Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01175/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01175-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
C. Gregory Turner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1175

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

C. GREGORY TURNER,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 13 CR 572 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2015 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2016

____________________

Before KANNE, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Gregory Turner was 

convicted of willfully conspiring, with Prince Asiel Ben Israel, to provide services for Zimbabwean Special Designated 

Nationals (“SDNs”), a group of government officials and related individuals deemed to be blocking the democratic processes or institutions of Zimbabwe.

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On appeal, Turner raises several challenges against his 

pre-trial and trial proceedings. First, he argues that the district court erred in admitting into evidence a document detailing his agreement to provide services for the Zimbabwean SDNs, called the “Consulting Agreement.” Second, he 

contends that the district court erred in its instructions to the 

jury. Third, Turner argues that the district court erred in its 

interactions with the jury after deliberations had begun. We 

affirm.

Before turning to the case, we note that Turner also

claims that the evidence obtained pursuant to the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) should have been 

suppressed. (Appellant Br. 35–39.) We have reviewed the 

classified materials and find that the investigation did not 

violate FISA. We shall issue a separate, classified opinion 

explaining this conclusion. See United States v. Daoud, 755 

F.3d 479, 485 (7th Cir. 2014), supplemented, 761 F.3d 678 (7th 

Cir. 2014).

I. BACKGROUND

We begin with a brief synopsis of the relevant legal 

framework for Turner’s case, including the statutes, executive orders, and regulations underlying the Zimbabwe sanctions. Then, we summarize the pertinent factual background

and procedural history.

A. Legal Framework of Zimbabwe Sanctions

In 1977, Congress enacted the International Emergency 

Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), Pub. L. 95-223 (codified at

50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–07), which empowered the President to 

declare a “national emergency” during peace time “to deal 

with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its 

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source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, 

to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the 

United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). To counter this threat, the 

IEEPA broadly authorized the President to:

[I]investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, 

void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, 

withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or 

exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in 

which any foreign country or a national thereof has 

any interest by any person, or with respect to any 

property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United 

States.

Id. § 1702(1)(B). Additionally, violations of “any license, order, regulation, or prohibition” issued pursuant to the 

IEEPA are unlawful and carry civil and criminal penalties. 

Id. § 1705.

In March 2003, President George W. Bush invoked the 

IEEPA to issue Executive Order 13288, titled “Blocking 

Property of Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or 

Institutions in Zimbabwe.” 68 Fed. Reg. 11457 (Mar. 6, 2003).

This order declared a “national emergency” in response to 

“an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of 

the United States” arising from the actions and policies of 

certain Zimbabwean government officials that were “undermin[ing] Zimbabwe’s democratic processes or institutions, contributing to the deliberate breakdown in the rule of 

law in Zimbabwe, to politically motivated violence and intimidation in that country, and to political and economic instability in the Southern African region.” Id.

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To counter this threat, Executive Order 13288 prohibited 

“[a]ny transaction or dealing by a United States person or 

within the United States in property or interests in property”

belonging to any of the special designated nationals 

(“SDNs”) listed in the Annex. Id. Prohibited transactions or 

dealings include “the making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of any 

person listed in the Annex.” Id. The order also prohibited 

“any conspiracy formed to violate the prohibitions.” Id.

Among the seventy-seven persons listed in the Annex 

were Robert Gabriel Mugabe, the President; Simon Khaya 

Moyo, the former Deputy-Secretary for Legal Affairs (and 

current Ambassador to South Africa); Emmerson Mnangagwa, the Parliamentary Speaker; and Samuel Mumbengegwi, 

the former Minister of Industry and International Trade (and 

current Foreign Minister). Id. In November 2005, President 

Bush issued Executive Order 13391, which reiterated the 

prohibitions described in Executive Order 13288 but also 

took “additional steps,” such as expanding the list of SDNs 

to include Gideon Gono, Governor of the Federal Reserve 

Bank. See 70 Fed. Reg. 71201 (Nov 22, 2005). Both executive 

orders remain in effect.

To effectuate these executive orders, the Department of 

Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) enacted several regulations, commonly referred to as the “sanctions” against the Zimbabwean SDNs. 31 C.F.R. § 541.101 et 

seq. Under 31 C.F.R. § 541.201(a)(1), property located within 

the United States belonging to Zimbabwean SDNs is deemed 

“blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.” Under 31 C.F.R. § 541.405, the 

prohibited dealings with SDNs include “legal, accounting, 

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financial, brokering, freight forwarding, transportation, public relations, or other services” and extend “to services performed in the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located.” Pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 541.204(b), “[a]ny conspiracy 

formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this part

is prohibited.” However, U.S. persons may apply for a license from OFAC that, if granted, would permit them “to 

engage in any transactions prohibited,” such as providing 

services to SDNs, without violating these sanctions. 31 C.F.R. 

§ 501.801(b).

B. Factual Background and Procedural History

From November 2008 until April 2010, Turner conspired 

with Ben Israel to provide services to, or on behalf of, Zimbabwean SDNs, without a license from the United States 

Treasury Department. Specifically, Turner and Ben Israel 

agreed to provide public relations services—lobbying U.S. 

officials to remove the sanctions, arranging for Zimbabwean 

officials to meet with U.S. officials to discuss the removal of 

sanctions, and assisting Zimbabwean officials in obtaining 

travel visas to the United States, to meet with U.S. officials to 

discuss removing the sanctions. Turner and Ben Israel were 

promised payment of $3,405,000 for their work.

On August 27, 2013, a grand jury returned an indictment 

against Turner, charging the following: (1) Count One alleged conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of a 

foreign government without prior notification to the Attorney General, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951(a); (2) 

Count Two alleged acting in the United States as an agent of 

a foreign government without prior notification to the Attorney General, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 951(a); and (3) 

Count Three alleged willfully conspiring to provide services 

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on behalf of, or for the benefit of, Zimbabwean SDNs, in violation of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1705(c), and 31 C.F.R. §§ 541.201, 

541.204, and 541.405.1

A jury trial against Turner began on September 29, 2014.

During trial, the government presented evidence of Turner’s

and Ben Israel’s agreement with Zimbabwean SDNs to provide lobbying services in exchange for $3,405,000. One key 

piece of evidence was the Consulting Agreement, a document which contained details of the arrangement and a distinctive four-installment payment structure keyed to specific 

events: (1) $90,000 upon signing of the contract, (2) 

$1,105,000 upon completion of a meeting in Zimbabwe, (3)

$1,105,000 upon completion of a meeting in South Africa, 

and (4) $1,105,000 upon completion of this project. The government then presented evidence tying the Consulting 

Agreement to corresponding actions by Turner, Ben Israel, 

and the Zimbabwean SDNs. 

Additionally, the government presented evidence of

Turner’s and Ben Israel’s efforts to facilitate meetings and 

correspondence between U.S. officials and Zimbabwean 

SDNs. The government also established that Turner never 

applied for or received a license from the U.S. Treasury Department to permit him to provide services to, or on behalf 

of, Zimbabwean SDNs.

On October 10, 2014, the jury acquitted Turner on Counts 

One and Two and convicted him on Count Three. The dis-

 1 The August 27, 2013, indictment includes four counts, but only Counts 

One, Two, and Four pertain to Turner. R. 38. Therefore, Count Four as 

listed in the indictment is what is referred to as “Count Three” in 

Turner’s case, for the purposes of his indictment, trial, and appeal.

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trict court held Turner’s sentencing hearing on January 20, 

2015. The district court determined that Turner’s advisory 

guidelines range was 14 to 21 months, based on an offense 

level of 14 and a criminal history category of I. Subsequently, 

the district court sentenced Turner to a within-guidelines 

range sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment and one year of 

supervised release. Judgment was entered against Turner on 

January 21, 2015. Turner appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Turner raises several challenges to his pretrial and trial proceedings. When necessary, we provide additional factual background in order to fully address each 

claim. 

First, Turner argues that the district court erred in admitting the Consulting Agreement into evidence as an authenticated coconspirator statement. Second, Turner contends that 

the district court erred in its instructions to the jury for 

Count Three, specifically contesting the court’s definition of 

“willfulness,” its decision not to require unanimity with regard to specific SDNs, and its inclusion of SDN Mumbengegwi. Third, Turner argues that the district judge erred in 

her interactions with the jury after deliberations had begun,

specifically disputing the district judge’s replacement of juror Chism and her ex parte communications with the jury.

A. Consulting Agreement

We begin by examining Turner’s challenge to the district 

court’s admission of the Consulting Agreement into evidence as a properly authenticated coconspirator statement, 

pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 901 and 801(d)(2)(E).

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On August 29, 2014, the government and Turner moved 

in limine to admit and to bar, respectively, the Consulting 

Agreement—the document that the government argues outlined Turner and Ben Israel’s agreement with officials to receive $3,405,000 for their services.

The district court, on September 22, 2014, provisionally 

granted the government’s motion “on the assumption that it 

will introduce evidence at trial sufficient to support the factual assertions made in its motion.” (R. 176 at 1–2.) The critical facts included the following: “that (1) Ben Israel and 

Turner acted in accordance with the Consulting Agreement’s 

distinctive payment structure and (2) Ben Israel, or someone 

acting on his behalf, sent the Consulting agreement to [a National City Bank employee] to explain the purpose of the incoming wire from [Monica] Mutsvangwa.” (Id. at 14.) The 

district court assessed that, assuming the government introduced evidence establishing these facts, the Consulting 

Agreement was admissible as an authenticated coconspirator statement. (Id. at 14–15)

Then, during trial, the government presented evidence 

for these factual assertions and moved to admit the Consulting Agreement into evidence as a coconspirator statement. 

(Trial Tr. 57, Oct. 1, 2014.) Turner responded: “No objection.” 

(Id.)

On appeal, Turner argues that the district court erred in 

admitting the Consulting Agreement as a properly authenticated coconspirator statement, pursuant to Federal Rules of 

Evidence 901 and 801(d)(2)(E). Specifically, he contends that 

the Consulting Agreement was hearsay and that it was not 

properly authenticated because the government presented 

insufficient evidence that Ben Israel was the declarant and 

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that the Zimbabwe meeting took place in accordance with 

the agreement’s payment structure. We disagree.

This court reviews a district court’s interpretation of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence de novo but the district court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Mendiola, 707 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2013). In Turner’s 

case, the district court did not have to interpret the Federal 

Rules of Evidence; it merely determined whether the Consulting Agreement met the requirements for Rules 901 and 

801(d)(2)(E). Accordingly, we review the district court’s admission of the Consulting Agreement for an abuse of discretion.

Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) provides that “[t]o satisfy 

the requirement of authenticating ... an item of evidence, the 

proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a 

finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” The 

authentication requirement can be fulfilled in a variety of 

ways, including by evaluating “[t]he appearance, contents, 

substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4); see also United States v. Fluker, 698 

F.3d 988, 999 (7th Cir. 2012). “Only a prima facie showing of 

genuineness is required; the task of deciding the evidence’s 

true authenticity and probative value is left to the jury.” 

Fluker, 698 F.3d at 999.

This court has upheld the authentication of document evidence under Rule 901(b)(4) where the declarant’s specific 

identity was unknown but the content, other distinctive 

characteristics, and circumstances support that the declarant 

was a coconspirator. See, e.g., United States v. Mokol, 957 F.2d 

1410, 1420 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that handwritten bribe 

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sheets found in the defendant’s home containing dates, 

names, initials, and amounts corroborated by other evidence

were properly authenticated under Rule 901(b)(4), despite an 

unknown author). In United States v. De Gudino, 722 F.2d 

1351, 1355–56 (7th Cir. 1984), in affirming an aliensmuggling conviction, this court held that lists of smuggled 

aliens were properly authenticated under Rule 901(b)(4), 

even though the lists’ author was unknown. The De Gudino

court held that there was “prima facie evidence of ... authenticity” based on the testimony outlining the conspiracy’s 

smuggling techniques, the fact that the lists were seized 

from the “headquarters of the [illegal alien smuggling] operation,” and the contents of the lists, which included “names 

of smuggled aliens and their sponsors, dates, telephone 

numbers, dollar figures, and records of payment.” Id.

Similar to De Gudino, here, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in finding that the Consulting Agreement was properly authenticated under Rule 901(b)(4), despite uncertainty regarding the identity of the declarant,

based on its content detailing the distinctive payment structure and the circumstances surrounding its receipt.

First, the district court found, based on the government’s 

anticipated evidence (which was presented at trial), that Ben 

Israel and Turner acted in accordance with the Consulting 

Agreement’s distinctive structure. The court noted “the Consulting Agreement’s distinctive payment structure,” which 

called for four payments keyed to specific events: (1) $90,000 

upon signing of this contract, (2) $1,105,000 upon completion 

of a meeting in Zimbabwe, (3) $1,105,000 upon completion of 

a meeting in South Africa, and (4) $1,105,000 upon completion of this project. (R. 176 at 3, 10.) The court observed, that 

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this payment structure had a “high degree of correspondence” with Ben Israel’s and Turner’s actions, including their 

attempts to receive the $90,000 initial payment, their activities to arrange a South Africa meeting and “phase three visit 

to Zimbabwe,” and their ongoing efforts to be paid by Zimbabwean officials. (Id. at 10–11.)

Next, the district court determined, again based on the 

government’s anticipated evidence (which was presented at 

trial), that Ben Israel or a coconspirator sent the Consulting 

Agreement to a bank employee to explain the incoming wire 

from Monica Mutsvangwa. (Id. at 12–15.) It found that in response to a request from Ben Israel’s bank for documentation to explain the incoming wire from Mutsvangwa’s account, the Consulting Agreement was sent the next business 

day in an email from the account “princeasiel@aol.com,”

which was used by Ben Israel. (Id. at 13–14.)

Taken together, the district court’s assessments relating 

to the Consulting Agreement’s distinctive characteristics and 

receipt in connection with a coconspirator are more than sufficient to constitute “prima facie evidence of ... authenticity,” despite uncertainty surrounding the specific declarant. 

De Gudino, 722 F.2d at 1355. This is all that is required under 

Rule 901(b)(4). Fluker, 698 F.3d at 999.

In addition, Turner asserts that the Consulting Agreement was inadmissible hearsay. Because the Consulting 

Agreement was a coconspirator statement, we hold that it 

was properly admitted as non-hearsay, pursuant to Rule 

801(d)(2)(E).

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that “a 

statement ... is not hearsay” if it “is offered against an opCase: 15-1175 Document: 55 Filed: 09/09/2016 Pages: 31
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posing party and ... was made by the party’s coconspirator 

during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” A statement is 

admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) “if the government 

proves by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant and the declarant were 

members of the conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made 

during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 

United States v. Cruz-Rea, 626 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2010).

In this case, the facts establishing the Consulting Agreement’s authenticity under Rule 901(b)(4) also satisfy Rule 

801(d)(2)(E). See De Gudino, 722 F.2d at 1356 (“The contents 

of the [authenticated documents] also establish the [authenticated documents] as co-conspirator statements admissible 

under rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 

As discussed, the government provided evidence, based on 

the Consulting Agreement’s distinctive characteristics and 

the circumstances surrounding its transmission, that the 

Consulting Agreement’s declarant was a coconspirator who 

shared the document to help achieve payment for lobbying 

services, a goal of the conspiracy. Moreover, Turner’s argument about the uncertain identity of the Consulting Agreement’s declarant also fails in the context of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 

This court has explicitly held that it is “wrong to suggest that 

it is necessary to know the precise identity of a coconspirator 

before statements can be admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).” 

United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 570 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Hence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the authenticated Consulting Agreement as a coconspirator statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).

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B. Instructions to the Jury

Next, Turner contests the district court’s jury instructions 

for Count Three on three grounds. First, he argues that the 

court erred in its definition of “willfully” or “willfulness.” 

Second, Turner contends that the court erred by not requiring jury unanimity with regard to the specific Zimbabwean 

SDNs for whom services were provided. Third, he argues 

that the court constructively amended the indictment by including SDN Mumbengegwi.

“We review de novo whether jury instructions accurately 

summarize the law, but give the district court substantial 

discretion to formulate the instructions provided that the instructions represent a complete and correct statement of the 

law.” United States v. Daniel, 749 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2014)

(internal quotation marks omitted). If this court “determine[s] that the instructions accurately summarize the law, 

[we] review[] the district court’s phrasing of the instruction 

for abuse of discretion. Reversal is warranted only where the 

reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

1. Willfulness Definition

Turner starts by disputing the district court’s definition 

of “willfulness” or “willfully.”

The district court’s jury instructions stated: “Count Three 

of the indictment charges [Turner] with willfully conspiring 

to provide services on behalf of and for the benefit of certain 

specially designated nationals, specifically Robert Mugabe, 

Gideon Gono, Simon Moyo, or Samuel Simbarashe Mumbengegwi, without first having obtained a license from the 

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United States Department of the Treasury.” (Trial Tr. vol. VI, 

130, Oct. 7, 2014.) The district court provided the following 

definition for the term “willfully:”

As used in Count 3, the defendant acted willfully if 

he acted intentionally and purposefully with the intent to do something the law forbids, that is, with 

bad purpose to disobey or to disregard the law. The 

defendant need not be aware of the specific law or 

rule that ... his conduct would violate. In other 

words, the defendant does not have to know that 

his conduct would violate a particular law, executive order or federal regulation, but he must act 

with the intent to do something the law forbids. 

(Trial Tr. vol. VI, 131, Oct. 7, 2014.)

On appeal, Turner claims that the district court’s definition misstates the law. He argues, instead, that the definition 

of “willfulness” requires “that the government must show 

that [Turner] acted with ‘the specific intent to do something 

the law forbids ... i.e. providing services to Specially Designated Nationals.’” (Appellant Br. 27.)

In the present case, the district court’s definition of “willfulness” accurately summarized the law because it is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bryan v. United 

States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998).

In Bryan, the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of 

the term “willfully” for a defendant convicted of “‘willfully’ 

dealing in firearms without a federal license.” Id. at 186. The 

Court held that the traditional definition of “willfully” applied—that the government only needed to prove 

“knowledge that the conduct is unlawful.” Id. at 192. The 

court expressly rejected the defendant’s arguments for “a 

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more particularized showing”—that the defendant knew 

that a specific federal law prohibited his conduct. Id. In 

reaching its conclusion, the Court affirmed the district 

court’s explanation of the term “willfully,” which read:

A person acts willfully if he acts intentionally and 

purposely and with the intent to do something the 

law forbids, that is, with the bad purpose to disobey or to disregard the law. Now, the person need 

not be aware of the specific law or rule that his 

conduct may be violating. But he must act with the 

intent to do something the law forbids. 

Id. at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court did not commit any error. The 

district court accurately stated the law—its definition of 

“willfully” is consistent with Bryan’s holding that, for willfulness, “the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no 

excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is 

required.” Id. at 196. Turner’s argument for a specific intent 

requirement was the very argument rejected by the Bryan 

Court. Id. at 192–96. Additionally, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion with its phrasing—its definition of “willfully” closely tracks the explanation of “willfully” upheld by 

the Bryan Court.

Turner contends that this court has sometimes required a 

more particularized definition of “willfulness,” relying primarily on United States v. Dobek, 789 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2015). 

In Dobek, an engineer who sold canopy seals to the Venezuelan Air Force was convicted of exporting munitions to Venezuela without a State Department license, in violation of 22 

U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2), (c), and 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.1, 123.1, 127.1. Id.

at 699. In holding that “willfully” required “knowledge by 

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the defendant ... that he needed a license to export the munitions that he exported,” the Dobek court provided the following reasoning:

Ordinarily a person is conclusively presumed to 

know the law ... But this principle, sensible when a 

person is bound to know that what he is doing is 

wrong, breaks down when a person who does not 

know of the law prohibiting what he does has no 

reason to think that he's acting wrongfully. Especially when the law is a regulation rather than a 

statute. He may not be aware of a regulation imposing an embargo on the export of a product to a 

particular country when it is a product that is 

commonly exported. The United States is the 

world's largest exporter of munitions.

Id. at 700. The Dobek court, however, affirmed the defendant’s conviction under harmless error review because “the 

evidence that the violation was willful was overwhelming,”

even under a heightened willfulness definition. Id. at 702.

In this case, even if we were to give Turner the benefit of 

a heightened willfulness definition, similar to the standard

in Dobek, his claim would still fail under harmless error review, similar to the outcome in Dobek. Turner arranged 

meetings and correspondence between U.S. and Zimbabwean officials in order to discuss the lifting of the “sanctions”—

Executive Orders 13288 and 13391 and 31 C.F.R. § 541.101 et 

seq. In other words, he provided services to the SDNs to assist in lifting the prohibitions against providing services to 

the SDNs. Turner was clearly aware that his conduct was 

unlawful, even under a heightened definition of willfulness, 

and therefore “the evidence that [Turner’s] violation was 

willful was overwhelming.” Dobek, 789 F.3d at 702.

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Accordingly, the district court’s definition of “willfully” 

was proper and there was no abuse of discretion in its phrasing.

2. Jury Unanimity Regarding Specific SDNs

Turner also argues that “the jury should have had to

unanimously decide which Specially Designated National

Turner conspired to provide services on behalf of” (Appellant Br. 30.) Turner had presented this argument as part of

his proposed jury instructions, which the court rejected.

Instead, the district court provided the following instructions for the first element of Count Three: “To find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in Count 3, you must 

find that the government has proven ... that two or more 

U.S. persons agreed to provide services on behalf of or for 

the benefit of a specially designated national.” (Trial Tr. vol. 

VI, 130, Oct. 7, 2014.)

The Supreme Court has held that while jury unanimity is 

required for each principal element of a crime, “‘a federal 

jury need not always decide unanimously which of several 

possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular 

element, say, which of several possible means the defendant 

used to commit an element of the crime.’” Daniel, 749 F.3d at 

613 (quoting Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817

(1999).

As a result, in Turner’s case, we must determine if the 

particular SDN on whose behalf Turner conspired to provide services for constitutes an element or a means of the offense. We conclude that it is a means, rather than an element, 

of Turner’s offense.

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We start by examining the language of the statute and 

regulations underlying Turner’s offense. Turner was convicted of conspiring to provide services on behalf of, or for 

the benefit of, Zimbabwean SDNs, in violation of the IEEPA, 

50 U.S.C. § 1705(c), and 31 C.F.R. §§ 541.201, 541.204, and 

541.405.

The IEEPA makes it unlawful for “a person to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause a violation of 

any license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued under 

this chapter.” 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a). This offense does not mention SDNs, let alone require a unanimous jury finding as an 

element the specific SDNs for whom services were performed.

We next consider 31 C.F.R. §§ 541.201, 541.204, and

541.405, which implement Executive Orders 13288 and 

13391, which, in turn, were issued pursuant to the IEEPA. 

Section 541.201(a)(1) prohibits transactions of all property 

belonging to “[t]he persons listed in the Annex to Executive 

Order 13288 of March 6, 2003, as amended by Executive Order 13391 of November 22, 2005.” There, “persons” are the 

Zimbabwean SDNs. Section 541.204(b) prohibits “[a]ny conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in 

this part.” Section 541.405(a)(1) prohibits “services performed” by U.S. persons “[o]n behalf of or for the benefit of 

a person whose property and interests in property are 

blocked pursuant to § 541.201(a).”

Again, there is nothing in the language of these regulations to indicate that the jury must unanimously find as an 

element the specific SDNs for whom services were performed. In fact, the language of the regulations is worded 

broadly, so as to encompass any combination or group of 

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SDNs—“[t]he persons listed in the Annex” and “a person

whose property and interests in property are blocked”

§§ 541.201(a)(1), 541.405(a)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the 

relevant statutory and regulatory language indicates that the 

specific SDN is a means, rather than an element, of Turner’s 

offense.

Turner’s argument is similar to the one rejected by this 

court in United States v. Griggs, 569 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 2009). 

In Griggs ̧ a defendant convicted of conspiring to further a 

Ponzi scheme challenged the jury instructions, arguing that 

the jury should have been required to agree unanimously on 

an overt act that at least one of the conspirators had committed. Id. at 342–43. Our decision in Griggs rejected the defendant’s argument, holding that “[t]he law distinguishes between the elements of a crime, as to which a jury must be 

unanimous, and the means by which the crime is committed.” Id. at 343 (citing Richardson, 526 U.S. at 817–18 and 

Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631, 649 (1991)). Applying this 

rule, we determined that the jurors had agreed unanimously 

on the defendant’s crime—“that he had taken a step toward 

accomplishing the goal of the conspiracy.” Id. at 344. We further held, in contrast, that it was “inconsequential” that the 

jury might have disagreed on the means of the crime, namely the overt acts or specific steps taken in carrying out the 

offense. Id.2

 2 We note that the Griggs court did assess that the jury “may not have 

been unanimous about the elements of [defendant’s] crime” but then determined it was harmless error. 569 F.3d at 344–45. However, this assessment does not affect Griggs’s conclusion, pursuant to Richardson, that 

a crime and its elements required jury unanimity, but the means of 

committing the crime did not.

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Like Griggs, here, as the government points out, even if 

the jurors in Turner’s case had disagreed on which particular

SDN that Turner conspired to provide services for, such disagreement would not mean that the jurors also disagreed on 

whether Turner conspired to provide services for an SDN.

(Appellee Br. 32–33.) In other words, the identities of the 

particular SDNs are a means, not an element, of Turner’s offense. Therefore, it did not require jury unanimity.

Turner relies heavily on Richardson to support his argument that the particular SDN for whom services were provided is an element of the offense. In Richardson, the Supreme Court interpreted the Continuing Criminal Enterprise 

(“CCE”) statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848, holding that to convict a defendant, jurors must unanimously agree not only that the 

defendant committed some “continuing series of violations” 

but also on “each individual violation” that made up the 

continuing series. 526 U.S. at 820, 824 (internal quotation

marks omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme 

Court examined the language and legal tradition of the CCE 

statute in order to determine congressional intent, as well as 

the potential unfairness that would befall defendants if the 

predicate offenses were not deemed to be elements. Id. at 

818–24; see also United States v. Pollock, 757 F.3d 582, 587 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (summarizing Richardson’s holding and reasoning).

Turner’s reliance on Richardson, however, is misplaced. In 

United States v. Gibson, in declining to apply Richardson to require that the specific form of pecuniary gain was an element of murder-for-hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a), this court 

held that Richardson’s analysis was “specific to the CCE statute.” 530 F.3d 606, 611–12 (7th Cir. 2008). In the present case, 

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No. 15-1175 21

Turner was convicted of violating the IEEPA, not the CCE

statute, and therefore Richardson does not apply. Turner also 

fails to present any cogent arguments for applying Richardson to the IEEPA based on statutory language, legal tradition, or unusual risk to defendants—the types of arguments

found persuasive in Richardson. See Pollock, 757 F.3d at 587

(declining to extend Richardson to a felon in possession offense after analysis under the “Richardson factors”). Because

Richardson’s analysis was specific to the CCE statute, this 

court and our sister circuits have routinely declined to apply 

it to other offenses. See, e.g., id. (rejecting the argument that 

possession of a specific firearm was an element of a felon in 

possession charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); United States v. 

Lee, 317 F.3d 26, 37–40 (1st Cir. 2003) (rejecting the argument 

that the specific devices possessed was an element of possession of counterfeit or unauthorized access devices under 18 

U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3)). As such, we decline to apply Richardson

to Turner’s case.

In the alternative, Turner contends that “[a]t a minimum, 

the particular SDN is an object of the conspiracy,” which also requires jury unanimity. (Appellant Br. 33.) This contention is meritless and simply repackages his previous argument. For Count Three, Turner’s jury instructions named 

four SDNs—Mugabe, Gono, Moyo, and Mumbengegwi—

and required that the government prove as an element “that 

two or more US persons agreed to provide services on behalf 

of or for the benefit of a specially designated national.” (Trial 

Tr. vol. VI, 130, Oct. 7, 2014 (emphasis added).) In other 

words, the object of the conspiracy was providing services 

for any combination of the named SDNs. As discussed, the 

identity of the particular SDN is a means, not an element of 

Turner’s offense. Therefore, Turner’s contention fails.

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22 No. 15-1175

3. Constructive Amendment

Turner also contends that the district court’s jury instructions constructively amended his indictment because Count 

Three of the indictment did not include SDN Mumbengegwi,

but the court’s jury instructions for Count Three did include 

this individual.

Turner raises his claim under the Fifth Amendment, 

which provides that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for 

a ... crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 

Jury.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “A constructive amendment to 

an indictment occurs when either the government ..., the 

court ..., or both, broadens the possible bases for conviction 

beyond those presented by the grand jury.” United States v. 

Cusimano, 148 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, not all variations in proof 

that contradict or supplement verbiage in the indictment rise 

to the level of constructive amendments.” United States v. 

Phillips, 745 F.3d 829, 832 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Rather, the offense “charged in the indictment must be materially different or substantially altered at 

trial, [so that] it is impossible to know whether the grand jury would have indicted for the crime actually proved.” Id. 

(alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, Count Three of the indictment charged 

Turner and Ben Israel with “willfully conspir[ing] to provide 

services on behalf of and for the benefit of Specially Designated Nationals Robert Mugabe, Gideon Gono, and Simon 

Khaya Moyo,” in violation of the IEEPA and implementing 

regulations. (R. 38 at 18.)

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No. 15-1175 23

After closing arguments, however, the district court instructed the jury that, “Count Three ... charges the defendant with willfully conspiring to provide services on behalf of 

and for the benefit of certain specially designated nationals, 

specifically, Robert Mugabe, Gideon Gono, Simon Moyo, or 

Samuel Simbarashe Mumbengegwi.” (Trial Tr. 130, vol. VI, Oct.

7, 2014. (emphasis added))

Because Turner did not raise an objection below, this 

court reviews his constructive amendment claim for plain 

error. Cusimano, 148 F.3d at 828. In this circumstance, we will 

only reverse if the constructive amendment constituted “a 

mistake so serious that but for it the [defendant] probably 

would have been acquitted in order for us to reverse.” Id.

(alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, Turner’s argument fails because it is similar 

to the one rejected by this court in Phillips. In Phillips, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to defraud the government and presenting a false claim, and the indictment only mentioned two fraudulent tax returns. 745 F.3d at 832. 

During trial, however, the government introduced evidenced of two additional fraudulent tax returns, arguing 

that “the unusual similarities among the four returns were 

proof of the conspiracy.” Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that a constructive amendment had occurred. 

The Phillips court rejected defendant’s constructive 

amendment claim because “the indictment can be read naturally to include all four tax returns.” Id. The Phillips court 

further held that the fact that only two returns are mentioned in the indictment “does not preclude the government 

from relying upon extremely similar evidence that also falls 

within the charged dates and of which [the defendant] clearCase: 15-1175 Document: 55 Filed: 09/09/2016 Pages: 31
24 No. 15-1175

ly had notice.” Id. Consequently, the Phillips court held that 

no constructive amendment occurred. Id. at 833.

Similarly, there was no constructive amendment of 

Turner’s indictment. As in Phillips, Count Three of Turner’s 

indictment can be read naturally to include SDN Mumbengegwi. Count Three explicitly states, “Paragraphs 1(a), (b), (c), 

(d) of Count One are reallaged here,” and Paragraph 1(b)(v) 

of Count One specifically identifies Mumbengegwi as an 

SDN. (R. 38 at 2, 18.) Furthermore, like in Phillips, the evidence of Turner’s relationship with SDN Mumbengegwi was 

extremely similar to the evidence of Turner’s relationship 

with the other listed SDNs. And Turner clearly had notice 

regarding SDN Mumbengegwi, who was specifically identified in Count One of the indictment. Phillips confirmed that 

the “admission of evidence intricately related to the charged 

crimes ... does not constructively amend the indictment,” 

and we hold that this principle firmly controls Turner’s 

claim. 745 F.3d at 832 (quoting United States v. Alhalabi, 443 

F.3d 605, 614 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, Turner’s indictment was 

not constructively amended.

C. Interactions with Jury after Deliberations Began

Lastly, Turner challenges the district court’s interactions

with the jury after deliberations had begun.

On October 7, 2014, at 3:05 p.m., the district judge asked 

the jurors to begin deliberations. The district judge then told 

the two alternate jurors that they could go home but were 

not formally excused because it was possible their services 

might still be needed. (Trial Tr. vol. VI, 137, Oct. 7, 2014.)

Approximately 45 minutes into deliberations, juror 

Chism sent the district judge a note that stated: “I have a fuCase: 15-1175 Document: 55 Filed: 09/09/2016 Pages: 31
No. 15-1175 25

neral to go to tomorrow so I would like to know what you 

would like me to do.” (Id. at 142.) The district judge discussed the note with the government and Turner, and they 

agreed that the judge could confer with Chism about the situation ex parte in the jury room.

As the judge was walking to the jury room, she received 

another note from the jury inquiring about the schedule and 

Chism’s request. (Id. at 145.) The judge then had an ex parte

conversation with Chism in front of the jury. Chism informed the judge that that the funeral was for his cousin, it 

would take place at 11 a.m. the following morning, and that 

he would not be available to deliberate at all the following 

day. The judge described Chism as “annoyed” and “angry.” 

(Id. at 146, 151.)

The judge returned to the courtroom and conferred with 

the government and Turner. The judge decided not to excuse 

Chism for the following reasons: he had not mentioned the 

funeral until deliberations had begun, another juror had requested time off for an uncle’s funeral, and neither funeral 

was for an immediate family member.

The district judge returned to the jury room and communicated ex parte her decision with the jury, stating, “[w]e've 

decided that you need to go ahead and deliberate.” (Trial Tr. 

vol. VII, 5, Oct. 8, 2014.) According to the judge, Chism responded that “he would not return the following day regardless of the court’s order.” (R. 233 at 1.)

Again, the judge went back to the courtroom and discussed the situation with the government and Turner. Ultimately, the judge decided to excuse Chism. She reasoned 

that “deliberations had barely begun (if at all)” and if she alCase: 15-1175 Document: 55 Filed: 09/09/2016 Pages: 31
26 No. 15-1175

lowed Chism to take off the following day, she would also 

have to allow the other juror to go to a funeral, potentially 

extending the deliberations for over a week. (Id. at 2.)

On October 8, 2014, the next alternate juror, Timothy 

Lambin, was called. After Lambin assured the district judge 

that he had not discussed the case with anyone, the district 

judge instructed the jury to begin deliberations from the beginning. On October 10, 2014, the jury reached its verdict.

On appeal, Turner argues that the district judge erred by: 

(1) replacing juror Chism with an alternate and (2) engaging 

in ex parte communications with the jury.

1. Replacement of Juror Chism with an Alternate

Turner first argues that the district judge improperly replaced Chism with an alternate.

This court has held that a district court has discretion to 

replace a deliberating juror, pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure Rule 24(c)(3), which provides:

Retaining Alternate Jurors. The court may retain alternate jurors after the jury retires to deliberate. The 

court must ensure that a retained alternate does not 

discuss the case with anyone until that alternate 

replaces a juror or is discharged. If an alternate replaces a juror after deliberations have begun, the 

court must instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew.

United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2007).

Accordingly, this court reviews a district court’s replacement of a deliberating juror with an alternate for an abuse of 

discretion. Id. at 690. If the district court has a “legitimate basis

for th[e] decision [to replace a juror], there is no abuse of disCase: 15-1175 Document: 55 Filed: 09/09/2016 Pages: 31
No. 15-1175 27

cretion.” Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district judge had a legitimate basis for excusing Chism. According to the district judge, Chism was “annoyed” and “angry,” and he had declared that he would not 

return the following day regardless of the district court’s order. This court has stated, “there is hardly anything that 

would make a juror less able to serve than his failure to 

show up.” United States v. Almonacid, 70 F. App’x 390, 392 

(7th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Peters, 617 F.2d 503, 

505 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a more complete disqualification than a failure to appear.”). Thus, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in replacing Chism 

with an alternate.

Turner argues that the district court erred in not demonstrating “good cause” to dismiss Chism.3 This argument is 

without merit because it is based on the incorrect Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure. Turner’s “good cause” argument and supporting cases are all premised on Rule 23(b)(3), 

which provides: “[a]fter the jury has retired to deliberate, the 

court may permit a jury of 11 persons to return a verdict, 

even without a stipulation by the parties, if the court finds 

good cause to excuse a juror.” See United States v. Araujo, 62 

F.3d 930, 931 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Patterson, 26 F.3d 

1127, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. McFarland, 34 F.3d 

1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing Rules 23 and 24 but an-

 3 Turner uses the term “just cause” in his argument. However, “[i]n current Rule 23(b), the term ‘just cause’ has been replaced with the more 

familiar term ‘good cause,’ that appears in other rules. No change in substance is intended.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b), 2002 advisory committee 

note.

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28 No. 15-1175

alyzing the dismissal of a juror for “just cause” under Rule 

23); United States v. Tabacca, 924 F.2d 906, 913–15 (9th Cir. 

1991). In contrast, here, the district judge replaced Chism 

pursuant to Rule 24(c)(3). Consequently, Turner’s argument 

fails.

2. Ex Parte Communications with the Jury

Turner next contends that the district judge had improper ex parte communications with the jury. He raises his claim 

under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 43.

This court has explained that a “defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of a prosecution, but this right does not extend to every interaction between the court and the jury.” Winters v. Miller, 274 F.3d 

1161, 1168 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Gagnon, 470

U.S. 522, 526 (1985)). The “mere occurrence of an ex parte

conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right. The defense 

has no constitutional right to be present at every interaction 

between a judge and a juror, nor is there a constitutional 

right to have a court reporter transcribe every such communication.” United States v. Bishawi, 272 F.3d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 

2001) (quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). Instead, “the constitutional right to presence ... exists where there is a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of opportunity to defend 

against the charge and to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by the defendant’s absence.” Id. at 

461–62. (citing Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526). Additionally, “[t]he 

broader, procedural right to be present afforded by Federal 

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No. 15-1175 29

Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 is likewise not without limits.” Id. at 462.

In this case, Turner challenges the district judge’s ex parte

communications with the jury, including her “conversation

with the jury regarding replacing juror Chism” and her

comment that “we are not going to be able to do this 

again ..., it’s only that you had just begun that I am going to 

excuse” somebody. (Appellant Br. 42.)

This court determines whether ex parte contact violates a 

defendant’s constitutional or procedural right to presence 

under a harmless error standard. Bishawi, 272 F.3d at 462. 

Under this standard, this court will only reverse if the error 

affects the defendant’s “substantial rights,” which are those 

that affect the outcome of the case. Id. In other words, this 

court will “look to see if the communications had a prejudicial effect on the defendant and rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.” Moore v. Knight, 368 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 

2004) (internal quotations marks omitted). We have held that 

“a right to presence violation entitles the defendant to a new 

trial only if the ex parte communication at issue likely affected the jury’s verdict.” Bishawi, 272 F.3d at 462.

In the present case, Turner’s claim does not survive

harmless error review because he fails to establish that the ex 

parte communication likely affected the jury’s verdict.

As an initial matter, Turner persuasively asserts that his 

procedural right to presence under Rule 43 was violated. 

Rule 43(a) “entitles a defendant to be present at all stages of 

his trial,” and “[c]ommunication between the judge and the 

jury, or a single juror, is one of those stages.” United States v. 

Pressley, 100 F.3d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Fed R. Crim P. 

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43(a) and Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39 (1975)). Here, 

the district court engaged in ex parte communications with 

members of the jury without Turner or his counsel being 

present, thereby violating Rule 43.

It is less clear, however, whether Turner has demonstrated that he is entitled to a presumption of prejudice. We have

held that “[i]n a criminal case, any private communication ... 

with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the 

jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial.” Bishawi, 272 F.3d at 462. (alteration in original) (citing 

Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954)). This presumption, however, is “without question rebuttable.” Id. (citing Rushen, 464 U.S. at 118–19).

Here, the record shows that all of the district judge’s ex 

parte communications with the jury pertained only to the replacement of Chism, not the substance of the case. It is unclear whether these communications relate to “the matter 

pending before the jury” and at least one of our sister circuits has expressly distinguished between ex parte contacts 

that are “merely ministerial in nature” and those that constitute “substantive communications.” United States v. Martin, 

777 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2015) (“A defendant is not prejudiced by ex parte contacts between judge and jury that are 

merely ministerial in nature and not substantive communications.”)

Regardless, even if Turner was entitled to a presumption 

of prejudice, his claim fails to survive harmless error review 

because these ex parte contacts did not likely affect the outcome of the case. The alleged ex parte conversations regarding the replacement of Chism concerned a proper exercise of 

discretion by the district court. And the district judge’s ex 

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No. 15-1175 31

parte comment had no determinable, much less a fundamentally unfair, effect on the deliberations—Chism was replaced 

by an alternate and the jury subsequently returned a verdict. 

Thus, there is nothing to suggest that these ex parte communications impacted the outcome of the case.

Turner asserts that the other jurors might have disagreed 

with Chism and the ex parte communications might have allowed them to effectuate his removal. His contention, however, is pure speculation. Not only is this scenario unsupported, but it is unlikely given that the deliberations had 

“barely begun (if at all)” and the jurors “had nothing to do 

with making that decision [to replace Chism].” (Trial Tr. 7, 

Oct. 8, 2014.)

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED.

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