Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00340/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00340-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wade Knight
Petitioner
Andre Matevousian
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WADE KNIGHT,

Petitioner,

v.

ANDRE MATEVOUSIAN,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00340-AWI-EPG-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

RECOMMENDING DENIAL OF PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 

COMPEL

(ECF Nos. 23, 24, 39)

Petitioner Wade Knight is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In his petition, Petitioner challenges a prison 

disciplinary proceeding on due process and abuse of authority grounds. For the reasons discussed 

herein, the Court recommends denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

I.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner currently is in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at the 

United States Penitentiary in Atwater, California, serving a 235-month imprisonment term for 

conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by robbery. According to an incident report 

generated by BOP, on February 5, 2014, Officer J. Mendoza observed four inmates, including 

Petitioner, standing over the victim inmate and punching him with closed fists in the upper torso 

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and facial area. (ECF No. 20-4 at 2; ECF No. 20-7 at 2).1 Officers responded to the scene, 

Officer Mendoza directed all inmates to “get down,” and staff directed the inmates to “stop 

fighting.” The inmates did not comply with the orders, and staff discharged oleoresin capsicum. 

Thereafter, the inmates were put in hand restraints. (Id.).

On February 5, 2014, Petitioner was charged with assaulting any person (with serious 

injury) in Incident Report No. 2545590. (ECF No. 20-4). After Lieutenant C. Scarbrough 

completed investigation of the charge, the incident report was forwarded to the Unit Discipline 

Committee (“UDC”) for further action. (ECF No. 20 at 2 ¶ 10). On February 9, 2014, the UDC 

held a hearing and determined there was sufficient basis to refer the matter to the Discipline 

Hearing Officer (“DHO”) for disposition. (Id. at 2 ¶ 11). Thereafter, BOP staff determined that 

the victim inmate suffered less serious injuries than initially thought and directed a rewrite of the 

incident report. (Id. at 3 ¶ 13). 

Accordingly, on March 7, 2014, Petitioner was charged with assaulting any person 

(without serious injury) in the rewritten Incident Report No. 2545590. (ECF No. 20-7). After 

Lieutenant S. Helling completed reinvestigation of the charge, the rewritten incident report was 

forwarded to the UDC for further action. (ECF No. 20 at 3 ¶ 15). On April 25, 2014, the UDC 

held a hearing and determined there was sufficient basis to refer the matter to the DHO for 

disposition. (Id. at 3 ¶ 16). 

On May 8, 2014, the DHO held a hearing. (ECF No. 20-10). According to the DHO 

Report, Petitioner pleaded not guilty and stated, “I was not fighting.” (Id. at 2). At the hearing, 

Petitioner was assisted by staff representative R. Villapudua, and inmates Grinnage and Ritchie 

appeared as witnesses.2The DHO found that the act was committed as charged. (Id. at 3).

Petitioner was assessed a sanction of 27 days of disallowed good conduct time, 30 days of 

disciplinary segregation, 180 days’ loss of phone privilege, and 180 days’ loss of email privilege.

(Id. at 4).

 

1

Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.

2

Petitioner asserts that the DHO spoke with Grinnage and Ritchie, witnesses requested by Petitioner, only after the 

DHO already found Petitioner guilty and imposed sanctions. (ECF No. 1 at 17). This claim is addressed in section 

II(A)(2)(a), infra.

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After administratively appealing the decision, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition 

for writ of habeas corpus on March 4, 2015. (ECF No. 1). Respondent has filed an answer to the 

petition. (ECF No. 19). The parties have filed supplemental briefing per the Court’s order. (ECF

Nos. 32, 42).

II.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner challenges the disciplinary proceeding arising from Incident Report No. 

2545590. Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because he never received 

notice regarding the delay in both the rewrite of the incident report and the UDC hearing on the 

rewritten incident report. (ECF No. 1 at 15–16). Petitioner also argues that the DHO abused his 

authority by failing to review all of the evidence before rendering a decision and by taking the 

matter personally rather than professionally. (Id. at 17, 19).

A. Review of Claims

1. Delays in Disciplinary Process

Petitioner asserts his due process rights were violated because the rewrite of the incident 

report was not timely issued and the subsequent UDC hearing on the rewritten incident report

was not timely held. Petitioner also contends he was entitled to receive notifications regarding 

the reasons for the delays. (ECF No. 1 at 15–16). 

The incident report was rewritten on March 7, 2014, twenty-six days after the initial UDC 

hearing on February 9, 2014.3(ECF No. 20 at 2 ¶ 11, 3 ¶ 14). The subsequent UDC hearing on 

the rewritten incident report was held on April 25, 2014, forty-nine days after the rewritten report 

was issued. (Id. at 3 ¶ 16). BOP’s inmate discipline program regulations state that an inmate

“will ordinarily receive the incident report within 24 hours of staff becoming aware of [the 

inmate’s] involvement in the incident” and that the “UDC will ordinarily review the incident 

report within five work days after it is issued[.]” 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.5(a), 541.7(c) (2014)

 

3 The Court notes that the impetus for the rewrite was BOP staff’s determination that the victim inmate’s injuries 

were not as severe as initially thought. There is nothing in the record as to when this determination occurred, other 

than it occurred after the UDC hearing on February 9, 2014. (ECF No. 20 at 3 ¶ 13).

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(emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the regulation’s use of “ordinarily” 

renders the time frame not mandatory. Valdez v. Adler, 518 F. App’x 563, 564 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(analyzing regulations in effect in 2010). Further, the regulations do not require notification to an 

inmate if there are delays in the disciplinary process.

Moreover, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has held that adherence to the 

timelines and procedures established in the inmate discipline program regulations is required to 

satisfy constitutional due process. Prisoners cannot be entirely deprived of their constitutional 

rights, but their rights may be diminished by the needs and objectives of the institutional 

environment. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). Prison disciplinary proceedings

are not part of a criminal prosecution, so a prisoner is not afforded the full panoply of rights in 

such proceedings. Id. at 556. Thus, a prisoner’s due process rights are moderated by the 

“legitimate institutional needs” of a prison. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454–55 (1984).

When a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the loss of good time credits, due 

process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) advance written notice of the charges at least 

twenty-four hours before a disciplinary hearing; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with 

institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in 

his defense; and (3) a written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the 

reasons for the disciplinary action. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–67. Here, 

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that his due process rights were violated because Wolff does not 

require issuance of an incident report within twenty-four hours or a hearing within five days. Nor 

does Wolff require notice to an inmate regarding any delays in the disciplinary process. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

2. The DHO’s Consideration of Evidence

a. Witnesses

Petitioner asserts that the DHO abused his authority by speaking with Grinnage and 

Ritchie, inmate witnesses requested by Petitioner, only after the DHO already found Petitioner 

guilty and imposed sanctions. (ECF No. 1 at 17). In an affidavit submitted by Petitioner in 

support of this claim, Grinnage declares:

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[O]n or about May 8, 2014[,] I had spoken with the Discipline 

Hearing Officer in the matter of Inmate Wade Knight concerning 

Incident Number 2545590. The Discipline Hearing Officer had 

asked me if I was a witness on Inmate Wade Knight[’s] behalf. 

After telling him I had heard he had already found Inmate Wade 

Knight guilty[,] I asked him what did he want[] to talk to me about. 

The Discipline Hearing Officer said he wanted my statement. I told 

him that Inmate Wade Knight was not f[]ighting.

(ECF No. 1 at 29). In the answer, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s assertion is completely 

unsubstantiated by the record. (ECF No. 19 at 9). Box III(C) of the DHO Report provides that 

Grinnage and Ritchie were called as witnesses and appeared at the hearing. (ECF No. 20-10 at 

2). In a supplemental declaration, the DHO specifically addresses Petitioner’s contention and 

declares:

I did not speak to either witness in Knight’s presence. It is my 

practice to speak to inmate witnesses outside the presence of the 

accused to prevent both witnesses and the accused from 

manipulating the disciplinary process through coded body 

language, words and symbols. This practice also allows an inmate 

witness the ability to more freely speak about the accused’s 

involvement in the incident without fear of reprisal.

. . .

I had not determined Knight’s guilt prior to speaking to inmates 

Grinnage and Ritchie. As DHO, I have never sanctioned an inmate 

accused of a disciplinary rules violation before I have spoken to his 

requested witnesses.

(ECF No. 33 at 2 ¶¶ 4, 11).

An “inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses . . . in his 

defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or 

correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. However, the Supreme Court recognized that “the 

unrestricted right to call witnesses from the prison population carries obvious potential for 

disruption” and cautioned that courts “should not be too ready to exercise oversight and put aside 

the judgment of prison administrators.” Id. The Court is unaware of a Ninth Circuit case on this

specific issue, but the Second Circuit has held that “[i]t is not a violation of due process at a 

disciplinary hearing to take the testimony of a witness outside the presence of an inmate.” 

Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 

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43, 48 (2d Cir. 1989)). The Court finds that the expanded record is clear that the inmate 

witnesses testified at the hearing outside Petitioner’s presence and before the DHO made a 

determination of Petitioner’s guilt. (ECF No. 33 at 2). Grinnage’s declaration that he gave his 

statement to the DHO after Grinnage told the DHO that he “heard” that Petitioner already had 

been found guilty is mere hearsay, and the record establishes that no official decision was 

rendered until after the inmate witnesses’ testimony was taken. (ECF No. 20-10 at 2–4).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

b. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner also argues that the facts of the case overwhelmingly show that Petitioner was 

not fighting as reported. (ECF No. 1 at 17). The Supreme Court has held that “the requirements 

of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary 

board to revoke good time credits.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. “Ascertaining whether this standard is 

satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the 

credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether 

there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion . . . .” Id. at 455–56. Here, 

the written report of the incident provides that Officer Mendoza personally observed Petitioner 

striking the victim inmate with closed fists in the upper torso and facial area. (ECF No. 20-7 at 

2). Therefore, the Court finds that there is “some evidence” to support the decision to disallow 

good conduct time. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

3. The DHO’s Alleged Bias

Petitioner contends that the DHO “neglect[ed] to perform his legal obligation as a 

Disciplinary Hearing Officer and took the matter more personal th[a]n professional.” (ECF No. 1 

at 19). In support of this claim, Petitioner calls attention to the DHO’s failure to state on the 

record that the reporting officer emailed Petitioner’s staff representative to review the video 

footage of the incident and determine whether Petitioner was downstairs during the fight. (Id.).

Inmates are entitled to an impartial decisionmaker in a disciplinary proceeding. Wolff, 418 U.S. 

at 570–71. Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the email to Petitioner’s staff representative was 

considered by the DHO, as stated in Box III(D) of the DHO Report. (ECF No. 20-10 at 3). The 

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record does not demonstrate that the DHO “present[ed] such a hazard of arbitrary decision 

making” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571, or “dishonestly suppresse[d] evidence of innocence,” Edwards 

v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 647 (1997). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on 

this claim.

B. Motions to Compel

Although discovery is available pursuant to Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases,4it is only granted at the Court’s discretion, and upon a showing of good cause. Bracy v. 

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997); McDaniel v. U.S. District Court (Jones), 127 F.3d 886, 888 

(9th Cir. 1997); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997); Rule 6(a), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. Good cause is shown “where specific allegations before the court 

show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to 

demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.” Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908–09 (citing Harris v. Nelson, 

394 U.S. 287 (1969)). If good cause is shown, the extent and scope of discovery is within the 

court’s discretion. See Rule 6(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

1. Video Footage of February 5, 2014 Incident

On October 26, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion to compel Respondent to provide 

Petitioner the opportunity to review video footage of the February 5, 2014 incident at issue in the 

instant petition. (ECF No. 23). Petitioner seeks the video footage “so that he can present a 

deposition as to what can be found on the footage and direct the court frame by frame as to his 

whereabouts in the footage.” (Id. at 1–2). In the petition, Petitioner argues that the facts of the 

case overwhelming demonstrate that Petitioner was not fighting as reported. Petitioner contends 

that the Disciplinary Hearing Officer abused his authority by, among other things, relying on the 

incident report, which allegedly conflicts with other evidence. (ECF No. 1 at 17–19). Due 

process is satisfied “if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to 

revoke good time credits” and “does not require examination of the entire record, independent 

 

4 The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases apply to § 2241 habeas petitions. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases (“The district court may apply any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not covered 

by” 28 U.S.C. § 2254.).

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assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. 

As discussed in section II(A)(2)(b), supra, given this “minimally stringent” “some evidence” 

standard, Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994), Petitioner has not presented 

allegations demonstrating that he is entitled to relief. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown good 

cause and is not entitled to discovery of video footage of the February 5, 2014 incident. 

2. Law Governing the Rewrite of Incident Report

On December 2, 2015, Petitioner filed a document labeled as a motion to compel wherein 

Petitioner seeks confirmation as to whether a rewrite of an incident report is governed by title 28 

of the Code of Federal Regulations. (ECF No. 24). The Court cannot provide legal advice to 

litigants, even when they are pro se litigants who lack legal training. In the petition, Petitioner 

challenges the rewrite of the incident report as a violation of due process, and the Court 

addressed this issue in section II(A)(1), supra.

3. Depositions of Ritchie and Villapudua

On July 5, 2016, Petitioner moved for a court order to depose inmate Ritchie and staff 

representative Villapudua. (ECF No. 39). Petitioner contends that “Ritchie will provide extra 

support” for the claim that Petitioner’s requested inmate witnesses spoke with the DHO after he 

had already found Petitioner guilty and imposed sanctions. (Id. at 1). Petitioner also argues that 

Villapudua can provide insight on this claim because she was present at the DHO hearing. (Id. at 

2). 

“[A] district court abuse[s] its discretion in not ordering Rule 6(a) discovery when 

discovery[i]s ‘essential’ for the habeas petitioner to ‘develop fully’ his underlying claim.” Smith 

v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 997 (9th Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 2005)). Villapudua “ha[s] no 

independent recollection” regarding whether the inmate witnesses appeared and testified at the 

hearing. (ECF No. 32 at 4 n.1). Additionally, Petitioner has already supplied the Court with the

affidavit of inmate witness Grinnage, who declares that he spoke with the DHO about 

Petitioner’s incident after Grinnage “heard [the DHO] had already found Inmate Wade Knight 

guilty.” (ECF No. 1 at 29). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that depositions of Ritchie

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and Villapudua are not “essential” for Petitioner to “develop fully” his claim,5and thus, 

Petitioner is not entitled to such discovery.

III.

RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED. Further, the Court DENIES the motions to compel (ECF Nos. 23, 24, 39).

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

THIRTY (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The 

assigned United States District Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within 

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. 

Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th 

Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 18, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

5 The Court notes that in ordering an expansion of the record on whether the inmate witnesses appeared and testified 

at the disciplinary hearing or whether they spoke with the DHO after he had already found Petitioner guilty, the 

Court was seeking further details from Respondent regarding the DHO hearing and its procedures. (ECF No. 29).

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