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Parties Involved:
Arthur Maez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United Statea Court ot Appeals Tenth Circuit 

APR 191989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-1128 

ARTHUR MAEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO. 

(D.C. No. CR-87-322) 

Stephen P. McCue, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico (Ann Steinmetz, Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, was also on the brief} for Defendant-Appellant 

Paula Burnett, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico {William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, and Robert J. 

Baca, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

were also on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BRORBY, Circuit Judge, and ANDERSON, 

District Judge* 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

* The Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, United States District Judge 

for the District of Utah,· sitting by designat-ion_. 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 1 
·· ~ . ..... ~Defendant Maez. .. _(Maez) was . . char.gerl .with .armed bank robbery, a 

violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a) & (d) (1982) and aiding and 

abetting, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). He filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his 

home and truck and incriminating statements he made thereafter. 

That motion was denied after a suppression hearing and the 

evidence was admitted at trial. Maez was convicted. He appeals, 

arguing that the motion to suppress should have been granted. 

The paramount question presented is whether a violation of 

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), occurred when a number of 

armed officers and a SWAT team, having no warrant for an arrest, 

surrounded a mobile home occupied by Maez, his wife and children, 

and over loud speakers asked the occupants to remove themselves 

from the horne, which they did, Maez then being taken into custody. 

We hold that a violation and unlawful arrest occurred. Because 

evidence obtained after the arrest and admitted at trial over 

Maez' objection was tainted, we reverse. 

I 

Factual Background and Procedural Posture 

A. 

The Arrest of Maez 

Two men robbed an Albuquerque bank on Friday, August 14, 

1987. A bank customer reported that an early 1960's Ford or Dodge 

pickup truck with a wooden tailgate and a New Mexico license plate 

number K0-1919 was involved in the robbery. There was· no such 

number, but an FBI dispatcher found that license number KD-1919 

belonged to a 1959 Ford pickup truck re~istered to Maez. ·· A 

description of the truck, both robbers, and Maez' address was 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 2 
.given over. the radio. 

Deputy Sheriff Pacheco heard the broadcast at 3:00 p.m. He 

knew Maez and contacted a confidential informant who knew where 

Maez lived. The informant directed Pacheco to the Maez' home. At 

the home he saw a truck matching the description he had been 

given. By now it was 3:30 p.m. II R. 18-19. Pacheco left and 

the Albuquerque police department and FBI were contacted. The 

Maez home was left unguarded between approximately 3:30 and 4:30 

p.m. Pacheco returned at approximately 4:30 p.m. after meeting 

with his supervisor. From that point on the trailer (which had 

only one exit the front door) was under surveillance. The 

truck at the residence was later identified as the getaway truck~ 

Several Albuquerque police officers, a SWAT team and the FBI 

met in a restaurant parking lot to plan Maez' arrest. 1 They 

arrived at the Maez' home between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. III R. 106; 

SWAT team members dressed in black surrounded the trailer and 

(over loud speakers) asked the occupants of the home to come out. 

II R. 38-39; III R. 143. None of the officers went to the door. 

Mrs. Maez heard some commotion outside. When she looked out the 

front door she saw her fifteen year old son walking across the 

street with his hands in the air. She watched as he was searched 

and handcuffed. An FBI agent testified the boy was handcuffed; he 

was never a suspect in the robbery however. III R. 132. There 

were rifles pointed at the house. III R. 152. Mrs. Maez told her 

1 

It is not clear from the record precisely when the meeting 

took place. FBI agent Garay testified that it began around 4:00 

p.m. III R. 130. Police officer Whitson said .that he was at the 

meeting between 4:30 and 5:00 p.m. II R. 46. Agent Guyman said 

that he was at the meeting at 5:45 p.m. III R. 73. 

3 

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.. -,husband.-.wha.t. was .. happe.ning .and he ... looked .. outside and said, "we 

have to go outside •••• » III R. 152. Mr. and Mrs. Maez were 

told to exit one at a time. 

B. 

Mrs. Maez' Consents to Search 

By the time Mrs. Maez had left the trailer it was 

approximately 6:45 p.m. II R. 49-50; III R. 75. She was 

escorted, with her two month old baby, outside the trailer park 

fence, past approximately ten police officers and into the 

presence of five more. Shortly thereafter, she was asked to read 

and sign consent forms authorizing a search of the trailer. She 

owned the trailer. Police officer Whitson filled in the blanks on 

an Albuquerque police department consent form and explained the 

form to Mrs. Maez before she signed it. 2 Mrs. Maez was given time 

to read the form.3 No evidence was seized pursuant to this 

consent. II R. 44-45. 

After she had signed the Albuquerque police department 

consent form, Mrs. Maez was asked to sign an FBI consent to search 

form. Agent Guyman explained that they would be looking for 

money, weapons, or clothing. He told Mrs. Maez that her husband 

had been arrested. Guyman filled out the form and had Mrs. Maez 

read it out loud. Agent Marrero, who was present when the form 

was signed, testified that Mrs. Maez was visibly upset when she 

2 

This first 

officers could 

yet exited. By 

3 

consent to search form was obtained so that the 

enter the trailer to search for Maez, who had not 

the time the form was signed, he had exited. 

The form indicates that there is a 

deny permission to search the property. 

4 

constitutional right 

I R. 11, Exh. C. 

to 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 4 
·. -,signed ,,,,the. form,.,. She ... said·.that·,·:&he signed the-.. forms only. because 

she had to. III R. 97, 157. 4 A bag containing $5,800, a blue 

stocking cap, a box of ammunition, and two red bandannas were 

seized. Mrs. Maez signed a third consent to search form relating 

to her personal automobile; no evidence was seized from the 

automobile.5 

c. 

Maez' Interrogation 

Maez was taken into custody by the Albuquerque Police 

Department and turned over to the FBI at approximately 7:15 p.m. 

The officers asked if they could search the trailer and vehicles 

and when they indicated they had no search warrant, Maez said no. 6 

4 

Mrs. Maez also testified that before she signed the 

Albuquerque police department consent form she was told that the 

officers did not have a warrant to search the house, but could get 

one. III R. 156. She thought that she would have to wait outside 

while they were getting the warrant if she did not sign the 

consent form. During this time Mrs. Maez was holding their baby. 

II R. 56; III R. 156, 158. 

5 

The dissent's focus on the voluntariness of the third consent 

and its quotation of testimony about it are misplaced. Nothing 

was seized pursuant to the third consent to search. Its validity 

is not at issue. We note this because the consent to search which 

is at issue, the second consent to search, preceded this third 

consent to search the automobile. In fact, the third consent form 

was signed over an hour after the search of the trailer. III R. 

85. It is difficult to validate the second consent by events 

which occurred over an hour after it was signed. 

6 

Maez said that he and his wife communicated with their heads 

regarding consent to search their trailer. "[S]he was reading the 

paper and she went like this, you know, and something like that 

(indicating), you know, to let me know if it's all right if they 

can search the trailer. I told her 'Well, it's your trailer. 

It's up to you,• and I shook my head up and down, to go ahead if · she ·wanted to, because the traileF .. is under her name." III R. 

145. Mrs. Maez said th.at she had no communication with her 

husband, although she was not asked specifically about nonverbal 

communication. 

. 5 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 5 
He -.was .tben--"_.takenc,. to an. inter.view room where .he .was given Miranda 

warnings and signed a waiver of rights form. There was no 

conversation prior to their arrival. It was now 8:00 p.m. Maez' 

interrogation lasted for an hour and one half. II R. 35. He 

signed a consent to search form relating to his truck during the 

interrogation. Guyman was called and he searched the truck. 

During the interrogation FBI agent Garay asked Maez about the 

dark veins on his arm. Maez admitted that he used heroin three 

times a week and said that he had taken two valiums two hours 

before he was taken into custody. III R. 122. Maez explained 

that he had been driving his pickup in the vicinity of the bank 

(picking up pop cans) on the day of the robbery. He also admitted 

ownership of the cap found outside the bank doors. However, when 

Agent Denniston explained where it had been found, Maez denied 

that it was his. Agent Garay testified that about three quarters 

of the way through the interview, Maez vomited. III R. 135. The 

interview continued. Garay testified that Maez did not appear to 

him to be confused, frightened, or under the influence of drugs. 

Maez said that he felt dizzy from the valiums and that he was 

confused by the questions of the three officers. III R. 145-146. 

D. 

The Trial Court's Ruling on the Motion to Suppress 

The trial court orally denied the motion to suppress. The 

court found that "there was probable cause to arrest the 

defendant," a fact not disputed on appeal. II R. 162-164. The 

court further found that Maez was arrested "legally .•• after he 

came out of his trailer." II R. 164. 

The court found that "while the circumstances may 

tense and while the environment 

6 

may not have been 

have been 

ideal 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 6 
. ... . ... • , .. that .. nevertheless .... [Ms. Patsy .. Maez] .. voluntarily and 

willingly gave the officers a permission to search." II R. 164. 

The court concluded that all of the items which were seized from 

the trailer were "legally and validly taken under the permission 

to search •• II II R. 164. 

The court further found that after being given Miranda 

warnings, Maez willingly and knowingly gave permission to search 

the Ford pickup "in which the holster was found." II R. 165. The 

court held that the statements made by Maez, including the 

statements regarding his cap, were "knowingly and willingly given" 

after he had been given Miranda warnings. II R. 165. 

E. 

Evidence At Trial 

At trial, bank teller Christina Carlsen testified that one of 

the robbers was wearing a hat and had a red bandanna over his 

face. The bandanna, which was found during the search of the 

trailer conducted pursuant to the FBI consent form signed by Mrs. 

Maez, was admitted into evidence. Carlson identified Maez as the 

taller of the two robbers and the one who struck Mariana Griego, 

another teller, unconscious with the gun he was carrying. Griego 

identified Maez as one of the robbers. IV R. 111. She said that 

he put a gun under her chin. Griego said that although she could 

not clearly see his face during the robbery (because it was 

covered by the bandanna and he was wearing a cap), she was able to 

see his eyes, a mustache, and dark graying hair. She remembered 

Maez being about five feet seven inches tall. Griego also said 

that she recognized a number of tattoos on Maez' arms and on the 

web of his thumb. IV R. 105-114. 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 7 
.:.-.. On. the ..... way o.ut .. of the ..bank., .one .. of .. the .r.obbers hit. Ernest 

Harrison, Jr., vice president of the bank {and a former FBI agent) 

and knocked him to the ground~ The taller robber's hat fell off. 

Harrison followed the robbers around a corner and saw them leaving 

in a light colored pickup with a wooden tailgate. He said that 

the taller robber was wearing grey pants and was approximately 

five feet nine inches tall. IV R. 42-43. At the same time, a 

bank customer, Michael Barnes, saw what he thought was a gun and 

followed the truck to see the license plate number. He reported 

the number and also described the truck as an early 1960 1 s Ford 

with a wooden tailgate. He testified that the taller robber was 

wearing a light blue shirt. He also identified photographs of the 

truck. 

A box of .25 caliber ammunition, which was found in Maez' 

trailer during the search, was admitted in evidence, as were the 

bandannas, cash totalling $5,844, and various pictures of the 

items seized. The cash consisted of 294 one dollar bills, 118 

five dollar bills, 71 ten dollar bills, 120 twenty dollar bills, 7 

fifty dollar bills, and 15 one hundred dollar bills. The bank had 

baited four twenty dollar bills, but none were found in the 

trailer. No guns or bank wrappers were found. 

Agent Garay testified that a holster had been found in Maez' 

truck, but the holster itself was never offered in evidence. 

Agent Denniston testified regarding statements Maez made during 

his interrogation. Maez said he had been driving his truck in the 

vicinity of the bank (picking up cans). Maez denied the robbery, 

and · cla-imed ·that the money found in the· trailer was his .. 

Denniston also testified that Maez admitted that the cap was his, 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 8 
.. · ... ... . and .then-recanted .af-ter being .. tol.d ... that ... it had.-been found outside 

the bank. 

The sole defense witness was Mrs. Maez. She testified that 

when her husband left the trailer on the morning of August 14, 

1987, he was wearing tennis shoes, green khaki pants, a white 

shirt, and a yellow hat. Later that day she left. When she 

returned around 3:00 p.m. Maez was there, wearing the same pants 

and a t-shirt. Mrs. Maez brought three of her husband's hats to 

court, all of which were admitted in evidence. 

The jury returned a guilty verdict. Maez filed a motion for 

a new trial, arguing that Griego's identification was 

impermissibly suggestive and unreliable, violating his due process 

right to a fair trial. The trial court denied the motion and a 

timely notice of appeal was filed. 

II 

Analysis 

Maez argues that his arrest at his home 

violated the Fourth Amendment and that 

without a warrant 

evidence subsequently 

obtained was tainted. We first consider whether Maez• arrest was 

lawful. If his arrest was unlawful, we must then decide whether 

the subsequent consents to search given by Mr. and Mrs. Maez and 

Maez' incriminating statements were tainted by the unlawful 

arrest. 

A. 

Maez' Warrantless Arrest 

The Fourth Amendment provides that "(t]he right of the people 

· to· be, secure · in ·their --persons, ·houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 9 
·cand .. no .War.rantsc,shalL.,i-ssue,.:..:-but upon p.r:Obable .cause, .supported .by 

Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 

searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 11 In Payton v. 

New York, 445 u.s. 573, 576, 590 (1980), the Supreme Court held 

that, absent exigent circumstances, police officers may not enter 

an individual's home without consent to make a warrantless routine 

felony arrest even with probable cause.? In the instant case, 

police officers, FBI agents and a SWAT team surrounded the Maez' 

trailer, and. with guns pointed at the home, asked him and his 

family to come out. They did and Maez was taken into custody. 

i. 

The Application of Payton 

An arrest or seizure occurs 11when the officer, by means of 

physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained 

the liberty of a-citizen .. " Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1, 19 

n.l6 (1968). See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207 n.6 

(1979). A show "of official authority such that 'a reasonable 

person would have believed he was not free to leave'" indicates 

that an arrest has occurred. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 

(1983) (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 

446 u.s., 544, 554 (1980)) (opinion of Justice Stewart joined by 

Justice Rehnquist). "Examples of circumstances that might 

indicate a seizure, even when the person did not attempt to leave, 

would be the threatening pressure of several officers, the display 

of a weapon by an officer . . • or the use of language or tone of 

7 

A warr~ntless arrest £~ public with probable cause do~s no~ 

violate the Fourth Amendment, even though exigent circumstances do 

not exist. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976). 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 10 
~",voice ... , __ indica..ting .. ~.that. compli_ance. with .the officer's r:.eque.st might 

be compelled." Mendenhall, 446 u.s. at 554. 11 [T]he determination 

of whether an arrest has occurred is not dependent on whether the 

citizen is formally placed under arrest ••• II Unites States v. 

Hatfield, 815 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir. 1987) {quoting United 

States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 356 (6th Cir. 1986)), cert. 

denied, 479 U.S. 1097 (1987). 

The government argues that Maez "chose to exit his home. He 

was arrested in a public place.u Brief of Appellee at 14. And 

the trial court found that Maez "was requested to come out of his 

home, or out of the trailer in which he was living and he was 

arrested after he came out into the open." II R. 164. We cannot 

agree in light of the undisputed facts. The Albuquerque SWAT team 

had surrounded the Maez• trailer with rifles pointed at the horne. 

II R. 39-41: III R. 152. Over the loud speakers the occupants 

"were asked to remove themselves from the mobile horne ••• ," as 

Officer Whitson testified. II R. 39. Mrs. Maez saw the officers 

with rifles pointed at the house and her son being searched and 

handcuffed. She told her husband what had happened. '' [H]e went 

to the door and he looked out and he said, [']We have to go 

outside,['] and he got the baby and we were going outside." III 

R. 152. Given the presence of some ten officers, the drawn 

weapons of the SWAT team surrounding the trailer, the use of the 

loudspeakers, and the frightening circumstances his family faced, 

a reasonable person would have believed he had to come out of the 

11 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 11 
., home ~~ and,.".,submit _ .. to ,th·e .. show ... of-,.author Lty. Accordingly, we hold 

that Maez was arrested while in his home. 8 

The government strenuously argues that Payton does not apply 

here because there was no warrantless entry into Maez' home. It 

says that the Court drew a firm line at the threshold of the home. 

Brief of Appellee at 11-14. The contention has considerable force 

because Payton does make repeated references to entry such as 

"nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home • II 445 u.s. at 

576. The Court said the Fourth Amendment "has drawn a firm line 

at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that 

threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Id. 

at 590. And the Court noted that "'physical entry of the home is 

the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment 

is directed.'" Id. at 585 (quoting United States v. United States 

District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). 

It is true also that Payton involved cases where police 

officers, acting with probable cause but without a warrant, 

entered the defendants' homes to make arrests. In the case of 

Payton, the officers used crowbars to break open the door and 

enter the apartment. Payton, 445 U.S. at 576-577. In the case of 

8 

As noted, the trial judge found 

arrested legally. He came out of his 

out of his home, or out of the trailer 

he was arrested after he came out into 

that the "defendant was 

-- he was requested to come 

in which he was living and 

the open." III R. 164. 

We review the findings on a motion to suppress under the 

clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Alonso, 790 F.2d 

1489, 1493 (lOth Cir. 1986). However, where only an ultimate 

finding such as consent is made and there are undisputed 

underlying facts supporting a contrary conclusion, that conclusion 

may be drawn by the- appellate court. See United States v. 

Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1455 n.7, and---1456 (lOth Cir. 1985) 

(citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 u.s. 590, 604 (1975). 

12 

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.. . . Riddick,., .. the ... officers-.~'-knocked on . the door. of the house where 

Riddick lived, and when his son opened the door, entered and 

arrested Riddick. Id. at 578. In both cases there was physical 

entry. The government argues that Payton does not condemn the 

arrest in this case because the officers did not physically enter 

the trailer. 

We are persuaded, however, by the decisions of the courts 

which have applied Payton where a physical crossing of the 

threshold did not occur and their reasoning that the lack of 

physical entry alone is not dispositive. Those courts have held 

that Payton is violated where there is such a show of force that a 

defendant comes out of a home under coercion and submits to being 

taken in custody. United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893 

and n.l (9th Cir. 1985}, cert. denied, 476 u.s. 1144 (1986); 

United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1164 (6th Cir. 1984), 

cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061 (1985); Scroggins v. State of 

Arkansas, 633 s.w. 2d 33, 37 (Ark. 1982). Cf. United States v. 

Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512, 1514-15 (11th Cir. 1986) (FBI agents, 

with weapons drawn, knocked on door, directed occupant to open the 

door, which he did, and agents arrested him inside). In both AlAzzawy and Morgan, as in the case now before us, the police had 

surrounded the defendants' homes and requested their exit by 

bullhorn. Both courts reasoned that Payton was violated. AlAzzawy, 784 F.2d at 893; Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1166. "In these 

circumstances, it is the location of the arrested person, and not 

the arresting agents, that determines whether an arrest occurs 

- within~a home." United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d at 893. We 

agree and think the important point is that in cases of physical 

13 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 13 
.,,,intrusi-o"n, -OI::· coercion- to. leave-= t-he home, .as i-n ... this-- case.,. the 

privacy of the home is effectively invaded. Commentators have 

endorsed such a view of Payton where a defendant's coming out of 

his home resulted from coercion. See 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure 

§ 6.l(e) at 592-94 (2nd ed. 1987). 

Payton recognizes that at the "very core [of the Fourth 

Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home 

and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.~~ 445 

U.S. at 589-590 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 u.s. 505, 

511 (1961)). While "physical entry of the home is the chief evil 

against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed" the 

Court has "refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances of 

actual physical trespass." United States v. United States 

District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). Here the governmental 

intrusion, without consent and without a warrant, was in the form 

of extreme coercion which effected the arrest of Maez while he was 

in his home. We hold that the finding of the trial judge to the 

contrary is clearly erroneous and that, given the undisputed 

circumstances here, there was a violation of Maez' Fourth 

Amendment rights. 

ii 

Exigent Circumstances 

In addition to its argument -- which we have rejected -- that 

there was no arrest of Maez in the home, the government says that 

both probable cause for the arrest and exigent circumstances 

existed ·so that - there was in any __ event :no violation of Payton. 

Brief of Appellee at 13, 15. Emergency conditions may make a 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 14 
·· . .;_,,_-· · '"·war~antless ~,search -·o-r:-: ar-r-est consti ti &ionaL.twhere -probable cause 

exists, see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-750 (1984}, and 

here Maez does not dispute the existence of such probable cause. 

Moreover, Payton recognized that if exigent circumstances exist, 

the constitional bar against a suspect's arrest in his home 

without a warrant does not apply. 445 u.s. at 590. Here, 

however, Maez contends there was no assertion of exigency made in 

the trial court by the government's law enforcement witnesses or 

its counsel. Appellant Maez' Reply Brief at 12.9 We agree and 

reject the government's argument of exigent circumstances made for 

the first time on appeal. 

We cannot accept the government's belated assertion of the 

exigent circumstances claim for basic reasons. Where police seek 

to enter a home without a warrant the state bears the burden of 

9 

The government argues that the record supports the existence 

of exigent circumstances because: (1) the police knew that one of 

the bank robbers was armed and had used the butt of his handgun to 

disable (knock unconscious) a bank customer; (2} a large sum of 

money had been stolen from a bank; (3} ·the police had physical 

descriptions of items worn by the robbers which might be 

destroyed; (4) Maez might seek to warn the other robber or seek 

assistance if he should become aware of the presence of the 

police; and (5) the police knew Maez was a heroin addict and a 

convicted felon. 

Citing United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 

1984} (en bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984), the government 

argues that the existence of exigent circumstances is supported by 

the record and "dictated the arrest procedure." Brief of 

Appellee, at pp. 15-16. McConney held that the "mixed question of 

exigency is reviewable de novo as a question of law." 728 F.2d at 

1204-05. In United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586 (lOth Cir. 

1983), we said that in assessing whether the government's burden 

demonstrating exigent circumstances was met, we "evaluate the 

circumstances as they would have appeared to prudent, cautious and 

trained officers." (citations omitted). Since we conclude that 

the government waived its right to raise the-- issue of exigen-t 

circumstances on appeal for reasons stated in the text, we do not 

undertake an evaluation of the record. 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 15 
- """_ -proving,. that. suf.ficient _ exigency-... exists. -"United States v ·- Aquino, 

836 F.2d 1268, 1271 (lOth Cir. 1988) (citing Coolidge v. New 

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971)). That burden is particularly 

heavy where the police seek to enter a suspect's home or the home 

of a third person because warrantless seizures inside a home are 

presumptively unreasonable. Aquino, 836 F.2d at 1271 (quoting 

Payton, 445 U.S. at 586). It is important that the facts on 

exigent circumstances be developed and that findings be made on 

them. ~, United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 586-591. 

In the Payton opinion itself, the Supreme Court noted that 

while it was arguable that the warrantless arrest of Payton might 

have been justified by exigent circumstances, none of the lower 

courts had relied on any such justification and accordingly the 

Court had no occasion to consider such an emergency or dangerous 

situation. 445 u.s. at 583. In Steagald v. United States, 451 

U.S. 204 (1981), the government argued for the first time on 

appeal that the record did not clearly show that the petitioner, 

who was arrested in a third party's house, had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the home. The Court declined to grant 

the government's request for a remand for factual findings on the 

issue: 

[T]he Government was initially entitled to 

defend against petitioner's charge of an unlawful 

search by asserting that petitioner lacked a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched 

home, or that he consented to the search, or that 

exigent circumstances justified the entry. The 

Government, however, may lose its right to raise 

factual issues of this sort before this Court when 

it has made contrary assertions in the courts 

below, when it has acquiesced in contrary findings 

by those courts, or when it has failed to raise 

such questions in a timely fashion during the 

litigation. 

16 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 16 
We conclude that this is such a case. The 

Magistrate's report on petitioner's suppression 

motion, which was adopted by the District Court, 

characterized the issue as whether an arrest 

warrant was sufficient to justify the search of 

'the home of a third person' for the subject of the 

warrant. App. 12. The Government never sought to 

correct this characterization on appeal, and 

instead acquiesced in the District Court's view of 

petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim. 

Id. at 209 (emphasis added). Here, the government concedes in its 

brief that it did not argue the issue below. Brief of Appellee, 

15-16. In fact, the defendant specifically argued below that 

exigent circumstances did not exist and the government did not 

dispute the argument. 10 Hence the district court had no reason to 

consider the issue. 

For these reasons, we must reject the government's argument 

that its claim of exigent circumstances be taken up for the first 

time on this appeal. 

B .. 

The Taint Caused by the Payton Violation 

Having determined that Maez' warrantless arrest violated 

Payton and the Fourth Amendment, we must now go on to consider 

whether the illegal arrest tainted the consents to search 

subsequently given by him and his wife and his custodial 

statements, or whether any taint was sufficiently removed and 

attenuated by intervening circumstances. 

10 

In his "Motion To Suppress Physical Evidence" the defendant 

argued that "[n]o exigent circumstances existed to justify the 

search of the residence ..•. 11 I R. 8. The argument was again 

made · -~in··-the- ·"Memorandum Brief In Support of Defendant's Motion To 

Suppress Physical Evidence and Motion To Suppress Statements." I 

R. 12, p.6. The government's response brief does not contest 

these arguments. I R. 11. 

17 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 17 
i 

Mrs. Maez' Consent to Search 

We first consider whether the consent to search given by Mrs. 

Maez to the FBI was voluntary in fact so as to remove the taint of 

Maez' unlawful arrest. A consent to search which is preceded by a 

Fourth Amendment violation is valid only if it is voluntary in 

fact. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1520-1521 (lOth 

Cir. 1988); United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1151 (lOth 

Cir. 1986), cert~ denied, 479 U.S. 914 {1986)). If the consent is 

not sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of 

the illegal arrest, it must be suppressed as fruit of the 

poisonous tree. See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1520 (quoting Brown v. 

Illinois, 422 u.s. 590, 601 {1975)). 

Without citation to authority, the government initially 

argues that because Mrs. Maez was not arrested, 11 her consent to 

search the trailer cannot be tainted by her husband 1 S prior 

illegal arrest. We disagree and think the issue, as stated in 

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), is whether 

"granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to 

which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation 

of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 

distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." This 

conclusion is mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in United 

11 

We accept the government's contention that Mrs. Maez was not 

arrested only for the sake of analysis, given our conclusion that 

Mr. Maez was arrested while in the trailer. If under the Terry, 

Dunaway, Mendenhall, and Royer arrest anal·ysis, supra, Mr. Maez 

was arrested, it follows that Mrs. Maez was also arrested. She 

was in the same position. 

18 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 18 
.,_ States v •.... Ceccolini, 435 u.s. 268 (.191.8).~ _see also .United States 

v. Howard, 828 F.2d 552, 556 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In Ceccolini, the defendant (a businessman suspected of 

gambling) moved to suppress damaging statements of an employee, 

resulting from an unlawful search of his business premises. Id. 

at 269-272. The employee was not arrested. The Court rejected 

the government's argument that "the testimony of a live witness 

should not be excluded at trial no matter how close and proximate 

the connection between it and a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment." Id. at 274-275. While the primary issue before the 

Court was whether a categorical distinction should be drawn 

between physical and verbal evidence found as the result of an 

unlawful search, the Court specifically noted that the witness 

whose testimony was at issue was not a defendant. Id. at 275, 

277. The Court nevertheless concluded that "'verbal evidence 

which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an 

unauthorized arrest as the officers 1 action in the present case is 

no less . the 'fruit' of the official illegality than the more 

common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.'" Id. at 275 

(quoting Wong Sun, 371 u.s. at 485) Thus, the defendant could 

raise the taint issue as to the statements made by his employee. 

And while the witness in Ceccolini gave statements, as opposed to 

a consent to search, the same analysis is required here. The 

question is whether the statements of the witness (or in our case 

the consent) have "become so attenuated as to dissipate the 

taint." Ceccolini, 435 u.s. at 274 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 

487, 491). 

19 

-: 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 19 
-"" - -Whether a· consent .to, ,search preceeded by a Fourth Amendment 

violation is sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary 

taint of the illegal arrest depends upon whether it is voluntary 

in fact, which in turn depends upon the totality of circumstances 

surrounding the consent. See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1520 (citing 

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 248-249 (1973) and 

Carson, 793 F.2d at 1149). In applying the Schneckloth v. 

Bustamante voluntariness test to consents to search obtained 

subsequent to Fourth Amendment violations, this court has 

considered the three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 

u.s. 590 (1975), which apply to confessions. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 

1520-1521. These factors include "[t]he temporal proximity of the 

arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening 

circumstances, and particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the 

official misconduct II • • Cl • Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-604 (citation 

omitted). Weighing these factors the court must decide the 

ultimate question whether the consent was sufficiently an act of 

free will to purge the primary taint of the illegal arrest. See 

Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1520. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 u.s. 

491, 501 (1983); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 u.s. 471, 486 

{1963); Carson, 793 F . 2d at 1152; United States v. Recalde, 761 

F.2d 1448, 1458 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

As noted, the district judge found that Mrs. Maez' consent 

was voluntarily and willingly given, although he expressed 

reluctance in making this finding. 1 2 The judge had also held 

12 

-The court stated in part: 

And I will find that while the circumstances 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

20 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 20 
there .- .was,--no illegal- arr.est--.of Mr .. Maez and thus- had_ no reason to 

consider whether Mrs. Maez' consent was sufficiently an act of 

free will to purge the primary taint of her husband's unlawful 

arrest. 

When consent is obtained after an illegal arrest there must 

be a break in the causal connection between the illegality and the 

evidence thereby obtained. Dunaway v. New York, 442 u.s. 200, 

217-219 ( 1979). Here the violation of Payton and the undisputed 

train of events that followed compel us to hold that Mrs. Maez' 

consent was tainted and invalid. 13 First, the proximity of the 

(Footnote continued): 

may have been tense and while the environment may 

not have been that of the most ideal for 

considering the signing of a permission to search, 

that nevertheless she voluntarily and willingly 

gave the officers a permission to search. This is 

Government's Exhibit 1. 

III R. 164-165. 

13 

The district court did not discuss the taint issue resulting 

from the Payton violation. It is not our function to try facts or 

to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court in 

determining factual issues. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1521. However, 

where the proceedings below "resulted in a record of amply 

sufficient detail and depth from which the determination may be 

made," the appellate court may conduct a taint analysis. Brown, 

422 U.S. at 604, quoted in Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1521 n.lO. See 

also Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1458-1459 (voluntariness determination 

held clearly erroneous where, although there was some evidence to 

support it, the entire record indicated that the defendant's 

consent was tainted); United States v. Patino, 830 F.2d 1413, 

1418-1419 (7th Cir. 1987). 

The dissent argues that it is inappropriate for us to conduct 

a taint analysis, that only the trial court is in a position to 

assess credibility and discern truth and that the case should be 

remanded. But none of the facts relating to the proximity of the 

·arrest-and confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, 

or the flagrancy of official misconduct are in dispute. And these 

are the facts which are crucial to the taint analysis and upon 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

21 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 21 
- ~·-- 7 ,a.rr.est .. ,and .. Mrs .•. Maez ~-;consents .clear.ly indicates that taint of the 

Payton violation was not purged. The FBI consent form was signed 

by Mrs. Maez at approximately 7:15p.m., just after she had been 

summoned from the trailer by the bullhorn. And when she signed 

the form she was still in the trailer park. III R. 64-66. 

Second, the intervening circumstances indicate no purging of 

the primary taint of her husband's illegal arrest. After leaving 

the trailer, Mrs. Maez was immediately asked by Albuquerque police 

officer Whitson to sign the police department's consent to search 

form. II R. 39. She was then approached by FBI agent Gyman who 

explained that the FBI wanted to search for money, weapons, and 

clothing, and the second consent form was signed. III R. 65-66. 

There were no intervening circumstances of any significance to 

purge the taint of the unlawful warrantless arrest of Maez. 

With respect to the purpose and flagrancy of the violation, 

the last Brown factor, it cannot be said that the officers 

purposefully violated Payton in the sense that they were aware of 

(Footnote continued): 

which the government bore the burden of proof. See Brown, 422 

u.s. at 603-604; Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1520-1521; Recalde, 761 

F.2d at 1457-1459. The record is of "amply sufficient detail and 

depth" for us to conclude, as the Court did in Brown, that the 

taint of the Fourth Amendment violation was not purged. Brown, 

422 u.s. at 603-604. The suppression hearing developed the 

circumstances in detail (II R. at 4-58; III R. at 62-162) and the 

basic facts vitiating the consents and statements are undisputed, 

as noted throughout our opinion. 

Applying the proper test of considering the whole record, and 

not merely relying on portions as the dissent does to support its 

view, we are left with the firm conviction that a mistake was made 

in finding the consents and Mr. Maez' statements valid. The 

correct standard of review is whether "although there is evidence 

to support [the findings], the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence · is left with the· .definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been commft:ted." United States v. Grier, 8"66 F.2d 

908, 935 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. D'Antoni, 856 

F.2d 975, 978-979 (7th Cir. 1988)). 

22 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 22 
the-- impropriety - of their actions, .as- was the case in Brown. See 

Brown, 422 U.S. at 605. The manner of the arrest, however, 

created a frightening scene for the Maez family as did Brown's 

arrest. 14 Id. Agent Marrero, who was present when Mrs. Maez 

signed the FBI consent form, testified that she was crying and 

upset when she signed the form. She said that she signed the 

consent forms only because she had to. Before leaving the trailer 

Mrs. Maez had seen her fifteen year old son walking across the 

street with his hands in the air, and she watched as he was 

handcuffed. She was holding her two month old baby from the time 

she left the trailer throughout the signing of all three consent 

forms. II R. 41, 56-57. The undisputed facts clearly indicate 

that the taint of Maez' arrest had not been purged when Mrs. Maez 

signed the FBI consent to search form and the police department 

consent. 15 

14 

The dissent rejects the majority's view that the 

circumstances created a frightening scene for the Maez family. 

The dissent's reasoning is difficult to understand since the 

dissent accepts the majority's holding that a violation of Payton 

v. New York occurred that holding being grounded on the 

frightening scene that exerted "extreme coercion which effected 

the arrest of Maez while he was in his home." See · supra at p. 14. 

Our Payton holding follows state and federal courts which hold 

that a Payton violation occurs where there is such a show of force 

that a defendant comes out of his home under coercion and submits 

to being taken into custody. See supra at p. 13. The essential 

facts leading us to hold there was a frightening scene here were 

undisputed -- the presence of ten armed SWAT team members with 

rifles pointed at the trailer, the request to come out over the 

bull horn, and the handcuffing of the fifteen year old son. 

15 

The dissent contends that our opinion misreads the record. 

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress an appellate 

court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the government and must -accept the trial court's findings of fact 

unless clearly erroneous. United States v~-- J i menez, 864 F. 2d '686, 

688 (lOth Cir. 1988). But an appellate court must not simply 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

23 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 23 
-The .. gover.nment ,ar.gues ... thaLMrs. Mae.z, was. advised, of her right 

to refuse consent, both orally and on the consent forms 

themselves. While this fact is indeed probative it is not 

dispositive of the voluntariness issue. Schneckloth, 412 u.s. at 

227, 249; Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1458-1459. We note that Mrs. Maez 

testified that she was told by the officers that if she refused 

consent they could simply get a warrant while she waited outside. 

III R. 156. This tends to undermine any salutary effect that 

advice of the right to refuse consent might have had. United 

States v. Ocheltree, 622 F.2d 992, 993-994 (9th Cir. 1980). 

We hold that Maez' illegal arrest tainted the subsequent 

consents to search the trailer given by Mrs. Maez and that her 

consents were not "'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the 

primary taint' [of the illegal arrest]." Brown, 422 U.S. at 602 

(quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486). The evidence seized pursuant 

to the FBI consent to search form, including the paper bag 

containing $5,844, the box of ammunition, two red bandannas, and 

the dark blue knit cap should have been suppressed, along with 

various photographs of the seized evidence. 16 

(Footnote continued): 

consider from the record those facts which might support a trial 

court's findings and ignore the record as a whole. A trial 

court's factual determinations in criminal cases, as in civil 

cases, see Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 u.s. 564, 573 (1985), 

may be clearly erroneous even where supported by some evidence, if 

on the whole record the court is left with a firm and definite 

conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. 

Grier, 866 F.2d 908, 935 (7th Cir. 1989). See~ United States 

v. Recalde, 761 F. 2d 1448, 1457-1459 (lOth Ci r. 

1985)(voluntariness determination held clearly erroneous where, 

although there was some evidence to support it, the entire record 

indicated that the defendant's consent was tainted). 

16 

The photographs referred to are only those photographs of the 

tainted evidence which were admitted at trial. 

24 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 24 
ii 

Maez• Consent to Search 

After exiting the trailer Maez was taken into custody by the 

Albuquerque police department. He was then turned over to the FBI 

and given Miranda warnings. He was taken to an interview room at 

the Albuquerque office of the FBI. He signed a waiver of rights 

form at 8:00 p.m., approximately 45 minutes after he had been 

taken into custody. III R. 110-111. He was then interrogated. 

During the interrogation he signed a consent to search form, 

authorizing a search of his pickup truck. III R. 112-115. Doc, 

11, Exh. B. Officer Guyman searched the truck and found a 

holster. The district judge found that Maez, after being advised 

of his Miranda rights, »willingly and knowingly gave permission to 

search the Ford pickup » III R. 165. As was true with 

respect to Mrs. Maez' consent, the district judge did not discuss 

the effect of the prior illegal arrest, having held that no 

violation or unlawful arrest occurred. 

To determine whether Maez• consent to search the truck was 

sufficiently an act of free will to purge the taint of his illegal 

arrest we again consider the three-factors enunciated in Brown. 

The proximity of Maez' arrest and his subsequent consent given 45 

minutes later does not indicate that the taint of the Payton 

violation was purged. In Brown v. Illinois, Brown's initial 

statement was separated from his illegal arrest by less than two 

hours. Brown, 422 u.s. at 604. The Court there held that Brown's 

statement, like James Wah Toy's statment in Wong Sun, was the 

frui.~t ·of the-poisonous-tree. -Id. at 604-605. See also.·Wong Sun, 

371 u.s. at 486-487. From the time Maez was taken to the FBI 

25 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 25 
..... , -interview . room he was. in the. custody., of .. at lea.st three officers, 

see III R. 109, and was initially in the presence of ten. See 

Patino, 830 F.2d at 1418 (taint not purged where defendant 

continually in the company of one officer). His removal to the 

interview room does not indicate a break in the causal connection 

between his arrest and the subsequent consent. Hayes v. Florida, 

470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985); Dunaway, 442 u.s. at 212-213. 

With respect to the second Brown factor, the effect of any 

intervening circumstances, the government does not point to and we 

do not find in the record any circumstances which would tend to 

dissipate the taint. 17 With respect to the last factor, the 

purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct, the manner of 

the arrest was such that it would cause surprise, fright and 

confusion. See Brown, 422 u.s. at 605. Maez testified that he 

felt dizzy during his interrogation; he vomitted approximately 

three quarters of the way through the interview, as one of the FBI 

agents testified. III R. 135. Considering all three Brown 

factors, we hold that Maez• consent to search the truck was not 

sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint. See 

Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1520. 

The government notes that the consent form was signed after 

Maez had been advised of his Miranda rights, which is probative. 

But as the Supreme Court noted, n[i]f Miranda warnings, by 

17 

The government argues that because Maez refused to consent to 

a search of his home he was capable of exercising his rights, free 

from the taint of the illegal arrest. While relevant, this fact 

is not dispositive. In Recalde, the gefendant refused to answer 

questions and yet subsequently signed a consent form; we 

nevertheless found that consent tainted. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 

1459. 

26· 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 26 
·, themselves, "were · -held - to -. attenuate - . the taint of an 

unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful 

the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary 

rule would be substantially diluted." Brown, 422 U.S. at 602-603. 

Miranda warnings do not per se break the causal connection between 

an illegal arrest and evidence subsequently obtained. See 

Dunaway, 442 u.s. at 216-217. 

We hold that in these circumstances, notwithstanding the 

Miranda warnings, Maez' consent was tainted by his prior illegal 

arrest and the testimony regarding the holster should have been 

suppressed. 

III 

Maez' Custodial Statements 

During his interrogation Maez explained where he had been and 

what he had been doing on the day of the robbery. He said that he 

had been in possession of his pickup throughout the day and had 

been in the area of the bank. He admitted ownership of a cap 

shown to him during the interrogation by Agent Denniston. When 

told that the cap had been found outside the doors of the bank 

which had been robbed, Maez then denied ownership of the cap. 

Officer Denniston testified about those statements at trial and 

the cap was admitted. IV R. 153-160. 

The exculpatory and incriminating statements made by Maez 

during his interrogation are subject to the same analysis as the 

consent to search the truck. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 u.s. 687, 

690-694 (1982); Brown, 422 U.S. at 593-595; Wong Sun, 371 u.s. at 

486- 487 (exculpatory ~nd incriminating statements entitled to the 

protection of the exclusionary rule). Applying the same Brown 

27 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 27 
, -.. analysis-,,_ -~which .... we, made , earlier, _we -- hold"' that the statements 

should have been suppressed.l8 

IV 

The judgment is accordingly REVERSED and the case is REMANDED 

for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 

18 

While Maez' Fourth Amendment rights were violated and the 

evidence outlined in Part B should have been suppressed, we could 

affirm the conviction if the constitutional errors were harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Harrington v. California, 395 u.s. 

250, 254 (1969); United States v. Morales Quinones, 812 F.2d 604, 

610 (lOth Cir. 1987). The government concedes, however, that if 

admi_ssion of the paper bag containing the money, the box of -- ammunition, the red, bandannas, the photographs, and the dark blue 

knit cap was error, its admission cannot be considered harmless 

error. Brief of Appellee, p. 21. 

28 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 28 
No. 88-1128, United States v. Arthur Maez 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

Although I agree with the majority's application of Payton v. 

New York, 445 u.s. 573 {1980), I do not agree that the statements 

and written consents to search given by Patsy and Arthur Maez are 

extinguished by the Payton violation in this case. Respectfully, 

I must dissent for two reasons. First, the majority reaches a 

result not dictated by the record. Second, I cannot endorse the 

analytical framework of the majority opinion. 

Based upon my view of the record, I have no doubt that Patsy 

and Arthur Maez voluntarily consented to the searches herein. The 

force of the consents given in this case overcomes the taint 

placed by the Payton violation. The same is true of the 

statements made by the defendant. The majority reaches its 

conclusion only by disregarding the government's evidence and 

adopting the defendant's after-the-fact gloss on what happened the 

day of his arrest. Such practice blocks a sound disposition in 

this case. 

At the suppression hearing, the government called 

agents as witnesses to demonstrate the voluntariness 

consents given by Mrs. Maez to search her home and auto. 

two FBI 

of the 

Special 

Agent Guyman testified, in part, that when he first spoke to Patsy 

Maez ;- he. explained to her. that· her h~sband was being placea under· 

arrest and charged with a bank robbery which had occurred earlier 

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 29 
that afternoon. He told her that her husband matched the 

description of the robber and a vehicle belonging to him had been 

used in the robbery. 

In response to counsel's question: "Can you describe how she 

reacted and responded to you?" Special Agent Guyman testified: 

She had indicated that there was no problem that we 

would be going to search the trailer. She had indicated 

that the trailer belonged to her and it was in her 

possession. In essence what I did is I filled out the 

search form and had her read it out loud to me and then 

she signed it. 

He further testified: "She read it out loud to me and she did not 

have any questions ••.. It appeared to me that she understood." 

The agent's testimony is bolstered by the defendant's testimony. 

As to the search of the mobile home, the defendant testified that 

he left the decision as to consent up to his wife. "I told her 

'Well, it's your trailer. It's up to you,' and I shook my head up 

and down, to go ahead if she wanted to, because the trailer is 

under her name." 

The consent form which Patsy Maez signed reads as follows: 

8/14/87 

(date) 

ALBUQUERQUE 

(Location) 

I, PATSY ANN MAEZ, , having been informed of 

my constitutional right not to have a search made of the 

premises hereinafter mentioned without a search warrant 

-2-

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 30 
and of my right to refuse to consent to such a search, 

hereby authorize SA CALVIN E. GUYMAN , and 

JOSE A. MARRERO , Special Agents of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of 

Justice, to conduct a complete search of my premises 

located at 9600 CENTRAL SW SPACE 41 These 

agents are authorized by me to take from my premises any 

WEAPONS & MONEY, letters, papers, materials or other 

property which they may desire. 

This written permission is being given by me to the 

above-named Special Agents voluntarily and without 

threats or promises of any kind. 

At the suppression hearing, the government introduced and the 

court received the executed consent form into evidence. 

Special Agent Marrero testified regarding Patsy Maez' consent 

to search the vehicle. He stated, in part, as follows: 

A She was in the mobile home throughout the search. 

Q Were you able to tell during the times that you 

observed her, did she appear to be -- could you describe 

how she appeared? Did she appear frightened, et cetera? 

A She did not appear frightened. She appeared I would 

say sad, and if I may say so she had a resigned look 

about her as far as -- somehow I got the feeling that 

what was happening was not a total shock to her, but it 

was an unpleasant experience for her. 

Inside the Maez trailer home, Special Agent Marrero again advised 

Patsy Maez that she was not under arrest and was under no 

obligation to talk to the agents. When asked if she would consent 

to a search of her vehicle, "[s]he agreed to the search and 

wi t"hout ·her asking question's we did explain to her that she was 

under no obligation to give the consent, though she didn't ask any 

-3-

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 31 
questions relating to the consent." "I showed it to her. I read 

it to her and I had her read it." Patsy Maez executed a consent 

to search her vehicle as well as her home.l 

On cross-examination, Special Agent Marrero was asked: "So 

would it be fair to say your assignment was to accompany Ms. Maez, 

Mrs. Maez so that she would sign a consent to search form?» 

Special Agent Marrero responded: 

No. My assignment was to accompany her and explain to 

her if she, not so that she would, but rather if she 

would. My assignment wasn't to make her sign the 

consent. My assignment was to help her understand what 

the consent entailed and it was totally up to her 

whether or not she signed it. 

When asked if she had cried, Special Agent Marrero testified: 

"[S)he might have had a tear in her eye, but she wasn•t, she 

hadn•t broken down into tears or anything like that. She wasn't 

uncontrollably crying and sobbing and all this. She was just 

sitting there minding her child." When asked if he questioned 

Patsy Maez about the bank robbery itself, Special Agent Marrero 

responded: "My conversation with her was limited to making sure 

that she was comfortable. Would you like some water, she said 

yes. Is the baby getting heavy, can I help you in any way, that 

sort of thing, but not relating to the investigation •••• " 

1. Although .. no evidence was seized pu:r:suant to this·- consent, in 

the context of the whole record, this consent is relevant to show 

Patsy Maez' persistence in consenting to searches. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 32 
Mrs. Maez testified that she signed the consent to search 

forms because she felt she "had to. 11 She stated she was "scared 

and upset and angry•• during the whole procedure, but that she was 

not crying. On cross-examination the government brought out the 

facts that Mrs. Maez had worked for the New Mexico Department of 

Human Services for nineteen years, and that currently she was a 

clerk-specialist. In the past she had been a notary public. She 

testified that she knew her husband had been in the penitentiary 

11 [a]bout four times" during their sixteen-year marriage. 

In my view the record portrays a scene that is far removed 

from the thundering drama of police abuse depicted in the majority 

opinion. Patsy Maez is a literate woman who has held a government 

position for nineteen years. She has endured a marriage to a man 

who has been in and out of incarceration. In the bank robbery of 

the instant case, Arthur Maez was identified as the man who used a 

firearm to knock unconscious a female bank employee. He admitted 

to an FBI agent that at the time of his latest arrest, he was 

using heroin approximately three times per week. One wonders who 

Patsy Maez was afraid of and angry with during the arrest of this 

man. I believe we make a mistake when we substitute our 

perception of the facts for that of the trial court. 2 

2 In determining the ·-statements, .the- tr.ial 

illegal arrest on Patsy sensibilities. 

voluntariness of the consents and 

judge"" : must - -determine the- .impact of the ·- and Arthur Maez, not its impact on our 

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Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 33 
Likewise, I cannot accept the majority's interpretation of 

the record as to the consent to search and the statements given by 

Arthur Maez while in custody. Special Agent Garay testified that 

he advised the defendant of his constitutional rights orally when 

he was taken into custody at 7:15 p.m. The defendant was then 

transported to 

there had been no 

agent. 

the FBI office in Albuquerque. Until that point, 

conversation between the defendant and the 

At the FBI office, Special Agent Garay again advised Arthur 

Maez of his constitutional rights. Forty-five minutes after his 

arrest, the defendant read aloud the advisement of rights and 

executed a waiver identical to the one executed by his wife. 

Additionally, the defendant read aloud and executed a consent to 

search his pickup truck. Both of these documents were admitted 

into evidence at the suppression hearing. Special Agent Garay ~ 

agreed with counsel that the defendant appeared "to be aware of 

what was going on" when he was interviewed. The defendant was a 

man with an extensive criminal record, appeared to understand his 

rights, and did not appear to be confused or frightened during the 

interview. Although the defendant vomited three-quarters of the 

way through the interview, Special Agent Garay testified that he 

was trained to recognize symptoms of persons who are under the 

influence of drugs, and that the defendant appeared to have 

control of himself. Deputy Pacheco of the Bernalillo County 

---.~ ·sheriffts ·Department· testified in part: 

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Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 34 
Q And that he told you he had taken two valiums? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he tell you he had taken any other medication or 

drugs that evening? 

A He was asked if he was under the influence of heroin 

and he said no. Any other drug and he said no. He 

vomited after he drank the water that we gave him. 

Many of these facts are not noted in the majority's opinion. 

Again, the majority substitute their perception of the facts for 

that of the trial court. 

What troubles me as much as the majority's perception of the 

facts, however, is the majority's application of legal principles 

to produce an outcome which is both unwarranted and unwise. The 

questions presented for review are whether the consent to search 

given by Patsy Maez to the FBI was voluntary in fact so as to 

remove the taint of Arthur Maez' unlawful arrest, and whether 

Arthur Maez' consent to search and in-custody statements were 

sufficiently acts of free will to purge the taint of his illegal 

arrest. Majority op. at 17-18, 24, 26. I do not agree with the 

majority's disposition of the case or with its usurpation of the 

trial court•s function. 

The majority notes that the district judge found that Patsy 

Maez' consent was voluntarily and willingly given. The district 

judge observed: 

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Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 35 
And I will find that while the circumstances may have 

been tense and while the environment may not have been 

that of the most ideal for considering the signing of a 

permission to search, that nevertheless she voluntarily 

and willingly gave the officers a permission to 

search •••• 

Contrary to the majority's contention that the district judge 

"expressed reluctance in making this finding," majority op. at 20, 

I interpret the comments as recognizing the fact that one can give 

consent voluntarily even under circumstances which are less than 

conducive to thoughtful reflection. Experience teaches us that 

commonly, when suspects and/or family members waive constitutional 

rights and give information to law enforcement officers, the 

setting is less than pastoral. In this case, I have no doubt that 

Patsy Maez voluntarily consented to the search of her mobile home. 

In spite of the illegal arrest, if asked to do so, I would be 

inclined to hold that the evidence demonstrates her consent was 

' 

strong enough to overcome the illegality of her husband's arrest. 

Similarly, I would be inclined to hold that Arthur Maez' waiver of 

Miranda rights and consent to search under the circumstances of 

this case overcame the illegality of the arrest. 

The majority correctly concludes that whether a consent to 

search preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation is sufficiently an 

act of free will to purge the primary taint of the illegal arrest 

depends on whether it is voluntary in fact. The trial court, 

although incorrectly opining that the arrest was lawful, did hold 

a factual hearing and determined that the consents and statements 

were voluntary. In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, 

-aAppellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 36 
the trial court's findings must be accepted by this court unless 

they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Guglielmo, 834 F.2d 

866, 868 (lOth Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Cooper, 733 

F.2d 1360, 1364 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 467 u.s. 1255 (1984); 

United States v. Gabriel, 715 F.2d 1447, 1450 (lOth Cir. 1983)). 

"A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence 

to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed." United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 u.s. 364, 395 

(1948), cited in, ~' Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 u.s. 564, 

573 (1985); Everaard v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 842 F.2d 

1186, 1191 (lOth Cir. 1988). "Questions of fact are reviewed 

under the deferential, 'clearly erroneous' standard as set forth 

in Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(1). Although the standard is a rule of 

civil procedure, it is applied to certain issues in criminal 

proceedings." United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 

(lOth Cir. 1986). "If findings are not made, this court must 

uphold the ruling if there is any reasonable view of the evidence 

to support it." United States v. Fountain, 776 F.2d 878, 884 

(lOth Cir. 1985) (citing Anderson, 470 U.S. 564); Colon-Sanchez v. 

Marsh, 733 F.2d 78 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); 

Cooper, 733 F.2d at 1364). 

On appeal, the evidence must be viewed in the light most 

favorable to the district court's findings. Guglielmo, 834 F.2d 

-at'-'868 (ci~ing··United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543 (lOth Cir. 

1985)). See also United States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 561 

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Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 37 
(lOth Cir. 1987). Stated differently, the reviewing court must 

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government. United States v. Ashby, 864 F.2d 690, 692 (lOth Cir. 

1988); United States v. Jimenez, 864 F.2d 686, 688 (lOth Cir. 

1988); United States v. Soto-Ornelas, 863 F.2d 1487, 1490 (lOth 

Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 840 (lOth Cir. 

1986). 

Where a motion to suppress is heard, the credibility of the 

witnesses, the weight to be given the evidence, and the drawing of 

inferences are for the trial judge. Fountain, 776 F.2d at 879 

(citing Cooper, 733 F.2d at 1374). Although in footnotes 13 and 

15 the majority cites the United States v. Grier, 866 F.2d 908, 

935 (7th Cir. 1989), a proper use of that case demands that we pay 

attention to the full quotation therein. The Seventh Circuit 

case utilized by the majority states the law as I urge herein and 

which has been set forth in numerous cases of our own circuit. In 

Grier, the court said: 

"A district court's denial of a motion to suppress 

evidence will be affirmed on appeal unless it is 

clearly erroneous. We will rely on the district 

court's findings of fact absent a showing of clear 

error. This standard applies to the district 

court's findings on the credibility of witnesses, 

findings that will not be reversed unless clearly 

erroneous. 'A finding is "clearly erroneous" when 

although there is evidence to support it, the 

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with 

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been committed.' United States v. United States .. Gypsum co., 333 u.s. 364, 395, 68 s.ct. 525, 542, 

92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). 'Where there are two 

permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's 

choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.' 

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Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 38 
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 u.s. 564, 574, 105 

s.ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)." 

(Quoting United States v. D'Antoni, 856 F.2d 975, 978- 79 (7th Cir. 

1988)). Furthermore, I am not left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed by the trial judge as 

to his finding of voluntariness. In Lone Star Steel Co. v. United 

Mine Workers of America, 851 F.2d 1239, 1242 (lOth Cir. 1988), we 

applied the concept: "Where there are two permissible views of 

the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be 

clearly erroneous." (Citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 

u.s. 338, 342 (1949)). Obviously, there are at least two 

permissible views of the evidence. For these reasons, I would not 

overturn the trial court's findings that the consents and 

statements were voluntary. 

Furthermore, I cannot agree with the procedure used by the 

majority to effect its result. The majority chose to "take the 

bull by the horns," conduct a taint analysis, and suppress the 

evidence in this case. Such initiative is particularly 

inappropriate in this case. Based upon the cold slab of a 

transcript, different readers conjure entirely different 

scenarios. The trial judge, and only the trial judge, is in a 

position to discern the truth in a case like this. Resolution of 

the issue of voluntariness in this case turns on the credibility 

of the witnesses. Only the trial judge can assess the credibility 

-· of participants reliably. The majority does not even address 

whether the trial judge's findings are "clearly erroneous," and 

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Appellate Case: 88-1128 Document: 01019591597 Date Filed: 04/19/1989 Page: 39 
yet disregards the findings and renders an opposite result. With 

all due respect to my fellow appellate judges, there are times 

when we should "mind our own business," and this is one of those 

times. In my view, we should remand for further proceedings 

consistent with our holding as to the Payton violation. After the 

trial court is given an opportunity to assess the facts in light 

of the Payton violation, then, if the case returns to us, we 

should review the findings under the "clearly erroneous" standard 

of review. 

Citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), the majority 

footnotes the concept that "where the proceedings below 'resulted 

in a record of amply sufficient detail and depth from which the 

determination may be made,' the appellate court may conduct a 

taint analysis." Majority op. at 21 (quoting Brown, 422 u.s. at 

604). This is not~ case in which that procedure is appropriate. 

In Brown, the Court noted tha~ the illegality "had a quality of 

purposefulness. 

Brown, 422 U.S. 

The impropriety of the arrest was obvious " 

at 605. Remand in Brown would have resulted in 

mechanical disposition of the case. Such is not true in the 

instant case, and consequently I must dissent. 

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