Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01584/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01584-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roberta Kowitz
Appellant
Douglas Reinertson
Appellee
Trinity Health
Appellee
Mark Waldera
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1584

___________________________

Roberta Kowitz,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

Trinity Health; Douglas Reinertson; Mark Waldera,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees.

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck

____________

 Submitted: May 16, 2016

 Filed: October 17, 2016

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Roberta Kowitz appeals the district court’s adverse grant ofsummary judgment

on her claims that her former employer, Trinity Health, and former supervisors,

Douglas Reinertson and Mark Waldera, violated her rights under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) and the North Dakota Human Rights Act. The district court

concluded that Kowitz failed to show she was capable of performing the essential

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360 
functions of her position, and that Trinity did not have a duty to reassign Kowitz to

an alternate position. Because we conclude that Kowitz produced evidence that she

could have performed the essential functions of her position with reasonable

accommodation, we reverse.

I. Background

Kowitz began working for Trinity Health in 2007 as a respiratory therapist in

the cardiopulmonary department. She later assumed additional duties as a lead

technician in the blood gas laboratory. Her direct supervisor was Reinertson, and

Reinertson’s direct supervisor was Waldera.

Kowitz had cervical spinal stenosis, a degenerative disease of the spine. On

July 21, 2010, Kowitz requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act

(FMLA) to have corrective neck surgery. Trinity approved her request to take leave

from July 27, 2010 through September 10, 2010. On September 7, 2010, Kowitz’s

doctor determined she could not return to work until October 18, 2010. Kowitz

requested an extension of her leave time until October 19, 2010. Trinity granted this

request. After the extension, Kowitz had used all of the leave time available to her

under the FMLA.

When she returned to work, Kowitz provided Trinity with a Return to Work

Form, in which her doctor outlined her physical restrictions. The form stated that up

until November 29, 2010, Kowitz would be restricted to working eight-hour shifts,

and lifting, carrying, pulling, or pushing no more than ten pounds, among other

restrictions. Kowitz also verbally informed Reinertson that she would be unable to

work twelve-hour shifts until approved to do so by her doctor. Trinity assigned

Kowitz to eight-hour shifts, rather than twelve-hour shifts, though Reinertson

informed her that Trinity would not be able to accommodate the eight-hour shifts

indefinitely.

-2-

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360 
On November 19, 2010, Reinertson posted a memorandum in the

cardiopulmonarydepartment’s communication book directing department employees

to provide updated copies of their basic life support certifications by November 26,

2010. The memorandum stated, “If you are not up to date on your BLS you will need

to submit a letter indicating why you are not up to date and the date you are scheduled

to take the BLS class.” Severalrespiratory therapists, including Kowitz, did not have

up-to-date basic life support certifications.

“Basic life support” refers to cardiopulmonary resuscitation, or CPR. 

Renewing a basic life support certification required taking a written examination and

performing a physical demonstration of CPR. After Reinertson posted the

memorandum, Kowitz took and passed the written examination. On November 30,

2010, Kowitz submitted a letter toReinertson informing himthatshe would be unable

to take the physical portion of the examination until cleared to do so by her doctor. 

Kowitz copied Waldera on the letter, as well as Trinity’s human resources

department. The letter stated, in part,

This is to inform you that I will not be able to do the physical part of

BLS until I have clearance from Dr[.] Transfeldt. I have an appointment

with him on December 2. I will inform you via fax hopefully that day. 

Thank you for understanding my condition. It has been very stressful

for me these past months. I am trying my best but at the same time I

want to protect the surgery I had on my neck. I do go home after a[n] 8

hour shift and I have a lot of tightness in my neck and times when we

are very busy, I have pain. 

On December 2, 2010, Kowitz’s doctor determined that she would need to

complete at least four additional months of physical therapy before she would be able

to complete the physical portion of the basic life support certification. Immediately

after the appointment, Kowitz left Reinertson a voicemail message relaying her

doctor’s instructions. On December 3, 2010, Reinertson and Waldera informed

-3-

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360 
Kowitz that her employment wasterminated because she was unable to performbasic

life support. 

Kowitz brought suit against Trinity, Reinertson, and Waldera, alleging, among

other things, that she was unlawfully terminated on the basis of her disability. The

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that

Kowitz was not qualified to perform the essential functions of either of her positions

because she was not certified to provide basic life support. The district court

additionally concluded that because Kowitz never requested a transfer to another

position within Trinity, Trinity was under no obligation to reassign her to a position

that did not require basic life support certification.

II. Discussion

The ADA and the North Dakota Human Rights Act prohibit employers from

discriminating against employees on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a);

N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-03(1). Because North Dakota courts look to case law

interpreting the ADA for guidance in interpreting the state statute, see Schweigert v.

Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 227 (N.D. 1993), we will consider the

claims together.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of a disability, a

plaintiff must show that she “(1) has a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the ADA,

(2) is a ‘qualified individual’ under the ADA, and (3) ‘suffered an adverse

employment action as a result of the disability.’” Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R.

Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Duty v. Norton–Alcoa Proppants,

293 F.3d 481, 490 (8th Cir. 2002)). For an employee to be a qualified individual

under the ADA, she must “(1) possess the requisite skill, education, experience, and

training for h[er] position, and (2) be able to perform the essential job functions, with

-4-

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 4 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360 
or without reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 712 (quoting Heaser v. Toro Co., 247

F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2001)).

Trinity argues that Kowitz was not a qualified individual under the ADA,

because performing basic life support was an essential function of both of her

positions. Essential functions “are the fundamental duties of the job, but not its

marginal functions.” Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corp. Servs., Inc., 691 F.3d 925, 930

(8th Cir. 2012). In determining whether a job function is essential, we consider

several factors, including “what functions the employer thinks are essential, written

job descriptions, how much time an employee spends on the job performing the

function, the consequences of not having the employee perform the function, and

whether other current employees in similar jobs perform the function.” Scruggs v.

Pulaski Cty., 817 F.3d 1087, 1092 (8th Cir. 2016).

The job description for Kowitz’s position as lead technician in the blood gas

laboratory states that basic life support certification is required. For the respiratory

therapist position, Kowitz produced one job description that states basic life support

certification is “preferred, but not required.” The defendants, on the other hand,

submitted other versions of the job description, which state that basic life support

certification isrequired, or would be required within 30 days of hiring. Additionally,

Reinertson and Waldera both testified that certification was necessary for respiratory

therapists to ensure the safety of their critically ill patients. 

There is some dispute as to how often respiratory therapists might be required

to perform chest compressions. Another respiratory therapist testified that she was

required to perform basic life support independently up to five times per year, and as

part of a team up to ten times per year. She testified that, depending on how many

employees were assisting in administering basic life support, respiratory therapists

could be required to perform chest compressions and airway management. Waldera,

on the other hand, testified that he was unaware of any respiratory therapist

-5-

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 5 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360 
performing chest compressions during his twelve years at Trinity. Nonetheless,

Waldera testified that regardless of how frequently it was required, respiratory

therapists were expected to perform basic life support independently when necessary

to save a patient’s life. Finally, even though several respiratory therapists’

certifications had lapsed at the time Reinertson posted his memorandum, every

respiratory therapist except for Kowitz obtained an updated certification by the

November 26, 2010 deadline. Given this evidence, there was no genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the certification was an essential function of both of

Kowitz’s positions. 

The question, then, is whether Kowitz could have performed this essential

function with an accommodation, and if so, whether Trinity failed to reasonably

accommodate her. According to Kowitz, Trinity should have allowed her additional

time to complete her basic life support certification, or reassigned her to another

position that did not require the certification. The district court rejected this

argument, concluding that Kowitz produced no evidence that she ever requested an

accommodation for her inability to perform basic life support.

When a disabled employee requests an accommodation for her disability, the

employer must engage in an interactive process with the employee to determine

whether a reasonable accommodation is possible. E.E.O.C. v. Convergys Customer

Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 491 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2007). The employee isresponsible for

initiating the process “by making [her] employer aware of the need for an

accommodation.” Id. The employee “must provide relevant details of[her] disability

and, if not obvious, the reason that [her] disability requires an accommodation” so

that the employer can identify and propose potential options, but she need not use

technical language to make the request or suggest what accommodation might be

appropriate. Id. This is in keeping with the logic of the interactive process, which

is intended to be “informal and flexible”—the employee is responsible for providing

relevant information about her condition and needs, and once aware of those needs

-6-

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 6 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360 
the employer is responsible for considering how best to accommodate them. Kratzer

v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 398 F.3d 1040, 1045 (8th Cir. 2005); see Convergys, 491

F.3d at 795.

Kowitz has presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether she requested an accommodation. Upon being told that her basic

life support certification was due, Kowitz notified her supervisor in writing that she

was unable to complete the physical component of the certification until she had been

cleared to do so by her doctor. At this point, Trinity was already aware of Kowitz’s

disability based on her prior FMLA leave for neck surgery and the information

provided in her Return to Work Form. Kowitz advised her supervisor that she had

an appointment scheduled with her doctor in a few days, and would inform him of her

clearance that day. Kowitz also indicated that she was still experiencing neck pain,

and thanked her supervisor for understanding her condition. After her doctor’s

appointment, Kowitz called her supervisor and left a voicemail notifying himthatshe

required four months of physical therapy before she would be able to complete the

life support certification. The next day, Kowitz was terminated from her position at

Trinity, with no further discussion.

Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that Kowitz had “[made

her] employer aware of the need for an accommodation.” Convergys, 491 F.3d at

795. Though Kowitz did not ask for a reasonable accommodation of her condition

in so many words, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Kowitz, her

notification to her supervisor that she would not be able to obtain the required

certification until she had completed physical therapy implied that an accommodation

would be required until then. Though we have held that an employer’s duty to

accommodate an employee is not triggered until the employee clearly requests an

accommodation, in those cases the ostensible requests were significantly more

ambiguous. See E.E.O.C. v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir.

2014) (the employee said that he was “fine,” never requested an accommodation, and

-7-

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 7 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360 
did not seek evaluation for his condition until after his termination); Ballard v. Rubin,

284 F.3d 957, 962 (8th Cir. 2002) (the employee specifically stated that he did not

want an accommodation, while also stating that it was “appropriate” for him to

consider his doctor’s recommendations); Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165

F.3d 1212, 1216 (8th Cir. 1999) (the employee never requested an accommodation,

but rather told her supervisor that she was “feeling fine” and had been approved to

return to work). 

By contrast, in this case there was evidence from which a jury could find that

Trinity should have understood—or did understand—Kowitz’s communications to

be a request for an accommodation. Trinity was aware of Kowitz’s specific

condition, as well as the general nature of the limitations it placed on her. Kowitz

referred to her surgery, prior leave, and ongoing pain in her written notification that

she would be unable to complete the life support certification without medical

clearance. Kowitz’s Return to Work Form, completed less than two months before

her termination, stated that she could not lift, carry, pull, or push more than ten

pounds. While the Return to Work Form did not explicitly say that Kowitz could not

complete the physical component of basic life support certification, there is nothing

in the record to show that she knew, at the time the form was completed, that she

would be required to recertify by a date certain and before she was physically able to

do so. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the certification requirement had not been

rigorously enforced; rather, Reinertson required an updated certification from

employees only after realizing that several therapists had expired certifications. The

record does show that Kowitz advised her supervisor of her inability to complete the

certification requirement on November 30, and again on December 2—several days

after the November 26 deadline for providing an up-to-date certification. But

Kowitz’s delay is not dispositive of whether she made the request, and it is for a jury

to decide how to reconcile that fact with the rest of the evidence. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 8 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360 
An employee is required only to “provide[] the employer with enough

information that, under the circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of

both the disability and desire for an accommodation.” Ballard, 284 F.3d at 962

(quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142 (3d Cir.), vacated on other

grounds, 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999)). This determination necessarily accounts for

the employer’s knowledge of the disability and the employee’s prior communications

about the disability, and is not limited to the precise words spoken by the employee

at the time of the request. When Kowitz advised her supervisor that she would be

unable to complete the physical requirements of her basic life support certification

until she had done four months of physical therapy, she was not required to “formally

invoke the magic words ‘reasonable accommodation’” to transform that notification

into a request for accommodation. Id. (quoting Taylor, 174 F.3d at 158). Viewed in

context, Kowitz’s written notification thatshe would be unable to complete the basic

life support certification without medical clearance, and her statement that she

required four months of physical therapy before completing the certification, could

readily have been understood to constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation

of her condition.1

III. Conclusion

Because there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kowitz

made a request for an accommodation sufficient to trigger Trinity’s duty to engage

The dissent asserts that this conclusion collapses the distinction between the

1

requirement that the employer know ofthe employee’s disability, and the requirement

that the employee request a reasonable accommodation. But our holding is not so

broad: We conclude merely that a reasonable jury could find that Trinity understood

Kowitz’s communications to be a request for accommodation, and not simply an

additional notification of her disability.

-9-

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 9 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360 
in the interactive process of identifying a reasonable accommodation, the judgment

of the district court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The court’s opinion issignificant doctrinally, because it collapses two elements

of a disability discrimination claim. The decision effectively eliminates what this

court consistently has called a “predicate requirement”—i.e., that an employee

seeking a reasonable accommodation from her employer must clearly request

accommodation before the employer has an obligation to engage in the “interactive

process” contemplated by the Americans with Disabilities Act. Because Roberta

Kowitz never requested an accommodation for the disability that made her unable to

perform an essential function of her job, I would affirm the judgment of the district

court.

Kowitz could not perform basic life support, which was an essential function

of her job as a respiratory therapist and lead technician in the blood gas lab at Trinity

Health. Trinity required that all employees provide a basic life support certification

by November 26, 2010, and Kowitz failed to do so. After Kowitz informed her

supervisor on December 2 that she could not complete her certification until she had

completed at least four months of physical therapy, Trinity terminated her

employment.

Kowitz now argues that Trinity failed to make a reasonable accommodation of

her disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Kowitz asserts that Trinity should

have given her a longer grace period within which to obtain her basic life support

certification or reassigned her to an open position that did not require performance

of life support.

-10-

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 10 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360 
An employee alleging that an employer failed to make a reasonable

accommodation must prove, among other things, two separate elements: (1) that the

employer knew about her disability, and (2) that she requested an accommodation or

assistance for her disability. Schaffhauser v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 794 F.3d 899,

906 (8th Cir. 2015). A request for accommodation is a “predicate requirement” to

initiate the interactive process. EEOC v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d 963, 971

(8th Cir. 2014); Kratzer v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 398 F.3d 1040, 1045 (8th Cir.

2005); Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2002); see also Walz v.

Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 779 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2015). Quoting the EEOC’s

interpretive guidelines, we have explained: “Once a qualified individual with a

disability has requested provision of a reasonable accommodation, the employer

must make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation.”

Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 951 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis

added) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. § 1630.9). 

This is not an onerous burden on the employee. There is no requirement to use

magic words like “reasonable accommodation,” but the employee’s notice must

“make it clear to the employer that the employee wants assistance for his or her

disability.” Id. at 952 n.5 (emphasis added); accord Ballard, 284 F.3d at 962

(explaining that notice to the employer “must make clear that the employee wants

assistance for his or her disability”) (emphasis added). We affirmed a summary

judgment in Product Fabricators because the evidence did “not indicate that [the

employee] made a specific request for an accommodation.” 763 F.3d at 971

(emphasis added). In the court’s favored precedent, EEOC v. Convergys Customer

Management Group, Inc., 491 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2007), the employee did not merely

notify his employer of an inability to work due to disability and then claim that the

employer should have inferred a request for assistance; he “testified at trial that he

requested an accommodation because of limitations created by his wheelchair, thus

meeting his initial burden.” Id. at 795. The plaintiff in Ballard generated an issue of

-11-

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 11 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360 
fact on the request element by asking the employer to account for his doctor’s

recommendations of curtailing travel and to take his physical limitationsinto account

before requiring out-of-town travel. 284 F.3d at 962.

It is undisputed that Kowitz never requested an accommodation for her

inability to perform basic life support. She merely informed supervisor Reinertson

thatshe was unable to attempt to obtain a basic life support certification until she had

completed four months of physical therapy. That notification of Kowitz’s disability

does not create a genuine issue of fact concerning whether Kowitz requested an

accommodation. As the district court explained, “Kowitz admits she never made a

request or even mentioned to Waldera, Reinertson, or the Trinity Health HR

Department she was interested in transferring to a vacant position within Trinity

Health.” R. Doc. 75, at 14. And “Kowitz never applied for any positions with Trinity

Health despite knowing job vacancies were posted on Trinity’s website which she

was familiar with and had access to.” Id. 

In rejecting the district court’s judgment, the court conflates the employer’s

knowledge of an employee’s disability with the requirement that an employee must

make a clear request for accommodation. Any employee who notifies an employer

that she cannot work because of a disability can be said in some sense to have made

her employer “aware of the need for an accommodation.” Ante, at 7. But we have

never said that merely notifying the employer of a disability is an “implied” request,

id., sufficient to trigger an employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process. We

have said precisely the opposite: an employee must make it clear that she wants

assistance or accommodation. Even where an employer previously has made

reasonable accommodation, an employee who wants additional assistance cannot

“expect the employer to read her mind and know she secretly wanted a particular

accommodation and then sue the employer for not providing it.” Mole v. Buckhorn

Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and

-12-

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 12 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360 
brackets omitted). It is not the court’s place to impose a rule based on how a

beneficent employer would treat an employee who notifies the employer of a

disability, even if some employers might well take it upon themselves to initiate an

interactive process without a request from the employee.

People should be entitled to clarity in the law. Employers and employees rely

on predictability to make efficient decisions and to avoid costly and burdensome

litigation. There is no practical difference between asserting that this record creates

a genuine issue of fact for trial, ante, at 9 n.1, and collapsing what heretofore have

been two separate elements of a disability discrimination claim. By eliminating the

requirement of a clear request for accommodation that is distinct from notice of

disability, the court generates regrettable uncertainty. I would affirm the judgment.

_________________________

-13-

Appellate Case: 15-1584 Page: 13 Date Filed: 10/17/2016 Entry ID: 4459360