Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03169/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03169-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Carlton J. Watkins
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

Ualted Statel Court oTAJpe•ll Tenth Clreult 

JUN 07 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. No.95-3169 

CARLTON J. WATKINS, 

Defendants-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 93-CR-10083 

D. Blair Watson, Assistant United States Attorney, Wichita, Kansas (Randall K. Rathbun, 

United States Attorney, Wichita, Kansas on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Laura B. Shaneyfelt, Focht, Hughey & Calvert, Wichita, Kansas, (John E. Cowles, Law 

Office of John E. Cowles, Wichita, Kansas, on the brief) for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before PORFILIO, HOLLOWAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-3169 Document: 01019276477 Date Filed: 06/07/1996 Page: 1 
After a jury trial, defendant Carlton J. Watkins was found guilty of both 

conspiracy to distribute and distribution of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 

841(a)(l) and 846. Watkins appeals, claiming that the district court erred when it allowed 

the prosecution in its case-in-chief to present certain incriminating statements made by 

Watson to an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"). We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Watkins was charged in a superseding indictment with one count of conspiring to 

distribute and four counts of distributing crack cocaine. Watkins eventually entered into 

plea negotiations with Blair Watson, an Assistant United States Attorney. During a 

meeting on or about May 19, 1994, Watkins gave a proffer of the information that he 

could provide to the prosecution. Specifically, Watkins told Watson that he had 

distributed crack cocaine and also divulged the name of his source for the crack cocaine. 

The meeting was attended by Watkins and his attorney Richard Seaton, Watson, and a 

number of law enforcement personnel, including DEA Agent Darrell Pressnell. Watkins 

was informed that anything he said during that May 19th meeting was protected by Rule 

11 ofthe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

After evaluating the information that Watkins had provided during the May 19th 

meeting, Watson agreed to enter into a plea agreement with Watkins. A written plea 

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i 

agreement was subsequently entered into on June 6, 1994. That agreement specifically 

provided as follows: 

It is further understood that no information given by this defendant 

subsequent to and in response to this agreement will be used against him in 

any criminal case or criminal investigation, except ... if he violates any 

provision of this Plea Agreement, in which event it is specifically 

understood and agreed that all information given by him or derivatives, 

shall be admissible in evidence in any proceedings against him. 

Upon Watkins' entry into the plea agreement, the government arranged for him to be 

released to a halfway house in order to facilitate his cooperation. 

On June 7, 1994, after Watkins had already entered into the plea agreement, Agent 

Pressnell transported Watkins to the DEA office and debriefed him. Watkins was not 

represented by counsel at the June 7th meeting and was not told that his statements could 

be used against him. During the debriefing, Watkins repeated his earlier statement that he 

had sold crack cocaine and also identified the same source for the drugs that he had 

identified during the May 19th meeting. The following day, June 8, 1994, Watkins 

breached the plea agreement by escaping from the halfway house. 

After Watkins was apprehended, the government brought him to trial. Both before 

and at trial, Watkins objected to the introduction of all statements that he had made to law 

enforcement personnel during the May 19th and June 7th meetings. Although the district 

court suppressed the statements made during the May 19th meeting, it refused to block 

the admission of the statements made at the June 7th meeting. According to the district 

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court, Rule 11(e)(6) only applies to statements made during the plea negotiations process. 

Because the statements during the June 7th meeting were made after the plea agreement 

had already been reached, the district court held that Rule 11 (e)( 6) did not preclude their 

admission. Watkins appeals. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

ANALYSIS 

Watkins' appeal presents the following question: Are statements made by a 

criminal defendant pursuant to, but subsequent to the finalization of, a plea agreement 

entitled to protection under Rule 11(e)(6) ofthe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

Other circuits have considered this issue and conclude that they are not. 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, evidence of the 

following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the 

defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: 

(D) any statement made in the course of plea 

discussions with an attorney for the government which do not 

result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty 

later withdrawn. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6)(D). By its very terms, Rule 11(e)(6)(D) only excludes those 

statements which are made "in the course of plea discussions." !d. Furthermore, the 

policy underlying Rule 11(e)(6)(D) is ''to allow a defendant to freely negotiate without 

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• 

fear that statements will [later] be used against him." United States v. Knight, 867 F .2d 

1285, 1288 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 846 (1989); see also United States v. Lloyd, 

43 F.3d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Knight). Accordingly, both the language of, 

and the policy underlying, Rule ll(e)(6)(D) verify that once a plea agreement is reached, 

statements made thereafter are not entitled to the exclusionary protection of the Rule. 

Knight, 867 F.2d at 1288; Lloyd, 43 F.3d at 1186; United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 

685 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Gelestino v. United States, 445 U.S. 967 

(1980); United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708,731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 

(1978). Because the statements of Watkins at issue here were made after the plea 

agreement had already been finalized, they are not entitled to Rule ll(e)(6)(D)'s 

exclusionary protection. 1 

In an effort to distinguish Lloyd, Knight, Davis, and Stirling, Watkins asserts that 

the rule set out in those cases does not apply here because unlike the situation in the 

aforementioned cases, Watkins' June 7th statements are identical to the protected 

statements he made at the May 19th meeting. The mere fact that the statements made at 

the June 7th meeting were substantively identical to the statements made at the May 19th 

meeting does not mean that the June 7th statements are somehow covered by Rule 

ll(e)(6). As noted in Davis, the purpose of Rule ll(e)(6) is to foster free dialogue and 

1

In light of this determination that statements made by a criminal defendant after 

the finalization of a plea agreement are not entitled to protection under Rule 11 (e)( 6)(D), 

this court need not address Watkins' argument that Rule 11 protections cannot be waived. 

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encourage compromise in the plea negotiation process. 617 F.2d at 685. That purpose is 

not served by excluding statements made after a plea agreement has been reached. This is 

true whether the subsequent statements are the same as those made during the plea 

negotiations process or not. 

Finally, Watkins argues that the plea agreement itself prohibits the use of the 

statements made at the June 7th meeting. In support of his contention, Watkins points to 

language in the plea agreement providing that "[i]t is further understood that no 

information given by this defendant subsequent to and in response to this agreement will 

be used against him in any criminal case or investigation." Unfortunately, Watkins fails 

to note that the provision he cites does not apply if "he violates any provision of this Plea 

Agreement, in which event it is specifically understood and agreed that all information 

given by him or derivatives, shall be admissible in evidence in any proceedings against 

him." 

As indicated above, statements made after the plea agreement has been entered 

into are not entitled to protection under Rule 11(e)(6). Thus, the June 7th statements may 

be excluded only under the terms of the plea agreement. See Lloyd, 43 F.2d at 1185-86 

(discussing a plea provision similar to the one at issue here). The agreement, however, 

specifically provides that any statements Watkins might make after entering into the 

agreement are admissible if he breaches the agreement. Because the parties do not 

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.. 

dispute that Watkins breached the agreement when he left the halfway house, his 

statements at the June 7th meeting are admissible under the plea agreement. 

The judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. 

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