Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10246/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10246-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dwight Ramon Pollard
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DWIGHT RAMON POLLARD, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10246

D.C. No. 

2:08-cr-00332-JCMGWF-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 13, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed March 8, 2017

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit

Judges, and John R. Tunheim,* Chief District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Gould

* The Honorable JohnR. Tunheim, Chief United States District Judge

for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. POLLARD

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s $4,128,554

forfeiture order in a case in which the defendant pleaded

guilty to one count of aggravated identity theft and aiding and

abetting, and one count of possessing a false identification

document with the intent to defraud the United States. 

The panel held that when a conviction for aggravated

identity theft is premised on a proven or admitted violation of

a predicate offense that is enumerated in the civil forfeiture

statute, then forfeiture is authorized; and that the district court

had statutory authority to enter a criminal forfeiture order in

this case because of the defendant’s conviction of aggravated

identity theft with a bank fraud predicate offense.

The panel held that the defendant knowingly and

voluntarily waived his right to challenge the forfeiture as a

violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ExcessiveFinesClause,

on notice grounds, and on the ground that the district court

erred by not requiring the government to prove the amount of

proceeds.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. POLLARD 3

COUNSEL

Jason F. Carr (argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender;

Rene L. Valladares, Federal Public Defender; Cristen C.

Thayer, Research and Writing Attorney; Office of the Federal

Public Defender, Las Vegas, Nevada; for DefendantAppellant.

Elizabeth O. White (argued), Appellate Chief; Daniel G.

Bogden, United States Attorney; Daniel D. Hollingsworth,

Assistant United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s

Office, Las Vegas, Nevada; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Dwight Pollard and several codefendants used false

identification documents to open fraudulent bank accounts

and steal money. Pollard was caught, and pleaded guilty to

one count of aggravated identity theft and aiding and abetting,

and one count of possessing a false identification document

with the intent to defraud the United States. He was

sentenced to time served and supervised release. The court

also ordered $1,430,396.91 in restitution, and $4,128,554.00

of forfeiture. As part of his plea agreement, Pollard agreed to

the specified amount of forfeiture, waived various rights

related to forfeiture, and waived his right to appeal. 

Pollard challenges the forfeiture order, contending thatthe

district court lacked the statutory authority to impose

forfeiture, and that the forfeiture amount violates the Eighth

Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. He also raises issues

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4 UNITED STATES V. POLLARD

relating to notice and the government’s failure to prove the

amount of forfeiture.

I

In the Second Superseding Indictment, Pollard—along

with his codefendants—was charged with five counts of bank

fraud, four counts of aggravated identity theft, and one count

of conspiracy, all relating to a scheme to defraud Bank of

America. The indictment also included six forfeiture

allegations—one for bank fraud and five for conspiracy—

seeking forfeiture of up to $4,128,554.00.

The indictment alleged that Pollard and his codefendants

used false identifications to assume control over the bank

accounts of various Bank of America patrons. The

defendants opened up accounts in the patrons’ names, and

connected those new accounts to patrons’ existing accounts

so that the defendants could transfer money out of the

existing accounts. The defendants then could access the

patrons’ existing accounts by using fraudulently obtained

debit cards to withdraw money. 

Pollard pleaded guilty to one felony count of aggravated

identity theft and aiding and abetting, and one misdemeanor

count of possessing a false identification document with the

intent to defraud the United States. An essential element of

Pollard’s aggravated identity theft plea was an admission that

he committed and aided and abetted bank fraud. In the

recitation of facts, Pollard also admitted to conspiring with

others to commit both bank fraud and aggravated identity

theft. 

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UNITED STATES V. POLLARD 5

Pollard also agreed to “the criminal forfeiture of an in

personam criminal forfeiture money judgment in the amount

of $4,128,554.00.” He waived his right to appeal, and

various rights related to the forfeiture. 

The district court sentenced Pollard to time served and

two years of supervised release, and imposed restitution in the

amount of $1,430,396.91, for which Pollard and his

codefendants were jointly and severally responsible. The

court initially declined to impose forfeiture, concluding that

forfeiture “would thwart the purposes of rehabilitation and

thwart the factors set forth in 18 USC, Section 3553(a).” The

government appealed. While that appeal was pending, we

issued our decision in United States v. Newman, which held

that when the government meets the requirements for the

imposition of forfeiture, “the district court must impose

criminal forfeiture in the amount of the ‘proceeds’ of the

crime.” 659 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2011). In response to

the government’s motion, we vacated the district court’s

judgment in this case and remanded “for the district court to

follow the procedures set forth in Newman.” Order, United

States v. Pollard, No. 11-10157 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2012).

On remand, the district court held that it had statutory

authority to enter an order of criminal forfeiture for a

conviction of aggravated identity theft, and found that the

government had given Pollard notice of the criminal

forfeiture. The district court denied Pollard’s request for a

hearing to determine the amount of proceeds. Noting its

authority to rely on factual statements in the plea agreement,

the district court reasoned that, because the parties stipulated

to the amount of forfeiture, “the government did not have an

independent obligation to offer detailed proof of that

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6 UNITED STATES V. POLLARD

stipulated fact.” The court found “no reason to question the

accuracy of the stipulated amount,” and entered an order of

criminal forfeiture in the stipulated amount of $4,128,554.00. 

Pollard timely appealed the order of forfeiture and the

amended judgment incorporating that order. 

II

We review a “district court’s interpretation of federal

forfeiture law de novo.” United States v. Casey, 444 F.3d

1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006). Similarly, we review de novo the

legality of the sentence, United States v. Flores, 559 F.3d

1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009), and “the validity of an appeal

waiver,” United States v. Medina-Carrasco, 815 F.3d 457,

461 (9th Cir. 2016). 

III

The government’s primary argument is that this appeal is

barred by Pollard’s plea agreement, which included a waiver

of the right to appeal and waiver of specific rights related to

forfeiture. However, even a valid appellate waiver does not

prevent courts from reviewing an illegal sentence, that is, one

that “exceeds the permissible statutory penalty for the crime

or violates the Constitution.” United States v. Bibler, 495

F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 2007). We consider whether the

district court had the statutory authority to impose forfeiture

when the crime of conviction was aggravated identity theft,

whether the forfeiture amount violated the Eighth

Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, andwhether forfeiture

was imposed without the Government meeting the statutory

notice requirement. We address each claim in turn.

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UNITED STATES V. POLLARD 7

A

Title 18 of the United States Code separates civil and

criminal forfeiture into two different sections. Section 981

covers civil forfeiture and § 982 covers criminal forfeiture. 

18 U.S.C. §§ 981–982. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c)

provides: 

If a person is charged in a criminal case with

a violation of an Act of Congress for which

the civil or criminal forfeiture of property is

authorized, the Government may include

notice of the forfeiture in the indictment or

information pursuant to the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure. If the defendant is

convicted of the offense giving rise to the

forfeiture, the court shall order the forfeiture

of the property as part of the sentence in the

criminal case . . . .

This provision “permits the government to seek criminal

forfeiture whenever civil forfeiture is available and the

defendant is found guilty of the offense.” Newman, 659 F.3d

at 1239. It “make[s] criminal forfeiture available in every

case that the criminal forfeiture statute does not reach but for

which civil forfeiture is legally authorized.” Id. (quoting

United States v. Padron, 527 F.3d 1156, 1161–62 (11th Cir.

2008)). If the Government had statutory authority to seek

civil forfeiture against Pollard, it had the authority to seek

criminal forfeiture.

The civil forfeiture statute provides, “[a]ny property, real

or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds

traceable to a violation of [several specific] section[s] . . . of

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8 UNITED STATES V. POLLARD

this title or any offense constituting ‘specified unlawful

activity’ (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of this title), or a

conspiracy to commit such offense,” “is subject to forfeiture

to the United States.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1), (a)(1)(C)

(emphasis added). The civil forfeiture statute does not

require that property be traceable to a conviction, only that it

be traceable to a violation of an enumerated provision.

Pollard was convicted of aggravated identity theft, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1) and 1028A(c)(5).1

Aggravated identity theft is committed when an individual

“during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in

subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses,

without lawful authority, a means of identification of another

person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). We refer to the felonies

“enumerated in subsection (c)” as “predicate offenses.” 

Although a violation of § 1028A, is not itself an enumerated

offense in either the civil or criminal forfeiture statutes, see

id. §§ 981, 982, or an “offense constituting ‘specified

unlawful activity’ (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of [Title

18]),” id. § 981(a)(1)(C), some of the aggravated identity

theft predicate offenses are enumerated in the forfeiture

statutes. We have not previously addressed whether

1 Pollard was also convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1028(a)(4)(b)(6) & (c)(3)(A), possessing a false identification

document with the intent to defraud the United States. Proceeds obtained

from a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028 are subject to forfeiture under both

the civil and criminal forfeiture statutes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(C),

982(a)(2)(B). However, the government did not argue for, and the district

court did not use, this conviction as the basis of its forfeiture order. 

Because the appealed order is predicated on Pollard’s conviction for

aggravated identity theft, and the government argues for imposition of

forfeiture based on that conviction alone, we address only forfeiture for a

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.

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UNITED STATES V. POLLARD 9

forfeiture is authorized on the basis of an admitted violation

of a predicate offense that is also enumerated in the civil

forfeiture statute. We now hold that when a conviction for

aggravated identity theft is premised on a proven or admitted

violation of a predicate offense that is enumerated in the civil

forfeiture statute, then forfeiture is authorized. 

In his plea agreement, Pollard admitted to committing

aggravated identity theft, including commission of the

predicate offense of bank fraud, a violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1344. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5).2 Bank fraud is an

enumerated offense under the civil forfeiture statute. See 18

U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). The proceeds of Pollard’s crime of

conviction are, therefore, traceable to a violation of an

enumerated section supporting forfeiture, because they are

traceable to his admitted violation of the federal bank fraud

statute. That statute was essential to his conviction for

aggravated identity theft. Put another way, the aggravated

identity theft charge necessarily included a “charge[] . . . [for]

a violation of [the bank fraud] Act,” and civil forfeiture is

authorized for violations of the bank fraud statute. See 28

U.S.C. § 2461(c). The proceeds of the crime must be

forfeited to the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C);

Newman, 659 F.3d at 1239–40. The district court had

statutory authority to enter a criminal forfeiture order because

of Pollard’s conviction of aggravated identity theft, with a

bank fraud predicate offense.

2 During the colloquy at the change of plea hearing, the district court

outlined the elements of aggravated identity theft, bank fraud, and aiding

and abetting. Pollard pleaded guilty, and agreed with the recitation of

facts in the plea agreement.

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10 UNITED STATES V. POLLARD

B

Pollard also asserts that the forfeiture order violates the

Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. 

As explained above, a waiver of appellate rights generally

does not preclude review of a sentence that violates the

Constitution. See United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113,

1124–25 (9th Cir. 2016). However, as the Government notes,

Pollard waived more than just his general right to appeal. 

Under the section of the plea memorandum titled,

“Forfeiture,” Pollard not only agreed to “an in personam

criminal forfeiture money judgment in the amount of

$4,128,554.00,” but also specifically waived “any claim or

defense under the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, including, but not limited to, any claim or

defense of excessive fine in any proceedings concerning the

property.” 

A defendant may waive his constitutional rights if clear

and convincing evidence shows that the waiver is knowing,

voluntary, and intelligent. Gete v. I.N.S., 121 F.3d 1285,

1293 (9th Cir. 1997). We “indulge every reasonable

presumption against waiver.” Id. (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v.

Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)). To determine whether

a defendant has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently

waived his constitutional rights, “we review the particular

circumstances of the case and the nature of the right

involved.” Id.

Pollard does not argue that his entry into the plea

agreement overall was not knowing or voluntary, nor does he

challenge the sufficiency of the plea colloquy. Rather, he

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UNITED STATES V. POLLARD 11

asserts that his agreement to the plea’s forfeiture provisions

in particular was without knowledge and voluntariness. 

Pollard argues that he lacked knowledge of the forfeiture

amount because the plea agreement does not clearly state the

amount of forfeiture, and he lacked notice that the

Government would seek forfeiture for aggravated identity

theft. This contention is contradicted by the plain language

of the plea, Pollard’s statement that he understood the

government would seek forfeiture of $4,128,554.00, and his

attorney’s statements at the plea hearing reiterating that

Pollard agreed to forfeiture in the amount of more than four

million dollars. Pollard also relies on a statement the district

court made at sentencing regarding his ability to negotiate all

aspects of the plea agreement, in an attempt to assert that

acceptance of the forfeiture provisions was not voluntary. 

The district court’s statements related to the negotiating

positions of the parties, not the voluntariness of Pollard’s

plea. Pollard does not offer any additional argument as to

why his plea was not knowing or voluntary.

The record supports the conclusion that Pollard

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligentlyagreed to the amount

of forfeiture and the accompanying forfeiture provisions,

including the waiver of his right to challenge the amount on

Eighth Amendment grounds. Although in the colloquy at the

change of plea hearing the district court did not specifically

address the Eighth Amendment waiver, the court did confirm

that Pollard waived his right to appeal, and that he did so

freely and voluntarily. The court also confirmed that before

Pollard signed the written plea agreement, Pollard read it,

understood its terms, discussed it with his lawyer, and that

Pollard’s lawyer answered any questions Pollard had. The

forfeiture provisions were not obscure; instead, they were set

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12 UNITED STATES V. POLLARD

forth in their own section with the bold and underlined

heading: “Forfeiture.” 

Both the prosecutor and the district court raised the issue

of forfeiture during the change of plea hearing. During the

prosecutor’s recitation of the substance of the plea agreement,

she twice referred to Pollard’s agreement to forfeiture. The

first reference was at the start of her recitation. The second

was made shortly after explaining that Pollard waived his

right to appeal. The prosecutor stated, “[t]he defendant

agrees to the forfeiture of property up to the amount of

$4,128,554 as set forth in Section K of this agreement,

paragraphs 19 through 30, Pages 10 and 11.” The prosecutor

specifically drew the court and Pollard’s attention to the

provisions of the plea agreement addressing forfeiture,

including the waiver of an Eighth Amendment challenge. 

After the prosecutor’s recitation of the substance of the

plea agreement, the district court asked both Pollard and his

attorney if they agreed that the terms of the plea agreement

were correctly stated and if they conformed to Pollard’s

understanding of the agreement. Both answered in the

affirmative. In addition, the court confirmed with Pollard that

he understood the government would be seeking forfeiture of

$4,128,554.00. Pollard confirmed that was his understanding. 

At sentencing, Pollard’s attorney stated, “we have a plea

agreement in this case and Mr. Pollard did agree to the

forfeiture amount of $4 million and some so we’re bound by

the terms of the plea agreement.” 

Pollard knowingly and voluntarily accepted the plea

agreement, agreed to waive his right to appeal, knew that the

government was seeking a specific amount of forfeiture,

agreed to that specific amount of forfeiture, and waived his

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UNITED STATES V. POLLARD 13

right to challenge the forfeiture amount on Eighth

Amendment grounds. There is clear and convincing evidence

in the record that shows Pollard’s waiver of his right to

challenge the forfeiture amount on Eighth Amendment

grounds was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Gete,

121 F.3d at 1293.3 We conclude that Pollard waived this

Eighth Amendment claim and decline to address it.4

C

Pollard also challenges the legality of the forfeiture order

on the grounds that the Government did not file a forfeiture

allegation related to the count of conviction. Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) sets forth the notice requirements

for forfeiture, and “provides that a court may not enter an

order of forfeiture unless the indictment or information

contains notice that the government will seek forfeiture.” 

United States v. Lo, 839 F.3d 777, 790 (9th Cir. 2016)

(evaluating the adequacy of a forfeiture notice despite there

being an appellate waiver). As noted above, a general

appellate waiver does not prevent the court from analyzing a

claim of an illegal sentence. See id. at 790; Bibler, 495 F.3d

at 624.

3 We need not address whether a knowing and voluntary waiver of a

specific constitutional challenge would remain binding if there were

significant changes in the case law concerning the viability of such a

challenge. Pollard relies on no such legal developments here.

4 We also do not address whether the government may recover the full

agreed upon forfeited amount fromboth Pollard and his codefendants. See

Newman, 659 F.3d at 1244 n.8 (noting that “[t]he government asserts that

it may not, and will not, seek forfeiture from co-conspirators that exceeds

the total amount of ‘proceeds,’” but declining to address the issue).

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14 UNITED STATES V. POLLARD

Like the Eighth Amendment claim, Pollard waived his

right to appeal the forfeiture order on notice grounds. See

United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir.

1990) (concluding a defendant may waive constitutional and

statutory rights as part of a plea bargain). In the plea

agreement, Pollard specifically “agree[d] to waive . . . Fed. R.

Crim. P. . . . 32.2(a).” For the reasons stated above, we

conclude that this waiver was valid, and decline further to

address this claim. 

IV

Pollard challenges the forfeiture amount on one final

ground. He argues that the district court erred by not

requiring the government to prove the amount of proceeds. 

Unlike the claims discussed above, this argument does not go

toward the statutory or constitutional legality of the sentence. 

The Government asserts that Pollard waived this particular

argument when he waived his general appellate rights. We

agree that Pollard waived this claim, but hold that he did so

when he waived his other claims and rights related

specifically to forfeiture, rather than through the general

appellate waiver. That specific forfeiture waiver provided

that Pollard waived “all constitutional, legal, and equitable

defenses . . . in any proceedings concerning the property.” A

claim that the district court erred by not requiring the

government to prove the amount of proceeds when it imposed

forfeiture in the amount to which Pollard agreed falls

squarely within this waiver. For the reasons set forth above,

we hold that Pollard knowingly and voluntarily waived this

claim, and we decline to consider it.

AFFIRMED.

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