Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05195/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05195-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Henke

Wanda Henke
Appellee
National Science Foundation
Appellant
United States Department of Commerce
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 19, 1996 Decided May 17, 1996

No. 95-5195

WANDA HENKE,

APPELLEE

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv00189)

Wendy M. Keats, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellants,

with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Leonard Schaitman, Attorney and Eric

H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, were on the briefs.

Eric R. Glitzenstein argued the cause for appellee, with whom Katherine A. Meyer was on the brief.

Before: WALD, GINSBURG and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is whether the Department of Commerce's

Advanced Technology Program("ATP") maintains a "systemofrecords" containing "records" about

appellee Wanda Henke, within the meaning of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994) ("Act").

Henke isthe President and co-owner of Dynamic In Situ GeotechnicalTesting, Inc. ("Dynamic")a

company which develops earthquake engineering technology. Between 1990 and 1992 Dynamic

submitted three applicationsfor competitive high-technologygrantsfromthe ATP, each ofwhichwas

reviewed by technology and business experts as well as members of the ATP staff, and each of which

was denied funding. Although the ATP provided Henke with oral summaries of the reviewers'

comments, it declined to release copies of the actual reviews or evaluations. Henke then filed a

request under the Privacy Act, seeking disclosure of the reviews. The ATP continued to refuse to

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disclose the reviews, claiming that it did not maintain a "systemofrecords" within the meaning of the

Privacy Act, because it did not systematically file and retrieve information about individuals which

was indexed by their names. Henke, however, argued that the ATP's groups of paper files and

computer databases fell within the Act's definition.

Under the ATP's computer system, when grant proposals are received, an ATP employee

enters administrative information (e.g., name ofcompany, address, telephone number, e-mail address,

technology area of the proposal, name of contact person) into a database for that proposal. In each

of Dynamic's three proposals, Henke had listed herself as Dynamic's contact person, and her name

was entered in that field. Henke thus argued that a system of records existed because it was possible

for anATP employee to enter "Wanda Henke" into the computer, have the computersearch for every

proposal in which Henke waslisted as a contact person, and then use the proposal numbersto go into

the ATP'sfile room, find those proposals, and obtain information which was arguably "about" Henke

(since she happened to be one of two scientists at Dynamic). The ATP acknowledged that while it

could theoretically retrieve information this way, it did not in practice use the system that way, but

instead used the computer databasesfor routine administrative purposes,such as organizing the peer

reviews by the type of technology involved.

The district court, however, agreed with Henke that the ATP's retrieval capability was

sufficient to create a systemofrecords keyed to individuals. It ruled that while the text of the Privacy

Act was inconclusive on the retrieval capability point, the Act's legislative history and policies

supported an expansive view of "system of records." We find, however, that not only is Henke's

position contrary to the plain language of the Privacy Act, but that it is also inconsistent with the

policies underlying the Act. We hold therefore that in the case of a program like the ATP which does

not have an investigatory function, which obtains the names of individuals only as an administrative

adjunct to a grant-making program focusing on businesses, and which has presented evidence that

it does not in practice use its system to retrieve information keyed to individuals, a "system of

records" does not exist with respect to those individuals. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of

the district court, and remand for the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the

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1Under the Act, a "system of records" is defined as "a group of any records under the control

of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some

identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual." 5 U.S.C. §

552a(a)(5).

The Act defines a "record" as "any item, collection, or grouping of information about an

individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial

transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or

the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a

finger or voice print or a photograph." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4). 

Department of Commerce.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Privacy Act

The Privacy Act of 1974 "safeguards the public from unwarranted collection, maintenance,

use and dissemination of personal information contained in agency records ... by allowing an

individual to participate in ensuring that his records are accurate and properly used." Bartel v.

F.A.A., 725 F.2d 1403, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1984). To that end, the Act requires any agency which

maintains a "system of records" to publish at least annually a statement in the Federal Register

describing that system.1 Such notice must include, among other things, "the name and location of the

system," the "categories of individuals on whom records are maintained in the system," the

"categories of users and purposes of their use," and "the policies and practices of the agency

regarding storage, retrievability, access controls, retention, and disposal of the records." 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(e)(4). In addition, any agency which maintains a system of records must

upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any information

pertaining to him which is contained in the system, permit him ... to review the record

and have a copymade of all or any portion thereof in a form comprehensible to him....

5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1).

The Privacy Actunlike the Freedom of Information Actdoes not have disclosure as its

primary goal. Rather, the main purpose of the Privacy Act's disclosure requirement is to allow

individuals on whom information is being compiled and retrieved the opportunity to review the

information and request that the agency correct any inaccuracies. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2)

(permitting individual to request amendment of her record due to inaccurate, irrelevant or incomplete

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2As Judge Sirica put it:

Properly understood, the right to access under section 3(d) [of the Privacy Act] is

aimed entirely at improving informational quality. This is in sharp contrast to

parallel rights guaranteed by the Freedom of Information Act. Unlike the FOIA,

access to agency records ... is not a statutory objective for its own sake. In

contrast to the FOIA, the right of access afforded by the Privacy Act is not

designed to free up public entry to the full range of government files. Rather,

access under the Privacy Act is merely a necessary adjunct to the broader objective

of assuring information quality by obtaining the views of persons with the interest

and ability to contribute to the accuracy of agency records.

Smiertka v. Dep't of Treasury, 447 F. Supp. 221, 226 (D.D.C. 1978), remanded on other

grounds, 604 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 

3The ATP program is established within the National Institute of Standards and Technology,

which is itself an entity within the Department of Commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 272(a). We follow

here the district court's convention of referring to the defendants/ appellants as "ATP." 

4Proposals are first screened to see if they meet the basic criteria for the competition (e.g.,

whether they comply with page limits, and whether they are from a business and not an

individual). Next, proposals are reviewed by technical experts (typically federal employees) and

experts in business fields (typically in the private sector). Reviewers answer a number of written

information).2 Agencies are, however, authorized to promulgate rules to exempt certain records

within a system from disclosure, such as "investigatory material compiled for law enforcement

purposes ... [or] investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability,

eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal contracts, or

access to classified information." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k).

B. Advanced Technology Program

The Department of Commerce's Advanced Technology Program was established in 1990 to

"improv[e] the competitive position of the United States and its businesses" by making grants to

American businesses to assist in the development of high-risk technologies. 15 U.S.C. § 278n; 15

C.F.R. Part 295.3 The ATP program accepts grant proposals only from businesses (or joint ventures

involving a business), and submitsthose proposalsto technical and business experts who review them

to determine whether the project has "the potential for eventual substantial widespread commercial

application," and whether the applying company has "the requisite ability in research and technology

development and management in the project area in which the grant, contract, or cooperative

agreement is being sought." 15 U.S.C. § 278n(d)(10); 15 C.F.R. § 295.3.4 Based on these

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questions (e.g., "How would you rate the quality and innovativeness of the proposed technical

program?"), and then rate each proposal on a scale of 1 to 10. See Declaration of Dennis Michael

Stogsdill ("Stogsdill Decl.") WW 5-10, reprinted in App. 26-28. 

5As of August 1994, there were ten databases in allone for each of the 10 ATP competitions

which had taken place since 1990. Stogsdill Decl. ¶ 19, reprinted in App. 32. 

recommendations and the program's budget constraints, the ATP makes a final decision on funding,

approving approximately 10% of all proposals. See Stogsdill Decl. ¶ 11, reprinted in App. 29.

The ATP maintains information about these proposals both in paper files and in a collection

of computer databasesneither of which the ATP has recognized as a "system of records." Each of

the paper files is labeled with a unique proposal number which identifies the year of the competition,

the specific competition number within that year, and the order in which the proposal was received

(e.g., "93-2-0018"). Each paper file contains the grant proposal itself, any business or technical

expert reviews, documentation from the ATP staff, debriefing worksheets, administrative checklists,

and copies of correspondence with the business. In short, the paper file contains the comprehensive

record of the proposal. The only way these files are indexed and retrieved is by their proposal

number. See generally Stogsdill Decl. WW 13-14, reprinted in App. 29-30.

In addition, the ATP maintainsfor each individual competition a separate computer database,

organized around approximately 70 different "fields." When a proposal arrives, an ATP employee

enters into those fields administrative information about the proposal such as the name of the

organization, its mailing address, its e-mail address, its telephone number, its fax number, whether

it is a for-profit organization, the congressional district ofthe business, whether the proposal contains

proprietary information, the type of technology involved in the proposal, whether it is a new or

revised proposal, andof greatest import herethe name of a "technical contact" at the applying

organization. See Stogsdill Decl. ¶ 15, reprinted in App. 30; ATP Database Information, reprinted

in App. 72-73.

These databases are designed to allow searching by fields. Thus, for example, if the ATP

wished to compile a list of every proposalsubmitted from Tennessee's Third Congressional District,

an ATP employee could go into each database,5enter the code for that district, and pull up a screen

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6The district court explained:

To find a proposal using the computer database, one would bring the cursor to the

"technical contact" or "business contact" field and ask the computer to search for a

certain arrangement of characters. If someone is listed as a contact person, the

computer can locate that name in the field. ATP personnel could then bring the

cursor back over to the proposal number field and find the proposal number

associated with that contact person's name. Since Wanda Henke is listed as a

"technical contact" for Dynamic, if her name is entered into the technical contact

field, her proposal number can be retrieved in a matter of seconds. With her

proposal number, the agency can retrieve her paper file.

Henke v. Dep't of Commerce, No. 94-189, Mem. op. at 8 ("Mem. op."), reprinted in App. 282. 

7We refer to these fields collectively as "contact person" fields. 

with all of the administrative information for each of those proposals. Similarly, the ATP could use

the databases to sort the proposals according to technology area, which would help the program

facilitate its technical reviews. See Stogsdill Decl. ¶ 16, reprinted in App. 31. The computer

databases contain only administrative information, and do not contain the text of the grant proposals,

technicalreviews, or any of the other information contained in the ATP's paper files. However, if an

authorized ATP employee were to perform a computer search and retrieve a proposal's number, the

employee could make note of that number, go to the paper files, and obtain that information.6

C. Dynamic's Proposals

Between 1990 and 1992, Dynamic submitted three proposals for ATP funding. In its 1990

proposal, Henke was listed as Dynamic's "contact person"one of the fields used in the databases.

In Dynamic's 1991 and 1992 proposals, Henke was listed as "technical contact," "business contact"

and "organizational representative," also fields in the databases.7

After each of Dynamic's proposals was denied, the ATP staff provided Henke with an

extensive oral debriefing discussing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposal as seen by

the reviewers and the ATP staff. Though the oral debriefings discussed some of the comments of the

reviewers and the ATP staff, none of those individuals was identified by name. The ATP did not

provide Henke with copies of the actual reviews or evaluations.

D. Henke's Litigation

In December, 1992, Wanda Henke and her husband Robert filed requests under the Freedom

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8The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the ATP with respect to Robert

Henke's claims because he had conceded that he was not listed in any of the databases' fields, and

thus the court concluded that ATP did not maintain a "system of records" on him. 

of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 522, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, for all

information in the possession of the ATP program relating to Dynamic, Wanda Henke, or Robert

Henke. The ATP refused to disclose the confidential technical and business reviews in Dynamic's files

under FOIA, citing its deliberative process and personal privacy exemptionsan issue which is not

the subject of this appeal. In addition, the ATP refused to disclose the information under the Privacy

Act, claiming that the computer databases did not constitute a "system of records" for purposes of

the Act, because it did not in practice use the computer system to retrieve information about Wanda

or Robert Henke which was indexed by either of their names. The Henkes then filed a Privacy Act

claim in the district court.8

After allowing limited discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Henke, finding that the ATP did in fact maintain a "system of records ... with respect to Wanda

Henke" and that the information she was seeking either "pertains to her or, in the alternative, is her

"record.' " Mem. op. at 3-4. As the district court put it, the goals of the Privacy Act would be

frustrated if the ATP were maintaining inaccurate information about Henke, yet she could not get

accessto that information. The district court expressed concern that the ATP's "approach could also

result in an anomaly wherein Privacy Act rights wax or wane depending on whether an agency

happens to be employing, at any particular moment, its existing computer capability to retrieve

records through the names of individuals." Mem. op. at 11-12.

Thus, the court rejected as immaterial the ATP's assertion that it did not in practice retrieve

information about individuals by using a contact person's name, finding instead that "an agency's

existing capability to retrieve information by reference to an individual's name creates a "system of

records.' " Mem. op. at 7 (emphasis added). Finding the text of the Privacy Act inconclusive on what

constitutes a "system of records," the court turned to the legislative history, in which it said it found

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9The court rejected the ATP's claim that the information in the paper files did not constitute a

"record" about Henke, finding that "a document need not be a "record' for an individual to have a

right of access to it.... [S]o long as information "pertains' to the requestor, and it is found in a

system of records, the requestor has a right of access to it." Mem. op. at 13. The court found

that since Henke "constitutes the full-time technical staff for Dynamic," comments about the

quality of Dynamic's staff would necessarily be comments which described her, and thus that she

was entitled to receive copies of the confidential peer reviews. Mem. op. at 14. 

10The district court did not, however, rely on the plain meaning of the Act, but instead based

its conclusion on the legislative history and policies behind the Act. 

no support for the ATP's "restrictive approach." Mem. op. at 11.9 Accordingly, the court ordered

the ATP to disclose the confidential peer reviews.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Meaning of a "System of Records"

We start with "the fundamental canon that statutory interpretation begins with the language

of the statute itself." Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58

(1990). In every case, however, we must recognize that "the meaning of statutory language, plain

or not, depends on context," King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991), a concern which

is brought into high relief here by the fact that the determination that a system of records exists

triggers virtuallyallofthe othersubstantive provisions ofthe PrivacyAct,such as an individual'sright

to receive copies and to request amendment of her records.

In this case, both Henke and the ATP argue that the statute's plain meaning supports their

respective constructions. Henke argues that the Act's language clearly supports the district court's

conclusion that an agency maintains a system of records where it has the capability to retrieve

information about an individual which is indexed under her name.10 The ATP argues the opposite,

claiming that the Act's statement that a system exists if information keyed to an individual "is

retrieved" by the agency meansthat unless an agency has an actual practice of retrieving information

by an individual's name, there is no system of records.

Henke'stextual argument is unconvincing, for it does not take account ofCongress' definition

of a system of records as a "group of records ... from which information is retrieved by the name of

the individual...." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (emphasis added). Henke's argument would be stronger if

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11Henke seeks to bolster her textual claim by pointing us toward section (e)(4) of the Act,

which requires agencies, when they promulgate their notice of their system of records to publish

"the policies and practices of the agency regarding storage, retrievability, access controls,

retention, and disposal of the records." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4) (emphasis suggested by Henke). 

Because the Act requires agencies to explain their retrievability policies, Henke argues,

retrievability (as opposed to actual retrieval) should be the standard for determining whether a

system of records exists. However, section (e)(4) only requires the agency to describe its

"policies and practices" regarding retrievability, not to discuss every potential information

retrieval that could be accomplished through use of the system. 

Congress had used words which more clearly suggested that retrieval capability would be enough

to create a system of recordssomething individual Members of Congress had in fact attempted to

do in other billsintroduced before the enactment ofthe PrivacyAct. The Records Disclosure Privacy

Act of 1974, for example, would have applied where an agency "maintains records ... which may be

retrieved by reference to, or are indexed under such person's name...." H.R. 12206, 93d Cong., 2d

Sess (1974) (emphasis added). And another bill introduced later that year would have applied to

informationwhichwas "computer-accessible ormanual-accessible," words clearly connoting retrieval

capability. H.R. 13872, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (emphasis added). But in the Privacy Act itself,

Congress used the words "is retrieved," which suggest strongly that a group of records should

generally not be considered a system of records unless there is actual retrieval of records keyed to

individuals.11

Not surprisingly, therefore, this court and others have previously concluded that retrieval

capability is not sufficient to create a system of records. See, e.g., Bartel v. F.A.A., 725 F.2d at 1408

n.10 ("To be in a system of records, a record must ... in practice [be] retrieved by an individual's

name or other personal identifier.") (emphasis added); Baker v. Dep't of Navy, 814 F.2d 1381, 1383

(9th Cir.) (deferring to a Navy Regulation stating that a " "system of records' is ... [a] group of

recordsfromwhich information "is', as opposed to "can be', retrieved by the name ofthe individual"),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987). While Bartel did not focus on the definition of a system of

records, our statement there tends to deflate Henke's claim that under the plain language of the

statute, retrieval capability is enough to transform a group of records into a system of records.

The ATP's construction, on the other hand, is more consistent not only with the language of

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12The ATP's position is also consistent with that of the Office of Management and Budget

("OMB"), whose guidelines, we have found, are "owed the deference usually accorded

interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration...." Albright v. United

States, 631 F.2d 915, 919-20 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Addressing the meaning of "system of

records," OMB said:

The definition of "system of records" limits the applicability of some of the

provisions of the Act to "records" which are maintained by an agency, retrieved by

individual identifier (i.e., there is an indexing or retrievel [sic] capability using

identifying particulars, as discussed above, built into the system), and the agency

does, in fact, retrieve records about individuals by reference to some personal

identifier.

Privacy Act Guidelines, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974:

SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY 1027 (1976) ("SOURCE BOOK") (emphasis in original). Thus, the

OMB guidelines make it clear that it is not sufficient that an agency has the capability to retrieve

information indexed under a person's name, but the agency must in fact retrieve records in this

way in order for a system of records to exist. Moreover, OMB went on to address the

applicability of the Act to a hypothetical situation almost identical to the one we are faced with

here:

The "are retrieved by" criterion implies that the grouping of records under the

control of an agency is accessed by the agency by use of a personal identifier; not

merely that a capability or potential for retrieval exists. For example, an agency

record-keeping system on firms it regulates may contain "records" (i.e., personal

information) about officers of the firm incident to evaluating the firm's

performance. Even though these are clearly "records" "under the control of " an

agency, they would not be considered part of a system as defined by the Act unless

the agency accessed them by reference to a personal identifier (name, etc.). That

is, if these hypothetical "records" are never retrieved except by reference to

company identifier or some other nonpersonal indexing scheme (e.g. type of firm)

they are not a part of a system of records.

Id., reprinted in SOURCE BOOK at 1028. 

the statute but with the policies underlying the Act.12 As discussed above, the ATP's interpretation

takes account of Congress' use of the words "is retrieved" in the statute. Moreover, as the ATP

points out, under Henke'stheory that mere retrieval capability creates a systemofrecords, an agency

faces the threat of being found retrospectively to be maintaining a system of records it did not even

know existed, simply by dint of a potential use it neither engaged in nor contemplated. This in turn

would create serious compliance problems for the agency, because if it had not recognized that it

maintained a system of records and had therefore not published notice of its system in the Federal

Register, then neither would it have followed the procedures necessary to invoke the exemptions in

the Privacy Act which Congress intended to protect disclosure of national security information,

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13One definition of "system" is "a complex unity formed of many often diverse parts subject to

a common plan or serving a common purpose." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY 2322 (1976) (emphasis added). 

confidential law enforcement information, or other information from confidential sources. See 5

U.S.C. §§ 552a(j), (k). Indeed, were we to find that the ATP was maintaining a system of records

here, the agency would not be entitled to invoke exemption (k)(5) of the Act, which protects the

disclosure of "investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining eligibility for ...

Federal contracts," because not knowing that it has a system of records keyed to technical contacts,

the ATP has never published the necessary rules to invoke this exemption. Cf. Henke v. Dep't of

Commerce, No. 95-5181, __ F.3d __ (D.C. Cir. 1996) (NSF has acknowledged that it has a system

of records and has promulgated the necessary rules to invoke the section (k)(5) exemption).

This is not to suggest that an agency may simply refuse to acknowledge that it maintains a

system of records and thereby insulate itself from the reach of the Privacy Act. To the contrary, if

there is evidence that an agency in practice retrieves information about individuals by reference to

their names, the mere fact that the agency has not acknowledged that it operates a system of records

will not protect it from the statutory consequences of its actions. On the other hand, there is no

magic number of incidental or ad hoc retrievals by reference to an individual's name which will

transform a group of records into a system of records keyed to individuals.

One factor in deciding whether such a system exists, obviously, is the purpose for which the

information on individuals is being gathered, an approach which is consistent with Congress'

distinction between a mere group of records and a system of records.13 Thus, as in the case with the

ATP program, where information about individualsis onlybeing gathered as anadministrative adjunct

to a grant-making programwhich focuses on businesses and where the agencyhas presented evidence

that it has no practice ofretrieving information keyed to individuals, the agency should not be viewed

as maintaining a system of records. On the other hand, where an agencysuch as the FBIis

compiling information about individuals primarily for investigatory purposes, Privacy Act concerns

are at their zenith, and ifthere is evidence of even a few retrievals of information keyed to individuals'

names, it may well be the case that the agency is maintaining a system of records. We hold therefore

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14Henke points to two occasions on which a member of the ATP staff retrieved Dynamic's

proposal number given only the name of the company and Henke's name. See Rule 56(f) Affidavit

of Wanda Henke ("Henke Aff."), reprinted in App. 121. These retrievals were, however,

performed entirely at Henke's request, and while they support the conceded point that the ATP

has the ability to retrieve a proposal number given the proposal's administrative information, we

do not agree that these two searches seriously weaken the ATP's claim that it does not in practice

retrieve information keyed to individuals. 

15This situation stands in contrast to the grant programs administered by the National Science

Foundation ("NSF"), which gives grants both to businesses and individuals. NSF grants are

frequently structured around a lead scientist or "principal investigator," who is more than just an

administrative contact. In this sort of situation, an evaluation of a grant application will often

address the qualifications of the "principal investigator," and the NSF will routinely retrieve

information about principal investigators by those individuals' names. Not surprisingly, therefore,

the NSF has in fact designated its principal investigator files as a Privacy Act system of records. 

See 45 C.F.R. § 613.6(a); Henke v. Dep't of Commerce, ___ F.3d ___, ___ n.1, Slip op. at 4 n.1. 

that in determining whether an agency maintains a system of records keyed to individuals, the court

should view the entirety of the situation, including the agency's function, the purpose for which the

information was gathered, and the agency's actual retrieval practice and policies.

B. Applying this Test

The finalquestion is whetherthe ATP wasin fact maintaining a systemofrecords with respect

to Henke. As we have suggested above, the fact that the ATP's purpose in requesting the name of

a technical contact was essentially administrative and was not necessary to the conduct of any of the

ATP's core programmatic purposes weighs strongly against allowing a few isolated incidents of

retrieval to transform the group of records contained in its paper files and computer databases into

a system of records about Henke.14 The ATP gives grants to businesses, not to individuals, and does

not maintain its computer database in order to retrieve information on individuals.

Henke has not seriously disputed the ATP's assertion that an applicant's prospects for

receiving a grant will not turn on who it names as a technical contact, nor doesshe dispute the ATP's

claim that the "technical contact" designated by the company applying for an ATP grant need not be

responsible for directing any part of the project. As the ATP argues, "[t]he company could choose

anyoneany scientist, technician, patent expert, grants expert, an outside consultant who may have

assisted in preparing the proposal.... The ATP program takes no notice, one way or the other, of any

individual characteristics of the "contact' person chosen." Appellant's Reply Brief at 8.15Indeed, in

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16In light of our disposition of this case we do not reach the disputed issue of whether the peer

reviews constituted Henke's "records" for purposes of the Privacy Act. 

1990, the first year of the ATP competitions, the ATP did not ask applicants for a "business" or

"technical" contact, but instead asked them only to designate "the person to be contacted on matters

involving this application." Stogsdill Decl. ¶ 29, reprinted in App. 35.

Henke does argue that in her experience, technical contacts are likelyto be scientists, and thus

reviews which focus on the quality of a company's "staff " are likely to be "about" the technical

contacts. See Henke Aff. at 3, reprinted in App. 123. Even if this assertion is true, the record

indicates conclusively that the ATP's purpose in requesting the name of a technical contact is

essentially administrative and is not even necessary for the conduct of the ATP's operations. Put

another way, the ATP program's substantive interests would not be affected (though it might run a

bit less efficiently) if it only requested a phone number or fax number as a contact point rather than

the name of a contact person. Consequently, we find that in the absence of any evidence that the

names of contact persons are used regularly or even frequently to obtain information about those

persons, the ATP does not maintain a system of records keyed to individuals listed in the contact

person fields of its databases.16

III. CONCLUSION

We find that the ATP does not currentlymaintain a "systemofrecords" with respect to Henke

for purposes of the Privacy Act. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court and

remand the case for the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the Department of

Commerce.

So ordered.

USCA Case #95-5195 Document #200365 Filed: 05/17/1996 Page 13 of 13