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Parties Involved:
Carolyn W. Colvin
Appellee
Mablene Jones
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

MABLENE JONES, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 14-5115 

(D.C. No. 4:13-CV-00414-GKF-TLW) 

(N.D. Okla.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

 

Mablene Jones appeals from an order of the district court affirming the 

Commissioner’s decision denying her applications for Social Security disability, 

disabled widow’s benefits, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 1, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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Ms. Jones filed for these benefits effective May 17 and 20, 2010. The agency denied 

her applications initially and on reconsideration. 

On December 5, 2011, Ms. Jones received a de novo hearing before an 

administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ determined that she suffered from the 

serious impairments of degenerative joint disease of the knees and depression. The 

ALJ further concluded that her impairments did not meet or equal a listed 

impairment. She determined that Ms. Jones retained the residual functional capacity 

(RFC) to perform light work with the following restrictions: she would be unable to 

operate foot controls and would be “limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks. She 

is able to have superficial and incidental work-related interaction with co-workers 

and supervisors, but would not be effective in a team environment. The claimant 

should be in a job that does not require significant public interaction to complete job 

duties.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 26. 

Based on this RFC determination, the ALJ found that Ms. Jones could not 

return to any of her past relevant work, but that there were a significant number of 

other jobs that she could perform in the national economy. Applying the 

Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, rule 202.14 (the 

grids) as a framework, and considering the testimony of a vocational expert (VE), the 

ALJ concluded that she would be able to perform the requirements of the light jobs of 

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hand sorter, hand packager, or office helper; and the sedentary jobs of assembler or 

clerical mailer. She was therefore not disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision 

the Commissioner’s final decision. 

We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual 

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct 

legal standards were applied. Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 

2010). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

On appeal, Ms. Jones raises a single issue: whether the ALJ properly 

considered the treating medical source opinion evidence she presented in support of 

her claim. Although she purports to challenge the ALJ’s treatment of “all of the 

treating medical source opinion evidence,” Aplt. Br. at 21, she has only developed an 

appellate argument that the ALJ failed to give appropriate consideration to the 

opinions of Dennis Koldkolo, M.D.1

 

 

1

 The ALJ referred to this physician as “Dr. Koldkolo,” whereas Ms. Jones 

refers to him as “Dr. Kolokolo.” As we read his hand-printed name, which appears in 

capital letters on the forms he completed, the correct spelling of his surname is 

“Koldkolo.” See Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 379-82. 

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The ALJ “assume[d]” that Dr. Koldkolo was Ms. Jones’s treating physician at 

Tulsa Dream Center Health Services (Dream Center), where she received treatment. 

Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 30. The only medical records expressly associated with 

Dr. Koldkolo are forms that he completed and signed on November 9, 2011. See id., 

Vol. 3 at 379-82. But several Dream Center records also appear to bear his signature. 

See id. at 310, 370, 375. Like the ALJ, we will assume that Dr. Koldkolo was 

Ms. Jones’s treating physician. 

Dr. Koldkolo expressed his opinions in the form of four “checked box” 

questionnaire forms, which included his: (1) “Medical Opinion Re: Clinical 

Assessment of Pain,” id. at 379; (2) “Medical Opinion Re: Sedentary Work 

Requirements,” id. at 380; (3) “Medical Opinion Re: Basic Unskilled Work 

Requirements,” id. at 381; and (4) “Medical Opinion Re: Absences From Work,” 

id. at 382. Ms. Jones specifically challenges the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Koldkolo’s 

opinions concerning her ability to stand and walk, which are primarily contained on 

the “Sedentary Work Requirements” form. On that form, Dr. Koldkolo answered the 

question, “Can your patient stand and/or walk for up to two (2) hours in an 8-hour 

workday?” by checking both “Yes” and “No” answers, but he scratched out the “Yes” 

answer and marked the obliteration with his initials. Id. at 380. 

Although the “Sedentary Work Requirements” form requests “objective 

medical findings that support your opinion,” id., none were provided. On the 

“Clinical Assessment of Pain” form, the “underlying medical condition” causing pain 

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was identified as “[right] knee swelling, pain, immobility” and “DJD: degenerative 

joint disease.” Id. at 379. On the “Basic Unskilled Work Requirements” form, the 

contributing impairments and/or symptoms were identified as “DJD” and 

“Depression.” Id. at 381. And on the “Absences From Work” form, the contributing 

impairments and/or symptoms were listed as “pain, depression, and [hypertension].” 

Id. at 382. Other than a handwritten notation that Ms. Jones could “not [medically 

sustain normal work stress] for 8 hours,” id. at 380, these are the only narrative 

indications on the forms; the remainder of the opinions were expressed through 

checkmarks in boxes. 

The ALJ determined that the limitations on these forms 

are . . . not well supported by or fully consistent with the Dream Center 

treatment notes. Although there are complaints of pain, the objective 

findings have shown no effusion and normal range of motion of the 

knee. There are x-rays in the record, which indicate the presence of 

degenerative joint disease. However, the above findings on physical 

examination do not fully support the allegations of pain, and 

Dr. Koldkolo’s indication that such pain would cause inadequate 

functioning in or abandonment of basic physical work activities. I note 

Dr. Koldkolo’s statements regarding [Ms. Jones’s] inability to maintain 

attention and concentration for extended periods and [her] inability to 

handle normal work stress. After careful consideration of the record, I 

find [Ms. Jones] is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks; further 

limitation is not supported in the record. There is an absence of mental 

health treatment in the record. I accord Dr. Koldkolo’s opinions little 

weight. 

Id., Vol. 2 at 30 (citation omitted). 

“A treating physician’s opinion must be given controlling weight if it is 

supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and 

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is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.” Knight ex rel. P.K. 

v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

If an opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must still determine what 

weight, if any, to assign to the opinion by considering the factors set forth at 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927. Id. at 1176-77. The ALJ must give good 

reasons for the weight she assigns to the opinion, and specific, legitimate reasons if 

she rejects the opinion completely. See Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1301 

(10th Cir. 2003). Although she need not explicitly discuss each factor, see Oldham v. 

Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007), the reasons stated must be “sufficiently 

specific” to permit meaningful appellate review, Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Ms. Jones argues that the ALJ could reject Dr. Koldkolo’s opinions only by 

citing contrary medical evidence. She contends that “[t]he alleged lack of evidence 

on a physical exam is not evidence.” Aplt. Br. at 23. Ms. Jones relies on McGoffin v. 

Barnhart, 288 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 2002). In that case, we stated that an ALJ 

“may reject a treating physician’s opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory 

medical evidence and not due to his or her own credibility judgments, speculation or 

lay opinion.” Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there is no 

indication that the ALJ relied on her own “credibility judgments, speculation, or lay 

opinion” in evaluating Dr. Koldkolo’s opinions. Moreover, in McGoffin, we further 

explained that “an ALJ’s credibility judgments . . . by themselves do not carry the 

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day and override the medical opinion of a treating physician that is supported by the 

record.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The lack of affirmative support in the medical record is a legitimate 

consideration at both steps of treating physician analysis. See id. (noting that treating 

physician’s well-supported opinion is entitled to controlling weight); Soc. Sec. 

Ruling 96-2P, 1996 WL 374188, at *2 (July 2, 1996) (“The adjudicator cannot decide 

a case in reliance on a medical opinion without some reasonable support for the 

opinion.”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3) (identifying degree to which 

physician’s opinion is supported by relevant evidence as a factor to be considered in 

assigning weight to the opinion). In light of these considerations, the ALJ properly 

considered the lack of medical evidence, in particular the findings of lack of effusion 

and normal range of motion of the knee, in assigning little weight to Dr. Koldkolo’s 

opinions.2

 

Ms. Jones also contends that the x-rays support, rather than undermine, 

Dr. Koldkolo’s opinions, because they revealed “a moderate amount of narrowing 

about the medical sides of both knee joints as well as some narrowing about the 

patellofemoral spaces bilaterally.” Aplt. Br. at 25 (quoting Aplt. App., Vol. 3 

at 327). She claims these findings “support . . . Dr. [Koldkolo’s] allegations of pain 

and difficulty standing/walking.” Id. But the question is not whether Ms. Jones has 

 

2

 A normal range of motion might actually be considered affirmative evidence 

contradicting Dr. Koldkolo’s restrictions on walking or standing rather than a lack of 

evidence, but even considered as a lack of evidence, the ALJ properly relied on it. 

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pain or difficulty in standing and walking; it is whether the ALJ provided adequate 

reasons for rejecting Dr. Koldkolo’s check-in-the-box opinions that she could not 

stand and walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday and that her pain would be so 

severe as to cause inadequate functioning in basic physical work activities.3

 

Ms. Jones fails to show that the moderate narrowing revealed on the x-rays, which 

the ALJ specifically mentioned but discounted, compelled her to accept 

Dr. Koldkolo’s restrictions in the face of medical evidence that showed lack of 

effusion and a full range of motion. 

Finally, Ms. Jones argues that even if the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Koldkolo’s 

opinions were not well supported justified her decision not to give the opinions 

controlling weight, it did not justify her further decision to assign them little weight. 

Certainly, an ALJ must complete both steps of the analysis in analyzing a treating 

physician’s opinion. See, e.g., Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 

2004) (“[E]ven if a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, 

it is still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the relevant factors.” 

 

3

 In her reply brief, Ms. Jones asserts that “[t]he ALJ’s ‘reasons’ address [only 

her] pain level and attention and concentration, not her ability to walk and stand.” 

Reply Br. at 7. But the ALJ specifically mentioned all four of Dr. Koldkolo’s 

opinions before rejecting his “indication that such pain would cause inadequate 

functioning in or abandonment of basic physical work activities.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 

at 30. “Basic work activities” were defined in the “Clinical Assessment of Pain” 

form to include “walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, bending or 

stooping, reaching, carrying, handling, etc.,” id. Vol. 3 at 379 (emphasis added). 

Also, the ALJ’s discussion of knee problems, even if phrased in terms of associated 

pain, implicitly addressed Dr. Koldkolo’s assessment of Ms. Jones’s ability to stand 

and walk due to those problems. 

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(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). But the ALJ did so here. As noted, 

she cited the lack of supporting evidence for the opinion, a legitimate factor in 

determining the weight to be given a treating physician’s opinion. In addition, the 

ALJ noted that “it is unclear from the record [Dr. Koldkolo’s] specialty, or the length 

and frequency of his treatment of [Ms. Jones].” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 30. These also 

were legitimate factors to be considered under the applicable regulations. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)(i), (5), 416.927(c)(2)(i), (5) (identifying length of 

treatment relationship and frequency of examination and physician’s specialty as 

factors to be considered in assigning weight to medical opinions). 

In sum, the ALJ provided adequate reasons for assigning little weight to 

Dr. Koldkolo’s opinions concerning Ms. Jones’s ability to stand and walk. 

See Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1258 (“The ALJ provided good reasons in his decision for 

the weight he gave to the treating sources’ opinions. Nothing more was required in 

this case.” (citation omitted)). 

 The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Mary Beck Briscoe 

 Chief Judge 

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