Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01987/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01987-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Veterans Affairs
Respondent
Tonya Knowles
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TONYA KNOWLES,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________ 

2019-1987

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-1221-19-0047-W-1.

______________________ 

Decided: January 10, 2020

______________________ 

TONYA KNOWLES, Largo, FL, pro se. 

 KELLY A. KRYSTYNIAK, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by JOSEPH H.

HUNT, REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR., ROBERT EDWARD 

KIRSCHMAN, JR. 

 ______________________ 

Before DYK, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

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2 KNOWLES v. DVA

PER CURIAM. 

Pro se appellant Tonya Knowles appeals from a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) denying Ms. Knowles’s request for corrective action under the 

Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Ms. Knowles is currently employed by the Bay Pines 

Veterans Affairs Health Care System, a veterans’ hospital 

operated by the Department of Veterans Affairs (agency)

in Bay Pines, Florida. From 2016 to 2018, Ms. Knowles 

was subject to several personnel actions she believes were 

in retaliation for her protected disclosure in violation of the 

WPA. In 2017, Ms. Knowles filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) alleging that Bay Pines employees were not properly storing patients’ medical records 

and that she had been detailed, suspended, discriminated 

against, experienced a hostile work environment and received a proposed removal as reprisal for the allegation regarding the improper storage of medical records. Each 

personnel action is discussed below. 

On December 30, 2016, the agency proposed to suspend 

Ms. Knowles from duty and pay for ten days based on three 

charges: (1) failure to safeguard confidential information, 

(2) negligence causing waste and delay, and (3) disruptive 

behavior. After Ms. Knowles gave oral and written replies, 

the agency’s deciding official issued a final decision on 

March 10, 2017 sustaining the charges and mitigating the 

proposed ten-day suspension to seven days. 

On January 10, 2017, the agency issued a memorandum stating that Ms. Knowles left protected health information and personally identifiable information concerning 

several patients unattended and unsecured on her desk. 

On February 7, 2017, the agency issued another memorandum finding that Ms. Knowles committed a privacy violation by leaving a pre-complaint form with her own name, 

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KNOWLES v. DVA 3

address, and social security number face-up in a tray by 

her work station. 

On March 26, 2018, the agency again proposed to suspend Ms. Knowles from duty and pay, this time for fourteen 

days based on two charges: (1) failure to follow instructions 

and (2) disruptive behavior. After Ms. Knowles gave oral 

and written replies, the agency’s deciding official issued a 

final decision on April 20, 2018, sustaining the charges and 

the proposed fourteen-day suspension. 

On June 29, 2018, the agency proposed to remove Ms. 

Knowles from federal employment based on two charges: 

(1) failure to cooperate and (2) failure to safeguard confidential information. To date, the agency has not reached a 

decision regarding Ms. Knowles’s proposed removal. 

The OSC closed its inquiry as to whether the agency 

was improperly storing patients records on September 29, 

2017 and determined that the agency had begun safeguarding documents in compliance with agency regulations. The OSC closed its inquiry into Ms. Knowles’s claim 

of whistleblower retaliation on October 18, 2018. Ms. 

Knowles then filed an individual right of action with the 

Board on October 19, 2018, alleging that the agency’s personnel actions against her violated the WPA because they 

were in retaliation for making a protected disclosure. 

Based on the testimony and evidence presented, the administrative judge found that Ms. Knowles had made at 

least one protected disclosure and had established that her 

disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s personnel actions. But the administrative judge also found that 

the agency would have taken the same disciplinary actions 

notwithstanding Ms. Knowles’s disclosure and therefore

that corrective action was not warranted. The administrative judge’s initial decision became the final decision of the 

Board. Ms. Knowles timely appealed to this court. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

DISCUSSION

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Our standard of review is limited and requires this 

court to affirm a decision of the Board unless it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with the law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 

5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence” that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Ingram v. Dep’t of the Army, 623 

Fed. Appx. 1000, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

The WPA prohibits an agency from taking a personnel 

action because of any whistleblowing “disclosure” or activity. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)–(9). An employee who believes 

he has been subjected to illegal retaliation must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he made a protected 

disclosure that contributed to the agency’s action against 

him. See Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1367 

(Fed. Cir. 2012). “If the employee establishes this prima 

facie case of reprisal for whistleblowing, the burden of persuasion shifts to the agency to show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken ‘the same personnel 

action in the absence of such disclosure.’” Id. at 1364 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)). If the agency does not show by clear 

and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same 

action absent the whistleblowing, the agency’s personnel 

action must be set aside. See Siler v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 

908 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

In Ms. Knowles’s case, the government does not dispute that agency officials issued personnel actions against 

her. The parties likewise agree that Ms. Knowles made 

protected disclosures. The question here is whether the 

Board properly found that the agency established “by clear 

and convincing evidence,” that for each of the personnel actions taken between 2016 and 2018, “it would have taken 

the same personnel action in the absence of [a protected] 

disclosure.” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2). This Court has outlined 

factors to consider to answer that question. Carr v. Soc. 

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Sec. Amin.,185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Under 

Carr, the Board considers (1) “the strength of the agency’s 

evidence in support of its personnel action;” (2) “the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of 

the agency officials who were involved in the decision;” and 

(3) “any evidence that the agency takes similar actions 

against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are 

otherwise similarly situated.” Id. Here, substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings with respect to the 

Carr factors and its ultimate determination that the 

agency would have implemented the personnel actions it 

did, or proposed to, even if Ms. Knowles had not made a 

protected disclosure. 

A. MARCH 2017: SEVEN DAY SUSPENSION

In December 2016, the agency proposed a ten-day suspension, which was mitigated to a seven-day suspension in 

March 2017. The charges against Ms. Knowles included: 

(1) failure to safeguard confidential information, (2) negligence causing waste and delay, and (3) disruptive behavior. 

Charge one was supported by four specifications, all of 

which detailed instances in which Ms. Knowles mishandled or lost confidential information. Charge two was supported by three specifications all of which relate to the free 

credit monitoring services the agency had to provide to veterans due to Ms. Knowles’s mishandling of confidential information. Charge three was supported by three 

specifications, all of which discussed Ms. Knowles’s disruptive behavior during work, including Ms. Knowles’s language and actions in front of veterans. 

With respect to the first Carr factor, substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings that the agency met its 

burden of proving charges one and two. J.A. 11–12. For 

charge one, the record contained a handwritten note from 

a veteran stating that while he was sitting with Ms. 

Knowles and she was looking for his patient information, 

another veteran returned it to him. J.A. 11. Additionally, 

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6 KNOWLES v. DVA

this mishandling of information was also documented in a 

memorandum from 2016. Id. For charge two, the Board

noted that Ms. Knowles did not deny that her actions required the agency to bear the expense of credit monitoring 

for veterans whose confidential information she had misplaced. J.A. 12. The Board declined to consider charge 

three, because the agency provided little supporting testimony and evidence. Id. The Board reasonably found the 

evidence in supporting charges one and two sufficient to 

sustain those charges and justify the imposed seven-day 

suspension. Id. 

With respect to the second Carr factor, the Board 

properly found no retaliatory motive by the three agency 

officials involved in recommending, proposing, and deciding Ms. Knowles’s suspension. J.A. 12–14. Ms. Knowles 

argues that for all three agency officials her “criticisms reflected on both of their capacities as management officials 

and employees, which is sufficient to establish a substantial retaliatory motive.” The Board is in the best position 

to assess the credibility of witnesses. Haebe v. DOJ, 288 

F.3d 1288, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We find that the Board

appropriately made credibility determinations as to each 

testifying official and its “find[ing of] no evidence in the record” for retaliatory motivation for these officials supported 

by substantial evidence. J.A. 13, 14.

With respect to the third Carr factor, the Board found 

“neither party presented meaningful evidence regarding 

the extent to which the agency may take similar actions 

against employees who did not engage in protected activity 

but who are otherwise similarly situated to the appellant.” 

J.A. 14. Thus, the Board concluded that “there is no relevant comparator evidence.” Id. Ms. Knowles argues that 

the agency did not take similar actions against a different 

whistleblower employee, Dr. Roula Baroudi, who was accused of photographing patient records. Dr. Baroudi, however, was not a similarly situated non-whistleblower, but 

rather an allegedly similarly situated whistleblower. 

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KNOWLES v. DVA 7

Therefore, the Board appropriately did not consider this information. Siler v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 908 F.3d 1291, 1299 

(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Though the agency’s treatment of other 

whistleblowers may illuminate any motive to retaliate under Carr factor 2, it does not show the agency’s treatment 

of non-whistleblower employees accused of similar conduct, 

the precise inquiry considered under Carr factor 3.”). 

Based on the record, substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s decision that the agency properly established by 

clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the 

same personnel action even absent Ms. Knowles’s protected disclosure. 

B. 2017 SECURITY VIOLATIONS

In 2017, Ms. Knowles was informed that she had violated agency rules related to safeguarding printed and electronic individually identifiable privacy-protected 

information. The agency issued two memorandums, the 

first from the Information Security Officer (ISO) and the 

second from the Assistant Chief of Health Information 

Management (ACHIM). 

As to the first Carr factor, the Board found strong evidence supporting the violations, and substantial evidence 

supports its finding. J.A. 15, 17. The first memorandum 

from the agency’s ISO on January 10, 2017, detailed that 

Ms. Knowles had left patient records unattended or unsecured on her desk. J.A. 14–15. The Board found that Ms. 

Knowles did not deny leaving the information unattended 

and unsecured on her desk. J.A. 15. The second memorandum from February 7, 2017 indicated Ms. Knowles left a 

pre-complaint form with Ms. Knowles’s full name, address, 

and social security number face-up in the top tray at a work 

station. J.A. 16. Again, Ms. Knowles did not deny the allegation. J.A. 17. 

As to the second Carr factor, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that no evidence existed on the 

part of the two agency officials to retaliate against Ms. 

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8 KNOWLES v. DVA

Knowles. The ISO was unaware of Ms. Knowles’s protected 

disclosure when it issued the January 2017 memorandum. 

J.A. 15. Nor was there any evidence in the record as to

whether the ACHIM, the author of the second memorandum, knew about Ms. Knowles’s protected disclosure. J.A. 

17. 

Neither Ms. Knowles nor the government presented evidence as to a similarly situated non-whistleblower. Therefore, the Board was free to find the personnel action lawful 

under Carr factors one and two. Sutton v. Dep’t of Justice, 

94 M.S.P.R 4, 12–13 (2003) (finding that whistleblower was 

lawfully removed based on the evidence under Carr factors 

one and two, where the record contained no evidence of action taken against similarly situated non-whistleblowers); 

see also McCarthy v. Int’l Boundary & Water Comm.: U.S. 

& Mexico, 116 M.S.P.R. 594, 626 (2011) (concluding that 

“the third Carr factor is not a significant factor for the 

Board’s analysis in the instant appeal” in the absence of 

evidence showing that the agency took similar actions 

against similarly situated non-whistleblowers).1 Thus, the 

Board did not err in holding that the agency properly established by clear and convincing evidence that it would 

have taken the same personnel action even absent Ms. 

Knowles’s protected disclosure. 

C. MARCH 2018: FOURTEEN DAY SUSPENSION

In March 2018, the agency proposed to suspend Ms. 

Knowles for fourteen days without pay based on two 

charges, “failure to follow instructions” and “disruptive behavior.” With respect to the first Carr factor, substantial 

evidence supports the Board’s finding that the record evidence supports the validity of the charges. J.A. 19. The 

 

1 To the extent that Ms. Knowles is presenting the 

same evidence with respect to Dr. Baroudi, see the explanation in part A, supra. 

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KNOWLES v. DVA 9

record evidence contained the March 26, 2018 suspension 

proposal with handwritten notes by Ms. Knowles. Id. 

None of Ms. Knowles’s notes denied the allegations, nor did 

Ms. Knowles offer testimony about the underlying conduct, 

as to either charge. Id. Moreover, as to the disruptive behavior charge, the record contained the email sent by Ms. 

Knowles to Ms. Royer, accusing Ms. Royer of altering an 

email originally drafted by Ms. Knowles. J.A. 18. Additionally, the Board properly credited Ms. Royer’s testimony 

that she feared Ms. Knowles would damage her career and 

she therefore raised the allegation with her supervisor. 

J.A. 21. 

As to the second Carr factor, the Board reasonably 

found no evidence that the proposing official or the deciding

official suffered negative consequences as a result of Ms. 

Knowles’s protected disclosure nor other evidence suggesting the disclosure motivated their decisions. J.A. 21–22. 

Ms. Knowles argues that the proposing officer was placed 

on a “Performance Improvement Plan” (Plan) that “focused 

on areas that the Business Office Service Leadership Team 

was underperforming in.” To the extent Ms. Knowles argues that participation in the Plan was a negative consequence of her disclosures, there is no evidence in the record 

supporting this claim. And, as explained above, we find 

that the Board made appropriate credibility determinations in finding no evidence of a retaliatory motive. 

With respect to the third Carr factor, we agree with the 

Board that neither Ms. Knowles nor the government presented evidence as to a similarly situated non-whistleblower and therefore the Board appropriately only 

considered Carr factors one and two.2 Thus, the Board did 

not err in holding that the agency properly established by 

 

2 To the extent that Ms. Knowles is presenting the 

same evidence with respect to Dr. Baroudi, see the explanation in part A, supra. 

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10 KNOWLES v. DVA

clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the 

same personnel action even absent Ms. Knowles’s protected disclosure. 

D. JUNE 2018: PROPOSED REMOVAL

In June 2018, the agency proposed to remove Ms. 

Knowles from federal employment based on two charges. 

The first charge was “failure to cooperate” and was supported by two specifications which both relate to Ms. 

Knowles’s failure to address questions and issues from the 

agency’s Privacy Office. The second charge was “failure to 

safeguard confidential information.” The second charge 

was supported by eleven specifications alleging that Ms. 

Knowles sent confidential veteran information to her personal email address. 

With respect to the first Carr factor, the Board’s findings of strong evidence to support both charges are amply 

supported by the evidence. The record contains a copy of 

the Privacy Office’s confirmation memorandum, listing all 

of the steps Ms. Knowles should take with respect to the 

confidential information she sent to her personal email address, which Ms. Knowles did not sign. J.A. 127. The record in front of the Board also contained copies of several 

email messages containing the confidential information

Ms. Knowles sent to her personal email account. J.A. 27. 

Ms. Knowles did not deny the facts alleged in the specifications. Id.

As to the second Carr factor, the Board found no evidence in the record that the officer proposing the removal 

suffered negative consequences as a result of Ms. Knowles’s

disclosure nor any other evidence suggesting that such a 

disclosure motivated her to issue the notice of removal. 

J.A. 27–28. For the reasons provided earlier, we find that 

the Board made appropriate credibility determinations and 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. Because Ms. Knowles’s arguments and the Board’s finding as 

to the third Carr factor are no different than what was

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KNOWLES v. DVA 11

presented for the other personnel actions discussed above, 

we affirm the Board’s findings here as well.

We have considered Ms. Knowles’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is 

affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No Costs.

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