Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-18-02088/USCOURTS-ca7-18-02088-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Albert E. Dowthard
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-2088 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

ALBERT E. DOWTHARD, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. 

No. 3:16-cr-50061-1 — Philip G. Reinhard, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 17, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 23, 2020 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Albert Dowthard pleaded guilty to 

being a felon in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Because of his prior state convictions, he was sentenced under 

the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to 186 months in 

prison. See id. § 924(e). Although he raised no such argument 

in the district court, he now contends that Rehaif v. 

United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), invalidates his plea because he was not informed that knowledge of his status as a 

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previously convicted felon was an element of his § 922(g) 

charge. Alternatively, he disputes his classification as an 

Armed Career Criminal, arguing that two of the four prior offenses used to sentence him do not qualify as violent felonies. 

Dowthard has the burden of showing that a misunderstanding of the elements of his offense affected his substantial 

rights, yet he does not even assert that he would not have 

pleaded guilty if he had properly understood the elements. 

Thus, he has failed to carry that burden. And his prior Illinois 

conviction for attempted aggravated domestic battery has as 

an element the attempted use of physical force and therefore 

counts as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. With that conviction and the two he does not challenge, he has the three 

necessary predicates for an enhanced sentenced under 

§ 924(e). Accordingly, we affirm both his conviction and his 

sentence. 

I 

One night in November 2018, Dowthard fired a revolver 

from an open car window. No one was hit. But police responded to the shots, searched the car, and recovered the 

gun—which Dowthard’s prior felony convictions barred him 

from having. The United States charged him with possessing 

a firearm after “previously having been convicted of a crime 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and, in his case, § 924(e). 

Although the indictment accused Dowthard of being a felon 

who knowingly possessed a gun, it said nothing about his 

knowledge that any of his prior crimes were felonies. 

Dowthard eventually pleaded guilty under a written 

agreement admitting that he “possessed the .38 revolver” and 

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No. 18-2088 3

“had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” He stipulated that 

he had several prior state convictions that the government believed qualified him for a 15-year minimum sentence under 

§ 924(e). He reserved the right to object on that score and appeal “the validity of this plea and the sentence imposed.” 

Before accepting Dowthard’s plea, the district court informed him that a conviction would require proof (or an admission) that he had first been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment and then had 

knowingly possessed a firearm, and also that the firearm had 

traveled in interstate commerce. After stating that he understood the charge and plea agreement, Dowthard admitted the 

allegations. The court accepted his plea. 

Dowthard’s plea agreement and presentence investigation 

report both took special note of four of his prior felony convictions. The first, and most important for our purposes, was 

a 2004 conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(2), for which 

Dowthard received a 6-year prison term. He served just over 

two years in prison on that sentence before being released on 

parole. The other felony convictions central to this appeal 

were for (1) aggravated battery involving bodily harm, 720 

ILCS 5/15-4(b)(6); (2) attempted aggravated domestic battery 

involving strangulation under 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) and 720 

ILCS 5/8-4(a); and (3) residential burglary, 720 ILCS 5/19-3. 

He received a 180-day sentence for each of these convictions, 

though Illinois law classifies these offenses as “Class 1” or 

“Class 2” felonies, punishable by terms of imprisonment exceeding one year. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30, 5/5-4.5-35. The probation office concluded that the 2004 controlled-substance 

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conviction qualified as a “serious drug offense” under 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A), that the residential burglary and the aggravated domestic abuse assault convictions were both violent felonies under § 924(e)(2)(B), and that—because he had at 

least three qualifying predicate offenses—Dowthard was eligible for an enhanced sentence under the ACCA. It did not 

initially flag the aggravated battery conviction as a qualifying 

predicate. 

Dowthard disputed the classification of the two violent 

felonies identified by probation. He argued that an Illinois attempt to commit a force-based crime need not involve “the 

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i); his attempt conviction, he contended, 

required only a “substantial step” toward completing the 

crime, and that step could be divorced from the contemplated 

application of physical force. Moreover, he argued that his intended offense, aggravated domestic battery, did not have 

force as an element. The government countered that 

Dowthard’s conviction was for attempting aggravated domestic battery under a subsection requiring strangulation of 

the victim—in a word, force—and that his reading of the Illinois attempt statute was foreclosed by Hill v. United States, 877 

F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2017). 

As for Illinois’s residential burglary statute, Dowthard argued that it defined “burglary” more broadly than federal law 

because it applied to a “dwelling place,” which might include 

locations other than buildings or structures. The government 

responded that precedent also foreclosed this theory, namely, 

Smith v. United States, 877 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2017). 

At the sentencing hearing, Dowthard acknowledged that 

he had read and understood the PSR and stated that he had 

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No. 18-2088 5

no objections to any of the facts in it. The district court ruled 

that all four of the putative predicates—Dowthard’s drug 

crime, aggravated battery involving bodily harm, attempted 

aggravated domestic battery by strangulation, and residential 

burglary—counted under § 924(e). After granting Dowthard 

a 3-level decrease in offense level for timely accepting responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, the court sentenced him to 186 

months’ imprisonment—within his Guidelines range and 

well above the 10-year ceiling that § 924(a)(2) would furnish 

if the ACCA had not applied. 

Dowthard filed a notice of appeal. Before briefing, the Supreme Court issued Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 

(2019), which changed the appellate courts’ understanding of 

the elements of an offense under §§ 922(g) and 924(a). Rehaif 

holds that, to secure a conviction under these sections, the 

government must prove that a defendant knew he belonged 

to a category of persons barred from possessing a firearm (at 

least for felons and those illegally in the United States). Id. at 

2200. Dowthard now challenges both his conviction and his 

sentence. 

II 

A. Conviction 

Dowthard asks us to vacate his conviction because, under 

Rehaif, he could not properly be convicted without the government establishing that he knew, at the time he possessed 

the gun, that he had “been convicted in any court of[] a crime 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He first contends that his indictment is 

invalid for omitting this scienter requirement, but he has 

waived any argument he could make on that front. The 

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omission of an element from an indictment is not a jurisdictional defect, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002), 

and his guilty plea waived his right to assert that the indictment failed to state an offense. United States v. Wheeler, 857 

F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2017). Dowthard has not waived his opportunity to seek to withdraw his plea, though. Hurlow v. 

United States, 726 F.3d 958, 966 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Tollett v. 

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266–67 (1973)). Indeed, the plea agreement expressly reserved the right to appeal the “validity” of 

his plea. Still, because he did not move to withdraw his plea 

in the district court, he has forfeited this argument, so he 

rightly concedes that our review of his request is for plain error only. See United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 727 (7th Cir. 

2016). 

On plain-error review, Dowthard must show (1) an error 

(2) that is plain today, (3) that affected his substantial rights 

and (4) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 

732 (1993); United States v. Williams, No. 19-1358, __ F.3d __, 

2020 WL 111264, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 10, 2020). The parties agree 

that in light of Rehaif the first two prongs are met. As for the 

third prong, we recently concluded that the burden of persuasion rests on the defendant seeking to withdraw his plea 

based on Rehaif to show that there is “a reasonable probability 

that he would not have pleaded guilty if he knew of Rehaif.” 

Williams, 2020 WL 111264, at *3.1 

 

1 The Supreme Court based its holding in Rehaif in large part on 18 

U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), which provides a maximum 10-year sentence for one 

who “knowingly violates” § 922(g). 139 S. Ct. at 2194. Dowthard, though, 

was not charged and convicted under § 924(a), but under § 924(e), which 

has no express scienter requirement, “knowingly” or otherwise. We do not 

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Dowthard, however, has never asserted—in his briefs or 

during oral argument—that he would have insisted on going 

to trial (or held out for a better deal) if he had been aware that 

knowledge of his status as a felon was an element of his 

charge. He suggests only that Rehaif would have caused him 

to consider more closely “what effect ... prior precedent regarding stipulations to certain evidence bear upon this issue.” 

This is not enough to carry his burden. 

Although the record does not establish definitively 

whether Dowthard knew of his felon status at the time he possessed the firearm, he has offered us no reason to believe he 

might not have. He previously was sentenced to and served 

more than a year in prison on his drug conviction. This time 

in prison would severely hamper an assertion that he was ignorant of the fact that this crime was punishable by more than 

a year of imprisonment. He, thus, faces an “uphill battle” to 

show that a Rehaif error affected his substantial rights. Williams, 2020 WL 111264, at *4. Beyond that one conviction, the 

sheer number of his other convictions, which included four 

crimes serious enough to be potential predicates under the 

ACCA and otherwise led to a criminal history category of V, 

would further impair an ignorance argument. Cf. United States 

v. Burghardt, 939 F.3d 397, 405 n.4 (1st Cir. 2019) (noting defendant’s criminal history category of VI tended to negate inference that defendant was ignorant of the potential sentence 

he faced for his convictions). Plus, the district court reduced 

his Guidelines range for his timely acceptance of responsibility by entering his plea. We see nothing in the record to imply 

 

decide today whether Rehaif ‘s holding extends to § 924(e) and instead accept the government’s concession of error for the purposes of this appeal. 

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that Rehaif offered anything to Dowthard that would have 

prompted him to risk a longer sentence by going to trial. See 

Williams, 2020 WL 111264, at *4; United States v. Parker, 

368 F.3d 963, 969 (7th Cir. 2004). Thus, he has not demonstrated that the Rehaif error affected his substantial rights or 

the integrity of the proceedings. 

B. Armed Career Criminal Classification 

Dowthard also challenges his classification (and enhanced 

sentence) under the ACCA, arguing that attempted aggravated domestic battery by strangulation and residential burglary in Illinois do not qualify as violent felonies. A “violent 

felony” under the ACCA is a crime that either (1) “has as an 

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person of another,” (called the “elements” 

clause), or (2) “is burglary, arson, or extortion” or “involves 

use of explosives,” (the “enumerated” clause). 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B). Whether a given conviction is a “violent felony” under § 924(e) is examined de novo under a “categorical 

approach,” focusing on the elements of the crimes rather than 

on the underlying conduct. United States v. Duncan, 833 F.3d 

751, 754 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ker Yang, 799 F.3d 750, 

752 (7th Cir. 2015). 

To warrant an enhanced sentence under § 924(e), 

Dowthard must have three convictions that are each either a 

violent felony or a serious drug offense. Dowthard concedes 

that the district court correctly found two qualifying convictions: his controlled substance conviction is a “serious drug 

offense,” and his aggravated battery conviction has the use of 

physical force as an element, so it is a violent felony. In order 

for us to reverse his sentence, then, he must show that the district court erred in classifying both of the remaining two 

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predicate convictions. He cannot. His aggravated domestic 

battery conviction qualifies under the elements clause. We 

therefore need not address his new argument on appeal that 

Illinois residential burglary does not qualify under the enumerated clause because Illinois may not require proof of unlawful entry as an element of the offense. See United States v. 

Glispie, 943 F.3d 358 (7th Cir. 2019) (certifying question to Illinois Supreme Court).

To start, Dowthard no longer disputes that aggravated domestic battery by strangulation is itself a “violent felony.” 

This concession is well-taken. See, e.g., United States v. Waters, 

823 F.3d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases for proposition that all bodily-harm variants of Illinois domestic battery 

have force as an element). The Supreme Court defines “physical force” as “force capable of causing physical pain or injury 

to another person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 

(2010); see also Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 554 

(2019). The statute underlying Dowthard’s attempt conviction 

explains that aggravated domestic battery occurs when a person, “in committing a domestic battery, strangles another individual” and further defines strangling as “intentionally impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of an 

individual by applying pressure on the throat or neck of that 

individual or by blocking the nose or mouth of that individual.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5). This application of pressure or 

blocking of airways necessarily requires force capable of causing physical pain or injury. See United States v. Mancillas, 880 

F.3d 297, 304 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding similarly worded Indiana offense is a crime of violence under elements clause of 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2). 

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Dowthard nonetheless asserts that his conviction for attempting aggravated domestic battery does not count as a violent felony because Illinois’s attempt statute does not mention 

“force.” And, in his view, a person who unsuccessfully “attempts” to carry out a crime that would ultimately involve the 

use of force may do so without taking any step that could independently be characterized as an “attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” under § 924(e). Illinois defines an 

attempt as occurring “when, with intent to commit a specific offense, [a defendant] does any act that constitutes a substantial 

step toward the commission of that offense.” 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) 

(emphasis added). 

As Dowthard acknowledges, we have already addressed 

this argument in Hill v. United States, 877 F.3d 717, 719 (7th 

Cir. 2017). We held that an Illinois attempt to commit a crime 

that would involve force necessarily involves an attempt to use 

force under § 924(e). Still, Dowthard suggests that our ruling 

in United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2018), warrants 

revisiting Hill. In D.D.B., we determined that an Indiana attempt (as distinct from an Illinois attempt) to commit a forcible felony did not qualify as violent crime in the context of a 

juvenile proceeding, because Indiana does not require a defendant to have specific intent to complete each element of the 

attempted crime. Id. at 691. The lack of a specific-intent element meant that Indiana’s attempt statute, unlike Illinois’s, 

diverges from the federal-law understanding of an “attempt” 

to use force. In D.D.B., we expressly distinguished Hill on that 

ground, see id. at 690–91, so nothing about the decision calls 

Hill into question. Dowthard articulates no other ground for 

overruling Hill. The district court, thus, properly determined 

that Dowthard’s attempted aggravated battery conviction 

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was his third predicate offense, and so he was subject to an 

enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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