Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03084/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darron Gregory Gilliam
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 14, 1998 Decided February 26, 1999

No. 97-3084

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Darron Gregory Gilliam,

Appellant

Consolidated with

No. 97-3085

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cr00057-01)

(No. 96cr00057-02)

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Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant Darron Gregory Gilliam. With him on

the briefs was A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Edward C. Sussman, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant Ricardo Matthew

Gross.

Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

Before: Silberman, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Darron Gilliam and Ricardo Gross

appeal their convictions for armed bank robbery and related

offenses on the grounds that the district court erred in

denying their motions to suppress evidence and statements,

for severance under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14, and for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict on the firearms charges. Gross

also challenges the district court's denial of his motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict on his conviction for

carjacking.1 Finally, Gilliam challenges his sentence under

the "three strikes" statute, 18 U.S.C. s 3559(c) (1994), on the

ground that the government failed to prove that he had

previously been convicted of two serious violent felonies. We

affirm all of the convictions except Gilliam's s 922(g) firearms

conviction.

__________

1 Gross also contends that he was severely prejudiced by the

district court's refusal to make an in limine ruling as to whether the

government could cross-examine his wife about an alleged inappropriate contact with a juror. The district court declined to rule

before direct examination, and Gross chose not to put his wife on

the stand. Because he did not call his wife to testify, Gross

forfeited his right to raise this issue on appeal. See Luce v. United

States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984).

I.

As a result of a robbery of the Hospitality Community

Federal Credit Union, Gilliam and Gross were indicted for

armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. s 2113(a) and (d) (1994); the

use or carrying of two firearms during a crime of violence, id.

s 924(c) (1994); possession of firearms by a convicted felon,

id. s 922(g) (1994); armed carjacking, D.C. Code Ann. ss 22-

2903 and 22-105 (1981); and first-degree theft from a senior

citizen, id. ss 22-3811, 22-3812(a), 22-3901 and 22-105

(1981).2 They were found guilty by the district court of the

felon-in-possession count and by the jury on all other counts.3

A third defendant, Jerome Thomas, was acquitted on all

counts. The district court sentenced Gilliam to two mandatoUSCA Case #97-3084 Document #419090 Filed: 02/26/1999 Page 2 of 21
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ry terms of life imprisonment under the "three strikes"

statute, 18 U.S.C. s 3559(c), for armed robbery and the

s 924(c) firearms conviction, and Gross to an aggregate of 228

months imprisonment.

We review the evidence in Part II, where we address

appellants' contention that the district court erred in denying

their motions to suppress evidence and statements because

the police lacked probable cause for a warrantless search of a

bag in Gilliam's car. In Part III, we address appellants'

severance claims. In Part IV, we address their challenges to

their firearms convictions. Finally, in Part V, we address

their challenges to their sentences.

II.

At approximately 7:30 a.m. on January 31, 1996, two

masked men robbed the Hospitality Community Federal

Credit Union in Northeast Washington, D.C., taking over

$142,000 in cash and $242,000 in food stamps. The masked

men confronted Ellsworth Brewer, the bank manager, as he

__________

2 Prior to trial, on the government's motion, the district court

dismissed the charge of possession of two firearms during a crime

of violence (the armed carjacking), in violation of D.C. Code

ss 22-3204(b) and 105.

3 The defendants elected a bench trial on the s 922(g) charges.

was opening the bank's parking lot gate so that he could park

his car, which was nearby with the driver's door open and the

engine running. One man pressed something hard into

Brewer's back that Brewer thought was a gun; the masked

man said, "[y]ou know what this is. Don't act crazy." Brewer saw about two inches of a gun barrel protrude from the

hands of the other man. While one masked man led Brewer

to the bank, the other parked Brewer's car in the gated lot.

The masked men then forced Brewer to let them into the

bank; while one tied Evangeline Brown (another employee

who was already in the bank) with duct tape, the other told

Brewer that if he missed the combination for the vault, he

would be shot in the head and his brains blown out. After

obtaining currency and food stamps from the vault, the

masked men tied Brewer and fled, taking Brewer's car.4

Brewer and Brown described the masked men as being about

six feet tall: one was wearing a light tan or beige trench-coat,

dark corduroy pants, and gloves; the other was wearing a

dark three-quarter length coat.

While canvassing the crime scene, the police found Gilliam's

wallet, with his photo identification, in the bank's parking lot,

along with a laundry bag like that used by the masked men to

carry the currency and food stamps from the bank. Upon

determining that Gilliam had a criminal record, including a

prior armed robbery, the police went to his home at approximately 9:30 a.m. and learned from a neighbor that about an

hour earlier, Gilliam drove up with two other men in a gray

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Plymouth Reliant K car, unloaded cardboard boxes and plastic bags, and took them into Gilliam's house. About 45

minutes later, the police saw two men leave Gilliam's house

and get into the same gray car, which had been parked in

front of the house. Each man was carrying a plastic bag;

one was wearing a tan trench-coat and the other was wearing

a dark coat.

The police followed the car until it stopped and its two

occupants, Jerome Thomas and Ricardo Gross, got out. At

__________

4 Brewer's car was found more than a month after the robbery

with a broken steering wheel column near K Street, N.E.

that point, the police ordered Thomas and Gross away from

the car and to the sidewalk, where they were placed on the

ground and handcuffed. Through the open car door, a police

officer saw the tan trench coat draped across the front

passenger seat and partially hanging over a plastic bag.

Believing that the bulky, bundled objects outlined in the bag

were likely proceeds from the robbery, the officer searched

the bag and found over $15,000 in cash and $1,270 in food

stamps. Gross and Thomas were then formally arrested;

Gilliam was arrested at approximately the same time near his

house.5 A subsequent search of Gilliam's home led to the

recovery of two ski masks, gloves, a 9mm handgun, a semiautomatic pistol, a piece of paper stamped with the name of the

credit union, approximately $117,500 in cash, and approximately $136,000 in food stamps. A subsequent search of the

car produced two additional plastic bags found in the back

seat containing $900 in currency, money wrappers, checks

block-stamped from the credit union, and a small key from a

teller's cash drawer that fit the drawers of the bank. In the

pocket of the trench coat the police found a roll of duct tape,

which contained Gross' fingerprint, that matched the duct

tape used to tie Brown and Brewer at the bank. A sales

receipt and registration in the glove box confirmed that the

car was Gilliam's.

Probable cause to arrest exists where "the facts and circumstances" within a law enforcement officer's knowledge are

"sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [the

suspects] had committed or [were] committing an offense."

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see also Henry v. United

States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Brinegar v. United States,

338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); Lincoln v. United States, 992 F.2d

356, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Probable cause to search exists

where in view of the "totality of the circumstances," "there is

__________

5 Both appellants engaged in incriminating conduct. When

Gross was told that he was under arrest, he asked, "What is it?

Did somebody see the car?" He later told one of the detectives in

the transport car "I messed up this time." Gilliam, in identifying

himself to the police, reached for his wallet and discovered that it

was missing.

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a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will

be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.

213, 238 (1983); United States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 20

(D.C. Cir. 1997). "Although probable cause to arrest and

probable cause to search have different emphases," United

States v. Dawkins, 17 F.3d 399, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1994), articulating when probable cause exists is a "common sense" determination, which turns on the "practical considerations of everyday life." Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S.

at 175). While each fact standing alone may be insufficient,

the combination of all of the facts can establish probable

cause, United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 574 (D.C. Cir.

1996); United States v. Halliman, 923 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C.

Cir. 1991), and certain conduct that may appear "innocent to

a lay person may have entirely different significance to an

experienced [law enforcement] officer." Catlett, 97 F.3d at

573-74 (quoting United States v. Hicks, 752 F.2d 379, 384

(9th Cir. 1985)). We review the legal conclusion of probable

cause de novo, the district court's findings of historical fact

for clear error, and we give due weight to inferences drawn

from the evidence by law enforcement officers and the district

court. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996);

United States v. Harrison, 103 F.3d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Applying these principles, we find no error in the district

court's denial of appellants' motions to suppress the evidence

found in the bag in Gilliam's car.6 Based on the physical

evidence at the robbery scene, the eyewitnesses' statements,

and the tight time frame, as well as their own observations

and those of Gilliam's neighbor, the police had reason to

believe that the two men who got into Gilliam's car had

participated in criminal activity. Compare Brinegar, 338 U.S.

__________

6 The government contends that only Gilliam preserved his

Fourth Amendment appeal because Gross conceded that there was

no basis upon which to challenge the seizure of evidence from the

car if officers could rely on their collective knowledge to establish

probable cause. We disagree. Although Gross' counsel acknowledged the legal standard, he proceeded to attack the officers'

collective knowledge and argued in the district court that there was

no basis for a probable cause finding.

at 175-76, and Catlett, 97 F.3d at 573, and Halliman, 923

F.2d at 881-82, and United States v. Young, 598 F.2d 296,

298-300 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and Coleman v. United States, 420

F.2d 616, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1969), with Beck, 379 U.S. at 91, and

Henry, 361 U.S. at 100-02. The same evidence provided a

sufficient foundation for the police to believe that a plastic

bag carried into the car by the two men leaving Gilliam's

home was likely to contain proceeds of the robbery. See

Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; Turner, 119 F.3d at 20; Dawkins, 17

F.3d at 404; United States v. Garrett, 959 F.2d 1005, 1007-08

(D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Caroline, 791 F.2d 197, 201

(D.C. Cir. 1986). The police officer at the scene of the

robbery noted that the bank manager had not told him that

either a wallet or laundry bag had been in the parking lot

prior to the robbery. It was reasonable, therefore, for the

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police to connect the wallet and bag with the masked men and

to believe that Gilliam's home or the car in which he had been

seen after the robbery might contain evidence of the robbery.

See United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 634-35 (D.C.

Cir. (1993).

Gilliam's neighbor saw Gilliam and two other men drive to

Gilliam's house in a gray Plymouth K car the morning of the

robbery. Shortly thereafter, the police saw Gross and Thomas get into the same car upon leaving Gilliam's house. Given

the closeness in time and use of the same car, the police could

reasonably believe that Gross and Thomas were the same

men who arrived at the house with Gilliam. One man wore a

tan trench coat similar to that worn by one of the masked

robbers. Both men carried bulky, heavy plastic bags. A

police officer thought that one of the plastic bags he saw

through the open car door contained bulky objects consistent

with the shape of money and food stamps. Viewed in its

totality, the evidence provided probable cause for the police to

search the plastic bag and to seize the bundled money and

food stamps found in the bag. See California v. Acevedo, 500

U.S. 565, 573-74 (1991); cf. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.

798, 824 (1982); Caroline, 791 F.2d at 201-02.

Because the police had probable cause to search the plastic

bag, we do not reach the issue of whether there was also

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probable cause to search the entire car (which was searched

later pursuant to a warrant), see Ross, 456 U.S. at 799-800;

whether the police could have seized the plastic bag and its

contents in a valid search incident to arrest, see New York v.

Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); cf. United States v. Fafowora,

865 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1989); whether the contents of the

bag would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means;

see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447-48 (1984); or whether

the police, pursuant to a Terry stop, could have searched the

bag in a protective sweep for weapons. See Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1 (1968); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).

Appellants' contention that the evidence subsequently found

in Gilliam's home and car, and the statements made by Gross

after his arrest, should also have been suppressed as the fruit

of an illegal search fails given the lawful search of the bag in

the car. Hence, the district court did not err in denying

appellants' motions to suppress.

III.

Appellants also contend that the district court abused its

discretion in denying their motions for severance of defendants under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. United States v. Brown, 16

F.3d 423, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Manner, 887

F.2d 317, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1989). They maintain that because

there were three defendants and only two masked robbers,

each defendant's claim of innocence was tantamount to presenting the prosecutor's case against the other two defendants; indeed, the government's silence on their respective

roles in the commission of the robbery heightened their need

to incriminate each other. In addition, they contend that a

severance was required because the joint trial compromised

their right to exclude inadmissible evidence that was seriously

prejudicial: Gilliam's letter to Thomas and Gross' testimony

about Gilliam's alleged drug activity.

In appellants' view, they presented mutually antagonistic

defenses that necessitated a severance of their trials under

Rule 14. Gilliam did not testify, but Gross and Thomas did,

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each attempting to prove that he was not one of the two

masked robbers. Thomas testified that he went to Gilliam's

house to borrow money for car repairs and just happened to

be there when the other two men arrived in Gilliam's gray

Reliant K car. Over his codefendants' objections, Thomas

introduced a letter from Gilliam stating that Thomas had

nothing to do with the robbery, and that Gilliam would

somehow inform the trial judge of this fact. Gross, in turn,

presented a different innocent presence defense, testifying

that he had no knowledge of the robbery and, over Gilliam's

objection, that he had gone to Gilliam's house for drugs and

met Thomas there. In closing argument, Gilliam's counsel

told the jury that it could infer from the evidence that Gross

and Thomas were the two masked robbers.

Mutually antagonistic defenses exist where the acceptance

of one defendant's defense is irreconcilable with the defense

presented by a codefendant. See Zafiro v. United States, 506

U.S. 534, 537-38 (1993). Under Rule 14, concerns about

prejudice stem from the danger that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both

defendants are guilty, United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d

31, 71-72 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Manner, 887 F.2d at 326; see

Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 537-38, or alternatively, that the jury will

decide that at least one of the defendants is guilty regardless

of whether the government has met its burden of proof.

Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 542 (Stevens, J. concurring). To demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in denying

a severance, however, the appellant must show more than

"the presence of some hostility" among codefendants, and

"more than the fact that co-defendants whose strategies were

generally antagonistic were tried together." Brown, 16 F.3d

at 433 (internal quotations omitted). Even where codefendants implicate each other, their defenses are not necessarily

mutually antagonistic, and even when they are mutually

antagonistic, they are not necessarily improperly prejudicial.

Thus, in Brown, 16 F.3d at 433, despite the fact that the first

defendant's denial of any involvement in the charged offense

was contradicted by a second defendant's defense that the

drugs and gun seized from her apartment belonged to the

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first defendant, the court noted that the jury could have

believed either defense or could have believed that neither

defense was entirely accurate. See id. Observing that

Brown's real concern was that his codefendant's testimony

was damaging to his defense, the court noted that a defendant is not ordinarily entitled to exclude testimony of a

former codefendant if the district court severed their trials.

Id.

In the instant case, the government's evidence showed that

only two men were at the bank. Gross and Thomas each

claimed he was not at the bank, but neither pointed the finger

at one or more of the other defendants. Gilliam denied any

involvement. In theory, the jury could have accepted either

Gross' or Thomas' defense, or all three defenses, concluding

in the latter circumstance that the government had charged

the wrong men. By thus putting the government to its proof,

there was no logical inconsistency in their defenses for Rule

14 purposes. Compare State v. Kinkade, 680 P.2d 801, 804

(Ariz. 1984) (describing codefendants' defenses as "completely

antagonistic" where only one of two codefendants could have

committed the charged murder, each of the two codefendants

admits being present at the crime scene, each charges the

other with having committed the crime, and there is no

possibility that a third party was present).

Even if appellants' defenses were mutually antagonistic,

the Supreme Court concluded in Zafiro that a severance

under Rule 14 should be granted "only if there is a serious

risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right

of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a

reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." 506 U.S. at 539;

see also United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 383-84 (D.C.

Cir. 1997); United States v. Applewhite, 72 F.3d 140, 144

(D.C. Cir. 1995). As examples of serious risk, the Court

listed the inadmissibility of evidence if tried separately, markedly different degrees of culpability, or if essentially exculpatory evidence available to a defendant tried alone were inadmissible in a joint trial. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. Moreover,

the Court added that even when the risk of prejudice is high,

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less drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, will often

suffice as a remedy. Id.

Appellants cannot show that the potential prejudice they

faced from a joint trial rises to the Zafiro standards. Each

defendant's culpability was separately demonstrated. The

evidence of the location of Gilliam's wallet, his home as the

hiding place for the robbery proceeds, and the use of his car

to carry away the proceeds, all combine to demonstrate his

direct involvement in the robbery and its immediate aftermath. Gross' involvement in the robbery was independently

clear from his fingerprint on the duct tape used to tie up the

two bank employees. Thomas admitted he knew that the

money was from a bank, and he was seen leaving Gilliam's

home with a bulky bag and driving away with Gross in

Gilliam's car later the same morning of the robbery. The

district court instructed the jury to consider the relevant

evidence against each defendant separately "as if he were

being tried alone," and further, that the conduct or evidence

against any one of the defendants should not influence the

jury's deliberation on the others' guilt or innocence. The jury

is presumed to follow the court's instructions, see, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987), and the verdicts

indicate that the jury was able to distinguish between the

defendants, as it found Thomas not guilty of the robbery and

s 924(c) firearms charge.

Still, appellants contend that they were seriously prejudiced by the compromise of their right to exclude inadmissible evidence: Gilliam's letter to Thomas was admitted over

their objections as a statement by Gilliam against his interest.

See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). However, only Gross moved for

severance based upon the resulting prejudice; Gilliam objected on evidentiary grounds alone, and he can hardly show that

the denial of a severance was plain error. See United States

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Even if the district court

erred in admitting the letter as a statement against interest,

the government could have introduced it against Gilliam in a

separate trial as an admission by a party opponent. See Fed.

R. Evid. 801(d)(2); United States v. Bolden, 514 F.2d 1301,

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dent and substantial" evidence to convict him regardless of

the admission of his statements in the letter. Halliman, 923

F.2d at 884 (quotation marks and citation omitted). His

wallet was found at the robbery scene and the proceeds of the

robbery were found in his home. Moreover, the letter, as

read to the jury, tended to exculpate Thomas rather than

inculpate Gilliam.

As for Gross, the admission of the statements in Gilliam's

letter to Thomas had no prejudicial effect as would require a

severance, even though Gross maintains that while the redacted letter did not refer to him, he was implicated through

its exoneration of Thomas. This is another way of making a

claim of mutually antagonistic defenses and is unpersuasive.

Furthermore, whether the letter would have been admissible

in a separate trial against Gross, there was "independent and

substantial" evidence to convict him: his fingerprint was on

the duct tape found inside the bank. Id. Insofar as Gross

also contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right

to cross-examine Gilliam about his statements to Thomas, his

claim fails because Gilliam's statements did not expressly

implicate him. See Gray v. Maryland, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 1154-

57 (1998); Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211; Applewhite, 72 F.3d

at 145.

Nor can Gilliam show that the district court's denial of a

severance was an abuse of discretion by reason of the admission of Gross' testimony about Gilliam's involvement with

drugs. Although the government has failed to point to a

permissible purpose under Rule 404(b) for admitting the

evidence in a separate trial of Gilliam, the evidence of his

guilt was overwhelming. Moreover, the prejudice was mitigated to some extent by the district court's cautionary instructions to the jury when the testimony was admitted, and

by the final instructions to the jury before it retired to

deliberate that any evidence of drugs inside Gilliam's home

was to be considered only as it related to Gross. Thus, his

claim of prejudice fails. See Halliman, 923 F.2d at 884.

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion

in denying appellants' motions for severance under Rule 14.

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IV.

Appellants challenge their firearms convictions under 18

U.S.C. ss 924(c) and 922(g). Gilliam and Gross were both

charged with the use or carrying of a Beretta 9mm handgun

and an Intratech .22 caliber Scorpion Machine (semiautomatic) Pistol, during a crime of violence. Under s 924(c)(1), the

use or carrying of a semiautomatic firearm increases the

statutory penalty from a five-year to a ten-year mandatory

sentence. Appellants maintain, in effect, that because there

was no direct evidence that both of the masked men had a

gun, much less that one of the guns was a semiautomatic

weapon, the government failed to meet its burden to prove

that appellants used or carried two guns, either as a principal

or as an aider and abettor. Of course, the government may

meet its burden of proof by circumstantial as well as direct

evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Treadwell, 760 F.2d 327,

333 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Holland v. United States, 348 U.S.

121, 140 (1954)). If "any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt" based on the evidence before the trier of fact, the

district court properly denies a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also United States v. Harrington,

108 F.3d 1460, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Viewing the evidence,

direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the

government, as we must, see United States v. Graham, 83

F.3d 1466, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the jury could reasonably

find that in robbing the bank appellants used and carried two

guns, one of which was a semiautomatic pistol.

Appellants do not contest that a defendant can be convicted

under s 924(c) on an aiding and abetting theory for his codefendant's use of a gun. If there is evidence from which the

factfinder may infer that each defendant was aware that the

other was armed, then one defendant's knowledge of the gun

may be imputed to the other defendant. See, e.g., Harrington, 108 F.3d at 1471; United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526,

529 (3d Cir. 1996). But, here, they maintain, the evidentiary

deficiency arises from the fact that there was no evidence

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that anyone saw a second gun during the robbery. However,

the bank manager testified that while he was detained by one

of the masked men he saw about two inches of a gun barrel,

akin to a handgun, protrude from the hands of the other

masked man. The other bank employee saw the same

masked man point a black handgun at her, threatening "don't

move or I'll shoot you." While neither bank employee actually saw a second gun, there was circumstantial evidence that

the two masked men had a second gun. The bank manager

testified that one of the men pressed a hard object against his

side and threatened to blow his brains out; the robber

warned, "you know what this is. Don't act crazy," and when

they reached the vault, the same robber told the manager not

to miss the combination, or he would "blow [his] ... brains

out." Combined with the evidence that the police had recovered two guns in Gilliam's home inside of the same bag as the

ski masks and stolen cash, a reasonable jury could find that,

given the fact that two masked men were attempting to rob a

bank, the object felt by the manager was a gun: it was hard

like a gun and a gun was the type of tool needed to carry out

the threat.

The absence of evidence of a direct sighting of the second

gun by either bank employee is, therefore, immaterial. See

Treadwell, 760 F.2d at 333. In none of the cases on which

appellants rely did the police recover the alleged gun. See

United States v. Jones, 16 F.3d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 1994);

United States v. Patino, 962 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1992);

Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d 1382, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

Because the object was the robbery of a federal credit union

and one of the masked men was armed, the jury could

reasonably infer from the threatening statements and the

discovery of both guns that the second masked man was also

armed, with a semiautomatic. So viewed, Gilliam and Gross

were responsible for two weapons; each carried and used a

gun during the robbery, and each aided and abetted his

partner's use.7 See, e.g., Harrington, 108 F.3d at 1371;

Price, 76 F.3d at 529.

__________

7 Contrary to appellants' assertion, the government did not

take the position on appeal that evidence of the use or carrying of

Appellants' contention, raised for the first time on appeal,

that the government should be required to prove their specific knowledge where a semiautomatic or automatic weapon is

involved is barred by our decision in United States v. Harris,

959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Foreshadowing the Supreme

Court's reasoning in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600

(1994), this court held in Harris that the National Firearms

Act, 26 U.S.C. s 5861(d), which makes possession of an

unregistered automatic weapon unlawful, implicitly requires

that a defendant have specific knowledge that a weapon is

automatic because an otherwise law abiding citizen "who has

come into possession of an automatic weapon ... quite possibly has no reason to be aware that the weapon is a 'firearm'

within the meaning of the statute." Harris, 959 F.2d at 259.8

But the court expressly declined to extend such reasoning to

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s 924(c) because the government already had the burden of

proving under s 924(c) that a defendant knowingly engaged

in criminal behavior with a firearm. See id. Thus there was

no need for an additional element of knowledge of the specific

type of gun because regardless of the kind of gun, the

defendant's mental state was just as culpable. See id.

Put otherwise, and contrary to appellants' position, Harris

applied strict liability for the type of gun used by a defendant

in committing a s 924(c) offense. See id. at 258. Consequently, appellants' reliance on Staples, in which the Supreme

Court reversed a conviction under 18 U.S.C. s 5861(d) in the

absence of proof of knowledge, is to no avail. Other circuits

have also held that Staples does not extend a special mens

rea requirement to s 924(c), on the rationale that because the

semiautomatic provision of s 924(c) is a sentencing enhance-

__________

one of the two firearms was sufficient to support the s 924(c)

convictions.

8 In Staples, 511 U.S. at 603, the Supreme Court reversed the

conviction of a defendant for failing to register a semiautomatic

weapon that had been modified to be capable of fully automatic fire

because the jury had not been allowed to consider the defendant's

claim that he did not know that the weapon had such automatic

capability.

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ment and not an element of the offense, a separate mens rea

need not be proven. See United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44,

51-52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 568 (1998); United

States v. Brantley, 68 F.3d 1283, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 1995).

Accordingly, by introducing evidence from which a reasonable

jury could find that appellants used and carried two guns

during the robbery, and that the search of Gilliam's home

revealed one of the guns was a semiautomatic, the government met its burden of proof under s 924(c).

Gross' further contention that because the evidence indicates he carried the handgun, he cannot be convicted for

aiding and abetting the use of the semiautomatic is also

without merit. There is no authority to support Gross'

assertion that a defendant's carrying of a gun in a joint

robbery precludes him from being liable for aiding and abetting the use of his co-defendant's firearm. United States v.

Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (in banc), on which

Gross relies, simply states that s 924(c) does not sustain

multiple gun convictions for a single underlying criminal act.

There is no Anderson problem here because the government

charged both guns in the same s 924(c) count, and upon

conviction, the district court sentenced Gross for only the

semiautomatic weapon.

One of the challenges to a s 922(g) conviction is not so

readily disposed of, however. Under s 922(g) it is unlawful

for anyone who has been convicted of a crime punishable by a

sentence over a year to possess a firearm that has traveled in

interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 67

F.3d 320, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Gross' contention that the

government failed to offer any evidence of his prior convictions flounders on his admission on the witness stand to a

prior conviction for attempted distribution of heroin and his

counsel's statement, without dissent by Gross, to the district

court that Gross conceded that his prior conviction qualified

as a predicate conviction for the felon-in-possession count.

Gilliam, on the other hand, made no such concession or

admission, and there is no evidence that he waived his right

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to put the government to its proof. Cf. Olano, 507 U.S. at

733; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).

It is undisputed that under s 922(g), the government must

prove that the defendant has a prior felony conviction. Here,

the prosecutor informed the district court that he had a

certified copy of a prior conviction of Gilliam, but never

submitted the document to the court for introduction into

evidence. Nor at any time did the prosecutor represent to

the district court that Gilliam had expressly agreed that proof

of his prior convictions was unnecessary. On appeal the

government maintains that because Gilliam did not challenge

the prosecutor's representation that he had a certified copy of

a 1986 robbery conviction and that Gilliam had been convicted

of the three prior felony offenses charged in count three of

the indictment, he "essentially stipulat[ed] to this prior felony

element of the s 922(g) offense." Consequently, in the government's view, the failure formally to introduce the certificate was not fatal.

Before hearing any evidence the district court engaged

Gilliam in a colloquy about his criminal record. The prosecutor proffered that Gilliam had prior convictions for armed

robbery, robbery, kidnaping, obstruction of justice, assault

with a deadly weapon, and carrying a deadly weapon. The

court inquired, "I assume you're not challenging these convictions. You're not saying that these are not your prior

convictions, right?" Gilliam answered, "[n]o, I'm not....

Not at this time anyway." The prosecutor did not offer into

evidence at the bench trial on the felon-in-possession count

any documentary or other evidence to prove that Gilliam had

the requisite prior convictions. Recalling perhaps that the

district court had engaged Gilliam in a pretrial colloquy about

his criminal record, the prosecutor apparently failed to recall

that in responding to the district court's inquiry Gilliam gave

a qualified denial, leaving open his option to challenge his

prior convictions at a subsequent time. Thus, in the absence

of waiver or an admission by Gilliam, there was no evidence

before the court to prove Gilliam's prior record.

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Although the government relies on Gilliam's silence in

failing to challenge his prior convictions, the burden remained

on the government to offer into evidence proof of every

element of the charged offense. While it could have done so

by a stipulation with the defendant or by a waiver by the

defendant of his right to put the government to its proof,

neither occurred here. Cf. Old Chief v. United States, 117

S.Ct. 644, 653 (1997); Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.

368 (1964). The government's reliance on United States v.

Hardin, 139 F.3d 813 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 225

(1998), and United States v. Branch, 46 F.3d 440 (5th Cir.

1995), in which the defendants had entered into stipulations

with the government on an element of the crimes charged, is

misplaced. Indeed, even if there had been a stipulation, the

government may well still have needed to introduce the

stipulation into evidence, for as the Ninth Circuit has observed, whether there is a stipulation between the defendant

and the government, if it is not offered in evidence there is

"no fact in evidence that the [trier of fact] could take as

proved." United States v. James, 987 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir.

1993); cf. United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 678-81 (4th

Cir. 1996). Because there was neither a stipulation nor other

waiver by Gilliam, nor proof by introduction into evidence of

the certified copy of his prior conviction, the government

failed to present evidence on an element of the s 922(g)

offense. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69 (1991).

By contrast, Gross' challenge to his conviction for carjacking, on the ground that because the bank manager was away

from his car at the time he was assaulted by the robbers,

there was insufficient evidence to convict him of carjacking

under D.C. Code s 22-2903 (1981), fails. A carjacking occurs

so long as the victim is in immediate actual possession of the

vehicle. See Pixley v. United States, 692 A.2d 438 (D.C.

1997). "Immediate possession," an element borrowed from

the crime of robbery, see Pixley, 692 A.2d at 440, is retained

if the car is within such range that the victim could, if not

deterred by violence or fear, retain actual physical control

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over it. See, e.g., Spencer v. United States, 116 F.2d 801, 802

(D.C. Cir. 1940); Rouse v. United States, 402 A.2d 1218, 1220

(D.C. 1979). Although the bank manager had stepped out of

his car to unlock the parking lot gate, he left the car running

with the driver's door open. The jury could reasonably find

that the bank manager intended to get back into his car to

park it in the credit union lot once he had opened the gate,

but the robbers prevented him from doing so, and thus

deprived the manager of immediate possession of his car. As

for Gross' contention that he never intended to steal the car,

the statute does not require that the government prove

specific intent to steal. See Pixley, 692 A.2d at 439-40; see

also Allen v. United States, 697 A.2d 1, 2 (D.C. 1997).

Thus, the district court erred only in denying Gilliam's

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the

s 922(g) charge.

V.

Finally, appellants attack their sentences. Insofar as

Gross contends that the district court erred in sentencing him

to a consecutive ten-year term for the use or carrying of a

semiautomatic weapon in violation of s 924(c)(1), this is another way of claiming that there was insufficient evidence to

convict him for the use or carrying of the semiautomatic

pistol, and hence his contention is without merit. Gilliam, on

the other hand, contends that the district court erred in

imposing two life sentences under the "three strikes" statute,

18 U.S.C. s 3559(c),9 because the government failed to prove

__________

9 18 U.S.C. s 3559(c) provides in relevant part:

(1) ... a person who is convicted in a court of the United

States of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to life

imprisonment if--

(A) the person has been convicted (and those convictions have

become final) on separate prior occasions in a court of the

United States or of a State of--

(i) two or more serious violent felonies.

that he had at least two prior predicate convictions for serious

violent felonies.

Gilliam first maintains that in view of the severity of the

penalty under the statute, due process requires the district

court to hold an evidentiary hearing before imposing a mandatory life sentence. The three strikes statute incorporates a

notice requirement from the Controlled Substances Act, 21

U.S.C. s 851(a), requiring the government to give the defendant formal notice in an information of the defendant's predicate convictions on which the government intends to rely in

seeking the imposition of life imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C.

s 3559(c)(4). The government gave Gilliam such notice.

However, other provisions of the Controlled Substances Act,

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namely ss 851(b) and (c), require the district court to ask the

defendant to admit to or deny his prior convictions, and upon

a denial, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing in

which the government must prove the convictions beyond a

reasonable doubt. 21 U.S.C. s 851(c). Gilliam contends that

the statute should be read to incorporate some of the additional due process requirements of ss 851(b) and (c).10

There is, however, no authority to support Gilliam's contention, and the Tenth Circuit has rejected it, concluding that

"[t]he fact that the defendant does not concede the existence

or seriousness of former convictions does not automatically

require a separate section 3559 hearing." United States v.

Oberle, 136 F.3d 1414, 1424 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 119

S. Ct. 197 (1998). "Rather, it is only when a defendant

__________

10 Gilliam stated in a footnote of his brief that although due

process "arguably" "may well require" a higher standard of proof

than a preponderance of the evidence as well as an evidentiary

hearing where the sentence enhancement under three strikes imposes a punishment greater than the maximum sentence authorized

for the offense of conviction, he concluded that the court "does not

have to address this issue" "because the government failed to prove

Mr. Gilliam's prior convictions by even a preponderance of the

evidence." He never directly argued that meeting the preponderance standard is insufficient, and the court will not construe the

briefs to raise an argument that is hinted at but never stated. Cf.

United States v. Whren, 111 F.3d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

tenders evidence to deny the seriousness of the former convictions or to deny that the prior convictions pertained to him

or her that the district court must conduct a hearing." Id.

Even assuming ss 851(b) and (c) were applicable, Gilliam

made neither a tender nor a denial that would trigger an

inquiry. Before sentencing, Gilliam and his counsel received

the presentence report setting forth Gilliam's prior convictions, and acknowledged that the report did not contain any

material factual inaccuracies.11 In a memorandum in aid of

sentencing, counsel asked only for consideration of Gilliam's

mental condition. At sentencing, Gilliam's counsel stated,

"[a]s the court [is] aware, there's very little I can say in this

case, given the papers filed by the government and given Mr.

Gilliam's convictions." Under the circumstances, even if Gilliam's statements did not constitute a waiver, his actions

amounted to forfeiture and we find no plain error. See

Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-33. Because "[a]ll that [Gilliam] did

was to put the government to its proof," Oberle, 136 F.3d at

1424, the district court could properly rely on the factual

statements in the presentence report.12 See Fed. R. Crim. P.

__________

11 Among the convictions noted in the presentence report was a

1971 kidnaping conviction and a 1986 armed robbery conviction, for

which Gilliam received 6-18 years. Under subsection (2)(F)(i) of

the three strikes statute, kidnaping qualifies as an enumerated

serious violent felony. Under subsection (2)(F)(ii), armed robbery

qualifies as a predicate offense "that by its nature, involves a

substantial risk that physical force against the person of another

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may be used in the course of committing the offense," and is

punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or

more.

12 Although the presentence report can resolve the threestrikes sentencing issue, it cannot provide the necessary element of

s 922(g) because it was neither acknowledged nor prepared prior to

Gilliam's conviction for the offense. As to Gilliam's counsel's statement during oral argument in this court that there may be an issue

of identification as to one of Gilliam's prior convictions, in the

absence of any relevant record on appeal, such a claim must be

presented initially to the district court. See, e.g., Oliver v. United

States, 335 F.2d 724, 726 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1964).

32(b)(6)(D); Washington, 115 F.3d at 1010; United States v.

Booze, 108 F.3d 378, 381-82 (D.C. Cir. 1997); cf. United

States v. Hill, 131 F.3d 1056, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Hence,

the district court did not err in accepting the presentence

report as meeting the government's burden to prove that

Gilliam had two predicate convictions under s 3559(c). Cf.

Oberle, 136 F.3d at 1424.

Accordingly, because the government failed to introduce

evidence on an element of the offense, we reverse Gilliam's

conviction under 18 U.S.C. s 922(g), but in view of evidence

presented in connection with sentencing, we affirm his life

sentences; otherwise we affirm the judgments of conviction.

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