Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01494/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01494-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
M. Carrasco
Defendant
M. Slankard
Defendant
Lawone Wilkinson
Plaintiff
D. Zanchi
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWONE WILKINSON, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

SERGEANT M. SLANKARD, et al.

Defendants. 

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No. 1:08-CV-1494-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Sergeant M. Slankard’s Motion to Dismiss

[Doc. # 14]. A response and reply have been filed.

Factual and Procedural Background

On October 3, 2008, Plaintiff Lawone Wilkinson (“Wilkinson”) filed a pro se civil

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sergeant M. Slankard (“Slankard”),

Captain D. Zanchi, and Associate Warden M. Carrasco. On February 27, 2009, this Court

screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its screening order, the Court

stated:

A first amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896

F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat an original

complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was

raised in the original complaint is waived if it is not raised in a first amended

complaint. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

February 27, 2009, Order, p. 3. The Court dismissed the Complaint with leave to file an

amended complaint. 

Case 1:08-cv-01494-CKJ Document 22 Filed 01/19/10 Page 1 of 8
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On March 16, 2009, Wilkinson filed a First Amended Complaint against Slankard.

Wilkinson alleged that, on February 24, 2008, between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. he was

returning to his housing unit from the yard. Slankard stopped Wilkinson and told him to

remove his clothing (except his boxer shorts) before entering the housing unit. Wilkinson

alleged that he complied with the request, but complained that because it was under 50

degrees outside and there was no emergency, he should not be forced to remove his clothing.

Slankard repeated his order and Wilkinson reiterated his complaint. Wilkinson alleged that

Slankard then pulled out a can of pepper spray, pointed it at Wilkinson’s face, instructed him

to drop his clothes and boots to the ground, and face the wall with his hands behind his back.

Slankard then told other officers to handcuff Wilkinson and walk him to the holding cage.

Wilkinson alleged that he told Slankard that he was disabled and that it would be

painful to walk to the cage without his orthopedic boots. Because Slankard responded that

it would be more painful if the officers dragged Wilkinson to the cage, he walked to the cage.

Wilkinson alleged that Slankard then kicked Wilkinson’s boots across the dirty prison yard.

The other officers escorted Wilkinson to the cage. When Wilkinson requested to see a

doctor, he was told to ask Slankard; his request was not acknowledged. Wilkinson alleged

that he was strip searched in the cage for an hour and was released and sent back to his

housing unit.

Wilkinson alleged that, on February 27, 2008, he was called into the office by

Slankard and his lieutenant. They requested that Wilkinson make an audio/video statement

of the February 24, 2008, incident. Wilkinson alleged that he asked whether Slankard

should be involved in making the video, but was told it was none of his business. After

Wilkinson made the video, Slankard told Wilkinson he would receive a disciplinary write up.

Wilkison alleged: Count I – Slankard used excessive force when he pointed the can

of pepper spray at him; Count II – Slankard violated Wilkinson’s ADA rights by forcing him

to walk to the holding cage without his orthopedic boots; Count III – Slankard’s conduct

violated Wilkinson’s Eighth Amendment rights, and; Count IV – Slankard. retaliated against

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him by filing a disciplinary report after Wilkinsons complained about Slankard’s conduct.

The Court screened Wilkinson’s First Amended Complaint, determined that

Wilkinson has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted as to Counts I – III

and dismissed those claims. The Court determined that Wilkinson had stated a claim in

Count IV and directed Slankard to file an Answer. On June 26, 2009, this Court denied

Wilkinson’s Motion for Reconsideration.

On October 19, 2009, Slankard filed a Motion to Dismiss in which asserts Wilkinson

has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Declaration of N. Grannis (“Grannis”)

is attached to the Motion to Dismiss. Grannis, the Chief of the Inmate Appeals Branch,

declares that the Inmate Appeals Branch keeps an electronic database of each inmate appeal

that has proceeded through the final level of review. Grannis further declares that a review

of the database as to Wilkinson reveals that two appeals were accepted for the final level of

review and that neither of those appeals reference any retaliation claims against Slankard. 

Wilkinson has filed an opposition and a request for judicial notice. These documents

refer to Wilkinson’s original Complaint and documents attached to it. Slankard has filed a

reply in which he asserts that consideration of the original Complaint is not appropriate

because the Court stated that an amended complaint supersedes an original complaint and

that the original complaint is treated as nonexistent.

Consideration of Original Complaint

Slankard requests the Court not consider the original Complaint and the documents

attached to it. However, should the Court not consider these documents and should

Wilkinson subsequently file a motion for reconsideration and request additional time to

submit a supplemental response, it is likely the Court would find it appropriate to permit a

supplemental response. See generally Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 855-56 (9th Cir.

2004). Such a procedure would merely delay the Court’s consideration of the documents.

The Court finds it appropriate, therefore, to consider the documents at this time.

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Motion to Dismiss – Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Slankard asserts that the remaining count of the First Amended Complaint must be

dismissed because Wilkinson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Ordinarily,

plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust the

administrative remedies available to them. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102

S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). However, Congress replaced this “general rule of nonexhaustion,” with a “general rule of exhaustion” for all prisoner suits based on federal law.

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). Indeed,

prisoners are required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this

title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006).

Exhaustion in cases subject to §1997e is mandatory. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524, 122 S.Ct. at

983; Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover, futility or other

exceptions to the exhaustion requirement do not apply. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741

n. 6, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 1825, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) 

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S.Ct.

910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). A defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the

absence of exhaustion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. Because exhaustion is a matter of abatement

in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to decide

disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Indeed, a court has broad discretion as to the method

to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s

Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988), quotation omitted. Further, a plaintiff’s

allegations of exhaustion are not presumed to be true. Ritza, 837 F.2d at 368-69.

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has determined that the claims must be exhausted before

filing suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting

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The Court notes that the completion of two third level appeals by Wilkinson

establishes that he is familiar with the third level appeal process.

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exhaustion pendente lite would inevitably undermine Congressional objective of reducing

the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits). 

Slankard asserts that the State of California, through the California Department of

Corrections (“CDCR”), provides its prisoners and parolees with the right to appeal

administratively “any department decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). “An

appellant must submit the appeal within 15 working days of the event or decision being

appealed, or of receiving an unacceptable lower level appeal decision.” Cal. Code Regs. Tit.

15, § 3084.6(c).

The CDCR inmate appeal process has several levels of appeal: informal resolution,

formal written appeal on a CDCR Form 602, second level appeal to the institution level, and

third level appeal. See Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15, § 3084.5. The decision of the Director of

CDCR at the Inmate Appeals Branch (for appeals received prior to August 2008) or the

decision of the Office of Third Level Appeals - Health Care for medical appeals (for

decisions received as of August 2008 or as of November 2008 for medical staff complaints)

constitutes exhaustion of the administrative remedies available to an inmate within the

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 

Grannis asserts that Wilkinson has not pursued to completion any grievances/appeals

relating to Count IV of the First Amended Complaint against Slankard. Two appeals taken

through the third level appeal by Wilkinson have been attached to the Motion to Dismiss;

neither of these appeals mentions the alleged wrongdoing by Slankard at issue in this case.1

Slankard asserts this claim should be dismissed.

The summary attached to Grannis’ declaration includes two appeals that were

screened out (IAB number 0726763). Included within the documents attached to the original

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The inclusion in the summary of the appeal that was screened out is corroborated by

the exhibit attached to Wilkinson’s original Complaint. See United States v. Perez-Corona,

295 F.3d 996, 1001 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2002) (a court should only take judicial notice of facts

contained in agency records that bear “sufficient indicia of reliability . . .”). 

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Complaint is a June 27, 2008, letter from the Inmate Appeals Branch to Wilkinson. The

letter advised Wilkinson that institution and parole staff were available to assist him in

obtaining additional copies of forms and documents needed to submit an appeal, that the

Inmate Appeals Branch had determined that the appeal submitted by Wilkinson did not

comply with relevant regulations, that the appeal was being screened out, and that the appeal

was cancelled. Complaint, Ex. D.2

 Although the bottom of the document includes the

statement “Permanent Appeal Attachment - Do Not Remove[,]” id., it is not clear if the

document(s) it was attached to are included as an attachment to the original Complaint. 

It appears that Wilkinson attempted to pursue an appeal through the third level, but

when advised that it was screened out, Wilkinson did not submit a third level appeal that

complied with the regulations. The attachments to the Complaint, the opposition, and the

request for judicial notice do not include any information from Wilkinson that he attempted

to pursue the third level appeal following receipt of the letter advising him that the appeal

was screened out. Moreover, Wilkinson does not assert that he did not know that further

action was needed to pursue a third level appeal – indeed, the letter establishes that he was

advised staff was available to assist him, that the appeal submitted by Wilkinson did not

comply with relevant regulations, that the appeal was screened out, and that the appeal was

cancelled. Rather, the summary attached to Grannis’s declaration establishes that Wilkinson

did not pursue a third level appeal, as to the claim in this case, following the notification to

Wilkinson that the appeal was screened out. Moreover, Wilkinson does not assert that the

administrative procedures were unavailable or that prison officials effectively obstructed his

ability to pursue his grievance through the third level of appeal.

The Court finds Slankard has met his burden establishing that Wilkinson did not

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exhaust his administrative remedies. Dismissal is appropriate.

Dismissal with Prejudice

Slankard asserts that, where a prisoner-plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative

remedies, and the time for filing an administrative grievance has lapsed, a procedural default

results. Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1995). In Marsh, the Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeals stated:

Without the prospect of a dismissal with prejudice, a prisoner could evade the

exhaustion requirements by filing no administrative grievance or by intentionally

filing an untimely one, thereby foreclosing administrative remedies and gaining

access to a federal forum without exhausting administrative remedies.

53 F.3d at 710. Slankard argues that, while Marsh addressed section 1997e prior to the

enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress’s enactment of a more

restrictive statute should not permit circumvention under its less restrictive predecessor. See

Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 (“obviously broader exhaustion requirement” intended by Congress).

Slankard asserts that this matter should be dismissed with prejudice; to do otherwise would

permit Wilkinson to circumvent the administrative review system.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct.

2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006), Ninth Circuit law directed the district court to dismiss a

complaint without prejudice to allow the prisoner a chance to exhaust his administrative

remedies. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“If the district court concludes that the prisoner has not

exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without

prejudice.”); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d at 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002).

However, Woodford now forecloses any untimely exhaustion. The exhaustion requirement

may not be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective

administrative grievance or appeal.” Woodford, 126 S.Ct. at 2382. Proper exhaustion

requires compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules. Id. at

2386; see e.g., Janoe v. Garcia, 2007 WL 1110914, at *8-9 (S.D.Cal. March 29, 2007)

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(dismissing Complaint with prejudice where a prisoner did not pursue the three-step formal

review process, and had no time to exhaust); Regan v. Frank, 2007 WL 106537, at *4-5 (D.

Haw. 1/9/07) (dismissing plaintiff's claims with prejudice for failure to timely exhaust

administrative remedies as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) prior to filing suit). The

CDCR administrative appeals process requires that prisoner administrative appeals be

submitted within fifteen days of receiving an adverse determination. Wilkinson did not

pursue a third level appeal after being advised that the appeal had been screened out; i.e.,

Wilkinson did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Under Woodford, it is impossible for

Wilkinson to cure this defect. Therefore, dismissal with prejudice for failure to exhaust is

appropriate.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 14] is GRANTED.

2. This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and shall then close its file in this

matter.

DATED this 19th day of January, 2010.

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