Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04083/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04083-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Felix A. Salcido
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELIX A. SALCIDO,

Petitioner,

 v.

JAMES A. YATES, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 08-04083 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AS

UNTIMELY

(Docket no. 8)

INTRODUCTION

On August 26, 2008, Petitioner Felix A. Salcido, a state

prisoner incarcerated at Pleasant State Valley Prison, filed a pro

se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. On December 15, 2008, the Court ordered Respondent to show

cause why the petition should not be granted. On April 27, 2009,

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the present petition as

untimely under 28 U.S.C § 2244(d), the statute of limitations

established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). Petitioner opposed the motion, and Respondent has

filed a reply to the opposition. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court GRANTS Respondent's motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

The following factual and procedural background is based on

the allegations in the petition, on Respondent's motion to dismiss

and attached exhibits, and on Petitioner's opposition to the motion

to dismiss. 

On December 14, 2001, following a jury trial, Petitioner was

convicted of one count of murder in the second degree. (Pet. at

2.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to fifteen years to life

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 1 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 A pro se federal habeas petition is deemed filed on the date

it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See Saffold v.

Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded on

other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (holding that a

federal or state habeas petition is deemed filed on the date the

prisoner submits it to prison authorities for filing, rather than the

date it is received by the courts). Petitioner claims he delivered

the petition to prison authorities for mailing on August 20, 2008, the

date the petition was signed. (Opp'n at 2.) The record shows that

prison authorities mailed the petition the following day, on August

21, 2008. (Opp'n Ex. B.) Therefore, the Court concludes that the

petition was filed on August 20, 2008.

2

imprisonment. (Id.) Petitioner challenged his conviction in the

California Court of Appeal where it was affirmed on February 17,

2004. (Id.) Petitioner filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court, which was denied on April 28, 2004. 

(Resp't Ex. 2.)

On July 25, 2005, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in

the Santa Clara County Superior Court. (Resp't Ex. 3.) The

superior court denied the petition after conducting an evidentiary

hearing on January 12, 2007. (Resp't Ex. 4.) On March 2, 2007,

Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme

Court, which was denied on August 22, 2007. (Resp't Ex. 5.) 

Petitioner filed the present federal habeas petition on August

20, 2008.1 

DISCUSSION

I. AEDPA Limitations Period

The AEDPA became law on April 24, 1996 and imposed for the

first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by

prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 2 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

must be filed within one year of the latest date on which: (A) the

judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the

time passed for seeking direct review; (B) an impediment to filing

an application created by unconstitutional state action was

removed, if such action prevented the petitioner from filing;

(C) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (D) the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

However, "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for

state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to

the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted

toward any period of limitation." Id. § 2244(d)(2).

A state prisoner with a conviction finalized after April 24,

1996, such as Petitioner, must satisfy the AEDPA statute of

limitations. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler),

128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d

530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

"Direct review" within the meaning of the statute includes the

ninety-day period during which a criminal appellant can file a

petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme

Court, whether he actually files such a petition or not. Bowen v.

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In the present case, the California Supreme Court denied

review on April 28, 2004. The judgment became final for purposes

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 3 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

of the AEDPA statute of limitations ninety days later, on July 27,

2004. See id. Accordingly, Petitioner was required to file a

federal habeas corpus petition no later than July 27, 2005. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Because he did not file the present petition

until August 20, 2008, the petition is untimely unless he can show

that he is entitled to tolling.

II. Statutory Tolling

The petition may be timely if the limitations period was

tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for a substantial period of

time. As noted earlier, AEDPA's one-year limitations period is

tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for "[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The limitations period

is also tolled during the time between a lower state court's

decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state

court. Carey, 536 U.S. at 223. In California, where prisoners

generally use the State's original writ system, this means that the

limitations period remains tolled during the intervals between a

state court's disposition of an original state habeas petition and

the filing of the next original state habeas petition in a higher

court, provided the prisoner did not delay unreasonably in seeking

review in the higher court. See id. at 220-25.

In the present action, Petitioner alleges that his appellate

attorney filed his state habeas petition in the Santa Clara County

Superior Court on July 25, 2005. (Opp'n at 6.) Only two days

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 4 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Respondent argues that the fact that "only two days remained

demonstrates that Petitioner failed to pursue his rights diligently

during the period he was exhausting his state court remedies." (Reply

at 4.) Petitioner has failed to explain his delay in filing his state

superior court habeas petition or to claim that he is entitled to

equitable tolling at any time during this delay; therefore, the Court

need not address this issue. 

5

remained before the statutory limitations period expired.2 The

limitations period was tolled until the California Supreme Court

denied Petitioner's state habeas petition on August 22, 2007. 

Thereafter, Petitioner had only two days, or until August 24, 2007,

to file his federal habeas petition. Because Petitioner filed his

federal habeas petition on August 20, 2008 -- more than a year

after the statute of limitations had expired -- his petition is

untimely unless he is entitled to equitable tolling.

III. Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitations period can be equitably tolled

because § 2244(d) is a statute of limitations and not a

jurisdictional bar. See Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288. "When external

forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for

the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling will not be

available in most cases because extensions of time should be

granted only if "'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's

control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Beeler,

128 F.3d at 1288 (citation omitted). The prisoner must show that

"the 'extraordinary circumstances' were the cause of his

untimeliness." Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted). Another statement of the standard is that a

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 5 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing

two elements: "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way,"

preventing timely filing. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418

(2005).

The Ninth Circuit has said that the petitioner "bears the

burden of showing that this extraordinary exclusion should apply to

him." Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Indeed, "'the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.'" 

Id. at 1066 (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 878 (2000)). 

However, "[r]ather than let procedural uncertainties

unreasonably snuff out a constitutional claim, the issue of when

grave difficulty merges literally into 'impossibility' should be

resolved in [a petitioner's] favor." Lott, 304 F.3d at 920. When

a prisoner is proceeding pro se, his allegations regarding

diligence in filing a federal petition on time must be construed

liberally. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable

tolling because his untimeliness was caused by extraordinary

circumstances beyond his control. (Opp'n at 6-7.) 

First, Petitioner claims that his delay in obtaining notice of

the state supreme court's denial of his state habeas petition was

an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control. (Opp'n at 3.) 

Petitioner claims that a week before the August 22, 2007 denial, he

had terminated his appellate attorney, who agreed to send

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 6 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Petitioner the "trial transcripts, work product and pertinent

affidavits so [Petitioner] could continue his collateral petition

in propria persona." (Id. at 3, 7.) On August 28, 2007,

Petitioner received a letter from his appellate attorney informing

him of the denial. Petitioner claims that "'due to the eleventh

hour decision of concluding representation of counsel' there was

not sufficient time for Petitioner to further pursue his collateral

petition in propria persona." (Id. at 3.) As mentioned above,

when Petitioner began seeking state collateral relief, he only had

two days remaining before his limitations period expired. 

Therefore, after his state collateral proceedings concluded on

August 22, 2007, the limitations period expired two days later, on

August 24, 2007. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that a

prisoner's lack of knowledge that the state courts have reached a

final resolution of his case can be grounds for equitable tolling

if the prisoner acted diligently to obtain notice. Ramirez v.

Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, Petitioner had

just terminated his appellate attorney a week before the denial was

issued. Because Petitioner had only started representing himself

as a pro se litigant a week before the denial, the only manner he

could obtain notice of the denial was through his appellate

attorney, who presumably was informed of the denial by the state

supreme court. The appellate attorney's address may have been the

only address listed in Petitioner's state court habeas action. The

fact that Petitioner was still in contact with his appellate

attorney at the time the denial was issued shows that Petitioner

acted diligently to obtain notice of the denial; therefore,

Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling from the date of the

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 7 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

denial, August 22, 2007, through August 28, 2007, the date he

received notice of the denial from his appellate attorney. See

Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 997.

The limitations period began to run again on August 28, 2007,

and Petitioner had two days to file his federal habeas petition

before the limitations period expired. On August 30, 2007, the

last day before the expiration of the limitations period,

Petitioner wrote a letter seeking to obtain "the trial transcripts,

work product and pertinent affidavits" from his appellate counsel. 

(Opp'n at 3; Ex. B.) Petitioner also claims to have made several

telephone calls to his appellate attorney making the same request. 

(Opp'n at 3.) Because his attorney was delayed in returning his

trial records and transcripts, Petitioner claims he should be

entitled to equitable tolling from August 30, 2007, the first date

he requested his trial records, through May 9, 2008, the date he

received his complete case file. (Id. at 4-7.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a habeas petitioner cannot be

expected to "'prepare and file a meaningful petition on his own

within the limitations period' without access to his legal file." 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1027-28 (9th Cir.

2005) (quoting Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 801). However, the issues

actually raised in the petition may show that the lack of a

transcript did not actually delay the filing of the petition. 

United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 N. 5 (9th Cir. 2004).

Furthermore, the grounds for granting equitable tolling are "highly

fact dependant." Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir.

2002). Where a prisoner fails to show "any causal connection"

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 8 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

between the grounds upon which he asserts a right to equitable

tolling and his inability to file a timely federal habeas

application, the equitable tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005), amended, 447 F.3d

1165 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, as mentioned above, Petitioner received copies of his

prior state habeas petitions on November 26, 2007. However, he did

not attempt to draft his federal petition until after he received

his complete case file -- including his trial records and

transcripts -- on May 9, 2008. Respondent argues Petitioner's

allegations do not show a causal connection between the delay in

receiving his complete case file and his inability to file a timely

federal habeas petition. (Reply at 3.) Petitioner does not

specify why the transcripts and affidavits were necessary to file a

timely federal petition. Petitioner also fails to explain whether

he was unable to obtain this information from the previous state

petitions provided to him on November 26, 2007, or even from his

general knowledge obtained during his trial and at the evidentiary

hearing in Santa Clara County Superior Court. Respondent argues

that Petitioner should at most only be entitled to equitable

tolling from August 30, 2007 through November 26, 2007, the date he

received his state court petitions, because "the issues raised in

the present petition are virtually identical to those raised in

previously filed state petitions, [and] the absence of additional

materials did not make it impossible to file the present petition

on time." (Id. at 4(citing Battles, 362 F.3d at 1198 n.5)). Thus,

Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 9 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

tolling for the period from November 26, 2007 through May 9, 2008,

during which his appellate attorney failed to return the trial

transcripts, work product and pertinent affidavits to him. (Reply

at 2 (citing Gassler v. Bruton, 255 F.3d 492, 495 (8th Cir. 2001)

(rejecting equitable tolling based on delay in receiving trial

transcripts because possession of trial transcript is not a

condition precedent to filing for post-conviction relief; a

petition seeking collateral relief could have been filed, following

which, if necessary for decision of the issues raised, the court

could have ordered production of the transcript).) Nevertheless,

the Court need not decide this issue because, as explained below,

the present petition would still be untimely by over three months.

Even if Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling during the

entire period he did not have access to his complete case file,

then -- with no time remaining in the limitations period -- he

should have filed his federal habeas petition on May 10, 2008, the

day after he received his complete case file. Instead, he filed it

more than three months later. Petitioner argues he is further

entitled to equitable tolling from May 9, 2008 through August 20,

2008, the date he filed the present petition. (Opp'n at 6-7.) 

Petitioner argues that he could not file the present petition

immediately after obtaining his complete case file because his pro

se status left him "without the amenities of an attorney's law

office (i.e. books, copy machine, computer, etc.)." (Opp'n at 7.) 

Additionally, Petitioner claims he had limited access to the prison

law library because he was obliged to attend his assigned

vocational trade classes Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. until

3:00 p.m. (Opp'n at 7.) As a result, he only had access to the

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 10 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

law library on Saturdays to research and draft his federal

petition. (Id.) 

A pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by

itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); cf. CantuTzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1998) (pro se

status during state habeas proceedings did not justify equitable

tolling); United States v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir.

1993) (pro se status, illiteracy, deafness and lack of legal

training not external factors excusing abuse of the writ). Nor do

"ordinary prison limitations on . . . access to the law library and

copier" constitute extraordinary circumstances or make it

impossible to file on time. See Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998. 

Petitioner's allegations fail to show that equitable tolling

is warranted during the more than three months of delay at issue. 

The claims raised in the present petition are identical to those

raised in the state court petition; therefore, a timely federal

habeas petition would not have differed much from his state habeas

petitions. Petitioner's pro se status and his limited access to

the prison law library did not make it impossible for him to file a

federal petition on time, Beeler, 128 F.3d 1288; nor were they the

cause of his untimeliness, Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799. 

In sum, the limitations period ran from July 27, 2004 until

July 25, 2005 -- two days before the limitations period expired --

when Petitioner filed his habeas petition in the state superior

court. Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling during the

entire time his state habeas petitions were pending from July 25,

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 11 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

2005 through August 24, 2007. The limitations period ordinarily

would have begun to run on again August 25, 2007; however,

Petitioner did not receive notice of the denial until August 28,

2007. Because Petitioner was diligent in obtaining notice of the

denial, he is entitled to equitable tolling during the four-day

delay. Even if the limitations period is equitably tolled from

August 30, 2007 through May 9, 2008 while Petitioner sought to

obtain his complete case file, the present petition is untimely

because it was filed more than three months past the expiration of

the limitations period. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable

tolling during the more than three-month delay from May 9, 2008

through August 20, 2008 because his pro se status and alleged lack

of access to the prison law library do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances beyond his control making it impossible to file his

federal petition on time. Accordingly, the present petition is

untimely, and the Court GRANTS Respondent's motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Respondent's

motion to dismiss the petition as untimely; the petition is hereby

DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate

all pending motions and shall enter judgment and close the file. 

This Order terminates Docket no. 8.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 2/16/10 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELIX A SALCIDO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JAMES A YATES et al,

Defendant.

 /

Case Number: CV08-04083 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on February 16, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Felix A. Salcido T-38674

Pleasant Valley State Prison

Facility D, D3-124

P.O. Box 8504

Coalinga, CA 93210

Dated: February 16, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:08-cv-04083-CW Document 13 Filed 02/16/10 Page 13 of 13