Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-1_21-cr-00011/USCOURTS-akd-1_21-cr-00011-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nancy Marie Miller
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

SUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ALASKA 

 

 

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

 

 NANCY MARIE MILLER, 

 

 Defendant. 

 

 

 1:21-CR-00011-TMB-MMS 

 

FINAL REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

 MOTION TO SUPPRESS [DKT. 72] 

 

I. MOTION PRESENTED 

The indictment, filed in November 2021, charges Nancy Marie Miller with one 

count of attempting to possess controlled substances with intent to distribute,1 one count 

of possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute,2 and one count of possessing 

firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking.3 Dkt. 2. Miller has moved to suppress all 

statements made by her during the interrogations on July 20, 2021, on several bases: (1) 

Miller was in custody for Miranda purposes when Detective Carl Lundquist asked Miller 

if she “could hang out” at her residence, and that “[he would] rather [she] be here” for a 

K-9 unit to arrive and inspect a mailed package; (2) Detective Lundquist employed a 

deliberate two-step strategy to obtain a pre-warning confession from Miller that was not 

cured by a “midstream and halfhearted Miranda advisement”; and (3) Miller invoked her 

1

 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) 

2

 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) 

3

 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) 

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right to counsel in unambiguous and unequivocal terms when she purportedly stated that 

“she needed to see a lawyer because she didn’t know what to do” [sic] See generally Dkt. 

72. The government responds that (1) the initial interrogation was not custodial in nature 

because it was conducted at Miller’s residence and without restraint on “freedom of 

movement”; (2) should this Court conclude that Miller was in custody for Miranda

purposes, Detective Lundquist’s midstream Miranda warning renders Miller’s statements 

admissible; and (3) Miller did not invoke her right to counsel when she purportedly 

communicated to law enforcement that “maybe I should get a lawyer, I don’t know what 

to do.” [sic] See generally Dkt. 78.

As an initial matter, there is no need to hold an evidentiary hearing. Both parties 

have filed substantive briefings, have submitted numerous exhibits, including audio 

exhibits, and Miller has since retracted her request for an evidentiary hearing. The 

briefings, exhibits, and extensive litigation have produced a sufficiently developed record 

that allows this Court to recommend a ruling on Miller’s [Dkt. 72] motion. 

This Court hereby issues its Final Report and Recommendation regarding Miller’s 

Motion to Suppress. Dkt. 72. For the reasons below, Miller’s Motion to Suppress should 

be DENIED. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

II. FACTUAL HISTORY

The following facts are drawn from audio recordings of law enforcement interviews, 

from law enforcement reports, and from party briefings. Def. Ex. D-1 to D-7; Gov. Ex. 1 

to 4; Dkt. 72, Dkt. 78.

A. The First Package

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The investigation into Nancy Miller began on July 20, 2021, when her uncle, Terry 

Miller, opted to wait at his residence due to rescheduled traveling plans. Def. Ex. D-1, D3; Def. Ex. D-4 at 03:28-04:01. Terry Miller’s decision had the collateral effect of spoiling 

a drug trafficking scheme because at around 3:00 p.m., Terry Miller intercepted a 

“suspicious” package mailed to his address. Def. Ex. D-1, D-2. The package was 

postmarked from “Industrial Provisions, 17391 WA-106, Belfair, WA 98528.” Id. Terry 

Miller was unfamiliar with the company or the company’s address. Def. Ex. D-1, D-2, D3. Things went from bad to worse for the scheming traffickers when Terry Miller opened 

the package, observed a crystal-like substance, and concluded that it was likely his diabetic 

treatment that was “wrapped in the crystals to keep them cool.” Id. Despite having some 

knowledge of drug substances, Terry Miller nonetheless tasted the substance from the 

suspicious package but could not discern what it was, other than “it didn’t taste like salt.” 

[sic] Id. Mr. Miller had grievously misapprehended the situation. The shipment did not 

contain his diabetic medicine, and it was not wrapped in crystals to keep it cool. The 

crystalline substance referred to in the argot as “crystal,” was in fact, methamphetamine.

Id. Law enforcement was thereafter alerted. Id.

Officer John Cryderman arrived at Terry Miller’s residence around 3:30 p.m. Id.

Terry Miller notified Officer John Cryderman of what had occurred and relinquished any 

rights to the package. Officer Cryderman inspected the package and observed, among other 

things, two “bag[s] of crystallized substance.” Def. Ex. D-1. 

Officer Cryderman transported the package to the law enforcement station for 

further inspection. Id. Officer Cryderman researched the “Industrial Provisions” company; 

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and found that it did not exist. Id. Officer Cryderman then researched the return address of 

the company; learning it was a residential address. Id. At around 4:30 p.m., the 

investigation picked up when Officer Cryderman transferred possession of the package to 

Detective Lundquist, who verified that it was methamphetamine. Def. Ex. D-1, D-2. In an 

unrecorded interview, Officer Dominic Branson called Terry Miller to inquire into the 

methamphetamine. Def. Ex. D-3. Terry Miller denied any knowledge of any 

methamphetamine trafficking but recalled that he had fired employees that were known to 

consume methamphetamine. Id. One such employee was Brett King. Id.

B. The Second Package

Law enforcement soon discerned that a second package, labeled with the same 

company and company address, but now for “Nance Miller,” [sic] was scheduled for 

delivery at Nancy Miller’s residence. Def. Ex. D-2, D-3. Nancy Miller4 had, at some point, 

dated King. Id. Armed with that preliminary information, Postal Service Inspector Charles 

Nalley and Detective Lundquist traveled to Miller’s residence at around 5:10 p.m., 

approached the residence, but Miller “opened the door before” Detective Lundquist “was 

able to knock.” Id. The first thirty seconds of the interaction occurred outside of Miller’s 

home. Def. Ex. D-4 at 00:01-00:30. The audio recording begins with Detective Lundquist 

inquiring into the second package, and Miller confirming that she received an air 

conditioner inside the package. Id. Miller agrees to Detective Lundquist’s request to inspect 

the package and both law enforcement officials are invited to “come inside.” Id. Now 

4 Terry Miller is of limited, factual value after his initial involvement. In light of that, Nancy Miller 

will now be referred as “Miller” for efficiency purposes. 

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inside, Detective Lundquist seemingly inquired into a different package when he asked, 

“what about, that box?” Id. at 00:31-00:47 (emphasis added). Miller paused, but ultimately

denied that she had received “that” package; and in a further ten second span, twice denied 

that she received or had knowledge of the package when Detective Lundquist asked, “No?” 

and “Any ideas about it?” Id. at 00:48-00:59. Detective Lundquist’s line of questioning 

returned to the second package, and Miller responded that she had actually retrieved the 

second package from a designated location. Id. at 01:00-01:10. Miller and both officers 

then walk out of Miller’s residence and toward the designated location after Miller agreed

to show the location. Id. at 01:11-02:50. Detective Lundquist, during this walk, inquired 

into Miller's daily whereabouts, about any co-tenants, and regarding the logistics of the 

second package. Id. Miller lived alone, was at work earlier in the day, and again 

emphasized that she retrieved the second package from the designated location. Id. The 

audio is unclear, but it appears that Miller inquired into law enforcement’s interest in these 

packages. Id. at 02:47-03:10. The following is detective Lundquist’s response: “I don’t 

know exactly. I know there was another box, that was fairly similar to it, that contained a 

lot of drugs. So that’s why we’re trying to find this one.” [sic] Id.

SA Nalley interjected by asking if “you have any friends that use your address to 

get mail. Lot of people do that.” Id. at 03:11-03:26. Miller revealed that, among other 

people, King had utilized Miller’s address for about six to seven months. Id. at 03:28-04:01. 

Since the end of their “rocky” relationship, King had turned to controlled substances, and 

frequently visited Miller’s neighborhood and the designated location for packages. Id. at 

04:02-04:39. Miller, without prompting, offered that King was overseeing a sex trafficking

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ring. Id. at 04:40-06:00. Detective Lundquist focused the questioning back to the second 

package, and warned that the post office had “cameras” in the event that Miller was lying. 

Id. at 06:00-07:20. Miller and the two officials, during this interval, walked back from the 

package delivery location to Miller’s mailbox. Id. The remainder of Def. Ex. D-4 is law 

enforcement officials re-asking the previous investigatory questions. Id. at 07:30-09:37. Of 

importance is Miller's stated belief that it was “drugs, probably” inside any packages that 

may have been mailed in the past. Id. at 09:00-09:17. Detective Lundquist pauses the audio 

recording to make a phone call. Id.; Dkt. 78-1.

The Def. Ex. D-5 recording begins in the middle of a conversation, at around 5:35 

p.m. It appears, from the context of the conversation, that Miller and the law enforcement 

officials are inside or near the entrance to Miller’s residence. Miller agrees to entrust the 

second package to law enforcement for investigatory purposes. Def. Ex. D-5 at 00:01-

00:13. Detective Lundquist asks if Miller will be “home all night,” with Miller responding 

that she would “be running to the store ... I’ll be back in about forty-five minutes.” Id. at 

00:14-00:20. Law enforcement writes down Miller’s contact information to return the 

second package at a later unspecified time. Id. at 00:21-00:55. Detective Lundquist, at this 

juncture, mentioned that the next investigatory step was to have a K-9 sniff the second 

package for controlled substances. Id. at 00:56-01:17. No protests from Miller. Id. at 01:18-

01:30. To the contrary—Miller “trusts” law enforcement with the package. Id. Twenty 

seconds later, Detective Lundquist steps out to make another phone call to inquire into 

whether it would be “easier” for law enforcement to bring the K-9 to Miller’s residence. 

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Id. at 01:31-02:05. Miller stressed that a neighbor might get “uptight” as to the K-9’s 

presence because the neighbor owned a large dog. Id.

The next audio recording again begins in the middle of a conversation between 

Miller and SA Nalley. Def. Ex. D-6; Gov. Ex. 1.5 Detective Lundquist mentioned that the 

K-9 would be stationed “at the end of the driveway” to avoid any concerns from Miller’s 

neighbor. Id. at 00:01-00:17. In that same breath, Detective Lundquist again asked if Miller 

had planned to visit a grocery store. Id. at 00:18-00:25. Miller again replied in the 

affirmative. Id. Detective Lundquist then replied, “Yeah. I mean I can't, I’m not gonna keep 

you here.” [sic] Id. at 00:25-00:29. Miller emphasized that the end of the driveway was a 

workable location for the K-9’s presence, that she would return in “forty-five minutes or 

so,” and specified the name of the store after Detective Lundquist followed up with more 

questions. Id. at 00:30-00:35. The conversation was steered into a different direction when 

Detective Lundquist, without pause, inquired into Miller’s vehicle that had a “package in 

the backseat.” Id. at 00:36-00:54. It appears that Detective Lundquist stepped out of 

Miller’s residence and toward the vehicle, Miller opened the vehicle, and Miller showed 

the packages to law enforcement. Id. at 00:36-01:35. Detective Lundquist immediately 

returned to Miller’s grocery plans: “If you could hang out, I’d rather you be here, while 

we’re doing this. So part of this is, I don’t want you to have your stuff without you. So I’d 

rather you be here for this. Hopefully it won’t be long.” Id. at 01:36-01:52. Miller obliged: 

“Whatever you want.” Id. at 01:53-02:01. There is a question or two about the air 

5 Def. Ex. D-6 and Gov. Ex. 1 are the same audio recording and will therefore be cited under one 

Id. for efficiency purposes. 

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conditioner and about King. Id. at 02:02-03:30. Miller and law enforcement walked back 

inside Miller’s residence. Id. at 03:31-04:20. Refreshments are offered. Id. None are 

served. Id. The audio ends with Detective Lundquist and SA Nalley returning to their 

vehicle. Id.

It is unclear how much time elapsed between the law enforcement officials returning 

to their vehicle and the start of the Def. Ex. D-7 and Gov. Ex. 26 audio recording. Miller 

estimates that it was approximately 20 to 30 minutes after the Def. Ex. D-6 audio recording 

ends. Dkt. 72 at 5. The government does not specify an approximate time and instead 

focuses on the arrival of seven law enforcement officials. Dkt. 78 at 3. Equally unclear is 

when Detective Lundquist had been informed by “Sgt Branson” [sic] that “the return 

address on both the air conditioner and meth parcel were linked to N. Miller. USPI Farmer 

[sic] told me both labels had been created at about the same time and used the same 

account.” Dkt. 78-1. 

What is clear is that both law enforcement officials were back inside Miller’s 

residence at the start of the Def. Ex. D-7 and Gov. Ex. 2 audio recording. Detective 

Lundquist again raised the law enforcement concern that the second package may have

contained controlled substances. Id. at 00:01-00:21. It appears that Miller was utilizing her 

cell phone to retrieve her online shipping account while the conversation turned to the 

identity of the possible shipper. Id. at 00:22-01:00. After a multitude of questions from 

Detective Lundquist, Miller revealed that she had orchestrated the mailing logistics across 

6 Def. Ex. D-7 and Gov. Ex. 2 are the same audio recording and will therefore be cited under one 

Id. for efficiency purposes. 

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multiple states for the second package. Id. at 01:01-02:27. This is where the particulars of 

the “Industrial Provisions” company start to matter: 

Detective Lundquist: What’s the Industrial Provisions? What 

does that mean?

Miller: Uh, it’s just the name of a company. Of my company.

Detective Lundquist: Of your company? 

Miller: Yeah. 

Detective Lundquist: Oh. Okay.

Miller: Well, it's actually Brett's company. It’s both of ours. 

We had it together. When I had paypal.

Detective Lundquist: Explain it to me. 

Miller: We had a paypal account together. 

Detective Lundquist: Yeah I don’t know how that works. 

Explain it to me. 

Miller: When you had a paypal account, you do a business 

account, and I guess you put a name on it. Stuff like that.

Detective Lundquist: So did you put that name on it?

Miller: Brett put that name on it. Back in the day, when we 

were working together.

Detective Lundquist: How did it end up on your package 

today?

Miller: I put that on there. I bought the label. 

Detective Lundquist: So how does that work?

Miller: I printed it off ... Yeah I had [someone] send the air 

conditioner to me.

[sic] Id. at 02:28-03:47. Detective Lundquist again asked the previous investigatory 

questions, and Miller again answered in the affirmative that she had orchestrated the multistate shipping logistics for the second package. Id. at 03:48-07:00. Miller, however, denied 

that she had printed other shipping labels at the time she printed the label for the second 

package. Id. at 07:01-07:15. More repetitive questions ensued regarding King and mailing 

logistics. Id. 07:16-09:00. Miller again denied that she had created other labels, and 

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Detective Lundquist’s tone was clearly dubious when he replied, “interesting.” Id. at 09:01-

09:37. The audio at this juncture sounded as if Miller walked away while keys jingled 

simultaneously. Id. at 09:38-10-30. Miller’s briefing alleges that Miller was “searching for 

her truck keys inside the house” during that time interval. Dkt. 72 at 6. Miller then asked,

“you guys don’t believe me?” with SA Nalley affirming a purported belief in Miller’s 

statements. Def. Ex. D-7, Gov. Ex. 2 at 10:31-11:10. Notably, Miller then asked if she 

could “change [her] pants. Is that okay?” Id. at 11:11-12:10; Dkt. 78-1. About a minute and 

a half later, SA Nalley asked Miller, “you weren’t going to meet anyone, were you?” Id. at 

12:11-13:25. Miller stated that she had planned to meet a friend at the grocery store.” Id.

at 13:26-14:00. SA Nalley expressed appreciation to Miller for “waiting.” Id.

C. Other Law Enforcement Officials Arrive

Reinforcements arrived fourteen minutes into the Def. Ex. D-7 and Gov. Ex. 2 audio 

recording. Id. at 14:01-15:00. The ensemble included two Drug Enforcement Agency 

agents, three U.S. Postal Service Inspectors, and two other local law enforcement officials. 

Dkt. 72 at 6-7; Dkt. 78 at 3. About three to four minutes later, Miller asked if her address 

was on a package, and law enforcement replied affirmatively. Def. Ex. D-7, Gov. Ex. 2 at 

15:01-19:00. SA Nalley expressed some concern regarding Miller’s movements to find her 

vehicle’s keys, and Miller volunteered that her vehicle could be searched. Id. at 19:01-

20:00. The audio recording indicates that Miller walked around her residence in search of 

her vehicle keys but was stopped by SA Nalley right before she stepped outside. Id. at 

20:01-22:00. It is at this juncture that USPIS Inspector Kevin Horne and DEA Agent 

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Marcus Chernecke introduce themselves and ask Miller if she would be willing to speak. 

Id. at 22:01-22:32. Miller muttered, “sure,” but Detective Lundquist interjected:

Detective Lundquist: Kind of just a formality thing ... Like you 

asked to go to the store a little bit ago, and I told you that I 

wanted you to stay here with us.

Miller: Yes you did.

Detective Lundquist: And, so, that basically means, you are not 

free to leave.

Miller: Okay.

Detective Lundquist: And so you’re not, as of right now, 

you’re not in any trouble. Not under arrest, nothing like that. 

But I want to make sure that you are aware of your rights.

Miller: Okay.

[sic] Id. at 22:33-22:55. Miller is then Mirandized. Id. at 22:56-23:30. Another DEA Agent 

joins Inspector Horne and Agent Chernecke. Id. at 23:30-24:20. For the next hour and a 

half—Miller confessed to her role in the methamphetamine shipment, her affirmative acts

of mailing both packages, and her residence and vehicles were consensually searched. Id.

at 24:21-01:58:27.

The parties disagree on whether Miller invoked her right to counsel. The precise 

language that Miller used is the source of the disagreement and is critical to this 

determination. The purported invocation of counsel occurs at about the 50-to-55-minute

mark in the Def. Ex. D-7 and Gov. Ex. 2’s audio recording. In that recording, Miller’s 

language is unclear, it sounds as though she says, “I should get a lawyer. I don’t know 

what to do.” [sic] Id. at 51:15-51:29. The audio captured in Gov. Ex. 3 at 26:15-26:28. is 

clearer in this regard: “Maybe I should get a lawyer. I don’t know. What to do.” [sic]. All 

three exhibits, on the contrary, capture Agent Chernecke’s response in crystal-clear terms: 

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I’m gonna explain something okay. It’s your 100% right to get 

a lawyer, any time you want. You can also, talk to us. And if 

there’s something you wanna answer at this point, we can table 

it. Just like I tabled that other thing. But as soon as you 

definitively say, hey I can’t talk to you, and I want a lawyer. 

We have to step away from this. Just know that if you say that, 

then you kind of don’t have our assistance, right now, anymore. 

Then we’re gonna be like okay, we’ll take our evidence to the 

table, she’ll take her evidence to the table, and her lawyer, and 

we’ll see what happens in court. But if you want to answer 

some questions, we want your cooperation, ultimately ... In 

other words, if we walk away from this now, you’re the person 

we are going to be after ... but I don’t believe that’s true, Brett 

King is the big fish ... having said all that, you still want to 

kind of feel out what we have to offer here, and what you can 

offer us, and kind of go through the motions here?” 

Def. Ex. D-7, Gov. Ex. 2 at 51:30-53:40; Gov. Ex. 3 at 26:29-28:35. Miller, without 

hesitation, and with enthusiasm, responds with a “hells yeah.” Def. Ex. D-7, Gov. Ex. 2 at 

53:41-53:45; Gov. Ex. 3 at 28:36-28:42.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any 

criminal case to be a witness against” themselves. U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment 

prohibition against self-incrimination requires law enforcement officials to advise 

defendants of their Fifth Amendment rights before a custodial interrogation begins. It 

logically follows that a defendant who is subjected to a custodial interrogation without first 

being advised of their Miranda rights will have their answers “excluded from evidence at 

trial in the [government’s] case in chief.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985). 

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“Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but 

only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are 

implicated.” Berkemer v. McCarty 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984); see also Michaels v. Davis, 

51 F.4th 904, 921 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The purpose of Miranda’s prophylactic protections is 

to counteract the coercive pressures of the custodial setting by giving the defendant the 

power to exert some control over the course of the interrogation.”) (citation cleaned up). 

Law enforcement officials must supply Miranda warnings when a defendant is (1) 

interrogated and (2) in custody. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 

The interrogation element turns on “whether, in light of all the circumstances, the 

police should have known that a question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 

response.” United States v. Williams, 842 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal 

quotations omitted). This includes express questioning, routine questioning, or depending 

on the circumstances, “any words or action on the part of the police that the police should 

know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode 

Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980); see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 

610 (1990). In that regard, the perceptions of the defendant being questioned is important 

to scrutinize. Pennsylvania, 496 U.S. at 600-01 (citing Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 

(1990)). 

The custody element “is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought 

generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508–09 

(2012). Custody is therefore not necessarily the same as a Fourth Amendment seizure, 

instead requiring a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree 

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associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) 

(quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)); see also United States v. 

Bassignani, 757 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 2009). A federal court must examine the totality 

of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, with a particular focus “on the objective 

circumstances of the interrogation, not the subjective views of the officers or individual 

being questioned.” United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2002). In other words, 

the inquiry involves assessing whether a reasonable person would “have felt he or she was 

not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 

112 (1995). The Ninth Circuit has identified five factors relevant to the custody 

determination: “(1) the language used to summon the individual; (2) the extent to which 

the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt; (3) the physical surroundings of the 

interrogation; (4) the duration of the detention; and (5) the degree of pressure applied to 

detain the individual.” Kim, 292 F.3d at 974. 

As the Ninth Circuit has emphasized: location matters. United States v. Craighead,

539 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008). Craighead stressed that “courts have generally been 

much less likely to find that an interrogation in the suspect’s home was custodial in nature 

[since] the suspect is in familiar surroundings,” and the “element of compulsion concerned 

the Court in Miranda is less likely to be present where the suspect is in familiar 

surroundings.” Id. at 1083. Under certain circumstances, the jealously-guarded sanctity of 

a person’s home is converted into a “police-dominated environment,” so much so that a 

reasonable person “may not feel that he can successfully terminate the interrogation if he 

knows that he cannot empty his home of his interrogators until they have completed their 

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search.” Id. Whether there is a police-dominated environment is an inquiry that “is 

necessarily fact intensive.” Id. at 1084. Craighead offers four additional non-dispositive 

factors: “(1) the number of law enforcement personnel and whether they were armed; (2) 

whether the suspect was at any point restrained, either by physical force or by threats; (3) 

whether the suspect was isolated from others; and (4) whether the suspect was informed 

that he was free to leave or terminate the interview, and the context in which any such 

statements were made.” Id. “Other factors may also be pertinent to, and even dispositive 

of, the ultimate determination whether a reasonable person would have believed he could 

freely walk away from the interrogators”; the aforementioned factors are simply “ones that 

recur frequently.” Kim, 292 F.3d at 974. 

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

This Court has carefully considered the briefings, pertinent portions of the record, 

and the aforementioned Kim and Craighead factors. Having done so, this Court concludes 

that, under the totality of the circumstances, Miller was not subjected to a custodial 

interrogation at any time throughout questioning by Detective Lundquist and SA Nalley. 

It is important to first note that both parties do not address Miranda’s interrogation 

element. See Rhode Island, 446 U.S. at 301; see also Pennsylvania, 496 U.S. at 600-01; 

see also Williams, 842 F.3d at 1147. The government’s briefing omits the element 

altogether, while Miller presupposes that an interrogation manifested from the outset. 

To be clear—Miller was interrogated. Williams, 842 F.3d at 1147. Detective 

Lundquist and SA Nalley peppered Miller with investigatory questions that were intended 

to discern whether Miller had knowledge of, or had taken affirmative action regarding the 

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two packages, the mailing addresses, and possible co-conspirators. The content, form, and 

context of law enforcement questioning revolved around eliciting information relating to 

the methamphetamine packaging and the ongoing law enforcement investigation. 

Important here too is that, as the interrogation progressed and Detective Lundquist received 

additional investigatory information, the accusatory tone of the questioning intensified to 

the extent that Detective Lundquist may have anticipated incriminating answers. Compare

Def. Ex. D-4 at 00:01-09:17 with Def. Ex. D-7, Gov. Ex. 3 at 00:01-14:00. Law 

enforcement questioning, in other words, went beyond fact-finding. Indeed, Detective 

Lundquist repeated the same investigatory questions whenever Miller provided an 

unsatisfying answer or denied the accusatory or argumentative nature of certain law 

enforcement questions. A careful review of the audio exhibits also indicates that law 

enforcement, at times, challenged Miller’s statements with other “known facts” that 

suggested knowledge or guilt of drug trafficking. See United States v. Norris, 428 F.3d 

907, 912 (9th Cir. 2005). Overall, the questions of law enforcement were within the scope 

of, and in relation to, their investigation. The government also does not dispute Miller’s 

characterization that Miller was subjected to an interrogation. The July 20, 2021 

interactions fit comfortably within the ambit of Miranda’s interrogation element. See 

Rhode Island, 446 U.S. at 301; see also Pennsylvania, 496 U.S. at 600-01; see also 

Williams, 842 F.3d at 1147. 

This Court now turns to the custody element. Kim, 292 F.3d at 974; Craighead, 539 

F.3d at 1084. 

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The language used to summon the individual. Law enforcement did not order Miller 

to “speak to them,” did not order Miller to submit to questioning at a “police station,” and 

the record indicates that law enforcement did not approach Miller in a coercive or 

confrontational manner. See Kim, 292 at 974-75 (“If the police ask—not order—someone 

to speak to them and that person comes to the police station, voluntarily, precisely to do 

so, the individual is likely to expect that he can end the encounter.”). The two law 

enforcement officials, at all times, exhibited a calm and non-confrontational tone. Their 

investigative inquiries could not be reasonably interpreted as commands. Id. Moreover, the 

record establishes that Miller met law enforcement outside her home, before officials had 

an opportunity to knock. During the course of her interactions with law enforcement, Miller 

moved freely about her property and her residence. A reasonable person, under these 

circumstances, would have felt free to end law enforcement interaction or otherwise cease 

volunteering answers to law enforcement questioning. See Kim, 292 F.3d at 974-75; see 

also California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1982) (holding that defendant was not in 

custody when he agreed to accompany police to the station to answer questions and was 

allowed to leave immediately afterward); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) 

(holding that the defendant was not in custody when he came to the station voluntarily and 

left ‘without hindrance’ after 30 minutes of questioning)). The principles in Bassignani, 

575 F.3d at 884, guide this Court as well: “Where we have found an interrogation noncustodial, we have emphasized that the defendant agreed to accompany officers to the 

police station or to an interrogation room.” (citing United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 

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1048, 1059 (9th Cir. 2004) and citing Norris, 428 F.3d at 912) (citation cleaned up). This 

factor therefore weighs against a finding of custody. Kim, 292 F.3d at 974. 

Extent to which Miller is confronted with evidence of guilt. Here, as previously 

mentioned, law enforcement questioning was aimed at eliciting incriminating information. 

The analysis under the interrogation element applies with equal force to this factor. This 

factor therefore weighs in favor of a custody finding. 

Physical surroundings of the interrogation. The government’s position that “this 

factor cuts heavily in favor of the [g]overnment” is well-taken. An interrogation that is 

conducted “in familiar surroundings weighs against finding that the defendant is in 

custody.” Bassignani, 575 U.S. F.3d at 885 (citing United States v. Eide, 875 F.3d 1429, 

1436 (9th Cir. 1989)). Critical here, as Miller’s briefing highlights, is that a federal court 

is required to consider the additional Craighead factors whenever an interrogation occurs 

at a defendant’s residence. Although an analysis involving the Kim and Craighead factors 

runs the danger of being “improperly collapse[d],” Bassignani, 575 F.3d at 886, the Ninth 

Circuit has offered useful guidance: Craighead’s “approach of using the police-dominated 

sphere as the benchmark for custodial interrogation in locations outside the police station 

is consistent with the Supreme Court’s adaptations of Miranda to these types of locations.” 

Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1083-84. The operative question, on that understanding, is whether 

law enforcement created a police-dominated atmosphere at Miller’s residence. This Court 

will incorporate the Craighead factors under this Kim factor. 

This Court first notes that the record is silent on whether Detective Lundquist and 

SA Nalley were armed, however, the practice of law enforcement being armed while on 

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duty is so ubiquitous, it is reasonable for this Court to assume that both Detective Lundquist 

and SA Nalley were armed. There is, however, nothing in the record to indicate that a 

firearm was brandished, unholstered, or visible to the extent that it would have indicated 

that law enforcement came prepared for confrontation. What tips the scale toward a finding 

against custody is that Miller’s freedom or will was not overborne by the presence of two

on-scene law enforcement officials. Craighead is distinguished on this point because 

there—unlike here—“[e]ight law enforcement officers, representing three different 

agencies” arrived at the defendant’s home from the beginning. Law enforcement officials 

in this case also did not touch Miller, threaten her, handcuff, or even raise their voice. While 

the interaction was an interrogation, it was conversational in tone, open, and friendly, with 

Miller at one point uttering that she “trusted” law enforcement with the temporary 

possession of the second package. Miller enjoyed unrestricted freedom of movement in 

and around her residence, which indicates to this Court that Miller reasonably believed that 

she could depart her residence or retreat to a “police-free” room. Equally important is that 

the record indicates that Miller was not isolated from the outside world, from the presence 

of family members, unable to make a telephone call, or that law enforcement neutralized 

the familiarity of the location. Kim, 292 F.3d at 977. 

There is a closer question as to whether Miller “was informed that [she] was free to 

leave or terminate the interview, and the context in which any such statements were made.” 

The two law enforcement officials did not explicitly notify Miller that she was not under 

arrest or that her statements were voluntary. The government does not explain why such 

critical information was not provided to Miller from the outset of the interrogation. The 

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Ninth Circuit, however, has emphasized practical considerations in evaluating a person’s 

perceived freedom to leave. Kim, 292 F.3d at 974. Although Detective Lundquist did not 

explicitly state that Miller was “free to leave,” Detective Lundquist responded, “Yeah I 

mean I can’t, I’m not gonna keep you here,” when Miller mentioned her plan to buy

groceries. A reasonable person would have perceived this as being “informed that [they] 

were free to leave.” On this point, Detective Lundquist’s statement that “[he’d] rather 

[Miller] to be here” for the K-9 inspection, is closer to a recommendation or request than 

it is to an order or command. This Court’s conclusion is further strengthened by Miller’s 

amicable response: “Whatever you want.” Moreover, this Court disagrees with Miller that 

even if law enforcement had provided explicit admonitions, “she would have reasonably 

understood that any attempt to leave the area would be obstructed or physically 

impossible.” There was little to no restraint on Miller’s physical movements, Miller was 

near her vehicle several times throughout the interrogation, and her vehicle keys were not 

confiscated. Miller, in other words, had readily available means to leave her residence. This 

Craighead factor presents a close call, made all the more difficult because law enforcement 

did not explicitly admonish Miller that she was free to leave, but additional facts in the 

totality of the circumstances lead this Court to conclude that a reasonable person would 

have felt free to leave. This Craighead factor is ambivalent. Kim, 292 F.3d at 974; 

Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1083. All other Craighead factors weigh against a finding of 

custody and the Kim factor, overall, weighs against a finding of custody. 

Duration of the interrogation. There is no bright-line rule for this factor: Ninth 

Circuit jurisprudence “suggest[s] that a two-and-a-half hour interrogation is at the high end. 

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We have found a defendant not in custody when he was interrogated for more than one 

hour, Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1052, and approximately 45 minutes. Norris, 428 F.3d at 911. 

In contrast, we have found a defendant in custody when she was interrogated for 45 to 90 

minutes. Kim, 292 F.3d at 972.” Bassignani, 575 F.3d at 886. Although there were gaps in 

the interviews, particularly between Def. Ex. D-6 and Def. Ex. D-7, the length of Miller’s 

interrogation is on the higher end of the spectrum. All told, Miller was interrogated for 

approximately two to three hours. This factor therefore weighs in favor of custody. Kim, 

292 F.3d at 974. 

Degree of pressure applied to detain the individual. For reasons stated in the first 

Kim factor, in the third Kim factor, and in the Craighead factors, this Court concludes that 

this factor weighs against custody. Kim, 292 F.3d at 974. 

Under the totality of the circumstances, and as analyzed under the Craighead factors 

and Kim factors, this Court concludes that Miller was subjected to an interrogation that was 

not custodial in nature or conducted in a police-dominated atmosphere. Because Miller was 

not in custody for Miranda purposes during Detective Lundquist and SA Nalley’s 

interrogation, both law enforcement officials were not obligated to advise Miller of her 

Miranda rights and no Fifth Amendment violation occurred. 

Miller was, however, subjected to a custodial interrogation at the time that 

additional agents arrived. Inspector Horne and Agent Chernecke introduced themselves, 

and asked Miller if she would be willing to speak. It is true that Detective Lundquist, just 

prior to the Miranda warnings, stated to Miller, “You asked to go to the store a little bit 

ago, and I told you that I wanted you to stay here with us ... And, so, that basically means, 

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you are not free to leave.” It is important to stress that the “custody determination is 

objective and not based upon the subject views of law enforcement officials.” Bassignani, 

575 F.3d at 883 (quoting Kim, 292 F.3d at 973). The custody analysis for Miranda

purposes, in other words, is an objective one, and the subjective intent of law enforcement 

officials is neither conclusive nor controlling. This Court’s analysis, as previously iterated, 

turns on whether a reasonable person would have not felt at “liberty to terminate the 

interrogation and leave.” Keohane, 516 U.S. at 112; see also Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322 

(custody involves assessing whether there was a ““formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 

movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”). On that understanding, this 

Court’s conclusion is unaffected by Detective Lundquist’s statements right before 

admonishing Miller of her Miranda rights. 

This Court also need not decide Miller’s argument regarding “midstream Miranda

warnings” under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 621-22 (2004), because a finding of 

custody is required to properly raise such an argument. “Seibert dealt with the admissibility 

of statements made after the police give midstream warnings, that is, when police begin a 

custodial interrogation without advising the suspect of his Miranda rights, obtain 

incriminating statements, and then continue questioning after administering warnings in 

order to re-elicit the incriminating statements.” United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 

F.3d 1118, 1129-30, as amended 416 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); see also 

Reyes v. Lewis, 833 F.3d 1001, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Because the interrogation was 

custodial, both [courts] concluded that this unwarned confession at the San Bernardino 

sheriff's station was obtained in violation of Miranda.”). Even if this Court were to review 

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Miller’s arguments on its merits, Detective Lundquist and SA Nalley did not engage in a 

deliberate effort to apply the Seibert “forbidden two-step technique.” As the Ninth Circuit 

has pointed out, there “is nothing wrong with officers seeking to question a suspect in a 

non-custodial situation. Rather, this may be viewed as good police work. So long as the 

officers believed that the interview remained non-custodial, where they turned out to be 

mistaken, a subsequent, warned confession must be allowed into evidence if voluntarily 

given.” Reyes, 833 at 1014-15. 

This Court makes one final comment. This Court agrees with the government’s 

characterization of Miller’s ambiguous and equivocal request for counsel. A careful review 

of Gov. Ex. 3 at 26:15-26:28 dispels any doubt in Miller’s language: “Maybe I should get 

a lawyer. I don’t know. What to do.” [sic]. Miller’s ambiguous statement was filled with 

uncertainty and trepidation. It is similar to the statement at issue in Davis v. United States, 

512 U.S. 452, 463 (1994), where the “petitioner’s remark to [law enforcement officials]—

‘Maybe I should talk to a lawyer’—was not a request for counsel, and we see no reason to 

disturb that conclusion. The [law enforcement officials] therefore were not required to stop 

questioning petitioner, though it was entirely proper for them to clarify whether petitioner 

in fact wanted a lawyer.” The Ninth Circuit has likewise ruled that a defendant did not 

unambiguously invoke their right to counsel when the defendant stated, “I don’t know if I 

should without an attorney.” Michaels v. Davis, 51 F.4th 904, 923 (9th Cir. 2022). 

Moreover, a reasonable law enforcement official, in light of the context and the 

circumstances, would not have interpreted Miller’s statement as an unambiguous and 

unequivocal request for counsel. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. 

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This Court concludes that Miller did not unambiguously invoke her right to counsel and 

law enforcement officials were not required to cease the interrogation at that point. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Miller’s Motion to Suppress should be DENIED. 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). 

DATED this 16th day of December, 2022, at Anchorage, Alaska.

s/ Matthew M. Scoble 

CHIEF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Pursuant to D. Alaska Loc. Mag. R. 6(a), a party seeking to object to this proposed finding 

and recommendation shall file written objections with the Clerk of Court no later than the 

CLOSE OF BUSINESS on December 23, 2022. Failure to object to a magistrate judge’s 

findings of fact may be treated as a procedural default and waiver of the right to contest 

those findings on appeal. Miranda v. Anchondo, et al., 684 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2012). The 

Ninth Circuit concludes that a district court is not required to consider evidence introduced 

for the first time in a party’s objection to a magistrate judge’s recommendation. United 

States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2000). Objections and responses shall not exceed 

five (5) pages in length, and shall not merely reargue positions presented in motion papers. 

Rather, objections and responses shall specifically designate the findings or 

recommendations objected to, the basis of the objection, and the points and authorities in 

support. The parties shall otherwise comply with provisions of D. Alaska Loc. Mag. R. 

6(a). Reports and recommendations are not appealable orders. Any notice of appeal 

pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. See Hilliard v. Kincheloe, 796 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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