Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-01398/USCOURTS-caDC-98-01398-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Respondent
Frederick W. Martin
Petitioner
Portland Natural Gas Transmission System
Intervenor

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Submitted October 15, 1999 Decided January 25, 2000

No. 98-1398

Frederick W. Martin,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,

Respondent

Portland Natural Gas Transmission System,

Intervenor

On Petition for Review of Orders of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Frederick W. Martin, appearing pro se, was on the briefs

for petitioner.

Jay L. Witkin, Solicitor, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, John H. Conway, Deputy Solicitor, and David H.

Coffman, Attorney, were on the brief for respondent.

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George H. Williams, Jr. and Gunnar Birgisson were on

the brief for intervenor.

Before: Williams, Ginsburg and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: Frederick Martin petitions for

review of a decision of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission authorizing the construction of a new pipeline that

would traverse part of Mr. Martin's property. Despite Mr.

Martin's failure to designate the correct order in his petition

for review, we hold that we have jurisdiction to review the

Certificate Order. Because the Commission's decision was

not arbitrary and capricious, we deny the petition.

I. Background

In 1997 the Commission authorized the Portland Natural

Gas Transmission System to construct a pipeline nearly one

mile of which would use an existing right-of-way through Mr.

Martin's farm in North Stratford, New Hampshire. Portland

Natural Gas Transmission Sys., 80 FERC p 61,345 (1997)

(the "Certificate Order"). The farm was established by an

ancestor of Mr. Martin's in the early 1830s and the farmhouse

and surrounding 112-acre tract are characteristic of early

19th century building and farming patterns. Mr. Martin has

improved the farm but maintained its historic character and

function. The property was listed in the National Register of

Historic Places one year after the Commission authorized

Portland to construct the pipeline.

Before the Commission, Mr. Martin challenged the plan to

build the pipeline across his property upon various environmental grounds, alleging that the pipeline would damage the

open fields and other scenic and natural resources on his

property and endanger the historic farmhouse. Mr. Martin

suggested an alternative route for the pipeline, but the Commission rejected that route in favor of the Portland plan to

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ing but the Commission denied his application. Portland

Natural Gas Transmission System, 83 FERC p 61,080 (1998)

(the "Rehearing Order").

II. Analysis

Although Mr. Martin seeks to challenge the Commission's

Certificate Order, his petition for review mentions only the

Rehearing Order. Before we reach the merits of Mr. Martin's argument, therefore, we must determine whether we

have jurisdiction to hear his claim.

A. Jurisdiction

After the Commission denied Mr. Martin's request for

rehearing, he filed a petition for review and a motion for stay

of construction. In the petition, Mr. Martin sought review of

the Commission's Rehearing Order, in which the Commission

had denied his request that the agency reconsider its decision

to grant the certificate to Portland. It is clear from Mr.

Martin's briefs before this court, however, that what he really

wants is review of the Certificate Order, which is the order

actually authorizing Portland to construct the pipeline across

his property.

Under 15 U.S.C. s 717r(b): "Any party ... aggrieved by

an order issued by the Commission ... may obtain a review

of such order in the court of appeals ... by filing ... a

written petition praying that the order ... be modified or set

aside...." Mr. Martin is aggrieved by the Certificate Order,

not the Rehearing Order, which simply denied rehearing.

Indeed, an order denying rehearing is unreviewable except

insofar as the request for rehearing was based upon new

evidence or changed circumstances. See ICC v. Brotherhood

of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 278-80 (1987).

The Commission argues that, because Mr. Martin failed to

designate the Certificate Order in his petition for review, this

court lacks jurisdiction to review that Order. According to

the Commission, the two orders do not "merge" such that an

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appeal of the Rehearing Order may be construed as an appeal

of the Certificate Order. Cf. Conecuh-Monroe Community

Action Agency v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 581, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1988)

(noting that, where district court simultaneously denied preliminary injunction and entered judgment on underlying complaint, "the preliminary injunction question ... merged into

the final judgment").

In general, this court reviews only the order(s) designated

in the petition for review. See Fed. R. App. P. 15(a) (1998)

("petition must ... designate ... the order or part thereof to

be reviewed"); see also John D. Copanos & Sons, Inc. v.

FDA, 854 F.2d 510, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1988).* The failure to

designate an order in the petition is not necessarily fatal to its

review, however. As we said in Southwestern Bell Telephone

Co. v. FCC, a party may demonstrate its intention to appeal

from one order despite referring only to a different order in

its petition for review if the petitioner's intent " 'can be fairly

inferred' " from the petition or documents filed more or less

contemporaneously with it. 180 F.3d 307, 313 (D.C. Cir.

1999) (quoting Brookens v. White, 795 F.2d 178, 180 (D.C. Cir.

1986)).

In Southwestern Bell, the FCC had denied a local exchange

carrier's petition for rehearing of an Investigation Order in

which the agency had found that the carrier had underestimated its future tariff requirements. See id. at 309-10.

Southwestern Bell then petitioned this court for review, citing

only the Reconsideration Order. See id. Upon examination

of Southwestern Bell's petition for review and its subsequent

filings, we found that "nothing prior to the brief filed in this

court ... gave the Commission any notice of Southwestern

Bell's intent to seek review of the Investigation Order." Id.

__________

* Effective December 1, 1998, Fed. R. App. P. 15(a) was amended

(in style but not in substance) to require that a petitioner "specify"

rather than "designate" the order or part thereof to be reviewed.

Because Mr. Martin filed his petition prior to the amendment, we

refer to the earlier version of the Rule in this opinion.

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at 313. The petition designated for review only the Reconsideration Order and only that order was appended to the

petition; likewise, the docketing statement named only the

Reconsideration Order and only that order was attached to it;

and the preliminary statement of issues focused upon Southwestern Bell's petition for review of the Reconsideration

Order. See id.

Like the petitioner in Southwestern Bell, Mr. Martin designated in his petition for review only the order denying

rehearing, but unlike the earlier petitioner, he made his

intent to seek review of the underlying order fairly inferable

from his contemporaneous filings. On the same day that Mr.

Martin filed his petition for review, he filed a motion to stay

the construction of a portion of the pipeline pending review of

his petition. The motion for stay bespeaks in two ways Mr.

Martin's intent to seek review of the Certificate Order.

First, by attaching to the motion a copy of his application

to the Commission for rehearing, in which he cites and

discusses the Certificate Order, Mr. Martin identified the

order from which his dispute with the Commission arose.

Second, the nature of the motion for stay itself sufficed to

indicate Mr. Martin's purpose in filing his petition for review.

He sought a stay in order to prevent the irreparable harm to

his property that allegedly would attend the construction of

the pipeline. Because Portland clearly derived its authority

to construct the pipeline from the Certificate Order, Mr.

Martin's motion for stay was necessarily directed to that

order. And if Mr. Martin sought to stay enforcement of the

Certificate Order, then he must also have meant to seek

review of the Certificate Order, not the Rehearing Order. Cf.

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) (holding that where

petitioner submitted two notices of appeal, one that was

premature and one that failed to specify judgment from which

appeal was being taken, "Court of Appeals should have

treated the [second] ... as an effective, although inept,

attempt to appeal from the judgment sought to be vacated.

Taking the two notices and the appeal papers together,

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petitioner's intention ... was manifest"). Moreover, Mr.

Martin's filings subsequent to the petition for review, including the docketing statement and the certificate as to rulings

under review, indicated that he was challenging the Certificate Order as well as the Rehearing Order.

Nor does the Commission claim to suffer any prejudice

from our review of the Certificate Order despite Mr. Martin's

failure to designate it in his petition for review. Although an

agency is under no obligation to determine whether a party

that petitions for review of an unreviewable order meant to

specify a different order, see Southwestern Bell, 180 F.3d at

314, here the Commission's filings in response to Mr. Martin's

petition for review and motion for stay indicate that the

agency was aware from the outset that Mr. Martin meant to

seek review of the Certificate Order.

The Commission's opposition to Mr. Martin's motion for

stay lists the Certificate Order as one of several orders

"relevant to this proceeding." In moving to transfer Mr.

Martin's case from the First Circuit to this circuit, the

Commission invoked the authority of 28 U.S.C. s 2112(a)(1):

"If proceedings are instituted in two or more courts of

appeals with respect to the same order ... the agency ...

shall file the record in the court in which proceedings with

respect to the order were first instituted." The Commission

expressly argued that the First Circuit should transfer Mr.

Martin's case to this circuit because another party had filed a

petition for review of the Preliminary Order and the Certificate Order in this circuit before Mr. Martin had filed his

petition for review. That the Commission understood Mr.

Martin's petition for review to encompass the Certificate

Order, therefore, is apparent; indeed, its argument for transfer of the case depended upon it.

In sum, despite Mr. Martin's failure to refer to the Certificate Order in his petition for review, his accompanying motion for stay provided the Commission with notice of his

intent to seek review of the Certificate Order. Accordingly,

we have jurisdiction to consider Mr. Martin's claim.

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B. The Merits

Mr. Martin challenges the Certificate Order as arbitrary

and capricious on the grounds that the Commission failed to

comply with regulations promulgated under the National

Environmental Protection Act and the National Gas Act in

order to protect scenic and historic places. Under the regulations implementing the NEPA, the agency was required to

prepare an Environmental Impact Statement in which it

discussed any inconsistency between the proposed project

and a state or local environmental plan or law. 40 C.F.R.

s 1506.2(d). Mr. Martin complains that the Commission

failed to discuss the consistency of Portland's proposed pipeline with a "river corridor management plan" adopted by the

State of New Hampshire. The Commission points out, dispositively, that no inconsistency with any state or local plans

was raised before it, and that the cited regulation does not

require it affirmatively to address consistency with such

plans.

The NGA regulation governing placement of pipeline

rights-of-way provides:

Where practical, rights-of-way should avoid ... places

listed in the National Register of Historic Places.... If

rights-of-way must be routed through such historic

places ... they should be located in areas or placed in a

manner so as to be least visible from areas of public view

and so far as possible in a manner designed to preserve

the character of the area.

18 C.F.R. s 2.69(a)(1)(ii). Mr. Martin claims that because a

portion of his land lies within a state-designated "river corridor" and because the State had certified his entire property

as "historic" before the Commission prepared its Final Environmental Impact Statement, the agency should have addressed in the certification proceedings whether the regulations required an adjustment to take the proposed pipeline

route around Mr. Martin's property. Mr. Martin proposed

such an adjustment to the Commission.

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The Commission considered the "visual impact" of the

proposed pipeline on historic properties such as Mr. Martin's,

as well as the practicality of the alternative route Mr. Martin

proposed. The Commission rejected the alternative route

because it would have required Portland to develop a new

right-of-way, in contravention of 18 C.F.R. s 2.69(a)(1)(i),

which states that "[i]n locating proposed facilities, consideration should be given to the utilization, enlargement or extension of existing rights-of-way." We cannot fault the Commission for approving Portland's use of the existing right-of-way

through Mr. Martin's property rather than requiring the

pipeline company to develop a new route through previously

undisturbed properties.

The Commission also notes that, New Hampshire's designation notwithstanding, Mr. Martin's property was not listed

on the National Register of Historic Places at the time of the

proceedings, nor even as of his request for rehearing, and

that he therefore did not raise before the agency any claim

related to listing on the National Register. The record of the

certification proceeding bears out the Commission's point.

Therefore, the agency's decision was in no respect arbitrary

and capricious.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we have jurisdiction to review

the Certificate Order, and the petition for review is

Denied.

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