Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01053/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01053-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joset M. Cizek
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

JOSET M. CIZEK, 

V. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAIS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

No. 91-1053 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant - Appellee. ) 

ORDER 

Filed January 15, 1992 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

This matter comes on for consideration of appellee's motion 

for publication of the order and judgment entered November 14, 1991. 

Upon consideration whereof, the motion for publication is 

granted. The judgment entered November 14, 1991 is vacated. Our 

mandate is recalled. The order and judgment, filed November 14, 1991, 

is published as modified. The mandate shall reissue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

ROBERT L 

By: {ti~ 

Cnief Deputy 

Appellate Case: 91-1053 Document: 010110097009 Date Filed: 01/15/1992 Page: 1 
~1L~D PUBLISH . .t Court of Ap~b 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

United 8,te~'1 Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOSET M. CIZEK, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

JAU 15 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-1053 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 90-N-481) 

SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS. 

William C. Duven, Colorado Springs, Colorado, attorney for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Michael J. Norton, United States Attorney, and Paula M. Ray, 

Assistant United States Attorney, ·Denver, Colorado, attorneys for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-1053 Document: 010110097009 Date Filed: 01/15/1992 Page: 2 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff Joset M. Cizek filed suit against the United States 

under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 

2671-2680, for injuries she allegedly sustained in an automobile 

accident involving an employee of the United States Forest 

Service, Department of Agriculture. 

to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. 

The government filed a Motion 

Civ. P. 12(b)(l) for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that Plaintiff had not 

adequately complied with the claim presentation requirements of 

the FTCA. The FTCA requires that, prior to filing suit in federal 

court, a claimant must submit a claim in writing to the proper 

federal agency within two years of the date of the incident, and 

the claim must specify the "sum certain" amount of the recovery 

sought. See 28 u.s.c. §§ 2401(b) and 2675; 28 C.F.R. § 14.2. 

Treating the government's Motion to Dismiss as one for 

summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment and 

dismissed the action. We concur in the outcome, but not with the 

means. A Rule 12(b)(l) motion to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction should be considered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, 

if the jurisdictional issue is "'intertwined with the merits of 

the case.'" Redmon ex rel. Redmon v. United States, 934 F.2d 

1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 

257, 259, (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987)). A 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-1053 Document: 010110097009 Date Filed: 01/15/1992 Page: 3 
"1 

court's consideration of matters outside the pleadings does not 

transform the Rule 12(b)(l) motion into one for summary judgment. 

Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 259 n. 5; see also Osborn v. United States, 

918 F.2d 724, 728-29 (8th Cir. 1990). We therefore treat the 

district court's grant of summary judgment as a dismissal for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l), which we 

review de novo. Walden v. Bartlett, 840 F.2d 771, 772-73 (10th 

Cir. 1988). 

Federal court jurisdiction to entertain actions for damages 

against the United States is prescribed by 28 u.s.c. § 2675(a), 

which requires claimants to present their claims to the 

appropriate federal agency before suing the United States by 

filing "(l) a written statement sufficiently describing the injury 

to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum 

certain damages claim." Warren v. United States Dep't of Interior 

Bureau of Land Management, 724 F·.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Because the FTCA constitutes a waiver of the government's 

sovereign immunity, the notice requirements established by the 

FTCA must be strictly construed. Three-M Enters., Inc. v. United 

States 548 F.2d 293, 295 (10th Cir. 1977). The requirements are 

jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Id. at 294. 

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with an 

employee of the United States Forest Service on June 24, 1987. On 

October 27, 1987, Plaintiff filed a Standard Form 95, Claim for 

Damage, Injury or Death, with the Department of Agriculture, but 

failed to claim damages in a sum certain on the form. On June 23, 

1989, Plaintiff filed a state court action against the Forest 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-1053 Document: 010110097009 Date Filed: 01/15/1992 Page: 4 
Service employee. In March, 1990, the government removed the 

action to federal court and moved for dismissal based on 

Plaintiff's failure to adequately present her claim for damages to 

the proper agency within the two-year limitations period. 

A review of the record confirms that Plaintiff did not 

present a claim containing a statement of a sum certain of the 

damages sought, which would have allowed the government to make 

even a reasonable estimate of the value of her claim, until after 

the limitations period had run. The only notice filed within the 

two-year limitations period was the SF95 which simply stated that 

the amount of claim for Plaintiff's personal injury was "ongoing." 

Appellant's App. at XXIX. 1 The only other form of notification 

contained in the record, a letter from Plaintiff's counsel to the 

agency dated August 28, 1989, even if sufficient to satisfy the 

requirements, was submitted outside the limitations period. 2 Id. 

at XI-XV. 

Plaintiff argues that her state court action, filed before 

the expiration of the limitations period, placed the government on 

sufficient notice to satisfy the requirements. The cases which 

have addressed this issue, however, support the conclusion that 

the filing of a suit does not constitute adequate notice to the 

federal agency. Henderson v. United States, 785 F.2d at 123-25 & 

1 Although 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) allows for notification in a 

form other than a SF95, it nevertheless requires that there be 

written notification, together with a claim in a sum certain, in 

order to be considered sufficient. Henderson v. United States, 

785 F.2d 121, 123 n. 10 (4th Cir. 1986). 

2 Plaintiff's claim accrued on June 24, 1987, the date 

accident. The Plaintiff had until June 24, 1989, in which 

a sufficient claim with the Department of Agriculture. 

4 

of the 

to file 

Appellate Case: 91-1053 Document: 010110097009 Date Filed: 01/15/1992 Page: 5 
r n. 12. Plaintiff further argues that her insurer's request for 

reimbursement from the agency was sufficient to place a sum 

certain on her claim. The insurer requested reimbursement for 

claims paid on Plaintiff's behalf in the amount of $1,632.56. 

Appellant's App. at XLIII. Plaintiff acknowledges that she did 

not file this claim; rather, it was filed by the insurance 

carrier. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6). Plaintiff's ultimate claim 

value, submitted by her counsel via his letter of August 28, 1989, 

requested $74,500.00 in damages. Appellant's App. at xv. 

Considering the wide disparity in these figures, we suggest that 

they demonstrate that the insurer's claim for reimbursement and 

Plaintiff's claim for damages were not, in fact, identical. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to explain how the government 

could evaluate her claim based upon her insurer's claim for 

reimbursement. 

In Shelton v. United States, 61~ F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1980), 

the court held that claimant's insurance company's claim for 

reimbursement of a sum certain amount it had paid claimant under 

his policy for lost wages did not constitute a claim for money 

damages of a "sum certain" so as to toll the FTCA statute of 

limitations. The court there pertinently observed: 

The claims of an injured party and his insurance 

carrier are not always coextensive. An insurer's claim 

will never exceed that of the· injured party; the injured 

party, however, often seeks recovery for damages not 

encompassed in the insurer's claim. This distinction is 

inherent in 39 C.F.R. § 912.6(D) which permits subrogees 

to present wholly compensated claims, but requires both 

insurers and injured parties to participate, either 

jointly or individually, in filing partially compensated 

claims. The record in this case discloses that 

Shelton's and Aetna's claims were not, in fact, 

identical. Indeed, in an accident case a plaintiff 

could be expected to seek damages for pain and 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-1053 Document: 010110097009 Date Filed: 01/15/1992 Page: 6 
suffering, medical bills, and injury to property as well 

as compensation for loss of wages. (Footnote omitted). 

615 F.2d at 715-16. 

In summary, we conclude that Plaintiff failed to present 

proper notice of her claim to the appropriate agency within the 

two-year limitations period established by§ 2401(b). Plaintiff's 

claim was properly dismissed for lack 

jurisdiction. 

AFFIRMED. 

6 

of subject matter 

Appellate Case: 91-1053 Document: 010110097009 Date Filed: 01/15/1992 Page: 7 
FIL.ED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL~niood Stares Coμrt qf Appeals Tenth C1rcu1t 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOSET M. CIZEK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Oefend~nt-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

t~OV 14 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-1053 

(D.C. No. 90-N-481) 

(O. Colo.) 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff Joset M. Cizek filed suit under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671-2680, for 

injuries she allegedly sustained in an automobile accident 

involving an employee of the United States Forest Service, 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-1053 Document: 010110097009 Date Filed: 01/15/1992 Page: 8 
Department of Agriculture. The government submitted a Motion to 

Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) asserting lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff had not adequately 

complied with the claim presentation requirements of the FTCA. 

The FTCA requires that, prior to filing suit in federal court, a 

claimant must submit a claim to the proper federal agency within 

two years of the date of the incident. The claim must be in 

writing and must specify the "sum certain" amount of the recovery 

sought. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 240l(b) and 2675; 28 C.F.R. § 14.2. 

Treating the government's Motion to Dismiss as one for 

summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment and 

dismissed the action. Although we concur in the outcome, we 

disagree with the means. A Rule 12(b)(l) motion to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be considered under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, if the jurisdictional issue is "'intertwined 

with the merits of the case.' 11 Redmon ex rel. Redmon v. United 

States, 934 F.2d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1991)(quoting Wheeler v. 

Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 259, (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 

986 (1987)). A court's consideration of matters outside the 

pleadings does not transform the Rule 12(b)(l) motion into one for 

summary judgment. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 259 n.5; see also Osborn 

v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 728-29 (8th Cir. 1990). We 

therefore treat the district court's grant of summary judgment as 

a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(l), which we review de novo, Walden v. Bartlett, 840 

F.2d 771, 772-73 (10th Cir. 1988). 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-1053 Document: 010110097009 Date Filed: 01/15/1992 Page: 9 
\ 

\ 

Federal court jurisdiction to entertain actions for damages 

against the United States is prescribed by 28 u.s.c. § 2675(a). 

Section 2675(a) requires claimants to present their claims to the 

appropriate federal agency before suing the United States by 

filing 11(1) a written statement sufficiently describing the injury 

to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum 

certain damages claim. 11 Warren v. United States Dep't of Interior 

Bureau of Land Management, 724 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Because the FTCA constitutes a waiver of the government's 

sovereign immunity, the notice requirements established by the 

FTCA must be strictly construed. Three-M Enters •• Inc. v. United 

States 548 F.2d 293, 295 (10th Cir. 1977). The requirements are 

jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Id. at 294. 

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with an 

employee of the United States Forest Service on June 24, 1987. On 

October 27, 1987, Plaintiff filed a Standard Form 95, Claim for 

Damage, Injury or Death, with the Department of Agriculture, but 

failed to claim damages in a sum certain on the form. On June 23, 

1989, Plaintiff filed a state court action against the Forest 

Service employee. In March, 1990, the government removed the 

action to federal court and moved for dismissal based on 

Plaintiff's failure to adequately present her claim for damages to 

the proper agency within the two-year limitations period. 

A review of the record confirms that Plaintiff did not 

present a claim containing a statement of a sum certain of the 

damages sought, which would have allowed the government to make 

even a reasonable estimate of the value of her claim, until after 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-1053 Document: 010110097009 Date Filed: 01/15/1992 Page: 10 
( 

\ 

the limitations period had run. The only notice filed within the 

two-year limitations period was the SF95 which simply stated that 

the amount of claim for Plaintiff's personal injury was "ongoing." 

Appellant's App. at XXIX. 1 The only other form of notification 

contained in the record, a letter from Plaintiff's counsel to the 

agency dated August 28, 1989, even if sufficient to satisfy the 

requirements, was submitted outside the limitations period. 2 Id. 

at XI-XV. 

Plaintiff raises the argument that her state court action, 

filed before the expiration of the limitations period, placed the 

government on sufficient notice to satisfy the requirements. The 

case law addressing this issue, however, supports the conclusion 

that the filing of a suit does not constitute adequate notice to 

the federal agency. Henderson v. United States, 785 F.2d at 

123-25 & n.12. We also reject Plaintiff's argument that her 

insurer's request for reimbursement from the agency was sufficient 

to place a sum certain on her claim. The insurer requested 

reimbursement for claims paid on Plaintiff's behalf in the amount 

of $1,632.56. Appellant's App. at XLIII. Plaintiff's ultimate 

claim value, submitted by her counsel via his letter of August 28, 

1989, requested $74,500.00 in damages. Id. at XV. Considering 

1 Although 28 C.F.R. S 14.2(a) allows for notification in a 

form other than a SF95, it still requires that there be written 

notification, plus a claim in a sum certain, in order to be 

considered sufficient. Henderson v. United States, 785 F.2d 121, 

123 n.10 (4th Cir. 1986). 

2 Plaintiff's claim accrued on June 24, 1987, the date 

accident. The Plaintiff had until June 24, 1989, in which 

a sufficient claim with the Department of Agriculture. 

4 

of the 

to file 

Appellate Case: 91-1053 Document: 010110097009 Date Filed: 01/15/1992 Page: 11 
the wide disparity in these figures, we fail to grasp how the 

Plaintiff intended the government to evaluate her claim from this 

insurance reimbursement request. 

In summary, we conclude that Plaintiff failed to present 

proper .notice of claim to the appropriate agency within the 

two-year limitations period established by § 2401(b), and 

therefore, Plaintiff's claim was properly dismissed for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. 

We hereby modify the Judgment of the United States District 

Court for the District of Colorado dated December 7, 1990, to 

reflect a dismissal of Plaintiff's action for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction and AFFIRM. 

Entered for the Court 

James E. Barrett 

Senior Circuit Judge 

5 

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