Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00500/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00500-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Avalos
Petitioner
Scott Frauenheim
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD AVALOS,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT FRAUENHEIM,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00500-BAM HC

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

COGNIZABLE FEDERAL CLAIM

(Docs. 1 and 2) 

SCREENING ORDER

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserts a single claim: that his constitutional right to due process was 

violated when prison officials illegally disciplined him for his cellmate's possession of manufactured 

alcohol (pruno). Because the petition fails to state a cognizable federal claim, the Court dismisses 

it.1

I. Preliminary Screening

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to conduct a preliminary 

review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly 

appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the Rules 

 

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Petitioner consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (Doc. 5.)

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Governing 2254 Cases; see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). A petition 

for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable 

claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave to be granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th

Cir. 1971).

II. Procedural and Factual Background

At 7:00 a.m. on July 31, 2012, Correctional Officer A. Mercado detected a strong odor of 

inmate manufactured alcohol (pruno) coming from the cell occupied by Petitioner and his cellmate 

Rios. In a subsequent search of the cell, Officer Mercado discovered approximately 2 1⁄2 gallons of 

pruno in a plastic bag in a common area of responsibility of both inmates.

At an institutional hearing on August 11, 2012, Rios pleaded guilty to the charge of a 

Division C Offense of "Possession of Inmate Manufactured Alcohol (Pruno)." Rios stated, "It's all 

me. It's all my fault." Doc. 1 at 56.

Later on August 11, 2012, Petitioner personally appeared at an institutional hearing and pled 

not guilty to the charge of a Division C Offense of "Possession of Inmate Manufactured Alcohol 

(Pruno)." At the hearing, Plaintiff partly admitted guilt: ". . . I knew that morning it was in the cell." 

Doc. 1 at 50. The Senior Hearing Officer (SHO) found Petitioner guilty and assessed a credit 

forfeiture of 120 days and loss of privileges.

Petitioner appealed the decision, contending (1) that he was misquoted and that he actually 

stated that he knew that the pruno had been found in his cell when he returned from breakfast and (2) 

that he was wrongly disciplined for the actions of his cellmate. Denying the appeal at the second 

level, the Appeals Coordinator wrote:

Mr. Avalos, a cell search was conducted of your assigned cell. Inmate 

manufactured alcohol was found in your assigned cell. The making of alcohol 

takes several days before it reaches the state as it was found in your cell. The 

Officer could smell the odor of alcohol outside your cell with the door closed; 

therefore it is hard to believe you had no knowledge of the alcohol with this 

strong odor permeating from your cell. You are reminded that you will be held 

responsible and accountable for your living area at all times. Your claims in this 

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appeal have been proven false and your guilty finding will not be changed.

Doc. 1 at 39.

On December 14, 2012, following review at the third level, the appeal was again denied. The 

Appeals Examiner wrote:

The appellant claims that he did not possess the alcohol which was discovered in 

his cell. The alcohol was found in a common area of the cell, possessed a strong 

odor, was of large quantity, and the sergeant verified that it was alcohol. The 

cellmate's claim of ownership does not eliminate the appellant's culpability in this 

matter. The appellant had the ability to be proactive in his dissociation from the 

situation. He did not choose to exercise this option, and must in light of the 

evidence, share responsibility for the rule violation. The appellant asserts that he 

is not responsible for the actions of his cell partner. The evidence presented by 

the Reporting Employee leads a reasonable person to believe that appellant was 

aware of the presence of the contraband in the cell and he gave his implied 

consent to allow the alcohol into the cell.

Doc. 1 at 38.

The Appeals Examiner concurred in the finding that Petitioner was aware of the pruno and 

exercised constructive control over it. He found no evidence to support Petitioner's contention that 

the SHO misquoted Petitioner. He declined to address various issues and requests first presented at 

the third level of appeal. Finally, the Appeals Examiner concluded that Petitioner was provided with 

all necessary administrative protections throughout the hearing and appeals process and that the 

evidence supported the findings and disposition.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court on February 19, 2013. On 

March 21, 2013, the Fresno County Superior Court dismissed Petitioner's habeas corpus petition for 

failure to state a prima facie case for relief. The Superior Court held that the requirements for 

federal due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the prison disciplinary board's decision to 

revoke good time credits. Evaluating the standard of review, said the court, does not require 

examination of the record as a whole, independent assessment of the witnesses' credibility, or 

weighing of the evidence. The California Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District summarily 

denied the petition on May 23, 2013. The Supreme Court of California summarily denied the 

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petition on February 18, 2015.

On April 1, 2015, Petitioner filed a timely § 2254 petition in this Court along with a motion 

for judicial notice of Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (2011).

III. Standard of Review

Habeas corpus is neither a substitute for a direct appeal nor a device for federal review of the 

merits of a guilty verdict rendered in state court. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 (1979) 

(Stevens, J., concurring). Habeas corpus relief is intended to address only "extreme malfunctions" in 

state criminal justice proceedings. Id. 

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the Court must apply its provisions. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled 

on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012). Under AEDPA, a petitioner 

can prevail only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000).

"By its terms, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, 

subject only to the exceptions set forth in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 

86, 98 (2011). 

As a threshold matter, a federal court must first determine what constitutes "clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Lockyer, 538 

U.S. at 71. To do so, the Court must look to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the Supreme 

Court's decisions at the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. The court must then consider 

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whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law." Id. at 72. The state court need not have cited clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent; it is sufficient that neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court 

contradicts it. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). The federal court must apply the presumption 

that state courts know and follow the law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). The

petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 

1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The AEDPA standard is difficult to satisfy since even a strong case for relief does not

demonstrate that the state court's determination was unreasonable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. "A 

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or 

incorrectly." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit 

precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the 

state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 

664 (2004)). Put another way, a federal court may grant habeas relief only when the state court's 

application of Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable and no fair-minded jurist 

could disagree that the state court's decision conflicted with Supreme Court's precedent. Williams, 

529 U.S. at 411.

IV. Alleged Violation of Due Process Rights

When the state has made good time subject to forfeiture only for serious misbehavior, 

procedural due process of law requires inmates subject to the loss of conduct credits to be given 

advance written notice of the claimed violation, a right to call witnesses and present documentary 

evidence where it would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals, and a 

written statement of the finder of fact setting forth the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the 

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disciplinary action taken. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1974). If the inmate is 

illiterate, or if the issue is so complex that it is unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and 

present the evidence necessary for adequate comprehension of the case, the inmate should be given 

access to help from staff or a sufficiently competent inmate designated by staff. Confrontation, 

cross-examination, and counsel are not required. Id. at 568-70. As demonstrated by the 

documentation appended to and incorporated into the petition, the institution hearing procedure 

complied with the procedural due process requirements in all respects. In the ensuing state habeas 

process, the California state courts properly applied the applicable federal standard for evaluating 

Petitioner's allegation of due process violations. See Doc. 1 at 24-25. 

When conduct credits are a protected liberty interest, some evidence in the record must 

support the revocation decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). To determine 

satisfaction of the standard, a court need not examine the entire record, independently assess 

witnesses' credibility, or weigh the evidence. Id. at 455-56. The only relevant question is whether 

any evidence in the record could support the disciplinary board's conclusion. Id.

Pointing to Rios's statement that the pruno and its production were solely his doing,

Petitioner contends that the institutional hearing personnel and the state courts erred in finding him

guilty and imposing punishment. The Court disagrees. The institutional and state decisions were 

supported by evidence, even though that evidence was unfavorable to Petitioner. As the hearing 

officer explained, Rios' claiming ownership and responsibility did not absolve Petitioner of 

culpability when he had to have known of the presence of the pruno, the smell of which was so 

intense that a correctional officer could smell it outside the closed cell, and the quantity of which (2 

1⁄2 gallons) was sufficient to be obvious in the cell's limited common area. Neither the institutional 

hearing personnel nor the state courts erred in concluding that Petitioner had constructive possession 

of the pruno, even if Rios prepared it and claimed ownership.

///

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V. State Claim

Apparently for the first time, Petitioner contends in his federal petition that the state courts

erred in failing to take judicial notice of In re Ishmael Ali Muhammed (Cal. Super. Ct. (Sacramento 

Cty.) Dec. 16, 1991) (No. 105458). Alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable 

in federal habeas corpus. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the 

Court does not reach this issue.

VI. Conditions of Confinement

A federal petition for writ of habeas corpus concerns whether a petitioner is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "Habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a 

state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or 

speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983." Preiser v. 

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-89 (1973). Challenges to the conditions of prison life are properly 

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 142 (1991). A plaintiff may 

not seek both types of relief in a single action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1994); 

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498-99 n. 15; Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1990); Advisory 

Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

Petitioner attempts to craft a conditions of confinement argument that the housing of two 

prisoners in cells designed for single occupancy somehow acts as a constitutional bar to his being 

found guilty of possession of contraband. He requests judicial notice of Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 

1910 (2011). Despite his citation to the United States Supreme Court case, however, Petitioner 

appends to the petition limited annotated excerpts of Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F.Supp.2d 

882 (E.D. Cal. and N.D. Cal. 2009). The Coleman/Plata lines of cases are inapposite because they 

were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and addressed conditions of confinement, particularly medical 

(Coleman) and mental health (Plata) in California prisons. Accordingly, the Court denies 

Petitioner's motion for judicial notice.

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Further, to the extent that Petitioner intends to raise the double-celling of prisoners as a

condition of confinement, the Court would be required to dismiss that claim from the pending habeas 

action.

As the Court understands the petition, however, Petitioner's intent is not to assert a conditions

of confinement claim, but to disarm the conclusion that he could be found guilty of possessing 

contraband simply because he shared a cell with the inmate who created and possessed it. Petitioner

quotes, "'In California, design capacity is based on one inmate per cell, single bunks in dormitories, 

and no beds in space not designed for housing." Coleman, 922 F.Supp.2d at 910 (quoting 

Corrections Independent Review Panel, Ex. P4 at 123). In context, the Coleman court discussed the 

impact of prison overcrowding on the capacities of the prisons' medical and mental health facilities. 

Petitioner, however, attempts to defeat the guilt finding for possessing inmate manufactured alcohol 

(pruno) by arguing that he could not have been implicated in his cellmate's illicit activities if he had 

been individually housed. Not only is his argument farfetched, but it also fails to acknowledge his 

own complicity in illicit activities of which the institutional tribunal and state courts concluded he 

had to have been aware.

But in any event, the Coleman dicta regarding the design capacity of California prisons in 

general did not grant inmates a federal right to be singly celled. Regardless of the merits of 

Petitioner's creative argument, housing him in a cell with another prisoner was not contrary to, nor 

did it involve, an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. As a result, it is not a 

cognizable claim in this habeas action. 

V. Certificate Of Appealability Denied

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district 

court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of 

appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:

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(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of 

appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or 

trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test 

the validity of such person's detention pending removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

 appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

 detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

 applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

 right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate 

 which specific issues or issues satisfy the showing required by 

 paragraph (2).

I 

If a court denies a petitioner's petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability

"if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or 

that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Although the 

petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate "something more than 

the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 

338.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court's 

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or 

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate 

of appealability.

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus fails to state a cognizable federal claim. 

Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS that:

1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment; and

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 5, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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