Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02769/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02769-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Corrections Corporation of America
Defendant
Darin Jones
Plaintiff

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S:\CLR\prisoners\appealaptcounsel

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Darin Jones, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 10-2769-PHX-RCB (JRI)

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Corrections Corporation of )

America )

)

Defendant. )

 )

This is a prisoner civil rights action brought pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently there are several matters pending

before the court in this action. The first is a document

denoted “Notice of Appeal” filed by plaintiff pro se Darin Jones

(Doc. 122). Plaintiff is “appealing” the order of the Honorable

Jay R. Irwin, United States Magistrate Judge (“the Magistrate

Judge”), denying without prejudice “Plaintiff’s Motion for

Appointment of Counsel[.]” Ord. (Doc. 110) at 12:2-3. Also

pending is plaintiff’s “Motion for Request for Stay[,]” filed

simultaneous with his “Notice of Appeal.” Mot. (Doc. 123).

Third, defendant Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”)

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filed a “Request to Strike Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal[,]” as

well as opposing that motion for a stay. Resp. (Doc. 126) at

1:14-15. Lastly, even before the issuance of the Magistrate

Judge’s order denying plaintiff’s motion for appointment of

counsel, plaintiff also filed a motion for a “Stay of

Proceedings to Enforce a Judgement Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 62

Physical and Mental Examinations[] Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 35[.]”

Mot. (Doc. 107) at 1. 

 Background

Pursuant to this court’s referral order, among other

things, Magistrate Judge Irwin issued an order expressly

“consider[ing] . . . Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of

Counsel[.]” Ord. (Doc. 110) at 2:8. Plaintiff sought counsel

due to his “mental incompetence, the complexity and merits of

the case, and his inability to secure counsel.” Id. at 2:9-11.

Stressing that plaintiff “founds his request upon due process

protections[,]” the Magistrate Judge devoted the bulk of his

order to discussing the constitutional limitations on

plaintiff’s request. Id. at 3:9-10. 

As the starting point for his analysis, the Magistrate

Judge recited the established rule that there is no “general

constitutional right for an indigent to have appointed counsel

in a civil case[]” in this Circuit. Id. at 2:13-14 (citing

Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9 Cir. 1980)). th

Likewise, the Magistrate Judge accurately stated that the

Supreme Court has “adopted a ‘presumption that an indigent

litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he

loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty interest.’”

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In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1631, this case was transferred here 1

because it “should have been brought in the District of Arizona, where the events

at issue occurred.” Ord. (Doc. 73) at 1. 

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Id. at 2:23-24 (quoting Lassister v. Department of Social Servs.

of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640

(1981)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge

explained that “[a]bsent such a deprivation of physical liberty,

a constitutional right to appointment of counsel must be found

as a corollary to other general constitutional principles.” Id.

at 2:25-27. 

Consistent with the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge

examined plaintiff’s request for counsel in light of the

constitutional principles of “right of access” and “procedural

due process[.]” Id. at 2:28 and at 3:9 (emphasis omitted). He

soundly reasoned that “Plaintiff’s right of access it not at

issue, and therefore cannot justify appointment of counsel[]”

on that basis. Id. at 3:7-8. Next, the Magistrate Judge

properly engaged in “a due process analysis of the type

announced in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 892,

47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976),” i.e., a balancing test. See Hernandez

v. Whiting, 881 F.2d 786, 771 n.3 (9 Cir. 1989). After th

identifying the various interests at stake and thoroughly

discussing each, the Magistrate Judge found that plaintiff could

not “overcome the presumption against appointed counsel.” Ord.

(Doc. 110) at 10:13-14. The Magistrate Judge thus found that

“Plaintiff will not be denied procedural due process in the

absence of appointed counsel.” Id. at 10:15-16.

Prior to the transfer of this action, the United States 1

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District Court, District of Alaska, granted plaintiff’s

application for “in forma pauperis” (“IFP”) status pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915. Doc. 12 (3:10-cv-00054-TMB) at 1. As that

statute allows, the court waived plaintiff’s prepayment of the

$350.00 filing fee, but it assessed him an initial partial

filing fee, and required monthly installment payments of the

remainder from plaintiff’s prisoner trust account. Id. at 1-2.

Despite having been previously granted IFP status, plaintiff did

not mention section 1915 in his motion, let alone subsection

(e)(1) thereof. Section 1915(e)(1) authorizes a court to

“request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford

counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 

Nonetheless, undoubtedly adhering to the well-recognized

rule that “in general, courts must construe pro se pleadings

liberally[,]” Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 893 (9 Cir. th

2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), the

Magistrate Judge addressed a “statutory request for counsel

under” section 1915(e)(1). Ord. (Doc. 110) at 10:17 (emphasis

omitted). 

After careful consideration, the Magistrate Judge found

that plaintiff could show “neither the likelihood of success nor

the complexity of the issues necessary” to satisfy the

“‘exceptional circumstances’” standard necessary “to support a

request for counsel under” that particular statute. Id. at

11:20-21; and at 10:19. Based upon the foregoing, the

Magistrate Judge denied without prejudice to renew plaintiff’s

motion for appointment of counsel. 

Two days prior to the issuance of that order, plaintiff

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filed a motion for a stay pending resolution of his motion for

appointment of counsel. After the issuance of the Magistrate

Judge’s order plaintiff filed a “Notice of Appeal[]” in this

district court, “chall[e]ng[ing] [the Magistrate] Judge’s denial

of his appointment of counsel[.]” Not. (Doc. 122) at 1.

Simultaneous with the filing of that Notice, plaintiff filed a

second motion for a stay essentially reiterating his reasons for

seeking appointment of counsel. 

Defendant CCA did not address the merits of plaintiff’s

“appeal” or his second motion for a stay. Instead, CCA is

taking the position that the order denying appointment of

counsel “is not immediately appealable[,]” and hence “there is

no viable reason to stay this case.” Resp. (Doc. 126) at 2:4;

2:6. CCA thus reasons that the court should deny plaintiff’s

motion for a stay. CCA also specifically “requests that the

Court . . . strike the notice of appeal.” Id. at 2:8. 

As to plaintiff’s first filed motion for a stay, CCA does

not object to a brief extension “to allow the parties to submit

their Joint Case Management Plan.” Resp. (Doc. 118) at 1:20-21.

CCA is opposing “the remainder of Plaintiff’s Motion” on two

grounds, however. Id. at 1:22. First, CCA asserts that that

motion is “premature[.]” Id. at 1:23. Second, CCA contends that

plaintiff cannot invoke Rule 35 as “a weapon” to “be used to

force CCA to pay for Plaintiff’s expert.” Id. at 1:24. 

 Discussion

I. “Appeal”

Evidently the parties are operating under the misconception

that plaintiff filed his “appeal” in the Ninth Circuit Court of

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The CCA expressly declares that it is opposing “Plaintiff’s motion to 2

stay this case while this Ninth Circuit considers his appeal[.]” Resp. (Doc. 126)

at 1:16-18 (emphasis added). Further, the CCA reasons that because plaintiff’s

“appeal” does not “confer jurisdiction on the Ninth Circuit,” the court should

strike his “notice of appeal” and deny his motion for a stay. Id. at 2:5-6.

Likewise, plaintiff mistakenly relies upon Fed. R. App. 4, governing appeals

as of right to a circuit court from a judgment or order of a district court. See

Not. (Doc. 122) at 1. Moreover, plaintiff concludes his motion for a stay

asserting that “[t]here should be no further actions taken or decided [until] the

9 Circu[i]t[] [C]ourt of [A]ppeals has made a decision and if denied in the 9 th th

[C]irc[i]t[] [he] [i]ntend[s] to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals [sic].”

Id. at 2.

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Appeals. He did not; plaintiff filed his “appeal” in this 2

district court. Therefore, CCA’s argument that the Magistrate

Judge’s denial of counsel is an “interlocutory order” which

“must fit within the ‘collateral order exception to the final

judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291” misses the mark. See Resp.

(Doc. 126) at 1:21-23 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528

(1949)). Section 1291 confers jurisdiction upon circuit courts

to review “final decisions” of the district courts. See 28

U.S.C. § 1291; see also Ortiz v. Jordan, --- U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct.

884, 891, 178 L.Ed.2d 703 (2011) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (“The jurisdiction of a Court of Appeals under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 extends only to appeals from . . . final decisions

of the district courts.”) Consequently, section 1291's

jurisdictional grant does not come into play in the present

case. Hence, despite what the CCA urges, whether the Magistrate

Judge’s order fits within the collateral order exception to

section 1291 is irrelevant at this juncture. Moreover, despite

its designation as a “Notice of Appeal,” given the statutory

framework for a magistrate judge’s authority discussed below,

the court will be treating that “Notice” as objections under

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Specifically excluded from that grant of authority are motions “for 3

injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss

or quash an indictment or information. . . , to suppress evidence in a criminal

case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can by granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an

action.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Clearly, this court has the authority

to address such objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

A. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 636 delineates the powers of federal magistrate

judges. The referral order in the present case was made

pursuant to section 636(b)(1). Under that statute, the standard

of review differs depending upon whether a magistrate judge’s

decision is non-dispositive or dispositive. Section

636(b)(1)(A), with the exception of eight types of motions,3

authorizes a magistrate judge to resolve “any pretrial

matter[s]” subject to “reconsider[ation] thereunder “where it

has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly

erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see

also Estate of Conners by Meredith v. O’Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 658

(9 Cir. 1993) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a district th

judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear any

nondispositive pretrial matter pending before the court.”) In

discussing “nondispositive matters[,]” Rule 72(a) explains that

“[w]hen a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party’s claim or

defense is referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide,

the magistrate judge must promptly conduct the required

proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a written order stating

the decision.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). That Rule allows a party

14 days within which to file and serve objections to the

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magistrate judge’s order. Id. Correspondingly, 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B), permits a district court to designate a

magistrate judge to conduct hearings and submit proposed

findings of fact and recommendations to the district court on

the excepted motions listed in section 636(b)(1)(A). If written

objections are filed, the district court conducts a de novo

review of those proposed findings of fact and recommendations.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

To determine the scope of the magistrate judge’s authority

and, in turn, the standard of review, it is not enough to

“simply look to the list of excepted pretrial matters” in

636(b)(1)(A). See United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 377 F.3d

1064, 1068 (9 Cir. 2004). The court must look beyond the plain th

language of that statute because the eight listed motions “are

not an exhaustive list of all the pretrial matters that are

excepted from the magistrate judge’s authority.” Id. at 1067.

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “any motion not listed,

nor analogous to a motion listed in this category, falls within

the non-dispositive group of matters which a magistrate may

determine.” Id. at 1067-68 (citation omitted) (emphasis added

by Rivera-Guerrero Court). Thus, a court also “must look to the

effect of the motion, in order to determine whether it is

properly characterized as dispositive or non-dispositive of a

claim or defense of a party.” Id. at 1068 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Discussion

A motion for appointment of counsel is not among those

motions excepted from section 636(b)(1)(A). As just explained

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though, that does not necessarily mean that such a motion is

dispositive. Indeed, courts routinely deem orders denying

appointment of counsel to be nondispositive, subject to review

under the clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard. See,

e.g., Tremblay v. Lapier, 2010 WL 3187456 (D.Mont. Aug. 10,

2010); McDonald v. Waddington, 2009 WL 302279, at *2-*3

(W.D.Wash. Feb. 6, 2009) (finding that a magistrate judge’s

“non-dispositive order denying [a prisoner’s] request for

appointment of counsel . . . was neither clearly erroneous nor

contrary to law[]”); and Nash v. Waddington, 2007 WL 2461774

(W.D.Wash. Aug. 27, 2007) (same). That is logical given that

such motions are not dispositive of a party’s claim or defense.

Cf. Jones v. Vanderville, 2009 WL 4572880, at *2 (E.D.Cal. Dec.

1, 2009) (magistrate judge’s order dismissing the complaint with

leave to amend was non-dispositive). 

Based upon the foregoing, this court, too, considers the

Magistrate Judge’s order denying plaintiff Jones’ motion for

appointment of counsel to be non-dispositive. Bolstering this

conclusion is the fact that the Magistrate Judge explicitly

denied that motion “without prejudice.” Ord. (Doc. 110) at

12:3. A denial without prejudice is different than a denial

with prejudice “in the sense that” the former “does not preclude

a subsequent motion based on the same argument.” See Ross v.

Excel Group Flexible Benefit Plan, 2008 WL 4567229, at *3

(D.Ariz. Oct. 14, 2008). Therefore, the Magistrate Judge’s

order also is non-dispositive “in the sense” that it does not

completely foreclose plaintiff from seeking appointment of

counsel at another point during this litigation. See id.

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The determination that the Magistrate Judge’s order is nondispositive means that it is subject to the clearly erroneous

or contrary to law standard of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). See

also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a) (a district court “must consider timely

objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that

is clearly erroneous or contrary to law[]”). “The clearly

erroneous standard, which applies to a magistrate judge's

findings of fact, is significantly deferential, requiring a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

Patterson v. Ryan, 2010 WL 4136097, at *2 (D.Ariz. Oct. 13,

2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “By

contrast, the contrary to law standard . . . permits independent

review of purely legal determinations by the magistrate judge.”

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). With

these standards in mind, the court will consider plaintiff's

objections to the order denying his motion for appointment of

counsel.

Those objections consist of a list of 13 statements, mostly

pertaining to plaintiff’s complaint, although a few are germane

to his motion for counsel. Further, plaintiff asserts that the

Magistrate Judge did not rely upon current and applicable

Supreme Court case law. See Not. (Doc. 122) at 1, ¶ 2).

Plaintiff has utterly failed to show that any of the Magistrate

Judge’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. Nor has he

shown that any of the Magistrate Judge’s legal conclusions were

contrary to law. Plaintiff would be hard pressed to make

either showing given the Magistrate Judge’s thoughtful and

careful review of plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel,

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The court is well aware that in this Circuit a magistrate judge has no 4

authority to issue a dispositive order denying in forma pauperis status unless

there has been written consent pursuant to section 636(c). Tripati v. Rison, 847

F.2d 548, 549 (9 Cir. 1988); see also Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, th

1114 (9 Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (“[A]n application to proceed in forma th

pauperis is not a nondispositive matter under Rule 72(a).”); and LRCiv 72.2(a)(4)

(“[A] Magistrate Judge may not deny a request for in forma pauperis status unless

the person requesting such status has expressly consented in writing to Magistrate

Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).”) There was no written consent

here. 

The Magistrate Judge’s order did invoke the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,

as discussed herein. Therefore, at first glance it might appear that the

Magistrate Judge exceeded the scope of his statutory authority in denying

plaintiff’s request for counsel based upon subsection (e)(1) of that statute.

However, the Magistrate Judge clearly had the authority, as he did, to consider

whether plaintiff’s request for counsel should be granted under that particular

statute. The Magistrate Judge had that authority because in contrast to the denial

of informa pauperis status, as explained above, the denial of a request to appoint

counsel is non-dispositive. 

Moreover, as noted at the outset, the transfer of this action from the United

States District Court, District of Alaska, that court granted plaintiff’s

application for IFP status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). Especially

given that history, it is obvious that the issue of plaintiff’s IFP status was not

before Magistrate Judge Irwin. Rather, he only properly considered the discrete

issue of whether the court should “request an attorney to represent” plaintiff

under section 1915(e)(1) because plaintiff is “unable to afford counsel.” See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 

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the applicable law, and the relevant facts. Thus, there is

absolutely no basis for this court to reconsider any aspect of

the Magistrate Judge’s order denying without prejudice

plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. Accordingly, the

court overrules plaintiff’s objections and affirms that order.4

That ruling renders moot defendant’s motion to strike

plaintiff’s “Notice of Appeal.” The court thus denies as moot

defendant’s motion to strike (Doc. 126). 

II. Motions for a Stay

A. March Motion

Prior to the Magistrate Judge issuing the subject order,

plaintiff filed a motion entitled “Stay of Proceedings to

enforce a Judgement Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 62 Physical and Mental

Examinations[] Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 35[.]” Mot. (Doc. 107). On

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April 20, 2011, the Magistrate Judge withdrew the referral order

as to that particular motion, so that motion is now properly

before this court for consideration. 

Insofar as the court is able to discern, plaintiff’s motion

actually seeks three separate forms of relief. First, plaintiff

is seeking a “stay [of] all proceedings[] until[] the motion

for counsel is ‘resolved[.]’” Mot. (Doc. 107) at 1, ¶ 1).

Second, if his motion for appointment of counsel is denied,

plaintiff “asks this court for reconsideration of that denial.”

Id. at 1, ¶ 2). Third, “at the defendant[’]s expense[,]”

plaintiff is seeking a “private examination” as to his “mental

status” pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 35. Id. at 2, ¶ 7). 

Given the limited scope of the stay which plaintiff is

seeking, i.e., “until[] the motion for counsel is resolved[,]’”

his motion is moot because this court has resolved that issue.

Plaintiff’s motion also is moot insofar as he is seeking

“reconsideration of th[e] denial” of his motion for appointment

of counsel because this court has found no basis for

reconsideration. See id. at 1, ¶ 2). 

As to plaintiff’s request for a private mental examination

at defendant’s expense, Rule 35 simply does not encompass such

a request. To be sure, pursuant to Rule 35 a district court has

the discretion “under appropriate circumstances, [to] order a

party to submit to a physical examination at the request of an

opposing party[.]” Callegari v. Lee, 2011 WL 175927, at *7

(N.D.Cal. Jan. 19, 2011). However, “Rule 35 ‘does not vest the

court with authority to appoint an expert to examine a party

wishing an examination of himself.’” Id. (quoting Smith v.

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Plaintiff’s reliance upon FED.R.CIV.P. 24 as the basis for this motion 5

is misplaced. That Rule governs intervention in an action and has no relevance

whatsoever to this stay motion. 

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Carroll, 602 F.Supp.2d 521, 526 (D.Del. 2009); see, e.g., Baker

v. Hatch, 2010 WL 3212859 at *3 (E.D.Cal. 2010) (finding no

authority under Rule 35(a) to grant pro se prisoner plaintiff's

request for medical examination); Adams v. Epps, 2008 WL 4861926

at *1 (S.D.Miss. 2008) (same); Cabrera v. Williams, 2007 WL

2682163 at *2 (D.Neb. Sept.7, 2007) (same)). Therefore, the

court denies plaintiff’s motion insofar as he is seeking a

court-ordered physical examination at defendant’s expense. 

In short, the court denies in its entirety plaintiff’s

motion for a stay (Doc. 107). 

B. April Motion

Simultaneously with the filing of his “Notice of Appeal”

plaintiff filed a “Motion for Request for Stay[] Under Rule 245

Intervention to Stop Al[l] Proceeding[]s [U]ntil[] 9th

Circu[i]t[] Court of Appeals Rules on Appeal from the Court’s

Decision” (Doc. 123) at 1 (footnote added). The court sua

sponte withdraws the reference to the Magistrate Judge as to

this motion, and denies it as premature given that currently

there is nothing pending in the Ninth Circuit.

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s “Motion for Request for Stay[]” (Doc. 107)

is DENIED; 

(2) Plaintiff’s “Notice of Appeal” (Doc. 122), is

OVERRULED; and the Magistrate Judge’s order denying plaintiff’s

motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice (Doc. 110)

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is AFFIRMED; 

(3) Plaintiff’s “Motion for Request for Stay[]” (Doc. 123)

is DENIED; and 

(4) Defendant’s “Request to Strike Notice of Appeal” (Doc.

126) is DENIED.

DATED this 5 day of May, 2011. th

copies to plaintiff pro se and all counsel of record

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