Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02306/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02306-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Alaina Phipps
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALAINA PHIPPS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-2306-KJN

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”).1 In her motion for summary judgment, 

plaintiff principally contends that the Commissioner erred by finding that plaintiff was not 

disabled from March 25, 2011, the date plaintiff’s SSI application was filed, through April 29, 

2013, the date of the final administrative decision. (ECF No. 17.) The Commissioner filed an 

opposition to plaintiff’s motion and a cross-motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff 

subsequently filed a reply brief. (ECF Nos. 19, 22.)

 

1

This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(15), and both 

parties voluntarily consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. 

(ECF Nos. 7, 9.) 

Case 2:14-cv-02306-KJN Document 24 Filed 12/23/15 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

For the reasons discussed below, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment, GRANTS the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and enters 

judgment for the Commissioner. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on October 14, 1987, has a high school education, is able to 

communicate in English, and previously worked as a signboard carrier and a seasonal actor in a 

haunted house.

2

 (Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 23, 34, 36-37, 69, 178.) On March 25, 2011,

at the age of 23, plaintiff applied for SSI, alleging that her disability began on January 1, 2002,

and that she was disabled primarily due to depression, bipolar disorder, limited communication 

skills, anxiety, and difficulty with understanding people. (AT 9, 69, 146, 179.) After plaintiff’s 

applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, plaintiff requested a hearing before an 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which took place on February 22, 2013, and at which plaintiff, 

represented by an attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. (AT 29-59.) In a decision 

dated April 29, 2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined

in the Act, from March 25, 2011, the date that plaintiff’s SSI application was filed, through the 

date of that decision. (AT 9-24.) The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on August 4, 2014. 

(AT 1-3.) Plaintiff then filed this action in federal district court on October 2, 2014, to obtain 

judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1.) 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

On appeal, plaintiff raises the following issues: (1) whether the ALJ improperly rejected 

the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Gopal Gabbur; and (2) whether the ALJ 

erroneously discounted plaintiff’s own testimony concerning her symptoms and functional 

limitations. 

 

2 Because the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, including plaintiff’s

medical and mental health history, the court does not exhaustively relate those facts in this order. 

The facts related to plaintiff’s impairments and treatment will be addressed insofar as they are 

relevant to the issues presented by the parties’ respective motions.

Case 2:14-cv-02306-KJN Document 24 Filed 12/23/15 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “The 

court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of the ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ evaluated plaintiff’s entitlement to SSI pursuant to the Commissioner’s standard 

five-step analytical framework.3 At the first step, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not

 

3 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the Social 

Security program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to disabled 

persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in part, as 

an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). A parallel 

five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-

42 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the 

claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to step 

three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or 

equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the 

claimant is automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past relevant work? If so, the 

Case 2:14-cv-02306-KJN Document 24 Filed 12/23/15 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 25, 2011, plaintiff’s SSI application date. (AT 

11.) At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: borderline 

personality disorder, bipolar disorder, major depression, obesity, and mild degenerative joint 

disease of the left knee. (Id.) However, at step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not 

have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of

an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AT 13.) 

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) as follows:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c). The 

claimant can lift and/or carry fifty pounds occasionally and twentyfive pounds frequently. The claimant can sit, stand, and/or walk six 

hours in an eight-hour workday. She can perform simple, repetitive 

tasks. She can occasionally interact with the public. The claimant 

can perform low stress work not involving high production 

requirements. 

(AT 15.) 

At step four, the ALJ found, based on the VE’s testimony, that plaintiff was capable of 

performing past relevant work as a signboard carrier, because such work did not require the 

performance of work-related activities precluded by plaintiff’s RFC. (AT 23-24.)4 Thus, the ALJ 

concluded that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from March 25, 

2011, the date of plaintiff’s SSI application, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AT 24.)

///

 

claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to perform any 

other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

4

In light of the ALJ’s finding at step four, the ALJ did not proceed to step five of the sequential 

disability evaluation process. 

Case 2:14-cv-02306-KJN Document 24 Filed 12/23/15 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

B. Plaintiff’s Substantive Challenges to the Commissioner’s Determinations

(1) Whether the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. 

Gopal Gabbur

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 

1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally speaking, 

a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining physician’s opinion, and an 

examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a non-examining physician’s opinion. 

Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202. 

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 830-31. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons. Id. at 830. While a treating professional’s opinion 

generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by a supported examining 

professional’s opinion (supported by different independent clinical findings), the ALJ may 

resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes 

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). The regulations require the ALJ to weigh the 

contradicted treating physician opinion, Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1157,5except that the ALJ in any 

event need not give it any weight if it is conclusory and supported by minimal clinical findings. 

Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, minimally 

supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a nonexamining professional, by itself, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining 

professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 

 

5

The factors include: (1) length of the treatment relationship; (2) frequency of examination; (3) 

nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (4) supportability of diagnosis; (5) consistency;

and (6) specialization. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. 

Case 2:14-cv-02306-KJN Document 24 Filed 12/23/15 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

On January 29, 2013, Dr. Gabbur issued a mental medical source statement essentially 

indicating that plaintiff was completely disabled, with no useful ability to function, or an inability 

to meet competitive standards, as to virtually all mental abilities and aptitudes needed to do 

unskilled work. (AT 328-33.) As discussed below, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Gabbur’s 

opinion.

As an initial matter, the ALJ justifiably questioned the reliability of Dr. Gabbur’s report, 

because numerous alterations/additions had been made to the report in different ink and with a 

different handwriting. (AT 19, 328-33.) As the ALJ noted, the additions “are favorable to the 

claimant and attempt to add to the authoring physician’s opinion that the claimant’s marijuana use 

is not material to her limitation.” (AT 22.) Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ was required to recontact Dr. Gabbur about such irregularities is without merit. The ALJ did not find that Dr. 

Gabbur’s opinion was incomplete or otherwise missing information – the ALJ found that it was 

likely altered, thereby undermining its reliability. Moreover, if there were an alternative 

explanation for the changes to the report, plaintiff had an opportunity to submit a clarifying 

statement from Dr. Gabbur to the Appeals Council. Although plaintiff was represented by 

counsel, she apparently declined to do so. (AT 1-5.) 

Setting aside the alteration issue, the ALJ also reasonably observed that Dr. Gabbur does 

not appear to have had a significant treatment relationship with plaintiff. (AT 22.) Despite the 

fact that Dr. Gabbur claimed to have seen plaintiff monthly since January 7, 2009, the record only 

documents one personal visit with plaintiff on September 18, 2012. (AT 22, 322-25, 328.)6 Even 

though plaintiff also received some care from other treatment providers at the clinic where Dr. 

Gabbur worked, and Dr. Gabbur would presumably have had access to their treatment notes, it 

was not improper for the ALJ to consider the lack of an extensive personal treatment relationship 

with frequent examinations in weighing Dr. Gabbur’s opinion.

////

 

6 Again, if this were a simple mistake in failing to obtain all of Dr. Gabbur’s records, one would 

have expected plaintiff’s counsel, upon reviewing the ALJ’s decision, to request and submit 

supplemental records from Dr. Gabbur to the Appeals Council. That was not done. 

Case 2:14-cv-02306-KJN Document 24 Filed 12/23/15 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Moreover, the ALJ properly relied on the opinions of the consultative examiners to 

discount Dr. Gabbur’s extreme opinion. (AT 21-22.) On April 28, 2008, consultative psychiatrist 

Dr. Timothy Canty performed a comprehensive mental evaluation and diagnosed plaintiff with 

borderline personality disorder. (AT 228-33.) Dr. Canty opined as follows:

I don’t think she would have difficulty with simple to moderately 

complex nonpublic tasks. Given her personality disorder it would 

be best that she attempt low stress fairly routine work. She would 

not have difficulty attending or completing appropriate work from a 

psychiatric standpoint. 

(AT 231.) Several years later, on May 17, 2011, consultative psychiatrist Dr. Bradley Daigle 

performed another comprehensive mental evaluation and diagnosed plaintiff with borderline 

personality disorder, currently untreated. (AT 245-51.) Dr. Daigle observed that plaintiff “might 

benefit from counseling and/or medication, but as things stand currently, she appears to be 

capable of relatively non-stressful routine employment which does not include heavy exposure to 

others.” (AT 249.) More specifically, he opined that plaintiff was not significantly limited in her 

ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple 1- or 2-step job instructions; slightly 

limited in her ability to follow detailed and complex instructions, maintain concentration and 

attention/persistence/pace, and associate with day-to-day work activity including attendance and 

safety; slightly to moderately limited in her ability to adapt to the stresses common to a normal 

work environment; and moderately limited in her ability to relate and interact with supervisors, 

co-workers, and the public. (Id.) Because Drs. Canty and Daigle personally examined plaintiff 

and made independent clinical findings, their opinions constitute substantial evidence on which 

the ALJ was entitled to rely. 

Plaintiff argues that Drs. Canty and Daigle were not provided with all of plaintiff’s 

treatment records for review. However, in this case, any such error was harmless, because as the 

ALJ noted, the weight of the treatment records are consistent with the opinions of Drs. Canty and 

Daigle, showing that plaintiff was generally stable and functional during periods of compliance 

with her treatment and medication regimen. (AT 20-22, 239-44, 299-301, 319-20.) Indeed, most 

of plaintiff’s episodes of increased symptoms and decompensation relate to periods of time when 

plaintiff was not taking her medications. (See, e.g., AT 299 [December 22, 2011 involuntary 

Case 2:14-cv-02306-KJN Document 24 Filed 12/23/15 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

hospitalization after running out of medication approximately 1.5 months prior], 322 [at the

September 18, 2012 visit with Dr. Gabbur, plaintiff was only taking her medications 2-3 days per 

week].) As such, it is not very plausible that Drs. Canty and Daigle would have offered a 

different opinion had they reviewed all of plaintiff’s records. Additionally, even though Dr. 

Gabbur’s opinion is more recent, that factor alone is not dispositive, particularly given the ALJ’s 

many well-founded reasons for discounting Dr. Gabbur’s opinion.

In sum, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Gabbur’s

opinion. While plaintiff urges a different interpretation of the medical evidence, the court defers, 

as it must, to the ALJ’s rational resolution of any conflicting evidence and ambiguities in the 

record. 

(2) Whether the ALJ erroneously discounted plaintiff’s own testimony concerning her 

symptoms and functional limitations 

As noted above, plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly rejected plaintiff’s own

testimony regarding her symptoms and functional limitations. 

In Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals summarized the ALJ’s task with respect to assessing a claimant’s credibility:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of 

the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the 

ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply 

because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably 

produce the degree of symptom alleged. 

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so. . . .

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035-36 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “At the same time, the 

ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would 

be available for the asking....” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Case 2:14-cv-02306-KJN Document 24 Filed 12/23/15 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 

693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 

1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other things, the 

“‘[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or 

between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 

symptoms of which [claimant] complains.’” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 

2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 

1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the 

court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 959.

In this case, the ALJ permissibly relied on the medical evidence, as properly weighed by 

the ALJ, to find plaintiff not completely credible. Although lack of medical evidence to fully 

corroborate the alleged severity of symptoms cannot form the sole basis for discounting plaintiff’s 

subjective symptom testimony, it is nevertheless a relevant factor for the ALJ to consider. Burch

v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005).

The ALJ also legitimately referenced plaintiff’s untruthfulness about her marijuana use. 

(AT 21.)7 See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (ALJ properly considered 

claimant’s lack of candor regarding drug and alcohol use). By way of example, on January 18, 

2013, plaintiff denied drug use, but tested positive for THC (a component of marijuana) and 

benzodiazepine. (AT 378.)

The ALJ further properly considered plaintiff’s statement that she did not attempt to work, 

because of the need to care for her son. (AT 17.) Plaintiff claims to have been disabled since 

 

7

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not specifically reference plaintiff’s untruthfulness about 

marijuana use in the credibility analysis portion of the ALJ’s decision. The court declines to 

apply such a mechanical reading of the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ clearly referenced plaintiff’s 

untruthfulness about marijuana use in the decision and thus plainly considered it as part of his 

evaluation of plaintiff’s credibility. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(“As a reviewing court, we are not deprived of our faculties for drawing specific and legitimate 

inferences from the ALJ’s opinion.”). 

Case 2:14-cv-02306-KJN Document 24 Filed 12/23/15 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

January 1, 2002, but actually worked as a signboard carrier in 2007-2008 until she stopped 

working due to her pregnancy. (AT 146, 179-80, 229, 247.) On April 28, 2008, plaintiff told Dr. 

Canty that childcare was the reason why she did not anticipate attempting to work any time soon. 

(AT 230, see also AT 231 [“However, from a practical standpoint, she is deferring employment 

and education as she is a full-time single mother.”].) 

Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s activities were 

inconsistent with her allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations. (AT 17-18, 21-22.) 

“While a claimant need not vegetate in a dark room in order to be eligible for benefits, the ALJ 

may discredit a claimant’s testimony when the claimant reports participation in everyday 

activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a work setting...Even where those activities 

suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s 

testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” Molina, 

674 F.3d at 1112-13 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Burch, 400 F.3d at 680 

(ALJ properly considered claimant’s ability to care for her own needs, cook, clean, shop, interact 

with her nephew and boyfriend, and manage her finances and those of her nephew in the 

credibility analysis); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ’s 

determination regarding claimant’s ability to “fix meals, do laundry, work in the yard, and 

occasionally care for his friend’s child” was a specific finding sufficient to discredit the 

claimant’s credibility). 

In this case, on April 28, 2008, plaintiff told Dr. Canty that she had attended Sacramento 

City College the previous Fall, but had dropped out from the Spring semester due to pregnancy 

stressors; she was the primary caretaker of her infant son, although her friends came over for 

support; she managed the money; and she socialized with a few friends, watched television, and 

listened to music. (AT 229.) A few years later, on May 17, 2011, Dr. Daigle summarized

plaintiff’s report of her activities of daily living as follows:

She currently lives in an apartment in Sacramento with her son. 

She has a valid driver’s license. She drives a motor vehicle without

particular problems. She is able to take buses. She goes out alone 

without any reported difficulty. She takes care of her own self-care. 

She does her own household chores, housecleaning, laundry, 

Case 2:14-cv-02306-KJN Document 24 Filed 12/23/15 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

shopping, childcare, and cooking. She handles the bills and money. 

She has one friend who helps her baby-sit. She watches television 

and spends time on the internet. She has a Facebook account with 

over 100 friends. She occasionally goes to rock concerts and she 

has previously played the drums and sung in a choir.

(AT 247.) At the time, plaintiff was also attending American River College with a full college 

load of 12 units and a GPA of about 2.0. (AT 246.) Those activities plausibly suggest that 

plaintiff was not as limited as she claimed, and was capable of at least simple, repetitive, low 

stress work with only occasional public contact. 

To be sure, the record also contains some contrary evidence suggesting that plaintiff’s 

activities were more limited. However, it is the function of the ALJ to resolve any ambiguities, 

and the court finds the ALJ’s assessment to be reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. 

See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming ALJ’s credibility 

determination even where the claimant’s testimony was somewhat equivocal about how regularly 

she was able to keep up with all of the activities and noting that the ALJ’s interpretation “may not 

be the only reasonable one”). As the Ninth Circuit explained:

It may well be that a different judge, evaluating the same evidence, 

would have found [the claimant’s] allegations of disabling pain 

credible. But, as we reiterate in nearly every case where we are 

called upon to review a denial of benefits, we are not triers of fact. 

Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ...Where, as 

here, the ALJ has made specific findings justifying a decision to 

disbelieve an allegation of excess pain, and those findings are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record, our role is not to 

second-guess that decision.

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989).

In light of the above, the court finds that the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing 

reasons for discounting plaintiff’s testimony of disabling symptoms and functional limitations 

beyond the limitations assessed in the ALJ’s RFC. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is free from 

prejudicial error and supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Accordingly, IT 

IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is DENIED. 

Case 2:14-cv-02306-KJN Document 24 Filed 12/23/15 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) is 

GRANTED.

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 23, 2015

Case 2:14-cv-02306-KJN Document 24 Filed 12/23/15 Page 12 of 12