Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01257/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01257-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Allstate Insurance Company
Appellee
Byron S. Sellers
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

. FILED 

Umted States Court of App~~ 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 2 3 1996 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

BYRON S. SELLERS, 

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, 

v. 

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant -Counter-Claimant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

PATRICK FISHER 

Cler:; 

No. 95-1257 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 94-S-1152) 

Randal R. Kelly (Brad R. Irwin of Irwin & Boesen with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for 

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant. 

Sherwin V. Wittman II of Wittman & McCord, Colorado Springs, Colorado (Cynthia J. Hyman, 

Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief) for Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee. 

Before TACHA, BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Byron S. Sellers appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant 

Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") on his breach of contract claims. We exercise jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

Appellate Case: 95-1257 Document: 01019279334 Date Filed: 04/23/1996 Page: 1 
On May 21, 1991, Mr. Sellers was injured in a noncontact motorcycle accident with an 

unidentified automobile while on duty as a Jefferson County Deputy Sheriff. At the time of the 

accident, Mr. Sellers had an insurance policy with Allstate on a Dodge he owned which provided 

for uninsured motorist coverage up to $50,000. Jefferson County had a business insurance policy 

with United States Fire Insurance Company ("U.S. Fire") which also provided for uninsured motorist 

coverage up to $50,000. Mr. Sellers had additional uninsured motorist coverage on a personal 

motorcycle with Colonial Insurance Company ("Colonial") for up to $25,000. As compensation for 

his injuries, Mr. Sellers has recovered $90,000 from U.S. Fire and $25,000 from Colonial. 

In late April1992, Mr. Sellers mailed Allstate notice of the accident. For the following two 

years a series of correspondences took place between Mr. Sellers, his attorneys and Allstate 

representatives regarding the type and amount of Allstate's liability. Finally, in April 1994, Mr. 

Sellers filed suit against Allstate alleging breach of contract due to Allstate's failure to arbitrate 

and/or pay his claim. Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the policy issued by 

U.S. Fire prevented any claims against Allstate because of an anti-stacking provision contained in 

Mr. Sellers's policy with Allstate. In response, Mr. Sellers argued the anti-stacking clause of the 

Allstate policy was rendered void by Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 10-4-609(2) Qr in the alternative Allstate was 

prohibited from denying coverage under a waiver or estoppel theory. The district court granted 

Allstate's motion for summary judgment. Mr. Sellers appeals raising two issues: (1) the district 

court erred in determining Allstate's anti-stacking policy provision was not rendered void by Colo. 

Rev. Stat.§ 10-4-609(2), and (2) the district court erred in fmding no genuine issues of material fact 

existed with respect to Allstate's waiver of its stacking argument or estoppel to assert that argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-1257 Document: 01019279334 Date Filed: 04/23/1996 Page: 2 
I 

"We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo applying the same 

legal standard as the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c)." Wolfv. Prudential Ins. Co. of 

America, 50 F .3d 793, 796 (1Oth Cir. 1995). In so doing, we examine the factual record and all 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party. !d. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

We will first address the applicability of a clause contained in Mr. Sellers' insurance contract 

with Allstate which provides: 

If the insured person was in, on, getting into or out of a vehicle which is insured for 

this coverage under another policy, coverage under this policy will be excess. This 

means that when the insured person is legally entitled to recover damages in excess 

of the other policy limit, we will only pay the amount by which the limit of liability 

of this policy exceeds the limit of liability of that policy. 

Mr. Sellers does not dispute that the County-issued motorcycle he was riding at the time of the 

accident was insured by U.S. Fire for $50,000 --the same liability limit provided for in his policy 

with Allstate on his personal vehicle. Because the amount ofliability under the Allstate policy does 

not exceed the amount ofliability under the U.S. Fire policy, Allstate claims it has no liability to Mr. 

Sellers. Mr. Sellers argues, however, that his claim against Allstate did not arise until after Allstate 

breached its contractual obligation to arbitrate in 1993 and thus the contract's anti-stacking provision 

is invalid due to the Colorado Legislature's Amendment to 1 0-4-609(2) in 1992 which provides in 

3 

Appellate Case: 95-1257 Document: 01019279334 Date Filed: 04/23/1996 Page: 3 
pertinent part: 

A policy may contain provisions which prohibit stacking the limits of more 

than one uninsured motorist coverage policy as provided in this section, if such 

provisions are included in a single policy covering multiple vehicles or in multiple 

policies issued by one insurer or an affiliated insurer, under common ownership or 

management, to an insured or to a resident relative of such insured. Such provisions 

shall not prohibit stacking of the uninsured or underinsured portions of a policy 

issued to an insured and a separate policy covering the insured which was not issued 

to an insured or a resident relative. 

Mr. Sellers also claims the amendment's anti-stacking provision is not subject to the general rule that 

statutes are presumed to apply prospectively because the amendment merely clarified the intent of 

the preexisting statute and thus should be applied retroactively. The district court found the antistacking provision was valid because Mr. Sellers was legally entitled to recover for his injuries on 

the date of the accident, which was prior to the statutory amendment. Furthermore, the district court 

noted that prior to the amendment anti-stacking provisions were allowed in Colorado and that 

"[a]bsent any evidence to the contrary, Colorado statutes apply prospectively only." 

As a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction, we apply the law of the state where the 

claim was brought. Budd v. American Excess Ins. Co., 928 F.2d 344, 346 (lOth Cir. 1991). In 

Colorado, insurance policies are generally interpreted under the law of the state where the policy was 

issued. Blue Cross ofWestern New York v. Bukulmez, 736 P.2d 834, 841 (Colo. 1987). Our duty 

is thus to ascertain and "apply the most recent statement of state law by the state's highest court." 

Woodv. Eli Lilly & Co., 38 F.3d 510,513 (lOth Cir. 1994). Although we are not required to follow 

the dictates of an intermediate state appellate court, we may view such a decision as persuasive as 

to how the state supreme court might rule. Perlmutter v. United States Gypsum Co., 4 F .3d 864, 869 

4 

Appellate Case: 95-1257 Document: 01019279334 Date Filed: 04/23/1996 Page: 4 
n.2 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

The Colorado Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, but we find a recent 

Colorado Court of Appeals opinion persuasive authority regarding how this issue should be decided. 

In Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Walther, 902 P.2d 930, 936 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995), the court rejected the 

plaintiffs contention that the General Assembly's 1992 amendment to § 1 0-4-609(2) applied to an 

insurance policy's anti-stacking clause where "[t]he amendment was enacted after the policy here 

was issued and after the accident upon which the claim was based." In the case at bar, both the 

issuance of the policy and the accident also preceded the amendment. Therefore, according to the 

only Colorado case to deal directly with this issue, both Mr. Sellers' argmnents fail because the 1992 

amendment to 1 0-4-609(2) cannot serve to retroactively invalidate an insurance policy's anti-stacking 

provision which was in effect prior to the amendment where the accident for which he seeks 

recovery also occurred prior to the amendment. 

II 

Next, Mr. Sellers argues the district court erred in finding no material facts existed as to the 

applicability of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. Mr. Sellers, however, fails to identify a single 

factual dispute in support of his position, nor are we aware of any material factual dispute. In 

reviewing a motion for summary judgment where there are no material facts in dispute we look to 

see whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law. Wolf, 50 F.3d at 796. As we 

noted above, because this is a diversity action we look to the laws of Colorado. 

5 

Appellate Case: 95-1257 Document: 01019279334 Date Filed: 04/23/1996 Page: 5 
"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege." Department of 

Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo. 1984). Waiver can be established either through an 

express statement or it can be implied through a party's conduct. !d. In order for estoppel to apply 

four elements must be established: "the party to be estopped must know the facts; this party must 

intend that his or her conduct be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a 

right to believe the other party's conduct is so intended; the party asserting the estoppel must be 

ignorant of the true facts; and the party asserting the estoppel must rely on the other party's conduct 

to its injury." ld; Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n of Colorado, 761 P.2d 1140, 1146 (Colo. 1988). 

Mr. Sellers maintains that by continuing to discuss the scope of its liability with him, while 

preventing him from obtaining arbitration, Allstate either waived its right to challenge its liability 

altogether or should be estopped from doing so because it knew the relevant facts and he relied on 

their assurances to his detriment in the form of drawn out and expensive legal proceedings. The 

district court held that "[e]ven assuming the existence of facts sufficient to support a waiver and/or 

estoppel argument, it is well established that these doctrines cannot be used in order to create 

coverage where none previously existed under the terms of the policy." The district court then noted 

that because Allstate merely provided excess coverage up to $50,000, and Mr. Sellers had already 

received $50,000 from the primary insurer "no coverage exists under the Allstate policy and the 

doctrines of waiver and estoppel cannot be used to create coverage." 

Mr. Sellers argues the district court erred in its application of Colorado law because he was 

not attempting to use waiver or estoppel to create coverage but merely to enforce coverage the 

6 

Appellate Case: 95-1257 Document: 01019279334 Date Filed: 04/23/1996 Page: 6 
Allstate policy already provided. We disagree and fmd the district court was correct in its 

interpretation and application of Colorado law. In Hartford Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 372 P.2d 

740, 742 (Colo. 1962), the court quoted 29A Am. Jur. § 1135 in holding that "while an insurer may 

be estopped by its conduct or its knowledge from insisting upon a forfeiture of a policy, the 

coverage, or restrictions on the coverage, cannot be extended by the doctrine of waiver or estoppel." 

Mr. Sellers is seeking to extend the coverage of Allstate's policy. Allstate's policy specifically states 

that it provides excess coverage in cases where the vehicle involved is insured by another policy. 

Mr. Sellers does not dispute that U.S. Fire was the primary insurer of the motorcycle involved in the 

accident. Allstate's coverage was thus limited to provide whatever deficit existed between the 

amount U.S. Fire paid Mr. Sellers and its policy's $50,000 limit. In this case, U.S. Fire paid Mr. 

Sellers $90,000 as the result of a lawsuit settlement thus leaving Allstate with no liability to Mr. 

Sellers. To allow Mr. Sellers to use the doctrine of waiver or estoppel to recover anything from 

Allstate would be an illegitimate expansion upon the express coverage of the policy. See also 

Continental Casualty Co. v. Empire Casualty Co., 713 P.2d 384,390 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding 

the doctrine of waiver may not be used to establish or expand insurance coverage where none existed 

under the policy), affd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 764 P.2d 1191 (Colo. 1988); 

Western Ins. Co. v. Cimarron Pipe Line Constr., Inc., 748 F.2d 1397, 1399 (lOth Cir. 1984) (noting 

well settled view that doctrines of waiver and estoppel cannot be used to extend coverage of an 

insurance policy). 

For the reasons stated above the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

7 

Appellate Case: 95-1257 Document: 01019279334 Date Filed: 04/23/1996 Page: 7