Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10449/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10449-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lavelle Phillips
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LAVELLE PHILLIPS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 14-10448

14-10449

D.C. Nos.

2:12-cr-00292-MCE-1

2:13-cr-00398-MCE-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 7, 2015*

San Francisco, California

Filed July 6, 2016

Before: Alex Kozinski, Jay S. Bybee,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bybee;

Concurrence by Judge Christen

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 UNITED STATES V. PHILLIPS

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgments in cases

in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced

following his guilty pleas to possession of drugs with intent

to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The panel held that the district court committed no

procedural error at sentencing.

The panel held that United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d

1111 (9th Cir. 2010), which held that felons are categorically

different from the individuals who have a fundamental right

to bear arms, forecloses the defendant’s argument that it

violates the Second Amendment for misprision of felony, a

non-violent and purely passive crime, to serve as a predicate

for his felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). The panel wrote that there are good reasons to

be skeptical of the constitutional correctness of categorical,

lifetime bans on firearm possession by all “felons.” The

panel wrote that although the defendant is right that

misprision is not a violent crime, he is wrong about

misprision of felony being purely passive, where the crime

has long been interpreted to contain some element of active

concealment. The panel wrote that it was hard pressed to

conclude that a crime that has always been a federal felony

cannot serve as the basis of a federal firearm ban simply

because its actus reus may appear innocuous.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. PHILLIPS 3

Concurring, Judge Christen wrote that because binding

precedent forecloses the defendant’s Second Amendment

challenge, she would not engage in further analysis of it.

COUNSEL

Douglas Beevers, Assistant Federal Defender; Heather E.

Williams, Federal Defender; Federal Defenders ofthe Eastern

District of California, Sacramento, California; for DefendantAppellant.

Jason Hitt, Assistant United States Attorney; Camil A.

Skipper, Appellate Chief; Office of the United States

Attorney, Sacramento, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Lavelle Phillips pleaded guiltyto possession of drugs with

intent to distribute, as well as being a felon in possession of

a firearm. He was sentenced to 57 months in prison. On

appeal he asks us to invalidate his sentence as procedurally

flawed and to hold that his conviction violates the Second

Amendment. We decline both invitations and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Police officers approached Phillips while he was in his

car. They smelled marijuana and noticed a partially-empty

bottle of alcohol, and tried to arrest him. Phillips violently

resisted and fled. After finally subduing him and searching

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4 UNITED STATES V. PHILLIPS

Phillips’s car, police found drugs, scales, and money. Three

days later, Phillips was released on bail.

Only a few months after that, a different set of officers

came upon Phillips talking with another man in front of a

home. As they approached, Phillips fled. And this time he

got away, but not before dropping a .45 caliber handgun, a

high capacitymagazine, and his wallet, complete with several

forms of identification and his recent bail receipt.

Phillips was indicted in two separate cases. In August of

2012, he was brought up on charges of being a felon in

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

He filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that

§ 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional, as applied, under the

Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion. 

Phillips then pleaded guilty. In December of 2013, Phillips

was separately indicted for possession of various drugs with

intent to distribute. Early the next year he pleaded guilty to

these drug charges as well. The district court then

consolidated both cases for sentencing purposes.

At sentencing the district court ultimately calculated a

Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months. The district court

reviewed all the relevant sentencing materials and considered

the particulars of Phillips’s case (e.g., that he fled police, had

an extended magazine with his gun, etc.). Then it ran through

the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and varied

upward to impose concurrent 57 month sentences on both the

gun and drug charges. Phillips timely appealed. He argues

that his sentence was procedurally flawed and that his

conviction for being a felon in possession violates the Second

Amendment. We review the former claim for plain error,

since Phillips never raised these particular objections below,

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UNITED STATES V. PHILLIPS 5

United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108

(9th Cir. 2010), while we review the latter claim de novo,

United States v. Chick, 61 F.3d 682, 686 (9th Cir. 1995).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Procedural Error at Sentencing

We can easily dismiss Phillips’s procedural error

argument. When we review sentencing for plain error,

“reversal is not justified where the [district] court review[ed]

and listen[ed] to the defendant’s arguments, state[d] that it

has reviewed the criteria set forth in § 3553(a), and then

impose[d] a sentence, explaining both the sentence and the

justification for the decision.” United States v. Rangel,

697 F.3d 795, 806 (9th Cir. 2012). That is precisely what

happened here.

The district court read all relevant materials, understood

the proper role of the guidelines (i.e., that they “are advisory

and not mandatory”), considered the relevant factors under

§ 3553(a), and decided to vary upward from the Guidelines

range based on Phillips’s particular circumstances. 

Specifically, the court noted that Phillips had come into

federal court more than once, understood “right and wrong”

but kept making “incredibly stupid decisions,” and had a

penchant for running from the police. We discern no error

here, let alone a plain one.

Phillips’s arguments to the contrary are based

entirely—and admittedly—on speculation of the first order. 

Phillips believes that throughout the sentencing, the judge

made “vague comments” that “appear to reject several of the

Sentencing Commission’s basic guidelines.” He concludes

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6 UNITED STATES V. PHILLIPS

that these “policy disagreements” ranged from the district

court’s belief that a six-level enhancement for high capacity

magazines was “too lenient,” to a disagreement with giving

prior convictions that receive prison time only “3 criminal

history points.” All of Phillips’s conclusions are reached, of

course, in splendid isolation from the record, for, as he

frankly admits in his brief, the district court “never expressly

mentioned such a policy disagreement.” If the district court

judge harbored any policy disagreements, he appropriately

kept them to himself and gave no indication that they

influenced the sentence whatsoever. Phillips’s sentencing,

even if not perfect, was about as much as anyone could ask

for, and the court committed no procedural error.

B. Second Amendment Claim

Phillips’s other argument—based on his motion to

dismiss the indictment (for felon in possession) on Second

Amendment grounds—is more significant. The predicate for

Phillips’s § 922(g)(1) conviction was a prior conviction for

“misprision of felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 4. Misprision of felony

consists of “having knowledge of the actual commission of a

felony cognizable by a court of the United States,” and

“conceal[ing] [it]” bynot “mak[ing] known the same [as soon

as possible] to some judge or other person in civil or military

authority under the United States.” Id. It is punishable by a

fine and up to three years in prison. Id.

Phillips argues that misprision of felony is a non-violent,

“passive crime of inaction,” and that permitting it to serve as

a predicate for his § 922(g)(1) conviction violates the Second

Amendment. Although Phillips’s situation presents some

otherwise interesting issues of Second Amendment

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UNITED STATES V. PHILLIPS 7

jurisprudence, his claim is ultimately foreclosed by our

precedent.

The Second Amendment protects the right to “keep and

bear arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II. The Supreme Court’s

landmark decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.

570 (2008), held that this right encompasses an individual

right to possess a functioning firearm in the home for the

lawful purpose of self defense. Id. at 595, 635. But the Court

was careful to add a caveat, instructing the lower courts that

its holding did not “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions

on the possession of firearms by felons . . . [,]” id. at 626–27,

adding that such measures were “presumptively lawful,” id.

at 627 n.26.

Based on this language, we held in United States v.

Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010), that “felons are

categorically different from the individuals who have a

fundamental right to bear arms,” and we accordingly upheld

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against a Second Amendment

challenge. Id. at 1115; see also Van Der Hule v. Holder,

759 F.3d 1043, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2014) (relying on Vongxay

to again uphold 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as constitutional);

United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1144–45 (9th Cir.

2013) (Bea, J., concurring) (“The Court in Heller seemed to

equate the status of a felon . . . with a presumptive

disqualification from the Second Amendment right.”). Our

decision in Vongxay forecloses Phillips’s argument, and we

accordingly affirm the district court’s denial of Phillips’s

motion to dismiss the indictment.1

1 Phillips argues that Vongxay is not good law. He contends that it

conflicted with circuit precedent when it relied, in part, on United States

v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2005), a pre-Heller case that held that

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8 UNITED STATES V. PHILLIPS

Nevertheless, there are good reasons to be skeptical of the

constitutional correctness of categorical, lifetime bans on

firearm possession by all “felons.” Heller’s caveat endorsed

only “longstanding” regulations on firearms, naming felon

bans in the process. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. Yet courts

and scholars are divided over how “longstanding” these bans

really are.2

there is no individual right to bear arms under the Second Amendment. 

See Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1116. But Vongxay acknowledged Heller’s

holding—that there is an individual right under the Second

Amendment—notwithstanding the panel’s assertion that it was “still

bound by Younger.” Id. (“[O]ur holding is buttressed by the fact that

Younger upheld the very type of gun possession restriction that the

Supreme Court deemed ‘presumptively lawful’ [in Heller].”).

If the panel had truly considered itself bound by Younger in all

respects, it would not have analyzed the Second Amendment question at

all, since there would have been no claim to an individual right. If Phillips

believes that Vongxay is inconsistent with Heller, his remedy in this court

is to seek rehearing en banc.

2 For instance, some view bans on felon firearm possession as

historically stemming from the common law practice of forfeiture. See,

e.g., Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1144 (Bea, J., concurring) (justifying blanket

felon bans based on the idea that at common law, “felonies resulted in

forfeiture of property and rights”); DonB.Kates, Jr., HandgunProhibition

and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev.

204, 266 (1983) (“Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the

common law right to possess arms. That law punished felons with

automatic forfeiture of all goods, usually accompanied by death.”); Don

B. Kates, Jr. & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations and

Criminological Considerations, 60 Hastings L.J. 1339, 1363 (2009)

(doubling down on the historical pedigree of the felon ban, but conceding

it would be “next to absurd” to claim that conviction for modern day

felonies like income tax evasion or antitrust violations would disqualify

someone fromowning a firearm). Others disagree, however, finding little

to no historical justification for the practice. See, e.g., United States v.

Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (observing that first

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UNITED STATES V. PHILLIPS 9

We understand Phillips’s argument here to be different,

however. He contends that misprision is non-violent and

purely passive and accordingly cannot constitutionally serve

as a basis for depriving him of his right to possess a firearm. 

Although he is right that misprision is not a violent crime, he

is wrong about it being “purely” passive. Both in the United

States, United States v. Hodges, 566 F.2d 674, 675 (9th Cir.

1977), and England, Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecutions

[1961] 3 All Eng. L. Rep. 33, the crime of misprision of

felony has long been interpreted to contain some element of

active concealment, though a mere lie might be sufficient,see

United States v. Ciambrone, 750 F.2d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir.

1984) (“A person who witnesses a crime does not violate

18 U.S.C. § 4 if he simply remains silent”). Not since the

days of the “hue and cry” has misprision consisted purely of

failing to report one’s knowledge of a felony. See Rollin M.

Perkins, Perkins on Criminal Law 514–15 (2d ed. 1969).3

federal statute disqualifying violent felons did not exist until 1938 and that

first complete federal felon ban did not exist until 1961); id. at 650 (Sykes,

J., dissenting) (“The historical evidence [on categorical, lifetime exclusion

offelons] is inconclusive at best.”); C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha

Stewart Have a Gun? 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 695, 708–14 (2009)

(responding to Kates, “The English right to have arms for self-defense that

developed after being announced in the 1689 Declaration ofRights did not

specifically exclude ‘felons.’ . . . The relevant issue is not whether one

forfeited ‘all goods’—implicitly one’s guns—upon a felony conviction. 

One did at common law forfeit personal property . . . upon [felony]

conviction . . . . But it did not follow that one could not thereafter purchase

and hold new personal property—including a gun.”); id. at 708

(“[R]ecognizing the hazard of trying to prove a negative, one can with a

good degree of confidence say that bans on convicts possessing firearms

were unknown before World War I.”).

3 The English “hue and cry” was a duty, at least since the passage of the

Statute of Winchester in 1285, requiring any private citizen who became

aware of the commission of a felony to publically (“with horn and with

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10 UNITED STATES V. PHILLIPS

That crime never crossed the Pond, as it was understood as

being inconsistent with American values. See Marbury v.

Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat) 556, 575–76 (1822) (Marshall,

C.J.) (“It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every

offender, and to proclaim every offence which comes to his

knowledge; but the law which would punish him in every

case for not performing this duty is too harsh for man.”);

Perkins, supra, at 514–17. So Phillips’s pure-passivity

argument falls short.

And assuming the propriety of felon firearm bans—as we

must under Supreme Court precedent and our own—there is

little question that Phillips’s predicate conviction for

misprision of felony can constitutionally serve as the basis for

a felon ban. The statute under which Phillips was convicted

here, 18 U.S.C. § 4, is functionally identical to its

predecessor, enacted by the First Congress as a part of the

Crimes Act of 1790 (prior to the ratification of the Second

Amendment). And it similarly made misprision of felony a

felony.

4 Because actions of the First Congress provide

voice”) call the community together to pursue the felon “from town to

town, and from county to county” until apprehended. 4 William

Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *290 (1769). Failure

by either private citizens or the sheriff to discharge this duty was

criminally punished, id. at *290–91, though some have contended that

“the absence of a reported decision during the four hundred years since the

offence first crept into a book” suggests the purely passive form of this

crime was “largely theoretical,” Perkins, supra, at 514–15 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

4 Compare Crimes Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 113, Sec. 6 (“[I]f any person or

persons, having knowledge of the actual commission of . . . [a] felony . . .

within any . . . place . . . under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the

United States, shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and make

known the same to some one of the judges or other persons in civil or

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UNITED STATES V. PHILLIPS 11

“‘contemporaneous and weighty evidence’ of the

Constitution’s meaning,” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,

723 (1986) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790

(1983)), we are hard pressed to conclude that a crime that has

always been a federal felony cannot serve as the basis of a

felon firearm ban, simply because its actus reus may appear

innocuous.5

military authority under the United States . . . such person or persons shall

be adjudged guilty of misprision of felony, and shall be imprisoned not

exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding five hundred dollars.” ),

with 18 U.S.C. § 4 (“Whoever, having knowledge of the actual

commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States,

conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some

judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States,

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or

both.”).

5 Our holding does not address, however, the question of whether there

are limits on Congress’s and the States’ ability to define any old crime as

a felony and thereby use it as the basis for a § 922(g)(1) conviction,

consistent with the Second Amendment. Misprision of felony was, in

England, only a misdemeanor if committed by “a common person” (as

opposed to “a public officer,” in which case the crime was a felony). 

Blackstone, supra, at *121. What little evidence there is of American

state misprision law also suggests it was treated as a misdemeanor. See

State v. Wilson, 67 A. 533, 533–34 (Vt. 1907); Perkins, supra, at 514–17. 

Because the First Congress made misprision a felony prior to the

ratification of the Second Amendment, we presume that Congress (and by

extension, the States) have some power to change crimes that were

misdemeanors into felonies and thereby make them the basis of a felon

firearm ban. It may be that Congress’s and the States’ power in this

regard is unfettered, or it may be that only crimes that were treated as

felonies at the Founding can serve as the basis for depriving someone of

his or her Second Amendment rights. Can Congress or the States define

petty larceny as a felony? Of course. Can a conviction for stealing a

lollipop then serve as a basis under § 922(g)(1) to ban a person for the rest

of his life from ever possessing a firearm, consistent with the Second

Amendment? That remains to be seen.

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12 UNITED STATES V. PHILLIPS

In short, there may be some good reasons to be skeptical

about the correctness of the current framework of analyzing

the Second Amendment rights of felons. But in light of

Heller and Vongxay, those issues are beside the point here.

AFFIRMED.

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I fully join the Court’s rejection of Phillips’s procedural

challenge to his sentence. I also agree that our prior

precedent and Supreme Court precedent foreclose Phillips’s

argument that use of his prior conviction as a predicate

offense for his § 922(g)(1) conviction violates the Second

Amendment. Because binding precedent forecloses Phillips’s

Second Amendment argument, I would not engage in further

analysis or discussion of it. See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush,

386 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004) (Commentary “made

during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but . . .

unnecessary to the decision in the case” is “nonbinding dicta”

and is “not precedential.”).

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