Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00925/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00925-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert A. Horel
Respondent
Robert Conner Wright
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT CONNER WRIGHT, ) 1:06-cv-00925-TAG HC

) 

Petitioner, ) 

) ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 

v. ) (Doc. 9)

) 

ROBERT A. HOREL, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

)

____________________________________)

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se on a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The instant petition was filed on July 19, 2006. (Doc. 1). On January 24, 2008, Respondent

filed the instant motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, contending that Petitioner’s claims were not

fully exhausted in state court. (Doc. 9). On April 9, 2008, Petitioner filed an opposition to the

motion to dismiss, contending that he had “fairly presented” the issue in question to the California

Supreme Court, thus exhausting it; however, Petitioner requested in the alternative that, should the

Court conclude that the issue was not exhausted, a stay should be granted to permit Petitioner to

pursue exhaustion in state court. (Doc. 15). 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .: Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if the

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motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the state’s

procedural rules. See e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to

evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d

599, 602-603 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the Court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. .

In this case, the motion to dismiss is based on Respondent’s contention that Petitioner has

never exhausted his claim in the California Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Court will review the

motion pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Exhaustion

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state’s alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982);

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S. Ct. 509

(1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the

highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented

the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis);

Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis), superceded by

statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 432, 434, 120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.

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1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509 . . . (1971), we said that

exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged

violations of the prisoners’ federal rights” (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state

courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights,

they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United

States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state

court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he

must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) his

federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims

were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000).

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must

make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of

federal courts, even if the federal basis is “self-evident,” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882,

889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations that would control

resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir.

1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that

the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal

standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

 C. Petitioner’s claims

 The facts are not in dispute. Respondent has lodged documents with the Court that establish

that on Petitioner was sentenced to the upper term under California law, that Petitioner, citing

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), presented the issue of the legality of

an upper term sentence based on judge-found facts to the California Supreme Court in his petition

for review, and that on April 20, 2005 the California Supreme Court denied the petition without

prejudice to any relief to which Petitioner might be entitled after the it determined the effect of the

United States Supreme Court decision in Blakely, to California law. (Lodged Documents (“LD”) 3). 

Subsequently, in Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007), the United States

Supreme Court ruled that California’s determinate sentencing law was flawed in that the imposition

of upper term sentences violated a defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by

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delegating to the judge rather than the jury the responsibility for finding facts justifying the upper

term sentence. Id. at 860. 

While conceding that the other eight grounds for relief in the petition are fully exhausted,

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s Blakely/Cunningham claim is not exhausted because

Cunningham significantly changed the nature of California sentencing law and thus Petitioner should

have returned to state court to obtain further relief in light of Cunningham before filing his claim in

federal court. Petitioner, understandably, believes he has done everything required of him to exhaust

his claims. However, he requests that, should the Court conclude that the Blakely/Cunningham

claim is not exhausted, he should be granted a stay to return to state court and exhaust that claim. 

In Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624 (9th Cir. 2008), decided subsequent to Respondent’s motion

to dismiss, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clarified that the Cunningham

decision, striking down California's determinate sentencing law, was compelled by Blakely, such that

the decision as to whether a petitioner's constitutional rights herein were violated rests, as a threshold

matter, on whether or not his conviction became final before Blakely, not Cunningham, was decided. 

Citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989). the Ninth Circuit panel states

flatly:

Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker made “courts throughout the land” aware that sentencing

schemes that raise the maximum possible term based on facts not found by a jury violate the

constitutional rights of defendants. [Cunningham, supra,] at 306. No principles of comity or

federalism would be served by refusing to apply this rule to functionally indistinguishable

state sentencing schemes on collateral review. Cunningham thus did not announce a new rule

of constitutional law and may be applied retroactively on collateral review.

Butler, 528 F. 3d at 639.

In Butler, the District Court rejected the same argument regarding exhaustion that

Respondent is now raising in this case. In upholding the District Court’s approach, the Ninth Circuit

pointed out the logical fallacy in premising lack of exhaustion on a subsequent Supreme Court

decision that did not effect a “new rule”:

“The State also argues that Butler’s habeas petition must be dismissed for failure to exhaust,

because Cunningham constitutes an intervening change in federal law that casts the legal

issue in a fundamentally different light. (Citation omitted). Before Teague, we sometimes

held a habeas petition unexhausted because of changes in federal law. (Citations omitted).

///

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After Teague, an intervening change in federal law that casts the legal issue in a

fundamentally different light is a “new rule” that cannot be applied on collateral review under

any circumstances regardless of whether the petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies

. . .. Where there is no new rule announced, the state court has had a fair chance to address

the issue when it was raised, and there is no reason to require further exhaustion. We hold

that when a petitioner raises a claim in state court that is later resolved in a case that

announced no “new rule,” a petitioner is not obligated to return to state court to exhaust his

remedies under that case.”

Butler, 528 F.3d at 639. (Emphasis supplied).

The parties do not dispute that Petitioner raised his Blakely claim in the California Supreme

Court and that the claim was denied, albeit without prejudice to return at a later time. In light of

Butler, however, the Court must conclude that Petitioner has “fairly presented,” and thus fully

exhausted, his Blakely claim to the highest state court because, contrary to Respondent’s contention,

the subsequent Cunningham decision did not “cast Petitioner’s claim in a significantly different

light.” (Doc. 9, p. 2). Moreover, although Blakely has not been given retroactive effect like

Cunningham to cases on collateral review, Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004, over a year before

Petitioner’s direct review became final on July 19, 2005. Thus, Blakely would be applicable to

Petitioner’s case.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 9), is DENIED. 

The Court will order Respondent to file an answer to the petition and will establish a

briefing schedule by separate order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 7, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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