Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-08079/USCOURTS-ca10-95-08079-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Meyers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

lJaleld S11te1 Court ot Ap,.aa TenUa Ctrcull 

SEP -6 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Qerkv. No. 95-8079 

DAVID MEYERS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. 95-CR-58) 

David A. Kubichek (David D. Freudenthal, United States Attorney, 

Cheyenne, Wyoming, Patrick J. Crank, Assistant United States 

Attorney, with him on the briefs), Casper, Wyoming, for appellee. 

Thomas B. Jubin, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for appellant. 

Before BALDOCK, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

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David Meyers (Meyers) appeals from his conviction and sentence 

entered following a jury trial wherein he was found guilty of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count I), and aiding 

and abetting possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and (b) (1) (C) and 18 U.S.C. § 

2 (Count II) . 

Facts 

On August 24, 1994, Carl Jones (Jones) purchased four pounds 

of marijuana from Mitchell Meyers in Tucson, Arizona, which had 

been arranged by Meyers and coconspirator, Scott Recore (Recore). 

Jones mailed the marijuana to himself in Casper, Wyoming, in an 

attempt to avoid discovery. The attempt failed and the marijuana 

was discovered. 

Jones ultimately decided to cooperate and in a series of 

statements described a marijuana conspiracy allegedly involving 

himself, Meyers, Richard Federico (Federico) and Mitchell Meyers. 

Jones' statements provided the basis for Wyoming Division of 

Criminal Investigation Special Agent Steve Freel's (Agent Freel) 

testimony and evidence presented to the grand jury. Agent Freel 

testified to the grand jury that Jones was involved in storing and 

packaging marlJUana in various quantities for Meyers between 

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January and August, 1994, in exchange for payment in the form of 

one-quarter of a pound of marijuana; it was Meyers who advised 

Jones and inspected the packages; and Jones made four trips for 

Meyers and brought back between five and seven pound of marijuana 

each trip. 

On May 19, 1995, Meyers was indicted by a grand jury on Count 

I and Count II. On August 11, 1995, Meyers pled not guilty and 

trial was set for October 2, 1995. 

Just prior to trial, the government discovered that Jones had 

lied to investigating officers in his initial statements by 

omitting Recore's middleman role in the conspiracy and by stating 

that he dealt directly with Meyers when in fact he dealt primarily 

with Recore. Jones allegedly lied pursuant to an agreement between 

Meyers, Recore, and himself which provided that if caught Recore 

and Jones would intentionally blame Meyers for the entire 

conspiracy so that Meyers could "try out" his religious freedom 

defense. 

At trial, Jones testified that from January to July, 1994, he 

would receive between five and seven pounds of marijuana from 

Recore every seven to ten days; in July, 1994, he traveled to El 

Paso, Texas, to obtain marijuana from Federico at the direction of 

Recore, who was acting at the direction of Meyers; and at the end 

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of August, 1994, he traveled to Tucson, Arizona, to meet with 

Meyers' cousin, Mitchell Meyers, and obtain four pounds of 

marijuana. Recore testified that he was receiving all the 

marijuana he distributed to Jones from Meyers and that he was 

acting at Meyers' direction by delivering the marijuana to Jones. 

Before trial, Meyers filed numerous motions including motions 

to dismiss based on religious freedom under the First Amendment and 

the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et. seq. 

(RFRA). At the hearing on Meyers' religious freedom defense, 

Meyers testified that he is the founder and Reverend of the Church 

of Marijuana and that it is his sincere belief that his religion 

commands him to use, possess, grow and distribute marijuana for the 

good of mankind and the planet earth. 

After a careful and thorough analysis, the district court 

concluded that the neutral drug laws at issue were not subject to 

a First Amendment free exercise challenge and that Meyers' beliefs 

did not constitute a religion for purposes of the RFRA. United 

States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1509 (D. Wyo. 1995). 

Therefore, the court denied his motion to raise a RFRA defense. 1 

1 The district court denied Meyers' motion before trial 

at the hearing on October 2, 1995. (ROA, Vol. III at 68-70). 

However, the district court's written Order was filed on November 

14, 1995. United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Wyo. 

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The jury found Meyers guilty on both counts and he was 

sentenced to thirty-three months imprisonment, 

supervised release, and assessed $100. 

Issues 

three years 

On appeal, Meyers contends that: {1) the district court erred 

in prohibiting his religious freedom defense; {2) the indictment 

was legally insufficient; (3} the indictment was improperly amended 

by the proof at trial; ( 4) he was denied due process by the 

government's failure to timely inform him or the court of the 

infirmity in the testimony presented to the grand jury; (5) the 

district court erred in failing to award him a two point reduction 

in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility; (6) the 

district court erred in its calculation of the marijuana quantities 

attributable to him; and (7) the district court erred in failing to 

timely address the issues of pre-trial release and post-conviction 

release pending appeal. 

Discussion 

I. Religious Freedom Defense 

Meyers contends that the district court erred in failing to 

balance his interests in his religion with governmental interests 

1995). 

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as required by the First Amendment and the RFRA; in refusing to 

recognize his interpretation of his own religion; and in refusing 

to give his beliefs the status of religion. 

A. Free Exercise Clause 

Meyers asserts that as the Reverend of the Church of Marijuana 

it is his sincere belief that his religion commands him to use, 

possess, and distribute marijuana for the benefit of mankind and 

the planet earth and that 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 

2, which prohibit this religiously motivated conduct, unduly 

burden his constitutional right to free exercise of religion. 

Meyers maintains that in order to substantially burden religiously 

motivated conduct, the government must demonstrate a compelling 

state interest and use means narrowly tailored to achieve that 

interest. 

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment guarantees 

that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . II u.s. 

Const. amend. I. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 

(1940), the Court recognized that there are two aspects of the free 

exercise of religion: freedom to believe and freedom to act. 

On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the 

acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of 

worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to 

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such religious organization or form of worship as the 

individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On 

the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the 

chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two 

concepts,-- freedom to believe and freedom to act . 

.l.Q.. at 303. 

While the freedom to believe and profess whatever religious 

doctrines one desires is absolute, the freedom to act cannot be. 

.l.Q.. at 303-04. "Conduct remains subject to regulation for the 

protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate 

definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection." .l.Q.. at 

304. 

In Employment Div .. Dep't of Human Resources of Or .. v. Smith, 

494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court held that the right to free exercise 

of religion does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 

comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the 

ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his 

religion prescribes (or proscribes) , nor does a generally 

applicable criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct 

that substantially burdens a religious practice have to be 

justified by a "compelling governmental interest." (citing United 

States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)). In Smith, 

respondents argued that "their religious motivation for using 

peyote place[d] them beyond the reach of a criminal law that [was] 

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not specifically directed at their religious practice and that 

[was] concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the 

drug for other reasons." 494 U.S. at 878. The respondents further 

argued "that even though exemption from generally applicable 

criminal laws need not automatically be extended to religiously 

motivated actors, at least the claim for a religious exemption must 

be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in Sherbert y. 

Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)," where governmental actions that 

substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a 

compelling governmental interest. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-83. 

In reaching its decision, the Court stated that "[w]e have 

never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from 

compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the 

State is free to regulate." .r..ct. at 878-79. The Court pointed out 

that "[t]he only decisions in which [it has] held that the First 

Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law 

to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise 

Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with 

other constitutional protections." .r..ct. at 881 (citations omitted). 

In addition, the Court specifically rejected the respondents 

contention that a neutral law of general applicability that burdens 

a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental 

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interest. The Court held that: 

The government's ability to enforce generally applicable 

prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its 

ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 

"cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental 

action on a religious objector's spiritual development." 

Lyng [v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 

U.S. 439, 451 (1988)]. To make an individual's 

obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's 

coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the 

State's interest is "compelling--permitting him, by 

virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself," 

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. [145], 167 [1878]--

contradicts both constitutional traditions and common 

sense. 

~. at 885 (footnote omitted) . 

In our case, Meyers' challenge to his convictions under the 

Free Exercise Clause must fail. First, as in Smith, Meyers 

challenges the application of valid and neutral laws of general 

applicability on the grounds that they prohibit conduct that is 

required by his religion. Therefore, we hold that Meyers' 

challenge fails for the same reasons as the respondents challenge 

in Smith failed, i.e., the right to free exercise of religion under 

the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not relieve an 

individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law 

of general applicability on the ground that the law incidentally 

affects religious practice. Second, we hold that when, as here, 

the challenge is to a valid neutral law of general applicability, 

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the law need not be justified by a compelling governmental 

interest. ~ Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. Inc. v. City of 

Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 521 (1993). 

B. RFRA 

Meyers argues that the district court erred in refusing to 

recognize his interpretation of his own religion and in refusing to 

give his beliefs the status of religion under the RFRA. 

In response to the Court's rejection of the compelling 

governmental interest test in Smith, Congress passed the RFRA reestablishing the compelling interest test of Sherbert, 374 U.S. 

398, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), as the analytical 

framework governing all cases where free exercise of religion is 

substantially burdened. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1). 

The RFRA provides that "(g]overnment shall not substantially 

burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results 

from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in 

subsection (b) of this section." § 2000bb-1(a). Subsection (b) 

provides that: 

Government may substantially burden a person's 

exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 

application of the burden to the person--

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 

interest; and 

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering 

that compelling governmental interest. 

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42 u.s.c. § 2000bb-l(b). 

Under the RFRA, a plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, three threshold requirements to state a prima 

facie free exercise claim. Thiry y. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1494 

(lOth Cir. 1996). The governmental action must (1) substantially 

burden, (2) a religious belief rather than a philosophy or way of 

life, (3) which belief is sincerely held by the plaintiff. .I..d. 

The government need only accommodate the exercise of actual 

religious convictions. Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1479 n.l 

(lOth Cir.) (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-19; Thomas v. Review 

~' 450 U.S. 707, 713-18 (1981)), cert. denied, u.s. 1 115 

s. Ct. 2625 (1995). Once the plaintiff has established the 

threshold requirements by a preponderance of the evidence, the 

burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the challenged 

regulation furthers a compelling state interest in the least 

restrictive manner. Werner, 49 F.3d at 1480 n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000bb-l (b)) . 

Our review of the requirements, although largely factual in 

nature, presents mixed questions of fact and law. Thiry, 78 F.3d 

at 1495. We review the meaning of the RFRA ~ llQYQ, including the 

definitions as to what constitutes substantial burden and what 

constitutes religious belief, and the ultimate determination as to 

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whether the RFRA has been violated. ~- Sincerity is a factual 

matter and, as with historical and other underlying factual 

determinations, we defer to the district court's findings, 

reversing only if those findings are clearly erroneous. ~-

There is no dispute that Meyers' beliefs are sincerely held 

and that they are substantially burdened by 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 

846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The issue is whether his sincerely held 

beliefs are "religious beliefs," rather than a philosophy or way of 

life. In analyzing this issue, the district court examined the 

cases that have delved into the question of "what is religion" and 

catalogued the many factors used to determine whether a set of 

beliefs is religious in nature. 2 Meyers, 906 F. Supp. at 1501. 

2 The district court "gleaned" many of these factors from 

the following cases: Africa v. Commonwealth of Pa., 662 F.2d 1025 

(3rd Cir. 1981), ~- denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982); Malnak v. 

YQgi, 592 F.2d 197 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Sun Myung 

MQQn, 718 F.2d 1210 (2nd Cir. 1983), ~- denied, 466 U.S. 971 

(1984); Founding Church of Scientology of Washington. D.C. v. 

United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D. C. Cir.), ~. denied, 396 U.S. 

963 (1969); Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 

F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 

(2nd Cir. 1943); Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free 

Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Jacques v. Hilton, 

569 F. Supp. 730 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 422 (3rd Cir. 

1984); Church of the Chosen People v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 

1247 (D. Minn. 1982); Womens Services. P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. 

Supp. 1022 (D. Neb. 1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1980), 

vacated, 452 U.S. 911 (1981); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896 

(E.D.N.Y. 1977); Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 

1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1277, ~. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974); 

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The court then used its list of factors to examine Meyers' beliefs 

to determine if his beliefs fit the factors sufficiently to be 

included in the realm of "religious beliefs." 

Keeping in mind that the threshold for establishing the 

religious nature of his beliefs is low, the court considered the 

following factors: 

1. Ultimate Ideas: Religious beliefs often address 

fundamental questions about life, purpose, and death. As 

one court has put it, "a religion addresses fundamental 

and ultimate questions having to do with deep and 

imponderable matters." Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032. These 

matters may include existential matters, such as man's 

sense of being; teleological matters, such as man's 

purpose in life; and cosmological matters, such as man's 

place in the universe. 

2. Metaphysical Beliefs: Religious beliefs often are 

"metaphysical," that is, they address a reality which 

transcends the physical and immediately apparent world. 

Adherents to many religions believe that there is another 

dimension, place, mode, or temporality, and they often 

believe that these places are inhabited by spirits, 

souls, forces, deities, and other sorts of inchoate or 

intangible entities. 

3. Moral or Ethical System: Religious beliefs often 

prescribe a particular manner of acting, or way of life, 

that is "moral" or "ethical." In other words, these 

beliefs often describe certain acts in normative terms, 

such as "right and wrong," "good and evil," or "just and 

unjust." The beliefs then proscribe those acts that are 

"wrong," "evil," or "unjust." A moral or ethical belief 

structure also may create duties -- duties often imposed 

United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968); Fellowship 

of Humanity v. Alameda County, 315 P.2d 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). 

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by some higher power, force, or spirit -- that require 

the believer to abnegate elemental self-interest. 

4. Comprehensiveness of Beliefs: Another hallmark of 

"religious" ideas is that they are comprehensive. More 

often than not, such beliefs provide a telos, an 

overreaching array of beliefs that coalesce to provide 

the believer with answers to many, if not most, of the 

problems and concerns that confront humans. In other 

words, religious beliefs generally are not confined to 

one question or a single teaching. Africa, 662 F.2d at 

1035. 

5. Accoutrements of Religion: By analogy to many of the 

established or recognized religions, the presence of the 

following external signs may indicate that a particular 

set of beliefs is "religious": 

a. Founder, Prophet, or Teacher: Many religions 

have been wholly founded or significantly influenced by 

a deity, teacher, seer, or prophet who is considered to 

be divine, enlightened, gifted, or blessed. 

b. Important Writings: Most religions embrace 

seminal, elemental, fundamental, or sacred writings. 

These writing often include creeds, tenets, precepts, 

parables, commandments, prayers, scriptures, catechisms, 

chants, rites, or mantras. 

c. Gathering Places: Many religions designate 

particular structures or places as sacred, holy, or 

significant. These sites often serve as gathering places 

for believers. They include physical structures, such as 

churches, mosques, temples, pyramids, synagogues, or 

shrines; and natural places, such as springs, rivers, 

forests, plains, or mountains. 

d. Keepers of Knowledge: Most religions have 

clergy, ministers, priests, reverends, monks, shamans, 

teachers, or sages. By virtue of their enlightenment, 

experience, education, or training, these people are 

keepers and purveyors of religious knowledge. 

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e. Ceremonies and Rituals: Most religions include 

some form of ceremony, ritual, liturgy, sacrament, or 

protocol. These acts, statements, and movements are 

prescribed by the religion and are imbued with 

transcendent significance. 

f. Structure or Organization: Many religions have 

a congregation or group of believers who are led, 

supervised, or counseled by a hierarchy of teachers, 

clergy, sages, priests, etc. 

g. Holidays: As is etymologically evident, many 

religions celebrate, observe, or mark "holy," sacred, or 

important days, weeks, or months. 

h. Diet or Fasting: Religions often prescribe or 

prohibit the eating of certain foods and the drinking of 

certain liquids on particular days or during particular 

times. 

I. Appearance and Clothing: Some religions 

prescribe the manner in which believers should maintain 

their physical appearance, and other religions prescribe 

the type of clothing that believers should wear. 

j. Propagation: Most religious groups, thinking 

that they have something worthwhile or essential to offer 

non-believers, attempt to propagate their views and 

persuade others of their correctness. This is sometimes 

called "mission work," "witnessing," "converting," or 

proselytizing. 

Meyers, 906 F. Supp. at 1502-03 (footnotes omitted). 

The district court emphasized that "it cannot rely solely on 

established or recognized religions to guide it in determining 

whether a new and unique set of beliefs warrants inclusion" and 

that "no one of these factors is dispositive, and that the factors 

should be seen as criteria that, if minimally satisfied, counsel 

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the inclusion of beliefs within the term 'religion.'" .l.d. at 1503. 

However, in accord with Yoder, the court noted that "[p] urely 

personal, political, ideological, or secular beliefs probably would 

not satisfy enough criteria for inclusion." .I.d. at 1504. 

Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216 (philosophical and personal beliefs are 

secular beliefs); Africa, 662 F.2d at 1036 (finding beliefs are 

secular not religious); Berman, 156 F.2d at 380-81 (beliefs which 

are moral and social are not religious); Church of the Chosen 

People, 548 F. Supp. at 1253 (beliefs which are sexual and secular 

are not religious) . 

After carefully examining Meyers' beliefs derived from his 

testimony, the district court concluded that his beliefs were 

secular and, thus, did not constitute a "religion" for RFRA 

purposes. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. at 1509. The court concluded that: 

Marijuana's medical, therapeutic, and social effects 

are secular, not religious .... Here, the Court cannot 

give Meyers' "religious" beliefs much weight because 

those beliefs appear to be derived entirely from his 

secular beliefs. In other words, Meyers' secular and 

religious beliefs overlap only in the sense that Meyers 

holds secular beliefs which he believes so deeply that he 

has transformed them into a "religion." 

While Meyers may sincerely believe that his beliefs 

are religious, this Court cannot rely on his sincerity to 

conclude that his beliefs rise to the level of a 

"religion" and therefore trigger RFRA' s protections. 

Meyers is, of course, absolutely free to think or believe 

what he wants. If he thinks that his beliefs are a 

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religion, then so be it. No one can restrict his 

beliefs, and no one should begrudge him those beliefs. 

None of this, however, changes the fact that his beliefs 

do not constitute a "religion" as that term is uneasily 

defined by law. Were the Court to recognize Meyers' 

beliefs as religious, it might soon find itself on a 

slippery slope where anyone who was cured of an ailment 

by a "medicine" that had pleasant side-effects could 

claim that they had founded a constitutionally or 

statutorily protected religion based on the beneficial 

"medicine." 

l..Q.. at 1508. Finally, the court noted that "Meyers' professed 

beliefs have an ad hoc quality that neatly justify his desire to 

smoke marijuana." l..Q.. at 1509. 

We agree with the district court. Under the district court's 

thorough analysis of the indicia of religion, which we adopt, we 

hold that Meyers' beliefs more accurately espouse a philosophy 

and/or way of life rather than a "religion." The district court 

did not err in prohibiting Meyers' religious freedom defense. 

II. Sufficiency of Indictment 

Meyers declares that the district court erred in failing to 

grant his motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that it 

was legally insufficient. Meyers reasons that Agent Freel's 

testimony was insufficient to support the indictment because it 

consisted almost entirely of a hearsay recitation of false 

statements made by Jones and that with the deletion of this false 

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information from the indictment, there is insufficient evidence to 

form the basis of the indictment. We review the sufficiency of an 

indictment ~ DQYQ. United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 

(lOth cir. 1995), ~. denied, u.s. (1996). 

As a preliminary matter, "the validity of the indictment is 

not affected by the character of the evidence considered." United 

States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45 (1974). 

If indictments were to be held open to challenges on 

the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent 

evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would 

be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that 

before trial on the merits a defendant could always 

insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the 

competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand 

jury. This is not required by the Fifth Amendment. An 

indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased 

grand jury, like an information drawn by a prosecutor, if 

valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the 

charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires 

nothing more. 

Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (footnotes 

omitted) . Therefore, we are concerned only with whether an 

indictment meets the minimal constitutional standards which we 

determine by practical rather than technical considerations. 

Bolton, 68 F.3d at 400; United States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391, 

1400 (lOth Cir. 1993), ~. denied, u.s. (1994). 

Generally, an indictment is sufficient "'if it contains the 

elements of the offense charged, putting the defendant on fair 

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notice of the charge against which he must defend, and if it 

enables a defendant to assert an acquittal or conviction in order 

to prevent being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense.'" 

Bolton, 68 F.3d at 400 (quoting United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 

1527, 1530 (lOth Cir. 1989), ~. denied, 493 U.S. 1020 (1990)). 

In this case, the indictment adequately informed Meyers of the 

charges against him; therefore, we hold it was valid on its face 

and cannot be attacked further. Notably, because conspiracy does 

not require the government to establish any overt acts, Meyers' 

contention that the overt acts alleged in the indictment were false 

is irrelevant. ~United States v. Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1319 

(lOth Cir. 1994) ("Under the drug conspiracy statute, the 

government need not prove the commission of any overt act in 

furtherance of the conspiracy.") (citing United States v. Shabani, 

115 S. Ct. 382, 385 (1994)). 

III. Improper Amendment of Indictment 

Meyers contends that the district court erred in denying his 

motion to dismiss on the grounds that the indictment was improperly 

amended by the proof at trial. Meyers asserts that the government 

presented facts at trial which were materially and substantially 

different from the facts presented to the grand jury and that this 

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variance is reversible error. 

A variance arises when the evidence presented at trial 

establishes facts which are different from those alleged in the 

indictment. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 (1979); 

United States v. Powell, 982 F. 2d 1422, 1431 (lOth Cir. 1992), 

~- denied, 507 U.S. 946 (1993). However, no variance occurs 

when the government's theory on which the case was tried is the 

same as that charged in the indictment. DYnn, 442 U.S. at 106. 

M.oreover, even if a variance exists, we will not reverse unless the 

variance affects the defendant's substantial rights. Powell, 982 

F.2d at 1431; United States v. Harrison, 942 F.2d 751, 759 (lOth 

Cir. 1991) ("variance did not affect defendant's right to a fair 

trial") . 

Here, the indictment charged that: 

On or about between January, 1994, through and 

including November, 1994, in the District of Wyoming and 

elsewhere, DAVID MEYERS, MITCHELL MEYERS, and RICHARD 

FEDERICO, Defendants herein, and Carl Jones, did 

intentionally, knowingly, and unlawfully combine, 

conspire, confederate, and agree together, and with other 

persons, both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to 

possess with the intent to distribute, and to distribute, 

marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a) (1) and 841 (b) (1) (C). 

(ROA, Vol. I, Tab 1 at 1-2). The indictment further alleged that 

marijuana was obtained from Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico, from 

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Mitchell Meyers, Federico, and others at the direction of Meyers 

for distribution by him, id. at 2; Meyers would either personally 

transport the marijuana or arrange for others to do so, id.; and 

Meyers introduced Jones, or made arrangements for the introduction, 

to Meyers' sources of marijuana with the intent that Jones begin 

transporting marijuana for him. ~- at 3. 

This is the same theory on which the case was tried and 

submitted to the jury. Therefore, we hold that there was no 

variance between the charging indictment and the evidence 

established at trial. The fact that the government presented 

additional evidence of the existence of a middleman in the 

conspiracy, Recore, who was unknown to the grand jury, is 

immaterial. 

In addition, Meyers has failed to assert how any alleged 

variance affected a substantial right. In fact, he could not do so 

since he was aware at all times of the existence of Recore and 

Recore's role in the alleged conspiracy. Therefore, he could not 

be prejudiced or denied a fair trial merely because the government 

uncovered another member of the conspiracy who agreed to cooperate. 

IV. Due Process 

Meyers contends that he was denied due process by the 

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government's failure to timely inform him and the court of the fact 

that Jones' pre-trial statements, which were presented to the grand 

jury through Agent Freel's testimony, were false. Meyers asserts 

that where an indictment is obtained by false testimony to the 

grand jury, due process requires the government to immediately 

inform the court and opposing counsel and, if the "perjury" is 

material, to inform the grand jury. Meyers maintains that the 

proper remedy is to dismiss the indictment. 

In order to prevail on a due process claim, a defendant must 

show actual prejudice. A due process violation "require [s] a 

specific showing of identifiable prejudice of the accused affecting 

his substantial rights." United States v. Comosona, 614 F.2d 695, 

697 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). 

It is undisputed that although the indictment contained false 

statements based on Jones' false representations to Agent Freel, 

there was no actual perjury committed and the government did not 

know the statements were false at the time they were presented to 

the grand jury. Therefore, this is clearly not a case involving 

any type of prosecutorial misconduct, abuse, bad faith, or 

vindictiveness. 

Additionally, Meyers has failed to show how he was prejudiced 

as a result of this infirmity. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how 

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Meyers could be prejudiced by any alleged failure of the government 

to inform him of Jones' false statement inasmuch as Jones' false 

statement concerned Meyers' actions. Meyers should know what he 

did and did not do in the course of the conspiracy. In fact, if 

Recore's trial testimony is to be believed, then it is Meyers who 

is to blame for the inaccurate testimony presented to the grand 

jury, because it was he who told Jones to implicate him as the main 

conspirator. ~ (ROA, Vol. IV at 369). Therefore, we hold that 

Meyers was not denied due process and that the extraordinary remedy 

of dismissing the indictment shall not be imposed here. 

V. Acceptance of Responsibility 

Meyers contends that the district court erred in failing to 

award him a two point reduction in his offense level for acceptance 

of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). Meyers states that he 

is entitled to a two point reduction in his offense level based on 

his pre-trial statements "clearly demonstrating a recognition and 

affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal 

conduct." 

To receive such a reduction, the defendant must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he has clearly demonstrated 

acceptance of responsibility for his offense. United States v. 

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Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 23 
.l..Y:::l, 83 F.3d 1266, 1292 (lOth Cir. 1996). "Whether the defendant 

has clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility is a factual 

question we review only for clear error." .ld. ~United States 

v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423 (lOth Cir.), ~- denied, u.s. 

(1995). In so doing, "we remain mindful that '[t]he sentencing 

judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance 

of responsibility. For this reason the determination of the 

sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review.'" ~~ 

83 F.3d at 1292-93. 

In general, pleading not guilty and requiring the government 

to prove guilt at trial demonstrates denial of responsibility, 

regardless of how easily the government can prove guilt. United 

States v. Portillo-Valenzuela, 20 F.3d 393, 394-95 (lOth Cir.), 

~- denied, u.s. (1994). However, in "rare situations," 

a defendant may deserve the reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility even though he goes to trial . .ld. at 394; U.S.S.G. 

3El.l note 2. 

Based on our review, we hold that this is not one of those 

"rare situations." Meyers' pre-trial testimony at the hearing 

regarding his religious freedom defense did not rise to the level 

of an acceptance of responsibility for the criminal conduct charged 

in the indictment. Although he admitted that he used marijuana and 

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Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 24 
distributed it to others as part of the Church of Marijuana, he 

specifically denied distributing marijuana to Jones and he refused 

to answer other questions specifically relating to the charges in 

the indictment. (ROA, Vol. III at 54). In fact, Meyers testified 

that he actively tried to discourage Jones from trafficking in 

marijuana. ~- at 62, 64, and 65. Therefore, the government had 

to prove guilt at trial and, in essence, specifically disprove 

Meyers' statements. Accordingly, the district court did not err in 

denying Meyers a two point reduction in his offense level for 

acceptance of responsibility. 3 

VI. Quantity of Marijuana 

Meyers maintains that the district court erred in calculating 

the quantity of marijuana attributable to him. He asserts that 

the district court erred by including ten pounds of marijuana 

related to Connie Griffis, by double counting three pounds of 

marijuana involved in a transaction on July 19, 1994, and by over 

The government asserts that Meyers was offered a 

conditional plea that would have preserved his right to pursue 

any legal issues he wished under the RFRA. This would also 

supports our conclusion that the district court's denial of a 

reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility was 

not error; however, we cannot find any evidence in the record to 

support the government's assertion. 

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counting three pounds of marijuana from Federico's testimony. 

The government has the burden of proving the quantity of 

marijuana for sentencing purposes by a preponderance of the 

evidence. United States v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1508 (lOth Cir. 

1993); United States v. Ortiz, 993 F.2d 204, 207 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

"We review this determination under a clearly erroneous standard, 

and we will not disturb it unless it has no support in the record, 

or unless after reviewing all the evidence we are firmly convinced 

that an error has been made." United States v. Cook, 949 F.2d 289, 

296 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

The district court found that Meyers' relevant conduct in the 

conspiracy involved 83 pounds of marijuana or 38 kilograms; 

therefore his base offense level was 18. If we accept Meyers' 

assertions as true his relevant conduct would be 67 pounds or 30 

kilograms. Under U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c) 20 kilograms (44 pounds) to 

40 kilograms (88 pounds) of marijuana correlates to a base offense 

level of 18. 4 Therefore, Meyers' base offense level under his own 

calculations would also be 18. Thus, this issue is without merit. 

4 Under the measurement conversion table provided, one 

pound of marijuana equals 0.4536 kilograms. U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l 

Application Note 10. 

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Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 26 
VII. Bail and Release 

Meyers contends that the district court erred in failing to 

address his motions for pretrial release, in denying him pretrial 

release, and in failing to address his motion for post-conviction 

release pending appeal. 

On May 19, 1995, and on June 2, 1995, the government filed a 

Motion for a Detention Hearing and invoked the rebuttable 

presumption under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) that no conditions of release 

will assure defendant's appearance and the safety of the community. 

On July 10, 1995, Meyers was arrested in Colorado apparently on the 

warrant issued in Wyoming on May 19, 1995. On July 11, 1995, 

Meyers appeared before Colorado Magistrate Judge 0. Edward 

Schlatter and was remanded to the custody of the United States 

Marshall. On July 14, 1995, Meyers' waived his right to an 

identity hearing with no right to a preliminary hearing. At the 

same time, Colorado Magistrate Judge Richard M. Borcher found that 

Meyers was a danger to the community and ordered that he be 

detained and transferred to the charging district, Wyoming. 

Meyers was arraigned in the District Court for the District of 

Wyoming on August 11, 1995. The minutes of the arraignment reflect 

that a motion for bond was to be filed and heard at a later date; 

however, no date was set. On August 14, 1995, Meyers filed a 

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Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 27 
Motion for Pretrial Release and on September 12, 1995, Meyers filed 

a Second Motion for Pretrial Release. 

Trial commenced October 2, 1995, and the jury returned a 

verdict of guilty on both counts on October 5, 1995. That 

afternoon, the district court held a hearing on Meyers' outstanding 

motions for pretrial release. The district court denied the 

motions on the grounds that Meyers' has a history of failing to 

appear and that he was a flight risk especially since he had 

already been convicted. (ROA, Supp. Vol. I at 8 & 12). 

On December 1, 1995, Meyers was sentenced to 33 months 

imprisonment and three years of supervised release. On December 

12, 1995, Meyers filed a notice of appeal and, simultaneously, a 

motion for release pending appeal. There has been no ruling on 

Meyers' December 12, 1995, motion for release by either the 

district court or this court. 

A. Pretrial Release 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (f) (1) (C), the judicial officer shall 

hold a detention hearing upon motion by the government in a case 

that involves an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment 

of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances 

Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et. seq. "The hearing shall be held 

immediately upon the person's first appearance before the judicial 

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officer unless that person, or the attorney for the Government, 

seeks a continuance." 21 U.S.C. § 3142(f). 

The district court failed to hold a pretrial detention hearing 

in a timely manner. 5 While the failure to provide Meyers with the 

hearing demanded by the statute is unfortunate, it is not a 

sufficient reason to require mandatory release of the defendant. 

United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711 (1990). By the 

same token, it is not a sufficient justification to reverse Meyers' 

otherwise valid convictions. ~~United States v. Rivera, 837 

F.2d 906, 925 (lOth Cir. 1988), vacated, 900 F.2d 1462 (lOth Cir. 

1990) (failure of the district court to comply with statutory 

requirements is not sufficient reason to dismiss all charges) . 

The district court erred in failing to timely address Meyers' 

pretrial release motions. However, because Meyers was convicted on 

both counts, the error was harmless and the issue is now moot. ~ 

Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 722 (harmless error analysis applies 

to § 3142 review) 

B. Release on Appeal 

5 The district court was untimely because (1) it did not 

hold a detention hearing within five days of Meyers' initial 

appearance in its court, ~ 18 u.s.c. § 3142(f), and (2) if 

Meyers' motions for a pretrial release are construed as "appeals" 

of the Colorado magistrate judge's denial of bond, the motions 

were not determined promptly as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). 

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Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 29 
Since the detention hearing occurred after Meyers was 

convicted and the district court based its ruling, in part, on the 

fact that Meyers had already been convicted, we will treat Meyers' 

December 12, 1995, motion as an appeal to this court of the 

district court's denial of post-conviction release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3145 (c) . 6 Our "review of detention or release orders is plenary 

as to mixed questions of law and fact and independent, with due 

deference to the district court's purely factual findings." United 

States y. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

In United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 952-53 (lOth Cir. 

1985), we held that in order to grant bail pending appeal, a court 

must find that (1) the defendant has met his burden of proving by 

clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee or pose 

a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community if 

released under § 3143 (b) (1), and (2) he has established by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the appeal is not for purpose of 

delay, the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact, and 

if that substantial question is determined favorably to defendant 

6 Although the filing of a notice of appeal usually 

divest the district court of further jurisdiction, the initial 

determination of whether a convicted defendant is to be released 

pending appeal is to be made by the district court. United 

States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 954 (lOth Cir. 1985). ~ ~ 

Fed. R. App. P. 9 Advisory Committee Notes, Subdivision {b). 

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on appeal, the decision is likely to result in reversal or an order 

for a new trial of all counts on which imprisonment has been 

imposed. 

Here, the district court found that Meyers had a history of 

failing to appear and that he posed a significant flight risk. We 

conclude that the district court's findings are amply supported by 

the record and that Meyers has failed to establish that he has 

satisfied the criteria required for release stated in§ 3143(b). 

Therefore, the district court's denial of bail pending appeal is 

affirmed. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 31 
No. 95-8079 -- UNITED STATES v. MEYERS 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge, respectfully dissenting. 

Because I do not believe it is the proper role of the 

court to establish a factor-driven test to be used to define 

what a religion is, I respectfully dissent from my colleagues. 

The ability to define religion is the power to deny freedom of 

religion. The ethereal and personal nature of religion has 

posed problems for most courts that have attempted to define 

it. See Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1985) 

("The determination of whether a belief is religious or not is 

an extremely delicate task which must be approached with 

caution."); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3rd 

Cir. 1981) ("[j]udges are ill-equipped to examine the breadth 

and content of an avowed religion 11 ), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 

908 (1982); United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d 

Cir. 1943) (recognizing that the definition of religion 11 is 

found in the history of the human race and is incapable of 

compression into a few words 11 ) ; see also Brown v. Dade 

Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (judges 

filed two concurrences and two dissenting opinions in a case 

Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 32 
attempting to define religion in order to determine whether a 

religious school's policy of racial discrimination was 

religious or social or political in nature), cert. denied, 434 

u.s. 1063 (1978). 

In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972), the 

Supreme Court held that religious beliefs are distinct from 

philosophical and personal choices but failed to provide a 

test or a definition against which lower courts could hold the 

religious claims of petitioners to determine whether the 

claims warrant constitutional protection. Many courts have 

felt compelled by the distinction made in Yoder to establish 

a definition of religion. See United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 

1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1992); Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 

1121, 1123 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 478 (1985); 

Africa, 662 F.2d at 1031. We, however, had declined to do so 

until now. In Werner v. McCotter, 49 F. 3d 1476, 1479 n.l 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2625 (1995), we 

recognized the distinction in Yoder and then found " [a] 

plaintiff, however, need not hew to any particular religious 

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Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 33 
orthodoxy; it is enough for the plaintiff to demonstrate that 

a government has interfered with the exercise or expression of 

her or his own deeply held faith." Id. at 1480. I believe an 

approach that prevents the courts from evaluating the 

orthodoxy and expression of the individual is the approach 

most in keeping with the mandates of the Constitution and the 

Supreme Court. For, it seems to me that the free exercise of 

religion which we are all guaranteed by the First Amendment 

necessarily includes the rights of individuals to define their 

own religion. Accordingly, it is an unproductive and 

unnecessarily invasive exercise for the courts to attempt to 

evaluate an individual's religious claims and practices 

against any set standard of preconceived notions of what types 

of religious beliefs are valid of being recognized by the 

courts. In fact, in the conscientious objector context, the 

Supreme Court has held 

"Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may 

not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines 

or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real 

as life to some may be incomprehensible to others." 

Local boards and courts in this sense are not free 

to reject beliefs because they consider them 

"incomprehensible." 

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Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 34 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1965) (quoting 

United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944)}. By 

attempting to evaluate another's religion with a factor-driven 

test we have essentially gutted the Free Exercise Clause of 

its meaning and are ignoring the Supreme Court's cautionary 

words that a person's views can be "incomprehensible" to the 

court and still be religious in his or her "own scheme of 

things." Id. 

In an early opinion addressing the Constitutional meaning 

of "religion," the Supreme Court first recognized that the 

word religion is not defined in the Constitution and then 

turned to Thomas Jefferson's views that 

"religion is a matter which lies solely between man 

and his God; that he owes account to none other for 

his faith or his worship; that the legislative 

powers of the government reach actions only, and not 

opinions, -- I contemplate with sovereign reverence 

that act of the whole American people which declared 

that their legislature should 'make no law 

respecting an establishment of religion or 

prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' ·thus 

building a wall of separation between church and 

State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme 

will of the nation in behalf of the rights of 

conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction 

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the progress of those sentiments which tend to 

restore man to all his natural rights, convinced he 

has no natural right in opposition to his social 

duties." 

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). The Court 

then held that Jefferson's words "may be accepted almost as an 

authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the 

amendment thus secured. Congress was deprived of all 

legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to 

reach actions which were in violation of social duties or 

subversive of good order." Id.; see also, Ballard, 322 U.S. 

at 87 (noting the intent of the "fathers of the Constitution" 

to provide for the "the widest possible toleration of 

conflicting views" and protection of religious beliefs, even 

those deemed incredible or preposterous by most people) ; Davis 

v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) ("[w]ith man's relations 

to his Maker and the obligations he may think they impose, and 

the manner in which an expression shall be made by him of his 

belief on those subjects, no interference can be permitted"). 

The Court expressed the same sentiment in Cantwell v. 

Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940), when it held 

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Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 36 
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the 

subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one 

hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the 

acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form 

of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to 

adhere to such religious organization or form of 

worship as the individual may choose cannot be 

restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards 

the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. 

Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts, -- freedom 

to believe and freedom to act. The first is 

absolute but, in the nature of things, the second 

cannot be. 

The absoluteness of the freedom to believe and the freedom to 

exercise a chosen form of religion is significantly diluted by 

a court sponsored inquiry into what the individual believes 

and how he or she expresses those beliefs. Although the 

factors provided by the majority opinion arguably are content 

neutral, they still require an individual to provide evidence 

concerning what he or she believes and how he or she expresses 

those beliefs so that the courts may then judge whether the 

beliefs and practices are acceptable enough to be labeled a 

11 religion11 under our definition. Such scrutiny clearly usurps 

the individual's right to believe and to express those beliefs 

however he or she chooses. 

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The Supreme Court has also cautioned that a determination 

of what is a religious belief or practice is 11 not to turn upon 

a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in 

question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, 

consistent or comprehensible to others in order to merit First 

Amendment protection. 11 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana 

Employment Sec. Dilvr., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) . Furthermore, 

11 it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious 

practice or activity for one group is not religion under the 

protection of the First Amendment ... Fowler v. Rhode Island, 

345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953); see also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 

490 U.S. 680, 693 (1989) ( 11 under the First Amendment, the IRS 

can reject otherwise valid claims of religious benefit only on 

the ground that a taxpayers' alleged beliefs are not sincerely 

held, but not on the grounds that such beliefs are inherently 

irreligious 11 ). By applying a broad factor- driven test as 

advocated by the majority opinion, the subjective perceptions 

of the court are necessarily invoked in evaluating whether 

what the individual claims to be religious is indeed 

religious. It also requires the court to judge the practices 

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• 

of the individual to see if they are indeed "religious." This 

test clearly violates the spirit, if not the intent, of the 

First Amendment. 

The Second Circuit relied on the works of American 

philosopher William James to define religion as: 

"the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual 

men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend 

themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may 

consider the divine. " W. James, The Varieties of 

Religious Experience 31 (1910) . In referring to an 

individual's relation to what he considers the 

divine, Professor James used the word 'divine' in 

its broadest sense as denoting any object that is 

godlike, whether it is or is not a specific deity. 

Id. at 34. Therefore, under the Religion Clauses, 

everyone is entitled to entertain such view 

respecting his relations to what he considers the 

divine and the duties such relationship imposes as 

may be approved by that person's conscience, and to 

worship in any way such person thinks fit so long as 

this is not injurious to the equal rights of others. 

United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983), 

cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984). I believe this definition 

comes the closest to capturing the inherently elusive, 

spiritual and personal nature of religion. I also believe 

that under such a definition it is inappropriate, if not 

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Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 39 
impossible, to evaluate or analyze the religious beliefs of an 

individual under a factor-driven approach. The 

appropriateness of the above definition lies in its openness, 

which also makes it unworkable as a standard for those seeking 

concrete guidance in this area. 

It seems to me the better practice is not to engage in 

any type of an attempt to define religion and instead to 

assume, without deciding, the validity of an individual's 

sincerely held religious beliefs for purposes of 

constitutional protection. See Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs 

of Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684, 689 (11th Cir. 1987) (assuming 

secular humanism ls a religion for purposes of the 

Establishment Clause); United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 

820, 824 (11th Cir. 1982) (assuming Ethiopian Zion Coptic 

Church is a valid religion) , cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 

(1983); see also Jones v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294, 296-97 (9th 

Cir. 1979) (assuming members of the Universal Life Church are 

entitled to First Amendment protection) . Under this approach 

if an individual makes a claim that a government law 

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Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 40 
substantially burdens his or her sincere religious beliefs I 

would assume the validity of the religion without analyzing 

the tenets or practices of the religion to see if they fit 

some preconceived vision of what a religion is. This approach 

may seem radical; however, it is the only way we can assure an 

individual the absolute freedom to worship what he or she 

chooses in the way in which he or she chooses. It is 

important to note that such a practice would not send us down 

a "slippery slope" or create a mass shield which any criminal 

could use to thwart prosecution for crimes done in the name of 

religion. It has never been the law in this country that 

religious beliefs prevent the government from regulating 

criminal or other harmful actions of individuals. Cantwell, 

310 U.S. at 303. Under the Religious Freedom and Restoration 

Act, after raising the defense of religion, the individual 

must show that his or her religious beliefs are sincerely held 

and were substantially burdened. If this showing is made, 

then the government may still prevail if it shows that such 

burden is necessary to further a compelling government 

interest and that the law is the least restrictive means of 

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furthering that interest. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb-1. This law 

enforces the absolute freedom of the individual to believe and 

worship whatever he or she chooses, but clearly prevents him 

or her from freely acting on these beliefs in ways that are 

harmful to others. 

In this case, I would assume the validity of Mr. Meyers' 

religious beliefs and affirm the district court's findings 

that these beliefs are sincerely held and substantially 

burdened by the laws in question. Although I am confident 

that the government will have no problem meeting its burden of 

proof, Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 

(government has a compelling interest in regulating the use of 

marijuana and is not required to accommodate sacremental use) , 

cert. denied, 495 U.S. 906 (1990), it has not yet been given 

an opportunity to do so. Therefore, in accordance with the 

requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, I would reverse the 

district court's findings that Mr. Meyers' sincerely held 

beliefs are not religious and I would remand to allow the 

government an opportunity to meet its burden of showing that 

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Appellate Case: 95-8079 Document: 01019277530 Date Filed: 09/06/1996 Page: 42 
the laws involved serve a compelling government interest and 

are the least restrictive means of meeting that interest. See 

United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1559 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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