Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01247/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01247-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Interior
Respondent
Katherine L. Fleming
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Intervenor

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

KATHERINE L. FLEMING,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-1247

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-1221-11-0460-B-2.

______________________ 

Decided: May 9, 2016

______________________ 

 KATHERINE L. FLEMING, Homestead, FL, pro se.

 ROBERT NORWAY, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ALLISON 

KIDD-MILLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., BENJAMIN C.

MIZER. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, PLAGER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

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2 FLEMING v. INTERIOR

PER CURIAM. 

Katherine L. Fleming petitions for review of the Merit 

System Protection Board’s (“Board”) decision denying her 

request for corrective action in an individual right of 

action (“IRA”) appeal. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The National Park Service, a component of the Department of the Interior, employed Fleming as a Museum 

Curator at Everglades National Park. Fleming was 

appointed for a term that began on September 18, 2005 

and was not to exceed October 17, 2006. The term could 

be extended up to four years, subject to completion of a 

one-year trial period. In June 2006, before the end of her 

one-year trial period, Fleming was terminated due to 

unsatisfactory conduct and performance.

A lengthy procedural history eventually followed. In 

an IRA appeal, Fleming alleged that her termination was 

in retaliation for various disclosures that constituted 

protected whistleblowing activity. In one of those disclosures, Fleming informed the eventual deciding official 

that she was improperly exposed to hazardous chemicals 

while performing emergency stabilization of cannons at 

the Dry Tortugas National Park.

An administrative judge (“AJ”) dismissed Fleming’s 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction after determining there was 

no protected disclosure. On review, the Board vacated the 

AJ’s decision because the Dry Tortugas disclosure could 

have been a contributing factor to Fleming’s termination. 

In that relevant disclosure, Fleming had informed the 

eventual deciding official that she was improperly exposed to hazardous chemicals at work.

On remand, the AJ denied Fleming’s request for corrective action. The AJ found that Fleming failed to prove 

that she made a protected disclosure, because her Dry 

Tortugas disclosure revealed information that the decidCase: 16-1247 Document: 24-2 Page: 2 Filed: 05/09/2016
FLEMING v. INTERIOR 3

ing official already knew. The AJ also found that even 

assuming the disclosure was protected and was a contributing factor to Fleming’s termination, the agency proved 

by clear and convincing evidence that it would have 

terminated Fleming in the absence of the disclosure.

On review, the Board determined that Fleming’s 

disclosure was protected even though it revealed information that was already known to the deciding official. 

The Board also determined that the AJ’s analysis of the 

purportedly clear and convincing evidence did not comply 

with the standard described in Whitmore v. Department of 

Labor, 680 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Specifically, the 

Board found that the AJ was required to consider Fleming’s evidence and arguments that her supervisor’s assertions about her performance and conduct were 

unreasonable. The Board found that the AJ also was 

required to consider any other evidence that detracted 

from the agency’s claim that it terminated Fleming based 

only on her performance (and not in retaliation). The 

Board remanded for the AJ to reconsider the record as a 

whole and make thoroughly-reasoned findings addressing 

the evidence supporting his conclusions and the countervailing evidence.

On remand, the AJ denied Fleming’s request for 

corrective action. The AJ found that Fleming made a 

protected disclosure and that this disclosure was a contributing factor to her termination. However, the AJ 

found that the agency demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same termination action in the absence of the disclosure. The AJ made 

this determination on the basis of the three factors listed 

in Carr v. Social Sec. Admn., 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. 

Cir. 1999) ((1) “the strength of the agency’s evidence in 

support of its personnel action”; (2) “the existence and 

strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the 

agency officials who were involved in the decision”; and 

(3) “any evidence that the agency takes similar actions 

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4 FLEMING v. INTERIOR

against employees who are not whistleblowers but who 

are otherwise similarly situated”).

Fleming petitioned for review of the AJ’s decision. On 

review, the Board modified the AJ’s decision because the 

AJ erred by taking an overly restrictive view of the second 

Carr factor. However, the Board otherwise affirmed the 

AJ’s decision. With respect to the first Carr factor, the 

Board determined that the evidence supporting Fleming’s 

termination was “very strong.” With respect to the second 

Carr factor, the Board determined that there may have 

been some motive to retaliate against Fleming. The third

Carr factor was not at issue. As a result, the Board 

weighed the first and second factors, and agreed with the 

AJ that the agency had met its burden of showing by clear 

and convincing evidence that it would have terminated 

Fleming absent her disclosure.

Fleming petitions this court for review. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is “(1) 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been 

followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 

U.S.C. § 7703(c); Hayes v. Dep’t of the Navy, 727 F.2d 

1535, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Substantial evidence is 

“‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. 

Cir. 1984) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 

U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

We review procedural matters relative to discovery 

and evidentiary issues for abuse of discretion; such matters fall within the Board’s sound discretion. Curtin v. 

Office of Personnel Mgmt., 846 F.2d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 

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FLEMING v. INTERIOR 5

1988). Credibility determinations by the Board are “virtually unreviewable.” Hambsch v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 

796 F.2d 430, 436 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

The Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The reasons for Fleming’s removal were supported by evidence from the deciding official, Fleming’s 

supervisor, and two National Park Service archivists. It 

is possible that a fact-finder could review the evidence 

and come to a conclusion that supported Fleming’s characterization of her conduct and performance. However, 

the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions 

from the evidence does not preclude the Board’s finding 

from being supported by substantial evidence. See 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 750 F.2d at 933. Moreover, 

“[t]he standard is not what [we] would decide in a de novo 

appraisal, but whether the administrative determination 

is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 

whole.” Parker v. United States Postal Serv., 819 F.2d 

1113, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In sum, we find no basis for 

disturbing the Board’s decision.

Fleming disagrees. She reviews the evidence, challenges various credibility determinations, and suggests an 

alternative narrative in which (1) she did not exhibit 

performance or conduct problems, (2) she was improperly 

evaluated, and (3) her supervisor—not Fleming—

exhibited problematic behavior.

Again, there may be evidence supporting and militating against Fleming’s assertions, but we “are not in a 

position to re-evaluate these credibility determinations, 

which are not inherently improbable or discredited by 

undisputed fact.” See Pope v. United States Postal Serv., 

114 F.3d 1144, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Indeed, such determinations are “virtually unreviewable” on appeal. See 

Hambsch, 796 F.2d at 436. Although Fleming reviews the 

evidence in detail, we repeat that “[t]he standard is not 

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6 FLEMING v. INTERIOR

er the administrative determination is supported by 

substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Parker, 

819 F.2d at 1115. Contrary to Fleming’s arguments, the 

Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.

Fleming also argues that certain evidence constituted

hearsay and that various witnesses improperly relied on 

hearsay evidence. However, “it has long been settled that 

[hearsay] may be used in administrative proceedings and 

may be treated as substantial evidence, even without 

corroboration, if, to a reasonable mind, the circumstances 

are such as to lend it credence.” Hayes, 727 F.2d at 1538. 

Moreover, “procedural matters such as the admissibility 

of evidence, including hearsay, fall within the sound 

discretion of the Board and its AJs.” Kewley v. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Servs., 153 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 

1998). There has been no error in this regard.

Fleming also has concerns about the absence of certain evidence, such as receipts and purchase orders documenting what chemicals were used during the incident 

that formed the basis of Fleming’s protected disclosure. 

Fleming observes that “the Federal Circuit has held that 

even merely negligent destruction of relevant evidence 

merits adverse inferences, and the Board’s failure to 

impose them is an abuse of discretion.” Pet. Br. at 30 

(citing Kirkendall v. Dep’t of the Army, 573 F.3d 1318, 

1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). She suggests that the “absence of 

these documents should be of great concern since we can 

only speculate about what other documents might have 

been withheld or missing.” Pet. Br. at 30.

We decline to engage in such speculation. In Kirkendall, we found that the Board abused its discretion because it had departed from its longstanding practice of 

drawing such inferences, if the relevance of the destroyed 

documents was “beyond doubt.” See Kirkendall, 573 F.3d 

at 1327. In this instance, it is not clear that any documents were destroyed. Moreover, to prevail, Fleming 

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FLEMING v. INTERIOR 7

must prove that the error caused substantial harm or 

prejudice to her rights that could have affected the outcome of the case. See Curtin, 846 F.2d at 1379. Fleming 

has not met this burden, and there was no abuse of discretion in the Board’s handling of procedural matters 

concerning discovery. See id. at 1378.

We have considered Fleming’s other arguments and 

find them unpersuasive. The Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law, or obtained without procedures 

required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s decision. 

AFFIRMED

No costs.

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