Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01494/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01494-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Davood Khademi
Plaintiff
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Placer
Defendant
United States of America
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVOOD KHADEMI,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF 

PLACER, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-CV-1494-KJM-DMC-P

FINDINGS AND RECCOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 

means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 

1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 

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complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 

claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Superior Court of the State of 

California for the County of Placer (Superior Court); and (2) the United States of America. See

ECF No. 1, pg. 1. Below are plaintiff’s factual allegations as best understood by this court. 

It appears that on April 29, 2017, plaintiff was arrested as the result of a physical 

altercation between himself and another individual. After this arrest, he was booked, charged with 

an offense, and provided with legal counsel from the Placer County Public Defender’s Office. 

According to plaintiff, this counsel apparently gave “inadequate representation” and plaintiff was 

subsequently placed in a state mental health facility. At this facility, plaintiff was given 

psychiatric medication which caused him adverse side-effects including memory damage. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him with 

adequate legal counsel and then subsequently ordering him to receive unnecessary mental health 

treatment. Plaintiff also alleges that, after his arrest, he was denied adequate law library access 

and access to a speedy trial. As a result of these instances of misconduct, plaintiff claims to have 

suffered a deprivation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id.

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II. DISCUSSION

The court finds plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of defects. 

Specifically: (1) neither named defendant may be sued under § 1983; and (2) claims related to the 

validity of his underlying criminal proceedings or judgment are not cognizable under § 1983.

A. Improper Defendants

1. Superior Court of the State of California

Defendant Superior Court of the State of California is immune from suit under the 

Eleventh Amendment. “[S]tates, state agencies, and state officials cannot be sued in their official 

capacities for money damages, under § 1983, because of the protection under the Eleventh 

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” Cox v. Cty. of L.A., No. 2:19-cv-07702-PA (SHK), 2019 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198014, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2019) (citations omitted). It is well 

established that the Superior Court is a California state agency. See id.; see also Greater Los 

Angeles Counsel on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, this 

federal action is barred under the Eleventh Amendment as to the Superior Court and it would be 

futile to grant plaintiff leave to amend. 

2. United States of America

Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim against defendant United States of 

America. “Traditionally, the requirements for relief under [§] 1983 have been articulated as: (1) a 

violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately 

caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acing under color of state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947 

F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). While municipalities and other local government units are

considered “persons” to which § 1983 may apply, the “United States of America,” as a named 

defendant, is not. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). This defect is

fatal as to plaintiff’s § 1983 action against the United States and may not be cured by granting 

leave to amend. 

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B. Non-Cognizable Claims

Plaintiff alleges two claims related to his underlying state court criminal 

proceedings and/or judgement. Specifically, plaintiff alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and 

violation of his speedy trial rights. Neither claim is cognizable under § 1983. When a state 

prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is 

entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser 

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 

1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Thus, where 

a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief alleges constitutional violations 

which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s underlying conviction or sentence, 

or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing resulting in imposition of a sanction affecting the 

overall length of confinement, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction 

or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through some similar 

proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 claim 

not cognizable because allegations were akin to malicious prosecution action which includes as 

an element a finding that the criminal proceeding was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield 

v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable 

because allegations of procedural defects were an attempt to challenge substantive result in parole 

hearing); cf. Neal, 131 F.3d at 824 (concluding that § 1983 claim was cognizable because 

challenge was to conditions for parole eligibility and not to any particular parole determination); 

cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (concluding that § 1983 action seeking changes in 

procedures for determining when an inmate is eligible for parole consideration not barred because 

changed procedures would hasten future parole consideration and not affect any earlier parole 

determination under the prior procedures).

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Here, neither of plaintiff’s claims relating to his underlying court proceedings 

and/or judgement relate to his condition of confinement. Claims alleging ineffective legal counsel 

or violation of constitutional rights at trial are better addressed in a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus than under § 1983.

III. CONCLUSION

Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be 

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of 

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed 

with prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 13, 2020

____________________________________

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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