Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03830/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03830-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. Hedgpeth
Respondent
Frank Leon Webster
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK LEON WEBSTER,

Petitioner,

 v.

A. HEDGPETH, Warden,

Respondent. ______________________________

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No. C 07-3830 MMC (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL;

GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(Docket No. 2)

On July 26, 2007, petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the abovetitled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant petition

challenges the sentence imposed on a 1995 conviction obtained against petitioner in the

Alameda County Superior Court. The sentence was enhanced by a 1985 conviction that

petitioner claims was constitutionally invalid. Petitioner previously filed in this district three

petitions challenging the 1985 conviction. One petition, filed in 2001, challenged the validity

of the 1995 sentence on the ground that the 1985 conviction used to enhance the sentence

was unconstitutionally obtained; two petitions, filed, respectively, in 1987 and 2002,

challenged the validity of the 1985 conviction and sentence directly. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court finds the instant petition is subject to dismissal because petitioner has not

sought or obtained authorization to file a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(b)(3).

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Case 3:07-cv-03830-MMC Document 5 Filed 11/02/07 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Indeed, petitioner was appointed counsel before he elected to

proceed pro se.

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BACKGROUND

A. The 2001 Petition

In 2001, petitioner filed in this district a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

challenging his 1995 conviction. See Webster v. Ortiz, No. C 01-0453 MMC (PR). One of

the claims petitioner raised in the petition was a challenge to his sentence, which had been

enhanced by the 1985 conviction. Petitioner claimed the 1985 conviction could not be used

to enhance the 1995 sentence because the 1985 conviction had been obtained in violation of

petitioner’s constitutional right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.

806, 832, 835 (1975). 

Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Lackawanna

County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001), this Court dismissed petitioner’s claim

sua sponte, holding as follows: 

In Lackawanna, the [Supreme] Court held that if a “conviction is later used to

enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the

enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior

conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. [Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 404.] 

The only exception to the rule barring challenges to prior convictions used to

enhance current sentences is that a petitioner may challenge a prior conviction

on the ground that the right to the appointment of counsel for an indigent

defendant under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), was denied. [Id.] 

 Petitioner’s third claim does not fall within this exception because he does not

claim that he was denied his right to the appointment of counsel.1

 Petitioner’s

claim that his decision to exercise his right to self-representation under Faretta

was not knowingly and voluntarily made is distinct from the “unique

constitutional defect” of failing to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant. 

See Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496 (1994) (holding exception for

bringing claims under Gideon for the denial of the right to the appointment of

counsel does not encompass other claims under the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel, such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, involuntary guilty

plea, and failure to advise of the right to “stipulated facts”). As a result,

petitioner’s third claim does not fall under the exception to the rule in

Lackawanna that petitioner may not challenge the constitutionality of the 1985

prior conviction used to enhance his current sentence. Accordingly,

petitioner’s third claim must be dismissed.

(Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, filed July 23, 2001, at 2:10-3:1.) 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In a separate order, the Court denied on the merits petitioner’s one remaining claim

challenging his 1995 conviction, that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in

connection with a pre-trial motion to suppress. (See Order Denying Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed Sept. 26, 2001.)

Petitioner then sought a certificate of appealability, which both this Court and the

Ninth Circuit denied. (See Webster v. Ortiz, No. C 01-0453, Docket Nos. 27 & 29.) 

Petitioner also filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying his petition on

the merits. In the motion he alleged he was entitled to habeas relief because a false tape

recording of a “911” call was introduced at his state trial. The Court denied the motion,

finding petitioner knew about the claim when he filed his petition, and he had made no

showing that respondent had either prevented him from raising the claim, or had engaged in

any fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct in connection with petitioner’s presentation of

the claim. (See Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed Sept. 25, 2002.) 

B. The 1987 and 2002 Petitions

In 2002, petitioner filed in this district a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

challenging the validity of his 1985 conviction and sentence. See Webster v. Myers, No. C

02-0305 MMC (PR). In response to the petition, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the

petition as a second or successive petition. The motion was based on petitioner’s previously

having filed a petition in the Northern District of California challenging the same 1985

conviction and sentence. That petition, Webster v. Myers, No. C 87-4949 WWS (PR), was

denied on the merits on April 4, 1988. 

In opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss, petitioner argued that his 2002

petition should not be dismissed as a second or successive petition because he was attempting

to present new claims and factual allegations not presented in the 1987 petition. Petitioner

asserted that prison officials had prevented him from presenting those claims and factual

allegations in the 1987 petition by altering that petition before it was sent to the district court. 

He claimed he only became aware that the 1987 petition had been altered when he received a

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Petitioner acknowledges that he cannot directly challenge the 1985 conviction and

sentence, because the Ninth Circuit denied his application for leave to file a second or

successive petition challenging that conviction and sentence in the district court. 

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copy of the 1987 petition in conjunction with respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

The Court found the 2002 petition was a second or successive petition under 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) and, consequently, petitioner was required to obtain authorization

from the Ninth Circuit to file the petition in the district court. Accordingly, the Court

dismissed the petition without prejudice to petitioner’s refiling the petition if he obtained the

necessary order from the Ninth Circuit. (See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Successive

Petition, filed Apr. 10, 2002.) 

Petitioner subsequently applied to the Ninth Circuit for authorization to file a second

or successive petition challenging the 1985 conviction and sentence. On August 9, 2006, the

Ninth Circuit denied petitioner’s application. (See Pet. at 5; Ninth Circuit Order, filed

Aug. 9, 2006, attached to Pet.) 

C. The Instant Petition

In the instant petition, petitioner asserts he is attempting to challenge the validity of

the enhanced sentence he received for the 1995 conviction. Petitioner argues he is

challenging the 1995 sentence on the ground that the 1985 conviction used to enhance the

sentence is unconstitutional, because petitioner was denied access to the courts when he

attempted to challenge the validity of the 1985 conviction.2

 Specifically, petitioner claims he

was denied access to the courts because his 1987 federal habeas petition challenging the 1985

conviction was altered by prison officials before the 1987 petition was filed. Consequently,

he argues, the district court denied the 1987 petition without having had the opportunity to

rule on all of petitioner’s challenges to the 1985 conviction.

Petitioner acknowledges that this Court, relying upon Lackawanna, supra, previously

dismissed petitioner’s claim, which he raised in his 2001 petition, that the 1995 sentence

should not have been enhanced by the 1985 conviction because the 1985 conviction had been

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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obtained in violation of petitioner’s right to self-representation. Petitioner argues, however,

that if the Court had been aware when it dismissed the claim that the 1985 conviction was

invalid because petitioner had been denied access to the courts, the Court would not have

concluded that petitioner’s challenge to the 1995 sentence was foreclosed by Lackawanna. 

Petitioner asserts that he should be allowed to proceed with the instant petition because he

did not learn that the 1987 petition had been altered until he received a copy of the 1987

petition in conjunction with respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s 2002 petition

challenging the 1985 conviction as a second or successive petition. Consequently, petitioner

argues, he was unable to raise the denial of access to the courts claim in the 2001 petition. 

DISCUSSION

A second or successive petition may not be filed in the district court unless the

petitioner first obtains from the appropriate United States Court of Appeals an order

authorizing the district court to consider such petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 

Petitioner does not dispute that in 2001 he filed a prior petition challenging the same

conviction and sentence as challenged in the instant petition, and that the 2001 petition was

denied on the merits. Rather, he argues that the instant petition should not be treated as a

second or successive petition, because, when he filed the 2001 petition, he was not aware of

the facts underlying his current challenge to the 1985 conviction, specifically, denial of

access to the courts. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244, “a claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus

application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be

dismissed” unless the petitioner first moves “in the appropriate court of appeals for an order

authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive application.” See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2244(b)(2), (b)(3)(A). “The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or

successive application only if it determines the application makes a prima facie showing that

the application satisfies the requirements of [28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2)].” See U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(3)(C); see also § 2244(b)(2) (listing circumstances under which second or

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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successive petition may proceed). Accordingly, the issue of whether petitioner may file the

instant petition under the circumstances he alleges must be determined by the Ninth Circuit. 

Because the instant petition is a second or successive petition and petitioner has not

sought or obtained an order from the Ninth Circuit authorizing him to file a second or

successive petition in the district court, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED, without

prejudice to petitioner’s refiling the petition if he obtains the necessary order.

In light of petitioner’s lack of funds, his application to proceed in forma pauperis is

hereby GRANTED.

This order terminates Docket No. 2.

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 2, 2007 _________________________ MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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