Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-18-03719/USCOURTS-ca8-18-03719-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hubert Carter
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 18-3719

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Hubert Carter

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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Submitted: November 11, 2019

Filed: February 19, 2020

[Unpublished]

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Before SHEPHERD, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Hubert Carter pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1

 sentenced Carter to 180 months

1

The Honorable Beth Phillips, then District Judge, now Chief Judge for the

United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.

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of imprisonment, the mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) of the Armed

Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).

On appeal, Carter argues the district court violated the Sixth Amendment by

determining Carter committed at least three ACCA predicate offenses on different

occasions. The Sixth Amendment, as Carter points out, requires any fact that

increases the maximum or mandatory minimum penalty for a crime must be submitted

to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.

99, 111–12 (2013). Because committing an ACCA predicate offense on three

different occasions increases the minimum penalty for his crime, Carter argues a jury

— not the court — must determine whether the predicate offenses occurred on

different occasions. No jury found Carter committed ACCA predicate offenses on

three different occasions. Therefore, he contends his ACCA-enhanced sentence is

unconstitutional. 

As an initial matter, the underlying premise of Carter’s argument is flawed. 

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(A), “[a]t sentencing, the court may

accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact.” Fed. R.

Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A). Here, the Presentence Report (“PSR”) clearly indicates Carter

had at least three convictions for six different transactions involving possession with

intent to sell, sale of, or distribution of, cocaine. Because Carter did not object to the

PSR, and specifically did not object to the dates listed for the prior offenses, the

district court did not err in relying on the prior convictions portion of the PSR as

findings of fact during sentencing. See United States v. Harris, 794 F.3d 885, 887

(8th Cir. 2015). As such, the Sixth Amendment was not implicated.

Furthermore, our precedent is clear that while it is true “a fact increasing either

end of the [sentencing] range produces a new penalty and constitutes an ingredient of

the offense,” and that “a jury [must] find those facts beyond a reasonable doubt,” the

Supreme Court has deemed prior convictions a sentencing factor rather than a criminal

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element necessitating a jury finding. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 112, 111; AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226–27 (1998). As we recognized in United

States v. Wyatt, the implication of Carter’s argument is that Almendarez-Torres was

wrongly decided and our precedent following the case should be overruled, but we

have previously “unequivocally rejected” such an argument. 853 F.3d 454, 458–59

(8th Cir. 2017). The district court was correct in following our precedent and

applying the ACCA enhancement to Carter’s sentence.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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