Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03099/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03099-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Labor
Respondent
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Corey Demond Stoglin
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

COREY DEMOND STOGLIN,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-3099

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CH-0752-12-0357-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: February 11, 2015

______________________ 

 COREY DEMOND STOGLIN, Minneapolis, MN, pro se.

 SARA B. REARDEN, Office of the General Counsel, 

Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for 

respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

 PER CURIAM.

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2 STOGLIN v. MSPB

Petitioner Corey Stoglin appeals a final order of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dismissing his 

petition for review as untimely filed without a showing of 

good cause for the delay. See Stoglin v. Dep’t of Labor, 

CH-075-12-0358-I-1 (M.S.P.B., Feb. 18, 2014) (Resp’t’s 

App. 1–5) (“Final Order”). Because the Board properly 

dismissed Mr. Stoglin’s petition, this court affirms.

BACKGROUND

I. 

Petitioner Corey Stoglin worked as a compliance officer with the United States Department of Labor (“Agency”). On July 5, 2011, the Agency proposed to suspend 

Mr. Stoglin under an Alternative Discipline Agreement 

(“Agreement”) for thirty days due to “misuse of his government credit card and non-payment of the resulting 

debt.” See Stoglin v. Dep’t of Labor, CH-075-12-0358-I-1 

(M.S.P.B, July 10, 2012) (Resp’t’s App. 6–15) (“Initial 

Decision”). 

The Agreement mandated Mr. Stoglin “will be in a 

leave without pay (LWOP) status for a period of seven [] 

duty days spanned over four [] pay periods.” Id. at 8. The 

Agreement also required Mr. Stoglin to “pay all outstanding credit card balance owed on his government issued 

travel card by January 23, 2012.” Id. Finally, it stipulated that if Mr. Stoglin failed to take any action effectuating 

any part of the Agreement, the deciding official “will issue 

his decision to suspend [Mr. Stoglin] from duty and pay 

for thirty [] calendar days.” Id. 

Mr. Stoglin breached the Agreement by failing “to pay 

the outstanding credit card debt by January 23, 2012.” Id. 

Per the terms of the Agreement, the Agency subsequently 

suspended him for thirty days. On March 21, 2012, Mr. 

Stoglin filed an appeal from the Agency’s action suspending him from duty. 

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STOGLIN v. MSPB 3

In addition to his appeal contesting the thirty-day 

suspension, Mr. Stoglin argued the Agency’s suspension 

violated the Uniformed Services Employment and 

Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”) (38 U.S.C. 

§§ 4301–33), and the Veterans Employment Opportunity 

Act (“VEOA”) (5 U.S.C. § 3330a). Mr. Stoglin’s VEOA and 

USERRA claims were unrelated to his appeal contesting

the Agency’s thirty-day suspension.1 

A. Initial Decision 

On July 10, 2012, the Administrative Judge (“AJ”) issued an initial decision dismissing Mr. Stoglin’s appeal of 

his thirty-day suspension because it found the Board 

lacked jurisdiction to entertain his claims. Upon reviewing the Agreement, the AJ determined Mr. Stoglin “specifically and unambiguously waived his right to pursue a 

Board appeal of his 30-day suspension.” Initial Decision 

at 8. The AJ determined that if Mr. Stoglin “wished to 

preserve his right to seek Board review, he had the burden to expressly reserve that right under the settlement 

agreement.” Id. at 4 (citing Mays v. USPS, 995 F.2d 

1056, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). However, the AJ found the 

Agreement unambiguously states Mr. Stoglin “will not 

contest the contents of the agreement in any administrative or judicial forum, including the [Board].” Id. at 5. 

Therefore, the AJ held “as a result of the [Agreement] and 

the appellant’s waiver, the Board is divested of jurisdiction over this matter.” Id. at 5–6 (citing Grubb v. Dep’t of 

the Interior, 76 M.S.P.R 639, 643–44 (1997)). 

1 In the Initial Decision, the Board found Mr. 

Stoglin failed to make nonfrivolous allegations under 

VEOA and USERRA with respect to his thirty-day suspension. Following this determination, the Board concluded it did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Stoglin’s 

VEOA and USERRA claims. 

 

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4 STOGLIN v. MSPB

In the Initial Decision, a Notice to Appellant (“Notice”) was provided to Mr. Stoglin, stating: the “[I]nitial 

[D]ecision will become final on August 14, 2012, unless a 

petition for review is filed by that date or the Board 

reopens the case on its own motion.” Id.

B. Petition for Review

On June 5, 2013, the Board “informed [Mr. Stoglin]

that his petition for review in the instant case did not 

meet the Board’s filing requirements because it appeared 

that it was not filed by August 14, 2012.” Final Order at 

2. 

On February 18, 2014, the Board issued a Final Order 

dismissing Mr. Stoglin’s petition as untimely filed without 

showing good cause for the delay. In doing so, the Board 

found “[t]he [I]nitial [D]ecision remains the final decision 

of the Board regarding the appellant’s March 21, 2012

appeal of the 30-day suspension.” Id. at 4 (citing 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.113). 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review and Jurisdiction 

This court’s review of a decision of the Board is limited by statute. The Board’s decision must be affirmed 

unless it is: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained 

without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation 

having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial 

evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2012); see Briggs v. Merit 

Sys. Prot. Bd., 331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

This court can set aside a Board decision “unsupported by substantial evidence when it lacks such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” McLaughlin v. Office of Pers. 

Mgmt., 353 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]hether the 

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STOGLIN v. MSPB 5

regulatory time limit for an appeal [of an agency action] 

should be waived based upon a showing of good cause is a 

matter committed to the Board’s discretion and this court 

will not substitute its own judgment for that of the 

Board.” Walls v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 29 F.3d 1578, 1581

(Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Mendoza v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

966 F.2d 650, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc)). 

Mr. Stoglin appeals the Board’s decision dismissing 

his appeal as untimely filed. This court has jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (2012).

II. Mr. Stoglin Does Not Have a Claim under USERRA

On appeal to this court, Mr. Stoglin again argues the 

Board applied the incorrect law because “USERRA was 

not applied as liberally as Congress intended . . . [and the 

Board] never addressed many of the issues of [his] case.” 

Pet’r’s Br. 1. Furthermore, Mr. Stoglin contends the 

Board’s decision “was . . . a retaliation by an agency 

official who violated USERRA.” Id. 

In its Initial Decision, the Board noted Mr. Stoglin

“made several additional VEOA and USERRA claims 

unrelated to his [thirty-day] suspension,” and that “these 

claims were separated out and addressed in [other proceedings].” Initial Decision at 2 n.1. Additionally, in its 

Final Order, the Board stated: 

The appeal that was docketed as MSPB Docket 

No. CH-4324-12-0389-I-1 involved allegations that 

the agency violated his rights under USERRA. In 

a July 17, 2012 initial decision, the [AJ] dismissed 

that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Board 

dismissed the petition for review of that initial decision as untimely filed without good cause shown. 

The appellant sought judicial review of that decision before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 

Final Order at 2 n.2 (citations omitted).

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6 STOGLIN v. MSPB

Mr. Stoglin does not challenge the validity of the 

Board’s determination that his petition was untimely 

filed. Additionally, because Mr. Stoglin’s USERRA claims 

were not addressed by the Board in its Final Order and 

are currently being litigated in a different judicial proceeding, his claims are not properly before this court.2 

See, e.g., Wallace v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 879 F.2d 833

(Fed. Cir. 1989) (applying the “general principle” that 

appellate courts will not consider “an issue that was not 

properly raised before or decided by the Board.”). 

III. The Board Correctly Determined Mr. Stoglin’s Appeal 

Was Untimely without a Showing of Good Cause

A petitioner filing an untimely petition for review 

must show there was good cause for the delay and that he 

“exercised due diligence in attempting to meet the filing 

deadline.” Zamot v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 332 F.3d 1374, 

1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). 

Additional factors demonstrating whether there is good 

cause for an untimely filing include “the length of the 

delay, whether the [petitioner] was notified of the time 

limit, the existence of circumstances beyond the [petitioner’s] control that affected his ability to comply with the 

deadline, the [petitioner’s] negligence, if any, and any 

unavoidable casualty or misfortune that may have prevented timely filing.” Zamot, 332 F.3d at 1377. The 

burden is on the petitioner to show excusable delay. See 

Mendoza, 966 F.2d at 653 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Therefore, 

before the Board, the burden rests with Mr. Stoglin to 

provide evidence showing he exercised diligence and 

ordinary prudence in filing his appeal twenty-four days 

late. See id. 

2 On November 4, 2014, this court granted the 

Board’s motion to remand Mr. Stoglin’s appeal asserting 

his USERRA claim to the Board for further proceedings. 

 

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STOGLIN v. MSPB 7

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Board’s Determination that Mr. Stoglin’s Petition for Review 

Was Untimely

“[A] petition for review must be filed within 35 days 

after the date of issuance of the initial decision or, if the 

petitioner shows that the initial decision was received 

more than 5 days after the date of issuance, within 30 

days after the date the petitioner received the initial 

decision.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). Here, the Initial Decision was issued on July 10, 2012 and specifically stated it 

“will become final on August 14, 2012 [(i.e., thirty-five 

days after the issuance of the initial decision)], unless a 

petition for review is filed by that date or the Board 

reopens the case on its own motion.” Initial Decision at 8. 

Mr. Stoglin did not file his petition until September 7, 

2012–twenty four days after the deadline. 

The certificate of service shows the Initial Decision 

was served on Mr. Stoglin, a registered e-filer, by electronic mail. Furthermore, Mr. Stoglin’s appeal to this 

court is devoid of any evidence he did not understand the 

language in the initial decision providing the date requiring him to file a timely petition for review. The Board has

denied a waiver to its regulatory time limit in instances 

where the petitioner does not establish a good reason for 

an untimely filing. Wright v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 113 

M.S.P.R. 124, ¶¶ 8–9 (2010) (finding an eleven day delay 

not minimal when appellant has not shown good cause for 

delay). Thus, the Board did not abuse its discretion in 

finding Mr. Stoglin’s petition for review was untimely. 

B. Mr. Stoglin Did Not Provide Evidence of Good Cause to 

Waive the Regulatory Time Limit

On appeal, Mr. Stoglin urges this court to “reverse the 

findings of the MSPB” because the AJ “failed to get the 

facts of the case right despite [his] best efforts to explain 

the motivating behavior of the agency.” Pet’r’s Br. 2. Mr. 

Stoglin sought to present additional evidence “regarding 

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8 STOGLIN v. MSPB

the [A]gency’s purported violations of veterans’ preference 

laws.” Final Order at 4. In arguing the Board should 

waive the regulatory time limit to allow him to present 

this evidence, Mr. Stoglin contends this evidence was not 

available before the record closed. Resp’t’s Br. 9.

Although Mr. Stoglin argues the evidence was unavailable prior to the closing of the record, he has not 

provided any evidence that he attempted to obtain the 

evidence prior to the close of the record. See Phillips v. 

U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1982)

(stating delay is excusable where, under the circumstances, a petitioner exercises diligence or ordinary prudence). 

Moreover, the evidence sought to be presented by Mr. 

Stoglin could not establish good cause for his untimely 

filed petition because it addresses the merits of the case

rather than the reason for the delay. Thus, Mr. Stoglin

has failed to show he exercised diligence and ordinary 

prudence in filing his appeal. See Mendoza, 966 F.2d at 

653. 

Even accounting for his pro se status, the Board had 

sufficient evidence to support its finding. The Board 

considered many appropriate factors such as the extent of 

Mr. Stoglin’s delay, his knowledge and access to the 

Initial Decision, and the reasons provided as to why the 

Board should waive the regulatory time limit. It did not 

abuse its discretion by dismissing the appeal for failure to 

show good cause.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s decision is 

 AFFIRMED

No costs. 

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