Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01063/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01063-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerry C. Lamm
Appellant
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JERRY C. LAMM,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1063

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 14-2651, Judge William A. Moorman.

______________________ 

Decided: March 15, 2016 

______________________ 

JERRY C. LAMM, Hillsville, VA, pro se.

JOSEPH A. PIXLEY, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, DEREK 

SCADDEN, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

Case: 16-1063 Document: 15-2 Page: 1 Filed: 03/15/2016
2 LAMM v. MCDONALD

______________________ 

Before REYNA, WALLACH, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Jerry C. Lamm appeals from a decision of the Court of 

Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirming 

a Board of Veterans Appeals (“the Board”) decision denying his claim for non-service-connected pension benefits. 

We conclude that the Veterans Court applied the correct 

law, and accordingly affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Lamm served on active duty in the United States 

Army from October 1961 to October 1963. Mr. Lamm did 

not serve in Vietnam. After his discharge from active 

service, Mr. Lamm served in the Army Reserves. 

In March 2009, Mr. Lamm applied for non-serviceconnected pension benefits. His application was denied at 

the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office 

because he lacked the required period of wartime service. 

Mr. Lamm appealed to the Board and then the Veterans 

Court, which both affirmed that Mr. Lamm did not serve 

during a “period of war.” We are asked to review the 

Board determination that Mr. Lamm is not entitled to 

non-service-connected pension benefits. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (2002). 

ANALYSIS

Our review of Veterans Court decisions is limited by 

statute. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), we may review “the 

validity of a decision of the [Veterans] Court on a rule of 

law or of any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual 

matter) that was relied on by the Court in making the 

decision.” Unless the appeal presents a constitutional 

issue, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual 

Case: 16-1063 Document: 15-2 Page: 2 Filed: 03/15/2016
LAMM v. MCDONALD 3

determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as 

applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2). The issue before the Veterans Court required interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 1521 (“Veterans of a 

period of war”).

Veterans must meet certain requirements before they 

are entitled to receive federal non-service-connected 

pension benefits. One such requirement is service that 

occurred during a “period of war.” 38 U.S.C. § 1521(j). A 

veteran meets this requirement if the veteran served in 

the “active military, naval, or air service” either (1) for 

ninety days or more during a “period of war,” (2) during a 

“period of war” and was discharged or released from such 

service for a service-connected disability, (3) for a period 

of ninety consecutive days or more and such period began 

or ended during a “period of war,” or (4) for an aggregate 

of ninety days or more in two or more separate periods of 

service during more than one “period of war.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 1521(j).

The term “active military, naval, or air service” includes “active duty,” or certain statutorily defined periods 

of active or inactive duty training during which an individual becomes disabled or dies. 38 U.S.C. § 101(24). 

Service through enlistment in the Army Reserve does not 

constitute “active duty” service. 38 C.F.R. 

§ 21.7020(b)(ii)(C) (2007). 

Congress has defined the “period of war” for the Vietnam era separately for those who served in Vietnam 

and those who did not. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(11) and 

§ 101(29). The period from February 28, 1961 to May 7, 

1975 is the “period of war” for veterans who served in 

Vietnam. Id. at § 101(29)(A). For veterans who did not 

serve in Vietnam, the “period of war” includes only the 

period from August 5, 1964 to May 7, 1975. Id. at 

§ 101(29)(B).

Case: 16-1063 Document: 15-2 Page: 3 Filed: 03/15/2016
4 LAMM v. MCDONALD

As Mr. Lamm does not dispute that he falls into neither category under 38 U.S.C. § 101(29), as he neither 

served in Vietnam nor served in the period from August 5, 

1964 to May 7, 1975, there is no doubt that he did not 

serve in a “period of war” as Congress has defined that 

term.

Mr. Lamm’s briefing refers this court to certain lifeand-death situations he faced while on active duty in 

Germany. He argues that his service in these combattype situations should be considered wartime service. 

While Mr. Lamm may have faced life-threatening situations in Germany, the Veterans Court applied the correct 

law in determining that these experiences do not constitute service during a “period of war” as Congress requires 

under 38 U.S.C. § 1521. To the extent that Mr. Lamm 

argues that the Veterans Court erred in applying this law 

to the facts of his case, this court does not have jurisdiction to review such questions. 

Mr. Lamm’s briefing repeatedly cites to 38 U.S.C. 

§ 501(a) as supporting his claim for benefits and establishing that, in a combat situation, any disputed issue is 

decided in favor of the veteran. While that provision 

merely establishes the Secretary of Veterans Affairs’ 

authority to prescribe rules and regulations, it appears 

from Mr. Lamm’s reply brief that he is intending to refer 

to 38 C.F.R. § 3.102.1

That regulation implements 38 U.S.C. § 5107, which 

establishes the standard of proof that applies in determining veterans benefits claims. Peterson v. United States, 

104 Fed. Cl. 196, 208 (2012). That statute establishes

 

1 An excerpt from Mr. Lamm’s Statement of the 

Case attached to his reply brief indicates that this regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.102, was issued under the authority of

38 U.S.C. 501(a).

Case: 16-1063 Document: 15-2 Page: 4 Filed: 03/15/2016
LAMM v. MCDONALD 5

what is called the “benefit of the doubt” doctrine. Id. 

Under the “benefit of the doubt” doctrine, if, after the 

Secretary has considered all the evidence in a case, the 

positive and negative evidence regarding any material 

issue are approximately the same, “the Secretary shall 

give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5107(b). The regulation implementing the statute 

indicates that the doctrine applies “even in the absence of 

official records, particularly if the basic incident allegedly 

arose under combat, or similarly strenuous conditions, 

and is consistent with the probable results of such known 

hardships.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.102.

The “benefit of the doubt” doctrine does not help 

Mr. Lamm, as the doctrine cannot serve to change Congress’s definition of “period of war.” See, e.g., Boyer v. 

West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (While “interpretative doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor” if

we find a veterans’ benefit statute ambiguous, veterans

“cannot rely upon the generous spirit that suffuses the 

law generally to override the clear meaning of a particular 

provision.”) (citations omitted).

Mr. Lamm makes two constitutional arguments: he 

argues that he was denied due process in applying for 

pension benefits, and he makes an equal protection challenge, arguing that it is unfair and irrational for the law 

to treat veterans who served during the Vietnam War 

period differently depending on whether they served in 

Vietnam.

Mr. Lamm’s due process argument fails. A veteran’s 

entitlement to disability benefits “is a property interest 

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Cushman v. 

Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009). However, 

Mr. Lamm does not state why he believes due process was 

lacking, and we do not see any indication from the record 

Case: 16-1063 Document: 15-2 Page: 5 Filed: 03/15/2016
6 LAMM v. MCDONALD

that he did was denied due process in seeking non-service 

connected pension benefits.

His equal protection argument similarly fails. Congress’s eligibility requirements for non-service-connected 

pension benefits are not unconstitutional merely because

they treat veterans who served in Vietnam differently 

than those who served elsewhere during the same time

period. Burrow v. Nicholson, 245 F. App’x 972, 974 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007) (unpublished); Gorecke v. West, 17 Vet. App. 

363 (2000); Fischer v. West, 11 Vet. App. 121, 123 (1998). 

There is a strong presumption that laws providing for 

government payment of monetary benefits are constitutional. Talon v. Brown, 999 F.2d 514, 514 (Fed. Cir. 

1993). The rational basis standard of review applies, and 

“it is not ‘patently arbitrary and irrational’ to treat wartime veterans differently than nonwartime veterans for 

the purpose of awarding pension benefits or to treat 

veterans who served in the Republic of Vietnam differently from those who served elsewhere for the purpose of 

defining wartime service.” Burrow, 245 F. App’x at 974 

(quoting Burrow v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 411 (2006)). 

CONCLUSION

The Board properly interpreted the law as it applies 

to Mr. Lamm’s request for non-service-connected pension 

benefits. Therefore, we affirm the Veterans Court’s 

decision. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 16-1063 Document: 15-2 Page: 6 Filed: 03/15/2016