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Parties Involved:
Clarence Edward Reed
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SEP 2 0 1980 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

CLARENCE EDWARD REED, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 89-5149 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-31-C) 

( N. D. Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District 

Judge.** 

Defendant-appellant Clarence Edward Reed was convicted by a 

jury of: 1) possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 

u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l), 2) being a felon in possession of firearms, 18 

u.s.c. § 922(g), 3) maintaining a place for the purpose of 

distributing controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 856 and 4) using 

firearms during a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior United States 

District Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

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' 

Reed appeals on three grounds. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. 

I. 

Reed argues that Tulsa police officers destroyed his 

relationship with his retained counsel, forcing her to withdraw 

from the case. Reed contends that this constituted a violation of 

his sixth amendment right to counsel. 

Tulsa police arrested Reed in March 1989. He originally was 

charged in state court with several drug and firearms offenses. 

Unable to post bond, Reed remained in custody after his arrest. 

Reed retained Tulsa attorney Sondra Houston. Subsequent to Reed's 

retention of counsel, he was taken from his cell and placed in a 

conference room with two Tulsa police officers and an ATF agent. 

The officers asked Reed a series of questions concerning his 

activity and suggested the possibility of a deal in exchange for 

his cooperation. Reed declined to answer the officers' questions 

and requested that his attorney be present during the 

interrogation. An officer telephoned Houston who immediately came 

to the jail and chastised the officers for speaking with her 

client in her absence. A rancorous exchange followed whereupon 

the interview was abruptly terminated. Reed testified that the 

AFT agent told him: "'Whatever kind of deal that we was going to 

give you ..• you just fucked up. Your attorney just fucked up. 

She blew it.'" Rec. vol. II at 12. Reed further testified that 

as he was being escorted back to his cell a city officer told him: 

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"'It's none of my business, but if I was you, I would get rid of 

that lawyer that you got, because she's just going to mess it up 

for you[.]'" Id. The officers' disparagement of Houston caused 

Reed to worry that Houston would be unable to provide effective 

representation. Houston worried that the incident had eroded 

Reed's confidence in her abilities and that she might be obliged 

to testify on Reed's behalf in a suppression hearing. Houston 

subsequently withdrew from the case. 

When a federal indictment was brought against Reed, the 

Federal Public Defender (FPD) served as counsel. Reed was 

satisfied with the FPD's representation. Id. at 37. Reed also 

acknowledged that he no longer believed that the interrogation 

incident had undermined Houston's ability to represent him 

effectively. Id. at 20. The district court found that no reason 

existed why Houston could not represent Reed effectively, had Reed 

elected to proceed with her as counsel. Id. at 85. 

The sixth amendment mandates that "[i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the 

Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. am. VI. This 

right promotes fairness in the adversary criminal process by 

"ensur[ing] that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). "[I]n 

evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, 'the appropriate inquiry 

focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused's 

relationship with his lawyer as such.'" Wheat v. United States, 

486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 

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U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984)). 

[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one's 

preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth 

Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to 

guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal 

defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will 

inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. 

Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. 

The district court found that although the officers' 

interrogation of Reed was manifestly improper, Houston's ability 

to represent her client was not compromised by the incident. 

After reviewing the record, we cannot say the district court was 

clearly erroneous in making this determination. Reed therefore 

was not effectively deprived of Houston's representation as a 

result of the interrogation incident. More importantly, the sixth 

amendment does not encompass Reed's right to be represented by 

Houston. Reed was represented adequately in federal court by the 

FPD and expressed confidence in the FPD's performance. In the 

absence of any showing of prejudice resulting from the FPD's 

representation, we decline to find a violation of the sixth 

amendment. The government's deliberate sabotage of the attorneyclient relationship may in some cases constitute prosecutorial 

misconduct sufficiently glaring to warrant dismissal of a criminal 

indictment. However, we cannot say on this record either that the 

police officers' conduct was sufficiently flagrant or that the 

relationship between Houston and Reed was compromised so as to 

require this draconian remedy. 

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II. 

Reed next contends that the search warrant executed on his 

home was based upon an affidavit which failed to establish 

probable cause. He therefore argues that the evidence seized from 

the home should have been suppressed. 

The drugs and firearms underlying Reed's conviction were 

seized pursuant to search warrant executed on a residence located 

at 512 East Seminole Place in Tulsa. Rec. vol. I doc. 6 ex. A. 

The affidavit supporting the search warrant was sworn by Tulsa 

Police Officer w. A. Yelton. Id. ex. B. The affidavit stated 

that, within the past 48 hours, Yelton was approached by a 

confidential informant who told him that cocaine was being sold 

from the Seminole Place residence. Yelton states that he and the 

informant went to the suspect residence. Yelton then searched the 

informant and found no money and contraband on his person. Yelton 

next gave the informant some money, watched him enter the 

residence and return a short time later. The informant had a 

small amount of cocaine. While the informant was in the 

residence, Yelton watched all exits and entrances; no one else was 

seen coming or going. 

The fourth amendment provides that "no warrant shall issue, 

but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 

or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "'Probable 

cause' .•• means less than evidence which would justify 

condemnation . It imports a seizure made under circumstances 

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which warrant suspicion." Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 

Cranch.) 339, 348 (1813) (Marshall, C.J.). The Supreme Court has 

adopted a "'totality of the circumstances'" approach to the 

"'common-sense practical question'" of probable cause. United 

States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 931 (10th Cir. 1990) 

(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)). In making 

a probable cause determination, "the evidence ... must be seen 

and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as 

understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." 

Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 

411, 418 (1981)). 

Affidavits "'are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst 

and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of 

elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have 

no proper place in this area.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting 

United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)). An 

affidavit must contain sufficient information to enable the 

magistrate to make an independent determination of probable cause, 

not just ratify the conclusions of the attesting officer. Gates, 

462 U.S. at 239. On the other hand, a magistrate's probable cause 

determination is entitled to considerable deference and courts 

scrutinizing the sufficiency of an affidavit should not conduct a 

de novo review. Id. at 236. 

Reed argues that because the Yelton's affidavit contained no 

explicit statement concerning the informant's credibility, the 

affidavit was insufficient to allow the magistrate to make an 

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independent probable cause determination. We decline to hold a 

policemen's affidavit to the standards of common law pleading. 

Yelton's belief that cocaine was being sold at the Seminole Place 

residence was not merely based on the speculations of a 

confidential informant; Yelton took affirmative steps to confirm 

these allegations. Although the affidavit never specifically 

speaks to the informant's credibility, such information is 

implicit in the fact that the informant apparently purchased drugs 

in the suspect residence at officer Yelton's direction. Under the 

totality of the circumstances, Yelton's affidavit contained 

sufficient information to enable the magistrate to make an 

independent finding of probable cause. 

III. 

Reed finally contends that there was insufficient evidence 

that he actually possessed the firearms and the guns. In 

reviewing this claim, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government inquiring whether a reasonable jury 

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on 

all elements of the charged offenses. See Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1979). 

The jury heard evidence that Reed and his wife rented a house 

on 512 East Seminole Place in Tulsa. In March 1989, police 

executed a search warrant on that house. Reed was found in the 

living room sitting on the couch. A loaded Colt revolver was on 

the couch next to Reed. Five other loaded handguns were found in 

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the immediate vicinity. Police found quantities of crack cocaine 

on the coffee table in front of the living room couch as well as 

scales, razor blades and drug paraphernalia. Altogether, sixtysix grams of cocaine with an estimated street value of $5,000 were 

found in the Seminole Place residence. This amount of cocaine was 

far more than one would possess for purely personal use. 

A person possesses cocaine when he exercises dominion and 

control over it. United States v. Savinovich, 845 F.2d 834, 837 

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943 (1988). A defendant's 

dominion over property in which contraband is found is strong 

circumstantial evidence of possession. See id. Similarly, one 

possesses a firearm when he exercises control over it. United 

States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1444 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1829 (1990). 

Here, large quantities of cocaine were found in a house 

rented by Reed. Much of the cocaine was found upon a coffee table 

adjacent to the couch upon which Reed was sitting. From this 

evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Reed exercised dominion and control over the cocaine 

within his house. A reasonable jury also could conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Reed exercised control over the pistol on 

the couch, as well as the guns in his immediate vicinity. Reed's 

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convictions therefore are supported by sufficient evidence. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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