question the VE about

a possible conflict was not error given the complete absence of

evidence of an apparent unresolved conflict.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth and upon consideration of the

administrative record and memoranda of the parties, it is

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 32 of 35
33

recommended that the decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security, denying Plaintiff’s claim for supplemental security income

benefits, is due to be AFFIRMED.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to this report and recommendation.

DONE this the 31st day of March, 2006. 

 /s/ Sonja F. Bivins 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 33 of 35
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this

document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court.

Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on

appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988). The procedure for challenging the findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more detail

in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a

“Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is

established by order. The statement of objection shall

specify those portions of the recommendation to which

objection is made and the basis for the objection. The

objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at

the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth

the party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different

disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a

copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate

judge, although a copy of the original brief may be

submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief

in support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief

in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment

of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing party

may submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10) days of

being served with a copy of the statement of objection. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72; SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 34 of 35
3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate

judge finds that the tapes and original records in this action are

adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to

this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is

advised that a judicial determination that transcription is

necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost of

the transcript.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-00742-BH-B Document 22 Filed 03/31/06 Page 35 of 35