Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01656/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01656-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
D. L. Runnels
Respondent
Dominic Wright
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Dominic Wright,

Petitioner, No. Civ. S 02-1656 LKK PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

D. L. Runnels, Warden,

Respondent.

-oOoPetitioner is a state prisoner, without counsel, seeking a

writ of habeas corpus. 

A jury found petitioner guilty of two robberies with a

firearm in violation of Ca. Pen. Code, §§ 211, 12022.5, three

false imprisonments with a firearm in violation of Ca. Pen. Code

§§ 236, 12022.5, and of being a convicted felon in possession of

a firearm in violation of Pen. Code, § 12021. In a separate

trial, the court found defendant had a prior serious felony

conviction. Cal. Pen. Code §§ 667, subs. (b)-(i); 1170.12. The 

court sentenced petitioner to consecutive sentences of 

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imprisonment totally 33 years and four months: (1) five years

and four months for the first robbery; (2) 20 years for the

second robbery; (3) two years and eight months for each false

imprisonment; and (4) one year and four months for being a felon

in possession of a firearm.

Petitioner appealed. The appellate court affirmed the

judgment in a reasoned opinion.

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court. The court denied review.

Petitioner sought habeas relief in the trial court, which

denied relief upon the ground petitioner unreasonably delayed in

seeking relief and failed to justify the delay.

Petitioner sought habeas relief in the appellate court,

which summarily denied the writ.

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

the California Supreme Court. The court summarily denied the

writ.

The following facts are taken from the state appellate

court’s opinion:

FACTS

On the evening of September 30, 1996, four

culprits carried out a criminal enterprise at a Raley’s

supermarket. The store closed at 11:00 p.m., and by

11:30 the night shift employees had arrived. When the

head night-shift clerk opened the front door to allow

the head evening-shift clerk to leave, the culprits

burst in and pushed both employees to the floor. The

culprits were dressed in dark clothing and wore masks. 

At least two of them had guns. As the head clerks lay

on the floor, they felt guns pressed against them.

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The culprits went about the task of looting the

store. One of the clerks was forced to open the safe,

from which the culprits took cash, lottery tickets,

food stamps, and gift certificates. The culprits also

went through the cash registers and emptied out the

tills. As they proceeded through the store, they

encountered three other night shift employees and

ordered them to lie down if they did not want to die.

Two factors contributed to a quick response by

sheriff’s deputies: (1) during the robbery a silent

alarm was tripped and deputies on patrol were informed

of that fact by radio dispatch, and (2) the Raley’s

safe contained a pack of $20 bills with a tracer device

that was activated and began emitting a silent signal

when the culprits took the bills.

Two deputies on patrol in a vehicle equipped to

read the tracer device were heading toward the Raley’s

store when the equipment began reading the tracer

signal. The signal was close and was coming from the

direction in which they were heading. As a red compact

car passed the deputies, the signal direction reversed,

thus indicating it was coming from the car. When the

deputies turned around to follow, they saw the car,

with four persons inside, turn into an apartment

complex.

The deputies eventually located the car parked in

a stall, and saw a suspect getting out of the vehicle. 

When the suspect saw the deputies, he climbed over a

retaining wall and fled. Two other suspects were

observed coming out from behind a dumpster. They fled

when ordered to stop. One suspect, Darrell Spann, was

tracked and located with the help of a police

department canine unit. Another suspect, John Spann,

was arrested after being chased through a park and over

a fence.

While the chase was ongoing, other deputies

investigated the car and adjacent areas. The car

contained numerous items that established its use in

the robbery, including a ski mask, a woolen cap, rolls

of quarters, and an empty holster. Defendant’s wallet,

containing his driver’s license or identification card,

was found on the console by the stick shift. Documents

in the car reflected that it was owned by the

defendant’s brother, Norman Woods, who lived with

defendant in unit 212 of the apartment complex. In

adjacent areas, deputies used a tracking device to

locate additional items, including sweat pants, a black

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wig, gloves, black cloth in the form of a mask, and a

backpack that contained over $13,000.

About an hour after the initial chase, deputies at

the apartment complex saw defendant’s brother, Woods,

approaching unit 212. He was dressed like one of the

fleeing suspects had been dressed, and there were grass

stains and debris in his hair and on his clothing. He

had a roll of quarters in his pocket. Woods was

arrested at that time.

Defendant’s former girlfriend, Larcida Johnson,

lived less than a mile down the road from defendant’s

apartment. She testified that defendant had been at

her apartment at about 9:30 on the evening before the

robbery. He left, saying he was going somewhere with

Woods. Johnson went to bed at about 11:30 p.m. Some

time thereafter, she was awakened by a telephone call

from defendant. He said he was coming over to spend

the night. He arrived at about 3:00 a.m., bringing

with him a bag that contained money and two pistols. 

Johnson helped defendant count the money; there was

about $11,000 in the bag. Defendant said he got the

money from a store. They put the money and guns under

Johnson’s bed. Defendant made a telephone call and

then asked Johnson to drive him home. He was arrested

when he arrived there. Johnson was questioned by the

deputies but was not detained.

Early the next morning, defendant called Johnson

from jail. He told her not to talk, and later said the

conversation was probably being recorded, which it was. 

He said, “Just do that what you were talking about. Do

that,” and told her, “Give my friend away.” Johnson

testified that by “friend,” defendant was referring to

the guns he had left at her apartment. When Johnson

expressed reluctance, defendant told her: “Um, you

can. Go to Baylife.” Johnson testified that Baylife

was a security guard at her apartment complex. 

Defendant replied affirmatively when Johnson asked: 

“Both of ‘em?” He told her to tell Baylife that

defendant said “Merry Christmas.” Subsequently,

Johnson asked: “What I supposed to say [sic]? Um, I

can’t remember what I was supposed to say. Them was

asking me hella questions [sic].” Defendant replied: 

“Like what? You tell them the truth. He was with me.” 

Later, when Johnson said she did not know what time

defendant came over, defendant said: “I hear you.” 

Before closing the conversation he said: “Well, I was

just calling to tell you to move something, baby.”

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Johnson did not give the guns to Baylife. 

Defendant called later and told her to give $1,000 to a

person named Danny so that he could bail Woods out of

jail. Johnson gave $1,000 and the guns to Danny. 

Woods was bailed out of jail by James McLaughlin, who

testified that he was given $1,000 in cash for that

purpose by his brother, Daniel McLaughlin. After Woods

got out of jail, Johnson gave the rest of the money to

him.

When the trial court took a break during the

testimony of Larcida Johnson, juror number 12 used a

restroom where codefendant Spann was having a

conversation with an unidentified person. The

conversation ended when the juror was observed, but the

juror heard Spann say the words “he bought it.” The

juror did not hear anything before or after the

statement and described it as a general statement

rather than one reflective of anger or frustration. 

Although the juror did not ascribe any meaning to the

statement, he properly called the incident to the

court’s attention. During questioning about it, the

juror assured the court that he could, and would,

totally disregard the incident during deliberations. 

The court declined to replace the juror with a

substitute.

This court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state

court’s adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to

or an unreasonable application of federal law as clearly

established by the United States Supreme Court or in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

When a petitioner “challenges the state court’s findings

based entirely on the state record,” a federal court must first

determine whether the adjudication resulted in a decision based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Taylor v. Maddox,

366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). A state court’s determination

is unreasonable if the court failed to make a factual finding

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when it should have, the state court’s factual finding is made

under an incorrect legal standard or when the fact-finding

process is defective. Taylor, 366 F.3d 992. If a federal court

finds the state court’s determination is reasonable, the court

must presume it is correct, although the determination may be

rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 999; 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1). 

When a petitioner challenges a state court’s legal

determinations, the court must determine whether it is contrary

to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is contrary to clearly

established federal law if the state court applies incorrect

legal authority, or if it applies correct authority to a case

involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-14 (2000). A decision

involves an unreasonable application of federal law if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle but

applies it to the facts of the prisoner’s case in a manner that

is “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63

(2003). “Clearly established federal law” is defined as the

holdings of the United States Supreme Court existing when the

state court issued its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

Circuit law is “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining

whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.

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2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Where the state court summarily denies relief without

comment, the district court will look to the last reasoned state

decision on the issue. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991). 

If none exists, the district court must independently review the

record to determine whether the state ruling was contrary to or

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner claims the trial court should have removed Juror

#12 for bias following the juror’s chance encounter with one of

petitioner’s co-defendants. 

The appellate court found the trial adequately examined the

juror and deferred to the trial court’s credibility finding. It

found the encounter was inadvertent, the juror had not engaged in

misconduct, promptly had notified the trial court of the incident

and that the statement was out of context, meant nothing to the

juror and was not inherently prejudicial. For these reasons, the

appellate court determined the trial court did not err in

refusing to dismiss Juror #12.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

guarantees an accused an impartial jury, viz., one composed of

jurors who are not necessarily ignorant of the facts and issues,

but of jurors who can disregard their impressions or opinions and 

reach a verdict based upon evidence presented in court. Smith v.

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,

722-23 (1961). When presented with a colorable claim of juror

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bias, a trial court should hold a hearing to determine the effect

of potentially prejudicial occurrences. Phillips, 455 U.S. at

217. 

While in the restroom during a recess, Juror #12 heard one

of petitioner’s co-defendants, Darrell Spann, say, “He bought

it.” Petitioner contends this statement shows Juror #12

determined petitioner’s guilt before trial concluded.

Outside the presence of the other jurors, the court examined

Juror # 12:

Q: My Court Attendant handed me a note that indicates

that you overheard, overheard a statement made by Mr.

Spann in the rest room; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q: How long ago was that, sir?

A: Approximately ten or fifteen minutes.

Q: So just right at this most recent break?

A: Yes.

Q: All right. And what did you hear?

A: It – I believe he said he bought it. I don’t – I

don’t know, that was all that I heard and I opened the

door and I believe they saw me and he didn’t say

anything else.

Q: All right. And are you sure Mr. Spann said this as

opposed to from the other gentleman he was with?

A: I am fairly certain.

Q: Okay. What context was it said, do you know? Did

you hear anything before?

A: No.

Q: Anything after it?

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A: No.

Q: What was the tone? Was it said with anger or

frustration or?

Q: Just a general statement.

Q: Did you put any meaning to it?

A: No.

Q: He bought an item, he bought it in terms of some

other implication?

A: I have nothing to base that on.

Q: Can you totally disregard this statement for the

purposes of your deliberations that is completely put

it out of your mind not consider it at all?

A: yes.

Q: All right. Would you step outside for just a

second, sir. Thank you for your patience with me.

A: You’re welcome.

RT. 621-22.

The prosecutor and petitioner’s counsel both moved to

dismiss Juror #12 upon the ground the juror could have been

prejudiced by the statement. The court reserved ruling until it

could voir dire Juror #12 again after the weekend recess.

The second inquiry also occurred outside the presence of the

other jurors: 

Q: Hi. How are you this morning?

A: I’m fine.

Q: Why don’t you have a seat wherever you would like,

sir.

A: Sure.

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Q: I just wanted to check with you briefly now that

some time has passed since you overheard Mr. Spann’s

statement in the bathroom and ask if you reflected on

it any over the weekend?

A: No, I haven’t really thought of it at all.

Q: Ascribe any meaning to it at all?

A: No.

Q: Have any problem with the admonition I gave to you

that you have to totally ignore it during the course of

your deliberation?

A: No, problem.

Q: So, for example, if you did ascribe some meaning to

it during the course of your deliberations, you would

have to conscientiously set that aside and treat it as

though you never heard of it. Can you do that?

A: Yes.

Q: Thank you very much, sir. If you would step

outside.

RT. 658-59.

The court refused to dismiss the juror, finding, 

[Juror # 12's] demeanor is solid and he says that he

will not consider it. I would note there are multiple

meanings for that, many of which are totally

unconnected with the case.

Even if he ascribes some other meaning to it, he

indicates he can put that aside and the Court finds

that credible.

RT. 659-60.

The state court’s finding is not an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence and is

entitled to a presumption of correctness which petitioner has

failed to rebut. This claim should be denied.

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Petitioner claims the evidence does not support the jury’s

findings petitioner personally used a firearm or his conviction

of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Personal Use of a Firearm 

Petitioner asserts the evidence does not support the finding

he personally used a firearm and so his punishment for robbery

and for false imprisonment should not have been enhanced. 

The appellate court found:

Here, the evidence established that four culprits

carried out the criminal scheme. When the culprits

rushed the door, the head night clerk saw that the

first two of them had guns. He did not notice whether

the other two culprits were armed. During the ordeal,

the head night clerk and the head evening clerk were

restrained by two of the culprits, each pressing guns

into the clerks’ heads and backs.

The first two culprits to enter the store, the

ones who used guns and maintained control of the head

clerks, were noticeably larger than the other two

culprits. Defendant and Woods are each six feet two

inches tall, while Darrell Spann and John Spann are

five feet seven inches and five feet eight inches tall,

respectively. In addition, according to defendant’s

girlfriend, Johnson, whose testimony was supported by

defendant’s recorded telephone call to her from the

jail, defendant brought the guns to her home after the

incident and asserted ownership and control over them.

This evidence supports a reasonable inference that

defendant was one of the larger culprits who personally

used a gun during the commission of the crimes. It was

for the jury to determine whether, in light of all of

the evidence, the inference should be drawn. (People

v. Farris (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 376, 383-384.) On

appeal, the fact that the inference is a reasonable one

is sufficient to sustain the finding against challenge

based upon the sufficiency of the evidence. (Ibid.)

To extend a sentence beyond the statutory maximum based upon

a fact other than the existence of a prior conviction, the fact

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must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). A federal habeas court will find a

fact not proved beyond a reasonable doubt only if, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979).

California law requires a sentencing court to extend an

accused’s sentence by 3, 4, or 10 years upon a finding the

accused used a firearm in the commission of a felony. Cal. Pen.

Code § 12022.5(a). What constitutes use of a gun is a matter of

state law, viz., evidence the accused has “employ[ed] the gun to

neutralize the victim’s companions, bystanders, or other persons

who might otherwise interfere with the successful completion of

the crime.” People v. Granado, 49 Cal. App. 4th 317 (Cal. 1996).

The evidence at trial showed that of the four males who

rushed the front doors of Raley’s as the head night clerk

entered, two of them had guns and used them to restrain Carole

Peak and Jason Bryner, the head evening and night clerks. The

two with guns were noticeably larger than the others and

petitioner and one co-defendant are at least four inches taller

than the other two. Petitioner is 6' 2".

Kelly White testified that while working the night of the

robbery she saw a thin 5' 6" black male wearing a black baseball

cap, a black, short-sleeved T-shirt, black jeans and a red

bandanna covering his face about 20 feet away from her. He told

her to “get down on the ground now if you don’t want to f- - -

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ing die” and she complied. White did not see a weapon.

Jennifer Griffin testified she noticed a 5' 7" black male

with a thin, medium build wearing a bandanna over his face

standing about six feet away from her. The person told her to

“come here,” but she moved back and so he told her to “get on the

ground unless you want to die.” She asked if he was serious and

he repeated his command. Griffin obeyed. She did not see a

firearm.

Terry Mason testified he saw a very thin 5' 6" black male

with a red bandanna on his face. The person gestured with his

hands for Mason to get down on the floor and Mason complied. 

Mason did not see a firearm.

Petitioner arrived at Johnson’s apartment around 3:00 a.m.

the morning after the robbery with a bag containing $11,000 and

two guns, and later directed her to give the guns to a third

person. 

The state court’s determination is not an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

That determination is presumed correct and petitioner has not

rebutted it by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner should

be denied relief on this claim.

With respect to the false imprisonment counts, the appellate

court explained:

The prosecution’s view of the case, which we find to be

supported by the evidence and reasonable inferences

therefrom, was that defendant and Woods entered the

store with guns, seized control over the two head

clerks, and used their guns to maintain control over

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the head clerks while they forced them to open the

safe. The Spann brothers followed defendant and Woods

into the store and went about emptying the tills and

otherwise looting while defendant and Woods directed

their attention to the head clerks and the safe. As

the Spann brothers encountered the three subordinate

employees in the aisles, they ordered them to lay down

or die. None of the subordinate employees saw a gun

during the incident. This scenario, according to

defendant, fails to demonstrate that he personally used

a gun in the commission of the false imprisonments of

the subordinate employees. We disagree.

People v. Granado (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 317

(Granado), drew a distinction “between the victim’s

knowledge or observations as (sometimes necessary)

evidence of use, and the victim’s knowledge as (in

effect) an element of use.” (Id. at p. 326.) Granado

held that, while it may sometimes be impossible to

prove gun use without evidence of the victim’s

knowledge or observations, the victim’s knowledge is

not an element of the enhancement. (Ibid.) The only

mental state requirement for a gun-use enhancement is

the accused’s intent to use the gun in the furtherance

of the crime. (Id. at p. 328.) Granado added that a

gun may be used in the commission of an offense even if

the use is directed toward someone other than the

victim of that crime. (Id. at p. 330.) For example, a

defendant uses a gun in the commission of a crime “when

he or she employs the gun to neutralize the victim’s

companions, bystanders, or other persons who might

otherwise interfere with the successful completion of

the crime.” (Ibid.) The test is functional rather

than formulaic. (Ibid.)

We agree with the decision in Granado and find it

controlling here. Defendant and his cohorts planned a

criminal endeavor which required them to gain entrance

to the store and seize control over all persons that

might be present. Defendant and Woods used guns to

gain and maintain control over the two supervisory

employees who were present. The use of the guns

facilitated the commission of the false imprisonment of

the subordinate employees in two ways: (1) it

emboldened the Spann brothers to order the subordinate

employees to lie down or die, confident that defendant

and Woods were there with guns to back up the Spann

brothers’ threats; and (2) it restrained the

supervisory employees from providing aid or assistance

to the subordinate employees, or otherwise interfering

with completion of the criminal enterprise. This is

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sufficient evidence to establish defendant’s personal

use of a gun in the commission of the false

imprisonments.

(Footnote omitted).

The process was adequate and the evidence adduced at trial

is sufficient to support the appellate court’s determination. 

That determination therefore is presumed correct and petitioner

has not rebutted it by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore,

the state court’s decision is not an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented and petitioner is

not entitled to relief upon this claim. 

Conviction of Being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm 

Petitioner claims the evidence is insufficient to support

his conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The appellate court found:

In order to support a conviction for illegal

possession of a firearm, it is not necessary that the

firearm be recovered and introduced into evidence. 

Rather, it is sufficient that the defendant’s

possession of the firearm be established by the

testimony of a competent witness. (People v. Hughes

(1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 615, 620; People v. De Falco

(1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 590, 592; People v. Billingsley

(1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 247, 250-251.) The evidence we

have set forth in connection with defendant’s previous

contention is sufficient to establish his possession of

firearms.

The elements of the offense are conviction of a felony,

ownership, possession, custody or control of a firearm and

knowledge. Cal. Pen. Code § 12021; People v. Jeffers, 49

Cal.Rptr. 2d 86 (Cal. App. 1996).

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Petitioner stipulated to previously having been convicted of

a felony and his former girlfriend Larcida Johnson, testified

petitioner brought a duffel bag to her apartment containing two

guns and about $11,000 the night of the robbery.

The fact-finding procedure was adequate, the determination

is reasonable in light of the evidence presented and therefore

the determination is presumed correct. Petitioner has not by

clear and convincing evidence rebutted the determination and so

his claim fails. 

Petitioner claims instructing the jury it could consider

flight as evidence of guilt denied him a fair trial because

identity was at issue.

Applying state law that mirrors federal law, see People v.

Ray, 13 Cal.4th 313, 345 (Cal. 1996); People v. Roberts, 2

Cal.4th 271, 310 (Cal. 1992), the appellate court found the

evidence supported giving the flight instruction.

A jury instruction violates due process when, considering

the overall jury charge, the instruction makes the trial unfair. 

Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). Where the evidence

tends to show an accused fled because he knew he was guilty of a

crime, a jury may consider flight as consciousness of guilt. See

United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2004). No

Supreme Court precedent prohibits giving an instruction on flight

when the defendant’s identity is in issue if the evidence

supports the instruction. 

The judge gave the following instruction:

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The flight of a person immediately after the commission

of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime, is not

sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a

fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in the

light of all other proved facts in deciding whether a

defendant is guilty or not guilty. The weight to which

this circumstance is entitled is a matter for you to

decide.

RT. 1023-24.

The trial judge gave the instruction because the evidence

showed the individuals in the red car driving away from the store

committed the robbery and that the jury could infer those four

saw the sheriff’s deputies turn to follow them. When petitioner

and his cohorts arrived at petitioner’s apartment complex

petitioner left his wallet, which contained his identification,

in the car. And in the middle of the night petitioner decided to

spend the night at his girlfriend’s apartment. 

Clearly established federal law does not bar instructing the

jury about the implications of flight when the accused’s identity

is in issue. Therefore, the appellate court’s decision was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law.

Petitioner claims the prosecutor violated Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to provide the defense with

evidence impeaching the testimony of a prosecution witness; trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to locate and

interview a defense witness; and appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to investigate and to seek reversal of

the conviction upon the ground the prosecution suppressed

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exculpatory evidence. 

Respondent contends this court is barred from considering

these claims because of petitioner’s default of the rule in In re

Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (Cal. 1993).

Where a prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state

court pursuant to an “independent and adequate state procedural

rule,” federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the

prisoner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or that the failure

to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage

of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). A

state ground is adequate and independent if the last state court

to which the petitioner presented the claim actually relied on a

state rule that was sufficient to justify the decision. Valerio

v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert.

denied, 538 U.S. 994 (2003). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined the rule

in Clark to be independent as of 1998, when the California

Supreme Court clarified the rule. See In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th

770 (1998).

Petitioner purportedly defaulted January 22, 2002, when he

filed a habeas petition in the Sacramento County Superior Court

and so as to petitioner the rule is independent. 

But the question of adequacy remains open. A state rule is

adequate if it is firmly established and regularly followed by

state courts at the time of the purported default. Lee v. Kemma,

534 U.S. 362, 389 (2002); Hill v. Roe, 321 F.3d 787, 790 (9th

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Cir. 2003). The state has the burden of pleading and proving the

adequacy of its rule. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 938 (2003). 

Respondent’s only argument in support of adequacy is that

before petitioner’s conviction was final, a different federal

court found California courts have consistently and regularly

applied the untimeliness rule since Clark. See Deere v. Calderon,

890 F.Supp. 893, 900 (C. D. Cal. 1995). This court is not bound

by Deere, whose reasoning the Ninth Circuit has questioned in any

event. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 583. Were this court inclined to

rely in the least on Deere, it would not so do in this case since

Deere involved California’s standards governing capital cases and

this is a non-capital case. The distinction is not without

difference; the California Supreme Court has created standards to

guide condemned prisoners in determining what constitutes

“substantial delay,” but other prisoners have no such guidance

and so must rely on what California’s courts have said

“substantial delay” is in the individual circumstances presenting

themselves to the judicial system.

Since respondent has not presented an array of non-capital

cases decided since Clark showing California’s courts have made

the standard predictable and understandable, he has failed

satisfy his burden under Bennett.

Accordingly, the court must address the merits of

petitioner’s last three claims.

Petitioner claims the prosecutor withheld exculpatory

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evidence. Due process imposes upon the prosecution an

affirmative duty to disclose to an accused material, exculpatory

evidence. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Evidence is exculpatory if it is

favorable to the accused either because it affirmatively

demonstrates innocence or because it would impeach a prosecution

witness. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Evidence

is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 

In determining materiality, courts must consider the evidence’s

impact both item-by-item and cumulatively. Kyles v. Whitley, 514

U.S. 419 (1995). 

Petitioner asserts the prosecutor suppressed two items: (1)

a tape from the home answering machine of petitioner and

petitioner’s brother which purportedly would have shown

petitioner called from his former girlfriend’s apartment at the

time of the robbery; and (2) a videotape of the police interview

with petitioner’s former girlfriend.

Sheriff’s Deputy Danny Minter was inside the apartment

petitioner shared with his brother and co-defendant, Norm Woods. 

Deputy Minter noticed the telephone was off the cradle and so he

replaced it. It is unclear how Deputy Minter gained access to

the apartment but nothing in the record suggests anyone removed

anything from it and petitioner attaches no police reports or

affidavits showing Deputy Minter or any other law enforcement

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officer seized a tape from the answering machine. Nor does

petitioner submit evidence someone else gave such a tape to the

police. In short, there is no reason to believe the evidence

petitioner asserts the prosecution suppressed exists and so there

is no basis to find a Brady violation.

Petitioner contends the prosecution suppressed a video tape

of a detective interviewing Johnson about the robbery and asserts

the video would show Johnson testified falsely.

In the early morning hours of October 1, 1996, Johnson told

a sheriff’s deputy petitioner had been with her the night of

September 30, 1996. Detective Minter questioned Johnson October

3, 1996, and she again said petitioner was with her the night of

September 30, 1996.

At trial, Johnson testified that the night of the robbery

she went to sleep around 11:30 p.m.. Sometime around 3:00 a.m.,

petitioner called to say he was spending the night and arrived at

her apartment shortly thereafter with a bag containing two guns

and around $11,000. She hid the money under her bed and the guns

in the duffel bag in her closet. After his arrest, petitioner

told Johnson to give the guns to the security guard at her

apartment complex. Instead, she gave them to Danny McLaughlin

when she, at petitioner’s direction, gave McLaughlin $1,000 for

bail for petitioner’s brother and co-defendant, Norman Woods. 

When Woods was released Johnson gave him the rest of the money. 

 Defense counsel used a video tape and transcript of

Detective Minter questioning Johnson October 3, 1996, to show

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that despite substantial pressure near the time of the robbery,

Johnson maintained petitioner was innocent. Detective Minter

read California Penal Code sections 32 and 33 pertaining to

accomplice liability and told her that the District Attorney’s

Office was considering perjury charges; that she would have to

pass a criminal background check if she wanted to work with

children in the future; that petitioner had another girlfriend;

that petitioner was using her; that if she did not tell the truth

she would be convicted of perjury; and that Detective Minter

would help her any way he could.

Insofar as this is the video tape to which petitioner

refers, the prosecution did not suppress it. Insofar as

petitioner refers to a different video tape, he has not

identified it with sufficient specificity to show it exists. 

Accordingly, I find the prosecution did not suppress an

exculpatory video.

Petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective. The Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments entitle an accused to counsel whose

advocacy ensures the outcome of a criminal proceeding is

reliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 

To establish deprivation of this right petitioner must identify

acts or omissions that cannot be said to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

He must also must demonstrate the errors undermined the

reliability of the outcome of trial, viz., there is a reasonable

probability that but for the errors the outcome of the trial

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would have been different. Id. at 693-94. 

Petitioner asserts counsel failed to investigate and to

interview a crucial witness. 

Petitioner does not allege what investigation would have

revealed. Nor does he identify the “crucial witness,” or proffer

any evidence of what this witness would have said. Since

petitioner has failed to identify any specific incident of

professionally unreasonable judgment, his claim fails. See James

v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (conclusory allegations

of counsel’s ineffectiveness insufficient to warrant federal

habeas relief).

Petitioner asserts he told counsel the tape from his home

answering machine had a recording of petitioner calling from the

witness’ residence at the time of the robbery and could have been

used to impeach Johnson. As discussed above, petitioner has not

shown such a tape exists. Accordingly, counsel’s failure to

obtain it was not professionally unreasonable.

Petitioner claims appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to obtain the tape from petitioner’s home answering

machine and arguing for reversal upon the ground the prosecution

suppressed exculpatory evidence.

A defendant pursuing an appeal as of right is entitled to

counsel’s effective assistance. Evitts v. Lucy, 469 U.S. 387

(1985).

I have found trial counsel was not ineffective because there

is no evidence such a tape exists; for like reason, appellate

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counsel’s performance was not professionally unreasonable in this

regard. See United States v. Baker, 256 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 2001)

(applying Strickland standard to claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel on appeal).

For all the reasons stated, I recommend the court deny the

petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: November 29, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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