Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03652/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03652-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Oakland
Defendant
Christopher Craig
Defendant
P. Phan
Defendant
J. Turner
Defendant
Michael Turner
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL TURNER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

OAKLAND POLICE OFFICERS

CHRISTOPHER CRAIG, J. TURNER, P.

PHAN, CITY OF OAKLAND,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-03652 SI

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS THE THIRD

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. Pursuant to

Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and

hereby VACATES the hearing. Having considered the papers submitted, and for good cause shown,

the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case has been described in several prior orders of this Court and

need not be recounted in detail here. By way of summary, this action was filed by plaintiff Michael

Turner against the City of Oakland and several Oakland police officers who stopped plaintiff’s car on

March 23, 2009 while plaintiff was riding in the car as a passenger. After the police found marijuana

on the driver of the car, they handcuffed plaintiff and searched the vehicle, where they found a vial of

“blessing oil.” Plaintiff explained that he used the oil for religious purposes. According to plaintiff,

although the officers admitted that they did not know whether the oil contained any illegal substances,

they confiscated the vial and arrested plaintiff. Plaintiff was held in jail for ten days while the blessing

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oil was tested for the presence of illegal substances. 

In his Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), plaintiff asserts the same claims he alleged in his

previous complaint: claims against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First and

Fourth Amendment rights, a Monell claim against the City of Oakland, and state law claims against all

defendants for false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Presently before the Court

is defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,

the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff

to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading

of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 555. In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which

relief can be granted, the court must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and draw all

reasonable inferences in its favor. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).

However, the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted

deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th

Cir. 2008). 

DISCUSSION

I. First Amendment Claim

Plaintiff alleges that the officers violated his rights under the First Amendment by seizing his

blessing oil, arresting him, and expressing skepticism that the oil was a religious artifact. TAC ¶ 49.

The Court advised plaintiff in its prior orders that, in order to state a claim under the First Amendment,

plaintiff must provide factual allegations showing (1) that the officers acted with the “object or purpose”

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of suppressing plaintiff’s religion, and (2) that plaintiff’s beliefs were “sincerely held” and “rooted in

religious belief.” See Jan. 14, 2010 Order at *4 (Docket No. 37); March 9, 2010 Order at *5-6 (Docket

No. 50) (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993);Callahan

v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

 In response to these admonitions, plaintiff has alleged in his TAC that he attends the Church of

God in Christ and that his aunt gave him the blessing oil for use during “meditation, prayer, and other

religious rituals.” TAC ¶ 22. Plaintiff alleges that he “told the officers that he believed the use of

blessing oil for anointing purposes could be found in the Bible at Psalms 23:5” and that “he had

incorporated this anointing oil into daily life and sprinkled it over himself during prayer or just kept it

with him for good luck and spiritual purposes.” Id. ¶¶ 22-23. 

Although these allegations respond to the Court’s request for further information regarding

plaintiff’s beliefs, plaintiff has provided no allegations tending to show that the officers acted with the

object or purpose of suppressing his faith. Plaintiff has simply repeated the same allegations contained

in previous versions of the complaint: that the officers seized the oil and arrested plaintiff after

expressing disbelief that the oil was used for religious purposes. Plaintiff has provided no allegations

tending to show that the officers acted with the object and purpose of suppressing his religion, rather

than with the purpose of determining whether the oil contained an illegal substance such as hashish oil

or concentrated cannabis. Although plaintiff argues in his opposition to the motion to dismiss that the

officers “had no objective factual basis for believing the oil resembled hashish oil yet they arrested him

anyway,” he also states that “[d]etecting hashish oil is more difficult than detecting alcohol or marijuana

and it requires some level of training and/or experience.” Oppo. at 3-4. Plaintiff’s allegations do not

provide a plausible basis for his First Amendment claim. 

Having provided plaintiff with multiple opportunities to amend his claim and clear instructions

for doing so, the Court concludes that plaintiff is unable to cure the defects in his claim. See Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is therefore DISMISSED

with prejudice. 

///

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 Plaintiff relies on Dubner v. City & County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2001) for

the proposition that it is defendants’ burden of proof to show probable cause, not plaintiff’s burden to

show the absence thereof. However, Dubner addressed the issue of the burden of production at trial.

Id. at 965 (“Although the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the issue of unlawful arrest, she can

make a prima facie case simply by showing that the arrest was conducted without a valid warrant. At

that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide some evidence that the arresting officers had

probable cause for a warrantless arrest. The plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proof, but the

burden of production falls on the defendant.”). Dubner did not affect the rule that a plaintiff must

provide sufficient allegations to state a plausible claim for relief, and must prove his allegations at trial.

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II. Fourth Amendment Claims

A. Plaintiff’s Arrest

Plaintiff alleges that his arrest and the search of his residence violated his rights under the Fourth

Amendment because the officers lacked probable cause to believe he was engaged in any criminal

behavior. Plaintiff’s claim is based on his allegations that he told the officers that the blessing oil was

used for religious purposes and was not an illegal substance, but the officers refused to test the oil on

the spot and “admitted that they were not sure the blessing oil contained any illegal substances.” TAC

¶ 51. In dismissing this claim in its two prior orders, the Court advised plaintiff that these allegations

were insufficient to show “more than a sheer possibility” that the officers lacked probable cause for the

arrest. See Jan. 14, 2010 Order at *5-6; March 9, 2010 Order at *7 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).

Plaintiff has provided no additional allegations in the most recent version of the complaint.1

 

As with the First Amendment claim, the Court must conclude, based on plaintiff’s multiple

chances to amend his claim and the Court’s repeated admonitions regarding the specific facts needed

in order to do so, that plaintiff is unable to cure the defects in his claim. Plaintiff’s Second Cause of

Action for Fourth Amendment violations relating to his arrest is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.

B. Plaintiff’s Detention

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him for

ten days while purportedly testing the blessing oil for the presence of illegal substances. In dismissing

this claim as alleged in the previous version of the complaint, the Court explained that although plaintiff

might be able to state a claim based on detention for more than 48 hours without being given a probable

cause hearing, plaintiff’s allegations were “insufficient to establish the precise length of plaintiff’s

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detention, as well as the circumstances of that detention.” March 9, 2010 Order at *8-9 (citing Gerstein

v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975); Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991)). In response,

plaintiff has now alleged that he was held for ten days without a hearing. TAC ¶ 56. In the Court’s

view, that allegation is sufficient to state a Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful detention.

Defendants assert, however, that plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed because the 48-hour

requirement “has been interpreted as not applying when a parole hold on other matters has been placed

upon the defendant.” Ng v. Superior Court, 840 P.2d 961, 966 (Cal. 1992). Defendants assert that the

likelihood that plaintiff was detained pursuant to a parole hold presents an “obvious alternative

explanation” for the detention, rendering plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim implausible. See Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). In connection with the previous motion to

dismiss, defendants submitted evidence of plaintiff’s parole status; however, this evidence is not

referenced in the complaint and is not properly considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss. See United

States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Because the allegations in the complaint, taken as true, state a claim for unlawful detention under

the Fourth Amendment, the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action as to his detention is

DENIED. To the extent defendants are in possession of evidence that may undermine this claim,

defendants may present such evidence in support of a dispositive motion. 

III. Monell Claim

Plaintiff asserts a claim against the City of Oakland under Monell v. Department of Social

Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), based on the City’s alleged failure to train or supervise its

officers and to provide adequate policies and procedures for carrying out searches and arrests. Plaintiff

alleges that the City “failed to train its police officers . . . in the proper and reasonable manner of

detecting narcotics and making arrests,” including “the appropriate means to detect unlawful substances

or refrain from making arrests in that area.” TAC ¶¶ 76, 79. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss,

plaintiff clarifies that this claim is based on the officers’ admitted inability to identify concentrated

cannabis or hashish oil. Oppo. at 17-18.

In dismissing this claim from the previous version of the complaint, the Court explained that

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plaintiff had “failed to support his contention with any facts that tend to show that the officers were

acting pursuant to a custom or policy, or that the officers were inadequately trained.” See Jan. 14, 2010

Order at *7; March 9, 2010 Order at *10. In his TAC, plaintiff does not remedy this deficiency.

Instead, he offers legal arguments concerning the sufficiency of his claims, as well as speculative

allegations regarding the City’s practices. TAC ¶ 75 (“In general, the pleadings contain[] sufficient

evidence to establish [the elements of a Monell claim]”); ¶ 74 (“It could also be that the police, in

exercising their discretion, so often violate constitutional rights that the need for further training must

have been plainly obvious to the city policymakers, who, nevertheless, are ‘deliberately indifferent’ to

the need”). These statements do nothing to bolster plaintiff’s claim.

It appears that plaintiff is unable to allege additional facts plausibly supporting a Monell claim

against the City of Oakland. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.

IV. State Law Claims

A. False Arrest

Plaintiff asserts that the officers committed false arrest under California law by arresting him

without probable cause or a reasonable basis to believe that he had committed any crime. The Court

previously dismissed this claim on the ground that, as described above with respect to plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claim, plaintiff had failed to allege that the officers lacked probable cause for the arrest.

The Court directed plaintiff to amend his complaint with allegations showing that the officers lacked

probable cause. In the latest version of his complaint, plaintiff includes no new factual allegations.

Instead, plaintiff includes arguments concerning the parties’ burdens of proof and production at trial.

See TAC ¶¶ 85-86. These arguments are inappropriate in a complaint; moreover, they do not provide

support for plaintiff’s claim.

Having concluded that plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment challenge to the arrest must be dismissed

because plaintiff cannot allege facts showing a lack of probable cause, the Court finds that plaintiff’s

Fourth Cause of Action, for false arrest, must also be DISMISSED with prejudice.

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B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff’s final claim alleges that defendants engaged in intentional infliction of emotional

distress by arresting plaintiff despite knowing “that they did not have sufficient objective facts to

support a conclusion that the substance was concentrated cannabis.” TAC ¶ 91. Plaintiff alleges that

this conduct was “so outrageous in character and so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency.” Id. The Court previously admonished plaintiff that these allegations are far too conclusory

to state a claim for infliction of emotional distress. See March 9, 2010 Order at *11. Plaintiff has

disregarded the Court’s admonition and failed to include any new factual allegations in his complaint.

The Court concludes that plaintiff cannot amend his complaint to cure the defects previously identified.

Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and

DENIES in part defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 52). Plaintiff’s First, Third, Fourth and

Fifth Causes of Action, and the portion of his Second Cause of Action challenging his arrest, are hereby

DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 5, 2010 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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