Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00224/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00224-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Claude Finn
Respondent
Bryan Johnson
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRYAN JOHNSON,

Petitioner, No. 2:08-cv-0224-LKK-JFM (HC)

vs.

CLAUDE FINN, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with an application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a 2006 decision of

California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger reversing a decision by the California Board of

Parole Hearings (Board) to grant petitioner a parole date.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 16, 1990, petitioner was sentenced to seventeen years to life in state

prison following his conviction on charges of second degree murder with use of a firearm. Ex. 1

to Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed April 21, 2008. Petitioner shot the victim

during an altercation that followed a drug deal. Ex. 5 to Answer, at 8-13. Petitioner was twentyeight years old at the time of his commitment offense. Id. at 19. 

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On April 19, 2006, petitioner appeared before the Board for a subsequent parole

consideration hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board found petitioner suitable for

parole. The Board’s determination that petitioner “would not pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison” was based on several

findings: (1) petitioner “has no juvenile record of assaults”; (2) in prison petitioner “has

enhanced his ability to function within the law upon release through participating in educational

programs, “achieving his doctorate of divinity, master’s BA through the Universal Life Church”,

a certificate from the American School of Mortgage Banking, participating in AA, completing

“some FEMA courses” as well as a paralegal program and a drafting program; and (3) petitioner

had received “several laudatory chronos,” had been deemed a “critical employee” at a prison job,

had worked at a variety of jobs during a thirty day lockdown at Folsom Prison, and had received

a “glowing letter” in 2005 from a psychologist. Id. at 84-86. With respect to that letter, the

Board noted that they “were particularly impressed by [the psychologist’s] impression of you in

terms of your scholastic ability here, and it’s not only scholastic, it’s – you’re being a good peer,

you’re being a good buddy. You’re doing something positive here and you can carry that to the

outside.” Id. The Board also noted that petitioner did not have “any significant history of violent

crime.” Id. The Board also noted petitioner’s specific employment plans and support from his

family, id. at 88-89, as well as the fact that petitioner had no serious disciplinary violations in the

nearly seventeen years he had been in prison, and his last 128 had been in 1992. Id. at 90. In

addition, the Board found that petitioner had “shown remorse and accepted responsibility” for his

criminal behavior. Id.

On September 5, 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger issued the decision challenged

in the instant action, reversing the Board’s grant of parole. In relevant part, the Governor’s

decision was as follows:

In reviewing the Board’s 2006 decision, I have considered various

positive factors concerning Mr. Johnson’s parole suitability. In

prison, Mr. Johnson maintained a discipline-free conduct record,

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although he was counseled five times, most recently in 1996, for

minor misconduct. He also made efforts to enhance his ability to

function within the law upon release. Mr. Johnson, who entered

prison with a high school diploma, earned a paralegal certificate in

2000 and completed numerous business, banking, and emergency

management courses. He also completed vocational mechanical

drawing and received a master’s degree in religion and a doctorate

in religious philosophy from the Universal Life Church, the church

which ordained Mr. Johnson as a minister in 1995. He worked

institutional jobs such as counselor’s clerk, peer education

instructor, typist, porter, laundry laborer, clerk/runner, tier tender,

office clerk, and Prisoner Advisory Counsel President. In addition,

he availed himself of an array of self-help and therapy, including

Narcotics Anonymous, Alcoholics Anonymous, Substance Abuse

Program, Personal Growth and Life Skills Process, Anger

Management, Breaking Barriers, Cage Your Rage, Prisoner Reentry Program, Domestic Violence Group, Alternative to Violence

Project, and Communicable Disease Risk Reduction. He maintains

supportive relationships with family and friends and he received

some positive evaluations from mental health and correctional

professionals over the years. His plans upon parole include living

with his wife in Los Angeles County, the county of last legal

residence, and working at a construction company.

Despite the positive factors I have considered, the second-degree

murder for which Mr. Johnson was convicted was especially grave,

in part because it was committed during the course of criminal

activity. The Court of Appeal found that “[t]he evidence, direct

and circumstantial, points unwaveringly to defendant’s having

killed a potential drug customer after accusing him of being the

police and immediately after a struggle for the weapon.” Mr.

Johnson told the 2006 Board that after Mr. Knight “snatche[d]” his

money during their cocaine transaction and ran, Mr. Johnson

followed him and they fought. When the fight ended, Mr. Johnson

said he turned to walk away, but when he heard his brother holler

“watch out,” Mr. Johnson thought Mr. Knight was about to shoot

him, so “I grab the gun out of my back pocket and I turn and I

shoot twice.” Mr. Johnson admitted to the 2006 Board, however,

that there was no evidence that Mr. Knight had been armed with a

weapon. Instead, the Court of Appeal opinion noted that Mr.

Knight ran back to Mr. Atwood’s car “amidst a hail of gunfire,”

and that Mr. Atwood drove away “while shots were being fired at

the car.” Thus, this was a senseless crime that resulted in Mr.

Knight’s death and also put Mr. Atwood at risk for serious injury. 

The gravity of the second-degree murder committed by Mr.

Johnson is alone sufficient for me to conclude presently that his

release from prison would pose an unreasonable public safety risk. 

The Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office expressed to the 2006

Board its opposition to Mr. Johnson’s parole, based in part on the

gravity of the murder he committed.

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At age 45 now, after being incarcerated for more than 16 years, Mr.

Johnson says he accepts responsibility for the murder and is

remorseful for his action. But given the record before me and after

carefully considering the very same factors the Board must

consider, I find that the negative factors weighing against Mr.

Johnson’s parole suitability presently outweigh the positive ones

tending to support it. 

Ex. 6 to Answer. 

Petitioner challenged the Governor’s decision in state court through petitions for

writ of habeas corpus filed at every level of the state court system. The last reasoned rejection of

his challenge was the decision of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, which, citing two

California Supreme Court cases, found “ample evidence” to support the Governor’s decision, and

nothing in the decision “which indicates it was arbitrary and capricious. Rather, it complies with

the standard required by law.” Ex. 2 to Answer.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

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Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) (internal citations

omitted). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims that the Governor’s decision violates his federal constitutional

law because the decision was not supported by any evidence, and there was no nexus between the

facts found by the Governor and petitioner’s current dangerousness.

California law creates a liberty interest in parole protected by the due process

clause of the United States Constitution. See Pirtle v. California Board of Prison Terms, F.3d 

, 2010 WL 2732888, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. July 12, 2010) (quoting McQuillion v. Duncan, 306

F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002)). “That liberty interest encompasses the state-created requirement

that a parole decision must be supported by ‘some evidence’ of current dangerousness.” Pirtle,

id. (citing Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 562-63 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc); also citing 

Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606, 608-09 (9th Cir.2010)).

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To assist in determining who may pose an unreasonable risk of

danger, the California parole regulations identify circumstances

that “tend[ ] to indicate unsuitability for release.” Cal.Code Regs.,

tit. 15, § 2402(c). These circumstances include the aggravated

nature of the commitment offense, a previous record of violence,

an unstable social history, sadistic sexual offenses, a history of

severe mental problems related to the offense, and serious

misconduct in jail. Id. The regulations also identify circumstances

that “tend to show suitability” for parole, including the lack of a

juvenile record, a stable social history, signs of remorse, significant

stress as a motivation for the crime, lack of criminal history,

realistic plans for the future, and good institutional behavior. Id. §

2402(d).

Pirtle, slip op. at 4.

Under California law, “the paramount consideration for both the

Board and the Governor” must be “whether the inmate currently

poses a threat to public safety and thus may not be released on

parole,” [In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169, 190

P.3d 535] at 552 [(2008)], and “the facts relied upon by the Board

or the Governor [must] support the ultimate decision that the

inmate remains a threat to public safety.” Id. at 554. Accordingly,

for a reviewing court “the relevant inquiry is whether some

evidence supports the decision of the Board or the Governor that

the inmate constitutes a current threat to public safety.” Id. at 553;

see also Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562 (noting that “ ‘some evidence’

of future dangerousness is indeed a state sine qua non for denial of

parole in California”) (citing Lawrence, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169, 190

P.3d at 549; In re Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 213,

190 P.3d 573, 582 (2008)).

Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2010). “[T]he ultimate question of parole

suitability [is] whether the inmate poses a threat to public safety.” Pirtle, slip op. at 5. There

must be “some evidence” of such a threat, and neither the Board nor the Governor may “rely

solely on the circumstances of a commitment offense, because ‘[t]he prisoner’s aggravated

offense does not establish current dangerousness ‘unless the record also establishes that

something in the prisoner’s pre-or post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and

mental state’ supports the inference of dangerousness.’ [Hayward at 562] (quoting Lawrence, 82

Cal.Rptr.3d 169, 190 P.3d at 555).” Id. 

In the instant case, the Governor relied solely on petitioner’s commitment offense,

which occurred more than sixteen years prior to his decision, to reverse the Board’s finding that

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petitioner is suitable for parole. The Governor cited nothing from petitioner’s pre- or postconviction history to support his conclusion that petitioner’s release from prison “ would pose an

unreasonable public safety risk.” The exhaustive findings made by the Board in their decision,

many of which were cited by the Governor, explain this omission: there was a dearth of evidence

in the record to support a determination that petitioner posed a current danger to the community. 

The Governor’s decision to find petitioner unsuitable for parole was not supported by “some

evidence” of current dangerousness. Consequently, the decision violated petitioner’s right to due

process.

Petitioner is only entitled to relief if the last reasoned state court decision rejecting

his claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or . . . was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The state superior court’s decision was both contrary to

applicable principles of federal law and an unreasonable determination of the facts in the record. 

Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to relief from this court and this court will recommend that the

California Board of Parole Hearings be ordered to set a parole date that will ensure that petitioner

is released on parole within thirty days from the date of any order by the district court adopting

these findings and recommendations. See Pirtle, slip op. at 8. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that 

1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be granted; and 

2. The California Board of Parole Hearings be directed to set a parole date for

petitioner that will ensure his release on parole within thirty days from the date of any order by

the district court adopting these findings and recommendations. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 19, 2010.

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john0224.157

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