Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01418/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01418-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Camtek, Ltd.
Appellee
Rudolph Technologies, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Appellant

v.

CAMTEK, LTD.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1418

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 95/001,874.

______________________ 

Decided: December 22, 2016

______________________ 

 DANIEL W. MCDONALD, Merchant & Gould P.C., 

Minneapolis, MN, argued for appellant. Also represented 

by RACHEL C. HUGHEY, ROBERT A. KALINSKY. 

 DAVID LEON BILSKER, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & 

Sullivan, LLP, San Francisco, CA, argued for appellee. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, REYNA, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

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2 RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM.

Opinion dissenting-in-part filed by Circuit Judge

REYNA.

PER CURIAM.

Rudolph Technologies, Inc. (“Rudolph”) appeals an inter partes reexamination decision of the U.S. Patent and 

Trademark Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

(“Board”). The Board affirmed the examiner’s decision 

that rejected claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–11, 14, and 17–19 of 

U.S. Patent No. 7,729,528 (the “’528 patent”) as obvious. 

The Board rejected on new grounds claims 30–34 and 36 

of the ’528 patent as obvious. We reverse the Board’s 

rejection of claims 9–11 as obvious. We affirm the Board’s

obviousness determinations for claims 1–3, 6, 7, 14, and 

17-19 on original grounds as supported by substantial 

evidence. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Rudolph’s 

appeal as to the newly rejected claims. 

BACKGROUND

The ’528 patent describes systems and methods for inspecting substrates, such as silicon wafers, used to fabricate computer chips or “die.” A substrate can consist of an 

individual die, a plurality of die, one portion of an individual die, or portions of an individual die. See generally

claim 1. The claims are directed to using a visual inspection device for visually inputting multiple known good 

quality substrates and using a microprocessor to train the 

system and develop a model of a good quality wafer. ’528 

Patent col. 7 ll. 5–8, 13–16. The visual inspection device 

may be any type of camera capable of high-resolution 

imaging. Id. cols. 9–10 ll. 67–01. By creating a model 

from imaging multiple substrates, the model can be used 

to inspect substrates of unknown quality to distinguish 

good quality substrates from defective substrates. The 

inspection device accounts for color and other visual 

variations that could produce false negatives if a one-toCase: 15-1418 Document: 64-2 Page: 2 Filed: 12/22/2016
RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 3

one comparison is used. Id. col. 8, l.55–col. 9 l. 42, col. 14 

ll. 28–60. A gray scale is used for each pixel in the camera image, providing a value from 0 to 255 to indicate 

variation from pure black to pure white. Id. col. 14 ll. 47–

53. A mean may be determined from the pool of substrates. Id. col. 13 ll. 13–19, col. 14 ll. 47–49. Standard 

deviations of the gray scale value of each pixel may also 

be determined from the pool. Id. col. 14 ll. 54–60. Acceptable variations may be adjusted based on viewing 

additional substrates. Id. col. 14 ll. 28–67.

Once a model of a good quality wafer is developed, 

substrates of unknown quality are inspected by the inspection device in a single inspection phase. The unknown quality substrate images are compared to the 

model to determine their quality. Id. cols. 15–18 ll. 56–

21. If the model and the inspected substrate match, then 

the inspected substrate passes inspection; if they do not 

match, then the inspected substrate fails inspection. Id.

col. 7 l.54–col. 8 l. 15. 

The ’528 patent has 53 claims, with independent 

claims 1, 9, 14, 30, and 32 being relevant to this appeal. 

Claim 1 recites a “visual inspection device for visually 

inputting a plurality of known good quality substrates 

during training.” Claim 1 does not recite “training a 

model,” but the claim does reference “a microprocessor 

having processing and memory capabilities for developing 

a model of good quality substrate and comparing unknown quality substrates to the model.” 

Claim 9 recites “training a model as to parameters of 

a good substrate via optical viewing of multiple known 

good substrates” and “inspecting the unknown quality

substrates using the model.” Both claims 1 and 9 disclose 

the use of multiple substrates. 

Claim 14 recites “a controller for comparing pixel data 

for unknown quality substrates to a model of a good 

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4 RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

quality substrate.” Unlike claims 1 and 9, claim 14 does 

not disclose forming a model through multiple substrates. 

Also, claim 14 does not recite the “training” or “training a 

model” limitations. 

Claims 30 and 32 recite using at least two substrates 

to create a model. Claims 30 and 32 do not recite the 

“training” limitation.

All claims recite an “illuminator,” a method for “illuminating,” or a means for “illuminating” the substrate or 

a portion of the substrate during inspection. 

Prior Art References 

In the inter partes reexamination proceeding, the examiner relied on two references: U.S. Patent No. 

5,982,921 (“Alumot”) and U.S. Patent No. 5,298,963 

(“Moriya”). See, e.g., J.A. 4–5, 1290–1303. 

Alumot describes a system for inspecting individual 

die on semiconductor wafers. Alumot identifies defective 

die by comparing an inspected die to a reference pattern. 

Alumot teaches that inspection occurs in two phases and 

discloses that “it is contemplated, however, that the 

invention, or features thereof, could also be embodied in 

the apparatus which effects only the first examination or 

only the second examination.” J.A. 385. Alumot discloses 

that the reference pattern can be created using “at least 

one” reference: 

As also indicated above, during the Phase I examination (and also the Phase II examination), the 

pattern of one die D, serving as the inspected pattern, is compared with the light pattern of at least 

one other die, serving as the reference pattern, to 

determine the likelihood of a defect being present 

in the inspected pattern.

Alumot col. 8 ll. 37–43 (emphasis added). 

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RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 5

Alumot further teaches that a comparator (i.e., Comparator 77) receives data about the reference pattern from 

a memory storing data about the reference (i.e., Reference 

Die Memory 75) and data about the die under inspection. 

J.A. 341, 376. The comparator then compares the two 

data items to determine whether the die is potentially 

defective. The comparison is done pixel by pixel. J.A. 

341, 376. The reference image or pattern may therefore 

be a pattern on another like article (e.g., a die-to-die 

comparison), another like pattern on the same article 

(repetitive-pattern comparison), or data stored in a database (die-to-database comparison):

Instead of using, as a reference to be compared 

with the data derived from the inspected article, 

data generated from real images of another like 

article (in the die-to-die comparison), or of another 

like pattern on the same article (repetitive pattern

comparison), the reference data may be generated 

from simulated images derived from a database; 

such a comparison is called a die-to-database

comparison.

Alumot col. 27 ll. 45–51 (emphases added); see also J.A. 

1291. 

Moriya discloses another system for inspecting the 

surface of semiconductor wafers. J.A. 303–21. In particular, Moriya teaches using an illuminator to provide illumination to a moving substrate and a camera for 

capturing still images of the moving substrate during 

inspection of the substrate’s surface. See, e.g., Moriya col. 

4 ll. 32–40, col. 7 ll. 57–66, col. 8 ll. 22–38. 

Procedural History 

In 2012, Camtek Ltd. (“Camtek”) requested inter 

partes reexamination of the ’528 patent. The examiner 

rejected claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–11, 14, and 17–19 as obvious 

over Alumot in view of Moriya and rejected claims 30–34 

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6 RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

and 36 as anticipated by Alumot. J.A. 1290–1303. On 

appeal, the Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of 

claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–11, 14, and 17–19 as obvious. J.A. 10–

11. The Board further rejected claims 30–34 and 36 on 

new grounds as obvious over Alumot. J.A. 15–16, 19–21. 

The Board placed Rudolph on notice that the newly 

rejected claims were not final rejections. The Board 

advised Rudolph that it had to take further action if 

Rudolph wished to appeal the new grounds on which the 

obviousness decision was based: 

Under 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(b), our decision includes a 

new ground of rejection. That section provides 

that “a new ground of rejection . . . shall not be 

considered final for judicial review.” That section 

also provides that Patent Owner, WITHIN ONE 

MONTH FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, 

must exercise one of the following two options 

with respect to the new grounds of rejection to 

avoid termination of the appeal proceeding as to 

the rejected claims . . . .

J.A. 21 (emphasis in original). According to the 

Board’s instructions, Rudolph was required to either 

reopen prosecution or request a rehearing if it wished to 

appeal the new-grounds rejections. 

Rudolph appeals. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) and 35 U.S.C. § 141(b). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

During a reexamination proceeding, the presumption 

of patent validity does not apply, and a petitioner may 

prove obviousness invalidity by preponderant evidence. 

Q. I. Press Controls, B.V. v. Lee, 752 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014). A patentee can demonstrate error by showing 

that the Board either reached an incorrect conclusion on 

obviousness or based its obviousness determination on 

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RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 7

incorrect factual predicates. See In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 

1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

Obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a question of 

law based on underlying findings of fact. Flo Healthcare 

Sols., LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 

(citing cases). We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. See In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 

2004). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, and such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Ad 

Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 618 

F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 

During reexamination, the Board must construe

claims giving them their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. In re Rambus, Inc., 

753 F.3d 1253, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Board’s interpretation of disputed claim language must be reasonable. 

In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1997). When 

findings of fact extrinsic to the patent are not at issue, we 

review de novo the Board’s determination of the broadest 

reasonable interpretation of the claims. See Cuozzo Speed 

Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2134–35 (2016).

DISCUSSION

Rudolph appeals the Board’s decision that claims 1–3, 

6, 7, 9–11, 14, 17–19, 30–34, and 36 are obvious under 

35 U.S.C. § 103. Rudolph does not separately challenge 

the Board’s decision on the dependent claims. Therefore, 

we review the Board’s decision on the independent claims 

only. 

Independent Claims 1, 9, and 14

Rudolph’s primary argument concerns Alumot’s dieto-die comparison description, which discloses comparing 

the pattern of an inspected die to the pattern of “at least 

one” other die. Alumot col. 5 ll. 24–29; see also J.A. 9–11. 

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8 RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

Rudolph argues that the Board erred in interpreting “at 

least one” to mean either multiple one-to-one die comparisons or comparing multiple die patterns collectively. 

Rudolph argues that the Board erred in determining that 

both possibilities exist. Rudolph argues that the language 

“at least one” modifies the phrase “serving as the reference pattern,” which is singular and denotes only one-toone comparisons. Rudolph cites the following passage and 

contends that the phrase “at least one” discloses singular, 

not multiple, comparisons: 

In this manner, different dies on the same wafer 

are continuously scanned to produce the scattered 

light collected by the light collectors 42 (or 42’, 

FIGS. 6a–8a) so as to enable a die-by-die comparison to be made of each die, called the inspected 

die, with another die, called the reference die, to 

produce an indication of the probability of a defect 

in the inspected die.

Alumot col. 9 ll. 3–9. 

Rudolph also contends that Alumot does not disclose a 

model, training a model, or using a microprocessor for 

developing a model. Rudolph argues that Alumot’s die-todatabase comparison is not a model based on images from 

multiple substrates; rather, it is a purely theoretical 

disclosure based on mathematics. 

Rudolph suggests that Alumot criticizes as inefficient 

the inspection of patterned wafers using images of patterns, and that Alumot characterizes the use of substrate 

images for inspection as “extremely slow.” Alumot col. 1 l. 

34. 

Rudolph also argues that the Board failed to define

the level of ordinary skill in the art. 

Camtek responds that the Board’s conclusions on obviousness are supported by substantial evidence. Camtek 

argues that the Board’s analysis of the “at least one” 

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RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 9

language is consistent with the teaching of Alumot and 

comports with the understanding of a skilled artisan that 

the phrase contemplates using more than one die as a 

reference for comparisons. Camtek contends that Alumot’s reference-pattern disclosure corresponds to the

claimed “model” because the reference pattern is created 

using the intensities of individual pixels from an image of 

the reference die with a classification type for each pixel. 

Camtek also rejects the notion that Alumot teaches away 

from the use of imagery during die inspections. Finally, 

Camtek argues that Rudolph fails to show prejudice from 

any failure by the Board to define the level of ordinary 

skill in the art. 

Rudolph is correct with respect to claim 9. Claim 9 

requires “training a model as to parameters of a good 

substrate via optical viewing of multiple known good 

substrates.” ’528 patent col. 21 ll. 60–61.

It is undisputed that Alumot does not teach training a 

model using multiple known good substrates. Alumot 

merely states: “the pattern of one die D, serving as the 

inspected pattern, is compared with the light pattern of at 

least one other die, serving as the reference pattern.” 

Alumot col. 8 ll. 39–41. Even the Board found that “Alumot does not indicate clearly whether [its] multi-die 

comparison . . . involves (1) multiple one-to-one die comparisons as Patent Owner contends or (2) comparing 

multiple patterns collectively to an inspected die as 

Requestor contends.” J.A. 13. Nonetheless, the Board 

concluded, without any evidentiary support, that “skilled 

artisans would understand that there are only two possibilities to compare a die’s pattern with that of multiple 

other dies in Alumot: the comparison is either done individually on a die-by-die basis (i.e., multiple one-to-one 

comparisons) or collectively (i.e., plural-to-one comparison)” and, as such, Alumot renders obvious “training a 

model as to parameters of a good substrate via optical 

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10 RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

viewing of multiple known good substrates.” ’528 patent 

col. 21 ll. 60–61.

For the Board to have found that the “at least one 

other die” disclosure in Alumot suggests multiple-die 

comparison is one thing. But extrapolating this disclosure 

even further, to find that Alumot suggests training a 

composite model, is quite another, requiring more inferences than are justified considering the sum and substance of Alumot. “A factfinder should be aware, of 

course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and 

must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 

(2007) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 

(1966)). Indeed, one must “be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed 

invention without any explanation as to how or why the 

references would be [modified] to produce the claimed 

invention.” Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, 

Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 n.3 

(Fed. Cir. 2008)). Because the Board relied on no evidence for its determination that one of ordinary skill 

would have known of training a model using multiple dies 

as one of two ways to compare an inspected light pattern 

to that of “at least one other die,” substantial evidence 

does not support the factual findings underlying its obviousness conclusion for claim 9 and the claims depending 

from it. Accordingly, we find claim 9 not obvious over 

Alumot in view of Moriya.

Independent claims 1 and 14, however, do not require 

a single model to be trained using multiple dies. Claim 1 

refers to “inputting of a plurality of known good quality 

substrates having a user defined level of quality during 

training” and later provides for “developing a model,” but 

it leaves open the possibility that a model might be 

trained from a single known good substrate. ’528 patent 

col. 21 ll. 23–33. As the Board found, “multiple wafers 

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RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 11

are needed to train the system,” but not to train the 

model, for claim 1. A8. Similarly, claim 14 refers to a 

“model of a good quality substrate,” which could be prepared from a single known good substrate. ’528 patent 

col. 22 ll. 38–39. Accordingly, claims 1 and 14 and their 

dependent claims are rendered obvious.

We are not persuaded by Rudolph’s argument that the 

Board erred by failing to articulate the level of ordinary 

skill in the art. Failure to address the level of skill in the 

art is not error when the parties do not put such a determination at issue and when the level of an artisan’s skill 

is evident from the prior art and patent. While it is 

preferable that the fact finder specify the level of skill it 

has found to apply to the invention at issue, “the absence 

of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not 

give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself 

reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is 

not shown.’” Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 

(Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid 

State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see 

also Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 

807 F.2d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that the district 

court’s failure to make a specific finding as to the level of 

skill in the art is not reversible error when the failure did 

not influence the ultimate conclusion of obviousness). On 

the record evidence, we are satisfied that the patent and 

prior art reflect the appropriate level of skill. We also are 

not persuaded by Rudolph’s suggested teaching-away 

argument. Although Alumot characterized certain inspection systems as “extremely slow,” the Board did not 

err in concluding that skilled artisans would still consider 

using those inspection systems. 

We affirm the Board’s decision that claims 1–3, 6, 7, 

14, and 17–19 are obvious over the prior art, and reverse

the Board’s decision with respect to claims 9–11. 

Independent Claims 30 and 32

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12 RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

The Board rejected claims 30–34 and 36 on new 

grounds as obvious over Alumot. The Board placed Rudolph on notice that the newly rejected claims were not 

final rejections, citing 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(b). Camtek 

argues that we lack jurisdiction to review the newly 

rejected claims. Camtek contends that Rudolph was 

required to reopen prosecution or request a rehearing on 

the newly rejected claims, and that Rudolph failed to do 

so. Rudolph responds that review is proper because those 

claims were rejected for the same reasons as the other 

claims. Rudolph explains that a patent owner is required 

to reopen prosecution or request rehearing only under 

certain circumstances. For example, in reopening prosecution, the patent owner must present “either an amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence related to 

the claims so rejected, or both.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(b)(1). 

Rudolph asserts that because it does not seek to amend or 

submit new evidence, it was not required to reopen prosecution or request a rehearing. 

We agree with Camtek that review of the newly rejected claims is not properly before us. Under 37 C.F.R. 

§ 41.77(b), “[a]ny decision which includes a new ground of 

rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Id. § 41.77(b). Upon receiving a rejection on new grounds, the regulation directs 

the patentee to pursue one of two options within one 

month of the decision to “avoid termination of the appeal 

proceeding.” Id. § 41.77(b)(1)–(2). The regulation makes 

clear that the penalty for failing to pursue one of these 

two opinions is that the appeal will be terminated as to 

those newly rejected claims. 

Section 41.77(b) requires parties to either reopen 

prosecution or request rehearing to exhaust their administrative remedies. See, e.g., Acme Scale Co. v. LTS Scale 

Co., 615 F. App’x 673, 677–78 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Board

placed Rudolph on clear, express notice of this requirement and the consequences for failing to act. J.A. 21. 

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That Rudolph does not seek to amend or present new 

evidence does not absolve Rudolph from following procedural requirements for appealing newly rejected claims. 

The purpose of the regulation is fundamental. We have 

often said that only final agency determinations and court 

judgments are ripe for appeal. See Morris v. United 

States, 392 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Section 

41.77(b) permits review of decisions on new grounds only 

after the Board has received evidence or argument challenging the Board’s determination. To the extent Rudolph 

believed its argument and evidence made in connection 

with claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–11, 14, and 17–19 subsumed any 

additional argument it could have made as to claims 30–

34 and 36, Rudolph should have requested a rehearing 

and simply so stated. 

Rudolph’s appeal as to claims 30–34 and 36 is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION

The Board’s decision for claims 1–3, 6, 7, 14, and 17–

19 is correct and supported by substantial evidence. We 

affirm the Board’s decision on those claims. The Board’s 

finding of obviousness for claims 9–11 is not supported by 

substantial evidence, and we reverse the Board’s decision 

on those claims. We dismiss Rudolph’s appeal as to 

claims 30–34 and 36 because we lack jurisdiction to 

review the Board’s new grounds for rejection. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, 

AND DISMISSED-IN-PART

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Appellant

v.

CAMTEK, LTD.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1418

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 95/001,874.

______________________ 

REYNA, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.

I agree with the court’s opinion except with respect to 

claim 9 and the claims depending from it. For claim 9, 

the majority concludes that the Board’s determination of 

obviousness is unsupported by substantial evidence. I 

disagree. 

The Board found, based on the text of the Alumot reference, that “Alumot at least suggests . . . comparing 

multiple patterns collectively to an inspected die.” A10. 

Alumot specifically explains that the system compares 

“the inspected pattern” to “the light pattern of at least one 

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2 RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

other die, serving as the reference pattern.” (A374, 8:37–

43.) In my view, a POSITA would read the term “at least 

one” to include more than one: “at least” means that both 

exactly one die and multiple dies are possible.

Curiously, however, the majority claims that “the 

Board relied on no evidence for its determination that 

one of ordinary skill would have known of training a 

model using multiple dies as one of two ways to compare 

an inspected light pattern to that of at least one other 

die.” Maj. Op. 10 (emphasis added). The majority does not 

explain how or why the text from the Alumot reference 

does not count as evidentiary support, nor does it cite 

legal authority for that proposition. Indeed, a basic tenet 

of U.S. Patent law is that the text, diagrams, and figures 

of a prior art reference are evidence. See, e.g., Sakraida v. 

Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (listing prior patents and prior art publications as types of evidence in an 

obviousness inquiry); Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 

1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing the scope and content 

of the prior art references as substantial evidence in 

support of the Board’s determination of nonobviousness). 

The interpretation of such evidence results in factual 

findings. “Art can legitimately serve to document the 

knowledge that skilled artisans would bring to bear in 

reading the prior art identified as producing obviousness.” 

Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 

1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015). These factual findings can 

“include findings as to the scope and content of the prior 

art, the differences between the prior art and the claimed 

invention, the level of ordinary skill in the art, the presence or absence of a motivation to combine or modify with 

a reasonable expectation of success, and objective indicia 

of non-obviousness.” Id. at 1364.

The majority appears to concede that the Board’s finding that “Alumot suggests multiple-die comparison” was 

likely valid. Maj. Op. 10. The Board found that there are 

two ways to implement multiple-die comparison, “(1) 

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RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 3

multiple one-to-one die comparisons . . . or (2) comparing 

multiple patterns collectively to an inspected die,” and 

that Alumot is ambiguous as to which is used. A9–10. 

The second option, collective comparison, corresponds 

closely to training a model. The Board, citing the Alumot

specification as evidence, found that “Alumot at least 

suggests” the second alternative. A10. So perhaps in 

stating that there is no evidence, the majority meant that 

there is no evidence that speaks specifically to the fact 

that a POSITA might choose the second alternative 

suggested by Alumot. 

Even so, no such specific evidence is required. See 

Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1356 (even though only the prior art 

references themselves were presented, this was substantial evidence for the Board’s findings). The Board’s ultimate finding was that it would have been obvious to a

skilled artisan to train a model “using plural known good 

quality substrates.” A10. To get from a choice of two 

options, the second of which entails training a model, to 

actually training a model, a POSITA merely needs to 

make a simple binary decision. That choice is a small 

mental leap that the Board found the POSITA would 

make after reading the cited evidence in the patent. This 

finding, what a POSITA would have learned after reading 

the specification of the reference, is a factual finding. See 

Ariosa, 805 F.3d at 1365; cf. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 

550 U.S. 398, 400 (2007) (findings about the “specific 

understanding or principle” within a POSITA’s knowledge

are unnecessary). 

The majority errs in its belief that the standard of 

substantial evidence requires an express statement of the 

system rendered obvious or a specific explanation in 

evidence for how a POSITA would address every yes-or-no 

question. See, e.g., Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.p.A., 808 F.3d 

829, 834–35 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (making inferences from 

context of prior art references about what a POSITA 

would have understood); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 

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4 RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

1320 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding substantial evidence for a 

POSITA’s motivation to combine references even when 

there was no explicit teaching in the references suggesting that they be combined). Yet that is the evidentiary 

justification the majority seems to require of the Board. 

Substantial evidence is a deferential standard of review. “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, 

and such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Ad Hoc 

Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 618 F.3d 

1316, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Even 

when a reasonable fact-finder “could have found some 

facts differently,” the result “must be sustained if it is 

supported by substantial evidence on the record.” Apple 

Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (en banc) (upholding presumed fact findings based 

on substantial evidence). 

The Board’s factual finding is supported by substantial evidence. Here, a reasonable mind might have found 

Alumot’s suggestion that multiple known good dies be 

used as a reference as sufficient to support the idea that a 

POSITA might have built such a system by creating a 

model of those multiple known good dies. In fact, the 

reasonable minds at the Board came to this very conclusion. That the majority would have found otherwise is 

immaterial. 

“[A]s an appellate court, it is beyond our role to reweigh the evidence or consider what the record might 

have supported, or investigate potential arguments that 

were not meaningfully raised.” Apple, 839 F.3d at 1062. 

“Our review is limited to whether fact findings made and 

challenged on appeal are supported by substantial evidence in the record, and if so, whether those fact findings 

support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. 

Here, the majority errs in that it sets aside what the 

Board properly found to be “evidence” to find that there is 

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RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 5

“no evidence.” This is contrary to the standard of review 

of substantial evidence. A reasonable person reading 

Alumot could conclude that a skilled artisan reading the 

reference would think to try training a model of known 

good dies. For this reason, I dissent from the majority as 

to claim 9.

Case: 15-1418 Document: 64-2 Page: 18 Filed: 12/22/2016