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Parties Involved:
Baskor
Appellee
Bernette
Appellee
Brengesty
Appellee
Butler
Appellee
John Doe
Appellee
Sugar Ray Lewis
Appellant
Mills
Appellee
Parker
Appellee
Westbrook
Appellee
Wright
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30589

Summary Calendar

SUGAR RAY LEWIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

BRENGESTY, Captain; MILLS, Lieutenant; BASKOR, Lieutenant; WRIGHT,

Lieutenant; BERNETTE, Captain; WESTBROOK, Lieutenant; BUTLER,

Lieutenant; PARKER, Sergeant; JOHN DOE,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:07-CV-279

Before KING, STEWART, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Sugar Ray Lewis, Louisiana prisoner # 110697, filed a complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against the above named defendants, arguing that the defendants

used excessive force against him in violation of his rights under the Eighth

Amendment. Lewis moved for appointment of counsel three times before trial,

and the magistrate judge denied his motions. Lewis, acting pro se, presented an

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 13, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 09-30589

opening statement, a closing argument, his own testimony, and the testimony

of other witnesses at a jury trial of his case. At the close of plaintiff’s evidence,

the district court directed a verdict for Brengesty. The jury found in favor of the

remaining defendants.

Lewis takes issue with the jury verdict, arguing that the defendants did

in fact use excessive force against him and that Brengesty, who he admits

applied no force to him, was liable for failing to intervene. “We may overturn a

jury verdict only if it is not supported by substantial evidence, meaning evidence

of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise

of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.” Snyder v. Trepagnier,

142 F.3d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1998). A reversal of a jury verdict may be obtained

“only if no reasonable jury could have arrived at the verdict.” Id.

The defendants’ testimony was consistent that force was used on Lewis

only to the extent required to restore discipline after Lewis refused orders to

turn over a bundle of legal papers for inspection, attempted to bite one

defendant, and attempted to head butt another. The jury was free to credit the

defendants’ testimony over the testimony of Lewis and his witnesses, and we

must accept the jury’s credibility determination. See Guillory v. Domtar Indus.,

Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1334 (5th Cir. 1996); Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 453

(5th Cir. 1992). The verdict is not one that no reasonable jury could have

reached, and it will not be reversed. See Snyder, 142 F.3d at 795.

Lewis also argues that the district court erred in dismissing Brengesty as

a defendant at the close of his case-in-chief on the defendants’ motion for

judgment as a matter of law, a ruling we review de novo. Raggs v. Miss. Power

& Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 2002). The district court concluded that

Lewis had not put forth evidence in support of an excessive force claim as to

Brengesty, and that Lewis’s pleadings did not allege the requisite elements for

a failure-to-protect claim against him. To establish a failure-to-protect claim, a

plaintiff must show that he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a

2

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No. 09-30589

substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately

indifferent to his need for protection.” Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th

Cir. 1995). Lewis did not plead deliberate indifference as to Brengesty, and at

1

trial, he offered virtually no evidence against Brengesty. At the time the motion

for judgment as a matter of law was granted, the only witness even placing

Brengesty at the scene was Lewis himself, and he stated only that Brengesty

was there at some point during the incident and “just sat there and watched”

while the other officers beat him.

2

Even if Lewis’s pleadings and this evidence were sufficient to avoid a

judgment as a matter of law, “[a]t every stage of the proceeding, the court must

disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.”

FED. R. CIV. P 61. Because Lewis’s claim against Brengesty, construed liberally,

requires a showing that Brengesty failed to protect him from one or more of the

other defendants who were using excessive force, the failure of Lewis’s excessive

force claim against all of the other defendants would necessarily doom his

failure-to-protect claim. Thus, Lewis has not met his burden of demonstrating

that the dismissal of Brengesty at the close of his case in chief was error which

prejudiced him. See James v. NICO Energy Corp., 838 F.2d 1365, 1373 (5th Cir.

1988)(“[W]here the essential issue was presented to and rejected by the jury, any

error in presenting [the dismissed claim] to the jury was harmless error.”); see

also Goulet v. New Penn Motor Express, Inc., 512 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2008)(“A

wrongly directed verdict in favor of one party is harmless where the jury’s

ultimate verdict necessarily defeats a claim against the dismissed party.”).

1 He alleged as follows: “Captain Brengesty involved by not stopping Defendants from

beating me.”

 During the defendants’ case, Brengesty testified that he arrived at a point in time

2

when Lewis was on the floor with a small cut over his eye and that he never observed anyone

strike him.

3

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No. 09-30589

Finally, Lewis argues that the district court erred when it denied his

motions for appointment of counsel. A district court is not required to appoint

counsel for an indigent plaintiff on appeal in a civil suit unless there exist

exceptional circumstances warranting such an appointment. Ulmer v.

Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212, 213 (5th Cir. 1982). Lewis has not shown that

exceptional circumstances exist that would have required appointment of

counsel. Accordingly, he has not shown that the district court’s denial of his

motion was an abuse of discretion. See Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1242

(5th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, Lewis has not shown that exceptional

circumstances exist that would warrant appointment of appellate counsel. See

Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, and Lewis’s

motion for appointment of appellate counsel is DENIED.

4

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