Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03018/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03018-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mariseli Gomez Bell
Appellee
PNC Bank, National Association
Appellant

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-3018 

MARISELI GOMEZ BELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 12-C-1274 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MARCH 31, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 31, 2015 

____________________ 

Before KANNE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and 

SPRINGMANN, District Judge.

*

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Mariseli Gomez Bell alleged that 

her former employer, PNC Bank, failed to pay her overtime 

 

*The Honorable Theresa L. Springmann, of the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation. 

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2 No. 14-3018 

wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§§ 201–262, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1-

105/15 and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 

820 ILCS 115/1-115/15. Bell claims that the failure was not an 

isolated incident, but rather part of a policy or practice of 

PNC that affected many other employees. Consequently she 

successfully moved the district court to certify a class of 

plaintiffs. We affirm. 

I. 

The district court set forth an extensive and thorough recitation of the facts in this case, from which we borrow liberally. Bell worked as a senior banker at the PNC branch at 

Broadway and Berwyn Streets in Chicago from June 1, 2009, 

through May 31, 2011. Bell submitted an affidavit from 

which the district court extracted facts about her knowledge 

of PNC’s overtime policies and practices. R. 65, apx.1–7. In 

her affidavit, Bell states that she was evaluated, in part, on 

the basis of how many new accounts she brought into the 

bank, and in order to generate new accounts she needed to 

spend “significant” time outside of her regular work hours 

visiting prospective clients. Some of the assignments to visit 

prospective clients came from Greg Bolden, a PNC vice president who did not work at the Broadway and Berwyn 

branch. The overtime work was necessary, she asserted, because the branch was understaffed and could not spare her 

absence, including, at times, during her lunch breaks. 

According to Bell, when she submitted time cards reflecting overtime work, her branch manager, Letticia Flores, rejected the time cards and told Bell that PNC “would not 

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No. 14-3018 3

permit the overtime.” R. 65, apx.3.1 Flores also submitted an 

affidavit describing her personal knowledge of PNC’s overtime policies and practices. Flores is now deceased and cannot be cross-examined, but in her affidavit, Flores states that 

her supervisor, Christina Romis, a PNC regional manager, 

told her that “PNC would not permit [Flores] to report overtime for the branch,” and “PNC expected its employees to 

handle their outside-the-branch work on their own time, 

without reporting any extra hours that they worked.” Id., 

apx.10. Bell also averred that Romis told her that PNC 

“would not permit overtime to be reported by employees.” 

Id., apx.3. PNC, however, has always had written policies 

prohibiting off-the-clock work and requiring payment for 

overtime hours. 

In January 2011, Margaret Alvarez, an Employee Relations Investigator for PNC, contacted Bell to ask whether she 

had ever worked unpaid overtime hours, and Bell confirmed 

that she had. According to Bell, Alvarez told her that PNC 

“would not pay for hours that [Bell] could not support with 

documents.” Id., apx.4. On July 31, 2011, after Bell had resigned from PNC, she received an electronic deposit in her 

checking account for $1,392.89. Later, Bell learned through 

communications related to this litigation, that through this 

payment PNC intended to compensate her for 68.15 unpaid 

overtime hours. Bell believes that this payment is insufficient 

 

1 Citations are to the record cites from the district court. Due to various 

anomalies in the electronic docketing system and procedures regarding 

the unsealing of documents in this court, (see Seventh Circuit Operating 

Procedure 10(b)), the record does not appear in one location on our 

docket. Instead it appears at R. 11, 12, 13 and 20 in our docket. To avoid 

confusion, therefore, we cite to the district court record. 

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4 No. 14-3018 

to compensate her for the actual number of overtime hours 

she worked for PNC in 2009 and 2010. 

In addition to Bell’s and Flores’ affidavits, the district 

court considered PNC’s own investigation reports documenting complaints of unpaid overtime. The reports show 

that in addition to Bell, two other employees at the same 

branch complained that they were not paid for overtime 

hours that they worked. One employee, Ernest Ward, 

claimed that he was not paid for 45.61 hours of overtime and 

that he was discouraged from submitting overtime records. 

PNC’s investigation into Ward’s claims revealed that Flores 

did not want employees at her bank working overtime and, 

instead, offered Ward permission to leave work early on another day as compensation. R. 66, apx.276–77. After the investigation, PNC paid Ward for 50.18 hours of overtime. 

According to the PNC investigator, on July 3, 2013, PNC 

began to investigate whether Ward “enable[d] branch employees to falsify bank referral reports.” R. 73–1, pp.6–7. The 

next day, Ward filed a lawsuit against PNC for failure to pay 

overtime wages. See Ward v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 13 C 95 

(N.D. Ill., dismissed Sept. 25, 2014). PNC fired Ward on February 14, 2013. 

PNC’s investigation reports also show that another employee at Bell’s branch, Tess Claveria, claimed that Flores 

refused to allow overtime claims and instead directed 

Claveria to leave work early on a later day in an attempt to 

compensate Claveria for the overtime hours. Claveria also 

claimed that she was deprived of her full lunch hour on certain occasions. Claveria sought compensation for overtime 

hours, and PNC determined that it only owed her payment 

for 8.02 overtime hours. Alvarez stated that PNC’s analysis 

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No. 14-3018 5

of teller electronic journals, alarm codes, log-in and log-out 

reports, and payroll reports for the dates Claveria reported 

unpaid overtime or missed meal periods showed that 

Claveria provided inconsistent statements about the time 

she worked. On December 26, 2012, PNC began to investigate claims that Claveria “entered false information that enabled her to receive credit for unearned referrals and/or unearned incentive pay.” R. 73–1, p.6. Claveria opted into this 

lawsuit on January 23, 2013, and PNC fired her on February 

14, 2013. 

PNC eventually fired branch manager Flores as a result 

of its investigations into allegations of unpaid overtime. Bell 

testified that after Flores was fired, her new “manager [told 

Bell] that if [Bell] was working overtime to go ahead and report it.” R. 65, apx.53 (145:17–23). 

PNC produced all of its internal investigation reports detailing any direct or indirect complaints of unpaid overtime 

in Illinois for the relevant time period. The reports disclose 

that nearly ninety percent of PNC’s Illinois branches have 

never had any complaints about unpaid overtime. They also 

show that some employees at other branches complained to 

PNC Employee Relations that they worked overtime hours 

for which they were not paid. PNC produced a table compiling these complaints and listing any overtime compensation 

PNC paid as a result of its internal investigations. R. 65, 

apx.153–58. Bell’s counsel compared PNC’s table to the investigation reports themselves and created a list of complaints found in the investigation reports that were not included in PNC’s table, and a list of employees who worked 

overtime but were not paid. R. 65, apx.159–161. The district 

court reviewed PNC’s table, Bell’s counsel’s list, and the inCase: 14-3018 Document: 51 Filed: 08/31/2015 Pages: 36
6 No. 14-3018 

vestigation reports themselves and created a summary compilation of what the evidence revealed regarding complaints 

of unpaid overtime made by employees at each branch included in the class Bell seeks to certify. The district court 

compiled the following facts: 

• At the Algonquin branch, an employee alleged that he 

was not paid when he arrived early to work or when he 

traveled to customer locations to pass out flyers. R. 66, 

apx.302, apx.308–09. The employee also stated, however, 

that the branch manager had never told him not to record 

overtime. Id. p. apx.308. Other employees at the branch stated that the employee purposefully arrived to work early so 

he could leave early. Id. p. apx.309. PNC told the employee 

he would need to provide documentation for any time for 

which he had not been paid, and the employee agreed that 

he would provide this if he could. Id., apx.302. The employee 

was fired for other misconduct unrelated to recording time, 

id. at apx.301–03, and the employee never requested payment for unpaid hours. 

• At a Bloomington branch on Market Street & JC Parkway, an employee alleged that the branch manager planned 

to shift overtime hours to the following week to avoid paying overtime rates. R. 66, apx.314. PNC contacted the manager, and he denied having said that he intended to shift 

hours in this manner and promised to clarify with the 

branch staff that overtime hours would not be shifted. Id.

• At the Bolingbrook branch, a branch manager was informed that two employees had taken home information 

about new PNC products to study. When an employee noted 

that employees should receive overtime pay for such work, 

the branch manager said, “Bolingbrook does not have this 

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No. 14-3018 7

issue.” R. 66, apx.319–20. The manager was disciplined. Id., 

apx.321. The two employees did not request overtime pay, 

but PNC paid each of them an hour of overtime. R. 65, 

apx.155. Another employee stated that on rare occasions she 

did not record that she left work ten minutes late. R. 66, 

apx.328. PNC’s records do not reflect that this employee requested overtime compensation for this time or that PNC 

paid her any such compensation. 

• At the Buffalo Grove branch, several employees reported that the branch manager told employees that “PNC 

does not allow overtime and overtime would only be paid to 

employees who were deserving of it.” R. 66, apx.364. The 

manager also told employees to take extra paid vacation rather than paying overtime. Id. PNC investigated the manager, R. 66, apx.362, and paid seven employees a total of 148.45 

hours of overtime. R. 65, apx.154. 

• At the Carpentersville branch, an employee initially alleged that she had been denied a lunch break. The investigation revealed that the employee had formerly been allowed 

to take her lunch break late in the afternoon so she could 

pick up her son, but had been told she could no longer do 

this because it violated PNC policy. The employee confirmed that she was fully compensated for her lunch break 

and was not owed additional pay. R. 66, apx.418. 

• At a Chicago branch at 18th & Clark, an employee reported that her practice was to enter all of her time for the 

week at the beginning of the week and then adjust for any 

differences that occurred as the week progressed. R. 66, 

apx.424. She reported that on some occasions she worked 

past the time she had initially recorded but failed to adjust 

the time. Id. The employee stated that her branch manager 

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never advised her not to record all the time she worked. Id., 

apx.424–25. PNC investigated whether the employee was 

owed any additional pay and determined that she was not. 

R. 65, apx.154. 

• At a Chicago branch at 35th & State, an employee alleged that she worked through lunch breaks, but she also 

stated that she always recorded the time she worked, and 

she did not allege that PNC had failed to pay her overtime 

she was owed. R. 66, apx.438. PNC’s investigation revealed 

that the branch manager thought the employee was exempt 

from overtime pay, and the manager was issued a warning 

for this mistake. Id.

• At a Chicago branch at 87th & Cottage Grove, an employee reported that the branch manager “made [the employee] feel as though she was not allowed to enter overtime 

on her time card,” but “never specifically directed her not to 

enter overtime.” R. 66, apx.475. PNC fired the manager due 

to “extensive discrepancies in the time [the employee] entered as compared to the time she was logged into her computer” over a three-month period, and the manager was “ultimately responsible” for errant time reporting. Id. PNC paid 

the employee for 251.6 hours of overtime as a result of its investigation. R. 65, apx.154. PNC’s investigator’s notes also 

show that another employee alleged that her lunch breaks 

were frequently interrupted due to inadequate staffing. 

R. 66, apx.487. PNC’s records do not reflect that this employee’s allegations were addressed. 

• At a Chicago branch at LaSalle & Kinzie, the assistant 

branch manager reported that some employees had not reported overtime because “they may have been told there 

was ‘no overtime.’ ” R. 67, apx.545. One employee reported 

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No. 14-3018 9

that he did not always record his overtime because “he did 

not want the branch to incur overtime.” Id. Both employees 

stated that the branch manager communicated the importance of recording their time accurately, and no one had 

ever told them to enter time inaccurately. Id. Another employee consistently worked overtime and failed to record it, 

despite the manager telling the employee not to stay late and 

to accurately record his time if he did stay late. Id., apx.540. 

Alvarez states that this employee was paid for all hours 

worked. R. 73–1, p.7 (ID#1036), but PNC’s list of overtime 

paid does not show that the employee was paid. R. 65, 

apx.154. 

• At a Chicago branch in Lincoln Park, an employee 

admitted that she sometimes interrupted her lunch break to 

assist customers. She did not allege that she was owed unpaid overtime or that her supervisor required her to interrupt her lunch break. R. 67, apx.557. 

• At a Chicago branch at Madison & Leavitt, an employee admitted that he sometimes interrupted his lunch 

break to assist customers and would take additional lunch 

break time to compensate. He did not allege that he was 

owed unpaid overtime or that his supervisor required him 

to interrupt his lunch break. R. 67, apx.564. 

• At a Chicago branch at North & Homan, several employees stated that the branch manager had interrupted their 

lunch breaks. R. 67, apx.570–71. The manager was disciplined with a verbal warning. Id. at apx.571. None of the 

employees sought payment for unpaid off-the-clock hours, 

and PNC did not pay for any. R. 65, apx.157. 

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• At a Chicago branch at State & Huron, an employee 

alleged that he had not been paid for work he did at home. 

R. 67, apx.577. The employee was advised that he was not 

permitted to work at home without approval of his manager. 

Id. The employee was paid for 0.30 hours of overtime. R. 65, 

apx.154. 

• Bell cites hand written notes of PNC investigators and 

alleges that these notes show that in 2009 at the Downers 

Grove branch on 75th Street, “employees reported that management refused to permit employees to record time for 

work performed before the bank opened,” R. 64, p.5 (citing 

R. 67, apx.583–84, apx.588, apx.593), and that “[e]mployees 

were not paid for pre-shift work.” R. 64, p.7 (citing R. 67, 

apx.583–85). The district court, however, could not decipher 

the hand-written notes. Alvarez stated that the investigation 

at the Downers Grove branch did not involve an allegation 

of unpaid overtime, but rather allegations that employees 

were arriving to work late but recording their time as if they 

had arrived on time. R. 73–9, pp.8–9 (ID#1096-97). The district court noted that Alvarez did not cite any documents in 

the record to support these statements, nor did she explain 

why she would have personal knowledge of the investigation at the Downers Grove branch. 

• At the Elgin branch, an employee stated that “there 

used to be a rumor that the policy was if you had an outage 

and you did not find it you did not get paid for the time you 

took to look for the outage.” R. 67, apx.599. The employee 

described this as an “unofficial rule.” Id. The employee, 

however, also stated that he had recently attended a meeting 

at which a person from the PNC legal department explained 

that all overtime was to be paid. Id. The employee also stated 

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No. 14-3018 11

that he has always been paid overtime, despite the rumor of 

an unofficial policy. Another employee initially alleged that 

she thought the branch manager told her not to record overtime, but that she missed a meeting at which the manager 

instructed the employees to record all overtime accurately. 

Id., apx.599–600. The employee initially thought she was 

owed 200 hours of overtime pay but later clarified that she 

was owed less than $200 of overtime pay. Id., apx.600. The 

employee agreed that she was in fact owed 3.45 hours of 

overtime, id., and PNC paid this. R. 65, apx.154. 

• At the Fox Lake branch, an anonymous employee reported that the branch manager required employees to report to work five minutes early and not record that time. 

R. 67, apx.612–13. PNC investigators spoke with two other 

employees at the branch and they said that the manager had 

never given such an instruction. Id. No employees requested 

payment for unpaid overtime, and PNC did not pay for any. 

R. 65, apx.154. 

• At the Loves Park branch, several employees reported 

that a former branch manager instructed them not to record 

overtime, but that their current manager instructed them to 

report any overtime they worked. R. 67, apx.623. Alvarez 

stated that the Employee Relations department repeatedly 

asked the employees to report any overtime they were 

owed, but the employees failed to do so. R. 73–1 ¶ 46. 

• At the North Aurora branch, employees reported that 

the branch manager required them to arrive at work five 

minutes prior to the start of their shifts but not record these 

five minute periods. R. 67, apx.652–53. The manager was 

fired, id. at apx.653, and seven employees were each paid between 1.75 and 2.75 hours of overtime. R. 65, apx.155. 

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• At the Orland Park West branch, an employee was 

suspected of under-reporting her time. R. 67, apx.670. The 

employee admitted that she under-reported her time to hide 

her inability to work efficiently. Id., apx.670–71. PNC paid 

the employee 1.25 hours of overtime. R. 65, apx.155. 

• At the Park Ridge branch, an employee reported a single instance of her manager telling her to record a lunch 

break she did not take in order to avoid overtime and allow 

the employee to take an extra paid break the following week. 

R. 67, apx.676–77. PNC told the manager this violated PNC 

policy. Id., apx.677. The employee did not request payment 

for unpaid overtime, and PNC did not pay for any. R. 65, 

apx.157. 

• At a Rockford branch on Riverside Boulevard, an employee reported that the branch manager “requested” that 

employees take extra time off rather than report overtime. 

R. 67, apx.702. PNC investigators spoke with three employees at the branch and all three said they had never been instructed not to report overtime. One employee skipped 

lunches without the manager's knowledge, and PNC paid 

that employee 2.75 hours of overtime. R. 65, apx.154. Another employee alleged that the manager had asked him to 

complete reports at home without overtime pay, but the employee indicated that he refused to do so. R. 67, apx.693. 

• At the Schaumburg branch, in the course of a separate 

investigation, PNC learned that an employee had interrupted her lunch on several occasions to assist customers. R. 67, 

apx.714. PNC paid the employee 1 hour of overtime. R. 65, 

apx.155. Another employee stated that he also sometimes 

interrupted his lunch break to assist customers, but the employee stated that he would always complete his lunch break 

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No. 14-3018 13

at some point during the day. R. 67, apx.714. Both employees 

stated that the decision to interrupt their lunch breaks was 

their own. Id.

• At the West Aurora branch, during a review of the 

branch's records, the PNC Employee Relations investigator 

noticed that an employee had worked every day from March 

7, 2011, through March 18, 2011. R. 67, apx.726. The employee stated that “she thinks nothing of it if she comes into the 

branch to help out for a few minutes, and that she does not 

expect to get paid.” Id. at apx.725. The manager advised the 

employee that she must record all her time. Id. PNC’s investigation report notes that the employee would be paid overtime for the unreported time, R. 67, apx.725, but PNC’s list of 

overtime payments contains no record that the employee 

was paid. R. 65, apx.156. 

• At the Wheaton–Danada branch, two employees reported that the branch manager “reacted in a negative manner when they entered overtime on their time sheets.” R. 67, 

apx.738. Both employees also reported that “they had inaccurately recorded their time on a number of occasions in order to make it appear as though they had only worked 40 

hours per week.” Id. at apx.731. After an investigation into 

the amount of overtime pay PNC owed the two employees, 

PNC paid one employee for 39 hours of overtime and 27 additional hours of regular pay, and the other employee for 1.6 

hours of overtime and 1.6 additional hours of regular pay. 

R. 65, apx.154. 

In addition to the incidents recorded in PNC's investigation reports, Bell submitted an affidavit from James Cobb, a 

manager of PNC's DePaul branches, in which he states that 

he had borrowed “more than 37[PNC] employees ... from 

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14 No. 14-3018 

branches all over the Chicago region” to staff “table days,” 

which are PNC promotional events. R. 65, apx.14. Cobb attached to his affidavit a list of 37 employees he says he “borrowed.” R. 65, apx.15. Cobb learned that his spouse, Ernest 

Ward (who as the Court has already noted, filed a related 

suit against PNC), had worked for him during a table day 

but had not recorded this time on his time card at the 

Broadway and Berwyn branch where Ward worked. Cobb 

expressed concern to a PNC Employee Relations representative that he did not know whether the thirty-seven employees had been paid for their overtime through their branch 

offices. Cobb claimed that he was told to ignore the issue 

and that PNC would not investigate. Alvarez, on the other 

hand, testified that she talked to PNC payroll personnel who 

told her that all thirty-seven of the employees in question 

had been properly paid. Alvarez did not provide business 

records to support this assertion. And, at least according to 

Cobb’s affidavit, Ernest Ward was not paid for his overtime. 

PNC contends that it has a written overtime policy that 

explicitly requires payment of time and a half for any time 

worked over forty hours in any work week. It contends that 

pursuant to this policy, it “has paid overtime at every branch 

in the putative class every year during the class period.” 

R. 72, p.6. Specifically, according to Alvarez, “PNC has paid 

overtime to non-exempt branch employees at every branch 

in the putative class during each year from 2009 to October 

2013 for a total of $432,290.85 for approximately 17,673 hours 

of overtime.” R. 73–1, p.4, (ID#1031). Alvarez, however, did 

not submit or reference any business records to the district 

court to support this assertion nor did she explain how she 

had personal knowledge of those facts. The district court, 

therefore, did not consider those assertions. This may have 

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No. 14-3018 15

been an incorrect conclusion, as evidence given by affidavit 

could suffice to resolve disputes before deciding whether to 

certify a class. See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 

672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (For class certification purposes, a 

judge need not accept the plaintiff’s assertion that she met 

the requirements of Rule 23 as conclusive; instead “the judge 

would receive evidence (if only by affidavit) and resolve the 

disputes before deciding whether to certify the class.”). On 

the other hand, an affidavit must be based on personal 

knowledge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); Cocroft v. HSBC Bank 

USA, N.A., No. 14-1460, 2015 WL 4597537, at *4 (7th Cir. 

July 31, 2015). As we discuss in a moment, the burden is on 

the proposed plaintiff class to prove eligibility for class 

certification, and so the importance of the affidavit may not 

be significant. If the district court finds it necessary, it can 

explore the issue further upon remand. 

The district court also noted that even if PNC had business records to support Alvarez’s statements that PNC paid 

all of the overtime due, those records would not negate the 

evidence in the record that PNC’s management had denied 

compensation for overtime work on a number of occasions. 

The district court found that the evidence showed that PNC 

often paid overtime only after initially failing to do so. It 

then noted that if PNC willfully failed to pay overtime, PNC 

would be liable not merely for actual overtime wages, but 

also for additional damages under both Illinois law and the 

Fair Labor Standards Act. See 820 ILCS 105/12; 29 U.S.C. 

§§216, 260. 

Despite PNC’s alleged written policy and the evidence 

that PNC has paid some overtime and disciplined branch 

managers who had prevented employees from properly reCase: 14-3018 Document: 51 Filed: 08/31/2015 Pages: 36
16 No. 14-3018 

cording overtime, Bell contends that the evidence in the record demonstrates that PNC has an unofficial policy of frequently denying proper compensation to its non-exempt 

employees who have worked overtime. In the district court 

Bell argued that this evidence constituted a sufficient basis to 

certify a class that the plaintiff proposed as follows (in relevant part): 

All people residing in Illinois who: 

(a) Were employed by PNC Bank (or any of its 

predecessors) on a full-time basis at any point 

during the Class Period; 

(b) Were classified by PNC Bank as nonexempt from the overtime laws; and 

(c) Worked in one of the 27 Certified Branches. 

R. 63, p.2 (ID#929). 

Bell listed 27 branches at which she contended there was 

proof of an unofficial policy or practice of denying overtime. 

Id. at p.2-3 (ID#929-930); Order, p.13.2

Bell contended that the class-wide proceedings would resolve PNC’s liability for the following common questions: 

As a question of fact, did PNC Bank have an 

unofficial policy or practice that required employees class-wide to work off-the-clock overtime hours (that is, an unofficial policy or prac-

 

2 Bell initially sought to bring claims on behalf of a putative class of nonexempt employees of PNC’s Illinois retail bank branches. After a year of 

discovery, Bell moved under Rule 23 to certify a narrower class of all 

non-exempt employees at 27 Illinois branches of PNC. 

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No. 14-3018 17

tice that prohibited employees from reporting 

overtime hours)? 

As a question of fact, did PNC Bank have a 

policy or practice that PNC Bank investigations 

would not fairly lead to full pay for employees 

for overtime work? 

As a mixed question of law and fact, were 

those policies and practices unlawful and 

harmful to employees in the 27 Illinois branches that are in the class? 

As a matter of law, is PNC Bank’s written policy on overtime a defense? 

As a mixed question of law and fact, has the 

plaintiff shown that PNC Bank’s conduct was 

willful? 

As a mixed question of law and fact, has PNC 

Bank proven that its conduct was undertaken 

in good faith? 

As a question of fact, did PNC Bank’s conduct 

make it more difficult for class members to calculate the number of off-the-clock hours that 

they worked? 

As a mixed question of law and fact, when calculating overtime pay for class members, does 

the Fluctuating Workweek doctrine apply? 

R. 63, pp. 3–4 (ID#930-931). 

In the district court, PNC argued that (1) the class did not 

meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) requiring numerosity, 

commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation; 

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18 No. 14-3018 

(2) Bell could not demonstrate that common questions of law 

or fact predominated over individual claims as required by 

Rule 23(b)(3); (3) the class was insufficiently defined and 

(4) conditional certification of a collective action under the 

Fair Labor Standards Act was not warranted. 

The district court certified a class of employees from 

twenty-six PNC branches in Illinois, excluded employees 

from two proposed branches (the DePaul branch and the 

Naperville branch) and including, instead, employees from 

another branch (the Oak Park branch). The district court 

concluded that whether PNC has an unofficial policy or 

practice that requires employees to work off-the-clock overtime hours was a question common to the class. The court 

below also concluded that Bell’s proposed class met the requirements for numerosity, typicality, and adequacy of representation, and these conclusions are not contested on appeal. Finally, the court concluded that the common issues 

predominated over any individual questions. 

On appeal, PNC asks this court to address only the following two issues: 

(1) whether the district court abused its discretion in certifying a class without requiring the 

plaintiff to prove the existence of an unwritten 

policy to satisfy Rule 23’s commonality and 

predominance requirements, and 

(2) Whether the district court abused its discretion in certifying a class by treating individualized liability issues as damages issues. 

We address each of these in turn, keeping in mind that 

we review class certification orders for an abuse of discretion 

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No. 14-3018 19

which can occur when a district court commits legal error or 

makes clearly erroneous factual findings. Reliable Money Order, Inc. v. McKnight Sales Co., Inc., 704 F.3d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 

2013). Our review is deferential, but exacting: “A class may 

only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous 

analysis, that the prerequisites” for class certification have 

been met. CE Design, Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 

637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 2011). The party seeking certification bears the burden of demonstrating that certification is 

proper by a preponderance of the evidence. Messner v. 

Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 

2012). 

II. 

We addressed many of these same issues regarding 

commonality and predominance within the last few weeks 

in our decision in Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Bd. of Ed., 

No. 14-2843, 2015 WL 4667904 (7th Cir. August 7, 2015). We 

summarize our general explanation of class action requirements here, and refer the reader to that decision for a more 

nuanced and detailed discussion. Id. 

Because a class action is an exception to the usual rule 

that only a named party before the court can have her claims 

adjudicated, the class representative must be part of the class 

and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury. 

Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011); Chicago 

Teachers Union, 2015 WL 4667904, at *3. The general gatekeeping function of Federal Rule 23(a) ensures that a class 

format is an appropriate procedure for adjudicating a particular claim by requiring that the class meet the following 

requirements: 

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20 No. 14-3018 

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 

members is impracticable (numerosity); 

(2) there are questions of law or fact common 

to the class (commonality); 

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative 

parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 

the class (typicality); and 

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy of representation). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (parentheticals ours). 

In addition to meeting these requirements, the class must 

satisfy one of the four conditions in Rule 23(b). In this case, 

the plaintiffs sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3), the 

rule that applies to class actions when the purported class 

seeks monetary damages. Federal Rule 23(b)(3) allows for 

class certification when “questions of law or fact common to 

the class members predominate over any questions affecting 

individual members” and when a “class action is superior to 

other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 

A. Commonality 

Because Rule 23(a) provides a gate-keeping function for 

all class actions, ordinarily we would begin there and only 

turn our attention to Rule 23(b) after we were certain that all 

of Rule 23(a)’s requirements had been met. In this case, however, the question of commonality and predominance overlap in ways that make them difficult to analyze separately; 

consequently much of our discussion applies to both issues. 

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No. 14-3018 21

See Chicago Teachers Union, 2015 WL 4667904, at *13. Nevertheless, we focus first on teasing out the question of commonality. 

Although a court need only find a single common question of law or fact (Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556), the mere occurrence of all plaintiffs suffering as a result of a violation of 

the same provision of law is not enough. Id. at 2551; Chicago 

Teachers Union, 2015 WL 4667904, at *4. Suchanek v. Strum 

Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 2014). The claims must 

depend upon a common contention that is capable of classwide resolution. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551; Chicago Teachers 

Union, 2015 WL 4667904, at *4. In this context, class-wide 

resolution means that determining the truth or falsity of the 

common contention will resolve an issue that is central to 

the validity of each claim. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. The 

majority in Wal-Mart summed this up by stating: 

What matters to class certification ... is not the 

raising of common ‘questions'—even in 

droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide 

proceeding to generate common answers apt to 

drive the resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what 

have the potential to impede the generation of 

common answers. 

Id. at 2551 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). 

In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court emphasized that it was 

looking for “some glue holding the alleged reasons for all 

those decisions together, ... [such] that examination of all the 

class members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.” Id. at 2552 

(emphasis in original). 

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22 No. 14-3018 

Bell proposes that the common question is as follows: 

Did PNC have an unofficial policy or practice that required 

employees class-wide to work off-the-clock overtime hours? 

PNC argues that before the district court could properly certify a class based on the unofficial policy theory, Bell was required to actually prove—not merely allege—the existence 

of such a policy. In this sense, PNC seems to agree that the 

question posed is common to all parties. After all, commonality is satisfied when “determination of [the] truth or falsity 

will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one 

of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 

Why would the plaintiffs need to prove the truth of their allegation that PNC has an unofficial policy of refusing to pay 

overtime if it was not central to the validity of each one of 

the claims? PNC, however, alleges that the answer to this 

question will not resolve the question “in one stroke,” but 

we disagree for reasons we will explain below when we discuss the issue of predominance. And in fact, in a similar 

case, this Circuit has already concluded that a proposed class 

of bank employees maintained a common claim that the 

bank enforced an unlawful, unwritten policy of denying 

employees earned overtime compensation and that “[t]his 

unofficial policy is the common answer that potentially 

drives the resolution of this litigation.” Ross v. RBS Citizens, 

N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 909 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, judgment 

vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013).3 PNC argues that Ross can be 

 

3 On appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded the Ross decision. See RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Ross, 133 S. Ct. 1722 

(2013) (“Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in 

light of Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).”). The case settled 

before the Seventh Circuit could address the Supreme Court's order. See 

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No. 14-3018 23

distinguished because the “district court weighed the evidence and concluded that the plaintiffs had proven the existence of an unofficial policy.” PNC Brief, p.24 (emphasis in 

original). PNC does not cite to a particular page of the Ross

order to support this contention, and, in fact, the district 

court’s language in Ross suggests that the mounting evidence proved not that the bank had the policy, but that the 

common question would predominate over individual issues: 

The court concludes, however, that the number 

of people making the same allegations across 

branches, managers, positions, and time frames 

has reached a point from which it may be inferred 

that the common issue of whether a company-wide 

policy existed to deny overtime will predominate 

over the variations in methods used to accomplish the alleged policy. The complexity of 

proof is a problem plaintiffs will have to address in presenting their case on the merits but 

it does not negate predominance of the central, 

common issue. 

 

Tamas v. Family Video Movie Club, Inc., No. 11 C 1024, 2013 WL 4080649, at 

*6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2013). As the district court explained, the Supreme 

Court’s order, however, does not negate the precedential authority or 

persuasiveness of the holding and reasoning in Ross, as orders granting 

certiorari, vacating, and remanding are not reversals and do not indicate 

that the lower court’s decision was erroneous. See Order, pp.19-20, n.7. 

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24 No. 14-3018 

Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., No. 09-CV-5695, 2010 WL 3980113, 

at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2010) (emphasis ours), affirmed, 667 

F.3d 900 (2012). 

We need not spend too much time analyzing whether the 

district court in Ross did or did not come to a conclusion 

about the merits of the question, because our case law is 

clear that such proof is not required, only that it “is capable of 

proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.” Messner v. Northshore 

Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 818 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Cases in which low-level managers use their given discretion to make individual decisions without guidance from 

an overarching company policy do not satisfy commonality 

because the evidence varies from plaintiff to plaintiff. See 

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2553–55; Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 

688 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 2012). Bell, on the other hand, has 

offered evidence that the denial of overtime pay came from a 

broader company policy and not from the discretionary decisions of individual managers. Bell proffered evidence that 

she was told not to record overtime. Her branch manager, 

Letticia Flores submitted an affidavit that stated that PNC 

regularly required off-the-clock work. And at least one regional manager, Christina Romis, told branch managers not 

to record overtime worked by their employees. Moreover 

the court chronicled plentiful evidence suggesting that many 

employees worked overtime without proper compensation. 

We conclude therefore, that the question “Did PNC have 

an unofficial policy or practice that required employees 

class-wide to work off-the-clock overtime hours?” is indeed 

a common one that is capable of class-wide resolution. Our 

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No. 14-3018 25

discussion of predominance that follows will add further 

fodder to this conclusion. 

B. Predominance 

Even after a proposed class has met the requirements of 

Rule 23(a), however, a Rule 23(b)(3) class must also demonstrate that “questions of law or fact common to the class 

members predominate over any questions affecting individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). (The Rule 23(b)(3) requirement regarding superiority is not at issue in this appeal). The burden is on the plaintiffs to demonstrate, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that they have met each requirement of Rule 23. Messner, 669 F.3d at 811. 

To support its contention that Bell was required to actually prove—not merely allege—the existence of such a policy, 

PNC cites to the part of the Wal-Mart decision that states, 

that “a party seeking class certification ... must be prepared 

to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, 

common questions of law or fact, etc.” PNC Brief, p.17, citing

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (emphasis by PNC). 

PNC, however, has conflated two inquiries. A proposed 

class of plaintiffs must prove the existence of a common question, and one that predominates over individual questions, 

but it need not prove that the answer to that question will be 

resolved in its favor. On this point, the Supreme Court in 

Amgen could not have been more clear: “Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.” Amgen Inc. v. Ct. Ret. Plans and 

Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013). “[T]he office of a 

Rule 23(b)(3) certification ruling is not to adjudicate the case; 

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26 No. 14-3018 

rather, it is to select the method best suited to adjudication of 

the controversy fairly and efficiently.” Id. at 1191; Chicago 

Teachers Union, 2015 WL 4667904, at *14. The Seventh Circuit 

has been as unequivocally clear as the Supreme Court in 

Amgen, warning that “In conducting this analysis, the court 

should not turn the class certification proceedings into a 

dress rehearsal for the trial on the merits.” See Messner, 

669 F.3d at 811; See also Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 

(7th Cir. 2010); Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 677 

(7th Cir. 2009); Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 677 

(7th Cir. 2002). In sum, the proposed class must prove compliance with Rule 23, and need not prove the merits of the 

underlying common question. The very language of the quotations from the Supreme Court and this court upon which 

the plaintiff relies unequivocally support this notion. The 

court in Wal-Mart stated that, “A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with 

the Rule [23]—that is, he must be prepared to prove that 

there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common 

questions of law or fact, etc.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 

(emphasis ours). The language of our decision in Messner is 

the same: “[p]laintiffs bear the burden of showing that a 

proposed class satisfies the Rule 23 requirements. Messner, 

669 F.3d at 811. (emphasis ours). 

Thus, the default rule is that a court may not resolve merits questions at the class certification stage. “Rule 23 grants 

courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries 

at the certification stage. Merits questions may be considered 

to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant 

to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class 

certification are satisfied. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1194–95. See 

also Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 

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No. 14-3018 27

2407 (2014) (finding that price impact evidence “does not 

bear on the question of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3), 

and is thus appropriately considered only on the merits after 

the class has been certified.”); Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 685 (7th 

Cir. 2010) (“a court may take a peek at the merits before certifying a class, ... [but] this peek must be limited to those aspects of the merits that affect the decisions essential under 

Rule 23.”). 

This does not mean, however, that on issues affecting 

class certification, a court must simply assume the truth of 

the matters as asserted by the plaintiff. If there are material 

factual disputes that bear on the requirements for class certification, the court must “receive evidence if only by affidavit and resolve the disputes before deciding whether to 

certify the class.” Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 

672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001). And so, for example, a judge might 

need to determine if a class really has 10,000 members as a 

plaintiff alleges or only 10, as alleged by defendants. Id. This 

is what the Wal-Mart court meant when it said that Rule 23 

“does not set forth a mere pleading standard.” Wal-Mart,

131 S. Ct. at 2551. Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that 

a proposed class satisfies the Rule 23 requirements, but they 

need not make that showing to a degree of absolute certainty. Messner, 669 F.3d at 811. 

In other words, a court weighing class certification must 

walk a balance between evaluating evidence to determine 

whether a common question exists and predominates, without weighing that evidence to determine whether the plaintiff class will ultimately prevail on the merits. The distinction 

between proving evidence of a common question that predominates and proving evidence of the merits can be 

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28 No. 14-3018 

demonstrated by comparing two opinions from this Circuit. 

In Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 

2003), the plaintiffs proposed a common question as to 

whether the defendant leaked chemicals in violation of law, 

and whether those chemicals reached the soil and groundwater beneath the homes of the class members. The plaintiffs 

in that case presented a theory backed by credible evidence 

that there was a single source of contamination by a single 

defendant and the claim was that a container containing 

harmful chemicals leaked and contaminated the water supply, thus harming the plaintiffs. Id. at 911. The plaintiffs did 

not prove that the container leaked, nor that the ground water was contaminated, but rather presented sufficient evidence of a theory that was common to the class and predominated over individual issues. Id. at 911–12. In contrast, in 

Parko, property owners attempted to certify a class of homeowners who claimed that the groundwater under their 

homes had been contaminated by chemicals from a particular defendant and its predecessors and subsidiaries. Parko v. 

Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1084 (7th Cir. 2014). But unlike in 

Mejdrech, the plaintiffs did not set forth any evidence that 

any particular defendant was the source of the pollution, 

that the groundwater was even polluted, that it provided a 

source of water for the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs experienced any diminution in property value. Id. at 1085–86. In 

other words, it was “not even clear that the plaintiffs had 

identified a common issue.” Id. at 1086 (emphasis in original). 

In this case the district court sifted through voluminous 

evidence that pointed to a common question as to whether 

PNC had an unwritten practice or policy that required employees class-wide to work off-the-clock overtime hours. In 

fact, the district court went so far as to lean toward an analyCase: 14-3018 Document: 51 Filed: 08/31/2015 Pages: 36
No. 14-3018 29

sis of the merits stating that “there is evidence in the record 

to the contrary [of PNC’s claim] that supports Bell’s contention that PNC has an ‘unofficial policy or practice that required employees class-wide to work off-the-clock overtime 

hours.’” Order, p.17. Bell and Flores both stated that Christina Romis, a PNC regional manager, told them that PNC had 

a policy against paying for overtime work. R. 65, apx.3, 10. 

PNC’s investigation reports reveal that employees from at 

least six other branches alleged that their managers told 

them that PNC had an unofficial policy against compensating overtime work. See R. 66, apx.364 (Buffalo Grove); R. 67, 

apx.599 (Elgin); R. 66, apx.475 (87th & Cottage Grove); R. 67, 

apx.623 (Loves Park); R. 67, apx.652–53 (North Aurora); R. 

67, apx.738, 731 (Wheaton–Danada). 

PNC makes a convincing argument that the answer to 

Bell’s alleged common question will not resolve a key issue 

for all plaintiffs. PNC asserts that if the answer to the question “Does PNC have an unofficial policy of denying overtime pay?” is “no,” then over 250 employees at 26 different 

branches are left with nothing in common and each class 

member must prove his or her claim individually. As the 

court noted in Amgen, a common question predominates 

over individual claims if “a failure of proof on the [common 

question] would end the case” and the whole class “will 

prevail or fail in unison.” Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191. And, in 

the context of commonality, the Wal-Mart court stated that a 

common question is one in which the answer to the question 

“will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each 

one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 131 at 2551. 

If, to make a prima facie showing on a given 

question, the members of a proposed class will 

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30 No. 14-3018 

need to present evidence that varies from 

member to member, then it is an individual 

question. If the same evidence will suffice for 

each member to make a prima facie showing, 

then it becomes a common question. 

Messner, 669 F.3d at 815. 

PNC argues that if a court determines that PNC does not, 

in fact, have the alleged unwritten policy, then “resolution of 

that issue would have no bearing whatsoever on these individual claims.” (PNC reply brief, p.12). Each class member 

who chooses to bring a claim for unpaid overtime, PNC argues, would still be required to prove each element of the 

off-the-clock claim: that they worked overtime, that their 

manager knew or had reason to know of the work, and that 

it caused them to work more than 40 hours in a week. 

PNC, however, misunderstands the nature of the proposed class’ claim. The class’ claim is that they have been 

denied overtime pay because of an unofficial policy that either prohibited or discouraged PNC employees from seeking overtime pay. If, on the merits, the district court were to 

determine that there was no such unofficial policy (and indeed it is possible, as we make no contentions about the prospects of victory on the merits, see Chicago Teachers Union, 

2015 WL 4667904, at *14) then all of the class members’ 

claims would fail in unison. They may have an individual 

claim that remains, but it would be based on an entirely different legal theory. Instead, the individual claim would be 

one by individual Employee A alleging that her manager, 

Manager B, forced her to work off-the-clock without pay. 

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No. 14-3018 31

Thus the class claim that PNC had an unofficial policy 

that left it liable under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Illinois law would prevail or fail for the class as a whole. “In no 

event will the individual circumstances of particular class 

members bear on the inquiry.” Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191. It 

makes no difference to the class claim as a whole how many 

hours of off-the-clock work each employee worked or the 

intent of the manager. These would be issues for the portion 

of the suit in which individual damages are assessed—an 

issue we will discuss below. In other words, “[a] failure of 

proof on the common question ... ends the litigation and thus 

will never cause individual questions of reliance or anything 

else to overwhelm questions common to the class.” Amgen, 

133 S. Ct. at 1196. 

It is true that the alleged violations were eventually 

“cured” for many employees—in many cases PNC eventually paid employees for overtime work, or disciplined or terminated non-complying managers. But PNC’s efforts to cure 

errors does not resolve all of the questions regarding liability. Even when cured, the evidence could leave a court resolving the case on the merits to resolve whether (a) the efforts to cure were necessary because of a previous unwritten 

policy, (b) a good faith violation absolved PNC of liability, 

(3) the violations were willful and thus exposed PNC to 

greater liability, (4) PNC’s written policy is a defense. 

The rules for class certification work as well in PNC’s favor as they do in Bell’s. Class certification “provides a single 

proceeding in which to determine the merits of the plaintiffs’ 

claims, and therefore protects the defendant from inconsistent adjudications.” 5 Moore's Federal Practice §23.02 

(1999). If the district court finds that PNC did not have the 

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32 No. 14-3018 

alleged unwritten policy, then all of the plaintiffs’ claims fail 

and the class would be decertified. 

This is not an unknown process. When the class is decertified, the suit becomes an individual action, leaving the individual plaintiffs to file their claims on their own. See, e.g., 

Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 913–14 (7th Cir. 

2002). Rule 23(e) which requires that notice of a proposed 

dismissal be given to all members of the class anticipates just 

such a scenario so that class members know that the statute 

of limitations, that had been tolled during the pendency of 

the class action, will begin running again. Id. at 914. 

C. Individualized relief 

The fact that the plaintiffs might require individualized 

relief or not share all questions in common does not preclude certification of a class. Chicago Teachers Union, 2015 WL 

4667904, at *11; In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 

757 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2014) (commonality of damages is 

not required in class action suit); Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 

F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010) (the need for individual proof 

alone does not necessarily preclude class certification); Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 801 (7th Cir. 2008); Allen v. Int’l 

Truck and Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 471–72 (7th Cir. 2004). 

Rule 23(b) requires only common evidence and common 

methodology, not common results. Messner, 669 F.3d 802. 

“Neither Rule 23 nor any gloss that decided cases have added to it requires that every question be common. It is routine 

in class actions to have a final phase in which individualized 

proof must be submitted.” Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 756. See also

Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Employee Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 

364, 369 (7th Cir. 2012) (In a 23(b)(2) class action, “a declaration is a permissible prelude to a claim for damages.”). 

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No. 14-3018 33

If the class prevails in demonstrating that PNC had an 

unofficial policy or practice that required employees classwide to work off-the-clock overtime hours, scores of separate trials might be necessary to determine which class 

members were actually adversely affected by the policy and 

if they were, what loss each class member sustained. At least 

it will not be necessary in each of those trials to determine 

whether PNC had an illegal policy of denying pay for offthe-clock work. This is precisely parallel to our conclusion in 

McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 

672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[S]hould the claim of disparate impact prevail in the class-wide proceeding, hundreds of separate trials may be necessary to determine which 

class members were actually adversely affected by one or 

both of the practices and if so what loss each class member 

sustained ... But at least it wouldn’t be necessary in each of 

those trials to determine whether the challenged practices 

were unlawful.”) See also Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 

668 F.3d 481, 505–06 (7th Cir. 2012) (Rovner, J. dissenting) 

(describing a second step process in class action litigation in 

which adversarial proceedings were held to determine 

which potential class members had been harmed by an illegal employment rule). 

If the district court finds that PNC has an official policy 

of denying overtime pay, it is likely that a certain number of 

class members were not harmed by the policy because they 

never worked beyond their forty-hour week. This alone does 

not preclude class certification. Plaintiffs need not prove that 

every member of the proposed class has been harmed before 

the class can be certified. Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 757. A class 

will often include persons who have not been injured by the 

defendant's conduct, but this possibility or, indeed inevitaCase: 14-3018 Document: 51 Filed: 08/31/2015 Pages: 36
34 No. 14-3018 

bility, does not preclude class certification. Kohen, 571 F.3d at 

677 (7th Cir. 2009). “If very few members of the class were 

harmed, that is an argument not for refusing to certify the 

class but for certifying it and then entering a judgment that 

would largely exonerate” the defendant. Suchanek, 764 F.3d 

at 757–58 (internal citations omitted). “If, however, a class is 

defined so broadly as to include a great number of members 

who for some reason could not have been harmed by the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, the class is defined too 

broadly to permit certification.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 824. The 

important distinction then is “between class members who 

were not harmed and those who could not have been 

harmed.” Id. at 825. For example, in this case, managerial 

employees who are exempt from overtime hour laws could 

not have been harmed by the policy. Those employees who 

could have been harmed by the policy, but were, in fact, not 

harmed, can be excluded during a later determination on the 

merits. 

For example, as described in Jamie S., after this court declared that United Airlines “no married female flight attendant” rule violated Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination, 

any woman who had lost her position because of the rule 

became entitled to relief. But these class members were difficult to identify. Many had silently resigned their positions in 

contemplation of the rule rather than formally protesting or 

waiting for the airline to discharge them, so there was no 

record as to why any particular female flight attendant left. 

Consequently, adversarial hearings were held before special 

masters in order to establish whether each claimant in fact 

left her position because of the illegal rule. See Jamie S., 

668 F.3d at 505–06 (Rovner, J. dissenting) (describing facts 

and processes from McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 

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No. 14-3018 35

F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1978) and Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 

444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971)). 

PNC assumes that Rule 23 requires every class action to 

resolve all liability issues for every class member. “Rule 

23(b)(3), however, does not require a plaintiff seeking class 

certification to prove that each element of her claim is susceptible to classwide proof.” Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1196. And 

our cases demonstrate that commonality as to every issue is 

not required for class certification. In Suchanek, we determined that the question as to whether coffee packaging misled consumers was common despite the fact that individual 

consumers saw different packaging and may have been 

harmed to varying extents or not at all. Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 

757. In IKO, we upheld certification of a class despite the fact 

that different plaintiffs had different experiences with the 

sub-standard roofing tiles. IKO, 757 F.3d at 601–02. And in 

Pella, we certified a class despite the fact that plaintiffs’ experiences with defective Pella windows may have been caused 

by many individual variances such as specific conditions 

and installation, noting that the fact that class members still 

must prove individual issues of causation and damages 

would not prevent class certification. Pella Corp., 606 F.3d at 

394. 

It is true that some employees have been made whole as 

a result of the PNC investigation. It is entirely possible, 

however, that these employees were still injured and could 

collect damages beyond their actual wages. Under both Illinois law and the Fair Labor Standards Act, a good faith violation does not absolve the employer of liability. 820 ILCS 

105/12; 29 U.S.C. §§216, 260. Nor does an agreement between 

the employee and the employer to work for less than the reCase: 14-3018 Document: 51 Filed: 08/31/2015 Pages: 36
36 No. 14-3018 

quired wage. 820 ILCS 105/12(a). Both Illinois law and the 

Fair Labor Standards Act distinguish between willful violations and violations made in good faith for purposes of determining the extent of an employer’s liability. 820 ILCS 

105/12; 29 U.S.C. §§216, 260. Whether or not PNC had an unlawful policy denying required compensation is relevant to 

whether PNC willfully denied overtime pay to its employees, or whether such denials occurred despite a good faith 

attempt to comply with the statute. These questions are, in 

turn, relevant to the extent of damages under Illinois law 

and the Fair Labor Standards Act. See 820 ILCS 105/12; 

29 U.S.C. §§216, 260. In short, many issues remain unanswered and the district court was correct to conclude that a 

class action would be an appropriate and efficient pathway 

to resolution. 

The district court properly considered each of the issues 

and did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class. The 

decision of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED. 

Case: 14-3018 Document: 51 Filed: 08/31/2015 Pages: 36