Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16913/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16913-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Simon Cheffins
Appellant
Gregory Jones
Appellant
Michael B. Stewart
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SIMON CHEFFINS and GREGORY

JONES,

Plaintiffs-Counter-DefendantsAppellants,

v.

MICHAEL B. STEWART,

Defendant-Counter-PlaintiffAppellee.

No. 12-16913

D.C. No.

3:09-cv-00130-RAM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Robert A. McQuaid, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 8, 2014

San Francisco, California

Filed June 8, 2016

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Diarmuid F.

O’Scannlain and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain;

Concurrence by Judge McKeown

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2 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

SUMMARY*

Visual Artists Rights Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor

of the defendant in an action under the Visual Artists Rights

Act and Nevada law.

Plaintiffs transformed a used school bus into La Contessa,

a mobile replica of a 16th-century Spanish galleon for use at

the Burning Man Festival. After the defendant took

possession of the land on which La Contessa was stored, he

burned its wooden structure so that a scrap metal dealer could

remove the underlying school bus from his property.

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment on the

VARA claim, the panel held that La Contessa was “applied

art” and therefore was not covered by VARA’s protection of

artists’ rights of integrity and attribution in works of visual

art. Agreeing in large part with the Second Circuit’s analysis,

the panel held that an object constitutes a piece of applied

art ̄as opposed to a work of visual art ̄where the object

initially served a utilitarian function and the object continues

to serve such a function after the artist makes embellishments

to it.

The panel held that at trial on the plaintiffs’ conversion

claim, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

excluding expert testimony, nor in instructing the jury on

abandoned property, lost profits, and punitive damages. The

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 3

district court also did not abuse its discretion in admitting

evidence of drug paraphernalia surrounding La Contessa as

it sat on the defendant’s property.

Finally, the panel held that the district court did not err in

awarding attorneys’ fees to the defendant after the plaintiffs

rejected an offer of judgment made under Nevada law.

Concurring, Judge McKeown expressed concern with the

majority’s definition of applied art. She wrote that the right

question to ask is whether the primary purpose of the work as

a whole is to serve a practical, useful function, and whether

the aesthetic elements are subservient to that utilitarian

purpose.

COUNSEL

Paul E. Quade (argued), Quade Law, Ltd., Reno, Nevada,

Plaintiff-Appellants.

Keegan G. Low (argued) and Kristen L. Martini, Robison,

Belaustegui, Sharp & Low, Reno, Nevada, for DefendantAppellee.

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4 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether the Visual Artists Rights Act

applies to a used school bus transformed into a mobile replica

of a 16th-century Spanish galleon.

I

A

Plaintiffs Simon Cheffins and Gregory Jones, along with

a number of volunteers, built the La Contessa, a replica of a

16th-century Spanish galleon for use at the Burning Man

Festival.1 Cheffins began his creation by acquiring a used

school bus. He and Jones then designed and constructed the

galleon facade, including a hull, decking, masts, and a handcrafted figurehead. These elements and the bus were then

transported to the Black Rock Desert in northern Nevada, the

site of Burning Man, and assembled. When completed, the La

Contessa was approximately sixty feet wide and sixteen feet

long with a mast over fifty feet tall.

The La Contessa first appeared at the Festival in 2002.

Festival participants took rides on the La Contessa, and at

least two weddings were performed on its deck. It reappeared

in 2003 and 2005. In 2003, it was used as part of a marching

band performance, and, in 2005, it was the centerpiece of a

children’s treasure hunt, among other things.

1 As Cheffins and Jones helpfully explain, Burning Man is an art and

countercultural festival held each year for the week preceding Labor Day.

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 5

After the 2002 Festival, Cheffins and Jones stored the La

Contessa on property owned by Festival organizers. After the

2003 and 2005 Festivals, Cheffins and Jones stored the La

Contessa on land in Nevada held in life estate by one Joan

Grant, who had given them permission to do so. In late 2005,

however, Grant’s home burned down, causing her to abandon

the life estate. Thereafter, defendant Michael Stewart took

possession of the land in fee simple through a limited liability

company.

Cheffins and Jones did not relocate the La Contessa after

the change of property ownership. Rather, it sat unmoved on

Stewart’s land until December 2006. Sometime during that

month, Stewart intentionally burned the wooden structure of

the La Contessa so that a scrap metal dealer could remove the

underlying school bus from his property.

B

Cheffins and Jones filed this suit in the District of Nevada

in March 2009, alleging that Stewart violated the Visual

Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(A) (VARA), and

committed common law conversion when he destroyed theLa

Contessa. After cross motions for summary judgment,

Magistrate Judge Robert McQuaid dismissed Cheffins and

Jones’s claim under the VARA, concluding that the La

Contessa was “applied art” and so not protected by the

statute.2 Cheffins and Jones’s conversion claim proceeded to

trial before a jury, which found in favor of Stewart, who then

moved for and was granted an award of attorneys’ fees under

2 The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge under

28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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6 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) and Nevada state

law.

II

In this timely filed appeal, Cheffins and Jones contend

that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment

on their VARA claim and that Stewart was not entitled to

attorneys’ fees. Cheffins and Jones also appeal several

evidentiary rulings, assert that the trial court gave several

deficient jury instructions, and contend that the trial court

erred when it failed to grant summary judgment on their

conversion claim.

A

The VARA was enacted in 1990 as an amendment to the

Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 106A. “The purpose of VARA is

to protect two ‘moral rights’ of artists—the rights of

‘integrity’ and ‘attribution.’” Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine

Ins. Cos., 311 F.3d 979, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing H.R.

Rep. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1990)). “The right of

integrity allows the [artist] to prevent any deforming or

mutilating changes to his work, even after the title in the work

has been transferred.” Id. at 985 (citation omitted and internal

quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). “The right

of attribution allows the artist to be recognized by name as

the creator of a work.” Id. In order to provide those

protections, the VARA states that “the author of a work of

visual art” shall “have the right,” among other things, to

“prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other

modification of [a] work which would be prejudicial to his or

her honor” and “to prevent any destruction of a work of

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 7

recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent

destruction of that work . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).

As the text of the statute shows, the VARA only applies

to “works of visual art.” It does not define the term “work of

visual art,” but the VARA is part of the Copyright Act, which

defines “work of visual art” in the affirmative and in the

negative. A “work of visual art” is:

(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture,

existing in a single copy, in a limited edition

of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and

consecutively numbered by the author, or, in

the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast,

carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or

fewer that are consecutively numbered by the

author and bear the signature or other

identifying mark of the author; or

(2) a still photographic image produced for

exhibition purposes only, existing in a single

copy that is signed by the author, or in a

limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are

signed and consecutively numbered by the

author.

17 U.S.C. § 101. On the other hand, a “work of visual art” is

not:

(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical

drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion

picture or other audiovisual work, book,

magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base,

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8 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

electronic information service, electronic

publication, or similar publication;

(ii) any merchandising item or advertising,

promotional, descriptive, covering, or

packaging material or container;

(iii) any portion or part of any item described

in clause (i) or (ii).

Id. (emphasis added).

B

On summary judgment, Stewart asserted, and the trial

court subsequently concluded, that the La Contessa was not

a “work of visual art” because it was “applied art.” Whether

the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the

VARA claim turns on whether the La Contessa was a “work

of visual art.” The parties assert that this question, in turn,

depends on whether it was applied art.3

3 Even if the La Contessa were not “applied art” it is not clear that it

would qualify for protection under the VARA. After all, the “VARA’s

definition of work of visual art operates to narrow and focus the statute’s

coverage; only a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, or an exhibition

photograph will qualify.” Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 300

(7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the trial court

concluded that the La Contessa was a sculpture, we need not further

address the issue because it is not raised on appeal.

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 9

III

A

The VARA does not define the term “applied art,” and

federal courts have rarely had occasion to interpret its

meaning. In Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d

Cir. 1995), the Second Circuit held that a sculpture

constructed of portions of a school bus and affixed to a wall

in a building lobby was not “applied art.” Id. at 83. It

explained that the term “applied art” means “two-and threedimensional ornamentation or decoration that is affixed to

otherwise utilitarian objects.” Id. at 84–85 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The court further explained that the sculpture

was not “applied art” simply because it was affixed to “the

lobby’s floor, walls, and ceiling” because “[i]nterpreting

applied art to include such works would render meaningless

VARA’s protection for works of visual art installed in

buildings.” Id. at 85.

The Second Circuit provided an additional gloss on what

constitutes a “work of visual art,” and by extension what

constitutes “applied art,” in Pollara v. Seymour, where it

explained that the “VARA may protect a sculpture that looks

like a piece of furniture, but it does not protect a piece of

utilitarian furniture, whether or not it could arguably be called

a sculpture.” 344 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2003). The court

went on to hold that an elaborate painted banner was not a

“work of visual art” eligible for protection under the VARA.

Id. at 271.

We agree in large part with the Second Circuit’s analysis. 

As the Second Circuit suggested, the focus of our inquiry

should be on whether the object in question originally

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10 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

was—and continues to be—utilitarian in nature. Such a focus

comports with dictionary definitions of the term “applied

art.”4 For example, Webster’s Dictionary defines “applied

art” as “employed in the decoration, design or execution of

useful objects.” The Merriam Webster Dictionary 105 (3d ed.

1974) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Oxford English

Dictionary explains that one definition of “applied” is “put to

practical use” and lists “applied arts” as a frequent application

of the term. The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989).

These definitions suggest that, in its ordinary meaning,

applied art consists of an object with a utilitarian function that

also has some artistic or aesthetic merit.

Further, this approach makes sense in the statutory

context in which “applied art” is used in 17 U.S.C. § 101.

“Applied art” is enumerated in a list that also contains, inter

alia, maps, globes, charts, technical drawings, diagrams,

models, newspapers, periodicals, data bases, and electronic

information services. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The fact that the other

items in the list are utilitarian objects leads us to conclude

that the listed items are related by their practical purposes and

utilitarian functions, requiring a focus on utility when

construing the term “applied art.”5

4

 We adopt the “common practice of consulting dictionary definitions”

to clarify the “ordinary meaning” of terms used in a statute but not defined

therein. Johnson v. Aljian, 490 F.3d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 2007). We consult

“the edition [of the dictionary] in print when Congress enacted” the

VARA. Id.

5 Under the canon of noscitur a sociis “statutory terms ‘grouped in a list

should be given related meaning’” and the fact that “‘several items in a list

share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as

possessing that attribute as well.’” Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 976

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Kimsey, 668 F.3d 691, 701 (9th

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 11

We therefore hold that an object constitutes a piece of

“applied art”—as opposed to a “work of visual art”—where

the object initially served a utilitarian function and the object

continues to serve such a function after the artist made

embellishments or alterations to it.6 This test embraces the

circumstances both where a functional object incorporates a

decorative design in its initial formulation, and where a

functional object is decorated after manufacture but continues

to serve a practical purpose. Conversely, “applied art” would

not include a piece of art whose function is purely aesthetic

or a utilitarian object which is so transformed through the

addition of artistic elements that its utilitarian functions cease.

B

We respond briefly to the concern expressed in the

concurrence that the standard we adopt today may not be

workable—that it raises difficult questions regarding where

exactly the line defining “applied art” will be drawn. See

Concurrence at 22. The analysis we adopt today directs the

court’s attention awayfrom assessments of an object’s artistic

merit and instead toward the object’s practical utility. The

standard is relatively simple: where a functional object,

despite claims of artistic merit, continues to serve a utilitarian

Cir. 2012)); see also Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 195–98 (2012) (discussing the noscitur a

sociis canon).

6 With recognition that nearly every object on which art is installed will

be in some sense “utilitarian,” we caution that the utilitarian function must

be something other than mere display of the work in question. See also

17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic

utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the

article or to convey information.”).

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12 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

purpose, it is applied art. Although the answers to some of

the questions regarding this standard may be clear,7resolution

of the case before us does not require us to provide a

comprehensive inventory of all the objects that will or will

not meet the definition of “applied art.”

Indeed, the call for a “more textured and flexible

definition of applied art,” Concurrence at 22, raises even

greater concerns of line drawing. The concurrence would

have judges “evaluate [a] work as a whole,” to determine

“whether the artistic creation is subservient” to its “useful

function.” Id. at 28. Such an analysis necessarily requires

courts to express judgments regarding the importance of an

object’s artistic qualities, and to determine whether those

qualities predominate over the object’s non-artistic utility. 

Even approached from the perspective of a “reasonable

observer,” id. at 29, the question for a court remains whether

an objectively reasonable person would conclude that a

creation is more “art” than useful object. How different

judges could answer such a question on a consistent basis is

anything but clear.

Any attempt to guide judicial determinations of an

amorphous concept like “applied art” is unlikely to be

completely satisfying to all. But the approach we adopt today

7 For example, we have explained that the “transformation from

utilitarian object to work of art,” Concurrence at 22, occurs where an

object’s utilitarian functions cease. We can leave for another case

whether there might be some de minimis exception to this standard, where

an object continues to serve only the most trivial of utilitarian functions. 

Further, we have explained that our focus is on objects that in fact

continue to serve real utilitarian functions (as opposed to those which may

retain the ability to serve utilitarian functions, or those which at one point

in history served such functions, see id.).

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 13

instructs courts to focus precisely on an object’s continuing

utility—and not to ask whether that utility is somehow

subservient to an artistic creation. Difficult cases may still

arise, but our standard aims to limit the situations in which

they do.

C

We now apply this standard to the facts of this case.

The La Contessa began as a simple school bus—an object

which unquestionably served the utilitarian function of

transportation. To transform the bus into the La Contessa,

Cheffins and Jones adorned it with the visual trappings of a

16th-century Spanish galleon. While the La Contessa’s

elaborate decorative elements may have had many artistic

qualities, the La Contessa retained a largely practical function

even after it had been completed. At Burning Man, the La

Contessa was used for transportation, providing rides to

festival-goers, hosting musical performances and weddings,

and serving as a stage for poetry and acrobatics shows.

Indeed, the La Contessa often was driven about the Festival

grounds and was banned from the Festival in 2004 because

“its unsafe driving practices far exceeded community

tolerance and out-weighed the visual contribution” it made.

Under the definition we adopt today, the La Contessa

plainly was “applied art.” It began as a rudimentary utilitarian

object, and despite being visually transformed through

elaborate artistry, it continued to serve a significant utilitarian

function upon its completion. As “applied art,” the La

Contessa was not a work of visual art under the VARA and

therefore not eligible for its protection. Therefore, the trial

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14 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

court properly granted summary judgment to Stewart on

Cheffins and Jones’s VARA claim.

IV

A

Cheffins and Jones next argue that the trial court abused

its discretion when it excluded the testimony of Joanne

Northrup and Diedre DeFranceaux, two of their expert

witnesses, and when it refused to allow Cheffins and Jones to

supplement other expert reports. After conducting a lengthy

hearing on the matter, the trial court concluded that the

proffered testimony would be unduly speculative. The trial

court did not abuse its considerable discretion in this case.

We have repeatedly explained that “a trial court not only has

broad latitude in determining whether an expert’s testimony

is reliable, but also in deciding how to determine testimony’s

reliability.” Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.,

373 F.3d 998, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

B

Cheffins and Jones raise two issues related to the trial

court’s jury instructions on abandoned property. First, they

contend that the trial court abused its discretion when it

declined to instruct the jury on abandoned property, lost

profits, and punitive damages based on Nevada Revised

Statues §§ 487.210–487.250. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion. The statutory scheme only applies to “vehicles

abandoned on public land,” and it is uncontested that the La

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 15

Contessa remained on Stewart’s private land until its

destruction. N.R.S. § 487.235.8

Second, Cheffins and Jones contend that the trial court

improperly instructed the jury on abandonment under Nevada

law, asserting that the given instruction failed to explain the

required showing of intent. The given instruction, however,

explained that “abandonment may be inferred from . . . acts

done” and thus comported with Nevada law. See J.H. Mallett

v. Uncle Sam Gold & Silver Mining Co., 1 Nev. 188, 204–05

(1865) (holding that “the moment the intention to abandon

and the relinquishment of possession unite, the abandonment

is complete”).

C

Cheffins and Jones next assert that the trial court abused

its discretion by failing to include jury instructions on lost

profits and punitive damages resulting from the destruction of

the La Contessa—which the court concluded were unduly

speculative. The court did not abuse its discretion. Moreover,

even if the district court had erred, such error was harmless

because the jury found in favor of Stewart on Cheffins and

Jones’s conversion claim, meaning that there were no

damages to award in any case. See Kennedy v. S. Cal. Edison

Co., 268 F.3d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that

“[h]armless error review applies to jury instructions in civil

cases”).

8 Cheffins and Jones’s related contention that the trial court should have

provided a jury instruction based on N.R.S. § 118A.460 fails for a similar

reason. That statute applies to landlord-tenant relationships, and is

inapplicable to the facts of this case.

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16 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

D

Cheffins and Jones also contend that the trial court erred

when it admitted evidence of drug paraphenalia surrounding

the La Contessa as it sat on Stewart’s property. The trial court

first determined that it would not admit such evidence, but

then reversed itself and allowed the evidence “simply to show

the condition of things around the ship” when a witness

visited the La Contessa. We have previously explained that

“evidentiary rulings should not be reversed absent clear abuse

of discretion and some prejudice,” S.E.C. v. Jasper, 678 F.3d

1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012), and we see neither clear abuse of

discretion nor prejudice here. Such evidence was relevant to

the value of the La Contessa at the time of its destruction, and

the trial court provided the jury with an appropriate limiting

instruction.

E

Cheffins and Jones next contend that the trial court erred

when it denied their motion for partial summary judgment on

their conversion claim. The conversion claim subsequently

was presented to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of

Stewart. Cheffins and Jones’s appeal therefore fails at the

outset, because “we do not review the denial of summary

judgment when the case has gone to trial.” Affordable Hous.

Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1193 (9th Cir.

2006); see also Lum v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 963 F.2d

1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that “there is no need

to review denials of summary judgment after there has been

a trial on the merits,” and dismissing appeal).

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 17

V

Finally, Cheffins and Jones challenge the court’s award

of attorneys’ fees to Stewart, which the court made after they

rejected an offer of judgment made under Nevada law.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) allows a party to

recover attorneys’ fees, when, among other things, a motion

specifies “the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the

movant to the award.” Moreover, we have recognized that,

under Nevada law, “a prevailing [party] is entitled to recover

attorneys’ fees if an offer of judgment is rejected.” MRO

Commc’ns, Inc. v. AT&T, 197 F.3d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir.

1999); see Nev. R. Civ. P. 68.

Cheffins and Jones assert that the timing requirements of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 apply to an offer of

judgment made under state law, rendering the award of

attorneys’ fees improper because the offer of judgment on

which the trial court based its award would not have been

timely. Stewart urges that Rule 68 does not apply.

We agree with Stewart. “Rule 54 provides a federal

procedural mechanism for moving for attorney’s fees that are

due under state law.” Med. Protective Co.v. Pang, 740 F.3d

1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2013). Therefore, “Nevada’s offer of

judgment rules and statutes . . . provide the applicable

procedure” for awarding attorneys’ fees in a case like this

one, where the only claim at the time Stewart made his offer

of judgment was a state law conversion claim. MRO,

197 F.3d at 1281–83 (“In an action where a district court is

exercising its subject matter jurisdiction over a state law

claim” the “state law denying the right to attorney’s fees or

giving a right thereto, which reflects a substantial policy of

the state, should be followed.” (quoting Alyeska Pipeline

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18 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31

(1975))). Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)

provides the applicable procedure for awarding attorneys’

fees, and because Stewart’s offer of judgment complied with

the underlying Nevada state law rule, it was timely for

purposes of the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees.9

AFFIRMED.

10

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I write separately to express my concern with the

majority’s definition of applied art, which centers on whether

an object has or retains a utilitarian function. Maj. Op. 10. 

This focus runs the risk of unduly narrowing the protections

of artists under the Visual Artist Right’s Act of 1990,

17 U.S.C. § 106A (“VARA”), and not focusing on the work

as a whole. Although the majority’s formulation may protect

the clearest cases—those works that are “purely aesthetic” or

“so transformed through the addition of artistic elements that

[their] utilitarian functions cease,” Maj. Op. 11,—it leaves

 

9

 While the parties did not brief the issue, we agree with the trial court

that there is no conflict between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and

Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 68. See Goldberg v. Pac. Indem. Co.,

62 F.3d 752, 756 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the MRO opinion is

not relevant to whether Arizona’s offer of judgment rule conflicts with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 because, unlike Arizona, Nevada’s

rule allows for recovery of attorneys’ fees).

 

10 The denial of Cheffins and Jones’s motion for summary judgment is

not appealable and their appeal from that order is therefore DISMISSED.

Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp., 433 F.3d at 1193.

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 19

other cases—such as works of art that incorporate utilitarian

elements, or that could be put to practical purposes—out in

the cold. To better effectuate the purpose of VARA, we need

a more nuanced definition of “applied art” that balances

between the risk of unduly restricting VARA’s reach and the

risks of turning judges into art critics or consigning to

litigation every work of art that includes some utilitarian

function. In determining whether a work is “applied art,” the

right question to ask is whether the primary purpose of the

work as a whole is to serve a practical, useful function, and

whether the aesthetic elements are subservient to that

utilitarian purpose. Because the bus/Spanish galleon La

Contessa is applied art under either standard, I concur in the

judgment as well as parts I, II, IV, and V of the panel opinion.

VARA enshrined the concept of droit moral, or “moral

rights,” in American law to a limited extent. Cheryl Swack,

Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A

Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United

States, 22 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 361, 363 (1998). Long

recognized in Europe, moral rights “afford protection for the

author’s personal, non-economic interests in receiving

attribution for her work, and in preserving the work in the

form in which it was created, even after its sale or licensing.” 

Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress:

Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act and the

Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990,

14 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 477, 478 (1990).

VARA protects the moral rights of attribution and

integrity, but only for a narrow subset of the works of visual

art already protected under the Copyright Act. 3 Nimmer on

Copyright § 8D.06[A][2]. Thus, the creator of a qualifying

“painting, drawing, print, or sculpture,” or “still photographic

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20 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

image produced for exhibition purposes only,” 17 U.S.C.

§ 101, may “prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or

other modification of [the] work which would be prejudicial

to his or her honor” and to “claim authorship” of the work. 

Id. § 106A(a). Coverage is limited to these listed

categories of works of visual art. The statute also prohibits

the destruction of work of “recognized stature.” Id.

§ 106A(a)(3)(B). As a result, acts of so-called “art murder”

like the removal of Diego Rivera’s mural from Rockefeller

Center, now have limits.1 Thus, when Kent Twitchell’s mural

depicting artist Ed Rucha was painted over, Twitchell sued

under VARA; he ultimately settled for $ 1.1 million.2

The protections provided by VARA “are analogous to

those protected by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.” 

H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 5 (1990).3 Affording artists these

 

1

In 1934, Rivera’s unfinished mural was removed from the wall of the

RCA building and destroyed over the course of a weekend. The

Rockefellers apparently made this decision due to Rivera’s refusal to omit

the figure of Lenin from his work. See Rivera RCA Mural is Cut from

Wall, N.Y. Times, February 13, 1934, at 21. Indeed, the mutilation of a

Picasso painting, Trois Femmes, by two Australian “entrepreneurs” was

significant to the passage of VARA. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 17.

2 Although Twitchell’s generous settlement was heralded as “a

vindication of artists’ moral rights under VARA, the case provides no

judicial precedent on this matter.” Charles Cronin, Dead on the Vine:

Living and Conceptual Art and VARA, 12 Vanderbilt J. Ent. & Tech. L.

209, 219 n.49 (2010).

3 The Berne Convention secures “the protection of the rights of authors

in their literary and artistic works,” Berne Convention for the Protection

of Literary and Artist Works, art. 1, July 24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-

27 (1986), including moral rights “[t]o claim authorship” and “to object

to certain modifications and other derogatory actions,” id. at art. 6bis. The

United States acceded to the Berne Convention in 1988, but did not

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 21

rights—which are otherwise largely not recognized in our

intellectual property system—helps foster a “climate of

artistic worth and honor that encourages the author in the

arduous act of creation.” Id. (internal quotations omitted);

see also Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 296–98

(7th Cir. 2011) (detailing the history of VARA).

Although VARA amended the Copyright Act, its unique

protections do not extend to every copyrightable work. 

Rather, the statute may be invoked only if the painting,

drawing, print, sculpture, or “still photographic image

produced for exhibition purposes only” is part of a “limited

edition of 200 copies or fewer” that have been “signed and

consecutively numbered by the author.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 

Significantly, a work does not fall within VARA’s protection

if, among other exclusions, it is mass-produced, intended for

use in advertising, or is “applied art.” Id.

This case hinges on that final exception—applied art. The

parties agree that La Contessa, a Spanish galleon built on the

chassis of a school bus by Cheffins and Jones, was a

sculpture. The parties also do not contest that La Contessa

was a work of recognized stature. Thus VARA would

prohibit the destruction of La Contessa unless it was a work

of applied art.

The majority focuses the inquiry “on whether the object

in question originally was—and continues to be—utilitarian

in nature.” Maj. Op. 9–10. Thus, the majority holds “that an

object constitutes a piece of ‘applied art’—as opposed to a

‘work of visual art’—where the object initially served a

recognize moral rights until Congress enacted VARA two years later.

Swack, supra at 363.

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22 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

utilitarian function and the object continues to serve such a

utilitarian function after the artist made embellishments or

alterations to it.” Maj. Op. 11. This definition pays

insufficient heed to the character of the work as a whole and

fails to clarify when the product of artistic creation has

crossed the threshold of functionality that transforms it from

visual to applied art.

The central focus of our inquiry should be on whether a

work is primarily directed to a utilitarian purpose. The

majority’s bare statement provides scant guidance. At what

point does the transformation from utilitarian object to work

of art occur? Is any residual utilitarian function sufficient to

consign a work to the “applied art” label, or must the

utilitarian function be significant? Does it matter whether an

object within a work retains a possible, but unused or

impractical, utilitarian function versus whether it continues to

be used for its original purpose? What is the magic dividing

line that informs our legal determination? These questions

highlight the need for a more textured and flexible definition

of applied art.

Defining the term “applied art” is no easy task. To be

sure, judicial attempts to categorize artistic creations are

fraught with difficulties. As Justice Holmes observed long

ago, judges make terrible art critics: “It would be a dangerous

undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute

themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations.” 

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251

(1903). There is some irony in the fact that VARA was

enacted as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,

Pub. L. No. 101-650, which created eighty-five new federal

district and appellate judgeships. Thankfully, apart from

occasional fair use cases under the Copyright Act, these

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 23

judges have been able to devote themselves to tasks other

than critiquing paintings and sculptures. Although VARA

does not ask us to assess the beauty or value of art, attempting

to discern whether a unique creation is visual or utilitarian art

poses similar challenges.

The difficulty of our job is compounded because VARA

provides no definition of applied art. Leaders of the art

communitywarned Congress that VARA “does not offer firm

definitions” of applied and visual art, leaving “open for

conjecture the kinds of art and artists eligible for protection.” 

Hearing on H.R. 3221, Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987,

Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the

Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th

Cong. 136 (1988) (testimony of the Association of Art

Museum Directors, American Arts Alliance, and American

Association of Museums). Congress was unmoved: the

House Report accompanying the bill unhelpfully states that

the definition of applied art is “self-explanatory” and instructs

courts construing the statute to use “common sense” as well

as the “generally accepted standards of the artistic

community.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 11, 13.

Although many court decisions have addressed applied

art, these cases provide little guidance on how to distinguish

applied from visual art. The issue in nearly all applied art

cases is whether the work was copyrightable applied art or

instead a noncopyrightable work of “industrial design.” See,

e.g., Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 972 (6th

Cir. 1983) (“Congress intended to distinguish between

‘copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted works

of industrial design.’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess. 54)); Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel.

Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 920 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[There is a]

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24 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

distinction between works of applied art eligible for copyright

protection and industrial designs ineligible for protection.”);

Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 1978)

(noting the “precise line between copyrightable works of

applied art and uncopyrighted works of industrial design”).

The analysis in these cases is driven by the principle that

works may unquestionably be applied art, such as a detailed

carving on the back of a chair—an obviously utilitarian

object—but may also enjoy certain copyright protection.4

Whether such a work falls under VARA’s protections is a

different question. Thus, while these opinions have coalesced

around a definition of applied art for the purpose of copyright

protection as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that are

intended to be or have been embodied in useful articles,” 8-

4A Nimmer on Copyright § 102, they do not provide an

answer under VARA because VARA protects a new and

different “genus” of “‘works of visual art,’” 3 Nimmer on

Copyright § 8D.06[A][2].

VARA’s protections cannot be limited only to works

entirely devoid of any utilitarian purpose. As Judge Gesell

once noted: “Art through the ages has often served a

utilitarian purpose[].” Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp.

939, 941 (D.D.C. 1976), rev’d 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 

Many outstanding sculptures, including the Caryatids of the

Acropolis and the monumental carvings of Ramses at the

temple of Karnak are in fact columns that provided buildings

with structural integrity. Medieval tapestries not only

4

Indeed, examples of original “pictoral, graphic, and sculptural works”

protected by copyright include dolls and toys, mosaics, and stained glass

designs. United States Copyright Office, Circular 40.0915, Copyright

Registration for Pictorial, Graphic, and Sculptural Works (2015).

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 25

represented a form of fine art, but also “ke[pt] castles and

cathedrals free from draft.” William S. Lieberman, Modern

French Tapestries, 6 Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin

142, 142 (1948). Of course, the famous Bayeux tapestries,

which depict events leading to the Battle of Hastings, retain

their utilitarian function to some extent: they could still be

used to keep a drafty castle warm. Likewise, Tracy Emin’s

My Bed, displayed at the Tate Britain, incorporates Emin’s

real bed as a “monument to the heartache of a relationship

breakdown.”5 The bed arguably retains its original utilitarian

function—it remains a bed, and could still be slept in—but it

is no longer meant or used for this utilitarian purpose. 

Rather, like the Bayeux tapestries, My Bed is now appreciated

and viewed as a work of creative expression and, when

viewed as a whole, the utilitarian object has become part of

a visual art piece.

The modern era abounds with examples of fine art that

serve some utility. Perhaps the most famous sculpture of the

modern era—Rodin’s The Thinker—was conceived when the

artist was designing a set of monumental doors titled The

Gates of Hell.

6 Doors, of course, are utilitarian objects that

facilitate the movement of people into and out of buildings. 

Likewise, a young Pablo Picasso painted a massive

background piece for the ballet Le Tricorne. Although that

painting surely served some utilitarian purpose as a stage

5 Hannah Ellis-Petersen, Tracy Emin’s Messy Bed Goes on Display at

Tate for First Time in 15 Years, The Guardian (Mar. 30, 2015, 10:41 AM),

http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/30/tracey-emins-messybed-displayed-tate-britain-first-time-in-15-years.

6 Rodin envisioned Dante sitting and contemplating the scenes of eternal

damnation portrayed on the Gates. Albert E. Elsen, Rodin’s Thinker and

the Dilemmas of Modern Public Sculpture 43 (1985).

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26 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

curtain, following that debut, it has been displayed as a

painting for half a century. The painting was the focus of

intense debate when it was removed last year from the Four

Seasons restaurant in New York’s Seagram Building, where

it had hung since 1959.7 Some sculptures designed by Dale

Chihuly are fantastically artistic and original and yet could

also serve a utilitarian purpose of diffusing fresh water or

serving as a room divider. The artistic and utilitarian aspects

are entwined in some of Chihuly’s pieces.8

It is easy to imagine a sculpture composed of an array of

utilitarian objects. VARA’s legislative history confirms this

situation: Congress emphasized that because “[a]rtists may

work in a variety of media, and use any number of materials

in creating their works . . . . whether a particular work falls

within the definition should not depend on the medium or

materials used.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 11. Indeed, a

Florida plumber/artist who created a sculpture with auto

parts, plumbing fixtures and scrap wiring, found himself in

the middle of VARA litigation when the “junk” was

removed.9 Automatically relegating these pieces—which are

7 Le Tricorne has found a new home at the New York Historical Society. 

Benjamin Muller, After 55 Years in Vaunted Spot, a Picasso Is Persuaded

to Curl, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 2014, at A14.

8 Chihuly’s work is heralded for “render[ing] meaningless the

distinctions between utilitarian product and art, art and craft, beauty and

function.” Patterson Sims, Suola di Chihuly: Venezia and Seattle, in Dale

Chihuly: Installations 1964–1992 (1992).

9 The story of this fascinating dispute is outlined in Christopher J.

Robinson’s note: The “Recognized Stature” Standard in the Visual Artists

Rights Act, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1935, 1958 (2000). The parties did not

contest that the work was a sculpture, but fought bitterly over whether the

visual art was of “recognized stature.” Id.

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 27

unquestionably works of visual art—beyond the scope of

VARA simply because they may serve some practical

function would undermine the purpose of the law.

The majority alludes to the fact that a work would not

necessarily fall outside VARA’s scope simply because it

could possibly serve some practical purpose, concluding that

La Contessa must be “applied art” because “it continued to

serve a significant utilitarian function upon its completion.” 

Maj. Op. 13. But how significant the utilitarian function must

be—either when a work is initially created, or after it

undergoes artistic modifications—cannot be deduced from

the majority’s test for “applied art.” The analysis must be

more nuanced, and, as a matter of procedure, in some cases,

these issues will raise questions of fact that preclude

summary judgment.

Art dictionaries and reference materials provide useful

guidance on this score. In seeking to distinguish applied art

from “fine art,” The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Art Terms

states that applied art is “Art that is created for useful objects

and remains subservient to the functions of those objects.”

The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Art Terms 13 (Michael

Clarke and Deborah Clarke eds., 2d ed. 2010) (emphasis

added). As examples, it lists “ceramics, furniture, glass,

leather, metalwork, textiles, arms and armour, clocks, and

jewelry.” Id. Likewise, The Thames & Hudson Dictionary

of Art Terms confirms that applied art is “Art which is

essentially functional, but which is also designed to be

aesthetically pleasing.” The Thames &Hudson Dictionary of

Art Terms 17 (Edward Lucie-Smith ed., 2d ed. 2004)

(emphasis added). This dictionary provides a similar list of

applied art items: “furniture, metalwork, clocks, textiles,

[and] typography.” Id. The definition of applied art in

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28 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

materials published by the World Intellectual Property

Organization (“WIPO”)—the bodytasked with administering

the Berne Convention—is also helpful. WIPO has defined

applied art as “cover[ing] the artistic contributions of the

makers of knick-knacks, jewellery, gold and silverware,

furniture, wallpaper, ornaments, clothing, etc.” WIPO, Guide

to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and

Artistic Works 16–17 (1978).10

These definitions illustrate that applied art does not

encompass every work that has any conceivable utilitarian

purpose, nor one that incorporates functional objects or

pieces. Rather, the definitions employed by art dictionaries

and the objects they list reflect that the key question is

whether the primary purpose or essence of the work is

utilitarian or functional.

To effect the purpose of VARA and provide guidance for

the art community, I believe courts should evaluate the work

as a whole, asking whether its primary purpose is to serve a

useful function and whether the artistic creation is subservient

to that purpose. If the primary purpose is for the work to be

viewed and perceived as art, then any incidental utilitarian

function will not push it outside the scope of VARA. If a

work’s primary purpose is functional, however, no amount of

aesthetic appeal will transfer it into visual art subject to

VARA’s protections. Determining a work’s primary purpose

need not constitute a judicial inquiry into the nature of art. 

Rather, as in other legal contexts, courts should ask whether

1 0 Th is d o c ume n t is a v a i l a b l e o n -li n e a t

ftp ://ftp.wip o .int/p ub /lib r a ry/ eb o o ks/historica l-ip b oo ks/

GuideToTheBerneConventionForTheProtectionOfLiteraryAndArtistic

WorksParisAct1971.pdf

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CHEFFINS V. STEWART 29

“a reasonable observer” would “consider [the work] designed

to a practical degree” for a utilitarian or artistic purpose. See

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2013)

(articulating a “primary purpose” test for determining

whether an object is a “vessel”).

In this case, applying the analysis I outline yields the

same result as the majority: La Contessa was applied art. The

school bus-turned-galleon was designed for, and employed

as, a performance venue, restaurant, and means of

transportation around the Burning Man festival. Poets,

acrobats, and bands performed on its decks. It drove revelers

from party to party within Nevada’s Black Rock desert. On

various occasions, the galleon was driven at high speeds,

prompting festival organizers to send Cheffins and Jones a

letter condemning its “unsafe driving practices.” When La

Contessa was not serving this purpose, it was dragged to a

field, covered with a tarp, and left to sit idle for months at a

time. Taken as a whole, this is powerful evidence that the

primary purpose of La Contessa was to serve the utilitarian

functions of performance venue, gathering space, and peoplemover. Although Cheffins and Jones testified passionately

about La Contessa’s beauty and the artistic expression they

felt it embodied—and it is an impressive work of art in many

respects—I conclude it is applied art because its aesthetic

appeal was subservient to its primary utilitarian purpose. 

Thus, the VARA claim fails.

VARA has spawned comparatively little litigation over

the last quarter-century, and I hope that no spasm of artistic

destruction or mutilation changes this trend. However, given

the unique protections under VARA and the inherent

difficulties in defining “visual arts” and “applied arts,” the

arts, the art world, and the legal community would benefit

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30 CHEFFINS V. STEWART

from a more nuanced and flexible test for determining the

scope of VARA’s protection of artistic works.

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