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Parties Involved:
Defense Distributed
Appellant
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
Appellee
Mike Pompeo, Secretary, U.S. Department of State
Appellee
Second Amendment Foundation, Incorporated
Appellant
United States Department of State
Appellee
Conn Williamson
Appellant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-50811

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED; SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, 

INCORPORATED,

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

CONN WILLIAMSON

 

 Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MIKE POMPEO, 

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; DIRECTORATE OF 

DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS, Department of State Bureau of Political 

Military Affairs, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and HO, Circuit Judges.

JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs are Second Amendment advocates who wish to publish plans 

for how to assemble a firearm using a 3D printer. They brought this suit to 

prevent the State Department from blocking their efforts. After settling with 

the State Department, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed this suit.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 21, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

Plaintiffs now seek to revive their Texas suit under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(e). They do so in response to a nationwide injunction against 

enforcement of the settlement issued by the Western District of Washington.

But Rule 59(e) authorizes motions to alter or amend judgments—not to 

revive lawsuits. Accordingly, we decline the request of the Second Amendment 

advocates and affirm.

I.

Plaintiff Defense Distributed is a non-profit Texas company that 

promotes the Second Amendment’s individual right to keep and bear arms. It 

developed plans for assembling a firearm, known as the “Liberator,” using a 

3D printer, and sought to publish those plans on the internet. The company is 

joined in this lawsuit by Plaintiffs Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. and 

Conn Williamson, who also promote the right to keep and bear arms through 

various efforts.

The State Department administers and enforces the Arms Export 

Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2778, and its implementing regulations, the 

International Traffic in Arms regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a). The 

Department ordered Defense Distributed not to publish its plans on the ground 

that federal regulations prohibit their publication without the government’s 

prior approval.

In response, Plaintiffs sued the State Department, the Secretary of 

State, and other senior State Department officials in the Western District of 

Texas. After the district court denied preliminary injunctive relief, this court 

affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the district court ordered 

the parties to discuss settlement. The parties subsequently entered a 

settlement agreement that effectively permitted Plaintiffs to publish the plans.

A month later, three gun-control organizations filed an emergency 

motion to intervene challenging the settlement agreement as unlawful under 

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the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied the motion to 

intervene.

The parties then filed a stipulation of dismissal of the entire suit under 

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). In doing so, the parties did not ask the court to retain 

jurisdiction over the settlement agreement.1

A few days later, the district court purported to enter a final judgment 

acknowledging the voluntary dismissal and then dismissing the case with 

prejudice. But as we shall explain below, the district court did not have 

jurisdiction to issue that judgment. The court lost jurisdiction when the parties 

voluntarily dismissed the entire suit under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).

On the same day that the Western District of Texas entered the 

purported final judgment in the Texas suit, the state of Washington, joined by 

eighteen other states and the District of Columbia, filed a lawsuit in the 

Western District of Washington seeking to enjoin the settlement agreement as 

a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Tenth Amendment of 

the U.S. Constitution. The district court in Washington quickly issued a 

temporary restraining order against the State Department. That same court

then issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the State Department from 

implementing or enforcing certain provisions of the settlement agreement.

In response to the Washington suit, Plaintiffs sought to vacate the 

judgment accompanying the stipulated dismissal in the Texas suit, withdraw 

the stipulation of dismissal, and reopen the case. Plaintiffs relied on Federal 

 

1 If the parties had wanted to, they could have asked the district court to retain 

jurisdiction—for example, to oversee enforcement of a settlement agreement. See Hospitality 

House, Inc. v. Gilbert, 298 F.3d 424, 430 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The Court specified two ways in 

which a court may make a settlement agreement part of its dismissal order: ‘either by 

separate provision (such as a provision “retaining jurisdiction” over the settlement 

agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order.’”) 

(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994)).

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Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), as well as Rule 60(b). The district court denied 

the motions. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of their Rule 59(e) motion.

This court reviews the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of 

discretion. In re Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 926 F.3d 103, 128 (5th Cir. 2019). 

Relief under Rule 59(e) may issue only if Plaintiffs demonstrate “a manifest 

error of law or fact or . . . newly discovered evidence.” Id.

II.

Rule 59(e) allows a party to “alter or amend a judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P.

59(e). It does not allow a party to revive and initiate further proceedings in a 

dismissed lawsuit. So Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion must fail for that reason 

alone.

Moreover, there is no “judgment” when the parties voluntarily dismiss 

the entire case under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Under Rule 41(a)(1)(A), a stipulation 

of dismissal operates to dismiss the action “without a court order.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 41(a)(1)(A). And “[a] stipulation of dismissal under that rule ordinarily—

and automatically—strips the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction” over 

the dismissed action. Nat’l City Golf Fin. v. Scott, 899 F.3d 412, 415–16 (5th 

Cir. 2018).

So the district court here had no jurisdiction to enter final judgment in 

this case. Under Rule 41, “a district court’s jurisdiction over a case that is 

settled and voluntarily dismissed by stipulation cannot extend past the filing 

date absent an express contingency or extension of jurisdiction.” 

SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010). Any 

actions taken after that filing are accordingly “superfluous.” Id. (quoting 

Meinecke v. H & R Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1995)).

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III.

Even if we were to conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to 

issue the judgment, and that the Rule 59(e) motion was timely and otherwise 

appropriate in this context, we would still have no choice but to affirm.

Rule 59(e) motions “are for the narrow purpose of correcting manifest 

errors of law or fact or presenting newly discovered evidence.” Faciane v. Sun 

Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 931 F.3d 412, 423 (5th Cir. 2019). District courts 

have “considerable discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case under Rule 

59(e).” Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. The Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 

1993). “Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary 

remedy that should be used sparingly.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 

473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiffs contend that relief under Rule 59(e) is warranted because they 

could not have foreseen the Washington lawsuit—and that the resulting 

national injunction unjustly interferes with the rights they sought to vindicate 

in this very suit. But be that as it may, Rule 59(e) does not authorize courts to 

grant relief under these circumstances. The initiation and prosecution of the 

Washington suit did not render any action by the district court in Texas 

erroneous, let alone manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, we cannot say that the 

district court abused its discretion in denying relief under Rule 59(e).2

 

2 Plaintiffs also sought relief from the district court under Rule 60(b). But they do not 

present Rule 60(b) as an alternative basis for relief on appeal. And for good reason: Rule 

60(b)(1) provides for relief resulting from mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 

neglect—not to redress “the consequences of decisions deliberately made, although 

subsequent events reveal that such decisions were unwise.” Nat’l City Golf, 899 F.3d at 418. 

Nor do any of the remaining subsections of Rule 60(b) apply. See, e.g., Edward H. Bohlin Co., 

6 F.3d at 357 (reserving relief under 60(b)(6) for when “the initial judgment [has been shown] 

to have been manifestly unjust”).

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* * *

Plaintiffs are undoubtedly sincere in their belief that the government 

interfered with their constitutional rights by forbidding them from publishing 

information about assembling the Liberator firearm to fellow citizens—as 

evidenced by the settlement agreement they were able to obtain from the State 

Department. And they are understandably frustrated by the nationwide 

injunction that stands in their way today. But established rules of civil 

procedure do not permit this court to grant the relief they seek here. We affirm.

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