Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-09552/USCOURTS-ca10-89-09552-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Justice
Respondent
Mesa Airlines
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

F I L _cj D , __ United States C{)urtof Appea.s Tcnt!l Circuit 

DEC 1 7 1991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

MESA AIRLINES, a corporation, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR 

IMMIGRATION RELATED UNFAIR 

EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, 

Respondents. 

In Re Charge of Zeki Yeni Komsu 

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No. 89-9552 

On Petition for Review from the Department of Justice 

(DOJ No. 88-200001) 

Gary Risley, General Counsel for Mesa Airlines, Inc., Far.mington, 

New Mexico, for Petitioner. 

Andrew M. Strojny, Acting Special Counsel, and Daniel Echavarren, 

Acting Deputy Special Counsel, u.s. Department of Justice, Office 

of Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Employment 

Practices, Washington, D.C., on the brief for Respondent. 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges, and SPARR, District Judge.* 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Daniel B. Sparr, u.s. District Judge for the 

District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-9552 Document: 01019324193 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 1 
On January 12, 1988, the Special Counsel for Immigration 

Related Unfair Employment Practices (Special Counsel) filed two 

complaints against Mesa Airlines, Inc. (Mesa) pursuant to the 

Immigration Reform and Control Act (!RCA), 8 u.s.c. § 1324b 

(1988). The Special Counsel charged Mesa with refusing to employ 

Mr. Zeki Yeni Komsu as a pilot because he was not a citizen of the 

United States, and with engaging in a pattern and practice of 

discriminatory hiring on the basis of citizenship. Administrative 

Law Judge Marvin Morse (ALJ) heard the complaint, and found that 

Mesa had refused to hire Mr. Komsu in violation of section 

1324b(a)(1)(B) and had engaged in a pattern and practice of 

discrimination. Mesa petitioned this court to review that 

~ finding. We dismiss Mesa's appeal for lack of appellate 

jurisdiction. 

Judge Morse set forth his findings in a "Final Decision and 

Order" dated and signed on July 24, 1988. The next day, July 25, 

Judge Morse's secretary served the order on the parties by mail. 

Sixty-three days after the date of the order, on September 25, 

1989, the Clerk of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals received and 

filed Mesa's Petition for Review. The Special Counsel moved to 

dismiss the petition as untimely filed. 

A party may seek review of the decision or order of an 

Administrative Law Judge in an unlawful immigration-related 

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Appellate Case: 89-9552 Document: 01019324193 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 2 
employment practice case "[n]ot later than 60 days after the entry 

of such final order." 8 u.s.c. § 1324b(i)(l); 28 CFR 

1 § 68.Sl(b) .• This time limit is jurisdictional and not 

discretionary. See Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 

u.s. 257, 264 (1978) (thirty days for appealing civil judgment 

jurisdictional); Selco Supply Co. v. EPA, 632 F.2d 863, 864 (lOth 

Cir. 1980) (sixty days for appealing EPA order jurisdictional), 

cert. denied, 450 u.s. 1030 (1981). The Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure provide that the "day of the act . from 

which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be 

included. The last day of the period shall be included, unless it 

is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday." Fed. R. App. P. 

26(a); 28 C.F.R. § 68.7(a)(same). Moreover, "filing shall not be 

~ timely unless the papers are received by the clerk within the time 

fixed for filing." Fed. R. App. P. 25(a). Although both the IRCA 

and the applicable regulation provide that the time for filing an 

appeal shall run from "entry" of the order, neither one defines 

entry. If the order was "entered" when the ALJ signed and dated 

it on July 24, Mesa had to file its appeal no later than Friday, 

September 22. In that event, Mesa's appeal was untimely when it 

reached the Clerk on September 25, and we must dismiss. If 

1 The Interim Final Rules in effect at the time of the filing of this appeal were codified at 28 C.F.R. Part 68. Final Rules 

were adopted on November 24, 1989 and published in the same 

section. No changes other than numbering were made to the 

sections relevant to this appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 89-9552 Document: 01019324193 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 3 
instead the order was not "entered" until it was mailed on July 

25, then we have jurisdiction over the appea1. 2 

The order of a federal district court is deemed entered at 

that point when it is both set forth in a document separate from a 

judge's opinion and memorandum and is reflected in an appropriate 

notation on the docket. Herrera v. First Northern Sav. & Loan 

Ass'n, 805 F.2d 896, 899 (lOth Cir. 1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. 

Unlike the Federal Rules, however, the IRCA does not require that 

decisions be recorded on a chronological docket. Compare Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 79(a) (requiring docket of all events, kept in 

chronological order) with 28 C.F.R. §§ 68.1 et seq. Because the 

Executive Office of Immigration Review does not keep a docket 

'-' sheet, the Federal Rules' definition of "entry" in the context of 

judicial actions is inapplicable. Cf. Cham-Haulers, Inc. v. 

United States, 536 F.2d 610, 615 (5th Cir. 1976) (judicial rules 

on filing for review inapplicable to review of Interstate Commerce 

Commission order because I.C.C. lacks official docket). 

Those cases that have interpreted similar statutes hold that 

in the absence of a docket, entry is effected when the order is 

made public. In Cham-Haulers, for example, the Fifth Circuit 

concluded that an order of the ICC was entered only when it was 

2 The sixtieth day after July 25, 1989 was a Saturday. 

Therefore, the last day for filing an appeal under this statute 

after entry of an order on July 25 was Monday, September 25. 

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Appellate Case: 89-9552 Document: 01019324193 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 4 
"final, complete, and a matter of public record." 536 F.2d at 616 

(interpreting the Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 u.s.c. § 

2344, which runs from "entry" of order). See also Western Union 

Tel. Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 375, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (F.c.c. orders 

statutorily deemed "entered" upon public notice); cf. Southern 

Pac. Pipe Lines, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 796 F.2d 

539, 540 n.1 (D.C. Cir 1986) (time for petitioning for judicial 

review runs from date of public notice when statute, 49 u.s.c. § 

2005(a), refers to date of "issue"); National Black Media 

Coalition v. FCC, 760 F.2d 1297, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (public 

notice, rather than personal service, begins period for appeal 

under statute giving 30 days from "public notice"). The focus on 

public notice both creates a clear cut-off date, and assures that 

'-' courts do not prematurely review agency action. ..A decision 

becomes a final decision when it is both complete and passes out I 

of the control of the authority by being relea~ed to the 

interested parties or to the public in decisional form without any 

immediate intention of recall or reconsideration." City of Gallup 

v. FERC, 702 F.2d 1116, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 

We hold that, absent evidence to the contrary, an order that 

is not entered on any docket is nonetheless "entered" for purposes 

of running the time for appeal on the date it is signed and dated 

by the ALJ. In so doing, we decline to adopt Mesa's proffered 

alternative. The case tracking sheet to which Mesa refers us is 

nothing more than an index to the contents of the original case 

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Appellate Case: 89-9552 Document: 01019324193 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 5 
file kept at the Office of the Administrative Hearing Officer in 

Arlington, Virginia, and has none of the legal significance of a 

docket. Were we to run the t~e for appeal from the date printed 

on the case tracking sheet, we would need an affidavit in each 

case from the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer 

to determine whether the petition for review was t~ely. We are 

unwilling to complicate this issue or to undermine the bright-line 

date restriction. 

We do not believe that service of the order on July 25 is 

relevant to our calculation. 3 The D.C. Circuit has held that the 

lack of private notice to the parties will not prevent the t~e 

for appeal from running once the FCC has given public notice of 

~ its decision. National Black Media Coalition, 760 F.2d at 1299. 4 

In the case before us, Judge Morse wrote that his decision was 

"final" and "so ordered" on July 24, 1989. Final Decision and 

Order at 71. Mesa itself referred to Judge Morse's decision as 

"the Order ••• which was entered on July 24th, 1989." Petition 

for Review at 1 (emphasis added). We have no reason to believe 

3 Indeed, Mesa does not make this argument itself. 

4 Our result is not contrary to that in Chem-Haulers. The 

Fifth Circuit held in that case that an ICC order becomes final 

when it is "signed, the Commission seal is affixed, and the order 

is served." 536 F.2d at 613. We agree with the D.C. Circuit that 

Chem-Haulers' reference to service contemplates public service. 

See National Black Media Coalition, 760 F.2d at 1300. We also 

note that unlike the instant case, the court in Chem-Haulers 

signed, sealed, and served its order all on the same day--nearly 

two weeks after it decided to affirm. 

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Appellate Case: 89-9552 Document: 01019324193 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 6 
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that this order was not made public on the day it was signed and 

dated. 5 

We deny Mesa's request for five extra days of mailing time 

under 28 C.F.R. § 68.7(c)(2). That regulation allows the extra 

days only when "a party has the right • . • to take some action 

within a prescribed period after the service of a [document]." 

Id. (emhasis added). Since Mesa's right to appeal ran from sixty 

days of ent6Y of the·order, the five day extension does not apply. 

Nor is Mesa entitled to extra time for excusable neglect. 

Rule 26(b) forbids this court from granting extra time for filing 

an appeal from an order of an administrative agency "except as 

~ specifically authorized by law." Fed. R. App. P. 26(b). Neither 

the rule governing such appeals, the !RCA, or the regulations 

thereunder provide for any time extensions. See Fed. R. App. P. 

15(a); 8 u.s.c. § 1324b(i)(1); 28 C.F.R. §§ 68.1 et seq. Federal 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(S), which allows the district 

court to extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable 

neglect, does not apply to appeals from agency orders. Fed. R. 

App. P. 20 (Rules 3-14 not applicable to review of orders of 

agencies). 

5 Had Mesa inquired after the status of its case and been 

unable to learn about its disposition, we might agree that the 

order was not in fact .. public" when signed and dated. 

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Appellate Case: 89-9552 Document: 01019324193 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 7 
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Appellate Case: 89-9552 Document: 01019324193 Date Filed: 12/17/1991 Page: 8