Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03120/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03120-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terrell L. Thompson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 3, 2000 Decided December 22, 2000

No. 99-3120

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Terrell L. Thompson,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cr00139-01)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony W. Miles, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Marc E. Rindner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

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Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Roy W. McLeese,

III, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Ginsburg, Randolph, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: The question before the court is

whether the district court properly admitted evidence police

obtained from a search of the appellant. The district court

held that the police had reasonable suspicion to search the

appellant because they had received an anonymous tip that he

was carrying a gun -- the possession of which is unlawful in

the District of Columbia -- and because the tip was corroborated to the extent of certain details, which were in themselves innocent. The Supreme Court subsequently held that

a search based upon an anonymous tip, only innocent details

of which have been corroborated, is not reasonable and the

evidence it produces is not admissible. Florida v. J.L., 529

U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1379-80 (2000).

We nonetheless affirm the judgment in this case because

uncontradicted evidence in the record shows that the tip at

issue bore indicia of reliability not present in J.L. and because

the defendant's conduct itself gave the police reasonable

cause to suspect that he was engaged in unlawful activity.

We remand the case to the district court for resentencing,

however, at the request of both parties.

I. Background

The facts surrounding the search of Terrell Thompson were

established at an evidentiary hearing and are not in dispute.

At around 3:20 a.m. Officers Holloway and Pope of the

Metropolitan Police Department had just completed a traffic

stop near the intersection of "I" and Half Streets, S.E.

Officer Holloway was in uniform, standing near his marked

cruiser with Officer Pope when a middle-aged, Black man

traveling southbound on Half Street drove up to them.

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The motorist told the officers that he "just saw" a man

carrying a gun get out of a sport-utility vehicle in the parking

lot of a Wendy's restaurant some 100 yards from where the

officers stood. The informant, who was anxious and agitated,

described the suspect as a young Black man wearing dark

pants and a bright orange shirt. The officers accepted what

he said as likely true and neither requested nor acquired

specific information identifying him.

Officers Holloway and Pope then drove in their separate

cars to the Wendy's, which was closed. As the two officers

entered the parking lot from "K" Street, they saw a darkcolored sport-utility vehicle leaving the lot. Because the

officers had been told the suspect had exited the vehicle,

however, they did not stop it. Officer Holloway then saw a

Black man, who turned out to be Thompson, wearing a bright

orange shirt and standing by himself at the far end of the

parking lot with his back against a fence. There was no one

else in the parking lot. Thompson was looking around the

edge of the fence toward a nightclub called the Mirage. He

was, the district court found, "sort of peeking around as if he

was trying to keep his position concealed."

Fearing, based upon the tip, that Thompson was armed,

Officer Holloway exited his cruiser with his weapon drawn

and approached Thompson. Thompson spotted Officer Holloway over his left shoulder when Holloway was within five to

seven feet of him. Thompson stepped away from the fence

and, without trying to flee, took five steps toward "I" Street.

Holloway instructed him to raise his hands in the air and to

stop, and Thompson complied. Thompson at that point said

something to the effect of "you got me" and indicated that he

would not put up a fight. At Holloway's instruction he

dropped to his knees. As Holloway assisted him to the

ground, the officer felt a weapon toward the front of Thompson's person. At that point Officer Pope arrived and helped

to handcuff Thompson. The two officers then rolled Thompson over and retrieved a nine-millimeter semiautomatic pistol,

loaded and cocked, that was sticking out of his waistband.

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A federal grand jury indicted Thompson for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court

denied Thompson's motion to suppress the gun and certain

statements he made to the police, ruling that the anonymous

tip together with certain corroborating details, such as

Thompson's attire, race, sex, and location, gave the police

reasonable ground to suspect that Thompson had a gun.

Thompson then entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving

his right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to suppress. The court sentenced Thompson to 37 months in

prison, reflecting a two-point enhancement under the United

States Sentencing Guidelines for possession of a stolen weapon.

Thompson initially filed a notice of appeal challenging only

his sentence, but he has since filed an unopposed motion to

add the suppression issue in light of the decision of the

Supreme Court in Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375.

II. Analysis

Under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States, the police may not stop and search a person

unless they have reason to suspect he is engaged in wrongdoing. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1968) (police may

stop and frisk persons walking up and down street and

peering into window of store, apparently casing it for robbery). As applied to the facts of this case, the fourth

amendment requires that Officer Holloway have had a "reasonable fear for his own or others' safety" before frisking

Thompson. Id. at 30.

Specifically, "[t]he officer ... must be able to articulate

something more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.' " United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7

(1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). Whether that standard is met must be determined " 'from the standpoint of an

objectively reasonable police officer,' " without reference to

"the actual motivations of the individual officers involved."

United States v. Hill, 131 F.3d 1056, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).

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In this case the district court determined that Officer

Holloway had reasonable suspicion to search Thompson based

upon the tip he got from the motorist and the corroboration

of certain of the details of that tip:

[A]n anonymous tip from an anonymous citizen can be

the basis for a Terry stop provided that there is some

corroboration to provide the police officers with legitimate reasons to believe that the tip was reliable. And

the cases have held that the corroboration can be that

when they go to the scene they're confronted with what

the tipster told them he saw. And so the corroboration

in this case ... is exactly what the Government says it is.

The citizen tipster said black male, bright orange shirt,

blue jeans or dark pants. And he's in a parking lot at

Wendy's .... And he's got a gun .... They [then]

found what they were told they were going to find.

The district court's reasoning was based solidly upon the

holdings of this court in United States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d

944, 947-51 (1992), and United States v. McClinnhan, 660

F.2d 500, 502-03 (1981), in which we deemed the same type of

combination sufficient to support a stop and frisk.

The decision of the Supreme Court in Florida v. J.L. casts

new light upon this recurring situation. In that case an

anonymous caller had told the Miami-Dade police that a

young Black man, standing at a particular bus stop and

wearing a plaid shirt, had a gun. When the police went to

investigate they saw three Black males there, one of whom,

15 year-old J.L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Upon frisking

him, the police discovered a gun. See 120 S. Ct. at 1377.

The Supreme Court, upon those facts, held that the police

did not have reason to believe that the suspect had an illegal

firearm nor, hence, reason to stop and frisk him. Id. at 1380.

The police cannot rely upon "the bare report of an unknown,

unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew

about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had

inside information about [the suspect]." Id. at 1379. The

Court dismissed the argument that "the tip was reliable

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because its description of the suspect's visual attributes

proved accurate: There really was a young black male wearing a plaid shirt at the bus stop." The Court explained that

"[s]uch a tip ... does not show that the tipster has knowledge

of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here

at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of

illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate

person." Id. Finally, the Court rejected any suggestion that

the putative possession of a firearm, and the danger that

poses, might alter the inquiry into reasonable suspicion. Id.

at 1379-80.

Thus, the Supreme Court has now rejected the district

court's reasoning in admitting the evidence against Thompson. Ordinarily we would remand for further proceedings a

case in which the district court did not "ask[ ] the right legal

questions in making its ruling," United States v. Williams,

951 F.2d 1287, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1991); to do so here is

unnecessary, however, because uncontested facts in the record still warrant our affirming the ruling. See United States

v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The tip in

this case bears indicia of reliability beyond those of the

anonymous tip in J.L.; and the police themselves observed

Thompson engaging in suspicious conduct.

First, the tipster here informed the police in person, making his report inherently more trustworthy than that of the

unidentified caller in J.L. The informant stated that he "just

saw" Thompson, indicating that his knowledge was based

upon firsthand observation, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

234 (1983); the recency and the proximity of his claimed

observation further suggested that it would prove accurate,

see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972).

In addition, the informant in this case was more accountable, and therefore more reliable, than was the anonymous

caller in J.L. The precise situation here was anticipated by

Justice Kennedy, concurring in J.L.:

If an informant places his anonymity at risk, a court can

consider this factor in weighing the reliability of the tip.

An instance where a tip might be considered anonymous

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but nevertheless sufficiently reliable to justify a proportionate police response may be when an unnamed person

driving a car the police officer later describes stops for a

moment and, face to face, informs the police that criminal

activity is occurring.

120 S. Ct. at 1381. The informant in this case subjected

himself to ready identification by the police when he approached them in his car; the police need only have asked for

his identification or simply noted the license plate on his car.

Cf. United States v. Valentine, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL

1648972 *1, *3 (3d Cir. 2000) (face-to-face tip supports reasonable suspicion, notwithstanding informant's refusal to identify

himself, in light of informant's accountability and claimed

immediate, firsthand basis for knowledge). Had the information he provided proved false, he would have been subject to

potential criminal prosecution. See D.C. Code Ann. s 4-151

(misdemeanor to "make or cause to be made to the Metropolitan Police ... a false or fictitious report of the commission of

any criminal offense").

Thompson argues that the ability of the police to identify

an otherwise anonymous telephone caller and the prospect of

a prompt police response make the anonymous caller in J.L.

no less accountable than the face-to-face informant in this

case. For this he relies upon Justice Kennedy's observation

in his separate opinion, that as their technology improves,

"the ability of the police to trace the identity of anonymous

telephone informants may be a factor which lends reliability

to what, years earlier, might have been considered unreliable

anonymous tips." 120 S. Ct. at 1381. Justice Kennedy's

point, however, is not that face-to-face tips lack the requisite

reliability but that even anonymous calls might one day have

it.

Second, what the police themselves observed of Thompson's

conduct was clearly suspicious. Although the district court

erroneously relied upon innocent corroborating details in

upholding the search, it also found, based upon undisputed

police testimony, that the officers observed Thompson concealing himself behind the fence and peering out toward the

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street. Moreover, he was doing so in the parking lot of a

closed restaurant at three o'clock in the morning.* Reviewing these facts objectively, that is, from the perspective of a

reasonable police officer, Thompson's apparent effort to conceal himself behind the fence must be regarded as suspicious,

much as was the defendants' apparent casing of the store in

Terry. See 392 U.S. at 28. Thompson's furtive conduct was

not merely consistent with the tip that he had a weapon; it

would have signaled a reasonable police officer that Thompson was positioning himself to use it, perhaps against someone exiting the nightclub toward which he was looking. To

ask more of the police in these circumstances -- to require

them to investigate still further or to watch from a distance -- might well preclude them from interceding before

the suspect has accomplished his violent, perhaps lethal,

purpose. The requirement of reasonable suspicion does not

necessitate such forbearance.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Thompson's conviction. We also vacate his sentence, however, because as the

Government concedes, the evidence does not support the

conclusion that the gun he had was stolen. This matter is

therefore remanded to the district court for resentencing

consistent with the opinion.

So ordered.

* We disregard Officer Holloway's observation that Thompson

"looked like he was going to shoot someone" because Holloway also

testified that his belief that Thompson had a gun was based solely

upon the tip, as opposed to Thompson's own conduct.

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