Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-01659/USCOURTS-ca4-08-01659-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sang Y. Lee
Appellant
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

SANG Y. LEE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 08-1659

UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND

IMMIGRATION SERVICES,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.

(1:07-cv-00141-CCB)

Argued: October 27, 2009

Decided: January 25, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and

AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Traxler wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Agee joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Ivan Yacub, Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellant. Jason Daniel Medinger, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

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ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

Sang Lee, a Korean national, entered the United States in

July 2000 as a visitor with permission to remain until January

21, 2001. Lee overstayed his visa and remains in the United

States despite his failure to maintain lawful nonimmigrant status. 

In May 2003, Lee applied under the Immigration and

Nationality Act ("INA") to adjust his status and become a permanent resident based on his employment with the Korean

Broadcasting Network ("KBN"). See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).

Ordinarily, the failure to maintain continuous lawful status by

overstaying a visa renders a prospective immigrant ineligible

for an adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2)

(excluding aliens who were "in unlawful immigration status

on the date of filing the application for adjustment of status

or who . . . failed . . . to maintain continuously a lawful status

since entry into the United States"). Nevertheless, Lee

claimed that he could still apply for adjusted status by virtue

of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), a provision that permitted otherwise

ineligible aliens to apply for an adjustment of status. This provision expired on April 30, 2001, except for "grandfathered

aliens." See 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(b); Ogundipe v. Mukasey, 541

F.3d 257, 259 (4th Cir. 2008). 

The District Director for the United States Citizenship &

Immigration Services ("USCIS" or "the Service") denied

Lee’s application, concluding that he did not qualify as a

"grandfathered" alien under 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(j) and thus was

precluded from filing for an adjustment of status. Lee did not

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appeal the District Director’s denial to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") because, despite Lee’s unlawful immigration status, the Service has yet to place him in removal

proceedings. Instead, after the Director denied his application

to adjust status, Lee filed this action under the Administrative

Procedure Act ("APA") challenging the validity of 8 C.F.R.

§ 245.10(j). The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed Lee’s action. For the reasons discussed

below, we affirm.

I.

A. Grandfathering under Section 1255(i)

To better understand both the procedural history of Lee’s

case and the arguments he raises here, it is helpful to review

briefly the adjustment-of-status process as it relates to

§ 1255(i) and its grandfathering clause. 

Prior to 1952, obtaining immigrant status was possible only

through the issuance of an immigrant visa by a United States

consular office abroad. See Choe v. INS, 11 F.3d 925, 928

(9th Cir. 1993); Landin-Molina v. Holder, 580 F.3d 913, 916

(9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that under this practice "an alien

already inside this country could acquire immigrant status

only by temporarily leaving the United States to secure an

appropriate visa"). In 1952, Congress established an

adjustment-of-status process, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a),

affording aliens who entered as nonimmigrants a means of

becoming permanent residents without having to depart the

United States and apply for an immigrant visa from a consular

office abroad. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); INS v. Bagamasbad,

429 U.S. 24, 25 n.* (1976) (per curiam) (explaining that the

adjustment-of-status provision was enacted so that "aliens

would not inevitably be required to leave the country and

apply to a United States consul in order to obtain permanentresident status"). 

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Generally speaking, Congress has limited the use of the

adjustment-of-status mechanism to lawfully present aliens in

order "to discourage intending immigrants from moving to the

United States before becoming fully eligible for permanent

residence and to encourage them to follow the orderly consular process for the issuance of immigrant visas." In re

Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 359 (BIA 2007); see LandinMolina, 580 F.3d at 916 (observing that "this process benefitted only those aliens who were in the United States lawfully"). For our purposes, these lawful-presence restrictions

are codified in § 1255(c).

In 1994, Congress enacted § 1255(i), temporarily lifting

§ 1255(c)’s restrictions on certain aliens seeking adjustment

of status. Under the version originally enacted by Congress,

an alien who was eligible to receive an immediately

available immigrant visa, but who would be precluded from adjustment of status under [§ 1255(a)]

for having entered without inspection or for one of

the reasons enumerated in [§ 1255(c)], was permitted

to adjust status upon payment of a surcharge along

with an application for adjustment under [§ 1255(i)].

In re Wang, 23 I. & N. Dec. 924, 927 (BIA 2006). Because

this measure was intended to be temporary, it contained a sunset provision requiring that a § 1255(i) application for adjustment of status be filed between October 1, 1994, and October

1, 1997. See 1995 Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-317,

§ 506(b), (c), 108 Stat. 1724, 1765-66 (effective Oct. 1,

1994); In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 360. 

After the expiration of § 1255(i) under the 1994 Act, Congress added a grandfather clause to allow the continued use of

§ 1255(i) by aliens who were beneficiaries of either a visa

petition or a labor certification filed on or before January 14,

1998. See In re Wang, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 927 (explaining that

the grandfather provision "shift[ed] the focus of the filing

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requirements from the date the application for adjustment of

status was filed to the date on which the underlying visa petition or application for a labor certification was filed"); 1998

Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 111(b), 111 Stat.

2440, 2458 (1997). 

In 2000, Congress extended the expiration date for

§ 1255(i) adjustment applications to April 30, 2001, see 2001

Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 106-554, § 1502(a)(1)(B), 114

Stat. 2763,1 the cutoff date incorporated into the current version of § 1255(i):

(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)

and (c) of this section, an alien physically present in

the United States—

(A) who— 

(i) entered the United States without

inspection; or 

(ii) is within one of the classes enumerated in subsection (c) of this section; 

(B) who is the beneficiary . . . of— 

(i) [an immigrant visa petition] that was

filed with the Attorney General on or

before April 30, 2001; or 

1Congress also added a physical presence requirement—if the visa petition or labor certification was filed after January 14, 1998, the alien must

have been physically present in the United States on the December 21,

2000, date that the amendments were enacted. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1255(i)(1)(c). Aliens seeking to apply for adjustment of status under

§ 1255(i) are still required to pay a fine in addition to the standard processing fees associated with a § 1255(a) application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1);

8 C.F.R. § 245.10(c). 

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(ii) an application for a labor certification

. . . that was filed pursuant to the regulations of the Secretary of Labor on or before

such date; 

. . . 

may apply to the Attorney General for the adjustment of his or her status to that of an alien lawfully

admitted for permanent residence.

8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1). Thus, after the 2000 amendments,

§ 1255(i) effectively forgives a period of illegal stay for any

alien who is the beneficiary of a labor certification application

or an immigrant visa petition filed on or before April 30,

2001. See Figueras v. Holder, 574 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir.

2009) ("[A]djustment under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) . . . waives

any period of illegal stay in the United States if a visa petition

was filed on behalf of the petitioner on or before April 30,

2001. . . ."). The term "grandfathered alien" appears in the

implementing regulations, not the statutory text. The regulations use this term as a type of shorthand for an alien who is

the beneficiary of an application for labor certification or a

petition for an immigrant visa that was filed on or before

April 30, 2001. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(1)(i). 

B. Adjustment of Status under Section 1255(i)

The fact that an alien is grandfathered for § 1255(i) purposes does not mean he is a fortiori eligible for an adjustment

of status; it means only that he is "entitled to apply for adjustment of status." Ahmed v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 806, 808 (7th

Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted). Under § 1255(i), a grandfathered alien must make essentially the same eligibility showing required in any application under § 1255(a) for adjustment

of status: (1) that "the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant

visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence," and (2) that "an immigrant visa is immediately avail6 LEE v. USCIS

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able to the alien at the time the [§ 1255(i)] application is

filed." 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2); see Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447

F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Section 1255(i) does not . . .

create an automatic or a mandatory exception to § 1255(c)" in

view of the fact that "the entire application for adjustment of

status must meet with the discretionary approval of the Attorney General or his designee.").

Aliens who seek to adjust their status based on employment, as Lee does, are thus required to demonstrate that they

are eligible for an employment-based visa and that an

employment-based visa is immediately available. See Lendo

v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 439, 442 (4th Cir. 2007). To do so

requires the prospective immigrant to find a job with an

employer willing to sponsor him through the time-consuming

application process for labor certification and issuance of an

immigrant visa. The prospective employer first must apply on

behalf of the alien to the Department of Labor ("DOL") for a

Labor Certification. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(C); see also

United States v. Ryan-Webster, 353 F.3d 353, 355 (4th Cir.

2003). The DOL’s issuance of a Labor Certification indicates

that the DOL is satisfied that "(1) sufficient United States

workers are not able, willing, qualified, and available for a

particular job; and (2) employment of a particular alien will

not adversely effect the wages and working conditions of

United States workers similarly employed." Ryan–Webster,

353 F.3d at 356; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i). With a valid

Labor Certification in hand, the prospective employer then

submits a petition (technically speaking, a Form I-140 Immigrant Visa Petition for Alien Worker) to the USCIS for an

immigrant work visa. See Lendo, 493 F.3d at 441; see 8

U.S.C. § 1153(b). At that point, the alien, assuming he qualifies for grandfathered status, can apply to adjust his status by

filing a Form I-485. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i); 8 C.F.R.

§ 204.5(n).2

2

If the Service grants the application to adjust status, then the alien is

issued a "Green Card" reflecting his right to live and work in the United

States permanently (assuming he does nothing to cause his removal). See

Lendo, 493 F.3d at 442; Ryan–Webster, 353 F.3d at 356. 

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Finally, even after a grandfathered alien has established eligibility for adjustment of status, the decision is ultimately a

discretionary one for the Attorney General, acting through his

designee. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2) ("[T]he Attorney General

may adjust the status of the alien to that of an alien lawfully

admitted for permanent residence if [the statutory eligibility

requirements are satisfied]." (emphasis added)); Higuit v.

Gonzales, 433 F.3d 417, 419 (4th Cir. 2006). Thus, even after

an alien establishes grandfathered status under § 1255(i), he

faces "a two-step process, involving, first, proof of [his] statutory eligibility for the adjustment, and second, an exercise of

discretion by the Attorney General as to whether to grant such

relief." Singh v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

II.

In 2003, Lee found a willing sponsor in KBN, which

offered him employment as a graphic designer. Before offering the job to Lee, KBN had already obtained an approved

Labor Certification on behalf of another individual. Originally, KBN had planned for Eun Kun Lee, who is unrelated

to Sang Lee, to fill the graphic design position. In January

2001, KBN filed an application on behalf of Eun Kun Lee for

a Labor Certification on the graphic design position. Soon

thereafter, the DOL issued the Labor Certification as

requested, but Eun Kun ended up not working for KBN as

anticipated. 

When KBN offered the position to Sang Lee in 2003, it

requested permission from the DOL to use the previouslyapproved Labor Certification for Sang Lee even though he

was not the named beneficiary. Under the labor regulations

then in effect, a sponsoring employer was permitted to substitute a different prospective worker than the one originally

named on the Labor Certification. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 656.30(c)(2) (2003). In accordance with this practice, the

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DOL permitted KBN to use the existing Labor Certification

for the benefit of Sang Lee.3

Based on this substituted Labor Certification, KBN petitioned the USCIS on behalf of Sang Lee for a work visa. Lee

simultaneously petitioned for adjustment of status under

§ 1255(i), claiming eligibility under the grandfathering provision as "the beneficiary of an application for labor certification filed on or after January 15, 1998, and on or before April

30, 2001." J.A. 61. In November 2003, the USCIS granted

KBN’s visa petition on behalf of Lee. 

In early 2004, however, while Lee’s petition for adjustment

of status was still pending, Lee left KBN and began working

as a graphic designer for a different Korean news outlet in

Washington, D.C. In response, KBN withdrew the visa petition it had filed on Lee’s behalf, resulting in the automatic

revocation of USCIS’s approval of KBN’s immigrant visa

petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(iii)(c). The revocation

then resulted in the USCIS’s denial of Lee’s application for

adjustment of status because a visa was no longer immediately available for Sang Lee. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2)(i); 8

U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2)(B). Thus, the USCIS ruled that, "[a]bsent

evidence that [Lee is] entitled to any other immigrant classification, [Lee’s] application must be, and hereby is denied."

J.A. 86. 

Through new legal counsel, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that he was still eligible for adjustment of

status under the portability provisions of the American Competitiveness in the Twenty First Century Act of 2002, Pub. L.

106-313. Under the Act, 

3The Secretary of Labor stopped the practice of Labor Certification substitution in 2007. See 72 Fed. Reg. 27904, 27944 (May 17, 2007); 20

C.F.R. § 656.11(a) (2009). The new rule, however, does not affect substitutions approved by the DOL before the effective date of July 16, 2007.

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an approved immigration petition will remain valid

for the purpose of an application for adjustment of

status when the alien changes jobs if two conditions

are met: (1) the adjustment of status application has

remained unadjudicated for more than 180 days; and

(2) the alien’s new employment is the same or similar to the job for which the visa petition was

approved. 

Sung v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 2007); see 8

U.S.C. § 1154(j).4 Because Lee’s application had been pending for at least 180 days and his current employment was

identical to his job at KBN, Lee contended that the visa petition filed on his behalf should not have been revoked and that

he was eligible for adjustment of status based on his current

employment. 

After initially denying the motion to reconsider as

untimely, the Director reopened Lee’s case because the

USCIS failed to issue the Notice of Intent to Deny required

"in cases involving revoked employment-based visa petitions"

where the "application for adjustment of status was pending

for 180 days or more." J.A. 104. Since the Service did not

issue the Notice of Intent to Deny, Lee was not afforded the

opportunity to submit proof of his similar employment under

the portability provision. Thus, the Director concluded the

original denial of Lee’s application under § 1255(i) was erroneous.

4 An alien may lose his eligibility for § 1255 status adjustment

while awaiting the adjustment if, inter alia, the alien is no longer

employed by the employer who submitted the approved visa petition. However, noting the substantial time necessary for processing adjustment of status applications, Congress enacted § 204(j)

of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(j)-

the portability statute. 

Sung v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 2007). 

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Despite reopening the case, the Director nevertheless concluded that Lee failed to qualify for grandfathered status

under § 1255(i) because he was not the beneficiary originally

named in the Labor Certification. The Director noted that

although the Labor Certification was filed before the April 30,

2001, cutoff date, it "was not filed on [Lee’s] behalf," but "on

behalf of another individual, Eun Kun Lee," J.A. 107, a disqualifying fact under the regulations: 

Only the alien who was the beneficiary of the

application for the labor certification on or before

April 30, 2001, will be considered to have been

grandfathered for purposes of filing an application

for adjustment of status under [§ 1255(i)]. An alien

who was previously the beneficiary of the application for the labor certification but was subsequently

replaced by another alien on or before April 30,

2001, will not be considered to be a grandfathered

alien. An alien who was substituted for the previous

beneficiary of the application for the labor certification after April 30, 2001, will not be considered to

be a grandfathered alien.

8 C.F.R. § 245.10(j) (emphasis added).

Lee sought no further administrative review. The regulations do not provide for an internal appeal from a USCIS

decision denying an application for adjustment of status; the

alien can obtain further review only by renewing the application during removal proceedings, whereupon the Immigration

Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals will consider it.

See 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii). 

Having not yet been placed in removal proceedings, Lee

filed this action in federal district court under the APA, see 5

U.S.C. §§ 701-706, challenging the USCIS’s denial of his

application for adjustment of status. Lee argued that the promulgation of 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(j) was an ultra vires exercise

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of USCIS’s authority to implement § 1255(i) because the regulation improperly narrowed the scope of "beneficiary" within

the meaning of the statute.

The district court granted USCIS’s motion to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction. Pursuant to the judicial review provisions

of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B) and (D), the district court concluded that any

legal challenge to a USCIS denial of adjustment of status

must be brought via petition for review in the court of

appeals, not in district court. The district court found it lacked

jurisdiction because Lee did not follow this procedural course:

"Lee’s proper recourse, therefore, is to exhaust the applicable

administrative review mechanism by proceeding from USCIS

to the BIA and then directly to the circuit court of appeals."

J.A. 160.

III.

Lee argues that the district court had jurisdiction to consider his claim under the APA, which provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or

adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the

meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review

thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702. The APA "is not a jurisdictionconferring statute." Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). Rather, the jurisdictional source for an action

under the APA is the "federal question" statute, which grants

the district court "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States," see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and thereby "confer[s] jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action." Califano v.

Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). The judicial review provisions of the APA, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, simply provide "a

limited cause of action for parties adversely affected by

agency action." Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 185; see Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 891 n.16 (1988) ("[I]t is common

ground that if review is proper under the APA, the District

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Court ha[s] jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331."). In his

APA action, Lee claims that he was adversely affected by the

District Director’s application of 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(j), an

invalid regulation, to deny him adjustment of status under

§ 1255(i). 

Although the APA embodies a "basic presumption of judicial review" of final agency action, Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S.

182, 190 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), its judicial review provisions do not apply where "statutes preclude

judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1); see Wade v. Blue, 369

F.3d 407, 411 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[A] specific limitation of

federal court jurisdiction . . . overrides the general grant of

federal jurisdiction in § 1331.") Thus, the first issue we must

address is whether the INA precludes review of Lee’s claim

under the APA.

The INA specifically closes the door to judicial review of

certain discretionary agency decisions, including the denial of

an application for adjustment of status: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), . . . except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the

judgment, decision, or action is made in removal

proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to

review—

(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief

under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or

1255 of this title, or 

(ii) any other decision . . . specified under this

subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney

General or the Secretary of Homeland Security,

other than the granting of relief under section

1158(a) of this title. 

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8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 

Congress expressly included decisions to deny relief under

§ 1255 within this jurisdiction-limiting provision; therefore,

the denial of an application for adjustment of status under

§ 1255(i) is not amenable to judicial review. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B); see also Higuit, 433 F.3d at 419. And,

although § 1252 generally addresses judicial review with

regard to final orders of removal, the language "regardless of

whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal

proceedings" makes clear that the jurisdictional limitations

imposed by § 1252(a)(2)(B) also apply to review of agency

decisions made outside of the removal context. See, e.g.,

Mejia Rodriguez v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

562 F.3d 1137, 1142 n.13 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Jilin

Pharmaceutical USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 199 n.5

(3d Cir. 2006). Thus, the fact that Lee is not and has never

been in removal proceedings does not render § 1252(a)(2)(B)

inapplicable.

The claim raised in Lee’s APA action falls squarely within

the scope of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Although Lee’s claim in his

amended complaint is carefully worded to avoid expressly

challenging the denial of his application for adjustment of status, that is clearly what Lee seeks to do. Lee’s complaint is

that the District Director made a faulty eligibility determination under § 1255(i); that determination was the sole basis for

the denial of Lee’s application and cannot be divorced from

the denial itself. 

We also find Lee’s argument unavailing to the extent he

characterizes his claim as raising a pure question of law subject to review under § 1252(a)(2)(D). This provision, which

was added through the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.

109-13, 119 Stat. 231, provides:

Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other

provision of this Act (other than this section) which

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limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims

or questions of law raised upon a petition for review

filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (emphasis added). Congress made

explicit that despite the jurisdiction-stripping language of

§ 1252(a)(2)(B), "courts of appeal [retain] a narrowly circumscribed jurisdiction to resolve constitutional claims or questions of law raised by aliens seeking discretionary relief."

Higuit, 433 F.3d at 419. 

Even if we assume Lee’s challenge raises a reviewable

question of law, § 1252(a)(2)(D) does not give Lee a jurisdictional bootstrap into district court. The express language of

the statute requires Lee to raise any constitutional or legal

questions "upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate

court of appeals." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). To the extent

Congress decided to permit judicial review of a constitutional

or legal issue bearing upon the denial of adjustment of status,

it intended for the issue to be raised to the court of appeals

during removal proceedings. See Hassan v. Chertoff, 543

F.3d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) ("Although 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves jurisdiction over ‘constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for

review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section,’ that provision is inapplicable here.

Hassan’s challenge to the denial of adjustment was not raised

upon a petition for review filed with this court; his case comes

to us on direct appeal from the district court."). Unlike subsection (B), § 1252(a)(2)(D), by its express terms, applies

only in the context of removal proceedings. See e.g., Abdelwahab v. Frazier, 578 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2009) ("First,

§ 1252(a)(2)(D) applies only to questions of law ‘raised upon

a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of

appeals.’ Thus, it does not grant jurisdiction to review questions of law in district court cases."); Hamilton v. Gonzales,

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485 F.3d 564, 567 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007); Jilin Pharmaceutical,

447 F.3d at 206 n.16; El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562,

567-68 (7th Cir. 2004). We agree with the Tenth Circuit that

this provision "is naturally read as a limitation on the broad

jurisdiction stripping provisions found in §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)

and (C)." Hamilton, 485 F.3d at 567. It does not purport to

"confer an expanded grant of jurisdiction but merely confirm[s] our authority to review ‘constitutional claims and questions of law,’ but only after a final order of removal has been

entered." Id. at 567.5

Like a number of our sister circuits, we therefore conclude

that the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain

Lee’s challenge to the District Director’s eligibility determination and subsequent denial of adjustment of status. See

Abdelwahab, 578 F.3d at 820-21; Hassan, 543 F.3d at 566;

McBrearty v. Perryman, 212 F.3d 985, 987 (7th Cir. 2000);

cf. Hamilton, 485 F.3d at 567. But see Pinho v. Gonzales, 432

F.3d 193, 200-04 (3d Cir. 2005). The statute specifically provides that the exclusive means of judicial review of a legal

issue related to the denial of an adjustment of status is by a

petition for review to the court of appeals.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the

district court.6

AFFIRMED

5Lee claims that, in cases like his, our interpretation leads to unjust

results. Because the Agency controls when or even if Lee will be placed

in removal proceedings, Lee argues that he is effectively in a state of

"limbo" and cannot seek judicial review. Our task, however, is only to

determine the meaning of the statute as passed by Congress, not to question the wisdom of the provision enacted. See Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel,

226 F.3d 291, 308 (4th Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom., Barnhart v. Sigmon

Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002). 

6

In view of our conclusion that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes the district

court’s jurisdiction, we need not address the USCIS’s exhaustion argument. See El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562, 569 n.9 (7th Cir. 2004). 

16 LEE v. USCIS

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