Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01945/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01945-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Motor Vehicles
Defendant
Gary Goethe
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to Rule or 1

Rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY GOETHE, No. 2:07-cv-01945-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief against

Defendant, the State of California, Department of Motor Vehicles,

(“Defendant”) for racial discrimination claims arising under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et

seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Defendant now

moves to dismiss the First Cause of Action, Plaintiff’s disparate

impact claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) on grounds that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the 1

claim. 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefings. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

Defendant also moves to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action,

Plaintiff’s racial discrimination and retaliation claim, and the

Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy to

interfere with civil rights, for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

Additionally, Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s allegations

relating to events occurring prior to December 2006 pursuant to

Rule 12(f). For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion to

dismiss will be granted.2

BACKGROUND

The Court has previously set forth a factual background for

this action in its Order of February 20, 2008, which is

incorporated by reference and need not be reproduced herein. 

Mem. & Order 2-4, February 20, 2008.

On February 20, 2008, this Court dismissed without prejudice

the First, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action in Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Plaintiff filed his Second

Amended Complaint(“SAC”) on March 13, 2008.

Plaintiff alleges five causes of action in his SAC:

1) Disparate Impact Discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a);

2) Disparate Treatment Discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a);

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3

3) Retaliation for Engaging in a Protected Activity in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a); 4) Racial Discrimination and Retaliation in violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1981; 5) Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Defendant filed the current Motion to Dismiss challenging

the First Cause of Action in its entirety because Plaintiff

failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies. 

Defendant further challenges the Fourth and Fifth Causes of

Action in their entirety, arguing that those claims are barred by

the Eleventh Amendment. Additionally, Defendant filed a motion

to strike, under Rule 12(f), Plaintiff’s allegations contained in

paragraphs 11-14 and 54 of the SAC.

Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff’s disparate treatment

or retaliation claims.

STANDARD

1. Rule 12(b)(1)

In moving to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(1), the challenging party may either make

a “facial attack” on the allegations of jurisdiction contained in

the complaint or can instead take issue with subject-matter

jurisdiction on a factual basis (“factual attack”). Thornhill

Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733

(9th Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549

F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). 

///

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4

If the motion constitutes a facial attack, the Court must

consider the factual allegations of the complaint to be true. 

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981);

Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. If the motion constitutes a factual

attack, however, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to

plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material

facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for

itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d

at 733 (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). 

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitlement to

relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65

(2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

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Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level. Id. at 1965 (citing 5 C. Wright &

A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d

ed. 2004) (“The pleading must contain something more . . . than .

. . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a

legally cognizable right of action”).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should

“freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of . . . the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to

amend is only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of

the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow

Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

2. Rule 12(f)

The Court may strike “from any pleading any insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “(T)he function of a 12(f)

motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money

that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing

with those issues prior to trial....” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H.

Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Immaterial matter

is that which has no essential or important relationship to the

claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded. 

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6

Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.

1993)(rev’d on other grounds Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S.

517, 114 S. Ct. 1023, 127 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1994))(internal

citations and quotations omitted). Impertinent matter consists

of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the

issues in question. Id.

ANALYSIS

1. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Title VII requires Plaintiff to exhaust his administrative

remedies prior to seeking relief in this court. Equal Employment

Opportunity Comm’n v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th

Cir. 1994). However, this Court does have jurisdiction over

claims not included in the administrative charge if they are like

or reasonably related to included claims. B.K.B. v. Maui Police

Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002). Jurisdiction extends

to claims that “[fall] within the scope of the EEOC’s actual

investigation or an EEOC investigation which can reasonably be

expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Farmer

Bros. at 899 (internal quotations and citations omitted)(emphasis

in original).

Exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a

civil suit. Macy v. Dalton, 853 F. Supp. 350, 356-357 (E.D. Cal.

1994). Therefore, this Court will treat Defendant’s motion as a

Rule 12(b)(1) challenge to its subject-matter jurisdiction. The

Court is not limited “to the face of the pleadings and can

consider any evidence.” 

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 “A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 3

reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known

within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or

(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to

sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned...A court

shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied

with the necessary information...judicial notice may be taken at

any stage of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), (d), (f).

7

McCarthy v. U.S., 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). More

specifically, this court may consider “affidavits or any other

evidence outside the pleadings that is properly before the

court.” St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir.

1989) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff admits he bears the burden of proving this Court

has jurisdiction over his claims. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. Of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). Despite this, Plaintiff failed

to file a copy of his EEOC Charge with his SAC. Additionally, in

his SAC, Plaintiff refers to a right-to-sue letter issued by the

EEOC as “Exhibit A”, but there is no Exhibit A, nor is there a

right-to-sue letter attached to the SAC. However, because the

Court may consider any evidence properly before it, and the

Plaintiff has not objected to Defendant’s request that the Court

take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Charge, original Complaint,

FAC containing a right-to-sue letter attached thereto as Exhibit

A, and the Memorandum and Order previously issued in this case on

February 20, 2008, the Court will take notice of these documents

in its analysis. Defendant’s request that this Court take

judicial notice of Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge along with the

Complaint, FAC, and Memorandum and Order is GRANTED pursuant to

Federal Rule of Evidence 201.3

///

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8

The Court has previously set forth its analysis of the law

as applied to Plaintiff’s disparate impact claim in his FAC and

his EEOC Charge of Discrimination number 555-2006-01115

(“Charge”) in its Order of February 20, 2008. Mem. & Order 6-14,

February 20, 2008. In granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss,

this Court found that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies because Plaintiff did not plead facts

that would have lead to an investigation of the disparate impact

claim. Instead, the Court found that Plaintiff alleged only that

he suffered from instances of individual racial discrimination

and that he was denied promotional opportunities in retaliation

for prior complaints. He stated that he had been treated less

favorably because of his race and implied that his supervisors

operated with discriminatory intent. Therefore, this Court

granted the Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend.

Plaintiff now contends that he exhausted his administrative

remedies and the EEOC unilaterally excluded the disparate impact

claim from his Charge. Although an EEOC charge may substantially

condense and edit a plaintiff’s complaint, the complaint’s

theory, not the agency’s drafting, is dispositive. Anthony v.

County of Sacramento, 898 F. Supp. 1435, 1443 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 

If the EEOC charge is deficient in recording the theory of the

case, and the deficiency results from negligence by the EEOC

representative who completes the charge form, then the plaintiff

may present his pre-complaint questionnaire as evidence that the

claim was properly exhausted. Id.; B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1102. 

///

///

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9

In B.K.B., the court noted that “because the charge is

intended to satisfy the dual purpose of establishing notice of

the complainant’s claims both to the agency and to the named

respondent, review of a plaintiff’s pre-complaint questionnaire

in order to determine the scope of the charge may impair part of

its statutory purpose.” Id. at 1101 (emphasis in original). Due

to this concern, the court only looks to the questionnaire when

the failure of notification is due to agency negligence. Id. at

1101-02. The B.K.B. Court determined that, although not included

in the charge, the Plaintiff had exhausted her claims because

evidence presented showed the absence of the claim was due to a

“clerical error.” Id. at 1102-03. Because of the Court’s prior

ruling on the Charge’s lack of a disparate impact claim,

Plaintiff must show that such a claim was included in the

complaint filed with the EEOC, and it was negligently excluded

from the Charge.

Once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss

into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence

properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion

must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy

its burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. OrdonezGaray v. Chertoff, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76434 *6 (E.D. Cal.

2007). The requirement is not unlike summary judgment under

Rule 56, where the non-moving party must present evidence to

defeat the motion. Frasure v. U.S., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184

(D. Nev. 2003) (citing Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft

Indus., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

///

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 Specifically, the exhibits include excerpts from 4

Exhibit 4, including an email sent to Defendant (“Exhibit 1”), a

letter from Defendant to the State Personnel Board (“Exhibit 2”),

and a signed letter from the EEOC (“Exhibit 3”).

 Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) requires “authentication 5

or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility.” 

Thus, a proper foundation is laid when there is “evidence

sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is

what its proponent claims.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).

10

In response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff

filed a number of exhibits, including his entire EEOC Claim

(“Exhibit 4”). Plaintiff contends that the exhibits show that 4

he exhausted his disparate impact claim in his EEOC Claim because

the EEOC was on notice of his intentions, and the claim was

unilaterally excluded from his Charge by the EEOC. However, the

authenticity of the Claim (Exhibit 4), as a whole, was not shown,

and because Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 are said to be part of Exhibit 4

their significance lies in Exhibit 4 being properly

authenticated. It follows that the proper evidentiary foundation

for these documents must be established before they can be

considered by this Court. Because the authenticity of the 5

exhibits cannot be established from the documents filed, the

Court will not consider them in its decision.

In Plaintiff’s SAC, he relies on the same EEOC Charge that

he relied upon in his FAC to show that he exhausted his

administrative remedies for his disparate impact claim. 

Plaintiff’s additional exhibits are not properly before the

Court; however, these documents may only be relevant if the EEOC

agent was somehow negligent in his or her duties. 

///

///

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11

Because the Court will not consider the Plaintiff’s Exhibits, it

is left to consider the same Charge that it considered in the

FAC, and for the reasons noted in the Memorandum and Order dated

February 20, 2008, and summarized above, this Court does not have

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action. Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend. In granting

leave to amend, the Plaintiff is cautioned that any further

failure to plead all of the necessary facts will cause the Court

to dismiss this claim with prejudice.

2. Sovereign Immunity

Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Causes of

Action, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985 respectively, on

Eleventh Amendment grounds. Plaintiff does not oppose

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to the Fourth and

Fifth Causes of Action. The law clearly supports Defendant’s

Motion and the Court will briefly address why it is precluded

from hearing these claims.

The Eleventh Amendment is an affirmative defense and

dismissal pursuant to the doctrine is not based on subject matter

jurisdiction. Elwood v. Drescher, 456 f.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir.

2006) (citing Miles v. California, 320 F.3d 986, 988-989 (9th

Cir. 2003)). Therefore, this Court will address Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and

1985 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Stoner v. Santa Clara County

Office of Educ., 502 f.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2007).

///

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12

Though the Eleventh Amendment expressly applies only to

suits against a state by citizens of another state, it is well

established that suits against a state by its own citizens are

prohibited as well. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984). Even when all allegations of material

fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable

to the Plaintiff, this Court is precluded from hearing those

claims. 

Under the sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh

Amendment, section 1981 does not create a cause of action against

an unconsenting state by its citizens. Pittman v. Oregon

Employment Dep’t., 509 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007). In this

case, Plaintiff is suing the California Department of Motor

Vehicles (“DMV”), a state-run department. ITSI T.V. Productions,

Inc. v. Cal. Exposition and State Fair, 3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir.

1993). Because there is nothing to suggest that the DMV

consented to the section 1981 claim, it is immune under the

Eleventh Amendment. Therefore Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action is GRANTED with leave to amend

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

One cannot state a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985

in the absence of a claim for deprivation of rights under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Caldeira v. County of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1182

(9th Cir. 1989). An unconsenting state may not be sued under

section 1983 because Congress did not abrogate the States’

Eleventh Amendment immunity when enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will

v. Michigan Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989). 

///

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 The Court need not decide the motion to strike 6

paragraph 54 of Plaintiff’s SAC because that claim, as part of

Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action, was already dismissed in this

order.

13

In the present case Plaintiff fails to, and cannot, allege a

claim under section 1983. Therefore, his section 1985 claim

necessarily fails and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED

with leave to amend pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

3. Motion to Strike

As noted before, the Court may strike “from any pleading any

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent,

or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Defendant

contends, and Plaintiff agrees, that the SAC contains time-barred

allegations. However, time-barred allegations may be used as

“background evidence in support of a timely claim.” Nat’l R.R.

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). Plaintiff’s

time-barred allegations in paragraphs 11-15 of the SAC provide

background information pertaining to Plaintiff’s employment with

the DMV, and they are not part of the causes of action within the

actual claims that are before this Court. Therefore Plaintiff’s 6

Motion to Strike under Rule 12(f) is DENIED.

///

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///

///

///

///

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CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Cause of

Action is GRANTED with leave to amend under Rule 12(b)(1). 

Plaintiff is cautioned that another failure to plead all of the

necessary facts will cause the Court to dismiss with prejudice. 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Causes

of Action is GRANTED with leave to amend under Rule 12(b)(6). 

Plaintiff is directed to file a Third Amended Complaint, should

he choose to do so, not later than thirty (30) days following the

date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 18, 2008

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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