Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01286/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01286-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Henry L. Harris
Plaintiff
Victoria Monroe
Plaintiff
John E. Potter
Defendant

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1 After the untimely death of Mr. Harris, Victoria

Monroe was substituted in as plaintiff as his successor in

interest. See Civil Docket No. 116 (Stipulation and Order,

December 13, 2006). At all material times, Monroe has also

acted pro se. I use the term “plaintiff” to refer both to Mr.

Harris and to the papers and arguments presented by Ms. Monroe

on his behalf. Because the allegations of the complaint relate

solely to Mr. Harris, I use the masculine prepositional form. 

All parties have consented to my jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(c) for all proceedings, including entry of final

judgment. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY L. HARRIS,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

JOHN E. POTTER, U.S.

Postmaster General,

Defendant(s).

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No. C 05-1286 BZ

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before me is defendant’s second and re-noticed motion for

summary judgment against pro se plaintiff Henry Harris.1 By

Order dated February 6, 2006, I granted summary adjudication

in favor of defendant on all issues except plaintiff’s claims

that he suffered retaliation for having filed prior complaints

Case 3:05-cv-01286-BZ Document 135 Filed 05/09/07 Page 1 of 10
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of age discrimination. See Civil Docket No. 65. On March 7,

2006, defendant filed his second summary judgment motion. 

Civil Docket No. 67. After considering both parties’ papers,

I scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine certain

specific questions of fact. Civil Docket No. 97 (Order

Denying Summary Judgment, May 11, 2006). Following Mr.

Harris’ untimely death, the evidentiary hearing was held on

March 26, 2007. I issued findings of fact and allowed

defendant to re-notice his motion for summary judgment. See

Civil Docket No.’s 130, 131. Full briefing followed.

At all material times, Plaintiff worked for the defendant

in the Bay Valley District as a Driver Instructor Examiner

(DIE). Assigned to the Training and Development Unit

(Training) of the Human Resources Department, his principal

duty was to train people hired to drive postal service

vehicles. See Findings of Fact (FF), ¶ 1. Plaintiff

complains that he suffered retaliation by being denied

overtime work. Specifically, he alleges that on February 21,

2003, he observed Dennis Ward, a Tractor Trailer Operator

(“TTO”) in the Transportation and Networks (“Transportation”)

department, performing DIE work. He further asserts that, in

the same period of time, the Training Unit’s failure to keep

its own overtime desired list and defendant’s refusal to allow

plaintiff to sign his name onto Transportation’s overtime

desired list denied him overtime. 

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that

plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action and,

even if he did, defendant had legitimate business reasons for

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2 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no

genuine issue as to any material facts and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

There is no genuine issue of material fact where “the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to

find for the [non-movant].” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). The nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own

affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). When determining whether there is a

genuine issue for trial, “inferences to be drawn from the

underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the [non-movant].” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587;

Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A mere

scintilla of evidence will not be sufficient to defeat a motion

for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

3

not allowing plaintiff to work overtime. For the reasons set

out below, I GRANT defendant’s motion for summary judgment.2

It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an

employee in retaliation for opposing any practice made

unlawful by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29

U.S.C. § 621, et seq. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). The elements of a

prima facie case of retaliation are that the employee engaged

in statutorily protected activity; that he was discharged or

suffered some other adverse employment decision; and that

there is a causal connection between the two. O’Day v.

McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir.

1996). 

Once an employee has established a prima facie case of

retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer “to articulate

a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment

decision. Then in order to prevail, the [employee] must

demonstrate that the employer’s alleged reason for the adverse

employment decision is a pretext for another motive which is

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3 I assume, for the purpose of this Order, that

plaintiff met the other two elements of his prima facie case. 

4 Plaintiff argues that defendant violated the duty to

disclose discoverable documents by refusing to supply him with

employee training lists, overtime desired lists, and budget

documents thereby limiting plaintiff’s ability to make an

evidentiary showing. See Pl.’s Opp. at 3, 5, 14; see also

Pl.’s Trial Exh. V. Plaintiff, however, produced no admissible

evidence to support his assertion that the documents were not

produced. In fact, the pertinent training lists are only kept

for one year and were therefore unavailable. See Evid. Hr’g.

Tr. at 46:19-47:9; Def.’s Reply at Lee Decl. ¶ 3. Overtime

desired lists for the pertinent period were provided to

plaintiff in discovery. See Def.’s Reply at Lee Decl. ¶ 3. 

Budget documents showing overtime allocations were provided to

plaintiff in anticipation of trial, see Def.’s Trial Exh. 15,

and were introduced again at the evidentiary hearing, where

plaintiff cross-examined an employee knowledgeable about them. 

In any case, plaintiff cites no authority to support the

conclusion that alleged discovery violations will defeat

summary judgment. Plaintiff could have sought to compel

production of documents when discovery was open.

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discriminatory” or, in this case, retaliatory. Wallis v. J.R.

Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). The requisite

proof to establish a prima facie case is minimal, and

plaintiff “need only offer evidence which gives rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

I agree with defendant that plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate an adverse employment decision cognizable under

section 623(d).3

 First, although the defendant’s Budget and

Finance Department records indicate that approximately 101

overtime hours were allotted to the Human Resources Department

for fiscal year 2003, and 272 hours for 2004,4 Manager of

Human Resources Virginia Glover was not aware of these

allocations. FF at ¶¶ 4, 2. Consequently, no employee in the

Training Unit was paid overtime in 2003 or 2004 . Id. at ¶¶

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5 Plaintiff argues repeatedly in opposition that the

Training Unit’s failure to keep its own overtime desired list

constituted a breach of the collective bargaining agreement and

the local memorandum of understanding. See Pl.’s Opp. at 3;

Pl.’s Trial Exh. E; Def.’s Exh. 9. The question before me,

however, is whether plaintiff’s not receiving opportunity for

overtime work constituted an adverse employment decision. At

any rate, plaintiff presented no evidence to suggest that

defendant’s handling of Training Unit overtime in any way

reflected a change to past practice, or was implemented

subsequent to plaintiff’s complaints. For this reason, and for

those already explained, plaintiff’s lack of overtime

opportunity in the Training Unit did not constitute an adverse

employment decision. 

5

5, 3, 2. Plaintiff submitted no evidence to demonstrate

otherwise. Thus, the fact that defendant did not keep an

overtime list for the Training Unit, id. at ¶ 13, and that

plaintiff had no opportunity to work overtime in his

department in 2003 and 2004 does not demonstrate an adverse

employment action.5 No one in his department was granted or

had an opportunity to work overtime, and he was treated no

differently. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Potter, 2005 WL 2296830,

at *7 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (where employee could not have worked

overtime, action by employer precluding employee’s eligibility

for that overtime did not constitute an adverse employment

action).

As for observing Mr. Ward perform DIE work in February

2003, it is undisputed that when TTOs such as Mr. Ward were

assigned DIE work on an ad hoc basis in 2003 and 2004, they

were paid straight time out of the Transportation budget. 

They were not paid overtime. When on February 21, 2003, Mr.

Ward was utilized as an ad hoc DIE, he was not paid overtime. 

See id. at ¶¶ 10, 11. Insofar as plaintiff was not eligible

for overtime in his department, Mr. Ward’s DIE work deprived

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6 Plaintiff correctly asserts that Ms. Glover recently

approved some overtime for Training Unit employees. See Evid.

Hr’g. Tr. at 13:8-13. That Training employees were assigned

some overtime once within the past year, however, does not have

any bearing on whether plaintiff or his co-workers were

eligible for overtime in the pertinent period, or whether

plaintiff’s experiences constituted an adverse decision. At

any rate, the allocation occurred as a result of the “hiring

[of] more carriers than we have ever hired before.” Evid.

Hr’g. Tr. at 13:15. As for the argument that the use of the

TTOs to perform DIE work violated the collective bargaining

agreement, see Pl.’s Opp. at 6, the argument is without merit

for much the same reasons articulated in note five above. 

7 Plaintiff argues that the historic practice of not

allowing Training employees to sign up for Transportation

overtime is a violation of the agreement. See Pl.’s Opp. at 4. 

For the reasons articulated in notes five and six, the argument

is without merit. 

6

neither plaintiff nor any other Training employee of overtime. 

Because no Training employees could receive overtime during

the relevant period, plaintiff’s not receiving overtime could

not constitute an adverse employment decision.6

Nor did the defendant’s refusal to allow plaintiff to

sign onto Transportation’s overtime desired list in 2003 and

2004 constitute an adverse employment decision. It is

undisputed that employees such as plaintiff, who were not a

part of the Transportation department, historically were not

allowed to sign onto Transportation’s overtime desired list.7

See id. at ¶ 15. It is also undisputed that, as a DIE,

plaintiff would have been eligible for Transportation overtime

only if the overtime desired lists were exhausted and, even

then, only after the employees working in other tours within

Transportation declined the assignment. Id. at ¶ 16. Because

Transportation’s overtime desired list was never exhausted in

2003 or 2004 in the manner described, plaintiff was never

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8 As evidence that Transportation overtime list was in

fact exhausted during the relevant period, plaintiff points to

a number of declarations in which plaintiff and other employees

state that the “Overtime Desired List” was exhausted at various

times in 2003 and 2004. See Pl.’s Trial Exhs. M, P. Assuming

the employees refer to Transportation’s overtime desired list,

the declarations say nothing of whether Transportation

employees in other tours declined overtime assignments once the

list was exhausted. 

9 Plaintiff presses the argument that because the local

memorandum of understanding required establishment of an

overtime desired list for the Training Unit, defendant’s

failure to do so evidences the pretextual character of its

defense. Assuming plaintiff’s take on the agreement is

correct, as already noted there is no evidence that the

Training Unit’s failure to keep its own overtime list

represented any change of practice following plaintiff’s

complaints of discrimination. It is undisputed that the

practice impacted all Training Unit employees equally. No

evidence rebuts defendant’s managers’ explanations. On these

facts, it is impossible to accept plaintiff’s claim of pretext. 

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denied overtime for which he was eligible.8 Thus, he

experienced no adverse employment decision.

Evan assuming that plaintiff has made out a prima facie

case of retaliatory discrimination, defendant has demonstrated

legitimate, non-retaliatory and non-pretextual justifications

for his actions. There was no evidence proffered to rebut the

explanations of Ms. Glover and Training Unit manager Janice

Newsome that they never approved overtime in 2003 and 2004

because they understood there to be no allotted overtime

budget for their departments. The absence of a Training Unit

overtimed desired list, therefore, is understandable.9 

As for the use of TTOs to perform DIE work, it is

undisputed that TTOs such as Mr. Ward were paid straight time

out of Transportation’s budget to perform their DIE work. 

Thus, the use of TTOs was more economical than paying overtime

wages for the same work. See id. at ¶¶ 10-12. Moreover, the

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10 Plaintiff argues that defendant’s admission that DIEs

recently performed overtime work belies the explanation that

the use of TTOs for the work was more economical and efficient,

thus evidencing pretext. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp. at 4; Evid.

Hr’g. Tr. at 13:8-13. First, that DIEs have within the past

year worked overtime does not mean that it was not, and is not,

more economical to have as much of the work done at the regular

wage rate as possible. Second, as Ms. Glover explained at the

hearing, the recent approval of overtime was in response to the

“hiring [of] more carriers than we have ever hired before.” 

Evid. Hr’g. Tr. at 13:15. Due to the number of new hires and

the time within which they had to be trained, it was more

efficient to utilize some overtime within the Unit. See id. at

13:16-18. This explanation stands undisputed, and in fact

serves to corroborate defendant’s positions regarding the

allotment of overtime within the Training Unit. 

8

practice resulted from the need to maintain strict adherence

to the required training regime. Id. at ¶¶ 7-9, 12. Because

the practice was demonstrably more economical, and because it

was required to timely train defendant’s employees, defendant

met its burden to demonstrate a legitimate, non-retaliatory

reason for using TTOs to perform DIE work.10

Finally, as for the refusal to allow plaintiff to sign

onto Transportation’s overtime desired list, the evidence

demonstrates that defendant was attempting to abide by

historical practice and the applicable memorandum of

understanding. As already explained, employees outside

Transportation were historically barred from signing onto the

department’s overtime desired list. See FF at ¶ 15. The

applicable memorandum of understanding, Def.’s Trail Exh. 9,

demonstrates that overtime lists would be established by

section and tour, and that employees on other tours within the

same section would have priority for overtime over employees

outside the section. See id. at Art. 8, § 2(A); Art. 39, §

1(C). This corroborates the explanations given at the hearing

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11 Plaintiff argues that defendant’s shifting

explanations for his treatment of plaintiff go to pretext. 

Plaintiff is correct that, earlier in this litigation,

defendant took the position that the Training Unit had no

overtime budget at all. Later, defendant clarified that

Training had a small overtime budget allotment. At the

evidentiary hearing, it was shown that neither Ms. Glover nor

Ms. Newsome knew of the budget allotment, and it is undisputed

that they acted consistently with that understanding. In light

of all of the evidence discussed, there is no issue of fact as

to the legitimacy of defendant’s justifications. 

12 In his opposition, plaintiff refers to defendant’s

allegedly retaliatory refusal to promote him and to remove a

letter fo warning from his file. See Pl.’s Opp. at 2, 5, 9,

19-20. Plaintiff’s claims regarding various refusals to

promote, however, were dismissed by my Order dated February 6,

2006. In the same Order, I concluded that the only claims

remaining were plaintiff’s post-2002 retaliation claims, in

which neither a failure to promote nor a failure to remove a

letter of warning were alleged. See Civil Docket No. 70 (Decl.

of Jonathan U. Lee in Support of Mot. and Mot. for Sum. J, Exh.

A (Postal Service EEO Compl., August 8, 2003)); Pl.’s Trial

Exh. I:283, 299. Thus, plaintiff’s complaints about promotions

and the letter of warning are not properly before me. Insofar

as plaintiff attempts to raise denials for overtime or any

other claim that arose between 1997 and 2000, see Pl.’s Opp. at

15-18, those claims are barred both by the passage of time and

by my previous orders on summary judgment in this case and in

Harris v. Potter, 2002 WL 31298852 (2002). 

9

and comports with and my own findings of fact. See FF at ¶

16. Defendant’s refusal to allow plaintiff to sign onto

Transportation’s overtime list is therefore supported by

legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons.11

Because he cannot demonstrate that he suffered an

adverse employment decision, plaintiff has not satisfied his

burden to show a prima facie case of retaliation. Even if he

could, defendant offers legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons

for adhering to practices and policies that denied plaintiff

the opportunity to work overtime. For all the reasons

discussed, no material issues of fact exist to preclude me

from granting summary judgment.12 Therefore, IT IS HEREBY

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ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. 

Dated: May 9, 2007

Bernard Zimmerman

United States Magistrate Judge

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