Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-06249/USCOURTS-ca10-95-06249-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Antoin Novey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

Unlteci States Court of Appe&!J Tenth Circuit 

MAR 15 1996 

PATRICK FISHER C!2r:~ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 95-6249 

v. 

CHARLES ANTOIN NOVEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-89-95-T) 

Susan M. Otto, Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Okla., for 

Defendant/Appellant. 

Frank Michael Ringer, Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma 

City, Okla. (Patrick M. Ryan, United States Attorney, with him on 

the brief) for Plaintiff/Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

This appeal from the denial of Charles Novey's petition to 

reduce his sentence implicates the authority of the United States 

Sentencing Commission to enact Amendment 506, which amended the 

Appellate Case: 95-6249 Document: 01019277638 Date Filed: 03/15/1996 Page: 1 
commentary to United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.1 to reduce 

the penalty for career offenders. For the reasons stated below, 

we hold that the Commission exceeded its authority in enacting 

Amendment 506, and we AFFIRM the district court. 

I. 

In June 1989, Charles Novey pled guilty to making a false 

statement to the Postal Service, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 

and possession with intent to distribute 3837.5 grams of 

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Ten days prior 

to the guilty pleas, the government filed an information alleging 

that the defendant had been previously convicted of a controlled 

substance offense. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (C), the prior 

conviction raised the maximum penalty Novey could receive for his 

drug trafficking conviction from twenty to thirty years. 

The presentence investigation report stated that Novey in 

fact had two prior convictions involving controlled substances. 

Based on these two prior convictions, the district court 

determined that Novey was a career offender for purposes of the 

United States Sentencing Guidelines. Guideline § 4B1.1, which 

implements 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), provides that "[a] career 

offender's criminal history category in every case shall be 

Category VI" and that the defendant's offense level is to be 

calculated on the basis of the "Offense Statutory Maximum." The 

district court found that the Offense Statutory Maximum for 

Novey's drug trafficking conviction was thirty years, as this was 

the maximum sentence he could receive after applying the 

enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (C). Under the Career 

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Offender Guideline, an Offense Statutory Maximum of twenty-five 

years or more results in an offense level of 34. The court thus 

calculated a level 34 and category VI range of 262 to 327 months. 

Novey was sentenced to 262 months on the drug trafficking charge 

and 40 months, to run concurrently, on the false statements 

charge. 

The district court's calculation of Novey's sentence was 

affirmed by this court. See United States v. Novey, 922 F.2d 624 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234 (1991). However, 

effective November 1, 1994, the United States Sentencing 

Commission enacted Amendment 506, which modifies the application 

note defining "Offense Statutory Maximum" for purposes of 

Guideline § 4Bl.l.l As amended, application note 2 to § 4Bl.l 

provides that the Offense Statutory Maximum "refers to the maximum 

term of imprisonment authorized ... , not including any increase in 

that maximum term under a sentencing enhancement provision that 

applies because of the defendant's prior criminal record .... " 

(emphasis added). As directed by the amended application note 2, 

the Offense Statutory Maximum for Novey's offense would be only 

twenty years: the maximum penalty provided by 21 U.S.C. 

§ 84l(b) (1) (C) without the enhancement for a prior felony 

conviction. This recalculation would lower Novey's offense level 

1 The Commission has designated Amendment 506 as an amendment 

that is authorized for retroactive application. See U.S.S.G. 

§ lBl.lO (a) (Nov. 1995) ("Where a defendant is serving a term of 

imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to that defendant 

has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the 

Guidelines Manual listed in subsection (c) below, a reduction in 

the defendant's term of imprisonment is authorized under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582 (c) (2). "); U.S.S.G. § lBl.lO (c) (Nov. 1995) (listing 

Amendment 506) . 

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from 34 to 32, and would lower the appropriate sentencing range 

from 262-327 months to 210-262 months. 

Based on Amendment 506's reduction of the applicable 

Guidelines range to his offense, Novey filed a motion pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(c) and 3742(a) (2) seeking a reduction of his 

sentence. The government responded that Amendment 506 is invalid, 

as it is inconsistent with Congress' mandate that sentences for 

career offenders be set "at or near the maximum term authorized." 

28 U.S.C. § 994(h). The district court agreed with the government 

that Amendment 506 "clearly conflicts" with§ 994(h). 

Accordingly, the district court found Amendment 506 "not binding" 

and denied Novey's motion for sentencing relief pursuant to that 

amendment. We affirm. 

II. 

The Sentencing Guidelines are promulgated by the Sentencing 

Commission pursuant to the enabling legislation enacted by 

Congress. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998. The duties of the Commission 

are enumerated at 28 U.S.C. § 994. At issue in this case is 

section 994(h), which provides: 

The Commission shall assure that the guidelines specify a 

sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum 

term authorized for categories of defendants in which the 

defendant is eighteen years or older and [has been convicted 

of a crime of violence or enumerated felony drug offense and 

has at least two such prior convictions] . 

Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the Commission 

promulgated Guideline § 4B1.1, entitled "Career Offender." The 

Guideline's definition of career offender tracks the language of 

§ 994 (h) : 

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A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at 

least eighteen years old at the time of the instant offense, 

(2) the instant offense is a felony that is either a crime of 

violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the 

defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either 

a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. 

Section 4Bl.l goes on to provide that a career offender 

automatically receives a criminal history of VI, and the 

defendant's offense level is keyed to the "Offense Statutory 

Maximum. " 

Before the enactment of Amendment 506, the commentary to 

Guideline § 4Bl.l defined Offense Statutory Maximum simply as "the 

maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of 

conviction that is a crime of violence or controlled substance 

offense." U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.l, comment., n.2 (Nov. 1993). The 

commentary further explained that "[t]he legislative history of 

this provision suggests that the phrase 'maximum term authorized' 

should be construed as the maximum term authorized by statute." 

Id., comment., back'd. Where a statute, such as 21 U.S.C. 

§ 84l(b) (1) (C), provides for an enhanced maximum penalty because 

of a defendant's prior criminal record, the circuit courts that 

addressed the issue prior to the Sentencing Commission's adoption 

of Amendment 506 have interpreted "Offense Statutory Maximum" to 

mean the enhanced statutory maximum. See United States v. Smith, 

984 F.2d 1084, 1086-87 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 204 

(1993); United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1394-97 (5th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 217 (1993); United States v. 

Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1364 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 

U.S. 1070 (1993); United States v. Garrett, 959 F.2d 1005, 1009-11 

(D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Arnis, 926 F~2d 328, 329-30 (3d 

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Cir. 1991); United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 558-60 

(9th Cir. 1989). Under this interpretation, a defendant's prior 

convictions are, in effect, used twice: first to enhance the 

defendant's criminal history category and again to enhance the 

defendant's offense level. The courts, while acknowledging this 

result, found it to be consistent both with Guideline § 4B1.1 and 

with Congress' desire to sentence career offenders at or near the 

statutory maximum. See. e.g., Smith, 984 F.2d at 1087. 

With Amendment 506, the Commission amended application note 2 

of the Commentary to § 4B1.1 to define the term "Offense Statutory 

Maximum" as the statutory maximum without considering any 

enhancement based on the defendant's prior criminal record. The 

amended definition reads, in part, as follows: 

"Offense Statutory Maximum," for the purposes of this 

guideline, refers to the maximum term of imprisonment 

authorized for the offense of conviction that is a crime of 

violence or controlled substance offense, not including any 

increase in that maximum term under a sentencing enhancement 

provision that applies because of a defendant's prior 

criminal record (such sentencing enhancement provisions are 

contained, for example, in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A), 

( b ) ( 1 ) ( B ) , ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C) , and ( b ) ( 1 ) ( D ) ) . . . . 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, comment., n.2 (Nov. 1994). 

The government protests, and the district court agreed, that 

this definition of "Offense Statutory Maximum" is inconsistent 

with§ 994(h) 's mandate that a sentence be set for career 

offenders that is "at or near the maximum term authorized." 

III. 

"[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or 

explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the 

Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a 

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plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline." Stinson v. United 

States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993). Our review of any amendment 

to the commentary is therefore deferential.2 Nonetheless, the 

Sentencing Commission does not have the authority to override or 

amend a statute. See Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 763, 766, 

768 (1996). We are compelled by the clear directive of § 994(h) 

to hold that Amendment 506 is inconsistent with that statute, and 

is therefore invalid as beyond the scope of the Commission's 

authority delegated to it by Congress. 

We turn first to the language of § 994(h) itself. The 

statute directs the Commission to assure that the guidelines 

specify a sentence "at or near the maximum term authorized for 

categories of defendants in which the defendant is eighteen years 

old or older and [has been convicted of a crime of violence or 

2 Under Stinson, when determining whether commentary is 

consistent with the sentencing guidelines themselves, the degree 

of deference is the same as that accorded to "an agency's 

interpretation of its own legislative rule," 113 S. Ct. at 1919, 

and the commentary is controlling unless plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the guideline. See id. There appears to be 

some debate as to whether Stinson implies this level of deference 

whenever judicial review of the commentary is undertaken, or 

whether the appropriate standard when commentary is being reviewed 

for consistency with a statute is supplied by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 

(1984). See United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1404 and n.6 

(1st Cir. 1995) (noting debate and applying Chevron standard). 

Chevron provides that "[w]hen a court reviews an agency's 

construction of the statute which it administers," the court must 

determine whether Congress has directly addressed the precise 

question at issue and, if not, must determine "whether the 

agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the 

statute." 467 U.S. at 842-43. We need not delve into such fine 

distinctions here, however, since we find that Amendment 506 

stands squarely in conflict with§ 994(h), and is invalid under 

either standard. 

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enumerated drug offense and has two such prior convictions] ."3 

Amendment 506 can be valid only if the phrase "maximum term 

authorized" could plausibly be interpreted to mean either the 

"maximum enhanced term authorized" or the "maximum unenhanced term 

authorized."4 Standing alone, the phrase "maximum term 

authorized" is subject to either interpretation. As we read the 

statute, however, the phrase "maximum term authorized" is modified 

by the phrase which immediately follows: "for categories of 

defendants in which the defendant is eighteen years old or older 

and [has been convicted of a crime of violence or enumerated drug 

offense and has two prior such convictions]." Because the 

"maximum term authorized" for categories of defendants in which 

3 The full text of 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) reads: 

(h) The Commission shall assure that the guidelines specify 

a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term 

authorized for categories of defendants in which the defendant is 

eighteen years old or older and--

(1) has been convicted of a felony that is--

(A) a crime of violence; or 

(B) an offense described in section 401 of the 

Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841), sections 1002(a), 

1005, and 1009 of the Controlled Substances Import and Export 

Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, and 959), and the Maritime Drug 

Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.); and 

(2) has previously been convicted of two or more prior 

felonies, each of which is--

(A) a crime of violence; or 

(B) an offense described in section 401 of the 

Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841), sections 

1002(a), 1005, and 1009 of the Controlled Substances 

Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, and 959), 

and the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. 

App. 1901 et seq.). 

4 Novey was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841. 

Accordingly, our opinion addresses whether Amendment 506 is 

consistent with§ 994(h) in the context of that statute. 

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the defendant has two prior qualifying felony convictions is 

necessarily the enhanced statutory maximum, we find no ambiguity 

in the statute. It would make no sense for the statute to require 

the "maximum term authorized" to be considered in the context of 

defendants with two or more prior qualifying felony convictions 

unless it was intended that that phrase mean the enhanced sentence 

resulting from such a pattern of recidivism.5 

We find further guidance regarding Congress' intent in 

enacting§ 994(h) when that subsection is read in conjunction with 

§ 994(i). Subsection 994(i) directs the Commission to assure that 

the guidelines specify "a sentence to a substantial term of 

imprisonment" for several categories of defendants, including 

defendants who have been convicted of two or more prior felonies, 

without regard to the nature of the prior felony convictions. 

Section 994(h), by contrast, applies to a subset of such 

defendants: those who have been convicted of two prior felonies, 

both of which are crimes of violence or qualifying drug 

trafficking offenses. Defendants with the specific criminal 

histories addressed in§ 994(h) are to receive something more than 

5 Without Amendment 506, the maximum Guidelines range for a 

defendant eligible for the enhancement provisions of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b) (1) (C) is 262 months to 327 months, or a maximum sentence 

of 27 years and three months. While individual characteristics of 

a particular defendant may cause the penalty to be raised or 

lowered, we believe this starting point is "at or near" the 

enhanced statutory maximum penalty of thirty years provided in 

§ 841(b) (1) (C). By contrast, if Amendment 506 is applied, the 

Guideline range for the category of defendants eligible for the 

enhancement provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (C) is 210 months 

to 262 months, or a maximum sentence of 21 years and 10 months. 

This latter range, we believe, cannot be described as "at or near" 

the enhanced statutory maximum of thirty years provided in 

§ 841 (b) (1) (C). 

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a "substantial term of imprisonment"; they are to receive a term 

of imprisonment that is "at or near the maximum term authorized." 

The history of the guidelines enabling legislation is consistent 

with this observation, as it demonstrates that Section 994(h) was 

added to strengthen the penalties for career criminals beyond 

those already provided by subsection 994(i). SeeS. 1437, 95th 

Cong. 2d Sess., 124 Cong. Rec. 1385-86 (1978) (Senate version of 

legislation containing text now found in§ 994(i)); S. 2572, 128 

Cong. Rec. 26517-18 (1982) (statement of Senator Kennedy, sponsor 

of amendment underlying the current§ 994(h)). 

Most compellingly, we agree that the Commission's current 

interpretation of the statute is "inherently implausible because 

it effectively nullifies the criminal history enhancements 

carefully enacted in statutes like 21 U.S.C. § 841." United 

States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1415 (1st Cir. 1995) (Stahl, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part) . Under the reading 

urged by Novey, § 994(h) would provide that qualifying recidivist 

violent felons or drug offenders would only receive sentences at 

or near the maximum term authorized for defendants without such 

prior criminal history--that is, the unenhanced maximum. This 

would negate those provisions in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A)- (D) 

which clearly provide that qualifying recidivist criminals may 

receive penalties substantially above the maximum penalties 

authorized for first-time offenders of the same offense. We 

cannot agree that by expressing an intent to punish repeat drug 

offenders "at or near the maximum term authorized," Congress in 

fact intended that express statutory sentence enhancements for 

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qualifying recidivist offenders be disregarded. As the District 

of Columbia Circuit reasoned in United States v. Garrett, 959 F.2d 

1005, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1992), in response to a pre-Amendment 506 

challenge to the use of an enhanced maximum penalty to establish 

the Offense Level in Guideline § 4Bl.l: 

To conclude that Congress, in approving the Guidelines, 

intended to erase the statutory distinctions among offenders 

based either on their past actions or on the circumstances of 

the offense, distinctions carefully set forth in subsection 

841(b) (1) (B), would be senseless. On the contrary, under the 

career offender provision, Congress simply refined further 

the statutory sentence range so that the sentencing judge 

must impose a term of imprisonment nearer to the statutory 

maximum for a drug recidivist. 

We note that our holding today is consistent with our prior 

holding in United States v. Smith, 984 F.2d 1084 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

In Smith, decided before the Commission enacted Amendment 506, we 

upheld the district court's use of the enhanced 30 year sentence 

provided by§ 841(b) (1) (C) to calculate the Offense Statutory 

Maximum for purposes of Guideline § 4Bl.l. We reasoned that 

"[t]he Sentencing Guidelines merely implement Congress' intent 

that career offenders should receive a sentence that is at or near 

the statutory maximum." Id. at 1087. We cited United States v. 

Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1989) for the 

"instructiven discussion we found therein. In Sanchez-Lopez, the 

Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's use of the enhanced 

statutory maximum for purposes of the Guidelines, reasoning that: 

Congress made it very clear that the Sentencing Commission 

should ensure that [career criminals] should receive a 

sentence of imprisonment under the guidelines that is at or 

near the maximum term authorized by statute .... 

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[I]f the district court had not applied the career 

offender provision [as well as the statutory enhancement] , Congress' intent for repeated drug offenders to have near the 

maximum sentence would have been thwarted." 

Id. at 559. 

Of course, the Commission is free to enact commentary that 

contravenes prior judicial constructions of a particular 

guideline, see Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1919, as long as the 

commentary does not conflict with the guideline or violate a 

statute. We find it significant, however, that most cour~s 

upholding the use of an enhanced statutory maximum under the 

Guidelines before the enactment of Amendment 506 relied, not on a 

construction of Guideline § 4Bl.l, but on a construction of 

§ 994(h). See. e.g., Smith, 984 F.2d at 1087, Sanchez-Lopez, 879 

F.2d at 559; Garrett, 959 F.2d at 1010; United States v. Sanchez, 

988 F.2d 1384, 1396 (5th Cir. 1993). 

IV. 

In holding that Amendment 506 is invalid, we recognize that 

we stand in disagreement not only with the Commission, but with 

the only other appellate court to address the issue. See United 

States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1400 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Although 

the call is close, we hold that Amendment 506 is a reasonable 

implementation of the statutory mandate.") .6 We therefore turn to 

6 Of the handful of district courts to consider the question, 

moreover, most have sustained Amendment 506 against challenges 

from the government. See. e.g., United States v. Saunders, 890 F. 

Supp. 764, 768 (W.D. Wis. 1995); United States v. Fountain, 885 F. 

Supp. 185, 189 (N.D. Iowa 1995); United States v. Robinson, 906 F. 

Supp. 1136, 1144 (E.D. Mich. 1995); but see United States v. 

North, No. 91-14019-CR-HIGHSMITH, 1996 WL 56455, *2 (S.D. Fla. 

Jan. 11, 1996); United States v. Sheppard, 879 F. Supp. 80, 82 

(C.D. Ill. 1995). 

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the arguments that have been put forward in support of the 

Arnendmen t . 

The first is that the reading of § 994(h) that we adopt today 

is "unduly rigid." See 129 Cong. Rec. 22888 (1983) (Summary of the 

Comprehensive Crime Control Act) (provisions sue~ as § 994(h) 

"provide[] general legislative guidance to the Commission 

These provisions are intended to accord some direction to the 

Commission without so circumscribing its consideration of 

occasional countervailing factors as to prove unduly rigid."). 

The commentary to Guideline § 4B1.1, as amended, explains that 

"[t]he Commission's refinement of [the definition of Offense 

Statutory Maximum] over time is consistent with Congress' [] choice 

of a directive to the Commission rather than a mandatory minimum 

sentencing statute." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, comment., back'd (Nov. 

1995). To read§ 994(h) too literally, it is urged, not only 

ignores Congressional intent that the Sentencing Commission retain 

discretion, but ignores the myriad of other Congressional 

directives to the Commission contained in section 994. "[T]he 

Sentencing Reform Act places many restraints on the Commission 

apart from those embodied in section 994(h) ,"LaBonte, 70 F.3d at 

1407: ~, restraints ensuring consistency and certainty in 

sentencing, see § 994(f), to restraints minimizing the likelihood 

of overcrowding in federal prisons, see § 994(g). 

Moreover, proponents point out, the "Offense Statutory 

Maximum" is only a starting point for the calculation of a 

sentence; numerous downward or upward adjustments may follow. 

"Unless one is ready to place any and all downward adjustments 

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beyond a repeat offender's reach[,] ... it is surpassingly 

difficult (if not impossible} to expect the Commission to write a 

rule which ensures that career offenders will invariably receive 

sentences 'at or near' each individual's" enhanced statutory 

maximum. LaBonte, 70 F.3d at 1410; see also United States v. 

Saunders, 890 F. Supp. 764, 768 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (Amendment 506 

must be valid "[u]nless one reads§ 994(h) as prohibiting any 

changes in the guidelines that have the effect of reducing the 

sentence that can be meted out to a drug offender .... "). 

We believe such arguments misconstrue the nature of Amendment 

506's fatal flaw. Section 994(h) does not mandate that each 

individual defendant receive a sentence "at or near the maximum 

term authorized." Rather, the statute directs the Commission to 

assure that the guidelines specify such a term "for categories of 

defendants" in which the defendant is a recidivist violent felon 

or drug offender.? Sentence adjustments based on the 

7 The First Circuit finds ambiguity in the phrase "categories 

of defendants:" it may mean either (1) defendants against whom 

prosecutors have filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

§ 851(a) (1), or (2) all offenders (or all repeat offenders) 

regardless of whether the prosecution chooses to invoke the 

enhancement. See LaBonte, 70 F.3d at 1404-05. The only maximum 

term that could apply to the entire category of all defendants 

under the broader definition (number 2, above) is the unenhanced 

statutory maximum, so the Commission's adoption of that standard 

is plausible. See id. 

We simply disagree that this phrase is ambiguous. The 

categories of defendants intended by Section 994(h) are expressly 

defined as those "in which the defendant is eighteen years or 

older and-- (1) has been convicted of a [qualifying] felony ... ; 

and (2) has previously been convicted of two or more prior 

felonies, each of which is [a qualifying felony] . The fact that 

an entirely distinct statute, 21 U.S.C. § 851{a) (1), provides that 

the government may not invoke statutory enhancements without 

filing an information cannot inject ambiguity into a facially 

clear statute. 

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circumstances of ~ individual defendant, such as acceptance of 

responsibility, substantial assistance to the investigation, or 

any other mitigating factor, are not implicated. Our holding 

today in no way infringes on the Commission's discretion to 

provide for adjustments to a sentence after the offense level is 

determined. We simply hold that the Commission cannot 

categorically eliminate statutorily mandated enhancement 

provisions from the sentencing calculation.8 

A second justification advanced in favor of Amendment 506 is 

that it promotes consistency in sentencing. In enacting Amendment 

506, the Commission explained that the Amendment "avoids 

unwarranted disparity associated with variations in the exercise 

of prosecutorial discretion in seeking enhanced penalties based on 

prior convictions." U.S.S.G., App. C, Amend. 506, at 411 (Nov. 

1995). Because the enhancement provisions apply only if the 

government chooses to invoke them, see. e.g., 21 U.S.C. 

§ 851(a) (1), similarly situated defendants may receive disparate 

sentences depending on the behavior of the prosecutor. Because 

"avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with 

similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct" is 

one of the Sentencing Commission's fundamental purposes, 28 U.S.C. 

8 We acknowledge that in the case at bar, application of 

Amendment 506 could potentially lead to a sentence of 21 years and 

10 months. Such a sentence does not entirely eliminate the 

enhancement provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (C), as the sentence 

is greater than the twenty year maximum otherwise provided for 

Novey's offense by § 841. Nonetheless, we believe that this 

outcome ignores the statutory mandate of § 994(h), as it is not 

"at or near" the maximum term authorized. 

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§ 991(b) (1) (B), proponents urge that Amendment 506 is therefore 

consistent with Congressional intent. 

It is indisputable that a primary goal of federal sentence 

reform was "the elimination of unwarranted sentencing disparity." 

S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1984 

U.S.S.C.A.N. 3182, 3235. Equally clear, however, is that Congress 

perceived such disparity to be the result of unchecked discretion 

by sentencing judges and parole boards. See, ~, S. Rep. No. 

225 at 37, 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 3221 ("These disparities ... can 

be traced directly to the unfettered discretion the law confers on 

those judges and parole authorities responsible for imposing and 

implementing the sentence."). We can find no indication, either 

in the text of the guidelines enabling legislation or the 

legislative history, that the guidelines or the Commission were 

intended specifically to address prosecutorial discretion. In 

fact, one of the most common criticisms of the entire guidelines 

system is that it transfers discretion from district judge to 

prosecutor. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 

583 (2d Cir.) (Feinberg, J.) (noting with concern transfer of 

discretion under Guidelines), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 845 (1991); 

United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d Cir. 

1990) (Rosenn, J., concurring) (transfer of discretion to prosecutor 

permits "manipulation of ... charge and sentencing"). 

Even assuming a general Congressional concern with curbing 

prosecutorial discretion, we would be unable to agree that the 

disparity caused by decisions to seek a sentence enhancement is 

the "unwarranted" disparity which Congress sought to eliminate. 

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Subsection 994(h) refers explicitly to, among other statutes, 21 

U.S.C. § 841. The Commission commented that when§ 994(h) was 

enacted by Congress in 1984, the current enhanced maximum 

sentences provided for recidivist drug offenders did not exist. 

See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 506, at 411 (November 1, 1995). 

However, 21 U.S.C. § 841 as it existed in 1984 did contain 

enhancement provisions for repeat offenders. See, ~, 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841 (b) (1) (A}, (b) (1) (B) (1982 ed.) (providing enhancements from 

15 to 30 years and from 5 to 10 years, respectively, where a 

defendant had one or more prior convictions for, inter alia, "an 

offense punishable under this paragraph"); United States v. 

Garrett, 959 F. 2d 1005, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("We note that 

Congress, fully aware that subsection 841(b) (1) (B) contained a 

tiered punishment scheme, approved the Guidelines after it enacted 

that subsection.") .9 To invoke these enhancements, moreover, the 

government was required to file an information to establish prior 

convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 851{a) (1) (1982 ed.). We therefore 

must assume that Congress was aware that the "maximum term 

authorized" for a recidivist drug offender would vary depending on 

whether the prosecutor filed an information, and we must abide by 

the plain meaning of § 994(h). See LaBonte, 70 F.3d at 1420 

(Stahl, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (because 

§ 994(h) specifically refers to statutes which expressly vest 

9 In fact, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984--the 

same legislation containing the guidelines enabling provisions--

amended the penalty provisions contained in 841(b) (1) (A) and (B), 

which, as noted above, contained enhanced penalties for qualifying 

recidivist drug offenders. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1982 ed. Supp. 

III) (setting forth 841(b) and (c) as amended by Pub. L. 98-473). 

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prosecutorial discretion, disparities resulting from 

implementation of § 994(h) 's clear directive are not the 

unwarranted disparities Commission was charged to avoid) . The 

disparities decried by proponents of Amendment 506 based on 

prosecutorial discretion should be addressed to Congress in 

connection with 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) (1) rather than utilized by the 

courts to give an artificial, and inconsistent, interpretation to 

28 u.s.c. § 994(h}. 

v. 

Although we believe the statute is clear and unambiguous, it 

is with reluctance that we find Amendment 506 invalid. We agree 

with the policy considerations giving deference to the Commission. 

The Commission's attempt to ameliorate the severity of the 

guidelines' treatment of recidivist drug offenders, moreover, is 

consistent with a widespread belief among judges that the 

guidelines system may be excessively draconian, and unreasonably 

deprives judges of the discretion to consider mitigating 

circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 

956, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J. concurring) (regretfully 

reversing sentencing judge who "reasonably concluded that the 

sentence prescribed by the Guidelines was unnecessary and 

excessive"); United States v. Jackson, 30 F.3d 199, 204-206 (1st 

Cir. 1994) (Pettine, J. concurring) (criticizing guidelines for 

forcing judges to mechanically sentence defendants to 

inappropriately severe sentences). Nonetheless, Congress, not the 

Commission or the courts, has the responsibility to revise its 

statutes. We hold that Amendment 506 is not within the scope of 

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the Commission's authority, and therefore is not binding. The 

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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