Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05944-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Board of Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers Health Care Plan of Northern California
Plaintiff
Jayco Mechanical
Defendant
Kym Mechanical
Defendant
Sheet Metal Workers Local 104 Vacation, Holiday Savings Plan
Plaintiff
Sheet Metal Workers Pension Trust of Northern California
Plaintiff
Bruce Word
Plaintiff

Document Text:

NO. C 09-05944 RS

ORDER

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

*E-Filed 06/15/2010* 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SHEET 

METAL WORKERS HEALTH CARE 

PLAN OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, 

SHEET METAL WORKERS PENSION 

TRUST OF NOTHERN CALIFORNIA, 

SHEET METAL WORKERS LOCAL 104 

VACATION, HOLIDAY SAVINGS PLAN, 

and BRUCE WORD as Trustee, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

KYM MECHANICAL, a California 

corporation, formerly doing business as 

JAYCO MECHANICAL, 

 Defendant. 

____________________________________/

No. C 09-05944 RS 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT 

Plaintiffs are the Board of Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers Health Care Plan of 

Northern California, Sheet Metal Workers Pension Trust of Northern California, Sheet Metal 

Workers Local 104 Vacation, Holiday Savings Plan, and Bruce Word as Trustee (collectively, the 

“Union”). They move for default judgment, liquidated damages, interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs 

Case 3:09-cv-05944-RS Document 19 Filed 06/15/10 Page 1 of 5
NO. C 09-05944 RS 

ORDER

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pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 55(b)(2). Defendant Kym Mechanical (“Kym”) 

has not filed papers in opposition. This matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument, 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Accordingly, the motion hearing scheduled for June 17, 2010

is vacated. It is apparent from plaintiffs’ motion and supplemental declarations that they must 

submit additional information before default judgment would be appropriate.1 Their motion is 

therefore denied without prejudice. The Clerk’s entry of default shall remain in place and, good 

cause appearing, plaintiffs may renew their motion for default. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On July 1, 1994, Kym entered into a collective bargaining agreement (the “Agreement”) 

with the Union, which provided that Kym would periodically contribute funds based on the number 

of Union employee hours worked. As plaintiffs explain, the Savings Plan’s administrators sent to 

Kym a preprinted form each month. This form listed all known employees and the applicable 

“fringe benefit contribution rates.” Maraia Decl. ¶ 2. Kym was to complete the reporting form by 

making corrections (such as deletions of terminated employees or additions of new hires) and by 

totaling up all contribution sums due. Under the Agreement, Kym had until the twentieth day of the 

month after the work was completed to pay these contributions. Payments after the twentieth were 

termed “delinquent.” The parties extended the Agreement from June 30, 1999 to June 30, 2006. 

What is not entirely clear from the papers, though, is whether the Agreement remained valid after 

June 30, 2006. Under this second contract, late payment subjected Kym to liability for liquidated 

damages, as well as for attorneys’ fees and costs. 

 

1

 Entry of default judgment is within the court’s discretion, Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 

(9th Cir. 1980), and is governed by the following factors: (1) the merits of plaintiffs’ substantive 

claim; (2) the sufficiency of the complaint; (3) prejudice to plaintiffs; (4) the sum of money at stake; 

(5) potential disputes concerning material facts; (6) whether default was due to excusable neglect; 

and (7) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s strong policy favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel 

v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). When considering the Eitel factors, all factual 

allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint are taken as true, except for those relating to damages. 

TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). Because certain threshold 

questions indicate that default judgment would be premature, the Court does not reach the Eitel

factors. 

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NO. C 09-05944 RS 

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Apparently, a dispute arose when Kym made a delinquent payment for work done in 

September of 2009. Plaintiffs allege that when they sought liquidated damages for that delinquent 

payment, Kym stopped making certain monthly contributions altogether. On December 18, 2009, 

the Union filed the instant Complaint, citing Kym’s failure to pay liquidated damages relating to the 

September late payment and for any missed contributions (and corresponding late fees) thereafter. 

After Kym failed to respond to the Complaint or make an appearance in the case, plaintiffs sought 

an entry of default, which the Clerk of Court entered. Plaintiffs now move for default judgment 

pursuant to contract law and section 1132 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 

(“ERISA”). See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). 

A declaration filed with the instant motion indicates that, for the time periods stated in the 

Complaint, Kym’s underpayments total $25,010.64. See Ex. 3 of Maraia Decl. Plaintiffs also seek 

interest assessed from the delinquency date of each payment. Id. (calculating interest); See also Ex. 

6 of Carroll Decl. (setting rate of interest). To lend legitimacy to these amounts, plaintiffs supply 

copies of the self-reporting documents described above (and listing employee names, hours worked, 

and payment due dates). See Ex. 4 of Maraia Decl. Somewhat disconcertingly, though, the majority 

of these documents are unsigned by the employer. 

When combined with interest and liquidated damages, the damage request climbs to 

$41,859.53. See Ex. 3 of Maraia Decl. Finally, plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees through June 17, 

2010, totaling $740.00, plus costs of suit totaling $425.00. See Carroll Decl. 1:24-1:28 (calculating 

fees and costs). The total requested recovery is $43,024.53. The Complaint, by contrast, generally 

requests recovery of the unpaid contributions owed, liquidated damages, interest, attorneys’ fees, 

and costs of suit but provides no numerical estimate of these requested damages. 

Plaintiffs allege they notified Kym of the entry of default and subsequent motion for default 

judgment. They also submit copies of various documents allegedly sent to Kym to alert it to the 

exact damages requested. These documents are unsigned, blank, and bear no indication of the time 

period to which they refer, nor any estimation of the extent of Kym’s liability. 

II. DISCUSSION 

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A. Existence of Contract

 Plaintiffs neither provide evidence nor allege that the Agreement extended beyond June of 

2006. The alleged failures to contribute funds first occurred in 2009. The very fact that Kym 

continued to make payments beyond 2006 does of course suggest an extension occurred, but without 

really any explanation from plaintiffs, it is not clear that this Court may assume the existence of a 

contract governing the relevant time period. If such a contract exists, plaintiffs should so indicate. 

B. Damages Must Not Differ in Kind from Those Identified in the Complaint

A second threshold question is whether plaintiffs seek to recover damages not listed in their 

Complaint. Following entry of default, district courts are authorized to grant default judgment so 

long as the judgment does not “differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the 

pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. Technically, the Complaint describes 

the kind of damages plaintiffs seek. The Complaint does not, though, ever actually estimate the 

expected recovery, and so the numbers expressed in plaintiffs’ motion for default do not appear 

anywhere in the Complaint. In explanation, plaintiffs at least in the Complaint suggest that Kym 

had “unique knowledge of the amounts of contributions . . . . .” Compl. ¶ 6. Assuming this is true, 

it raises the question of whether plaintiffs’ estimates are indeed reliable. In the motion and 

referenced supporting declarations and exhibits, plaintiffs do supply copies of the self-reporting 

records exchanged by the parties to support their contention that Kym’s reported underpayments, 

liquidated damages, and interest for the time periods named in the Complaint total $41,859.53. 

While these records detail Kym’s expected monthly contributions, the fact that few are actually 

signed by the employer does give some cause for concern. 

The chief concern surrounding plaintiffs’ failure to pin down their requested relief prior to 

the default judgment stage is that, in doing so, they may have also failed to notify Kym adequately. 

Plaintiffs, of course, insist they duly (and even periodically) informed Kym of the relief they now 

request. See Ex. 5 of Carroll Decl. They supply bare form documents used for payment defaults 

devoid of dates and signatures. See Ex. 2 of Maraia Decl. Indeed, many of these documents are 

labeled “drafts” and lack markings of any kind. Id. Presumably, completed versions of these 

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default forms, if sent to Kym, would demonstrate that Kym on a monthly basis knew precisely the 

extent of plaintiffs’ demands. From the facts and documents presented, it seems possible Kym was 

amply notified. Such a showing, however, is not sufficient to merit default judgment. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Plaintiffs have failed to submit evidence regarding several crucial issues and, accordingly, 

their motion for default judgment is denied without prejudice. Plaintiffs may supply the necessary 

documents and renew the motion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 06/15/2010 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 3:09-cv-05944-RS Document 19 Filed 06/15/10 Page 5 of 5