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Parties Involved:
James Snyder
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FI LED 

United States C-oul-'t of A ppo4ls 

Tenth Circuit 

J L 16 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) No. 90-8042 

JAMES SNYDER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) (D. Kan. No. CR89-0079-0) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS, District 

Judge.** 

The defendant-appellant, James Barrie Snyder, was indicted 

for conspiring to distribute Lysergic Acid Diethylamide ("LSD") 

under 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l) and for involving minors in the 

conspiracy under 21 u.s.c. § 845b. 1 The defendant was convicted 

by a jury and was sentenced to serve a term of ninety-seven 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 

** The Honorable Dale E. Saffels, United States District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

1 Under 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l), it is unlawful "for any person 

knowingly or intentionally ... to distribute ... a controlled 

substance." Under 21 u.s.c. § 845b it is unlawful for anyone "at 

least eighteen years of age to knowingly and intentionally employ, 

hire, use, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce, a person under 

eighteen years of age to violate [§841]." Section 845b has now 

been recodified as 21 U.S.C. § 161. 

Appellate Case: 90-8042 Document: 010110128882 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 1 
months. The defendant has presented a number of issues on appeal, 

which may generally be grouped together into the following issues: 

(1) whether the government's witnesses improperly commented on his 

right to remain silent; (2) whether the district court erred in 

allowing the government to introduce evidence tending to prove 

that the defendant had conspired to distribute marijuana even 

though the indictment did not charge him with conspiring to 

distribute marijuana; (3) whether the government improperly 

bolstered the testimony of one of its witnesses; (4) whether there 

was sufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (5) whether 

the district court improperly calculated his sentence under the 

United States Sentencing Guidelines by basing his sentence on a 

quantity of LSD sold by a co-conspirator. For the reasons stated 

below, we AFFIRM the district court. 

FACTS 

In May of 1989, defendant's sister-in-law, Lynette Snyder, 

began to sell marijuana to school children in the Casper, Wyoming 

area. Lynette purchased the marijuana from the defendant who was 

living in Denver. In June of 1989, Lynette decided to sell LSD. 

She purchased the LSD from defendant's daughter, Sara Snyder. 

Sara was eighteen years old at that time and was living with her 

father. Lynette used her daughter, Brooke Snyder, and two of her 

friends, Dan Candeleria and Jason Bowman, to sell both the 

marijuana and the LSD at a school in Casper. During this time, 

Brooke Snyder and Dan Candelaria were seventeen years old, and 

Jason Bowman was eighteen years old. In addition, Mikelle 

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Brammer, a nineteen-year-old who was living with Lynette and her 

daughter Brooke, was also participating in the drug distribution 

scheme. After local authorities received a tip that Lynette 

Snyder was distributing drugs in the Casper area, they began an 

investigation that eventually led them to the defendant. 2 The 

defendant was indicted on September 18, 1989. He was tried in the 

United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. The 

jury handed down its verdict of guilty on February 6, 1990 

following a two-day trial. 

DISCUSSION 

The defendant has raised a number of issues on appeal 

claiming that errors were committed during both the guilt phase 

and sentencing phase of his trial. Specifically he claims that: 

(1) two government witnesses improperly commented on his right to 

remain silent; (2) the district court erred in allowing the 

government to introduce evidence that tended to prove that the 

defendant was involved in the sale of marijuana--a crime he was 

not charged with--and that allowing such evidence chilled his 

ability to testify on his own behalf; (3) the government 

improperly bolstered the testimony of one of its witnesses by 

referring to a plea bargain reached between the witness and the 

government where the witness promised to tell the truth in 

exchange for leniency; (4) the district court erred in not 

2 Several of the above mentioned participants pleaded guilty to 

conspiring to distribute marijuana and LSD and to involving minors 

in the conspiracy; Lynette Snyder received a sentence of 120 

months; and Sara Snyder and Mikelle Brammer received twenty-four 

month sentences. 

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granting defendant's request for an acquittal following the 

government's presentation of its case in chief on the grounds that 

there was insufficient evidence to convict him of conspiring to 

distribute the LSD, and of intending to involve minors to help 

distribute the narcotics; and (5) the district court improperly 

calculated his sentence based upon a quantity of LSD sold by Sara 

Snyder to Lynette Snyder, which according to the defendant, was 

sold prior to his involvement in the alleged conspiracy. We will 

address these issues seriatum. 

I. Comment on the Defendant's Right to Remain Silent 

The defendant claims that the two police officers called by 

the government as witnesses improperly testified about the 

defendant's desire to exercise his right to consult with his 

attorney before talking with them, thereby undermining his 

constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. We 

disagree. 

The two witnesses were police officers who had interviewed 

the defendant in Denver prior to his arrest. At trial, the police 

officers presented the following testimony: 

Q. (By Government's Attorney) Now, Officer 

Weischedel, with reference to your investigation 

concerning this matter, did you have occasion to meet 

with James Snyder? 

A. Yes, I did. 

Q. And where was that? 

A. Where? 

Q. Where? 

A. It was in Denver, Colorado, at his residence. 

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Q. And what date? 

A. I believe that was on September 12th, 1989. 

Q. And for what purpose? 

A. We went there with the purpose of talking to him 

and getting his side of the story. We had been told by 

other co-conspirators that he was involved also. 

Q. Who is "we"? 

A. Myself, Special Agent Mike Burnett with Division 

of Criminal Investigation, and an Ed Eddinger, I believe 

his last name is, he is with the Denver Police 

Department. 

Q. Did you meet with Mr. Snyder: 

A. Yes, we did. 

Q. And what happened then? 

A. We met with Mr. Snyder, introduced ourselves, 

and asked him if he would be willing to accompany us to 

the Denver Police Department in regards to his behalf, 

or give his side of the story. He advised that he would 

accompany us but he would like to talk to his attorney 

first. 

At which time we said that was fine to talk to his 

attorney, and if he still wanted to talk with us to call 

our motel, and we could arrange a meeting. 

As we were attempting to--or about to leave, he 

asked, "Well, what do you want to know?" And special 

Agent Burnett told him that we were interested, again on 

his side of the story, and also working up his connect. 

At that time Mr. Snyder stated that was part of the 

problem, that he had more than one source, or something 

to that effect. And then he also told us that he would 

go with us, and we told him not until--to call his 

attorney first, and then if they wanted to talk to us 

they could come and meet us someplace. And then we 

left. 

Q. All right. 

Tr. Vol. IV at 88-90. The second police officer, Michael Burnett, 

presented similar testimony at the end of the trial. Tr. Vol. IV 

at 281-83. 

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The defendant argues that the government put on this 

testimony hoping that the jury would believe the defendant was 

guilty simply because he did not want to speak with the officers 

until after he had consulted with his attorney. The government 

contends that the defendant's Fifth Amendment Rights are not 

implicated because at the time he allegedly spoke with the 

officers, he had not yet been arrested. Because we hold that the 

government did not comment on the defendant's invocation of his 

right to remain silent with the intent that the jury would think 

this was evidence of his guilt nor was the testimony "of such 

character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to 

be a comment on the defendant's right to remain silent,"~ 

United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1257 (10th Cir. 

1991)(quotation omitted), we need not decide whether these 

comments implicated the Fifth Amendment even though the defendant 

had not yet been formally arrested. 

The government claims, and we agree, that the testimony was 

introduced to prove that the defendant had been dealing narcotics-

-not that he was exercising his right to remain silent. 

Specifically, the officers stated that although the defendant 

claimed that he wanted to speak with his attorney, he did state, 

in response to the officers' questions regarding his "connect," 

that "he had more than one source .... " Likewise, to the 

extent the jurors afforded this testimony any weight in their 

deliberations, they most likely relied on what the defendant did 

say and not his expressed desire to remain silent. We do not 

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believe that the jury would naturally or necessarily take this 

testimony as a comment on the defendant's right to remain silent. 

II. Evidence of the Uncharged Crime 

The defendant alleges, and the government admits, that the 

government introduced a great deal of evidence tending to prove 

that the defendant had sold a substantial amount of marijuana to 

Lynette Snyder. The defendant claims that he was in effect being 

tried for a crime for which he had not been charged, and that this 

evidence prejudiced his ability to defend himself against the LSD 

conspiracy charge. 

Under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), "[e]vidence of other crimes, 

wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 

person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, or absence of mistake or accident." We review the 

district court's decision to admit such evidence under an abuse of 

discretion standard. See United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 

1373 (10th Cir. 1989). We cannot, on this record, hold that the 

district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. 

The crucial issue in this case is whether the defendant had 

reached some kind of agreement with his daughter Sara to deliver 

the LSD to Lynette. The defendant argues that while he was aware 

that Sara had been participating in an LSD distribution scheme 

with Lynette, he had never been an active participant. The 

government, on the other hand, contends that the LSD distribution 

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scheme was the product of a plan or agreement reached between the 

defendant, Sara, and Lynette. In fact, the government argues that 

the marijuana sales and LSD sales were so inexorably intertwined 

in the overall conspiracy to sell drugs--both LSD and marijuana--

that they were part of the same conspiracy to sell drugs in 

Casper. Evidence that the defendant had delivered a substantial 

amount of marijuana to Lynette tended to prove opportunity, 

intent, and a plan between the defendant and his daughter, Sara, 

to add LSD to the marijuana already being distributed through the 

distribution network in Casper. The fact that the defendant had 

been actively participating in a marijuana distribution scheme 

with Lynette at the same time he had allegedly been conspiring 

with Sara to distribute the LSD undercuts his claim that he had 

not been an active participant in the LSD distribution conspiracy. 

At a minimum, we cannot say that the district court's decision to 

admit this evidence constituted an abuse of discretion. 3 

3 The defendant raised a related issue of whether his right to 

testify on his own behalf was "chilled" when the district court 

denied his motion in limine to keep out evidence of the marijuana 

transactions. The defendant claims that because the district 

court refused to grant his motion, he was unable to take the stand 

in his own defense out of fear that the government would ask him 

questions about the marijuana transactions thereby forcing him to 

plead the "Fifth" on the stand. 

Because we hold that the district court did not err in 

allowing the government to introduce evidence pertaining to the 

defendant's sale of marijuana to Lynette, we cannot hold that the 

defendant's right to testify on his own behalf was improperly 

"chilled." While there indeed may have been strategic reasons why 

the defendant may not have wanted to take the stand, his right to 

take the stand was not denied. 

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III. Improper Bolstering 

The defendant claims that the government improperly bolstered 

the testimony of Mikelle Brammer and Lynette Snyder by referencing 

their plea agreements. The plea agreements provide that Mikelle 

and Lynette would provide "truthful" testimony in exchange for the 

government's recommendation of a sentence reduction. 4 The 

defendant argues that the reference to the "truthfulness" of their 

testimony constituted improper bolstering. We disagree. In 

United States v. Lord, 907 F.2d 1028, 1029 (10th Cir. 1990), we 

held that "[i]n light of the dual nature of a plea or cooperation 

agreement in both impeaching and bolstering the credibility of a 

witness," a district court can allow the government during direct 

examination to present evidence of the plea agreement--including 

the truthfulness provisions contained in the agreement--even 

though the witness' credibility has not yet been attacked by 

defense counsel. The defendant requests that we consider 

overruling Lord. We decline to do so. 

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

The defendant claims that the evidence introduced by the 

government at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict 

both as to the conspiracy to distribute LSD in Casper and the use 

of minors in the conspiracy. In examining a sufficiency of the 

evidence claim, we review the evidence presented in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution. If after taking into account all 

4 In addition to verbally referring to the agreements, the 

government introduced the written plea agreement into evidence. 

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reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the direct and 

circumstantial evidence presented there is sufficient evidence 

from which a jury might properly have found the defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm its verdict. 

States v. Willis, 890 F.2d 1099, 1103 (10th Cir. 1989). 

See United 

After 

carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the jury's 

verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. 

Specifically, we note that there was ample evidence of the 

defendant's participation in a conspiracy with his daughter, Sara, 

and Lynette to distribute LSD in Casper. First, the defendant 

admits that there was overwhelming evidence proving that he had 

supplied Lynette with a substantial amount of marijuana to sell in 

Casper. Both Lynette and her daughter Brooke testified that 

Lynette had started selling marijuana and then had decided to sell 

LSD in order to increase her profit margin. Lynette sold the LSD 

and the marijuana at the same time. The jury could infer from 

Brooke's testimony that on at least one occasion, her mother had 

sent LSD purchase money to the defendant. Lynette further 

testified that she had mailed separate money orders to purchase 

the LSD and the marijuana. She testified that she had made the 

LSD money order in the name of Sara Snyder, and the marijuana 

money order in the name of Mike Rider at the defendant's request. 

She admitted that on several occasions she had sent both the LSD 

and the marijuana money orders in the same Federal Express 

envelope addressed to the defendant, and that on at least one 

occasion she had checked with the defendant to see whether Sara 

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had been able to purchase the LSD. 5 Lynette further admitted that 

on one occasion she had received the marijuana and the LSD from 

Denver in the same box addressed from the defendant. 

Similarly, Dan Candeleria testified that on one occasion, he, 

Lynette, and Jason Bowman had driven down to Denver to pick up LSD 

and marijuana and that the defendant had actively helped Lynette 

search Sara's bedroom to find the LSD. After they were unable to 

find the LSD, Dan testified that the defendant had agreed to tell 

Sara to bring it to Casper. There was clearly sufficient evidence 

for the jury to find that the defendant had engaged in a 

conspiracy to distribute LSD in Casper. While Sara may have been 

primarily responsible for the ultimate supply of LSD, the evidence 

is nonetheless compelling that the defendant was an active 

participant. 

The defendant also argues that there is no evidence linking 

him with the use of minors in the conspiracy. We disagree. In 

July 1989, Brooke, who was at that time seventeen, flew down to 

see the defendant in Denver to pick up marijuana for her mother. 

Dan Candeleria, who was then seventeen, testified that he had 

driven to Denver in his car with Lynette and Justin to meet with 

the defendant to pick up and pay for some LSD and marijuana. In 

addition to these two instances where the defendant took an active 

role in situations involving minors, the evidence is sufficient to 

5 The defendant argues that because Lynette testified that she had 

asked the defendant whether "Sara had 'gotten it,'" that her 

testimony was ambiguous. We disagree. Lynette never disputes the 

fact that James knew exactly what she was talking about when she 

asked him whether Sara had gotten it. Sara was the source of the 

LSD and the defendant responded to the inquiry by saying he was 

not sure but that he thought Sara had procured the LSD. 

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support an inference that the defendant knew that Lynette would 

involve minors in the conspiracy up in Casper. 6 Indeed, Lynette's 

seventeen year-old daughter, Brooke, delivered the last batch of 

LSD to the government agents that led to everyone's arrest. 

v. Sentencing Guidelines 

The defendant claims that the district court improperly 

calculated his sentence by aggregating all the LSD sold by Sara to 

Lynette for purposes of calculating his base offense level under 

u.s.s.G. § 2Dl.1. Specifically, the defendant claims that there 

is no evidence that he had anything to do with the quantity 

considered by the court. So long as the district court determined 

that the quantity at issue "was within the scope of and reasonably 

foreseeable in connection with, defendant's agreement with his coconspirators," the use of the quantity to determine the 

defendant's offense level was appropriate. See United States v. 

Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1462 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. 

Ct. 9 9 0 ( 19 91) . 

We apply the clearly erroneous standard of review when 

reviewing the district court's findings of fact made in the 

context of a§ 2Dl.1 guideline determination. United States v. 

Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456, 1466 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. 

Ct. 396 (1990). Under the record before us, we cannot conclude 

that the district court was clearly erroneous. 

6 The defendant makes a related claim that the district court 

erred in submitting to the jury the issue of whether he had 

conspired to use minors in the conspiracy. However, because this 

claim is based entirely upon the defendant's claim that the 

evidence was insufficient, we reject it. 

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CONCLUSION 

We have reviewed each of the defendant's claims and have 

found each of them to be without merit. Therefore, the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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