Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03031/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03031-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Omaha
Appellee
Laura Kincaid
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Thomas D. Thalken, United States Magistrate Judge for the

District of Nebraska, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3031 

___________

Laura Kincaid, *

* 

Plaintiff-Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District of

* Nebraska.

City of Omaha, * 

*

Defendant-Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: March 8, 2004

 Filed: August 9, 2004

___________

Before RILEY, McMILLIAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Laura Kincaid (“Kincaid”) worked as a Detention Supervisor at the City of

Omaha jail. In 2000, she suffered a job-related injury that prevented her from

working. While on leave, Kincaid expressed interest in a promotion, which she did

not receive. She later returned to work and sustained another injury. After the City

of Omaha (“City”) again denied her the promotion, Kincaid filed this lawsuit, alleging

discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court1

 found that

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of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

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Kincaid made out a prima facie case of race and disability discrimination but failed

to offer evidence to rebut the City’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

employment actions. The district court therefore granted summary judgment in favor

of the City. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Kincaid, an African American, began working at the City jail in 1982 as a

Detention Technician I. She was promoted to Detention Technician II in 1990 and

to Detention Supervisor in 1996. In December 1999, Kincaid suffered a work-related

injury to her shoulder and wrist. She informed the City of her injury and sought

medical treatment from Dr. Gregory Hansen (“Dr. Hansen”), an orthopedic surgeon.

In January 2000, Dr. Hansen diagnosed Kincaid’s injury as “a clear

impingement syndrome with [a] possible rotator cuff tear.” (App. at 24.) Dr. Hansen

scheduled Kincaid for surgery and advised her not to do any work. After Kincaid’s

surgery on February 2, 2000, Dr. Hansen examined her once in February, twice in

March, and once in April. On each occasion, he advised Kincaid not to do any work,

not even sedentary tasks involving less than ten pounds of lifting. 

On May 19, 2000, Susan Riley (“Riley”), a Workers’ Compensation

Coordinator for the City, wrote Dr. Hansen a letter inquiring about Kincaid’s ability

to return to work. Riley stated, “[W]e are able to provide sedentary desk duty in a

controlled work environment in which Ms. Kincaid could sit, stand, or walk as

needed, and we can accommodate almost any restriction that would be necessary.”

(App. at 40.) In response, Dr. Hansen advised the City that Kincaid was unable to do

any work. Dr. Hansen reached the same conclusion after examining Kincaid on June

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2 and 13, 2000. Unable to work, Kincaid applied for leave under the Family and

Medical Leave Act. 

On June 29, 2000, while still out on leave and before she had received a work

release from Dr. Hansen, Kincaid emailed Deputy Chief Barbara Hauptman

(“Hauptman”) to find out whether there were any jobs available at the jail that did not

involve lifting, pulling, or potential confrontations with prisoners. Kincaid

specifically inquired about the position of Detention Manager. Unlike the Detention

Supervisor position, the Detention Manager position did not involve physical

confrontations with prisoners. Instead of dealing directly with prisoners, the

Detention Manager oversaw Detention Supervisors and Detention Technicians and

was responsible for budgeting and personnel matters. Hauptman informed Kincaid

that the current Detention Manager, Rick Powers (“Powers”), planned to resign soon.

Powers resigned on July 8, 2000. Thereafter, Kincaid again expressed an

interest in the Detention Manager position to Hauptman. Despite Kincaid’s interest,

the City appointed Morgan Larson (“Larson”) to temporarily fill the position. Larson

had five years of experience as a Detention Supervisor at the City jail and previously

worked as a lieutenant for the State Department of Corrections. 

 

On July 12, 2000, a Benefits Manager for the City, Paul Murphy (“Murphy”),

notified Kincaid that the City approved her June request for leave under the Family

and Medical Leave Act. He also advised Kincaid that she must present a “fitness for

duty certificate” before resuming employment with the City.

 

Kincaid did not receive a doctor’s release to return to work until September 12,

2000. At that time, Dr. Hansen restricted Kincaid to light-duty, sedentary positions

that did not involve a risk of physical confrontations with prisoners. Within two

weeks of her return to work in September 2000, Kincaid sustained another shoulder

injury for which surgery was required. She underwent surgery in October 2000 and

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continued to receive treatment from Dr. Hansen thereafter. Kincaid never returned

to work in the jail. 

On January 17, 2001, Kincaid applied for a Service Connected Disability

Pension. At her hearing before the pension board, Kincaid stated that Dr. Hansen had

not yet released her to perform even limited-duty jobs. Approximately one week

later, Kincaid obtained a letter from Dr. Hansen, in which Dr. Hansen stated that

Kincaid was not to return to work in the jail due to the risk of physical confrontations

and further injury. Shortly thereafter, the board granted Kincaid a disability pension.

 

Three days after Kincaid applied for her disability pension, the City hired

retired police Lieutenant Charles Benak (“Benak”) to replace Larson as the Detention

Manager. Like Kincaid, Benak is disabled and receives a disability pension. 

In March 2002, Kincaid filed the present lawsuit, claiming that the City failed

to promote her to the Detention Manager position because of her disability or race,

in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C § 1981, and Title VII. The City moved for

summary judgment on all counts. It challenged whether Kincaid had a qualifying

disability under the ADA, and it denied that its employment actions were motivated

by any discriminatory animus. 

The City offered several non-discriminatory reasons for its employment

actions. Omaha Police Chief Donald Carey (“Carey”) and Hauptman testified that the

City jail was in the process of being merged with the county jail when the Detention

Manager position first became available in July 2000. The City anticipated the

merger to take two to four years, and after its completion, the City planned to

eliminate the Detention Manager position. Due to the temporary nature of the

position, Carey and Hauptman did not believe a full-scale employee search was

warranted.

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The City also maintained that Kincaid was not considered for the Detention

Manager position in July 2000 or January 2001 because she had not presented a

doctor’s release when those positions were available. According to the City, standard

operating procedures required an injured employee to present a doctor’s release

before returning to work. The City’s Administrative Manual, which outlines the

standard operating procedures at the jail, provides that “[e]mployees who have a

doctor’s release for light duty . . . may be assigned to a limited duty position within

the department.” (App. at 200.) The City further noted that Benefits Manager

Murphy advised Kincaid that she must present a “fitness for duty certificate” prior to

being restored to employment. Carey and Hauptman both testified that they did not

consider Kincaid for the Detention Manager position because she failed to submit a

doctor’s release. Hauptman noted that at the time the City hired Benak, Kincaid was

seeking a disability pension from the City and had represented that she was unable

to do any work. 

Finally, Carey testified that he selected Benak because Benak was well suited

for the job. Carey believed that as a retired police lieutenant, Benak possessed a

unique combination of experience, ability, and knowledge of police operations that

would enable him to effectively manage the jail. Carey also thought Benak would

facilitate the merger of the City and county jails.

 

Kincaid did not dispute that the City and county jails were undergoing a

merger. Nevertheless, she maintained that the City’s proffered legitimate reasons for

hiring Larson and Benak were pretexts for unlawful discrimination. Kincaid claimed

she was qualified for the Detention Manager position because she had previously

performed that position on a temporary basis. Kincaid noted that Deputy Chief

Brenda Smith testified that she (Kincaid) was a good employee, that Hauptman

testified she should have been given an opportunity to interview for the Detention

Manager position, and that some key decision-makers provided no reasons why she

was not considered for the job. Kincaid further claimed that the decision to hire

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We have considered the evidence Kincaid presented in the original motion for

summary judgment as well as the additional evidence Kincaid presented in her motion

to reconsider. Because we agree with the district court that this evidence combined

is insufficient to survive summary judgment, we need not address the district court’s

alternative holding that Kincaid should not have been allowed to supplement the

record. 

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Benak had nothing to do with whether Kincaid had presented the City with a doctor’s

release. According to Kincaid, Police Captain Anthony Infantino (“Infantino”)

announced the hiring of Benak in September 2000—after Kincaid had been released

to work and before her second injury. 

 

The district court found that Kincaid made out prima facie cases of disability

and race discrimination, but held that she failed to show that the City’s proffered

legitimate reasons for its employment decisions were pretextual. It therefore granted

summary judgment in favor of the City on each count. Kincaid then filed a motion

for reconsideration, claiming that discovery conducted after the City filed its motion

for summary judgment created a triable issue on the question of pretext. In her

motion to reconsider, Kincaid moved to supplement the record with this additional

evidence. The district court found that Kincaid’s motion to supplement the record

should be denied but nevertheless proceeded to analyze Kincaid’s discrimination

claims in light of the newly offered evidence. The district court denied Kincaid’s

motion to reconsider, again finding that Kincaid failed to rebut the City’s legitimate

reasons for not promoting her.2

 

II. APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

This Court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.

Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173 F.3d 1076, 1085 (8th Cir. 1999). Summary

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judgment is appropriate if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, contains no questions of material fact and demonstrates that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The moving party bears

the burden of showing both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and an

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Once the moving party has

met its burden, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations of his pleadings,

but must set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a

genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

B. ADA

We analyze Kincaid’s ADA discrimination claim under the burden-shifting

framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See

Christopher v. Adam’s Mark Hotels, 137 F.3d 1069, 1071 (8th Cir. 1998). Under this

framework, Kincaid must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination based

upon a disability under the ADA. See id. 

“To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, [Kincaid] ‘must show

that she is disabled within the meaning of the Act; [that] she is qualified

to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable

accommodation; and [that] she suffered an adverse employment action

because of her disability.’” 

Id. at 1072 (alteration in original) (quoting Webb v. Mercy Hop., 102 F.3d 958, 959-

60 (8th Cir. 1996)). The burden then shifts to the City to proffer a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See id. Once the City

proffers such a reason, the burden shifts back to Kincaid to show that the City’s stated

reason is pretextual. See id. 

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At oral argument, Kincaid’s counsel argued that the City did not have a policy

requiring injured employees to submit a doctor’s release prior to reinstatement. Upon

further questioning from the Court regarding the City’s standard operating procedures

and the letter in which Murphy advised Kincaid that she must present a “fitness for

duty certificate” prior to resuming employment, Kincaid’s counsel argued that the

City required doctor’s releases only from employees who wished to be reinstated to

positions involving physical confrontations with prisoners. We find this argument

wholly unsupported by the record. 

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For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that Kincaid

established a prima facie case of disability discrimination. Our analysis focuses,

instead, on whether Kincaid presented sufficient evidence to rebut the City’s

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions. We find that

Kincaid failed to meet her burden. 

Carey and Hauptman asserted that Kincaid was not considered for the

Detention Manager position in July 2000 or January 2001 because she was out on

leave at those times and had not presented a doctor’s release to indicate that she was

able to return to work. The City claimed that standard operating procedures required

an injured employee to present a doctor’s release, or “fitness for duty certificate,”

prior to reinstatement. The City’s assertion and Carey and Hauptman’s testimony is

supported by the following written evidence in the record: the City’s Administrative

Manual, Riley’s letter to Dr. Hansen inquiring about Kincaid’s ability to return to

work and the City’s willingness to accommodate any necessary restrictions, and

Murphy’s letter advising Kincaid that she must present a “fitness for duty certificate”

prior to returning to work. 

Kincaid offered no evidence to rebut the City’s assertion that its standard

operating procedures required injured employees to present a doctor’s release prior

to reinstatement, nor did she offer evidence showing that the City applied this policy

more stringently to her than to other injured employees.3

 There is no dispute that

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Kincaid failed to present a doctor’s release to the City before it hired Larson. Indeed,

the record indicates that Dr. Hansen did not approve Kincaid to perform any work

until September 12, 2000—more than two months after the City hired Larson. Based

on these facts, no reasonable jury could find that the City’s selection of Larson over

Kincaid was motivated by discriminatory animus. The question remaining is whether

Kincaid presented sufficient evidence to rebut the City’s nondiscriminatory reasons

for selecting Benak.

The parties dispute when the City hired Benak. Kincaid claims that while she

was working during the two-week period between her injuries in September 2000,

Captain Infantino informed her and other employees that Benak received the

Detention Manager position. The City, on the other hand, claims it hired Benak after

Kincaid re-injured herself and went on leave the second time. Even assuming the

City made the decision to hire Benak in September 2000 when Kincaid was able to

work, we find that Kincaid failed to meet her burden under the third prong of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis.

Kincaid argues that the City’s discriminatory animus is evinced by the fact that

the City hired someone less qualified than her for the Detention Manager position.

Although an employer’s selection of a less qualified candidate “can support a finding

that the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for the hiring was pretextual,” it is the

employer’s role to “[i]dentify[] those strengths that constitute the best qualified

applicant.” Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1037-38 (8th Cir. 1997). This is so

because “the employment-discrimination laws have not vested in the federal courts

the authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness

of the business judgments made by employers, except to the extent that those

judgments involve intentional discrimination.” Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,

63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995).

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In this case, the City claimed that Benak, a retired police lieutenant, had a

unique set of skills that would facilitate the merger of the City and county jails and

allow him to manage the jail effectively. The City presented evidence that Benak had

a thorough knowledge of police operations, experience with budgets and mergers, and

an ability to work with City and county officials. Kincaid did not dispute Benak’s

abilities, nor did she dispute the fact that the City and county jails were being merged.

Instead, Kincaid maintained that she was more qualified than Benak because of her

experience as a Detention Supervisor and the fact that she had occasionally filled in

as the Detention Manager on previous occasions. 

Viewed in the light most favorable to Kincaid, the record showed that Kincaid

and Benak were both qualified for the Detention Manager position. However, to

support a finding of pretext, Kincaid must show that the City hired a less qualified

applicant. Duffy, 123 F.3d at 1037; cf. Lidge-Myrtil v. Deere & Co., 49 F.3d 1308,

1311 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Although [an employee] does possess the experience and some

of the other qualities essential for success in the position, this does not suffice to raise

an inference that [the employer’s] stated rationale for giving the position to another

is pretextual.”); Pierce v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 601, 604 (8th Cir. 1988) (“The mere

existence of comparable qualifications between two applicants, one black male and

one white female, alone does not raise an inference of racial discrimination.”). Based

on the record, no reasonable jury could find that Benak was less qualified than

Kincaid. 

In sum, the record shows that Kincaid was not available to work at the jail

when the City hired Larson and that Benak and Kincaid’s qualifications were, at

most, comparable. Because Kincaid offered insufficient evidence to rebut the

legitimate reasons the City offered for its employment decisions, we affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on Kincaid’s ADA claim. 

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C. Race Discrimination

We also analyze Kincaid’s racial discrimination claims under the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework. Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1056

(8th Cir. 1997) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies to Title VII

disparate treatment and § 1981 claims). Kincaid offered the same evidence of pretext

in support of her racial discrimination claims as she did with respect to her ADA

claim. As discussed above, this evidence is insufficient to rebut the legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons put forth by the City. We therefore affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on the racial discrimination

claims. 

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

______________________________

 

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