Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01106/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01106-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chad Allen Mutschelknaus
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1106

___________

United States of America, * 

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of North Dakota. 

Chad Allen Mutschelknaus, *

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 21, 2009 

Filed: January 4, 2010

___________

Before RILEY, HANSEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Chad Allen Mutschelknaus entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of

possession of child pornography. He now appeals the denial of his motions to

suppress, challenging both the sufficiency of the search warrant application and the

timing of the officers’ forensic analysis of his seized computer. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

An investigation into the distribution of child pornography led law enforcement

officers to a computer user in Alaska going by the online identity “Aronechee.” An

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examination of Aronechee’s computer revealed that he had been distributing child

pornography through an online photo-sharing program. Aronechee gave law

enforcement officers permission to adopt his online identity. Using his identity,

officers sent Mutschelknaus a message claiming that Aronechee’s collection of images

had been lost after a computer crash. In response, Mutschelknaus sent a total of 236

images, saying that he was “just sending what you sent me at one time.” Nearly all

of the images depicted children engaged in sexual acts or in sexually explicit poses.

Officers traced the Internet Protocol address of the computer sending these

images to the home of Mutschelknaus’s girlfriend. They then informed Immigration

and Customs Enforcement Special Agent Michael Arel about the exchange,

forwarding him a disk with the images Mutschelknaus sent. Special Agent Arel

applied for a search warrant for the home of Mutschelknaus’s girlfriend on December

12, 2007. The federal magistrate judge issued the warrant, which required that the

search of the home be performed within ten days. The magistrate judge also allowed

officers the additional sixty days they requested to examine forensically any computer

equipment seized. Federal agents searched the home and seized a computer that same

day. When officers later examined the computer, more than ten days later but within

the sixty-day time frame, they discovered images of child pornography.

A grand jury indicted Mutschelknaus on one count of distribution of child

pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1), and one count of possession of child

pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2). After the district court1

 denied

Mutschelknaus’s two motions to suppress the evidence from the December 12, 2007

search and the subsequent examination of the seized computer, Mutschelknaus entered

a conditional guilty plea to the possession of child pornography count. The district

court sentenced him to 63 months’ imprisonment.

1

The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of North Dakota.

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II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mutschelknaus challenges the district court’s denial of both of his

motions to suppress. First, he argues that the search warrant application provided

insufficient information to permit the magistrate judge to find probable cause to justify

the search. In particular, he argues that the application should have included either the

images themselves or a more detailed description of the images Mutschelknaus sent

to allow a magistrate independently to determine that the images were child

pornography. Second, he argues that the sixty-day extension allowed for officers to

analyze the seized computer violated Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure. “On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review a district

court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions—including its probable

cause determination—de novo.” United States v. El-Alamin, 574 F.3d 915, 923 (8th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We reject Mutschelknaus’s first argument because the search warrant

application contained sufficiently detailed descriptions of the images Mutschelknaus

sent to permit the issuing judge to make an independent finding of probable cause. 

“An affidavit establishes probable cause for a warrant if it ‘sets forth sufficient facts

to establish that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of criminal

activity will be found in the particular place to be searched.’” United States v. Snyder,

511 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States

v. Davis, 471 F.3d 938, 946 (8th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied, 554 U.S. ---, 128 S. Ct.

2947 (2008). “Whether probable cause to issue a search warrant has been established

is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances, and resolution of the

question by an issuing judge should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.” 

United States v. Hansel, 524 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Grant,

490 F.3d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, 555 U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 520 (2008). 

“As a general matter, an issuing court does not need to look at the images described

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in an affidavit in order to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that

they constitute child pornography. A detailed verbal description is sufficient.” 

United States v. Lowe, 516 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2008). 

 The search warrant application described the development of the investigation,

including law enforcement officers’ use of the online identity of Aronechee, a person

known to distribute child pornography. In this case, the law enforcement officer

posing as Aronechee provided Special Agent Arel with copies of the images that

Mutschelknaus sent. Special Agent Arel’s application described the images as

“appear[ing] to depict children engaged in sexually explicit acts” and noted that one

image included “a young female child performing oral sex on an adult male.” The

application also stated that “[n]early every image sent . . . depicted children engaged

in sexual acts or in sexually explicit poses.” Additionally, the search warrant

application included information about Special Agent Arel’s training and experience

in investigations of child pornography and exploitation. The information in the

application was sufficient to permit a magistrate judge independently to conclude that

there was probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity would be found

at the home. 

 Mutschelknaus argues that the images described “could have been virtual

children or adults depicted as children,” and since such images do not fall within the

statutory definition of child pornography, the warrant application did not establish a

fair probability of finding evidence of criminal activity. However, Special Agent Arel

was trained in child pornography investigations and described the images as involving

children. See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 844 (8th Cir. 2009) (considering

the affiant’s training in evaluating the sufficiency of a search warrant application). 

Furthermore, the application explicitly contrasts a child and an adult depicted in the

same image, reinforcing the notion that these images actually did involve children. 

See United States v. Grant, 490 F.3d 627, 632 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Lewis, an experienced

computer-repair technician, personally observed the images on the Grants’ computer

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and, specifically distinguishing those images from the ‘adult pornography’ he had

seen on other computers, concluded that the images on the Grants’ computer were

child pornography.”). In any event, merely identifying an alternative, non-criminal

explanation for the information in a warrant is not sufficient to render it defective,

unless that explanation eliminates the fair probability that evidence of criminal activity

will be found at the described location. See United States v. Robertson, 39 F.3d 891,

894 (8th Cir. 1994) (“That [the defendant] can now advance alternative explanations

for [their suspicious activity] does not undermine the magistrate’s decision to credit

the agents’ reasonable inferences.”). Here, given the descriptions of the images in the

warrant application, Aronechee’s involvement in child pornography, and Special

Agent Arel’s training and experience, probable cause existed. We therefore affirm the

district court’s denial of Mutschelknaus’s first motion to suppress.

Mutschelknaus also argues that the sixty-day extension that the magistrate judge

allowed for examining the seized computer violated Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, which requires that warrants be executed within ten days of

issuance. The Government argues that Rule 41 does not govern subsequent

examinations of seized items and that because the computer was seized within ten

days, Rule 41’s requirements were met. Regardless of whether Rule 41 was violated,

however, “noncompliance with Rule 41 does not automatically require exclusion of

evidence in a federal prosecution. Instead, exclusion is required only if a defendant

is prejudiced or if reckless disregard of proper procedure is evident.” United States

v. Spencer, 439 F.3d 905, 913 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted).

Mutschelknaus does not argue that the sixty-day extension prejudiced him. Our

recent analysis in United States v. Brewer applies with equal force to the facts of

Mutschelknaus’s case. “The computer media at issue here were electronically-stored

files in the custody of law enforcement. Because of the nature of this evidence, the

. . . delay in searching the media did not alter the probable cause analysis.” United

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States v. Brewer, --- F.3d ---, No. 08-3079, slip op. at 11 (8th Cir. Dec. 17, 2009). Nor

did the officers show a “reckless disregard of proper procedure.” See Spencer, 439

F.3d at 913. The search warrant application acknowledges that computer

examinations can take additional time and accordingly requested additional time to

perform the examination after the computer was seized. “Courts have permitted some

delay in the execution of search warrants involving computers because of the

complexity of the search.” United States v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 2005)

(collecting cases). Here, the officers’ explicit request for an extension shows a

manifest regard for the issuing judge’s role in authorizing searches, rather than a “bad

faith [attempt] to circumvent federal requirements.” See id. Because the sixty-day

extension did not prejudice Mutschelknaus and because the officers did not show a

reckless disregard of proper procedure, we also affirm the district court’s denial of

Mutschelknaus’s second motion to suppress.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of

Mutschelknaus’s motions to suppress. 

______________________________

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