Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-21-03081/USCOURTS-caDC-21-03081-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chance Barrow
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 2024 Decided July 19, 2024 

No. 21-3081 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

CHANCE BARROW, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:20-cr-00127-1) 

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J. 

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony Axam Jr., Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance. 

Timothy R. Cahill, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Chrisellen R. 

Kolb, Nicholas P. Coleman, and Elizabeth Aloi, Assistant U.S. 

Attorneys. 

Before: HENDERSON, MILLETT and CHILDS, Circuit 

Judges. 

USCA Case #21-3081 Document #2065499 Filed: 07/19/2024 Page 1 of 18
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS. 

CHILDS, Circuit Judge: After a seven-day trial, a jury 

convicted Appellant Chance Barrow (“Barrow”) of two counts 

of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and one count of 

concealment of material facts in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1001(a)(1). In turn, the district court sentenced Barrow to 

seventeen months of imprisonment and ordered him to pay 

$77,057.00 in restitution. On appeal, Barrow seeks reversal of 

his convictions and the order of restitution on the basis that 

there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions, and 

that the district court erred in its evidentiary findings, casemanagement rulings, jury instructions on concealment, and 

award of restitution. After careful consideration of the record, 

we vacate Barrow’s wire fraud convictions and the district 

court’s restitution order, reverse Barrow’s conviction for 

concealment of material facts, and remand the concealment 

charge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 

I.

In 2016, the Army Criminal Investigation Division 

(“Army-CID”) employed Barrow as a digital forensic examiner 

in Army-CID’s Pacific Fraud Field Office in Irvine, California. 

By 2018, Barrow was a special agent responsible for running 

his own investigations. In March 2018, Barrow’s now ex-wife 

filed a report against Barrow with the Naval Criminal 

Investigative Service (“NCIS”) alleging sexual assault. When 

Army-CID learned of NCIS’s criminal investigation, ArmyCID placed Barrow on administrative duty—a status where the 

employee loses his badge, credentials, and weapon and is 

unable to conduct investigations. After receiving the NCIS’s 

investigative report in April 2018, Army-CID officials met 

with Barrow and conveyed to him that he “no longer had a 

future with our agency and it did not look good for him.” J.A. 

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1889:20–21. That meeting followed these officials’ prior 

meeting with Frank Robey—the official with ultimate 

authority to fire or retain Barrow—who had told them “it’s 

probably better off if [Barrow] resigns” but had not explicitly 

said he would fire Barrow if he did not resign. J.A. 1902–1903. 

Approximately thirty minutes later, Barrow submitted his 

resignation. 

 

In May 2018, Barrow applied for a position in Maryland 

as a criminal investigator or special agent with the Treasury 

Inspector General for Tax Administration (“TIGTA”). To 

complete the TIGTA application, Barrow answered a series of 

questions regarding his suitability for employment. When 

asked if he is a “current federal employee,” Barrow stated that 

he was not a current federal employee, J.A. 1095 #3; when 

asked what agency and organization currently employed him, 

Barrow answered “not applicable,” J.A. 1095 #5; when asked 

additional information about his current agency of 

employment, Barrow stated that he was currently employed by 

“Department of Defense - United States Army Criminal 

Investigations Command,” J.A. 1095 #6; when asked “[i]f you 

are a current Federal employee, what is your duty station,” 

Barrow stated his duty station was Irvine, California, J.A. 1095 

#7; and when asked “[i]f you are a Federal employee, under 

what type of appointment are you currently serving,” Barrow 

stated that he was serving an appointment as a “career or 

career-conditional appointment in the competitive service,” 

J.A. 1095 #8. Barrow submitted additional documentation to 

support his application package including his resume which 

stated he possessed an active Top Security Clearance; an 

outdated Standard Form (“SF”) 50: Notification of Personnel 

Action; a SF-15: Application for 10-Point Veteran Preference 

in which he identified his current employment as a criminal 

investigator; and a Treasury Department Bureau of Fiscal 

Services Optional Form, where he answered “no” when asked 

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if, “[d]uring the last 5 years,” he had ever “been fired from any 

job for any reason,” “quit after being told that [he] would be 

fired,” left “any job by mutual agreement because of specific 

problems” or “debarred from Federal employment.” J.A. 1120. 

 Based on the information Barrow provided, a TIGTA 

employee conducted a pre-employment screening telephone 

interview with Barrow. Barrow told the interviewer that he 

was not currently a federal employee and that he was not 

leaving current employment because of allegations of 

misconduct or other unfavorable circumstance. Since he had 

passed a full background check within five years of his TIGTA 

application, Barrow was asked to complete a SF-86C by 

updating answers to questions from his last SF-86: 

Questionnaire for National Security Positions. Significantly, 

Barrow failed to provide a reason for departing Army-CID, to 

include whether he was “[f]ired,” “[q]uit . . . after being told 

you would be fired,” “left . . . by mutual agreement following 

charges or allegations of misconduct”; provided as a reference 

Kirk Ellis, who was not Barrow’s supervisor at the time he 

resigned from Army-CID and was his close friend and 

confidante; and reported no changes to whether he had ever had 

his National Security Clearance “denied, suspended, or 

revoked” or if there had been any changes to his investigations 

and clearance record. J.A. 1126–J.A. 1127, J.A. 1166, J.A. 

1184. TIGTA hired Barrow as a criminal investigator with a 

start date of October 1, 2018. 

TIGTA received notice of the new domestic violence 

allegations against Barrow on July 24, 2019. On August 1, 

2019, TIGTA initiated a criminal investigation and reassigned 

Barrow to administrative duties. Thereafter, TIGTA placed 

Barrow on paid administrative leave on September 11, 2019, 

indefinite suspension without pay on April 22, 2020, and 

officially terminated him on July 17, 2021. 

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On July 22, 2020, a federal grand jury indicted Barrow on 

two counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and 

one count of concealment of material facts in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1). At trial in June 2021, the district court 

made several evidentiary rulings related to the NCIS 

investigation of Barrow and his job performance at TIGTA. 

The district court prohibited disclosure of the details of the 

NCIS investigation of Barrow to the jury, concluding that the 

only relevance the investigation had to the case was that 

Barrow was under investigation at the time of his application 

to TIGTA. Further, the district court prevented Barrow from 

rebutting the inference that he moved to Maryland to evade the 

NCIS investigation. The district court noted that evidence of 

Barrow’s inquiry into other jobs prior to the NCIS investigation 

did not “provide meaningful evidence of Barrow’s state of 

mind at the time he resigned from Army-CID and moved from 

California to Maryland.” Appellee’s Br. 44–45. The district 

court further excluded evidence from witness Scott Moffit 

regarding Barrow’s job performance while working at TIGTA, 

finding that Barrow’s job performance was not an issue. 

Additionally, the district court prohibited introduction of 

evidence relating to advice Barrow requested on whether he 

should disclose the NCIS investigation, finding that this 

evidence went to the merits of the NCIS investigation, which 

had been excluded by the court. On June 24, 2021, the jury 

found Barrow guilty on both wire fraud counts and the 

concealment count. The district court sentenced Barrow to 

seventeen months of imprisonment and ordered him to pay 

$77,057.00 in restitution. 

Barrow timely appealed. 

II.

We have jurisdiction to review Barrow’s appeal of his 

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judgment of conviction as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

A.

Before turning to the merits, we first address whether 

Barrow preserved his sufficiency challenge to the wire fraud 

convictions, as it dictates which standard of review to apply: de 

novo or plain error. If Barrow properly preserved the issue, we 

review questions of law de novo.

1

 United States v. Boyd, 803 

F.3d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“We review a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence de novo.”) (emphasis added). 

Conversely, if Barrow failed to preserve the issue, plain error 

review applies.2 United States v. Bostick, 791 F.3d 127, 142 

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Because Johnson did not raise that argument 

in the District Court, our review is for plain error.”). 

To preserve a claim of error on appeal, a party 

typically must raise the issue before the trial 

court. No procedural principle is more familiar 

than that a right may be forfeited in a criminal 

case by the failure to make timely assertion of 

the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to 

determine it. 

1

 “De novo review means that the reviewing court ‘do[es] not defer 

to the lower court’s ruling but freely consider[s] the matter anew, as 

if no decision had been rendered below.’” Dawson v. Marshall, 561 

F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 

See also Burke v. Gold, 286 F.3d 513, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 

(Randolph, J., dissenting) (“De novo review means that the district 

court’s opinion (if it rendered one) drops out.”). 

2

 “Plain error review means that we will reverse only if there was an 

error, that was plain, that affected the defendant’s substantial rights, 

and that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the 

judicial proceedings.” United States v. Presbitero, 569 F.3d 691, 698 

(7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 

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Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. Dist. of Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 436 

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). 

 Barrow argues that de novo review is applicable because 

he “‘preserve[d] the full range of challenges’ to the sufficiency 

of the evidence.” Reply Br. 6 (citing, e.g., United States v. 

Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (according to Barrow, a 

“general claim of insufficient evidence preserved defense that 

was never raised or argued to the court or jury in any form 

below”)). The government disagrees asserting that plain error 

review is applicable because Barrow “moved for judgment of 

acquittal on the wire-fraud counts based on specific evidentiary 

grounds, but he did not assert that the government failed to 

prove he had schemed to deprive TIGTA of ‘money or 

property.’” Appellee’s Br. 18 (citing J.A. 2492–J.A. 2493). 

 Generally, if a defendant raises specific objections to the 

sufficiency of the evidence at trial, his claim is subject to plain 

error review if he raises a different objection on appeal. See

United States v. Spinner, 152 F.3d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 

(“However, we review an appellant’s sufficiency-of-theevidence challenge for plain error when a motion for judgment 

of acquittal was based on specific (and different) grounds.” 

(citing United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 62 (D.C. Cir. 

1992))); Bostick, 791 F.3d at 142 (“Because Johnson did not 

raise that argument in the District Court, our review is for plain 

error.”). However, even if we find plain error applicable, the 

“fail[ure] to present any evidence on an essential element of a 

crime . . . would warrant reversal under either [the sufficiency 

or plain error] standard[s]].” Spinner, 152 F.3d at 956; see id. 

(“express[ing] uncertainty as to how a plain error review of a 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument might differ from the 

standard of review we apply when the argument has been 

preserved” because the standard for preserved sufficiency 

standards is already “highly differential”) (quotations omitted). 

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We need not decide whether plain error or de novo review 

applies to Barrow’s record-based sufficiency challenge, since 

our analysis would be the same under either standard. 

B.

 As to the merits, Barrow asserts that the government’s 

evidence was insufficient to support wire fraud convictions 

because it did not show a scheme “to defraud TIGTA of 

‘money or property’ as those terms are used in § 1343.” 

Appellant’s Br. 39. “When reviewing a conviction for 

sufficiency of the evidence, ‘the relevant question is whether, 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 

United States v. Gaskins, 690 F.3d 569, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 

(citation omitted). “In making that determination, ‘the 

prosecution’s evidence is to be viewed in the light most 

favorable to the government, drawing no distinction between 

direct and circumstantial evidence, and giving full play to the 

right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence 

and draw justifiable inferences of fact.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

The wire fraud statute makes it a criminal offense for a 

person to “devise[] or intend[] to devise any scheme or artifice 

to defraud, or [to] obtain[] money or property by means of false 

or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmit[] 

or cause[] to be transmitted by means of wire . . . 

communication in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1343. “The elements of wire fraud are (1) formation of a 

‘scheme to defraud,’ [to get money or property,] and (2) use of 

interstate wire communication to further that scheme.” United 

States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1334–35 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 

For Barrow’s wire fraud offenses, the government charged that 

Barrow devised “a scheme to defraud” for the “purpose” of 

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obtaining “paid employment with TIGTA” using “materially 

false and fraudulent representations regarding his employment 

history.” J.A. 33. We find that the evidence was insufficient 

to allow the jury to conclude that Barrow was guilty of wire 

fraud as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Recently, in United States v. Guertin, 67 F.4th 445 (D.C. 

Cir. 2023), this court defined how a scheme to defraud money 

or property is demonstrated for an employee trying to maintain 

his employment and salary.3

 Specifically, the court held that 

3 Guertin was decided May 16, 2023, and Barrow was 

convicted June 24, 2021. This gap in time is of no effect 

because the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have 

recognized the general rule that an appellate court must apply 

the law in effect at the time it renders its decision. Thorpe v. 

Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969); Am. 

Freedom Def. Initiative v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 

901 F.3d 356, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2018). “[J]udicial decisions 

presumptively apply retroactively to all cases still open on 

direct review and all events, regardless of whether such events 

predate or postdate the new rule.” Child.’s Hosp. Ass’n of Tex. 

v. Azar, 507 F. Supp. 3d 249, 253 (D.D.C. 2020) (citing Harper 

v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993)). This 

longstanding approach ensures that judgments reflect the 

current legal standards, even if it means setting aside a ruling 

that was correct at the time it was rendered. Henderson v. 

United States, 568 U.S. 266, 271 (2013) (citing United States

v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801)). Moreover, we do not 

believe our consideration of Guertin runs afoul of United States 

v. Reynoso, 38 F.4th 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2022), where the court 

held that “a defendant cannot make out a sufficiency challenge 

as to offense elements that the government had no requirement 

to prove at trial under then-prevailing law.” Id. at 1091. Unlike 

in Reynoso—which addressed a new knowledge-of-felon status 

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“[i]f an employee’s untruths do not deprive the employer of the 

benefit of its bargain, the employer is not meaningfully 

defrauded of ‘money or property’ when it pays the employee 

his . . . salary.” Id. at 451. Further, the court drew the 

distinction that “when the employer receives the benefit of its 

bargain, the employee’s lie merely deprives the employer of 

honesty . . . which cannot serve as the predicate for wire fraud.” 

Id. 

element decreed by the Supreme Court in Rehaif v. United 

States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019) when issued on the same day as 

Reynoso’s sentencing—Guertin does not recognize or create 

new elements the government needs to prove for a wire fraud 

conviction. Instead, in Guertin, our court identified already 

existing aspects of wire fraud previously elaborated on by the 

Supreme Court and other appellate courts. See McNally v. 

United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987); Skilling v. United 

States, 561 U.S. 358, 400 (2010); Kelly v. United States, 590 

U.S. 391, 398 (2020) (object of scheme must be money or 

property); United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1313 

(11th Cir. 2016) (A scheme to defraud requires a lie “about the 

nature of the bargain itself.”); United States v. Shellef, 507 F.3d 

82, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (A scheme that only causes a victim “to 

enter into transactions they would otherwise avoid” is not wire 

fraud). We further note that any concerns regarding Reynoso’s 

applicability or whether Barrow’s Guertin argument should 

have been formulated as a claim of trial error rather than 

sufficiency of the evidence challenge are alleviated by the 

government’s failure to either cite to Reynoso or raise related 

concerns regarding Guertin in its briefing, thus forfeiting the 

arguments. Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 

2019) (“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in his 

opening brief.” (citation omitted)). 

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In Guertin, the government brought wire fraud charges 

against a former Foreign Service Officer in the State 

Department who “adjudicated Chinese visa applications to the 

United States.” Id. at 447. Guertin’s indictment charged him 

with violating the wire fraud statute by failing “to disclose ‘a 

sexual relationship with a foreign national whose visa 

application he had adjudicated; certain financial problems 

arising out of gambling activity; and an undisclosed loan 

agreement with two Chinese nationals collateralized by 

Guertin’s home.’” Id. The government alleged that these lies 

deprived it of the benefit of the bargain because suitability for 

security clearance was a condition of the job. Id. at 452. 

This court held that the lies alleged were insufficient to 

sustain a wire fraud conviction. Id. The court observed that it 

is “not the law” “that an employee’s breach of any important 

condition of employment that is facilitated by wire fraud is 

tantamount to a ‘scheme’ to defraud the employer of ‘money 

or property.’” Id. Thus, in Guertin, the government was 

unable to satisfy the indictment’s purposes under the wire fraud 

statute because there was neither a plausible allegation nor 

evidence showing that the employer did not receive the benefit 

of the bargain or was subject to a scheme to deprive it of money 

or property. Id. Viewing wire fraud allegations in the 

employment context through the lens of Guertin, if an 

employee’s “untruths do not deprive the employer of the 

benefit of the bargain,” paying a salary does not defraud the 

employer. Id. at 451. 

The wire fraud theory charged and proved against 

Barrow—that his lies enabled him to receive salary payments 

he otherwise would not have received—is materially identical 

to that charged in Guertin. Compare Indictment, J.A. 33 ¶ 11 

(“The purpose of the scheme was for [Barrow] to obtain paid 

employment with TIGTA by making materially false and 

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fraudulent representations regarding his employment history to 

hide the circumstances of his resignation from Army-CID in 

the midst of serious allegations of misconduct.”), with Guertin, 

67 F.4th at 448 (“The princip[le] claim in the indictment is that 

‘the purpose of [Guertin’s] scheme’ of untruths was to defraud 

the State Department and ‘unlawfully enrich himself by 

maintaining his State Department employment and salary 

despite engaging in conduct that would jeopardize his 

suitability for a security clearance and a position of trust as a 

Foreign Service Officer.’”). 

On appeal, the government for the first time asserts that 

Barrow’s fraud deprived TIGTA of an honest criminal 

investigator thereby depriving it of the benefit of the bargain. 

To that end, the government highlights scattered pieces of 

evidence that supposedly show that dishonesty from an 

investigator would deprive it of the benefit of the employment 

bargain.4

 That, however, is not the case the government 

indicted or tried. The district court, in fact, repeatedly 

emphasized that Barrow’s “work performance is not at issue.” 

J.A. 2538:3–9; see J.A. 2538:15–17 (government arguing that 

Barrow’s job performance is “not relevant” because “[t]he 

intent to defraud is getting the job that he would not otherwise 

4

 At trial, the government presented testimony from Chanda Jones, 

TIGTA’s personnel security specialist, who testified that TIGTA 

investigators are “held to a higher [standard of] integrity.” J.A. 2385. 

Ray Park, an Army-CID special agent, testified that an investigator 

under investigation for criminal conduct could negatively impact the 

cases he is working on to include having them “thrown out in court.” 

J.A. 1931–J.A. 1932. In addition, the government points out that 

“Barrow’s Army-CID supervisors testified that, for this reason, 

Barrow was removed from all active investigative work and 

prohibited from even ‘touch[ing] any case files’ as soon as they 

learned about the NCIS investigation.” Appellee’s Br. 23–24 

(citation omitted). 

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have gotten”); J.A. 2539:4–12 (court rejecting Barrow’s 

“argument that doing a good job means that [Barrow] would 

not have any intent to defraud” as speaking “to something 

that’s not at issue,” since the relevant “intent to defraud” 

involved intent to obtain a job Barrow would not have 

otherwise obtained). The district court acknowledged, in any 

event, evidence that Barrow performed his job well. See J.A. 

949 (“[T]here is no evidence in this case that Mr. Barrow did 

not intend to perform investigative services, and in fact, he had 

a ‘successful’ rating on his performance review[.]”); J.A. 951 

(“Defendant’s performance review indicates that Mr. Barrow 

‘took the initiative’” by taking on various new tasks even when 

assigned to administrative duties). None of the evidence, 

instructions, or arguments focused on whether Barrow’s lies 

deprived the government of the benefit of its employment 

bargain by denying it of an officer with the desired level of 

honesty now belatedly claimed. It is simply too late for the 

government to try and repackage its prosecution now. The 

Supreme Court has made clear that we may not “cherry-pick 

facts presented to a jury charged on [an incorrect wire fraud] 

theory and apply them to the elements of a different wire fraud 

theory in the first instance.” Ciminelli v. United States, 596 

U.S. 306, 316–17 (2023). To do as the government asks would 

require this court “to assume not only the function of a court of 

first view, but also of a jury” which is “not [its] role.” Id.; see 

also McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 270 n.8 (1991) 

(“Appellate courts are not permitted to affirm convictions on 

any theory they please simply because the facts necessary to 

support the theory were presented to the jury.”). 

For those reasons, we reject the government’s theory in 

accordance with Guertin. We find that after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a 

rational trier of fact could not conclude that TIGTA failed to 

receive the benefit of its bargain with Barrow. Because Barrow 

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did not defraud TIGTA of money or property, the evidence 

presented was insufficient to support his conviction on two 

counts of wire fraud. We vacate Barrow’s convictions for wire 

fraud and remand to the district court with instructions to enter 

a judgment of acquittal.5

 

C.

As to his concealment conviction, Barrow takes issue with 

the district court’s evidentiary rulings, trial management 

decisions, and instructions to the jury, alleging abuse of 

discretion and contending that the district court’s errors 

“undercut his attempts to establish reasonable doubt as to intent 

and misled [the jury] concerning his duty to disclose.” 

Appellant’s Br. 32. 

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) criminalizes the falsification, 

concealment, or covering up of a material fact from the 

5

 We are not suggesting by this finding that employers are without 

recourse when an employee is found to be dishonest or to have lied 

on an application. Employers can still discipline employees they find 

to be dishonest, but that dishonesty does not mean they should also 

be charged with a criminal offense when the government fails to 

prove those lies caused actual money or property loss to the 

government. In addition, given the facts of this case, we need not 

here decide when, if ever, lies about job qualifications would go to 

“the benefit of the core employment bargain.” Guertin, 67 F.4th at 

452. If, for instance, an employer posts a job opening specifically 

intended for veterans, an applicant who lied about veteran status 

might be said to have deprived the employer of one important part of 

what the employer was paying for—even if the applicant intends to 

and does perform the job. But because the government indicted and 

tried Barrow on a theory that is on all fours with that in Guertin, we 

need not address other scenarios where the benefit sought by the 

government might differ in form of character. 

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government. The elements of a concealment of material fact 

offense are: 

(1) the defendant must make a statement, or 

have a duty to disclose the information; (2) the 

statement must be false, or there must be acts 

amounting to concealment; (3) the statement or 

concealed facts must be material; (4) the person 

must make the statement or conceal the facts 

knowingly and willfully; and (5) the statement 

or concealed information must concern a matter 

within the jurisdiction of a federal department 

or agency. 

United States v. Moore, 446 F.3d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 2006). In 

Barrow’s indictment, the government asserted that Barrow 

willfully concealed or failed to reveal his resignation from 

Army-CID, how it occurred before his possible termination, 

and the allegations of misconduct leading to the NCIS criminal 

investigation in completing the TIGTA employment 

application. We vacate and remand finding that the exclusion 

of evidence rebutting the materiality of the facts allegedly 

concealed by Barrow constitutes reversible error. See United 

States v. Akers, 702 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 

(reviewing the district court’s decision to exclude evidence for 

abuse of discretion). 

A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 

615–16 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “The question is whether th[e] 

evidence affected substantial rights, for ‘[a]ny error, defect, 

irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights 

must be disregarded.’” United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 

1024 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)). “In 

evaluating whether th[ere] was harmless error, we ask ‘what 

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effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had 

upon the jury’s decision.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

“Specifically, we must determine whether ‘the error had 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.’” Id. (citation omitted). “An error is harmless 

if the guilty verdict was ‘surely unattributable to the error.’” 

Id. (citation omitted). 

The district court’s exclusion of the evidence rebutting the 

materiality of the facts allegedly concealed constitutes 

reversible error. As relevant here, the district court prohibited 

Barrow from presenting testimony that he told the TIGTA 

interview panel that he had left Army-CID.

Because the government had to show Barrow’s intent to 

deceive the TIGTA, intent is a material issue for the jury to 

decide. Barrow argues that because he was not allowed to 

present his evidence, the district court undercut his ability to 

rebut his intent to conceal material facts and establish 

reasonable doubt with the jury. We agree. Testimony that 

Barrow candidly informed TIGTA in his interview that he had 

already left his prior government employment directly 

undermined the government’s theory that Barrow meant for his 

resume and various online answers to deceive the government 

about his employment status. The government, in fact, 

“acknowledges that the district court erred by excluding” this 

testimony. Appellee Br. 35. The government nonetheless 

argues this error was harmless because the relevant facts 

Barrow was charged with concealing had to do with the 

circumstances of his resignation, rather than the resignation 

itself. Appellee Br. 35–36. 

We cannot say, on this record, that “the guilty verdict was 

‘surely unattributable to the error.’” Wilson, 605 F.3d at 1024 

(quoting United States v. Baugham, 449 F.3d 167, 176 (D.C. 

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17 

Cir. 2006)). The exculpatory evidence undercut a critical part 

of the government’s case, and its exclusion left Barrow to 

defend with one arm tied behind his back. At closing, the 

government focused at length on how Barrow “la[id] the 

groundwork for his scheme to hide the truth early on in 

TIGTA’s application process.” J.A. 2832:16–18. The 

government called Barrow’s resume—which listed him as still 

employed by Army-CID—“a lie,” and argued at length that the 

error could not have been unintentional. J.A. 2832–J.A. 2833. 

The government further argued that Barrow’s “lie in his resume 

help[ed] him through the next phase,” which included further 

“lie[s]” on forms regarding his employment status. J.A. 2833–

J.A. 2835. In addition, one of the things the indictment 

specifically charged Barrow with concealing from TIGTA was 

“that he had previously resigned from a position with ArmyCID prior to Army-CID’s proposed termination of Barrow[.]” 

J.A. 39 ¶ 25. Given the nature of the allegation and the 

government’s argument, there is relevant doubt as to whether 

precluding Barrow from presenting evidence that he expressly 

informed his TIGTA interviewers that he was no longer 

employed influenced the verdict against him. 

 The district court excluded relevant testimony that should 

not have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. 

As a result, we reverse Barrow’s concealment conviction and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

D.

Barrow posits that if the evidence is insufficient to support 

wire fraud convictions, we must vacate the district court’s 

restitution order. Appellant’s Br. 68. 

“The purpose of the [Mandatory Victim Restitution Act] 

is ‘essentially compensatory: to restore a victim, to the extent 

money can do so, to the position [the victim] occupied before 

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sustaining injury.’” United States v. Fair, 699 F.3d 508, 512 

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Because we vacate all three 

of Barrow’s convictions, there is no longer an injury to the 

government to “restore.” Therefore, we vacate the restitution 

order of $77,057.00. 

***** 

For the foregoing reasons, we (1) vacate Chance Barrow’s 

two convictions for wire fraud and remand for entry of a 

judgment of acquittal; (2) reverse Barrow’s conviction for 

concealment of material facts and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion; and (3) vacate the 

district court’s restitution order. 

So ordered. 

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