Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caeb-1_17-ap-01009/USCOURTS-caeb-1_17-ap-01009-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
U.S. Trustee
Plaintiff
Terri Ann Brest-Taylor
Defendant

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRESNO DIVISION

In re

TERRI ANN BREST-TAYLOR,

Debtor.

TRACY HOPE DAVIS,

United States Trustee,

Plaintiff,

v.

TERRI ANN BREST-TAYLOR,

Defendant.

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Case No. 17-10310-B-13

Adv. Proceeding No. 17-1009-B

DC No. UST-1

MEMORANDUM RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

11 U.S.C. § 105 permits a bankruptcy court to issue any 

order or judgment “necessary or appropriate to carry out the 

provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code.]” 1 Cases have held this 

section empowers the court to enjoin future filings to prevent 

abuse of the bankruptcy process. See generally, In re Leavitt,

209 B.R. 935 (9th Cir. BAP 1997) aff’d on other grounds (In re 

Leavitt), 171 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999). In this dismissed case, 

the United States Trustee seeks an injunction barring this 

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references 

to the Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and all “Rule” 

references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 

1001-9037. All “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

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Debtor from refiling for two years based on, among other things, 

numerous filings by this Debtor in the past five years.

The court has applied the Ninth Circuit’s factors governing 

dismissals with prejudice and finds this case appropriate for 

such a bar. This motion for summary judgment has been opposed by 

this pro se Debtor. However, the Debtor has not provided any 

evidence establishing a genuine material disputed fact 

warranting a trial and thus summary judgment is granted.

PERTINENT FACTS

Defendant, Debtor Terri Ann Brest-Taylor (“Defendant”) 

filed this bankruptcy case on January 31, 2017. On page 3 of the 

petition, the Defendant failed to disclose all of her prior 

bankruptcy filings within the proceeding eight years, listing 

only one of the relevant five cases.2 After the court issued a 

“Notice of Incomplete Filing” on January 31, 2017, the United 

States Trustee filed this adversary proceeding.3 The Defendant 

failed to appear at either her first meeting of creditors or the 

continued meeting.4

The Chapter 13 Trustee filed a motion to dismiss on several 

grounds including the Debtor’s unreasonable delay, failure to 

appear at the meeting of creditors, failure to provide necessary 

documents, failure to file all schedules and statements, and 

failure to file Chapter 13 plan.5 The court dismissed this 

2 Ex. 13 to Decl. of Gregory S. Powell (“Powell Declaration”) 

(Doc. No. 18). 3 Powell Declaration Ex. 12. 4 Id. 5 Powell Declaration Ex. 14 and 15.

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bankruptcy case on April 14, 2017, but the court reserved 

jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding.

In the previous eight years, this Debtor has filed six 

bankruptcy cases including this case.6 All those cases, except

one, was dismissed for the Defendant’s failure to submit 

documents, make payments or otherwise not comply with her duties 

under the Bankruptcy Code.7,8 The United States Trustee also 

established that Defendant’s ninth bankruptcy, filed August 10, 

2016, in this division (16-12894-13), the Defendant failed to 

disclose prior bankruptcy cases.9

In opposition to the motion, the Defendant responded to the 

United States Trustee’s separate statement of undisputed facts 

and submitted a declaration. The Defendant does not dispute the 

fact that she filed all of the bankruptcy petitions or that they 

were dismissed or that a few cases resulted in discharge. 

Rather, the Defendant states in her declaration essentially the 

same statements made in her answer.10 She states that “she feels 

she is under unfriendly fire and by her actions did not pursue 

the Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing to date. Even though the 

6 Powell Declaration Ex. 5 through 15. 7 The one case which was not dismissed was a Chapter 7 proceeding 

filed on November 21, 2012 in the Sacramento Division of this court 

(12-40363-7). A discharge was entered March 25, 2013 (Powell 

Declaration Ex. 6). 8 The United States Trustee has submitted to the court evidence 

of filings by this Debtor dating back to February 20, 1996. A total of 

four bankruptcies were filed by this Debtor between 1996 and 2004, two 

discharges were entered in Chapter 7 cases and two were dismissed. On 

June 25, 2003, the Bankruptcy Court barred the Debtor from filing a 

bankruptcy proceeding for 180 days. (Powell Declaration Ex. 1 through 

4). 9 Powell Declaration Ex. 11. 10 See Doc. No. 27.

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remainder of the documents were prepared and ready for filing.”11

She labels some of the repeat filings as “mere duplicates.”12 As 

for the filings since 2012, the Defendant claims that “[she] was 

not abusive in filing.” She acknowledged that she received a 

chapter 7 discharge “without incident” in her sixth bankruptcy 

case.13

Specifically, in case seven, filed June 3, 2015, the 

Defendant references the completion of a civil litigation 

matter, but that her antagonists in the civil litigation 

“violated the automatic stay in place.”14 For her eighth case, 

filed October 27, 2015, she states that she “filed to preserve 

the estate and business assets after the Calaveras County Butte 

fire in September 2015.” She also states “Defendant had to deal 

with the landlord’s emotional response to take their real estate 

back from Defendant.” She acknowledged that her eighth case was 

dismissed and her plan payment returned to her by the Chapter 13 

Trustee.

For her ninth case, filed August 10, 2016, the Defendant 

admitted it was a skeletal bankruptcy petition and an “emergency 

filing” but she “did not have her previous bankruptcy filing 

numbers available.”15 She stated that “the trustee’s attorney 

said that a discharge was too early so we did not continue.”16

As for the current case, which was dismissed, she states 

that “prior bankruptcy filings as the case numbers would be 

11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id.

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amended [sic] in her final submittal before the Chapter 13 341 

meeting.” The Defendant goes on to say “upon Defendant’s arrival 

to the Fresno Division to complete her filings she discovered 

that an adversary complaint by the United States Trustee had 

been filed on February 10, 2017, indicating that she be barred 

from the bankruptcy court now and for another two years. 

Defendant left the building and did not file or continue as 

slanderous comments were apparent [sic] that there would be no 

relief.”17

JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction of this adversary proceeding 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) in that this bankruptcy case was 

referred to this court by the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of California by way of General Orders 181 

and 223. The District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1334(b) in that this is a civil proceeding arising in a 

case under Title 11 of the United States Code. This is a “core” 

proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).

Should it ever be determined that this court was unable to 

enter a final adjudication in this matter, the court finds that 

the United States Trustee has impliedly consented to this 

court’s authority to enter a final judgment by filing this 

action and not reserving the right to require the District Court 

to finally adjudicate this matter. The court finds that the 

Defendant has expressly consented to this court entering a final

17 Id.

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judgment because paragraph 1 of the Defendant’s answer states 

“jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding is agreed upon, 

unless change of venue is granted.”

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Plaintiff and movant, the United States Trustee, contends 

that even though the underlying bankruptcy case has been 

dismissed, the Defendant in this case should be barred from 

filing for two years. The United States Trustee contends that 

the Defendant is using bankruptcy for the sole purpose of 

delaying creditors; that she has no legitimate reason to file 

for bankruptcy relief. The United States Trustee also contends 

that the Defendant’s creditors have been wrongfully hindered and 

delayed and that the Defendant will continue to abuse the 

bankruptcy process unless the case is dismissed and the 

Defendant is enjoined from filing another bankruptcy for two 

years.

The Defendant does not dispute the number of filings and 

proclaims that summary judgment is not appropriate because 

“there is no rule disallowing the amount of bankruptcy filings.” 

The Defendant also claims that none of the filings were 

“abusive.” She also claims that a two-year bar would be 

“slanderous” to her and that summary judgment should not be 

granted because the court may delay entry of summary judgment to 

allow discovery to proceed.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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ANALYSIS

1. Summary Judgment Standard

In an adversary proceeding, summary judgment is proper when 

“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), incorporated by 

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056. The key inquiry on a 

motion for summary judgment is whether a genuine issue of 

material fact remains for trial. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 258-50 

(1986).

“[A dispute] is genuine only if there is a sufficient 

evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact finder could find 

for the nonmoving party, and a dispute [over a fact] is 

‘material’ only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under 

the governing law.” Barboza v. New Form, Inc. (In re Barboza), 

545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2008) citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

248.

The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence 

of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corporation v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). To support the assertion that 

a fact cannot be genuinely disputed, the moving party must “cite 

to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . ., admissions, 

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A).

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If a moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings 

and identify facts that show a genuine issue for trial. Celotex,

477 U.S. at 324. See also Barboza, 545 F.3d 707 [“the burden 

shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial.”] citing 

Henderson v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1055-56 (9th 

Cir. 2002). The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show 

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Electric Industries Company v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 

U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Summary judgment may be appropriate due to 

the nonmoving party’s failure to buttress allegations with 

adequate evidentiary support. In re Quinones, 537 B.R. 942, 947 

(Bankr. Ct. N.D. Cal. 2015) citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

In ruling on the summary judgment motion, the court must 

view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Barboza, 545 F.3d at 707, citing County of 

Tuolumne v. Sonora Community Hospital, 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The court “generally cannot grant summary judgment 

based on its assessment of the credibility of the evidence 

presented.” Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 756 (1978). “At the 

summary judgment stage, the judge’s function is not himself to 

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to 

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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2. Standard for Dismissal with a Bar to Refiling

This case has been dismissed. The issue before the court is 

whether the Defendant should be barred from refiling. In Leavitt 

v. Soto (In re Leavitt), 171 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999) the 

Ninth Circuit held that a dismissal with prejudice must be 

coupled with a finding of bad faith based on egregious conduct. 

In other words, dismissal with prejudice under § 349(a) is not 

meant to be a remedy for every instance of Debtor misconduct. 

Id. In this circuit, bankruptcy courts make good faith 

determinations on a case-by-case basis, after considering the 

totality of the circumstances. Id.

The so called “Leavitt factors” are: (1) whether the 

debtor misrepresented facts in her petition or plan, unfairly 

manipulated the Bankruptcy Code, or otherwise filed her chapter 

13 petition in an inequitable manner; (2) the debtor’s history 

of filings and dismissals; (3) whether the debtor only intended 

to defeat state court litigation; and (4) whether egregious 

behavior was present. Id. In addition, a “court must make its 

good faith determination in light of all militating factors.” Ho 

v. Dowell (In re Ho), 274 B.R. 867, 876 (9th Cir. BAP 2002) 

citing Goeb v. Heid (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 

1982). Although application of the Leavitt factors inform the 

process, “the court is not obligated to count the four Leavitt

factors as though they present some sort of a box-score but 

rather is to consider them all and weigh them in judging the 

‘totality of circumstances.’” In re Lehr, 479 B.R. 90, 98 

(Bankr. N.D.Cal. 2012). “The Bankruptcy Court is not required to 

find that each [Leavitt] factor is satisfied or even to weigh 

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each factor equally.” Rather, “[t]he Leavitt factors are simply 

tools that the Bankruptcy Court employs in considering the 

totality of the circumstances.” Id.

3. Application of the Leavitt Factors

The Defendant here does not dispute any of the facts 

asserted by the United States Trustee in support of the motion 

for summary judgment. Rather, the Defendant urges that none of 

her previous filings, nor the most recent, was “abusive.” 

However, simply raising the self-serving conclusion that a 

filing was “not abusive” does not amount to raising a material 

factual dispute warranting denial of summary judgment. As 

Leavitt demonstrates, the totality of circumstances should be 

considered.

Here, the court cannot ignore that the totality of 

circumstances includes evidence of virtually all three 

components of the first Leavitt factor. First, the Defendant 

failed on two occasions to list all her previous filings in both 

her ninth and tenth cases. This is a misrepresentation of facts 

in her petition. The Defendant’s own declaration does not deny 

that facts were misrepresented when she states “she did not 

intend in any case to misrepresent facts in her petition or plan 

in an unfair manner.”18

Second, the undisputed facts establish that the Defendant 

unfairly manipulated the Bankruptcy Code. In her seventh case, 

filed June 3, 2015, the Defendant says under oath that a deposit 

was taken, that her antagonists violated the automatic stay, but 

18 Doc. 27, 4:23-25.

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she paid “their attorney to stipulate and move on.”19 In her 

eighth case, the Defendant states under oath that she filed the 

case on December 27, 2015 to preserve the estate and business 

assets after a fire but that “[she] had to deal with the 

landlord’s emotional response to take their real estate back 

from Defendant.” She goes on to say “Defendant had motioned the 

court to do a voluntary dismissal as the business relationship 

and tenant relationship suffered and Defendant reluctantly moved 

from their building.”20 Dealing with an emotional response is not 

a reason to file bankruptcy. She determined three months after 

the case was filed that a business and tenant relationship 

suffered and she “moved.” Again, no stated justification for 

filing the bankruptcy was provided.

In her ninth case, Defendant admits it was an emergency 

filing and she did not have her previous bankruptcy filing 

numbers available. She provides no basis or reason for the 

filing and allowed the case to be dismissed because she was 

advised by the Trustee’s attorney that a discharge was “too 

early.”21 No fact was provided to justify the filing. The 

Defendant simply states that it was not abusive. Finally, the 

most recent case. The Defendant admitted it was an emergency 

filing, but she aborted the attempt when she heard what she 

believed were slanderous comments.22 All of these are examples of 

manipulation of the Bankruptcy Code rather than seeking relief 

for any particular reason.

19 Doc. 27, 3:25-4:2. 20 Doc. 27, 4:4-9. 21 Doc. 27, 4:11-13. 22 Doc. 27, 4:16-21.

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Thirdly, all of these filings have resulted in delaying the 

Defendant’s creditors. Given the lack of justification provided 

in response to this motion, this evidence establishes the 

Defendant filing petitions in an inequitable manner.23

The second Leavitt factor is true beyond cavil. In the past 

21 years, the Debtor has filed ten bankruptcy cases. She has 

filed six bankruptcy cases since 2009. With the exception of the 

cases filed under Chapter 7, all were dismissed and she has 

already been subject to a 180-day bar. The dismissals since 2009 

have, with one exception, all been due to failure to file 

documents, make payments, or in the case of the most recent 

filing, failing to do several things required of Debtors under 

the Bankruptcy Code.

The third Leavitt factor, intention to defeat the state 

court litigation, does not appear applicable in this case. The 

United States Trustee has not established, with any facts, any 

attempt by the Debtor to avoid state court litigation. The 

Defendant’s own declaration references various state court 

litigations which had been pending or concluded prior to, or 

contemporaneously with, at least two of her Chapter 13 filings. 

However, the court, on this record, cannot find that the defeat 

of state court litigation was a primary factor in this Debtor’s 

numerous filings.

The final Leavitt factor, egregious behavior, is present in 

this case. The sheer numerosity of filings suggests egregious 

23 While it is true that the Debtor has received discharges when 

Chapter 7’s were filed, that does not explain or justify the numerous 

aborted or failed attempts to commence a Chapter 13 case under the 

Bankruptcy Code.

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behavior. Beyond that, however, other facts demonstrate what 

this court views as egregious behavior. First, the Defendant’s 

own opposition states “Defendant did file the following 

bankruptcies as there is no rule disallowing the amount of 

bankruptcy filing(s) only one discharge per chapter is allowed 

in the time allowed by law . . . .”24 The Defendant also states 

in her opposition “if the bankruptcy court dismisses the case, 

you may re-file unless the court says otherwise.”25 Even more 

egregious is the following:

There is no limit to filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, 

only a limit to Chapter 7 filings every eight years 

and, prior to that there was no limit to filing a 

Chapter 13 bankruptcy, only a Chapter 7 every six 

years. Unless, the U.S. Trustee, Trustee, or creditor 

opposes within the time allowed per notice by the 

Court the bankruptcy filing(s) could be filed and even 

re-filed thereby generating a new case number . . . . 

Discharge may not be available but the Chapter 13 Plan 

payments would be a viable way to clearly pace out the 

outstanding balances to creditors.26

These statements not only show a misunderstanding of the 

bankruptcy law, but an intent to violate that law and make 

multiple filings if it suits the Defendant regardless of the 

outcome of those filings. Clearly, the Defendant is 

sophisticated, has a partial knowledge of the bankruptcy law,

and has demonstrated an inclination to exploit the law by filing 

numerous cases that do not conclude. There is no material 

dispute as to these facts since they are in the record by the 

Defendant herself.

24 Doc. 25, 3:1-3. 25 Doc. 25, 3:7. 26 Doc. 26, 2:9-20.

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The court has viewed all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Defendant in this case. The court believes the 

Defendant has a sincere belief that the filings were not 

abusive. However, the objective facts are undisputed. Those 

objective facts show a tendency to manipulate the Bankruptcy 

Code to the detriment of the creditors on numerous occasions 

over the past five years.27 Looking at the facts in a light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no reasonable doubt 

as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact. Compare, Hector 

v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976). The Defendant here 

has not set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine 

dispute for trial. Barboza, 545 F.3d at 707. The Defendant has 

provided no specific evidence to show that a dispute exists. Id.

The court will issue a bar to Defendant’s further filing 

without prior permission from the Chief Bankruptcy Judge of the 

affected District. This permits the defendant access to the 

court if necessary. However, the defendant will need to 

demonstrate the necessity of the future filing while the bar is 

in effect. The court does not issue this order lightly, but has 

determined that without this condition, there may very well be 

future filings that have similar results as most of the last 

ten.

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27 While not necessary or important to this decision, the court is 

mindful of the numerous filings by this Debtor over the past 20 years. 

However, those filings predating 2012 have little present 

significance.

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4. Need for Further Discovery

The Defendant did raise, without full factual development, 

that summary judgment may not be proper at this stage before the 

parties have engaged in discovery.28 The Defendant’s lack of 

factual development on this issue defeats the claim.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) provides as 

follows:

(d) When Facts Are Unavailable to the Nonmovant. 

If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, 

for specified reasons, it cannot present facts 

essential to justify its opposition, the court may:

(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;

(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or 

declarations or take discovery, or;

(3) issue any other appropriate order.

Defendant’s declaration filed in opposition to the motion for 

summary judgment does not show any specified reasons that the 

Defendant could not present facts essential to justify her 

opposition. The declaration does not state any need for 

additional evidence to oppose the motion for summary judgment or 

specify reasons why the evidence was unavailable or even 

intimate what that evidence may be. This omission cannot be 

remedied by construing the Defendant’s declaration entirely in 

her favor. Even if the declaration was so construed, there is no 

mention of any need for further discovery in order for the 

Defendant to meet the proof presented in the motion for summary 

judgment.

28 Doc. 29, 2:13-3:23.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the United States Trustee’s 

motion for summary judgment will be granted. The case having 

already been dismissed, the motion for summary judgment is 

granted barring the Defendant from filing another bankruptcy 

case for two years from the date this judgment is final unless 

prior authorization is obtained from the Chief Bankruptcy Judge 

in the District in which she desires to file a bankruptcy case.

In seeking leave to file a bankruptcy case in this or any 

other District, the motion for leave to file shall be supported 

by drafts of the petition, schedules, statement of financial 

affairs, and all other documents required for the complete 

filing of a bankruptcy case. In addition a copy of the order and 

this memorandum shall also be included as exhibits provided to 

the Chief Bankruptcy Judge from whom leave to file a bankruptcy 

case is requested.

The Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court, and deputy clerks 

operating at the discretion and control of the Clerk of the 

Court in any District, are authorized to reject any petition 

attempted to be filed by Terri Ann Brest-Taylor, individually or 

jointly, during the two-year period if there is not prior 

authorization from the Chief Bankruptcy Judge of the

corresponding District. The United States Trustee shall prepare

/ / /

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the order granting the motion for summary judgment and a 

separate judgment, forthwith.29

29 The above constitutes the court’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

52 made applicable to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy courts 

by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052. To the extent 

necessary, the above shall also constitute the court’s reasons 

for granting the motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

56(a) made applicable to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy by 

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056.

Memorandum [UST-1] - 17

 

Filed 08/18/17 Case 17-01009 Doc 39
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Instructions to Clerk of Court

Service List - Not Part of Order/Judgment

The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment 

or other court generated document transmitted herewith to the 

parties below. The Clerk of Court will send the Order via the 

BNC or, if checked X , via the U.S. mail.

Debtor(s), Attorney for the Debtor(s), Bankruptcy Trustee 

(if appointed in the case), and X Other Persons Specified 

Below:

Terri Ann Brest-Taylor

c/o 1600 Marion St #103

Kingsburg CA 93631

Gregory S. Powell

2500 Tulare St #1401

Fresno CA 93721

U.S. Trustee

Office of the U.S. Trustee

2500 Tulare St #1401

Fresno CA 93721

Memorandum [UST-1] - 18

Filed 08/18/17 Case 17-01009 Doc 39