Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01857/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01857-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Respondent
Aaron Wright
Petitioner
Aaron Michael Wright
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Aaron Michael Wright, )

)

Defendant/Movant, )

) CR 09-00241 PHX NVW

v. ) CIV 11-01857 PHX NVW(MEA)

)

United States of America, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

Plaintiff/Respondent. )

)

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

On September 21, 2011, Mr. Aaron Wright(“Movant”), who

is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional

Institution in Ashland, Kentucky, filed a pro se Motion to

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255, regarding a criminal conviction and sentence entered by

the Court. Respondent filed a response to Movant’s motion to

vacate or set aside his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on

October 4, 2011. See Civil Doc. 6 (“Response”). Movant filed

a reply to the response on October 24, 2011. See Doc. 14.

I Procedural History

Federal law enforcement agents executed a search

warrant on Movant’s residence on May 22, 2008, a date Movant was

not at home. See Response, Exh. 1. The search was pursuant to

an investigation of individuals utilizing the Internet to engage

in “peer to peer” (“P2P”) sharing of child pornography. Id. at

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1-2. Child pornography was ultimately found on computer disks

belonging to Movant which were taken from his bedroom in the

residence during the execution of the search warrant. The video

files charged in Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment were found on

these disk(s). Id. at 2.

The FBI contacted Movant at his residence when he

returned to Arizona on May 26, 2008. Id. The agents provided

Movant with a copy of the search warrant that they used to

search the residence and provided him with a receipt of the

items taken during the search. Id., Exh. 3 at 34 & Exh. 6.

During the meeting with the FBI, Movant voluntarily spoke to the

agents and answered their questions. Id., Exh. 6. Movant

admitted to downloading child pornography and using “Limewire”

and sharing images with other people. Id., Exh. 3. Movant

also stated that he had burned images that had been uploaded to

his computer by other users of a peer-to-peer file sharing

program to computer disks to free hard-drive space on his

laptop. Id., Exh. 3 at 34-35. 

At the time of the interview, Movant provided written

consent to the FBI agents to seize and search his laptop

computer. Id., Exh. 2. On May 27, 2008, an FBI Special Agent

obtained a search warrant for the laptop computer from a

Magistrate Judge. Id., Exh. 3. The video file referenced in

Count 5 of the indictment was found on Movant’s laptop computer.

Id., Exh. 3.

A forensic evaluation of the disks and other loose

media seized during the execution of the first search warrant

revealed that the Movant had 1,128 images of suspected child

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pornography and 59 video files containing suspected child

pornography. The computer forensic evaluation also determined

that Movant had been searching for and downloading child

pornography for over a year and that he searched for child

pornography on twenty different dates. Id. at 2.

Defense counsel met with the government to review this

evidence. Defense counsel ultimately hired an independent

forensic expert, Ms. Loehrs, to evaluate the evidence. Id. at

3. Ms. Loehrs prepared a written report on October 22, 2009,

prior to the date Movant pled guilty. Id.

On November 16, 2009, Movant pled guilty to Count 5 of

the indictment, i.e., possession of child pornography, a Class

C felony offense. Id., Exh. 4. Pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C)

plea agreement, both parties agreed that Movant’s term of

imprisonment would be not less than 60 months but not greater

than 90 months. See Criminal Doc. 76. In return for the guilty

plea, the government dismissed Counts 1 through 4 of the

indictment, i.e., two counts of distribution of child

pornography, and two counts of possession of child pornography.

Id.; Response, Exh. 5 at 72. 

During the plea colloquy, Movant was advised of his

constitutional rights. Response, Exh. 4. Movant agreed to

waive these rights. Movant expressly waived his right to take

a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence and his right to

file a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255, provided he was sentenced in accordance with

the plea agreement. Id., Exh. 4 at 10. See also Criminal Doc.

76.

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At the time of his plea colloquy Movant was also

advised that, by pleading guilty pursuant to the plea agreement,

he was giving up his right to appeal or collaterally attack the

judgement. 

THE COURT: The plea agreement also provides

that you are giving up your right to appeal

and your right to collaterally attack the

judgment and the sentence that will be

imposed against you if the sentence is within

the terms of the plea agreement. That means

you cannot in the future attack the validity

or correctness of this conviction or sentence

in another court. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: I understand, Your Honor.

Response, Exh. 4 at 10.

During the change of plea hearing, Movant also averred

that he was satisfied with his lawyer’s representation:,

THE COURT: Mr. Wright, have you had an

opportunity to thoroughly discuss your case

with your lawyer?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with your

lawyer’s representation in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there anything you think your

lawyer should do that she has not done?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there anything you want her to

do that she has not done?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

Id., Exh. 4 at 6.

Prior to sentencing, Movant’s counsel filed objections

to sentencing enhancements recommended in the presentence

report. See Criminal Docs. 57 & 63. The Court determined that

the applicable sentencing guideline range was 97 to 121 months.

Response, Exh. 5 at 18-19. The plea agreement specified a

sentence of no more than 90 months. The government requested

that Movant be sentenced to 90 months, which required a

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one-level downward departure from the guideline range. The

Court opted to depart downward four levels, to reach a 66 month

sentence. On April 4, 2010, Movant was sentenced to 66 months

in prison followed by lifetime supervised release. Id., Exh. 4

at 56-62. Because Movant was sentenced in accordance with the

plea agreement, the government moved to dismiss Counts 1 through

4 of the indictment, which motion was granted. Id., Exh. 4 at

72 

In his section 2255 motion Movant asserts he was denied

the effective assistance of counsel. Movant alleges his defense

counsel did not properly investigate his case, that counsel

failed to file various motions to suppress the evidence against

Movant, and that counsel did not force compliance with the

Speedy Trial Act.

II Analysis

Respondent asserts that this section 2255 action must

be dismissed because Movant waived his right to collaterally

attack his conviction and sentence in the written plea

agreement. The plea agreement signed by Movant expressly waived

his right to collaterally attack any matter pertaining to

Movant’s conviction and sentence if the sentence imposed was

consistent with the written terms of the agreement. The

sentence imposed on Movant was consistent with the terms of the

plea agreement. Because the sentence imposed was in accordance

with the plea agreement, the plea agreement is valid.

Therefore, Movant is bound by the plea agreement’s waiver of his

right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. 

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Because Movant legitimately waived his right to bring

this action, his section 2255 motion may be summarily denied.

See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S. Ct. 2543,

2546-47 (1984) (“It is well settled that a voluntary and

intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has

been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally

attacked.”); United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th

Cir. 2005) (reaching this conclusion in the context of a direct

appeal wherein the Movant waived his right to directly appeal or

collaterally attack his conviction and sentence in a plea

agreement), overruled on other grounds by United States v.

Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007); United

States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1991). 

A defendant’s waiver of his right to a direct appeal

and a section 2255 action is enforceable if the language of the

waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised,

and the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. See United

States v. Speelman, 431 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2005).

However, a plea agreement which waives the Movant’s right to

collaterally attack their sentence is not enforceable if the

waiver was involuntary. See, e.g., Washington v. Lampert, 422

F.3d 864, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2005). See also United States v.

White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002). 

A collateral attack alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel in negotiating a plea agreement may be brought

notwithstanding a waiver of this right in the agreement, but

only if the agreement was involuntary or unknowing. See

Washington, 422 F.3d at 870-71; United States v. Cockerham, 237

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F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2001); Bridgeman v. United States,

229 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2000). 

In Cockerham the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held

that “a plea agreement waiver of postconviction rights does not

waive the right to bring a § 2255 petition based on ineffective

assistance1 of counsel claims challenging the validity of the

plea or the waiver.” 237 F.3d at 1187. See also Washington, 422

F.3d at 870-71; DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919, 924 (8th

Cir. 2000) (“A defendant’s plea agreement waiver of the right to

seek section 2255 post-conviction relief does not waive

defendant’s right to argue, pursuant to that section, that the

decision to enter into the plea was not knowing and voluntary

because it was the result of ineffective assistance of

counsel.”). 

Movant does not argue that his counsel’s alleged

failures resulted in Movant unknowingly or involuntarily signing

a plea agreement. Movant’s allegation that, had his counsel

adequately investigated his case and pressed what Movant asserts

is “evidence” of his innocence, he would not have entered into

a plea, is contradicted by Movant’s statements during his plea

and sentencing hearings. 

Movant’s contemporaneous statements regarding his

understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial weight in

determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary. See United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th

Cir. 1991); United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1096 (6th

Cir. 1998) (holding that “a straightforward and simple ‘Yes,

your Honor’ is sufficient to bind a Movant to [the] consequences

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[of a plea agreement].”). Because he was adequately informed of

the consequences of his plea, Movant’s guilty plea can be

considered voluntary and knowing. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395

U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969). The undersigned

concludes Movant’s guilty plea was voluntary and made

intelligently. See Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th

Cir. 1986); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Because Movant does not produce any evidence indicating

he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement,

the undersigned concludes the plea agreement was valid, as was

Movant’s voluntary waiver of his right to collaterally attack

his sentence. Accordingly, the section 2255 petition should be

denied and dismissed. Compare United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d

431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994).

III Conclusion

Because the waiver of his right to collaterally attack

his sentence in the written plea agreement was not unknowing or

involuntary, the Court may dismiss Movant’s claims as waived.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Wright’s motion

for relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to

section 2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

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court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure

for the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2011.

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