Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00386/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00386-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Anderson
Defendant
Kameron Lee
Defendant
Therese L. Lesher
Plaintiff
Jeffrey Miley
Defendant
Sean Miller
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

THERESE L. LESHER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF ANDERSON, a municipal 

corporation; CITY OF ANDERSON 

POLICE SERGEANT SEAN MILLER,

individually; CITY OF ANDERSON 

POLICE OFFICERS JEFFREY MILEY, 

individually, and KAMERON LEE, 

individually, and DOES 1-50, 

jointly and severally, 

Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-00386 WBS DMC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Therese Lesher (“plaintiff”) brought this 

action against the City of Anderson (“Anderson” or “City”),

Anderson Police Sergeant Sean Miller, Anderson Police Officers 

Jeffrey Miley and Kameron Lee, and DOES 1-50 seeking damages for 

violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983; municipal and supervisory liability under 42 

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

U.S.C. § 1983; violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. 

Civil Code § 52.1; malicious prosecution; violation of Article 1, 

§ 13 of the California Constitution; assault and battery; false 

arrest and imprisonment; and negligence. (See Second Am. Compl. 

(“SAC”) (Docket No. 28).)

The City of Anderson now moves to dismiss the fourth

cause of action of the SAC for municipal liability under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. (See Mot. to Dismiss (Docket No. 29).)

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On or about August 13, 2019, at approximately 12:30 

a.m., plaintiff was sitting on the porch of her apartment 

building talking with her cousin, Denhene Leach, and two other 

persons, accompanied by Leach’s dog. (See SAC at ¶ 17.) Several 

Anderson Police Department (“APD”) vehicles pulled into the 

parking lot in front of the building without lights or sirens. 

(See id. at ¶ 18.) Unbeknownst to plaintiff and her group, 

another tenant of the apartment complex had called in a noise 

complaint to the APD. (See id.) Leach’s dog left the porch and 

walked in the direction of the officers, who had exited their 

vehicles. (See id. at ¶ 19.) Suddenly, one of the officers 

yelled that he had allegedly been bitten by Leach’s dog. (See

id.) The dog was then retrieved and taken into Leach’s 

apartment. (See id.) 

Plaintiff’s dog, which was locked in her vehicle, began 

barking. (See id. at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff went to her car to calm 

down her dog and ensure that it stayed in her vehicle. (See id.) 

As plaintiff approached her vehicle, defendant officer Miley 

yelled for her to control her dog. (See id.) He told her that 

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

he would pepper spray the dog or shoot it if plaintiff did not 

control the dog’s barking. (See id.) In response, plaintiff 

reached into the partially open rear window of the vehicle and 

grabbed hold of her dog’s harness. (See id.) 

Plaintiff disapproved of the way the officers were

performing their duties in their interactions with her and Leach. 

(See id. at ¶ 21.) Accordingly, she criticized defendants, 

including Miley and Miller, and expressed her disapproval of the 

way they were conducting themselves. (See id.) Without warning, 

plaintiff was then thrown against the side of her vehicle, 

subjected to various uses of force, and handcuffed by defendants

Miller, Miley, and Lee. (See id. at ¶ 22.) 

Plaintiff was searched and arrested, and her personal 

property was removed from her person. (See id.) She was 

transported to the Shasta County Jail and booked by defendants 

for alleged violations of California Penal Code sections 69 

(using threats or violence to prevent executive officers from 

performing their duties or resisting executive officers in the 

performance of their duties), 647(f) (being so intoxicated in a 

public place that one is unable to care for their own safety or 

the safety of others), and 148(a)(1) (resisting, delaying, or 

obstructing a law enforcement officer). (See id.) Plaintiff 

contends that she was cooperative, spoke calmly, and obeyed the 

officers’ commands at all material times. (See id.) She

sustained an injury to her left forearm, fractures to her

clavicle and left finger, and property damage. (See id. at 

¶¶ 26, 29.) 

Based on the arrest, plaintiff was criminally 

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

prosecuted in Shasta County, California, for three misdemeanor 

counts of violation of Penal Code section 148(a)(1). (See id. at 

¶ 23.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants Miller, Lee, and Miley 

deliberately and knowingly misrepresented the facts of the 

incident and her behavior when reporting the incident, leading to 

her prosecution, and continued to do so up to and during trial. 

(See id.) She alleges they did so, and that these

misrepresentations were provided to the Shasta County District 

Attorney’s Office, to make plaintiff defend herself against 

criminal charges the officers knew were illegitimate and to cover 

up their own criminal acts and abuse of authority. (See id. at 

¶ 24.)

On September 24, 2020, plaintiff was acquitted on all 

three counts after a jury trial. (See id. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff 

alleges that in addition to her injuries and property damage, 

defendants’ conduct also caused her to lose income and to have to 

pay bail and attorneys’ fees. (See id. at ¶ 29.)

Plaintiff filed the instant action in this court on 

March 2, 2021. (See Docket No. 1.) On June 30, 2021, the court 

granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

for municipal liability against the City. (See Docket No. 19.) 

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on July 20, 2021, 

(Docket No. 20), and, per the parties’ stipulation, a Second 

Amended Complaint on September 5, 2021, (Docket No. 28).

II. Discussion

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for 

dismissal when a complaint fails to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A Rule 

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In deciding such a 

motion, all material allegations of the complaint are accepted as 

true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. 

Id.

Dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to allege 

“sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory,” 

id., or to state “a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Although legal 

conclusions “can provide the framework of a complaint, they must 

be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679.

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for vicarious 

liability, a local government “may not be sued under § 1983 for 

an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell 

v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 

(1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy 

or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts 

or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy, inflicts 

the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under 

§ 1983.” Id. Here, plaintiff seeks to establish municipal 

liability on the part of the City for (1) having an 

unconstitutional custom or policy, (2) ratifying the decisions of 

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

the police officers who caused the constitutional violations, and 

(3) failing to adequately train its police officers. (SAC at ¶¶

51-60 (Docket No. 28).) 

A. Unconstitutional Custom or Policy

To establish Monell liability based upon an 

unconstitutional custom or policy, a plaintiff must prove “the 

existence of a widespread practice that, although not authorized 

by written law or express municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and 

well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of 

law.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) 

(plurality opinion) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 

U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)).

At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must do 

more than simply allege that a Monell defendant “maintained or 

permitted an official policy, custom, or practice of knowingly 

permitting the occurrence of the type of wrongs” alleged 

elsewhere in the complaint. Rather, the complaint must allege 

“additional facts regarding the specific nature of that alleged 

policy, custom[,] or practice.” See AE ex rel. Hernandez v.

Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). 

It is unclear from the SAC exactly what practice or 

practices plaintiff relies upon to establish an unconstitutional 

custom or policy causally related to the conduct which is the 

subject of this case. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. 

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406 (1997) (holding that a Monell claim lies 

where “the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree 

of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between 

the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights”). 

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

The SAC lists, in shotgun fashion, ten so-called 

“customs, policies, practices, and/or procedures” upon which 

plaintiff’s Monell claim is based. (See SAC at ¶ 52 (Docket No. 

28).)1 Each of these is couched in broad terms, such as 

“[f]ailure to supervise and/or discipline officers for misconduct 

that results in the violation of citizens’ civil rights,” or 

“[u]sing or tolerating inadequate, deficient, and/or improper 

procedures for handling, investigating, and reviewing complaints 

of officer misconduct.” (Id.) If such generalized descriptions 

were deemed sufficient, a plaintiff would be able to survive a 

motion to dismiss a Monell claim in just about every excessive 

force case under § 1983.

Even where the policy or custom is adequately specified

in the complaint, the plaintiff also “must ordinarily point to a 

pattern of prior, similar violations of federally protected 

rights, of which the relevant policymakers had actual or 

constructive notice.” Hyun Ju Park v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 

952 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Connick v. Thompson, 

563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011); Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 

F.3d 1232, 1253 (9th Cir. 2010)); see, e.g., Perryman v. City of 

1 In all respects pertinent to plaintiff’s unlawful 

policy or custom theory, these allegations are identical to those 

in plaintiff’s original complaint. (Compare Compl. at ¶ 41 

(Docket No. 1) with SAC at ¶ 52 (Docket No. 28).) In its Order 

granting in part defendants’ motion to dismiss that complaint, 

the court held that because plaintiff had “merely allege[d] that 

the defendant has a policy or custom of performing various wrongs 

alleged elsewhere in her complaint,” she failed to adequately 

plead a Monell claim. (Docket No. 19 at 9-10 (citing AE ex. rel. 

Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637; Bagley v. City of Sunnyvale, 16-cv02250 LHK, 2017 WL 344998, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017); 

Mendy v. City of Fremont, 13-cv-4180 MMC, 2014 WL 574599, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2014)).)

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Pittsburg, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2021 WL 493396, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 10, 2021) (considering prior incidents in deciding whether 

Monell complaint adequately identified pattern of past 

violations); Hughey v. Drummond, 2:14-cv-00037 TLN AC, 2017 WL 

590265, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) (same); see also Bagley 

v. City of Sunnyvale, 16-cv-02250 LHK, 2017 WL 344998, at *15 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017) (granting motion to dismiss Monell

claim because plaintiff failed to “allege any facts that indicate 

that the [city’s] police force is regularly taking actions 

involving excessive force or unlawful arrests” and instead “only

[pled] actions related to his own arrest and prosecution”).

In an attempt to show a pattern of prior, similar 

violations of federally protected rights of which the City

policymakers had actual or constructive notice, plaintiff 

identifies four other lawsuits against Anderson and APD officers.

(See SAC at ¶ 57 (Docket No. 28) (citing Haught v. City of 

Anderson, et al., 2:11-cv-1653 JAM CKD (E.D. Cal. 2011); Knighten 

v. City of Anderson, et al., 2:15-cv-1751 TLN CMK (E.D. Cal. 

2015); McMillan v. County of Shasta, et al., 2:20-cv-00564 JAM 

EFB (E.D. Cal. 2020); Rawlins v. City of Anderson, et. al., 2:21-

cv-00567 TLN DMC (E.D. Cal. 2021)).)2 

To determine whether this history of previous lawsuits 

is sufficient to plausibly allege a municipal policy, custom or 

practice at the pleading stage, the court considers all of the 

2 Defendant City requests that the court take judicial 

notice of the docket and papers filed in the four cases plaintiff 

identifies in her Second Amended Complaint. (See Req. for Jud. 

Notice (Docket No. 29-2).) Plaintiff has not opposed that

request. (See Opp. to Mot. (Docket No. 34).) Accordingly, the 

City’s request is granted.

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

relevant factors, including (1) the number of prior lawsuits; (2) 

the allegations in those lawsuits, including the degree of 

similarity between the facts alleged in the prior lawsuits and 

the facts alleged in the action under consideration; (3) the 

timing of the prior lawsuits; (4) the disposition of the prior 

lawsuits; (5) the number and identity of defendants in the prior 

lawsuits, including whether the municipality itself was a 

defendant and whether any of the defendants in the prior lawsuits 

were the same as the defendants in the case under consideration;

and (6) the size of the municipality in relation to the number 

and type of lawsuits.

Here, the previous cases in which APD officers were 

alleged to have committed § 1983 violations were all relatively 

recent, having been filed in the last ten years, and the although 

the size of the APD is not alleged in the SAC, the court can take 

judicial notice that Anderson is a relatively small city in 

Shasta County, California, with a population of a little over 

10,000. With regard to the number of prior cases, while the 

Ninth Circuit has suggested that one or two prior similar

incidents, standing alone, are generally insufficient to prove

the existence of an unconstitutional custom or practice,3 the law 

does not establish a precise number of previous lawsuits which 

must be alleged to overcome a motion to dismiss. See Gonzalez v. 

Cnty. of Merced, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2017) 

(O’Neill, J.) (observing same); (see also Mot. at 7-8 (Docket No. 

3 See, e.g., Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 

1235 (9th Cir. 1989) (one incident cannot establish a practice); 

Meehan v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(two incidents cannot establish a custom). 

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

29-1) (contending that the four prior incidents identified by 

plaintiff in her Second Amended Complaint put it into a 

precedential “grey area”)). 

Accordingly, to determine whether the existence of 

these previous lawsuits is sufficient to establish a pattern of 

prior, similar violations of federally protected rights, of which 

the relevant policymakers had actual or constructive notice, the 

court must look to the other relevant factors, including the 

similarity of the allegations in the prior cases to the 

allegations in this case, the defendants in the prior cases, and 

the disposition of those cases.

The most similar of the prior cited cases is Knighten, 

in which defendant Miller in the instant case was alleged to have

reached into the plaintiff’s car window, pulled him against the 

inside of the car door, twisted his arm, and slammed him against 

Miller’s vehicle before informing the man he was under arrest for 

making a “door ding” on Miller’s vehicle. (See SAC at ¶ 57 

(citing 2:15-cv-01751 TLN CMK, Docket No. 21 at ¶¶ 3, 6-8).)4 

Haught, however, bears no similarity whatsoever to the 

present case. There, the plaintiff, who had already been 

4 In her Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff notes 

that the court in Knighten also identified several other 

complaints for alleged uses of excessive force by Miller. (See

SAC at ¶ 57 (citing Knighten, 2:15-cv-01751 TLN CMK) (Docket No. 

28).) However, because the nature and circumstances of those 

uses of force are not apparent, the court cannot conclude that 

they are sufficiently similar to the uses of excessive force 

alleged here. Moreover, while prior unlawful acts of Miller, if 

they were sufficiently similar to the conduct alleged in this 

case, might be relevant to show a common practice on his part, 

they would do little to establish a department-wide practice in 

order to support Monell liability.

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

arrested, alleged she was subsequently driven to a remote 

location and raped. (See id. (citing 2:11-cv-01653 JAM CMK).) 

Similarly, the allegations in McMillian bear little resemblance 

to the facts alleged here. There, the plaintiff alleged he was 

arrested, that he was placed in handcuffs that were too tight and 

placed into a patrol car, that the officer threatened to slam the 

car door on him, and that the officer shoved his legs inside of 

the car before closing the door. (See id. (citing 2:20-cv-00564 

JAM EFB, Docket No. 43 at ¶¶ 20-27, 29, 92).) And in Rawlins, 

the plaintiff alleged an officer instructed her to move her 

vehicle, and when she checked her child’s car seat before doing 

so, the officer reached into her vehicle, grabbed and twisted her 

arm, and handcuffed and arrested her. (See id. (citing 2:21-cv00567 TLN DMC, Docket No. 1 at ¶ 18).) 

With the possible exception of Knighten, the manner of 

arrest and use of force in the other referenced cases, except for 

the fact that a car was in some way involved, do not resemble 

those alleged here, and thus do not plausibly suggest an unlawful 

policy or custom of excessive force or false arrest. Nor do 

those cases support, with the possible exception of McMillian,

the existence of the alleged unlawful policies or customs of 

retaliatory arrest or “hurt a person – charge a person.” One 

similar prior incident does not plausibly suggest the existence 

of “a widespread practice . . . so permanent and well settled as 

to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” 

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). “[R]andom acts” or “isolated or sporadic incidents” 

are insufficient to prove the existence of an unconstitutional 

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

custom or practice. Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 

1995); Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Rather, the plaintiff must prove that the custom or practice in 

question has “sufficient duration, frequency[,] and consistency 

that [it] has become a traditional method of carrying out 

policy.” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918.

Finally, at oral argument on the motion, counsel 

represented to the court that none of the four referenced cases 

went to judgment. It was represented that two of them settled, 

and the other two were still pending. Settlement of a lawsuit 

does not establish the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations, and 

without a judgment against the defendants, the allegations of a 

complaint are little more than unproven allegations.

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that 

plaintiff has failed to state a claim for Monell liability based 

on unlawful policy or custom.

B. Ratification

The Ninth Circuit has “found municipal liability on the 

basis of ratification when the officials involved adopted and 

expressly approved of the acts of others who caused the 

constitutional violation.” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 920. To show 

ratification, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 

municipality’s “authorized policymakers approve[d] a 

subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.” Christie v. Iopa, 

176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 

at 127). “Ratification . . . generally requires more than 

acquiescence”; policymakers must “ma[k]e a deliberate choice to 

endorse the officer[’]s[ ] actions.” Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of 

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted), rev’d in part on other grounds, 575 

U.S. 600, 610-17 (2015). 

In its previous order, the court held that plaintiff’s 

original complaint failed to state a Monell claim under a 

ratification theory. (See Docket No. 19 at 10-11.) It did so 

because the complaint included only “conclusory pleading” in 

support of ratification, rather than “any factual allegations 

regarding any approval or ratification by Anderson . . . or the 

basis for such approval.” (See id.)

Plaintiff’s new allegations in support of her

ratification claim appear to consist solely of her references to

the prior lawsuits, which include allegations of excessive force 

and false arrest against defendants Miller and Lee, arguing that 

their continued employment by Anderson despite being named in 

those lawsuits “emboldened Defendants Miller and Lee to continue 

to commit violations without fearing discipline, demotion, or 

termination.” (See SAC at ¶ 58 (Docket No. 28).) Plaintiff also 

points to the allegation in Knighten that Miller was promoted to 

Sergeant and given a pay raise after the incident at issue in 

that case. (See id.) 

However, plaintiff has not provided any factual 

allegations identifying any authorized policymakers who approved 

the officers’ actions and the basis for such approval. See

Christie, 176 F.3d at 1239. Such conclusory pleading, absent any 

supporting factual allegations, does not sufficiently state a 

Monell claim. See Hicks v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 1:17-cv-01187

LJO SAB, 2018 WL 347790, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2018)

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

(dismissing ratification claim where complaint contained no 

factual allegations to support claim that defendant county 

“approved, ratified, condoned, encourage, sought to cover up, 

and/or tacitly authorized” conduct of police unit). Plaintiff 

has therefore failed to state a cognizable claim of ratification 

under Monell.

C. Failure to Train

To state a claim for failure to train under Monell, a 

plaintiff must show that (1) the existing training program is 

inadequate “in relation to the tasks the particular officers must 

perform”; (2) the relevant officials were “deliberate[ly]

indifferen[t] to the rights of persons with whom the police come 

into contact”; and (3) the inadequacy of the training “‘actually 

caused’ a deprivation of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional 

rights.” Merritt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 

390-91 (1989)). 

In her opposition, plaintiff contends that the Second 

Amended Complaint adequately states a Monell claim based on 

failure to train “for the same reasons as . . . with respect to 

Plaintiff’s policy, custom, or practice Monell claim.” (Opp. to 

Mot. at 25-26 (Docket No. 34).) However, as the court has 

already concluded, plaintiff has not adequately stated a Monell

claim based on unlawful policy or custom. 

Further, the Second Amended Complaint contains hardly

any references to the City’s training programs or alleged 

deficiencies therein, and plaintiff does not explain how the 

alleged unconstitutional policies or customs addressed above 

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

necessarily also evince a lack of training. Indeed, since her 

original complaint, plaintiff appears to have removed most of her 

complaint’s references to “training.” (Compare, e.g., Compl. at 

¶¶ 42, 47 (Docket No. 1) (alleging City “fail[ed] to properly 

. . . hire, train, instruct, monitor, supervise, evaluate, 

investigate, and discipline” defendant officers) (emphasis added) 

with SAC at ¶¶ 53, 59 (Docket No. 28) (alleging City “fail[ed] to 

properly . . . monitor, supervise, evaluate, investigate, and 

discipline” defendant officers).)

Plaintiff has provided no factual allegations as to (1)

how Anderson’s officer training is inadequate, (2) how the 

relevant officials have been deliberately indifferent to the 

rights of Anderson citizens, or (3) how the inadequacy of the 

training actually caused the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. See Merritt, 875 F.2d at 770. In fact, 

plaintiff has provided no factual allegations whatsoever 

regarding the Anderson officer training program. (See SAC 

(Docket No. 28).) Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a 

cognizable claim of failure to train under Monell. 

For the reasons stated, plaintiff has failed to state a

claim for municipal liability under Monell based on failure to 

train.

III. Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, the court concludes 

that the fourth cause of action of the SAC fails to state a claim 

against the City of Anderson for municipal liability under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. 

Counsel for plaintiff has suggested that plaintiff be 

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

allowed to proceed on the bare-bones generalized allegations in 

the SAC at least until she has had the opportunity to conduct 

some limited discovery to develop facts to support her Monell

claim. There are sound reasons why the law does not permit a 

plaintiff to do that. Particularly given the current the state 

of the economy, a city of the size and location of Anderson 

understandably has limited resources. Before a plaintiff may be

permitted to tap into those resources to require responses to the 

kind of discovery requests which could be expected in order to 

develop a direct claim against the City, the law requires the 

plaintiff to come forward with something of more substance and 

specificity than the kind of generalized conclusions and 

speculation in plaintiff’s SAC. And because plaintiff has unable 

to state a viable claim under Monell after multiple rounds of 

amendment to the complaint, the court declines to grant further 

leave to amend.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, alleging municipal 

liability under § 1983, be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

Dated: December 2, 2021

Case 2:21-cv-00386-WBS-DMC Document 37 Filed 12/02/21 Page 16 of 16