Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01868/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01868-13/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
Defendant
Leticia Ceja-Corona
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LETICIA CEJA-CORONA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CVS PHARMACY, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01868-AWI-SAB

ORDER REQUIRING ADDITIONAL 

BRIEFING ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF 

CLASS SETTLEMENT

On July 30, 2014, Plaintiffs Leticia Ceja-Corona and Margarita Rubio Armenta, on 

behalf of themselves and others similarly situated (hereinafter collectively referred to as 

“Plaintiffs”), filed a motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement. (ECF No. 48.) 

Plaintiffs’ motion is unopposed.

The hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion took place on September 10, 2014. Attorney David 

Yeremian appeared telephonically on behalf of Plaintiffs. Attorney Thomas McInerney appeared 

telephonically on behalf of Defendant. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will require the 

parties to submit additional briefing in support of the motion.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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I.

BACKGROUND

A. Allegations in the Operative Complaint

The operative complaint in this action is the Second Amended Complaint filed on 

February 26, 2014. (ECF No. 45.) Plaintiffs’ complaint raises six causes of action: 1) for failure 

to pay minimum wages and overtime, 2) for failure to provide reporting time pay, 3) for failing 

to provide accurate earnings statements, 4) for failure to timely pay wages upon termination, 5) 

for unfair competition under California Business & Professions Code § 17200, and 6) for failure 

to pay wages and overtime for off-the-clock work, and 7) for penalties under California’s Private 

Attorney’s General Act, California Labor Code § 2699.

Plaintiffs Leticia Ceja-Corona and Margarita Rubio Armenta were employed by 

Defendant CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (“Defendant”) in the County of Stanislaus in California. 

(Second Am. Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs originally brought this action on behalf of two classes: first, 

on behalf of all persons who are or have been employed by Defendant at distribution centers as 

nonexempt hourly employees in the State of California at any time four years prior to the filing 

of this lawsuit and continuing on to the present. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 27.) The second class 

consists of all persons who are or have been employed by Defendant at distribution centers as 

nonexempt hourly employees at any time three (3) years prior to the filing of this lawsuit and 

continuing to the present and who elect to opt into this action. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 27.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs all wages, overtime, and reporting 

time pay due under the California Labor Code, the applicable California Industrial Welfare 

Commission Wage Orders, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 10.) 

Plaintiffs allege that, prior to clocking in for the day, they must gain admittance into distribution 

centers using security badges that are swiped before passing through turnstiles. (Second Am. 

Compl. ¶ 14.) After entering the facility, employees must deposit their personal belongings in 

lockers because Defendant’s policy prohibits employees from taking personal belongings into 

areas where merchandise is stored. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) While at their lockers, 

employees must also collect the tools they use to perform their job duties. (Second Am. Compl. 

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¶ 15.) Employees then walk to the stock room, which requires employees to swipe their security 

badges. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) Frequently, there is a line of employees entering the stock 

room. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) Employees do not clock in until they are inside the stock 

room, and spend 15-20 minutes going through the entry process before they clock in. (Second 

Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) Employees must repeat the same process any time they leave the distribution 

center for a lunch or rest break. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) Employees are not compensated for 

this time. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 16.)

Any time an employee leaves the distribution center, they must return to their lockers, 

return their tools and collect their personal belongings before going through the security 

screenings required by Defendant. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) During the security screenings, 

employees are searched. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 18.) Often, employees must wait in long lines 

while other employees are searched as they leave. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 18.) Employees spend 

15-20 minutes after clocking out to go through the security screening and are not compensated 

for their time. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 20.)

Plaintiffs allege that the off-the-clock work described above causes employees to work 

overtime, either extending their shifts more than eight hours per day or over forty hours per 

week. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs further allege that, in some instances, employees 

reported to work, but were given no work to do or worked less than one half of their scheduled 

shift, but did not receive reporting time pay. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs further allege 

that employees were not given timely, accurate and itemized wage statements. (Second Am. 

Compl. ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs also allege that employees who quit their jobs with Defendant were not 

given all wages owed to them within 72 hours of resignation or thirty days thereafter. (Second 

Am. Compl. ¶ 24.)

B. Terms of the Proposed Class Settlement

The parties attended mediation on April 8, 2014. At the mediation, the parties reached a 

settlement. Defendant agrees to pay $900,000.00 in cash to resolve the claims of any class 

members who do not timely and validly opt out. The $900,000.00 is paid by Defendant on a 

non-reversionary basis. The parties propose the following deductions from the $900,000.00 

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settlement figure:

 up to $10,000 to Ceja-Corona and $7,500 for Armenta for their services and participation 

as class representatives;

 up to $270,000 to Class Counsel for attorneys’ fees and up to $15,000 for litigation costs;

 $7,500 to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) for 

penalties pursuant to Labor Code § 2699, et seq.;

 $30,700 for the costs of claims administration;

 Defendant’s share of payroll taxes on the settlement awards.

Defendant’s records show that there are approximately 2,273 class members in this 

action. The proposed settlement provides that an equitable formula will be applied to distribute 

the settlement funds to each participating class member based upon the number of workweeks 

the member has worked during the relevant time period. The settlement provides for a $50.00

guaranteed minimum payment for participating class members. 

The parties propose the following timeline for settlement:

Timing Event

20 calendar days after preliminary approval 

of settlement

Defendant provides Claims Administrator 

mailing addresses for Class Members

30 calendar days after preliminary approval 

of settlement

Claims Administrator mails Notice Packet to 

Class Members

45 calendar days after Claims Administrator 

mails to Class Members

Deadline for Class Members to submit Claim 

Forms, exclusion forms, or objections.

28 days before final approval hearing Plaintiff files Motion for Final Approval of 

Class Action Settlement

December 1, 2014 Final Approval Hearing

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENTS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) states:

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(e) Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise. The 

claims, issues or defenses of a certified class may be settled, 

voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s 

approval. The following procedures apply to a proposed 

settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise:

(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all 

class members who would be bound by the proposal.

(2) If the proposal would bind class members, the court may 

approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, 

reasonable, and adequate.

(3) The parties seeking approval must file a statement 

identifying any agreement made in connection with the proposal.

(4) If the class action was previously certified under Rule 

23(b)(3), the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it 

affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class 

members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but 

did not do so.

(5) Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires 

court approval under this subdivision (e); the objection may be 

withdrawn only with the court’s approval.

Rule 23 “requires the district court to determine whether a proposed settlement is 

fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 

(9th Cir. 1998) (citing Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

“It is the settlement taken as a whole, rather than the individual component parts, that must be 

examined for overall fairness.” Id. (citing Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San 

Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 628 (9th Cir. 1982)).

“Assessing a settlement proposal requires the district court to balance a number of 

factors: the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of 

further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount 

offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the 

experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of 

the class members to the proposed settlement.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026 (citing Torrisi v. 

Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993)). “To survive appellate review, the 

district court must show it has explored comprehensively all factors.” Id.

Moreover:

Several circuits have held that settlement approval that takes place 

prior to formal class certification requires a higher standard of 

fairness. The dangers of collusion between class counsel and the 

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defendant, as well as the need for additional protections when the 

settlement is not negotiated by a courtdesignated class 

representative, weigh in favor of a more probing inquiry than may 

normally be required under Rule 23(e).... Because settlement class 

actions present unique due process concerns for absent class 

members, we agree with our sister circuits and adopt this standard 

as our own.

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.

III.

DISCUSSION

At the hearing, the Court discussed a number of apparent defects in the motion for 

preliminary approval of the class settlement. Accordingly, the Court will defer on making a 

recommendation on whether the motion should be granted or denied and require the parties to 

submit additional briefing on the issues outlined below.

Moreover, for the sake of clarity in the record, the Court will require any additional 

briefing submitted by the parties to be complete in and of itself, without reference to the 

previously filed motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement. In other words, 

the Court will require the parties to file an amended motion so that any class members looking at 

the record will only need to review the newly filed amended motion, without having to refer 

back to the previously filed motion.

A. California Class versus Nationwide Class

At the hearing, the Court noted that the operative complaint in this action sought to 

certify two classes: a California class for the claims under California law and a Nationwide class 

for claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, the proposed settlement only pertained 

to a class of California employees, as well as a separate class for PAGA claims. It was unclear 

how Nationwide Class members would be affected by the settlement.

At the hearing, the parties indicated that it was their intent that the settlement would only 

bind members of the California class and that Nationwide class members (who were not also 

members of the California class) would not be precluded from bringing their claims in a separate 

action. Moreover, the parties indicated that the settlement would resolve this action in its 

entirety, without addressing the claims brought by Nationwide class members outside California. 

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Accordingly, the Court will require the parties’ amended motion to expressly acknowledge that 

the claims brought on behalf of the Nationwide class members outside of California would 

effectively be dismissed without prejudice as a result of this settlement.

B. Class Certification

At the hearing, the Court noted that Plaintiffs’ motion was largely boilerplate, without 

sufficient evidence to support certification of a class for settlement purposes. Accordingly, the 

Court will require the parties’ amended motion to address the issues set forth below.

When the parties seek approval of a proposed class action settlement, the Court must 

“ascertain whether the proposed settlement class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to all class actions, namely: (1) numerosity, (2) 

commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019 

(citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997)). Courts “must pay 

‘undiluted, even heightened, attention’ to class certification requirements in a settlement 

context.” Id. (quoting Amchem Products, Inc., 521 U.S. at 620).

Additionally, Plaintiffs seek certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

23(b)(3), which requires a demonstration that questions of law or fact common to class members 

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and that a class action is 

superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Finally, the Court notes:

Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party 

seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his 

compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove 

that there are in fact sufficient numerous parties, common 

questions of law or fact, etc. We recognized in Falcon that 

“sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the 

pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question,” 

[citation] and that certification is proper only if “the trial court is 

satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 

23(a) have been satisfied, [citation].”

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (italics in original). In other 

words, Plaintiffs’ must prove, with supporting evidence, that the class certification requirements 

are met in this action.

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As discussed in more detail below, Plaintiffs’ motion lacks sufficient evidentiary support 

because it does not include any evidentiary support, other than a declaration from Plaintiffs’ 

attorney.

1. Numerosity

The numerosity requirement is satisfied where “the class is so numerous that joinder of 

all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 

approval states that there are approximately 2,273 class members.

However, Plaintiffs’ motion does not submit any evidence detailing how the 2,273 figure

was calculated. The only evidence regarding the number of class members is the declaration of 

David Yeremian, the attorney for Plaintiffs. Mr. Yeremian only provides the vague statement 

that “There are approximately 2,273 Class Members.” (Decl. of David Yeremian ¶ 30.) Mr. 

Yeremian provides no foundation as to how he reached this figure. At the hearing, the parties 

informed the Court that the 2,273 figure is likely outdated since it was calculated some time ago. 

The parties informed the Court that Defendant provided this figure, along with names and 

addresses, to the third party administrator to send notice out class members, but provides no 

insight as to how Defendant came up with this figure.

Accordingly, the Court will require any amended motion to include a declaration from a 

competent witness detailing how class members were identified and how their names and 

addresses were ascertained.

2. Commonality

The commonality requirement is satisfied where “there are questions of law or fact that 

are common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). However, “[a]ll questions of fact and law 

need not be common to satisfy the rule. The existence of shared legal issues with divergent 

factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal 

remedies within the class.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019.

Again, Plaintiffs submit a vague declaration from Mr. Yeremian stating, in conclusory 

fashion, that the commonality requirement is met because all the class members were subject to 

the same employment policies and practices. Plaintiffs do not submit evidence establishing the 

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existence of commonality in this action.

“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered 

the same injury.’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting 

General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). “This does not mean 

merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law.” Id. “Their claims 

must depend upon a common contention.... That common contention, moreover, must be of such 

a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or 

falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each of the claims in one stroke.” Id. 

Plaintiffs argue that commonality exists because all class members suffered the same 

injuries, namely unpaid wages, overtime and inaccurate wage statements. However, this in and 

of itself does not meet the standard set forth in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., as Plaintiffs have not 

identified any “common contention” that will resolve an issue central to the validity of each 

claim.

At the hearing, the parties indicated that Defendant has two distribution centers in 

California. The parties state that the same security policies are in effect at both distribution 

centers, but provide no evidentiary detail as to what these security policies entail and how they 

caused or contributed to a common injury among all class members. Accordingly, any amended 

motion should include admissible evidence which establishes the “common contention” 

connecting employees from both distribution centers to a shared injury.

Moreover, at the hearing, Plaintiff’s conceded that their claims for unpaid reporting time 

pay are largely unrelated to their claims based upon off-the-clock work associated with waiting 

for security screenings. Further, both parties indicated that the unpaid reporting time pay claims 

were determined to be not as widespread and insubstantial. Yet, settlement in this action 

purports to bind all class members with respect to any potential unpaid reporting time pay claim 

they may possess. This outcome would unduly prejudice individual class members who may 

possess valid and substantial claims for unpaid reporting time pay. The Court is not inclined to 

approve a settlement where the parties acknowledge that these reporting time claims were not 

found to be an issue common to the class, yet individual class members would be required to 

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give up their right to pursue their claims. Accordingly, any amended motion should either 

amend the terms of the proposed settlement such that class members are not required to release 

these claims, or the parties should present persuasive arguments to the Court why it would be fair 

and equitable for class members to release a claim that was found not to be common to the class.

3. Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 

of the claims or defenses of the class[.]” This does not require the claims to be substantially 

identical, but that the representatives claims be “reasonably co-extensive with those of the absent 

class members.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.

Plaintiffs vaguely argue that Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the whole class. 

Notably, Plaintiffs’ boilerplate brief makes no distinction between the claims of Plaintiff Leticia 

Ceja-Corona and the claims of Plaintiff Margarita Rubio Armenta. Furthermore, there is no 

admissible evidence regarding the facts of Ceja-Corona’s claims or Armenta’s claims. Any 

amended motion should include admissible evidence which demonstrates how Ceja-Corona’s 

claims and Armenta’s claims are typical to the claims or defenses of the remaining class 

members.

4. Adequacy of Representation

The named plaintiffs must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23(a)(4). In determining whether the named plaintiffs will adequately represent the class, 

the courts must resolve two questions: “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any 

conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel 

prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. “Adequate 

representation depends on, among other factors, an absence of antagonism between 

representatives and absentees, and a sharing of interest between representatives and absentees. 

Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

At this point in time, the Court does not see any issues regarding the adequacy of the 

named plaintiffs and their counsel, and therefore reserves any decision on this issue until after 

the parties file an amended motion.

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5. Predominance

“[T]he focus of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry is on the balance between 

individual and common issues.” Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 652, 663 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 

Where common questions present a significant aspect of the case and are able to be resolved for 

all class members in a single action, the case can be handled on a representative rather than 

individual basis. Alberto, 252 F.R.D. at 663.

For the same reasons discussed above, in the context of the issue of commonality, the 

Court notes that Plaintiffs have not identified any common policy that applies across all 

distribution centers. Further, the off-the-clock work claims and the reporting time pay claims 

asserted by Plaintiffs raise different factual issues which would require individualized 

assessment for each class member. Thus, it is unclear whether class issues predominate over the 

individual issues.

Further, the Court notes that the nature of Plaintiffs claims raises individualized inquiries 

as well. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant failed to pay employees for time spent waiting in 

employer mandated security lines. However, the amount of time waiting in line would 

necessarily vary from person to person. The first employee in line may not have a claim or may 

have a smaller claim that the last employee in line, who naturally would wait longer and thus be 

entitled to more damages. Further, the length of the line may vary at different times during the 

day, with longer lines and longer waits during busier times (such as at 9:00 a.m. or at 5:00 p.m.), 

and shorter lines and shorter waits during less busy times. Plaintiffs offer no insight as to how 

such issues could be resolved on a class-wide basis or how, in spite of these issues, the common 

class issues predominate over the individual issues. Accordingly, any amended motion should 

provide further support on the issue of predominance.

6. Superiority

Rule 23(b)(3) provides that courts should consider “(A) the class members' interests in 

individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature 

of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the 

desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; 

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and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Where the parties have agreed to precertification settlement (D) and perhaps (C) are irrelevant. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620. 

Plaintiffs note that resolving each class members’ claims on an individual basis would be 

uneconomical because each individual suit would be for a relatively small amount. However, 

Plaintiffs do not provide any evidence or argument regarding exactly how much each claim is 

worth for each individual member. While Plaintiffs’ argument seems reasonable in theory, the 

Court must be given some insight as to how much off-the-work time was unpaid for the average 

class member in order to evaluate this argument. Moreover, Plaintiffs would have to 

demonstrate how much in damages, PAGA penalties, etc. an average class member would be 

entitled to if they brought an individual claim. Accordingly, any amended motion should 

provide concrete numbers which demonstrate that the value of each individual’s claim is so low 

that individual claims would be uneconomical.

C. Whether the Proposed Settlement is Fundamentally Fair, Adequate, and 

Reasonable

Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, 

and reasonable. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026 (citing Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 

1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Assessing a settlement proposal requires the district court to 

balance a number of factors: the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, 

and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the 

trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the 

proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; 

and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026 

(citing Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993)).

Plaintiffs’ boilerplate motion does not adequately address these factors. First, the Court 

notes that there is little discussion regarding the strength of Plaintiffs’ case. Plaintiffs’ have not 

discussed what evidence, if any, is in their possession. Although Plaintiffs identify a single 

favorable case regarding compensation for off-the-time work associated with employer mandated 

security clearances, Plaintiffs provide little discussion of the facts specific to this case.

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Second, there is no indication of the risk, expense, complexity or likely duration of 

further litigation, or the risk of maintaining class action status throughout trial. It is unclear how 

much discovery has been completed.

Third, the Court notes that the proposed settlement provides for a payment of $7,500 to 

the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) for PAGA penalties 

pursuant to Labor Code § 2699, et seq. However, Plaintiffs provide no justification for this 

amount. Thus, the $7,500 figure appears to be largely arbitrary and bears no relationship to the 

total amount of settlement. The Court notes that California Labor Code § 2699(l) requires court 

approval of any settlement of a PAGA claim. The Court further notes that, generally, the 

settlement of PAGA claims is ripe for collusion between a class of plaintiffs and a defendant, as 

neither party has any incentive to increase the amount awarded to the LWDA. In an amended 

motion, the parties are expected to demonstrate the basis of the $7,500. For example, the parties 

could provide the Court with an estimate of the maximum total damages that would be awarded 

to Plaintiffs if they prevail on all the claims, and calculate what percentage of that total award 

would be attributable to PAGA penalties. Alternatively, the parties may submit a reasonable 

proposal whereby notice is given to the LWDA of the terms of the proposed settlement, with the 

LWDA given a chance to object to the terms of the settlement of the PAGA claim.

Moreover, the Court notes that the proposed class notice references “an equitable 

formula” where each member receives an amount proportional to the number of workweeks she 

or he worked for Defendant compared to all the weeks worked by all class members. Based 

upon the Joint Stipulation of Class Action Settlement and Release, this equitable formula divides 

the number of weeks worked by an individual class member by the number of weeks worked by 

all class members to determine the percentage of the total settlement that the individual class 

member should receive. The Court notes that the number of weeks worked is not precisely 

proportional to the amount each individual is entitled to, as someone who works full time each 

week may be entitled to a greater settlement payment than someone who worked a few days each 

week for the same period of time. Further, this formula does not appear to take into account any 

differences in the hourly rate of pay that may exist between class members.

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Similarly, it is unclear how the “equitable formula” takes into account the sums paid out 

associated with Plaintiffs’ claim based upon reporting-time pay. It is unclear how the sums owed 

for claims based upon being sent home early without reporting time pay can be calculated using 

only the number of weeks worked by each individual class member.

Further, the Court notes that Plaintiffs have not introduced any evidence or argument 

regarding the adequacy of the settlement. Plaintiffs only state, in boilerplate fashion, that the 

settlement was reached after extensive negotiations. “To determine whether a settlement falls 

within the range of possible approval, a court must focus on substantive fairness and adequacy, 

and “consider plaintiffs' expected recovery balanced against the value of the settlement offer.” 

Lusby v. Gamestop, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 400, 415 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting In re Tableware 

Antitrust Litig., 484 FSupp.2d 1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007)). Plaintiffs have not provided any 

indication of what Plaintiffs’ expected recovery would be if they prevailed on the merits. 

Plaintiffs has not introduced evidence of the total amount of off-the-clock work that was unpaid 

by Defendant for all class members. The Court also notes that Plaintiffs have provided little 

justification for the enhancement payment to Ceja-Corona and Armenta ($10,000 and $7,500, 

respectively). Plaintiffs have not provided any specifics regarding the amount of time each 

devoted to the case, nor any discrete evidence of retaliation from prospective employers. This, 

combined with the lack of any detailed analysis of the strength of the merits of Plaintiffs’ case, 

makes it impossible for the Court to evaluate whether the $900,000 settlement figure is within 

the range of what would be regarded as fair and adequate.

Moreover, the Court notes that the settlement is described as non-reversionary, yet the 

settlement funds not claimed by class members are to be forwarded to a “CVS Caremark 

Employee Relief Fund.” Plaintiffs provide no insight as to what this fund is, or what benefit it 

provides to the class.

Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiffs request “up to 30%” in attorneys’ fees. It is 

unclear what is meant by “up to” and the Court assumes that Plaintiffs will be requesting 30%. 

In the Ninth Circuit, courts typically calculate 25% of the common fund as the “benchmark” for 

a reasonable fee award providing adequate explanation in the record for any special 

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circumstances that justify departure. In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation, 654 

F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated justification to depart higher 

than 25%, particularly in light of the relatively early stage of this action, where settlement was 

reached prior to class certification. If Plaintiffs wish to request a departure from 25%, the Court 

will require Plaintiffs to submit evidence of the actual number of hours worked in this action to 

determine whether a departure from the benchmark of 25% is warranted.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court will require the parties to submit an amended motion 

which addresses the issues outlined above.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, the Court will order the parties to submit an amended motion 

for preliminary approval of class action settlement which addresses the issues outlined above. 

The parties’ amended motion shall be completed in and of itself without reference to the prior 

motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The parties shall file an amended motion addressing the issues outlined in this 

order on or before October 15, 2014; and

2. A continued hearing on the motion for preliminary approval of the class 

settlement shall take place on Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. in 

Courtroom 9 (SAB) before United States Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 11, 2014 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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