Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01467/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01467-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rosanne Campbell
Respondent
Steven Robert Sloan
Petitioner

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28 1On March 28, 2006, Respondent lodged copies of the state court transcripts with her motion to dismiss.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN ROBERT SLOAN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

ROSANNE CAMPBELL, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-CV-1467 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #6]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus, following his conviction by

jury trial on May 21, 2001, of one count of second degree murder in violation of Cal. Penal Code

§ 187, with arming/great bodily injury enhancements in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 12022.53

and 12022.5. See Lodged Document No. 1.1 On August 14, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to serve

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2Although the petition was actually filed in the 5th DCA on October 8, 2003, the petition was dated September 30,

2003. In Houston v. Lack, the Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is deemed filed on the date of its

submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487

U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied the rule to assess the timeliness of federal habeas

filings under the AEDPA limitations period. Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222, (9th Cir. 2001), citing Houston v. Lack,

487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). Therefore under the mailbox rule, the Court deems the petition filed on

September 30, 2003, the date Petitioner presumably handed his petition to prison authorities for mailing.

3A copy of the petition was not provided to the Court by either party. Respondent states she attempted to obtain a

copy from the superior court; however, the superior court was unable to locate the file. Therefore, the Court will utilize the

date the petition was filed in the superior court - May 11, 2004 - as the date of filing.

4

This petition was filed in the 5th DCA on September 7, 2004, but it was signed by Petitioner on August 31, 2004.

Under the mailbox rule, the Court deems the petition filed on August 31, 2004, the date Petitioner presumably handed his

petition to prison authorities for mailing.

5

The petition was filed on October 6, 2004, but dated September 30, 2004. Therefore, the Court will utilize

September 30, 2004, as the date of filing pursuant to the mailbox rule.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 2

an indeterminate term of 15 years to life with possibility of parole on the murder conviction plus 25

years to life on the enhancements. Id.

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

(hereinafter “5th DCA”). On March 24, 2003, the appellate court affirmed the judgment. See Lodged

Document No. 2. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court; it was

summarily denied on June 11, 2003. See Lodged Documents Nos. 3 and 4.

Petitioner then filed four post-conviction collateral challenges in the state courts. Petitioner

filed his first collateral challenge, a petition for writ of habeas corpus, on September 30, 2003, in the

5

th DCA.2 See Lodged Document No. 5. It was denied without comment on October 20, 2003. See

Lodged Document No. 6. Petitioner next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Stanislaus

County Superior Court on May 11, 2004.3 See Lodged Document No. 7. The petition was denied in a

reasoned opinion on May 21, 2004. Id. On August 31, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the 5th DCA.4 See Lodged Document No. 8. The petition was summarily denied on

September 16, 2004. See Lodged Document No. 9. Finally, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on September 30, 2004.5 See Lodged Document No.

10. The petition was summarily denied on September 21, 2005. See Lodged Document No. 11.

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6

This petition was filed in this Court on November 16, 2005, but it is dated October 21, 2005. Under the mailbox

rule, the Court will utilize October 21, 2005, as the date of filing.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 3

On October 21, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court.6 On

March 28, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being filed outside the one-year

limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). On May 5, 2006, Petitioner filed an

opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

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2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on October 21, 2005, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme

Court on June 11, 2003. Thus, direct review concluded on September 9, 2003, when the ninety (90)

day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463

U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159

F.3d 345, 347 (8th Cir.1998). Petitioner had one year until September 9, 2004, absent applicable

tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed

filing the instant petition until October 21, 2005, over one year beyond the due date. Absent any

applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

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U.S . District Court

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C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year

statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction

petition was timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408 (2005); Chavis v. Evans, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 846 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the requirements

for statutory tolling. Id.

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on September 9, 2003, and expired on

September 9, 2004. Petitioner’s first state habeas petition was filed in the 5th DCA on September 30,

2004, which was within the statute of limitations. At that point, 21 days of the limitations period had

expired. Under § 2244(d)(2), Petitioner is entitled to tolling for the time this petition was pending

until it was denied on October 20, 2003. 

Petitioner filed his next petition in the Stanislaus County Superior Court nearly seven months

later on May 11, 2004. Respondent submits that the interval should not be tolled because Petitioner

unreasonably delayed and did not proceed in an orderly fashion upward to the next appellate level.

Respondent’s arguments are persuasive. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s rulings in Saffold and

Chavis, Petitioner is entitled to tolling for the interval between the denial of the first state habeas

petition and the filing of the second habeas petition, provided that Petitioner did not unreasonably

delay in filing his second petition. Saffold, 536 U.S. at 225; Chavis, 126 S.Ct. at 852. As noted by

Respondent, Petitioner delayed for nearly seven months until he filed his second habeas petition. In

the absence of “clear direction or explanation” from the state court indicating whether the state

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petition was timely, the federal court “must itself examine the delay . . . and determine what the state

courts would have held in respect to timeliness.” Chavis, 126 S.Ct. at 852. In Chavis, the Supreme

Court found an unexplained delay of six months to be presumptively unreasonable under California

law. Id. at 854. The Supreme Court stated, “Six months is far longer than the ‘short period[s] of

time,’ 30 to 60 days, that most States provide for filing an appeal to the state supreme court. Id.,

quoting Saffold, 536 U.S. at 219. In addition, the Supreme Court provided the following guidance

for determining timeliness:

[T]he Circuit must keep in mind that, in Saffold, we held that timely filings in California (as

elsewhere) fell within the federal tolling provision on the assumption that California law in

this respect did not differ significantly from the laws of other States, i.e., that California’s

‘reasonable time’ standard would not lead to filing delays substantially longer than those in

States with determinate timeliness rules. 

Chavis, 126 S.Ct. at 853, citing Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222-223.

Here, Petitioner’s delay of seven months is clearly unreasonable. The delay is more than the

six months which was considered unreasonable in Chavis, and Petitioner has provided no

explanation for the delay. Therefore, Petitioner did not proceed timely from the denial of his first

habeas petition to his second petition and is thus not entitled to tolling for that interval. 

Respondent also argues that Petitioner should not be granted tolling for the interval because

he was not proceeding in an ascending fashion. The Ninth Circuit has held that interval tolling is

available even if the petitioner was not proceeding in an orderly progression. Gaston v. Palmer, 417

F.3d 1030, rehearing granted and opinion modified by Gaston v. Palmer, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL

1215382 (9th Cir. 2006). It is questionable whether Gaston still remains valid in light of Chavis. In

any case, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling even under Gaston. In Gaston, the Ninth Circuit found

that interval tolling is only available if the petitioner was behaving as he would in a typical appeal

state, i.e., bringing the same claims to the court of first instance, then appealing the denial or

otherwise seeking review in an expeditious fashion. Id. at 1044. Here, Petitioner was not behaving in

such a manner. The latter three petitions can be considered one complete round of collateral review,

because Petitioner was raising the same several claims and appealing the denials to the next level.

The first petition contained only one claim and Petitioner did not expeditiously seek review to the

next level. Therefore, Respondent is correct and Petitioner should not be granted tolling for the

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interval. The statute of limitations thus recommenced on October 21, 2003, the day after the 5th DCA

denied the first habeas petition.

A noted above, Petitioner’s second habeas petition was filed in the superior court on May 11,

2004. At that point, 203 additional days had expired in the limitations period for a total of 224 days.

This petition, having been filed within the limitations period, is arguably timely filed. Pursuant to

§ 2244(d)(2), Petitioner is entitled to tolling for the time this petition was pending until it was denied

on May 21, 2004. The next petition was filed in the 5th DCA three months later on August 31, 2004.

Respondent argues Petitioner should not be granted tolling for this interval because the three month

delay was unreasonable. As discussed above, the Supreme Court held in Chavis that an unexplained

six month delay is unreasonable. Chavis, 126 S.Ct. at 854. Petitioner’s delay of 102 days is not as

long as that in Chavis; however, it is longer than the “short period of time” of 30 to 60 days noted by

the Supreme Court which most States provide for filing an appeal. Id. In addition, Petitioner

concedes the claims were entirely the same and he fails to explain why he delayed three months to

file his next petition. In light of these facts, the interval was unreasonable and Petitioner should not

be entitled to interval tolling. An additional 102 days of the limitations period ran for a total of 326

days. 

The 5th DCA denied the petition on September 16, 2004. Petitioner then filed a habeas

petition in the California Supreme Court on October 6, 2004. Respondent concedes Petitioner timely

filed this petition. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to interval tolling for the period between the last

two habeas petitions, and he is entitled to tolling for the time the last petition was pending until it

was denied on September 21, 2005. With 39 days remaining, the statute of limitations was set to

expire on October 31, 2005. Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on October 21, 2005, ten days

before the statute’s expiration. The instant petition was therefore timely filed. For this reason,

Respondent’s motion should be denied and Respondent should be directed to file an answer to the

petition.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss

based on an alleged violation of the statute of limitations be DENIED and Respondent be DIRECTED

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to file an answer to the petition.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The

Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 22, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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