Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05050/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05050-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anne Shields
Petitioner

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2004 Decided September 14, 2004

No. 03-5047

IN RE: PHILLIP A. BROOKS

PETITIONER

Consolidated with

Nos. 03-5048, 03-5049, 03-5050, 03-5057

On Petitions for Writ of Mandamus

(No. 96cv01285)

Robert D. Luskin argued the cause for petitioners. On the

petitions for writ of mandamus and reply were Amy Berman

Jackson, John Thorpe Richards, Jr., Elizabeth Wallace Fleming, Michael D. Goodstein, Deanna Chang, William H.

Briggs, Jr., Marc E. Rindner, Hamilton P. Fox, III, Gregory

S. Smith, Thomas E. Wilson, Bradley S. Lui, Dwight Bostwick, and Melissa McNiven.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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G. William Austin, III argued the cause for respondents.

With him on the response were Dennis M. Gingold, Elliott H.

Levitas and Keith Harper.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Before us are five petitions for

writs of mandamus filed by 11 current and former officials

and employees of the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and

of Justice. Each of the petitioners was the subject of an

investigation, initiated by the district court, to determine

whether that individual should be ordered to show cause why

he or she should not be held in contempt for conduct relating

to the litigation over the DOI’s handling of monies held in

trust for individual Indians.

The petitioners originally sought the recusal of District

Court Judge Royce Lamberth, Special Master Alan Balaran,

and Special Master-Monitor Joseph Kieffer III based upon

alleged ex parte communications they made or received in the

course of that litigation. Special Master Balaran has since

resigned and we ordered Special Master-Monitor Kieffer

removed in Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

The petitioners still seek to recuse Judge Lamberth and to

suppress the reports and recommendations written (but not

filed with the district court) by Special Master Balaran before

he resigned.

We now deny the petition to recuse Judge Lamberth from

the pending contempt proceedings because he has stated he

did not receive ex parte communications substantively related

to those proceedings from either Balaran or Kieffer, and we

have no reason to conclude he abused his discretion by

refusing to recuse himself. We do, however, vacate Balaran’s

proposed reports and recommendations relating to the contempt proceedings.

I. Background

The present petitions and the contempt proceedings to

which they relate arise from the ongoing litigation over the

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DOI’s mishandling of the ‘‘Individual Indian Money’’ trust

accounts created for each Indian having an interest in certain

allotted lands. See Cobell, 334 F.3d at 1133. Because the

petitioners are not parties to that case, the facts and the

procedural history relevant here may be recounted without

laying waste the better part of a forest.

In February 1999 the district court held then-Secretary of

the Treasury Robert Rubin, then-Secretary of the Interior

Bruce Babbitt, and then-Assistant Secretary of the Interior

Kevin Gover, in their official capacities, in civil contempt for

violating two discovery orders issued in the trust reform

litigation. See Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C.

1999). The district court, with the consent of the parties,

then appointed Alan Balaran to serve as a special master

pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

in order to ‘‘oversee the discovery process in this case.’’ In

August 1999 the district court additionally authorized Balaran

to make ‘‘on-site visits to any location where [trust account]

Records are maintained’’ in order to protect such records

‘‘from destruction or threatened destruction.’’

In April 2001 the district court, again with the consent of

the parties, appointed Joseph Kieffer to serve for one year as

a ‘‘court monitor,’’ with a mandate to ‘‘monitor and review all

of the Interior defendants’ trust reform activities and file

written reports of his findings with the Court.’’ Kieffer was

‘‘permitted to make and receive ex parte communications with

all entities necessary and proper to effectuate his duties.’’ By

October Kieffer had issued four reports. The reports were

‘‘unflattering to the DOI’’ and ‘‘prompted the district court to

order Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb TTT

to ‘show cause why they should not be held in civil contempt

of court in their official capacities,’ ’’ Cobell, 334 F.3d at 1135;

see also Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2002)

(Contempt Referrals).

The order to show cause set out five possible reasons (or

‘‘specifications’’) for holding Norton and McCaleb in contempt: four were based upon Court Monitor Kieffer’s reports

and addressed the DOI’s noncompliance with court orders

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relating to trust reform; the fifth was based upon a report

issued in November 2001 by Special Master Balaran concerning the destruction of email records by officials and employees of the DOI. See Cobell, 334 F.3d at 1135; see also Cobell

v. Norton, 237 F. Supp. 2d 71, 76 (D.D.C. 2003) (Order

Denying Recusal). On September 17, 2002 the district court

held both Norton and McCaleb in civil contempt of court upon

all five specifications. Contempt Referrals, at 161, rev’d, 334

F.3d at 1145-50 (vacating contempt charge against Norton

because specifications either did not support such a charge or

were based upon ‘‘conduct of her predecessor,’’ and vacating

contempt charge against McCaleb because court did not

identify any ‘‘specific act or omission whatsoever on his

part’’). At the same time the district court referred to

Balaran (1) the plaintiffs’ October 2001 ‘‘Motion for Order to

Show Cause Why Interior Defendants and Their Employees

and Counsel Should Not Be Held in Contempt for Violating

Court Orders and for Defrauding This Court TTT,’’ and (2)

their March 2002 ‘‘Motion for Order to Show Cause Why

Interior Alleged Contemnors and Their Counsel Should Not

Be Held in Contempt for Destroying E-mail.’’ See Order

Denying Recusal, at 76; see also Contempt Referrals, at 155.

With respect to the first motion, the court instructed

Balaran to

develop a complete record with respect to these 37 nonparty individuals [and], upon completing his review of

these matters, issue a report and recommendation regarding whether each individual should be ordered to

show cause why he or she should not be held in (civil or

criminal) contempt of court, or whether other sanctions

are appropriate against such individuals.

Contempt Referrals, at 155. With respect to the second

motion, the court instructed him to ‘‘issue a report and

recommendation regarding the issues raised.’’ Id. at 155-56.

Thereafter, 16 of the 37 non-parties named in the September 17 referrals filed motions in the district court to recuse

Judge Lamberth, Special Master Balaran, and Special Master-Monitor Kieffer from participating in the contempt proUSCA Case #03-5050 Document #847855 Filed: 09/14/2004 Page 4 of 16
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ceedings.* They argued that ‘‘although the communications

between the Court and its special masters were not improper

in the context of the underlying litigation,’’ they were inconsistent with participation in the contempt proceedings because ‘‘the Master and the Monitor furnished the Court with

extrajudicial knowledge about the current litigation.’’ Order

Denying Recusal, at 77-78. In the alternative, the movants

sought discovery regarding the substance of the ex parte

communications Balaran and Kieffer had with employees and

officials of the DOI and with the district judge. The district

court denied the motions in their entirety.

In February 2003, 11 of the 16 movants petitioned this

court for writs of mandamus providing the same relief.**

Their petitions were held in abeyance while the court decided

Cobell, 334 F.3d 1128, in which we concluded, among other

things, that Kieffer’s appointment as Special Master-Monitor

was not valid because it was made over the objection of the

defendants.

Following our decision in Cobell, we ordered further briefing and argument on the current petitions. The plaintiffs in

the underlying trust reform litigation then responded to the

five petitions, and the petitioners filed a consolidated reply.

After oral argument on March 15, 2004 we ordered Special

Master Balaran to take no further actions with respect to the

* The district court had renewed Kieffer’s appointment in April

2002, this time as a Special Master-Monitor, over the objections of

the petitioners.

** In No. 03-5047 petitioner Phillip Brooks seeks to recuse Judge

Lamberth or to take discovery of his ex parte contacts with Kieffer

and Balaran; in No. 03-5048 petitioners Bruce Babbitt, Edith

Blackwell, Edward Cohen, John Leshy, and Michael Rosetti seek to

recuse Judge Lamberth and Special Master Balaran; in No. 03-

5049 petitioners Tom Clark II, Charles Findlay, and John Most also

seek to recuse Judge Lamberth and Special Master Balaran; in No.

03-5050 petitioner Anne Shields seeks to recuse Judge Lamberth or

to take discovery of his ex parte contacts with his judicial officers;

and in No. 03-5057 petitioner Sabrina McCarthy seeks to recuse

Judge Lamberth or to take discovery of his ex parte contacts with

his judicial officers and to recuse Special Master Balaran.

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reports and recommendations he was going to issue pursuant

to the September 17 referrals. On April 5 Balaran resigned

as a special master both in the contempt proceedings and in

the underlying trust reform litigation. With the removal of

Kieffer and the resignation of Balaran from all aspects of the

Cobell litigation, all that remained of the present petitions

were the issues relating to the disqualification of the district

court judge — or so it seemed.

On April 15, 2004 the plaintiffs filed a ‘‘Suggestion of

Mootness’’ in part, arguing there is ‘‘no remaining controversy’’ with respect to Balaran. The petitioners, however, responded that the question of Balaran’s recusal is not moot

because Balaran had completed and, but for our order of

March 15, would submit to the district court his reports and

recommendations relating to the contempt charges against

the 37 individuals who are not parties to the underlying

litigation. Therefore, the petitioners claimed ‘‘any reports

[Balaran] completed after the time he should have been

recused would be tainted and invalid and should not be

released or shared with the District Court.’’

II. Analysis

In the light of our earlier disqualification of Special MasterMonitor Kieffer, and of Special Master Balaran’s resignation,

two questions remain. First, must the district judge, as the

petitioners claim, either (a) recuse himself or (b) allow discovery of the ex parte communications he had with Kieffer and

Balaran? Second, may Balaran submit to the court the

reports and recommendations he prepared pursuant to the

September 17 referrals?

A. Recusal of the District Judge

A writ of mandamus is ‘‘an extraordinary remedy, to be

reserved for extraordinary situations.’’ Cobell, 334 F.3d at

1137. Nonetheless, ‘‘we will issue a writ of mandamus compelling recusal of a judicial officer where the party seeking

the writ demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to reUSCA Case #03-5050 Document #847855 Filed: 09/14/2004 Page 6 of 16
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lief.’’ Id. at 1139. A party has such a right when a judicial

officer has ‘‘personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary

facts,’’ 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), or when the judicial officer’s

‘‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned,’’ 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(a).

The petitioners argue Judge Lamberth should have disqualified himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) because he

acquired personal knowledge of disputed facts through his ex

parte communications with Kieffer and Balaran. According

to the petitioners, Kieffer’s time sheets show that he met with

the District Judge ex parte more than 80 times, for a total of

more than 120 hours. Similarly, in the motions for recusal

they filed in the district court, the petitioners claimed that

Balaran’s time records ‘‘reveal[ed] seven private meetings

with the Court for a total of approximately eight hours.’’ See

Order Denying Recusal, at 89. The petitioners also point to

ex parte communications Balaran had with numerous individuals involved in the Cobell litigation, including DOI officials

and employees, plaintiffs’ counsel, and the Independent Counsel investigating Secretary Norton, which communications

they claim Balaran later ‘‘transmitted’’ to the district court in

the form of ‘‘memoranda TTT regarding matters such as

compliance with discovery obligations [and] sanctions.’’

The respondents reply that the district court fully addressed each of the petitioners’ claims in its ruling denying

their motions for recusal. There the district judge acknowledged having met privately with the Court Monitor and the

Special Master but rejected any suggestion those meetings

constitute a proper ground for his recusal. Far from it, the

district court stated:

It is not only appropriate but necessary for the Court, as

principal, to consult with its agents regarding the manner in which they are carrying out their assigned

dutiesTTTT [T]hroughout these regular consultations,

the Court discussed with the Master the general nature

of the ongoing tasks that the Master was involved with,

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in order to ensure that the Master was responsibly

carrying out the duties to which he was assigned.

Id. at 89-90.

The district judge cast additional light upon the nature of

his off-the-record meetings in describing his consultations

with Kieffer:

In the course of a typical meeting, for example, the

Monitor might inform the Court that he planned to travel

to New Mexico to meet with the Office of the Special

Trustee, and receive a briefing about their role in the

historical accounting process. Or he might explain that

he traveled to Billings, Montana to meet with title records office personnel, examine their hard copy records,

and review the pilot [Trust Asset and Accounting Management System]. Or he might inform the Court that he

had been briefed by the Deputy Commissioner of the

Bureau of Indian Affairs about the organization of their

office.

Id. at 91-92. The judge concluded that the ‘‘subject of these

consultations was what the Monitor was doing, not what he

was finding’’; they did not expose the court to any ‘‘bare

facts’’ relevant to the underlying investigation. Id. at 92.

The petitioners resist that conclusion upon the basis of

statements in two opinions the judge rendered in the course

of the Cobell proceedings. The first is this snippet from the

district court’s opinion of September 17, 2002: ‘‘[T]he Court is

personally aware of the background of the April 19, 2002

meeting, the conversations at that meeting and at the subsequent meetings between the Deputy Secretary and the Court

Monitor.’’ Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D.D.C.

2002).* They also point to the district court’s opinion of

September 30, 2002 concerning Court Monitor Kieffer’s request for compensation, in which the court stated: ‘‘It is

* Although the petitioners say the opinion is ‘‘replete with references to information gathered by the Court Monitor and shared

with the District Court,’’ they identify no other and none is apparent to us.

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sufficient that the Court Monitor has advised this Court

regarding his meetings and discussions with third parties and

has always informed this Court about the nature, extent, and

substance of such meetings and discussions upon request.’’

Cobell v. Norton, 223 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D.D.C. 2002).

As the respondents point out, the district judge addressed

both the quoted statements in his opinion denying the petitioners’ motion to recuse, in which he concluded, ‘‘Any honest

reading of these opinions TTT demonstrates that movants

have fundamentally misconstrued’’ the relevant passages.

Order Denying Recusal, at 93. With respect specifically to

the September 17 opinion, the judge explained that the

Deputy Secretary of the DOI had requested that the Court

Monitor attend the April 19 meeting in order to resolve a

dispute between the Deputy Secretary and the Special Trustee appointed by the court in the underlying trust reform

litigation:

[T]he only reason that the Court knew anything about

the April 19 meeting, or the background relating to that

meeting, is that the Monitor was compelled to ‘‘present[ ]

the facts surrounding the request of the Deputy Secretary’’ to hold the meeting, in order that the Court could

make an informed decision about whether to authorize

the Monitor’s attendance at the meeting.

Id. at 96. So understood, the September 17 opinion does not

show that the district judge acquired personal knowledge of

disputed evidentiary facts.

Similarly, the district court explained why the single sentence to which the petitioners pointed in the court’s September 30 opinion, when viewed in its context, is innocuous. The

court was not asking the Court Monitor for substantive

information; rather it was asking for information relevant to

verifying ‘‘the reasonableness and propriety of the Monitor’s

compensation requests.’’ Id. at 97. Thus, the district court

reasonably explained that in referring to the ‘‘nature, extent,

and substance of [Kieffer’s] meetings’’ with third parties, the

court was concerned with the subject matter, not the actual

content, of those meetings.

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The petitioners nonetheless claim the district judge’s ex

parte contacts with Kieffer and Balaran provided him with

‘‘information [that] cannot be ‘controverted or tested by the

tools of the adversary process,’ ’’ quoting Edgar v. K.L., 93

F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996). Just like the petitioners in

Edgar, they claim, the ‘‘Petitioners here are completely in the

dark about what transpired during the Monitor’s 120 hours of

communications with the Court.’’ The respondents correctly

point out, however, that unlike the district judge in Edgar,

who ‘‘declined to state on the record his own memories of

what happened’’ in his private meetings with a panel of courtappointed experts, id. at 258, the district judge here declared

‘‘unequivocally’’ he knows of no substantive information that

was provided during any of his consultations with Kieffer or

Balaran. Order Denying Recusal, at 92; see also id. at 90.

Still unappeased, the petitioners question whether the district judge should be relied upon to recall what was discussed

in so many unrecorded meetings lasting so many hours. But

their question reflects a misconception about the assurance

required of the judge: He need not recall all that was

discussed at those meetings; he need only recall that the

substance of the special masters’ findings was not discussed.

If, as he represents, that was an implicit ground rule for the

conduct of those meetings, then the pertinent question is

whether it was ever violated. We see no reason for not

accepting the judge’s unequivocal response.

Moreover, it is not surprising that the district judge met

many times with the Special Master and the Court Monitor;

he had to oversee and to coordinate their efforts on the

court’s behalf during four years of complicated and contentious litigation. Keeping a careful inventory of the tasks they

had performed appears sensible, particularly in the light of

the defendants’ several challenges to Kieffer’s and Balaran’s

requests for compensation. See, e.g., Cobell, 223 F. Supp. 2d

at 159 (defendants request adjustment or reconsideration of

Kieffer’s compensation because he ‘‘failed to provide sufficiently detailed information about the work performed’’).

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Because neither the proffered evidence of ex parte meetings between the court and its agents nor the district court’s

September 2002 opinions show the judge had acquired ‘‘personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts,’’ 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(b)(1), we hold the petitioners have failed to show the

‘‘clear and indisputable right’’ to relief that is required for

this court to issue a writ of mandamus.

The petitioners also claim the district judge should be

recused because his ‘‘impartiality [in any contempt proceedings] might reasonably be questioned,’’ 28 U.S.C. § 455(a),

based upon the ex parte communications considered above.

‘‘The standard for disqualification under § 455(a) is an objective one. The question is whether a reasonable and informed

observer would question the judge’s impartiality.’’ United

States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In this

case the answer is no, for the same reason we determined

above that the judge’s ex parte contacts with the special

masters did not give him personal knowledge of disputed

evidentiary facts.

B. Discovery

As an alternative to recusal of the district judge, several of

the petitioners claim a right to take discovery of the ex parte

communications between the judge and his agents. The

respondents point out that the petitioners ‘‘fail to identify a

single case authorizing the discovery they demand under such

circumstances.’’ That is not surprising considering the rather

extraordinary relief the petitioners request — discovery of

the private communications between a district judge and

subordinate judicial officers regarding matters the judge has

expressly stated are procedural and non-substantive. The

petitioners argue that, as in Edgar, ‘‘The appearance of

impartiality concerns are magnified in this case TTT by the

District Court’s refusal to permit discovery regarding the

nature of ex parte contacts.’’ In other words, discovery is

warranted because the district court’s refusal to allow it

creates an appearance of partiality that can be dispelled only

by allowing discovery. The circularity of this argument is

manifest. In any event, as we have seen, Edgar is not on

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point because the judge in that case ‘‘declined to state on the

record his own memories of what happened’’ during his ex

parte communications with a panel of experts, 93 F.3d at 258,

whereas here the district judge has described ‘‘the nature of

the ex parte contacts,’’ and stated unequivocally that those

contacts were of a procedural and not a substantive nature.

Accordingly, the petitioners have not shown a ‘‘clear and

indisputable right’’ to the extraordinary relief they request.

C. The Special Master

Several of the petitioners urge that despite Balaran’s resignation ‘‘this court must rule on whether the Special Master

should have been recused from the contempt proceedings

under § 455, and if so, permanently enjoin the release of his

report and recommendations and any other work product he

may have completed.’’ In reply the respondents argue that

vacatur of Balaran’s reports and recommendations was not

the relief requested in the petitions and is ‘‘without justification [and] has no basis in the law.’’ If, however, the September 17 referrals to Balaran as special master in the Cobell

litigation were made in error because Balaran should have

been recused from the contempt proceedings, then any work

produced pursuant to the September 17 referrals must also

be ‘‘recused’’ — that is, suppressed. We are constrained,

therefore, to determine whether Balaran should have been

recused from the contempt proceedings.

The petitioners claim Balaran should have been recused

from the contempt proceedings under § 455(b)(1) because, as

a special master, he had been performing investigative and

adjudicative tasks that entailed ex parte communications with

witnesses and third parties in the underlying trust reform

litigation, as documented in Balaran’s time sheets. For example, Balaran had ex parte contacts with Dennis Gingold,

the plaintiffs’ lead counsel, see, e.g., Invoice of 10/7/99, as well

as several other of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, see, e.g., Invoice of

3/22/00. Balaran also had ex parte contacts with unnamed

‘‘moles,’’ see, e.g., Invoice of 4/18/01 (‘‘Review submissions

from ‘Mole 43’ ’’); Invoice of 4/20/01 (‘‘Review correspondence

from ‘moles’ in field’’), and unnamed employees at the DOI,

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see, e.g., Invoice of 2/5/01. Accordingly, the petitioners rely

upon Cobell, 334 F.3d 1128, in which we held squarely that ‘‘in

this Circuit the ethical restrictions of § 455 apply to a special

master,’’ id. at 1144 (citing Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627,

630-32 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).

The district court, in denying the petitioners’ motions to

recuse Balaran, reasoned that the holding in Cobell quoted in

the previous sentence, because it invoked the precedent of

Jenkins, did not apply to Balaran as special master in the

contempt proceedings:

[T]he Jenkins court took pains to clarify that ‘‘at least

insofar as special masters perform duties functionally

equivalent to those performed by a judge, they must be

held to the same standards as judges for purposes of

disqualification.’’ Jenkins, 849 F.2d at 631 n.1TTTT And

the litmus test by which special masters are construed to

be the ‘‘functional equivalent’’ of judges is the ‘‘clearly

erroneous’’ standard of deference.

Order Denying Recusal, at 84-85 (emphasis in original). Because the district court proposed to review Balaran’s findings

in the contempt proceedings de novo rather than for clear

error, but see FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e)(2) (2002) (‘‘the court shall

accept the master’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous’’),

it concluded the Special Master’s duties would be nonadjudicative in nature, and the Special Master therefore

would not be subject to recusal under § 455.

As an initial matter, we note Balaran’s own description of

his role, in a memorandum sent to ‘‘All Counsel’’ at the outset

of the contempt proceedings, which plainly demonstrates the

adjudicative nature of his position. For instance, he undertook ‘‘preliminarily [to] decide whether the individual Bills of

Particular warrant dismissal before initiating any discovery.’’

In any event, we were not in Jenkins concerned only with

situations in which a special master is the ‘‘functional equivalent’’ of a trial judge because his findings are accorded

deferential ‘‘clear error’’ review. Rather, we were concerned

with any situation in which ‘‘a special master’s partiality may

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operate unchecked and uncheckable by the district court.’’

Jenkins, 849 F.2d at 631.

The district court’s proposal in this case to review the

Special Master’s findings de novo does not solve the problem

of ‘‘unchecked and uncheckable’’ partiality. Balaran’s fouryear involvement in the trust reform litigation entailed innumerable contacts with witnesses and third parties likely to

have information relevant to the contempt proceedings. Inevitably, he would have formed impressions about the character of some, perhaps many, of the individuals named in the

contempt proceedings. Consider the letter of January 31,

2001 Special Master Balaran wrote to Phillip Brooks, Esq.,

one of several attorneys in the Department of Justice who

represented the DOI and later became a subject of Balaran’s

contempt inquiry:

I am firmly resolved to expose and reform [Office of

Trust Records senior] management infirmities once and

for all. What presents a more complicated dilemma is

the recent conduct of government counsel. It has come

to my attention that certain attorneys currently employed by the Department of Justice and the Office of

the Solicitor (in concert with OTR management) have

launched a misguided campaign to undermine my authority. These individuals have reportedly gone to great

lengths to malign me both personally and professionally

in front of [Bureau of Indian Affairs] employees and to

misinform these employees as to the true purpose behind

my appointment and as to the inherent rights and responsibilities attendant to that position. They have successfully dissuaded BIA/OTR employees from contacting

me freely. While I understand that you may choose to

discount the credibility of those who chose to report

these events to me, rest assured I have spoken to these

individuals at length and I am convinced, given the level

of detail contained in their reports and my own independent verification, that what I am being told is true.

The question therefore remains how to address government counsel who publicly call into question my ability to

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read, who liken my investigation to those undertaken by

television characters or who insist that I have never

practiced law. As I have been called worse things by

better lawyers, I will not take these personal insults to

heart. I will, however, not tolerate what I consider to be

a transparent attempt to undermine the Court’s orders

and I will not accept the conduct of any official who

creates an environment where employees fear reprisal

simply for contacting my office.

In view of the tone and the substance of this letter, it

seems likely, if not inevitable, that Balaran’s compilation of

the record for the district court’s review, not to mention his

reports and his recommendations, would be subject to selection bias; at the very least, an observer apprised of all the

facts would reasonably question his impartiality. Indeed, if

Balaran could properly serve as special master advising the

district court whether to initiate contempt proceedings, then

it would seem equally permissible for a judge presiding over a

criminal proceeding to dispatch his law clerk to visit the scene

of the crime, take fingerprints, interview witnesses, and report back to the judge about his findings. The judge’s

undertaking to review the clerk’s findings de novo would not

be assurance against the biases of the clerk affecting the

judgment of the court; so much the worse if the clerk, like

Special Master Balaran, had personal knowledge of the parties — and perhaps of the events in suit — from prior

dealings with them.

The respondents, echoing the district judge’s rationale, in

part, for denying the motions to recuse Special Master Balaran, see Order Denying Recusal, at 85-88, assure this court

that any ex parte communications Balaran had with third

parties in connection with his duties in the underlying Cobell

litigation will not taint the contempt proceedings because ‘‘his

reports to the Court concerning [Information Technology]

security and e-mail destruction were not based on any information derived from’’ those communications. They also note

Balaran assured the district court and the parties that his

‘‘[f]indings stemming from proceedings in which the Named

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Individuals have not been afforded the opportunity to participate and/or comment will not be considered during these

proceedings.’’ These assurances do not, however, cure the

problem of selection bias. Our concern is not with information that ‘‘enters the record and may be controverted or

tested by the tools of the adversary process,’’ Edgar, 93 F.3d

at 259; our concern is with information that ‘‘leave[s] no trace

in the record,’’ id. — such as Balaran’s ex parte contacts with

‘‘moles’’ and unnamed DOI employees — that may reasonably

be expected to color the way in which he approaches his task,

and ultimately his reports and recommendations to the district court, and thus to taint the contempt proceedings despite

the steps taken to insulate those proceedings from the information to which Balaran was exposed ex parte.

Because the district court’s proposed de novo review of

Balaran’s findings does not render his task as special master

in the contempt proceedings non-adjudicative, the ex parte

communications Balaran had in his role as special master in

the trust reform litigation required his recusal from the

contempt proceeding pursuant to § 455(b)(1). Moreover, the

nature and extent of his ex parte contacts would lead an

informed observer reasonably to question his impartiality,

thereby requiring his recusal independently pursuant to

§ 455(a). We therefore hold the district court erred in failing

to grant the petitioners’ motions to recuse Balaran.

III. Conclusion

The petitions for a writ of mandamus to recuse Judge

Lamberth are denied. Because Special Master Balaran had

ex parte contacts that may have given him personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts relevant to the contempt

proceedings, those proceedings should never have been referred to him. Therefore any reports, recommendations, or

other work product Balaran prepared pursuant to the September 17 referrals may not be submitted to the district court

or otherwise disseminated in any manner.

So ordered.

USCA Case #03-5050 Document #847855 Filed: 09/14/2004 Page 16 of 16