Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03029/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03029-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 20, 2009 Decided July 28, 2009 

No. 08-3029 

IN RE: SEALED CASE

______ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07cr00015-JDB-01) 

______ 

Jonathan Zucker argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. 

Nicholas P. Coleman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued 

the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Elizabeth 

Trosman, and Kenneth F. Whitted, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: HENDERSON, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit 

Judges. 

 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. 

 Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Sentenced to eleven years in 

prison after pleading guilty to unlawful distribution of 2.1 

grams of heroin, defendant appeals, arguing that the district 

USCA Case #08-3029 Document #1198396 Filed: 07/28/2009 Page 1 of 21
2 

court improperly sought to promote his rehabilitation through 

a longer term of imprisonment. Although defendant’s failure 

to object to the district court’s reasoning at sentencing limits 

us to plain error review, we agree that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) 

expressly prohibits sentencing courts from treating 

rehabilitation as a reason for imposing a longer term of 

imprisonment. In light of this clear statutory provision, and 

because this case also meets the remaining elements of the 

stringent plain error test, we vacate the sentence and remand 

for resentencing. Also, in accordance with our general 

practice and the government’s concession, we remand 

defendant’s additional claim that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 

I. 

Defendant, a 56-year-old drug addict, sold $20 worth of 

heroin to an undercover officer. Approached by officers 

shortly after the sale, defendant discarded 32 additional 

ziplock bags of a substance that tested positive for opiates. 

District of Columbia authorities arrested defendant and later 

charged him in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia 

with unlawful distribution of heroin and possession of heroin 

with intent to distribute. After protracted plea negotiations, 

defendant accepted a cooperation agreement entailing transfer 

of his case to the United States District Court for the District 

of Columbia, where he pled guilty to unlawful distribution, 

see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Defendant’s subsequent 

attempts at cooperation produced little of use to the 

government and ultimately ended when he failed a drug test. 

Defendant’s crime of distribution of less than five grams 

of heroin set his federal Sentencing Guidelines base 

offense level at 12. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 

§ 2D1.1(c)(14) (2007). Although the district court based the 

offense level on only the 2.1 grams of heroin involved in the 

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incident for which defendant was arrested, defendant’s 

criminal history category of VI reflected his long-term 

involvement with heroin dealing and related crimes. Because 

defendant’s cooperation efforts were ultimately unfruitful, the 

government declined to request a downward departure for 

substantial assistance, id. § 5K1.1, but it did acknowledge that 

defendant was entitled to credit for acceptance of 

responsibility, id. § 3E1.1 (providing for two-level acceptance 

of responsibility credit plus additional one-level decrease in 

certain circumstances for base offense levels of 16 or higher). 

Finding the cooperation efforts in good faith, the district court 

agreed that an acceptance of responsibility credit was 

warranted. Together defendant’s base offense level, criminal 

history category, and acceptance of responsibility credit 

would have yielded a guidelines range of 24 to 30 months. 

Defendant’s prior felony convictions, however, triggered the 

sentence enhancement for career offenders, id. § 4B1.1, which 

automatically increased his guidelines range to 151 to 188 

months. 

Having calculated this advisory guidelines range, the 

district court weighed several of the sentencing factors listed 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Beginning with the nature of the 

offense, the district court, though recognizing the seriousness 

of heroin dealing, acknowledged that the specific transaction 

for which defendant was arrested involved only a small 

quantity of drugs. The district court also considered 

defendant’s lengthy criminal history, which it attributed to his 

drug addiction, saying: 

The most important parts of that history add up 

simply to the fact that the defendant has been 

involved in using drugs and in criminal activity that 

is in conjunction with that use, the heroin 

distribution trade and small—not insignificant but 

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small thefts of various kinds, presumably to help 

support the habit. 

Sentencing Tr. 29. The district court viewed this pattern of 

recidivism as relevant to one of the section 3553(a) 

sentencing factors, namely, the need to protect the public 

from further criminal activity. See § 3553(a)(2)(C). Next, in 

a colloquy central to the issue before us, the district court 

turned to “another factor under 3553(a),” stating: 

I do think that the defendant may benefit from some 

of the programs and educational training and the 

medical treatment that is available in the federal 

prison system, and that would actually be more 

available and more useful for the defendant over a 

somewhat longer period of time than it would over a 

very short period of time. 

Sentencing Tr. 31–32. Before imposing the sentence, the 

district court reiterated the relevant factors, including “the 

need . . . to provide the defendant with needed educational or 

vocational training or other treatment in the correctional 

system in an effective manner.” Id. at 32; see § 

3553(a)(2)(D). While believing that a “substantial” sentence 

was called for, the district court reassured defendant that his 

sentence would allow “the prospect of release at some point in 

the future.” Sentencing Tr. 33. In the end, the district court 

concluded that a below-guidelines sentence of 132 months 

was “sufficient but not greater than is necessary to comply 

with the purposes of sentencing as set out in the various 

factors in Section 3553(a).” Id. After recommending that 

defendant be admitted to the prison’s “500-hour” drug 

treatment program, id. at 34, the district court encouraged him 

to take advantage of drug treatment and educational programs 

during his time in prison, id. at 37. 

USCA Case #08-3029 Document #1198396 Filed: 07/28/2009 Page 4 of 21
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Defendant now appeals, arguing that the district court 

improperly treated imprisonment as a means of promoting 

rehabilitation and consequently imposed a longer prison term. 

Defendant also claims that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Accepting the 

government’s concession that we should remand the latter 

claim for an evidentiary hearing under United States v. 

Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 909–910 (D.C. Cir. 2003), we need 

address only the sentencing challenge. 

II. 

Because defendant’s trial counsel failed to object at 

sentencing, we review his sentencing claim for plain error. 

United States v. Mouling, 557 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

Under this standard, defendant must show that the error 

occurred, that it was “plain,” and that it affected his 

substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 

(1993). If these three elements are met, we may reverse only 

if we find that the error “seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

Defendant’s sentencing challenge involves the interplay 

between two statutory provisions governing criminal 

sentencing, both of which refer to the role of rehabilitation. 

The first, section 3553, is the familiar provision governing all 

sentencing determinations. Entitled “[i]mposition of a 

sentence,” it directs sentencing courts to “impose a sentence 

sufficient but not greater than necessary” to comply with four 

enumerated purposes of sentencing. § 3553(a). Subsections 

(a)(2)(A), (B), and (C) set forth the goals of providing just 

punishment, deterring further crime, and protecting the public. 

Id. And central to the issue before us, subsection (a)(2)(D), 

directs sentencing courts to consider the need for the sentence 

“to provide the defendant with needed educational or 

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vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 

treatment in the most effective manner.” § 3553(a)(2)(D). 

Sentencing courts must also abide by the second 

provision at issue here, section 3582, which covers 

“[i]mposition of a sentence of imprisonment” and sets forth 

the “[f]actors to be considered in imposing a term of 

imprisonment,” § 3582(a). It provides: 

The court, in determining whether to impose a term 

of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to 

be imposed, in determining the length of the term, 

shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) 

to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing 

that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of 

promoting correction and rehabilitation. 

Id.

Relying on section 3582(a), defendant argues that a 

sentencing court errs if it imposes a longer term of 

imprisonment as a means of rehabilitating a defendant. 

According to defendant, the district court here did just that, as 

evidenced by its statement that defendant “may benefit from 

some of the programs and educational training and the 

medical treatment that is available in the federal prison 

system, and that would actually be more available and more 

useful for [him] over a somewhat longer period of time than it 

would over a very short period of time.” Sentencing Tr. 31–

32. 

For its part, the government sees no error in the district 

court’s approach. Although acknowledging that section 

3582(a) bars a sentencing court from choosing a prison term 

over a non-incarceration sentence because of the rehabilitative 

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programs available in prison, the government insists that once 

the sentencing court makes the initial decision to imprison a 

defendant, it may then treat those same rehabilitative concerns 

as a reason to impose a longer term of imprisonment. 

According to the government, this interpretation of section 

3582(a) avoids a conflict with section 3553(a)(2)(D), which 

requires sentencing courts to consider rehabilitation as a 

purpose of sentencing. 

The issue before us—whether section 3582(a) allows a 

sentencing court to treat rehabilitation as a reason for 

lengthening a defendant’s prison term—has divided our sister 

circuits. The Ninth has held that although section 3582(a) 

bars sentencing courts from choosing prison rather than a 

non-incarceration sentence to promote rehabilitation, it allows 

sentencing courts to select a longer prison term to promote 

rehabilitation. See United States v. Duran, 37 F.3d 557, 561 

(9th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit has also adopted this 

interpretation. See United States v. Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 

622, 629–30 (8th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. 

Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091, 1096–97 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting in a 

case involving revocation of supervised release under § 

3583(g) that courts making an initial sentencing decision can 

impose a longer term of imprisonment for rehabilitation); 

United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874, 879–80 & n.6, (6th Cir. 

1995) (citing Duran in a revocation of supervised release 

case, although acknowledging that “it is difficult to see a 

distinction between the imposition of a sentence of 

imprisonment and the length of imprisonment”). By contrast, 

the Third Circuit has held that section 3582(a)’s bar on 

promoting rehabilitation through imprisonment applies to 

both decisions—whether to imprison a defendant at all and 

whether to impose a longer prison term. United States v. 

Manzella, 475 F.3d 152, 156–61 (3d Cir. 2007). The Second 

Circuit has reached the same result, though in an unpublished 

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opinion. United States v. Yehuda, 238 F. App’x 712, 713 (2d 

Cir. 2007) (“[R]ehabilitation . . . is not a permissible basis for 

increasing [defendant’s] term of imprisonment.”); see also

United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1213–14 (10th Cir. 

2004) (acknowledging that “the initial term of imprisonment 

is always limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)”); United States v. 

Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that 

sentencing courts may not “extend the term of imprisonment 

 . . . for the purpose of providing . . . rehabilitative treatment” 

(quoting United States v. Harris, 990 F.2d 594, 597 (11th Cir. 

1993) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 994(k)))). 

Given the plain language of sections 3553(a) and 

3582(a), we agree with the Third and Second Circuits that 

sentencing courts may not treat rehabilitation as a reason for a 

longer term of imprisonment. Section 3582(a) expressly 

states that “the court . . . in determining the length of the term 

[of imprisonment], shall consider the factors set forth in 

section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, 

recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of 

promoting correction and rehabilitation.” § 3582(a) 

(emphasis added). Congress thus spoke clearly: in deciding 

how long to keep a defendant in prison, sentencing courts 

may not use imprisonment as a means of rehabilitation. 

Section 3582(a)’s straightforward language leaves no 

room for the government’s distinction between selecting 

prison rather than a non-prison sentence and imposing a 

longer term of imprisonment. As a textual matter, the 

government nowhere explains how the phrase “recognizing 

that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting 

. . . rehabilitation” can modify section 3582(a)’s first clause 

(“in determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment”) 

but not its second (“in determining the length of the term”). 

As a matter of logic, the government’s position is likewise 

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untenable. If, as the government concedes, imprisonment is 

not an appropriate means of promoting rehabilitation, how 

can more imprisonment serve as an appropriate means of 

promoting rehabilitation? This case demonstrates the point 

nicely. Under the government’s theory, the district court 

would err by choosing imprisonment rather than, say, 

probation to help defendant “benefit from some of the 

programs and educational training and the medical treatment 

that is available in the federal prison system,” Sentencing Tr. 

31, yet would commit no error by choosing to keep defendant 

in prison longer to benefit from those same programs that 

would be “more available and more useful for [him] over a 

somewhat longer period of time than . . . over a very short 

period of time,” id. at 31–32. 

Attempting to escape section 3582(a)’s clear language, 

the government urges us to follow the Ninth Circuit’s 

reasoning, i.e., that if Congress had wanted to bar 

consideration of rehabilitation as a reason to increase a 

sentence it “could have enacted a statute that admonished 

judges to recognize ‘that imprisonment or the length of 

imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting 

correction and rehabilitation.’” Duran, 37 F.3d at 561. But 

Congress had no need to provide such clarification given the 

statute’s express instruction that sentencing courts must 

recognize the inappropriateness of imprisonment for 

rehabilitation both in choosing imprisonment rather than a 

non-incarceration sentence and “in determining the length of 

the term.” § 3582(a). As the Third Circuit explained, “[t]he 

possibility that a clearly worded statute might be even more 

clearly worded does not negate the fact that it is already 

clear.” Manzella, 475 F.3d at 160. Nor would the addition of 

the phrase “or the length of imprisonment” add anything that 

the term “imprisonment” on its own doesn’t already convey. 

According to the dictionary, “imprisonment” means “[t]he 

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action of imprisoning, or [the] fact or condition of being 

imprisoned.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) 

(emphasis added). In context as well, “imprisonment” 

encompasses the decision to imprison a defendant for a longer 

period of time. A sentencing court deciding to keep a 

defendant locked up for an additional month is, as to that 

month, in fact choosing imprisonment over release. If the 

sentencing court adds the extra month to make a defendant 

eligible for a prison drug treatment or educational program, it 

fails to recognize that “imprisonment” is not an appropriate 

means of promoting rehabilitation. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit 

itself, although not expressly overruling Duran, later cited 

section 3582(a) in support of its holding that a sentencing 

court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive rather than 

concurrent sentences based on the defendant’s need for 

mental health treatment. United States v. Kikuyama, 109 F.3d 

536, 539 (9th Cir. 1997). In so doing, it even described 

section 3582(a) as standing for the proposition that “in 

determining length of term of imprisonment, court must 

‘recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of 

promoting correction and rehabilitation.’” Id. (emphasis 

added) (quoting § 3582(a)). 

In a further effort to support its distinction between the 

decision to sentence a defendant to prison at all and the 

selection of a longer term, the government points to section 

3582’s legislative history. It highlights the following passage 

in the Senate Report: 

“[Section 3582(a)] specifies, in light of current 

knowledge, that the judge should recognize, in 

determining whether to impose a term of 

imprisonment, ‘that imprisonment is not an 

appropriate means of promoting correction and 

rehabilitation.’ This caution concerning the use of 

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rehabilitation as a factor to be considered in 

imposing sentence is to discourage the employment 

of a term of imprisonment on the sole ground that a 

prison has a program that might be of benefit to the 

prisoner. This does not mean, of course, that if a 

defendant is to be sentenced to imprisonment for 

other purposes, the availability of rehabilitative 

programs should not be an appropriate consideration, 

for example, in recommending a particular facility.” 

Appellee’s Br. 23–24 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119 

(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3302) 

(emphasis added by Appellee). Even if legislative history 

could override the statute’s plain text—which of course it 

cannot—this excerpt provides no support for the 

government’s position. That sentencing courts may consider 

rehabilitation in recommending a particular facility hardly 

suggests that they may keep a defendant in that or any other 

prison facility for a longer period of time for rehabilitative 

purposes. 

The government’s warning against creating a conflict 

between sections 3553(a) and 3582(a) fares no better. Our 

reading of section 3582(a) respects its plain text and gives 

effect to each of its clauses, while allowing section 3582(a) 

and section 3553(a) to play their unique roles in the statutory 

scheme. We thus agree with the Third Circuit that section 

3582 has a narrower scope than section 3553: the former deals 

specifically with imprisonment, while the latter addresses 

imposition of a sentence, a broader concept that encompasses 

imprisonment as well as probation and fines. See Manzella, 

475 F.3d at 158; see also § 3553(a)(3) (instructing sentencing 

courts to consider “the kinds of sentences available”); 18 

U.S.C. § 3551 (listing as “[a]uthorized sentences” probation, 

fines, and imprisonment). Together, sections 3582(a) and 

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3553(a) instruct sentencing courts to consider rehabilitation as 

one of the purposes of sentencing but bars them from 

seeking to achieve rehabilitation through imprisonment. See 

Manzella, 475 F.3d at 158; see also United States v. Maier, 

975 F.2d 944, 946–47 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining the 

difference between “sentence” under § 3553(a) and 

“imprisonment” under § 994(k), which provides that the 

sentencing guidelines must “reflect the inappropriateness of 

imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the 

purpose of rehabilitating the defendant”); S. REP. NO. 98-225, 

at 76–77 (explaining that the committee had rejected the view 

that rehabilitation should be eliminated completely as a 

purpose of sentencing, but that it “[i]nstead . . . retained 

rehabilitation and corrections as an appropriate purpose of a 

sentence, while recognizing . . . that ‘imprisonment is not an 

appropriate means of promoting correction and 

rehabilitation,’” and noting that “the purpose of rehabilitation 

is still important in determining whether a sanction other than 

a term of imprisonment is appropriate in a particular case” 

(footnotes omitted)). Thus, far from creating the conflict the 

government fears, these provisions harmonize comfortably 

with each other in a rational scheme that retains the 

sentencing goal of rehabilitation but pursues this goal through 

means other than incarcerating a defendant or keeping him in 

prison longer. 

Here, the district court stated that the defendant would 

benefit from prison rehabilitation programs over a “somewhat 

longer period of time,” indicating that it viewed rehabilitation 

as a reason to lengthen a term of imprisonment. The court 

thus failed to “recognize[e] that imprisonment is not an 

appropriate means of promoting correction and 

rehabilitation,” § 3582(a). Of course, nothing in section 

3582(a) prohibits sentencing courts from considering 

rehabilitative needs for other reasons, such as in selecting a 

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shorter term of imprisonment or in imposing a nonincarceration sentence. Such decisions would fully comply 

with the statutory command to “recognize[e] that 

imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting 

rehabilitation,” § 3582(a). 

This brings us, then, to the plain error test’s second 

element: whether the error was “plain.” Generally an error is 

plain if it contradicts circuit or Supreme Court precedent. 

Even absent binding case law, however, an error can be plain 

if it violates an “absolutely clear” legal norm, “for example, 

because of the clarity of a statutory provision.” United States 

v. Merlos, 8 F.3d 48, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1993). This is just such 

a case. As explained above, section 3582(a) speaks with 

absolute clarity on this point. See supra at 8–9; cf. Olano, 

507 U.S. at 734 (“plain” is synonymous with “clear” or 

“obvious”). 

In the government’s view, the circuit split on this issue 

necessarily means that the error could not have been plain. 

We disagree. To be sure, as our dissenting colleague points 

out, see Dissenting Op. at 3–4, we have recognized that a 

division of authority on a given point may provide cause to 

question the plainness of an error, but we did so in cases 

lacking the kind of clear statutory language at issue here. See, 

e.g., United States v. Baldwin, 563 F.3d 490, 491–92 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009) (involving the question whether a district court 

may “delegate[] its authority to determine [defendant’s] 

restitution obligations”); United States v. Andrews, 532 F.3d 

900, 908–909 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (involving the question 

whether a district court’s use of a later version of the 

sentencing guidelines violated the ex post facto clause); 

United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 895–96 (D.C. Cir. 

2006) (involving the question whether a court-imposed ban on 

internet use as a condition of supervised release fits the broad 

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statutory goals enumerated in § 3583). Moreover, we have 

not hesitated to deem an error involving clear language plain, 

even when another circuit considered the provision 

ambiguous enough to defeat a finding of plain error. United 

States v. Joaquin, 326 F.3d 1287, 1292–93 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

Moving on to the plain error test’s third inquiry, we ask 

whether the error affected the defendant’s “substantial rights.” 

To show an impact on “substantial rights” in the sentencing 

context, the defendant “‘must show a reasonable likelihood 

that the sentencing court’s obvious errors affected his 

sentence.’” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (quoting United States v. 

Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). As we have held, 

the reasonable likelihood standard “is somewhat more relaxed 

in the area of sentencing than it is for trial errors, since ‘a 

resentencing is nowhere near as costly or as chancy an event 

as a trial.’” United States v. Gomez, 431 F.3d 818, 822 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Saro, 24 F.3d at 288). 

Given this standard, we conclude that defendant has 

shown a reasonable likelihood that his sentence would 

have been shorter had the district court properly viewed 

imprisonment as inappropriate for promoting rehabilitation. 

The district court expressly stated that it believed that 

defendant would benefit from the prison system’s 

rehabilitative programs over a “somewhat longer period of 

time.” Sentencing Tr. 31–32. Even absent such an express 

link to sentence duration, we have found direct invocation of 

an impermissible sentencing factor to establish a reasonable 

likelihood of prejudice. See Joaquin, 326 F.3d at 1293–94 

(holding that the district court’s specific reference to the 

impermissible factor of defendant’s prior arrest record before 

concluding that defendant posed a risk of recidivism was 

sufficient to establish prejudice). 

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The government argues that even absent error, defendant 

was unlikely to have received a “very short” sentence. This 

misses the point. The question isn’t whether defendant’s 

prison term would have been drastically shorter—just whether 

it was reasonably likely that the prison term would not have 

been as long had the district court considered only permissible 

factors. To be sure, as the government and our dissenting 

colleague emphasize, see Dissenting Op. at 4, the district 

court considered factors other than rehabilitation, such as the 

seriousness of the offense and defendant’s criminal history 

and pattern of recidivism. But the court’s invocation of these 

factors hardly negates its express reliance on prison 

rehabilitation programs, especially given its repeated 

references to defendant’s drug problems and its view that 

defendant’s criminal history stemmed largely from his drug 

addiction. 

Having determined that defendant has demonstrated error 

that was plain and that affected his substantial rights, we must 

finally decide whether the error seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings such that 

we should exercise our discretion to correct it. Olano, 507 

U.S. at 732. We have repeatedly opted to correct plain 

sentencing errors that, if left uncorrected, would result in a 

defendant serving a longer sentence. See, e.g., United States 

v. Watson, 476 F.3d 1020, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[L]eaving 

in place an error-infected sentence that would have been 

materially different absent error and that could be readily 

corrected would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” (alteration in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The same is 

true here. We cannot say that keeping defendant in prison 

longer for improper reasons would leave the fairness, 

integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings 

unscathed. See United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 767 

USCA Case #08-3029 Document #1198396 Filed: 07/28/2009 Page 15 of 21
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(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“We are also convinced that, if the District 

Court’s error was prejudicial, the error would ‘seriously 

affect[ ] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.’ As the Seventh Circuit aptly observed, ‘[i]t is a 

miscarriage of justice to give a person an illegal sentence that 

increases his punishment, just as it is to convict an innocent 

person.’” (quoting United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 

483 (7th Cir. 2005)). Given the facts of this case, we see no 

“countervailing factors,” Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 

1423, 1433 (2009), to suggest that we should decline to 

exercise our discretion to correct the sentencing error. 

According to the government, “the remote possibility that 

appellant may serve a slightly longer sentence in order to help 

him overcome his drug dependency is hardly the kind of 

‘error’ that impugns the judicial process, given that addiction 

has been the primary cause of appellant’s criminal behavior.” 

Appellee’s Br. at 30. This argument amounts to nothing more 

than a disagreement with Congress’s determination that 

sentencing courts may not attempt to rehabilitate a defendant 

through imprisonment. Indeed, seeking to meet a defendant’s 

rehabilitative needs in a way that Congress has deemed 

inappropriate, see § 3582(a), represents exactly the kind of 

error that impugns the judicial process. Cf. Joaquin, 326 F.3d 

at 1294 (reversing a sentence under plain error review 

because “reliance on information expressly deemed unreliable 

by the Sentencing Commission seriously affects the fairness 

and integrity of judicial proceedings”). 

Because this case meets the standard for plain error, we 

vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. In doing so, we 

emphasize that this disposition in no way requires the district 

court to shorten the sentence on remand. Rather, the district 

court remains free to resentence the defendant appropriately, 

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either by reimposing the same sentence based solely on 

permissible factors or by resentencing if in fact it did lengthen 

the sentence to promote rehabilitation. 

So ordered.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON,Circuit Judge, concurring in

part and dissenting in part:

Although I agree with my colleagues that we should remand

the defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim for an evidentiary

hearing, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that his

sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing. For

the following reasons, I would affirm the sentence. 

In reviewing a sentence for plain error, we have held that

“[p]lain error exists ‘where (1) there is error (2) that is plain and

(3) that affects substantial rights and (4) the court of appeals

finds that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v.

Brown, 516 F.3d 1047, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting United

States v. Andrews, 479 F.3d 894, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal

quotations omitted)). The defendant alleges that the district

court sentenced him to a longer term of imprisonment in order

to promote his rehabilitation and argues that doing so constituted

plain error. At sentencing, the district court stated that the

defendant’s offense was “a serious drug crime contributing to

the blight on the community from drugs.” Sentencing Tr., In re

Sealed Case, Cr. No. 07-0015, at 27 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2008)

(Sentencing Tr.). The court characterized the defendant’s

criminal history as “lengthy,” id. at 28, and noted his “trend” of

“coming out of some criminal justice context, whether it be

incarceration or supervision . . . , and still engaging in criminal

activity . . . . [including] incarcerat[ion] for violations of his

conditions of [supervised] release,” id. at 30 (emphasis added).

The court also found relevant the defendant’s age of 58 years.

Id. at 29. The defendant’s lengthy and recidivist history “l[ed]

the Court to observe, consistent with one of the factors under

3553(a), that there is a need to protect the public from further

criminal activity.” Id. at 30. At the close of its discussion of the

factors it deemed relevant to selecting a sentence, the court

stated:

Now, with respect to another factor under 3553(a), I do

think that the defendant may benefit from some of the

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programs and educational training and the medical

treatment that is available in the federal prison system,

and that would actually be more available and more

useful for the defendant over a somewhat longer period

of time than it would over a very short period of time.

Id. at 31-32; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). The court then

announced the sentencing guidelines range as 151 to 188

months. Sentencing Tr. at 32. It iterated:

Again, I have assessed this based on all the factors

under Section 3553(a), including in particular those in

3553(a)(2)(A), which are the need to reflect the

seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,

provide just punishment for the offense, to afford

adequate deterrence both to the defendant and others,

and to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant and to provide the defendant with needed

educational or vocational training or other treatment in

the correctional system in an effective manner, all of

which is, when considered by the Court, designed to

result in a sentence that is sufficient but not greater

than necessary.

Id. at 32-33. “[T]aking all of that into account,” the court

concluded that “a sentence less than the guideline range is

warranted.” Id. at 33. Nevertheless, the court decided a

“substantial” sentence was appropriate and sentenced the

defendant to 132 months’ imprisonment and 36 months’

supervised release. Id. at 33-34. The court also

“recommend[ed] that [the defendant] be admitted to the Bureau

of Prisons’ residential drug abuse treatment program, what is

called the 500-hour program while incarcerated.” Id. at 34. 

First and foremost, the court did not err, plainly or

otherwise, because it did not in fact sentence the defendant to a

longer term of imprisonment in order to promote rehabilitation.

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1

The court noted that “there’s little in the way of a showing that

the defendant wants or is able to conform his conduct to the law in the

future” and “the defendant has not shown any ability to conform his

conduct to the law now or even after some relatively short period of

incarceration.” Sentencing Tr. at 31.

As noted, the court focused on the defendant’s lengthy criminal

history and recidivist tendencies even after periods of

incarceration. It mentioned rehabilitation briefly at the close of

a more lengthy discussion of the other factors under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(1) and (2). And even with the defendant’s recidivism,

the court imposed a sentence well below the guidelines range.

Its emphasis nonetheless remained on the need for imprisonment

to protect the public from a career offender.1 Cf. United States

v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2007) (vacating sentence of

30 months’ imprisonment—well above sentencing guidelines

range of 2 to 8 months—sentencing court had imposed solely to

allow defendant to participate in prison drug treatment

program).

Second, assuming the district court in fact sentenced the

defendant to a longer term of imprisonment in order, in part, to

promote his rehabilitation, but see Majority Op. at 16-17, and

assuming further that the court did so erroneously, that error

would not be plain. Plain error requires that the error be “‘clear’

or, equivalently, ‘obvious.’” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 734 (1993). Whether the limitation contained in the last

clause of section 3582(a) applies both to the decision to impose

imprisonment as well as the length thereof or only to the

decision to imprison has, as the majority discusses, split the

circuits. See Majority Op. at 7-8. Whoever has the better

reading, courts have read it differently—and with conflicting

results—which manifests, at least to me, that any court that has

read it erroneously has not done so plainly. See United States v.

Baldwin, 563 F.3d 490, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (relying on circuit

split in finding no plain error); Andrews, 532 F.3d at 909 (same);

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United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 895-96 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(same). 

Moreover, even assuming error that is plain, the defendant

has failed to “demonstrate ‘a reasonable likelihood that the

sentencing court’s obvious errors affected his sentence.’”

United States v. Williams, 358 F.3d 956, 966 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(quoting United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 288 (D.C. Cir.

1994)). In view of the district court’s emphasis on the

defendant’s decades-long inability to refrain from criminal

activity unless incarcerated, the length of the sentence was

unaffected by any desire to accord the defendant one more

chance at rehabilitation. In short, I believe the court would have

imposed the same sentence irrespective of any rehabilitation

impulse and therefore the defendant was not prejudiced.

Because the defendant has not satisfied the first three prongs of

plain error review, I need not reach whether “the error seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Andrews, 479 F.3d at 896 (internal quotations

omitted)); see United States v. Mouling, 557 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C.

Cir. 2009) (no need to reach fourth prong of plain error test

because error was not plain). 

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the vacatur and

remand of the defendant’s sentence.

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