Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-03057/USCOURTS-caDC-94-03057-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Allen Ford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 10, 1995 Decided June 9, 1995

No. 94-3057

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MARK ALLEN FORD,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cr00347-01)

Bernard S. Grimm, appointed by the court, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs

was Dennis F. Nee.

Alan M. Boyd, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief

were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas C. Black, and Andrew S.

Levetown, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, BUCKLEY and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: This case involves the legality of a warrantless search incident to

an in-home arrest, conducted without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. On the morning of

January 10, 1992, six law enforcement officers, including a special agent of the FBI, arrived at the

home of Mark Ford's mother with an arrest warrant for Ford. Upon entering the apartment, the FBI

agent observed appellant in the apartment hallway and arrested him. The agent then conducted what

the Government characterizes as a "protective sweep." He walked into the bedroom immediately

adjoining the hallwayinwhich appellant was arrested, purportedlyto check for individuals who might

pose a danger to those on the arrest scene. Once in the bedroom, the agent spotted a gun clip in plain

view on the floor, and, although he realized that there were no people in the bedroom, the agent

nevertheless continued to search. He lifted a mattress under which he found live ammunition, money,

and crack cocaine, and he lifted the window shades and found a gun on the window sill. Ford moved

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to suppress this evidence, but the District Court held that the agent was justified in searching the

bedroom, and that the evidence found therein wasthus admissible. Ford was subsequently convicted

of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C)

(1988) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1988).

Appellant challenges his convictions, contending that the District Court erred in failing to

suppress evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We agree. In Maryland v. Buie,

494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990), the Supreme Court held that "incident to [an] arrest the officers could, as

a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other

spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately

launched." In this case, the agent was justified in looking in the bedroom, which was a space

immediately adjoining the place of arrest. And once in the bedroom, the agent could legitimately

seize the gun clip which was in plain view. The agent could not, however, lawfully search beyond

thatneither under the mattress nor behind the window shadesbecause these were notspacesfrom

which an attack could be immediately launched, and there were no exigent circumstances justifying

the warrantless search. We hold that the evidence taken from under the mattress and from behind

the window shades was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore wasinadmissible

at trial.

Once in the bedroom pursuant to a legitimate protective sweep under Buie, and once having

seen the gun clip in plain view, the law enforcement officers had available reasonable measures to

ensure their safety. They could have secured the bedroom and telephoned a magistrate for a search

warrant, or they could have asked the owner ofthe apartment, appellant'smother, whethershe would

consent to a search ofthe apartment in lieu of waiting for a magistrate to issue a search warrant. This

reasonable alternative to a warrantless search would have avoided the infringement of Fourth

Amendment rights, without in any way jeopardizing the safety of the officers. However, the officers

took no such reasonable measures. Because the search was unreasonable and hence unconstitutional,

we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the District Court forsuch proceedings

as may be appropriate.

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1On April 7, 1992, the Government charged appellant with five narcotics and firearm offenses

arising from two arrests, and on June 2, 1992, appellant entered a guilty plea on two counts. 

Appellant twice moved to withdraw his guilty plea, the second time declaring his innocence

(contending that he did not possess the gun and drugs found in his brother's bedroom) and both

times his motions were denied. On appeal, this court held that the District Court abused its

discretion in refusing to grant appellant's second motion to withdraw his guilty plea. United

States v. Ford, 993 F.2d 249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1993). On June 29, 1993, the District Court vacated

appellant's convictions and set aside his sentences. On September 17, 1993, the Government filed

a retyped indictment. 

I. BACKGROUND

On January 10, 1992, FBI Special Agent Stephen Godfrey received a call from the

Metropolitan Police Department informing him that officers in the Homicide Unit had a warrant for

the arrest of appellant Mark Ford. The affidavit accompanying the arrest warrant alleged that

appellant had shot a man after appellant and several accomplices robbed the man of cocaine. Agent

Godfrey ran a criminal check on appellant and discovered that appellant previously had been arrested

for forcible robbery, drug possession, and possession of a prohibited weapon.

At approximately 7 a.m. on January 10, 1992, Agent Godfrey and five police officers arrived

at the apartment of appellant's mother in Washington, D.C. Upon entering the apartment, Agent

Godfrey saw Ford, having emerged from a back bedroom, walking down a short hallway toward the

officers. Agent Godfrey instructed appellant that he was under arrest, after which Ford was

handcuffed and confined by the other officers. Appellant did not resist the arrest.

Agent Godfrey then walked into the bedroom from which appellant had emerged. The agent

turned on the light in the bedroom and noticed a loaded .45 caliber magazine on the floor next to a

set of box springs and mattresses. Although Agent Godfrey realized that there were no persons in

the roomthe room was devoid of furniture except for the box springs and mattresses, a dresser or

wardrobe, and several bags piled up in a cornerGodfrey nevertheless proceeded to conduct a

search. He lifted one of the mattresses and found live ammunition, money, and crack cocaine. Upon

lifting the window shades, he discovered a .45 caliber handgun on the window sill.

Ford was charged, by a retyped indictment,

1 with possession with intent to distribute cocaine

base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), use of a firearm in relation to a drug

trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and possession of

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a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On September 20, 1993, the

District Court held a pre-trial evidentiaryhearing on the admissibilityof physical evidence seized from

the apartment of appellant's mother at the time of Ford's arrest. Agent Godfrey testified that he went

into the bedroom "to make sure there was no one there to harm [the arresting officers]." Tr. of

Motion Hearing (Sept. 20, 1993) at 30, reprinted in Appendix for Appellant (App.) 30. He also

testified that there were no chairs or coffee tables behind which someone could hide, and that it would

have been "[v]irtually impossible" for someone to hide underneath the mattresses in the bedroom.

Id. at 33, reprinted in App. 33. Agent Godfrey further testified that, shortly after he lifted the

mattress and found the ammunition, money, and contraband, an officer who had been stationed

outside of the apartment informed him that the officer thought he had seen someone attempt to leave

through the window or attempt to put something on the window sill. Id. at 18, 40, reprinted in App.

18, 40. Agent Godfrey then lifted the window shades and found the gun.

The District Court concluded that Agent Godfrey conducted a legitimate protective sweep

and that the evidence discovered was admissible at trial. The court stated:

Given Mr. Ford's prior record, the fact that the warrant being executed wasfor felony

murder, and the hour at which the warrant was executed, this Court finds that it was

reasonable for Agent Godfrey to conduct a protective sweep to make sure that there

was no one else on the premises who might have posed a danger to the officers or

other individuals in the apartment. Agent Godfrey's actions amounted to no more

than a cursory inspection of those places where an individual might have been found.

United States v. Ford, Crim. No. 91-347, slip op. at 7 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1993), reprinted in App.

87. The court held that the seized .45 caliber ammunition, found in plain view and with an

incriminating character immediately apparent, was admissible. Id., slip op. at 8, reprinted in App.

88. The court also held that, "[i]n conducting a protective sweep, a reasonably prudent police officer

who finds ammunition in plain view next to a bed is justified in checking the immediate vicinity in an

attempt to locate weapons that might pose a danger to those present." Id.

Ford was subsequently tried by a jury. On February 4, 1994, the District Court granted

appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the second countuse of a firearm in relation to a

drug trafficking offenseand, later that day, the jury returned a guilty verdict against appellant on

the remaining two counts. On May 6, 1994, the District Court sentenced appellant to concurrent

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2Appellant also challenges the District Court's joinder of the felon-in-possession count with the

other counts, as well as the District Court's decision not to suppress the evidence of cocaine,

contending that the Government failed to establish the chain of custody of the evidence after it

was seized. Because we find the first challenge dispositive, we need not reach the second two. 

terms of seventy months imprisonment on both counts, to be followed by concurrent terms of three

years of supervised release. Appellant challenges the District Court's determination that Agent

Godfrey's search in the bedroom was permissible under the protective-sweep doctrine.2

II. ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures. See Skinner v.

Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). In determining the reasonableness of

a search, courts balance the intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the

promotion of legitimate Government interests. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S.

579, 588 (1983). The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the "cardinal principle" that "

"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are

perse unreasonable under the Fourth Amendmentsubject only to a few specifically established and

well-delineated exceptions.' " Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United

States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).

In 1990, following the principles enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Supreme Court carved out one such exception in Buie,

permitting law enforcement officers to conduct a "protective sweep" incident to an in-home arrest.

See Buie, 494 U.S. at 331-34. In Buie, following an armed robbery committed by a man in a red

running suit and an accomplice, the police obtained an arrest warrant for Buie at his home and

arrested him as he emerged from the basement. Id. at 328. One of the officers entered the basement

"in case there was someone else" there, and seized a red running suit lying in plain view. Id. In

assessing the propriety of this search, the Court held:

as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without

probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spacesimmediately

adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.

Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken

together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably

prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a

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3

In Buie, the Supreme Court focused on this second prong because the defendant in that case

was arrested outside the basement and the search was conducted in the basement, which

presumably contained spaces which were not immediately adjoining the place of Buie's arrest. 

Thus, the question for the lower court on remand was whether the searching officer possessed "a

reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an

individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." Id. at 337; see also id. at 338 (Stevens,

J., concurring) (noting that record "suggests that no reasonable suspicion of danger justified the

entry into the basement" and that "[t]he State may thus face a formidable task on remand"); id. at

339 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (disagreeing with Justice Stevens' observation that State has

formidable task on remand). 

4The Supreme Court also stated that this second kind of sweep "lasts no longer than is

necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to

complete the arrest and depart the premises." Id. at 335-36. 

danger to those on the arrest scene.

Id. at 334.

The Court thus identified two situations in which protective sweeps are justified, and two

types of protective sweeps. The first involves "look[ing] in closets and other spaces immediately

adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched." Id. The second3

goes "beyond that," but is nevertheless circumscribed"such a protective sweep, aimed at protecting

the arresting officers, ifjustified bythe circumstances, is nevertheless not a fullsearch ofthe premises,

but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found."4Id. at

334-35. The first type of sweep requires no probable cause or reasonable suspicion, while the second

requires "articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would

warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual

posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." Id. at 334.

This case involvesBuie'sfirst type ofsweep. The law enforcement officers who arrested Ford

lacked a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area searched harbored a

dangerousindividual, which would justify Buie'ssecond type ofsweep. In its brief, the Government

argues that the officers had the requisite articulable facts for Buie's second type of sweep: because

the background check revealed that appellant had prior arrests and that the present arrest warrant was

for homicide, the officers could assume that Ford might be armed and dangerous. However, when

Godfrey began hissweep, appellant had already been arrested and placed in the custody of the police

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5That crime occurred on June 14, 1991. The warrant was executed on January 10, 1992. 

6The Government also argues that appellant's background "combined with the poor lighting

conditions in the apartment ... and the fact that the arrest for homicide took place in front of his

visibly upset mother and another unknown woman, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in

believing that there could be other dangerous third parties in the apartment." Brief for Appellee at

18. Poor lighting, a visibly upset mother, and another unknown woman, however, have nothing

to do with a belief that the area harbors "an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest

scene." Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. 

7

Indeed, when asked at the evidentiary hearing why he went into the bedroom, Agent Godfrey

testified, "I did not know if there was anybody back there. I wanted to make sure there was no

one there to harm us." Tr. of Motion Hearing at 30, reprinted in App. 30. 

officers. As we recently stated in another protective sweep case, "the officers' awareness that

[appellant] had a previous weapons conviction and could be dangerous did not itself directly justify

the sweep. Once [appellant] was in custody, he no longer posed a threat to the police." United

States v. Henry, 48 F.3d 1282, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding articulable suspicion based on

informant's warning that appellant would have weapons, that appellant's "boys" or "counterparts"

might be with him, and that, when arrested just outside his front door, appellant said "they got me");

see also United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095, 1097 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he danger which

justifies a protective sweep comes from the possible presence of other armed and dangerous persons

in the vicinity."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 596 (1991). The Government also argues that the affidavit

accompanying the warrant alleged that appellant had accomplices with him when he committed the

crime for which he was being arrested, and that this fact would warrant a reasonably prudent officer

in believing that the apartment harbored other dangerous individuals. This argument, too, is

unpersuasive. The crime for which appellant was arrested occurred almost seven months prior to his

arrest,5and the officers had absolutely no indication that the alleged accomplices were present in

Ford's mother's apartment when the arrest occurred.6

Notably, the Government chose not to pursue Buie's second prong at oral argument before

this court. This made sense, because the record here is clear that Agent Godfrey possessed no

articulable facts which would have led himto believe that the area he searched harbored an individual

posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.7

Under Buie's first prong, however, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or

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reasonable suspicion, Agent Godfrey was free to look in spaces immediately adjoining the place of

Ford's arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. Because the arrest took place in

the hallway, and the bedroom from which Ford emerged was immediately adjoining the hallway,

Agent Godfrey could legitimately look in the bedroom for potential attackers. Upon seeing, in plain

view, the gun clip, an object whose incriminating character is immediately apparent, Agent Godfrey

was justified in seizing it. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990) (noting that not

onlymust officer have arrived at place fromwhich evidence could be plainly viewed without violating

Fourth Amendment, but incriminating character of evidence must be "immediately apparent");

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).

The protective sweep permitted under Buie'sfirst prong, however, is very circumscribed, and

did not permit Agent Godfrey to search under the mattress or behind the window shades. The Buie

Court specifically stated that such a sweep consists of a "look in closets and otherspacesimmediately

adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched." 494 U.S. at 334.

Agent Godfrey never suggested that a person might have been hiding under the mattress. To the

contrary, he testified that it would have been "[v]irtually impossible" for someone to do so. Tr. of

Motion Hearing at 33, reprinted in App. 33. The District Court noted that "Agent Godfrey testified

that he lifted the mattress in search of a gun." Ford, Crim. No. 91-347, slip op. at 8, reprinted in

App. 88. Likewise, Godfrey's testimony regarding the gun found on the window sill gave no

indication that someone could have been hiding behind the window shades. On this point, the District

Court noted that Godfrey "testified that he went to the window only after having been told by the

officers stationed in the back of the apartment that someone had gone to or placed something in the

window." Id. Accordingly, by searching under the mattress and behind the window shades the agent

exceeded the scope of the protective sweep defined by Buie's first prong.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Agent Godfrey had a reasonable belief based on specific and

articulable facts that the bedroom harbored an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest

scenei.e., he wasjustified inconducting a searchunderBuie'ssecond prongthe permissible scope

of that sweep still would not have encompassed lifting the mattress or the window shades. Buie's

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8As the Buie Court stated, "[t]he type of search we authorize today is far removed from [a]

"top-to-bottom' search ... moreover, it is decidedly not "automati[c],' but may be conducted only

when justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is harboring a person posing a

danger to those on the arrest scene." 494 U.S. at 336. 

second type of sweep extends only to "a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be

found," 494 U.S. at 335, and Godfrey never suspected that he would find a person in either location.

Thus, even under thissecond prong, law enforcement officers are not entitled to conduct a fullsearch

of the premises.8 Rather, they may sweep only those spaces where a person may be found, and their

search may last "no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion." Id. at 335-36. In

this case, the law enforcement officer plainly exceeded the permissible scope of a protective sweep.

The Government argues that lifting the mattress and the window shades, if not reasonable

conduct during a protective sweep, were justified by exigent circumstances. Citing the Supreme

Court's decisionsin Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967), and Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393-

94, the Government contends that the presence of a gun clip created an exigent circumstance: a

threat to the safety of the law enforcement officers. The circumstances underlying the decisions in

Hayden and Mincey, however, differ significantly from the facts in this case. There simply were no

exigent circumstances surrounding Ford's arrest justifying a warrantless search.

Hayden involved the "hot pursuit of [a] fleeing suspect," see Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394, and

there the Court found that "the exigencies of the situation"the officers were in pursuit of a

suspected armed felon in a house which he had entered only minutes before they arrivedjustified

their warrantless entry and search, see Hayden, 387 U.S. at 297-98. In Hayden, the police spread

out through the house in search of the suspect and weapons and seized several items including a

shotgun, ammunition, and clothesthe suspect allegedlywore. Id. The Court noted that "the seizures

occurred prior to or immediately contemporaneous with Hayden's arrest, as part of an effort to find

a suspected felon, armed, within the house into which he had run only minutes before the police

arrived." Id. at 299. Thus, the Court reasoned that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police

officersto delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the

lives of others," id. at 298-99, and held that the search and seizures were lawful, id. at 300-01. By

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9The Government also points to this court's decision in United States v. Allison, 639 F.2d 792

(D.C. Cir. 1980), in which this court upheld a warrantless search due to exigent circumstances. In

that case, an arrestee told the police that Allison, who had just witnessed the arrest, had a lot of

contraband, cash, and a gun in his hotel room, and that if the police did not "get over there fast"

they would miss him because "he will get all of the drugs out of the motel and probably leave

town." Id. at 793. The court found that "[e]xigent circumstances ... exist where contraband is ...

threatened with imminent removal or destruction," and that staking out the premises to obtain a

warrant "would have risked loss of the evidence and could have endangered the policemen's

safety." Id. at 794 (internal quotations omitted). Exigency due to the imminent destruction of

evidence in this case was not an issue since the police officers presumably had watch over the

occupants. 

contrast, the crime which gave rise to Ford's arrest warrant occurred months, not minutes, before the

police arrived at his mother's apartment, and the seizures occurred after, not prior to or

contemporaneous with Ford's arrest. In short, this case does not involve a "hot pursuit of [a] fleeing

suspect," and delaying the course of the officers' investigation in this case clearly would not have

endangered their lives or the lives of others.

In Mincey, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of a homicide scene, in which

detectives seized a great deal of incriminating evidence, violated the Fourth Amendment. 437 U.S.

at 395. In that case, after a narcotics raid by several plainclothes police officers which resulted in a

shooting, the officers swept the apartment looking for victims and arranging for medical assistance,

but did not search for or seize any evidence. 437 U.S. at 387-88. Homicide detectives arrived within

ten minutes and searched the entire apartment without a search warrant. Id. at 388-89. The Court

rejected the Government's argument that the search was justified by exigency or emergency, noting

that "[a]ll the persons in Mincey's apartment had been located before the investigating homicide

officers arrived there and began theirsearch." Id. at 393. The Court held that "warrants are generally

required to search a person's home or his person unless "the exigencies of the situation' make the

needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under

the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 393-94. As in Mincey, the police in this case had secured all the

persons in the apartment of Ford's mother. There simply were no exigent circumstances in this case

making the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search was objectively

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.9

We hold that Agent Godfrey's search under the mattress and behind the window shades

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violated the Fourth Amendment because a search incident to an in-home arrest, under Buie 's first

prong, permits only a "look in closets and otherspacesimmediately adjoining the place of arrest from

which an attack could be immediately launched." 494 U.S. at 334. There were no exigent

circumstancesin this case justifying a warrantless search beyond what was prescribed in Buie. Thus,

the evidence seized from these spacesunder the mattress and behind the window shadeswas

improperly admitted at trial and Ford's conviction must be reversed.

* * *

This is not to say that having seen the gun clip on the bedroom floor, Agent Godfrey could

not reasonably have wondered about hissafety. We do not mean to require that "police officers take

unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties." Terry, 392 U.S. at 23. In presenting this case,

the Government assumes that the law enforcement officers here had only two options: either the

police search the house until they find the suspected gun or they back out of the apartment with guns

poised, attempting to protect themselves against an individual who might use the hidden gun. This

misstates the situation, for the police had reasonable alternatives to these two extremes. First, the

police could have telephoned a magistrate for a search warrant. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A)

("[A] Federal magistrate judge may issue a warrant based upon sworn testimony communicated by

telephone."). The Government contends that "[t]he early morning hour of the arrest would delay

obtaining a warrant for several hours." Brief of Appellee at 23 n.8. Thus, the Government defines

"[t]he alternative to Agent Godfrey's limited search" as "plac[ing] a guard at the door of appellant's

bedroom and hav[ing] him wait several hoursin the apartment of the family of an individual they just

arrested for murder while other officers obtained a search warrant." Id. But this mischaracterizesthe

alternative. Assuming, arguendo, that the Government is correct in its assertion that the early

morning hour of the arrest would have delayed the obtaining of a warrant for several hours, law

enforcement officers had another reasonable alternative. They could have secured the bedroom and

telephoned a magistrate for a search warrant, or they could have asked the owner of the apartment,

appellant's mother, whether she would consent to a search of the apartment in lieu of waiting for a

magistrate to issue a search warrant. This reasonable alternative to a warrantless search would have

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avoided the infringement of Fourth Amendment rights, without in any way jeopardizing the safety of

the officers.

III. CONCLUSION

In this case, the law enforcement officer's search under the mattress and behind the window

shades went beyond the narrowlyconfined protective sweep articulated inBuie. As such, the officer's

actions violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches. Because the

District Court erred in admitting evidence seized during an unconstitutional search of appellant's

mother's apartment, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the District Court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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