Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03152/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03152-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Atlantic Research Corporation
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3152

___________

Atlantic Research Corp. *

 *

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

 v. * Western District of Arkansas.

*

United States of America, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: March 16, 2006

Filed: August 11, 2006

___________

Before WOLLMAN and RILEY, Circuit Judges, and ROSENBAUM,1 District Judge.

___________

ROSENBAUM, District Judge. 

Atlantic Research Corporation (“Atlantic”) seeks partial reimbursement from

the United States for costs incurred in an environmental cleanup. Atlantic’s claim is

based on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2005), as amended by the Superfund

Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100

Stat. 1613, 1615. The issue for consideration is whether CERCLA forbids a party

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The district court dismissed this matter on the government’s Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. As such, the court assumed the facts most favorably to Atlantic, the nonmoving party. We do the same; and therefore, assume, but do not decide, that the

United States would be liable under CERCLA.

3

These sections have been codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a) and 9613(f). For

convenience, this Opinion refers to the statute sections as designated in CERCLA,

rather than as later codified.

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such as Atlantic, which has voluntarily cleaned up a site for which it was only partly

responsible, to recover part of its cleanup costs from another liable party.2

 For the

reasons that follow, we hold that CERCLA § 107 permits such a cause of action.

I. Background

Atlantic retrofitted rocket motors for the United States from 1981 through

1986. It performed this service at its Camden, Arkansas, facility. The work included

using high-pressure water spray to remove rocket propellant. Once removed, the

propellant was burned. Residue from burnt rocket fuel contaminated the Arkansas

site’s soil and groundwater.

Atlantic voluntarily investigated and cleaned up the contamination, incurring

costs in the process. It sought to recover a portion of these costs from the United

States by invoking CERCLA §§ 107(a) and 113(f).3

 Atlantic and the government

began to negotiate in an effort to resolve these financial matters. 

The negotiations ended with the United States Supreme Court decision in

Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 125 S. Ct. 577, 160 L.

Ed. 2d 548 (2004) (“Aviall”). In Aviall, the court found a party could only attempt

to obtain § 113(f) contribution “during or following” a §§ 106 or 107(a) CERCLA

civil action. Id. at 161, 125 S. Ct. at 580. As no action had been commenced against

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 “[I]t is well settled that a panel may depart from circuit precedent based on

an intervening opinion of the Supreme Court that undermines the prior precedent.”

T.L. v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 2006), citing Young v. Hayes, 218

F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2000). As will be seen, while Aviall has undermined Dico’s

reasoning for parties in Atlantic’s position, its holding remains viable for those

parties which still have recourse to relief under § 113. Accordingly, Dico can be

reconciled with our present holding and we need not ultimately answer whether

Aviall compels reconsideration of Dico.

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Atlantic under either §§ 106 or 107(a), the Aviall decision barred its § 113(f)

contribution claim. 

With its § 113(f) claim Aviall-foreclosed, Atlantic amended its complaint. The

amended complaint relied solely on § 107(a) and federal common law. In lieu of

answer, the government moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), arguing this Court’s pre-Aviall decision in Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 340

F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Dico”) foreclosed Atlantic’s § 107 claim. The district

court agreed. Atlantic appeals.

As will be discussed in more detail below, Dico held that a liable party could

not bring an action under § 107. Dico, 340 F.3d at 531. We recognize the generally

preclusive effect of a previous panel’s ruling. United States v. Blahowski, 324 F.3d

592, 596-97 (8th Cir. 2003). But this rule is not inflexible. Where the prior decision

can be distinguished, or its rationale has been undermined, a subsequent decision can

depart from the prior path.4 We are convinced Dico is such a case; it is clearly

distinguishable from the case at bar, and its analytic is undermined by Aviall.

II. Analysis

As this case turns on the interpretation of CERCLA, a federal statute, our

review is de novo. Iowa 80 Group, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service, 406 F.3d 950,

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The last of these, § 113(f)(3)(B), concerns the rights of settling parties. As the

parties in this case have obviously not reached a settlement, § 113(f)(3)(B) is not

examined here.

-4-

952 (8th Cir. 2005). We undertake this review, recognizing our obligation to

effectuate the intent of Congress when interpreting federal statutes. Id. To resolve

the question before us, we must briefly review the intertwined history of CERCLA

§§ 107 and 113, and then analyze this history in light of Aviall. 

A. CERCLA Cost Recovery and Contribution - Pre-Aviall 

CERCLA is Congress’s monumental attempt to “encourage the timely cleanup

of hazardous waste sites,” and “place the cost of that response on those responsible

for creating or maintaining the hazardous condition.” Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C.

Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935-36 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

To achieve these ends, CERCLA effectively transformed centuries of real property

and tort liability law by making those who contaminate a site strictly liable for the

costs of subsequent cleanup by others. See Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to

Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on Common Law Strict Liability

Environmental Claims, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 903 (2004); Ronald G. Aronovsky,

Federalism & CERCLA: Rethinking the Role of Federal Law in Private Cleanup Cost

Disputes, 33 Ecology L. Q. 1, 9 (2006). 

When the federal or a state government conducts the cleanup, CERCLA

permits the sovereign to recover its costs from whomever is liable for the

contamination. § 107(a)(4)(A). CERCLA also provides three methods by which

private parties may recover cleanup costs. The first is found at § 107(a)(4)(B), a part

of the original statute in 1980. Congress added the others, §§ 113(f)(1) and

113(f)(3)(B), as part of SARA.5

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Many prior opinions have called these “potentially responsible parties”

(abbreviated “PRP”). We decline to use this term. The PRP term has been developed

by the courts. It is not found in CERCLA. The term refers to “a party who may be

covered by the statute at the time the party is sued under the statute.” Pneumo Abex

Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R. R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 773 n.2 (4th Cir.

1998). After Aviall, the term has been weakened and “may be read to confer on a

party that has not been held liable a legal status that it should not bear.” Consolidated

Edison Co. c. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 98 n.8 (2d Cir. 2005). 

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Sections 107(a) and 113(f)(1) are central to our analysis. The Eighth, and

many of its sister Circuits, have previously held that liable parties seeking

reimbursement must use § 113(f)(1), and may not use § 107 for that purpose. Today,

we consider whether this ruling remains viable in the post-Aviall world.

CERCLA’s § 107(a) provides that “covered persons,” which we will call

“liable parties,”6 are liable for, among other things:

(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States

Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the

national contingency plan;

(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person

consistent with the national contingency plan[.]

§ 107(a)(4)(A),(B). Courts have found in CERCLA’s reference to “any other

necessary costs of response” and “any other person,” authority to allow private suits

under § 107(a)(4)(B). See Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir.

1985) (collecting cases).

Section 113 contains a subsection entitled “Contribution,” the first part of

which states:

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Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable

or potentially liable under [§ 107(a)], during or following any civil

action under [§§ 106 or 107(a)]. Such claims shall be brought in

accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims,

the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such

equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this

subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for

contribution in the absence of a civil action under [§§ 106 or 107].

§ 113(f)(1).

There is some similarity in the remedial responsibilities borne by liable parties

under §§ 107(a) and 113(f). The Supreme Court has termed these sections’ remedies

“similar and somewhat overlapping,” yet “clearly distinct.” Compare Key Tronic

Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 1966, 128 L. Ed. 2d 797

(1994) with Aviall, 543 U.S. at 163 n. 3, 125 S. Ct. at 582 n.3. Each requires proof

of the same elements. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489,

1496 (11th Cir. 1996). They differ, however, in procedure and scope.

 1. Section 107(a) Remedies 

Section 107(a) has a six-year statute of limitations, and allows a plaintiff to

recover 100% of its response costs from all liable parties, including those which have

settled their CERCLA liability with the government. §§ 113(g)(2), 107(a). Prior to

SARA’s enactment, some courts implied a right to contribution from § 107, see

Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986)

(collecting cases), or as a matter of federal common law. United States v. New Castle

County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1265-66 (D. Del. 1986). The right initially was thought

to be uncertain in light of the Supreme Court’s traditional reluctance to imply rights

of action in the context of other statutes. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff

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Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-40, 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2066, 68 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1981)

(declining to imply an antitrust right of action for contribution).

 2. Section 113 Remedies

Congress resolved the uncertainty when enacting SARA in 1986 by

adding § 113 to “clarif[y] and confirm” a right to CERCLA contribution. United

Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 1994),

citing S. Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1985). Section 113's explicit right to

contribution is more restricted than that afforded by § 107. Section 113's right is

subject to a three-year statute of limitations; plaintiffs can recover only costs in

excess of their equitable share, and may not recover from previously-settling parties.

§ 113(f)(1), (f)(2), (g)(3).

 3. The Section 107(a)/Section 113 Conflict - Pre-Aviall

Congress’s addition of § 113 posed a dilemma. Courts saw that CERCLA, as

amended, created a situation where litigants might “quickly abandon section 113 in

favor of the substantially more generous provisions of section 107,” thus rendering

§ 113 a nullity. New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1123

(3d Cir. 1997). 

To prevent § 107 from swallowing § 113, courts began directing traffic

between the sections. See id.; United Techns., 33 F.3d at 101; Bedford Affiliates v.

Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998). As a result, regardless of which CERCLA

section a plaintiff invoked, courts typically analyzed §§ 107 and 113 together, aiming

to distinguish one from the other. See Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 424; Centerior

Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 347 (6th Cir. 1998);

Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R. R. Co., 142 F.3d 769,

776 (4th Cir. 1998); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298,

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1301-02 (9th Cir. 1997); New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1121-22; Redwing Carriers,

94 F.3d 1489, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Colorado & Eastern R. R. Co.,

50 F.3d 1530, 1534-35 (10th Cir. 1995); United Techns., 33 F.3d at 99; Akzo

Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994); Amoco Oil Co. v.

Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989).

Traffic-directing dramatically narrowed § 107 by judicial fiat. On its face, §

107(a)(4)(B) is available to “any . . . person” other than the sovereigns listed in §

107(a)(4)(A). See Control Data Corp., 53 F.3d at 936 n.9. In practice, however,

courts gradually steered liable parties away from § 107 and required them to use §

113; § 107 was reserved for “innocent” plaintiffs who could assert one of the

statutory defenses to liability. See Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 424; Pinal Creek,

118 F.3d at 1301; New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1124; Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d

at 1496; Centerior Service, 153 F.3d at 349; United Techns., 33 F.3d at 100; Akzo

Coatings, 30 F.3d at 764-65. This cramped reading of § 107 prevented liable parties

from using it to evade § 113's Congressionally-mandated constraints, thus preserving

the vitality of § 113. See New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1121; Colo. & Eastern, 50

F.3d at 1538; United Techns., 33 F.3d at 98. 

In the pre-Aviall analysis, § 113 was presumed to be available to all liable

parties, including those which had not faced a CERCLA action. See Akzo Coatings,

30 F.3d at 763 n. 4 (liable party’s § 113 claim for costs voluntarily incurred held

barred by settlement); Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1306 (liable party’s claim for costs

voluntarily incurred governed by both §§ 107 and 113). Accordingly, most courts

concluded liable parties could not use § 107. See Pnuemo Abex, 142 F.3d at 776

(collecting cases); but see Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1302 (holding liable parties could

not seek direct recovery under § 107, but that “§ 107 implicitly incorporates a claim

for contribution” which remains available to liable parties through combined

operation of both sections); United Techns., 33 F.3d at 99 n. 8 (suggesting, in dicta,

that a liable party may bring contribution action under § 107).

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Our opinion in Dico was the last in this pre-Aviall line. The Environmental

Protection Agency (“EPA”) had forced Dico, Inc., and another party to clean up an

Iowa site which both had contaminated. Dico sued the other party, seeking direct

recovery of 100% of its costs under § 107 and for contribution under § 113. The

other party settled with the EPA and moved for summary judgment in Dico’s lawsuit.

The district court granted the motion. It found Dico’s § 113 claims were barred by

the settlement and, as a liable party, Dico had no right to recover its full cleanup cost

under § 107. 

Dico appealed the dismissal of its § 107 claim, arguing the Supreme Court’s

opinion in Key Tronic allowed liable parties a claim in direct recovery. We

disagreed, noting Key Tronic dealt with a pre-SARA implied right to § 107

contribution. Dico, 340 F.3d at 531. When we affirmed the dismissal, we joined

other Circuits in narrowly construing § 107, and holding a liable party may only

assert a contribution claim under § 113. Id. at 530, citing among others Bedford

Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 424; Centerior Service, 153 F.3d at 350; Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d

at 1306; Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1496; Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1536;

United Techns., 33 F.3d at 101; Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 764; and Amoco Oil, 889

F.2d at 672. We now see that Aviall undermines Dico, and the judge-created analytic

upon which it relies.

B. The Effect of Aviall 

Aviall’s facts are similar to those at hand. Aviall Services, Inc., purchased

contaminated aircraft maintenance sites from Cooper Industries. The Texas Natural

Resource Conservation Commission directed Aviall’s efforts at environmental

cleanup, but neither the Commission, the EPA, nor any private party brought a

CERCLA action against Aviall.

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After the cleanup, Aviall sued Cooper for both cost recovery under § 107 and

contribution under § 113. It later amended its complaint, seeking recovery only under

§ 113, assuming - based on Circuit precedent – that its § 107 rights would be

preserved in the § 113 claim. The district court granted Cooper’s motion for

summary judgment, holding Aviall had no right to § 113 relief absent a prior §§ 106

or 107 CERCLA enforcement action, and that Aviall’s amended complaint

abandoned any potential § 107 claim. A Fifth Circuit panel’s affirmance was

reversed, en banc. 

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed again. Justice Thomas, writing for

a seven-member majority, construed § 113's “during or following” language. He said,

“[t]he natural meaning of this sentence is that contribution may only be sought subject

to the specified conditions, namely, ‘during or following’ a specified civil action.”

Aviall, 543 U.S. at 165-66, 125 S. Ct. at 583. The Court found the words “during or

following” established a condition precedent to a § 113(f) claim. As such, a court

which allowed a § 113 contribution claim, absent the prior §§ 106 or 107 action,

would render § 113's precondition a nullity. 

Having made this determination, the Court turned to its previous Key Tronic

reference to CERCLA's “similar and somewhat overlapping” remedies. The Court

explained that §§ 107's and 113's remedies were only “similar” in that “both allow

private parties to recoup costs from other private parties.” Id. at 163 n. 3, 125 S. Ct.

at 582 n. 3. The Court carefully noted, however, that “the two remedies are clearly

distinct.” Id. 

Dissenting Justices Ginsburg and Stevens analyzed Key Tronic differently.

They said the Key Tronic court had not questioned whether § 107 afforded liable

parties a cause of action against other liable parties. It simply disagreed whether the

right was implied or explicit. Id. at 172, 125 S. Ct. at 586-87. Justices Ginsburg and

Stevens did not agree that Aviall’s amended complaint abandoned a § 107 claim,

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 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), the United States has

brought to our attention Elementis Chromium L.P. v. Coastal States Petroleum Co.,

450 F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 2006). In that case, the Fifth Circuit determined that the

imposition of joint and several liability was inappropriate in a contribution claim

under § 113. The Court cited Redwing Carriers for the proposition that “‘when one

liable party sues another liable party under CERCLA, the action is not a cost recovery

action under § 107(a),’ and the imposition of joint and several liability is

inappropriate.” Elementis Chromium, 450 F.3d at 613. As we have noted, Redwing

Carriers is an example of the judicial traffic-directing that narrowed the scope of §

107 prior to Aviall. Because the Fifth Circuit was not asked to construe § 107 in its

opinion, we decline to afford this isolated quotation touching on § 107 the weight the

government believes it deserves.

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which they would have allowed to proceed. Id. at 174. The majority explicitly

avoided this question, see id. at 173-74, 125 S. Ct. at 587-88, reserving it for another

day.

 C. The Matter At Hand 

That day has arrived. We now ask: Can one liable party recover costs

advanced, beyond its equitable share, from another liable party in direct recovery, or

by § 107 contribution, or as a matter of federal common law? 

The Second Circuit is the only Court which has considered this question since

Aviall.

7

 That Court revisited its pre-Aviall precedent, much as we have done here,

and concluded that § 107 allowed one liable party to recover voluntarily incurred

response costs from another. Consolidated Edison Co. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d

90, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished its

holding in Bedford Affiliates, which – like Dico – had rejected a liable party’s direct

recovery claim under § 107. Id. at 102.

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In light of Aviall’s holding that §§ 107 and 113's remedies are distinct, the

Second Circuit held “it no longer makes sense” to view section 113(f)(1) as the

exclusive route by which liable parties may recover cleanup costs. See Consolidated

Edison Co., 423 F.3d at 99. The court looked to Section 107(a)(4)(B)’s “any other

person” language, and found “no basis for reading into this language a distinction

between so-called ‘innocent’ parties and parties which, if sued, would be held liable

under section 107(a).” Id. at 99. So saying, the Second Circuit reopened § 107 cost

recovery to liable parties. 

Our Court now stands at the same crossroad. We agree with our sister Circuit,

and hold that it no longer makes sense to view § 113 as a liable party’s exclusive

remedy. This distinction may have made sense for parties such as Dico, which was

allowed to seek contribution under § 113. But here, Atlantic is foreclosed from using

§ 113. This path is barred because Atlantic – like Aviall – commenced suit before,

rather than “during or following,” a CERCLA enforcement action. Atlantic has opted

to rely upon § 107 to try to recover its cleanup costs exceeding its own equitable

share. We conclude it may do so.

The Supreme Court emphasized that §§ 107 and 113 are “distinct.”

Accordingly, it is no longer appropriate to view § 107's remedies exclusively through

a § 113 prism, as we did in Dico, and as the government requests. We reject an

approach which categorically deprives a liable party of a § 107 remedy. Like the

Second Circuit, we return to the text of CERCLA, and find no such limitation in

Congress’s words. 

We have held that “any other person” means any person other than the

statutorily enumerated “United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe.”

Control Data Corporation, 53 F.3d at 936 n. 9. Atlantic is such a “person,” see

CERCLA § 101(G)(21); no one disputes its having incurred “necessary costs of

response.” On its face § 107 applies. 

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 Compare this text to § 107(a)(4)(A)’s more sweeping recovery of “all costs

of response . . . not inconsistent with the national contingency plan.”

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As the Second Circuit stated, “[e]ach of those sections, 107(a) and 113(f)(1),

embodies a mechanism for cost recovery available to persons in different procedural

circumstances.” Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 99. Thus, a liable party may,

under appropriate procedural circumstances, bring a cost recovery action under § 107.

This right is available to parties who have incurred necessary costs of response, but

have neither been sued nor settled their liability under §§ 106 or 107. 

We recognize that § 107 allows 100% cost recovery. Some pre-Aviall cases

justified denying liable parties access to § 107, reasoning Congress would not have

intended them to recover 100% of their costs and effectively escape liability. See,

e.g., United Techns., 33 F.3d at 100 (“it is sensible to assume that Congress intended

only innocent parties - not parties who were themselves liable - to be permitted to

recoup the whole of their expenditures.”) We agree, and reaffirm Dico’s holding that

a liable party may not use § 107 to recover its full response cost.

But § 107 is not limited to parties seeking to recover 100% of their costs. To

the contrary, the text of § 107(a)(4)(B) permits recovery of “any other necessary costs

of response . . . consistent with the national contingency plan.” While these words

may “suggest full recovery,” United Techns., 33 F.3d at 100, they do not compel it.8

CERCLA, itself, checks overreaching liable parties: If a plaintiff attempted to use §

107 to recover more than its fair share of reimbursement, a defendant would be free

to counterclaim for contribution under § 113(f). Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at

100, n. 9; Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1495. Accordingly, we find that allowing

Atlantic’s claim for direct recovery under § 107 is entirely consistent with the text

and purpose of CERCLA.

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Alternatively, we are satisfied that a right to contribution may be fairly implied

from the text of § 107(a)(4)(B). Unlike some other statutes, CERCLA reflects

Congress’s unmistakable intent to create a private right of contribution. See

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 91, 101 S.

Ct. 1571, 1580, 67 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1981) (“the ultimate question . . . is whether

Congress intended to create the private remedy . . . that the plaintiff seeks to invoke”).

We discern Congress’s intent by looking to CERCLA’s language, its legislative

history, its underlying purpose and structure, and the likelihood that Congress

intended to supersede or to supplement existing state remedies. Id.

Contribution is crucial to CERCLA’s regulatory scheme. As the Supreme

Court recognized in Key Tronic, “CERCLA is designed to encourage private parties

to assume the financial responsibility of cleanup by allowing them to seek recovery

from others.” Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 819, n. 13. At first, Congress left some

CERCLA liability issues, such as joint-and-several liability and contribution, to be

developed by the federal courts under “traditional and evolving principles of common

law.” United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 806-07 (S.D. Ohio

1983). Courts, thereafter, held § 107 and federal common law supported a right of

contribution. Id.; Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1457 n. 3. But when Congress revisited

CERCLA in 1986, it enacted an explicit right to contribution in § 113. This reflects

Congress’s unambiguous intent to allow private parties to recover in contribution.

We must next ask whether, in enacting § 113, Congress intended to eliminate

the preexisting right to contribution it had allowed for court development

under § 107. We conclude it did not. The plain text of § 113 reflects no intent to

eliminate other rights to contribution; rather, § 113's saving clause provides that

“[n]othing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action

for contribution in the absence of a civil action” under §§ 106 or 107. § 113(f)(1).

This view is further supported by examining § 113's legislative history reflecting

Congress’s intention to clarify and confirm, not to supplant or extinguish, the existing

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As we have found a statutory right to direct recovery and contribution, we

need not address Atlantic’s claim of a similar right under federal common law.

Accordingly, we leave that question for another day.

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right to contribution. See United Techns., 33 F.3d at 100, citing S. Rep. No. 11, 99th

Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1985). We conclude therefore that if Congress intended § 113 to

completely replace § 107 in all circumstances, even where a plaintiff was not eligible

to use § 113, it would have done so explicitly. Accordingly, we consider the plain

language of CERCLA to be consistent with an implied right to contribution for

parties such as Atlantic.

We conclude that the broad language of § 107 supports not only a right of cost

recovery but also an implied right to contribution.9 See Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at

1302 (“§ 107 implicitly incorporates a claim for contribution”); United Techns., 33

F.3d at 99 n.8 (“It is possible that, although falling outside the statutory parameters

for an express cause of action for contribution [under § 113(f)(1)], a [volunteer

remediator] who spontaneously initiates a cleanup without governmental prodding

might be able to pursue an implied right of action for contribution under § 107(c)”).

We discern nothing in CERCLA’s words, suggesting Congress intended to establish

a comprehensive contribution and cost recovery scheme encouraging private cleanup

of contaminated sites, while simultaneously excepting – indeed, penalizing - those

who voluntarily assume such duties.

The government argues that if we allow Atlantic a § 107 remedy, we will

render § 113 meaningless. Appellee’s Br. at 24-25. This argument fails; liable

parties which have been subject to §§ 106 or 107 enforcement actions are still

required to use § 113, thereby ensuring its continued vitality. But parties such as

Atlantic, which have not faced a CERCLA action, and are thereby barred from § 113,

retain their access to § 107. See Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 818; United Techns., 33

F.3d at 99 n. 8; Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1301. This resolution gives life to each of

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CERCLA’s sections, and is consistent with CERCLA’s goal of encouraging prompt

and voluntary cleanup of contaminated sites. Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 819, n. 13.

A contrary ruling, barring Atlantic from recovering a portion of its costs, is not

only contrary to CERCLA’s purpose, but results in an absurd and unjust outcome.

Consider: in this, of all cases, the United States is a liable party (who else has rocket

motors to clean?). It is, simultaneously, CERCLA’s primary enforcer at this, among

other Superfund sites. See Sophia Strong, Note, Aviall Services v. Cooper Industries:

Implications for the United States’ Liability Under CERCLA, the “Superfund Law”,

56 Hastings L. J. 193, 198-99 (2004). 

If we adopted the Government’s reading of § 107, the government could

insulate itself from responsibility for its own pollution by simply declining to bring

a CERCLA cleanup action or refusing a liable party’s offer to settle. This bizarre

outcome would eviscerate CERCLA whenever the government, itself, was partially

responsible for a site’s contamination. 

Congress understood the United States’ dual role. When it enacted SARA, it

explicitly waived sovereign immunity. CERCLA § 120(a). This waiver is part and

parcel of CERCLA’s regulatory scheme. It shows Congress had no intention of

making private parties shoulder the government’s share of liability. Strong, 56

Hastings L. J. at 209-10.

Here, Atlantic assisted the United States by helping modernize its defenses.

Atlantic, recognizing the deleterious environmental consequences, remediated the

environment without compulsion. Its choice to do so, especially where the ultimate

compulsory authority lay with the United States-corporate, will not be held to its

detriment. The United States, under CERCLA, is liable for its share of the burden.

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The Court, then, concludes Congress resolved the question of the United

States’ liability 20 years ago. It did not create a loophole by which the Republic

could escape its own CERCLA liability by perversely abandoning its CERCLA

enforcement power. Congress put the public’s right to a clean and safe environment

ahead of the sovereign’s traditional immunities. 

We hold that a private party which voluntarily undertakes a cleanup for which

it may be held liable, thus barring it from contribution under CERCLA’s § 113, may

pursue an action for direct recovery or contribution under § 107, against another

liable party. 

We reverse the judgment of the district court. 

It is so ordered.

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