Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-04061/USCOURTS-ca8-04-04061-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Charles Poe III
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-4061

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

James Charles Poe, III, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 12, 2005

Filed: November 15, 2005

___________

Before ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

James Charles Poe III was convicted of conspiracy to possess counterfeit

checks and of possession of implements for making counterfeit checks, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a), (b) (2000). Poe contends his conviction must be vacated

because the District Court1

 permitted a codefendant, Kendrick Bankhead, to testify

against Poe despite an alleged conflict of interest of Bankhead's defense counsel, who

had represented Poe in an unrelated state criminal case six years before this case.

Agreeing with the District Court that no conflict of interest harmed Poe, we affirm.

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Though it is not relevant to this appeal, for the sake of completeness we note

that Thurman later also pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge.

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I.

On March 11, 2003, a federal grand jury indicted Bankhead and Mario

Thurman for conspiracy to make and possess counterfeit checks. The indictment also

listed two counterfeiting counts against Bankhead and seven counterfeiting counts

against Thurman. Attorney John Stratford represented Bankhead. With Stratford's

assistance, Bankhead entered into a plea agreement with the government on May 6,

2003. Under the plea agreement, Bankhead agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy

charge in exchange for the dismissal of the other two counts. Bankhead also agreed

to testify as a government witness as needed. On June 3, 2003, Bankhead pleaded

guilty to the conspiracy charge.2

 On August 14, 2003, the District Court entered

judgment against Bankhead and sentenced him to twenty-one months' imprisonment.

On May 7, 2003, the grand jury issued a superseding indictment, adding Poe

as a member of the Bankhead-Thurman conspiracy to make and possess counterfeit

checks. The superseding indictment also charged Poe with possession of implements

for making counterfeit checks. On July 1, 2003, Poe made his initial appearance.

Herbert Wright was appointed to represent Poe, but the attorney-client relationship

deteriorated and Wright moved to withdraw from the representation. 

On November 13, 2003, the District Court held a hearing on Wright's motion

to withdraw. Before the hearing, Stratford notified the government that he had

represented Poe in a state criminal case years before he began his representation of

Bankhead in this case. At the beginning of the hearing and at the government's

urging, the District Court addressed the potential conflict of interest involved in

Stratford's representation of Bankhead, Poe's codefendant in this case. Stratford

informed the court that he had represented Poe "six or seven years ago" in a state

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court "forgery case that's pretty unrelated to this type of case." Tr. of Hearing at

3:19–22 (Nov. 13, 2003). Stratford added, "I don't really know anything [that] would

have hurt Mr. Poe." Id. at 3:24–25. When asked when he began his representation

of Bankhead, Stratford replied, "[S]ix, seven, eight months, I think, before Mr. Poe

was even indicted." Id. at 4:3–4. Based on this information, the District Court stated

that Stratford "had absolutely no conflict for quite some time, because [he was]

representing Mr. Bankhead when Mr. Poe was not even a part of this case." Id. at

5:4–7. The District Court then asked Stratford whether he was "going to have

anything more to do with this case now that we've already sentenced your client, Mr.

Bankhead." Id. at 5:15–17. Stratford responded, "No." Id. at 5:18.

When asked about objections, Wright replied, "I can't form any objection of

Mr. Stratford. . . . It appears that his involvement with—with Mr. Bankhead was

resolved prior to my client, Mr. Poe, coming into the picture. . . . And as long as he's

not going to be providing any information that—that—based on his previous

representation of Mr. Poe to the United States, I see no problem." Id. at 5:23–6:7.

Recognizing that Stratford's prior representation of Poe, his current representation of

Bankhead, and Poe's late addition to the conspiracy charge created "an awkward

situation," the District Court nonetheless concluded there was no problem "because

of the time involved and because the offenses are apparently not connected." Id. at

6:17–20. After the hearing, the District Court granted Wright's motion to withdraw.

Jeffrey Rosenzweig was then appointed to represent Poe. From May 17 to 19,

2004, Poe's charges were tried to a jury. On May 18, Rosenzweig contended

Stratford's prior representation of Poe resulted in a conflict of interest when Stratford

negotiated a plea agreement for Bankhead in this case. Rosenzweig argued that the

proper remedy for the conflict of interest was to prohibit Bankhead from testifying

against Poe. Rosenzweig presented evidence that Poe, while represented by Stratford,

pled nolo contendere in the state court case on April 27, 1998. The District Court

once again held that no conflict of interest prohibited Bankhead from testifying

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against Poe, explaining that Poe's state court conviction was six years earlier and

none of the parties involved in that case (other than Poe) were involved in this case.

The court allowed Rosenzweig to question Stratford, however, to determine whether

his prior representation of Poe benefitted Bankhead in this case.

The District Court particularly was concerned with admitting evidence against

Poe that arose out of Stratford's representation of him in 1998. See Fed. R. Evid.

404(b) (discussing the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts).

Thus, Stratford was asked whether he had discussed with Bankhead anything from

Poe's 1998 case. Stratford responded, "No. And really the only thing I remember

about Mr. Poe's [1998] case is that he came to me later trying to get his record

expunged, which made me think even more that he wasn't going to get in any more

trouble." Trial Tr. at 305:23–306:1 (May 18, 2004).

The District Court then explained that at the time of the November 2003

hearing, the court had been focused only on the fact that Bankhead had already been

found guilty and sentenced. The court admitted that it was not then focused on

Bankhead's introducing Rule 404(b) evidence about Poe's 1998 conviction while

being represented by Stratford. Although the District Court still concluded that no

actual conflict of interest existed, the court stated it was inclined to require the

government to withdraw the Rule 404(b) evidence or not to allow Bankhead to testify

against Poe: "It seems to me that if Mr. Stratford's client, Mr. Bankhead, is testifying

against Mr. Poe in this case, and also the government is using against Mr. Poe a

conviction of record in which Mr. Stratford represented Poe, that just might be too

much." Id. at 308:9–13. Stratford again was asked whether he provided Bankhead

with any information from his representation of Poe that could be used in this case.

Stratford responded that he absolutely had no such information.

Later that afternoon, the government asked to revisit the issue of Bankhead's

testimony against Poe. The District Court noticeably was concerned that "Stratford

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is put in an awkward position of having his client Bankhead testify against former

client Poe, and at the same time former client Poe's conviction at the time of

Stratford's representation is in evidence." Id. at 401:17–21. Arguing that Stratford

testified he gave no privileged information to the government or to Bankhead, the

government asked the District Court to allow Bankhead to testify that he gave

counterfeit checks to certain individuals including Poe. Refusing to decide the issue

at the time, the court asked counsel to return the next morning with authority on the

conflict-of-interest issue, noting, "I don't have any authority on this conflict." Id. at

409:4.

The next day, the District Court allowed the government to call Bankhead as

a witness, but only allowed him to testify that he supplied Poe with counterfeit checks

in 2002. The jury heard no evidence about Poe's 1998 state court conviction. But the

jury heard evidence about the conduct underlying the 1998 state court conviction,

because the government introduced evidence regarding a federal conviction Poe had

in 1998 arising out of the same conduct. Stratford did not represent Poe in the 1998

federal case.

The jury convicted Poe of both counts. On December 2, 2004, the District

Court sentenced Poe to concurrent sentences of sixty months' imprisonment on the

conspiracy charge and seventy-one months' imprisonment on the possession charge.

On appeal, Poe contends his conviction must be vacated because the District Court

erroneously allowed Bankhead to testify against Poe despite Stratford's conflict of

interest in representing Bankhead.

II.

Recognizing this case "presents an unusual variation on the issue of attorney

conflict of interest and the ramifications which derive from the conflict," Poe asserts

that the relevant legal questions are "whether there is an actionable conflict of interest

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Had Poe moved to disqualify Stratford from representing Bankhead based on

a conflict of interest, as opposed to moving to exclude Bankhead's testimony, our

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and whether Poe was prejudiced by the presentation of Bankhead['s] testimony in this

format." Poe's Brief at 11, 12. To answer these questions in the affirmative, Poe

invokes the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Relying

on Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), Poe maintains "that the requirement

of joint representation over timely objection causes an actual conflict necessitating

automatic reversal of conviction, since prejudice is presumed." Poe's Brief at 13.

The problem with Poe's theory is this case does not involve, and has never

involved, joint representation of criminal defendants. Thus, the application of the

Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel entails the pounding of a

square peg into a round hole. See, e.g., Page v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 49 Fed. Appx.

663, 665 (8th Cir. 2002) (unpublished per curiam) (explaining that the Sixth

Amendment right to conflict-free representation "is held by criminal defendants

objecting to their own attorneys"); English v. United States, 620 F.2d 150, 151 (7th

Cir.) (per curiam) (holding that defendant could not raise an ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim against former attorney, who represented defendant's codefendant, but

noting that the former attorney "had a duty to refrain from taking any action adverse

to [the defendant's] interests in a matter in which he had represented [the defendant]")

(citation and quotation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 859 (1980). Stratford did not

represent Poe in this case. Poe was represented by Wright and then Rosenzweig.

And Poe does not claim Rosenzweig provided ineffective assistance.

Nevertheless, we indulge Poe's invitation to apply conflict-of-interest

principles developed in Sixth Amendment cases, recognizing that the District Court

repeatedly determined that Stratford's representation of Bankhead did not present a

conflict of interest. We review this no-conflict determination under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. United States v. Haren, 952 F.2d 190, 195 (8th Cir. 1991).3

 We

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standard of review would be the same, i.e., we review for an abuse of discretion the

denial of a defendant's motion to disqualify another attorney. See United States v.

Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 590 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1048 (2003).

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review the District Court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Acty, 77

F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 872 (1996).

The Sixth Amendment provides a criminal defendant the right "to have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Because this right

means little if the assistance is ineffective, the right also encompasses the right to the

effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86

(1984). To guarantee the effective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant enjoys

the right to be represented by counsel free from any conflicts of interest. Wood v.

Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). In joint representation situations, where

codefendants actually are represented by the same counsel, Rule 44(c)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires district courts to protect a defendant's

right to the effective assistance of counsel: "The court must promptly inquire about

the propriety of joint representation and must personally advise each defendant of the

right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless

there is good cause to believe that no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court

must take appropriate measures to protect each defendant's right to counsel."

Poe's misapplication of Sixth Amendment principles originates from his

misplaced reliance on Holloway. In Holloway, a single defense attorney was

appointed to represent three defendants charged with robbery and rape. 435 U.S. at

477. When the defense attorney moved for the appointment of separate counsel for

each defendant because the attorney had received confidential information from them,

the trial court refused to appoint separate counsel. Id. at 477–78. A jury convicted

the defendants of all counts. Given these circumstances, the Supreme Court applied

an earlier case's holding "that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint

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representation over timely objection reversal is automatic." Id. at 488 (citing Glasser

v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1942)). The rationale for such a holding is that

the "[j]oint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends

to prevent the attorney from doing." Id. at 489–90. Later, the Supreme Court stated

that Holloway "create[d] an automatic reversal rule only where defense counsel is

forced to represent codefendants over his timely objection, unless the trial court has

determined that there is no conflict." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168 (2002).

An obvious dissimilarity between Poe's case and Holloway is that Poe's

attorney represented only Poe, while a single attorney was forced to represent all

three defendants in Holloway. Even assuming Stratford somehow represented Poe,

the most critical dissimilarity is that the District Court in this case specifically found

that no conflict of interest existed. To overcome the District Court's no-conflict

finding, Poe must show that defense counsel "actively represented conflicting

interests" that "actually affected the adequacy of [the] representation." Cuyler v.

Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980); see also Brien v. United States, 695 F.2d 10,

15 (1st Cir. 1982) (stating that "the conflict must be real, not some attenuated

hypothesis having little consequence to the adequacy of representation").

We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining

that no conflict of interest existed in this case. The District Court properly considered

Poe's objections to Stratford's representation of Bankhead, specifically considering

the potential conflicts of interest. In doing so, the District Court made two important

findings. First, the District Court found that Stratford's representation of Bankhead

effectively was completed before Poe was involved in the case. That finding is not

clearly erroneous. It is undisputed that Stratford began his representation of

Bankhead long before Poe was even indicted. Indeed, Stratford negotiated

Bankhead's plea agreement before the grand jury indicted Poe. Poe made his initial

appearance in this case nearly a month after Bankhead pleaded guilty. The District

Court sentenced Bankhead nearly three months before the government raised the

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conflict-of-interest issue. Thus, Stratford's representation of Bankhead essentially

was concluded before Poe's case even began, just as Stratford testified.

The District Court's second finding is even more important. Specifically, the

District Court found that Bankhead and the government possessed absolutely no

information from Stratford's representation of Poe in 1998 that could prejudice Poe

in this case. This second finding, like the first, is not clearly erroneous. Over the

course of two interrogations, Stratford swore that he did not know any confidential

information about Poe that would assist Bankhead or prejudice Poe in this case. He

further testified that he did not provide any information gained from representing Poe

in 1998 to Bankhead or to the government. Finally, Bankhead's testimony did not

even remotely implicate the events underlying Stratford's representation of Poe.

Regardless of the identity of Bankhead's attorney, Bankhead's testimony went directly

to the events in 2002 dealing with counterfeit checks. Nothing from Poe's 1998 state

case found its way into Bankhead's testimony. Indeed, not a single reference to Poe's

1998 state court conviction was made during the trial.

Two additional considerations also support our conclusion that the District

Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that no conflict of interest arose out of

Stratford's prior representation of Poe. First, we recognize that criminal defense

attorneys occupy the best position from which to make the initial determination on

whether a conflict of interest exists. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485; Haren, 952 F.2d at

195 ("A district court may give substantial weight to defense counsel's

representations regarding conflicts of interest."). Stratford testified that he possessed

no information from his prior representation of Poe that could assist either the

government or Bankhead in this case. No evidence detracts from Stratford's

testimony. Second, the District Court correctly played its role in ferreting out the

potential conflict of interest. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c)(2) (implying that a district

court need not take protective measures when "there is good cause to believe that no

conflict of interest is likely to arise"). Given the District Court's finding that no

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conflict of interest existed, we would be hard-pressed to insert ourselves into this case

at this juncture based on this record. See, e.g., Smith v. Bordenkircher, 671 F.2d 986,

986–87 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding that "a lawyer representing two or more

criminal defendants in a state trial [was not required to] withdraw as counsel for

remaining defendants because of potential conflict of interest when one co-defendant

turn[ed] state's evidence" because the district court's finding that no actual conflict

of interest existed was not clearly erroneous), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 848 (1982).

In sum, we reject Poe's invitation to reverse his conviction by applying the

Sixth Amendment principles enunciated in Holloway. More to the point, Poe has

cited no authority supporting his theory that Bankhead's testimony must be excluded

based on Poe's allegation that Stratford labored under a conflict of interest. Indeed,

his argument relies solely on Sixth Amendment cases. Even if Poe had relied on the

Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct in asserting his conflict-of-interest theory,

we still would not reverse the District Court's finding that this case did not present a

conflict of interest. 

To the extent rules on professional ethics are enlightening on the propriety of

the District Court's no-conflict finding, we consult an attorney's duty to former clients

under Arkansas's Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.9, which governs conflicts

of interests involving former clients, states, "A lawyer who has formerly represented

a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a

substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to

the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation."

Ark. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.9(a) (1990), revised by, In re Ark. Bar

Ass'n—Petition to Revise the Ark. Rules of Prof'l Conduct, No. 03-1049 (Ark.

March 3, 2005) (making minor changes to Rule 1.9). The Arkansas Supreme Court

considers matters to be substantially related for purposes of Rule 1.9 "if they involve

the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that

confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior

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representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent

matter." Id. cmt. n.3 (2005). Similarly, Rule 1.9(c) forbids an attorney from

divulging a former client's confidences even after the representation ends.

As outlined above, Stratford represented Poe in an unrelated state case six

years before this federal case. Stratford has no memory of any information from his

representation of Poe, and he did not provide any information to the government or

to Bankhead that was used against Poe. Bankhead's testimony related solely to the

crime for which Poe was currently charged and did not reference or implicate

anything from the 1998 state court conviction. We conclude that (1) the 1998 state

case and this federal case are unrelated and (2) the District Court did not err in

finding that Stratford did not divulge any confidential information from the 1998 case

that assisted Bankhead or prejudiced Poe.

We appreciate that it may be discomforting to know that your former attorney

had represented a codefendant who may now testify against you. However, this case

did not develop in a way that afforded the District Court an opportunity to address the

conflict-of-interest issue until after Stratford effectively concluded his representation

of Bankhead. When the government raised the potential conflict of interest, the

District Court properly asked whether a conflict of interest existed and held hearings

to deduce what Stratford knew and what he may have divulged to Bankhead. After

performing its duty to consider the conflict-of-interest issue, the District Court rightly

concluded that no conflict of interest existed. Bankhead's testimony buttressed the

District Court's finding as Bankhead did not testify about anything from the 1998

state case.

Finally, we note that even if Stratford had labored under a conflict of interest,

we know of no authority requiring the District Court to exclude Bankhead's testimony

because no evidence gained from Stratford's prior representation of Poe was

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presented to the jury. Instead, Bankhead offered only direct evidence of Poe's current

criminal conduct.

III.

For the reasons stated, Poe's challenge to his conviction is rejected and his

conviction is affirmed.

______________________________

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