Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-07077/USCOURTS-caDC-07-07077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Adeyemi
Appellant
District of Columbia
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 10, 2008 Decided May 16, 2008 

No. 07-7077 

JAMES ADEYEMI, 

APPELLANT

v. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 04cv01684) 

Leah M. Quadrino argued the cause for appellant. With 

her on the briefs was Steven Reed. 

Mary T. Connelly, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Peter J. 

Nickles, Interim Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor 

General, and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General. 

Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney General, entered an 

appearance. 

Before: GRIFFITH and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge. 

USCA Case #07-7077 Document #1116671 Filed: 05/16/2008 Page 1 of 14
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: James Adeyemi is deaf. 

After failing to obtain an information technology position in 

the D.C. Public School System, he sued the District of 

Columbia for unlawful employment discrimination under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act. The District of Columbia 

responded that it hired two candidates who were better 

qualified than Adeyemi. The U.S. District Court granted 

summary judgment for the District of Columbia. We affirm: 

Adeyemi did not produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable 

jury to find that the District of Columbia’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason – that it hired better-qualified 

candidates – was not the actual basis for the decision and that 

it intentionally discriminated against Adeyemi on account of 

his disability. 

I 

In 2002, the D.C. Public School System (DCPS) 

abolished its existing employment positions and advertised 

the resulting job “vacancies” both within DCPS and to the 

general public. Incumbent workers could re-apply but were 

not guaranteed their old jobs. 

The DCPS Office of Information Technology announced 

seven vacancies for Level 11 Information Technology 

Specialists. The vacancy announcement listed the necessary 

qualifications in general terms and requested that each 

applicant submit a resumé and written statement. 

 The DCPS Human Resources Department screened the 

applications and selected 20 interviewees for the Level 11 

positions. Five of the 20 interviewees were incumbents; they 

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already worked for DCPS in the Office of Information 

Technology. Two IT employees were assigned to interview 

the 20 Level 11 candidates. Ulysses Keyes, the Director of 

Enterprise Information Systems for the Office of Information 

Technology, was responsible for making the final hiring 

decisions after considering the applicants’ resumés, written 

statements, experience, and interview performances, as well 

as DCPS’s particular needs. 

James Adeyemi applied for the Level 11 position, as well 

as for a higher-grade Level 12 position. His application did 

not note his disability. Based on Adeyemi’s application, 

DCPS’s Human Resources Department initially determined 

he possessed the minimal qualifications for the Level 11 

position (but not for the higher-grade Level 12 position) and 

selected him as one of the 20 Level 11 interviewees. 

Manuel Farfan and Henry Thompson interviewed 

Adeyemi. Farfan and Thompson first learned that Adeyemi 

was deaf when he arrived for his interview. Because a signlanguage interpreter was not available on such short notice, 

Farfan and Thompson typed questions that appeared on a 

computer screen and Adeyemi then typed his responses. 

During the interview, Thompson also passed Adeyemi a note 

asking how he communicated in offices where no one knew 

sign language. Adeyemi responded that he often used written 

communication, and he explained that he had “no problem 

with writing as [his] basic communication.” Interview Notes, 

Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 130. 

When Farfan, Thompson, and Keyes later met to discuss 

the applicants, Farfan asked Keyes how DCPS could 

accommodate Adeyemi if he were hired. Keyes stated “we 

can always accommodate him.” Farfan Deposition, J.A. 331. 

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 After all of the interviews were completed, DCPS offered 

five of the seven available Level 11 positions to the five 

incumbents who had interviewed. Keyes later explained that 

the incumbents had desirable “qualifications, experience, and 

backgrounds” and performed well in their interviews. Keyes 

Deposition, J.A. 21. Moreover, he had concerns about 

starting the school year with an entirely new staff; the 

incumbents’ institutional knowledge gave them “a very big 

advantage coming back on board.” Id. at 55. 

For the remaining two Level 11 vacancies, however, 

Keyes was not satisfied with the pool and decided not to 

extend offers at that time to any of the numerous other Level 

11 candidates. Instead, he asked the Human Resources 

Department to re-advertise for the remaining two Level 11 

vacancies. But this renewed effort still did not produce any 

viable candidates. At that point, Keyes had his back “against 

the wall timewise”: He had to fill the vacancies within days 

or risk losing the positions altogether due to funding 

constraints. Id. at 33. 

Out of time to find new candidates for the remaining two 

Level 11 vacancies and not particularly happy with the 

remaining Level 11 candidates, Keyes looked to the pool of 

applicants for the separate Level 12 positions. To qualify for 

the higher-grade Level 12 position, applicants had to meet 

more demanding knowledge and experience requirements. As 

noted above, Adeyemi himself had applied for a Level 12 

position but did not make the initial cut for the Level 12 

interviews. 

Keyes asked the Human Resources Department if he 

could fill a Level 11 position with a candidate who had 

applied and was qualified for the Level 12 position. Human 

Resources informed Keyes it was permissible because 

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candidates qualified for the Level 12 positions were 

automatically qualified for the lower-grade Level 11 

positions. 

Keyes then offered the last two Level 11 positions to two 

Level 12 candidates: Qaiser Iqbal and Cynthia Wang. 

According to Keyes, Iqbal had desirable skills from his 10 

years as a programmer/analyst working with enterprise-wide 

computer systems in the corporate world; that experience 

would be useful because Level 11 Specialists used 

mainframes on a daily basis. Keyes later stated that Iqbal’s 

corporate experience “was really what it came down to.” Id. 

at 49. Keyes further explained that Iqbal “was more 

qualified” and a “better match for [DCPS] than anybody else 

in the untapped pool, including Mr. Adeyemi.” Id. at 48. 

 Keyes stated that he chose Wang for the Level 11 

position because she had “documented experience” with the 

PeopleSoft application. Id. at 37. This experience was “very 

attractive” to DCPS because it was “in the middle of a 

PeopleSoft implementation” and “in the process of hiring 

consultants and trying to get staff up to speed with someone 

who understood the HR portion.” Id. at 37, 51. None of the 

Level 11 candidates – including Adeyemi – had PeopleSoft 

experience. 

After learning that he did not obtain the position, 

Adeyemi filed an administrative complaint with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission claiming that DCPS 

had discriminated against him in violation of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Following an 

unsuccessful mediation, Adeyemi filed a complaint in the 

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. After 

discovery was completed, the District Court granted the 

District of Columbia’s motion for summary judgment, finding 

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that Adeyemi had not established a prima facie case of 

disability discrimination. Adeyemi v. District of Columbia, 

2007 WL 1020754, at *21 (D.D.C. 2007). In the alternative, 

the District Court concluded that Adeyemi had not produced 

sufficient evidence to cast doubt on DCPS’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation that it had hired Iqbal and Wang 

because they were better qualified. See id. Adeyemi appeals; 

we review the District Court’s summary judgment de novo. 

II 

A 

 The Americans with Disabilities Act makes it unlawful 

for an employer to “discriminate against a qualified individual 

with a disability because of the disability of such individual in 

regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, 

or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 

training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Putting aside the issue 

of reasonable accommodation, the two basic elements of a 

disability discrimination claim are that (i) the plaintiff 

suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the 

plaintiff’s disability. 

The District Court in this case first carefully analyzed 

whether Adeyemi had made out a “prima facie case” under 

the McDonnell Douglas analysis. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). On appeal, the parties – 

particularly the plaintiff – similarly have devoted large 

portions of their briefs to that question. As we recently 

explained in Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 

however, “the prima facie case is a largely unnecessary 

sideshow.” 2008 WL 819989, at *3 (D.C. Cir. 2008). As 

Supreme Court precedents establish, the prima-facie-case 

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aspect of McDonnell Douglas is irrelevant when an employer 

has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its 

decision – as an employer almost always will do by the 

summary judgment stage of an employment discrimination 

suit. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-

11 (1993); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 

U.S. 711, 714-16 (1983); see also Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 

417 F.3d 845, 856 (8th Cir. 2005) (Colloton, J., concurring in 

judgment); Wells v. Colorado Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 

1205, 1221, 1224-28 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring). 

Therefore, if an employer asserts a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, the 

district court must conduct one central inquiry in considering 

an employer’s motion for summary judgment or judgment as 

a matter of law: whether the plaintiff produced sufficient 

evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s 

asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason 

and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the 

plaintiff on a prohibited basis. See Brady, 2008 WL 819989, 

at *2-3. 

As we explained in Brady and as this case again 

illustrates, this streamlined approach will assist courts and 

litigants alike. The district courts can focus on the key 

question of discrimination without slogging through the 

McDonnell Douglas prima facie factors, which in any event 

do little more than generate “enormous confusion.” Id. at *3. 

And litigants need not devote briefing and oral argument to 

the often difficult and usually irrelevant prima-facie-case 

question.1

 

 1

 Although the prima facie case is ultimately irrelevant here, 

Adeyemi correctly points out that the District Court did not analyze 

the factors that previous cases have identified. The District Court 

asked whether Adeyemi: (1) had a disability; (2) was qualified for 

the position; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action

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B 

In this disparate-treatment disability discrimination suit, 

as in most cases that reach court, the parties do not dispute 

that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action under 

the statute – here, not being hired. DCPS has asserted a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring Adeyemi 

– namely, that it hired Iqbal and Wang because they were 

better qualified. We therefore turn directly to the central 

issue: whether Adeyemi produced evidence sufficient for a 

reasonable jury to find that the employer’s stated reason was 

not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally 

discriminated against Adeyemi based on his disability. When 

considering whether summary judgment or judgment as a 

matter of law is warranted for the employer in an employment 

discrimination case, the court considers all relevant evidence 

presented by the plaintiff and defendant. See Brady, 2008 

WL 819989, at *3. 

Adeyemi challenges DCPS’s qualifications-based 

explanation on three main grounds. 

 

because of his disability. In analyzing the third factor, the court 

focused on the question of causation – that is, whether plaintiff was 

not hired because of his disability. However, even under the 

original McDonnell Douglas test that was used pre-Aikens, the 

prima facie case did not require a full causation analysis in a 

failure-to-hire case, but only asked whether after the rejection, “the 

position remained open and the employer continued to seek 

applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.” 

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In any event, this further 

illustrates our point that “[d]isagreement and uncertainty over the 

content, meaning, and purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima 

facie factors have led to a plethora of problems,” thereby “wasting 

litigant and judicial resources.” Brady, 2008 WL 819989, at *2 n.1, 

*3. 

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First, according to Adeyemi, a reasonable jury could find 

discrimination because he was not hired despite his high 

ranking within the Level 11 applicant pool. But when an 

employer says it made a hiring or promotion decision based 

on the relative qualifications of the candidates, a plaintiff can 

directly challenge that qualifications-based explanation only if 

the plaintiff was “significantly better qualified for the job” 

than those ultimately chosen. Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 

889, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The qualifications gap must be 

“great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination.” 

Jackson v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 703, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Only then could the factfinder “legitimately infer that the employer consciously 

selected a less-qualified candidate – something that employers 

do not usually do, unless some other strong consideration, 

such as discrimination, enters into the picture.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In cases where the comparative 

qualifications are close, a reasonable jury would not usually 

find discrimination because the jury would “assume that the 

employer is more capable of assessing the significance of 

small differences in the qualifications of the candidates, or 

that the employer simply made a judgment call.” Aka v. 

Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 

(en banc); see also Jackson, 496 F.3d at 707. We must 

“respect the employer’s unfettered discretion to choose 

among qualified candidates.” Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of 

Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996). To conclude 

otherwise, we have said, “would be to render the judiciary a 

super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s 

business decisions – a role we have repeatedly disclaimed.” 

Jackson, 496 F.3d at 707 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The record here shows that Adeyemi was not as qualified 

as either Iqbal or Wang – much less “significantly better 

qualified,” as our cases require. Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 897. 

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Unlike Adeyemi, both Iqbal and Wang possessed the requisite 

qualifications not just for the Level 11 position but also for 

the higher-grade Level 12 position. Both Iqbal and Wang 

also possessed significant experience that Adeyemi largely 

lacked – Iqbal with mainframe computers and Wang with 

PeopleSoft. To be sure, as Adeyemi notes, those particular 

qualifications were not specifically mentioned in the vacancy 

announcement. But they were fairly encompassed within the 

announcement, which sought candidates with a broad range of 

computer knowledge and skills. And as this Court has 

explained, the fact that an employer “based its ultimate hiring 

decision on one or more specific factors encompassed within 

a broader and more general job description does not itself 

raise an inference of discrimination sufficient to overcome 

summary judgment.” Jackson, 496 F.3d at 709. 

Adeyemi points out that his interview score tied him for 

fifth place among the 20 people who interviewed for the 

Level 11 positions and that the Human Resources Department 

ranked him fourth overall out of the 20 original applicants 

deemed eligible for the Level 11 positions. For purposes of 

summary judgment, we accept that characterization of the 

scores. But the problem for Adeyemi is that those facts do 

not show he was significantly better qualified than the two 

successful candidates, Iqbal and Wang. To begin with the 

obvious: Both Iqbal and Wang made the initial cut to be 

interviewed for the higher-grade Level 12 positions. 

Adeyemi did not make that cut. And the Level 12 cut 

occurred before DCPS knew he was deaf, thereby establishing 

that the initial Level 12 cut was not discriminatory, a point 

Adeyemi does not contest. Wang interviewed only for the 

Level 12 positions, so she was not even part of the Level 11 

rankings that Adeyemi relies on. Iqbal interviewed for both 

the Level 11 and Level 12 positions. But the record is silent 

as to Iqbal’s overall rank in the Level 11 pool. Indeed, he 

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could have ranked first, second, or third in that Level 11 pool. 

In any event, a slight difference in ranking would not show 

that Adeyemi was “significantly better qualified,” particularly 

given Iqbal’s mainframe experience and DCPS’s needs. 

Adeyemi also notes that his interview score in isolation was 

slightly higher than Iqbal’s Level 11 interview score, but such 

small differences were considered “a wash.” Keyes 

Deposition, J.A. 59. Moreover, as in most job hiring 

situations, the interview score here was only one of many 

factors DCPS considered in the hiring process; DCPS also 

weighed the applicants’ experience and qualifications, as well 

as DCPS’s needs. 

Adeyemi also asserts that there is no contemporaneous 

evidence of DCPS’s qualifications-based explanation. And 

Adeyemi hints that DCPS has manufactured its justifications 

after the fact. But the absence of contemporaneous evidence 

is hardly unusual; employers ordinarily do not “publish a 

contemporaneous statement of reasons every time they make 

a hiring or firing decision.” Jackson, 496 F.3d at 710. We 

therefore decline to find any significance in the timing of 

DCPS’s explanation. 

In short, under our precedents, the evidence of 

comparative qualifications here does not raise an inference of 

discrimination sufficient for Adeyemi to overcome summary 

judgment; in fact, the evidence of Iqbal’s and Wang’s 

superior qualifications tends to undermine any suggestion of 

discrimination. 

Second, Adeyemi argues that a reasonable jury could find 

discrimination from the supposed “irregularities” in DCPS’s 

hiring process – namely, that DCPS (i) re-advertised the Level 

11 position after hiring the five incumbents and then (ii) hired 

individuals for the Level 11 position from the separate Level 

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12 candidate pool. Adeyemi finds it suspicious that DCPS 

passed over the remaining candidates in the Level 11 pool. 

But this does not raise an inference of discrimination because 

DCPS passed over all non-incumbent candidates. Keyes 

declined to fill the two vacant Level 11 positions with any of 

the numerous remaining Level 11 candidates because he was 

not satisfied that they were the best he could find. He asked 

Human Resources to re-advertise the positions because he 

wanted a “star” who could take DCPS “to the next level.” 

Keyes Deposition, J.A. 55. When that proved unattainable, 

Keyes said “let’s settle for a doubles hitter, not a home-run 

hitter.” Id. at 57. At that point, Keyes turned to the Level 12 

pool. Keyes rationally considered the Level 12 applicants 

superior to the Level 11 applicants because those who 

qualified for the Level 12 position possessed greater 

knowledge and experience. Moreover, Keyes had personally 

interviewed the Level 12 candidates and testified that he felt 

he knew them. A reasonable jury ordinarily cannot find 

discrimination simply from the fact that an employer takes 

extra steps to find better-qualified employees. Here, 

therefore, we do not believe a reasonable jury could find 

unlawful discrimination in the sequence of events by which 

DCPS filled the final two Level 11 positions. 

Third, Adeyemi points to statements made by DCPS 

employee Thompson that, according to Adeyemi, evince a 

discriminatory animus. As Adeyemi correctly argues, this 

Court has held that a plaintiff may overcome summary 

judgment by presenting specific evidence suggesting the 

“decision maker harbors discriminatory animus.” Holcomb, 

433 F.3d at 899. But Adeyemi has not presented sufficient 

evidence to meet this standard. 

Adeyemi focuses on one of Thompson’s interview 

questions and Thompson’s subsequent explanation of that 

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question. During the interview, Thompson asked Adeyemi 

how he communicated in offices where no one knew sign 

language; during his deposition, Thompson explained that he 

had asked that question because he did not know whether and 

how a reasonable accommodation could be made. But the 

Americans with Disabilities Act expressly permits employers 

“to make preemployment inquiries into the ability of an 

applicant to perform job-related functions”; therefore, 

Thompson could lawfully inquire how Adeyemi would 

perform specific job-related tasks. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(d)(2)(B), see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 

1630, App. § 1630; ADA Enforcement Guidance: 

Preemployment Disability-Related Questions and Medical 

Examinations, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/medfin5.pdf. 

We agree with the District Court that Thompson’s question 

and discussion about possible accommodation were “entirely 

appropriate” given the circumstances here. Adeyemi v. 

District of Columbia, 2007 WL 1020754, at *18 (D.D.C. 

2007). And contrary to Adeyemi’s argument, we see nothing 

in Thompson’s deposition explanation of the interview to 

suggest discriminatory animus. 

In any event, Thompson was not the decisionmaker for 

those positions. Rather, Keyes made the hiring decisions, and 

he did not express any concern about DCPS’s ability to 

accommodate Adeyemi. On the contrary, Keyes expressed 

confidence that DCPS could and would accommodate 

Adeyemi’s deafness if Adeyemi were hired. 

In short, Thompson’s statements do not suffice for 

Adeyemi to overcome summary judgment. 

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* * * 

We affirm the judgment of the District Court granting 

summary judgment to the District of Columbia. 

So ordered. 

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