Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-02200/USCOURTS-ca7-13-02200-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Lockett
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-2200

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAVID LOCKETT,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10 CR 983 — Gary S. Feinerman, Judge.

ARGUED DECEMBER 1, 2014 — DECIDED MARCH 31, 2015

Before BAUER, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant, David Lockett

(“Lockett”), pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The district court sentenced Lockett under the Armed Career

Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), to fifteen years’

imprisonment—the mandatory minimum under the Act. On

appeal, Lockett challenges the application of the ACCA,

arguing that the district court erred in finding that certain drug

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convictions qualified as predicates under the ACCA. In

addition, he argues that even if his drug convictions implicate

the ACCA, none can serve as predicates because of the

restoration of civil rights letter he received. For the reasons that

follow, we reverse the district court’s decision and remand for

resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

Lockett has an extensive criminal history. In 1979, Lockett

was arrested for armed robbery. In 1981, he pleaded guilty

to the lesser included offense of robbery and was sentenced

to thirty months’ probation. In 1982, he violated his probation

when he pleaded guilty to unlawful use of a weapon. In 1984,

he pleaded guilty to possession of heroin. In 1990, he was

arrested for and pleaded guilty to armed violence and to

several counts of distribution and possession with intent to

distribute heroin. The 1990 drug convictions were Class 2 and

3 felonies, carrying seven and five years’ imprisonment,

respectively. Because of his criminal history, however, Lockett

would have been subject to a maximum prison term of “twice

the maximum term otherwise authorized” for each of the 1990

drug convictions, which would bring his maximum sentences

to fourteen and ten years’ imprisonment. See 720 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 570/408(a). Nevertheless, he was ultimately sentenced to

four years’ imprisonment for the 1990 drug convictions, and

was paroled in February 1992. 

While on parole, he was arrested and charged with

three additional drug offenses; once in 1992 and twice in 1993.

He pleaded guilty to all three charges in 1993 and received

three years’ imprisonment to run concurrently. While serving

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No. 13-2200 3

that sentence, he completed the sentence related to his 1990

drug convictions. He completed his 1993 sentence in September 1995.

In 1997, he was arrested for delivery of cocaine. He pleaded

guilty to that charge in 1998 and received seven years’ imprisonment. After his release from the 1998 sentence, Lockett was

arrested in 2003, this time for attempt to possess a controlled

substance. He pleaded guilty and received six months’

conditional discharge and five days of community service. 

In November 2004, Lockett was arrested for and charged

with burglary, to which he pleaded guilty in 2005, resulting in

four years’ imprisonment. His prison sentence and parole for

that crime were completed in 2009. 

Finally, in 2010, Lockett was charged and convicted of the

offense underlying this appeal, being a felon in possession of

a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing,

the parties disputed whether Lockett qualified as an armed

career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and thus subject to the

attendant mandatory fifteen-year minimum. The parties

agreed that two of his prior convictions qualified as predicates,

but disagreed over whether a third qualifying conviction could

be found based on his 1990 drug convictions. The government

argued that because Lockett was subject to an Illinois recidivist

enhancement, which increases the maximum penalty for

Illinois recidivists’ convictions in the manner discussed above,

the convictions were qualifying predicates under the ACCA.

Agreeing with the government, the district court found any of

the 1990 drug convictions could qualify as a predicate conviction based on our decision in United States v. Perkins, 449 F.3d

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794 (7th Cir. 2006). The question then became whether a

restoration of civil rights letter Lockett received in September

1995 precluded the use of his 1990 drug convictions as qualifying predicates. Relying on United States v. Burnett, 641 F.3d 894

(7th Cir. 2011), the district court held that the letter did not

apply to Lockett’s 1990 convictions, and that they could

therefore serve as predicates. Thus, the district court found

Lockett to be an armed career criminal and sentenced him to

the mandatory fifteen-year minimum. 

Lockett presents two issues on appeal. First, he contends

that the district court erred in finding that his 1990 drug

convictions qualified as predicates under the ACCA because

the government never provided evidence from the record that

he actually faced the Illinois recidivist enhancement that would

bring his sentence for those convictions within the purview of

the ACCA. Second, he argues even if the 1990 convictions

qualify as predicates, they cannot be used as such because his

rights as to those convictions have been restored by virtue of

a 1995 restoration of civil rights letter. We need not reach

Lockett’s second argument, however, because as stated in

greater detail below, Lockett lacks a third qualifying conviction

to implicate the ACCA, rendering the district court’s belief that

imposition of the ACCA’s fifteen-year minimum was required

an error. We therefore reverse and remand for resentencing.

II. DISCUSSION

To qualify as an armed career criminal subject to the

ACCA’s mandatory fifteen-year minimum, a defendant must

have three previous convictions for a violent felony or a

serious drug offense, committed on three different occasions.

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Perkins, 449 F.3d at 795; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). “Under [the]

ACCA, a ‘serious drug offense’ includes ‘an offense under

State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing

with intent to distribute, a controlled substance ... for which a

maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is

prescribed by law.’” United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377,

381–82 (2008) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)). Whether a prior conviction is a qualifying

predicate under the ACCA is a question of law, subject to de

novo review. Kirkland v. United States, 687 F.3d 878, 882 (7th Cir.

2012). Any factual findings related to the defendant’s convictions, however, are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 883.

The parties do not dispute that Lockett was convicted of

two ACCA-qualifying convictions, but disagree as to whether

he has a third. The district court found that because any of

Lockett’s 1990 drug convictions could qualify as a predicate

under the ACCA, he was subject to the ACCA’s mandatory

minimum. Lockett contends on appeal that this was error and

we agree.

In Perkins, we held “as a matter of federal law the ‘maximum term of imprisonment’ to which § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) refers

is the maximum for the crime of conviction.” 449 F.3d at 796

(emphasis omitted). It made no difference that the defendant

was actually sentenced to less than the maximum; if by virtue

of his recidivism he “exposed himself” to a maximum of ten

years or more in prison, that conviction met the ACCA

statutory standard. Id. Following Perkins’ reasoning, Lockett’s

1990 convictions could qualify as predicates even though he

was ultimately sentenced to only four years’ imprisonment

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because, by virtue of the Illinois recidivist enhancement,

Lockett exposed himself to fourteen or ten years in prison.

But the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriquez adds an

evidentiary hurdle to our holding in Perkins. Rodriquez requires

the government to provide evidence from the record that the

defendant was in fact subject to the enhanced recidivist

penalties that could elevate his sentence past the ten-year

mark. 553 U.S. at 388–89. In imposing this additional requirement, the Supreme Court eliminated the possibility of a

hypothetical approach in which a court could assume that a

recidivist enhancement applied merely because it could apply.

Therefore, under Rodriquez, if state court records do not

demonstrate that Lockett actually faced the possibility of a

recidivist enhancement, the 1990 convictions cannot be used as

qualifying offenses under the ACCA. 

The Supreme Court indicated a number of examples of

record evidence that could show that a defendant faced the

possibility of a recidivist enhancement, including the judgment

of conviction, the plea colloquy, or from the imposed sentence

itself. Id. None of these examples are in the record before us.

Each document referencing Lockett’s 1990 drug convictions

only mentions his sentence of four years’ imprisonment; there

is no indication in the record that he was ever exposed to the

Illinois recidivist enhancement that would have brought his

maximum up to the ACCA-triggering minimum. 

Without findings of recidivism in Lockett’s record of

conviction, the attendant enhancements cannot be considered

in determining whether Lockett’s 1990 drug convictions

constituted serious drug offenses under the ACCA. According

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to the record, then, Lockett’s 1990 convictions can only be

evaluated in light of the actual four-year sentence imposed.

Because Lockett’s 1990 convictions did not expose him to at

least a ten-year sentence, none qualify as serious drug offenses

within the meaning of the ACCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A).

Therefore, Lockett lacks a third qualifying predicate and the

district court erred in believing that Lockett faced a mandatory

fifteen-year minimum. 

As a closing remark, if there were any doubts as to the

Supreme Court’s intent to impose the evidentiary requirement

we recognize today, we need only look to its recent opinion in

Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010). In CarachuriRosendo, the Court explained that “[in Rodriquez] [w]e held that

a recidivist finding could set the ‘maximum term of imprisonment,’ but only when the finding is a part of the record of

conviction.” Id. at 577 n.12. Thus, the evidentiary requirement

is assuredly a part of the Rodriquez holding, and not mere dicta

as the government seems to suggest. See also United States v.

Powell, 691 F.3d 554, 559 (4th Cir. 2012) (highlighting that the

Supreme Court confirmed its Rodriquez holding that a recidivist finding could set the maximum term of imprisonment only

when the finding is a part of the record of conviction in

Carachuri-Rosendo).

III. CONCLUSION

 For these reasons, Lockett’s sentence is REVERSED and

REMANDED to the district court for resentencing.

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