Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03039/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03039-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Cunningham
Appellee
Larry Noble
Appellee
Jason Powell
Appellant
Gary Slater
Appellee
D. Smith
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3039

___________________________

Jason Powell

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Larry Noble, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Iowa Department of

Public Safety; Gary Slater, in his official capacity as Fair Secretary/Manager/CEO

of Iowa State Fair; D. Smith, individually and in his official capacity as Officer for

Iowa State Fair Patrol; Michael Cunningham, individually and in his official

capacity as Trooper for the Iowa State Patrol

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

____________

 Submitted: April 13, 2015

 Filed: August 14, 2015

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Jason Powell brought a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and

1988 against four Iowa officials—Larry Noble, Gary Slater, Doug Smith, and

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Michael Cunningham—after he was ejected from the Iowa State Fairgrounds while

engaging in religious expression. Powell also moved for a preliminary injunction,

which the district court granted in part and denied in part. Powell filed this

interlocutory appeal challenging the denial. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1), we affirm the district court’s denial of Powell’s motion based on his

First Amendment claim and remand the case to the district court to consider Powell’s

request for preliminary injunctive relief based on his due process claim. 

I. Background

Powell is a Christian who contends that his beliefs compel him to publicly

share his faith with others. To achieve this goal, Powell seeks out public places

where he can find significant numbers of people near his home in Des Moines, Iowa,

and shares his faith by wearing clothing bearing Christian messages, holding signs,

engaging in open-air speech, and having conversations with individuals willing to

speak with him. Powell asserts he does not try to draw crowds, interfere with traffic,

conduct any formof demonstration, or otherwise cause a disturbance with his speech,

but only seeks to share his message with those willing to receive it. 

The events leading to this lawsuit occurred on August 15 and 16, 2013, when

Powell went to the Iowa State Fairgrounds seeking to share his Christian message. 

The fairgrounds, which are owned by the State of Iowa and managed by the Iowa

State Fair Board, cover approximately 435 acres in Des Moines and include

campgrounds, fair facilities, and parking areas. The fairgrounds are the home of the

Iowa State Fair, an annual event that attracts more than one million visitors per year. 

The fair takes place within a select portion of the fairgrounds, and fairgoers must pay

admission to enter the fair. 

The 2013 Iowa State Fair ran from August 8 to August 18. On August 15,

Powell went to the fairgrounds in the late afternoon and positioned himself on a

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sidewalk on the west side of the fairgrounds, outside the paid admission area. Powell

stood close to the intersection of East 30th Street and Grand Avenue near the main

gate to the fair, Gate 11. During the fair, East 30th Street is open to vehicles and

often heavily trafficked, while Grand Avenue is generally closed to automobile

traffic. Vehicles drop off and pick up fairgoers at Gate 11. Des Moines police

officers are stationed at Gate 11 during the fair to help control traffic. Powell stated

he chose to stand in this location because it offered a convergence of pedestrian

traffic, and indeed, of the approximately 86,000 people who attended the fair on

August 15, about 30,000 people entered or exited through Gate 11. After choosing

this location, Powell began sharing a religious message via oral presentation, a sign,

an expressive t-shirt, and one-on-one conversations. Powell asserts he did not block

any pedestrian traffic, create congestion, or otherwise cause a disturbance. Around

8:00 p.m., several uniformed Iowa State Fair Patrol Officers, including Appellee

Smith, approached Powell and told him to leave the fairgrounds. He asked the

officers to confirm whether he was standing on public property and they reiterated

that he needed to leave the property immediately. Powell again tried to clarify why

he was being asked to leave, and Smith told him he would be arrested for criminal

trespass if he did not leave immediately. Smith also told Powell he could continue

his expressive activities across the street on non-fairground property. Powell did not

find the location across the street suitable for his purposes and left the area.

The next day, Powellreturned to the fairgroundsin the late afternoon and stood

in front of some public restrooms near Gate 15 on the north side of the fairgrounds,

again outside the paid admission area. Gate 15 is near some of the primary parking

areas for the fair, and the roadways in this area experience heavy vehicular and

pedestrian traffic. Of the approximately 95,000 visitors who came to the fair on

August 16, about 24,000 came through Gate 15. At this location, Powell began

sharing his message by holding up a sign attached to an aluminum pole. He did not

make an oral presentation. Powell asserts he was careful to stand in a spot where he

was not blocking access to the restrooms or fair entrance. Shortly after 7:00 p.m.,

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Fair Patrol Officers approached Powell and told him to leave. Powell asked why he

had to leave, and the officers told him the fair owned the property and did not want

him there. When Powell asked if he was on public or private property, one of the

officers asked if he wasthe same person who caused a problem the prior day and then

radioed the Iowa State Patrol, who sent Appellee Cunningham, an Iowa State

Trooper, and another officer to the scene. Cunningham escorted Powell to a booking

area inside the fair, where he told Powell he had committed trespass and issued him

an ejection notice stating he was banned from the fair for its duration. Cunningham

warned Powell to stay away and told him he would be charged with criminal trespass

if he returned to the fairgrounds for any reason during the duration of the fair. 

Fearing arrest, Powell left and did not return to the fairgrounds during the 2013 fair.

In June 2014, Powell filed a complaint against four defendants: Smith and

Cunningham, who were involved in ejecting him from the fair; Slater, the manager

and CEO of the fair; and Noble, the Commissioner of the Iowa Department of Public

Safety. The complaint alleged that Powell’s ejection violated his free speech and due

process rights. Powell also filed a motion for preliminary injunction asking the

district court to enjoin the appellees from “applying [a] First Amendment ban on

Powell’s expression . . . so as to prevent Powell and other disfavored third party

speakers from engaging in protected expression on public sidewalks outside of the

Iowa State Fair during the 2014 event and all other future Iowa State Fairs.” R. Doc.

3, at 1. Appellees resisted Powell’s motion, arguing he failed to meet his burden of

showing he was entitled to a preliminary injunction. In their response to Powell’s

motion, appelleesstated that while the fair does not have any written rules regulating

visitors’ exercise of free speech during the fair, the fair does enforce two unwritten

rules, which they described as follows: (1) “the activity must not impede the flow of

people into, out of, or within the Fairgrounds;” and (2) “if a visitor brings a sign, the

sign must not be attached to any kind of pole or stick due to safety concerns with the

pole or stick being used as a weapon.” R. Doc. 12-4, at 2-3. Regarding the first rule,

appellees explained that “[w]ith more than a million people visiting the fair each year,

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maintaining the flow of people throughout the Fairgrounds becomes a paramount

concern. People standing in the entryways of the fairgrounds can impede or interfere

with the flow of people.” R. Doc. 12-4, at 2-3. In his reply to the appellees’

response, Powell argued that these unwritten rules are unconstitutional because they

violate his First Amendment and due process rights. Powell asked the court to enjoin

application of these rules, in addition to his earlier request that the court enjoin the

“ban on Powell’s expression on public ways outside [the] Fair.” R. Doc. 15, at 3.

The district court held a hearing on Powell’s motion. Powell testified at that

hearing, as did Slater and two Fair Patrol Officers who were involved in ejecting

Powell from the fairgrounds, Rhonda Hummel and Terry Orr. Hummel testified she

was dispatched to Gate 11 on the evening of August 15 because someone reported

there was a person standing outside that gate impeding the flow of pedestrians. When

Hummel arrived at Gate 11, she observed Powellstanding approximately 15 feetfrom

a ticket booth holding a poster-sized sign attached to a pole and obstructing

pedestrian traffic on the sidewalk, causing pedestrians to enter the street to pass him. 

Hummel was not part of the conversation between Smith and Powell, but she

observed Smith speak to Powell and then saw Powell leave the fairgrounds. Hummel

testified she would not have been concerned about Powell impeding traffic if he had

moved farther north or south of the main gate to less-congested portions of the

fairgrounds. Orr was dispatched to Gate 15 on the evening of August 16 based on a

report that there was an individual standing partially in the street who was impeding

people from entering the fair. When Orr arrived at Gate 15, he observed Powell

standing partially in the street, holding a sign attached to an aluminum pole, and

stopping people as they tried to enter the fair. Orr asked Powell to leave the

fairgrounds and told him he could cross the street to a convenience store to continue

his speech. Orr testified he was not concerned about the metal pole Powell was

holding, and while he was concerned that Powell was impeding traffic, he did not

mention that concern to Powell during their conversation. Slater testified about the

fair’s safety concerns regarding traffic impediments and specifically regarding the

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locations Powell chose for his speech. Slater stated he would not be concerned with

an individual positioning himself in less-trafficked areas north orsouth of Gate 11 or

north of Gate 15. Powell testified that none of the officers he encountered ever gave

him a reason for his ejection from the fair, told him he was impeding traffic, or

suggested he could move to less-trafficked areas on the fairgrounds, but rather only

told him he was trespassing and demanded that he leave. 

At the motion hearing, Powell clarified that he sought to enjoin three separate

rules or policies: (1) the “policy of treating public property as though it is private

property so as to empower the Fair Authority to dispose unwelcome individuals and

specifically serving as a ban on Mr. Powell’s speech”; (2) the “general prohibition on

things asthey would determine it that could possibly impede traffic”; and (3) “the ban

on the poles and sticks that would be attached to signage.” R. Doc. 23, at 70-71. 

Powell argued all three rules violate both his free speech and due process rights. 

Regarding free speech, Powell argued the rules are not narrowly tailored and there is

no evidence they address legitimate concerns, particularly as-applied to him. He also

argued the unwritten rules violate due process because they did not and do not give

Powell fair notice of what conduct is prohibited and lend themselves to arbitrary

enforcement. Powell cited Stahl v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 687 F.3d 1038 (8th

Cir. 2012), to argue that the unwritten rule against impeding traffic violates due

process because it does not give people notice of what conduct violates the law and

because whether a violation occurs could depend on the reactions of third parties

rather than the behavior of the person charged with a violation. Powell asked the

district court to enjoin fair officials from applying these three rules to prohibit his

expression. He is concerned that if he returns to the fair to try to share his message,

he will again be ejected and possibly arrested. 

The district court granted Powell’s motion for preliminary injunction on one

narrow issue, enjoining appellees from “arresting or threatening to arrest [Powell]

solely for engaging in protected speech on the Fairgrounds in locations where

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[appellees] have already conceded that he is not impeding or would not be likely to

impede the flow of traffic.” R. Doc. 18, at 31. The court otherwise denied Powell’s

request for preliminary injunctive relief. Powell now appeals the denial of his motion

for a preliminary injunction.

II. First Amendment Claim

We review a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of

discretion. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 870 (8th

Cir. 2012) (en banc). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the district court rests 1

its conclusion on clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal conclusions.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether to issue a preliminary

injunction, the district court must consider: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the

movant; (2) the balance between that harm and the injury that granting the injunction

will inflict on the other interested parties; (3) the probability the movant will succeed

on the merits; and (4) whether the injunction isin the public interest. Dataphase Sys.,

Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 

The parties express some confusion about the appropriate standard of review

1

in this case. Both cite Families Achieving Independence & Respect v. Nebraska

Department of Social Services(FAIR), 111 F.3d 1408 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc), with

Powell arguing FAIR dictates we “conduct an independent examination of the record

as a whole without deference to the district court” and appellees asserting FAIR

conflicts with our application of the abuse-of-discretion standard in Blue Moon

Entertainment, LLC v. City of Bates City, Missouri, 441 F.3d 561, 564 (8th Cir.

2006). “We consistently have held that the grant of preliminary relief is within the

discretion of the district court.” Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109,

114 n.8 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). FAIR presents no conflict because the court was

not reviewing a denial of preliminary injunctive relief. See FAIR, 111 F.3d at 1414. 

We note that “[w]hen purely legal questions are presented . . . this court owes no

special deference to the district court, and we review its legal conclusions de novo.” 

St. Louis Effort for AIDS v. Huff, 782 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

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The district court first considered the likelihood that Powell would succeed on

the merits of his First Amendment claim. The court preliminarily concluded that the

disputed portion of the fairgrounds should be considered a limited public forum, at

least during the Iowa State Fair. The court relied on a number of factors in reaching

this conclusion, including the presence of a fence around most of the fairgrounds,

marking it as separate and distinct from other public streets and sidewalks; the

presence of fair personnel and law enforcement around the fairgrounds; and the fact

that the areas in question are not continually open, uncongested thoroughfares used

to travel from one public point to another but rather, at least during the fair, are busy

and subject to significant congestion as thousands of people use them for ingress and

egress to the fair. The court acknowledged that the disputed areas are outside the

paid admission area, a distinction from other cases it cited finding fairs to be limited

public forums, but concluded the logic from those cases applied because the paid

admission area cannot serve its purpose without mechanisms to provide parking and

access points to the fair. 

The district court next concluded that the applicable standard of scrutiny for

the limited public forum at issue was the “reasonableness” and “viewpoint neutral”

standard. Applying this level of scrutiny, the court concluded all three rules at issue

are viewpoint-neutral and considered whether each isreasonable. Regarding the first

rule, which Powell characterized as a policy of “treating the public property like

private property so as to ban unwelcome speech,” the court found no evidence on the

record indicating appellees actually ascribe to or apply any such policy, and thus

found nothing for it to analyze or enjoin. The court found the two unwritten rules,

regarding traffic and poles and sticks, are reasonable except in one narrow

application, namely, appellees’ threat to arrest Powell in areas of the fairgrounds

where they conceded he would likely not impede traffic. The court thus concluded

Powell had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his First

Amendment claim except as to this one narrow issue.

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The district court next considered the threat of irreparable harm to Powell. It

concluded that, except on the aforementioned narrow issue, Powell’s failure to

demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits also implied a lack of irreparable

harm. The court further found that as there was no evidence on the record that the

rule against poles and sticks played a role in appellees’ decision to eject Powell from

the fairgrounds, Powell only demonstrated a mere possibility of harm arising from

that rule, which was insufficient to show a threat of irreparable harm. The court thus

concluded Powell was not entitled to injunctive relief on the poles-and-sticksrule and

continued to consider the balance of harms to Powell and other interested parties if

it preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the traffic rule. The court concluded that an

injunction barring appellees from enforcing the traffic rule would damage appellees’

interest in ensuring safe access to the fair and could pose a substantial risk of danger

to the public. The court discerned no particular harm from enjoining appellees from

arresting or threatening to arrest Powell solely for engaging in protected speech in

areas of the fairgrounds where he is not impeding the flow of traffic. The court thus

enjoined appellees from “arresting or threatening to arrest [Powell] solely for

engaging in protected speech on the Fairgrounds in locations where [appellees] have

already conceded that he is not impeding or would not be likely to impede the flow

of traffic.” R. Doc. 18, at 39. The court pointed to appellees’ testimony regarding

locations where Powell could stand and encouraged appelleesto provide Powell with

a list of any other areas on the fairgrounds where he could exercise his free speech

activities without impeding traffic. Powell now appeals, focusing on the district

court’s holdings on the two unwritten rules against impeding traffic and bringing

poles and sticks to the fair. 

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The rules Powell challenges are unwritten, informal rules, not “‘government

action based on presumptively reasoned democratic processes,’” and thus he “need

only show a reasonable probability of success, that is, a ‘fair chance of prevailing’”

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on his claims to warrant possible preliminary injunctive relief. Kroupa v. Nielsen,

731 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v.

Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). “The standards that we apply

to determine whether a State has unconstitutionally excluded a private speaker from

use of a public forum depend on the nature of the forum.” Good News Club v.

Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). Traditional and designated public

forums receive the greatest protection, while public entities have more flexibility to

regulate speech in limited public forums to facilitate the intended purposes of those

forums. See id.; Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry Found. v. Lee’s Summit R-7

Sch. Dist., 640 F.3d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 2011). “Once a court makes a determination

on the nature of the forum, it then applies the appropriate standard of scrutiny to

decide whether a restriction on speech passes constitutional muster.” Bowman v.

White, 444 F.3d 967, 974 (8th Cir. 2006). 

The parties agree that Powell’s religious expression is protected speech. They

disagree on the nature of the forum and on the appropriate standard of scrutiny. 

Powell argues that the areas in question are traditional public forums, as they are

sidewalks the public can freely access, as opposed to the paid admission areas of the

fair. Alternatively, he argues the areas should be treated as designated public forums,

as the fair has opened them to the public for speech purposes and has not limited that

use to certain groups or subjects. He argues that regardless of how the areas are

classified, the fair’s restrictionsshould be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Appellees

argue the district court correctly classified the areas a limited public forum and

correctly applied the appropriate level of scrutiny in evaluating whether the fair’s

rules are viewpoint-neutral and reasonable. 

We first consider what type of forum the disputed areas in question constitute. 

Traditional public forums are “public areas such as streets and parks that, since ‘time

out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts

between citizens, and discussing public questions.’” VictoryThrough Jesus, 640 F.3d

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at 334 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45

(1983)). Designated public forums are public areas “‘which the State has opened for

use by the public as a place for expressive activity.’” Id. (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at

45). “‘The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting

limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forumfor public

discourse.’” Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.

788, 802 (1985)). Limited public forums (sometimes called nonpublic forums)

include public properties that are not by tradition or designation public forums but

have been opened by the government for limited purposes, communicative or

otherwise. Id. 

Powell concedes that the paid admission areas of the fairgrounds constitute a

limited public forum but argues that the sidewalks in the non-paid-admission areas

of the fairgrounds on which he wantsto stand do not constitute a limited public forum

because access to them is free and unrestricted. While public sidewalks have most

often been treated as traditional public forums, “‘[p]ublicly owned or operated

property does not become a “public forum” simply because members of the public are

permitted to come and go at will.’” Bowman, 444 F.3d at 978 (alteration in original)

(quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)). “The government, no

less than a private owner of property, has the power to preserve the property under

its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” Grace, 461 U.S. at 178

(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he location and purpose of a publicly owned

sidewalk is critical to determining whether such a sidewalk constitutes a public

forum.” United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1990). In determining

forum type, we must consider factors such as the nature of the space, “the traditional

use of the property, the objective use and purposes of the space, and the government

intent and policy with respect to the property,” as well as “any special characteristics

regarding the environment in which those areas exist.” Bowman, 444 F.3d at 978. 

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The property in question—at least during the fair—servesthe specific purpose

of allowing tens of thousands of people to enter and exit the fair’s paid admission

areas. The sidewalks on which Powell wants to stand are not open, unrestricted

thoroughfares for general public passage but rather are situated near entrance gates

on the fairgrounds and serve as a congested conduit for ingress and egress. The

government’s intent and policy with respect to the use of these areas is to facilitate

safe and efficient access to the fair. The congestion, signage, police presence, and

fencing that mark the fairgrounds during the fair are special characteristics that

clearly set these areas apart from regular public sidewalks. Thus, on this record, we

agree with the district court’s preliminary conclusion that the disputed areas in

question should be considered a limited public forum, at least during the 11 days each

year when the Iowa State Fair is underway. 

We next consider what level of scrutiny applies to restrictions in this forum.

Our precedent makes clear that the appropriate standard for a limited public forum is

whether restrictions on speech are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. Victory

Through Jesus, 640 F.3d at 334-35; see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the

Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010)

(“Recognizing a State’s right to preserve the property under its control for the use to

which it is lawfully dedicated, the Court has permitted restrictions on access to a

limited public forum . . . with this key caveat: Any access barrier must be reasonable

and viewpoint neutral.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The district

court properly selected this standard for its analysis.2

Powell argues the district court should have applied a higher level ofscrutiny, 2

intermediate scrutiny, regardless of forum type, because case law distinguishes

between restrictionsthat completely exclude someone froma forum, which need only

be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral, and restrictions that restrict access or activity

once someone is allowed inside a forum, which must meet intermediate scrutiny. The

cases Powell relies on—Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,

Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981), and Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S.

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Finally, we review the district court’s application of this standard in

considering whether Powell has a “fair chance” of succeeding in proving the fair’s

rules are viewpoint-based or unreasonable, taking into account the fairgrounds’

function and all surrounding circumstances. See Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at

685. We conclude the rules are facially viewpoint-neutral, and the record shows no

evidence they are applied in a viewpoint-based manner or were so applied against

Powell. Indeed, Powell states the rules permit “[a]ny kind of expression,” without

creating limitations by speaker or topic, as long as expressive activities do not create

congestion or involve poles or sticks. Thus our analysis focuses on the rules’

reasonableness. “Control over access to a nonpublic forum may be based on the

subject matter of the speech, on the identity or status of the speaker, or on the

practical need to restrict access for reasons of manageability or the lack of resources

to meet total demand.” Victory Through Jesus, 640 F.3d at 335. A restriction “must

be ‘reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves’” and “[t]he

reasonableness of a restriction on access is supported when ‘substantial alternative

channels’ remain open for the restricted communication.” Id. (quoting Perry, 460

U.S. at 49, 53). 

98 (2001)—do not make this distinction, nor do we find support for this argument

elsewhere in the case law. See, e.g., Green v. Nocciero, 676 F.3d 748, 753-54 (8th

Cir. 2012) (“having chosen to conduct its businessin public and to hear citizen views,

the Board could not deny access to the meeting” or “discriminate against a speaker

based on his viewpoint,” but since the meeting was a limited public forum, the Board

“could reasonably restrict public access to this forum based on . . . the practical need

to restrict access for reasons of manageability,” which “necessarily included the

authority to remove an unruly or disruptive member of the audience” (internal

quotation marks omitted)); Victory Through Jesus, 640 F.3d at 335-36 (applying

reasonableness standard where appellants were not excluded from a backpack flyer

distribution programbut rather their accessto the programwasrestricted by deadlines

and limits on how often they could distribute flyers). 

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First, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding Powell

is unlikely to succeed in showing the rule against “imped[ing] the flow of people into,

out of, or within the Fairgrounds” is unreasonable. Appellees explain that, “[w]ith

more than a million people visiting the fair each year, maintaining the flow of people

throughout the Fairgrounds becomes a paramount concern.” R. Doc. 12-4, at 2-3. 

The Iowa State Fair “is a temporary event attracting great numbers of visitors who

come to the event for a short period to see and experience the host of exhibits and

attractions at the Fair. The flow of the crowd and demands of safety are more

pressing in the context of the Fair.” See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna

Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981). In this context, “[l]imiting congestion

and disruption is, of course, a legitimate and reasonable goal.” See Families

Achieving Independence & Respect v. Neb. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (FAIR), 111 F.3d

1408, 1421 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The fair’s rule prohibiting impeding the flow

of people in and out of the fairgrounds addresses the need to limit congestion and

disruption and to facilitate safe and efficient access to the fair. And, as evidenced in

the motion hearing, Powell retains alternative channels of communication on the

fairgrounds, so long as he does not position himself in a way that impedes the flow

of people. While these alternatives may not be Powell’s first choice, “‘[t]he First

Amendment does not demand unrestricted access to a nonpublic forum merely

because use of that forum may be the most efficient means of delivering the speaker’s

message.’” Id. at 1422 (alteration in original) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809). 

We also conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding

Powell is unlikely to succeed in showing the rule against bringing signs attached to

poles and sticksto the fair is unreasonable. Appellees assert thisrule is “due to safety

concerns with the pole or stick being used as a weapon.” R. Doc. 12-4, at 3. Powell

claims he needs to use a pole to hold signs above his head so his message can be seen

above the crowd. He primarily relies on Edwards v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 262 F.3d

856, 858-60 (9th Cir. 2001), a Ninth Circuit case that struck down a city ordinance

banning the attachment of wooden, plastic, or other types of support to signs carried

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during parades and public assemblies on city streets. The Edwards court, applying

the most stringent scrutiny to a restriction in a traditional public forum, noted the

city’s “substantial interest in safeguarding its citizens against violence,” but

concluded this ban was not “necessary” to serve that interest. Id. at 862-66. In

concluding the restriction could not survive a strict time, place, and manner test, the

court highlighted the unique nature and historical role of picket signs at parades and

public assemblies as a method of communication and protest and noted a number of

less restrictive alternatives the city could consider. Id. Given the differences in

context, forum, and scrutiny, we are not persuaded that the rationale from Edwards

applies here. The state has a valid interest in protecting the safety of fairgoers, see

Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650, and a ban on poles and sticks will likely be found to be a

reasonable restriction given that interest. Neither are we persuaded by Powell’s

argument that the rule is arbitrary because the fair allows mounted poles to support

tents and flags and small sticks for the fair’s many food-on-a-stick offerings. These

materials are generally different from the type of pole or stake a person would

typically use to support a sign above his or her head, and thus we doubt Powell could

show this makes the rule arbitrary. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did

not abuse its discretion in concluding Powell has not demonstrated a likelihood of

success on the merits of his First Amendment claim. 

B. Irreparable Harm

We next consider whether the district court abused its discretion in finding

Powell has not shown a threat of irreparable harm. “To succeed in demonstrating a

threat of irreparable harm, a party must show that the harm is certain and great and

of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.” S.J.W.

ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2012)

(internal quotation marks omitted). It is well-established that “[t]he loss of First

Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes

irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); see also Marcus v.

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Iowa Pub.Television, 97 F.3d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 1996) (“If [appellants] are correct

and their First Amendment rights have been violated, this constitutes an irreparable

harm.”). But as we have concluded Powell is unlikely to succeed in showing his First

Amendment rights have been violated, we agree with the district court that Powell has

not shown a threat ofirreparable harmthat warrants preliminary injunctive relief. See

Planned Parenthood Minn., 530 F.3d at 738 n.11 (“[W]ithout a showing that it will

likely prevail on its [First Amendment] claim . . . [appellant’s] asserted threat of

irreparable harm is correspondingly weakened in comparison to the State’s (and the

public’s) interest . . . .”). 

As we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining

Powell is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claim and has not

shown irreparable harm, we do not need to address the remaining Dataphase factors. 

See S.J.W., 696 F.3d at 779. We do share the district court’s concern regarding how

the officers who ejected Powell from the fairgrounds applied the fair’s rules in

handling those confrontations. But we believe the preliminary injunctive relief the

district court granted speaks to those concerns, and we note that our task at this point

is not to decide the merits of this case, but only to determine whether the district court

abused its discretion in assessing “whether the balance of equities so favors [Powell]

that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until the merits

are determined.” Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113; see also Roberts v. Van Buren Pub.

Sch., 731 F.2d 523, 526 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Our review of a district court’s denial of a

preliminary injunction is limited. The granting or denial of a preliminary injunction

is properly a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and the function of

an appellate court is limited to determining whether there has been an abuse of this

discretion.”). We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion and thus

affirm the district court’s denial of Powell’s request for preliminary injunctive relief

on his First Amendment claim. 

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III. Due Process Claim

Powell also argues he was entitled to a preliminary injunction based on his

likelihood of success on the merits of his due process claim. Powell asserted in his

complaint that appellees’ “policies are vague and lack sufficient objective standards

to curtail the discretion of officials,” in violation of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. R. Doc. 1, at 14. Citing City of Chicago v. Morales, 527

U.S. 41 (1999), Powell asserted that due process is a concern because he was

threatened with arrest for criminal trespass for violating rules that are unwritten and

are too vague to give a person clear guidance on when he or she might be violating

a rule. Powell compared this case to Stahl v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 687 F.3d

1038 (8th Cir. 2012), where the court held that a written ordinance prohibiting

conduct, including speech, that impeded pedestrian or vehicular traffic was

unconstitutionally vague and violated due process. Powell asked the district court to

enjoin the fair from applying its rules against himbecause they violate his free speech

and due process rights. 

The district court did not address Powell’s likelihood of success on the merits

of his due process claim. We will not address the merits of this claim for the first

time on appeal, for “[t]he district court is in the best position to evaluate all of the

evidence and weigh the factors to determine whether the injunction should issue.” 

Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 513 (8th Cir. 2006). But the claim warrants

consideration, particularly given that, though we have concluded the district court did

not abuse its discretion in determining Powell will likely not succeed in proving a

violation of his First Amendment rights, the allegation that these rules violate

Powell’s due process rights still implicatesspeech that both parties agree is protected. 

“A law’s failure to provide fair notice of what constitutes a violation is a special

concern where laws ‘abut[] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms’

because it ‘inhibit[s] the exercise’ of freedom of expression and ‘inevitably lead[s]

citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the

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forbidden area were clearly marked.’” Stahl, 687 F.3d at 1041 (alterations in

original) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972)). The fair

can prohibit impediments to the flow of people into, out of, and within the

fairgrounds, but it must do so “with reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be

prohibited.” Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); see also Stahl,

687 F.3d at 1041 (“So long as the ordinance is clear and provides fair notice as to

what conduct is deemed likely to cause a traffic problem, these regulations do not

offend due process.”); FAIR, 111 F.3d at 1415 (noting an unwritten rule or policy is

not automatically vague, but should be “made explicit by well-established practice,”

because “[t]o survive a vagueness challenge, a [rule] must give the person of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited and provide explicit

standards for those who apply” it (first alteration in original) (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for

consideration of whether Powell is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief based on

his due process claim. 

 

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of a preliminary

injunction on Powell’s First Amendment claim and remand the case to the district

court for consideration of whether Powell is entitled to a preliminary injunction on

his due process claim. 

LOKEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the court that Jason Powell’s First Amendment claim warrants no

greater preliminary injunctive relief than the district court granted. I join Parts I and

II of the court’s opinion. I respectfully dissent from the decision to remand for

further consideration of whether Powell’s void-for-vagueness Due Process claim

warrants additional preliminary injunctive relief. 

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“As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal

statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people

can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357

(1983). This due process doctrine has been applied more broadly, but facial

vagueness challenges to government restrictions “that do not threaten First

Amendment rights are not favored [and] a concrete showing of irreparable injury is

needed to justify preliminary injunctive relief barring enforcement.” Reproductive

Health Serv. of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 428 F.3d

1139, 1143 (8th Cir. 2005). Indeed, when a statute, regulation, or ordinance does not

implicate constitutionally protected conduct such as speech, a court “should uphold

the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” 

Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982). 

Here, Powell challenges unwritten policies that carry no criminal or civil

sanction and were adopted to carry out the important police functions of maintaining

order and managing traffic. Cf. Iowa Code §§ 321.229, 321.236(2). That the policies

are unwritten “is not fatal.” Faustin v. City and Cty. of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1202

(10th Cir. 2005). Divorced of First Amendment concerns, the vagueness claim is

inherently dubious. When the challenge isto imprecise non-criminalstandards -- for

example, “good taste,” “appropriate manner,” or “good citizenship” -- absent a

showing that policies have a chilling effect on the free speech rights of third parties,

the question is whether they “violate the due process clause as applied to the specific

facts of this case.” Woodis v. Westark Cty. Coll., 160 F.3d 435, 439 (8th Cir. 1998). 

Applying this well-established authority, it is apparent that Powell’s motion for

a preliminary injunction turned on the strength of his First Amendment claim. The

Due Process claim added nothing, and the district court did not err in failing

separately to address it. Indeed, any procedural due process claim Powell may have

had wasforeclosed when he acceded to the officers’ commandsthat he leave the State

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Fair, rather than challenging the validity of their actions. See Stephenson v.

Davenport Cty. Sch. Dist. 110 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1997).

I would affirm the district court’s order granting in part and denying in part

Powell’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 

______________________________

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