Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-07-06279/USCOURTS-ca10-07-06279-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary R. Thompson
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In re:

GARY R. THOMPSON,

Movant.

Nos. 07-6223 & 07-6279

(D.C. No. 07-cv-00706-F)

ORDER

Filed December 3, 2007

Before BRISCOE, EBEL, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.

Movant Gary R. Thompson, an Oklahoma state inmate, has filed a motion

for remand and a motion for authorization, both relating to his attempt, in June

2007, to file a second 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging his 1994 first-degree

murder conviction. The district court transferred the petition to this court because

Thompson had previously filed a § 2254 petition, see Thompson v. Ward,

13 F. App’x 782, 784 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of petition), but had not

obtained authorization from this court to file another § 2254 petition, as required

by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Thompson first filed a motion requesting the

matter be remanded to the district court, arguing that he does not need this court’s

authorization to file his proposed § 2254 petition. Though he does not believe

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authorization to file his proposed petition is necessary, he has also filed a motion

requesting authorization. We deny both motions.

Motion for Remand. In support of his remand motion, Thompson argues

that (1) the district court abused its discretion by sua sponte transferring the

§ 2254 petition to this court without first giving him an opportunity to present it

in district court; (2) as a matter of law, it is clearly established that the state must

assert that a second § 2254 petition is successive before burdening the § 2254

applicant to show that it is not; and (3) that a second-or-successive defense is not

jurisdictional, and federal courts have discretion to consider a second § 2254

petition if the state does not assert such a defense. These arguments are patently

frivolous, having no support in current law.

Since 1996, when the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) was adopted, federal habeas applicants have been prohibited from

filing a second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus in federal

court unless they first “move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order

authorizing the district court to consider the application.” § 2244(b)(3)(A). The

plain text of AEDPA’s pre-authorization statute clearly states that district courts

do not have discretion to consider an unauthorized second or successive petition,

and places the burden squarely on the applicant, not the government, to

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1 “A claim presented in a second or successive [§ 2254 petition] . . . shall be

dismissed unless the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of

constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme

Court,” or depends on facts that “could not have been discovered previously

through the exercise of due diligence,” and that would establish by clear and

convincing evidence that “but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(2) (emphasis added).

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demonstrate eligibility for such authorization. See § 2244(b)(2). Shortly after 1

AEDPA was enacted, this court held that, when an unauthorized second or

successive § 2254 petition or 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion is filed in district court,

the district court lacks jurisdiction to decide it, Pease v. Klinger, 115 F.3d 763,

764 (10th Cir. 1997), and should transfer the unauthorized petition or motion to

this court, in the interest of justice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631, to cure the lack

of jurisdiction, Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 1997) (per

curiam). 

In short, all of Thompson’s arguments in the motion for remand are without

merit. As support for these frivolous arguments, Thompson’s counsel relies either

on pre-AEDPA statutes, rules and decisions or misstates or misapplies the

holdings of more recent decisions. The district court correctly treated

Thompson’s proposed § 2254 petition as a second or successive petition and

correctly transferred it to this court for authorization. 

Motion for Authorization. Thompson requests authorization to present

claims in a second § 2254 petition that (1) he received constitutionally ineffective

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assistance of counsel because (a) his trial counsel failed to secure favorable

preliminary hearing evidence; impeach certain government witnesses; obtain

ballistic evidence from the state, raise suppression of evidence claims; and

challenge certain identification testimony; and (b) his appellate counsel failed to

raise a due process claim that Thompson should only have been charged with

second-degree murder; (2) the state suppressed evidence that certain witnesses

were given deals and assistance for testifying against him, and suppressed

portions of the preliminary hearing transcripts relevant to this claim; and

(3) Oklahoma state courts denied his constitutional right to access of the courts by

denying his post-conviction ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.

To obtain permission to file a second or successive § 2254 petition,

Thompson must show that he has not raised his claim in a previous habeas

petition, § 2244(b)(1) and (b)(2), and that his new claim either “relies on a new

rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” § 2244(b)(2)(A), or depends on

facts, previously undiscoverable through the exercise of due diligence, that would

establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was not guilty of the offense,

§ 2244(b)(2)(B). 

With respect to his first two claims, Thompson asserts that he is relying on

newly-discovered evidence, namely newly-discovered preliminary hearing

transcripts. This asserted new evidence does not meet the requirements of

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§ 2244(b)(2)(B) for two reasons. First, Thompson has not met his burden to

demonstrate that his new evidence “could not have been discovered previously

through the exercise of due diligence,” as required by § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). The

preliminary hearing and trial transcripts have been available since his conviction. 

He asserts that the state suppressed the preliminary hearing transcripts, but

provides no evidentiary support for this claim, and gives no indication of the

efforts he made to obtain these transcripts. See Babbitt v. Woodford, 177 F.3d

744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that movant failed to make a prima facie

showing under § 2244(b)(2)(B) where evidence was discoverable through due

diligence). 

Second, Thompson did not actually submit any new evidence in his motion

for authorization, and his conclusory and unsupported allegations are insufficient

to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that his purported new evidence establishes

by “clear and convincing” proof that he is not guilty of the underlying offense, as

required by § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). Furthermore, it is clear there is no new factual

predicate for Thompson’s ineffective-assistance of appellate counsel claim;

Thompson argued in his first § 2254 petition that he should only have been

charged with second-degree murder. See § 2244(b)(1) (“[a] claim presented in a

second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was

presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”).

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Finally, Thompson’s access-to-courts claim relies on no new evidence or

retroactively-applicable constitutional law under § 2244(b)(2). Moreover, the

denial of his state post-conviction petition based on application of state law is not

a basis for federal habeas relief. 

Accordingly, the motion for remand is DENIED, and the motion for

authorization is DENIED. The denial of authorization is not appealable and may

not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E). The matter is TERMINATED.

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

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