Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-73725/USCOURTS-ca9-11-73725-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Sunny Calaogan Viloria
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SUNNY CALAOGAN VILORIA, AKA

Sonny Viloria Nabarette, AKA

Sunny Nabarette, AKA Sunny V.

Nabarette, AKA Sunny Vicoria

Nabarrete, AKA Sunny Viloria

Nabarrette,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 11-73725

Agency No.

A040-495-721

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

June 9, 2015—Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed December 21, 2015

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Marsha S. Berzon,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

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2 VILORIA V. LYNCH

SUMMARY*

Immigration

The panel dismissed Sunny Calaogan Viloria’s petition

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision

finding that he failed to establish derivative United States

citizenship.

The panel held that this court lacks jurisdiction to resolve

Viloria’s citizenship claim on appeal of the BIA’s decision

vacating the Immigration Judge’s order terminating removal

proceedings and remanding, because there was no final order

of removal. The panel held that the statutory provision for

review of nationality claims, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5), did not

create an exception to this court’s limitation to review of final

removal orders.

COUNSEL

Manuel Q. Diones (argued), Law Offices of Manuel Q.

Diones, LLLC, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Petitioner.

Yanal Harbi Yousef (argued); Stuart F. Delery, Acting

Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Cindy S. Ferrier,

Assistant Director; Timothy G. Hayes, Trial Attorney, Office

of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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VILORIA V. LYNCH 3

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Sunny Calaogan Viloria is the adopted son of

a natural-born U.S. citizen father and a naturalized U.S.

citizen mother. Born in the Phillippines in 1978, he entered

the United States on an IR4 orphan visa at age seven. In June

2010, the government served him with a Notice to Appear

charging him as removable based on his conviction for a

third-degree drug offense seven years earlier. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

Viloria argued before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that he

was not removable because he obtained automatic derivative

citizenship from his parents upon his adoption. The IJ agreed

and terminated removal proceedings. The government

appealed the termination order to the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”), which concluded that Viloria had not met

his burden to establish citizenship, vacated the IJ’s

termination order, and remanded.

Viloria now petitions this court for review of his

citizenship claim. As we explain below, because Viloria has

not been ordered removed, we lack jurisdiction.

I.

Viloria was admitted to the United States in June 1986, in

Honolulu, Hawaii, on an IR4 orphan visa. He immediately

entered into the custody of his adoptive parents. The

adoption became final in August 1987. Viloria has resided in

the United States continuously since his adoption and has

remained unmarried.

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When he was twenty-four years old, Viloria pleaded no

contest to promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree,

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712-1243, in connection with his

possession of methamphetamine. The government later filed

a Notice to Appear in the Honolulu Immigration Court,

charging Viloria as removable under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) as an alien convicted of a controlled

substance violation other than possession for personal use of

less than thirty grams of marijuana.

At a hearing before the IJ, Viloria contested his

removability on the ground that he obtained derivative

citizenship through his adoptive parents. At the time of

Viloria’s adoption, the statutory provision for derivative

citizenship provided that:

(a) A child born outside of the United States,

one of whose parents at the time of the child’s

birth was an alien and the other of whose

parents then was and never thereafter ceased

to be a citizen of the United States, shall, if

such alien parent is naturalized, become a

citizen of the United States, when—

(1) such naturalization takes place while

such child is unmarried and under the age

of eighteen years; and

(2) such child is residing in the United

States pursuant to a lawful admission for

permanent residence at the time of

naturalization or thereafter and begins to

reside permanently in the United States

while under the age of eighteen years.

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VILORIA V. LYNCH 5

(b) Subsection (a)(1) of this section shall

apply to an adopted child only if the child is

residing in the United States at the time of

naturalization of such adoptive parent, in the

custody of his adoptive parents, pursuant to a

lawful admission for permanent residence.

8 U.S.C. § 1431 (1986).

Viloria admitted that he did not meet the criteria under

section 1431(b) because his adoptive mother—like him, a

Filipino citizen by birth—was naturalized in 1983, after

Viloria’s birth but before Viloria began residing in the United

States in his adoptive parents’ custody. He argued, however,

that subsection (a) of section 1431, rather than subsection (b),

applied to him, because he met the statutory definition of

“child”:

The term “child” means an unmarried person

under twenty-one years of age and includes a

child legitimated under the law of the child’s

residence or domicile, or under the law of the

father’s residence or domicile, whether in the

United States or elsewhere, and, except as

otherwise provided in sections 1431 to 1434

of this title, a child adopted in the United

States, if such legitimation or adoption takes

place before the child reaches the age of

sixteen years, and the child is in the legal

custody of the legitimating or adopting parent

or parents at the time of such legitimation or

adoption.

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6 VILORIA V. LYNCH

8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (1982). Because he was an unmarried

person under the age of twenty-one in the legal custody of his

parents at the time of his adoption, he was a “child” under

section 1101(c)(1); therefore, he contended, for purposes of

obtaining citizenship he was subject to section 1431(a), not

section 1431(b).

The IJ noted that the definition of “child” in section

1101(c)(1) applied “except as otherwise provided” by

sections 1431 and 1434, and that the “except” clause could be

read to preclude section 1101(c)(1) from applying when

derivative citizenship is at stake. But the IJ was persuaded by

Viloria’s argument that section 1431(b) supplemented, rather

than replaced, the definition of “child” in section 1101(c)(1)

as it applied to adopted children. That is, the IJ held that

former section 1431(a) was applicable both to an adopted

child who met the criteria of section 1431(b) and to an

adopted child who met the definition of “child” in section

1101(c)(1).

After the IJ terminated removal proceedings, the

government appealed. The BIA sustained the appeal,

reasoning that under the plain language of former section

1431, adopted children were required to meet the criteria

under subsection (b) to benefit from subsection (a). It

rejected Viloria’s argument that he was a child under section

1101(c)(1), indicating that, under the plain language of that

statute, section 1431 was an “except[ion]” to the definition of

child, not a supplement. Accordingly, the BIA vacated the

IJ’s order and remanded for further proceedings.

Viloria then petitioned this court for review. The

government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a final order

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VILORIA V. LYNCH 7

of removal. We denied the motion without prejudice to

renewal of the jurisdictional argument in the answering brief.

II.

We dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

It is well established that this court’s jurisdiction over

removal proceedings is limited to review of final orders of

removal. In relevant part, 8 U.S.C § 1252(b)(9) provides:

Judicial review of all questions of law and

fact, including interpretation and application

of constitutional and statutory provisions,

arising from any action taken or proceeding

brought to remove an alien from the United

States under this subchapter shall be available

only in judicial review of a final order under

this section.

(Emphasis added).

That limitation applies even if it appears a removal order

is likely forthcoming on remand. Alcala v. Holder, for

example, held that this court lacked jurisdiction over the

BIA’s order affirming an IJ’s grant of the government’s

motion to dismiss removal proceedings so that the

government could reinstate a prior order of removal. 

563 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009). Rejecting the

petitioner’s argument that the court had jurisdiction because

the prior order of removal was likely to be reinstated, Alcala

reaffirmed that “[t]he carefully crafted congressional scheme

governing review of decisions of the BIA limits this court’s

jurisdiction to the review of final orders of removal,” even if

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8 VILORIA V. LYNCH

the petitioner raises a constitutional claim or question of law. 

Id. at 1013, 1016. And Abdisalan v. Holder, a recent en banc

decision of this court, confirmed that “[w]hen the BIA

remands to the IJ for any reason, no final order of removal

exists until all administrative proceedings have concluded.” 

774 F.3d 517, 526 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended (Jan. 6, 2015).

Against this backdrop, Viloria asserts that this court

nonetheless has jurisdiction to resolve his citizenship claim

on appeal of the BIA’s order vacating the IJ’s order

terminating removal proceedings. Viloria concedes that no

final order of removal has issued. He maintains, however,

that the statutory provision for review of nationality claims,

section 1252(b)(5), creates an exception to this court’s

limitation to review of final removal orders. We disagree.

First, the statute itself belies Viloria’s argument. Section

1252 is headed “Judicial review of orders of removal.” 

(Emphasis added). Section 1252(b) is entitled “Requirements

for review of orders of removal” and further states that it

applies “[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal.” 

(Emphases added). Section 1252(b)(5)(A) states that “[i]f the

petitioner claims to be a national of the United States and the

court of appeals finds from the pleadings and affidavits that

no genuine issue of material fact about the petitioner’s

nationality is presented, the court shall decide the nationality

claim”; section 1252(b)(5)(B) instructs the court to transfer

proceedings to the district court if “a genuine issue of

material fact about the petitioner’s nationality is presented”;

and section 1252(b)(5)(C) limits consideration of a

nationality claim to the manner provided in sections

1252(b)(5)(A) and (B). Finally, as noted above, section

1252(b)(9) states that “[j]udicial review of all questions of

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VILORIA V. LYNCH 9

law and fact . . . shall be available only in judicial review of

a final order under this section.” (Emphasis added).

Section 1252(b)(5) does speak directly to nationality

claims. But nothing in it indicates that it creates an exception

for nationality claims from section 1252(b)(9)’s emphatic

jurisdictional restriction. Nor does section 1252(b)(5)

affirmatively grant broader jurisdiction than is otherwise

provided by section 1252. Instead, the provisions of section

1252(b)(5) govern a court proceeding in accordance with

section 1252—that is, a proceeding initiated after entry of an

order of removal.

Moreover, Congress contemplated the circumstances of

individuals who wish to bring citizenship claims, yet

provided that if a removal proceeding is pending or if the

citizenship issue arose in such a proceeding, questions of

citizenship should be resolved within that proceeding. See

8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). Section 1503 enables an individual to

file a declaratory judgment action in federal district court

seeking a declaration of citizenship. See id. But the statute

also expressly states that “no such action may be instituted in

any case if the issue of such person’s status as a national of

the United States (1) arose by reason of, or in connection with

any removal proceedings . . . , or (2) is in issue in any such

removal proceeding.” This limitation on initiating the

resolution of citizenship claims outside of removal

proceedings, where those proceedings are in process, further

evidences Congress’s intent to restrict, as far as possible,

review of citizenship claims arising in immigration cases in

instances in which final orders of removal have not been

entered.

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10 VILORIA V. LYNCH

Second, we have interpreted section 1252(b)(5) not to

expand the limitation on jurisdiction generally established by

section 1252. Iasu v. Smith declined to review a section

1252(b)(5) nationality claim brought in a habeas proceeding

filed after the REAL ID Act eliminated habeas review of

removal orders. 511 F.3d 881, 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2007). The

petitioner suggested that because the REAL ID Act left

section 1252(b)(5) intact, Congress had meant to confer

special jurisdiction on the courts of appeals to review

nationality claims. Id. at 889. Iasu disagreed, concluding

that “[t]he plain language of § 1252(b)(5) requires that upon

a petition for review of the BIA’s final order of removal, we

must evaluate a petitioner’s claim to United States

nationality.” Id. (quoting Theagene v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d

1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005)). Because the petitioner “failed to

file a petition for review challenging his final order of

deportation,” we lacked jurisdiction to review his claim. Id.

at 890.

Third, although no case in this circuit has addressed the

precise question presented here, several cases have confirmed

the general rule that this court does not have jurisdiction to

review a citizenship claim unless a final order of removal has

been entered. See Abdisalan, 774 F.3d at 523, 526; Anderson

v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2012); Alcala,

563 F.3d at 1013.

We have, however, broadly interpreted the term “final

order of removal” in section 1252 where the petitioner had no

other forum for review of his citizenship claim. See

Anderson, 673 F.3d 1089. Anderson addressed whether this

court could review an ultra vires order of the BIA removing

the petitioner after it reversed the IJ’s order terminating

removal proceedings. 673 F.3d at 1094–95. The BIA

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VILORIA V. LYNCH 11

disagreed with the IJ’s conclusion that the petitioner had

presented sufficient evidence of U.S. citizenship, but, rather

than remanding to the IJ to determine the petitioner’s

removability, the BIA entered a removal order of its own. Id.

at 1094. Recognizing that the BIA’s order was “a legal

nullity,” id., Anderson held that it was “nonetheless ‘a final

order of removal’ for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).” Id. Anderson recognized that any

time a meritorious citizenship claim under section 1252(b)(5)

is at issue, the underlying order of removal is technically a

legal nullity, because “[a]n order of removal issued against a

U.S. citizen is always ultra vires and void.” Id. at 1096. But

because the order’s “practical and concrete effect [was] to

deprive a United States citizen . . . of his right to reside in this

country,” and the order had “been treated as a final order of

removal by the agency officials who executed it,” it was “‘a

final order of removal’ within the meaning of § 1252(a).” Id.

at 1095–96. Thus, the court held that it had jurisdiction to

review the “null” order. Id. at 1096.

This case is nothing like Anderson. First, no

administrative order that purports to be a “final order of

removal” has been issued, invalid or not. So no cognizable

question of statutory interpretation arises as to the reach of

the “final order of removal” concept in section 1252. Second,

in treating an ultra vires order in Anderson as a valid final

order of removal, the court was motivated by the concern

that, if it did not address the claim before it, the petitioner

would be deprived entirely of a judicial evaluation of his

claim.1See id. at 1095–96. Refusing to review the

1 Courts resolving issues similar to those presented here have expressed

concern that, in certain circumstances, no final order of removal will be

entered, and so a petitioner with a non-frivolous claim to U.S. citizenship

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12 VILORIA V. LYNCH

petitioner’s claim would have abrogated the court’s role as

“the final arbiter of constitutional matters,” Anderson

reasoned, and would violate the “[c]onstitution[al] mandate[]

that any person with a non-frivolous claim to American

citizenship receive a judicial evaluation of that claim.” Id. at

1095 (quoting Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th

Cir. 2005), superseded by statute on other grounds,REALID

Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(c) (2005)). 

Here, in contrast, Viloria will likely later have a judicial

forum in which to attempt to prove his citizenship. He has

already litigated his citizenship claim before the IJ and BIA. 

If and when the agency enters a final order of removal against

him, he will have the opportunity to seek review of that order

in this court, including the underlying adverse determination

regarding his citizenship.2

Fourth, we acknowledge that requiring an individual with

a non-frivolous claim to U.S. citizenship to undergo a

prolonged administrative process before asserting that claim

in an Article III court, may, if the claim proves valid, long

delay the security afforded an individual by the recognition

that he or she is a U.S. citizen. But strong policy

will have no forum in which to prove citizenship. See U.S. Const., art. I,

§ 9 cl. 2; e.g., Anderson, 673 F.3d at 1095; Iasu, 511 F.3d at 887–88,

892–93.

2 We note that Viloria could prevail before the BIA on a ground other

than his citizenship and therefore not become subject to a final order of

removal. Whether he could then bring some action to establish his

citizenship—under section 1503(a) or via some other vehicle—is not a

question before us. In such an instance, there might well be a

constitutional imperative to provide a judicial forum for hearing the claim

of citizenship. See n.1, supra. The statutory provisions would be

interpreted with that concern in mind, as in Anderson.

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VILORIA V. LYNCH 13

considerations also weigh against the outcome Viloria seeks. 

For instance, in ruling that a partial remand order of the BIA

was not reviewable, Abdisalan noted that “considerations of

judicial efficiency . . . weigh in favor of reviewing a single

final order of removal.” 774 F.3d at 526. That rule “furthers

the same policies as the finality rule embodied in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.” Id. (quoting Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. Dir.,

Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 626 F.2d 106, 107 (9th

Cir. 1980)).

Similarly, Theagene held that a petitioner need not

exhaust his citizenship claim in proceedings before the

agency before a court of appeals addresses the claim on a

petition for review. 411 F.3d at 1110. Theagene explained

that, because section 1252(d)(1) states “only [that] an ‘alien’

may be required to exhaust administrative remedies,” the

court had jurisdiction to determine whether the petitioner was

in fact an alien subject to the exhaustion requirement. Id.

(emphasis added); accord Omolo v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 404,

407 (5th Cir. 2006); Moussa v. INS, 302 F.3d 823, 825 (8th

Cir. 2002); Bowrin v. INS, 194 F.3d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1999). 

While one could argue that Theagene supports the general

proposition that section 1252(b)(5) permits exceptions to

ordinary procedural requirements, the court emphasized that

its decision did not diminish the importance of ensuring “that

petitioners not bypass administrative procedures available as

of right before proceeding with judicial review.” 411 F.3d at

1110 n.4. It characterized section 1252(b)(5) as “a fail safe

against inadvertent or uninformed execution of a final order

of removal.” Id. Policy concerns do not outweigh the wealth

of authority requiring a final order of removal to confer

jurisdiction on this court.

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14 VILORIA V. LYNCH

One final note: Viloria is not without recourse if, as he

fears might happen, the Department of Homeland Security

detains him during the pendency of removal proceedings. If

those circumstances arise, he may file a habeas petition,

which a federal district court will have jurisdiction to

consider. See Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708 (9th

Cir. 2008) (reversing a district court’s dismissal, for lack of

jurisdiction, of an immigration petitioner’s habeas petition,

where the detained petitioner claimed U.S. citizenship and

was detained during the pendency of removal proceedings).3

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that we lack

jurisdiction to consider Viloria’s citizenship claim.

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

3

In addition, procedural safeguards protect against unjustified prolonged

detention. Specifically, Viloria would have the opportunity to contest any

detention through statutorily authorized or judicially mandated bond

hearings, in which the government would be required to show that he is

a danger to himself or others or is a flight risk. See Rodriguez v. Robbins,

804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015).

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