Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02443/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02443-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States
Appellee
Solomon Upshaw
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SOLOMON UPSHAW,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-2443

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-01339-VJW, Judge Victor J. Wolski.

______________________ 

Decided: December 12, 2016

______________________ 

SOLOMON UPSHAW, Cape Neddick, ME, pro se.

ELIZABETH ANNE SPECK, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN,

JR., DEBORAH A. BYNUM. 

______________________ 

Before TARANTO, LINN, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

Case: 16-2443 Document: 12-2 Page: 1 Filed: 12/12/2016
2 UPSHAW v. US

PER CURIAM. 

Solomon Upshaw owned a tractor and a trailer, which 

he alleges were wrongfully seized from him. Mr. Upshaw 

filed a complaint in the United States Court of Federal 

Claims asking for the recovery of those two items. The 

court dismissed his claims for lack of jurisdiction. We 

affirm. 

I 

Mr. Upshaw owned a 1992 Kenworth tractor and a 

Dorsey trailer. In his complaint filed with the Court of 

Federal Claims on November 6, 2015, he alleged that both 

were improperly seized as a result of a civil forfeiture, and 

he named two private individuals and one private company as defendants. There being no jurisdiction in the 

Court of Federal Claims over such claims against private 

persons, the court “construe[d] his complaint liberally to 

have been brought against the United States.” Appx. 2 

n.1. The United States then moved to dismiss the complaint. On July 28, 2016, the court granted the motion.

The court read the complaint as presenting two 

claims. One rests on a civil-forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 983, which Mr. Upshaw said was violated because he 

did not receive proper notice that his property would be 

forfeited. The Court of Federal Claims held that it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over that claim. The court 

reasoned that (1) Mr. Upshaw “fail[ed] to plead that the 

federal government had anything at all to do with the loss 

of his property,” and (2) “even if the government had 

seized the tractor and trailer, [the court] would still lack 

jurisdiction,” because 18 U.S.C. § 983 grants district 

courts, not the Court of Federal Claims, the authority to 

hear claims under that law.

Mr. Upshaw’s second claim alleged tortious conduct, 

for which he sought recovery under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680. The Court of FederCase: 16-2443 Document: 12-2 Page: 2 Filed: 12/12/2016
UPSHAW v. US 3

al Claims held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 

review that claim because tort claims are outside its 

jurisdiction. The court added that, to the extent that Mr. 

Upshaw was complaining about conduct by the Avon 

Police Department, the Department was not an agency of 

the United States, which therefore could not be liable for 

its conduct.

Mr. Upshaw appeals. We have jurisdiction over the 

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

II

We review de novo whether the Court of Federal 

Claims possessed jurisdiction. Estes Express Lines v. 

United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The 

party invoking a court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of 

establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, establishes and defines the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims

relevant here. The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to hear “any claim against the United States founded 

either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or 

any regulation of an executive department, or upon any 

express or implied contract with the United States, or for 

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding 

in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).

Mr. Upshaw appears to argue that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction simply because it liberally 

construed his complaint as asserting claims against the 

United States, not just the named private defendants. 

That is incorrect. The presence of the United States may 

be a necessary condition for jurisdiction here, but it is not 

sufficient. Jurisdiction requires not only the right defendant, but the right claims, i.e., claims within the 

Tucker Act. Only the former issue, not the latter, was 

resolved by reading the complaint as seeking relief 

against the United States. 

Case: 16-2443 Document: 12-2 Page: 3 Filed: 12/12/2016
4 UPSHAW v. US

Mr. Upshaw’s claims are outside the Tucker Act. 

With regard to Mr. Upshaw’s claim of a violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 983: If that statute applies to the forfeiture 

alleged, the comprehensive remedial regime of that statute commits the claim of violation to district courts, to the 

exclusion of the Court of Federal Claims. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 983(a)(4)(A) (“In any case in which the Government files 

in the appropriate United States district court a complaint for forfeiture of property, any person claiming an 

interest in the seized property may file a claim asserting 

such person’s interest in the property . . . .”); cf. Vereda, 

Ltda. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 

2001) (Tucker Act jurisdiction displaced by the forfeiture 

regime of 21 U.S.C. § 881). With regard to Mr. Upshaw’s 

tort claims: The Tucker Act excludes tort claims. 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (excluding claims “sounding in tort”); 

see U.S. Marine, Inc. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1360, 

1372 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s 

decision to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

No costs.

AFFIRMED

Case: 16-2443 Document: 12-2 Page: 4 Filed: 12/12/2016