Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-03090/USCOURTS-ca10-16-03090-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edward Amador
Appellant
Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust
Appellee
Wayne Wilke
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

EDWARD AMADOR; WAYNE WILKE, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

BOILERMAKER-BLACKSMITH 

NATIONAL PENSION TRUST, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 16-3090 

(D.C. No. 2:15-CV-02616-JAR-GLR) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Plaintiffs Edward Amador and Wayne Wilke, proceeding pro se, appeal the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Boilermaker-Blacksmith 

National Pension Trust. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I. Background 

 When plaintiffs retired, they began receiving monthly benefits from the Trust, 

a pension plan in which they participate. However, after the Trust received notices of 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

December 16, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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levy for each of them from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), it informed them 

by letter that their benefits would be withheld if they did not complete and return the 

forms provided. Neither plaintiff did so. The Trust honored the notices of levy and 

began sending plaintiffs’ benefits to the IRS. 

 Plaintiffs first sued the Trust in state court. That case was removed to federal 

court and then dismissed. The court concluded plaintiffs had failed to state a claim 

for a number of reasons, including their failure to exhaust available administrative 

remedies. Plaintiffs’ appeal to this Court was dismissed for lack of prosecution. 

 Plaintiffs next filed appeals with the Trust. Those were denied on the grounds 

that they were untimely and that the Trust was obligated to honor the notices of levy. 

In its denial letters, the Trust cited its governing provisions pertaining to its appeals 

procedure, including the sixty-day deadline for filing an appeal: 

Any claimant who applies for benefits and is ruled ineligible, or who 

believes he or she did not receive the full amount of benefits to which 

he or she is entitled, or who is otherwise subject to an adverse benefit 

determination, shall have the right to appeal to the Board of Trustees, 

requesting review of the denial or other adverse benefit 

determination. . . . 

All appeals must be made in writing and must state the grounds on 

which the claimant believes he or she is entitled to relief. The written 

notice of appeal must be sent to the Trustees within 60 days after 

notification of the denial of the application for benefits (or claim). 

Failure to file a written notice of appeal within the time period 

described will operate as a complete waiver of and bar to the right to 

appeal, and preclude judicial review. 

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R., Vol. 1 at 120 & 122. The denial letters also cited a provision requiring the Trust 

to comply with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) 

and federal tax law: 

This Plan is intended to comply with [ERISA] and with the 

requirements for tax qualification under the [IRS] Code and all 

regulations thereunder, and is to be interpreted and applied consistent 

with that intent. 

Id. at 121 & 123. 

 After their administrative appeals were denied, plaintiffs sued the Trust again. 

The district court granted the Trust’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that 

it did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by denying the appeals. 

II. Analysis 

 We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Bryson v. 

City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 787 (10th Cir. 2010). But where, as here, an 

ERISA provider explicitly retains the authority to interpret its governing provisions, 

“we employ a deferential standard of review, . . . asking only whether the denial of 

benefits was arbitrary and capricious.” Weber v. GE Group Life Assur. Co., 541 F.3d 

1002, 1010 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Applying this standard, we ask “only whether the interpretation of the plan was 

reasonable and made in good faith.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We look 

to the governing provisions of the Trust as a whole and consider the common and 

ordinary meaning of the language used. Id. at 1011. 

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 We construe liberally plaintiffs’ pro se pleadings. See Childs v. Miller, 

713 F.3d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 2013). However, pro se parties must follow the same 

rules of procedure as other litigants. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 

2007). We will not supply additional factual allegations or construct a legal theory 

on their behalf. See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009). 

A. Timeliness of Appeals 

 Plaintiffs concede that they did not meet the sixty-day deadline set forth in the 

Trust’s appeals procedure. They argue that the deadline applies only to decisions on 

eligibility for benefits. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 2. Their appeals were not subject to 

the deadline, they argue, because the Trust, having already determined that they were 

eligible to receive benefits, subsequently began sending those benefits to the IRS. 

The common meaning of the governing provision quoted above does not 

compel such a conclusion. Rather, the appeals procedure applies to “[a]ny 

claimant . . . who believes he or she did not receive the full amount of benefits to 

which he or she is entitled, or who is otherwise subject to an adverse benefit 

determination.” R., Vol. 1 at 120 & 122. The provision further states that “[a]ll 

appeals must be made in writing” and that “[t]he written notice of appeal must be 

sent to the Trustees within 60 days after notification of the denial of the application 

for benefits (or claim).” Id.

Nothing in these provisions suggests that plaintiffs were not subject to an 

adverse benefit determination or that any exception to the sixty-day deadline applies 

under these circumstances. Indeed, the use of “[a]ny,” “otherwise,” and “[a]ll” in the 

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above provisions points in the opposite direction, suggesting that the Trust was acting 

reasonably when it denied the appeals by invoking the sixty-day deadline. We 

therefore conclude plaintiffs have not shown that the Trust’s application of the 

sixty-day deadline to their appeals was arbitrary or capricious. 

B. Duty to Honor the Notices of Levy 

 Plaintiffs also argue that the Trust’s decision to honor the notices of levy was 

arbitrary and capricious. But this argument finds no support in the governing 

provisions of the Trust. To the contrary, the governing provisions as a whole are to 

be interpreted and applied “to comply with [ERISA] and with the requirements for 

tax qualification under the [IRS] Code.” Id. at 121 & 123. Federal law permits the 

IRS to collect ERISA benefits to satisfy outstanding tax liabilities. See 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6331(a) (authorizing the IRS to collect unpaid taxes “by levy upon all property and 

rights to property” of persons liable). Subject to exceptions not relevant here, “any 

person in possession of (or obligated with respect to) property or rights to property 

subject to levy upon which a levy has been made shall, upon demand of the [IRS], 

surrender such property or rights (or discharge such obligation) to the [IRS].” Id.

§ 6332(a). In light of these statutes and the governing provisions of the Trust, 

Plaintiffs have not shown that the Trust acted unreasonably or in bad faith when it 

honored the notices of levy from the IRS. 

III. Conclusion 

 Based on the administrative record before it, the Trust articulated two valid 

reasons for denying plaintiffs’ appeals. We conclude that it did not act arbitrarily or 

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capriciously in doing so; therefore, we need not reach the remainder of plaintiffs’ 

arguments. The judgment in favor of the Trust is affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge 

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