Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03743/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03743-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bryce Ulysses Larue
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3743

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Bryce Ulysses Larue, * 

* [UNPUBLISHED] 

Appellant. *

__________

Submitted: April 13, 2010

Filed: May 19, 2010

___________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

___________

PER CURIAM.

Bryce Ulysses Larue pled guilty to (1) conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or

more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and 846; and

(2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c). During Larue’s sentencing hearing, the district court1

 found Larue

had obstructed justice and increased Larue’s base offense level by two levels, pursuant

to United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) § 3C1.1. The district

court then found, based upon Larue’s total offense level of 26 and criminal history

Appellate Case: 09-3743 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/19/2010 Entry ID: 3666052
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category of I, that Larue’s advisory Guidelines range for the conspiracy offense was

63 to 78 months of imprisonment, with a mandatory 60 month consecutive sentence

for the firearms offense. The district court sentenced Larue to 70 months

imprisonment, to run consecutively to the mandatory 60 month sentence, followed by

four years of supervised release. Larue appeals his sentence, claiming (1) the district

court erred in imposing a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, and (2) the

70 month sentence is unreasonable. 

We review the district court’s factual finding that Larue’s conduct amounted

to obstruction of justice for clear error. See United States v. Boesen, 541 F.3d 838,

851 (8th Cir. 2008). We review the district court’s construction of the advisory

Guidelines de novo. See id. “U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 requires the district court to impose

a two-level sentence enhancement when it determines that a defendant has obstructed

justice.” Id. Examples of conduct which would support a finding of obstruction of

justice include “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a codefendant, witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.” U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(a). The district court based its finding that Larue obstructed justice

upon evidence in the record that Larue made a telephone call to one of his customers,

Joe Lobdell, and stated, “anyone who had anything to do with me should get out of

town.” Larue named two specific individuals whom Lobdell should tell needed to

leave town, and then stated, “anyone who’s [F-ing] with me needs to get out of town.”

Larue does not deny he made these statements, but claims they were not necessarily

threats, but were mere warnings to others to avoid arrest. We find the district court

did not clearly err in rejecting Larue’s disingenuous interpretation, see United States

v. Byas, 581 F.3d 723, 725 (8th Cir. 2009) (“A district court’s ‘choice between two

permissible views of the evidence is not clearly erroneous.’” (quoting United States

v. Garcia, 512 F.3d 1004, 1006 (8th Cir. 2008))), nor in finding Larue obstructed

justice. 

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Larue also argues that his 70 month sentence for conspiracy to distribute

cocaine is substantively unreasonable and greater than necessary to accomplish the

sentencing objectives set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “‘We review a challenge to the

reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.’” United States v. Price, 542

F.3d 617, 622 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Starr, 533 F.3d 985, 1003 (8th

Cir. 2008)). Because Larue’s sentence was within his advisory Guidelines range, we

accord it a presumption of reasonableness. See id. The only argument Larue presents

to rebut this presumption is “his lack of criminal history and his physical disability

relating to his back . . . could have formed the basis for a downward variance.”

During Larue’s sentencing hearing, the district court considered Larue’s “relatively

old” criminal history, and Larue’s health condition. The district court found these

factors were not sufficiently compelling to warrant a downward variance. The district

court emphasized the seriousness of the offenses—Larue was responsible for nearly

two kilos of cocaine, and as many as thirteen firearms were recovered in the course

of the investigation. The court also recognized the need for deterrence, and avoiding

unwarranted sentencing disparities “among defendants with similar records who have

been found guilty of similar conduct.” After considering all of the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors, the district court concluded “a sentence at the middle of the

[Guidelines] range is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to address the essential

sentencing considerations.” The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining

to grant Larue a downward variance. See, e.g., United States v. Statman, ___ F.3d

___, ___, Nos. 09-1452, 09-1767, 2010 WL 1753347, at *3 (8th Cir. May 4, 2010)

(finding the sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court

adequately considered defendant’s poor health and all of the § 3553(a) factors). 

We affirm the district court’s sentence. 

______________________________

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