Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-07-01494/USCOURTS-ca3-07-01494-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerry Boulding
Appellee
Pennsylvania State Police
Appellee
Angela Sykes
Appellant
Robert Vaughan
Appellee
Roger Waters
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 07-1494

 

ANGELA SYKES,

 Appellant

v.

PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE;

ROGER WATERS; JERRY BOULDING; ROBERT VAUGHAN

 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-01349)

Magistrate Judge: The Honorable Francis X. Caiazza 

 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 3, 2008

 

Before: BARRY, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges

(Filed: April 4, 2008 )

 

OPINION

 

BARRY, Circuit Judge

Appellant Angela Sykes appeals the January 17, 2007 order of the Magistrate

Judge granting summary judgment in favor of appellees Pennsylvania State Police

Case: 07-1494 Document: 0031733977 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/04/2008
 The parties refer only to what the District Court did and did not do, apparently 1

forgetting that they consented to jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge. See A8-9, 24. 

2

(“PSP”), Jerry Boulding, and Robert Vaughan. She does not appeal the grant of 1

summary judgment in favor of Roger Waters. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1291, and will affirm. 

I.

Sykes has been employed by PSP as a police communications officer (“PCO”) at

the Washington, Pennsylvania station since 1997. She is the only black female employee

at the station and the only black PCO. Vaughan, who is white, was Sykes’ direct

supervisor from the time she began working at the Washington station and conducted all

of Sykes’ reviews except in 2003, when he was on active military duty. Boulding, who is

black, has worked at the Washington station since January 2003 and was Vaughan’s

immediate supervisor. 

In March 2001, Sykes filed an internal complaint alleging that Vaughan and

Sergeant Lapia, the staff section supervisor, had created a racially hostile work

environment, and thereafter filed complaints with the Pennsylvania Human Relations

Commission (“PHRC”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). 

She subsequently withdrew the internal complaint as well as the PHRC and EEOC

complaints. 

On August 2, 2004, November 16, 2004, and November 17, 2004, Sykes filed

charges with the Bureau of Integrity and Professional Affairs seeking disciplinary action

Case: 07-1494 Document: 0031733977 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/04/2008
3

against Boulding, and on November 23, 2004, filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging

race discrimination, a racially hostile work environment, and retaliation. After Boulding

was cleared of the internal charges and Sykes received a right to sue letter, she brought

this action in the Court of Common Pleas asserting claims under Title VII and the

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) for race discrimination, hostile work

environment, and retaliation against PSP, and for race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§

1981 and 1983 against Boulding, Vaughan, and Waters. The action was subsequently

removed to federal court. 

Our review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary. Reese Bros., Inc.

v. United States, 447 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2006). We will affirm the order “if, when

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is ‘no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

II.

Sykes raises two issues before us: (1) the Magistrate Judge ignored or discredited

her evidence; and (2) the Magistrate Judge erred in applying Burlington Northern & Santa

Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006), which held, as relevant here, that

the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII covers only those employer actions that would

have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee, which means in the context of

this case that “the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well

Case: 07-1494 Document: 0031733977 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/04/2008
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dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 

126 S.Ct. at 2415. App. Br. at 1. We reject both issues. 

There is no dispute that, for whatever reason, there was friction and tension in

Sykes’ workplace. There is also no dispute that, again for whatever reason, Sykes

complained of numerous slights or wrongs, real or perceived, which, rightly or wrongly,

caused or fueled the friction and tension. Whatever the reason in fact may have been, our

review of the record convinces us that the evidence, even taken in the light most

favorable to Sykes, does not demonstrate that the reason was either discrimination or

retaliation. 

In reaching the same conclusion, the Magistrate Judge did not ignore or discredit

Sykes’ evidence; rather, he did a thorough review of the proffered evidence on which

Sykes particularly relied, and concluded that she had failed to raise any inference of

discrimination as to her substantive discrimination and hostile work environment claims. 

Indeed, although the Magistrate Judge recognized, as do we, that the general atmosphere

in which Sykes worked was less than “utopian,” he found the record “devoid of evidence”

that any differences in treatment were motivated by racial bias. A.14. He, therefore,

determined that Sykes had not set forth a prima facie case as to her §§ 1981 and 1983

claims or her Title VII hostile work environment claim. We agree. 

As for Sykes’ retaliation claim, the Magistrate Judge found that she had not shown

that any of the alleged retaliatory conduct was the result of her administrative filings in

Case: 07-1494 Document: 0031733977 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/04/2008
 Sykes points most particularly to certain lower scores on her performance 2

evaluations as evidence of retaliatory conduct. The lower scores, however, are not by

themselves actionable under Title VII absent a showing, not made here, that they resulted

in “a more tangible form of adverse action, such as ineligibility for promotional

opportunities.” Brown v. Snow, 440 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2006). And, we note,

there is no evidence that Sykes’ claimed failure to secure employment with other state

agencies was the result of the evaluations or that she was otherwise qualified for those

positions. 

5

2001 – the purported “protected activity.” With specific reference to Burlington, he 2

concluded that none of the alleged conduct deterred Sykes from her “vigorous and

repeated use of all available means to supplement, expand, and pursue allegations of

discrimination” – to Human Resources, to her union representatives who filed grievances

on her behalf, to the Bureau of Integrity and Professional Affairs, and to the EEOC. 

A.19. The Magistrate Judge, properly applying Burlington, did not err in so concluding. 

III.

We will affirm the January 17, 2007 order of the Magistrate Judge. 

Case: 07-1494 Document: 0031733977 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/04/2008