Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03139/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03139-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Obed Rodriguez-Lopez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3139

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the 

* Southern District of Iowa.

Obed Rodriguez-Lopez, *

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 14, 2006

Filed: April 24, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

After the district court1

 denied his motion to suppress the marijuana seized from

his vehicle, Obed Rodriguez-Lopez pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with

intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii). In his plea

agreement, Rodriguez reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

On appeal, Rodriguez contends that police violated the Fourth Amendment in the stop

of his vehicle because no objectively reasonable basis existed to believe that he

violated Iowa traffic law. We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.

Appellate Case: 05-3139 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/24/2006 Entry ID: 2036333
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We note that the Supreme Court has held that where the primary purpose of a

checkpoint is to detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the checkpoint violates the

Fourth Amendment. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000). 

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I. Background

The Sheriff's Office of Dallas County, Iowa, established a decoy checkpoint on

eastbound I-80. Along the highway, deputies posted signs that read "Narcotics

Enforcement Ahead", "Police Drug Dogs in Use", and "Be Prepared to Stop Ahead".

The deputies placed the signs just before the Van Meter exit, which is the last exit

before the announced checkpoint. In fact, no checkpoint existed.2

 Instead, the deputies

used the signs hoping that persons transporting narcotics would take the Van Meter

exit to avoid the decoy checkpoint.

Detective Steve Bandy parked his unmarked van at the top of the exit ramp to

observe and videotape cars exiting the interstate. Bandy recorded and reported traffic

violations he observed at the intersection. When he observed a violation, Bandy

instructed deputies waiting nearby to stop the driver who committed the traffic

violation. The deputies kept at least three drug dogs available to assist in checking the

stopped vehicles for illegal narcotics.

Obed Rodriguez-Lopez took the Van Meter exit, followed by a gravel truck.

Detective Bandy observed Rodriguez-Lopez fail to signal a turn when he reached the

stop sign. Detective Bandy videotaped the event and then signaled other officers to

make a stop on the vehicle.

As instructed by Detective Bandy, two nearby deputies stopped LopezRodriguez's vehicle. As the officers spoke with Lopez-Rodriguez, he became

increasingly nervous and gave inconsistent responses regarding his travel. The officers

employed a drug dog, which alerted to three locations on the exterior of the vehicle.

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The Iowa authorities determined that the total metric weight of the marijuana

was 105.5 kilograms.

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Officers subsequently searched the vehicle and found 243 one-pound bricks3

 of

marijuana. Lopez-Rodriguez was arrested and his vehicle impounded.

Lopez-Rodriguez was indicted for conspiracy to distribute at least 100

kilograms of a mixture containing marijuana and possession with intent to distribute

the same. He filed a motion to suppress all evidence derived from the traffic stop.

Lopez-Rodriguez argued that he had not violated the relevant Iowa traffic law by not

using his turn signal because no other vehicle was affected by his turn. The district

court denied the motion, holding that police had an objectively reasonable belief that

the gravel truck immediately behind Lopez-Rodriguez's vehicle was affected by his

turn.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Lopez-Rodriguez entered into

a plea agreement with the government. Pursuant to the agreement, he pleaded guilty

to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii). The agreement allowed him to appeal the denial of his

motion to suppress. The district court sentenced Lopez-Rodriguez to 120 months'

imprisonment.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Rodriguez-Lopez contends that his motion to suppress should have

been granted because the stop of his vehicle was constitutionally invalid, as his failure

to signal his turn did not constitute a traffic violation under Iowa Code § 321.314. We

hold that regardless of the proper interpretation of § 321.314, Detective Bandy could

have reasonably believed that Lopez-Rodriguez's failure to signal his intended turn

violated § 321.314. Therefore, we affirm the denial of Rodriguez-Lopez's motion to

suppress the evidence derived from the stop of his vehicle.

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On appeal from denial of motion to suppress, we review the district court's

findings of historical fact for clear error, while the district court's determinations of

reasonable suspicion and probable cause are reviewed de novo. United States v. Foley,

206 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir. 2000). Under the Fourth Amendment, any traffic violation

constitutes probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle. E.g., id.; Whren v. United

States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). We have held that "the validity of a stop depends

on whether the officer's actions were objectively reasonable in the circumstances, and

in mistake cases the question is simply whether the mistake, whether of law or fact,

was an objectively reasonable one." United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th

Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir.2005)) (internal

quotations omitted). "[S]ubjective good faith is not sufficient to justify the stop, for

officers have an obligation to understand the laws that they are entrusted with

enforcing, at least to a level that is objectively reasonable. Any mistake of law that

results in a search or seizure, therefore, must be objectively reasonable to avoid

running afoul of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1001 (emphasis original). 

The relevant traffic law provides

No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course upon a highway

unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety and

then only after . . . giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter

provided in the event any other vehicle may be affected by such

movement.

Iowa Code § 321.314. Rodriguez-Lopez argues that the statute is not violated when

no other vehicle is "affected" by any "turn". He contends the gravel truck which left

the interstate behind him was not affected by his failure to signal and therefore no

violation occurred. The parties cite State v. Malloy, 453 N.W.2d 243 (Iowa App.

1990) as the only Iowa case on point. In Malloy, the Iowa appeals court held that the

defendant driver was not required to signal a turn to a police car that was one and onehalf blocks behind the driver's vehicle because the police car was not affected by the

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turn. However, § 321.314 does not define what distance or condition renders a vehicle

"affected." Fortunately, we need not decide this issue because the resolution of the

case turns upon whether Detective Bandy's belief that the statute was violated was

objectively reasonable not whether it was in fact violated. Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001.

In Martin, the defendant, while within tribal jurisdiction, was stopped when

officers noticed that his right tail light was unilluminated. Id. at 1000. However,

Section 621(3) of the Tribe's Motor Vehicle Code required only that a vehicle be

"equipped with a stop light in good working order." (emphasis added).

Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant's conduct may have been legal under tribal

law, this court held that the "determinative question" was "whether an objectively

reasonable police officer could have formed a reasonable suspicion that [the

defendant] was committing a [traffic] violation." Id. at 1001. Because the laws of

surrounding areas provided for two working brake lights, and because any

misunderstanding of the Tribe's traffic code was understandable given the "confusing"

language of the provision, the Martin court held that the stop was valid, even if the

officer's interpretation was technically incorrect. Id. at 1001–02. 

In the case at bar, Detective Bandy's conclusion that the defendant violated the

law by failing to signal a turn was objectively reasonable. An officer observing the

defendant's vehicle exit the highway and the gravel truck following behind it could

have reasonably concluded that Rodriguez-Lopez's failure to signal his turn violated

Iowa's traffic laws by failing to inform the gravel truck behind him that he intended

to turn. Therefore, although Rodriguez-Lopez may have a defense to a prosecution for

violation of § 321.314, Detective Bandy's belief that his failure to signal violated §

321.314 was not unreasonable. We hold the stop was valid under the Fourth

Amendment.

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III. Conclusion

Because the stop of Rodriguez-Lopez's vehicle was permissible under the

Fourth Amendment, we affirm the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.

______________________________

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