Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca1-07-02266/USCOURTS-ca1-07-02266-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States
Appellee
Dawn Walker
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 07-2266

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

DAWN WALKER,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Lynch, Chief Judge,

Stahl and Howard, Circuit Judges.

Mary S. McElroy, Assistant Federal Defender, on brief

for appellant.

Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney,

and Robert Clark Corrente, United States Attorney, on brief for

appellee.

August 13, 2008

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18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) states: "The court, in determining 1

whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of

imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the

term, shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to

the extent that they are applicable, recognizing that imprisonment

is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and

rehabilitation."

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STAHL, Circuit Judge. Dawn Walker, who pled guilty to

one count of bank robbery, challenges her sentence of 77 months'

incarceration. She argues on appeal that the district court erred

by considering her need for mental health and substance abuse

treatment when determining the length of her prison sentence, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). We do not reach the merits of 1

Walker's appeal because, at sentencing, she intentionally abandoned

the objection she now raises. As a result of this waiver, "the

objection in question is unreviewable." United States v. Jimenez,

512 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007). 

After pleading guilty to one count of bank robbery, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), Walker was sentenced to 77

months' incarceration, which was at the low end of the advisory

guideline sentencing range of 77 to 96 months. Walker did not

object to the presentence report, but filed a motion and sentencing

memorandum in support of a downward departure. At the sentencing

proceeding, held on August 10, 2007, Walker's counsel elaborated on

her request for a below-guidelines sentence, explaining that a term

of no more than 48 months would "allow the amount of time necessary

for [Walker] to engage in drug treatment that's required, for her

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The court said, in part: 2

I've come to the conclusion that in this case it would be

a disservice to grant you the request that your lawyer

has made for a sentence below that guideline range

because it's not enough time to give you the services

that you need.

. . .

And so I have come to the conclusion, Ms. Walker, that in

order to turn you around, in order to give you the

foundation in basic day-to-day living skills that you so

desperately need, that a sentence at the low end of the

guideline range is appropriate and just in this case. 

It will give you the time that you need to clean up. It

will give you the time that you need to get some 

education. It will give you the time that you need for

mental health treatment. If you can't get all of those

things under control, my concern is that I don't want to

set you up to fail by giving you too little time. 

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to seek an education and for her to put her life on a track where

she can become a productive member of society." In other words,

Walker's rationale for a below-guidelines sentence was that 48

months was a sufficient length of time for her to reap the benefits

of the rehabilitative services offered within the federal prison

system. 

In imposing the 77-month sentence, the district court

adopted the sentencing rationale put forth by Walker -- that her

sentence should be related to the amount of time necessary for her

to benefit from the prison system's rehabilitation services -- but

disagreed as to the length of time necessary to accomplish this

goal. 

2

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This circuit has not determined how 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) 3

interacts with the mandate contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D),

requiring sentencing courts to consider, among other factors, the

"need for the sentence imposed" to "provide the defendant with

needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other

correctional treatment in the most effective manner." Other

circuits have reached disparate conclusions on this question.

Compare United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152, 157-58 (3d Cir.

2007) with United States v. Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622, 629-30 (8th

Cir. 2006). 

To the extent that Walker also suggests, for the first time 4

on appeal, that the imposed term of incarceration was not supported

by the evidence, we disagree. On the contrary, the sentence was

adequately supported by Walker's own description of her needs, a

sealed psychiatric report, and other information in the unobjectedto presentence report about her past conduct and failed treatment

efforts. 

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On appeal, Walker argues that the court's sentencing

rationale violated 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), which requires sentencing

courts to "recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate

means of promoting correction and rehabilitation." However, at 3

sentencing, both Walker and the district court adopted the view

that the length of Walker's sentence should be informed by the

amount of time necessary for her to receive sufficient

rehabilitative services. They merely differed on the length of

time required to accomplish that goal. Therefore, because she

asserted below the same rationale that she now claims was error,

Walker has waived the argument that the rehabilitation rationale

adopted by the court violated § 3582(a). 

4

This is not merely a case of forfeiture, where a party

"fails to make a timely assertion of a right," United States v.

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Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437 (1st Cir. 2002), which we would review

under plain error, id., but is actually a waiver, which occurs when

a party "intentionally relinquishes or abandons" a known right, id.

"The difference is critical: a waived issue ordinarily cannot be

resurrected on appeal." Id. Walker waived her right to object to

the district court's rehabilitation rationale by affirmatively

employing the same rationale to support her request for a belowguidelines sentence. Where an appellant has waived an objection

below, we will not review her argument, even for plain error. See,

e.g., United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1542 (7th Cir. 1996). 

For the foregoing reason, we affirm the sentence imposed

by the district court. 

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