Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06152/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06152-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Lee Barnes
Appellant
Stephen W. Kaiser
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

·r enth Circuit 

NOV 3 0 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

DONALD LEE BARNES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

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) 

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v. No. 90-6152 

STEPHEN W. KAISER, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

(D. C. No. CIV-90-301-A) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App . P . 

34(1); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Mr. Barnes is an inmate serving a ten-year sentence following 

his guilty plea to a drug charge after being convicted of three 

prior felonies. 

* be 

for 

res 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6152 Document: 010110093915 Date Filed: 11/30/1990 Page: 1 
Mr. Barnes filed his pro se petition for habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2254 in the United States District Court 

wherein he alleged two grounds for relief: "The Use of the 

Belatedly Entered 3rd Prior Felony Conviction Should Have Been 

Charged In The Preliminary Complaint. (2) Sentence Imposed in 

CRF-87-6665 is an Illegal Sentence." The district court, in a 

well-written and thorough opinion and order, denied relief, 

finding that Mr. Barnes had entered a knowing, intelligent and 

voluntary guilty plea to the crime set forth in the amended 

information and further concluded that the ten-year sentence was 

within the range of punishment. 

Mr. Barnes appeals this decision, prose, setting forth the 

same two issues and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

We grant Mr. Barnes permission to proceed in forma pauperis 

and having done so we affirm the decision of the district court 

for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district 

court's Opinion and Order, which was dated April 6, 1990. A copy 

thereof is attached hereto. 

In his brief to this court, Mr. Barnes raises an issue that 

was neither contained in his petition to the district court nor 

otherwise presented to the district court. He believes that he 

was sentenced under Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § Sl(B), which carries a 

sentencing range of ten years to life and he should have been 

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Appellate Case: 90-6152 Document: 010110093915 Date Filed: 11/30/1990 Page: 2 
sentenced under Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-40l(C), which carries a 

sentencing range of twenty years to life. He now argues that 

because of this error in state law he is not eligible for time off 

his sentence under Oklahoma's Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers 

Act, Okla. Stat. tit 57, § 573. 

The record on appeal fails to show under what provision of 

Oklahoma law Mr. Barnes was sentenced and further fails to show 

whether or not an emergency has been declared by the Governor of 

Oklahoma, which is necessary to trigger the provisions of this 

Act. This lack of information illustrates one of the reasons why 

this court will not consider an issue that was not presented to 

the trial court. We do not address this issue. 

A certificate of probable cause is denied. 

AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 90-6152 Document: 010110093915 Date Filed: 11/30/1990 Page: 3 
.. 

IN THE UNfTED STATES D(STRlCT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DlSTRlCT OF OKLAHOMA Fl LED 

APR O 6 90 

ROBERT 0. DENNIS 

DONALD LEE BARNES, ) 

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) 

) 

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CU:Rl(, U.S. DISTRICT COU k i 

WEST~ Dl~TRICT Of OKI.AH.., .. . ,, 

BY DEPUTY ' ( ~ ' 

-:---------

Petitioner 

V. CIV-90-301-A 

STEPHEN W. KAISER, 

Respondent. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Petitioner, a state prisoner, brings this Petition for a -· Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U .S.C. §2254 in order to challenge his conviction for Distribution of a 

Controlled Dangerous Substance After Former Conviction received in the District Court 

of Oklahoma County in Case No. CRF-87-6665. Petitioner is currently incarcerated 

pursuant to this conviction, entered on June 8, 1988, following a piea of guilty, and is 

serving a ten year sentence. 

The Petition alleges the following two grounds for habeas relief: 

Ground One: ''The sentence imposed in CRF-87-665 (sic) violates due 

process as the sentence was invalidly enhanced and thus is invalid under 

Oklahoma's enhanced punishment provision." 

Ground Two: "Petitioner was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right 

to due process and right to be informed when the state belatedly entered 

the third prior ielony conviction which should have been charged in the 

pre1iminary complaint. 

Appellate Case: 90-6152 Document: 010110093915 Date Filed: 11/30/1990 Page: 4 
Respondent Warden has filed a response to the Petition and has caused the filing 

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of the state court records in Petitioner's case., 

Petitioner did not appeal his conviction. However, Peririoner filed an Application 

for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to 22 O.S. 1981, § 1080, in the District Court of 

Oklahoma County, asserting that he was improperly sentenced under the state sentence 

enhancement provision for second and subsequent drug offenses. Petitioner also asserted 

that the state did not use "proper and legal procedures" when it failed to allege a third 

prior felony conviction "on the preliminary complaint" and, instead, asserted the third 

prior felony conviction in an amended information. The district court denied relief, and . 

the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of relief, finding that 

Petitioner "failed to file a direct appeal of his convictions (sic) [and] [t]he provisions of 

22 O.S. 1981, § 1080 are not a substitute for a direct appeal." In its Order, the 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals informed Petitioner that he should file a request for 

an appeal out of time in the district court. Barnes v. Oklahoma, No. PC-89-658 (Okl.Cr. 

filed July 27, 1989). Petitioner subsequently filed a request in the District Court of 

Oklahoma County for an appeal out of time. Relief was denied, and on appeal, the 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of relief, concluding that 

Petitioner's claims were without merit. Barnes v. Oklahoma, No. PC-89-943 (Okl.Cr. filed 

September 27, 1989). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6152 Document: 010110093915 Date Filed: 11/30/1990 Page: 5 
Accordingly, Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies. See Harris v. Reed, 

U.S. , 109 S.Cr. 1038 (1989)("[A] orocedural default does not bar consideration - - . 

of a federal claim on either direct or appellate review unless the last state court 

rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on 

a state procedural bar.") 

Petitioner's contention in Ground One is that he was improperly sentenced under 

63 O.S. Supp. 1988, §2-401, and he should have been sentenced under 21 O.S. Supp. 

1988, §51. It has long been settled that a mere error of state law does not constitute 

a denial of due process. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948); Perkins v. Pevton, -

369 F .2d 590, 592 ( 4th Cir. 1966). The interpretation of a state statute is a matter of 

state law and presents no federal constitutional issue cognizable in habeas. Bond v. 

Oklahoma, 546 F.2d 1369, 1377 (10th Cir. 1976). See Mendiola v. Estelle, 635 F.2d 

487, 489 (5th Cir. 1981)(relationship between state sentencing statutes is state law 

question not entitled to federal habeas review). 

Nevertheless, even if Petitioner has alleged a cognizable habeas claim, no error 

occurred in sentencing Petitioner, and he has not shown a denial o[ due proces:;. 

Pursuant to Oklahoma's Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, 63 O.S. §2-101 

et seq, it is unlawful to distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, 

distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance. 63 O.S. Supp. 1988, §2-

401(A) (1). Any person convicted of this offense with respect to a narcotic drug classified -

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as a Schedule I or Schedule II drug is subject to a senrence of from 5 years to life and 

a fine of up to $100,000.00. 63 b .S. Supp. 1988, §2-401(8)(1). A second or 

subsequent conviction for violations 'of the same provisions carries a punishment of rwice 

the sentence prescribed for a first offense. 63 O.S. Supp. 1988, §2-401(C). 

Petitioner was charged with Distribution of a Controlled Dangerous Substance, 

methamphetarnine, a Schedule II narcotic, After Fonner Conviction of three felonies. 

Two of the predicate felony convictions were drug related offenses,1 and a third prior 

conviction was for Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Intoxicating 

Liquor After Former Conviction of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence -

of [ntoxicating Liquor (CRF-76-1342). The two drug-related predicate felony convictions 

were filed with the Information on November 24, 1987. An Amended Information was 

filed on December 30, 1987, charging all three predicate felony convictions. The record 

shows Petitioner waived a preliminary hearing on January 27, 1988, but on February 19, 

1988, a Motion to Remand for Further Preliminary Hearing was sustained. On May 4, 

1988, Petitioner appeared with counsel and waived a preliminary hearing. He was 

arraigned on May 11, 1988, and trial was set for June 6, 1988. On June 8, 1988, 

Petitioner withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to the charge. 

The Information charged Petitioner with having committed the offense after former conviction 

of Distribution of a Controlled Dangerous Substance, received in the District Court of Oklahoma County 

on January 10, 1986, in CRF-85-4333 and after former conviction of Possession of a Controlled Dangerous 

Substance, received in the District Court of Oklahoma County on April 21 , 1987, in CRF-86-5648. 

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~ "--.. 

The Information charged a violation of 63 O.S. §2-401, and Petitioner's ten year 

sentence was within the range of punishment prescribed by 63 O.S. Supp. 1988, §2- , 

401 (C) for a second or subsequent_ felony drug conviction. Because of the prior nondrug related conviction, Petitioner could have been sentenced under Oklahoma's general 

enhancement statute, 21 O.S. Supp. 1988, §51 (B). However, if sentenced under §51(B), 

Petitioner would have been subject to a sentence of not less than twenty years. ·1 he 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted the state's enhancement statutes, 

concluding that where a defendant is charged with both drug and non-drug predicate 

offenses, it is permissible to provide for enhancement under either statute. Novey v. 

Oklahoma, 709 P.2d 696, 699 (Oki.Cr. 1985). Accord, Blunt v. Oklahoma, 743 P.2d 

145, 148 (Okl.Cr. 1987)(Parks, J., specially concurring). Thus, the court did not err in 

sentencing Petitioner, and Petitioner was not denied due process as a result of his 

sentencing. Moreover, even if the trial court erred in sentencing Petitioner under the 

Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the error was harmless since sentencing under 21 

O.S. Supp. 1988, §51 (B) would have increased Petitioner's sentence by at least ten years. 

Chaoman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See Walker v. Garrington, 521 F.Supp. 

1313, 1322 (M.D. Tenn. 1981)(error in jury sentencing under wrong enhancement 

statute harmless where sentencing under proper statute would have increased sentence 

by at least two years). 

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Petitioner does not allege that he was unaware at the time of his plea of the prior 

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felony convictions that were part of the charge filed against him in CRF-87-6665. 

Petitioner waived a preliminary hearing on two occasions. However, he was arraigned 

on the charge after the amended information was filed. The transcript of the guilry plea 

proceeding shows that the trial court informed Petitioner he was charged with 

distributing a controlled dangerous substance after former conviction. Petitioner replied 

affirmatively when asked if he understood the charge against him, if he had seen a copy 

of the charge, and if he had discussed the charge with his counsel. Presumably, his 

counsel had informed Petitioner of the charge against him. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 _ 

U.S. 637, 647 (1976). Petitioner was informed that if he entered a guilty plea to the 

charge he could receive a sentence of ten years to life imprisonment. Petitioner was 

informed of his trial rights and was informed that he would waive those rights by 

entering a plea of guilty. Petitioner was questioned concerning a plea agreement, and 

Petitioner informed the court that he had agreed with the state to enter a guilty plea 

and, in exchange for the plea, receive a sentence of ten years imprisonment, with the 

sentence to run concurrently with the sentence in another case, CRF-85-4333, involving 

the revocation of a suspended sentence. A factual basis for the plea was explored 

through questioning the Petitioner, and the court ascertained that Petitioner desired to 

enter a guilty plea and that the plea was being made both voluntarily and competently. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6152 Document: 010110093915 Date Filed: 11/30/1990 Page: 9 
The coun then accepted the plea and sentenced Petitioner to a 10 year concurrent 

sentence, consistent with the plea agreement. 

The record shows that Petitioner's plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly, 

with a full understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. 

Because Petitioner's plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly, Petitioner's valid 

plea forecloses any claims "relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights tnat 

occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 

(1973). Thus, Petitioner is barred by his valid plea from raising his claim that the filing 

of an amended information violated his rights to due process. 

Accordingly, judgment will enter denying the Writ of Habeas Corpus and 

dismissing the cause of action. rn view of the foregoing findings and conclusions, an 

appeal from this decision would not be well taken. Therefore, leave to proceed on 

appeal in f orma pauperis and a Certificate of Probable Cause are denied. 

Entered this b ,-.. day of April, 1990. 

~tf~LEY ~ ~ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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