Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-01335/USCOURTS-caDC-12-01335-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent
Helicopter Association International, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 10, 2013 Decided July 12, 2013

No. 12-1335

HELICOPTER ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of 

the Federal Aviation Administration

J. Michael Klise argued the cause for petitioner. With him

on the briefs were D. Kirk Shaffer and Gerald F. Murphy.

Edward Himmelfarb, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were

Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,

and Michael J. Singer, Attorney.

Before: ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The Helicopter Association

International, Inc. (“HAI”), challenges the authority of the

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Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) to issue a rule

requiring helicopter pilots to use a route one mile off the north

shore of Long Island, New York for the purpose of noise

abatement in residential areas. Because this challenge fails, and

because HAI’s other contentions regarding the lack of

substantial evidence, deviation from FAA policy, and a flawed

Regulatory Flexibility Act certification are unpersuasive, we

deny the petition for review.

I.

Prior to 2008, helicopter pilots flying between New York

City and eastern Long Island typically chose between three

routes: (1) the northern coast of Long Island; (2) the Long Island

Expressway through the middle of the island; or (3) the southern

coast of Long Island. Many pilots preferred to travel the north

shore route when traveling to south shore destinations like the

Hamptons, because that route was faster and less likely to

encounter weather delays common along the south shore. As a

result, the north shore route experienced significant helicopter

traffic. In response to complaints about the helicopter noise, the

FAA developed the North Shore Helicopter Route, which it

added to the New York Helicopter Route Chart in 2008. This

route, which was voluntary, diverted helicopter traffic from

populated areas on the north shore of Long Island to the waters

of Long Island Sound. 

When elected officials and FAA’s Flight Standards District

Office continued to receive complaints about helicopter noise on

the north shore, the FAA in 2010 proposed to make the North

Shore Route mandatory. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,

75 Fed. Reg. 29,471, 29,472 (May 26, 2010) (“NPRM”). Upon

receiving approximately 900 comments — from residents, local

government, citizen groups, businesses, and various trade

associations — the FAA determined that “[s]lightly more than

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a third of the total number of commenters complained about the

levels of helicopter noise that they are exposed to, particularly

during the summer months,” and issued the final rule in 2012. 

The New York North Shore Helicopter Route, 77 Fed. Reg.

39,911, 39,913 (July 6, 2012) (“Final Rule”). 

The FAA found that “residents along the north shore of

Long Island emphatically agreed that helicopter overflights

during the summer months are unbearable and negatively

impact their quality of life.” Id. at 39,913. Assisted by the John

A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center in analyzing

data from the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System

(“PDARS”), the FAA “modeled noise from approximately

15,600 flight operations, based on an average of 42.8 operations

per day over 11 days around Memorial Day and July 4, 2011,”

two of the busiest helicopter traffic weekends of the year. Id. at

39,914, 39,916 n.7. This data was used to calculate north shore

day-night average sound levels (“DNLs”), which consist of “the

24-hour average sound level, in decibels, for the period from

midnight to midnight, obtained after the addition of ten decibels

to sound levels for the periods between midnight and 7 a.m.,

and between 10 p.m., and midnight, local time.” 14 C.F.R.

§ 150.7. The FAA found that the sound levels, which were

below DNL 45 dB, were “below levels at which homes are

significantly impacted.” Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 39,916. 

In promulgating the Final Rule, the FAA did not change the

existing route that had been in use for several years but

explained that “[m]aximizing the utilization of the existing

route by making it mandatory will secure and improve upon the

decreased levels of noise that have been voluntarily achieved.” 

Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 39,914. Because “safety is [the

FAA’s] highest priority,” id., exceptions were provided for

helicopters not adequately outfitted to travel the route safely and

for pilots who determine route deviation is required because of

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weather or a need to transition to or from a destination or point

of landing. Id. at 39,914–15. The rule will be provisional for

two years, after which the FAA will sunset it upon determining

“there is no meaningful improvement in the effects of helicopter

noise on quality of life or that the rule is otherwise unjustified.”

Id. at 39,918. If there is improvement, the FAA may make the

rule permanent “after appropriate notice and opportunity for

comment.” Id. Or, if “reasonable modifications [can] be made

to the route to better address noise concerns . . . [, the FAA]

may choose to modify the rule after notice and comment.” Id. 

Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 605, the

FAA certified that because the Final Rule would impose

minimal costs on regulated small entities, a regulatory

flexibility analysis was not required. Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg.

at 39,919–20. HAI petitions for review.

 

II.

HAI challenges the Final Rule on four grounds, contending

first that the FAA lacks authority to alter air traffic patterns for

the sole purpose of reducing the impact of aircraft noise on

residential communities. As authority for the rule, the FAA

relied on 49 U.S.C. § 40103 and § 44715. Section 40103(b)

addresses “the use of the navigable airspace” and provides in

subsection (b)(2) that “[t]he Administrator shall prescribe air

traffic regulations on the flight of aircraft (including regulations

on safe altitudes) for . . . protecting individuals and property on

the ground.” Section 44715 authorizes the FAA to set standards

to measure aircraft noise and to prescribe regulations to control

and abate aircraft noise. 49 U.S.C. § 44715(a)(1)(A) (i) & (ii).

In HAI’s view, Congress has established a relatively

narrow framework under which the FAA can regulate noise. 

HAI maintains that the FAA’s general authority under § 40103

is limited by its focus on safety in subsection (b)(1), and by

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other provisions that address the FAA’s authority to regulate

noise through technology certification, see id. § 44715(a)(1),

and in and around airports, see id. §§ 47501 et seq., §§ 47521

et seq. Viewing these provisions together, HAI concludes that

the FAA cannot escape the limits on its jurisdiction to regulate

noise by relying on its general authority in § 40103. 

In support of its position, HAI relies on American

Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1995),

where the court, upon reviewing a rule on a renewable

oxygenate requirement, held the agency could not “rely on its

general authority to make rules necessary to carry out its

functions when a specific statutory directive defines the relevant

functions of [the agency] in a particular area.” Id. at 1119. In

that case, Congress set a specific objective of reducing

emissions of ozone-forming volatile organic compounds

(VOCs). See id. at 1115. Relying on its general rulemaking

authority, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1), the agency ignored this

objective, favoring instead a renewable oxygenate that would

not reduce VOC emission levels. Id. at 1115–16. HAI

maintains that the FAA’s reliance on its general authority under

§ 40103 is similar to the EPA’s reliance on its general

rulemaking authority under 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1) and is

likewise impermissible.

Whether the FAA has exceeded congressional limits on its

authority is a question of statutory construction to which the

familiar two step analysis in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), applies. 

“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;

for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–43. 

“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the

specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s

answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 

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Id. at 843. Such deference by the court extends to the agency’s

interpretation of statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of

the agency’s jurisdiction. See City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC,

– U.S. –, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 

Under the plain text of § 40103, the FAA has authority to

“prescribe air traffic regulations . . . [to] protect[] individuals

and property on the ground.” 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2). This is

exactly what the FAA did here. Responding to the noise

complaints of Long Island residents, the FAA prescribed new

air traffic regulations with the purpose of protecting these

residents’ use and enjoyment of their property. Noise, when it

reaches certain levels, has long been considered an actionable

nuisance because of its impediment to the use and enjoyment of

property. See, e.g., 3 THOMAS M. COOLEY & D. AVERY

HAGGARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 430 (4th ed.

1932). The word “protect,” defined as “to cover or shield from

that which would injure, destroy, or detrimentally affect,”

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1822 (1981), is broad enough to

encompass protection from noise caused by aircraft, and

Congress would, absent indication to the contrary, have

intended that the word be read in accordance with its natural

meaning, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Pub. Emplymt.

Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 595 (1988).

HAI has pointed to no express limitations on the FAA’s

general authority to protect individuals on the ground from

aircraft, including the noise created by their operation. 

Although the noise-related provisions HAI cites refer to discrete

areas, for example, to noise reduction in or near airports, see,

e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 47521 et seq., or to technology certification,

see id. § 44715(a)(2), neither their substance (as interpreted by

HAI) nor their structure suggest that Congress intended to

narrow its broad authorization to the FAA to regulate the use of

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navigable airspace, much less to restrict the FAA’s capacity to

manage aircraft noise to these limited contexts. As regards the

safety limitation emphasized by HAI, neither § 40103 when

read as a whole nor the plain text of § 40103(b)(2) requires that

air safety be the primary goal of all FAA regulations. The

“Federal Aviation Act requires a delicate balance between

safety and efficiency and the protection of persons on the

ground.” City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411

U.S. 624, 638–39 (1973) (citation omitted); see BFI Waste Sys.

of N. Amer., Inc., v. FAA, 293 F.3d 527, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

So long as the FAA balances safety concerns appropriately, as

it did here, its rulemaking decisions will not conflict with other

statutory safety requirements. 

HAI does not dispute that reducing noise through altering

flight routes can protect property on the ground by preventing

“interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment

of the land.” Souders v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 48

F.3d 546, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal alteration and quotation

marks omitted). Yet its view of Congress’s legislative scheme

would eviscerate such protection, preventing the FAA from

altering flight plans even where numerous helicopters were

operating at low altitudes over residential areas at all hours of

the day and night. HAI offers no persuasive reason to attribute

such a counterintuitive intent to Congress’s broad authorization

to the FAA over the flight of aircraft to protect individuals and

property. HAI’s counsel’s suggestion during oral argument that

the FAA can address helicopter noise only by imposing

certification restrictions on noise-producing aircraft

technologies, such as engines, see Oral Arg. Tr. at 6–7; cf. 49

U.S.C. § 44715(a)(2), conflicts with § 40103(b)(2)’s plain text. 

Dictum to the contrary regarding the scope of § 40103’s

predecessor in DiPerri v. FAA, 671 F.2d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1982),

is unpersuasive in view of the plain text of § 40103(b)(2) and

the inconclusive legislative history on which the court relied. 

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Id. (interpreting 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) and citing H.R. REP. NO.

85-2360 (1958)). 

The interpretation of § 40103(b)(2) as encompassing

protection from aircraft noise reflects the FAA’s long held

understanding of its authority. See, e.g., Special Air Traffic

Rules and Airport Traffic Patterns, Lorain County Regional

Airport, Ohio, 33 Fed. Reg. 11,748, 11,749 (1968). Even

assuming that because § 40103(b)(2) does not expressly state

that “protect” includes protection from aircraft noise and thus is

silent on the precise question at issue, see Chevron, 467 U.S. at

843, the FAA’s interpretation is reasonable and consistent with

the other statutory provisions cited by HAI, which indicate that

Congress intended to address aircraft noise in several different

ways, not to limit the broad authority granted under

§ 40103(b)(2). HAI fails to show that the FAA’s interpretation

of its authority is impermissible, much less that the affirmative

grant of authority to regulate “the use of the navigable airspace

. . . for . . . protecting individuals and property on the ground”

in § 40103(b) is comparable to the broad, non-substantive

rulemaking authority on which the EPA relied in the face of an

express congressional limitation in American Petroleum, 52

F.3d at 1117. The situation in American Petroleum, where an

agency flouted a congressionally imposed restriction, is not

present here. HAI’s reliance on FDA v. Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000), for the proposition

that Congress’s more specific enactment controls a prior grant

of general authority is likewise misplaced.

Because we conclude that the FAA acted within its

authority under § 40103(b)(2) in promulgating the Final Rule,

we need not address whether § 44715 could serve as an

independent source of such authority. 

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III.

We turn to HAI’s contentions that the FAA’s finding that

there is a noise problem is unsupported by substantial evidence

in the record and that the Final Rule was an impermissible

deviation from longstanding FAA policy. Under the

Administrative Procedure Act, the court will “hold unlawful and

set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are

“arbitrary [and] capricious.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) & (2)(A).

Again, our standard of review is highly deferential. See City of

South Bend, Ind. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 566 F.3d 1166, 1169

(D.C. Cir. 2009). The FAA’s findings of fact are “conclusive”

if they are “supported by substantial evidence.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 46110(c). HAI has failed to demonstrate that the Final Rule

is unlawful and must be set aside. And although the FAA

acknowledges, as HAI points out, that its certification under the

Regulatory Flexibility Act was based on incorrect fuel cost data,

there is no uncertainty that the FAA would reach the same result

in assessing the impact of the Final Rule on small entities were

the court to remand. 

A.

According to HAI, public complaints about noise are not

evidence of a noise problem absent objective, corroborating

data and the FAA’s justification for the Final Rule is without

foundation. It relies on Safe Extensions, Inc. v. FAA, 509 F.3d

593 (D.C. Cir. 2007), where the FAA based its decision to

evaluate differently two types of runway light bases on the

unsubstantiated statement of a single employee who had

responded to industry comments on a proposed FAA Advisory

Circular. In that case, the court held that “one employee’s bare

assertions” did not amount to substantial evidence. Id. at 595.

In promulgating the Final Rule, the FAA relied on a host of

externally generated complaints from elected officials and

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commercial and private residents of Long Island. It found that

over one third of commenters complained of helicopter noise. 

Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 39,913. The FAA explicitly

referred in the preamble to the Final Rule to the commenters’

complaints that “the helicopter noise interferes with sleep,

conversation, and outdoor activities.” Id. HAI offers no

evidence that the complaints were not based on actual

experience or were otherwise falsified. Although HAI refers to

the comment by the Eastern Region Helicopter Council

(“Council”) that 85% of the complaints to its hotline came from

only ten individuals, the FAA pointed out that this “cannot

demonstrate these individuals are the only ones disturbed by the

existing noise levels.” Id. at 39,914. The hundreds of

complaints considered by the FAA in response to the NPRM

were identifiable by the commenter’s name and a date. The

FAA could reasonably accept these comments from individual

members of the public, which are different from the

unsubstantiated factual statement of the agency employee in

Safe Extensions, 509 F.3d at 595, as empirical data of a noise

problem. HAI overlooks, moreover, that an agency’s

conclusion may be supported by substantial evidence even

though a plausible alternative interpretation of the evidence

would support a contrary view. See Robinson v. NTSB, 28 F.3d

210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

HAI claims, however, that the FAA acknowledged the

existence of scientific evidence that demonstrates there is no

significant noise problem, thereby undermining the reliability

of the complaints and by extension its decision to act on those

complaints. The Volpe study commissioned by the FAA

revealed that DNLs on and around the two busiest helicopter

traffic weekends of the year (Memorial Day and Fourth of July

weekends) were less than 45 dB along the north shore of Long

Island, see Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 39,916 & n.7, well below

the DNL 65 dB ceiling set by the FAA to mark noise levels

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compatible with residential land use near airports. See 14

C.F.R. pt. 150, app. A, tbl. 1. According to HAI, this reveals

that the FAA’s own study shows that the basis of the rule, a

noise problem, did not exist. 

HAI has not identified any statutory or regulatory provision

that sets 65 dB as the minimum noise level that must be reached

before the FAA can regulate the impact of aircraft noise on

residential populations. Neither has it shown that the area

addressed in the Final Rule is near an airport. The FAA’s

Airport Noise Compatibility Program, where the 65 dB level

appears, states that “[t]he designations contained in this table do

not constitute a Federal determination that any use of land

covered by the program is acceptable or unacceptable under

Federal, State, or local law.” 14 C.F.R. pt. 150, app. A, tbl. 1

n.*. That level was established for use in mapping noise

exposure within the vicinity of airports, not residential areas far

removed from an airport environment. See id., app. A, pt. A

§ A150.1(a). It serves as a reference point from which the FAA

can reasonably deviate when determining whether a particular

noise reduction intervention is in the public interest. See

Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures, 69 Fed. Reg.

33,778, 33,780–81 (June 16, 2004). Here, based on its

evaluation of the complaints and the results of the Volpe study,

the FAA concluded that noise levels below DNL 45 dB were

adversely impacting the north shore’s residential population to

a degree that further control was warranted, at least on a

provisional basis. The FAA explained that maximizing the use

of the existing North Shore Route would “secure and improve

upon the decreased levels of noise that have been voluntarily

achieved.” Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 39,914. 

Furthermore, the FAA’s stated objective in making the

North Shore Route mandatory was not limited to “improv[ing]

upon the decreased levels of noise that have been voluntarily

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achieved,” but to “secur[ing]” the existing noise levels as well

by preventing future increases. Id. Even assuming voluntary

usage of the route was high and noise levels relatively low, see

Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 39,914, 39,916, the rule was

designed to ensure that use of the route continues and that the

noise levels do not increase, thereby aggravating the problem

identified by commenters, id. at 39,914. Given the provisional

nature of the Final Rule, it represents a relatively minor,

temporary adjustment to the existing route that HAI maintains

is used by most helicopters. HAI fails to show the FAA acted

unreasonably.

To the extent HAI maintains the FAA relied on faulty

evidence and methods because it failed to use a larger data set

and a particular data analysis method, i.e., the Integrated Noise

Model, HAI ventures unsuccessfully into areas of agency

expertise. See U.S. Air Tour Ass’n v. FAA, 298 F.3d 997, 1008

(D.C. Cir. 2002). HAI cites no authority for the assertion that

the FAA is required to use the Integrated Noise Model when

assessing noise levels outside the vicinity of airports. The FAA

has identified the Integrated Noise Model as appropriate for

assessing noise in and around airports and the Noise Integrated

Routing System model (“NIRS”) for use “where the study area

is larger than the immediate vicinity of an airport.” FAA Order

1050.1E, Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures, app.

A, ¶ 14.5e (Mar. 20, 2006). The North Shore Route begins

approximately 20 miles northeast of LaGuardia Airport,

suggesting the FAA appropriately could use the NIRS, or, as it

did in this instance, a successor to the NIRS model. Final Rule,

77 Fed. Reg. at 39,913. Moreover, HAI’s counsel conceded at

oral argument that “we don’t really have a complaint about the

[Volpe] study, we have a complaint that the FAA in imposing

this rule is ignoring this study.” Oral Arg. Tr. at 16. But, as

noted, the FAA’s decision to make the route mandatory was

based on its assessment of the numerous complaints it received,

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not on the study per se. HAI has not met its burden to show that

the FAA used an incorrect data analysis methodology.

B.

HAI also fails to support its objection that the Final Rule is

arbitrary and capricious because the FAA reversed its

longstanding policy of not altering air traffic patterns for the

sole purpose of noise abatement. HAI identifies no prior FAA

policy that conflicts with the Final Rule while the FAA

identified three instances where it promulgated rules altering air

traffic patterns for the purpose of reducing noise over particular

sites, see Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 39,917 & n.11 (citing 62

Fed. Reg. 1192 (Jan. 8, 1997) (Rocky Mountain National Park);

35 Fed. Reg. 5466 (Apr. 2, 1970) (President Washington’s

home at Mount Vernon); 33 Fed. Reg. 11,748 (Aug. 20, 1968)

(Oberlin Conservatory of Music)). Additionally, a September

2004 FAA Advisory Circular set forth recommendations for

pilot use of the navigable airspace for the purpose of reducing

the impact of flights on “noise-sensitive areas,” such as

“residential” zones, citing 49 U.S.C. § 40103 for its authority to

make policy of this type. FAA Advisory Circular, Visual Flight

Rules (VFR) Flight Near Noise-Sensitive Areas, AC No: 91-36D

(Sept. 17, 2004). Rather than reversing past policy, the FAA

has acted in accordance with a longstanding, if infrequently

used, interpretation of its authority under § 40103. 

C.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act provides, in relevant part:

When an agency promulgates a final rule under section

553 of this title, after being required by that section or

any other law to publish a general notice of proposed

rulemaking, . . . the agency shall prepare a final

regulatory flexibility analysis.

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5 U.S.C. § 604(a). The analysis must include a description and

estimate of the “number of small entities to which the rule will

apply or an explanation of why no such estimate is available”

and “a description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize

the significant economic impact on small entities . . . .” Id.

§ 604(a)(4) & (6). If, however, the “head of the agency certifies

that the rule will not . . . have a significant economic impact on

a substantial number of small entities,” then no final regulatory

flexibility analysis need be published. Id. § 605(b). The FAA

made that certification. NPRM, 75 Fed. Reg. at 29,473; Final

Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 39,919–20. Our review is highly

deferential, “particularly . . . with regard to an agency’s

predictive judgments about the likely economic effects of a

rule,” Nat’l Telephone Coop. Ass’n v. FCC, 563 F.3d 536, 541

(D.C. Cir. 2009).

The FAA found that the cost increase per flight was

minimal and concluded it was likely to be passed on to

customers. See Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 39,919. Given that

the high cost of helicopter flights to eastern Long Island

suggests paying customers place a significant premium on their

time, the FAA reasoned that paying customers would not

choose far slower modes of transportation because of relatively

small price increases. See id. Since the operators would not

need to purchase new equipment to retrofit their helicopters, the

FAA determined that the Final Rule would impose minimal

costs on regulated small entities and that a regulatory flexibility

analysis was not required. See id. at 39,919–20.

 

HAI objects, first, that the Final Rule would require small

commercial operators to purchase expensive avionics to comply

with the FAA’s safety recommendations for safe flight along

the North Shore Route, and that the FAA did not take these

costs into consideration when certifying that a regulatory

flexibility analysis was not needed. The North Shore Route,

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however, contemplates that pilots would be operating under

visual flight rules. Id. at 39,912. The FAA concluded that

operators would not be required to purchase any new

equipment, see id., because pilot deviations from the North

Shore Helicopter Route are permitted when aircraft cannot be

operated safely along the route with existing equipment, see 14

C.F.R. § 93.103(b); Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 39,912, 39,914. 

HAI presents no basis to doubt FAA’s certification on this

ground.

Second, HAI objects that the FAA used an incorrect fuel

price in concluding that the economic impact of increased fuel

costs associated with longer flight times would not be

significant because the small commercial helicopter operators

would be able to pass on the minimal extra cost to their

customers. The FAA found that helicopter flights from New

York City to the east end of Long Island cost between $3,500

and $9,500 per trip, and initially calculated that the increased

cost per flight would be $150, using the estimated ten minute

time increase per flight proposed by the Council as the basis for

this figure. See Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 39,918–19. 

The FAA now acknowledges that the correct fuel price

yields a cost increase of as much as $354 per flight. See

Resp’t’s Br. at 47–48. Although this is a larger increase than

the original estimate, it is not significant in relation to the total

cost of a helicopter flight, especially when compared with the

cost of travel by rail or by car. The FAA’s conclusion that the

increase would be passed on to paying customers, based on the

high value they place on their time, remains reasonable. 

Although a court can affirm agency action only on grounds

provided by the agency, see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,

87–88 (1943); Lakeland Bus Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 810 F.2d 280,

287 (D.C. Cir. 1987), this requirement gives way here “when

there is not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of a

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proceeding on remand,” Manin v. NTSB, 627 F.3d 1239, 1243

n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal alteration and quotation marks

omitted). 

HAI further objects that the FAA used an incorrect estimate

of the number of small entities that would be affected by the

Final Rule. The FAA estimated that 35 small entities would be

affected based on the number of commercial helicopter

operators who were members of the Council. Final Rule, 77

Fed. Reg. at 39,919. According to FAA counsel, the Council is

the “large membership organization for . . . helicopter operators

in this region,” Oral Arg. Tr. at 29, and the Council presented

to the FAA that it “currently represents over 94% of the

helicopter operators and businesses supporting helicopters in the

New York Tri-State area, the majority of whom will be

impacted directly by the proposed rule,” Comments of the

Eastern Region Helicopter Council at 1 n.1 (June 25, 2010). 

The Council estimated over 100 small entities used the North

Shore Route, see id. at 15–16, but then, as now, provided no

evidence of how it arrived at that figure. An unsubstantiated

estimate is insufficient to call the FAA’s figure into question. 

To the extent HAI contends that the FAA violated

Executive Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993),

and Department of Transportation Order 2100.5 (May 22,

1980), both of which require that the agency perform cost

benefit analyses for each proposed regulation, neither creates

private rights, nor is an agency’s failure to comply with these

orders subject to judicial review. See Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d

1288, 1296 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

Accordingly, we deny HAI’s petition for review.

USCA Case #12-1335 Document #1446255 Filed: 07/12/2013 Page 16 of 16