Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cr-00150/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cr-00150-46/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brett Allen Bossingham
Defendant
Elisabeth Ann Bossingham
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Background

On April 15, 2010, Petitioner Elisabeth Ann Bossingham and her husband, Brett Allen 

Bossingham, were initially indicted on the charge of attempting to evade payment of federal taxes. 

Doc. 1. Petitioner and her husband had difficulty on procuring legal counsel for their defense. 

See, e.g. Docs. 50, 56, and 61. On April 15, 2011, for the legal representation of both Petitioner 

and her husband, the court approved the pro hac vice application of Gary Fielder (Colorado 

attorney) with Peter Gibbons (Fresno attorney) available for service and communication. Doc. 93. 

On December 13, 2011, the court approved the attorneys’ motion to withdraw. Doc. 137. From 

that point on, Petitioner and her husband represented themselves. A jury trial in this criminal case 

was held February 7-9, 2012. Docs. 159, 160, and 162. Petitioner and her husband were both 

convicted of conspiracy and multiple counts of attempting to evade payment of federal taxes. Doc. 

164. On April 30, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to 51 months of custody and 36 months of 

supervised release. Doc. 190. Petitioner filed an appeal. Doc. 197. On September 5, 2012, the 

Ninth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s appeal for failure to comply with a court order requiring 

Petitioner to either retain legal counsel or request leave to proceed without counsel. Doc. 203. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

v.

BRETT ALLEN BOSSINGHAM and 

ELISABETH ANN BOSSINGHAM,

Defendants

CASE NO. 1:10-CR-0150 AWI 

ORDER RE: ELISABETH ANN 

BOSSINGHAM’S 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

HABEAS CORPUS PETITION

(Docs. 219, 220, and 222)

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Petitioner’s conviction became final on December 5, 2012. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996, a one year statute of limitations applies for habeas corpus petitions 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. December 5, 2013 would have been the last date for timely filing of such 

a petition. 

On June 16, 2014 (with signature dated June 11, 2014), Petitioner filed an application with 

the Ninth Circuit for leave to file a second or successive habeas petition under Section 2255; 

included in her filing was an explanation for her substantive claims: ineffective assistance of 

counsel and defect in the Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11. Ninth Circuit Case No. 14-71669, Doc. 1-2. 

The Ninth Circuit dismissed the application, noting that Petitioner had not yet filed a first habeas 

petition. Ninth Circuit Case No. 14-71669, Doc. 2. Petitioner filed in this court a document 

entitled “MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND AFFIDAVIT OF ELIZABETH ANN 

BOSSINGHAM FOR SENTENCE MODIFICATION” in which she states “4. It is respectfully 

urged that any further investigation by this Court would disclose that this is a proper case in which 

the Courts discretion should be exercised to terminate the remaining sentence of approximately 12 

months of the Defendants custodial sentence and allow the Defendant to complete the remaining 

12 months on Home Detention with the appropriate agency supervision, followed by supervised 

probation as previously ordered of three years.” Doc. 213, at 1. The court interpreted Petitioner’s 

filing to be a Section 2255 habeas corpus petition and concluded that the petition was untimely; 

Petitioner was given an opportunity to provide a factually detailed response along with any 

documentation supporting application of equitable tolling. Doc. 214. Petitioner has made three 

filings on this issue. Docs. 219, 220, and 222.

II. Legal Standard

“A § 2255 movant is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: (1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and 

prevented timely filing.” United States v. Buckles, 647 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2011). “The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 

untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on 

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time.” Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009), citations omitted. A petitioner must 

provide specific facts regarding what was done to pursue the petitioner’s claims to demonstrate the 

diligence required for equitable tolling. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Conclusional allegations are generally inadequate. Williams v. Dexter, 649 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1061-

62 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 

III. Discussion

A. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner argues:

Justification For Equitable Tolling: U.S. v. Davila speaks to real or perceived 

ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage and harmless error in 

judicial involvement to assist public defender in helping defendant see that making 

a guilty plea through acceptance of a plea bargain was in his best interest. Attorney 

accountability in performance to provide Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 

making a guilty plea is essential, thus intersecting with Rule 11 and is at the core of 

proper plea execution whether at hearings, arraignment, or informally outside of the 

Court. A timeline has been provided showing diligent pursuit of rights, full reform 

and correction. Despite this, professional misconduct and constructive 

abandonment deserve equitable tolling and therefore, timeless compelling review.

Doc. 219, at 20. With regards to the second prong of equitable tolling (extraordinary 

circumstance), Petitioner raises issues of professional misconduct and constructive abandonment. 

She lists them as:

1. Conflict of Interest in Joint Representation-Failure to communicate and 

advocate defendant independently, and separately, from her co-defendant husband.

2. Failure to communicate government’s offer [when] it was ‘on the table.’

3. Failure to enter plea bargaining negotiations.

4. Failure to communicate and inform defendant to intelligently be able to 

understand all aspects of the plea offer and direct consequences of making a guilty 

plea in a plea agreement.

5. Failure to investigate quickly so as to facilitate plea bargaining.

6. Failure to advise defendant to enter into a plea bargain when it was 

clearly in defendant’s best interest.

7. Acted unprofessionally in ‘rejecting’ a plea offer, by not informing 

defendant of the plea offer, ever.

8. Failure to provide plea bargaining opportunity and, in fact, blocked 

defendant from that opportunity through constructive abandonment.

9. Acting unprofessionally through breach of fiduciary duty and with 

conflicts of interest in other cases and legal matters.

10. Failure to consider other viable defense strategies, such as plea 

bargaining or making a guilty plea, when the Bill of Particulars was denied and, 

thus, forcing the defendant towards trial.

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11. Failure to actively engage in counsel of the defendant at arraignment on 

the second superseding indictment where she could have made a guilty plea, thus 

avoiding further progression towards trial, unnecessarily.

12. Acting unprofessionally entertaining a high risk, non-statutory strategy 

of more culpable co-defendant husband that jeopardized defendant and allowed 

attorney to disengage from his responsibilities to the defendant, fostering a state of 

abandonment and throwing all parties into sever and irreparable conflict.

13. By constructive abandonment, there was complete failure to defend and 

advocate for defendant causing her to proceed to trial, unnecessarily, where she was 

convicted on the more serious charge of conspiracy and received a more sever 

sentence. 

Doc. 219, at 28-29. In sum, Petitioner alleges that counsel never told her about the plea deal 

offered and represented both defendants in this case though their legal positions conflicted. 

Petitioner argues that these problems constitute “unprofessional conduct on the part of both 

attorney Peter Gibbons and Gary Fielder which count as ‘extraordinary circumstance’ justifying 

equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida [560 U.S. 631, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010)].” Doc. 219, at 60. 

Holland does state that “Several lower courts have specifically held that unprofessional attorney 

conduct may, in certain circumstances prove ‘egregious’ and can be ‘extraordinary.’” Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651 (2010). The facts of this case do not qualify. Unprofessional conduct 

can constitute extraordinary circumstance when it occurs post-conviction and works to prevent a 

petitioner from making a timely filing. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“Though he was hired nearly a full year in advance of the deadline, Huffhines completely failed 

to prepare and file a petition. Spitsyn and his mother contacted Huffhines numerous times, by 

telephone and in writing, seeking action, but these efforts proved fruitless. Furthermore, despite a 

request that he return Spitsyn’s file, Huffhines retained it for the duration of the limitations period 

and more than two months beyond”); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 

(9th Cir. 1997) (“Beeler’s lead counsel, Scott Braden, had diligently pursued the preparation of 

Beeler’s petition. Braden, however, withdrew after accepting employment in another state, and 

much of the work product he left behind was not usable by replacement counsel - a turn of events 

over which Beeler had no control”); United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089, 1095 (8th Cir. 2005) 

(“Lasko specifically told Martin time and again that there was no deadline, and that those who told 

him otherwise were wrong. Thereafter, Lasko intimated that relief was forthcoming. Martin and 

his wife sought more information, but Lasko either ignored them or perpetuated further lies that 

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Martin’s documents had already been filed, going so far as to impugn the court’s docket system 

rather than admit the truth”); Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145 (2nd Cir. 2003) (“In spite 

of being specifically directed by his client's representatives to file a ‘2255,’ Weinstein failed to file 

such a petition at all”); see also Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3rd Cir. 2001) (potential 

extraordinary circumstances based on “Nara’s contention that his attorney in the third PCRA [state 

habeas petition] proceeding (in which the PCRA petition was withdrawn in favor of the motion to 

withdraw Nara’s guilty plea) effectively abandoned him and prevented him from filing the habeas 

petition on time”). The alleged misconduct cited by Petitioner all took place before the trial. 

Further, these were problems that Petitioner was aware of before her conviction. In a letter 

dated April 20, 2014, Petitioner wrote that “before we went to trial without counsel, Brett told me 

that there was a plea offer but that was the only communication with me....I remember coming 

home one night and was, literally, standing in the dark at the entrance of our bedroom when Brett 

told me briefly about the plea deal offered. Neither lawyer discussed anything with me by phone 

or email, or by any other means at ANY time! This is glaring professional misconduct.” Ninth 

Circuit Case No. 14-71669, Doc. 1-2, at 9 of 19. Petitioner also provides a declaration in which 

she states “When there was clear conflict of interest between the two attorneys and conflict of 

defendant culpability and defense strategies between defendants, it was decided to terminate both 

attorneys. Both lawyers were terminated for ‘just cause,’ for a lapsed plea offer and because all 

trust was gone.” Doc. 219, at 57. Petitioner specifically cites these issues as the basis for firing 

her attorneys and proceeding pro se. These alleged deficiencies might constitute extraordinary 

circumstances if they had been hidden from Petitioner, but those are not the facts of this case. 

There is no basis for applying equitable estoppel.

B. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or district judge issues a certificate of appealability (“COA”), an 

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final decision of a district judge in a habeas 

corpus proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Muth v. Fondren, 676 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 

2012). A COA may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

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constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA 

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of 

reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The issuance of a COA has been described as a 

“rare step.” Murden v. Artuz, 497 F.3d 178, 199 (2nd Cir. 2008). 

Here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable that Petitioner has failed to show that 

application of equitable tolling is warranted. Accordingly, a COA is denied.

IV. Order

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. Petitioner’s writ for habeas corpus is 

DISMISSED. The court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2016 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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