Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01237/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01237-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dexter L. Davis
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DEXTER L. DAVIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1237

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00162-LKG, Judge Lydia Kay 

Griggsby.

______________________ 

Decided: March 14, 2016

______________________ 

DEXTER L. DAVIS, Sondheimer, LA, pro se.

DELISA SANCHEZ, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., STEVEN J.

GILLINGHAM; JUAN CARLOS ALARCON, Office of General 

Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

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2 DAVIS v. US

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Dexter L. Davis appeals from a decision of the United 

States Court of Federal Claims dismissing his claims for 

lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1500 and for failure 

to state a claim under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the 

Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims 

(“RCFC”). Because the Court of Federal Claims correctly 

found that jurisdiction is improper, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Davis is a farmer residing in Louisiana. On December 2, 2010, Mr. Davis submitted an application for a 

subordinated loan from the Farm Service Agency (“FSA”). 

On February 24, 2011, the FSA formally denied his request. 

On March 2, 2011, Mr. Davis appealed the FSA’s denial to the United States Department of Agriculture 

(“USDA”) Appeals Division, alleging that he had been 

racially discriminated against and that the FSA’s denial 

failed to meet the timing requirements for loan applications under 7 C.F.R. § 764.53(c). The Division dismissed 

his appeal. 

On November 20, 2014, Mr. Davis filed a complaint in 

the United States District Court for the Western District 

of Louisiana, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 

1985, 1986, 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(f), the Administrative 

Procedure Act, and the 14th Amendment, as well as a 

claim for “fraud.” As defendants, the complaint named 

United States Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack in his 

official capacity and four other government officials in 

their individual capacities: Chris Beyerhelm, Chief Deputy Administrator of the USDA; Willie Cooper, State 

Executive Director of the FSA; Brad Smith, FSA Farm 

Case: 16-1237 Document: 12-2 Page: 2 Filed: 03/14/2016
DAVIS v. US 3

Loan Chief; and Steve Dooley, a local agent at the FSA. 

On August 21, 2015, the district court dismissed Mr. 

Davis’s claims with prejudice. 

In the interim, on February 23, 2015, Mr. Davis initiated the instant case, filing a complaint in the Court of 

Federal Claims. The complaint names the United States 

as defendant and asserts claims for breach of contract, 

breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

unjust enrichment, takings, trademark infringement,

breach of fiduciary duty, and instrumentals. Apart from 

jurisdictional allegations and the named causes of action, 

the complaint—including the entirety of its factual allegations in paragraphs 3 through 75—was identical to the 

Western District of Louisiana complaint. Compare J.A. 4-

22, with J.A. 78-96. 

On April 24, 2015, the government moved to dismiss 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant 

to RCFC 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). On September 10, 2015, 

the Court of Federal Claims granted the government’s 

motion to dismiss, finding that it was jurisdictionally 

barred under 28 U.S.C. § 1500. It also found that, even if 

it could overcome the jurisdictional hurdle of § 1500, it 

must still dismiss Mr. Davis’s case under RCFC 12(b)(6) 

because Mr. Davis failed to state any plausible claim for 

which relief could be granted. 

Mr. Davis timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

DISCUSSION

We review a Court of Federal Claims decision to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. 

Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 

1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the eviCase: 16-1237 Document: 12-2 Page: 3 Filed: 03/14/2016
4 DAVIS v. US

dence. Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed.

Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1500, the Court of Federal Claims 

may not exercise jurisdiction when a related action is 

pending in another court. The statute provides:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall 

not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect 

to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending 

in any other court any suit or process against the 

United States or any person who, at the time 

when the cause of action alleged in such suit or 

process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or 

professing to act, directly or indirectly under the 

authority of the United States. 

28 U.S.C. § 1500. Determining whether § 1500 applies 

involves two inquiries: “(1) whether there is an earlierfiled ‘suit or process’ pending in another court, and, if so, 

(2) whether the claims asserted in the earlier-filed case 

are ‘for or in respect to’ the same claim(s) asserted in the 

later-filed Court of Federal Claims action.” Brandt v. 

United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 

With respect to the first inquiry, whether an earlierfiled suit is “pending” is determined at the time the complaint is filed at the Court of Federal Claims. Id. at 1375. 

Mr. Davis’s Western District of Louisiana suit was pending on February 23, 2015, the date he filed his complaint 

with the Court of Federal Claims. Accordingly, we answer the first inquiry in the affirmative.

With respect to the second inquiry, two lawsuits are 

“for or in respect to” the same claim(s) if “they are based 

on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of 

the relief sought in each suit.” United States v. Tohono 

O’Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 310 (2011). Apart from 

jurisdictional allegations, the entire set of facts alleged in 

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DAVIS v. US 5

Mr. Davis’s Court of Federal Claims complaint (paragraphs 3 through 75) are word-for-word identical to the 

set of facts alleged in his Western District of Louisiana 

complaint. Compare J.A. 4-23, with J.A. 78-96. Quite 

literally, his suit in the Court of Federal Claims is “based 

on substantially the same operative facts,” and we must 

also answer the second inquiry in the affirmative.

Mr. Davis argues that the Court of Federal Claims 

erred in dismissing his claims because he sued federal 

employees in their individual capacity in the Western 

District of Louisiana, but sued the government in the 

Court of Federal Claims. We disagree. As the Supreme 

Court recognized, “[t]he [Court of Federal Claims] bar 

applies even where the other action is not against the 

Government but instead against a ‘person who, at the 

time when the cause of action alleged in such suit or 

process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or professing 

to act, directly or indirectly under the authority of the 

United States.’” Tohono O’Odham Nation, 563 U.S. at 

312. Here, all of the allegations that Mr. Davis makes 

with respect to the four individuals he sued (Messrs. 

Beyerhelm, Cooper, Smith, and Dooley) relate to actions 

that were performed in their capacity as government 

officials. See, e.g., J.A. 9-11, 17-21 (Complaint ¶¶ 30-33, 

35, 39, 41, 69, 73-75). For example, Mr. Davis alleges that 

Mr. Dooley elected to not grant his subordination, but 

instead referred his application to Mr. Smith. J.A. 9 

(Complaint ¶ 30). Thus, Mr. Davis’s Court of Federal 

Claims suit is against individuals who were “acting or 

professing to act . . . under the authority of the United 

States.” Section 1500 applies.

Mr. Davis also complains that the Court of Federal 

Claims failed to consider the Tucker Act. This is not true. 

The Court of Federal Claims acknowledged the Tucker 

Act in its opinion, but then concluded that its jurisdiction 

was nevertheless barred under § 1500. J.A. 103-07.

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6 DAVIS v. US

We have carefully considered the remainder of Mr. 

Davis’s arguments and have determined that they lack 

merit. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of 

Federal Claims’ decision that its jurisdiction was barred 

under § 1500. Because we can affirm the Court of Federal 

Claims’ dismissal on these grounds, we need not reach the 

remaining issues discussed in its decision, including its 

dismissals under RCFC 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

AFFIRMED

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