Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06991/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06991-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert McDonald
Plaintiff
Murali R. Nair
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MCDONALD,

Plaintiff,

v.

MURALI R. NAIR,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-06991-DMR 

ORDER REASSIGNING CASE TO 

DISTRICT JUDGE; REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IFP 

APPLICATION AND REMAND CASE 

TO SUPERIOR COURT

Pro se defendant Murali R. Nair (“Mr. Nair”) removed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1441 from Superior Court of California, County of Shasta, where it was pending as a small claims 

action against Mr. Nair. [Docket No. 1 (Notice of Removal).] Mr. Nair also filed an application to 

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). [Docket No. 2 (IFP).]

Not all parties have filed a declination or consent to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Therefore, the court issues this Report and Recommendation and 

reassigns this case to a District Judge for final disposition, with the recommendation that the IFP 

application be granted and that summary remand be ordered.

I. IFP APPLICATION

Having evaluated Mr. Nair’s financial affidavit, the court finds that he has satisfied the 

economic eligibility requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and therefore recommends that the IFP 

application be granted.

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

“Any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States 

have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or other defendants, to the district court 

of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 

Case 3:18-cv-06991-MMC Document 8 Filed 01/22/19 Page 1 of 4
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If the district court at any time determines that it lacks jurisdiction over the 

removed action, it must remedy the improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state 

court.” Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir.), opinion amended on 

denial of reh’g, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447). “The removal statute is 

strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction 

falls to the party invoking the statute.” Id. 

A. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a “federal court is presumed to lack 

jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. 

Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). “[T]he presence or 

absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which 

provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the 

plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) 

(quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). That rule applies equally to 

evaluating the existence of federal questions in cases brought initially in federal court and in 

removed cases. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 

n.2 (2002). 

Here, the underlying complaint alleges claims for relief based on unpaid wages and travel 

expenses. These are claims arising from California state law and do not give rise to federal question 

jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, there is no basis for exercising federal question jurisdiction.

B. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

A district court has diversity jurisdiction where the parties are diverse and “the matter in 

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332. “[I]n determining whether a challenged jurisdictional amount has been met, district courts 

are permitted only to assess the allegations in a complaint and not the validity of any asserted 

defenses . . . .” Ochoa v. Interbrew Am., Inc., 999 F.2d 626, 629 (2d Cir. 1993). Potential defenses 

to all or part of a plaintiff’s claim do not affect the amount in controversy, because the defense may 

Case 3:18-cv-06991-MMC Document 8 Filed 01/22/19 Page 2 of 4
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

be shown to be invalid. See Riggins v. Riggins, 415 F.2d 1259, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1969) (noting that 

statute of limitations defense might bar portion of relief sought did not affect amount in 

controversy). Similarly, the amount in controversy is determined without regard to any 

counterclaim to which a defendant may be entitled. See Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 

789 (9th Cir. 1977). 

In this case, the underlying complaint claims damages in the amount of $9,011.00, which is 

well below the statutory minimum of $75,000. There are no other facts establishing that the amount 

in controversy is sufficient for the court to exercise diversity jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, there is no basis for exercising diversity jurisdiction over the small claims 

action.

III. VENUE

“A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file 

in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is 

pending . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (emphasis added).

Here, the underlying complaint was filed in Shasta County Superior Court, which is in the 

Eastern District of California. Mr. Nair offers no basis for removing this case to the Northern 

District of California, nor is there any basis appearing on the face of the complaint or the notice of 

removal why venue is proper in this district.

Accordingly, Mr. Nair has failed to establish that venue is proper in the Northern District of 

California.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the court recommends that Mr. Nair’s IFP application be granted and 

that this action be remanded to the Shasta County Superior Court. The Clerk is directed to reassign 

this case to a District Judge.

Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district judge 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 

N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72-2.

// 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2019

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Donna M. Ryu

Case 3:18-cv-06991-MMC Document 8 Filed 01/22/19 Page 4 of 4