Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03001/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03001-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Khan Mohammed
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 17, 2011 Decided September 4, 2012

Reissued September 21, 2012

No. 09-3001

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

KHAN MOHAMMED,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cr-00357-1)

Shardul S. Desai argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the briefs was Peter S. Spivack, appointed by the court.

Vijay Shanker, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued 

the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Lanny A. 

Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, and Matthew Robert 

Stiglitz, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice. Kevin R. Gingras

and Teresa A. Wallbaum, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, 

and Roy W. McLeese III, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered 

appearances.

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2

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, GRIFFITH and KAVANAUGH, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

Opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment 

filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Khan Mohammed challenges his 

conviction and life sentence for narcoterrorism. He also claims 

that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. We affirm 

Mohammed’s conviction and sentence but remand for the 

district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim of

ineffective assistance.

I

While living in Pakistan in 2006, a man named Jaweed, 

who hailed from the village of Geratak in Afghanistan’s 

Nangarhar province, fell in with Abdul Rahman, a former 

Taliban official for the Jalalabad province of Afghanistan also 

living in Pakistan. Rahman was plotting an attack on the 

Jalalabad airfield, a strategic NATO airbase in eastern 

Afghanistan, and instructed Jaweed to return to Geratak and

contact a fellow villager, Khan Mohammed, who was also 

involved in the plot and needed help. Jaweed did as he was told

and visited Mohammed, who brought him into the planning of 

the attack, directing him to obtain the missiles that would be 

used in the strike.

But Jaweed soon turned against Rahman and Mohammed

and disclosed the plot to Afghan authorities. The Afghan police 

persuaded Jaweed to continue his role in the plot, but to become 

their informant. When primary responsibility for the 

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3

investigation was turned over to agents of the U.S. Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) deployed in Nangarhar, 

Jaweed worked with them as well. The DEA agents wired 

Jaweed and recorded several of his conversations with 

Mohammed in August and September 2006.

In the first of those conversations, Mohammed discussed 

with Jaweed details of the attack on the airfield and claimed that 

he had not only the same purpose as Rahman, but the same 

authority. Hearing his plans and his boast, the DEA decided to 

arrest Mohammed soon after Jaweed had given him the missiles. 

Concern about losing control of the missiles once they were in 

Mohammed’s hands, however, led to a different strategy. The 

DEA would arrest Mohammed for narcotics trafficking. 

Following this plan, Jaweed told Mohammed he had a friend 

looking for opium. Mohammed replied that he knew a source 

who could supply as much as Jaweed’s friend needed. Jaweed 

and Mohammed met three more times to iron out details, such as 

the price for the opium and Mohammed’s commission. These 

discussions also included plans for the attack on the airfield. For 

example, during one of the meetings Mohammed said they 

needed a car to secure the missiles. See Government Trial Ex. 

2C (Mohammed, stating that they would “tightly and firmly load 

[the missiles] in our car”). Eleven days later, Mohammed 

announced at another meeting that he would use the profits from 

the drug sale to buy a car, which could help carry out more drug 

deals.

The opium deal went off without a hitch. Jaweed 

accompanied Mohammed to a local bazaar where Mohammed 

negotiated the sale with his source. The next day, Jaweed 

accompanied Mohammed to the seller’s home and secretly 

videotaped Mohammed inspecting, paying for, and taking away 

the opium he then sold to Jaweed. Pleased with the results, the

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DEA agents told Jaweed to orchestrate another sale, this time for 

heroin. When Jaweed raised the idea, Mohammed readily agreed

and acquired almost two kilograms of heroin, which he then sold 

to Jaweed. Mohammed was enthused by the prospect of how 

much money their newly formed drug business could make. 

When Jaweed told Mohammed that his friend would send the 

opium and heroin to the United States, Mohammed declared, 

“Good, may God turn all the infidels to dead-corpses.”

Government Trial Ex. 2H. Their “common goal,” Mohammed 

told Jaweed, was to eliminate the “infidels” either “by opium or 

by shooting.” Id.

On October 29, 2006, the DEA and Afghan police arrested 

Mohammed at a roadside checkpoint. They blindfolded and

handcuffed him and drove him to a DEA base at the Jalalabad 

airfield. He was briefly held in a detention cell without 

handcuffs or blindfold and then taken to a room to be questioned

about the drug deals and the planned attack on the airfield.

During his interrogation, Mohammed was neither blindfolded 

nor shackled. The record is unclear whether he was handcuffed.

Three DEA agents conducted the questioning, one wearing a

visible sidearm.

Speaking through an interpreter, DEA Special Agent Jeffrey 

Higgins read Mohammed the Miranda warnings, which were 

translated into Pashto, his native language. Higgins asked 

Mohammed if he understood the warnings. Mohammed said that 

he did. Thinking Mohammed illiterate, Higgins did not ask him

to sign a rights card or a waiver form. Mohammed told Higgins 

that he was willing to answer questions, and the interview 

began. It lasted about two hours, including a short break.

Mohammed showed no distress during the questioning or any 

difficulty understanding the interpreter. He was given food and 

water, a prayer rug and the opportunity to pray, and was allowed 

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to use the bathroom. Questioning took place in a conversational 

tone and none of the DEA agents threatened Mohammed, 

although one told him, falsely, that his hands had tested positive 

for heroin. At no time did Mohammed ask for an attorney or that 

the questioning stop. At the end of the interrogation, the DEA 

agents told Mohammed that he was being charged with drug 

trafficking and terrorism under U.S. law. He was later 

transferred to the United States for trial. 

With trial scheduled for May, in January 2008 Mohammed

moved to suppress the statements he made during his

questioning at the airfield on the ground that his Miranda waiver 

was involuntary. On April 30, the district court denied his 

motion, concluding that he understood the Miranda rights and 

the consequences of giving them up. Tr. Status & Mots. Hr’g 

18:12-18, Apr. 30, 2008. On May 1, with jury selection set to 

begin in a week, Mohammed moved for a three-month 

continuance of the trial. Summoned to an ex parte hearing the

next morning, Mohammed’s counsel expressed to the court his 

fear that he had “been ineffective in assisting [Mohammed]” by 

failing to follow up on his lead that witnesses in Afghanistan 

would rebut the government’s allegation that he was part of the 

Taliban. Tr. Ex Parte Sealed Discussions 5:23-6:3, May 2, 2008. 

Counsel also asked for more time to prepare to examine the 

government’s narcoterrorism expert. Hearing this, Mohammed 

asked the court for new counsel. The court convened a second ex 

parte hearing that afternoon to address his request. Speaking

directly to the court at that hearing, Mohammed argued that his 

attorney could have obtained evidence that he was not part of the 

Taliban and that Jaweed was a thief. The court reminded 

Mohammed that he had already lodged the theft allegation 

against Jaweed, that the court had previously decided it lacked 

corroboration, and that Mohammed had agreed not to pursue the 

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allegation at trial.1 Mohammed’s counsel added that these 

witnesses might undermine Jaweed’s credibility more generally

by saying he was a liar. But under questioning by the court, he 

could point to no basis to believe that they would. Asked why he 

had not already tracked down these potential witnesses, 

Mohammed’s counsel claimed there were “insurmountable” 

logistical problems with traveling to Afghanistan to locate and 

bring them to the United States. Id. at 36:13-37:5. His trial 

preparation had focused on other issues instead. The court then

called yet another hearing that same day, this time with all the 

parties. Learning of Mohammed’s concerns, the government 

announced to the court that it would not seek to link him to the 

Taliban. Hearing that, Mohammed, through his counsel, agreed 

to withdraw his motion for a continuance and proceed to trial.

The government put on its case in four days. Two of these 

days were taken up with Jaweed’s testimony. Mohammed’s 

counsel called no witnesses and offered no evidence, and 

Mohammed did not take the stand. On May 15, 2008, a jury 

found Mohammed guilty of international drug trafficking, 21 

U.S.C. §§ 959(a)(1), (2), and drug trafficking with intent to 

provide financial support to a terrorist, id. § 960a. At sentencing, 

Mohammed objected to the recommendation in the 

Presentencing Report that the court apply the terrorism 

enhancement of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court found no 

 

1 While in custody in Afghanistan, Mohammed told his U.S. 

captors that Jaweed was a convicted thief set to serve an eighteen-year 

sentence in Afghanistan. The government filed a motion in limine to 

exclude any such impeachment evidence, arguing that Jaweed had 

denied this uncorroborated allegation. At Mohammed’s request, the 

government conducted a background check that turned up no criminal 

history for Jaweed in the Nangarhar province. Mohammed later agreed 

to drop this line of argument. 

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basis for the objection and applied the enhancement, but 

explained that it could have exercised its discretion under § 960a 

to impose the same sentence even without the enhancement. The 

district court sentenced Mohammed to two concurrent life 

sentences.

Mohammed does not challenge his conviction for 

international drug trafficking. He appeals only his conviction 

and sentencing for narcoterrorism. He also raises a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. We take jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

II

We consider first Mohammed’s argument that his Miranda 

waiver was invalid and that the district court erred by denying 

his motion to suppress the statements he made during his 

interrogation at the Jalalabad airfield. We need not resolve the 

novel question whether Miranda applies to the overseas 

custodial interrogation of a person who is not a U.S. citizen.

Even if we assume it does, any alleged error by the district court

was harmless because the government made no effort to use the 

statements at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 

630, 641 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Potential [Miranda] 

violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned 

statements into evidence at trial.”); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 

298, 306-07 (1985) (noting that the Fifth Amendment prohibits 

using compelled statements in the prosecution’s case-in-chief).

On appeal, Mohammed maintains that his statements were

used against him because Higgins was only able to identify 

Mohammed’s voice on the recordings at trial from having heard 

it first during the interrogation. But voice identification is not 

the type of incriminating information Miranda protects: 

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“Requiring a suspect to reveal the physical manner in which he 

articulates words, like requiring him to reveal the physical 

properties of the sound produced by his voice, does not, without 

more, compel him to provide a ‘testimonial’ response for 

purposes of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege.” Pennsylvania v. 

Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 592 (1990) (citation omitted); see also 

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317 (noting that Miranda ensures a suspect’s

unwarned answers may be excluded from the government’s 

case-in-chief).

Mohammed also asserts that what he said during 

interrogation was used against him indirectly. The government’s 

ability to rely on his statements for impeachment purposes, so 

his argument goes, made him hesitant to testify in his own 

defense. But this argument has no constitutional weight.

Statements taken in violation of Miranda are admissible as 

impeachment evidence unless they are, in very fact, involuntary. 

See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307; Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 

723 (1975) (holding that unwarned statements are admissible for 

impeachment purposes unless an “officer’s conduct amount[ed] 

to an abuse,” in which case admissibility is governed by “the 

traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness and 

trustworthiness”). And whatever one might conclude about the 

merits of Mohammed’s Miranda claim, he certainly has not 

shown the egregious facts necessary to establish that the 

statements he made during questioning were involuntary. See, 

e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010) 

(finding no coercion in a three-hour interrogation — longer than 

Mohammed’s — without evidence “that police threatened or 

injured [the defendant] during the interrogation or that he was in 

any way fearful”); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398-99 

(1978) (finding a confession involuntary when the defendant had 

been shot and paralyzed a few hours before questioning, was in 

intense pain, and gave confused and incoherent responses).

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We have been given no reason to disturb the district court’s 

findings that the DEA agents did not threaten or intimidate

Mohammed, that he was treated well during his relatively brief 

interrogation, and that he seemed eager to talk and comfortable 

enough to ask questions when he needed clarification. See Tr. 

Status & Mots. Hr’g 10:10-12:22. Mohammed emphasizes that 

he was blindfolded and handcuffed at times and perhaps even 

handcuffed during questioning. But no court has found that 

waivers made while a suspect is handcuffed are invalid for that 

reason alone, see, e.g., United States v. Adams, 583 F.3d 457, 

467-68 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding an implicit Miranda waiver 

even though the defendant was handcuffed while he was read his 

rights and during questioning); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 

634, 639 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding a Miranda waiver voluntary 

despite questioning the defendant in a remote location while 

handcuffed in the back of a squad car, with some officers 

wearing masks), much less that statements obtained while 

handcuffed are themselves involuntary. And although an agent 

lied to Mohammed that his hands tested positive for heroin, 

misleading a suspect during interrogation is only one factor in 

the totality of the circumstances analysis that governs our 

inquiry into voluntariness. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 

739 (1969). Just as telling a defendant, falsely, that his codefendant had already confessed to murder is “relevant,” yet not 

enough to render an “otherwise voluntary confession 

inadmissible,” id., the lie here is insufficient to outweigh the rest 

of the evidence showing that Mohammed’s statements were 

voluntary. Within the full context of the interrogation, we would 

be hard pressed to conclude that the possibility Mohammed was 

handcuffed combined with the agent’s lie was enough to render 

his statements involuntary. 

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III

Mohammed next argues that the evidence at trial cannot 

sustain his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 960a. This statute 

criminalizes conduct abroad that would violate domestic drug 

laws if “committed within the jurisdiction of the United States” 

when the actor “know[s] or intend[s] to provide, directly or 

indirectly, anything of pecuniary value to any person or 

organization that has engaged or engages in terrorist 

activity . . . or terrorism.” Id. Mohammed does not dispute that 

the evidence was sufficient to prove he engaged in a qualifying 

drug offense, that he met the statutory definition of a person who 

engages in terrorism, or that he knew the transaction would 

result in financial gain to himself. Instead, he urges us to graft an 

additional, unwritten intent requirement onto the statutory text, 

which he calls a “drug-terror nexus.” Appellant’s Br. 46. Under 

this theory, it is not enough that Mohammed committed a drug 

offense with intent to provide pecuniary value to a terrorist or 

terrorist organization; the government must also show he knew 

that the money would support terrorist acts.

But Mohammed overlooks the straightforward terms of the 

statute. Section 960a requires proof that the defendant intended 

to support a “person or organization that has engaged or 

engages in terrorist activity,” not that he intended his funds to be 

used for any particular activity. 21 U.S.C. § 960a (emphasis 

added). The first step in statutory interpretation considers the

statute’s plain language, see United States v. Villaneuva-Sotelo, 

515 F.3d 1234, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and we decline 

Mohammed’s invitation to ignore the words Congress chose.

The text is abundantly clear that Congress intended to target 

drug offenses the defendant knows will support a “person or 

organization” engaged in terrorism, with no additional 

requirement that the defendant intend his drug trafficking to 

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advance specific terrorist activity. In other words, Mohammed 

need not have planned for his drug proceeds to fund terrorist 

ends. It is sufficient that the proceeds went to a terrorist — him. 

Mohammed argues that we must look past this plain 

language because only his proposed intent requirement saves 

§ 960a from merely duplicating the work of statutes that already 

criminalize drug trafficking overseas, see 21 U.S.C. § 959, and 

material support of terrorism, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332d, 2339A, 

2339B, 2339C. But the premise that § 960a is redundant is 

suspect. Congress could have reasonably determined that 

international drug trafficking combined with the intent to 

support a terrorist is a different crime — more blameworthy, 

more dangerous, or both — than drug trafficking overseas and 

material support of terrorism committed separately. Or Congress

could have decided that the ability to charge one crime instead 

of two was a valuable, perhaps necessary, tool for prosecutors 

that warranted creating a new crime. In any event, Congress 

need not act with the sort of precision Mohammed’s argument 

assumes: “Redundancies across statutes are not unusual events 

in drafting,” and courts must give effect to overlapping statutes 

unless there is “positive repugnancy” between them. Conn. Nat’l 

Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (quoting Wood v. 

United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 363 (1842)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Mohammed emphasizes that § 960a’s 

penalty is greater than those for drug trafficking and material 

support combined, but that alone does not establish “positive 

repugnancy.” See Wood, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 363 (defining 

“manifest and total repugnancy” as more than “merely 

affirmative, or cumulative or auxiliary” provisions, but 

divergence between statutes so strong as “to lead to the 

conclusion that the latter laws abrogated, and were designed to 

abrogate the former”); see also United States v. Batchelder, 442 

U.S. 114, 123 (1979) (“So long as overlapping criminal 

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provisions clearly define the conduct prohibited and the 

punishment authorized, the notice requirements of the Due 

Process Clause are satisfied.”). At most, Mohammed highlights 

some congressional overlap among statutes directed at 

international drug trafficking and support of terrorism. That is 

no reason for us to depart from the clear text of a statute.

But absurd results will follow unless we do, Mohammed 

argues. As an example, he offers the hypothetical of a father who

sells drugs to pay a ransom to the Revolutionary Armed Forces 

of Columbia for his kidnapped child. Mohammed contends that 

this father, whose paternal love and not any support of terrorism 

drove him to crime, risks life imprisonment under the 

government’s reading of § 960a. Appellant’s Br. 46-47. But 

finding § 960a absurd based on this possibility would have 

broad implications for criminal law writ large. We can imagine 

similar problems for any sympathetic defendant forced by his 

circumstances to break the law. The criminal justice system 

deals with such unusual fact patterns through prosecutorial 

discretion and traditional defenses such as the duress defense, 

but not by rewriting criminal statutes that are uncontroversial in 

the overwhelming majority of their applications.

Similarly, Mohammed argues that, limited to its text, § 960a 

could reach an individual who donates some portion of his drug 

proceeds to a person or organization that engaged in terrorist 

acts in the past, but no longer does so.

2 Appellant’s Reply Br. 

21-22. Although the statute’s use of the past and present 

tense — “has engaged or engages in . . . terrorism” — increases

 

2

This concern does not arise in Mohammed’s case, where the 

government did not introduce evidence of his past terrorist 

involvement at trial, but instead relied on evidence that he was 

planning a terrorist attack.

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its potential breadth, such a result is by no means absurd. It 

neither defies “rationality” nor “common sense.” Landstar 

Express America, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 569 F.3d 493, 498 

(D.C. Cir. 2009); Suburban Transit Corp. v. I.C.C., 784 F.2d 

1129, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Wide-reaching criminal statutes 

are common, and while reasonable minds may differ about the 

wisdom of § 960a’s scope, “debatable policy . . . is hardly 

irrational,” Landstar, 569 F.3d at 499; cf. United States v. 

Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting a 

proposed interpretation for its “obvious absurdities” of ending “a 

centuries-old practice” in the criminal justice system and 

exposing federal prosecutors and judges to liability for entering 

into and approving plea agreements).

Moreover, even if we were persuaded that the statute is

redundant or leads to absurd results that justify a departure from 

its plain meaning, Mohammed’s proposed solution is utterly 

without support. The text lends no aid, as we have already 

discussed, and even his resort to legislative history is unavailing. 

He leans on three statements from some of the statute’s 

supporters to argue that some members of Congress believed 

§ 960a’s purpose is to punish those who use proceeds from drug 

sales to support terrorism. Appellant’s Br. 47-48 (quoting Rep. 

Hyde’s statement that Congress intended § 960a to “address and 

punish those who would use . . . illegal narcotics to promote and 

support terrorism,” 151 CONG. REC. H6292 (daily ed. July 21, 

2005), and statements from Reps. Hyde and Souder that § 960a 

would address the overlapping links between drug trafficking 

and global terrorism, id.; id. at H6293). Putting to one side the 

usual concerns about using legislative history, especially to 

avoid the plain meaning of a statute, these statements do not 

even contradict what the statute says. It is clear that Congress 

intended to punish those who support terrorism directly, as the 

Congressmen said, as well as indirectly, as the statute provides. 

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IV

If we sustain his conviction, Mohammed argues that we 

should remand for resentencing because the district court erred 

by applying the terrorism enhancement in the Sentencing 

Guidelines to calculate his sentencing range. We disagree.

The terrorism enhancement, found in Guidelines

§ 3A1.4(a), increases by twelve the base offense level for 

calculating a sentencing range if the defendant was convicted of 

a crime that “involved, or was intended to promote, a federal 

crime of terrorism.” “Federal crime of terrorism” is defined in

18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) as an offense in violation of certain 

enumerated statutes that is “calculated to influence or affect the 

conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to 

retaliate against government conduct.” Mohammed concedes

that § 960a is among the enumerated statutes, but argues that 

fact alone does not make his offense a “federal crime of

terrorism.” In his view, only the mens rea requirement he has 

urged us to read into the statute — an intent to finance 

terrorism — would justify including § 960a as a “federal crime 

of terrorism.” And as Mohammed points out again, the jury was 

not asked whether he had that intent.

But 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) offers no support for 

Mohammed’s theory. The definition of “federal crime of 

terrorism” contains its own intent element, with an additional 

requirement only that the offense of conviction appear on the 

statutory list, as § 960a does. The only question remaining, then, 

is whether we can sustain the district court’s finding that 

Mohammed had the requisite intent under § 2332b(g)(5). The 

district court found two alternate bases to conclude that he did:

he “specifically intend[ed] to use the commission from the drug 

sales to purchase a car to facilitate attacks against U.S. and 

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foreign forces in Afghanistan,” and he “specifically intend[ed]

and [was] motivated by the drugs’ destructive powers on U.S. 

civilian populations as a means of violent jihad against 

Americans who have fighting forces in Afghanistan against the 

Taliban.” Sentencing Tr. 17:8-15, Dec. 22, 2008. We conclude 

that the first finding was sufficient to apply the terrorism 

enhancement.

Mohammed maintains that the evidence does not establish

that he intended to use the drug proceeds to buy a car to aid in 

the Jalalabad attack. In one meeting with Jaweed, Mohammed 

stated that they would “tightly and firmly load [the missiles] in 

our car and bring [them]” for use in the planned attack. 

Government Trial Ex. 2C. Eleven days later, he told Jaweed he 

intended to use his portion of the proceeds of the drug sales to 

purchase a car. Government Trial Ex. 2D Mohammed argues

that his statements about buying a car indicate nothing more than

that he intended to buy the car for his personal use or to help in 

his drug trafficking. He claims that his statements cannot be read

to support the conclusion of the district court that he was 

referring to the same car that he said earlier would carry the 

missiles. 

Although Mohammed’s objection may show that the record 

can support alternate interpretations, it is far from proof that the 

district court’s reading of these conversations is clearly 

erroneous. See United States v. Erazo, 628 F.3d 608, 611 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011) (holding that we review factual findings underlying a 

decision to apply a sentencing enhancement for clear error, and 

give due deference to the district court’s application of the 

Guidelines to the facts). Clear error review is exacting: to 

reverse a district court’s findings of fact “we must be ‘left with 

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.’” Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 

USCA Case #09-3001 Document #1395757 Filed: 09/21/2012 Page 15 of 24
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v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). 

Mohammed’s objection does not reach this level of certainty. 

The district court pointed to specific statements in the record —

which Mohammed does not dispute he made — from which it 

drew plausible inferences. That Mohammed may have intended 

the car for personal use does not mean he could not also have 

planned to use the car in the attack, and he identifies no evidence 

directly contradicting the district court’s conclusion that he did.

Especially given the district court’s superior vantage point to 

make credibility determinations and glean “insights not 

conveyed by the record,” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007), we cannot conclude that its findings are clearly wrong.

3

V

Finally, Mohammed claims that his trial counsel was 

ineffective because he failed to adequately explore the 

possibility that evidence was available that would have 

significantly strengthened Mohammed’s defense. Prior to trial, 

Mohammed identified for his attorney certain witnesses from his 

village in Afghanistan who he claimed could bolster his 

character and impugn Jaweed’s. Mohammed’s attorney admits 

he did not try to locate or interview any of them. See, e.g., Tr. 

Status Hr’g 14:1-7, Feb. 25, 2008. Mohammed now claims that 

these witnesses could have shown that Jaweed had a reputation 

as a liar and was biased against him. Failing to introduce their 

testimony prejudiced his defense, Mohammed argues, because 

 

3

In light of this conclusion, we need not consider the district 

court’s second basis for applying the terrorism enhancement, nor the 

government’s alternate argument that any error would have been 

harmless because the district court stated it would have imposed the 

same sentence without the enhancement.

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Jaweed was the government’s star witness, and his credibility 

was central to the prosecution.

When advancing an ineffective assistance argument on direct 

appeal, an appellant must present “factual allegations that, if 

true, would establish a violation of his [S]ixth [A]mendment 

right to counsel.” United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 99 n.9 

(D.C. Cir. 1990). These allegations must satisfy both prongs of 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): deficient 

representation and prejudice. Id. at 687. Presented with a 

colorable claim, we remand for an evidentiary hearing unless the 

“record alone conclusively shows that the defendant either is or 

is not entitled to relief.” United States v. Burroughs, 613 F.3d 

233, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Rashad, 331 

F.3d 908, 910 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We do not “reflexively remand,” United States v. 

Harris, 491 F.3d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2007), but neither will we 

hesitate to remand when a trial record is insufficient to assess the

full circumstances and rationales informing the strategic 

decisions of trial counsel, see Massaro v. United States, 538 

U.S. 500, 505 (2003). 

To raise a colorable claim that his trial counsel was deficient,

Mohammed must allege errors “so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Mohammed’s 

attorney owed him a “duty to make reasonable investigations or 

to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 

investigations unnecessary,” id. at 691, so an allegation that 

counsel failed to contact potentially vital defense witnesses at 

Mohammed’s request, without good cause, could rise to this 

level. The key to Mohammed’s claim is whether his attorney’s 

less-than-thorough pre-trial investigation was supported by 

“reasonable professional judgments.” Id.; see also Wiggins v. 

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Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (noting that courts use an 

objective standard to assess performance under prevailing 

professional standards).

Pointing to three hearings that took place on May 2, 2008, 

the government maintains there is enough in the district court 

record for us to determine whether it was reasonable for 

Mohammed’s counsel not to search for these potential witnesses 

in Afghanistan. We disagree. At the ex parte hearing called to 

consider Mohammed’s request for new counsel, the district court

asked Mohammed directly what his witnesses would say at trial.

He answered that they would testify that he was not part of the 

Taliban and that Jaweed was a thief. Tr. Ex Parte Sealed 

Discussions 23:12-24:3. According to the government, 

testimony on these points would have been irrelevant to 

Mohammed’s defense in light of both the government’s 

stipulation, made at the final hearing of the day, that it would not 

introduce evidence of Mohammed’s Taliban involvement, as 

well as Mohammed’s agreement, made in the face of the motion 

in limine, that he would not to try to impeach Jaweed on this 

account. Cf. United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 391 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997) (“Even had [counsel] located these witnesses, the 

testimony they allegedly would have provided was tangential at 

best.”).

But the government misses the thrust of Mohammed’s 

argument. Although Mohammed emphasizes his attorney’s 

failure to contact potential witnesses, as he did before the district 

court, on appeal he argues that counsel should have made some 

effort to learn if the witnesses could undermine Jaweed’s 

credibility in general, by testifying, for example, that he had a 

reputation for dishonesty or that he harbored a grudge against 

Mohammed. The colloquies at the May 2 hearings did not 

explore that possibility or consider other facts that might be 

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19

developed by the district court on remand to give fuller context 

to the decisions counsel made, such as what Mohammed told his 

attorney while preparing his defense or what his attorney may 

have uncovered himself during trial preparation.

The government argues that Mohammed’s failure to press 

before the district court this point about Jaweed’s credibility in 

general shows that these witnesses would not have been able to 

support his allegation. We think the government infers too much 

from a colloquy between Mohammed and the court at a hastily 

convened ex parte hearing on the eve of trial. The question of 

ineffective assistance looks to the propriety of his attorney’s

decision not to follow up on Mohammed’s suggestions to track 

down possibly helpful witnesses in Afghanistan. If anything, the 

fact that his attorney noted for the court the possibility that the 

witnesses could have undermined Jaweed’s testimony more 

generally shows that he was aware of their potential value to 

Mohammed’s defense. The government urges us to disregard

this statement as mere speculation, but whether counsel did or 

should have had reason to investigate this hunch before trial is 

precisely the type of question an evidentiary hearing is designed 

to explore. The record before us may well be sufficient to judge 

the reasonableness of not pursuing witnesses who could refute 

evidence that Mohammed was part of the Taliban or that Jaweed 

was a thief, but it cannot tell us whether Mohammed’s attorney 

was justified in not finding out if they had anything else to offer 

his client’s defense. We do not know “all the circumstances” 

animating counsel’s strategic decisions from which we could 

determine whether his failure to pursue this potential line of 

defense was a reasonable, calculated choice or a mark of 

deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.

Even so, remand would not be needed if the record showed 

no prejudice to Mohammed from this alleged error. At this 

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stage, Mohammed need not prove actual prejudice, but merely 

show that the record does not “conclusively establish[] that he 

could not do so if given the chance.” Rashad, 331 F.3d at 912. 

The government argues there is no reasonable likelihood that 

testimony undercutting Jaweed’s credibility would have altered 

the verdict because the vast majority of evidence against 

Mohammed consisted of his own words and actions caught on 

tape, not Jaweed’s testimony. Mohammed responds that the 

recordings do not speak for themselves. The government put 

them into evidence through Jaweed, who explained the 

recordings and provided context for them over two days of 

testimony.

Mohammed has the better of this argument. The prosecutor 

frequently stopped the recordings at trial and asked Jaweed to 

explain them to the jury. For example, Jaweed testified that 

when Mohammed discussed blowing up mines around 

“Dagosar” and “the Red Castle” he was referring to government 

cars, Trial Tr. 46:9-20, May 9, 2008, and that plans to “fire 

missiles toward the airport,” referenced the Jalalabad airfield, id.

at 48:25-49:3.Jaweed’s testimony arguably shaped how the jury 

understood Mohammed’s words. Without the additional 

information Jaweed provided that Mohammed was discussing 

government targets, a juror conceivably could conclude that 

Mohammed was violent, but not a terrorist as required to convict

under § 960a. Errors that have “a pervasive effect on the 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence” have a greater 

probability of influencing the verdict, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

695-96, and Mohammed has raised a colorable claim that his 

attorney’s failure to introduce evidence challenging Jaweed’s 

credibility was such an error. The district court is best positioned 

to answer in the first instance whether this colorable claim rises 

to the level of actual prejudice. See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 506 

(explaining that the district court has an “advantageous 

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21

perspective” to assess prejudice within the full context of a trial, 

especially when the same judge from trial presides).

Because Mohammed has raised colorable claims under both 

Strickland prongs and the trial record does not conclusively 

show whether he is entitled to relief, we remand his claims to 

the district court to test his allegations further.4

VI

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mohammed’s 

judgment of conviction and sentence in all respects, but remand 

for an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance claim.

So ordered.

 

4 We agree with our concurring colleague that precedent and 

sound policy mark the district court as the best forum to litigate a claim 

of ineffective assistance, and we express no view on the merits of 

Mohammed’s claim. Our discussion seeks only to explain the reasons 

for our conclusion that the trial record is insufficient to resolve his 

claim on direct appeal. 

In most cases, the need for an evidentiary hearing is readily 

apparent because the trial record contains little of the information 

necessary to assess trial counsel’s performance. In such cases we may 

well “owe no special explanation when we remand.” Concurring Op. at 

2. But this is not the typical case, because the performance of trial 

counsel was an issue before the district court. In such an unusual 

circumstance, we see nothing amiss with explaining why the trial 

record is insufficient to weigh the merits of a claim of ineffective 

assistance on direct appeal. In order to respect our charge to avoid a 

“reflexive[] remand,” we must “interrogate the trial record according to 

Strickland’s familiar two prongs.” Harris, 491 F.3d at 443. 

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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 

concurring in the judgment: I concur in the judgment and in 

all but Part V of the Court’s excellent opinion. I write 

separately with respect to Part V only to express my

respectful view that this Court should not ordinarily delve into 

the merits of an ineffective-assistance claim before the district 

court has done so. The Supreme Court has stated that 

“ineffective-assistance claims ordinarily will be litigated in 

the first instance in the district court, the forum best suited to 

developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of 

representation during an entire trial.” Massaro v. United 

States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003). The district court “may 

take testimony from witnesses for the defendant and the 

prosecution and from the counsel alleged to have rendered the 

deficient performance.” Id.

For that reason, ineffective-assistance claims arising out 

of federal criminal cases are most appropriately brought in 

§ 2255 collateral proceedings. (The Supreme Court has said 

that procedural default rules do not preclude a defendant from 

bringing an ineffective-assistance claim for the first time in a 

§ 2255 proceeding. See id. at 504.) To be sure, this Court has 

also permitted ineffective-assistance claims to be raised on 

direct appeal.1

 But even so, when an ineffective-assistance 

argument is asserted on direct appeal, our usual practice is to 

remand the claim to the district court without substantial 

analysis by this Court of the merits of the claim. See, e.g., 

United States v. Laureys, 653 F.3d 27, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

 1 Our circuit is alone in permitting this procedure. At some 

point, we perhaps should conform our practice to that of all of the 

other circuits and require most ineffective-assistance claims to be 

raised in § 2255 proceedings, not on direct appeal. Cf. Martinez v. 

Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) (“there are sound reasons for 

deferring consideration of ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claims until the collateral-review stage”). Regardless of whether

we take that logical step, however, we should still give the district 

court the first opportunity to consider such claims.

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2

Whether it be in a § 2255 proceeding or on direct appeal, the 

key procedural principle remains the same: The district court 

should take the first crack at the merits of ineffectiveassistance claims.

Two principles of sound appellate decisionmaking 

support that district-court-first practice. First, as the Supreme 

Court has explained, the district court is the forum “best 

suited to developing the facts.” Massaro, 538 U.S. at 505. 

Otherwise, “appellate counsel and the court must proceed on a 

trial record not developed precisely for the object of litigating 

or preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or 

inadequate for this purpose.” Id. at 504-05. Second, by 

remanding to the district court as a matter of course when an 

ineffective-assistance claim is raised on direct appeal, we 

avoid wasting scarce resources as appellate counsel (and 

judges) fruitlessly and pointlessly squabble over ineffectiveassistance claims based on an incomplete record. We have 

acknowledged that the court of appeals can resolve an

ineffective-assistance issue in the first instance when the 

record “conclusively” shows that the defendant either is or is 

not entitled to relief. United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 

911 (D.C. Cir. 2003). But given the fact-bound nature of 

ineffective-assistance claims, that exception arises only rarely. 

If there is any doubt or difficulty, if it is not obvious from the 

face of the record whether relief is warranted, the appropriate 

course is simply to remand.

Applying those principles to this case, I do not see the 

need for the Court’s detailed analysis of Mohammed’s 

ineffective-assistance claim. We owe no special explanation 

when we remand an ineffective-assistance claim. We owe a 

special explanation only in the rare situations when we 

resolve the ineffective-assistance claim here at the appellate 

level. In this case, I would remand the ineffective-assistance 

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claim to the district court without the lengthy evaluation of 

the claim’s merits.

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