Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-41370/USCOURTS-ca5-15-41370-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rudith Valmore Guerrero-Araniva
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-41370

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RUDITH VALMORE GUERRERO-ARANIVA, also known as Rudith Valmore 

Araniva-Guerrero,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:15-CR-536-1

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Following the entry of his guilty plea conviction of illegal reentry, Rudith 

Valmore Guerrero-Araniva was sentenced to 32 months of imprisonment, 

based in part on an eight-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) for his prior conviction of the Texas offense of injury to a child 

under TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04. Guerrero-Araniva argues for the first time 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 23, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-41370 Document: 00513772205 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/23/2016
No. 15-41370

2

on appeal that the district court plainly erred by characterizing his 1991 Texas 

conviction for injury to a child as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes of applying the § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) sentencing 

enhancement and for convicting and sentencing him under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(b)(2). Relying primarily on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 

(2015), Guerrero-Araniva argues that the definition of a crime of violence in 8 

U.S.C. § 16(b), which is incorporated by reference into § 1101(a)(43)(F)’s 

definition of an aggravated felony, is unconstitutionally vague on its face. He 

further contends that this court cannot apply § 16(b) in this case without 

violating due process. 

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary 

affirmance, urging that Guerrero-Araniva’s arguments are foreclosed by our 

recent decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 

2016) (en banc), pet. for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). The

Government is correct that Gonzalez-Longoria forecloses Guerrero-Araniva’s 

facial vagueness challenge to § 16(b), as well as his challenge to our application 

of § 16(b) on due process grounds.1 See id. Accordingly, the motion for 

summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternate motion for an extension of time to 

file a brief is DENIED.

 

1 The recent grant of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court on the issue 

whether § 16(b) is unconstitutional in light of Johnson in Lynch v. Dimaya, ___ S. Ct. ___,

No. 15-1498, 2016 WL 3232911 (Sept. 29, 2016), does not alter our analysis. This court is 

bound by its own precedent unless and until that precedent is altered by a decision of the 

Supreme Court. See Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1986).

 Case: 15-41370 Document: 00513772205 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/23/2016