Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00550/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00550-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vincente Ortiz
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

VICENTE ORTIZ, )

)

Petitioner/Movant, ) No. CV 08-550-PHX-MHM (CRP)

) CR 04-1303-PHX-MHM

vs. )

) REPORT AND

)

) RECOMMENDATION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

__________________________________ )

Vincente Ortiz (“Movant”), filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc 1). Movant requests relief on three grounds.

He argues (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, alleging counsel failed to investigate

both his claims of United States citizenship as a member of the Cheyenne Native American

tribe and errors in the presentence report regarding his criminal history; (2) due process

violations because an immigration officer rather than an immigration judge reinstated his

prior deportation order; and (3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising

either of the above two claims in Movant’s direct appeal. The Government responds to

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Movant’s Motion, arguing trial counsel did investigate Movant’s claims of citizenship and

criminal history and offered proof of that investigation. The Government also contends

Movant’s claim regarding the validity of his reinstatement order is procedurally defaulted

and meritless. Finally, the Government asserts appellate counsel was not ineffective under

the Strickland standard.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 24, 2004, Border Patrol Agent Daniel DeLintt discovered Movant

hiding in the brush along the Colorado River north of Yuma, Arizona. (Doc 3, Ex. A). Upon

questioning by Agent DeLintt, Movant stated he was born in Mexicali, Baja California,

Mexico. (Doc 3, Ex. A, p 163). Movant was not in possession of paperwork that would

permit him to be legally present in the United States. (Doc 3, Ex. A, p 165). 

A search of Movant’s record by Border Patrol revealed he had been deported on two

other occasions. Movant was charged with illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§

1326(a), (b)(2). During his trial, Border Patrol Agent Daniel Rodriguez testified that Movant

was ordered removed to Mexico by an immigration judge in August 1992 and September

1996. (USA v. Ortiz, cr-04-1303-PHX-MHM, Doc 102, p 35). For purposes of this Habeas

Motion, the Government offers copies of the two orders in which the immigration judges

ordered Movant deported. (Doc 3, Ex. F). 

During the trial, defense counsel argued at length that Movant was a member of the

Cheyenne Nation. In his opening statement, defense counsel argued Movant was “one of the

original U.S. citizens . . . a Native American.” (USA v. Ortiz, cr-04-1303-PHX-MHM, Doc

101, p 145). In his cross-examinations of Agents DeLintt and Rodriguez defense counsel

elicited testimony that Movant was discovered near the Cocopah reservation and that he had

made past claims of Native American status. (Doc 3, Ex. A, pp 145-146, 170; Ex. B, pp 54-

57). Movant testified that he was born on the Cocopah Reservation and defense counsel

questioned him about his family’s Native American history as well as his Native American

upbringing and continued cultural practices. (Doc 3, Ex.B, pp 117-135, 157-164). An

affidavit from Movant’s defense counsel stated that he conducted a thorough investigation

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and hired a private investigator to research Movant’s claim of U.S. citizenship. (Doc 3, Ex.

D). 

The jury found Movant guilty of the illegal reentry. Judge Murguia sentenced Movant

on June 19, 2006. (Doc 3, Ex. C). Prior to sentencing, defense counsel twice met with

Movant and reviewed the presentence report with him. (Doc 3, Ex. C, p 3). Defense counsel

also submitted numerous objections to the presentence report including objecting to

Movant’s place of birth as Mexico, stating instead that Movant “maintains that he was born

in southern Arizona” and that Movant states he is a U.S. citizen, not a citizen of Mexico.

(USA v. Ortiz, cr-04-1303-PHX-MHM, Doc 74, p 2). Defense counsel also objected to

details of Movant’s past convictions including objecting to a voluntary deportation

proceeding, Movant’s knowledge of marijuana in a vehicle in another incident and other

alleged arrests. (USA v. Ortiz, cr-04-1303-PHX-MHM, Doc 74, p 2). Defense counsel also

submitted an affidavit to this Court stating he diligently investigated Movant’s prior criminal

history and did not find any discrepancies in the presentence report. (Doc 3, Ex. D). At

sentencing, Movant continued to claim he was a Native American and citizen of the United

States. (Doc 3, Ex. C, p 9).

Movant did not object to his criminal history category, offense level, or guideline

calculations. (Doc 3, Ex. C, pp 9-11, 5). Judge Murgia sentenced Movant to 52 months

incarceration, followed by three year supervised release. (USA v. Ortiz, cr-04-1303-PHXMHM, Doc 104, pp 14-15). 

Movant appealed his conviction and the Ninth Circuit denied that appeal on April 12,

2007. (USA v. Ortiz, cr-04-1303-PHX-MHM, Docs 76, 114). 

Movant then filed a timely Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 on March 19, 2008. (USA v. Ortiz, cr-04-1303-PHX-MHM, Doc 117). 

II. DISCUSSION

In his Motion, Movant first argues his trial counsel was ineffective because defense

counsel failed to properly investigate his U.S. citizenship through the Cheyenne Native

American tribe and that defense counsel failed to investigate Movant’s prior criminal history.

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The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was set out by

the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show: (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's

perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

Movant’s defense counsel did not fall below the established standard. In fact, based

on the record, Movant’s defense counsel diligently pursued Movant’s defense that he was a

Native American and throughly researched his prior criminal history. 

Defense counsel hired a private investigator to pursue Movant’s claim that he was a

Native American. In his affidavit to this Court, Movant’s counsel stated neither he nor the

private investigator discovered any evidence to substantiate Movant’s claim. Working with

the evidence he did have, defense counsel presented to the jury Movant’s argument that he

was a Native American. Defense counsel showed that the area where Movant was

discovered is close to the Cocopah reservation. Defense counsel also had Movant testify and

describe his Native American heritage, lineage, and continuing practice of the culture.

With regard to the presentence report, defense counsel met with Movant twice before

sentencing to review the presentence report with him. Based on his discussion with Movant,

defense counsel filed objections to the presentence report stating Movant disputed his

citizenship, place of birth, and the details of some of his prior criminal history. At

sentencing, Movant acknowledged that he understood the sentencing guidelines, that he had

spoken with his attorney about the presentence report, and Movant did not object to any of

the prior convictions. Movant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective fails.

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Movant also alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to bring an

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in his direct appeal. Ineffective assistance of

counsel claims are not appropriate for direct review, except in limited circumstances. United

States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir.2005). Such claims require a development

of facts outside the record and such development is not accomplished in a direct appeal.

Rather, a habeas corpus proceeding allows the defendant to “develop a record as to what

counsel did, why it was done, and what, if any, prejudice resulted.” Id. at 1156; citing United

States v. Laughlin, 933 F.2d 786, 788-789 (9th Cir.1991). The two limited circumstances in

which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is appropriate in a direct appeal occurs

“where the record on appeal is sufficiently developed to permit determination of the issue”

or “where the legal representation is so inadequate that it obviously denies a defendant his

Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. at 1156.

It was not appropriate to bring an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in the

direct appeal of Movant’s case. The record was not sufficiently developed on the issue of

whether Movant’s counsel effectively investigated Movant’s criminal history until

government counsel in the Habeas Petition made further inquiry. Furthermore, the record

shows that Movant’s counsel diligently investigated and defended Movant on his claim of

Native American status and any objections he had to his criminal history in the presentence

report. Appellate counsel was not ineffective when he did not bring a claim of ineffective

trial counsel in the direct appeal.

Movant next argues his due process rights were violated when an immigration officer

rather than an immigration judge reinstated his prior deportation order. The Government

argues first, Movant’s claim is procedurally defaulted because he failed to raise it in his

direct appeal and second, the claim is meritless. In his Motion, Movant argues his appellate

counsel erred in not making this claim in his direct appeal and thus appellate counsel was

ineffective.

To avoid procedural default “a criminal defendant [that] could have raised a claim of

error on direct appeal but nonetheless failed to do so, [] must demonstrate both cause

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excusing his procedural default, and actual prejudice resulting from the claim of error.”

United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir.1993). Generally, to demonstrate

“cause” for procedural default, an appellant must show that “some objective factor external

to the defense” impeded his adherence to the procedural rule. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.

478, 488 (1986). If the record shows that an appellate counsel's performance fell below the

standard of competency of counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984), or that he was denied representation by counsel on appeal altogether, he has

demonstrated cause for his procedural default. Id.

Under the Strickland standard, Ortiz’s appellate counsel was not ineffective when he

did not raise the deportation order issue in Movant’s direct appeal. At trial, the Government

offered proof of two prior deportations of Movant by immigration judges. Movant was first

deported by an immigration judge in August 1992 and then again in September 1996. Based

on these prior deportations, an immigration officer, a border patrol agent, reinstated Movant’s

prior deportation order. Per federal regulation, an alien who illegally renters the United

States after having been removed by an immigration judge through a prior deportation order

may be removed by an immigration officer. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8. The alien has no right to a

hearing before an immigration judge in those circumstances. Id. The Ninth Circuit held this

regulation permitting immigration officers rather than immigration judges to reinstate prior

deportation orders under the circumstances outlined in the regulation is permissible.

Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 494-495 (9th Cir.2007). Movant’s claim that

his due process rights were violated when an immigration officer rather than an immigration

judge reinstated his prior deportation order is meritless. Movant’s appellate counsel was not

ineffective in choosing not to raise this claim to the Ninth Circuit. 

Movant’s claim that reinstatement of his prior deportation order denied him due

process is both procedurally defaulted and meritless. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review and analysis, enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for

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Writ of Habeas Corpus.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s

judgment. The parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the court. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed.R.Civ.P.Rules 72. The parties are advised that any objections filed

are to be identified with the following case number: cv-08-550-MHM.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Movant

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 23rd day of June, 2009.

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