Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cr-01728/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cr-01728-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Armando Caraveo-Galindo
Defendant
Armand Carabeo Galindo
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

) No. CR 04-01728-TUC-CKJ [CRP]

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) REPORT and RECOMMENDATION

ARMANDO CARAVEO-GALINDO, )

aka Armand Carabeo Galindo ) 

)

Defendant. )

_________________________________ )

Defendant filed, pro se, a Motion For Dismissal of Indictment. While the motion was

unsigned, at a status conference Defendant clearly indicated he wanted to have the legal issue

raised and the motion to dismiss pursued. On that basis, the Court set the matter for

evidentiary hearing and argument, which was conducted on October 3, 2005.

The motion attacks the new reinstatement of removal practice authorized by the

Attorney General wherein a reinstatement order issues without the alien ever being brought

before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. 241.8. At the hearing, defense counsel raised a new

issue, that the reinstatement of the prior deportation was invalid because Defendant had never

previously been deported. For the reasons set forth in this report, the Court recommends that

the District Judge, after her independent review and consideration, DENY the Motion For

Dismissal of Indictment. (Docket 27)

FACTS

Defendant was arrested by Border Patrol Agents on July 26, 2004, and charged with

illegal re-entry after deportation. On August 25, 2004, Defendant was indicted for illegal reentry after deportation. The indictment alleges the Defendant was previously removed on

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March 18, 2003, through Nogales, but, thereafter, was found in Tucson on July 26, 2004. 

Defendant was the only witness at the evidentiary hearing. Defendant testified that

he came to the United States in the mid-1980's on a work visa. In the late 1980's, he applied

for amnesty. Defendant apparently did not follow through with that application.

On September 13, 1994, Defendant appeared before Immigration Judge John Zastrow.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Zastrow denied Defendant's application for

suspension of deportation and Defendant reserved his appeal rights. The application for

voluntary departure was granted and Defendant was given a year to voluntarily depart "with

an alternate Order of Deportation to Mexico." (Exhibit 1) 

Defendant testified that one month after being notified he had a year to voluntarily

return, he returned to Mexico without checking with immigration officials. Defendant denies

receiving written instructions from INS concerning how he was to voluntarily depart,

including the requirement that he present himself to immigration officials for voluntary

departure.

Defendant testified that he returned to the United States in 1996, where in short order,

he was convicted of a felony unrelated to immigration status. While in prison, Defendant

was processed for removal by INS officials, without appearing before an immigration judge,

on October 27, 1998, and Defendant's departure to Mexico through Nogales, Arizona, was

witnessed by immigration officers that day. (Exhibit 4) Defendant described this removal

as a "voluntary deportation."

Defendant testified that he reentered the United States in 2002. Defendant was

apprehended in 2002, and immigration officers decided to reinstate the prior deportation

order dated October 27, 1998. Apparently, at that time, Defendant told Special Agent Ellis

that he last entered the United States in March 1999, near San Ysidro, California. (Exhibit

2) At that time, Defendant indicated he wanted to contest the removal determination. In an

order dated January 29, 2003, Defendant was determined by the INS official to be subject

to removal, based on reinstatement of the October 27, 1998 order. (Exhibit 2)

In connection with this case, Defendant was apprehended by Border Patrol agents near

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Nogales, Arizona, on July 26, 2004. That same day, Defendant was served with a Notice of

Intent/Decision To Reinstate Prior Order. (Exhibit 3). At that time, Defendant declined to

make a statement contesting that he was removed on October 27, 1998, pursuant to an order

of deportation/exclusion/removal. The reinstatement of the removal order presumably will

take place without appearance before an immigration judge after Defendant is released from

custody in this case.

ANALYSIS

ORAL MOTION TO DISMISS - NO PRIOR DEPORTATION ORDER TO REINSTATE.

At the time of hearing, defense counsel argued that there is no prior order of

deportation to reinstate. Central to this argument is Defendant's factual assertion that he

voluntarily departed within one year after the September 13, 1994, hearing. That factual

assertion is contested by the Government. While this Court found Defendant's testimony not

to be credible, the factual dispute is for the jury to determine. 

Moreover, the factual distinction Defendant attempts to raise has no legal impact.

Defendant asserts he voluntarily departed pursuant to his request to the immigration judge

for permission to do so. Defendant argues that because he left voluntarily and within the

allowed time, the alternate order of deportation never took effect. Therefore, Defendant

argues, there was no order of deportation to reinstate. The statute in issue provides: 

If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the

United States illegally after having been removed or having

departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order

of removal is reinstated from its original date, and is not subject

to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may

not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the alien shall be

removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (emphasis added). The Defendant admits he voluntarily departed

while he was subject to alternate order of deportation. The plain language of the statute

allows the reinstatement of the September 13, 1994, Order of the Immigration Judge. 

Therefore, the argument raised by defense counsel at the time of the hearing does not provide

legal grounds for dismissal of the indictment. 

.. . . . . . . .

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The Government argued that the Morales-Izquierdo case was decided in an administrative

context and should not be applied in a criminal proceeding because of the differing burdens of proof

and standards of review. Response, p.2, ll.10-15. This Court disagrees. The Ninth Circuit has

accepted en banc review in Morales-Izquierdo, ___ F.3d ___, 2005, WL 2233278 (9th Cir. 2005).

The issue presented is a purely legal one. Differing burdens of proof are of no moment. If the Ninth

Circuit determines that there is no statutory authority to support 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a), then the lawful

prior removal element of a prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 cannot be proven based on a

reinstatement of removal procedure that excluded involvement of an immigration law judge.

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WRITTEN MOTION TO DISMISS - THE ULTRA VIRES REGULATION.

Defendant's pro se written motion challenges the validity of administrative officials

reinstating the prior removal order without allowing him to appear before an immigration

judge. The administrative regulations provide that in the case of reinstatement of a prior

removal order, the "alien has no right to a hearing before an immigration judge." 8 C.F.R.

§ 241.8(a). Defendant argues that the Attorney General was without authority to enact that

provision since it conflicts with the statutory requirement that:

"An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding

the inadmissability or deportability of an alien."

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1).

Defendant did not cite the case of Morales-Izquierdo v. Ashcroft, Ninth Circuit Case

No. 03-70674, but the issue he presents is identical to the issue presented to the Court of

Appeals in that case. The original panel decision in Morales-Izquierdo has been withdrawn

by order of the court. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 2233278 (9th Cir.

2005). Therefore, there is presently no Ninth Circuit authority on this issue.1

The Government argues as follows:

"Section 241(a)(5) of the Act, is not much different than its

former section 242(f). The difference is in the implementing

regulations. The current regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 eliminates

the requirement that the alien proceed before an immigration

judge. The purpose was to avoid unnecessary delays through

the immigration courts."

( Response, p.2, line 26 - p.3, line 2.) This explains what the regulation accomplishes and

why the agency wished to have the regulation enacted. This argument does not respond to

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the contention that 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a) is in conflict with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a), and thus, ultra

vires and invalid. The Government goes on to argue that Defendant's argument fails because

he cannot show prejudice, a plausible ground for relief. (Response, p.3)

Defendant does argue that his due process rights were violated. (Motion, p.1) When

a collateral attack to the underlying deportation is made on due process grounds, the

defendant must show prejudice to succeed in defeating that element of the prosecution.

United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592, 595 (9th Cir. 1992). The cases requiring a

showing of prejudice deal with classic due process deprivations. See, e.g., United States v.

Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 2148 (1987) (waiver of appeal must be knowing

and intelligent); United States v. Calle-Pineda, 627 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1980); and United

States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1985) (Appellants assert that mass

deportation hearing violated due process); Colindres-Aguilar v. Immigration and

Naturalization Service, 819 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1987) (denial of right to representation violated

due process).

In this case, a due process argument could be made. Defendant could argue that if the

enactment of 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a) was a lawful exercise of authority granted by statute, it still

violates his Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair hearing, which arguably would be

a hearing before a neutral fact-finder. It is difficult to find that argument in Defendant's

motion. If that argument was made in this case, it would fail because Defendant has not and

cannot provide a plausible claim for relief, a showing of prejudice, had his reinstatement of

removal hearing proceeded before an immigration judge.

Defendant does not argue a due process violation. Rather, he argues that the Attorney

General acted ultra vires in eliminating the alien's right to appear before an immigration

judge before removal. Defendant's position is that the administrative reinstatement of

removal alleged in the indictment is a legal nullity. Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874,

884 (9th Cir. 2003); Molina-Camacho v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 937, 941 (9th Cir. 2004). If so,

the Government cannot prove a lawful order of removal on March 18, 2003, and thus, an

element of the charge cannot be established. The issue is not whether the proceeding was

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fair, but whether there was any legal basis. Therefore, prejudice to the alien is not a relevant

inquiry.

The key issue presented by Defendant's motion is whether there is statutory

authorization for 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a), which eliminates the hearing before an immigration

judge when reinstating an order of removal. Defendant's argument is that an order reinstating

a prior order of removal is itself a final order of removal. Defendant argues that Congress

reserved the authority to enter such an order exclusively to immigration judges in § 240(a)

of the Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a). Defendant presents a very close question that has been the

subject of minimal briefing in this case. The question is a close one because it is undeniable

that under the old reinstatement of removal proceedings, I.N.A. § 242(f), the alien was

entitled to appear before an immigration judge. As the Government concedes, former I.N.A.

§ 242(f) is very similar to the current provision, I.N.A. § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).

The Court must determine what statutory changes, if any, support this dramatic change in

regulatory procedure. 

Comparing the old and the new reinstatement of removal statutes, there are three

significant differences that justify the implementation of the streamlined regulatory

procedure for administrative removal without an appearance before an immigration law

judge. Dinnal v. Gonzalez, 421 F.3d 247, 253 (3rd Cir. 2005). First current I.N.A. §

241(a)(5) applies to all prior removal or deportation orders. I.N.A. § 242(f) only applied to

aliens deported for specific reasons, such as their status as aggravated felons. Thus, under

the old procedure, reinstatement of removal could only be processed in a small percentage

of the illegal re-entry cases. The other two changes are related. I.N.A. § 241(a)(5) prohibits

reopening or review of the prior removal order, and also prohibits any applications for relief.

Id. These changes significantly impact the volume of cases for which summary reinstatement

is appropriate as well as the routine nature of the only determination necessary to support

entry of an order reinstating removal. 

The Supreme Court has established a two-step test to determine if any agency

interpretation of a statute is lawful. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense, 467

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U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.C. 2781-82 (1984). First, if the intent of Congress is clear and

unambiguous in the statute, the inquiry is at an end. Id. If the statute is ambiguous, then

substantial deference should be given the agency's construction, as long as that interpretation

is reasonable. Id. at 843-45.

The circuit courts that have reviewed this issue have all decided that 8 C.F.R. § 241.8

is a legitimate interpretation of I.N.A. § 241(a)(5) by the agency. The Eighth Circuit, without

analysis, determined that 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 was "clearly a permissible interpretation of the

statute that is entitled to substantial judicial deference." Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280

F.3d 858, 866 (8th Cir. 2002). The First Circuit, after extensive analysis, came to the same

conclusion. Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004). In Lattab, the court first

concluded that the statute itself, I.N.A. § 241(a)(5), was not clear concerning whether a

hearing before an immigration officer was required. This lack of clarity was emphasized by

two provisions in the new legislation, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2) and (b)(1)(i), that did explicitly

provide for no further hearing or review before an immigration judge. Lattab, 384 F.3d at

19.

Having determined that the statute was ambiguous, the court in Lattab went on to

address the second step of the Chevron test. Lattab, 384 F.3d at 19-20. The court found the

agency's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) in 8 C.F.R., § 241.8 to be reasonable,

particularly in light of the original order or new claims for relief. Id.

This Court agrees with the analysis in Lattab. Given the three significant differences

between old I.N.A. § 242(f) and new I.N.A. § 241(a)(5), the new procedure for reinstatement

of removal is a reasonable interpretation of the new statute. For this reason, this Court

recommends that the Motion To Dismiss be DENIED.

CONCLUSION

This Court recommends that the Court DENY Defendant's Motion To Dismiss The

Indictment. The oral motion made at the hearing relies on a faulty legal premise. The prior

voluntary departure in lieu of departure can be reinstated under the clear language of 8

U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). Alternatively, this argument presents a fact issue which must be

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resolved by a jury. Concerning the argument that the procedural regulation is ultra vires,

while the statute is ambiguous, the streamlined procedure is a reasonable interpretation of the

significant changes to the reinstatement of removal statute. Therefore, the motion should be

denied.

IT IS, THEREFORE, THE RECOMMENDATION OF THIS COURT that:

1. The oral motion to dismiss indictment presented at the hearing be DENIED for

lack of legal or factual basis; and

2. The written Motion To Dismiss the Indictment (Docket 27) be DENIED.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the parties have ten (10) days from the date of

this Report and Recommendation to file written objections to these findings and

recommendations with the District Court. Any objections filed should be filed as CR 04-

01728-TUC-CKJ.

DATED this 13th day of October, 2005.

CKJ

CRP

Daniel J. Santander, Esq.

Ronald R. Reyna, Esq.

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