Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01100/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01100-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Randolph Epps
Plaintiff
Kathy Mendoza-Powers
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN RANDOLPH EPPS, CASE NO. CV-F-05-1100 LJO DLB P

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO

vs. AMEND

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS, et al., 

Defendants.

 /

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint filed August 29, 2005.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court

must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous

or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984),

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citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners

Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees,

425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve

all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue in this action allegedly occurred at Avenal State Prison, where plaintiff was

formerly incarcerated. Plaintiff names Warden Mendoza-Powers; Deputy District Attorney J.

Williamson; Lieutenant R. Knudsen; Lieutenant Lambert; Sergeant Salcido Sacramento County District

Attorney J. Scully; and former Director J. Woodford as defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that on November 23, 2004, he was interviewed by Sergeant Salcido and given

a CDC 128B Counseling Chrono stating that plaintiff was not to contact the Sacramento District

Attorney’s Office “via a 3-way call.” Plaintiff was told that if he continued to call, he would be charged

with felony terrorist threat and given a two-year SHU term. Plaintiff claims the CDC 128B form was

signed by defendant Lambert at the request of defendant Knudsen. Plaintiff claimstheCDC 128 B arose

from an unsubstantiated report and memo generated by defendant Knudsen. Plaintiff contends his due

process rights were violated.

C. Plaintiff’s Claims

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause

of action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a

liberty interest for which the protection is sought. The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on

inmates a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population instead of segregation. See

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme

Court abandoned earlier case law which had held that states created protectable liberty interests by way

of mandatory language in prison regulations. Id. at 481-84. Instead, the Court adopted an approach in

which the existence of a liberty interest is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Id.

In doing so, the Court held that liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to freedom from

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restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

While plaintiff claims that his due process right were violated, he has failed to establish the

existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. He does not state what happened to him

as a result of the CDC 128B only that the report was unfounded. Plaintiff’s allegations that the CDC

128B was based on an unsubstantiated report, without more, does not state give rise to a claim for relief

under section 1983 for violation of the Due Process Clause. Without further detail, the Court is unable

to determine whether plaintiff states a cognizable due process claim. In addition, as noted, only a

deprivation which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life” will give rise to a due process claim. 

In addition, plaintiff has failed to link defendants Mendoza-Powers, Williamson, Sculley or

Woodford to any conduct described in the complaint. The Civil Rights Act under which this action was

filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the

defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held

that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of

section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section

1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates

a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights.

Further, supervisory personnel such as defendants Mendoza-Powers and Woodford are generally

not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior

and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and

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the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858,

862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941

(1979). To show a prima facie case of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege facts indicating that

supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights;

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so

deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)(internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are

broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under Section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant

County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Finally, prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil suits for damages under section 1983

which challenge activities related to the initiation and presentation of criminal prosecutions. Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). To the extent plaintiff’s allegations relate to the district attorney’s

actions in performing functions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,

plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable based on prosecutorial immunity. Id.; see Stevens v. Rifkin, 608

F.Supp. 710, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1984); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). 

D. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any claims upon which relief may be

granted. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the

deficiencies identified by the court in this order. Plaintiff should carefully review this order and the legal

standards provided, and amend only those claims that plaintiff believes in good faith are cognizable.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained of

have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th

Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There

can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between

a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v.

Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

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complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff

files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore,

in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant

must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court will

recommend that this action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to obey a court

order and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 26, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3c0hj8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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