Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00494/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00494-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Board of Trustees of the State Center Community College District
Defendant
David Paul Davenport
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID PAUL DAVENPORT,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE STATE

CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE

DISTRICT, 

 Defendant.

1:07-cv-00494 OWW SMS

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(6), OR IN THE

ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR A

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P.

12(e)

I. INTRODUCTION.

Plaintiff David Paul Davenport (“Davenport”) brings this pro

se action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), based on a claim of unlawful

retaliation by Plaintiff’s former employer, Defendant State

Center Community College District (“District”). Davenport

alleges the District fired him in retaliation for a sexual

harassment and discrimination complaint he submitted to the

District against his supervisor, Dr. Margaret E. Mericle. He

also asserts a wrongful termination claim based on various state

law theories and other claims for which he does not identify a

legal theory. 

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Before the court for decision is Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), or in the alternative, Motion for a More Definite

Statement Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (“Motion to

Dismiss”). Defendant seeks dismissal for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted on the grounds that: 1)

any claim for retaliation based on alleged acts prior to and

including the date of the Board of Trustees’ decision to

terminate Plaintiff, January 7, 2003, are barred because

Plaintiff did not submit his claim to the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within the Title VII filing

limitations period; 2) any claim for retaliation based on recent

alleged acts in November and December of 2006 is barred because

Plaintiff has failed to first exhaust his administrative

remedies; 3) Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by the

statute of limitations of the California Tort Claims Act, which

prevents suits for money or damages based on claims that accrued

more than one year earlier or, in some cases, more than six

months earlier; and 4) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies with respect to his state law claims

because he has not submitted a claim to the District prior to

filing a lawsuit as required by the California Tort Claims Act. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

A. Summary of the Complaint.

Plaintiff alleges he was fired from his position as a

tenured history instructor at Fresno City College by the

District’s Board of Trustees in retaliation for making an

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accusation of discrimination and sexual harassment against his

supervisor, Dr. Margaret Mericle. He asserts that in doing so,

the District violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 

Plaintiff’s complaint contains a long list of allegations of

allegedly unlawful conduct by the District, the clearest of which

is his Title VII retaliation claim. 

In response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff

clarifies his claims for relief as retaliation under Title VII

and unlawful termination, the latter “based on violations by the

Defendant of an employment contract; violations by the Defendant

of its own policies, rules and regulations as they relate to

making and resolving complaints; and violations by the Defendant

of various California Education Codes as they relate to equitable

treatment of all employees by a given employer.” (Doc. 17 at 2.) 

Plaintiff explains that he wrote a complaint against Dr. Mericle

and delivered it to her supervisor, Tony Cantu, on March 19,

2002. Six weeks later, on May 6, 2002, he was placed on

administrative leave by Randy Rowe, the District’s assistant vice

chancellor for human resources, who cited misconduct allegations

against Plaintiff as the reason for this administrative action. 

Plaintiff asserts his claim for wrongful termination under

state law on a breach of contract theory, based on piecing

together various accusations and assertions Plaintiff makes in

his complaint and opposition papers. Plaintiff complains that

any “accusations of misconduct” against him that Mr. Rowe cited

as the reason for placing Plaintiff on leave were never provided

to him nor was he promptly notified of the complaints in

purported violation of the operative collective bargaining

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agreement. Plaintiff also asserts that the investigation of the

accusations against him, which took place after he was placed on

leave, was improper because no written complaint existed as the

collective bargaining agreement requires before an investigation

is initiated. He further asserts that the District’s actions

violated various policies of the Board of Trustees and provisions

of the California Education Code in contravention of his

employment contract.

In Mr. Rowe’s letter to the Board recommending Plaintiff’s

termination, forty accusations of misconduct were identified. 

Plaintiff asserts he was never informed of the existence of these

accusations and contends that Mr. Rowe and others “fabricated

these complaints” against him. Plaintiff also complains that

“none of the accusations identified any duty or responsibility of

faculty that I hadn’t performed and none identified any policy

rule or regulation that I had violated.” (Doc. 1, Complaint at

4.)

Plaintiff alleges he engaged his union’s president and

attorney to argue on his behalf with Mr. Rowe, claiming that they

supported his position that the District’s actions against him

violated the collective bargaining agreement. On June 7, 2002,

Plaintiff claims he wrote a letter to District Chancellor Judith

Redwine accusing Mr. Rowe of retaliatory misconduct in response

to Plaintiff’s sexual harassment and discrimination complaint

against Dr. Mericle. Plaintiff further alleges that he notified

the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”)

on November 19, 2002 of his retaliation complaint, informing the

agency that the District was wrongfully proceeding with steps

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that pointed to his imminent dismissal. Plaintiff claims he

submitted a copy of the statement he made to the Board alleging

retaliation to each Board member before they voted in closed

session to fire him on January 7, 2003. 

After he was fired, Plaintiff alleges the District continued

to retaliate against him. 

Among the nasty things it subsequently did was (1)

force me to go to court to defend myself against

efforts to get a restraining order against me because I

had mentioned at the Board meeting Dr. Mericle’s and

Mr. Rowe’s actions against me, (2) cut off my pay

eleven months before the outcome of the evidentiary

hearing was known, (3) fail to enact policies, rules,

etc. to prohibit other faculty from engaging in the

behavior that they said was so egregious as to warrant

my dismissal, and (4) interfere with my efforts to find

employment as recently as December, 2006, when it sent

information to the California Commission on Teacher

Credentialing that resulted in the Commission denying

my application for a credential to work as a substitute

teacher. Any reasonable person will conclude that this

is compelling evidence that the SCCCD discriminated

against me, retaliated for making a sexual harassment

complaint against Dr. Mericle, and that it continues to

make my life miserable.

(Doc. 1, Complaint at 4-5.)

Plaintiff asserts that the DFEH issued him a right-to-sue

letter on August 17, 2006, after which he filed a charge with the

EEOC. The EEOC issued him a right-to-sue notice on December 29,

2006, which Plaintiff attaches to his complaint.

On the last page of his complaint, in the section entitled

“Relief,” Plaintiff requests reinstatement, lost wages and

expenses, and “damages in the amount of $500,000 for emotional

distress, defamation of character and breach of contract.” This

is the only reference to emotional distress and defamation in the

complaint or Plaintiff’s opposition. He does not identify any

defamatory statements.

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Because a pro se Plaintiff’s pleadings are liberally 1

construed, Plaintiff’s assertion of a section 1983 claim is

briefly addressed as follows: 1) as a state agency, the State

Center Community College District (“District”) is not a proper

party as it enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity against section

1983 actions. See Sosa v. Hiraoka, 714 F.Supp. 1100, 1104

(E.D.Cal. 1988) (State Center Community College District found to

be a state agency); Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir.

1990)(in reversing trial court’s application of 11 Amendment th

immunity to bar suit against the District on a Title VII claim

because Congress has expressly allowed such suits, the Ninth

Circuit refers to the District as a subdivision of the state and

does not dispute trial court’s characterization of it as a state

agency); 2) even were section 1983 applicable to the District,

the statute has a two-year limitations period, Equity Lifestyle

Properties Inc v. County of San Luis Obispo, 505 F.3d 860, 869 

(9th Cir. 2007); given that this suit was filed on March 29, 2007

regarding termination and other actions by the District in

January 2003 and in months prior, the two-year statute of

limitations bars Plaintiff’s civil rights action.

6

Finally, in his opposition, Plaintiff alleges he was

dismissed without an opportunity to respond to the charges

against him in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

rights. Without further explanation, he summarily asserts in a

footnote in his opposition: “It is also likely that Defendant’s

retaliation against Plaintiff is a United States Code Section

1983 violation because Defendant acted under color of authority

in depriving Plaintiff of his Constitutional rights.” (Doc. 17 1

at 2, fn 1.)

B. Administrative Hearing and Appeals to State Courts.

Plaintiff alleges he submitted a notice of opposition to the

District’s decision to terminate his employment within 30 days of

the decision. He then submitted the matter to an arbitrator who

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declined to hear it because the collective bargaining agreement

did not grant him review authority. An administrative hearing

was held where an administrative law judge sustained the

District’s decision. Plaintiff subsequently petitioned the

Fresno Superior Court for a trial de novo, which was denied. 

Plaintiff appealed this denial to the Fifth District Court of

Appeal, which was unsuccessful. Finally, Plaintiff petitioned

the State Supreme Court for review. Review was denied.

Plaintiff references the above administrative and state

court actions in both his complaint and opposition. Defendant

requests judicial notice of Administrative Law Judge Stephen J.

Smith’s decision in the state’s administrative hearing on this

matter, California Office of Administrative Hearings Case No.

N2003030194, and letters from DFEH as well as a copy of

Plaintiff’s DFEH complaint. (Doc. 20, Defendant’s Request for

Judicial Notice, Exs. A and B.) Defendant also requests judicial

notice of the Writ of Administrative Mandamus Statement of

Decision of the Fresno County Superior Court denying Plaintiff’s

appeal of the administrative hearing decision and the California

Fifth District Court of Appeal’s opinion affirming this judgment. 

(Doc. 20, Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exs. C and D.) 

As official records of a state administrative agency and state

court actions, judicial notice of these exhibits is proper.

Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 40 F.3d

1022, 1037 (9th Cir. 2002); Interstate Natural Gas Co. v.

Southern Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1953). Under

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), these are public records and their

existence cannot be disputed. Defendant’s request for judicial

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notice of these documents is granted. 

C. Procedural History.

Plaintiff filed his complaint on March 29, 2007 and attached

the December 29, 2006 right-to-sue notice he received from the

EEOC. (Doc. 1.) Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or in

the alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement Pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) on June 22, 2007. (Doc. 14.) Plaintiff

responded by filing “Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss and to Defendant’s Memo. of P & A” on July 25, 2007,

in which he opposed Defendant’s motion. (Doc. 17.) Plaintiff

attached various letters to his response, including

correspondence between him and Mr. Rowe, a page of the

administrative hearing transcript, and a page of the Fifth

District Court of Appeal’s opinion. (Id.) Defendant filed a

reply on August 20, 2007, along with a request for judicial

notice of four documents: the discrimination complaint Plaintiff

filed with DFEH and the corresponding letters from DFEH to

Plaintiff and the District closing the case; the administrative

law judge’s decision; the Fresno County Superior Court’s

decision; and the California Fifth District Court of Appeal’s

opinion. (Docs. 19 and 20.) 

On August 24, 2007, Plaintiff filed “Plaintiff’s Response to

Defendant’s Request for Judicial notice,” attaching his own

Request for Judicial Notice of various documents, including

correspondence Plaintiff had with DFEH and EEOC staff and

complaint questionnaires he alleges he completed when he filed

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Unlike the court and agency records for which Defendant 2

requests judicial notice, the documents Plaintiff submits are

subject to reasonable dispute as they are not public records and

are not “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R.

Evid. 201(b). Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is denied.

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his respective complaints with these agencies. (Doc. 25.) 2

Defendant filed its objection and request to strike Plaintiff’s

request for judicial notice on September 19, arguing Plaintiff’s

submission violates Local Rule 78-230 and the documents he

submits are not proper subjects of judicial notice because their

accuracy can be and is reasonably questioned by Defendant under

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). (Doc. 26.) On October 15, Plaintiff filed

“Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions Against Opposing Counsel and

Response to Defendant’s Objection and Request to Strike

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice.” (Doc. 29.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9th Cir. 2001). A complaint "should not be dismissed unless

it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Van

Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.

2002)(citations omitted); see also Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp.,

108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997) (issue is not whether plaintiff

will ultimately prevail, but whether claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claim). Dismissal is warranted

under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal

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theory or where the complaint presents a cognizable legal theory

yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson

v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all

material allegations in the complaint and construes them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Newman v.

Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 2002).

The court need not accept as true allegations that

contradict facts which may be judicially noticed. See Mullis v.

United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir.

1987). For example, matters of public record may be considered,

including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the

court or records of administrative bodies, see Mack v. South Bay

Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), while

conclusions of law, conclusory allegations, unreasonable

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact need not be

accepted. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9th Cir. 1981); see also Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453

(9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] document is not ‘outside’ the complaint if

the complaint specifically refers to the document and if its

authenticity is not questioned.”). Allegations in the complaint

may be disregarded if contradicted by facts established by

exhibits attached to the complaint. See Durning v. First Boston

Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus when ruling on

a motion to dismiss, the court may consider facts alleged in the

complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents relied

upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not

contested, and matters of which the court may take judicial

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notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-06 (9th Cir.

1988).

Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). A court must construe a pro se plaintiff’s “inartful

pleading” liberally in determining whether a claim has been

stated, including pro se motions as well as complaints. Zichko

v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001); Eldridge v. Block,

832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). This is especially true

when a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case. Ferdik

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). While a pro se

litigant must follow the same rules of procedure that govern

other litigants, King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987), “[d]ismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend

is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of

the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Schucker v.

Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988).

IV. DISCUSSION.

A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII

Retaliation Claim.

1. Legal Framework for Title VII Retaliation Claims.

Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful

employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or

to discharge any individual with respect to his compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The employer is also prohibited from

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retaliating against an employee for his opposition to an unlawful

employment practice. Lam v. Univ. of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1558-

59 (9th Cir. 1994). The antiretaliation provision of Title VII

states:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an

employer to discriminate against any of his employees

or applicants for employment, for an employment agency,

or joint labor-management committee controlling

apprenticeship or other training or retraining,

including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate

against any individual, or for a labor organization to

discriminate against any member thereof or applicant

for membership, because he has opposed any practice

made an unlawful employment practice by this

subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this

subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Sexual harassment is a type of sex

discrimination covered by Title VII. Burlington Indus., Inc. v.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-53 (1998). Accordingly, an employer’s

retaliatory conduct in response to an employee’s complaint of

sexual harassment, a protected activity, is actionable under

Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. Elvig v. Calvin

Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 965 (9th Cir. 2004); see

Garcia v. Los Banos Unified School Dist., 418 F.Supp.2d 1194,

1224 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 

To properly file suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must

first exhaust the administrative remedies available under 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839

F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Under the statute, a plaintiff

must initially file a timely charge with the EEOC and, if

dismissed, receive a right-to-sue letter from the agency and then

file any related court action within 90 days of receipt of the

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letter. Id.

Title VII mandates that claims must be filed with the EEOC

within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act(s) if the state

in which the discriminatory act occurred has a state agency that

deals with such matters. If not, the time limit is 180 days. 

The United States Supreme Court has explained:

An individual must file a charge within the statutory

time period and serve notice upon the person against

whom the charge is made. In a State that has an entity

with the authority to grant or seek relief with respect

to the alleged unlawful practice, an employee who

initially files a grievance with that agency must file

the charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the

employment practice; in all other States, the charge

must be filed within 180 days. 

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002). 

If not filed within these time limits, a claim is “time barred.” 

Id.

In California, a plaintiff who first files charges with the

California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”)

must file the charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged

unlawful practice. Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176

(9th Cir. 2000). However, the filing time period is not treated

as a jurisdictional bar but is subject to equitable doctrines

such as tolling or estoppel. Nat’l R.R., 536 U.S. at 113 (citing

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982)

(“We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the

EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal

court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is

subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”)) Such

doctrines are to be applied sparingly. Nat’l R.R., 536 U.S. at

113-14. 

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2. Acts Prior to and Including Termination.

Here Plaintiff alleges that, by placing him on

administrative leave and later firing him, the District

retaliated against him because he filed a complaint accusing his

supervisor, Dr. Mericle, of discrimination and sexual harassment. 

He delivered this complaint to Dr. Mericle’s supervisor, Tony

Cantu, the morning of March 19, 2002. In his opposition papers,

Plaintiff alleges that he filed his charges with the EEOC on

September 5, 2006. But he does not allege any retaliatory

conduct by the District in the 300 days prior to that date (e.g.,

between approximately November 2005 and September 5, 2006). 

Rather, he alleges the District retaliated much earlier, when he

was wrongfully placed on leave from his job with the District at

Fresno City College on May 6, 2002 and wrongfully terminated on

January 7, 2003 when the District’s Board of Trustees voted to

terminate his employment. But these alleged retaliatory acts

took place more than four years and three years prior to the date

he filed his EEOC complaint, respectively. On the face of the

complaint, Plaintiff’s own allegations show he missed the EEOC

filing period by three years. This is supported by the EEOC’s

own reasoning for issuing the dismissal and right-to-sue notice

Plaintiff received from the agency dated December 29, 2006, which

he attaches to his complaint: “[y]our charge was not timely filed

with EEOC; in other words, you waited too long after the date(s)

of the alleged discrimination to file your charge.” (Doc. 1.)

Next Plaintiff alleges he filed a retaliation complaint

November 19, 2002 with DFEH and that any EEOC “statute of

limitations is tolled while the matter is in agency hands,”

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relying on Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal.3d 410 (1974). Plaintiff

alleges he did not receive a notice of case closure and right-tosue from DFEH until August 17, 2006. This is consistent with the

letter from DFEH to Davenport that Defendant provides as Exhibit

A in its Request for Judicial Notice and of which judicial notice

has been taken. (Doc. 20.) Plaintiff’s argument fails for a

number of reasons. 

First, Elkins is inapplicable in this instance because it

addressed the tolling of the statute of limitations for filing a

civil action in a workers’ compensation case where a plaintiff

had filed a claim with the Workmens’ Compensation Appeals Board,

not a Title VII claim. Second, although Plaintiff alleges he

filed his DFEH complaint in November 2002, the public record 

indicates it was actually filed much later - in June 2006. 

Significantly, the District points out that on the face of the

“Complaint of Discrimination” Plaintiff filed with DFEH, the date

filed, as listed by DFEH, is June 2, 2006 while Plaintiff’s

signature is dated November 30, 2002. (Doc. 20, Ex. A.) The

same June 2, 2006 date is also evidenced by the agency’s stamp

showing the date of receipt of the document. (Id.) According to

DFEH records, Plaintiff filed his complaint with the agency on

June 2, 2006. It follows that even if, arguendo, as Plaintiff

claims the statute of limitations for EEOC filing was tolled upon

filing a complaint with the DFEH, he still missed the filing

deadline by over three years measured by the date of his

termination, when he had actual notice of the basis for his

claims, until the actual DFEH filing date of June 2006, when any

purported tolling would begin. Accordingly, even if the DFEH

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filing tolled the EEOC filing period, Plaintiff does not meet

Title VII’s timing requirements. 

Third, the dual filing doctrine cannot resurrect Plaintiff’s

claim either. Under a worksharing agreement between the two

agencies, copies of complaints received by DFEH are sent to EEOC

for filing and vice versa. Paige v. State of California, 102

F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, filing a charge “with one

agency is ‘deemed’ to be a filing with both” the state agency and

the EEOC. McConnell v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 1311,

1315 (9th Cir. 1987). Had Plaintiff filed his DFEH complaint

within the 300-day Title VII limitations period for filing an

EEOC charge, under the dual filing doctrine the complaint would

be deemed timely filed with the EEOC. However, as explained

above, judicially noticed indisputable public records evidence

that Plaintiff actually filed his complaint with DFEH on June 2,

2006. Any reciprocity afforded by dual filing does not apply to

save Plaintiff’s claim.

Nor can a case be made for equitable relief. The doctrine

of equitable estoppel comes into play to excuse a failure to file

an EEOC charge within the requisite time period where an employer

“misrepresents or conceals facts necessary to support a

discrimination charge.” Santa Maria, 202 F.3d at 1176-77

(equitable estoppel focuses on actions taken by the defendant to

prevent the plaintiff from suing in time). This is “sometimes

called fraudulent concealment.” Id. Here equitable estoppel is

inapplicable as Plaintiff does not allege that the District took

any actions with the purpose of preventing him from bringing

timely charges or concealing its adverse actions against him. 

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One who comes to equity must do so with clean hands. The

unexplained discrepancy between the 2002 date Plaintiff allegedly

signed his DFEH claim is 3 years earlier than the file stamped

receipt of the claim by the agency’s file stamp. This material

inconsistency cuts against Plaintiff. 

As for equitable tolling, in Zipes, the U.S. Supreme Court

applied this doctrine to Title VII limitations periods. The

Ninth Circuit allows equitable tolling when a plaintiff is unable

to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim

while acting with all due diligence. Socop-Gonzalez v. I.N.S.,

272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th Cir. 2001). The focus in deciding the

applicability of equitable tolling is on whether there was

excusable delay by the plaintiff. Santa Maria, 202 F.3d at 1178. 

In this case Plaintiff unequivocally admits he knew of the

alleged retaliatory discrimination in 2002 when he filed his DFEH

complaint, which alleges retaliation by the District for

Plaintiff’s sexual harassment complaint. Plaintiff also knew of

the District’s alleged retaliatory conduct when he was terminated

by the Board of Trustees in January 2003, as he alleges he made a

statement to the Board before their vote. Plaintiff does not

claim he was ignorant of key information relevant to his

potential claim to explain why he failed to comply with the EEOC

filing time period, nor does he offer any additional relevant

information he discovered after his termination. He does not

allege his delay was excusable and the facts he pleads offer no

reasonable excuse. Because Plaintiff cannot show that his

failure to file with the EEOC within the limitations period was

due to circumstances “beyond [his] control,” this failure is

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properly characterized as a “garden variety claim of excusable

neglect” and equitable tolling may not be invoked. SocopGonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1193.

3. Post-Termination Acts.

Plaintiff lists a number of acts after his termination date

that he alleges are properly classified as continuing retaliatory

acts by the District. First, Plaintiff claims the District

interfered with his prospective employment when it sent his

records to the California teacher credentialing commission in

December 2006 and also possibly November 2006. Plaintiff also

claims the District acted in retaliation when it ceased to pay

him while he pursued his administrative hearing, “harassed” him

by “making him defend himself in Superior Court against Emergency

Protective Orders sought by certain members of the college

staff,” caused him to submit his termination matter to arbitrator

Ronald Ho, forcing him to exhaust himself and his savings in

defending himself at an administrative hearing in which the

Defendant did not identify any standard of conduct by which the

actions of the Plaintiff were being measured,” compelling him to

petition the Fresno County Superior Court for a trial de novo,

and requiring him to appeal to the Fifth District Court of Appeal

and California Supreme Court. (Doc. 17 at 4-5.) None of these

complaints by Plaintiff concern acts of or conduct by the

District except the wage payment issue. Plaintiff offers no

factual or legal authority that he was entitled to posttermination compensation. The rest relate to legal action

Plaintiff took of his own volition to judicially remedy his

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alleged wrongful termination. 

That leaves the allegation of interference by the District

with Plaintiff’s prospective employment as the only potentially

viable post-termination retaliation claim. Presumably Plaintiff

argues these alleged more recent retaliatory acts constitute a

timely Title VII claim and are a proper subject of this lawsuit. 

Although Plaintiff’s EEOC charge, filed in September 2006, only

claimed retaliatory termination and could not have included

retaliatory acts alleged to have taken place in November and

December 2006, a “judicial complaint nevertheless may encompass

any discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations

of the EEOC charge, including new acts occurring during the

pendency of the charge before the EEOC.” Oubichon v. North Am.

Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1971); see Freeman v.

Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002). 

District court jurisdiction extends to allegations that fall

“within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC

investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the

charge of discrimination.” Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n

v. Farmer Brothers Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9 Cir. 1994) th

(emphasis in original; citations and internal quotations marks

omitted). Appropriate factors to consider include the alleged

basis of the discrimination, dates of the discriminatory acts

specified in the charge, perpetrators of discrimination named in

the charge, and the extent to which the judicial claims are

consistent with the Plaintiff’s original theory of the case. 

B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9 Cir. 2002). th

Here the alleged post-termination acts are not “reasonably

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related” to Plaintiff’s original retaliation charges and are not

a proper subject of this lawsuit. Plaintiff’s original

complaints to DFEH and EEOC alleged retaliation by the District

resulting in Plaintiff’s wrongful termination. The recent

alleged acts concern interference with Plaintiff’s prospective

employment, an entirely different type of claim. The recent

alleged acts could not have fallen within or be reasonably

expected to fall within the scope of the EEOC’s investigation,

because they are factually distinct and temporally remote from

the allegations in Plaintiff’s EEOC complaint. Moreover, the

alleged post-termination acts occurred in late 2006, more than

three years after the retaliatory acts that are the subject of

Plaintiff’s original EEOC complaint. There is no jurisdiction

over the post-termination retaliation allegations.

Nor can the post-termination acts serve as a “continuing

violation” to resurrect Plaintiff’s earlier untimely claims. The

Supreme Court has held that discrete unlawful acts are separate

unlawful practices under Title VII and “are not actionable if

time-barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely

filed charges.” Nat’l R.R., 536 U.S. at 113. Each discrete

discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges and must

be filed within 300 days of the occurrence of the discriminatory

act. Id. In Nat’l R.R., the Supreme Court did not address the

timely filing question with respect to “pattern-or-practice”

claims. 536 U.S. at 115 n.9.

This is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s recent claims as Plaintiff

does not allege an ongoing unlawful employment practice nor do

his allegations include a “pattern-or-practice” claim. 

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Plaintiff’s continuing retaliation argument fails because later

timely discriminatory acts do not resurrect time-barred acts as

Plaintiff attempts to do here.

4. Conclusion

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is

GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND.

B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s State Law

Claim(s).

Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law claims on

two grounds: 1) Plaintiff has not complied with the prerequisites

of the California Tort Claims Act, and 2) the Act’s statute of

limitations bars his claims. Plaintiff responds that he has

complied with the Act’s requirements. He asserts that he has

submitted two claims against the Defendant. First, he argues he

submitted a claim in 2001 for “damages caused by one of his

supervisor’s acts of sexual harassment,” which he alleges was

paid by the District. (Doc. 17 at 8.) Second, Plaintiff claims

he filed a claim after he was “assaulted on March 5, 2002 by one

of his students, namely Christopher Brown” and that this claims

was not processed by his supervisor. (Id.)

1. Prerequisites to Filing Suit Pursuant to the California Tort

Claims Act.

The California Tort Claims Act requires an individual

seeking money or damages from a public agency to first file a

claim with the agency. Cal. Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.; Ard v.

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County of Contra Costa, 93 Cal.App.4th 339, 343 (2001). 

Presentation of a timely tort claim is a jurisdictional

prerequisite to maintaining such a cause of action against a

public entity. Id.; see Hernandez v. McClanahan, 996 F.Supp. 975

(N.D. Cal. 1998). A plaintiff’s pendent state law claims against

a California public agency are barred unless the plaintiff has

complied with the requirements of the Tort Claims Act before

commencing a civil action. See Mangold v. Cal. Public Utilities

Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The purpose of the claim presentation requirement “is to

facilitate early investigation of disputes and settlement without

trial if appropriate, as well as to enable the public entity to

engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid

similar liabilities in the future.” Gatto v. County of Sonoma,

98 Cal.App.4th 744, 763 (2002) (quoting Lewis C. Nelson & Sons,

Inc. v. Clovis Unified School Dist., 90 Cal.App.4th 64, 72

(2001)). 

The claim must include “[a] general description of the

indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far

as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim.” 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 910(d). The sufficiency of a claim presented

under California Torts Claim Act is a case-specific inquiry. 

When the claim and the complaint set out different factual

circumstances, where there has been “a complete shift in

allegations, usually involving an effort to premise civil

liability on acts or omissions committed at different times or by

different persons than those described in the claim,” the claim

is not sufficient. Blair v. Superior Court, 218 Cal.App.3d 221,

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226 (1990). A complaint is subject to dismissal “if it alleges a

factual basis for recovery which is not fairly reflected in the

written claim.” Watson v. California, 21 Cal.App.4th 836, 844

(1993) (quoting Nelson v. California, 139 Cal.App.3d 72, 79

(1982)). 

"The essential elements of a claim are set forth in

Government Code section 910: (1) the names and addresses of the

claimant and the person to whom notices are to be sent, (2) a

statement of the facts supporting the claim, (3) a description of

the injury and the amount claimed as of the time of presentation,

and (4) the name(s) of the public employee(s) who caused the

injury, if known. Although a claim need not conform to pleading

standards, the facts constituting the causes of action pleaded in

the complaint must substantially correspond with the

circumstances described in the claims as the basis of the

plaintiff's injury." Loehr v. Ventura County Community College

Dist., 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1082-1083 (1983). 

Here the claims Plaintiff alleges he presented to the

District in compliance with the Act concern a 2001 sexual

harassment claim and a March 2002 claim of assault by a student. 

Neither claim contains allegations of wrongful termination based

on breach of contract, which is the state law theory Plaintiff

advances in the complaint he filed in this lawsuit. For

Plaintiff to meet the requirements of the Act, he must have

submitted a claim to the District that is “premised on

essentially the same foundation” as the judicial complaint he

filed here. Nelson, 139 Cal.App.3d at 79. Because the two

claims advanced concern entirely different factual circumstances

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and acts from those raised in this lawsuit, the claims Plaintiff

alleges he filed with the District in 2001 and 2002 are not

sufficient as a matter of law for Plaintiff to maintain a cause

of action under the California Tort Claims Act.

2. Time for Filing Suit Under the California Tort Claims Act.

Government Code section 911.2 requires that claims for

injury to persons be submitted no later than 6 months following

the accrual of the claim, and for any other claim, within one

year of the accrual of the claim. Schaefer Dixon Assoc. v. Santa

Ana Watershed Project Authority, 48 Cal.App.4th 524, 531 (1996)

summarized the requirements:

Under the Tort Claims Act, claims against local

governmental entities must be presented to the relevant

entity within six months (personal injury or property

damage) or one year (other causes of action) of the

date of accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code, §

911.2.) ‘The public entity has 45 days to grant or

deny the claim; if the claim is not acted upon within

45 days, it is deemed rejected. (§ 912.4) If written

notice of rejection is sent, suit must be brought

within six months (§ 945.6, subd(a)(1).) If no written

notice is given, the claimant is allowed two years from

the accrual date to file the suit. (§ 945.6,

subd(a)(2).)’

Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit March 29, 2007. The

District’s alleged breach of contract occurred when it placed

Plaintiff on administrative leave in 2002 and fired him in 2003. 

Both of these activities took place five and four years ago,

respectively. The complaint does not allege any personal injury.

Plaintiff cannot meet the requirement that he filed suit under

the Act within six months or one year following the complained-of

events. The Tort Claims Act’s statute of limitations is

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jurisdictional. It bars Plaintiff’s state law claims against the

District.

3. Conclusion

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims

for wrongful termination is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

V. CONCLUSION.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED only as to his

Title VII claim. Because Plaintiff is pro se, he is granted

LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff is cautioned that Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

11 requires a reasonable basis in fact and law for a complaint

under penalty of sanctions for pursuit of meritless claims. Any

amended complaint shall be filed on or before February 15, 2008.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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