Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02177/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02177-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald J. Abboud
Appellant
Comcast of Illinois X
Appellee
Multi-Vision Electronics
Not Party

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-2177

Comcast of Illinois X, An Illinois * 

Limited Liability Company, * 

 * 

Plaintiff – Appellee, * 

 * Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the 

 * District of Nebraska. 

Multi-Vision Electronics, Inc., * 

a dissolved Nebraska Corporation, * [UNPUBLISHED] 

doing business as Cable Network * 

Company, also known as Cable, * 

Network, * 

 * 

 Defendant, * 

 * 

Ronald J. Abboud, Individually, * 

 * 

Defendant – Appellant. * 

Submitted: March 8, 2010 

 Filed: March 16, 2010 

Before MURPHY, JOHN R. GIBSON, and RILEY, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 09-2177 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/16/2010 Entry ID: 3644866
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 Ronald Abboud appeals from the District Court’s1

 April 13, 2009 denial of 

his Rule 60(b) motion for relief from an October 11, 2006 judgment against 

Abboud in a suit by Comcast alleging violations of the Cable Communications 

Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1992) (“CCPA”). We affirm. 

 We review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of 

discretion. Jones v. Swanson, 512 F.3d 1045, 1048 (8th Cir. 2008). Rule 60(b) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to “relieve a party . . . of 

a final judgment” due to “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 

(2) newly discovered evidence . . . or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (2009). Relief under Rule 60(b) may be granted only upon an 

adequate showing of exceptional circumstances. Jones, 512 F.3d at 1048. 

 Appellant claims that the district court erred in concluding that his motion is 

untimely. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a Rule 60(b) motion to be 

brought “within a reasonable time, and . . . no more than a year after the entry of 

the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c) (2009). Final judgment in this case was 

entered on October 11, 2006. Appellant filed his Rule 60(b) motion on May 12, 

2008, over a year and a half later. 

 Appellant contends that a debtor in bankruptcy proceedings is granted an 

extension under 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) on the time to file a Rule 60(b) motion. “If 

applicable nonbankruptcy law . . . fixes a period within which the debtor may 

commence an action, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing 

of the petition, the trustee may commence such action only before . . . two years 

after the order for relief.” 11 U.S.C. § 108(a)(2) (2005). Appellant argues that 

since he filed his bankruptcy petition on July 16, 2007, less than a year after the 

 1

The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Nebraska. 

Appellate Case: 09-2177 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/16/2010 Entry ID: 3644866
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district court’s final judgment, he is entitled to an extra year to file his Rule 60(b) 

motion. 

 The statute is silent, however, on whether a debtor is entitled to the same 

time extensions as a trustee under § 108(a). Appellant is the debtor in his 

bankruptcy action, not the trustee. He fails to cite to any support, in the Eighth 

Circuit or elsewhere, that treats debtors and trustees synonymously for the 

purposes of § 108(a). Moreover, appellant ignores the importance of 

reasonableness in framing time limits on Rule 60(b) motions. This case involved a 

lengthy litigation in which summary judgment was upheld on appeal, see Comcast 

of Illinois X v. Multi-Vision Electronics, Inc., 491 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2007), and a 

subsequent stay pending appellant’s bankruptcy proceeding. The district court did 

not abuse its discretion in concluding that, given the case’s history, appellant’s 

motion was not filed within a reasonable time. 

 Even if appellant’s motion were timely filed, he did not supply evidence of 

exceptional circumstances warranting relief from judgment. He failed to 

demonstrate that Comcast did not exist as a legal entity at the time of his CCPA 

violations. In any event, the question of Comcast’s legal existence is irrelevant 

since it was awarded damages as a “private attorney general” on behalf of the 

entire cable industry, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(i) (1992). The district 

court found no mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or newly 

discovered evidence. Its denial of appellant’s Rule 60(b) motion was well within 

its discretion. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court. 

 

______________________________ 

Appellate Case: 09-2177 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/16/2010 Entry ID: 3644866