Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02841/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02841-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Gene John Lenzi
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GENE JOHN LENZI, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-2841-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying his application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act. The parties’ cross-motions for 

summary judgment are pending. For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner’s motion is 

granted and plaintiff’s motion is denied. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB, alleging that he had been 

disabled since July 1, 2003.1 Administrative Record (“AR”) at 147-150. Plaintiff’s application 

was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 108-112, 114-118. On April 24, 2013, a 

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 Plaintiff’s application indicates that his alleged onset date was July 1, 2003, AR 147, but 

virtually all other documents in the record indicate that plaintiff’s alleged onset date was July 1, 

2004, see e.g., id. at 17, 86, 95. The discrepancy is not material to resolution of plaintiff’s claim. 

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hearing was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Jean Kerins. Id. at 46-84. Plaintiff 

was represented by counsel at the hearing, at which he and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. 

Id. 

On May 15, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled under 

sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act.2 Id. at 17-29. The ALJ made the following specific 

findings: 

1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on 

December 31, 2010. 

 

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 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from his 

alleged onset date of July 1, 2004 through his date last insured of December 31, 2010 (20 

CFR 404.1571 et seq.). 

* * * 

3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following medically determinable 

impairments: hypertension, hyperlipidemia, anemia, status post colonoscopy with polyp 

removal, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), umbilical hernia, acute diverticulitis, 

degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, history of right knee joint effusion, history 

of acute helicobacter pylori infection, contraction of right middle finger, and alcohol 

abuse (20 CFR 404.1521 et seq.). During the relevant period, the claimant’s PTSD, 

anxiety and panic attacks were not medically determinable impairments; alternatively, the 

possible PTSD/anxiety disorder is nonsevere. 

* * * 

4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that significantly limited the ability to perform basic work related activities 

for 12 consecutive months; therefore, the claimant did not have a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments (20 CFR 404.1521 et seq.). 

* * * 

5. The claimant was not under disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time 

from July 1, 2004, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2010, the date last 

insured (20 CFR 404.1520(c)). 

Id. at 19-28. 

Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review was denied on October 8, 2014, leaving the 

ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-6. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

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more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that he did not have a medically determinable 

mental impairment prior to his date last insured by failing to (1) properly evaluate and credit 

plaintiff’s VA disability rating and (2) utilize the services of a medical expert to determine the 

onset of his PTSD. ECF No. 15 at 10-21. 

A. ALJ did not err by giving little weight to the VA’s disability rating 

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate and credit plaintiff’s VA 

disability rating. Id. at 10-19. 

Generally, an ALJ is required to give great weight to a VA disability rating. McCartey v. 

Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). “While a VA disability decision does not 

necessarily compel the [Social Security Administration] to reach an identical result, the ALJ must 

consider the VA’s finding in reaching his decision, because of the similarities between the VA 

disability program and the Social Security disability program.” Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 

1211 (9th Cir. 2012). However, “[b]ecause the standards for evaluating disability under the two 

programs is not identical, . . . the ALJ may give less weight to a VA disability rating if he gives 

persuasive, specific, valid reasons for doing so that are supported by the record.” McCartey, 298 

F.3d at 1075; see also Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 695 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Plaintiff served in the Army from August 1967 to June 1969. AR at 226. On July 29, 

2011, plaintiff filed a claim for benefits with the VA. Id. On March 7, 2013, the VA issued a 

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decision rating plaintiff’s disability due to PTSD at 50 percent. Id. The VA’s decision explained 

that the rating was effective July 29, 2011, the date plaintiff submitted his application, because 

“[w]hen a claim of service connection is received more than one year after discharge from active 

duty, the effective date is the date VA received the claim.” Id. at 226-228.3 In reaching its 

determination the VA considered, among other things, medical treatment records from May 2011 

through August 2012. Id. at 227. 

In finding that plaintiff was not disabled, the ALJ accorded “little weight” to plaintiff’s 

VA rating, finding that it was “based on evidence outside the relevant adjudicatory period and 

inconsistent with the claimant’s lack of mental diagnosis or mental treatment prior to December 

31, 2011 [sic].” AR at 27. Thus, the ALJ discounted the rating because it was based on evidence 

dated after plaintiff’s last insured date. 

To qualify for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, plaintiff was 

required to demonstrate that he was disabled prior to December 31, 2010, his last insured date. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see Morgan v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 

1991). The VA disability determination indicates that plaintiff’s VA rating was based on 

“treatment reports from Martinez VA Medical Center dated May 2011 to August 2012” and other 

letters, questionnaires and statements dated between 2011-2013. AR at 226-227. As all the 

evidence considered by the VA was dated after plaintiff’s date last insured, the ALJ accorded the 

disability rating little weight. 

Plaintiff argues that the VA’s effective date did not accurately reflect his actual onset date 

for his PTSD. He argues that although his PTSD diagnosis was made after his date last insured, 

the PTSD is related to his time in Vietnam and that use of “the effective date of July 29, 2011 did 

not reflect the VA’s opinion with respect to the onset of when Mr. Lenzi’s PTSD began.” ECF 

No. 15 at 15. Plaintiff misunderstands the ALJ’s reasoning. The ALJ did not reject the VA’s 

determination because the effective date of the disability rating was after plaintiff’s date last 

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 Plaintiff previously received a VA disability of 10% due to a hand impairment, which 

the ALJ incorrectly referred to as an initial PTSD rating. AR at 27. The ALJ’s treatment of this 

rating is not at issue. 

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insured. Rather, the ALJ rejected the VA disability rating because it was based on evidence that 

postdated plaintiff’s last insured date. AR at 27, 226-228. Further, contrary to plaintiff’s 

suggestion, the fact that the VA determined that plaintiff’s PTSD was related to his military 

service does not establish that he actually had functional limitations from PTSD prior to the date 

last insured. In fact, medical records from the VA indicate that in November 2004, well after 

plaintiff’s military service, plaintiff was screened for PTSD and depression, which negative 

results for both. Id. at 308. Plaintiff also had negative PTSD and depression screens in May 

2006, (id. at 284), July 2007 (id. at 253), and July 2008 (id. at 594). Significantly, plaintiff fails 

to cite to any objective medical evidence establishing that he suffered from PTSD prior to 2011. 

Plaintiff appears to acknowledge the lack of medical evidence during the relevant period, 

arguing that he should not be penalized for failure to seek treatment because veterans often do not 

seek treatment for PTSD. ECF No. 15 at 18. He argues that the Ninth Circuit has recognized that 

mental illness can be hard to diagnosis, is under reported, and that it would be a questionable 

practice to chastise those experiencing mental health issues for a failure to seek treatment sooner. 

Id. at 19; see Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 

F.3d 995, 1018 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff, however, did seek medical treatment within the relevant 

time period and explicitly denied experiencing any symptoms of PTSD or depression when 

questioned by doctors on numerous occasions. AR at 253, 284, 308, 529, 539, 541, 589, 592, 

594. 

Disability determinations must be based on objective medical findings. Ukolov v. 

Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508. Plaintiff’s contention that 

his mental impairments prevented him from working prior to his date last insured rests heavily on 

his subjective statements. The ALJ, however, discredited plaintiff’s symptom testimony because 

it was not supported by any objective medical findings. AR at 21. Specifically, the ALJ stated: 

A medically determinable impairment may not be established solely based on “symptoms 

alone” nor on claimant’s allegations regarding symptomology (20 CFR 416.908 and SSR 

96-4p). There must be evidence from an “acceptable medical source” in order to establish 

the existence of a medically determinable impairment (SSR 06-3p). Based on the 

claimant’s lack of mental diagnosis and lack of mental health treatment during the 

 

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relevant period, the undersigned cannot accord weight to the claimant’s allegations of 

PTSD or anxiety-related symptoms during the relevant period. 

Id. 

Any subjective complaints or symptoms plaintiff experienced, without objective medical 

evidence, are not enough to establish a disability. Ukolov, 420 F.3d at 1005 (“under no 

circumstances may the existence of an impairment be established on the basis of symptoms 

alone”). Thus, the ALJ did not err in finding that plaintiff’s subjective complaints failed to 

demonstrate that he had PTSD prior to December 31, 2010. 

Accordingly, the ALJ provided persuasive, specific, valid reasons for giving little weight 

to the VA disability determination and therefore did not err in evaluating this evidence. 

B. ALJ did not commit reversible error by failing to consult a medical expert 

regarding the onset date. 

 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to utilize the services of a medical expert 

to determine the onset of his PTSD. ECF No. 15 at 19-21. Generally, an ALJ is required to 

consult a medical expert if there is ambiguity as to the onset of the disability. Armstrong v. 

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 160 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1998) (“If the medical evidence is not 

definite concerning the onset date and medical inferences need to be made, SSR 83-20 requires 

the administrative law judge to call upon the services of a medical advisor and to obtain all 

evidence which is available to make the determination.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

 However, in this case the ALJ did not simply find that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that 

the onset date for his PTSD was prior to the date last insured. The ALJ found, in the alternative, 

that plaintiff’s PTSD was nonsevere. AR 20, 24. In making this finding, the ALJ observed that 

plaintiff had a positive response to medication within twelve months of his initial diagnosis, that 

he failed to comply with his prescribed course of treatment, and that he discontinued all mental 

health treatment after March 2012. AR at 26. 

///// 

///// 

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 The Social Security Act defines disability as an “inability to engage in any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which 

can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 

of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. 416(i). A condition which can be controlled or corrected 

by medication is not disabling. Montijo v. Secretary of HHS, 729 F.2d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1984); 

see also Odle v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 1983) (rib condition controlled with 

antibiotics not considered disabling). 

Even if the ALJ found plaintiff’s allegations of pre-existing PTSD to be credible, 

plaintiff’s medical records dated after December 31, 2010 show a positive response to 

psychotropic medication within twelve months of the initial diagnosis. In October 2011 plaintiff 

reported that the medication was “really helping him be more mellow and less depressed and 

anxious.” AR at 427-428. The doctor’s notes state plaintiff’s mood as “less irritable; upbeat 

affect.” Id. In November 2011 plaintiff reported moderate improvement in irritability with 

medication. Id. at 425. In November 2011 he also stated that counseling was beneficial. Id. In 

March 2012 he reported that his mood and irritability were improving with medication and 

counseling. Id. at 617-618. This evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s symptoms 

were controlled effectively with medication. 

The ALJ also noted “a pattern of noncompliance with recommended anger management 

classes.” Id. at 26; see id. 400 (treatment note dated January 26, 2012, indicating that plaintiff 

attended 3 out of 9 anger management group classes and that he was “not able to receive services 

on a consistent basis” because of “his busy travel schedule.”). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly 

held that a plaintiff’s failure to comply with treatment plans can be used as evidence to show that 

plaintiff was not as disabled as alleged. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

2008) (ALJ properly inferred plaintiff was not in disabling pain due to plaintiff’s failure to seek 

treatment and failure to take medication proscribed for treatment); see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 

F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir.1989); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff’s 

lack of compliance with his prescribed course of treatment was an appropriate consideration in 

assessing the severity of plaintiff’s PTSD. 

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More significantly, the record supports the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s mental 

impairments did not last more than 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423 (to have a disability 

the plaintiff must have “any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 

less than 12 months”). Plaintiff received his diagnosis of PTSD in April 2011 (AR at 448) and 

saw an improvement with medication by October 2011 (id. at 427-428), a mere six months after 

diagnosis. In March 2012, he reported improved mood and irritability (id. at 617-618), and there 

are no further records of mental health treatment after this date. Given the positive response to 

medication coupled with the fact that plaintiff sought treatment for less than one year, the ALJ 

permissibly concluded that plaintiff’s symptoms from PTSD did not last more than 12 months. 

As the ALJ made the additional finding that plaintiff’s PTSD was nonsevere, even after 

the date last insured, there was no need for the ALJ to determine the precise onset date for his 

PTSD. Accordingly, the ALJ did not commit reversible error by failing to consult a medical 

expert. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted; and 

 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in the Commissioner’s favor. 

DATED: March 24, 2016. 

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