Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06249/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06249-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Oscar Marnell St. Julian II
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

~'ENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

OSCAR MARNELL ST. JULIAN, II, a/k/a 

Davion Walker, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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DEC 1 8 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6249 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-89-21-R) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney; James F. Robinson, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

plaintiff-appellee. 

Howard R. Haralson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for defendantappellant. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Oscar Marnell St. Julian II {St. Julian, or 

Defendant) appeals his sentence imposed under the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.). 

* After exarn~n~ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 89-6249 Document: 01019628390 Date Filed: 12/18/1990 Page: 1 
Background 

St. Julian was indicted for violations of 21 u.s.c. §§ 841 

and 856 (1988), specifically for conspiracy to distribute cocaine 

base, and maintaining a premises (crackhouse) for the purpose of 

distributing cocaine base. St. Julian pled guilty to the 

crackhouse offense after negotiating a plea agreement under which 

the other charge was dropped. 

Pursuant to the plea agreement, St. Julian cooperated with 

Government investigators. However, after his release pending 

sentencing, St. Julian wrongfully failed to appear at a sentencing 

hearing scheduled for June 30, 1989. St. Julian did appear for 

sentencing on July 11, 1989. 

In determining St. Julian's sentence, and after resolving 

objections to the Presentence Report (PSR), the district court: 

1) established a base offense level of 16 for the crackhouse 

offense, u.s.s.G. § 2D1.8(a); 2) assessed two levels for 

possession of firearms, u.s.s.G. § 2Dl.B(b)(l); 3) rejected the 

PSR's recommended three level adjustment for defendant's alleged 

supervisory role, u.s.s.G. § 3Bl.l(b); 4) assessed two levels for 

obstruction of justice based on St. Julian's failure to appear at 

the June 30, 1989 sentencing hearing, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; and 5) 

subtracted two levels for St. Julian's acceptance of 

responsibility, u.s.s.G. § 3E1.l(a), all resulting in a total 

offense level of 18. The court also adopted the PSR 

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recommendation of criminal history category II, resulting in a 

guideline range of 30 to 37 months of incarceration. Finally, the 

court decided to depart upward from the sentencing range, based on 

its finding that St. Julian was involved with 36 ounces of cocaine 

base. 

Ultimately, the court imposed a sentence of six years 

(seventy-two months) imprisonment, three years of supervised 

release, and a fifty dollar special assessment. 

St. Julian was one of three co-defendants who pled.guilty to 

the crackhouse offense in this case. Co-defendant Davis received 

a sentence of 36 months; see United States v. Davis, 912 F.2d 1210 

(lOth Cir. 1990). Co-defendant Sardin received a sentence of 120 

months; see United States v. Sardin, No. 89-6189, slip op. (lOth 

Cir., December 18, 1990). All three separately appealed their 

sentences. 

St. Julian raises four issues on appeal; each is discussed 

below. 

Use of Information 

St. Julian first argues the sentencing court used certain 

drug-quantity information in violation of the fundamental fairness 

requirements of the fifth amendment due process clause. St. 

Julian claims the 36-ounce figure upon which the court based its 

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upward departure was obtained either from him under the plea 

agreement, which provided such information would not be used 

against him, or from his co-defendants, who merely corroborated 

information that he first provided. The Gove rnment insists the 

co-defendants were independent sources for the drug-quantity 

information upon which upward departure was based. 

Unlike a legal challenge to an application of the sentencing 

guidelines, this argument presents a question of fact: whether 

St. Julian was, in fact, the source of the information upon which 

the district court relied in deciding to depart upward from the 

initial guideline range. Questions of fact are revi ewed under the 

clear error standard. United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 

1181-82 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3302 (1990). 

St. Julian's claim that the Government wrongfully used 

information that he provided is unfounded. At sentencing, the 

district court agreed not to use information obtained from St. 

Julian that the Government did not know at the time it made the 

plea bargain. However, the Government provided testimony, based 

on interviews with co-defendants Sardin and Davis, that roughly 50 

ounces of cocaine base were imported through the conspiracy of 

which St. Julian was a member. Defense counsel failed to rebut 

that testimony. On appeal, St. Julian fails to allege any facts 

that would enable this court to find clear error in the district 

court's implicit finding he was not, in fact, the ultimate source 

of the drug quantity information. As that finding is supported by 

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the record, it will not be disturbed. St. Julian's reliance on 

United States v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253 (lOth Cir. 1989), and 

u.s.s.G. § 1Bl.8 is misplaced. See Davis, 912 F.2d at 1213. 

Because the Government did not wrongfully use information provided 

by St. Julian, those authorities are inapplicable to the facts of 

this case. Id. 

St . Julian's argument that he was the ultimate, although 

indirect, source of the drug quantity information is essentially 

identical to an unsuccessful argument made by co-defendant Davis. 

Davis, 912 F.2d at 1213-15. We rejected Davis's argument that the 

use of co-defendants' information violated either his plea 

agreement or his right to confront witnesses, and affirmed the 

district court's use of the co-defendants' statements as a basis 

for upward departure in Davis's sentence. Id. See also, 

Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1179-81 (upholding the sentencing judge's 

consideration of testimony from separate trial of defendant's coconspirators in determination of appropriate sentence under 

guidelines). 

St. Julian further refines Davis's argument with the factual 

claim that his co-defendants merely corroborated information that 

he first gave to the police. As we noted in Davis, however, 

"[t]here is no indication that the co-defendants' statements were 

elicited as a result of Davis' plea agreement with the government, 

and Davis provided no evidence that, had he refused to cooperate, 

his co-defendants likewise would not have offered the information 

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about the correct quantity of drugs involved." Davis, 912 F.2d at 

1213. This fully applies to St. Julian. The use of codefendants' statements does not violate any of St. Julian's 

rights. 

St. Julian also asserts duplicity on the part of a witness, 

alleging "(t] he same government witness testified at each 

sentencing and claimed to have obtained the information from a 

Defendant other than the one being sentenced at the time." 

Unfortunately, this argument was neither presented to the 

sentencing judge nor used to impeach the witness in question. 

Given the seriousness of the allegation, however, we have 

considered St. Julian's claim and cross-checked sentencing 

transcripts of his co-defendants. We are unable to agree with his 

version of the proceedings. The following exchange between 

counsel for co-defendant Sardin and the Government witness is 

instructive: 

Q. The forty ounces of crack or cocaine base that you 

have told the Judge you have the independent knowledge 

of, those amounts came from Oscar St. Julian? 

A. Yes. He corroborated .t.J1g information that 1. had. 

Sardin, No. 89-6189, Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings, May 17, 

1989, at 56 (emphasis added). The clear implication of this 

testimony is that St. Julian was not the sole or even the primary 

source of the drug quantity information. St. Julian has failed to 

demonstrate otherwise. 

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As we stated in Davis, "[w]hile there may be some concern 

that the use of the co-defendants' information against 

[defendants] may lead future defendants to refuse to cooperate in 

investigations, it is clear that ~he sentencing judge did not use 

[defendant'sJ own information against him. The plea agreement was 

not violated by the use of statements of ... co-defendants." 912 

F.2d at 1213. Neither was due process violated by the use of codefendants' information against St. Julian. 

Validity of Upward Departure 

St. Julian next argues the district court violated guideline 

procedures in its upward departure because drug quantity is not an 

appropriate basis for departure where the base offense is 

maintaining a crackhouse. 

This court reviews the validity of upward departures under 

the three-step process set forth in United States v. White, 893 

F.2d 276 (lOth Cir. 1990). Under the first step of the White 

analysis, "we determine whether the circumstances cited by the 

district court justify a departure from the Guidelines." Id. at 

277. The sentencing court can depart from the guideline range 

only if it "finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating 

circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 

consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 

guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 

described." 18 u.s.c. S 3553(b) (1988). 

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The sentencing court here identified drug 

specifically, defendant's involvement with 36 ounces 

base as the "grounds for departure from the 

quantity 

suggested for this offense." This court upheld the 

of cocaine 

guidelines 

use of drug 

quantity as an aggravating circumstance warranting upward 

departure for the offense of maintaining a crackhouse in the 

sentencing of St. Julian's co-defendant Davis. See Davis, 912 

F.2d at 1213, 1215. Because the quantity of illegal drugs was not 

a circumstance adequately taken into consideration by the 

Sentencing 

guidelines 

Commission in its formulation of the sentencing 

for this offense, that factor justified upward 

departure here. The first step of Whi te is thus fulfilled. 

The second step of the White analysis involves a review of 

factual determinations under the clearly erroneous standard. 

White, 893 F.2d at 278. Our consideration of St. Julian's first 

argument anticipated this step. As stated above, we find no clear 

error in the sentencing court's factual determination that St. 

Julian was involved with 36 ounces of cocaine base. The second 

White step is also satisfied. 

Under White's third step we consider the reasonableness of 

the degree of upward departure beyond the guideline range. Id. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1988), which mandates that we vacate a 

sentence outside the 

Although St. Julian 

reasonableness of 

guideline range if it 

has not specifically 

the sentencing court's 

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is unreasonable. 

challenged the 

degree of upward 

Appellate Case: 89-6249 Document: 01019628390 Date Filed: 12/18/1990 Page: 8 
departure, our concerns regarding the dispositions of his codefendants' appeals prompt us to consider the issue. See Davis, 

912 F.2d at 1215 (remand for explanation of reasons for the extent 

of departure above the guideline range), and Sardin, slip op. at 6 

(reversing and remanding sentence for unexplained disparity of 

upward departure as compared with sentences of co-defendants Davis 

and St. Julian). 

18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(e)(3) and 3553(a) (1988) provide appellate 

courts guidance in the task of reviewing the reasonableness of 

sentences. White summarized the statutory directives, stating: 

To determine whether the degree of departure is 

reasonable, we must consider the district court's 

prof fered justifications as well as such factors as: 

the seriousness of the offense, the need for just 

punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, 

correctional treatment, the sentencing pattern of the 

Guidelines, the policy statements contained in the 

Gui delines, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 

disparities. 

893 F.2d at 278. Even with such guidance, the process of assaying 

the "reasonableness" of a particular degree of departure remains 

enigmatic. 

To facilitate better appellate review of the reasonableness 

of degrees of departure, in recent case s we emphasize the 

importance of the sentencing court's "proffered justifications," 

id., or statement of reasons for the imposition of a specific 

sentence. Such a statement of reasons is a statutory requirement 

set forth in 18 u.s.c. § 3553, which provides: 

(c) Statement of reasons for imposing a sentence.--

The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in 

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open court the reasons for its imposition of the 

particular sentence, and, if the sentence--

(2) is not of the kind, or is outside the range, 

described in subsection (a)(4), the specific reason 

for the imposition of s sentence different from 

that described. 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988) (emphasis added). In United States v. 

Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 202 

(1990), we explained, ''[t]he language of the statute makes it 

clear that it is not enough to state simply the reasons for a 

departure from the guidelines; the reasons for the 'particular 

sentence' imposed must also be set forth." Id. at 1437 (emphasis 

added). The requirement of a specific statement of reasons is 

emphasized in other decisions as well. See United States v. 

Jackson, No. 89-6118, slip op. at 7-9 (lOth Cir. December 17, 

1990) (en bane); United States v. Freitekh, 912 F .2d 421, 423 

(lOth Cir. 19 90); United States v. Harris, 907 F.2d 121, 124 (lOth 

Cir. 1990); United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337 , 342 (lOth 

Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720, 723-24 (lOth 

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 1786 (1990). The explanation 

provided by the sentencing court must be evaluated against this 

backdrop of authority. 

The district court set forth its reasons for upward 

departure, and for the sentence imposed in this case, in comments 

concluding the Sentencing Hearing of July 11, 1989. Specifically, 

the court stated: 

You've stood before another Court and were placed 

on probation and that Court placed a certain amount of 

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confidence in you, and you rewarded that Court by coming 

to Oklahoma to assist in the sale of cocaine base, a 

large amount of cocaine base. 

And I have to presume that that cocaine is now part 

of our society here in Oklahoma City as a result of your 

cooperating to bring it here. 

I'm satisfied that based on the amount of cocaine 

involved, that being the 36 ounces of base, that that is 

grounds for departure from the guidelines suggested for 

this offense. 

I'm satisfied that the sentence the Court will 

impose will satisfy the requirements of 18 u.s. Code 

Section 3553, which requires the Court to consider the 

nature and the circumstance of the offe nse and the 

history and the characteristics of the Defendant, that 

the sentence imposed refl ect[s] the seriousness of the 

offense and will promote respect for the law and 

provides for just punishment and adequate defense for 

the protection of the public. 

Considering all these matters, it's the judgment of 

the Court that a departure upward is appropriate, and 

the Defendant will be sentenced to the Bureau of Prisons 

for imprisonment for a term of six years. 

The sentencing court enunciated the general factors that 

guided its sente ncing decision, i.,e., the seriousness of the 

offense, the need for respect for the law, just punishment, and 

protection of the public. The court did not, however, explain how 

those valid considerations produce any particular sentence given 

the specific facts and circumstances of this case, nor did the 

court identify any specific facts as supporting i ts conclusions. 

We have stated that "[a] general recitation is an insufficient 

statement of the reasons required by§ 3553(c). Specificity of 

reason is mandated by the statut e ...... Smith, 888 F.2d at 724 

(citation omitted). Despite studying the above-quoted statement 

of reasons, we can find in the tecord no specific facts or reasons 

for the "particular sentence" imposed. 18 u.s.c. § 3553(c). The 

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court provided no "reasonable methodology hitched to the 

Sentencing Guidelines to justify the reasonableness of the 

departure" to the six-year term. Harris, 907 F.2d at 124. The 

district court simply did not explain how it arrived at the six 

year figure. 

Without such an explanation, we are unable to perform our 

duty, mandated in § 3742, to "determine whether the sentence 

is outside the applicable guideline range, and is unreasonable, 

having regard for the reasons for the imposition of the 

particular sentence, as stated by the district court '' 18 

u.s.c. § 3742(e)(3)(B) (1988). See Harris, 907 F.2d at 123-24; 

Smith, 888 F.2d at 724. Our ability to "engage in the kind of 

meaningful review intended by§ 3742," Gardner, 905 F.2d at 1437, 

requires that the district court's explanation and its method of 

selecting an appropriate degree of departure entail more than 

identification of the rejected guideline range and the sentence 

imposed instead. 

In our view, a sentencing court that departs must employ a 

specific method to determine the degree of departure. In this 

case the sentencing court correctly identified an aggravating 

circumstance not adequately taken into consideration by the 

Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines, ~ 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3553(b), that is, St. Julian's involvement with 36 ounces of 

cocaine base. This fact demands an adjustment in the offense 

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point in the sentencing. Gardner, 905 F.2d at 1436 (quoting 

United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1990)). 

Once the decision to depart has been made, the guidelines 

must again be consulted, using the facts and circumstances that 

justify departure to arrive at the most appropriate offense level 

or criminal history category, as applicable. See Jackson, slip 

op. at 9. Having done this, a new sentencing range is obtained 

and the sentencing court may then conclude the adjusted sentencing 

range is inappropriate. If so, the sentencing court may utilize 

its discretion in selecting another sentence, based on facts and 

circumstances that still have not been adequately considered. In 

all cases, the court must enunciate in the record the specific 

facts, circumstances or reasons guiding its final decision. We 

emphasize that the first step is to find and articulate the facts 

justifying the departure. The second step is to utilize these 

facts to properly calculate either a new offense level, or a new 

criminal history category, or both. In the case before us, the 

offense level should be adjusted in accordance with the sentencing 

court's finding of specific facts warranting departure, that is, 

the quantity of drugs. 

The result of this structured approach is adherence to the 

guideline goals of uniformity and proportionality. See Jackson , 

slip op. at 3; Gardner, 905 F.2d at 1436. Explanation of the 

particular method utilized by the sentencing court further enables 

this court to measure the reasonableness of the sentence imposed. 

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We also believe that information regarding the court's reasons for 

the chosen degree of departure is critical to the Sentencing 

Commission in making future amendments to the guidelines. See 

U.s. s·. G. Ch .1, Pt .A, intro. comment; Jackson, slip op. at 15. 

We note the presentence report in this case merely states 

"[t]he Court may want to consider the possibility of an upward 

departure from the guidelines. The guideline for managing a drug 

establishment does not take into consideration the amount of drugs 

involved in the offense .... " We believe better sentencing would 

result if the presentence report calculated an alternate guideline 

range, using as a reference the most appropriate offense level or 

criminal history category, when the possibility of departure is 

reported. The alternate offense level or criminal history 

category should reflect and be based upon the circumstances 

justifying the departure. The reporting of alternate guideline 

ranges will thus provide the sentencing court meaningful 

assistance and give the defendant a better opportunity to 

meaningfully participate and present his or her evidence, 

arguments and objections concerning both the departure and the 

amount or degree of the departure . 

We are not unmindful of the problems facing a sentencing 

court at the time of sentencing. A sentencing court is not 

obliged to spend hours crafting a detailed explanation of the 

facts and circumstances leading to a sentence. 

the court assumes the burden of the "rare[]" 

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Nevertheless, once 

step of departure, 

Appellate Case: 89-6249 Document: 01019628390 Date Filed: 12/18/1990 Page: 14 
Jackson, slip op. at 5, it must also bear the corresponding burden 

of ensuring the record contains sufficient information to enable a 

reviewing court to determine how and why the sentencing court 

reached the degree of departure imposed. That information must 

include the court's explanation of intermediate steps between 

departure and selection of the final sentence, including reasons 

why the intermediate steps were themselves considered 

inappropriate. 

Because the sentencing court's explanation does not provide 

"the specific reason for the imposition of [the] sentence" 

required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), we must vacate the sentence and 

remand to the district court for resentencing. See United States 

v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531, 1535 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. 

Ct. 3252 (1990); Smith, 888 F.2d at 723-24. Although our previous 

cases have specifically dealt with courts failing to adequately 

explain the reasons for departure itself, §gg Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 

at 1535; United States v. Emrick, 895 F.2d 1297, 1298 (lOth Cir. 

1990); White, 893 F.2d at 278; the statutory directive of 

§ 3553(c) requires the same result in the case of failure to 

adequately explain the degree of departure. 2 See Gardner, 905 

F.2d at 1437. 

2 As noted above, § 3553 requires that the court "shall state in 

open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular 

sentence, and ... the specific reason for the imposition of a 

sentence different from that described. " 18 u.s.c. § 3553(c)(2) 

(1988) (emphasis added). 

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Despite the vacation of St. Julian's sentence and remand for 

resentencing, it makes good sense to consider St. Julian's 

remaining arguments now. 

Obstruction of Justice 

St. Julian also challenges the district court's two-level 

obstruction of justice adjustment for his failure to appear at the 

scheduled sentencing hearing of June 30, 1989. 

18 u .s.c. § 3742(e) (1988) requires this court to "give due 

deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to 

the facts . " Where the issue involves a mixed question of law and 

fact, a sliding-scale standard approaching de novo review may be 

appropriate . United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465, 1469 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). 

u.s.s.G. § 3Cl.l, "Willfully Obstructing or Impeding 

Proceedings," directs the sentencing court to increase the offense 

level by two levels "[i]f the defendant willfully impeded or 

obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct the administration 

of justice during the investigation or prosecution of the instant 

offense .... " The commentary to§ 3Cl.l states, "[t]his section 

provides a sentence enhancement for a defendant who engages in 

conduct calculated to mislead or deceive authorities or those 

involved in a judicial proceeding, or otherwise to willfully 

interfere with the disposition of criminal charges " 

comment. The application notes provide an expressly "not 

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exclusive" set of examples of conduct that may provide a basis for 

applying the adjustment. These include: destroying or concealing 

material evidence; testifying untruthfully or suborning perjury; 

producing altered, forged, or counterfeit documents; threatening 

or otherwise tampering with witnesses .or jurors; and furnishing 

material falsehoods to a probation officer. U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l, 

comment. (n.l{a)-(e)). 

In deciding to apply this adjustment to St. Julian, the 

district court stated: 

Adjustment for obstruction of justice, I'm adding 

two points. The Defendant was to be sentenced last 

Friday and he failed to appear. He did voluntarily turn 

himself in, which certainly is to his credit, but that 

doesn't take away the fact that he was ordered to appear 

at this Court last Friday and did not do so. 

Although failure to appear at a sentencing hearing does not 

closely resemble the examples provided with § 3C1.1, we are unable 

to conclude this adjustment was imposed in violation of law, 18 

u.s.c. § 3742(e)(l) (1988), or as a result of an incorrect 

application of the guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(2) (1988). St. 

Julian's failure to appear did "interfere with the disposition of 

criminal charges," u.s.s.G. § 3Cl.l, comment., and did "impede[] 

or obstruct[] the administration of justice during the 

prosecution of the instant offense," § 3C1.1, by delaying the 

imposition of his sentence for some ten days. 

According the district court the due deference required by 

§ 3742(e), as we must, the court's imposition of the two-level 

adjustment for obstruction of justice is upheld. 

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Weapons Possession 

Finally, St. Julian challenges the district court's 

assessment of two offense levels for possession of a firearm 

during commission of the offense. St. Julian challenges the 

factual basis for the assessment, arguing he was not present when 

the guns were purchased, and not in possession of the guns when 

they were confiscated. 

Allegations that the information before a sentencing court 

did not support the court's finding are reviewed under the 

"clearly erroneous" standard. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1181-82; 18 

u.s.c. § 3742(e)(4) {1988). We will not reverse the district 

court unless the court's finding was not supported by the record, 

or unless we are left, after reviewing all the evidence, with the 

"definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 

Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1182. Our review of the information 

presented to the district court compels the conclusion that its 

finding was well supported by the record. 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8, "Renting or Managing a Drug Establishment," 

directs the sentencing court to increase the offense level by two 

"[i]f a firearm or other dangerous weapon was possessed during 

commission of the offense .... " u.s.s.G. § 1B1.3(a)(l) directs 

sentencing courts to consider, in determining whether to apply a 

specific offense characteristic: 

all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by 

the defendant, or for which the defendant would be 

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otherwise accountable, that occurred during the 

commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation 

for that offense, or in the course of attempting to 

avoid detection or responsibility for that offense, or 

that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense; 

u.s.s.G. § 1B1.3(a){l) (emphasis added). 

The district court heard testimony placing St. Julian: 1) 

with the packaging for two semi-automatic firearms in the motel 

room from which drugs were distributed; 2) in the stolen 

automobile containing the firearms; and 3) with the co-defendants 

who selected and arranged the purchase of the weapons, although he 

was not with them when the weapons were actually purchased. The 

judge also heard testimony that the weapons were purchased to 

provide protection during the drug sales. Considering this 

evidence, the judge stated: 

As far as the use of firearms, I'm satisfied that there 

is adequate evidence that firearms were used in the 

perpetration of the offense in question, and even if 

this Defendant did not specifically have possession of 

the weapon, I'm satisfied from the evidence that he was 

intimately involved with those weapons. 

We find no clear error in this decision. 

Furthermore, given St. Julian's involvement in a conspiracy, 

the district court was entitled, if not required, to attribute to 

St. Julian weapons possessed by his co-conspirators in furtherance 

of the conspiracy if the possession was known to St. Julian or was 

reasonably foreseeable by him. See United States v. AguileraZapata, 901 F.2d 1209, 1213-15 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding that 

district court was justified in considering a co-defendant's 

foreseeable weapons possession for purposes of sentencing 

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enhancement despite the dismissal of conspiracy charges against 

defendant, where weapon was possessed in furtherance of jointly 

undertaken criminal activity); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 

427, 433 {4th Cir. 1989) (affirming sentence enhancement upon 

holding that defendant was "otherwise accountable," under U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.3(a)(l), for co-defendant 1 S foreseeable possession of a 

pistol, despite lack of proof that defendant physically possessed 

the weapon). Given the district court's finding concerning St. 

Julian's involvement with the weapons, no remand on the issue of 

foreseeability is necessary here. 

Finding no clear error in the district· court's finding, we 

uphold the increase of -st. Julian's base offense level by two 

levels for possession of a firearm during commission of the 

offense. 

Conclusion 

The district court's decision is AFFIRMED as to the basis for 

departure, and the offense level adjustments for firearms 

possession and obstruction of justice. Because of the inadequate 

statement of reasons provided by the district court in sentencing 

St. Julian, that sentence is VACATED. This matter is REMANDED to 

the district court for resentencing, including an adequate and 

specific statement of reasons supporting the decision to depart, 

the degree of departure, and the sentence imposed. 

-21-

Appellate Case: 89-6249 Document: 01019628390 Date Filed: 12/18/1990 Page: 20