Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01430/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01430-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony K. Horn
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY K. HORN, )

)

Petitioner, )

v. )

)

JAMES A. YATES, )

)

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:09-cv-01430-SMS-HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO

ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF

RESPONDENT

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE A

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties

have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States 

Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case,

including the entry of final judgment, by manifesting their

consent in writings signed by the parties or their

representatives and filed by Petitioner on September 2, 2009, and

on behalf of Respondent on October 5, 2009.

I. Procedural Summary

Plaintiff is in the custody of the California Department of

Corrections pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of

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California, County of Kings, of conviction following jury trial

of transporting a controlled substance (cocaine base) (Cal.

Health & Saf. Code § 11352(a)); possession of a controlled

substance (cocaine base) (Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11350(a));

and four misdemeanors, including evasion of a peace officer (Cal.

Veh. Code § 2800.1(a)), possession of paraphernalia used for

smoking a controlled substance (Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11364),

driving with a suspended license (Cal. Veh. Code § 14601.1(a)),

and driving without a valid license (Cal. Veh. Code § 12500(a)).

(LD CT 74-75.) Plaintiff had admitted that he had suffered two 1

prior felony convictions of first degree burglary and assault

(Cal. Pen. Code §§ 1170.12, 667, 459, 245(a)(2)). (LD CT 74.) On

February 21, 2008, Plaintiff was sentenced to twenty-five years

to life in prison. (LD CT 157.) 

Petitioner timely appealed to the California Court of

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, where on January 6, 2009, the

judgment was affirmed. (LD 4, op. p. 6.) Petitioner filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme on February 23,

2009 (LD 12, pet. p. 1), which was denied on July 15, 2009, in a

single sentence unaccompanied by any explanation. (LD 13, dock.

p. 1).

Plaintiff filed the petition before the Court on August 14,

2009. Respondent filed an answer on November 6, 2009, admitting

that the petition was timely and the claim appeared to be

exhausted. Petitioner filed a traverse on December 18, 2009.

“LD” refers to the documents lodged by Respondent with his answer. “CT” and “RT” refer to the clerk’s

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and reporter’s transcripts lodged by Respondent, each of which is consecutively paginated; otherwise, the documents

lodged by Respondent have been lodged as separate documents without consecutive pagination.

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II. Jurisdiction

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008

(1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9 Cir. 1999). th

A district court may entertain a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a state court on the ground that the custody is in violation of

the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28

U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 n. 7 (2000). 

Plaintiff’s sole claim is that he suffered a violation of

his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the effective

assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object

to evidence that at the time of the offenses in question,

Petitioner was wanted by law enforcement for an unrelated offense

and had previously served time in jail. Plaintiff seeks reversal

of his convictions of the felonies of transportation and

possession of cocaine base as well as the misdemeanor of

possessing paraphernalia. Thus, a violation of the Constitution

is alleged.

Further, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kings

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction

of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(a), (d).

Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over this action.

///////

/////////

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III. Facts2

Hanford Police Officer Cory Mathews testified that on May 3,

2007, at approximately 4:00 p.m., he received a dispatch

regarding a "wanted" subject. Mathews saw a Ford Expedition and

driver matching the description of the vehicle and driver

described in the dispatch, so Matthews made a U-turn. Mathews

followed the Expedition and activated his overhead lights,

alternating headlights, and siren, but the Expedition continued

traveling for approximately one-half mile before parking in a

driveway.

Mathews got out of his patrol car and ordered the driver,

Horn, out of the car. Horn got out and was taken to Mathews's

patrol car where he was handcuffed and placed in the back seat.

Mathews ordered the passenger, Nelson Lewis, out of the

Expedition and took him into custody for officer safety reasons.

Mathews spoke with Horn and asked him why he did not stop.

Horn replied that he got scared and drove to his father's house

because the Expedition belonged to his girlfriend and he did not

want it to be towed. While Mathews spoke with Horn, Officer Dale

Williams gave Mathews a plastic baggie containing .11 grams of

cocaine base that Williams found in the passenger's cup holder

that was molded into the Expedition's center console. Mathews

looked in the car and found a crack pipe in the same location.

When Mathews asked Horn about the cocaine base and pipe found in

the Expedition, he admitted they belonged to him. Horn also

The factual summary is taken from the second and third pages of the

2

opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, filed

January 6, 2009, in case number F054886. See, Galvan v. Alaska Dep’t. of

Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1199 n. 1 (9 Cir. 2005).

th

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stated that he was wanted by the police and did not want to go

back to jail. A urine sample provided by Horn tested positive for

cocaine.

Officer Stefanie Reese searched Lewis and found a crack pipe

on him.

The Defense Case

Lewis testified he was Horn's uncle. According to Lewis,

after Horn stopped the car in the driveway, the police did not

take him or Horn out of the car. Instead, Horn got out and walked

up to the front door of his father's residence. Lewis got out

of the car and was immediately told by the officers to put his

hands up. However, before getting out, Lewis put the cocaine base

and one of two glass pipes he had that day in one of the cup

holders in the center console. Lewis wanted to report to the

police that the cocaine and pipe found in the console belonged to

him, but he never did. Lewis was impeached with four convictions

for resisting arrest.

Officer Mathews testified in rebuttal that Horn did not exit

the car until Mathews ordered him out at gun point.

(Opn. at 2-3.)

IV. Legal Standards Governing Habeas Corpus

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

It is the petitioner’s burden to show that the decision was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 641

(2003); Baylor v.Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9 Cir. 1996). th

This Court must first decide what constitutes “clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States” within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). The term refers to the holdings,

as distinct from dicta, of decisions of the Supreme Court as of

the time of the relevant state court’s decision. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). It is thus the governing legal

principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the

pertinent time. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72.

A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if

it is substantially different from the relevant precedent of the

Supreme Court; the term “contrary to” is commonly understood to

mean “diametrically different,” “opposite in character or

nature,” or “mutually opposed.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405 (2000). A decision of a state court is contrary to clearly

established federal law if the state court applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court’s

cases or reaches a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on a question of law. Id. A state court’s decision

is also contrary to clearly established federal law if the facts

facing the state court are materially indistinguishable from

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relevant Supreme Court precedent, but the state court arrives at

a result opposite to the Supreme Court’s result. Id. A state

court’s application of a correct governing standard which leads

to a result different from that which would have been reached by 

the federal court considering the habeas petition is not

necessarily contrary to clearly established federal law. Id. at

406.

A state court’s decision involves an unreasonable

application of federal law if it correctly identifies the

governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of

a case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407-408. An application

of law is unreasonable if it is objectively unreasonable; an

application of federal law that is incorrect or inaccurate is not

necessarily unreasonable. Id. at 410.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that in a habeas

proceeding brought by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment

of a state court, a determination of a factual issue made by a

state court shall be presumed to be correct; the petitioner has

the burden of producing clear and convincing to rebut the

presumption of correctness. Not every finding of fact must be

expressly stated on the record; factual determinations may be

implied where it is clear in light of the applicable law that a

court’s decision on relief included an implicit factual

determination. Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 964 (9 Cir. th

2006).

V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A. Legal Standards 

The law governing claims concerning ineffective assistance

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of counsel is clearly established for the purposes of the AEDPA

deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v.

Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1229 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in

violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a convicted

defendant must show that 1) counsel’s representation fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing

professional norms in light of all the circumstances of the

particular case; and 2) unless prejudice is presumed, it is

reasonably probable that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d

344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). A petitioner must identify the acts or

omissions of counsel that are alleged to have been deficient.

Strickland, 466 U.S. 690. This standard is the same standard that

is applied on direct appeal and in a motion for a new trial.

Strickland, 466 U.S. 697-98.

In determining whether counsel’s conduct was deficient, a

court should consider the overall performance of counsel from the

perspective of counsel at the time of the representation.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There is a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct was adequate and within the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment and the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-90. 

In determining prejudice, a reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of

the proceeding. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the context of a

trial, the question is thus whether there is a reasonable

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probability that, absent the errors, the fact finder would have

had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

695. This Court must consider the totality of the evidence before

the fact finder and determine whether the substandard

representation rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair or

the results thereof unreliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 696.

A court need not address the deficiency and prejudice

inquiries in any given order and need not address both components

if the petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

Where the state court has applied the correct, clearly

established federal law to a claim concerning the ineffective

assistance of counsel, a federal district court analyzes the

claim under the “unreasonable application” clause of §

2254(d)(1), pursuant to which habeas relief is warranted where

the correct law was unreasonably applied to the facts. Weighall

v. Middle, 215 F.3d 1058, 1062-62 (2000) (citing Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)).

B. The Last Reasoned Decision

Where the California Supreme Court denies a claim in a

habeas petition or petition for review without citation or

comment, it is presumed to have denied the claim for the same

reasons stated in the last reasoned decision of a lower state

court; a federal district court will thus “look through” the

unexplained decision of the higher state court to the last

reasoned decision of a lower court as the relevant state-court

determination. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991);

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 998 n. 5 (9 Cir. 2004); th

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Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9 Cir. 2000). th

Here, Plaintiff’s claim was presented on direct appeal to

the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, and in

its opinion, the court addressed Petitioner’s contention on the

merits and stated reasons for rejecting it and affirming the

judgment of conviction. (LD 4, opn. in People v. Horn, case no.

FO54886 filed January 6, 2009, pp. 2-6.) Thus, the intermediate

state appellate court’s opinion was the last reasoned decision.

The pertinent part of the opinion is as follows:

Horn contends he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel by his defense counsel's failure

to move to exclude the evidence that he was a “wanted

man” and had previously served jail time. He further

contends this evidence prejudiced him with respect to

the transportation of cocaine and possession of

paraphernalia counts because it made the jury speculate

what offense or offenses he committed that would cause

the police to engage him in a vehicle pursuit. We will

find that any error in admitting this evidence was

harmless.

“‘“The burden of sustaining a charge of

inadequate or ineffective representation is

upon the defendant. The proof ... must be a

demonstrable reality and not a speculative

matter.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] There is a

presumption the challenged action ‘“might be

considered sound trial strategy” ‘under the

circumstances. [Citations.] On a direct

appeal a conviction will be reversed for

ineffective assistance of counsel only when

the record demonstrates there could have been

no rational tactical purpose for counsel's

challenged act or omission. (People v. Lucas

(1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 442 ... [‘Reviewing

courts reverse convictions on direct appeal

on the ground of incompetence of counsel only

if the record on appeal demonstrates there

could be no rational tactical purpose for

counsel's omissions.”]; People v. Mitcham

(1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1058, ... [‘“If the

record sheds no light on why counsel acted or

failed to act in the manner challenged,

‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation

and failed to provide one, or unless there

simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’

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[citation], the contention [that counsel

provided ineffective assistance] must be

rejected.”‘].)

“In considering a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, it is not necessary to

determine ‘“whether counsel's performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice

suffered by the defendant as a result of the

alleged deficiencies.... If it is easier to

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the

ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which

we expect will often be so, that course

should be followed.”‘ [Citation.] It is not

sufficient to show the alleged errors may

have had some conceivable effect on the

trial's outcome; the defendant must

demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability’ that

absent the errors the result would have been

different. [Citations.]” (People v. Mesa

(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1007-1008.)

Here, the defense did not rebut Officer Mathews's

testimony that Horn admitted the cocaine and pipe found

in the center console belonged to him. Further, Horn's

statement to Officer Mathews was corroborated by the

analysis of his urine sample, which showed he was under

the influence of cocaine when he was stopped, and

Lewis's possession of a cocaine pipe which made it more

likely that the one found in the console belonged to

someone else, i.e., Horn.

 In contrast, the only evidence presented by the

defense to show that the cocaine and pipe found in the

console did not belong to Horn was Lewis's testimony

that these items belonged to him. However, Lewis's

testimony was not persuasive because he did not claim

ownership of the cocaine or the pipe found in the

console the day Horn was arrested and he did not

provide a satisfactory explanation for waiting until

Horn's trial to claim this contraband was his.

Additionally, Lewis's testimony that Horn got out of

the car and walked up to his father's front door before

Officer Mathews spoke with them was contradicted by

Officer Mathews's testimony that he ordered both of

them out of the car. The jury could also reasonably

have found that Lewis was attempting to take

responsibility for the cocaine and pipe found in the

console to protect Horn because Horn was his nephew and

that Lewis was biased against the police because he had

several prior convictions for resisting arrest.

Additionally, Lewis did not explain why he would carry

two pipes and the defense did not explain why Horn

would admit the cocaine and pipe found in the console

belonged to him if they actually belonged to Lewis.

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Moreover, “[t]ransporting a controlled substance

in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352,

subdivision (a) occurs when a person moves contraband

from one place to another. [Citation.]” (People v.

Arndt (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 387, 398.) Transportation

does not require actual or constructive possession.

(People v. Eastman (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 668, 677.)

Here, the jury could reasonably have inferred that

Horn's admission that the cocaine and pipe found in the

console were his, at minimum, indicated that Horn was

aware of the presence of the cocaine found in his car.

Thus, even if the jury believed Lewis's contention that

he left the cocaine in the center console, this would

not have prevented them from convicting Horn on the

transportation of cocaine charge. Accordingly, in view

of the strong evidence that Horn was guilty of

transportation of cocaine and possession of drug

paraphernalia, we conclude it is not reasonably

probably Horn would have received a more favorable

result even if the court had excluded evidence

of his past criminality. We also reject Horn's

ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

(LD 4, opn. pp. 3-6.)

C. Analysis

Here, the appellate court’s statement of facts in its

opinion on the merits of Plaintiff’s claim has not been contested

by Plaintiff. This Court thus presumes that they are correct.

Although in some parts of its opinion the state court

incorrectly characterized Petitioner’s contention as one

regarding erroneously admitted evidence (LD 4, op. pp. 2, 3), it

also identified it as a claim concerning the effective assistance

of counsel (LD 4, op. p. 3) and applied the correct legal

standard of prejudice that was stated in Strickland, namely, that

a defendant was required to demonstrate a reasonably probability

that absent the errors, the result would have been different. (LD

4, op. p. 4). 

It must be determined whether the state court’s decision

involved an objectively unreasonable application of federal law

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to the facts of Petitioner’s case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

at 407-408.

In the process of determining that Petitioner had not

demonstrated prejudice (op. pp. 5-6), the appellate court

considered the overall evidence and the inferences that were

possible. It noted Officer Matthews’ unrebutted testimony that

Petitioner admitted that the cocaine and pipe found in the center

console belonged to him; the confirming, independent evidence of

the urine test indicating that Petitioner was under the influence

of cocaine at the time; and Lewis’s possession of an additional

cocaine pipe, which made more likely an inference that the other

pipe found in the console belonged to Petitioner. (Op. p. 4.) It

noted the absence of any explanation of why Lewis would carry two

pipes and why Petitioner would admit ownership of the pipe and

drugs if they actually belonged to Lewis. (Op. pp. 4-5.)

The state court further reasoned that the only defense

evidence that someone other than Petitioner possessed or owned

the items found in the console was Lewis’s testimony, which was

subject to an inference of bias due to Lewis’s being Petitioner’s

uncle and having suffered several prior convictions for resisting

arrest. (Op. p. 5.) Further, it explained that the failure of

Lewis to have claimed ownership of the cocaine or the pipe

earlier, and the absence of any explanation for that failure,

would deprive Lewis’s testimony of persuasive force. It noted

that Lewis’s testimony concerning the course of events was denied

by Officer Matthews, who further testified that he ordered both

Petitioner and Lewis out of the car. (Id.)

Finally, the appellate court addressed the transportation

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charge separately, noting state law to the effect that it did not

require proof actual or constructive possession, but only that a

person moved contraband from one place to another. The court

noted the reasonableness of an inference that Petitioner’s

admission of ownership of the pipe and cocaine indicated that

Petitioner was at least aware of the presence of cocaine in his

car and thus was subject to conviction for transportation. (Op.

p. 5.) 

Petitioner cites to state law concerning the prejudicial

effect of evidence concerning a defendant’s commission of other

offenses. However, this Court’s task on habeas review is to apply

the pertinent federal standard, which in turn requires a

consideration of the evidence in the case to determine whether

the state court’s application of the standard was objectively

reasonable. The state court reviewed the totality of the

evidence, assessed in an objectively reasonable manner the

inferences to be drawn therefrom by a trier of fact, and reached

an objectively reasonable conclusion concerning the probability

of a different result in the absence of the allegedly substandard

representation. 

The Court thus concludes that the state court’s application

of the Strickland standard to the facts was reasonable. Given the

strong evidence of Petitioner’s guilt and the unpersuasive nature

of the defense evidence, it was not objectively unreasonable for

the state court to conclude that in light of the circumstances,

Petitioner had not demonstrated a reasonable probability that

absent the allegedly deficient representation, the jury would

have had a reasonable doubt as to guilt.

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V. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 336 (2003). A certificate of appealability may issue only if

the applicant makes a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right. § 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a

petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether

the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or

that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement

to proceed further. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336

(quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). A

certificate should issue if the Petitioner shows that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a

valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in any procedural ruling. Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). In determining this issue, a court

conducts an overview of the claims in the habeas petition,

generally assesses their merits, and determines whether the

resolution was debatable among jurists of reason or wrong. Id. It

is necessary for an applicant to show more than an absence of

frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, it is not

necessary for an applicant to show that the appeal will succeed.

Id. at 338. 

A district court must issue or deny a certificate of

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appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the

applicant. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could

debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a

different manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing

of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court

DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

VI. Disposition

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that 

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus IS DENIED with

prejudice; and

2) The Clerk IS DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent;

and

3) The Court DECLINES TO ISSUE a certificate of

appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 21, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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