Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01283/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01283-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.
Defendant
Carolyn E. Miner
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAROLYN E. MINER,

Plaintiff,

v.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.,

Defendant.

No. 1:16-cv-01283-DAD-JLT

ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING 

MATTER TO THE KERN COUNTY 

SUPERIOR COURT

(Doc. No. 1)

This is an unlawful detainer action brought under California state law by defendant JP 

Morgan Chase Bank N.A. (“Chase”) against plaintiff Carolyn E. Miner. On July 5, 2016, 

defendant removed this case from the Kern County Superior Court to this federal court. (Doc. 

No. 1.)1 Plaintiff Miner asserts that removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because “the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000,” and under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) because this is “a civil 

action on a claim or right arising under the laws of the United States.” (Id. at 3.) 

I. Legal Standard

A district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action 

sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell 

 

1

In a separately filed request, defendant Chase notes that on June 27, 2016, the Kern County 

Superior Court entered a final judgment in favor of Chase, after conducting a trial on April 21, 

2016. (Doc. No. 4 at 2, Ex. B.)

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& Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is 

strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 

599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010); Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 

F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of 

the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1106–07; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 

F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, “the existence of federal jurisdiction depends solely 

on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses to those claims.” ARCO Envtl. 

Remediation, LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction” means that “the court resolves all 

ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042; Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, federal jurisdiction over a removed case “must be rejected 

if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 

F.3d at 1107; Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “If 

at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 

case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th 

Cir. 2001). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “is mandatory, not discretionary.” Bruns v. 

NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997). See also California ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 

375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). Where it appears, as it does here, that the district court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, “the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447(c).

II. Federal Question Jurisdiction

“The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” California v. United States, 

215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 838; Duncan, 76 F.3d at 

1485. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, courts look to what “necessarily appears in the 

plaintiff’s statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything in 

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anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” 

California, 215 F.3d at 1014. Accordingly, “a case may not be removed on the basis of a federal 

defense . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint and both parties concede 

that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 

386, 392 (1987); Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002). See 

also Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 70 (2009) (“It does not suffice to show that a federal 

question lurks somewhere inside the parties’ controversy, or that a defense or counterclaim would 

arise under federal law.”).

Here, plaintiff Miner has not shown that removal of this action to this federal court is 

appropriate. The complaint filed by plaintiff is a straightforward unlawful detainer action that is 

based entirely on state law. Because there is no federal question appearing in Chase’s complaint

in the underlying action, plaintiff Miner has failed to properly invoke this court’s jurisdiction. 

III. Diversity Jurisdiction

Federal courts may exercise “diversity jurisdiction” when the parties are in complete 

diversity, i.e. that citizenship of each plaintiff is different from that of each defendant, and the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1043; Matheson v. Progressive 

Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Absent 

unusual circumstances, a party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction should be able to allege 

affirmatively the actual citizenship of the relevant parties.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 

F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2002). Where it is Anot facially evident from the complaint that more than 

$75,000 is in controversy,@ defendants in the state action are required to prove, Aby a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy [met] the jurisdictional threshold.@ 

Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, plaintiff Miner fails to affirmatively allege both the citizenship of the parties and 

whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been met. Plaintiff’s notice of removal does 

not allege citizenship as to any party, nor does it allege that the parties are in complete diversity. 

Moreover, in the absence of a specified amount in controversy in the state court complaint, 

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plaintiff fails to prove that the amount-in-controversy threshold is met.2 Remand to the Kern

County Superior Court is therefore appropriate and mandatory. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Geographic 

Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107; Bruns, 122 F.3d at 1257.

Accordingly,

1. This action is remanded forthwith to the Kern County Superior Court, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 1, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

2

In her notice of removal, plaintiff references a separate state court case where by she allegedly 

sought to quiet title. (Doc. No. 1 at 4 (referencing case no. BCV-16100809).) However, that case 

cannot form the basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction here.

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