Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03171/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03171-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Braun Nathan Thompson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3171

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Braun Nathan Thompson, *

* [PUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 15, 2005

Filed: June 1, 2005

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit

Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Braun Thompson appeals his conviction and sentence on one count of being

a felon in possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e), one count of

being a felon in possession of ammunition, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e), and

one count of possession of an unregistered firearm, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d),

5871. We affirm.

Appellate Case: 04-3171 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/01/2005 Entry ID: 1909826
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The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendations of The Honorable

John A. Jarvey, Chief Magistrate Judge, United States District Court for the Northern

District of Iowa. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

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Mr. Thompson challenges the denial by the district court1

 of his motion to

suppress the evidence that a police officer seized after he stopped Mr. Thompson's

vehicle for running a stop sign. "We examine the factual findings underlying the

district court's denial of the motion to suppress for clear error and review de novo the

ultimate question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated." United

States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 981

(1999). 

The record amply supports the following findings of fact that the district court

made. In the course of a traffic stop, an investigating officer peered at the back seat

and saw two pry bars and an ax with a short handle. In addition, he noticed hand

prints on the trunk, which otherwise was covered in gravel dust. When the officer

asked Mr. Thompson for his driver's license, Mr. Thompson confessed that he was

driving without a license; the officer subsequently determined that the vehicle was

owned by Jeremy Weber of Rochester, Minnesota. Mr. Thompson also admitted that

he was on parole for armed robbery. The officer then asked Mr. Thompson what was

in his trunk, and Mr. Thompson responded by remarking that the keys were in the car,

retrieving the keys, and opening the trunk. After the officer looked inside the trunk,

he asked to search the vehicle, in response to which Mr. Thompson opened the left

rear door and began handing the officer items that were inside the vehicle. During

the search, the officer discovered a shotgun shell and a loaded, sawed-off shotgun,

both of which he seized. 

Mr. Thompson contends that the officer's query about the trunk and his request

to search the vehicle went beyond the justifiable scope of a traffic stop for running

a stop sign. See United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924-25 (8th Cir. 2001). Even

Appellate Case: 04-3171 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/01/2005 Entry ID: 1909826
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if Mr. Thompson were correct, the officer's observations, combined with his

knowledge that several nearby farms located off gravel roads had been burglarized,

gave him reasonable grounds to suspect Mr. Thompson of criminal activity that

justified the inquiry. See United States v. Poulack, 236 F.3d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 2001),

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 864 (2001). 

Mr. Thompson also asserts that he did not voluntarily consent to the officer's

search of his vehicle. We review the district court's conclusion to the contrary for

clear error. See United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1990).

Although Mr. Thompson's actions during the stop suggest that he voluntarily

consented, cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 220, 248-49 (1973); United

States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 382, he contends that the officer deceptively induced

his consent: To obtain Mr. Thompson's cooperation, the police officer told

Mr. Thompson that he probably would give Mr. Thompson some breaks, implying

that he would not ticket Mr. Thompson to the full extent that he could, when all along

he intended to arrest Mr. Thompson for driving without a license and without

insurance. Mr. Thompson further notes that the officer did not inform him of his

Miranda rights or of his right to refuse to consent to the search. Whether

Mr. Thompson "relied upon promises or misrepresentations made by the police" and

whether he was "informed of [his] right to withhold consent or of [his] Miranda

rights" do in fact affect our assessment of the voluntariness of his consent. See

Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 381. But other considerations set out in Chaidez

overwhelmingly favor the district court's finding that Mr. Thompson's consent was

voluntary: Mr. Thompson is an adult with a lengthy criminal record; the traffic stop

had lasted only a few minutes when the officer asked to look inside the trunk and the

vehicle; and the police officer treated Mr. Thompson in a polite and friendly manner.

See id. Therefore the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Thompson

voluntarily consented to the search. 

Appellate Case: 04-3171 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/01/2005 Entry ID: 1909826
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 The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

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Mr. Thompson also challenges the constitutionality of his sentence. The

United States Sentencing Guidelines suggest a range of 262 to 327 months for each

of Mr. Thompson's felon-in-possession convictions; the statutory maximum sentence

is life imprisonment. The sentencing court2

 found that the guidelines range

"substantially underrepresents the seriousness of [Mr. Thompson's] criminal history

or the likelihood that he will commit other crimes." As a result, the sentencing court

departed upward from the guidelines range and imposed two 420-month terms of

imprisonment to run concurrently on the felon-in-possession counts. Mr. Thompson

argued at sentencing and in his appellate brief that the sentencing court's upward

departure from the guidelines range violated his sixth amendment rights.

Mr. Thompson was sentenced before the Supreme Court's decision in United

States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), and the sentencing court erred by not

sentencing him under the advisory guidelines scheme set out in that case.

Nevertheless, at Mr. Thompson's sentencing hearing, the court declared that, in the

event that the guidelines "are found to be unconstitutional, in whole or in relation to

this case," it would impose the same sentence. The sentencing court also said that,

in deciding whether to impose the same sentence as an alternative, it "considered all

the factors set forth at" 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which include the guidelines. After

Booker, district courts must sentence defendants in light of the considerations set out

in § 3553(a). Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65. Because the sentencing court made

known that it would impose the same 420-month sentence after taking those

considerations into account, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

We have considered Mr. Thompson's other assignments of error and have

determined that they are meritless. We therefore affirm his conviction and sentence.

______________________________

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