Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cr-00856/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cr-00856-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joel Guzman-Lopez
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Respondent

vs.

Joel Guzman-Lopez, 

Defendant-Movant. 

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CR 03-0856-PHX-JAT

CV 04-2550-PHX-JAT (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Joel Guzman-Lopez (“Movant”), has filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or

Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. #22).

On August 6, 2003, Movant pleaded guilty to Count I of the Information, illegal re-entry

after deportation with a sentencing enhancement, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and

1326(b)(2). Doc. #20. On November 17, 2003, Movant was sentenced to 37 months in the

custody of the Bureau of Prisons followed by supervised release for three years. Doc. #20.

Movant filed the instant Motion to Vacate on November 12, 2004, within the limitations

period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

Movant alleges four grounds for relief in his motion. First, he alleges that the court's

use of his prior felony convictions to enhance his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment

because the facts supporting the enhancement were not decided by a jury. Second, Movant

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alleges that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), the sentence enhancement provision, is unconstitutional.

Third, Movant appears to allege a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because as a

deportable alien he is not eligible for a drug treatment program, movement to a halfway

house or other sentence reductions. Regarding Ground Four, the court is unable to

understand Movant's claim. Respondent filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #25) on

December 27, 2004. Movant has not filed a reply.

DISCUSSION

A. Ground One

Movant contends in Ground One that the court's use of a prior felony conviction to

enhance his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment. He contends that the fact of his prior

conviction was not decided by a jury. Movant offers no additional argument to support his

claim in Ground One but attaches to his motion as "Memorandum A" an article discussing

the case of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).

Movant's claim that a jury was required to determine he had a prior conviction is

without merit. In Blakely, the Supreme Court applied the rule announced in Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000): "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact

that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to

a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court explained in Blakely that "the

'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose

solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."

Blakely, 124 S.Ct at 2537 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, a judge may not

impose a sentence in excess of what the jury's factual findings or the defendant's own

admissions allow. See id.

Here, Movant admitted in his plea agreement that he was convicted of possession of

a controlled substance for sale, a felony, on May 25, 1994, for which he was sentenced to

270 days jail. Doc. #19 at 7. Because Movant admitted his prior conviction, the sentencing

court could use the prior conviction as a basis to enhance the sentence. Additionally, prior

convictions are an exception to the rule announced in Apprendi and expanded in Blakely.

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Thus, even if Movant had not admitted his prior conviction, the sentencing court had the

authority to make the finding that Movant had a prior conviction and use it to enhance the

sentence. Finally, Movant's Blakely claim may not be raised on collateral review. The Ninth

Circuit recently held that the new rule announced in Blakely "does not apply retroactively

to a conviction that was final before that decision was announced." Schardt v. Payne, 414

F.3d 1025, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005). Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004, more than six

months after Movant's conviction became final. For all of these reasons, the court will

recommend that Movant's claim in Ground One be denied. 

B. Ground Two

Movant contends in Ground Two that the penalty provisions in 8 U.S.C.§ 1326(b)(2),

are unconstitutional. Movant supplements his claim with an attachment identified as

"Memorandum B." Doc. #22. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that subsection (b)(2) of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 was intended to be

a sentencing factor and not a separate criminal offense that had to be proved to a jury beyond

a reasonable doubt. Movant argues that the holding in Almendarez-Torres has been called

into question because one of the justices in the 5-4 majority stated in his concurring opinion

in a subsequent case, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), that AlmendarezTorres was wrongly decided. Movant argues that in light of Apprendi, subsections (b)(1) and

(b)(2) must be treated as elements of the underlying offense or separate offenses, either of

which must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Movant's argument has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In U.S.

v. Echavarria-Escobar, 270 F.3d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001), the court expressly rejected the

argument presented here that Justice Thomas' concurrence in Apprendi undermines the rule

announced in Almendarez-Torres. The court stated, "[W]e cannot ignore controlling

Supreme Court authority based on speculation as to the possibly evolving individual views

of Supreme Court Justices." Echavarria-Escobar, 270 F.3d at 1271. Since Apprendi, the

court has reaffirmed that a district court does not violate the Sixth Amendment by applying

the § (b)(2) enhancement based on aggravated felonies that the defendant did not admit to

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and that the government did not allege in the indictment or prove at trial. Arellano-Rivera,

244 F.3d at 1127; United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 2001). Under

Almendarez-Torres, which remains controlling Supreme Court authority, sections (b)(1) and

(b)(2) are sentencing factors that can be decided by the judge. See id. 

Moreover, as with his claim in Ground One, Movant's claim in Ground Two must fail

because he admitted his prior conviction. The (b)(1) and (b)(2) subsections cannot be

unconstitutional as applied to Movant because by admitting his prior conviction in his plea

agreement, he waived any right to require the government to prove the prior conviction to

a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. For these reasons, Movant's claims in Ground Two are

without merit and the court will recommend that they be denied.

C. Ground Three

Movant alleges in Ground Three that because he is a deportable alien he is not eligible

for a drug treatment program, movement to a halfway house or other sentence reductions.

He appears to be alleging that the Bureau of Prisons policy that renders aliens ineligible for

certain sentence reduction programs is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Movant

provides no additional argument to support his claim. 

In McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1185-86 (9th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.

1086 (2000), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of habeas corpus

petitions brought by federal prisoners subject to immigration detainers who challenged this

Bureau of Prisons policy on equal protection grounds. The court held that “excluding

prisoners with detainers from participating in community-based treatment programs, and

consequently from sentence reduction eligibility, is at least rationally related to the BOP’s

legitimate interest in preventing prisoners from fleeing detainers while participating in

community treatment programs.” Id. at 1186. Accordingly, Movant's equal protection claim

in Ground Three is without merit and the court will recommend that it be denied..

D. Ground Four 

Finally, Movant's allegation in Ground Four is indecipherable. The entire claim reads:

"Lack of legal knowledge and advisement indigent and new legal ruling of the Supreme

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Court." Doc. #22 at 5. Movant presents no argument to support his claim. Having failed to

present a valid claim in Ground Four, the court will recommend that it be denied. 

E. Waiver

The government in its response failed to raise the fact that in his plea agreement,

Movant waived the right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. Plea agreements

are contractual in nature and their plain language will generally be enforced if the agreement

is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 2005 WL 1671552 (Oct. 3, 2005). For example, a waiver of

appellate rights is enforceable if the language of the waiver encompasses the right to appeal

on the grounds raised and the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. Moreover, a

defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a § 2255 action challenging the length of

his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Abarca-Espinoza v.

United States, 508 U.S. 979 (1993). In § 2255 actions, the only claims that cannot be waived

are a claim that the waiver itself was involuntary or that ineffective assistance of counsel

rendered the waiver involuntary. See Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing “doubt” that a plea

agreement could waive a claim that counsel erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty

or accept a particular part of the plea bargain); Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining

to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective assistance or involuntariness of the

waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4 (summarizing Pruitt and Abarca, but

declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the

voluntariness of the waiver).

Here, Movant expressly waived his right to collaterally attack his "conviction and

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, or any other collateral attack." Doc. #19 at 4. None of

Movant's § 2255 claims have anything to do with the voluntariness of the plea agreement or

the waiver. Thus, the court finds Movant's express waiver an additional basis to recommend

denying his motion to vacate.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

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That the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal

Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. #22) be DENIED;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 21st day of October, 2005.

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