Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02734/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02734-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chandar Oum
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHANDAR OUM,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-2734-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying applications for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act 

(“Act”), respectively. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born September 20, 1971, applied on August 18, 2011 for DIB and SSI, alleging 

disability beginning October 1, 2009. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 156-67. Plaintiff alleged 

he was unable to work due to diabetes, high blood pressure, and nerve damage. AT 177. In a 

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decision dated April 17, 2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.1 AT 11-21. 

The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements for the 

Social Security Act through December 31, 2015.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since October 1, 2009, the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following medically severe combination of 

impairments: insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, diabetic 

peripheral neuropathy of the extremities, hypertension, bilateral 

carpal tunnel syndrome, and exogenous overweight status/obesity.

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 

burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform between 

light and sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b): the claimant has the ability to lift and/or carry 20 

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; the claimant cannot 

perform climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, the claimant 

cannot crawl, but can occasionally feel with the bilateral upper 

extremities; and the claimant must avoid concentrated exposure, 

i.e., intense, continuous, intractable, unremitting exposure, to 

hazard and extremely loud noise.

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a 

case manager and property manager. This work does not require 

the performance of work-related activities precluded by the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity.

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from October 1, 2009, through the date of this 

decision.

AT 13-21. 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) improperly discounted the opinion of Dr. Chan, one of plaintiff’s treating 

physicians, without articulating specific and legitimate reasons in support of that determination; 

and (2) improperly found that plaintiff could perform past relevant work at step four based on a 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination that did not take into account all of plaintiff’s 

impairments.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

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ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ Articulated Proper Reasons for Discounting Dr. Chan’s Opinion

First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by discounting the opinion of Dr. Chan, one of 

plaintiff’s treating physicians, without providing specific and legitimate reasons for doing so.

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a 

greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

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contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In 

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical 

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, 

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a 

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

Here, the record contains treating records from Dr. Chan from between July 2011 and July 

2012. On July 3, 2012, Dr. Chan completed a one-page “physical capacities evaluation” for 

plaintiff. AT 417. Therein, she diagnosed plaintiff with severe diabetic polyneuropathy and 

bilateral moderate-to-severe carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. Based on these diagnoses and her 

clinical evaluations of plaintiff, Dr. Chan opined that plaintiff could sit for up to two hours at a 

time and stand and walk for up to one hour at a time. Id. She further opined that plaintiff could 

stand, sit, and walk for up to one hour total in an eight-hour workday. Id. She also opined that 

plaintiff could occasionally lift up to 20 pounds and carry up to 10 pounds. Id. Furthermore, she 

determined that plaintiff could not engage in any repetitive grasping, fine manipulation, or 

pushing and pulling of controls with his hands, and could not use his feet for repetitive 

movements such as using leg controls. Id. Dr. Chan also found that plaintiff was limited to 

occasional bending, squatting, crawling, and reaching, and could not engage in any climbing. Id. 

Finally, she opined that plaintiff had a mild restriction from activities involving exposure to 

marked changes to temperature and humidity. Id.

The ALJ gave the following rationale in support of his decision to discount Dr. Chan’s 

treating opinion:

I discount Dr. Chan’s opinion because her own notes do not comport with the 

medical source statement. For instance, the claimant testified that over the course 

of an eight-hour day he could stand 1.5 hours, which is greater than Dr. Chan’s 

assessment. Moreover, Dr. Chan’s assessment regarding sitting is internally 

inconsistent. Dr. Chan stated that the claimant could sit for two hours at a time but 

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could sit only one hour total during an eight-hour workday. The relatively mild 

symptoms at the July 2011 neurology consult and objective evidence such as 5/5 

motor strength throughout except 4/5 strength in the toe extensors and normal gait 

with good arm swing are not consistent with the extremely restrictive assessment 

Dr. Chan gave. Dr. Chan’s opinion is also not consistent with the consultative 

examiner’s notation that the claimant walked into the examination room without 

assistance or difficulty, was able to transfer from a chair to the examination table, 

and sat comfortably. Dr. Chan opined that the claimant could not drive an 

automobile. However, the claimant stated that he rarely drove. Thus, the 

claimant’s statements show that the claimant is in fact more capable than Dr. Chan 

opined. For the above reasons, Dr. Chan’s opinion is not fully persuasive.

AT 19 (citations to the record omitted). Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, this rationale contained

multiple specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Chan’s opinion that were supported 

by substantial evidence in the record.2

First, the ALJ determined that Dr. Chan’s own objective medical findings in her treatment 

notes indicated that plaintiff’s physical impairments imposed functional limitations less extreme 

than those Dr. Chan opined. Indeed, as the ALJ noted, Dr. Chan’s treating records show that 

plaintiff had a normal gait with good arm swing and full 5/5 motor strength in all of his 

extremities, with the exception of 4/5 strength in his toe extensors, throughout the course of his 

time under Dr. Chan’s treatment. AT 19, 351, 355, 388, 421, 424. Dr. Chan also noted during 

each examination that plaintiff experienced reduced light touch, pin prick, and temperature

sensitivities up to the mid shin on his legs and up to the mid forearm in his arms, but generally 

classified these sensory impairments as “mild.” AT 351, 368, 388, 421, 424. Dr. Chan further 

found that plaintiff had a “mild unsteady” Romberg’s sign, but normal coordination testing. Id. 

While Dr. Chan noted on July 2, 2012 that an electrodiagnostic study provided evidence 

“consistent with . . . right moderate to severe and left moderate carpal tunnel syndrome,” she also 

noted that plaintiff’s “hand therapy helped some” and that plaintiff “has been stable without new 

focal or neurological complains [sic] or symptoms.” AT 423. In short, the ALJ’s determination 

that Dr. Chan’s own treatment records did not support her opinion that plaintiff had extreme 

 

2 Because Dr. Chan’s opinion was contradicted by the opinions of plaintiff’s other physicians, 

particularly, the opinion of examining physician Dr. Schwartz, the ALJ was required to provide 

“specific and legitimate” reasons in support of his decision to discount Dr. Chan’s opinion. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.

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limitations in his ability to perform tasks such as standing, walking, sitting, grasping, and using 

foot and hand controls was a specific and legitimate reason for discounting Dr. Chan’s opinion

that was supported by substantial evidence from the record. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 

(holding that incongruities between a treating physician’s objective medical findings and that 

physician’s opinion constitutes a specific and legitimate reason for an ALJ to reject that 

physician’s opinion); see also Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856 (holding that the ALJ properly discounted 

a treating physician’s functional recommendations that “were so extreme as to be implausible and 

were not supported by any findings made by any doctor,” including the treating physician’s own 

findings). 

Furthermore, the ALJ highlighted the fact that Dr. Chan provided incongruous opinions 

that plaintiff could sit for two hours at a time, but could only sit for a total of one hour over the 

course of an eight-hour workday in support of his decision to assign Dr. Chan’s opinion lesser 

weight. Plaintiff suggests that this inconsistency was likely an oversight on Dr. Chan’s part and 

argues that this apparent discrepancy required the ALJ to re-contact Dr. Chan to obtain 

clarification of the basis for these opinions. However, the record before the ALJ already 

contained all of Dr. Chan’s treating notes from throughout the relevant period that provided the 

underlying basis for Dr. Chan’s opinion. Moreover, the ALJ properly considered this 

contradiction in Dr. Chan’s opinion and reasonably determined that it supported his determination 

that Dr. Chan’s opinion was entitled to reduced weight. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039-40 (“The 

ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for 

resolving ambiguities.”). 

The ALJ also determined that Dr. Chan’s opinion was entitled to only reduced weight 

because its functional findings conflicted with the clinical findings of Dr. Schwartz, an examining 

physician. Specifically, the ALJ cited to Dr. Schwartz’s statements that plaintiff was able to walk

into the examination room without assistance or difficulty, transfer from a chair to the 

examination table, and sit comfortably throughout the course of the examination. AT 19 (citing 

AT 372-76). Furthermore, Dr. Schwartz opined, on the basis of his own independent clinical 

findings, that plaintiff’s impairments caused him physical limitations far less severe than those 

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opined by Dr. Chan. AT 376. Specifically, Dr. Schwartz opined that plaintiff’s limitations 

permitted him to sit and stand for a maximum of four hours in an eight-hour workday, and 

imposed no limitations on his ability to sit and ambulate without assistance. Id. He also opined 

that the impairments to plaintiff’s upper and lower extremities limited him to activities involving 

occasional feeling and from working at heights. Id. Given the substantial medical evidence in 

the record indicating that plaintiff suffered from generally mild arm and leg impairments that 

were stable throughout the relevant period, e.g., AT 351, 355, 366, 388, 421, the ALJ’s reliance 

on the more moderate clinical findings of Dr. Schwartz in support of discounting Dr. Chan’s 

opinion was proper. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. 

The ALJ also found Dr. Chan’s opinion that plaintiff could not drive an automobile to be 

more restrictive than, and at odds with, plaintiff’s own statement that he rarely drove.3 Plaintiff 

argues that Dr. Chan never opined that plaintiff could not drive an automobile, therefore 

rendering this reason for discounting Dr. Chan’s opinion improper. However, Dr. Chan did opine 

that plaintiff could not engage in activities that required repetitive foot movements such as using 

foot-based controls. AT 417. From this determination, the ALJ could reasonably infer that the 

limitations opined by Dr. Chan would completely restrict plaintiff from operating an automobile. 

See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e must uphold the ALJ’s 

findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”). Furthermore, 

the ALJ also found that plaintiff’s statement that he could stand for “probably [an] hour and a 

half” total over the course of an eight-hour workday, AT 50, indicated that plaintiff himself 

believed he had a standing limitation less severe than that opined by Dr. Chan. Plaintiff argues 

that plaintiff’s self-assessment was largely consistent with Dr. Chan’s opinion that plaintiff could 

stand for only one hour total over the course of a standard workday because plaintiff also 

 

3 During the administrative hearing plaintiff testified that he could not drive due to his physical 

impairments, but earlier wrote in his adult function report that he rarely drove. AT 46, 206. 

Plaintiff also stated that he “rarely drives” to Dr. Schwartz during his consultative examination on 

January 6, 2012. AT 373. The ALJ noted this discrepancy between plaintiff’s prior statements 

and his hearing testimony and found plaintiff’s hearing testimony not credible. AT 19. Plaintiff 

does not challenge the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. Accordingly, the court defers to 

the ALJ’s credibility conclusions.

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estimated that he could only stand for 10 to 15 minutes at a time and qualified his statement 

regarding the total amount of time he could stand with the word “probably.” However, this 

argument does not negate the fact that the ALJ’s resolution of the apparent conflict between 

plaintiff’s subjective complaints and Dr. Chan’s opinion was reasonable. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 

1111. 

For the reasons discussed above, the ALJ provided multiple specific and legitimate 

reasons for discounting Dr. Chan’s opinion that were all supported by substantial evidence from 

the record. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding that Dr. Chan’s opinion was entitled to 

reduced weight when determining plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.

B. The ALJ Made a Proper Step Four Determination

Next, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step four by not including the limitations 

opined by Dr. Chan in his RFC determination on which his step four determination that plaintiff 

could perform past relevant work was based. However, for the reasons stated above, the ALJ 

properly discounted Dr. Chan’s opinion and substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that 

the extreme limitations opined by Dr. Chan were not supported by the rest of the record. The 

ALJ was not required to adopt the limitations opined by Dr. Chan. Moreover, the limitations 

contained in the ALJ’s RFC determination were supported by substantial evidence from the 

record. Indeed, the limitations included in the ALJ’s RFC determination largely tracked the 

physical limitations found in Dr. Schwartz’s opinion limiting plaintiff to light work, which, as 

discussed above, was generally supported by the record, except the ALJ found plaintiff to be 

somewhat more limited in his lifting and carrying abilities based on the evidence developed after 

Dr. Schwartz’s opinion. AT 18. 

The ALJ based his step four determination that plaintiff could perform his past relevant 

work as a case manager and property manager on his well-reasoned RFC conclusion. Given the 

limitations contained in the RFC determination, the ALJ was correct to determine that plaintiff 

was capable of performing his past work as a case manager and property manager as those jobs 

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are defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”).

4

 See DOT 195.107-010, 1991 WL 

671569 (caseworker); DOT 186.167-018, 1991 WL 671326 (property manager). Accordingly, 

the ALJ did not err in determining that plaintiff could perform past relevant work at step four, 

therefore making him not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

5

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is denied;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

Dated: November 9, 2015

11 oum2734.ss

 

4

The United States Dept. of Labor, Employment & Training Admin., Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles (4th ed. 1991), is routinely relied on by the SSA “in determining the skill level of a 

claimant’s past work, and in evaluating whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the 

national economy.” Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1990). The DOT classifies 

jobs by their exertional and skill requirements. The DOT is a primary source of reliable job 

information for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1).

5 While the ALJ could have concluded that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the 

Social Security Act at step four after determining that plaintiff was capable of performing past 

relevant work, he continued to step five of the sequential analysis and determined that there were 

other jobs existing in the national economy that plaintiff could perform given his RFC. AT 20-

21. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in this determination because he based it solely on the 

Medical Vocational Guidelines even though they did not accurately and completely describe 

plaintiff’s limitations, thus requiring the testimony of a vocational expert. While plaintiff’s 

argument is mooted by the fact that the ALJ properly found plaintiff not disabled at step four, the 

court notes that plaintiff provides no explanation as to how the ALJ’s RFC determination 

contained the sort of non-exertional limitations that would require the ALJ to consult with a 

vocational expert at step five. See Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007).

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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