Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01788/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01788-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Jones
Plaintiff
M. Palombo
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. PALOMBO,

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-01788-OWW-GSA PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING PLAINTIFF’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE

DENIED AS UNTIMELY FILED, AND

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT BE GRANTED

(Docs. 37 and 41) 

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Findings and Recommendations Addressing Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment

I. Background

Plaintiff Kevin Jones, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil

rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 10, 2007. This action for money

damages is proceeding on Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed January 28, 2008, against Defendant

Palombo for use of excessive physical force, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The event at

issue in this action occurred at Kern Valley State Prison, in Delano, California on July 18, 2006. 

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on June 29, 2009. After obtaining an

extension of time from the Court to file an opposition, Plaintiff filed what he entitled a motion for

summary judgment, which is addressed below. The motions have been deemed submitted pursuant 1

Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment by the

1

Court in an order filed on June 23, 2008. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). (Doc. 19.)

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to Local Rule 230(l), and the Court now issues its findings and recommendations for consideration. 

(Docs. 37, 41.)

II. Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

The deadline for filing pretrial dispositive motions was June 29, 2009, and Defendant timely

filed a motion for summary judgment on that date. On July 23, 2009, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking

an extension of time to file his response to Defendant’s motion, which was granted, and on July 30,

2009, Plaintiff filed what he entitled a motion for summary judgment. 

Despite Plaintiff’s language to the contrary, it is not clear that Plaintiff is seeking summary

judgment given his representation in his motion that there are triable issues of fact. Regardless, the

deadline for filing pretrial dispositive motions was June 29, 2009. Plaintiff’s cross-motion was not

timely, and Plaintiff did not seek an extension of the dispositive motion deadline. Although

Plaintiff was granted an extension of time, it was to file an opposition to Defendant’s motion and

did not have the effect of extending the deadline by which to file dispositive motions. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is untimely, and the Court

recommends that it be denied on that ground. The Court will, however, consider the filing as an

opposition to Defendant’s motion.

III. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when

it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment must be entered, “after

adequate time for discoveryand upon motion, against a partywho fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548

(1986). The “party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the ‘pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ 

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which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of

its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. 

The parties bearthe burden of supporting their motions and oppositions with the papers they

wish the Court to consider and/or by specifically referencing any other portions of the record they

wish the Court to consider. Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031

(9th Cir. 2001). The Court will not undertake to mine the record for triable issues of fact. Id.

B. Undisputed Background Facts

On July 18, 2006, Plaintiff was housed in the Administrative Segregation Unit at Kern

Valley State Prison in Delano, California. (Doc. 37-3, Def. Undisputed Facts 2 & 4; Doc. 41, Opp.,

Jones Dec. at court record p. 18.) Officer Perez, a female officer, was facilitating showers in the

unit and observed Plaintiff standing on his toilet masturbating. (Def. U.F. 5 & 6; Jones Dec. c.r.

p. 19.) Plaintiff was escorted to Sergeant Harden’s office, verbally counseled, and informed he was

receiving a Rules Violation Report (RVR) based on the incident. (Def. U.F. 14; Opp. & Jones Dec.

c.r. pp. 5 & 19.) Plaintiff became agitated and in expressing his displeasure in receiving an RVR,

raised his voice to Sgt. Harden. (Def. U.F. 15; Opp. c.r. pp. 5 & 6.) Plaintiff was returned to his

cell and shortly thereafter, Plaintiff began kicking his cell door repeatedly with great force out of

anger over receiving the RVR. (Def. U.F. 16 & 17; Opp. & Jones Dec. c.r. p. 6 & 19.)

Officers Terrazas and Palombo responded to Plaintiff’s cell, where they observed him

kicking his cell door. (Def. U.F. 19; Opp. & Jones Dec. c.r. p. 6 & 19.) Defendant Palombo

ordered Plaintiff to stop kicking the cell door. (Def. U.F. 21; Jones Dec. c.r. p. 19.) Plaintiff

stopped kicking the door, walked to the back of the cell, and sat on his desk after Defendant told

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him that kicking the door would not resolve his dissatisfaction with receiving an RVR. (Def. U.F.

25; Jones Dec. c.r. p. 19 & 20.)

Officer Terrazas and Defendant Palombo exited the area, believing the issue was resolved. 

(Def. U.F. 26; Jones Dec. c.r. p. 20.) Plaintiff waited until they began walking down the stairs and

then began kicking the cell door again. (Def. U.F. 27; Jones Dec. c.r. p. 20.) The officers returned

and Defendant Palombo told Plaintiff that if he did not stop kicking the door, Defendant was going

to spray him with pepper spray. (Def. U.F. 33; Jones Dec. c.r. p. 20.) Defendant issued multiple

orders to Plaintiff to quit kicking the cell door or he would be sprayed, but Plaintiff failed to

comply. (Id.) Defendant then opened the food port door and deployed his MK-9 O.C. pepper

spray, spraying toward Plaintiff’s facial area. (Def. U.F. 35; Jones Dec. c.r. p. 20.) Plaintiff

grabbed his state issued mattress and deflected some of the spray from his face while Defendant

emptied his canister. (Def. U.F. 38 & 39; Jones Dec. c.r. p. 20.) 

Thereafter, Plaintiff submitted to being handcuffed and was escorted to a nurse for

examination, after which he was decontaminated. (Def. U.F. 42; Jones Dec. c.r. p. 20.) The injuries

sustained by Plaintiff during the incident were limited to a burning sensation from the pepperspray,

(Def. U.F. 51; Opp. & Jones Dec. c.r. pp. 7 & 21), although Plaintiff also represents the pepper

spray subsequently made his sinus and allergy issues worse, (Opp. & Jones Dec. c.r. pp. 7 & 22).2

C. Legal Standard for Excessive Force Claims

“[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual

punishments forbidden by the Eighth Amendment,” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct.

995 (1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted), and “[w]hat is necessary to establish an

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . varies according to the nature of the alleged

constitutional violation,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5. Correctional officers must balance the need to

maintain or restore discipline through force against the risk of injury to inmates, which may require

them to act quickly and decisively, and which implicates the principle that prison administrators

should be accorded wide deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in

The Court will assume the truth of that representation in resolving Defendant’s motion.

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their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional

security. Id. at 6 (quotations and citations omitted). 

Therefore, for excessive force claims, “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Id. at 6-7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it

may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need

and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any

efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). While “[t]he absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment

inquiry, [it] does not end it.” Id. 

D. Discussion

Plaintiff was angry over receiving an RVR for masturbation and expressed that anger by

forcefully kicking his cell door. After Officers Terrazas and Palombo came to Plaintiff’s cell door

the first time and succeeded in getting Plaintiff to stop kicking the door, Plaintiff waited for them

to leave and then began forcefully kicking the door again. When they returned to his cell, Plaintiff

refused to comply with repeated orders to stop kicking the door, even though he admits he was

warned that pepper spray would be used against him if he did not comply with the orders.

Defendants submit evidence, uncontroverted by Plaintiff, that Officer Ojeda, who was in

the control booth, had an unobstructed view of Plaintiff’s cell and observed Plaintiff kicking his cell

door with as much force as possible. (Def. U.F. 28 & 29.) A red light on the control panel indicates

that a cell door is open or insecure while a green light indicates that a cell door is closed or secure. 

(Def. U.F. 30.) After Plaintiff began kicking his cell door, Officer Ojeda saw the control panel light

for Plaintiff’s cell begin flickering and it continued to flicker as Plaintiff continued to kick the door. 

(Id.) As a result, Officer Ojeda informed Defendant Palombo that the door to Plaintiff’s cell was

no longer secure, which is of particular concern in Administrative Segregation because inmates are

not allowed out of their cells unless restrained and escorted, usually by two officers. (Def. U.F. 31

& 32.) 

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After observing Plaintiff’s cell door move back and forth and receiving Officer Ojeda’s

warning that the cell was no longer secure, and in the face of Plaintiff’s refusal to comply with

repeated orders to stop kicking the door despite being threatened with the use of pepper spray,

Defendant deployed his pepper spray into the cell through the food port door in order to gain

Plaintiff’s compliance with orders. (Def. U.F. 34 & 35; Doc. 37-6, Palombo Dec., ¶22.) Plaintiff

deflected the some of the spray by using his mattress as a shield, but did feel the effects of the spray,

which achieved the desired effect of gaining Plaintiff’s compliance with orders. (Def. U.F. 39;

Palombo Dec., ¶22.) 

Plaintiff argues that the use of pepper spray against him violated his constitutional rights

despite his acknowledgment that he was forcefully kicking his cell door out of anger and refusing

to obey orders to cease, because Defendant used pepper spray not only to gain his compliance but

to “immobilize him” for failing to comply with verbal orders; that Defendant’s conduct was

unprofessional and unreasonable; that Plaintiff did not present a threat to himself or others; that

Defendant had other options to gain compliance, such as issuance of anotherRVR; and that Plaintiff

was harmed by the use of the pepper spray. (Opp. & Jones Dec., c.r. pp. 4, 5, 8, 12, 13, 14, 21, &

22.) 

Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing. Plaintiff’s belief that Defendant could have or should

have used another method to gain control over the situation is unpersuasive in light of the

undisputed facts showing that Plaintiff was repeatedly and forcefully kicking his cell door to the

point of compromising the security of the cell, and that Plaintiff failed to comply with repeated

orders to cease kicking the cell door despite being warned that pepper spray would be deployed. 

The Constitution protects Plaintiff from use of force that is sadistic and malicious. It does not

mandate that prison officials, in the midst of trying to regain control of a situation that is threatening

the safety and security of the institution, evaluate all potential methods and employ one that, in the

inmate’s opinion, is least forceful. 

To the contrary, judgments such as that made by Defendant Palombo in this instance and

under these circumstances are entitled to wide deference. Hudson at 6. Having clearly and

admittedly created a situation that required some sort of response by correctional officers to regain

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order, the Eighth Amendment does not entitle Plaintiff to second guess the method employed to

restrain him. The issue is whether the force was applied in a good-faith effort to restore discipline

or not, and the facts clearly demonstrate that it was so employed. 

Further, the fact that Plaintiff felt pain from the pepper spray and experienced breathing

issues as a result of the application of pepper spray does not suffice to raise a triable issue of fact

with respect to whether the force used was excessive. If pepper spray was benign and caused no

pain, it would be ineffective and would serve no usefulness as a tool by law enforcement to

maintain or restore discipline. It is a given that pain will result from the application of pepperspray

and therefore, suffering from a painful burning sensation is not evidence that the force used was

excessive, as Plaintiff argues.

There is no evidence in the record, other than Plaintiff’s unsupported opinion, that the force

was used against him was malicious and sadistic. Rather, the facts support Defendant’s position

that the use of pepper spray was limited to a good faith effort to restore discipline in light of

Plaintiff’s conduct and failure to obey orders to stop kicking the cell door. The Court finds that 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

The Court finds that based on the undisputed facts in this case, Defendant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant violated his rights under the Eighth

Amendment by using excessive force against him. In light of the Court’s finding that Defendant

is entitled to judgment on the merits, the Court does not reach Defendant’s argument that he is

entitled to qualified immunity.

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, filed June 29, 2009, be GRANTED, and judgment be entered for Defendant and against

Plaintiff.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

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Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 21, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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