Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01879/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01879-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Columbia National Life Insurance Company
Appellant
East West Holding Company, Inc.
Appellee
East West Life Insurance Agency, Inc.
Appellee
Maurice S. Fox
Appellee
Frank M. Halley
Appellee
Ira L. Thomas
Appellee
Frank J. Thompson
Appellee

Document Text:

..... 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

COLUMBIA NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

United Stat.es Court of Appeals 'P,;,nf:h f;i r(''.> it 

APR 121989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 86-1879 

EAST WEST LIFE INSURANCE AGENCY, 

INC.; EAST WEST HOLDING COMPANY, 

INC.; MAURICE S. FOX; FRANK J. 

THOMPSON; FRANK M. HALLEY; and 

IRA L. THOMAS, 

(D.C. No. CIV-85-1219-A} 

(W.D. Oklahoma} 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before LOGAN, McWILLIAMS, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

On May 8, 1985, Columbia National Life Insurance Company 

(plaintiff} filed suit seeking damages of $11.5 million against 

the East West Life Insurance Agency, Inc. and others 

(collectively, defendants}. Plaintiff applied for and was granted 

three separate extensions of time to respond to defendants' motion 

to dismiss, the last extension expiring August 27, 1985. On that 

day, John C. Harrington, one of plaintiff's attorneys, applied for 

another three-day extension, but this time the court denied the 

request. Subsequently, Harrington applied for three more short 

extensions of time,.. each time .,_.apparently _ believing, and 

affirmatively representing to the court, that the fourth and 

Appellate Case: 86-1879 Document: 010110035108 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 1 
. J 

subsequent applications had been granted. On September 12, 1985, 

the district court dismissed plaintiff's suit pursuant to W.D. 

Okla. R. 14(A), which states that the district court may deem 

confessed any motion not opposed within fifteen days. Plaintiff 

did not appeal; instead, on November 6, 1985, it filed a Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. The court, 

focusing on Harrington's dereliction both in failing to file a 

response by the due date, and in falsely representing to the court 

that all earlier applications had been granted, denied relief. 

From that denial, plaintiff appeals. We reverse. 

This appeal is controlled by Hancock v. City of Oklahoma 

City, 857 F.2d 1394 (10th Cir. 1988), issued after the district 

court's dismissal order. In that case, which also came from the 

Western District of Oklahoma, plaintiff's counsel failed to 

realize that defendant had filed a summary judgment motion, and 

did not respond to it. Therefore, the district court granted 

summary judgment for the defendant pursuant to the same local rule 

involved in the instant case. It subsequently denied Rule 60(b) 

relief, finding that the attorney's failure to realize defendant 

had moved for summary judgment did not constitute excusable 

neglect. We reversed, holding that relief under Rule 60(b) was 

appropriate because "a dismissal for violation of the local rule 

was a severe sanction reserved for the extreme case, and is only 

appropriate where a lesser sanction would not serve the ends of 

justice." Id. at 1396. We concluded that the plaintiff there was 

not guilty of dereliction; the mistake was by her attorney. In 

addition, the defendant was not prejudiced by the attorney's 

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Appellate Case: 86-1879 Document: 010110035108 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 2 
error, and the inconvenience to the trial court, if any, did not 

justify dismissal of the plaintiff's lawsuit. 

We recognize that a Rule 60(b) motion does not substitute for 

an appeal or call into question the correctness of the original 

judgment, and we must uphold a district court's denial of Rule 

60(b) relief absent an abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

31.63 Acres of Land, 840 F.2d 760, 761 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Nevertheless, in deciding whether Rule 60(b) relief is appropriate 

to relieve a party from a dismissal due to failure to respond, we 

look at "(l) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; 

(2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; (3) the 

culpability of the litigant.'' Hancock, 857 F.2d at 1396; see also 

Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1520-21 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1988). 

At oral argument defendants conceded they suffered no prejudice 

from the short delay due to attorney Harrington's errors. In 

addition, neither the district court in its order nor the 

defendants in their brief make any serious argument that the delay 

interfered significantly with the district court's work. 

Defendants do vigorously assert that plaintiff, and not just 

its attorney, is responsible for the failure to respond to 

defendants' motion. Based upon the record before us, plaintiff is 

guilty of innocent inattention, at most, and not willful disregard 

of the district court's orders. See Toma v. City of Weatherford, 

846 F.2d 58, 61 (10th Cir. 1988). A party may be negligent in not 

keeping apprised of the status of its litigation and in failing to 

keep in . contact with its attorney; but normally a client is 

justified in relying on its attorney to file necessary documents 

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Appellate Case: 86-1879 Document: 010110035108 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 3 
on time. Shea v. Donohoe Const. Co., 795 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. 

Cir. 1986). We need not decide whether the court must notify the 

client before it dismisses a case due to attorney dereliction, cf. 

id., to hold that plaintiff here was not so culpable as to warrant 

denial of its Rule 60(b) motion. We hold, consistent with our 

recent decisions on this issue, that the court abused its 

discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief and reinstatement of 

plaintiff's case. Hancock, 857 F.2d at 1396; Hollis v. United 

States, 744 F.2d 1430, 1433 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Harrington appears to be guilty of gross misrepresentation 

and dereliction of duty. On remand, the court should consider 

imposing a stiff monetary sanction or other penalty against him. 

See id. Plaintiff's suit is ordered reinstated and the case is 

remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 

opinion. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

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Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 86-1879 Document: 010110035108 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 4