Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-07027/USCOURTS-ca10-15-07027-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Danny Dewayne Brewer
Appellant
Captain Riddle
Appellee
Terry Crenshaw
Appellee
Deana Gilroy
Appellee
Justin Jones
Appellee
Randy Knight
Appellee
Mark Knutson
Appellee
Art Lightle
Appellee
Jimmy Martin
Appellee
Officer Pinley
Appellee
Parker
Appellee
FNU Pavlukevick
Appellee
Shearwood
Appellee
William Taylor
Appellee
Ken Yott
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

DANNY DEWAYNE BREWER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

DEANA GILROY, Sergeant; FNU 

PAVLUKEVICK, Corrections Officer; 

JIMMY MARTIN, Warden’s 

Administrative Assistant; ART LIGHTLE, 

Deputy Warden; TERRY CRENSHAW; 

WILLIAM TAYLOR; JUSTIN JONES; 

MARK KNUTSON; SHEARWOOD; 

PARKER; CAPTAIN RIDDLE; KEN 

YOTT; RANDY KNIGHT; OFFICER 

PINLEY, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-7027 

(D.C. No. 6:13-CV-00471-RAW-SPS) 

(E.D. Oklahoma) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

September 1, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Danny Dewayne Brewer, an Oklahoma State prisoner proceeding pro se,1

appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, in which he 

alleges that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. Exercising jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM. 

I. BACKGROUND 

This case arises out of Mr. Brewer’s complaint, filed in the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, seeking relief pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations that occurred during Mr. Brewer’s 

incarceration in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC). 

Mr. Brewer’s complaint alleges that while he was incarcerated in the Davis 

Correctional Facility (DCF), Corrections Officer Sergeant Deanna Gilroy repeatedly 

sexually assaulted him in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Mr. Brewer filed 

a grievance with DCF setting forth his claims of sexual abuse against Defendant 

Gilroy and requesting that “[Defendant] Gilroy . . . be investigated and the witnesses 

that I mention be questioned.” Although DCF staff investigated the grievance, 

Mr. Brewer claims two DCF employees, identified as Defendant Captain Riddle and 

Defendant Corrections Officer Pinley, failed to properly investigate the alleged 

 1

 Because Mr. Brewer proceeds pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See 

Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 

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sexual assault.2

 Mr. Brewer charges that Defendants Riddle’s and Pinley’s 

investigation exhibited deliberate indifference to the alleged assault and violated 

Mr. Brewer’s constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Mr. Brewer also raises a similar claim against a DCF employee identified as 

Corrections Officer Fnu Pavlukevick. 

In addition, the complaint alleges that after Mr. Brewer reported the sexual 

assault, Jimmy Martin, the administrative assistant to the DCF Warden, conspired 

with Internal Affairs Officers and Oklahoma State Penitentiary (OSP) Deputy 

Warden, Art Lightle, to transfer Mr. Brewer to OSP in order to prevent him from 

filing the instant lawsuit. 

Mr. Brewer further claims the prison conditions at OSP violated his Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, he asserts he was placed in various unlit 

cells that smelled of urine, feces, and sewage. He also claims OSP officials did not 

give him a mattress, bedroll, or adequate food and water. 

Mr. Brewer infers that these prison conditions were the product of racial 

discrimination. He claims there is a history of racial discrimination at OSP and that 

all high-ranking corrections officers are white. According to Mr. Brewer, various 

OSP employees, including Defendant Lightle, used racial epithets when referring to 

President Barack Obama or African-American prisoners. 

 2

 Mr. Brewer sometimes refers to Defendant Pinley as Officer Pentley. 

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Mr. Brewer claims he submitted to the ODOC several administrative 

grievances challenging the prison conditions at OSP, two to Warden Randall 

Workman and one to Director’s Designee Debbie Morton, but received no response. 

Mr. Brewer also alleges he filed several emergency grievances to the ODOC 

Director’s Designee, Defendant Mark Knutson, claiming racial discrimination and a 

lack of water in his cell because the faucet was broken. Mr. Brewer claims Defendant 

Knutson refused to address these grievances. 

Defendants Crenshaw, Jones,3

 Knutson, Parker, Sherwood, Taylor, and Lightle 

filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Mr. Brewer failed to establish their 

personal participation in any constitutional violations. Defendants Riddle and Pinley 

also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Mr. Brewer had failed to properly exhaust 

his administrative remedies as to them. In response, Mr. Brewer filed three motions 

to amend his complaint, asserting in relevant part that he should be entitled to name 

additional defendants, including Internal Affairs Officers Randy Knight and Ken 

Yott.4

The district court agreed with Defendants Crenshaw, Jones, Knight, Knutson, 

Parker, Sherwood, Taylor, and Lightle that Mr. Brewer’s claims of constitutional 

violations were vague, conclusory, and failed to sufficiently assert that these named 

 3

 The complaint names former ODOC Director Justin Jones, but Mr. Brewer 

does not identify any allegations of specific misconduct on the part of this defendant. 

 

4

 Neither Officer Knight nor Officer Yott was served with the complaint. But 

Officer Knight entered an appearance in the district court. 

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defendants had personally violated Mr. Brewer’s constitutional rights. See Brewer v. 

Gilroy, No. CIV 13-471-RAW-SPS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33393, at *19 (E.D. 

Okla. Mar. 18, 2015) (“Personal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 

claim.” (quoting Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262–63 (10th Cir. 1976))). The 

district court also dismissed without prejudice Mr. Brewer’s claims that Defendants 

Riddle and Pinley failed to properly investigate the sexual assault allegations against 

Defendant Gilroy because Mr. Brewer had failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies with respect to those claims.5 Id. at *12-*13, *22. Ultimately, the court 

found the complaint frivolous,6

 dismissed the action in its entirety, and assessed a 

strike against Mr. Brewer.7 Id. at *23; see Smith v. Veterans Admin., 636 F.3d 1306, 

1313 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Under the PLRA, prisoners obtain a ‘strike’ against them for 

purposes of future IFP eligibility when their action or appeal in a court of the United 

States . . . [is] dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . .” (first and third alterations in original) 

 5

 The district court dismissed without prejudice Mr. Brewer’s claims against 

Defendants Gilroy, Pavlukevick, and Martin because the United States Marshals 

Service was unable to serve them due to Mr. Brewer’s failure to provide their current 

addresses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); 12(b)(5) (permitting dismissal for insufficient 

service of process). Mr. Brewer has not challenged the court’s dismissal of the claims 

against these defendants and we do not consider them further. 

6

 In dismissing the case as frivolous, the district court also found “there are no 

allegations that Internal Affairs Officers Knight and Yott personally participated in 

constitutional violations against plaintiff.” Brewer v. Gilroy, No. CIV 13-471-RAWSPS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33393, at *19 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 18, 2015). 

7

 Mr. Brewer has not challenged the district court’s imposition of a strike 

against him on appeal. 

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(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262, 1266 

(10th Cir. 2013) (“In this circuit, it is immaterial to the strikes analysis that the 

dismissal was without prejudice.”). 

Mr. Brewer timely appealed, and the district court, which had granted 

Mr. Brewer leave to file his complaint in forma pauperis (IFP) under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915 (see Dkt. No. 5),8

 also granted Mr. Brewer leave to proceed IFP on appeal. 

See Lister v. Dep’t of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n order to 

succeed on a motion to proceed IFP, the movant must show a financial inability to 

pay the required filing fees, as well as the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous 

argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised in the action.”). 

II. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Mr. Brewer challenges the district court’s exhaustion ruling and 

persists in his claim that Defendants Crenshaw, Jones, Knight, Knutson, Parker, 

Sherwood, Taylor, and Lightle violated his constitutional rights during his 

incarceration at OSP. In addition, he argues the district court improperly overlooked 

his claim of civil conspiracy against DCF and OSP employees for allegedly 

conspiring to transfer him to OSP to prevent him from filing the instant lawsuit. He 

also claims the district court should have permitted him to amend his complaint to 

cure any deficiencies rather than to dismiss it with prejudice. We first consider the 

district court’s exhaustion ruling before turning to the merits of Mr. Brewer’s 

 8

 All references to district court docket numbers will be in the format “Dkt. 

No. __” and refer to the district court filings in this case. 

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constitutional claims. Finally, we address whether the district court properly 

dismissed Mr. Brewer’s complaint without permitting him to amend. 

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

We review de novo the district court’s determination that Mr. Brewer’s 

constitutional claims against Defendants Riddle and Pinley were barred for failure to 

exhaust his administrative remedies. See Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 

(10th Cir. 2002). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), prisoners are 

required to exhaust their administrative remedies before initiating an action to 

vindicate federally protected rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be 

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility 

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”). The exhaustion 

requirement is an affirmative defense. Therefore, defendants “bear the burden of 

asserting and proving that the plaintiff did not utilize administrative remedies.” 

Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011). “Once a defendant proves 

that a plaintiff failed to exhaust, however, the onus falls on the plaintiff to show that 

remedies were unavailable to him . . . .” Id.

Here, we have little difficulty concluding Mr. Brewer’s claims against 

Defendants Riddle and Pinley are barred for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies. Although Mr. Brewer filed an administrative grievance regarding the 

alleged sexual assault, he did not assert the constitutional claims he now brings 

against these defendants for failure to adequately investigate his allegations. And 

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Mr. Brewer points to nothing that convinces us that acts of prison officials rendered 

those administrative remedies unavailable. Cf. Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1250 

(10th Cir. 2010) (holding that exhaustion is not required “[w]here prison officials 

prevent, thwart, or hinder a prisoner’s efforts to avail himself of an administrative 

remedy”). Rather, the administrative grievance process appears to have been 

available to Mr. Brewer at both the DCF and OPS facilities. See Patel v. Fleming, 

415 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that a prisoner failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies where, after he was transferred to a different facility, he 

failed to timely file his grievance); Gonyea v. Mink, 206 F. App’x 745, 747 (10th Cir. 

2006) (rejecting inmate’s claim that grievance process was unavailable where he 

could have filed a grievance against a county prison after his transfer to a county jail 

and in fact had filed multiple administrative requests with the jail).9

 Thus, the district 

court properly dismissed without prejudice Mr. Brewer’s claims against Defendants 

Riddle and Pinley. 

B. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim 

Next, we consider whether the district court properly dismissed Mr. Brewer’s 

claims against Defendants Crenshaw, Jones, Knight, Knutson, Parker, Sherwood, 

Taylor, and Lightle for failure to state a plausible claim that any named defendant 

violated Mr. Brewer’s constitutional rights. The district court granted these 

 9

 Though not binding, we find unpublished decisions from this court to be 

persuasive. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A) (“Unpublished decisions are not precedential, 

but may be cited for their persuasive value.”). 

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defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss these claims and, acting sua sponte, it also 

dismissed Mr. Brewer’s IFP complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.10

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and, 

although we construe Mr. Brewer’s pro se complaint liberally,11 “our role is not to act 

as his advocate.” Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009). We 

also review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss an IFP complaint under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 

1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). And “[w]e apply the same standard of review for 

dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that we employ for Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Id.; see also 

McKinley v. Maddox, 493 F. App’x. 928, 931 (10th Cir. 2012) (same).

To determine under Rule 12(b)(6) whether Mr. Brewer has sufficiently stated 

his claims, we accept as true the well-pled factual allegations and consider whether 

he has provided “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

See Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). Because Mr. Brewer is bringing his claims 

pursuant to § 1983, his complaint “must plead that each Government-official 

 10 This Section provides that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the 

court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous [or] fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii). 

11 “This liberal treatment is not without limits, and ‘this court has repeatedly 

insisted that pro se parties follow the same rules of procedure that govern other 

litigants.’” Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Garrett v. 

Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)). 

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defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). The complaint must 

therefore “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face’” as to the specific constitutionally impermissible actions 

allegedly committed by each named defendant to survive a motion to dismiss as to 

each defendant. Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Conclusory 

allegations are not enough to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Gallagher, 587 F.3d at 

1068. 

Mr. Brewer’s complaint, read liberally, asserts that (1) the prison conditions at 

OSP constituted cruel and unusual punishment and denied him due process; (2) OSP 

and ODOC prison officials refused to address grievances submitted through the 

mandatory prisoner grievance process in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment due process rights; (3) OSP and ODOC prison officials racially 

discriminated against him in violation of equal protection; and (4) DCF and OSP 

employees conspired to transfer him to OSP to prevent him from filing the instant 

lawsuit. 

In considering the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint supporting 

these claims, we conclude the district court properly dismissed Mr. Brewer’s 

complaint. 

1. Challenge to the Prison Conditions at OSP 

Mr. Brewer’s challenges to the prison conditions at OSP arise under the Eighth 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. “The Eighth Amendment, 

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which applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments on those 

convicted of crimes.” Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 809 (10th Cir. 

1999) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296–97 (1991)). The Eighth 

Amendment requires that prison officials “provide humane conditions of confinement 

by ensuring inmates receive the basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shelter, 

and medical care and by taking reasonable measures to guarantee the inmates’ 

safety.” DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Likewise, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any State from 

depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Perkins, 

165 F.3d at 808 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223 (1976)). “A prisoner’s 

liberty interests may arise . . . from state law.” Id. But state-created liberty interests 

are generally limited to conditions that impose “atypical and significant hardship on 

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. (quoting Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). As noted, “[i]n determining whether a dismissal 

is proper, we must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and construe those 

allegations, and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them, in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

a. Abuses by prison employees not named as defendants

Mr. Brewer asserts prison officials at OSP violated his constitutional rights 

when they placed him in unlit cells that smelled of urine, feces, or sewage, and 

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refused to give him a mattress, bedroll, or adequate food and water. According to 

Mr. Brewer, he was denied food entirely for seven days. He further alleges that at 

other times, prison employees threw food into his cell so that he would have to eat 

off the floor. 

Taken as true, these allegations might well support a plausible claim under the 

Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.12 However, Mr. Brewer’s claims based on these 

allegations fail because the named defendants are not the individuals Mr. Brewer 

claims were personally involved in these alleged abuses. 

For instance, Mr. Brewer alleges that on the day of his transfer to OSP, March 

4, 2012, a Sergeant Hammell and Corporal Crenshaw, the son of named defendant 

Terry Crenshaw, denied him food at lunch and dinner. Other than the fact that Terry 

Crenshaw and Corporal Crenshaw are father and son, respectively, Mr. Brewer 

provides no explanation why the named defendant, Terry Crenshaw, should be liable 

for the alleged conduct of Corporal Crenshaw, who is not named as a defendant. 

 12 Compare Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding 

no constitutional violation where plaintiffs were temporarily placed in a filthy cell 

with inadequate lighting and ventilation, there was a lack of enclosures around the 

shower and toilet, the prison provided unappetizing food, and there was no access to 

recreational facilities), with Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 

1996) (concluding prisoner sufficiently alleged constitutional violation where he 

claimed he was “provided no mattress, blankets or bedding of any kind, . . . not 

allowed to leave his cell for exercise, not provided with writing utensils, not provided 

with adequate ventilation, . . . and only sometimes allowed minimal amounts of toilet 

paper,” and “[t]hese conditions supposedly lasted for a period of days, weeks and 

months”). 

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Mr. Brewer further alleges that because the cell to which he was initially 

assigned had no lights or working plumbing, Mr. Brewer covered the window to get 

attention. He alleges a Captain Kennedy responded and moved him to another cell 

that had functioning plumbing, but also lacked working lights. Mr. Brewer claims he 

told Captain Kennedy he had not been fed, but Captain Kennedy responded that it 

was 1:30 a.m. and the kitchen was closed. According to Mr. Brewer, he then went 

seven consecutive days and nights without food. 

Mr. Brewer identifies the person responsible for bringing his food as Sergeant 

Spears13 and alleges Ms. Spears explained to him that Deputy Warden Art Lightle 

had imposed a seven day sack lunch restriction on Mr. Brewer but the kitchen was 

not sending the sack lunches. When Mr. Brewer asked for one of the trays of food 

visible on Ms. Spears’ food cart, she allegedly refused, explaining that the sack lunch 

restriction prohibited him from having a tray lunch, even if the kitchen was not 

actually sending the sack lunches. 

Mr. Brewer further asserts that an African American corrections officer, 

Sergeant Richard Buie, brought Mr. Brewer sack lunches during his shifts. When 

Mr. Brewer informed Lieutenant Glover, Ms. Spears’ superior, that Ms. Spears was 

not bringing him food, Lieutenant Glover claimed to have seen Mr. Brewer receive 

every meal over the security cameras. Mr. Brewer alleges that after Sergeant Buie 

 13 Mr. Brewer’s complaint makes allegations against two corrections officers 

who are married to each other and are both identified as Sergeant Spears in the 

record. For clarity and because the record does not provide a first name for 

Ms. Spears, we refer to them as Mr. and Ms. Spears in this decision. 

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told the kitchen to send sack lunches to Mr. Brewer, Ms. Spears withheld them, even 

when he could see his name and cell number on sack lunches on her cart. But 

Mr. Brewer has not named Ms. Spears, Captain Kennedy, or Lieutenant Glover as 

defendants in this action. 

Mr. Brewer asserts he informed Chief Peters that he had not received his sack 

lunches for seven days (except for, presumably, the lunches Sergeant Buie brought 

him). In response, Chief Peters allegedly agreed to have his lieutenants personally 

bring Mr. Brewer his lunches. Mr. Brewer contends Lieutenant Glover and 

Lieutenant Jowels thereafter threw Mr. Brewer’s food into his cell so that he would 

have to eat it off the floor, which he claims contained puddles of water from leaks in 

the quad’s roof that had seeped in under the door of his cell. Mr. Brewer also failed 

to name Lieutenant Jowels as a defendant in his complaint. 

Mr. Brewer next alleges he was moved to a different quad where Ms. Spears’ 

husband, Sergeant David Spears, was responsible for food delivery. Mr. Spears and 

an Officer Heartfield allegedly told the inmate “run man”14 on the quad that he would 

fire him if he gave Mr. Brewer anything. Mr. Brewer claims his new cell again had 

no functioning lighting, and he could see and smell raw sewage coming up from the 

pipes. According to Mr. Brewer he was not provided with a mattress or bed roll for 

seven days and was eating only every other day. When a new inmate run man was 

 14 “The run man is responsible for cleaning the Quad and passing out tea, juice, 

milk, coffee, toilet tissue, clothing, and indigent hygiene items.” Brewer, 2015 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 33393, at *16. 

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assigned to the quad, Mr. Brewer alleges Officer Heartfield repeated his instruction 

that Mr. Brewer not be given anything from the cart.15 Mr. Brewer claims he 

complained to corrections officers Sergeant Taylor16 and Sergeant Hands, who 

refused to intervene. Mr. Spears, Officer Heartfield, Sergeant Taylor, and Sergeant 

Hands are also not named as defendants in this action. 

Mr. Brewer further alleges that a year after complaining about these issues, 

Deputy Warden Art Lightle and Unit Manager William Taylor moved him to a high 

max cell.17 According to Mr. Brewer, unnamed corrections officers again denied him 

food for several days after the move. Mr. Brewer does not identify the prison officials 

who allegedly withheld food from him while he was housed in a high max cell and 

offers no allegations connecting these activities to any named defendants. 

 15 Mr. Brewer adds here an allegation that seems to imply that named 

defendant Case Manager Sherwood joined Officer Heartfield in this statement to the 

run man. However, this sole allegation in the complaint relating to Keith Sherwood 

(reading, in its entirety, “also the case manager Sharewood!”) is simply too tenuous 

to implicate him, even if the denial of access to items from the run man’s cart could 

rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 

16 Although it is unclear from the allegations in the complaint, this Sergeant 

Taylor appears to be a different individual than the named Unit Manager William 

Taylor, based on the plainest reading of the language in the complaint. 

17 Although Mr. Brewer does not provide further details about this in his 

complaint beyond noting that such a move is usually for punishment and he believes 

he had not been guilty of any misconduct since he arrived at OSP, in one of the 

grievance notices he attached to his complaint, he explains that he was moved to a 

high max cell for allegedly throwing something on the run man. 

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b. Allegations against named defendants 

The district court correctly dismissed Mr. Brewer’s claims, despite his detailed 

factual allegations, because he failed to allege that any named defendant personally 

participated in the alleged deprivations. See Mitchell, 80 F.3d at 1441 (affirming 

district court’s dismissal of claim where plaintiff failed to link the named appellees to 

the unconstitutional action, and holding that supervisor status by itself is insufficient 

to support liability). In the absence of specific allegations against one or more named 

defendants, Mr. Brewer cannot maintain a claim with respect to the conditions at 

OSP. See Bennett, 545 F.2d at 1262–63 (“Personal participation is an essential 

allegation in a § 1983 claim.”). 

To the extent Mr. Brewer has made allegations against the named defendants, 

we agree with the district court that the specific allegations of misconduct against 

Defendants Crenshaw, Sherwood, Taylor, and Lightle do not establish actionable due 

process or Eighth Amendment violations. For example, placing Mr. Brewer on a 

temporary sack lunch restriction does not implicate due process, see, e.g., Rogers v. 

Holt, 49 F. App’x 231, 232 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that there was no arguable due 

process claim where the prisoner alleged the denial of recreation and substitution of 

sack lunches for a period of five days), nor does the discretionary decision to transfer 

him to a high-max cell, see, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (ruling that 

changes in prison security classifications do not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment 

and, therefore, transfer to another, more restrictive prison does not violate due 

process) and Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 356–57 (10th Cir. 1978) (concluding 

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that discretionary intra state prison transfers and change of security status do not give 

rise to due process rights). 

Likewise, the allegation that Defendant Parker falsified Mr. Brewer’s prison 

record in order to conceal a refusal to follow OSP policy regarding yard time and 

showers, even if taken as true, is too vague to establish an actionable constitutional 

claim. Indeed, Mr. Brewer’s complaint fails to provide any factual detail regarding 

this claim. Without such information, it is impossible to tell whether the alleged 

restrictions on yard time and showers implicate the Due Process Clause. Compare

Perkins, 165 F.3d at 810 (recognizing that the total denial of exercise for an extended 

period of time could constitute cruel and unusual punishment), with Marshall v. 

Morton, 421 F. App’x 832, 838 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that “restrictions on an 

inmate’s telephone use, property possession, visitation and recreation privileges are 

not different in such degree and duration as compared with the ordinary incidents of 

prison life to constitute protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause”). 

For these reasons, Mr. Brewer has failed to sufficiently allege that Defendants 

Crenshaw, Jones, Knight, Parker, Sherwood, Taylor, or Lightle violated his 

constitutional rights, and the district court correctly dismissed his due process and 

Eighth Amendment claims against these named defendants. 

2. Disposition of Grievances 

Throughout this period at OSP, Mr. Brewer alleges he submitted a number of 

grievances to the prison administration. During March 2012, when he alleges Mr. and 

Ms. Spears were withholding his food and Lieutenants Glover and Jowels were 

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throwing his food onto his cell floor, Mr. Brewer claims he filed three grievances and 

a “Request to Staff” with the prison administration. Mr. Brewer asserts he sent two 

grievances to Warden Randall Workman and one to Director’s Designee Debbie 

Morton. He claims he did not receive responses to these grievances and that he was 

moved to a high max cell a year after making these complaints.18 

Because he felt prison officials were inadequately addressing his complaints, 

Mr. Brewer wrote directly to Deputy Director D.B. Parker. Mr. Brewer credits 

writing to Deputy Director Parker with improving the situation because he was then 

granted yard and exercise time, allowed showers three times a week, and provided 

three meals every day. Mr. Brewer nevertheless filed further grievances with the 

Director’s Designee Mark Knutson, one labeled an “emergency” grievance relating to 

the allegedly broken water faucet in his high max cell and two others labeled 

alternatively “emergency” and “sensitive” relating to racial discrimination he claimed 

he was experiencing at that time. Mr. Brewer claims Mr. Knutson responded that his 

broken water faucet was not an “emergency” and that Mr. Knutson “refused to 

address the racism issues.” 

The district court outlined the requirements of the mandatory grievance 

process in use by the ODOC at the relevant time. See Brewer, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

 18 Neither Randall Workman nor Debbie Morton is named as a defendant in 

this case. 

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33393, at *10-*11.19 In addressing Mr. Brewer’s claims about deficiencies in the 

disposition of his grievances, the district court considered the Martinez reports it had 

ordered defendants to prepare. See id. at *1.20 The uncontroverted Martinez report 

relating to OSP (Dkt. No. 61) included a sworn affidavit of Director’s Designee Mark 

Knutson (Dkt. No. 61, Ex. 15). In his affidavit, Mr. Knutson addresses each of the 

grievances filed by Mr. Brewer and the disposition of each according to the ODOC 

 19 The district court described the process as follows: 

According to DOC Policy OP-090124, “Inmate/Offender Grievance 

Process,” an inmate first must attempt to resolve his complaint 

informally. If that is unsuccessful, he may submit a Request to Staff 

(RTS). If the complaint still is not resolved, he then may file a 

grievance. If the grievance also does not resolve the issue, the inmate 

may appeal to the Administrative Review Authority or the Chief 

Medical Officer. The administrative process is exhausted only after all 

of these steps have been taken. . . . . 

Both DOC and CCA/DCF policies provide a specific remedy to an 

inmate in the event of failure of staff to respond to a RTS. Pursuant to 

DOC policy, if there has been no response within 30 calendar days of 

submission, the inmate may file a grievance to the reviewing authority 

with evidence of submitting the RTS to the proper staff member. The 

grievance may assert only the issue of lack of response to the RTS. 

Brewer, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33393, at *10-*11. Moreover, the ODOC grievance 

policies “permit a prisoner to circumvent the informal resolution processes and 

submit a grievance without first talking to an appropriate official and submitting a 

Request to Staff, provided that the grievance addresses a sensitive or emergency 

matter. A prisoner must use a particular form and write the word ‘emergency’ at the 

top of the form.” Smith v. Beck, 165 Fed. Appx. 681, 684 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation 

omitted). 

20 Although a “Martinez report may not be used to resolve disputed factual 

issues,” in the Tenth Circuit, “an uncontroverted report may serve as the basis for a 

dismissal” on a 12(b)(6) motion. Gallagher, 587 F.3d at 1068 n.7. 

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grievance procedures in effect at that time, including the reason that each grievance 

was returned or denied.21

Mr. Brewer has no independent due process rights that arise out of OSP or 

ODOC employees’ disposition of internal grievances. See, e.g., Gallagher, 587 F.3d 

at 1069 (holding that allegations related to the denial of prisoner’s grievances were 

insufficient to state a cognizable due process claim); Boyd v. Werholtz, 443 F. App’x 

331, 332 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that there is no independent constitutional right to 

state prison administrative grievance procedures). And the uncontroverted Martinez

report relating to OSP reveals Mr. Brewer’s allegations of deficiencies in the 

disposition of his grievances as specious. The district court therefore correctly 

dismissed Mr. Brewer’s claims against Mr. Knutson.

3. Racial Discrimination at OSP 

 21 For example, Mr. Brewer’s “sensitive emergency grievance” of September 

27, 2012 complaining of being placed on restriction was “unanswered due to the 

issue not being of an emergency or sensitive nature,” and Mr. Brewer “was directed 

to follow the standard grievance process.” Mr. Brewer’s May 30, 2013 “emergency 

grievance” relating to the broken water faucet “went unanswered due to the issue not 

being of an emergency nature,” and because Mr. Brewer had failed “to provide 

information regarding any informal action taken to resolve the complaint.” 

Mr. Brewer’s first grievance to Mr. Knutson about alleged racial discrimination, 

dated September 17, 2013 and marked “sensitive,” was unacceptable under the 

guidelines because it was not “of a sensitive nature,” and Mr. Brewer “was directed 

to follow the standard grievance process.” Finally, Mr. Brewer’s second grievance 

alleging racial discrimination, dated August 23, 2014, suffered from the “procedural 

error of raising multiple issues in one grievance,” and this was indicated to 

Mr. Brewer on the response form. (See Dkt. No. 61, Ex. 15, Affidavit of Mark 

Knutson dated June 11, 2014, at ¶¶ 7-11.) 

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We also agree with the district court that Mr. Brewer has not sufficiently 

alleged an equal protection violation. “Equal protection ‘is essentially a direction that 

all persons similarly situated should be treated alike’.” Grace United Methodist 

Church v. City of Cheyenne, 427 F.3d 775, 792 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting City of 

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)), vacated on rehearing 

on other grounds by 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006). Thus, to establish an equal 

protection violation, Mr. Brewer must allege facts that show the defendants treated 

him differently than other similarly situated prisoners. Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 

1252, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006).22 

Considering Mr. Brewer’s complaint under this standard, we conclude it fails 

to state a plausible equal protection claim against any named defendant. 

Mr. Brewer’s generic allegations of racial discrimination at OSP—ungrounded in 

specific factual averments that would show that he was treated differently from 

similarly situated white prisoners—are insufficient to state a plausible equal 

protection claim. Compare Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1322–23 (10th 

Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiff could not show an equal protection violation where 

he made vague and conclusory allegations but failed to provide specific facts 

 22 Because Mr. Brewer asserts an equal protection claim based on race, it is 

unnecessary for him to show that his treatment was not reasonably related to some 

legitimate penological purpose. See Tennyson v. Carpenter, 558 F. App’x 813, 820 

(10th Cir. 2014); cf. Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 371 (10th Cir. 1994) 

(concluding that because the prisoner failed to allege disparate treatment on the basis 

of any suspect classification, he was required to show that the distinction between 

himself and other inmates was not reasonably related to some legitimate penological 

purpose). 

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showing that white inmates were treated more favorably), with Tennyson v. 

Carpenter, 558 F. App’x 813, 820 (10th Cir. 2014) (concluding that an equal 

protection claim was not frivolous where the defendant alleged that he was the only 

African American in the choir and the only member disciplined for conduct common 

to all choir members, thereby alleging a suspect classification based on race). For this 

reason, the district court correctly rejected Mr. Brewer’s claims that defendants 

Crenshaw, Jones, Knight, Knutson, Parker, Sherwood, Taylor, or Lightle 

impermissibly discriminated against him on the basis of his race. 

4. Civil Conspiracy Claim 

We also reject Mr. Brewer’s contention that he sufficiently pled a civil 

conspiracy claim. Although the district court was required to read Mr. Brewer’s 

complaint liberally, it was under no obligation to craft Mr. Brewer’s claims for him. 

See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[Although] a pro se 

litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[,]” it is improper for “the district court to 

assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.”). Mr. Brewer’s complaint cannot 

be fairly read to assert a plausible civil conspiracy claim, even under the most 

generous reading. Rather, this claim consists of a few conclusory assertions of 

conspiracy, without providing any specific facts that would establish any named 

defendants took concerted action to transfer Mr. Brewer to OSP to prevent him from 

filing the instant lawsuit. We agree with the district court that this is insufficient to 

raise a civil conspiracy claim. See Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 

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533 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that although allegations of conspiracy can form a 

§ 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing an agreement and 

concerted action amongst the defendants[;] [c]onclusory allegations of conspiracy are 

insufficient” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

C. Dismissal Without Permitting Amendment 

Finally, we consider whether the district court properly dismissed 

Mr. Brewer’s complaint without permitting him leave to amend. A “district court 

should allow a plaintiff an opportunity to cure technical errors or otherwise amend 

the complaint when doing so would yield a meritorious claim.” Curley v. Perry, 246 

F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001). But the district court need not permit an 

opportunity to amend when “it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts 

he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Perkins v. 

Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Here, the district court found Mr. Brewer’s complaint frivolous, dismissing it 

without granting him leave to amend. Brewer v. Gilroy, No. CIV 13-471-RAW-SPS, 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33393, at *23 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 18, 2015). Mr. Brewer did not 

provide necessary additional factual averments in his filings with the district court to 

make out plausible claims that any named defendants violated his constitutional 

rights. Specifically, Mr. Brewer’s three motions to amend failed to identify any 

allegations that would have cured the deficiencies in his complaint. See, e.g., Curley, 

246 F.3d at 1284 (affirming a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for 

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failure to state a claim where the plaintiff failed to file a motion to reconsider 

explaining why the dismissal was erroneous). The district court did not abuse its 

discretion in dismissing Mr. Brewer’s complaint without granting him leave to amend 

because Mr. Brewer’s proposed amendments would have been futile. See Anderson v. 

Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir 2007) (“A proposed amendment is futile if the 

complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

III. CONCLUSION 

We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Brewer’s complaint 

and its assessment of one strike against Mr. Brewer.23 The district court permitted 

Mr. Brewer leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, but we remind him of his 

obligation to continue making partial payments until the entire fee has been paid. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Carolyn B. McHugh 

Circuit Judge 

 23 We affirm the strike assessed against Mr. Brewer because he did not 

challenge it on appeal. But because we agree with the district court that Mr. Brewer’s 

appeal is not frivolous, we do not impose a second strike. See Jennings v. Natrona 

Cnty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999). 

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