Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05092/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05092-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James H. Billington
Appellee
Morris D. Davis
Appellee
Louis Fisher
Amicus Curiae for Appellee
Daniel P. Mulhollan
Appellant
Morton Rosenberg
Amicus Curiae for Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 10, 2011 Decided June 1, 2012

No. 11-5092

MORRIS D. DAVIS,

APPELLEE

v.

JAMES H. BILLINGTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE

LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS,

APPELLEE

DANIEL P. MULHOLLAN, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-00036)

Sharon Swingle, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Tony

West, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S.

Attorney, and Thomas M. Bondy, Attorney.

Aden J. Fine argued the cause for appellee. With him on

the brief were Alexander A. Abdo, Arthur B. Spitzer, and

Frederick V. Mulhauser.

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Louis Fisher and Morton Rosenberg, appearing pro se, were

on the brief as amici curiae Dr. Louis Fisher and Morton

Rosenberg in support of appellee. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and ROGERS,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

SENTELLE, Chief Judge: Appellee, a former employee of

the Library of Congress, brought this action against, inter alia,

his former supervisor, Daniel Mulhollan, alleging that his

termination for publication of articles critical of high-level

public officials violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the

Constitution and entitled him to damages relief under Bivens v.

Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971). Appellant Mulhollan moved to dismiss,

arguing that a Bivens action is not available under the

circumstances of this case and that he is entitled to qualified

immunity. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, and

Mulhollan filed the current appeal. Because we conclude that

the courts should not imply a new form of Bivens action on the

facts of this case, we reverse the order of the district court

denying dismissal.

I. Background

Upon review of a district court’s ruling on a motion to

dismiss, we, like the district court, accept as true the wellpleaded factual allegations of the complaint. Sparrow v. United

Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

Therefore, the following recitation of facts implies no decision

on our part as to the accuracy of the allegations. In December

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2008, the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the publicpolicy-research arm of Congress and a department of the Library

of Congress, hired appellee Davis as Assistant Director of its

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division subject to a

mandatory, one-year probationary period. That division

provides research and analytical services to congressional

committees responsible for foreign affairs; international trade

and finance; defense policy and arms control; and defense

budget, manpower, and management. As Assistant Director,

Davis was responsible for leading, planning, directing, and

evaluating the research and analytical activities of the division. 

During his tenure as Assistant Director, Davis publicly

criticized the system of military commissions created to

prosecute suspected terrorists held at Guantanamo Bay Naval

Base, Cuba, a system with which he had become familiar while

serving as Chief Prosecutor there until October 2007. While

employed by CRS, Davis voiced his criticisms of the system at

a Human Rights Watch dinner, in a BBC documentary, at a

conference at Case Western Reserve University Law School,

and in a law review article in connection with the conference. 

He also spoke about his views at a Lawyers Association of

Kansas City meeting after accepting an award for speaking out

against what he characterized as the politicization of the

military-commissions system. 

On November 11, 2009, as Davis’s probationary year

neared its end, he published opinion pieces in both the Wall

Street Journal and the Washington Post criticizing Attorney

General Eric Holder and the Obama administration for choosing

to prosecute some Guantanamo detainees in federal courts and

others in military commissions. Davis called this decision “a

mistake” and “double-standard justice” that “we would condemn

if ... applied to us.” The Post piece challenged the contention

of former Attorney General Michael Mukasey that “the decision

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to try Guantanamo detainees in federal courts comes down to a

choice between protecting the American people and showcasing

American justice.” Davis wrote that Mukasey’s statement,

which expressed concern for the security of people where

detainees would be tried, was “fear-mongering worthy of former

vice president Dick Cheney.” Neither editorial included a

disclaimer that it represented Davis’s personal views and not

those of CRS or the Library of Congress.

The evening before the publication of the two opinion

pieces, Davis e-mailed appellant Mulhollan, the Director of

CRS, and informed him of the impending publication of the two

opinion pieces. Mulhollan responded by e-mail, questioning

Davis’s judgment and his ability to continue serving as Assistant

Director. After the pieces were published, Mulhollan told Davis

that the opinion pieces damaged Davis’s ability to lead his

division in providing objective, nonpartisan analysis. He also

asked how members of Congress could trust Davis’s leadership

on military-commissions issues given his public opposition to

current policy; how Republicans would view his objectivity after

his attack on Dick Cheney; and how Davis could properly

counsel employees who failed to comply with the CRS outsidespeech policy, which Mulhollan believed Davis had violated. 

On November 20, 2009, Mulhollan notified Davis that he would

be removed from his probationary appointment as Assistant

Director. Mulhollan provided Davis with a thirty-day

appointment as Mulhollan’s special advisor to provide time to

look for other employment, after which time Davis was

separated from CRS. 

Davis then filed the current action against appellant, as well

as James Billington, the Librarian of Congress, seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief, and seeking damages against

Mulhollan for violation of his constitutional rights under the

First and Fifth Amendments, asking the court to imply a remedy

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under Bivens. Mulhollan moved to dismiss, both on the basis of

qualified immunity and on the theory that the court should not

imply a Bivens remedy for the discharge of a civil-service

employee. Because we agree that there is no available Bivens

remedy, we will not reach the question of qualified immunity

but will reverse the district court’s denial of the motion to

dismiss. 

II. Analysis

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the

collateral order doctrine. It is a well-established application of

that doctrine that “a district court’s denial of a claim of qualified

immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an

appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). Because the

defense of qualified immunity from a Bivens damages action

“directly implicate[s]” the antecedent question whether to

recognize that Bivens action at all, our jurisdiction extends to

that question as well. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549

& n.4 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the

district court’s legal conclusions de novo. Wilson v. Libby, 535

F.3d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

A.

In Bivens, the Supreme Court determined that under

appropriate circumstances the federal courts possess the

discretion to create remedial actions against federal officials for

violations of constitutional rights, even though Congress has not

expressly authorized those specific remedies by statute. See

Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1983). Beginning with

Bivens, the Supreme Court has drawn upon this power in three

instances to create a nonstatutory action for money damages

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against federal officials for constitutional violations. See

Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (Fourth Amendment violation by federal

agents); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (employment

discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause); Carlson

v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (Eighth Amendment violations by

prison officials). 

For the most part, though, the Court has “responded

cautiously” to requests for new “Bivens” remedies. Schweiker

v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988). The decision whether to

recognize a new damages remedy is not about ensuring that

every violation of a constitutional right is vindicated. Rather,

the Bivens inquiry is a “judgment about the best way to

implement a constitutional guarantee.” Robbins, 551 U.S. at

550. As the Supreme Court has made clear, in most instances

the judgment has been that Congress, not the judicial branch, is

in the best position to prescribe the scope of relief available for

the violation of a constitutional right. The Supreme Court has

applied this analysis in a context paralleling the facts before us. 

Specifically, the Court in Robbins stated: “We have accordingly

held against applying the Bivens model to claims of First

Amendment violations by federal employers . . . .” 551 U.S. at

562 (citing Bush, 462 U.S. 367); see also Chappell v. Wallace,

462 U.S. 296 (1983); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669

(1987); Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412. In explaining its reluctance to

create new causes of action for federal employees alleging

violation of their constitutional rights, the Supreme Court

recognized that “Congress is in a far better position than a court

to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between

federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service.” Bush,

462 U.S. at 389. The Court further explained that Congress has

“developed considerable familiarity with balancing

governmental efficiency and the rights of employees,” and that

“it also may inform itself through factfinding procedures such as

hearings that are not available to the courts.” Id.

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In keeping with the Supreme Court’s recognition of

Congress’s primary role, we have held that the courts will not

imply a Bivens remedy where Congress has adopted a 

“comprehensive remedial scheme.” Wilson, 535 F.3d at 705. In

Wilson, we followed the approach established by the Supreme

Court in Bush v. Lucas, a case in which a NASA rocket scientist

sought damages for First Amendment violations based on an

alleged retaliatory demotion. The Court held that the statutory

scheme governing federal civil-service employees—“an

elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step,

with careful attention to conflicting policy

considerations”—qualified as a special factor that precluded

creation of a Bivens remedy for violations of a federal

employee’s First Amendment rights. Bush, 462 U.S. at 388–89. 

Although the existing scheme did not afford complete relief to

the plaintiff, the scope of relief Congress chose to implement in

that system reflected a congressional policy judgment “informed

by a thorough understanding of the existing regulatory structure

and the respective costs and benefits that would result from the

addition of another remedy” to the civil-service system. Id. at

388. Recognizing that “Congress is in a far better position than

a court” to make that policy judgment, the Court “decline[d] to

create a new substantive legal liability without legislative aid

and as at the common law.” Id. at 389–90 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). In declining to fashion a new

Bivens remedy, the Court in Bush explained that the relevant

question about a comprehensive remedial scheme for purposes

of special-factors analysis—whether the scheme represents an

informed congressional judgment about what relief should be

available—“cannot be answered simply by noting that existing

remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff.” Id. at

388.

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The Court again dealt with the topic of a comprehensive

scheme constituting a special factor in a Bivens analysis in

Schweiker v. Chilicky. In Chilicky, the Court made it even

clearer that whether the scheme affords a plaintiff relief for his

specific injuries is not determinative of this inquiry. The

plaintiffs in Chilicky sought money damages against state and

federal officials for violations of their due process rights that

resulted in the termination of the plaintiffs’ Social Security

disability benefits. The Social Security Act provided no

separate remedy for unconstitutional conduct that leads to the

wrongful denial of benefits. Yet the Court declined to create a

Bivens remedy to relieve these unredressed injuries, discerning

no relevant distinction between the civil-service system in Bush

and the Social Security Act’s remedial scheme. Chilicky, 487

U.S. at 424–25. Indeed, “The absence of statutory relief for a

constitutional violation . . . does not by any means necessarily

imply that courts should award money damages against the

officers responsible for the violation.” Id. at 421–22. To the

contrary, so long as “the design of a Government program

suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate

remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may

occur in the course of its administration,” the Court would not

add a Bivens remedy to the mix. Id. at 423. Again, deference to

the informed judgment of Congress was the key: “Congress is

the body charged with making the inevitable compromises

required in the design of a massive and complex welfare benefits

program,” and it fulfilled that charge. Id. at 429. Congress’s

choice to leave the remedy sought by the plaintiffs out of that

complex program was not a legal basis for judicially revising

Congress’s considered policy judgment. Id.

In Wilson, as we had earlier done in Spagnola v. Mathis,

859 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1988), we applied the Supreme Court’s

precedents from Chilicky and Bush. Although in both Wilson

and Spagnola the comprehensive remedial scheme did not

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provide the relief the plaintiff was seeking, “it is the

comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme involved, not the

‘adequacy’ of specific remedies extended thereunder, that

counsels judicial abstention.” Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 227. At

bottom, then, “courts must withhold their power to fashion

damages remedies when Congress has put in place a

comprehensive system to administer public rights, has ‘not

inadvertently’ omitted damages remedies for certain claimants,

and has not plainly expressed an intention that the courts

preserve Bivens remedies.” Id. at 228. The presence of these

indicia of an informed congressional judgment is sufficient to

stay the judiciary’s hand in favor of Congress’s decision. 

Because the CSRA met these requirements, the Spagnola Court

held that “the creation of a Bivens remedy for civil service

employees and applicants who advance constitutional challenges

to federal personnel actions,” id. at 230, was foreclosed, even

though the remedies available to the plaintiffs were “not so

complete,” id. at 226. 

Wilson v. Libby explicitly rejected the notion that a

comprehensive scheme must include some remedy for the

plaintiff before the scheme can constitute a special factor that

precludes creation of a Bivens remedy. A CIA employee,

Valerie Plame Wilson, and her husband, Joseph Wilson, brought

a Bivens action against then-Vice President Cheney, his Chief of

Staff, and the President’s Deputy Chief of Staff based on alleged

improper disclosure of information by those individuals. The

disclosure blew Mrs. Wilson’s cover as a CIA operative. The

Wilsons alleged a violation of Mr. Wilson’s free speech rights

based on retaliatory disclosure of the information; violations of

both his and Mrs. Wilson’s equal protection rights; a violation

of her right to privacy based on the public disclosure of her

personal information; and a violation of her Fifth Amendment

property rights based on the disclosure’s effective elimination of

her position through destruction of its secrecy. 

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None of these claims were cognizable under the Privacy

Act. Mrs. Wilson’s claims were barred by the Privacy Act’s

exemption of the Offices of the President and Vice

President—which included the three defendants—from its

coverage. The Act provided Mr. Wilson with no relief at all;

only the person whose records are actually disclosed may bring

a claim under the Privacy Act. Still, we declined to create a

Bivens remedy for these alleged constitutional violations. We

first pointed out that the Wilsons’ contention that they had no

possibility of relief was inaccurate because Mrs. Wilson had a

possible claim against the Deputy Secretary of State. Even if

they were correct that the Act provided at least Mr. Wilson with

no relief whatsoever, they were incorrect to “focus on the

necessity of a remedy at all.” Wilson, 535 F.3d at 709. We

reiterated that “[t]he special factors analysis does not turn on

whether the statute provides a remedy to the particular plaintiff

for the particular claim he or she wishes to pursue.” Id. Instead,

the correct inquiry continues to be the one put forth in Bush:

“the question of who should decide whether such a remedy

should be provided.” Id. (citing Bush, 462 U.S. at 380 (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Deference to Congress to make that

decision is “especially due” when it “intentionally withheld” a

remedy, which shows “the considered judgment of Congress

that certain remedies are not warranted.” Id. That deference is

owed “whether Congress has chosen to exclude a remedy for

particular claims, as in Bush and Chilicky, or from particular

defendants,” as was the case in Wilson. Id.

B.

1.

The primary question before us in this case then is whether

the CSRA is a “comprehensive remedial scheme,” i.e., a scheme

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that reflects a considered congressional judgment about which

remedies should be available for claims that fall within its ambit. 

It qualifies as such “when Congress has put in place a

comprehensive system to administer public rights, has ‘not

inadvertently’ omitted damages remedies for certain claimants,

and has not plainly expressed an intention that the courts

preserve Bivens remedies.” Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 228. That

being established, we give “appropriate judicial deference” to

Congress’s judgment on the matter, treating the comprehensive

scheme as a special factor that precludes the creation of a Bivens

remedy. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423.

No one contests that the CSRA is a “comprehensive system

to administer public rights.” Davis admits this much, and

indeed, that conclusion was necessary to this court’s holding in

Spagnola that the CSRA was a special factor precluding the

creation of a Bivens remedy for the plaintiffs in that case. See

Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 228; see also Bush, 462 U.S. at 385–86. 

Nor has Congress provided any suggestion, much less a “plainly

expressed” intent, that Bivens remedies should be preserved for

claimants in Davis’s shoes.

Further, Congress’s choice to omit damages remedies for

claimants in Davis’s posture was a deliberate one—or as we

have put it before, Congress has “not inadvertently” omitted

these damages remedies. A review of the CSRA’s remedial

scheme as it relates to Davis and most other civil-service

members not employed by an agency under the executive branch

for purposes of the CSRA makes it clear that their general

excision from the remedial protections available through that

scheme was in fact conscious and “not inadvertent.”

The CSRA defines the “civil service” as “all appointive

positions” in all three branches of government. 5 U.S.C. § 2101. 

The civil service is then divided into three categories: the Senior

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Executive Service, the competitive service, and the excepted

service. The Senior Executive Service includes certain highlevel executive positions. See id. § 3132(a)(2). The competitive

service, generally speaking, includes “all civil service positions

in the executive branch,” excluding positions that require Senate

confirmation and those Congress specifically excludes by

statute. Id. § 2102. It also includes positions in certain named

categories if Congress specifically includes any particular

positions in those categories by statute. Id. Finally, the

excepted service contains the remainder of the civil-service

positions—those positions not in the competitive service or the

Senior Executive Service. Id. § 2103. 

Congress plainly included employees in Davis’s former

position in the “civil service” as defined by the CSRA. Davis

was an appointed employee with CRS, part of the Library of

Congress. The Library of Congress is not in the executive

branch for purposes of § 2102, nor are Library of Congress

employees specifically included in the competitive service by

statute. Therefore, within the CSRA’s definitional structure,

Davis was a member of the excepted service. 

Congress deliberately included Library of Congress

employees in the “civil service” governed by the CSRA. Then,

just as deliberately, Congress chose to limit the beneficiaries of

the CSRA’s remedial protections in large part to nonprobationary employees in the executive branch. Specifically,

three chapters of the CSRA govern personnel actions taken

against civil-service employees and the remedies available to

those employees. With only inconsequential exceptions, none

of them provide procedural rights or remedial measures for

civil-service employees of non-Executive agencies, which

include the Library of Congress. Moreover, the primary set of

protections against arbitrary adverse employment actions,

contained in Chapter 75, is not available to employees who are

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on probationary status. This leaves Davis, an employee of the

Library of Congress on probationary status, without recourse

under the CSRA for adverse actions taken against him.

In each of the three CSRA chapters governing personnel

actions, the unambiguous language Congress used to delineate

which civil-service employees would be eligible for the remedial

protections provided demonstrates that the exclusion of

probationary and CRS employees was deliberate. First, under

Chapter 43, Congress provided procedural protections and rights

of appeal in the context of performance reviews to “employees,”

which are defined in Chapter 43 as individuals “employed in or

under an ‘agency.’” Id. § 4301(2). “Agency” is in turn defined

in Chapter 43 as “an Executive agency” and the Government

Printing Office (GPO), excluding certain entities not pertinent

here. Id. § 4301(1). These definitions reflect an intentional

choice to leave civil-service members not employed by the

statutorily referenced Executive agencies—including employees

of CRS, see id. § 7103(a)(3) (listing the Library of Congress

separately from “Executive agency”)—ineligible for these

remedial protections.

Chapter 75 of the CSRA, which governs adverse actions

taken against civil-service employees for the “efficiency of the

service,” excises probationary and non-Executive agency

employees from its procedural protections in similar fashion. 

The protections available to civil-service members for minor

adverse actions (suspensions shorter than 14 days) are limited to

“employees,” which are defined as individuals in the

competitive service not on probationary status. Id. § 7501(1). 

The protections against major adverse actions (removal, longer

suspensions, pay or grade reduction, or furlough) are also

limited to “employees,” which are defined more broadly under

that subsection as (A) members of the competitive service not on

probationary status; (B) preference-eligible members of the

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excepted service who have served at least a year in an Executive

agency (or in the Postal Service or the Postal Regulatory

Commission); or (C) non-preference-eligible, non-probationary

members of the excepted service who have served two years or

more in an Executive agency. See id. § 7511(a)(1). These

carefully crafted definitions set up clear demarcations between

the categories of civil-service members eligible and ineligible

for the CSRA’s main body of procedural protections against

adverse employment actions, and the ineligible group includes

excepted-service employees of non-Executive agencies and

probationary employees. 

Chapter 23, which establishes the principles of the merit

system of civil-service employment, forbids an agency from

engaging in certain “prohibited personnel practices,” id.

§§ 2301–02. Each section is limited almost exclusively to

employees of Executive agencies using an approach nearly

identical to that used in Chapter 43. The section listing the basic

principles of the merit system applies to “an Executive agency”

and the Government Printing Office. Id. § 2301. The section

listing the specific prohibited personnel actions defines

“personnel action” as an action “with respect to an employee in,

or applicant for, a covered position in an ‘agency,’” which is

again defined as an Executive agency and the Government

Printing Office (excluding government corporations, intelligence

agencies, and the Government Accountability Office). Id.

§ 2302. 

The careful categorization of the subsets of civil-service

employees eligible for each part of the CSRA’s remedial scheme

speaks for itself—Congress’s decisions about which civilservice members would be eligible for these protections were

not made inadvertently. Our discussion of the same inquiry in

Wilson reflects this. There, we held that Congress was aware

that the definition of “agency” it chose would exclude the

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Offices of the President and Vice President from the Privacy

Act’s disclosure requirements (leaving the Wilsons without

claims against the three defendants, who were employed with

those offices). That awareness was sufficient to deem the

omission “intentional” and “not inadvertent.” Wilson, 535 F.3d

at 708. Here, the unambiguous use of the narrowing term

“Executive agency”—a term which plainly does not contain the

Library of Congress within the meaning of the statute, see 5

U.S.C. § 7103(a)(3)—and the express exclusion of probationary

employees from the “agencies” and types of “employees”

subject to the CSRA’s remedial protections evidences an explicit

congressional design for the subsets of civil-service employees

that would and would not have access to those protections. We

are satisfied that Congress omitted the subset of employees that

includes Davis from the remedial protections of the CSRA every

bit as intentionally as it omitted the Offices of the President and

Vice President from Privacy Act requirements in Wilson. And

as we wrote in Wilson, “it is where Congress has intentionally

withheld a remedy that we must most refrain from providing one

because it is in those situations that ‘appropriate judicial

deference’ is especially due to the considered judgment of

Congress that certain remedies are not warranted.” Wilson, 535

F.3d at 709 (citing Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423).

In short, all indications suggest Congress has made an

informed judgment about which remedies should be available to

particular classes of civil-service employees. The CSRA is a

comprehensive system to administer public rights; Congress

consciously, “not inadvertently” omitted remedies for civilservice members employed in or under the Library of Congress;

and nothing suggests Congress intended that courts preserve

Bivens remedies for such claimants. These indications are

sufficient to require our deference to Congress as “the body

charged with making the inevitable compromises required in the

design of a massive and complex . . . program.” Chilicky, 487

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U.S. at 429.

2.

Davis’s argument to the contrary rests on the idea that in no

other case has the Supreme Court or this court refused to

recognize a Bivens remedy for a plaintiff based on the existence

of a remedial scheme that provides no relief whatsoever for the

alleged constitutional violations. This is incorrect. To begin

with, the Chilicky plaintiffs sought a Bivens remedy against state

and federal officials for “emotional distress and for loss of food,

shelter and other necessities proximately caused by [the

officers’] denial of [disability] benefits without due process.” 

487 U.S. at 419 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Act

“makes no provision for remedies in money damages against

officials responsible for unconstitutional conduct that leads to

the wrongful denial of benefits.” Id. at 424. Even so, the

Supreme Court rejected the Bivens request because the Social

Security Act provided a multi-step process for review of

disability claims.

Wilson is even more to the point. The Privacy Act provided

no relief for the claims of either Mr. or Mrs. Wilson against the

three officers they sued for disclosing the fact of Mrs. Wilson’s

CIA employment. The Act only offered a “possible claim” by

Mrs. Wilson against a defendant not named in the lawsuit. 

Wilson, 535 F.3d at 709. Mr. Wilson had no cognizable claim

under the Privacy Act against anyone because the only

information disclosed by the defendants was his wife’s, meaning

only she could bring a claim under the Act. Yet this court

refrained from providing a Bivens remedy even to him because

“the special factors analysis does not turn on whether the statute

provides a remedy to the particular plaintiff for the particular

claim he or she wishes to pursue.” Id. Simply put, this will not

be the first time we have rejected a Bivens request in light of a

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comprehensive statutory scheme that fails to provide for redress

of a plaintiff’s constitutional claims.

These precedents control the current case. The district court

pointed to the CSRA’s lack of any review for Davis’s alleged

constitutional violations as dispositive evidence that the CSRA

cannot be considered a “comprehensive” remedial system. But

Chilicky, Spagnola, and particularly Wilson are to the contrary. 

“[C]ase-specific analysis . . . of the particular statutory remedies

available to a claimant” is not required; instead, we look to

whether the design of a statutory scheme evinces an informed

congressional judgment that the remedies provided by the

scheme are adequate. Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 227–28. If it does,

the scheme’s failure to provide a remedy to a “particular

plaintiff for the particular claim he or she wishes to pursue” does

not make the scheme any less “comprehensive” for purposes of

determining whether it is a special factor that precludes the

creation of a Bivens remedy. See, e.g., Wilson, 535 F.3d at 709. 

The Wilson plaintiffs made a nearly identical argument, see id.

at 707. It was as unavailing then as it is now. The Privacy Act’s

failure to provide complete relief to the Wilsons did not

“undermine its status as a ‘comprehensive scheme’ that stops us

from providing additional remedies under Bivens.” Id. Just so,

the CSRA’s lack of relief for Davis does not prevent it from

being a “comprehensive remedial scheme” that precludes us

from creating a Bivens remedy. 

Davis contends that his complete lack of available remedies

under the CSRA matters for a slightly different reason. He

argues that Congress’s omission of any remedies for Library of

Congress employees under the CSRA, while deliberate, does not

demonstrate a considered judgment about which remedies

should be available to those employees; rather, it shows that

those employees are not “included in” or “covered by” the

concededly comprehensive remedial system at all. This would

USCA Case #11-5092 Document #1376529 Filed: 06/01/2012 Page 17 of 46
18

mean he could still bring a Bivens action, he concludes, because

a comprehensive remedial system cannot serve as a special

factor barring creation of a Bivens remedy for employees who

are not “covered” by that system. 

This is not a novel theory. It has been framed before as the

question “whether a particular claimant—and his underlying

claim—should be included in a given congressional

‘comprehensive system’ for purposes of applying ‘special

factors’ analysis.” Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 229. For instance,

“while in some cases the outer boundaries for inclusion in

‘comprehensive systems’ may be less than clear,” there was

“little doubt” that Congress had brought First Amendment

claims like those advanced by the Spagnola plaintiffs “within

CSRA’s ambit . . . because the CSRA itself, in one fashion or

another, affirmatively speaks to [claims like those] by

condemning the underlying actions as ‘prohibited personnel

practices.’” Id. This case is not materially different. Moreover,

while the CSRA’s remedial scheme does not provide Davis with

procedural protections (due to his status as a probationary

employee of a non-Executive agency), it does provide

procedural protections and rights of appeal for the specific

underlying actions he challenges. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 4301–03

(providing certain protections to employees of “Executive

agencies” removed for unacceptable performance, including

advance written notice, a written decision, and the right to

appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board); id. §§ 7512–13

(providing similar procedural protections and rights of appeal to

employees against whom major adverse employment action is

proposed). Both by definition and in substance, then, the CSRA

accounts for civil-service members in Davis’s status. Congress

may have then chosen to make the CSRA’s remedial protections

for adverse employment actions unavailable to the subset of

civil-service members of which Davis is a part, but he has

provided us with no good reason to think that this choice is a

USCA Case #11-5092 Document #1376529 Filed: 06/01/2012 Page 18 of 46
19

signal to create a new Bivens remedy for that class of employees

and not simply a considered congressional judgment that these

remedies for these employees are not warranted.

Indeed, the only evidence Davis uses to suggest he is not

“included” in the CSRA’s comprehensive remedial scheme is

the lack of relief available to him under that scheme. As we

have explained above, and as the precedents make clear, this is

certainly not a sufficient reason to place a claimant and his

claims outside the ambit of a comprehensive remedial scheme

for purposes of special-factors analysis. See, e.g., Wilson, supra.

In sum, the CSRA includes a comprehensive remedial scheme

evincing a “considered judgment of Congress that certain

remedies are not warranted,” Wilson, 535 F.3d at 709, including

the damages remedy Davis seeks for alleged constitutional

violations. As we must give “appropriate judicial deference” to

that judgment, id., we decline to create a Bivens remedy and

thereby contravene Congress’s choice.1

 

Conclusion

Because we hold that Davis has failed to state a Bivens

claim for which relief may be granted, there is no reason to

reach the merits of his claims or to consider whether Director

Mulhollan is entitled to qualified immunity. We vacate the

order of the district court denying Mulhollan’s motion to dismiss

and remand with instructions to dismiss Davis’s Bivens claims.

1

 Davis can and has filed a claim for injunctive relief for the

alleged constitutional violations. We express no view on the validity

of that claim. See, e.g., Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 229–30.

USCA Case #11-5092 Document #1376529 Filed: 06/01/2012 Page 19 of 46
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: From the unremarkable

fact that Congress was aware that it was not including

employees of the Legislative Branch in the remedial provisions

of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”), Pub. L. No.

95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections

of 5 U.S.C.), the court concludes that “Congress consciously,

‘not inadvertently’ omitted remedies” for Library of Congress

employees, and thus the CSRA precludes a Bivens1 remedy for

Col. Morris D. Davis. Op. at 15. The premise of the court’s

holding is that when Congress enacts a remedial scheme for a

specific group of claimants, it is making a conscious decision

not to enact a remedial scheme for other claimants, regardless of

how far beyond the intended scope of the enacted scheme those

other claimants are, and even in the absence of any evidence

demonstrating Congress chose to exclude them because it did

not want them to have a remedy at all. There is no limiting

principle to this theory, and in adopting it, the court allows the

“special factor” exception to swallow the rule. The Supreme

Court has not gone so far, see Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617

(2012); nor should we. 

The court ignores the real question in this case – why did

Congress exclude Legislative Branch employees? The answer,

found in the unambiguous legislative history of the CSRA and

the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-

1, 109 Stat 3 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1438), is that

Congress, based on separation of powers principles, did not want

the Executive Branch to have the power to adjudicate claims of

Legislative Branch employees – a motivation that says nothing

about what Congress intended with respect to Legislative

Branch employee Bivens claims. Indeed, the legislative history

of the Congressional Accountability Act demonstrates that

1

 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388

(1971).

USCA Case #11-5092 Document #1376529 Filed: 06/01/2012 Page 20 of 46
2

Congress expressly concluded that judicial adjudication posed

none of the same separation of powers concerns. Because

Congress did not “intentionally withhold a remedy,” Wilson v.

Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 709 (D.C. Cir. 2008), from Library of

Congress employees by enacting the CSRA, and neither it nor

the Congressional Accountability Act constitutes special factors

counseling hesitation in recognizing a Bivens action, I would

affirm the district court’s ruling that Davis stated a valid Bivens

claim. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

I.

In Bivens, the plaintiff alleged that federal officials

conducted an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the

Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and the Supreme Court

held that the federal officials could be sued for violating his

constitutional rights, reasoning that “[h]istorically, damages

have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of

personal interests in liberty.” 403 U.S. at 395. To determine

whether a complaint states a valid Bivens claim, the Court has

instructed that the first question is “whether any alternative,

existing process for protecting the [constitutionally recognized]

interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch

to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in

damages.” Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 621 (quoting Wilkie v.

Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)) (alteration in original). 

Absent an alternative remedy, the question is whether “any

special factors counsel[] hesitation before authorizing a new

kind of federal litigation.” Id. (quoting Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550).

One such special factor is where Congress, although not

explicitly foreclosing a damages action, has provided “recourse

to ‘an elaborate, comprehensive scheme,’” Wilkie, 551 U.S. at

575 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385 (1983)), such

that recognition of a Bivens action would “interfere with

USCA Case #11-5092 Document #1376529 Filed: 06/01/2012 Page 21 of 46
3

Congress’ carefully calibrated system.” Id. This is the question

presented by the complaint, which alleges that the Librarian and

Davis’s supervisor violated his First and Fifth Amendment

rights under the Constitution when he was fired from his

position as Assistant Director of the Foreign Affairs, Defense,

and Trade Division, in the Congressional Research Service

(“CRS”) at the Library of Congress after an article and letter to

the editor criticizing the Obama and Bush Administrations’

handling of Guantanamo detainee trials were each published in

a newspaper.

A.

The court views the fact that Library of Congress

employees are excluded from the CSRA’s remedial scheme for

personnel actions, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(a), 4301(1), &

7511(a)(1)(B)(i), as evidence that Congress intentionally

withheld a remedy from them, and thus the CSRA constitutes a

“special factor” precluding a Bivens action for Davis. Op. at

11–15. Although the exclusion of Library employees is

dispositive in this case, it demands the opposite result. 

Contrary to the court’s conclusion, see Op. at 12, the Congress

that enacted the CSRA did not “define” the scope of the civil

service and then limit remedies to Executive Branch employees

in one deliberative, fell-swoop. Instead, more than a decade

before enacting the CSRA, Congress enacted the “Definitions”

section of Title 5, Chapter 21 of the U.S. Code “to establish a

basis of reference” “for convenience” when referring to federal

employees. S. REP. NO. 89-1380, at 46–47 (1966); H.R. REP.

NO. 89-901, at 26–27 (1966).2

 No evidence suggests that

2

 The court concludes that “Congress deliberately included

Library of Congress employees in the ‘civil service’ . . . [t]hen, just as

deliberately, Congress chose to limit” the remedial provisions to the

Executive Branch, see id. at 12. But these definitions were enacted in

1966, twelve years prior to the enactment of the CSRA. See Act of

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4

Congress intended anything about what remedies should be

available to Library employees when it enacted the CSRA; it

was addressing the altogether different question of how to

provide a fair system for adjudicating remedial claims within the

Executive Branch civil service. That Library employees are in

the “excepted service” as a matter of vernacular convenience

adds nothing to the analysis. Congress did not view itself as

legislating on what remedies should be available to Library

Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89-554, §§ 2101–2103; 80 Stat. 378, 408 (1966)

(enacting Title 5, United States Code, entitled “Government

Organization and Employees”). The legislative history of the 1966

Act indicates that Congress defined the “civil service” to “consist of

all appointive positions in the executive, judicial, and legislative

branches,” 5 U.S.C. § 2101(1) (1966), in order “to establish a basis of

reference to employees in this title.” S.REP. NO. 89-1380, at 46; H.R.

REP. NO. 89-901, at 26. Section 2102 of the 1966 Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 2102, defined the “competitive service,” with some exceptions not

relevant here, as “all civil service positions in the executive branch.” 

This was done simply to reorganize and centralize the Code’s

definition based on two prior statutes, the Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27

§ 7, 22 Stat. 406 (1883), and the Act of Nov. 26, 1940, ch. 919, title

I, 54 Stat. 1211 (1940). See S.REP.NO. 89-1380, at 46; H.R.REP.NO.

89-901, at 26. Finally, section 2103 of the 1966 Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2103

(1966), provided that “[f]or purposes of this title, the ‘excepted

service’ consists of those civil service positions which are not in the

competitive service.” Both the House and Senate Reports of the 1966

Act stated that section 2103 “is supplied for convenience. The

‘excepted service’ has come to mean all employees not in the

competitive service, for whatever reason.” S.REP.NO.89-1380, at 47;

H.R. REP. NO. 89-901, at 27. The only modification the CSRA made

to the definitions in 5 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2103 was to add provisions

regarding the Senior Executive Service, which are not at issue here. 

See CSRA § 401 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 2101a, 2102(a)(1), &

2103(a)).

USCA Case #11-5092 Document #1376529 Filed: 06/01/2012 Page 23 of 46
5

employees when it enacted the CSRA and it is thus irrelevant to

the “special factors” analysis. 

Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2002), illustrates

this point. In Stewart, a federal employee filed a Bivens action

against her employer for an alleged unlawful search in violation

of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1129. This court reasoned that

the CSRA did not preclude the Bivens action because “a

warrantless search is not a ‘personnel action[] . . . covered by

this system’ and [thus] such a search does not fall ‘within the

statutory scheme.’” Id. at 1130 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.

367, 385 n.28 (1983)). The court noted that “Bush virtually

compels the conclusion that the [CSRA] does not preclude a

Bivens action for a warrantless search.” Id. Stewart thus stands

for the proposition that where a claim is outside the scope of a

remedial scheme, such that Congress did not envision itself as

legislating on the subject of that claim, the remedial scheme

does not preclude a Bivens action based on that claim. 

This principle applies with equal force here, where Davis is

a claimant who is outside the scope of the remedial scheme,

such that Congress did not envision itself as legislating about the

remedies available to that claimant. “The [CSRA] is not

concerned with the conduct of which [he] claims,” id., that is,

violation of constitutional rights of a Legislative Branch

employee. Stewart reflects the appropriate limiting principle to

the proposition that “a comprehensive statutory scheme

precludes a Bivens remedy even when the scheme provides the

plaintiff with no remedy whatsoever.” Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d

697, 709 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). A specific claimant or a specific claim must be

“within the statutory scheme,” Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385

n.28 (1983), such that Congress withheld a remedy for the

conscious purpose of denying one, in order for the scheme to

preclude a Bivens action for that claimant or claim.

USCA Case #11-5092 Document #1376529 Filed: 06/01/2012 Page 24 of 46
6

The Supreme Court’s precedent holding that a

comprehensive remedial statutory scheme precludes a Bivens

action reflects this limiting principle. For example, in Bush,

462 U.S. at 386, the Executive Branch federal employee’s

claims were “fully cognizable” by the Civil Service

Commission’s “elaborate, comprehensive scheme.” In

Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988), the Social

Security disability beneficiaries and their claims were within the

“considerably more elaborate,” id. at 424, remedial scheme

enacted by Congress, even though it did not provide “complete

relief,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Similarly, in Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61,

71–73 (2001), the prisoner’s claims were covered by

“alternative remedies [] at least as great, and in many respects

greater, than anything that could be had under Bivens.” The

Court’s most recent discussion of Bivens in Minneci, 132 S. Ct.

at 626, adheres to this approach, holding that a federal prisoner

in a private correctional facility had no Eighth Amendment

Bivens claim where the alleged “conduct is of a kind that

typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law.”

Until recently, this court has followed suit. For example, in

Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 225 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the

en banc court concluded that the constitutional claims of the

Executive Branch employees were covered by the CSRA, and

thus they were within the scope of the remedial scheme. In

Wilson, 535 F.3d at 707, the court stated that “each

Constitutional claim, whether pled in terms of privacy, property,

due process, or the First Amendment, is a claim alleging

damages from the improper disclosure of information covered

by the Privacy Act.” Id. But see id. at 713 (Rogers, J.,

dissenting). On the basis of unambiguous legislative history, the

court concluded that Congress intentionally excluded the

President, Vice-President, and their staffs as possible defendants

for Privacy Act claims. Id. at 708. I dissented from the court’s

USCA Case #11-5092 Document #1376529 Filed: 06/01/2012 Page 25 of 46
7

holding in Wilson, and continue to disagree with its analysis. 

Yet in Wilson the court at least sought to determine, through

legislative history, whether Congress acted with the purpose of

withholding a remedy for claims against such defendants

premised on the release of information covered by the Privacy

Act. See id. In all of these cases, the alternative remedies or the

remedial scheme at issue covered either the claimants or their

claims, such that they were “within the statutory scheme,”

Stewart, 275 F.3d at 1130 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted), or the court concluded that legislative history

demonstrated Congress excluded claims or claimants for the

purpose of withholding all remedies, and thus a Bivens remedy

could be precluded.

The court today acknowledges that this limiting principle

“is not a novel theory,” Op. at 18, but its response misses the

point of the principle altogether. The court reasons that Davis’s

claim would be covered by the CSRA, but as a claimant he is

not, and thus he is not outside the “outer boundary” of the

CSRA’s scope. See Op. at 18–19. Whenever the limiting

principle is implicated, either a claim (but not the claimant) or

a claimant (but not the claim) will be covered by the remedial

scheme; otherwise there would be no need to consider whether

the “outer boundary,” Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 229, of the

remedial scheme has been breached. The difficulties arise

precisely where one, but not both, is included. Under the court’s

logic, Stewart’s limiting principle would not have applied in

Stewart itself, where a federal employee (the claimant) was

covered by the CSRA, but her Fourth Amendment claim,

premised on work-site actions, was not. The court’s analysis

restates the obvious fact Davis is not an Executive Branch

employee, and from that somehow concludes that there was “a

considered congressional judgment that [] remedies for [nonExecutive Branch employees] are not warranted.” Op. at 18–19. 

The analysis of whether the limiting principle should apply,

USCA Case #11-5092 Document #1376529 Filed: 06/01/2012 Page 26 of 46
8

however, depends on why Congress excluded either the claimant

or the claim. If it acted with the purpose of preventing a remedy

altogether, then the Stewart limiting principle is inapplicable. If

it did so for reasons unrelated to a desire to remove all remedies,

then Stewart applies. 

The court does not bother to pose, let alone answer, this

question, ignoring that both Wilson and Spagnola consulted the

legislative history of the remedial scheme to ascertain the “outer

boundaries for inclusion in ‘comprehensive systems,’”

Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 229. In Wilson, the court’s determination

that the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, was a “special factor”

precluding a Bivens action for both Wilsons’ claims against the

President, the Vice-President, and their staff was based on what

the Supreme Court viewed as “‘unambiguous’ legislative

history” that “Congress did not inadvertently omit the Offices of

the President and Vice President from the Privacy Act’s

disclosure requirements.” Wilson, 535 F.3d at 708 (quoting

Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445

U.S. 136, 156 (1980)). In Spagnola, a case involving whether

the CSRA precluded a Bivens action for constitutional claims of

Executive Branch employees, the en banc court “f[ou]nd

nothing in the legislative history suggesting that Congress’

omission of a damages remedy in the CSRA was anything but

advertent,” 859 F.2d at 229, “nor . . . discern[ed] any clear

expression of congressional intent that the courts preserve

Bivens remedies,” id. The court noted that “[t]he most that can

be said for the legislative history of the CSRA is that Congress

did not expressly intend to eliminate damages remedies” for

Executive Branch employees, observing the “‘explicit

congressional declaration’ exception to allowing damages

remedies . . . has little relevance to the ‘special factors’

exception after Chilicky.” Id. at 229 n.10 (emphasis in original). 

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9

The question here is not whether Congress’s omission of a

damages remedy in the CSRA was advertent, but whether

Congress’s omission of Library of Congress employees from

coverage under the CSRA demonstrates a conscious choice that

such employees not have a Bivens remedy, or instead whether

such employees are simply outside the scope of the question

Congress was addressing in enacting the CSRA, making the

CSRA irrelevant to the Bivens analysis, as it was in Stewart. See

275 F.3d at 1130. The legislative history of the CSRA

demonstrates the latter. In adopting the CSRA, Congress

focused on reforming the “civil service system” of the

“executive branch.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-1403, at 3 (1978),

reprinted in House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service,

96th Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Civil Service

Reform Act of 1978, at 640 (Comm. Print 1979). The CSRA

thus included “general policies of the merit system principles

applicable to the competitive civil service and throughout the

executive branch,” id. at 4, providing guidance for “all

Executive agencies to follow,” id. Congress’s plain intent was

to reform the employment practices of the Executive Branch.

The legislative history of the CSRA confirms that

Legislative Branch employees were excluded from the CSRA’s

remedial provisions not because Congress wished to express its

intent that they have no remedies available, but instead because

of separation of powers concerns. During the conference

committee mark-up session, the House and Senate Members

agreed that the Library of Congress, the Government

Accountability Office (also in the Legislative Branch), and the

Administrative Office of the Courts (in the Judicial Branch),

would not be required to seek allotments of “supergrade”

positions from the Office of Personnel Management in the

Executive Branch. These offices would “retain the supergrade

allocations that they have on the theory that they are not in the

Executive Branch and that the President or the personnel

USCA Case #11-5092 Document #1376529 Filed: 06/01/2012 Page 28 of 46
10

manager for the President should not have the power to shift

those supergrades around. The [C]ongress ought to retain that

power.” The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: Joint

Conference of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

and the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th

Cong. 22 (Sept. 26, 1978), reprinted in HOUSE-SENATE

CONFERENCE MARKUP SESSION ON CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT

OF 1978, Senate Comm. on Gov’t Affairs and House Comm. on

Post Office and Civil Service (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall). 

As one Senate Conferee put it, “we feel so strongly about the

separation of powers principle.” Id. (statement of Sen. Percy).

Although Congress was aware it was not extending the

CSRA’s remedial scheme, which is administered by the

Executive Branch, to Library employees, see Op. at 11–15, this

conclusion is only half the analysis. The reason for the

exclusion reflected in the legislative history — the protection of

the separation of powers — demonstrates that Congress did not

view itself as legislating on the subject of what remedies should

be available to Library employees, and in excluding Library

employees from CSRA coverage did not “intentionally

withh[o]ld a remedy,” Wilson, 535 F.3d at 709. The Stewart

limiting principle therefore applies in Davis’s case.

B.

Likewise, the Congressional Accountability Act does not

preclude a Bivens action in this case.3

 Most of its provisions do

3

 The Congressional Accountability Act, guided by the

principle that “Congress should be subject to the same laws as apply

to a business back in a home state,” S. REP.NO. 103-397, at 6, applied,

among other laws, “8 key anti-discrimination and employee-protection

laws to the Congress”: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; The

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; The Rehabilitation

Act of 1973; The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; The

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11

not apply to the Library of Congress, because “the Library of

Congress[4

] [was] already covered by antidiscrimination and

employee protection laws.” S. REP. NO. 103-397, at 2 (1994);

2 U.S.C. § 1302.5 The House Floor debate indicates that its

purpose was to make Congress abide by the same antidiscrimination laws that apply to the private sector, see, e.g., 114

Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993; The Fair Labor Standards Act

of 1938; The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970; and the

Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. Id. at 6; see 2

U.S.C. § 1371(b). 

4

 The universal definition of “covered employee” in the

Accountability Act does not extend to the Library of Congress, 2

U.S.C. § 1301(3), but various provisions afford Library employees

protections under other federal laws. See id. § 1314(a)(2) (Employee

Polygraph Protection Act of 1988); § 1315(a)(2) (Worker Adjustment

and Retraining Notification Act); § 1316(a)(2)(B) (Veterans’

Employment and Reemployment); § 1341(a)(2)(D) (Occupational

Safety and Health Act of 1970).

5

 Prior to enactment of the Accountability Act, Library

employees “enjoy[ed] most of the rights and protection of the

antidiscrimination laws, including the right to brings actions in U.S.

district court,” id. at 4, although “enforcement mechanisms []

differ[ed]” from those applicable to Executive Branch employees. 

Specifically, Congress had previously extended coverage to Library

employees of: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended

in 1972), see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b), the Age Discrimination Act of

1967 (as amended in 1978), see 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), and the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), see 42 U.S.C.

§ 12209. Consistent with Congress’s concern for separation of

powers, for Title VII and Age Discrimination Act claims, the Librarian

had the powers normally given the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b); 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b). The

Librarian was also authorized to establish remedies and procedures for

claims under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12209(2).

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12

Cong. Rec. 264-65 (statement of Rep. Goodling, chairman of the

House Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities),

and that there was no consideration or rejection of a remedial

scheme to address constitutional claims of Library employees –

claims that do not exist against private employers. The Senate

deliberations of the Congressional Accountability Act

demonstrate Congress’s consistent concern with protecting

separation of powers in managing Legislative Branch

employment affairs, supporting the conclusion that both the

Accountability Act and the CSRA are irrelevant to the question

before the court.

To authorize executive branch agencies to enforce

antidiscrimination and employment laws against

Congress would create a dangerous entanglement

between these two branches of government. The

legislative branch must be free from executive branch

intimidation, real or perceived . . . . To maintain the

necessary separation of powers, the Committee [on

Governmental Affairs] determined that it is essential to

maintain independence from the executive branch.

S. REP. NO. 103-397, at 6 (1994).6

 “On the other hand,” in

extending judicial review to congressional employee claims, 

6

 S. Rep. No. 103-397 accompanied a predecessor bill, H.R.

4822 in the 103d Congress. In introducing S. 2, the bill that ultimately

was enacted, see Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L.

No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), the Chairman

of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, before which the bill

was pending, noted that S. 2 did not come to the Senate Floor

following the normal committee referral process and “refer[red]

Members to [] committee report No. 103-397” for legislative history

of the previous bill because S. 2 was “a modified version of H.R.

4822.” 141 Cong. Rec. 684 (1995) (statement of Sen. Roth).

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13

separation-of-powers concerns that make executivebranch enforcement unacceptable are not applicable to

[federal] district court actions. Courts and judges do

not have the complex interactions with Congress that

executive agencies have, so the risk of intimidation

would not arise.

Id. at 8.7 

A Bivens action cannot sensibly be precluded where

Congress has expressed no view whatsoever on what remedies

should be available for First Amendment violations and where,

in extending remedies for other claims, it has expressed its

desire that the judiciary resolve claims. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1404,

1407–09. Although Congress restricted some employment

claims from judicial review, it only did so for claims arising

under the Accountability Act, which Davis’s First Amendment

7

 Some House Members would have allowed personal

liability suits against Members of Congress for violations of the laws

covered by the Accountability Act. See 141 Cong. Rec. at 536,

(statements of Rep. Goodling & Rep. Fawell). Instead, Congress

provided that appropriations may be used as the sole source from

which to pay awards or settlements of claims under the Accountability

Act, see 2 U.S.C. § 1415(a), precluding personal liability by Members

of Congress, see also 141 Cong. Rec. at 536 (“Members of Congress

[shall be] indemnified for any damages, costs, or legal fees to which

a prevailing party may be found entitled.”) (statement of Rep. Fawell).

 This approach is consistent with the practical result of Bivens actions,

where the United States often indemnifies its employees sued pursuant

to Bivens. Cf. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (noting that

government expends a good deal of money indemnifying employees);

Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 208 (1985) (“[A]ny expense of

litigation is largely alleviated by the fact that a Government official

who finds himself as a defendant in litigation of this kind is often

represented, as in this case, by Government counsel.”).

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14

claim does not.8 Furthermore, Congress’s inclusion of a

provision in the Congressional Accountability Act calling for a

study to determine if the rights, protections, and procedures for

Library employees were “comprehensive and effective,” 2

U.S.C. § 1371(c), supports the conclusion that Congress had

not, in either it or the CSRA, indicated what remedies it thought

should be available to Library employees for alleged violations

of their First Amendment rights. The Congressional

Accountability Act, therefore, is not a special factor precluding

a Bivens action by Davis. 

C.

Davis’s Bivens action also is not precluded by the fact that

he was a probationary employee when he was fired. See

Appellant’s Br. at 58 (citing Library of Cong. Reg. 2020-3.1,

§ 3(1)(1)); Compl. ¶ 55. The Library can point to no reason his

probationary status should be a “special factor” precluding a

Bivens action. The Library’s internal regulations and policies

8

 2 U.S.C. § 1410 provides that “[e]xcept as expressly

authorized by sections 1407, 1408, and 1409 of this title, the

compliance or noncompliance with the provisions of this chapter and

any action taken pursuant to this chapter shall not be subject to judicial

review.” For example, congressional employees must complete

counseling and mediation before seeking judicial remedies. 2 U.S.C.

§ 1408. Section 1410 was included to prevent the “circumvention of

th[e] Act by such methods as implied statutory, common law, or

Constitutional causes of action in either the Judicial or Executive

Branch.” H.R. REP. NO. 103-650 (II), at Part II, section 17 (1994). 

Because constitutional claims for alleged First Amendment violations

are not included as a “provision[] of this chapter,” 2 U.S.C. § 1410,

Davis’s Bivens action is not precluded by this section. Cf. Ethnic

Employees of Library of Congress v. Boorstin, 751 F.2d 1405, 1415

(D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that Congress did not intend Title VII to

preclude suits “for constitutional violations [of the First Amendment]

against which Title VII provides no protection at all”). 

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15

are not part of the record, nor publically available, and its

regulation on providing assistance without partisan bias and

policy on outside activities, which are part of the record, do not

constitute a “comprehensive scheme” that would preclude a

Bivens action; neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held

the availability of injunctive relief, see Op. at 19 n.1, is such a

“comprehensive scheme,” see, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 831, 845–47 (1994). Even assuming the brevity of

Davis’s eleven months’ employment at the Library would affect

the amount of damages he could recover for a constitutional

violation, it does not qualify as a “special factor” suggesting he

does not have a remedy.9

 And assuming Library regulations

provide for termination of probationary employment for many

reasons, Supreme Court precedent is clear that the exercise of

free speech rights may not be among those reasons.10

9

 Contrary to the court’s suggestion, see Op. at 12–13, in the

CSRA Congress provided that probationary Executive Branch

employees would have review, through investigation by the Office of

Special Counsel, of alleged constitutional violations. See Castle v.

Rubin, 78 F.3d 654, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(1)(A)

& (a)(3); 2302(b)(12) & § 2301(b)(2). This provides further evidence

that Congress has not indicated that constitutional violations of

probationary employees’ rights should be without remedy.

10 The Supreme Court instructed:

[E]ven though a person has no “right” to a valuable

governmental benefit and even though the government may

deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are

some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It

may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his

constitutionally protected interests – especially, his interest in

freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a

benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected

speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would

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16

D.

The court observes that “in most instances the judgment has

been that Congress, not the judicial branch, is in the best

position to prescribe the scope of relief available for the

violation of a constitutional right.” Op. at 6. In this instance,

however, Congress (acting through the Library) is the defendant

alleged to have violated its employee’s constitutional rights. In

Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), a female congressional

staffer whose employment was terminated because of her

gender, had no statutory cause of action because Congress had

exempted itself from Title VII, id. at 247. With three exceptions

relevant to the Library, see supra n.5, only upon enactment of

the Accountability Act did Congress extend application to itself

of some employment laws, and then only those applicable to the

private sector, necessarily excluding First Amendment

constitutional claims. In the sixteen years since Congress

received the mandated study11 of whether the rights, protections,

and procedures for Library employees were “comprehensive and

effective,” 2 U.S.C. § 1371(c), Davis’s supervisor (Daniel P.

Mulhollan) does not suggest Congress has addressed how

constitutional claims of Library employees should be resolved. 

in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the

government to “produce a result which [it] could not

command directly.”

Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (quoting Speiser v.

Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (alteration in original)); see also

Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383–84 (1987); Keyishian v. Bd.

of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967).

11 See Study of Laws, Regulations, and Procedures at The

General Accounting Office, The Government Printing Office, and The

Library of Congress, at 121–22 (Dec. 31, 1996), available at

http://www.compliance.gov/reports-studies/sec230/sec230_12-96.pdf.

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17

The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the Judicial

Branch’s competence to review congressional employment

decisions: 

[J]udicial review of congressional employment

decisions is constitutionally limited only by the Speech

or Debate Clause of the Constitution . . . . [W]e

conclude that if respondent is not shielded by the

Clause, the question whether his dismissal of petitioner

violated her Fifth Amendment rights would . . . require

no more than an interpretation of the Constitution. 

Such a determination falls within the traditional role

accorded courts to interpret the law, and does not

involve a lack of respect due a coordinate branch of

government, nor does it involve an initial policy

determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial

discretion. 

Davis, 442 U.S. at 235 n.11 (internal quotations, citations, and

alterations omitted); see S. REP. NO. 103-397, at 7–8.

Other special factors do not counsel against recognizing

Davis’s Bivens action. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 537, is instructive. 

There, the plaintiff alleged various private property and tort-like

invasions by federal employees, which the Court characterized

as “death by a thousand cuts.” Id. at 555. The Court explained

that he “ha[d] an administrative, and ultimately a judicial,

process for vindicating virtually all of his complaints,” id. at

553, which created “no intuitively meritorious case for

recognizing a new constitutional cause of action, but neither . . .

plainly answer[ed] no to the question whether [the plaintiff]

should have it,” id. at 554. Upon weighing the reasons for and

against recognizing a right (the Bivens step two question), the

Court concluded in view of “the serious difficulty of devising

a workable cause of action,” where “[a] judicial standard to

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18

identify illegitimate pressure going beyond legitimate hard

bargaining would be endlessly knotty to work out,” that any

damages remedy against the Executive Branch employees “who

push too hard for the Government’s benefit” against a private

property owner’s rights would “come better, if at all, through

legislation.” Id. at 562. No such difficulty exists here, for

Davis’s claim rests on a claimed violation of his liberty interests

that are protected under the First and Fifth Amendments. See

infra Part II.A.

In fact, in Wilkie the Court contrasted the facts of that case

with that of “an employee who spoke out on matters of public

concern and then was fired,” id. at 556, where “the outcome

turns on ‘what for’ questions: what was the Government’s

purpose in firing him and would he have been fired anyway? 

Questions like these have definite answers, and we have

established methods for identifying the presence of an illicit

reason,” id. These are the questions posed by Davis’s Bivens

claim. Furthermore, that the Supreme Court indicated a federal

employee suing for termination in violation of the First

Amendment would be a candidate for a Bivens action

underscores the court today has gone too far, effectively holding

that the CSRA precludes all federal employee Bivens actions for

termination of employment in violation of the First Amendment. 

Yet the only way to give meaning to the Supreme Court’s

statement in Wilkie, given that the Court has held such claims by

Executive Branch employees are precluded, see Bush, 462 U.S.

at 386, is to conclude that the Court, just five years ago, implied

that Bivens actions would not be so precluded for employees of

the other branches, not covered by the CSRA. Although the

Supreme Court has recognized Bivens actions in only a few

instances, see Op. at 5, this likely reflects the proliferation of

comprehensive remedial statutory schemes, not a conclusion that

there should be no Bivens action in the absence of such a scheme

covering the claimant. See id. at 576 (quoting Carlson v. Green,

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19

446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting

in part). But see Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 626 (Scalia, J., joined by

Thomas, J., concurring). Courts must 

presume that justiciable constitutional rights are to be

enforced through the courts. And, unless such rights

are to become merely precatory, the class of those

litigants who allege that their own constitutional rights

have been violated, and who at the same time have no

effective means other than the judiciary to enforce

these rights, must be able to invoke the existing

jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their

justiciable constitutional rights.

Passman, 442 U.S. at 242. 

For these reasons, “the court’s decision is not the product of

the application of the Bivens doctrine to [Davis’s] claims,” but

instead a “refusal to acknowledge precedent [holding] that

Bivens is a remedial doctrine,” Wilson, 535 F.3d at 722 (Rogers,

J., dissenting), and here that Congress has said nothing about

what remedies should be available to Library employees for the

alleged constitutional violations. With today’s decision, the

court goes beyond Wilson, where it “cede[d] to Congress the

judiciary’s defined role to decide issues arising under the

Constitution,” id., and now abandons the judiciary’s role even

where all evidence regarding purpose demonstrates that

Congress did not envision itself as legislating on the question

now before the court. Contrary to the precedent of the Supreme

Court and this court, the court turns the Bivens doctrine on its

head to require some “special factor” in favor of recognizing a

Bivens claim. Whatever “deference to the informed judgment of

Congress,” Op. at 8, is appropriate with respect to Executive

Branch remedial schemes, see Bush, 462 U.S. at 389, where

Congress is alleged to violate employee rights, Congress itself

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20

recognized that Judicial Branch review does not pose the same

separation of powers concerns as does Executive Branch review,

see S. REP. NO. 103-397, at 7–8, a sufficient special factor

favoring recognizing a Bivens remedy. 

II. 

In moving to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Daniel Mulhollan, who was

Davis’s supervisor at the CRS and fired him, asserted the

defense of immunity. On appeal, he maintains that he is entitled

to qualified immunity in part because the potential harm to the

CRS from Davis’s two opinion pieces “was clear from the

complaint and the documents incorporated by reference,” and he

“did not need to develop an evidentiary record.” Appellants’

Reply Br. at 18. Taking Mulhollan at his word, his immunity

defense would fail, but a remand for fact finding is required.

A.

The “necessary antecedent” question to deciding the

immunity question is the sufficiency of the complaint’s

allegations to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Navab-Safavi v.

Glassman, 637 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Upon de novo

review of a denial of a motion to dismiss, and accepting, as the

court must, the factual allegations in the complaint as true,

Daniels v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir.

2008), Davis’s complaint manifestly “contain[s] sufficient

factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

1. Based on the analysis in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391

U.S. 563, 568 (1968), this court has developed a four-part test

for determining whether an employee’s First Amendment rights

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21

have been violated. See O’Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 1126,

1133 (D.C. Cir. 1998).12 Mulhollan wisely limits his challenge

to the second factor, maintaining that Davis compromised his

appearance of objectivity and harmed their working relationship,

but that too fails. 

The Supreme Court has observed that a “stronger showing

[of governmental harm] may be necessary if the employee’s

speech more substantially involved matters of public concern.” 

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983). That case involved

a workplace questionnaire of little public interest. Id. at 151–52. 

Speech about government policies, on the other hand, is a

“paradigmatic matter of public concern.” Sanjour v. EPA, 56

F.3d 85, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks, citation,

and alteration omitted). To establish governmental harm where

a high level policy maker is involved “[a]t a minimum, the

employee’s speech must relate to policy areas for which he is

responsible.” Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 

 Further, the “simple assertion by [The Library and Mullhollan]

without supporting evidence of the adverse effect of the speech

on” CRS’s function is inadequate. Navab-Safavi, 637 F.3d at

318 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

12 The four factors are: (1) whether the employee’s speech

was “on a matter of public concern”; (2) “whether the governmental

interest in” non-disrupted, efficient public services “outweighs the

employee’s interest, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of

public concern, and the interest of potential audiences in hearing what

the employee has to say”; (3) whether the employee’s “speech was a

substantial or motivating factor in prompting the retaliatory or

punitive act of which she complains”; and (4) whether the employer

“would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the

protected conduct.” O’Donnell, 148 F.3d at 1133 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

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22

In Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569–70, the court concluded that

there was no threat to harmony between the employee, coworkers, and the supervisor where “[t]he statements [were] in no

way directed towards any person with whom [the employee]

would normally be in contact.” The Court emphasized that the

public had a strong interest in being exposed to the viewpoints

of teachers on issues of school funding: “Teachers are, as a

class, the members of a community most likely to [be] informed

. . . . [I]t is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such

questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.” Id. at 572. 

Davis’s two opinion pieces, relying on his professional

experience prior to his employment with CRS, were not directed

at Mulhollan, the Library, the CRS, or any member of Congress. 

Compl. ¶¶ 47, 50. In each he was identified as a former chief

prosecutor for military commissions at Guantanamo; as such

Davis was likely one of the more informed persons who could

speak publically on the issue. The public interest in being

exposed to his speech is high. 

Moreover, Mulhollan concedes that at CRS Davis had no

authority over military commission issues. Rather, he maintains

that because the same congressional committees oversee both

defense issues within Davis’s purview and military

commissions, the issues are related enough. But even if Davis

can properly be viewed as a “policymaker,” which he disputes,

the court in Hall was clear that the relation to the policymaker’s

work area is a “minimum” requirement to show government

harm. Davis’s complaint states that Members of Congress were

aware that the American Law Division, and not his division, was

responsible for issues relating to military commissions, see

Compl. ¶ 32. Davis’s name has not appeared on any reports to

Congress about military commissions, and no congressional

inquiries have been directed to him on that subject. Id. ¶ 29. Cf.

Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390–91 (whether employee serves in “public

contact role” relevant to government harm inquiry). 

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23

Furthermore, “the fact that [Davis’s] criticism was

cumulative . . . diminish[es] the harm it caused.” O’Donnell,

148 F.3d at 1138. Not only had Davis spoken publically on

military commissions with the CRS’s knowledge and was never

questioned about those activities, Compl. ¶¶ 33-40, unlike the

employee in O’Donnell, his criticism was not aimed at his

employer or the Congress. The Library encourages outside

speech by its employees, id. ¶¶ 65, 68–69; see Library of

Congress Regulation 2023-3, section 3 (Mar. 23, 1998); CRS

Policy on Outside Speaking and Writing (Jan. 23, 2004),

minimizing any potential government harm. Former CRS

employees at the Library of Congress have recounted, without

contradiction, the tradition of the independent expert analysts at

CRS speaking publically on controversial issues of concern to

Congress. See Br. of Amici Curiae Dr. Louis Fisher and Mr.

Morton Rosenberg, at 15–17. Davis included no disclaimer in

the two published pieces, see LCR 2023-3, section 3(B), but

neither did he purport to speak, based on his pre-Library

employment experience, for anyone other than himself, and the

newspapers identified him only as the former chief prosecutor

for military commissions who had retired from the military in

2008.

Although Mulhollan claims, pointing to his letter of

admonishment to Davis, that his relationship with Davis became

strained as a result of Davis’s published article and letter, that

“simple assertion . . . without supporting evidence of the adverse

effect of the speech on [the CRS’s functions]” is inadequate. 

Navab-Safavi, 637 F.3d at 318 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Otherwise, as Davis suggests, there would be

nothing to stop employers from pretextually claiming harm in

order to shield themselves from liability. The district court

concluded the instances to which Mulhollan pointed, which he

initiated, were examples of everyday employer/employee

interactions. Mulhollan’s more plausible suggestion might be

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24

that the two opinion pieces damaged the non-partisan reputation

of the CRS. But Davis’s article and letter to the editor do not

take a partisan position, instead criticizing decisions and

officials in both Democrat and Republican administrations. His

situation is in that respect unlike the CRS analyst in Keeffe v.

Library of Congress, 777 F.2d 1573, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1985), who

attended a partisan political convention, and such a partisan

label cannot be ascribed to Davis’s speech.

2. Davis’s complaint also states a plausible claim under the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Library’s

policies and actions must provide Davis a “reasonable

opportunity to know what is prohibited.” Grayned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). This requires that “the

Library . . . give loud and clear advance notice when it . . .

decide[s] to interpret a particular regulation as a prohibition or

limitation on an employee’s outside activity.” Keeffe, 777 F.2d

at 1583. 

In Keeffe, the CRS analyst was disciplined for attending a

partisan political convention under a Library regulation

regarding the potential conflict of interest posed by employees

engaging in political activities. Id. at 1576. Although the court

upheld the regulation (LCR 2023-7, “Unrestricted Political

Activities of Library Employees”) as facially valid and not

impermissibly vague, id. at 1579–81, the court found that, as

applied to Keeffe, the Library violated her due process rights, id.

at 1582. She had previously attended a 1974 partisan

convention without Library complaint; between 1972 and July

1980 the Library had denied no requests by an employee for

clearance to engage in a political activity, id.; the Library did not

inform Keeffe that it had denied her request until after she had

left for the 1980 partisan convention, id. at 1576. “In light of

this background, the Library’s course of dealing with her in the

summer of 1980 was insufficient to place Keefe on notice that

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25

the prior interpretation [of the regulation] had changed.” Id. at

1582. 

So too here. The Library’s Policy encourages outside

speaking by its employees; Mulhollan had previously approved

Davis’s requests to speak and write on the topic of military

commissions, see Compl. ¶¶ 33–38; Davis had made public

statements in the past similar to those published in the two

newspapers, id. ¶ 36; Mulhollan had never previously told Davis

that his outside speaking on the topic of military commissions

was harmful to the Library, the CRS, or was prohibited, id. ¶ 40. 

As in Keeffe, Mulhollan and the Library’s “course of dealings,”

777 F.2d at 1582, “entitled [Davis] to read the Library’s overly

long silence as assent,” id. at 1583.

The responses by the Library and Mulhollan are

unpersuasive. Although they maintain that as a probationary

employee Davis had no property interest in his job, see Piroglu

v. Coleman, 25 F.3d 1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1994), Davis’s due

process claim is based on the violation of his liberty interest in

free speech. Among the reasons government employees may not

be terminated without violating their due process rights is for

their protected interest in the right to speak. See supra Part I.C. 

Further, Davis is not challenging the Library’s exercise of

discretion not to have disciplined him for his previous outside

speaking, but Mulhollan’s termination of his employment

without “loud and clear advance notice,” Keeffe, 777 F.2d at

1583, given the Library’s previous course of dealing, that his

conduct could be punished. Mulhollan assented to Davis’s

previous speaking engagements, see Compl. ¶¶ 34–35, and he

terminated Davis’s employment because of his speech. 

Regardless of whether Mulhollan had personally caused “the

Library’s overly long silence,” Keeffe, 777 F.2d at 1583, due

process required that as Davis’s supervisor he end the silence by

giving prior fair notice that Davis’s conduct was subject to

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26

punishment and could result in the termination of his

employment at the Library. 

B.

Government officials are shielded from personal liability “if

their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). What

is “clearly established” is not to be defined at a “high level of

generality,” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011),

and although “[the Supreme Court] do[es] not require a case

directly on point, [] existing precedent must have placed the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. at 2083. 

The district court denied Mullhollan’s motion to dismiss the

complaint on the ground of qualified immunity, agreeing with

Davis that Mulhollan’s own conduct indicated the First

Amendment right in question was sufficiently clear to him. The

complaint alleged that Mulhollan asked Davis to “acknowledge

that . . . the First Amendment . . . did not apply” to the

publication of the two opinion pieces that were the basis for the

termination of his employment. Compl. ¶¶ 56. As the district

court found, “Mulhollan was at least aware of ‘a general

constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law,”

Hope [v. Pelzer], 536 U.S. [730,] [] 741 [(2002)], and that this

constitutional rule might have applicability to [Davis’s]

articles.” Mem. Op. at 40. 

Although qualified immunity defenses should be decided at

“the earliest possible stage in litigation,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502

U.S. 224, 227 (1991), where the Pickering test applies, unless

the “relative weight of the governmental interest and established

constitutional rights . . . [are] quite evident from the pleadings,”

a decision may “properly await some evidentiary development”

to determine “fact-dependent” interest balancing and thus may

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27

be inappropriate at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Navab-Safavi, 637

F.3d at 318. To the extent the Library and Mullhollan contend

that the potential harm to CRS was clear from the complaint and

the documents it incorporated by reference, see Appellant’s

Reply Br. 18–19, they rely on factual assertions about the nature

of Davis’s position and job responsibilities, CRS’s interest in

maintaining the appearance of objectivity and lack of bias, and

the content and tone of Davis’s opinion pieces – aspects of

which Davis disputes and are either untethered to or inconsistent

with the record now before the court. Under the circumstances,

a remand is required to develop a factual record. 

Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s ruling that

Davis’s complaint stated a valid Bivens claim and the denial of

the motion to dismiss the complaint except I would remand for

further fact-finding on the qualified immunity defense; I

respectfully dissent.

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