Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00268/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00268-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bill FitzGibbons, LLC
Plaintiff
Nancy Collat Goedecke
Defendant
Mayer Electric Supply Company, Inc
Defendant
REV Birmingham, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BILL FITZGIBBONS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

REV BIRMINGHAM, INC., et al,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:14-CV-268-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This civil action was originally filed in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division, by the plaintiff, Bill Fitzgibbons,

LLC, against the defendants, REV Birmingham, Inc. (“REV”), Mayer Electric Supply

Company, Inc. (“Mayer”), and Nancy Collat Goedecke. (Doc. 1). Against Goedecke

and Mayer, the complaint alleges tortious interference with a business relationship

(Count One), federal unfair competition (Count Two), and unjust enrichment (Count

Three). Against REV, the complaint alleges federal unfair competition (Count Two),

and unjust enrichment (Count Three). Against all three defendants, the complaint

alleges a civil conspiracy “to commit a substantive tort against FitzGibbons.” (Doc.

1 at 15) (Count Four). All claims arise out of the parties’ involvement with the

creation of “light sculptures” to be installed in several railroad underpasses in

FILED

 2014 May-12 PM 05:20

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-00268-VEH Document 46 Filed 05/12/14 Page 1 of 42
downtown Birmingham.

The case was transferred to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). It now

comes before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by Mayer and Goedecke (doc.

22), and a motion to dismiss filed by REV (doc. 33). Both motions argue that the

complaint should be dismissed, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The

plaintiff has filed two opposition briefs in response to the motions and, in both,

moves the court to allow it to amend the complaint should the court deem the

complaint to be insufficient. (Doc. 36 at 11; doc. 40 at 10). In the reply brief it filed

to its motion to dismiss, REV has moved the court to strike “Exhibit A” to the

plaintiff’s brief in opposition to its motion to dismiss. (Doc. 42 at 2, 6-7). 

For the reasons stated herein, REV’s motion to strike will be GRANTED, the

motions to dismiss will be DENIED without prejudice, and the plaintiff’s motion

to amend will be GRANTED. 

I. STANDARD

“[A] court should only grant a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)] where

the defendant demonstrates that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez,

480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007). “Moreover, when ruling on a motion to

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dismiss, a court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

and accept all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts [and reasonable inferences drawn

from those facts] as true.” Id. (emphasis added). A court looks to the facts alleged in

the plaintiff’s complaint, and not its merely conclusory statements, when ruling on

a motion to dismiss. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

“a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct.

1955, 1964–65, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (quotations omitted). “Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 1965.

Mere conclusory statements in support of a threadbare recital of the elements of a

cause of action will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

The complaint alleges, in pertinent part:

10. FitzGibbons is an internationally known light artist that creates

unique light sculptures that are site-specific for physical structures. His

artwork is normally large scale lighting of a public structure to enhance

the entire area to make the area a very desirable place for the public.

11. In addition to being internationally known as a light artist creating

light sculptures, FitzGibbons has completed numerous public art

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projects throughout the United States, and in foreign countries.

12. Some examples of the awards received by FitzGibbons for his work

as a light artist creating light sculptures includes the following:

(a) Being named “Texas State Artist” by the Texas

Legislature in 2012;

(b) Being a visiting Fulbright Scholar in Hungary;

(c) Recognition of his Day Star Arch in Art in Americas –

2000-2001 Public Art Review;

(d) Forthcoming spring cover story in National Art

Magazine Art Voices;

(e) Cover story in LEDs Magazine for the LightRails

project; and

(f) Will be featured in the next issue of Du Coté Chez

Vous, a design magazine published in Paris, France.

13. Because of FitzGibbons’ international reputation as a light artist

providing light sculptures, in October 2012, Atticus Rominger, Chief

Public and Investor Relations Officer of REV Birmingham, contacted

FitzGibbonsin San Antonio, Texas about providing a light sculpture for

one of the underpasses in Birmingham. In addition to providing a

Google map link of the particular underpass, Rominger stated the

following:

I think there is great potential for future projects if we can

get this one off the ground.

14. After reviewing the proposed underpass to receive the light

sculpture, FitzGibbons responded, indicating that such a light sculpture

“would be a dynamic transformative public art installation that would

receive national attention.”

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15. After a conference call with FitzGibbonsin San Antonio, Texas that

included employees of the City of Birmingham and REV Birmingham,

a site inspection of the underpass was arranged. Immediately prior to the

site inspection, Rominger sent out an email dated January 28, 2013

indicating that “Light Artist” FitzGibbons will be coming from San

Antonio, Texasto Birmingham, Alabama for a tour of potential sites for

light installations. A notice was also sent to employees of the City of

Birmingham.

16. On January 31, 2013, FitzGibbons flew from San Antonio to

Birmingham and met with the following people, plus others:

(a) David Fleming, Chief Executive Officer of REV

Birmingham;

(b) Kate Nielson, President of the Community

Foundation of Greater Birmingham; and 

(c) Bonner Wagnon, Public Director of the

Cultural-Alliance.

17. Four underpasses were inspected for what was later named the

“LightRails” project. FitzGibbons was told by Rominger if the project

on the first underpass was successful, REV Birmingham would like to

do the other three underpasses, which had similar structural elements to

be equipped with similar LightRails.

18. On February 8, 2013, FitzGibbons sent a proposal for a light

sculpture on the 18th Street underpass. On February 11, 2013, Rominger

requested FitzGibbonsto think about proposals for all four underpasses.

19. The proposal submitted to REV Birmingham by FitzGibbons on

February 8, 2013 stated:

It is understood that this artwork will come on line as pilot

project with the goal of creating similar artworks at the

14th, 19th and 20th Street underpasses.

20. After some discussion of a timeline, REV Birmingham and

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FitzGibbons entered into a contract.

21. On March 15, 2013, the City of Birmingham was contacted by REV

Birmingham to get the City to provide dedicated electrical circuits to

power to the soon-to-be installed light sculpture at the 18th Street

underpass. The City of Birmingham subsequently provided the

dedicated circuits, which were paid for by the taxpayers of Birmingham.

22. The timeline proposed for the light sculpture at the 18th Street

underpass was very tight. FitzGibbons put aside other paying work to be

able to complete the LightRails project on the schedule requested by

REV Birmingham.

23. During the completion of the project at the 18th Street underpass,

various names were suggested for the light sculpture until settling on the

term “LightRails”.

24. While FitzGibbons was completing the light sculpture at the 18th

Street underpass, FitzGibbons was asked by Rominger of REV

Birmingham to donate his lights and his services for a one-night

fundraiser event in Birminghamfor the Red Cross called Paint the Town

Red. FitzGibbons complied with the request.

25. REV Birmingham wanted the LightRails project completed in four

months by June 27, 2013, which was a very difficult schedule to meet.

Typically, such a project would take 12 to 15 months to complete.

26. In May 2013, Rominger suggested to FitzGibbons that the lighting

fixtures be purchased fromNancy Goedecke and/or her company Mayer

Electric. Rominger stated Goedecke owned Mayer Electric, a large

electrical supply company in the State of Alabama.

27. FitzGibbons informed Rominger/REV Birmingham that he

purchased the ColorKinetics fixtures he used directly from the

manufacturer. Because the ColorKinetics fixtures were sold directly by

the manufacturer to FitzGibbons, the price FitzGibbons paid for the

fixtures was the same price that would have been paid by Mayer

Electric. There was no markup in the price of the ColorKinetics light

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fixtures provided by FitzGibbons.

28. At the time that Rominger suggested the light fixtures be purchased

from Mayer Electric, Goedecke was (a) a member of the Board of

Directors of REV Birmingham and (b) Chairman and CEO of Mayer

Electric.

29. Rominger ignored Goedecke’s conflict of interest . . . when

attempting to get FitzGibbons to buy the light fixturesfrom Goedecke’s

company, Mayer Electric.

30. Despite the statements by FitzGibbons that he purchased directly

from the factory, Chris Hatcher with REV Birmingham sent an email to

Goedecke indicating:

Someone with S and W [Electric] will be call [sic] Mayer

within the next few days to discuss the supply list with you.

31. The grand opening of the light sculpture created by FitzGibbons at

the 18th Street underpass occurred on July 27, 2013. The light sculpture

project was branded and promoted as “LightRails[.]” Thousands of

invitations were sent by REV Birmingham, inviting people to the Grand

Opening of “LightRails” on July 27, 2013.

32. At the grand opening of “LightRails,” the Mayor of Birmingham,

city officialsfrom Birmingham, REV Birmingham and other dignitaries

spoke lavishly about “LightRails”. [sic] The “LightRails” project was

reported widely in the media in Birmingham and throughout the United

States.

33. As a result of the “LightRails” project designed, built and installed

by FitzGibbons, numerous glowing reports have appeared, not only

throughout the United States, but throughout the world. Justsome of the

many favorable articles are attached hereto.

34. After the grand opening of “LightRails” on June 27, 2013, hundreds

(maybe even thousands) of items have appeared on the Internet praising

the “LightRails” project.

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35. The “LightRails” project designed, created and installed by light

artist FitzGibbons gives a very favorable image of the City of

Birmingham. That favorable impression of the City of Birmingham

created by LightRails could not have been purchased with advertising

dollars. The “LightRails” project designed by light artist FitzGibbons is

a very fundamental part of the revitalization of downtown Birmingham.

36. While REV Birmingham promotes itself as a “private-public

partnership,” the “LightRails” project was paid for at least in part by the

taxpayers of the City of Birmingham.

37. On June 26, 2013, one day before the grand opening of the

“LightRails” project, Rominger requested FitzGibbons in San Antonio,

Texas to begin preparation for a “LightRails” project at the 14th Street

underpass in Birmingham, a similar type structure. Pursuant to that

request, extensivemeasurements and photographs were made ofthe 14th

Street underpass. FitzGibbonsrecommended interactive componentsfor

pedestrians at the 14th Streed underpass. . . . Rominger and Chris

Hatcher of REV Birmingham responded that this was a great idea.

Therefore, FitzGibbons began to investigate an interactive component.

38. On July 10, 2013, Rominger asked FitzGibbons to do a proposal for

the 14th Street underpass. Also, Rominger asked what particular fixtures

to use, how much they would cost, and what kind of switches

FitzGibbons would specify for the other “LightRails” projects, including

the 14th Street underpass. FitzGibbons provided the requested

information on the LED fixtures and continued research for appropriate

switches for REV Birmingham.

39. Rominger, on behalf of REV Birmingham, also asked FitzGibbons

for media contacts that would help REV Birmingham in their

fundraising efforts. FitzGibbons provided REV Birmingham with the

media contacts.

40. During the grand opening of the “LightRails” project, Hatcher of

REV Birmingham, set up a meeting between Nancy Goedecke and

FitzGibbons at his hotel shortly before leaving Birmingham, Alabama

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for a flight back to San Antonio, Texas.

41. The meeting occurred on the morning of June 28, 2013 and was

attended by Rominger of REV Birmingham, Nancy Goedecke, a

Director of REV Birmingham and Chairman of the Board of Mayer

Electric, one of Mayer Electric’s employees and FitzGibbons.

42. At the meeting, Goedecke was upset because FitzGibbons did not

purchase the light fixtures from Mayer Electric. FitzGibbons explained

to Goedecke that he purchased the light fixtures directly from the

manufacturer at the same price the fixtures could be purchased by

Goedecke and/or Mayer Electric. Additionally, FitzGibbons

(individually) is a sole employee of Bill FitzGibbons, LLC and, hence,

has lower overhead costs than Mayer Electric. The meeting concluded

with Goedecke stating, “It looks like we are competitors,” or words to

that effect.

43. Goedecke ignored the conflict of interest that she had between her

position as (a) a Director of REV Birmingham and (b) as Chairman of

the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Mayer Electric when she

demanded to know why the ColorKinetics light fixtures had not been

purchased from her company.

44. Based upon information and belief, the conduct of Goedecke, Mayer

Electric and/or REV Birmingham violates the Alabama Ethics Act.

45. To prove FitzGibbons was supplying the light fixtures at

FitzGibbons’ cost, invoices reflecting those costs were confidentially

provided by FitzGibbons to REV Birmingham.

46. Based upon information and belief, everything provided to REV

Birmingham, including, but not limited to, (a) cost of the light fixtures,

(b) proposals for the 14th Street underpass, and (c) designs and

programs of the 18th Street underpass were all provided to Goedecke

and/or Mayer Electric with the objections of FitzGibbons.

47. On November 21, 2013, Rominger called FitzGibbons and informed

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him that REV Birmingham was not going to hire FitzGibbons for the

next three underpasses previously discussed, but REV Birmingham was

going to go local.

48. Based upon information and belief, because Mayer Electric has an

exclusive area distributorship in Alabama for ColorKinetics fixtures.

Hence, going local means that Goedecke and/or Mayer Electric will be

providing the ColorKinetics light fixtures for the remaining three

LightRails projects.

49. Based upon information and belief, information received from

FitzGibbons, some of which was confidential, has been provided to

Goedecke so that Goedecke and/or Mayer Electric with others(currently

unknown) will be able to install the other proposed “LightRails”

projects.

50. Further, based upon information and belief, the other “LightRails”

projects are going to be copying FitzGibbons’ artistic creation for the

18th Street underpass to provide similar LightRails for the other three

similar underpasses.

51. Based upon information and belief, the public is being misled, and

will continue to be misled, into believing that FitzGibbons designed,

created and installed all four underpasses, when such is not true.

52. The designing and creation of the LightRails project by FitzGibbons

occurred in San Antonio, Texas. Communications concerning the

LightRails project were received in, or sent from, San Antonio, Texas.

FitzGibbons signed the contract in San Antonio, Texas and was paid in

San Antonio, Texas.

(Doc. 1 at 3-11).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Choice of Law

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As noted above, against Goedecke and Mayer, the complaint alleges the

Alabama state law claim of tortious interference with a business relationship (Count

One), federal unfair competition (Count Two), and the Alabama state law claim of

unjust enrichment (Count Three). Against REV, the complaint alleges federal unfair

competition (Count Two), and the Alabama state law claim of unjust enrichment

(Count Three). Against all three defendants, the complaint alleges a civil conspiracy,

under Alabama law, “to commit a substantive tort against FitzGibbons.” (Doc. 1 at

15) (Count Four). All defendants move to dismiss all counts. The court will address

both motions to dismiss at the same time.

Since this case was transferred from a federal court sitting in Texas, this court

uses Texas choice-of-law rules to determine whether Texas or Alabama law applies

to the state law claims. Am. Family Life Assur. Co. of Columbus, Ga. v. U.S. Fire Co.,

885 F.2d 826, 832 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The substantive law that applies in a suit

originally brought in Missouri and transferred by the defendant or by the court under

28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) to Georgia should be determined according to Missouri's

choice-of-law rules.”). “Texas uses the Restatement's ‘most significant relationship’

test to decide choice-of-law issues.” Ins. Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. Neese, 407

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S.W.3d 850, 853 (Tex. App. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). The parties agree 1

 The Texas Supreme Court has noted: 1

For tort suits, the “most significant relationship” test involves at least two levels of

analysis. The first level, as stated in section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,

involves a general test: the weighing of the competing policy interests of the different

jurisdictions. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Posey, 146 S.W.3d 302, 314 (Tex.App.-

Texarkana 2004, no pet.). Section 6 requires consideration of

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative

interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectations,

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and

(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be

applied.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2).

The second level of analysis provides additional guidance concerning a

specific area of law. Posey, 146 S.W.3d at 314. Section 6 “sets out the general

principles by which the more specific rules are to be applied.” Gutierrez, 583

S.W.2d at 318–19. In a tort case, section 145 provides a more specific rule. Id. at

319. Section 145 emphasizes the four factors:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) the domicil[e], residence, nationality, place of incorporation

and place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is

centered.

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that Alabama has the most significant relationship to this case. (Doc. 22 at 9; doc. 33

at 5; doc. 36 at 3; doc. 40 at 3). The court agrees as well. Alabama substantive law

2

applies to the state law claims.

B. Count One – Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship

(Goedecke and Mayer)

Count One alleges that Goedecke and Mayer, tortiously interfered with the

business relationship between the plaintiff and REV. To establish the tort of

interference with contractual or businessrelationships a plaintiff must prove: “(1) the

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2).

Another level of analysis may be directed by other sections of the

Restatement where there is a specific context within the area of law. Posey, 146

S.W.3d at 315. Texas courts have often applied more specific sections of the

Restatement to address particular choice of law issues. Hughes, 18 S.W.3d at 206

n. 2 (holding section 184 of the Restatement provides the “standards by which a

court is to determine immunity from a tort suit when an employee is covered by

workers' compensation insurance”).

Ins. Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. Neese, 407 S.W.3d 850, 853-54 (Tex. App. 2013).

 As noted by Goedecke and Mayer in their motion: 2

All of [the Section 145] factors counsel in favor of application of Alabama

law on [p]laintiff’s state law claims--all defendants reside in Alabama; the

relationship between the parties is centered in Alabama; the Project is located in

Alabama; future projects, if any, will be located in Alabama; and any alleged

conduct causing [p]laintiff injury occurred, if anywhere, in Alabama. Moreover,

[p]laintiff’s “injury” occurred, if at all, in Alabama since the “business

relationship” at issue was centered there, and, according to [p]laintiff, it was

where the defendants allegedly conspired against it and became unjustly enriched.

It follows that Alabama law should be applied to [p]laintiff’s claims.

(Doc. 22 at 9).

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existence of a protectible business relationship; (2) of which the defendant knew; (3)

to which the defendant was a stranger; (4) with which the defendant intentionally

interfered; and (5) damage.” White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5,

14 (Ala. 2009) (emphasis added); see also, Alabama Psychiatric Servs., P.C. v. A Ctr.

for Eating Disorders, L.L.C., 1110703, 2014 WL 272338 at * 4 (Ala. Jan. 24, 2014)

(same). The defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed because they are not

“strangers” to the business relationship between the plaintiff and REV. 

a. The Standard for Determining Whether a Party Is a

“Stranger” to the Business Relationship

Parsons &Whittemore Enterprises Corp. v. Cello Energy, LLC (“Cello”), 613

F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1281-85 (S.D. Ala. 2009) provides an excellent summary and

discussion of the standard, and cases which have applied it. In Cello, Judge Granade

wrote:

In Alabama, a “party to a particular contract cannot, as a matter

3

 The opinion in Cello, and many other cases discussing this Alabama tort, use the word

3

“contract”, and the phrase “contractual relations” when discussing the “stranger” issue. It is

noted that the same cases, while discussing this issue, will sometimes also use the word

“business” and the phrase “business relations.” No inference should be drawn therefrom as, since

1986, there has been but one “combined” tort in Alabama for intentional interference with

business or contractual relations. See, Gross v. Lowder Realty Better Homes & Gardens, 494 So.

2d 590, 597 (Ala. 1986) overruled on other grounds by White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC,

32 So. 3d 5 (Ala. 2009) (“[W]e announce a new rule in this state broad enough to encompass

both interference with business relations and interference with contractual relations[.]”); see also,

Orrin K. Ames III, Tortious Interference with Business Relationships: The Changing Contours of

This Commercial Tort, 35 Cumb. L. Rev. 317, 327 (2005). The “stranger” rules apply in both the

contract and business relations contexts. No party argues otherwise. 

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of law, be liable for tortious interference with that contract.” Bama

Budweiser v. Anheuser–Busch, 611 So.2d 238, 247 (Ala.1992).

Likewise, a party to “[interdependent] contractual relations” with

different “rights and duties between different sets of parties to a

multiparty contract” cannot be liable for interference. Ex parte Blue

Cross & Blue Shield, 773 So.2d 475, 480 (Ala.2000). The party

asserting the tortious interference claimbearsthe burden of establishing

that the party defending the claim “is a ‘third party’ or ‘stranger’ to the

contract or business relationship with which the defendant allegedly

interfered.” Waddell & Reed, 875 So.2d at 1154.

The Waddell &Reed case explains various ways a defendant may

be a party in interest to a business relationship. “A defendant is a party

in interest to a relationship if the defendant has any beneficial or

economic interest in, or control over, that relationship.” Id.

One is not a stranger to the contract just because one

is not a party to the contract, as it has been held that the

alleged interferer is not a stranger to the contract and thus

not liable for tortious interference where the alleged

interferer was the agent for one of the parties to the

contract of insurance (i.e., the underwriter), and all the

purported acts of interference were done within the scope

of the interferer's duties as agent.

Id. (quotations omitted).

Further narrowing the category of parties that are subject to

liability for this tort, [] Waddell & Reed went on to explain:

that all parties to a comprehensive interwoven set of

contracts which provided for the financing, construction,

and transfer of ownership were not strangers, i.e., the

purchaser of a radio station was not a stranger to the

contractual relations between the radio station's seller and

the seller's lenders. Thus, in order for a defendant to be

liable for tortious interference with contractual relations,

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the defendant must be a stranger to both the contract and

the business relationship giving rise to and underpinning

the contract.

Id. at 1154–55. (quotations omitted, emphasis in original). The court

summarized as follows:

“[A] defendant is not a ‘stranger’ to a contract or business

relationship when: (1) the defendant is an essential entity

to the purported injured relations; (2) the allegedly injured

relations are inextricably a part of or dependent upon the

defendant's contractual or business relations; (3) the

defendant would benefit economically from the alleged

injured relations; or (4) both the defendant and the plaintiff

are parties to a comprehensive interwoven set of contracts

or relations.”

Id. at 1156 (citations omitted, alteration in original).

After setting out the foregoing summary, the court reiterated that

a party cannot be liable for interference unless it is “a stranger to both

the contract and the business relationship giving rise to and

underpinning the contract.” Id. at 1157. It further explained that “[a]

person with a direct economic interest in the contract is not a stranger to

the contract. Parties to an interwoven contractual arrangement are not

liable for tortious interference with any of the contracts or business

relationships.” Id. at 1157 (emphasis omitted). A defendant cannot be

found liable for interfering with a contract as long as the defendant is

essential to the allegedly injured relation “arising from interwoven

contractual arrangements that include the contract.” Id.

Alabama courts have applied this elaborate rule of law to find that

Anheuser–Busch was a party to a contract between a party that

purchased a beer distributorship and the party that sold the

distributorship because the buyer and seller could not have completed

the sale without Anheuser–Busch's approval, Bama Budweiser, 611

So.2d at 247; that an insurance company was a party to multiparty

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contractual relations between a dentist and his insured patients because

the dentist and his patients contracted together in reliance on the

insurer's interdependent contractual obligation to pay for dentalservices,

Blue Cross &Blue Shield, 773 So.2d at 480; and that a business-owner's

father, who had no job title at the business, was not an owner or

employee of the business, did not regularly work at the business, was

not paid by the business, but who helped the business owner interview

employees, fired at least two employees, helped his son find financing

to purchase the business, described himself as the “agent” of the

business, and informed employees that the business was not going to

provide them with an agreed-upon equity interest in the business, could

not be liable for interfering with the contract between the business and

an employee he fired because he was acting as the agent of his son or of

his son's business when he fired the employee, Parsons v. Aaron, 849

So.2d 932 (Ala.2002).

In Bellsouth Mobility, Inc. v. Cellulink, Inc., 814 So.2d 203

(Ala.2001), the court found that a cell phone service and equipment

supplier was a party to the contractual relationship between its sales

agent and a retail store where the sales agent set up sales kiosks. The

supplier and the sales agent entered into an agreement specifically

addressing the sales agent's agreement with the retail store in which the

supplier agreed to furnish the kiosks and to pay the rent due the retail

store for the kiosks. Id. at 208–09. The sales agent agreed with the

supplier that the sales agent would execute a lease with the retailer and

assign the lease to the supplier if the sales agent ceased operating at the

location covered by the lease. Id. at 209. Also, the agreement between

the supplier and the sales agent included a clause in which the supplier

agreed to pay the retailer a percentage of the sales that were made at the

kiosk in the retailer's store. Id. at 209. The lease agreement that the sales

agent executed with the retailer specifically provided that the supplier

would pay the fixed rent and percentage commission due on the kiosks.

Id.

After the agreement between the supplier and the sales agent was

signed and the lease between the sales agent and the retailer wassigned,

the supplier entered into a separate agreement with the retailer which

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allowed the supplier to staff kiosks at the retailer's stores with the

supplier's own employees. Id. at 209–10. In the meanwhile, the sales

agent was having trouble making its quotas with the supplier. Id. at 210.

The retailer ordered the sales agent to vacate its kiosks at the retailer's

stores pursuant to a 90–day cancellation clause in the lease. Id. at

209–10. The sales agent sued the supplier for interfering with the sales

agent's relationship with the retailer. Id. at 210.

Although the supplier was not a party to the lease agreement

between the sales agent and the retailer, the court found that the supplier

could not be liable for interference based on the theory that, “[w]hen

tripartite relationships exist and disputes arise between two of the three

parties, then a claim alleging interference by the third party that arises

from conduct by the third party that is appropriate under its contract

with the other two parties is not recognized.” Id. at 212 (quotations and

citation omitted). Relying in particular on the Bama Budweiser case, the

court held that the sales agent and the retailer could not have entered

into their lease agreement without the supplier's approval, that the

supplier was a party to every cell phone subscription that the sales agent

sold from its kiosk at the retailer's store, and that the lease agreement

with which the supplier allegedly interfered set out rights and

obligations between the supplier and the retailer. Id. at 214. As a

consequence, the supplier was not a stranger to the relationship between

the sales agent and the retailer. Id.

More recently, the Supreme Court of Alabama applied the rule in

Tom's Foods, Inc. v. Carn, 896 So.2d 443 (Ala.2004). In that case, a

company called “Tom's Foods” had agreements with a company called

“Dixie” for Dixie to distribute Tom's Foods products in vending

machines. Id. at 446. Dixie financed some of its vending machines

through Tom's Foods, pledging all of Dixie's vending machines, office

equipment, trucks, inventory, and cash proceeds as collateral. Id. Tom's

Foods assigned the notes and security agreements to Stephens

Diversified Leasing, Inc., which eventually changed its name to “STI.”

Id. at 446–47. The assignment gave STI a right of recourse against

Tom's Food if Dixie defaulted. Id.Later, Dixie leased additional vending

machines from STI, which gave STI a right to repossess the equipment

18

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if Dixie defaulted and precluded Dixie from transferring the machines

without STI's consent. Id. at 447. Dixie acknowledged that Tom's Foods

was STI's agent for enforcing the terms of the lease. Id.

Dixie defaulted on its obligations in late 1996. Id. STI asked

Tom's Foods to repossess the vending machines, which Tom's Foods

began to do on February 19, 1997. Id. 447–48. Duke learned about

Dixie's problems and negotiated an oral agreement in February 1997

with Dixie to purchase Dixie's accounts and equipment. Id. at 448. Duke

began servicing Dixie's customers while Duke was working to obtain

financing in order to maintain the accounts. Id. at 448–49. Tom's Foods

opposed Duke's activities, expressed its intent to repossess Dixie's

vending machines, and began its repossession efforts. Id. at 449–50.

Duke accused Tom's Foods of interfering with its agreement with

Dixie to purchase the vending machines. The Supreme Court of

Alabama held that Tom's Foods was not a stranger to the agreement

between Duke and Dixie. First, Tom's Foods, Dixie, and STI were

parties to comprehensive, interwoven contracts that gave Tom's Foods

an economic interest in the relationship between STI and Dixie. Id. at

455. Second, Tom's Foods was acting as STI's agent when it was

repossessing Dixie's vending machines. Id. Third, Tom's Foods was not

a stranger to the business relationship between Dixie and STI because

Tom's Foods helped create that relationship. Id. Finally, Duke was

acting as Dixie's agent when it was servicing Dixie's accounts with the

vending machines at issue and “stood in Dixie's shoes and had no more

right to retain the vending machinesthan did Dixie.” Id. Based on “these

facts, Tom's Foods, STI, Dixie, and Duke were all parties to an

interwoven set of contracts and business relationships,” precluding

Tom's Foods' liability for interference. Id.

[In] Peacock v. Merrill, Civ. A. 05–377BHC, 2005 WL 2739138

(S.D.Ala. Oct. 24, 2005), . . . the court denied a Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss an intentional interference with a

business relationship claim. The plaintiff accused the defendants, who

were “Directors, Managing Members, Officers, Members, and

Shareholders and/or Interest Holders” of certain companies of acting in

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“their individual capacities for their own benefit and on their own

behalf” when they “fraudulently and improperly” purchased the

plaintiff's interest in those companies, thereby “divesting [the plaintiff]

of her interest in those companies.” Id. at *1. The court found that,

assuming the defendants were acting in their individual capacities when

they committed their alleged misdeeds, they could be strangers to the

plaintiff's relationship with the companies because “[a] shareholder's

relationship with the company in which they maintain an interest ... is

not inextricably intertwined or necessarily dependent on another

individual's similar relationship with that company.” Id. at *2.

Cello, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 1281-84.

b. The One Sentence from the Complaint which the

Defendants Cite Does Not Establish that the Defendants

Are Parties to the Contract/Business Relationship

between the Plaintiff and REV

The complaint alleges that “Nancy Goedecke ignored a conflict of interest she

had and unethically used her position on the Board of REV Birmingham to divert

future LightRails projectsto her company, Mayer Electric Supply Company, Inc., for

her personal gain.” (Doc. 1 at 2). The defendants argue only that this allegation

defeats the plaintiff’s claim, citing to the statement in Waddell & Reed that “‘[a]

defendant is a party in interest to a relationship if the defendant has any beneficial or

economic interest in, or control over, that relationship.’” (Doc. 22 at 10 quoting

Waddell &Reed, 875 So. 2d at 1154 (emphasis in document 22) (citing Parsons, 849

So.2d at 937; BellSouth, 814 So.2d at 214; Colonial Bank v. Patterson, 788 So. 2d

134, 139 (Ala. 2000) overruled by White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So.

20

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3d 5 (Ala. 2009); Blue Cross, 773 So.2d at 480); doc. 39 at 2).

It is undisputed that Goedecke and Mayer were not parties to the contract

between the plaintiff and REV. Of course, that alone does not mean that they are

necessarily strangers to the business relationship between the plaintiff and REV.

However, the vague allegation that Goedecke “used her position on the board of

REV” does not, alone, show that she was a party to the business relationship. The

court notes that the statement provides the court with no facts as to what specifically

was done. The court also notes the following:

4

– unlike in BellSouth or in Bama Budweiser, here there are no facts alleged

indicating that the plaintiff and REV could not have entered into the agreement

without Goedecke or Mayer’s permission or approval.5

– there are no facts alleged indicating that Goedecke and Mayer are essential

entities to the purported injured relations; 

– unlike in Blue Cross & Blue Shield, here there are no facts alleged indicating

that the plaintiff and REV contracted in reliance on some other duty to be

 The absence of facts is a problem throughout the complaint, and, while it appears to 4

help the plaintiff as to this argument, as noted below, such absence ultimately dooms the

intentional interference count as a whole, as well as the other counts of the complaint. However,

at this point, the court limits its discussion to the narrow issue raised by the defendants.

 The court is aware of the allegation that Goedecke is a Board member of REV. 5

However, there is no allegation that she had to approve of the arrangement or it would not have

happened.

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performed by Goedecke and/or Mayer, or that the allegedly injured relations

are inextricably a part of or dependent upon Goedecke and Mayer’s contractual

or business relations with any party; 

– there are no facts alleged indicating that Goedecke and/or Mayer benefitted

economically from the relationship between the plaintiff and REV; 

– unlike in Tom’s Foods, here there are no facts alleged indicating that

Goedecke, Mayer, the plaintiff, and/or REV are parties to “a comprehensive

interwoven set of contracts or relations;” and

– there are no facts alleged indicating that Goedecke and/or Mayer were the

agents of any party to the contract, and/or that they acted within the scope of

any such agency.

For the reasons cited above, the court determinesthat Goedecke and Mayer are

incorrect in their assertion that the one sentence they cited establishes that they are

parties to the business relationship.

2. As to This Claim, the Twombly and Iqbal Minimum Pleading

Standards Have Not Been Met

Despite the court’s findings in the previous section, the court notes that the

burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the party defending the claim “is a ‘third

party’ or ‘stranger’ to the contract or businessrelationship with which the defendants

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allegedly interfered.” Waddell & Reed, 875 So.2d at 1154. Although this may only

be an evidentiary burden, it should be considered along with the requirements of 6

Twomby and Iqbal. In making its finding in the previous section, the court does not

7

shift the burden to the defendants to prove that they are parties to the relationship.

However, the posture of the one argument made by the defendants in their original

motion constrained the court to what was alleged and was relevant to that argument.

The defendants did not argue that Count Two failed to allege sufficient facts under

Twombly and Iqbal. The court notes, however, that the count is deficient in that

regard.

An example of one such deficiency is illuminated by the response the plaintiff

made to the motion to dismiss. There, the plaintiff argues that Goedecke was not a

party to the business relationship, even though she was a member of the board of

REV, because she “acted outside the scope of her duties as a board member of REV

Birmingham.” (Doc. 36 at 4). The plaintiff points to allegations that: 

(1) REV Birmingham arranged a meeting between FitzGibbons,

Goedecke, and an unnamed employee of Mayer Electric.

 The Supreme court has cautioned against confusing evidentiary burdens with pleading 6

requirements. See, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510, 122 S. Ct. 992, 997, 152 L.

Ed. 2d 1 (2002) (“The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, however, is an evidentiary

standard, not a pleading requirement.”).

 Indeed, the plaintiff acknowledges the burden on it in its opposition brief. (Doc. 36 at 4). 7

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(2) At that meeting, Goedecke was upset because FitzGibbons did not

purchase suppliesfromMayer Electric for the first ofthe fourLightRails

underpasses.

(3) Goedecke ignored a conflict of interest between her position with

REV Birmingham and her position as an officer of Mayer Electric.

(4) Goedecke stated, “It looks like we [i.e., Mayer Electric and

FitzGibbons, LLC] are competitors.”

(Doc. 36 at 4-5) (citing doc. 1 at ¶¶ 40-41, 42, 43). The plaintiff then writes:

Because the Complaint has sufficiently pleaded that Goedecke acted

outside the scope of her duties as a REV Birmingham board member,

and she was therefore a stranger to the relationship between

FitzGibbons, LLC and REV Birmingham, the motion should be denied

with respect to this claim.

(Doc. 36 at 5).8

The court does not agree that the complaint “has sufficiently pleaded that

Goedecke acted outside the scope of her duties as a REV Birmingham board

member.” First, the complaint contains no fact which describes the nature of those

duties, so it is impossible to say that it has pled facts which show that she acted

outside the scope of them. Second, even if the complaint had pled the nature of

Goedecke’s duties as a member of the board, it does not say what she did that was

outside the scope of those duties other than to vaguely state that she “ignored a

conflict of interest.” Accordingly, the court cannot say that she was not an agent of

 This is the entire argument the plaintiff makes as to this count. 8

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Case 2:14-cv-00268-VEH Document 46 Filed 05/12/14 Page 24 of 42
REV when she did whatever it is that she is supposed to have done. 

The failure to allege that Goedecke did anything is fatal both to this argument

and to Count One as a whole. “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his

entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)

(quotations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Id. at 1965. Mere conclusory statements in support of

a threadbare recital of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). However,

Goedecke and Mayer did not include this as a reason that this count should be

dismissed, and so the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to respond to it. In any

9

event, the point is moot as the court will allow the plaintiff an opportunity to amend

this count.

C. Count Two – Unfair Competition (REV, Goedecke, and Mayer)

Against all three defendants, the plaintiff attempts to make a claimfor “passing

 They discussed this reason in their reply, but only in connection with the agency issue. 9

See, doc. 39 at 3. 

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off” under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). The 10

Eleventh Circuit has explained:

[A] false designation of origin claim, which proscribes the behavior of

“passing off” or “palming off,” . . . “occurs when a producer

misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else's.” Dastar

Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 n. 1, 123

S.Ct. 2041, 2045, 156 L.Ed.2d 18 (2003). To establish a prima facie case

under § 1125(a), a plaintiff must show (1) that the plaintiff had

enforceable trademark rights in the mark or name, and (2) that the

defendant made unauthorized use of it “such that consumers were likely

to confuse the two.” Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn

Steaks, Inc., 106 F.3d 355, 358 (11th Cir.1997); see SunAmerica Corp.

v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 77 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th

Cir.1996).

Custom Mfg. & Eng'g, Inc. v. Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647-48 (11th Cir.

2007). 

1. There Is No Allegation of Enforceable Trademark Rights

That statute provides: 10

(a) Civil action

(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any

container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,

or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading

description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which--

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the

affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to

the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial

activities by another person[.]

15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (a)(1)(A).

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Nowhere in the complaint isthere even a conclusory allegation that the plaintiff

has “enforceable trademark rights” in anything. No facts are alleged from which an

inference of such rights can be made. The plaintiff’s responses to the motions to

dismiss make no attempt to argue that the plaintiff has any such rights. For those

reasons, the count fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

11

To the extent that his initial contribution to the LightRails project isthe “thing”

in which the plaintiff has enforceable trademark rights, and the alleged violation is

“copying,” the contract in this case reveals that the plaintiff may not have any such 12

rights. It providesthat REV “shall have ownership and possession” ofthe project, and

may “make any and all reproductions or derivatives in whatever form,” for “any . . .

 On April 24, 2014, the plaintiff filed a two page “supplement” to its responses to the 11

motions to dismiss to which it attached a copy of the United States Supreme Court’s recent

decision in Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). (Doc.

44 at 1). The Court issued the decision after the plaintiff responded to the motions. The plaintiff

does so purportedly in an attempt, for the first time, to respond to the claim that it has no

enforceable trademark interest. (Doc. 44 at 1). First, Lexmark is clear that “[s]ection 1125(a) . . .

creates two distinct bases of liability: false association, § 1125(a)(1)(A), and false advertising, §

1125(a)(1)(B).” Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1384. In that case, the Supreme Court addressed only the

issue of standing, and then only in the context of a false advertising claim. Id. at 1390 (“[T]o

come within the zone of interests in a suit for false advertising under § 1125(a), a plaintiff must

allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales.”). The instant case deals with only

false association, and the issue is not one of standing. Other than to note that Lexmark “appears

to overrule many years of precedent” (doc. 44 at 2), the plaintiff does not explain how Lexmark is

helpful. In summary, the complaint still does not allege enforceable trademark rights.

 The contract may be considered in deciding the Rule 12(b)(6) motions because it is an 12

attachment to the complaint and is also central to the plaintiff’s claims. Starship Enterprises of

Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta Cnty., Ga., 708 F.3d 1243, 1253 n. 13 (11th Cir. 2013).

27

Case 2:14-cv-00268-VEH Document 46 Filed 05/12/14 Page 27 of 42
purpose.” (Doc. 1-3 at 7, at § 11.0). Although this point wasraised by the defendants,

the plaintiff has failed to address it in its opposition briefs.

2. None of the Defendants Can Be Liable under the Lanham Act

for Misappropriation of Confidential Information

Count Two alleges:

60. . . . The LightRails project contained confidential information of

FitzGibbons that was provided to REV Birmingham, who in turn

provided the confidential information to Goedecke and/or Mayer

Electric.

61. The confidential information includesthe details on the structure and

programming of the light fixtures on the 18th Street underpass,

including, but not limited to, how much each of the fixtures cost, the

switches to be used, and the lighting sequence. All of this was provided

by FitzGibbons to REV Birmingham under an expectation of privacy.

62. The information provided by FitzGibbons to REV Birmingham is

not generally known in the trade or by the public, and cannot be derived

from publically available information. The information provided by

FitzGibbons to REV Birmingham was provided under circumstances to

reasonably expect REV Birmingham to maintain its confidentiality.

Also, the information provided toREV Birminghamhas economic value

to FitzGibbons.

63. Based upon information and belief, the confidential information

provided by FitzGibbons to REV Birmingham was in turn provided to

Goedecke, who has a conflict of interest between her positions (a) on the

Board of Directors of REV Birmingham and (b) as Chairman and CEO

of Mayer Electric. 

(Doc. 1 at 12).

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These paragraphs seem to allege a Lanham Act claim based on REV 13

improperly giving to Goedecke and Mayer, and Goedecke and Mayer improperly

accepting, confidential information which the plaintiff gave to REV. However, the

plaintiff has not cited, and this court has not found, any authority for the proposition

that there is a cause of action under the Lanham Act for misappropriation of

confidential information. At least one court which has considered the issue has

determined that there is not. See, Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co.,

Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (“[T]he Lanham Act does not

concern itself with the question of whether an item isin the public domain or with the

related question of whether the item is a trade secret.” ); Potucek v. Taylor, 738

F.Supp. 466, 469–70 (M.D.Fla.1990). 

Even if the LanhamAct provides a remedy for misappropriation of confidential

information, the complaint does not allege that the information was in fact given to

Goedecke and Mayer. It states only that “[b]ased upon information and belief,” it was

given to them. (Doc. 1 at ¶46 (“Based upon information and belief, everything

provided to REV Birmingham, including, but not limited to, (a) cost of the light

fixtures, (b) proposals for the 14th Street underpass, and (c) designs and programs of

 The exact basis of the Lanham Act claim is unclear, as this count appears to set out 13

many different types of conduct. The court will address each different allegation of conduct

separately.

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Case 2:14-cv-00268-VEH Document 46 Filed 05/12/14 Page 29 of 42
the 18th Street underpass were all provided to Goedecke and/or Mayer Electric with

the objections of FitzGibbons.”), ¶ 49 (“Based upon information and belief,

information received from FitzGibbons, some of which was confidential, has been

provided to Goedecke so that Goedecke and/or Mayer Electric with others (currently

unknown) will be able to install the other proposed “LightRails” projects.”), ¶ 63

(“Based upon information and belief, the confidential information provided by

FitzGibbonsto REV Birmingham wasin turn provided to Goedecke[.]”)). It has been

noted, and this court agrees, that:

[t]he Twombly plausibility standard . . . does not prevent a plaintiff from

“pleading facts alleged ‘upon information and belief’ “ where the belief

is based on factual information that makes the inference of culpability

plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.”) The Twombly Court stated that “[a]sking for plausible

groundsto infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement

at the pleading stage; itsimply callsfor enough fact to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal[ity].” 550 U.S.

at 556. 

Associated Indus. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Advanced Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 12-80393-CIV, 2013

WL 1176252 at * 3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2013). However, here there is no inference

based upon facts in the complaint, only a conclusion that the information was given

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Case 2:14-cv-00268-VEH Document 46 Filed 05/12/14 Page 30 of 42
by REV to Goedecke and Mayer. 

14

3. The Lanham Act Creates No Cause of Action for Copying

Count Two also alleges in part:

64. Based on information and belief, REV Birmingham, Mayer

Electric and/or Goedecke are continuing the “LightRails” project for

three additional underpasses essentially duplicating the efforts of

internationally-known light artist FitzGibbons. Each of the underpasses

is similar in structure, and REV Birmingham/Mayer Electric/Goedecke

have all of the information about the first LightRails completed by

 This issue may be moot however, because, in its response to the motion, the plaintiff 14

implies that the claim is not based on the misappropriation. It states: 

The inducement of FitzGibbons by REV Birmingham to provide the design

information is a critical element to the story, underscoring the lengths to which the

Goedecke Defendants went to ensure the public still perceives the remaining

underpasses as FitzGibbons, LLC LightRails projects.

(Doc. 36 at 7). If this issue is moot, and the plaintiff wishes the court to treat this argument as if

it were a fact alleged in the complaint (the complaint contains no such allegation), the court

cannot do so. A complaint may not be amended by briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.

Fleming v. Dowdell, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1148 (M.D. Ala. 2005) aff'd, 182 F. App'x 946 (11th

Cir. 2006) (citing Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald and Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir.2004)

(“A plaintiff may not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary

judgment.”) and Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir.1989) (“It is a basic

principle that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to

dismiss[.]”)). 

Even if the court did treat this “fact” as if it were part of the complaint, this “fact” does

not show that any of the defendants used the information to make others believe that the new

projects were done by the plaintiff. While the “fact” might be “consistent” with such a purpose,

the court is obliged to consider “more likely explanations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681,

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). In this case, it is more likely that, if the

information was given to Goedecke, it was because she was a member of the REV board. In that

context, it would have been used possibly to evaluate costs and other aspects of the project only

as it related to whether REV should engage the plaintiff or not. Regardless, assuming that REV

gave the information to Goedecke and Mayer, there are no facts alleged that it did so in order that

the project could be “passed off” as the plaintiff’s.

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Case 2:14-cv-00268-VEH Document 46 Filed 05/12/14 Page 31 of 42
FitzGibbons at the 18th Street underpass.

65. Based on information and belief, REV Birmingham, Mayer Electric

and/or Goedecke will be duplicating the work of internationally-known

light artist Fitzgibbons.

(Doc. 1 at 13). The defendants argue that these paragraphs allege only “copying” of

the plaintiff’s work, and that copying alone is not a violation of the Lanham Act.

(Doc. 22 at 14; doc. 39 at 5-6). The plaintiff does not respond to this argument. 

“In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright

protects an item, it will be subject to copying.” TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.

Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29, 121 S. Ct. 1255, 1260, 149 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2001). 

“The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in

creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of

exclusivity.” Id. at 34; see also, Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int'l,

Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 511 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]rademark law does not prohibit copying

assuch; that isthe province of copyrights and patents.”) (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc.,

532 U.S. at 34).15

Although REV is responsible for hiring out new LightRails projects, the

 Also, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (the Copyright Act) broadly preempts “all legal or equitable 15

rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright.” 17

U.S.C.A. § 301(a). Further, even if copying was a violation of the Lanham Act, under the terms

of the plaintiff’s contract, the plaintiff gave REV the right “to make any and all reproductions or

derivatives in whatever form,” of the plaintiff’s part of the project. (Doc. 1-3 at 7).

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complaint does not say that more LightRails projects have been completed, or even

contracted out. Further, there are no facts that Goedecke did anything other than: meet

with the plaintiff (doc. 1 at ¶ 41), express that she was upset that the plaintiff did not

purchase light fixtures from her company (doc. 1 at ¶ 42), and tell the plaintiff “[i]t

looks like we’re competitors,” or words to that effect (doc. 1 at ¶ 42). From these

bare allegations, a plausible leap that new projects have been done, much less that

Goedecke and Mayer were involved, cannot be made.16

 The complaint alleges that Rominger told Fitzgibbons that the plaintiff would not be 16

hired for the remaining projects because REV was “going local.” The complaint then states:

Based upon information and belief, because [sic] Mayer Electric has an exclusive

area distributorship in Alabama for ColorKinetics fixtures. Hence, going local

means that Goedecke and/or Mayer Electric will be providing the ColorKinetics

light fixtures for the remaining three LightRails projects.

(Doc. 1 at ¶ 48). This language also does not establish a plausible claim. First, the plaintiff is

again merely speculating “upon information and belief” that Mayer has such an exclusive area

distributorship. There are no facts in the complaint to support that conclusion. Second, as noted,

the complaint does not allege that a contract has been awarded, or that any more work has been

done. Therefore, even if Rominger has said that REV was “going local,” and even if Mayer was

REV’s only option in that regard, there is no allegation that they actually did “go local.”

The court notes that, in its response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff cites to

evidence outside the pleadings in an attempt to show that Mayer has “‘been selected to provide

LED lighting fixtures for the 20th Street underpass lighting project,’” and “‘Mayer . . . has since

been selected as the lighting supplier for two additional REV Birmingham underpass lighting

projects.’” (Doc. 36 at 6, n. 23) (quoting Goedecke and Mayer’s response to interrogatories, doc.

40-2 at 9). Document 40-2 is the subject of REV’s motion to strike. That motion will be

GRANTED, and the court declines to consider this extrinsic evidence as “courts generally do not

consider allegations outside of the complaint itself.” U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Crestwood

Healthcare, L.P., CV-11-S-3361-NE, 2012 WL 1886351 at *9 (N.D. Ala. May 18, 2012) (Smith,

J.) (citing St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.2002)). Regardless, even

if the court considered the evidence, it shows only that Mayer supplied lighting for the project,

not that it somehow was passing off the new projects as the plaintiff’s.

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Also, the complaint does not provide any facts from which it could be

determined that the work has, or will be, duplicated by any of the defendants. The

complaint does not identify any specific features, other than lights which are placed

in an underpass, which would be common to the work of both the plaintiff and these

defendants. Further, even if the project was duplicated, there are no facts indicating

that any of the defendants has represented to anyone that the plaintiff was involved,

so that they could “pass off” the new projects as the plaintiff’s.

4. There Are No Facts Alleged which Show how the New Work

Could Be Confused with the Work of the Plaintiff.

Count Two alleges:

66. As a result of the acts complained of hereinabove, REV

Birmingham/Mayer Electric/Goedecke have created a false designation

of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or a false or misleading

representation of fact, which:

(a) islikely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive;

(1) as to the affiliation, connection, or association of

Defendants with FitzGibbons; or

(2) asto the origin, sponsorship or approval of FitzGibbons

of the goods, services or commercial activities of

Defendants.

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67. Further, Defendants created a false or misleading representation that

misrepresents the “LightRails” projects on the remaining three

underpasses as being goods orservicesthat originate with FitzGibbons.

68. More specifically, Defendants’ acts are likely to cause confusion, to

cause mistake or to deceive others into believing the remaining three

“LightRails” projects for underpasses have an affiliation, connection or

association with FitzGibbons, or the remaining three underpasses

originate from, are sponsored by, or are approved by, FitzGibbons.

(Doc. 1 at 13). These conclusory statements also do not establish how there might be

confusion, and there are no other facts in the complaint which support these claims.17

D. Count Three – Unjust Enrichment (REV, Goedecke, and Mayer)

Count II alleges:

71. REV Birmingham has knowingly accepted the services performed

by FitzGibbons. As a result of knowingly accepting the services

provided by FitzGibbons, REV Birmingham accepted those services

with knowledge of their value, and with the reasonable expectation to

pay FitzGibbons for such services.

 The court also notes that the light sculptures at issue are a form of public art. There is 17

no allegation that they are “sold” to the public, or that money is otherwise made off the 18th

Street project or any new project. The second element of a passing off claim requires that the

defendant made unauthorized use of the enforceable trademark “such that consumers were likely

to confuse the two.” Custom Mfg. & Eng'g, Inc. v. Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647-48

(11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). With respect to this element, the

Eleventh Circuit has stated that courts should consider “the similarity of the parties' retail outlets,

trade channels, and customers (‘consider[ing] where, how, and to whom the parties' products are

sold’).” Custom Mfg. & Eng'g, Inc. v. Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 648 (11th Cir. 2007).

The plaintiff does not explain how a passing off claim under the Lanham Act could be had where

the art is public and not “sold” to “consumers.” Of course, since this issue was first raised in

REV’s reply brief (doc. 42 at 3), the plaintiff has not had a chance to respond to it. Accordingly,

the court will not rule on the merits of this argument.

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72. FitzGibbons had a reasonable expectation to be compensated for the

services provided when REV Birmingham asked for and received

information on other prospective “LightRails” projects. REV

Birmingham knew that FitzGibbons expected to be paid for those

services.

73. Further, Goedecke and/or Mayer Electric, by receiving such

information throughREV Birmingham, knew that FitzGibbons expected

to be paid for his services.

74. As a result of Defendants accepting the services of FitzGibbons and

the benefits thereof, Defendants accepted those services with knowledge

that FitzGibbons should be paid a reasonable value for the services

rendered.

(Doc. 1 at 14). In its response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff writes:

The Alabama Supreme Court has stated:

In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment,

the plaintiff must show that“the ‘ “defendant holds money which, in

equity and good conscience, belongs to the plaintiff or holds money

which was improperly paid to defendant because of mistake or fraud.”

’ Dickinson v. Cosmos Broad. Co., 782 So.2d 260, 266 (Ala.2000)

(quoting Hancock–Hazlett Gen. Constr. Co. v. Trane Co., 499 So.2d

1385, 1387 (Ala.1986)).... ‘The doctrine of unjust enrichment is an old

equitable remedy permitting the court in equity and good conscience to

disallow one to be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.’ Battles

v. Atchison, 545 So.2d 814, 815 (Ala.Civ.App.1989).”Avis Rent A Car

Sys., Inc. v. Heilman[,] 876 So.2d 1111, 1123 (Ala.2003). “ ‘One is

unjustly enriched if his retention of a benefit would be unjust.’ ” Welch

v. Montgomery Eye Physicians, P.C., 891 So.2d 837, 843 (Ala.2004)

(quoting Jordan v. Mitchell, 705 So.2d 453, 458 (Ala.Civ.App.1997)).

The retention of a benefit is unjust if“ ‘(1) the donor of the benefit ...

acted under a mistake of fact or in misreliance on a right or duty, or (2)

the recipient of the benefit ... engaged in some unconscionable conduct,

such as fraud, coercion, or abuse of a confidential relationship. In the

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absence of mistake or misreliance by the donor or wrongful conduct by

the recipient, the recipient may have been enriched, but he is not deemed

to have been unjustly enriched.’ ”Welch, 891 So.2d at 843 (quoting

Jordan, 705 So.2d at 458). The success or failure of an

unjust-enrichment claim depends on the particular facts and

circumstances of each case. Heilman, supra.

Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So. 2d 638, 654-55 (Ala. 2006); see also, Hardy v. Smith,

18

2110726, 2013 WL 1490611 at * 3 (Ala. Civ. App. Apr. 12, 2013) reh'g denied,

2110726, 2013 WL 4291698 (Ala. Civ. App. Aug. 16, 2013) (same). “‘To prevail on

a claim of unjust enrichment under Alabama law, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the

defendant knowingly accepted and retained a benefit, (2) provided by another, (3)

who has a reasonable expectation of compensation.’” Matador Holdings, Inc. v. HoPo

Realty Investments, L.L.C., 77 So. 3d 139, 145 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Portofino

 The plaintiff’s responses (doc. 36 at note 27; doc. 40 at note 20) also cite to the 18

following from Mantiply:

Recovery on a theory of quantum meruit arises when a contract is implied.

Brannan & Guy, P.C. v. City of Montgomery, 828 So.2d 914 (Ala.2002).“There

are two kinds of implied contracts—those implied in fact and those implied in

law. Contracts implied in law are more properly described as quasi or constructive

contracts where the law fictitiously supplies the promise [to pay for the labor or

services of another] to prevent a manifest injustice or unjust enrichment,

etc.”Green v. Hospital Bldg. Auth. of Bessemer, 294 Ala. 467, 470, 318 So.2d

701, 704 (1975). This Court has stated:“It is the settled law of this State that

where one knowingly accepts services rendered by another, and the benefit and

the result thereof, the law implies a promise on the part of the one accepting with

knowledge the services rendered by another to pay the reasonable value of such

services rendered.”Hendrix, Mohr & Yardley, Inc. v. City of Daphne, 359 So.2d

792, 795 (Ala.1978). 

Mantiply, 951 So. 2d at 656. See doc. 36 at 8, n. 27. The section referenced by the plaintiff

specifically addressed only quantum meruit. 

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Seaport Vill., LLC v. Welch, 4 So.3d 1095, 1098 (Ala.2008)). 

The “benefit” which the plaintiff claims it gave to REV was the preparation,

and proposal, at REV’s request for a LightRails project at the 14th Street underpass

in Birmingham. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 37). The plaintiff alleges that 

Pursuant to that request, extensive measurements and photographs were

made of the 14th Street underpass. FitzGibbons recommended

interactive components for pedestrians at the 14th Streed underpass.

Rominger and Chris Hatcher of REV Birmingham responded that this

was a great idea. Therefore, FitzGibbons began to investigate an

interactive component.

38. On July 10, 2013, Rominger asked FitzGibbons to do a proposal for

the 14th Street underpass. Also, Rominger asked what particularfixtures

to use, how much they would cost, and what kind of switches

FitzGibbons would specify for the other “LightRails” projects,including

the 14th Street underpass. FitzGibbons provided the requested

information on the LED fixtures and continued research for appropriate

switches for REV Birmingham.

39. Rominger, on behalf of REV Birmingham, also asked FitzGibbons

for media contacts that would help REV Birmingham in their

fundraising efforts. FitzGibbons provided REV Birmingham with the

media contacts.

(Doc. 1 at 8-9). The defendants argue that the plaintiff cannot prevail because it had

no reasonable expectation that it would be compensated. 

The plaintiff’s responses refer to the above allegations and argue that they

“clearly” show that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that it would be paid for

these services. (Doc. 36 at 9; doc. 40 at 6-7). The court does not agree. It is

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undisputed that the plaintiff had no contract for the other projects. The one contract

the plaintiff did have covered the 18th Street project alone. The allegations to which

the plaintiff pointsshow only that the plaintiff was asked to prepare a proposal for the

other projects and did so. The Alabama Supreme Court has held that the plaintiff need

not be compensated for “effortsin attempting to secure [a] contract,” even if someone

else gets the contract. Utah Foam Products, Inc. v. Polytec, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1345,

1350-51 (Ala. 1991). 

Further, the parties’ course of dealing, as outlined elsewhere in the complaint,

belies any inference that the plaintiff reasonably expected to be paid. The complaint

states that before the plaintiff received the contract for the 18th Street project,

Fitzgibbons reviewed the 18th Street underpass (doc. 1 at ¶ 14), inspected the four

underpasses which comprise the entire LightRails project (doc. 1 at ¶17), and

eventually sent a proposal for the 18th Street project (doc. 1 at ¶18). Only then did the

plaintiff and REV enter into the contract for the 18th Street project. (Doc. 1 at ¶20). 

The contract into which the parties entered does not provide for payment for the work

performed prior to the date on which it was executed. (Doc. 1-3 at 9-10). Further, the

contract clearly states that the plaintiff “shall not commence . . . services until this

Agreement is fully executed and [REV] issues a Notice to Commence Work” (doc.

1-3 at 9), language which implies that REV would not pay for work done before such

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time. Finally, the complaint does not allege that the plaintiff expected to be paid, or,

more importantly, was paid for the work it performed prior the date the 18th Street

contract was executed.

The plaintiff pointsto no facts in the complaint establishing why itshould have

expected to be paid for the work done in an attempt to secure the new LightRails

projects.

E. Count Four – Civil Conspiracy (REV, Goedecke, and Mayer)

Count Four reads:

77. As a result of the acts complained of herein above, all of the

Defendants (REV Birmingham, Mayer Electric and/or Goedecke) have

conspired together, and with others currently unknown, to commit a

substantive tort against FitzGibbons. As a result, the Defendants have

combined to do (a) something that is unlawful or (b) something that is

lawful by an unlawful means.

78. Further, the acts of the co-conspirators (REV Birmingham,

Mayer Electric and/or Goedecke) are attributable to each other.

79. As a result of the civil conspiracy, FitzGibbons has been

damaged in an amount yet to be determined, but in excess of the

jurisdictional minimums of this Court.

(Doc. 1 at 15). The allegation, without any facts in support, that the defendants have

combined to do “something,” simply does not rise to the pleading level required by

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Twombly and Iqbal.

19

F. The Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend

As noted, the plaintiff asked for leave to amend in the event that this court

found its complaint to be deficient. (Doc. 36 at 11; doc. 40 at 10). The Eleventh

Circuit has noted:

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a party may amend

its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's

leave, if a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) motion has been filed.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Although Rule 15(a)(2) instructs that leave of the

court to amend pleadings should be given freely, when justice so

requires; a district court may deny a motion to amend on “numerous

grounds, such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and

futility of the amendment.”

Mitchell v. Thompson, 12-12774, 2014 WL 1647350 (11th Cir. Apr. 25, 2014)

(quoting Carruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.2004)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted in original)). The defendants do not

object to (or even respond to) the motion to amend in their reply briefs. There has

been no showing, nor is it clear from the pleadings or posture of this case, that the

defendants would be prejudiced as a result of allowing the amendment. Further, the

 The defendants also argue that this claim is due to be dismissed because the other 19

counts are due to be dismissed, and, absent an underlying tort, a conspiracy claim cannot lie. Avis

Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Heilman, 876 So. 2d 1111, 1124 (Ala. 2003) (“[L]iability for civil

conspiracy rests upon the existence of an underlying wrong and if the underlying wrong provides

no cause of action, then neither does the conspiracy.”). The plaintiff agrees with this proposition.

Because the court will allow the plaintiff to amend, this issue is moot.

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case was filed relatively recently, in December of 2013. Finally, the court cannot say

that an amendment would be futile. The plaintiff will be allowed to amend the

complaint to add additional facts in support of its claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as

follows:

1. REV’s motion to strike “Exhibit A” to the plaintiff’s brief opposition the

motion to dismiss (doc. 42 at 2, 6-7) is GRANTED. 

2. The motion to dismiss filed by Mayer and Goedecke (doc. 22) is

DENIED without prejudice;

3. The motion to dismiss filed by REV (doc. 33) is DENIED without

prejudice;

4. The plaintiff’s motions to amend the complaint (doc. 36 at 11; doc. 40

at 10) are GRANTED. The plaintiff shall file a complete amended

complaint within 14 days which addresses the issues identified in

this opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of May, 2014.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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