Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00693/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00693-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ruben Dario Perlaza
Petitioner
Warden
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN DARIO PERLAZA,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00693-EPG-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND DISMISS THE PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT 

TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE 

(ECF No. 15)

Petitioner Ruben Dario Perlaza is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons stated herein, the 

undersigned recommends granting Respondent’s motion to dismiss and dismissing the petition 

for writ of habeas corpus.

I.

BACKGROUND

On March 21, 2022, Petitioner was sentenced to an imprisonment term of fifty-six

months by the United States District Court for the Southern District of California for possession 

of cocaine with intent to distribute on board a vessel. (ECF No. 15-1 at 3.

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) Petitioner is currently 

confined at the Federal Correctional Institution in Mendota, California. (ECF No. 1 at 1.)

On April 22, 2024, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. (ECF No. 1.) The petition 

1 Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.

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was transferred to this Court June 13, 2024. (ECF Nos. 7, 8.) In the petition, Petitioner

challenges a Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) policy of refusing to allow prisoners with 

immigration detainers to apply First Step Act (“FSA”) time credits (“FTCs” or “ETCs”). (ECF 

No. 1.) On August 13, 2024, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that: (1)

“Petitioner’s FSA ETC claim must be jurisdictionally dismissed for lack of constitutional 

standing and failure to state a claim under law” because “Petitioner has suffered a final order of 

removal”; (2) “Petitioner lacks statutory authority under § 2241 to compel BOP’s FSA ETC 

discretionary (sentence end-phase programming) action via declaratory and advisory opinions”; 

and (3) “Petitioner has not administratively challenged any finding related to FSA ETC earning 

calculation determinations, and/or ineligibility to apply FSA ETC sentence-offsets prior to filing 

the instant petition.” (ECF No. 15 at 2–4.)

As Respondent had not provided the Court with a copy of the final order of removal 

itself, the Court ordered Respondent to file a copy of the purported final order of removal. (ECF 

No. 16.) Respondent filed a copy of the final order of removal under seal. (ECF No. 22.) On 

November 14, 2024, Petitioner filed a response to the purported final order of removal. (ECF No. 

24.)

II.

DISCUSSION

A. First Step Act

“On December 21, 2018, the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 

was enacted. The Act implemented a number of prison and sentencing reforms.” Bottinelli v.

Salazar, 929 F.3d 1196, 1197 (9th Cir. 2019). Under the First Step Act, a “prisoner, except for an 

ineligible prisoner under subparagraph (D), who successfully completes evidence-based 

recidivism reduction programming or productive activities, shall earn time credits[.]” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3632(d)(4)(A). “Time credits earned under this paragraph by prisoners who successfully 

participate in recidivism reduction programs or productive activities shall be applied toward time 

in prerelease custody or supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C). However, a “prisoner is 

ineligible to apply time credits under subparagraph (C) if the prisoner is the subject of a final 

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order of removal under any provision of the immigration laws (as such term is defined in section 

101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(17))).” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3632(d)(4)(E)(i).

B. Exhaustion

“As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available 

judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 

F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). However, because it is not a jurisdictional 

prerequisite, exhaustion can be waived. Id. (citations omitted). “Exhaustion is not required if: (1) 

administrative remedies would be futile; (2) the actions of the agency clearly and unambiguously 

violate statutory or constitutional rights; or (3) the administrative procedure is clearly shown to 

be inadequate to prevent irreparable injury.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 

1991). 

The BOP grievance process is set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq. “As a first step in 

this process, an inmate normally must present his complaint informally to prison staff using a 

BP–8 form.” Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010). “If the informal complaint 

does not resolve the dispute, the inmate may make an ‘Administrative Remedy Request’ 

concerning the dispute to the prison Warden using a BP–9 form.” Nunez, 591 F.3d 1219. “If the 

Warden renders an adverse decision on the BP–9, the inmate may appeal to the Regional 

Director using a BP–10 form.” Nunez, 591 F.3d 1219. “The inmate may appeal an adverse 

decision by the Regional Director to the Central Office (also called the General Counsel) of the 

BOP using a BP–11 form.” Nunez, 591 F.3d 1219. A final decision from the Office of General 

Counsel completes the BOP’s administrative remedy process. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a).

Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Petitioner 

contends that exhaustion is futile. (ECF No. 1 at 7; ECF No. 1-2 at 6–8.) The Court finds the 

exhaustion requirement should be waived in the instant matter. Given Respondent’s 

determination that Petitioner is “jurisdictionally and statutorily barred from FSA ETC sentenceoffsets due to the final order of removal,” (ECF No. 15 at 3), pursuing administrative remedies 

would be futile and thus, the petition should not be dismissed for nonexhaustion. 

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C. Final Order of Removal

A prisoner is ineligible to apply FTCs “if the prisoner is the subject of a final order of 

removal under any provision of the immigration laws (as such term is defined in section 

101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(17))).” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3632(d)(4)(E)(i). Respondent contends that Petitioner is ineligible to apply FTCs as he is the 

subject of a final order of removal. (ECF No. 15 at 3.) Respondent has filed a copy of a Notice 

and Order of Expedited Removal2under section 235(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

(8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)) that was issued against Petitioner on April 16, 2024. (ECF No. 22.) The 

order states that DHS “has determined that you are inadmissible to the United States under 

section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)” and orders that Petitioner be “removed from the United States.” (Id.)

Petitioner argues the Form I-860 is not a final order of removal and has not been signed 

by an immigration judge. (ECF No. 24 at 1–2.) However, “[e]xpedited removal proceedings 

involve, as the name suggests, a streamlined process through which certain non-citizens—such 

as those apprehended at or near the border soon after entry—may be removed from the United 

States without a hearing before an immigration judge.” Alvarado-Herrera, 993 F.3d at 1190 

(emphasis added). “Expedited removal orders are entered by DHS immigration officers, not by 

immigration judges, and judicial review of such orders is severely curtailed.” Alvarado-Herrera, 

993 F.3d at 1190 (emphasis added).

Petitioner also argues that the certificate of service section is blank, which makes “clear 

this form has never been served on Petitioner and can not be final.” (ECF No. 24 at 1.) Judicial 

review of expedited removal orders is limited 

to three narrow issues, each of which must be raised in habeas 

corpus proceedings: “whether the petitioner is an alien”; “whether 

the petitioner was ordered removed” under an expedited removal 

order; and whether the petitioner can prove that he or she has

lawful status in the United States as an asylee, refugee, or 

permanent resident.

Alvarado-Herrera, 993 F.3d at 1192 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2)). In Alvarado-Herrera, the 

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“[T]he form on which DHS issues expedited removal orders [is] Form I-860[.]” Alvarado-Herrera v.

Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2021).

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Ninth Circuit rejected the petitioner’s argument that an expedited removal order was invalid 

because the record did not show whether the petitioner signed the Form I-860 acknowledging 

receipt. The Ninth Circuit concluded that such a challenge did “not fall within any of the 

categories of reviewable issues[.]” Alvarado-Herrera, 993 F.3d at 1192. 

“[I]n the deportation context, a ‘final order of removal’ is a final order ‘concluding that 

the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 579 (2020) 

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A)). Here, the order of expedited removal states that Petitioner 

is inadmissible and orders that Petitioner be removed from the United States. (ECF No. 22.) The 

Ninth Circuit has recognized that expedited removal proceedings result in final orders of 

removal. See Lopez v. Garland, 40 F.4th 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting that in AguilarAguilar v. Napolitano, 700 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2012), DHS “secured a final order of removal

through the expedited removal process” based on a petitioner’s “conviction for an aggravated 

felony”), cert. denied sub nom. Luvian v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 2461 (2023); Alcala v. Holder, 563 

F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007), 

wherein “the expedited proceeding . . . had resulted in a final order of removal”). 

Petitioner is the subject of a removal order issued via expedited removal proceedings, 

which the Ninth Circuit has recognized results in final orders of removal, and thus, Petitioner is 

ineligible to apply time credits under the First Step Act. See Gomez-Cuzme v. Birkholz, No. 

2:23-cv-01753-ODW-SHK, 2023 WL 4423602, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2023) (“Here, Petitioner 

is subject to a final removal order under section 235(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality 

Act (“INA”), and is thus ineligible to apply time credits under the First Step Act.”), findings and 

recommendation accepted, 2023 WL 4422830 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2023); Ceron v. Engleman, No. 

CV 23-3388-SSS (AGR), 2024 WL 967858, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2024) (“Petitioner is 

subject to a[n expedited] final order of removal and thus statutorily ineligible for FSA’s earned 

time credits.”), findings and recommendation accepted, 2024 WL 968850 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 

2024). Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner “is the subject of a final order of removal” for 

purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i), and thus, is ineligible to apply FTCs toward time in 

prerelease custody or supervised release. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner fails to state a 

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claim for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.3

III.

RECOMMENDATION & ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondents’ 

motion to dismiss (ECF No. 15) be GRANTED and the petition for writ of habeas corpus be 

DISMISSED.

Further, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to randomly assign a District Court Judge to 

the present matter.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

THIRTY (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 

written objections, no longer than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits, with the Court and 

serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The assigned United States District 

Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 2, 2024 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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In light of this conclusion, the Court declines to address Respondent’s argument that “to the extent

Petitioner demands immediate award of ETCs and compelled placement in pre-release RRC or early TSR, 

Petitioner lacks statutory authority under § 2241 to compel BOP’s FSA ETC discretionary (sentence endphase programming) action via declaratory and advisory opinions.” (ECF No. 15 at 3.)

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