Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01643/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01643-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ismael Garcia
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1643

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Ismael Garcia, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 4, 2010

Filed: April 29, 2010

___________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Ismael Garcia pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of

methamphetamine mixture, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846.

The district court imposed a within-Guidelines-range sentence of 156 months in

prison and 5 years of supervised release. Garcia appeals, arguing that the district court

erred in making the drug-quantity calculations, and in classifying his 2007 state drugtrafficking conviction as prior criminal history rather than relevant conduct. We

conclude that there was procedural error at sentencing, so we vacate the judgment and

remand for further proceedings.

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The conspiracy charge to which Garcia pled guilty alleged a conspiracy

occurring between November 1, 2005, and August 1, 2006. The record at sentencing

reflected that Garcia was convicted in Missouri state court in June 2007 for the

offense of trafficking in drugs, second degree, on June 20, 2006. As the state drug

trafficking offense occurred during the time frame of the federal conspiracy, the

question arose at sentencing whether the 2007 Missouri conviction should be counted

as a “prior sentence” for purposes of computing Garcia’s criminal history score under

the federal sentencing guidelines. The term “prior sentence” includes any sentence

previously imposed upon an adjudication of guilt, if the sentence was “for conduct not

part of the instant offense.” USSG § 4A1.2(a). Conduct is “part of the instant

offense” if it is “relevant conduct to the instant offense” under the provisions of USSG

§ 1B1.3. 

At sentencing, Garcia argued that his methamphetamine trafficking in June

2006 was relevant conduct to the federal conspiracy that spanned from November

2005 through August 2006, and that the 2007 Missouri conviction was therefore based

on conduct that was “part of the instant offense.” On that basis, Garcia argued that the

2007 Missouri conviction did not result in a “prior sentence,” and that the court should

not assess three criminal history points for the 2007 conviction. See PSR ¶ 56. 

The district court rejected Garcia’s contention, stating that “to accept your

argument, I would have to assume or conclude that the drugs involved in the Lafayette

County instance were the same drugs that had been attributed to the defendant in this

case.” S. Tr. 46. Finding that the evidence did not show that the probation office had

attributed drugs from the June 2006 offense conduct to Garcia in determining his

offense level for the federal conspiracy, the court overruled Garcia’s objection to the

assessment of three criminal history points. 

We conclude that there was procedural error in calculating the advisory

guideline range, because the district court did not apply the correct legal standard in

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ruling on Garcia’s objection. To determine whether the 2007 Missouri conviction

resulted in a “prior sentence,” the court was required to determine whether the June

2006 conduct was relevant conduct to the federal conspiracy charged in this case.

Whether the probation office attributed to Garcia the quantity of drugs involved in the

June 2006 conduct is not dispositive. The question is whether those drugs should

have been attributed to Garcia as relevant conduct under § 1B1.3. The district court

never addressed this point. We express no view on the proper determination, but

conclude that the case must be remanded for further consideration of Garcia’s

objection to the assessment of three criminal history points under paragraph 56 of the

presentence report.

On Garcia’s remaining contentions, we conclude that there is no procedural

error. We review for plain error the argument first raised on appeal that the district

court erred in using some amounts of methamphetamine mixture and some amounts

of actual methamphetamine to calculate the total drug quantity, and we find none. See

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(B); § 2D1.1, comment (n.10(B)). 

As to other arguments related to the drug quantity, we review the district court’s

calculations for clear error. See United States v. Plancarte-Vazquez, 450 F.3d 848,

852 (8th Cir. 2006). Based on the evidence presented by the government at the

sentencing hearing, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in attributing to

Garcia 23.48 grams of actual methamphetamine from a purchase made by an

undercover detective on December 20, 2005; or in determining that Garcia was

responsible for 2.5 pounds of methamphetamine discussed with an undercover

detective on January 13, 2006, which included 34.52 grams of actual

methamphetamine the detective bought during that same meeting. See U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), (B) (relevant conduct includes all acts “committed, aided, abetted,

counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused” by defendant; and in

case of jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable acts and

omissions of others in furtherance of jointly undertaken criminal activity); PlancarteAppellate Case: 09-1643 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/29/2010 Entry ID: 3659636
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Vazquez, 450 F.3d at 852 (when calculating drug quantity in context of narcoticstrafficking conspiracy, sentencing court may consider all transactions known or

reasonably foreseeable to defendant that were made in furtherance of conspiracy;

district court’s assessment of witness’s credibility is almost never clear error given

that court’s comparative advantage at evaluating credibility); see also Anderson v.

City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (describing circumstances

where district court’s finding is clearly erroneous). Contrary to Garcia’s argument,

the drugs represented by the 34.52 grams were not double counted. 

We reject Garcia’s contention that the district court clearly erred by attributing

to Garcia approximately two ounces of methamphetamine mixture that he displayed,

but did not sell, to an undercover detective on January 10, 2006. It was not clear error

for the court to credit the detective’s testimony that Garcia admitted to possessing four

ounces total during the January 10 transaction, two of which were not distributed.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment and remand for resentencing.

______________________________

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