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Parties Involved:
Hugh O. Plunkett
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 9, 1997 Decided October 3, 1997

No. 96-3140

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

HUGH O. PLUNKETT, A/K/A DENNIS IVAN HUNTER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cr00207-01)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant, with whom A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, was on the briefs. Neil H. Jaffee,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Carmen R. Kelley, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. 

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John R. Fisher, Roy 

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W. McLeese, III, and Nancy Page, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, 

were on the briefs.

Before: SILBERMAN, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: The Sentencing Guideline commonly known as 

the "safety valve" limits the applicability of statutory minimum sentences in certain cases. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 

MANUAL § 5C1.2 (1995) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. A defendant 

who qualifies for the safety valve also receives a two-level 

reduction in offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(4). To 

qualify, a defendant must overcome five hurdles, one of which 

is that the defendant must not have "possess[ed] a firearm 

... in connection with the offense." Id. § 5C1.2(2). Application Note 3 to the safety valve defines the word "offense" to 

mean "the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct." Id.

application note 3. Appellant Hugh O. Plunkett appeals his 

conviction on the principal ground that the district court 

erred as a matter of law in using this broad definition of 

"offense" to deny him the two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(4). We affirm.

I.

Following his indictment on six narcotics- and weaponsrelated counts, Plunkett pled guilty to one count of possession 

with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack, a form 

of cocaine base. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) (1988 

& Supp. V 1993). Under the terms of the plea agreement, his 

plea related only to the drugs found on his person when he 

was arrested, and not to more than 500 grams of crack and a 

firearm found the next day in his apartment. For sentencing 

purposes, however, Plunkett acknowledged as part of his plea 

agreement his responsibility for the additional crack and the 

firearm.

The district court sentenced Plunkett to 189 months imprisonment. Starting from a base offense level of 36, see

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2), the court imposed a two-level increase 

for possession of a firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) and 

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a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under 

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), resulting in an offense level of 35. The 

court found that Plunkett could not qualify for the safety 

valve because, under Application Note 3, his firearm possession was part of the offense as "relevant conduct"; thus, the 

court could not apply the two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(4). Because Plunkett had no prior criminal record, the sentencing range was between 168 and 210 months, 

and the court chose a sentence at the midpoint of that range.

II.

On appeal, Plunkett contends that the provision in the 

safety valve barring eligibility as a result of firearm possession "in connection with the offense" depends only on the 

offense of convictionhere, a conviction based solely on the 

drugs found on his person at the time of his arrestand not, 

as the government maintains, the offense of conviction and all 

relevant conducthere, the greater drug distribution scheme, 

including the crack found at his apartment. Specifically, he 

contends that the district court erred as a matter of law in 

applying Application Note 3 because it is inconsistent with 

both the safety valve and the provision in the Guidelines 

entitled "Relevant Conduct," U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Because 

these arguments were not presented to the district court, our 

review is for plain error,1see United States v. Robinson, 86 

F.3d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and we find none.

First, we are unpersuaded that Application Note 3's interpretation of the safety valve is invalid because it purportedly 

negates any difference between the word "offense," used in 

__________

1 We acknowledge that both counsel discussed the scope of the 

"offense" under the safety valve at some length with the district 

court, but we fail to find any reference to the particular arguments 

advanced on appeal. Indeed, defense counsel appeared not to 

contest that the offense for purposes of the safety valve included 

the entire drug distribution scheme, not just the offense of conviction. We cannot agree with Plunkett that on appeal he has simply 

"provided additional detail in support of his argument" or that "his 

arguments at sentencing and on appeal are one and the same."

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three subsections of the safety valve, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (2)-(4), 

and the phrase "the offense or offenses that were part of the 

same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan," used 

in another subsection, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(5). Even if Application Note 3 is viewed, in this respect, as somewhat odd, 

"[c]ommentary is not 'inconsistent' with a guideline simply 

because it adopts what [this court] might regard as one of the 

less likely interpretations of a guideline." Robinson, 86 F.3d 

at 1199 (citing United States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330, 333 (D.C. 

Cir. 1994)). Application Note 3 does not adopt an interpretation of the safety valve so implausible as to be invalid. See 

United States v. Wilson, 106 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1997); 

see also United States v. Burke, 91 F.3d 1052, 1052-53 (8th 

Cir. 1996). Indeed, the definition in Application Note 3 is the 

same definition as appears in the commentary to the guideline 

entitled "Application Instructions," in the part of the Guidelines concerning general application principles. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.1 application note 1(l).

Further, there is no inconsistency, much less the "flat 

inconsistency" necessary to invalidate commentary, Stinson v. 

United States, 508 U.S. 36, 43 (1993), between Application 

Note 3 and the guideline that defines "relevant conduct." 2

Subsection (a) of that guideline, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, provides 

that, for purposes of Chapters Two and Three of the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court should consider a broad 

range of conduct, whereas subsection (b) provides: "Factors 

in Chapters Four and Five that establish the guideline range 

shall be determined on the basis of the conduct and the 

information specified in the respective guidelines." U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.3. Plunkett's possession of the contraband found in his 

apartment would qualify as relevant conduct under subsection 

__________

2 We reject the government's suggestion that, under the language of Stinson, challenges to guideline commentary based on 

inconsistency with a guideline are allowed only when the commentary is inconsistent with the particular guideline it interprets. See 

Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38. The rationale of the opinion, that commentary has a status akin to an agency's interpretation of its own 

regulations, see id. at 44, applies equally to conflicts between the 

commentary to one guideline and the language of another.

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(a), but the safety valve appears in Chapter Five and subsection (b) applies. The exclusion of Chapters Four and Five 

from subsection (a) does not, however, imply that courts 

applying the factors under these chapters under subsection 

(b) should be unable to consider a similarly broad range of 

relevant conduct. Subsection (a) is a background rule, valid 

"in the absence of more explicit instructions in the context of 

a specific guideline," while "[n]o such rule of construction is 

necessary with respect to Chapters Four and Five because 

the guidelines in those Chapters are explicit as to the specific 

factors to be considered." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 background. 

Application Note 3 is not precluded by subsection (b). Although subsection (a) does not apply of its own force in 

construing the safety valve, the natural and reasonable assumption is that the use of the phrase "relevant conduct" in 

Application Note 3 refers to subsection (a), which contains the 

only definition of "relevant conduct" in the guideline so 

entitled. See id. § 1B1.3(a).

Moreover, while implicit cross-referencing is disfavored in 

light of the norm of explicit cross-referencing in the Guidelines, see United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 

(D.C. Cir. 1993), it is appropriate where other considerations 

so dictate. Plunkett maintains, citing Chatman, that because 

Application Note 3 does not mention U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a), the 

definition from that provision should not apply. Chatman,

however, will not bear the weight he would have it carry. In 

that case, as here, the court was considering whether to 

interpret a term in one guideline in accordance with another 

guideline. But the similarity ends there. In Chatman,

"[n]othing in the Guidelines themselves or in the Application 

Notes" suggested that one guideline should control the other, 

Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450, and the term in question was not 

defined in that section "or anywhere else in the Guidelines," 

id. at 1449. Here, the disputed phrase is the very title of 

another guideline. "[R]elevant conduct" also cannot mean 

only the offense of conviction, as Plunkett contends, since 

there would then be no reason for Application Note 3 to 

mention "relevant conduct" in addition to the offense of 

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conviction.3 Using U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a), a definition from the 

part of the Guidelines dealing with general application principles, comports with the structural scheme of the Guidelines. 

Other circuits appear to agree.4

Finally, the district court did not plainly err in finding that 

the safety valve did not apply to Plunkett, although we need 

not resolve the relationship between the standard for the 

safety valve and the standard that governs the two-level 

enhancement for weapon possession under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(1). The commentary to the enhancement provision instructs that the two-level upward "adjustment should 

be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly 

improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense." 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 application note 3. Plunkett maintains that 

the "clearly improbable" standard has no relevance to the 

safety valve's reference to use or possession of a firearm "in 

connection with the offense" and notes that this court has 

distinguished between weapons possession under the enhancement guideline and the safety valve. See In re Sealed 

Case (Sentencing Guidelines' "Safety Valve"), 105 F.3d 1460, 

1463 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Even assuming that he is correct that 

the usual preponderance of the evidence standard applies,5

see United States v. Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 

__________

3

In addition, the broader definition of "offense" in Application 

Note 3 is consistent with congressional intent in enacting the safety 

valve. Congress meant the safety valve to prevent the situation in 

which the "least culpable offenders may receive the same sentences 

as their relatively more culpable counterparts." H.R. REP. NO. 

103-460, at 4 (1994). If other relevant conduct has bearing upon 

the offender's culpability, the district court appropriately considers 

such conduct in applying the safety valve. Given this intent it 

would be odd if eligibility for sentencing under the safety valve 

precluded consideration of relevant conduct.

4

See Wilson, 106 F.3d at 1143; Burke, 91 F.3d at 1053; United 

States v. Smith, 991 F.2d 1468, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1993). Plunkett 

cites no direct support for his contention.

5 We need not address Plunkett's contention that the government should bear the burden of proof to demonstrate a defendant's 

ineligibility for the safety valve, for prevailing on this issue would 

not change the disposition of his appeal.

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1994); see also United States v. Gambino, 106 F.3d 1105, 

1110 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Ramirez, 94 F.3d 1095, 

1101 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ajugwo, 82 F.3d 925, 

929 (9th Cir. 1996), Plunkett appears to recognize, by treating 

the issue in a footnote, that he could not meet his burden to 

show plain error in this regard.6See United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

__________

6

In light of our disposition we do not address whether imposition of a two-level enhancement for when "a dangerous weapon ... 

was possessed" under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) should preclude application of a two-level decrease under the safety valve and U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(4) as a matter of law. We note, however, that the 

government concedes, in light of In re Sealed Case (Sentencing 

Guidelines' "Safety Valve"), 105 F.3d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1997), that 

automatic preclusion should not apply at least when the two-level 

enhancement is based solely on vicarious or co-conspirator liability. 

See id. at 1462-63.

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