Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05062/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05062-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jill Brown
Respondent
Michael David Woody
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL DAVID WOODY,

Petitioner,

 v

JILL BROWN, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No C 05-5062 VRW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Before the court is petitioner Michael David Woody’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254. For the

reasons that follow, the petition is denied.

I

On August 30, 2002, the Humboldt County district attorney

filed an information charging petitioner with two counts of

possession of heroin for sale, one count of transportation of heroin 

and one count of possession of ammunition. The information also

charged petitioner with three misdemeanors, including resisting

arrest, possession of a hypodermic needle and possession of less

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than 28.5 grams of marijuana, as well as a sentence enhancement for

two prison priors.

On June 20, 2003, a jury in the Superior Court of the

State of the California in and for the County of Humboldt found

petitioner guilty of all charges except for one count of possession

of heroin for sale. On July 25, 2003, the court sentenced

petitioner to a total of seven years, eight months in prison for the

felony convictions. The court imposed concurrent jail terms for the

misdemeanors.

On July 25, 2003, petitioner filed a notice of appeal in

the California court of appeal, challenging the misdemeanor

convictions on the ground that the statute of limitations had

expired. This single-issue appeal was successful, and on August 16,

2004, the court of appeal struck the misdemeanor convictions. See

People v Woody, No A103381, 2004 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 7522 (Cal Ct

App Aug 16, 2004). Having prevailed on his claim, petitioner did

not seek further review in the California Supreme Court.

On May 10, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in the California court of appeal. It was summarily

denied on June 7, 2004.

On July 28, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. It was summarily

denied on June 15, 2005.

On December 8, 2005, petitioner filed the instant petition

under 28 USC § 2254. On March 24, 2006, this court found that

petitioner’s claims appeared cognizable under § 2254 and ordered

respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be

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granted. 

Respondent filed an answer on September 27, 2006. 

Petitioner did not file a traverse. 

 

II

The following facts are derived from the transcripts of

the record on appeal. 

On the morning of May 7, 2001, the Humboldt County Drug

Task Force (“HCDTF”), a state-supervised drug enforcement unit, was

conducting surveillance of Kathy Mosely’s residence in Eureka when

petitioner drove up to the house in a green Mercury. Reporter's

Transcript on Appeal ("RT") at 58-63 (Doc # 23, Resp't Ex B-1).

Eureka Police Department Sergeant Patrick O’Neill observed

Mosely exit her house and get into the passenger seat of

petitioner’s car. Petitioner drove a short distance and stopped in

an alleyway where he and Mosely had a brief conversation. 

Petitioner then drove around the block and dropped off Mosely in

front of her house. RT 64.

After driving several blocks, petitioner picked up a man

standing on the sidewalk. Petitioner parked in an alleyway where he

and the passenger had a short conversation. Petitioner then drove

around the block and dropped off the passenger. RT 65. 

O’Neill stated that from his experience in other drug

cases, this series of short meetings was consistent with illegal

drug activity, because drug exchanges will be brief and occur

covertly, in alleyways outside of public view. RT 65-66.

Petitioner pulled into a trailer park and when he exited 

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a Eureka police officer conducted a traffic stop after seeing that

petitioner wasn’t wearing his seat belt. Petitioner gave his

address as 3306 Pine Street in Eureka. After giving a warning, the

officer let petitioner go. RT 66.

By May 11, 2001, petitioner was one of the primary

subjects of the investigation. That afternoon, a team of HCDTF

agents, including O’Neill, conducted a traffic stop as petitioner

was leaving Mosely’s residence. RT 70-72. The agents knew

petitioner was on parole and subject to a search condition. RT 199-

200.

One of the agents turned on his siren and emergency

lights, but petitioner did not pull over. The agent pulled up next

to petitioner and attempted to get his attention. Eventually

petitioner came to a stop. RT 72-73.

As O'Neill approached, he saw petitioner reaching across

the passenger side of the car. O'Neill couldn't tell whether

petitioner was trying to hide things, grab things or grab a weapon. 

O'Neill and another agent ordered petitioner to exit the car, but

petitioner appeared to ignore them. Fearing for his safety, O'Neill

reached into the car and pulled petitioner out. Petitioner did not

attempt to punch O'Neill, but he did not exit the vehicle easily. 

Petitioner wouldn't stand still, so the officers placed him on the

ground and handcuffed him. RT 73-75. 

At some point during the struggle, petitioner's car had

shifted into gear and rolled across the street, hit a fence and came

to rest. RT 75. 

A search of petitioner’s person uncovered $1,471 in cash. 

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A search of the car revealed a cellular phone and a black film

canister containing a bundle wrapped in electrical tape. After

cutting into the bundle, O’Neill discovered several grams of heroin. 

RT 77-79. The total weight of the heroin was 13.23 grams. RT 91,

243. Agents also found a scrap of paper which O’Neill described as

a pay-and-owe sheet for keeping track of debts and drug sales. RT

214.

Petitioner was advised of his Miranda rights. Petitioner

admitted that he was a regular heroin user. RT 79-80. When O’Neill

told petitioner that he believed petitioner was a heroin addict who

sold heroin in order to support his habit, petitioner admitted,

“that’s about right.” RT 83-84. 

Petitioner denied having swallowed any heroin, but when he

was taken to the holding cell at the Eureka Police Department, he

began to cough and gag. RT 84-86. He then admitted that he had

swallowed several grams of heroin that had been in the car. RT 85-

86. Petitioner was taken to the hospital and treated. RT 87.

On May 14, 2001, O’Neill and other HCDTF officers searched

petitioner’s residence at 3306 Pine Street. They were let into the

house by petitioner’s brother, Christopher Woody. In the common

living room area of the house, there was a couch with two end

tables. RT 87-88. Inside the right end table the officers found a

small plastic Easter egg which contained three 6-gram bindles of

heroin. RT 88, 97, 244. 

O’Neill believed that the heroin was intended for sale,

partly because of petitioner’s earlier statements and partly because

of the large volume of drugs found. RT 97, 117. O’Neill similarly

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believed that the drugs seized from petitioner’s car were intended

for sale, based on the quantity, the cell phone, and petitioner’s

comments. RT 118. 

In petitioner’s bedroom the officers found a small amount

of marijuana. RT 89. They searched a Levi’s jacket on a hanger and

found a Glock Model 27 magazine with ammunition. The magazine

contained four 40-caliber rounds. Several hypodermic syringes were

found in a brown paper bag. RT 90. 

Petitioner’s parole was revoked, but he was not charged by

the Humboldt County district attorney. The district attorney did

file forfeiture proceedings against him for the money recovered. 

Petitioner was released on parole, but returned to prison on two

subsequent parole revocations. Clerk's Transcript on Appeal ("CT"),

107 (Resp't Ex A).

On July 23, 2002, HCDTF agents learned that petitioner was

wanted on an outstanding parole violation warrant. Petitioner was

found in a room in Chin’s Motel in Eureka, along with a man and a

woman identified as Regina White and Michael Farnum. RT 100-101. A

search of the room revealed a plastic Easter egg, similar to the one

found in petitioner’s home, hidden underneath the right pillow on

the bed. RT 101. The egg contained sixteen “boogers,” packages of

heroin weighing a fifth of a gram each, wrapped in wax paper. RT

80, 102, 127. There was also a larger chunk wrapped in plastic

which weighed 1.93 grams. RT 102-105. O’Neill stated that the

totality of the circumstances indicated the drugs were packaged for

sale and not for personal use, because the drugs were pre-measured

in uniform amounts and individually wrapped. RT 103, 115-116. Also

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found inside the room was a digital scale, plastic wrapping,

approximately 550 hypodermic syringes in a cardboard box, and a

pager. RT 106. Regina White told O’Neill that the heroin was hers. 

RT 178. 

A “215 card” was found in petitioner’s wallet. The card

stated that petitioner was a caregiver for Robert Woody, who used

medical marijuana. RT 198, 201. 

At all times during the search of petitioner, the officers

knew that he was on parole and subject to warrantless and

unannounced searches. RT 199-200.

III

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v

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Taylor, 529 US 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable

application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id at 409. 

In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state

court to address the merits of the petitioner’s claim in a reasoned

decision. LaJoie v Thompson, 217 F3d 663, 669 n7 (9th Cir 2000). 

Where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its decision

on a petitioner’s federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court

decision on the claim, a federal habeas court should conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s decision was an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See Himes v Thompson, 336 F3d 848, 853

(9th Cir 2003). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under 28 USC § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the

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dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Id at 412; Clark v Murphy, 331 F3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir

2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes

of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court's

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings

need be “reasonably” applied. Id. 

IV

Petitioner seeks habeas relief under 28 USC § 2254 based

on four claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective, (2) the trial

court abused its discretion in failing to appoint counsel during

petitioner’s motion for substitution of counsel, (3) the lapse in

time between petitioner’s arrest and arraignment on the May, 2001

charges violated due process, and (4) petitioner’s conviction was

supported by insufficient evidence. 

A

 Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

can be grouped into six general categories: (a) trial counsel failed

to challenge the length of time between petitioner's arrest and

arraignment; (b) trial counsel failed to challenge the legality of

evidence seized from the 3306 Pine Street residence; (c) trial

counsel failed to investigate the circumstances of petitioner’s

arrests and the searches conducted at 3306 Pine Street and Chin's

Motel; (d) trial counsel failed to object to certain statements made

by Officer O’Neill, as well as investigate O’Neill’s complaint

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history; (e) trial counsel improperly admitted petitioner’s prior

convictions, and failed to challenge the misdemeanor charges; and

(f) trial counsel failed to declare an irrevocable conflict with

petitioner.

The California Supreme Court summarily rejected each of 

petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. A review of

the record shows that the court's denials were not an objectively

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28

USC § 2254(d); Himes, 336 F3d at 853. 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable

as a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which

guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of counsel. 

Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 686 (1984). 

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, petitioner must establish two things. First, he must

establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i e, that it

fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Id at 687-88. Second, he must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance,

i e, that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Id at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id. 

1

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective 

for not moving to dismiss the charges related to his May 11, 2001

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arrest on the grounds that the delay in prosecution violated state

statutory law, and that trial counsel’s error was compounded by his

failure to allege prejudice in connection with that claim. 

Petitioner further claims that his trial counsel should have moved

to dismiss the May 2001 charges because the district attorney

impliedly promised that petitioner would never be prosecuted for

them. 

Petitioner’s arrest and the search of his car on May 11,

2001 uncovered several bindles of heroin, a pay-and-owe sheet and a

large quantity of cash. The search of 3306 Pine Street on May 14,

2001 uncovered an ammunition clip, more bindles of heroin, several

hypodermic needles and some marijuana. Petitioner’s parole was

revoked, but he was never arraigned on charges in connection with

the May 2001 incidents until his arrest on July 23, 2002, at which

point all the charges were consolidated. 

In a written pre-trial memorandum, petitioner’s trial

counsel moved to dismiss all charges stemming from the May 2001

traffic stop and arrest on the theory that the 14-month delay

between arrest and arraignment violated petitioner’s right to a

speedy trial under the California and United States constitutions. 

CT 106. The trial court denied the motion, finding that there were

no speedy trial violations, and that any delay in prosecution was

harmless. RT 11-12.

Petitioner now claims that the motion to dismiss would

have been granted if trial counsel had argued that the 14-month

delay violated California Penal Code § 825. This claim is without

merit. 

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In order to show that defense counsel’s failure to file a

motion resulted in prejudice under Strickland, petitioner must show

that (1) had his counsel made the motion, it is reasonable that the

trial court would have granted it as meritorious; and (2) had the

motion been granted, it is reasonable that there would have been an

outcome more favorable to him. Wilson v Henry, 185 F3d 986, 990

(9th Cir 1999).

A lawyer need not file a motion that he knows to be

meritless on the facts and the law. Put simply, trial counsel

cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless

motion. Juan H v Allen, 408 F3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir 2005); Rupe v

Wood, 93 F3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir 1996).

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, California Penal Code §

825 is inapplicable to petitioner’s arrest and arraignment. Section

825 generally requires that defendants subject to arrest by warrant

be brought before a magistrate within 48 hours. People v Hughes, 27

Cal 4th 287, 326 (2002). Following the May 11, 2001 traffic stop,

petitioner was not arrested by warrant but placed in custody for

suspected parole violations. Under California law, the arraignment

requirement of § 825 does not apply when a parole hold has been

placed on a defendant for a suspected parole violation. See Hughes,

27 Cal 4th at 326 (citing Ng v Superior Court, 4 Cal 4th 29, 38

(1992)) (parole hold does not trigger § 825 arraignment

requirement). Because the delay in prosecution did not violate §

825, it is not reasonable that the trial court would have found any

motion to dismiss raising that issue to be meritorious. Trial

counsel’s failure to raise the § 825 claim did not prejudice

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petitioner. See Strickland, 466 US at 693, Wilson, 185 F3d at 990. 

Similarly, it cannot be said that petitioner’s trial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present

additional evidence of prejudice in support of a § 825 claim. 

Petitioner argues that if the prosecution had arraigned him

immediately after the May 11, 2001 arrest, evidence collected during

the May 14, 2001 search of 3306 Pine Street, as well as the

incriminating statements petitioner made to investigators while

awaiting his parole revocation, would never have been admitted. But

petitioner cannot establish prejudice because any statutory

challenge to the delay in prosecution would have been denied as

meritless. Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable

probability that any additional argument on the statutory delay

would have resulted in a successful motion. See Wilson, 185 F3d at

990. This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.

Petitioner next claims that, by not pursuing criminal

charges immediately after petitioner’s May 2001 arrest and instead

allowing the parole revocation process to run its course, the

district attorney indirectly promised that petitioner would never

face charges in connection with the May 2001 arrest. Petitioner

argues that this promise was breached when the district attorney

filed an information consolidating the May 2001 charges with new

charges for which petitioner was ultimately acquitted. 

In its motion to dismiss, petitioner’s trial counsel argued

that petitioner was misled into thinking that the May 2001 charges

were resolved because the district attorney did not pursue those

charges during petitioner’s parole revocation process. The

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prosecution denied that it had ever made such a promise, but

suggested that it had held off bringing criminal charges because

petitioner had provided information to authorities about drug

trafficking in Humboldt County. For his cooperation, petitioner was

given an opportunity to “cease his criminal activity.” CT 115. By

re-offending, petitioner demonstrated that he did not deserve the

prosecutor’s largesse.

Had there been a formal agreement between petitioner and

the district attorney immunizing petitioner from prosecution, trial

counsel might be faulted for failing to file a motion to dismiss on

that basis. But petitioner does not provide any evidence of such an

agreement. The record suggests that the district attorney simply

chose to refrain from prosecuting petitioner in connection with the

May 2001 arrest, but then changed course after petitioner reoffended. Petitioner’s conclusory allegations to the contrary do

not support a finding that trial counsel’s performance on this issue

was deficient and prejudicial. See Jones v Gomez, 66 F3d 199, 205

(9th Cir 1995) (conclusory claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel not basis for federal habeas relief).

Nor was trial counsel ineffective for not moving to

dismiss the May 2001 charges after the jury acquitted him of the

July 2002 charges, on the theory that the older charges would never

have been filed without the newer charges. Although the district

attorney’s decision to pursue the May 2001 charges was perhaps

precipitated by petitioner’s later conduct, the prosecution was

entitled to pursue the May 2001 charges at any point before the

statute of limitations expired. Petitioner’s acquittal on the more

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recent charges does not affect his convictions on the earlier

charges. Petitioner’s argument to the contrary is speculative and

unsupported by the record. See Rios v Rocha, 299 F3d 796, 813 n23

(9th Cir 2002) (rejecting two ineffective assistance of counsel

claims based on petitioner's failure to produce evidence of

prejudice); Gomez, 66 F3d at 205 (rejecting conclusory claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel). Trial counsel’s failure to

present a motion to dismiss cannot be said to have resulted in

prejudice under Strickland. 

In sum, petitioner has not established that his trial

counsel’s representation on the delay in prosecution was deficient

or prejudicial under Strickland. The California Supreme Court’s

rejection of petitioner’s claims was not an objectively unreasonable

application of Strickland. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

2

Petitioner’s next set of ineffective assistance of counsel

claims relate to the evidence seized from 3306 Pine Street. He

claims that trial counsel should have moved to suppress this

evidence because the officers did not have authorization to search

his house. He further claims that trial counsel failed to challenge

the sufficiency of the evidence seized. The claims are meritless.

The search of 3306 Pine Street revealed three bindles of

heroin, an ammunition clip, several hypodermic needles and some

marijuana. Petitioner’s trial counsel filed a motion seeking to

suppress this and other evidence, arguing that the officers did not

have a search warrant and that they were not properly granted

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permission to enter the house by either petitioner or his parole

officer. CT 73-83. The motion was later withdrawn. CT 101. 

The decision to withdraw the motion did not constitute

ineffective assistance. At the time of the traffic stop and during

the search of his house, petitioner was on parole, and this fact was

known by the HCDTF officers. A suspicionless search of a parolee

conducted under the authority of the California statute which

authorizes such searches does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See

Samson v California 126 S Ct 2193, 2202 (2006); see also People v

Reyes, 19 Cal 4th 743, 750-754 (Cal 1998) (suspicionless searches

conducted pursuant to parole search condition not unreasonable under

4th Amendment). All California parolees are informed that “you and

your residence and any property under your control may be searched

without a warrant at any time by any agent of the Department of

Corrections or any law enforcement officer.” Cal Code Regs, tit 15

§§ 2511(b)(4), 3901.9.2(b)(4). 

Because the search of petitioner’s home while he was on

parole was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the officers

did not need to receive permission from petitioner’s brother to

enter. If trial counsel had submitted the motion to suppress, it is

not reasonable that the trial court would have granted the motion as

meritorious. See Wilson, 185 F3d at 990; see also Anderson v

Alameida, 397 F3d 1175, 1180-81 (9th Cir 2005) (counsel not

ineffective for failing to move to suppress confession for Massiah

violation when motion would have been without merit). Petitioner’s

claim fails.

Petitioner next claims that trial counsel failed to

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investigate the possibility that the heroin belonged to third

parties. Petitioner speculates that this would have been a

meritorious defense. 

A defense attorney has a general duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes

particular investigations unnecessary. See Strickland, 466 US at

691, Turner v Duncan, 158 F3d 499, 456 (9th Cir 1998). Strickland

directs that “‘a particular decision not to investigate must be

directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances,

applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’” 

Silva v Woodford, 279 F3d 825, 836 (9th Cir 2002) (quoting

Strickland, 466 US at 491). 

Petitioner’s claim fails because he does not show either

that trial counsel actually failed to investigate this defense, or

that a failure to investigate resulted in prejudice.

During his closing remarks, trial counsel explicitly

raised the possibility that the heroin found at 3306 Pine Street

belonged to members of petitioner’s family. RT 383. Petitioner’s 

claim that trial counsel failed to investigate a third-party defense

is not supported by the record. 

Importantly, petitioner does not show that trial counsel’s

failure to investigate a third-party defense prejudiced him. 

Petitioner provides no evidentiary support whatsoever for his claim

that the heroin belonged to someone else. He simply states that it

must have belonged to someone else and ignores the fact that the

quantity and quality of the heroin seized from his home matched the

heroin seized from his car and stomach. Petitioner has not shown

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that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have

been different. See Strickland, 466 US at 694.

In sum, petitioner has not established that trial

counsel’s representation on the legality of the evidence seized from

3306 Pine Street fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,

or that trial counsel’s failings were prejudicial. Strickland, 466

US at 688. The California Supreme Court’s rejection of these claims

was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. See

28 USC § 2254(d). 

3

Petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to investigate

and interview various witnesses regarding his arrest on May 11,

2001. He also claims that trial counsel failed to obtain witnesses

who would have testified about the circumstances of the searches

conducted at 3306 Pine Street and Chin’s Motel. These claims are

wholly without merit.

The duty to investigate and prepare a defense does not

require that every conceivable witness be interviewed. Hendricks v

Calderon, 70 F3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir 1995). A defendant's mere

speculation that a witness might have given helpful information if

interviewed is not enough to establish ineffective assistance. See

Bragg v Galaza, 242 F3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir), amended, 253 F3d 1150

(9th Cir 2001).

To establish prejudice caused by the failure to call a

witness, a petitioner must show that the witness was likely to have

been available to testify, that the witness would have given the

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proffered testimony and that the witnesses’ testimony created a

reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a verdict

more favorable to the petitioner. Alcala v Woodford, 334 F3d 862,

872-73 (9th Cir 2003).

Petitioner claims that certain unnamed witnesses would

have testified that Kathy Mosely and another woman, Heather Randall,

were informants for HCDTF, and that these women “set up”

petitioner’s arrest as well as other drug-related arrests in Eureka.

Petitioner does not provide any identifying information

about these additional witnesses, or explain why they would have

testified on his behalf. Conclusory statements do not establish

ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner must tender

affidavits from the witnesses counsel neglected to interview or

call, showing the "helpful testimony for the defense" they could

have presented. Dows v Wood, 211 F3d 480, 486 (9th Cir 2000); Bragg

v Galaza, 242 F3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir 2001). Petitioner's

assertions are purely speculative, and will not do. See id. 

Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel failed to

investigate and interview witnesses who he claims used drugs in his

home. Petitioner attaches affidavits from two such witnesses,

Ernest Hardin and Robert Danford. 

 Trial counsel’s failure to secure these witnesses cannot

be deemed prejudicial. Given their status as drug users, it was

likely not in petitioner’s best interest to have them testify on his

behalf. Their testimony would have raised the inference that they

were clients of petitioner or co-conspirators, or both. Trial

counsel’s theory was that petitioner was a low-level drug user and

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not a supplier. Depicting his home as a den of drug use would have

conflicted with defense strategy. 

Moreover, neither Hardin nor Danford would have testified

that they actually left drugs behind in petitioner’s home, only that

it was possible. Given their prior drug-related arrests, they

likely would have declined to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds. 

Even if they had been available to testify, their proffered

testimony would not have created a reasonable probability that the

jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to petitioner. 

Alcala, 334 F3d at 872-73; United States v Berry, 814 F2d 1406, 1409

(9th Cir 1987) (no prejudice where appellant offered no indication

of what potential witnesses would have testified to or how their

testimony might have changed the outcome of the hearing).

Petitioner also alleges that trial counsel failed to

obtain the testimony of his brother, Chris Woody, who he claims

would have testified that he did not have authority to allow

officers into the home. According to petitioner, his brother also

would have contradicted Officer O’Neill’s testimony that no gun was

recovered from petitioner’s home.

Petitioner again fails to provide any affidavits providing

factual support for this alleged testimony. Moreover, the failure

of trial counsel to secure petitioner’s brother as a witness was not

prejudicial. Petitioner’s parole status meant that the officers did

not need his brother’s permission to enter the house, and any

testimony on this issue was irrelevant. The value of any testimony

about a gun being seized from petitioner’s home would have been

heavily outweighed by the harm of exposing petitioner to felony

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prosecution for possession of a gun by an ex-felon. See Cal Penal

Code § 12021. Any potential testimony from petitioner’s brother

would not have created a reasonable probability that the jury would

have reached a verdict more favorable to petitioner. Petitioner has

not established prejudice under Strickland. See Alcala, 334 F3d at

872-73. 

Finally, petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed

to interview Regina White and Michael Farnum, who were present

during the search of the room at Chin’s Motel. Petitioner argues

they would have undermined Officer O’Neill’s testimony that

petitioner was the one who opened the door. 

The fact that petitioner was acquitted of all charges in

connection with the search of Chin’s Motel means that any failure by

trial counsel to call these witnesses could not have been

prejudicial. Their potential testimony, while slightly inconsistent

with Officer O’Neill’s testimony, would not have undermined the

overwhelming evidence regarding the charges for which petitioner was

convicted. Petitioner once again has not established prejudice

under Strickland. See Alcala, 334 F3d at 872-73. 

Petitioner’s claims regarding trial counsel’s failure to

secure potential witnesses do not establish that trial counsel was

ineffective. The California Supreme Court reasonably applied the

Strickland standard in summarily rejecting these claims. See 28 USC

§ 2254(d).

4

Petitioner raises several ineffective assistance of

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counsel claims regarding Officer O’Neill’s testimony. Petitioner

claims that trial counsel failed to object to O’Neill’s testimony on

the ground that O’Neill perjured himself when he denied seizing a

gun from petitioner’s home. Petitioner also claims that trial

counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation into the

employment and citizen complaints filed against Officer O’Neill and

that he should have objected to certain admissions petitioner made

to Officer O’Neill. These claims are without merit.

Petitioner provides a copy of an inventory record

indicating that Officer O’Neill recovered a gun from petitioner’s

home. As previously noted, trial counsel’s failure to point out

falsehoods in Officer O’Neill’s testimony regarding the gun was not

prejudicial because any value in impeaching O’Neill was outweighed

by the serious risk that petitioner would be subject to prosecution

for illegal possession of a firearm. Petitioner has not established

that trial counsel’s failure to object to this element of O’Neill’s

testimony had any material impact on the outcome of his trial. See

Strickland, 466 US at 694. Indeed, O’Neill’s misstatement likely

saved petitioner from being charged with an additional offense. 

With regard to petitioner’s other allegations about

Officer O’Neill’s employment and civilian complaint history, these

assertions are too vague and unsupported by specific facts to

satisfy petitioner’s burden of establishing deficient performance

and prejudice under Strickland. See Gomez, 66 F3d at 204

(conclusory allegations that prosecution failed to disclose arrest

history of witness do not warrant habeas relief).

Petitioner next claims that trial counsel should have

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objected to certain admissions, but he does not offer any legal

justification why these statements should have been excluded. 

Petitioner asserts that his admission to Officer O’Neill that he was

a drug dealer was said in a sarcastic tone and that his admission to

selling heroin to support his habit was made in the past tense. But

petitioner does not dispute that he made these statements and any

question over his sincerity in making them was not a proper basis

for an objection.

Petitioner also claims that many of his statements to the

police should have been excluded as having been extracted during his

“illegal detention” following his arrest on May 11, 2001. This

court has concluded that there is no legal basis for challenging the

delay in petitioner’s arraignment; consequently, there was no valid

reason for challenging any of petitioner’s statements during this

delay as having been illegally obtained. 

In sum, the various evidentiary challenges petitioner

alleges his trial counsel should have made are exceedingly minor and

would have done nothing to mitigate the overwhelming evidence

supporting petitioner’s convictions. This was not a case that

hinged on Officer O’Neill’s credibility, given the quantity of drugs

and other paraphernalia seized from petitioner’s car, home and

stomach. Petitioner has not established prejudice under Strickland. 

See United States v Gibson, 690 F2d 697, 703-04 (9th Cir 1982)

(failure to make evidentiary objections does not render assistance

ineffective unless challenged errors can be shown to have prejudiced

the defense). The California Supreme Court did not unreasonably

apply Strickland when it summarily denied petitioner’s ineffective

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assistance of counsel claims on these issues. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

5

Petitioner claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance when he admitted petitioner’s prior convictions. He also

claims that counsel should have objected to the misdemeanor offenses

for exceeding the statute of limitations. Neither claim justifies

habeas relief. 

Petitioner’s ex-felon status was a necessary element of

one of the offenses for which he was charged, possession of live

ammunition by a felon. Trial counsel’s decision to admit the prior

convictions was a legitimate strategic choice that prevented the

jury from being exposed to petitioner’s lengthy criminal record, as

well as the facts underlying those convictions. See Strickland, 466

US at 689. Moreover, it cannot be said, in light of the evidence as

a whole, that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would

have reached a verdict more favorable to petitioner if the prior

convictions had not been admitted. See id at 694. 

As for the misdemeanor offenses, petitioner’s convictions

for resisting arrest, possession of a hypodermic needle and

possession of less than 28.5 grams of marijuana were stricken on

appeal as having exceeded the statute of limitations. It matters

not, for purposes of habeas relief, that trial counsel failed to

raise the statute of limitations before appellate counsel. The

misdemeanor charges have already been stricken on appeal. 

Petitioner’s habeas claim as to them is moot. Strickland, 466 US at

695.

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Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel with regards to the

prior convictions and the misdemeanor charges. The California

Supreme Court’s rejection of petitioner’s claims was not an

objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. See 28 USC §

2254(d).

6

Finally, petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was

ineffective for not declaring an irrevocable conflict during the

hearing on petitioner’s motion for a substitution of counsel. 

Petitioner contends that his relationship with trial counsel had

deteriorated to the point where counsel’s representation was

“perfunctory at best.” Petitioner’s claim does not warrant habeas

relief. 

Petitioner made a motion under People v Marsden, 2 Cal 3d

118 (1970), for a substitution of counsel. That motion was heard

and denied on June 16, 2003. CT 167. Petitioner argues that this

ruling was in error, and that trial counsel had an obligation to

assist petitioner in arguing that there was an irrevocable conflict

between them. 

Petitioner’s allegation that there was a complete

breakdown in communication with his trial counsel is wholly

unsupported by the record. Petitioner and his trial counsel

conferred on a number of occasions during the trial as well as

during sentencing. RT 126, 167, 434, 480, 497. Petitioner provides

no specific facts that support his allegation that he and trial

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counsel were embroiled in a conflict so severe as to deprive

petitioner of any counsel whatsoever. See Daniels v Woodford, 428

F3d 1181, 1197 (9th Cir 2005). The Sixth Amendment guarantees

effective assistance of counsel, not a "meaningful relationship"

between an accused and his counsel. Morris v Slappy, 461 US 1, 14

(1983). 

Trial counsel was under no obligation to acquiesce to

petitioner’s demands for substitute counsel. Nothing in the record

suggests that counsel’s performance was “perfunctory.” Counsel in

fact managed to have petitioner acquitted on the charge of

possession of heroin for sale in connection with his arrest at

Chin’s Motel. Petitioner’s claims to the contrary are conclusory

and factually unsupported.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The California

Supreme Court’s denial of the claim was not an objectively

unreasonable application of Strickland. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

B

Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly denied

his Marsden motion for substitution of counsel and that he should

have been appointed separate counsel to represent him during that

motion. These claims do not warrant federal habeas relief.

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a

defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and is properly

considered in federal habeas. Bland v California Dep't of

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Corrections, 20 F3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir 1994), overruled on other

grounds by Schell v Witek, 218 F3d 1017 (9th Cir 2000) (en banc).

When a defendant voices a seemingly substantial complaint about

counsel, the trial judge should make a thorough inquiry into the

reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction. Id at 1475-1476;

Hudson v Rushen, 686 F2d 826, 829 (9th Cir 1982). The inquiry need

only be as comprehensive as the circumstances reasonably would

permit, however. King v Rowland, 977 F2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir 1992)

(record may demonstrate that extensive inquiry was not necessary). 

If a state court denies a motion for substitute counsel,

the ultimate inquiry in a federal habeas proceeding is whether the

petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Schell,

218 F3d at 1024-1025. The question is whether the conflict between

petitioner and his attorney was so great that it resulted in a total

lack of communication or other significant impediment that

effectively deprived petitioner of the attorney-client relationship

required by the Sixth Amendment. Id at 1026. 

As previously noted, petitioner made a motion for

substitute counsel which was heard and denied by the trial court on 

June 16, 2003. The transcript of that proceeding is not available;

however, the record makes clear that the trial court’s denial of

petitioner’s motion did not amount to a Sixth Amendment violation. 

The record shows that petitioner and trial counsel conferred

numerous times during trial and sentencing. See RT 126, 167, 434,

480, 497. Petitioner sets forth no evidence to the contrary. In

fact, there is no indication whatsoever that petitioner’s

relationship with trial counsel was so poisoned as to amount to a

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deprivation of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel. Schell, 218 F3d at 1024-1025. 

Petitioner argues that he was ill-prepared to represent

himself during the Marsden motion and that he should have been

provided separate counsel to represent him during the motion. In

the context of a motion to substitute counsel, the Ninth Circuit has

suggested that separate counsel is warranted only where current

counsel fails to assist the defendant in making the motion or takes

an adversarial and antagonistic stance regarding the motion. 

Stenson v Lambert, No 05-99011, 2007 US App LEXIS 22612 at *34 (9th

Cir Sept 24, 2007). It’s unclear whether the Ninth Circuit’s

suggestion derives from clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

Regardless, petitioner’s claim fails because he does not provide any

evidence of an antagonistic and adversarial relationship with trial

counsel.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

claim that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights in

denying his Marsden motion. The California Supreme Court’s

rejection of the claim was not an objectively unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

C

Petitioner claims that his due process rights were

violated when he was returned to prison for parole revocation

proceedings following his May 11, 2001 arrest, rather than

immediately arraigned on criminal charges. This claim is without

merit.

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It is well established that pre-accusation delay does not

implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. United

States v Marion, 404 US 307, 320 (1971). Pre-indictment or prearrest stage delays are subject to the general requirements of due

process, but such delays do not merit relief unless the petitioner

can first establish that the delay actually prejudiced his ability

to defend himself. See United States v Gregory, 322 F3d 1157, 1165

(9th Cir 2003); United States v Ross, 123 F3d 1181, 1185-86 (9th Cir

1997). If the petitioner can demonstrate actual prejudice, then the

court must weigh the prejudice against the length of the delay and

the reason for it. See United States v Bracy, 67 F3d 1421, 1427

(9th Cir 1995).

Here, the district attorney did not seek criminal charges

during petitioner’s parole revocation proceedings in May 2001 or

upon his re-release. It was not until petitioner’s July 23, 2002

arrest on an outstanding parole revocation warrant that the district

attorney pursued criminal charges against petitioner, at which point

the 2001 charges and the new charges were consolidated. 

The approximately 14-month “delay” in prosecution does not

warrant federal habeas relief because petitioner cannot demonstrate

that he suffered any actual prejudice. At the time of his May 11,

2001 arrest, petitioner had engaged in numerous suspected drug

sales. After resisting arrest, he was found to have a pay-and-owe

sheet, a large amount of cash and a significant quantity of heroin

which was retrieved from his car and his stomach. He admitted to

selling heroin to support his habit and a search of his home

revealed additional amounts of heroin as well as live ammunition. 

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The prosecution’s case against petitioner was very strong. Any

delay in prosecution was of trivial consequence. Indeed, as the

trial court noted during the severance motion, petitioner likely

benefitted from the delay in prosecution, to the extent that the new

charges were weaker than the older ones. Any prejudice in

petitioner’s inability to obtain witnesses or otherwise defend

himself is speculative and remote. See Ross, 123 F3d at 1185-86

(witness' death before trial not prejudicial because the expected

content of his testimony was speculative and cumulative).

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

claim of due process violation for delay in prosecution. The

California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was not an 

objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme

Court precedent. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

D

Petitioner claims that his conviction was supported by

insufficient evidence. The claim does not warrant federal habeas

relief. 

A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court

conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the

evidence was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v Borg,

982 F2d 335, 338 (9th Cir 1992). Rather, the relevant inquiry on

review of a constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is "whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

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the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v Virginia, 443 US

307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). The reviewing court "faced

with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting

inferences must presume – even if it does not affirmatively appear

on the record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts

in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Id

at 326. 

Petitioner was convicted of one count of possession of

heroin for sale, one count of transportation of heroin and one count

of possession of ammunition. Petitioner contends that there was

insufficient evidence that the heroin seized from his home actually

belonged to him because he had been in prison for more than 72 hours

at the time his house was searched. A review of the record shows

that the direct and circumstantial evidence supporting petitioner’s

convictions was overwhelming. The large quantity of heroin seized

from petitioner’s car and stomach matched the quantity and quality

of the heroin seized from his home. Petitioner was caught with payand-owe sheet as well as a large quantity of cash. A rational juror

could have concluded that the bindles of heroin seized from

petitioner’s home belonged to petitioner and were intended for sale. 

See Jackson, 443 US at 319. That a rational juror also could have

concluded otherwise is of no consequence – this court must presume

that the jury resolved any conflicting inference in favor of the

prosecution. See id at 326.

It simply cannot be said that, after viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of

fact could have found it beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner

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was guilty of the offenses for which he was convicted. Id. The

state court's rejection of petitioner’s claim was not an objectively

unreasonable application of Jackson v Virginia. See 28 USC §

2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

this claim. 

V

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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