Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03229/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03229-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Abelardo Barrientos Arnobit
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 22, 2016*

Decided July 26, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐3229

ABELARDO BARRIENTOS ARNOBIT,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH,

Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A041‐245‐950

O R D E R

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Abelardo Barrientos Arnobit, a citizen of the Philippines, petitions pro se1 for

review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming an immigration

judge’s denial of his request for a fourth continuance. We deny the petition.

Arnobit, then in his early thirties, entered the United States as a lawful

permanent resident in 1987. Nine years after his arrival, in 1996, he pleaded nolo

contendere to two crimes—attempted grand theft of a vehicle and receiving stolen

property. In 2009 the government initiated removal proceedings alleging that Arnobit

was removable because these were convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  

The proceedings have been protracted. The IJ first granted Arnobit a continuance

in March 2010 to obtain counsel. When Arnobit appeared with counsel in December

2010, the IJ found him removable but granted a second continuance to apply for a

waiver under the former § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act—a

discretionary waiver of removability available to lawful permanent residents who were

domiciled in the United States at least seven consecutive years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)

(repealed 1996); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294–98, 315 (2001). At the next hearing in

November 2011, Arnobit, through counsel, submitted an application for a § 212(c)

waiver, and the IJ scheduled another hearing date two years later to consider the merits.

At the hearing in January 2014, Arnobit appeared with new counsel, and the

government presented new information that he also had been convicted in California in

2009 for possessing a controlled substance, a conviction that likely made him ineligible

for a § 212(c) waiver. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996); United States v. De Horta

Garcia, 519 F.3d 658, 659 (7th Cir. 2008). “Out of an abundance of caution,” the IJ said,

she wanted to see more documentation concerning Arnobit’s criminal dispositions, so

she granted Arnobit “one more continuance.”  

Four months later Arnobit conceded that he was not eligible for the § 212(c)

waiver but asked for a fourth continuance. Arnobit, through counsel, told the IJ that he

wanted time to seek a pardon to vacate the California controlled‐substance offence. He

also advised the IJ that he was awaiting a decision in a case pending before this court

that would allow “stand‐alone” applications for a § 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility

(instead of requiring a concurrent application for adjustment of status). See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(h); Klementanovsky v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 788, 792–94 (7th Cir. 2007).

                                                 

1 After briefing in this court had been completed, Arnobit’s counsel moved to

withdraw and we granted the motion.

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No. 15‐3229    Page 3

The IJ denied Arnobit’s request for another continuance because the possibilities

of a pardon or a favorable ruling from this court regarding § 212(h) waivers were “far

too speculative.” Because Arnobit’s removability had been established by clear and

convincing evidence, the IJ ordered his removal. The IJ agreed, however, to reopen the

matter if Arnobit obtained a pardon or became eligible for a § 212(h) waiver. The IJ’s

decision was upheld by the Board of Immigration Appeals, which concluded that

Arnobit’s hope for a “stand‐alone” § 212(h) waiver had since been foreclosed by our

recent holding in Palma‐Martinez v. Lynch, 785 F.3d 1147, 1149–50 (7th Cir. 2015), and

that Arnobit did not demonstrate good cause for a continuance based on the

“speculative possibility” of postconviction relief.

When an alien such as Arnobit is removable for committing crimes involving

moral turpitude, we generally lack jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) to review

the final order of removal, including prior procedural orders like a motion for a

continuance. See Moral–Salazar v. Holder, 708 F.3d 957, 960–62 (7th Cir. 2013). But we

retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D); Adame v. Holder, 762 F.3d 667, 670, 672–73 (7th Cir. 2014). In his petition,

Arnobit raises a legal question when he argues that the IJ and the Board did not

sufficiently explain their denial of his request for a continuance and did not follow

Matter of Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 785 (BIA 2009), a precedential Board decision that

outlined factors an IJ may consider when determining whether good cause exists to

continue removal proceedings pending the adjudication of a family‐based visa petition.

Even if we assume that Arnobit’s submission to the Board sufficiently raised the

issue of the adequacy of the IJ’s explanation, his argument fails. The IJ and Board

sufficiently explained why a continuance was not warranted: the speculative possibility

of post‐conviction relief did not demonstrate good cause and our decision in

Palma‐Martinez upheld the Board’s interpretation that a “stand‐alone” § 212(h) waiver

was not available for aliens in Arnobit’s circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29;

Palma‐Martinez, 785 F.3d at 1150–51. Moreover, here the IJ and Board did not fail to

follow precedent: Hashmi outlined factors to be considered when an adjustment‐of‐

status application is pending, and that is not the case here. Matter of Hashmi, 24 I. & N.

Dec. at 790.

Arnobit also asserts generally that the IJ and the Board denied him his due

process right to a “full and fair hearing on the merits of his case,” but this charge is the

type of unfocused argument that this court has repeatedly concluded does not present a

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constitutional claim. See Delgado v. Holder, 674 F.3d 759, 765 (7th Cir. 2012);

Portillo–Rendon v. Holder, 662 F.3d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, Arnobit’s petition is DENIED.

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