Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_04-cv-00538/USCOURTS-ared-4_04-cv-00538-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pearleana Richmond
Plaintiff
Social Security Administration
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

PEARLEANA RICHMOND Plaintiff

v. 4:04CV000538 JLH/HLJ

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration, Defendant

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

INSTRUCTIONS

This recommended disposition has been submitted to United States

District Judge J. Leon Holmes. The parties may file specific written

objections to these findings and recommendations and must provide the

factual or legal basis for each objection. An original and two

copies of the objections must be filed with the Clerk no later than

eleven (11) days from the date of the findings and recommendations.

A copy must be served on the opposing party. The District Judge,

even in the absence of objections, may reject these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

DISPOSITION

Plaintiff, Pearleana Richmond, has appealed the final decision

of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration to deny her

claim for Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security

Income (SSI), based on disability. Both parties have submitted

appeal briefs and the case is ready for decision.

The Court's function on review is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the

Case 4:04-cv-00538-JLH Document 15 Filed 07/14/05 Page 1 of 12
2

record as a whole and whether it is based on legal error. Long v.

Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v. Chater,

82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1996).

 In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must

consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as

well as evidence that supports it; the Court may not, however,

reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial

evidence would have supported an opposite decision. Sultan v.

Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d

1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).

"Disability" is the "inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A "physical or

mental impairment" is "an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Plaintiff alleged disability based on high blood pressure,

thyroid problem and rheumatoid arthritis. (Tr. 121) The

Commissioner found that she was not disabled within the meaning of

the Social Security Act. The only issue before this Court is whether

Case 4:04-cv-00538-JLH Document 15 Filed 07/14/05 Page 2 of 12
 1

The Hon. J. Frederick Gatzke.

3

the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within

the meaning of the Act is supported by substantial record evidence.

After conducting an administrative hearing, the Administrative

Law Judge1

 (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a

disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time

through October 28, 2003, the date of his decision. (Tr. 24) On May

15, 2004, the Appeals Council received and considered additional

evidence and then denied Plaintiff's request for a review of the

ALJ's decision, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the

Commissioner. (Tr. 6-8) Plaintiff then filed her complaint

initiating this appeal. (Docket #2)

After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds

that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence.

Plaintiff was 47 years old at the time of the hearing. (Tr. 29)

She completed the tenth grade in school. Id. She had no past

relevant work. (Tr. 23)

The ALJ considered Plaintiff's impairments by way of the

required five-step sequential evaluation process. The first step

involves a determination of whether the claimant is involved in

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)(2004). If the

claimant is, benefits are denied, regardless of medical condition,

age, education or work experience. Id.

Step 2 involves a determination, based solely on the medical

evidence, of whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of

Case 4:04-cv-00538-JLH Document 15 Filed 07/14/05 Page 3 of 12
4

impairments which significantly limits claimant’s ability to perform

basic work activities, a “severe” impairment. Id., § 404.1520(c).

If not, benefits are denied. Id.

Step 3 involves a determination, again based solely on the

medical evidence, of whether the severe impairment(s) meets or equals

a listed impairment which is presumed to be disabling. Id.,

§ 404.1520(d). If so, and the duration requirement is met, benefits

are awarded. Id.

If claimant does not meet or equal a Listing, then a residual

functional capacity assessment is made based on all the relevant

medical and other evidence. Id., § 404.1520(e). This residual

functional capacity assessment is utilized at Steps 4 and 5. Id.

Step 4 involves a determination of whether the claimant has

sufficient residual functional capacity, despite the impairment(s),

to perform the physical and mental demands of past relevant work.

Id., § 404.1520(f). If so, benefits are denied. Id.

Step 5 involves a determination of whether the claimant is able

to make an adjustment to other work, given claimant's age, education

and work experience. Id., § 404.1520(g). If so, benefits are

denied; if not, benefits are awarded. Id.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since January 1, 1986, her alleged onset of

disability. (Tr. 23) He found that Plaintiff had "severe"

impairments, myalgias and myofascial pain due to polyarthritis with

positive rheumatoid factor and status post open reduction and

internal fixation of the fifth metatarsal fracture, but that she did

Case 4:04-cv-00538-JLH Document 15 Filed 07/14/05 Page 4 of 12
5

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or

equaled a Listing. Id. He judged that Plaintiff’s allegations

regarding her impairment and its impact on her ability to work were

not totally credible. Id. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional

capacity for sedentary work activity and had no significant

nonexertional impairments. Id. 

He noted that she had no substantial gainful work experience in

the past 15 years. Id. He ALJ correctly noted that, once Plaintiff

was determined to have no past relevant work, the burden shifted to

the Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs within the

economy that she could perform, given her residual functional

capacity, age, education and past work. (Tr. 22)

The ALJ applied Plaintiff's vocational profile and the residual

functional capacity which he had found, and established that Rule

201.24, Table No. 1, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4

directed a finding of not disabled. (Tr. 23) Consequently, the ALJ

concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id.

Plaintiff points out that the ALJ found that she was capable of

sedentary work. (Br. 5, Tr. 22, 23) She correctly points out that

the ALJ, in application of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines,

inconsistently stated that she was capable of light work activity.

(Tr. 22) While Plaintiff’s point is well taken, it seems clear that

the statement that she was capable of light work was scrivener's

error. Twice, the ALJ correctly stated that she was capable of only

sedentary work. (Tr. 22, 23) More importantly, all of Table No. 1,

Case 4:04-cv-00538-JLH Document 15 Filed 07/14/05 Page 5 of 12
6

Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4 deals with sedentary, as

opposed to light, work.

Plaintiff also contends that the Rule that the ALJ utilized to

find that she was not disabled applied to persons 18-44, not to those

45-49, like she. (Br. 5) There are two relevant periods of time in

this case. Plaintiff was last insured for the purposes of Title II

March 31, 1986. (Tr. 23) In order to receive Disability Insurance

benefits, an applicant must establish that she was disabled before

the expiration of her insured status. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(c)

(1991); Pyland v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1998); Battles

v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 657, 659 (8th Cir. 1990). She alleged an onset

of disability on January 1, 1986. Therefore, for the purposes of

Disability Insurance benefits, the relevant period is January 1

through March 31, 1986.

For purposes of SSI, Plaintiff’s application was filed in May of

2002. (Tr. 315) SSI benefits are not payable for a period prior to

the application. Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1185 (8th Cir.

1989). An applicant must be disabled during the pendency of his or

her application. Turley v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 524, 527 (8th Cir.

1991). The ALJ’s decision is dated October 28, 2003. (Tr. 24)

Therefore, the relevant time period for SSI is May, 2002, through

October 28, 2003.

Rule 201.24 would have been applicable to Plaintiff’s Disability

Insurance benefits claim, since she was 31 years old at the time that

she was last insured. Rule 201.18, which the ALJ did not mention,

would have been applicable to her SSI claim. The ALJ did not cite

Case 4:04-cv-00538-JLH Document 15 Filed 07/14/05 Page 6 of 12
7

Rule 201.18, but the error is harmless, because it also directed a

finding of not disabled.

Plaintiff suggests that, because she will be 50 years old

October 12, 2005, and Rule 201.19 directs a finding of disabled, that

she should have been evaluated under that Rule, too. A claimant’s

age as of the time of the decision governs in applying the

regulations. Varley v. Secretary of Health & Human Services , 820

F.2d 777, 780 (6th Cir. 1987); Russell v. Commissioner of Social

Security, 20 F.Supp.2d 1133, 1134 (W.D. Mich. 1998). If, as

Plaintiff seems to suggest, this were not so, then courts would

constantly remand cases as claimants aged through the appellate

process.

Next, Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not

support the ALJ’s decision because he did not present evidence from

a vocational expert. (Br. 6-10)

Generally, if the claimant suffers from nonexertional

impairments that limit her ability to perform the full range

of work described in one of the specific categories set

forth in the guidelines, the ALJ is required to utilize

testimony of a vocational expert. Groeper v. Sullivan, 932

F.2d 1234, 1235 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1991). In those instances,

the ALJ cannot rely exclusively on the guidelines to direct

a conclusion of whether claimant is "disabled" or "not

disabled." Thompson v. Bowen, 850 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir.

1988). Instead, testimony of a vocational expert must be

taken. Groeper, 932 F.2d at 1235. The exception to this

general rule is that the ALJ may exclusively rely on the

guidelines even though there are nonexertional impairments

if the ALJ finds, and the record supports the finding, that

the nonexertional impairments do not significantly diminish

the claimant's RFC to perform the full range of activities

listed in the guidelines. Thompson, 850 F.2d at 349-350

(emphasis added).

Reed v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 812, 816 (8th Cir. 1993)(emphasis in

original); accord, McGeorge v. Barnhart, 321 F.3d 766, 768-69 (8th

Case 4:04-cv-00538-JLH Document 15 Filed 07/14/05 Page 7 of 12
 2

The ALJ also cited S.S.R. 96-7p, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929.

That ruling tracks Polaski and the two regulations and elaborates on

them.

8

Cir. 2003); Holley v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2001);

Holz v. Apfel, 191 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 1999). 

The record firmly supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff had

no nonexertional impairment that significantly affected her residual

functional capacity to perform a full range of sedentary work

activities.

In support of her argument, Plaintiff points to her testimony of

pain, swelling, dizziness and sleepiness, and contends that the ALJ

improperly discredited that testimony. (Br. 7) The ALJ evaluated

Plaintiff's subjective complaints in light of Polaski v. Heckler, 739

F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984).2 (Tr. 17-22)

The absence of an objective medical basis which supports the

degree of severity of subjective complaints alleged is just

one factor to be considered in evaluating the credibility of

the testimony and complaints. The adjudicator must give

full consideration to all of the evidence presented relating

to subjective complaints, including the claimant's prior

work record, and observations by third parties and treating

and examining physicians relating to such matters as:

1. the claimant's daily activities;

2. the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain;

3. precipitating and aggravating factors;

4. dosage, effectiveness and side effects of

medication;

5. functional restrictions.

The adjudicator is not free to accept or reject the

claimant's subjective complaints solely on the basis of

personal observations. Subjective complaints may be

discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as

a whole. 

Case 4:04-cv-00538-JLH Document 15 Filed 07/14/05 Page 8 of 12
9

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis in original).

There is little objective support in the record for Plaintiff's

claim of disability. No evaluations during the relevant periods

showed medical conditions that were disabling. Furthermore,

inconsistencies between the medical evidence and Plaintiff's

subjective complaints gave reason to discount those complaints.

Richmond v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1141, 1443 (8th Cir. 1994). 

Given the inconsistencies in Plaintiff's statements, the lack of

medical evidence in support of Plaintiff's allegations, the lack of

treatment for significant periods of time, Plaintiff's daily

activities, her poor work record, her functional capabilities and the

lack of restriction placed on Plaintiff by her physicians, the ALJ

could rightly discount Plaintiff's subjective complaints. See Thomas

v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259-60 (8th Cir. 1991); Cabrnoch v. Bowen,

881 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir. 1989).

For instance, although Plaintiff contended that her medications

made her sleepy and she had to take one or two naps during the day, as

the ALJ properly noted, she had never reported any such side effects

to her physicians. (Tr. 21, 22) There is no evidence that Plaintiff

complained of any side effects of her medication with any doctor, so

the ALJ was justified in rejecting that claim. Hajek v. Shalala, 30

F.3d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1994); see Barrett v. Shalala , 38 F.3d 1019,

1023 (8th Cir. 1994); Richmond v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1441, 1444 (8th

Cir. 1994); Ownbey v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 342, 345 (8th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff achieved relief of her symptoms on prednisone. (Tr.

235) However, she let her prescription run out. (Tr. 233) Her

Case 4:04-cv-00538-JLH Document 15 Filed 07/14/05 Page 9 of 12
10

doctor also started her on methotrexate, and was enthusiastic about

its use. (Tr. 235) However, she stopped taking it, and had missed an

appointment where the doctor had intended to increase her dosage.

(Tr. 232) 

Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ’s failure to list the Polaski

factors, and argues that he made no reference to her activities of

daily living. (Br. 8) The ALJ cited Polaski, S.S.R. 96-7p, 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929. There was no reason to list every

factor. Furthermore, the ALJ noted her sitting, standing, cooking and

yard work. (Tr. 21) Those are activities of daily living.

The ALJ's credibility analysis was proper. He made express

credibility findings and gave his reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints. E.g., Shelton v. Chater, 87 F.3d 992, 995 (8th

Cir. 1996); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 258 (8th Cir. 1996);

Hall v. Chater, 62 F.3d 220, 224 (8th Cir. 1995). 

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to adequately

comply with S.S.R. 96-8p because he did not make a function-byfunction analysis of her residual functional capacity. (Br. 10-11)

The ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity

based on all relevant evidence, including medical records,

observations of treating physicians and others, and claimant’s own

descriptions of her limitations. Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549,

556 (8th Cir. 2003); Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th

Cir. 2001).

The ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination clearly

included physical functioning, as called for by the Ruling and 20

Case 4:04-cv-00538-JLH Document 15 Filed 07/14/05 Page 10 of 12
 3

Both § 404.1545 and 416.945 also contain a paragraph (c) pertaining

to mental functioning and a paragraph (d) dealing with other

abilities affected by impairments, such as vision, hearing, skin

impairments, etc. There were no such impairments in this case.

11

C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(b) and 416.945(b) (2003). 3

 Consistent with the

Ruling, the ALJ narratively discussed medical evidence, subjective

complaints and other evidence, recognized that her impairments created

limitations and incorporated those limitations into the residual

functional capacity. (Tr. 17-23) A fair reading of the ALJ’s opinion

reveals that he properly determined Plaintiff’s residual functional

capacity. Plaintiff’s argument seeks to place the burden of proof on

the Commissioner. It is the claimant's burden, and not the Social

Security Commissioner's burden, to prove the claimant's residual

functional capacity. Masterson v. Barnhart, 383 F.3d 731, 737 (8th

Cir. 2004); Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2003);

Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); Young v.

Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1069 n.5 (8th Cir. 2000); Anderson v. Shalala,

51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995). 

It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make

an independent decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision of the

ALJ because there is evidence in the record which contradicts his

findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence in the

record as a whole which supports the decision of the ALJ. E.g., Mapes

v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996); Pratt v. Sullivan, 956

F.2d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 1992).

There is ample evidence in the record as a whole that "a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion"

Case 4:04-cv-00538-JLH Document 15 Filed 07/14/05 Page 11 of 12
12

of the ALJ in this case. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; see

also Reutter v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2004). The

Commissioner's decision is not based on legal error.

THEREFORE, the Court hereby affirms the final determination of

the Commissioner and dismisses Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 11th day of July, 2005.

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 4:04-cv-00538-JLH Document 15 Filed 07/14/05 Page 12 of 12