Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03483/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03483-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael B. Mukasey
Respondent
Ali Abdulla Sabhari
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

Michael B. Mukasey has been appointed Attorney General, and is substituted

as respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3483

___________

Ali Abdulla Sabhari, * 

* 

Petitioner, * 

* Petition for Review of an Order 

v. * of the Board of Immigration

* Appeals.

Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney *

General of the United States * [PUBLISHED]

of America,1

 * 

* 

Respondent. *

___________

Submitted: September 27, 2007

Filed: April 10, 2008 

___________

Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Ali Sabhari seeks review of a denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA) of his motion to reopen sua sponte proceedings relating to his removal from the

United States. Sabhari also argues that the BIA's refusal to reopen proceedings

violated the Due Process Clause. We dismiss the petition for review. 

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I. Background

Sabhari lawfully entered the United States in November 1993 as a visitor from

Kuwait. He remained in the United States beyond the expiration of his visitor visa,

which expired in May 1994. In July 1997, the former Immigration and Naturalization

Service ("INS") initiated removal proceedings by filing a Notice to Appear charging

Sabhari with remaining in the United States longer than permitted and for procuring

admission to the United States by fraud or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact.

Five years after coming to the United States, and subsequent to the initiation of

removal proceedings, Sabhari applied for asylum and withholding of removal.

Sabhari's December 7, 1998 application stated that he sought asylum based upon

discrimination and persecution that he faced in Kuwait. Sabhari also claimed that he

was mistreated because of his third class or Bedouin status, his allegedly Jewish

appearance, and his status as a Shiite Muslim. 

The Immigration Judge (IJ) issued an oral decision on July 19, 1999, denying

Sabhari's application for asylum, application for withholding of removal, application

for relief under the Convention Against Torture, and application for voluntary

departure. The IJ found that Sabhari failed to introduce sufficient, concrete or direct

evidence to show that he had a well-founded fear of persecution. Sabhari's testimony

was not sufficiently detailed, consistent or believable to provide a plausible and

coherent account of the basis for his fears, according to the IJ. On June 28, 2002, the

BIA summarily affirmed the IJ's decision without opinion. 

Sabhari filed his first motion to reopen proceedings with the BIA on September

25, 2002. Sabhari applied for adjustment of status based on an unadjudicated

immediate-relative visa petition filed on Sabhari's behalf by his United States citizen

spouse. On February 10, 2003, the BIA denied Sabhari's first motion to reopen

proceedings based on a finding that Sabhari had not shown prima facie eligibility for

adjustment of status. Sabhari failed to produce clear and convincing evidence

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indicating a strong likelihood that the marriage was bona fide as required by the

relevant regulations. 

On May 15, 2006, Sabhari filed a second motion to reopen, requesting asylum

and related relief. He asserted that numerical and time bars should not apply to his

motion because he had discovered that his estranged brother's 1997 asylum

application had been granted based upon the "same" facts as his own application. On

August 31, 2006, the BIA denied this second motion to reopen concluding that the

motion was untimely and numerically-barred. The BIA further determined that

Sabhari's arguments for getting around those bars failed as Sabhari had not shown

changed country conditions in Kuwait.

The BIA declined to reopen the case sua sponte because the circumstances of

Sabhari's untimely second motion to reopen were not exceptional. In his first motion

to reopen, Sabhari elected to pursue adjustment of status instead of asylum. The denial

of Sabhari's adjustment of status application was not an extraordinary circumstance

justifying his untimeliness in seeking asylum. The BIA, exercising its discretion,

concluded that Sabhari's delay justified denial of his motion to reopen and his

underlying asylum claim. Sabhari then filed his petition for review.

II. Discussion

In his petition for review, Sabhari argues that the BIA abused its discretion by

denying his motion to reopen proceedings sua sponte based on exceptional

circumstances.

In a removal proceeding, an alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings.

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (emphasis added). This motion

must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C. §

1229a(c)(7)(C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, Sabhari's motion to reopen fails

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because it is his second motion to reopen, and it was filed well beyond 90 days. In

fact, it came years after the final administrative order of removal. 

The governing regulations also provide that the BIA may reopen proceedings

on its own motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, we recently held, en banc, that the

decision whether to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte is committed to the BIA's

discretion by law and that we lack jurisdiction to review the agency's discretionary

decision. Tamenut v. Mukasey, No. 05-4418, 2008 WL 637617 (8th Cir. Mar. 11,

2008) (en banc) (published per curiam). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the

BIA's decision not to reopen Sabhari's proceedings sua sponte.

Sabhari also argues that the BIA violated the Due Process Clause by denying

his motion to reopen. Although we lack jurisdiction over Sabhari's challenge to the

decision not to reopen sua sponte, we generally do have jurisdiction over any

colorable constitutional claims. See Mouawad v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 405, 411 (8th

Cir. 2007); Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001). To be

colorable, a constitutional claim must have "some possible validity." Torres-Aguilar,

246 F.3d at 1271. 

Sabhari argues that the BIA violated the Due Process Clause by finding that he

did not clearly state when he learned of his brother's asylum grant nor did he explain

why his non-estranged family members could not have helped him discover the grant

sooner. Sabhari also argues that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should

have disclosed to Sabhari that his brother was granted asylum. We think these

contentions are simply "cloaking an abuse of discretion argument in constitutional

garb," Onyinkwa v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 797, 799 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting TorresAguilar, 246 F.3d at 1271), and are thus insufficient to justify judicial review. The

Due Process Clause guarantees that removal proceedings will be fundamentally fair

and Sabhari points to nothing that suggests that the proceedings below were not

fundamentally fair. Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2004).

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Therefore, we conclude that Sabhari has not advanced a colorable claim that the BIA

violated his constitutional rights.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review.

______________________________

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