Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-16-01334/USCOURTS-ca8-16-01334-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric L. Price
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 16-1334

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Eric L. Price

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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 Submitted: November 14, 2016

Filed: March 21, 2017

[Published]

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, SMITH and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM. 

The Honorable William Jay Riley stepped down as Chief Judge of the United

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States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at the close of business on March 10,

2017. He has been succeeded by the Honorable Lavenski R. Smith. 

Appellate Case: 16-1334 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/21/2017 Entry ID: 4514275 
Eric Price wassentenced to 110 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to

possessing firearms as a felon. The district court calculated his base offense level as 2

24 because of two felony crime-of-violence convictions, and then it applied a fourlevel enhancement because Price possessed the guns in connection with a felony

marijuana offense. Price appeals these enhancements. We affirm. 

I. Crime of Violence

We review the crime-of-violence determination de novo. United States v.

Harrison, 809 F.3d 420, 425 (8th Cir. 2015). Section § 2K2.1(a)(2) of the Guidelines

directs a base offense level of 24 when a felon in possession has twice been convicted

of a crime of violence. “Crime of violence” means an offense punishable by more

than one year in prison that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened

use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).

“‘[P]hysical force’ means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical

pain orinjury to another person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). 

 

Price argues that his 2011 attempted-aggravated-assault conviction under Kan.

Stat. Ann. § 21-3410(a) (2007) (current version at Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5412(b)(1)

(2011)) did not require proof that he used violent force against another. The statute

defines aggravated assault as ordinary assault committed under special circumstances,

such as with a deadly weapon. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3410. A companion statute

defined ordinary assault as “intentionally placing another person in reasonable

apprehension of immediate bodily harm.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3408 (2007) (current

version at Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5412(a) (2011)). Price contends that we recently held

an indistinguishable Arkansas statute not to require violent force. See United States

v. Jordan, 812 F.3d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 2016). The Arkansas statute, though, is

distinguishable. It requires only that the defendant “create[] a substantial danger of

The Honorable David GregoryKays, Chief Judge,UnitedStates DistrictCourt

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for the Western District of Missouri.

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Appellate Case: 16-1334 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/21/2017 Entry ID: 4514275 
death orserious physical injury.” Id. (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-204(a)(1)). The

Kansas statute, on the other hand, requires that the defendant make the victim

reasonably fearimmediate physical harm. We recently addressed a similar Minnesota

statute requiring proof of an “act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate

bodily harm or death.” United States v. Schaffer, 818 F.3d 796, 798 (8th Cir. 2016)

(quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1)). The Minnesota statute, we concluded,

requires violent force. Id. at 798. The Kansas aggravated-assault statute likewise

requires violent force.

Price contends that the government did not raise this force-clause argument

below and should be unable to do so now. The government, however, is not seeking

review of the district court’s decision. Its appellate arguments are not essential to our

review. We may affirmthe district court judgment for any reason the record supports.

United States v. Berger, 553 F.3d 1107, 1109 (8th Cir. 2009). Over Price’s objection,

the district court accepted the presentence report’s findings and conclusions, which

determined “that both [prior convictions] fall under the ‘force’ clause of

§ 4B1.2(a)(1).” In sum, the record supportsthe district court’s conclusion that Price’s

prior convictions fall under the force clause of § 4B1.2(a). 

Price also argues that Kansas law defines “attempt” more broadly than doesthe

common law. Price did not present this argument to the district court. “To preserve

an error for appellate review, an objection must be timely and must ‘clearly stat[e] the

grounds for the objection.’ Errors not properly preserved are reviewed only for plain

error . . . .” United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc)

(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Williams, 994 F.2d

1287, 1294 (8th Cir. 1993)). The government notes that, under our cases, if a

completed crime is a crime of violence, then an attempt to commit it “automatically

qualifies...under the binding commentary to § 4B1.2.” United States v. Sawyer, 588

F.3d 548, 556 (8th Cir. 2009), abrogated in part by United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d

633, 641 (8th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Brown, 550 F.3d 724, 728 (8th Cir.

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Appellate Case: 16-1334 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/21/2017 Entry ID: 4514275 
2008) (Guidelines consider an aiding-and-abetting conviction to be a conviction for

the underlying offense). In light of this caselaw, Price’s asserted error is not plain. See

United States v. Anderson, 783 F.3d 727, 741 (8th Cir. 2015). 

II. Marijuana Offense. 

We review a possession-in-connection-with-another-felony enhancement for

clear error. United States v. Bates, 614 F.3d 490, 493 (8th Cir. 2010). Section

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) of the Guidelines calls for a four-level enhancement when the

defendant “[u]sed or possessed any firearm . . . in connection with another felony

offense.” 

The district court found that Price’s guns were linked to more than 600 grams

of marijuana found in the trunk of the car that he occupied. The evidence at

sentencing established that on June 13, 2014, a white Chevy Malibu backed into a

residential driveway. Price got out of the front passenger seat and went into the house.

Then someone opened the garage door from the inside, and a backseat passenger got

out of the car. The car’s trunk opened, and Price and the other passenger made three

or four trips carrying things from the trunk to the garage. The other passenger closed

the trunk and got back into the car. Price closed the garage and also got back into the

car and left. Police soon stopped the car and arrested Price. More than 600 grams of

marijuana was found in the trunk—all of it was in heat-sealed or Ziploc baggies.

Some of it was found inside a pillow case and some in white grocery bags. Four guns

were also found in the car, including a loaded MAC-10-style gun and a Beretta pistol

in the trunk. Price pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing these guns. 

 

Price argues that the evidence does not support a finding that he constructively

possessed the marijuana. We disagree. Price knew about and exercised dominion or

control over the marijuana. See United States v. Scofield, 433 F.3d 580, 586 (8th Cir.

2006) (constructive possession arises from knowledge and control or dominion). The

only material difference between the gunsin the trunk, which Price admits knowingly

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Appellate Case: 16-1334 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/21/2017 Entry ID: 4514275 
possessing, and the marijuana in the trunk, which he denies knowingly possessing,

is that the marijuana was not in plain sight but was packaged. The trained narcotics

officer, though, testified that the marijuana was in plain smell:

Q. All right. So if—if someone was just sort of looking there or casually

observing the trunk, you wouldn’t notice thatmarijuana until you moved

some stuff around; right?

A. Well, you could smell it. 

Price transferred items from the car trunk to the house. He knowingly

possessed the guns in the trunk. And the marijuana odor in the trunk was obvious.

This is sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish by a preponderance that Price

possessed the guns in connection with a marijuana felony. This case is therefore

unlike Scofield, in which the government failed to prove constructive possession

beyond a reasonable doubt because it “presented no evidence that [the defendant]

knew the drugs were stored in the garage.” 433 F.3d at 586. The possession evidence

is not overwhelming, but it is sufficient.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm. 

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Appellate Case: 16-1334 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/21/2017 Entry ID: 4514275