Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-13-01564/USCOURTS-ca13-13-01564-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
First Quality Baby Products, LLC
Appellee
First Quality Hygienic, Inc.
Appellee
First Quality Products, Inc.
Appellee
First Quality Retail Services, LLC
Appellee
SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag
Appellant
SCA Personal Care, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG

SCA PERSONAL CARE, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC,

FIRST QUALITY HYGIENIC, INC.,

FIRST QUALITY PRODUCTS, INC. AND

FIRST QUALITY RETAIL SERVICES, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2013-1564

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Kentucky in No. 10-CV-0122, Chief 

Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr.

______________________ 

Decided: September 18, 2015

______________________ 

MARTIN J. BLACK, Dechert LLP, Philadelphia, PA, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by TERILYNN A. EVANS, KEVIN MARK FLANNERY, SHARON K.

GAGLIARDI. 

KENNETH GEORGE, Amster Rothstein & Ebenstein 

LLP, New York, NY, argued for defendants-appellees. 

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2 SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS

Also represented by MARK BERKOWITZ, SANDRA ADELE 

HUDAK, CHARLES R. MACEDO. 

J. DEREK VANDENBURGH, Carlson, Caspers, Vandenburgh, Lindquist & Schuman, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for 

amicus curiae The Toro Company. Also represented by 

JOSEPH W. WINKELS. 

RICHARD DELUCIA, Kenyon & Kenyon LLP, New York, 

NY, for amicus curiae Medinol Ltd. Also represented by 

MARK ALEXANDER CHAPMAN, ELIZABETH GARDNER,

ALOYSIUS ANTONY PFEFFER, JOSEPH MATTHEW PURCELL,

JR., ERIC SCHREIBER; RICHARD H. PILDES, New York, NY. 

GREGORY A. CASTANIAS, Jones Day, Washington, DC, 

for amicus curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association. Also represented by CAROLINE EDSALL, ISRAEL SASHA 

MAYERGOYZ; PHILIP STATON JOHNSON, Johnson & Johnson, New Brunswick, NJ; KEVIN H. RHODES, 3M Innovative Properties Company, St. Paul, MN; HERBERT CLARE 

WAMSLEY, JR., Intellectual Property Owners Association,

Washington, DC.

ANDREW JOHN DHUEY, Berkeley, CA, for amicus curiae Morris Reese.

MICHAEL J. FARNAN, Farnan LLP, Wilmington, DE, 

for amicus curiae ART+COM Innovationpool GmbH. 

ARIEL LAVINBUK, Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, 

Untereiner & Sauber LLP, Washington, DC, for amici 

curiae Stephanos Bibas, Samuel L. Bray, John F. Duffy. 

Also represented by MICHAEL E. KENNEALLY. 

NANCY MERTZEL, Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Stern 

LLP, New York, NY, for amicus curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association. Also represented by 

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SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS 3

DENISE WHELTON DEFRANCO, Finnegan, Henderson, 

Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Boston, MA.

STEVEN C. SEREBOFF, SoCal IP Law Group LLP, 

Westlake Village, CA, for amicus curiae Conejo Valley 

Bar Association. Also represented by MARK ANDREW

GOLDSTEIN, MEENAKSHI KALA SARVAIYA. 

PHILIP J. WARRICK, Klarquist Sparkman, LLP, Portland, OR, for amici curiae Garmin International, Inc., 

Limelight Networks, Inc., LinkedIn Corporation, Mentor 

Graphics Corporation, Newegg Inc., SAP America, Inc., 

SAS Institute Inc., Symmetry LLC, Xilinx, Inc. Also 

represented by JOHN D. VANDENBERG. 

MITCHELL M. WONG, Ashmasons LLP, New York, NY, 

for amicus curiae Ashmasons LLP.

JOHN THORNE, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans 

& Figel, PLLC, Washington, DC, for amici curiae Dell 

Inc., CTIA The Wireless Association, Hewlett-Packard 

Company, Intel Corporation, Xerox Corporation. Also 

represented by AARON M. PANNER, GREGORY G. RAPAWY. 

SUZANNE MICHEL, Google Inc., Washington, DC, for 

amicus curiae Google Inc.

DEREK SHAFFER, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae Marvell 

Semiconductor, Inc. 

EUGENE M. GELERNTER, Patterson Belknap Webb & 

Tyler LLP, New York, NY, for amici curiae Johnson & 

Johnson, Cordis Corporation. Also represented by 

GREGORY DISKANT, SCOTT B. HOWARD. 

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4 SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS

VERA RANIERI, Electronic Frontier Foundation, San 

Francisco, CA, for amici curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Knowledge.

KEVIN J. CULLIGAN, Goodwin Procter LLP, New York, 

NY, for amicus curiae Askeladden, L.L.C. Also represented by JOHN P. HANISH; BRIAN TIMOTHY BURGESS, WILLIAM 

M. JAY, Washington, DC.

DOUGLAS A. MIRO, Ostrolenk Faber LLP, New York, 

NY, for amicus curiae Universal Remote Control, Inc. Also 

represented by ALAN FEDERBUSH. 

MICHAEL SONGER, Crowell & Moring, LLP, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae AT&T Mobility II LLC. Also 

represented by VINCENT JOHN GALLUZZO. 

GREER N. SHAW, Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Los Angeles, 

CA, for amicus curiae T-Mobile USA, Inc. Also represented by TRISHA FARMER, Phoenix, AZ.

DOMINIC P. ZANFARDINO, Brinks Gilson & Lione, Chicago, IL, for amicus curiae Cook Medical LLC. Also represented by CYNTHIA A. HOMAN, ANDREW S. MCELLIGOTT. 

BRETT L. FOSTER, Holland & Hart LLP, Salt Lake 

City, UT, for amicus curiae Hydro Engineering, Inc. Also 

represented by DAWN M. DAVID, MARK A. MILLER. 

MARK CHRISTOPHER FLEMING, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, for amicus curiae 

Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. Also represented by 

ROBERT J. GUNTHER, JR., OMAR KHAN, New York, NY.

MATTHEW WOLF, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, 

DC, for amici curiae Briggs & Stratton Corp., HarleyDavidson Motor Company, Inc., Jockey International, 

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SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS 5

Inc., Rockwell Automation, Inc., Wisconsin Manufacturers 

& Commerce.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, LOURIE, DYK,

MOORE, O’MALLEY, REYNA, WALLACH, TARANTO, CHEN, and

HUGHES, Circuit Judges.∗

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge PROST in which 

Circuit Judges NEWMAN, LOURIE, DYK, O’MALLEY, and

REYNA join.

Opinion concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part filed by 

Circuit Judge HUGHES in which Circuit Judges MOORE,

WALLACH, TARANTO, and CHEN join.

PROST, Chief Judge. 

We convene en banc to resolve whether, in light of the 

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), laches 

remains a defense to legal relief in a patent infringement 

suit. We conclude that Congress codified a laches defense 

in 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1) that may bar legal remedies. 

Accordingly, we have no judicial authority to question the 

law’s propriety. Whether Congress considered the quandary in Petrella is irrelevant—in the 1952 Patent Act, 

Congress settled that laches and a time limitation on the 

recovery of damages can coexist in patent law. We must 

respect that statutory law. 

Nevertheless, we must adjust the laches defense in 

one respect to harmonize it with Petrella and other Supreme Court precedent. We emphasize that equitable 

principles apply whenever an accused infringer seeks to 

use laches to bar ongoing relief. Specifically, as to injunc-

∗ Circuit Judge Stoll did not participate in this decision.

 

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tions, considerations of laches fit naturally within the 

eBay framework. In contrast, Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 

514 (1888), and Petrella counsel that laches will only 

foreclose an ongoing royalty in extraordinary circumstances.

I. BACKGROUND

The present dispute arose out of litigation concerning 

adult incontinence products. SCA alleges that First 

Quality, a competitor in the adult incontinence products 

market, infringes U.S. Patent No. 6,375,646 (’646 patent). 

SCA first contended that First Quality’s Prevail® All 

NitesTM product infringes the ’646 patent in a letter sent 

to First Quality on October 31, 2003. The correspondence 

explained:

It has come to our attention that you are making, 

selling and/or offering for sale in the United 

States absorbent pants-type diapers under the 

name Prevail® All NitesTM. We believe that these 

products infringe claims of [the ’646 patent].

We suggest that you study [the ’646 patent]. If 

you are of the opinion that the First Quality Prevail® All NitesTM absorbent pants-type diaper 

does not infringe any of the claims of this patent, 

please provide us with an explanation as to why 

you believe the products do not infringe. If you 

believe that the products do infringe, please provide us with your assurance that you will immediately stop making and selling such products.

J.A. 544.

First Quality responded on November 21, 2003 and 

claimed the patent was invalid: 

As you suggested, we studied [the ’646 

tent]. . . . In addition, we made a cursory review of 

prior patents and located U.S. Patent No. 

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SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS 7

5,415,649, (“the ’649 Patent”), which was filed in 

the United States on October 29, 1991 and is 

therefore prior to your client’s ’646 Patent. A review of Figs. 3 and 4 of the prior ’649 Patent reveals the same diaper construction claimed by 

the ’646 Patent. Thus, the prior ’649 Patent invalidates your client’s ’646 Patent. As you know, an 

invalid patent cannot be infringed.

J.A. 547. SCA and First Quality ceased communications 

regarding the ’646 patent after First Quality’s response. 

However, on July 7, 2004, SCA requested reexamination 

of the ’646 patent in light of the ’649 patent. SCA did not 

notify First Quality of the reexamination because, in 

SCA’s view, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 

reexaminations are public and First Quality could follow 

the proceedings itself. Yet, from First Quality’s point of 

view, SCA dropped its infringement allegations against 

First Quality after First Quality argued the patent was 

invalid in the November 21st letter. 

The PTO instituted reexamination on the ’646 patent 

and, on March 27, 2007, confirmed the patentability of all 

twenty-eight original claims and issued several other 

claims SCA added during reexamination. Meanwhile, 

First Quality invested heavily in its protective underwear 

business. In 2006, First Quality expanded its line of adult 

incontinence products. In 2008, First Quality acquired 

Tyco Healthcare Retail Group LP, which had several lines 

of competing products, and in 2009 First Quality spent 

another $10 million to purchase three more lines of protective underwear products. SCA was aware of First 

Quality’s activities, but never mentioned the ’646 patent 

to First Quality during this time.

On August 2, 2010—over three years after reexamination concluded—SCA filed a complaint alleging that 

First Quality infringes the ’646 patent. Service of the 

complaint was the first time in nearly seven years that 

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SCA had communicated with First Quality regarding 

the ’646 patent. The district court proceeded with discovery and issued a claim construction order. First Quality 

then moved for partial summary judgment of noninfringement and for summary judgment of laches and 

equitable estoppel. The district court granted First 

Quality’s motion as to laches and equitable estoppel and 

dismissed the noninfringement motion as moot.

SCA appealed, and on September 17, 2014, a panel of 

this court affirmed the district court’s opinion on laches, 

but reversed as to equitable estoppel. See SCA Hygiene 

Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 767 

F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Panel Opinion”). On laches, 

the panel rejected SCA’s argument that the Supreme 

Court’s Petrella decision abolished laches in patent law, 

reasoning instead that the panel was bound by this 

court’s prior en banc opinion in A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. 

Chaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 

(en banc), and that Petrella left Aukerman intact. Panel 

Opinion at 1345. As to the delay element, the panel 

opinion held that while “SCA was not required to provide 

notice of the reexamination to First Quality,” “SCA remained silent for more than three years after the patent 

came out of reexamination.” Id. at 1346. “Given the 

circumstances, SCA should have been prepared to reassert its rights against First Quality shortly after the ’646 

patent emerged from reexamination.” Id. Therefore, the 

panel concluded that “SCA has failed to raise a genuine 

issue of material fact regarding the reasonability of its 

delay.” Id. 

With respect to the prejudice element of laches, the 

panel affirmed the district court’s analysis. Specifically, 

the panel agreed that First Quality made a number of 

significant capital expenditures in its adult incontinence 

business, and that First Quality likely would have “restructured its activities to minimize infringement liability 

if SCA had brought suit earlier.” Id. at 1347. Because 

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SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS 9

SCA did not present any contrary evidence, the panel held 

that “SCA has not identified any evidence that raises a 

genuine issue of material fact regarding First Quality’s 

presumed economic prejudice.” Id. at 1348. And although 

the district court did not explicitly weigh the equities in 

determining that laches applied, the panel concluded the 

error was harmless. Id. Thus, the panel affirmed the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment on laches.1

SCA subsequently filed a petition for rehearing en 

banc, asking this court to reconsider Aukerman in light of 

Petrella. On December 30, 2014, this court granted SCA’s 

petition and posed the following two en banc questions:

(a) In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 134 S. Ct. 

1962 (2014) (and considering any relevant differences between copyright and patent law), 

should this court’s en banc decision in A.C. 

Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 

F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992), be overruled so 

that the defense of laches is not applicable to 

bar a claim for damages based on patent infringement occurring within the six-year 

damages limitations period established by 35 

U.S.C. § 286?

1 On equitable estoppel, the panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment because competing inferences could be drawn as to the meaning of SCA’s 

silence regarding the ’646 patent. Panel Opinion at 1350. 

The panel also held that a dispute of material fact remained over whether First Quality relied on SCA’s alleged misleading communication because First Quality 

could have relied on its own belief that the ’646 patent 

was invalid or simply ignored the ’646 patent. Id. at 

1350–51.

 

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(b) In light of the fact that there is no statute of 

limitations for claims of patent infringement 

and in view of Supreme Court precedent, 

should the defense of laches be available under some circumstances to bar an entire infringement suit for either damages or 

injunctive relief? See, e.g., Lane & Bodley Co. 

v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193 (1893).

SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby 

Prods., LLC, No. 2013-1564, 2014 WL 7460970, at *1 

(Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2014) (granting en banc review). 

Following briefing, including numerous amicus briefs, we 

held oral argument on June 19, 2015.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

II. VIABILITY OF LACHES AFTER PETRELLA

A 

SCA contends that, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella, laches is no longer available as a defense 

to patent infringement within the six-year damages 

recovery period. We last addressed our laches law en 

banc in Aukerman. There, we set out five rules regarding 

the laches defense:

1. Laches is cognizable under 35 U.S.C. § 282 

(1988) as an equitable defense to a claim for 

patent infringement.

2. Where the defense of laches is established, the 

patentee’s claim for damages prior to suit may 

be barred.

3. Two elements underlie the defense of laches: 

(a) the patentee’s delay in bringing suit was 

unreasonable and inexcusable, and (b) the alleged infringer suffered material prejudice attributable to the delay. The district court 

should consider these factors and all of the evCase: 13-1564 Document: 258-2 Page: 10 Filed: 09/18/2015
SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS 11

idence and other circumstances to determine 

whether equity should intercede to bar prefiling damages.

4. A presumption of laches arises where a patentee delays bringing suit for more than six 

years after the date the patentee knew or 

should have known of the alleged infringer’s 

activity.

5. A presumption has the effect of shifting the 

burden of going forward with evidence, not the 

burden of persuasion.

Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028.

Four different portions of Aukerman’s reasoning are 

especially relevant to this case. First, we determined in 

Aukerman that laches was codified in 35 U.S.C. § 282. 

Aukerman explained that, “[a]s a defense to a claim of 

patent infringement, laches was well established at the 

time of recodification of the patent laws in 1952.” Id. at 

1029. We also credited P.J. Federico’s Commentary on the 

New Patent Act for its observation that the second paragraph of § 282 includes “equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel and unclean hands.” Id. (quoting P.J. 

Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 

1, 55 (West 1954) (hereinafter Federico Commentary)). 

Second, Aukerman addressed the argument that laches conflicts with 35 U.S.C. § 286, which limits recovery of 

damages to the six years prior to the complaint. We

explained that “[i]n other areas of our jurisdiction, laches 

is routinely applied within the prescribed statute of 

limitations period for bringing the claim.” Id. at 1030 

(citing Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir.

1988) (en banc) (military pay); Reconstruction Finance 

Corp. v. Harrisons & Crosfield Ltd., 204 F.2d 366 (2d 

Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 854 (1953) (breach of contract)). Moreover, we observed that § 286 (or a virtually 

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identical analogue) “has been in the patent statute since 

1897,” and that, “[w]ithout exception, all circuits recognized laches as a defense to a charge of patent infringement despite the reenactment of the damages limitation 

in the 1952 statute.” Id. Aukerman also noted that

“section 286 is not a statute of limitations in the sense of 

barring a suit for infringement.” Id. Rather, “the effect of 

section 286 is to limit recovery to damages for infringing 

acts committed within six years of the date of the filing of 

the infringement action.” Id. Finally, we reasoned that 

laches and a statute of limitations are not inherently 

incompatible. “By section 286, Congress imposed an 

arbitrary limitation on the period for which damages may 

be awarded on any claim for patent infringement. Laches, on the other hand, invokes the discretionary power of 

the district court to limit the defendant’s liability for 

infringement by reason of the equities between the particular parties.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Third, we rejected the argument “that laches, by reason of being an equitable defense, may be applied only to 

monetary awards resulting from an equitable accounting, 

not to legal claims for damages.” Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 

1031. According to the Aukerman court, the merger of 

law and equity courts allowed laches to bar legal relief. 

When in 1915 Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 398—which 

authorized parties to plead equitable defenses at law 

without having to file a separate bill in equity—“laches 

became available to bar legal relief, including patent 

damage actions.” Id. We also found persuasive the fact 

that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) recognizes laches 

as a defense in civil actions. Id. 

Fourth, Aukerman considered whether laches bars recovery of pre-filing damages only, or whether it precludes 

the entire suit. In ruling that laches prohibits recovery of 

pre-filing damages only, Aukerman relied on the Supreme 

Court’s Menendez decision. Aukerman quoted the following portion of Menendez: 

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Mere delay or acquiescence cannot defeat the 

remedy by injunction in support of the legal right, 

unless it has been continued so long[,] and under 

such circumstances[,] as to defeat the right itself. . . . Acquiescence[,] to avail[,] must be such 

as to create a new right in the defendant. . . . 

So far as the act complained of is completed, acquiescence may defeat the remedy on the principle 

applicable when action is taken on the strength of 

encouragement to do it[;] but so far as the act is in 

progress[,] and lies in the future, the right to the 

intervention of equity is not generally lost by previous delay, in respect to which the elements of an 

estoppel could rarely arise.

Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1040 (quoting Menendez, 128 U.S. 

at 523–24.) Aukerman was motivated by preserving the 

distinction between laches—which bars only pre-suit 

damages—and equitable estoppel—which bars the entire 

suit. Id. Estoppel, which does not necessarily involve 

delay in bringing suit, requires “statements or conduct of 

the patentee which must ‘communicate . . . in a misleading way’ . . . that the accused infringer will not be disturbed by the plaintiff patentee in the activities in which 

the former is currently engaged.” Id. at 1042. Aukerman

explained that the “stated difference in the effect of laches 

and estoppel has served well to emphasize that more is 

required in the overall equities than simple laches if an 

alleged infringer seeks to wholly bar a patentee’s claim.” 

Id. at 1040. The court dismissed a rule by which laches 

could bar all relief “in egregious circumstances.” Id. 

For over two decades, Aukerman governed the operation of laches in patent cases. However, last year in 

Petrella the Supreme Court held that laches was not a 

defense to legal relief in copyright law. Petrella calls 

portions of Aukerman’s reasoning into question, necessitating our present en banc reconsideration of laches. 

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Petrella involved an assertion that Metro-GoldwynMayer’s (“MGM”) critically-acclaimed 1980 film Raging 

Bull infringed a copyright in a 1963 screenplay authored 

by Frank Petrella. Frank Petrella’s daughter, Paula 

Petrella (“Petrella”), renewed the copyright in 1991, but 

did not contact MGM until seven years later. Petrella, 

134 S. Ct. at 1971. Over the next two years, Petrella and 

MGM exchanged letters concerning Petrella’s copyright 

claim. Id. Petrella then went silent, and did not file suit 

until January 6, 2009, about nine years after her last 

correspondence with MGM. Id. To dispose of the suit, 

MGM moved for summary judgment of laches, which the 

district court granted and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that 

laches is no defense to a copyright infringement suit 

brought within the Copyright Act’s statutory limitations 

period. Fundamentally, the Supreme Court reasoned that 

“the copyright statute of limitations, § 507(b), itself takes 

account of delay,” crowding out the judiciary’s power to 

decide whether a suit is timely. Id. at 1973. According to 

the Court, “[l]aches . . . originally served as a guide when 

no statute of limitations controlled the claim.” Id. at 

1975. Historically, “laches is a defense developed by 

courts of equity; its principal application was, and remains, to claims of an equitable cast for which the Legislature has provided no fixed time limitation.” Id. at 1973. 

Laches is thus “gap-filling, not legislation-overriding.” Id. 

at 1974. In this respect, separation of powers concerns 

drove the result in Petrella. Petrella consequently held 

that “in face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to bar legal relief.” Id. 

Therefore, under Petrella, “[t]o the extent that an infringement suit seeks relief solely for conduct occurring 

within the limitations period . . . courts are not at liberty 

to jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit.” 

Id. at 1967.

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In addition, the Petrella Court conceded that “there 

has been, since 1938, only one form of action—the civil 

action.” Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974 (internal quotation

marks omitted). But, the Court responded, “the substantive and remedial principles [applicable] prior to the 

advent of the federal rules [have] not changed.” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Both before and after the merger of law and equity in 

1938, this Court has cautioned against invoking laches to 

bar legal relief.” Id. at 1973.

Petrella also addressed the extent to which laches 

should affect equitable relief. The Court explained: “In 

extraordinary circumstances, however, the consequences 

of a delay in commencing suit may be of sufficient magnitude to warrant, at the very outset of the litigation, curtailment of the relief equitably awardable.” Id. at 1977. 

Petrella then contrasted a Sixth Circuit case involving a 

copyrighted architectural design and the facts in Petrella. 

In the Sixth Circuit case, Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities, Inc., 474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007), the plaintiffs 

“would not be entitled to an order mandating destruction 

of the housing project” embodying the copyrighted design 

because “the plaintiffs knew of the defendants’ construction plans before the defendants broke ground, yet failed 

to take readily available measures to stop the project; and 

the requested relief would work an unjust hardship upon 

the defendants and innocent third parties.” Petrella, 134 

S. Ct. at 1978 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In Petrella, however, “Petrella notified 

MGM of her copyright claims before MGM invested millions of dollars in creating a new edition of Raging Bull. 

And the equitable relief Petrella seeks—e.g., disgorgement of unjust gains and an injunction against future 

infringement—would not result in total destruction of the 

film, or anything close to it.” Id. (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the 

Court reasoned that “[a]llowing Petrella’s suit to go 

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forward will put at risk only a fraction of the income 

MGM has earned during that period and will work no 

unjust hardship on innocent third parties, such as consumers who have purchased copies of Raging Bull. The 

circumstances here may or may not (we need not decide) 

warrant limiting relief at the remedial stage, but they are 

not sufficiently extraordinary to justify threshold dismissal.” Id. (citation omitted).

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court continued: “Should 

Petrella ultimately prevail on the merits, the District 

Court, in determining appropriate injunctive relief and 

assessing profits, may take account of her delay in commencing suit.” Id. The Court then laid out several considerations for the district court. In particular, the “court 

should closely examine MGM’s alleged reliance on Petrella’s delay.” Id. “This examination should take account 

of MGM’s early knowledge of Petrella’s claims, the protection MGM might have achieved through pursuit of a 

declaratory judgment action, the extent to which MGM’s 

investment was protected by the separate-accrual rule, 

the court’s authority to order injunctive relief on such 

terms as it may deem reasonable, and any other considerations that would justify adjusting injunctive relief or 

profits.” Id. at 1978–79 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). In conclusion, the Court assured that, 

“on the facts thus far presented,” Petrella would remain 

entitled to an ongoing royalty. Id. at 1979 (“Whatever 

adjustments may be in order in awarding injunctive relief, 

and in accounting for MGM’s gains and profits, on the 

facts thus far presented, there is no evident basis for 

immunizing MGM’s present and future uses of the copyrighted work, free from any obligation to pay royalties.”). 

Finally, the Supreme Court in Petrella recognized 

that Congress could provide for a laches defense, noting, 

as an example, that it had done so in the Lanham Act, 

governing trademarks. Id. at 1974 n.15. The Court took 

no position on whether its decision extends to the patent 

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context, remarking that “based in part on § 282 and 

commentary thereon, legislative history, and historical 

practice, the Federal Circuit has held that laches can bar 

damages incurred prior to the commencement of suit, but 

not injunctive relief. We have not had occasion to review 

the Federal Circuit’s position.” Id. (citation omitted).

Still, Petrella clearly casts doubt on several aspects of 

Aukerman. The following sections reexamine the availability of laches to bar recovery of damages incurred within 

the six-year limitations period.

B 

First, we consider the character of 35 U.S.C. § 286. 

Section 286 states, in relevant part: “Except as otherwise 

provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the 

filing of the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in 

the action.” 35 U.S.C. § 286. The parties and amici

fervently debate whether § 286 is a statute of limitations

or a damages limitation. By its terms, § 286 is a damages 

limitation. The statute does not preclude bringing a 

claim—instead, it limits a patentee’s damages recovery to 

compensation for only the last six years of infringement. 

See Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo 

Co., 754 F.2d 345, 347–48 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 

However, this distinction is irrelevant to the resolution of this case under Petrella. As discussed above at

II.A, Petrella focuses on the fact that, in enacting a statute of limitations, Congress has spoken on the timeliness 

of copyright infringement damages claims. Thus, the 

question under Petrella is whether Congress has prescribed a time period for recovery of damages. Section 

286 is one such prescription. In § 286, Congress provided

a six-year time period for recovery of damages. Given 

that laches also considers the timeliness of damages 

claims, § 286—a damages-barring time provision—

invokes Petrella’s logic at least as much as, and perhaps 

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more than, a statute of limitations. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 

1973 (“[T]he copyright statute of limitations, § 507(b), 

itself takes account of delay.”). Moreover, because patent 

infringement is a continuous tort, there is no relevant 

functional difference between a damages limitation and a 

statute of limitations. We therefore see no substantive 

distinction material to the Petrella analysis between § 286 

and the copyright statute of limitations considered in 

Petrella. 

C 

Next, we determine that Congress codified a laches 

defense in 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1). Section 282(b)2 provides:

The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent 

and shall be pleaded:

(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for 

infringement or unenforceability.

(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit 

on any ground specified in part II as a condition for patentability.

(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit 

for failure to comply with— 

(A)any requirement of section 112, except 

that the failure to disclose the best 

2 This version of § 282(b) incorporates amendments 

by the America Invents Act that, due to later effective 

dates, are inapplicable to the instant case. See Pub. L. 

112–29, § 15(a), (c), 125 Stat. 284, 328; § 20(g), (j)(1), (l), 

125 Stat. 284, 334–35 (2011). Those amendments, however, would not affect our decision today. For convenience, therefore, we use the current version of the statute.

 

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mode shall not be a basis on which any 

claim of a patent may be canceled or 

held invalid or otherwise unenforceable; or

(B)any requirement of section 251.

(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by 

this title.

By its plain terms, § 282 broadly sets out defenses available in a patent infringement or validity suit. Rather than 

enumerate specific defenses, subsection (1) lists categories 

of defenses—“[n]oninfringement, absence of liability for 

infringement or unenforceability.” Subsections (2) and (3) 

follow this pattern, referring to invalidity based on “any 

ground specified in part II as a condition for patentability,” “any requirement of section 112,” and “any requirement of section 251.” And § 282(b) concludes with a 

catch-all provision in subsection (4): “[a]ny other fact or 

act made a defense by this title” is a defense within 

§ 282(b).

The House and Senate Reports on § 282 confirm that 

Congress intended § 282 to have broad reach. Only one 

sentence in each Report describes § 282(b), but both 

endorse an expansive interpretation of the subsection. 

The Senate Report explains that “[t]he five defenses 

named in R. S. 4920 are omitted and replaced by a broader paragraph specifying defenses in general terms.” S. 

Rep. No. 82-1979 at 8–9 (1952), 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 

2422. Likewise, the House Report clarifies that “[t]he 

defenses to a suit for infringement are stated in general 

terms, changing the language in the present statute, but 

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not materially changing the substance.”3 H.R. Rep. No. 

82-1923, at 10 (1952).

Contemporary commentary by “P. J. Federico, a principal draftsman of the 1952 recodification,” Diamond v. 

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 321 (1980), reveals that the 

“broader” and “general” § 282 codified the laches defense. 

Federico’s Commentary on the New Patent Act, which 

appears as a prologue to Title 35 in West’s initial publication of the statute, states: 

The defenses which may be raised in an action involving the validity or infringement of a patent 

are specified in general terms, by the second paragraph of section 282, in five numbered items. 

Item 1 specifies “Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement, or unenforceability” (the 

last word was added by amendment in the Senate 

for greater clarity); this would include the defenses such as that the patented invention has not 

been made, used or sold by the defendant; license; 

and equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel 

and unclean hands.”

Federico Commentary (emphases added). 

The dissent criticizes our reliance on Federico, Dissent at 9–10, but the Supreme Court has trusted Federico

as an authority on the Patent Act at least thrice. See

3 The dissent asserts that the words “not materially 

changing the substance” indicate that § 282 is no broader 

than R. S. 4920. Dissent at 8. But by the statutes’ plain 

terms that contention is wrong. R. S. 4920 enumerated 

five specific defenses. Even putting aside § 282(b)(1) and 

the catch-all provision in §282(b)(4), § 282(b)(2) and (b)(3) 

clearly broaden the statutory defenses available to accused infringers.

 

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Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 

U.S. 17, 28 (1997) (citing 2 D. Chisum, Patents § 8.04[2], 

pp. 63–64 (1996) (discussing Federico Commentary));

Diamond, 447 U.S. at 321 (citing Hearings on H.R. 3760 

before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the 

Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1951) (statement of P. 

J. Federico)); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 

Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342 n.8 (1961) (citing Federico Commentary). Moreover, we and our predecessors have relied 

on the Federico Commentary countless times as “an 

invaluable insight into the intentions of the drafters of 

the Act.” Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 

1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Antares Pharma, Inc. 

v. Medac Pharma Inc., 771 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 

2014); Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., 304 F.3d 

1256, 1264 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2002); BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. 

Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1993); 

Albert v. Kevex Corp., 729 F.2d 757, 761 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 

Application of Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 603 (C.C.P.A. 1977); 

Application of Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 924 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 

1964). In addition, Judge Rich, who was deeply involved 

in crafting the Patent Act, described Federico in a concurring opinion as “[t]he key person” in drafting the Patent 

Act. Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 

1985) (Rich, J., concurring). According to Judge Rich, 

Federico “not only wrote the first draft of the Act himself 

and actively participated for the next two years in every 

detail of its revisions but, having been made a special 

consultant to the House subcommittee in charge of the 

project, he was also a principal author of House Report 

No. 1923 on the bill, which was virtually copied by the 

Senate Judiciary Committee as its report No. 1979, and 

the author of the section-by-section Revisors Notes.” Id. 

Judge Rich also reveals that the Federico Commentary

was solicited by the West Publishing Company for publication with the new Title 35:

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After enactment of the law, West Publishing 

Company asked Federico to write a commentary 

on it for publication in U.S.C.A., which he did, and 

it was published in 1954 in the first of the volumes containing the new Title 35. Federico also 

submitted drafts of the commentary to Ashton 

and the Drafting Committee for suggestions . . . . 

Id. (footnote omitted). We therefore consider the Federico 

Commentary to be a sufficiently reliable source on the 

meaning of § 282. 

To summarize, § 282 uses inclusive language, the legislative history characterizes § 282 as “broader” and 

“general,” and the Federico Commentary explicitly states 

that § 282 includes laches. The dissent does not point to 

anything that contradicts our understanding of § 282. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Congress codified a laches 

defense in § 282.

Notably, our construction of § 282 to include laches is 

neither novel, nor a direct response to Petrella. Rather, 

for decades we have held that laches was codified in § 282, 

including once sitting en banc in Aukerman. See Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1029; Symbol, 277 F.3d at 1366; Mylan 

Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 

2001); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 

1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Nothing in Petrella casts doubt on 

our longstanding construction of the Patent Act.

D 

Having determined that Congress codified a laches 

defense in § 282, we now reach the critical question: does 

laches as codified in the 1952 Patent Act bar recovery of 

legal relief? If laches as codified in § 282 is a defense

against only equitable relief, Petrella prohibits judicial 

application of laches to bar legal damages. If, however, 

laches as codified operates as a defense to both legal and 

equitable relief, patent law’s statutory scheme—like the 

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Lanham Act, see Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974 n.15—does 

not implicate Petrella. In that case, § 282 obligates us to 

apply laches as a defense to legal relief, notwithstanding 

§ 286’s time limitation on the recovery of damages. 

Turning to the content of the laches defense in § 282, 

the text of § 282 provides little guidance. Because § 282 

does not enumerate specific defenses, the statutory text 

says nothing on the applicability of laches to legal relief. 

Similarly, the legislative history is silent on the meaning 

of laches, and Federico does no more than mention laches’ 

codification in § 282.

In these circumstances, the Supreme Court counsels 

that “[w]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed 

by the common law, we must presume that Congress 

intended to retain the substance of the common law.” 

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 

1363 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).4 This 

4 While the doctrine of laches in the patent context 

is not strictly a matter of common law, as the patent law 

is statutory, the Supreme Court has treated uniform 

interpretations of statutes involving judicially created 

doctrines as invoking common law adoption principles. In 

United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 533 (1993), the 

Supreme Court considered whether the statutory scheme 

there implicitly allowed for the federal government to 

recover prejudgment interest for money owed by state 

governments. The statute itself was silent on the issue, 

only expressly requiring individuals to pay prejudgment 

interest. The Court determined that there was a common 

law tradition of the federal government being able to 

recover prejudgment interest for money owed it by the 

states, and therefore that the statute implicitly allowed 

for the federal government to recover prejudgment interest against the states. Indeed, the Court rejected an 

 

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presumption applies where “Congress has failed expressly 

or impliedly to evince any intention on the issue.” Astoria 

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110

(1991); see also Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 

783 (1952) (“Statutes which invade the common law . . . 

are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention 

of long-established and familiar principles, except when a 

statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”). “In order 

to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must 

speak directly to the question addressed by the common 

law.” United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

This canon of construction is especially applicable 

here. Congress’s purpose in enacting the Patent Act was 

to codify the prevailing law wholesale, except where 

changes were expressly noted. The House Report reveals 

that, while a preliminary draft of the Patent Act “included 

a collection of a large number of proposed changes in the 

law,” “[a]s a result of the comments received, it was 

decided not to include most of the proposed changes in a 

bill but to defer them for later consideration, and to limit 

the bill to the main purpose of codification and enactment 

of title 35 into law, with only some minor procedural and 

other changes deemed substantially noncontroversial and 

desirable.” H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 3. Consequently, 

“the principal purpose of the bill [was] the codification of 

title 35 . . . .” Id. at 5; S. Rep. No. 82-1979 at 4, 1952 

argument that the presumption favoring the common law 

only applies “with respect to state common law or federal 

maritime law.” Id. at 534. See also Singer, Norman & 

Singer, J.D., 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction

§ 50:1 (7th ed. 2007) (“All legislation is interpreted in 

light of the common law and the scheme of jurisprudence 

existing at the time of its enactment.”).

 

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U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2397. While “there [were] a number of 

changes in substantive statutory law,” “these [were] 

explained in some detail in the revision notes,” and “[t]he 

major changes or innovations in the title consist of incorporating a requirement for invention in § 103 and the 

judicial doctrine of contributory infringement in § 271.” 

H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 5; S. Rep. No. 82-1979 at 4, 

1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2397. No changes to laches doctrine 

were mentioned in the revision notes. Finally, “just 

before the bill was passed in the Senate, Senator Saltonstall asked on the floor, ‘Does the bill change the law in 

any way or only codify the present patent laws?’ Senator 

McCarran, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee which 

had been in charge of the bill for the Senate, replied, ‘It 

codifies the present patent laws.’” Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 350 n.2 (1961) 

(Black, J., concurring) (quoting 98 Cong. Rec. 9323 (July 

4, 1952)); see also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 

448 U.S. 176, 203 (1980) (quoting the same). Therefore, if 

anything, Congress intended to adopt the laches patent 

common law when it included laches in § 282. 

As outlined above, Congress remained silent on the 

content of the laches defense.5 Section 282 therefore 

retains the substance of the common law as it existed at 

the time Congress enacted the Patent Act. See Astoria, 

501 U.S. at 109 (“[L]egislative repeals by implication will 

not be recognized . . . .”). See generally Symbol, 277 F.3d 

at 1366 (“There is nothing in the legislative history to 

suggest that Congress did not intend to carry forward the 

defense of prosecution laches . . . .”); Transco Prods. Inc. v. 

5 If we can infer anything from what Congress said, 

it is that Congress intended to “not materially chang[e]

the substance” of the § 282 defenses. H.R. Rep. No. 82-

1923, at 10.

 

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Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 557 (Fed. Cir. 

1994) (“The legislative history of section 120 does not 

indicate any congressional intent to alter the Supreme 

Court’s interpretation of continuing application practice.”). Accordingly, we must review the case law prior to 

1952 to determine whether courts applied laches to bar 

legal relief.

Some initial background information is necessary to 

place the case law in context. Traditionally, patentees 

could seek an injunction and an accounting of profits—

both equitable remedies—by filing a bill in equity courts. 

Alternatively, patentees could seek compensatory damages by filing an action at law. In 1870, however, Congress 

gave equity courts the authority to award legal damages 

in patent cases. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 

198, 206 (1870). Forty-five years later, in 1915, Congress 

passed a general statute (§ 274b) providing that “in all 

actions at law equitable defenses may be interposed by 

answer, plea, or replication without the necessity of filing 

a bill on the equity side of the court.” Act of March 3, 

1915, ch. 90, § 274b, 38 Stat. 956 (1915). Prior to this 

statute, parties wishing to raise equitable defenses in an 

action at law had to file a separate bill in equity seeking 

to enjoin the legal action. See, e.g., Kessler v. Eldred, 206 

U.S. 285 (1907). Section 274b did not change substantive 

law. See Enelow v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 382

(1935), overruled on other grounds by Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988). 

Rather, “[t]he net effect of [§§ 274a and 274b] was to allow 

transfer of action begun on either side of the court to the 

other side, without the necessity of commencing a new 

action, to permit determination of law questions arising in 

equity actions in those actions, and to allow equitable 

defenses to be offered and equitable relief to be granted in 

an action at law.” City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 

337 U.S. 254, 256–57 (1949). Beginning in 1915, then, 

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accused infringers were not procedurally foreclosed from 

pleading a laches defense in an action at law.

The merger of law and equity was completed with the 

advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. 

“[T]here has been, since 1938, only ‘one form of action—

the civil action.’”6 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974 (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 2). Prior to 1938, where the requirements 

for equitable jurisdiction were satisfied, patentees often 

alleged patent infringement in a bill in equity, as equitable courts could provide the powerful remedies of an 

accounting of profits and an injunction, which were unavailable in actions at law, in addition to compensatory 

damages. After the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 

implemented, patentees no longer needed to choose.

Finally, in the Patent Act of 1946, Congress eliminated accounting of profits as a remedy for patent infringement (except for design patents). See Act of Aug. 1, 1946, 

Pub. L. No. 79-587, 60 Stat. 778; see also Kori Corp. v. 

Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 654 

(Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The 1946 amendment to the damages 

provisions effectively eliminated this double recovery.”). 

“After the 1946 amendment . . . R.S. 4921 provided that 

‘the complainant shall be entitled to recover general 

damages which shall be due compensation for making, 

using, or selling the invention, not less than a reasonable 

royalty therefor . . . .’” Kori, 761 F.2d at 654 (quoting Act 

of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-587, 60 Stat. 778). The 

prior availability of an equitable accounting of profits in 

patent infringement cases is relevant because, in cases 

litigated between 1870 and 1946, the patentee often 

sought both compensatory damages and an accounting of 

6 The christening of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not alter any substantive law. Petrella, 134 S. 

Ct. at 1974. 

 

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profits. Id. Moreover, “[f]ollowing the 1870 Patent Act, 

courts regularly used the terms ‘account’ and ‘accounting’ 

to refer to the special master’s determination of both an 

adjudged infringer’s profits and a patentee’s damages.” 

Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 

1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013). For this reason, it is in many cases 

difficult to determine whether a court applied laches to 

bar purely equitable relief, or whether, in using the term 

“accounting,” a court also prohibited legal relief. That 

said, equity courts’ grouping of legal and equitable relief 

under a single name—accounting—could explain a unique 

willingness in patent law to apply laches to bar a traditionally legal remedy.

With all of the foregoing in mind, we now turn to the 

pre-1952 case law on laches. Upon review, the case law 

demonstrates that, by 1952, courts consistently applied 

laches to preclude recovery of legal damages. Nearly 

every circuit recognized that laches could be a defense to 

legal relief prior to 1952. See, e.g., Banker v. Ford Motor 

Co., 69 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1934); Hartford-Empire Co. v. 

Swindell Bros., 96 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1938); Ford v. Huff, 

296 F. 652 (5th Cir. 1924); France Mfg. Co. v. Jefferson 

Elec. Co., 106 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1939); Brennan v. Hawley 

Prods. Co., 182 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1950); Middleton v. 

Wiley, 195 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1952).7 In fact, the only two 

pre-1952 circuit courts that considered SCA’s argument—

that laches operates as a defense to equitable relief only—

expressly held that laches can also bar legal remedies. 

See Ford, 296 F. at 658; Banker, 69 F.2d at 666.

7 Significantly, the cases cited as examples here do 

not include the numerous cases that apply laches to bar 

an “accounting.” Because of the term’s inherent ambiguity (described above in text), we do not rely on such cases.

 

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The Ford case was both early and influential. In 

Ford, the patentee, Huff, was employed by defendant 

Henry Ford as an electrical and mechanical engineer. 

Ford, 296 F. at 654. Huff and Ford agreed that Huff 

would invent a magneto for an automobile flywheel and

assign the patent rights to Ford, and Ford would pay a 

reasonable royalty for the invention’s use. Id. Huff 

subsequently invented the magneto and assigned the 

patent rights to Ford. Id. While Ford paid Huff $10,000 

in installments upon Ford manufacturing the first 20,000 

magnetos, Ford made no further royalty payments. Id. 

Huff did not bring suit against Ford until fourteen 

years after the invention, ten years after he left the Ford 

Motor Company, and eight years after the patents issued. 

Id. at 655. The court found that Ford had established 

both laches and equitable estoppel—laches from the 

delay, and equitable estoppel from Huff’s acceptance of 

Ford’s $10,000 payment. Id. at 657. The court then 

considered whether the laches and equitable estoppel 

defenses could be brought in a suit at law. Citing § 274b

and Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, 260 U.S. 

235 (1922), the Fifth Circuit stated that “a defendant in 

an action at law who files a plea setting up an equitable 

defense is given the same rights as if he had set them up 

in a bill in equity.” Id. at 658. The court reasoned that “a 

bill in equity disclosing the state of facts alleged in the 

plea in question would show that defendant was entitled 

to prevent the enforcement of the claim asserted by this 

suit on the ground that plaintiff’s conduct had been such 

as to deprive him of the right to enforce that claim.” Id. 

Therefore, because the laches and equitable estoppel 

defenses could be pleaded in a bill in equity to enjoin the 

patentee’s suit at law for patent infringement, § 274b 

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allowed the defenses to be pleaded directly in the legal 

suit.8 

The only other case to expressly consider the argument that laches cannot preclude legal relief is Banker. 

In Banker, which involved only laches and not equitable 

estoppel, the Third Circuit employed similar methodology 

to Ford. Specifically, Banker held that “[h]ad the appellant’s suit been in equity, the evidence would have been 

ample for holding that recovery was barred because of 

laches.” Banker, 69 F.2d at 666. Nevertheless, “[t]he 

appellant admit[ted] the authority of the cited cases if 

applied in equity, but contend[ed] that they [were] inapplicable to actions at law.” Id. The court quickly dispensed with that contention, however. Relying on Ford, 

Banker concluded that § 274b “authorizes equitable 

defenses in actions at law theretofore applicable only in 

equity.” Id. 

A plethora of other cases assumes laches to preclude 

legal relief without discussion. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire 

Co. v. Swindell Bros., 96 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1938); France

Mfg. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 106 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 

1939); Brennan v. Hawley Prods. Co., 182 F.2d 945 (7th 

Cir. 1950); Universal Coin Lock Co. v. Am. Sanitary Lock 

8 Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Enelow—

which held that § 274b changed no substantive law—cited 

Ford in the context of an injunction staying a legal action 

pending resolution of an equitable defense. Enelow, 293 

U.S. at 383. Although unclear, Enelow arguably approved

of Ford’s § 274b methodology. Id. (explaining that, under 

§ 274b, “the court, exercising what is essentially an equitable jurisdiction, in effect grants or refuses an injunction 

restraining proceedings at law precisely as if the court 

had acted upon a bill of complaint in a separate suit for 

the same purpose”).

 

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Co., 104 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1939); George J. Meyer Mfg. 

Co. v. Miller Mfg. Co., 24 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1928); Wolf, 

Sayer & Heller v. U.S. Slicing Mach. Co., 261 F. 195 (7th 

Cir. 1919); Middleton v. Wiley, 195 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 

1952).9 In addition, the Supreme Court in Lane & Bodley 

Co. v. Locke mentions monetary compensation, but does 

not state whether the recovery was legal or equitable in 

nature. 150 U.S. 193, 194 (1893) (“[T]he circuit court 

found in favor of the complainant, and, after reference to 

and report by a master, rendered a final decree against 

the defendant for the sum of $3,667.37, with interest and 

costs.”). Countless other cases refer to an accounting, and 

thus remain ambiguous as to whether they barred legal 

relief. See, e.g., Union Shipbuilding Co. v. Bos. Iron & 

Metal Co., 93 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1938); Gillons v. Shell Co. 

of Cal., 86 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1936); Window Glass Mach. 

Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 284 F. 645, 647 (3d Cir. 

1922); A.R. Mosler & Co. v. Lurie, 209 F. 364 (2d Cir. 

1913). Significantly, neither SCA, nor the amici, nor the 

dissent, can identify a single appellate-level patent infringement case stating—much less holding—that laches 

is inapplicable to legal damages.

9 SCA and some amici contend that the Middleton

case holds that laches cannot preclude legal relief. But 

Middleton merely states that the elements of laches were 

not proven in that case. As Middleton reasoned, delay, 

without prejudice, is insufficient. Middleton, 195 F.2d at 

847. Moreover, the Middleton court ruled that application 

of laches would have been inequitable because the accused infringers “knowingly and deliberately were using 

for their own benefit the owner’s patented equipment 

without authority, legal excuse or payment of royalty.” 

Id. 

 

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Finally, the Walker patent treatise supports the conclusion that laches can preclude legal remedies. The 1937 

version of the Walker treatise was published before many 

of the cases discussed above. 4 Walker, on Patents (Deller’s ed. 1937). Nonetheless, although it does not list 

laches among the defenses in actions at law, see id.

§§ 656, 687–88, Walker elsewhere explains that “[w]here 

a plaintiff is chargeable with laches, he cannot recover the 

damages he has suffered nor the profits defendant has 

gained.” Id. § 880B (citing George Meyer, 24 F.2d 505). 

Moreover, Walker’s 1951 Supplement states that “[l]aches 

and estoppel are equitable defenses, and may be interposed in an action at law.” 4 Walker, on Patents at 106

(Supp. 1951) (addressing § 575) (citing Mather v. Ford 

Motor Co., 40 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Mich. 1941)). 

In sum, the case law strongly supports the availability of laches to bar legal relief. Section 282 codified whatever laches doctrine existed when Congress enacted the 

Patent Act in 1952. Although the development occurred 

over time, by 1952 nearly every circuit had approved of 

the proposition that laches could bar legal relief for patent 

infringement, and no court had held to the contrary. The 

Walker treatise—in 1937 and then more authoritatively 

in 1951—agreed that laches precludes recovery of legal 

damages. The laches doctrine codified in § 282 must have 

meaning, and, absent any direction from Congress, it 

takes on its common law meaning. Following a review of 

the relevant common law, that meaning is clear: in 1952, 

laches operated as a defense to legal relief. Therefore, in 

§ 282, Congress codified a laches defense that barred 

recovery of legal remedies.

The dissent suggests that this significant court of appeals authority allowing a laches defense to patent damages actions should not be deemed incorporated into the 

1952 Act because “[a]ny analysis of what the common law 

was at a certain point in time must start with Supreme 

Court precedent” which established a “general principle” 

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that laches does not bar a claim for legal relief. Dissent 

at 10, 12. The dissent also suggests that circuit authority 

allowing the laches defense in equity actions is not pertinent to congressional intent. Id. at 13. The dissent is 

incorrect on both counts. In contrast to other areas, in 

patent law before 1952 there was no sharp distinction 

between legal and equitable actions for damages or in the 

defenses that were available. See supra pp. 23–

25. Patent damages actions were unlike typical damages 

actions in that the 1870 statute allowed the recovery of 

damages in either an action at law or in equity, see 16 

Stat. 206 (1870), and the 1897 statute of limitations 

applied to both legal and equitable actions, see 29 Stat. 

694 (1897), as did the laches defense. Furthermore, the 

Chairman of the Judiciary Committee clarified on the 

Senate floor just before the Patent Act was passed that 

the 1952 Act “codifie[d] the present patent laws.’” 98 

Cong. Rec. 9323 (emphasis added); see also supra pp. 21–

22. If Congress looked to the common law, it likely looked 

to the common law of patents10 rather than to more 

general principles. 

10 The two patent cases cited by the dissent—both 

trial court cases from a single jurisdiction—are unhelpful. 

In the first, City of Concord v. Norton, 16 F. 477 (C.C.D. 

Mass. 1883), after noting that the equitable defense of 

estoppel was available at law and at equity, the court 

found that equitable estoppel was not established. Id. at 

479. The court then stated that if laches had been alleged, it would not have been available because “for laches 

the remedy at law is found in the statute of limitations.” Id. at 480. It is difficult to know what was meant 

by this dictum because at this time no statute of limitations existed in patent law. The second, Thorpe v. Wm. 

Filene’s Sons Co., 40 F.2d 269, 270 (D. Mass. 1930), simp-

 

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E 

The fact that § 286 speaks to the timeliness of damages claims does not alter the outcome. Petrella fundamentally concerns separation of powers. That is, Petrella

eliminates copyright’s judicially-created laches defense 

because Congress, through a statute of limitations, has 

already spoken on the timeliness of copyright infringement claims, so there is no room for a judicially-created 

timeliness doctrine. See Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974 

(describing laches as “gap-filling, not legislationoverriding”). The statutory scheme in patent law, however, is different. While Congress has spoken on the timeliness of patent damages claims, Congress also codified a 

laches defense in § 282. Thus, because § 286 provides for 

a time limitation on the recovery of legal remedies, and 

§ 282 provides for laches as a defense to legal relief, the 

separation of powers concern is not present. See id. at 

1974 n.15 (noting that laches is preserved in trademark 

law because the Lanham Act “expressly provides for 

defensive use of ‘equitable principles, including laches’”). 

Laches therefore remains a viable defense to legal relief 

in patent law. 

Despite whatever tension may exist between the 

§ 286 damages limitation and the § 282 laches defense, 

“we have no authority to substitute our views for those 

expressed by Congress in a duly enacted statute.” Mobil 

Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 626 (1978). If, 

in light of this issue’s newfound salience, Congress dely did not address whether patent law was different from 

other areas. Moreover, because a plethora of court of 

appeals-level case law concludes that laches may bar legal 

relief, we need not list the many district court cases, such 

as Mather, 40 F. Supp. at 591–92, that accord with our 

reasoning.

 

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cides that the § 286 damages limitation and the § 282

laches defense are incompatible, it can change the law. 

As a court, however, we must apply the law as enacted, 

which means that the § 286 damages limitation and the 

§ 282 laches defense must continue to coexist. 

F 

Finally, one major difference between copyright and 

patent law bears mention: copyright infringement requires evidence of copying, but innocence is no defense to 

patent infringement. Compare N. Coast Indus. v. Jason 

Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1992) (“If the 

plaintiff copyright holder survives the first step, i.e., it 

establishes that it owns a valid copyright, then the plaintiff must establish infringement by showing both access to 

its copyrighted material on the part of the alleged infringer and substantial similarity between the copyrighted 

work and the alleged infringing work.”), and Eden Toys, 

Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 

1982) (“Evidence of independent creation may be introduced by a defendant to rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie 

case of infringement.”), with Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco 

Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (2015) (“Direct infringement is a strict-liability offense.”). Because copyright 

infringement requires proof of access, a potential defendant is typically aware of a risk that it is infringing and 

can estimate its exposure when making its initial investment decision. See Dell Br. 26–27; Roche Br. 19–21. The 

potential defendant can also accumulate evidence of 

independent creation to protect its investment. Thus, in 

Petrella—as in a typical copyright suit—“[a]llowing Petrella’s suit to go forward will put at risk only a fraction of 

the income MGM has earned during that period and will 

work no unjust hardship on innocent third parties . . . .” 

Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1978.

In patent law, however, the calculus is different. For 

example, in the medical device industry, a company may 

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independently develop an invention and spend enormous 

sums of money to usher the resultant product through 

regulatory approval and marketing, only to have a patentee emerge six years later to seek the most profitable 

six years of revenues. See Roche Br. 19–23; IPO Br. 19. 

In the high tech industry, amici advise that businesses 

receive demand letters every day—many of which assert 

unmeritorious claims—and it is often impractical for 

companies to determine which claims have merit. See

Dell Br. 23–27. Independent invention is no defense in 

patent law, so without laches, innovators have no safeguard against tardy claims demanding a portion of their 

commercial success. Consequently, “there is a recurring 

risk that a stale patent claim will inflict significant hardship on a defendant who has lost the meaningful ability to 

choose between alternative technologies and whose investment in research, development, and further innovation may be jeopardized.” Dell Br. 27. This risk likely 

explains why the amici in this case—encompassing industries as diverse as biotechnology, electronics, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, software, agriculture, apparel, 

health care, telecommunications, and finance—

overwhelmingly support retaining laches in patent law.11

11 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Roche Molecular 

Systems, Inc. in Support of Defendants-Appellees; Brief of 

Dell Inc. et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees; Brief of Intellectual Property Owners 

Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of DefendantsAppellees; Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Briggs & 

Stanton Corp., Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc., Jockey 

Int’l, Inc., Rockwell Automation, Inc. and Wisconsin Mfrs. 

& Commerce in Support of Defendants-Appellees; Brief of 

Amicus Curiae Hydro Engineering, Inc. on Rehearing En 

Banc in Support of Defendants-Appellees; Brief of Amici 

 

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III. LACHES’ APPLICATION TO ONGOING RELIEF

The second question for en banc review concerns the 

extent to which laches can limit recovery of ongoing relief. 

Aukerman held that laches could not bar prospective 

relief. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1041. Reexamination of 

that rule is necessary in light of Petrella and the Supreme 

Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 

U.S. 388 (2006). There are two parts to this inquiry: 

whether laches can bar permanent injunctive relief and 

whether it can bar an ongoing royalty for continuing 

infringing acts.

When a court orders ongoing relief, the court acts 

within its equitable discretion. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 

391–92; Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 

1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007). As eBay instructs, equitable “discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional 

principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in 

other cases governed by such standards.” eBay, 547 U.S. 

at 394. With respect to injunctions, this means following 

eBay’s familiar four-factor test:

A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 

available at law, such as monetary damages, are 

inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 

considering the balance of hardships between the 

plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 

Curiae AT&T Mobility II LLC and T-Mobile USA, Inc. in 

Support of Defendants-Appellees; Brief of Amici Curiae 

Johnson & Johnson and Cordis Corp. in Support of Defendants-Appellees; Brief of Amici Curiae Garmin Int’l, 

Inc. et al. on Rehearing En Banc Supporting DefendantsAppellees. 

 

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warranted; and (4) that the public interest would 

not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

Id. at 391.

Consideration of laches fits naturally into this framework. As noted in Petrella, “the District Court, in determining appropriate injunctive relief . . . may take account 

of [the plaintiff’s] delay in commencing suit.” Petrella, 

134 S. Ct. at 1978; see also Menendez, 128 U.S. at 523 

(“Mere delay or acquiescence cannot defeat the remedy by 

injunction in support of the legal right, unless it has been 

continued so long, and under such circumstances, as to 

defeat the right itself.”). Many of the facts relevant to 

laches, such as the accused infringer’s reliance on the 

patentee’s delay, fall under the balance of the hardships 

factor. Id. Unreasonable delay in bringing suit may also 

be relevant to a patentee’s claim that continued infringement will cause it irreparable injury. More than anything, district courts should consider all material facts, 

including those giving rise to laches, in exercising its 

discretion under eBay to grant or deny an injunction. See 

eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.

The Aukerman court, relying on Menendez, based its 

conclusion that laches may only bar pre-suit damages on 

the necessity of maintaining a distinction between laches 

and equitable estoppel. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1040–41. 

But Menendez does not create a bright-line rule favoring 

injunctions. In fact, Menendez repeatedly allows for the 

possibility that laches could foreclose injunctive relief. 

For example, an injunction may be inequitable when the 

delay “has been continued so long, and under such circumstances, as to defeat the right itself.” Menendez, 128 

U.S. at 523; see also id. at 524 (“[S]o far as the act is in 

progress, and lies in the future, the right to the intervention of equity is not generally lost by previous delay, in 

respect to which the elements of an estoppel could rarely 

arise.”) (emphasis added); id. at 524–25 (“Delay in bringCase: 13-1564 Document: 258-2 Page: 38 Filed: 09/18/2015
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ing suit there was, and such delay as to preclude recovery 

of damages for prior infringement; but there was neither 

conduct nor negligence which could be held to destroy the 

right to prevention of further injury.”) (emphasis added).12 

Likewise, eBay clarifies that a patentee is not automatically entitled to an injunction—the patentee must prove 

that the equities favor an injunction. eBay, 547 U.S. at 

392 (“[I]njunctive relief may issue only in accordance with 

the principles of equity.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Laches, an equitable defense, belongs in that 

calculus. We, accordingly, reject Aukerman’s bright line 

rule regarding the interplay between laches and injunctive relief.

With respect to ongoing royalties, while the principles 

of equity apply, equity normally dictates that courts 

award ongoing royalties, despite laches. Menendez, an 

influential case contrasting laches and equitable estoppel 

in the trademark context, guides us here. According to 

Menendez, delay in exercising a patent right, without 

more, does not mean that the patentee has abandoned its 

right to its invention. Rather, the patentee has abandoned its right to collect damages during the delay. 

Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, is different—the 

patentee has granted a license to use the invention that

extends throughout the life of the patent: 

Acquiescence, to avail, must be such as to create a 

new right in the defendant. . . . But there is nothing here in the nature of an estoppel; nothing 

which renders it inequitable to arrest at this stage 

12 While these passages contemplate that estoppel 

will be the primary situation where delay can bar an 

injunction, they also allow for the possibility that the facts 

surrounding delay can be so extreme—without establishing estoppel—as to preclude an injunction.

 

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any further invasion of complainants’ rights. 

There is no pretense of abandonment. That would 

require proof of non-user by the owner, or general 

surrender of the use to the public. . . . Delay in 

bringing suit there was, and such delay as to preclude recovery of damages for prior infringement; 

but there was neither conduct nor negligence 

which could be held to destroy the right to prevention of further injury.

Menendez, 128 U.S. at 524–25.

Petrella also briefly considered the propriety of ongoing royalties. Although Petrella did not supply its reasoning, it found that, “on the facts thus far presented, there 

[was] no evident basis for immunizing MGM’s present and 

future uses of the copyrighted work, free from any obligation to pay royalties.” Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1979. As did 

Aukerman, moreover, Menendez and Petrella caution 

against erasing the distinction between laches and estoppel. As Petrella stated, “the doctrine of estoppel may bar 

the copyright owner’s claims completely, eliminating all 

potential remedies. The test for estoppel is more exacting 

than the test for laches, and the two defenses are differently oriented. The gravamen of estoppel . . . is misleading and consequent loss. Delay may be involved, but is 

not an element of the defense. For laches, timeliness is 

the essential element.” Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1977 (citations omitted). For that reason, absent egregious circumstances, when injunctive relief is inappropriate, the 

patentee remains entitled to an ongoing royalty.

In sum, we must recognize “the distinction between . . . estoppel and laches . . . .” Id. (first alteration in 

original). Whereas estoppel bars the entire suit, laches 

does not. As outlined above, laches in combination with 

the eBay factors may in some circumstances counsel 

against an injunction. However, a patentee guilty of 

laches typically does not surrender its right to an ongoing 

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royalty. Menendez, 128 U.S. at 523–25. Paramount in 

both these inquiries are the flexible rules of equity and, as 

a corollary, district court discretion. “[A] major departure 

from the long tradition of equity practice should not be 

lightly implied.” eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982)). 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, laches remains a defense 

to legal relief in a patent infringement suit after Petrella. 

Laches bars legal relief, and courts must weigh the facts 

underlying laches in the eBay framework when considering an injunction. However, absent extraordinary circumstances, laches does not preclude an ongoing royalty.

Finally, we reinstate the panel opinion’s reversal of 

the district court’s grant of summary judgment on equitable estoppel and adopt its reasoning. We thus remand to 

the district court for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG

SCA PERSONAL CARE, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC,

FIRST QUALITY HYGIENIC, INC.,

FIRST QUALITY PRODUCTS, INC. AND

FIRST QUALITY RETAIL SERVICES, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2013-1564

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Kentucky in No. 10-CV-0122, Chief 

Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr.

______________________ 

HUGHES, Circuit Judge, concurring-in-part, dissenting-inpart, with whom MOORE, WALLACH, TARANTO, and CHEN, 

Circuit Judges, join.

Patent law is governed by the same common-law principles, methods of statutory interpretation, and procedural rules as other areas of civil litigation. Today, the 

majority adopts a patent-specific approach to the equitable doctrine of laches. In doing so, the majority overlooks 

Congress’ intent and Supreme Court precedent, which 

demonstrate that laches is no defense to a claim for 

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2 SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS

damages filed within the statutory limitations period 

established by 35 U.S.C. § 286. 

In Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 

1962, 1974 (2014), the Supreme Court emphasized that it 

had never approved the use of laches to bar a claim for 

legal damages brought within a statutory limitations 

period. The majority reasons that Petrella is not controlling here because Congress specifically incorporated 

laches as a defense to legal damages into the Patent Act 

of 1952. But the majority has no sound basis for finding 

that Congress intended to displace the uniform limitations period in § 286 with the case-specific doctrine of 

laches. The majority’s key logic—that Congress adopted 

the view of some lower courts that laches could bar legal 

relief in patent cases—requires us to presume that Congress ignored the Supreme Court. For in 1952, the Supreme Court had already recognized the common-law 

principle that laches cannot bar a claim for legal damages. I know of no precedent for inferring a congressional 

departure from a common-law principle recognized by the 

highest court based solely on aberrational lower-court 

decisions. 

The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned this 

court not to create special rules for patent cases. In light 

of the Supreme Court’s clear, consistent, and longstanding position on the unavailability of laches to bar 

damages claims filed within a statutory limitations period, we should not do so here. I respectfully dissent-inpart.1

1 I agree with the majority that laches is available 

to bar equitable relief. I therefore join Part III of the 

majority opinion. 

 

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I 

The Supreme Court in Petrella held that when Congress enacts a statutory limitations period, courts cannot

invoke the equitable doctrine of laches to bar claims for 

legal relief filed within that period. 134 S. Ct. at 1967. 

The Supreme Court reasoned that a statutory limitations 

period expresses Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of 

a claim. Id. Because the statutory limitations period 

“itself takes account of delay,” courts cannot further 

regulate the timeliness of a claim using the doctrine of 

laches. Id. at 1973. The Supreme Court found that the 

conflict between these two delay-based limitations creates

a separation of powers problem, and concluded that 

“courts are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment 

on the timeliness of suit.” Id. at 1967. 

The Supreme Court further explained that “laches is a 

defense developed by courts of equity; its principal application was, and remains, to claims of an equitable cast for 

which the Legislature has provided no fixed time limitation.” Id. at 1973 (citing 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 

§ 2.4(4), p. 104 (2d ed. 1993)). This principle has a strong 

historical pedigree: “[b]oth before and after the merger of 

law and equity in 1938, [the Supreme Court] has cautioned against invoking laches to bar legal relief.” Id. at 

1973. The Supreme Court cited several of its decisions as 

proof, including two cases decided prior to 1952. See id.

(citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395, 396

(1946); United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935)). 

Although some regional-circuit cases have departed from 

this principle, the Supreme Court found “no case in which 

[the Supreme Court] has approved the application of 

laches to bar a claim for damages brought within the time 

allowed by a federal statute of limitations.” Id. at 1974.

Like the statute of limitations considered in Petrella, 

the statutory limitations period in § 286 of the Patent Act

expresses Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of claims

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4 SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS

for damages. See 35 U.S.C. § 286. Section 286 prohibits 

recovery of damages when a claim is filed more than six 

years after the associated patent infringement occurs, but 

allows recovery of damages when a claim is filed within 

that six-year window. Cf. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1973 

(observing that under the Copyright Act’s statute of 

limitations, “a successful plaintiff can gain retrospective 

relief only three years back from the time of suit”). I 

agree with the majority that, with respect to claims for 

damages and the conflict with laches, there is no functional difference between § 286 and a statute of limitations. See Maj. Op. at 17–18. The Supreme Court’s 

decision in Petrella, therefore, strongly suggests that 

laches is not available to further regulate the timeliness 

of damages claims in patent-infringement cases. 

To overcome this conclusion, we would have to find 

compelling evidence that Congress incorporated laches 

into the Patent Act as an additional time-bar on claims 

for legal damages. The Supreme Court has required clear 

evidence to justify inferring a congressional departure 

from traditional common-law principles, such as the 

principle recognized in Petrella that laches does not apply 

to claims for legal relief. See, e.g., Nken v. Holder, 556 

U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (applying the “presumption favoring 

the retention of long-established and familiar principles, 

except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident”); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 

(1982) (“[A] major departure from the long tradition of 

equity practice should not be lightly implied.”). Additionally, the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that

there must be a particular justification in the statute 

before this court may announce special rules for patent 

cases that depart from the rules for other areas of civil 

litigation. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, 

Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836–40 (2015); Octane Fitness, LLC v. 

ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014);

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eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 

(2006).

II

The majority brushes aside the teachings of Petrella

and finds based on vague legislative history and muddled 

case law that Congress intended to depart from the common-law principle that laches only bars equitable relief 

where a statutory limitations period applies. See Maj. Op. 

at 18–35. Two flaws pervade the majority’s analysis. 

First, the majority interprets 35 U.S.C. § 282 in isolation, 

without regard to Congress’ intent expressed in § 286. 

Second, in addition to misreading the pre-1952 cases it 

cites, the majority limits the scope of its review to favorable patent cases. The majority ignores Supreme Court

precedent and other federal court decisions holding that 

laches does not bar claims for legal relief filed within a 

statutory limitations period. Properly analyzed, we 

cannot reasonably infer from the Patent Act that Congress intended to depart from this common-law principle. 

A 

The majority finds that Congress incorporated laches 

into § 282 because Congress chose to use broad language 

in that section; and because an executive-branch official 

said so. See Maj. Op. at 18–22. Although the majority 

does not identify which particular term encompasses a 

defense of laches, the only possible candidates are “[n]oninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or 

unenforceability.” 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1). The remaining

subsections refer specifically to other provisions of the 

Patent Act, none of which allude to laches. See id. at 

(b)(2)–(4). First Quality and several amici argue that 

laches falls within the term “unenforceability” in particular. 

The language in § 282(b)(1) is ambiguous at best, and 

contains no hint of a special version of laches that applies 

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to legal relief within a statutory limitations period. The 

terms “absence of liability” and “unenforceability” do not 

precisely refer to any particular defenses to patentinfringement suits. Although the plain meaning of these

terms does not conclusively rule out the defense of laches,

it does not necessarily include a defense of laches either. 

The majority seems to think that the indeterminate 

breadth of these terms helps its case, making it more 

likely that laches falls somewhere within their scope, 

whatever that may be. See Maj. Op. at 18–20. But statutory interpretation cannot turn on this kind of guesswork. 

And even if laches were implicit in § 282, that would not 

be enough, for the question is whether Congress prescribed a variant form of laches in the Patent Act that 

applies to claims for legal relief. 

The majority disregards an important tool of statutory 

interpretation that shows Congress did not adopt such a 

defense. It is a “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 

context and with a view to their place in the overall 

statutory scheme.” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 

(2015) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. 

Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. 

Commc’n Comm’n, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986) (noting the 

“familiar rule of construction that, where possible, provisions of a statute should be read so as not to create a 

conflict”). Here, the statutory limitations period in § 286 

informs the scope of § 282. Section 286 expresses Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of damages claims: a 

patent owner may recover damages when a claim is filed 

within six years of infringement, but no later. If § 282 

includes a defense of laches that applies to claims for 

damages, it would conflict with this judgment. Laches

could bar a patent owner from recovering damages even 

though its claim was filed within the clearly defined sixCase: 13-1564 Document: 258-2 Page: 47 Filed: 09/18/2015
SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS 7

year period established by § 286. The extent of this 

conflict is highlighted by the Supreme Court’s reasoning 

in Petrella. Notwithstanding the additional elements of 

laches beyond mere delay, the Supreme Court held that 

laches and the statute of limitations were in such conflict 

that applying laches created a separation of powers 

problem. See Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1967, 1973. Congress’ 

decision to create a fixed statutory limitations period in 

§ 286 therefore strongly suggests that it did not intend to 

codify a defense of laches that further regulates the 

timeliness of damages claims.

The legislative history of § 286 further proves the 

point. Between 1874 and 1897, the federal patent statute 

did not contain a limitations period of any kind. See 

Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 613–14 (1895). 

Federal courts therefore relied on analogous state statutes of limitations to determine the timeliness of claims. 

See id. at 618, 620. Congress found this approach problematic, and in 1897 enacted the predecessor to § 286 to 

“create a uniform statute of limitations.” H.R. Rep. No. 

54-940, at 2 (1896); see Rev. Stat. § 4921 (1897).2 If we 

read § 282 to incorporate the flexible, case-specific doctrine of laches as to legal damages, that section would 

2 Section 286 and its predecessor contain virtually 

identical language. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 286 (“[N]o 

recovery shall be had for any infringement committed 

more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or 

counterclaim for infringement in the action.”), with Rev. 

Stat. § 4921 (1897) (“But in any suit or action brought for 

the infringement of any patent there shall be no recovery 

of profits or damages for any infringement committed 

more than six years before the filing of the bill of complaint or the issuing of the writ in such suit or action . . . .”). 

 

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“tug against the uniformity Congress sought to achieve.” 

Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1975 (noting a similar conflict with 

the statute of limitations in the Copyright Act). Thus, to 

be consistent with the purpose of § 286, we cannot interpret § 282 to incorporate a defense of laches that bars

legal relief otherwise permitted under § 286. 

The House and Senate Reports from 1952 also contradict the majority’s interpretation. Both sources explain

that § 282 restates statutory defenses “in general terms, 

changing the language in the present statute, but not 

materially changing the substance.” H.R. Rep. 82-1923 at 

10 (1952); S. Rep. 82-1979 at 9 (1952). This declaration 

shows that Congress intended to preserve what the language of the pre-1952 statutes fairly conveys. And nothing in the pre-1952 statutes suggests an authorization of 

laches as a bar to legal damages requested within a 

limitations period. The pre-1952 provision enumerating 

defenses applicable to an infringement suit, whether for 

legal or equitable relief, does not refer directly or indirectly to laches. See 35 U.S.C. § 69 (1946) (codifying Rev. 

Stat. § 4920 as amended). The provision authorizing 

remedies refers to “the course and principles of courts of 

equity” (which includes laches) in the portion addressing 

injunctions, but does not mention equitable defenses in 

the portion addressing damages. 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946) 

(codifying Rev. Stat. § 4921 as amended). In the absence 

of any prior statutory authorization of laches as a bar to 

legal damages, the majority relies on pre-1952 “common 

law.” But nothing in the legislative history reflects congressional recognition of any pre-1952 case law on the 

subject of laches, let alone approval of such case law as 

went beyond what the pre-1952 statutes authorized on 

their face. The key 1952 legislative history on § 282 thus

runs counter to the majority’s conclusion that Congress 

intended this section to incorporate laches as defense to 

legal damages. 

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The majority’s only evidence that Congress intended 

to incorporate a defense of laches at all in § 282 is a lone 

statement in P.J. Federico’s Commentary on the New 

Patent Act. But Mr. Federico’s reference to “laches” does 

not suggest that Congress incorporated a distinctive 

version of laches that, contrary to its traditional role at 

common law, bars a claim for legal damages filed within a 

statutory limitations period. This statement therefore 

cannot support the majority’s conclusion. Indeed, the only 

interpretation of this statement that is consistent with 

§ 286 is that Mr. Federico was referring to laches as a 

defense to equitable relief only. And in any event, an 

inference that Congress departed from a common-law 

principle could not properly rest entirely on a statement 

made two years after the enactment of the Patent Act by 

one person who, though central to its drafting, was not a 

member of Congress voting on the measure.3

In Petrella, the Supreme Court was presented with a 

similarly vague reference to “laches” in Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8(c), which lists the affirmative defenses 

available in a civil action. See 134 S. Ct. at 1974–75. In 

light of the statute of limitations and the traditional role 

of laches, however, the Supreme Court found that this 

reference does not establish laches as a defense to damages claims. Id. So too here. Mr. Federico’s lone post-hoc 

3 The Supreme Court has found that a post-hoc 

statement, even from members of Congress, “does not 

qualify as legislative ‘history,’ . . . [and] is consequently of 

scant or no value” for statutory interpretation. Graham 

Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex. rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 298 (2010) (discrediting a letter from 

the primary sponsors of the bill in Congress); see also 

Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 

447 U.S. 102, 117–18, 120 (1980).

 

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reference to laches is entirely insufficient as a matter of 

statutory construction to conclude that Congress intended

to incorporate laches as a defense to claims for legal 

damages, particularly in light of the contrary and clear 

language of § 286. 

B 

To find that Congress intended to codify laches as a 

defense to claims for legal damages, the majority relies on 

the canon of statutory interpretation that “[w]hen a 

statute covers an issue previously governed by the common law, we must presume that Congress intended to 

retain the substance of the common law.” Kirtsaeng v. 

John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted). But the presumption

that Congress intended to retain an aspect of the common 

law only applies where the common-law principle is 

sufficiently “well established.” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan 

Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); see also 

Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)

(explaining that Congress is presumed to retain “longestablished and familiar” common-law principles). If the 

case law on a particular issue is conflicting, we cannot 

infer from Congress’ silence which approach Congress 

intended to adopt. Cf. Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 

U.S. 291, 299 (1995) (declining to infer ratification of 

judicial interpretation of a statute when these interpretations were largely dicta and “were not uniform in their 

approach”). Here, contrary to the majority’s narrow 

analysis of regional-circuit cases, the pre-1952 case law 

did not clearly establish that a plaintiff’s laches may 

preclude recovery of legal damages. 

1 

Any analysis of what the common law was at a certain 

point in time must start with Supreme Court precedent. 

See, e.g., Astoria, 501 U.S. at 107–08 (relying on Supreme 

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pel and res judicata). For even if there were differing 

views in the lower courts, it would be nearly impossible to 

conclude that there was a uniform understanding of the 

common law that was inconsistent with Supreme Court 

precedent. In our judicial system, the Supreme Court’s 

understanding is controlling. 

Prior to 1952, the Supreme Court decided several cases holding that laches cannot bar a claim for legal relief 

filed within a statutory limitations period. See Holmberg, 

327 U.S. at 395 (“If Congress explicitly puts a limit upon 

the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an 

end of the matter. The Congressional statute of limitation is definitive.”); Mack, 295 U.S. at 489 (“Laches within 

the term of the statute of limitations is no defense at 

law.”); Cross v. Allen, 141 U.S. 528, 537 (1891) (“So long 

as the demands secured were not barred by the statute of 

limitations, there could be no laches in prosecuting a suit 

upon the mortgages to enforce those demands.”). Further,

the Supreme Court made clear that laches is unavailable 

not only in an action at law, but also in a suit in equity to 

enjoin an action at law. See Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 

U.S. 314, 326–27 (1894). The Supreme Court explained 

that a court of equity may enjoin an action at law only if

the plaintiff’s delay is accompanied by further conduct 

that meets the requirements for equitable estoppel: 

Though a good defense in equity, laches is no defense at law. If the plaintiff at law has brought his 

action within the period fixed by the statute of 

limitations, no court can deprive him of his right 

to proceed. If the statute limits him to 20 years, 

and he brings his action after the lapse of 19 years 

and 11 months, he is as much entitled, as [a] matter of law, to maintain it, as though he had 

brought it the day after his cause of action accrued, though such delay may properly be considered by the jury in connection with other facts 

tending to show an estoppel. 

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Id.; see also McClintock on Equity § 28, p. 75 (2d ed. 1948) 

(“The majority of the courts which have considered the 

question have refused to enjoin an action at law on the 

ground of the laches of the plaintiff at law.”). In sum, as 

noted in Petrella, the Supreme Court has never “approved 

the application of laches to bar a claim for damages 

brought within the time allowed by a federal statute of 

limitations.” 134 S. Ct. at 1974.4 

Moreover, several lower courts before 1952 likewise 

applied this general principle in patent-infringement 

cases to conclude that laches does not bar a claim for legal 

relief. In City of Concord v. Norton, 16 F. 477, 477 (C.C.D. 

Mass. 1883), the plaintiffs filed a bill in equity to enjoin 

the defendant’s action at law based on laches. The court 

held that although equitable estoppel is available to bar a 

claim for legal relief, laches is not. Id. at 480. “[F]or 

laches the remedy at law is found in the statute of limitations, and if that statute is inadequate there is no other 

remedy.” Id. Similarly, in Thorpe v. Wm. Filene’s Sons 

Company, 40 F.2d 269, 269 (D. Mass 1930), the court 

recognized that laches “has no application to actions at 

law. A plaintiff’s conduct may, however, have been of 

4 The majority implies that the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193 

(1893), is to the contrary. See Maj. Op. at 31. In that 

case, the Supreme Court found that laches barred a claim 

brought in equity. Lane & Bodley, 150 U.S. at 201. As 

the majority notes, the Supreme Court does not say 

whether the monetary relief barred by laches was legal or 

equitable in nature. And the Supreme Court decided 

Lane & Bodley before the statutory limitations period for 

damages claims was enacted. It therefore does not say 

anything about whether laches may bar a claim for legal 

damages governed by a statute of limitations. 

 

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such character as . . . to make it unconscionable for him to 

maintain it. This is estoppel and is recognized in equity 

as sufficient ground for enjoining an action at law.” 

These decisions alone defeat the conclusion that 

“courts consistently applied laches to preclude recovery of 

legal damages” prior to 1952. Maj. Op. at 28. To say that 

a rule was “well established” when the Supreme Court 

clearly and repeatedly held otherwise is to give insufficient recognition to the hierarchy of federal courts. Further, laches is a general equitable defense, not a defense 

specific to patent infringement. For the purposes of a 

common-law incorporation theory, therefore, the role of 

laches in other areas of civil litigation is of a piece with

the role of laches in patent cases.5 We cannot assume

that Congress would have ignored Supreme Court precedent on the issue and focused solely on regional-circuit 

decisions in patent cases. 

2 

Even if we could focus solely on regional-circuit law, 

the cases cited by the majority do not themselves show 

that there was a uniformly well-established rule that 

5 The majority argues that a Senate floor statement 

claiming that the Patent Act “codifie[d] the present patent 

laws,” 98 Cong. Rec. 9323, justifies its narrow focus on the 

role of laches in patent cases only. See Maj. Op. at 33. 

But unlike the doctrine of contributory infringement, a 

judicial doctrine expressly incorporated into the Patent 

Act of 1952, laches is not a patent law specific to patent 

cases. It is a general equitable defense to liability. Congress’ codification of “patent laws” therefore does not 

support an assumption that Congress only looked to the 

application laches in patent cases, and not to fundamental 

equitable principles announced by the Supreme Court. 

 

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laches is available to bar legal damages otherwise permitted by § 286. Nearly all of these decisions either apply 

laches under a misinterpretation § 274(b) of the Judicial 

Code, mention laches in dicta, or apply laches to bar a 

claim brought in equity. The discussion of laches in these 

cases does not clearly demonstrate that in 1952 laches 

was available to bar a claim for legal damages in a civil 

action. 

The majority primarily relies on two cases that address the availability of equitable relief under § 274(b) of 

the Judicial Code. See Ford v. Huff, 296 F. 652 (5th Cir. 

1924); Banker v. Ford Motor Co., 69 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 

1934). Section 274(b) stated that “in all actions at law 

equitable defenses may be interposed by answer, plea, or 

replication without the necessity of filing a bill on the 

equity side of the court.” Act of March 3, 1915, ch. 90, 

§ 274(b), 38 Stat. 956 (1915). As the court in Ford recognized, however, § 274(b) simply eliminated procedural 

barriers to requesting equitable relief in actions at law—

obviating the need to file separately in a court of equity—

but did not change the substantive and remedial principles of law and equity. See 296 F. at 658 (finding that 

under § 274(b), “a defendant in an action at law who files 

a plea setting up an equitable defense is given the same 

rights as if he had set them up in a bill in equity”). The 

Supreme Court subsequently confirmed that “the procedure was simplified, but the substance of the authorized 

intervention of equity was not altered.” Enelow v. N.Y.

Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 382 (1935); cf. Stainback v. Mo 

Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 383 n.26 (1949) (“Notwithstanding the fusion of law and equity by [Fed. R. Civ. P. 

2], the substantive principles of Courts of Chancery 

remain unaffected.”). And under Supreme Court precedent, it was a substantive principle of law and equity that 

laches alone was not a sufficient basis for a court of equity 

to enjoin an action at law. See Wehrman, 155 U.S. at 

326–27. Section 274(b) therefore does not authorize 

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courts to bar a claim for damages in an action at law 

based on a defense of laches. 

The holding in Ford is consistent with this understanding of § 274(b). The court found that the plaintiff’s 

claim was barred under a theory of equitable estoppel, 

which is an appropriate ground for enjoining an action at 

law for damages. See Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 

582–83 (1879). Equitable estoppel requires a showing 

that the defendant relied on a misleading communication

by the plaintiff that is inconsistent with his present claim. 

See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 

F.2d 1020, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). The plaintiff 

in Ford had accepted payment “under circumstances 

calculated to lead defendant to believe or understand that 

such payment was accepted by plaintiff in full satisfaction 

and discharge of all claims by him.” 296 F. at 657. Noting that “[t]he effect of one being estopped to enforce a 

claim is that his plight is substantially the same as it 

would have been if the claim had never existed,” the court 

held that the plaintiff’s action at law was barred. Id. at 

657–58. The disposition in Ford thus rested on a theory 

of equitable estoppel, consistent with substantive equitable principles and § 274(b). See Thorpe, 40 F.2d at 270 

(finding that in Ford, “while the word ‘laches’ is used, the 

decision clearly rested upon the ground of estoppel”). Any 

mention of laches was mere dictum, and certainly cannot 

be read to contradict Supreme Court precedent holding 

that laches does not bar a claim for damages in an action 

at law. See Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 543 

U.S. 335, 351 n.12 (2005) (“Dictum settles nothing, even 

in the court that utters it.”). 

The Third Circuit in Banker, however, took Ford beyond its holding and applied laches in an action at law

based on a misinterpretation of § 274(b). Although the 

court cited Ford for its interpretation of § 274(b), the court

went further and held that this provision “authorizes 

equitable defenses in actions at law theretofore applicable 

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only in equity.” Banker, 69 F.2d at 666. The Third Circuit found that “[had] the appellant’s suit been in equity, 

the evidence would have been ample for holding that 

recovery was barred because of laches.” Id. For support, 

the Third Circuit relied on cases in which courts of equity 

applied laches to preclude a claim for an injunction and 

an accounting. Id. But it does not follow from these cases 

in equity that laches may also be grounds for enjoining a 

claim to legal damages in an action at law. Moreover, by 

1952, the Supreme Court had established that laches 

cannot be invoked for this purpose, see Wehrman, 155 

U.S. at 326–27, and that § 274(b) does not change substantive principles of law and equity, see Enelow, 293 U.S. 

at 382. In light of the Third Circuit’s flawed analysis, as 

highlighted by Supreme Court decisions, Banker does not 

support a well-established rule in 1952 that laches may 

preclude a claim for legal damages in patent-infringement 

cases, notwithstanding the statutory limitations period. 

Neither do the cases relying on Banker without discussion. See, e.g, Universal Coin Lock Co. v. Am. Sanitary 

Lock Co., 104 F.2d 781, 781 (7th Cir. 1939).

Several other cases cited by the majority involve 

courts of equity barring a plaintiff’s suit due to laches. In 

one of these cases, the precluded relief included damages. 

See George J. Meyer Mfg. Co. v. Miller Mfg. Co., 24 F.2d 

505 (7th Cir. 1928). Others applied laches to bar a request for an “accounting,” which we have said was sometimes—but only sometimes—used to refer to damages. 

See, e.g., Wolf, Sayer & Heller v. U.S. Slicing Mach. Co., 

261 F. 195 (7th Cir. 1919); Hartford-Empire Co. v. Swindell Bros., 96 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1938); Union Shipbuilding Co. v. Boston Iron & Metal Co., 93 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 

1938); France Mfg. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 106 F.2d 605 

(6th Cir. 1939); Gillons v. Shell Co. of Cal., 86 F.2d 600 

(9th Cir. 1936); Window Glass Mach. Co. v. Pittsburgh 

Plate Glass Co., 284 F. 645 (3d Cir. 1922); A.R. Mosler & 

Co. v. Lurie, 209 F. 364 (2d Cir. 1913).

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These cases do not support the conclusion that laches 

was well understood to bar legal damages in 1952. Courts 

of equity had discretion to dismiss a claim on equitable 

grounds such as laches or unclean hands. Because the 

patent statute required courts of equity to award damages 

upon a finding of infringement, see Patent Act of 1870, ch. 

230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (1870), the court’s equitable 

discretion to reject a patent-infringement claim allowed it 

to bar legal damages in that equity court. But a plaintiff 

also had the option to seek damages in a court of law. 

And it was well established that, although a court of 

equity could refuse to grant damages itself, it could not 

enjoin a court of law from doing so. See, e.g., Wehrman, 

155 U.S. at 326–27. Thus, laches could only bar a plaintiff from recovering damages in a particular forum. It was 

not sufficient to deny a remedy altogether. 

That principle necessarily endures after the merger of 

law and equity. See Stainback, 336 U.S. at 383. In the 

post-merger system, therefore, prior case law applying

laches to bar damages in a court of equity does not suddenly extend to all claims for damages. Plaintiffs are still 

entitled to damages that would have been available in a 

court of law, to which laches was no defense. 

The majority’s remaining support is minimal. See, 

e.g., Brennan v. Hawley Prods. Co., 182 F.2d 945, 948–49 

(7th Cir. 1950) (applying laches to bar all relief without 

mention of the statutory limitations period, citing Universal Coin Lock, 781 F.2d at 781, and cases applying laches 

to bar relief in a court of equity). Particularly in light of 

the Supreme Court’s repeated holding that laches cannot 

preclude a claim for legal damages governed by a statutory limitations period, these outliers are not sufficient to

show a clear or well-established common-law rule to the 

contrary. To the extent that Congress codified laches, 

therefore, it was as a defense to equitable relief only, not

as a defense to legal relief otherwise permitted under 

§ 286. 

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C 

The majority’s policy concerns do not alter this conclusion. The majority argues that, because a copyright 

holder must prove a defendant’s access to a work to 

establish infringement, potential defendants are more 

likely to know they are at risk of being sued. See Maj. Op. 

at 35. But innocence is no defense to direct patent infringement, and thus a defendant is less likely to be 

aware of its potential liability for infringement. See id. at 

35–36. The majority argues that a defense of laches is 

therefore more useful to defendants in patentinfringement suits. See id. at 36.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella did not depend on policies specific to copyright law. It turned on the 

conflict between laches and a statutory limitations period, 

and the longstanding principle that laches cannot bar a 

claim for legal relief. See 134 S. Ct. at 1967, 1973–74. 

That innocence is not a defense to direct patent infringement does not make this reasoning any less applicable. 

In any event, the majority’s policy concerns are not 

the only consequences at stake. Patent owners often have 

good reason for delaying suit. As the Seventh Circuit 

observed: 

Frequently the position of the patentee (financial 

and otherwise) prevents the institution of suits. 

The patent litigation is often prolonged and expensive. Moreover from the very nature of the 

thing he cannot be fully cognizant of all infringements that occur throughout the length and 

breadth of this country. . . . Then, also, the validity of his patent and the infringement thereof may 

be, as here, disputed. These defenses present 

mixed questions of fact and law concerning which 

there is necessarily some doubt and uncertainty. 

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George J. Meyer Mfg. Co., 24 F.2d at 507. Resolving these 

competing policy concerns is precisely the type of judgment left for Congress. Congress was well-aware of the 

nature of patent infringement in 1952, and it must be 

presumed that Congress took these concerns into account 

when it established the six-year limitations period for 

bringing a claim for damages. We should not undermine 

Congress’ judgment in 1952 according to our own assessment of the current policy landscape. 

III

The Supreme Court in Petrella reiterated the principle that laches does not apply to claims for legal relief 

governed by a statutory limitations period. The evidence 

of congressional intent and the pre-1952 case law is 

insufficient to justify departing from this principle in 

patent-infringement cases. Following the Supreme 

Court’s longstanding precedent, I read § 286 to express 

Congress’ exclusive judgment on the timeliness of a claim

for damages. Laches is not available as a further defense. 

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent-in-part.

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