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Parties Involved:
Champion Boxed Beef Company
Appellee
Local No. 7 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union
Appellant

Document Text:

.. , 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CHAMPION BOXED BEEF COMPANY, 

v. 

Plaintiff-Counter-DefendantAppellee, 

LOCAL NO. 7 UNITED FOOD AND 

COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL 

UNION, named as: United Food and 

Commercial Workers, 

Defendant-Counter-ClaimantAppellant. 

No. 93-1221 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 93-S-124) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Walter v. Siebert of Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado, for 

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee. 

John P. Bowen, Wheat Ridge, Colorado, for Defendant-CounterClaimant-Appellant. 

Before LOGAN and SETH, Circuit Judges, and KELLY,* District Judge. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Patrick F. Kelly, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-1221 Document: 01019285070 Date Filed: 05/06/1994 Page: 1 
United Food & Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7 (the 

Union) appeals from the district court's order granting Champion 

Boxed Beef Company's (the Company) motion for summary judgment and 

vacating an arbitrator's award as not from the essence of the controlling collective bargaining agreement. 1 

As in other cases in which the district court grants summary 

judgment, we review the grant of summary judgment in a labor arbitration case de novo. Judicial review of·an arbitral award, however, "is among the narrowest known to the law." Litvak Packing 

Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers. Local Union No. 7, 886 

F.2d 275, 276 (lOth Cir. 1989). The arbitrator's factual findings 

are beyond review, and, so long as the arbitrator does not ignore 

the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement, so is 

his interpretation of the contract. See United Paperworkers Int'l 

Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987) (citing United 

Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co~., 363 U.S. 593, 599 

(1960)). As long as the arbitrator's award "draws its essence 

from the collective bargaining agreement" it must be upheld. 

Enterprise Wheel & Car, 363 U.S. at 597. 

Chris Montemayor was an employee of the Company and served as 

a steward for the Union. His usual job was to catch and sort 

product as it came off the line. On September 30, 1992, Montemayor's supervisor asked him to take a temporary assignment at the 

unloading dock. Although precisely what happened and what was 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1221 Document: 01019285070 Date Filed: 05/06/1994 Page: 2 
said after this request was disputed in testimony before the arbitrator, it is agreed that Montemayor did not perform the temporary 

assignment and that he was discharged by the Company for insubordination and for refusing to perform reasonable work. Pursuant to 

the collective bargaining agreement, Montemayor filed a grievance 

that was referred to arbitration. The resulting arbitration award 

reinstated Montemayor. The Company sued in federal district court 

to vacate the award; the Union filed a counterclaim, seeking the 

award's enforcement. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the 

district court denied the Union's motion, granted the Company's 

motion, and vacated the award. This appeal followed. We exercise 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reverse. 

part: 

I 

The collective bargaining agreement provides in pertinent 

ARTICLE 7 

7.01. No employee covered by this Agreement shall 

be . . . dismissed without just and sufficient cause. 

Sufficient cause of discharge shall include, among other 

reasons, ... insubordination; ... [and] refusal to 

perform any reasonable work, service or labor when 

required to do so by the Company .... 

ARTICLE 35 

35.01. This Agreement contains all of the covenants, stipulations and provisions agreed upon between 

the parties hereto and no representative of either party 

has authority to make, and none of the parties shall be 

bound by, any statement, representation or agreement 

reached prior to the signing of this Agreement or made 

during these negotiations not set forth herein. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1221 Document: 01019285070 Date Filed: 05/06/1994 Page: 3 
It is further agreed and understood that any letter 

of understanding, past practice or other matter not 

included or attacped to this Agreement is null and void 

as of the date of this Agreement. 

Collective Bargaining Agreement at 5-6, 39 (Appellant's App. Doc. 

2) • 

The parties stipulated the following issues to be decided by 

the arbitrator: "Was the Grievant, Chris Montemayor, discharged 

for just and sufficient cause on September 30, 1992? If not, what 

is an appropriate remedy?" Award at 16 (Appellant's App. Doc. 3). 

The arbitrator decided that the Company did not have sufficient 

cause to discharge Montemayor because Montemayor's actions did not 

rise to the level of insubordination or refusal to perform reasonable work within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 22, 24. To reach this result, the arbitrator looked 

at the language of the collective bargaining agreement and listened to testimony concerning the Company's current practice--the 

"common law of the shop"--when other employees have balked at 

accepting work assignments. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & 

Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960) ("[T]he industrial common law--the practices of the industry and the shop--is 

equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not 

expressed in it."). 

The arbitrator found that Montemayor had never stated that he 

would not do the requested work. Award at 23 (Appellant's App. 

Doc. 3). The arbitrator further found that Montemayor had a physical excuse, of which the Company was on notice, for declining the 

temporary assignment. Id. The arbitrator also found that the 

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Company does not fire employees who refuse work assignments without counseling and a warning. Id. at 23-24. 

In vacating the arbitrator's award, the district court held 

that the arbitrator "stray[ed] beyond the four corners of the 

[collective bargaining] agreement." Tr. of Dist. Ct. Hr'g at 61, 

67-68 (Appellant's App. Doc. 4) (citing NCR Corp. v. International 

Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 906 F.2d 1499, 1504 (lOth 

Cir. 1990)). The district court concluded that, by considering 

the Company's practice of not firing employees who refuse work 

assignments, the arbitrator was ignoring the plain language of the 

collective bargaining agreement that allows the Company to discharge employees who refuse to perform reasonable work. 

of Dist. Ct. H'rg at 67-68 (Appellant's App. Doc. 4). 

See Tr. 

The district court appears to have accepted the Company's argument that 

the arbitrator was inappropriately looking at past practices in 

contravention of Article 35 of the collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 67. 

We disagree with the ~istrict court's conclusion that the 

arbitrator's determination in this case failed to draw its essence 

from the "four corners" of the collective bargaining agreement. 

It is a well-recognized principle that, except where expressly 

limited by a labor agreement, an arbitrator may consider and rely 

upon extrinsic evidence, including negotiating and contractual 

history of the parties, evidence of past practices, and the common 

law of the shop, when interpreting ambiguous provisions. See NCR 

Corp., 9 06 F. 2d at 1501. And as noted above, " [ t] he labor 

arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express 

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provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law--the 

practices of the industry and shop--is equally a part of the 

collective bargaining agreement." Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 

363 U.S. at 581-82. Seeking to interpret the Article 7 language 

"refusal to perform reasonable work," the arbitrator legitimately 

heard testimony about the practices in the Company's shop that are 

utilized when employees resist requests to have them perform new 

or different work. The phrase "reasonable work" is ambiguous in 

that it seems to indicate a recognition by the parties to the 

agreement that not every order by the employer to perform a task 

is unquestionable and mandatory. The arbitrator heard testimony 

suggesting that the Company has considered employees' physical 

condition and other justifications for refusing work assignments, 

and the arbitrator concluded that it was common practice in the 

shop to excuse employees from proposed work or to counsel 

employees to accept proposed work and warn them of the possibility 

of discharge. 

We believe the district court was troubled by the arbitrator's interpretation of the bargaining agreement phrase "refusal 

to perform reasonable work," 2 and this court does not ratify or 

reject the arbitrator's interpretation. But we do recognize that 

2 The district court's concerns stem largely from its belief that 

the arbitrator's consideration of policies and practices not 

explicitly found in the agreement violate Article 35 of the collective bargaining agreement. See Tr. of Dist. Ct. H'rg at 67 

(Appellant's App. Doc. 4). However, that provision only restricts 

reliance on "past practice or other matter" that predated this 

bargaining agreement. The current labor contract was in force for 

more than a year before Montemayor was discharged, and we cannot 

upset the arbitrator's findings that the Company's actions had 

promulgated a cognizable and relevant law of the shop at the time 

of Montemayor's dismissal. 

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a court may not overrule the arbitrator's factual findings or contract interpretations because we disagree with them. See Misco, 

484 U.S. at 38. Therefore, we conclude that the arbitrator did 

not exceed his authority in considering the common law of the shop 

in this case, and that the award draws its essence from the 

collective bargaining agreement. 

Accordingly, the order of the district court vacating the 

arbitration award is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED with 

instructions to enter an order of enforcement. 

Seth, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result. 

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