Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06059/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06059-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Veronica Garcia
Plaintiff
Governing Board
Defendant
Ray Heid
Defendant
Los Banos Unified School District
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERONICA GARCIA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

LOS BANOS UNIFIED SCHOOL )

DISTRICT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:04-CV-6059-SMS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DOC. 23)

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for all

proceedings, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b), and Local Rule 73-301.

I. Background

By stipulated order dated October 26, 2004, Judge Wanger

granted Defendant Ray Heid’s motion to dismiss the first claim

for relief alleging a violation of Title VII against him because

the Ninth Circuit had ruled that supervisors and co-workers who

are not otherwise employers may not be individually liable for

Title VII violations, subject to the Ninth Circuit’s reversing

its ruling before judgment is entered in this case. Judge Wanger

also granted the motion of Defendant Los Banos Unified School

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District (LB), a public school district and employer, to dismiss

the second claim for relief against it (a claim pursuant to

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act) because the

district had Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Thus, the first amended complaint (FAC) filed on October 4,

2004, alleges 1) in the first claim a violation of Title VII

against LB and its Governing Board; and 2) in the second claim a

violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(FEHA), Cal. Govt. Code §§ 12940 et seq., against Defendant Heid

only.

More specifically, it is alleged in the FAC: 

1) Defendants failed to take adequate action in connection

with Plaintiff’s informal internal complaints, lodged before

March 24, 2003, of sexually offensive conduct by Defendant Heid,

and Defendants retaliated against her by supervising her work

more closely, giving her an unwarranted adverse employment

evaluation, engaging in conduct intended to ridicule and

embarrass her, and continuing to engage in sexually offensive

conduct;

2) Defendant Heid discriminated against Plaintiff, a female

employee whom he supervised, on the basis of sex by subjecting

her to a continuing pattern of conduct creating a sexually

hostile work environment, most recently manifested in May 30,

2003, when he made sexually suggestive comments and gestures to

Plaintiff; and

3) Defendant LB, the employer, denied that sexual harassment

occurred and failed to take appropriate action to remedy the

effects of the discriminatory treatment that had been the basis

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of Plaintiff’s formal complaints. (FAC at 4-5.)

The complaint alleges that LB and the Governing Board

engaged in discrimination because of sex in violation of 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), retaliation for Plaintiff’s opposing

unlawful discrimination in violation of § 2000e-3, and inadequate

corrective action because of a failure to take all reasonable

steps to prevent harassment of Plaintiff. (FAC at 5-6.) She

alleged that Defendant Heid and the Governing Board of LB engaged

in discrimination because of sex in violation of Cal. Govt. Code

§ 12940(a), retaliation in violation of Cal. Govt. Code §

12940(h), and inadequate corrective action by failing to take all

reasonable steps to prevent harassment in violation of Cal. Govt.

Code § 12940(I). (FAC at 5-6.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory

damages for mental and physical injury, general damages, punitive

damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. (FAC at 7.)

Defendants answered the FAC on November 17, 2004, admitting

jurisdiction, venue, employment status, Defendant Heid’s

supervisory position, the allegations regarding submission of

charges and the complaint, and the role of the Governing Board,

but denying the other factual allegations; they asserted

affirmative defenses of failure to mitigate, exclusive Worker’s

Compensation remedy, failure to exhaust administrative remedies,

statute of limitations, res judicata (administrative action), and

failure to state a claim.

Pursuant to the parties’ consent, Judge Wanger ordered the

case assigned to the Magistrate Judge for all further proceedings

on November 24, 2004.

Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment

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and/or summary adjudication on July 22, 2005, including a notice,

memorandum, declaration of Robert J. Rosati with exhibits, and a

statement of undisputed facts. Plaintiff filed an opposing

memorandum and statement of controverting evidence with exhibits

on August 3, 2005. On September 30, 2005, Defendants filed a

reply, including a statement of additional undisputed facts and a

reply brief.

Defendants’ motion came on regularly for hearing on October

7, 2005, at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 4 before the Honorable Sandra

M. Snyder, United States Magistrate Judge. Ray Hassan and Anthony

Bothwell appeared on behalf of Plaintiff; Robert J. Rosati

appeared on behalf of Defendants. After argument, the parties

submitted supplemental briefs with exhibits on November 9, 2005,

and provided courtesy copies to the Court. The matter was

submitted to the Court.

II. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the

moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of

"the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any," which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It is the

moving party’s burden to establish that there exists no genuine

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issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co.,

585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978).

If a party moves for summary judgment with respect to a

matter as to which the opposing party has the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial, then the moving party must show that the

opposing party cannot meet its burden of proof at trial by

establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact as

to an essential element of the opposing party’s claim or defense;

the moving party must meet the initial burden of producing

evidence or showing an absence of evidence as well as the

ultimate burden of persuasion. Nissan Fire Ltd. v. Fritz Cos.,

Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). In order to carry its

burden of production, the moving party must either produce

evidence negating an essential element of the opposing party's

claim or defense, or show that the nonmoving party does not have

enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. (citing High Tech Gays v.

Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir.

1990)). In order to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on

the motion, the moving party must persuade the court that there

is no genuine issue of material fact. Id.

However, “where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion

may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

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upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial. Id. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is

before the district court demonstrates that the standard for

entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this

factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials

of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits or admissible discovery material

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809

F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine,

i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc.,

818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

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III. Defendant Heid’s Argument that the FEHA Claim Is Barred

 by Plaintiff’s Failure to Challenge the Determination

 of the School Board

Defendant Heid claims that the FEHA action against him is

barred because Plaintiff pursued a grievance with the school

board, which found that she was not the victim of harassment, and

Plaintiff failed to challenge that finding by filing and pursuing

a mandate action in state court. Plaintiff asserts that she did

not pursue the school board’s formal complaint procedure, so the

board’s determination could not be binding; further, she is not

barred by any failure to seek judicial review because Defendant

failed to give her notice of the availability of judicial review

and the time period within which such review was required to be

initiated. 

In Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24 Cal.4th 61 (2000), it

was held that a FEHA action brought by a terminated employee was

barred by laches where the personnel board of the city-employer

had ruled against the employee in a grievance proceeding, and

where the city council had affirmed the personnel ruling, because

the employee had failed to file a timely challenge to the city’s

ruling in the form of a petition for writ of administrative

mandamus in the California courts. The California Supreme Court

ruled that with respect to FEHA claims, under the doctrine of

exhaustion of judicial remedies, where a party pursues an

administrative remedy, receives an adverse finding, and fails to

have the finding set aside through judicial review procedures,

the administrative finding is binding in a later civil action

concerning discrimination claims under FEHA. Id. at 76. The court

in Johnson noted that the Title VII claim was not barred by the

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unreviewed administrative determination. 24 Cal.4th at 74-75.

In Johnson, the injured employee filed a grievance with the

employer, 24 Cal.4th at 66, and was considered a party to the

administrative proceeding, id. at 69-70. Central to the holding

was the premise that the employee in question pursued or availed

himself of an administrative process that provided an internal

remedy and resulted in administrative findings. Id. at 70, 76.

The court specified that the context in which this principle

applies is where the party or entity whose quasi-judicial

determination “is challenged--be it hospital, voluntary private

or professional association, or public entity--has provided an

internal remedy." Id. at 70 n.2. The court recognized that a

plaintiff has a choice of the administrative remedies available

and may choose to use the FEHA process instead of civil service

remedies. Id. at 72-73. However, if the employee chooses to use

the non-FEHA process provided for by the employer, obtains a

decision, and fails to pursue a judicial remedy for reviewing the

administrative action, then the findings in that administrative

procedure should be given binding effect. This is necessary to 1)

accord proper respect to the administrative agency’s quasijudicial procedures and to preclude the party from circumventing

the established process for judicial review via a petition for

administrative mandate; and 2) provide a uniform practice of

judicial, rather than jury, review of quasi-judicial

administrative decisions. Johnson, 24 Cal.4th at 70.

Plaintiff argues that there is a factual dispute regarding

whether Plaintiff pursued the administrative remedy before the

school board. Review of the evidentiary materials shows that LB

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Superintendent Alderete testified at deposition that before

September 10, 2003, or on August 13, 2003, during mediation, a

mediator told Alderete and others that there was a sexual

harassment claim or allegation, but “they” would not tell LB who

was involved. LB asked them to tell who was involved and asked to

have the complainant come forward. (D.’s Ex. 21 at 27-28, 72.)

Alderete wrote a letter to a union representative, Gaulman, dated

September 10, 2003, stating in part that at a meeting on

September 9, 2003, where several people were in attendance,

Gaulman indicated that a female member of the CSEA bargaining

unit had experienced sexual harassment from a male supervisor who

had repeatedly grabbed his crotch in front of her; Alderete

further stated that Gaulman (“You”) refused to identify either

the complaining witness or the supervisor involved, indicating

that the complaining witness feared retaliation. Alderete then

formally requested CSEA (the union) and the complaining witness

to come forward and file a complaint under the district’s sexual

harassment complaint procedure so that the district could

properly investigate the charges. Alderete attached a copy of the

district’s complaint procedure to the letter, and he assured

Gaulman that the district took all complaints alleging sexual

harassment seriously and would ensure that no person filing a

complaint would be subjected to retaliation. (D.’s Ex. 26.) 

Alderete testified that he first became aware that Plaintiff

Veronica Garcia was the person discussed on September 9, 2003,

during the “Mejia hearing” before the Board, which was not

reported or recorded. (D.’s Ex. 21 at 28.)

Plaintiff testified at deposition that she told Michaela

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Elliott about a masturbation incident several days after it

happened, told her union representative, (P.’s Ex. 7, at 92), and

told the Board of Education at the time when she was present in

regard to Mr. Mejia’s complaints; the union did not grieve

against Heid because of what he did to her, but because of what

Heid did to Mejia, (id. at 109-110); they did not complain about

Heid’s treatment of Plaintiff because it was up to Plaintiff to

complain, and she did not ask her union to complain about it

because she did not think it was going to help her; when she went

to the Mejia meeting, she did not know that he was going to share

about the sexual harassment, but she expected to go as support

with information about the incident concerning wiping her ass as

consistent with Heid’s having been obscene with Mejia, (id. at

110-12). Thus, as of early September 2003, it does not appear

that there was a formal union grievance requested by Plaintiff.

This is consistent with her testimony that she did not take it up

before the executive board of the CSEA chapter before the

masturbation issue was brought up in front of the Board of

Education. (D.’s Ex. 1 at 110, 111, 115.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff appeared to lodge a complaint

regarding Defendant Heid’s treatment of her. It is undisputed

that Kaplan was hired to investigate and that Kaplan interviewed

Plaintiff and witnesses identified by Plaintiff. (P.’s Stmt. of

Evidence, items 2, 3.) Plaintiff testified that she met with Sue

Kaplan, Gaulman, and John Puentes, and she identified witnesses;

Kaplan took notes and told Plaintiff she was going to write a

statement and send it to Plaintiff; and Kaplan wrote a letter to

Plaintiff enclosing the statement “as Mr. Gaulman requested.”

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(D.’s Ex. 1 at 182, 184; D.’s Ex. 29 at 179-80; D.’s Ex. 14.) A

letter to Plaintiff from Kaplan dated September 26, 2003,

indicates that Kaplan met with Plaintiff on September 25, 2003,

about the complaint; union representative Gaulman had requested

that Kaplan prepare a statement from the interview to constitute

the written complaint under the District’s complaint procedure;

and Plaintiff was asked to review the statement, make changes,

and sign and return. (D.’s Ex. 14.) Plaintiff testified that she

understood that pursuant to the district’s complaint procedures,

she had to submit a written complaint; the district was helping

Plaintiff with the complaint. (D.’s Ex. 29, at 180.) Plaintiff

discussed the declaration with Gaulman; although Kaplan

instructed Plaintiff to make any needed changes, Plaintiff wanted

to write her own statement with the changes. (Id. at 181.)

Plaintiff did not sign the declaration that Kaplan had prepared.

(Id.) 

Excerpts of Plaintiff’s deposition testimony show that some

form of complaint was submitted to Villalta about a month after

Plaintiff spoke with Kaplan. Villalta concluded after

investigation that the evidence did not substantiate Plaintiff’s

complaints. (D.’s Ex. 1 at 227.)

Villalta wrote Plaintiff on October 23, 2003, and stated

that pursuant to the district’s complaint procedure, it was

thereby giving written notice of the investigative findings.

(D.’s Ex. 5.) Villalta wrote that the district had completed its

investigation of Plaintiff’s allegations against Heid; her

complaints, first raised at a board meeting and later contained

in a written statement of her interview with Sue Kaplan on

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September 23, 2003, were found to have been unsubstantiated given

the totality of the evidence. Villalta informed her that she

could file a written appeal of the decision to the Board within

ten working days of receipt of the letter, which would result in

an appeal hearing to be held at the next regularly scheduled

board meeting which would fall at least twelve days after the

appeal was filed. (D’s Ex. 5.) Further, Villalta informed

Plaintiff that she also had appeal rights to the State Department

of Education. (Id.) Attached to the letter was a copy of the

Governing Board’s procedures for discrimination complaints, which

contained notification that injunctions, restraining orders, and

other unspecified civil law remedies might also be available to

complainants. 

The receipt of the findings and notice are not disputed by

Plaintiff, although Plaintiff claims that the findings were

gratuitous. (P.’s Stmt., item 4.)

Beginning October 28, Garcia corresponded with Kaplan by email and conversed with her regarding making corrections to her

“statement”; Plaintiff sent corrections on October 28. (D.’s Ex.

29 at 227-28, Exs. 30-33.) The corrections relate solely to

modifications of an earlier statement. Plaintiff testified that

after receiving notice of Villalta’s findings, she then wrote

Kaplan and sent corrections to her documents. (D.’s Ex. 1 at

227.) In a memo to file dated October 28, 2003, regarding a

telephone conversation between Kaplan and Plaintiff on the same

date, Kaplan noted that Plaintiff was told that her corrected

statement was too late because the investigation had been

completed, and that any of her concerns about the process should

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be taken up with Mr. Villalta. (Id., Ex. 33.) It thus does not

appear that this correspondence constituted a lodging of an

appeal with the Board; rather, it was an effort by Plaintiff to

make changes to the initial complaint. Further, because Kaplan

referred Plaintiff to Villalta, it does not appear solely from

the contents of this document that Kaplan understood the

correspondence to constitute an appeal to the Board by Plaintiff. 

It is undisputed that a board hearing was held on November

19, 2003, at which the Board met in closed session, found that

there was no evidence of sexual harassment, and instructed

Alderete to advise Garcia, which he did on November 20, 2003.

(P.’s Stmt., items 5-7.) It is further undisputed that Garcia did

not challenge the Board’s findings with the California Department

of Education or seek a writ of mandate. (Id. at item 8.) However,

Plaintiff argues that this is impertinent because she never filed

an appeal with the school board. (P.’s Stmt. at item 8.) 

At deposition Plaintiff testified that she had submitted a

typewritten statement to the Board of Education; she referred to

having complained to the Board of Education more than once; and

she described her 2003 evaluation by Heid as retaliation for her

complaining about incidents (D.’s Ex. 1 at 55-56, 85, 137).

However, these deposition excerpts do not specify the stage of

the proceedings to which Plaintiff was referring. 

Plaintiff testified that she went to the Board twice. Once

was in reference to the Mejia grievance; the other was in

reference to the sexual harassment. The one regarding Mejia was

in September 2003, and the sexual harassment charge was in

November 2003. (P.’s Ex. 7 at p. 53.) Plaintiff referred to a

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typewritten statement that she had taken to or in front of the

Board of Education. (Id. at 56, 128.) On October 29, 2003, six

days after Villalta notified Plaintiff that the investigation

resulted in a conclusion that Plaintiff’s complaints were

unfounded, Plaintiff signed under penalty of perjury a statement

to Sue Kaplan in connection with a sexual harassment

investigation, which she stated was the basis for her complaint.

(D’s Ex. 6.) This statement is expressly made to Kaplan,

investigator of the complaint (first page), and it seeks removal

of the negative evaluation from her file, an apology, and Heid’s

resignation. It does not refer to a previous investigation or set

of administrative findings; it does not expressly purport to be

an appeal, as distinct from a correction or confirmation of the

initial statement. 

Plaintiff testified that she spoke with Kaplan in November

about Kaplan’s wanting to follow up on an additional comment

about Heid having talked about getting even on an evaluation.

(P’.s Ex. 7 at 231.) This tends to show that a process regarding

the harassment complaint was continuing.

Further, reference to Plaintiff’s own representations sheds

light on the nature of the proceedings at this point. Plaintiff

alleges in the first amended complaint filed in this Court that

she lodged a formal complaint pursuant to Defendant district’s

complaint procedure regarding Heid’s sexually offensive conduct,

discriminatory treatment, retaliation, and creation of a sexually

hostile work environment. (FAC at 4.) Reference to Plaintiff’s

EEOC complaint (D.’s Ex. 4), dated December 30, 2003, reveals

that in a cover letter that Plaintiff wrote to whom it may

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concern, Plaintiff stated that the letter from Villalta stating

the results of the district’s findings caused her to decide to go

in front of the Board of Education to raise her complaint. It may

be concluded from this direct evidence of Plaintiff’s

understanding of the procedures and knowledge of the history of

her own actions in pursuing a complaint that Plaintiff pursued

the district’s complaint procedures to the point of filing an

appeal with the Board of Education. 

In resisting the assertion that Plaintiff pursued the

district’s complaint procedures, Plaintiff cites to evidence from

various sources, including Puentes’ testimony that Plaintiff was

afraid of retaliation, (P.’s Ex. 21 at p. 44), Plaintiff’s

testimony that she was afraid of losing her job (P.’s Ex. 23 at

p. 47), her testimony that she did not complain about Heid’s

treatment of her or ask her union to complain about it because

she did not think it was going to help her, (P.’s Ex. 7 at 110-

111), and the fact that in September 2003 Superintendent Alderete

solicited a complaint. This evidence may support a conclusion

that Plaintiff was reluctant early in the process, but it does

not relate directly to the conduct later in the process.

Plaintiff cites to Gaulman’s deposition at page 66. (P.’s Ex. 10,

at 66, lines 7-9.) Reference to Plaintiff’s exhibit 10 does not

reveal a page 66; it does contain page 87, which contains

Puentes’ testimony that at some point Plaintiff had questioned

whether she should even have complained about it in the first

place but that she was going through a process. This reveals some

uncertainty or ambivalence on the part of Plaintiff, but it again

does not directly relate to the nature or extent of Plaintiff’s

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participation in November 2003.

Plaintiff argues that further evidence that Plaintiff did

not avail herself of an appeal to the Board is found in

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the district’s procedures for

discrimination complaints. (P.’s Ex. 21.) 

Plaintiff first points to her failure to complain informally

to her supervisor or summarize her efforts at informal

resolution.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that there are several

documents regarding procedures. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 21 purports

to be LB Board policy regarding employee and personnel complaints

as well as general guidelines regarding unspecified types of

complaints. It specifies that if a complaint involves sexual

harassment, it should be made directly to the employee’s

immediate supervisor; however, an employee is not required to

resolve sexual harassment complaints with the offending person.

(P.’s Ex. 21 at p. 2, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff’s Exhibit 21 as well as

Defendant’s Exhibit 8 (at p. 1) indicate that if a complaint is

related to discrimination, the district’s procedure for

discrimination complaints should be used. The discrimination

complaint procedures were attached to Villalta’s letter of

October 23, 2003 (D.’s Ex. 5). They indicate that the first step

is an informal meeting with an administrator. 

In the supplemental brief, Plaintiff appears to argue that a

complaint procedure for personnel or employees of the LB is the

applicable procedure because Plaintiff refers to steps and time

deadlines present in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 21 which differ from

those in the discrimination complaint procedure. (P.’s Ex. 21.)

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However, reference to the guidelines of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 21

reveal that the first guideline states that if a complaint is

related to discrimination, the district’s procedure for

complaints concerning discrimination should be used. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s complaint concerned discrimination on the basis of

sex as well as for harassment or hostile work environment. The

Court concludes that it will thus apply the procedure for

discrimination complaints to Plaintiff’s complaint. 

The letter of Kaplan dated October 17, 2003, summarizing her

investigation, indicates that because Plaintiff’s supervisor was

the alleged harasser, Plaintiff’s comments at the Board meeting

were considered to satisfy the informal step. (D.’s Ex. 27 at

Bates pp. 33-34.) This is consistent with the policies of LB and

is not a substantial or significant deviation from the procedure

at the first level under the circumstances. It does not indicate

a failure to pursue the internal remedy. Thus, Plaintiff did not

deviate substantially from the procedure at the first level.

Plaintiff notes her further failure to file a formal written

complaint with her immediate supervisor within sixty days of the

conduct complained of, and the failure of the immediate

supervisor or principal at that step to conduct an investigation,

meet with the complainant to resolve the complaint, and provide a

written answer in ten working days after the meeting. Turning

instead to the procedures for a discrimination complaint, the

procedure requires a complaint to be initiated within thirty days

after the complainant should have known of the alleged

discrimination. The second level requires a formal written

complaint to the district nondiscrimination coordinator within

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ten days of the attempt to resolve the complaint informally. It

is apparent that both parties considered the complaint at both

levels to be timely. As to the deadline for a writing, Kaplan’s

letter reveals that the parties considered the written statement

that Kaplan prepared at Gaulman’s request, and which Plaintiff

had not yet signed, as a timely formal written complaint. (D.’s

Ex. 27 at Bates p. 34.) In order to expedite the investigation,

and because the procedure required a written complaint, Kaplan

asked Plaintiff to put her complaint in writing at the initial

interview of Plaintiff. (D.’s Ex. 6 at p. 2.) The procedure

required that the investigation conclude in ten days on the first

formal level; Kaplan sought and received permission from

Plaintiff for an extension of time to investigate. (Id.) It may

be inferred that the parties’ various writings document an

agreement to extend the time limits by written mutual agreement,

as was permitted by the complaint procedure. 

Plaintiff also notes the failure of both parties to comply

with the formal complaint procedure step 2, which required

Plaintiff to file a written complaint with the superintendent or

designee within five working days of receiving the answer at step

one that includes all information presented at step one, and the

Superintendent or designee to conduct any investigation, meet

with the complainant, and present all concerned parties with a

written answer to the complaint within ten working days after the

meeting. Plaintiff also points to step three of the formal

complaint procedure, which requires a written appeal to the Board

including all information presented at steps one and two, and a

report from the superintendent or designee to the Board that

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describes the attempts to resolve the complaint at step two.

Plaintiff asserts that no report was submitted, and no appeal

hearing was held. Again, the Court notes that this argument

relates to the more general procedure, not the discrimination

procedure.

However, the Court notes that both the discrimination

complaint procedures and the complaint guidelines provide for a

level of review of the immediate supervisor’s or district

nondiscrimination coordinator’s response to the formal written

complaint. This additional level of review, to be completed

before an appeal to the Board was undertaken, was not performed

or sought. It is possible that the district considered one level

bypassed because of the fact that the harasser was the immediate

supervisor. Alternatively, it may be that under the

discrimination procedure, the superintendent had designated the

Board to undertake the next level of review. In any event, it

appears that LB considered the next level of review to be an

appeal to the Board, which is the final step of review under

either complaint procedure. The apparent absence of one level of

review is troubling, but it is not sufficient to support a

conclusion that the complaint procedure was not pursued by

Plaintiff. In light of Plaintiff’s admissions that she sought

review by the Board, and considering the Board’s having held a

hearing on November 19, 2003, and having informed Plaintiff on

November 20, 2003, that it had denied her complaint of sexual

harassment, the Court should conclude that Plaintiff did pursue

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Step 3 of the personnel procedure is to file a written appeal to the Board within five working days of

receipt of the answer at Step 2. A report is to be submitted to the Board, and an appeal hearing I is held at the next

regularly scheduled Board meeting. (D.’s Ex. 10.) Level IV of the discrimination process also consists of the

complainant’s filing a written appeal to the “Board,” which is provided with the information from all previous levels,

and which “shall grant the hearing request for the next regular Board meeting for which it can be placed on the

agenda.” (D.’s Ex. 9.) Both procedures provide that complaints against a district employee must be conducted in

closed session as a personnel matter. The Board must render its decision in thirty days of the hearing and must mail

its decision to all parties. The Board’s decision shall be final. (D.’s Ex. 10.) 

The discrimination complaint procedure then expressly provides that complainants may appeal the district’s

action to the California Department of Education, requires the Superintendent to ensure that complainants are

informed that other civil law remedies may also be available, and requires this information to be published with the

district’s nondiscrimination complaint procedures and included in any related notices, citing to Cal. Ed. Code §

262.3. (D.’s Ex. 9.) 

20

to a final decision1 before the LB Board her complaint regarding

Heid’s conduct. She thus exhausted the employer’s internal

remedy. 

Citing Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, 31 Cal.4th 1074

(2003), Plaintiff argues that she was not required to pursue any

internal remedy offered by her employer. Schifando held that an

employee-plaintiff’s allegation of exhaustion of FEHA remedies

was sufficient to state exhaustion of administrative remedies

even though there was no allegation of exhaustion of the

employer’s internal administrative remedy because it was not

necessary for an employee to exhaust both such remedies. In

Johnson, however, the employee had pursued both the city’s

internal grievance procedure as well as FEHA’s process, where he

was issued a right-to-sue letter. The court held that the civil

service findings with respect to the public employee were binding

because not set aside judicially. Accord, Risam v. County of Los

Angeles, 99 Cal.App.4th 412, 421 (2002); see Page v. Los Angeles

County Probation Department, 123 Cal.App.4th 1135 (2005).

Here, Plaintiff not only pursued her FEHA claim, but she

also pursued her employer’s internal remedy to a final decision

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2

 There appears to be implied an admission that Plaintiff and witnesses appeared at a hearing before the

Board. (P.’s Supp. Brief at p. 3, lines 10-14.) 

21

within the internal remedial system. Johnson applies to make the

Board’s findings binding on Plaintiff. Schifando made it clear

that Johnson would apply to prevent an employee from exhausting

the employer’s internal remedy and then getting a second bit of

the “procedural apple.” Schifando, 31 Cal.4th at 1090-91. 

Citing Lewis v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1247

(1999), Plaintiff argues that the procedure of the Board was not

a quasi-judicial proceeding because such a proceeding has been

defined as an administrative hearing involving a confrontation,

oral or otherwise, between an affected individual and an agency

decision-maker sufficient to allow an individual to present the

case in a meaningful manner. Plaintiff contends that LB’s

internal complaint procedure was not such a proceeding because

Plaintiff lacked counsel at the school board hearing; evidence

was suspect because Kaplan, the investigator, was employed by a

law firm hired by the school board; and the mere appearance of

Plaintiff and witnesses does not mean that Plaintiff sought or

requested the hearing.2

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1094.5(a), providing for a review of

administrative decisions, concerns writs issued for the purpose

of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order

or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which a hearing

is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and

discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the

inferior tribunal, board, or officer. 

It has been held that where a complainant is deprived of

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notice and a hearing, and is not informed of the reason for the

action taken or of the right to respond to the charges against

the complainant, it is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Westlake

Community Hospital v. Superior Court (Kaiman), 17 Cal.3d 465,

478, 485 (1976). However, no formal judicial process is required;

it is sufficient if the procedure identifies a decision-making

body and requires it to give full and fair consideration at a

hearing. Pomona College v. Superior Court (Corin), 45 Cal.App.4th

1716, 1729 (1996) (tenure review decision). Substantive and

procedural defects in a quasi-judicial proceeding may be raised

in a mandamus proceeding. Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior

Court (Kaiman), 17 Cal.3d at 484; Pomona College v. Superior

Court (Corin), 45 Cal.App.4th at 1729.

Defendant has shown that the procedures in question called

for the lodging of a complaint; notice of hearing, of any

decision rendered, and of the right to appeal to the next level;

submission of all information presented at previous levels to the

Board; a hearing at a regular Board meeting; a decision by the

Board within ten days; and an appeal thereafter to the state

department of education as well as access to other civil law

remedies. As previously noted, Plaintiff appears to have admitted

that witnesses and Plaintiff appeared before the Board. It may be

reasonably inferred and concluded that LB’s procedures required a

hearing and the taking of evidence, and they vested discretion in

the determination of facts in the Board. Thus, the Court

concludes that the LB Board’s hearing and determination

constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding subject to review by

administrative mandamus pursuant to § 1094.5.

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Finally, Plaintiff argues that she is not bound by the

Board’s findings because LB did not comply with the provisions of

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1094.6(f), which states that in making a

final decision, the agency “shall provide notice to the party

that the time within which judicial review must be sought” is

governed by the section, which in § 1094.6(b) imposes a ninetyday statute of limitations after a final decision is rendered. It

does not appear that any defendant gave notice to Plaintiff of

the ninety-day statute of limitations for filing a petition for

administrative mandamus. However, this does not mean that

Plaintiff is not subject to the decision. One case held that an

employer’s decision does not become final unless notice is given.

Cummings v. City of Vernon, 214 Cal.App.3d 919, 922 (1989).

However, it has been held that § 1094.6(f) means only that absent

notice, the strict ninety-day statutory period is tolled, and

that instead such a case is governed by the doctrine of laches. 

El Dorado Palm Springs Ltd. v. Rent Review Commission, 230

Cal.App.3d 334, 344-47 (1991) rev. denied, August 29, 1991. This

is the better view because it does not insulate decisions from

judicial review simply because notice of the statute of

limitations is not given. Further, it is consistent with Johnson,

24 Cal.4th at 68, where the Supreme Court of California noted

that the doctrine of laches, and not the ninety-day time limit

expressed in § 1094.6, governed the case because the public

agency employer did not notify the plaintiff employee in that

case of the ninety-day period. 

The Court thus concludes that the failure to give notice of

the ninety-day period did not render the requirement of

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administrative mandamus inapplicable to Plaintiff. 

Where a plaintiff who pursued the employer’s internal remedy

did not seek review by writ of administrative mandamus to reverse

an unfavorable finding with respect to conduct alleged to have

violated FEHA, the appropriate remedy is to grant summary

judgment because the administrative findings are binding by way

of collateral estoppel. Risam v. County of Los Angeles, 99

Cal.App.4th 412, 419-20 (2002) (citing Johnson v. City of Loma

Linda, 24 Cal.4th 61, 69-70). Collateral estoppel in California

bars litigation of an issue decided at a previous proceeding if

1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous proceeding is

identical to the one sought to be relitigated; 2) the previous

proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and 3) the

party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or

in privity with a party at the prior proceeding. Risam, 99

Cal.App.4th at 420 (citing Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton, 199

Cal.App.3d 235, 243-44 (1988)).

Here, the complaints that Plaintiff submitted to Defendant

LB were essentially complaints by Plaintiff against Defendant

Heid; thus, the same parties are involved. The conduct covered by

the complaint included all the factual matters covered by the

instant claim, including Heid’s yelling and threats in October

2002, retaliation for complaining about the yelling, Heid’s

November 2002 comments regarding wiping Plaintiff’s ass,

retaliation for complaining regarding that incident, the

evaluations, screaming, and the sexual harassment in May 2003. 

(D.’s Exs. 14, 6.)

In summary, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s failure to

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obtain reversal of the findings of the Board by way of

administrative mandamus bars Plaintiff’s FEHA action against Heid

with respect to the conduct encompassed by the present FEHA claim

against Heid.

IV. Summary Adjudication

Defendants LB and Heid move for summary adjudication of the

claims involving retaliation, failure to take appropriate action

regarding Plaintiff’s complaints, and most of the claim

concerning sexually hostile work environment except for two

incidents of “masturbation” that occurred on May 30, 2003, and

January 2, 2004. Defendants argue that the conduct complained of

is not actionable under the governing California and federal law,

and that much of the conduct cannot be considered because with

respect to it, Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative

remedies because the conduct was not set forth in her complaints

to the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing

(DFEH) and federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission

(EEOC).

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

1. Title VII

With respect to Title VII, before filing suit on a statutory

employment discrimination claim, the aggrieved employee must have

exhausted the employee’s administrative remedy by filing a timely

and sufficient charge with the appropriate administrative agency

and obtained a “right to sue” letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b),

(f)(3). A failure of exhaustion in the form of a failure to file

a timely administrative claim has been characterized as not

jurisdictional and may be raised as an affirmative defense to the

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claim. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393

(1982). However, the filing of a sufficient administrative claim

that includes the matters forming the basis of a later judicial

claim, and the receipt of a right-to-sue letter, have been

referred to as jurisdictional pre-requisites to maintaining a

Title VII action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

798 (1973) (filing charges with the EEOC and receiving notice of

the right to sue are jurisdictional prerequisites to filing a

suit in federal court); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d

1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002). The purpose of the requirement of

administrative exhaustion is to give the charged party notice of

the claim and to permit investigation and conciliation by the

administrative agency, as well as to narrow the issues for prompt

adjudication and decision. Id. A judicial complaint may encompass

any discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations

of the EEOC charge. Freeman v. Oakland Unified School District,

291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Oubichon v. North Am.

Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1973)). A district

court’s jurisdiction extends to all allegations of discrimination

that fall within the scope of either the EEOC’s actual

investigation or an EEOC investigation that can reasonably be

expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Freeman,

291 F.3d at 636. A district court must inquire whether the

original EEOC investigation would have encompassed the additional

charges made in the court complaint but not included in the EEOC

charge itself. Id. The language of EEOC charges must be liberally

construed because the charges are often made by lay people who

are not expert in the technicalities of formal pleading; the

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crucial element of the charge is the factual statement. B.K.B.

276 F.3d at 1100. Allegations of discrimination not included in

the administrative charge may not be considered by a district

court unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to the

allegations contained in the EEOC charge. Id. Factors

appropriately considered are the alleged basis of the

discrimination, dates of the discriminatory acts specified in the

charge, perpetrators of discrimination named in the charge,

locations at which discrimination is alleged to have occurred,

and the extent to which the judicial claims are consistent with

the Plaintiff’s original theory of the case. Id.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed her DFEH complaint on

January 5, 2004; she filed her EEOC complaint on February 24,

2004. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s DFEH/EEOC complaint

stated the following:

In March 24, 2003, I was subjected to retaliation.

In May 2003, I was sexually harassed. I was hired

April 23, 2001.

I. I believe I was subjected to retaliation in the

form of being issued a poor performance evaluation.

I also believe I was sexually harassed because of

my sex, female. My beliefs are based on the following:

A. In March 24, 2003, I was issued a poor performance

evaluation by Mr. Ray Heid. Investigation will reveal that

prior to my reporting harassment my performance

evaluations were good.

B. On May 30, 2003, I was visually and verbally

sexually harassed by Ray Heid, Facility Director. To my

knowledge no corrective action was taken.

(P.’s Statement, items 48, 49; D.’s Exs. 4, 16.)

Thus, reasonably and liberally interpreted, Plaintiff’s 2004

administrative claims specifically mention good performance

evaluations preceding a poor evaluation on March 24, 2003, which

was alleged to have been retaliation for previous reporting of

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previous, unspecified sexual harassment; visual and verbal sexual

harassment on May 30, 2003; and a failure on the part of the

employer to take corrective action. The theories involved are

sexual harassment, failure to remedy harassment, and retaliation

for reporting harassment. The time period encompassed by the

express allegations of the administrative claim logically

includes the time of the occurrence of the previous, unspecified

harassment; the reporting of that harassment, which necessarily

preceded March 2003; the allegedly retaliatory performance

evaluation of March 2003; the later harassment of May 2003; and

any time period after the first report of the sexual harassment

during which the employer could have taken corrective action.

The FAC filed here contains things not expressly specified

in the administrative claim: 1) pre-evaluation allegations

regarding informal complaints with district representatives

alleging sexually offensive conduct by Defendant Heid; 2)

specifications of additional incidents of Heid’s retaliation

against Plaintiff (closer supervision, continuing sexually

offensive conduct, and conduct intended to ridicule and embarrass

Plaintiff, in addition to the unwarranted negative evaluation);

3) sexual discrimination (a continuing pattern of conduct

creating a sexually hostile work environment, most recently

manifested by the sexually suggestive comments and gestures to

Plaintiff on May 30, 2003); and 4) Defendant district’s failure

to take appropriate action after Plaintiff formally complained,

consisting of denying that Heid’s conduct amounted to sexual

harassment. (FAC at 4-5.) 

The informal complaints Plaintiff made about Heid before

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March 2003 are reasonably understood as the root of the

retaliation of which Plaintiff complained and thus were clearly

within the scope of the express allegations of the administrative

complaint. A reasonable investigation of the claim regarding

retaliatory evaluation would have encompassed other acts of

arguably retaliatory conduct during the same period. The

district’s actions in response to the formal complaint were

relevant to the related issue of its other actions in response to

informal complaints regarding the same conduct, namely, sexual

harassment. The pattern of conduct constituting a sexually

hostile work environment was part and parcel of the matter

investigated, namely, alleged sexual harassment, Plaintiff’s

complaints about that conduct, the alleged retaliation, and the

Defendant district’s response to Plaintiff’s complaints. 

In summary, the additional specification in the FAC related

to matters that either fell within the scope of the EEOC’s actual

investigation or an EEOC investigation that could reasonably be

expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. They were 

like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the

EEOC charge. The alleged basis of the discrimination was the

same. The time period of the discriminatory acts specified within

the charge largely overlapped the period of the acts stated in

the FAC. The perpetrators of the discrimination as well as the

general location at which the alleged discrimination took place,

as alleged in the administrative complaint, appear to be the same

as those involved in the allegations in the complaint. The claims

in the complaint are consistent with the Plaintiff’s original

theory of the case.

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The Court concludes that Plaintiff did not fail to exhaust

her administrative remedies with respect to claims under Title

VII involving retaliation, failure to take appropriate action

regarding Plaintiff’s complaints, or a sexually hostile work

environment. 

2. FEHA

Previously the Court has concluded that the FEHA action

against Heid is barred by collateral estoppel; thus, further

issues pertaining to this claim are moot. 

However, in case the Court’s conclusion is incorrect, the

Court notes that result under FEHA would be the same as that

under Title VII. With respect to an action under California’s

FEHA, Cal. Govt. Code § 12960 provides for the filing of an

administrative complaint as follows:

(b) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful

practice may file with the department a verified complaint, in

writing, that shall state the name and address of the person,

employer, labor organization, or employment agency alleged to

have committed the unlawful practice complained of, and that

shall set forth the particulars thereof and contain other

information as may be required by the department. The director or

his or her authorized representative may in like manner, on his

or her own motion, make, sign, and file a complaint. (Emphasis

added.)

Under California law, the requirement of exhaustion of

administrative remedies under FEHA is a jurisdictional

prerequisite to resort to the courts. Johnson v. City of Loma

Linda, 24 Cal.4th 61, 70 (2000). It is generally a plaintiff’s

burden to plead and prove timely exhaustion of administrative

remedies, such as filing a sufficient complaint with the

Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) and obtaining a

right-to-sue letter. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. County of Los

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Angeles, 42 Cal.App.3d 32, 37 (1974) (regarding taxpayer duty to

establish exhaustion). Failure to exhaust warrants a defense

summary judgment. Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Company,

Inc., 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1724 (1994). 

As to the requisite level of specificity of an

administrative complaint, § 12960 requires that the particulars

of the unlawful practice be stated. The policies underlying

administrative exhaustion under FEHA are to resolve disputes and

eliminate unlawful employment practices by conciliation; the

purpose of the administrative charge is to trigger the

investigatory and conciliatory procedures of the responsible

administrative agency. Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations

Company, 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1615 (1995) (holding that a DFEH

complaint regarding specific acts of discrimination based on race

and national origin did not suffice to exhaust a claim of

subsequent retaliation because of the filing of the charge).

Claims in a complaint subsequently filed in court can include the

precise unlawful practices mentioned in the DFEH complaint as

well as claims like or reasonably related to the DFEH complaint

that would be necessarily be uncovered in the course of a DFEH

investigation. Id. at 1614-18. This may include new acts

occurring during the pendency of the charge before the EEOC.

Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corporation, 482 F.2d 569,

571 (9th Cir. 1973).

FEHA provisions should be liberally construed for the

accomplishment of the purposes thereof, including the resolution

of potentially meritorious claims on the merits. Richards v. CH2M

Hill, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 798, 819 (2001).

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Here, as set forth at length in connection with the EEOC

administrative claim, the new matter in the complaint concerns

claims like or reasonably related to the DFEH complaint that

would necessarily be uncovered in the course of a DFEH

investigation.

Thus, in summary, the Court has previously concluded that

Plaintiff’s FEHA claim is barred by collateral estoppel. However, 

should such issue be appropriately before the Court, the Court

concludes that Defendant has not established that it is entitled

to judgment on some aspects of Plaintiff’s claims due to any

failure on Plaintiff’s part to exhaust administrative remedies

under FEHA.

B. Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff filed her DFEH complaint on January 5, 2004; on

January 28, 2004, the DFEH sent Plaintiff a notice of case

closure because the complaint was waived to another agency

(EEOC). (P.’s Ex. 3.) She filed her EEOC complaint on February

24, 2004. The EEOC sent Plaintiff a notice of right to sue within

ninety days on May 5, 2004. (P.’s Ex. 2.) 

Defendant argues that all incidents prior to January 5,

2003, with respect to the DFEH claim, and before April 2003, with

respect to the EEOC complaint, are outside the statute of

limitations.

Plaintiff notes that when discrimination charges are filed

with a state agency in a “deferral state,” including California,

within 300 days of the occurrence of the employment practice,

then the charges are deemed constructively filed with the EEOC at

the same time pursuant to a work-sharing agreement between the

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DFEH and the EEOC. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.10(c); McConnell v. General

Telephone Company of California, 814 F.1d 1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir.

1987). However, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), the charge 

cannot be considered “filed” with the EEOC “before the expiration

of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the

State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier

terminatedA.” Id. This is because the state agency must be given a

sixty-day window in which it has the initial and exclusive right

to process the charge, “free from premature federal

intervention.” EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S.

107, 110 (1988). The net effect of this sixty-day deferral

provision on the 300-day limitations period is that a charge

initially filed with a state agency will be treated as

constructively filed with the EEOC upon either the expiration of

60 days or the termination of agency proceedings, whichever

occurs first. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); see also 29 C.F.R. §

1601.13(b)(1).

Here, the state agency proceedings terminated on January 28,

2004, at which time the DFEH charge was deemed constructively

filed with the EEOC. 

1) Title VII

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) requires that a charge be

filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment

practice occurred, except in cases in which the aggrieved person

has initially instituted proceedings with an authorized state or

local agency, in which case the charge must be filed within 300

days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or

within thirty days after notice of the agency’s termination of

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proceedings, whichever is earlier.

The court considered when an unlawful employment practice

occurs within the meaning of § 2000e-5(e)(1) with respect to

discrete discriminatory acts and hostile work environment claims

in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101

(2002); it did not consider “pattern or practice” claims, id. at

115 n. 9. Subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling,

discrete retaliatory or discriminatory acts each constitute

separate, distinct unlawful employment practices, and they occur

on the day that they happen, so a party must file a charge within

300 days of the date of such an act or lose the ability to

recover for it. Id. at 110-11, 113. The mere fact that an

otherwise time-barred discrete act is related to acts alleged in

timely filed charges is not sufficient to render it actionable.

Id. at 113.

A hostile work environment (HWE) claim differs from a claim

of a discrete act because a HWE claim by its very nature involves

cumulative or repeated conduct, and it is composed of a series of

separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful

employment practice. Id. at 115, 117. It cannot be said that such

an unlawful employment practice occurred on any particular day;

indeed, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its

own. Id. at 115. Discriminatory harassment constitutes a

particular type of discrimination with respect to the terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment mentioned in § 2000e2(a)(1) that violates the Act where the workplace is permeated

with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and/or insult that is

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the

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victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.

Id. at 116. Determination of the presence of an actionable

hostile work environment involves consideration of all the

circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory

conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating as distinct from merely offensive, and whether it

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. Id.

at 117. As long as an act contributing to the claim occurs within

the filing period, some of the component acts of the HWE practice

may fall outside the statutory time period, and a court may

consider the entire time period of the hostile environment for

the purpose of determining liability. Id. at 117. The employer

may be liable for all acts that are part of the claim so long as

at least one act within the statutory period is related to the

others or is part of the same HWE practice. Id. at 118, 120. It

has been held that actions were all part of the same actionable

HWE practice where there was no intervening act of the employer,

and all the component acts involved the same type of employment

actions, occurred relatively frequently, and were perpetrated by

the same managers, such as where managers made racial jokes, used

racial epithets, performed racially derogatory acts, and made

negative comments regarding the capacity of blacks to be

supervisors. Id. at 120. The remedy for delay in filing with the

EEOC in such a case is to afford the defendant employer equitable

defenses, such as laches. Id. at 121.

Defendant argues that the acts alleged in Plaintiff’s case

are simply discrete discriminatory acts and not incidents in a

larger HWE practice. Defendant cites Porter v. California Dept.

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of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2004), which the

Court notes was superseded upon denial of rehearing by the

opinion at 419 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2005). Porter establishes that a

HWE claimant to survive summary judgment must show 1) the

complainant was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a

sexual nature; 2) the conduct was unwelcome; and 3) the conduct

was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

her employment and create an abusive work environment. 419 F.3d

at 892 (citing Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,

642 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Here, Plaintiff alleged sexual discrimination (presumably of

the HWE variety as distinct from quid pro quo), including preevaluation, informal complaints with district representatives

alleging sexually offensive conduct by Defendant Heid; additional

incidents of Heid’s retaliation against Plaintiff, including

closer supervision, continuing sexually offensive conduct,

conduct intended to ridicule and embarrass Plaintiff, and the

unwarranted negative evaluation; sexual discrimination consisting

of a continuing pattern of conduct creating a sexually hostile

work environment, most recently manifested by the sexually

suggestive comments and gestures to Plaintiff on May 30, 2003;

and Defendant district’s failure to take appropriate action after

Plaintiff formally complained, consisting of denying that Heid’s

conduct amounted to sexual harassment. 

Plaintiff’s statement of evidence controverting Defendant’s

statement of undisputed fact and Plaintiff’s statement of

undisputed facts reveal that although there may be disputes as to

the truth of Plaintiff’s evidence, Plaintiff offers evidence of

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numerous incidents of conduct on the part of Defendant Heid at

the workplace of varying severity, including frequent raising of

his voice at Plaintiff in front of others, (P.’s Ex. 7 at 44);

yelling at Plaintiff on October 3, 2002, about a mistake in an

advertising bid, (id. at 186); screaming at her when he was

looking for a document and approaching her with clenched fists on

October 8, 2002, causing Plaintiff to believe that he was going

to hit her, (id. at 128, 140-42); a month or so later throwing a

document at Plaintiff and making obscene comments, (id. at 45);

asking her on October 31, 2002, if she wiped her ass when she

went to the bathroom and then telling her to do so, (P.’s Ex. 7

at 112); becoming angry and telling Plaintiff that he could chew

her ass on or about November 19, 2002, (id. at 201); frequent

adjusting of his penis, (P.’s Ex. 7 at 84-86, and admitted,

Plaintiff’s Ex. 5 at 23-24); Heid’s barely speaking to Plaintiff 

as of November 2002 or using rude gestures after Plaintiff

reported him for the second time, (P.’s Ex. 7 at 67-68, 183-84);

being upset with Plaintiff and telling only Plaintiff that she

was late returning from lunch when the other employees were also

late in December 2002, (id. at 203); looking at Plaintiff with

hatred, (id. at 68); yelling at Plaintiff about a missing

labelmaker, (id. at 184, 186); leaning over Plaintiff’s desk and

commenting on May 30, 2003, that her pants looked good on her,

gasping or inhaling, and mimicking masturbation, (P.’s Ex. 7 at

88-90); mocking Plaintiff in December 2003 after she went to the

Board by putting in her box a letter that was complimentary to

him, (id. at 71); and Heid’s mocking her and mimicking

masturbation during a work conversation with Plaintiff on January

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2, 2004, (P.’s Ex. 13, 7 at 68-70). Plaintiff also submitted

deposition testimony tending to show that this conduct had a

seriously deleterious effect on her emotional and physical

health. (P.’s Ex. 7 at 12-16, 41-44, 213-25.) 

The Court concludes that these continuous, relatively

severe, and potentially sexually discriminatory acts committed by

one supervisor constitute a series of separate acts that

collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice, and

further, that there is evidence that at least one of the

incidents of sexually harassing conduct occurred within the

statutory period. This case is not like Porter, in which discrete

acts by some people, unrelated in time and character, may be

considered distinct from other discrete acts. The Court rejects

the argument that the statute of limitations bars recovery for

sexually harassing conduct in the form of a HWE that preceded

April 2003. 

2. FEHA

Again, the Court has previously determined that the FEHA

claim is barred by collateral estoppel. However, in an abundance

of caution, the Court notes that should the issue appropriately

be before it, then the result is essentially the same under FEHA

as under Title VII because of the more liberal continuing

violations doctrine applicable to FEHA claims.

Cal. Govt. Code 12960(d) provides a one-year statute of

limitations:

No complaint may be filed after the expiration of one

year from the date upon which the alleged unlawful

practice or refusal to cooperate occurred....

With tolling provisions not applicable here, Cal. Govt. Code §

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12965 provides that a right-to-sue letter or notice shall issue

to the claimant upon the completion of the investigation, the

absence of an accusation within 150 days after the filing of a

complaint, or upon the department’s earlier determination that no

accusation will issue. The notices indicate that the claimant may

bring a civil action within one year of the date of the notice.

Id.

FEHA provides that no complaint for any violation of its

provisions may be filed with the Department "after the expiration

of one year from the date upon which the alleged unlawful

practice or refusal to cooperate occurred," with an exception for

delayed discovery not relevant here. Cal. Govt. Code, § 12960.

The limitations period begins to run after the unlawful

employment practice occurs. Romano v. Rockwell International,

Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479, 492-93 (1996). Analysis of HWE claims under

FEHA with respect to the statute of limitations is more favorable

to Plaintiff because under FEHA, the California courts recognize

a “continuing violations” doctrine such that an employer's

persistent failure to eliminate a hostile work environment is a

continuing violation if the employer's unlawful actions are 1)

sufficiently similar in kind to those within the statutory

period; 2) have occurred with reasonable frequency (recurring

rather than isolated); (3) and have not acquired a degree of

permanence in the sense that an employer's statements and actions

make clear to a reasonable employee that any further efforts to

end harassment will be futile. Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26

Cal.4th 798, 823-24 (2001). Here, the acts were sufficiently

similar in kind, appear to have been reasonably frequent, and had

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not acquired permanence before the statutory period. The Court 

concludes that Defendant has not established that portions of

Plaintiff’s HWE claim occurring beyond the statutory period are

barred by the FEHA statute of limitations.

C. Sexual Harassment

Defendant argues that summary adjudication should be granted

as to all allegations of sexual harassment except the

“masturbation” allegations of May 30, 2002, and January 2, 2004,

which are disputed and which, if sustained, would constitute

sexual harassment. Defendant contends that Heid’s other conduct

was sex-neutral hostile conduct.

Under Title VII, discrimination with respect to

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment

“because of such individual’s... sex” is prohibited. 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-2(a)(1). The distinction between quid pro quo harassment

(where threats are carried out, or a term or condition of

employment is actually affected) and hostile work environment

(HWE) harassment (where bothersome attention, sexual remarks, or

offensive conduct in general are sufficiently severe or pervasive

to create a hostile work environment) is relevant with respect to

the extent of the employer’s vicarious liability and defenses

thereto. It is also relevant to a threshold question of whether

or not a plaintiff can prove discrimination in violation of Title

VII. The Supreme Court has stated:

When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment

action resulted from a refusal to submit to a 

a supervisor’s sexual demands, he or she establishes

that the employment decision itself constitutes a 

change in the terms and conditions of employment that

is actionable under Title VII. For any sexual harassment

preceding the employment decision to be actionable,

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however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive.

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54

(1998). To state a prima facie case for HWE sexual harassment

under either Title VII, the plaintiff must allege that 1) the

plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, conduct, or

comments, 2) the harassment was based on sex, and 3) the

harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions

of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,

64-68 (1986). 

Here, although a number of Plaintiff’s factual allegations

are disputed, the disputed and undisputed facts reflect that

Plaintiff worked for LB as an accounting technician and

experienced Heid’s raising his voice and getting upset. After she

complained, Heid yelled at her in an upset fashion, as distinct

from merely raising his voice; he got upset with men and women,

and raised his voice, as distinct from yelled, at both men and

women. (D’s Ex. 1 at 129.) He had given her evaluations that

required some improvement on her part. (Id. at 168-71.) Heid

became very upset with Plaintiff on or about October 3, 2002; he

yelled at her and raised his arm in a way that caused her to

believe that Heid intended to hit her on or about October 8,

2002, which was followed by an apology and card, and Plaintiff’s

report to Heid’s Superior, Elliott, who verbally admonished Heid.

(D.’s Exs. 3, 1 at 141-44.) Plaintiff continued to feel

physically threatened, nervous, really upset, and afraid. (Id. at

145.) She did not consider his losing his temper to be sexual

harassment, and did not consider the incidents of yelling before

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that to be such; he was merely a poor manager and a rude man.

(D.’s Ex. 1 at 145-46.) He had several times told her that she

looked nice, and she was not offended. (Id. at 163.) Then on or

about November 7, 2002, Plaintiff made a mistake on a document,

and Heid made fun of her and asked her if she had wiped herself

after she went to the restroom, and instructed her to do so; he

threw a document at her; it upset Plaintiff, who considered it to

be sexual harassment and reported the incident to Elliott. (Id.

at 149-51; P.’s Ex. 7 at 45.) Heid thereafter was rude to her,

looked at her with hatred, used a bad tone of voice, did not

answer her greetings, was kind to others but barely spoke to her,

and often raised his voice. (D’s Ex. 1 at 182-84, P.’s Ex. 7 at

68.) On or about November 19, 2002, he criticized her about a

mistake in an advertisement for a bid and told her he was going

to chew her ass. (D.’s Ex. 1 at 201.) She perceived that he

singled her out for criticism and was upset with her for being

late, but he did not criticize others who were also late, in

December 2002. (Id. at 202-04.) In December 2002, Heid was upset

with Plaintiff for having someone else sign forms while Heid was

out of town, and he was upset with Plaintiff for obtaining advice

from another person and using a credit card to obtain merchandise

that was on sale for only a day when Heid was out of town. He

accused her of blaming others when different printers caused

reports to line up differently (Id. at 207-11.) He required

Plaintiff to work with a bus driver who was on light duty and who

was rude, but he allowed others their wishes not to work with

her. (Ex. 3.) He gave Plaintiff the negative performance

evaluation in March 2003. (Id. at 214.) He yelled at her on or

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about April 30, 2003, when asking for a label maker that someone

else had; he also got very angry and told her that she was very

bad at her job because she allowed a vacuum cleaner to be

purchased with modernization funds. (Ex. 3.) He regularly sent

work back as unacceptable, something was wrong every month, and

Elliott caught the mistakes. (D.’s Ex. 1 at 211.) Plaintiff

believed the unfavorable evaluation of March 24, 2003, was

unjustified and was in retaliation for her complaints about the

incidents in 2002. (Id. at 137.) Plaintiff testified that Heid

mimicked masturbation in her presence on May 30, 2003, while

leaning over her desk after sucking in his breath and commenting

how good she looked in her pants. (Id. at 91-92, P.’s Ex. 1 at

88-91.) She also testified that during a conversation when most

of the workers were gone from the office, Heid played with his

privates with his head going up and down in January 2004. (P.’s

Ex. 7 at 73-75, 80-83.) Plaintiff also claimed, and Heid did not

deny, that Heid continually adjusted his private parts all the

time, which she ignored. (D.’s Ex. 1 at 84-85.) Others noted that

Heid did that all the time. (P.’s Ex. 7 at 85.) Plaintiff

testified that others believed that Plaintiff should not have to

take Heid’s bad treatment of her. (P.’s Ex. 7 at 185-86.)

Plaintiff admitted some mistakes at work but believed she

was a good employee; she also testified that her stress from

Heid’s conduct, computer program and software problems, and

overwork contributed substantially to her making mistakes. (P.’s

Ex. 7 at 137, 202, 213-216.) Elliott confirmed that the workload

was high until 2003. (D.’s Ex. 20 at 88.) Plaintiff had

previously received evaluations that she was effective and met or

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exceeded standards. (P.’s Ex. 15.) Elliott thought that Heid

should have given Plaintiff a worse evaluation, and she thought

that Plaintiff’s work was inaccurate and could not be corrected.

(D.’s Ex. 20 at 132, 41-50, 79-81.) 

Plaintiff made inconsistent statements to her sister about

her boss being a nice boss, and she failed to tell her husband,

sister, or Elliott about the May 2003 masturbation incident, but

she told John Puentes and Rod Gaulman of the CSEA union; she

ultimately talked about it with her husband and sister later

after she talked to the Board on September 11, 2003. (D.’s Ex. 1

at 91-94, 115, 191-92.) Plaintiff admitted that in 2003 a lot of

people in CSEA were upset with Heid because he swore and yelled,

using abusive language; the matter was discussed at executive

board meetings. (D.’s Ex. 1 at 107-110.) John Puentes,

groundskeeper for LB and union job steward, testified to problems

with Heid verbally harassing or using profanity with Darren

Mariani after a meeting a couple of times; yelling or screaming

at Margaret Gomes, a confidential employee, about documents not

being ready, telling her that he would get rid of her, and

enjoying it, which he manifested by making hand gestures to

others that indicated that he had “got her”; chewing out Brian

Daguerre, with whom Heid did not get along, by accusing him of

having called OSHA; using profanity to contractors at the site in

several meetings by saying things such as “You got to fucking be

kidding me,” and yelling or swearing at just about everybody

depending on his mood. (D.’s Ex. 25 at 10-19.) Plaintiff

testified that Heid did not often yell at Gomes. (P.’s Ex. 7 at

128.)

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Mejia testified that Heid swore at construction guys in a

joking, back-and-forth exchange. (D.’s Ex. 23 at 13.) Heid

contacted Mejia on the radio and told him to move his equipment;

Mejia replied that he was on his break and would move after the

break, and Heid shouted over the radio something like, “When I

tell you to fucking do something you damn well better do it.”

This was overheard by a lot of people. Mejia thought Heid needed

an anger management class because that is what Mejia would have

had to do if he had done it to Heid. Mejia took it to the union

and was contacted by Villalta and Elliott. Heid apologized to

Mejia once in private and once in front of four of five other

men. The union continued to process the matter to the school

board. Mejia thought the union took it out of proportion because

all he really wanted was a sincere apology. (D.’s Ex. 23 at 13-

28.)

The law is established. Discrimination “because of” sex can

be found even if the person committing the discriminatory act is

the same sex as the plaintiff; the critical issue is whether

members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or

conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are

not exposed. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523

U.S. 75, 80 (1998). To support an inference of discrimination on

the basis of sex, it is not necessary that the challenged conduct

involve explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity or use

of sex-specific and derogatory terms, or that it be motivated by

sexual desire. It can be sufficient to introduce comparative

evidence of how the alleged harasser treated members of both

sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. Id. at 80-81. The standard to be

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met is establishing conduct that is sufficiently severe or

pervasive such that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s

position would find the environment hostile or abusive in light

of the context of all surrounding circumstances. Id. at 81-82.

There need not be diagnosed psychological injury; what is

required is that the hostile conduct pollute the victim’s

workplace, making it more difficult for her to do her job, take

pride in her work, or desire to stay on in her position. Steiner

v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir.1994). 

Although some evidence here warrants an inference that some

of Heid’s conduct (raising his voice and using profanity) was

directed to both men and women, or to virtually everyone at the

workplace, the evidence likewise warrants an inference that

Plaintiff, a woman, was subjected to this conduct more often and

more intensely than male employees or contractors were, and that

the treatment of Plaintiff was more severely abusive, as distinct

from bantering or joking in tone. A reasonable trier of fact

could conclude that the non-masturbation abuse of Plaintiff was

part and parcel of a practice of harassment directed to Plaintiff

because of her sex, and that it was not simply sex-neutral,

hostile conduct. In view of the necessity of drawing all

reasonable inferences possible in favor of the non-moving party,

it is not for this Court to sever out the incidents that clearly

reflect sex-based content, or to resolve issues of fact regarding

the severity or intensity of Heid’s abuse of Plaintiff. See

Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d at 1463 n. 4. 

The mere fact that Heid abused others does not entitle

Defendant to summary adjudication of the HWE claim. This is

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because it may be inferred that the abuse of Plaintiff, a female,

was different because it was more frequent, severe, and sometimes

involved sexual content, such as offensive references to

Plaintiff’s body and sexual conduct. Steiner v. Showboat

Operating Co., 25 F.3d at 1463-64. Further, a rational trier of

fact could infer that Heid’s conduct towards Plaintiff was

offensive and hostile to a reasonable woman. 

EEOC v. National Education Association, 422 F.3d 840 (9th

Cir. 2005), cited by Defendant in its reply brief, does not

change this analysis. There the Ninth Circuit was faced with

conduct directed at female employees in combination with an

absence of direct evidence (facial or overt sex- or genderspecific content, such as sexual language, sex or gender

stereotypes, or sexual overtures) that the conduct was because of

sex. The court concluded that the supervisor’s angry outbursts

and physically threatening and hostile conduct (standing over

female employees, shaking fists at them, and loud and hostile

shouting) could constitute discrimination because of sex if there

was direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser

treated members of both sexes, and there was a basis for an

inference that a pattern of abuse was directed at women. The

court concluded that although there was abuse of both men and

women in the workplace, the supervisor’s abuse of women was

objectively different because it was more severe and relied on

sexual epithets, offensive and explicit references to women’s

bodies, and sexual conduct, and because it had a subjectively

different effect on the females. Specifically, the court noted

that raising voices to male employees was less frequent, they

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could talk it out, and it was of a more bantering, joking

character.

Here, the evidence warrants an inference that the treatment

of Plaintiff was different from the verbal abuse directed at

males, was more overtly sexual, was accompanied by overtly sexual

conduct, and was more severe and frequent than that directed at

the others.

The Court has previously concluded that the FEHA claim is

barred because of collateral estoppel. However, in an abundance

of caution, should the issue appropriately be before the Court,

the Court notes that the result would be the same with respect to

FEHA as under Title VII.

FEHA prohibits a variety of unfair labor practices including

discrimination “in terms, conditions or privileges of employment”

on the basis of sex. Cal. Govt. Code § 12940, subd. (a). Cal.

Govt. Code § 12940, subdivision (h)(1) makes it unlawful for an

employer, because of "sex, to harass an employee or applicant."

Under FEHA, the federal definition is adopted, and the elements

of HWE sexual harassment are: 1) the plaintiff belongs to a

protected group; 2) the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual

harassment; 3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; 4)

the harassment complained of was sufficiently pervasive so as to

alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working

environment; and 5) respondeat superior. Fisher v. San Pedro

Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App.3d 590, 608 (1989); Beyda v City of

Los Angeles, 65 Cal.App.4th 511, 516-18 (1998).

Heid’s conduct towards Plaintiff would constitute HWE

harassment under California law as well, which proscribes sexual

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harassment, which is defined as "verbal, physical, or sexual

behavior directed at an individual because of her, or his,

gender," and includes, but is not limited to, conduct which is

verbal (such as epithets, derogatory comments or slurs), as well

as physical and visual insults. Flait v. North American Watch

Corp., 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 476-77 (1992). 

In summary, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled

to summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s HWE claim of sexual

harassment under Title VII. 

D. Retaliation Claim

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim for

having complained about the yelling incident and the “wipe

yourself” comment in October 2002 fails as a matter of law

because 1) Plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct when she

complained about Heid’s conduct, which was not sexual harassment;

2) the allegedly unjust evaluation of March 24, 2003, was not an

adverse employment action under FEHA; 3) Defendant has

established that there is no issue of material fact with respect

to its having shown that it had a non-retaliatory reason for the

negative performance evaluation; and 4) any claimed retaliatory

conduct beyond the negative performance evaluation exceeds the

scope of Plaintiff’s administrative complaints.

Under Title VII, an employer may not take any adverse

employment action against an employee who has opposed any

practice made unlawful by Title VII or made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation,

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3 The Court has previously found that Plaintiff’s FEHA claim is barred

by collateral estoppel. However, in an abundance of caution, the Court notes

that should the retaliation claim under FEHA appropriately be before the

Court, Cal. Govt. Code § 12940(j) (2000) states that it is an unlawful

employment practice, unless based on a bona fide occupational qualification or

security regulations of the state or of the United States, for “any

employer... or person... to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate

against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden

under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or

assisted in any proceeding under this part.” 

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proceeding or hearing under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).3

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to

retaliation claims under FEHA and Title VII. Stegall v. Citadel

Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2003); Flait v.

North American Watch Corp. 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 475-76 (1992). The

employee must establish a prima facie case by showing that the

employee engaged in a protected activity, his employer subjected

him to adverse employment action, and there is a causal link

between the protected activity and the employer's action.

Stegall, 350 F.3d at 1065-66; Akers v. County of San Diego, 95

Cal.App.4th 1441, 1453 (2002). Then the employer has the burden

to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the action

taken. The employee then bears the ultimate burden of

demonstrating that any such reason was merely a pretext for a

discriminatory motive, and that the retaliation was intentional.

Stegall, 350 F.3d at 1066; Akers v. County of San Diego, 95

Cal.App.4th at 1453.

In connection with Defendant’s contentions regarding the

scope of this action in the context of administrative exhaustion,

the Court has previously confirmed the propriety of including

within the retaliation claim before the Court not only the

negative work evaluation in March 2003, but also other acts of

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continuing retaliation during that period constituting HWE

harassment that were set forth in the FAC. These acts include

continuing sexually offensive conduct and other conduct intended

to ridicule and embarrass Plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleged and provided evidence reasonably

warranting an inference that she complained to Elliott, Heid’s

superior, about Heid’s sexually derogatory “ass wiping” remark

and his having yelled at her and raised his fist in a physically

threatening way. Title VII and FEHA protect an employee who has

opposed any practice made unlawful by Title VII or forbidden by

FEHA. As previously noted, sexual harassment is a forbidden form

of sex discrimination under both statutes. Plaintiff has thus

provided evidence from which it may be concluded that she engaged

in a protected activity by complaining about sexual harassment.

As previously set forth at length, Plaintiff alleged and

provided evidence warranting an inference that she suffered a

series of retaliatory acts thereafter, including the negative

performance evaluation of March 2003, consistently negative

comments, continuing sexually offensive conduct, and rude and

hostile behavior. The negative performance evaluation can

constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII. Yartzoff

v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (transfers of job

duties and an allegedly undeserved negative performance rating).

It may reasonably be inferred that the continuing course of

conduct in May 2003 and thereafter was conduct motivated by a

retaliatory motive and reasonably likely to deter an employee

from engaging in protected activity. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d

1234, 1242-43 9th Cir. 2000); Porter v. California Department of

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4

 The fact that the negative performance evaluation itself arguably preceded the statutory limitations period

does not vitiate the prima facie showing because Plaintiff complains of a series of similar acts closely related in time

and performed by the same supervisor, which together were substantially deleterious with respect to Plaintiff’s work

environment. 

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Corrections, 419 F.3d at 895-96; Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian

Church, 375 F.3d 951, 965 (9th Cir. 2004) (sexual harassment).4

Again, should the Court have erred in its conclusion that

collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff’s remaining FEHA claim, then

the Court will set forth its reasoning regarding the FEHA claim

in the interests of the efficient administration of justice.

Although the California Supreme Court granted a hearing in McRae

v. Department of Corrections, 127 Cal.App.4th 779 (2005), on

which Defendant relies, the court has nevertheless held that a

series of allegedly harassing and discriminatory acts (HWE)

preceding and postdating the statutory limitations period,

including a negative performance evaluation and conduct

humiliating to the employee, may constitute an adverse employment

action when, considering all the circumstances, it materially

affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment such

that it is reasonably likely to impair a reasonable employee’s

job performance or prospects for advancement or promotion.

Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal.4th 1028 (2005).

Because it appears that Heid and Elliott knew of Plaintiff’s

complaints, and because of the relatively short period of time

within which the course of harassing conduct was undertaken,

Plaintiff has established a causal connection between the earlier

complaints and the later retaliatory conduct.

The evidence set forth by Defendant warrants a reasonable

inference that Defendant had a non-retaliatory reason for its

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actions, namely, performance deficiencies in Plaintiff’s work

perceived by both Elliott and Heid. However, despite previously

documented deficiencies in Plaintiff’s work, Plaintiff had not

received negative overall performance evaluations before her

complaints about harassment. (P.’s Ex. 15.) Indeed, even though

Elliott had believed Plaintiff was inadequate, had heard

complaints about Plaintiff, and had not wanted Plaintiff promoted

to the account technician position from account clerk, Plaintiff

had been promoted, and Elliott reviewed her work. Plaintiff also

produced evidence warranting a reasonable trier of fact in

concluding that overwork, stress caused by Heid’s abusive

conduct, Heid’s unwillingness to communicate with Plaintiff, and

computer defects or problems contributed significantly to the

problems with Plaintiff’s work; coupled with the evidence of

Heid’s continuing abusive conduct and increased negative

scrutiny, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the

non-moving party, a rational trier of fact could conclude that

the true reason for the negative evaluations of Plaintiff was

retaliation for having complained of Heid’s earlier harassment,

and that the harassment was because of sex. Cf. Yanowitz v.

L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1144 (citing Hairston v. The

Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 913, 921 (11th Cir. 1993)).

The Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to

summary adjudication on the retaliation claim.

E. Corrective Action

With respect to Title VII, Plaintiff claims that LB failed

to take prompt corrective action regarding her complaint about

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5

 Defendant expressly limits its argument to the Title VII claim, asserting that any FEHA claim is irrelevant

because only Heid is a defendant in the FEHA action, and Heid has no duty to take corrective action. The Court 

expresses no opinion as to any FEHA claim against Heid regarding corrective action because the moving parties do

not raise any argument regarding such a claim but merely assume that it does not exist. Because Defendants make no

motion in connection with any FEHA claim against Heid, Plaintiff’s argument that such a claim exists is disregarded.

It should be noted that under FEHA, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail to take all

reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring, Cal. Govt. Code § 12940(k);

this has in some courts been interpreted to create a statutory tort which, if the employer was indifferent to harassment

that was separately established, would expose the employer to emotional distress damages. 

54

Heid’s alleged masturbation conduct on May 30, 2003.5 Defendant

argues that it undertook an investigation as soon as it became

aware of Plaintiff’s allegations by hiring Kaplan, responding

through Villalta, and holding a full hearing before the Board of

Trustees. Defendant asserts that it cannot be faulted for not

imposing discipline because its investigation resulted in a

finding of insufficient evidence of harassment.

Plaintiff argues that Heid and Elliott, an assistant

superintendent and senior executive of LB, knew of harassment as

far back as October 2002. This does not pertain to Plaintiff’s

claim in the complaint, which is that Defendant district failed

to take appropriate action after Plaintiff formally complained of

Heid’s conduct because the district found that the evidence did

not support Plaintiff’s complaint.

With respect to Plaintiff’s allegation that the district

failed to take appropriate action after Plaintiff formally

complained about the May 30, 2003 masturbation incident, Title

VII defines an employer to include any agent of an employer, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(b), which means that discriminatory conduct by an

employer’s agent may be imputed to an employer generally on

agency principles, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524

U.S. 742, 765 (1998). Supervisors and coworkers who do not

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qualify as employers are not individually liable for violations

of Title VII. Miller v. Maxwell’s International Inc., 991 F.2d

583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993). Further, sexual harassment by a

supervisor is generally not conduct within the scope of the

employment because it lacks a motive to serve the employer.

Burlington Industries, Inc., 524 U.S. at 757. However, an

employer may be liable for a supervisor’s acts if the employer

was negligent with respect to the harassment, as where it knew or

should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it. Id. at

759. Where a supervisor takes a tangible employment action, such

as a denial of a raise or a promotion, the employer is liable.

Id. at 761-63. Where there is supervisor harassment without a

tangible employment action, the employer may defend if it shows

it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually

harassing behavior, and the employee unreasonably failed to take

advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided

by the employer to avoid the harm. Id. at 765-66.

An employer’s tolerating sexual harassment against its

employee adversely changes the terms of the employment in

violation of Title VII. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d

917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000). If an employer fails to take corrective

action after learning of an employee’s sexually harassing

conduct, or takes inadequate action that emboldens the harasser

to continue his misconduct, the employer can be deemed to have

adopted the harasser’s conduct and its results; however, an

employer cannot be liable for misconduct of which it is unaware.

Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001). Upon

gaining notice, the employer has a duty to take prompt corrective

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action that is reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Id.

The employer must take temporary steps to determine whether the

complaint is justified, and then take permanent remedial steps

once it completes its investigation. Id. Separation or minimizing

contact is not necessarily required; it depends on the severity

of the alleged harassment and the evidence provided to the

employer in support of the complaint. Id. at 1192-93. Launching a

good faith investigation is the most significant measure to be

taken in response. Id.

Here, an investigation was promptly launched, and the

various steps of the complaint procedure were completed with

relatively minimal delay. Witnesses suggested by the Plaintiff

were contacted, and Plaintiff was interviewed. Final notice was

given in late November. Plaintiff was transferred to another

location, but not until January 2004.

The evidence warrants an inference that the employer

undertook an action in good faith promptly after the September

2003 revelation. However, there is also evidence of Heid’s longstanding harassment of Plaintiff without effective intervention,

the employer’s failure to separate Plaintiff immediately after

the complaint, and Plaintiff’s evidence that in January 2004,

when other workers were absent from the office, Heid played with

his privates in her presence. This evidence warrants a contrary

inference, namely that transfer of Plaintiff should reasonably

have been undertaken earlier. It is for the trier of fact to

decide the adequacy and significance of the employer’s conduct.

Accordingly, Defendant has not shown that as a matter of law it

is entitled to judgment on the corrective action claim.

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V. Disposition

In summary, Plaintiff’s FEHA claim against Heid is barred by

collateral estoppel for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust judicial

remedies to set aside the Defendant Board’s negative findings.

However, Defendant has failed to show that there is an absence of

a triable issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s

other claims under Title VII.

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that

1) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or summary

adjudication is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and

2) Defendant Heid is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Heid based on FEHA; and

3) Defendant has not shown that it is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s other claims against Defendant

Los Banos Unified School District.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 16, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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