Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50373/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50373-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Francisco Jimenez-Arzate
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FRANCISCO JIMENEZ-ARZATE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50373

D.C. No.

3:12-cr-01421-LAB-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 19, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed January 12, 2015

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld and Kim McLane Wardlaw,

Circuit Judges, and Matthew F. Kennelly, District Judge.*

Per Curiam Opinion

* The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a sentence for illegal reentry into the

United States after deportation in a case in which the district

court found that the defendant’s prior conviction for violation

of Calif. Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of

violence for federal sentencing purposes. 

The panel rejected the defendant’s contentions (1) that

United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009)

(holding that a conviction under § 245(a)(1) is categorically

a crime of violence), is no longer good law in light of People

v. Aznavoleh, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901 (Ct. App. 2012), and

People v. Wyatt, 229 P.3d 156 (Cal. 2010); and (2) that Ceron

v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), abrogates

Grajeda. 

The panel held that there was justification for the district

court’s exercise of discretion in imposing supervised release. 

COUNSEL

Vincent J. Brunkow (argued), Kara Lee Hartzler, Federal

Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE 3

Mark R. Rehe (argued), Andrew R. Haden, United States

Attorney’s Office, San Diego, California, for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Francisco Jimenez-Arzate pleaded guilty to having

illegally re-entered the United States after having previously

been deported. The district court sentenced him to 34 months

in prison and three years of supervised release. He timely

appeals his sentence.

Jimenez-Arzate argues that the district court erred in

finding that his prior conviction for violation of California

Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence

for federal sentencing purposes. He contends that United

States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009), is no longer

good law in light of People v. Aznavoleh, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d

901 (Ct. App. 2012), and People v. Wyatt, 229 P.3d 156 (Cal.

2010). Jimenez-Arzate also argues that Ceron v. Holder,

747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), abrogates Grajeda.

We disagree. Aznavoleh involved a defendant who

intentionally ran a red light while racing another car down the

street even though he saw a car entering the intersection on

the green. People v. Aznavoleh, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 905,

908 (Ct. App. 2012). The defendant made no effort to stop

despite a passenger warning him that he needed to stop. Id.

at 904. The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial

court’s finding that the defendant met the willfulness element

of assault under California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), which the

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4 UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE

California Court of Appeal defined as intentionality. Id. at

906.

Wyatt involved a father who, while play wrestling with

his infant son, struck the boy with such force that he killed

him. People v. Wyatt, 229 P.3d 156, 157 (Cal. 2010). The

Wyatt court upheld the father’s conviction for involuntary

manslaughter and assault on a child causing death because

“substantial evidence established that defendant knew he was

striking his young son with his fist, forearm, knee, and elbow,

and that he used an amount of force a reasonable person

would realize was likely to result in great bodily injury.” Id.

As did the California Court of Appeal in Aznavoleh, the

California Supreme Court in Wyatt explained that “a

defendant guilty of assault must be aware of the facts that

would lead a reasonable person to realize that a battery would

directly, naturally and probably result from his conduct. He

may not be convicted based on facts he did not know but

should have known.” Id. at 159 (quoting People v. Williams,

29 P.3d 197, 203 (Cal. 2001)).

Contrary to Jimenez-Arzate’s argument, Aznavoleh did

not hold that an automobile accident stemming from merely

reckless driving may result in a conviction under § 245(a)(1). 

The defendant in Aznavoleh engaged in street racing,

heedlessly disregarding a perceived likelihood of death or

grave injury to others. Likewise, in Wyatt, a reasonable

person would have recognized the dangers of striking a child

with the deadly force used, even if the defendant was not

subjectively aware of the risks of his “play wrestling” with

the child in that manner.

Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc),

addresses the question of whether a conviction under

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UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE 5

California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of

moral turpitude. It does not address the question of whether

a conviction under § 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of

violence. As such, it does not abrogate Grajeda’s holding

that a conviction under § 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of

violence.

Jimenez-Arzate also argues that the district court abused

its discretion in imposing a term of supervised release

because he would be deported as an illegal alien upon his

release. Here, the district court made an individualized

finding that supervised release was warranted because of

Jimenez-Arzate’s consistent history of sneaking back into the

United States after deportation. The district court specifically

noted thatJimenez-Arzate had previouslybeen deported three

times and that “[t]he three wags of fingers in his face saying

‘stay out, stay out or you’re going to be subject to

prosecution’ didn’t do any good.” The district judge also

noted that he “can’t trust [Jimenez-Arzate’s] assurance he’s

not going to come back” because “[h]e probably gave that

assurance on three prior occasions, and yet he’s back again

committing crimes.” The district judge concluded that

supervised release was necessary to protect the public and

deter Jimenez-Arzate from returning to the United States. 

There was justification for the district court’s exercise of

discretion in imposing supervised release.

AFFIRMED.

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