Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01913/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01913-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin C. Darks
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1761

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* 

v. * 

* 

Henry Ruiz, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

No. 05-1762

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* 

v. * 

* 

Carl A. Chatman, * 

* 

Appellant. *

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___________

No. 05-1804

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* 

v. * 

* 

Joseph Gonzales, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

No. 05-1805

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* 

v. * 

* 

Michael A. Aviles, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

No. 05-1913

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

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* 

v. * 

* 

Kevin C. Darks, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Appeals from the United States

No. 05-2088 District Court for the 

___________ Western District of Missouri.

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* 

v. * 

* 

Robert Lopez, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

No. 05-2601

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* 

v. * 

* 

Augustine C. Aviles, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

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1

The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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Submitted: January 9, 2006

Filed: May 1, 2006 (Corrected on: 05/05/06)

 (Corrected on: 05/16/06)

___________

Before MURPHY, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") executed

a reverse-sting operation involving a large quantity of narcotics at a warehouse in

Kansas City, Missouri. The reverse sting resulted in the arrest of Henry Ruiz, Carl

Chatman, Daniel Ramirez, Joseph Gonzales, Michael Aviles, Kevin Darks, Robert

Lopez, and Augustine Aviles. A jury convicted the men of narcotics and weapons

crimes, as well as criminal forfeiture. In this consolidated appeal, appellants have

filed separate briefs raising issues regarding sufficiency of the evidence, juror

misconduct, evidentiary error, severance, and sentencing error. We affirm the district

court's1

 judgment in all respects. 

I. Background

We begin with a thorough factual review to address the appellants' sufficiency

of the evidence arguments. Prior to the events relevant to the appeal, Angel Torres

trafficked in illegal narcotics, supplying drug dealers in Kansas City, Missouri, with

narcotics from Mexico. After his arrest, Torres worked with the ATF as a confidential

informant. 

In October 2003, the ATF initially sent Torres to Kansas City, Missouri, to

assist in the investigation of a particular suspected large-scale drug dealer. Torres

himself had previously been a large-scale supplier of illegal narcotics to the Kansas

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2

 In a "reverse-sting operation," a government agent sells or negotiates the sale

of a controlled substance to a suspect.

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City area. Police intended to use Torres to make contact with this person and then

arrange a reverse-sting operation.2

 Instead, Torres encountered a person known as

"Yogi," who Torres knew to be involved in the narcotics trade. The two men traveled

to a bar in Kansas City's Westport area for a few beers, where they discussed a

potential large-scale narcotics transaction. A short time later, Yogi introduced Torres

to appellant Augustine Aviles ("Augustine"). Torres observed Augustine give Yogi

an unknown amount of cash. Yogi went to the restroom a few minutes later. In Yogi's

absence, Torres told Augustine he was bringing up a "little something something"

from Texas for Yogi, and Augustine responded that he was the "dog getting rid of

that something something." The two exchanged phone numbers.

The next day, Torres met with Augustine at a local restaurant. Augustine

briefly questioned the legitimacy of Torres's credentials, asking Torres to produce his

Texas driver's license. Once Augustine was satisfied, the two men discussed a

potential business relationship in illegal narcotics. Augustine boasted of his narcotics

selling prowess in Kansas City and represented that he could quickly distribute large

quantities of narcotics in the area. 

Later that night, Augustine invited Torres to his home. In Augustine's home,

Torres observed approximately 500 grams of cocaine and a pound of marijuana on

the kitchen table. On the dining room table, Torres saw approximately eight to ten

pistols. Augustine and Torres discussed exchanging guns for drugs. At some point

during this conversation, Michael Aviles ("Michael"), Augustine's brother, entered

the room. Augustine then called Carl Chatman into the room and told him to retrieve

three assault rifles, which Chatman did. After this meeting, law enforcement decided

to make Augustine the primary investigatory target. The following day, Augustine

gave Torres a tour of Kansas City to assure Torres of his ability to quickly distribute

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as much narcotics as Torres could provide. Torres then left Kansas City and returned

to Texas. 

Over the next month, Augustine and Torres spoke on the phone multiple times,

and law enforcement recorded many of these conversations. Torres agreed to deliver

to Augustine 400 pounds of marijuana and 2 kilograms of cocaine. The men

negotiated a price of $375 per pound of marijuana and $17,000 per kilogram of

cocaine. Augustine made several references to already having buyers in place for the

drugs. 

In a recorded conversation before the reverse sting, Torres informed Augustine

that the truck was in route to Kansas City, and Augustine responded that he had a

crew in place to unload the truck. Torres indicated that the truck carried the amount

of narcotics ordered by Augustine, as well as additional drugs bound for Chicago.

Augustine replied that the trip to Chicago might be unnecessary, implying that he

could distribute the entire contents of the truck in Kansas City. Augustine further

stated that he and his crew would place the drugs in one vehicle, which would be

escorted by other vehicles, and that nobody better stop the vehicle with the drugs

because they were "going for life or death." 

Augustine and Torres arranged to meet at the Ameristar Casino in Kansas City

on the night of the truck's arrival. That night, a surveillance officer observed several

vehicles meet at the casino. Augustine and Michael got out of one vehicle and rode

with Torres to the warehouse where the truck was to deliver the drugs. On the way,

Michael made several comments about how the deal was going to be a success and

how they would get rid of all the drugs. Augustine reiterated his intention to harm

police if they stopped the vehicle carrying the drugs. Also while en route, Michael

received phone calls from the other vehicles and instructed the callers to stay close

behind them and not to lose them. 

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3

The appeal of the eighth defendant, Daniel Ramirez, was severed from this

appeal. 

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In preparation for the sting, law enforcement officials outfitted the warehouse

and the trailer of the truck delivering the narcotics with surveillance cameras. Four

cameras placed in the warehouse and one in the trailer provided several angles of the

scene. Officers planned to record the activity of Torres and each of the eight

defendants3

 while in the warehouse.

Upon arrival at the warehouse, Torres unlocked the warehouse and directed the

blue minivan into the building, followed by the silver minivan. Torres then closed the

warehouse door to avoid drawing unnecessary attention. After the door was closed,

Ruiz took a gun wrapped in a baby blanket from the blue minivan, in which he had

ridden, and gave it to Augustine. Augustine, in the presence of Ruiz, Darks, Chatman,

and Gonzales, gave the gun to Torres as a "gift from his heart." 

After the tractor trailer arrived with the drugs, all eight defendants and Torres

went to the front of the warehouse to get ready to unload the trailer. Torres opened

the warehouse door and entered the back of the tractor trailer to help Special Agent

Cheatham (who had driven the tractor trailer) unload the boxes of narcotics. The truck

carried 5 boxes, each of which contained 80 pounds of marijuana. One of the boxes

also contained 2 kilograms of fake cocaine. Special Agent Cheatham testified that the

odor of marijuana was evident around the trailer as the boxes were being unloaded.

Of the five boxes of narcotics, three boxes were unloaded from the truck before the

police raided the warehouse. Chatman carried the first box into the warehouse, which

he placed behind the blue minivan that he drove to the warehouse. Ruiz carried the

second box and placed it behind the blue minivan. Michael reached for the third box,

but the box was ultimately carried by Ramirez and placed behind the blue minivan.

Torres then walked to the rear of the blue minivan. There, he opened one of the

boxes and dumped the bricks of marijuana onto the floor of the warehouse. He

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In addition to the firearms recovered, police found seven portable radios that

were tuned to the same frequency. Two radios were found in each of the three

vehicles that the defendants drove to the warehouse. The other radio was found on the

warehouse floor. Law enforcement also seized $13,400, which was to be the down

payment for the drugs.

5

Count I charged all of the defendants with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams

or more of cocaine and 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1), and 846. Count II charged all of the defendants with possession

with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), (b)(1). Count III charged all of the defendants with possession with intent

to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), (b)(1). Counts IV through XI charged each of the eight defendants

individually with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 934(c)(1)(A). Count XII charged all of the defendants with

criminal forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853. 

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instructed the defendants to count the drugs, which Michael, Ramirez, and Lopez

proceeded to do. From across the warehouse, Cheatham yelled to Torres that the third

box contained the cocaine. Torres retrieved the cocaine and gave it to Augustine, who

placed it in the back seat of the blue minivan. 

At this point, Torres signaled police to initiate arrest. The police proceeded to

arrest the defendants after startling them with a loud flash-bang device. During the

arrest, Chatman pointed a gun at the law enforcement team as they entered the

warehouse but ultimately surrendered. Darks was caught on video discarding a

revolver4

 while attempting to flee. Two other handguns were recovered from the blue

minivan, and ammunition recovered from Ruiz's person matched one of these two

handguns.

A federal grand jury returned a twelve-count superceding indictment charging

the defendants with various narcotics and weapons crimes, as well as criminal

forfeiture.5

 At trial, Augustine testified that none of the other defendants were aware

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Two of the special verdicts are relevant on appeal. The jury attributed to

Augustine the entire 400 pounds of marijuana and 2 kilograms of cocaine. The jury

attributed to Darks the 2 kilograms of cocaine but only 240 pounds of marijuana.

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that they were going to pick up narcotics at the warehouse that night, claiming that

he told the other seven that they were going to pick up cleaning supplies.

After a two-week trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts as to

Augustine Aviles, Michael Aviles, Carl Chatman, Henry Ruiz, Joseph Gonzales, and

Kevin Darks. The jury convicted Daniel Ramirez and Robert Lopez on all counts with

the exception of the count involving possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

The jury also returned special verdicts for the amount of narcotics attributable to each

defendant for sentencing purposes.6

On appeal, each appellant filed separate briefs through counsel. Two of the

appellants, Chatman and Gonzales, have also filed pro se briefs. For the following

reasons, we affirm in all respects.

II. Discussion

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendants Ruiz, Michael, Darks, Lopez, Chatman, and Gonzales challenge

the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. In the alternative, they contend that the district

court should have given them a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Lopez also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented

to the grand jury. 

"We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,

resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, and accepting all

reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that support the jury's verdict." United

States v. Alexander, 408 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal

quotations omitted). We reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found the

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defendants guilty. Id. "[W]e will uphold the verdict if there is any interpretation of

the evidence that could lead a reasonable-minded jury to find the defendant[s] guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Hamilton, 332 F.3d 1144, 1149 (8th Cir.

2003). 

With respect to the Rule 33 argument, "A district court may grant a new trial

for insufficiency of the evidence 'only if the evidence weighs heavily enough against

the verdict that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.'" United States v. Lacey,

219 F.3d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Brown, 956 F.2d 782, 786

(8th Cir. 1992). "In making this determination, the court need not view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the government, but may instead weigh the evidence

and evaluate for itself the credibility of the witnesses." Id. at 783–84. This Court

reviews a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial for "a clear and manifest

abuse of discretion." Id. at 784.

Sufficient evidence supported each defendant's conviction, and the district

court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendants' requests for a new trial. The

evidence regarding what took place after the truck arrived is most probative. When

the truck arrived, all of the defendants went to the back of the tractor trailer, where

the odor of marijuana was evident. Chatman and Ruiz actually carried two of the

boxes—each of which contained 80 pounds of marijuana—from the trailer to behind

the blue minivan. Michael reached out to carry the third box, which was ultimately

carried by Ramirez. Behind the blue minivan, Torres opened one of the boxes and

dumped the bricks of marijuana onto the floor of the warehouse. Torres then

instructed the defendants to count the drugs, which Michael, Ramirez, and Lopez

proceeded to do. Cheatham yelled to Torres—from across the warehouse—that the

cocaine was in the third box. Torres retrieved the cocaine and handed it to Augustine,

who placed it in the back of the blue minivan. 

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In addition, before the tractor trailer arrived, Ruiz took a gun wrapped in a baby

blanket from the blue minivan and handed it to Augustine. Augustine then gave the

gun to Torres as a gift in the presence of Ruiz, Darks, Gonzales, and Chatman.

Chatman and Michael were also present during the preliminary discussions between

Augustine and Torres pertaining to the establishment of an illegal narcotics

relationship, which took place several weeks earlier at Augustine's home.

Moreover, while riding with Torres to the warehouse, Michael made repeated

references to the narcotics transaction and heard Augustine reiterate his intention to

harm the police in the event that the vehicle containing the drugs was pulled over.

Michael also was in communication with the other vehicles to make sure that they did

not get separated from Torres's vehicle on the way to the warehouse. 

Following his arrest, Darks admitted to serving as a lookout during the

controlled sale. Darks told police that he was paid $100 to do so. Darks carried a

handgun at the warehouse that night, and the video evidence shows him discarding

the gun as he attempted to flee.

Gonzales had a prior felony conviction for possession of marijuana with intent

to distribute that was properly admitted at trial pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal

Rules of Evidence because it tended to prove motive, knowledge, and lack of mistake

so as to rebut his argument that he was merely present and unaware that a drug

conspiracy was taking place.

Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendants were not merely

present; there was sufficient evidence to convict each defendant of the narcotics

charges, including conspiracy to distribute narcotics. Because there was sufficient

evidence of conspiracy to distribute narcotics, there was sufficient evidence to

support the firearms convictions, as it was reasonably foreseeable that members of the

narcotics conspiracy would possess and use firearms in furtherance of the conspiracy.

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United States v. Bailey, 235 F.3d 1069, 1074–75 (8th Cir. 2000); see also United

States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1946). 

As for the defendants' alternative argument for a new trial, we see no

miscarriage of justice given the evidence of record; therefore, the district court

committed no manifest abuse of discretion by denying defendants' request for a new

trial. See Lacey, 219 F.3d at 784.

Finally, we find no merit in Lopez's argument that there was insufficient

evidence before the grand jury to justify his indictment. The petit jury's ultimate

finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt renders the alleged grand jury error, if any,

harmless. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986); see also United States

v. Exson, 328 F.3d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Dismissal due to errors in grand jury

proceedings is appropriate only if the defendant shows actual prejudice."). 

B. Juror Misconduct

Lopez, Darks, Michael, Augustine, and Gonzales moved for a judgment of

acquittal or a new trial following trial based alleged juror misconduct. Defendants

alleged Juror Anna Batrez failed to disclose certain information during voir die.

During voir dire, Juror Batrez indicated that she did not know any of the defendants.

However, Juror Batrez noticed the presence of Angelina Aviles, Michael's and

Augustine's mother, as well as Angelina's sisters, in the courthouse during trial. Juror

Batrez knew these women and then deduced that they were related to Augustine and

Michael Aviles. Concerned about there being a potential problem, Juror Batrez

informed the courtroom deputy clerk. Neither the district court nor counsel were

aware of the issue until after trial. 

Pursuant to McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548

(1984), a party seeking a new trial on the basis of concealed juror bias must prove

three things: (1) that the juror answered dishonestly, not just inaccurately; (2) that the

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In Tucker II, we described the level of deference accorded under the clear error

standard in light of Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,573–75 (1985):

If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the

record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even

though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would

have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible

views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be

clearly erroneous. We may reject the fact finder's choice between

conflicting evidence only where there is something wrong with the

choice. Furthermore, when findings are based on determinations

regarding the credibility of witnesses, the level of deference is even

higher than the standard already described. 

Tucker II, 243 F.3d at 506 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

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juror was motivated by partiality; and (3) that the true facts, if known, would have

supported striking the juror for cause. United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016, 1026

(8th Cir. 1998) (Tucker I). "Findings of fact on a McDonough hearing are reviewed

under the 'clearly erroneous' standard of review." United States v. Tucker, 243 F.3d

499, 506 (8th Cir. 2001) (Tucker II).7

 "Honesty of the juror and actual bias are factual

issues." Id. "The ultimate determination of whether a new trial is required is reviewed

for abuse of discretion." Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 77 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th

Cir.1996)). 

Following an evidentiary hearing on the alleged juror misconduct, the district

court found that the juror was being truthful during voir dire when she answered that

she did not know any of the defendants. The district court concluded that the juror

was not motivated by bias because the juror immediately notified the district court

upon recognizing the family members of the defendants, expressing her concern

about the situation. There simply is no dishonesty in the juror's response to support

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8

During voir dire, Juror Batrez indicated that she did not know any of the

defendants. 

9

At the time of the trial, Juror Batrez had not seen Angelina or her sisters, Rose

and Hope, for years. While Juror Batrez knew that Angelina had sons, Juror Batrez

did not know their names and prior to trial had neither met nor seen Michael or

Augustine Aviles. In fact, before the evidentiary hearing, Juror Batrez did not even

know how Michael and Augustine were related to Angelina, Rose, and Hope. With

regard to Juror Batrez's son Tony having a fight with Angel Aviles, the older brother

of Michael and Augustine, Juror Batrez was not aware of this specific incident, and

there was no evidence that Tony even knew either Michael or Augustine, much less

that he had any problems with them.

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an allegation of bias.8

 Rather, the juror's honesty is reflected by her self-disclosure.

Moreover, the facts show no motive for partiality by the juror.9

 We hold that the

defendants fail to establish that Juror Batrez was biased. Therefore, we affirm the

district court's denial of the defendants' motion for a new trial.

C. Video Evidence

Darks challenges the government's use of video evidence at trial. Prior to the

reverse-sting operation, law enforcement placed four hidden cameras in the

warehouse and one hidden camera in the trailer. At trial, the government entered

fourteen digital video discs (DVDs) into evidence. Nine discs consisted of compiled

videos—one for each defendant and one for government witness Torres. Each

compiled video tracked the movements of a particular individual from the time he

arrived at the warehouse until his arrest. The remaining five discs contained the

entire, unedited video recordings made by each of the five hidden cameras. The

government played the nine compiled videos to the jury at trial, whereas the other five

discs were admitted into evidence and available to the jury. 

Darks claims that the compiled DVDs should have been excluded under Rule

403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Specifically, Darks claims that the probative

value of the compiled videos was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial

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impact. He contends his individualized video prejudiced his defense because it "overemphasized his involvement" in the narcotics transaction so as to deny him a fair trial.

He posits that "the probative value of the evidence was limited by the fact that the

individual video presentations were composites prepared by government agents." We

disagree.

We review a district court's decision overruling a Rule 403 objection for an

abuse of discretion. United States v. Looking Cloud, 419 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir.

2005). Rule 403 provides, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,

waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403

(emphasis added). "The term 'unfair prejudice,' as to a criminal defendant, speaks to

the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into

declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged." Old

Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997); see also Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory

committee's note ("'Unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to

suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an

emotional one.").

The individualized nature of the videos does not undermine their probative

value nor make their possible prejudicial effect unfair. Rule 403 only bars admission

of unfairly prejudicial evidence. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180. The compiled video of

Darks did not lure the jury to convict him for a reason other than his guilt. To the

contrary, compiling the unedited videos made the recordings more helpful to the jury

by making it easier for them to see the government's evidence against each defendant

individually. Because the compiled videos were probative and not unfairly

prejudicial, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by overruling

Darks's Rule 403 objection to the evidence. 

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10Rule 14 reads in pertinent part "If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an

indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a

defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the

defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires." Fed. R. Crim. P.

14(a). 

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D. Motions for Severance

Darks and Gonzales argue that their motions for severance should have been

granted. "In general, persons charged in a conspiracy or jointly indicted on similar

evidence from the same or related events should be tried together." United States v.

Adkins, 842 F.2d 210, 211 (8th Cir. 1988). However, under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 14,10 if a party will be prejudiced by the joinder, the trial court may grant

a severance. Id. "To make a showing of prejudice, an appellant must establish

something more than the mere fact that he would have had a better chance for

acquittal had he been tried separately." Id. at 212. "The appellant must demonstrate

that the jury was unable to compartmentalize the evidence as it related to the separate

defendants." Id. "A denial of a motion to sever will not be reversed unless clear

prejudice and an abuse of discretion are shown." United States v. Pherigo, 327 F.3d

690, 693 (8th Cir. 2003). We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion

as to either defendant.

1. Darks

In closing arguments, Darks's trial counsel drew attention to the redactions in

Darks's post-arrest statements. Counsel sought to highlight allegedly inconsistent

reports by two law enforcement officers regarding who Darks said offered him $100

to serve as a lookout. The district court sustained the government's objection that this

line of argument threatened to impermissibly prejudice the other defendants. Darks's

counsel then moved for severance, which the district court denied. 

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On appeal, Darks contends that this rendered him unable to present fully his

defense that his statements did not implicate him in the conspiracy. We disagree and

hold that Darks has failed to show how he was prejudiced. The district court only

barred Darks from drawing attention to the redactions in the statements, which was

intended to prevent Darks from injecting reversible error at the end of a lengthy trial.

Darks was still free to argue that the statements were vague and unrecorded, and that

the officers' testimony regarding the statements was similarly illusive. Therefore,

Darks was not prevented from mounting a defense, and the denial of his motion for

severance was not an abuse of discretion. 

2. Gonzales

Gonzales contends that the evidence against him was minimal and that as a

result, he could have only been convicted on account of the cumulative evidence

against the other defendants. We have already held that there was sufficient evidence

to convict Gonzales. Furthermore, Gonzales "must establish something more than the

mere fact that he would have had a better chance for acquittal had he been tried

separately." Adkins, 842 F.2d at 212. Gonzales was still free to argue the supposed

lack of evidence against him. The jury ultimately rejected the argument and found

him guilty. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying

Gonzales's motion for severance. 

E. Sentencing Error

Two defendants allege sentencing error. Augustine Aviles contends that the

district court erred by sentencing him based upon the quantity of drugs that the

government sought to sell rather than the quantity of drugs that he could have

purchased for $13,400, the amount of cash that he brought with him on the night of

his arrest. Darks argues that the district court erred in calculating the drug quantity

attributable to him as well and also that his sentence was unreasonable. 

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"We review a challenge to the district court's interpretation and application of

the advisory guidelines de novo and the court's factual findings for clear error."

United States v. Blazek, 431 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 2005). Post-Booker, the

calculation of the advisory Guidelines range represents the "critical starting point."

United States v. Thomas, 422 F.3d 665, 669 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United States

v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1002–03 (8th Cir. 2005). The district court may then exercise

its discretion to impose a sentence within or outside of the Guidelines range by taking

into account 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Thomas, 422 F.3d at 669. 

"We review sentences within or outside the guidelines range for

reasonableness." United States v. Hawkman, 438 F.3d 879, 882 (8th Cir. 2006). In

determining reasonableness, the "primary point of reference" is the factors of §

3553(a). United States v. Hadash, 408 F.3d 1080, 1083 (8th Cir. 2005).

"Reasonableness review is 'akin to abuse of discretion review[.]'" United States v.

Sebastian, 436 F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Rogers, 423

F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005)). An abuse of discretion may occur "if a sentencing

court fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight,

gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only

appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at

a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the

case." Haack, 403 F.3d at 1004. 

1. Augustine Aviles

The district court attributed 400 pounds of marijuana and 2 kilograms of

cocaine to Augustine. Augustine posits that he should have only been held

accountable for the amount of drugs that he reasonably could have purchased with the

$13,400 in cash that he brought to the warehouse. This argument represents an

allegation of what has become known as "sentencing entrapment."

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11U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment n.12, provides in relevant part that

If . . . the defendant establishes that the defendant did not intend to

provide or purchase, or was not reasonably capable of providing or

purchasing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance, the

court shall exclude from the offense level determination the amount of

controlled substance that the defendant establishes that the defendant

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Entrapment, as a defense to criminal liability, developed from concern that the

government might induce an otherwise law-abiding individual to engage in criminal

conduct. See WAYNE R.LAFAVE,CRIMINAL LAW §5.2(a) (3d. Ed. 2000). The concept

of "sentencing entrapment," by comparison, represents a more recent development in

response to modern sentencing-guidelines systems. See United States v. Barth, 990

F.2d 422, 424–25 (8th Cir. 1993) (explicitly recognizing the legal availability of

sentencing entrapment as a grounds for departure under the federal Sentencing

Guidelines); see also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment n.14. In the case of a narcotics

crime, the drug quantity involved acts as a primary determinate of a defendant's

sentence under the Guidelines. United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir.

2000) (Searcy I); United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1996); Barth,

990 F.2d at 425. "Therefore, relatively small differences in the quantity or kind of

drugs involved in an offense may dramatically alter a defendant's prison term." Searcy

I, 233 F.3d at 1099.

"Sentencing entrapment occurs when official [government] conduct leads a

defendant predisposed to deal only in small quantities of drugs to deal in larger

quantities, leading to an increased sentence." Searcy I, 233 F.3d at 1099 (quoting

United States v. Berg, 178 F.3d 976, 981 (8th Cir. 1999)) (brackets by Searcy I)

(internal quotations omitted). If a defendant establishes sentencing entrapment, "the

court shall exclude from the offense level determination the amount of controlled

substance that the defendant establishes that the defendant did not intend to provide

or purchase or was not reasonably capable of providing or purchasing." U.S.S.G. §

2D1.1, comment n.12;11 e.g., Searcy I, 233 F.3d at 1099. Although the predisposition

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did not intend to provide or purchase or was not reasonably capable of

providing or purchasing.

12U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment n.14, provides in relevant part that

If, in a reverse sting (an operation in which a government agent sells or

negotiates to sell a controlled substance to a defendant), the court finds

that the government agent set a price for the controlled substance that

was substantially below the market value of the controlled substance,

thereby leading to the defendant's purchase of a significantly greater

quantity of the controlled substance than his available resources would

have allowed him to purchase except for the artificially low price set by

the government agent, a downward departure may be warranted.

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of the defendant to commit the crime represents the major focus of the sentencing

entrapment analysis, Searcy I, 233 F.3d at 1099, the government's conduct acts as a

triggering mechanism, i.e., the defendant must prove that "the government induced

the defendant to commit the crime." United States v. Searcy, 284 F.3d 938, 942 (8th

Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (Searcy II). Thus, a court

initially must determine whether the government induced the defendant. 

In a reverse-sting operation, inducement occurs when the government "set[s]

a price for the controlled substance that was substantially below the market value of

the controlled substance[.]" U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment n.14.12 In addition to its

literal meaning, the term "price" includes credit arrangements, commonly known as

"fronting," that are found unusually generous in light of market practices. United

States v. Lora, 129 F. Supp. 2d 77, 91 (D. Mass. 2001); see Stavig, 80 F.3d at 1246

("This transaction fails to show that the government provided Stavig with a financial

arrangement so attractive that he was able to purchase a significantly larger quantity

than he would have otherwise purchased."). 

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We have not previously set forth parameters to analyze whether a credit

arrangement accepted by the government constitutes an arrangement substantially

below market. A generous credit arrangement becomes increasingly suspect where

the government possesses limited assurances of the defendant's ability to be trusted

with repayment. See Lora, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 94–95; cf. Stavig, 80 F.3d at 1246

(holding that the government did not provide the defendant with an overly generous

financial arrangement, reasoning that the defendant had received cocaine from the

confidential informant before under similar terms). The government may obtain

sufficient assurances in a variety of ways, such as when a trusted third-party trafficker

vouches for the defendant, the defendant socializes with undercover agents to earn

their trust, the defendant presents assets that could be used to satisfy the debt, and the

defendant provides information about the extensiveness of his drug-trafficking

operation in order to demonstrate his ability to distribute the relevant drug quantity

and make repayment. Lora, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 94–95. Other forms of assurances

might also suffice, and the determination should ultimately be made in light of the

totality of the circumstances. 

As to drug quantity, the defendant must prove that he was "predisposed to deal

only in small quantities of drugs[.]" Searcy I, 233 F.3d at 1099 (quoting Berg, 178

F.3d at 981) (internal quotations omitted). This requires the defendant to prove that

he had "neither the intent nor the resources for completing" the transaction of the

quantity alleged. Stavig, 80 F.3d at 1246–47 (quoting United States v. Naranjo, 52

F.3d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotations omitted); see also U.S.S.G. §

2D1.1, comment n.12.

When determining whether a defendant was predisposed to deal in a smaller

drug quantity, a court should consider not only the defendant's cash on hand, but also

other facts indicative of intent and resources. Relevant considerations include

whether the government's agent pressured the defendant, whether the defendant

desired the alleged quantity of drugs, whether the defendant communicated an ability

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to repay the debt within a reasonable time, whether the defendant has previously

distributed substantial quantities, and whether the defendant expressed his intent to

engage in future dealings of similar size or scale. Lora, F. Supp. 2d at 93–94 (citing

United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995) and United States v. Woods,

210 F.3d 70, 75–76 (1st Cir. 2000)). 

Torres testified that—based upon his experience as a former supplier of illegal

narcotics to the Kansas City area—he would have been comfortable fronting

$170,600 worth of narcotics to Augustine because Torres believed that Augustine

would not have attempted to rip him off. This is because Torres was satisfied with

Augustine's reliability based on their contacts in person and over the phone, as well

as the fact that Torres knew where Augustine lived and had been to his residence.

Augustine attacks Torres's testimony as "devoid of logic," arguing that there

was insufficient trust between the two men because they had no prior business

relationship and because Torres had no third-party assurances that Augustine was

reliable. Indeed, Special Agent Cheatham testified that fronting "was not unusual as

long as there is some element of trust or someone's vouched for the person that's

getting the load or if they've done business previous to that . . . ." Augustine contends

because there was no basis for such trust between himself and Torres, the credit

arrangement offered by the government was substantially below the market under the

circumstances of this case. Augustine also notes that the government used the same

400 pounds of marijuana and the same warehouse to conduct a reverse-sting

operation on another, unrelated individual a short time prior to the arrest of Augustine

and his co-defendants. Augustine believes that this supports his contention that the

government set the drug quantity solely to enhance his sentence. 

Here, the record indicates that the district court did not commit clear error by

denying Augustine's sentencing entrapment claim. The credit arrangement presents

a close question. Augustine was prepared to pay $13,400 on the night of the

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13As mentioned, the parties agreed to a price of $375 per pound of marijuana

and $17,000 per kilogram of cocaine. Augustine agreed to purchase 400 pounds of

marijuana and 2 kilograms of cocaine. Thus, the total price of the narcotics that

Augustine agreed to purchase in this transaction was $184,000. Subtracting the

$13,400 that Augustine possessed on the night of his arrest, the amount of fronted

narcotics equaled $170,600. In other words, Torres was fronting Augustine

approximately 92.72 percent of the purchase price. 

14The price and quantity were the product of negotiations between Augustine

and Torres, making Augustine's reliance on United States v. Hicks, 1999 WL

1073672, at *3–5 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished), misplaced. The case at bar is

distinguishable from a situation in which the price was unilaterally set by the

government or the drug quantity was not known to the defendant. See Hicks, 1999

WL 1073672, at *3–5 (remanding for re-sentencing because the defendant never

knew the quantity of drugs to be distributed to him, as the quantity was set either by

the supplier in Columbia or by the government). 

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transaction, less than 8 percent of the total transaction price of $184,000.13 Torres had

few assurances of Augustine's reliability, but Torres's testimony provides sufficient

evidence that the credit arrangement was not artificially generous. Also, the two men

freely bargained about both the price and drug quantity.14

Augustine also fails to prove lack of predisposition to deal in the quantity

attributed to him. Minimal inducement was required, as Augustine expressed

willingness to distribute narcotics in response to Torres's first remark regarding Yogi.

Augustine stressed the capability of his operation to distribute and pay for the entire

drug quantity. Beginning with the initial contact with Torres and continuing through

to his statements while driving to the warehouse, Augustine repeatedly assured Torres

that he had a network in place to quickly move a large quantity of drugs, that he

already had buyers in place for the shipment, and that he could have full payment in

just a few days. On the way to the warehouse, Michael also stated that the deal was

going to be a success and how they would get rid of all the drugs. In addition,

Augustine made numerous statements that he wanted a large shipment and that he

was willing to accept an even larger quantity of drugs, including his statement that

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the truck might not need to go to Chicago because he could distribute the entire

truckload. As mentioned above, the price and drug quantity were reached after

bargaining between the two men. 

On this record, we hold that the district court did not commit clear error by

holding Augustine accountable for the entire quantity of drugs that he agreed to

purchase. The record supports the finding that the government did not induce the

defendant to engage in the negotiated narcotics transaction but rather that the

defendant possessed the intent and the resources to complete the deal as negotiated.

2. Darks

Darks raises two allegations of sentencing error. First, Darks argues that the

district court erred in computing drug quantity. Second, he alleges that his sentence

is unreasonable, asserting that the district court treated the Guidelines as essentially

mandatory. Darks's arguments on both issues are without merit. As to drug quantity,

Darks ignores circuit precedent, which states that "[i]n jointly-undertaken criminal

activity, a defendant is accountable for his own conduct as well as conduct taken by

others that was in furtherance of the activity and reasonably foreseeable." United

States v. Alexander, 408 F.3d 1003, 1009 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.

Francis, 367 F.3d 805, 821 (8th Cir.2004)); see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). With

respect to reasonableness of the sentence, Darks contends that the district court

imposed a sentence as though the Guidelines were still mandatory. We disagree. The

district court correctly referenced the Guidelines as advisory and sentenced him to the

low end of the Guidelines range. Darks challenges the reasonableness of his sentence

considering the aberrational nature of his behavior. However, the record reflects the

district court considered all the factors in § 3553(a). We cannot say the sentence is

unreasonable. 

F. Pro Se Briefs

We have reviewed the supplemental pro se briefs filed by Darks and Gonzales,

and we affirm on the issues raised without comment. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

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III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, we affirm in all respects. 

______________________________

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