Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00614/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00614-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elvin Johnson
Plaintiff
Timothy Iliff
Defendant

Document Text:

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ELVIN JOHNSON,

AIS #151292

Plaintiff,

:

:

:

:

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 15-614-CG-M

:

DR. TIMOTHY ILIFF,

Defendant.

:

:

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This § 1983 action, filed by Elvin Johnson, an Alabama 

prison inmate, proceeding pro se, was referred to the 

undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D.

Ala. GenLR 72, and is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s 

Complaint, (doc. 1), Defendant’s Answer and Special Report

(docs. 12, 13), which the Court has converted into a Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 14)1. After consideration of the 

pleadings and Motion and for the reasons set out below, it 

is recommended that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

be granted and that Plaintiff’s action be dismissed with 

prejudice.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, despite being given an opportunity to do so. 

Case 1:15-cv-00614-CG-M Document 15 Filed 05/17/16 Page 1 of 15
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I. Facts and Proceedings

In August, 2015, Plaintiff injured his ribcage during an 

altercation with another inmate. (Doc. 1 at 3). According 

to Plaintiff, the injury resulted in “a dent” in his side 

and caused severe pain and agony. Id. Following the 

incident, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant, Dr. Timothy 

Iliff, who x-rayed Plaintiff’s ribs, determined there were 

no broken bones, and then prescribed Plaintiff pain 

medication. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that after 

prescribing medication, Defendant withdrew from treating 

Plaintiff and that Plaintiff’s medical grievances went 

unanswered in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. 

(Id. at 3-4).

According to Defendant, on June 26, 20152, Plaintiff 

presented to health care unit of the Fountain Correctional 

Facility and was screened by a nurse to whom Plaintiff 

indicated that he had bumped the left side of his chest on 

his bed during an altercation. (Doc. 13-1 at 6-10, 39). 

Upon exam, Plaintiff was found to have abrasions on his 

knees, right heel, and redness under his left eye. (Id.) 

X-rays of Plaintiff’s ribs showed no evidence of a rib

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 2 According to Plaintiff, his altercation and subsequent rib injury 

occurred on or about August 26, 2015. However, the medical records 

submitted by Defendant supports that the incident and complained of 

injury actually occurred on June 26, 2015. Nonetheless, the disputed 

date has no effect on this Court’s analysis as this disputed fact is 

not material.

Case 1:15-cv-00614-CG-M Document 15 Filed 05/17/16 Page 2 of 15
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fracture. (Doc. 13-1 at 9). Plaintiff was given Motrin

and released. (Doc. 13-1 at 12). 

On June 28, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a sick call slip 

that stated “I have broken ribs!!! Or broken rib cage”. 

(Doc. 13-1 at 13). As a result, Plaintiff was seen by a 

nurse at which time he was instructed to continue his 

medication. (Doc. 13-1 at 14-15). Then, on June 30, 2015, 

Plaintiff was prescribed Naproxen for his continued rib 

pain. (Doc. 13-1 at 16). 

On July 4, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a second sick call 

for rib pain that stated “my rib cage is broke and damage”. 

(Doc. 13-1 at 17). Plaintiff was seen by a nurse the next 

day. (Doc. 13-1 at 18-19). Plaintiff was additionally seen 

by the nurse on July 7, 2015, for tightness near his 

stomach for which Plaintiff was given Tylenol. (Doc. 13-1 

at 20-21). Plaintiff was again seen by the nurse 

practitioner on July 16, 2015, for continued rib pain. 

(Doc. 13-1 at 39). On that date, no deformities were noted 

and Plaintiff was educated on the healing process for his 

injury. Id.

On October 18, 2015, Plaintiff was seen in the medical 

unit for nausea and vomiting and on November 13, 2015, 

Plaintiff was seen for a cough and congestion for the past 

two weeks. (Doc. 13-1 at 23-24). During the second visit, 

Case 1:15-cv-00614-CG-M Document 15 Filed 05/17/16 Page 3 of 15
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it was noted that Plaintiff had left chest wall pain off 

and on from a fall against a bed rail. (Id.) Plaintiff 

was treated for bronchitis which included a chest x-ray 

being ordered, but, again, no abnormalities were identified 

with regard to Plaintiff’s ribs. (Doc. 13-1 at 23-25). 

Plaintiff was seen in the medical unit on November 24, 

2015, for continued rib pain and was scheduled for an 

appointment on December 4, 2015. (Doc. 13-1 at 27-28). On 

December 9, 2015, Plaintiff was seen in the health care 

unit for vomiting after admitting to smoking synthetic 

marijuana. (Doc. 13-1 at 30-31, 37). Plaintiff was seen 

again on December 15, 2015, by a nurse practitioner who 

noted Plaintiff had mild left chest wall pain for which 

Plaintiff was instructed to quit smoking and given 

Naproxen. (Doc. 13-1 at 36). Plaintiff’s last sick call 

slip was submitted on December 21, 2015, when Plaintiff 

again complained of rib pain. (Doc. 13-1 at 33). On that 

visit, it was noted that Plaintiff was not taking his 

prescribed medication. 

Plaintiff has now brought this action against Dr. Iliff 

asserting his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. For 

damages, Plaintiff requests that Defendants “award 100,000 

(one hundred thousand) in compensatory damages, 100,000 

Case 1:15-cv-00614-CG-M Document 15 Filed 05/17/16 Page 4 of 15
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(one hundred thousand) in punitive damages and injuctive 

relief. (Doc. 1 at 6). 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant this Court 

authority under Rule 56 to render “judgment as a matter of 

law” to the party who moves for summary judgment. 

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper “if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact. . . .” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). The Court must view the evidence produced by “the 

nonmoving party, and all factual inferences arising from 

it, in the light most favorable to” that party. Barfield 

v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 934 (11th Cir. 1989). However, 

Rule 56(e) states that:

If a party fails to properly support an 

assertion of fact or fails to properly 

address another party’s assertion of 

fact as required by Rule 56(c), the 

court may:

(1) give an opportunity to properly 

support or address the fact;

(2) consider the fact undisputed for 

purposes of the motion; 

(3) grant summary judgment if the 

motion and supporting materials—

including the facts considered 

undisputed—show that the movant is 

entitled to it; or

(4) issue any other appropriate order.

Case 1:15-cv-00614-CG-M Document 15 Filed 05/17/16 Page 5 of 15
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FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless 

there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party 

for a jury to return a verdict for that party. . . . If the 

evidence is merely colorable, . . . or is not significantly

probative, . . . summary judgment may be granted.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 

(1986) (internal citations omitted). “Summary judgment is 

mandated where a party fails to make a showing sufficient 

to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Custom Mfg. and Eng’g, Inc. v. Midway 

Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007).

Also, it is well settled that a conclusion cannot be 

taken as true, and the Court will not accept conclusory 

allegations as facts in consideration of a motion for 

summary judgment. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 

(2009); see also Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 

1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000)(“[t]his court has consistently 

held that conclusory allegations without specific 

supporting facts have no probative value”); Fullman v. 

Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984)(a 

plaintiff’s mere verification of conclusory allegations is 

not sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment). 

Case 1:15-cv-00614-CG-M Document 15 Filed 05/17/16 Page 6 of 15
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that Defendant acted 

with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.

Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any 

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, ... subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United 

States ... to the deprivation of any 

rights ... secured by the Constitution 

and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in 

equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Additionally, the Eighth 

Amendment provides that, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 

unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 

The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and 

unusual punishment prohibits prison officials from 

exhibiting deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of 

serious harm to an inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 828 (1994).

The Supreme Court summarized a state’s constitutional 

responsibilities with regard to inmates as follows:

[W]hen the State takes a person into its 

custody and holds him there against his 

will, the Constitution imposes upon it a 

corresponding duty to assume some 

responsibility for his safety and 

general well-being . . . . The rationale 

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for this principle is simple enough: 

when the State by the affirmative 

exercise of its power so restrains an 

individual’s liberty that it renders him 

unable to care for himself, and at the 

same time fails to provide for his basic 

human needs – e.g., food, clothing, 

shelter, medical care, and reasonable 

safety – it transgresses the substantive 

limits on state action set by the Eighth 

Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 

189 (1989)(citations omitted).

In order to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claims, 

Plaintiff must prove three elements: “(1) a condition of 

confinement that inflicted unnecessary pain or suffering, 

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (citations 

omitted), (2) the defendant’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to 

that condition, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) 

(citations omitted), and (3) causation, Williams v. 

Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1982) (citations 

omitted.).” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th

Cir. 1993). 

In Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980, 983 (11th Cir. 

1994), the court described the first two elements as 

follows:

An Eighth Amendment claim is said to 

have two components, an objective 

component, which inquires whether the 

alleged wrongdoing was objectively 

harmful enough to establish a 

Case 1:15-cv-00614-CG-M Document 15 Filed 05/17/16 Page 8 of 15
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constitutional violation, and a 

subjective component, which inquires 

whether the officials acted with a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind.

A prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is 

to ensure “reasonable safety,” a “standard that 

incorporates due regard for prison officials’ ‘unenviable 

task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane 

conditions.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45 (citations 

omitted). “Whether one puts it in terms of duty or 

deliberate indifference, prison officials who act 

reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and 

Unusual Punishments Clause.” Id. 

DISCUSSION

To prevail on a claim for inadequate medical care, an 

inmate must show that the defendant acted with deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 

In order for Plaintiff to meet his burden on the 

objective component of the Eighth Amendment claims, 

Plaintiff must demonstrate that an “objectively serious 

medical need” exists. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 

(11th Cir. 2003). A serious medical need is “considered 

one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating 

treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person 

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would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s 

attention.” Id. (citing Hill v. DeKalb Reg’l Youth Det. 

Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994) overruled on 

other grounds in Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 

1014, 1031 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2001)(quotation marks omitted)). 

“In either of these situations, the medical need must be 

one that, if left unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of 

serious harm.” Id. (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

In order to meet the subjective requirement of an 

Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim, Plaintiff 

must demonstrate “deliberate indifference” to a serious 

medical need. Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243. “Deliberate 

indifference entails more than mere negligence. Estelle, 

429 U.S. at 106; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 

(1994). The Supreme Court held that a prison official 

cannot be found deliberately indifferent under the Eighth 

Amendment “unless the official knows of and disregards an 

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official 

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S., 

825, 837-38 (emphasis added). However, “an official’s 

failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have 

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perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, 

cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of 

punishment.” Id. at 838. Therefore, “under Estelle and 

Farmer, deliberate indifference has three components: (1) 

subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) 

disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than 

mere negligence.” Farrow, 320 F.3d 1235, 1246 (citing 

McElligot, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255)(stating that defendant must 

have subjective awareness of an “objectively serious need” 

and that his response must constitute “an objectively 

insufficient response to that need”)). 

In the present action, Plaintiff complained of an 

injury to his ribcage following an altercation with another 

inmate. He was seen by a nurse the same day his alleged 

injury occurred and his medical records show that Plaintiff 

was examined physically, his vital signs were checked, and 

x-rays were taken of his ribs, none of which indicated that 

Plaintiff was suffering a serious injury. (Doc. 13-1 at 6-

10). Plaintiff’s x-rays confirmed that he did not have any 

broken ribs, he was given Motrin for pain, and released. 

(Doc. 13-1 at 6-10, 12). Further, Plaintiff’s extensive 

follow up medical records detail Plaintiff’s treatment by 

the medical staff and confirm that from the time of his 

alleged injury, Plaintiff was seen an additional ten times, 

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each time receiving treatment for his complaints which 

included physical exams, follow up x-rays and the 

prescription of medication. Moreover, according to the 

medical records, at no time was Plaintiff found to have a 

serious medical need requiring more extensive treatment 

than what was rendered by the medical professionals. 

Plaintiff’s records, likewise, fail to show any signs of an 

undiagnosed serious injury such as major abrasions, 

bleeding, bruising, etc., which would have warranted an 

obvious need for additional care. Based on the medical 

records describing Plaintiff’s injury, this Court does not 

find that Plaintiff’s injury was an objectively serious 

medical need. 

Nevertheless, even if a serious medical need existed, 

Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant was deliberately 

indifferent to it. To the contrary, it is undisputed that 

Plaintiff was seen the same day his alleged injury occurred

and at that time, Plaintiff was examined, treated, and 

released. It is additionally undisputed that Plaintiff was 

seen again on ten occasions after his injury for follow up 

care by the medical professionals in the medical unit, and 

there is no evidence to support that Plaintiff’s complaints 

were ignored. In fact, a plain reading of Plaintiff’s 

complaints only suggests that he does not agree with the 

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course of treatment he received, which does not result in 

any constitutional violation as it is well established that 

a difference in opinion, or a disagreement between an 

inmate and prison officials as to what medical care is 

appropriate for his particular condition does not state a 

claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. See 

Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989); 

accord Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 

1977)(disavowing any attempts to second-guess the propriety 

or adequacy of a particular course of treatment, as this, 

along with all other aspects of health care, remains a 

question of sound professional judgment). As a result, 

Plaintiff has failed to show that he suffered a serious 

medical need to which Dr. Iliff was indifferent. 

Conclusion

There is no question of material fact from which a 

jury could reasonably find that Plaintiff was subjected to 

a substantial risk of serious harm, of which Defendant was

subjectively aware and deliberately indifferent, or that 

Defendant’s conduct caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. As a result, it is recommended that 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and this 

action be dismissed with prejudice. 

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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS 

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D. ALA. GenLR 72(c)(2). The parties should note 

that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to 

object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with 

the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to 

challenge on appeal the district court's order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party 

was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the 

absence of a proper objection, however, the court may 

review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the 

interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding 

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

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incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 17th day of May, 2016.

s/ BERT W. MILLING, JR 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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