Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cr-00022/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cr-00022-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barton Joseph Sloan
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT 

Acting United States Attorney 

JAMES R. CONOLLY 

Assistant United States Attorney 

501 I Street, Suite 10-100 

Sacramento, CA 95814 

Telephone: (916) 554-2700 

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

United States of America 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

BARTON JOSEPH SLOAN, 

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. 2:20-CR-22-KJM 

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS 

CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME PERIODS 

UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND 

ORDER 

DATE: January 10, 2022 

TIME: 9:00 a.m. 

COURT: Hon. Kimberly J. Mueller

This case was set for a status conference on January 10, 2022. By this stipulation, the parties 

request that the Court continue the status conference to March 21, 2022, and to exclude time under 

Local Code T4, as well under the Court’s General Orders, for the reasons set forth below. 

On April 17, 2020, this Court issued General Order 617, which suspends all jury trials in the 

Eastern District of California scheduled to commence before June 15, 2020, and allows district judges to 

continue all criminal matters to a date after June 1. This and previous General Orders were entered to 

address public health concerns related to COVID-19. 

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

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509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”). 

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice 

continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that 

the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless 

“the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the 

ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 1 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”). 

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 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020). 

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STIPULATION 

1. By this stipulation, the United States and defendant Barton Joseph Sloan, through their 

respective undersigned counsel, move to continue the status conference until March 21, 2022, and to 

exclude time between January 10, 2022, and March 21, 2022, under Local Code T4, as well as under the 

Court’s General Orders. 

2. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has produced in this matter approximately 60 pages of police 

reports, court documents, and photographs, as well as a recording of a post-arrest interview. 

b) Defense counsel requires additional time to review the discovery, analyze the 

case, and discuss it with her client. Defense counsel will also need time to conduct additional 

investigation and investigate potential defenses and evidence in mitigation of potential sentence 

in the event of a negotiated disposition. 

c) Defense counsel represents and believes that failure to grant additional time as 

requested would deny Mr. Sloan the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, 

considering the exercise of due diligence. 

d) The government does not object to this continuance. 

e) Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions 

of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within 

which a trial must commence 

f) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because some of evidence defense counsel seeks to review is available only in the 

offices of the United States Attorney, due to concerns for witness safety. Defense counsel and 

defense investigators have been encouraged to telework and minimize personal contact to the 

greatest extent possible, and to that end would be best served by delaying that review. 

g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

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h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 10, 2022 to March 21, 

2022, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, and pursuant to the Court’s General 

Orders, in light of the public safety concerns created by the COVID-19 pandemic. 

3. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence. 

IT IS SO STIPULATED. 

Dated: January 4, 2022 PHILLIP A. TALBERT 

Acting United States Attorney 

/s/ JAMES R. CONOLLY 

 JAMES R. CONOLLY 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Dated: January 4, 2022 /s/ SHARI RUSK

SHARI RUSK 

Counsel for Defendant 

BARTON JOSEPH SLOAN 

FINDINGS AND ORDER 

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED. The status conference is continued to March 21, 2022, at 

9:00 a.m., time between January 10, 2022, and March 21, 2022 is excluded. 

DATED: January 12, 2022. 

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