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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Anthony Davon Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

ANTHONY DAVON WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 15-3277 

(D.C. No. 5:14-CR-40094-DDC-3) 

(D. Kan.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, MATHESON and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

 

Anthony Davon Williams pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and (b)(1)(A). As part of his 

plea agreement, Mr. Williams waived his appellate rights “except to the extent, if 

any, the [district court] impose[d] a sentence in excess of the sentence recommended 

by the parties.” Mot. to Enforce, Att. C (Plea Agreement) at 13. The parties agreed 

to a 156-month prison term, and after accepting his guilty plea, the district court 

 

* This panel has determined that oral argument would not materially assist the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The 

case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment 

is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, 

and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent 

with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 25, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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sentenced Mr. Williams to the agreed-upon 156 months in prison. Nevertheless, 

Mr. Williams filed a notice of appeal, and the government has now moved to enforce 

the appeal waiver pursuant to United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) 

(en banc) (per curiam).1

 

 In evaluating a motion to enforce an appeal waiver, we consider “(1) whether 

the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; 

(2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and 

(3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.” 

Id. at 1325. Mr. Williams challenges only the second element, claiming he did not 

execute his appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily. We therefore restrict our 

analysis to the second Hahn factor, see United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143 

(10th Cir. 2005) (declining to consider uncontested issue), and evaluate only whether 

Mr. Williams satisfied his burden to show that he did not knowingly and voluntarily 

execute his appeal waiver, see United States v. Tanner, 721 F.3d 1231, 1233 

(10th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (requiring defendant to show that his appeal waiver was 

not knowingly and voluntary). 

To assess whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate 

rights, “we ordinarily look to (1) whether the language of the plea agreement states 

 

1

 In his docketing statement, Mr. Williams described his proposed appeal as 

follows: “Defendant wishes to challenge all rulings in the case that could be deemed 

adverse[,] including, but not limited to, Speedy Trial, suppression of evidence, 

conviction, objections to PSIR and sentence imposed.” Dkt. Stmt. at 4. 

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that the defendant entered the agreement knowingly and voluntarily; and (2) whether 

the district court conducted an adequate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 

colloquy.” United States v. Rollings, 751 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir.) (internal 

quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 494 (2014). “[T]he synergistic 

effect of both will often be conclusive.” Tanner, 721 F.3d at 1234. However, “either 

the express language of the plea agreement, if sufficiently clear, detailed, and 

comprehensive, or the probing inquiry of a proper Rule 11 colloquy could be enough 

to conclude the waiver was knowing and voluntary.” Id. 

Here, both the plea agreement and the district court’s Rule 11 colloquy 

demonstrate that Mr. Williams knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights. 

Paragraph 10 of the plea agreement contains the appeal waiver and states: 

[Mr. Williams] knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to appeal or 

collaterally attack any matter in connection with this prosecution, his 

conviction, or the components of the sentence . . ., including the length 

and conditions of supervised release, as well as any sentence imposed 

upon revocation of supervised release. [Mr. Williams] is aware that 

18 U.S.C. § 3742 affords him the right to appeal the conviction and 

sentence imposed. By entering into this agreement, [Mr. Williams] 

knowingly waives any right to appeal a sentence imposed in accordance 

with the sentence recommended by the parties under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). 

[Mr. Williams] also waives any right to challenge his sentence, or the 

manner in which it was determined, or otherwise attempt to modify or 

change his sentence, in any collateral attack, including, but not limited 

to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (except as limited by 

United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001)), or a 

motion brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). In other 

words, [Mr. Williams] waives the right to appeal the sentence imposed 

. . . except to the extent, if any, the Court imposes a sentence in excess 

of the sentence recommended by the parties under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). 

 

Mot. to Enforce, Att. C (Plea Agreement) at 13. 

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Additionally, paragraph 14 of the plea agreement indicates that Mr. Williams 

had time to discuss his case and the plea agreement with his attorney; that he had 

read and understood the plea agreement; and that he agreed it was “true and accurate 

and not the result of any threats, duress, or coercion.” Id. at 15. Mr. Williams 

acknowledged all of these provisions by signing just below a sentence stating that he 

was “entering his guilty plea freely, voluntarily, and knowingly.” Id. at 16. This 

language demonstrates that Mr. Williams knowingly and voluntarily waived his 

appellate rights. 

The district court’s Rule 11 colloquy bolsters this conclusion. At the change 

of plea hearing, Mr. Williams stated that he was thirty-three years old and had 

completed one year of college. In response to the court’s questioning, he indicated 

that he had reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney, had fully questioned his 

attorney, and had made the decision to enter the plea agreement himself, without any 

force or threats made against him. Mr. Williams also questioned the court to his 

satisfaction, soliciting clarification from the court, the government, and his own 

attorney as to the scope of the waiver. He then maintained that he wished to plead 

guilty. Afterwards, the district court explained the waiver to Mr. Williams and 

advised him that he was “giving up substantial parts of [his] right to appeal and also 

parts of [his] right to later attack this conviction.” Id., Att. A (Change of Plea Tr.) 

at 24. Mr. Williams indicated that he knew what he was doing. He also 

acknowledged the constitutional rights that he was forfeiting and admitted the factual 

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predicate for his guilty plea. Only after establishing all this did the district court 

accept Mr. Williams’ guilty plea as “knowing and voluntary and intelligent.” 

Id. at 38. 

Nevertheless, Mr. Williams contends he did not knowingly and voluntarily 

execute the appeal waiver because the district court’s plea colloquy only informed 

him that he was waiving “substantial parts” of his right to appeal, without identifying 

which specific parts he was waiving. But we have upheld as knowing and voluntary 

an appeal waiver that the district court did not specifically mention during the 

Rule 11 colloquy. See Tanner, 721 F.3d at 1235. Here, by contrast, the district court 

fully answered Mr. Williams’ questions concerning the scope of his appeal waiver. 

The court then specifically directed Mr. Williams to the precise paragraph of the plea 

agreement that contained the appeal waiver and advised him that through the appeal 

waiver, he was waiving substantial parts of his appellate rights. The court asked 

Mr. Williams if he knew what he was doing, and Mr. Williams replied that he did. 

Against all this, Mr. Williams cites no evidence or authority to carry his burden and 

support his claim that the court “implicitly misinformed” him by telling him he was 

waiving substantial parts of his appellate rights. Resp. Br. at 5. 

Mr. Williams also contends that his questions at the sentencing hearing show 

that he did not fully appreciate the implications of his appeal waiver. At sentencing, 

he again questioned the court about the scope of the appeal waiver, asking whether it 

precluded him from seeking to modify his sentence based on new, retroactive 

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changes in the law. After obtaining assurances from the court, the government, and 

defense counsel that it would not, Mr. Williams elected to proceed with sentencing, 

stating, “I can be sentenced today.” Mot. to Enforce, Att. B (Sent. Tr.) at 13. But 

nothing in his questions suggests he misunderstood the consequences of his appeal 

waiver. To the contrary, his questions, which were fully answered by the court and 

counsel, support the conclusion that he executed the waiver knowingly and 

voluntarily. And, in any event, a defendant like Mr. Williams cannot rely on 

statements made at sentencing to inject ambiguity into a knowingly and voluntary 

plea agreement. See United States v. Arevalo-Jimenez, 372 F.3d 1204, 1206 

(10th Cir. 2004) (“[S]tatements made after the entry of the appeal waiver and the 

district court’s acceptance of the guilty plea cannot overcome the plain language of 

the appeal waiver.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 The record demonstrates that Mr. Williams’ waiver was knowing and 

voluntary. Therefore, we grant the government’s motion to enforce the appeal 

waiver. This appeal is dismissed. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Per Curiam 

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