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Parties Involved:
Angie Dikeman
Appellant
Bryan Dikeman
Appellant
Angela L. Field
Appellee
Philip W. Hopkins
Appellee
National Educators, Inc.
Appellee
Reed And Hopkins, P.C.
Appellee
Darryl Sampson
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

BRYAN DIKEMAN and ANGIE DIKEMAN, 

Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 

vs. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

NATIONAL EDUCATORS, INC., ) 

d/b/a CONTINENTAL COLLECTION ) 

AGENCY, LTD., ANGELAL. FIELD, ) 

DARRYLS~SON,~aROBERT~ON, ) 

PHILIP W. HOPKINS and ) 

REED AND HOPKINS, P.C., ) 

Defendants/ Appellees 

) 

) 

No. 94-1197 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 93-N-185) 

Vmcent C. Todd, Lakewood, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Thomas C. Helgeson (Jerome V. Porter and Elizabeth S. Kreis with him on the brief), Wheat Ridge, 

Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, HENRY, Circuit Judge, and COOK,* District Judge 

COOK, District Judge 

* The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern, 

Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-1197 Document: 01019279276 Date Filed: 04/11/1996 Page: 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 

This case comes before us on the appeal of the plaintiffs after a jury verdict for the defendants. 

The plaintiffs seek damages for alleged violations of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act 

(FDCPA). The plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of their claim that a statutorily required disclosure 

was not made, from the refusal of one proposed jury instruction and from one jury instruction that 

was made over their objection. 

In November of 1992, Darryl Sampson, an employee acting on behalf of the Continental 

Collection Agency (Continental), contacted the appellants Brian and Angela Dikeman in an attempt 

to collect rent and other charges claimed by the Aztec Villa Apartments, where the Dikemans had 

previously resided. Within thirty days of the initial communication, the appellants, acting through 

counse~ requested verification of the debt under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. Continental and Darryl 

Sampson responded to appellants' counsel with a letter of December 9, 1992 and additional pages of 

documentation of the amount owed. Nowhere in the papers submitted by way of verification did 

there appear any verbal statement1 disclosing that the debt collector was attempting to collect a debt 

and that any information obtained would be used for that purpose. 2 

Attorneys for Continental prepared a county court complaint claiming $1, 138.55, including 

$1 SO in attorney fees. The amount of the debt was overstated in the verification and the initial 

In this opinion, the term "verbal" shall mean oral or written. The term "verbal statement" 

shall mean an oral or written statement expressly stating the content of what is communicated. 

2 The defendants' brief alleges that the initial communication with the Dikemans specifically 

advised the Dikemans of their rights under the FDCP A. The record on appeal and the plaintiffs' 

brief is not clear on this point; however, it is apparent that the Dikemans sought the assistance of 

an attorney and must have become aware of the nature of the situation. In oral argument, the 

plaintiffs conceded that they suffered no damage as a result of the alleged failure to disclose and 

that their claim was of a purely technical violation. 

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complaint.3 In response to further inquiry,4 Darryl Sampson and Continental determined that Aztec 

Villa Apartments had overstated the amount of the debt. Sampson and Continental, however, made 

no subsequent written verification reflecting the correct amount of the debt. 5 Whatever may have 

been the nature of the error,6 it is clear that after discovering the error the defendants amended their 

complaint to reduce the claim on account of the error. There is nothing in the record on appeal to 

suggest that the defendants attempted to collect the overstatement of their verification before or after 

amending their complaint aside from the act of serving and filing of the original complaint. 

The initial complaint was served on the plaintiffs on December 19, 1992 and filed December 

22, 1992. The amended complaint, filed on January 13, 1993, claimed $612.78, which amount also 

included $150 for attorney fees. After some discovery, the plaintiffs tendered unconditional payment 

of $206.11, an amount they did not dispute. Continental voluntarily withdrew the county court 

action. 

The appellants then brought this action in federal court under the Federal Debt Collection 

Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et. seq. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants 

violated the Act by: (1) failing to provide a statutorily required disclosure in their communication with 

the debtor's attorney, (2) attempting to collect an attorney fee in excess of that which was actually 

3 We use the term "verification" to describe the papers sent to the plaintiffs and not to 

express an opinion as to whether these papers meet the statutory requirement of a verification or 

validation. 

4 Presumably the inquiry was from counsel for the plaintiffs. 

The defendants claim this was done orally. 

6 The appellants' appendix does not make the nature of the error clear and the appellants' 

brief does not state the nature of the error. The appellees' brief states that the debt collector later 

discovered that the apartment had been re-rented resulting in some reduction of the amount owed. 

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incurred, and (3) commencing their county court action before verifying the correct amount of the 

debt. 

.In the court below, the jury evidently viewed the verification overstating the amount owed 

as not being a validation of the debt under the statute and found that the defendants had "commenced 

suit against the Plaintiffs without providing validation of a disputed debt." Nevertheless, the jury also 

found that this error was unintentional and made in good faith. 7 

ll. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 

The first issue in this case is whether the trial court correctly held as a matter of law that the 

disclosure requirement of15 U.S.C. § 1692e (11) was not violated. We review such questions oflaw 

de novo. Jenkinsv. Heintz, 25 F.3d 536,538 (7thCir. 1994), aff'd, _U.S.__, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 

131 L.Ed.2d 395 (1995). Resolution ofthis issue requires the interpretation of statutory language 

defining the following as one form of"false or misleading representation": 

Except as otherwise provided for communications to acquire location information 

under section 1692b of this title, the failure to disclose clearly in all communications 

made to collect a debt or to obtain information about a consumer, that the debt 

collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used 

for that purpose. 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e (11). 

7 The appellants' appendix in this case does not document many of the background facts 

related above. For purposes of this opinion, we have assumed some undocumented statements 

contained in the appellants' brief to be true. We d~ this not because we accept these facts as true 

but to demonstrate on a rather incomplete record on appeal that the appellees should prevail even 

accepting the facts as the appellants state them. Although any disputes as to the core facts stated 

above appear to be minor, we nevertheless point out that we would not necessarily have been 

willing to rely on these facts to justify a decision in the appellants' favor. 

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The precise legal question we address here is whether the required statutory disclosure of§ 

1692e (II) must be included in a verbal statement in communications to an attorney when the matters 

required to be disclosed would be clear to an attorney from the communication viewed in context. 1 

"In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and 

when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the 

most extraordinary circumstance, is finished." Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co.,. 505 U.S. 

469, 475, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2594, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992). In the case before us, our inquiry begins 

with meaning of the word "disclose".9 However, in construing the statute we also look to other 

provisions of the Act to determine the purpose of the law and the context in which the word is used. 

1 The court below held that the verification of a debt was not a communication made to 

collect a debt subject to the disclosure requirement of§ 1692e (I 1). We will affirm a decision for 

any reason that finds support in the record. Parks v. LR.S., 618 F.2d 677 (lOth Cir. 1980). In 

this case, it is possible to affirm with a more narrow holding than that relied upon by the court 

below. Accordingly, we do not reach the issue addressed by the trial court, but merely note that 

under our decision, the judgment below is properly affirmed regardless of whether the trial court 

was correct in determining that the verification of a debt "was not a communication made to 

collect a debt." 

We also need not address the question, which has split the circuits, regarding whether the 

disclosure requirement applies to follow-up notices. Pressley v. Capital Credit & Collection 

Service, Inc., 760 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1985); Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied,·_ U.S.__, 115 S.Ct. 2613, 132 L.Ed.2d 856 (1995); Carroll v. Wolpofl and 

Abramson, 961 F.2d 459 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 905, 113 S.Ct. 298, 121 L.Ed.2d 222 

(1992); Dutton v. Wolpoff and Abramson, 5 F.3d 649 (3d Cir. 1993); Frey v. Gangwish, 970 F.2d 

1516 (6th Cir. 1992) and Pipi/es v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1989). 

For purposes of this decision, we will assume, without deciding, that the disclosure 

requirement does apply to subsequent notices, including communications to verify a debt. 

9 A number of terms are defined at the beginning of Subchapter V on Debt Collection 

Practices at 15 U.S. C.§ 1692, but neither the word "disclose" nor the word "disclosure" are 

among the defined terms. 

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The term "disclose" used in the statute is, viewed in isolation, ambiguous as to whether a 

verbal statement is required. 10 We contrast the use of "disclose" in this subsection with the use of 

"statement" in§ 1692g of the same subchapter to define the requirements for disclosure by creditors 

in a different context. The definition of the word "statement" focuses on express communication 

orally or in writing. The word "statement" also suggests intentional communication and, it also 

connotes literal verbal communication. The word "disclosure" does not have as strong a connotation 

of intention or verbal expression as does the word "statement" .

11 

10 The Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1981) defines "disclose," in part, as 

follows: 

1 obs : to open up : UNCLOSE 2 a : to expose to view : lay open or uncover 

(something hidden from view) b: to make known: open up to general knowledge~ 

esp: to reveal in words (something that is secret or not generally known): 

DIVULGE syn see REVEAL 

Although one definition says that "disclose" especially means to reveal in words, it is clear 

that a number of definitions do not require verbal statements. Further, where a communication is 

made in words, the disclosure made by those words need not be made expressly or intentionally 

by the writer of the words. The word "disclose" can be construed to include matters inferable 

from the very nature and fact of a written communication. 

Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) defines "disclose" similarly: "To bring into view by 

uncovering~ to expose~ to make known~ to lay bare~ to reveal to knowledge; to free from secrecy 

or ignorance, or make known. See Discovery." Similarly, the related term "disclosure" is defined: 

"Act of disclosing. Revelation~ the impartation of that which is secret or not fully understood." 

The definition of"disclosure" points out that under the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601 

et. seq.), there are detailed requirements of disclosure, but that statutory scheme is very much 

more particulariZed than the general disclosure requirement of§ 1692e ( 11 ). 

11 Among the definitions of "statement" given in the Webster's Third New International 

Dictionary (1981) are "a formal declaration required by law or made in the course of some official 

proceeding," and "PROPOsmoN". A definition of "proposition" that refers back to the word 

statement is as follows: "a declarative sentence : an expression in language, symbols or signs of 

something capable of being believed, doubted or denied: a verbal expression that is either true or 

false -- called also statement." Black's Law Dictionary indicates that nonverbal conduct may be a 

statement 

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We also take note that§ 1692e (11) does not place the required disclosure in quotation marks 

or set forth any specific required wording for the disclosure but merely defines what the content of 

the required disclosure will be: "that the debt collector is attempting ... "(emphasis added) /d 

The definition of the tenn "disclose" is sufficiently ambiguous that, in an appropriate context, 

it could be construed to include other forms of making facts known than verbal statements. To 

determine whether such a broad construction is appropriate with regard to this subsection in this 

circumstance we look to the nature of the legal requirement, the nature of the recipient of the 

communication, the larger statutory context and the purposes of the statute as stated at the beginning 

of the subchapter of which the disputed statutory language is a part. 

We begin our analysis with the language of the section at issue. The disclosure requirement 

here is contained in a subsection of§ 1692e. That section prohibits generally "false, deceptive, or 

misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." The section then 

lists examples of such improper conduct "[w]ithout limiting the general application of the foregoing." 

/d The section does not say the reverse, however; that the more general language of§ 1692e cannot 

be considered in limiting the scope of ambiguous terms used in the subsections. 

In view of the purpose of§ 1692e (11) to define a form of deceptive or misleading means 

used in connection With the collection of a debt, we are reluctant to conclude that there is a deceptive 

or misleading practice in the mere failure to disclose by verbal statement to a lawyer what should be 

clear to the lawyer from the fact of the communication, its nature, contents and context. 12 We are 

under the rules of hearsay, but these definitions are clearly set forth in the cited statutes. See FED. 

R EVID. 80l(a). 

12 Of course, we are not saying that the protections contained in§ 1692e(11) do not apply 

when collecting debts from lawyers. If a debt collector seeks to collect a debt from a lawyer, then 

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here inclined to adopt a broad construction of the word "disclose" in part because to do otherwise 

would characterize this particular form of innocent and sufficient communication as deceptive or 

misleading, contrary to the plain meaning of the language of the section in which the word is used. 

In a factual situation where the failure to make the required disclosure by verbal statement 

might be misleading to a lawyer, the statute may require disclosure by verbal statement of such of the 

required information as is not obvious to a lawyer, 13 but those are not the facts before us here. In ·this 

case the lawyer to whom the communication was made requested the communication in the course 

of representing his clients on the collection matter. The verification contained a cover letter with a 

letterhead stating "Continental Collection Agency, Ltd.", a signed "Statement of Deposit Accounts" 

itemizing the rent and other fees claimed with a bottom line stating the "TOTAL AMOUNT DUE 

OWNER", the lease agreement and copies of move in and move out reports on the condition of the 

property showing a cleaning charge of $160. 

The legal implications of communicating with a debt collector would be especially within the 

professional competence of a lawyer hired to represent a client's interests in the collection process, 

and the fact that a communication is made to collect a debt is something that the lawyer's professional 

expertise would allow him or her to discern easily on facts such as these. In short, both elements 

required to be disclosed would have been clear to a lawyer from the requested verification. 

the full force ofthe FDCPA applies to the debt collector's activity, just as it would ifthe person 

owing the alleged debt was not a lawyer. 

13 For example, it is possible that in certain factual contexts a communication might be made 

to an attorney representing a debtor in such a manner that either it is not obvious that the 

communicator is a debt collector or it is not obvious that the debt collector is attempting to 

collect a debt from the lawyer's client. The disclosure requirement still applies and a disclosure by 

verbal statement within the communication of the facts that are not apparent may be necessary in 

such a situation. 

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In our interpretation of the word "disclose", we also rely on the statement of purposes at the 

beginning of the subchapter in § 1692 (e), which says: "It is the purpose of this subchapter to 

eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who 

refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to 

promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses." (emphasis 

added) 

The failure to make a verbal statement to a lawyer of what would be clear to a lawyer from 

the communication viewed in context is not fairly characterized as an abusive debt collection practice 

nor does failure to make a verbal disclosure give a competitive advantage to any debt collector, other 

than a de minimis savings of time, because the debtor's representative will know just as much 

regardless of whether a verbal disclosure is made. In addition, since the Act is for consumer 

protection and the disclosure requirement is designed to protect such consumers as may not have the 

sophistication to appreciate the significance of debt collection communications, it is not likely that 

Congress imagined that verbal statements of characterizations and legal implications obvious to an 

attorney would ordinarily be required in communications made to a debtor's attomey. 14 

14 We emphasize that in making our decision, we rely heavily on the professional status and 

representative role of the lawyer, as contrasted with that of a consumer, the kind of person the 

statute is designed to protect. We do not by this decision hold that the disclosure requirement can 

be satisfied without a verbal statement in the case of a direct communication with the debtor 

simply because the debtor happens to be knowledgeable about the law or even a practicing 

lawyer. We note that at least one court has held that "the FDCPA protects all consumers, the 

gullible as well as the shrewd." Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993). See also 

Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1989), Emanuel v. American 

Credit Exchange, 870 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1989) and Dutton v. Wolpoff and Abramson, 5 F.Jd 

649 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the requirement to disclose that an attempt is being made to 

collect a debt need not always be made expressly to a consumer, but the debt collector must 

expressly warn that information obtained will be used against the consumer). It is enough for 

purposes of deciding this case to note that regardless of the standard used for communications 

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Accordingly, we hold that the fact of the debt verification and its content, viewed in context, 

was adequate to disclose to an attorney hired to represent the debtor that the debt cOllector was 

attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained would be used for that purpose within 

the meaning of§ 1692e (II).15 A disclosure pursuant to§ 1692e (II) by verbal statement would be 

a pointless formality and is not required in such a situation. 

ill. CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES 

The plaintiffs argue that a claim for $150 in attorney fees in the complaint against them was 

a violation of 15 U.S. C. § 1692f They argue that the refusal of the trial judge to instruct the jury that 

the defendants could only seek attorney fees if allowed by contract was prejudicial to their case "in 

light of the jury's finding that the Defendants did not collect or ~empt to collect amounts not 

permitted by the contract or authorized by law." In their statement of issues, the plaintiffs frame the 

issue as whether the complaint demanding $I 50 in attorney fees violated 15 U.S. C. § I692f That 

section prohibits the use of unfair and unconscionable means of collecting or attempting to collect 

with consumers, a lawyer acting as the representative of a debtor is not, in that capacity, a 

consumer under the Act. 15 U.S. C. § I692a. 

We also emphasize that the alleged deceptive practice in this case was not a misleading 

representation but an omission to include a verbal warning under a statute that requires the debt 

collector to "disclose" something. We are not holding here that an affirmative misrepresentation 

to a lawyer would be excusable merely because a lawyer could see through the false statement. 

15 We limit our holding to the facts of this case. Certainly, different circumstances may require 

the creditor to make the disclosure contained in§ 1692e(11) in its communications with a debtor's 

lawyer. We are cognizant of§ 1692e(11)'s requirement that "in all communications made to 

collect a debt or to obtain information about a consumer," it must be disclosed that the debt 

collector is attempting to collect a debt (emphasis added). However, in the present case, it would 

be somewhat absurd to require this disclosure when the debtor's lawyer requested the 

communication from the creditor concerning the collection matter at issue. That is, plaintiffs' 

lawyer knew that Continental was attempting to collect a debt, and§ 1692e(II)'s disclosure 

requirement would not afford any additional protections to the consumer. 

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a debt. Subsection 1 of that section specifically prohibits: "The collection of any amount (including 

any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is 

expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law." 

We find that the record on appeal is inadequate, and we are therefore unable to review this 

tssue. The documents which the plaintiffs submitted are incomplete in that they do not fully detail 

the substance of this issue, nor do they sufficiently convey all the facts which form the basis of the 

issue. Further, we are not convinced that the plaintiffs adequately documented that this issue was 

preserved for appeal, and we thus refrain from addressing the substance of the plaintiffs' claim. An 

appellant who provides an inadequate record does so at his peril. Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 969 

F.2d 977,978-79 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

IV. BONA FIDE ERROR INSTRUCTION 

The jury's third finding states: "Defendants National Educators, Inc., d/b/a Continental 

Collection Agency, Ltd. and Angela L. Field did commence suit against the plaintiffs without 

providing validation of a disputed debt." The jury also found good faith and a bona fide error defense 

as to this finding. The plaintiff argues that there was not sufficient evidence to support the bona fide 

error defense to the third finding and appeals the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on this issue. 

"An erroneous jury instruction requires reversal only if, after review of the record as a whole, 

we determine the error to have been prejudicial." United States v. Caro, 965 F.2d 1548 (1Oth Cir. 

1992). At trial, when the defendant proffered the disputed instruction on bona fide error, its attorney 

referred to testimony from two agency employees that was intended to lay the foundation for the 

instruction. It is apparent that these witnesses would have supplied the evidence, if anyone did. 

However, their complete testimony was not furnished to us on appeal. If plaintiffs challenge the 

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.. sufficiency of that testimony, it is not unreasonable to expect the plaintiffs to have provided it. We 

therefore find it unnecessary to reach the merits of this issue because of the inadequate record 

provided. Deines, 969 F .2d at 978-79. 

Affirmed. 

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