Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03282/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03282-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brandy K. Brenton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3282

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Brandy K. Brenton, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 16, 2006

Filed: February 22, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, LAY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

I. BACKGROUND

In May 2004, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging

Brandy Brenton with conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to distribute five

kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and

possession with intent to distribute less than 500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 

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The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

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On March 29, 2005, the district court1

 denied Brenton’s request for a

continuance. On the day of trial, Brenton again requested a continuance because, she

claimed, the relationship between her and her attorney had substantially deteriorated.

The district court also denied this request. 

Trial commenced on April 21, 2005. On direct examination, the government

introduced certain documents recovered from Brenton’s home through Officer Lang

of the Omaha Police Department. Officer Lang testified the documents were

consistent with records kept by individuals involved in drug distribution. On crossexamination, Officer Lang admitted he did not know who made the records, when

they were made, or where they were made. Further, Officer Lang testified the

documents were also consistent with gambling records. When defense counsel asked

Officer Lang if he was any more knowledgeable than his fellow officers in the details,

practices, and procedures of drug records generally, Officer Lang responded he was

not. Defense counsel objected to the introduction of Officer Lang’s testimony. The

objection was overruled.

A jury subsequently found Breton guilty of conspiracy to distribute or possess

with intent to distribute over 500 grams of cocaine, and possession with intent to

distribute less than 500 grams of cocaine. 

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Brenton filed a motion in limine to preclude the government from introducing

the records recovered from her house. She also objected to the introduction of Officer

Lang’s testimony at trial. Therefore we assume, for purposes of this appeal, that

Brenton properly preserved any alleged trial error regarding the introduction of

Officer Lang’s testimony.

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II. DISCUSSION

Brenton argues the district court2

 erred on three separate grounds when it

permitted Officer Lang to testify at trial. We review the district court’s evidentiary

rulings for an abuse of discretion. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n.1

(1997). 

First, Brenton contends she did not receive notice from the government that

Officer Lang would be called as an expert witness until one day before trial. Brenton

argues the government’s omission was prejudicial because it prevented her from

preparing a proper cross-examination for Officer Lang. However, Rule 16(a)(1)(G)

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure places an affirmative obligation on the

defendant to request a list of the witnesses the government intends to use in its casein-chief. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G). The record does not reveal, nor does

Brenton claim, that she made any such request prior to trial. Therefore, there was no

error.

Second, Brenton argues the district court erred when it permitted Officer Lang

to testify because his testimony was overly speculative, and “[e]xpert testimony that

is speculative is not competent proof and contributes nothing to a legally sufficient

evidentiary basis.” Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1057

(8th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). However, we have made clear that an

expert’s testimony generally goes to credibility, not admissibility. McKnight v.

Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1408 (8th Cir. 1994). Expert opinion is overly

speculative, and therefore inadmissible, only where “it is so fundamentally

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unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the jury.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Before testifying about the records recovered from Brenton’s home, Officer Lang

provided testimony detailing the knowledge, training, and experience he had acquired

conducting drug investigations as a police officer with the Omaha Police Department.

This foundation was enough to demonstrate Officer Lang’s testimony was capable of

offering some assistance to the jury.

Third, Brenton contends the district court erred when it allowed Officer Lang

to testify as an expert without first being so recognized by the court. However, the

record reveals the district court did qualify Officer Lang as an expert. During voir

dire, Officer Lang detailed the extent of his extensive training, knowledge, and

experience in drug activities and investigations. Further, Officer Lang stated that he

had been recognized previously as an expert witness in both state and federal court.

We note that “[i]t is well within the discretion of a district court to allow law

enforcement officials to testify as experts concerning the modus operandi of drug

dealers.” United States v. Solorio-Tafolla, 324 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). Given

the record before us, we believe the district court recognized Officer Lang as an expert

before he testified and, therefore, there was no error.

Brenton next contests the jury’s verdict. Specifically, Brenton disputes the

jury’s drug quantity findings. Our standard of review in these instances is strict.

United States v. Sanders, 341 F.3d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 2003). We are required to

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all

reasonable inferences from the evidence in the government’s favor. Id. 

Brenton’s conviction is supported by the testimony of Jared Welsh, who stated

he began purchasing “8-balls” (one eighth of an ounce), quarter-ounce, and half-ounce

quantities of cocaine from Brenton in December 2003. Welsh further testified that,

in January or February 2004, he began purchasing at least one ounce of cocaine, each

week, from Brenton until her arrest on April 28, 2004. Welsh stated this estimate was

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Brenton also filed a pro se brief asserting several other bases for appeal. After

review, we find these claims to be meritless.

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“conservative.” Brenton urges the court to disregard Welsh’s testimony because, on

previous occasions, he provided officers with conflicting accounts regarding the

amount of drugs he purchased from Brenton. However, we will not consider attacks

on witness credibility when evaluating an appeal based on sufficiency of the evidence.

United States v. Funchess, 422 F.3d 698, 701 (8th Cir. 2005). The record testimony

of Welsh, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, is sufficient to

support the jury’s drug quantity findings and its verdict. 

Finally, Brenton argues the district court erred when it denied her two motions

for continuance. We review these rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States

v. Vesey, 330 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 2003). We note that prior to Brenton’s last

two motions for continuance, she sought and received several continuances.

Moreover, the record reveals Brenton used several delaying tactics as her case was

proceeding to trial. Although a defendant maintains the right to select counsel of her

choice, this right should not be manipulated to delay the orderly administration of

justice. United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1992). The record

supports the conclusion that Brenton’s motions for continuance were simply the latest

in a series of measures aimed at delaying trial. Therefore, the district court did not

abuse its discretion when it denied these motions.3

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s evidentiary rulings, its denial of Brenton’s

motions for continuance, and the jury’s verdict.

______________________________

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