Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03967/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03967-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Gilbert
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH GILBERT,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES A. YATES, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-3967 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

INTRODUCTION

This matter is now before the court for consideration of the merits of Joseph Gilbert’s pro

se petition for writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons discussed below, the petition will be

denied. 

BACKGROUND

A. The Crimes

On August 15, 2001, the victim, Edwin Pineda, who was affiliated with the Nortenos

gang, met with Gilbert to sell him two ounces of cocaine for $1,000. At their meeting place,

Gilbert and a female entered Pineda’s truck. Pineda gave Gilbert the cocaine and Gilbert tossed

a $20 bill at Pineda. When Pineda protested, Gilbert pulled a gun out and told Pineda to drive.

Gilbert put the gun on Pineda’s back while he gave Pineda directions to a hotel in Daly City. 

At the hotel, Andrew Sedillo entered the truck, carrying a roll of duct tape. Sedillo told

Pineda, “‘Oh, you fucked up, you know, you been messing with the Surenos.’” Cal. Ct. App.

Opinion, p. 2. Sedillo also told Pineda it was a ‘call from the pen,’ which Pineda understood to

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mean that someone at the ‘higher level’ had ordered Pineda killed. Id. 

When Sedillo told Pineda to turn off the ignition, Pineda hit the gun from Gilbert’s hand

and jumped out of the truck. Gilbert shot at Pineda as Pineda ran away. Pineda was shot in the

back, chest and legs. Pineda reached a restaurant, where someone called the police. Pineda told

the police initially that his car had been stolen by two black males because he didn’t want to

“snitch” and get his family involved. Pineda later told the police what really happened. 

Later that day, police found Gilbert outside Pineda’s apartment, in possession of a .45

semi-automatic handgun and wearing Pineda’s jacket. An examination of the gun revealed that

the bullets recovered from the shooting scene were fired from Gilbert’s gun. Gunshot residue

was found on Gilbert’s hands. Sedillo’s fingerprints were found on the gun’s magazine and a

strip of duct tape recovered from the vehicle Pineda had been driving, which had been reported

stolen.

At trial, a note written by Sedillo in his jail cell was admitted into evidence. The note

included Sedillo’s name, prison identification number, and the circumstances surrounding

Pineda’s shooting. Sedillo’s note identified Pineda by the tattoo he had on his left leg. The note

contained statements that were used by the prosecution to show that the crimes were for the

benefit of the Nortenos criminal street gang. 

The defense presented evidence of Pineda’s prior drug dealing and encounters with the

police. The defenses of Gilbert and Sedillo focused largely on attacking Pineda’s credibility.

B. Procedural History

Gilbert and Sedillo were both charged with attempted premeditated murder, carjacking,

kidnapping in the commission of carjacking, second degree burglary, assault with a

semiautomatic firearm, and first degree burglary. See Cal. Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664, 215, 209.5,

211, 212.5, 245(b), 460. Gang enhancement allegations were made against both defendants.

Cal. Pen. Code, § 186.22. Arming enhancements were alleged against Sedillo. Cal. Pen. Code,

§ 12022(a)(1). Personal use of a firearm allegations and great bodily injury allegations were

made against Gilbert. See Cal. Pen. Code, §§ 12022.53, 12022.7. 

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The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to join the cases against Sedillo and

Gilbert. The court also denied defendants’ motion to bifurcate trial on the gang enhancement

allegations. A San Mateo County jury found Sedillo and Gilbert guilty on all counts, and found

true all the enhancement allegations. Sedillo was sentenced to state prison for 37 years to life

and Gilbert was sentenced to 40 years to life.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed Gilbert’s conviction and the California Supreme

Court denied Gilbert’s petition for review. 

Gilbert filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 15, 2006. He alleged

that: (1) the joinder of his case with Sedillo’s violated his right to due process, (2) the court’s

denial of his motion to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations from the rest of the trial

violated his right to due process, and (3) the imposition of a forty years to life sentence was cruel

and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

conviction occurred in San Mateo County, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241

(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim

they seek to raise in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). State judicial remedies have been

exhausted for the claims presented in the petition. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or

if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decision but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal

habeas court may nor issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

DISCUSSION

A. Joinder with Co-Defendant

Gilbert contends that his right to due process was violated because the trial court did not

sever his trial from that of his co-defendant. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision

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to consolidate the cases of Gilbert and Sedillo. The appellate court stated, 

“[W]here two or more persons can be jointly tried, the fact that separate accusatory

pleadings were filed shall not prevent their joint trial." ( § 1098.) The prosecutor invoked

this principle when she moved to consolidate the actions against defendants for a single,

joint trial. Over defendants' opposition, the trial court granted the motion. Both Sedillo

and Gilbert contend this ruling was error.

“A ‘classic’ case for joint trial is presented when defendants are charged with common

crimes involving common events and victims.” (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478,

499-500, 250 Cal. Rptr. 550.) The trial court's ruling may be overturned only for abuse

of discretion. (E.g., People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1074-1075.)

This was a textbook case for consolidation. The evidence against each defendant was

very strong. Gilbert arranged the meeting with Pineda and directed him to the location

where Sedillo was waiting. There is nothing to suggest the meeting of Sedillo, Pineda,

and Gilbert was coincidental; on the contrary, it appears that Sedillo and Gilbert

coordinated beforehand that they would confront Pineda once Gilbert had brought Pineda

to where Sedillo was waiting. Sedillo's fingerprint was found on the gun's magazine (as

well as the duct tape he brought), but gunshot residue was found on Gilbert. Sedillo

brought the gun, and used it to threaten Pineda, but it was Gilbert who fired it and kept

it afterwards. In addition to the gun, items of Pineda's personal property were found on

Gilbert when he was arrested.

It is true, as Gilbert maintains, that the direct evidence of gang involvement was stronger

against Sedillo, who wrote the jailhouse letter. It was Sedillo who first aimed the gun at

Pineda and told him he had “fucked up” by “messing with the Surenos.” However, the

jury was instructed to consider the letter only against Sedillo, not Gilbert, and there is

nothing to overcome the presumption that the jury followed this admonition. (E.g.,

People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1014; People v. Davenport (1995) 11

Cal.4th 1171, 1210.)

Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 4-5.

A joinder of co-defendants or counts may prejudice a defendant sufficiently to render his

trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th

Cir. 1997). A federal court reviewing a state conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 does not

concern itself with state law governing severance or joinder in state trials. Id. at 370. Nor is it

concerned with procedural right to severance afforded in federal trials. Id. Its inquiry is limited

to the petitioner's right to a fair trial under the United States Constitution. To prevail, Gilbert

must demonstrate that the state court's joinder or denial of his severance motion resulted in

prejudice great enough to render his trial fundamentally unfair. Id.; see also United States v.

Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986) (“misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional

violation only if it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right

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to a fair trial”). Prejudice is shown if the impermissible joinder had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772

(9th Cir. 2000).

“Antagonism between defenses or the desire of one defendant to exculpate himself by

inculpating a codefendant . . . is insufficient to require severance. . . . To be entitled to severance

on the basis of mutually antagonistic defenses, a defendant must show that the core of the

codefendant's defense is so irreconcilable with the core of his own defense that the acceptance

of the codefendant's theory by the jury precludes acquittal of the defendant.” United States v.

Throckmorton, 87 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1132 (1997).

Gilbert and Sedillo did not have mutually antagonistic defenses. The opening statements

showed that both of their defenses centered on the jury finding that Pineda’s testimony was

untrue. Gilbert’s attorney stated, “that evidence only points to Mr. Gilbert’s guilt, again, if you

believe Edwin Pineda.” RT 138. Similarly, Sedillo’s attorney stated, “Mr. Pineda is not just a

drug dealer and a gang member, he’s a liar and a man with a motive, particularly at this point

with a motive to tell a story that incriminates somebody.” RT 143. The same theme that Pineda

was a completely incredible witness was the centerpiece of each defendant's closing argument.

Their other closing arguments were not completely harmonious, however. Gilbert's counsel also

offered non-guilty explanations for the physical evidence (e.g., the gun possession, gunshot

residue, and presence at Pineda's home) against Gilbert. Gilbert's counsel also argued that

Pineda had chosen to blame Gilbert because he was young and would not pose a threat. See RT

1374. The closest Gilbert's counsel came to arguing adverse to Sedillo's position was to argue

that if the jury believed Pineda at all, Pineda was unsure who fired the shots at him but had

testified that Sedillo was in the truck and Sedillo's fingerprint was on the magazine of the gun.

See RT 1385. By contrast, Sedillo's attorney conceded Gilbert's presence at the scene of the

shooting and at Pineda's home, while arguing the absence of evidence that Sedillo was at either

place. See, e.g., RT 1396, 1419, 1429-32, 1435. Sedillo's attorney also tried to put distance

between Sedillo and Gilbert by conceding that Sedillo was in a gang, but Gilbert was not in the

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gang as a way to show that the crime was not gang-related. See, e.g., RT 1400-01. Sedillo's

attorney offered non-guilty explanations for the physical evidence that connected Sedillo to the

crimes. Significantly, neither Gilbert nor Sedillo presented a theory that he was not guilty

because the other defendant was guilty . . . not surprising because the prosecution evidence was

not of a lone perpetrator, but rather was of a pair of perpetrators. Acceptance of Sedillo's theory

did not preclude acquittal of Gilbert. Their defenses were not irreconcilable. 

The problems that can result from joint trials were addressed and largely avoided at

Gilbert’s trial. The jury was instructed that the prison note was only admissible against Sedillo.

RT 899; CT 272-273. The jury also was told to consider separately each defendant and to

consider separately each count. RT 308-309. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540

(U.S. 1993) (juries presumed to follow a court's limiting instructions with respect to the purposes

for which evidence is admitted). 

As the state appellate court noted, the evidence against each defendant was very strong.

Both defendants had distinct and roughly equal roles in luring and attacking Pineda. A joint trial

made sense for the kidnapping and shooting of a single victim. Both Gilbert and Sedillo were

charged for the same crimes. This was not a case where the defendants each faced different

charges, such that the negative impact of certain charges for a specific defendant would spill

over and prejudice the other defendant’s case. The joinder did not render Gilbert’s trial

fundamentally unfair or have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. 

The California Court of Appeal discussed only the state law claim and did not discuss the

federal constitutional claim arising from the trial court's decision regarding the joinder issue.

When confronted with such an unexplained decision, this court conducts an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision was an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. See Plascencia v. Alameda, 467 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (9th Cir.

2006). Having done so, the court concludes that Gilbert is not entitled to the writ on this claim

because he has not shown that the state court's rejection of his claim was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §

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2254(d). 

B. Request to Bifurcate Trial on Gang Enhancement Allegations

Gilbert claims that his right to due process was violated because the trial court refused

to bifurcate trial on the gang enhancement allegations from trial on the other charges.

Specifically, Gilbert claims that much of the gang evidence was linked to a prison letter that his

co-defendant wrote and “no evidence was presented that Petitioner was a gang member.”

Traverse, p. 7. The state court of appeal rejected Gilbert’s claim, determining that there had not

been a misjoinder under state law and Gilbert had not established there was a substantial danger

of prejudice in allowing the evidence. The appellate court stated that the gang evidence was

relevant during the guilt determination phase of the trial because “it provided the motive for

defendants[] committing the charged offenses. The evidence was clearly material because

motive is always relevant in a criminal proceeding.” Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 7.

A joinder of charges or a failure to separate the guilt from the sentencing phase violates

due process only if the joinder was so prejudicial that the court should have ordered a separate

trial. Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1999). Also, the impermissible joinder must

have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict to

support habeas relief. Id. The admission of evidence violates due process if there are no

permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d

918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Despite Gilbert’s assertion that “no evidence was presented that petitioner was a gang

member,” much of the evidence presented by Officer Andaluz, the prosecution’s gang expert,

was applicable to Gilbert. Andaluz gave extensive testimony regarding the Norteno and Sureno

gangs of San Francisco. RT 859-984. Nortenos are associated with the number 24 and that 24th

Street LNS, Locos North Side, is a subgroup of the Norteno gang and primarily claims the

territory of 24th and Mission streets in San Francisco. RT 866-867. Once gang members have

been “jumped” into the gang, they receive a moniker or nickname. RT 890. The 24th Street

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LNS benefits from crimes committed by its members. RT 911-915. Members commit crimes

to “promote the theory or the idea that they control this area . . . it also instills fear . . . the act of

violence also escalates their status among the gang. It enhances prestige among other gang

members.” RT 914. Moreover, “the more violent you are, the more you are respected.

Sometimes the more ruthless you are . . . you’re thought of almost as a hero among the gang

members.” RT 915. The victim, Pineda, had testified that he knew Gilbert by the nickname

“Moreno” from 24th Street. RT 461, 475-476. 

Here, as the appellate court found, the gang evidence was relevant to Gilbert’s motive to

commit the crime and the jury could have drawn the permissible inference that Gilbert attacked

Pineda in order to benefit the gang. The gang evidence provided an explanation why Gilbert

shot at Pineda after he had already taken his valuables, keys and cocaine and why the stolen

cocaine was returned to Pineda's residence after the shooting. This was not a case where the

“joinder of counts allow[ed] evidence . . . to be introduced in a trial where the evidence would

otherwise be inadmissible.” Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772. Gilbert has not shown he was

prejudiced by the failure to bifurcate because the gang evidence was highly probative at the guilt

determination phase of the trial. The Ninth Circuit has permitted the admission of gang evidence

when used to establish something other than the character of the defendant. See United States

v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984); United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000);

United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1995). Gang enhancement allegations

differ from certain other sentence enhancement allegations, and that difference explains in large

part why they are less likely to warrant a separate trial. In California, "'[a] prior conviction

allegation relates to the defendant's status and may have no connection to the charged offense;

by contrast, the criminal street gang enhancement is attached to the charged offense and is, by

definition, inextricably intertwined with that offense.'" Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 6 (quoting

People v. Hernandez, 33 Cal. 4th 1040, 1048-49 (Cal. 2004)). As a result, there often is less

need for bifurcation, but the trial court still must consider whether the evidence is so unduly

prejudicial that it threatens to sway the jury to convict regardless of actual guilt. Id. at 6-7. 

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Gilbert has not shown that the denial of his motion to bifurcate violated his right to due

process. As with the joinder claim, the California Court of Appeal discussed only the state law

claim and did not discuss the federal constitutional claim arising from the trial court's decision

regarding the bifurcation of trial of the gang enhancement allegation. The state court's

unexplained rejection of the claim required that this court conduct an independent review of the

record to determine whether the state appellate court’s decision was an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. See Plascencia v. Alameda, 467 F.3d at 1197-98. Gilbert is

not entitled to the writ on this claim because he has not shown that the state court's rejection of

his claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law within

the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

C. Eighth Amendment Claim

Gilbert claims that the imposition of a 40-years-to-life sentence was cruel and unusual

punishment. His theory is that his sentence was grossly disproportionate because he was a minor

when he committed the crimes.

There are two types of Eighth Amendment challenges to a criminal sentence. See Harris

v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1996). A petitioner may challenge his sentence as grossly

disproportionate to the crime, or he may claim that it is inconsistent with evolving standards of

decency. 

In rejecting Gilbert’s claim, the appellate court stated, 

Courts have already held that a life sentence for attempted murder is not excessive, either

by itself (e.g., People v. Villegas (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1230-1231; People v.

Morales (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 917, 929-931) or together with a 25-year gun use

enhancement under section 12022.53 (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489,

493-498). Moreover, the 25 years to life maximum sentence under section 12022.53 has

also survived constitutional challenge. (E.g., People v. Zepeda (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th

1183, 1212-1216; People v. Gonzales (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 16-19.)

This court has noted that carjackings “involve confrontation between the perpetrator and

the rightful owner. The confrontation entails great fear, serious injury, and even death.

Violence and use of firearms are not uncommon.” (In re Travis W. (2003) 107

Cal.App.4th 368, 375, 376.) There is no logical reason why kidnapping committed to

facilitate a carjacking cannot justify a life term, when courts have readily held such a term

for kidnapping is not excessive. (E.g., People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52,

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63-64; People v. Smith (1992) 18 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1197, fn. 5; In re Maston (1973) 33

Cal. App. 3d 559, 561-565, 109 Cal. Rptr. 164.)

In order to prevail, Gilbert would have to carry the very substantial burden of

demonstrating that these sentences shock the conscience and offend society's fundamental

beliefs. (E.g., In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d 410, 424.) In reviewing this claim it is

appropriate to consider the nature of the offense and the degree of danger to society.

(Ibid.; People v. Weddle (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1195-1196.) The evidence showed

that, for the benefit of a criminal street gang, Gilbert was the triggerman in a brutal

kidnapping and premeditated attempted murder. He was a full participant in what was

plainly meant to be a cold-blooded ambush killing. Society is clearly endangered by

public shootings with semiautomatic weapons. These cold realities are not nullified

because Gilbert was a minor at the time; there was no evidence that he was unusually

immature, either emotionally or intellectually, as was the 17-year-old in People v. Dillon

(1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390. The judicial conscience has not been shocked

at life sentences for minors committing violent felonies. (See, e.g., People v. Felix (2002)

108 Cal.App.4th 994, 1001; People v. Gonzales, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 17.) 

As for the federal component of Gilbert's contention, in 2003 the United States Supreme

Court held that that it was not cruel and unusual punishment to impose life sentences for

a person who stole $ 84.70 of videotapes and $ 399 of golf clubs (Lockyer v. Andrade

(2003) 538 U.S. 63, 66, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144; Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 155

L. Ed. 2d 108). Granted, these were third strike sentences, while Gilbert has no prior

convictions. On the other hand, Gilbert was not sentenced for a single offense, but a

number of serious and violent crimes. Having concluded that Gilbert's life sentences do

not offend the California Constitution's prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment,

it follows that the sentences do not run afoul of the stricter federal prohibition against

cruel and unusual punishment.

Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 8-9. 

The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and

sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the

crime. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.11, 24-25 (2003) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.

957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Outside the context of capital punishment,

successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences are rare. Solem v. Helm, 463

U.S. 277, 289 (1983). 

As the state appellate court mentioned, the United States Supreme Court has held that it

is not cruel and unusual punishment to impose life sentences for recidivists with current

shoplifting offenses. The Supreme Court has also held that it is not cruel and unusual

punishment to sentence a one-time offender to mandatory life imprisonment without parole for

possessing 672 grams of cocaine. Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957, 1009 (1991). Here, Gilbert

kidnapped and shot a person for the benefit of a criminal street gang. He was convicted of six

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counts and sentenced to forty years to life. Unlike the defendant in Harmelin, Gilbert will be

eligible for parole. Based on the severity of Gilbert’s convictions, his sentence was not grossly

disproportionate to the crime.

The crux of Gilbert’s argument, however, rests on the fact that he was 17 years old at the

time he committed the crimes. Specifically, Gilbert points to his sentencing hearing where

various people testified to his potential to be rehabilitated. In essence, Gilbert argues that his

sentence was grossly disproportionate not because his crimes were not serious, but because of

his limited culpability as a 17 year-old. 

The Ninth Circuit in Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1996), specifically

rejected such an argument and held that the imposition of life sentence without parole for a 15

year old murderer was not grossly disproportionate. The court stated, 

[C]apital punishment aside, there's no constitutional (or rational) basis for classifying

punishment in distinct, ordinal categories. As the Supreme Court noted in Harmelin, 501

U.S. at 996, if we put mandatory life imprisonment without parole into a unique

constitutional category, we'll be hard pressed to distinguish mandatory life with parole;

the latter is nearly indistinguishable from a very long, mandatory term of years; and that,

in turn, is hard to distinguish from shorter terms. Youth has no obvious bearing on this

problem: If we can discern no clear line for adults, neither can we for youths.

Accordingly, while capital punishment is unique and must be treated specially, mandatory

life imprisonment without parole is, for young and old alike, only an outlying point on

the continuum of prison sentences. 

Harris, 93 F.3d at 584-85. Similarly, life imprisonment in Gilbert’s case is not grossly

disproportionate simply because he committed the crime when he was 17 years old. 

Evolving standards of decency also do not preclude the imposition of life imprisonment

for a prisoner who committed the crime while he was a minor. Evolving standards of decency

should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent. Atkins v. Virginia, 536

U.S. 304, 312 (2002). The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values

is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures. Id. at 311-312. However, the court must

also bring its own judgment to the case by asking “whether there is a reason to disagree with the

judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.” Id. at 313.

In 2005, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a majority of states rejected the

imposition of the death penalty for offenders under 18 and that evolving standards of decency

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required the prohibition of the death penalty for minors. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568

(2005). Roper overruled Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), which had allowed capital

punishment for minors. The Roper Court recognized, “[t]o the extent Stanford was based on

review of the objective indicia of consensus that obtained in 1989, it suffices to note that those

indicia have changed.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. The trend towards forbidding capital

punishment in other contexts (see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (execution of mentally

retarded offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment)) and the increased knowledge

regarding a juvenile’s culpability and immaturity, led to the Court’s decision that common

standards of decency no longer permitted the execution of juveniles. Id. at 569-74. 

 When Gilbert committed his crimes in 2001, Roper did not exist and Stanford was still

the law. If the death penalty did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment for minors, neither

did life imprisonment. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in Harris found that the imposition of life

imprisonment for a minor did not offend evolving standards of decency. Harris, 93 F.3d at 583-

84. Even if Roper had existed at the time the California courts considered Gilbert’s claim, it

would not have required relief because Roper specifically recognized that the death penalty

receives special consideration under the Eighth Amendment. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. The state

court’s determination that Gilbert’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment is not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 12, 2007 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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