Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03169/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03169-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Theodore Shanta Morgan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

~" l .G .u .U 

Unit.eel State~ Coμrt~f Ap~~b 

Tent!'l C1rcm , 

FEB 2 5 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

THEODORE SHANTA MORGAN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No . 91-3169 

(D.C. No. 90-30012-02) 

( D. Kan . ) 

Before BALDOCK, BARRETT, Ci rcuit Judges, and DAUGHERTY, District 

Judge.** 

This case results from a brutal stabbing incident in the 

federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. Defendant-appel lant 

Theodore Shanta Morgan and a fellow Leavenworth inmate 

(Codefendant) allegedly were upset with a third inmate (Victim) 

because they thought he was passing information to prison 

authorities. On October 31, 1988, Defendant and Codefendant 

allegedly entered Victim's cell, surprised him, slammed him to the 

floor and stabbed him fifteen times with a rusty ten-inch "shank. " 

Although severely wounded, Victim survi ved and identified his 

* This order and judgment has no precede ntial value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** Honorable Frederick A. Daugherty, Senior United States 

District Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-3169 Document: 010110226153 Date Filed: 02/25/1992 Page: 1 
attackers. Defendant and Codefendant were indicted for one count 

of possession of a prohibited object while in a federal prison, 18 

U.S.C. § 179l(a)(2) and§ 2, and a second count of assault with a 

deadly weapon, 18 u.s.c. § 113(c) and§ 2. Codefendant pleaded 

guilty to the assault count, but he did not identify Defendant as 

his accomplice. Defendant subsequently was tried by jury and 

convicted on both counts. He appeals, pointing to three errors: 

(1) the admission of Codefendant's guilty plea as evidence of 

Defendant's guilt; (2) the failure of the government to disclose 

the results of scientific tests that could have been crucial to 

the defense; and (3) the questioning of defense witnesses 

regarding witness fees. We address only the first issue because 

it requires reversal. 

On direct examination at trial, Victim unequivocally 

identified Defendant as the person who stabbed him. Defendant 

then cross-examined Victim and attempted to impeach the 

identification. In the process, Defendant raised the issue of 

Codefendant's identity and attempted to impeach Victim's resulting 

testimony. This was the first mention of Codefendant. In 

response to this cross-examination, the government requested at 

two separate bench conferences outside the presence of the jury 

that the court notice Codefendant's guilty plea as a means of 

rehabilitating Victim's identification testimony. On both 

occasions, the district court took the matter under advisement but 

did not rule. Later, Defendant again attempted to impeach the 

identification testimony in his cross-examination of another 

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Appellate Case: 91-3169 Document: 010110226153 Date Filed: 02/25/1992 Page: 2 
government witness. This time, in spite of the court's ear lier 

denial to rule on the matter, the government openly referred to 

the guilty plea in objecting to the cross-examination. At the 

close of the government's case, the court attempted to remedy the 

situation by formally noticing the guilty plea in accordance with 

Fed. R. Evid. 201 and instructing the jury to consider the guilty 

plea only as evidence of Victim' s credibility, not as substantive 

evidence of Defendant's guilt. The government then mentioned the 

plea twice more in its closing argument, and the court 

incorporated the cautionary instruction into the written jury 

instructions. 

Defendant argues that the repeated references to the guilty 

plea during the initial cross-examination, the government's 

closing arguments, and the jury instructions -- undermined the 

fundamental fairness of the trial because the jury could have used 

the plea as evidence of his guilt. Indeed, "the ple a or 

conviction of a codefendant may not be used as substantive 

evidence of another's guilt." United States v. Dunn, 841 F~2d 

1026, 1030 (10th Cir. 1988). See also United States v . Smith, 806 

F.2d 971, 974 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Davis, 766 F.2d 

1452, 1456-57 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985); 

United States v. Baez, 703 F.2d 453, 455 (10th Cir. 1983). The 

danger of unfair prejudice resulting from the natural inclination 

of juries to determine guilt by association in this situation is 

obvious. See United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1480 (10th 

Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989). Howe ver, this 

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Appellate Case: 91-3169 Document: 010110226153 Date Filed: 02/25/1992 Page: 3 
does not absolutely preclude the admission of a codefendant's 

guilty plea; the plea may be admitted if the codefendant testifies 

and if the plea is used only to impeach or enhance the 

codefendant's credibility. Baez, 703 F.2d at 455. On this latter 

point, "cautionary instructions limiting the jury's use of the 

plea to permissible purposes are critical." Id. 

The government argues that its references to Codefendant's 

guilty plea and the judicial notice of the plea were appropriate 

because the court gave a cautionary instruction limiting the use 

of the plea to a permissible purpose; that is, it instructed the 

jury to consider the guilty plea only as evidence of Victim's 

credibility. 1 Rehabilitation of Victim's credibility, however, is 

1 The court instructed the jury as follows: 

All right. Ladies and gentlemen, before we start with 

the defendant's case, let me give you a cautionary 

instruction that I think is necessary because certain 

evidence has come in. The cautionary instruction will 

read as follows: 

"Members of the jury, counsel for the United States has 

requested this Court to take judicial notice of the fact 

that James Hale Demones [Codefendant] was charged with 

the defendant in this case in Count 2, the assault 

charge, and that he has pleaded guilty to that charge. 

This is a fact capable of accurate and ready 

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned, and, therefore, under Federal 

Rules of Evidence 20l(b)(2) it is appropriate for the 

Court to take judicial notice of this fact. You may 

reject this fact if you wish, but you should have some 

reasonable basis for doing so. You are further 

instructed that Mr. Demones' plea of guilty has been 

submitted as evidence for your consideration upon strict 

conditions. You may not consider the plea of guilty by 

Mr. Demones as direct evidence of Defendant Morgan's 

guilt. You may not find Defendant Morgan guilty simply 

because someone who is alleged to have been an 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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Appellate Case: 91-3169 Document: 010110226153 Date Filed: 02/25/1992 Page: 4 
not a "permissible purpose." We categorically answered this 

question in United States v. Austin, 786 F.2d 986 (10th Cir. 

1986). In Austin, the government argued that the codefendants' 

convictions for their participation in the conspiracy were 

admissible in part to rehabilitate the government's primary 

witness. We stated: 

under the pertinent case law and Fed. R. Evid. 609(a), 

it is the testifying witness' own prior conviction that 

is admissible on cross-examination to impeach his 

credibility or on redirect to rehabilitate him. See, 

~, United States v. Edwards, 716 F.2d 822, 825 (11th 

Cir. 1983) (per curiam). We have found no case, and the 

Government has not cited one, in which a conviction 

other than that of the witness himself was properly 

admitted on the issue of his credibility. 

786 F.2d at 992. Accord United States v. Eason, 920 F.2d 731, 735 

n.7 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Austin); United States v. Hansen, 544 

F.2d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Veltre, 

591 F.2d 347, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing Hansen) . We 

see no material distinction between Austin and this case, and the 

government has not cited Austin . Codefendant did not testify; he 

was "not in court, not on trial, and not to be tried . . .. " 

Hansen, 544 F.2d at 780. Therefore, the government committed 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

accomplice has pled guilty. The evidence is being 

admitted solely as it may pertain to the strength and 

credibility of Christopher Turner's [Victim] 

identification testimony. You may consider it only for 

this purpose. It must not be considered as substantive 

evidence of defendant's guilt . " 

Tr. 199-200. The written jury instructions were identical to the 

above verbal caution. 

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clear misconduct when it referred to the plea and the court erred 

legally in noticing it. 

Having determined that the trial court erred, we must 

determine whether the error is reversible. On this point, the 

government claims that Defendant did not contemporaneously object 

below and that the heightened plain error standard therefore 

applies. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(l) (contemporaneous objection 

required); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (plain error may be noticed even 

if not preserved). Defendant claims that he adequately preserved 

the issue for appeal by objecting to any mention of the plea, but 

the record reveals otherwise. Defendant did not object when the 

government originally referred to the plea, see tr. 140, nor did 

he object at the conference on the second morning of the trial 

when the court raised the issue of the erroneous cautionary 

instruction to be read to the jury at the close of the 

government's case, see tr. 189. In fact, the record reveals that 

Defendant approved of the erroneous instruction. See Tr. 189 

("Since it's already been made clear to the jury that Demones has 

pled, I appreciate that type of cautionary instruction."). Only 

later did Defendant change his mind and object to the written jury 

instructions and any further reference to the guilty plea. 

Because Defendant did not contemporaneously obj e ct to the 

government's misconduct and to the court's erroneous instruction, 

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we review only for plain error.

2 

Recognition of plain error under Rule 52(b) "tempers the blow 

of a rigid application of the contemporaneous-objection 

requirement." United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) . 

Nevertheless, we use the rule "'sparingly, solely in those 

circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise 

result.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 

n.14 (1982)). We will not reverse for plain error unless, after 

reviewing the error against the entire record, we are "satisfied 

that the error not only affected substantial rights in a serious 

way, but also that the 'error had an unfair prejudicial impact on 

the jury's deliberations.'" See United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 

F.2d 1329, 1334 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 

16-17, n.14). 

In our cases dealing with this issue in the context of a 

plain error review, we have considered the following factors 

highly prejudicial: (1) the lack of a cautionary instruction; (2) 

repeated references to the plea by either the judge or prosecutor; 

and (3) lack of substantial untainted evidence against the 

defendant. See Smith, 806 F.2d 971 (reversible plain error in 

part because of lack of cautionary instruction and repeated 

references to plea); Austin, 786 F.2d 986 (reversible plain error 

2 If Defendant had adequately preserved this issue pursuant to 

Rule 103(a)(l), we would employ the harmless error standard, 

affirming the judgment only if we could determine that the error 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. 

Martinez-Nava, 838 F.2d 411, 416-17 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying 

harmless error standard to prosecutor's single reference to 

codefendant's guilty plea). 

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in part because of lack of cautionary instruction, repeate d 

references to plea, and adequate but "far from overwhelming 

evidence . . . ," id. at 992); Baez, 703 F.2d 453 ( reversible 

plain error in part because of lack of cautionary instruction and 

lack of evidence from witnesses other than the key witness whose 

credibility was significantly enhanced by admission of plea). See 

also United States v. Martinez-Nava, 838 F.2d 411, 416-17 (10th 

Cir. 1988) (discussing Smith, Austin and Baez); Davis, 766 F.2d at 

1456-57 (lack of cautionary instruction not per se plain error, no 

plain error in part because evidence of guilt was overwhelming). 

In this case, the factors considered in Smith, Austin and 

Baez are present. The court gave a cautionary instruction, but 

the cautionary instruction erroneously focused the jury's 

attention on Victim's credibility, an impermissible object for the 

admission of Codefendant's guilty plea . This obviously is more 

compelling in the plain error context than the complete failure to 

give an instruction as discussed in Smith, Austin and Baez. Also, 

both the court and the prosecutor repeatedly referred to 

Codefendant's guilty plea -- the judge in his repeated cautionary 

instructions, and the prosecutor during trial and in closing 

arguments . Finally, as in Austin and Baez, the testimony of the 

government's primary witness, Victim, was significantly enhanced 

by the admission of Codefendant's guilty plea. Other than 

Victim's testimony, the government had very little evidence that 

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Appellate Case: 91-3169 Document: 010110226153 Date Filed: 02/25/1992 Page: 8 
even remotely connected Defendant to the stabbing. 3 While 

Victim's unequivocal testimony certainly was adequate to conv ict 

Defendant, "it was far from overwhelming 

F.2d at 992. 

II Austi n, 786 

We think that substantial rights were affected in a serious 

way and that the jury's deliberations were unfairly prejudiced. 

The case is not distinguishable from our previous holdings in the 

plain error context. Therefore, we REVERSE the conviction and 

REMAND for a new trial. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

3 Government witnesses testified of finding a wet T-shirt in 

the corner of Defendant's cell, but the T-shirt was not bloody. 

Other than Victim's testimony, the government provide d no evidence 

connecting the knife or the bloody clothing found in the prison 

after the stabbing to Defendant. No prison guards or fellow 

inmates testified of seeing Defendant in the vicinity of Victim's 

cell when the stabbing occurred and physical evidence was 

completely lacking. 

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