Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05049/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05049-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Lee Powers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

• 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F 1 L ~ .u 

United StatesCourtof Appeals Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

MAY 2 & 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

JOE RODGERS, 

Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

DONALD LEE POWERS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Case No. 92-5029 

(D.C. No. (91-CR-023-E) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

Case No. 92-5049 

(D.C. No. (91-CR-023-E) 

(N.D. of Okia .. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER, District 

Judge.** 

Background 

Appellant Donald Lee Powers ("Powers") is an admitted cocaine 

addict. Powers had a girlfriend who introduced him to cocaine and 

Joe Rodgers (Rodgers) • Rodgers dealt cocaine frequently. In 

February 1991, police arrested one Edward Farner for speeding; at 

the time, Farner possessed cash and some cocaine. Farner 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and 

shall not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth 

Circuit, except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the 

law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 

** Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 1 
eventually turned informer and agreed to help set up a "buy" 

between himself and Rodgers. Police subsequently arrested Rodgers. 

Police obtained a search warrant for a house owned by Powers in 

which officers found firearms and several pounds of cocaine. 

Powers was indicted with co-defendant Joe Rodgers in October 1991 

for conspiring to distribute cocaine. The Oklahoma district court 

sentenced Powers to 151 months and a five-year supervised release. 

Appellant Rodgers also was named in the two-count superseding 

indictment charging him with conspiring to distribute five kilos or 

more of cocaine and use or carrying of firearms during drug 

trafficking. Rodgers was convicted on both counts and received a 

200 month sentence, a $10,000 fine per count one, and a consecutive 

five year sentence per count two. 

consolidated for purposes of appeal. 

Discussion 

These cases have been 

Appellants Rodgers and Powers present nine issues for review 

on appeal. They are: (1) whether the district court erred in 

admitting certain tape recorded evidence and the accompanying 

transcript, and whether the United States committed 'prosecutorial 

misconduct' when it presented this evidence; ( 2) whether the 

district court erred in admitting "drug notes" and related 

testimony; ( 3) whether the district court erred when it denied 

Rodgers' motion for mistrial based on an officer-witness' 

testimony; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to support 

appellants' respective convictions; (5) whether the district court 

erred when it refused to give an instruction offered by Rodgers 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 2 
which defined the word "firearm; " (6) whether appellants' 

conviction should be reversed because of cumulative error; 

(7) whether the district court erred when it assessed Rodgers a 

$10,000 fine; (8) whether the Sentencing Guidelines are 

unconstitutional under the Eight Amendment; and, (9) whether the 

district court erred when it applied the guidelines. We affirm on 

all nine issues for reasons detailed below. 

(1) Whether the district court erred in admitting certain tape 

recorded evidence and the accompanying transcript, and whether 

the united states collllllitted 'prosecutorial misconduct' when it 

presented this evidence. 

Regarding the tape recording itself, the trial court admitted 

into evidence a tape recording of a conversation between government 

informant Eddie Farner and Rodgers. It also admitted the United 

States' version of a transcript of the conversation. We review the 

district court's decision to admit evidence under an abuse of 

discretion standard. See~, United States v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 

1360, 1367 (10th cir. 1992), citing, United states v. Cardenas, 864 

F.2d 1528, 1530 (10th Cir.),~- denied, 491 U.S. 909 (1989). 

In Johnson, supra, we stated the standard under which the 

trial court should consider the admissibility of certain evidence: 

When "evidence is unique, readily identifiable and 

relatively resistant to change, the foundation need only 

consist of testimony that the evidence is what its 

proponent claims." (Cardenas, 864 F.2d at 1531.] On the 

other hand, when the evidence "is not readily 

identifiable and is susceptible to alteration by 

tampering or contamination, the trial court requires a 

more stringent foundation 'entailing a "chain of custody" 

of the item with sufficient completeness to render it 

improbable that the original item has either been 

exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered 

with."' I.g. (quoting Edward w. Cleary, McCormick on 

Evidence S 212, at 667 (3d ed. 1984)) (emphasis added in 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 3 
Cardenas). 

However, "the chain of custody need not be perfect 

for the evidence to be admissible." Id. If the trial 

court -- after "consider [ ing] the nature of the evidence, 

and the surrounding circumstances, including 

presentation, custody and probability of tampering or 

alteration" "determines that the evidence is 

substantially in the same condition as when the crime was 

committed, the court may admit it." Id. Once the court 

properly decides that the evidence is admissible, 

"deficiencies in the chain of custody go to the weight of 

the evidence, not its admissibility; the jury evaluates 

the defects and, based on its evaluation, may accept or 

disregard the evidence." United States v. Brandon, 847 

F.2d 625, 630 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 973, 

109 s.ct. 510, 102 L.Ed.2d 545 (1988). 

Moreover, we have "specifically rejected the adoption of 

'inflexible [foundation] criteria applicable to all cases,' [and] 

will not upset the [trial] judge's admission of a recording unless 

the foundation was clearly insufficient to insure the accuracy of 

the recording." United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 

1569 (10th Cir. 1993), quoting. United States v. Jones, 730 F.2d 

593, 597 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Rodgers argues that there existed no proper predicate for 

admitting the tape, no proper chain of custody, inaudibility, and 

complete lack of authentication as required by the Federal Rules of 

Evidence. Rodgers further argues that the trial court improperly 

admitted the transcript because the United States played only part 

of the tape to the jury and the transcript submitted by the United 

States in this regard was incomplete. Rodgers objected at trial 

and the trial court compelled the United States to play the whole 

recording for the jury and to amend the transcript. Rodgers urges 

that the trial court erred because it allowed the United states to 

utilize informer Farner to testify that the transcript was both 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 4 
accurate and inaccurate. On this basis, Rodgers concludes that 

both the tape's foundation and predicate were fundamentally flawed. 

After careful review of the record, we hold the trial court 

did not err in admitting the tape and the accompanying transcript. 

Powers and Rodgers had a fair opportunity at trial to generally 

review the tape, to correct the transcript submitted by the United 

States (Tr. Vol. at 64, 70-1), and to voir dire the government's 

informant (Tr. Vol. VII at 52-57). Certainly, either Rodgers or 

Powers was free to play portions of the tape he felt were relevant 

as well as to submit his version of the transcript for the jury to 

consider. Fed. R. Evid. 106. The trial court took great care to 

admonish the jury regarding the nature of the tape recording (Tr. 

Vol. VII at 59), the problems associated with the United States' 

version of the transcript (Tr. Vol. VII at 69-70), and Farner's 

credibility (Tr. Vol. VII. at 50-1, 58-9). We therefore conclude 

that the trial court properly considered the nature of the tape 

recording and the accompanying transcript, and the surrounding 

circumstances, including presentation, custody and probability of 

tampering or alteration. 977 F.2d at 1367. 

Regarding the claim of prosecutorial misconduct, appellant 

Powers essentially argues that the United States intentionally 

manipulated the tape recording and the transcript so as to omit 

allegedly critical evidence. Powers cites no authority on his 

behalf and does not refer this court to any part of the record in 

support of his argument. 

The standard of review for prosecutorial misconduct was well5 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 5 
stated in United states v. Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1296 (10th 

Cir. 1988): 

Prosecutorial misconduct is not per se reversible 

error. United States v. Taylor. 800 F.2d 1012, 1018 

(10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, -- u.s. --, 108 s.ct. 

123, 98 L.Ed.2d 81 (1987). We follow the general rule 

that not all misconduct requires reversal; rather, it is 

only when such conduct can be said to have influenced the 

verdict that it becomes prejudicial. Id. 

In United States v. Martinez-Nava, 838 F.2d 411, 416 

(10th Cir. 1988), we observed: 

In analyzing claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct, we must perform a two-step 

analysis. We must first examine whether the 

prosecutor's conduct was in fact improper, and 

if so, then determine whether such conduct 

requires reversal, or whether it was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. 

Hasting. 461 u.s. 499, 510, 103 s.ct. 1974, 76 

L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). "It is only when such 

conduct can present a question whether there 

is reason to believe that it influenced the 

jury's verdict that the failure to take 

appropriate steps to remove it will warrant a 

reversal." Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 

377, 383 (10th cir. 1958), ~- denied, 358 

U.S. 929, 79 s.ct. 315, 3 L.Ed.2d 302 (1959). 

In Alexander, supra, we went on to articulate the standard under 

which a court would evaluate whether the prosecutorial misconduct 

complained of was harmless. However, we need not quote this part 

of the standard because we hold that the prosecution's conduct was 

not, in fact, improper. 

At trial, the district court denied appellants' request for a 

mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. Instead, the trial 

court advised the jury that they did not have a complete version of 

the tape recording, and that they would hear both a complete 

version of the tape and would receive a complete transcript. (Tr. 

Vol. VII at 68). The trial court implicitly accepted the 

6 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 6 
prosecutor's explanation that the United States did not omit parts 

of the tape intentionally. (Tr. Vol. VII at 67). In any event, 

the trial court amply corrected the alleged misconduct by playing 

for the jury the complete tape recording and submitting to them a 

completed transcript. 

(2) Whether the district court erred in admitting "drug notes" and 

related testimony. 

The trial court admitted into evidence certain "drug notes" 

allegedly penned by Rodgers and testimony in support thereof. We 

review the district court's decision to admit the notes and 

accompanying testimony under an abuse of discretion standard. ~ 

~, Johnson, supra, 977 F.2d at 1367. 

Drug notes and testimony in support thereof may be admitted 

into evidence where the government establishes their foundation and 

relevancy. united states v, savaiano. 843 F.2d 1280, 1299 (10th 

Cir. 1988). At trial, one officer testified that he found said 

drug notes in a vehicle, a Chevy Blazer, which also contained an 

insurance verification form with Rodgers' name on it (Tr. Vol. VIII 

at 277); though on cross-examination, the officer stated that the 

Blazer was not registered in Rogers' name. (Tr. Vol. VIII at 285). 

Another witness, one Roger Smith, testified that Rodgers drove said 

Blazer on occasion. (Tr. Vol VII at 109). 

A second officer testified that he found a separate set of 

drug notes and a brown suitcase which contained about $30,000 

inside an apartment out of which Rogers and Powers allegedly 

operated their drug business. (Tr. Vol. VIII at 314). Witness 

Roger Smith placed Rodgers at the apartment and connected Rodgers 

7 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 7 
to both the notes and the money. (Tr. Vol VII at 129-31). 

Moreover, witness Eddie Farner placed Rodgers in the apartment on 

at least three occasions, each of which involved a drug transaction 

(Tr. Vol VII at 24-8) . On this circumstantial evidence, the 

government established both the foundation and relevancy of the 

drug notes and related testimony. 

Appellants' cite to United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 

800 (9th Cir. 1984) in support of the proposition that the trial 

court erred because the United States never connected the 

handwriting from the notes with either Rodgers or Powers. Ordonez 

is not analogous to the case at bar because, in that case, the 

government mustered no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the 

drug notes in question belonged to the defendants. lg. at 800, 

804-05. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by admitting this evidence. 

(3) Whether the district court erred when it denied Rodgers' 

aotion for mistrial baaed on an officer-witness' teatiaony. 

We stated the standard governing the analysis of whether a 

witness' testimony constitutes an impermissible comment on a 

defendant's right to remain silent in United States v, Burson, 952 

F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991): 

The invocation of the privilege against selfincrimination must be given a liberal construction. 

Hoffman v. united states. 341 u.s. 479, 486, 71 s.ct. 

814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). The invocation of the 

privilege against self-incrimination does not require any 

special combination of words. Quinn v. United States, 

349 U.S. 155, 162, 75 s.ct. 668, 673, 99 L.Ed. 964 

(1955). The privilege against self-incrimination can be 

asserted in any investigatory or adjudicatory proceeding. 

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444, 92 s.ct. 

1653, 1656, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). 

8 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 8 
* * * The general rule of law is that once a defendant 

invokes his right to remain silent, it is impermissible 

for the prosecution to refer to any Fifth Amendment 

rights which defendants exercised. Griffin v. 

California, 380 u.s. 609, 615, 85 s.ct. 1229, 1233, 14 

L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). 

* * * This does not end our analysis. [If there is an 

impermissible comment,] (w]e must still undertake our 

harmless error analysis. Chapman [v. California, 386 

U.S. 18, 24 (1967)] dictates the beneficiary of a 

constitutional error must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

the error complained of did not contribute to the guilty 

verdict. In United States v. Massey. 687 F.2d 1348 (10th 

Cir. 1982), we set forth five factors as relevant 

inquiries to be used in determining whether comment 

concerning the defendant's silence is harmless. These 

factors include: 

1. The use to which the prosecution puts the 

••• silence. 

2. Who elected to pursue the line of 

questioning. 

3. The quantum of other evidence indicative 

of guilt • . 

4. The intensity and frequency of the 

reference. 

5. The availability to the trial judge of an 

opportunity to grant a motion for mistrial or 

to give curative instructions. 

1,g. at 1353 (quoting Williams v. zaradnick. 632 F.2d 353, 

361-362 (4th Cir. 1980). 

Id. at 1200-1201. 

The officer's testimony at issue in the case at bar was as 

follows: 

Q. Did you have an occasion to do anything with him 

when you stopped him? 

A. After Mr. Rodgers was stopped and handcuffed, the 

uniformed officers took him downtown to the intake 

room. At a later date I went to try to attempt to 

interview Mr. Rodgers. He did not want to speak 

with me or didn't have anything to say. 

(Tr. Vol. VIII at 368-69). 

Under the first part of the test in Burson. we hold that 

9 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 9 
Rodgers properly invoked his right to silence because of his 

actions as outlined in the officer's testimony. Rodgers clearly 

did not want to speak with the officer. However, we hold that the 

officer's testimony was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt 

for at least four reasons. First, the above-quoted testimony 

constituted the only reference to Rodgers' silence at trial. 

Second, the prosecutor never referred to Rodgers' silence in 

closing argument. Third, the officer testified principally as an 

expert to establish the street value of some of the cocaine at 

issue and to explain Rogers' use of various drug-related 

paraphernalia such as scales, mirrors, etc. (Tr. Vol. VIII at 

364). Fourth and finally, a substantial quantum of other evidence 

adduced at trial connected Rodgers to various drug transactions. 

We therefore conclude that the officer's impermissible reference to 

Rodgers' silence at trial was harmless error beyond a reasonable 

doubt because the jury would have returned a guilty verdict 

regardless, and the officer's impermissible reference to Rodgers' 

silence did not substantially contribute to the guilty verdict. 

(4) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support appellants' 

respective convictions. 

Both Rodgers and Powers argue that the evidence will not 

sustain their respective convictions. In evaluating the 

defendants' argument, we must view all the evidence and inferences 

drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the government, in the 

aggregate and not in an isolated fashion. United States v, 

Levario, 877 F.2d 1483, 1485 (10th Cir. 1989). We must then decide 

whether a reasonable juror could find the defendants guilty beyond 

10 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 10 
a reasonable doubt, yet must avoid assessing the credibility of the 

witnesses. Id. (citations omitted). 

(a) Rodgers. 

Rodgers principally complains that the testimony which most 

incriminated him -- that of informer Eddie Farner, and government 

witnesses Roger Smith and Keva Clayton -- was perjured. We hold 

that, while some of these witnesses may have testified 

inconsistently, these witnesses did not "knowingly and willfully 

[give] false testimony." United States v. Jones, 730 F.2d 593, 597 

(10th Cir. 1984). 

We observe that witness Eddie Farner in particular testified 

inconsistently. For example, Farner testified at the preliminary 

hearing that he injected a half-ounce of cocaine the day he 

recorded an incriminating conversation with Rodgers. (Tr. Vol. IV 

at 38.) At trial, Farner testified that he did not inject the 

cocaine on that day. (Tr. Vol. VII. at 55) • However, inconsistent 

testimony is not necessarily perjured testimony. Defense counsel 

clearly pointed out to the jury that Farner testified 

inconsistently and it was for the jury to scrutinize Farner's 

credibility. This same argument applies to the testimony of Roger 

Smith and Keva Clayton. As a result, we hold that a reasonable 

juror could have found defendant Rogers guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt and, therefore, that the evidence, albeit at times 

inconsistent, was sufficient to convict Rodgers. 

(b) Powers. 

Powers essentially argues that his role in the conspiracy was 

11 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 11 
that of a drug-addicted bystander who the government swept up in 

its zeal to overcharge. Powers' Brief at 16. We cannot agree, 

viewing the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in a light 

favorable to the government. The evidence adduced at trial 

suggested that Powers personally distributed cocaine to customers 

(Tr. Vol. VII at 19, 22; Tr. Vol. VIII at 172, 180, 184, 189-90, 

196-7, 238); that Powers allowed his residence to be used by the 

conspiracy (Tr. Vol. VII at 25-7, 108, 120; Tr. Vol. VIII at 183, 

197-8, 235, 337-39; Tr. Vol. IX at 463); and, that Powers himself 

acted in partnership with other members of the conspiracy (Tr. Vol. 

VII at 19-30, 35, 99, 114-15, 151; Tr. Vol. VIII at 196-7, 264-5; 

Tr. Vol. IX at 439, 492, 582). On this basis, we hold that the 

evidence was sufficient to convict Powers. 

(5) Whether the district court erred when it refused to give an 

instruction offered by Rodgers which defined the word 

"firearm." 

Regarding jury instructions, the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure require that a defendant must "state[ ] distinctly the 

matter to which (defendant] objects and the grounds of the 

objection." See Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 30. We review the record for 

plain error absent such specific objections, otherwise we review 

Rodgers' claim regarding a specific instruction de novo. United 

States v, Barbee, 968 F.2d 1026, 1033 (10th Cir. 1992). 

The record shows that defendant Rogers' attorney properly 

objected, stating that he believed that "there has been no evidence 

presented that the gun was designed to shoot or if it could shoot." 

(Tr. Vol X at 620-21). The district court denied Rodgers' 

12 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 12 
proffered instruction because it believed a description of the 

weapon at issue was unnecessary. (Tr. Vol. X at 620). 

Defendants may present instructions which relate to their 

theory of the defense, but such a presentation must be tempered 

against the trial court's discretion to frame the instructions as 

it sees fit. See~, Barbee, 968 F.2d at 1033; United States v. 

Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1412-13 (11th Cir. 1989). The 

record shows ample circumstantial evidence that Rodgers carried and 

used the firearm during his drug dealings. (Tr. Vols. VII, VIII at 

36-8, 121-24, 252-54, 294-5; Tr. Vol. IX at 485-86). Moreover, our 

earlier decisions hold that the trial court may deny defendant's 

request for a "firearm defined" instruction where the instruction 

seemed redundant or obvious given the evidence adduced at trial. 

See~, United States v. Bolton, 905 F.2d 319, 322 (10th Cir. 

1990) (court held that trial court did not err in failing to 

instruct jury on the definition of firearm because sawed-off 

shotgun was clearly a firearm, defendant never requested such an 

instruction nor did defendant object to the instructions given); 

United States v. Beebe, 467 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1972) (failure 

to instruct on meaning of term "firearm" was harmless error in 

light of evidence adduced at trial). Thus, we conclude that the 

trial court did not err in refusing to give Rodgers' firearm 

instruction. Even if the refusal constituted error, the error 

would be harmless in light of the substantial evidence identifying 

the firearm and connecting it to Rodgers' and Powers' drug-related 

activities. 

13 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 13 
(6) Whether appellants' conviction should be reversed because of 

cumulative error. 

Rogers and Powers argue that even if no individual error at 

trial warrants reversal, the cumulative effect of the errors does. 

"' The cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless errors 

has the potential to prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a 

single reversible error. ' The purpose of cumulative error analysis 

is to address that possibility." United States v. Caro, 962 F.2d 

1438, 1446 (10th Cir. 1992). No cumulative effect existed here 

because we have found only one actual harmless error, i.e., the 

officer who impermissibly commented regarding Rodgers' right to 

remain silent. 

(7) Whether the district court erred when it assessed Rodgers a 

$10,000 fine. 

The district court imposed a $10,000 fine upon defendant 

Rodgers which amounted to half of the minimum $20,000 fine mandated 

by the guidelines in this case. We review findings of fact 

regarding a defendant's ability to pay under the clearly erroneous 

standard of review. United States v. Washington-Williams, 945 F.2d 

325, 326 (10th Cir. 1991). The record indicates that the district 

court judge properly took into account the relevant factors for 

asssessing the fine such as the seriousness of the conviction, and 

the need to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment 

and to deter. See Section 5El.2(d) (1). (Tr. Vol. IX at 2-5). 

Thus, we hold that the trial court did not act clearly erroneously 

in this regard. 

(8) Whether the Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional under 

the Eight Amendment. 

14 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 14 
Powers asserts that the Sentencing Guidelines are 

unconstitutional because they amount to "cruel and unusual 

punishment" under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment 

requires that a sentence not be disproportionate to the severity of 

the crime or involve unnecessary infliction of pain. United States 

v. Youngpeter, 986 F.2d 349, 355 (10th Cir. 1993), citing, Solem v. 

Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). In Powers' case, he contends that 

his minimum mandatory sentence of 151 months imprisonment is 

disproportionate to the crime committed. Powers further contends 

that the guidelines are "cruel and unusual" because they strip the 

district court judge of "the inherent judicial power to be 

merciful." Powers' Brief at 20, 22. 

As noted in our recent decision in Youngpeter, we generally 

uphold sentences imposed within the range designated by the 

guidelines because "the determination of the proper penalty is a 

matter for the legislature. 111 986 F.2d at 355; .§ll A.lJiQ United 

1 We are sensitive to the fact that more than one district 

court has expressed substantial dissatisfaction with results 

reached via the guidelines. See~, United States v, 

Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1259 n.20 (10th Cir. 1991) (district 

court dissatisfied with harsh sentence imposed by use of 

guidelines and its apparent lack of discretion to alter harsh 

sentence); .l!ll particularly. FED. SENTENCING REP., Vol. 5, No. 4, 

Jan./Feb. 1993 at 187-205, 233-34 (various appellate and trial 

court judges discuss plethora of problems associated with current 

sentencing guidelines). 

We are also sensitive to the fact that mandatory minimum 

sentences have caused significant problems and are under attack 

as a result. See~, Rhonda McMillion, Hard 'l'ime: mandatory 

minimum sentencing comes under congressional scrutiny, A.B.A. J., 

March 1993 at 100; FED. SENTENCING REP., Vol 5, No. 4, Jan./Feb. 

1993 at 206-235 (various prosecutors, defense lawyers and 

probation officers express views pro and con regarding sentencing 

guidelines); Stephen Chapman, End of justice: small crime, big 

sentence, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Mar. 29, 1993, at A6. We nonetheless 

15 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 15 
states v. Colbert, 894 F.2d 373, 374-5 (10th Cir. 1990) (base 

offense level for defendant's crime not disproportionate to what 

Congress believed was appropriate for drug offenses). 

We further disagree that the guidelines violate the Eighth 

Amendment because they strip the trial judge of his or her 

"mercifulness," i.e., his or her discretion. See United States v. 

Jackson, 921 F.2d 985, 988-89 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining the 

balance in the guidelines between uniformity and proportionality 

and further explaining circumstances under which court may depart 

from guidelines). See also United States v. Hughes, 901 F.2d 830, 

832 (10th Cir. 1990). For these reasons, we conclude that Powers' 

sentence was not sufficiently disproportionate to constitute cruel 

and unusual punishment. 

(9) Whether the district court erred when it applied the 

guidelines. 

Powers appeals the district court's application of the 

guidelines twofold. First, Powers argues that he did not, in fact, 

possess a firearm for purposes of 2O1.l(b)(l) of the Sentencing 

Guidelines and, therefore, the trial court erred when it enhanced 

his sentencing level by two points. Second, Powers contends that 

he, in fact, accepted responsibility and, therefore, the trial 

court erred by not granting him a two point reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility pursuant to sections lBl. 3 (a) and 

3El.l(a) of the guidelines. 

We review the district court's factual findings under the 

reason that it is Congress who must address these problems, not 

this court. 

16 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 16 
clearly erroneous standard and will not reverse the district court 

unless the court's findings were without factual support in the 

record, or, alternatively, if we are left with the definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been made after reviewing all 

the evidence. United states v. Goddard. 929 F.2d 546, 548 (10th 

Cir. 1991). We review legal questions de novo while giving due 

deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to 

the facts. 18 u.s.c. S 3742(e); 929 F.2d at 548. 

First, regarding the firearms enhancement, section 

2D1.l(b) (1), Application Note 3 states that the court should apply 

the two-point upward adjustment "if the weapon was present, unless 

it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the 

offense." In United states v. Underwood, 982 F.2d 426, 428 (10th 

Cir. 1992), we held that the S 2D1.l(b) (1) enhancement for 

possessing a firearm was proper if the defendant knowingly 

possessed the firearm during the drug offense, or was criminally 

negligent in his unwitting possession, or if the defendant knew or 

could have reasonably foreseen a codefendant's possession of the 

firearm during the offense. ,lg. We also recognized that 

"reasonable foreseeability" may be inferred if a codefendant 

knowingly possessed the weapon. ,lg. 

In the instant case, the district court approved the probation 

officer's report and made it the basis for the court's findings. 

(Tr. Vol. XII at 8, 10, 18-9). The probation report found that 

Powers knew or could have reasonably foreseen Rogers' possession of 

various firearms based on the evidence presented at trial. The 

17 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 17 
record shows that Rodgers possessed a number of firearms. (Tr. 

Vol. VII at 36-38, 121-24, 139; Tr. Vol. VIII at 252-54, 267-8, 

294-5, 374-5; Tr. Vol. IX at 485-6). Additionally, Officer Mark 

Robinson testified that he discovered a .44 caliber revolver in a 

search of Powers' apartment. (Tr. Vol VIII at 294-5). We reason 

that, "(g]iven (Rogers'] knowing possession of firearms during the 

conspiracy, we can infer that (Rogers'] possession was reasonably 

foreseeable to (Powers]." 982 F.2d at 429. Thus, the district did 

not err when it found that Powers possessed a firearm for purposes 

of 2D1.l(b) (1) of the sentencing guidelines. 2 

Second, regarding acceptance of responsibility, we stated our 

standard of review as follows: 

Under United States Sentencing Guideline S 3El.1, a 

defendant may receive an offense level reduction of two 

levels if he "clearly demonstrates a recognition and 

affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his 

criminal conduct." The Sentencing Guidelines Commission 

has recognized that the sentencing judge is in a unique 

position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of 

responsibility, necessitating that his determination be 

entitled to great deference on review. u.s.s.G. S 3El.1, 

comment (n. 5). Hence, in reviewing the trial court's 

decision not to grant the defendant a downward departure 

under this guidelines, we apply the clearly erroneous 

standard. (citations omitted). 

The defendant bears the burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to a 

reduction of the offense level for acceptance of 

responsibility. (citations omitted). Combining this 

burden with the application of the clearly erroneous 

2 We observe that the "reasonably foreseeable" standard is a 

broad one which reflects the policy articulated in the guidelines 

at Section 2D1.l(b) (1), Application Note 3. That is, the court 

should enhance defendant's level by two points "unless it is 

clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the 

offense." The result under this standard is that one defendant's 

use of weapons in a drug conspiracy will be "reasonably 

foreseeable" to a co-conspirator in the majority of cases. 

18 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 18 
' standard, the trial court's assessment is entitled to 

great deference by the appellate court and will generally 

be sustained. (citations omitted). 

United States v. Ochoa-Fabian, 935 F.2d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 

1991). 

The district court adopted the probation officer's report 

which found that Powers admitted only partial responsibility for 

the crimes outlined in Count I of the indictment. (Tr. Vol. _ XII at 

16-17). The district court reasoned that Powers "was in a position 

to know a lot more than he said he knew" and, therefore, the 

district court decided Powers had not accepted responsibility 

pursuant to the guidelines. lg. We hold that the district court's 

decision in this regard was not clearly erroneous and must be 

sustained on appeal. 

AFFIRMED. 

19 

Entered for the Court: 

Clarence A. Brimmer, 

United States District 

Judge 

Appellate Case: 92-5049 Document: 010110115783 Date Filed: 05/26/1993 Page: 19