Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-70661/USCOURTS-ca9-07-70661-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric H. Holder Jr.
Respondent
Makda Fessehaie Teclezghi
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MAKDA FESSEHAIE TECLEZGHI, 

Petitioner,

No. 07-70661

v.  Agency No.

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney A075-618-966

General,

Respondent. 

MAKDA FESSEHAIE TECLEZGHI, 

Petitioner, No. 07-71463

v. Agency No.  A075-618-966 ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney

General, ORDER

Respondent. 

Filed January 4, 2011

Before: Betty B. Fletcher and Andrew J. Kleinfeld,

Circuit Judges, and Kevin Thomas Duffy,*

Senior District Judge.

Order;

Dissent by Judge Pregerson

*The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, Senior United States District

Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

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ORDER

Judges Kleinfeld and Duffy voted to deny the petition for

rehearing. Judge Fletcher voted to grant the petition for

rehearing. Judges Kleinfeld and Duffy recommend denying

the petition for rehearing en banc, and Judge Fletcher recommends granting the petition for rehearing en banc. 

The full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en

banc, and a judge of the court requested a vote on whether to

rehear the case en banc. The en banc call failed to receive a

majority of votes by active judges in favor of en banc consideration. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en

banc are DENIED.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc:

An attorney representing an asylum seeker has a duty to

investigate all grounds upon which an applicant may be entitled to relief. However, the panel majority in this case erroneously and absurdly concludes otherwise. The panel majority

holds that an attorney does not provide ineffective assistance

of counsel when she fails to inquire as to whether her female

client has suffered female genital mutilation when (1) nearly

90 percent of women in the client’s home country endure such

a brutal procedure, and (2) it is well-settled that female genital

mutilation constitutes persecution sufficient to warrant a grant

of asylum. 

Specifically, the panel majority tells us that an attorney

does not perform incompetently in these circumstances by

failing “to inquire of his or her own accord into the condition

of a client’s genitals . . . .” Teclezghi v. Holder, 378 F. App’x

292 TECLEZGHI v. HOLDER

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615, 618 (9th Cir. 2010). As Judge Betty Fletcher wrote in her

dissent, the panel majority elevates the “potential discomfort

a lawyer might feel in asking a woman whether she has suffered female genital mutilation over the lawyer’s duty to do

his or her job.” Id. at 619 (B. Fletcher, J., dissenting). Because

I believe the panel majority’s decision will have a detrimental

effect on asylum seekers and is completely contrary to our

precedent, I dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. 

Teclezghi timely applied for political asylum claiming persecution on account of religion. Her asylum application was

denied by the IJ, the BIA, and this court. See Teclezghi v.

Gonzalez, 187 F. App’x 749, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2006). Teclezghi filed a motion to reopen based on the ineffective assistance of her previous attorneys, who all failed to ask her

whether she had suffered female genital mutilation, a basis

upon which she could have applied for asylum. Teclezghi, 378

F. App’x at 616. The BIA denied Teclezghi’s motion to

reopen as untimely and this court dismissed her petition for

review. Id. at 616-17. We voted on whether to rehear this case

en banc, and a majority of the active judges of this court did

not vote for a rehearing en banc. 

I dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. The BIA

clearly erred in failing to equitably toll the deadline for

Teclezghi to file her motion to reopen until she definitively

discovered her prior attorneys’ ineffective assistance. See

Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007). The

panel majority’s conclusion that Teclezghi did not suffer ineffective assistance of counsel and the panel majority’s refusal

to equitably toll the deadline until Teclezghi discovered her

prior counsels’ incompetence is contrary to our precedent.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

“the petitioner must demonstrate first that counsel failed to

perform with sufficient competence, and, second, that she was

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prejudiced by counsel’s performance.” Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2005).

A. Failure to Perform with Sufficient Competence

Teclezghi’s attorneys undoubtedly failed to perform with

sufficient competence. The 2005 Department of State Report

on Human Rights practices in Eritrea, which was submitted to

the court, shows that nearly 90 percent of women in Eritrea

endure female genital mutilation. Teclezghi, 378 F. App’x at

619 (B. Fletcher, J., dissenting). The attorneys in this case

should have known of the “high probability that Teclezghi

would be eligible for asylum because she had undergone this

brutal procedure.” Id. However, all of Teclezghi’s attorneys

failed to inquire into and raise female genital mutilation as a

ground for asylum. This clearly falls below the standards of

competency. 

Nevertheless, the panel majority concludes that Teclezghi’s

attorneys did not fail to perform with sufficient competence

when they “failed to ask her an intensely personal question

and raise a claim for relief that [she] admittedly never mentioned to them.” Id. at 618. But this is to be expected. Most

women who have been sexually traumatized (because of sexual violence, forced abortions, or female genital mutilation)

“find it extremely difficult to talk about [their experiences].”

Nahla Valji, Lee Anne De La Hunt, Gender Guidelines for

Asylum Determination, THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN LEGAL

AID CLINIC, NATIONAL CONSORTIUM ON REFUGEE AFFAIRS, 23

(1999), available at www.web.net/ccr/safr.PDF. In a South

African case study, of the 678 female client files reviewed,

“none mentioned [Female Genital Cutting] as a reason for

seeking asylum.” Lindsay M. Harris, Untold Stories: Gender

Related Persecution and Asylum in South Africa, 15 MICH. J.

GENDER & L. 291, 314 (2009). Harris also interviewed eighteen women who had experienced some form of genderrelated persecution and “[s]everal women . . . failed to realize

that such disclosure was necessary to obtain refugee status.”

294 TECLEZGHI v. HOLDER

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Id. at 334. Some women did not disclose details of their

gender-related persecution “because they were not asked

questions to elicit such information” and “did not understand

the importance of disclosing details of their persecution.” Id.

Contrary to the panel majority’s view, immigration attorneys do have a duty to identify all forms of relief that are

available to their clients, including female genital mutilation.

In turn, clients should be able to rely on their attorneys to

competently perform this duty. Teclezghi had no reason to

know that her female genital mutilation would qualify as a

basis of asylum in the United States. The panel majority, however, erroneously places the burden on the asylum seeker to

relay all types of personal facts to her attorney, regardless of

whether the asylum seeker knows the facts are relevant to her

asylum claim. Whereas this court has recognized that the burden of inquiry and investigation of potential forms of immigration relief is on the attorney, see Mohammed, 400 F.3d at

792 n.7, the panel majority here incorrectly shifted the burden

of inquiry to the asylum seeker. 

Furthermore, the panel majority’s holding runs contrary to

the ethical standards of competence and diligence that govern

all attorney conduct. The advisory committee notes for Rule

1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct explain that

“competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry

into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem . . . .” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5

(2002). The panel majority forgives attorneys for failing to

inquire about or investigate relevant country conditions that

have a 90 percent likelihood of applying to their clients’

claims for political asylum. This abrogates the attorney’s

responsibility to inquire about and analyze the factual and

legal elements relevant to her client’s claim. Id. This is not

“competent handling” and would likely lead to unfair and

unfortunate results in asylum proceedings.

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B. Prejudice

“[P]rejudice results when the performance of counsel was

so inadequate that it may have affected the outcome of the

proceedings.” Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 793-94 (emphasis in

original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Teclezghi certainly suffered prejudice because of her attorneys’ inadequate performances. 

We have recognized that female genital mutilation is a

ground for asylum in the United States. See In re Kasinga, 21

I. & N. Dec. 357, 361 (BIA 1996); Benyamin v. Holder, 579

F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2009); Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 795-96;

Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (en

banc). In fact, we found in Mohammed that a woman whose

attorney failed to present evidence that she had suffered

female genital mutilation in the past was prejudiced by her

attorney’s ineffective assistance. 400 F.3d at 801-03. Had

Teclezghi’s prior attorneys told her that female genital mutilation is a ground for asylum in the United States and asked her

whether she had suffered this brutal experience, she undoubtedly would have told them that she had. Thus, I believe the

outcome would have been different. At the very least, Teclezghi has satisfied her burden of showing that the outcome may

have been different. Id. at 793-94. Therefore, Teclezghi was

prejudiced by her attorneys’ failure to perform with sufficient

competence and should have prevailed on her ineffective

assistance of counsel claim.

II. Equitable Tolling

Because Teclezghi suffered ineffective assistance of counsel, the panel majority should have tolled the deadline to file

her motion to reopen until she definitively discovered her

prior counsels’ ineffective assistance. See Singh, 491 F.3d at

1096. The panel majority’s refusal to toll the deadline conflicts with our precedent in Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889

(9th Cir. 2003) and Wenqin Sun v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 802

296 TECLEZGHI v. HOLDER

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(9th Cir. 2009). The panel majority correctly quoted Iturribarria for the rule that equitable tolling of deadlines is appropriate when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of

“deception, fraud, or error.” 321 F.3d at 897, see Teclezghi,

378 F. App’x at 618. However, the panel majority only discusses cases of attorney deception and fraud, but not cases

involving attorney error, such as in Wenqin Sun. Id. In Wenqin Sun, we found that a lawyer’s innocent legal error may

equitably toll a motion to reopen deadline. 555 F.3d at 805-

06. Specifically, this court stated that “equitable tolling . . .

applies when a petitioner acts promptly after discovering

counsel’s error.” Id. In this case, Teclezghi’s attorneys’ failure to inquire about whether she had suffered female genital

mutilation were errors. Thus, the panel majority should have

equitably tolled her deadline for filing a motion to reopen and

determined whether Teclezghi acted promptly after discovering her previous counsels’ errors.

III. Conclusion

The panel majority fails to recognize that most political

asylum applications are intensely personal, often painful, and

may involve questions of sexual torture, rape, and humiliation. It is entirely expected that clients may not want to readily reveal such circumstances to their attorneys. It is precisely

because the subject matter of an asylum claim based on

female genital mutilation is so intensely personal and our

immigration system so complex that an attorney has a special

responsibility to adequately explain to her female clients their

rights to asylum and diligently investigate all grounds for

relief. The panel majority’s decision allowing attorneys to

forego investigating intensely personal facts in an asylum

claim diminishes the attorney’s role in the asylum process.

Our precedent tells us that competent attorney performance

requires more. I believe that our court should instill a greater

sense of professional responsibility in attorneys who represent

asylum seekers. Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of

rehearing en banc.

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