Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-01268/USCOURTS-caDC-96-01268-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Association of Manufacturers
Petitioner
United States Department of the Interior
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 5, 1997 Decided January 16, 1998 

No. 96-1268

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS,

PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

United States Department of the Interior

James R. Bieke argued the cause for the petitioner. William R. Galeota and Jan Amundson were on brief.

Greer S. Goldman, Attorney, United States Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for the respondent. Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and Naikang Tsao, Attorney, 

were on brief.

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Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq., 

(CERCLA) permits a "trustee" 1to recover from a "potentially responsible party" (PRP) 2

"damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable 

costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting 

from ... a release" of a hazardous substance regulated under 

CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(C). Subsection 301(c)(1) of 

CERCLA, directs the President (acting through his designee, 

the Secretary of the United States Department of Interior) to 

promulgate regulations that "specify ... standard procedures 

for simplified assessments [of natural resource damages] 

requiring minimal field observation, including establishing 

measures of damages based on units of discharge or release 

or units of affected area." 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c). A damage 

________

1 A "trustee" is a federal, state or Indian tribal official who, in 

accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2), is designated to "act on 

behalf of the public as [a] trustee[ ] for natural resources."

2 Under CERCLA, a PRP is:

(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,

(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous 

substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,

(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such 

person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and 

containing such hazardous substances, and

(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there 

is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, ...

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

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assessment performed according to these procedures is entitled to "the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption ... 

in any administrative or judicial proceeding." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9607(f)(2)(C).

This is a challenge to the final rule of the Department of 

the Interior (DOI), entitled "Natural Resource Damage AssessmentsType A Procedures," 61 Fed. Reg. 20,560 (1996) 

(codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (hereinafter 1996 Type A rule), 

that partially implements CERCLA section 301(c), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9651(c). The petitioner, National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), claims that the Type A final rule violates 

CERCLA and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 551 et seq., (APA), and therefore must be vacated for one 

or more of the following reasons: (1) the rule permits damages to be calculated without on-site verification that a natural resource has in fact been injured and that the injury is in 

fact attributable to the particular release in question; (2) the 

rule does not require a trustee to consider, in calculating 

natural resource damage (NRD), an alternative to restoration 

of an adversely affected resource (i.e., replacing a damaged 

resource or acquiring its equivalent); (3) the rule arbitrarily 

and capriciously fails to relate selected restoration alternatives to the "services" provided by the resource; 3

(4) the rule 

allows recovery for purely speculative losses regarding the 

affected resource's ability to assimilate future releases; (5) 

the rule authorizes recovery of private losses related to 

commercial fishing and hunting; (6) the rule's databases and 

computer submodels are not the "best available procedures" 

for determining NRD and invalidly rely on outdated studies 

and information or on suspect methodologies or both; (7) the 

rule permits a trustee to use Type A and Type B procedures 

________

3 Natural resource "services" consist of "the physical and biological functions performed by the resource including the human uses 

of those functions. These services are the result of the physical, 

chemical, or biological quality of the resource." 43 C.F.R. 

§ 11.14(nn) (1996).

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in combination to assess NRD from a single release; 4and (8) 

the rule provides for calculation of NRD resulting from 

releases or discharges of oil, notwithstanding the enactment 

of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.,

which authorizes the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to regulate oil releases or discharges.

DOI contends that NAM's first and fifth claims are untimely, the third claim was not raised below, one of the arguments 

included in NAM's seventh claim is not ripe for review and 

the eighth claim should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

Additionally, DOI responds on the merits, arguing that its 

interpretation of the relevant CERCLA provisions is entitled 

to deference under Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources 

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In addition, DOI 

contends that its damage submodels are otherwise reasonable, scientifically valid and adequately supported by credible 

studies.

We conclude that NAM failed to raise the third claim below 

and that it lacks standing to bring the eighth claim. Regarding the remaining claims, we conclude that DOI's interpretation of relevant CERCLA provisions is entitled to deference 

under step two of the familiar Chevron analysis and that its 

damage submodels suffice. Accordingly, we deny NAM's 

request to set aside DOI's 1996 Type A rule, as amended.5

I. BACKGROUND

Section 301(c) of CERCLA recites:

________

4 The "Type A" and "Type B" titles come from the clauses of 

subsection 301(c)(2): clause "A" requires DOI to develop "standard 

procedures for simplified assessments" and clause "B" requires DOI 

to develop "alternative protocols for conducting assessments in 

individual cases." 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2).

5 DOI informed the court that it promulgated certain technical 

corrections to the May 1996 rule on November 10, 1997. See

Natural Resource Damage AssessmentsType A Procedures, 62 

Fed. Reg. 60,457 (1997) (hereinafter Revisions to 1996 Type A rule). 

As discussed infra notes 16 and 23, the corrections moot two of 

NAM's challenges to the Type A procedures.

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(1) The President, acting through Federal officials 

designated by the National Contingency Plan published 

under section 9605 of this title, shall study and, not later 

than two years after December 11, 1980 shall promulgate 

regulations for the assessment of damages for injury to, 

destruction of, or loss of natural resources resulting from 

a release of oil or a hazardous substance for the purposes 

of this chapter and section 1321(f)(4) and (5) of Title 33. 

Notwithstanding the failure of the President to promulgate the regulations required under this subsection on 

the required date, the President shall promulgate such 

regulations not later than 6 months after October 17, 

1986.

(2) Such regulations shall specify (A) standard procedures for simplified assessments requiring minimal field 

observation, including establishing measures of damages 

based on units of discharge or release or units of affected 

area, and (B) alternative protocols for conducting assessments in individual cases to determine the type and 

extent of short- and long-term injury, destruction, or 

loss. Such regulations shall identify the best available 

procedures to determine such damages, including both 

direct and indirect injury, destruction, or loss and shall 

take into consideration factors including, but not limited 

to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover.

(3) Such regulations shall be reviewed and revised as 

appropriate every two years.

42 U.S.C. § 9651(c). Trustees must retain sums recovered 

for NRD "without further appropriation, for use only to 

restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of [the damaged] 

resources." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). Further, "[t]he measure 

of damages in any action ... [is] not ... limited by the sums 

which can be used to restore or replace" the affected resources, although CERCLA proscribes "double recovery ... 

for natural resource damages, including the costs of damage 

assessment or restoration, rehabilitation, or acquisition for 

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the same release and natural resource." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9607(f)(1).

As the final sentence of subsection 301(c)(1) foresaw, development of Type A and Type B procedures has not been 

accomplished as expeditiously as the Congress directed. Today, more than 17 years after section 301(c) of CERCLA was 

enacted, DOI has developed "simplified assessment[ ]" (i.e., 

Type A) procedures for only two aquatic environments: (1) 

the Great Lakes environments and (2) coastal and marine 

environments. The latter were the first Type A procedures 

developed; they were promulgated in 1987, see Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 52 Fed. Reg. 9042 (1987) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1988)) (hereinafter 1987 Type A rule), 

and subsequently reviewed by this court, see Colorado v. 

DOI, 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Colorado we upheld 

the 1987 Type A rule in part and vacated it in part, relying on 

our companion decision reviewing a challenge to DOI's Type 

B rule. See Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 

[hereinafter Ohio II]. After Coloradoin which we stated 

that "[w]e fully expect DOI to act as expeditiously as possible," 880 F.2d at 491DOI spent almost seven more years 

revising the Type A procedures and adding to them submodels for assessing NRD in Great Lakes environments. See

1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,560.

In light of the delay, it is indeed fortunate that a trustee 

has authority under CERCLA to settle claims for NRD 

without recourse to either Type A or Type B procedures. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 9622. Even if claims are not settled, a 

trustee is under no obligation to use Type A or Type B 

procedures to calculate damagesalthough the trustee must 

use the procedures if it wishes to use the rebuttable presumption provided for in subsection 107(f))(2)(C) of CERCLA, 42 

U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C). See 43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (1996).

If a trustee decides that a formal assessment is needed to 

effect recovery of NRD, the trustee must complete four 

administrative steps: (1) Preassessment, (2) Assessment 

Plan, (3) Assessment and (4) Post Assessment. 1996 Type A 

rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,562. The first step, Preassessment, 

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consists of "rapid review of readily available information that 

focuses on resources for which the Federal or State agency or 

Indian tribe may assert trusteeship under section 107(f) or 

section 126(d) of CERCLA." 43 C.F.R. § 11.23(b) (1996). 

The purpose of the Preassessment is to "ensure that there is 

a reasonable probability of making a successful claim before 

monies and efforts are expended in carrying out an assessment." Id.

The second step, the Assessment Plan, is undertaken "to 

ensure that the assessment is performed in a planned and 

systematic manner and that methodologies selected ... for a 

type A assessment or ... for a type B assessment ... can be 

conducted at a reasonable cost." 43 C.F.R. § 11.30(b). "The 

Assessment Plan must identify and document the use of all of 

the type A and/or type B procedures that will be performed 

... [and] be of sufficient detail to serve as a means of 

evaluating whether the approach used for assessing the damage is likely to be cost-effective and meets the definition of 

reasonable cost, as those terms are used" in the applicable 

regulations. Id. § 11.31(a)(1)-(2).

A trustee can use Type A procedures if six environmental 

conditions are met:

(a) The released substance entered an area covered by 

the [coastal and marine or Great Lakes procedures] ...

(b) The [type A procedures] cover the released substance[;] ...

(c) The released substance entered the water at or 

near the surface[;] ...

(d) At the time of the release, winds did not vary 

spatially over the area affected by the release in a way 

that would significantly affect the level or extent of 

injuries;

(e) The authorized official is not aware of any reliable 

evidence that, for species that are likely to represent a 

significant portion of the claim, the species biomass is 

significantly lower than the species biomass assigned by 

the [relevant computer submodels][; and] ...

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(f) Subsurface currents either: are not expected to 

significantly affect the level or extent of injuries; or are 

reasonably uniform with depth over the water column in 

the area affected by the release.

43 C.F.R. § 11.34 (1996). If a release is within these environmental parameters, a preliminary assessment of damages is 

performed according to Type A procedures and included in 

the draft Assessment Plan made available for public review 

and comment. Id. § 11.43. If the preliminary assessment 

indicates that damages will exceed $100,000, a trustee must 

either "(1) limit the portion of [the trustee's] claim calculated 

with the type A procedure to $100,000; or (2) compute all 

damages using type B procedures." Id. § 11.42(b). Nevertheless "[t]he $100,000 limit applies only to damages calculated by a type A procedure and does not limit damages 

calculated through supplemental type B studies." 1996 Type 

A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,563.

In deciding whether to use Type A or Type B procedures 

(or some combination of the two), the trustee must "weigh[ ] 

the difficulty of collecting site-specific data against the suitability of the averaged data and simplifying assumptions in the 

type A procedure for the release being assessed." 43 C.F.R. 

§ 11.35(a) (1996). The trustee may elect to use Type B 

procedures if "they can be performed at a reasonable cost and 

if the increase in accuracy outweighs the increase in assessment costs." Id. Even if a trustee decides to use Type A 

procedures, a PRP may nonetheless insist on Type B procedures. See id. § 11.35(b); 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 

20,562.

A trustee may use both Type A and Type B procedures to 

calculate NRD for the same release if the following criteria 

are met:

(1) The type B procedures are cost-effective and can 

be performed at a reasonable cost;

(2) There is no double recovery; and

(3) The type B procedures are used only to determine 

damages for injuries or compensable values that do not 

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fall into the categories addressed by the type A procedure.

43 C.F.R. § 11.36(a) (1996). If a trustee decides to use both 

kinds of procedures, it "must document in the Assessment 

Plan how [it] intend[s] to prevent double recovery." 1996 

Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,563.

The third step of the process, "Assessment," is subdivided 

into three phases:

Injury Determination; Quantification; and Damage Determination. In Injury Determination, trustees determine whether any natural resources have been injured. 

If trustees determine that resources have been injured, 

they proceed to Quantification, in which they quantify the 

resulting change in baseline conditions. "Baseline" conditions are the conditions that would have existed had the 

release not occurred. Finally, in Damage Determination, 

trustees calculate the monetary compensation to be 

sought as damages for the natural resource injuries. 

Damages include two components: (1) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, and/or acquiring the equivalent of the injured natural resources; and (2) the economic value lost by the public pending recovery of the 

resources (compensable value).

When trustees use type B procedures, they perform 

Injury Determination, Quantification, and Damage Determination through laboratory and field studies....

When trustees use a type A procedure, they perform 

Injury Determination, Quantification, and Damage Determination through a computer model....

Trustees must supply a number of data inputs to 

operate the [Type A submodels]. The rule also requires 

trustees to modify certain data contained in the models if 

they have more reliable information.... After trustees 

supply the data inputs and modifications, the models 

themselves perform the remaining calculations necessary 

to establish if there has been an injury, quantify the 

extent of injury, select appropriate restoration actions, 

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and value economic losses. With the availability of these 

computer models, trustees will now be able to pursue 

compensation for cases in which the cost of detailed type 

B studies is prohibitive.

1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,562-63. While the Type 

A computer submodels take into account a number of "site 

specific factors," including "physical variations among geographic areas, differences in the toxicity and physical characteristics of hazardous substances, seasonal and temperature 

effects, and differences in the biological productivity of the 

spill site," they do not require on-site testing, nor do they 

require empirical testing to establish a causal link between 

the release and any observable injury. Id. at 20,563.

Four computer programs comprise the Type A submodels 

and perform the damage calculations at the Assessment 

stage: (1) the Physical Fates Submodel, (2) the Biological 

Effects Submodel, (3) the Restoration Submodel and (4) the 

Compensable Value Submodel. 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. 

Reg. at 20,565-67. "The physical fates submodel estimates 

the distribution of the released substance on the water surface, along shorelines, in the water column, and in sediments 

over time." Id. at 20,565. "The biological effects submodel 

determines whether certain types of natural resource injuries 

have resulted from the release and, if so, quantifies those 

injuries." Id. "The restoration submodel estimates the cost, 

if any, of restoring the injured resources." Id. Finally, 

"[c]ompensable value, as computed by the compensable value 

submodel, is the sum of certain economic use values lost to 

the public pending reestablishment of baseline conditions 

through either natural recovery or active restoration, as 

determined by the restoration submodel." Id. at 20,566.

The fourth and final step of the process is the PostAssessment phase, at which time the trustee prepares a 

"Report of Assessment that consists of the Preassessment 

Screen Determination, the Assessment Plan, and the information" used by the Type A submodels to calculate damages. 

43 C.F.R. § 11.90(a) (1996). A copy of the report is then 

attached to the demand letter the trustee sends the PRP. Id.

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§ 11.91. Finally, the trustee prepares a Restoration Plan, as 

required by section 111(i) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9611, 

which details "how the monies [recovered] will be used to 

address natural resources, specifically, what restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the equivalent resources will occur." Id. § 11.93(a).

II. DISCUSSION

The yardstick by which we assess the petitioner's APA and 

Chevron challenges to the 1996 Type A rule is the one we 

used in Colorado:

We review DOI's type A rules, promulgated after 

informal notice and comment rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. 

§ 553(c), under the familiar "arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law" standard, see id. § 706(2)(A). Under this standard, 

we are mindful a reviewing court is "not to substitute its 

judgment for that of the agency." Citizens to Preserve 

Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 

823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971).

Moreover, it is well-established that when presented 

with "a pure question of statutory construction," a reviewing court's "first job is to try to determine congressional intent using 'traditional tools of statutory construction,' " NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 

Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 413, 421, 98 L.Ed.2d 429 

(1987) (quoting INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 

107 S.Ct. 1207, 1221, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)), for if 

"Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 

issue," then "the court, as well as the agency, must give 

effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress," Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-

43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). If, 

however, "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 

to the specific issue," id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782, then 

the question becomes whether the agency charged with 

implementing the statuteDOI in this casehas made a 

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"reasonable" interpretation, id. at 845, 104 S.Ct. at 2783, 

i.e., one that is "rational and consistent with the statute." 

United Food & Commercial Workers, 108 S.Ct. at 421.

880 F.2d at 486.

Thus, in reviewing an APA challenge to an agency's technical judgments incorporated in a submodel, "the agency's 

choice of model and its application must be respected when 

the record discloses that the agency examined the relevant 

data and articulated a reasoned basis for its decision." Ohio 

II, 880 F.2d at 479. Similarly, when reviewing an agency's 

technical judgments under step two of Chevron, we ask 

whether the agency's choices are "reasonable and consistent 

with congressional intent, and therefore worthy of deference." 

Id. at 477; accord Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. DOI, 88 

F.3d 1191, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting need to "defer to the 

agency's decision about how to strike th[e] balance" between 

conflicting statutory and policy goals "unless [the decision] is 

unreasonable"). Moreover, in applying both of these standards to the scientific judgment of an agency, we do not 

"review scientific judgments of the agency ... as the chemist, 

biologist, or statistician that we are neither qualified by 

training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court 

exercising our narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to 

certain minimal standards of rationality," Troy Corp. v. 

Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted), or, in the context of Chevron step two, 

assuring at a minimum the reasonableness of the judgment in 

light of the requirements imposed (or discretion granted) by 

the authorizing statute.

A. Verification of Injury and Causation

NAM first argues that DOI's Type A rule, which relies on 

computer submodels to calculate the types and amounts of 

damages that are rebuttably presumed to result from a 

particular release, violates subsections 107(a)(C) and 301(c)(1) 

of CERCLA, which limit recovery to damages "resulting from 

a release." 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(C), 9651(c)(1). Since DOI's 

computer submodels require only limited, site-specific data to 

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calculate damages, NAM contends that they improperly relieve the trustee of its burden to demonstrate that a particular release in fact caused injury to a specific natural resource. 

Further, NAM reasons that even if such submodels could in 

theory be used to calculate NRD, the submodels DOI has 

developed are too crude to reliably predict injuries to natural 

resources that are likely to "result from" releases and are 

therefore inconsistent with the command of subsection 

301(c)(2) to "identify the best available procedures to determine ... damages." See Ohio II, 880 F.2d at 462 ("Congress 

directed DOI to select ... 'best available' methodologies for 

determining damages, 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2), and a procedure that permitted unduly speculative assessments would 

not fulfill this intent."). We reject both arguments on their 

merits.

(1) Timeliness of challenge

DOI first responds that NAM's challenge is time-barred 

under section 113(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a), which 

requires that a petition for review of a final regulation be 

brought "within 90 days from the date of [its] promulgation." 

DOI reasons that since its 1987 Type A rule relied on the 

same kind of predictive computer submodels to establish 

causation and injury, NAM's challenge now is untimely because it should have been brought, if at all, in 1987. DOI is 

mistaken.

While an agency need not subject settled policy or established statutory interpretation to renewed legal challenge 

whenever it revises a regulation, "the period for seeking 

judicial review may be made to run anew when the agency in 

question by some new promulgation creates the opportunity 

for renewed comment and objection." Ohio v. EPA, 838 F.2d 

1325, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Ohio I]. Thus, in Ohio 

I we held that, although the petitioner had an opportunity to 

comment on the relevant provision in the original regulation, 

it was not barred from challenging the provision in the 

revised regulation because the agency had republished the 

provision, explained it anew and responded to at least one 

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comment directed to it. Id. at 1328-29; see also Kennecott,

88 F.3d at 1213 ("[J]udicial review of longstanding regulation 

is not barred when an agency reopens an issue covered in, or 

changes its interpretation of, that regulation; e.g., if an 

agency in the course of a rulemaking proceeding solicits 

comments on a pre-existing regulation or otherwise indicates 

its willingness to reconsider such a regulation by inviting and 

responding to comments, then a new review period is triggered."). However, "[t]he 'reopening rule' of [Ohio I] is not a 

license for bootstrap procedures by which petitioners can 

comment on matters other than those actually at issue, goad 

an agency into a reply, and then sue on the grounds that the 

agency had re-opened the issue." American Iron & Steel 

Inst. v. EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,

497 U.S. 1003 (1990). Thus, "when the agency merely responds to an unsolicited comment by reaffirming its prior 

position, that response does not create a new opportunity for 

review." Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1213.

Moreover, "the appropriate way to challenge a longstanding regulation on the ground that it is 'violative of statute' is 

ordinarily 'by filing a petition for amendment or rescission of 

the agency's regulations, and challenging the denial of that 

petition.' " Id. at 1214 (quoting Public Citizen v. Nuclear 

Regulatory Comm'n, 901 F.2d 147, 152 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990)). But "where an agency reiterates a rule or policy in such a way as to render the rule or 

policy subject to renewed challenge on any substantive 

grounds, a coordinate challenge that such a rule or policy is 

contrary to law" need not proceed by amendment or rescission petition. Public Citizen, 901 F.2d at 152-53. In such 

circumstances, to require that an administrative petition precede the "coordinate challenge" to the lawfulness of the 

agency's provision "would be a waste of time and resources." 

Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1214.

An agency may be deemed to have "constructively reopened" a previously unchallenged decision if its original 

rulemaking did not give adequate notice or incentive to 

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contest the agency's decision. For example, as a result of the 

partial invalidation of the 1986 Type B rule in the Ohio II

litigation,

our invalidation of that rule might have changed the 

stakes of a court challenge. In this situation, we would 

likely hold that Interior's adherence to its resolution of 

certain issues that arose in the course of the 1986 

proceeding was, even if not expressly reopened in its 

1994 rulemaking, constructively reopened by the change 

in regulatory context. For us to foreclose review of the 

agency's decision to adhere to the status quo ante under 

changed circumstances, on the grounds that the agency 

had not evidenced a willingness to reconsider the issue, 

would be to deny the significance of our own earlier 

ruling.

Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1214. Thus, "[b]efore any litigant 

reasonably can be expected to present a petition for review of 

an agency rule, he first must be put on fair notice that the 

rule in question is applicable to him." Recreation Vehicle 

Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 653 F.2d 562, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 

Accordingly, in Recreation Vehicle the court held that because it was unclear that EPA's final rule on noise emission 

levels for medium and heavy trucks applied to motor homes, 

"[t]he agency cannot now take advantage of the obscurity of 

its intentions in order to defeat [the petitioner's] rights 

statutorily conferred." Id.

Here, DOI's substantial revisions to the Type A procedures 

significantly altered the "regulatory context." In particular, 

the circumstances in which a trustee may elect to use Type A 

procedures to calculate damages have been significantly modified by the 1996 revisions. For example, a trustee may now 

supplement Type A procedures with selected Type B protocols, it may use Type A procedures in circumstances where 

species mortality may not be the anticipated principal adverse 

effect, it may use Type A procedures even if the release does 

not result in closing a fishing, beach or hunting area and it 

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may now utilize Type A procedures for releases in both Great 

Lakes and coastal and marine environments. Compare 43 

C.F.R. § 11.33 (1987) with 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.34, 11.35, 11.36, 

11.42(b) (1996).6 Thus, although DOI may not have intended 

to reopen the issue of the predictive aspect of its computer 

submodels' calculations of injury and causation, see 1996 Type 

A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,582, the different regulatory 

context wrought by the 1996 rule "significantly alter[ed] the 

stakes of judicial review," Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1227, and 

thereby constructively reopened to challenge the predictive 

nature of the computer submodels.

________

6 Kennecott also holds that there is no "constructive reopening" if 

"parties had adequate notice of a forthcoming change that might 

alter their incentive to seek judicial review." 88 F.3d at 1214. 

There, because potential litigants were on notice during the pendency of legal challenges to DOI's Type B rule (i.e., Ohio II) "that 

restoration cost rather than market value could become the predominant basis for damage assessments," we held that litigants 

"had an ample incentive at that time [i.e., before 1989 decision in 

Ohio II] to protest any provision [of the 1986 Type B rule] that 

might inflate restoration costs." Id. at 1215.

This case is distinguishable. Although DOI issued an advance 

notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) for the Great Lakes procedures in June 1988 (see Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 53 

Fed. Reg. 20,143, 20,143-46 (1988)) while our review of the 1987 

Type A rule was still pending, we do not believe that the ANPR was 

sufficient to put NAM or other interested parties on notice that the 

yet-to-be-developed Type A procedures for the Great Lakes would 

permit calculation of NRD for a release without on-site verification 

of injury and causation. In contrast to the Type B provisions at 

issue in Kennecott, the Great Lakes submodels were not a part of 

the Type A rule that DOI initially promulgated in 1987. Thus, 

unlike the Ohio II challenge, the Colorado litigation did not alert 

NAM and other potentially interested parties that a vestigial provision of the 1987 rule might have added significance as a result of 

that litigation. Therefore, Recreational Vehicles rather than Kennecott supplies the rule of decision: "Before any litigant reasonably 

can be expected to present a petition for review, he first must be 

put on fair notice that the rule in question is applicable to him." 

653 F.2d at 568.

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(2) Merits of challenge

DOI fares better responding to the merits of NAM's challengethat CERCLA sections 107(a)(C) and 301(c)(1) authorize a trustee to recover damages only for those injuries 

"resulting from ... a release"; DOI's Type A procedures 

permit a trustee to recover damages without any on-site, 

empirical verification that injury has in fact "result[ed] from" 

a particular release; therefore, DOI's predictive damage calculators are violative of CERCLA.

Contrary to NAM's contentions, we find nothing in the 

relevant provisions of CERCLA that requires greater proof 

of causation and injury than is provided by DOI's predictive 

computer submodels. Regarding causation, this court has 

repeatedly held that CERCLA is ambiguous on the precise 

question of what standard of proof is required to demonstrate 

that natural resource injuries were caused by, or "result[ ] 

from," a particular release. See Ohio II, 880 F.2d at 472 

("[W]hile we agree with petitioners that Congress expressed 

dissatisfaction with the common law as a norm in several 

areas of damage assessment, we conclude that CERCLA is at 

best ambiguous on the question of whether the causation-ofinjury standard under § 107(a)(C) must be less demanding 

than that of the common law."); Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1224 

("CERCLA left it to Interior to define the measure of damages in natural resources damage assessment cases.... 

While the statutory language requires some causal connection 

between the element of damages and the injurythe damages must be 'for' an injury 'resulting from a release of oil or 

a hazardous substance'Congress has not specified precisely 

what that causal relationship should be.") (citation omitted).

Similarly, we find nothing in the "resulting from" language 

of subsections 107(a)(C) and 301(c)(1), or other provisions of 

CERCLA, to indicate that the Congress unambiguously intended a particular kind or quantity of causation and injury 

proof as a prerequisite to recovery of NRD. While we have 

noted that the "best available procedures" language of subUSCA Case #96-1268 Document #323821 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 17 of 49
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section 301(c)(2) indicates that it would be inconsistent with 

CERCLA to permit "unduly speculative assessments," Ohio 

II, 880 F.2d at 462, we have never held that simply because 

assessments procedures are in some measure "speculative" or 

"predictive" they are contrary to CERCLA's "best available 

procedures" admonition. Rather, predictive submodels that 

represent rational scientific judgments about the probability 

that a particular release will cause a specific type and amount 

of injury are consistent with the Congress's intent to develop 

a "standardized system for assessing such damage which is 

efficient as to both time and cost." S. Rep. No. 96-848, at 85 

(1980); 7cf. Ohio II, 880 F.2d at 455 ("[S]upport for the 

proposition that Congress adopted common-law damage standards wholesale into CERCLA is slim to nonexistent.").

Moreover, contrary to NAM's suggestions, the fact that the 

Congress may have generally viewed recovery of NRD as a 

"compensatory remedy"see 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 

at 20,582; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1)does not mean that the 

Congress intended to require adducement of a particular 

quality and quantity of proof of injury, loss or destruction 

before allowing recovery. Rather, DOI developed the Type A 

procedures so that the public would be compensated for the 

NRD resulting from minor spills; the kind of spill ill suited 

for the expensive and resource-intensive Type B procedures. 

Cf. 1996 Type A final rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,572 ("Because 

of the cost involved in performing site-specific type B studies, 

trustees have rarely pursued damage claims for minor releases.").

Accordingly, we proceed to the second step of the Chevron

analysis, where "we ask whether [DOI] has adopted a reasonable interpretation of the statutethat is whether the agency 

considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion and 

whether the interpretation is arguably consistent with the 

underlying statutory scheme in a substantive sense." Kenne-

________

7 As we observed in Colorado, "[b]ecause the House concurred in 

the Senate bill [that became CERCLA] without amendment, see 126 

Cong. Rec. 31,950-82 (1980), th[is] Senate report is powerful evidence of congressional intent." 880 F.2d at 487.

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cott, 88 F.3d at 1206 (internal quotations omitted); accord 

Ohio II, 880 F.2d at 441 ("If ... the statute is ambiguous or 

silent on a particular issue, this court must assume that 

Congress implicitly delegated to the agency the power to 

make policy choices that represent a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that are committed to the agency's 

care by the statute.... In that event, the court must defer 

to the agency's interpretation of the statute so long as it is 

reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose.").8 According DOI's interpretation the deference it is due under 

Chevron step two, we conclude that DOI's reliance on predictive computer submodels to establish causation and injury 

is both reasonable and consistent with the commands of 

CERCLA.

Subsection 301(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2), the only 

CERCLA provision that speaks directly to the form and 

content of Type A procedures, states that the "regulations 

shall specify ... standard procedures for simplified assessments requiring minimal field observation, including establishing measures of damages based on units of discharge or 

release or units of affected area ...." (emphasis added). 

________

8 Nor can our decision in General Electric Co. v. United States 

Department of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1997), be read to 

require a different conclusion here. In General Electric we were 

asked to pass on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) regulation regarding NRD claims for releases of oil 

or petroleum products covered by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 

(OPA). While we upheld NOAA's determination that its computer 

submodels should be " 'reliable and valid for the particular incident,' " 128 F.3d at 772 (quoting 15 C.F.R. § 990.27(a)(3)), we did 

not conclude that such validation procedures were a necessary 

feature of the regulations authorized by OPA, nor did we suggest 

that the related but independent regulatory scheme established by 

CERCLA contained any such requirement. Further, although we 

briefly noted that NOAA's regulations provided a sufficient standard by which to assess the agency's exercise of discretion in 

calculating damages from oil releases, 128 F.3d at 778-79, we did 

not suggest that such a provision was essential for a court to assess 

the reasonableness and accuracy of damage calculations.

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DOI's Type A submodels appear consistent with the charge to 

develop standardized and simplified assessment procedures 

that require minimal field observation and that estimate 

damages according to the type, amount (i.e., "units of discharge or release"), location (i.e., "units of affected area") and 

other objective characteristics of a release. As DOI itself 

observed, "[i]nherent in the concept of developing unit values 

from existing studies is the notion of making assumptions in 

the absence of empirical data and applying average values 

across a range of nonidentical items." 1996 Type A rule, 61 

Fed. Reg. at 20,571. The Senate committee that favorably 

reported on the Senate bill that became CERCLA also envisioned streamlined Type A procedures that would "require as 

little fieldwork as possible, and rely on a combination of 

habitat values, tables of values for individual species, and 

previously conducted surveys and laboratory studies, related 

to units of discharge or units of affected area." S. Rep. No. 

96-848, at 86; cf. Colorado, 880 F.2d at 489-90 (declining to 

"second-guess DOI's technical determination" to use computer submodels, notwithstanding legislative history indicated 

use of tables would be consistent with congressional intent). 

Thus, DOI's interpretation of subsection 301(c)(2)(A) to permit the use of predictive computer submodels to determine 

causation and injury is plainly reasonable. To the extent that 

the "resulting from" language of subsections 107(a)(C) and 

301(c)(1) suggests a need for more definite proof of injury and 

causation than is suggested by subsection 301(c)(2)(A), we 

find that DOI's decision to address the potential inconsistency 

in legislative purpose by development of predictive computer 

submodels is "a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that are committed to the agency's care by the statute." 

Ohio II, 880 F.2d at 441.9

________

9 DOI explained its resolution of the potentially conflicting commands of subsections 107(a)(C), 301(c)(1) and 301(c)(2)(A) as follows:

There is a tension between the statutory provision requiring 

trustees to demonstrate that injury "resulted from" a release 

and the provision requiring the development of simplified assessment procedures that involve "minimal field observation." 

As noted in the cases cited by commenters, the requirement 

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Nor is NAM's assertion that it is unreasonable for DOI to 

require site-specific verification of damage, i.e., a "reality 

check," for its Type B procedures but not for its Type A 

procedures persuasive. The assertion ignores the significant 

differences between Type A and Type B procedures that both 

the text and the history of CERCLA affirm. In contrast to 

the "standard[ized]" procedures called for in subsection 

301(c)(2)(A), the Type B procedures are "for conducting assessments in individual cases to determine the type and 

extent of short- and long-term injury, destruction, or loss." 

42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). The legislative 

history of subsection 301(c)(2) indicates that the Type A 

procedures are intended "to effectively deal with damage 

assessment in most 'minor' releases of hazardous material," S. 

Rep. No. 96-848, at 86 (1980), whereas the Type B proce-

________

that trustees demonstrate that injury resulted from the release 

indicates that Congress intended that natural resource damage 

liability be compensatory. PRPs are to be held liable not just 

because they are responsible for a release but because they are 

responsible for a release that caused an adverse effect. On the 

other hand, by requiring the development of type A procedures, Congress recognized that assessment work can be expensive and time consuming. In the case of minor releases, it 

is often not cost-effective or feasible to conduct more than 

minimal field observations. The Department has struggled to 

resolve the tension between these two statutory requirements 

by developing Type A procedures that rely on computer models 

to predict actual site-specific effects to the maximum extent 

practicable but do not require on-site verification of the models' 

injury predictions.

* * *

In fact, as discussed above, the legislative history of 

CERCLA suggests that the Department would have been 

justified in developing a look-up table or compensation formula 

as a type A procedure. Instead, the type A models use both 

site-specific information provided by the trustees and biological 

and environmental information about the spill site contained in 

the database to approximate more precisely the actual effects 

of the release.

1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,581-82.

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dures are needed to address "large or unusually damaging 

releases and would be used to guide the site-specific damage 

assessment," id. We therefore agree with DOI that the text 

and the history of subsection 301(c)(2) fully support its decision to insist on a "reality check" only when the more 

extensive and individually-tailored Type B procedures are 

used.

In addition, the restrictive interpretation of subsections 

107(a)(C) and 301(c)(1) that NAM urges here ignores the 

purpose and effect of subsection 301(c)(2), which plainly intends a distinction between the two types of procedures. As 

we have repeatedly counseled, such an interpretation, which 

essentially deprives one provision of its meaning and effect so 

that another provision can be read as broadly as its language 

will permit, is inconsistent with the Congress's intent as well 

as our Chevron analysis. Cf. Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 

180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting agency interpretation of 

its general delegation provision because interpretation would 

render more specific and directly applicable delegation provision meaningless); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) 

("We must read the statutes to give effect to each if we can 

do so while preserving their sense and purpose."). Thus, 

NAM's suggested resolution of the potential conflict in purpose posed by subsections 107(a)(C), 301(c)(1) and 301(c)(2), 

would once again improperly call for us to give the "resulting 

from" language of subsections 107(a)(C) and 301(c)(1) a more 

restrictive meaning than the Congress intended. Cf. Ohio II,

880 F.2d at 446 n.14 ("Industry Intervenors advance a related 

argument, to the effect that Congress' choice of the word 

'damages' in § 107(a)(C) should be read to incorporate the 

common-law meaning of the term. In the first place, this 

argument loads a great deal of baggage onto an everyday 

word which has long since transcended its origins and is now 

defined in Webster's Dictionary as 'compensation in money 

imposed by law for loss or injury.' ... Moreover, as our 

examination of CERCLA's legislative history indicates, ... 

Congress' dissatisfaction with the common law provided a 

central motivation for enacting CERCLA.") (internal citations 

omitted). Accordingly, given the interrelated and crossUSCA Case #96-1268 Document #323821 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 22 of 49
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referenced nature of CERCLA subsections 107(a)(C), 

107(f)(1), 301(c)(1) and 301(c)(2), we find that DOI's decision 

to require a "reality check" for Type B but not for Type A 

procedures reads the provisions in an appropriately harmonious way. Cf. id. at 447 ("Indeed, the fact that subsection 

(f)(1) itself explicitly cross-references subsection (a)(C) as the 

source of liability indicates Congress' conscious design to read 

the two subsections as compatible and complementary: liability for 'damages is established in subsection (a)(C), while 

subsection (f)(1) orders DOI not to place a restoration-cost 

ceiling on the 'measure of damages.' ").

NAM's other arguments, attacking the accuracy and reliability of the submodels' predictions of injury and causation, 

are equally unpersuasive. In American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1997), we rejected a 

similar challenge, noting that

[p]ossessing imperfect scientific information, [the agency] 

had to decide whether to proceed on that basis or invest 

the resources to conduct the perfect study. It chose to 

do the former. This is the type of decision to which this 

court will generally apply the deferential standard of 5 

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).... Our deference, however, is not 

without limits. The agency's choice will be reversed as 

arbitrary and capricious if there is "simply no rational 

relationship" between the model chosen and the situation 

to which it is applied.

115 F.3d at 1004; cf. Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1225 ("Interior has 

balanced the need for an early, rough estimate against the 

danger of that estimate being too rough. We must defer to 

the agency's decision about how to strike that balance unless 

it is unreasonable."). Because DOI's Type A submodels are 

at least as scientifically rational and sophisticated as those we 

upheld in American Iron, we find no merit in NAM's contentions that the submodels permit "unduly speculative assessments" in contravention of the requirement that DOI "identiUSCA Case #96-1268 Document #323821 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 23 of 49
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fy the best available procedures" for the calculation of NRD.10

Finally, we note that nothing in the Type A regulations 

prevents a PRP that believes the submodels have erroneously 

found injury and causation from contesting the submodels' 

calculationseither with its own site-specific studies or with 

other evidence that calls into question the predictive calculations of the submodels. The Type A rule also enables a PRP 

that suspects that a Type A assessment overstates the actual 

loss to insist on Type B procedures. See 43 C.F.R. 

§ 11.35(b). Indeed, DOI revised its final rule

to require trustees to perform a preliminary application 

of the model and make the results available for public 

comment before presenting a damage claim. Therefore, 

PRPs will have an opportunity to evaluate the injury 

projections. They can then decide whether they have 

information that indicates that the projections are wrong 

and that the user inputs need to be modified or that type 

B procedures should be used.

1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,582.

B. Replacement and Acquisition Alternatives

NAM next argues that CERCLA subsections 107(f)(1) and 

301(c)(2) require that Type A procedures consider the costs of 

"replacement" or "acquisition of equivalent resources." 11 Be-

________

10 The computer submodels, contrary to NAM's assertions, do not 

dispense with all "field observation" and thereby render superfluous 

the Congress's expectation that Type A procedures will require 

"minimal field observation." Rather, for each release a number of 

site-specific variables must be collected and analyzed in order to 

compute damages. While DOI "interprets 'minimal field observations' to be information that is readily or routinely collected following a release," 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,582, the fact 

that it is "readily or routinely collected" does not make it any less 

site- or incident-specific. Moreover, as discussed above, the Type A 

submodels contain certain safeguards so that they will not be 

applied when environmental or other assumptions do not reflect 

actual conditions as of the date of the release. See supra Part I.

11 In relevant part, subsection 107(f)(1) provides:

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cause DOI's computer submodels do not expressly consider 

these costs in their NRD calculus, NAM contends that we 

must vacate the Type A rule. We disagree.

The subsection 107(f)(1) spending limitationi.e., recoveries "shall be retained ... for use only to restore, replace, or 

acquire the equivalent" of affected resourcesdoes not mean 

that a trustee must consider each of the alternative measures 

of damages in calculating NRD. Cf. Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 

1230 ("Although ... spending priorities may, in turn, imply a 

hierarchy in the way trustees should assess damages in the 

first place, we do not find [in either the text of 107(f)(1) or in] 

the committee report a sufficiently clear statement of Congressional intent necessary to resolve this issue under Chevron step one."). Indeed, the very next sentence of subsection 

107(f)(1) declares that "[t]he measure of damages ... shall 

not be limited by the sums which can be used to restore or 

replace" injured resources, which "carries in it an implicit 

assumption that restoration cost will serve as the basic measure of damages in many if not most CERCLA cases." Ohio 

II, 880 F.2d at 446.

More troublesome for DOI, however, is subsection 

301(c)(2), which requires that the Type A and B regulations 

"take into consideration factors including, but not limited to, 

replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosystem or 

________

Sums recovered by the United States Government as trustee 

under this subsection shall be retained by the trustee, without 

further appropriation, for use only to restore, replace, or 

acquire the equivalent of such natural resources. Sums recovered by a State as trustee under this subsection shall be 

available for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources by the State. The measure of 

damages in any action under subparagraph (C) of subsection 

(a) of this section shall not be limited by the sums which can be 

used to restore or replace such resources.

42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (emphasis added). The pertinent language of 

subsection 301(c)(2) recites that Type A and B regulations "shall 

take into consideration factors including, but not limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosystem or resource to 

recover." 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (emphasis added).

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resource to recover." 12 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (emphasis 

added). Absent from the list is "acquisition value," whose 

inclusion would strengthen the similarity to the spending 

limitation imposed by CERCLA subsection 107(f)(1). Nonetheless, we agree with DOI that the list may reasonably be 

read to require only that a number of different kinds of 

values for particular injury components be considered. Indeed, in Ohio II, we noted that subsection 301(c)(2) gave DOI 

discretion to fashion an appropriate measure of damages in a 

particular case although the discretion was circumscribed by 

the Congress's evident intent "that the measure of damages 

reflect a preference for restoration costs, at least where 

restoration is feasible and can be performed at a cost not 

grossly disproportionate to the use value of the resource." 

880 F.2d at 446; cf. S. Rep. No. 96-848, at 86 ("There is a 

need for maximum flexibility in the rulemaking proceeding, so 

that free scientific discussion will result. Only through this 

type of discussion will the agencies be adequately prepared to 

select the most accurate and credible damage assessment 

methodologies available."). In light of the legislative intent to 

confer discretion as to the choice of an appropriate measure 

of damages, we assess DOI's interpretation of subsection 

301(c)(2) under step two of Chevron.

DOI has defined certain key terms in its regulations:

Injury means a measurable adverse change, either 

long- or short-term, in the chemical or physical quality or 

the viability of a natural resource resulting either directly or indirectly from exposure to a discharge of oil or 

release of a hazardous substance, or exposure to a product of reactions resulting from the discharge of oil or 

release of a hazardous substance. As used in this part, 

injury encompasses the phrases "injury," "destruction," 

and "loss." ...

* * *

________

12 NAM does not argue that the Type A rule omits consideration 

of "use value," which is apparently provided by the Compensable 

Value Submodel. See 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,566-67.

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Replacement or acquisition of the equivalent means 

the substitution for an injured resource with a resource 

that provides the same or substantially similar services....

* * *

Restoration or rehabilitation means actions undertaken to return an injured resource to its baseline condition, 

as measured in terms of the injured resource's physical, 

chemical, or biological properties or the services it previously provided....

43 C.F.R. §§ 11.14(v) (emphasis added), 11.14(ii), 11.14(ll) 

(1996).13 Relying on these definitions, DOI contends that its 

Restoration Submodelwhich considers the costs and benefits of replacing an injured resource (e.g., restocking fish) 

against the costs and benefits of restoring the resource 

through natural recovery (e.g., allowing spawning and other 

________

13 While DOI's regulations equate replacement with acquisition, the Congress apparently believed that the terms as used in 

CERCLA subsection 107(f)(1) had somewhat different meanings:

[T]he primary purpose of the resource damage provisions of 

CERCLA is the restoration or replacement of natural resources damaged by unlawful releases of hazardous substances. 

However, ... a situation could arise in which the amount of 

damages caused by a release of hazardous substances is in 

excess of the amount that could realistically or productively be 

used to restore or replace those resources....

The Committee therefore intends [that] any excess funds 

recovered shall be used, in such an instance, for the third 

purpose spelled out in the language of the amendment, which is 

'to acquire the equivalent of the damaged resource.' ... The 

Committee expects that any such acquisition would provide 

resources of an equivalent nature at a location as near as 

reasonably possible to the site at which the damages occurred.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 4 at 50 (1985). Because we conclude that 

subsection 107(f)(1) does not speak directly to the issue of whether 

the Type A procedures must consider replacement and acquisition 

values when calculating damages under subsection 301(c)(2), however, we do not find in this passage an intent to assign replacement 

and acquisition independent meanings in subsection 301(c)(2).

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natural processes to replace destroyed fish stocks)satisfies 

the subsection 301(c)(2) requirement that the Type A regulations consider "replacement value." 14 See, e.g., The 

CERCLA Type A Natural Resource Damages Assessment 

Model for Coastal and Marine Environments, Technical Documentation, Vol. 1, § 5.4.3. DOI therefore reasons that its 

decision not to develop independent Replacement and Acquisition Submodels for its Type A calculations does not render 

its rule defective but merely less ambitious than it might have 

beenwhich, as we have previously held, is not a ground for 

reversal. See Colorado, 880 F.2d at 486 ("Despite the limited 

scope of the type A rules, DOI's actions are a sustainable 

response to an ambiguous statutory mandate in an area of 

scientific uncertainty.").

NAM, on the other hand, contends that DOI's consideration 

of replacement values is insufficient to satisfy subsection 

301(c)(2) and, in any event, DOI's computer submodels do not 

meet the requirements of subsection 107(f)(1) because they 

wholly fail to consider acquisition values. Regarding the 

latter, because the Congress has omitted any reference to 

acquisition values in subsection 301(c)(2), DOI reasonably 

accords significance to the omission and interprets it not to 

require consideration of off-site, acquisition alternatives to 

restoration. Nor can our decision in Colorado be read to 

command a different result. There, we held that DOI's 

failure to include "replacement or restoration values in its 

type A procedures" contravened "the clear mandate of Congress as interpreted in Ohio." 880 F.2d at 491 (emphasis 

added). We did not then, and we do not now, conclude that 

subsections 301(c)(2) and 107(f)(1) require the regulations to 

consider acquisition values.

________

14 Replacement or acquisition may be the only feasible remedies if 

the natural resources have been destroyed or irreparably injured. 

See 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,601 ("[T]he model 

calculates a loss and allows only one-to-one replacement, with 

correction for restocking survival, of missing individuals.... The 

[habitat restoration] models assume that all fish and shellfish killed 

are restocked, if stocks are available.") (emphasis added; quoted 

sentences from responses to two different comments).

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Finally, although DOI's final rule does an imperfect job of 

explaining how its Type A procedures incorporate consideration of replacement valueswhich it seems to refer to as 

"active habitat restoration" costs, see 1996 Type A rule, 61 

Fed. Reg. at 20,601-02any explanatory deficiencies can be 

remedied by DOI at the next biennial review. Accordingly, 

we conclude that DOI's Type A rule satisfies the requirement 

of subsection 301(c)(2) that it "take into consideration ... 

replacement value." Consistent with our earlier holding, its 

interpretation ensures "that the measure of damages reflect a 

preference for restoration cost, at least where restoration is 

feasible and can be performed at a cost not grossly disproportionate to the use value of the resource." Ohio II, 880 F.2d 

at 446.

C. Relation of Restoration Actions 

to Resource "Services"

NAM next asserts that DOI's Type A submodels are 

arbitrary and capriciousi.e., violate 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)

because they do not evaluate restoration alternatives in terms 

of the effect such action may (or may not) have on natural 

resource "services." See supra note 4. As DOI properly 

notes, however, NAM failed to raise this argument in the 

rulemaking proceedings below, and we find no reason to 

excuse NAM's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.

NAM contends that because the relationship between services and restoration was "a general point applicable to any 

NRD assessment," because it "had been emphasized repeatedly in prior rulemakings," because comments in the 

rulemaking regarding the Compensable Value Submodel indicated that the relationship between resource services and 

NRD was essential in developing "nonconsumptive wildlife 

values" and because "other documents in the record highlighted the services concept," DOI was given a "fair opportunity" to consider the issue below. Failing that, NAM argues 

that we should exercise our discretion and excuse NAM's 

failure to exhaust. NAM Reply Br. at 10-11.

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The fact that, buried in hundreds of pages of technical 

comments NAM submitted, some mention is made of the 

resource services concept and its relation to compensable 

values (rather than restoration alternatives) is insufficient to 

preserve the issue for review on appeal. "Our cases ... 

require complainants, before coming to court, to give the 

[agency] a fair opportunity to pass on a legal or factual 

argument." Washington Ass'n for Television & Children v. 

FCC, 712 F.2d 677, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added; 

quotation marks omitted); accord Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC,

78 F.3d 620, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("As a general rule, claims 

not presented to the agency may not be made for the first 

time to a reviewing court."); United States v. L.A. Tucker 

Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952) ("Simple fairness ... 

requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over 

administrative decisions unless the administrative body not 

only has erred but has erred against objection made at the 

time appropriate under its practice."). Thus, we decline to 

find that scattered references to the services concept in a 

voluminous record addressing myriad complex technical and 

policy matters suffices to provide an agency like DOI with a 

"fair opportunity" to pass on the issue.

Nor do we find any ground to excuse NAM's failure to urge 

its objection below. The fact that the Kennecott decision was 

not known on the date the comment period closed is unavailing. Kennecott did not suggest a new basis for challenging 

DOI's Type A rule; it simply reaffirmed that an agency's 

regulations must be internally consistent to guard against 

double recovery. 88 F.3d at 1220 ("In invalidating the regulations, we do not mean to suggest that CERCLA requires or 

forbids any particular measure of damages. The problem 

here is not with the standard adopted, but with the consistency between the language of the regulations and the preamble's explanation of what Interior did.") (emphasis added).15

________

15 American Maritime Association v. United States, 766 F.2d 

545, 566 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1985), is inapposite. There the agency 

made a significant change between its proposed rule and the final 

interim rule and thus the complainant did not have the opportunity 

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D. Lost Assimilative Capacity

Continuing its attack on the content and function of DOI's 

Restoration Submodel, NAM next argues that DOI's inclusion 

of calculations for lost "assimilative capacity"i.e., the prerelease ability of an environment "to repair itself by digesting, degrading, transforming, absorbing, or otherwise eliminating the pollutants placed in it," 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. 

Reg. at 20,599contravenes CERCLA. It contends that 

such losses are "unduly speculative" because there may never 

be another release of the same or similar hazardous substances in the affected environment and, even if they are not 

overly speculative, DOI's calculation methodology is fundamentally flawed. Both contentions are without merit.

Subsection 301(c)(2) requires the Type A and Type B 

regulations to "take into consideration ... [the] ability of the 

ecosystem or resource to recover." 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2). 

Consideration of lost assimilative capacity meets the command by assessing the cumulative effects a release may have 

on a resource's ability to recover and by preventing erosion of 

baseline conditions. Thus, DOI's interpretation of subsection 

301(c)(2) to permit assessment of lost assimilative capacity 

damages is plainly not unreasonable and instead is consistent 

with (if not required by) the Congress's intent to recover for 

the full damages resulting from a release. See Ohio II, 880 

F.2d at 464 (CERCLA intends recovery for all properly 

calculated losses and all kinds of losses reasonably ascribed to 

release); Colorado, 880 F.2d at 490-91 (similar); cf. S. Rep. 

No. 96-848, at 14 (one reason CERCLA was enacted was 

shortcomings of common law and statutory remedies in recovering full compensation). Moreover, contrary to NAM's contentions, the stand-by nature of the resource service does not 

make it speculative: "The assimilation of pollutants is a real 

service provided by natural resources and is well-founded in 

scientific literature." 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 

20,599. Indeed, the fact that such assimilative capacity ser-

________

to object to the change before seeking judicial review. Here 

nothing in the services-restoration relationship was substantively 

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vice may be called on only in the contingency of a future 

release does not render the losses any more speculative than 

other kinds of contingent losses for which damages may be 

assessed. Cf. Ohio II, 880 F.2d at 474-81 & nn.72-77 (upholding use of contingent valuation methodologies, including 

assessments of option and existence values, assuming resources may never be visited or used but recognizing standby value to their existence); General Elec. Co. v. United 

States Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 772-74 (D.C. Cir. 

1997) (upholding NOAA's use of contingent valuation methods 

in which individuals assign value to resources "even if they 

never plan to make active use of them").16

Nor do we find error in DOI's decision to calculate the 

monetary loss resulting from a diminution in assimilative 

capacity by extrapolating from the costs of dredging contaminated sediment in a nearby area. The standardized and 

simplified nature of Type A procedures necessarily dictates 

that they rely on data extrapolations to assign values to 

particular items of loss. Thus, while we agree with NAM 

that (for example) using dredging cost figures from Green 

Bay to calculate restoration costs in Chicago may not be the 

most accurate method of calculating costs, it is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary and capricious in the context of Type A 

assessments. Moreover, the alternative that NAM apparently urgesbarring recovery for such loss absent specific data 

on restoration costs for each potential release siteis incon-

________

altered between the notice of proposed rulemaking and the final 

rule.

16 In addition, the amended Type A rule does not permit recovery 

of lost assimilative capacity in every circumstance. Loss is calculated "only when there are releases that generate economic damages 

related to mortality or loss of production." See 1996 Type A rule, 

61 Fed. Reg. at 20,599. While an initial programming error permitted the calculation of such loss in cases where the submodels 

predicted no damages related to mortality or loss of production, 

DOI has since corrected the error. See Revisions to 1996 Type A 

rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,457-58. Thus, NAM's suggestion that 

including lost assimilative capacity in the submodels ensures per se 

damages in the event of a release is mistaken; only if mortality and 

production thresholds are exceeded will assimilative capacity loss be 

included in the damages claim.

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sistent with the remedial objectives of CERCLA and requires 

that Type A procedures provide greater precision in their loss 

measurements than CERCLA can reasonably be deemed to 

require.17

E. Economic Rent for Commercial 

Fishing and Hunting Losses

NAM next assails DOI's inclusion of "economic rent" losses 

in its Compensable Value Submodel.18 Its main argument is 

________

17 Nor does this conclusion make a PRP an insurer for future 

releases as NAM contends. Each subsequent PRP will be responsible for restoring assimilative capacity losses caused by a release 

for which it is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Were we to adopt 

NAM's interpretation, future PRPs would be responsible for losses 

to natural resources that were greater (because of decreased assimilative capacity caused by predecessor PRP) than they might 

otherwise have been. We can find nothing, nor has NAM referred 

us to anything, in CERCLA that requires DOI to favor the current 

PRP over a future PRP. Again, the fact that traditional tort 

remedies might suggest a different allocation of risks is not dispositive: "We have already noted our disagreement with the proposition 

that the strictures of the common law apply to CERCLA." Ohio 

II, 880 F.2d at 476.

18 "Economic rent" in this context does not refer to profits earned 

in non-competitive markets. Rather, DOI defines "economic rent" 

as "the excess of total earnings of a producer of a good or service 

over the payment required to induce the producer to supply the 

same quantity currently being supplied." Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674, 27,691 (1986); 1996 Type A 

rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,603 ("In other words, economic rent for 

commercially harvested resources is the fee that commercial harvesters could pay to the government and still find the harvesting 

economically feasible.").

Because DOI assumes that the small releases for which Type A 

procedures may be used will generally not cause commercial hunters and fishers to abandon or downsize their enterprises, any 

harvesting losses produced by a release will in fact represent 

"economic rent." See 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,604. 

NAM does not challenge the reasonableness of the assumption and 

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that commercial fishing and hunting losses are injuries of a 

"private" nature for which CERCLA does not permit recovery. According to NAM, recovery for such losses, under the 

guise of seeking compensation for losses of imputed rent that 

a trustee might collect for the privilege to fish and hunt, is 

ultra vires. Further, NAM contends that "DOI's calculation 

of the amount of damages resulting from lost economic rent is 

based on wholly speculative assumptions." NAM Br. 37. 

DOI's responses are twofold: (1) NAM's challenge is timebarred because economic rent losses have been a feature of 

DOI's Type B rules since 1986 and were a feature of DOI's 

1987 Type A rule; and (2) NAM's arguments are based on 

the mistaken premise that all commercial hunting and fishing 

losses represent "private" losses.

DOI's timeliness defense fails here for the same reasons 

that it failed with respect to NAM's challenge to the absence 

of a "reality check" in the Type A procedures: the change in 

"regulatory context" and stakes caused by the addition of 

Type A procedures for Great Lakes environments and by the 

substantial alterations in the procedures for coastal and marine environments constructively reopened this aspect of the 

procedures to challenge.

Regarding the merits, NAM's challenge is apparently predicated on the assumption that because commercial fishing and 

hunting enterprises have heretofore not been charged fees for 

the full value of their entitlement to fish and hunt in public 

aquatic environments covered by the Type A procedures, the 

entitlement is a private rather than a public one. We do not 

agree.

It is true that CERCLA does not permit private parties to 

seek recovery for damages to natural resources held in trust 

by the federal, state or tribal governments nor does it allow 

public trustees to recover for damages to private property or 

other "purely private" interests. See Ohio II, 880 F.2d at 460 

("The legislative history of CERCLA further illustrates that 

damage to private propertyabsent any government involve-

________

we see nothing in the record to suggest that DOI's conclusion 

resulting from its assumption is unreasonable either.

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ment, management or controlis not covered by the natural 

resource damage provisions of the statute."); Exxon Corp. v. 

Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 375 (1986) (compensation to "third parties 

for damage resulting from hazardous substance discharges 

... [is] clearly beyond the scope of CERCLA"). Determining whether a particular loss is "private" or "public" is the 

task with which we are faced here.19

CERCLA defines natural resources to encompass

land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging 

to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or 

otherwise controlled by the United States (including the 

resources of the fishery conservation zone established by 

the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act [16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801 et seq.] ) any State or 

local government, any foreign government, any Indian 

tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a trust restriction on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe.

42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (emphasis added). As noted earlier, 

resources must be under the stewardship of a trustee before 

damages can be assessed for their injury, loss or destruction. 

See supra note 1. A release of hazardous substances in the 

Great Lakes or covered coastal and marine environments that 

kills fish or game or makes it inedible or unusable for 

commercial or other purposes injures natural resources. Cf. 

Alaska Sport Fishing Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 773 

(9th Cir. 1994) ("A state has a sovereign interest in natural 

resources within its boundaries.").

Because public trustees do not currently charge commercial harvesters access fees above those required to cover ad-

________

19 NAM's reliance on Satsky v. Paramount Communications, 

Inc., 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993), is misplaced. The Tenth Circuit 

held that suits for injuries to "purely private interests" could not be 

barred by a state's recovery of public losses. Id. at 1470. It also 

held, however, that to the extent the "claims are for injuries to 

interests which all citizens hold in common, and for which the State 

has already recovered, the [former] judgement ... acts as a bar." 

Id.

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ministrative and registration costs, NAM reasons that the 

harvesters have converted these public resources into private 

property so that any adverse effect a release may have on 

harvesting activities represents a "purely private" loss for 

which the trustee cannot recover. The fact that commercial 

hunting and fishing operations are not presently paying 

something (or at least more) for the privilege to exploit public 

fish and game stocks does not mean that they have converted 

the stocks into private property. Rather, the public custodians of the resources have determined that the public interest 

is served by refraining from charging the commercial enterprises for harvesting the public fish and game stocks. Thus 

we do not find DOI's conclusionthat if the public cannot use 

its resources to foster commercial enterprises, the value of 

the resources to the public (as well as to the enterprises) has 

been diminishedunreasonable. See 1996 Type A rule, 61 

Fed. Reg. at 20,604 ("The governmental regulation of fish and 

wildlife harvest implies a public concern that these resources 

be managed in order to sustain their contribution to economic 

productivity.").

Nor does recovery of imputed rent losses run afoul of the 

subsection 107(f)(1) prohibition on double recovery. As the 

regulations explain, "[f]or minor releases where damages may 

be relatively low and data establishing injury and causation 

may be difficult to obtain, ... it is unlikely that commercial 

harvesters will go to the expense and trouble to pursue a 

legal claim." Id. at 20,604. In addition, "in some cases 

commercial harvesters will not have a private cause of action 

or their recoveries may be subject to geographic or temporal 

limitations." Id. Given the nature of the release for which 

damages are assessed, the likelihood of double recovery is 

minimal. If a commercial harvester does sue and succeeds in 

recovering the public's imputed rent as part of its lost profits, 

however, the regulations bar the trustee from including such 

losses in its calculation of NRD. Id.; 43 C.F.R. § 11.44(d) 

(1996). Moreover, once a state or other public trustee recovers such damages, a private party will be barred by res 

judicata from later seeking recovery for the same public 

losses. See Alaska Sport Fishing, 34 F.3d at 774 ("[T]he 

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United States and the state of Alaska, acting as government 

trustees, have already recovered for the very same damages 

plaintiffs now seek here.... Thus, under the doctrine of res 

judicata, plaintiffs are barred from asserting such claims in a 

second suit."). Accordingly, DOI's inclusion of economic rent 

losses in its Type A submodels cannot reasonably be deemed 

to pose a likely risk of double recovery.

Finally, DOI's ancillary attack on the reasonableness of the 

assumptions underlying the submodel's calculation of economic rents also fails. Once again, we can find nothing unreasonable or irrational in the means by which DOI's Compensable 

Value Submodel calculates lost economic rents resulting from 

a release. The fact that such imputed rents have not been 

collected previously does not ipso facto make their valuation 

unduly speculative as the assumption that minor spills will 

likely not affect commercial fishing and hunting appears 

reasonable. In view of an unchanged activity level, DOI's 

derivative conclusion that the harvesting losses represent an 

appropriate proxy for lost economic rent cannot be viewed as 

irrational. Again, in technical matters it is not our role to 

second guess the agency's expert judgments if they are 

reasonable and adequately explained. See Troy Corp., 120 

F.3d at 283; American Iron & Steel, 115 F.3d at 1004-05.

F. "Best Available Procedures" for Calculating NRD

NAM next seizes on the "best available procedures" language of subsection 301(c)(2)i.e., the Type A and B regulations "shall identify the best available procedures to determine such [natural resource] damages, including both direct 

and indirect injury, destruction, or loss"and contends that 

because DOI used certain inapplicable, outdated or methodologically suspect studies in developing its Type A submodels, 

it violated CERCLA's direction to use the "most accurate and 

credible damage assessment methodologies available." S. 

Rep. No. 96-848, at 86. NAM also suggests that because a 

Type A assessment enjoys a rebuttable presumption of correctness under subsection 107(f)(1), DOI is under a heightUSCA Case #96-1268 Document #323821 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 37 of 49
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ened obligation to demonstrate the validity and rationality of 

its modeling assumptions and their empirical support.20

Technical attacks on the Type A submodels are assessed 

under the deferential standard that applies when an agency's 

scientific and technical judgment is at issue. See generally 

Troy Corp., 120 F.3d at 283; American Iron, 115 F.3d at 

1004-05. The "best available procedures" language is neither 

defined by statute nor self-defining and so we apply Chevron

step two in assessing whether DOI's decision to include 

certain studies complies with subsection 301(c)(2)'s requirement that it "identify the best available procedures." See 

generally Ohio II, 880 F.2d at 476-78 (concluding DOI's 

adoption of contingent valuation methodologies was "best 

available procedure" because "the risk of overestimation has 

not been shown to produce such egregious results as to 

justify judicial overruling of DOI's careful estimate of the 

caliber and worth of CV methodology").

NAM's arguments regarding the additional burden an 

agency bears when using calculations whose results enjoy a 

rebuttable presumption of correctness is beside the point 

because the presumption has been established by the Congress, not the agency. See General Electric, 128 F.3d at 771-

72 ("Chemical Manufacturers [applicable test], however, applies only to rebuttable presumptions created by agencies and 

has no applicability where, as here, Congress created the 

presumption.").

NAM's argument is also fatally flawed because it reads 

"available" out of the subsection 301(c)(2) requirement to 

"identify the best available procedures to determine" damages, a disfavored interpretation under both Chevron steps. 

See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 798 F.2d 

1525, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1986); cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 

U.S. 330, 339 (1979). Thus, while the studies upon which DOI 

________

20 NAM also claims that the inclusion of "lost assimilative capacity" and "economic rent" variables in the Type A submodels violates 

the "best available procedures" mandate. As discussed above, 

however, we find nothing unreasonable or otherwise insufficient in 

DOI's use of these variables.

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relies may not use the "best" methodologies and techniques, 

they appear to be the "best available," which is all that 

CERCLA requires.21

DOI used a number of screening criteria that studies had 

to meet before they became part of its submodels' databases. 

See 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,571 ("The Department used only studies that: (1) Were based on an extensive 

literature review and consultations with relevant governmental agencies; (2) reasonably represented the natural resource 

and public use under investigation; (3) contributed to a 

reasonable representation of the different regions included in 

the model; (4) were conducted by a recognized universityassociated researcher or established consulting firm; and (5) 

used appropriate valuation methodologies."). These criteria 

assisted DOI in determining which studies were sufficiently 

reliable to use in its computer submodels. Thus, DOI's 

decision to use studies assigning values to recreational salmon 

and trout fishing in several western states in order to develop 

comparable values for such activities in the Great Lakes 

region was not unreasonable in view of the fact that there 

were no other studies available that satisfied the screening 

criteria and focused on the Great Lakes. Similarly, the fact 

that DOI used nine freshwater fishing studies, in addition to 

twenty-one salt water fishing studies, to produce averaged 

values for recreational fishing in coastal and marine environments can hardly be viewed as irrational or unreasonable. 

Again, DOI reasonably determined that the "best available" 

values could more accurately be developed by averaging a 

________

21 Had DOI chosen not to assign any values to damages because 

of the age, methodologies, etc. of certain studies, it would have less 

fully effected a fundamental purpose of CERCLAi.e., to ensure 

the full recovery of the costs associated with a release of hazardous 

substances. Cf. Ohio II, 880 F.2d at 478 (concluding that in light of 

"CERCLA's preference for restoration" it would not make sense to 

insist on more stringent pre-release contingent valuation surveys to 

satisfy "best available procedures" requirement of subsection 

301(c)(2)); Colorado, 880 F.2d at 490-91; S. Rep. No. 96-848, at 14 

(observing one reason CERCLA was enacted is that "the compensation ultimately provided ... is generally inadequate").

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broader range of values than the saltwater studies alone 

would have allowed.

Further, DOI's decision to arrive at average recreational 

values for the Great Lakes beaches by including four studies 

of recreational values for beaches in Hawaii and Florida, in 

addition to seven other studies of non-Great Lakes beach 

values, appears reasonable, especially given the absence of 

any suitable studies of Great Lakes beaches themselves. 

Once again, averaging values from such geographically diverse studies appears to have been a rational way in which to 

arrive at the "best available" values.22

We also find no error in DOI's decision to use older studies 

that rely on contingent valuation or travel cost methodologies. 

Again, DOI was confronted with a choice: utilization of older, 

less methodologically reliable studies to assign values for 

particular losses, guesswork to produce the appropriate values or their exclusion from its computer submodels. DOI's 

expert judgment that it was best to proceed in reliance on 

available studies is plainly a permissible interpretation of the 

subsection 301(c)(1) charge to "identify the best available

procedures to determine" NRD.

We also find reasonable DOI's decision to include wildlife 

viewing losses in its submodels. Because no studies existed 

that quantified or qualified the correlation between wildlife 

population losses and wildlife viewing losses, DOI reasonably 

assumed a one-to-one, linear correlation. In the absence of 

any studies to suggest that such linear assumptions overstate 

(or understate) loss, we can find no error in DOI's determination that population losses would typically result in a corresponding loss in viewing opportunities.

Finally, we decline to second-guess DOI's technical judgments as to toxicity values for certain types of releases. See 

________

22 Also, as noted in DOI's Brief, had the Florida and Hawaii 

studies been excluded, the average values in the Type A submodels 

would have been affected by a mere $.03 per day; hardly a basis to 

conclude that inclusion of the studies skewed the values in DOI's 

submodels. DOI Br. at 43.

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Troy Corp., 120 F.3d at 283; American Iron, 115 F.3d at 

1004-05. The fact that DOI's and NAM's experts disagree on 

the proper toxicity values for certain substances and concentrations does not render DOI's judgment defective.23 Cf. 

Ohio II, 880 F.2d at 465 (rejecting challenge to use of 

discount rate in calculating net present value of loss because 

"petitioners have given us no reason to substitute our judgment for that of Interior and of the Office of Management 

and Budget, whose circular provided the ten percent figure 

chosen"). Accordingly, once again we conclude that DOI's 

reconciliation of the "best available procedures" language and 

"full recovery" goals of CERCLA is reasonable and therefore 

sustainable. See Ohio II, 880 F.2d at 441, 464.

G. Application of Type A and Type B

Procedures to Same Release

NAM next challenges DOI's Type A rule because it permits 

trustees to use both Type A and Type B procedures to 

calculate NRD for the same release, which (1) violates the 

clearly expressed intent of the Congress that the two types of 

procedures be "alternative" rather than complementary procedures, (2) conflicts with the use of average valuations in the 

Type A computer submodels and (3) contravenes the regulatory requirement that Type B procedures not be employed to 

calculate compensable values until they have been validated 

for a specific incident by a "reality check." DOI responds 

that NAM's second argument is not ripe for resolution and 

that all of NAM's arguments are otherwise lacking in merit. 

We agree that NAM's arguments are without merit.24

________

23 NAM also criticizes DOI for including toxicity values for copper, zinc and mercury despite DOI's intent to remove such toxicity 

values for pure metals from its submodels' databases. See 1996 

Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,591. DOI has since acknowledged 

the error and removed the values from its submodels. See Revisions to 1996 Type A rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,458.

24 DOI also appears to suggest that at least a portion of NAM's 

challenge is untimely because the 1987 Type A rule allowed combined use of Type A and B procedures in certain circumstances. 

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(1) Legislative intent and combined application 

of Type A and Type B procedures

Subsection 301(c)(2) of CERCLA, as discussed and quoted 

above (see supra page 5), distinguishes, both textually and 

structurally, between Type A "standard procedures" and 

Type B "alternative protocols for conducting assessments in 

individual cases." 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2). The distinctions 

were intended:

This subsection calls for the promulgation of two types 

of regulations. First, a simplified type of regulation 

[Type A] is necessary to effectively deal with damage 

assessment in most 'minor' releases of hazardous materials....

The other type of regulations [Type B] would be 

employed in large or unusually damaging releases and 

would be used to guide the site-specific damage assessment. Such a regulation would contain protocols for 

field assessment of the type and extent of short- and 

long-term damage and methodologies for determining 

their value.

The protocols for field assessments should provide 

uniform instructions that will allow for thorough site 

investigation in a cost-effective manner. Sampling and 

statistical procedures should be clearly defined. The 

methods for determining the geographical extent of damage should also be enumerated. It is the intent of the 

legislation that these protocols be designed to accommo-

________

See DOI Br. 48 n.17. We reject the argument for the same reason 

we rejected it with respect to the challenges discussed supra in 

Parts II.A and II.E. Further, we note that the circumstances in 

which a combined Type A and Type B assessment may be used 

have been significantly expanded by the 1996 rule compared to the 

1987 rule. Compare 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,610 with

1987 Type A rule, 52 Fed. Reg. at 9048-49. Moreover, DOI 

appeared to reopen the issue: "The Department explicitly limited 

this rulemaking to four issues: ... the conditions for combined use 

of type A and type B procedures;...." 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. 

Reg. at 20,570.

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date the majority of potential release sites, including 

coastal estuaries, open water, freshwater rivers, lakes 

and wetlands.

S. Rep. No. 96-848, at 86; accord Colorado, 880 F.2d at 487 

("[A]lthough Congress did not have a specific intent regarding the proper scope of type A rules, it envisioned generally 

that type A rules would cover most minor releases and type B 

rules would cover large or unusually damaging releases.").

Nevertheless, subsection 107(f)(2)(C) does not differentiate 

between the two types of procedures with respect to the 

rebuttable presumption: "Any determination or assessment 

of damages to natural resources ... made by a Federal or 

State trustee in accordance with the regulations promulgated 

under section 9651(c) of this title shall have the force and 

effect of a rebuttable presumption." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9607(f)(2)(C) (emphasis added). Significantly, the Congress 

indicated that the rulemaking required by subsection 

301(c)(2) should emphasize flexibility and development of a 

variety of measurement tools for a trustee's use:

Investigations by the Committee on Environmental 

and Public Works revealed the need for an improved, fair 

and expeditious mechanism for dealing with natural resource damages caused by releases of hazardous materials. The principal hindrance to attaining such a mechanism was the absence of a standardized system for 

assessing such damages which is efficient as to both time 

and cost.

The reported bill provides ... that ... agencies should 

standardize a process through regulation for assessing 

damages to those resources. This could be done after a 

thorough review of alternatives for damage assessment. 

This approach will focus on scientific debate concerning 

damage assessment in the rulemaking process and result 

in a decision regarding the best simplified procedures for 

making accurate and defensible assessments of resource 

damages.

* * *

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The rulemaking should produce a range of products.

At one end will be simplified assessment procedures 

requiring a minimum of fieldwork and using a combination of habitat values, species values, and other simplified 

methods. Such procedures would be of value in dealing 

with minor releases. At the other end of the range 

would be damage assessment protocols to be used whenever the extent of natural resource damage is substantial 

and extensive fieldwork becomes necessary. The assessment procedures and protocols should include a choice of 

acceptable damage assessment methodologies to be employed with the evidentiary status of a rebuttable presumption accorded to the results when the protocols are 

followed.

There is a need for maximum flexibility in the rulemaking proceeding, so that free scientific discussion will 

result. Only through this type of discussion will the 

agencies be adequately prepared to select the most accurate and credible damage assessment methodologies 

available.

S. Rep. No. 96-848, at 85-86 (emphasis added).

By using Type A procedures and selectively supplementing 

them with certain low-cost and expeditious Type B procedures, DOI is able to arrive at a more complete assessment of 

damages at less cost and in less time than a full-blown Type 

B assessment would likely require. Cf. 1996 Type A rule, 61 

Fed. Reg. at 20,577 ("[T]rustees should not be forced to 

choose between foregoing compensation for a public loss not 

addressed by the type A submodel on the one hand and 

funding a full-scale, time-consuming, labor-intensive type B 

assessment of all injuries on the other hand.").

Nor does the combined use of Type A and Type B procedures pose a risk of double recovery. The regulations limit 

the use of supplemental Type B procedures to the determination of "damages for injuries or compensable values that do 

not fall into the categories addressed by the type A procedure." 43 C.F.R. § 11.36(a) (1996). In addition, a trustee 

who elects to use both types of procedures must document in 

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the Assessment Plan how double recovery is to be avoided. 

Id. § 11.36(c). Thus, if, for example, the Type A procedures 

have already produced a value for mortality losses, Type B 

procedures may not also be used to calculate that item of loss. 

We therefore find nothing unreasonable in DOI's interpretation of CERCLA subsection 301(c)(2) as permitting combined 

use of Type A and Type B procedures.25

(2) Average values and Type B procedures

NAM's challenge to the combination of Type B procedures 

and the average valuations produced by Type A procedures to 

arrive at a single NRD figure is, contrary to DOI's view, ripe 

for review. To determine ripeness we "evaluate both the 

fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to 

the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbott Labs. 

v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). In applying the twopart test, we note that the "basic rationale" of the ripeness 

test is "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature 

adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect 

the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative 

decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete 

way by the challenging parties." Id. at 148-49.

NAM's claim appears to be fit for resolution now. NAM 

has styled its challenge as one to the lawfulness of DOI's 

decision under CERCLA to allow trustees to calculate NRD 

with combined Type A and Type B procedures and DOI's 

decision to permit the combination is indisputably final. Cf. 

________

25 Nor do we find problematic the fact that the rule authorizes 

Type B assessments for types of losses not captured by Type A 

procedures. See 1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,578 ("Finally, 

the Department believes it is appropriate to revise the existing rule 

to allow supplemental use of type B procedures beyond resources 

not addressed in the type A submodels. The public can experience 

significant and distinct losses associated with the same resource.... The Department sees no reason to impose an arbitrary 

distinction between losses associated with different resources and 

losses associated with the same resource so long as there is no 

double recovery.").

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Abbot Labs., 387 U.S. at 149-50. Moreover, the effect of 

DOI's interpretation is sufficiently concrete and immediate to 

satisfy the second prong of the Abbott Labs. test. A trustee 

that complies with the criteria set forth in the regulation may 

now combine Type A and Type B procedures to assess 

natural resource damages resulting from a release and a PRP 

may well be required to decide whether it should force a Type 

B assessment or allow a supplemented Type A assessment to 

proceed. Cf. id. at 152-53 (finding that because FDA commissioner's rule, effective upon publication, required affected 

parties to take immediate action or face possible sanctions for 

non-compliance, rule's effect was "sufficiently direct and immediate as to render the issue appropriate for judicial review 

at this stage"). Thus, unlike the unripe challenge we rejected 

in Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1223 ("The guidance offered [in rule's 

preamble] is hypothetical and non-specific; it is not crafted as 

a concrete rule that can be applied under identified circumstances."), here the rules are concrete, specific and immediately effective.

Nonetheless, once again, NAM's claim fails on the merits. 

While the Type A submodels predict losses based on certain 

averaged values, that does not mean that supplementing the 

determinations with Type B calculations for values that are 

not included in the Type A submodels will result in overestimation or underestimation of damages. Because each of the 

procedures is addressed to a different type or component of 

loss, averaged and non-averaged values are not being combined to arrive at a joint loss figure for a particular type or 

component of damages. Thus NAM's assertion that combining items of loss arrived at through averaged values with 

items developed with non-averaged values produces bogus 

total loss figures is erroneous. Indeed, without the use of 

supplemental Type B procedures, a trustee could recover less 

than the full measure of damages sustained because certain 

values are not covered in the Type A submodels. Therefore, 

the addition of supplemental Type B procedures should not 

alter the degree to which the total loss figures produced could 

underestimate or overestimate loss. Moreover, we can find 

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gate NRD either with or without averaged values but not 

with a mixture of the two.

(3) Use of Type B procedures to assess compensable

value losses without "reality check"

NAM's final argument that DOI erred in permitting the 

use of certain Type B procedures without requiring sitespecific validation also fails. While the regulations do require 

that injury determination and quantification be performed 

anew when supplemental Type B procedures are employed to 

calculate items of loss other than compensable value, they do 

not require the same when the procedures are used to 

calculate compensable value losses not included in the Type A 

submodels. Again, this distinction reflects DOI's expert 

judgment that the Type A causation and loss predictions are 

adequate for the purposes of injury determination and quantification in the compensable value context but not in the 

restoration submodels. And again, we decline NAM's invitation to review expert judgments the Congress has committed 

to a coordinate branch of government. See Troy Corp., 120 

F.3d at 283; American Iron, 115 F.3d at 1004-05.

H. Inclusion of Non-Binding Oil Discharge 

Subroutines in Final Rule

Finally, NAM contends that DOI erred by retaining modeling subroutines for oil and petroleum discharges, which are 

now under the jurisdiction of NOAA and governed by regulations implementing OPA.26 Because we find that NAM lacks 

standing to bring the claim, we do not reach the merits.

________

26 With respect to oil discharges, DOI's regulations provide:

The Department began developing the type A procedures 

before the enactment of OPA and, thus, originally included 

both hazardous substances and oil in the [Type A] algorithms 

and databases. The Department has worked closely with 

NOAA during the development of the type A procedures. 

During its rulemaking, NOAA indicated it would allow use of 

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"[T]he standing doctrine requires would-be litigants to 

demonstrate an (1) injury in fact; (2) which is caused by, or is 

fairly traceable to, the alleged unlawful conduct; and (3) 

which is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision of the 

court." Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, 130 F.3d 

464, ---, 1997 WL 753903, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 9, 1997). 

Moreover, "[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the 

burden of establishing these elements, ... and may not 

pursue its claims before the federal judiciary if it fails to 

demonstrate any one of them." Id.

NAM's claim here is that DOI could not support NOAA's 

rulemaking under OPA by retaining subroutines and data it 

had developed while it retained jurisdiction over oil and 

petroleum discharges because DOI had no authority to publish such material in the Federal Register. Rather, according 

to NAM, NOAA had to recreate the submodels itself and 

subject its version of DOI's submodels to additional notice 

and comment. See Appellant Br. 48. NAM has two standing 

problems with the argument. First, NAM has wholly failed 

to identify how it or its members have suffered injury in fact 

that is concrete and imminent. See Bennett v. Spear, 117 

________

the Department's type A procedures under the OPA regulations....

NOAA's final rule states that trustees may use "[m]odelbased procedures, including type A procedures identified in 43 

C.F.R. part 11, subpart D," provided that any such procedure 

meets [certain specific conditions]....

Therefore, the Department has retained components relating 

to oil in the final versions of the [Type A procedures], while 

recognizing that these components are without any direct 

regulatory effect. The Department is also providing responses 

to comments it received on the oil-related components of the 

type A models. However, the Department wishes to emphasize 

that its regulations do not govern the assessment of natural 

resource damages for oil discharges under OPA. Trustees who 

wish to use the type A procedures and obtain a rebuttable 

presumption for assessments of oil discharges must follow the 

process established by NOAA's regulations.

1996 Type A rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,561.

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S. Ct. 1154, 1161 (1997). The regulations plainly acknowledge 

that the retained (and revised) subroutines are without binding effect because regulation of oil and petroleum discharges 

is now the exclusive province of NOAA. See 1996 Type A 

rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20,561. Thus, NAM cannot have been 

injured by DOI's decision to publish the non-binding materials. Second and more fundamentally, NAM has failed to 

show that any injury it may have suffered is "fairly traceable" 

to DOI's decision to retain, in non-binding form, the oil 

discharge databases and subroutines. To the extent NAM 

has a problem with NOAA's incorporation of the procedures 

into its OPA regulation without developing assessment submodels and databases anew and without subjecting such 

procedures to additional notice and comment, its claim is 

against NOAA, not DOI. Cf. Animal Legal Defense Fund,

130 F.3d at ---, 1997 WL 753903, at *3 ("In analyzing the 

'causation' element of constitutional standing, we ask whether 

it is 'substantially probable' that the challenged acts of the 

[respondent]as opposed to some third partycaused [the 

petitioner's] particularized injury."). Furthermore, NAM had 

an opportunity to participate in the litigation challenging 

NOAA's regulationsindeed, its counsel represented an intervenor in that case. See General Elec., 128 F.3d at 769. 

Accordingly, we find that NAM has failed to establish its 

standing to bring its oil discharge claims against DOI.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we uphold DOI's Type A rule 

(Natural Resource Damage AssessmentsType A Procedures, 61 Fed. Reg. 20,560 (1996) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 

11)). Accordingly, NAM's petition is

Denied.

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