Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00177/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00177-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gildardo Barrios
Defendant
Maria Dolores Barrios-Alvarez
Defendant
Edgar Munguia
Defendant
Marisa Munguia
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

GILDARDO BARRIOS (a.k.a. Edgar 

Munguia),

MARISA MUNGUIA,

MARIA DOLORES BARRIOS-ALVAREZ

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:19-CR-177-MCE

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;

ORDER

DATE: April 2, 2020

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

This case was set for a status conference on April 2, 2020, and moved to May 7, 2020, on the 

Court’s on motion, citing the interests of public health and safety, and excluding time under the Speedy 

Trial Act. The parties now request that the Court continue the status conference to July 16, 2020. To 

the extent it is needed, this stipulation supplements the basis for exclusion of time under General Order 

611 and requests that the Court also exclude time under Local Code T4, for the reasons set forth below.

On March 18, 2020, this Court issued General Order 612, with reference to General Order 611, 

which together permit District Judges to continue all matters scheduled to occur before May 1, 2020, 

until a date after that, and to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act. These General Orders were

entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

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openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

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STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and 

through defendants’ counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 2, 2020, and then continued to 

May 7, 2020, at 10:00 a.m., on the Court’s own motion. 

2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference to July 16, 

2020, and to exclude time between April 2, 2020, and July 16, 2020, under Local Code T4, in addition 

to the exclusion of time the Court has already ordered in light of public health concerns cited by General

Order 611.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has produced discovery in this matter including investigative 

reports, photographs, and laboratory reports. The government is also in the process of producing 

or making available to the defense audio and video recordings.

b) Counsel for defendants will need additional time to review the discovery. 

Defense counsel will also need time to review the current charges, to investigate and conduct 

research related to the current charges, and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to 

prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. 

c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation and 

order, to July 16, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), 

B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s 

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request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action 

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: April 10, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ JAMES R. CONOLLY

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: April 10, 2020 /s/ LEXI NEGIN

LEXI NEGIN

Counsel for Defendant 

GILDARDO BARRIOS

Dated: April 10, 2020 /s/ MARY ANN F. BIRD

MARY ANN F. BIRD

Counsel for Defendant 

MARISA MUNGUIA

Dated: April 10, 2020 /s/ DANIEL L. OLSEN

DANIEL L. OLSEN

Counsel for Defendant 

MARIA DOLORES BARRIOS-ALVAREZ

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2020

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