Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00654/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00654-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David B. Long
Respondent
Cuauhtemoc Rodriguez
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CUAUHTEMOC RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVID B. LONG,

Respondent.

No. 2: 14-cv-0654 TLN KJN P

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2011 conviction for first degree 

murder and personal discharge of a firearm. Petitioner is serving a sentence of 50 years to life 

imprisonment.

Petitioner raises two claims: 1) denial of right to an impartial jury; and 2) jury instruction 

error. After carefully considering the record, the undersigned recommends that the petition be 

denied.

II. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), an application for 

a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a state court can be granted 

only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A 

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federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. See

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 

2000).

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state 

court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established United 

States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in 

Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different result. Early v. Packer, 537 

U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court 

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the 

Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 

case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (it is “not enough 

that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm 

conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) (internal citations omitted). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded 

jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 

131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 

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The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). If there is no reasoned decision, 

“and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the 

claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the 

contrary.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. That presumption may be overcome by a showing 

that “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely.” 

Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). 

“When a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a 

federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits – but that 

presumption can in some limited circumstances be rebutted.” Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 

1088, 1096 (Feb. 20, 2013). “When the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that a 

federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in state court, § 2254(d) entitles the prisoner to” de 

novo review of the claim. Id., at 1097.

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, the federal court conducts an independent review of the record. 

“Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the 

only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively 

unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). Where no reasoned 

decision is available, the habeas petitioner has the burden of “showing there was no reasonable 

basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784. “[A] habeas court must 

determine what arguments or theories supported or, . . . could have supported, the state court’s 

decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those 

arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id. at 

786.

III. Factual Background

The opinion of the California Court of Appeal contains a factual summary. After 

independently reviewing the record, the undersigned finds this summary to be accurate and 

adopts it herein.

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An information charged defendant and his sons, Agustin and 

Octavio, with the murder of victim Kevin Marshall. The 

information further alleged that defendant personally discharged a 

firearm and thereby caused the victim's death. [Footnote omitted.]

On the afternoon of August 21, 2008, the 17–year–old victim and 

his 13–year–old friend G.W. were standing outside the building 

where G.W. lived. From outside an apartment complex across the 

street, defendant's teenage son Octavio, aka Tommy, was looking at 

them with “a mug,” an “ugly look.” The victim asked Octavio what 

he was looking at, and a fistfight ensued. Defendant and another 

son, Agustin, emerged from the building and joined the fistfight. 

Agustin ended up on the ground with a dislocated finger and thumb, 

multiple abrasions, and a laceration to the head. The victim also 

fought with defendant, who lost his balance and fell down during 

the encounter. This ended the fight.

The victim ran toward his home and saw his friend and neighbor, 

18–year–old Lutrell Thomas. The victim said he had been 

“jumped” by several men. The victim and Thomas called for the 

victim's two brothers and two more friends to join them in returning 

to continue the fight. The victim and Thomas ran ahead, while the 

others walked behind them.

Meanwhile, in the victim's absence, defendant and his sons got into 

defendant's black Ford Mustang and moved it into the driveway of 

the apartment complex. According to G.W., they got out of the car 

when the victim and Thomas returned.

According to Thomas, he and the victim ran up to the car and they 

each assumed a boxing stance. Defendant pulled a gun from his 

waistband. The victim and Thomas turned and ran away. Defendant 

ran after them and fired several shots. No bullets hit Thomas. The 

victim was hit, but he made it back to the apartment complex, 

where he collapsed and died.

A neighbor testified he heard gunshots, looked out the window of 

his top floor apartment, saw a Black man running down the street, 

and several seconds later, saw the shooter following. The shooter 

fired three more shots and then ran back the way he had come. 

Another witness told a police officer that the man firing the gun did 

not run but just stood in the middle of the street as he fired the gun. 

Police discovered a bullet hole in a green van parked on the street 

and seven bullet casings in the street.

Thirteen-year-old Wendy N., a neighbor who lived in the same 

apartment building as defendant's family, was outside, passing out 

flyers for an organic vegetable stand. She knew Agustin from the 

apartment swimming pool, and her friend had dated Octavio. She 

knew the victim because she once lived in the building where he 

lived. She saw the fistfight and saw the victim run away. Defendant 

and his sons moved the car. The victim and Thomas returned, and 

the two groups yelled and cursed at each other. The victim assumed 

a fighting stance with his hands up. According to Wendy and 

another young witness, it was Agustin who pulled out the gun and 

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fired it.

After the shooting, the police tracked defendant and his sons to his 

sister's residence in Los Angeles. Agustin was arrested at a Los 

Angeles hospital. A search of the sister's home revealed a loaded 

.38–caliber handgun and ammunition, which the parties stipulated 

at trial was the gun that fired the bullet that killed the victim. When 

defendant was arrested, he told police, “You don't need my sons. 

They didn't do anything. I shot and killed that guy.” He said nothing 

about shooting in self-defense.

A forensic pathologist testified that the victim sustained gunshot 

wounds from two bullets to the back. The pathologist opined that 

the shooter was behind the victim when the shots were fired. One 

bullet—which was not lethal—entered the back of the victim's right 

shoulder and exited the front of his body. The cause of death was a 

bullet that entered the back of the victim's right arm, exited and 

then entered the right side of the victim's back. A fragment of the 

lethal bullet was recovered from the victim's lung. The doctor 

placed a trajectory rod through the wounds in the back and arm, as 

depicted in a photograph admitted as People's Exhibit 35, which 

placed the victim's body in a position consistent with running. The 

lethal bullet passed through the lung, heart and pulmonary trunk, 

and stopped in the left lung.

Defendant testified in his own defense. On the day of the shooting, 

he was inside his apartment when his daughter ran in and said some 

guys wanted to fight Octavio outside. Defendant and Agustin went 

outside, where the victim and his friend were standing. Octavio told 

defendant, “Those black kids want to fight with me.” Defendant 

asked the victim, “What's up?” and “Do you have any problems 

with my sons?” The victim pointed to Octavio and said to him, 

“What's up, nigger?” Agustin then said, “[d]o you have a problem 

with my brother?” and the victim said, “[w]ith you too.” The victim 

and Agustin began to fight. Agustin grabbed the victim around the 

neck, and the victim grabbed Agustin around the stomach. Both fell 

to the ground. Agustin could not get up. Defendant approached to 

help him up. The victim tried to hit defendant. Defendant stepped 

on his own untied shoelaces and fell down. The victim hit 

defendant. Defendant did not hit the victim. Defendant put his 

hands up and said, “Oh, you want to fight with me now? Are you 

sure you want to fight with me?” The victim backed up. Defendant 

said, “All right, boy, you win.” “Go home.” The victim asked, “Can 

I get my bike?”; it was leaning against the fence. Defendant said 

yes. The victim then left the area.

According to defendant, he got in his car to take Agustin to the 

hospital and sent Octavio upstairs to get Agustin's medical card. 

The victim and Thomas returned, running toward the car. Each was 

reaching behind his back. Defendant testified that Agustin told him 

the victim and his friend were going to “shoot us up.” [Footnote 3.)

[Footnote 3: On both direct and cross-examination, 

defendant testified that Agustin told him the people running 

toward them were going to “shoot us up.” In her opening 

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brief, appellate counsel wrote that the men who were 

running toward the Mustang said they were going to “‘shoot 

up’ [defendant] and his sons.” As will be seen, this is one of 

several misrepresentations of the record made by appellate 

counsel.]

Defendant was afraid. He lived in a dangerous neighborhood where 

shootings had occurred. Defendant retrieved his gun from under the 

driver's seat. He kept it there instead of the house because Agustin 

was on probation, which prohibited him from having a gun “near 

him.” Defendant testified that, although the police had not found 

the gun when they searched defendant's car in an unrelated incident 

several months before the shooting, the gun was there, and the 

police overlooked it.

The victim and Thomas stopped approximately 30 feet away. 

Defendant put the gun in his waistband and got out of the car, 

intending to bring calm to the situation. According to defendant, 

Thomas said, “You want to fight with my brother?” and used the 

word “[m]otherfucker.” Defendant said, “Hey, boys, no more 

trouble.” Thomas replied, “You are fighting with my brother, 

motherfucker.” Thomas, who had approached to a point about 13 

feet from defendant, put his hand behind his back. Defendant 

believed Thomas was going for a gun and feared for his life and the 

lives of his sons, so defendant pulled out his gun, pulled the slide 

back and aimed it. Thomas saw the gun and ran away. According to 

defendant, the victim, who was at that time about 22 feet away, put 

his hand behind his back. Defendant believed the victim was 

reaching for a gun. Defendant fired six or seven shots at the victim, 

who ran away after all of the shots had been fired. Defendant 

testified that the victim was facing him when all of the shots were 

fired. He denied shooting at the victim while the victim was 

running away. Defendant said he did not know the victim had been 

hit. Defendant said he got back in his car and drove off with 

Agustin. Defendant traded cars with his wife, and then drove 

Agustin and Octavio to Los Angeles. Defendant was afraid that if 

he went to a local hospital, he and Agustin would be arrested and 

Agustin would not get the medical care he needed. Defendant also 

feared deportation.

Defendant admitted he had no explanation for the bullet trajectory 

which indicated the victim had been shot in the back.

The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found 

true the gun allegation.

On February 8, 2011, the trial court sentenced defendant to an 

indeterminate term of 25 years to life on the murder count, plus a 

consecutive term of 25 years to life for personal discharge of a 

firearm causing death.

People v. Rodriguez, 2012 WL 5383095 at *1-3 (2012).

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IV. Claim 1: Alleged Juror Bias

A. Opinion of California Court of Appeal

The California Court of Appeal was the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion 

addressing this claim. Accordingly, the undersigned gives AEDPA deference to this opinion. 

The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s juror bias claim for the reasons stated 

herein:

DISCUSSION

I. Autopsy Photographs

Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error by 

refusing to dismiss a juror who became ill after seeing the autopsy 

photographs during trial and could not view this evidence. We 

disagree.

A. Background

Before trial, the prosecution moved in limine to use autopsy 

photographs to show the trajectory of the bullets that struck the 

victim. The trial court ruled some of the photographs could be 

admitted, but precluded others. Using the autopsy photographs, the 

forensic pathologist described how the two bullets hit the victim, 

and stated that one of them—the lethal bullet—entered the back of 

the victim's right forearm, exited that arm, and reentered when it 

perforated the right side of the victim's back. The pathologist 

opined that the victim was shot in the back, whereas defendant 

testified the victim was facing him and reaching for a gun when 

defendant shot at him.

One of the photographs allowed at trial showed a metal rod passing 

through the wounds in the victim's arm and into the wound in his 

back. When the prosecutor moved on to an X-ray exhibit, the trial 

court called a recess and asked Juror No. 6 to stay behind. The 

following ensued:

THE COURT: How are you doing?

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: I just get really queasy. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: All right. I think we're probably about finished with 

the pictures, are we not, at least from the District Attorney?

[PROSECUTOR]: We have no more pictures of the body.

THE COURT: [Defense] Counsel, are you going to be putting the 

pictures back up?

“[AGUSTIN'S COUNSEL]: No.

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[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: No. But, Your Honor, the 

photographs may be examined in the jury deliberations room.

THE COURT: Well, that's true. What we need to make sure is that 

you can take a look at those photographs not just for the sake of 

looking at them and seeing the blood, but to determine—One of the 

things that the lawyers are going to be arguing about is that 

trajectory. [¶] So will you be able to take a look at those 

photographs, discuss them with the other jurors and look at them 

with that in mind?

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: I'll try.

THE COURT: Okay. If you cannot, you make sure and let us know.

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: Okay. Is that going to be a problem if I 

can't?

THE COURT: If you can't, then we will have alternates. We can 

put alternates in.

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: Okay.

THE COURT: And you have been chosen as a juror.

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: I know.

THE COURT: We would just as soon you do it, but if there is 

something that makes you not able to fully consider and discuss the 

evidence, then don't you hesitate to tell us.

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: Okay.

THE COURT: And we will let you out, and you can stay and watch 

the rest of the trial if you would like, but we will put an alternate in 

to deliberate. Okay?

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: I just don't want to get sick in front of 

everybody, you know.

THE COURT: Pardon?

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: I just don't want to get sick or pass out.

THE COURT: All right. And, also, if you feel yourself getting sick 

or if you have any problem at all, if you got up and walked out, I 

would know why, and we can take a break. Okay?

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: Okay.

THE COURT: If you can, tell the bailiff first, but if you need to, 

just get up and walk out. Do you want a bucket?

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: No, I'm okay.

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THE COURT: All right. We will start back up at 2:30.

(Sworn Juror No. 6 leaves the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Anything for the record, Counsel?

[PROSECUTOR]: No.

[AGUSTIN'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, if I may. On behalf of 

Agustin Rodriguez, I'm going to ask the other parties to enter into a 

stipulation to relieve Juror No. 6.[¶] My observation of her was, I 

saw her on the—when the very first picture was published. Because 

I remember voir dire and I checked her out real quick, and I 

honestly thought she was going to come close to regurgitation, like 

she was going to throw up. I think her responses have dropped 

down to [sic ] ‘I can be fair and impartial’ to ‘I'll try.’

[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, just for the record, I 

would join in [Agustin's counsel's] position.

THE COURT: [Prosecutor].

[PROSECUTOR]: I'm not prepared to actually enter into the 

stipulation to remove her at this point. I think what Juror No. 6 is 

doing is, she's having a difficult time because they are not pretty 

pictures. She told us that. She still indicated that she is going to do 

her best to be fair, just like she promised us before. She understands 

that if she cannot look at these photographs and discuss these 

photographs, she is to alert the Court, and we can make the 

appropriate adjustments at that point. [¶] I'm not hearing—I just 

don't hear enough for me to enter—be willing to enter into a 

stipulation to relieve her at this point, Your Honor. Perhaps I can—

I'll focus on her a little bit more as the afternoon progresses, but—

THE COURT: I haven't heard a motion for cause. Is there a motion 

or—All I have heard is your invitation to the stipulation.

[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: Well, I would make the motion for 

cause, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is this matter submitted?

[PROSECUTOR]: I'll submit.

[AGUSTIN'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, just one other real quick 

thing, if I could.

THE COURT: Sure.

[AGUSTIN'S COUNSEL]: I would rather—and maybe this is not 

expediency, but I think it's reasonable. I think I would rather—I 

will join the motion for cause now, and I would rather let her go 

now than let her get two days into deliberation, then come and tell 

you that she can't play any more or she can't be fair and impartial 

because of her sensitivities. If we put in an alternate, we start the 

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deliberation all over again. [¶] So now I submit.

THE COURT: I understand that it would be a matter for 

expedience; however, you guys picked these jurors, and I anticipate 

you did that purposefully, so unless there is actual cause, I would 

not remove her absent a stipulation. [¶] I'm satisfied that she will, as 

she did, notify the bailiff if she is not feeling well and notify the 

Court if she can't continue. So unless I see something to contradict 

that impression, I will leave her on and trust that she will let us 

know. And you guys keep an eye on her, as well.”

Questioning concerning the autopsy resumed in front of the jury but 

was soon interrupted by the following:

THE COURT: ... [¶] Juror No. 6, it doesn't look to me like you are 

doing so good.

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: Do I look bad?

THE COURT: No. You just don't—You look like you can't look at 

that.

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Are you able to?

SWORN JUROR NO. 6: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm just checking.

At the end of the day, after the jurors left the courtroom, the 

following occurred:

THE COURT: All right. We are out of the presence of the jury. 

Briefly for the record, when I broke in and inquired of Juror No. 6, 

it was because I noticed she was looking around and not looking up 

at the photograph on the screen. Later on when we were talking 

about—when the other witnesses were on and not talking about any 

of the autopsy or anything like that, I noticed that she had the same 

kind of detached demeanor, that she was often looking down and 

periodically looks up at the witness or looks around. But, in 

general, she seems to have a fairly detached presentation. [¶] 

Anything else for the record?

[PROSECUTOR]: No.

[AGUSTIN'S COUNSEL]: I would agree with the Court in their 

[sic] observations. My concern was that she was refusing to look at 

the evidence, but then I watched her when Detective Jasperson took 

the stand, and she was staring at the same place in [sic] the floor, 

so—

[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: She wasn't looking at the 

photograph when I put it back up on the projector.

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[AGUSTIN'S COUNSEL]: It did not appear so to me.

THE COURT: She is also apparently very concerned with—I don't 

know—split ends or something having to do with her hair. [¶] All 

right. Anything else for the record?

[PROSECUTOR]: No, not on the record, Your Honor. 

Defendants did not renew their earlier motion to excuse the juror 

for cause or contend that inattention was an additional reason to 

excuse the juror.

B. Analysis

Section 1089 provides, in pertinent part, “If at any time, whether 

before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror 

dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is 

found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests 

a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order 

the juror to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate, who 

shall then take a place in the jury box, and be subject to the same 

rules and regulations as though the alternate juror had been selected 

as one of the original jurors.” (§ 1089, 5th par.)

A trial court has “broad discretion to investigate and remove a juror 

in the midst of trial where it finds that, for any reason, the juror is 

no longer able or qualified to serve.” (People v. Millwee (1998) 18 

Cal.4th 96, 142, fn. 19.) We review the trial court's determination 

for abuse of discretion. (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 

462 (Boyette); People v. Cissna (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1105, 

1117.)

When a juror's fitness is questioned, the trial court must make a 

reasonable inquiry to determine whether the juror should be 

discharged. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1348–

1349.) “‘[T]he mere suggestion of juror “inattention” does not 

require a formal hearing disrupting the trial of a case. [Citation.]’” 

(Bradford, supra, at p. 1348; see id. at pp. 1348–1349 [trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a hearing where 

juror fell asleep twice but did not appear to continually fall asleep 

or sleep for a long period of time].) Although juror inattentiveness 

may constitute misconduct, “‘courts have exhibited an 

understandable reluctance to overturn jury verdicts on the ground of 

inattentiveness during trial.... Perhaps recognizing the soporific 

effect of many trials when viewed from a layman's perspective, 

[the] cases uniformly decline to order a new trial in the absence of 

convincing proof that the jurors were actually asleep during 

material portions of the trial.’” (Id. at p. 1349.)

The inability of the juror to perform his or her duties must be 

shown in the record to a “‘“demonstrable reality” ’ ” (People v. 

Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 807), and we review the trial 

court's exercise of discretion in this context under that standard 

(People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 711 (Fuiava)). We do not 

reweigh the evidence. (Fuiava, supra, at p. 714.) And we give 

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deference to the trial court's firsthand observations unavailable to us 

on appeal. (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1053.)

“Demonstrable reality” is a more stringent standard than 

“substantial evidence.” (Id. at p. 1052.) To meet the demonstrable 

reality standard, the trial court's decision to remove a juror must be 

“manifestly supported” by the evidence on which the court actually 

relied. (Id. at p. 1053.) Under that standard, the trial court is not 

permitted to presume the worst of a juror. (People v. Compton

(1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 59–60; People v. Bowers (2001) 87 

Cal.App.4th 722, 729.)

Here, defendant argues the record makes clear that Juror No. 6 was 

not able to look at the autopsy pictures. Defendant's appellate 

counsel goes further and falsely claims in the opening brief that the 

juror “consciously refused to consider key evidence.” Defendant 

also says the juror was detached during the remainder of the trial, 

which defendant suggests shows her inability to impartially 

confront the evidence, whether from her aversion to the autopsy 

photos or some “deeper mental deficiency.”

However, there is no evidence whatsoever of mental deficiency. 

Nor does the record support the misrepresentation of defendant's 

appellate counsel that the juror consciously refused to consider the 

evidence. The juror did look at the photographs during trial, which 

is why she felt queasy. That the trial court observed her not looking 

at a photograph the second time it was displayed does not 

demonstrate an inability to confront the evidence. The court 

checked in with her, and she affirmatively stated she was able to 

look at the photograph. She also affirmatively stated she would 

inform the court if she could not look at and discuss the evidence 

during deliberations. The fact that she did not alert the court of any 

problem during deliberations indicates she was able to look at and 

discuss the evidence.

Defendant also argues on appeal that the juror was “detached” as 

the trial continued, and should have been excused for this reason. 

Assuming, arguendo, that this contention was not forfeited when 

defendant's counsel did not assert it at trial (see Boyette, supra, 29 

Cal.4th at p. 462), we address the merits.

Defendant cites cases holding that trial courts did not abuse their 

discretion in excusing jurors for a variety of personal issues. None 

of these cases make the trial court's decision in this case an abuse of 

discretion. In People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, a juror got 

a speeding ticket which could cost him his job. The juror 

considered it unjust that the district attorney's office would not drop 

the matter. (Id. at pp. 845–846.) Even though the juror said it would 

not affect his performance on the jury, the trial court concluded 

there was no way the juror could avoid it affecting his judgment at 

least unconsciously. (Ibid.)

In People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, when the jury began 

deliberations, a juror asked to be discharged because she was 

starting a new job soon. (Id. at p. 1098.) She initially said her 

anxiety over the new job would not affect her deliberations, and the 

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court left her on the jury. After the jury returned verdicts on some 

counts and returned to deliberate on the remaining counts, the same 

juror again asked to be discharged but again said her anxiety would 

not affect her deliberations. However, after phoning her present 

employer, the juror told the court that the manager said she needed 

to do paperwork so the employer could vacate her spot, and the 

juror affirmatively stated her anxiety over this matter would affect 

her jury deliberations. (Id. at p. 1099.) The trial court excused her at 

that point. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record 

supported the trial court's ruling that good cause to excuse the juror 

did not exist before she spoke with her employer, and (2) good 

cause to excuse her did exist after she spoke with her employer. (Id.

at pp. 1099–1100.) Fudge supports affirmance in our case, where 

the juror earlier expressed anxiety but said it would not affect the 

performance of her duties as juror.

Defendant also cites Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 155 

Cal.App.3d 624, which held double jeopardy did not bar a retrial 

after the first trial ended in a mistrial when the court excused a juror 

who said he had prejudged the case and his mind kept wandering 

and he could not concentrate. (Id. at pp. 626–629.) The appellate 

court disregarded the juror's expression of prejudice, but concluded 

the juror's inability to concentrate was good cause to excuse the 

juror. (Id. at p. 629.) Here, in contrast, the juror said she was able to 

perform her duties as juror, and would let the court know if she 

could not.

Defendant also cites People v. Green (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 524, 

which held a juror's moving out of state was good cause for the trial 

court to excuse her from the sanity and penalty phases of trial. (Id.

at pp. 528–529.)

That the trial courts in the foregoing cases did not abuse their 

discretion in excusing jurors does not mean the trial court here 

abused its discretion in keeping Juror No. 6.

Defendant argues this case is analogous to People v. Ramirez

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 456–457, which held a trial court properly 

dismissed a juror after observing the juror sleeping multiple times 

during trial and learning that other jurors also observed the juror 

dozing during trial and deliberations. The Supreme Court held the 

trial court does not abuse its discretion when it discharges a juror 

who falls asleep during trial. (Id. at pp. 457–458.) Defendant argues 

the same inability to concentrate is present in this case. But it is not. 

Falling asleep is not the same as feeling queasy when viewing 

autopsy photographs or twirling one's hair. Moreover, Ramirez does 

not stand for the principle that a juror who appears inattentive must 

be dismissed. Rather, Ramirez held it was not an abuse of discretion 

for the trial court to dismiss the juror under the circumstances of 

that case. Here too, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial 

court to keep Juror No. 6.

In People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, a juror expressed 

concern that the extension of the trial beyond the date it was 

originally predicted to conclude created a problem with her job as 

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office manager of an elementary school. (Id. at pp. 618–621.) When 

the court asked if she would be distracted wondering what was 

going on at the school, she said, “Of course I'll be wondering what's 

happening at school,” but she felt strongly that she could continue 

on the jury and maintain her focus on the case. (Id. at p. 620.) The 

Supreme Court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in 

declining to excuse the juror. The trial court was in the position to 

observe the juror's demeanor in answering the court's questions and 

was persuaded the juror could perform her duties. (Id. at p. 621.)

Here, the record does not show as a demonstrable reality that Juror 

No. 6 could not carry out her responsibility to consider all of the 

evidence or that she was inattentive to the point that she missed trial 

evidence. Rather, it shows the trial court was hypervigilant after the 

juror's initial reaction to the autopsy photographs, such that the 

court noticed the juror played with her hair, looked around the 

room, and did not take a second look at an autopsy photograph 

redisplayed by defense counsel after having looked at the 

photograph when it was first displayed by the prosecution. None of 

this makes the trial court's decision an abuse of discretion. The trial 

court was in the position to observe the juror's demeanor in 

answering the court's questions and was persuaded the juror could 

perform her duties. (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 298, 

abrogated on other grounds in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 

Cal.4th 610, 637.)

Since we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

keeping Juror No. 6 on the jury, we need not address defendant's 

argument that he was prejudiced by the trial court's error. We 

nonetheless address that argument as it relates to the autopsy 

photograph. Defendant assumes Juror No. 6 committed misconduct 

by not considering the autopsy photograph, thus raising the 

rebuttable presumption of prejudice discussed in In re Hamilton

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 295–296 (Hamilton). Assuming the 

presumption of prejudice arises in this context, that presumption is 

rebutted by the evidence and the arguments of counsel.

Defendant contends his testimony that the victim was facing him 

when he began firing made the autopsy photographs “a critical 

piece of evidence,” and “[t]he difference between murder and 

voluntary manslaughter hung on this evidence.” Yet, the autopsy 

photographs, combined with the pathologist's testimony, established 

that the victim's back was to defendant when the victim was struck 

by two of the bullets defendant fired. And defendant's attorney 

wisely conceded, based on the pathologist's testimony and 

photograph showing the bullet trajectories, that the victim was not 

facing defendant when defendant shot at him. Defense counsel 

argued defendant believed the victim was facing him, but was 

wrong in that belief. [Footnote 4.]

[Footnote 4: Defendant's counsel told the jury: 

“[Defendant] also tells us that [the victim] was facing him 

when he fired all seven of these shots. Now, we know that

that can't be the case because we had the testimony from Dr. 

Fiore, ... a forensic pathologist, who conducted the autopsy 

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examination on the body of [the victim], and he told us that 

the wounds were back to front.... You will recall that she 

told us, that in her opinion—there was a photograph ... with 

a directional rod ... where they positioned the arms so it 

would have been as though he were running. They put a rod 

through a wound to the arm into the wound of the upper 

back torso to show that that could have been a single shot 

that struck [the victim] as he was running. It went through 

his arm and then into his chest through his lungs, his heart 

and caused his rather immediate death. So he could not have 

been facing [defendant ] when all these shots were fired. [¶] 

But, Ladies and Gentlemen, if you look at this record again, 

if you go back and recall the evidence, there is some support 

here for [defendant's] belief that [the victim] was facing him 

when the shots were fired. He was wrong in that belief. 

That's what the physical evidence tells us. But I think the 

question here is: Could he have believed that, given the 

circumstances of the situation in which he was operating at 

the time these shots were fired? And again, this is happening 

quickly. It's under stress. And you have to assess it from that 

standpoint....” (Italics added.)

In our view, defendant essentially asserts on appeal that Juror No. 6 

failed to consider evidence that was helpful to the prosecution, not 

evidence that was helpful to his case. Thus, assuming, arguendo, 

Juror No. 6 did not consider the evidence, defendant was not 

prejudiced, even applying the juror misconduct standard of “no 

reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood 

that one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant.” 

(Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 296; see People v. Danks (2004) 

32 Cal.4th 269, 303, quoting In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 

654 [“’All pertinent portions of the entire record, including the trial 

record, must be considered. “The presumption of prejudice may be 

rebutted, inter alia, by a reviewing court's determination, upon 

examining the entire record, that there is no substantial likelihood 

that the complaining party suffered actual” ’ bias.”] (Italics added 

by Carpenter.)

Here, assuming Juror No. 6 did not consider the autopsy 

photograph, no prejudice occurred because if she had considered it, 

the verdict would have been the same.

People v. Rodriguez, 2012 WL 5383095 at *3-9.

B. Analysis

Petitioner argues that juror 6 should have been dismissed because she was unable to 

consider the autopsy photos. In support of this claim, petitioner attaches the briefing he submitted 

to the California Supreme Court in support of his petition for review. In this briefing, petitioner 

cites both state and federal law.

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To the extent petitioner argues that the trial court abused its discretion under state law in 

failing to dismiss juror 6, such a contention is not cognizable in federal habeas. Generally, issues 

of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). 

“The availability of a claim under state law does not of itself establish that a claim was available 

under the United States Constitution.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 239 (1990). 

Accordingly, to the extent petitioner raises a state law claim regarding the trial court’s failure to 

dismiss juror 6, it is not cognizable in this action.

State criminal defendants have a federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. 

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair 

trial is violated when the “essential feature” of the jury is not preserved. Williams v. Florida, 399 

U.S. 78, 100 (1970). California Penal Code section 1089 governs the dismissal and substitution 

of jurors in California criminal trials. Under section 1089, a juror may be removed from service 

either before or after final submission of the case if the juror becomes ill, dies, or upon other 

“good cause.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of section 1089, after 

determining that it “preserved the ‘essential feature’ of the jury required by the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments.” Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 995 (9th Cir.), amended, 768 F.2d 

1090 (9th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, reviewing habeas courts need only decide whether the state 

court’s application under the circumstances violated a petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights (e.g., 

whether good cause existed for the dismissal of the juror). Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422, 

1426–28 (9th Cir.1997).

Section 1089 provides in pertinent part:

If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the 

case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good 

cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her 

duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears 

therefor, the court may order the juror to be discharged and draw 

the name of an alternate, who shall than take a place in the jury box, 

and be subject to the same rules and regulations as though the 

alternate juror had been selected as one of the original jurors.

Cal.Penal Code § 1089.

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Under AEDPA, a state court’s factual determination that good cause existed for the 

dismissal of a particular juror is presumed correct, and must be upheld unless the finding was 

based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d) (2), (e)(1); Perez, 119 F.3d at 1426.

The undersigned finds that the California Court of Appeal did not violate clearly 

established federal law when it upheld the trial court’s findings that there was no good cause to 

dismiss juror 6, and that juror 6 was able to carry out her responsibilities as a juror. The state 

appellate court reasonably found that juror 6’s failure to look at the photos the second time they 

were displayed did not demonstrate an inability to confront the evidence. The state appellate 

court also reasonably found that the trial court correctly denied petitioner’s request to excuse 

juror 6 after juror 6 told the trial court that she would be able to look at the photos and that she 

would inform the court if she could not look at and discuss the evidence during deliberations. 

To the extent petitioner argues that the trial court should have dismissed juror 6 because 

she was “detached,” the undersigned finds that the California Court of Appeal reasonably denied 

this claim as well. The state appellate court reasonably found that the record did not show that 

juror 6 was inattentive to the point that she missed trial evidence. The state appellate court 

reasonably found that the trial judge was vigilant after juror 6’s initial reaction to the autopsy 

photos and was persuaded that juror 6 could perform her duties after questioning her. 

The undersigned also agrees with the California Court of Appeal that petitioner has not 

demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to remove juror 6, i.e., that the 

failure to remove juror 6 had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). As noted by the California 

Court of Appeal, the purpose of the at-issue autopsy photos was to show the trajectory of the 

bullets that petitioner shot at the victim. The doctor who performed the autopsy testified that the 

victim was shot twice. (RT at 552.) Based on the location of the shots in the victim’s body, the 

doctor testified that she could tell that the shooter was standing behind the victim. (Id. at 563.) 

Thus, even if juror 6 was unable to view the autopsy photos, she was able to hear the testimony of 

the doctor regarding the trajectory of the shots and the location of the shooter. In addition, as 

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noted by the California Court of Appeal, during closing argument petitioner’s lawyer admitted 

that the victim could not have been facing petitioner when he was shot. (RT at 891-92.) 

Because petitioner’s counsel admitted that the victim was not facing petitioner when he 

was shot, based on the doctor’s undisputed testimony, the trial court’s failure to dismiss juror 6 

based on her alleged inability to view the autopsy photos did not have a substantial and injurious 

impact on the verdict. For these reasons, this claim should be denied.

V. Claim 2: Alleged Jury Instruction Error

A. Opinion of California Court of Appeal

The California Court of Appeal was the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion 

addressing this claim. Accordingly, the undersigned gives AEDPA deference to this opinion. 

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim for the reasons stated herein:

II. Jury Instruction

Defendant next argues the trial court erred by modifying 

CALCRIM No. 505—the jury instruction on justifiable homicide: 

self-defense and defense of others—by adding that fear of great 

bodily injury could include injury inflicted by hands or fists. 

Defendant argues the modification constituted judicial endorsement 

of the prosecution's theory of the case and lessened the burden of 

proof. We disagree.

A. Background

The trial court added the following italicized language to the 

penultimate paragraph in CALCRIM No. 505: “Great bodily injury 

means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that 

is greater than minor or moderate harm, and may be inflicted by 

hands or fists.” (Italics added.)

The court also instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 5.31: “An 

assault with the fists does not justify the person being assaulted in 

using a deadly weapon in self-defense or defense of another unless 

that person believes, and a reasonable person in the same or similar 

circumstances would believe, that the assault is likely to inflict 

great bodily injury upon him or upon another person.”

B. Analysis

Defendant's appellate counsel again misrepresents the record by 

claiming the trial court added the “hands or fists” language “[o]ver 

appellant's objection.” As the People point out, defendant's trial 

counsel actually requested that language.

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Defendant's reply brief says trial counsel proposed multiple 

modifications to CALCRIM No. 505, some of which the trial court 

rejected, and defendant claims he did object to the trial court that he 

did not want the “hands and fists” language without his other 

modifications. Again, appellate counsel misrepresents the record.

After the court read the instructions to the jury, it asked counsel if 

there were any objections to the instructions. Defendant's trial 

counsel stated that he had several objections for the record. 

Regarding the modified CALCRIM No. 505, counsel stated, “I 

objected to the Court giving the version of CALCRIM 505 that is in 

the instruction package, and we requested in our trial brief a slightly 

different version of CALCRIM 505.... [¶] The Court did give one 

portion of that instruction that we requested. That was the—it's 

included in the Court's instructions, and that is that great bodily 

injury can be caused by hands and fists, but I wanted the Court to 

give the entire instruction ... that we had crafted, because I felt that 

it was a better statement of the law and the burden on the People to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this was not an act of selfdefense. So having said that, that's the basis for my objection.” The 

trial court said, “We did make a little bit of a modification of 505 to 

add in that the great bodily injury may be inflicted by hands or fists. 

It appeared to me that adding in any more about the District 

Attorney's burden was redundant to the language that was already 

in the instruction.” [Footnote 5.]

[Footnote 5: The trial court rejected defendant’s proposed 

language that stated: “Unless the prosecution proves 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant’s] beliefs were 

unreasonable, self-defense or defense of another applies 

regardless of whether or not the danger actually existed.”]

It is clear that defendant's proposed modification included the very 

language about which he now complains. Indeed, defendant 

devoted some two and a half pages in his trial brief to argument 

supporting the addition of the “hands or fists” language. 

Defendant's trial brief does not state he wanted all his proposed 

modifications to CALCRIM No. 505 or none at all, and defendant 

did not object in the trial court on the grounds that he advances now 

on appeal. And defendant does not contend on appeal that the trial 

court erred in rejecting other parts of defendant's proposal. Since 

defendant requested of the trial court the exact language he now 

challenges on appeal, the invited error doctrine bars his appellate 

challenge. (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 250 (Huggins

).)

Even if we entertain the contention, it lacks merit. The modified 

instruction accurately states that great bodily injury can be inflicted 

by hands or fists. Indeed, the instruction actually benefited 

defendant by allowing the jury to find he acted in self-defense, even 

if the victim and Thomas did not have any weapons other than their 

fists.

Defendant acknowledges the modification was a correct statement 

of law, i.e., that great bodily injury can include injury by hands or 

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fists. He argues that, since the ability to cause great bodily injury 

with fists is implied in the commonly understood definition of great 

bodily injury, there was no need to state it expressly. Defendant 

claims the trial court, by “emphasizing” that great bodily injury can 

include injury by hands or fists, led the jury to believe that the court 

regarded the fist fight as the sole provocation and therefore 

minimized defendant's claim that the victim appeared to be 

reaching for a gun. He argues the two instructions together 

endorsed the prosecution's theory that defendant shot the victim in 

response to a fistfight, and that this fistfight did not justify 

defendant's use of deadly force. Defendant says the instructions also 

lessened the prosecution's burden of negating the defense theory 

that the victim was reaching for a gun when defendant shot him.

Defendant cites no authority whatsoever supporting reversal here, 

where the modification correctly stated the law. He cites case law 

that the correctness of an individual jury instruction is evaluated in 

the context of the entire charge to the jury, not in isolation. (People 

v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 252.) True, but that is not 

helpful to defendant. Where, as here, a defendant claims that 

instructions correct in law are ambiguous or misleading, the proper 

standard is to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood 

that the jury misunderstood the instructions in the manner asserted 

by the defendant. (Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380–

381; Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 193.) In making that 

determination, we look to the instructions as a whole. (People v. 

Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 963 [“ ‘ “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury 

instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, 

not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a 

particular instruction.”] We also look to the arguments of counsel. 

(See People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 189.)

Here, there is no likelihood that the instructions led the jurors to 

convict defendant because they believed the trial court regarded the 

fistfight as the sole provocation and therefore minimized 

defendant's claim that the victim appeared to be reaching for a gun. 

Consistent with CALCRIM No. 101, which was given at the 

beginning of the trial, the court expressly told the jury, “Do not take 

anything I say or do during trial as an indication of what I think 

about the facts, the witnesses, or what your verdict should be.” At 

the end of the trial, consistent with CALCRIM No. 3550, the trial 

court repeated the admonition it gave at the beginning of the trial, 

instructing the jury, “It is not my role to tell you what your verdict 

should be. Do not take anything I said or did during the trial as an 

indication of what I think about the facts, the witnesses, or what 

your verdict should be.” Earlier in the charge at the end of the trial, 

consistent with CALCRIM No. 200, the trial court told the jury, 

“Do not assume just because I give a particular instruction that I am 

suggesting anything about the facts. After you have decided what 

the facts are, follow the instructions that do apply to the facts as you 

find them.” We presume the jurors followed the instructions. 

(Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 716.)

Moreover, none of the evidence supported defendant's theory other 

than his own self-serving testimony. All other evidence pointed the 

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other way, e.g., no gun was found on the victim, and the victim was 

shot from behind as he was running away.

Lastly, nothing the prosecutor said during closing argument misled 

the jury. Contrary to defendant's argument on appeal, the prosecutor 

did acknowledge defendant's theory that the victim was reaching 

for a gun, and at no time did the prosecutor imply such evidence 

would not support a valid legal theory in this case. The prosecutor 

urged the jury to reject defendant's testimony. The prosecutor 

argued the testimony that defendant believed the victim and 

Thomas had guns was not reasonable, because if he really thought 

that, defendant would not have gotten out of his car to try to calm 

the situation down. She also argued it was unreasonable for the 

victim to reach for a gun he did not have. Additionally, the 

prosecutor emphasized that the victim was gunned down as he was 

fleeing, and contended it is not self-defense to shoot a person who 

is running away from you in the back even if you believe he had a 

gun. The prosecutor argued that, at most, such a scenario equates to 

a belief in future, not imminent harm.

We conclude defendant fails to show instructional error.

People v. Rodriguez, 2012 WL 5383095 at *9-11.

B. Procedural Default

Respondent argues that petitioner’s claim challenging the modification to CALCRIM 505 

is procedurally barred based on the California Court of Appeal’s finding that petitioner waived 

the claim by requesting the at-issue change.1

State courts may decline to review a claim based on a procedural default. Wainwright v. 

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977). As a general rule, a federal habeas court “'will not review a 

question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law 

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.'” 

Calderon v. United States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). The state rule is only “adequate” if it is 

“firmly established and regularly followed.” Id. (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 

 

1

 As noted by the California Court of Appeal, in his trial brief, petitioner’s counsel requested 

that CALCRIM 505 be modified in a number of ways, including adding the language that great 

bodily injury may be inflicted by hands or fists. (CT at 34.) After the instructions were read to 

the jury, petitioner’s counsel objected to the version of CALCRIM 505 read to the jury because it 

did not include all of his proposed modifications. (RT at 863-64.) Petitioner’s counsel 

acknowledged that the trial court had given his proposed modification that great bodily injury can 

be caused by hands or first, but objected that he had wanted CALCRIM 505 modified in all of the 

ways he proposed. (Id. at 864.) 

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(1991)). See also Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F 3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[t]o be deemed 

adequate, the state law ground for decision must be well-established and consistently applied.”) 

The state rule must also be “independent” in that it is not “interwoven with the federal law.” Park 

v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 

1040-41 (1983)). Even if the state rule is independent and adequate, the claims may be heard if 

the petitioner can show: (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged 

violation of federal law; or (2) that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50.

Respondent has met his burden of adequately pleading an independent and adequate state 

procedural ground as an affirmative defense. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. The invited error 

doctrine is recognized as a valid procedural default that bars federal habeas review. See, e.g., 

Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 832 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that invited error doctrine may 

be a valid basis for procedural default under habeas review where the state court clearly and 

expressly invoked the invited error doctrine). Petitioner, who did not file a reply to respondent’s 

answer, has failed to meet his burden of asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate the 

inadequacy of California's invited error doctrine as unclear, inconsistently applied or not wellestablished, either as a general rule or as applied to him. Bennet, 322 F.3d at 586. Petitioner has 

also failed to demonstrate that there was cause for his procedural default or that a miscarriage of 

justice would result absent review of the claims by this federal habeas court. See Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 748. 

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, petitioner’s claim alleging jury instruction 

error is procedurally barred. Nonetheless, even if this claim were not procedurally barred, for the 

following reasons it lacks merit and should be denied.

C. Analysis of Merits of Jury Instruction Claim

Legal Standard

Habeas relief is warranted on the basis of a flawed jury instruction if the flaw amounted to 

constitutional error and caused prejudice. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-47 (1998). A 

jury instruction in a criminal trial violates due process, and thus amounts to constitutional error, if 

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it relieves the state of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the 

charged offense. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 (1989). “[N]ot every ambiguity, 

inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction” will have such an effect, however. Middleton 

v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004). Where it is unclear whether an instruction relieves the state 

of its burden of proof because a challenged instruction is ambiguous, constitutional error exists 

only if “‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the ... instruction in a way’” that 

would lead to conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt for each element of the 

charged offense. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 

U.S. 370, 380 (1990)).

Analysis

The California Court of Appeal correctly found, as petitioner through counsel conceded, 

that CALCRIM 505 correctly stated the law, i.e., that great bodily injury can be inflicted with 

hands or fists. Petitioner’s real argument appears to be that CALCRIM 505, as modified, led the 

jury to believe that the trial court regarded the first fight with the victim, i.e, the fist fight, as the 

sole provocation for petitioner shooting the victim, which reduced the prosecution’s burden of 

negating the defense theory that the victim was reaching for a gun when he was shot. For the 

reasons stated herein, the undersigned finds that the denial of this claim by the California Court of 

Appeal was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. 

To put petitioner’s claim in context, the undersigned quotes the relevant portion of

CALCRIM 505 read to the jury:

505. Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another

The defendants are not guilty of murder or manslaughter if they 

were justified in killing someone in self-defense or defense of 

another. A defendant acted in lawful self-defense or defense of 

another if:

1. The defendant reasonably believed that he or someone else was 

in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury.

2. The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of 

deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger.

AND

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3. The defendant used no more force than was reasonably 

necessary to defend against that danger.

****

Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury. 

It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm, and it 

may be inflicted by hands or fists. 

(CT at 653-54.)

The jury was also instructed with CALJIC 5.31, which read,

CALJIC 5.31 Assault with Fists – When Use of Deadly Weapon 

Not Justified.

An assault with the fists does not justify the person being assaulted 

in using a deadly weapon in self-defense or defense of another 

unless that person believes, and a reasonable person in the same or 

similar circumstances would believe, that the assault is likely to 

inflict great bodily injury upon him or upon another person.

(CT at 654.) 

As noted by the state appellate court, CALCRIM 505, as modified, benefited petitioner by 

allowing the jury to find he acted in self-defense, even if the victim and Thomas did not have any 

weapons other than their fists. In addition, as read together, CALCRIM 505 and CALJIC 5.31, 

informed the jury that a reasonable person could not use deadly force to defend against an assault 

by hands or fists unless that person reasonably believed that the assault was likely to inflict great 

bodily injury. These instructions did not lead the jury to believe that the court regarded the first 

fight between petitioner and the victim as the “sole provocation,” or minimize petitioner’s 

defense that the victim was reaching for a gun.

In addition, as noted by the California Court of Appeal, the jury was instructed not to take 

anything said by the trial judge during the trial as an indication of what he thought about the facts 

or what the verdict should be. (CT at 639.) The jury was also instructed, “Do not assume just 

because I give a particular instruction that I am suggesting anything about the facts.” (Id. at 642.) 

These instructions instructed the jury to disregard any statement by the trial judge or jury 

instruction suggesting the judge’s views regarding the facts or verdict. A jury is presumed to 

follow its instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). 

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The undersigned also finds that the California Court of Appeal reasonably found that the 

only evidence supporting petitioner’s theory, i.e, that it looked like the victim was reaching for a 

gun, was petitioner’s own testimony. The lack of evidence supporting petitioner’s defense 

undermines any possible prejudice caused by the at-issue instructions. 

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that CALCRIM 505, as modified, 

did not wrongly lead the jury to believe that the trial court regarded the first fight with the victim, 

i.e. the first fight, as the sole provocation for petitioner shooting the victim, thus reducing the 

prosecution’s burden of negating the defense theory that the victim was reaching for a gun when 

he was shot. Accordingly, this claim is without merit. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a writ of 

habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” If petitioner files objections, 

he shall also address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why and as to 

which issues. A certificate of appealability may issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(3). Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after 

service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: June 13, 2016

Rod654.157

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