Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06011/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06011-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary Alford
Appellant
Tracy McCullum
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

GARY L. ALFORD 

Petitioner – Appellant, 

v. 

TRACY McCULLUM, Warden 

Respondent – Appellee. 

No. 15-6011 

(D.C. No. 5:13-CV-01256-HE) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

 Gary Alford is a prisoner currently in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of 

Corrections. Alford was tried and convicted in state court on charges of Unlawful 

Possession of A Controlled Drug with Intent to Distribute, Possession of a Controlled 

Substance, Driving a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of an Intoxicating 

Substance, Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and Possession of a Controlled 

Dangerous Substance with Intent to Distribute after two or more previous felony 

convictions. For these offenses, Alford was sentenced to over twenty years of 

imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) 

 *

 This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 

consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 29, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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affirmed Alford’s conviction and sentence. The trial court then denied Alford’s 

application for post-conviction relief, and again the OCCA affirmed. 

Alford then initiated this § 2254 action in the Western District of Oklahoma. A report 

and recommendation by the magistrate judge found no actionable deficiencies in the 

OCCA’s treatment of the four grounds for relief urged by Alford. Thus, the magistrate 

recommended denying habeas relief on all four grounds. Alford filed an objection to the 

magistrate’s report and recommendation in which he raised only one issue. After 

reviewing de novo the magistrate’s report and recommendation and considering Alford’s 

objection, the district court adopted the magistrate’s report in its entirety. The district 

court also denied Alford a certification of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), 

finding that he had not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 

Alford now seeks a certificate of appealability before this court, arguing only that the 

coercive effect of the state magistrate’s error in refusing to appoint him counsel before 

his preliminary hearing rendered his later waiver of counsel involuntary in violation of 

the Sixth Amendment. For the reasons stated herein, we deny Alford’s application for a 

certificate of appealability and dismiss Alford's appeal. 

I. Factual Background 

Alford was arrested on November 6, 2009. According to an affidavit submitted by 

the arresting officer, she pulled Alford over after observing him driving 30 miles per hour 

in a 60 mile per hour zone for a sustained period of time. The officer also asserted that, 

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upon approaching Alford’s car, she smelled burnt marijuana and observed an empty beer 

can on Alford’s front seat. The officer eventually arrested Alford for driving under the 

influence of drugs. When the police inventoried his car, they recovered a digital scale and 

two plastic bags containing marijuana. 

Of particular relevance to Alford’s appeal here are the circumstances surrounding his 

appearance at the preliminary hearing. Before his preliminary hearing, Alford filed three 

documents: (1) a motion for discovery in which he stated he was appearing “pro se”; (2) a 

pauper’s affidavit that stated he had no source of income, that he had not been employed 

for five years, and that his brother had posted his bond; and (3) an application for 

appointed counsel in which he stated he could not afford to hire an attorney. An 

Oklahoma district court judge denied the application for an appointed attorney, observing 

that when he attempted to call Alford he was told Alford was “at work” and thus Alford’s 

statement concerning his lack of employment was no longer true. 

At Alford’s preliminary hearing, the judge advised him of his right to counsel and of 

the dangers inherent in self-representation. Alford indicated he wanted to represent 

himself because he might get a “lazy lawyer” who “would do nothing with it.” He also 

stated he believed he was competent to represent himself at the preliminary hearing, and 

that he was waiving his right to have an attorney present at the preliminary hearing. 

Alford later retained private counsel who entered an appearance in his case on June 

3, 2010. This counsel was allowed to withdraw on December 1, 2010, after Alford had 

again expressed a desire to represent himself. Before Alford’s trial, the judge again 

advised him of his rights to counsel, to self-representation, and to court-appointed 

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counsel if he could not afford to hire an attorney. Alford stated that he wanted to represent 

himself but he requested that the court appoint him an attorney to help in answering his 

questions and in directing him how to proceed. After a series of further discussions, 

Alford was eventually appointed counsel. 

Upon commencement of his trial, Alford’s appointed counsel informed the judge that 

Alford wished to make his own opening statement. Following further discussion, Alford 

again waived his right to counsel and decided to undertake self-representation. He was 

convicted by the jury on all counts. 

Alford appealed this verdict to the OCCA, arguing as his sole proposition of error 

that “the magistrate erred in refusing to appoint counsel” for him before his preliminary 

hearing and that the “coercive effect of this error” rendered his “subsequent waiver of 

counsel inadequate as it was not a voluntary waiver.” The court rejected this argument. 

Alford then sought post-conviction relief in the trial court. This application was denied, 

and the OCCA affirmed the district court’s decision. 

Alford then brought the current §2254 action in federal court, offering four grounds 

for error. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation rejecting Alford’s 

argument on all four grounds, and Alford’s only objection to the report concerned the 

magistrate’s rejection of Alford’s argument that the coercive effect of the state 

magistrate’s error in refusing to appoint him counsel before his preliminary hearing 

rendered his later waiver of counsel involuntary in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 

After the district court reviewed de novo the magistrate’s report and recommendation and 

considered Alford’s objection, it chose to adopt the magistrate’s report in its entirety. The 

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district court also denied Alford a certification of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2), finding that he had not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” Alford now appeals to this court, again raising only his Sixth 

Amendment argument. 

II. The COA 

A COA acts as a jurisdictional prerequisite to our consideration of a state prisoner’s 

appeal from the denial of his habeas petition by the district court. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 335–36 (2003). Until a COA is issued, we lack jurisdiction to rule on the 

merits of such an appeal. Id. at 336. To obtain a COA, a plaintiff must make a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where, as 

here, a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, a plaintiff can 

obtain a COA only by “showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the 

petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were 

‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893, n.4 (1983)). 

Alford has not made an adequate showing here. His brief before this court contains, 

principally, a lengthy recitation of his version of the “facts” concerning whether or not he 

had counsel at various periods throughout his trial and the reasons he chose (or, 

according to his brief, did not choose) to waive counsel. At this point in the proceedings 

we must give the OCCA’s factual findings a presumption of correctness, 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1), and Alford has provided no basis for us to overcome this presumption. Both 

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the OCCA and the magistrate judge thoroughly considered and disposed of Alford’s 

arguments based on his waiver (or lack of waiver) of counsel. Having carefully reviewed 

Alford’s brief, the record on appeal, the OCCA’s decision, and the magistrate’s report, we 

can find no basis for determining that Alford’s claim meets our standard for the grant of a 

certificate of appealability. Although we therefore lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of 

this appeal, we provide a brief review of Alford’s claim to illustrate our basis for denying 

Alford a COA. 

Given that the OCCA reviewed and denied Alford’s Sixth Amendment claim on the 

merits, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) would govern our 

review of this claim. Under the AEDPA we could not grant relief absent a showing that 

(1) the state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The magistrate 

correctly determined that the relevant Supreme Court precedent here is Farretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975), which holds that the waiver of counsel must be 

made “knowingly and intelligently.” In Alford’s case, the OCCA found that he 

was thoroughly and repeatedly advised of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation. He had the means to hire a lawyer and did so before [he] fired his 

attorneys and strongly asserted his right to represent himself. He proceeded to trial 

pro se where he was assisted by stand-by counsel to whom he was not entitled. 

 

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Based on these findings, the OCCA determined that Alford’s waiver of counsel was 

knowing and voluntary and that he suffered no violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel. 

The record before this court buttresses the OCCA’s conclusions, and we do not 

believe reasonable jurists could find any reason to encourage Alford to proceed further. 

Alford told the state court trial judge that he was unhappy with his lawyers and wanted to 

proceed without counsel. He unequivocally stated that he did not want court-appointed 

counsel to “lead” his defense and instead preferred to represent himself with stand-by 

counsel. He repeatedly reiterated this preference even after being informed of the dangers 

of self-representation. Given these unrefuted facts, we conclude that Alford’s waiver of 

counsel was both knowing and intelligent. Alford has failed to provide any basis for a 

reasonable jurist to determine that the OCCA unreasonably applied governing Supreme 

Court precedent or made an unreasonable determination of the facts. We can see no 

grounds for granting a COA on this claim. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated herein, we DENY Alford’s application for a certificate of 

appealability, DENY Alford’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and DISMISS 

Alford’s appeal. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge 

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