Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03019/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03019-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Calvin Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14‐3019

CALVIN DAVIS,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 3:14‐cv‐50124— Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2016

Before BAUER, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.  Calvin Davis pleaded guilty in 2010

to a narcotics conspiracy charge pursuant to a written plea

agreement providing that he would be sentenced to a term

equal to 66 percent of either the low end of the sentencing

range advised by the Sentencing Guidelines or the statutory

minimum term, whichever was greater. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

11(c)(1)(C). Davis expected to receive a prison term of no more

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than 80 months. However, the Guidelines range as subse‐

quently calculated by the probation officer and adopted by the

district courtturned outto be much longerthan the parties had

expected it would be. The court ultimately ordered Davis to

serve 172 months in prison, a term that was equal to 66 percent

of the low end of the Guidelines range and therefore consistent

with the plea agreement, but more than twice what the parties

had anticipated when they entered into that agreement. No

appeal was filed from the sentence. But more than four years

later, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v.

United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), Davis filed a motion under

28 U.S.C. § 2255 contending that he was entitled to relief

because the judge’s sentencing findings regarding his criminal

history had increased the statutory minimum term of impris‐

onment. He also asserted, among other claims, that his attor‐

ney was ineffective in advising him about the consequences of

his plea (including the likely sentence) and in failing to file a

notice of appeal following his sentencing. The district court

dismissedthe motion,reasoning thatDavis hadno viable claim

under Alleyne given that the Supreme Court has not yet

declared that decision applicable retroactively on collateral

review, and that Davis’s other claims were untimely. We agree

and affirm the district court’s judgment.

I.

In 2008, Davis became involved with a Rockford, Illinois

drug ring led by Hollis Daniels that trafficked primarily in

heroin and occasionally crack cocaine. See United States v. Block,

705 F.3d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 2013) (describing the organization).

His duties included picking up heroin from a supplier in

Chicago, dropping off the raw heroin to other conspirators for

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dilution and packaging, supplying street‐level dealers with

25‐countretail packages of heroin, and collecting the proceeds

of their sales. The organization distributed approximately 700

grams of heroin per week. Davis was stopped and arrested

while on his way to complete a pre‐arranged delivery of heroin

to someone who was, unbeknownst to him, a confidential

informant; he had 80 grams of heroin in his possession. After

he was charged in Illinois state court, he began to cooperate

with federal and state agents investigating the Hollis organiza‐

tion, became a confidential informant, and over the course of

the next year wore a recording device to capture other mem‐

bers of the organization discussing their illegal activities. The

investigation culminated in a second superseding indictment

charging Davis and 14 others with conspiring to distribute

(and to possess with the intent to distribute) more than one

kilogram of heroin and 50 grams of crack cocaine, among other

offenses. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846.

Davis pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge pursuant to

a written plea agreement. Davis agreed to continue cooperat‐

ing with the government and to provide truthful testimony in

any subsequent proceeding. In exchange for his assistance, the

government agreed to ask the court to depart downward from

eitherthe applicable statutoryminimumterm ofimprisonment

or the low end of the advisory range specified by the Sentenc‐

ing Guidelines, whichever was higher, and to impose a

sentence equal to 66 percent of that term. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(e); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Because the drug conspiracy

involved more than one kilogram of heroin, Davis was

presumptively subject to a statutory minimum sentence of 10

years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i). The agreement expressly

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acknowledged that minimum term as well as the maximum

possible term of life imprisonment. See R. 300 at 4 ¶ 8a & 7

¶ 10d.1 However, given whatthe attorneys knew about Davis’s

criminal history, both parties anticipated that Davis would

have only one criminal history point (resulting in a criminal

history of I) and that he would consequently be eligible for a

sentence below the statutory minimum. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f);

U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(1). Based on their preliminary Guidelines

calculations, the parties also anticipated that the advisory

Guidelines range would be 108 to 135 months. In accordance

with the Government’s agreement to seek a downward

departure to 66 percent of either the low end of that range (i.e.,

approximately 71months) or ofthe statutory 10‐year minimum

(roughly 79 months), whichever was greater, the parties

expected the recommended sentence to be no more than 80

months. This was a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, so provided

that the governmentfound Davis’s cooperation to be sufficient

and made the departure motion, the district court, having

accepted the agreement, was obliged to sentence Davis to 66%

of eitherthe Guidelines minimum or statutory minimum term.

The agreement recognized in several ways, however, that

the parties’ Guidelines calculations were preliminary and that

both the Guidelines range and the final sentence might

ultimately turn out to be different than the parties assumed at

the time they entered into the agreement. Thus, in recounting

the parties’ calculations as to Davis’s criminal history and the

1

   Citations to the record in Davis’s criminal prosecution take the form of

“R. ___.” Citations to the record in Davis’s section 2255 proceeding take the

form of “2255 R. ___.”

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No. 14‐3019 5

anticipated Guidelines range, for example, the agreement

noted that the calculations were “based on the facts now

known to the government.” R. 300 at 6 ¶ 10(c) & (d). More to

the point, the agreement expressly recognized that the parties’

Guidelines calculations were tentative, that the calculations

might change following the probation officer’s investigation,

and that any such changes would not constitute a basis for a

withdrawal of Davis’s guilty plea:

Defendant and his attorney and the government

acknowledge that the above Guideline calculations

are preliminary in nature, and are non‐binding

predictions upon which neither party is entitled to

rely. Defendant understands that further review of

the facts or applicable legal principles may lead the

government to conclude that different or additional

Guideline provisions apply in this case. Defendant

understands that the Probation Office will conduct

its own investigation and that the Court ultimately

determines the facts and law relevant to sentencing,

and that the Court’s determinations govern the final

Guideline calculation. Accordingly, the validity of

thisAgreementis not contingentupon the probation

officer’s or the Court’s concurrence with the above

calculations, and defendant shall not have a right to

withdraw his plea on the basis of the Court’s rejec‐

tion of these calculations.

R. 300 at 7 ¶ 10e. The agreement similarly acknowledged that

any errors in correcting orinterpreting the Guidelines could be

corrected by either party prior to sentencing, and again stated

that “[t]he validity of this Plea Agreement will not be affected

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by such corrections, and defendant shall not have a right to

withdraw his plea, nor the government the right to vacate this

Plea Agreement, on the basis of such corrections.” R. 300 at 7

¶10f. Finally, the agreement acknowledged that no threats,

promises or representations had been made nor agreements

reached, otherthan those set forth in the plea agreement itself,

to cause Davis to plead guilty. R. 300 at 16 ¶ 28. In signing the

agreement,Davis acknowledgedthat he hadread,understood,

and accepted its terms. R. 300 at 17 ¶ 29.

As it turned out, the probation officer’s presentence

investigation andreportproducedGuidelines calculations that

were much less favorable to Davis than those set forth in the

plea agreement. Davis previously had served in the United

States Army, and after receiving his military records, the

probation officer learned that Davis had, contrary to his

representation to her, been discharged from the Army on other

than honorable terms2 and had a disciplinary record that

included convictions at a general court martial(pursuantto his

guilty plea) for the military offenses of fraudulent enlistment,

bigamy, attempted bigamy, and adultery and a 30‐month term

of confinement for those offenses. That record increased the

number ofpoints inDavis’s criminal history,disqualifying him

for a sentence below the 10‐year statutory minimum, and

placed him into a criminal history category ofIII. Furthermore,

because Davis had, in the probation officer’s view, misrepre‐

2

   The probation officer characterized Davis’s discharge as dishonorable.

Davis’s counsel represents that, upon further investigation, it appears that

Davis actually received a so‐called “bad conduct” discharge, which is a

somewhat less serious, although still negative, form of discharge.

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No. 14‐3019 7

sented the circumstances of his military discharge and his

disciplinaryhistory,3 thepresentence reportrecommendedthat

his offense level be increased by two levels pursuant to section

3C1.1 for obstructionofjustice.4Yet anotherunanticipatedtwo‐

level increase was proposed for the firearms that had been

possessed by Davis’s co‐conspirators. See U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(1).5 The various changes resulted in a Guidelines

sentencing range of 262 to 327 months.

When Davis was sentenced on October 13, 2010, the district

court adopted the Guidelines calculations set forth in the

presentence report. Judge Kapala acknowledged that the

resulting sentencing range was higher than the parties had

anticipatedin the plea agreement, but attributedthe bulk ofthe

difference to the fact that “the attorneys did not anticipate that

3

   The probation officer also noted that Davis had failed to appear at a

meeting convened to discuss the discrepancy, but the district court did not

consider that absence when it imposed the enhancement for obstruction of

justice. R. 875 at 9, 11.

4

   Counsel suggests that because Davis served more than one term in the

military, Davis may have been confused as to which discharge the

probation officer was asking him aboutratherthan deliberately attempting

to misrepresent the circumstances of his discharge. However, any error as

to the enhancement for obstruction of justice would fall within the scope of

the appeal and collateral relief waiver we discuss below. The same is true

with respectto counsel’s additionalrepresentation thatDavishaddisclosed

and discussed his bigamy conviction with the probation officer.

5

    The probation officer and the district judge agreed that despite the

enhancement for obstruction of justice, Davis should still receive credit for

acceptance of responsibility given the extent of his cooperation with and

assistance to the government. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4).

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[Davis] would lie to the probation officer[and], unfortunately,

the defendant brought the consequences of that lie upon

himself.” R. 875 at 26. Consistent with its obligations underthe

plea agreement, the government moved the court pursuant to

section 5K1.1 to depart downward and impose a sentence at 66

percent ofthe low end ofthe advisory Guidelines range (which

was obviously higherthan the statutory minimum). The judge

granted the motion and ordered Davis to serve a prison term

of 172 months.6

Davis did not appeal from the sentence imposed. Indeed,

in the plea agreement, Davis had largely waived his right to

both appeal his conviction and sentence and to seek collateral

relief under section 2255:

Waiver of appellate and collateral rights. Defen‐

dant further understands he is waiving all appellate

issues that might have been available if he had

exercised his right to trial. Defendant is aware that

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1291, and Title

18, United States Code, Section 3742, afford a defen‐

dant the right to appeal his conviction and the

sentence imposed. Acknowledging this, if the

government makes a motion at sentencing for a

downward departure pursuant to Sentencing

Guideline § 5K1.1, defendant knowingly waives the

right to appeal his conviction, any pre‐trial rulings

6

   On September 22, 2015, Davis’s sentence was reduced by agreement to

138 months pursuant to Guidelines amendment 782, which lowered the

offense level for his narcotics‐related offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

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No. 14‐3019 9

by the Court, and any part of the sentence (or the

manner in which that sentence was determined),

including any term ofimprisonment and fine within

the maximums provided by law, in exchange forthe

concessions made by the United States in this Plea

Agreement. Defendant also waives his right to

challenge his conviction and sentence, and the

manner in which the sentence was determined, and

(in any case in which the term of imprisonment and

fine are within the maximums provided by statute)

his attorney’s alleged failure or refusal to file a

notice of appeal, in any collateral attack or future

challenge, including but not limited to a motion

brought under Title 28, United States Code, Section

2255. The waiverin this paragraph does not apply to

a claim of involuntariness, or ineffective assistance

of counsel, which relates directly to this waiver orto

its negotiation, nor does it prohibit defendant from

seeking a reduction of sentence based directly on a

change in the law thatis applicable to defendant and

that, prior to the filing of defendant’s request for

relief, has been expressly made retroactive by an Act

of Congress, the Supreme Court, or the United

States Sentencing Commission.

R. 300 at 12‐13 ¶ 19b.

On May 31, 2014, Davis submitted his pro se motion for

relief under section 2255. As relevant here,the motion attacked

his guilty plea and sentence on three grounds. First, Davis

alleged that he was deprived of the effective assistance of

counsel when, atthe time of his guilty plea, his lawyer “grossly

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misinformed” him as to the potential sentence he could

receive. 2255R. 1 at 9. Second, Davis contended thatthe district

court ran afoul of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in

Alleyne by subjecting him to an enhanced minimum term of

imprisonment based on facts not charged in the indictment or

found by a jury. Third, Davis asserted that his counsel was

ineffective when he failed to file a notice of appeal from his

conviction and sentence despite Davis’s instruction to do so.

The district court dismissedDavis’s section 2255 request on

its own motion as untimely. 2255 R. 3. The court noted that

under section 2255(f), Davis had one year from the date his

conviction became final to file his motion. Davis’s conviction

became final on October 27, 2010, after the 14‐day period in

which to file an appeal from his conviction and sentence

expired; Davis thus had until October 27, 2011, to file his

request for collateral relief. Yet, Davis did not file the motion

until May 31, 2014, more than three and one‐half years later.

The court found no merit to Davis’s contention that his motion

was nonetheless timely because it was filed within one year of

the Supreme Court’s Alleyne decision, because the Supreme

Court had not yet declared that decision retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review. See Simpson v. United

States, 721 F.3d 875, 876 (7th Cir. 2013). Davis subsequently

asked the district court to reconsider the dismissal, which the

district court declined to do.

We granted Davis a certificate of appealability with respect

to the claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

notice of appeal, and we also appointed counsel to represent

Davis in this appeal.In briefing the appeal, Davis’s counsel has

addressed other aspects of Davis’s request for relief under

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No. 14‐3019 11

section 2255, which may be construed as an implicit request to

expand the certificate of appealability. It is not strictly

necessary for us to rule on that request because, as we explain

below, the district court correctly concluded that Davis’s

section 2255 motion was untimely.

II.

We would be remiss if we did not begin our analysis by

noting the first and most obvious potential obstacle to relief for

Davis, which is his waiver of the right to appeal his conviction

and sentence and to seek collateral relief under section 2255.

We have repeatedly enforced such waivers in the face of

claims, not unlike Davis’s, that a defendant was sentenced to

a term of imprisonment significantly greater than he was led

to expect at the time of his guilty plea. See United States v.

Smith, 759 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir.) (“There is no doubt a

defendant may waive his right to challenge a sentence not yet

imposed ... .”) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 732

(2014); United States v. Henry, 702 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 2012)

(“unanticipated sentences do not create grounds for negating

the terms of a plea agreement”) (quoting United States v . Sines,

303 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2002)). Davis does not suggest that

the waiver itself was involuntary on his part or the product of

ineffective assistance of counsel—a claim that the waiveritself

authorizes—but he attempts to argue that the grossly

inaccurate advice his attorney allegedly gave him as to the

potential sentence casts the knowing and voluntary nature of

the entire plea agreement, and his guilty plea, into doubt. See

Smith, 759 F.3d at 707 (“The sole type of ineffectiveness claim

we have said that a defendant may not waive is an

ineffectiveness claim having to do with the waiver (or the plea

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agreement as a whole) and its negotiation.”) (citing Hurlow v.

United States, 726 F.3d 958, 964‐66 (7th Cir. 2013));see also Solano

v. United States, — F.3d —, 2016 WL 456204, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb.

5, 2016) (“The appeal waiver stands or falls with the plea

agreement.”) (citing United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049,

1051 (7th Cir. 2000)). Davis insists that he never would have

entered into the plea agreement had he realized he could be

sentenced to a term above the statutory minimum of 10 years.

See generally Morales v. Boatwright, 580 F.3d 653, 659 (7th Cir.

2009) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370

(1985)).

His claim of involuntariness is difficult to square with the

terms of the plea agreement. As we have discussed, the

agreement expressly noted that the Guidelines calculations

reflected in the agreement were preliminary, that they might

change following the presentence investigation, and that “the

validity of this Agreement is not contingent upon the

probation officer’s or the Court’s concurrence with the above

calculations,” R. 300 at 7 ¶ 10e, all of which is incongruous

with Davis’s alleged reliance upon the sentencing range set

forth in the agreement. Similar admonishments likely were

given to Davis at his change‐of‐plea hearing, although a

transcript of that hearing is not part of the record in this appeal

or in the underlying criminal case. That transcript, coupled

with the admonishments and acknowledgments in the written

plea agreement itself, might well doom Davis’s after‐the‐fact

claim of involuntariness. See Nunez v. United States, 495 F.3d

544, 545‐46 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, judgment vacated, &

remanded on other grounds, 554 U.S. 911, 128 S. Ct. 2990 (2008);

see also Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 2008)

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(noting thatthis portion ofthe original opinion was beyond the

scope of the Supreme Court’s remand). In any case, we need

not address the validity of the plea agreement and its waiver

provision further, as we agree with the district court that

Davis’s section 2255 motion fails on other grounds.

We start with the Alleyne claim. Indubitably, this claim,

which is based on a change in law post‐dating Davis’s plea and

sentence, is one that is not barred by the plea agreement’s

waiver. R. 300 at 13 ¶ 19b; see also § 2255(f)(3). But there are,

nonetheless, multiple problems with the claim. Alleyne holds

that any factual determination that increases the statutory

mandatory minimum term to which a defendant is subject (in

that case, the fact that a defendant “brandished” a gun) must

be charged in the indictment and proven beyond reasonable

doubt to the factfinder. 133 S. Ct. at 2161‐63. It is, first of all, not

at all clear why Alleyne is of any help to Davis. He was subject

to a 10‐year statutory minimum based on the amount of heroin

involved in the trafficking conspiracy—an amount that was

charged in the indictment and to which he pleaded guilty. So

the minimum term was not the result of any determination

made by Judge Kapala at sentencing. Perhaps Davis could

assert a variant of an Alleyne claim in the sense that it was the

judge’s findings as to his criminal history (including his

convictions in the military court martial) that rendered him

ineligible for a below‐minimum sentence. See § 5C1.2(a)(1).

Davis himself points this out in a footnote in his opening brief.

Davis Br. at 12 n.3. The problem with this variant, however, is

that criminal history findings are generally exempt from the

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), line

of precedents entitling a defendant to a formal charge and a

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trial on facts that expose him to harsher penalties. See

Almendarez‐Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S. Ct. 1219

(1998). And the Supreme Court in Alleyneitself said that it was

“notrevisit[ing]” the holding of Almendarez‐Torres. 133 S. Ct. at

2160 n.1. See United States v. Long, 748 F.3d 322, 329 (7th Cir.)

(enhanced mandatory minimum properly applied

notwithstanding that findings as to prior convictions that

triggered the enhancement were made by judge rather than

jury), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2832 (2014). But, in any case, the

clearest impediment to the Alleyne claim is the one that Judge

Kapala cited: the Supreme Court has not held that Alleyne

applies retroactively to cases on collateralreview. Our decision

in Simpson notes that it is only the Supreme Court that has

authority to declare Alleyne retroactive, 721 F.3d at 876, and

unless and until it does so, Davis cannot claim the benefit of

Alleyne in a 2255 motion. See also Crayton v. United States,

799 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 424 (2015);

Walker v. United States, 810 F.3d 568, 574 (8th Cir. 2016) (“every

circuit to consider this issue has concluded that Alleyne does

not apply retroactively”) (collecting cases). The district court

was thus on firm ground in dismissing this claim.7

7

   Davis suggests that he should be able to claim the benefit of Alleyne

without the Supreme Court first declaring Alleyne retroactive because his

case never had the airing that it would have had in a direct appeal (whether

as a result of the appeal waiver in the plea agreement or his attorney’s

alleged ineffectiveness in not filing an appeal). Davis Br. at 18‐19. But one

has nothing to do with the other. Alleyne was decided several years after

Davis’s conviction became final. And as our decision in Simpson makes

clear, we simply do not have the authority to declare Alleyne applicable

retroactively on collateralreview—only the Supreme Court has that power.

(continued...)

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No. 14‐3019 15

This brings us to the timeliness of the other claims

presented in Davis’s section 2255 motion. Section 2255(f)

imposes a one‐year time limit on the claims asserted in a

section 2255 motion. Although that period may have begun at

different times for different aspects of Davis’s 2255 motion, we

cannot discern a scenario under which any of the other claims

were timely. To the extent Davis is complaining of errors made

at his sentencing or his attorney’s ineffectiveness with respect

to the plea agreement, those claims were known to Davis at the

time his conviction became final—which as the district court

noted, was on October 27, 2010, when the 14‐day time to file an

appeal from his conviction and sentence expired. Thus, Davis

had until October 27, 2011, to seek collateral relief on those

claims. See § 2255(f)(1). As to claims based on subsequent

changes in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the period begins to

run on the date that the Supreme Court recognizes a right or

(as relevant here) deems the right applicable to cases on

collateral review. See § 2255(f)(3). With respect to the claim of

attorney ineffectiveness based on the failure of Davis’s counsel

to follow his instruction and file a timely appeal following his

sentencing, we may assume that Davis did not immediately

realize, at the conclusion of the 14‐day period in which such an

appeal could have been filed, that his counsel had, in fact, filed

no appeal. Still, our cases recognize that a defendant bears a

duty of diligence in monitoring the status of his appeal. See

Ryan v. United States, 657 F.3d 604, 607‐08 (7th Cir. 2011);

Montenegro v. United States, 248 F.3d 585, 592‐93 (7th Cir. 2001),

7

  (...continued)

721 F.3d at 876.

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16 No. 14‐3019

overruled in part on other grounds by Ashley v. United States,

266 F.3d 671, 674‐75 (7th Cir. 2001). The limited record before

us does not indicate when Davis learned that his counsel had

not filed an appeal, but under no circumstance can we imagine

that, in the exercise of due diligence, it could have taken Davis

more than three years to discover that fact. See § 2255(f)(4)

(specifying that for claims based on newly discovered facts,

one‐year period begins to run when those facts could have

been discovered in the exercise of due diligence). In any case,

the sole basis on which Davis has argued that this claim and

the other claims he has included in his section 2255 motion

apart from the Alleyne claim is the fact that the Alleyne claim

itself is timely, having been filed within one year of the Alleyne

decision. But as every other circuit to have considered the

question has concluded, and we now hold,8 the timeliness of

each claim asserted in either a section 2255 motion or a petition

challenging a state‐court conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 22549

must be considered independently. See DeCoteau v. Schweitzer,

774 F.3d 1190, 1192 (8th Cir. 2014); Capozzi v. United States,

768 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir. 2014) (per curiam), cert. denied, 135

S. Ct. 1476 (2015); Zack v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 917, 926 (11th Cir.

2013) (en banc); Prendergast v. Clements, 699 F.3d 1182, 1186‐88

(10th Cir. 2012); Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1169‐71 (9th

Cir. 2012); Bachman v. Bagley, 487 F.3d 979, 982‐84 (6th Cir.

2007); Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113, 117‐22 (3d Cir. 2004)

8

   We previously left this question open. Taylor v. Michael, 724 F.3d 806, 810

n.3 (7th Cir. 2013).

9

   See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1), setting forth time limits for a petition under

section 2254 which parallel those of section 2255(f).

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(Alito, J.); see also Stallings v. Williams, 2015 WL 1003918, at *3

(S.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2015), appeal filed (7th Cir. Aug. 26, 2015) (No.

15‐2827); Jefferson v. Duncan, 2015 WL 249646, at*4 n.4 (N.D. Ill.

Jan. 16, 2015); Harris v. Polley, 2014 WL 5025767, at *6 (C.D. Ill.

Oct. 7, 2014); Steele v. Lemke, 2014 WL 148742, at *3 (N.D. Ill.

Jan. 14, 2014); Judkins v. Hardy, 2013 WL 2156038, at*4‐*5 (N.D.

Ill. May 17, 2013); Ramos v. Trancoso, 2010 WL 3025013, at *2‐*3

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2010). The simple fact that Davis might have

one timely claim to make under section 2255 based on a

Supreme Court precedent issued years after his conviction

otherwise became final does not allow him to tack on

additional, otherwise untimely claims to that one timely claim.

Davis asserts that all of his claims are intertwined, but that is

true only in the sense that they all generally relate to his

sentence, and that is not enough to deem them all timely. The

Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Alleyne—which in any case

we have said is not a basis forrelief to Davis— does notrender

his other claims timely.10

10   Davis has suggested in his reply brief that the government breached the

plea agreement by advocating forthe sentencing enhancements (including

the enhancementfor obstruction ofjustice)that substantially lengthenedthe

advisory Guidelines range. See Davis Reply at 7‐8. We find nothing in the

plea agreementthat bars the governmentfrom agreeing with enhancements

proposed by the probation officer, however. See R. 300 at 7 ¶ 10e. And, of

course, the government did move for the section 5K1.1 departure from the

bottom of the Guidelines range as anticipated by the agreement.

Case: 14-3019 Document: 45 Filed: 03/15/2016 Pages: 18
18 No. 14‐3019

III.

For all of the reasons we have discussed, the district court

properly denied/dismissed Davis’s section 2255 motion.

AFFIRMED

Case: 14-3019 Document: 45 Filed: 03/15/2016 Pages: 18