Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03085/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03085-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Interior
Respondent
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Jimmi Tyler Rebish
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

JIMMI TYLER REBISH,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________

2014-3085, 2014-3087

______________________

Petitions for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in Nos. SF-1221-13-0494-W-1, SF-0752-13-0362-I-1.

______________________

Decided: February 4, 2015

______________________

JIMMI TYLER REBISH, Meridian, Idaho, pro se.

CALVIN M. MORROW, Attorney, Office of the General 

Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, 

DC, for respondent in 2014-3085. Also represented by

BRYAN G. POLISUK.

KATRINA LEDERER, Attorney, Office of the General 

Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, 

DC, for respondent in 2014-3087. Also represented by

BRYAN G. POLISUK.

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2 REBISH v. MSPB

______________________

Before TARANTO, MAYER, and CLEVENGER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed, for 

lack of jurisdiction, two appeals brought by Jimmi Tyler 

Rebish, a former employee of the Department of the 

Interior, Bureau of Reclamation. One of Mr. Rebish’s 

appeals alleges a violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b); the other alleges that, though 

he resigned from his position, the resignation was involuntary and hence constituted a removal, which he challenges as improper. In both, he contends that the 

Department violated an agreement it signed to settle an 

earlier administrative grievance he had brought, a settlement agreement pursuant to which he had resigned. 

Mr. Rebish now appeals the Board’s dismissals. We 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Rebish worked as a Civil Rights Program Specialist in an office of the Department in Boise, Idaho. In 

October 2008, he declined a reassignment to Denver, 

Colorado, and the Department removed him from his 

Boise position. He brought an administrative grievance, 

which was resolved by a settlement agreement with the 

Department, without any Board involvement. The Department agreed to provide Mr. Rebish with a neutral 

employment reference, R.A. 34 (Case No. 14-3087), and he

agreed to resign and “not to file any EEO complaints, 

MSPB appeals, grievances, or court actions, . . . or any 

other claim he has filed or could have filed against the 

Agency through the date of [the agreement’s] execution.” 

R.A. 33 (Case No. 14-3087); see R.A. 5. Mr. Rebish was 

represented by counsel when he signed the agreement.

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Four-and-a-half years later, a private investigator 

hired by Mr. Rebish contacted at least one Department 

employee who, in the ensuing conversation, made remarks that Mr. Rebish views as violating the neutralreference promise in the settlement agreement. R.A. 39, 

43–44 (Case No. 14-3085). Mr. Rebish then filed two 

appeals with the Board, both alleging breach of the settlement agreement.1 In the first, Mr. Rebish alleged that 

the Department provided less-than-neutral references in 

reprisal for whistleblowing related to an equal employment opportunity investigation. In the second, he challenged his resignation pursuant to the settlement 

agreement as involuntary, citing the Department’s alleged breach of the settlement agreement and also contending that the original removal (the subject of the 

settlement agreement) resulted from the Department’s 

giving of preferential treatment to a female employee. 

The Board dismissed both appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

Mr. Rebish has timely appealed the dismissals to this 

court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9);

see also Conforto v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 713 F.3d 1111, 

1116 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

1 It appears that Mr. Rebish first pursued these challenges with the Office of Special Counsel in 2012 or 2013. 

Mr. Rebish has not provided us—and did not provide the 

administrative judge or Board—with a copy of his original 

complaint. On October 21, 2014, Mr. Rebish filed a related suit in the Court of Federal Claims. He has asked to 

supplement the record here with the government’s partial

motion to dismiss that case. See Defendant’s Partial 

Motion to Dismiss, Rebish v. United States, No. 14-cv01022 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 22, 2014). We grant the request.

 

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We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is “(1) 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been 

followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 

U.S.C. § 7703(c). “Whether the Board possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate a case is a question of law, which this 

court reviews de novo.” Barrett v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 309 

F.3d 781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “When an individual 

appeals to the Board, he or she bears the burden of proving . . . jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” 

Id. at 785.

A

Mr. Rebish’s first Board appeal is an appeal under the 

Whistleblower Protection Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221. The 

Board has jurisdiction over such an appeal “if the appellant has exhausted his administrative remedies before the 

[Office of Special Counsel] and makes non-frivolous 

allegations that (1) he engaged in whistleblowing activity 

by making a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(b)(8), and (2) the disclosure was a contributing 

factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a 

personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a).” Yunus 

v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 

2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The standard 

for assessing whether an allegation is frivolous “is analogous to that for summary judgment.” Kahn v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 528 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he petitioner must 

show the existence of a material fact issue . . . to support 

Board jurisdiction. Non-frivolous allegations cannot be 

supported by unsubstantiated speculation in a pleading 

submitted by petitioner.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

We agree with the Board that Mr. Rebish’s appeal 

under the Whistleblower Protection Act must be disCase: 14-3085 Document: 31-2 Page: 4 Filed: 02/04/2015
 REBISH v. MSPB 5

missed for lack of jurisdiction because Mr. Rebish failed to 

make a sufficient allegation that a disclosure he made 

contributed to the Department’s decision to make the 

allegedly unfavorable employment references at issue. In 

particular, Mr. Rebish did not make a non-frivolous 

allegation “that the ‘deciding official knew of the disclosure’ and that the adverse action ‘was initiated within a 

reasonable time of that disclosure.’” Reid v. Merit Sys. 

Prot. Bd., 508 F.3d 674, 678–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 5 

U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Kewley v. Dep’t of Health & Human 

Servs., 153 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Karl Stock, 

one of the Department officials who made an allegedly 

unfavorable reference, submitted a sworn declaration

that, at the time he made the reference, he was “unaware 

of any whistleblowing disclosures made by [Mr. Rebish].” 

R.A. 37 (Case No. 14-3085). Mr. Rebish, on the other 

hand, adduced no evidence that any of the officials that 

made unfavorable references knew of any protected 

disclosures, proffering only an indefinite statement that 

“[a]gency officials were and are aware of [his] protected 

disclosure” in an affidavit. R.A. 39 (Case No. 14-3085). 

Such bare, generalized assertions do not establish a 

genuine dispute of material fact. The Board properly 

dismissed Mr. Rebish’s first appeal.

B

Mr. Rebish’s second appeal asserts that his resignation pursuant to the settlement agreement was involuntary and hence, presumably, that it was actually a 

“removal” that the Board may review under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7512. “[A]n employee who voluntarily retires has no 

right to appeal to the Board.” Staats v. U.S. Postal Serv., 

99 F.3d 1120, 1123–24 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “A decision to 

resign or retire is presumed to be voluntary.” Id. at 1123. 

The presumption is especially difficult to overcome when

resignation occurred pursuant to a settlement agreement. 

See, e.g., Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 

630 (1948) (“One who attacks a settlement must bear the 

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6 REBISH v. MSPB

burden of showing that the contract he has made is tainted with invalidity, either by fraud practiced upon him or 

by a mutual mistake under which both parties acted.”); 

Asberry v. U.S. Postal Serv., 692 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed.

Cir. 1982) (“Those who employ the judicial appellate 

process to attack a settlement through which controversy 

has been sent to rest bear a properly heavy burden.”). 

We agree with the Board that Mr. Rebish’s appeal regarding involuntary resignation must be dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction. The Board stated that there was no

basis for challenging the validity of the settlement agreement here. Rebish v. Dep’t of Interior, No. SF-0752-13-

0362-I-1, 2014 WL 5161854, at *1 (M.S.P.B. Jan. 23, 

2014). That rationale supports the conclusion that Mr. 

Rebish did not make a non-frivolous allegation as to the 

involuntariness of his resignation, which is necessary for 

jurisdiction. He did not allege that the settlement agreement was invalid or entered into involuntarily, such as by 

coercion or deception; indeed, both the administrative 

judge and Board found the contrary. Rebish, 2014 WL 

5161854, at *1; R.A. 7 (Case No. 14-3087) (administrative 

judge); see R.A. 36 (Case No. 14-3087) (“All parties have 

entered into this Agreement voluntarily and with a complete and thorough understanding of its terms, meaning, 

and effect. Each of the undersigned is signing the Agreement voluntarily and freely without coercion, having had 

the opportunity to read and raise questions about its 

meaning prior to signing.”). Instead, Mr. Rebish made an 

allegation of breach. Even if there was a breach as Mr. 

Rebish claims, however, it would not imply invalidity of 

the agreement or involuntariness in his resignation. 

Therefore, the Board properly dismissed Mr. Rebish’s 

second appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s judgment is affirmed.

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No costs.

AFFIRMED

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