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Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 7, 2011 Decided December 9, 2011

No. 09-3116

IN RE: SEALED CASE

______

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cr-00233-1)

______

Before: ROGERS, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Appellant and a co-defendant were

extradited from Panama following their indictment on one count

of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine,

intending or knowing that it would be imported into the United

States from Columbia, Panama, Nicaragua, and elsewhere

outside of the United States. Appellant pleaded guilty and

received a below-Guidelines sentence of 84 months’

imprisonment (and 36 months’ supervised released). On appeal,

he contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction; venue was

improper; his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary; and he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. 

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He also contends that his sentence was unreasonable. None of

appellant’s challenges to his conviction succeed. 

The district court had jurisdiction over the charged

conspiracy because appellant’s extradition conformed with the

governing treaty between the United States and Panama, and

appellant waived his venue challenge by not raising it in the

district court. Appellant identifies no plain error affecting his

substantial rights in the district court’s acceptance of his guilty

plea. Further, appellant fails to show he was denied effective

assistance of counsel as would entitle him to reversal of his

conviction. Because appellant presents no grounds for setting

aside the judgment based on his guilty plea, the waiver of his

right to appeal a below-Guidelines sentence set forth in the plea

agreement is valid. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal of his

sentence and affirm the judgment of conviction.

I.

In November 2004, appellant was negotiating with a

confidential source (“CS”) to arrange for the importation of

heroin and cocaine into the United States. From then until April

2006, appellant regularly communicated with the CS by

telephone and e-mail. Appellant advised the CS of his contacts

with Colombian paramilitaries and their interest in exchanging

cocaine for weapons. In June 2005, appellant introduced the CS

to a heroin supplier at a videotaped meeting in Honduras; the

three men agreed to conduct a drugs-for-weapons exchange in

the near future. Appellant met the CS again in November 2005,

in Nicaragua, where the CS conducted a “weapons flash” and

appellant took digital pictures to show his paramilitary contacts.

 

At a meeting in Colombia in February 2006, appellant

introduced the CS to some of his paramilitary contacts,

including his co-defendant (hereinafter “Doe”), who represented

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a cocaine supplier associated with the paramilitaries. Appellant

told Doe that he had seen the weapons in November, and Doe

reached an agreement with the CS to deliver several hundred

kilograms of cocaine in exchange for the weapons. Doe and the

CS thereafter confirmed the details of the exchange by telephone

and discussed transporting the cocaine from Columbia to Las

Vegas and Chicago, among other locations in the United States. 

Doe told appellant he was planning to sell 500 kilograms to the

CS outright, on which he would pay appellant a commission of

$100 per kilogram, and to provide the CS an additional 200

kilograms on credit, on which he would pay appellant a

commission of $200 per kilogram. Appellant later discovered

Doe planned to sell the CS 700 kilograms outright, for a total of

900 kilograms of cocaine. 

Pursuant to their agreement, Doe sent an associate

(hereinafter “Moe”) to meet with the CS in Nicaragua on March

29, 2006, and view the weapons. Moe called the CS to inform

him of his arrival in Nicaragua, saying he was calling on

appellant’s behalf. Following an inspection of the weapons,

Moe informed Doe that they were acceptable. On March 31,

2006, and April 1, 2006, the CS and an undercover Panamanian

law enforcement officer met with appellant, Doe, and Moe in

Panama, where the cocaine was available for delivery, to discuss

the weapons-for-drugs exchange. On April 5, 2006, Panamanian

officials took appellant, Doe, and Moe into custody pursuant to

a provisional arrest warrant submitted by the U.S. Department

of State to the Republic of Panama.

A federal grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted

appellant, Doe, Moe and two other individuals on April 25,

2006, on one count of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or

more of cocaine, intending or knowing that it would be

unlawfully imported into the United States from the Republics

of Colombia, Panama, Nicaragua, and elsewhere outside of the

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United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963, in conjunction

with 21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a)(1), 960, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On June

1, 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice sent documents

formalizing the requests for extradition of appellant, Doe, and

Moe to the State Department for immediate submission to the

appropriate Panamanian authorities. Appellant and Doe were

brought to the United States and arraigned in the district court

on October 9, 2007, and January 15, 2008, respectively. Two

weeks before his scheduled trial date, appellant entered into a

plea agreement with the government. 

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, the district court held a hearing in which appellant

participated with the assistance of court-appointed counsel and

a court-certified interpreter. When the district court inquired if

appellant had been given a written Spanish translation of the

plea agreement, defense counsel advised that appellant had not

but explained that he and appellant “went through the factual

proffer fairly in detail,” Plea Hr’g Tr. 5, July 30, 2008, with the

assistance of a court-certified interpreter, the day before the Rule

11 hearing. They met again with the interpreter in the cell block

the morning of the hearing to review amendments to the plea

agreement. Defense counsel further advised the district court

that he and appellant “went over the plea agreement in terms of

the meanings of the particular paragraphs and sometimes

verbatim translations of the particular paragraphs, as well as a

review of the facts,” and that he believed appellant was

“comfortable with both” the plea agreement and the statement

of facts “and signed them.” Id. at 5. The district court then

emphasized to appellant that it would be willing to answer his

questions at any time. Speaking through an interpreter,

appellant told the district court that he was satisfied with defense

counsel’s services and that his counsel had “explained things to

[him],” “kn[ew] all about [his] part in all this,” and had “helped

[him] with the translations and in making [him] understand the

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process.” Id. at 9. The district court inquired about any

medications appellant might have taken that day; appellant

stated that he had taken one pill to help him sleep, another for

sleep-related anxiety, and another for his blood pressure, and

when the district court inquired, he affirmed that he felt alert and

could pay attention during the hearing, id. at 8. 

After reviewing the government’s factual proffer with

appellant, the district court explained the terms of the plea

agreement. The district court advised appellant that he would be

sentenced to a minimum of ten years’ imprisonment and a

maximum of life imprisonment, and that he also could be fined. 

The district court, appellant, and his counsel also discussed the

likelihood that appellant would be deported upon release from

prison and the relationship between his deportation and any

period of supervised release the district court might order. The

district court summarized the factors it would consider in

determining his sentence and noted the possibility that his

Guidelines sentencing range could change prior to sentencing. 

It then explained to appellant the significance of the waiver of

his right to appeal a sentence below the statutory maximum;

when asked if this explanation of the waiver was clear, appellant

indicated it was. 

As part of the Rule 11 colloquy, the district court inquired

whether appellant was entering the plea agreement of his own

free will, and appellant explained that his decision to do so

related to his co-defendant Doe’s decision to plead guilty, but

that he also “want[ed] to cooperate in everything [he] [could].” 

Id. at 28. Then, after appellant assured the district court that no

one had tried to threaten or force him into entering the plea

agreement, the district court accepted his guilty plea as

intelligent and voluntary.

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Before the hearing concluded, appellant renewed his request

to be moved to another facility, reminding the district court that

he had been attacked at the D.C. Jail and that he feared for his

safety. The government, which for security reasons had

opposed a transfer to the Corrections Treatment Facility

(“CTF”) where his co-defendant Doe was being housed,

withdrew its opposition because “both [appellant] and [Doe]

[were] cooperating.” Id. at 30–31.

Over five months later, on January 8, 2009, appellant filed

two pro se motions requesting the appointment of new counsel. 

In his first motion, appellant claimed that he had received

ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel had been too

busy to attend to his case, and that he “was forced to sign a plea

agreement without knowing fully what it meant” because

defense counsel had not provided him with a copy of the plea

agreement in Spanish. Mot. for Sixth Am. Violation Ineffective

Assist. Counsel 1. He also suggested that in return for his plea

he had been “offered to be taken out of solitary confinement at

D.C. Jail and transferred to CTF” after having been “put in

protective custody after an assassination attempt.” Id. In his

second motion, appellant claimed that defense counsel, in a

possible conflict of interest, had allowed co-defendant Doe’s

counsel to question him about a 1998 incident, after which Doe

decided to plead guilty and testify against him. Mot. for Sixth

Am. Violation Conflict Interest 1. The district court appointed

new counsel while “making no decision at [that] point about

[his] plea” and emphasizing that the appointment of new counsel

did not “mean[] that there [would] be any kind of automatic

granting of a request . . . to withdraw [his] plea.” Status Conf.

Tr. 12–13, Jan. 15, 2010.

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On October 21, 2009, the district court sentenced appellant

to 84 months’ imprisonment, followed by 36 months’ supervised

release.1

II.

As a threshold matter, appellant contends that the district

court lacked jurisdiction over his case because his arrest and

extradition to the United States violated the governing

extradition treaty. Specifically, he contends that his extradition

did not conform to the method of delivering a prisoner to the

United States prescribed in Article IV, as required by Article I,

of the Treaty Between the United States and Panama for the

Mutual Extradition of Criminals, U.S.-Pan., May 25, 1905, 34

Stat. 2851 (“Extradition Treaty”). He also contends that his

extradition violated the doctrine of “dual criminality,” which

allows extradition only if the charged conduct is considered

criminal in both jurisdictions. See United States v. Sensi, 879

F.2d 888, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 

1

 From a base offense level of 38, appellant received a twolevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and an additional twolevel reduction under the “safety valve provision,” U.S.S.G.

§ 5C1.2(a). The district court denied appellant a two-level reduction

for being only a “minor participant” in the conspiracy, reasoning that

he had been involved in the conspiracy for a longer period of time

than his co-defendant Doe and had served as the “bridge” connecting

the CS to Doe and other participants. Appellant’s Guidelines range

was thus 151–188 months. The government moved for an additional

three-level departure for substantial assistance, reducing the

Guidelines range to 108–135 months. Upon considering the factors

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court sentenced appellant to 90

months’ imprisonment, with credit for time served here and in

Panama, thus arriving at a sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment, with

36 months’ supervised release.

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The Extradition Treaty provides that the United States and

Panama “mutually agree to deliver up persons who, having been

charged with or convicted of any of the crimes and offenses

specified . . . , committed within the jurisdiction of one of the

contracting parties, shall . . . be found within the territories of

the other.” Extradition Treaty art. I. Where the United States

seeks the “arrest and detention of a fugitive” in Panama before

“the presentation of formal proofs,” “the proper course shall be

to apply to the Foreign Office, which will immediately cause the

necessary steps to be taken in order to secure the provisional

arrest or detention of the fugitive.” Id. art IV. The United States

must then submit a formal requisition for the surrender of the

prisoner, supported by evidence, within two months of the

prisoner’s arrest; otherwise, the prisoner must be released. See

id. Both the Republic of Panama and the United States are also

parties to the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic

in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, opened for

signature Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 (“U.N. Drug

Convention”), under which signatories agreed to establish as a

criminal and extraditable offense the conspiracy to distribute

narcotic drugs such as cocaine, see id. art. 3, ¶ 1, art. 6, ¶ 2.

The record, as supplemented, indicates by all appearances

that appellant was taken into custody pursuant to a provisional

arrest warrant submitted to Panamanian government officials,

and that the U.S. government submitted formal documentation

in support of his extradition from Panama within two months of

the arrest. Appellant identifies no irregularities in his arrest or

extradition that would suggest nonconformity with the method

prescribed in the Extradition Treaty. Further, appellant’s

extradition did not violate the doctrine of “dual criminality”

because the charged conduct — conspiracy to distribute cocaine

— was a criminal and extraditable offense in Panama, a

signatory to the U.N. Drug Convention. See U.N. Drug

Convention art. 3, ¶ 1, art. 6, ¶ 2. Therefore, appellant’s

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jurisdictional challenges are without merit. Appellant has

waived his challenge to venue in the District of Columbia by

failing to raise it in the district court, see United States v.

Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States

v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1517 & n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United

States v. Wilson, 26 F.3d 142, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

III.

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

“prescribes a procedure ‘designed to assist the district court

judge in making the constitutionally required determination that

a defendant’s guilty plea is truly voluntary . . . [and] to produce

a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors

relevant to this voluntariness determination,’” United States v.

Dewalt, 92 F.3d 1209, 1211–12 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969)), thereby

“‘eliminat[ing] any need to resort to a later [i.e., postconviction] factfinding proceeding in [the] highly subjective

area of voluntariness,’” id. at 1212 (second and third alterations

in original) (quoting McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 469). After a

sentence is imposed, the defendant may not withdraw his plea;

rather, “the plea may be set aside only on direct appeal or

collateral attack.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e). Any variance from

the requirements of Rule 11 is harmless error unless it “affects

substantial rights.” Id. 11(h). Where a defendant raises Rule 11

error for the first time on appeal, review is for plain error. 

United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 80 (2004)

(citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 63 (2002)); see also

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993). Unless

the error — even one “preserved” by objection in the district

court — is “structural,” it can result in reversal of a conviction

only if it affected the outcome of the proceeding. Dominguez

Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81. The defendant must demonstrate a

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“reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have

entered” a guilty plea. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83.

On appeal, appellant contends that his guilty plea was not

knowing, intelligent, or voluntary because he was never

provided a written translation of the plea agreement in Spanish,

his native tongue; “he was under the duress and coercive effect

of being housed in a detention facility where” he had suffered a

knife attack, “knowing that as soon as he pleaded guilty he

would be moved out of that facility,” Appellant’s Br. 21; and the

district court was required to conduct a more searching inquiry

into the nature and effects of the medications he had taken on

the day he entered his plea. He also identifies two points during

the plea colloquy that he contends reveal his general lack of

understanding: his question regarding the relationship between

his likely deportation and any period of supervised release the

district court might order, and his apparent confusion over the

difference between a reduction below the statutory minimum

sentence and a departure from the Guidelines sentencing range. 

At no point has appellant contended that, but for the Rule 11

errors he asserts the district court committed, he would not have

pleaded guilty. Nor does appellant identify any provision of the

plea agreement he would not have accepted. The alleged errors

thus “did not affect the outcome of the district court

proceeding,” Dewalt, 92 F.3d at 1213, and are harmless, see

FED.R.CRIM.P. 11(h). Appellant therefore fails to demonstrate

that he is entitled to reversal of his plea-based conviction on the

ground that the district court plainly erred under Rule 11. This

is so even treating appellant’s claims as constitutional in nature

— going to the knowing and voluntary element of his guilty plea

— because he does not argue his claims are of “structural” error. 

See Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81; cf. United States v.

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148–49 (2006).

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IV.

“‘A plea is not voluntary or intelligent,’ and therefore

unconstitutional, ‘if the advice given by defense counsel on

which the defendant relied in entering the plea falls below the

level of reasonable competence.’” United States v. Taylor, 139

F.3d 924, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v.

Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Appellant’s

contention that his plea was not voluntary and intelligent

because he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the

effective assistance of counsel is evaluated under the twopronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

See United States v. Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir.

2003). Appellant must show both “that his counsel’s

performance ‘fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness,’” Taylor, 139 F.3d at 929 (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687–88), and “that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty

and would have insisted on going to trial,” id. at 929–30

(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). See also

United States v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

As with his Rule 11 contentions, appellant fails to assert —

let alone demonstrate — a reasonable probability that, but for

initially appointed defense counsel’s purported errors, he would

not have pleaded guilty. Rather, appellant appears to suggest he

would have pleaded sooner than his co-defendant Doe had

defense counsel provided him with a written Spanish translation

of the plea agreement, consulted with him more frequently, and

protected him from questioning by his co-defendant Doe’s

counsel. “At a minimum,” appellant contends, defense counsel

“should have negotiated a joint plea,” Appellant’s Br. 26–27,

thereby denying the co-defendant the “tactical advantage” he

enjoyed at sentencing as a result of his earlier plea, id. at 25. 

Yet in articulating his request for new appointed counsel,

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appellant told the district court that although “there were certain

matters that [he] want[ed] to clear up in terms of the procedure,”

he “always wanted to cooperate with the prosecution” and with

“the government of the United States.” Status Conf. Tr. 14, Jan.

15, 2010. From the time of his initial request for new counsel

through this appeal, appellant has never suggested that he would

not have pleaded guilty had initially appointed defense counsel

provided more satisfactory assistance. Therefore, his ineffective

assistance claim necessarily fails the second prong of the

Strickland test.

V.

“A defendant may waive his right to appeal his sentence as

long as his decision is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” 

United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

During the Rule 11 hearing, appellant confirmed his

understanding that in pleading guilty he would waive his right

to challenge the reasonableness of his sentence on appeal unless

it exceeded the Guidelines range. Because appellant has shown

no procedural or constitutional defect in the district court’s

acceptance of his guilty plea, appellant’s waiver is valid and the

appeal of his below-Guidelines sentence is foreclosed.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal of appellant’s sentence

and affirm the judgment of conviction.

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