Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-13-01176/USCOURTS-ca8-13-01176-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dennys Rodriguez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 13-1176

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Dennys Rodriguez

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

____________

 Submitted: July 10, 2015

 Filed: September 3, 2015 

____________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

In United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2014), we affirmed the

district court’s denial of Dennys Rodriguez’s motion to suppress evidence. 1

The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the

1

District of Nebraska, adopting the Findings and Recommendation of the Honorable

F.A. Gossett, III, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Nebraska. 

Appellate Case: 13-1176 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Entry ID: 4313152 
Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted Rodriguez’s

petition for certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case to us for further

consideration. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). We affirm.

K-9 officer Morgan Struble stopped Rodriguez for a traffic violation and issued

a written warning. Struble then asked for permission to walk his drug dog around the

vehicle. Rodriguez denied consent. After a second officer arrived on the scene,

Struble walked the dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs

approximately seven or eight minutes after Struble had issued the warning. A search

of the vehicle revealed methamphetamine. 

Rodriguez was charged with possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or

more of a mixture orsubstance containing methamphetamine. He moved to suppress

the evidence of drug trafficking, arguing that the delay from the time Struble had

issued the written warning until the dog indicated the presence of drugs was an

unreasonable seizure. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be denied. 

Applying United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 648-49 (8th

Cir. 1999), and the cases that followed it, the magistrate judge concluded that the

delay did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was a de minimisintrusion on

Rodriguez’s personal liberty. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014,

1016-17 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Morgan, 270 F.3d 625, 631-32 (8th Cir. 2001). The district court

reached the same conclusion, agreeing that “the total elapsed time is similar to the

times found constitutional by the Eighth Circuit.” D. Ct. Order of Aug. 30, 2012, at

4. After the motion was denied, Rodriguez entered into a conditional guilty plea and

thereafter appealed the denial of the motion to suppress.

Applying $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency and its progeny, we held that

Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was not

violated: 

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The resulting seven- or eight-minute delay issimilar to the delay that we

have found to be reasonable in other circumstances. See Morgan, 270

F.3d at 632 (“We do not believe that the few minutes difference between

the time in this case and $404,905 has constitutionalsignificance.”). We

thus conclude that it constituted a de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez’s

personal liberty. 

Rodriguez, 741 F.3d at 907-08. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide

“whether police routinely may extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent

reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.

The Court held “that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for

which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable

seizures.” Id. at 1612. The Court then vacated our judgment and remanded the case

to usfor further proceedings. On remand, Rodriguez argues that the evidence of drug

trafficking must be suppressed as evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment

violation. 

In Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423-24 (2011), the Supreme Court

held that “searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate

precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.” When Rodriguez’s vehicle was

stopped in March 2012, the law of this Circuit provided that a brief delay to employ

a drug dog did not constitute an unconstitutional seizure, as long as the traffic stop

was not unreasonably prolonged. We thus “repeatedly [had] upheld dog sniffs that

were conducted minutes after the traffic stop concluded.” Rodriguez, 741 F.3d at

907. The magistrate judge, the district court, and this court all determined that the

seven- or eight-minute delay in this case constituted a de minimis intrusion on

Rodriguez’s personal liberty and that Rodriguez’s seizure waslawful under our thenbinding precedent. Under Davis, therefore, the exclusionary rule does not apply

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because the circumstances of Rodriguez’s seizure fell squarely within our case law

and the search was conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on our precedent.2

Rodriguez argues that “the Supreme Court [in Davis] never intended to

withhold the remedy of exclusion from defendants who secure a favorable Fourth

Amendment decision in the Supreme Court.” Appellant’s Suppl. Br. 9. The dissent

in Davis also raised this issue, asking why a defendant would seek to overturn

precedent of the courts of appeals. “After all, if the (incorrect) circuit precedent is

clear, then even if the defendant wins (on the constitutional question), he loses (on

relief).” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2438 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority dismissed

this concern, concluding that “a good-faith exception for objectively reasonable

reliance on binding precedent will not prevent review and correction of such

decisions,” because “defendants in jurisdictions in which the question remains open

will still have an undiminished incentive to litigate the issue.” Id. at 2433. 

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

Rodriguez contends that the government waived any argument that the good2

faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply. Ordinarily, we do not consider

arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Sager, 743 F.2d

1261, 1263 n.4 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating the general rule and then considering an

argument raised for the first time in the government’s petition for rehearing). But

here, the government advanced the Davis argument in support of the district court’s

judgment, and Rodriguez had a full and fair opportunity to address in his

supplemental brief whether Davisshould apply. “We review judgments, not opinions,

and we may affirma judgment on any ground supported by the record, whether or not

that ground was urged below or passed on by the District Court.” Sager, 743 F.2d at

1263 n.4 (applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule on rehearing).

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