Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04129/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04129-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Scott Brede
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4129

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Jeffrey Scott Brede, *

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 15, 2007

Filed: February 23, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Jeffrey Scott Brede (Brede) entered a conditional guilty plea to receiving a

firearm while under indictment. On appeal, Brede argues the district court1

 abused its

discretion in denying two requested jury instructions. 

A grand jury indicted Brede for making a false statement in acquisition of a

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), and for receiving a firearm while under

indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(n) and 924(a)(1)(D). Shortly before trial,

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Brede requested a jury instruction defining the terms “indictment,” “information,” and

“complaint.” Brede argued the underlying Minnesota state charges were brought on

a complaint which was not the same as an indictment or an information. On the

morning of trial, Brede requested an additional instruction defining the term

“willfully,” arguing willfully was the requisite criminal intent under § 924(a)(1)(D).

The district court denied Brede’s proposed jury instruction defining indictment,

information, and complaint, concluding the terms were functionally equivalent for

purposes of § 922(n). Likewise, the district court rejected Brede’s proposed

“willfully” instruction, concluding “knowingly” was the appropriate instruction.

Based on the district court’s rejection of the two proposed jury instructions, Brede

believed a conviction would be inevitable and entered a conditional guilty plea to

receiving a firearm while under indictment. The government dismissed the charge of

making a false statement in acquisition of a firearm. Brede reserved the right to

appeal the district court’s denial of the two proposed jury instructions. Thereafter, the

district court sentenced Brede to two years’ probation. This appeal followed.

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to grant or deny

a request for a particular jury instruction. United States v. Gianakos, 415 F.3d 912,

920 (8th Cir. 2005). A conviction will be reversed based on a district court’s

instructional error as to a particular instruction only upon a finding of prejudice to the

parties. Id. Jury instructions need not be technically perfect or a model of clarity. Id.

When viewing the instructions as a whole in light of the evidence and applicable law,

we determine whether the instructions “fairly and adequately submitted the issues in

the case to the jury.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

The district court was not required to give Brede an instruction defining

indictment, information, and complaint. In Schook v. United States, 337 F.2d 563,

567 (8th Cir. 1964), we rejected the defendant’s attempt to distinguish between an

indictment and an information, holding Congress sought “to protect the public by

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proscribing [acts involving firearms by] . . . those charged with felonies without

attaching any significance to the procedural vehicle forming the basis of the charge.”

We concluded it would “emasculate Congress’ purpose for us to distinguish between

persons lawfully charged with a felony by ‘information’ and those charged by

‘indictment.’” Id. The same rationale applies here. Under Minnesota law, a

“complaint is a written signed statement of the essential facts constituting the offense

charged.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 2.01. Consequently, Brede became subject to the

prohibitions of § 922(n) when the state of Minnesota filed the felony complaints

against Brede. The district court did not err in determining an indictment, an

information, and a Minnesota complaint are functionally equivalent and did not abuse

its discretion in refusing to adopt Brede’s proposed jury instruction defining those

terms.

Nor did the district court err in denying Brede’s proposed “willfully”

instruction. In Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194-96 & nn.17-23 (1998), the

Supreme Court held when the “willful” element of § 924(a)(1)(D) applies to § 922’s

firearms statutes, “‘knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required.’”

Thereafter, we applied Bryan’s broad definition of willful in United States v. James,

172 F.3d 588, 591-92 (8th Cir. 1999), a firearms case involving violations of

§§ 922(a)(5) and 924(a)(1)(D). In James, we concluded proof the defendant “knew

his conduct was unlawful” is all that is required. Id. at 592. Thus, in the present case,

the district court’s proposed “knowingly” instruction adequately defined the requisite

criminal intent under § 924(a)(1)(D), as it applies to § 922(n).

Accordingly, we affirm. 

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