Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00925/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00925-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Electronic Data Systems Corporation
Defendant
Adwowa Jacobs
Plaintiff
Jeff Williams
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

ADWOWA JACOBS, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 

) 2:05cv925-MHT

ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS ) (WO)

CORPORATION and JEFF )

WILLIAMS, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Adwowa Jacobs brings this sexual harassment

lawsuit against defendants Electronic Data Systems

Corporation (EDS) and Jeff Williams. Jacobs alleges that

the defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e17, and additionally asserts state-law claims for

outrage, assault and battery, invasion of privacy, and

negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and wanton

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 12/18/06 Page 1 of 14
1. The Title VII, outrage, and invasion of privacy

claims were directed at both defendants. The assaultand-battery claim was directed at Williams only, and the

claims for negligent hiring, training, and supervision

and wanton hiring, training, and supervision were

directed at EDS only.

2

hiring, training, and supervision.1

 This court has

original jurisdiction over the Title VII claim pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), as well as supplemental

jurisdiction over the state-law claims pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367.

This case is currently before the court on the

defendants’ motions for summary judgment. For the

reasons that follow, summary judgment will be granted on

all but the assault-and-battery claim, which will be

dismissed without prejudice.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 12/18/06 Page 2 of 14
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that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule 56,

the party seeking summary judgment must first inform the

court of the basis for the motion, at which point the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate

why summary judgment would not be proper. Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17

(11th Cir. 1993) (discussing burden-shifting under Rule

56). The non-moving party must affirmatively set forth

specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and may

not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the

pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The court’s role at the summary-judgment stage is not

to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the

matter, but rather to determine only whether a genuine

issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In doing so, the court must

view the admissible evidence in the light most favorable

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 12/18/06 Page 3 of 14
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to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of that party. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Abandoned Claims

In Jacobs’s response to the defendants’ motions for

summary judgment, Jacobs opposed summary judgment on only

two claims: her Title VII claim against EDS and her

assault-and-battery claim against Williams. On all of

her other claims, Jacobs “acquiesce[d] to the positions

of the Defendants....” Pl. Br. at 4. The court will

therefore treat those claims as abandoned and grant

summary judgment thereon. Road Sprinkler Fitters Local

Union No. 669 v. Independent Sprinkler Corp., 10 F.3d

1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994); Beasley v. Conopco, Inc.,

273 F.Supp.2d 1239, 1246 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (Albritton,

J.).

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 12/18/06 Page 4 of 14
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B. Title VII

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice

for an employer ... to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1).

Sexual harassment violates Title VII’s prohibition of

discrimination based on sex when the “terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment” include a discriminatorily

hostile or abusive environment. Harris v. Forklift Sys.,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986); Mendoza v. Borden,

Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

“To prove sexual harassment under Title VII, a

plaintiff must show (1) that she belongs to a protected

group; (2) that she has been subjected to unwelcome

sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on

her sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of

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2. Rule 36(a) states in relevant part:

“A party may serve upon any other party

a written request for the admission, for

purposes of the pending action only, of

the truth of any matters within the

scope of Rule 26(b)(1) set forth in the

request that relate to statements or

opinions of fact or of the application

of law to fact....

“The matter is admitted unless, within

30 days after service of the request,

... the party to whom the request is

directed serves upon the party

requesting the admission a written

answer or objection addressed to the

(continued...)

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employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working

environment; and (5) that a basis for holding the

employer liable exists.” Hulsey v. Pride Rests., LLC,

367 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004). If a plaintiff is

unable to establish all five elements, the defendant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In this case, Jacobs’s Title VII claim for sexual

harassment cannot survive summary judgment because she

failed to respond to EDS’s request for admissions. Under

Rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,2

 a

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2. (...continued)

matter, signed by the party or by the

party's attorney.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a).

3. Rule 36(a) encompasses admissions as to a fact,

a mixed question of law and fact, and even admissions on

an ultimate issue or one that would otherwise be

dispositive of the case. See 8A Wright, Miller & Marcus,

Federal Practice & Procedure § 2256, at 538 (1994).

7

party may serve on any other party a written request for

admission of the truth of a matter. Fed. R. Civ. P.

36(a).3

 If a party fails to respond to a request for

admission within 30 days, the matter is deemed admitted.

Id. In this case, on March 27, 2006, EDS served Jacobs

with requests for 17 admissions, including the following:

“REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit that

you have not been harassed because of

your gender.

...

“REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15: Admit

that you have never been subject to

unwelcome sexual harassment during your

employment with EDS.”

EDS Ex. A-2, at 7-8. Jacobs having failed to respond to

EDS’s requests for admissions, the magistrate judge

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 12/18/06 Page 7 of 14
4. Rule 36(b) states in relevant part:

“Any matter admitted under this rule is

conclusively established unless the

court on motion permits withdrawal or

amendment of the admission. Subject to

the provision of Rule 16 governing

amendment of a pre-trial order, the

court may permit withdrawal or amendment

when the presentation of the merits of

the action will be subserved thereby and

the party who obtained the admission

fails to satisfy the court that

withdrawal or amendment will prejudice

that party in maintaining the action or

defense on the merits.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b).

8

entered an order on July 12, 2006, deeming them admitted

by operation of Rule 36(a).

Under Rule 36(b),4

 a court may permit a party to

withdraw an admission if “the presentation of the merits

will not be subserved by the withdrawal” and “the party

obtaining the admissions would not be prejudiced in its

presentation of the case by the withdrawal.” Smith v.

First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 837 F.2d 1575, 1577 (11th

Cir. 1988). In this case, however, Jacobs has filed no

motion to withdraw the admissions or set aside the

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 12/18/06 Page 8 of 14
5. Viewed in the light most favorable to Jacobs

absent her admissions, the evidence reflects the

following. Jacobs, an EDS employee since 1997, was

entering the elevator at her workplace after lunch on

February 10, 2005, when she felt someone touch her rear

(continued...)

9

magistrate judge’s order. Nor did Jacobs even address

the issue in her brief in opposition to summary judgment,

despite the defendants having argued that summary

judgment was warranted on the basis of the admissions.

See EDS Mot. Summ. J. at 7 n.3; Williams Mot. Summ. J. at

16. As Rule 36(b) expressly provides for withdrawal only

“on motion,” the court will not sua sponte withdraw

Jacobs’s admissions or set aside the order of the

magistrate judge. See Am. Auto. Ass’n v. AAA Legal

Clinic, 930 F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th Cir. 1991).

Admittedly, Jacobs has opposed summary judgment with

other evidence that tends to contradict the admissions.

Jacobs’s deposition testimony is generally inconsistent

with her admissions that she had not been harassed

because of her gender and had never been subject to

unwelcome sexual harassment during her employment at EDS.5

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 12/18/06 Page 9 of 14
5. (...continued)

end. She found herself alone in the elevator with Jeff

Williams, a non-supervisory co-worker, who grabbed her,

pressed his body against her, and forced her against the

wall. Despite Jacobs’s verbal and physical protests,

Williams persisted, saying he was cold and wanted her to

warm him up. Williams untucked Jacobs’s blouse, rubbed

her stomach and breasts, and began to put his hand down

her pants. Williams laid his head on her shoulder and

told Jacobs it felt good. When the elevator came to a

stop, Williams walked out. Williams Ex. E.

Immediately thereafter, Jacobs sent the following email to Williams: “What just happened in the elevator

please don’t let that happen again. That was very

inappropriate and disrespectful. No need to apologize in

the future let’s just keep things on a business level.”

EDS Ex. B-3. Williams replied: “I understand, just

joking around with you, no disrespect meant.” EDS Ex. B4.

Jacobs reported the incident to EDS, and EDS

conducted an investigation. There were no witnesses, and

Williams stated that all he did was hug Jacobs. Unable

to substantiate more than a ‘hugging,’ and having no

record of previous complaints or problems with Williams,

EDS reprimanded Williams with a verbal warning, required

him to complete an online workplace harassment training

course, and instructed Jacobs to report any future

incidents. Liebman Decl. ¶¶ 8-11.

On June 13, 2005, Jacobs again complained to EDS

about Williams’s conduct. This time, she alleged that

Williams was intimidating her, following her, and staring

at her, both in and out of the workplace. EDS again

investigated, but Williams denied any misconduct and none

of his co-workers would corroborate Jacobs’s allegations.

EDS told Williams that he was to stay away from Jacobs.

Id. ¶¶ 12-13.

Jacobs has found these incidents so disturbing that

(continued...)

10

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 12/18/06 Page 10 of 14
5. (...continued)

she has sought medical and psychological care as a

result. She has suffered from anxiety attacks,

depression, paranoia, and insomnia, and she was afraid to

ride the elevator alone. As a result of her physical

altercation with Williams in the elevator, Jacobs

suffered a painful physical injury to her shoulder which

has required medical care and physical therapy. Jacobs

Dep. at 176-209.

11

But admissions are unlike other evidence in that a party

cannot rebut its own admissions by introducing evidence

that contradicts it. In re Carney, 258 F.3d 415, 420

(5th Cir. 2001) (“Since Rule 36 admissions, whether

express or by default, are conclusive as to the matters

admitted, they cannot be overcome at the summary

judgement stage by contradictory affidavit testimony or

other evidence in the summary judgment record.”); United

States v. Kasuboski, 834 F.2d 1345, 1350 (7th Cir. 1987);

see also 8A Wright, Miller & Marcus, § 2264, at 572-74.

Once an issue is deemed admitted, the admission is

conclusive unless withdrawn upon motion to the court.

Perez v. Miami-Dade County, 297 F.3d 1255, 1264 (11th

Cir. 2002); United States v. 2204 Barbara Lane, 960 F.2d

126, 129 (11th Cir. 1992); Stubbs v. Comm’r, 797 F.2d

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 12/18/06 Page 11 of 14
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936, 937-38 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).

As stated, the court’s role at the summary-judgment

stage is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the

truth of the matter, but rather to determine only whether

a genuine issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). If this case were

to proceed to trial, Jacobs would not be permitted to

introduce evidence to rebut the admissions she has

already made during the discovery phase of this

litigation. Williams v. City of Dothan, 818 F.2d 755,

762 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Am. Auto. Ass’n, 930 F.2d

at 1120. Jacobs has admitted that she was not harassed

because of her gender and she was never subject to

unwelcome sexual harassment during her employment with

EDS. EDS Ex. A-2, at 7-8. These admissions preclude

recovery under Title VII, which in a sexual harassment

suit requires that the plaintiff be subject to unwelcome

harassment on the basis of sex. Hulsey, 367 F.3d at

1244. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material

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fact as to Jacobs’s Title VII claim, and EDS is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.

C. Supplemental State-Law Claim

This court “may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim if ... [it] has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because summary judgment is due to

be granted on Jacobs’s Title VII claim, the court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her

non-abandoned state-law claim against Williams for

assault and battery. Accordingly, the assault-andbattery claim will be dismissed, albeit without

prejudice. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383

U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966); L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d

679, 685 (11th Cir.1995). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(d), the applicable statute of limitations under

state law will be tolled 30 days so as to allow Jacobs

time to refile that claim in state court.

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 12/18/06 Page 13 of 14
* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that

summary judgment should be granted in favor of the

defendants on Jacobs’s Title VII claim as well as her

abandoned claims, while her remaining state-law claim

against Williams for assault and battery should be

dismissed without prejudice.

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 18th day of December, 2006.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 12/18/06 Page 14 of 14