Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_05-cv-00238/USCOURTS-ared-2_05-cv-00238-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Calvin Richmond
Plaintiff
Linda Sanders
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HELENA DIVISION

CALVIN RICHMOND PETITIONER

vs. Civil Case No. 2:05CV00238 HLJ

LINDA SANDERS, Warden, 

FCI, Forrest City, Arkansas RESPONDENT

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United

States District Court Judge J. Leon Holmes. Any party may serve

and file written objections to this recommendation. Objections

should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis

for the objection. If the objection is to a factual finding,

specifically identify that finding and the evidence that supports

your objection. An original and one copy of your objections must

be received in the office of the United States District Court Clerk

no later than eleven (11) days from the date of the findings and

recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party.

Failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right

to appeal questions of fact.

If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to

submit new, different, or additional evidence, and to have a

hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at

Case 2:05-cv-00238-JLH Document 5 Filed 10/28/05 Page 1 of 9
2

the same time that you file your written objections, include the

following:

1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is

inadequate.

2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing before

the District Judge (if such a hearing is granted)

was not offered at the hearing before the

Magistrate Judge. 

3. The detail of any testimony desired to be

introduced at the hearing before the District Judge

in the form of an offer of proof, and a copy, or

the original, of any documentary or other nontestimonial evidence desired to be introduced at

the hearing before the District Judge.

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the

necessity for an additional evidentiary hearing, either before the

Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge.

Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to:

Clerk, United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite 402

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

DISPOSITION

Now before the court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by Calvin Richmond, an inmate of the Federal

Correctional Institution in Forrest City, Arkansas, serving a

fifteen month sentence for conspiracy to defraud the United States

and aiding and abetting in the filing of false tax claims.

Petitioner does not challenge his convictions or his sentence. His

only claim in this petition is his challenge to the Bureau of

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1 That statute provides as follows:

c) Pre-release custody.--The Bureau of Prisons shall, to

the extent practicable, assure that a prisoner serving a

term of imprisonment spends a reasonable part, not to

exceed six months, of the last 10 per centum of the term

to be served under conditions that will afford the

prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and

prepare for the prisoner's re-entry into the community.

The authority provided by this subsection may be used to

place a prisoner in home confinement. The United States

Probation System shall, to the extent practicable, offer

assistance to a prisoner during such pre-release custody.

2 The court has entered similar findings in Jones v. Sanders,

No. 2:05CV00194; Perry v. Sanders, No. 2:05CV00165; Sutherland v.

Sanders, No. 2:05CV00173.

3

Prison’s (BOP) interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c),1 the statute

that governs the transfer of inmates to community correctional

centers (CCC’s) prior to their release from imprisonment. He

contends he is entitled to serve the last six months of his

sentence in a CCC, but the BOP interprets the statute to allow him

to be transferred to a CCC for only thirty days or less. He argues

the decision in Elwood v. Jeter, 386 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2004)

prevents the BOP from interpreting the statute in this manner, and

that the application of this interpretation to him violates the Ex

Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.

This is one of several cases before this court, containing the

exact issues and appearing as replicas of the same petition, and

containing the same Response from the Respondent.2 This court has

addressed this issue in Jones v. Sanders, NO. 2:05CV00047

(E.D.Ark.June 7, 2005), and Mayers v. Sanders, NO. 2:05CV00055

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3 As a district court recently observed, there is a 

a growing split of authority in the federal district

4

(E.D.Ark.June 7, 2005). In addition, Proposed Findings and

Recommendations by this court regarding this issue have been

adopted by the Hon. George Howard, Jr., in Fults v. Sanders, NO.

2:05CV00091 (E.D.Ark. July 22, 2005), and by the Hon. J. Leon

Holmes in Rodriquez v. Sanders, NO. 2:05CV00067 (E.D.Ark. Aug. 30,

2005). Respondent filed a notice of appeal on September 13, 2005,

in Fults v. Sanders, USCA Case No. 05-3490. 

The court need not set forth in detail its reasoning as to the

issues decided in the above cases. The court rejected Respondent’s

argument that continued limitations on transfers to CCCs under a

new regulation that went into effect on February 14, 2005, at 28

C.F.R. § 570, are a “categorical exercise” of its discretion and do

not conflict with Elwood. Instead, this court agreed with a recent

decision from the Eastern District of New York, which found this

new regulation “in no way furthers or interprets” the factors set

forth in § 3621(b) that were intended to inform the BOP's

decision-making with regard to CCC placement. Pimentel v.

Gonzalez, 367 F.Supp.2d 365, 374-75 (E.D.N.Y May 3, 2005). This

court concluded that, although the BOP labeled the rule a

“categorical exercise of discretion” it did not exercise its

discretion at all, but merely re-packaged the December 2002 blanket

rule that was rejected in Elwood.3 In the present case, Respondent

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courts about the validity of the February 2005 rule. Some

courts have invalidated the new regulation on the ground

that it disregards the factors set forth in § 3621(b),

and therefore suffers from the same infirmities as the

December 2002 policy. See, e.g., Baker v. Willingham,

No.3:04CV1923(PCD), 2005 WL 2276040 (D.Conn. Sep. 19,

2005); Wiederhorn v. Gonzales, No. 05-360, 2005 WL

1113833 (D.Or. May 9, 2005); Pimentel v. Gonzalez, 367

F.Supp.2d 365 (E.D.N.Y.2005); Paige v. United States, 369

F.Supp.2d 1257 (D.Mont.2005); Cook v. Gonzales, No.

05-09, 2005 WL 773956 (D.Or. April 5, 2005); Drew v.

Menifee, No. 04-9944, 2005 WL 525449 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,

2005). But a fairly equal number of courts have ruled to

the contrary, concluding that the February 2005 policy

reasonably interprets the enabling statute, § 3621(b),

and therefore, is valid. See Charboneau v. Menifee, 05

Civ.1900(MSM), 2005 WL 2385862 (S.D.N .Y. Sep. 28, 2005);

Lee v. United States, No.Civ.A. 04-0610-CG-C, 2005 WL

2179796 (S.D.Ala. Sep. 6, 2005); Hurley v. Sherrod,

No.Civ.A.05CV0117LTBPAC, 2005 WL 2141490 (D.Colo. Sep. 1,

2005); Troy v. Apker, 05 Civ. 1306(GEL), 2005 WL 1661101

(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2005) (finding that the BOP has the

authority to categorically exercise its discretion

regarding CCC transfers and upholding the validity of the

February 2005 rule); Moss, 376 F.Supp.2d 416 (same); Yip,

363 F.Supp.2d 548 (same); Levine v. Menifee, 05

Civ.1902(RCC), 2005 WL 1384021 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2005)

(same); Levine v. Apker, 05 CV 3472(CLB), 2005 WL 1417134

(S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2005) (finding "no Constitutional

infirmity in the exercise of categorical discretion under

the circumstances where the statute calls for

individualized consideration"). See also Wiesel v.

Menifee, No. 04 Civ. 9681(DAB), 2005 WL 1036297 (S.D.N.Y.

May 2, 2005) (upholding the February 2005 regulations,

but finding their application to petitioner, who was

convicted prior to the policy change, to be a violation

of the Ex Post Facto Clause). 

Harris v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2005 WL 2562970, *8 (D.N.J.

October 6, 2005).

5

raises additional issues not addressed in Jones, Mayers, Fults, or

Rodriquez. 

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I.

The court will first address Respondent’s argument that § 2241

is not the appropriate statute for raising these issues because

Petitioner is merely challenging the place or condition of

confinement, not the length or duration of his confinement as

authorized by § 2241. 

“[T]he statutes governing habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §§

2241-2255, were enacted in 1948, before the writ developed into a

vehicle for federal courts ‘to reexamine federal constitutional

issues even after trial and review by a state,’” Lonchar v.

Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 336 (1996), quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.

443, 459 (1953). 

Section 2255 was enacted to create a jurisdictional basis

in the sentencing court for certain types of post

conviction claims, in general those dealing with the

imposition of the sentence in which the sentencing court

would have the previous knowledge and the immediate

access to the necessary files. Therefore, § 2255 granted

in personam jurisdiction in the sentencing court over the

petitioner and the custodian of the petitioner, even

though they would not necessarily be within the territory

of the district court. This grant of jurisdiction by

Congress was a departure from the rule in habeas corpus

actions announced in Ahrens v. Clark, supra, that

required the physical presence of the defendant and his

custodian within the territorial confines of the district

court.

Lee v. United States, 501 F.2d 494, 499-500 (8th Cir. 1974). It

gave “the sentencing judge the first opportunity to re-examine all

circumstances of the conviction and sentence when they are said to

have involved some fundamental injustice or impropriety.” United

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States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir.

1954).

Section 2241 petitions are ordinarily filed in the district in

which an inmate is incarcerated.

Generally, only matters concerning the conditions of

confinement or the execution of a sentence are within the

subject matter jurisdiction of the court presiding in the

district in which a prisoner is incarcerated. See Lee v.

United States, 501 F.2d 494, 500 (8th Cir.1974); cf.

United States v. Fraser, 688 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir.1982)

(sentencing court has no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

2255 to hear extraterritorial challenge to execution of

sentence). 

DeSimone v. Lacy, 805 F.2d 321, 323 (8th Cir. 1986). Clearly, §

2241 is the proper vehicle for matters relating to the execution of

Petitioner’s sentence or the conditions of confinement. 

II.

Respondent next contends Petitioner’s argument does not state

a claim under § 2241 because Petitioner does not have a

constitutional right to be housed in a certain institution. Since

Petitioner may challenge the execution of his sentence under §

2241, he may challenge the BOP’s interpretation of statutes that

impact on the execution of his sentence. As the court in Elwood

explained, although the language of § 3624(c) does not mandate the

BOP place any certain inmate in a CCC prior to his release, it

bestows a duty on the BOP to ensure each inmate “spends a

reasonable part of the last ten percent of his or her term ‘under

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conditions that afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to

adjust to and prepare for the prisoner's re-entry into the

community’ to the extent that this is practicable.” Elwood v.

Jeter, 386 F.3d at 846. Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of

that duty, and he properly brought this matter under § 2241.

Moreover, this court is aware that the court in Elwood did not rule

the petitioner had a right to be transferred to a CCC. It merely

ruled he had a right to be considered for such a transfer in

accordance with the factors taken into account by the BOP prior to

its adoption of the December 2002 policy. Respondent’s argument

has no merit.

The court has reviewed Respondent’s challenges to its previous

holdings in Jones, Mayers, Fults and Rodriquez and finds they also

have no merit. In light of the court’s ruling, there is no need to

address Petitioner’s Ex Post Facto claim.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this petition be, and it is

hereby, granted. Respondent is directed to (a) consider, within

twenty days and in good faith, transferring Petitioner to a CCC for

the last six months of his sentence in accordance with the factors

taken into account by the BOP prior to its adoption of the December

2002 policy; and (b) placing Petitioner in conditions that will

afford him a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for

his reentry into the community during a reasonable part of the last

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ten percent of his term, to the extent practicable, not to exceed

six months.

SO ORDERED this 28th day of October, 2005.

 

United States Magistrate Judge

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