Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02469/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02469-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roosevelt Dye
Appellant
University of Arkansas
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2469

___________

Roosevelt Dye, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

University of Arkansas, Southeast *

Branch at Rohwer; University of * [UNPUBLISHED]

Arkansas, Agriculture Department of *

Fayetteville, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: May 5, 2006

Filed: May 11, 2006

___________

Before RILEY, MAGILL, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Roosevelt Dye appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary judgment

in his Title VII employment discrimination action. After de novo review, we agree

with the district court that Dye did not provide evidence that a discrete discriminatory

act occurred within the limitations period (beginning 180 days prior to his May 22,

Appellate Case: 05-2469 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/11/2006 Entry ID: 2043637
-2-

2003 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge), and thus his

EEOC charge was untimely and his suit was barred by the statute of limitations. See

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109-10 (2002) (litigant has up

to 180 or 300 days—depending on state—after unlawful employment practice

happened to file EEOC charge; claim is time-barred if it is not filed within time limit;

term “practice” applies to “discrete act or single occurrence”); Diaz v. Swift-Eckrich,

Inc., 318 F.3d 796, 798 (8th Cir. 2003) (Arkansas plaintiff had 180 days after alleged

unlawful employment practice occurred to file EEOC charge); Tademe v. St. Cloud

State Univ., 328 F.3d 982, 987-88 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting argument that past

discrete acts of discrimination represented ongoing pattern or practice of

discrimination for purposes of timeliness); Kasper v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 425

F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 2005) (standard of review).

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-2469 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/11/2006 Entry ID: 2043637