Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-01134/USCOURTS-caDC-09-01134-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Respondent
Hoopa Valley Tribe
Petitioner
PacifiCorp
Intervenor for Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 21, 2010 Decided December 28, 2010 

No. 09-1134 

HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE, 

PETITIONER

v. 

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, 

RESPONDENT

PACIFICORP, 

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of Orders of the 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

Thane D. Somerville argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs was Thomas P. Schlosser. 

Samuel Soopper, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With him on 

the brief were Thomas R. Sheets, General Counsel, and Robert 

H. Solomon, Solicitor. 

Michael A. Swiger argued the cause for intervenor 

PacifiCorp. With him on the brief was Sam Kalen. 

USCA Case #09-1134 Document #1285059 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 1 of 8
2 

Before: HENDERSON, BROWN, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: One of the modern U.S. 

government’s major regulatory tasks is to reconcile 

competing demands on the Nation’s natural resources. This 

case involves one small episode in that larger story. The 

dispute concerns water resources in the Pacific Northwest, 

where a hydroelectric plant provides power to some citizens 

but interferes with the food needs and recreational desires of 

others. 

The Klamath Hydroelectric Project is located on the 

Klamath River in Oregon and California. The Project serves 

as a source of electricity for customers in a six-state area of 

the Pacific Northwest. From 1956 to 2006, a power company 

known as PacifiCorp operated the Klamath Hydroelectric 

Project pursuant to a 50-year license granted by the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission. Since the original license 

expired in 2006, PacifiCorp has operated the Project under 

successive annual licenses granted by FERC. 

 The Hoopa Valley Tribe of American Indians holds 

fishing rights in the Klamath River and subsists in part on the 

River’s trout. In 2007, the Tribe requested that FERC impose 

conditions on PacifiCorp’s annual licenses so as to preserve 

the Klamath River’s trout fishery. FERC declined to do so. 

In this Court, the Tribe has challenged FERC’s refusal as 

contrary to the Commission’s regulations and precedents, and 

as unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree and 

therefore deny the Tribe’s petition. 

USCA Case #09-1134 Document #1285059 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 2 of 8
3 

I 

 The Klamath Hydroelectric Project consists of dams, 

reservoirs, and powerhouses along the Klamath River and one 

of its tributaries in Oregon and California. Since 1956, 

PacifiCorp has operated the Project pursuant to licenses 

granted by FERC – specifically, a 50-year license that expired 

in 2006 and annual licenses since then. 

 The Hoopa Valley Reservation is located in the Klamath 

River Basin, and the Klamath River flows through the Tribe’s 

lands. Tribe members fish in the Klamath River, and the 

Tribe subsists in part on the River’s trout. 

Seeking to protect the River’s trout fishery, the Tribe 

petitioned FERC to include new ramping rate and minimum 

flow requirements in PacifiCorp’s annual licenses. (The 

ramping rate is the rate at which water levels rise or fall in the 

river due to project operations.) FERC decided that such 

interim conditions were not necessary and denied the Tribe’s 

request. See PacifiCorp, Order Denying Motion for Interim 

License Conditions, 125 FERC ¶ 61,196 (2008). The 

Commission found that the trout fishery was sustaining 

“certain adverse effects” from the Project but was 

“nevertheless thriving,” and FERC concluded that the Project 

posed no risk of “irreversible environmental damage.” Id.

¶¶ 13, 16. 

The Tribe filed a petition for rehearing. In its denial of 

that petition, FERC explained that, absent the prospect of 

irreversible environmental harm from the licensed project, it 

examines “a request to impose interim conditions under the 

terms of the license essentially in the same manner as if [it] 

USCA Case #09-1134 Document #1285059 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 3 of 8
4 

were being asked to reopen the license.” PacifiCorp, Order 

Denying Rehearing, 126 FERC ¶ 61,236, at ¶ 12 (2009). 

Under that standard, the Commission will impose conditions 

“[i]f, with the passage of time, a project is found to have 

unanticipated, serious impacts on . . . fishery resources.” Id.

¶ 14; Ohio Power Co., Order Denying Requests for 

Rehearing, 71 FERC ¶ 61,092, at 61,314 n.43 (1995). 

Applying that “unanticipated, serious impacts” standard, 

FERC concluded that there were no such impacts here and 

that interim conditions were not necessary for the Klamath 

Project. 

 The Tribe now seeks review of FERC’s decision. 

II 

 The Tribe raises three alternative challenges to FERC’s 

decision. 

First, the Tribe contends that FERC’s decision declining 

to impose interim conditions was “standardless.” The Tribe is 

incorrect. The Commission explained that it would impose 

interim conditions on a hydroelectric project if the project was 

having “unanticipated, serious impacts” on fishery resources. 

PacifiCorp, Order Denying Rehearing, 126 FERC ¶ 61,236, 

at ¶ 14 (2009). The Commission in turn applied that standard: 

“Because the project is not having an unanticipated, serious 

impact on the trout fishery, it was an appropriate exercise of 

our discretion to deny the Tribe’s request . . . .” Id. Contrary 

to the Tribe’s argument, the Commission quite plainly 

articulated and applied a standard in rejecting the Tribe’s 

claims. 

USCA Case #09-1134 Document #1285059 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 4 of 8
5 

Second, the Tribe claims that FERC required 

“irreversible environmental damage” as a prerequisite to 

imposing interim conditions on the Klamath Project. 

According to the Tribe, such a requirement is too stringent. 

But the premise of the Tribe’s argument is wrong: The 

Commission did not require “irreversible environmental 

damage” as a prerequisite to imposing interim conditions on 

an annual license. To be sure, the Commission’s initial order 

noted that the Klamath Project was not causing irreversible 

environmental damage. See PacifiCorp, Order Denying 

Motion for Interim License Conditions, 125 FERC ¶ 61,196, 

at ¶ 13 (2008). But in doing so, FERC was merely suggesting 

that a finding of irreversible environmental damage would be 

sufficient to justify interim conditions to protect the trout 

fishery. FERC never said that a finding of irreversible 

environmental damage was necessary to justify interim 

conditions here. In any event, to the extent there was any 

ambiguity in the initial order, the Commission’s rehearing 

order cleared it up. There, the Commission stated explicitly 

that it could impose interim conditions even “absent a 

showing of irreversible environmental damage.” 126 

FERC ¶ 61,236, at ¶ 9; see also id. ¶ 10. 

Third, the Tribe alternatively argues that the 

“unanticipated, serious impacts” standard adopted by the 

Commission in the rehearing order is inconsistent with 

FERC’s precedents and regulations. We disagree. The 

Commission has long applied the “unanticipated, serious 

impacts” standard in deciding whether to reopen an existing

license. See Ohio Power Co., Order Denying Requests for 

Rehearing, 71 FERC ¶ 61,092, at 61,314 n.43 (1995). FERC 

decided to also employ that standard here because, the 

Commission explained, it examines “a request to impose 

interim conditions under the terms of the license essentially in 

USCA Case #09-1134 Document #1285059 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 5 of 8
6 

the same manner as if [it] were being asked to reopen the 

license.” 126 FERC ¶ 61,236, at ¶ 12. The Commission’s 

analysis adheres to its statutory obligation to issue annual 

licenses “under the terms and conditions of the existing 

license.” 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1). That statutory provision was 

designed to “preserv[e] the status quo at the expiration of a 

long-term license.” Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake 

Superior Chippewa Indians v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 510 F.2d 

198, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1975). FERC preserves the status quo in 

this context by treating annual licenses and long-term licenses 

alike. Applying the same standard in both contexts as FERC 

did here is, therefore, an entirely sensible way to fulfill the 

Commission’s statutory obligation. 

Contrary to the Tribe’s claim, moreover, the 

“unanticipated, serious impacts” test is consistent with 18 

C.F.R. § 16.18(d). By its terms, § 16.18(d) provides only that 

“the Commission may incorporate additional or revised 

interim conditions if necessary and practical to limit adverse 

impacts on the environment.” As the Commission has 

correctly explained, that broadly worded regulation grants 

FERC considerable discretion in deciding when to condition 

annual licenses. 126 FERC ¶ 61,236, at ¶ 17; see also Wash. 

Water Power Co. v. FERC, 201 F.3d 497, 502 (D.C. Cir. 

2000) (agency interpretation of its own regulation prevails 

“unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 

regulation”) (citation omitted). The Commission has 

exercised its discretion under § 16.18(d) by adopting the 

“unanticipated, serious impacts” standard to guide its interim 

conditions analysis. We find FERC’s decision consistent with 

the regulation.1

 1

 In this context, the “unanticipated” prong of the test does not 

meaningfully restrain the Commission from imposing interim 

USCA Case #09-1134 Document #1285059 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 6 of 8
7 

Finally, the Tribe suggests that FERC has never before 

applied the “unanticipated, serious impacts” test in an interim 

conditions case. That is true, but there have not been many 

cases with circumstances like those present here. The 

Commission may articulate and apply the standard now. 

Agencies have authority to establish legal standards “by 

general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation.” SEC v. 

Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). That is all FERC 

has done here, and we find its decision reasonable and 

reasonably explained. 

III 

 The Tribe further suggests that FERC’s decision – 

namely, that the Project was not causing “unanticipated, 

serious impacts” – lacked sufficient factual support in the 

record. We disagree. 

Based on evidence from a separate Department of the 

Interior hearing and from FERC’s own Environmental Impact 

 

conditions. Because hydroelectric power licenses can last for as 

long as 50 years, environmental impacts on fishery resources that 

are identified after the license period has ended almost certainly 

will have been “unanticipated” at the time of the original licensing. 

As a result, FERC’s analysis in deciding whether to impose interim 

conditions usually will boil down to its assessment of whether the 

impacts on fishery resources are sufficiently “serious” to justify 

interim conditions. One situation that qualifies as “serious” under 

this standard occurs when the project is causing “irreversible 

environmental damage.” Cf. Platte River Whooping Crane Critical 

Habitat Maintenance Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992); 

Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust 

v. FERC, 876 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 

USCA Case #09-1134 Document #1285059 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 7 of 8
8 

Statement, the Commission concluded that the Klamath River 

trout fishery had sustained “some adverse effects” but was 

nevertheless “thriving.” PacifiCorp, Order Denying Motion 

for Interim License Conditions, 125 FERC ¶ 61,196, at ¶ 16 

(2008). The Tribe questions that conclusion, arguing that 

FERC cites unreliable data (based on catch rates) and has 

chosen the wrong side in a battle of experts. 

 This controversy presents “a classic example of a factual 

dispute the resolution of which implicates substantial agency 

expertise.” Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 

376 (1989). FERC acknowledged conflicting evidence and 

weighed the testimony of dueling experts. There was 

evidence on both sides; we thus have no basis to overturn the 

Commission’s resolution of this debate. The Commission’s 

conclusion is based on substantial evidence. Cf. Wis. Valley 

Improvement Co. v. FERC, 236 F.3d 738, 746-47 (D.C. Cir. 

2001). 

* * * 

 We deny the Hoopa Valley Tribe’s petition for review. 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #09-1134 Document #1285059 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 8 of 8