Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02006/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rafael Garcia-Espinoza
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

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RP

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Rafael Garcia-Espinoza, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV 10-2006-PHX-DGC (LOA)

No. CR 10-616-PHX-DGC

ORDER

On September 20, 2010, Movant Rafael Garcia-Espinoza, who is confined in the

Federal Correctional Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania, filed a pro se “Motion For Time

Reduction By An Inmate In Federal Custody, (28 U.S.C. § 2255)” ( Doc. 1 in CV 10-2006-

PHX-DGC (LOA)). By Order filed October 12, 2010 (Doc. 4), the Court denied the Motion

because it was not filed on the court-approved form. Movant was given 30 days from the

filing date of the Order to file an amended motion.

On December 13, 2010, an Amended Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 7) was filed. Because the

Amended Motion was signed by “Laura Rios” and not by Movant, the Court, by Order filed

April 5, 2011 (Doc. 9), directed the Clerk of Court to strike the Amended Motion and gave

Movant 30 days from the filing date of the Order to file a second amended motion signed by

either Movant personally or an attorney who is permitted to practice in this District Court.

On April 5, 2011, Movant filed a Second Amended Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 10) that is

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signed by Movant. The Court will summarily dismiss the Second Amended Motion.

I. Procedural History

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pled guilty to Re-Entry of Removed Alien, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), with sentencing enhancement pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(1). On September 8, 2010, the Court sentenced Movant to a 37-month term of

imprisonment, with credit for time served, followed by three years on supervised release.

Movant does not allege any grounds for relief in his Second Amended Motion,

although he asks that the Court grant the following relief:

Time reduction [-] I am a 55 yr. old male with [a] very poor health condition

that is slowly deteriorating. I have a heart condition that I have to take daily

medication for. Along with high blood pressure and cholesterol I also have my

wife at home that is d[i]sable[d] and also suffers from diabetes, high blood

pressure, renal failure and a condition called lupus. I have been a really good

inmate staying out of trouble while []waiting to finish serving my sentence.

I believe I deserve a sentence reduction due to my statement above. * points

and authorities equal rights protection I, VI, VII, and XIV Amendments. A

person should not be discriminated regardless of race, religion, color, origin

or nationality. I know that I will be deported upon completing my sentence

and I will never return to the United States of America. Please review my case

to determin[e] my eligibility for my request.

II. Summary Dismissal

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears

from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving

party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the

United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither a hearing nor a

response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526

(9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982).

In this case, the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted

because Movant has waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.

III. Waiver

Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.” United States

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v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume

waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d

1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and

unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a

§ 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431,

433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). The only

claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v.

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the

right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt,

32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel

erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca,

985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective

assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4

(declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the

voluntariness of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States, 396

F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth

Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily and

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knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to attack,

in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

during sentencing.”).

As part of his plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

Providing the defendant’s sentence is consistent with this

agreement, the defendant waives (1) any and all motions,

defenses, probable cause determinations, and objections that the

defendant could assert to the indictment or information; and (2)

any right to file an appeal, any collateral attack, and any other

writ or motion that challenges the conviction, an order of

restitution or forfeiture, the entry of judgment against the

defendant, or any aspect of the defendant’s sentence, including

the manner in which the sentence is determined, including but

not limited to any appeals under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and motions

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2255. The defendant

acknowledges that if the Court sentenced the defendant

according to the terms of this agreement, this waiver shall result

in the dismissal of any appeal, collateral attack, or other motion

the defendant might file challenging the conviction, order of

restitution or forfeiture, or sentence in this case.

(Doc. 23 in CR 10-616-PHX-DGC). Movant indicated in his plea agreement that he had

discussed the terms with his attorney, agreed to the terms and conditions, and entered into

the plea voluntarily. (Doc. 23 in CR 10-616-PHX-DGC).

None of Movant’s assertions in his Second Amended Motion pertain to the

voluntariness of the waiver. Movant expressly waived issues regarding the imposition of

sentence and expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. The Court accepted his

plea as voluntarily made. Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived the issues

raised in his Second Amended Motion. Thus, the Court will summarily dismiss the Second

Amended Motion. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The Clerk of Court must terminate Doc. 24 in CR 10-616-PHX-DGC.

(2) The Second Amended Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or

Correct Sentence (Doc. 10 in CV 10-2006-PHX-DGC (LOA)) is denied and the civil action

opened in connection with this Motion (CV 10-2006-PHX-DGC (LOA)) is dismissed with

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prejudice. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

(3) Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, in the event

Movant files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because

reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

DATED this 12th day of July, 2011.

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