Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03137/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03137-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jonathan Brunswig
Appellee
City of Scott City, Kansas
Intervenor
Donald Dornon
Appellant
Gary Eitel
Appellee
Richard Ford
Appellee
Joshua Gooden
Appellee
Dan Goodman
Appellee
Everett Green
Appellee
Chris Jurgens
Appellee
Ted Kuffler
Appellee
Fred Kuntzsch
Appellee
Perry Nowak
Appellee
Bo Parkinson
Appellee
Jack Schmitt
Appellee
John Shirley
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

DONALD DORNON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CHRIS JURGENS, Chief of Police in his 

individual capacity; RICHARD FORD, 

Ordinance Officer in his individual 

capacity; DAN GOODMAN, Mayor in his 

individual capacity; EVERETT GREEN, 

Ward I Councilman in his individual 

capacity; BO PARKINSON, Ward I 

Councilman in his individual capacity; 

GARY EITEL, Ward 2 Councilman in his 

individual capacity; JONATHAN 

BRUNSWIG, Ward 2 Councilman in his 

individual capacity; JACK SCHMITT, 

Ward 3 Councilman in his individual 

capacity; PERRY NOWAK, Ward 3 

Councilman in his individual capacity; 

JOSHUA GOODEN, Ward 4 Councilman 

in his individual capacity; FRED 

KUNTZSCH, Ward 4 Councilman in his 

individual capacity; TED KUFFLER, in his 

individual capacity; JOHN SHIRLEY, City 

Attorney in his individual capacity, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

------------------------------ 

CITY OF SCOTT CITY, KANSAS, 

 Intervenor. 

No. 15-3137 

(D.C. No. 5:14-CV-04065-RDR-KMH) 

(D. Kan.) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

January 28, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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2 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

This case stems from an abatement of nuisance conditions on Donald Dornon’s 

property in Scott City, Kansas. Acting under the city code, officials removed items 

from the property in May 2014. Dornon, proceeding pro se, sued several city 

officials alleging they violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dornon appeals, and we 

affirm. 

I. Background 

 Scott City’s code prohibits a property owner to allow “conditions which are 

injurious to the health, safety or general welfare of the residents of the city or conditions 

which are detrimental to the aesthetic characteristics of adjoining properties, 

neighborhoods or the city.” Code of the City of Scott City, Kansas § 4-4-6 (2013). The 

city may remove items from private property to abate such conditions after notifying the 

owner and giving him an opportunity to remedy the violation or seek a hearing in the 

matter. See id. §§ 4-4-7, 4-4-9. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

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 After the city removed items from Dornon’s property in accordance with this 

provision, Dornon brought this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Scott City’s 

mayor, city council members, chief of police, and others conspired to violate his 

constitutional rights by passing the abatement provision and using it to search and seize 

his property without a warrant or conviction. The district court ruled that Dornon’s 

complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim against any of the 

defendants and granted their motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As 

alternative grounds for dismissal, the court ruled that the mayor and city council members 

were entitled to legislative immunity and that Dornon had failed to allege wrongful acts 

by defendants Shirley, Kuffler, and Jurgens. 

II. Analysis 

We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See S.E.C. v. 

Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 640 (10th Cir. 2014). A complaint must contain a “short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege 

facts that, if true, are sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

claim is facially plausible when the court can “draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Because Dornon appears pro se, 

we liberally construe his pleadings. Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1199 

(10th Cir. 2013). 

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As the defendants correctly point out, Dornon does not challenge the district 

court’s finding that the mayor and city council members are entitled to legislative 

immunity. Nor does he dispute the court’s determination that he failed to allege 

unlawful acts by Shirley, Kuffler, and Jurgens. Dornon has therefore waived any 

argument that the district court erred by dismissing his claims against these 

defendants on these grounds. See Blue Mountain Energy v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 

805 F.3d 1254, 1259 n.3 (10th Cir. 2015). 

That leaves only Dornon’s claim against defendant Ford, the public service 

officer who conducted the abatement. We must determine whether the district court 

erred when it held that Dornon failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible 

claim against Ford under § 1983; that is, that Dornon failed to allege facts that, if 

true, show Ford deprived him of his federal constitutional or statutory rights under 

color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC 

Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 1125, 1143 (10th Cir. 2014). Dornon’s complaint claims 

that Ford “without a conviction or any warrant[,] . . . searched, seized, and destroyed 

[his] personal property” under color of state law. R. at 10. Dornon refers generally 

to his “constitutional rights” and various constitutional amendments, but he does not 

identify the specific rights he accuses Ford of violating. The district court interpreted 

Dornon’s claims to allege violations of his Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, 

and because Dornon does not explain how any other constitutional provisions apply, 

we do the same. 

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We have held that in the absence of egregious actions (which could violate 

substantive due process) nuisance abatement does not violate a property owner’s 

Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights if he is given adequate notice and an 

opportunity for a hearing, and if the abatement is conducted in a reasonable manner. 

See Santana v. City of Tulsa, 359 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2004). Although 

Dornon argues on appeal that the city seized items from the wrong property and that 

the condition of his property did not warrant abatement under the code, we decline to 

consider these arguments because Dornon failed to raise them in the district court. 

See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011). Otherwise, 

Dornon does not identify any egregious action on the part of the city or any 

unreasonableness in the performance of the abatement; and he does not dispute that 

he was notified of the proposed abatement and failed to request a hearing. He argues 

only that Ford seized his property without a warrant or conviction. But neither was 

required for the civil abatement here. The district court did not err by holding that 

Dornon’s complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. 

III. Conclusion 

 We affirm the district court’s order dismissing Dornon’s claims. 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge 

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