Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02485/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02485-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey D. Lachowski
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2485 

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Jeffrey D. Lachowski, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 17, 2004

 Filed: April 29, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MAGILL, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

Jeffrey Lachowski appeals the district court’s imposition of a restitution order

as part of his sentence for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The

district court ordered Lachowski to pay $2,250.75 in restitution (jointly and severally

with another person) to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) for costs incurred

cleaning up toxic chemicals associated with methamphetamine production found on

the premises where Lachowski lived. Lachowski contends that there was no statutory

basis for the restitution order and that there was insufficient evidence to prove the

amount of restitution. We reverse and vacate the restitution order.

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I.

On March 26, 2004, Lachowski entered a plea of guilty to a charge of

possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. According to the presentence report (PSR), a search of

Lachowski’s residence uncovered 66 grams of methamphetamine along with various

drug paraphernalia and ingredients used to manufacture and sell methamphetamine.

The PSR also states that Lachowski told Craig Dorn, who was convicted of

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in a related case, that he had been making

methamphetamine. Lachowski did not object to any of the sections of the PSR that

implicated him in the manufacture of methamphetamine.

The DEA cleaned up toxic materials in Lachowski’s residence associated with

the manufacture of methamphetamine and sought $2,250.75 in restitution. The PSR

suggested ordering restitution, but making Garth Ruh, who lived in the same

residence as Lachowski, jointly and severally liable. Lachowski objected, contending

that there was not sufficient information to impose the amount of restitution sought.

In response, the DEA submitted the invoice of the private contractor that performed

the cleanup and an affidavit by a DEA special agent that arranges for private

contractors to dispose of toxic waste from drug labs. At the sentencing hearing,

Lachowski renewed his objection. He argued that the evidence submitted by the DEA

was insufficient to show the “need for the clean up, what was cleaned up, and whether

the charges for the clean up were fair and reasonable.” Br. of Appellant at 10-11.

The district court found the affidavit and invoice to be sufficient and ordered

$2,250.75 in restitution to the DEA.

II.

On appeal, Lachowski raises two issues. First, he argues that the district court

lacked statutory authority to impose restitution. Second, he argues that the evidence

submitted was insufficient to support the restitution order.

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“Federal courts cannot order restitution in a criminal case without a statutory

basis.” United States v. Pawlinski, 374 F.3d 536, 540 (7th Cir. 2004). Although the

parties have argued that the district court ordered restitution to the DEA as a term of

supervised release, we do not agree. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (allowing for

discretionary imposition of restitution as a term of supervised release). Rather, after

a close review of the record, we believe that the district court followed the suggestion

of the PSR and imposed restitution pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(q). Section 853(q)

authorizes the imposition of restitution for the clean-up costs of drug labs when the

defendant has been “convicted of an offense . . . involving the manufacture of

amphetamine or methamphetamine.”

Lachowski failed to object at trial to the statutory authority to impose a

restitution order, and his claim is therefore reviewed for plain error. United States v.

Piggie, 303 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2002). The imposition of restitution without a

statutory basis can constitute plain error. United States v. Ramirez, 196 F.3d 895,

899 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Trigg, 119 F.3d 493, 501 & n.7 (7th Cir.

1997), and United States v. Obasohan, 73 F.3d 309, 311 (11th Cir. 1996)) (“[A]n

order to pay restitution beyond that authorized by the statute is a plain error of law.”).

For an error to have been plain, it must have been “clear” or “obvious” under current

law. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). 

We have found no pertinent authority concerning the scope of § 853(q).

Usually, for an error to be plain, it must be in contravention of either Supreme Court

or controlling circuit precedent. The lack of such precedent, however, does not

prevent a finding of plain error if the error was, in fact, clear or obvious based on the

materials available to the district court. See United States v. Ruiz-Gea, 340 F.3d

1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that a district court’s ruling that is “clearly

erroneous” constitutes plain error if there was no precedent). 

In the absence of controlling precedent of either this court or the Supreme

Court, the district court is granted more discretion under the plain error standard

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Because § 853(q) is limited to situations where the offense the defendant was

convicted of “involves” the manufacture of methamphetamine, we look only to what

Lachowski was convicted of, not whether the district court could reasonably conclude

that Lachowski had manufactured methamphetamine.

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simply because the less guidance there is, the smaller the realm of decisions that

would be clearly or obviously wrong under current law. There is ultimately, however,

a limit to what the district court can do, even under plain error review, and, for

example, in the statutory construction context, it is possible that the construction of

the statute proffered by the district court departs so far from the text that it is clearly

incorrect as a matter of law. We must therefore determine if there was error and, if

so, whether it was plain. 

Our analysis of the statute must start, as always, with the plain text. In re Hen

House Interstate, Inc., 177 F.3d 719, 722 (8th Cir. 1999). By its text, § 853(q) applies

only when the defendant has been convicted of an offense “involving” the

manufacture of methamphetamine.1

 The term “involving” appears to expand the

scope of the statute beyond convictions for the manufacture of methamphetamine into

related areas. See United States v. King, 325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). Thus, as

with most statutes, there is a gray area in which arguments can be made regarding the

applicability of the statute. But we need not determine the actual scope of the statute.

Rather, we only need to determine whether it was clear or obvious that possession

with intent to distribute was not covered by the statute.

“Involving” is defined as “includ[ing] as a necessary circumstance, condition,

or consequence.” Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1005 (2d ed.

1997). Possession with intent to distribute and manufacture are distinct crimes and

are listed separately in the federal criminal code. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

(making it unlawful to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent

to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance ”). It strikes us as clear

that possession of an item does not include as a necessary circumstance being

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associated in any way with its manufacture. Furthermore, distribution is essentially

the deliverance of a product to its intended recipients. See Random House Webster’s

Unabridged Dictionary, supra, at 572. Again, this does not require the person

distributing the good to have any connection with its manufacture. Thus, the offense

of possession with intent to distribute does not, in any way, include as a necessary

circumstance that the person possessing or distributing the drugs had any connection

whatsoever with the manufacture of those drugs. Based purely on the plain language

of the statute, it is clear that it does not authorize restitution for possession with intent

to distribute. Normally, our inquiry would end here as we find that the plain language

does not support restitution in this case. See, e.g., United States v. S.A., 129 F.3d

995, 998 (8th Cir. 1997). However, because we are reviewing for plain error, we will

continue our inquiry to ensure that other methods of statutory construction do not

suggest an alternative outcome.

An examination of other federal drug statutes confirms our understanding of

the statute. See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484

U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (noting that a provision that is ambiguous in isolation is “often

clarified” by the rest of the statutory scheme). There are a myriad of different federal

drug offenses beyond the actual manufacture of a controlled substance, including, for

example, the unlawful possession of a listed chemical with intent to manufacture a

controlled substance, as well as the criminalization of conspiracy or attempt to

manufacture a controlled substance. On some level, any drug crime “involves” the

manufacture of the drug, because if the drug was not manufactured it could not be

later possessed. But we believe that such a reading of “involving” goes too far.

When the Second Circuit commented while construing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) that

“[t]he word ‘involving’ has expansive connotations,” it was interpreting a statute that

referenced offenses “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent

to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” King, 325 F.3d at 113. The

inclusion of both manufacturing and possession with intent to distribute in a statute

that includes the term “involves” further suggests to us that possession with intent to

distribute does not “involve” manufacturing.

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It strikes us as quite illogical that Congress would have used the term

“involving the manufacture” of methamphetamine if it intended to authorize

restitution to the United States for any drug crime. An examination of other

restitution schemes involving drug offenses confirms that Congress knows how to

create an expansive restitution program. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A), a district

court is authorized to order restitution to the victim of most drug offenses if certain

conditions are met. Section 3663(c)(1) allows for the imposition of restitution when

there is no identifiable victim. Had Congress intended to allow restitution to the

United States for drug lab cleanup when the defendant had been convicted of

possession with intent to distribute, it could have simply referenced 21 U.S.C. § 841,

which contains the prohibition on both possession with intent to distribute and

manufacturing. Congress did not do so, but rather limited restitution to offenses

“involving” the manufacture of methamphetamine.

In light of the foregoing statutory analysis, we are persuaded that the district

court’s conclusion that restitution is authorized by § 853(q) for possession with intent

to distribute is clearly and obviously incorrect. We therefore find that the restitution

order in this case constitutes plain error.

III.

We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court and VACATE the

restitution order.

______________________________

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