Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-17-01068/USCOURTS-ca13-17-01068-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Homeland Security
Respondent
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Marsha L. Payton
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MARSHA L. PAYTON,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2017-1068

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-0353-16-0369-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: March 10, 2017

______________________ 

MARSHA L. PAYTON, Holly Hill, FL, pro se. 

STEPHEN FUNG, Office of the General Counsel, Merit

Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, O’MALLEY, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Case: 17-1068 Document: 39-2 Page: 1 Filed: 03/10/2017
2 PAYTON v. MSPB

“If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again.” Although 

this popular proverb may apply to many things in life, the 

legal doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel 

restrict its application to legal claims. Marsha L. Payton 

yet again appeals a final order of the Merit Systems 

Protection Board (“the Board”) relating to her removal 

from the position of Management Program Specialist with 

the United States Customs and Border Protection, a 

component of the Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”), in 2004. This is now her twelfth appeal to this 

court regarding her removal. See Payton v. Merit Sys. 

Prot. Bd. (Payton XI), 526 F. App’x 957 (Fed. Cir. 2013)

(citing Payton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 513 F. App’x 963 

(Fed. Cir. 2013) (describing Payton’s prior petitions for 

review)). In this appeal, Payton again alleges that DHS

erroneously failed to restore her to duty following a compensable injury. See Payton v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.

(Final Order), 124 M.S.P.R. 38 (M.S.P.B. 2016). This is 

the third time Payton has made this particular allegation 

in this court. See Payton XI, 526 F. App’x 957; Payton v. 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Payton 2010), 403 F. App’x 496 

(Fed. Cir. 2010). Because the Board did not abuse its 

discretion in applying collateral estoppel for the second 

time to this claim, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Payton’s employment history and her challenges to 

her removal have been well documented in previous 

opinions. See, e.g., Payton v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 300 

F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Payton 2010, 403 F. App’x 

496; Payton v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 502 F. App’x 942 

(Fed. Cir. 2013); Payton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 513 F. 

App’x 963 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Payton XI, 526 F. App’x 957. 

We rely on our previous opinions for the general background of Payton’s removal and provide here only the 

facts relevant to our immediate decision.

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PAYTON v. MSPB 3

DHS removed Payton from duty in 2004 based on five 

charges of misconduct: (1) absence without leave, 

(2) failure to follow instructions, (3) insubordination, 

(4) unprofessional conduct, and reckless disregard for the 

safety of others. Payton 2010, 403 F. App’x at 496–97. 

The Board affirmed Payton’s removal. Id. at 497. Payton 

filed a petition for review in this court, but the Clerk’s 

office returned it as untimely filed. Payton v. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., 300 F. App’x at 891.

Prior to her removal, Payton suffered an employmentrelated injury in 2003. Payton 2010, 403 F. App’x at 497. 

The Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs accepted 

Payton’s claim for compensation for the injury. Id. In 

2009, Payton filed a new appeal with the Board challenging DHS’s decision not to restore her to duty after a 

medical examination cleared her to return to work. Id. 

The Administrative Judge (“AJ”) dismissed her appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction because DHS had removed Payton for 

cause rather than her compensable injury, and the Board 

affirmed the AJ’s decision. Id. We affirmed that decision 

on appeal because DHS removed Payton based on charges 

unrelated to her compensable injury. Id. at 497–98.

In 2011, Payton again challenged DHS’s denial of her 

request to restore her to duty. Payton XI, 526 F. App’x at 

958. The AJ found Payton’s challenge barred by res 

judicata and collateral estoppel, and the Board affirmed 

on collateral estoppel grounds. Id. at 957–58. We concluded that collateral estoppel barred Payton’s challenge 

and affirmed the Board’s decision. Id. at 959–60.

On February 12, 2016, Payton again appealed to the 

Board challenging DHS’s failure to restore her to duty. 

Payton v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Initial Decision), 2016 

MSPB LEXIS 2375, at *1 (M.S.P.B. Apr. 20, 2016). The 

AJ acknowledged Payton’s two previous appeals addressing this same issue and issued an Order to Show Cause

(“Order”) explaining the collateral estoppel doctrine and 

Case: 17-1068 Document: 39-2 Page: 3 Filed: 03/10/2017
4 PAYTON v. MSPB

asking Payton to demonstrate why the appeal should not 

be dismissed based on collateral estoppel and lack of 

jurisdiction. Id. at *4–6. The AJ considered Payton’s 

submissions in response to the Order and found that

collateral estoppel applied to the jurisdictional issue. Id.

at *9–10. The Board affirmed the AJ’s ruling on collateral 

estoppel. Final Order, 124 M.S.P.B. at 38.

Payton appealed the Board’s decision to this court. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

The Board may apply collateral estoppel to an issue if 

the following four factors are satisfied: (1) the issue in the 

current case is identical to the issue adjudicated in the 

prior case; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior 

case; (3) the determination of the issue in the prior case 

was necessary to the judgment; and (4) the party against 

whom collateral estoppel is asserted was fully represented 

in the prior case. Morgan v. Dep’t of Energy, 424 F.3d 

1271, 1274–75 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Board correctly 

applied collateral estoppel to Payton’s current challenge. 

As we concluded in Payton XI, the decision and proceedings in Payton 2010 satisfy each of these factors. Payton 

XI, 526 F. App’x at 960. The issue—whether Payton 

established the Board’s jurisdiction over her claim—is 

identical to the issue presented in Payton 2010. Id. The 

issue was actually litigated, it was necessary to the judgment, and Payton was a party to the appeal. Id. Because 

the Board correctly determined that collateral estoppel 

applies in this case, the Board did not abuse its discretion

when it dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Payton sets forth various arguments in her appeal 

that appear to address claims of discrimination and the 

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PAYTON v. MSPB 5

merits of her removal.1 Even setting aside the applicability of res judicata and collateral estoppel, Payton has 

waived the arguments in this case because she did not 

raise them until her appeal to this court. See Kachanis v. 

Dep’t of the Treasury, 212 F.3d 1289, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 

(explaining that a party appealing a decision of the Board 

cannot raise new issues on appeal); Bosley v. Merit Sys. 

Prot. Bd., 162 F.3d 665, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining 

that the court will not consider issues a party fails to raise 

before the AJ).

CONCLUSION

We have considered Payton’s remaining arguments, 

and we conclude they are meritless. For the foregoing 

reasons, we affirm the Board’s Final Order. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

 

1 In a supplemental letter to the court, Payton moves to 

charge the MSPB with slander and discrimination. 

Because we do not consider such motions in the first 

instance, we dismiss the motion.

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