Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01267/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01267-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jamie Featherston
Appellee
James O'Toole
Appellee
Rocky James Turney
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

MAR 2 3 ·1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

ROCKY JAMES TURNEY , 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES O'TOOLE, individually, as 

Superintendent of Central State 

Griffin Memorial Hospital, a 

state hospital of the Oklahoma 

Department of Mental Health: 

JAMIE FEATHERSTON, individually 

as Psychologist of Central State 

Griffin Memorial Hospital, 

Defendants- Appe llees. 

No. 88-1267 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT · 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. CIV-87-1882-P ) 

SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS: 

Susan Manchester, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma , Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Rober t H. Henry , Attorney General of Oklahoma, Robert A. Nance, 

Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Chief, Fede ral Division, 

Oklahoma City , Oklahoma, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and THEIS,* District 

Judge. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge . 

* Honorable Frank G. Theis, Senior Judge , U. S. District Court, 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1267 Document: 01019729899 Date Filed: 03/26/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Rocky James Turney appeals from a summary 

judgment in favor of defendant-appellees James O' Toole and Jamie 

Featherston. The district court held that the defendants were 

absolutely immune from a damages suit , and dismissed Turney's 

action. We a ffirm i n part and remand for further proceedings. 

BACKGROUND 

Late on the night of Friday, April 3, 1987, Special Judge 

John Wolking of the District Court of Canadian County, Oklahoma, 

received a phone ca l l from Dr. Ma rgaret Mehle of Parkview 

Hospital, a private facility in El Reno , Oklahoma, concerning 

Rocky Turney, a seventeen year old juvenile who Dr . Me hle said was 

violent, suicidal and in need of mental treatment. I n response, 

Judge Walking verbally ordered that Tu rney be placed in protective 

custody and taken to Central State Gr iff in Memorial Hospital 

(''Centra l State"), a public faci li ty in Norman, Oklahoma. R. Vol . 

I , Ex. Cat 13 (Walking affidav it ). Defendant-appellee O'Toole is 

t he superintendent of Central State . Id. at 18 (O' Too le 

affidavit}. Defendant Featherston i s a psychologist at that 

facility. Id. at 21 (Featherston affidavi t). 

Tu r ne y was then transported to Centr a l State. The physician 

on duty te lephoned Judge Wal king , who confirmed t ha t he had 

ordered Turney confined there for treatment. Id. at 24 {Holloway 

affidavit). Turney was then placed in_the adult maximum security 

unit , known as Ward 28c. R. Vol . I , Ex . F at 28 (Turney 

affidavit). When efforts to f ind a mo re suitable placement 

fail ed, Cen tral State's pa tient advocate secured a writ of habeas 

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Appellate Case: 88-1267 Document: 01019729899 Date Filed: 03/26/1990 Page: 2 
corpus 1 on Wednesday, April 8, and Turney was released into the 

custody of his parents. R. Vol. I, Ex. C at 22 (Featherston 

affidavit). 

Turney filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against O'Toole, 

Featherston, and other defendants who have since been dismissed 

from the action. The complaint alleged that Turney's constitutional rights were violated, mostly because of his juvenile 

status under Oklahoma law, both by the fact of his confinement at 

Central State, and by the conditions of that confinement. See R. 

Vol. I , Ex. A at 12 . The district court held that O'Toole and 

Featherston were absolut ely immune from l iabi l ity, and dismissed 

the suit. See R. Vol. II at 25-26. We hold that O'Toole and 

Fea therston we re a bsolutely immune from liability arising from the 

fact of Turney's confinement, but that they were only qualifiedly 

immune from l iability arising from t he conditions in which he was 

held . 

l Turney argues that this writ collaterally estopped the 

·defendants from contesting the illegality of his detention. This 

argument is unavailing for a number of reasons. The only one we 

need mention is that collateral estoppel applies onl y to issues 

which have been actually and necessarily decided. Willner v. 

Budig , 848 F . 2d 1 032 , 1034 (lOth Ci r . 1988) , cert . denied, 109 S . 

Ct . 840 {1989) . The petition for the writ gave two reasons why 

Turney' s confinement allegedly was unlawful : that the oral 

detent ion order was invalid and that he was being held in an 

improper ward. See R. Vol. I, Ex. C at 66 (peti tion for writ of 

habeas corpus). The order granting the writ stated only that "no 

legal cause [had been] shown for such holding and restraint or for 

the continuation thereof," without giving any reasons. In re 

Turney , No. C-87-994-T, slip op. at 1 (Cl eveland County Dist. Ct. 

Apr. 8, 1987) . Because either proposed reason would have been a 

sufficient ground for granting the writ, it cannot be said that 

either issue was actually and necessarily decided . Restatement 

(Second) of Judgments§ 27 comment·s e-i (1980) . Therefore , the 

writ has no preclusive effect. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1267 Document: 01019729899 Date Filed: 03/26/1990 Page: 3 
DISCUSSION 

Just as judges acting in their judicial capacity are 

absolutely immune from liability under section 1983, Pierson v. 

Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-554 (1967); Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 

F.2d 1431, 1434-35 (lOth Cir. 1986), "official[s] charged with the 

duty of executing a facially valid court order enjoy[] absolute 

immunity from liability for damages in a suit challenging conduct 

prescribed by that order." Valdez v. City & County of Denver, 878 

F.2d 1285, 1286 (lOth Cir. 1989); see Wiggins v. New Mexico State 

Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812, 815 (lOth Cir. 1981), cert. 

denied, 459 U.S. 840 (1982}; T & W Inv. Co. v. Kurtz, 588 F.2d 

801, 802 {lOth Cir. 1978); see also,~, Rogers v. Bruntrager, 

841 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1988); Coverdell v. Department of 

Social & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1987); 

Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238-39 (7th Cir. 

1986); Property Management & Invs., Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.2d 599, 

602 (11th Cir. 1985); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 {5th 

Cir. Unit A June 1981); Fowler v. Alexander, 478 F.2d 694, 696 

(4th Cir. 1973); Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d 

Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 941 (1969); Bradford Audio Corp. v. 

Pious, 392 F.2d 67, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1968). This quasi-judicial 

immunity applies with full force to a judicial order that a person 

be detained for mental evaluation. See Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 

F.2d 163, 166 {5th Cir. 1980); Sebastian v. United States, 531 

F.2d 900, 903 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 856 {1976); 

Arensman v. Brown, 430 F.2d 190, 194-95 (7th Cir. 1970); Hoffman 

v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 300 (9th Cir. 1959); Kenney v. Fox, 232 

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Appellate Case: 88-1267 Document: 01019729899 Date Filed: 03/26/1990 Page: 4 
F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir. 1956); Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583, 588 

{lst Cir. 1954); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hospital, 3 40 F. Supp. 

125, 131 {N.D. Ill. 1972). 

Turney contends that the defendants in this case are not 

entitled to absc>lute quasi -judicial immunity because .Judge 

Walking's order was not "facially valid" insofar as it violated 

several Oklahoma statutes. 2 We need not address these arguments. 

Even assuming that the order was infirm as a matter of state law, 

it was facially valid.3 "Facially valid" does not mean "lawful." 

An erroneous order can be valid. See, ~, Baker v. McCollan, 

443 u.s. 137, 143-44 (1979). 

2 It is argued that Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 43A, § 5-102 (West 

Supp. 1990) ("No person shall be accepted into any institution 

without the use of the official forms properly executed.") renders 

a n oral emergency detention order invalid. The substance of the 

orde r .. is alleged to be faulty because it does not satisfy the 

requirement . in Okla. Stat. Ann., t i t. 10, § 1120(8)( 1 ) {West 1987) 

that a juvenile be evaluated in the menta l hea l th facility nearest 

to the child's residence which has been designated by the 

Commissioner of Mental health as appropriate for such evaluations. 

3 Turney places great reliance upon this court' s decision in 

Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (lOth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 

459 U.S. 1147 ( 1983 ). Taylor has no bearing on the present case. 

The question there was whether the order pursuant to which the 

defendants acted was sufficient to defeat the plai ntiff's claim 

f or false imprisonment . See id. at 1352-53. Whether the order 

would have been sufficien~o immunize the defendants from 

liability, a completely unrelated question , was not discuss ed. 

Also, Taylor was a case where the defendants themselves 

obtained the order under which they claimed immun ity , and they 

obtained it in bad faith. Id. at 1348-49. Such an order does not 

provide the same quasi-judicial immunity as an order which the 

defendant played no part in procuring , so cases such as Taylor are 

to be distinguished. Guerra v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 , 1256 (lst 

Cir. 1974); Jobson v. Henne, 355 F . 2d 129, 134 {2d Cir. 1966); 

Thompson v. Sanborn, 568 F. Supp. 385 , 390 (D.N.H. 1983 ); Dick v. 

Watonwan Coun t y, 551 F . Supp. 983, 990-91 n.lO (D. Minn. 1982); 

Fa rmer v. Lawson, 510 F. Supp. 91, 95 (N.D. Ga. 198 1 ). But cf. 

Boullion v. McClanahan, 539 F.2d 213 , 214 (5th Cir. Unit~Mar. 

1981). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1267 Document: 01019729899 Date Filed: 03/26/1990 Page: 5 
To accept so narrow a conception of facial validity would 

eliminate much of the immunity granted just last year in Valdez. 

State officials 11must not be required to act as pseudo-appellate 

tourts scrutinizing the orders of judges," Valdez v. City & County 

of Denver, 878 F.2d at 1289, but subjecting them to liability for 

executing an order because the order did not measure up to statutory standards would have just that effect. To allow plaintiffs 

to bring suit any time a state agent executes a judicial order 

which does not fulfill every legal requirement would make the 

agent 11 a 'lightning rod for harassing litigation aimed at judicial 

orders.'., Id. (quoting T & W Inv. Co. v. Kurtz, 588 F.2d at 802). 

Simple fairness requires that state officers 11 not be called upon 

to answer for the legality of decisions which they are powerless 

to control." Valdez v. City & County.of Denver, 878 F.2d at 1289. 

A narrow conception of facial validity also would deprive the 

court of most of the benefit it derives from the existence of 

quasi-judicial immunity for officers carrying out its orders. 

11 'The fearless and unhesitating execution of court orders is 

essential if the court's authority and ability to function are to 

remain uncompromised,'" but state officers subject to litigation 

"might neglect the execution" of those orders. Id. at 1288 {quoting Coverdell v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 834 F.2d at 

765}. Also, "a fear of bringing down litigation on the [officer 

executing the order} might color a court's judgment in some 

cases." Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 

547 F.2d l, 3 (1st Cir. 1976). If the court ignored the danger of 

such suits, "[t]ension between trial judges and those officials 

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Appellate Case: 88-1267 Document: 01019729899 Date Filed: 03/26/1990 Page: 6 
responsible for enforcing their orders inevitably would result." 

Valdez v. City & County of Denver, 878 F.2d at 1289. "The public 

interest demands strict adherence to judicial decrees,n id., 

especially with respect to emergency detention orders, for 

immediate treatment often is necessary and the class of officials 

qualified to carry out the order is limited. 

"We do not hold that the unquestioning execution of a 

judicial directive may never provide a basis for liability against 

a state officer." Sebastian v. United States, 531 F.2d at 903 

n.6; see also Czikalla v. Malloy, 649 F. Supp. 1212, 1214 (D. 

Colo. 1986). There are limits to how unlawful an order can be and 

still immunize the officer executing it. Because quasi-judicial 

immunity derives from judicial immunity, the order must be one for 

which the issuing judge is immune from liability. Therefore, a 

state official is not absolutely immune from damages arisiqg from 

the execution of an order issued by a judge acting 11 in the 'clear 

absence of all jurisdiction.'" Stump v. Sparkman, 435 u.s. 349, 

357 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 

(1872)). Also, quasi-judicial immunity will not attach to state 

officials acting "outside the scope of their jurisdiction." Cok 

v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (lst Cir. 1989); Williams v. Wood, 612 

F.2d 982, 985 (5th Cir. 1980). 

Applying this standard, it is clear that the defendants enjoy 

absolute immunity for admitting Rocky Turney to Central State. It 

was within Judge Walking's jurisdiction to order a juvenile 

detained for mental evaluation, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, 

§ 123(A)(l0) (West Supp. 1990) {special district judges may hear 

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"[a]ny matter at any stage . in a ••• mental health [or] 

juvenile ••• proceeding"}, and certainly the staff of Central 

State had the authority to admit a patient for that purpose. We 

are not willing to put officials executing court orders in the 

position of having to choose between "disregard[ing) the judge's 

orders and fac[ing] discharge, or worse yet criminal contempt, or 

... fulfill[ing] their duty and risk[ing] being haled into 

court." Valdez v. City & County of Denver, 878 F.2d at 1289. 

Because Rocky Turney was admitted to Central State pursuant to 

Judge Walking's order, .the defendants are absolutely immune from 

liability for that action. 

The district court failed to take into account, however, that 

this absolute immunity extended only to acts prescribed by Judge 

Walking's order, see Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1274 (9th 

Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 {1980), and that all the 

order decreed was Turney's confinement at Central State. It did 

not dictate any specific placement or treatment within the facility. Therefore, the defendants are not absolutely immune from 

liability arising from Turney's placement in the maximum security 

ward. Instead, they are only qualifiedly immune. See Garrett v. 

Rader, 831 F.2d 202, 203 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

Turney's complaint alleged that the conditions of his confinement violated his constitutional rights in two ways: because 

he was detained in association with "criminal, vicious, or 

dissolute persons," Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 10, § 1107.l(A){2} 

(West 1987), in violation of a state-created liberty interest, and 

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because he was placed in an unsafe environment. 4 SeeR. Vol. I, 

Ex. A at 9. After examining the record and the governing law, we 

cannot determine whether the defendants' conduct with respect to 

these charges was within their qualified immunity. We therefore 

remand the case for further consideration of these issues. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

4 A third·argument, that Turney was not provided the least 

restrictive method of treatment which was appropriate in violation 

of Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 10, § 1129(2) (West 1987), is raised in 

Turney's briefs. This issue was not raised below. "A matter not 

pursued before the trial court, such as this one, is 

'inappropriate for consideration on appeal.'" Adams-Arapahoe 

School Dist. No. 28-J v. Continental Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 772, 776 

(lOth Cir. 1989) (quoting Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & 

Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 361 {lOth Cir. 1971}). 

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