Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01345/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01345-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jason B. Guidry
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1345

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JASON B. GUIDRY,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 13-CR-16 — Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 17, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 22, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Jason Guidry was sentenced to 

twenty-five years in prison after he pled guilty to possessing and distributing illegal drugs and prostituting

women. On appeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress evidence found during 

searches of his car and his two residences; the imposition 

of two sentence enhancements; and the imposition of 

vague, ambiguous, and conflicting conditions of superCase: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
2 No. 15-1345

vised release. For the reasons that follow, we vacate and 

remand the disputed conditions of supervised release, 

and affirm Guidry’s conviction, prison term, and all other 

supervised release terms.

I. Background

A. Traffic Stop

On August 21, 2012, City of Sheboygan police officer 

Dustin Fickett stopped a car driving without license 

plates. When Fickett approached the car, he recognized 

Guidry, the driver. Fickett had pulled Guidry over a few 

months earlier and smelled a strong odor of marijuana, 

but after searching the car, Fickett did not find any illegal 

drugs. In the months that followed, Fickett learned that 

the Sheboygan Detective Bureau suspected that Guidry 

was using and dealing drugs.

During this stop, Fickett detected only a faint odor of 

marijuana, and because it was windy, Fickett was not 

sure that the odor was emanating from inside Guidry’s

car. As a result, Fickett did not believe that he had probable cause to search the car.

Fickett asked Guidry for his vehicle paperwork and 

identification and Guidry complied. Fickett returned to 

his car and immediately called officer Trisha Saeger, who 

handled a drug-detection canine, and asked her to come 

to the scene. While he waited for Saeger to arrive, Fickett 

processed Guidry’s paperwork and called for a backup 

officer.

Saeger arrived about five minutes after Fickett’s call, 

and officer Anthony Hamilton arrived about three 

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-1345 3

minutes after that. When Saeger arrived, Fickett was still 

preparing Guidry’s citation.

After checking in with Fickett and Saeger, Hamilton 

approached Guidry’s vehicle. Hamilton asked Guidry to 

exit the vehicle in preparation for a dog sniff, in accordance with standard department procedure. Guidry became argumentative, stated that he did not consent to a 

dog sniff, and remained in the car, fumbling with paperwork. Hamilton asked Guidry to show his hands and 

again requested that he step out of the car. This time, 

Guidry complied. Guidry did not close the door. Moments later, Saeger began the dog sniff.

Saeger has been working with Bud, her canine, since 

March 2009. Bud is trained to detect odors of marijuana, 

cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. Bud alerts to an 

odor change by changing his behavior. He is also trained 

to “indicate,” usually by sitting, to an odor of drugs. As 

soon as Bud passed the driver’s open door, Bud alerted.

Soon after, Bud indicated an odor of drugs by sitting 

down in front of the door. Then Bud got up, approached 

the car, and, according to Guidry, put his head into the 

car through the open door.

Fickett told Guidry that Bud had indicated at the 

driver’s door and Guidry admitted that he had smoked 

marijuana at home and still had a “half blunt” in the car.

Saeger then searched the car and found the blunt, as well 

as a 7 UP “safe can” containing clear plastic baggies of 

heroin and cocaine. Fickett arrested Guidry.

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
4 No. 15-1345

B. Searches of Guidry’s Residences

On August 22, 2012, the day after Guidry’s arrest, 

Fickett and Detective Brian Bastil gave sworn testimony 

to a circuit court commissioner in support of a search 

warrant for Guidry’s residence at 1725 North 12th Street

(the “12th Street residence”). Fickett described the results 

of the search of Guidry’s car: 15 grams of heroin, individually bagged; 4.1 grams of powder cocaine, individually bagged; and 3.9 grams of crack cocaine, individually 

bagged. Bastil testified that the car contained a distribution quantity of drugs worth thousands of dollars.

Bastil also provided information obtained from two 

confidential informants as part of an ongoing investigation of the 12th Street residence. The first informant, “CI1,” told Bastil that Guidry was prostituting women and 

selling large amounts of heroin, powder cocaine, crack 

cocaine, marijuana, and ecstasy from the 12th Street residence. CI-1 admitted to purchasing heroin from Guidry 

two months earlier. A second confidential informant, 

“CI-2,” also disclosed that Guidry was selling heroin and 

other drugs from the 12th Street residence, and admitted 

to purchasing heroin from Guidry at the residence within 

the past two weeks. Bastil testified that Guidry identified 

1725 North 12th Street as Guidry’s residence on the night 

of Guidry’s arrest, and that Guidry had admitted to 

smoking marijuana at his residence immediately before

the traffic stop.

The court commissioner authorized the warrant and 

Bastil immediately led a search of the 12th Street residence. That search uncovered heroin, powder cocaine, a 

substantial amount of crack cocaine, a mason jar full of 

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-1345 5

marijuana, and another safe can. A woman present at the 

residence during the search told Bastil that Guidry maintained another residence on Pine Street in which the exchange of sex and drugs took place. She said that Guidry 

prostituted women there, that he took about ninety percent of the money, and that he “feeds [the women] with 

heroin.” 

A few hours later, Bastil again appeared before a

court commissioner seeking a warrant to search Guidry’s 

Pine Street residence. He described the drugs that were

found at the 12th Street residence, as well as the information he learned from the woman who was present 

during the search. Bastil also testified that named individual Chelsee W. and another known female had visited

Guidry’s Pine Street residence within the previous three 

weeks and had received heroin from Guidry in exchange 

for sex acts. Chelsee had told Bastil that the second female had overdosed at the residence after receiving her 

heroin, a fact that Bastil independently confirmed. The 

court commissioner authorized the search warrant. 

C. Motions to Suppress

On June 10, 2013, Guidry filed a motion to suppress 

evidence found in his car during the traffic stop. He argued that because the driver’s door was open, the police 

had improperly expanded the dog sniff to the interior of 

his car. A magistrate judge filed a report on July 1, 2013 

recommending that the district court deny Guidry’s motion because the officers’ decision to leave the door open 

was insufficient to show a desire to facilitate the dog 

sniff. The magistrate judge also determined that the officers were acting under a reasonable suspicion that the veCase: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
6 No. 15-1345

hicle contained narcotics because Fickett detected a faint 

odor of marijuana during the traffic stop, Fickett had 

previously pulled Guidry over and detected a strong 

odor of marijuana, and Fickett had since received information that Guidry was using and dealing drugs. Guidry 

objected to the report and recommendation, but the district court adopted it on August 16, 2013.

On November 22, 2013, Guidry filed a supplemental 

brief in support of his motion to suppress, arguing that 

the searches of his two residences were unlawful because

the information used to obtain search warrants was acquired through the illegal search of his car. He contended

that the traffic stop was impermissibly delayed and 

broadened by Fickett’s decision to bring a drug detection 

dog to the scene. The magistrate judge again recommended that the district court deny Guidry’s motion, 

reasoning that the dog sniff did not delay the stop in any 

appreciable way because the canine officer arrived shortly after the stop was initiated. The district court adopted 

the magistrate judge’s report, over Guidry’s objection, on 

January 24, 2014.

On February 28, 2014, Guidry filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered at his residences, again 

contesting the search warrants. He argued that the affidavits attached to the search warrants did not contain 

sufficient reliable information to establish probable

cause. The magistrate judge filed a report on March 24,

2014 rejecting Guidry’s claims and the district court 

adopted the report, over Guidry’s objection, on July 10, 

2014.

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-1345 7

D. Plea Agreement 

Guidry entered into a plea agreement with the government on October 10, 2014. Guidry agreed to plead 

guilty to Counts 6, 7, 10, and 14: three counts of interstate 

travel for the purposes of prostitution in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2421, and one count of possession with intent to 

distribute heroin, crack, and cocaine in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Guidry preserved his 

right to appeal the decisions denying his motions to suppress.

The plea agreement contained an attachment with 

sworn testimony from three witnesses—A.R., M.M., and 

A.M.—supporting the three interstate travel counts. A.R. 

prostituted for Guidry from February to April of 2012. In 

her affidavit, A.R. explained that she believed Guidry 

loved her and that she was his girlfriend. To elicit her 

participation in his escort business, Guidry told her that 

men would pay thousands of dollars to spend time with 

“nice females like her.” He posted an ad for her online 

and drove her to a hotel in Rockford where she “did 

dates.” She explained that she was afraid of Guidry:

“[H]e’s a big guy ... and anything could happen—I was 

afraid that it would get physical.”

M.M. stated in her affidavit that she met Guidry in 

April 2012 through her boyfriend who purchased heroin 

from him. M.M. had been addicted to heroin but had 

been clean for six months before meeting Guidry. She 

was a stripper and Guidry said that she could make more 

money prostituting for him. Guidry took her to Rockford 

to prostitute and gave her heroin in return. Guidry knew 

M.M. was addicted to heroin and would go through 

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
8 No. 15-1345

withdrawal if she did not get heroin every twenty-four 

hours. She explained, “[Guidry] scared me. I always 

wanted to please him ... and I did not want to go 

through withdrawal.” 

A.M. also met Guidry in April 2012 when she and a 

friend started going to Guidry’s house to buy heroin and 

crack. Guidry asked A.M. to prostitute for him and said it 

would be easy money. When A.M. told him she did not 

want to go to Rockford to prostitute, he threatened to cut 

off her heroin supply, so A.M. went to Rockford. She explained that she was afraid of Guidry because he had 

brutally beaten his ex-girlfriend, who was one of her 

friends, and because he was “very big” and “always yelling at us.”

E. Presentence Report and Sentencing

The probation office prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSR”) on December 23, 2014. The PSR 

recommended several sentencing enhancements, including a cross reference from U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(a) to §

2A3.1(a)(2) because Guidry caused his victims to engage 

in sexual acts by placing them in fear, and a two-level 

“vulnerable victim” enhancement under § 3A1.1(b)(1).1

Guidry’s final guidelines range was 210 to 262 months.

At Guidry’s sentencing hearing, the government offered the testimony of Dr. Selahattin Kurter, a doctor certified in psychiatry and addiction medicine. He testified 

about heroin’s addictive properties and explained that 

 1 For all three interstate travel counts, the PSR also applied a fourlevel enhancement under § 2G1.1(b)(1) because Guidry used fraud or 

coercion in committing the offenses. 

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-1345 9

addicts have a powerful fear of withdrawal that causes 

them to “look for the drug at all costs.”

Detective Tamara Remington, the case agent for the 

trafficking portion of the investigation, testified about her 

contact with the witnesses. She explained that A.R. “has 

been very frightened since hearing [Guidry’s] name 

again.... I believe she’s gone into hiding. She’s very 

scared.” Remington explained that Guidry has a controlling and angry side that he used to keep A.R. prostituting 

for him. For example, A.R. had a violent confrontation 

with Guidry in 2012 when she tried to leave him. A.R. 

called a cab and as she entered, Guidry forcibly pulled

her out. The cab driver was so concerned by Guidry’s 

behavior that he intervened by holding on to A.R. and 

calling 911. A few days later, when A.R. returned to Sheboygan after staying with her parents, her apartment had 

been ransacked. Allegedly, Guidry told her that he was 

responsible and that A.R. was going to leave this world 

just as she entered it—with nothing. Remington also interviewed the cab driver that intervened to help A.R., 

and he confirmed A.R.’s account and explained that he 

recalled the incident well because Guidry was threatening both A.R., who he described as “petite,” and him. 

Before sentencing Guidry, the district court explained 

that after thoroughly considering the record, the court 

believed that the circumstances warranted an aboveguidelines sentence. The court sentenced Guidry to 299 

months, or nearly twenty-five years, in prison. The district court also imposed three-year terms of supervised 

release for each of the four counts, all running concurrently. This appeal followed.

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
10 No. 15-1345

II. Discussion

On appeal, Guidry challenges the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress evidence found during 

the searches of his car and his two residences; the imposition of two sentence enhancements; and the imposition of 

vague, ambiguous, and conflicting conditions of supervised release. We address each of these arguments in 

turn.

A. Search of Guidry’s Car

Guidry contends that the district court erred by denying his first motion to suppress because the evidence discovered during the traffic stop was the product of an illegal dog sniff. Guidry does not dispute that the traffic 

stop was lawful and supported by probable cause. He instead argues that the officers improperly prolonged the 

duration of the traffic stop and violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights by allowing the dog to search the interior of his car. When reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we review findings of fact 

for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. United 

States v. Uribe, 709 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).

i. Duration of the Traffic Stop

In arguing that the officers impermissibly delayed the 

traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff, Guidry relies on Rodriguez v. United States, in which the U.S. Supreme Court 

held that police cannot prolong a traffic stop in order to 

conduct a dog sniff without reasonable suspicion that the 

vehicle contains illegal drugs. 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615–16 

(2015).

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-1345 11

Under Rodriguez, Guidry’s claim fails for two reasons: 

first, the dog sniff did not prolong the traffic stop, and 

second, even if it had, the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that Guidry’s car contained illegal drugs.

First, unlike the search in Rodriguez, the dog sniff did not 

prolong the traffic stop in any meaningful way: Saeger 

arrived on the scene five minutes after Fickett called her, 

and at that time, Fickett was still preparing Guidry’s traffic citation. As the magistrate judge observed, “most important here, at the time when Bud ‘indicated’ that drugs 

were present in the vehicle, thereby providing a new justification to extend the traffic stop, Officer Fickett had yet 

to complete his initial mission—that is, issuing Guidry a 

traffic citation.” 

Even if there was evidence that the officers had improperly delayed issuing Guidry’s citation, this case satisfies Rodriguez for a second reason. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court noted that reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity would justify the police in detaining the driver 

beyond completion of the traffic infraction. Id. at 1616. 

Here, when Fickett pulled Guidry over, he had reasonable suspicion to believe that Guidry had drugs in his car.

Fickett not only smelled a faint odor of marijuana, but he 

also recalled that he had previously stopped Guidry and 

smelled marijuana. Moreover, Fickett was aware that his 

detective bureau had evidence that Guidry was a drug 

user and dealer. Thus, Fickett “had reasonable suspicion 

of criminal activity at that point and so was justified in 

prolonging the stop for a reasonable time to confirm or 

dispel, with the dog’s assistance, his mounting suspicions.” United States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 959 (7th Cir. 

2015) (holding that reasonable suspicion justified the ofCase: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
12 No. 15-1345

ficer in prolonging the stop by eight minutes to wait for 

the arrival of the drug dog). 

ii. Dog Sniff of the Interior of Guidry’s Car

In arguing that the police officers violated his constitutional rights by allowing Bud to intrude into the interior of his car, Guidry relies on United States v. Winningham, in which the Tenth Circuit held that a dog sniff violated the Fourth Amendment. 140 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 

1998). In that case, police officers stopped a van on the 

reasonable suspicion that it contained illegal aliens. Despite the fact that the van was empty, the agents called in 

a dog. The handler observed a “just noticeable difference” in the dog’s conduct as it reached the rear of the 

van and unleashed the dog. Id. at 1329. When the dog 

reached one of the van doors that the officers had left 

open, it leaped into the van and methodically sniffed the 

interior. Eventually, the dog alerted at a rear vent that

contained fifty kilograms of marijuana.

The Tenth Circuit determined that the officers’ conduct, which included opening the door, allowing the van 

to sit for several minutes with the door open, unleashing

the dog as it neared the open door, and allowing the dog 

to remain in the van, suggested a desire to facilitate a dog 

sniff of the van’s interior. Id. at 1331. And because the police did not have reasonable suspicion for a search of the 

interior after their visual inspection revealed nothing 

suspicious, the Tenth Circuit held that the search violated

the Fourth Amendment. Id. 

This case is distinguishable from Winningham. Here, 

there is no indication that the officers intended to faciliCase: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-1345 13

tate the dog’s entry into the car. Unlike the officers in 

Winningham, Saeger kept Bud on his leash and did not allow him to jump into the car. Moreover, the officers did 

not open the door—it was Guidry who left it open. Immediately after Guidry exited, Saeger led Bud through 

her usual circuit, and despite her efforts to keep Bud outside of the car, his head allegedly entered it. In sum, the 

facts of this case are very different from those in Winningham and more closely resemble cases where no 

Fourth Amendment violation was found. See United 

States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 214–15 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred 

when a dog jumped instinctively though an open car 

door “without facilitation by its handler”); United States 

v. Lyons, 486 F.3d 367, 373–74 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding no 

Fourth Amendment violation when a dog stuck his head 

instinctively though a van’s open window without being 

directed to do so by officers); United States v. Stone, 866 

F.2d 359, 363–64 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding no Fourth 

Amendment violation when a dog jumped instinctively 

into defendant’s open hatchback and when officers did 

not ask the defendant to open the hatchback for purposes 

of the dog sniff).

As important, at the point that Bud’s head supposedly entered Guidry’s car, the officers had probable cause 

to search the interior because Bud indicated that the car

contained drugs while sniffing the car’s perimeter. By 

contrast, at the time that the dog entered the van in Winningham, the officers had no reason to suspect that evidence of criminal activity would be found. 140 F.3d at 

1331. 

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
14 No. 15-1345

Because the dog sniff search of Guidry’s car was lawful, the district court correctly denied Guidry’s motion to 

suppress.

B. Searches of Guidry’s Residences

Guidry next attacks the legality of the search warrants 

for his two residences on the grounds that the officers did 

not have probable cause. “Probable cause is established 

when, considering the totality of the circumstances, there 

is sufficient evidence to cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search will uncover evidence of a 

crime.” United States v. Harris, 464 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 

2006) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).

When a search is authorized by a warrant, deference is 

owed to the issuing judge’s conclusion that there is probable cause if there is “substantial evidence in the record” 

that supports his decision. United States v. Sims, 551 F.3d 

640, 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). We have also explained:

Where probable cause is based on information 

supplied by an informant, we employ a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry encompassing 

several factors: first, the degree to which the informant acquired knowledge of the events 

through firsthand observation; second, the detail and specificity of the information provided 

by the informant; third, the interval between 

the date of the events and a police officer’s application for the search warrant; and fourth, 

the extent to which law enforcement corroborated the informant’s statements. No one factor 

is determinative and a deficiency in one factor 

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-1345 15

may be compensated for by a strong showing 

in another or by some other indication of reliability.

United States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Guidry first contends that Bastil did not have probable cause to search his 12th Street residence because Bastil failed to corroborate statements made by the confidential informants, the informants did not testify in front of 

the court commissioner, and some of the informants’ information was old. These arguments assume that the 

court commissioner relied only on the information provided by the confidential informants when issuing the 

warrant. However, in addition to that information, the 

court commissioner considered that officers had found 

distribution quantities of drugs in Guidry’s car and that

Guidry admitted to using drugs at his home. That evidence alone provided probable cause to believe that a 

search of Guidry’s home would turn up further evidence 

of criminal activity.

Guidry’s arguments about the reliability of the informants’ information also fail. Although neither informant satisfied all four of the Searcy factors, there were 

many indications that the information they provided was 

reliable: the informants were known to police, they acquired their information through first-hand observation,

their accounts were detailed, and CI-2 purchased drugs 

from Guidry less than two weeks before his arrest. Although CI-1’s information was somewhat stale, CI-2’s upto-date account corroborated it and gave officers cause to 

believe that criminal activity was continuing at that resiCase: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
16 No. 15-1345

dence. Further, the seizure of distribution quantities of 

drugs from Guidry’s car corroborated the statements 

made by both informants. Therefore, the court commissioner correctly determined that there was probable 

cause to search Guidry’s 12th Street residence.

Guidry next argues that the police did not have probable cause to search his residence on Pine Street because 

there was no indication that the informant present during 

the search of the 12th Street residence was reliable. But 

that informant also passed the Searcy test—her statement 

was detailed, based on recent information, and corroborated by other witnesses and the large amounts of drugs 

recovered from Guidry’s home and car. As such, the 

court commissioner properly determined that the police 

had probable cause to search Guidry’s Pine Street residence.

Because both warrants were legal, the district court 

did not err in denying Guidry’s motion to suppress the 

evidence found during the searches of his residences.

C. Sentence Enhancements

Guidry disputes the district court’s application of certain sentence enhancements. We review the district 

court’s application of the sentencing guidelines de novo

and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. 

Bennett, 461 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2006).

i. Cross Reference to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(a)(2)

The applicable sentencing guideline for an interstate 

travel offense is § 2G1.1, but the district court applied the 

cross reference to § 2A3.1(a)(2), the criminal sexual abuse 

statute, because it determined that Guidry’s offenses inCase: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-1345 17

volved conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2242—“caus[ing] 

another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening 

or placing that other person in fear ....” Guidry acknowledges that the victims testified that they were afraid for 

their safety, but argues that this evidence is inadequate to 

permit the cross reference.

We disagree. “In the § 2242 context we define the concept of ‘fear’ broadly ....” United States v. Henzel, 668 F.3d 

972, 977 (7th Cir. 2012). In Henzel, we observed that the 

district court had underestimated the sentencing range 

by not applying the cross reference to § 2A3.1 when the 

evidence clearly showed that the victim, a twelve-yearold girl, was manipulated into having sex with the adult 

defendant, whom she feared. Id. We noted that the child 

testified and the defendant admitted that the child was 

afraid of the defendant, and that the defendant had 

“mental and emotional power” over her. Id. We also explained that the evidence suggested “that the girl feared 

... [that the defendant] would react badly if she did not 

meet his demands.” Id. 

As in Henzel, the evidence shows that Guidry exercised mental and emotional power over his victims, in 

addition to physical violence, in order to induce them to 

work as escorts. Each of the three victims testified that 

they were afraid of Guidry and what would happen to 

them if they did not do what he said. Moreover, each victim was addicted to heroin and Guidry controlled their 

supply based on their willingness to engage in sexual 

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
18 No. 15-1345

acts. As such, the district court correctly applied the cross

reference to § 2A3.1 when sentencing Guidry.2

ii. “Vulnerable Victim” Enhancement 

The district court also applied a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1), which allows courts to 

increase a sentence by two levels “if the defendant knew 

or should have known that a victim of the offense was a 

vulnerable victim.” The guideline application notes explain that “vulnerable victim” means a person “who is a 

victim of the offense of conviction and ... who is unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, 

or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2.

The district court determined that the enhancement 

was appropriate due to Guidry’s knowledge and exploitation of M.M.’s heroin addiction. Guidry opposes the 

 2 Guidry also contends that the district court did not comply with 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B), which directs district 

courts to rule on disputed matters in the PSR before sentencing defendants, when it applied the cross reference. Guidry admits that this rule 

imposes only a “minimal burden” on the sentencing judge to make findings on record when resolving a dispute between the parties. United 

States v. Heckel, 570 F.3d 791, 796 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, the district court 

did make the necessary factual findings before sentencing Guidry. Although the district court did not separate the analysis for the cross reference and the § 2G1.1(b)(1) “fraud and coercion” enhancement, the district court noted Guidry’s intimidating presence, his emotional and 

physical manipulation of the victims, and the victims’ reasonable fear of 

him. Those factual findings supported the imposition of the cross reference and satisfied the minimal burden set forth under Rule 32(i)(3)(B).

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-1345 19

enhancement, arguing that a victim’s status as a drug 

addict is insufficient to warrant the enhancement, and 

that there was no evidence that M.M. was otherwise vulnerable.

Our sister circuits have held that drug addiction is not 

enough, standing alone, to serve as the basis for this enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Volkman, 736 F.3d 

1013, 1030 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that if the victims’ 

drug addiction was the “sole basis for the district court’s 

decision to apply the enhancement, then reversal would 

be warranted”), vacated on other grounds, Volkman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 13 (2014); United States v. Pavao, 948 

F.2d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[W]e should hesitate to say 

that anyone involved with drugs becomes ipso facto a 

‘vulnerable victim’ of a crime ....”). But federal courts 

have affirmed the vulnerable victim enhancement in cases involving drug addicts where the sentencing court 

“considered [the victim] as an individual, and ... did not 

rest its ultimate determination simply upon the fact that 

[the victim] belonged to a class of ... drug users.” Pavao, 

948 F.2d at 78; see also United States v. Amedeo, 370 F.3d 

1305, 1317 n.10 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming the sentence 

enhancement based on the victim’s drug addiction and

explaining, “[w]e do not suggest that every drug addict 

is a vulnerable victim within the meaning of § 3A1.1.

Applying this enhancement is highly fact-specific and 

must take into account the totality of the circumstances”

(internal citation omitted)). 

In applying the sentence enhancement, the district 

court observed that Guidry used his knowledge that

M.M. was addicted to heroin and suffered painful withCase: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
20 No. 15-1345

drawal symptoms if she did not receive it to control her.

In other words, the court applied the enhancement not 

simply because M.M. was an addict, but because Guidry 

preyed on her addiction in order to force her to engage in 

sexual acts. Because the district court appropriately considered M.M.’s individual situation, the court correctly 

applied the sentence enhancement.

D. Conditions of Supervised Release

The district court imposed thirteen standard conditions of supervised release and three “additional” conditions. Guidry objects to five of these conditions. Guidry 

did not raise his objections in his briefing before the district court or at his sentencing hearing and so we review 

for plain error. United States v. Baker, 755 F.3d 515, 523 

(7th Cir. 2014).

i. Standard Condition 4: Support of Dependents

Standard Condition 4 requires Guidry to “use his best 

efforts to support his dependents.” Guidry points out

that because he was sentenced to approximately twentyfive years in prison, his three dependents (children who 

were sixteen, twelve, and ten years old at the time of his 

sentencing) will be adults when he is released. Because 

he is unlikely to gain any dependents while incarcerated, 

Guidry argues that the condition is not tailored to him 

individually. We found a similar condition requiring a 

defendant to “support dependents and meet family responsibilities” to be impermissibly vague and overbroad 

in United States v. Sewell, 780 F.3d 839, 851 (7th Cir. 2015).

Moreover, Guidry is correct that the condition is not appropriately tailored to his personal history. Thus, we vaCase: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-1345 21

cate the condition and remand to the district court for 

clarification.

ii. Standard Condition 7 and Additional Condition 2: Use 

of Alcohol

Standard Condition 7 prohibits Guidry from drinking 

“alcoholic beverages to intoxication.” This condition conflicts with Additional Condition 2, which requires 

Guidry to “refrain from use of all alcoholic beverages 

throughout his supervised release term.” This inconsistency is an error that the court must address on remand. See Baker, 755 F.3d at 529 (“[C]onditions of supervised release must make clear what conduct is prohibited

....”). 

iii. Standard Condition 13: Notification of Risks

Standard Condition 13 requires Guidry to “notify 

third parties of risks that may be occasioned by [his]

criminal record or personal history or characteristics and 

shall permit the probation officer to make such notification and confirm [his] compliance with such notification 

requirement.” In United States v. Kappes, we held that this 

condition contains “numerous ambiguities”: 

There is no indication of what is meant by 

“personal history” and “characteristics” or 

what “risks” must be disclosed to which “third 

parties.” Presumably, the meaning of these 

terms would change from defendant to defendant, which makes definitions particularly 

important with this condition.

782 F.3d 828, 849 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). Those same ambiguities are 

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22
22 No. 15-1345

present in this case, and as such, we vacate and remand 

this condition for clarification from the district court.

iv. Additional Conditions 1 and 2: Payment for Treatment 

Additional Condition 1 requires Guidry to participate 

in a sex offender treatment program and “pay the cost of 

the program under the guidance and supervision of his 

supervising probation officer.” Additional Condition 2 

requires Guidry to pay for alcohol and drug abuse treatment. In Baker, we vacated similarly-worded conditions 

because they did “not specify what will happen if [the 

defendant] bears the burden of paying and is unable to 

do so.” 755 F.3d at 529. For the same reason, we vacate 

and remand these conditions.

As a final note, we reiterate a point that we underscored during oral argument: It is important that in every 

sentencing, both the prosecution and defense confirm 

that any conditions of supervised release are unambiguous and sufficiently tailored to the defendant’s circumstances, and remind the sentencing judge to make the 

appropriate findings justifying their imposition.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE Standard Conditions 4, 7, and 13, as well as Additional Conditions 1 

and 2; and REMAND for resentencing consistent with this 

opinion. We AFFIRM Guidry’s conviction, prison term,

and all other conditions of supervised release.

Case: 15-1345 Document: 46 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 22