Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-23-15444/USCOURTS-ca9-23-15444-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Batway

Annie Batway
Appellant
City of Phoenix
Appellant
Krish Singh
Appellee
Smith-Petersen

Brittany Smith-Petersen
Appellant
Unknown Parties

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KRISH SINGH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CITY OF PHOENIX; BRITTANY 

SMITH-PETERSEN, Officer, Badge 

No. 10529, wife; SMITH-PETERSEN, 

First Name Unknown, husband; 

ANNIE BATWAY, Officer, Badge 

No. 9656, wife; BATWAY, First 

Name Unknown, husband; 

UNKNOWN PARTIES, named as 

John and Jane Does I-X, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-15356 

D.C. No. 2:21-cv00099-JJT 

OPINION

KRISH SINGH, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

CITY OF PHOENIX; BRITTANY 

SMITH-PETERSEN, Officer, Badge 

No. 23-15444 

D.C. No. 2:21-cv00099-JJT 

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2 SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX

No. 10529, wife; ANNIE BATWAY, 

Officer, Badge No. 9656, wife, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

SMITH-PETERSEN, First Name 

Unknown, husband; BATWAY, First 

Name Unknown, husband; 

UNKNOWN PARTIES, named as 

John and Jane Does I-X, 

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 17, 2024

Phoenix, Arizona

Filed December 26, 2024

Before: Susan P. Graber, Roopali H. Desai, and Ana de 

Alba, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber

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SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX 3 

SUMMARY*

Qualified Immunity/Excessive Force

The panel (1) reversed the district court’s summary 

judgment for City of Phoenix police officer Brittany SmithPetersen on Krish Singh’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force 

claim; (2) reversed the district court’s order remanding 

Singh’s state law claims to state court; and (3) dismissed 

Smith-Petersen’s cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

Smith-Petersen and another police officer responded to a 

report of an attempted robbery with a knife. When they 

arrived, Singh held a knife to his own neck and asked the 

officers to shoot and kill him. He refused to drop the knife, 

and Smith-Petersen shot and seriously injured him. The 

district court held that although a reasonable jury could find 

that Smith-Petersen violated Singh’s constitutional right, she 

was nevertheless protected by qualified immunity from 

Singh’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit because there was no clearly 

established law that would have put her on notice that her 

force was objectively unreasonable under the 

circumstances. The district court remanded the state claims 

to state court for resolution. 

The panel agreed with the district court’s holding, not 

challenged on appeal, that Singh established a plausible, 

although not conclusive, constitutional violation at step one 

of the qualified immunity analysis. At step two—in which 

plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the rights allegedly 

violated were clearly established—the panel held that Glenn 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX

v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2011), 

involving materially similar facts, put Smith-Petersen on 

notice that her use of deadly force plausibly violated Singh’s 

right to be free from excessive force. Here as in Glenn, 

(1) plaintiff did not brandish a knife but rather held it to his 

own neck; (2) despite failing to comply with commands to 

drop the knife, a number of circumstances weighed against 

deeming plaintiff an immediate threat; (3) the offense here—

attempted robbery with a knife—was less serious than in 

Glenn; (4) plaintiff did not actively resist arrest; (5) officers 

should have been aware that plaintiff was emotionally 

disturbed; and (6) no effective warning was given. Finally, 

the question of whether Smith-Petersen could have used less 

intrusive means of force was better suited to resolution by 

the trier of fact.

The panel held that it lacked jurisdiction over SmithPetersen’s cross-appeal challenging the district court’s 

determination that genuine factual disputes existed as to 

whether her use of deadly force was reasonable. The panel 

reversed the dismissal of the state-law claims and remanded 

for reconsideration of whether supplemental jurisdiction 

over the claims should be exercised. 

COUNSEL

David L. Abney (argued), Ahwatukee Legal Office, PC, 

Phoenix, Arizona; J. Scott Halverson, Law Offices of J. 

Scott Halverson PC, Tempe, Arizona; for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Ashley Caballero-Daltrey (argued), Justin M. Ackerman, 

and John T. Masterson, Jones Skelton & Hochuli PLC, 

Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendants-Appellees.

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SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX 5

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Krish Singh was shot and seriously injured by 

Defendant Officer Brittany Smith-Petersen in Phoenix, 

Arizona. Smith-Petersen and another Defendant, Officer 

Annie Batway, had responded to a report of an attempted 

robbery with a knife. When the two police officers arrived, 

Plaintiff held a knife to his neck and asked the officers to 

shoot and kill him. Plaintiff refused to drop the knife, and 

Smith-Petersen shot him. Plaintiff sued the City of Phoenix, 

Smith-Petersen, and Batway. The district court entered 

summary judgment for Defendant Smith-Petersen on 

Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force, brought under § 1983, 

holding that she was protected by qualified immunity, and 

the court remanded Plaintiff’s state claims to state court for 

resolution. We reverse and remand with respect to the 

appeal, and we dismiss Smith-Petersen’s cross-appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 11, 2019, Brittany Smith-Petersen and 

Annie Batway, who were police officers with the Phoenix 

Police Department, responded to a report of an attempted 

armed robbery at a Home Depot in Phoenix, Arizona. 

Before the officers arrived at the scene, the dispatcher 

informed them that the person who had reported the incident 

stated that the suspect was trying to rob him with a knife. In 

an updated report, the officers were told that the suspect was 

chasing the victim with a knife in a parking lot. The officers 

arrived at the scene at the same time, but in separate patrol 

vehicles. They saw Plaintiff walking through a Carl’s Jr.’s 

parking lot; he was not chasing anyone.

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6 SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX

The officers pulled their vehicles up on both sides of 

Plaintiff, forming an L-shaped configuration around him. 

While still in her patrol vehicle, Smith-Petersen directed 

Plaintiff to stop and to show both hands. Plaintiff was 

holding a knife against his own throat. Smith-Petersen got 

out of her patrol vehicle and ordered Plaintiff to “stay right 

there.” She then drew her firearm, aimed it at Plaintiff, and 

yelled, “If you come any closer, I’ll fucking shoot you.” She 

told Batway to “get out of the way.” She then told Plaintiff 

to “drop the fucking knife,” while she moved around the 

back driver’s side of her patrol car—placing her vehicle 

between her and Plaintiff. In response, Plaintiff said, 

“What? I’m going to die anyway.” Smith-Petersen then told 

Plaintiff, “if you come any closer, I will kill you. Do you 

understand? Put the gun down.” Plaintiff immediately 

corrected Smith-Petersen by saying something to the effect 

of, “it’s a knife.” In response, Smith-Petersen stated, “I’m 

sorry, you’re right,” and instructed Plaintiff to “put the knife 

down.” For the remainder of the encounter, but before 

Smith-Petersen shot Plaintiff, Plaintiff made several 

statements, including that people thought he was “crazy” and 

that he wanted Smith-Petersen to shoot him. At no point did 

Plaintiff suggest that he intended to harm either of the 

officers or anyone else.

Approximately two minutes into the interaction, Plaintiff 

began to move slowly toward the corner of the front driver’s 

side of Smith-Petersen’s vehicle, which was positioned 

between the two of them. She moved backward in response, 

explaining that she did not want to shoot Plaintiff. Plaintiff 

said something to effect of, “I want to get shot.” As Plaintiff 

slowly inched forward, Batway repeatedly told him to stop. 

He persisted, “Go ahead ma’am,” and continued to move 

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SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX 7

Petersen, she continued to move backward, and Batway 

continued to tell Plaintiff to stop. Plaintiff appeared to stop 

next to the front of the vehicle. Smith-Petersen then fired a 

single round, striking Plaintiff in the abdomen. Plaintiff fell 

to the ground and dropped the knife. He survived his 

injuries.

In her deposition, Smith-Petersen testified that, at the 

time she shot Plaintiff, she believed that he posed a threat to 

her, to Batway, and to the public because he failed to comply 

with their repeated directions to drop the knife and continued 

to advance toward her. She conceded that Plaintiff “did not 

make any specific sudden changes in movement to elicit 

[her] to fire [her] weapon sooner.” But, she explained, she 

fired her weapon “because [she] no longer had [a] barrier as 

well as Officer Batway never had a barrier.” Although both 

officers carried “OC spray”— akin to pepper spray—and a 

taser at the time of the incident, Smith-Petersen testified that 

she did not believe that it was safe to use a taser, because of 

the positions she and Batway were holding and because of 

“containment problems” due to the open parking lot. She 

also testified that she did not feel that it would have been 

effective for her to have used the pepper spray or the taser, 

given the distance between her and Plaintiff.

In November 2020, Plaintiff sued Defendants in Arizona 

state court. The complaint raised a single federal claim and 

three state claims: (1) violation of the Fourth Amendment, 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Smith-Petersen only; 

(2) assault and battery, against the City and Smith-Petersen; 

(3) negligence and gross negligence, against all Defendants; 

and (4) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention, 

against the City. Defendants removed the action to federal 

court.

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8 SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX

After discovery, Defendants moved for summary 

judgment on each of Plaintiff’s claims. The district court 

granted Defendants’ motion only as to Plaintiff’s claim 

under § 1983, holding that a reasonable jury could find that 

Smith-Petersen violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, but 

she was nevertheless protected by qualified immunity. The 

court also remanded the remaining claims to state court. 

Plaintiff timely appeals, and Smith-Petersen timely crossappeals, arguing that the district court’s ruling that she 

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right will affect the 

resolution of the state claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Evans v. 

Skolnik, 997 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 2021). Many of the 

facts underlying this case are disputed. But, because we 

review the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

Smith-Petersen in these circumstances, we must construe all 

facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Id. at 1063. 

Jurisdictional questions are subject to de novo review. 

United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 

2007). 

DISCUSSION

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from 

civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory 

or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time 

of the challenged conduct.” Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 

825 (2015) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). In determining whether qualified immunity 

shields a police officer or other governmental official, we 

ask two questions: (1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has 

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SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX 9 

alleged . . . or shown . . . make out a violation of a 

constitutional right,” and (2) if so, whether that right was 

“‘clearly established’ at the time of [the] defendant’s alleged 

misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) 

(citations omitted). If the answer to either question is “no,” 

the officer prevails and is immune from suit. See id. at 236. 

A. Qualified Immunity

The district court held, and we agree, that Plaintiff has 

established a plausible, even though not conclusive, 

constitutional violation at step one of the qualified-immunity 

analysis. On appeal, Plaintiff challenges only the district 

court’s holding at the second step of the analysis. At this 

step, Plaintiff “bears the burden of showing that the rights 

allegedly violated were clearly established.” Shafer v. 

County of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 

2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. 

The Supreme Court has held that the law is “clearly 

established” when “every reasonable official would have 

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Taylor, 

575 U.S. at 825 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Although a case need not be “directly on 

point, . . . existing precedent must have placed the statutory 

or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). The district court held 

that there was no clearly established law that would have put 

Smith-Petersen on notice that her force was objectively 

unreasonable in the circumstances. We disagree. 

The facts in this case are closely akin to those in Glenn 

v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2011), which 

sufficed to put Smith-Petersen on notice. In Glenn, the 

officers responded to a domestic dispute involving an 

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10 SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX

intoxicated and suicidal eighteen-year-old male (“Lukus”). 

Id. at 866. In a 911 call requesting officer assistance, 

Lukus’s mother described her son as being “out of control, 

busting [their] windows,” “intoxicated,” suicidal, and 

possessing a pocketknife with which he was threatening his 

parents. Id. at 867. Although the dispatcher neglected to 

share with the officers that Lukus’s mother noted that Lukus 

had threatened them with the knife, the dispatcher did tell the 

officers that Lukus was “very intoxicated,” that he “had 

broken a window and was out in the driveway,” and that 

“there were hunting rifles inside the house.” Id. When one 

of the officers asked whether “the Glenns could lock the 

doors since he ‘[didn’t] want [Lukus] going inside if there 

are guns in [the house],’” the dispatcher responded that 

“Lukus had ‘busted through the front door.’” Id. 

After arriving at the home and establishing a staging area 

that was a short distance from the Glenn home, the first 

responding officer, Deputy Mikhail Gerba, bypassed the 

staging area, where he encountered a friend of Lukus’s, 

whom he ordered to “[g]et on the fucking ground.” Id. at 

868 (brackets in original). The friend complied, explaining 

that Lukus was “by the garage” and that “[they] [had] him 

calmed down.” Id. Gerba proceeded to the driveway, 

positioning himself about eight to twelve feet from Lukus, 

who was holding the pocketknife to his own neck and was 

standing by his parents and another of his friends. Id. Gerba, 

from the moment he arrived, “‘only scream[ed] commands 

loudly at Lukus’ such as ‘drop the knife or I’m going to kill 

you.’” Id. (brackets in original). But Lukus “may not have 

heard or understood these commands because he was 

intoxicated and many people were yelling at once.” Id. 

Approximately four minutes after the first officer arrived 

at the scene, officers fatally shot Lukus, who was acting 

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SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX 11

erratically and, according to the responding officers, did not 

comply with their repeated orders to put down the 

pocketknife that he possessed. Id. at 867–69. Officers 

initially employed non-lethal force by shooting Lukus with 

beanbag rounds when he failed to comply with their orders. 

Id. at 869. But Lukus began moving toward the home in 

which his parents were located, and the officers then fatally 

shot him with live, lethal rounds. Id. 

The district court in Glenn entered summary judgment in 

the officers’ favor, concluding that they were entitled to 

qualified immunity. We reversed. Id. at 866. 

We concluded in Glenn that the officers’ use of force was 

not undisputably reasonable because: (1) although Lukus 

possessed a pocketknife, he “held [it] to his own neck” and 

never brandished or threatened anyone at the scene with it, 

id. at 873, 875–76; (2) even though Lukus did not respond to 

the officers’ orders to put down the knife during the roughly 

three minutes that elapsed before they used the beanbag 

rounds, “a number of other circumstances weigh[ed] against 

deeming him ‘an immediate threat to the safety of the 

officers or others,’” id. at 873 (citation omitted); (3) the 

“character of the offense” committed by Lukus was not 

severe because “[n]either the district court nor the 

defendants . . . identified any crime that Lukus committed,” 

id. at 874; (4) Lukus may not have been actively resisting 

arrest, despite his failing to follow the officers’ commands 

to put down the pocketknife,1 id. at 875; (5) the officers 

1 Active resistance entails “pulling away from a deputy’s grasp, 

attempting to escape, resisting or countering physical control or 

demonstrating the willingness to engage in combat by verbal challenges, 

threats, aggressive behavior, or assault.” Id. at 875 (brackets and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

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12 SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX

were, or should have been, aware that Lukus was suicidal or 

otherwise mentally disturbed, which diminished the 

government’s interest in using deadly force, id. at 875–76; 

(6) Lukus may not have comprehended the warnings and 

commands that the officers gave because he was intoxicated 

and there were other people yelling, id. at 876; and (7) less 

lethal alternatives, such as the use of a taser, may have been 

available, id. at 876–78. Therefore, we held that “the district 

court erred in granting summary judgment on the 

constitutionality of the officers’ use of force.” Id. at 878. 

The facts in this case are similar to the facts in Glenn in 

all material respects: 

First, Plaintiff and Lukus both held knives. And, at the 

time of the encounter with officers, Plaintiff “did not 

brandish [the knife] at anyone, but rather held [it] to his own 

neck.”2 Id. at 873. 

Second, as in Glenn, despite Plaintiff’s failure to comply 

with the officers’ commands to drop the knife, “a number of 

2 For the first time at oral argument, Smith-Petersen argued that the 

position of the knife blade was “pointed toward the officers” and not 

toward Plaintiff, despite his keeping the knife at his neck during the 

encounter. She argues that this factor enhanced the threat to the officers 

because Plaintiff could have “easily attack[ed] [the officers] rather than 

himself because the blade [was] already facing them.” The officers both 

attested that Plaintiff was holding the knife to his own neck in a way that 

would have made it easy for him to attack others. But, before oral 

argument, neither officer detailed how the knife was positioned or held 

such that it increased the perceived threat. Contrary to this newly raised 

characterization, from the available video evidence it appears that the 

knife blade may be pointed toward Plaintiff’s neck (inward) and not in 

the direction of the officers. Regardless, this distinction is not 

dispositive, in part because of the distance between Plaintiff and the 

officers.

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SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX 13

other circumstances weigh against deeming him ‘an 

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.’” Id.

(citation omitted). In particular, the record supports findings 

that Plaintiff was suicidal, that he was “not in possession of 

any guns,” that he was “not in a physical altercation with 

anyone,” that he did not “threaten[] anyone with the knife, 

and [that] no one was trying to get away from him.” Id. As 

in Glenn, Plaintiff “did not attack the officers . . . [nor] did 

he even threaten to attack any of them.” Id. (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Calonge v. City 

of San Jose, No. 22-16495, 2024 WL 2873371, at *8 (9th 

Cir. June 7, 2024) (noting that even though the suspect 

appeared to be carrying a gun, “he did not brandish his 

weapon or menace the officers; and he did not attempt to 

[access] . . . an area that could contain other people”). There 

was no other person in the open parking lot besides Plaintiff 

and the officers, “so a jury could conclude that no one was 

close enough to [Plaintiff] to be harmed by him before police 

could intervene.” Id. at 874. Moreover, as we noted in 

Glenn and as the district court here suggested in its decision, 

a jury reasonably could conclude that the officers “could 

have moved farther away at any time, had they wanted to,” 

undermining the notion that Plaintiff posed an immediate 

threat. Id.

Third, we have established “two slightly different ways” 

of assessing the seriousness of the offense in question. S.R. 

Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2019). 

“[A] particular use of force would be more 

reasonable . . . when applied against a felony suspect than 

when applied against a person suspected of only a 

misdemeanor.” Id.; see id. (explaining that cases involving 

a misdemeanor would “provide little, if any, basis for a use 

of deadly force”). Courts also may “use[] the severity of the 

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14 SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX

crime at issue as a proxy for the danger a suspect poses at 

the time force is applied.” Id. (citing Smith v. City of Hemet, 

394 F.3d 689, 702–03 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that 

“the nature of the crime at issue provid[ed] little, if any, 

basis” for the use of force where the suspect had physically 

assaulted his wife but was standing alone on his porch when 

officers arrived)). Even when a suspect has made “felonious 

threats or committed a serious crime prior to [an officer’s] 

arrival,” however, a jury could discount the severity of the 

suspect’s purported crimes when the suspect is “indisputably 

not engaged in [felonious] conduct when [the officer] 

arrive[s].” Id.

The officers in Glenn were responding to a domestic 

disturbance. “Domestic violence situations are particularly 

dangerous because more officers are killed or injured on 

domestic violence calls than on any other type of call.” 

George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 839 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 

Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 450 (9th Cir. 2011)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the 

officers in Glenn had more reason to fear for their safety than 

Smith-Petersen did here. It is true that the “legitimate 

escalation of an officer’s concern about his or her safety is 

less salient when the domestic dispute is seemingly over by 

the time the officers begin their investigation.” Id. (quoting 

Mattos, 661 F.3d at 450) (alteration adopted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). But the officers in Glenn arrived 

at the scene of the incident, the Glenns’ home, where the 

domestic dispute was seemingly still active—that is, a 

domestic dispute involving a suicidal suspect armed with a 

knife. See Glenn, 673 F.3d at 868 (noting that Gerba 

approached the driveway of the home and “positioned 

himself eight to twelve feet from Lukus, who was standing 

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SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX 15

by the garage near his parents” and was “holding the 

pocketknife to his own neck”). 

Here, the officers were responding to a report of an 

attempted robbery with a knife, a felony under Arizona law. 

Smith-Petersen argues that Plaintiff also violated other 

criminal statutes, which supported the use of deadly force. 

Those alleged violations may have been misdemeanors, 

which undercuts the use of deadly force. Browder, 929 F.3d 

at 1136; see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1202(B) (specifying 

that “[t]hreatening or intimidating pursuant to subsection A, 

paragraph 1 or 2 is a class 1 misdemeanor”), 13-2508(B) 

(specifying that “[r]esisting arrest pursuant to subsection A, 

paragraph 3 of this section is a class 1 misdemeanor”). 

Because a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff’s 

conduct showed an intent to harm only himself, a jury also 

could find that Plaintiff’s actions at the time of the officers’ 

arrival did not constitute felonious conduct. In Glenn, the 

officers were dispatched to a domestic disturbance involving 

a “fight with a weapon” and were aware that Lukus had a 

pocketknife, that he was “intoxicated,” and that he had 

“busted through the front door.” Glenn, 673 F.3d at 867. 

The officers also knew that there were hunting rifles inside 

the house and, based on the information they were provided, 

that the Glenns could not lock the doors to prevent Lukus 

from going inside to retrieve the rifles.3 Id. Even then, the 

officers in Glenn first used less lethal force before eventually 

shooting and killing Lukus. See id. at 869 (noting that one 

of the officers shot Lukus with all six of the shotgun’s 

3 When notifying the dispatcher that the Glenns owned hunting rifles, 

Lukus’s mother explained that “they were locked up and Lukus could 

not get to them.” Glenn, 673 F.3d at 867. But that detail—that the 

hunting rifles were locked up—was not communicated to the officers 

when dispatched. 

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16 SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX

beanbag rounds before the officers employed the fatal 

rounds). Thus, the officers here arrived at a scene where a 

less serious crime was occurring than in Glenn. 

Fourth, as in Glenn, Plaintiff did not actively resist arrest, 

despite his failing to comply with the officers’ commands. 

Smith-Petersen does not contend that Plaintiff “tried to flee 

before officers shot him”; he “‘did not attack the officers’ or 

anyone else, nor did he threaten to do so at any point while 

officers were on the scene.” Id. at 874–75 (distinguishing 

passive resistance from more “active” or “ominous” 

resistance) (quoting Smith, 394 F.3d at 703). In Smith, we 

held that the plaintiff’s refusal to comply with the officers’ 

commands to remove his hands from his pockets and place 

them on his head, his reentry into his home despite the 

officers’ orders, and his brief refusal to place both hands 

behind his back were “not . . . particularly bellicose.” 394 

F.3d at 703. Similarly, in this case, “the crux of the 

resistance was the refusal to follow officers’ commands, 

rather than actively attacking or threatening officers or 

others.” Glenn, 673 F.3d at 875 (citing Smith, 394 F.3d at 

703). Thus, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s conduct constituted less than active 

resistance, which did not warrant the use of deadly force. 

See id. (noting that “the defendants’ own guidelines would 

characterize Lukus’ conduct as less than active resistance, 

not warranting use of a beanbag shotgun”). 

Fifth, the officers “were or should have been aware that 

[Plaintiff] was emotionally disturbed.” Id. at 875. The 

record strongly supports that Plaintiff was suicidal. Contrary 

to Smith-Petersen’s suggestion that the relevant incident did 

not involve a suicidal suspect, Defendants’ own expert 

concluded that Plaintiff was “threatening suicide” and 

acknowledged that “he was holding the knife to his own 

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SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX 17

throat.” Moreover, when Smith-Petersen warned Plaintiff to 

“[s]tay right there, stop, if you come any closer I will fucking 

shoot you[,]” Plaintiff responded: “That’s what I want.”

Sixth, in Glenn we considered whether the officers had 

given an effective warning to Lukus. Id. at 876. We held 

that, even though the officers gave seemingly clear warnings 

to Lukus, Lukus “may not have heard or understood [the 

officers’] commands because he was intoxicated and many 

people were yelling at once.” Id. at 868, 874 n.9. As in 

Glenn, Plaintiff “did not respond to officers’ orders to put 

the knife down during the approximately [two minutes and 

fifteen seconds] that elapsed before he was shot.” Id. at 873; 

see id. at 873–74 (noting that officers had shot Plaintiff with 

beanbags approximately three minutes after arriving and that 

they fatally shot Plaintiff less than four minutes after 

arriving). 

As in Glenn, no effective warning was given to Plaintiff. 

Although Plaintiff heard and understood the officers’ 

warnings, they had no effect on him given his mental state. 

He responded quite simply that he wanted the police to shoot 

him, emphasizing his suicidal state, so no warning could 

effectively convince him to change his behavior. 

Threatening a suspect with something that the suspect wants, 

in this case for Smith-Petersen to shoot and kill Plaintiff, is 

not a sufficient warning in these circumstances. See 

generally Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 829 (9th Cir. 

2010) (“Although we have refused to create two tracks of 

excessive force analysis, one for the mentally ill and one for 

serious criminals, we have found that even when an 

emotionally disturbed individual is acting out and inviting 

officers to use deadly force to subdue him, the governmental 

interest in using such force is diminished by the fact that the 

officers are confronted . . . with a mentally ill individual.” 

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18 SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX

(quoting Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1283 (9th Cir. 

2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Deorle, 

272 F.3d at 1283 (noting that “a heightened use of less-thanlethal force will usually be helpful in bringing a dangerous 

situation” involving a an emotionally distraught individual 

who is armed and dangerous “to a swift end”). 

Finally, in considering whether less intrusive means of 

force were available in this case, we agree with the district 

court that genuine disputes of fact exist. Smith-Petersen 

testified that she did not believe it was safe to use her taser 

or spray, given the positions she and Batway occupied. On 

the other hand, Plaintiff’s expert opined that Smith-Petersen 

could have used less lethal options in the circumstances. 

Thus, the question whether Smith-Petersen could have used 

her taser, spray, or another less-lethal option before or 

instead of using deadly force, is better suited to resolution by 

the trier of fact. See Glenn, 673 F.3d at 878 (“[T]here was 

conflicting evidence on these points, so on summary 

judgment we must assume that a taser would have been a 

feasible option. Although a jury could ultimately disagree 

that the officers were in optimal taser range or that use of a 

taser was otherwise feasible or preferable, these are disputed 

questions of fact.”). 

The present case is readily distinguishable from Hart v. 

City of Redwood City, 99 F.4th 543 (9th Cir. 2024). The 

decedent in Hart was trying to commit suicide using a knife, 

and he already had cut himself by the time the police arrived 

at his home after his wife called for assistance. Id. at 545–

46. During the incident, Hart “came towards [the officers] 

at a slow run [or a ‘brisk walk’], holding the knife out 

towards the officers,” and he moved from thirty to thirtyseven feet away to only eight to ten feet away from the 

officers in about 5.9 seconds. Id. at 546, 549. Indeed, Hart’s 

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SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX 19

own expert testified that Hart posed an imminent threat to 

the officers. Id. at 551. By contrast, Plaintiff here never 

threatened or ran at the officers, as they conceded in their 

testimony; no less lethal methods were attempted; and 

Plaintiff’s expert did not concede that Plaintiff posed an 

imminent threat. 

Likewise, the present case is easily distinguished from 

two other recent opinions from this court. In Napouk v. Las 

Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, No. 23-15726, 2024 

WL 5051193 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2024), the decedent held a 

large object that appeared to the officers to be a machete, id. 

at *2, whereas here the object was a small pocketknife. In 

Napouk, the decedent moved the object around and pointed 

it in various directions. Id. at *2–3, *6. By contrast, here, 

Plaintiff held the pocketknife only to his own throat. There, 

the decedent continually advanced on the officers, id. at *3, 

*6, and began to move more quickly toward them while 

telling them to “get out of here,” id. at *3. In this case, 

Plaintiff said nothing aggressive, never moved quickly, and 

had stopped at the time he was shot. 

Cuevas v. City of Tulare, 107 F.4th 894 (9th Cir. 2024), 

differs from this case even more markedly. In Cuevas, 

police attempted a traffic stop involving three suspects. Id.

at 896–97. The suspects led police on a high-speed felony 

chase, involving an exchange of gunfire. Id. at 897. Here, 

Plaintiff was alone, was on foot, had no firearm, and did not 

attempt to flee.4

4 Cuevas was argued and submitted on June 13, 2024, while this case 

was submitted earlier, on May 17, 2024. Accordingly, this case has 

priority under Ninth Circuit General Order 4.1(a), but we distinguish it 

for the sake of clarity in our case law.

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20 SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX

Because we hold that Glenn put Smith-Petersen on 

notice that her use of deadly force plausibly violated 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of excessive 

force, we need not and do not reach Plaintiff’s alternative 

argument that this this case falls within the “obvious case” 

exception described in Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 

199 (2004) (per curiam). 

B. Jurisdiction Over the Cross-Appeal 

Considering our jurisdiction sua sponte, as we must, 

Hajek v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 186 F.3d 1105, 1107 (9th 

Cir. 1999), we lack jurisdiction over Smith-Petersen’s crossappeal. At the first step of the analysis, the district court 

ruled that genuine factual disputes existed, thus precluding a 

determination that Smith-Petersen’s use of deadly force was 

reasonable as a matter of law, “because the disputed facts 

and inferences could support a verdict for either party.” 

Although we have jurisdiction to resolve legal questions on 

appeal, “we lack jurisdiction to review a district court’s 

conclusion that genuine factual disputes exist.” Sialoi v. 

City of San Diego, 823 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2016); see

Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995) (noting that 

appellants are “explicitly limited . . . to appeals challenging, 

not a district court’s determination about what factual issues 

are ‘genuine,’ . . . but the purely legal issue [of] what law 

was ‘clearly established’” (citations omitted)). 

A party may nevertheless raise, on appeal, a legal 

argument that would trigger appellate jurisdiction. 

If the defendant argues only that the evidence 

is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact, we lack jurisdiction. If the 

defendant’s appeal raises purely legal 

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SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX 21

questions, however, . . . we may review those 

issues. In other words, we have jurisdiction 

to review an issue of law determining 

entitlement to qualified immunity—even if 

the district court’s summary judgment ruling 

also contains an evidence-sufficiency 

determination—but not to accede to a 

defendant’s request that we review that 

evidence-sufficiency determination on 

appeal.

Est. of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 

2021). Here, Smith-Petersen does not challenge a legal 

conclusion that the district court made and does not argue 

that there was no Fourth Amendment violation even if all 

disputed facts are construed in Plaintiff’s favor. She merely 

“characteriz[es] [her] arguments as legal ones directed at the 

materiality of disputed facts,” which we have held does not 

give rise to appellate jurisdiction. Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 

877, 886–87 (9th Cir. 2022). 

For example, Smith-Petersen challenges the district 

court’s determination that there is a genuine factual dispute 

as to whether she could have continued to move back, away 

from Plaintiff, as Plaintiff moved toward her and whether 

Plaintiff stopped before he was shot. She argues that those 

facts “are not material,” because Plaintiff’s “failure to heed 

[more than a dozen] lawful commands to stop and put down 

the knife made him a threat.” As another example, assessing 

the severity of the crime, Smith-Petersen argues that whether 

Plaintiff was actively threatening her and Batway with the 

knife is immaterial because it is undisputed that they were 

responding to a call of an attempted robbery with a knife. 

But those arguments are “poorly disguised [efforts]” aimed 

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22 SINGH V. CITY OF PHOENIX

at arguing materiality—the true challenge being directed at 

the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 886. Therefore, we 

“must accept the district court’s determinations that there are 

genuine disputes of fact and that a jury could find” that the 

facts favor Plaintiff. Id. at 887. Accordingly, we dismiss the 

cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to Defendant Smtih-Petersen with respect to 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, reverse the dismissal of the statelaw claims, and remand for further proceedings on the 

§ 1983 claim and for reconsideration of whether to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. We 

dismiss the cross-appeal. 

No. 23-15356, REVERSED AND REMANDED. No. 

23-15444, DISMISSED. Costs on appeal and cross-appeal 

are awarded to Plaintiff-Appellant. 

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