Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02218/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02218-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Army
Respondent
Curtis Kibler
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CURTIS KIBLER,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-2218

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-0752-15-0915-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: October 6, 2016 

______________________ 

CURTIS KIBLER, Stafford, VA, pro se. 

KATRINA LEDERER, Office of the General Counsel, 

Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for

respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, O’MALLEY, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

Case: 16-2218 Document: 18-2 Page: 1 Filed: 10/06/2016
2 KIBLER v. MSPB

PER CURIAM. 

Curtis Kibler petitions for review of a final order of 

the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissing Kibler’s 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Kibler was employed as a Human Resources Specialist with the Department of the Army from May 5, 2014, 

until his resignation on May 11, 2015. He subsequently 

appealed to the Board, contending that his resignation 

was involuntary and generally alleging that he had been 

forced to resign due to a hostile work environment and 

because of “discrimination,” “retaliation,” and “disparate 

treatment.” J.A. 7. 

In particular, Kibler alleged that during his employment, the agency improperly handled his leave requests

by requiring him to request leave by email instead of text 

message, denied him annual leave and leave without pay

(LWOP), and forced him to take one day of administrative 

leave. He further alleged that he was not provided with 

performance standards until after he filed a successful 

grievance, and that a performance appraisal rating him 

as “Needs Improvement” on May 8, 2015, was erroneous. 

Finally, he alleged that his supervisor unilaterally canceled two of his client meetings, instructed him to take 

actions that he did not agree with, and assigned him work 

that was not properly his responsibility.

The administrative judge dismissed Kibler’s appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction after concluding that Kibler’s 

resignation was not involuntary. Kibler petitioned the 

Board for review, but the Board denied his petition in a 

final order and affirmed the administrative judge’s determination of no jurisdiction. Kibler then petitioned this 

court for review. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9).

Case: 16-2218 Document: 18-2 Page: 2 Filed: 10/06/2016
KIBLER v. MSPB 3

DISCUSSION

Although the Board has jurisdiction to review an employee’s removal under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701 and 7512, its

jurisdiction does not extend to an employee’s resignation, 

unless the resignation was involuntary and, therefore, 

tantamount to a constructive removal. See Garcia v. Dep’t 

of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 

(en banc). The employee bears the burden of proving 

involuntariness by a preponderance of the evidence and 

must, as a threshold matter, assert non-frivolous allegations that, if proven, would establish the Board’s jurisdiction. See id. at 1344; see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). 

We review the Board’s jurisdictional determinations de 

novo, but are bound by its factual determinations if supported by substantial evidence. See Bolton v. Merit Sys. 

Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

The dispositive question in this petition is whether 

Kibler’s allegations, taken as true, were sufficient to 

demonstrate that his resignation was involuntary. We 

examine involuntariness using an objective standard that 

asks “whether working conditions were made so intolerable by the agency that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign.” Shoaf v. 

Dep’t of Agric., 260 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The 

employee must show that: “(1) the agency effectively 

imposed the terms of . . . resignation . . . ; (2) the employee 

had no realistic alternative but to resign . . . ; and (3) the 

employee’s resignation . . . was the result of improper acts 

by the agency.” Id. (citing Fruhauf Sw. Garment Co. v. 

United States, 111 F. Supp. 945, 951 (Ct. Cl. 1953)). 

Kibler argues that he “provided . . . clear and convincing evidence[] in support of the unbearable working 

conditions the agency effectively imposed” on him, and 

that his allegations were non-frivolous. The Board examined each of Kibler’s allegations and found that, even if 

Case: 16-2218 Document: 18-2 Page: 3 Filed: 10/06/2016
4 KIBLER v. MSPB

proven, they would not have established a work environment so hostile that a reasonable person in Kibler’s 

position would have been forced to resign. 

We agree with the Board. With respect to Kibler’s allegations concerning LWOP, for instance, Kibler concedes 

that LWOP is granted entirely at the agency’s discretion. 

The denial of Kibler’s request for LWOP was therefore not 

improper, much less an act that would have compelled a 

reasonable person to resign. Similarly, although Kibler 

was dissatisfied with the agency’s failure to provide him 

with timely performance standards, his dissatisfaction 

was open to a grievance procedure—which in fact Kibler 

successfully pursued.1 The Board also correctly determined that Kibler’s conclusory allegations of “retaliation,” 

“discrimination,” and “disparate treatment” were insufficient to satisfy the standard for involuntariness. J.A. 7. 

Thus, we agree that Kibler failed to assert a non-frivolous 

allegation that the agency made working conditions so 

difficult that a reasonable person would have felt compelled the resign. As such, the Board correctly determined 

that it had no jurisdiction over this case.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No Costs.

 

1 Kibler also argues that he lacked an alternative to 

resignation because the agency denied his within-grade 

increase. But as he concedes, the agency did not do so

until after he tendered his resignation, and the question 

of whether a resignation was involuntary is assessed at 

the time it was submitted. Cruz v. Dep’t of Navy, 934 F.2d 

1240, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (en banc). 

Case: 16-2218 Document: 18-2 Page: 4 Filed: 10/06/2016