Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_24-cv-00043/USCOURTS-ared-3_24-cv-00043-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paula Cowell
Defendant
Drew Curtis
Defendant
Thomas Hurst
Defendant
Shawn McLemore
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

SHAWN MCLEMORE PLAINTIFF 

ADC #179359 

V. Case No. 3:24-CV-00043-BSM-BBM 

PAULA COWELL, Administrator, 

Grimes Unit, ADC; THOMAS HURST, 

Warden, Grimes Unit, ADC; and DREW 

CURTIS, Lawyer, James Law Firm DEFENDANTS 

 RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

 The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to 

United States District Judge Brian S. Miller. You may file written objections to all or part 

of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must (1) specifically explain the 

factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court 

within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do not file objections, 

Judge Miller may adopt this Recommendation without independently reviewing all of the 

evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of 

fact. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

On March 18, 2024, Plaintiff Shawn McLemore (“McLemore”), an inmate at the 

Grimes Unit of the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”), filed a pro se Complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The Complaint alleged that Grimes Unit 

Administrator Paula Cowell (“Cowell”) and Warden Thomas Hurst (“Hurst”) violated 

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McLemore’s right to access the courts by failing to timely notarize McLemore’s state-court 

Rule 37 petition. Id. 

On April 29, 2024, McLemore paid in full the $405 filing and administrative fee to 

open this case. (Doc. 4). The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires federal 

courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, 

or employee, regardless of fee status. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a); Lewis v. Estes, 242 F.3d 375 

(8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding § 1915A’s screening requirement applies regardless 

of fee status). 

The Court conducted an initial screening of McLemore’s Complaint pursuant to the 

PLRA and noted several deficiencies.1

 (Doc. 6). McLemore was given leave to file an 

amended complaint and placed on notice that an amended pleading would supersede his 

previous Complaint. Id. at 4 (citing In re Atlas Lines, Inc., 209 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 

2000)). 

On November 7, 2024, McLemore filed an Amended Complaint, adding Drew 

Curtis (“Curtis”), a lawyer with the James Law Firm, as a Defendant to this action. (Doc. 

7 at 1). Accordingly, the Court will proceed with screening. 

1

 The PLRA requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a 

governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or a 

portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b). When making this determination, the Court must accept the truth of the 

factual allegations contained in the complaint, and it may consider the documents attached to the complaint. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011). 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Allegations in Amended Complaint 

In his Amended Complaint, McLemore claims that, after the direct appeal of his 

criminal conviction was denied by the Arkansas Supreme Court, he hired the James Law 

Firm to represent him in post-conviction relief proceedings. (Doc. 7 at 5). Specifically, he 

hired the James Law Firm to file a Rule 37 petition for postconviction relief that was to be 

filed within 60 days after the denial of his direct appeal. Id. The deadline to file the Rule 

37 petition was March 14, 2023. Id. 

On March 13, 2023, the day before the court deadline, Curtis contacted Grimes Unit 

administrative staff to arrange for the signing and notarizing of the Rule 37 petition. (Doc. 

7 at 5). The Rule 37 petition was to be faxed back immediately after signing to Curtis. Id. 

On March 13, 2023, at approximately 3:00 p.m., while McLemore was in restrictive 

housing, he was approached by Cowell with a copy of the Rule 37 petition, which included 

an affidavit to be signed and notarized. (Doc. 7 at 5). McLemore was prepared to follow 

the necessary steps to make sure that the documents were executed correctly, but he was 

told, “per your attorney he just needed your signature and he would handle the notary[.]” 

Id. McLemore claims that this instruction directly conflicts with Arkansas Code Annotated 

§ 21-14-111(a)(1), which states that it is unlawful for any notary public to witness any 

signature on any instrument unless the notary public either witnesses the signing of the 

instrument and personally knows the signer, or is presented proof of the identity of the 

signer. Id. at 5–6. 

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McLemore was instructed to sign the document without a notary present. (Doc. 7 at 

6). The Rule 37 petition was then faxed back to Curtis, and, when he discovered that the 

document had not been notarized, he signed and notarized a new petition in McLemore’s 

name in front of a notary public. Id. The document signed by Curtis was filed in the state 

court on March 13, 2023. Id. Curtis then attempted to amend the verification, using a copy 

of the Rule 37 petition that was personally signed by McLemore in front of a notary public 

on March 16, 2023, but it was denied as untimely. Id. McLemore claims that these actions 

affected his ability to timely file for postconviction relief under Rule 37 in his state-court 

case. Id.; see also State v. Shawn Garrett McLemore, Grant County, Arkansas, Circuit 

Court Case No. 27CR-20-09.2

 McLemore sues Defendants in their individual and official 

capacities. (Doc. 7 at 2). For relief, McLemore seeks restitution “and/or re-evaluation of 

Rule 37 for retrial.”3 Id. at 7. 

B. Screening 

To survive pre-service screening under the PLRA, a “complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[L]abels and conclusions,” a 

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and “naked assertions devoid 

2

 Arkansas state court records can be found using the Arkansas Judiciary’s Court Connect website: 

https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad (last accessed Nov. 25, 2024). 

3

 As for McLemore’s alternate request to re-evaluate his Rule 37 petition and request for a retrial, 

this Court is unable to provide that relief. See Clemons v. Luebbers, 381 F.3d 744, 750 (8th Cir. 2004) 

(holding federal court does not sit to correct a state court’s application of its ordinary adequate procedural 

rules); Fields v. Payne, No. 4:20-cv-00351 KGB-PSH, 2023 WL 2378964, at *21 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 6, 2023); 

see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (holding civil rights action not proper vehicle to 

challenge conviction). 

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of further factual enhancement” are insufficient to plead a plausible claim. Id. Further, 

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). However, “[a] pro 

se complaint must be liberally construed,” and courts “should construe the complaint in a 

way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal 

framework.” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014) 

(cleaned up; citations omitted); Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) 

(citation omitted). 

Liberally construing McLemore’s Amended Complaint, he fails to allege any

plausible claim against the named Defendants—Paula Cowell, Thomas Hurst, or Drew 

Curtis. Accordingly, this Court recommends that his Amended Complaint be dismissed 

without prejudice. 

C. Access to the Courts 

McLemore appears to claim that the denial of notary services violated his 

constitutional rights. The Court interprets McLemore’s allegations as raising a First 

Amendment access-to-the-courts claim. 

McLemore, like all prisoners, has “a constitutional right of access to the courts,” 

which includes the ability to seek a new trial, release from confinement, or the vindication 

of fundamental civil rights. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 824, 827 (1977) (overruled 

on other grounds). To state a First Amendment claim, a plaintiff must allege actual injury; 

in an access to the courts claim, the injury would be “the hindrance of a nonfrivolous and 

arguably meritorious underlying legal claim.” Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 (8th 

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Cir. 2008). To prove actual injury, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal 

claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.” White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 680 (8th 

Cir. 2007) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 (1996)). Speculative injuries are 

insufficient; the inmate must identify a specific injury related to the alleged deprivation. 

Hartsfield, 511 F.3d at 833; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351–52. Further, to successfully pursue a 

First Amendment claim based on denial of right of access to the courts, a plaintiff must 

show that the defendant acted with some intentional motivation to restrict his or her access 

to the courts. Morris v. City of Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1020 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing 

Scheeler v. City of St. Cloud, Minn., 402 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2005)). 

1. Warden Thomas Hurst 

McLemore names Hurst as a Defendant to this action. (Doc. 7 at 2). However, 

McLemore does not include any allegations against Hurst in his Amended Complaint. 

There is no vicarious liability in § 1983 actions; therefore, a prisoner “must plead that each 

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated 

the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. McLemore does not allege that Hurst was 

personally involved in any constitutional violations. Accordingly, McLemore’s claim 

against Hurst should be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief. 

2. Paula Cowell 

McLemore asserts that, on March 13, 2023, Cowell arrived at his cell with a copy 

of the Rule 37 petition, which included an affidavit to be signed and notarized. (Doc. 7 at 

5). He claims that he was instructed to sign the document without a notary present. Id. at 

6. Specifically, he alleges that he was told, “per your attorney he just needed your signature 

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and he would handle the notary[.]” Id. at 5. McLemore contends that, when he finally did 

sign the document in front of a notary public on March 16, 2023, his Rule 37 petition was 

denied as untimely. Id. at 6. 

McLemore attaches exhibits to his Amended Complaint that add context to his 

allegations. (Doc. 7 at 15–16). In an email dated March 13, 2023, non-Defendant Nicole 

Christian, an administrative specialist at the Grimes Unit, informed Curtis, McLemore’s 

attorney, that the “notary is out today,” and there was “no one that is able to notarize it.” 

Id. at 15. In response, Curtis instructed, “I just need his signature. We can notarize it here.” 

Id. In another email to Christian later that day, Curtis wrote, “The petition does have to be 

notarized by someone at the prison after talking within the office. If the person who 

notarizes them is there tomorrow, will you have him re[-]sign in the presence of the 

notary?” Id. at 16. 

As stated above, to successfully pursue a First Amendment claim based on denial 

of right of access to the courts, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with some 

intentional motivation to restrict his or her access to the courts. Morris, 512 F.3d at 1020; 

Scheeler, 402 F.3d at 830. The exhibits that McLemore has attached to his Amended 

Complaint indicate that Cowell was following the guidance that McLemore’s attorney 

provided to Grimes Unit administration, which was that he just needed McLemore’s 

signature at that time. (Doc. 7 at 15–16). McLemore has failed to show that Cowell 

intentionally interfered with McLemore’s access to the court by simply following the 

instructions of McLemore’s counsel as relayed to Grimes Unit administration and bringing 

the Rule 37 petition to McLemore for signature on the date requested. 

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McLemore also claims that the instruction to sign the document without a notary 

present directly conflicts with Arkansas law, which makes it unlawful for any notary public 

to witness any signature on any instrument unless the notary public either witnesses the 

signing of the instrument and personally knows the signer or is presented proof of the 

identity of the signer. (Doc. 7 at 5–6). However, as indicated in the exhibits attached to 

McLemore’s Amended Complaint, there was no notary present in the Grimes Unit on 

March 13, 2023. Id. at 15. To the extent that McLemore may be attempting to claim that 

Cowell violated his right of access to the court when his attorney later signed and notarized 

a new petition in McLemore’s name in front of a notary public, there is no indication that 

Cowell had any knowledge of these future actions by Curtis. Id. at 6. 

Because McLemore has failed to state a plausible claim against Cowell, his claim 

against Cowell should be dismissed without prejudice. 

3. Drew Curtis 

McLemore alleges that Defendants’ actions affected his ability to timely file for 

postconviction relief under Rule 37. (Doc. 7 at 5–6). He attaches as an exhibit a decision 

and order of the Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, cautioning 

Curtis for his conduct in this matter. Id. at 10–14. However, criminal defense attorneys, 

whether appointed or retained, do not act under color of state law when performing 

traditional functions as counsel. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding 

a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a traditional 

functions as counsel); Dunn v. Hackworth, 628 F.2d 1111, 1112 (8th Cir. 1980) (“The 

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actions of privately retained counsel are not considered state action and therefore cannot 

form the basis of a § 1983 claim.”); Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 750 (8th Cir. 1992) 

(stating that attorneys who represented a plaintiff, “whether appointed or retained, did not 

act under color of state law and, thus, are not subject to suit under section 1983”). Thus, 

Curtis, as retained counsel for McLemore, is not subject to suit under § 1983. Accordingly, 

McLemore’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against Curtis under § 1983 and 

should be dismissed. 

4. Official Capacity 

McLemore also sues Defendants in their official capacities. (Doc. 7 at 2). He seeks 

restitution “and/or re-evaluation of Rule 37 for retrial.” Id. at 7. As stated above, this Court 

is unable to provide McLemore’s requested relief in the form of re-evaluating his Rule 37 

petition and granting a retrial. See Clemons, 381 F.3d at 750; Fields, 2023 WL 2378964, 

at *21; see also Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. 

“A suit against a government officer in his official capacity is functionally 

equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran 

Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). McLemore’s claims against Defendants 

Cowell and Hurst, then, are the equivalent of claims against the state of Arkansas, and 

McLemore’s damages claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan 

Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Moreover, as noted above, Curtis is not a 

state actor under § 1983. Polk Cnty., 454 U.S. at 325. Therefore, McLemore’s officialcapacity claims should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 

1. McLemore’s Amended Complaint, (Doc. 7), be DISMISSED, without 

prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

2. The Court RECOMMEND that the dismissal count as a “strike” for the 

purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

3. The Court CERTIFY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma 

pauperis appeal from any Order adopting this Recommendation would not be taken in good 

faith. 

 DATED this 26th day of November, 2024. 

 ____________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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