Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02635/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02635-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chad Taylor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2635

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Chad Taylor

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

 Submitted: August 12, 2015

 Filed: October 9, 2015

[Published]

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Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Chad Taylor pled guilty to possessing a prohibited object in prison in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2). Taylor received a sentencing enhancement for committing

a "crime of violence" under the career offender guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). On

appeal, Taylor argues that his sentence is unlawful because the language in the

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guideline is unconstitutionally vague. We held this appeal in abeyance pending the

Supreme Court's anticipated decision in Johnson v. United States. 

In Johnson, the Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career

Criminal Act (ACCA) is unconstitutionally vague. 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct.

2551, 2563 (2015). That clause defines a "violent felony" to include any felony that

"otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury

to another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The residual clause of the sentencing

guideline uses identical language to the ACCA, including as a "crime of violence"

any felony that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). We requested supplemental

briefing to address the relevance ofthe Supreme Court's decision to Mr. Taylor's case.

The United States concedes that the sentence imposed by the district court

should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing in light of Johnson. After

Johnson, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration two guideline

sentences using the residual clause. E.g., United States v. Maldonado, 581 F. App'x

19, 22–23 (2d Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2929 (2015). The Sixth

Circuit recently vacated a guideline sentence using the residual clause and remanded

to the district court for reconsideration in light of Johnson. United States v. Darden,

605 F. App'x 545, 546 (6th Cir. July 6, 2015). 

In United States v. Wivell, our circuit concluded that the sentencing guidelines

are "not susceptible to a vagueness attack." 893 F.2d 156, 159 (8th Cir. 1990). We

reasoned there that the due process vagueness doctrine does not apply to the

guidelines because they do not "attempt[] to proscribe or prescribe conduct," but only

provide guidance in sentencing convicted criminals. Id. at 159–160. Wivell does not

foreclose Taylor's challenge, however, because a prior panel ruling does not control

"when the earlier panel decision is cast into doubt by an intervening Supreme Court

decision." United States v. Anderson, 771 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2014).

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In Johnson, the Supreme Court explained that the Fifth Amendment principles

prohibiting vague or standardless criminal laws "apply not only to statutes defining

elements of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences." 135 S. Ct. at 2557. The

ACCA residual clause stricken by the Court was a sentencing statute, not a statute

proscribing conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Although the guidelines are not

statutes, district courts must consider them and correctly calculate the advisory

guideline range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49, 51 (2007); United States v.

Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 460–61 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). The reasoning in Wivell

that the guidelines cannot be unconstitutionally vague because they do not proscribe

conduct is doubtful after Johnson. See 135 S. Ct. at 2557. We leave for the district

court on remand the question of whether the residual clause of the career offender

guideline is unconstitutional.

For these reasons, we vacate Taylor's sentence and remand to the district court

for resentencing.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Chad Taylor appeals the sentence imposed for his unlawful possession of a

“prohibited object”—i.e., a 5.75-inch rod with a sharpened tip—in prison. The

district court, in calculating an advisory sentencing range under the sentencing

guidelines, determined that Taylor was a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1(a), and

sentenced him to thirty-seven months in prison pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The

court concluded that Taylor’s offense of conviction, see 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2), was

a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the guidelines, because it “involve[d]

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” USSG

§ 4B1.2(a)(2). Taylor, citing Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015),

argues that the sentence must be vacated because the quoted clause from

§ 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague. Johnson held that the comparably-worded

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“residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), which set a statutoryminimumterm

of imprisonment for certain firearms offenses, is unconstitutionally vague.

Taylor’s vagueness argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent. In United

States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1990), this court held that “the Sentencing

Guidelines are simply not susceptible to a vagueness attack.” Id. at 159. The court

reasoned that “[b]ecause there is no constitutionalright to sentencing guidelines—or,

more generally, to a less discretionary application of sentences than that permitted

prior to the Guidelines—the limitations the Guidelines place on a judge’s discretion

cannot violate a defendant’s right to due process by reason of being vague.” Id. at

160. This court, in an unpublished decision, continued to apply Wivell after the

guidelines were rendered advisory. United States v. Jefferson, 267 F. App’x 483, 484

(8th Cir. 2008). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit concluded that United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220 (2005), “bolstered” Wivell and cases that followed it: “Since the

Guidelines are merely advisory, defendants cannot rely on them to communicate the

sentence that the district court will impose. Defendants’ inability to look to the

Guidelines for notice underscores why . . . they cannot bring vagueness challenges

against the Guidelines.” United States v. Tichenor, 683 F.3d 358, 365 (7th Cir. 2012)

(footnote omitted).

The majority here declines to follow Wivell and seeks refuge in the rule that a

prior panel decision is not controlling if an intervening Supreme Court decision is

inconsistent with the prior opinion. See McCullough v. AEGON USA Inc., 585 F.3d

1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2009). The court asserts that Johnson is such an intervening

decision, because it explained that constitutional vagueness principles “apply not only

to statutes defining elements of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.” 135 S.

Ct. at 2557. As Johnson itself recognized, however, this proposition was nothing

new: the point wassettled well before this court decided Wivell in 1990, asillustrated

by Johnson’s citation of United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979), as

establishing the proposition. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557; see Simpson v. Lockhart,

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942 F.2d 493, 497 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Batchelder and rejecting vagueness

challenge to sentencing statutes); United States v. House, 939 F.2d 659, 664 (8th Cir.

1991) (rejecting vagueness challenge to statutory minimum sentence); United States

v. Bishop, 894 F.2d 981, 987 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990) (same).

Wivell addressed a different question: whether a vagueness challenge lies

against sentencing guidelines that cabin a judge’s discretion when sentencing within

a range set by statute. Johnson says nothing whatever about that issue. See United

States v. Matchett, No. 14-10396, 2015 WL 5515439, at *6 (11th Cir. Sept. 21, 2015)

(“By its terms, the decision of the Supreme Court in Johnson is limited to criminal

statutes that define elements of a crime or fix punishments. . . . The Armed Career

Criminal Act defines a crime and fixes a sentence, but the advisory guidelines do

neither.”) (internal citation omitted). Wivell thus remains binding circuit precedent,

and Taylor’s due process claim should be rejected by this panel. Any argument that

Wivell was wrongly decided should be directed to the full court in a suggestion for

en banc review.

Taylor also argues that his offense of possession of a prohibited object in

prison is not a crime of violence under the guidelines. Taylor’s statute of conviction,

18 U.S.C. § 1791(a), is “divisible” within the meaning of Descamps v. United States,

133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013), because “it lists in the disjunctive multiple, alternative

elements for committing the offense.” United States v. De La Cruz, 582 F. App’x

327, 329 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2929 (2015). Taylor

was charged with possessing in prison “a weapon and an object that is designed and

intended to be used as a weapon,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) and

(d)(1)(B), so the court should consider under the modified categorical approach

whether that offense was a crime of violence.

Taylor asserts that his offense does not qualify, because it does not involve

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. This court

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has ruled, however, that possession of a weapon in a correctional facility meets that

standard under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and the definition of “violent felony” that

prevailed before Johnson. United States v. Boyce, 633 F.3d 708, 710-12 (8th Cir.

2011). Boyce reasoned that the offense “create[s] the possibility—even the

likelihood—of a future violent confrontation,” because “[w]hen a prisoner carries a

dangerous weapon, that behavior indicates that he is prepared to use violence if

necessary and is ready to enter into conflict, which in turn creates a danger for those

surrounding the armed prisoner.” Id. at 712 (internal quotation marks omitted). The

case for finding a “crime of violence” under the guidelines is even stronger, because

the binding commentary to USSG § 4B1.2 contemplates that mere possession of a

dangerous weapon—for example, a sawed-off shotgun—can qualify as a crime of

violence. See USSG § 4B1.2, comment. (n.1). Attenuation between possession and

use of a weapon in prison, therefore, does not preclude treating Taylor’s offense as

a crime of violence under the guidelines. Cf. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2565-66

(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). The district court correctly ruled that

Taylor is a career offender under the sentencing guidelines.

For these reasons, applying the circuit precedent of Wivell and Boyce, I would

affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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