Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00403/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00403-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Burton
Respondent
Azeem R. Hosein
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AZEEM R. HOSEIN, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

ROBERT BURTON, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:19-cv-0403 KJM AC P 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Currently pending before the court is respondent’s motion 

to dismiss the petition as untimely. ECF No. 18. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

On January 13, 2015, petitioner was convicted of assault with intent to commit oral 

copulation, with an enhancement for being armed with a deadly weapon, and felony false 

imprisonment, with an enhancement for using a deadly weapon. ECF No. 1 at 1-2; ECF No. 19-1 

(Lod. Doc. 1) at 219. He was sentenced to twenty-three years and eight months in prison, which 

included a four-month consecutive term for the enhancement on the false imprisonment charge. 

Lod. Doc. 1 at 219. 

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A. Direct Review 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 

District, which on April 28, 2016, reversed the four-month consecutive term imposed for the 

enhancement on the false imprisonment charge and affirmed the remainder of the judgment. ECF 

No. 19-2 (Lod. Doc. 2) at 6. The trial court was directed to amend the abstract of judgment to 

reflect the modified judgment. Id. On July 11, 2016, the Sacramento County Superior Court 

filed an amended abstract of judgment nunc pro tunc to February 27, 2015. ECF No. 19-3 (Lod. 

Doc. 3). It appears that petitioner attempted to file a petition for review in the California Supreme 

Court that was rejected as untimely on January 11, 2017. ECF No. 19-4 (Lod. Doc. 4) at 109. 

B. State Collateral Review 

On February 10, 2018,1 petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

Sacramento County Superior Court. Lod. Doc. 4 at 37. On March 21, 2018, the court denied the 

petition as untimely. ECF No. 19-5 (Lod. Doc. 5). 

On July 25, 2018, petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District. ECF No. 19-6 (Lod. Doc. 6) at 31. The 

petition was denied on August 2, 2018. ECF No. 19-7 (Lod. Doc. 7). 

On August 15, 2018, petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court, ECF No. 19-8 (Lod. Doc. 8) at 45, which was denied on January 30, 

2019, ECF No. 1-1 at 55. 

On October 16, 2018, petitioner filed another pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

the Sacramento County Superior Court. ECF No. 19-10 (Lod. Doc. 10) at 7. On November 16, 

2018, the petition was denied. ECF No. 19-11 (Lod. Doc. 11). 

On February 7, 2019, petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, ECF No. 19-12 (Lod. Doc. 12) at 9, which 

was denied on February 21, 2019 ECF No. 19-13 (Lod. Doc. 13). 

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 Petitions filed while petitioner was proceeding pro se reflect application of the prison mailbox 

rule. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (establishing rule that a prisoner’s court 

document is deemed filed on the date the prisoner delivered the document to prison officials for 

mailing). 

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C. Federal Petition 

The instant petition was filed on February 15, 2019. ECF No. 1 at 52. 

II. Motion to Dismiss 

Respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground that it is untimely. ECF No. 18. 

He argues that, without tolling, petitioner had until June 7, 2017, to file a petition in federal court. 

Id. at 3. He further asserts that petitioner did not file any state collateral actions within the 

limitations period and as a result was not entitled to tolling. Id. Therefore, since the federal 

petition was not filed until February 15, 2019, it was untimely and is now barred. Id. at 4. 

Petitioner has filed two nearly identical oppositions to the motion to dismiss that simply state that 

he is the petitioner and he opposes the motion. ECF Nos. 21, 22. 

III. Statute of Limitations 

Section 2244(d)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code contains a one-year statute of 

limitations for filing a habeas petition in federal court. This statute of limitations applies to 

habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996, when the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act (AEDPA) went into effect. Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation 

omitted). 

A. Applicable Trigger Date 

The one-year statute of limitations starts from one of several alternative triggering dates. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In this case, the applicable date is that “on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Under California law, if a timely petition for review is not filed in the 

state supreme court, a judgment becomes final forty days after the appellate court affirms the 

judgment. Cal. R. Ct. 8.366(b)(1) (court of appeal decision in a criminal appeal is final in that 

court thirty days after filing); Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(e)(1) (petition for review must be filed within ten 

day of court of appeal decision becoming final in that court). 

Here, the appellate court did not remand petitioner’s case for re-sentencing, but instead 

reversed part of the sentence and directed the trial court “to prepare an amended abstract of 

judgment.” Lod. Doc. 2 at 6. Under California law, “[b]ecause the ‘abstract of judgment is not 

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the judgment of conviction’ and ‘does not control if different from the court’s oral judgment,’ a 

court must amend the abstract of judgment any time there is a discrepancy between the two.” 

Gonzalez v. Sherman, 873 F.3d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting People v. Mitchell, 26 Cal. 4th 

181, 185 (2001)). The Court of Appeal’s order modifying the judgment constituted the new 

judgment, and the remand to the superior court was simply to ensure the abstract of judgment 

reflected the new judgment. Accordingly, any appeal to be taken was to be taken from the 

appellate court’s order, not the abstract of judgment. Because petitioner did not timely seek 

review in the California Supreme Court, Lod. Doc. 4 at 109, his conviction became final forty 

days after the appellate court filed its opinion. The conviction therefore became final on June 7, 

2016, and the AEDPA’s one-year clock began to run on June 8, 2016. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 

F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001) (the day order or judgment becomes final is excluded and time 

begins to run the day after the judgment becomes final (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a))). Absent 

tolling, petitioner had until June 7, 2017, to file a federal habeas corpus petition. Since the 

petition was not filed until February 15, 2019, the petition is untimely unless petitioner is entitled 

to tolling, and petitioner “bears the burden of proving that the statute of limitation was tolled.” 

Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 

B. Statutory Tolling 

The limitations period may be statutorily tolled during the time “a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The “statute of limitations is not tolled 

from the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral 

challenge is filed because there is no case ‘pending’ during that interval.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225 

(2002). “[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitation of the limitations period that has ended 

before the state petition was filed.” Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(citation omitted). In other words, once the limitations period has expired, a subsequent state 

petition cannot revive it. Id. Here, petitioner did not file his first state petition until February 10, 

2018—just over eight months after the federal statute of limitations expired on June 7, 2017. 

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Thus, neither first state petition nor any subsequent state petitions acted to toll or revive the 

federal statute of limitations. Accordingly, the federal petition is untimely unless petitioner is 

entitled to equitable tolling. 

C. Equitable Tolling 

A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of 

limitations “only if the he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 

“[T]he statute-of-limitations clock stops running when extraordinary circumstances first arise, but 

the clock resumes running once the extraordinary circumstances have ended or when the 

petitioner ceases to exercise reasonable diligence, whichever occurs earlier.” Luna v. Kernan, 

784 F.3d 640, 651 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 891-92 (9th Cir. 

2014)). An “extraordinary circumstance” has been defined as an external force that is beyond the 

inmate’s control, Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted), and 

“[t]he diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is ‘reasonable diligence,’ not ‘maximum 

feasible diligence,’” Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and some quotation marks 

omitted). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 

U.S. at 418. 

Here, petitioner has not alleged facts from which the court can find that an extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way to prevent timely filing, nor has he shown that he has diligently 

pursued his rights. See ECF Nos. 21, 22. However, while petitioner’s opposition to the motion to 

dismiss is cursory, the petition itself refers to the fact that a showing of actual innocence 

constitutes an equitable exception to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations, ECF No. 1 at 15, 31-32, 

and so this will be construed as an argument for equitable tolling. 

“Actual innocence” is a recognized basis for equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013); Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 934 

(9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “[A] credible claim of actual innocence constitutes an equitable 

exception to AEDPA’s limitations period, and a petitioner who makes such a showing may pass 

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through the Schlup [v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995),] gateway and have his otherwise time-barred 

claims heard on the merits.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 932; accord, McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386. Schlup 

held that a showing of actual innocence could excuse a procedural default and permit a federal 

habeas court to reach the merits of otherwise barred claims for post-conviction relief. 513 U.S. at 

314-15. 

To pass through the Schlup gateway, a “petitioner must show that it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 327. Schlup additionally “requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional 

error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324. 

Petitioner’s argument falls short of satisfying the requirements for this exception because 

he does not introduce reliable new evidence to show a credible claim of actual innocence. Rather, 

he argues that there was mitigating or alibi evidence that went uninvestigated, ECF No. 1 at 26, 

36-37; that law enforcement failed to collect and preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, 

including fingerprint and DNA evidence, id. at 19, 21, 45; and that his trial counsel did not 

contact eyewitnesses, id. at 28. The allegedly uninvestigated “alibi” evidence is not actually 

evidence of an alibi, but character evidence that petitioner contends would show he was “a 

productive member of society not the monster counsel allowed him to be portrayed as.” Id. at 26. 

Furthermore, petitioner has not produced any new evidence, but merely speculates as to what his 

attorney could have uncovered had he properly investigated. Speculation about the possibility of 

new evidence is not sufficient: without new evidence, the actual innocence exception does not 

apply. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-29. Moreover, though petitioner argues that there was no 

physical evidence to connect him to the crime and that the case against him was largely 

circumstantial, ECF No. 1 at 31-32, 45, a challenge to the sufficiency of the prosecutor’s evidence 

at trial is not a showing of actual innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 330 (explaining the difference 

between the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, standard governing sufficiency challenges and the 

actual innocence standard); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (“‘actual 

innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency” (citation omitted)). 

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Because petitioner points to no new evidence that would meet Schlup’s exacting standard, 

he is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

IV. Certificate of Appealability 

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must 

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A 

certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a petition is dismissed on 

procedural grounds, as is being recommended in this case, a certificate of appealability “should 

issue when the prisoner shows, at least, [(1)] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and [(2)] that jurists of 

reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

This court finds that jurists of reason would not find it debatable that the petition is barred 

by the statute of limitations and a certificate of appealability should not issue. 

V. Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant 

The petition should be denied because it was filed too late. You had one year from June 

8, 2016, to file a federal habeas petition. You did not file any state petitions during that time that 

would toll the statute of limitations (stop the clock). You do not get equitable tolling because you 

have not provided facts showing that there were extraordinary circumstances and that you were 

diligent, and you have also not submitted new evidence to show that you are actually innocent. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 18, be granted and petitioner’s application 

for a writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be denied as untimely. 

2. This court decline to issue the certificate of appealability referenced in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days after 

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 

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the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Due to exigencies in the court’s 

calendar, no extensions of time will be granted.2 The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 6, 2020 

2

 Petitioner is informed that in order to obtain the district judge’s independent review and 

preserve issues for appeal, he need only identify the findings and recommendations to which he 

objects. There is no need to reproduce his arguments on the issues. 

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