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Parties Involved:
Mary Theresa Dorailea Duran
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

1 • 1 ED 

United Sta.:es Court of Appeab 

Tenth Circuit 

APR 18 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

-vs- ) No. 88-1801 

) 

MARY THERESA DORAILEA DURAN ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant.) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Colorado 

No. 88 -CR-25 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT1 

Before Chief Judge HOLLOWAY, Judge MOORE, and WINDER, 2 District 

Judge . 

Appellant, Mary Theresa Dorailea Duran ("Duran"), 

appeals from her conviction by a jury of Count II of an 

indictment which charged her with knowingly passing counterfeit 

money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. Duran had been indicted 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and 

shall not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth 

Circuit, except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the 

law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. 

R . 36 .3. 

2 The Honorable David K. Winder, United States District 

Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1801 Document: 01019971500 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 1 
in a two-count indictment with each count containing the same 

statutory charge. The jury acquitted Duran of Count I and 

convicted her of Count II. Duran filed a motion for a new trial 

which was denied by the trial court and Duran was then placed on 

probation for three years and ordered to pay $100.00 in 

restitution based on her conviction on Count II. Duran appeals , 

claiming (1) that the prosecution violated Rule 16 Fed. R. 

Crim. P. by failing to reveal a critical portion of Duran's 

statement; (2) that the testimony of a government agent who had 

interviewed Duran constituted knowing use of perjured testimony 

by the government; (3) that the trial court abused its discretion 

by failing to grant the motions for a mistrial and for a new 

trial; and (4) that the evidence was insufficient to support t he 

conviction on Count II. We find that no prejudicial error 

justifying reversal was committed in the trial court and we 

affirm the conviction of Duran on Count II. 

The major issue in this case centers around the conduct 

of government agent Powell who investigated this case and who 

took an oral statement from Duran prior to trial. Discovery 

provided to the defense prior to trial revealed that no written 

statement was given by Duran in response to interrogation by 

Powell or other agents, but that she had given an oral statement . 

This oral statement was set forth in a report of Powell's and the 

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statement includes Duran's account to Powell concerning how s he 

had obtained the counterfeit bills. Duran acknowledged that she 

had, in fact, obtai ned counterfeit bills and that she had passed 

them as alleged in Counts I and II of the indictment, but her 

defense was tha t she had innocently obtained the bills and passed 

them not knowing that they were counterfeit when they were 

passed. In the statement which Duran gave to Powell and which i s 

contained in his report, Duran claims she had no idea the money 

was counterfei t and further claims she obtained the counterfeit 

money from an unknown Spanish male who had paid her cash for s ome 

custom automobile wheels she sold to him after he answered an ad 

she had placed in a super market. There is no mention in 

Powe ll's report of Duran stating that she had sold the car whe els 

when her husband was in jail and she needed money to make ends 

meet. 

A motion to suppress the statement of Duran's set fo rth 

in Powell's report was made by Duran prior to trial. She claimed 

the statement was not knowingly and intelligently made but wa s 

the product of coercion and there was no valid waiver of her 

Miranda right to remain silent and to retain counsel. At the 

hearing on Duran's motion to suppress, Powell testified 

concerning the taking of her statement. At no time during his 

testimony did he say Duran had told him she sold the wheels when 

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Appellate Case: 88-1801 Document: 01019971500 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 3 
her husband was in jail. The motion to suppress was denied. 

Duran also filed a pretrial motion to prohibit contact 

with her by government agents. This was based on Powell's 

contact with her after she had been indicted and had obtained 

counsel. This motion was granted. A motion to produce was filed 

along with this, requesting any statements made by Duran, as well 

as a ny reports concerning interviews of other witnesses, 

discoverable either under Rule 16 Fed. R. Crim. P., or 

exculpatory and required to be produced under Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963). The government responded that Powell had not 

reduced any other interviews to writing and had no other reports. 

At no time during this hearing did the government state that 

Duran told Powell she had sold the wheels when her husband was in 

jail. 

Because of concern about the actions of Powell, Duran' s 

counsel contacted the prosecutor prior to trial to discuss the 

matter of Duran's husband, Martin Martinez, being in jail. 

Defense counsel's concern was based upon other evidence 

pertaining to Martinez and not based on any statement by Duran, 

as counsel had no notice of that portion of Duran's statement 

referring to her husband being in jail. The prosecutor assured 

counsel that he had instructed Powell that the fact that Martinez 

was in jail was not an appropriate subject of testimony. 

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At trial, Powell was asked on direct examination 

whether he had questioned Duran during their interview about the 

source of the two counterfeit bills she was charged with passing. 

Powell responded, in part, as follows: 

Her response was that after her husband had 

been put in jail, she was trying to make ends 

meet so she went to sell some wheels. 

(Emphasis added) 

At this point defense counsel moved for a mistrial 

based on Powell's statement that Duran's husband was in jail. 

Defense counsel advised the court of her conversation with the 

prosecutor prior to trial, including the prosecutor's agreement 

to instruct Powell not to discuss this subject at trial. The 

prosecutor responded to the court that he had instructed Powell 

not to mention this subject. Defense counsel also advised the 

court that Duran denied making this statement and that it was not 

recorded in Powell's report of the oral statement he had taken 

from Duran. Defendant's motion for a mistrial was denied. 

Duran's first claim on appeal is that the government 

violated Rule 16 Fed. R. Crim. P. by failing to reveal a critical 

portion of Duran's statement. Although this court does not 

c ondone the actions of the government agent, and is of the 

op inion that he acted improperly under the circumstances of this 

case by testifying the defendant's husband was in jail, the 

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Appellate Case: 88-1801 Document: 01019971500 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 5 
s t a ndard of review in these situations is whether the government 

f a iled to provide information as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 

16 ( a ) (1) (A), and, if so, whether that failure deprived the 

defendant of substantial rights. United States v. Jensen, 608 

F . 2d 1349, 1357 (10th Cir. 1979). 

The analysis of this claim is intertwined with the 

above discussion regarding Powell's conduct. Rule 16 Fed. R. 

Crim . P. requires the government to provide, "the substance of 

any oral statement which the government intends to offer in 

evidence at the trial made by the defendant .. " Although t he 

report of Powell's provided to the defense prior to trial did not 

include the eight words underlined above, it did provide the 

"substance" of the statement. Also, no evidence has been offered 

that the prosecution knew of this information prior to trial, o r 

knew Powell would testify to this at trial. Therefore, they 

could not have revealed information they were not aware of 

themselves. Thus, this court finds no violation of Rule 16 Fed . 

R. Crim. P. and no deprivation of the substantial rights of the 

defendant. 

Duran's second claim on appeal is that Powell's 

testimony at trial constituted knowing use of perjured testimony 

by the government. This claim is also directed towards the eight 

words underlined above taken from Powell's trial testimony. The 

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Appellate Case: 88-1801 Document: 01019971500 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 6 
standard of review is whether the government knowingly presented 

perjured testimony and, if so, whether "there is any reasonable 

likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 

judgment of the jury." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 

(1976). 

To meet this standard, Duran must first show that the 

testimony was false and second that the government knowingly 

presented this false testimony. As defense counsel instructed 

the court, Duran denied making this statement to Powell. 

However, assuming the statement by Powell was false, no evidence 

has been offered by Duran that the government knowingly presented 

this false testimony. As previously mentioned, there is no 

evidence that the government knew of this statement or knew 

Powell would testify about this at trial. Thus, Duran fails to 

meet her burden of proof. Therefore, this court finds that the 

government did not knowingly use perjured testimony at trial and 

Duran's second claim on appeal must fail. 

Duran's third claim on appeal is that the trial court 

abused its discretion by failing to grant her motions for a 

mistrial and a new trial. The standard of review by this court 

is whether the district court clearly abused its discretion in 

denying these motions. United States v. Ramsey, 726 F.2d 601, 

604 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986). 

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Rulings on a motion for a mistrial and for a new trial are within 

the discretion of the trial court. United States v. Westbo, 576 

F.2d 285, 292 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Williams, 605 

F.2d 495, 499 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 

(1979). The standard for granting motions for a mistrial or a 

new trial is whether it is required in the interests of justice. 

Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1961); United States v. 

Dixon, 658 F.2d 181, 193 (3rd Cir. 1981); Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. 

As mentioned, the decision to deny these motions was 

within the discretion of the trial court and should be given 

considerable deference. Absent evidence indicating a clear abuse 

of this discretion the trial court's decision should not be 

reversed. This court cannot say that denying these motions based 

on the statement made by Powell was a clear abuse of this 

discretion, especially in light of the trial court's offer to 

instruct the jury that the fact Duran's husband was in jail was 

irrelevant and should not be considered as evidence of her guilt. 

Therefore, this court finds that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Duran's motions for a mistrial and a 

new trial. Thus, Duran's third claim on appeal is denied. 

Duran's fourth claim on appeal is that the evidence was 

insufficient to support the conviction on Count II. The standard 

of review is whether, when the evidence and its inferences are 

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Appellate Case: 88-1801 Document: 01019971500 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 8 
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a 

reasonable jury could have returned a guilty verdict. United 

States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1531 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. 

denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986). 

The evidence presented at trial established that Duran 

used a counterfeit $100 bill to buy movie tickets and received 

roughly $80 in genuine currency in change. After later 

suspecting the bill to be counterfeit, Alan Leyba, the manager of 

the theater, approached Duran outside the theater and asked to 

talk to her. Leyba did not mention his concerns about the $100 

bill at this time. Duran immediately fled from Leyba through a 

department store to the outside. Leyba confronted Duran again, 

expressing his belief that the bill she had given him was 

counterfeit. In response, Duran told Leyba that some unknown man 

had given the bill to her on the condition that she give the 

change to him. This story was different from Duran's later 

account to Powell that she had obtained the money by selling some 

automobile wheels to another unknown man. Duran denied giving 

this conflicting story to Leyba and she explained her flight from 

Leyba as a reaction to an attack on her the previous summer. 

Despite Duran's explanation, we believe the combination 

of Duran's flight from Leyba and the different stories she gave 

to Leyba and Powell, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

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prosecution, could have resulted in a reasonable jury returning a 

guilty verdict. Using the aforementioned standard, this court 

finds that there was sufficient evidence to convict Duran on 

Count II. Thus, Duran's fourth claim on appeal is denied. 

In conclusion, we find that no prejudicial error was 

committed in the trial court justifying reversal. In reaching 

this decision, this court finds that the government did not 

violate Rule 16 Fed. R. Crim. P. and did not deprive the 

defendant of any substantial rights; that the government did not 

knowingly use perjured testimony; that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Duran's motions for a mistrial 

and a new trial; and that there was sufficient evidence, when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, for a 

reasonable jury to return a guilty verdict. Therefore, we affirm 

the conviction of Duran on Count II. 

Entered for the Court 

David K. Winder 

District Judge 

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