Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02504/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02504-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vickie Sue Branch
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

VICKIE SUE BRANCH, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:15-cv-2504-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”), disabled widow’s benefits, and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under 

Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment 

are pending. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied 

and the Commissioner’s cross-motion is granted. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, widow’s insurance benefits, and 

SSI, alleging that she had been disabled since January 31, 2007.1 Administrative Record (“AR”) 

 1

 Plaintiff subsequently amended her alleged onset date to June 28, 2012. 

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234, 319-322. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 243-

252, 254-261. On July 31, 2014, a hearing was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 

Vincent Misenti. Id. at 43-89. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing, at which she 

and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. Id.

On September 2, 2014, the ALJ issued an amended decision finding that plaintiff was not 

disabled under sections 216(i), 223(d), 202(e) and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.2 Id. at 13-23. The 

ALJ made the following specific findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

December 31, 2016. 

 2

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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2. It was previously found that the claimant is the unmarried widow of the deceased insured 

worker and has attained the age of 50. The claimant met the non-disability requirements 

for disabled widow’s benefits set forth in section 202(e) of the Social Security Act. 

3. The prescribed period ends on August 31, 2016. 

4. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 31, 2007, the 

alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.). 

5. The claimant has the following severe impairments: carpal tunnel syndrome (hereinafter 

“CTS”); chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (hereinafter “COPD”); status post left eye 

aneurysm; and anxiety disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). 

* * * 

6. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 

416.926). 

* * * 

7. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has 

the residual functional capacity to lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds 

frequently, and stand, sit, and walk up to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. She is able to 

occasionally engage in overhead reaching with her left upper extremity. All other 

reaching is limited to frequent. The claimant is capable of frequent handling and fingering 

with her left hand. She is able to occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but is precluded 

from climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant should avoid working around 

hazards such as machinery and heights. She is able to work around ordinary hazards in 

the workplace, such as boxes on the floor, doors ajar or approaching people or vehicles. 

The claimant is able [sic] to read very small print, but is able to read ordinary newsprint or 

bulk print.[3

] She is precluded from engaging in commercial driving. The claimant is 

able to frequently socially interact with coworkers, and occasionally interact with the 

public. 

* * * 

8. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a housekeeper. This work 

does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965). 

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 As observed by plaintiff, it appears that the ALJ intended to state that the plaintiff could 

not read very small print. As written, the decision’s distinction between very small print and 

ordinary newsprint is superfluous. Moreover, when posing hypothetical questions to the VE at 

the administrative hearing, the ALJ included restrictions “from performing tasks requiring 

reading of very small print.” AR 81. In any event, the apparent scrivener’s error is not relevant 

to the issues raised by the parties. 

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* * * 

9. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

January 31, 2007, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)). 

Id. at 16-23. 

Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review was denied on October 30, 2015, leaving 

the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 3-8. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting opinions from her examining physician, 

non-examining physician, and nurse practitioner without sufficient justification. ECF No. 17 at 

8-13. 

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 Plaintiff was seen by internist Roger Wagner, M.D., an examining physician. AR 632-

636. Dr. Wagner diagnosed plaintiff with COPD, an aneurism burst of the left eye resolved with 

surgery in 2012, carpal tunnel syndrome, and hypertension. Id. at 636. It was Dr. Wagner’s 

opinion that plaintiff could stand and walk up to six hours, sit without limitation, and lift 50 

pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently. Id. He also opined that plaintiff had no postural 

limitations and no manipulative limitations with her right hand, but could only perform frequent 

manipulations with her left hand. Id. He also concluded that plaintiff should avoid working 

around chemicals, dust, fumes, and gasses given her COPD. Id. 

 The record also contains opinions from Dr. J. Linder, a non-examining physician. Dr. 

Linder opined that plaintiff could lift 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, stand 

and/or walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, use her 

right hand without limitation, but was limited to occasional left hand manipulation. Id. at 186-

187, 199-200, 212-213. 

 Plaintiff’s nurse practitioner, Debra Martin, also completed a physical RFC statement. Id. 

at 855-858. Ms. Martin diagnosed plaintiff with hypertension, anxiety, COPD, osteoarthrosis, 

backache, chronic pain syndrome, hyperlipidemia, dysmetabolic syndrome, migraine headaches, 

depression, and carpel tunnel syndrome. Id. at 855. Ms. Martin opined that plaintiff’s pain and 

stress would frequently interfere with the attention and concentration needed to complete simple 

work tasks, and that she could not walk one city block without rest or severe pain, walk one city 

block on rough or uneven ground, nor climb steps without the use of a handrail at a reasonable 

pace. Id. at 856. She further opined that plaintiff would need to lie down for 2 hours during an 8-

hour workday due to fatigue, pain, and stress. Id. It was also Ms. Martin’s opinion that plaintiff 

could sit for about 4 hours in an 8-hour workday; stand and walk for about 3 hours in an 8-hour 

workday; and lift 15 pounds occasionally,10 pounds frequently, but never 20 pounds or more. Id. 

at 856-857. She also opined that plaintiff would need to take a 15 minute break every hour, 

would be “off task” more than 30 percent of the time during an 8-hour workday, and that 

plaintiff’s impairments would require her to be absent from work 5 days or more a month. Id. at 

857-858. 

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 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Wagner’s opinion that plaintiff 

should avoid working around chemicals, dust, fumes, and gases due to her COPD. ECF No. 12 at 

4. In assessing plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ gave “substantial weight to the opinion of Dr. Wagner, 

placing the [plaintiff] at a medium exertional capacity, with manipulative and pulmonary 

restrictions.” AR 21. Although the ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Wagner assessed pulmonary 

restrictions, the ALJ did not incorporate such restrictions into plaintiff’s RFC. Moreover, the ALJ 

provided no explanation for his rejection of this portion of Dr. Wagner’s opinion. 

 The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ did not explicitly reject the pulmonary 

limitations assessed by Dr. Wagner. ECF No. 13 at 6. Nevertheless, the Commissioner argues 

that “it is clear from [the ALJ’s] decision he reviewed the medical evidence of record including 

this portion of Dr. Wagner’s opinion and accorded it appropriate weight.” Id. To support this 

contention, the Commissioner relies on the ALJ’s observations that plaintiff’s “COPD complaints 

appear brief, mild and reversible with medication. There is no evidence she has required 

emergency room intervention or hospitalization for COPD attacks. Pulmonary function studies 

were never performed. No treating or examining physician has precluded work based on COPD. 

Furthermore, [she] has continued to smoke, against medical advice.” AR 22. 

 The ALJ’s observations, however, were raised in support of his rejection of plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints, which included statements that her COPD was one of several impairments 

that prevented her from worker. See AR 22, 56-57, 65-68. The ALJ did not, however, rely on 

such observations to reject Dr. Wagner’s opinion. 

 Moreover, the ALJ’s observations regarding plaintiff’s COPD symptoms and treatment do 

not undermine Dr. Wagner’s opinion. Dr. Wagner did not opine that plaintiff’s COPD would 

preclude all work. Instead, he only opined that plaintiff “should avoid working around chemicals, 

dust, fumes and gases given the COPD.” AR 636. This opinion is not at odds with the ALJ’s 

observations that plaintiff’s shortness of breath and coughing may be controlled with medication, 

or the fact that plaintiff has not required emergency services for her COPD. The mere fact that 

medications have provided relief does not necessarily mean that plaintiff is free to work around 

chemicals and other pulmonary irritants without exacerbation of her COPD symptoms. 

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 Simply put, the ALJ’s brief discussion of plaintiff’s COPD, which was raised only in the 

context of evaluating plaintiff’s credibility, does not provide a sufficient basis for rejecting Dr. 

Wagner’s opinion. The ALJ failed to provide any reason, much less a specific and legitimate 

reason, for rejecting Dr. Wagner’s opinion that plaintiff had pulmonary limitations. 

 The Commissioner further argues that any error in not incorporating Dr. Wagner’s full 

opinion in the RFC was harmless. ECF No. 13 at 7; see Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1129 

(9th Cir. 1990) (harmless error analysis applicable in judicial review of social security cases); 

Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a court 

may affirm an ALJ’s decision “under the rubric of harmless error where the mistake was 

nonprejudicial to the claimant or irrelevant to the ALJ’s ultimate disability conclusion.”). The 

Commissioner contends that even with the pulmonary restrictions assessed by Dr. Wagner, 

plaintiff would be able to perform her past work as a housekeeper because that job does not entail 

exposure to chemicals, dust, fumes, or gases. Id. 

 The ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled based in part on a vocational expert’s 

testimony that a hypothetical individual with plaintiff’s RFC could perform plaintiff’s prior 

relevant work as a housekeeper. According to the DOT, that job does not require exposure to airborne irritants or chemicals. Cleaner, Housekeeper, DOT 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783 

(exposure to atmospheric conditions, toxic chaotic chemicals, and other environmental conditions 

are not present); see also Meyerpeter v. Astrue, 902 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (finding 

that the ALJ’s failure to include limitation to avoiding concentrated exposure to airborne irritants 

and chemicals in the hypothetical posed to the VE was harmless because the jobs identified by the 

VE, including housekeeper, did not require exposure to such conditions). Thus, any failure by the 

ALJ to include Dr. Wagner’s opinion that plaintiff had pulmonary restrictions was harmless 

because plaintiff could work as a housekeeper even with such environmental limitations. 

 Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to give sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. 

Linder’s opinion that plaintiff was limited to only occasional handling and fingering with her left 

///// 

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hand.4 The ALJ accorded “significant weight” to Dr. Linder’s opinion because it was “consistent 

with that of Dr. Wagner.” The only significant difference was that Dr. Linder limited plaintiff to 

occasional handling and fingering, while Dr. Wagner limited plaintiff to frequent handling and 

fingering. The ALJ was permitted to resolve the conflict between Dr. Linder and Dr. Wagner’s 

assessments and give greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Wagner, an examining physician. See 

Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156 (an ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony); 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (the opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than 

the opinion of a non-examining physician); cf. Sheffer v. Barnhart, 45 F. App’x 644, 645 (9th Cir. 

2002) (“Because the ALJ was entitled to resolve this evidentiary conflict between conflicting 

opinions of equal weight, he did not need to provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting 

[two treating physicians’ opinions].”). Accordingly, the ALJ permissibly rejected Dr. Liner’s 

opinion that plaintiff was limited to occasional handling and fingering. 

 Lastly, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting the 

opinion from her nurse practitioner, Ms. Martin. ECF No. 12 at 8-10. The applicable regulations 

provide that a nurse, although a treating medical source, is viewed as an “other source” and not as 

an “acceptable medical source.” SSR 06-3p; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d), 416.913(d). In rejecting 

testimony from an “other source,” the ALJ need only give germane reasons for doing so. Molina 

v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ may consider the mere fact that an 

opinion is not from an “acceptable medical source” in giving it reduced weight. See SSR 06–3p, 

2006 WL 2329939, at *5; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). 

 Here, the ALJ found the Ms. Martin’s opinion sharply contrasted with the opinion of Dr. 

Wagner, suggesting that her opinion was influenced by sympathy for the plaintiff. AR 21. 

Consequently, the ALJ determined that Dr. Wagner’s opinion was entitled to greater weight than 

the opinion provided by Ms. Martin. Id. The ALJ permissibly rejected Ms. Martin’s opinion in 

favor of an opinion that was not only from an acceptable medical source, but also substantially 

consistent with the opinions from Dr. Linder, who is also an acceptable medical source. See 20 

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 Curiously, plaintiff does not challenge Dr. Bullard’s identical opinion. 

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C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4) (“the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more 

weight we will give to that opinion”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(4) (same); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(c) 

(findings by state agency physicians constitute proper evidence from non-examining sources); 20 

C.F.R. § 416.913(c); SSR 96–6p (“State agency medical . . . consultants are highly qualified 

physicians . . . who are experts in the evaluation of the medical issues in disability claims.”). 

 Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the ALJ committed reversible error. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted; and 

 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in the Commissioner’s favor. 

DATED: March 21, 2017. 

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