Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-16-16533/USCOURTS-ca9-16-16533-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aoki Center for Critical Race and Nation Studies
Amicus Curiae
Attorney General for the State of Nevada
Appellee
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
Amicus Curiae
Ronald Ross
Appellant
Williams
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONALD ROSS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAMS, Warden; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF 

NEVADA,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 16-16533

D.C. No.

2:14-cv-01527-

JCM-PAL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc June 19, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed February 24, 2020

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and William A. 

Fletcher, Ronald M. Gould, Richard A. Paez, Marsha S. 

Berzon, Consuelo M. Callahan, Milan D. Smith, Jr., Sandra 

S. Ikuta, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Paul J. Watford and 

Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Friedland;

Dissent by Judge Ikuta

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2 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The en banc court reversed the district court’s judgment 

dismissing as untimely Ronald Ross’s amended habeas 

corpus petition challenging his Nevada state conviction for 

theft-related offenses, and remanded.

Proceeding pro se, Ross timely filed a habeas petition in 

the district court. Using a court-provided form, he asserted 

eight claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. He also 

attached an order from the Nevada Supreme Court affirming 

the denial of his state petition for postconviction relief. After 

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations had expired, Ross 

filed with counsel’s assistance an amended petition that 

included multiple claims, some of which resembled those 

identified in Ross’s original pro se federal petition and 

discussed in the attached state court order. Dismissing the 

amended petition as untimely, the district court rejected 

Ross’s argument that its claims related back to the original, 

timely petition.

Explaining that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

15(c)(1)(B) and 10(c) apply in habeas proceedings, the en 

banc court held that if a petitioner attempts to set out habeas 

claims by identifying specific grounds for relief in an 

original petition and attaching a court decision that provides 

greater detail about the facts supporting those claims, that 

petition can support an amended petition’s relation back. 

The en banc court held that the exhibit containing the 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 3

Nevada Supreme Court order was a part of the original 

petition for all purposes under Rule 10(c), and that the 

original petition therefore set out or attempted to set out 

conduct, transactions, or occurrences to which claims in the 

amended petition could relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(B).

The en banc court wrote that the central question is 

whether the amended and original petitions share a common 

core of operative facts, as those facts are laid out in the 

amended petition and “attempted to be set out” in the 

original petition; and that if an exhibit to the original petition 

includes facts unrelated to the grounds for relief asserted in 

that petition, those facts were not “attempted to be set out” 

in that petition and cannot form a basis for relation back. 

Applying this framework, the en banc court wrote that 

Ross’s amended petition and his original petition with the 

attached exhibit share a common core of operative facts—

for example, defense counsel’s purported failure to object to 

the state witness’s distraction theft testimony —such that the 

amended petition relates back.

The en banc court rejected arguments (1) that the Nevada 

Supreme Court order is not a “written instrument” within the 

meaning of Rule 10(c) so it should not be considered part of 

Ross’s petition and cannot provide facts to which the 

amended petition could relate back, and (2) that a petition 

can only incorporate an attachment by clearly and repeatedly 

referencing it. The en banc court wrote that a petition need 

not be pleaded with sufficient particularity to support 

relation back. Observing that Habeas Rule 2(c)’s 

particularity requirement applies to pleading, the en banc 

court explained that the requirements of relation back are 

explicitly more generous. The en banc court saw no basis to 

conclude that, in general, allowing a petitioner to incorporate 

facts from attachments into his petition for relation back 

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4 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

purposes will saddle district courts with a greater volume of 

documents to review than the Habeas Rules expressly 

contemplate. 

The en banc court remanded for the district court to 

consider which of the claims in the amended petition 

(beyond the claim regarding the failure to object to expert 

testimony) are supported by facts in the original petition.

Judge Ikuta, joined by Judges Callahan and M. Smith, 

dissented. She wrote that the majority’s interpretation of 

Rule 10(c) in the habeas context—to mean that the facts 

contained in “a written instrument that is an exhibit to a” 

habeas petition are “part of the pleading for all purposes” but 

only to the extent the facts are arguably related to the 

petition’s grounds for relief—is unworkably broad and 

complex, inconsistent with the Habeas Rules, AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations, and the Supreme Court’s guidance on 

applying Rule 10(c) in this context.

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 5

COUNSEL

Jonathan M. Kirshbaum (argued), Assistant Federal Public 

Defender; Rene L. Valladares, Federal Public Defender; 

Office of the Federal Public Defender, Las Vegas, Nevada;

for Petitioner-Appellant.

Jeffrey M. Conner (argued), Assistant Solicitor General;

Matthew S. Johnson, Deputy Attorney General; Adam Paul 

Laxalt, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General,

Carson City, Nevada; for Respondents-Appellees.

David M. Porter, Chair, NADCL Amicus Committee, 

Sacramento, California; Gabriel J. Chin, University of 

California, Davis School of Law, Davis, California; for 

Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense 

Lawyers and Aoki Center for Critical Race and Nation 

Studies.

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6 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

Ronald Ross, proceeding pro se, timely filed a habeas 

petition in the United States District Court for the District of 

Nevada. Using a court-provided form for habeas petitions, 

he asserted eight claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

based on specific alleged deficiencies in his trial counsel’s 

performance. Ross’s statements on the form petition 

contained a short description of each claim. Ross also 

attached a six-page order from the Nevada Supreme Court 

affirming the denial of his state petition for postconviction 

relief. That order summarized the factual basis for most of 

the claims Ross had raised in his state petition, many of 

which were the same as those raised in his federal petition.

The district court appointed Ross counsel. Some months 

later, after the one-year statute of limitations under the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), had expired, Ross filed 

an amended petition with counsel’s assistance. The 

amended petition included multiple claims, some of which 

resembled those that were identified in Ross’s original pro 

se federal petition and discussed in the attached state court 

order. The district court dismissed Ross’s amended petition 

as untimely, rejecting Ross’s argument that its claims related 

back to his original, timely petition.

A divided three-judge panel affirmed the district court’s 

dismissal. Ross v. Williams, 896 F.3d 958, 972–73 (9th Cir. 

2018). We granted rehearing en banc, Ross v. Williams, 

920 F.3d 1222, 1223 (9th Cir. 2019), and now reverse.

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 7

I

Following his conviction for several theft-related 

offenses in Nevada state court, Ronald Ross was sentenced 

under Nevada’s habitual offender statute to life in prison 

with a possibility of parole after twenty years. Ross 

appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed his 

conviction and sentence on November 8, 2010. Ross did not 

file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States 

Supreme Court.

On November 30, 2011, Ross petitioned for 

postconviction relief in Nevada state district court, asserting 

among other things various claims of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel. That court denied relief.

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on July 22, 2014, 

explaining its decision in a six-page written order. That 

order enumerated Ross’s claims that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for:

(A) “failing to engage in pretrial 

discovery,” which would have 

enabled counsel to obtain a 

surveillance video;

(B) “violating [Ross’s] right to a speedy 

trial”;

(C) allowing “a communication 

breakdown [that] prevented [Ross] 

from being able to assist counsel in 

the preparation of his defense”;

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8 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

(D) “failing to object to expert testimony 

pertaining to pickpockets and 

distraction thefts”;

(E) “failing to retain a defense expert to 

rebut the expert testimony” about 

pickpockets and distraction thefts;

(F) “failing to properly challenge the use 

of a preliminary-hearing transcript in 

lieu of live testimony” or to “mak[e] 

an offer of proof as to what additional 

questions counsel would have posed 

to a live trial witness”;

(G) “failing to renew at trial [Ross’s] 

preliminary-hearing objection” 

concerning testimony about a 

surveillance video on the grounds that 

the testimony “violat[ed] the best 

evidence rule”; and

(H) “failing to raise certain objections 

during the State’s closing arguments 

and at sentencing and . . . failing to 

move post-verdict to dismiss the case 

for lack of evidence.”1

1 For ease of reference, we have adopted different labeling systems 

to identify the claims in each of the documents at issue. We denote

claims addressed in the Nevada Supreme Court postconviction order as 

Claims A–H, claims included in the original federal petition as Claims 

1–8, and claims included in the amended federal petition as Claims I–

XI.

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 9

In the course of rejecting those claims, the order discussed 

the facts underlying most of them.

On September 14, 2014, Ross filed a pro se federal 

habeas petition in the District of Nevada using the district’s 

standard petition form. In relevant part, Ross listed his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel as the constitutional basis for 

his claims. Where the form inquired about the facts on 

which he based those claims, Ross provided a list of alleged 

deficiencies in his trial counsel’s performance. The list 

stated that trial counsel (1) “failed to secure a speedy trial”; 

(2) “failed to review evidence prior to trial and adequately 

prepare”; (3) “failed to file pretrial motions”; (4) “failed to 

address the prejudice of evidence lost prior to trial”; 

(5) “failed to prepare for . . . jury selection” because counsel 

“attempted to force a deal”; (6) “failed to prepare for . . . 

trial,” again because counsel “attempted to force a deal”; 

(7) “failed to retain defense experts for . . . trial”; and 

(8) “failed to object to the State’s use of [an] expert witness.”

Although Ross did not include any further facts on the 

petition form, he appended an affidavit stating, among other 

things, that the Nevada Supreme Court had affirmed the 

denial of his state postconviction relief petition. The 

affidavit included a notation to “see attached order.” Ross 

then attached that order as exhibit “A.” On the same day, he 

also filed a handwritten “request” in which he asked the 

court to provisionally file the petition, give him leave to 

amend, and appoint counsel. The request stated that 

“Petitioner incorporates by reference and fact, the attached 

Affidavit in support of this motion, and writ, with attached 

exhibits.”

The district court reviewed the petition and appointed 

counsel to assist Ross. It set a deadline for the filing of any 

amended petition and stated that no response by the State 

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10 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

would be required absent further court order. Following 

extensions of this filing deadline and with the assistance of 

newly appointed counsel, Ross filed an amended habeas 

petition on June 8, 2015, asserting eleven claims. Eight were 

claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that 

Ross’s trial counsel: (I) failed to protect Ross’s right to a 

speedy trial; (II) failed to communicate with Ross prior to 

trial; (III) failed to seek an appropriate sanction based on a 

discovery violation; (IV) failed to object based on the best 

evidence rule; (V) failed to object to expert testimony; 

(VI) failed to call a defense expert; (VII) failed to object to 

the admission of preliminary hearing testimony based on the 

State’s inability to establish the witness’s unavailability; and 

(VIII) failed to raise mitigating arguments at sentencing 

against the imposition of a habitual offender sentence. The 

remainder alleged: (IX) violation of the Confrontation 

Clause; (X) violation of the right to a speedy trial; and 

(XI) deprivation of due process based on legally insufficient 

evidence.

The district court reviewed the amended petition and 

directed the State to file a response. The State moved to 

dismiss, arguing in relevant part that the amended petition 

was untimely. The State highlighted that the amended 

petition was filed after AEDPA’s one-year statute of 

limitations had run, and the State contended that the 

amended petition’s claims did not relate back to Ross’s 

concededly timely original federal petition because the 

original petition lacked factual allegations. Ross opposed 

dismissal, arguing that his amended petition related back 

because the Nevada Supreme Court order he had attached to 

his original federal petition included the necessary facts. 

The district court granted the State’s motion and entered an 

order of dismissal. The court reasoned that Ross had 

included no facts in his original form petition and had not 

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 11

referred to the attached state court order sufficiently for the 

facts therein to be considered incorporated by reference, so 

there was nothing to which the amended petition could relate 

back.

Ross timely appealed.

II

As relevant to this case, AEDPA requires that an 

individual seeking habeas relief from a state criminal 

judgment file a petition in federal court within one year of 

“the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). This 

statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of state 

postconviction proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). As the 

parties agree, Ross’s September 14, 2014 original petition 

fell within the limitations period, while his June 8, 2015 

amended petition did not.2 The claims raised in the amended 

petition are therefore untimely unless they relate back to 

Ross’s original petition.

Under Rule 15(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, an otherwise untimely amended pleading “relates 

back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the 

2 Ross’s limitations period began to run on February 7, 2011, the 

deadline for him to seek United States Supreme Court review of the 

Nevada Supreme Court’s decision affirming his judgment of conviction. 

The limitations period then ran for 296 days. It was tolled from 

November 30, 2011 to August 18, 2014 during the pendency of Ross’s 

state postconviction proceedings. When those proceedings concluded, 

the limitations period began to run again. Because 296 of the 365 days 

to file had already passed, the AEDPA deadline was the first business 

day that was at least 69 days later: October 27, 2014.

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12 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the 

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to 

be set out—in the original pleading.” Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 10(c) provides that “[a] statement in a pleading 

may be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading 

or in any other pleading or motion” and that “[a] copy of a 

written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of 

the pleading for all purposes.”

Relying on these rules, Ross argues that the exhibit 

containing the Nevada Supreme Court order was “a part of 

[his original petition] for all purposes,” and that the original 

petition therefore “set out” or “attempted to . . . set out” 

conduct, transactions, or occurrences to which claims in his 

amended petition could relate back. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). We agree.

A

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B) and 10(c) 

apply in habeas proceedings. Under provisions of both the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (the 

“Habeas Rules”), the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply 

to habeas proceedings to the extent they are consistent with 

the Habeas Rules, federal statutory provisions, and habeas 

practice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(4); Habeas R. 12. An 

additional statutory provision specifically incorporates 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 into habeas procedure. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (“[An] [a]pplication for a writ of 

habeas corpus . . . . may be amended or supplemented as 

provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil 

actions.”). We refer to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

81(a)(4), Habeas Rule 12, and Section 2242 collectively 

herein as the “Habeas Incorporation Provisions.”

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 13

Relying on the Habeas Incorporation Provisions, the 

Supreme Court has applied both Rule 15(c) and Rule 10(c) 

to habeas proceedings. In Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 

(2005), the Supreme Court considered whether an amended 

habeas petition related back to an original petition under 

Rule 15(c).3 Id. at 649, 656–64. In applying Rule 15(c) in 

habeas cases, some courts of appeals had treated an entire 

trial, conviction, or sentence as a “transaction” or 

“occurrence” to which an amended petition could relate 

back. See id. at 653–54, 656–57. The Court explained that 

this approach misinterpreted Rule 15(c): An amended 

petition “does not relate back . . . when it asserts a new 

ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time 

and type from those the original pleading set forth.” Id.

at 650. Instead, the Court held, both petitions must “state 

claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts.” Id.

at 664.

In Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1 (2005) (per curiam), the 

Supreme Court held that, under Rule 10(c), a habeas 

petitioner could rely on a brief appended to his petition to 

plead his petition with sufficient particularity. Id. at 4. The 

habeas petition at issue asserted a claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct. See id. at 2–3. In support, the petitioner 

attached a brief to his habeas petition, which articulated that 

claim in more detail. See id. at 3–4. The petition made 

repeated references to the brief. Id. at 4. The Supreme Court 

treated the brief as part of the petition under Rule 10(c), and 

3 Mayle relied on then-applicable provisions of the Habeas Rules 

and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Habeas R. 11 (2004); Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 81(a)(2) (2004); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2) (2004). Although these 

provisions have since been renumbered and in some instances revised, 

they remain identical or functionally equivalent to the provisions on 

which Mayle relied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(4); Habeas R. 12; Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).

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14 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

accordingly deemed the petition to properly present the 

prosecutorial misconduct claim regardless of whether, 

without the attachment, the petition might have been 

construed as presenting the claim “in too vague and general 

a form.” Id.

B

The foregoing authorities make plain that relation back 

is available under the circumstances presented here. If a 

petitioner attempts to set out habeas claims by identifying 

specific grounds for relief in an original petition and 

attaching a court decision that provides greater detail about 

the facts supporting those claims, that petition can support 

an amended petition’s relation back.4 An amended petition 

relates back if it asserts one or more claims that arise out of 

“the conduct, transaction, or occurrence” that the original 

petition “set out” or “attempted to . . . set out”—in other 

words, if the two petitions rely on a common core of 

operative facts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B); Mayle, 545 U.S. 

at 657, 664. “[F]or all purposes,” including relation back, 

the original petition consists of the petition itself and any 

“written instrument[s]” that are exhibits to the petition. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also Dye, 546 U.S. at 4. Like a brief, a 

court decision is a written instrument. See Dye, 546 U.S. 

at 4.

4 Because that rule resolves this case, we do not consider whether 

the original petition, without reliance on the attached Nevada Supreme 

Court order, included enough factual content to support the relation back 

of some of the claims later asserted in the amended petition. See infra

n.9.

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 15

1

We follow two steps to determine whether an amended 

petition relates back to an original petition that relied on an 

appended written instrument to help set forth the facts on 

which it based its claims. First, we determine what claims 

the amended petition alleges and what core facts underlie 

those claims. Second, for each claim in the amended 

petition, we look to the body of the original petition and its 

exhibits to see whether the original petition “set out” or 

“attempted to . . . set out” a corresponding factual episode, 

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B)—or whether the claim is 

instead “supported by facts that differ in both time and type 

from those the original pleading set forth,” Mayle, 545 U.S. 

at 650, 664. At a minimum, the original petition “attempted 

to . . . set out” all facts that supported a ground for relief 

asserted in the original petition. Those facts therefore could 

provide the necessary correspondence for relation back. Cf. 

id. at 659–60 (explaining that an amendment that “invoked 

a legal theory not suggested by the original complaint” could 

relate back to the original complaint because it arose out of 

the same “episode-in-suit” (citing Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R. 

Co., 323 U.S. 574, 580–81 (1945))5).

In comparing the petitions’ sets of facts, we do not 

require that the facts in the original and amended petitions 

be stated in the same level of detail. Relation back may be 

appropriate if the later pleading “merely correct[s] technical 

deficiencies or expand[s] or modif[ies] the facts alleged in 

the earlier pleading,” “restate[s] the original claim with 

5 “Episode-in-suit” refers to the incident that gave rise to a lawsuit. 

In Tiller, the episode-in-suit was “a worker’s death attributed . . . to the 

railroad’s failure to provide its employee with a reasonably safe place to 

work.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 660.

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16 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

greater particularity,” or “amplif[ies] the details of the 

transaction alleged in the preceding pleading.” 6A Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 

Procedure § 1497 (3d ed. 2019). Sufficient correspondence 

exists if the two claims arise out of the same episode-in-suit. 

See, e.g., Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664 n.7 (approving relation 

back when “the original petition challenged the trial court’s 

admission of recanted statements, while the amended 

petition challenged the court’s refusal to allow the defendant 

to show that the statements had been recanted” (citing 

Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 

2001)); Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1296–97 (9th Cir. 

2013) (determining that a claim that appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise double jeopardy related back 

to a timely raised substantive double jeopardy claim), 

abrogated on other grounds by Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 

2058 (2017).

The central question under this framework is whether the 

amended and original petitions share a common core of 

operative facts, as those facts are laid out in the amended 

petition and “attempted to be set out” in the original petition. 

If an exhibit to the original petition includes facts unrelated 

to the grounds for relief asserted in that petition, those facts 

were not “attempted to be set out” in that petition and cannot 

form a basis for relation back.

Applying this framework here, Ross’s original form 

petition and attached exhibit contain core facts to which 

claims in his amended petition relate back. An obvious 

example is Claim V of Ross’s amended federal petition, 

which asserts that Ross’s trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object when the State failed to “provide any notice 

that [it] intended to present expert testimony” from the 

State’s witness about what “distract theft[s]” were. In his 

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 17

original form petition, Ross listed as Claim 8 the similar 

contention that “counsel . . . failed to object to the State’s use 

of [an] expert witness.” The attached Nevada Supreme 

Court postconviction order provided factual details related 

to this claim. In its discussion of Claim D, that order 

evaluated Ross’s argument that his “counsel was ineffective 

for failing to object to expert testimony pertaining to 

pickpockets and distraction thefts where the [State’s] 

witness was not noticed as an expert.” Comparing the 

claims’ operative facts clearly reveals a common core—

defense counsel’s purported failure to object to the state 

witness’s distraction theft testimony—that was present in the 

original petition and to which the amended petition relates 

back.6

2

None of the State’s or the dissent’s counterarguments is 

persuasive. The State argues that the Nevada Supreme 

Court’s order is not a “written instrument” within the 

meaning of Rule 10(c), so it should not be considered part of 

Ross’s petition and cannot provide facts to which the 

amended petition could relate back. But Rule 10(c) does not 

define “written instrument,” and, especially in the habeas 

context, there is no reason to believe—as the State 

contends—that the term was intended to be limited to private 

written agreements such as contracts, leases, or wills. See 

Habeas R. 4 advisory committee’s note to 1976 adoption 

(consideration of habeas petition “may properly encompass 

6 As explained below, see infra Part III, we remand for the district 

court to consider which of the remaining claims in the amended petition 

are supported by facts in the original petition. We emphasize that the 

correspondence need not be as precise as the correspondence in the 

expert testimony claim for there to be relation back. See Nguyen, 

736 F.3d at 1296–97.

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18 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

any exhibits attached to the petition, including, but not 

limited to, transcripts, sentencing records, and copies of state 

court opinions” (emphasis added)). Indeed, Dye instructs 

that a legal brief counts as a written instrument within the 

meaning of Rule 10(c). See 546 U.S. at 4.7 We need not 

articulate a comprehensive definition of “written 

instrument,” because, whatever the boundaries of the 

definition, if it includes a brief it must include formal judicial 

decisions.

The State contends, however, that even if the Nevada 

Supreme Court’s order is a written instrument within the 

meaning of Rule 10(c), Dye imposes a requirement that a 

petition can only incorporate an attachment by “clear[ly] and 

repeated[ly]” referencing it—which the State argues Ross 

did not do. See Dye, 546 U.S. at 4. But neither the Habeas 

Incorporation Provisions nor any other governing law erects 

this hurdle to petitioners’ pursuit of habeas relief. Dye

treated an appended supporting brief as part of a habeas 

petition pursuant to Rule 10(c), without making a distinction 

between habeas petitions and other civil actions for purposes 

7 Dye did not specify whether it relied on the portion of Rule 10(c) 

providing that a “written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a 

part of the pleading for all purposes,” the portion of Rule 10(c) providing 

that “statement[s] in a pleading” may be “adopted by reference 

elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion,” or 

both. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). For two reasons, we understand the Court 

to have relied at least on the “written instrument” provision. First, the 

Court described the brief as appended to the petition, which is best 

understood as a reference to the portion of Rule 10(c) about exhibits. 

Second, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court considered the brief in itself 

to be “a pleading” within the meaning of the other portion of Rule 10(c). 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) (defining types of pleadings that may be filed in 

federal court, and not listing briefs); Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 

87 F.3d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between a pleading and 

a brief).

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 19

of the incorporation of attachments. See id. (citing one of 

the Habeas Incorporation Provisions, then-Rule 81(a)(2), to 

support application of Rule 10(c)). The Court mentioned 

that the petition made “clear and repeated references” to the 

brief, id. at 4, but that does not mean that it was necessary

for the petition to do so in order for that attachment to be a 

part of the petition. To the extent the Court relied on the 

“clear and repeated references” to the brief at all, it would 

have been because the issue in Dye was about whether the 

petition was pleaded with sufficient particularity, not about 

relation back.8

In fact, a petition need not be pleaded with sufficient 

particularity to support relation back. Arguing otherwise, 

the State contends that Habeas Rule 2(c), which requires that 

habeas petitions “specify all the grounds for relief available” 

to a petitioner and “state the facts supporting each ground,” 

cabins relation back by precluding the consideration of any 

matter outside the four corners of the petition. Similarly, the 

dissent suggests that the purported conflict between 

Rule 10(c) and Habeas Rule 2 indicates that we should 

preclude courts from examining exhibits for relation back 

purposes unless the exhibits have been clearly and 

repeatedly incorporated by reference. Dissent at 38–40, 47

& n.6. We cannot agree with either approach for the simple 

reason that Rule 2(c) sets forth only a pleading requirement. 

The requirements for relation back are different—and 

explicitly more generous. Rule 15(c)(1)(B) allows relation 

back to an occurrence that was only “attempted to be set out” 

8 Like the State, the dissent insists that Dye formulated a habeasspecific rule that an exhibit is incorporated only when the petition makes 

“clear . . . reference[]” to it. Dissent at 47 (alteration in original). Yet 

the dissent offers no explanation of why our contrary reading of Dye is 

incorrect.

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20 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

in the original pleading, which necessarily contemplates that 

the original pleading may be inadequately pleaded yet still 

support relation back. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B) (emphasis 

added); see also, e.g., Dean v. United States, 278 F.3d 1218, 

1222 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (concluding that claims 

in an amended habeas petition could relate back to claims in 

an original petition that expressly omitted supporting facts if 

the claims arose out of the same specific conduct or 

occurrence);9 McClellon v. Lone Star Gas Co., 66 F.3d 98, 

102 (5th Cir. 1995) (allowing relation back to original 

complaint that “obviously did not conform with the pleading 

requirements of [R]ule 8”). Indeed, a key purpose of Rule 

15 is to permit pleading deficiencies to be fixed through 

amendment. See Wright & Miller § 1497.10

9 The Eleventh Circuit in Dean adopted an even more permissive 

approach to relation back than Ross advocates for—or than we need 

consider—here. In Dean, the original petition included a claim objecting 

to perjured testimony at trial for which the petitioner provided no factual 

support at all, indicating that he intended to file “all facts in support 

thereof” at a later time. Id. at 1221–22. The Eleventh Circuit held that 

this claim, among others, provided a basis for the amended petition to 

relate back. See id. at 1222. The court explained: “When the nature of 

the amended claim supports specifically the original claim, the facts 

there alleged implicate the original claim, even if the original claim 

contained insufficient facts to support it. One purpose of an amended 

claim is to fill in facts missing from the original claim.” Id.

10 The dissent sidesteps the fact that whether a petition was pleaded 

with sufficient particularity and whether a subsequent petition relates 

back to facts set out or attempted to be set out in the original petition are 

different questions governed by different standards, instead insisting that 

an original petition’s failure to comply with the requirements for filing 

an adequate habeas petition prevents it from supporting relation back. 

Dissent at 40. But the inquiries are not so easily merged, because Rule 

15 expressly contemplates that inadequately pleaded pleadings may 

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 21

Mayle does not instruct otherwise. The Court did explain 

in Mayle that, because Habeas Rule 2(c)’s particularity-inpleading requirement is “more demanding” than Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)’s notice pleading standard,11

habeas petitioners could not rely on a definition of “conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence” that was more “capacious” than 

the definition applied to civil cases. 545 U.S. at 655, 657. 

But, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, see Dissent at 35–

36, Mayle did not adopt a habeas-specific meaning of Rule 

15 that is less capacious than the standard civil definition. 

Rather, relying on Rule 15’s application in “run-of-the-mine 

civil proceedings,” Mayle simply explained that relation 

back depends upon there being claims in the amended 

petition that share a common core of operative facts with 

support relation back, thereby requiring an analysis of what the pleading 

set out or attempted to set out, including in the habeas context.

11 In light of the Supreme Court’s later decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 

(2007), it is not clear that there remains much practical difference 

between Habeas Rule 2(c)’s and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

8(a)(2)’s pleading standards. Compare Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78 

(explaining that to survive a motion to dismiss a civil pleading must 

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and cannot rely on 

“labels and conclusions,” “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement,’” or “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully” (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 

557, 570)), with Mayle, 545 U.S. at 655 (“In the past, petitions have 

frequently contained mere conclusions of law, unsupported by any facts. 

[But] it is the relationship of the facts to the claim asserted that is 

important.” (alteration in original) (quoting Habeas R. 2(c) advisory 

committee’s note to 1976 adoption)), and id. (“[T]he petition is expected 

to state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error.” 

(quoting Habeas R. 4 advisory committee’s note to 1976 adoption)).

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22 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

claims in the original habeas petition. 545 U.S. at 657–59.12 

The general principle that relation back requires a single 

course or pattern of conduct—not factually and temporally

unrelated conduct arising out of the same underlying 

proceeding—showed why an entire criminal proceeding was 

too broad to “delineate an ‘occurrence’” for relation back 

purposes. Id. at 661 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)). Here, 

Ross identified particular errors that he believes entitle him 

to habeas relief; nowhere in his original or amended petition 

did he attempt to rely on his entire trial as the transaction or 

occurrence at issue.13

The State next contends that permitting relation back 

based on attached exhibits would contravene the goals 

motivating the Habeas Rules’ adoption in Rule 2(d) of a 

standard form for habeas petitions. The Advisory 

Committee explained that the form was adopted to achieve 

greater administrative convenience. Prior to adoption of the 

form, petitions frequently contained “mere conclusions of 

law, unsupported by any facts,” or were “lengthy and often 

illegible . . . [and] arranged in no logical order.” See Habeas

12 The dissent suggests that applying normal relation back principles 

in federal habeas cases is “inconsistent with AEDPA.” Dissent at 44, 47

n.6. This suggestion cannot be reconciled with the reasoning in Mayle, 

which applied normal relation back principles to determine relation back 

in a habeas case. If the Supreme Court had believed that allowing 

relation back defied AEDPA’s statute of limitations, it presumably 

would have just said so instead of engaging in all of the analysis it did in 

Mayle.

13 Indeed, Mayle instructs courts to look for “congeries” of facts, 

545 U.S. at 661—which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as a 

“collection of things merely massed or heaped together; a mass, heap,” 

Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989)—thereby illustrating our prior 

point that relation back looks to the existence of supporting facts and not 

to how well those facts are pleaded.

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 23

R. 2(c) advisory committee’s note to 1976 adoption.14 

Judges who received such submissions “had to spend hours 

deciphering them.” Id.

We disagree with the State that ruling in Ross’s favor 

here will saddle district courts with the task of sifting

through unmanageably large attachments. As an initial 

matter, Ross was obligated to attach the Nevada Supreme 

Court decision to his habeas petition,15 and the Advisory 

Committee notes to the 1976 adoption of Habeas Rule 4 

explicitly contemplate that district courts will review “any 

exhibits attached to the petition, including, but not limited 

to, transcripts, sentencing records, and copies of state court 

opinions” as part of their ordinary habeas screening 

obligations. Accordingly, we see no basis to conclude that, 

in general, allowing a petitioner to incorporate facts from 

attachments into his petition for relation back purposes will 

14 Following the 1976 enactment of the Habeas Rules, subsequent 

amendments moved the provision providing for a form petition from 

Habeas Rule 2(c) to Habeas Rule 2(d). Accordingly, this note

corresponds to the provision now listed in Habeas Rule 2(d).

15 Because the form petition required Ross to attach the decision, it 

is far from clear that, as the dissent contends, Ross failed to “substantially 

follow” the requirements of the form petition. See Habeas R. 2(d); 

Dissent at 40–42. The form petition purported to allow Ross to attach 

only two pages stating supporting facts, but it also included a separate 

requirement that he attach a state court order he knew to contain further 

supporting facts. Faced with this apparent inconsistency, he might 

reasonably have interpreted the form’s instructions not to constrain him 

from relying on the facts in required attachments.

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24 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

saddle district courts with a greater volume of documents to 

review than the Habeas Rules expressly contemplate.16

Moreover, in determining whether an amended petition 

relates back, district courts face no obligation to wade 

unguided through entire exhibits attached to an original 

petition to determine whether those exhibits contain core 

facts. Relation back is decided once there is an amended 

petition—and an amended petition must itself satisfy the 

particularity standards of Rule 2(c) in order to avoid 

dismissal on particularity grounds, separate and apart from 

timeliness concerns. The only operative pleading before the 

court will therefore presumably be one that is particular and 

not too difficult to navigate. Moreover, relation back is 

rarely decided on the pleadings alone; instead, courts 

typically have the benefit of briefing on a motion to amend 

or motion to dismiss. As in this case, such briefing will 

typically identify the specific portions of an earlier pleading 

that contain the relevant factual material to which the new 

pleading is attempting to relate back, avoiding the need for 

the judge to sift independently through the original petition’s 

exhibits. If the submissions discussing the amended petition 

fail to do so, district courts have familiar remedies, such as 

dismissing the new claim as time-barred for failure to show 

that it relates back, declining to grant leave to amend for 

similar reasons, or requesting supplemental briefing to better 

explain the relationship between the amended petition and 

16 The dissent at first appears to suggest that treating exhibits as part 

of a habeas petition would undermine various aspects of habeas rules and 

procedure, see Dissent at 40–42, but it later admits that any documents 

to which a petition makes “clear . . . reference[]” would be incorporated 

therein, see id. at 47 (alteration in original). The dissent offers no 

account of why its concerns about the volume of attachments or 

compliance with the habeas rules would be ameliorated by the inclusion 

of words such as “see attached” or “incorporated by reference.”

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 25

the original one—for example, by identifying the particular 

facts from an attachment that support each claim for relief.17

To the extent the State has a separate concern about 

whether contending with voluminous filings is consistent 

with Rule 2’s particularity-in-pleading standard, the Habeas

Rules provide a more direct solution. It is true that some of 

the requirements of Habeas Rule 2 were motivated by the 

Advisory Committee’s concern that petitioners too 

frequently filed “lengthy and often illegible petitions” or 

“mere conclusions of law, unsupported by any facts.” See

Habeas R. 2(c) advisory committee’s note to 1976 adoption. 

But when a petitioner files a petition that is insufficient under 

the particularity-in-pleading standard, the Advisory 

Committee Notes instruct that the district court must accept 

and file the defective petition, and in appropriate 

circumstances “require the petitioner to submit a corrected 

petition that conforms to Rule 2(c).” See Habeas R. 2(c) 

advisory committee’s note to 2004 amendment. Although 

an earlier incarnation of Rule 2 had permitted a court to 

return an insufficient petition to the petitioner without filing 

it, following the enactment of AEDPA’s one-year statute of 

limitations the Advisory Committee cautioned that rejecting 

without filing “a petition because it is not in proper form may 

pose a significant penalty for a petitioner, who may not be 

able to file another petition within the . . . limitations 

period.” Id. Rather than retroactively applying—with 

17 Contrary to the dissent’s view, see Dissent at 33–34, our holdings 

that an attachment to a petition is a part of the petition for all purposes 

and that only those facts that correspond to a claim asserted in the 

petition are “set out or attempted to be set out” in that petition are entirely 

consistent. Background facts set out in an attachment that are unrelated 

to the original petition’s claims may be a part of a petition without 

necessarily setting out or attempting to set out a transaction or occurrence 

to which a later amended petition may relate back.

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26 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

prejudice—the requirements of Rule 2(c) to an original 

pleading once there is an amended pleading, district courts 

must accept original petitions in the form they are filed and 

then enforce Rule 2(c) by requiring petitioners to make any 

necessary adjustments through the amendment process.18

These commonsense procedures also dispose of any 

concern that petitioners could lay the groundwork for an 

endless host of claims unburdened by the statute of 

limitations merely by submitting a blank petition and 

attaching a complete trial record or other voluminous filings. 

Such a petitioner would have failed to set out any claims in 

her original petition in the first place, and therefore could not 

incorporate corresponding facts under the rule we explain 

here. And the district court would have ample ability to 

require re-filing to ensure that such a petitioner complied 

with the particularity-in-pleading requirement.19

18 For example, if, upon “promptly examin[ing]” Ross’s original 

petition, the district court had concern about a deficiency in that petition, 

the district court could have informed Ross about the deficiency. See 

Habeas R. 4. Had the court done so, Ross could have simply copied the 

factual background from the state court order into an amended petition. 

Indeed, there is every reason to believe Ross would have done precisely 

this given that he had already tried to incorporate that order by reference 

in support of his claims. If this rote copying had occurred before the 

statute of limitations had run, there would be no question that Ross’s 

amended petition would not be time barred.

19 Although the reasons given above suffice to require reversal here, 

we also note that courts are obligated to “liberally construe[]” documents 

filed pro se, like Ross’s original petition. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 

89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 

(1976)). Doing so, it is clear that Ross “attempted to . . . set out” the 

factual background for the claims in his petition by attaching the Nevada 

Supreme Court’s order to it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). The obligation 

to construe pro se filings liberally means courts must frequently look to 

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 27

III

For the foregoing reasons, claims in Ross’s amended 

petition that share core operative facts in common with those 

in his original petition relate back to the original petition and 

should not have been dismissed. But because we do not 

typically consider in the first instance issues not discussed 

by the district court, see Am. President Lines, Ltd. v. Int’l 

Longshore & Warehouse Union, Alaska Longshore Div., 

Unit 60, 721 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2013), we will not 

ourselves undertake the full comparison necessary to 

determine which claims in the amended petition relate back. 

Rather, we remand for the district court to consider which of 

the claims in the amended petition (beyond the claim 

regarding the failure to object to expert testimony, discussed 

above) are supported by facts incorporated into the original 

petition.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

the contents of a pro se filing rather than its form. For example, in Zichko 

v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2001), we concluded that a habeas 

petitioner had preserved for appeal a particular claim even though facts 

relating to that claim did not appear in the part of the pro se petition in 

which he labeled and summarized the claim. Id. at 1020-21. And in 

Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2008), we explained that, when 

a pro se petitioner whose habeas petition is pending submits a new 

petition, the new petition should be construed as a motion to amend the 

pending petition rather than as a second or successive petition. Id.

at 888-90; see also Belgarde v. Montana, 123 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 

1997) (noting that we construe pro se petitioners’ use of habeas forms 

“with deference”).

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28 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, joined by CALLAHAN and 

M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, dissenting:

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Civil Rules) 

do not automatically apply to habeas proceedings. Instead, 

the Supreme Court has made clear that courts must first 

determine whether a Civil Rule is inconsistent with the 

Habeas Rules or AEDPA, and if so, whether a less expansive 

reading of the Civil Rule eliminates the conflict. See Mayle 

v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656–64 (2005); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 

545 U.S. 524, 528–33 (2005). Here, the majority interprets 

Rule 10(c) in the habeas context to mean that the facts

contained in “a written instrument that is an exhibit to a” 

habeas petition are “part of the pleading for all purposes” but 

only to the extent the facts are arguably related to the 

petition’s grounds for relief. On its face, this interpretation 

is unworkably broad and complex, saddling district courts 

with the task of sorting through voluminous attachments to 

determine which facts correspond to a petition’s grounds for 

relief. In effect, the majority returns us to the gloomy days 

before the Habeas Rules when judges spent hours 

deciphering “two thousand pages of irrational, prolix and 

redundant pleadings.” Rule 2, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases, advisory committee’s notes (quoting Passic v. 

Michigan, 98 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 (E.D. Mich. 1951)). 

Because the majority’s interpretation is inconsistent with the 

Habeas Rules, AEDPA’s statute of limitations, and the 

Supreme Court’s guidance on applying Rule 10(c) in this 

context, see Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1, 4 (2005) (per 

curiam), I dissent.

I

In 2009, Ronald Ross was convicted by a jury of several 

theft-related offenses. He was sentenced under Nevada’s 

habitual-offender statute, receiving a lifetime term of 

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 29

imprisonment with eligibility for parole after 20 years. Ross 

appealed his conviction and sentence. The Nevada Supreme 

Court affirmed.

Ross then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief 

(PCR) in Nevada state court. He attached to the petition a 

22-page handwritten memorandum that set forth the factual 

bases for his claims in greater detail. When the form petition 

asked for “supporting facts,” Ross repeatedly referenced his 

“supporting memorandum.” The state PCR court denied 

relief, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.

Having exhausted his state-court remedies, Ross filed a

timely pro se habeas petition in federal court. Ross used the 

court-provided form “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 By a Person in State Custody.” 

The form instructs a petitioner to “[a]ttach to this petition a 

copy of all state court written decisions regarding this 

conviction.” In boldface, the form warns the petitioner:

State concisely every ground for which you 

claim that the state court conviction 

and/or sentence is unconstitutional. 

Summarize briefly the facts supporting 

each ground. You may attach up to two 

extra pages stating additional grounds 

and/or supporting facts. You must raise in 

this petition all grounds for relief that 

relate to this conviction. Any grounds not 

raised in this petition will likely be barred 

from being litigated in a subsequent 

action.

The form then leads the petitioner step-by-step to provide the 

necessary information for each claimed ground for relief. 

For each alleged ground of relief, the form states, “I allege 

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30 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

that my state court conviction and/or sentence are 

unconstitutional, in violation of my __________ 

Amendment right to __________, based on these 

facts:__________ .” The form then guides the petitioner to 

explain how this claim was exhausted in state court.

The final page of the form requires a certification as to 

the truth of the allegations. This page states in boldface, 

“DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY,” 

and continues: 

I understand that a false statement or answer 

to any question in this declaration will subject 

me to penalties of perjury. I DECLARE 

UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY 

UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA THAT THE 

FOREGOING IS TRUE AND 

CORRECT.

The petitioner must then sign and date the form.

In his petition, Ross alleged violations of his Fifth 

Amendment right to due process, his Sixth Amendment right 

to counsel, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due 

process and equal protection. But each time the petition 

required a statement that the alleged constitutional violation 

was “based on these facts,” Ross provided only the following 

conclusory allegations:

Counsel was ineffective for failing to:

1. Secure a speedy trial

2. Failed to review evidence and adequately 

prepare

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 31

3. Failed to file pretrial motions

4. Failed to argue the prejudice of evidence 

lost prior to trial

5. Failed to prepare for jury selection

6. Failed to prepare for trial

7. Failed to retain defense experts

8. Failed to object to the state’s use of expert 

witness.

Ross did not take the opportunity to “attach up to two extra 

pages stating additional grounds and/or supporting facts.” 

And unlike in state court, where Ross repeatedly referenced 

a “supporting memorandum,” Ross did not indicate that any 

attached document contained “supporting facts,” or even 

mention any attached document.

Ross did, however, attach several documents to his 

petition. First, he attached a three-page handwritten affidavit 

in which he explained that he encountered delays in 

obtaining a copy of a Nevada Supreme Court ruling on his 

post-convictions relief claims. Second, he attached a copy 

of the six-page Nevada Supreme Court ruling, along with a 

remittitur and the first page of a letter from his attorney 

regarding the ruling. But Ross’s petition made no mention 

of the Nevada Supreme Court ruling.

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1), expired on October 27, 2014, a little over a 

month after Ross filed his original petition. On June 8, 2015, 

nearly eight months after the limitations period expired, 

Ross’s newly appointed counsel filed a 27-page petition 

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32 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

styled as a “First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus.” The new petition raised eleven claims for relief 

and provided several pages of facts and argument for each of 

the claims. The state moved to dismiss on the ground that 

the amended petition was time barred, and the district court 

granted the motion. This appeal followed.

II

There is no dispute that Ross filed his amended petition 

after AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations ran. Maj. 

at 11. To avoid this time bar, Ross argues that the amended 

petition “relates back” to the date of the original petition 

under Rule 15(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

(the Civil Rules).1

There is a fatal flaw with Ross’s argument: To relate 

back, the amended petition must assert “a claim or defense 

that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 

out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). But as the majority tacitly 

concedes, see Maj. at 9, 12, Ross’s original petition contains 

no well-pleaded factual allegations—indeed, it contains no 

factual allegations at all. Because the original petition fails 

to set out any “conduct, transaction, or occurrence,” relation 

back under Rule 15(c)(1) is simply unavailable.

This should be the end of Ross’s story. But the majority 

springs an unexpected twist. According to the majority, the 

Nevada Supreme Court ruling that is attached to Ross’s 

1 Rule 15(c)(1) provides: “An amendment to a pleading relates back 

to the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a

claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 

set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(c)(1).

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 33

habeas petition must be deemed to be part of the petition 

under Rule 10(c) of the Civil Rules. Maj. at 14.

2

 But not the

entire ruling; rather, the majority explains, only the facts in 

the ruling that are related to the original petition’s “grounds 

for relief” are incorporated into the petition. Maj. at 16. If 

any of the facts in the ruling are “unrelated” to the original 

petition’s grounds for relief, they are effectively stricken 

from the attachment. Maj. at 16. The majority explains that, 

after determining which facts are incorporated into the 

original petition, the district court must then determine 

whether the claims in the amended petition are “supported 

by facts in the original petition.” Maj. at 17 n.6. The 

majority “emphasize[s],” however, that the correspondence 

between the facts incorporated by attachment into the 

original petition and the new claims need not be that 

“precise.” Maj. at 17 n.6.

It is far from clear what is required under the majority’s 

new rule.

As a threshold matter, the majority is inconsistent.

Relying first on the language of Rule 10(c), the majority 

states that “the original petition consists of the petition itself 

and any ‘written instrument[s]’ that are exhibits to the 

petition” for “all purposes.” Maj. at 14. But the majority 

then skips over the operative language in Rule 10(c)—that 

the written instrument is “part of the pleading for all 

purposes”—and instead holds that the original petition 

includes only certain facts set forth in the exhibit—

2 Rule 10(c) states: “Adoption by Reference; Exhibits. A statement 

in a pleading may be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same 

pleading or in any other pleading or motion. A copy of a written 

instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all 

purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).

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34 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

apparently, those facts that can be used for the relation back 

of a subsequent amended petition. See Maj. at 16. This 

novel approach of using Rule 15(c) to determine the content 

of a habeas petition from the vantage point of a later, 

untimely petition has no support in the Civil or Habeas 

Rules.

Even if this backwards-looking approach made sense, 

the majority fails to provide district courts with any guidance 

on how to determine when the facts in an attached exhibit 

are related to the “grounds for relief asserted in [a] petition.” 

Maj. at 16. The legal claims listed in the form habeas 

petition are often broad and vague. Here, for instance, 

Ross’s original petition asserts violations of his Fifth 

Amendment right to Due Process, his Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due 

Process and Equal Protection, based on conclusory 

allegations such as “[c]ounsel was ineffective for failing to 

. . . prepare for trial.” How will a district court determine 

whether the facts in voluminous attachments, which may 

include opinions, briefs, and entire trial transcripts, relate to 

the claim that counsel failed to “prepare for a trial”? The 

majority does not say. The task may be manageable in this 

case, where the attachment is a mere six-page judicial 

opinion. But as the majority implicitly recognizes, a district 

court must undertake this analysis with respect to any and all 

attachments to the habeas petition, which could amount to 

thousands of pages, and the district court must deem any fact 

in any attachment that even arguably relates to a broad claim 

to be part of the original petition, at least for purposes of 

relation back. See Maj. at 17 & n.6.

There is a critical problem with such an expansive 

interpretation and application of Rule 10(c): it is directly 

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contrary to Supreme Court rulings preventing this sort of 

application of the Civil Rules in the habeas context.

III

The Supreme Court has made clear that “habeas corpus 

is . . . not automatically subject to all rules governing 

ordinary civil actions.” Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 

490 n.4 (1971) (citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 

(1969)). Habeas proceedings are “unique,” and so “[h]abeas 

corpus practice in the federal courts has conformed with civil 

practice only in a general sense.” Harris, 394 U.S. at 294. 

From its inception, habeas corpus was “tempered by a due 

regard for the finality of the judgment of the committing 

court.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256 

(1973) (Powell, J., concurring).

The Court has likewise made clear that a Civil Rule 

“applies in habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 only ‘to the extent that [it is] not inconsistent with’ 

applicable federal statutory provisions and rules.” Gonzalez, 

545 U.S. at 529 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 

Specifically, Rule 81(a)(4) of the Civil Rules provides that 

the Civil Rules apply to habeas proceedings only “to the 

extent that the practice in those proceedings: (A) is not 

specified in a federal statute [or the Habeas Rules]; and 

(B) has previously conformed to the practice in civil 

actions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(4). Similarly, Habeas Rule 

12 “‘permits application of the [Civil Rules] only when it 

would be appropriate to do so,’ and would not be 

‘inconsistent or inequitable in the overall framework of 

habeas corpus.’” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 654 (quoting Rule 11, 

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, advisory committee’s 

notes (2004)). Moreover, even beyond a “substantive 

conflict with AEDPA standards,” a Civil Rule cannot be 

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36 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

applied if it “could be used to circumvent” habeas-specific 

procedures. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531–32.

In light of the Supreme Court’s recognition that courts 

must “limit the friction” between a Civil Rule and habeas 

requirements, id. at 534, the Court has provided a framework 

for applying Civil Rules in the habeas context.

First, any interpretation and application of a Civil Rule 

in the habeas context must be consistent with the 

corresponding Habeas Rule and the unique nature of habeas 

proceedings. A court may not adopt an expansive 

interpretation of a Civil Rule if doing so will interfere with 

habeas-specific requirements. See Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664; 

see also Harris, 394 U.S. at 297 (rejecting a “literal 

application” of Rule 33, which provides for discovery 

through interrogatories, to habeas proceedings, because it 

“would do violence to the efficient and effective 

administration of” habeas). Thus in Mayle, the Court 

rejected the Ninth Circuit’s expansive interpretation of Rule 

15(c) as allowing an amended habeas petition to relate back 

to an original petition merely because both petitions related 

to the “same trial, conviction, or sentence.” 545 U.S. at 662. 

According to the Court, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation 

interfered with Habeas Rule 2(c), which required that habeas 

petitioners plead with particularity. Id. at 661. Before 

applying a Civil Rule in the habeas context, therefore, courts 

must determine whether doing so is consistent with the 

corresponding Habeas Rule, and if not, the extent to which 

the two can be harmonized by applying the Civil Rule “less 

broadly.” Id. at 657.

Second, any application of a Civil Rule must be 

consistent with AEDPA, and AEDPA’s goal of “advanc[ing] 

the finality of criminal convictions.” Id. at 662. In light of 

this goal, the Supreme Court held that Rule 60, which 

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 37

provides for relief from final judgments or orders, applies 

only narrowly in the habeas context so as to avoid 

circumventing AEDPA’s general prohibition on second or 

successive petitions. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531–33; see 

also Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 489–90 (1975) 

(declining to apply Rule 60 when doing so would be 

inconsistent with statutory exhaustion requirement). 

Similarly, courts must be “mindful of Congress’ decision to 

expedite collateral attacks by placing stringent time 

restrictions on [them].” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 657 (citation 

omitted). Given AEDPA’s concerns with “finality” and 

“federalism,” it imposes “a tight time line, a one-year 

limitation period” on habeas petitions. Id. at 662–63. Courts 

may not apply a Civil Rule to a habeas proceeding in a way 

that “swallow[s] AEDPA’s statute of limitation.” Id.

(quoting Felix v. Mayle, 379 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(Tallman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev’d,

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005)). Thus, if applying a 

Civil Rule in the habeas context would give AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations “slim significance,” id. at 662, courts 

should apply the rule “less broadly” to account for AEDPA’s 

policy concerns regarding finality, id. at 657.

IV

The majority makes a fundamental error in adopting an 

interpretation of the Rule 10(c) and applying it in the habeas 

context without even considering the Supreme Court’s 

guidance for ensuring consistency with the Habeas Rules, 

the unique nature of habeas, and AEDPA. Maj. at 15–17. 

As a result, the majority’s interpretation conflicts with all 

three.

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A

First, the majority’s interpretation of Rule 10(c) is 

inconsistent with the corresponding Habeas Rule and with 

the proper administration of habeas proceedings. See Mayle, 

545 U.S. at 661, Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531–33. The 

corresponding rule here is Habeas Rule 2, which governs the 

form of habeas petitions. See Rule 2, Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, advisory committee’s notes. Habeas 

Rule 2 provides that “[t]he petition must: (1) specify all 

grounds for relief available to the petitioner; (2) state all facts 

supporting each ground; (3) state the relief requested; (4) be 

printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten; and (5) be 

signed under penalty of perjury . . . .” Rule 2(c), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. The petition must also 

“substantially follow either the form appended to [the 

Habeas Rules] or a form prescribed by a local district-court 

rule.” Rule 2(d), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The 

majority’s expansive interpretation of Rule 10(c) is contrary 

to Habeas Rule 2 in three material ways.

First, the majority’s interpretation of Rule 10(c) violates 

the requirement imposed by Habeas Rule 2(c) that the 

petition specify the grounds for relief and the facts 

supporting each ground. The Habeas Rules’ specificity 

requirement is one of the unique features of habeas 

proceedings. See Mayle, 545 U.S. at 649. It is distinct from 

the pleading requirements in the civil context, see Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires that a complaint merely 

provide “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests,” see Mayle, 545 U.S. at 655 

(citation omitted). As explained by the Supreme Court, 

Habeas Rule 2(c) “is more demanding.” Id. “It provides that 

the petition must ‘specify all the grounds for relief available 

to the petitioner’ and ‘state the facts supporting each 

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ground.’” Id. (quoting Rule 2(c), Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases).

This specificity requirement is necessary to assist courts 

in fulfilling the Habeas Rules’ screening function. Under 

Habeas Rule 4, courts must “promptly examine” each 

petition, and dismiss a petition “[i]f it plainly appears from 

the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. This reflects a 

congressional command, see 28 U.S.C. §2243, which makes 

it “the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications 

and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the 

respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer,” Rule 4, 

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, advisory committee’s 

notes (citing Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 

1970)).

By departing from Habeas Rule 2(c)’s specificity 

requirement, the majority’s interpretation of Rule 10(c) 

frustrates this screening function. Under the majority’s take 

on Rule 10(c), a petitioner need not state claims and facts 

with specificity because the facts recited in any attached 

document, whether it is a judicial opinion, a brief, or an 

entire trial transcript, are deemed to be part of the petition so 

long as the facts are arguably related to the petition’s claims 

for relief. Maj. at 16–17. Because any exhibit can serve as 

a source of facts, a court cannot perform its screening 

function without searching through the attachments and 

speculating as to which facts support which claims. 

Moreover, the court’s screening obligations are vitiated by a 

petitioner’s ability to bring an “amended” petition at any 

time by relying on facts referenced in attached documents, 

so long as they are arguably related to the claims in the 

original petition. Therefore, the majority’s interpretation of 

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40 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

Rule 10(c) interferes with “the efficient and effective 

administration” of habeas. Harris, 394 U.S. at 297.

The majority’s argument that it can ignore the conflict 

between its reading of Rule 10(c) and Habeas Rule 2(c) on 

the ground that “[Habeas] Rule 2(c) sets forth only a 

pleading requirement” is unavailing. Maj. at 19. As the 

majority acknowledges, the threshold question in this case is 

whether the facts in an attachment can be considered part of 

a habeas petition for purposes of relation back. Maj. at 15. 

Habeas Rule 2 “describes the requirements of the actual 

petition, including matters relating to its form, contents, 

scope, and sufficiency.” Rule 2, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases, advisory committee’s notes (emphasis added). 

It is precisely because Habeas Rule 2 sets forth a “pleading 

requirement,” Maj. at 19, that it controls to the extent a Civil 

Rule, such as Rule 10(c), could expand the “contents” or 

“scope” of a habeas petition beyond that contemplated by 

Habeas Rule 2, see Rule 12, Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases (Civil Rules apply only “to the extent they are not 

inconsistent” with Habeas Rules). The majority attempts to 

gloss over the conflict between its application of Rule 10(c) 

and Habeas Rule 2 by focusing instead on the “generous” 

language of Rule 15(c)(1)(B), Maj. at 19, but this is merely 

a straw man. Rule 15(c)(1)(B) does not address the contents 

of the original habeas petition, and so it has no bearing on 

the question whether the majority’s application of Rule 10(c) 

to modify the contents of the habeas petition is inconsistent 

with the requirements of Habeas Rule 2.

Second, the majority’s interpretation of Rule 10(c) 

conflicts with Habeas Rule 2(d)’s requirement that 

petitioners use a standardized form. The standardized form 

requirement is a unique feature of habeas, distinguishing 

habeas petitions from civil complaints. Compare Rule 2(d), 

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Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases with Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). There are habeas-specific reasons for this rule. 

Because habeas petitioners are frequently pro se prisoners, 

see 1 Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas 

Corpus Practice & Procedure § 12.2, at 852 (7th ed. 2018), 

the requirement to use a standardized form was calculated to 

improve the quality of the habeas petition and to assist 

judges in identifying meritorious claims, see Rule 2, Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases, advisory committee’s notes 

(“Administrative convenience, of benefit to both the court 

and the petitioner, results from the use of a prescribed 

form.”).3 Before this requirement, petitions “frequently 

contained mere conclusions of law, unsupported by any 

facts.” Id. “In addition, lengthy and often illegible petitions, 

arranged in no logical order, were submitted to judges who 

. . . had to spend hours deciphering them.” Id. The 

standardized form in this case instructs petitioners that they 

“may attach up to two extra pages stating additional grounds 

and/or supporting facts.” Limiting petitions to “two extra 

pages” of additional facts makes sense in light of the 

concerns that motivated the Habeas Rules. See Rule 2, Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases, advisory committee’s notes.

The majority’s interpretation of Rule 10(c) eliminates 

the value of this requirement, because it requires courts to 

deem attached materials part of the petition. Maj. at 14. The

3 The majority “note[s] that courts [must] ‘liberally construe[]’ 

documents filed pro se.” Maj. at 26 n.19. But the form habeas petitions 

like the one Ross used were designed to assist prisoners filing pro se. 

See Rule 2, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, advisory committee’s 

notes. These petitions provide clear, step-by-step instructions in plain 

English and give prisoners ample guidance for setting out their claims 

and the facts supporting them. Given these substantial efforts to 

accommodate pro se filers, there appears to be no basis for further 

relaxing procedural requirements.

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majority does not acknowledge that Ross failed to comply 

with the form petition. See Maj. at 9, 23 n.15. Indeed, the 

majority casts aside the form petition’s instructions and the 

requirement that a petitioner “substantially follow” the form, 

Rule 2(d), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, by 

interpreting Rule 10(c) to allow petitioners to attach reams 

of documents, all of which may contain facts that correspond 

to the petition’s claims for relief, Maj. at 16–17.

4

 In doing 

so, the majority strikes a blow to “the efficient and effective 

administration” of habeas, Harris, 394 U.S. at 297, and 

returns judges to the task of ferreting through thousands of 

pages of “irrational, prolix and redundant pleadings,” Rule 

2, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, advisory 

committee’s notes (quoting Passic, 98 F. Supp. at 1016). 

This will result in the very thing the Habeas Rules—and 

form petitions specifically—were designed to prevent: an 

increased burden on the judicial system and an increase in 

length, and corresponding decrease in quality, of habeas 

petitions. See id.

Finally, the majority’s interpretation of Rule 10(c) 

renders the Habeas Rules’ penalty-of-perjury requirement 

4 The majority does not go so far as to argue that Ross “substantially 

follow[ed]” the requirements of the form petition. Maj. at 23 n.15. 

Instead, the majority argues that Ross might have been confused by the 

instruction (on page 1) to “[a]ttach to th[e] petition a copy of all state 

court written decisions regarding this conviction” and the separate 

instruction (on page 3) that “[y]ou may attach up to two extra pages 

stating additional grounds and/or supporting facts.” There is nothing 

“apparent[ly] inconsisten[t]” with these instructions, Maj. at 23 n.15, 

because no reasonable petitioner would think that attaching “all state 

court written decisions” is the same as “stating additional grounds and/or

supporting facts,” particularly given that these instructions appear in 

separate sections on separate pages of the form petition. In short, the 

majority’s post-hoc rationalization as to why Ross did not follow the 

instructions is unsupported by the record and belied by common sense.

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meaningless. A petitioner cannot reasonably be considered 

to have verified the accuracy of factual statements included 

in hundreds or thousands of pages of documents from a 

range of sources. See Rule 2(c)(5), Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases.5 By effectively relieving pro se petitioners of 

the responsibility to verify the accuracy of the facts alleged 

in a habeas petition, the majority undermines one of the 

important means of improving the quality of habeas 

pleadings and better enabling the courts to identify 

meritorious claims. See Rule 2, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases, advisory committee’s notes (“There is a penalty 

for perjury, and this would seem the most appropriate way 

to try to discourage it.”). Again, this penalty-of-perjury 

requirement is a unique feature of habeas proceedings, and 

is based on habeas-specific reasons. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) 

(“Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a 

pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an 

affidavit.”).

The majority does not attempt to address the 

inconsistency of its interpretation and application of Rule 

10(c) with Habeas Rule 2. Instead, the majority directs a 

court considering a late petition to allow (or solicit) “briefing 

to better explain the relationship between the amended 

petition and the original one,” and to allow the petitioner the 

opportunity to identify “the particular facts from an 

attachment that support each claim for relief.” Maj. at 24–

25. This approach tacitly concedes there may be no obvious

relationship between the original petition and the new one. 

Indeed, in this very case, where the exhibit is a brief, six5 This requirement reflects a congressional command. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2242 (“Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing 

signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by 

someone acting in his behalf.”).

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44 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

page ruling, the majority nevertheless declines to “undertake 

the full comparison necessary to determine which claims in 

the amended petition relate back.” Maj. at 27.

In sum, the majority’s interpretation of Rule 10(c) 

conflicts with Habeas Rule 2 and does so in a way that 

frustrates the “the efficient and effective administration” of 

habeas. Harris, 394 U.S. at 297. It should be rejected on 

this ground alone.

B

Second, the majority’s interpretation of Rule 10(c) is 

inconsistent with AEDPA. As Mayle explained, we may not 

apply a Civil Rule in a manner that would “swallow 

AEDPA’s statute of limitation,” 545 U.S. at 662 (citation 

omitted), but rather must respect Congress’s decision to put 

“stringent time restrictions” on collateral attacks, id. at 657.

The majority’s interpretation and application of Rule 

10(c) conflicts with these instructions. If each attachment to 

a habeas petition can serve as a wellspring of facts to support 

new claims for relief in a subsequent petition, petitioners will 

lay the groundwork for a host of claims that will relate back 

merely by pleading broad, malleable claims for relief and 

then following the form’s instructions to “[a]ttach to this

petition a copy of all state court written decisions regarding 

this conviction.” Because a petitioner apparently needs only 

a colorable argument that facts in an attachment relate to a 

broad claim in the original petition, any reasonable petitioner 

will assert broad claims for relief and attach reams of 

documents to preserve a full panoply of claims that can be 

revived after AEDPA’s limitations period runs. Thus, under 

the majority’s reasoning, a petitioner’s amended habeas 

petition will rarely be barred by AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. See Maj. at 15–17.

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 45

The majority does not address the inconsistency between 

its interpretation of Rule 10(c) and AEDPA. As the majority 

implicitly acknowledges, an attorney can sidestep AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations merely by explaining how facts buried 

in hundreds of pages of exhibits relate to the claims for relief 

in the original petition and then argue that the entirely new 

claims in the amended petition relate to those facts. Maj. 

at 15–17. The majority fails to explain how this result can 

be squared with Mayle’s warning that “it would be 

anomalous” to apply an inappropriately broad reading of a 

Civil Rule in the habeas context so as to avoid AEDPA’s 

stringent time restrictions. 545 U.S. at 663. Thus, the 

majority’s reading of Rule 10(c) “swallow[s] AEDPA’s 

statute of limitation,” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 662 (citation 

omitted), in direct contradiction to the Supreme Court’s 

specific direction in Mayle. In applying Rule 10(c) in a way 

that gives AEDPA’s statute of limitations “slim 

significance,” id. at 662, the majority disregards “AEDPA’s 

‘finality’ and ‘federalism’ concerns,” id. at 663.

C

Rather than tailor its interpretation of Rule 10(c) to be 

consistent with the Habeas Rules and AEDPA, as required 

by the Supreme Court, the majority attempts to justify its 

rejection of this guidance on the ground that the Supreme 

Court cited and applied Rule 10(c) in Dye, 546 U.S. at 4. 

Maj. at 14. But Dye does not support the majority. To the 

contrary, it demonstrates how Rule 10(c) should be 

interpreted narrowly to avoid conflicts in the habeas context. 

See Dye, 546 U.S. at 4.

In Dye v. Hofbauer, the Sixth Circuit dismissed a state 

prisoner’s habeas petition on the ground that the petitioner 

failed to exhaust his claim of prosecutorial misconduct in 

state court. 111 F. App’x 363, 364 (6th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 

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46 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

546 U.S. 1 (2005). The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the 

petitioner’s federal habeas petition made only a vague 

reference to a due process violation; therefore, even if the 

petitioner had presented an identical claim in his state 

petition, he had not “fairly presented” a federal 

constitutional claim to the state court. Id. The Supreme 

Court reversed. Citing Rule 10(c) and Rule 81(a)(2) (which 

then provided that the Civil Rules apply to habeas 

proceedings only “to the extent” consistent with the Habeas 

Rules and historical practice), the Court held that the 

petitioner had adequately exhausted his claims because the 

“petition made clear and repeated references to an appended 

[state-court] brief, which presented [the petitioner’s] federal 

claim with more than sufficient particularity.” Dye, 546 U.S. 

at 4. In other words, rather than rely on Rule 10(c)’s broad 

language that a document attached to a pleading “is a part of 

the pleading for all purposes,” the Court held that only when 

a habeas petition “ma[kes] clear . . . reference[]” to an 

attachment, may a court consider the attachment under Rule 

10(c) to clarify the allegations in the petition. Id.

Contrary to the majority’s reading, Maj. at 14, by

focusing on the petitioner’s “clear and repeated references” 

to the attachment, Dye implicitly rejected the majority’s 

interpretation of Rule 10(c). Dye’s narrow application of 

Rule 10(c) is consistent with the Habeas Rules, the unique 

nature of habeas proceedings, and AEDPA. The 

incorporation by reference of an attachment, which itself 

was sufficiently particular, is consistent with the specificity 

requirements of Habeas Rule 2(c). See Rule 2(c), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. A targeted incorporation of 

specific facts allows the petitioner to comply with the 

Habeas Rules’ penalty-of-perjury requirement, see Rule 

2(c)(5), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, because the 

petitioner can rationally identify the specific facts verified to 

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ROSS V. WILLIAMS 47

be true. And Dye’s narrow interpretation of Rule 10(c) is 

consistent with AEDPA’s statute of limitations, because the 

incorporation of targeted facts in a specified exhibit does not 

give a petitioner an unbounded opportunity to later raise a 

wide range of other claims after AEDPA’s one-year 

limitations period has run. Cf. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 662.

V

Applying Rule 10(c) as it was applied in Dye, and in a 

manner consistent with the Supreme Court’s framework, the 

analysis of Ross’s challenge is straightforward. Ross’s 

original petition does not make “clear . . . reference[]” to the 

Nevada Supreme Court ruling attached to his petition. Ross 

knew how to incorporate an appended document by 

reference; he did exactly that in his state petition. Because 

he did not reference the Nevada Supreme Court ruling in his 

federal habeas petition, it was not incorporated into his 

petition under Rule 10(c) and Dye, 546 U.S. at 4. This means 

that his original petition failed to set out any “conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). In 

the absence of any “congeries of facts,” Mayle, 545 U.S. 

at 661, in the original petition, the amended petition could 

not relate back to a core of operative facts in the original 

petition. As a result, Ross’s amended petition does not relate 

back to the original petition under Rule 15(c), and the claims 

in the amended petition are time-barred.6

6 Because the proper analysis of Rule 10(c) resolves this case, there 

is no need to analyze whether Rule 15(c) applies to the amended petition. 

Nevertheless, any interpretation and application of that rule in the habeas 

context must also meet the Supreme Court’s requirement that an 

application of the Civil Rules be consistent with the Habeas Rules, 

habeas procedures, and AEDPA. The majority’s broad interpretation of 

Rule 15(c) as giving courts expansive authority to find “[s]ufficient 

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48 ROSS V. WILLIAMS

***

By applying Rule 10(c) to a habeas petition without 

giving due consideration to the habeas context, the majority 

violates the Supreme Court’s direction for applying the Civil 

Rules in this context and creates an approach inconsistent 

with the Habeas Rules and with Congress’s intention to 

impose strict time limits on habeas petitions. Further, the 

majority turns its back on the Supreme Court’s guidance for 

applying Rule 10(c) in the habeas context, which makes 

clear that an exhibit is incorporated into a habeas petition 

only when the petition makes “clear . . . reference[] to” the 

exhibit. Dye, 546 U.S. at 4. The majority’s approach is 

squarely at odds with AEDPA and the Habeas Rules, and it 

places a substantial burden on the judicial system. 

Therefore, I dissent.

correspondence” between a claim in the amended petition and a 

“corresponding factual episode” in the original petition, Maj. at 15–16, 

and the majority’s “emphasi[s] that the correspondence need not be as 

precise” as the example in its opinion, Maj. at 17 n.6, is mistaken, cf. 

Mayle, 545 U.S. at 661 (rejecting Ninth Circuit’s “boundless” approach 

to Rule 15(c) because “[a] miscellany of claims for relief could be raised 

later rather than sooner and relate back”). Similarly, the majority’s 

reliance on Dean v. United States, 278 F.3d 1218, 1222 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(per curiam), to suggest that an amended petition might relate back to an 

original petition even if the original petition “provide[s] no factual 

support at all” is misplaced. Maj. at 19–20 & n.9. This is because Mayle

(which postdates Dean) rejected such a boundless application of Rule 

15(c)(1)(B) by holding that “separate congeries of facts supporting the 

grounds for relief . . . delineate an ‘occurrence.’” 545 U.S. at 661 

(emphasis added). That is, there is no “conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence” if there are no “congeries of facts.”

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