Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-03023/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-03023-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Navy Novikoff
Plaintiff
United States
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN NAVY NOVIKOFF,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

No. 2:11-cv-03023-MCE-EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

John Navy Novikoff (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against the United States of 

America (“Defendant”), seeking damages for Defendant’s willful failure to guard or warn

of a dangerous condition located on its property in violation of California Civil Code 

section 846. Currently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(“Motion”). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.

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 1 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(g).

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BACKGROUND2

This action stems from a bicycle 

accident that occurred in September 2009 

when Plaintiff crashed into a fence enclosure 

while participating in a time trial race on a path 

adjacent to a canal. (Mem. of P.&A. in Supp. 

of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 34-1 at 

4.)3 An entity unrelated to Defendant 

organized the race. Defendant issued a 

permit, however, allowing the race to be 

conducted on the path it owns and maintains. 

(ECF No. 34-1 at 4; Pl.’s Dep. Tr. Excerpts, ECF No. 39 at 8). While the path is a 

maintenance road for the adjacent canal, it is also open for public use, including for

walking, running and cycling. (EFC No. 34-1 at 4.) Defendant uses the canal to 

transport water and uses the path to maintain the canal and requisite water transporting 

equipment. (Exs. Supporting Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 34-3 at 23.) 

On the portion of the path where Plaintiff’s accident occurred, Defendant had 

installed, approximately forty years ago, a bright yellow head gate, which is a large metal 

fixture used to withdraw water from the canal. Id. (ECF No. 39 at 20.) The head gate 

protrudes into the path and is surrounded by a chain link fence (hereafter “Enclosure”)

intended to restrict the public’s access to the head gate itself. 

 2 The facts are taken, sometimes verbatim, from Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts. (ECF 

No. 36.) Also included is a copy of a photograph that Plaintiff submitted of the relevant portion of 

Defendant’s property. Use of the photograph is intended to add clarity to the Court’s physical description. 

(ECF No. 34-1 at 13.) 

3 Time trials are generally conducted so that riders race only the clock, entering the course at 

staggered starting times so that they do not encounter each other while racing. (Expert Witness 

Disclosures Ex. 1, ECF No. 30-1 at 2.)

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(Expert Witness Disclosures Ex. 3, ECF No. 30-3 at 11).4 The fence that surrounds the 

head gate juts out at a ninety degree angle from the canal and therefore sits 

perpendicular to the path. Id. The entire enclosure protrudes into the path 

approximately five feet. Id. at 3.

At the time of the accident, the head gate itself was painted bright yellow and the 

fence along the path and Enclosure was gray. (ECF No. 34-1 at 4; Opp’n to Mot. for 

Summ. J., ECF No. 37 at 6.) At some point in the past, Defendant had painted the

enclosure fence white and placed white object markers with reflectors on the fence in 

both directions. (ECF No. 37 at 6.) However, over time, the white paint on the 

Enclosure faded away, so the fence was gray at the time of the accident. In addition, the 

reflector facing the direction from which Plaintiff was traveling had long since fallen off. 

(ECF No. 30-3 at 4-5; Expert Witness Disclosures Ex. 2, ECF No. 30-2 at 13.) 

Moreover, in 2005, Defendant had contracted to have the path maintained and had 

specified in that maintenance contract that the CalTrans street and road standards were 

to be used, but those standards were not followed. (ECF No. 37 at 6.) 

Ultimately, while racing in his time trial, Plaintiff rode directly into the Enclosure at 

a high rate of speed. He suffered a concussion, contusions and lacerations to his right 

shoulder, multiple fractures of his left hand and lacerations and other injuries to his right 

leg. (ECF No. 34-1 at 4; Expert Witness Disclosures Ex. 5, ECF 30-5 at 2-3.) Prior to 

Plaintiff’s accident, no accidents related to the Enclosure had been reported. (ECF 

No. 34-1 at 4.) 

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 4 Defendant objects to the Court considering Plaintiff’s expert reports because the reports are 

unsworn and therefore inadmissible for consideration on the present motion. The Court has considered 

the objection and determined that Plaintiff’s submitted expert reports may be admitted because Plaintiff 

subsequently filed sworn declarations from his experts. (ECF No. 42.)

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STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when “the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to 

dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.

In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the 

portions in the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial 

responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine 

issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence or non-existence of a genuine factual 

dispute, the party must support its assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in 

the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits 

or declarations . . . or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do not establish 

the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce 

admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The nonmoving party 

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248, 251-52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper 

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). The nonmoving party must also 

demonstrate that the dispute about a material fact “is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248. 

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In other words, the judge needs to answer the preliminary question before the evidence 

is left to the jury of “not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any 

upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon 

whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 (quoting Improvement 

Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)) (emphasis in original). As the Supreme Court 

explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule [56(a)], its 

opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 

the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Therefore, “[w]here the record taken as 

a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. 87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the nonmoving party is 

to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed 

before the court must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the nonmoving

party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. 

Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 

810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

A. Immunity from Liability

Plaintiff may sue Defendant because Defendant waived its sovereign immunity 

from liability for tortious conduct by its employees within the scope of their employment 

when it enacted the Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”). Termini v. U.S., 963 F.2d 1264, 

1265 (9th Cir. 1992). The FTCA renders Defendant liable in tort to the same extent as a 

private individual under the law of the place where an injury occurs. Id. 

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However, “an action under FTCA exists only if the State in which the alleged misconduct 

occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct to go forward.” Carlson v. 

Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980). Therefore, “[if], under the laws of the State where the 

United States’ activity takes place, suit could not be brought against a private individual 

for engaging in such activity, then a cause of action may not be maintained against the 

United States either.” Termini, 963 F.2d at 1266. 

California tort law governs this case because Plaintiff’s accident took place in 

California. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). California Civil Code section 846 provides private 

landowners with substantial immunity from liability for injuries incurred by those entering 

or using their land for recreational purposes. Cal. Civ. Code § 846. Indeed, the general 

rule is that a land owner “owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use 

by others for any recreational purpose.” Id. There are, however, three exceptions to this 

rule. Liability may still attach if: (1) a landowner’s “willful or malicious failure to guard or 

warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity” caused the injury; (2) the 

injured person paid consideration to use the property; or (3) the injured person was 

expressly invited by the landowner rather than merely permitted to use the property. Id.

In the instant case, Plaintiff did not pay Defendant to ride his bike on the path, nor 

did Defendant expressly invite Plaintiff to use the path. (ECF No. 34-1 at 4.) The time 

trial was run by an entity unrelated to Defendant, and Plaintiff registered with that entity 

in order to participate in the race. (ECF No. 34-1 at 4.) Therefore, Defendant’s Motion 

turns on whether Defendant willfully or maliciously failed to “guard or warn against a 

dangerous condition, use, structure or activity.” Cal. Civ. Code § 846.

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B. Willful Misconduct

In assessing whether a landowner’s actions amount to “willful and malicious 

behavior” within the meaning of California’s Recreational Use Statute, courts must look 

at whether the landowner has: (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the peril to be 

apprehended; (2) actual or constructive knowledge that injury is probable, as opposed to 

possible; and (3) conscious failure to act to avoid peril. Termini, 963 F.2d at 1267. 

Courts consider these three elements essential, and each has to be met in order for 

Plaintiff to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Id.

1. Actual or Constructive Knowledge of the Peril

Defendant claims that it had no knowledge, constructive or actual, that a peril 

existed because the Enclosure had not caused any accidents since it had been built 

forty years earlier. (ECF No. 34-1 at 6.) Defendant has confused the issue of probability 

that an injury will result with the issue of whether actual danger is present. 

Defendant built the Enclosure so that a chain link fence juts out at a ninety degree 

angle five feet into a path where the general public is permitted to walk, run and bike. 

(ECF No. 30-3 at 3; EFC No. 34-1 at 4.) The Enclosure effectively obstructs oncoming 

traffic, and those using the path must take measures to avoid crashing into it. The 

Enclosure is an obvious danger. Termini, 963 F.2d at 1267. 

The facts in this case are analogous to those in Termini, where the court 

determined that a road ending at a cliff was a “peril to be apprehended.” Likewise, a 

reasonable jury might conclude that an obstruction five feet into a path used by bikers, 

runners and cyclists is an obvious peril. Id.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s expert, William Neuman, determined that because the 

fence of the enclosure is the same color as the fence lining the path, there is a 

camouflage effect. (ECF No. 30-3 at 3-4.) 

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The camouflaging makes it difficult to detect that the fence protrudes onto the path until 

a person is much closer than three hundred feet away, which is the distance that the 

Enclosure can first be seen by a user on the path. Id. This makes the enclosure 

“unusually dangerous.” Id. at 4. Construing this evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court 

concludes that a reasonable jury could determine that a danger actually existed. 

Nor can Defendant claim a lack of constructive knowledge, since it built the 

Enclosure and undertook safety precautions such as painting the head gate yellow, 

fencing it with a white fence that contrasted with the road, utilizing reflectors and 

widening the path. (ECF No. 37 at 5). The circumstances in this case are thus again

similar to Termini, where the court found the United States had knowledge of the 

relevant peril when it had merely graded the road in question. Termini, 963 F.2d at 

1267. A reasonable jury could likewise conclude that Defendant had either actual or 

constructive knowledge of the peril in this case. 

2. Actual or Constructive Knowledge that Injury is Probable

Defendant argues against the existence of a probability of an injury because the 

Enclosure is an obvious structure that should be avoided. (ECF No. 34-1 at 6.) Further,

Defendant argues no accidents have occurred at this location in the past forty years. 

(ECF No. 34-1 at 4.) However, even Defendant acknowledges that the absence of 

accidents is not dispositive. Termini, 963 F.2d at 1269. 

In fact, some of the best indicators that Defendant knew injury was probable are 

its own actions. As stated above, Defendant had previously taken many steps to make 

the Enclosure more obvious in an attempt to help people avoid hitting the structure. If 

Defendant did not think it was probable that someone or something was going to crash 

into the Enclosure, resulting in some sort of damage, there would be no need to have 

taken such actions. 

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Plaintiff’s expert also opines that injury was probable. (ECF No. 30-3 at 5.) The 

reduction in sight lines by the preceding curve means that, when approaching from the

direction that Plaintiff was riding, the Enclosure only becomes visible at a distance of 

three hundred feet. Id. at 3. Assuming the cyclist was able to immediately recognize the 

obstruction as soon as it became visible, a cyclist traveling at time trial speeds would 

only have 6.8 to 8.2 seconds to avoid the Enclosure. (ECF No. 37 at 5-6.) However,

the camouflaging effect explained above, coupled with certain cycling techniques,

reduces the time a rider would have to avoid the obstruction considerably because the 

rider would not recognize the obstruction until he is much closer. (ECF No. 30-3 at 3-6.) 

Similarly to Termini, where the court determined the lack of room for error led to more of 

a probability of injury, here, the reduction in reaction time caused by the camouflaging 

effect and riding style also can result in that finding. 963 F.2d at 1268. 

Plaintiff’s expert also asserts that Defendant did not follow mandatory guidelines 

required by the Reclamation Manual for dealing with an obstruction like the Enclosure. 

(ECF No. 30-2 at 3, 13.) For example, according to that expert, the markings on the

ground do not conform to the mandatory standards and required inspections did not take 

place, as is evidenced by the missing reflector. Id. at 3-6, 13. 

For its part, Defendant disputes that these guidelines are mandatory. (Def.’s 

Supplemental Expert Disclosures, ECF No. 33 at 1-2.) Regardless, under the relevant 

case law, a lack of compliance with known safety regulations is an important factor in 

determining whether the tortfeasor possessed constructive knowledge that injury was 

probable. Rost v. U.S., 803 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1986). Initially, the Enclosure 

appears like a large and obvious structure that must be avoided, but given the expert 

opinions on speed and distance, a factual dispute remains as to whether Defendant

knew that injury was probable. 

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3. Conscious Failure to Act to Avoid the Peril

Defendant has consciously acted to some extent to avoid the peril caused by the 

Enclosure. As stated above, Defendant painted the head gate yellow, painted the 

Enclosure white to contrast against the other fence, put reflectors on the outside of the 

gate, widened the path around the Enclosure, re-routed the centerline of the path around 

the Enclosure and contracted to have the road maintained according to the CalTrans 

standards. (ECF No. 34-1 at 4; ECF No. 37 at 6; ECF No. 30-3 at 4.) These are all acts 

that were an effort to avoid the peril. However, Defendant failed to maintain the 

precautions that were taken. See Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 53 Cal. App. 4th 

854, 859 (1997) (“The nonmoving party in a summary judgment motion can demonstrate 

that there is a triable issue of fact in regards to whether the Defendant failed so 

completely to maintain the actions that were taken that its conduct became willful or 

malicious.”). 

The paint on the fence had faded, the obstacle reflectors had rusted off and 

regular inspections and maintenance did not take place. (ECF No. 30-3 at 4-5; ECF 

No. 30-2 at 4-5). Based on these facts, it can be inferred for the purposes of summary 

judgment that the required inspections did not take place, or were woefully inadequate 

and rise to the level of a question of whether the failure constituted conscious failure to 

act. 

Additionally, as mentioned above, Defendant did not follow the guidelines in the 

Reclamation Manual. (ECF No. 30-2 at 3, 13). For example, these guidelines required 

certain markings on the path to help people avoid the Enclosure. Those markings were 

completely absent. Id. at 6, 13. 

Moreover, the evidence shows that Defendant was aware of these standards and 

apparently intended to implement them, since they were included in the maintenance 

contract. Those precautions were nonetheless never implemented. (Pl.’s Exs. Ex. 1, 

ECF No. 38-1 at 24; ECF No. 30-2 at 13.) 

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Defendant completely failed to ensure that contracted safety precautions were

implemented and failed to remedy the situation afterward. When an act is done with an 

absolute disregard for its consequences, it can be considered willful misconduct. 

Manuel v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 173 Cal. App. 4th 927, 947 (2009). 

The combination of all the above facts arguably rises above the level of regular 

negligence. Whether it rises to the level of conscious failure is a determination that is 

better left to a jury. Therefore, whether Defendant consciously failed to act to avoid the 

peril also turns on disputed facts.

CONCLUSION5

For the reasons described above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 26, 2013

 5 This case hinges on whether willful misconduct exists; therefore, the assumption of the risk 

defense was not discussed in this order. Regardless of the ultimate finding, the assumption of the risk 

defense will either not be necessary or not available. If it is ultimately determined that Defendant did not 

act with “willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or

activity,” then immunity is appropriate under California Civil Code and the assumption of the risk defense is 

not needed. Cal. Civ. Code § 846 . On the other hand, if it is determined that Defendant’s actions were 

willful or malicious, the assumption of the risk defense is not available because Defendant’s actions would 

rise to the level of reckless or intentional. Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 320 (1992).

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