Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05122/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05122-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adolfo Calero-Portocarrero
Appellee
Central Intelligence Agency
Appellee
David Linder
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 6, 2001 Decided June 5, 2001

No. 00-5122

David Linder, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Adolfo Calero-Portocarrero, et al.,

Appellees

Consolidated with

Nos. 00-5123 & 00-5124

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(94ms00146)

(94ms00147)

(94ms00150)

---------

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Jennifer M. Green argued the cause for appellants. With

her on the brief were Beth Stephens and Michael Ratner.

W. Mark Nebeker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, R. Craig

Lawrence and Mark E. Nagle, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Ginsburg, Randolph, and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: This case began as an action to

enforce subpoenas duces tecum served on various federal

agencies, including the Departments of Defense and State

and the Central Intelligence Agency. The agencies are not

parties to the Florida lawsuit generating these discovery

requests. Aspects of the case were before this court in

Linder v. Department of Defense, 133 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir.

1998), and we assume familiarity with that opinion.

In this round, the Linders, plaintiffs in the Florida case,

object to the district court's ruling compelling the Defense

Department, the State Department, and the CIA to comply

with the expanded subpoenas on condition that the Linders

pay "half the reasonable copying and labor costs." Linder v.

Calero-Portocarrero, 180 F.R.D. 168, 177 (D.D.C. 1998); Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 183 F.R.D. 314, 322-23 (D.D.C.

1998); Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 31 F. Supp. 2d 134, 136

n.4 (D.D.C. 1998). The court based its ruling on the following

language in Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B): "an order to compel

production shall protect any person who is not a party or an

officer of a party from significant expense resulting from the

inspection and copying commanded." We asked at oral argument whether sovereign immunity shielded federal agencies

from third-party subpoenas under Rule 45 on the basis that

the United States is not a "person" as Rule 45 uses the term.

We called for supplemental briefing on this question in light

of Al Fayed v. CIA, 229 F.3d 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and

because sovereign immunity would bar our exercise of jurisdiction. Burkhardt v. Washington Metro. Area Transit

Auth., 112 F.3d 1207, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

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I.

After considering the supplemental briefs we have concluded that federal agencies cannot, in view of our precedents,

claim sovereign immunity to avoid compliance with thirdparty subpoenas. Whether, as a matter of interpretation, the

word "person" in Rule 45 includes the federal government is a

non-jurisdictional question the government failed to raise in

the district court and we therefore express no opinion on it.

In authorizing parties to serve subpoenas on "persons" who

are not parties to litigation, Rule 45 states: "Every subpoena

shall ... command each person to whom it is directed to

attend and give testimony or to produce and permit inspection and copying" of documents or tangible things. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C). The courts of appeals are not entirely in

agreement on their approach to Rule 45 when the object of

the third-party subpoena is the federal government.

In Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Department of Interior, 34

F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit ruled that

sovereign immunity is no bar to compelling the testimony of

federal officers under the federal discovery rules. Congress

waived the sovereign immunity of the United States with

regard to all actions that seek "relief other than money

damages" in 5 U.S.C. s 702. 34 F.3d at 779 n.9. Third-party

subpoenas do not seek damages and so the court held that

federal agencies must comply with Rule 45 subpoenas unless

the district court, exercising its discretion under the protective provisions of Rules 45 and 26, relieves them of that

obligation. Id. at 778-79.

In Comsat Corp. v. National Science Foundation, 190 F.3d

269 (4th Cir. 1999), the National Science Foundation refused

to comply with a third-party subpoena issued under Rule 45.

The Fourth Circuit, like the Ninth, concluded that 5 U.S.C.

s 702 waived the government's sovereign immunity, but held

that because the waiver appeared in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the standard of review set forth in that act,

and codified at 5 U.S.C. s 706, controlled. 190 F.3d at 274.

The court therefore reviewed the agency's refusal to provide

the subpoenaed material under the "arbitrary and capricious"

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standard. Id. at 277-78 (recognizing its disagreement with

Exxon Shipping). The Second Circuit, agreeing with Comsat, has also directed a district court to review an agency's

refusal to produce documents requested under Rule 45 under

the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. EPA v. General

Elec. Corp., 197 F.3d 592, 599 (2d Cir. 1999).

We too have determined that sovereign immunity is not a

defense to a third-party subpoena. Northrop Corp. v.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 398 n.2 (D.C. Cir.

1984), stated: "Since at least 1965 ... this court has assumed

the nonapplicability of sovereign immunity" to a non-party

subpoena directed at the government. We found "no cause to

upset a steady course of precedent by attempting to graft

onto discovery a broad doctrine of sovereign immunity." Id.

More recently, in Houston Business Journal, Inc. v. Office of

the Comptroller, 86 F.3d 1208, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1996), we

stated that sovereign immunity does not insulate the federal

government from complying with a Rule 45 subpoena, because in federal court the government has waived its sovereign immunity for actions "seeking relief other than money

damages" in 5 U.S.C. s 702. Unlike the Fourth and Second

Circuits, we have never read the waiver contained in APA

s 702 to be limited by APA s 706. Nothing in the language

of s 702 indicates that it applies only to actions brought

under s 706, and our decisions have never so held. With

respect to Rule 45, we have consistently proceeded under the

ordinary standard of review to determine whether a district

court properly considered the motion to compel production--

inquiring whether the district court abused its discretion in

denying or compelling discovery. See Schreiber v. Society for

Savings Bancorp, Inc., 11 F.3d 217, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1993); In

re Subpoena, 967 F.2d 630, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Our doubts about the applicability of Rule 45 stemmed

from Al Fayed v. CIA, 229 F.3d 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000), a case in

which we construed 28 U.S.C. s 1782, a statute similar in

effect to Rule 45. The statute permits discovery directed to

non-parties in the federal courts by parties to proceedings

before foreign and international courts. In relevant part it

provides that the "district court of the district in which a

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person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony...." 28 U.S.C. s 1782(a). Al Fayed sought discovery

from the CIA pursuant to this section. We held that the

term "person" in s 1782(a) did not include the federal government. Al Fayed, 229 F.3d at 276-77. In a statute, "the word

'person' ... does not include a sovereign absent affirmative

evidence of such an inclusory intent." Id. at 274. This

"presumption is, of course, not a hard and fast rule of

exclusion," id. (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781

(2000) (internal quotations omitted)), but there was no reason

not to apply the presumption to s 1782, particularly in light

of the Dictionary Act, which defines statutory terms and

governs the meaning of those words "unless the context

indicates otherwise." 1 U.S.C. s 1. The Dictionary Act

defines the word "person" as "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies and joint stock companies, as well as individuals," but does not mention the federal

government or its agencies. Id.

Although our past decisions have assumed that "person" in

Rule 45 included the federal government, we have never

expressly so held and our assumption may need to be reexamined in light of Al Fayed. But this is not the case in which to

undertake the reexamination. Sovereign immunity provides

no defense to the government and so there is no jurisdictional

problem we need to address. Whether Rule 45's use of the

word "person" should exempt the federal government, as Al

Fayed held in regard to s 1782, is purely a question of

statutory interpretation, a question the government did not

raise before the district court. We therefore decline to

decide it. See Marymount Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 19 F.3d

658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

II.

The Linders offer four reasons why we ought to reverse

the district court's imposition of costs. The first is that the

court misapplied Rule 45, contradicting existing case law. As

amended in 1991, Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B) provides that

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when a district court compels production by a non-party the

court "shall protect" that person from "significant expense

resulting from the inspection and copying commanded." Before the amendment, costs could be shifted, but the decision

to do so was within the discretion of the district court. See

United States v. CBS, Inc., 666 F.2d 364, 371 n.9 (9th Cir.

1982). As the notes to the amendment explain, the 1991

changes were intended "to enlarge the protections afforded

persons who are required to assist the court." Fed. R. Civ. P.

45, advisory committee notes.

There are relatively few reported cases applying the new

Rule 45. In re The Exxon Valdez, 142 F.R.D. 380 (D.D.C.

1992), described the 1991 amendment as representing "a clear

change from old Rule 45(b), which gave district courts discretion to condition the enforcement of subpoenas on the petitioners paying for the costs of production." Id. at 383. The

court thought " 'protection from significant expense' does not

mean that the requesting party necessarily must bear the

entire cost of compliance.... There is no indication that [the

amendment] intended to overrule prior Rule 45 case law,

under which a non-party can be required to bear some or all

of its expenses where the equities of a particular case demand

it." Id. The district court here considered the factors mentioned in Exxon Valdez and in pre-1991 cases dealing with

cost shifting: "whether the non-party actually has an interest

in the outcome of the case, whether the non-party can more

readily bear its costs than the requesting party, and whether

the litigation is of public importance." Linder, 180 F.R.D. at

177; Linder, 183 F.R.D. at 322.

The Linders claim the court erred in concluding that fee

shifting was mandatory. But Rule 45 requires precisely

that--the district court "shall protect" a non-party from

"significant expense." Under the revised Rule 45, the questions before the district court are whether the subpoena

imposes expenses on the non-party, and whether those expenses are "significant." If they are, the court must protect

the non-party by requiring the party seeking discovery to

bear at least enough of the expense to render the remainder

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"non-significant." The rule is susceptible of no other interpretation.

The estimated expenses of compliance here amounted to

$199,537.08. Is this amount "significant"? We have no trouble concluding that it is. Compare Williams v. City of Dallas,

178 F.R.D. 103, 113 (N.D. Tex. 1998) ($9,000 estimate sufficiently significant to shift costs). While a court might take

into account the financial ability of the non-party to bear

some costs (a question we do not reach today), the district

court here was well within bounds in treating expenses of

nearly $200,000 as "significant." (Whether the court should

have shifted the entire amount is beside the point in light of

the Linders' position that they will pay no expenses whatsoever in order to obtain discovery.)

According to the Linders, two statutes preclude imposing

expenses on them even if Rule 45 means what we think it

means. The first is the Intelligence Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1998. Pub. L. No. 105-107, 111 Stat. 2252 (1997),

codified at 22 U.S.C. s 2715a. Section 307 of the Intelligence

Authorization Act states that "it is in the national interests of

the United States to provide information regarding the killing, abduction, torture, or other serious mistreatment of

United States citizens abroad," 22 U.S.C. s 2715a(a)(1), and

directs federal agencies to "take all appropriate action" to

identify information pertaining to such crimes and make it

available to the family members of the victims. Id.

s 2715a(b). The Linders believe this means they are entitled

to the subpoenaed material without charge. We think not.

The Act creates no enforceable rights on behalf of any party.

It provides no cause of action. It is simply a general statement of policy. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). It

does not refer to federal discovery rules, and it does not

address who should bear the costs of the production of

covered information. Even if the Act were enforceable, earlier document production in this case satisfied any obligations

the government might have under this legislation. The government has already provided all information generated between January 1, 1984, and December 31, 1988, concerning

Benjamin Linder, the attack in which he was killed, and

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information about other contra attacks in the region in the

same time period. Linder, 183 F.R.D. at 316-17.

The Linders' second statute is the Freedom of Information

Act, or more precisely, the public interest exception in FOIA,

5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(4)(A)(iii), requiring documents to be furnished to the requester at no charge or at a reduced charge

when this is in the public interest. They also rely on

s 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III) and argue in the alternative that, at the

most, they should only have to pay the search and duplication

costs of the documents. We see no basis for believing that

FOIA affects the cost-shifting provisions of Rule 45. Rule 45

was amended to include cost-shifting provisions in 1991--long

after the relevant FOIA sections became law. See Pub. L.

No. 99-570, s 1803, 100 Stat. 3207-48, 3207-49 (1986). If the

Linders wish to proceed under FOIA, they are of course free

to do so. Whether they then could be required to bear some

or any of the costs is not for us to say in this case.

The Linders' last argument is that our previous decision in

this case compels release of these documents at no cost.

There is nothing to this. In that opinion we dealt only with

the scope of the subpoenas, not who should bear the costs of

production. 133 F.3d at 23-25.

The judgment of the district court that the CIA and

Departments of State and Defense need not comply with

plaintiffs' subpoenas is affirmed.

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