Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04301/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04301-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tyrone Judon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

We reinstate the vacated opinion of United States v. Judon, 472 F.3d 575 (8th

Cir. 2007), vacated, 552 U.S. ---, 128 S. Ct. 860 (2008), with the exception of Section

II.D.3. We also note that Gladger Ross, Jr., another defendant in this case, did not file

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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Nos. 05-4301/06-1049

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United States of America,

Appellee/Cross Appellant,

v.

Tyrone Judon, also known as

Antwon,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

Northern District of Iowa.

[UNPUBLISHED]

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 Submitted: February 14, 2008 

 Filed: July 1, 2008

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, SMITH and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

This case is before us on remand from the United States Supreme Court for

reconsideration in light of Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. ---, 128 S. Ct. 558

(2007). After reconsidering Tyrone Judon’s sentence as directed by the Supreme

Court, we again vacate and remand for resentencing.1

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a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. Therefore, our previous

rulings with respect to Ross’s conviction and sentence remain unchanged.

-2-

In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court rejected the position that the crack/powder

cocaine disparity created by the 100:1 ratio between crack and powder cocaine in the

United States Sentencing Guidelines was mandatory and held that “under [United

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)], the cocaine Guidelines, like all other

Guidelines, are advisory only.” Id. at 564. After holding that a district court “may

consider the disparity between the Guidelines’ treatment of crack and powder cocaine

offenses,” id., it further stated that “[i]t would not be an abuse of discretion for a

district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the

crack/powder [cocaine] disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve

[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run case.” Id. at 575. However, as

this court observed in United States v. Spears, also on remand from the Supreme

Court, “the district court may not categorically reject the ratio set forth by the

Guidelines.” --- F.3d ---, 2008 WL 2485329, at *1 (8th Cir. June 23, 2008) (en banc).

In our previous Judon opinion, we reviewed the district court’s decision to

sentence Judon to 50 months’ imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court first

determined that the 100:1 ratio between crack and powder cocaine resulted in a total

offense level of 26. The district court then applied a 20:1 ratio, instead of a 100:1

ratio, to calculate a revised offense level and guidelines range. Like the district court

in Spears, the district court here said it was adopting United States v. Perry, 389 F.

Supp. 2d 278 (D.R.I. 2005), abrogated by United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir.

2006), abrogated by Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558, as recognized in United States v.

Rodriguez, --- F.3d ---, 2008 WL 2265898 (1st Cir. June 4, 2008), where the district

court chose to impose a 20:1 ratio, instead of the Guidelines’ 100:1 ratio, because the

100:1 ratio “cannot withstand the scrutiny imposed by sentencing courts when the §

3553 factors are applied.” Id. at 307. On appeal, we reversed the district court’s

decision to “var[y] under § 3553(a) based solely on its rejection of the 100:1 drug

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-3-

quantity ratio between crack and powder cocaine” and vacated Judon’s sentence.

Judon, 472 F.3d at 585-87.

Reviewing Judon’s sentence in light of Kimbrough and our recent Spears

decision, we again vacate Judon’s sentence and remand for resentencing. In Spears,

we held that “[n]othing in Kimbrough suggests the district court may substitute its

own ratio for the ratio set forth in the Guidelines.” Spears, 2008 WL 2485329, at *2.

In sentencing Judon, the district court substituted a 20:1 ratio based on Perry and did

not vary based on an individualized assessment of the particular circumstances in

Judon’s case. See id. at *1. The district court simply “establish[ed] a ratio of its

own.” Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575. Therefore, as in Spears, we must vacate Judon’s

sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. Judon’s conviction

is affirmed for the reasons set forth in our prior opinion. Judon, 472 F.3d at 582-83.

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