Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01047/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Redline Detection, LLC
Appellant
Star Envirotech, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

REDLINE DETECTION, LLC,

Appellant

v.

STAR ENVIROTECH, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1047

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2013-

00106.

______________________ 

Decided: December 31, 2015

______________________ 

 MATTHEW NEWBOLES, Stetina, Brunda, Garred & 

Brucker, Aliso Viejo, CA, argued for appellant. Also 

represented by GREGORY CLARKSON, LOWELL ANDERSON.

BRENTON R. BABCOCK ̧ Knobbe, Martens, Olson & 

Bear, LLP, Irvine, CA, argued for appellee. Also represented by JARED C. BUNKER, EDWARD A. SCHLATTER. 

JEREMIAH HELM, Office of the Solicitor, United States 

Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for 

intervenor. Also represented by JOSEPH MATAL, JAMIE 

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2 REDLINE DETECTION, LLC v. STAR ENVIROTECH, INC. 

LYNNE SIMPSON, SCOTT WEIDENFELLER, THOMAS W.

KRAUSE. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Redline Detection, LLC (“Redline”) appeals 

the inter partes review (“IPR”) decision of the United 

States Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO” or “the 

Office”) Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“the PTAB” or 

“the Board”), which denied Redline’s motion to submit 

supplemental information under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(a) 

(2012) and found Redline failed to show that claims 9 and 

10 of U.S. Patent No. 6,526,808 (the “’808 patent”) would 

have been obvious. See Redline Detection, LLC v. Star 

Envirotech, Inc., IPR2013-00106, 2014 WL 2995050

(P.T.A.B. June 30, 2014) (J.A. 36–75) (“Final Decision”). 

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

I. The ’808 Patent

Appellee Star Envirotech, Inc. (“STAR”) owns the ’808 

patent, which relates to methods of generating smoke for 

use in volatile and explosive environments. Specifically, 

the ’808 patent describes methods for generating smoke 

that “enables the presence and location of leaks in a fluid 

system (e.g. the evaporative or brake system of a motor 

vehicle) to be accurately and visually detected depending 

upon rate of the air flow through the fluid system under 

test and whether smoke escapes from the system.” ’808 

patent col. 1 ll. 12–16. A partial schematic of the smokegenerating apparatus is depicted below.

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Id. fig.1.

This apparatus “includes a sealed chamber 6 which 

contains a non-toxic oil supply 8. An air inlet tube 10 

projects upwardly from the bottom of chamber 6 and 

extends above the oil supply 8.” Id. col. 3 ll. 25–28. “An 

inlet orifice 12 is formed in the air inlet tube 10 so as to 

lie within the oil supply 8 immediately above the bottom 

of chamber 6. A resistor heating grid (e.g. coil) 14 extends 

laterally across the sealed chamber 6 . . . .” Id. col. 3 ll. 

30–34. The “fluid baffle 18” contains “a smoke outlet 

orifice 20” that “extends laterally across the sealed chamber 6 above the heating grid 14.” Id. col. 3 ll. 35–38. 

Alternative embodiments allow for the use of nitrogen 

(“N2”) or carbon dioxide (“CO2”) gas in place of air for 

testing high-pressure systems (e.g., air brakes) with high 

operating temperatures without the risk of an explosion. 

Id. col. 6 ll. 63–67. “A mixture of air [or inert gas] and oil 

is then blown upwardly and outwardly from the air inlet 

tube 10 towards and into contact with the heating grid

[14], whereby the[] oil is instantaneously vaporized into 

smoke.” Id. col 3 ll. 47–50. The resulting “smoke travels 

through the outlet orifice 20[] in fluid baffle 18 for receipt 

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by the smoke outlet line 2.” Id. col. 3 ll. 50–52. This 

smoke is carried by the smoke supply line 4 “to the fluid 

system to be tested so that the integrity of the system 

may be visually inspected for leaks depending upon the 

absence or presence of smoke escaping therefrom.” Id. col. 

3 ll. 52–56. 

II. Prior Art

The prior art discloses various methods to generate

smoke—e.g., combusting smoke-producing fluid with a 

heating element, vaporizing mixtures of oil and CO2 gas, 

and vaporizing small droplets of oil dispersed in a stream 

of inert gas. Each of these methods advance smoke generating technology, but these methods are not suitable for 

leak testing closed systems that have volatile hydrocarbons. The ’808 patent generates smoke that can be used 

to test closed and potentially explosive systems for leaks. 

A. Gilliam

U.S. Patent No. 5,107,698 (“Gilliam”) describes methods and devices for detecting leaks in fluid systems via 

smoke. J.A. 972–82. Figure 3 of Gilliam is depicted 

below. 

Gilliam fig.3. 

“Smoke-generating assembly 35 includes [air] pump 

15, thermistor 8, spike-protecting diode 9, switch 10, and 

ceramic heating element 11. A smoke-producing fluid is 

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poured into chamber 20 through filler port 6.” Id. col. 6 ll. 

20–23. Smoke is circulated throughout the system by air 

pump 15. If heating element 11 becomes “submerged, 

vaporization is prevented and the fluid is merely heated 

and eventually reaches it boiling point.” Id. col. 6 ll. 38–

41. When the heating element 11 becomes sufficiently 

hot, the smoke-producing fluid vaporizes within chamber 

40. The generated smoke then passes through “conduit 

22 into the vacuum system connected thereto for leak 

testing purposes.” Id. col 8 ll. 11–13. Thus, the “[s]moke 

generating fluid should preferably be non-flammable and 

non-toxic.” Id. col. 5 ll. 67–68.

Because temperature control of the heating element is 

important to this prior art, Gilliam discloses several 

preferred embodiments for controlling temperature. See, 

e.g., id. col. 7 ll. 1–4, 14–18, 26–28. Additionally, the 

“spark-arrestor 3 prevents sparks or even flames from 

entering a vehicle’s engine, thereby causing an explosion. 

Flames could be generated . . . if a flammable fluid mixture was inadvertently created in chamber 20.” Id. col. 7 

ll. 55–59. 

B. Stoyle

Great Britain Patent No. 1,240,867 (“Stoyle”) (J.A. 

1004–08) describes an apparatus for “heating [] oil or 

other mixtures of oil and [CO2], oil and water, or oil, [CO2] 

and water to produce smoke or mist . . . for testing ventilation systems or for theatrical effects.” Stoyle p. 1 ll. 11–

17. Figure 3 of Stoyle is depicted below.

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Id. fig.3. 

“The fluid inlet means 14 are connected to a generator 

capable of producing a foam of oil and [CO2] gas. The 

oil/gas mixture is forced into the space 7 and, passing 

through the gaps between the knurlings, eventually 

reaches the outlet means 10, where it emerges in the form 

of a mist or smoke.” Id. p. 2 ll. 101–08. This allows for “a 

relatively large contact area for heating the oil/gas mixture[,] . . . [making] the heating very uniform and easy to 

control.” Id. p. 2 ll. 109–11, 118–19. Additionally, this 

apparatus permits the “production of oil smokes and 

mists with a relatively lower proportion of gas in the 

mixture by comparison with other types of heater[s].” Id.

p. 3 ll. 15–18. 

C. Pauley

Great Britain Patent No. 640,266 (“Pauley”) (J.A. 

1010–15) describes an apparatus for generating an 

opaque fog, for use in theatrical work, that is “sufficiently 

heavy in weight by comparison with the surrounding air,” 

Pauley p. 2 ll. 20–22, such that the fog can “‘lay’ conveniently without quickly melting or drifting away,” id. p. 2 

ll. 51–52. Figure 1 of Pauley is depicted below. 

Id. fig.1.

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“[G]lycerine, oil or other suitable liquid is sprayed in 

atomised form by means of a jet of [CO2 or N2 gas] under 

pressure on to a surface sufficiently heated as to cause an 

immediate vaporisation of the liquid.” Id. p. 1 ll. 26–31. 

This “vapour . . . [is] propelled along . . . [and] cooled 

again by the expanding gas.” Id. p. 1 ll. 31–34. The 

cooled liquid condenses to form a heavy fog or mist. Id. p. 

2 ll. 37–38. Using inert gas to propel and cool the vaporized liquid is advantageous “because its presence greatly 

reduces any tendency to ignition of the vapour should the 

liquid medium be one of an inflammable nature.” Id. p. 2 

ll. 42–47. 

D. 1999 Website

Applications for the Smoke Generator, published on 

the Internet in 1999, disclose potential uses of smoke 

generators sold by third party, Corona Integrated Technologies, Inc. J.A. 1038–41 (“the 1999 Website”). The 

1999 Website discloses that smoke generators produce a 

non-hazardous, thermal fog, which could be used for leak 

testing. J.A. 1039–40. In particular, the 1999 Website 

explains that “[o]ur smoke machines have been used to 

detect leaks in a broad range of systems, including asbestos enclosures, flues and chimneys, luggage holds of 

aircraft and ships, freight containers, vehicles and drainage and fire sprinkler systems.” J.A. 1039. 

III. Proceedings

In January 2013, Redline filed a corrected IPR Petition with the PTAB, requesting review of claims 9 and 10 

of the ’808 patent.1 This IPR was instituted on July 1, 

1 The ’808 patent underwent two ex parte reexaminations. The first ex parte reexamination certificate 

issued in July 2011: (1) claim 9 was patentable as amended; (2) new claim 10 was added and determined to be 

patentable; and (3) claims 1–8 were not reexamined. The 

 

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2013. On July 30, 2013, Redline filed a Motion for Supplemental Disclosure of New Exhibits, requesting submission of four pieces of evidence. In August 2013, the PTAB 

denied Redline’s request to submit supplemental information and expunged the submitted evidence from the 

record. The PTAB subsequently issued its Final Decision 

on June 30, 2014, finding Redline failed to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that claims 9 and 10 of the 

’808 patent would have been: (1) obvious over Gilliam and 

Stoyle; and (2) obvious over Gilliam, Pauley, and the 1999 

Website. Redline timely appealed. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 

§ 143 (2012), the Director of the USPTO intervened in 

March 2015. This court has jurisdiction to review the 

PTAB’s Final Decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A)

(2012) and 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2012). 

DISCUSSION

I. USPTO’s Interpretation of its Regulations Accords With 

Law

On appeal, Redline argues the PTAB erred in denying 

its motion to submit supplemental information for three 

reasons. First, Redline argues the regulatory history of 

37 C.F.R. § 42.123 demonstrates the USPTO has already 

incorporated its statutory mandate into the three tier 

scheme of subsections (a) through (c) of that regulation 

and, thus, the PTAB cannot “mix and match” these requirements at its discretion. Second, Redline argues the 

plain language of § 42.123(a) precludes the imposition of 

any additional criteria beyond the plain language of the 

regulation. Finally, Redline argues the PTAB’s decision 

was arbitrary and capricious because Petitioners in other 

IPR proceedings were allowed to submit supplemental 

information. We address each argument in turn.

second ex parte reexamination certificate issued in May 

2012 with no amendments to the patent. 

 

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A. Deference Is Accorded to the PTAB’s Interpretation of 

USPTO Regulations 

This court accepts the PTAB’s “interpretation of 

[USPTO] regulations unless that interpretation is ‘plainly 

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’” In re 

Sullivan, 362 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations 

omitted), or conflicts with the USPTO’s “intent at the time 

of the regulation’s promulgation,” Gardebring v. Jenkins, 

485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988). We review the PTAB’s decision 

of how it manages its permissive rules of trial proceedings 

for an abuse of discretion. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wash., 334 F.3d 1264, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 

2003). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision (1) is 

clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on 

an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact findings; or (4) involves a record that contains 

no evidence on which the Board could rationally base its 

decision.” Abrutyn v. Giovanniello, 15 F.3d 1048, 1050–51 

(Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester 

Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).

B. Relevant Legal Authority 

Congress’s enactment of the Leahy-Smith America 

Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 6(a)–(c), 125 

Stat. 284, 299–305 (2011) (codified in part at 35 U.S.C. 

§§ 311–319) replaced inter partes reexamination with IPR

for requests filed on or after September 16, 2012. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318 (2006), with 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–

319 (2012).2 The AIA authorized the USPTO to promulgate regulations governing the administration of IPR 

proceedings. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(3)–(4) (“The Director 

2 Any discussion in this opinion of IPRs, and corresponding citations to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319, shall refer to 

the statutory provisions effective on or after September 

16, 2012. 

 

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shall prescribe regulations . . . establishing procedures for 

the submission of supplemental information after the 

petition is filed; [and] establishing and governing [IPR] 

under this chapter and the relationship of such review to 

other proceedings under this title.”). The AIA also requires consideration of “the effect of any such regulation 

on,” among other things, “the efficient administration of 

the Office[] and the ability of the Office to timely complete 

proceedings instituted under this chapter.” Id. § 316(b). 

Consistent with Congress’s mandate, the USPTO 

promulgated general regulations governing the PTAB’s 

trial practices, 37 C.F.R. Part 42, Subpart A, in addition 

to specific regulatory requirements for IPR proceedings, 

37 C.F.R. Part 42, Subpart B. These regulations encourage Petitioners “to submit all of the evidence that supports the ground of unpatentability asserted in the 

petition” within the time period proscribed in 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.123(a), (b), or (c). Changes to Implement Inter Partes 

Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and 

Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,708 (U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Aug. 14, 2012) (“Final Rule”) (to be codified at 

37 C.F.R. pt. 42); see also Office Patent Trial Practice 

Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,763 (U.S. Patent & 

Trademark Office Aug. 14, 2012) (“[A] petitioner must 

identify each claim that is challenged and the specific 

statutory grounds on which each challenge to the claim is 

based, provide a claim construction for the challenged 

claims, and state the relevance of the evidence to the 

issues raised.” (citing in part 37 C.F.R. § 42.104)). 

The AIA authorizes the filing of supplemental information with the PTAB during the course of an IPR, 35 

U.S.C. § 316(a)(3), and the USPTO promulgated regulations pursuant to that authority. In particular, Section 

42.123(a) states:

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Motion to submit supplemental information. 

Once a trial has been instituted, a party may file a 

motion to submit supplemental information in accordance with the following requirements: 

(1) A request for the authorization to file a motion 

to submit supplemental information is made within one month of the date the trial is instituted. 

(2) The supplemental information must be relevant to a claim for which the trial has been instituted.

37 C.F.R. § 42.123(a) (emphases added). Subsection (b) 

provides for submitting supplemental information later 

than one month after the date the trial is instituted. Id. 

§ 42.123(b). Subsection (c) provides for the submission of 

supplemental information that is not relevant to an 

instituted claim. Id. § 42.123(c). Under subsections (b)

and (c), the party must show “why the supplemental 

information reasonably could not have been obtained 

earlier, and that consideration of the supplemental information would be in the interests-of-justice.” Id. 

§ 42.123(b), (c). 

The PTAB’s decision to admit supplemental information is also informed by 37 C.F.R. Part 42, Subpart A. 

See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(a) (“An [IPR] is a trial subject to 

the procedures set forth in subpart A of this part.”). 

Subpart A requires USPTO regulations “be construed to 

secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of 

every proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b); see also 35 U.S.C. 

§ 316(b). Consistent with this regulation, the USPTO has 

authorized the PTAB to “determine a proper course of 

conduct in a proceeding for any situation not specifically 

covered by this part and may enter non-final orders to 

administer the proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(a). The 

PTAB may also “waive or suspend a requirement of 

part[] . . . 42 [Trial Practice Before the PTAB] and may 

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place conditions on the waiver or suspension.” Id. 

§ 42.5(b). 

C. The PTAB’s Interpretation of 37 C.F.R. § 42.123 is 

Consistent with the Regulatory History and Is Not Plainly Erroneous

1. Section 42.123(a) Does Not Preclude Consideration of 

Additional Criteria Beyond Timing and Relevance 

The PTAB found Redline’s IPR Petition did not rely 

on an expert declaration in support of its position. J.A. 4 

(PTAB Order–Conduct of the Proceeding); see also J.A. 

1078–1142 (corrected petition to institute IPR). Rather, 

Redline’s Motion for Supplemental Disclosure of New 

Exhibits sought to introduce four new exhibits: (1) a sixtypage declaration of Redline’s expert, Dr. Michael St. 

Denis; (2) the resume of Dr. St. Denis; (3) U.S. Patent No. 

3,250,723; and (4) U.S. Patent No. 3,432,439. J.A. 2. The 

PTAB denied Redline’s Motion, noting Redline did not 

make “any attempt to justify the submission of an expert 

declaration after filing its petition and after a decision to 

institute has been made except to note that the move was 

cost effective . . . .”3 J.A. 4. The PTAB also found that 

Redline did not allege “any of the arguments or evidence 

in the newly submitted declaration [was] information that 

reasonably could not have been submitted with the Petition.” J.A. 4. “The [PTAB] chose two of twelve grounds 

proposed by Redline, thus Redline could have submitted 

expert opinion testimony to support those grounds with 

the petition itself.” J.A. 4; see also J.A. 1431 (Redline 

3 During oral argument, Redline reaffirmed nothing 

prevented it from submitting the supplemental information with its Petition. The “rationale was one of cost 

savings primarily the driving factor . . . .” Oral Argument 

at 2:25–42, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.

aspx?fl=2015-1047.mp3 (Counsel for Redline). 

 

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admitted to the PTAB it intentionally delayed filing this 

information because “submission of the declaration at this 

point [after institution of the IPR] makes things far less 

complex than had [Redline] had an expert opine as to all 

12 grounds as originally submitted in our petition”). The 

PTAB concluded Redline did not establish a sufficient 

basis for submitting new evidence and its “‘supplemental 

evidence’ is in essence something more than just supplemental evidence.” J.A. 5.

The PTAB determined “nothing in 37 C.F.R. § 42.123 

requires that a request to submit supplemental information satisfying these two criteria [,i.e., timeliness and 

relevance,] automatically be granted no matter the circumstance.” J.A. 18 (citation omitted). Rather, the 

USPTO regulations dictate “[a] party filing a motion has 

the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the 

requested relief.” J.A. 18 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.20). “This 

is so, no matter the requested relief.” J.A. 18 (emphasis 

added). The PTAB emphasized “the Board decides such 

motions in view of its mandate to ensure the efficient 

administration of the Office and the ability of the Office to 

complete IPR proceedings in a timely manner.” J.A. 18–

19. The PTAB also stated whether the Board grants a 

motion to submit supplemental information also “depend[s] upon the Board’s determination that, in its discretion, the action sought by the movant is consistent with 

the Board’s statutory mandate.” J.A. 19. 

On appeal, Redline argues “the regulatory history of 

[37 C.F.R.] § 42.123 shows that the [USPTO] has already 

incorporated its statutory mandate into the three tier 

scheme of subsections (a)–(c)” of that regulation. Appellant’s Br. 45 (capitalization and emphasis omitted). 

Redline contends the USPTO cannot consider factors 

articulated in subsections (b) and (c) if the timeliness and 

relevance conditions in subsection (a) are satisfied. 

According to Redline, this tiered rule “reflects a balance of 

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making.” Id. at 45. Redline alleges Comments 91–93 of 

the regulatory history “presumptively established that the 

timeliness and relevance requirements of §42.123(a) alone 

were sufficient to meet the [PTAB’s] statutory mandate 

for economy, integrity, efficient administration, and 

timely consideration of IPRs.” Id. at 45–46 (citing 35 

U.S.C. § 316(b)). Redline also argues the omission of the 

37 C.F.R. § 42.123(b) and (c) limitations from § 42.123(a) 

offers further support for its hierarchical interpretation of 

the regulation. Id. at 46. According to Redline, this 

arrangement “clearly evidences an intent on the part of 

the rulemaking body that those factors were not meant to 

be considered for submissions under § 42.123(a), and 

instead the sole criteria for admission were those in the 

plain language of the regulation.” Id. Because all three 

subsections were adopted in the same rulemaking session, 

Redline argues this lends “strength to the inference . . . [that] timeliness and relevance[] formed the sole 

basis for evaluating submissions under [§ 42.123(a)].” Id. 

at 48. 

Redline’s arguments rely, in part, on rules of statutory construction—e.g., (1) the exclusion of particular

language from one subsection of a statute that was included in other subsections means “it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully 

in the disparate inclusion or exclusion,” Keene Corp. v. 

United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); and (2) words that 

appear in different statutes that are adopted during the 

same legislative session creates a negative implication 

that is “strongest when the portions of a statute treated 

differently had already been joined together and were 

being considered simultaneously when the language 

raising the implication was inserted,” Lindh v. Murphy, 

521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997) (citation omitted). The Supreme 

Court has found that canons of statutory construction “are 

not mandatory rules. They are guides that ‘need not be 

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conclusive.’” Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 

84, 94 (2001) (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 

532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001)). Rather these guides “are 

designed to help judges determine the Legislature’s intent 

as embodied in particular statutory language.” Id. 

The PTAB’s interpretation of its governing regulations is not plainly erroneous. Its interpretation of 

§ 42.123(a) is consistent with the regulation’s plain language and the USPTO’s intent in promulgating § 42.123. 

The plain language of § 42.123(a) does not exclude the 

application of other general governing regulations. The 

guiding principle for the PTAB in making any determination is to “ensure efficient administration of the Office and 

the ability of the Office to complete IPR proceedings in a 

timely manner.” J.A. 18–19; see 35 U.S.C. § 316(b). 

Requiring admission of supplemental information so long 

as it was timely submitted and relevant to the IPR proceeding would cut against this mandate and alter the 

intended purpose of IPR proceedings. 

Redline’s interpretation of the regulatory history does 

not warrant a different conclusion. For example, Redline’s reliance on the USPTO’s response to Comments 91–

93 is flawed. These responses do not conflict with the 

USPTO’s intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation. Further, none of the USPTO’s statements “presumptively established that the timeliness and relevance 

requirements of §42.123(a) alone were sufficient to meet 

the [PTAB’s] statutory mandate for economy, integrity, 

efficient administration, and timely consideration of 

IPRs.” Appellant’s Br. 45–46 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(b)). 

The USPTO’s statements suggest the PTAB may allow 

the submission of supplemental information if certain 

conditions are met. Comment 91 addresses the public’s 

concern that “the petitioner may intentionally hold back 

some evidence which would be unfair to the patent owner.” Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,707. In response, the 

USPTO said “the patent owner will have sufficient time to 

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address any new information submitted by the petitioner, 

except in the situation where the party satisfies the 

requirements of § 42.123(b) [within thirty days of the 

institution of the IPR] . . . .” Id. This statement does not 

connote the PTAB must accept supplemental information 

so long as it is timely and relevant. Comment 92 notes 

“Petitioners are encouraged to set forth their best grounds 

of unpatentability and supporting evidence in their petitions, lest the Board not to institute the review or deny 

the asserted grounds of unpatentability (§ 42.108(b)).” Id. 

at 48,708. Similarly, Comment 93 says the final rule 

provides “that a party may seek authorization to file a 

motion to submit supplemental evidence relevant to a 

claim for which the trial has been instituted within one 

month of the date the trial is instituted.” Id. (emphasis 

added). These statements do not indicate the PTAB must 

accept supplemental information if timely submitted and 

relevant. 

In sum, nothing in § 42.123 or its regulatory history 

expressly states or implies that all elements of the PTAB’s 

mandate are incorporated into § 42.123(a) and that it 

must be read to the exclusion of the remaining subsections in that regulation and 37 C.F.R. Part 42, Subpart A. 

2. Section 42.123(a) Does Not Prohibit the PTAB from 

Exercising Discretion

Redline next argues the plain language of 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.123(a) “establishes a comprehensive scheme that 

leaves no room for [the] PTAB to impose its own discretionary requirements.” Appellant’s Br. 41. Rather, it 

says, the regulation permits “consideration of two and 

only two requirements: timeliness and relevance. If the 

regulation permitted the Board to consider or impose 

additional criteria, it would by its plain language have 

said so.” Id. at 41–42. 

In support of this argument, Redline states “[i]t is a 

fundamental principle of administrative law that ‘agenCase: 15-1047 Document: 69-2 Page: 16 Filed: 12/31/2015
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cies are bound to follow their own rules, even self-imposed 

procedural rules that limit otherwise discretionary decisions.’” Id. at 41 (quoting Hernandez v. Dep’t of Air Force, 

498 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Redline proffers 

several IPR decisions where supplemental information 

was admitted, stating “[s]everal other [PTAB Panels], in 

deciding motions brought under § 42.123(a), have started 

and ended their analysis with the plain meaning of this 

regulation.” Id. at 42. Redline relies primarily on Pacific 

Market International,4 where the PTAB admitted “extensive expert declaration testimony submitted under 

§ 42.123(a) and set[] forth reasons to combine particular 

prior art references that formed the underlying basis for 

instituting the IPR, precisely as Redline sought to do in 

submitting its own expert testimony.” Id. at 43 (citing 

Pac. Mkt. Int’l, LLC v. Ignite USA, LLC, IPR2014-00561, 

Paper 23 at 3 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 2, 2014)). Redline asserts the 

Panel in Pacific Market International “was obligated 

under § 42.123(a) to allow the supplemental expert testi4 Redline also cites Norman International, Inc. v. 

Toti Testamentary Trust, IPR2014-00283, Paper 29 

(P.T.A.B. Sept. 29, 2014) (addressing Petitioner’s submission of supplemental information to confirm the accuracy 

of the translation of a Japanese Patent Application Publication that was submitted in the IPR Petition); Brose 

North America v. UUSI, LLC, IPR2014-00416, -417, 

Paper 16 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 16, 2014) (addressing Petitioner’s submission of a U.S. patent and patent publications 

for claim construction); and Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. 

Juniper Network, Inc., IPR2013-00369, Paper 37 (P.T.A.B. 

Feb. 5, 2014) (addressing Petitioner’s submission of 

supplemental information to establish that prior art cited 

in the IPR Petition qualified as a prior art printed publication). Appellant’s Br. 42–43. However, Pacific Market 

International presents the scenario most similar to the 

present proceeding.

 

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18 REDLINE DETECTION, LLC v. STAR ENVIROTECH, INC. 

mony.” Id. at 44. Redline also contends the rationale and 

application of § 42.123(a) in Pacific Market International 

“is incapable of being reconciled with the decision in this 

case.” Id. 

Redline’s regulatory interpretation presents a new 

facet of the first argument it raised regarding § 42.123, 

and it fails for the same reasons discussed above. Its 

interpretation requires the PTAB to exclude all other 

regulations governing PTAB proceedings and admit 

supplemental information so long as the request was 

timely made and the information is relevant to the proceeding. The plain language of § 42.123(a) does not 

support such a reading. Nothing within subsection (a) 

excludes application of other PTAB regulations. Rather, 

timeliness and relevancy provide additional requirements 

that must be construed within the overarching context of 

the PTAB’s regulations governing IPR and general trial 

proceedings.5 Additionally, the PTAB has discretion to 

grant or deny motions as it sees fit. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.5(a), (b). 

5 Redline’s argument on appeal is also inapposite to 

its conduct throughout its IPR proceeding. Redline complied with the PTAB’s general requirements without 

protest—i.e., demonstrating entitlement to relief within 

its Petition, 37 C.F.R. § 42.20, and providing assurances 

to the PTAB that its motion was consistent with the 

regulations allowing for further evidence before deposition 

or testimony is taken, id. § 42.53(d)(2). See J.A. 1430 

(transcript from conference call with the PTAB discussing 

Redline’s Motion).

 

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3. The PTAB’s Decision Comports with Other PTAB 

Decisions Allowing Supplemental Information and Is Not 

Arbitrary and Capricious 

Redline next argues “[t]he arbitrary-and-capricious 

standard requires an agency to provide an adequate 

explanation to justify treating similarly situated parties 

differently.” Appellant’s Br. 49 (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting In re FCC, 753 F.3d 1015, 1142 (10th 

Cir. 2014)). Without an adequate explanation, Redline 

contends the PTAB’s decision deviates from its previous 

decisions allowing supplemental information. Id. In 

support of its argument, Redline relies on Palo Alto 

Networks and Pacific Market International. These decisions do not support Redline’s argument that the PTAB 

must accept supplemental information so long as it is 

timely and relevant.

In Palo Alto Networks, the Petitioner sought to submit 

supplemental information that would establish the cited 

prior art within the Petition did in fact qualify as a prior 

art printed publication. The PTAB found the information 

was not intentionally withheld nor did allowing this 

information limit the PTAB’s ability to timely complete 

the proceeding. Palo Alto Networks, Paper 37 at 4. The 

PTAB did agree that it must decide this Motion not solely 

on § 42.123 requirements, but also in light of 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.1(b) (i.e., the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution 

of proceedings). Id. Redline relies on this case because 

the PTAB determined whether information could have 

been obtained earlier was a requirement under 

§ 42.123(b) and (c), not (a). Appellant’s Br. 43; see id. at

49–50. Redline also relies on this case because the PTAB 

found the submission of the supplemental information 

would not prevent the PTAB from satisfying its mandate 

under § 42.1(b). Id. at 43. 

Redline’s reliance is misplaced. The PTAB in Palo Alto Networks found the supplemental information would 

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20 REDLINE DETECTION, LLC v. STAR ENVIROTECH, INC. 

not prevent it from fulfilling its mandate since the “Patent Owner already [had] possession of the supplemental 

information” because it was served “in response to Patent 

Owner’s objections” and it is “the same supplemental 

information that Petitioner now seeks to submit under 

§ 42.123(a).” Palo Alto Networks, Paper 37 at 5. Redline 

has not provided any evidence to indicate STAR possessed 

the supplemental information it seeks to admit.6 The 

PTAB in Palo Alto Networks also determined the supplemental information “Petitioner seeks to submit does not 

change the grounds of unpatentability authorized in this 

proceeding, nor does it change the evidence initially 

presented in the [IPR] Petition to support those grounds 

of unpatentability.” Id. at 3. That is not what Redline 

did. The PTAB determined, in its Decision on Redline’s 

Request for Rehearing, that Redline’s supplemental 

information “relates to a ground for which the trial was 

instituted, rather than only to a claim of the patent, for 

which the trial was instituted.” J.A. 19. 

6 Redline failed to follow the proper procedure during the IPR proceeding. Once the Petition is filed, the 

Petitioner may reply: 1) after institution of the proceeding; and 2) after the patent owner has filed an opposition 

to the Petition. See Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,766 

(citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(8)). At that time, a petitioner 

“may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition.” Id. at 48,768 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.23). 

Any new issues raised in the reply will not be considered. 

“Examples of indications that a new issue has been raised 

in a reply include new evidence necessary to make out a 

prima facie case for the patentability or unpatentability of 

an original or proposed substitute claim, and new evidence that could have been presented in a prior filing.” 

Id. 

 

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In Pacific Market International, the Petitioner sought 

to submit its expert’s supplemental declaration in support 

of its claim of obviousness. Pac. Mkt. Int’l, Paper 1 (IPR 

Petition); id. Ex. 1014 (expert declaration relied on in IPR 

Petition). The IPR Petition itself was a sixty-page document, id. Paper 1, that relied heavily on its expert declaration, which was a separate sixty-eight page document 

with claim charts comparing the claims to prior art, id. 

Ex. 1014. The Supplemental Declaration was a ten-page 

declaration that supplements the Petitioner’s claim of 

obviousness that was first argued in its IPR Petition. Id. 

Ex. 1021. The PTAB accepted the supplemental information as evidence within the proceeding and determined 

the Patent Owner had sufficient time to address the new 

information submitted by the Petitioner in its request 

made one month from the institution date. Id. Paper 23 

at 3. This information was also found not to change 

grounds instituted on nor did it change evidence presented in the IPR Petition. Id. at 4. 

However, the PTAB stated “[a]lthough a party may 

meet the [37 C.F.R. § 42.123] requirements . . . that does 

not, itself, guarantee that the motion will be granted.” Id.

at 3 (emphasis added). This provision does not offer “a 

routine avenue for bolstering deficiencies in a petition 

raised by a patent owner in a Preliminary Response. . . . Petitioner should not expect . . . a ‘wait-andsee’ opportunity to supplement a petition after initial 

comments or arguments have been laid out by a patent 

owner.” Id. The PTAB, in Pacific Market International,

explicitly relied on § 42.1(b) when conducting its 

§ 42.123(a) analysis, emphasizing that the PTAB’s mandate “is to interpret our Rules ‘to secure the just, speedy, 

and inexpensive resolution’ to this proceeding.” Id. at 4 

(quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b)). 

Here, Redline asserts its submission of Dr. St. Denis’s 

sixty-page declaration was identical to the type of evidence submitted in Pacific Market International and the 

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22 REDLINE DETECTION, LLC v. STAR ENVIROTECH, INC. 

Panel in this instance reached an opposite conclusion, 

thus acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 

Appellant’s Br. 50–51. Redline’s opening brief presents 

Pacific Market International as the case that is most 

similar to its case because the PTAB admitted “extensive 

expert declaration testimony submitted under § 42.123(a) 

and set[] forth reasons to combine particular prior art 

references that formed the underlying basis for instituting 

the IPR, precisely as Redline sought to do in submitting 

its own expert testimony.” Id. at 43 (citing Pac. Mkt. Int’l, 

Paper 23 at 3). Redline asserts the Panel in Pacific 

Market International “was obligated under § 42.123(a) to 

allow the supplemental expert testimony.” Id. at 44. 

Further, Redline contends, the rationale and application 

of § 42.123(a) in Pacific Market International “is incapable 

of being reconciled with the decision in this case.” Id. 

Redline’s characterization of Pacific Market International is inaccurate and misleading. The Panel’s decision 

expressly stated 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(a) is not a routine 

avenue to pursue, nor does the regulation require an 

automatic acceptance of, supplemental information. See 

Pac. Mkt. Int’l, Paper 23 at 3. This is the exact opposite of 

having an obligation to allow the supplementary information. Redline fails to appreciate the stark difference 

between the short, supplemental expert report, which the 

PTAB reasonably permitted in Pacific Market International, and its de novo expert report submitted for the 

first time. Pacific Market International is inapposite. 

II. The PTAB Did Not Err in Finding that Redline Failed 

to Prove the ’808 Patent Would Have Been Obvious over 

the Cited Prior Art

A. Standard of Review and the Legal Standard for Obviousness 

We review the PTAB’s factual findings for substantial 

evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. Rambus Inc. 

v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “A finding is 

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REDLINE DETECTION, LLC v. STAR ENVIROTECH, INC. 23

supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable mind 

might accept the evidence to support the finding.” K/S 

Himpp v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC, 751 F.3d 1362, 1364 

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see also In re Gartside, 

203 F.3d 1305, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “If the evidence in 

[the] record will support several reasonable but contradictory conclusions, we will not find the Board’s decision 

unsupported by substantial evidence simply because the 

Board chose one conclusion over another plausible alternative.” In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

A patent claim should be held to have been obvious 

and therefore invalid “if the differences between the 

subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 

such that the subject matter as a whole would have been 

obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 

having ordinary skill in the art [(“PHOSITA”)] to which 

said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).7 

Whether a claimed invention is unpatentable as obvious 

is a question of law that is reviewed de novo, based on 

underlying findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1316. These underlying factual inquiries include: (1) the scope and content of 

the prior art; (2) differences between the prior art and the 

claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (4) secondary considerations of nonobviousness, such as commercial success, long felt but 

unsolved needs, failure of others, and unexpected results. 

Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18, 

30 (1966). 

7 In passing the AIA, Congress amended section 

103. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. at 287. 

However, because the ’808 patent application was filed 

before March 16, 2013, the pre-AIA § 103(a) applies. See

id., § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293. 

 

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24 REDLINE DETECTION, LLC v. STAR ENVIROTECH, INC. 

When asserting that a claimed invention would have 

been obvious, that party “must demonstrate by clear and 

convincing evidence that a skilled artisan would have had 

reason to combine the teaching of the prior art references 

to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled 

artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success from doing so.” PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., 

Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Whether such a 

motivation has been demonstrated is a question of fact” 

reviewed for substantial evidence. Medichem, S.A. v. 

Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1164–65 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

B. Redline Waived Its Arguments Regarding PTAB’s 

Determination of the PHOSITA’s Skill Level

The PTAB rejected Redline’s unsupported oral argument that a PHOSITA “must have experience, education, 

and knowledge specific to the United States.” Final 

Decision at 16. Instead, the PTAB adopted the PHOSITA 

definition offered by STAR’s expert, Dr. M. David Checkel, who explained that a PHOSITA in the area of “motor 

vehicle engine diagnosis and repair, including [evaporative emission control (“EVAP”)] system leak detection 

methods, at the time of the filing of the ’808 patent[]

possessed a range of educational and professional experience, with more education demanding less professional 

experience.”8 Id. at 17. Redline declined to rebut STAR’s 

8 Dr. Checkel’s declaration stated that, at the time 

the ’808 patent was filed, not many technicians 

focused solely on evaluating and developing diagnostic systems for the EVAP systems, [such that] 

the person of ordinary skill would have had experience developing diagnostic and repair tools for 

engine systems in general. . . . The professional 

experience possessed by the ordinary artisan 

 

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definition of a PHOSITA by submitting rebuttal expert 

testimony in its reply, after it reviewed STAR’s expert 

declaration. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.23 (opposition and replies), 42.53(b)(1) (taking testimony). 

On appeal, Redline argues the PTAB did not “apply 

[the PHOSITA] definition in the context of an obviousness 

analysis . . . [and did not] consider the common sense or 

creativity of a person skilled in the art.” Appellant’s Br. 

54. However, STAR correctly notes the PTAB “spent a 

considerable amount of time at the Oral Hearing, as well 

as several pages of its Final Decision, [defining a 

PHOSITA].” Appellee’s Br. 48 (citing Final Decision at 

14–17). The PTAB noted Redline argued for a different 

PHOSITA standard, but “provide[d] no persuasive alternative.” Final Decision at 16. Now on appeal, Redline is 

arguing for the application of a different PHOSITA 

standard. These arguments are based upon information 

appended to Redline’s Motion for Supplemental Disclosure of New Exhibits that the PTAB excluded. They were 

would thus have included experience in engine diagnosis and repair, including at least some experience with EVAP systems and other emission 

systems. . . . The ordinary artisan would also 

have had a limited understanding of the chemistry of combustion and the characteristics of hydrocarbon based fuel.

According to Dr. Checkel, for the person of ordinary skill who held a high school diploma, the 

amount of relevant professional experience would 

be seven to ten years, while those with more educational experience would require correspondingly 

less years of professional experience. 

Final Decision at 15 (quoting Redline Detection, Paper 41 

at 29). 

 

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26 REDLINE DETECTION, LLC v. STAR ENVIROTECH, INC. 

thus not made to the PTAB and are improper on appeal. 

Because this court’s review of the PTAB’s decision “is 

confined to the ‘four corners’ of that record[,] . . . it is 

important that the applicant challenging a decision not be 

permitted to raise arguments on appeal that were not 

presented to the [PTAB].” In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 

1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We hold Redline’s arguments 

waived and need not address them. 

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the PTAB’s Determination of the Scope and Content of the Prior Art

1. The PTAB Considered the Prior Art as a Whole

Redline argues on appeal that the PTAB failed to consider the prior art as a whole, but rather considered 

teachings from only four references. Redline contends the 

Board failed to consider the following submitted prior art 

references: (1) Research and Testing, Aircraft Engineering 

& Aerospace Tech., Jan. 1969, Vol. 41, Issue 1, p. 44 (“AE 

Article”) (J.A. 1002) and (2) T. Dunnington, High Temperature Smoke Training—the Way Forward, Indus. Fire J., 

56 (Dec. 1995–Jan. 1996) (“IJF Article”) (J.A. 1009). 

Appellant’s Br. 57. 

The PTAB, in fact, considered these references. In its 

decision to institute the IPR, the PTAB rejected redundant grounds. It noted that Redline “acknowledge[d] that 

the teachings of some of these additional references are 

themselves redundant.” J.A. 1294. The sentence immediately following this statement discussed prior art references submitted by Redline, including the “‘IFJ Article 

describing the ViCount smoke system of the AE Article[].’” 

J.A. 1294; see J.A. 110.

What is more, Redline raised these prior art references during oral argument at the PTAB while discussing 

other alleged prior art and cited them in its reply brief to 

the PTAB during its discussion of the prior art. See J.A. 

3757 (oral argument), 3500 (reply). The PTAB also cited 

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to the portion of Redline’s reply brief in its Final Decision. 

Final Decision at 24. Thus, the record demonstrates the 

references certainly were considered by the PTAB. 

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the PTAB’s Analysis of 

Gilliam, Stoyle, Pauley, and the 1999 Website

On appeal, Redline contends the PTAB improperly excluded its supplemental information and therefore its 

motivation to combine analysis, and ultimate obviousness 

determination, is incomplete and, therefore, improper. 

The PTAB’s “findings could not be made if the excluded 

declaration of Dr. St. Denis was entered.” Appellant’s Br. 

51. Redline also argues that the PTAB otherwise erred in 

its motivation to combine analysis. Id. at 58–60. We 

address each argument in turn.

a. The PTAB’s Factual Findings for Gilliam, Stoyle, 

Pauley, and the 1999 Website

The grounds on which the PTAB instituted the IPR 

were based on Redline’s assertions that independent 

claim 9 and dependent claim 10 were unpatentable under 

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over: (1) Gilliam and Stoyle, Final 

Decision at 17; and (2) Gilliam, Pauley, and the 1999 

Website, Final Decision at 27. Based on the record before 

it, the PTAB determined what each reference taught and 

determined whether a PHOSITA would have been motivated to combine these references. Substantial evidence 

supports the PTAB’s factual findings. 

The PTAB found “Gilliam does not teach or suggest 

the use of inert gas to create an inert environment in the 

closed smoke-producing chamber, as a combustionprevention alternative.” Final Decision at 21. In reaching this finding, the PTAB stated Gilliam preferably uses 

a smoke-producing fluid that is non-flammable and nontoxic. Id. at 19 (citing Gilliam col. 5 ll. 67–68). “When the 

smoke-producing fluid comes in contact with ceramic 

heating element 11, the smoke-producing fluid vaporizes 

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28 REDLINE DETECTION, LLC v. STAR ENVIROTECH, INC. 

within the chamber 30.” Id. (citing Gilliam col. 6 ll. 34–

36). The PTAB further noted, “[s]moke generated within 

chamber 30 is then conveyed via conduit 22 to a particular automotive system for leak testing.” Id. (citing 

Gilliam col. 8 ll. 8–13). Additionally, Gilliam “includes at 

least three ways to prevent combustion of a flammable, 

smoke producing fluid . . . .” Id. at 20 (citation omitted). 

The PTAB found that Stoyle does not “disclose or suggest creating an inert environment during leak-testing of 

a closed vacuum system in a motor vehicle, such as an 

EVAP system including a fuel tank.” Id. at 25. “Stoyle 

does not teach generation of smoke in an inert environment within a closed smoke-producing chamber, as recited in claim 9 of the ’808 patent.” Id. at 24 (citation 

omitted). Rather, the PTAB found “the generation of 

smoke using inert gas in Stoyle is different in type and 

location than recited in claim 9 of the ’808 patent.” Id. 

(citation omitted). Smoke in Stoyle is generated “when a 

heated mixture of oil and CO2 is combined with air and 

that smoke is not produced within a closed smoke producing chamber.” Id. at 25 (citation omitted). Additionally,

the PTAB agreed with Dr. Checkel that smoke produced 

by flash evaporation and pressure would be inappropriate 

and dangerous to use in a closed EVAP system. Id. at 25–

26 (citing J.A. 2055–56).

The PTAB found that Pauley “teaches the use of [CO2

or N2 gas] as a medium for atomizing and propelling fog, 

smoke, or mist forming liquid in order to reduce, but not 

necessarily to prevent, any risk of ignition.” Id. at 27 

(citation omitted). Relying on Dr. Checkel’s testimony, 

the PTAB found that “Pauley does not teach or suggest 

creating an inert environment within a closed smokeproducing chamber, but rather teaches combining an inert 

gas with air to generate smoke in an open tube.” Id. at 30 

(citation omitted). While “Pauley teaches the presence of 

inert gases ‘reduces to a minimum any tendency to ignition of the vapour should the liquid employed be of an 

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inflammable nature,’” this in itself “does not prevent 

ignition of the flammable fluid, ‘as would be the case in an 

inert environment within a closed chamber.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

The PTAB determined that the 1999 Website suggests 

“only that vehicles may be leak tested using the Corona 

smoke machine described therein.” Id. at 27 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

b. Motivation to Combine Gilliam and Stoyle

The PTAB determined a PHOSITA would have had no 

reason “to substitute Stoyle’s use of inert gas, forced into 

the narrow compressed space between a bore and a plug, 

in place of the air used in Gilliam’s temperatureregulated, spark arrestor-governed system to generate 

smoke in a closed smoke-producing chamber.” Id. at 22 

(citation omitted). The PTAB found there was no rational 

underpinning to combine Gilliam and Stoyle to achieve 

the invention recited in claim 9 of the ’808 patent. Id. 

The PTAB also noted that its analysis is applicable to 

both independent claim 9 and dependent claim 10 of the 

’808 patent. “Claim 10 recites that the method of claim 9 

comprises ‘the additional step of regulating the pressure 

at which the smoke is carried by said non-combustible gas 

from said closed smoke producing chamber to the closed 

system undergoing testing.’” Id. at 26 (quoting ’808 

patent col. 2 ll. 28–31); see also J.A. 158 (ex parte reexamination certificate adding claim 10 to the ’808 patent). 

Redline argued to the PTAB that Gilliam teaches all 

limitations of claims 9 and 10 of the ’808 patent, “except 

[that Gilliam uses] air instead of inert gas to generate 

smoke and carry that smoke to the systems being tested.” 

Id. at 17 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Redline argued the reason to 

combine these references is the “disclosure of the safety 

advantages of Stoyle’s mist or smoke produced with an 

inert gas, i.e., [CO2 gas], and Gilliam’s cautions about the 

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30 REDLINE DETECTION, LLC v. STAR ENVIROTECH, INC. 

dangers of the introduction of flammable smoke into 

tested systems.” Id. at 23 (citation omitted). 

The PTAB rejected Redline’s arguments because it 

found they were not supported with declaration testimony, “and the inferences [Redline] attempt[ed] to draw 

from statements made in Gilliam and Stoyle [were] rebutted effectively by [STAR’s expert] . . . .” Id. at 24 (citations omitted). After reviewing the record and the 

unrebutted testimony of STAR’s expert, the PTAB determined Redline failed to provide sufficient evidence to 

show a PHOSITA would “have had reason to substitute 

the air used in Gilliam with inert gas alone from the 

mixture disclosed in Stoyle to achieve the invention 

recited in claim 9.” Id. at 25. 

On appeal, Redline argues a PHOSITA “would be familiar with Gilliam’s smoke machines to test for EVAP 

system leaks and the risks associated therewith.” Appellant’s Br. 58 (capitalization and emphasis omitted). It 

contends that a PHOSITA would have understood the 

teachings of Gilliam, such that smoke could be created 

and used to test systems for leaks. Id. Redline further 

argues a PHOSITA would have understood that Gilliam’s 

prior art “expressly warns of the potential for gasoline 

vapors to explode.” Id. As such, a “skilled artisan would 

also know that at least as early as 1950[] it was known 

that one could generate a non-flammable smoke that 

eliminates the risk of explosion by vaporizing an oil with 

an inert gas . . . .” Id. at 59. Thus, Redline contends “[a]s 

a matter of common sense, [a PHOSITA as defined by the 

PTAB] . . . would [have] unquestionably [understood] the 

risk of explosion inherent to gasoline vapors, and would 

[have] be[en] motivated to exercise ordinary creativity 

and common sense to minimize such risk” and combine 

known and readily available alternatives. Id. at 58–59. 

Substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s determination that there was no motivation to combine Gilliam and 

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Stoyle. The PTAB determined that Gilliam teaches the 

combustion of a smoke producing fluid in an oxygen 

environment. Final Decision at 19. Dr. Checkel’s declaration supports this finding, demonstrating that Gilliam’s 

combustion does not work without oxygen. “Based on the 

education and experience of the person of ordinary skill in 

the field in July 1999, this person would have understood 

that smoke is generally the product of combustion.” J.A. 

2049 ¶ 123. “And the teachings of Gilliam would confirm 

to this person that Gilliam’s methods involved at least 

some combustion” through the vaporization of smokegenerating fluid. J.A. 2049. During IPR proceedings, 

Redline acknowledged that Gilliam does not disclose the 

use of inert gas to create an inert environment for preventing ignition within the smoke producing chamber. 

Final Decision at 20. 

The PTAB also determined that Stoyle uses high 

pressure and temperature to flash evaporate oil to generate smoke. Id. at 25 (quoting J.A. 2054–55 ¶ 136). 

Stoyle’s high pressure is achieved using CO2 gas that is 

forced through narrow passages in the heated assembly. 

J.A. 2055 ¶ 136. The superheated oil is “released to 

ambient conditions where it undergoes flash evaporation, 

forming oil vapor which is condensed to form a mist of

droplets.” J.A. 2055 ¶ 136 (footnote omitted). A 

PHOSITA “would not look to Stoyle to supply any missing 

features” because “the smoke-generating methods are 

materially different and are used for materially different 

purposes.” J.A. 2054 ¶ 135. 

The PTAB properly found that Gilliam and Stoyle, 

taken together, generate smoke via differing methods and 

thus, could not be combined to achieve the claimed invention recited in claims 9 and 10 of the ’808 patent. A

PHOSITA in July 1999 would have no reason to remove 

the ambient air from Gilliam and replace it with inert gas 

from Stoyle. Stoyle relies on high temperature and pressure. Gilliam relies on vaporizing fluid in an oxygen 

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32 REDLINE DETECTION, LLC v. STAR ENVIROTECH, INC. 

environment. Both of these methods can damage closed 

EVAP systems with volatile compounds. 

c. Motivation to Combine Gilliam, Pauley, and the 1999 

Website

The PTAB determined that a PHOSITA would have 

had no “reason to substitute the air used in Gilliam with 

the inert gas from the mixture of air and inert gas disclosed in Pauley’s open-tube, theatrical effects system for 

generating smoke in air to achieve the invention recited 

in claim 9 [of the ’808 patent].” Final Decision at 31.

On appeal, Redline argues Pauley “shows that it was 

known well before July 1999 that an inflammable smoke 

may be created by vaporizing an oil in an inert gas environment, and that inflammable smoke may be used in a 

wide variety of commercial applications . . . .” Appellant’s 

Br. 59. Redline states the smoke in Pauley can be used in 

theatrical effects, firefighter training, and even “automotive leak detection systems.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Redline’s previously discussed arguments on appeal 

regarding Gilliam are also applicable under this motivation to combine argument. Redline does not offer any 

arguments on appeal regarding the motivation to combine 

the 1999 Website. Thus, the PTAB’s determination that 

“[t]he 1999 Website adds little to the asserted combination of Gilliam and Pauley,” is uncontested. Final Decision at 27. 

Substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s determination that there was no motivation to combine Gilliam, 

Pauley, and the 1999 Website. Dr. Checkel’s declaration 

stated “the inert gas [in Pauley] is only provided to atomize the glycerine or oil, propel it against the heating 

element and reduce the tendency to ignition in the region 

of the hot element.” J.A. 2066 ¶ 160. “[U]se of an inert 

gas ‘reduces to a minimum’ the tendency to ignition—

rather than eliminating the tendency—suggest[ing] to a 

person of ordinary skill that the smoke generation method 

Case: 15-1047 Document: 69-2 Page: 32 Filed: 12/31/2015
REDLINE DETECTION, LLC v. STAR ENVIROTECH, INC. 33

is not in an inert environment and needs some ambient 

air or oxygen.” J.A. 2066 ¶ 161 (footnote omitted). Pauley 

requires ambient air to work for its intended purpose, 

otherwise “[a] purely inert smoke mixture, produced 

without entraining ambient air[,] would produce an 

anoxic environment . . . present[ing] a hazard to the 

actors and audience.” J.A. 2067 ¶ 163 (footnote omitted). 

The PTAB accordingly determined “the use of inert gas in 

Pauley is different in type and location from that recited 

in claim 9 of the ’808 patent.” Final Decision at 31. 

Both Pauley and Gilliam require air to produce smoke 

in accordance with their disclosed inventions. But, “neither Pauley nor Gilliam disclose using an inert gas . . . to 

prevent ignition and thereby avoid the possibility of an 

explosion” when using the smoke to test closed EVAP 

systems that contain volatile compounds. J.A. 2068 

¶ 165. Further, Dr. Checkel’s declaration noted the 1999 

Website references “‘vehicle’ in a list including large, open 

objects such as chimneys, luggage holds of aircraft and 

ships . . . [which] would confirm to a [PHOSITA] that the 

smoke machines discussed were intended for large open 

objects . . . not the sensitive, hazardous EVAP system in a 

vehicle engine.” J.A. 2070 ¶ 169. Based on this testimony, the PTAB properly determined the 1999 Website did 

not teach the use of smoke machines for leak testing 

closed EVAP systems. Substantial record evidence supports the PTAB’s finding there was no motivation to 

combine Pauley, Gilliam, and the 1999 Website.

CONCLUSION

Redline’s remaining arguments are unpersuasive. 

Accordingly, the decision of the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board is 

AFFIRMED

Case: 15-1047 Document: 69-2 Page: 33 Filed: 12/31/2015