Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01194/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01194-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steven L. Chaffin
Appellee
Merit Systems Protection Board
Appellee
Warren Wexler
Appellant

Document Text:

FILL~ 

United States Court of Appealct 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

WARREN WEXLER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, 

STEVEN L. CHAFFIN, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

FEB 171993 

OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

No. 92-1194 

(D.C. No . 91-CV-2041) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

Plaintiff Warren Wexler appeals from an order of the United 

States District Court for the District of Colorado granting 

summary judgment to Defendants, Merit Systems Protection Board 

(MSPB) and Steven Chaffin, in this action involving the validity 

of a settlement and release agreement entered into by Plaintiff 

with his former employer, the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), on 

December 1, 1988. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal . See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-1194 Document: 010110175744 Date Filed: 02/17/1993 Page: 1 
Plaintiff was an employee of the BOR of the United States 

Department of the Interior, and was dismissed for cause on 

September 2, 1988. Plaintiff appealed his dismissal to the MSPB. 

The MSPB scheduled a hearing on Plaintiff's appeal for December 1, 

1988. Plaintiff was represented by counsel during this appeal, 

and prior to the MSPB hearing, Plaintiff and the BOR entered into 

a settlement agreement. On December 6, 1988, the administrative 

judge, Defendant Chaffin, found that the agreement was lawfuJ. and 

freely entered into by the parties. Plaintiff then appealed the 

December 6, 1988 decision to the MSPB, claiming that Chaffin had 

forced and coerced him into accepting the settlement offer. On 

April 19, 1989, the MSPB denied Plaintiff's petition finding that 

the decision of the administrative judge was based on correct 

interpretation of the law, and that no new and material evidence 

that was unavailable, despite due diligence, when the record was 

closed, had come to light. Wexler v. Department of Interior, No. 

DE7528810434 (MSPB Apr. 19, 1989). See also 5 C. F.R. § 1201.115. 

On October 6, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the MSPB. Wexler v. 

Department of Interior, No. 89-3264, slip op. (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 

19 9 0) . 

In the instant case, Plainti=f filed a complaint in the 

district court, seeking $51 million in damages, claiming that he 

recently discovered that an ex parte communication had occurred 

between Chaffin and Plaintiff's former counsel on the morning of 

December 1, 1988, prior to the MSPB hearing. Plaintiff alleged 

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Appellate Case: 92-1194 Document: 010110175744 Date Filed: 02/17/1993 Page: 2 
that this "new evidence" shows a conspiracy between Chaffin and 

Plaintiff's counsel to use undue influence and to defraud 

Plaintiff into accepting a wrongful settlement. 1 Plaintiff's 

complaint also alleged that he filed a "tort claim" with the MSPB 

which was denied on May 22, 1991 . On Defendants' motion for 

summary judgment, the district court held that Plaintiff's claims 

against Chaffin were barred because he is entitled to absolute 

judicial immunity . The court also held that the clai ms against 

MSPB were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We hold that 

the district court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, 

and we therefore remand with instructions to vacate the judgment. 

The elaborate remedial scheme provided by the Civil Service 

Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub . L. No . 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, 1978 

U.S.C. C.A. N. 2723 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U. S.C. ), 

provides the exclusive route through which federal employees, such 

as Plaintiff, may seek monetary relief for allegedly improper 

employment actions. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S . 367, 388-90 (1983) . 

The CSRA provides for administrative review before the MSPB. See 

5 u.s.c. § 7701 . Under the MSPB regulations, initial decisions 

are prepared by administrative judges, with review available 

before the MSPB. 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201 . 111-.114. Except in 

discrimination actions, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has 

exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final orders or decisions 

1 The "new evidence" of ex parte communication consisted of 

notes by Plaintiff' s former counsel in whi ch he made reference to 

an earlier MSPB precedent that Chaffin subsequently also mentioned 

during the pre- hearing p r oceedings. 

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Appellate Case: 92-1194 Document: 010110175744 Date Filed: 02/17/1993 Page: 3 
of the MSPB. 5 U.S.C. § 7703. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a} (9). 

Appeal to the Federal Circuit is available to employees "adversely 

affected or aggrieved by a final order or decision of the [MSPB] ." 

5 u.s.c. § 7703 (a} (1). 

Although we construe prose complaints liberally, see Meade 

v . Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir. 1988), we cannot find 

any authority to support district court jurisdiction in this case. 

First, to the extent Plaintiff is challenging the procedures by 

which he achieved satisfaction of his employment termination 

claim, these procedures are governed by the CSRA, which vests 

exclusive jurisdiction in the MSPB and the Federal Circuit . See 

Bers v. United States, 666 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1987); Arakawa 

v. Reagan, 666 F. Supp. 254. 257 (D.D.C. 1987). Plaintiff claims 

a prohibited ex parte communication between Chaffin and 

Plaintiff's attorney, and the MSPB has specifically provided 

avenues of redress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201 . 101-.103 . To the extent 

Plaintiff is attempting to set aside the settlement agreement by 

using undue influence as a defense to the settlement, such 

challenge is an impermissible collateral attack. The MSPB and the 

Federal Circuit have adjudged the settlement to be valid. It is 

well established that only void judgements--i.e., judgments which 

show a jurisdictional defect--can be subject to collateral attack. 

7 Moore's Federal Practice ,r 60.41 (2d ed. 1992). Plaintiff has 

not alleged that the MSPB or Federal Circuit judgments are void, 

therefore, the District Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a 

collateral attack. 

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Appellate Case: 92-1194 Document: 010110175744 Date Filed: 02/17/1993 Page: 4 
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff's complaint states a 

tort claim against the MSPB and Chaffin, the district court lacks 

jurisdiction. The Federal Tort Claims Act, (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, provides the exclusive remedy for tort 

actions against the federal government, its agencies, and 

employees. Ascot Dinner Theatre v . Small Business Admin ., 887 

F.2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1989); Galvin v. OSHA, 860 F.2d 181, 

183 (5th Cir. 1988) . Under the FTCA, only the United States is a 

proper defendant, and failure to name the United States as 

defendant in an FTCA suit results in a fatal lack of jurisdiction . 

Allgeier v. United States, 909 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1990) ; 

Vernell v. United States Postal Service, 819 F.2d 108, 110 (5th 

Cir. 1987). Further, claims of fraud against the federal 

government are barred by§ 2680(h) of the FTCA, and, like other 

exceptions t o the FTCA, § 2680(h) limits the jurisdiction of the 

federal courts. See Paul v. United States, 929 F.2d 1202 , 1204 

(7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Texarkana Trawlers. 846 F . 2d 

297, 304 (5th Cir. 1988). Therefore, because Plaintiff has failed 

to name the United States as a defendant in this action, a nd 

because his claim is one of fraud, the d istrict court lacks 

jurisdiction. 

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to VACATE for want of 

jurisdiction. 

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Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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