Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16228/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16228-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of North Las Vegas
Appellee
Michael P. Curley
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL P. CURLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-16228

D.C. No.

2:09-cv-01071-KJD-VCF

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 10, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed December 2, 2014

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, John B. Owens,

and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Friedland

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2 CURLEY V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

SUMMARY*

Americans with Disabilities Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in an action alleging employment discrimination and

retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities

Act.

The plaintiff alleged that the City of Las Vegas

discriminated against him by firing him because of his

hearing impairment and retaliated against him for filing an 

EEOC complaint and requesting an accommodation. The

panel held that the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether the City’s stated reason for

firing him—his long history of threatening coworkers—was 

pretextual.

COUNSEL

Michael P. Balaban (argued), Law Offices of Michael P.

Balaban, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Sandra Douglass Morgan (argued) and Jeffrey F. Barr, City

Attorneys, North Las Vegas, Nevada, for DefendantAppellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CURLEY V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 3

OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

Michael Curley appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of the City of North Las Vegas

on his claims alleging discrimination and retaliation in

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 

First, we consider whether a doctor’s finding that Curley did

not pose a safety threat belies one of the City’s stated reasons

for firing him—his long history of threatening coworkers. 

Second, we consider whether the City’s prior leniency toward

Curley’s misconduct provides reason to doubt that the City

fired him partly because of that misconduct. We conclude

that neither provides a basis for finding the City’s

explanations pretextual, so we affirm the district court’s grant

of summary judgment.

I. Background

Michael Curley was an employee of the City of North Las

Vegas from 1996 until 2009. In 2005, Curley became a

pretreatment inspector—a position that primarily entailed

cleaning sewers and preventing sewer blockages.

Curley received many oral and written reprimands during

his employment with the City. His disciplinary record

reflects that, over the course of several years, Curley had

numerous verbal altercations with coworkers, made

insensitive remarks about a fellow employee’s motorcycle

accident, damaged City property, and made several threats of

violence against coworkers. Curley’s disciplinary record also

includes statements by coworkers regarding his constant

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4 CURLEY V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

complaints and negative remarks about his managers and the

City.

In December 2008, Curley filed a charge of

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”).1 The charge alleged that the City

had denied Curley’s request for accommodation of a hearing

impairment. The charge also alleged that the City was

retaliating against him for having filed a prior charge of

retaliation and race and age discrimination.

In January 2009, Curley made a second request that the

City provide him an accommodation for a hearing

impairment. In his request, he complained that the noise

from one of the trucks he operated was causing his hearing to

deteriorate. Curley asked to be relieved from all duties that

required him to be near that type of truck. Because those

duties were essential to his position, the City rejected his

request and instead recommended that he use dual hearing

protection.

Shortly after his correspondence with the City regarding

his second request for accommodation, Curley was involved

in another incident with a coworker. The coworker asked

Curley to remove his hearing protection so that the two of

them could communicate about a work-related task. In

response, Curley began swearing and asking the coworker

whether he thought he was a doctor. The incident prompted

the City to place Curley on administrative leave and to launch

an investigation into his behavior.

1 Curley also filed this charge with the Nevada Equal Rights

Commission. For simplicity, we will refer to the NERC and the EEOC

collectively as the EEOC.

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CURLEY V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 5

As part of the investigation, the Human Resources

Department interviewed City employees and asked about

their interactions with Curley. The interviews revealed that

Curley had repeatedly threatened his coworkers and their

families. For example, he threatened to put a bomb under a

car, insinuated that he had mafia connections, and talked

about giving a “blanket party”—which would involve

throwing a blanket over a person’s head and beating him. 

One coworker reported that Curley threatened to kick his

teeth out if the coworker did not join a union. On another

occasion, Curleythreatened to shoot his supervisor’s children

in the kneecaps.

The interviews also revealed details about Curley’s work

habits. Multiple coworkers said that Curley regularly

conducted personal business while at work, sometimes

spending up to three hours on his cell phone. It also appears

that Curley was operating an ADA consulting business. 

Many of the calls he made during work were about the

business, and coworkers saw him approach disabled

individuals to discuss potential lawsuits.

Finally, the City scheduled Curley for a fit-for-duty

evaluation as part of the investigation. The evaluation

assessed only whether Curley could return to work and

whether he was a danger to himself or others. The doctor

who conducted the evaluation determined that Curley was fit

for duty and was not a danger to himself or others.

At the conclusion of the investigation, Human Resources

recommended that the City conduct a hearing to determine

how to discipline Curley. After the hearing, the City decided

to fire him. A memorandum explaining the termination

included the following charges: nonperformance of duties due

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6 CURLEY V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

to excessive phone calls, intimidation of coworkers by threats

of violence, conducting and soliciting personal business on

work time, and making disparaging remarks about his

supervisors and the City.

Shortly after his termination, Curley filed a charge with

the EEOC alleging discrimination and retaliation under the

ADA. Curley received a right-to-sue notice and filed suit in

state court in Nevada. The City removed the case to the

United States District Court for the District of Nevada, which

granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. Curley

appealed.

II. Standard of Review

A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed

de novo. Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 954

(9th Cir. 2013). We must determine, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether

there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the

district court correctly applied the substantive law. Id. We

may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground

supported by the record, even one not relied upon by the

district court. Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998,

1009 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007).

III. Discussion

The ADA prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing]

against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In addition, the ADA prohibits

retaliating against an employee who engages in certain

protected activities. See id. § 12203(a). Curley argues that

the City discriminated against him by firing him because of

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CURLEY V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 7

his hearing impairment. He also contends that the City fired

him in retaliation for his filing an EEOC complaint and

requesting an accommodation.

Discrimination and retaliation claims under the ADA are

both subject to the burden-shifting framework outlined in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04

(1973). See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49–50

& n.3 (2003); Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181,

1186–87 (9th Cir. 2003); Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins.

Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001). Under that

framework, an employee challenging an adverse employment

action has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case

of discrimination (or retaliation). The burden then shifts to

the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory (or

nonretaliatory) reason for the adverse employment action. If

the employer does so, then the burden shifts back to the

employee to prove that the reason given by the employer was

pretextual. See Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 49–52 & n.3; Brown,

336 F.3d at 1187; Snead, 237 F.3d at 1093.

A. Discrimination

We need not decide whether Curley can establish a prima

facie case of discrimination, because, even if he could, he has

not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

City’s reasons for terminating him were pretextual. Curley

concedes that, assuming he could establish a prima facie case,

the City has carried its burden of providing legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for firing him. The City gave four

reasons for Curley’s termination: nonperformance of duties

due to excessive phone calls, intimidation of coworkers by

threats of violence, conducting and soliciting personal

business on work time, and making disparaging remarks

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8 CURLEY V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

about his supervisors and the City. Curley has failed to offer

any basis for believing those reasons were pretext for

discrimination.

Curley tries to show pretext by pointing to the results of

his fit-for-duty evaluation. The doctor who performed that

evaluation determined that Curley was fit for duty and not a

danger to himself or others. Curley contends that the City’s

decision to fire him despite the conclusions of the evaluation

creates a genuine issue of material fact as to the credibility of

the City’s stated reasons for firing him.

Curley’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the City

explained that it fired Curley because of the threats he had

made in the past, not the danger of future violence. The

Seventh Circuit addressed an analogous situation in

Bodenstab v. County of Cook, 569 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2009). 

In that case, the employer fired the plaintiff for making

threats and informed him that it believed he was a direct

threat to the health and safety of his coworkers. Id. at 658. 

The court determined that it did not need to decide whether

the plaintiff actually posed a “direct threat” as defined by the

ADA. Id.2 The Seventh Circuit held that, even if the plaintiff

was not a direct threat, summary judgment was appropriate

because the employer “had a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason for firing [him]—the threats he had alreadymade.” Id.

at 659. In other words, the plaintiff’s threats were an

independent and sufficient basis for dismissal, regardless of

whether he posed an actual danger.

2 Under the ADA, it is a defense against a charge of discrimination that

the employee was a “direct threat to the health or safety of other

individuals in the workplace.” 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)–(b).

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CURLEY V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 9

Like the plaintiff in Bodenstab, Curley was fired for

threats he had alreadymade. The City’s notice of termination

specifically relied on Curley’s history of intimidating

coworkers. Nothing in the fit-for-duty evaluation addressed

that history. Thus, even if the City had Curley evaluated to

determine whether he posed a danger to other employees, the

City represented that it fired him for past threats, not for the

potential of future violence. Curley presented no evidence

that the City’s reliance on past threats was actually pretext for

discrimination.

Second, even if the fit-for-duty evaluation somehow

undermined the credibility of the City’s stated concern about

Curley’s threats, the City put forward other reasons for

terminating him: nonperformance of duties, conducting

personal business at work, and making disparaging remarks

about his supervisors and the City. Curley does not even try

to refute these reasons. Disputing only one of several wellsupported, independentlysufficient reasons for termination is

generally not enough to defeat summary judgment. See

Cotton v. City of Alameda, 812 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir.

1987) (“We must consider whether a genuine issue exists

with respect to the credibility of each of the employer’s

proffered explanations.”); Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t,

427 F.3d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“[A]s a

general rule, an employee must proffer evidence that shows

each of the employer’s justifications are pretextual.”

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

There is no reason to depart from that rule here.3

3 A plaintiff’s attack on an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons may sometimes defeat summary judgment without discrediting all

of the employer’s stated reasons. For example, this could be true when:

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10 CURLEY V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

B. Retaliation

As with his discrimination claim, we need not decide

whether Curley established a prima facie case of retaliation

because he cannot show pretext. Curley argues that, because

the City tolerated his bad behavior for years before his recent

protected activity (filing an EEOC claim and making an

accommodation request), his termination must be retaliatory. 

But Curley wrongly assumes that the City was aware of the

severity and scope of his misconduct during the years in

which it refrained from terminating him. In fact, after his

protected activity, Curley instigated yet another altercation

(1) the reasons are so intertwined that a showing of

pretext as to one raises a genuine question whether the

remaining reason is valid, see [Russell v. Acme-Evans

Co., 51 F.3d 64, 70 (7th Cir. 1995)]; (2) the pretextual

character of one explanation is “so fishy and

suspicious,” id., that a jury could “find that the

employer (or its decisionmaker) lacks all credibility,”

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1050 (11th

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Birch, J., concurring and

dissenting); (3) the employer offers a plethora of

reasons, and the plaintiff raises substantial doubt about

a number of them, [Tyler v. RE/MAX Mountain States,

Inc., 232 F.3d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 2000)]; (4) the

plaintiff discredits each of the employer’s objective

explanations, leaving only subjective reasons to justify

its decision, see Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d

1284, 1298–99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); or (5) the

employer has changed its explanation under

circumstances that suggest dishonesty or bad faith, Cole

v. Ruidoso Mun. Schs., 43 F.3d 1373, 1380–81

(10th Cir. 1994).

Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1310 (bracketed citations replacing short form

citations). No circumstances like these are present here.

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CURLEY V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 11

with a coworker, which prompted the City to investigate his

behavior. This investigation revealed the full extent of his

misconduct, including several additional, independently

sufficient bases for firing him. Curley does not contest these

additional bases. Given this, the City’s failure to fire Curley

sooner does not constitute evidence from which a jury could

find that the stated reasons for firing Curley were pretextual.

Curley also argues that the fact that the City fired him

within two months of his protected activity is itself evidence

of pretext. It is true that very close temporal proximity

between a protected activity and an adverse employment

action can be sufficient evidence of a causal link between the

two to support a prima facie showing of retaliation. See

Brown, 336 F.3d at 1187. But the new information revealed

by the City’s investigation defeats any causal inference that

might otherwise follow from the temporal proximity between

his protected activity and his termination. The timing here

therefore does nothing to refute the City’s legitimate

explanations for the adverse employment action, making

summaryjudgment appropriate even if Curleyhas established

a prima facie case. See Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671,

680–81 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that, although “the timing of

the[] events suffice[d] to establish a minimal prima facie case

of retaliation, it d[id] nothing to refute” the employer’s stated

legitimate reasons for disciplining the plaintiff).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district

court’s order granting summary judgment for the City.

AFFIRMED.

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