Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-02218/USCOURTS-ca13-19-02218-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Delvin Lamar Baldwin
Petitioner
Department of Defense
Respondent
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

DELVIN LAMAR BALDWIN,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________

2019-2218

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-0752-19-0400-I-1.

______________________

Decided: March 5, 2020

______________________

DELVIN LAMAR BALDWIN, Yorktown, VA, pro se. 

 CALVIN M. MORROW, Office of General Counsel, United 

States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, 

for respondent. Also represented by KATHERINE MICHELLE 

SMITH, TRISTAN LEAVITT. 

 ______________________

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

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2 BALDWIN v. MSPB

Pro se petitioner Delvin Baldwin petitions for review of 

a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Baldwin was removed from federal employment. Under the negotiated 

grievance procedure that covers Mr. Baldwin’s position, he 

could appeal his removal by filing a grievance under the 

Master Labor Agreement or by appealing to the Board, but 

not both. Mr. Baldwin knew that his union filed a grievance related to his removal, but he did not affirmatively 

disavow the union’s initiation of the grievance process on 

his behalf. These actions constitute a binding election of 

the negotiated grievance procedure, which precludes the 

Board’s jurisdiction over Mr. Baldwin’s appeal. We therefore affirm the Board’s dismissal.

I

The Defense Logistics Agency, a support agency within 

the Department of Defense, issued its decision to remove

Mr. Baldwin from his position as a Materials Handler 

Leader pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7512. The letter was dated 

January 14, 2019 and was signed by Mr. Baldwin the next 

day. Mr. Baldwin’s position was covered under a negotiated grievance procedure governed by a Master Labor 

Agreement (MLA). The removal decision letter informed 

Mr. Baldwin of his appeal rights, including filing a grievance under the MLA or appealing to the Board, but not 

both. Resp. App. 22–23.1 See also 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e)(1) 

(stating that actions under § 7512 “which also fall within 

the coverage of the negotiated grievance procedure may, in 

the discretion of the aggrieved employee, be raised either 

under the appellate procedures of section 7701 of this title 

or under the negotiated grievance procedure, but not 

both”). 

1 Resp. App. refers to the Supplemental Appendix included with the Respondent’s brief. 

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BALDWIN v. MSPB 3

On February 1, 2019, Quinton Montague, the vice president of the union that represented Mr. Baldwin, sent an 

email entitled “Request for Formal Grievance” (grievance 

email) to John Pearson, Mr. Baldwin’s third-line supervisor. Resp. App. 26. Mr. Baldwin was copied on this email. 

It requested “a mutually agreed meeting to discuss the subject grievance for Delvin Baldwin,” citing the portion of the 

governing MLA that sets out the procedure for a formal 

grievance. Id. The grievance email also stated a “[f]ormal 

signed letter [would be] coming soon.” Id. No such letter 

appears in the record. 

On February 14, 2019, Mr. Pearson, Mr. Baldwin, and 

two union representatives met. See Resp. App. 32–33 (Formal Grievance Response). Mr. Baldwin presented at least 

three arguments against his removal. Id. Mr. Pearson, on 

behalf of the agency, sustained Mr. Baldwin’s removal. Id. 

On March 27, 2019, the union notified Mr. Pearson of its 

intent to advance Mr. Baldwin’s case to arbitration. Again, 

Mr. Baldwin was copied on this email.

Three days later, Mr. Baldwin appealed his removal to

the Board. He contended that he had not elected to file a 

grievance, as evidenced by the lack of a signed document

as promised in the grievance email. In effect, he argued 

that the union acted on its own by sending the grievance 

email. The agency moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

The agency argued that Mr. Baldwin chose to grieve his 

removal under the negotiated grievance procedure of the 

MLA rather than appeal to the Board; the Board therefore 

had no jurisdiction over his appeal. 

The Administrative Judge issued an Order to Show 

Cause, giving Mr. Baldwin a chance to allege facts to establish a prima facie case for Board jurisdiction. Mr. Baldwin again argued that the union initiated the grievance 

process without his consent and that, therefore, he made

no binding election of the grievance process. Mr. Baldwin 

also argued that the email only suggested an intent to file 

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4 BALDWIN v. MSPB

a formal grievance; it was not a formal grievance because 

no signed letter ever followed. And even if it were considered a formal grievance, he argued that it was untimely 

because it was not filed within ten working days after the 

agency issued the removal decision. 

The agency reasserted its position that the union’s February 1 email was a formal grievance that effected a binding election of the grievance process under the MLA. The 

agency also submitted a declaration from Mr. Pearson that 

Mr. Baldwin attended and actively participated in the February 14 grievance meeting. According to the Administrative Judge, Mr. Baldwin sought to strike Mr. Pearson’s 

declaration because “Pearson could not know the level of 

[Mr. Baldwin’s] engagement and thus could not state that 

he was ‘fully engaged’ in the grievance meeting.” Resp. 

App. 3–4. 

The Administrative Judge dismissed Mr. Baldwin’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. She found that he made a binding election of the grievance process by participating in and

failing to disavow the grievance process before his appeal 

to the Board. 

In the absence of a petition for administrative review, 

the Administrative Judge’s initial decision became the final decision of the Board on July 5, 2019. 

II

We have jurisdiction over a petition to review a final 

decision of the Board. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1295(a)(9). “Whether the [B]oard had jurisdiction to adjudicate a case is a question of law, which we review de 

novo.” Forest v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 47 F.3d 409, 410 (Fed. 

Cir. 1995). We review the Board’s factual findings affecting 

the jurisdictional inquiry for substantial evidence. Lentz v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 876 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

On appeal, Mr. Baldwin again argues the grievance 

email sent by the union was not a binding election of the

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BALDWIN v. MSPB 5

grievance process because it was not (1) timely and (2) “in 

writing, in accordance with the parties[’] grievance procedure.” Pet. Br. 12 (emphasis omitted); 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7121(e)(1). We disagree. Section 7121(e)(1) makes clear 

that Mr. Baldwin had two relevant options to pursue after 

his removal: a grievance under the MLA’s negotiated grievance procedure, or an appeal to the Board. Though the record reflects no signed grievance letter, Mr. Baldwin elected 

the grievance process by participating in and failing to disavow the grievance process initiated by the February 1 

grievance email. 

A

Under the MLA, Article 36 § 8(A), an employee grievance must be filed within ten work days from the date of 

the decision notice. Resp. App. 29.2 Here, the grievance 

email was sent thirteen working days after Mr. Baldwin’s 

removal decision. But Article 36 § 10 of the MLA also provides that “[t]ime limits at any step of the grievance procedure may be extended by the mutual consent of the 

parties.” Resp. App. 31. And as the Administrative Judge

cited in her decision, the Board has held that untimely filed 

grievances can effect valid elections under § 7121. Sherman v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 122 M.S.P.R. 644 ¶ 17 

(M.S.P.B. Sept. 11, 2015) (finding a valid election of the 

grievance process under § 7121(g), despite untimely filing, 

because the agency “reached the merits of the grievance 

and denied it on substantive grounds”). In granting the 

grievance meeting and then issuing a formal grievance 

2 The agency contends that because the union filed 

this grievance it was timely because union grievances must 

be filed within twenty working days. See Resp. App. 30

(MLA, Article 36 § 8(E)). Mr. Baldwin disputes whether 

this period applies. We need not reach this argument because the Administrative Judge did not err in her analysis 

under the ten-day period.

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6 BALDWIN v. MSPB

response, the agency reached the merits of the grievance 

and denied it accordingly. The Administrative Judge did 

not err in finding that the grievance email was a binding 

election despite being submitted three days late.

B

Mr. Baldwin next contends that the grievance email

should not be given effect because it does not meet all the 

requirements of the MLA’s Formal Grievance procedures. 

See Resp. App. 29 (Article 36 § 8(D)’s requirements for a 

formal grievance, including that it “must be signed by the 

grievant(s)”). But the union and the employee have independent rights to file a grievance over a matter within the 

scope of the grievance procedure. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7121(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii). While the union may file a grievance, the Board requires that employees have knowledge

of grievances filed on their behalf. Kendrick v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 74 M.S.P.R. 178, 181 (M.S.P.B. 1997). See 

also Morales v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 823 F.2d 536, 538–39

(Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding an employee’s grievance “void” 

where she did not request or ratify a grievance filed on her 

behalf, entitling her to appeal to the Board). In Kendrick, 

the Board identified a “signed writing” or “oral acknowledgement” as “explicit evidence” of an employee’s binding 

election of the grievance process. 74 M.S.P.R. at 182. But 

it also said that an employee’s “knowledge that the union 

had filed a grievance regarding the action coupled with a 

failure on the appellant’s part to affirmatively disavow that 

the grievance was being pursued [o]n his behalf would constitute implicit evidence that the appellant had authorized 

the union to present a grievance [o]n his behalf.” Id. 

Such is the case here. We see no error in the Administrative Judge’s reliance on Kendrick. And substantial evidence supports her finding that Mr. Baldwin failed to 

affirmatively disavow that the union was pursuing a grievance on his behalf. Resp. App. 7 (finding Mr. Baldwin 

“failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that the union 

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BALDWIN v. MSPB 7

filed a grievance without his consent, thus making his 

grievance nonbinding”). Mr. Baldwin presented no evidence that he disavowed the grievance at any time during 

the months-long grievance process. He received notice that 

he could not elect both the grievance process and appeal to 

the Board; he was copied on the email grievance, attended

the resulting grievance meeting, and presented arguments 

against his removal; and he received the agency’s Formal 

Grievance Response, all without objecting to the union’s actions. 

III

We have considered Mr. Baldwin’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive.3 Because the Board 

properly dismissed Mr. Baldwin’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we affirm.

AFFIRMED

No costs.

3 In particular, Mr. Baldwin contends that the Administrative Judge erred in considering Mr. Pearson’s declaration, which details Mr. Baldwin’s participation in the 

grievance meeting. Mr. Baldwin characterizes the declaration as “manufactured evidence.” Pet. Br. 12. No record 

evidence leads us to doubt the veracity of Mr. Pearson’s 

declaration. In fact, it largely confirms the substance of 

Mr. Pearson’s contemporaneous, post-meeting Formal 

Grievance Response. See Resp. App. 32 (reviewing the 

three main arguments raised during the grievance meeting). And the Administrative Judge allowed both Mr. Baldwin and the agency to submit new evidence in response to 

its Order to Show Cause. We see no error in the Administrative Judge’s acceptance or consideration of Mr. Pearson’s declaration.

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