Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03027/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03027-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 7, 2012 Decided July 3, 2012

No. 08-3027

IN RE: SEALED CASE

______

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cr-00053-1)

______

Before: GARLAND and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Appellant pled guilty to RICO 

conspiracy and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. He 

appeals, arguing that his conviction was obtained in violation 

of Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the 

government breached his plea agreement. For the reasons 

below, we remand for the district court to consider certain of 

his claims of ineffective assistance, but deny his appeal in all 

other respects.

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I

In 2006, appellant was arrested and charged with two 

felonies. During questioning, law enforcement officials

learned that appellant was a member of a gang. Thinking he

could help in their investigation of a rival gang, prosecutors 

from the U.S. Attorney’s Office interviewed appellant as well. 

The interview was conducted subject to the terms of a 

debriefing agreement, signed by appellant, that provided, “No 

statements made by [appellant] during the interview(s) will be 

used against him in the government’s case-in-chief in any 

criminal prosecution, other than a prosecution for perjury, 

giving a false statement, or obstruction of justice.” The 

agreement also provided, “The government may use against 

[appellant] information directly or indirectly derived from 

statements he makes or other information he provides during 

the interview(s), and may pursue and use against him the 

fruits of any investigative leads suggested by such statements 

or other information.” The purpose of this provision was “to 

eliminate the necessity for a Kastigar hearing, at which the 

government would have to prove that the evidence it would 

introduce at trial is not tainted by any statements or other 

information given by [appellant].” 

Following the interview, appellant continued to cooperate 

in the investigation of the rival gang. He pled guilty to one 

count of conspiracy to participate in a racketeer influenced 

corrupt organization (RICO), which carries a Sentencing 

Guidelines range of thirty years to life in prison. In support of 

that plea, appellant admitted that he was a member of a gang

and that he conspired with other members of the gang to 

traffic in narcotics and to commit acts of violence, including 

attempted murder, to protect and enrich the gang. In return, 

the government dropped the charges for which appellant had 

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been arrested and agreed to release him pending sentencing so 

that he could continue to help with the investigation from the 

street.

The plea agreement allowed that the prosecution could

ask the court to revoke appellant’s release at any time and that 

it would do so if he violated the conditions of his release, 

engaged in misconduct, or failed to continue to cooperate. 

The agreement also provided that the government would file a

motion for a downward departure from the Sentencing 

Guidelines if appellant provided substantial assistance in the 

investigation of the rival gang. The plea agreement also 

included an integration clause prohibiting any modification

not made on the record in open court or in a writing signed by 

all the parties. 

After appellant was released, the police received 

information that he had attempted to commit an assault. The 

government deemed this a violation of the plea agreement and 

asked the court to issue a warrant for his arrest. The court 

issued the warrant, and the police arrested appellant. At the

bond hearing, appellant denied any wrongdoing. The district 

court responded that the plea agreement allowed the 

government to request an arrest warrant for any reason. At 

subsequent hearings, appellant claimed that the government 

had broken its promise to seek his release following his grand 

jury testimony. The district court rejected the claim, relying 

on the government’s argument that the prosecutor who had 

made this promise lacked authority to do so. 

Despite its troubles with appellant, as promised, the 

prosecution filed a motion for a downward departure from the 

Sentencing Guidelines. Appellant had given the government 

substantial help, including grand jury testimony and

information about multiple homicides. The district court 

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granted the government’s motion and sentenced appellant. He

now appeals, and we exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

II

Appellant first argues that the government obtained the 

information underlying his RICO conviction in violation of 

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), and that the 

district court committed plain error in failing to hold a 

Kastigar hearing before accepting his plea. 

In Kastigar, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth 

Amendment bars the compelled disclosure of selfincriminating information unless the government first grants 

the witness “[i]mmunity from the use of compelled testimony, 

as well as evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom.” 

Id. at 453. Even with such immunity, in any later prosecution 

of the witness, the government must prove at a so-called 

Kastigar hearing that “all of the evidence it proposes to use 

was derived from legitimate independent sources” and not 

from the compelled disclosure. Id. at 461-62. There is nothing 

in this recitation of fundamental principles that benefits 

appellant for the simple reason that the government did not 

compel him to provide any incriminating information; he did 

so voluntarily pursuant to the debriefing agreement. Not only 

is the record free of any suggestion of compulsion, the 

debriefing agreement itself contains an acknowledgment that 

appellant “fully under[stood]” the agreement and “voluntarily 

agree[d]” to enter into the conversations with the government 

that in due course, according to appellant, led to his disclosure 

of the information used to establish his guilt. Kastigar simply 

does not apply. United States v. Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350, 

1355 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen . . . a witness provides 

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information voluntarily, the government is not obligated to 

agree to any particular scope of immunity.”).

The debriefing agreement alone determines the scope of 

appellant’s immunity, id., and its terms are clear. The 

agreement expressly allowed the government to use against 

him the information he provided in order to eliminate the need 

for a Kastigar hearing. The government promised only that no 

use would be made of appellant’s statements in its case-inchief, yet appellant’s decision to plead guilty meant there was 

no case-in-chief. Therefore, the government did not need an 

independent source for the information it used to draft the 

charges against appellant, and the district court did not err 

when it failed to convene a hearing on the matter.

III

Appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance 

from his counsel, who he alleges failed to request a Kastigar

hearing or to adequately explain the scope of immunity 

appellant was promised under the debriefing agreement, and

recommended that appellant plead guilty to the more serious 

RICO charge instead of negotiating a plea bargain to the 

original charges he faced.

With respect to the Kastigar hearing, there was nothing 

deficient about counsel’s failure to seek something to which 

appellant was not entitled. There can be no claim of 

ineffective assistance in the absence of deficient conduct by 

counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984). As to the other claims of ineffective assistance, we 

agree with appellant and the government that we should 

remand those claims to the district court for factual 

development. Appellee’s Br. 24. Appellant raised the claims 

for the first time on appeal, and we cannot tell from the record 

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whether he is entitled to relief. See United States v. Mouling, 

557 F.3d 658, 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

IV

Appellant argues that the government breached its 

obligations under the plea agreement by revoking his release. 

A “plea agreement is a contract,” and “courts will look to 

principles of contract law to determine whether a plea 

agreement has been breached.” United States v. Jones, 58 

F.3d 688, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The plea agreement gives the 

government discretion to ask the court to return appellant to 

detention pending sentencing at any time for any reason. The 

agreement provides, “Your client understands and agrees that 

at any time the Government can ask that your client be 

detained pending sentencing.” Bound to use that discretion in 

good faith, see id. at 692, the record makes clear the 

government did. The government sought appellant’s detention 

only after receiving information that he had attempted an 

assault. Although appellant disputed this allegation, the 

question for this court is not whether the attempt occurred, but 

whether the government acted in good faith on the 

information it possessed. 

Appellant also claims that the government reneged on a 

promise by one of the prosecutors to release him again if he 

testified before a grand jury. The government concedes that 

the promise was made but argues that the prosecutor had no 

authority to do so. We need not resolve the question of the 

prosecutor’s authority because the government obtained 

nothing from the promise to which it was not already entitled; 

the plea agreement already required appellant to testify upon 

the government’s request. Moreover, the integration clause 

barred all modifications to the plea agreement except those 

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made on the record in open court or in a writing signed by all 

parties. The prosecutor’s oral promise was neither.

Lastly, appellant suggests that the government was 

obligated to release him a second time because the 

prosecutor’s promise induced him to enter his plea. See 

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (explaining 

that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise 

or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part 

of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 

fulfilled”). But appellant’s timing is off. He entered the plea

agreement months before the prosecutor made this promise. 

V

For the foregoing reasons, we remand this matter to the 

district court to assess the merits of three of appellant’s four

ineffective assistance claims. We deny his appeal in all other 

respects.

So ordered.

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