Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-23-15726/USCOURTS-ca9-23-15726-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cameran Gunn
Appellee
Buford Kenton
Appellee
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
Appellee
Gerald Elmer Napouk
Appellant
Mary Napouk
Appellant
Fredrick Waid
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GERALD ELMER NAPOUK, 

individually, and as Co-Special 

Administrator of the Estate of Lloyd 

Gerald Napouk; MARY NAPOUK, 

individually, and as Co-Special 

Administrator of the Estate of Lloyd 

Gerald Napouk; FREDRICK WAID, 

as Co-Special Administrator of the 

Estate of Lloyd Gerald Napouk,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN 

POLICE DEPARTMENT; BUFORD 

KENTON; CAMERAN GUNN, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-15726

D.C. No. 2:20-cv01859-JCM-BNW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 2, 2024

Pasadena, California

Filed December 10, 2024

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2 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

Before: Ryan D. Nelson, Lawrence VanDyke, and Gabriel 

P. Sanchez, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion by Judge VanDyke; 

Concurrence by Judge R. Nelson; 

Dissent by Judge Sanchez 

SUMMARY*

Qualified Immunity/Deadly Force 

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment for two Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 

Department officers in an action arising from the fatal 

shooting of Lloyd Gerald Napouk. 

The officers responded to reports of a man walking 

around a residential neighborhood in the middle of the night 

with a “machete” or a “slim jim,” behaving suspiciously and 

walking up to cars and houses. When they arrived, they 

attempted to engage Napouk for several minutes, but he 

refused to follow their commands and repeatedly advanced 

toward them with what the officers believed was a long, 

bladed weapon. When Napouk advanced upon the officers 

a final time with the weapon, coming within nine feet of 

Sergeant Kenton, both officers fired their weapons, killing 

him. Napouk’s weapon turned out to be a plastic toy 

fashioned to appear as a blade. 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 3

Napouk’s parents and estate sued, alleging excessive 

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, deprivation of 

familial relations in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 

municipal liability based on Monell v. Department of Social 

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and Nevada state law claims. 

The panel held that the officers were entitled to qualified 

immunity from the Fourth Amendment excessive force 

claim. First, the totality of the circumstances based on the 

undisputed facts shows that Napouk posed an immediate 

threat to the officers at the moment they fired. No rational 

jury could find that the officers’ mistake of fact as to 

Napouk’s weapon, which objectively looked like a machete, 

was unreasonable. Second, as the district court determined, 

Napouk may have committed assault with a deadly weapon 

as the event unfolded by brandishing the object and refusing 

to respond to the officers’ orders. Third, Napouk repeatedly 

failed to comply with the officers’ orders to drop his weapon 

and to stop moving, and advanced toward the officers with 

the weapon. Accordingly, the officers’ conduct did not 

violate the Fourth Amendment, but even if it did, they would 

still be entitled to qualified immunity because they did not 

violate clearly established law.

The panel held that plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment 

deprivation of a familial relationship claim failed because 

there was no evidence that the officers acted with anything 

other than the legitimate law enforcement objectives of selfdefense and defense of each other.

Finally, plaintiffs’ Monell claims failed because there 

was no constitutional violation and plaintiffs’ state law 

claims failed because the officers were entitled to 

discretionary-function immunity under Nevada state law. 

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4 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

Judge R. Nelson concurred in the majority opinion and 

the conclusion to affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 

claim for deprivation of a familial relationship. In his view, 

substantive due process does not extend to the Napouks’ 

relationship with their forty-four-year-old son. 

Dissenting, Judge Sanchez stated that majority erred by 

failing to evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party and by minimizing evidence that, when 

properly credited, created genuine disputes of material 

fact. A rational trier of fact could find that the officers’ use 

of deadly force was objectively unreasonable because 

Napouk did not pose an imminent threat to the safety of the 

officers, he was not committing a crime or resisting arrest, 

and several non-lethal alternatives were available to contain 

the slowly unfolding encounter. And Ninth Circuit caselaw 

clearly establishes that police officers may not kill a suspect 

who does not pose an imminent threat to the safety of 

officers or bystanders, is not committing any crime or 

actively resisting arrest, and in which non-lethal alternatives 

are available to the officers.

COUNSEL

Peter Goldstein (argued), Peter Goldstein Law Corp, Las 

Vegas, Nevada, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Craig R. Anderson (argued) and Marquis Aurbach, Marquis 

Aurbach Coffing, Las Vegas, Nevada, for DefendantsAppellees.

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 5

OPINION

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge:

Sergeant Buford Kenton and Officer Cameran Gunn 

responded to reports of a man walking around a residential

neighborhood in the middle of the night with a “machete” or 

a “slim jim,” behaving suspiciously and walking up to cars 

and houses. When they arrived, they attempted to engage 

Lloyd Gerald Napouk for several minutes, but he refused to 

follow their commands and repeatedly advanced towards 

them with what they believed was a long, bladed weapon. 

When he advanced upon them a final time with the weapon, 

coming within nine feet of Sergeant Kenton, both officers 

fired their weapons, killing him. Napouk’s parents and 

administrators of his estate sued Kenton and Gunn and the 

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), 

alleging constitutional and state law claims. Defendants 

moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted 

their motion, determining that the officers’ use of force was 

reasonable as a matter of law. We affirm.

I.

At around midnight on October 27, 2018, a bystander

called the LVMPD nonemergency line to report that a white

adult male was walking down Floating Flower Avenue with 

a “slim jim” or a “long stick,” peering into cars, talking to 

himself, and raising his fist at the cars. Three minutes later, 

another bystander called 911 to report that an African 

American adult male1 with a “machete,” “big tool,” or “piece 

of metal” was going door-to-door looking into houses,

1 The callers made differing reports as to the man’s race. In actuality, 

Napouk was Innuit. 

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6 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

talking to himself, and pointing the object at the houses. A 

few minutes later, the first bystander called again to report 

that the man had moved to Tender Tulip Avenue and was 

going into people’s backyards and looking into windows. 

The bystander told the operator that he was armed and would 

shoot the man if he came into his yard.

A few minutes after the first call, Seargent Kenton and 

Officer Gunn, riding in separate patrol cars, assigned 

themselves to the call. According to the information they 

received from dispatch, a male wearing a baseball cap and 

camo backpack was walking around with a “slim jim,” a 

“long stick,” or “possibly a ... machete,” going door to door

and peering into windows. A police helicopter was also 

dispatched.

When the officers arrived in the neighborhood, Gunn 

briefly spoke with the second bystander, who told him that 

Napouk was one street over and wearing sunglasses. The 

officers did not preplan or communicate before they 

interacted with Napouk. Both officers drove over to the next 

street, where Napouk came out from between two houses. 

Both officers thought Napouk was holding a machete. Gunn

activated his patrol car lights and parked his car right in front 

of Napouk, and Kenton parked behind Gunn. Gunn exited 

his car with his gun drawn and stood near the driver side 

door, immediately telling Napouk to “put it on the ground,” 

and drop it. He asked Napouk what was in his hand and 

repeated his command to drop it.

Kenton also exited his car, moved towards Napouk with 

his gun drawn, repeatedly asked Napouk what was in his 

hand, and told him to put it on the ground. Kenton also 

repeatedly commanded Napouk to remove the headphones 

from his ears while pointing to his own ears. Napouk stood 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 7

still for several seconds to the right of Gunn’s patrol car, 

holding the long, black object at his side. Gunn reported that 

Napouk was not following commands and “saying we’re 

gonna have to shoot him.” 

Napouk then walked slowly in front of and around to the 

driver side of Gunn’s patrol car, where Gunn was standing, 

failing to follow the officers’ commands to put the object 

down. Gunn retreated to stand behind the back of his patrol 

car, and both officers continued to repeat commandsto “drop 

the knife.” Napouk stood next to the driver side door of 

Gunn’s patrol car and smoked a cigarette for over a minute, 

with Gunn positioned at the driver side bumper and Kenton 

on the passenger side at the hood of the car. The officers 

repeatedly told Napouk that “it’s not worth it,” that “it’s all 

good, man. We can talk,” and that “you’re not in any 

trouble,” and Kenton also tried asking his name. Kenton 

radioed during this time to request a beanbag shotgun and a 

canine unit and asked that medical be standing by. Napouk 

stayed in the same place and moved the long object in 

different positions, pointing it outward, up in the air, and 

straight out next to him.

After around two minutes standing in one place and 

failing to abide by the officers’ commands, Napouk moved 

more quickly along the side of the car toward Gunn, telling 

the officers twice to “get out of here.” Gunn retreated around 

the other side of the car, repeating his command to drop the 

weapon. Kenton followed Napouk around the car repeating 

commands to drop it. Napouk then turned and walked at 

Kenton, who retreated back to stand with Gunn at the 

passenger side near the hood of the car. Both officers said 

“I’m gonna shoot you,” and Napouk responded “you have 

to.” Gunn told Napouk if he took one more step towards 

them, “I will shoot you,” and Napouk said, “I know.” 

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8 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

Kenton told him again to drop it and “it’s not worth it man,”

and again tried to ask his name and talk to him. 

Napouk stopped at the front driver side of Gunn’s patrol 

car for another minute, moving his hat around on his head 

and telling the officers to “get out of here,” while the officers 

stood on the passenger side, continuing to repeat commands 

to drop it and attempting to ask his name. Eventually, he 

began slowly moving again, across the front of the car 

toward them. They again retreated, Gunn behind a parked 

car on the side of the road next to his patrol car, and Kenton 

to the back of Gunn’s patrol car. Kenton again radioed to 

request that someone with a beanbag shotgun come in 

behind him.

Napouk continued to move slowly in their direction, 

changing his grip on the object a few times. The officers 

continued instructing him to put it down, and Kenton told 

him “I don’t want to shoot you today.” Napouk continued 

to move along the passenger side of Gunn’s patrol car 

towards Kenton, positioning himself between the two

officers. Gunn told Kenton to “watch your crossfire.” 

Kenton told Napouk “one more step and you’re dead,” to 

which Napouk responded, “I know” and continued 

advancing. When Napouk was about nine feet away, the 

officers both shot him multiple times. 

Other officers put a handcuff on Napouk and performed 

first aid and CPR immediately following the shooting, but 

Napouk was pronounced dead at the scene. After the 

shooting, it was discovered that the object was a plastic toy 

fashioned to appear as a blade. Napouk’s toxicology report 

revealed that he had been high on methamphetamine. 

Napouk’s parents, individually and as representatives of 

his estate, sued LVMPD, Gunn, and Kenton. They allege 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 9

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment,

deprivation of familial relations in violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, several municipal liability claims

based on Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 

658 (1978), and battery/wrongful death and

negligence/wrongful death under Nevada law. The district 

court granted summary judgment for Defendants, 

determining primarily that the officers’ use of force was 

reasonable as a matter of law. Plaintiffs appeal the district 

court’s judgment on all except their municipal liability for 

failure to train claim.

II.

“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, 

viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Edwards v. Wells Fargo & Co., 606 F.3d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 

2010). We similarly review “the district court’s conclusions 

regarding qualified immunity de novo” and consider 

“disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 

946 (9th Cir. 2017); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 

(2007). 

III.

Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment on their claims of (1) Fourth Amendment 

excessive force; (2) Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of a 

familial relationship; (3) municipal liability for an 

unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy; (4) municipal 

liability based on ratification; (5) battery/wrongful death 

under Nevada law; and (6) negligence/wrongful death under 

Nevada law. We address these claims in turn.

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10 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

A.

Both officers are entitled to qualified immunity from the 

excessive force claim. Qualified immunity protects 

government officials from suit unless “(1) they violated a 

federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the 

unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the 

time.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 

(2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 

(2012)). Here, neither prong is satisfied.

1.

Under the first prong, we must determine whether “the 

use of force is contrary to the Fourth Amendment’s 

prohibition against unreasonable seizures.” Wilkins v. City of 

Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2003). We look at 

“whether it would be objectively reasonable for the officer to 

believe that the amount of force employed was required by 

the situation he confronted.” Id. “Determining whether the 

force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the 

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 

Amendment interests against the countervailing 

governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he 

‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged 

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, 

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. And 

“[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for 

the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments—in circumstances that are tense, 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 11

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force 

that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396–97.

Here, Kenton and Gunn each shot Napouk several times. 

“The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is 

unmatched.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 9. Where, as here, deadly 

force, which “‘implicates the highest level of Fourth 

Amendment interests,’” is used, “the issue is determining

whether the governmental interests at stake were sufficient to 

justify it.” Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024,

1031 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting A.K.H. ex rel. Landeros v. City 

of Tustin, 837 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2016)).

The Supreme Court has provided three factors for 

determining the strength of the government’s interest: 

“[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the 

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers 

or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or 

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 

396. The “most important” of these factors is “whether the 

suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the 

officers or others.” Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1117 

(9th Cir. 2014). 

a.

Addressing the second and “most important” factor first, 

Napouk posed an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers. See id.

i.

We first address Plaintiffs’ contention that the district 

court erred in failing to conclude that a rational jury could 

find the officers’ mistake of fact as to the machete 

unreasonable. Plaintiffs argue that there was a genuine 

factual dispute as to whether the officers’ belief that Napouk 

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12 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

was holding a bladed weapon was reasonable. But no 

rational jury could find the officers’ mistake unreasonable.

“Officers can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as 

to the facts establishing the existence of an immediate threat, 

and in those situations courts will not hold that they have 

violated the Constitution.” Est. of Strickland v. Nevada 

County, 69 F.4th 614, 621 (9th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks 

and citations omitted) (holding that officers’ perception that

a plastic, airsoft replica gun was a real firearm was not 

unreasonable). “When an officer’s use of force is based on 

a mistake of fact, we ask whether a reasonable officer would 

have or should have accurately perceived that fact.” Id. 

(quotation marks omitted) (citing Torres v. City of Madera, 

648 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011)). “Whether the mistake 

was an honest one is not the concern, only whether it was a 

reasonable one.” S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125,

1133 (9th Cir. 2019) (alteration marks and quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Torres, 648 F.3d at 1127).

Here, witnesses gave several different descriptions of the 

object Napouk held, which highlights that others were at 

least confused as to what the object was. The officers were 

told that Napouk had either a slim jim, long stick, or 

machete. When they arrived on the scene just after midnight, 

both officers asked Napouk what was in his hand, and he

failed to respond. Kenton told him at various points to drop 

“the knife” and “the weapon,” while Gunn testified at a 

deposition that he perceived the object to have a metal blade 

because of the way light reflected off of it. Pictures and 

reports of the object confirm that at twenty-two inches long,

made of layers of dark gray plastic adhered together and 

square at the end, and with a handle made of wire and yellow 

rope covered in black tape, the object was a “homemade 

plastic sword.” Even Plaintiffs describe the object in their 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 13

complaint as a “toy sword wrapped in duct tape” and a 

“machete shaped instrument.” Put simply, the item

objectively looked like a machete, and no rational jury could 

find Kenton or Gunn’s mistake unreasonable. See S.R. 

Nehad, 929 F.3d at 1134.

Plaintiffs’ cases to the contrary are unavailing. First, in

Torres v. City of Madera, an officer mistook her own pistol 

for her taser and shot a suspect—obviously a different 

situation from here. 648 F.3d at 1120. In S.R. Nehad v. 

Browder, an officer shot a suspect who he thought was 

approaching him with a knife, even though he never saw a

knife and the suspect turned out to have only a blue metallic 

pen. 929 F.3d at 1131. In Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 

officers mistook an undercover officer arresting a suspect for 

“a civilian threatening another civilian with a gun.” 350 F.3d

at 955. In each of these cases, certain circumstances, such 

as special training or warnings from others on the scene, put 

the officer “on notice” that their belief might be mistaken, 

such that they “should have known.” Torres, 648 F.3d at 

1125, 1127. Here, no such facts alleged by Plaintiffs suggest 

circumstances by which the officers should have known the 

object, which was obviously made to look like a knife, was 

not actually a knife. Therefore, no rational jury could find 

the officers’ mistake unreasonable.

ii.

With the mistake of fact addressed, this becomes a 

straightforward case. As already explained, we assess 

reasonableness “from the perspective of a reasonable officer 

on the scene.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. As the officers 

reasonably perceived it, Napouk was holding a long, bladed 

weapon, walking toward one of them and failing to follow 

commands to stop or to drop the weapon. At the moment 

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14 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

they fired, Napouk was within ten feet of them, had ignored 

their commands for more than five minutes, and had moved 

at them several times, causing them to retreat with increasing 

frequency as the encounter went on. See Smith v. City of 

Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 704 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that

“where a suspect threatens an officer with a weapon such as 

a gun or a knife, the officer is justified in using deadly 

force”).

Our court has previously found it objectively reasonable 

to view an individual as an immediate threat in similar 

situations. In Blanford v. Sacramento County, our court

addressed a case similar to this one. 406 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 

2005). Officers responded to reports of a man wandering 

through a suburban neighborhood carrying a sword and 

“behaving erratically.” Id. at 1112. The court determined 

that it was objectively reasonable for officers to view him as 

an immediate threat when he was attempting to enter a home 

and failed to comply with verbal commands to stop and to 

drop the sword. Id. at 1116. Here, Napouk similarly was 

found wandering streets and behaving erratically while 

carrying what appeared to be a long, bladed object, and 

similarly failed to comply with verbal commands to stop and 

drop the object. And in Lal v. California, officers were 

approached by a suspect holding a “football-sized rock” over 

his head. 746 F.3d at 1112, 1115, 1117. This court held that 

the officers were justified in their belief that he posed an 

immediate threat when he advanced on them. Id. Here, 

Napouk approaching the officers with what they reasonably 

perceived to be a long, bladed weapon was reasonably 

perceived as posing an even greater threat than a suspect 

with a rock.

Plaintiffs make several arguments as to why Napouk did 

not present an immediate threat, but none are convincing. 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 15

First, they argue that Napouk did not pose an immediate 

threat because he did not wave the object in a “threatening 

manner.” For this they cite Hayes v. County of San Diego, 

736 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2013), Glenn v. Washington County,

673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2011), and George v. Morris, 736 

F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2013). But none stands for the broad, 

sweeping proposition for which Plaintiffs cite them, and 

each is distinguishable. In Hayes, officers encountered a 

suspect in his kitchen. 736 F.3d at 1227. When he complied 

with an officer’s command to show his hands, revealing that 

he was holding a knife, pointed tip down, they immediately 

shot him. Id. at 1228. In Glenn, officers responded to 

reports of a suicidal and intoxicated man holding a 

pocketknife. 673 F.3d at 873. When the officers arrived, 

they positioned themselves a few feet from him and made 

sure all other bystanders were out of the way. Id. at 874.

Though he did not respond to their commands to drop the 

pocketknife, he stayed in the same position, holding the 

pocketknife to his own neck, and made no sign of moving 

until the officers fired upon him. Id. at 873–74. And in 

Morris, police responded to a report of a man with a gun at 

his house. Morris, 736 F.3d at 832. When they arrived, the 

officers spotted the man, who had terminal brain cancer, 

using a walker on his balcony and holding a gun in his hand 

with the barrel pointed down. Id. at 832–33. There was a 

dispute of fact as to whether the man lifted the gun and

whether he was even physically capable of wielding it. Id. 

at 833, 835.

Those cases stand for the proposition that the mere fact 

alone “that the suspect was armed with a deadly weapon 

does not render the officers’ response per se reasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 838 (internal quotation

marks omitted). That makes imminent sense. Many lawCase: 23-15726, 12/10/2024, ID: 12916713, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 15 of 59
16 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

abiding individuals possess weapons for a variety of 

legitimate purposes, and such mere possession has never 

alone justified the use of deadly force by law enforcement. 

But none of those cases supports Plaintiffs’ very different 

proposition that an armed individual can pose a threat only

when that person brandishes the weapon in a “threatening 

manner.” Courts have repeatedly rejected that unreasonable 

argument. “If the person is armed—or reasonably suspected 

of being armed—a furtive movement, harrowing gesture, or 

serious verbal threat might create an immediate threat.” 

George, 736 F.3d at 838; see also Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 

F.3d 1093, 1100 (11th Cir. 2018) (The court determined that 

even if the suspect had not raised his hatchet before he was 

shot, he posed an immediate threat because he was close to 

and approaching the officers and “could have raised the 

hatchet in another second or two and struck [the officer] with 

it. Whether the hatchet was at [his] side, behind his back, or 

above his head doesn’t change that fact.”). Instead, the cases 

simply look at the totality of the circumstances to determine 

whether each individual who was holding a weapon was 

reasonably perceived as posing a threat at the moment the 

officer acted. Glenn, 673 F.3d at 872; Hayes, 736 F.3d at 

1233–1234; George, 736 F.3d at 838. Unlike Glenn, Hayes,

and George, the undisputed facts here show that Napouk had 

repeatedly disobeyed commands to stop moving toward the 

officers and to drop the weapon. By telling him that they 

would shoot him if he took another step, the officers clearly 

indicated to him their reasonable perception that they saw 

further deliberate movement toward them with the weapon

as a threat. Rather than comply with their repeated 

commands, Napouk continued to hold the object, moving it 

around and pointing it in various directions, and continued 

to deliberately advance toward them.

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 17

Second, Plaintiffs argue that there was at least a dispute 

of fact as to Napouk’s pace when he advanced towards the 

officers. They claim that while the district court’s order 

describes Napouk as walking at “variable paces,” the 

officers described Napouk’s pace as “slow” and said that it 

did not change. But whether his pace was the same during 

his final approach as it was throughout the entire encounter

is a red herring obscuring the facts that actually matter. 

What matters is that regardless of whether Napouk’s pace

was “slow” as a subjective matter, and regardless of whether 

Napouk varied his pace at some point, Plaintiffs do not—and 

cannot—dispute that when the officers fired, Napouk was 

within nine feet and deliberately advancing on the officers

with what they reasonably perceived to be a long, bladed 

weapon in his hand. 

Third, Plaintiffs assert that Napouk did not make 

“indirect verbal threats,” or “becom[e] increasingly 

irritated” as the district court’s order described. But again, 

even accepting Plaintiffs’ view in this regard does not 

change the calculus. Napouk was behaving erratically,

holding what the officers reasonably perceived to be a lethal 

weapon, repeatedly ignoring their commands to stop and to 

drop it, and repeatedly deliberately advancing toward them 

with the weapon in his hand. Those facts and circumstances, 

regardless of whether he verbally threatened them or became 

increasingly irritated, show an immediate threat.

Fourth, Plaintiffs claim that the officers “created their 

own sense of urgency and unnecessary haste.” Of course, 

“an officer’s poor judgment or lack of preparedness [can] 

cause[] him or her to act unreasonably, with undue haste.” 

S.R. Nehad, 929 F.3d at 1135 (quotations omitted). But the 

undisputed facts clearly show that is not this case. The 

officers laudably responded quickly to reports of an armed 

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18 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

individual walking around a neighborhood, looking in cars 

and going up to houses. After they found him, they spent 

more than five minutes attempting to engage with him and 

convince him to drop his weapon. Only when he 

deliberately advanced on them a final time, putting himself 

in a position where the officers were concerned about 

crossfire, did they finally engage. 

Finally, the Plaintiffs claim that the officers had “ample 

opportunity to reposition [or] withdraw,” and therefore they 

should have again retreated instead of shooting. For this 

proposition, Plaintiffs again cite Glenn. But in that case, the 

suspect “stayed in the same position from the moment 

officers arrived and showed no signs of attempting to move 

until after he was fired upon.” 673 F.3d at 874. So Glenn

does not involve a situation like this one where officers 

repeatedly retreated (at least four times) and attempted to 

engage and reason with Napouk, who continually advanced 

upon them. And Deorle v. Rutherford, the other case 

Plaintiffs cite, similarly does not stand for the obviously 

wrong proposition that officers must indefinitely retreat if

able. 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001). In Doerle, the suspect

“had not harmed or attempted to harm anyone” in the time 

the officer observed him, had dropped his crossbow as the 

officer instructed, and was walking with only a can or bottle

in his hand. Id. at 1281–82. Based on all the facts and 

circumstances, there was “no immediate need to subdue” the 

suspect at the moment the officer used force against him. Id. 

at 1282. So again, the situation was substantially different 

from the one Kenton and Gunn faced.2 Officers “need not 

2 The dissent mistakenly characterizes our analysis as relying on factual 

distinctions between this case and certain other cases—namely Glenn, 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 19

avail themselves of the least intrusive means of responding 

to an exigent situation,” Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 

(9th Cir. 1994), and we decline to create a rule by which 

officers have a duty to indefinitely retreat when faced with 

an immediate threat. Cf. Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 331 

(9th Cir. 1989) (“[S]uch a duty may be inconsistent with 

police officers’ duty to the public[.]”), overruling on other 

grounds recognized by Edgerly v. City & County of San 

Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 956 n.14 (9th Cir. 2010).

In sum, the totality of the circumstances based on the 

undisputed facts in this case shows that Napouk posed an 

immediate threat to the officers at the moment they fired.

b.

Next, we address the severity of the crime at issue. This 

court often has “used the severity of the crime at issue as a 

proxy for the danger a suspect poses at the time force is 

applied.” S.R. Nehad, 929 F.3d at 1136 (citing Lowry v. City 

of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1257 (9th Cir. 2017)). As the 

district court determined, Napouk may have committed

assault with a deadly weapon as the event unfolded by 

brandishing the object and refusing to respond to the 

officers’ orders. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.471(1)(a), (2)(b)

(“Assault means: (1) Unlawfully attempting to use physical 

Hayes, and George—to “reject[] Plaintiffs’ evidence” in this case. But 

we do not “reject” Plaintiffs’ evidence. Indeed, this opinion repeatedly

cites Plaintiffs’ evidence as true. Rather, we merely explain that 

Plaintiffs’ evidence fails to create any dispute of material fact about 

whether Napouk was an imminent threat—he clearly was. We

distinguish the facts of other cases simply to demonstrate why this case 

does not warrant the same legal conclusion reached in those cases, and 

why the different facts in those cases failed to demonstrate the presence 

of an “imminent threat” while the dissimilar facts of this case do rise to 

that level.

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20 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

force against another person; or (2) [i]ntentionally placing 

another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate 

bodily harm.”). This is a sufficiently serious and dangerous

crime. As explained above, that the weapon turned out to be 

plastic has no bearing on the severity of the crime because 

the officers on the scene reasonably believed it was real. See

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

c.

The final Graham factor asks whether the suspect is 

“actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 

flight.” Id. As discussed above, Napouk repeatedly failed 

to comply with the officers’ orders to drop his weapon and 

to stop moving, and advanced toward the officers with the 

weapon.

Plaintiffs cite Young v. County of Los Angeles, arguing 

that because the officers never explicitly told Napouk that he 

was under arrest, he could not have resisted arrest. 655 F.3d 

1156 (9th Cir. 2011). But the circumstances of this case are 

unlike Young, where an officer pepper sprayed and hit a

suspect with a baton who was sitting on a curb and “eating 

his broccoli.” Id. at 1159. The subject there had been pulled 

over for a seatbelt violation and while the officer wrote his 

citation, he exited his truck to give the officer his 

registration. Id. Rather than “just hav[ing] a seat in the 

truck” as the officer instructed, he sat down on the sidewalk. 

Id. The officer never warned him that failure to comply 

would result in force or arrest, id. at 1165, whereas Kenton 

and Gunn warned Napouk that further noncompliance with 

their orders would necessitate use of force. And unlike this 

case, where Napouk was actively resisting orders and 

deliberately moving toward the officers with a bladed 

weapon, “Young was not being placed under arrest nor 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 21

attempting to flee when [the officer] began to pepper spray 

him.” Id. 

This case is also unlike Glenn, where the court 

determined that the suspect did not actively resist arrest 

because he “stayed in the same position from the time 

officers arrived and took no threatening actions (other than 

noncompliance with shouted orders).” 673 F.3d at 874–75. 

Napouk refused to follow the officers’ orders to stop moving

towards them and to drop the weapon. And unlike Glenn, 

where there was genuine dispute over whether the suspect 

“heard or understood those orders” to drop his pocketknife,

id. at 875, here, Napouk is heard on the body camera footage 

from both officers responding to their commands. For 

example, when Kenton told Napouk “one more step and 

you’re dead,” Napouk responded, “I know.” Therefore, 

Napouk actively resisted the officers’ orders, satisfying

Graham’s final factor.

d.

Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that other factors suggest 

the officers’ use of force was unreasonable, including 

Napouk’s mental state, the availability of less lethal means, 

and the lack of an effective warning. To start, while we have 

recognized that these other factors are relevant when 

evaluating the totality of the circumstances, Glenn, 673 F.3d 

at 872, they do not overcome the Graham factors to prove a 

constitutional violation where all three Graham factors favor 

the officers’ use of force. But even if they could, each

weighs in the officers’ favor in this case.

First, though “whether the officers were or should have 

been aware that [the suspect] was emotionally disturbed” is

a relevant consideration, Glenn, 673 F.3d at 875, we do not 

have “two tracks of excessive force analysis, one for the 

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22 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

mentally ill and one for serious criminals,” Bryan v. 

MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 829 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs 

are correct that this court has said that “when an emotionally 

disturbed individual is ‘acting out’ and inviting officers to 

use deadly force to subdue him, the governmental interest in 

using such force is diminished by the fact that the officers 

are confronted, not with a person who has committed a 

serious crime against others, but with a mentally ill 

individual.” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1283. But that is true only 

“where such an individual is neither a threat to himself nor 

to anyone else.” Bryan, 630 F.3d at 829; see also Glenn, 673 

F.3d at 875–76 (emphasizing that the suspect was not

“brandishing [his pocketknife] at his parents or friends”). 

For example, in Bryan, the suspect had no weapon, “never 

addressed” the officer, and “remained stationary at a 

distance of approximately twenty feet.” 630 F.3d at 828. 

That he was also “yelling gibberish and hitting his thighs”

such that the officer believed he “may have been mentally 

ill” did not increase the government interest in using force 

against him. Id. at 822, 829.

In a case like this one, on the other hand, where the 

suspect is brandishing what is reasonably understood to be a 

lethal weapon and advancing towards the officers, that he 

was emotionally disturbed does not negate the serious threat 

he exhibited. If anything, his mental state and erratic 

behavior made Napouk more of a threat to the officers

because he clearly was not behaving rationally or in a 

predictable manner when he repeatedly approached them 

with a bladed weapon. Therefore, under these 

circumstances, Napouk’s mental state does not lessen the 

government interest in the use of force.

Second, Plaintiffs relatedly contend that because of 

Napouk’s mental state, the officers should have made a 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 23

“greater effort to take control of the situation through less 

intrusive means.” But as we have repeatedly stated, officers 

“need not avail themselves of the least intrusive means of 

responding to an exigent situation; they need only act within 

that range of conduct we identify as reasonable.” Scott, 39 

F.3d at 915. 

Here, the officers made a concerted effort to deescalate 

the situation and use alternative means. The officers tried to 

engage and reason with Napouk for more than five minutes, 

and they repeatedly retreated as Napouk deliberately 

advanced toward them. They tried to deescalate by saying 

things like “it’s all good, man. We can talk,” and “you’re not 

in any trouble,” and Kenton tried several times to ask

Napouk’s name. Kenton also radioed to request a beanbag 

shotgun and a canine unit, and then followed up shortly 

before the situation escalated to request them a second time. 

Only when Napouk advanced upon them a fifth time

with what they reasonably believed was a long, bladed 

weapon, putting himself on a path where he could end up

between Kenton and Gunn such that they were concerned 

about crossfire, failed to follow commands to drop it and 

stop, and came within nine feet of Kenton did the officers 

use deadly force. That the officers did not retreat another 

time to wait for the less lethal means they requested does not 

make their actions unreasonable. Nor does the mere fact that

tasers were available make the officers’ use of a gun to 

protect themselves from a perceived deadly threat

unreasonable. Glenn, 673 F.3d at 876.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the officers failed to give 

effective warnings. “In general, we have recognized that an 

officer must give a warning before using deadly force 

‘whenever practicable.’” Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 747 

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24 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs do not dispute that

the officers repeatedly warned Napouk that they would shoot 

him if he came closer, but they argue that Napouk was 

wearing headphones, so the warnings may not have been 

effective. This is refuted by the record. When the officers 

warned Napouk that they would shoot, Napouk responded 

by saying “you have to” and “I know.” Plaintiffs also point 

out that Kenton and Gunn failed to identify themselves as 

officers. While they are correct that this may be a

consideration, see S.R. Nehad, 929 F.3d at 1138, here, the 

officers were uniformed, and both pulled up right in front of 

Napouk in their patrol vehicles with the lights on. No 

rational juror would believe he did not know they were 

officers. Based on these facts, no rational jury could 

determine that the officers failed to give effective warnings. 

* * *

For these reasons, the totality of the circumstances leads

us to conclude that the officers’ use of force was reasonable. 

Glenn, 673 F.3d at 872 (“We examine the totality of the 

circumstances and consider whatever specific factors may be 

appropriate in a particular case ....” (quotations omitted)). 

Napouk may not have been a threat if he simply possessed 

what they believed was a bladed weapon, or stood in one 

place, or merely failed to comply with their commands to 

drop the weapon. But he deliberately advanced toward the 

officers with what they believed was a long, bladed weapon 

and repeatedly ignored their commands to drop it and to stop 

moving. Viewed holistically, these facts justified the 

officers’ use of force.

2.

The officers’ conduct did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment, but even if it did, they would still be entitled to 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 25

qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly 

established law. To be clearly established, there need not be 

“a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have 

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 

debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). 

While in the “rare” case a clearly established right may be 

obvious, clearly establishing a right usually requires 

“‘controlling authority’ or a robust ‘consensus of cases of 

persuasive authority.’” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63, 64 (quoting 

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–42). The burden is on Plaintiffs, 

Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 946, to show that “the right’s contours 

were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the 

defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was 

violating it,” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2018) 

(citation omitted). 

According to Plaintiffs, “Bryan, Drummond, Deorle, 

Gonzalez, Harris, Young, and Glenn ... clearly established 

the principles that render the deadly force unreasonable.” 

But as discussed above, Bryan, Deorle, Young, and Glenn

are distinguishable. In Bryan, Young, and Glenn, none of the 

suspects advanced towards the officers. Bryan, 630 F.3d at 

828 (noting that the suspect “remained stationary at a 

distance of approximately twenty feet”); Young, 655 F.3d at 

1164 (noting that suspect was “sitting on the sidewalk”);

Glenn, 673 F.3d at 874 (noting that the suspect “stayed in 

the same position from the moment officers arrived and 

showed no signs of attempting to move until after he was 

fired upon”). And in Bryan, Young, and Deorle, the suspect 

did not have a weapon. Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826 (“It is 

undisputed that Bryan was unarmed, and, as Bryan was only 

dressed in tennis shoes and boxer shorts, it should have been 

apparent that he was unarmed.”); Young, 655 F.3d at 1166

(noting suspect was “armed only with broccoli and a 

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26 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

tomato”); Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1281 (“Deorle had discarded 

his crossbow following Rutherford’s instructions to do so, 

and carried only a bottle or a can with him.”).

Drummond, Gonzalez, and Harris are similarly 

distinguishable. In Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of 

Anaheim, officers “allegedly crushed Drummond against the 

ground by pressing their weight on his neck and torso, and 

continuing to do so despite his repeated cries for air, and 

despite the fact that his hands were cuffed behind his back 

and he was offering no resistance.” 343 F.3d 1052, 1061 

(9th Cir. 2003). In Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, after a 

skirmish during a traffic stop, an officer ended up inside a 

car with a suspect, who was unarmed. 747 F.3d at 792. The 

suspect shifted the car into drive and attempted to flee, with 

the officer in the passenger seat, and the officer shot the 

suspect in the head. Id. at 792–93. There was a genuine

dispute of fact as to how quickly the car took off, and 

therefore whether the officer or anyone else was in danger. 

Id. at 796. And Harris v. Roderick concerns the FBI’s 

actions at Ruby Ridge. 126 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997). 

There, the court denied qualified immunity to an agent who 

shot without warning or opportunity to surrender a suspect

who “made no aggressive move of any kind,” and was 

running back to the safety of his cabin. Id. at 1203. In none 

of these cases did the undisputed facts show an armed man 

deliberately advancing upon officers. Therefore, none of the 

cases clearly establish that the officers would violate 

Napouk’s constitutional rights by firing at him as he 

intentionally approached with a weapon and refused to drop 

it.

Finally, at argument, Plaintiffs discussed Hayes. But as 

already discussed, the suspect in Hayes revealed the knife by 

complying with the officers’ commands to show his hands, 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 27

and the officers immediately shot him without giving him a 

warning to stop or to drop the knife. 736 F.3d at 1227–28. 

So again, Hayes is factually dissimilar to this case, where the 

officers repeatedly ordered Napouk to stop and to drop his 

weapon and acted with deadly force only when he refused 

and deliberately approached within a few feet of them. 

Therefore, the officers here are entitled to qualified 

immunity.

B.

Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of a 

familial relationship claim also fails. In the Ninth Circuit, 

an adult decedent’s parents have the right to assert a 

substantive due process claim for the deprivation of the 

companionship of their child. Sinclair v. City of Seattle, 61 

F.4th 674, 678–79 (9th Cir. 2023). Even assuming arguendo 

that such a claim exists based on these facts, where Napouk 

was an adult in his forties, id. at 685–86 (Nelson, J., 

concurring), only “[o]fficial conduct that ‘shocks the 

conscience’ in depriving parents of that interest is cognizable 

as a violation of due process.” Jones v. Las Vegas Metro. 

Police Dep’t, 873 F.3d 1123, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2017)

(alterations in original) (quoting Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 

F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010)). “Where actual deliberation 

[by the officers] is practical, then an officer’s ‘deliberate 

indifference’ may suffice to shock the conscience.” 

Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554. But where, as here, “a law 

enforcement officer makes a snap judgment because of an 

escalating situation, his conduct may only be found to shock 

the conscience if he acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to 

legitimate law enforcement objectives.” Id.; see also Porter

v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying 

the second standard to a “five-minute altercation” between 

the suspect and the officer that was “quickly evolving and 

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28 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

escalating, prompting repeated split-second decisions” 

(internal quotations omitted)). 

Here, assuming Plaintiffs could assert a substantive due 

process claim based on the death of their forty-four-year-old

son, and that they could succeed in making out an excessive 

force claim, there is no evidence that the officers acted with 

anything other than the legitimate law enforcement 

objectives of self-defense and defense of each other. Id. at 

1140 (to shock the conscience, the officer’s purpose must be 

“to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest” 

(quotation omitted)). Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment 

claim fails.

C.

Plaintiffs also appeal dismissal of their Monell claims 

alleging municipal liability for an unconstitutional custom,

practice, or policy and municipal liability based on 

ratification. Under Monell, a municipality is liable for 

constitutional torts committed by its employees only if those 

torts were committed pursuant to the municipality’s policies 

or customs. Henry v. County of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 517 

(9th Cir. 1997). A municipality is liable only if (1) “the 

[plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which he was 

deprived;” (2) “the municipality had a policy;” (3) “this 

policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff's 

constitutional right;” and (4) “the policy is the ‘moving force 

behind the constitutional violation.’” Van Ort v. Est. of 

Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir 1996). Here, because 

we have found no constitutional violation, we also affirm the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment on the Monell

claims. See Hayes, 736 F.3d at 1231 (noting that a 

constitutional violation is required for Monell liability).

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 29

D.

Plaintiffs also bring battery and negligence claims under 

Nevada law. Nevada’s discretionary immunity statute 

“precludes claims against state officers based on acts or 

omissions relating to a ‘discretionary function,’ even if that 

discretion is abused.” Jones, 873 F.3d at 1133. Under 

Nevada law, state actors are entitled to discretionaryfunction immunity if their decision “(1) involves an element 

of individual judgment or choice and (2) is based on 

considerations of social, economic, or political policy.” 

Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 756 F.3d 1154, 

1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up) (quoting Martinez v. 

Maruszczak, 168 P.3d 720, 729 (Nev. 2007)). “But 

decisions made in bad faith, such as ‘abusive’ conduct 

resulting from ‘hostility’ or ‘willful or deliberate disregard’

for a citizen’s rights, aren’t protected under the immunity 

statute even if they arise out of a discretionary function.” 

Jones, 873 F.3d at 1133. 

Here, the officers’ actions fell within the discretionary 

function as it has been applied by Nevada’s courts. See 

Sandoval, 756 F.3d at 1169 (applying discretionary 

immunity to most police actions during an interaction with 

three suspects); see also Gonzalez v. Las Vegas Metro. 

Police Dep’t, No. 61120, 2013 WL 7158415 (Nev. 2013) 

(applying discretionary immunity to police actions in 

detaining and arresting a suspect). And because we have 

already determined that the officers acted reasonably and 

there is no evidence that they acted with bad faith, that 

immunity applies. See Jones, 873 F.3d at 1133. Therefore, 

the district court properly granted summary judgment on the 

state law claims.

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IV.

Plaintiffs have not shown that Kenton’s or Gunn’s 

actions were objectively unreasonable in violation of 

Napouk’s Fourth Amendment rights or that such rights were 

clearly established. Therefore, the district court properly 

granted summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment 

claim. And because the officers acted reasonably, the 

district court also properly granted summary judgment on 

the Fourteenth Amendment, Monell, and state tort claims. 

AFFIRMED.

R. Nelson, J., concurring: 

I concur in the majority opinion and the conclusion to 

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ substantive 

due process claim. In my view, however, substantive due 

process does not extend to the Napouks’ relationship with 

their forty-four-year-old son. Our circuit has recognized a 

substantive due process right to the companionship of one’s 

adult children in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Sinclair v. 

City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674, 679 (9th Cir. 2023). In doing 

so, we have created a split with other circuits.1 And our 

holding that plaintiffs have such a right finds no basis in the 

text, history, or tradition of the Fourteenth Amendment. Our 

1 Compare Valdivieso-Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 8–9 (1st Cir. 1986), 

McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 829 (3d Cir. 2003), Russ v. Watts, 414 

F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2005), Robertson v. Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254, 

1259–60 (11th Cir. 2005), and Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 

637, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (all finding no such substantive due process 

right), with Trujillo v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Santa Fe. Cnty., 768 F.2d 

1186, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding right to familial relations under 

the First, not the Fourteenth, Amendment). 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 31

ahistorical precedent should not be extended beyond the 

narrow circumstances in those prior cases. 

The Supreme Court has recognized that states may not 

unjustifiably interfere with the “formation and preservation 

of certain kinds of highly personal relationships.” Roberts 

v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). These include 

those that “attend the creation and sustenance of a family,” 

including the rearing of children. Id. at 619; accord Meyer 

v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); May v. Anderson, 

345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). That interest protects a parent’s 

autonomy to decide questions related to the “custody, care 

and nurture of the child.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 

651 (1972) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 

166 (1944)); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 

(1982) (same). 

Following these principles, we first held in Morrison v. 

Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1275 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), that 

a parent’s relationship with her child is constitutionally 

protected. There, county officials deported the plaintiff’s 

minor son, a German ward of the state, on the grounds that 

the plaintiff could not adequately care for her child. Id. at 

1272. The plaintiff brought a § 1983 action alleging 

deprivation of her parental rights without due process of law. 

Id. at 1271. We held that the plaintiff had a constitutional 

interest in “preserv[ing] her access to [her] child.” Id. at 

1275. Morrison was rooted in the same basic principle that 

a parent has a protected custodial interest in her child. 

We have affirmed Morrison’s holding that parents have 

a protected custodial interest in the companionship and 

society of their minor children. See, e.g., Kelson v. City of 

Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1985); Wallis v. 

Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1131–36 (9th Cir. 2000). But we 

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32 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

did not stop there. Breaking from most of our sister circuits, 

we extended this right to reach a parent’s relationship with 

an adult child. See, e.g., Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 

F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986); Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. 

Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1998); Porter v. 

Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2008). In these three 

cases, we simply accepted that the plaintiff parents had a 

constitutionally protected right to their relationship with 

their adult children. But we cited no special reason why. We 

took no pains to explain how the parents’ relationship with 

their adult child bears on the custody, care, and nurture of 

that child. Cf. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. For example, we 

did not discuss that special circumstances, such as the adult 

child’s age or living arrangements, may allow his parents to 

assert a constitutional right to a familial relationship. Nor 

did we ground such a conclusion in the Constitution’s text or 

our Nation’s history and tradition. These cases are pure 

judicial ipse dixit. 

I have already explained why trying to ground this 

constitutional right in the Constitution’s text or our Nation’s 

history and tradition would be a losing enterprise. Sinclair, 

61 F.4th at 684–86 (R. Nelson, J., concurring). “The 

Supreme Court has admonished that we must be wary of 

recognizing new substantive due process rights ‘lest the 

liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly 

transformed into the policy preferences’ of judges.” Id. at 

685 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 

(1997)). “Before recognizing a substantive due process 

right, the Court requires ‘a careful description’ of the 

asserted right and then a determination that it is ‘deeply 

rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” Id. (quoting 

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21). 

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Even so, we were bound in Sinclair by precedent to hold

that the plaintiff had a valid liberty interest in her 

relationship with her nineteen-year-old son. 61 F.4th at 679. 

We reiterated, however, that Strandberg, Moreland, and 

Porter were not well-reasoned, suggesting that we would not 

be bound by them in a later case with fewer factual 

“similarities” to them. Id. 

This is such a case. George Lloyd Napouk was fortyfour years old when he died. His parents live thousands of 

miles from where Napouk resided. Thus, while their grief is 

justifiably still great, they lack the custodial parent-child 

relationship that we held in Sinclair was constitutionally 

protected. I would not extend Sinclair to these 

circumstances. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 

530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (we 

should not “distort[] existing precedent” where it would be 

“[un]faithful to the meaning” of the Constitutional text). We 

may be bound by ahistorical precedent. But we should not 

extend ahistorical precedent when it otherwise violates our 

Nation’s history and tradition. See, e.g., Kennedy v. 

Bremerton Sch. Dist., 4 F.4th 910, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2021) 

(R. Nelson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 

(precedent should not be extended when it is “ahistorical 

[and] atextual”); see also Murguia v. Langdon, 73 F.4th 

1103, 1108–18 (9th Cir. 2023) (Bumatay, J., dissenting from 

denial of rehearing en banc) (we should follow “Supreme 

Court precedent and our Constitution’s text” rather than 

extend “atextual and ahistorical expansion[s] of substantive 

due process rights”); Texas v. Rettig, 993 F.3d 408, 417 (5th 

Cir. 2021) (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 

banc) (“[O]ur duty [is] to apply the Constitution—not extend 

precedent.”). 

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34 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

As part of our Nation’s history and tradition, the right to 

“establish a home and bring up children” was “recognized at 

common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 

by free men.” Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. Given this, the 

Supreme Court has held that the Constitution protects the 

relationships that “attend the creation and sustenance of a 

family,” such as “the raising and education of children,” and 

“cohabitation with one’s relatives.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 

619. 

But that history and tradition does not extend to the 

circumstances here. The Napouks had long ago raised their 

son. And they were not cohabitating with him—they were 

thousands of miles away. Nor do the Napouks identify any 

other special reason that their parent-child relationship is of 

a custodial nature warranting constitutional protection. 

Nothing in our Nation’s “history and tradition” recognizes a 

constitutionally protected liberty interest in this type of 

relationship with a forty-four-year-old son. We should 

decline to recognize one here, particularly since it reflects an 

extension of our atextual and ahistorical precedent. Cf. 

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 

For these reasons, the Napouks have no substantive due 

process claim for familial relations. Sinclair—while faithful 

to our precedent—was wrongly decided as a matter of first 

principles. See Sinclair, 61 F.4th at 684–86 (R. Nelson, J., 

concurring). But even under Sinclair, there is no substantive 

due process right here. We should correct our prior 

erroneous precedent, including Sinclair, en banc in the 

appropriate case. See id. at 686. 

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SANCHEZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Shortly after midnight on October 27, 2018, Las Vegas 

police Sergeant Buford Kenton and Officer Cameran Gunn 

fired their service weapons at Lloyd Gerald Napouk, a 

mentally impaired man holding a homemade plastic sword 

on an empty residential street. As video evidence and the 

officers’ own description of the five-minute encounter 

established, Napouk never verbally threatened the officers, 

rushed at them, or brandished or pointed the object in their 

direction. Napouk’s demeanor was calm, his gait and 

movements were slow and deliberate, and he was 

unresponsive to the officers’ repeated commands that he put 

the object down. When Napouk approached within ten feet 

of Sergeant Kenton, both officers fired seven rounds from 

their Glock semiautomatic pistols, striking and killing him. 

Napouk was a Las Vegas resident and a U.S. Navy veteran. 

Following his death, Napouk’s parents brought claims under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 

Department (“LVMPD”), Sergeant Kenton, and Officer 

Gunn, alleging excessive force and other constitutional and 

state law claims. 

Because the reasonableness of a law enforcement 

officer’s use of deadly force “‘nearly always requires a jury 

to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw 

inferences therefrom, we have held on many occasions that 

summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in 

excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.’” Torres 

v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

This case is no different. A rational trier of fact could find 

that the officers’ use of deadly force was objectively 

unreasonable because Napouk did not pose an imminent 

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36 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

threat to the safety of the officers, he was not committing a 

crime or resisting arrest, and because several non-lethal 

alternatives were available to contain the slowly unfolding 

encounter. The majority errs by failing to evaluate the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 

and by minimizing evidence that, when properly credited, 

create genuine disputes of material fact. This is a matter that 

should be decided by a Las Vegas jury. 

These errors also infected the second step of the 

majority’s qualified immunity analysis. In defining the 

“clearly established” right at issue in an excessive force case, 

“courts must take care not to define a case’s ‘context’ in a 

manner that imports genuinely disputed factual 

propositions.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) 

(per curiam). Set in its proper context, our caselaw clearly 

establishes that police officers may not kill a suspect who 

does not pose an imminent threat to the safety of officers or 

bystanders, is not committing any crime or actively resisting 

arrest, and in which non-lethal alternatives are available to 

the officers—even when the suspect is armed with a bladed 

weapon and ignores officer commands or advances upon 

them. I respectfully dissent.

I.

A.

When resolving questions of qualified immunity at 

summary judgment, courts engage in a two-prong inquiry. 

First, a court “must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff 

has alleged . . . or shown . . . make out a violation of a 

constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

232 (2009) (internal citations omitted). Second, a court must 

determine whether the right at issue was “clearly 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 37

established” at the time of the violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 

U.S. 730, 739 (2002). 

In determining whether a police officer’s use of force 

against a person is objectively unreasonable in violation of 

the Fourth Amendment, the trier of fact must give “careful 

attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular 

case,” including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether 

the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest 

or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor, 

490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The Graham factors are nonexhaustive, see Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 n.5 (9th 

Cir. 1994), and we have considered other relevant factors 

such as “whether officers gave a warning before employing 

the force,” whether “there were less intrusive means of force 

that might have been used,” and whether it should have been 

apparent to the officers that the person they used force 

against was emotionally disturbed. Glenn v. Wash. Cnty., 

673 F.3d 864, 875-76 (9th Cir. 2011). 

As the Supreme Court explains, while courts have the 

discretion to decide the order in which to address the two 

qualified immunity prongs, “under either prong, courts may 

not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party 

seeking summary judgment.” Tolan, 572 U.S. at 656. This 

is not unique to qualified immunity analysis; rather, “it is 

simply an application of the more general rule that a ‘judge’s 

function’ at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence 

and determine the truth of the matter but to determine 

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (citation 

omitted). At summary judgment, we must “view the facts in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all 

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” S.R. Nehad v. 

Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing 

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38 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 

2007)). “Where a police officer has used deadly force, it is 

especially important that we adhere to that approach . . . 

[b]ecause the person most likely to rebut the officers’ 

version of events—the one killed—cannot testify.” Calonge 

v. City of San Jose, 104 F.4th 39, 44 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned 

up). 

Thus, where the objective reasonableness of an officer’s 

conduct turns on disputed issues of material fact, that is “a 

question of fact best resolved by a jury.” Wilkins v. City of 

Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2003). Summary 

judgment is appropriate only when, after crediting the 

nonmovant’s evidence and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in their favor, “a verdict in favor of the defendants 

on the claim for excessive force is the only conclusion that a 

reasonable jury could reach.” Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 

747 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (emphasis 

added). 

In Tolan, for example, the Supreme Court vacated the 

Fifth Circuit’s grant of qualified immunity in an excessive 

force case because the court “failed to view the evidence at 

summary judgment in the light most favorable to [the 

plaintiff] with respect to the central facts of this case,” failed 

to “credit evidence that contradicted some of its key factual 

conclusions,” and “improperly ‘weigh[ed] the evidence’ and 

resolved disputed issues in favor of the moving party.” 572 

U.S. at 657 (citation omitted). That the Fifth Circuit granted 

qualified immunity under the second prong did not alter the 

Court’s conclusion. “Our qualified-immunity cases 

illustrate the importance of drawing inferences in favor of 

the nonmovant, even when, as here, a court decides only the 

clearly-established prong of the standard.” Id. “[W]e have 

instructed that courts should define the ‘clearly established’ 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 39

right at issue on the basis of the ‘specific context of the 

case,’” and therefore “courts must take care not to define a 

case’s ‘context’ in a manner that imports genuinely disputed 

factual propositions.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

While the majority correctly recites the applicable 

summary judgment standard, see Maj. Op. at 9, at every turn 

the majority fails to apply it. Its errors permeate both prongs 

of its qualified immunity analysis, as I explain next. 

B.

In determining whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently 

alleged a constitutional violation, the district court and the 

majority repeatedly erred by weighing the evidence in 

Defendants’ favor and failing to credit competent evidence 

from Plaintiffs that create genuine issues of material fact. 

When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiffs, the evidence establishes that (1) Napouk did not 

pose an imminent threat to the safety of the officers or 

bystanders, (2) Napouk did not commit a severe crime and 

was not actively resisting arrest, and (3) the officers could 

have strategically repositioned and employed less lethal 

alternatives to contain a fraught situation with a mentally 

impaired individual. Based on the evidence presented in the 

record, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that 

Defendants’ use of deadly force was objectively 

unreasonable under the circumstances. 

i.

As a preliminary matter, I agree with my colleagues that 

Defendants had a reasonable, but mistaken, belief that 

Napouk was holding a bladed weapon. See Maj. Op. at 11-

13. When “‘an officer’s particular use of force is based on a 

mistake of fact, we ask whether a reasonable officer would 

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40 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

have or should have accurately perceived that fact.’” S.R. 

Nehad, 929 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Torres, 648 F.3d at 1124). 

On this record, no reasonable officer should have accurately 

perceived at nighttime that Napouk’s “sword” was in fact a 

homemade plastic toy. 

The majority jumps to the conclusion, however, that 

“[w]ith the mistake of fact addressed, this becomes a 

straightforward case.” Maj. Op. at 13. Not so. Even 

assuming Napouk’s plastic object had been a bladed weapon 

and he was “behaving erratically,” that does not establish 

that Napouk posed an imminent threat to the safety of the 

officers as a matter of law. An officer’s reasonable use of 

deadly force still requires “that the suspect pose[] a 

significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the 

officer or others.” Gonzalez, 747 F.3d at 793 (citation 

omitted). “[O]fficers may not kill suspects simply because 

they are behaving erratically, nor may they ‘kill suspects 

who do not pose an immediate threat to their safety or to the 

safety of others simply because they are armed.’” Peck v. 

Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 887-888 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 

Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Rather, “courts must consider ‘the totality of the facts and 

circumstances in the particular case’; otherwise, that a 

person was armed would always end the inquiry.” Glenn, 

673 F.3d at 872 (citation omitted).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiffs, Napouk displayed none of the characteristics that 

would suggest to a reasonable officer that he was an 

immediate threat to others. To begin with, the encounter 

occurred in the middle of an empty residential street shortly 

after midnight, with no bystanders present. Both officers 

described Napouk’s general gait as “slow” and “deliberate.” 

The record is undisputed that Napouk made no “furtive 

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movement[s]” or “harrowing gesture[s]” such as running, 

swinging, or lunging at Defendants. George v. Morris, 736 

F.3d 829, 838 (9th Cir. 2013). Sergeant Kenton 

acknowledged that Napouk did not “wav[e]” the object at 

them and appeared “calm” as he smoked a cigarette through 

much of the encounter. Plaintiffs’ expert also testified that 

Napouk gripped the object’s handle without his index finger, 

which would not “have allowed for a quick attack.” 

Indeed, the district court acknowledged that Plaintiffs’ 

evidence of Napouk’s “slow pace, non-threatening grip on 

the object, calm demeanor, lack of verbal threats, and the 

officers’ protection behind certain vehicles” would 

“contradict a finding of immediate threat” if taken as true. 

But rather than credit Plaintiffs’ evidence that Napouk posed 

no immediate threat to anyone, the district court determined 

that Plaintiffs’ evidence was “not indicative of the actual 

incident.” The district court erred by “substituting [its] 

judgment concerning the weight of the evidence for the 

jury’s.” Torres, 648 F.3d at 1125 (cleaned up). 

The district court also failed to credit video evidence that 

Napouk had not threatened the officers, construing the 

evidence instead to find that Napouk made “indirect verbal 

threats” against Defendants. The bodyworn video footage 

reflects that when Napouk approached the officers, Sergeant 

Kenton warned, “I’m gonna shoot you, motherfucker,” to 

which Napouk responded, “You have to.” Officer Gunn also 

warned Napouk, “If you take one more step, I will shoot 

you,” and Napouk replied, “I know.” After Sergeant Kenton 

warned again, “I’m going to shoot you. You come one more 

step, you’re dead,” Napouk proceeded forward and 

responded, “I know,” before being shot by the officers. 

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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiffs, Napouk’s statements constituted expressions of 

self harm, not “indirect verbal threats.” In Glenn, we 

reversed the district court, finding triable issues of material 

fact concerning the reasonableness of the officers’ use of 

lethal force against a suicidal teenage suspect who held a 

knife to his own throat. 673 F.3d at 872. Although the 

suspect “did not respond to officers’ orders to put the knife 

down” for several minutes, “a number of other 

circumstances weigh[ed] against deeming him an immediate 

threat to the safety of the officers or others,” including that 

his threats of violence “focused on harming himself rather 

than other people” and that he had not attacked or threatened 

to attack the officers. Id. at 873 (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). 

The majority makes the same summary judgment errors 

on appeal. My colleagues conclude, “Napouk was behaving 

erratically, holding what the officers reasonably perceived to 

be a lethal weapon, repeatedly ignoring their commands to 

stop and to drop it, and repeatedly deliberately advancing 

towards them with the weapon in his hand. Those facts and 

circumstances . . . show an immediate threat.” See Maj. Op. 

at 17. While a jury could view the evidence in this light, our 

task on summary judgment is not “to weigh the evidence and 

determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether 

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

The majority ignores conflicting testimony and video 

evidence establishing that Napouk never verbally threatened 

the officers, brandished or waved the object at them, lunged 

or charged at them, or made any sudden movements 

throughout the five-minute encounter. Although Defendants 

testified that Napouk’s pace was “slow” and did not change 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 43

as he approached the officers, the majority asserts that this 

evidence does not “actually matter” because Napouk 

advanced to within nine feet of them at the time of the 

shooting, holding what they perceived was a sword. See 

Maj. Op. at 17. This is quintessential evidence-weighing. In 

S.R. Nehad, we refused to hold that an officer’s use of lethal 

force was reasonable as a matter of law based on evidence 

that the decedent did not “make any sudden movements, or 

move the supposed knife in any way,” and was moving at a 

“relatively slow pace” toward the officer. 929 F.3d at 1134. 

Here, a reasonable jury could weigh the significance of 

Napouk’s slow pace and deliberate movements differently 

than the majority and conclude that Defendants had adequate 

time to respond to a slowly advancing Napouk with other 

non-lethal alternatives.1 Taken together, Plaintiffs’ evidence 

creates genuine issues of material fact as to whether Napouk 

posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers. 

ii.

As for the other two Graham factors, the “severity of the 

crime” and “actively resisting or evading arrest,” the district 

court and majority improperly weigh the evidence in the 

moving party’s favor to find Defendants’ actions objectively 

reasonable. 490 U.S. at 396. The district court 

1 That Napouk was nine or ten feet away at the time of the shooting does 

not place the reasonableness of the officers’ actions beyond debate. 

Officer Gunn testified that Napouk was 25 feet away when they first 

approached him, while Sergeant Kenton estimated a 15-foot gap. 

Bodycam video shows that the distance varied throughout the encounter 

as Napouk approached and Defendants retreated and repositioned behind 

Officer Gunn’s patrol vehicle three times. The distance between Napouk 

and the officers, the pace of his approach, and whether the officers could 

have withdrawn to a safer distance before the fatal shooting are material 

factual questions that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. 

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acknowledged that “[i]nitially, Napouk’s behavior, albeit 

suspicious, did not constitute a crime.” However, according 

to the district court, this factor favored the officers, because 

there was “probable cause” to arrest Napouk for assault with 

a deadly weapon as he “was brandishing the object and 

refusing to respond appropriately to the officers’ orders.” 

The majority accepts the district court’s determination. 

This Graham factor plainly supports Plaintiffs. 

Defendants were called to the scene based on a report made 

on the “non-emergency” line about a suspicious person 

“talking to himself” and carrying a “slim jim” or tool or 

machete. There were no reports of a crime, much less a 

felony in progress. See S.R. Nehad, 929 F.3d at 1136 (“[A] 

particular use of force would be more reasonable, all other 

things being equal, when applied against a felony suspect 

than when applied against a person suspected of only a 

misdemeanor.”). 

The majority concludes that Defendants had “probable 

cause” to arrest Napouk because he was ignoring the 

officers’ orders but overlooks Plaintiffs’ evidence that 

Defendants had no intention of arresting him. Sergeant 

Kenton testified that Napouk “was not wanted for a crime,” 

and Officer Gunn told Napouk, “We just want to talk, you’re 

not in trouble.” The majority also ignores Plaintiffs’ 

conflicting evidence that Napouk was not brandishing the 

object or threatening the officers in any way. At a minimum, 

there is a genuine dispute whether Napouk’s actions gave 

Defendants probable cause to arrest him based on his failure 

to follow orders, as well as whether Defendants intended to 

perform an arrest in the first place. 

The majority’s analysis with respect to the third Graham 

factor, actively resisting or fleeing arrest, suffers from the 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 45

same evidence-weighing errors. The district court 

concluded that “officers gave several warnings to Napouk 

that they would use deadly force if he continued to resist” 

and found these warnings objectively sufficient as a matter 

of law. The majority similarly concludes that there is no 

genuine dispute that Napouk heard the officers’ commands. 

The majority fails to credit evidence in the record that 

Napouk may not have heard or understood the officers’ 

orders or warnings. See Glenn, 673 F.3d at 876 (finding a 

disputed issue of material fact where the suspect “‘may not 

have heard or understood [officers’] warnings’ because he 

was intoxicated and there were other people yelling”). 

Napouk wore a tan baseball cap, sunglasses, backpack, 

and corded headphones in both ears, and he did not respond 

when Sergeant Kenton ordered him to remove his 

headphones or drop the object, making it unclear what orders 

Napouk was able to hear. A postmortem toxicology report 

indicated that Napouk was intoxicated on 

methamphetamine. Video evidence shows that throughout 

the encounter, Napouk was largely non-responsive or 

incoherent—at one point telling the officers that he gave 

birth to them. There was also significant noise from the 

overhead police helicopter and frequent miscommunication 

between the parties. LVMPD policy expressly 

acknowledges that a “subject may be non-compliant due to 

a . . . mental, physical or hearing impairment, . . . drug 

interaction or emotional crisis.” Jury questions exist 

regarding whether similar impairments prevented Napouk 

from understanding the officers’ warnings or complying 

with their instructions. 

To be sure, there is also evidence that Napouk was able 

to hear Defendants, such as when he responded to their 

warnings that they would shoot him by saying, “you have to” 

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46 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

or “I know.” But the summary judgment standard does not 

permit us to pick and choose which evidence should be 

credited or discounted. The record discloses a genuine 

dispute as to whether Napouk was able to hear or 

comprehend the officers’ commands given the noise, his 

intoxicated state, and his mental state, and therefore whether 

he was actively resisting arrest. 

iii.

Perhaps the most glaring example of the majority’s 

misapplication of the summary judgment standard is its 

analysis of the availability of non-lethal alternatives to 

contain this slowly unfolding situation. “The availability of 

alternative methods . . . is a relevant factor in determining 

whether the amount of force used in a particular instance 

was, in fact, reasonable.” Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 

867, 882 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up); see also Glenn, 673 

F.3d at 876. 

Both officers carried taser guns. Officer Gunn stated that 

using a taser could have been effective and that he believed 

Sergeant Kenton was transitioning to a taser while he 

provided firearm coverage because he “heard plastic 

shifting.” Indeed, at one point Sergeant Kenton drew and 

then holstered his taser, and Officer Gunn asked, “What do 

you have, Sarge?”—which was Officer Gunn’s “attempt to 

ask him if he was transitioning” to a taser. Sergeant Kenton 

did not respond, and Officer Gunn “didn’t press the issue any 

further.”2 

LVMPD policy provides that even “where deadly force 

is clearly justifiable,” using a taser is appropriate if “another 

2 The following statements came from LVMPD’s Critical Incident 

Review Report. 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 47

officer is present and capable of providing deadly force to 

protect the officers and/or others as necessary.” LVMPD’s 

investigation of the incident concluded that there had been a 

breakdown in communication between Sergeant Kenton and 

Officer Gunn. Had the officers adequately communicated to 

allow Sergeant Kenton to transition to a taser, Officer Gunn 

could have maintained firearm coverage while Sergeant 

Kenton subdued Napouk with his taser. 

Beyond the use of tasers, Plaintiffs presented evidence 

that Defendants had other non-lethal alternatives available to 

them. For example, Officer Gunn had a beanbag shotgun in 

his police vehicle and did not use it. A police helicopter 

provided continuous air support, which allowed the officers 

to reposition again without fear of losing Napouk. Both 

officers had pepper spray, and Sergeant Kenton had 

requested a unit with a beanbag shotgun and K-9 police dog. 

LVMPD Sergeant Dawid Chudoba had also arrived on the 

scene with a “low lethal shotgun” prior to Napouk being 

shot.

Finally, there was substantial evidence that Defendants 

could have strategically repositioned or withdrawn to a safer 

distance before the shooting. Plaintiffs’ expert witness 

testified that, at the time of the shooting, Sergeant Kenton 

“could have moved behind his police vehicle, moved behind 

Gunn’s police vehicle, or could have withdrawn further 

away from Napouk, instead of firing shots.” LVMPD 

Undersheriff Christopher Darcy testified that at the time 

Sergeant Kenton fired at Napouk, he could have instead 

walked backward or used either his car or Officer Gunn’s car 

as cover—but chose not to. Plaintiffs point out that strategic 

repositioning is LVMPD policy and Defendants had already 

repositioned behind Officer Gunn’s car several times. 

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48 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

The district court made no mention of Plaintiffs’ 

conflicting evidence, concluding instead that Defendants 

had already “repositioned several times to create more 

distance between themselves and Napouk” and that “[i]t was 

only when they had no more options to reposition or retreat 

that the situation got dangerous enough to use deadly force.” 

The majority takes the same view, stating that “[o]nly when 

Napouk advanced upon them a fifth time with what they 

reasonably believed was a long, bladed weapon, putting

himself on a path where he could end up between Kenton 

and Gunn such that they were concerned about crossfire, 

failed to follow commands to drop it and stop, and came 

within nine feet of Kenton did the officers use deadly force. 

That the officers did not retreat another time to wait for the 

less lethal means they requested does not make their actions 

unreasonable.” Maj. Op. at 23. 

It is clear that the majority has improperly adopted the 

movants’ view of the evidence, crediting Defendants’ 

testimony that Napouk’s failure to follow commands, his 

repeated advancements, and the potential for crossfire did 

not permit them to take any action other than to use deadly 

force. In discounting Plaintiffs’ contrary evidence in its 

analysis, the majority repeatedly “neglected to adhere to the 

fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, 

reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Tolan, 572 U.S. at 660.3 

3 The majority also rejects Plaintiffs’ evidence because, in its view, the 

factual circumstances here are “substantially different” from other cases 

such as Glenn, 673 F.3d 864 and Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 

(9th Cir. 2001). See Maj. Op. at 18. This turns the summary judgment 

standard on its head. In determining whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 49

When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party, the evidence would permit a jury to 

conclude that Defendants were not facing an imminent threat 

of serious harm by a stationary or slowly advancing Napouk 

who never threatened them, or lunged or charged or waved 

the plastic object at them. A jury could reasonably find that 

Defendants had time to strategically reposition or withdraw 

to a safer distance, as there were no bystanders in the 

vicinity, there was continuous air support, and other backup 

had arrived or was nearby. A jury could also find that 

Defendants could have deployed less lethal alternatives such 

as a taser or pepper spray and that it was the officers’ 

miscommunications and lack of coordination that caused 

them to act with undue haste, with lethal consequences.4 In 

alleged a constitutional violation, Plaintiffs are not required to allege 

facts that are similar enough to other cases where we found genuine 

disputes of material fact. On summary judgment, we must determine 

whether a rational trier of fact might resolve the issue in favor of the 

nonmoving party, by crediting the nonmovant’s evidence and drawing 

all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. S.R. Nehad, 929 F.3d at 

1132. 

4 Napouk’s obvious mental instability is also a relevant factor in the 

jury’s consideration of the reasonableness of the officers’ actions. See 

Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1058 

(9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]here it is or should be apparent to the officers that 

the individual involved is emotionally disturbed, that is a factor that must 

be considered in determining, under Graham, the reasonableness of the 

force employed.”); see also Crawford v. City of Bakersfield, 944 F.3d 

1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Although we have refused to create two 

tracks of excessive force analysis, one for the mentally ill and one for 

serious criminals, our precedent establishes that if officers believe a 

suspect is mentally ill, they should make a greater effort to take control 

of the situation through less intrusive means.”) (cleaned up). Whether 

Defendants should have exercised greater caution and restraint in view 

of Napouk’s mental state is a genuine dispute of material fact. 

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short, the evidence permitted a reasonable jury to find that 

Defendants’ use of deadly force was objectively 

unreasonable under the circumstances. 

C.

The majority also errs under the second prong of the 

qualified immunity analysis by defining the “clearly 

established” right at issue in a context “that imports 

genuinely disputed factual propositions.” Id. at 657. When 

the clearly established right is framed in the specific context 

of this case and, importantly, in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, our circuit precedent clearly 

establishes that Defendants’ deadly force was objectively 

unreasonable under the circumstances. 

A police officer “cannot be said to have violated a clearly 

established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently 

definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes 

would have understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff 

v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014). As the Supreme 

Court recently reiterated, “this Court’s case law does not 

require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly 

established,” but existing precedent must “place[] the 

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” RivasVillegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (quoting White 

v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)).

Two cases in particular define the clearly established 

right in question: Glenn v. Washington, 673 F.3d 864 and 

Hayes v. County of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 

2013). These cases clearly establish that law enforcement 

may not use deadly force against a person with a bladed 

weapon who does not pose an imminent threat to the safety 

of officers or bystanders, is not committing any crime or

actively resisting arrest, and in which non-lethal alternatives 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 51

are available to manage a situation involving a suicidal or 

mentally unstable individual. Contrary to the majority’s 

position, these cases establish that lethal force is objectively 

unreasonable even when the suspect ignores officer orders 

or warnings or is advancing on law enforcement while 

armed. 

In Glenn v. Washington, a mother called 911 around 3:00 

a.m. when her intoxicated adult son, Lukus Glenn, held a 

“pocketknife to his neck and threatened to kill himself.” 673 

F.3d at 866-67. She told the 911 dispatcher that her son was 

“out of control, busting our windows, and has a knife and is 

threatening us,” later adding that he stated he was “not 

leaving until the cops shoot him and kill him.” Id. at 867. 

The arriving police officer positioned himself eight to twelve 

feet from Lukus, who stood outside near the garage, and 

shouted commands at Lukus to “drop the knife or I’m going 

to kill you.” Id. at 868. A second officer arrived and took 

position six to twelve feet from Lukus, yelling “drop the 

knife or you’re going to die” and “drop the fucking knife.” 

Id. Neither officer had a taser gun, but a third arriving officer 

shot Lukus with a beanbag shotgun. Id. at 869. Lukus 

seemed to “retreat” after being struck by the beanbag but 

moved toward the house where his parents were located, and 

the other officers opened fire with their Glock pistols, killing 

Lukus. Id. We held that the district court “erred in granting 

summary judgment on the constitutionality of the officers’ 

use of force.” Id. at 878.

Glenn is similar to this appeal in all material respects. 

Glenn involved the unreasonable use of deadly force on a 

mentally unstable suspect who had a bladed weapon and 

presented an apparent threat to himself. See id. at 879. 

Although Glenn “did not respond to officers’ orders to put 

the knife down” for several minutes, other circumstances 

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“weigh[ed] against deeming him ‘an immediate threat to the 

safety of the officers or others,’” including that his threats 

“focused on harming himself rather than other people” and 

that he had not attacked or threatened to attack the officers 

themselves. Id. at 873 (internal citation omitted). 

We also concluded that the officers “could easily have 

positioned” the parents behind them or “the officers could 

have positioned themselves between [Glenn] and the front 

door.” Id. at 879. Because of conflicting evidence in the 

record, we assumed at summary judgment that a taser was a 

feasible alternative. Id. at 878. We observed that the Lukus 

family had not called the police to report a crime, and 

viewing the evidence in plaintiff’s favor, concluded that 

Lukus’s conduct was not “active resistance” because he had 

only ignored officer commands. Id. at 874-75. Finally, we 

concluded that Lukus “was ‘obviously emotionally 

disturbed,’ a factor to which the officers should have 

assigned greater weight.’” Id. at 875. 

Glenn provides clear notice that law enforcement’s use 

of deadly force can be objectively unreasonable when a 

mentally unstable suspect armed with a knife does not pose 

an imminent threat to the safety of officers or bystanders, has 

not committed any crime, is not actively resisting arrest 

simply by ignoring officer commands, and whose mental 

instability warrants greater caution and restraint, particularly 

where non-lethal alternatives exist such as repositioning, 

beanbag shotguns, and tasers.5 

5 The majority attempts to distinguish Glenn on the basis that Lukus was 

stationary and never advanced on the officers, see Maj. Op. at 18, but 

Supreme Court precedent makes clear that a case does not need to be 

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In Hayes v. County of San Diego, officers arrived at 

Hayes’s residence shortly after 9:00 p.m. in response to a 

neighbor’s domestic disturbance call. 736 F.3d at 1227. 

Upon the first officer’s arrival, Hayes’s girlfriend told the 

sheriff’s deputy that Hayes had attempted suicide that night 

by inhaling exhaust fumes from his car. Two deputies 

entered the home and encountered Hayes in an adjacent 

room eight feet away and ordered Hayes to “show [them] his 

hands” because his right hand was behind his back. Id. 

Hayes “[took] one or two steps toward[]” a deputy while 

“rais[ing] both his hands to approximately shoulder level, 

revealing a large knife pointed tip down in his right hand.” 

Id. at 1227-28. The deputy believed that “Hayes represented 

a threat to his safety” and both deputies drew their weapons 

and shot a total of four rounds at Hayes from a distance of 

“six to eight feet away,” killing him. Id. at 1228. Hayes’s 

girlfriend testified that “Hayes was not ‘charging’ at the 

deputies and had a ‘clueless’ expression on his face at the 

time, which she described as ‘like nothing’s working 

upstairs.’” Id. 

The district court granted summary judgment based on 

the undisputed fact that Hayes was moving toward the 

deputies with a knife raised, causing the deputies to believe 

that Hayes was an immediate threat. Id. at 1233. We 

reversed, holding that there were genuine disputes of 

“directly on point for a right to be clearly established.” Rivas-Villegas, 

595 U.S. at 5; Hope, 536 U.S. at 741 (“[A] general constitutional rule 

already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity 

to the specific conduct in question.”); see also Mattos v. Agarano, 661 

F.3d 433, 442 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Even if Glenn did not involve 

a suspect armed with a knife advancing on officers, other cases like 

Hayes and S.R. Nehad make clear that this does not render the officers’ 

actions reasonable as a matter of law. 

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material fact concerning the objective reasonableness of the 

officers’ use of deadly force. Id. at 1234 n. 6. We observed 

that Hayes had committed no crime and there was no 

evidence he was “actively resisting arrest.” Id. at 1233. 

Although Hayes was “walking towards the deputies,” we 

noted that “he was not charging them.” Id. In addition, 

Hayes “did not swing the knife at [a deputy]” and “[t]here 

[was] no clear evidence . . . that Hayes was threatening the 

officers with the knife here.” Id. at 1234, 1234 n.6. We 

reiterated that the “mere fact that a suspect possesses a 

weapon does not justify deadly force.” Id. at 1233 (citation 

omitted). 

Hayes differs from this appeal in one respect: the 

deputies did not warn Hayes before shooting him because 

they “didn’t believe [they] had any time.” Id. at 1228. But 

this factor cuts in Plaintiffs’ favor because the shooting in 

Hayes occurred within four seconds of the deputies ordering 

him to show his hands, see id., and at a distance of only six 

to eight feet in “a dimly lit, confined space,” id. at 1234 n.6. 

Here, Defendants shot Napouk when he was nine feet away 

from Sergeant Kenton on a well-lit, open street after 

Defendants interacted with him for over five minutes. Our 

observation in Hayes applies with equal force here:

The circumstances of this case can be viewed 

in multiple ways: as “suicide by cop,” as 

officers suddenly threatened with a deadly 

weapon, or as a depressed man simply 

holding a knife when confronted by law 

enforcement. As with most excessive force 

claims, the correct determination of the 

circumstances here will require a careful 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 55

balancing of the evidence and the inferences 

that can be made therefrom.

Id. at 1236.

Glenn and Hayes “‘squarely govern[]’ the specific facts 

at issue,” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) 

(citation omitted), and would make “clear to a reasonable 

officer that [fatally shooting Napouk] was unlawful in the 

situation he confronted,” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 

(2001).6 Napouk’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

deadly force under these circumstances was clearly 

established in 2011 under Glenn and 2013 under 

Hayes. Accordingly, I would conclude that Defendants are 

not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

II.

Plaintiffs asserted several other federal and state law 

claims that were adjudicated by the district court in 

Defendants’ favor: (1) municipal liability claims under 

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 

6 A third case, S.R. Nehad, also bears similarity to this appeal in several 

material ways. A police officer received reports of a man threatening 

people with a knife and encountered Nehad in an alleyway shortly after 

midnight. 929 F.3d 1130-31. Nehad matched the suspect’s description 

and approached the officer at a “steady pace” or “a relatively slow pace” 

as the officer exited his vehicle. Id. at 1131, 1134. The officer ordered 

Nehad to “Stop, drop it,” before shooting Nehad at a range of seventeen 

feet. Id. at 1131. While S.R. Nehad supports Plaintiffs’ argument that 

even a suspect armed with a knife and advancing on a police officer 

“does not end the reasonableness inquiry,” id. at 1134, the opinion was 

published in 2019 and cannot serve as “clearly established law” at the 

time of Napouk’s death in 2018. See Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104 

(“[R]easonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time 

of the conduct.”) (citation omitted).

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(1978); (2) deprivation of familial relations without 

substantive due process in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and (3) state law claims for battery-wrongful 

death and negligence.

Once the district court found that Napouk had suffered 

no constitutional violation, the court declined to evaluate 

Plaintiffs’ claims of municipal liability based on an 

unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy. Because a 

rational juror could find that the officers used excessive 

force in shooting and killing Napouk in violation of his 

Fourth Amendment rights, I would remand Plaintiffs’ 

Monell claims to the district court for an analysis of 

LVMPD’s policies and practices in the first instance.

As for Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim, our 

precedent recognizes that parents have a liberty interest in 

the companionship and society of their child. Wilkinson v. 

Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010); Curnow v. 

Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991); 

Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1057 (9th 

Cir. 2018) (“A decedent’s parents and children generally 

have the right to assert substantive due process claims under 

the Fourteenth Amendment.”). A deprivation of that interest 

is a constitutional violation that a plaintiff may vindicate 

through a § 1983 action, even when the child is an adult. See 

Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2008). As 

parents of their deceased adult son, Plaintiffs have standing 

under the law of this circuit.

Even so, I agree with the majority that Plaintiffs have 

failed to demonstrate a substantive due process claim. Only 

“[o]fficial conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ in depriving 

parents of that interest is cognizable as a violation of due 

process.” Jones v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 873 F.3d 

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 57

1123, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Wilkinson, 610 F.3d 

at 554) (alteration in original). “[W]here a law enforcement 

officer makes a snap judgment because of an escalating 

situation, his conduct may be found to shock the conscience 

only if he acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate 

law enforcement objectives.” Hayes, 736 F.3d at 1230 

(citing Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554). Under this standard, 

Defendants did not act with a purpose to harm Napouk 

unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives, which 

include “self-defense.” A.D. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 712 

F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs’ allegations 

therefore fail under the purpose-to-harm standard.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ battery-wrongful death claim should 

survive with their Fourth Amendment claim. In Nevada, a 

state law claim for battery by a police officer mirrors the 

federal civil rights law standard. Williams v. City of Sparks, 

112 F.4th 635, 646-647 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Liability attaches 

at the point at which the level of force used by a peace officer 

exceeds that which is objectively reasonable under the 

circumstances.”). Because a Las Vegas jury could find that 

Defendants’ use of deadly force was objectively 

unreasonable, I would reverse summary judgment on 

Plaintiffs’ state law claim for battery-wrongful death.

Plaintiffs also allege a negligence-wrongful death claim 

under Nevada law, while Defendants assert discretionaryfunction immunity. Nevada has waived its general state 

immunity under Nevada Revised Statutes § 41.031. The 

State retains a “discretionary function” form of immunity for 

officials exercising policy-related or discretionary acts. See

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.032(2) (Immunity exists “[b]ased upon 

the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 

perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the 

State or any of its [employees] . . . , whether or not the 

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58 NAPOUK V. LVMPD

discretion involved is abused.”). Defendants, as the State 

employees, have “the burden of proving that the 

discretionary function exception applies.” Sigman v. United 

States, 217 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Nevada’s discretionary-function immunity statute 

“mirrors the Federal Tort Claims Act” and is subject to the 

same two-part federal test as articulated in Berkovitz v. 

United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988). Martinez v. 

Maruszczak, 168 P.3d 720, 727 (Nev. 2007). State actors are 

entitled to discretionary-function immunity under Nevada 

Revised Statutes § 41.032(2) if their decision “(1) involve[s] 

an element of individual judgment or choice and (2) [is] 

based on considerations of social, economic, or political 

policy.” Id. at 729. “[I]n a close case [the court] must favor 

a waiver of immunity and accommodate the legislative 

scheme.” Hagblom v. State Dir. of Motor Vehicles, 571 P.2d 

1172, 1175 (Nev. 1977) (citation omitted).

The officers’ actions do not fall under the discretionaryimmunity exception, and the majority errs in holding 

otherwise. Even if a split-second decision to use lethal force 

were based on “social” or “political” policy so as to be a 

discretionary function, Martinez, 168 P.3d at 729, decisions 

made in “bad faith” or with “‘willful or deliberate disregard’ 

for a citizen’s rights[] [are not] protected under the immunity 

statute,” Jones, 873 F.3d at 1133 (evaluating immunity 

under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.032(2)). A rational juror could 

find that the officers acted unreasonably and in “willful 

disregard” for Napouk’s rights by using lethal force under 

circumstances that did not require the use of lethal force. I 

would therefore conclude that Defendants lack 

discretionary-function immunity and reverse summary 

judgment on Plaintiffs’ Nevada negligence-wrongful death 

claim.

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NAPOUK V. LVMPD 59

III.

On this record, “we cannot say that a verdict in favor of 

the defendants on the claim for excessive force is the only 

conclusion that a reasonable jury could reach.” Gonzalez, 

747 F.3d at 797. This case belongs before a jury of Las 

Vegas citizens to make that ultimate determination. 

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