Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03821/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03821-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Una Mae Davis
Appellant
Cleveland Hammonds
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

 No. 03-3744

___________

Una Mae Davis, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Cleveland Hammonds, Jr., *

Superintendent, *

*

Appellee, *

__________ 

Appeals from the United States

 No. 03-3821 District Court for the

___________ Eastern District of Missouri.

Una Mae Davis, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Cleveland Hammonds, Superintendent, *

St. Louis Public Schools, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: June 17, 2004

Filed: June 24, 2004

___________

Appellate Case: 03-3821 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/24/2004 Entry ID: 1780872 
1

The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Missouri. 

2

She did not specifically cite the ADEA, but the district court construed her

complaint as asserting such a claim. 

-2-

Before BYE, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals, Una Mae Davis appeals the district court’s1

adverse grant of summary judgment in her employment-discrimination lawsuit, and

its dismissal of her related lawsuit. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm.

See Kenney v. Swift Transp., Inc., 347 F.3d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 2003) (summary

judgment standard of review); Doe v. Sch. Dist. of Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605, 613 (8th

Cir. 2003) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard of review). 

Davis is African American and in her late sixties; she was employed by the St.

Louis Public School District (District) as a teacher from 1985 to 1993. She filed two

lawsuits against District Superintendent Cleveland Hammonds based on allegations

arising from her unsuccessful applications for elementary teaching positions in 1999,

2000, and 2001. In her first lawsuit (Davis I)--filed in June 2002 in federal court--

Davis claimed race, age, and gender discrimination under Title VII and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).2

 After Davis’s gender-discrimination

claim was dismissed for lack of exhaustion, in May 2003 she filed a second lawsuit

(Davis II) in state court, claiming race, age, and gender discrimination under Title

VII, the ADEA, and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA); the lawsuit was

removed to federal court. 

We agree with the district court that Davis did not create any trialworthy issues

on her race- and age-discrimination claims. See Kenney, 347 F.3d at 1045

Appellate Case: 03-3821 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/24/2004 Entry ID: 1780872 
-3-

(describing burden shifting in Title VII case); Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318 F.3d

803, 806-07 (8th Cir.) (applying burden-shifting analysis in ADEA case), cert.

denied, 124 S. Ct. 153 (2003); Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 930 n.2

(8th Cir. 2002) (noting Title VII and MHRA claims are analyzed using same legal

principles), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 994 (2003). Further, even if Davis’s August 2002

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge was timely as to her claim of

gender discrimination, she also did not produce any evidence showing that the

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons District gave for not hiring her were a pretext

for gender discrimination. Finally, the lists of former teachers hired by District

during the relevant period included many individuals who were as old or older than

Davis, African American, and female, and Davis cannot compare herself to teachers

hired for the first time by District, or to individuals who were hired at schools she did

not contact or who were hired for teaching positions in high school. Cf. EEOC v.

Kohler Co., 335 F.3d 766, 775-76 (8th Cir. 2003) (instances of disparate treatment

can support claim of pretext, but plaintiff has burden of proving that disparately

treated employees were similarly situated in all relevant respects). 

We also find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Davis’s motion to compel, see Roberts v. Shawnee Mission Ford, Inc., 352 F.3d 358,

360 (8th Cir. 2004) (appellate review of discovery orders is narrow and deferential),

and that Davis II was properly removed to federal court, see Lindsey v. Dillard’s, Inc.,

306 F.3d 596, 598 (8th Cir. 2003) (claims can be removed based on federal question

jurisdiction, and if pendant state claims are closely related to federal claim, district

court has supplemental jurisdiction over them). Davis’s remaining arguments provide

no basis for reversal, and we decline to consider the arguments she raises for the first

time on appeal. 

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 03-3821 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/24/2004 Entry ID: 1780872