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Parties Involved:
Antonio Soza-Colin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12253

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANTONIO SOZA-COLIN, 

a.k.a.

MARCO MONDRAGON-BELMONTES

a.k.a.

MARCOS ANTONIO MONDRAGON,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12253

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cr-00017-CAR-CHW-1

____________________

Before WILSON, LAGOA, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Antonio Soza-Colin appeals his sentence of 95 

months’ imprisonment for illegally reentering the United States after a removal following a conviction for an aggravated felony, in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). Soza-Colin argues that the 

district court’s statement at the sentencing hearing that the decision to grant him “credit” would be up to the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons (“BOP”) shows that the district court mistakenly believed 

that it lacked the authority to grant him a downward departure for 

the time he spent in state and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody. Soza-Colin asserts that this court should 

weigh in his favor any ambiguity the district court had in its sentencing authority. Having reviewed the record and read the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s imposition of a 95-month 

sentence for Soza-Colin.

I.

While we may not review the discretionary decision of a district court’s refusal to grant a downward departure, we may conduct a de novo review of the question whetherthe district court mistakenly believed it lacked the authority to grant such a departure. 

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23-12253 Opinion of the Court 3

United States v. Pressley, 345 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2003). However, where a party raises an issue with his or her sentence for the 

first time on appeal, we review the issue for plain error. See United 

States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2014). “To prevail under the plain error standard, an appellant must show: (1) an 

error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) it affected his substantial 

rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 822.

II.

In the context of a de novo review of a defendant’s claim that 

the district court mistakenly believed it lacked the authority to depart, “we maintain a presumption in the district court’s favor.” 

United States v. Rodriguez, 34 F.4th 961, 975 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. 

denied, 143 S. Ct. 580 (2023). Thus, “when nothing in the record 

indicates otherwise, we assume the sentencing court understood it 

had authority to depart downward.” United States v. Chase, 174 F.3d 

1193, 1195 (11th Cir. 1999). For example, where the district court 

does “not express any ambivalence regarding its authority to depart 

and the evidence does not otherwise reflect the district court misapprehended its authority,” we “assume the district court understood it had authority to depart downward and simply decided not 

to exercise its discretionary authority.” Id. Additionally, “[w]e do

not require a district court to expressly say whether it believes it 

has the authority to grant a departure.” Rodriguez, 34 F.4th at 975.

In United States v. Webb, we resolved an ambiguity as to 

whether the district court believed it lacked the authority to depart 

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in favor of the defendant. 139 F.3d 1390, 1395 (11th Cir. 1998). 

There, the district court apparently agreed “with both the proposition that it lacked the authority to depart as well as the proposition 

that it had the discretion to depart but chose not to do so.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, we noted that, “on balance . . . the record 

more strongly suggest[ed] that the court believed that it was not 

authorized to depart downward.” Id.

A “departure” generally refers to a sentencing court’s “imposition of a sentence outside the applicable guideline range or of 

a sentence that is otherwise different from the guideline sentence,” 

and a “downward departure” describes a “departure that effects a 

sentence less than a sentence that could be imposed under the applicable guideline range or a sentence that is otherwise less than the 

guideline sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 comment. (n.1(F)). “Credit,” 

by contrast, refers to time awarded “toward the service of a term 

of imprisonment for any time [the defendant] has spent in official 

detention prior to the date the sentence commences—(1) as a result 

of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a result 

of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the 

commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed[.]” 

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Unlike a downward departure, a court may 

not award credit at sentencing. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 

333, 112 S. Ct. 1351, 1354 (1992) (“§3585(b) does not authorize a 

district court to compute the credit at sentencing”). After the district court sentences a defendant, the Attorney General, through 

the BOP, has the responsibility of determining the amount of jail 

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time credit and administering the sentence. Id. at 335, 112 S. Ct. at 

1354-55.

III.

The record demonstrates that because Soza-Colin did not 

object to his sentence or argue that the court misunderstood its authority to grant a departure in the district court, we review the 

court’s decision for plain error. See Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d at 821. 

Unlike Webb, the record in this case does not indicate that the district court believed it lacked the authority to depart downward 

from the guideline range. Soza-Colin’s request for “credit” for the 

time he served in state and ICE custody was not a request for a 

“downward departure,” and the district court’s response that SozaColin’s receipt of “credit” would be “up to the Bureau of Prisons”

was a correct statement of the law. There is nothing in the record 

to indicate that the district court used the terms “credit” and 

“downward departure” interchangeably such that the district court 

created an ambiguity in its authority to depart downward. Thus, 

the district court did not commit an error for the purposes of plain 

error review.

Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we affirm Soza-Colin’s 95-month sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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