Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03087/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03087-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Colonel Sioban J. Ledwith
Appellee
Barry N. Nixon
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

BARRY N. NIXON, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

COLONEL SIOBAN J. LEDWITH, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 15-3087 

(D.C. No. 5:14-CV-03007-RDR) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before GORSUCH, MATHESON, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Barry N. Nixon appeals from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 

habeas petition.1

 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Mr. Nixon does not need a certificate of appealability to appeal from the 

district court’s decision. See Knighten v. Commandant, 142 F. App’x 348, 349 

(10th Cir. 2005). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

January 6, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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I. Procedural Background 

Mr. Nixon was an active duty Air Force Major when he was charged with two 

specifications (counts) of indecent acts with a minor, one specification of assault with 

intent to commit rape, one specification of simple assault, and one specification of 

rape. With the exception of the simple assault specification, which involved his wife, 

Mr. Nixon’s youngest daughter was the alleged victim. He pled guilty to all of the 

specifications, except he pled not guilty to the rape, and he pled guilty by exceptions 

and substitutions to the assault with intent to commit rape. He was tried and 

convicted by a general court-martial for the rape charge and sentenced to eighteen 

years of confinement. 

Before trial, Mr. Nixon filed a motion in limine to exclude victim testimony by 

his two older daughters regarding uncharged prior acts he allegedly committed 

against them.2

 After considering the evidence, briefs, and arguments from both sides, 

the military judge denied the motion and permitted the testimony under Military 

Rules of Evidence 414 to show Mr. Nixon’s predisposition to commit the charged 

acts against his youngest daughter. 

After he was convicted, Mr. Nixon appealed to the Air Force Court of 

Criminal Appeals (AFCCA), arguing, among other things, that the military judge 

abused her discretion in admitting the prior-acts evidence. He argued the evidence 

 2

 The alleged acts of molestation against Mr. Nixon’s two older daughters were 

barred from prosecution by the statute of limitations. 

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was not relevant to the rape charge because his two older daughters had never 

testified to any penetration. Mr. Nixon disputed that he had ever penetrated his 

youngest daughter, which was a necessary finding to prove the rape charge. 

 The AFCCA concluded the military judge had not abused her discretion in 

denying the motion in limine and admitting the prior-acts testimony. That court 

determined that the military judge had made the required threshold findings to admit the 

evidence under Mil. R. Evid. 4143

 and noted that “the testimony of [the older daughters] 

centered on acts of a similar nature.” Id. at 219. The AFCCA further noted that “[o]ur 

superior court has stated that it has never required the exact same acts of sexual 

molestation for the admission of evidence under M.R.E. 414.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 In response to Mr. Nixon’s argument that the military judge’s balancing analysis 

under Mil. R. Evid. 4034

 was inadequate, the AFCCA found “that the military judge 

adequately considered the potential for undue prejudice that is inevitably present when 

 3

 Rule 414(a) of the Military Rules of Evidence states: “In a court-martial 

proceeding in which an accused is charged with an act of child molestation, the 

military judge may admit evidence that the accused committed any other offense of 

child molestation. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is 

relevant.” This language is substantially similar to Rule 414(a) of the Federal Rules 

of Evidence. 

4

 Rule 403 of the Military Rules of Evidence states: “The military judge may 

exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 

danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 

misleading the members, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 

cumulative evidence.” This language is substantially similar to Rule 403 of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence. 

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dealing with propensity evidence.” Id. at 220 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

AFCCA “note[d] that the military judge did not specifically articulate that she balanced 

the probative value of the evidence against its unfair prejudicial value when finding the 

evidence admissible,” and therefore it would give her ruling less deference. Id. But it 

concluded that “her written ruling sufficiently shows that she conducted the balancing 

test and considered the Wright factors.”5

 Id. 

Mr. Nixon petitioned for review of the AFCCA’s decision with the Court of 

Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). In his petition for review, he again 

challenged the admission of the prior-acts testimony, in addition to three other issues. 

The CAAF denied review. Mr. Nixon then filed a motion asking the CAAF to 

reconsider its denial, arguing solely about the prior-acts-testimony issue. The CAAF 

denied the motion for reconsideration. 

 5

 In Wright, the military superior court explained that “Federal courts . . . have 

uniformly upheld the [new rules of evidence,]” including Rule 414, “while 

emphasizing the importance of a Rule 403 balancing test.” United States v. Wright, 

53 M.J. 476, 482 (C.A.A.F. 2000). That court further explained that in conducting 

the Rule 403 balancing test, military courts should consider the following factors: 

[1] Strength of proof of prior act . . . ; [2] probative weight of evidence; 

[3] potential for less prejudicial evidence; [4] distraction of fact finder; 

[5] time needed for proof of prior conduct[;] . . . [6] temporal proximity; 

[7] frequency of the acts; [8] presence or lack of intervening circumstances; 

and [9] relationship between the parties. 

Id. 

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Mr. Nixon filed the underlying § 2241 petition after the CAAF denied review. 

He was represented by a military attorney and a civilian attorney throughout his 

military proceedings, but he filed his § 2241 petition pro se. The district court denied 

the petition, and Mr. Nixon now appeals from that decision. His civilian attorney 

from the military proceedings is representing him on appeal. 

II. Federal Habeas Review of Military Proceedings 

“[O]ur review of court-martial proceedings is very limited.” Thomas v. U.S. 

Disciplinary Barracks, 625 F.3d 667, 670 (10th Cir. 2010). As the Supreme Court 

has explained, “[m]ilitary law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate 

from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment,” and “Congress has 

taken great care both to define the rights of those subject to military law, and provide 

a complete system of review within the military system to secure those rights.” 

Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). The Court further explained: 

The military courts, like the state courts, have the same responsibilities as 

do the federal courts to protect a person from a violation of his 

constitutional rights. In military habeas corpus cases, even more than in 

state habeas corpus cases, it would be in disregard of the statutory scheme 

if the federal civil courts failed to take account of the prior proceedings—of 

the fair determinations of the military tribunals after all military remedies 

have been exhausted. 

Id. at 142. The Court therefore held that “when a military decision has dealt fully and 

fairly with an allegation raised in [a habeas] application, it is not open to a federal civil 

court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence.” Id. Instead, “[i]t is the limited 

function of the civil courts to determine whether the military have given fair 

consideration to [the claims raised for federal habeas review].” Id. at 144. 

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 We review de novo the district court’s denial of a habeas petition. Thomas, 

625 F.3d at 670. The following considerations guide our review of the district court’s 

decision. If a claim brought in a federal habeas petition was not presented previously to 

the military courts, then the district court must deem it waived. Roberts v. Callahan,

321 F.3d 994, 995 (10th Cir. 2003). If the claim was presented to the military courts, 

then the district court should consider whether those courts “fully and fairly reviewed” 

the claim. See id. If they did so, then the district court must not review the claim. See id. 

If the claim was presented to the military courts, but was not given full and fair 

consideration, then “the scope of review by the federal civil court expand[s].” Lips v. 

Commandant, 997 F.2d 808, 811 (10th Cir. 1993). 

III. Discussion 

Mr. Nixon brought three claims in his habeas petition. His first claim stated: 

Petitioner was denied his Constitutional right to due process, his Sixth 

Amendment right to confrontation and to be appraised of all charges 

against him when the Military Judge and the [AFCCA] permitted both 

unchargeable conduct and uncharged misconduct using M.R.E. 414 without 

establishing either relevance or conducting the necessary balancing tests for 

prejudice, a requirement of both M.R.E. 414 and M.R.E. 403. 

Aplt. App. at 257. 

 His second claim stated: “The Military Judge failed to properly instruct and limit 

the jury members on the reasons for admission of unchargeable conduct and uncharged 

misconduct, [and] its relevance given the Petitioner’s guilty pleas. Thus, the prosecution 

was allowed to essentially try and sentence Petitioner as though there were three victims, 

not one.” Id. at 258. 

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 His third claim stated: “The [CAAF] and the [AFCCA] were substantially misled 

by the Government’s response brief containing material misstatement of facts that would 

have, if true, answered the M.R.E. 414’s requirement for relevance to the contested rape 

charge.” Id. 

 The district court determined that the military courts had given full and fair 

consideration to all of the claims and therefore Mr. Nixon was not entitled to habeas 

relief. 

A. Waived Claims

We affirm the district court’s denial of claims two and three because 

Mr. Nixon waived review. 

As to the second claim, Mr. Nixon does not raise any argument in his appellate 

opening brief regarding the district court’s determination that the military judge did 

not properly instruct the jury regarding the admission of the prior-acts testimony. 

His failure to address this claim in his opening brief waives any review of the district 

court’s ruling. See Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006). 

We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief as to this claim. 

As to the third claim, Mr. Nixon argued that the government’s response brief 

in his appeal before the AFCCA contained material misstatements of fact and 

substantially misled the AFCCA and the CAAF. In its response to the habeas 

petition, the government interpreted this argument “as a renewed challenge to the 

ruling of the military judge that the evidence offered under MRE 414 was 

admissible.” Aplt. App. at 10. The district court agreed with that construction. The 

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court then determined the issue had been fully and fairly considered and therefore 

Mr. Nixon was not entitled to habeas relief. 

We agree with the district court’s result, but not its reasoning. We disagree 

that this claim is a renewed challenge to the admissibility of the prior-acts evidence. 

Instead, it is a separate challenge to the AFCCA’s decision based on the impact of the 

government’s alleged misrepresentation about the evidence to that court. 

We may affirm on an alternative ground when “there is a record sufficient to 

permit conclusions of law.” Ashby v. McKenna, 331 F.3d 1148, 1151 (10th Cir. 

2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The record here supports the legal 

conclusion that Mr. Nixon did not present this claim to the military courts and 

therefore it must be deemed waived. See Roberts, 321 F.3d at 995. 

In its response to Mr. Nixon’s opening brief on appeal to the AFCCA, the 

government argued that the prior-acts testimony was properly admitted because 

“[w]hen a father digitally penetrates the vagina of his daughters, that has a clear and 

obvious connection to his penile penetration of another daughter.” Aplt. App. at 148. 

In his reply, Mr. Nixon countered the government’s relevance argument: “Arguing 

relevance, [the] Government’s Answer inaccurately represents to this Court that 

[Mr. Nixon] digitally penetrated [one of his older daughters].” Id. at 199. As he 

explained, “[t]here is no evidence of any penetration, digital or penile, of anyone 

other than [his youngest daughter].” Id. He further noted that “the military judge 

herself obviously did not think there was any evidence of penetration of anybody 

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other than [his youngest daughter], making no mention of penetration in her findings 

and ruling on the question.” Id. at 201. 

In its decision, the AFCCA summarized the testimony of Mr. Nixon’s two 

older daughters and did not mention any testimony regarding penetration. See id. at 

218. In discussing the arguments the parties raised on appeal, the AFCCA did note: 

“The Government argues that when a father digitally penetrates the vagina of one 

daughter, that incident has a clear and obvious connection to his penile penetration of 

another daughter.” Id. at 219. 

In his habeas petition, Mr. Nixon complained that although he brought the 

government’s misstatements to the attention of the AFCCA, that court repeated the 

misstatement of the evidence and therefore it was misled in its ruling. He further 

argued that the CAAF was misled because it denied review of his case. 

On appeal to this court, Mr. Nixon argues that the government’s 

misrepresentation in its response brief to the AFCCA “fatally infected the appellate 

record.” Aplt. Br. at 23. He contends the AFCCA should have “deliver[ed] [a] 

vigorous judicial rebuke” to the government, but instead the court “made no mention 

of the fact that the government’s relevance ‘argument’ was premised upon a 

falsehood, that the falsehood was specifically pointed out in [Mr. Nixon’s] reply 

brief, and failed to even mention the question in its opinion.” Id. at 24-25. 

Mr. Nixon failed to exhaust this claim. Like a state prisoner, a military 

prisoner must fully exhaust his claims in the military courts before raising a claim on 

federal habeas review. See McKinney v. Warden, 273 F.2d 643, 644 (10th Cir. 1959) 

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(“If an available contention is not asserted at the court-martial trial or within the 

military structure, it may not thereafter be raised on habeas corpus.”); see also 

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (explaining that state prisoners 

seeking federal habeas relief must “give the state courts one full opportunity to 

resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s 

established appellate review process,” which includes a petition for discretionary 

review to the state supreme court). 

To preserve this claim for habeas review, Mr. Nixon needed to raise it in his 

petition to the CAAF. See Roberts, 321 F.3d at 995 (“[I]f a ground for relief was not 

raised in the military courts, then the district court must deem that ground waived.”). 

As with unexhausted state habeas claims, we may review a claim that was not 

presented to the military courts if the military prisoner shows both “cause excusing 

the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the error.” Lips, 997 F.2d 

at 812. But nothing in the record before us indicates there was any cause for 

Mr. Nixon’s procedural default. He had the opportunity to raise the issue in his 

petition to the CAAF and failed to do so, see Aplt. App. at 263 (listing four issues 

raised in his CAAF petition); Aplee. Supp. App. at 1-2 (same).6

 We therefore deem 

this claim waived. See Roberts, 321 F.3d at 995. 

 6

 In Mr. Nixon’s petition for review to the CAAF, he spends many pages 

arguing about the admissibility of his older daughters’ testimony and how it was not 

relevant, but he never mentions the argument brought in his habeas petition—that the 

government’s misrepresentation that he had penetrated one of his older daughters 

when in fact no such testimony had been given misled the AFCCA. See Dist. Ct. 

(continued) 

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B. Prior-Acts Evidence

We now turn to Mr. Nixon’s first habeas claim, which challenged the 

admissibility of his older daughters’ prior-acts testimony. This claim has been fully 

exhausted in the military courts. See Aplt. App. at 217 (noting issue raised in 

pre-trial motion in limine to military judge); id. (noting issue raised on appeal to 

AFCCA); id. at 263 (noting issue raised in CAAF petition). 

We must therefore decide whether the district court properly determined that 

the military courts fully and fairly reviewed the claim. In doing so, the most 

important factor to consider is whether the military courts “failed to give adequate 

 

Doc. 1-1 at 10-29. He does discuss the evidence regarding penetration but never 

mentions that the government misrepresented this evidence to the AFCCA. See, e.g,

id. at 13 (asserting that his older daughters’ testimony was not relevant and should 

not have been admitted because “[t]he question of whether [Mr. Nixon] ever 

penetrated or attempted to penetrate [his youngest daughter] was the only relevant 

factual issue in contention at trial.”); id. (explaining that the two older daughters 

“provided no evidence that Major Nixon ever penetrated or even attempted to 

penetrate them in any way.”). 

Also, in Mr. Nixon’s reply brief to his habeas petition, he states that he agrees 

with the government “that this is not a new issue as [he] raised the issue of factual 

untruths in his [AFCCA] reply to the Government’s response.” Id., Doc. 9 at 3. But 

then he goes on to state: “However, the effect on the AFCCA’s review and the 

CAAF’s denial of review is brought up here for the first time because this is the first 

time it could have been raised.” Id. (emphasis added). This is essentially a 

concession that he did not exhaust his military remedies because it is not accurate 

that his habeas petition is the first time the issue could have been raised—it could 

have and should have been raised in his petition for review to the CAAF. 

 Because Mr. Nixon’s appendix did not include the documents cited above, we 

refer to them by their district court docket number. “These documents are properly 

part of the record on appeal because they were filed in the district court.” United 

States v. Williams, 511 F.3d 1044, 1046 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2007). 

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consideration to the issues involved or failed to apply proper legal standards.” 

Thomas, 625 F.3d at 671. 

The district court determined that the military courts “conducted a thorough 

review of the claim and determined the evidence was properly admitted.” Aplt. App. 

at 9. The court then quoted extensively from the AFCCA’s decision. Id. 

In his briefing before this court, Mr. Nixon does not show that the district 

court erred in determining that the military courts fully and fairly reviewed his claim. 

He focuses almost exclusively on arguing the merits of his claim—asserting that the 

military judge abused her discretion in admitting the prior-acts evidence and that the 

AFCCA erred in upholding the military judge’s decision. See Aplt. Br. at 11-22. But 

federal habeas courts do not reach the merits of a claim if it was fully and fairly 

considered by the military courts. See Roberts, 321 F.3d at 995. 

Mr. Nixon addresses whether there was a full and fair review in two 

paragraphs in the argument section for his first issue on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 

15-16. He asserts that the district court “was satisfied that there was a full and fair 

review merely because the AFCCA mentioned the questioned of relevance.” Aplt. 

Br. at 15. He concludes by focusing on the merits of his claim, arguing that: “‘Full 

and fair’ must mean something more than an uncritical adoption of the trial court’s 

conclusory ruling, where nothing in the lengthy testimony of [the older daughters] 

was probative of whether [Mr. Nixon] had raped their younger sister.” Id. at 16. 

In arguing his third issue on appeal, Mr. Nixon presents a vague and 

conclusory three-paragraph argument as to whether his claim received a full and fair 

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review. For example, he argues “[c]ommon sense informs that a review cannot be 

‘full’ where the lower court’s holding is obscured by disregard of the requirement to 

set forth the reasoning behind it.” Id. at 27. But he does not identify the military 

courts he has in mind. 

The military judge and the AFCCA both provided reasoning for their 

decisions. The CAAF’s order states that it considered the petition for review and 

then denied it without discussion, but we do not require military courts to issue a 

detailed opinion to conclude that they fully and fairly reviewed a claim, especially 

where, as here, the trial and intermediate appellate court had met this requirement. 

See Watson v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 143, 145 (10th Cir. 1986) (“When an issue is 

briefed and argued before a military board of review, we have held that the military 

tribunal has given the claim fair consideration, even though its opinion summarily 

disposed of the issue with the mere statement that it did not consider the issue 

meritorious or requiring discussion.”). The AFCCA issued a detailed opinion, 

spending four pages analyzing the military judge’s decision to admit the prior-acts 

evidence, and the CAAF’s denial of review affirms the AFCCA’s reasoning. 

We conclude the AFCCA’s decision provides ample discussion to show it 

adequately considered the issue. Mr. Nixon has not offered a reasoned basis for us to 

conclude otherwise. We agree with the district court’s decision that the military 

courts fully and fairly reviewed the claim involving the prior-acts testimony and that 

Mr. Nixon is therefore not entitled to habeas relief. 

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IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.7

Entered for the Court 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

 7

 We decline to consider Mr. Nixon’s fourth issue on appeal because he did not 

raise it in his habeas petition filed with the district court. See Somerlott v. Cherokee 

Nation Distribs., Inc., 686 F.3d 1144, 1150 (10th Cir. 2012) (“An issue is preserved 

for appeal if a party alerts the district court to the issue and seeks a ruling.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

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