Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02649/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02649-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Jennie Catalano
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIE CATALANO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-2649 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Now before the Court are plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s

cross-motion for summary judgment. On January 18, 2005, plaintiff Jennie Catalano moved

for summary judgment on the pleadings. On February 17, 2005, defendant Jo Anne B.

Barnhart, in her capacity as Commissioner of Social Security, filed an opposition to

plaintiff’s motion and a cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a reply

memorandum on March 3, 2005. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16-1(e), the matter is

submitted for decision by this Court without oral argument. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Jennie Catalano applied for a period of disability and disability insurance

benefits (“SSDI”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) on April 8, 1981. In a

hearing decision dated May 17, 1982, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Edward I. Staten 

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28 1 Defendant has been unable to locate plaintiff’s prior Social Security files, which may

have contained some relevant medical evidence.

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denied plaintiff’s application for benefits, and there is no indication in the record that

plaintiff appealed that decision. On June 1, 1984, plaintiff reapplied for SSDI, and the

application was granted with a disability onset date of July 1983.1

As a result of a class action lawsuit, State of New York v. Sullivan, No. 83 Civ. 5903

(RLC) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1989), aff’d, 906 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990), the Social Security

Administration was required to readjudicate class members’ claims involving cardiovascular

impairments. Plaintiff was a covered class member, and her 1981 claim was ordered to be

reopened. Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. On February 14,

2003, ALJ John J. Flanagan denied plaintiff’s application for benefits, and his decision

became final when the Appeals Council declined to review it on October 24, 2003. Although

the Appeals Council set aside its earlier decision to consider additional information, it again

denied review on April 27, 2004. On August 1, 2004, plaintiff commenced this action for

judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

B. Factual Background

1. Plaintiff’s Disability Claim

In her April 8, 1981 application, plaintiff alleged that beginning December 19, 1980,

she became disabled and unable to work because of angina pectoris and arteriosclerotic heart

disease (“ASHD”). Transcript of the Record of the Social Security Administration

proceedings (“TR”) at 251. 

2. Plaintiff’s Testimony

At the administrative hearing, plaintiff claimed that she could no longer work because

of chest pain and other symptoms brought on by stress at work. Plaintiff described her job as

a “Girl Friday” and that she “did everything that you could possibly do in an insurance

agent’s office.” TR at 418. Plaintiff described her work as being very stressful because she

managed 3,000 client files and there was a lot of pressure not to make a mistake. Plaintiff

testified that due to chest pain, she was hospitalized in January 1980 and twice in February

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1980. Plaintiff explained that she tried going back to work but stopped working in December

1980 because of her chest pains and other symptoms. Plaintiff stated that she attempted to go

back to work on a part-time basis in 1982 and 1983, but she was unable to work on a

sustained basis after December 1980. 

3. Medical Evidence

a. Treating Physicians

Plaintiff’s treating physician at Mercy Hospital, Rockville Centre, N.Y., Dr. Terence

O’Flannagan, reported in February 1980 on plaintiff’s chest pain and feelings of

apprehension. Dr. O’Flannagan discharged plaintiff from the coronary care unit with a

diagnosis of “chest pain, etiology undetermined, possible atypical coronary ischemic

syndrome.” TR 324. Dr. Stephen Richmond, a cardiologist, also examined plaintiff, and he

noted that plaintiff’s symptoms were difficult to evaluate, but could be anginal pectoris and

arteriosclerotic heart disease. 

Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Felix A. Monaco in March 1980. He gave his initial

impression as “possible psychophysiological gastrointestinal reaction--rule out ulcer

disease.” TR at 347. Dr. Monaco noted that plaintiff underwent a stress test at Long Island

Jewish Hospital, and the stress test was normal. On July 23, 1980, Dr. Monaco discharged

plaintiff with a diagnosis of “epigastric pain, etiology undetermined and superficial antral

gastritis.” TR at 348. 

Plaintiff was also treated by psychiatrist Dr. Patrick Cerone from March 1981 to

September 1981. In his psychiatric medical report, Dr. Cerone described plaintiff’s mood

and affect as anxiety and depression, and he noted that her scensorium and intellect was

clear, her judgment and insight was good, she had no problems with respect to her personal

habits, daily activities, and interests, and she had a good manner of relating to others. She

had no problem with her personal habits, in her daily activities, or in her ability to relate to

others. TR at 355. On September 3, 1981, Dr. Cerone diagnosed plaintiff with

psychophysiologic cardiac and GI disorder with anxiety and depression. 

//

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b. Consulting Physicians

On May 29, 1981, Dr. Arnold Miles examined plaintiff. Dr. Miles conducted a

cardiac stress test which had to be terminated after 4 minutes because plaintiff complained of

light-headedness, tiredness, and severe fatigue. Dr. Miles concluded that the cardiac stress

test was supportive of ischemic heart disease. Dr. Miles also conducted a residual functional

capacity (“RFC”) assessment. 

An analyst from the NYS Bureau of Disability Determinations issued a medical

evaluation on June 16, 1981. The analyst stated that plaintiff’s severe impairment was short

of any impairment in the Listings and that plaintiff had an RFC for light activity. 

Dr. A. Jordan issued an Office of Disability Operations Medical Consultant’s Case

Analysis on July 17, 1981. Dr. Jordan stated that plaintiff’s stress test was “submaximal,

there was no chest pain but S-T depression is noted in the recovery phase.” Id. Dr. Jordan

further stated that plaintiff could sit for 6 hours, stand for 6 hours, and lift 10 pounds. 

An analyst from the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance,

Division of Disability Determinations responded to a Request for Medical Advice on July 30,

2001. The analyst reviewed plaintiff’s medical records for the period of December 1980 to

May 1982 and “didn’t find a severe impairment from a medical point of view.” TR at 155-

56. 

c. Medical Expert’s Testimony

At the administrative hearing, the ALJ asked medical expert Dr. West to give an

overview of plaintiff’s cardiological state from December 1980 to May 1982. At the time of

the hearing, Dr. West only had medical records up to 1981. Id. Despite the missing medical

records from ‘83, ‘84, and ‘85, the ALJ decided to hear the testimony that Dr. West could

give based on the medical records before him. The ALJ left the record open to request the

missing medical records from ‘83, ‘84, or ‘85. 

Dr. West testified that plaintiff’s severe impairments were unexplained chest pains

and physical deconditioning. Dr. West explained that it was not clear “whether the chest

pain is causing [plaintiff] the aggravation or the aggravation is causing the chest pain.” TR at

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404. When asked by the ALJ whether plaintiff met or equaled any of the conditions outlined

in the Listing of Impairments, Dr. West stated that he could not find a significant cardiac

problem, other than the unexplained chest pain, during the time frame of December 1980 to

May 1982. When the ALJ asked Dr. West if he could reasonably come up with a functional

assessment during the period in question, Dr. West testified that although plaintiff is

deconditioned, she did not have a major physical limitation and could perform sedentary to

light work. 

4. Vocational Expert

The ALJ asked the Vocational Expert (“VE”) to assess plaintiff’s past work in terms

of exertion and skill level. The VE testified that the job plaintiff described as “Girl Friday”

was an atypical job and not described in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). 

Based on plaintiff’s description of her job duties, the VE stated that plaintiff’s job included

duties of an insurance clerk, insurance benefits clerk, insurance checker, and administrative

assistant. The VE noted that all of these jobs are performed at the sedentary level throughout

the national economy. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the Social Security

Administration’s denial of benefits is supported by substantial evidence in the administrative

record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court may overturn a decision to deny benefits only if

it is not supported by substantial evidence or if the decision is based on legal error. Andrews

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallenes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th

Cir. 1989). The same standard applies where the ALJ has awarded benefits and the claimant

seeks additional benefits, as in this case. See Swanson v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 767 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit defines substantial evidence as

“more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at

1039. Determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical testimony, and all

other ambiguities are to be resolved by the ALJ. Id.; Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750. The

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decision of the ALJ will be upheld if the evidence is “susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ’s Decision

In considering whether a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts a five-step

sequential inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At the first step, the ALJ

considers if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. If the claimant is not

engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step asks if the claimant has a severe

impairment (i.e., an impairment that has a significant effect on the claimant’s ability to

function). If the claimant has a severe impairment, the third step asks if the claimant has a

condition which meets or equals the conditions outlined in the Listings of Impairments in

Appendix 1 of the Regulations (the “Listings”). If the claimant does not have such a

condition, the fourth step asks if the claimant is capable of performing her past relevant

work. If the claimant is not capable of performing her past relevant work, the fifth step asks

if the claimant is capable of performing other work which exists in substantial numbers in the

national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(f); § 416.920(b)-(f). 

Here, the ALJ found that during the period in question, beginning December 1980

through May 1982, plaintiff retained the RFC to perform her past relevant work. At step one,

the ALJ found that the plaintiff had not been engaged in any substantial gainful activity

during December 1980 through May 1982. At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff did have

a “severe” impairment of non-specific chest pains and physical deconditioning that “may

have imposed more than a slight limitation on her ability to perform the basic work related

activities described at 20 C.F.R. 404.1521(b).” TR at 81. At step three, the ALJ found that

plaintiff did not establish any impairment or impairments that met or equaled the criteria of

any impairment in the Listings set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1. during the

period in question. At step four, the ALJ found plaintiff had the RFC for sedentary to light

work and could perform her past relevant work as generally required by employers

throughout the national economy. The ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not under a

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disability within the meaning of the Act, as amended, during the period beginning December

1980 and ending May 1982. 

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the ALJ’s decision was not based on

substantial evidence or that the ALJ’s decision was based on legal error. See generally

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039; Magallenes, 881 F.2d at 750. 

B. Whether the ALJ Failed to Consider Plaintiff’s Mental Impairment

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to consider her

mental impairment. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ legally erred by failing to find

and consider her mental impairment of “psychophysiologic cardiac and GI disorder with

anxiety and depression.” Plaintiff did not claim a mental impairment in her application or at

the administrative hearing, although she claims that references to a possible psychological

basis for her physiological symptoms in her medical records were likely sufficient to alert the

ALJ of her alleged mental impairment. Notably, plaintiff does not allege in any of the

pleadings that she actually meets or equals any of the Listings. 

At step two, the applicable regulations state that “[a]n impairment or combination of

impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit [a claimant’s] physical or mental

ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a). “Basic work activities” are

defined as including physical functions, such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing,

pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(1); understanding, carrying

out, and remembering simple instructions, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(3); use of judgment, 20

C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(4); and dealing with changes in a routine work setting, 20 C.F.R. §

404.1521(b)(6). 

At step three, the ALJ must explain adequately whether a claimant’s impairment(s)

meets or is medically equivalent to the criteria of any impairment in the Listings. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1525 (d), 404.1526(a); see Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 175-76 (9th Cir. 1990). 

“A boilerplate finding is insufficient to support a conclusion that a claimant’s impairment

does not meet or equal a listed impairment.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir.

2001). This does not mean, however, that the ALJ must “state why a claimant failed to

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satisfy every different section of the listing of impairments.” Gonzales v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d

1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that a four-page “evaluation of the evidence” provided an

adequate statement). Furthermore, an ALJ is not required to discuss the combined effects of

a claimant’s impairment where the claimant offers “no theory, plausible or otherwise, as to

how [his or her impairment(s)] combined to equal a listed impairment.” Lewis, 236 F.3d at

514. 

Under the circumstances in this case, the ALJ did not commit reversible error by not

considering plaintiff’s alleged mental impairment. As noted above, while Dr. Cerone stated

that plaintiff’s presenting problem was psychophysiologic cardiac and G.I. disorder with

anxiety and depression, he also reported that plaintiff had clear sensorium and intellect, good

insight and judgment, no problems in her personal habits and daily activities, and had a good

manner of relating to others. Dr. Jordan’s consultative report noted that plaintiff could sit for

six hours, stand for six hours, and lift ten pounds, and made no mention of a mental

impairment. On the July 30, 2001 Request For Medical Advice, the analyst concluded “I

didn’t find a severe impairment from a medical point of view.” TR at 156. These reports

indicate that even if plaintiff did have a mental impairment, it did not rise to the level of a

severe mental impairment because it did not limit her ability to do basic work activities. 

Moreover, Dr. West testified that plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments were

unexplained chest pains and physical deconditioning, and he did not mention that plaintiff

suffered from a mental impairment. Given the substantial weight of the medical records and

Dr. West’s testimony, the ALJ’s finding was supported by substantial evidence. 

A remand for explicit consideration of plaintiff’s mental impairment would not affect

the outcome of this case. Plaintiff does not explain how her mental impairment, in

combination with her medically determinable impairments of non-specific chest pains and

physical deconditioning, would meet or equal any impairment in the Listings. See Lewis,

236 F.3d at 514. Plaintiff does not specify which listing she believes she meets or equals,

and does not set forth any evidence which would support the diagnosis and findings of a

listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(d). Furthermore, the ALJ relied on Dr. West’s

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opinion “that the medical evidence in the record does not contain objective signs and

findings to establish that the claimant’s impairments, either alone or in combination, meet or

equaled the criteria of any listed impairment during the period in time at issue.” TR at 82. 

Dr. West was aware that there could possibly be a psychosomatic basis for plaintiff’s

symptoms, yet this did not change his conclusion that plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or

equal any of the criteria in the Listings. In fact, Dr. Cerone’s psychiatric medical report did

not mention any mental functional limitations. And finally, the ALJ stated that he reviewed

all evidence of record, including exhibits, the testimony given at the hearing, and the

arguments made by the claimant’s representative, in making his findings. Thus, by relying

on Dr. West’s testimony and the evidence of the record, the ALJ provided an adequate

explanation for finding that plaintiff did not have any impairments which met or equaled any

of the criteria in the Listings. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by failing to consider

plaintiff’s mental impairment. 

C. Whether the ALJ Improperly Assessed Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity

Plaintiff also alleges that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is legally flawed and led to an

erroneous finding that plaintiff could perform her past relevant work. Specifically, she

asserts that the ALJ (1) did not comply with Social Security Rulings (“SSRs”) in assessing

her functional limitations; (2) failed to perform a function-by-function assessment; and (3)

did not consider plaintiff’s statements and testimony or provide reasons for discrediting her

statements and testimony. 

1. Social Security Rulings

Defendant contends that plaintiff’s reliance on SSRs cannot establish legal error

because SSRs are not binding law. This contention is fatally flawed.

“Social Security rulings constitute the Social Security Administration’s interpretations

of the statute it administers and of its own regulations.” Chavez v. Department of Health and

Human Services, 103 F.3d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Paulson v. Bowen, 836 F.2d

1249, 1252 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1988)). SSRs are interpretive rulings and do not have the same

force and effect as the law or regulations. Paxton v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,

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856 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1988). However, courts defer to Social Security Rulings

unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the Act or regulations. Han v. Bowen,

882 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Accordingly, this Court considers the SSRs as valid interpretations of Social Security

laws and regulations and will defer to SSRs as precedent in adjudicating this case. 

2. Function-by-Function Assessment

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ assessed her RFC for the exertional demands of work in

categorical terms instead of providing a function-by-function assessment, as required by SSR

96-8p, and further that he failed to provide assessment of her non-exertional RFC. 

At step four in the sequential process, the Commissioner examines the claimant’s RFC

and the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(e). “RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related

physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” SSR 96-

8p. The SSRs require that the ALJ undertake a “function-by-function” assessment of the

claimant’s capacity to work according to exertional categories. 

The RFC assessment must first identify the individual’s functional limitations or

restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis,

including the functions in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 20 C.F.R. 404.1545 and

416.946. Only after that may RFC be expressed in terms of the exertional levels of

work, sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy. 

SSR 96-8p (July 2, 1996). 

To find that the claimant is not disabled at step four, the claimant must be able to

perform either (1) the actual functional demands and job duties of a particular past relevant

job; or (2) the functional demands and job duties of the occupation as generally required by

employers throughout the national economy. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th

Cir. 2001). An ALJ may rely on a non-treating, non-examining medical expert’s RFC

assessment as long as that assessment is not contradicted by all other evidence in the record,

is consistent with other evidence, and alone does not constitute substantial evidence to

support the Commissioner’s determination. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752. The reports of

consultative physicians called in by the Commissioner may serve as substantial evidence. 

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See Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 580 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In the present case, the ALJ properly relied on Dr. West’s testimony that plaintiff had

the RFC for sedentary to light work, and his opinion is consistent with other medical

evidence and not contradicted by the record. The record contains two function-by-function

assessments, one performed by Dr. Miles on May 29, 1981 and another performed by a

medical consultant on August 6, 2001. Both RFC assessments contain an evaluation of any

possible exertional and non-exertional limitations. For example, Dr. Miles found that

plaintiff could sit and stand for 8 hours, walk for 2 hours, occasionally lift up to 10 pounds,

frequently carry up to 10 pounds, and frequently bend, squat, crawl and climb. Dr. Miles

noted that plaintiff was “occasionally depressed” and was taking medication, but had no

sensory or environmental limitations. The August 6, 2001 RFC assessment contained similar

findings, stating that plaintiff could occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, frequently lift

and/or carry 10 pounds, stand and/or walk for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, sit about 6

hours in an 8-hour workday, and had unlimited ability to push and/or pull. The RFC

assessment further noted that plaintiff had no postural, manipulative, visual, communicative,

or environmental limitations. The medical consultant noted that it’s findings were

substantiated by a prior treating/examining source conclusions about plaintiff’s limitations. 

Indeed, the ALJ did not rely on Dr. West’s testimony alone to find that plaintiff had the RFC

for sedentary to light work. 

Although the ALJ did not engage in an explicit function-by-function analysis, he did

consider all the appropriate evidence in the record, including both medical consultants’

function-by-function assessments, in making his finding. A reviewing court may use its own

faculties for drawing specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s opinion. Magallanes,

881 F.2d at 752. Taking into account the substantial weight of the medical evidence and Dr.

West’s testimony, the ALJ was warranted in finding that plaintiff had the RFC for sedentary

to light work, as defined at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) and (b). The ALJ properly relied on the

function-by-function assessment conducted by the consulting physicians and was not

required to repeat the exercise. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by failing to conduct a

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function-by-function assessment. 

3. Consideration of Plaintiff’s Statements and Testimony

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to consider her statements and testimony in

assessing the severity of her limitations. 

“In deciding whether to accept a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ

must perform two stages of analysis: the Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1991)

analysis and an analysis of the credibility of the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity

of her symptoms.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). The Cotton

standard requires the claimant to produce medical evidence of an underlying impairment

which is reasonably likely to be the cause of the alleged symptoms. Id. “Once a claimant

meets the Cotton test and there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject

the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms only if he makes specific

findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. at 1284. The Ninth Circuit

has consistently held that “[t]he ALJ is responsible for determining credibility and resolving

conflicts in medical testimony.” Magallenes, 881 F.2d at 750; see also Allen v. Heckler, 749

F.2d 577, 580 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (“questions of credibility and resolutions of conflicts in the

testimony are functions solely for the [Commissioner]”). 

The ALJ rejected plaintiff’s statements and testimony because he did not find them to

be credible or supported by the medical evidence. The ALJ’s opinion contains a lengthy

description of plaintiff’s statements and testimony, and he credited her complaints of pain

and other symptoms to the extent that it was consistent with his decision. The ALJ explained

that he based his “decision primarily on the testimony of the medical expert as I found his

testimony to be corroborated by the medical evidence.” TR at 82. Dr. West testified that

although it wasn’t clear “whether the chest pain is causing her the aggravation or the

aggravation is causing the chest pain,” he saw no major physical limitation preventing

plaintiff from returning to work. TR at 404. The ALJ further explained that he discredited

plaintiff’s testimony because plaintiff was “in no apparent distress . . . had no problems

sitting, walking or testifying . . . was articulate in her responses and had no difficulty with her

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memory.” TR at 83. The ALJ considered plaintiff’s appearance at the hearing, along with all

the other evidence of the record, in making his credibility assessment. The medical evidence,

including the two consultative physician’s RFC assessments and Dr. Cerone’s medical

opinion that plaintiff had no mental functional limitations, contradicted plaintiff’s allegations

of disabling subjective symptoms. 

It is clear from the ALJ’s opinion that he considered plaintiff’s statements and

testimony, and based on the the medical expert’s testimony and the substantial medical

evidence, he found plaintiff’s complaints of disabling subjective symptoms not credible. 

“Where [] the ALJ has made specific findings justifying a decision to disbelieve a subjective

symptom allegation [], and those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record,

[the reviewing court] is not to “second-guess” that decision. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597,

604 (9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, the ALJ properly discredited plaintiff’s statements and

testimony of subjective symptoms, and his decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

D. Whether the ALJ Improperly Assessed Plaintiff’s Ability to Return to her Past

Relevant Work

Plaintiff finally contends that the ALJ committed reversible error by finding that she

could perform her past relevant work. 

A claimant bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability by

showing that a physical or mental impairment prevents her from engaging in previous

occupations. Allen v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 726 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir.

1984). If the Commissioner determines that a claimant retains the RFC to perform the actual

functional demands and job duties of a particular past relevant job or the functional demands

and job duties of the occupation as generally required by employers throughout the national

economy, then the claimant will not be found disabled. See SSR 82-61. The Ninth Circuit

does not require explicit findings regarding a claimant’s past relevant work both as generally

and actually performed. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845. The VE merely has to find that a claimant

can or cannot continue his or her past relevant work. Id. (citing Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d

794, 798 (1986) (“the claimant has the burden of proving an inability to return to his former

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type of work and not just to his former job”)). 

The ALJ properly found that plaintiff could return to her past relevant work as a “Girl

Friday” and insurance clerk. The VE testified that plaintiff’s job as a “Girl Friday” was a

very atypical job and is not described in the DOT. After discussing with plaintiff her job

duties, the VE identified a number of jobs, listed in the DOT, which best conformed to

plaintiff’s description of her past relevant work. These jobs included insurance clerk,

insurance benefits clerk, insurance checker, and administrative assistant, all of which are

sedentary jobs. Based on Dr. West’s opinion that plaintiff had the RFC for sedentary to light

work, the ALJ found that plaintiff was able to do her past relevant work, as that type of work

is generally performed. Thus, the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff could perform her past relevant

work is supported by substantial evidence. 

Plaintiff has not met her burden of proving that her physical or mental impairments

prevented her from returning to her past relevant work. As noted above, the ALJ properly

discredited plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. Accordingly, the ALJ properly

assessed plaintiff’s ability to return to her past relevant work, and this finding is supported by

substantial evidence. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The ALJ did not commit legal error in reaching his decision. Rather, the ALJ gave

specific, legitimate reasons for his determinations based on substantial evidence in the record

and properly concluded that plaintiff was not disabled under the Act during the period of

December 1980 through May 1982.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and

defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 4, 2005 /s/ 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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