Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35528/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35528-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Good Samaritan Regional Medical Center
Appellee
Susan Kobold
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SUSAN KOBOLD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GOOD SAMARITAN REGIONAL

MEDICAL CENTER,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-35528

D.C. No.

6:12-cv-02082-TC

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Thomas M. Coffin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

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2 KOBOLD V. GOOD SAMARITAN REG’L MED. CTR.

LARRY BARR; ANTHONY BARTON;

STEPHEN BUSCH; BRIAN CARLSON;

PETER DENNIS; DAN DORR; CLARK

GOBLE; WARREN MARTIN; BILLY

PIERCE; JESSE ROBINSON; DAVID

SHATTO; DOUGLAS TOELKES,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ROSS ISLAND SAND & GRAVEL

CO.,

Defendant-Third-Party-PlaintiffAppellee,

v.

OREGON TEAMSTERS EMPLOYERS

TRUST; GENERAL TEAMSTERS

LOCAL UNION NO. 162,

Third-Party-Defendant.

No. 13-35590

D.C. No.

3:12-cv-00683-MO

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding

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KOBOLD V. GOOD SAMARITAN REG’L MED. CTR. 3

ONA C. ALLEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NORTHWEST PERMANENTE, P.C.,

an Oregon corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-35265

D.C. No.

3:12-cv-00402-ST

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Janice M. Stewart, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 6, 2015

Portland, Oregon

Filed August 9, 2016

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Paul J. Watford, Circuit

Judges, and James Alan Soto,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

* The Honorable James Alan Soto, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

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SUMMARY**

Labor Law

The panel ordered consolidated three appeals involving

employees represented by labor unions who sought remedies

under state law against their employers; affirmed the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer in the

first appeal; affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in

part in the second appeal; and affirmed in the third appeal.

In all three cases, there was a collective bargaining

agreement (“CBA”) between the union and the employer

setting out a grievance and arbitration procedure to govern

disputes arising under the agreement. And in all three, a

grievance was filed but did not provide full relief, prompting

the employee to turn to the courts. All the employees initially

filed their cases in state court, but the cases were removed to

federal court on the basis of preemption under § 301 of the

Labor Management Relations Act. In all the cases, the

district court denied a motion to remand and held the state

law claims preempted.

A state law claim is preempted if it either involves a right

conferred upon an employee solely by virtue of a CBA or is

substantially dependent on analysis of a CBA.

In the first case, the panel held that assuming Or. Rev.

Stat. §§ 652.120 and 652.615 conferred upon a nurse the right

to receive premium pay for extra shifts worked, that right was

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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KOBOLD V. GOOD SAMARITAN REG’L MED. CTR. 5

substantially dependent on an analysis of the terms of a CBA

in order to determine which shifts qualified for premium pay. 

Accordingly, the state law claims were preempted by § 301. 

The plaintiff could not pursue her claims under § 301 because

she did not exhaust her remedies under the CBA and did not

allege that her union breached its duty of fair representation.

In the second case, the panel reversed in part, holding that

claims for violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610(4)

(establishing time limits regardingCBA-authorized paycheck

deductions) and breach of fiduciary duty were not preempted. 

The panel affirmed as to a claim for money received. The

panel concluded that § 652.610(4) conferred a right

independent of the plaintiffs’ rights under a CBA, and this

right was not substantially dependent on analysis of the CBA. 

The breach of fiduciary duty claim also was not preempted,

but the claim for money received was not independent of the

CBA and therefore was preempted. The panel remanded for

the district court to decide whether to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the non-preempted claims.

In the third case, the panel affirmed the district court’s

denial of the plaintiff’s motion to remand and its grant of

summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The panel held

that judicial estoppel did not bar the plaintiff, a nurse

practitioner, from arguing for remand to state court on the

ground that a CBA did not govern a credentialing decision

because the contrary position had been taken by the plaintiff’s

union, not the plaintiff herself, during arbitration. The panel

held that in light of the arbitrator’s decision that the

credentialing decision must be evaluated under the CBA, the

plaintiff’s claim for intentional interference with economic

relations arose out of the CBA, and thus was preempted. 

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment on a non-

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preempted defamation claim, the panel held that the claim

was time-barred.

COUNSEL

Thomas K. Doyle (argued), Bennett, Hartman, Morris &

Kaplan, Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiff-Appellant Susan

Kobold.

Kirk Peterson (argued), Bullard Law, Portland, Oregon, for

Defendant-Appellee Good Samaritan Regional Medical

Center.

Elizabeth Farrell Oberlin (argued), Portland, Oregon;

Benjamin Rosenthal, Portland, Oregon; for PlaintiffsAppellants Larry Barr, et al.

Ankur H. Doshi (argued) and Kamyavathana Sivanesan,

Portland, Oregon; Sheeba Suhaskumar, law student;

Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College,

Portland, Oregon; for Defendant-Third-Party-PlaintiffAppellee Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co.

Matthew Caruso Ellis (argued), Portland, Oregon; George P.

Fisher, Portland, Oregon; for Plaintiff-Appellant Ona C.

Allen.

Chris Kitchel (argued), James N. Westwood, and Brenda K.

Baumgart; Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, Oregon; for

Defendant-Appellee Northwest Permanente, P.C.

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OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

The three cases in this consolidated appeal—Kobold v.

Good Samaritan Regional Medical Center, Barr v. Ross

Island Sand & Gravel Co., and Allen v. Northwest

Permanente—involve different parties and facts, but are

similar in important ways. All three involve employees

represented by labor unions who seek remedies under state

law against their employers. In all three, there is a collective

bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the union and the

employer setting out a grievance and arbitration procedure to

govern disputes arising under the agreement. And in all three,

a grievance was filed but did not provide full relief,

prompting the employee to turn to the courts. All the

employees initially filed their cases in state court, but the

cases were removed to federal court on the basis of

preemption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations

Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). In all the cases, the

district court denied a motion to remand and held the state

law claims preempted. We consider the § 301 preemption

questions on appeal.

As this court has observed more than once, although

§ 301 preemption questions arise fairly frequently,

“[f]amiliarity . . . has not bred facility.” Cramer v. Consol.

Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (en

banc) (alteration in original) (quoting Galvez v. Kuhn,

933 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1991)). In the hope that doing so

will illuminate the parameters of § 301 preemption analysis,

and so help “[breed] facility,” id., we have consolidated the

three cases for consideration and resolve them in this single

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opinion. We begin with a review of § 301 preemption

doctrine and then proceed to discuss each case.

I. Section 301 Preemption

Section 301 of the LMRA states: “Suits for violation of

contracts between an employer and a labor organization

representing employees in an industry affecting commerce

. . . may be brought in any district court of the United States

having jurisdiction of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

On its face, § 301 reads as a jurisdictional statute. But not

long after its passage, the Supreme Court held, in Textile

Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957),

that § 301 is not simply jurisdictional. Instead, it should be

“understood . . . as a congressional mandate to the federal

courts to fashion a body of federal common law to be used to

address disputes arising out of labor contracts.” AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985). “The

Court subsequently held that this federal common law

preempts the use of state contract law in CBA interpretation

and enforcement.” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 689 (citing Local

174, Teamsters of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95,

103–04 (1962)). “Once preempted, ‘any claim purportedly

based on [a] . . . state law is considered, from its inception, a

federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.’”

Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir.

2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)).

In addition to promoting the development of a uniform

federal labor law, § 301 preemption doctrine is designed “in

large part to assure that agreements to arbitrate grievances

would be enforced, regardless of the vagaries of state law and

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lingering hostility toward extrajudicial dispute resolution.”

Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122 (1994). To give “the

policies that animate § 301 . . . their proper range,” the

Supreme Court has expanded “the pre-emptive effect of § 301

. . . beyond suits alleging contract violations” to state law

claims grounded in the provisions of a CBA or requiring

interpretation of a CBA. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 210–11.

Critically, “not every dispute concerning employment, or

tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining

agreement, is pre-empted by § 301.” Id. at 211. Drawing on

Supreme Court precedent, this court has articulated a twostep inquiry to analyze § 301 preemption of state law claims.

First, a court must determine “whether the asserted cause of

action involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue

of state law, not by a CBA. If the right exists solely as a result

of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and [the] analysis

ends there.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059. If the court

determines that the right underlying the plaintiff’s state law

claim(s) “exists independently of the CBA,” it moves to the

second step, asking whether the right “is nevertheless

‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collectivebargaining agreement.’” Id. (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at

394). Where there is such substantial dependence, the state

law claim is preempted by § 301.1If there is not, then the

claim can proceed under state law. Id. at 1059–60.

To determine whether a right is independent of a

CBA—the first Burnside factor—a court must focus its

inquiry on “the legal character of a claim, as ‘independent’ of

rights under the collective-bargaining agreement []and not

 

1

 We discuss later the consequences of a determination that a state law

claim is preempted by § 301.

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whether a grievance arising from ‘precisely the same set of

facts’ could be pursued.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123 (emphasis

added) (internal citation omitted). Only if the claim is

“founded directly on rights created by [a] collectivebargaining agreement[]” does § 301 preempt it. Caterpillar,

482 U.S. at 394.

The second Burnside factor—whether a plaintiff’s state

law right is “substantially dependent on analysis of [the

CBA],” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059—turns on “whether the

claim can be resolved by ‘look[ing] to’ versus interpreting the

CBA. If the latter, the claim is preempted; if the former, it is

not.” Id. at 1060 (quoting Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125)

(alteration in original). This court has previously “stressed

that, in the context of § 301 complete preemption, the term

‘interpret’ is defined narrowly—it means something more

than ‘consider,’ ‘refer to,’ or ‘apply.’” Balcorta v. Twentieth

Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir.

2000). And, notably, “a defendant cannot, merelyby injecting

a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a

state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under

federal law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399. In other words,

“[i]f the claim is plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption

is not mandated simply because the defendant refers to the

CBA in mounting a defense.” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691

(emphasis added).

The Burnside factors reflect two driving concerns of

preemption doctrine: first, preventing “parties’ efforts to

renege on their arbitration promises by ‘relabeling’ as tort

suits actions simply alleging breaches of duties assumed in

collective-bargaining agreements,” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123

(citation omitted), and second, preserving “a central tenet of

federal labor-contract law . . . that it is the arbitrator, not the

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court, who has the responsibility to interpret the labor

contract in the first instance,” Lueck, 471, U.S. at 220.

Notably, there is no basis for scuttling the state law cause

of action if any necessary CBA interpretation can in some

fashion be conducted via the appropriate grievance/arbitration

forum. To allow such scuttling disadvantages employees

covered by CBAs, as they lose state law protections because

of an embedded CBA issue possibly peripheral to their core

cause of action. The interest in sending substantial CBA

issues through grievance/arbitration does not justify creating

this disadvantage unless the interest cannot be otherwise

accommodated. There are, accordingly, circumstances in

which preemption can be avoided by accepting an arbitrator’s

interpretation of the CBA.2In some instances, for example,

an arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA may determine

whether an employee’s otherwise independent state law claim

2 For example, where a right arises independently under state law but

may later require interpretation of the CBA to calculate damages, “the

district court will be able to devise processes to preserve the preeminent

role of the CBAs’ dispute resolution processes to address the discrete

dispute then arising.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1074 n.19. Similarly, in

“[some] circumstances a practice of deferring the litigation pending an

arbitrator’s resolution of the contract interpretation issues rather than

extinguishing the claim might be appropriate.” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691

n.2; see also Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf & Western Sys. Co.,

192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971) (holding that where there is an applicable

arbitration clause, NLRB unfair labor practice cases involving

interpretation of the CBAs shall be held in abeyance, and the parties must

arbitrate the interpretation question before returning to the Board for

adjudication of remaining legal and factual issues). Thus, where the claim

cannot be resolved without interpreting the CBA, “[h]olding the plaintiff’s

cause of action substantively extinguished may not . . . always be the only

means of vindicating the arbitrator’s primacy as the bargained-for contract

interpreter.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124 n.18.

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in fact asserts a right created by the CBA. See Section IV.C,

infra.

Still, once a state law claim has been found substantially

dependent upon analysis of a CBA under the second prong of

Burnside, most often “that claim must either be treated as a

§ 301 claim, or dismissed as pre-empted by federal laborcontract law.” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 (internal citation

omitted). Under a collective bargaining agreement like the

ones in these cases, an employee usually cannot succeed in a

suit under § 301 to vindicate personal contract-based rights

unless the contractual grievance-arbitration procedure is

invoked on her behalf or on behalf of a group of employees

of which she is part. If the dispute is not ultimately resolved

by an arbitration, the employee must establish that the union

violated its duty of fair representation by failing to pursue the

grievance to arbitration, or pursuing it arbitrarily. See Air

Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991);

Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190–91 (1967). And, where the

remedies provided in the CBA have been exhausted, judicial

review is extremely limited. See United Paperworkers Int’l

Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987); Sw.

Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Drywall Dynamics, Inc.,

823 F.3d 524, 530 (9th Cir 2016) (noting that “courts

reviewing labor arbitration awards afford a ‘nearly

unparalleled degree of deference’ to the arbitrator’s decision”

(quoting Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Auto. Machinists

Lodge No. 1173, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace

Workers, 886 F.2d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc))).

Against this doctrinal backdrop, we proceed to the

specifics of each case.

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II. Kobold v. Good Samaritan Regional Medical Center

A. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff-Appellant Sue Kobold worked as an operating

room nurse for Defendant-Appellee Good Samaritan

Regional Medical Center (“Good Samaritan”) beginning in

1996. Nurses at Good Samaritan, including Kobold, are

represented by a union, the Oregon Nurses Association

(“ONA”). Their terms and conditions of employment are

negotiated between Good Samaritan and ONA and spelled

out in a collective bargaining agreement (“GS CBA”).

The GS CBA provides that nurses who work extra shifts

receive premium pay at one and one-half times the regular

rate. In early 2010, Kobold learned that for more than one

year Good Samaritan had not paid her the premium rate for

extra shifts worked. It appears, although the record is not

clear, that Kobold discovered the problem when the operating

room manager informed her that Good Samaritan would only

pay the regular rate, not the premium rate, to nurses who

signed up to work a surgical technician’s “orphan”

shifts—that is, vacant shifts that cannot be covered by staff

members within the same team. Kobold believed that nurses

who signed up to work these orphan shifts should be paid the

premium rate.

The GS CBA prescribes a mandatory five-step grievance

and arbitration procedure for “[p]roblems arising in

connection with the application or interpretation of the

Agreement.” ONA submitted a grievance regarding extra

shift premium pay, and Good Samaritan agreed prospectively

to change its practice and pay the premium rate for extra

operating room shifts. Good Samaritan refused, however, to

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issue retroactive pay for extra shifts already worked. It

claimed that those shifts had been marked as regular pay in

the electronic scheduling software, so the nurses knew the

pay rate before signing up to work the shifts. After ONA

requested arbitration, the union and Good Samaritan settled

the grievance.

As part of the settlement, Good Samaritan paid Kobold

$2,216.68, the equivalent of 45 days of premium pay. That

payment was the full amount to which Kobold was entitled

under the GS CBA, which authorizes grievances to be filed

up to 45 days following the occurrence of the matter being

grieved. Because Kobold believed she was entitled to more

than 45 days of back pay, she filed an action in state court.

Kobold asserted two causes of action in her complaint.

First, she alleged that Good Samaritan failed to pay all wages

owed her at each pay period, in violation of Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 652.120. Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.120(1) requires that “[e]very

employer shall establish and maintain a regular payday, at

which date the employer shall pay all employees the wages

due and owing to them.” Second, she alleged that Good

Samaritan unlawfully deducted from her paycheck amounts

due and owing, in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.615. Or.

Rev. Stat. § 652.615 creates a private right of action for a

violation of § 652.610(3), which provides that “[a]n employer

may not withhold, deduct or divert any portion of an

employee’s wages unless” an exception applies, one of which

is that “[t]he deduction is authorized by a collective

bargaining agreement to which the employer is a party.” Or.

Rev. Stat. § 652.610(3)(d). Kobold sought $24,000 in unpaid

wages, as well as attorney’s fees, costs, and disbursements.

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After Kobold filed her state court suit, Good Samaritan

filed a notice of removal, alleging that Kobold’s state law

claims are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. On the same

ground, Good Samaritan filed in federal court a motion to

dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary

judgment. The magistrate judge determined that Kobold’s

state law claims were preempted under § 301. He then

concluded that because Kobold failed to allege and could not

prove that she had exhausted her contractual remedies, and

also did not allege that ONA had breached its duty of fair

representation, she could not succeed on a claim under § 301.

He thus recommended that Good Samaritan’s motion for

summary judgment be granted. The district court adopted the

magistrate’s findings and recommendation, granted Good

Samaritan’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed

the case. We affirm.

B. Kobold’s State Law Claims Are Preempted by § 301

Assuming without deciding that ORS § 652.120 and

§ 652.615 independently confer upon Kobold the right to

receive premium pay for extra shifts worked, that right is

substantially dependent on an analysis of the terms of the GS

CBA. Before a court could calculate the total amount Kobold

is owed, it must determine which of the shifts she worked

qualified for premium pay. The Oregon statutes under which

Kobold seeks relief provide only that an employee be paid

“the wages due and owing to them.” Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 652.120(1). They do not provide any means with which to

assess whether wages are “due and owing.” To answer that

question, a court must consult the GS CBA. In this case,

because of a particular provision of the GS CBA that is in

dispute, a court must interpret, not just refer to or look at, the

GS CBA. See Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060.

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The GS CBA provides that nurses are to be paid one and

one-half times their regular pay rate for all hours worked

above their regularly scheduled full-time equivalent shifts

“except when there is a change of schedule agreed upon by

the Medical Center and nurse.”3 Thus, for Kobold to succeed

on her state law claim that she was not paid the premium rate

for extra shifts, a court must determine whether Kobold and

Good Samaritan agreed to a change of schedule.

Whether or not there was an agreed upon change of

schedule is exactly what is in dispute between the parties.

Good Samaritan argues that Kobold is not entitled to

premium pay because she agreed to work the extra shifts

“despite conspicuous notice that the shifts would be paid at a

regular rate.” Kobold contends that this reading of the

agreement exception “would undermine the purpose of the

extra shift premium and mean that Defendant would never

pay extra shift premium.”

The GS CBA does not directly and clearly explain what

constitutes a “change of schedule,” nor how an agreement

between Good Samaritan and a nurse is to be made. The

settlement agreement between Good Samaritan and ONA,

through which Kobold was paid 45 days of premium pay

wages, is of no help in resolving this dispute, because the

record does not contain a copy of the agreement or an

explanation of how the total amount paid to Kobold was

calculated. At best, all the settlement demonstrates is that

once the total number of extra shifts worked without

agreement to a change of schedule is known, it is simple to

calculate the amount of premium pay owed. But the

3 We refer to this provision of the GS CBA as the “agreement

exception.”

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settlement, as far as the record reveals, did not shed any light

on how to determine which shifts qualify for premium pay.

Ultimately, then, a court must interpret the meaning of the

agreement exception to resolve Kobold’s state law claims,

without any illumination from the parties’ agreements or

from an arbitrator chosen by the parties to interpret the GS

CBA. Because the state law claims substantially depend on an

interpretation of the GS CBA, Kobold’s state law claims are

to that degree preempted by § 301.

C. Kobold Cannot Pursue Her Claims Under § 301

As we have noted, the conclusion that § 301 precludes

adjudication of a state law claim in whole or part does not

automatically require dismissal of a union-represented

employee’s challenge of an employer’s actions. Here, for

example, Kobold could maintain her claim if she can

demonstrate that her remedies under the GS CBA were

exhausted or can yet be exhausted, see Part I, supra, or that

her union breached its duty of fair representation in failing to

do so, and if this court then determines that litigation of her

state cause of action remains available. Kobold cannot so

demonstrate.

The mandatory grievance procedure outlined in the GS

CBA, which ends with binding arbitration, was never

exhausted regarding premium pay for extra shifts worked

outside the 45-day period covered by the settlement. And

Kobold has not alleged that ONA breached its duty of fair

representation in agreeing to a settlement covering only 45

days instead of further pursuing the grievance. Because

Kobold cannot prove that her contractual remedies were

exhausted, and does not allege that ONA breached its duty of

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fair representation, she cannot pursue any alleged GS CBA

violation.

III. Barr v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co.

A. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiffs-Appellants (collectively referred to as “Barr”)

are or formerly were truck drivers employed by DefendantAppellee Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co. (“RISG”). Barr is

represented by General Teamsters Local Union No. 162

(“Teamsters”). In 2008, Teamsters and RISG agreed to a twoyear collective bargaining agreement (“RISG CBA”).

The RISG CBA provided that RISG and Barr would each

contribute to the cost of Barr’s health and welfare benefits.

RISG was to pay 90% of the cost of benefits, and would

deduct the other 10% from employees’ paychecks. RISG was

to remit its contributions and the employees’ paycheck

deductions to the Oregon Teamsters Employers Trust Fund

(“OTET”), which managed the health insurance plan. The

RISG CBA also set out a mandatory multi-step grievance

procedure culminating in arbitration. The grievance

procedure was to be “the sole method of resolving disputes

during the life of [the RISG CBA].”

In 2010, RISG “failed to timely provide premium

payments to OTET.” Teamsters filed a class action grievance

in May 2010, which RISG resolved by making the necessary

payments.

The 2008 RISG CBA expired at the end of December, but

Teamsters and RISG maintained it until November 2011

while they negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement.

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During that time, RISG allegedly again failed to make

contributions to OTET, causing Barr’s health insurance

benefits to lapse. RISG and Teamsters ratified a new RISG

CBA in November 2011, which ran retroactively from the

beginning of 2011 through the end of 2014. The new RISG

CBA retained the same 90/10 contribution to OTET for

employee health benefits and the same grievance procedure.

Barr filed suit in state court, alleging that RISG had, since

April 2011, deducted funds from their paychecks but failed to

remit the funds to OTET, causing Barr to lose his health

benefits. Barr’s complaint pleaded three state law claims:

violations of Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610(3), breach of fiduciary

duty, and money had and received. Barr sought unpaid

wages; medical expenses sustained as a result of not having

health benefits; emotional distress damages; and prejudgment interest. RISG filed a notice of removal on the

basis, inter alia, that Barr’s claims were preempted by § 301

of the LMRA; Barr filed a motion to remand, but the district

court denied it, reasoning that the question of when RISG was

required to remit the paycheck deductions to OTET required

interpretation of the RISG CBA.

After Barr filed his complaint but before the district court

denied his motion to remand, Teamsters and RISG continued

to negotiate the deductions issue. During that period,

Teamsters filed a grievance on behalf of Barr individually (as

opposed to the group of plaintiffs we refer to throughout as

Barr), alleging that RISG had not kept his health benefits

current and requesting that RISG pay the premiums owed.

Teamsters later instituted a class grievance covering all

employees who had lost OTET coverage because of RISG’s

failure to make the monthly payments, and settled that

grievance.

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Eventually, RISG and Teamsters negotiated settlements

and resolved the outstanding grievances. Under the terms of

the settlement, RISG agreed to pay the past due health

insurance premiums. Because the settlement did not fully

compensate Barr for his economic damages, non-economic

injuries, attorney’s fees and costs, or potential punitive

damages, he maintained his lawsuit.

RISG moved for summary judgment. In Barr’s

memorandum in opposition, he argued that RISG’s failure to

remit the paycheck deductions to OTET was a violation of

Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610(4). Barr had not previously

specifically mentioned Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610(4); his

complaint referred to § 652.610(3). Under Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 652.610(3)(d), “[a]n employer may not withhold, deduct or

divert any portion of an employee’s wages unless . . . [t]he

deduction is authorized by a collective bargaining agreement

to which the employer is a party.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610(4)

establishes time limits regardingCBA-authorized deductions.

It provides:

When an employer deducts an amount from

an employee’s wages as required or

authorized by law or agreement, the employer

shall pay the amount deducted to the

appropriate recipient as required by the law or

agreement. The employer shall pay the

amount deducted within the time required by

the law or the agreement or, if the time for

payment is not specified by the law or

agreement, within seven days after the date

the wages from which the deductions are

made are due. Failure to pay the amount as

required constitutes an unlawful deduction.

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Id. In his opposition to summary judgment, Barr argued that

although the deductions were authorized by the RISG CBA,

they became unlawful pursuant to § 652.610(4) when RISG

failed to pay the deductions to OTET within seven days.

The district court held that Barr’s state law claims were

preempted under § 301 of the LMRA because the dispute

could not be resolved without “referencing the CBA and

related principles.” On the ground that the RISG CBA’s

grievance and arbitration procedure was not exhausted, the

district court granted RISG’s motion for summary judgment

and dismissed the case with prejudice. Barr timely appealed.

We reverse as to preemption of Plaintiffs’ § 652.610(4) and

breach of fiduciary duty claims, but affirm as to the money

had and received claim.

B. Barr’s Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610(4) Claim

Although Barr did not mention § 652.610(4) in his

complaint as a ground for relief, we shall consider Barr’s

argument. “[U]nder the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a

complaint need not pin plaintiff’s claim for relief to a precise

legal theory.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011).

Here, Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610(4) is not so much a new claim

as a more precise and accurate framing of Barr’s original

allegation. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 652.610(3) and (4) work in

tandem: section 652.610(3) permits an employer to deduct a

portion of an employee’s wages if authorized to do so by a

CBA, and § 652.610(4) makes such deductions unlawful if

the funds are not properly paid within the time specified by

the CBA or, if the CBA is silent, within the statutorilysupplied seven-day time period. The interaction between the

two provisions of § 652.610 is key to Barr’s suit. As Barr

argues, “such allegation is so strongly suggested by the facts

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that only an unreasonable defendant would fail to make the

connection.”4

Having concluded that we may evaluate Barr’s

§ 652.610(4) argument, we reject RISG’s request that we

certify to the Oregon Supreme Court the question whether

§ 652.610(4) creates a private right of action. Whether a

statute grants a private right of action is not a jurisdictional

question. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.,

535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002). Nor is deciding the private

right of action question an essential prerequisite to

conducting a § 301 preemption inquiry. The preemption

analysis is concerned with whether a claim is properly

pursued under state or federal law. If federal law, then the

4 Even if the § 652.610(4) reliance were seen as a separate claim, “[t]he

district court should have construed [the matter raised in opposition to the

motion for summary judgment] as a request pursuant to rule 15(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend the pleadings out of time.”

Desertrain v. City of L.A., 754 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Apache Survival Coal v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 1994)).

Had it done so, the pertinentfactors should have counseled the district

court to grant leave to amend. See id. There is no evidence of bad faith.

Raising § 652.610(4) at the summary judgment stage did not cause RISG

to seek additional discovery nor did it cause any delays. RISG was already

on notice from the complaint that Barr’s claims stemmed from RISG’s

failure timely to remit the paycheck deductions to OTET. The district

court also discussed the timeliness issue with counsel at several points

during oral argument on Barr’s motion to remand. And RISG had full

opportunity to argue that the § 652.610(4) claim could not succeed as a

matter of law; it did so in its reply brief on its motion for summary

judgment. As Desertrain held, a claim of prejudice is unpersuasive where

defendants fully argued an issue in the summary judgment briefing.

754 F.3d at 1155. Finally, as we later discuss, considering Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 652.610(4) would not be futile. And Barr did not otherwise amend his

complaint.

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claim would proceed in accord with § 301, and it would not

matter whether the state statute provides a private cause of

action. That issue arises, in other words, only if RISG’s

preemption contention fails. As the parties have thus far

litigated only the preemption question, consideration of the

state law private cause of action theory is premature—and,

indeed, the issue may be litigated in state rather than federal

court. See Section III.D, infra.

Having settled these predicate issues, we proceed to the

merits of the § 301 preemption issue.

On the first Burnside factor, Livadas is closely analogous

to this case and confirms that § 652.610(4) confers a right

independent of Barr’s rights under the RISG CBA. Livadas

dealt with a California statute that, like Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 652.610(4), governs an employer’s failure properly to remit

employee payment in a timelymanner.5512 U.S. at 111. And,

as in this case, the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s

employment were subject to a CBA. Id. at 110.

When Livadas was discharged, she demanded that her

employer immediately pay the wages owed her, and, when

there was a delay in payment, the prescribed statutory

penalty.

6

Id. at 111. When no penalty was paid, Livadas sued

5 Cal. Lab. Code § 201 provides: “If an employer discharges an

employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due

and payable immediately.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 111 n.3.

6 Cal. Lab. Code § 203 provides that when an employer “willfully fails”

to comply with § 201, “the wages of such employees shall continue as a

penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an

action therefor is commenced; but such wages shall not continue for more

than 30 days.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 112 n.4.

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under the state statute. The Supreme Court held Livadas’ state

law claim not preempted under § 301 of the LMRA, because

“the primary text for deciding whether Livadas was entitled

to a penalty was not the [CBA], but a calendar.” Id. at 124.

The only question that needed to be decided was “whether

[the employer] ‘willfully fail[ed] to pay’ [Livadas’s] wages

promptly upon severance”—“a question of state law, entirely

independent of any understanding embodied in the collectivebargaining agreement between the union and the employer.”

Id. at 124–25 (quoting Cal. Lab. Code § 203).

This case is similar to Livadas in all pertinent respects.

Barr alleges RISG violated Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610(4) when

it failed to remit the paycheck deductions to OTET for

payment of Barr’s health insurance premiums. Article 11 of

the 2008 and 2011 RISG CBAs provides that the employees’

health insurance premiums are monthly premiums and that

RISG “agrees to make the appropriate monthly contribution”

to OTET. But the RISG CBA does not provide a specific due

date each month for transmitting such payments. Section

652.610(4) fills that gap by requiring that where the pertinent

employment contract is silent as to when deductions must be

remitted, the employer pay the amount deducted within seven

days of the date wages are due. As in Livadas, then, the

primary text for determining whether RISG violated

§ 652.610(4) is a calendar, not the RISG CBA. Barr’s claim

therefore is independent of his rights under the RISG CBA.

At the second step of the § 301 preemption inquiry, we

must determine whether Barr’s state law right to payment

within seven days is “substantially dependent on analysis of

[the RISG CBA].” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059 (internal

quotation marks omitted). It is not.

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RISG argues that an evaluation of Barr’s claim requires

this court to “interpret several key provisions of the contract.”

Specifically, RISG lists seven issues that would allegedly

require interpretation:

RISG’s obligations to make any deductions

from employee’s paychecks; the amount and

frequency of deductions taken; increases in

monthly premium changes; coverage

requirements of employees; RISG’s

obligations to return deductions upon

remittance to OTET; RISG’s obligations to

pay out of pocket medical expenses as alleged

in the Complaint; and the governing effect of

the subscription agreements that controlled

coverage of the Plaintiffs’ health and welfare

benefits under OTET and their relation to the

2008 CBA and 2011 CBA.

None of these matters require CBA interpretation. The

2008 and 2011 RISG CBAs unambiguously specify: RISG’s

obligation to deduct funds from Barr’s paychecks; the amount

and frequency of the deductions; to whom the deduction must

be remitted and for what purpose; and the terms of employee

eligibility for the health benefits. The RISG CBA does not

address whether RISG is obligated to return deductions it

ultimately remitted to OTET or to pay out-of-pocket medical

expenses incurred when Barr’s health insurance lapsed.

Rather, these are pure statutory questions concerning the

remedies available under Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610(4). As to

these issues as well, then, there is nothing in the RISG CBA

to interpet. Barr’s § 652.610(4) claim thus is not § 301

preempted under the second prong of the Burnside analysis

either.

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C. Barr’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim

Barr alleges that RISG’s obligations as a fiduciary arise

under Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 652.710 and/or 652.720.7 Or. Rev.

Stat. § 652.710(1) provides that “[a]ll moneys collected by an

employer from employees or retained from their wages . . .

pursuant to a contract are trust funds and shall be placed and

kept in separate accounts by the employer and shall promptly

be paid over to the contractor.” And § 652.720(1) provides

that “[n]o employer shall retain, directly or indirectly, from

employees or from their wages any part of the money

collected or retained under Or. Rev. Stat. 652.710 for use or

benefit of the employer.” These statutory provisions create

and impose duties on an employer independent of a CBA. See

Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059. Enforcing those duties does not

substantially depend on interpreting the RISG CBA. A court

need only determine whether RISG kept the health insurance

funds in a separate account, promptly turned them over, and

did not keep them for its own use or benefit; such a

determination does not require a court to do any more than

look at or refer to the RISG CBA, if that. See Balcorta,

208 F.3d at 1108. Barr’s breach of fiduciary duty claim thus

is not preempted.8

7

In his complaint, Barr alleged that RISG’s fiduciary obligations “arose

under one or more of the following statutory provisions”: Or. Rev. Stat.

§§ 652.610, 652.710, and 652.720. Because we conclude that the latter

two provisions create duties independent of the RISG CBA and are not

substantially dependent on the RISG CBA, we do not also consider the

first provision, which, in relevant part, permits an employer to deduct a

portion of an employee’s wages as authorized by a CBA. § 652.610(3)(d).

8 Whether Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 652.710 and 652.720 actually are fiduciary

duties is a matter of state law, which we do not address, as the question is

not before us.

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D. Barr’s Money Had and Received Claim

Barr’s money had and received claim, however, is

preempted. A money had and received claim is rooted in “the

equitable principle that one who has been unjustly enriched

by another should be required to make restitution. The action

may be maintained whenever one has money in his hands

belonging to another, which, in equity and good conscience,

he ought to pay over to that other.” Briggs v. Lamvik, 242 Or.

App. 132, 143 (2011) (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). Oregon courts have declared that such a claim is

“based on a contract implied in law.” Williamson v. Gov’t

Emps. Ins. Co., 247 Or. App. 48, 53 (2011).

Here, RISG’s authority to deduct funds from Barr’s

paychecks and Barr’s right to have those funds applied

toward his health insurance premiums are purely contractual

entitlements. Without those provisions in the RISG CBA,

Barr would have no basis upon which to bring the money had

and received claim. “State law does not exist as an

independent source of private rights to enforce collective

bargaining contracts.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394 (quoting

Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 376 F.2d. 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1967),

aff’d, 390 U.S. 557 (1968)). Because Barr’s money had and

received claim is not independent of the RISG CBA, it is

preempted under § 301.

The 2008 and 2011 RISG CBAs set out a mandatory and

exclusive grievance procedure for resolving disputes

“concerning the meaning, violation, and/or interpretation of

the Agreement.” The multi-step grievance procedure

culminates in arbitration. Barr therefore can only maintain a

claim under § 301 if he can demonstrate that his remedies

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under the RISG CBA were exhausted.9 The Teamsters settled

or abandoned all grievances related to RISG’s failure to remit

paycheck deductions to OTET; the grievances were never

submitted to an arbitrator.10 Because the contractual remedies

were not exhausted, and Barr does not allege that Teamsters

breached its duty of fair representation, he cannot pursue his

money had and received claim as a § 301 claim.

All three of Barr’s claims “have ‘a common nucleus of

operative fact.’” Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 245 (2007)

(quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,

725 (1966)); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The district court

therefore should decide on remand whether to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Barr’s Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 652.610(4) and breach of fiduciary duty claims.11

9 Barr does not allege that Teamsters breached its duty of fair

representation.

10 Barr’s counsel agreed during oral arguments on RISG’s motion for

summary judgment that the RISG CBA grievance and arbitration

procedures had not been exhausted; Barr does not argue otherwise on

appeal.

11 Before the district court addresses whether to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction, it should more fully consider whether the claims are

completely preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and raise a

federal issue for that reason. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S.

200, 210 (2004). RISG raised complete ERISA preemption as an

affirmative defense in its answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint, and the parties

addressed ERISA preemption in their memoranda on Plaintiffs’ motion to

remand to state court. The district court rejected RISG’s ERISA

preemption argument without explanation.

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IV. Allen v. Northwest Permanente

A. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff-Appellant Ona Allen is a nurse practitioner

formerly employed by Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the

Northwest (“HP”). The terms and conditions of Allen’s

employment were subject to a collective bargaining

agreement (“Nurses’ CBA”) negotiated between HP and

Allen’s union, the Oregon Federation of Nurses and Health

Professionals (“Nurses Union”). Defendant-Appellee

Northwest Permanente, P.C. (“NWP”), is an association of

physicians. HP and NWP are separate entities but both, as

well as a third organization, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals

(“KFH”), operate under the umbrella of their parent

organization, Kaiser Permanente Northwest (“KPNW”).

Allen was required, as a condition of her employment, to

be re-credentialed every two years. The credentialing process

involves review of an employee’s work performance by the

KPNWCredentials Committee, made up of representatives of

HP, KFH, and NWP. According to KPNW’s Credentialing &

Recredentialing Manual (“the Manual”), the Credentials

Committee “is a sub-committee of the NWP” board of

directors; HP “designate[s] the KPNW Credentials

Committee tomake recommendations regarding credentialing

decisions.” An individual practitioner “may not provide care

to KPNW members until the Credentials Committee makes

a final decision to recommend the applicant.” HP, KFH, and

NWP thus “each have a separate responsibility and

accountability to credential practitioners who are employed

or contracted to treat members” based upon the

recommendations of the Committee.

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The Manual provides that “[w]hen quality of care/service

issues arise, KPNW may initiate disciplinary action and/or

reduce, suspend, or terminate privileges or staff status.”

While the Nurses’ CBA covering Allen’s terms and

conditions of employment is silent regarding the credentialing

requirement or procedures, the Manual indicates that HP

“Union Staff,” including nurse practitioners such as Allen,

may appeal disciplinary actions based on credentialing

decisions through the grievance procedure detailed in the

Nurses’ CBA.

In July 2008, Allen submitted to the Credentials

Committee an application for the renewal of her credentials.

The Credentials Committee conferred regarding Allen’s

application and concluded that she needed to be placed on a

Work Improvement Plan (“WIP”) as a result of certain low

performance scores and multiple patient complaints.

Allen was on approved personal leave in New York when

she learned from an HP supervisor that the Credentials

Committee was requiring her to agree to a WIP as a condition

for recredentialing. At the time, Allen “told [the supervisor]

she was confused about why a WIP was necessary” and

believed the plan would violate her collective bargaining

rights. According to Allen, she was told that she was being

“uncooperative” and received no further explanation.

Several weeks later, the Credentials Committee met again

to discuss Allen’s application for recredentialing. At that

meeting, HP’s Primary Care Director explained that Allen

had neither signed nor responded to the WIP prepared for her.

The Committee also discussed “several complaints from

patients” regarding Allen’s care. At the conclusion of the

meeting, “[t]he committee recommended termination of Ms.

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Allen’s credentialing based on patient safety concerns

because of repeated instances of not examining patients.” The

next day, HP placed Allen on unpaid administrative leave,

because, without credentials, she was unable to care for

patients.

Allen was notified of the Credentials Committee’s

negative decision by a letter, which notified her that she was

“entitled to appeal the Committee’s determination, in

accordance with the terms of the KFHP Labor Contracts-

[Nurses Union] Agreement, Article 11, Grievance

Procedure.”12In accord with this advice, Allen’s union filed

a grievance on her behalf, and pursued it to binding

arbitration.

At arbitration, the parties stipulated that “the grievance is

arbitrable and includes an appeal of the Credentials

Committee’s adverse recommendation pursuant to

Credentialing PolicyNo. 26.” The primarydisputed issue was

whether the Nurses’ CBA’s provision that “corrective action

shall be for just cause only” applied to the Committee’s

decision.

Addressing that issue, the arbitrator in his opinion first

explained that “[r]esolving the issues presented entails an

examination of the power of the Credentials Committee and

the nature of its action” denying Allen’s application. After

observing that the Manual indicates that HP is responsible for

credentialing its own staff and that the Credentials Committee

merely “formulates recommendations to” HP, the arbitrator

noted that HP nonetheless “regarded the Credentials

12 The reference to Article 11 is an error; the grievance procedure is

actually found in Article 19 of the Nurses’ CBA.

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Committee’s action as a denial” rather than a

recommendation. Both parties, moreover, “seem[ed] to agree

that the grievant’s credentials were terminated by the

Credentials Committee,” even though such a termination

would appear to exceed the jurisdiction of the Committee.

Given that agreement, and because HP’s Board of Directors

made “no further determination,” the arbitrator concluded, the

Credentials Committee’s action “should be treated as a final

decision denying the grievant’s application for

recredentialing.”

The arbitrator went on to rule that the Nurses’ CBA’s

“just cause” standard was applicable. HP had “effectively

fired the grievant,” and “[i]nsofar as the Credentials

Committee’s decision was the foundation of the Employer’s

discharge of the grievant, it must be reviewed, to some

degree, under the just cause standard.”

Finally, the arbitrator ruled that the Credentials

Committee’s actions violated the just cause standard. He

concluded that Allen’s failure to cooperate with the

Credentials Committee was “excusable because she was on

vacation.” Rather than denying Allen’s application outright,

the Credentials Committee “should have recommended a

short term extension of the grievant’s credentials,” which

would have allowed the parties to address the “legitimate,

albeit debatable, concerns” raised by the committee. Because

of this shortcoming, Allen’s discharge was not for just cause.

Having so concluded, the arbitrator vacated the Committee’s

decision, remanded Allen’s credentialing application for

further proceedings by the Committee, and placed Allen on

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paid administrative leave for 60 days, but declined to award

back pay.

13

Unhappy with the arbitration award, Allen sued in state

court, naming NWP as the defendant and alleging state law

claims, including intentional interference with economic

relations/contract; defamation; breach of contract; and breach

of the duty of good faith. NWP removed the case to federal

court, arguing that the court had original jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Allen’s claims “arise under, and

require interpretation of” her CBA, and were thus preempted

by § 301 of the LMRA. In response, Allen filed a motion to

remand, contending that NWP’s credentialing process was

not governed by the Nurses’ CBA and that none of her claims

required interpretation of the Nurses’ CBA.

A magistrate judge concluded otherwise. She

recommended that the motion to remand be denied, holding

that “most of [Allen’s] claims substantially depend on an

analysis of the CBA, and, thus, are preempted.”14

Alternatively, the magistrate judge decided, Allen was

“taking the opposite position now than she took in the

arbitration” regarding whether the Committee’s actions were

governed by the Nurses’ CBA’s substantive standards, and

was therefore judicially estopped from arguing that they were

not. Allen filed no objection to the Findings and

Recommendation, and the district court adopted it.

13 On remand, the Credentialing Committee again denied Allen’s

credentialing application, and her union declined to pursue arbitration.

Those subsequent developments are not at issue in this appeal.

 

14 NWP conceded that Allen’s defamation claim was not preempted.

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Following limited discovery, Allen filed a motion for

reconsideration of the motion to remand, as well as a Fourth

Amended Complaint, in which she abandoned all of her

substantive claims except for defamation. NWP filed a

motion for summary judgment on the defamation claim. The

district court denied the motion for reconsideration and

granted NWP’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

B. Judicial Estoppel

Before turning to the substance of the preemption issue,

we address the district court’s alternative holding—that

Allen’s central argument is barred by judicial estoppel. “We

review the district court’s application of the doctrine of

judicial estoppel to the facts of this case for an abuse of

discretion.” Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001).

“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes

a party from gaining an advantage by asserting one position,

and then later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly

inconsistent position.” Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 782. Three

factors “inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in

a particular case.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742,

750 (2001): “First, a party’s later position must be ‘clearly

inconsistent’ with its earlier position.” Id. (quoting United

States v. Hook, 195 F.3d 299 (7th Cir. 1999)). “Second,

courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in

persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so

that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later

proceeding would create ‘the perception that either the first

or the second court was misled.’” Id. (quoting Edwards v.

Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982)). “A

third consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an

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inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or

impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not

estopped.” Id. at 751.

The district court concluded that judicial estoppel barred

Allen from arguing for remand on the ground that the

Credentials Committee’s adverse recommendation was not

governed by the Nurses’ CBA. As the district court

recognized, however, the contrary position was taken by

Allen’s union, not Allen herself, during the arbitration.

It is a core principle of labor law that “[t]he collective

bargaining system . . . of necessity subordinates the interests

of an individual employee to the collective interests of all

employees in a bargaining unit.” Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182. As a

corollary of this principle, a union representing an individual

in an arbitration proceeding has an obligation first to act for

the benefit of the bargaining unit as a whole, even where the

interests of the bargaining unit may diverge from those of the

individual grievant. See id.; Local 13, Int’l Longshoremen’s

&Warehousemen’s Union v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 441 F.2d 1061,

1067 (9th Cir. 1971).

We thus have recognized that when a union attorney

appears on behalf of an individual during a grievance

proceeding, while “the attorneymay well have certain ethical

obligations to the grievant, his principal client is the union; it

is the union that has retained him, is paying for his services,

and is frequently the party to the arbitration proceedings.”

Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1258 (9th Cir. 1985).

Peterson held that a union member could not sue a union

lawyer for malpractice on the basis of the lawyer’s handling

of a grievance because there was no attorney-client

relationship between the lawyer and the union member. Id.

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at 1261. For the same reason—because there was no

attorney-client relationship between Allen and her union

attorney during the arbitration—the attorney’s argument

about the applicability of the Nurses’ CBA, made on behalf

of the union, cannot be imputed to Allen for judicial estoppel

purposes. Because Allen herself took no position at all during

the arbitration, her litigating position cannot be “clearly

inconsistent” with a nonexistent earlier position. The district

court thus abused its discretion in concluding that judicial

estoppel barred her argument about the applicability of the

Nurses’ CBA.

C. Section 301 Preemption

Like the parties’ arguments, our preemption discussion

focuses on Allen’s claim for intentional interference with

economic relations. As we have noted, see Section IV.A,

supra, Allen’s Fourth Amended Complaint dropped that

claim. But, “[i]n determining the existence of removal

jurisdiction, based upon a federal question, the court must

look to the complaint as of the time the removal petition was

filed. Jurisdiction is based on the complaint as originally filed

and not as amended.” Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co.,

300 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting O’Halloran v.

Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1988))

(internal quotation marks omitted). Our preemption analysis,

therefore, must take into account Allen’s claims at the time of

removal, including her claim for intentional interference.

At first blush, Allen’s intentional interference claim does

not appear to fit comfortably into either prong of the Burnside

test. Allen argues that NWP, a third party to her employment

relationship with HP acting through the Credentialing

Committee, caused her discharge by its misconduct during

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the course of the credentialing process. As she points out, the

Nurses’ CBA governs only her relationship with HP; it says

nothing at all about the credentialing process. On its face,

therefore, her “asserted cause of action involves a right”—the

right to be free from harmful interference by a third party in

an employment relationship—“conferred upon an employee

by virtue of state law, not by a CBA.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at

1059. And by the same token, she argues, evaluating the

merits of her claim cannot be “‘substantially dependent on

analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement’” that is silent

on the relevant issues. Id. (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at

394).

But our analysis cannot end there. Under longstanding

labor law principles, the scope and meaning of a collective

bargaining agreement is not limited to the text of the

agreement. Instead, “the industrial common law—the

practices of the industry and the shop—is equally a part of the

collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it.”

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co.,

363 U.S. 574, 581–82 (1960). Because of the centrality of

industrial common law in collective bargaining relationships,

when an arbitrator interprets a collective bargaining

agreement, he is “entitled, and is even expected, to range

afield of the actual text of the collective bargaining agreement

he interprets.” Stead Motors of Walnut Creek, 886 F.2d at

1206. The arbitrator’s decision, in turn, conclusively

determines the meaning of the agreement. See Misco,

484 U.S. at 38. Thus where, as here, a plaintiff’s initial claim

did progress through arbitration, the question whether that

claim is based on a right conferred by the CBA must be

considered in light of the arbitrator’s decision.

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Put differently, for preemption purposes, an employee

may assert a right that arises from a CBA as interpreted by an

arbitrator even where the right is not explicitly mentioned in

the text of the agreement. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 215–16.

That is precisely what happened in this case. Even though the

Manual, in terms, limited the Committee to making a

recommendation and provided that only HP itself could take

“corrective action” subject to the just cause standard, the

arbitrator relied on the functional understanding of the parties

to the Nurses’ CBA regarding the nature and effect of the

Committee’s recommendation. Because the parties agreed

that Allen’s credentials were, as a practical matter, terminated

by the Committee’s decision, and that that decision directly

precipitated her termination, the arbitrator ruled, the

Committee’ decision must be evaluated under the just cause

standard of the Nurses’ CBA. In other words, the arbitrator

relied on the “industrial common law”—the “practices of the

industry and the shop,” Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. at

581–82—to interpret the just cause provision as extending to

the actions of the Credentials Committee. Under this

interpretation, Allen’s allegation in her complaint at the time

of removal concerning the conduct of the Committee is

necessarily an allegation that she was fired without just cause

in violation of her CBA.

In short, the arbitrator decided the question raised under

the first Burnside factor—whether Allen’s claims arise out of

the Nurses’ CBA or, rather, “exist independently” of it. In

asking us to conclude that her claims are independent of the

Nurses’ CBA, Allen is, in effect, asking us to overturn the

arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract. That we cannot do.

One of the central goals of LMRA preemption is

“preserv[ing] the central role of arbitration in our ‘system of

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industrial self-government.” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 219 (quoting

Warrior &Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. at 581). Lueck recognized

that “[a]rule that permitted an individual to sidestep available

grievance procedures would cause arbitration to lose most of

its effectiveness, as well as eviscerate a central tenet of

federal labor-contract law under § 301 that it is the arbitrator,

not the court, who has the responsibility to interpret the labor

contract in the first instance.” Id. at 220 (citation omitted).

And an arbitrator’s interpretation of a collective bargaining

agreement is conclusive; a reviewing court cannot secondguess it. “[E]ven if we were convinced that the arbitrator

misread the contract or erred in interpreting it, such a

conviction would not be a permissible ground for vacating the

award.” Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Drywall

Dynamics, Inc., 823 F.3d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Va. Mason Hosp. v. Washington State Nurses Ass’n, 511 F.3d

908, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2007)). Indeed, “[s]ince the labor

arbitrator is designed to function in essence as the parties’

surrogate, he cannot ‘misinterpret’ a collective bargaining

agreement.” Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1205. In this sense,

“his award is their contract.” Id. (quoting Theodore J. St.

Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A

Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 Mich.

L. Rev. 1137, 1140 (1977)); see also Lueck, 471 U.S. at 219.

Here, the arbitrator’s award determined that Allen’s

claims came within the scope of the Nurses’ CBA, and the

arbitrator then determined the appropriate remedy under that

agreement. That “award, just as a contract, is the expression

of the parties’ will and must be enforced as expressed.” Stead

Motors, 886 F.2d at 1206. Just as an award more strongly in

Allen’s favor would have bound her employer in any

subsequent litigation, so too must Allen abide by the

arbitrator’s understanding of the meaning and reach of the

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CBA.

We therefore agree with the district court that Allen’s

non-defamation claims are preempted under § 301, because

they involve rights arising under her CBA.15 Because those

claims were preempted at the time of removal, the district 

court properly denied Allen’s motion to remand and retained

jurisdiction over her remaining claims.

D. Summary Judgment on Allen’s Defamation Claim

As noted, supra, note 14, NWP concedes that Allen’s

defamation claim is not preempted. The district court granted

summary judgment to NWP on that claim for three separate

reasons: (1) the claim was time-barred; (2) Allen failed to

allege any defamatory statements; and (3) NWP was

protected by qualified privilege.16 We agree that the claim

15 Because we affirm the preemption issue on this ground, we do not

consider NWP’s alternative argument that any error on the part of the

district court was invited by Allen’s amendment of her complaint.

16 Allen argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her

discovery at two different points. We disagree. “Broad discretion is vested

in the trial court to permit or deny discovery, and its decision to deny

discovery will not be disturbed ‘except upon the clearest showing that

denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the

complaining litigant.’” Sablan v. Dep’t of Fin. of Com. of N. Mariana

Islands, 856 F.2d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Butcher’s Union

Local No. 498 v. SDC Investment, Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9thCir. 1986))

(some internal quotationmarks omitted). No such showing has beenmade.

We further agree with the district court that Allen waived any

argument that the district court improperly considered documents not

referenced in the compliant.

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was time-barred and affirm on that basis.17

The statute of limitations for a defamation claim in

Oregon is one year. Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.120(2). Allen filed her

complaint on December 29, 2011.18 Allen’s complaint was

based on statements allegedly made to the Credentials

Committee by Dr. Hotaki in 2008, well prior to December 29,

2010.

Allen’s injury from the defamatory statements, according

to her own complaint, was her “discharge” from HP in 2008,

which “injured her professional reputation.” This injury

flowed from the discharge itself; if anything, the arbitrator’s

decision cured her injury, by vacating the recommendation of

the Credentials Committee. The reputational injury began

well outside the limitations period. Further, to the extent that

Allen argues that her injury was the arbitrator’s refusal to

“make Allen whole” with an award of back pay, the denial of

a retrospective remedy was not itself the tortious injury; the

injury, instead, was her loss of income as a result of her loss

of reputation.

Finally, although Allen argued to the district court that

she could not have been aware of the allegedly defamatory

17 We also affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on

Allen’s claim for “equitable relief” based on a supposed separate contract

between her and NWP. Allen never presented any evidence of such a

contract.

18 The district court stated that Allen had filed her initial complaint “on

some unspecified date (but after November 2011).” Allen gives a specific

date in her briefing on appeal. Whether the complaint was filed on

December 29 or December 1 (the earliest possible date according to the

district court) makes no difference.

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statements until the arbitrator issued his written decision on

February 18, 2011, in her briefing on appeal she states that

she became aware of the statements upon attending the

arbitration hearings, the last of which took place on

November 23, 2010. That date is also prior to December 29

(or December 1), 2010. So Allen’s defamation claim was

filed more than a year after her awareness of the defamatory

statements. Thus, even if one focuses on when Allen became

aware of the defamatory statements themselves, the

limitations period had expired when the suit was filed.

Contrary to Allen’s submission, equitable tolling cannot

excuse her default. As the district court noted, “[e]quitable

tolling is used sparingly in Oregon.” Rodriguez v. Williams,

No. CIV. 08-290-ST, 2010 WL 1542092, at *3 (D. Or. Feb.

25, 2010) report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 08-

290-ST, 2010 WL 1541962 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 2010) aff’d,

447 F. App’x 850 (9th Cir. 2011). Allen has put forward no

plausible argument to excuse her failure to comply with the

statute of limitations.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to NWP on statute of limitations grounds.

Conclusion

In Kobold, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to Good Samaritan. In Barr, we

AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

RISG as to Barr’s money had and received claim, but

REVERSE as to Plaintiffs’ Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610(4) and

breach of fiduciary duty claims, and REMAND to the district

court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the § 652.610(4) and breach of fiduciary duty claims. In

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Allen, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Allen’s

motion to remand as well as its grant of summary judgment

to NWP.

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