Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01068/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01068-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dominique M. Betts
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1068

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Dominique M. Betts, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 17, 2007

Filed: December 4, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Dominique Betts (Betts) pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1

 sentenced Betts to 120

months’ imprisonment, to run consecutive to Betts’s state sentences. Betts appeals.

We affirm.

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At sentencing, Betts objected to the application of an enhancement pursuant

to Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(5). Betts never objected to the PSR’s factual statements.

We rely on and accept as true the unobjected to facts in the PSR. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 32(i)(3)(A); United States v. Wintermute, 443 F.3d 993, 1005 (8th Cir. 2006). 

All citations to the United States Sentencing Guidelines are to the 2005 edition.

See generally United States v. Carter, 490 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007).

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I. BACKGROUND

On November 20, 2005, Betts was a patron at The Next Level Club (Club), an

after-hours club in New Madrid, Missouri. Inside the Club, Kafern Williams

(Williams) hit Betts on the chin, rendering Betts unconscious and opening a cut that

later required eighteen stitches to close. Other patrons carried Betts out of the Club.

After regaining consciousness outside of the Club, Betts observed Williams with a

firearm. Betts then left the premises of the Club to go to an area behind a nearby

house to retrieve a firearm. After retrieving the firearm, Betts twice discharged the

firearm in the air behind the house. Betts discharged the firearm in an attempt to ward

off an alleged attack by Williams and an associate of Williams, who also had a

firearm. Betts related:

I started shootin’ the gun up in the air. Just to let [Williams] know, . . .

you ain’t the only one got a gun. . . . [A]fter I shot twice in the air, they

saw me where I was cause they saw the fire jumpin’ from the gun. . . . 

Betts pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The United States

Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR)2

 setting Betts’s

base offense level at twenty-four. The PSR applied a four level enhancement pursuant

to United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(5) for using a firearm in

connection with another felony offense, and credited Betts with three levels for

acceptance of responsibility. The PSR concluded Betts’s total offense level was

twenty-five and Betts had a criminal history category VI, based upon (1) Betts’

numerous convictions (assault; common assault; possession of marijuana; non-support

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of child; distribution, delivery, and manufacturing of a controlled substance; seconddegree assault; petty larceny; and possession of marijuana, as well as seven other

unscored convictions), (2) Betts being on probation at the time of the offense, and

(3) Betts committing the offense within two years of release from custody. Because

the statutory maximum term of imprisonment was 120 months’ imprisonment, Betts’s

advisory Guidelines sentencing range was 110 to 120 months’ imprisonment. 

The district court adopted the PSR’s computation of Betts’s advisory Guidelines

sentence, declined to depart downward based upon Betts’s criminal history category

over-representing either the seriousness of Betts’s criminal history or the likelihood

Betts will commit other crimes, and sentenced Betts to 120 months’ imprisonment.

The district court ordered Betts’s federal sentence to run consecutive to Betts’s state

sentences based upon “the serious nature of the instant offense” and “in consideration

of [Betts’s] history.” In concluding Betts’s sentence was tailored to the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors, the district court stated:

In determining the particular sentence to be imposed, the Court

shall consider first the nature and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant. Interjecting a firearm, even

if it didn’t actually go back into the club, into a social scene in response

to physical injury, 15 convictions in the span of 26 months, a sentence

as a result of those factors is to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to

promote respect for the law, which is sorely lacking here, to provide just

punishment, to afford deterrence, to protect the public, which is

important here. They’re all important, but protecting the public is a

motivating factor in this instance.

This appeal followed. 

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II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Betts argues (1) the district court erred in applying a four offense

level enhancement based upon Betts’s use of a firearm in connection with another

felony offense, (2) the district court erred by declining to depart downward based

upon Betts’s over-represented criminal history, and (3) Betts’s sentence is not

reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

A. Using a Firearm in Connection with Another Felony Offense

We review de novo the district court’s application of the Guidelines, and we

review for clear error the district court’s factual findings. See United States v. Ingram,

501 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2007). 

Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(5) increases a defendant’s offense level four levels “[i]f

the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with

another felony offense.” In the absence of a conviction for another felony offense, the

government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of the essential

elements of the underlying felony offense, including the absence of any defenses. See

United States v. Raglin, 500 F.3d 675, 677 (8th Cir. 2007). For Betts, we look to

Missouri criminal law. Under Missouri law, the State of Missouri has the burden to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant did not act in lawful self defense. See

Missouri v. Beck, 167 S.W.3d 767, 780 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). In the context of the

advisory Sentencing Guidelines, the government has the burden to prove the absence

of any defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Pirani, 406

F.3d 543, 551 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 

The district court concluded Betts used the firearm in connection with the crime

of unlawful use of a weapon, a Missouri class D felony punishable with up to four

years’ imprisonment. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 571.030.1(4), 571.030.7, 558.011.1(4)

(2005). The crime of unlawful use of a weapon is knowingly exhibiting “in the

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The requirements of Missouri Revised Statute section 563.031.1 (2005), in

addition to § 563.031.2, apply because “a defendant charged under § 571.030.1(4) is

only entitled to an instruction on self-defense if the facts justify the use of deadly

force.” Missouri v. Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d 31, 36 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 

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presence of one or more persons, any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry

or threatening manner.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4) (2005). 

First, Betts contends the government failed to prove (1) Betts used the firearm

“in an angry or threatening manner” and (2) Betts exhibited the firearm in the

presence of others, because Betts discharged the firearm in a location some distance

from other people. “Missouri courts have held that whether a weapon was exhibited

in a ‘threatening’ manner is an objective determination,” Ingram, 501 F.3d at 968, and

a defendant exhibits a firearm in the presence of others, even though no one saw the

firearm, “by giving evidence of [the firearm] through visible signs and actions,”

Missouri v. Johnson, 964 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). Betts retrieved and

discharged the firearm allegedly to ward off an attack by Williams and Williams’s

associate. Betts gave evidence of the firearm by firing it to threaten Williams and

Williams’s associate, who thereby learned Betts possessed a firearm. Betts stated,

“they saw me where I was cause they saw the fire jumpin’ from the gun.” The

government proved by a preponderance of the evidence Betts unlawfully used a

weapon in violation of Missouri Revised Statutes section 571.030.1(4). 

Second, Betts argues the government failed to prove Betts committed the crime

because Betts acted in lawful self defense. Missouri Revised Statute section

563.031.2 (2005) permits the “use [of] deadly force upon another person” if, among

other things, the defender “reasonably believes that such deadly force is necessary to

protect himself [or herself] or another against death, serious physical injury,” or other

forcible felony.3

 Under Missouri law, to prove lawful self defense, the evidence must

show:

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(1) an absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the defender;

(2) a real or apparently real necessity for the defender to kill in order to

save himself from an immediate danger of serious bodily injury or death;

(3) a reasonable cause for the defendant’s belief in such necessity; and

(4) an attempt by the defender to do all within his power consistent with

his personal safety to avoid the danger and the need to take a life. 

Missouri v. Thomas, 161 S.W.3d 377, 379 (Mo. 2005) (en banc). 

“A self-defense instruction is not appropriate if the defendant renewed or

continued the confrontation, because behavior of that sort is inconsistent with the

requirement that defendant avoid the danger and the need to take a life.” Id. “The

‘renewal’ cases are most often characterized by a renewal of the confrontation after

either (1) the initial victim left the scene to obtain a weapon or (2) a significant break

in the confrontation is made when the defendant removes himself or herself from the

confrontation before coming back to renew the fight.” Id. at 379-80 (punctuation

altered and internal citations omitted). Here, Betts renewed the confrontation with

Williams after the initial confrontation had ended and Betts left the Club to obtain a

weapon. Betts attempts to distinguish this situation from the renewal cases by arguing

Williams and Williams’s associate were still threats to Betts when Betts discharged

the firearm behind the house. Nothing in the record supports the allegation Williams

or Williams’s associate continued to threaten Betts when Betts discharged the firearm.

The district court’s factual finding that Betts was “removed from the problem, but

[Betts] then reinsert[ed] himself” is not clearly erroneous. The district court did not

err (1) in concluding Betts did not act in lawful self defense, (2) in holding Betts used

a firearm in connection with the crime of unlawful use of a weapon, and (3) in

applying a four level enhancement pursuant to Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(5). 

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B. Downward Departure Based Upon Betts’s Over-Represented

Criminal History

Betts claims the district court erred in denying a motion for downward

departure under Guidelines § 4A1.3(b)(1). “The discretionary denial of a motion for

downward departure is unreviewable unless the court failed to recognize its authority

to depart.” United States v. Cubillos, 474 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation

omitted). The district court recognized its authority to depart from the advisory

Sentencing Guidelines range; however, the district court declined to exercise its

discretion due to Betts’s extensive criminal history and likelihood of recidivism. The

district court’s decision not to depart downward is not reviewable. 

C. Reasonableness Review

Conceding the district court properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines in

running Betts’s federal sentence consecutive to Betts’s state sentences, Betts argues

running the 120 months’ imprisonment sentence consecutive to Betts’s state sentences

is not reasonable. Specifically, Betts contends the district court failed to consider

(1) Betts acted in self defense and (2) Betts only had an undischarged term of

imprisonment because Missouri revoked Betts’s probation before the imposition of

the federal sentence. We need not consider further Betts’s first contention because

Betts did not act in lawful self defense. 

We review for reasonableness a district court’s decision to impose a concurrent,

partially concurrent, or consecutive sentence. See United States v. Winston, 456 F.3d

861, 867 (8th Cir. 2006). Because the district court imposed a sentence within the

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, Betts’s sentence is presumptively reasonable.

See Rita v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007); United

States v. Solis-Bermudez, 501 F.3d 822, 884 (8th Cir. 2007). 

Section 3584(a), (b) of Title 18, United States Code, mandates consideration

of the § 3553(a) factors in determining whether to impose a concurrent, partially

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concurrent, or consecutive sentence, and encourages consecutive sentences “[w]hen

prison terms for multiple offenses are imposed at different times.” United States v.

Shafer, 438 F.3d 1225, 1227 (8th Cir. 2006). “The objective is ‘to achieve a

reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense and avoid unwarranted

disparity.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, cmt. n.3(A)). Furthermore, although “the

Guidelines are no longer mandatory, the Guidelines must be considered in fashioning

a reasonable sentence under § 3553(a).” United States v. Feemster, 483 F.3d 583, 588

(8th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, No. 07-6727 (Sept. 14, 2007). The Guidelines

recommend “the sentence for the instant offense be imposed consecutively to the

sentence imposed for the revocation.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, cmt. n.3(C). The district

court gave effect to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3584(a) and Guideline § 5G1.3 by running

Betts’s federal sentence consecutive to Betts’s state sentences. Betts’s consecutive

sentences are not unreasonable. 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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