Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01832/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01832-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joey Anthony Barnes
Petitioner
Jim Hamlet
Respondent

Document Text:

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 This statement of facts is taken from the April 21, 2000, opinion by the California 1

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 1-7, appended as

Exhibit C to Respondent’s Answer, filed on February 14, 2003.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEY ANTHONY BARNES,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-1832 GEB JFM P

vs.

JIM HAMLET,

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1998 conviction of first

degree murder. He seeks relief on the grounds that admission of evidence of prior domestic

violence violated his rights to due process and equal protection, and that he received ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the

undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

On Wednesday, October 22, 1997, Stockton police officers

discovered the dead body of Kathy Nixon in her home at 207 East

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Bianchi Road. Nixon was lying on her back near a couch in the

living room. The glass top of a nearby coffee table was on the

floor, but otherwise there was no sign of a struggle in the room. 

There was blood around Nixon’s nose and mouth and a pillow was

lying on her head partially covering her face. There was blood on

the pillow and on the carpet in the area of Nixon’s torso.

An examination of Nixon’s body revealed blood on her hands,

contusions to her right upper arm, a bruise on her jaw, and

abrasions on her neck. There was a stab wound on the left side of

her chest which, according to a medical expert, was not life

threatening. Nixon also had injuries to the inside of her neck. 

There were fractures to two small bones lying behind her Adam’s

apple and fractures to the left and right “greater horns” of her hyoid

bone, which sits above the Adam’s apple and curves under the jaw. 

There were also fractures to Nixon’s thyroid cartilage. A medical

expert testified Nixon had been dead from one to three days by the

time she was discovered, and two experts testified the likely cause

of death was asphyxia due to manual strangulation.

[Petitioner] had been romantically involved with Nixon for several

years and began living with her at least a year and a half before her

death. Also living with them was Nixon’s teenage son. Both

[petitioner] and Nixon were cocaine users. During their

relationship together, they often argued and, on several occasions,

[petitioner] assaulted her. On three occasions, for example, a

neighbor heard them arguing and, soon thereafter, Nixon arrived at

the neighbor’s house “all beat up.”

In one incident, on March 17, 1996, [petitioner] and Nixon got into

an argument and she pushed him on the chest. [Petitioner]

retaliated by slapping her on the face. When Nixon attempted to

call the police, [petitioner] pulled the phone cord out of the wall.

[Petitioner] slapped her several more times as she attempted to go

to a neighbor’s house to call the police. Nixon suffered bruises to

her chin and a swollen and bloody lip. 

In another incident, Nixon and a friend had planned to go out one

evening. When the friend arrived to pick her up, Nixon and

[petitioner] were arguing. They took their argument upstairs and

the friend could hear the sound of a scuffle and them “hitting the

walls.” The friend heard Nixon say, “Let go, Joey, you are choking

me, let go of me, let go of my neck.” [Petitioner] eventually left.

In yet another incident, three or four months before Nixon’s death,

her son came home and found the victim holding her cheek and

crying. There was a bruise and swelling in the area of her jaw and

cheekbone. [Petitioner] said Nixon had fallen and she said she

could not remember what happened. Later, [petitioner] admitted

he had hit Nixon twice and caused the bruising on her face.

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Two days later, Nixon called her sister-in-law, Wilma Bevels, and

said, “I thought he was going to kill me.” Nixon was crying and

said [petitioner] raped her. She explained [petitioner] had asked

for sex and she refused. [Petitioner] then said, “Well, you’re my

woman, I’m going to take it.” In the middle of sexual intercourse,

[petitioner] pulled his penis out and stuck it in Nixon’s mouth. 

With a knife to her throat and his knees on her arms, [petitioner]

told her, “You better not bite it.” Bevels advised Nixon to call the

police, but she said, “No, he might kill me.”

[Petitioner] moved out of Nixon’s residence several months before

her death. On the evening of August 23, 1997, he came to her

home to get a ride to a friend’s house. On the way to the friend’s

house, [petitioner] and Nixon got into an argument. She pulled

over and told him to get out. [Petitioner] asked her whom she was

dating and she refused to tell. [Petitioner] said, “If you don’t tell

me, I’ll get you.” [Petitioner] grabbed the car keys and got out. He

picked up a brick from a nearby home and broke out several

windows in Nixon’s car. He then threw the brick and keys in the

back of the car and departed. Nixon drove to Bevel’s house. She

had glass stuck in her face, legs, and hair. She also had an injury to

her thumb. The incident was reported to the police.

About a month before Nixon’s death, she told her son she did not

want [petitioner] living with them any more. A couple of weeks

later, [petitioner] moved in with a friend, Lawrence McGee. 

Defendant told McGee he thought Nixon was “messing with his

head.” [Petitioner] said he put a pillow over her face and asked if

she was “ready to die.” According to [petitioner], she just lay

there. [Petitioner] eventually left McGee’s residence saying he and

Nixon were getting back together.

Approximately a week before Nixon’s death, Bevels was standing

outside Nixon’s residence when she heard the voices of Nixon and

defendant inside. She went in and saw Nixon “standing by the

table scared stiff.” Nixon told Bevels [petitioner] had pulled a

knife on her. [Petitioner] responded that he was “just trying to get

her attention.” At about this same time, [petitioner] went to the

home of another friend looking for a place to stay.

On Saturday, October 18, [petitioner] came to the home of a friend

around noon. He was upset and complained that he thought Nixon

was “fooling around with some guy” because he had previously

seen a condom in the residence and later it was gone.

Just before midnight on Sunday, October 19, Bevels called Nixon

and invited her over to a party, i.e., smoke cocaine. [Petitioner] and

Nixon arrived five minutes later. Because Bevels did not get along

with [petitioner], the three went to buy cocaine and then parted

company. [Petitioner] and Nixon fought while the three were

together because Bevels refused to share the drugs with

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26 During the period leading up to Nixon’s death, her son was in custody in juvenile hall. 2

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[petitioner]. Bevels spoke with Nixon on the telephone shortly

thereafter. She heard [petitioner] in the background say “fuck that

bitch” and then the connection was broken.

Nixon did not go to work on Monday, October 20. Her car was

seen parked outside her residence that day. Bevels called Nixon

and knocked on her door, but got no answer. [Petitioner] was seen 2

around the residence on Monday. He also did not go to work that

day or the next two.

On Wednesday morning, October 22, [petitioner] was taken into

custody. He had scratch marks on his chest and back and around

his right eye. After waiving his Miranda rights, [petitioner] agreed

to speak with police. He said he had last seen Nixon on Monday,

October 20, when she picked him up at work and they went to her

house. He stayed there until approximately 7:20 p.m. and they

argued over bills. [Petitioner] told the police Nixon had been

nagging him and he left and walked to a vacant house, where he

spent the night. [Petitioner] went to work the next day and then

spent the night with Lawrence McGee. [Petitioner] explained the

scratch on his right eye was from a potato exploding while he was

cooking on Tuesday evening and he did not know how he got the

scratches on his back.

[Petitioner] testified on his own behalf. He indicated his problems

with Nixon stemmed from her drug use. He explained he had not

used drugs since 1984 or 1985 but was dragged back into it by

Nixon. According to [petitioner], Nixon’s drug habit stemmed

from her relationship with Bevels, who [petitioner] described as

“bad news” and who “seemed to have an influence over” Nixon.

[Petitioner] explained the incident with the broken car windows

resulted from him getting upset that Nixon was using the car to buy

drugs. He told her: “Well, nobody is going to use this car, you

know, if you can’t use this car the right way.”

[Petitioner] testified that he and Nixon were smoking cocaine on

Friday and Saturday before her death and “she would get paranoid

and would pick up things, knives, and stand in the doorway, you

know, because she thought people was looking at her.” On

Saturday night, Nixon was lying on the sofa in the living room,

then she would move to the floor, and then back to the sofa. She

asked [petitioner] about a girl he was dating at the time and

accused him of lying. At some point, according to defendant: “She

got up. It happened so fast. She had a knife. She came at me with

the knife. She hit me in the head. [¶] All I know is I grabbed her, I

grabbed her throat, and the knife – and we were going at it in some

kind of way that the knife came around and caught her on the side,

and then she – we just kept tussling. [¶] Then some way I turned

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her around, and my arms were like full and backwards, and then

we just, you know, went straight down to the floor and she said,

‘aaugh’ something like that, and then she didn’t move.”

[Petitioner] testified he left and walked to a deserted house where

he spent the night. He could not remember what happened to the

knife with which Nixon had been stabbed. The next day, he went

to a friend’s house and then to another where he spent the night. 

On Monday, he checked in at work and was told to report back the

next day. Later, he want to the theater and watched several

movies. On Tuesday and Wednesday, he went to work. He was

thereafter arrested.

(People v. Barnes, slip op. at 1-7.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents “if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases’, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at

different result. Early v. Packer, 573 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-406 (2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

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 California Evidence Code section 1109 , subdivision (a)(1) provides, in pertinent part,

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as follows: “[I]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving

domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of other domestic violence is not

made inadmissible by [Evidence Code s]ection 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant

to [Evidence Code s]ection 352.” At petitioner’s trial, evidence was admitted that petitioner had

committed prior acts of domestic violence against Nixon and petitioner’s former wife. 

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simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Challenges to California Penal Code § 11093

Petitioner argues that California Evidence Code § 1109 violates the federal Due

Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court will evaluate

these claims in turn below. 

1. Due Process Clause

Petitioner’s first claim is that “Evidence Code sec. 1109 lessens the people’s

burden of proof and violates due process law (sic).” (Pet. at 5.) The California Court of Appeal

rejected petitioner’s due process challenge to Cal. Evid. Code § 1109 with the following

reasoning:

In People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, the California

Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge to Evidence Code

section 1108, a parallel provision to Evidence Code section 1109

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which allows admission of prior sex offense evidence in a

prosecution for a sex offense. Based on Falsetta, at least three

Court of Appeal decisions, including one from this court, have

rejected due process challenges to Evidence Code section 1109. 

(See People v. Brown (2000) 75 Cal.App.4th 916, People v.

Hoover, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1024; People v. Johnson

(2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 410, 419-420.) In Johnson, we explained: 

“[L]ike Evidence Code section 1108, Evidence Code section 1109

is limited to prior acts of domestic violence in prosecutions for

domestic violence, thus avoiding far-ranging attacks, and the

statute requires pretrial notice to the defendant. Also, Evidence

Code section 1109, by expressly allowing the trial court to exclude

evidence under Evidence Code section 352, allows the trial court to

preclude inefficient mini-trials of prior acts. Evidence Code

section 352 provides a safeguard against undue prejudice. The trial

court’s discretion to exclude the prior acts evidence under

Evidence Code section 352 saves Evidence Code section 1109

from defendant’s due process challenge.” (77 Cal.App.4th at p.

420.) Defendant provides no principled basis for deviating from

these precedents.

(Opinion at 9-10.) 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the California Courts’ rejection of his

federal due process claim is contrary to or an unreasonable application of “clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1);

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003). The United States Supreme Court “has never

expressly held that it violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of

showing conduct in conformity therewith, or that it violates due process to admit other crimes

evidence for other purposes without an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the

evidence to such purposes.” Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F. 3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled

on other grounds by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003). In fact, the Supreme Court has

expressly left open this question. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5 (“Because we need

not reach the issue, we express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process

Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a charged

crime”). See also See Holgerson v. Knowles, 309 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2002) (habeas relief

not warranted unless due process violation was “clearly established” under federal law as

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 The court also notes that a federal statute similar to Cal. Evid Code § 1109 has been

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upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals against a due process challenge. See United States

v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166 (2002) (Fed. R. Evid. 414,

permitting admission of evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases, under which the

test for balancing probative value and prejudicial effect remains applicable, does not violate the

due process clause).

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determined by the Supreme Court); Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2001)

(same). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his due process claim. 

4

2. Equal Protection Clause 

In his next challenge to Cal. Pen. Code § 1109, petitioner contends that the statute

violates the equal protection clause because it “expressly permits the use of a defendant (sic)

prior acts of domestic violence as propensity evidence in a domestic violence prosecution even

where the accused does not testify and where otherwise the evidence of prior conviction would

not be placed before the jury.” (Pet. at 5.) The California Court of Appeal rejected this argument

on state law grounds, concluding that “because there is a rational basis for treating those accused

of domestic violence (Evid. Code, § 1109) or enumerated sex offenses (Evid. Code, § 1108)

differently from those accused of other offenses, [petitioner’s] equal protection claim fails.” 

(Opinion at 12.)

In LeMay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that

Federal Rule of Evidence 414 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it did not

discriminate against any group of individuals on the basis of a suspect or quasi-suspect class and

did not infringe on a fundamental right. LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1030 (defendants have "no

fundamental right to have a trial free from relevant propensity evidence that is not unduly

prejudicial"). Because Rule 414 did not burden a fundamental right and because sex offenders

are not a suspect class, the court found the rule was constitutional so long as it bears a

"reasonable relationship to a legitimate government interest." Id. at 1031. The court observed

that Rule 414 allowed prosecutors to introduce relevant evidence in furtherance of the legitimate 

/////

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government interest of prosecuting and convicting sex offenders. Id. On this basis the court

found the equal protection challenge to Rule 414 to be without merit. Id. 

Just as the class of sex offenders was considered not a suspect class in LeMay, the

class of persons charged with domestic violence is not a suspect class here. Further, California

Evidence Code § 1109 does not infringe on a fundamental right because petitioner has no

fundamental right to a trial free from relevant propensity evidence that is not unduly prejudicial. 

See LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1030. Section 1109 bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate

government interest in the effective prosecution of persons charged with domestic violence. See

id. at 1031. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state court decision rejecting his equal

protection challenge to § 1108 was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his equal protection claim.

3. “As Applied” Challenge

Petitioner also claims that admission of evidence of his prior acts of domestic

violence pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 1109 violated his right to due process because “murder is

not domestic violenc (sic) as defined by section 13700 and that the alleged incidents involving

appellant’s ex-wife were remote and extremely prejudicial.” (Pet. at 5.) In other words,

petitioner claims that California Evidence Code § 1109 is unconstitutional as applied to him in

this case.

Respondent argues that these claims have not been exhausted because they were

not raised in petitioner’s direct appeal in state court. Even if these claims are unexhausted, they

should be denied pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“[a]n application for a writ of habeas

corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the

remedies available in the courts of the State”); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir.

2005) (a federal court considering a habeas petition may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits

when it is perfectly clear that the claim is not “colorable”). 

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Petitioner appears to be arguing, as he did in the trial court, that evidence of prior

domestic violence is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible with respect to his conviction on the

charge of first degree murder. Petitioner explains, 

Petitioner also contends that Evidence Code § 1109, which permits

in cases of domestic abuse, the admission of a defendant’s other

crimes for the purpose of showing his propensity to commit such

crimes. Respondent can not get around the facts of this case, i.e.,

the current offense was not for a domestic violence offense. 

Therefore, petitioner was deprived of his Constitutional rights of

due process, a fair trial, and the equal protection of the law in

violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

(Traverse at 10.) (emphasis in original.) Petitioner has not cited any California or federal case in

support of his argument that Cal. Evid. Code § 1109 is not applicable here because petitioner was

charged with and convicted of murder. In any event, as respondent points out, petitioner was

originally charged in count one of the information with domestic abuse (abuse on a cohabitant),

in violation of Cal. Pen. Code §§ 273.5(A). (CT at 133-34.) Although this count against

petitioner was later dismissed, evidence of prior domestic abuse, which was admitted prior to the

dismissal, was relevant to the domestic violence charge.

With regard to evidence of petitioner’s prior acts of domestic violence towards

Nixon, the state appellate court stated:

As it relates to evidence of prior domestic violence against Nixon,

Evidence Code section 1109 is not really in issue. Such evidence

was admissible even before enactment of that provision. “Where a

defendant is charged with a violent crime and has had a previous

relationship with a victim, prior assaults upon the same victim,

when offered on disputed issues, e.g., identity, intent, motive,

etcetera, are admissible based solely upon the consideration of

identical perpetrator and victim without resort to a ‘distinctive

modus operandi’ analysis of other factors.” (People v. Zack (1986)

184 Cal.App.3d 409, 415.) The primary issue in this matter was

whether the killing of Nixon was intentional. Evidence of prior

assaults on Nixon by defendant was admissible to show defendant

intended to harm her in this instance. (See People v. Hoover

(2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1920.) 

(Opinion at 8-9.) 

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With respect to evidence of petitioner’s prior acts of domestic violence against his

former wife, which was clearly admitted pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 1109, the state appellate

court concluded that because the evidence was limited to prior acts of domestic violence, because

the statute required pretrial notice to petitioner, and because of the safeguards provided by Cal.

Evid. Code § 352, admission of this evidence did not violate due process. (Id. at 9-10.)

A state court's evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review unless the

ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory

provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process.

See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20

(9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, a federal court cannot disturb a state court's decision to admit

evidence on due process grounds unless the admission of the evidence was “arbitrary or so

prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.” See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355,

1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). In addition, in order

to obtain habeas relief on the basis of evidentiary error, petitioner must show that the error was

one of constitutional dimension and that it was not harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

U.S. 619 (1993). In order to grant relief, the habeas court must find that the error had "'a

substantial and injurious effect' on the verdict." Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir.

2001) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623). 

Under Ninth Circuit law, the admission of other crimes evidence violates due

process only if there were no permissible inferences the jury could have drawn from the

evidence. See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993); Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920

("[e]vidence introduced by the prosecution will often raise more than one inference, some

permissible, some not; we must rely on the jury to sort them out in light of the court's

instructions"). Even where there is no permissible inference that can be drawn, in order to

violate due process the evidence must be so highly inflammatory or emotionally charged as to

necessarily prevent a fair trial. See McKinney, 993 F.2d at 1384-85; Jammal, 926 F.2d at

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 In support of these two requests, petitioner cited Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1101 and 352. 5

California Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) provides that evidence of a character trait

is inadmissible to prove conduct on a specified occasion, except as provided in certain

enumerated Evidence Code sections, including Evidence Code section 1109. California

Evidence Code § 352 provides that the court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)

necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of

confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.

 

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920-21; see also LeMay, 260 F. 3d at 1027 (propensity evidence “will only sometimes violate the

constitutional right to a fair trial, if it is of no relevance, or if its potential for prejudice far

outweighs what little relevance it might have”). 

Here, the record reflects that the state trial judge struck an appropriate balance

between petitioner’s rights and the clear intent of the California legislature that evidence of prior

similar acts be admitted in domestic violence prosecutions. Prior to trial, petitioner filed a

motion to exclude any evidence of prior criminal conduct that did not “form a basis for any

charge in this case” and to preclude reference to prior acts of domestic violence. (CT at 174-75.)5

The trial judge held a hearing on the motion, during which he addressed each piece of evidence

sought to be introduced by the prosecution and allowed the admission of some of the evidence,

subject to certain limitations. (RT at 55-69, 141-42.) The evidence of petitioner’s prior acts of

domestic violence against Nixon has been described above in the “procedural and factual

background” section. Petitioner’s former wife testified that petitioner grabbed her, slapped her,

and pushed her to the ground on occasion, that he was jealous, and that he forced her to engage in

sexual intercourse after they had an argument. (RT at 644-69.) All of this evidence against

petitioner was clearly relevant to the charged crimes and, as noted by the trial court, had a

tendency to show intent. For this reason, there was a rational inference the jury could draw from

the challenged evidence that was not constitutionally impermissible. Although the prior crimes

evidence was potentially powerful, “[the fact] that prior acts evidence is inflammatory is not

dispositive in and of itself.” LeMay 260 F.3d at 1030. 

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The People’s case against petitioner was substantial. Petitioner took the stand and

essentially admitted to killing Ms. Nixon, albeit accidentally. It appears that at least one of the

prior incidents of domestic violence involved an actual conviction, (RT at 60), increasing its

reliability. See id. at 1029 (“the extent to which an act has been proved is a factor that district

courts may consider in conducting Rule 403 inquiry”). Although petitioner claims that the

evidence concerning his former wife was remote in time, the record reflects that the events

occurred on and off during their marriage and that they were divorced approximately two years

prior to the death of Ms. Nixon. (RT at 638, 640, 644-69.)

Under all the circumstances, this court concludes that the admission of the prior

domestic abuse evidence in this case did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s

verdict. Thus, it was reasonable for the California Court of Appeal to conclude that the

admission of the evidence of petitioner's prior acts of domestic violence did not render

petitioner's trial fundamentally unfair. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 11 (2002). For all of

these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his final claim, petitioner contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance for the following reason:

Counsel’s failure to have challenged the constitutionality of 1109

waives that issue. Counsel’s failure to have objected to the

admission of uncharged domestic violence, on the grounds that

1109 is unconstitutional.” 

(Pet. at 6.) 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-88. After a petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the

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result of reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally,

competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Second, a

petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981

(9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong

presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’”

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There

is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in

all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). However, that deference “is predicated on counsel’s performance

of sufficient investigation and preparation to make reasonably informed, reasonably sound

judgments.” Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)).

As discussed above, petitioner’s claims that Cal. Evid. Code § 1109 violate the

due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment lack merit. An attorney's

failure to make a meritless objection or motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel. Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Boag v. Raines, 769 

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F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985)). See also Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996)

("the failure to take a futile action can never be deficient performance"). 

Petitioner also argues that his trial counsel’s failure to challenge Cal. Evid. Code §

1109 on constitutional grounds constituted ineffective assistance. On direct appeal, petitioner

argued as follows:

Appellant anticipates that respondent may argue that defense

counsel’s failure to have challenged the constitutionality of 1109

waives that issue. If respondent does so argue and this court

agrees, it is clear that appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure

to have objected to the admission of the uncharged domestic

violence evidence on the grounds that 1109 is unconstitutional. 

(Answer, Ex. A at 36.) The California Court of Appeal did not, however, find the issue waived.

Rather, that court denied petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance as follows:

Inasmuch as we reject [petitioner’s] challenges to Evidence Code

section 1109, a fortiori, his claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel for trial counsel’s failure to raise a constitutional challenge

to that section also fails. Counsel had no obligation to raise a

claim which had no merit.

(Opinion at 12 n.4.) Accordingly, petitioner’s claim regarding waiver never became ripe and

should be denied on that basis.

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 27, 2006.

008:barnes1832.hc

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