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Parties Involved:
Anthony Ray Jefferson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

Pl LED 

United Stat¢1.i Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAN 2 9 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Plaintiff/Appellee, 

v. 

ANTHONY RAY JEFFERSON and , ROOSEVELT JEFFERSON, Jr., 

Defendants/Appellants. 

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Nos. 90-8028 

90-8030 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. Nos. 89-CR-017-0lB, 89-CR-017-02B) 

Daniel G. Blythe and Robert w. Schrader, Cheyenne, Wyoming for 

Defendants/Appellants. 

Richard A. Stacy, U.S. Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee. 

Before LOGAN and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, Senior District 

Judge.* 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-8028 Document: 010110016442 Date Filed: 01/29/1991 Page: 1 
Appellants Anthony Ray Jefferson and Roosevelt Jefferson, 

Jr., were arrested in Wyoming after officers discovered eight 

ounces of cocaine base (more commonly known as crack) in the trunk 

of a car they were occupying. They were charged and convicted in 

federal court of possession with the intent to distribute a 

controlled substance under 21 u.s.c. § 841(a). The appellants 

have presented a number of important issues for this court to 

consider, impacting the sentencing phase as well as the guilt 

phase of their trial. Among these are: (1) whether a non-owner 

driver of a car has a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in the car 

when the owner is present as a passenger; (2) whether a telephone 

pager bill introduced into evidence by the government to show that 

the accused owned a telephone pager constitutes inadmissiple 

hearsay; and (3) whether the district court committed reversible 

error during the sentencing phase of the trial when it stated that 

it did not have the discretion to depart from the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines. For reasons discussed below, we affirm the 

guilt phase of the trial and remand for reconsideration of the 

sentences. 

FACTS 

During the early morning hours of April 9, 1989, Anthony Ray 

Jefferson and his brother Roosevelt Lee Jefferson (the 

appellants), and their friend, Ernest Lee Tillis, were traveling 

east on Interstate 80 near Evanston, Wyoming, in Tillis' car. 

Officer Matoon of the Evanston police department, observing that 

the car had only one headlight and was weaving within its lane of 

travel, proceeded to pull the car over. Matoon discovered that 

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Roosevelt Jefferson, who was driving the car at the time of the 

stop, had a suspended Colorado license. Roosevelt told Matoon 

that they were returning from a trip to California. According to 

Roosevelt, they had gone to California to deliver a trailer. 

Matoon asked Roosevelt if they had any luggage in the trunk. 

Roosevelt said they did not have any luggage and that the trunk 

did not work. While Matoon was identifying the other occupants of 

the car as Anthony Jefferson and Earnest Tillis, officer Cole 

arrived as backup. 

Matoon asked the other two whether they possessed a valid 

driver's license. Anthony produced his two day-old valid Colorado 

driver's license. When Matoon asked Anthony about the trip, 

Anthony told Matoon that he had gone to California to visit his 

sick girlfriend. 

At this point, Matoon became suspicious and asked Roosevelt 

for his permission to search the car. Roosevelt told Matoon that 

because he was not the owner of the car, he was not sure he could 

consent to the search. When Matoon asked him the identity of the 

car's owner, Roosevelt responded that an individual by the name of 

"Shorty" owned the car. When asked who is Shorty, Roosevelt 

pointed to the car. There is no evidence, however, that Tillis 

identified himself to the officers as the owner of the car, nor 

did Tillis ever object to the search. After Matoon told Roosevelt 

that he could consent to the search, Roosevelt signed a consent 

form. 

Matoon immediately found the butt of a marijuana cigarette on 

the floor of the passenger seat near where Anthony was sitting. 

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Appellate Case: 90-8028 Document: 010110016442 Date Filed: 01/29/1991 Page: 3 
So,,a thereafter, Matoon found a plastic baggie containing 

marijuana cigarettes in a pouch located in the back of the 

driver's seat. At this point, the officers called for further 

backup. Next, Matoon removed the keys from the ignition and 

opened the trunk. The only response from the three defendants, 

who all observed Matoon approach the trunk, was their statements 

that the trunk did not work. Matoon searched the trunk and found 

nothing. A few minutes later, Officer Cole searched the trunk and 

discovered 198.11 grams of crack hidden inside a McDonald's bag 

that was wrapped up inside a pair of Levi jeans. Roosevelt, 

Anthony, and Tillis were taken into custody. 

When the baggie containing the crack was dusted for 

fingerprints, only Tillis' fingerprints could be identified. 

Anthony and Roosevelt maintained throughout the trial that they 

did not know the crack was in the trunk of Tillis' car. Tillis 

elected to cooperate with the government and testified that he and 

the Jefferson brothers had purchased the crack from sources in 

California intending to distribute it in the Denver area. In 

exchange for his cooperation, Tillis received a six level sentence 

reduction and was sentenced to a term of seventy-eight months. 

Roosevelt received a sentence of 151 months, and Anthony received 

a sentence of 360 months. Anthony and Jefferson have appealed 

their convictions and sentences. 1 

1 Anthony has raised several issues that impact him alone. Unless 

we state otherwise, the issues addressed apply to both brothers. 

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Appellate Case: 90-8028 Document: 010110016442 Date Filed: 01/29/1991 Page: 4 
DISCUSSION 

Part I of this opinion will address the issue of whether the 

Jefferson brothers' Fourth Amendment privacy rights were violated 

when officers Matoon and Cole searched the car. Part II will 

address whether the district court erred when it admitted into 

evidence a U.S. West pager bill that was used by the government to 

prove that Anthony was a drug distributor. In Part III we will 

review the remaining guilt phase issues raised by the appellants. 

Finally, in Part IV we will address the Appellants' sentencing 

phase issues. 

I 

The first issue we address is whether the district court 

erred when it ruled in a pretrial hearing that Anthony and 

Roosevelt did not possess protectable Fourth Amendment privacy 

rights in Tillis' car. Anthony and Roosevelt moved to supress the 

seized drugs, and the government advanced two arguments in 

response: first, that the brothers did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in Tillis' car and, second, that even if 

they did, Roosevelt waived those rights for both of them when he 

voluntarily consented to the search. The district court did not 

address the question of whether Roosevelt's waiver was valid 

because it ruled that the brothers did not possess any protectable 

privacy rights in Tillis' car under the Fourth Amendment. 

In order to determine whether an accused possesses 

protectable privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment, we must 

make a two-step subjective/objective inquiry: "first, has the 

individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the 

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Appellate Case: 90-8028 Document: 010110016442 Date Filed: 01/29/1991 Page: 5 
object of the challenged search? Second, is society willing to 

recognize that expectation as reasonable?'' California v. Ciraolo, 

476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). The district court focused on the 

objective part of the inquiry--namely whether under the facts of 

this case society is willing to recognize Roosevelt's and 

Anthony's expectation of privacy. Because we believe this is the 

critical issue, we will likewise focus on the objective step of 

this Fourth Amendment inquiry. 2 Although the district court's 

antecedent factual findings will be reviewed under the clearly 

erroneous standard, we will review the district court's final 

objective determination de novo. See United States v. RubioRivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. 

Monie, 907 F.2d 793, 794 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. 

McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ciraolo, 

476 U.S. at 207 (reviewing de novo the district court's reasonable 

expectation of privacy finding without expressly addressing the 

appropriate standard of review). 3 

There are only a few facts we deem critical to our analysis: 

(1) Roosevelt, the driver, was not the owner of the car; (2) 

Tillis, the owner, was present in, or in view of, the car when the 

purported Fourth Amendment violation occurred and did not object 

2 We will not discuss the subjective step in this opinion, and 

instead we will assume that Anthony and Roosevelt had manifested a 

subjective belief that they possessed protectable privacy rights 

in Tillis' car. 

3 In United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir. 

1984) we applied the clearly erroneous standard when we reviewed 

the lower court's determination that the accused did not possess 

protectable Fourth Amendment privacy rights. We interpret our use 

of the clearly erroneous standard in Obregon as having been 

applicable only to the antecedent facts. 

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to the search; (3) Anthony, who had shared the driving with 

Roosevelt, was a passenger when the search occurred; (4) Roosevelt 

claimed that he had not placed any of his luggage in the trunk and 

that the trunk was in fact broken; (5) Roosevelt did not introduce 

any evidence that he had borrowed Tillis' car on previous 

occasions or that he had any interest in the car other than 

serving as one of the designated drivers during this particular 

trip; and (6) Roosevelt and Anthony denied any knowledge regarding 

the presence of the crack in the trunk. 

Anthony's Fourth Amendment claim may readily be rejected 

under Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In Rakas, the Court 

held that defendants who were passengers in a car driven by the 

owner at the time of the search did not have a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the car such that they could raise a 

Fourth Amendment challenge to the search of the car. Id. at 148-

49. The Court held that a "passenger qua passenger" has no 

reasonable expectation of privacy in a car in which he asserts 

neither a property interest nor a possessory interest and where he 

disclaims any interest in the seized object. Id. Anthony, a 

"passenger qua passenger" claiming no interest in the crack, did 

not possess a protectable Fourth Amendment privacy right in 

Tillis' car;

4 therefore, we reject Anthony's claim that the 

4 Anthony tries to distinguish Rakas by arguing that Tillis, as 

the lawful owner, was the only person entitled to consent to the 

search. In effect, Anthony's argument is based upon a purported 

violation of Tillis' Fourth Amendment privacy rights. This 

argument fails because constitutional rights are personal and 

cannot, therefore, be raised by third parties. United States v. 

Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980). 

Tillis pled guilty and did not preserve a right to appeal the 

footnote continued. 

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officers violated his Fourth Amendment privacy rights. 

Similarly, we dispose of Roosevelt's claim based upon our 

reading of Rakas. The only additional fact that Roosevelt brings 

to the analysis is that he was driving the car, whereas in Rakas, 

the non-owner asserting the privilege was only a passenger. 

Because we have held that mere control is not sufficient to 

establish a protectable Fourth Amendment privacy right, we find 

this distinction to be immaterial. See generally United States v. 

Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 887-88 (10th Cir. 1990) (dismissing accused's 

Fourth Amendment claim because, although he was the driver, "[h]e 

was not the owner nor was he in lawful possession or custody of 

the vehicle."). 5 See also United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 

1371, 1375 (10th Cir. 1984)· (holding that an accused who was 

driving a rental car that was rented by a third party and was 

allegedly delivered to the accused did not have a protectable 

expectation of privacy). 6 

•.• footnote continued 

constitutionality of the search. Because he has not joined in 

this appeal, the issue of whether his constitutional rights were 

violated by the search is not before this court. 

5 In Roper, the accused was driving the car. The car had been 

rented by the wife of one of the passengers. The rental contract 

provided that it could only be driven by her, and there was no 

indication that the rental car company had authorized the accused 

to take control of the car. The wife was not present in the car 

when the search occurred. 

6 Under Roosevelt's theory, had Anthony been driving when the 

police pulled them over, Anthony--not Roosevelt--would have 

possessed a protectable privacy interest. It follows, therefore, 

that under this theory, whenever the brothers switched off 

driving, one brother's privacy rights vanished while the other's 

blossomed. We decline to attribute such a chameleonic, on-again 

off-again, characteristic to Fourth Amendment privacy rights. 

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Appellate Case: 90-8028 Document: 010110016442 Date Filed: 01/29/1991 Page: 8 
\ 

The Supreme Court has cautioned against basing a Fourth 

Amendment privacy analysis upon "arcane distinctions developed in 

property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the 

like . . II Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. Nonetheless, we must 

determine whether at the time of the search, Roosevelt Jefferson 

enjoyed "a property []or a possessory interests in the automobile, 

[]or an interest in the property seized." Id. at 148. Because we 

hold that Roosevelt Jefferson enjoyed neither, we reject his 

Fourth Amendment claim. Even though Tillis was not driving the 

car, he alone retained a possessory interest in the car. Because 

he was present in the car, he was constantly in a position to 

assert his possessory interest to the extent that he desired to do 

~o; therefore, he alone enjoyed the protection of the Four.th 

Amendment. 7 

The Second Circuit, confronted with an almost identical case, 

has applied a similar analysis: 

The [driver] ..• did not own the car, nor was there 

evidence that he had used the car on other occasions. 

There was no evidence as to the responsibility or 

control [the driver] ..• had over the automobile other 

than the fact he was driving it when stopped. According 

to the evidence, he had no luggage or other personal 

belongings stored in the trunk or behind the seat, which 

might have produced a privacy expectation in those 

storage areas ...• In addition, appellant never 

claimed any interest in the [narcotics] ..• seized. 

Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof of a 

7 We do not intend to establish a per se rule that any time the 

owner of a vehicle is present, the driver has no protectable 

privacy interest. We hold only that upon these facts neither 

Jefferson brother is able to establish a personal, reasonable 

expectation of privacy in either the vehicle or in the items 

seized. 

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privacy expectation. 

United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 965 (2d Cir. 1982). 

This case is distinguishable from the cases where an owner of 

a car has lawfully loaned the car to an accused, thereby 

entrusting·him with the right to enjoy a possessory interest in 

the car in the owner's absence, because here the owner remained 

with the car. See generally United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 

546, 548-49 (11th Cir. 1987) (an accused who borrows a car from a 

friend has standing to assert an expectation of privacy); United 

States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d 475, 483 n.11 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 469 U.S. 830 (1984) (accused who borrowed a car from his 

brother had a protectable privacy right); United States v. 

Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 779· n.1 (8th Cir. 1983) (where the accused 

had occasionally borrowed the vehicle from the owner and had 

obtained permission from the owner to use the vehicle on the day 

the vehicle was searched, the accused had a protectable privacy 

interest in the vehicle). Cf. United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 

1413, 1418-19 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that where the government 

failed to prove that the vehicle driven by the accused was stolen, 

the accused possessed protectable privacy rights because it was 

presumed that the accused had the owner's permission to use the 

vehicle). 8 

8 We have found only one other case where a court has been 

confronted with facts similar to ours where the owner was present 

in the car but was not driving when the police stopped and 

searched the vehicle. United States v. Padron, 657 F. Supp. 840 

(D. Del. 1987), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Rubio, 857 F.2d 

1466 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988). In 

Padron, the court held that the accused had a protectable privacy 

interest even though the owner was present when the vehicle was 

footnote continued ••• 

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we also distinguish Minnesota v. Olson, __ U.S. I I 

110 S. Ct. 1684, 1689 (1990). In Olson, the accused was chased by 

the police into a duplex where he was staying as a guest. Id. at 

1687. The state argued that the accused had no protectable 

expectation of privacy because he was never left alone in the 

duplex, nor was he given a key. In effect, the state argued that 

the guest had no protectable privacy interest because the owner of 

the house was present. Id, Olson, however, is inapposite because 

the Court's privacy analysis was tied to characteristics peculiar 

to living quarters. 

Id . 

From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks 

shelter in another's home precisely because it provides 

him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions 

will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those 

his host allows inside·. We are at our most vulnerable 

when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own 

safety or the security of our belongings. 

. . . footnote continued 

searched. Id, at 844. Although the district court opinion was 

affirmed by the Third Circuit, it was affirmed "without published 

opinion," and according to the Internal Operating Procedures of 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, such 

decision is not to be given precedential weight. Int. Op. Pro. 

5,6 (3d Cir. July 1990). In any event, for the reasons expressed 

in this opinion, we respectfully disagree with the district 

court's decision. We further note that in Padron the ultimate 

holding was that the accused did not possess a privacy interest in 

the luggage located in the car's hatch because he denied having 

any proprietary interest in the luggage. Similarly, in our case, 

the Jefferson brothers refused to claim a proprietary interest in 

the marijuana and crack. Requiring that the accused assert a 

possessory interest in the seized object will not place the 

accused in a "no-win situation" because under Simmons v. United 

States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), where an accused testifies as to 

his interest in a seized object in a suppression hearing to 

protect his Fourth Amendment rights, that testimony cannot be used 

against him in trial. 

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These privacy concerns simply do not apply in the context of 

automobile searches and seizures. In Rakas the Court noted that, 

although it did not need to decide whether the same expectations 

of privacy are present in cars and houses, it nonetheless pointed 

out in dicta that "cars are not to be treated identically with 

houses or apartments for Fourth Amendment purposes." Rakas, 439 

U.S. at 148. See generally New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-

113 (1986) ("One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor 

vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom 

serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal 

effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public 

scrutiny.") (quotations omitted); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 

U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (noting that for a variety of reasons, 

including the fact that an automobile is "subjected to pervasive 

and continuing governmental regulation and controls," one's 

expectation of privacy in an automobile is diminished). 

Although the appellants point out that they took turns 

sleeping in the car during the return leg of their trip, we do not 

believe that the Supreme Court intended that any time an accused 

takes a long distance road trip in a car, the car is to be treated 

like a home for Fourth Amendment purposes. The point remains that 

regardless of whether it is driven across town or across the 

country, a car does not envelop its occupants in a house-like 

cloak of Fourth Amendment protection. 

Neither Jefferson brother presented evidence of a sufficient 

interest in the car to trigger a recognition of Fourth Amendment 

privacy rights by this court. Anthony's claim of a Fourth 

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Amendment privacy right in Tillis' car fails under Rakas because 

he was a non-owner passenger, the owner was present, and he did 

not assert any interest in the marijuana or cocaine seized by the 

police. Roosevelt's claim similarly fails because, although he 

was driving the car when they were pulled over, that fact did not 

establish that Tillis had transferred his possessory interest in 

the car to Roosevelt. Therefore, we reject the appellants' claims 

that the Evanston police violated their Fourth Amendment privacy 

rights. 

II 

The next issue, raised only by Anthony, is whether the 

district court erred in admitting into evidence the U.S. West 

pager bill. We find that the district court did err in admitting 

the pager bill into evidence over Anthony's objection because its 

admission constituted inadmissible hearsay; however, we do not 

reverse on this issue because we find the error was harmless. 

Officer Cole found a bill for·a pager from U.S. West Paging 

with Anthony Jefferson's name on it in Tillis' car. The 

government offered it into evidence right after special agent Tony 

Young testified that telephone pagers were commonly used by drug 

distributors to avoid detection and "to minimize the chance that 

their telephone calls could be intercepted ..•• " R. Vol. VII 

at 278. Anthony Jefferson tendered a timely hearsay objection 

after Young testified about the use of pagers by drug dealers and 

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before the government offered the U.S. West bill into evidence. 

The trial judge overruled Anthony's objection. 9 

Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by 

9 The discussion between the attorneys and the trial judge was as 

follows: 

THE COURT: Well, I am inclined to think that the offer 

of proof has a circumstantial evidence bearing on the 

issues of the case, and while it isn't direct evidence I 

think that it might be somewhat indirect, and I am going 

to let it in. 

[ANTHONY'S ATTORNEY]: Okay. Your Honor, could you look 

at that? Could you look at that bill? This bill is an 

out-of-court statement, and it is offered to show that 

he had a pager. Could you look at that bill and see if 

it establishes that and whether the hearsay objection--

THE COURT: Well, I assume it is an ordinary statement 

of account. What does it look like? 

[ATTORNEYS FOR THE GOVERNMENT]: I will get it. A 

regular phone bill. 

[ATTORNEY FOR ANTHONY]: Sort of a phone bill. 

[ATTORNEY FOR THE GOVERNMENT]: We aren't going to have 

anybody from Mountain West--U.S. West, we aren't going 

to have anybody else testify about the balance of it. 

This piece of paper was found in the car. 

(Pause.) 

[ATTORNEY FOR ANTHONY]: This is an out-of court 

statement, and they have offered to prove that he has a 

pager. 

THE COURT: Well, it is a statement of $26.00 for a 

pager. 

[ATTORNEY FOR ANTHONY]: Yes. 

THE COURT: It would appear to be authentic. What is 

the problem? 

[ATTORNEY FOR ANTHONY]: It is an out-of-court 

statement, and it is hearsay, and I object to that. I 

don't think it falls. And also foundation, Your Honor. 

I mean a hearsay exception, excuse me. 

footnote continued 

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the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Fed. R. 

Evid. 80l(c). A statement is an "oral or written assertion. 

of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." 

Fed. R. Evid. 80l(a). Hearsay evidence cannot be admitted unless 

it falls under an exception. Fed. R. Evid. 802. 

Under the plain language of Rule 801, the pager bill was 

hearsay. The bill was a written statement intended by U.S. West 

to assert both that Jefferson had purchased pager service from 

U.S. West and that he owed U.S. West money for this purchase. 

There is no doubt that the government offered the bill into 

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted--namely that 

Jefferson had purchased pager service from U.S. West. Therefore, 

according to the plain language of Rule 801, the pager bill was 

inadmissible hearsay. Our conclusion that the district court's 

admission of the pager bill into evidence over the appellant's 

hearsay objection was erroneous is supported by a number of cases 

holding that a receipt introduced as evidence of payment for a 

good or service constitutes hearsay. See United States v. 

Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 1988); United States 

v. Watkins, 519 F.2d 294, 296-97 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Pacific Gas & 

. footnote continued 

THE COURT: This was found in the car? 

[ATTORNEY FOR THE GOVERNMENT]: It was found in the car 

by Officer Matoon, yes. 

THE COURT: Well, I think I will let it in. The 

objection is overruled. 

R. Vol. VII at 282. 

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Electric Co. v. G. w. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 

--' 442 P.2d 641, 647, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, _ (1968). 

The government in its brief argues that the district court's 

admission of the pager bill into evidence did not violate Rule 801 

because it was "offered as circumstantial evidence to show 

•.• the character and involvement of the Defendant, and to 

corroborate the testimony of the cooperating witness." 

Appellee's Brief at 12-13 (August 14, 1990). This argument is 

without merit. Whether evidence is offered as circumstantial 

evidence as opposed to direct evidence has nothing to do with 

whether it constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Granted, the pager 

bill combined with agent Young's testimony regarding the use of 

pagers by drug dealers was introduced as circumstantial evidence 

of Anthony's intent to possess and distribute the cocaine. 10 

However, the fact that the evidence was introduced to link 

circumstantially the accused to the crime does not render the 

lO In his brief, Anthony apparently raises the separate issue of 

whether the admission of the pager bill into evidence, combined 

with Agent Young's testimony regarding the use of pagers by drug 

dealers, constituted inadmissible drug courier profile evidence. 

See generally United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019, 1021 (8th 

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1163 (1990) (denouncing the 

use of drug courier profiles as substantive evidence). See also 

United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1210-13 & n.2 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (allowing drug courier profiles to be used by the 

government only when rebutting a defense claim of innocence based 

upon the profile characteristics); United States v. HernandezCuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983) (denouncing use of 

drug courier profiles as substantive evidence but allowing limited 

use as background information). 

Without addressing whether we intend to adopt an "antiprofile evidence position" in the future, suffice it to say that 

we need not address this issue here. Agent Young's telephone 

pager testimony was too limited to constitute a profile. Cf. 

Quigley, 890 F.2d at 1023 (profile consists of a "point by point 

examination of profile characteristics"). 

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Appellate Case: 90-8028 Document: 010110016442 Date Filed: 01/29/1991 Page: 16 
hearsay violation any more acceptable. 11 Indeed,· in many cases, 

the government will be forced to rely solely upon circumstantial 

'd . d t h' · t' 12 evi ence in or er o ac ieve a convic ion. The protection 

afforded to an accused by Rule 801 should not be discarded simply 

because the evidence is to be used circumstantially. Therefore, 

we hold that the district court erred when it admitted the U.S. 

West pager bill into evidence over Roosevelt's hearsay 

objection. 13 This does not end our analysis, however, because we 

11 In its brief the government cites to United States v. Ashby, 

864 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1793 

(1990). In Ashby we were presented with an automobile repair 

order admitted into evidence to prove that the "appellant and codefendant were involved in drug running since they had put so many 

miles on the car in a small amount of time." Id. at 693. 

However, in Ashby we concluded that "the work order was not used 

to prove the truth of the matters asserted." Id. Therefore, 

Ashby provides no support for the government's position. 

12 One commentator in particular has argued persuasively against 

importing a circumstantial/non-circumstantial use distinction into 

the hearsay rule: 

All hearsay evidence could be viewed as a kind of 

circumstantial evidence, and all hearsay risks could in 

that view be transmogrified into mere questions of 

weight. That course of reasoning, however •.. leads 

inevitably to error because it bypasses the whole point 

of the hearsay rule: when the belief of a human being 

in a matter is used as evidence of a matter, special 

risks exist, and special safeguards, especially crossexamination, have been designed to deal with them. 

o. Wellborn, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of 

Evidence, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 49, 62-63 (1982). See also R. Park, 

McCormick on Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay: A Critical 

Analysis Followed by Suggestions to Law Teachers, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 

423, 431 (1981) (noting with disapproval that some "courts have 

change[d] hearsay into nonhearsay simply by calling it 

'circumstantial evidence,'"). 

13 We are aware of the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in 

United States v. Marino, 658 F.2d 1120, 1125 (6th Cir. 1981), 

where it held that an airline ticket used at trial to prove that 

"the defendants traveled in interstate commerce .•• was 

footnote continued ... 

-17-

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must determine whether this error was harmless. 

In deciding whether the admission of the pager bill was 

harmless, we must first determine the appropriate standard of 

error review. The choices are limited to the nonconstitutional 

harmless error standard of review pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 

or the constitutional standard established in Chapman v. 

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 14 We note that neither party 

addressed this issue. Furthermore, Roosevelt's attorney did not 

raise a Confrontation Clause objection and instead based his 

objection solely upon a violation of Rule 801. Therefore, unless 

the trial judge's failure to exclude the pager bill amounted to 

plain error under the Confrontation Clause, we are bound to apply 

the nonconstitutional standard of review. 

In order to find plain error, the district court's error in 

failing to exclude the pager bill must have been "both obvious and 

substantial." United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 420 (5th Cir. 

1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978). See also United States 

••. footnote continued 

admissible because the defendants' possession of the documents 

constituted an adoption." Id. The court stated: "Just as 

silence in the face of an accusation may constitute an admission 

to its truth, possession of a written statement becomes an 

adoption of its contents." Id. We decline to apply the approach 

taken by the Sixth Circuit in Marino to this case. We can think 

of too many cases where the mere possession of a bill in no way 

constitutes an adoption of its contents. Common every day 

experience teaches us that disputes with creditors based upon 

inaccuracies contained in their bills is not a rarity. See 

generally Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct. 580 (1990) ("What we know as men and women we 

must not forget as judges."). 

14 · In Chapman, the Court held that when confronted with a 

constitutional error, a reviewing court can find the error 

harmless only if it is convinced that the error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

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v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 431-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 

1143 (1986) ("Plain error is obvious and substantial error that 

affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings."); United States v. Granville, 716 F.2d 819, 821 

(11th Cir. 1983), aff'd on rehearing, 736 F.2d 1480 (1984) ("To 

constitute [plain error] • , the deficiency must be obvious 

and substantial, affecting the fairness or integrity of the 

trial."); C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 856, at 

335-37 (1982). We will, however, apply the plain error rule less 

rigidly when reviewing a potential constitutional error. See 

United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 228 (2d Cir. 1990); Brown, 

555 F.2d at 420. See also Federal Practice and Procedure§ 856, 

at 342. Furthermore, "a closer scrutiny may also be appropriate 

when the failure to preserve the precise grounds for error is 

mitigated by an objection on related grounds." Torres, 901 F.2d 

at 228 (quotations omitted). 

Notwithstanding our closer scrutiny, it was not patently 

obvious that the district court's failure sua sponte to exclude 

the pager bill pursuant to the Confrontation Clause was error. A 

violation of the hearsay rule does not automatically equate to a 

constitutional violation of the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., 

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970) ("merely because 

evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay 

rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation 

rights have been denied."). See also R. Jonakait, Restoring the 

Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 

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557, 574 {noting that "hearsay not admissible under wellestablished evidence law can still be introduced without violating 

confrontation principles . . II ) . 

rn Idaho v. Wright, 110 s. Ct. 3139 {1990), the Supreme Court 

articulated a two-pronged test to determine whether the 

introduction of hearsay statements violated an accused's 

constitutional right to confrontation: (1) The Confrontation 

Clause is not violated if the hearsay statement "falls within a 

· firmly rooted hearsay exception;" and (2) even if it does not fall 

within such an exception, hearsay testimony is not violative of 

the Confrontation Clause if it is "supported by a showing_of 

particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id. at 3147 

{quotations omitted). See also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 

543-44 {1986). Although the introduction of this pager bill was 

not justified by a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it is far from 

clear that the introduction of the pager bill could not pass 

constitutional muster under the second prong of Idaho v. Wright--

whether it is supported by a showing of particularized guarantees 

of trustworthiness. The authenticity of the pager bill was not 

disputed. It was a bill from an established company that, on its 

face, gave every indicia of having been issued in the ordinary 

course of business. There was no indication that Anthony, who 

knew its contents, disputed the bill in any way. We need not, and 

do not, decide whether these factors establish the requisite 

"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." However, we do 

hold that they are sufficient to prevent a conclusion that it was 

patently obvious that the introduction of the pager bill violated 

-20-

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Anthony's confrontation rights. Furthermore, as we point out in 

the following analysis, the introduction of the pager bill was not 

so prejudicial that it undermined the integrity of the proceeding. 

Thus, it was not clear error for the district court to fail to 

exclude such evidence under the Confrontation Clause. Therefore, 

we will apply the nonconstitutional standard of review to the 

facts of this case. 

Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52, "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity 

or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 

disregarded." A harmless nonconstitutional error is one that did 

not have a "substantial influence" on the outcome in trial nor 

does it "leave[] one in 'grave doubt' as to whether it had such 

effect." United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 

1990) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 

(1946)). After carefully reviewing the record, we are satisfied 

that the erroneous admission of the pager bill into evidence did 

not have a "substantial influence" on the outcome in trial nor are 

we left in "grave doubt" as to whether it had such effect. 15 

Once again, we begin by examining the purpose behind the 

government's introduction of the U.S. West pager bill into 

evidence. The government hoped to link the bill to agent Young's 

testimony regarding the frequent use of pagers by drug 

distributors in order to prove that Roosevelt was aware of the 

15 Normally, the government bears the burden of proving that a 

nonconstitutional error was harmless. Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1469 

n.4. The government, apparently convinced of the strength of its 

argument that the admission of the pager bill into evidence did 

not violate Rule 801, did not address whether the trial judge's 

error was harmless. However, because the entire record is before 

us, we find that the government has met this burden. 

-21-

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presence of the cocaine in the trunk and to prove that he had a 

stake in the distribution of the cocaine. Because there was an 

abundance of evidence, other than the pager bill, from which the 

jury could have reached these conclusions without depending upon 

the pager bill, we find that the admission of the pager bill into 

evidence was harmless. 

First, officers Matoon and Cole testified that Anthony had 

told officer Matoon that the trunk did not work before he searched 

it when, in fact, the trunk did work. Second, Tillis testified 

that the purpose of the trip was to purchase cocaine from sources 

in California and to hook Anthony into Tillis' drug connections in 

California. Third, Tillis testified that Anthony had paid him to 

make two prior crack purchases from his sources in California. 

Fourth, a government agent testified that the volume of cocaine 

discovered in the trunk of Tillis' car was so large that it must 

have been acquired for purposes of distribution. Fifth, Anthony 

wrote a letter to Tillis when Tillis was in jail instructing him, 

"when you go to change your plead [sic] if the question come up I 

did not know what was going on, the only acknowledge [sic] I had 

was I was going to drive and that will only get me the time for 

conspiracy." Letter from Anthony to Tillis, Gov. Exhib. 17. 

Sixth, the trip from Denver to California and back to Denver 

lasted around thirty-four hours, suggesting that the only purpose 

behind the trip was to purchase the crack from Tillis' sources in 

California and deliver it back to Denver. Finally, the 

circumstantial evidence of the trip, the nature of the 

relationships between the participants, and the presence of the 

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illegal drugs both inside the passenger compartment and the trunk 

of the car provide persuasive evidence that Anthony was aware of 

the cocaine's presence in the car and participated in the 

conspiracy to distribute it. 

Because we believe that there was an abundance of evidence 

proving that Anthony possessed the crack with the intent to 

distribute it, we hold that the introduction of the pager bill 

into evidence was harmless. Therefore, we decline to reverse the 

district court on this issue. 

III 

In addition to the issues discussed, supra, the appellants 

have raised several other guilt phase issues for review. For the 

reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court on these 

issues. 

A 

Anthony contends that the district court erred in denying his 

motion in limine under Fed. R. Evid. 609 to keep out evidence of a 

prior conviction. According to Anthony, the conviction was more 

than ten years old. The government argues that the conviction was 

not more than ten years old and that even if it were, the district 

court had the discretion to admit it into evidence. While it is 

unclear whether the conviction was more than ten years old, we are 

persuaded that even if it were, the district court's decision to 

admit it into evidence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 

Anthony was incarcerated for the crime of aggravated robbery 

in September, 1972. He was paroled on December 18, 1973, but was 

reincarcerated on August 15, 1978 because he violated the terms of 

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his parole and because he was convicted of second degree burglary. 

He was paroled again for both offenses on April 19, 1979. He was 

arrested for the instant offense on April 9, 1989. The trial took 

place during November 6-7, 1990. 

Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) provides: "[e]vidence of a conviction 

under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten 

years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the 

release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that 

conviction, whichever is the later date •. II The elapsed time 

between April 19, 1979 (the last date that Anthony was released 

from confinement for both the 1972 robbery as well as for the 1978 

burglary conviction) was less than ten years if the Rule 609 clock 

stopped ticking on April 9, 1989--the day he was arrested for the 

instant offense. However, if under Rule 609 the limitations 

period is not tolled until the accused testifies, then ten years 

had already elapsed prior to the time of trial. The issue, 

therefore, is whether the Rule 609 limitations period is tolled at 

the time of arrest or at the time of testimony. We need not 

decide this issue, however, because under Rule 609, the district 

court has the discretion to permit the introduction of prior 

convictions that fall outside of the ten year period if he 

"determines in the interest of justice, that the probative value 

of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances 

substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect." Fed. R. Evid. 

609(b). 16 

16 A third possibility could be that the limitations period is 

tolled at the time of indictment. We note that there are several 

footnote continued •.• 

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We will reverse the district court's decision to allow the 

government to introduce the convictions into evidence only if we 

find an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lamb, 575 F.2d 

1310, 1314 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 854 (1978) 

(applying the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a 

district court's Rule 609(a)(l) ruling). The government argues 

that even if the ten year period had run, "since it is so close 

and since aggravated robbery is an offense that shows such a 

degree of dishonesty I think as to affect a person's credibility, 

that the court ought to allow it in ••• II R. Vol. VI at 17. 

The district court agreed: "I am inclined to agree with [the 

government], that aggravated robbery is a substantial crime, and 

that would go to the credibility of the witness, and, thus, I 

think that it could be introduced, even if it was slightly past 

the ten-year period." Id. at 18-19. Because we are not convinced 

that the trial judge abused his discretion in so ruling, we affirm 

the district court on this issue. 

B 

Next, Anthony contends that the government impermissibly 

commented on his right to remain silent. Because we determine 

that the government witness' statement was not intended to be a 

•.. footnote continued 

schools of thought with respect to the tolling of the ten year 

period. Compare Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 320, at 

353 (1979) (ten year period should be tolled at indictment in 

order to discourage dilatory tactics by the opponent); with 

Weinstein, 3 Weinstein's Evidence§ 609[7], at 609-12 (1988) (ten 

year period should not be tolled until the opponent testifies 

because the purpose behind the ten year limit is to separate those 

convictions that have a reasonable bearing on whether the 

opponent's testimony can be believed from those that have no 

reasonable bearing because they are stale). 

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comment on Anthony's right to remain silent and that the jury did 

not naturally and necessarily interpret it as such, we find no 

error with regard to this issue. 

The government called Frank Boyles, a special agent with the 

Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation, as a witness. Boyles 

had interviewed Anthony on April 9 after he was arrested. The 

government elicited a substantial amount of testimony from Boyles 

regarding his interview with Anthony. The critical point occurred 

when the government asked Boyles, "[d]id he [Anthony] indicate to 

you whether or not he was going to fully cooperate in your 

investigation?" R. Vol. VII at 257. Anthony objected to the 

question and asked for a mistrial. The court overruled his 

objection and allowed Boyles to answer the question: "He 

[Anthony] told me at that time that when I asked if he would 

cooperate in the investigation, he told me, 'No,' because he knows 

what happens to people who roll over, or cooperate with the police 

department, and what happens to them when they go to prison." Id. 

at 258-59. 

Anthony argues that the question posed by the government 

coupled with Boyles' answer amounted to an impermissible comment 

on Anthony's silence. We disagree. Under United States v. Mora, 

845 F.2d 233 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995 (1988), the 

test to determine whether the government impermissibly commented 

on the accused's silence is "whether the language used was 

manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would 

naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the 

defendant's right to remain silent." Id. at 235 (quotation 

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omitted). Furthermore, "[m]anifest intent will not be found if 

some other explanation for the prosecutor's remark is equally 

plausible." Id. (quotation omitted). We do not believe that the 

government intended to comment on Anthony's silence. Instead, it 

is equally plausible that the purpose behind this line of 

questioning was to show that Anthony's original explanation to 

Boyles about the purpose behind the California trip was untrue. 

The government undoubtedly hoped that Boyles' testimony would 

suggest to the jury that Anthony was not truthful in his earlier 

recitations of the reasons for the trip. Furthermore, we do not 

believe that the jury likely interpreted this evidence as a 

comment on Anthony's silence. Indeed, perhaps the exact opposite 

is true. Boyle's testimony was based on the substantial dialogue 

he had with Anthony on the day of his arrest; therefore, the jury 

most likely believed that Anthony waived his right to remain 

silent when he talked with Boyles--not that he exercised it. For 

these reasons, we deny this issue. 

C 

The last issue we address in Part III of this opinion is 

whether the trial judge erred in admitting into evidence Tillis' 

testimony about the prior drug trips he had taken with and on 

behalf of Anthony and Roosevelt. 17 We review this issue under an 

abuse of discretion standard. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). See United 

17 Tillis testified that he had made three trips to purchase 

cocaine prior to the instant trip. He testified that Anthony had 

paid him a total of $4,000.00 to take the first two trips to 

purchase cocaine from Tillis' sources in California. Tillis 

further testified that he and Roosevelt made the third purchase 

trip together and that Roosevelt furnished the money to purchase 

the drugs. 

-27-

Appellate Case: 90-8028 Document: 010110016442 Date Filed: 01/29/1991 Page: 27 
States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1373 (10th Cir. 1989). Because 

we do not believe that the trial judge abused his discretion, we 

deny this issue. 18 

Once again, we begin our analysis with an examination of the 

applicable evidence rule: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order 

to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 

18 Buried within the portion of their brief addressing this issue, 

the appellants raised a que~tion as to whether the government 

improperly bolstered Tillis' testimony in its opening statement. 

In its opening statement the prosecution mentioned Tillis' 

testimony: 

Eventually after giving some false information, and 

I will tell you that he did indeed give some false 

information to the police department, and to the 

authorities, the individual in the back seat, Ernest 

Tillis, agreed to essentially turn state's evidence and 

become a government's witness, and to testify truthfully 

about what had occurred. 

And in return for his truthful testimony he is 

entitled to receive a recommendation from me as the 

United State Attorney, to Judge Brimmer, and a 

recommendation which I might advise is not binding on 

Judge Brimmer, but he is entitled to receive a 

recommendation from me to Judge Brimmer for a sentence 

reduction, down to approximately 6.5 years to seven 

years of time that he would actually do in the 

penitentiary, if he testifies truthfully. 

R. Vol. VI at 34 

This statement as to the agreement reached between Tillis and 

the government does not constitute improper vouching. See United 

States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990) (where the 

government "[does] no more than reveal that the witness[) had an 

obligation to testify truthfully and explain[s) the consequences 

of a breach of that obligation," it does not constitute improper 

vouching). 

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\ 

' 

Protection against undue prejudice is presumed if the 

testimony meets the following four requirements: (1) the evidence 

must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be 

relevant; (3) the trial court must make a Rule 403 determination 

of whether the probative value of the similar acts is 

substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; 

and (4) pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 105, the trial court shall, upon 

request, instruct the jury that the evidence of similar acts is to 

be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was 

admitted. United States v. Record, 873 F.2d at 1374 (citing to 

Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)). 

First, there is no question but that Tillis' testimony was 

offered by the government to prove that Anthony and Jefferson had 

knowledge of the cocaine's presence in the trunk of Tillis' car, 

and that they were willing participants in a drug distribution 

plan. Therefore, we have no doubt that Tillis' testimony was 

offered for a "proper purpose." 

Second, Tillis' testimony about the prior acts was relevant 

to a determination of whether the Jefferson brothers were aware of 

the presence of the cocaine in the trunk of Tillis' car and 

whether they were participants in a drug distribution plan. 

Although the appellants would like us to adopt a rule forbidding 

Rule 404(b) evidence when the only evidence of the prior acts is 

the testimony of a perjury-prone co-conspirator, we decline to 

"superimpose[] a level of judicial oversight that is nowhere 

apparent from the language of that provision 

485 U.S. at 688. 

-29-

" Huddleston, 

Appellate Case: 90-8028 Document: 010110016442 Date Filed: 01/29/1991 Page: 29 
Third, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his 

discretion when he determined that the probative value of the 

similar acts outweighed any prejudice that may have flowed from 

them: "The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether 

or not prejudice inherent in otherwise relevant evidence outweighs 

its probative value." United States v. Record, 873 F.2d at 

1375. 19 

With regard to the fourth requirement, the trial judge never 

provided limiting instructions regarding the jury's use of Tillis' 

404(b) testimony. However, after carefully scrutinizing the 

record, it does not appear that the appellants ever requested a 

limiting instruction. The fourth requirement is triggered by a 

request on the part of the proponent. The litigants, not the 

trial judge, bear the burden to request a limiting instruction. 

Fed. R. Evid. 105. See United States v. Record, 873 F.2d at 1376 

("[I]t is not error for a trial court to fail to instruct the jury 

at the close of the case in the absence of a proper request by 

counsel."). 

After applying the above four-part test to the circumstances 

surrounding the admission into evidence of Tillis' testimony, we 

are satisfied that no error has occurred. We hold that the trial 

19 Although Tillis' testimony was an important part of the 

government's case in chief, the value was undermined by evidence 

that he had committed perjury prior to the trial. Furthermore, 

the defense tried to discredit his testimony by pointing out the 

sentencing break he received from the government in exchange for 

his testimony. The defense did an admirable job exposing these 

weaknesses during its thorough cross-examination of Tillis. We 

simply cannot say that the district court erred in allowing the 

jury to determine Tillis' credibility, especially in light of the 

clear probative value of his testimony. 

-30-

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judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting Tillis' Rule 

404(b) testimony into evidence. 

IV 

Although we find that the trial judge did not commit 

reversible error during the guilt phase of the trial, we are 

convinced that the trial judge committed plain error when he 

sentenced Anthony and Roosevelt to terms of 360 months and 151 

months respectively under the expressed belief that he had no 

d . . .d d d d f h .d 1· 20 iscretion to consi er a ownwar eparture rom t e gui e ines. 

20 In particular, we refer to the following portions of the 

sentencing transcript: 

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Stacy. Mr. [Anthony] 

Jefferson, in considering your presentence report, the 

court is obliged to follow the sentencing guidelines of 

the United States Sentencing Commission. I feel that in 

that regard I have no choice. 

When these guidelines are considered separately--

when the objections to the guidelines are considered 

separately, I think that I am--have been correct in each 

of the rulings that I've made. I think that the 

probation officer is right in the position that she has 

taken in these sentencing--presentence report. I think 

that it does result in a harsh result. 

This is the greatest sentence that I've ever 

imposed, and I've never imposed a sentence this long on 

anybody, particularly when I wasn't mad at them. And 

I'm not mad at you. I've long been a believer in 

Winston Churchill's philosophy that there was treasure 

in the heart of every man if only you can find it. And 

I think that applies in your case, too. 

I am glad that in your case I have spoken against 

the guidelines, because I believe that they are harsh. 

I believe that they should give the sentencing judge a 

discretion, and these guidelines don't. 

Here you are at the age of 37 years 

son will be grown if--before you get out 

you may never get out in your lifetime. 

result of this sentencing guideline. 

now, and your 

of prison. And 

That is the 

I have no discretion in this matter, and so for 

those reasons the Court must find that the defendant is 

a career offender as defined by the Sentencing 

footnote continued 

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( 

The trial court clearly has discretion to depart from the 

guidelines when it finds "that there exists an aggravating or 

mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 

taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission •••• " 

u.s.s.G. § SK2.0; 21 18 u.s.c. § 3553(b). We do not suggest that 

a departure is necessarily warranted in this case under the 

guidelines. However, it was error for the district court to 

refuse even to consider departing because of an erroneous belief 

that he had no power to do so. See United States v. Sharpsteen, 

913 F.2d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Russell, 870 F.2d 

18, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1989). Cf. United States v. Lowden, 900 F.2d 

213, 217-18 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 206 (1990) 

(district court instructed to inform Court of Appeals whether it 

exercised its discretion but chose not to depart, or whether it 

instead believed that it had no discretion to depart). 22 

• footnote continued 

Commission, and that makes this offense level a 37 with 

a criminal history level of 6 which results in a 

guideline range of 360 months, 30 years, to life. 

I wish you well and good luck. And I'm sorry, as 

I've said, to have to impose this length of sentence 

upon you. 

R. Vol. IX at 26-28. 

From the above statements, we are convinced that the trial 

judge was unaware of his right to exercise discretion to depart 

from the guidelines. 

21 We note, however, that the trial judge's discretion to depart 

from the guidelines is not unfettered. See United States v. 

Jackson, No. 89-6118, slip op. at 2-3 (10th Cir. filed December 

17, 1990) (Westlaw, 10th Cir. dir.) (en bane). 

22 Anthony raises several other sentencing issues, including one 

that erroneously relies upon an out-of-date version of the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines. Anthony argued that the trial judge 

footnote continued ..• 

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23 In his brief, Roosevelt makes the same arguments. For the 

reasons stated above, we reject Roosevelt's arguments as well . 

• • . footnote continued 

erroneously sentenced him as a career offender under u.s.s.G. §§ 

4Bl.1 & 4Bl.2. In constructing his argument, Anthony relied upon 

an outdated version of the u.s.s.G. that did not include 

amendments effective as of November 1, 1989 (both Anthony and 

Roosevelt were convicted and sentenced after the November 1, 1989 

effective date). The district court must refer to the guidelines 

"that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced ••• 

" 18 u.s.c. § 3553(a)(4). See United States v. Hewitt, 902 F.2d 

1082, 1083-84 (2d Cir. 1990). However, after reviewing Anthony's 

sentencing report, which was based upon the updated version of the 

u.s.s.G., we are confident that the trial judge based his decision 

upon the correct version of the u.s.s.G. We are satisfied that 

the judge properly sentenced Anthony as a career offender. In 

addition, Anthony alleged that the trial judge erroneously applied 

a two level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice. 

However, because Anthony admitted in his brief that this issue is 

moot if we find that he was properly sentenced as a career 

offender, we decline to address it. Finally, Anthony argues that 

his sentence is cruel and unusual and that it violates the Eighth 

Amendment because the guidelines have no consideration for human 

life and do not adequately distinguish between dissimilar cases. 

That argument is entirely without merit. In United States v. 

Hughes, 901 F.2d 830, 832-33 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 

163 (1990), we held that "in imposing sentence, the degree of 

discretion afforded under the Guidelines clearly is sufficient." 

23 Roosevelt raises two additional sentencing issues in his 

brief. First, Roosevelt argues that the district court's failure 

to apply a two level downward departure for Acceptance of 

Responsibility under u.s.S.G. § 3El.1 "denie[d] him equal 

protection under the law and require[d] him to waive his 

constitutional right against self-incrimination by 'admitting he 

committed a crime'. [sic]" However, Roosevelt never raised this 

objection to the district court during his sentencing hearing. 

Because we do not find that the district court's failure to 

consider this constitutional argument constitutes plain error, we 

affirm on this issue. 

Second, Roosevelt argues that the district court erred in not 

reducing his sentence under u.s.s.G. § 3Bl.2 for being a minor 

participant. We will reverse the district court only if we find 

its decision to be clearly erroneous. See United States v. 

Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1563 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 

88 (1990). The district court refused to find that Roosevelt was 

a minor participant, and given the evidence of his substantial 

involvement in the offenses, we do not find the district court's 

decision to be clearly erroneous. 

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We remand to the district court with instructions that it 

reconsider .Roosevelt and Anthony's sentences in light of 

u.s.s.G § 5K2.0. At the conclusion of the proceedings 

contemplated by this opinion, the clerk of the district court 

shall certify a record of those proceedings as a supplemental 

record on appeal. For purposes of reviewing the subsequent 

proceedings on remand, this court retains jurisdiction. In all 

other respects, the judgment of the court below is affirmed. 

CONCLUSION 

In Part I, we hold that neither Anthony nor Roosevelt 

possessed a protectable Fourth Amendment privacy right which was 

violated by the search of Tillis' car. In Part II, we hold that 

while the district court erred in admitting the pager bill into 

evidence over Anthony's hearsay objection, the error was harmless. 

In Part III, we deny the other guilt phase issues raised by the 

appellants. In Part IV, we remand for reconsideration of 

Anthony's and Roosevelt's sentences. Therefore we REMAND for 

reconsideration of the sentences only, and in all other respects, 

we AFFIRM. 

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Appellate Case: 90-8028 Document: 010110016442 Date Filed: 01/29/1991 Page: 34