Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-15845/USCOURTS-ca9-18-15845-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Civil Liberties Union
Amicus Curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona
Amicus Curiae
Mark Brnovich
Appellee
DSCC
Appellant
Bill Gates
Appellee
Katie Hobbs
Appellee
Suzanne Klapp
Appellee
Debbie Lesko
Appellee
Michele Reagan
Appellee
Tony Rivero
Appellee
State of Arizona
Intervenor - Pending
The Arizona Democratic Party
Appellant
The Arizona Republican Party
Appellee
The Democratic National Committee
Appellant
The United States
Amicus Curiae

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL

COMMITTEE; DSCC, AKA

Democratic Senatorial Campaign

Committee; THE ARIZONA

DEMOCRATIC PARTY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

KATIE HOBBS, in her official

capacity as Secretary of State of

Arizona; MARK BRNOVICH, Attorney

General, in his official capacity as

Arizona Attorney General,

Defendants-Appellees,

THE ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY;

BILL GATES, Councilman; SUZANNE

KLAPP, Councilwoman; DEBBIE

LESKO, Sen.; TONY RIVERO, Rep.,

Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-15845

D.C. No.

2:16-cv-01065-

DLR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

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2 DNC V. HOBBS

Argued and Submitted En Banc March 27, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed January 27, 2020

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Diarmuid F.

O’Scannlain, William A. Fletcher, Marsha S. Berzon*

,

Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Richard R. Clifton, Jay S. Bybee,

Consuelo M. Callahan, Mary H. Murguia, Paul J. Watford,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher;

Concurrence by Judge Watford;

Dissent by Judge O’Scannlain;

Dissent by Judge Bybee

*

Judge Berzon was drawn to replace Judge Graber. Judge Berzon has

read the briefs, reviewed the record, and watched the recording of oral

argument held on March 27, 2019.

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DNC V. HOBBS 3

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The en banc court reversed the district court’s judgment

following a bench trial in favor of defendants, the Arizona

Secretary of State and Attorney General in their official

capacities, in an action brought by the Democratic National

Committee and others challenging, first, Arizona’s policy of

wholly discarding, rather than counting or partially counting,

ballots cast in the wrong precinct; and, second, House Bill

2023, a 2016 statute criminalizing the collection and delivery

of another person’s ballot.

Plaintiffs asserted that the out-of-precinct policy (OOP)

and House Bill (H.B.) 2023 violated Section 2 of the Voting

Rights Act of 1965 as amended because they adversely and

disparately affected Arizona’s American Indian, Hispanic,

and African American citizens. Plaintiffs also asserted that

H.B. 2023 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and

the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

because it was enacted with discriminatory intent. Finally,

plaintiffs asserted that the OOP policy and H.B. 2023 violated

the First and Fourteenth Amendments because they unduly

burden minorities’ right to vote. 

The en banc court held that Arizona’s policy of wholly

discarding, rather than counting or partially counting, OOP

ballots, and H.B. 2023’s criminalization of the collection of

another person’s ballot, have a discriminatory impact on

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 DNC V. HOBBS

American Indian, Hispanic, and African American voters in

Arizona, in violation of the “results test” of Section 2 of the

Voting Rights Act. Specifically, the en banc court

determined that plaintiffs had shown that Arizona’s OOP

policy and H.B. 2023 imposed a significant disparate burden

on its American Indian, Hispanic, and African American

citizens, resulting in the “denial or abridgement of the right

of its citizens to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(a). Second, plaintiffs had shown that, under the

“totality of circumstances,” the discriminatory burden

imposed by the OOP policy and H.B. 2023 was in part caused

by or linked to “social and historical conditions” that have or

currently produce “an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed

by [minority] and white voters to elect their preferred

representatives” and to participate in the political process. 

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986); 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(b).

The en banc court held that H.B. 2023’s criminalization

of the collection of another person’s ballot was enacted with

discriminatory intent, in violation of the “intent test” of

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and of the Fifteenth

Amendment. The en banc court held that the totality of the

circumstances—Arizona’s long history of race-based voting

discrimination; the Arizona legislature’s unsuccessful efforts

to enact less restrictive versions of the same law when

preclearance was a threat; the false, race-based claims of

ballot collection fraud used to convince Arizona legislators to

pass H.B. 2023; the substantial increase in American Indian

and Hispanic voting attributable to ballot collection that was

targeted by H.B. 2023; and the degree of racially polarized

voting in Arizona—cumulatively and unmistakably revealed

that racial discrimination was a motivating factor in enacting

H.B. 2023. The en banc court further held that Arizona had

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DNC V. HOBBS 5

not carried its burden of showing that H.B. 2023 would have

been enacted without the motivating factor of racial

discrimination. The panel declined to reach DNC’s First and

Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Concurring, Judge Watford joined the court’s opinion to

the extent it invalidated Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy and

H.B. 2023 under the results test. Judge Watford did not join

the opinion’s discussion of the intent test.

Dissenting, Judge O’Scannlain, joined by Judges Clifton,

Bybee and Callahan, stated that the majority drew factual

inferences that the evidence could not support and misread

precedent along the way. In so doing, the majority

impermissibly struck down Arizona’s duly enacted policies

designed to enforce its precinct-based election system and to

regulate third-party collection of early ballots.

Dissenting, Judge Bybee, joined by Judges O’Scannlain,

Clifton and Callahan, wrote separately to state that in

considering the totality of the circumstances, which took into

account long-held, widely adopted measures, Arizona’s time,

place, and manner rules were well within our American

democratic-republican tradition.

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COUNSEL

Bruce V. Spiva (argued), Marc E. Elias, Elisabeth C. Frost,

Amanda R. Callais, and Alexander G. Tischenko, Perkins

Coie LLP, Washington, D.C.; Daniel C. Barr and Sarah R.

Gonski, Perkins Coie LLP, Phoenix, Arizona; Joshua L. Kaul,

Perkins Coie LLP, Madison, Wisconsin; for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Andrew G. Pappas (argued), Joseph E. La Rue, Karen J.

Hartman-Tellez, and Kara M. Karlson, Assistant Attorneys

General; Dominic E. Draye, Solicitor General; Mark

Brnovich, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General,

Phoenix, Arizona; for Defendants-Appellees.

Brett W. Johnson (argued) and Colin P. Ahler, Snell &

Wilmer LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, for Intervenor-DefendantsAppellees.

John M. Gore (argued), Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney

General; Thomas E. Chandler and Erin H. Flynn, Attorneys;

Gregory B. Friel, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Eric S.

Dreiband, Assistant AttorneyGeneral; Department of Justice,

CRD–Appellate Section, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus

Curiae United States.

Kathleen E. Brody, ACLU Foundation of Arizona, Phoenix,

Arizona; Dale Ho, American Civil Liberties Union

Foundation, New York, New York; Davin Rosborough and

Ceridwen Chery, American CivilLibertiesUnion Foundation,

Washington,D.C.; for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties

Union & American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona.

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DNC V. HOBBS 7

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

The right to vote is the foundation of our democracy. 

Chief Justice Warren wrote in his autobiography that the

precursor to one person, one vote, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.

186 (1962), was the most important case decided during his

tenure as Chief Justice—a tenure that included Brown v.

Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Earl Warren, The

Memoirs of Earl Warren 306 (1977). Chief Justice Warren

wrote in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964): “The

right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the

essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that

right strike at the heart of representative government.” 

Justice Black wrote in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17

(1964): “No right is more precious in a free country than that

of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws

under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights,

even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is

undermined.”

For over a century, Arizona has repeatedly targeted its

American Indian, Hispanic, and African American citizens,

limiting or eliminating their ability to vote and to participate

in the political process. In 2016, the Democratic National

Committee and other Plaintiffs-Appellants (collectively,

“DNC” or “Plaintiffs”) sued Arizona’s Secretary of State and

Attorney General in their official capacities (collectively,

“Arizona”) in federal district court.

DNC challenged, first, Arizona’s policy of wholly

discarding, rather than counting or partially counting, ballots

cast in the wrong precinct (“out-of-precinct” or “OOP”

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8 DNC V. HOBBS

policy); and, second, House Bill 2023 (“H.B. 2023”), a 2016

statute criminalizing the collection and delivery of another

person’s ballot. DNC contends that the OOP policy and H.B.

2023 violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as

amended (“VRA”) because they adversely and disparately

affect Arizona’s American Indian, Hispanic, and African

American citizens. DNC also contends that H.B. 2023

violates Section 2 of the VRA and the Fifteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution because it was enacted with

discriminatory intent. Finally, DNC contends that the OOP

policy and H.B. 2023 violate the First and Fourteenth

Amendments because they unduly burden minorities’ right to

vote.

Following a ten-day bench trial, the district court found in

favor of Arizona on all claims. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v.

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d 824 (D. Ariz. 2018) (Reagan). DNC

appealed, and a divided three-judge panel of our court

affirmed. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan, 904 F.3d 686

(9th Cir. 2018) (DNC). A majority of non-recused active

judges voted to rehear this case en banc, and we vacated the

decision of the three-judge panel. Democratic Nat’l Comm.

v. Reagan, 911 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2019).

We review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo

and its findings of fact for clear error. Gonzalez v. Arizona,

677 F.3d 383, 406 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). We may

“correct errors of law, including those that may infect a socalled mixed finding of law and fact, or a finding of fact that

is predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of

law.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see Smith v. Salt River Project

Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 591 (9th

Cir. 1997) (Salt River). We review for clear error the district

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DNC V. HOBBS 9

court’s overall finding of vote dilution or vote denial in

violation of the VRA. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 78; Salt River,

109 F.3d at 591.

Reviewing the full record, we conclude that the district

court clearly erred. We reverse the decision of the district

court. We hold that Arizona’s policy of wholly discarding,

rather than counting or partially counting, out-of-precinct

ballots, and H.B. 2023’s criminalization of the collection of

another person’s ballot, have a discriminatory impact on

American Indian, Hispanic, and African American voters in

Arizona, in violation of the “results test” of Section 2 of the

VRA. We hold, further, that H.B. 2023’s criminalization of

the collection of another person’s ballot was enacted with

discriminatory intent, in violation of the “intent test” of

Section 2 of the VRA and of the Fifteenth Amendment. We

do not reach DNC’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

I. Out-of-Precinct Policy and H.B. 2023

DNC challenges (1) Arizona’s policy of wholly

discarding, rather than counting or partially counting, ballots

cast out-of-precinct (“OOP”), and (2) H.B. 2023, a statute

that, subject to certain exceptions, criminalizes the collection

of another person’s early ballot. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-

122, -135, -584; H.B. 2023, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.

2016), codified as Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(H), (I).

Arizona offers two methods of voting: (1) in-person

voting at a precinct or vote center either on election day or

during an early-vote period, or (2) “early voting” whereby the

voter receives the ballot via mail and either mails back the

voted ballot or delivers the ballot to a designated drop-off

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10 DNC V. HOBBS

location. Arizona’s OOP policy affects in-person voting. 

H.B. 2023 affects early voting.

We describe in turn Arizona’s OOP policy and H.B. 2023.

A. Out-of-Precinct Policy

1. Policy of Entirely Discarding OOP Ballots

Arizona law permits each county to choose a vote-center

or a precinct-based system for in-person voting. Reagan,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 840. In counties using the vote-center

system, registered voters may vote at any polling location in

the county. Id. In counties using the precinct-based system,

registered voters may vote only at the designated polling

place in their precinct. Approximately 90 percent of

Arizona’s population lives in counties using the precinctbased system.

In precinct-based counties, if a voter arrives at a polling

place and does not appear on the voter rolls for that precinct,

that voter may cast a provisional ballot. Id.; Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§§ 16-122, -135, -584. After election day, county election

officials in close elections review all provisional ballots to

determine the voter’s identity and address. If, after reviewing

a provisional ballot, election officials determine that the voter

voted out of precinct, the county discards the OOP ballot in

its entirety. In some instances, all of the votes cast by the

OOP voter will have been cast for candidates and

propositions for which the voter was legally eligible to vote. 

In other instances, most of the votes cast by the OOP voter

will have been cast properly, in the sense that the voter was

eligible to vote on those races, but one or more votes for local

candidates or propositions will have been cast improperly.

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In both instances, the county discards the OOP ballot in

its entirety. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 840. That is, the

county discards not only the votes of an OOP voter for the

few local candidates and propositions for which the OOP

voter may have been ineligible to vote. The county also

discards the votes for races for which the OOP voter was

eligible to vote, including U.S. President, U.S. Senator, and

(almost always) Member of the U.S. House of

Representatives; all statewide officers, including Governor,

and statewide propositions; (usually) all countywide officers

and propositions; and (often) local candidates and

propositions.

2. Comparison with Other States

The district court found that Arizona “consistently is at or

near the top of the list of states that collect and reject the

largest number of provisional ballots each election.” Id.

at 856 (emphasis added). The district court’s finding

understates the matter. Arizona is consistently at the very top

of the list by a large margin.

Dr. Jonathan Rodden, Professor of Political Science and

Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford

University, provided expert reports to the district court. The

court gave “great weight” to Dr. Rodden’s analysis of the

“rates and causes of OOP voting” in Arizona. Id. at 835. 

Dr. Rodden reported: “Since 2012, Arizona has clearly

become the national leader in both provisional ballots cast

and especiallyin provisional ballots rejected among in-person

voters.” Jonathan Rodden, Expert Report (Rodden) at 25.

Dr. Rodden reported that, from 2006 to 2010, between

9 to 13 percent of all in-person ballots cast in Arizona were

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12 DNC V. HOBBS

provisional ballots. Id. at 24. In the 2012 general election,

more than 22 percent of all in-person ballots cast were

provisional ballots. Id. In Maricopa County, Arizona’s most

populous county, close to one in three in-person ballots cast

in 2012 were provisional ballots. Id. at 27–28. In the 2014

midterm election, over 18 percent of in-person ballots cast in

the State were provisional ballots. Id. at 25. These numbers

place Arizona at the very top of the list of States in collection

of provisional ballots.

Arizona also rejects a higher percentage of provisional

ballots than any other State. The district court found:

In 2012 alone “[m]ore than one in every five

[Arizona in-person] voters . . . was asked to

cast a provisional ballot, and over 33,000 of

these—more than 5 percent of all in-person

ballots cast—were rejected. No other state

rejected a larger share of its in-person ballots

in 2012.”

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 856 (alterations in original)

(quoting Rodden at 24–25).

One of the most frequent reasons for rejecting provisional

ballots in Arizona is that they are cast out-of-precinct. Id.;

see also Rodden at 26–29. From 2008 to 2016, Arizona

discarded a total of 38,335 OOP ballots cast by registered

voters—29,834 ballots during presidential general elections,

and 8,501 ballots during midterm general elections. Reagan,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 856.

As the figure below shows, Arizona is an extreme outlier

in rejecting OOP ballots:

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DNC V. HOBBS 13

Rodden at 26. The percentage of rejected OOP votes in

Arizona is eleven times that in Washington, the State with the

second-highest percentage.

The percentage of OOP ballots in Arizona, compared to

all ballots cast, has declined in recent years. But the

percentage of in-person ballots cast, compared to all ballots

cast, has declined even more. See Jonathan Rodden, Rebuttal

Report (Rodden Rebuttal) at 10. As a result, as a percentage

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14 DNC V. HOBBS

of in-person ballots between 2008 and 2014, the percentage

of OOP ballots has increased.

3. Reasons for OOP Ballots

Three key factors leading to OOP ballots are frequent

changes in polling locations; confusing placement of polling

locations; and high rates of residential mobility. These

factors disproportionately affect minority voters. Dr. Rodden

summarized:

Voters must invest significant effort in order

to negotiate a dizzying array of precinct and

polling place schemes that change from one

month to the next. Further, Arizona’s

population is highly mobile and residential

locations are fluid, especially for minorities,

young people, and poor voters, which further

contributes to confusion around voting

locations.

Rodden at 2; see also Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 857–58

(discussing these reasons).

a. Frequent Changes in Polling Locations

Arizona election officials change voters’ assigned polling

places with unusual frequency. Maricopa County, which

includes Phoenix, is a striking example. The district court

found that between 2006 and 2008, “at least 43 percent of

polling locations” changed. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 858. 

Between 2010 and 2012, approximately 40 percent of polling

place locations were changed again. Id. These changes

continued in 2016, “when Maricopa County experimented

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DNC V. HOBBS 15

with 60 vote centers for the presidential preference election

[in March], then reverted to a precinct-based system with

122 polling locations for the May special election, and then

implemented over 700 assigned polling places [for] the

August primary and November general elections.” Id. The

OOP voting rate was 40 percent higher for voters whose

polling places were changed. Id. As Chief Judge Thomas put

it, “the paths to polling places in the Phoenix area [are] much

like the changing stairways at Hogwarts, constantly moving

and sending everyone to the wrong place.” DNC, 904 F.3d at

732 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).

White voters in Maricopa County are more likely than

minority voters to have continuity in their polling place

location. Rodden at 60–61. Dr. Rodden wrote that between

the February and November elections in 2012, “the rates at

which African Americans and Hispanics experienced stability

in their polling places were each about 30 percent lower than

the rate for whites.” Id.

b. Confusing Placement of Polling Locations

Some polling places are located so counterintuitively that

voters easily make mistakes. In Maricopa and Pima

Counties, many polling places are located at or near the edge

of precincts. Id. at 50. An example is the polling place for

precinct 222 in Maricopa County during the 2012 election. 

Dr. Rodden wrote:

[A] group of 44 voters who were officially

registered to vote in precinct 222, . . . showed

up on Election Day at the Desert Star School,

the polling location for precinct 173. It is

easy to understand how theymight have made

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16 DNC V. HOBBS

this mistake. Polling place 173 is the local

elementary school, and the only polling place

in the vicinity. It is within easy walking

distance, and is the polling place for most of

the neighbors and other parents at the school,

yet due to a bizarre placement of the [polling

place at the] Southern border of precinct 222,

these voters were required to travel

15 minutes by car (according to [G]oogle

maps) to vote in polling location 222, passing

four other polling places along the way.

Id. at 47–48.

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DNC V. HOBBS 17

This map illustrates Dr. Rodden’s point:

Id. at 47.

In 2012, approximately 25 percent of OOP voters lived

closer to the polling place where they cast their OOP ballot

than to their assigned polling place. Id. at 53. Voters who

live more than 1.4 miles from their assigned polling place are

30 percent more likely to vote OOP than voters who live

within 0.4 miles of their assigned polling place. Id. at 54. 

American Indian and Hispanic voters live farther from their

assigned polling places than white voters. Id. at 60. 

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American Indian voters are particularly disadvantaged. The

district court found: “Navajo voters in Northern Apache

County lack standard addresses, and their precinct

assignments for state and county elections are based upon

guesswork, leading to confusion about the voter’s correct

polling place.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 873; Rodden

Second at 52–53.

c. Renters and Residential Mobility

High percentages of renters and high rates of residential

mobility correlate with high rates of OOP voting. Reagan,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 857. The district court found that rates of

OOP voting are “higher in neighborhoods where renters make

up a larger share of householders.” Id. Between 2000 and

2010, almost 70 percent of Arizonans changed their

residential address, the second highest rate of any State. 

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 857; Rodden at 11–12. The

district court found that “[t]he vast majority of Arizonans

who moved in the last year moved to another address within

their current city of residence.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at

857.

The need to locate the proper polling place after

moving—particularly after moving a short distance in an

urban area—leads to a high percentage of OOP ballots. 

Dr. Rodden wrote:

An individual who faces a rent increase in one

apartment complex and moves to another less

than a mile away might not be aware that she

has moved into an entirely new precinct—

indeed, in many cases . . . she may still live

closest to her old precinct, but may now be

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DNC V. HOBBS 19

required to travel further in order to vote in

her new assigned precinct. Among groups for

whom residential mobility is common,

requirements of in-precinct-voting—as well

as the requirement that they update their

registration with the state every time that they

move even a short distance within a

county—can make it substantially more

burdensome to participate in elections.

Rodden at 11.

The district court found that minority voters in Arizona

have “disproportionatelyhigher rates of residential mobility.” 

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 872. The court found, “OOP

voting is concentrated in relatively dense precincts that are

disproportionately populated with renters and those who

move frequently. These groups, in turn, are

disproportionately composed of minorities.” Id.

4. Disparate Impact on Minority Voters

The district court found that Arizona’s policy of wholly

discarding OOP ballots disproportionately affects minority

voters. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 871. During the general

election in 2012 in Pima County, compared to white voters,

the rate of OOP ballots was 123 percent higher for Hispanic

voters, 47 percent higher for American Indian voters, and

37 percent higher for African American voters. Rodden

at 43. During the 2014 and 2016 general elections in Apache,

Navajo, and Coconino Counties, the vast majority of OOP

ballots were in areas that are almost entirely American

Indian. Rodden Rebuttal at 53–54, 58; Jonathan Rodden,

Second Expert Report (Rodden Second) at 22. In all

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20 DNC V. HOBBS

likelihood, the reported numbers underestimate the degree of

disparity. Dr. Rodden wrote, “[A]lthough the racial

disparities described . . . are substantial, they should be

treated as a conservative lower bound on the true differences

in rates of out-of-precinct voting across groups.” Rodden

Second at 15 (emphasis in original). The district court found,

“Dr. Rodden credibly explained that the measurement error

for Hispanic probabilities leads only to the under-estimation

of racial disparities.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 838.

Racial disparities in OOP ballots in 2016 “remained just

as pronounced” as in 2012 and 2014. Rodden Second at 3. 

For example, the rates of OOP ballots in Maricopa County

“were twice as high for Hispanics, 86 percent higher for

African Americans, and 73 percent higher for Native

Americans than for their non-minority counterparts.” 

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 871–72; Rodden Second at 29. 

“In Pima County, rates of OOP voting were 150 percent

higher for Hispanics, 80 percent higher for African

Americans, and 74 percent higher for Native Americans than

for non-minorities.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 872. “[I]n

Pima County the overall rate of OOP voting was higher, and

the racial disparities larger, in 2016 than in 2014.” Id.;

Rodden Second at 33.

The district court found:

Among all counties that reported OOP ballots

in the 2016 general election, a little over 1 in

every 100 Hispanic voters, 1 in every 100

African-American voters, and 1 in every 100

Native American voters cast an OOP ballot.

For non-minority voters, the figure was

around 1 in every 200 voters.

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Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 872. That is, in the 2016 general

election, as in the two previous elections, American Indians,

Hispanics, and African Americans voted OOP at twice the

rate of whites.

B. H.B. 2023

1. Early Voting and Ballot Collection

Arizona has permitted early voting for over 25 years. Id.

at 839. “In 2007, Arizona implemented permanent no-excuse

early voting by mail, known as the Permanent Early Voter

List (“PEVL”).” Id. Under PEVL, Arizonans may either

(a) request an early vote-by-mail ballot on an election-byelection basis, or (b) request that they be placed on the

Permanent Early Voter List. See id.; Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-

542, -544. Some counties permit voters to drop their early

ballots in special drop boxes. All counties permit the return

of early ballots by mail, or in person at a polling place, vote

center, or authorized election official’s office. Early voting

is by far “the most popular method of voting [in Arizona].” 

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 839. Approximately 80 percent

of all ballots cast in the 2016 general election were early

ballots. Id. Until the passage of H.B. 2023, Arizona did not

restrict collection and drop-off of voted ballots by third

parties.

The district court heard extensive testimony about the

number of ballots collected and turned in by third parties. Id.

at 845. A Maricopa County Democratic Party organizer

testified that during the course of her work for the party she

personally saw 1,200 to 1,500 early ballots collected and

turned in by third-party volunteers. These were only a

portion of the total ballots collected by her organization. The

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organizer testified that during the 2010 election the Maricopa

County Democratic Party collected hundreds of ballots from

a heavily Hispanic neighborhood in one state legislative

district alone. A representative of Citizens for a Better

Arizona testified that the organization collected

approximately 9,000 early ballots during the 2012 Maricopa

County Sheriff’s election. A member of the Arizona

Democratic Party testified that the party collected “a couple

thousand ballots” in 2014. Id. A community advocate

testified before the Arizona Senate Elections Committee that

in one election he collected 4,000 early ballots. Id. A

Phoenix City Councilmember testified that she and her

volunteers collected about 1,000 early ballots in an election

in which she received a total of 8,000 votes.

2. Minority Voters’ Reliance on Third-Party Ballot

Collection

The district court found “that prior to H.B. 2023’s

enactment minorities generically were more likely than nonminorities to return their early ballots with the assistance of

third parties.” Id. at 870. The court recounted: “Helen

Purcell, who served as the Maricopa County Recorder for

28 years from 1988 to 2016, observed that ballot collection

was disproportionately used by Hispanic voters.” Id. 

Individuals who collected ballots in past elections “observed

that minority voters, especially Hispanics, were more

interested in utilizing their services.” Id. One ballot collector

testified about what she termed a “case study” demonstrating

the extent of the disparity. In 2010, she and her fellow

organizers collected “somewhere south of 50 ballots” in one

area. The area was later redistricted before the next election

to add the heavily Hispanic neighborhood of Sunnyslope. In

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2012, the organization “pulled in hundreds of ballots, [with

the] vast majority from that Sunnyslope area.”

The district court found that, in contrast, the Republican

Party has “not significantly engaged in ballot collection as a

GOTV [Get Out the Vote] strategy.” Id. The base of the

Republican Party in Arizona is white. Id. Individuals who

engaged in ballot collection in past elections observed that

voters in predominately white areas “were not as interested in

ballot collection services.” Id.

Minority voters rely on third-party ballot collection for

many reasons. Joseph Larios, a community advocate who has

collected ballots in past elections, testified that “returning

earlymail ballots presents special challenges for communities

that lack easy access to outgoing mail services; the elderly,

homebound, and disabled voters; socioeconomically

disadvantaged voters who lack reliable transportation; voters

who have trouble finding time to return mail because they

work multiple jobs or lack childcare services; and voters who

are unfamiliar with the voting process and therefore do not

vote without assistance or tend to miss critical deadlines.” Id.

at 847–48 (summarizing Larios’ testimony). These burdens

fall disproportionately on Arizona’s minority voters.

Arizona’s American Indian and Hispanic communities

frequently encounter mail-related problems that make

returning early ballots difficult. In urban areas of heavily

Hispanic counties, many apartment buildings lack outgoing

mail services. Id. at 869. Only 18 percent of American

Indian registered voters have home mail service. Id. White

registered voters have home mail service at a rate over

350 percent higher than their American Indian counterparts.

Id. Basic mail security is an additional problem. Several

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witnesses testified that incoming and outgoing mail often go

missing. Id. The district court found that especially in lowincome communities, frequent mail theft has led to “distrust”

in the mail service. Id.

A lack of transportation compounds the issue. 

“Hispanics, Native Americans, and African Americans . . .

are significantly less likely than non-minorities to own a

vehicle, more likely to rely upon public transportation, [and]

more likely to have inflexible work schedules[.]” Id. In San

Luis—a city that is 98 percent Hispanic—a major highway

separates almost 13,000 residents from their nearest post

office. Id. The city has no mass transit, a median income of

$22,000, and many households with no cars. Id. On the

Navajo Reservation, “most people live in remote

communities, many communities have little to no vehicle

access, and there is no home incoming or outgoing mail, only

post office boxes, sometimes shared by multiple families.” 

Id. “[R]esidents of sovereign nations often must travel

45 minutes to 2 hours just to get a mailbox.” DNC, 904 F.3d

at 751–52 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). As a result, voting

“requires the active assistance of friends and neighbors” for

many American Indians. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 870

(quoting Rodden Second at 60).

The adverse impact on minority communities is

substantial. Without “access to reliable and secure mail

services” and without reliable transportation, many minority

voters “prefer instead to give their ballots to a volunteer.” Id.

at 869. These communities thus end up relying heavily on

third-party collection of mail-in ballots. Dr. Berman wrote

with respect to Hispanic voters:

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[T]he practice of collecting ballots, used

principally in Hispanic areas, ha[s]

contributed to more votes being cast in those

places tha[n] would have been cast without

the practice. . . . That the practice has

increased minority turnout appears to have

been agreed upon or assumed by both sides of

the issue[.] Democrats and Hispanic leaders

have seen reason to favor it, Republicans have

not.

Berman, Expert Reply Report at 8–9. Similarly, LeNora

Fulton, a member of the Navajo Nation and previous Apache

County Recorder, testified that it was “standard practice” in

Apache County and the Nation to vote by relying on nonfamily members with the means to travel. Reagan, 329 F.

Supp. 3d at 870.

3. History of H.B. 2023

Before the passage of H.B. 2023, Arizona already

criminalized fraud involving possession or collection of

another person’s ballot. The district court wrote:

[B]allot tampering, vote buying, or discarding

someone else’s ballot all were illegal prior to

the passage of H.B. 2023. Arizona law has

long provided that any person who knowingly

collects voted or unvoted ballots and does not

turn those ballots in to an elections official is

guilty of a class 5 felony. A.R.S. § 16-1005. 

Further, Arizona has long made all of the

following class 5 felonies: “knowingly

mark[ing] a voted or unvoted ballot or ballot

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envelope with the intent to fix an election;”

“receiv[ing] or agree[ing] to receive any

consideration in exchange for a voted or

unvoted ballot;” possessing another’s voted or

unvoted ballot with intent to sell; “knowingly

solicit[ing] the collection of voted or unvoted

ballots by misrepresenting [one’s self] as an

election official or as an official ballot

repository or . . . serv[ing] as a ballot drop off

site, other than those established and staffed

by election officials;” and “knowingly

collect[ing] voted or unvoted ballots and . . .

not turn[ing] those ballots in to an election

official . . . or any . . . entity permitted by law

to transmit post.” A.R.S. §§ 16-1005(a)–(f). 

The early voting process also includes a

number of other safeguards, such as tamper

evident envelopes and a rigorous voter

signature verification procedure.

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 854 (alterations in original)

(internal record citations omitted).

There is no evidence of any fraud in the long history of

third-partyballot collection in Arizona. Despite the extensive

statutory provisions already criminalizing fraud involving

possession or collection of another person’s ballot, and

despite the lack of evidence of any fraud in connection with

third-party ballot collection, Republican State Senator

Don Shooter introduced a bill in February 2011. S.B. 1412,

50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (introduced) (Ariz. 2011),

http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/sb1412p.htm.

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Senator Shooter’s bill criminalized non-fraudulent thirdparty ballot collection. The district court had no illusions

about Senator Shooter’s motivation. It found:

Due to the high degree of racial polarization

in his district, Shooter was in part motivated

by a desire to eliminate what had become an

effective Democratic GOTV strategy. Indeed,

Shooter’s 2010 election was close: he won

with 53 percent of the total vote, receiving

83 percent of the non-minority vote but only

20 percent of the Hispanic vote.

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 879–80.

The state legislature amended Senator Shooter’s bill

several times, watering it down significantly. As finally

enacted, the bill—included as part of a series of electionrelated changes in Senate Bill 1412 (“S.B. 1412”)—restricted

the manner in which unrelated third parties could collect

and turn in more than ten voted ballots. S.B. 1412, 50th Leg.,

1st Reg. Sess. (engrossed), Sec. 3 at D (Ariz. 2011),

https://legiscan.com/AZ/text/SB1412/id/233492/Arizona2011-SB1412-Engrossed.html. If a third-party ballot

collector turned in more than ten ballots, the collector was

required to provide photo identification. After each election,

the Secretary of State was required to compile a statewide

public report listing ballot collectors’ information. The bill

did not criminalize any violation of its provisions.

When S.B. 1412 became law, Arizona was still subject to

preclearance under the Voting Rights Act. S.B. 1412

therefore could not go into effect until it was precleared by

the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or a three-judge

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federal district court. On May 18, 2011, the Arizona

Attorney General submitted S.B. 1412 to DOJ for

preclearance. Arizona Attorney General Thomas Horne,

Effect of Shelby County on Withdrawn Preclearance

Submissions, (August 29, 2013), https://www.azag.gov/opi

nions/i13-008-r13-013. On June 27, 2011, DOJ precleared all

provisions of S.B. 1412 except the provision regulating thirdparty ballot collection. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 880.

DOJ sent a letter to Arizona concerning the third-party

ballot collection provision, stating that the information

provided with the preclearance request was “insufficient to

enable [DOJ] to determine that the proposed changes have

neither the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or

abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or

membership in a language minority group.” Id. at 880–81. 

DOJ requested additional information and stated that it “may

object” to the proposed change if no response was received

within sixty days. Id. at 881.

Instead of responding with the requested information, the

Arizona Attorney General withdrew the preclearance request

for the third-party ballot collection provision. Id. The

Attorney General did so for good reason. According to DOJ

records, Arizona’s Elections Director, who had helped draft

the provision, had admitted to DOJ that the provision was

“targeted at voting practices in predominantly Hispanic

areas.”

The state legislature formally repealed the provision after

receiving the letter from DOJ. Withdrawing a preclearance

request was not common practice in Arizona. Out of

773 proposals that Arizona submitted for preclearance over

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almost forty years, the ballot collection provision of S.B.

1412 was one of only six that Arizona withdrew. Id.

Two years later, on June 25, 2013, the United States

Supreme Court decided Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S.

529 (2013). The Court declared unconstitutional the formula

in Section 4(b) of the VRA for determining “covered

jurisdictions,” therebyeliminating preclearance underSection

5 for any previously covered jurisdiction, including Arizona. 

On June 19, 2013, Arizona’s Governor had signed a new bill,

H.B. 2305, which entirely banned partisan ballot collection

and required non-partisan ballot collectors to complete

an affidavit stating that they had returned the ballot. 

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 881; H.B. 2305, 51st Leg., 1st

Reg. Sess. (engrossed), at Secs. 3 and 5 (Ariz. 2013),

https://legiscan.com/AZ/text/HB2305/id/864002. Violation

of H.B. 2305 was a criminal misdemeanor.

H.B. 2305 “was passed along nearly straight party lines in

the waning hours of the legislative session.” Reagan, 329

F. Supp. 3d at 881. “Shortly after its enactment, citizen

groups organized a referendum effort[.]” Id. They “collected

more than 140,000 signatures”—significantly more than the

required amount—“to place H.B. 2305 on the ballot for a

straight up-or-down [statewide] vote” in the next election. Id. 

Arizona law provided that repeal by referendum prevented

the legislature from enacting future related legislation without

a supermajority vote. Moreover, any such future legislation

could only “further[]”—not undercut—“the purposes” of the

referendum. Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(C), (14). 

“Rather than face a referendum, Republican legislators . . .

repealed their own legislation along party lines.” Reagan,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 881. The primary sponsor of H.B. 2305,

then-State Senator Michele Reagan (a future Secretary of

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State of Arizona and an original defendant in this action),

“admitted that the legislature’s goal [in repealing H.B. 2305]

was to break the bill into smaller pieces and reintroduce

individual provisions ‘a la carte.’” Id.

During the 2015 and 2016 legislative sessions,

Republican legislators again sought to criminalize ballot

collection by third parties, culminating in 2016 in the passage

of H.B. 2023, the measure challenged in this suit. The district

court found that Republican legislators had two motivations

for passing H.B. 2023. First, Republican legislators were

motivated by the “unfounded and often farfetched allegations

of ballot collection fraud” made by former State Senator

Shooter—who had introduced the bill to limit third-party

ballot collection in 2011. Id. at 880 (finding Shooter’s

allegations “demonstrably false”). Second, Republican

legislators were motivated by a “racially-tinged” video

known as the “LaFaro Video.” Id.

The video gave proponents of H.B. 2023 their best and

only “evidence” of voter fraud. During legislative hearings

on previous bills criminalizing third-party collection, the

district court wrote, “Republican sponsors and proponents

[had] expressed beliefs that ballot collection fraud regularly

was occurring but struggled with the lack of direct evidence

substantiating those beliefs.” Id. at 876. In 2014,

Republicans’ “perceived ‘evidence’ arrived in the form of a

racially charged video created by Maricopa County

Republican Chair A.J. LaFaro . . . and posted on a blog.” Id. 

The court summarized:

The LaFaro Video showed surveillance

footage of a man of apparent Hispanic

heritage appearing to deliver early ballots. It

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also contained a narration of “Innuendos of

illegality . . . [and] racially tinged and

inaccurate commentary by . . . LaFaro.” 

LaFaro’s commentary included statements

that the man was acting to stuff the ballot box;

that LaFaro did not know if the person was an

illegal alien, a dreamer, or citizen, but knew

that he was a thug; and that LaFaro did not

follow him out to the parking lot to take down

his tag number because he feared for his life.

Id. (alterations in original and internal record citations

omitted). A voice-over on the video described “ballot

parties” where people supposedly“gather en mass[e] and give

their un-voted ballots to operatives of organizations so they

can not only collect them, but also vote them illegally.” Id.

at 876–77.

The district court found, “The LaFaro Video did not show

any obviously illegal activity and there is no evidence that the

allegations in the narration were true.” Id. at 877. The video

“merely shows a man of apparent Hispanic heritage dropping

off ballots and not obviously violating any law.” Id. The

video “became quite prominent in the debates over H.B.

2023.” Id. The court wrote:

The LaFaro video also was posted on

Facebook and YouTube, shown at Republican

district meetings, and was incorporated into a

television advertisement—entitled “Do You

Need Evidence Terry?”—for Secretary

Reagan when she ran for Secretary of State. 

In the ad, the LaFaro Video plays after a clip

of then-Arizona Attorney General Terry

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Goddard stating he would like to see evidence

that there has been ballot collection fraud. 

While the video is playing, Secretary

Reagan’s narration indicates that the LaFaro

Video answers Goddard’s request for

evidence of fraud.

Id. (internal record citations omitted). The court found,

“Although no direct evidence of ballot collection fraud was

presented to the legislature or at trial, Shooter’s allegations

and the LaFaro Video were successful in convincing H.B.

2023’s proponents that ballot collection presented

opportunities for fraud that did not exist for in-person

voting[.]” Id. at 880.

The district court found that H.B. 2023 is no harsher than

any of the third-party ballot collection bills previously

introduced in the Arizona legislature. The court found:

[A]lthough Plaintiffs argue that the legislature

made H.B. 2023 harsher than previous ballot

collection bills by imposing felony penalties,

they ignore that H.B. 2023 in other respects is

more lenient than its predecessors given its

broad exceptions for family members,

household members, and caregivers.

Id. at 881. In so finding, the district court clearly erred. Both

S.B. 1412 and H.B. 2305 were more lenient than H.B. 2023.

For example, S.B. 1412, which was presented to DOJ for

preclearance, required a third party collecting more than ten

voted ballots to provide photo identification. There were no

other restrictions on third-party ballot collection. There were

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no criminal penalties. By contrast, under H.B. 2023 a third

party may collect a ballot only if the third party is an official

engaged in official duties, or is a family member, household

member, or caregiver of the voter. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-

1005(H), (I); Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 839–40. A third

party who violates H.B. 2023 commits a class 5 felony.

In 2011, the relatively permissive third-party ballot

collection provision of S.B. 1412 was withdrawn from

Arizona’s preclearance request when DOJ asked for more

information. In 2016, in the wake of Shelby County and

without fear of preclearance scrutiny, Arizona enacted H.B.

2023.

II. Section 2 of the VRA

“Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for the

broad remedial purpose of ‘rid[ding] the country of racial

discrimination in voting.’” Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,

403 (1991) (alteration in original) (quoting South Carolina v.

Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966)). “The Act create[d]

stringent new remedies for voting discrimination where it

persists on a pervasive scale, and . . . strengthen[ed] existing

remedies for pockets of voting discrimination elsewhere in

the country.” Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.

When Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was originally

enacted in 1965, it read:

SEC. 2. No voting qualification or

prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or

procedure shall be imposed or applied by any

State or political subdivision to deny or

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abridge the right of any citizen of the United

States to vote on account of race or color.

Chisom, 501 U.S. at 391 (citing 79 Stat. 437). “At the time

of the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2, unlike

other provisions of the Act, did not provoke significant debate

in Congress because it was viewed largely as a restatement of

the Fifteenth Amendment.” Id. at 392. The Fifteenth

Amendment provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the

United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the

United States or by any State on account of race, color, or

previous condition of servitude,” and it authorizes Congress

to enforce the provision “by appropriate legislation.” U.S.

Const. amend. XV. In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55

(1980) (plurality), the Supreme Court held that the “coverage

provided by § 2 was unquestionably coextensive with the

coverage provided by the Fifteenth Amendment; the

provision simply elaborated upon the Fifteenth Amendment.” 

Chisom, 501 U.S. at 392. That is, the Court held that proof of

intentional discrimination was necessary to establish a

violation of Section 2. Id. at 393.

Congress responded to Bolden by amending Section 2,

striking out “to deny or abridge” and substituting “in a

manner which results in a denial or abridgement of.” Id.

(quoting amended Section 2; emphasis added by the Court);

see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35. “Under the amended

statute, proof of intent [to discriminate] is no longer required

to prove a § 2 violation.” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 394. Rather,

plaintiffs can now prevail under Section 2 either by

demonstrating proof of intent to discriminate or “by

demonstrating that a challenged election practice has resulted

in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on color

or race.” Id. That is, a Section 2 violation can “be

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established by proof of discriminatory results alone.” 

Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404. The Supreme Court summarized: 

“Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a

violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect

alone and to establish as the relevant legal standard the

‘results test.’” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35 (emphasis added).

A violation of Section 2 may now be shown under either

the results test or the intent test. Id. at 35, 44. In the sections

that follow, we analyze Plaintiffs’ challenges under these two

tests. First, we analyze Arizona’s OOP policy and H.B. 2023

under the results test. Second, we analyze H.B. 2023 under

the intent test.

A. Results Test: OOP Policy and H.B. 2023

1. The Results Test

Section 2 of the VRA “‘prohibits all forms of voting

discrimination’ that lessen opportunity for minority voters.” 

League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d

224, 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45

n.10). As amended in 1982, Section 2 of the VRA provides:

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to

voting or standard, practice, or procedure

shall be imposed or applied by any State or

political subdivision in a manner which

results in a denial or abridgement of the right

of any citizen of the United States to vote on

account of race or color, or in contravention

of the guarantees set forth in section

10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in

subsection (b).

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(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established

if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is

shown that the political processes leading to

nomination or election in the State or political

subdivision are not equally open to

participation bymembers of a class of citizens

protected by subsection (a) in that its

members have less opportunity than other

members of the electorate to participate in the

political process and to elect representatives

of their choice.

52 U.S.C. § 10301 (emphases added).

The results test of Section 2 applies in both vote dilution

and vote denial cases. “Vote dilution claims involve

challenges to methods of electing representatives—like

redistricting or at-large districts—as having the effect of

diminishing minorities’ voting strength.” Ohio State

Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554 (6th Cir.

2014), vacated on other grounds, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th

Cir. 2014). A vote denial claim is generally understood to be

“any claim that is not a vote dilution claim.” Id. The case

now before us involves two vote-denial claims.

The jurisprudence of vote-denial claims is relatively

underdeveloped in comparison to vote-dilution claims. As

explained by the Fourth Circuit, “[T]he predominance of vote

dilution in Section 2 jurisprudence likely stems from the

effectiveness of the now-defunct Section 5 preclearance

requirements that stopped would-be vote denial from

occurring in covered jurisdictions[.]” League of Women

Voters, 769 F.3d at 239.

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In evaluating a vote-denial challenge to a “standard,

practice, or procedure” under the “results test” of Section 2,

most courts, including our own, engage in a two-step process. 

We first did so, in abbreviated fashion, in Smith v. Salt River

Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District,

109 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1997). We later did so, at somewhat

greater length, in Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir.

2012) (en banc). Other circuits have subsequently used a

version of the two-step analysis. See Veasey v. Abbott,

830 F.3d 216, 244–45 (5th Cir. 2016); League of Women

Voters, 769 F.3d at 240 (4th Cir. 2014); Husted, 768 F.3d

at 554 (6th Cir. 2014). Compare Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d

744, 755 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We are skeptical about the second

of these steps[.]”).

First, we ask whether the challenged standard, practice or

procedure results in a disparate burden on members of the

protected class. That is, we ask whether, “as a result of the

challenged practice or structure[,] plaintiffs do not have an

equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and

to elect candidates of their choice.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44. 

The mere existence—or “bare statistical showing”—of a

disparate impact on a racial minority, in and of itself, is not

sufficient. See Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595 (“[A] bare

statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial

minority does not satisfy the § 2 ‘results’ inquiry.” (emphasis

in original)).

Second, if we find at the first step that the challenged

practice imposes a disparate burden, we ask whether, under

the “totality of the circumstances,” there is a relationship

between the challenged “standard, practice, or procedure,” on

the one hand, and “social and historical conditions” on the

other. The purpose of the second step is to evaluate a

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disparate burden in its real-world context rather than in the

abstract. As stated by the Supreme Court, “The essence of a

§ 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure

interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an

inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and

white voters to elect their preferred representatives” or to

participate in the political process. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47;

52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). To determine at the second step

whether there is a legally significant relationship between the

disparate burden on minority voters and the social and

historical conditions affecting them, we consider, as

appropriate, factors such as those laid out in the Senate

Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to the VRA. Id.

at 43 (“The Senate Report which accompanied the 1982

amendments elaborates on the nature of § 2 violations and on

the proof required to establish these violations.”); Veasey,

830 F.3d at 244–45.

The Senate Report provides:

If as a result of the challenged practice or

structure plaintiffs do not have an equal

opportunity to participate in the political

processes and to elect candidates of their

choice, there is a violation of this section. To

establish a violation, plaintiffs could show a

variety of factors, depending on the kind of

rule, practice, or procedure called into

question.

Typical factors include:

1. the extent of any history of official

discrimination in the state or political

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subdivision that touched the right of

the members of the minority group to

register, to vote, or otherwise to

participate in the democratic process;

2. the extent to which voting in the

elections of the state or political

subdivision is racially polarized;

3. the extent to which the state or

political subdivision has used

unusually large election districts,

majority vote requirements, antisingle shot provisions, or other voting

practices or procedures that may

enhance the opportunity for

discrimination against the minority

group;

4. if there is a candidate slating

process, whether the members of the

minority group have been denied

access to that process;

5. the extent to which members of the

minority group in the state or political

subdivision bear the effects of

discrimination in such areas as

education, employment and health,

which hinder their ability to

participate effectively in the political

process;

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6. whether political campaigns have

been characterized by overt or subtle

racial appeals;

7. the extent to which members of the

minority group have been elected to

public office in the jurisdiction.

Additional factors that in some cases have

had probative value as part of plaintiffs’

evidence to establish a violation are:

[8.] whether there is a significant lack

of responsiveness on the part of

elected officials to the particularized

needs of the members of the minority

group.

[9.] whether the policy underlying the

state or political subdivision’s use of

such voting qualification, prerequisite

to voting, or standard, practice or

procedure is tenuous.

S. Rep. No. 97-417 (“S. Rep.”), at 28–29 (1982); see Gingles,

478 U.S. at 36–37 (quoting the Senate Report).

The Senate Committee’s list of “typical factors” is neither

comprehensive nor exclusive. S. Rep. at 29. “[T]here is no

requirement that any particular number of factors be proved,

or that a majority of them point one way or the other.” Id. 

“[T]he question whether the political processes are ‘equally

open’ depends on a searching practical evaluation of the ‘past

and present reality.’” Id. at 30. An evaluation of the totality

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of circumstances in a Section 2 results claim, including an

evaluation of appropriate Senate factors, requires “a blend of

history and an intensely local appraisal[.]” Gingles, 478 U.S.

at 78 (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769–70

(1973)). The Senate factors are relevant to both vote-denial

and vote-dilution claims. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (Senate

factors will be “pertinent to certain types of § 2 claims,”

including vote denial claims, but will be “particularly

[pertinent] to vote dilution claims.”).

Our sister circuits have struck down standards, practices,

or procedures in several vote-denial cases after considering

the Senate factors. In Husted, the Sixth Circuit upheld a

district court’s finding that an Ohio law limiting early voting

violated the results test of Section 2. The court wrote,

We find Senate factors one, three, five, and

nine particularly relevant to a vote denial

claim in that they specifically focus on how

historical or current patterns of discrimination

“hinder [minorities’] ability to participate

effectively in the political process.” Gingles,

478 U.S. at 37 (quoting Senate factor five). 

All of the factors, however, can still provide

helpful background context to minorities’

overall ability to engage effectively on an

equal basis with other voters in the political

process.

Husted, 768 F.3d at 555. In Veasey, the Fifth Circuit upheld

a district court’s finding that Texas’s requirement that a photo

ID be presented at the time of voting violated the results test. 

Veasey, 830 F.3d at 256–64 (considering Senate factors one,

two, five, six, seven, eight, and nine). In League of Women

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Voters, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court had

clearly erred in finding that the results test had not been

violated by North Carolina’s elimination of same-day

registration, and by North Carolina’s practice of wholly

discarding out-of-precinct ballots. League of Women Voters,

769 F.3d at 245–46 (considering Senate factors one, three,

and nine).

2. OOP Policy and the Results Test

Uncontested evidence in the district court established that

minority voters in Arizona cast OOP ballots at twice the rate

of white voters. The question is whether the district court

clearly erred in holding that Arizona’s policy of entirely

discarding OOP ballots does not violate the “results test” of

Section 2.

a. Step One: Disparate Burden

The question at step one is whether Arizona’s policy of

entirely discarding OOP ballots results in a disparate burden

on a protected class. The district court held that Plaintiffs

failed at step one. The district court clearly erred in so

holding.

Extensive and uncontradicted evidence in the district

court established that American Indian, Hispanic, and African

American voters are over-represented among OOP voters by

a ratio of two to one. See Part II(A), supra. The district court

wrote, “Plaintiffs provided quantitative and statistical

evidence of disparities in OOP voting through the expert

testimony of Dr. Rodden . . . . Dr. Rodden’s analysis is

credible and shows that minorities are over-represented

among the small number of voters casting OOP ballots.” 

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Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 871. Dr. Rodden reported that

this pattern was consistent over time and across counties. 

Based on this evidence, the court found that during the 2016

general election, American Indian, Hispanic, and African

American voters were twice as likely as white voters to vote

out-of-precinct and not have their votes counted. Id. at 872.

Despite these factual findings, the district court held that

Arizona’s policy of entirely discarding OOP ballots does not

impose a disparate burden under the results test. The court

gave two reasons to support its holding.

First, the district court discounted the disparate burden on

the ground that there were relatively few OOP ballots cast in

relation to the total number of ballots. Id. at 872. The district

court clearly erred in so doing.

The district court pointed out that the absolute number of

OOP ballots in Arizona fell between 2012 and 2016. It

pointed out, further, that as a percentage of all ballots cast,

OOP ballots fell from 0.47 percent to 0.15 percent during that

period. Id. The numbers and percentages cited by the district

court are accurate. Standing alone, they may be read to

suggest that locating the correct precinct for in-person voting

has become easier and that OOP ballots, as a percentage of

in-person ballots, have decreased accordingly.

However, the opposite is true. Arizona’s OOP policy

applies only to in-person ballots. The proper baseline to

measure OOP ballots to is thus not all ballots, but all inperson ballots. The district court failed to point out that the

absolute number of all in-person ballots fell more than the

absolute number of OOP ballots, and that, as a result, as a

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percentage of in-person ballots, OOP ballots increased rather

than decreased.

Even putting aside the potentially misleading numbers

and percentages cited by the district court and focusing only

on the decline in the absolute number of OOP ballots, the

court clearly erred. As indicated above, the vote-denial

category encompasses all cases that are not vote-dilution

cases. The number of minority voters adversely affected, and

the mechanism by which they are affected, may vary

considerably. For example, if a polling place denies an

individual minority voter her right to vote based on her race

or color, Section 2 is violated based on that single denial. 

However, a different analysis may be appropriate when a

facially neutral policy adversely affects a number of minority

voters. Arizona’s OOP policy is an example. We are willing

to assume in such a case that more than a de minimis number

of minority voters must be burdened before a Section 2

violation based on the results test can be found. Even on that

assumption, however, we conclude that the number of OOP

ballots cast in Arizona’s general election in 2016—3,709

ballots—is hardly de minimis.

We find support for our conclusion in several places. The

Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief to our en

banc panel in support of Arizona. Despite its support for

Arizona, DOJ specifically disavowed the district court’s

conclusion that the number of discarded OOP ballots was too

small to be cognizable under the results test. DOJ wrote:

[T]he district court’s reasoning was not

correct to the extent that it suggested that

plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim would fail solely

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because of the small number of voters

affected. . . .

That is not a proper reading of the statute. 

Section 2 prohibits any “standard, practice, or

procedure” that “results in a denial or

abridgement of the right of any citizen of the

United States to vote on account of race or

color.” 52 U.S.C. 10301(a) (emphasis added);

see also Frank v. Walker, 819 F.3d 384, 386

(7th Cir. 2016) (Frank II) (“The right to vote

is personal and is not defeated by the fact that

99% of other people can secure the necessary

credentials easily.”). Section 2 safeguards a

personal right to equal participation

opportunities. A poll worker turning away a

single voter because of her race plainly results

in “less opportunity * * * to participate in the

political process and to elect representatives

of [her] choice.” 52 U.S.C. 10301(b).

DOJ Amicus Brief at 28–29. DOJ’s brief appears to treat as

equivalent the case of an individually targeted single minority

voter who is denied the right to vote and the case where a

facially neutral policy affects a single voter. We do not need

to go so far. We need only point out that in the case before us

a substantial number of minority voters are disparately

affected by Arizona’s OOP policy. As long as an adequate

disparate impact is shown, as it has been shown here, and as

long as the other prerequisites for finding a Section 2 violate

are met, each individual in the affected group is protected

under Section 2.

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Further, in League of Women Voters, “approximately

3,348 out-of-precinct provisional ballots” cast by African

American voters would have been discarded under the

challenged North Carolina law. 769 F.3d at 244 (quoting the

district court). The district court had held that this was a

“minimal” number of votes, and that Section 2 was therefore

not violated. The Fourth Circuit reversed, characterizing the

district court’s ruling as a “grave error.” Id. at 241.

Finally, in the 2000 presidential election, the official

margin of victory for President George W. Bush in Florida

was 537 votes. Federal Election Commission, 2000 Official

Presidential General Election Results(Dec. 2001), available

at https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm. If

there had been 3,709 additional ballots cast in Florida in

2000, in which minority voters had outnumbered white voters

by a ratio of two to one, it is possible that a different

President would have been elected.

Second, the district court concluded that Arizona’s policy

of rejecting OOP ballots does not impose a disparate burden

on minority voters because Arizona’s policy of entirely

discarding OOP ballots “is not the cause of the disparities in

OOP voting.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 872. The court

wrote that Plaintiffs “have not shown that Arizona’s policy to

not count OOP ballots causes minorities to show up to vote

at the wrong precinct at rates higher than their non-minority

counterparts.” Id. at 873. Again, the district court clearly

erred.

The district court misunderstood what Plaintiffs must

show. Plaintiffs need not show that Arizona caused them to

vote out of precinct. Rather, they need only show that the

result of entirely discarding OOP ballots has an adverse

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disparate impact, by demonstrating “a causal connection

between the challenged voting practice and a prohibited

discriminatory result.” Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595 (emphasis

added). Here, “[t]he challenged practice—not counting OOP

ballots—results in ‘a prohibited discriminatory result’; a

substantially higher percentage of minority votes than white

votes are discarded.” DNC, 904 F.3d at 736 (Thomas, C.J.,

dissenting).

We hold that the district court clearly erred in holding that

Arizona’s policy of entirely discarding OOP ballots does not

result in a disparate burden on minority voters. We

accordingly hold that Plaintiffs have succeeded at step one of

the results test.

b. Step Two: Senate Factors

The question at step two is whether, under the “totality of

circumstances,” the disparate burden on minority voters is

linked to social and historical conditions in Arizona so as “to

cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority]

and white voters to elect their preferred representatives” or to

participate in the political process. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47;

52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). The district court wrote that because

in its view Plaintiffs failed at step one, discussion of step two

was unnecessary. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 873. The court

nonetheless went on to discuss step two and, after considering

various Senate factors, to hold that Plaintiffs failed at this step

as well. The district court clearly erred in so holding.

At step two, we consider relevant Senate factors. Some

Senate factors are “more important to” vote-denial claims, or

to some vote-denial claims, and others, “[i]f present, . . . are

supportive of, but not essential to” the claim. Gingles, 478 at

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48 n.15 (emphasis in original). That is, Senate factors vary in

importance depending on whether a court is dealing with a

vote-dilution or a vote-denial case. The same factors may

also vary in importance from one vote-denial case to another.

We emphasize that the relative importance of the Senate

factors varies from case to case. For example, as we will

describe in a moment, Arizona has a long and unhappy

history of official discrimination connected to voting. Other

States may not have such a history, but depending on the

existence of other Senate factors they may nonetheless be

found to have violated the results test of Section 2.

The district court considered seven of the nine Senate

factors: factor one, the history of official discrimination

connected to voting; factor two, racially polarized voting

patterns; factor five, the effects of discrimination in other

areas on minority groups’ access to voting; factor six, racial

appeals in political campaigns; factor seven, the number of

minorities in public office; factor eight, officials’

responsiveness to the needs of minority groups; and factor

nine, the tenuousness of the justification for the challenged

voting practice.

We analyze below each of these factors, indicating

whether we agree or disagree with the district court’s analysis

as to each. Of the various factors, we regard Senate factors

five (the effects of discrimination in other areas on minorities

access to voting) and nine (the tenuousness of the justification

for the challenged voting practices) as particularly important. 

We also regard factor one (history of official discrimination)

as important, as it bears on the existence of discrimination

generally and strongly supports our conclusion under factor

five. Though “not essential,” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15,

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the other factors provide “helpful background context.” 

Husted, 768 F.3d at 555.

i. Factor One: History of Official Discrimination

Connected to Voting

Arizona has a long history of race-based discrimination

against its American Indian, Hispanic, and African American

citizens. Much of that discrimination is directly relevant to

those citizens’ ability “to register, to vote, or otherwise to

participate in the democratic process.” Id. We recount the

most salient aspects of that history.

Dr. David Berman, a Professor Emeritus of Political

Science at Arizona State University, submitted an expert

report and testified in the district court. The court found

Dr. Berman “credible” and gave “great weight to

Dr. Berman’s opinions.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 834. 

The following narrative is largely drawn from Dr. Berman’s

report and the sources on which he relied.

(A) Territorial Period

Arizona’s history of discrimination dates back to 1848,

when it first became an American political entity as a United

States territory. “Early territorial politicians acted on the

belief that it was the ‘manifest destiny’ of the Anglos to

triumph in Arizona over the earlier Native American and

Hispanic civilizations.” David Berman, Expert Report

(Berman) at 4. Dr. Berman wrote that from the 1850s

through the 1880s there were “blood thirsty efforts by whites

to either exterminate” Arizona’s existing American Indian

population or “confine them to reservations.” Id. at 5. In

1871, in the Camp Grant Massacre, white settlers “brutal[ly]

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murder[ed] over 100 Apaches, most of whom were women

and children.” Id. Arizona’s white territorial legislature

passed a number of discriminatory laws, including antimiscegenation laws forbidding marriage between whites and

Indians. See James Thomas Tucker et al., Voting Rights in

Arizona: 1982–2006, 17 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 283, 283

n.3 (2008) (Tucker et al., Voting Rights). Dr. Berman wrote:

“By the late 1880s and the end of th[e] Indian wars, the

realities of life for Native Americans in Arizona were

confinement to reservations, a continuous loss of resources

(water, land, minerals) to settlers, poverty, and pressure to

abandon their traditional cultures.” Berman at 5.

White settlers also discriminated against Arizona’s

Hispanic population. Dr. Berman wrote:

Although Hispanics in the territory’s early

period commonly held prominent roles in

public and political life, as migration

continued they were overwhelmed by a flood

of Anglo-American and European

immigrants. While a small group of

Hispanics continued to prosper, . . . most

Hispanics toiled as laborers who made less

than Anglos even though they performed the

same work.

Id. (footnote omitted). Hispanics in Arizona “found it

difficult to receive acceptance or fair treatment in a society

that had little tolerance for people of Latin American

extraction, and particularly those whose racial make-up

included Indian or African blood.” Id. at 5–6 (quoting Oscar

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Five: The Next Twenty-Five Years 88–89 (Ariz. State Univ.

Pub. History Program & the Ariz. Historical Soc’y, 1987)).

Pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that ended

the Mexican-American War, the United States conferred

citizenship on the approximately 100,000 Hispanics living in

Arizona. In 1909, the Arizona territorial legislature passed a

statute imposing an English language literacy test as a

prerequisite to voter registration. Id. at 10. The test was

specifically designed to prevent the territory’s Hispanic

citizens—who had lower English literacy rates than white

citizens—from voting. Id. At the time, Indians were not

citizens and were not eligible to vote.

In 1910, Congress passed a statute authorizing Arizona,

as a prelude to statehood, to draft a state constitution. Upon

approval of its constitution by Congress, the President, and

Arizona voters, Arizona would become a State. Id. at 11. 

Members of Congress viewed Arizona’s literacy test as a

deliberate effort to disenfranchise its Hispanic voters. Id. 

The authorizing statute specifically provided that Arizona

could not use its newly adopted literacy test to prevent

Arizona citizens from voting on a proposed constitution. Id.

That same year, Arizona convened a constitutional

convention. Id. at 7. Although Congress had ensured that

Arizona would not use its literacy test to prevent Hispanic

citizens from voting on the constitution, Hispanics were

largely excluded from the drafting process. With the

exception of one Hispanic delegate, all of the delegates to the

convention were white. Id. By comparison, approximately

one-third of the delegates to the 1910 New Mexico

constitutional convention were Hispanic, and one-sixth of the

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48 delegates to the 1849 California constitutional convention

were Hispanic. Id.

The influence of Hispanic delegates is evident in those

States’ constitutions. For example, New Mexico’s

constitution provides that the “right of any citizen of the state

to vote, hold office or sit upon juries, shall never be

restricted, abridged or impaired on account of . . . race,

language or color, or inability to speak, read or write the

English or Spanish languages.” N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3

(1910). It also requires the legislature to provide funds to

train teachers in Spanish instruction. N.M. Const. art. XII,

§ 8 (1910). California’s constitution required all state laws to

be published in Spanish as well as English. Cal. Const. art.

XI, § 21 (1849).

By contrast, Arizona’s constitution did not include such

provisions. Indeed, two provisions required precisely the

opposite. The Arizona constitution provided that public

schools “shall always be conducted in English” and that

“[t]he ability to read, write, speak, and understand the English

language sufficiently well to conduct the duties of the office

without the aid of an interpreter, shall be a necessary

qualification for all State officers and members of the State

Legislature.” Ariz. Const. art. XX, §§ 7, 8 (1910).

(B) Early Statehood

(1) Literacy Test

Arizona became a State in 1912. That same year, the

Arizona legislature passed a statute reimposing an English

literacy test—the test that had been imposed by the territorial

legislature in 1909 and that Congress had forbidden the State

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to use for voting on the state constitution. Berman at 11; see

also James Thomas Tucker, The Battle Over Bilingual

Ballots: Language Minorities and Political Access Under the

Voting Rights Act 20 (Routledge, 2016) (Tucker, Bilingual

Ballots). According to Dr. Berman, the statute was enacted

“to limit ‘the ignorant Mexican vote.’” David R. Berman,

Arizona Politics and Government: The Quest for Autonomy,

Democracy, and Development 75 (Univ. of Neb. Press, 1998)

(Berman, Arizona Politics) (quoting letter between prominent

political leaders); Berman at 12.

County registrars in Arizona had considerable discretion

in administering literacy tests. Registrars used that discretion

to excuse white citizens from the literacy requirement

altogether, to give white citizens easier versions of the test,

and to help white citizens pass the test. See also Katzenbach,

383 U.S. at 312 (describing the same practice with respect to

African American citizens in southern States). In contrast,

Hispanic citizens were often required to pass more difficult

versions of the test, without assistance and without error. 

Berman, Arizona Politics at 75; see also Berman at 12.

The literacy test was used for the next sixty years. The

year it was introduced, Hispanic registration declined so

dramatically that some counties lacked enough voters to

justify primaries. Berman at 12. One county had recall

campaigns because enough Hispanic voters had been purged

from voting rolls to potentially change the electoral result. 

Id. Arizona would use its literacy test not only against

Hispanics, but also against African Americans and, once they

became eligible to vote in 1948, against American Indians. 

The test was finally repealed in 1972, two years after an

amendment to the Voting Rights Act banned literacy tests

nationwide. Id.

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(2) Disenfranchisement of American Indians

In 1912, when Arizona became a State, Indians were not

citizens of Arizona or of the United States. In 1924,

Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act, declaring all

Indians citizens of the United States and, by extension, of

their States of residence. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924,

Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1401(b)).

Indian voting had the potential to change the existing

white political power structure of Arizona. See Patty

Ferguson-Bohnee, The History of Indian Voting Rights in

Arizona: Overcoming Decades of Voter Suppression, 47Ariz.

St. L.J. 1099, 1103–04 (2015) (Ferguson-Bohnee). Indians

comprised over 14 percent of the population in Arizona, the

second-highest percentage of Indians in any State. Id. at 1102

n.19, 1104. Potential power shifts were even greater at the

county level. According to the 1910 Census, Indians

comprised over 66 percent of the population of Apache

County, over 50 percent of Navajo County, over 34 percent

of Pinal County, and over 34 percent of Coconino County. 

Id. at 1104.

Enacted under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,

the Indian Citizenship Act should have given Indians the right

to vote in Arizona elections. The Attorney General of

Arizona initially agreed that the Act conferred the right to

vote, and he suggested in 1924 that precinct boundaries

should be expanded to include reservations. Id. at 1105. 

However, in the years leading up to the 1928 election,

Arizona’s Governor, county officials, and other politicians

sought to prevent Indians from voting. Id. at 1106–08. The

Governor, in particular, was concerned that Indian voter

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registration—specifically, registration of approximately1,500

Navajo voters—would hurt his reelection chances. Id.

at 1107–08. The Governor sought legal opinions on ways to

exclude Indian voters, id., and was advised to “adopt a

systematic course of challenging Indians at the time of

election.” Id. at 1108 (quoting Letter from Samuel L. Pattee

to George W.P. Hunt, Ariz. Governor (Sept. 22, 1928)). 

County officials challenged individual Indian voter

registrations. Id. at 1107–08.

Prior to the 1928 election, two Indian residents of Pima

County brought suit challenging the county’s rejection of

their voter registration forms. Id. at 1108. The Arizona

Supreme Court sided with the county. The Arizona

constitution forbade anyone who was “under guardianship,

non compos mentis, or insane” from voting. Ariz. Const. art.

VII, § 2 (1910). The Court held that Indians were “wards of

the nation,” and were therefore “under guardianship” and not

eligible to vote. Porter v. Hall, 271 P. 411, 417, 419 (Ariz.

1928).

Arizona barred Indians from voting for the next twenty

years. According to the 1940 census, Indians comprised over

11 percent of Arizona’s population. Ferguson-Bohnee

at 1111. They were the largest minority group in Arizona. 

“One-sixth of all Indians in the country lived in Arizona.” Id.

After World War II, Arizona’s Indian citizens returned

from fighting the Axis powers abroad to fight for the right to

vote at home. Frank Harrison, a World War II veteran and

member of the Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation, and Harry

Austin, another member of the Fort McDowell Yavapai

Nation, filed suit against the State. In 1948, the Arizona

Supreme Court overturned its prior decision in Porter v. Hall. 

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Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456, 463 (Ariz. 1948). Almost

a quarter century after enactment of the Indian Citizenship

Act of 1924, Indian citizens in Arizona had the legal right to

vote.

(C) The 1950s and 1960s

For decadesthereafter, however, Arizona’s Indian citizens

often could not exercise that right. The Arizona Supreme

Court’s decision in Harrison v. Laveen did not result in “a

large influx” of new voters because Arizona continued to

deny Indian citizens—as well as Hispanic and African

American citizens—access to the ballot through other means. 

Berman at 15.

The biggest obstacle to voter registration was Arizona’s

English literacy test. In 1948, approximately 80 to 90 percent

of Indian citizens in Arizona did not speak or read English. 

Tucker et al., Voting Rights at 285; see also Berman at 15. In

the 1960s, about half the voting-age population of the Navajo

Nation could not pass the English literacy test. FergusonBohnee at 1112 n.88. For Arizona’s Indian—and Hispanic

and African American—citizens who did speak and read

English, discriminatory administration of the literacy test by

county registrars often prevented them from registering. See,

e.g., Berman, Arizona Politics at 75 (“As recently as the

1960s, registrars applied the test to reduce the ability of

blacks, Indians and Hispanics to register to vote.”).

Voter intimidation during the 1950s and 60s often

prevented from voting those American Indian, Hispanic, and

African American citizens who had managed to register. 

According to Dr. Berman:

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During the 1960s, it was . . . clear that

more than the elimination of the literacy

test in some areas was going to be

needed to protect minorities. Intimidation

of minority-group members—Hispanics,

African Americans, as well as Native

Americans—who wished to vote was . . . a

fact of life in Arizona. Anglos sometimes

challenged minorities at the polls and asked

them to read and explain “literacy” cards

containing quotations from the U.S.

Constitution. These intimidators hoped to

frighten or embarrass minorities and

discourage them from standing in line to vote. 

Vote challenges of this nature were

undertaken by Republican workers in 1962 in

South Phoenix, a largely minority Hispanic

and African-American area. . . . [In addition,]

[p]eople in the non-Native American

community, hoping to keep Native Americans

away from the polls, told them that

involvement could lead to something

detrimental, such as increased taxation, a loss

of reservation lands, and an end to their

special relationship with the federal

government.

Berman at 14–15.

Intimidation of minority voters continued throughout the

1960s. For example, in 1964, Arizona Republicans

undertook voter intimidation efforts throughout Arizona “as

part of a national effort by the Republican Party called

‘Operation Eagle Eye.’” Id. at 14. According to one account:

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The approach was simple: to challenge voters,

especially voters of color, at the polls

throughout the country on a variety of

specious pretexts. If the challenge did not

work outright—that is, if the voter was not

prevented from casting a ballot (provisional

ballots were not in widespread use at this

time)—the challenge would still slow down

the voting process, create long lines at the

polls, and likely discourage some voters who

could not wait or did not want to go through

the hassle they were seeing other voters

endure.

Id. (quoting Tova Andrea Wang, The Politics of Voter

Suppression: Defending and Expanding Americans’ Right to

Vote 44–45 (Cornell Univ. Press, 2012)).

Compounding the effects of the literacy test and voter

intimidation, Arizona “cleansed” its voting rolls. In 1970,

Democrat Raul Castro narrowly lost the election for

Governor. (He would win the governorship four years later

to become Arizona’s first and only Hispanic Governor.) 

Castro received 90 percent of the Hispanic vote, but he lost

the election because of low Hispanic voter turnout. 

Dr. Berman explained:

[C]ontributing to that low turnout was “a

decision by the Republican-dominated

legislature to cleanse the voting rolls and have

all citizens reregister. This cleansing of the

rolls erased years of registration drives in

barrios across the state. It seems certain that

many Chicanos did not understand that they

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had to reregister, were confused by this

development, and simply stayed away from

the polls.”

Id. at 17 (quoting F. Chris Garcia & Rudolph O. de la Garza,

The Chicano Political Experience 105 (Duxbury Press,

1977)).

(D) Voting Rights Act and Preclearance under Section 5

Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965. See

Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.

437–446 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10314,

10501–10508, 10701, 10702). Under Section 4(b) of the Act,

a State or political subdivision qualified as a “covered

jurisdiction” if it satisfied two criteria. Id. § 4(b). The first

was that on November 1, 1964—the date of the presidential

election—the State or political subdivision had maintained a

“test or device,” such as a literacy test, restricting the

opportunity to register or vote. The second was either that

(a) on November 1, 1964, less than 50 percent of the votingage population in the jurisdiction had been registered to vote,

or (b) less than 50 percent of the voting-age population had

actually voted in the presidential election of 1964. Seven

States qualified as covered jurisdictions under this formula:

Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South

Carolina, and Virginia. Determination of the Director of the

Census Pursuant to Section 4(b)(2) of the Voting Rights Act

of 1965, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897-02 (Aug. 7, 1965). Political

subdivisions in four additional States—Arizona, Hawai‘i,

Idaho, and North Carolina—also qualified as covered

jurisdictions. See id.; Determination of the Director of the

Census Pursuant to Section 4(b)(2) of the Voting Rights Act

of 1965, 30 Fed. Reg. 14,505-02 (Nov. 19, 1965).

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Under Section 4(a) of the VRA, covered jurisdictions

were forbidden for a period of five years from using a “test or

device,” such as a literacy test, as a prerequisite to register to

vote, unless a three-judge district court of the District of

Columbia found that no such test had been used by the

jurisdiction during the preceding five years for the purpose of

denying the right to vote on account of race or color. Voting

Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a). Under

Section 5, covered jurisdictions were forbidden from

changing “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,

or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting”

unless the jurisdiction “precleared” that change, by either

obtaining approval (a) from a three-judge district court of the

District of Columbia acknowledging that the proposed change

“neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying

or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” or

(b) from the Attorney General if a proposed change has been

submitted to DOJ and the Attorney General has not

“interposed an objection” within sixtydays of the submission. 

Id. § 5.

Three counties in Arizona qualified as “covered

jurisdictions” under the 1965 Act: Apache, Coconino, and

Navajo Counties. See Determination of the Director of the

Census Pursuant to Section 4(b)(2) of the Voting Rights Act

of 1965, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897-02, 14,505-02. Those counties

were therefore initially prohibited from using the literacy test

as a prerequisite to voter registration. All three counties were

majority American Indian, and there was a history of high use

of the literacy test and correspondingly low voter turnout. 

Berman at 12. However, in 1966, in a suit brought by the

counties against the United States, a three-judge district court

held that there was insufficient proof that a literacy test had

been used by the counties in a discriminatory fashion during

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the immediately preceding five years. See Apache Cty. v.

United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1966). The Navajo

Nation had sought to intervene and present evidence of

discrimination in the district court, but its motion to intervene

had been denied. Id. at 906–13.

Congress renewed and amended the VRA in 1970,

extending it for another five years. Voting Rights Act of

1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970). Under the

VRA of 1970, the formula for determining covered

jurisdictions under Section 4(b) was changed to add the

presidential election of 1968 to the percentage-of-voters

criterion. Id. § 4(b). As a result, eight out of fourteen

Arizona counties—including Apache, Navajo, and Coconino

Counties—qualified as covered jurisdictions. Tucker et al.,

Voting Rights at 286. Under the 1970 Act, non-covered

jurisdictions were forbidden from using a “test or device,”

such as a literacy test, to the same degree as covered

jurisdictions. The 1970 Act thus effectively imposed a

nationwide ban on literacy tests. Voting Rights Act of 1970,

Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 201.

Arizona immediately challenged the ban. In Oregon v.

Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132 (1970), the Court unanimously

upheld the ban on literacy tests. Justice Black wrote,

In enacting the literacy test ban . . . [,]

Congress had before it a long history of the

discriminatory use of literacy tests to

disfranchise voters on account of their

race. . . . Congress . . . had evidence to show

that voter registration in areas with large

Spanish-American populations was

consistently below the state and national

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averages. In Arizona, for example, only two

counties out of eight with Spanish surname

populations in excess of 15% showed a voter

registration equal to the state-wide average. 

Arizona also has a serious problem of

deficient voter registration among Indians.

Two years after the Court’s decision, Arizona finally repealed

its literacy test. Tucker, Bilingual Ballots, at 21.

In 1975, Congress again renewed and amended the VRA. 

Voting Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400

(1975). Under the VRA of 1975, the formula for determining

covered jurisdictions under Section 4(b) was updated to add

the presidential election of 1972. Id. § 202. In addition,

Congress expanded the definition of “test or device” to

address discrimination against language minority groups. Id.

§ 203 (Section 4(f)). Pursuant to this amended formula and

definition, any jurisdiction where a single language minority

group (e.g., Spanish speakers who spoke no other language)

constituted more than 5 percent of eligible voters was subject

to preclearance under Section 5 if (a) the jurisdiction did not

offer bilingual election materials during the 1972 presidential

election, and (b) less than 50 percent of the voting-age

population was registered to vote, or less than 50 percent of

the voting-age population actually voted in the 1972

presidential election. Id. §§ 201–203.

Every jurisdiction in Arizona failed the new test. As a

result, the entire State of Arizona became a covered

jurisdiction. Berman at 20–21.

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(E) Continued Obstacles to Voting: The Example of

Apache County

The VRA’s elimination of literacytests increased political

participation by Arizona’s American Indian, Hispanic, and

African American citizens. However, state and county

officials in Arizona continued to discriminate against

minority voters. Apache County, which includes a significant

part of the Navajo Reservation, provides numerous examples

of which we recount only one.

In 1976, a school district in Apache County sought to

avoid integration by holding a special bond election to build

a new high school in a non-Indian area of the county. See

Apache Cty. High Sch. Dist. No. 90 v. United States, No. 77-

1815 (D.D.C. June 12, 1980); see also Tucker et al., Voting

Rights at 324–26 (discussing the same). Less than a month

before the election, the school district, a “covered

jurisdiction” under the VRA, sought preclearance under

Section 5 for proposed changes in election procedures,

including closure of nearly half the polling stations on the

Navajo Reservation. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger,

Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep’t of Justice,

to Joe Purcell, Gust, Rosenfeld, Divelbess &Henderson (Oct.

4, 1976). DOJ did not complete its review before the

election. The school district nonetheless held the bond

election using the proposed changes. After the election, DOJ

refused to preclear the proposed changes, finding that they

had a discriminatory purpose or effect. Id. (and subsequent

letters from Assistant Attorney Gen. Drew S. Days III on

May 3, 1977, and June 10, 1977). The school district brought

suit in a three-judge district court, seeking a declaratory

judgment that the election did not violate the VRA.

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The district court found that “[t]he history of Apache

County reveals pervasive and systemic violations of Indian

voting rights.” Apache Cty. High Sch. Dist. No. 90, No. 77-

1815, at 6. The court found that the school district’s behavior

was neither “random[]” nor “unconscious[].” Id. at 14–15. 

“Rather, its campaign behavior served to effectuate the

unwritten but manifest policy of minimizing the effect of the

Navajos’ franchise, while maximizing the Anglo vote.” Id.

at 15.

(F) United States v. Arizona and Preclearance during the

1980s and 1990s

During the following two decades, DOJ refused to

preclear numerous proposed voting changes in Arizona. See,

e.g., Goddard v. Babbitt, 536 F. Supp. 538, 541, 543 (D. Ariz.

1982) (finding that a state legislative redistricting plan passed

by the Arizona state legislature “dilut[ed] the San Carlos

Apache Tribal voting strength and divid[ed] the Apache

community of interest”); see also Tucker et al., Voting Rights

at 326–28 (discussing additional examples). In 1988, the

United States sued Arizona, alleging that the State, as well as

Apache and Navajo Counties, violated the VRA by

employing election standards, practices, and procedures that

denied or abridged the voting rights of Navajo citizens. See

United States v. Arizona, No. 88-1989 (D. Ariz. May 22,

1989) (later amended Sept. 27, 1993); see also Tucker et al.,

Voting Rights at 328–30 (discussing the same). A three-judge

district court summarized the complaint:

The challenged practices include alleged

discriminatory voter registration, absentee

ballot, and voter registration cancellation

procedures, and the alleged failure of the

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defendants to implement, as required by

Section 4(f)(4), effective bilingual election

procedures, including the effective

dissemination of election information in

Navajo and providing for a sufficient number

of adequately trained bilingual persons to

serve as translators for Navajo voters needing

assistance at the polls on election day.

United States v. Arizona, No. 88-1989, at 1–2.

Arizona and the counties settled the suit under a Consent

Decree. Id. at 1–26. The Decree required the defendants to

make extensive changes to their voting practices, including

the creation of a Navajo Language Election Information

Program. See id. at 4–23. More than a decade later, those

changes had not been fully implemented. See U.S. Gov’t

Accountability Office, Department of Justice’s Activities to

Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities 91–92

(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04104

1r.pdf (identifying significant deficiencies and finding that

implementation of the Navajo LanguageElection Information

Program by Apache and Navajo Counties was “inadequate”).

During the 1980s and 1990s, DOJ issued seventeen

Section 5 preclearance objections to proposed changes in

Arizona election procedures, concluding that they had the

purpose or effect of discriminating against Arizona’s

American Indian and/or Hispanic voters. See U.S. Dep’t of

Justice, Voting Determination Letters for Arizona,

https://www.justice.gov/crt/voting-determination-lettersarizona (last updated Aug. 7, 2015). Three of these

objections were for statewide redistricting plans, one in the

1980s and two in the 1990s. Id. Other objections concerned

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plans for seven of Arizona’s fifteen counties. Id. (objections

to plans for Apache, Cochise, Coconino, Graham, La Paz,

Navajo, and Yuma Counties).

(G) Continuation to the Present Day

Arizona’s pattern of discrimination against minority

voters has continued to the present day.

(1) Practices and Policies

We highlight two examples of continued discriminatory

practices and policies. First, as the district court found, the

manner in which Maricopa County—home to over 60 percent

of Arizona’s population—administers elections has “been of

considerable concern to minorities in recent years.” Reagan,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 871; Berman at 20. During the 2016

presidential primary election, Maricopa County reduced the

number of polling places by 70 percent, from 200 polling

places in 2012 to just 60 polling places in 2016. Berman at

20. The reduction in number, as well as the locations, of the

polling places had a disparate impact on minority voters. 

Rodden at 61–68. Hispanic voters were “under-served by

polling places relative to the rest of the metro area,” id. at 62,

and Hispanic and African American voters were forced to

travel greater distances to reach polling places than white,

non-Hispanic voters. Id. at 64–68. The reduction in the

number of polling places “resulted in extremely long lines of

people waiting to vote—some for five hours—and many

people leaving the polls, discouraged from voting by the long

wait.” Berman at 20.

Second, the district court found that Maricopa County has

repeatedly misrepresented or mistranslated key information

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in Spanish-language voter materials. Reagan, 329 F. Supp.

3d at 875 (“Along with the State’s hostility to bilingual

education, Maricopa County has sometimes failed to send

properly translated education[al] materials to its Spanish

speaking residents, resulting in confusion and distrust from

Hispanic voters.”); Berman at 20. In 2012, the official

Spanish-language pamphlet in Maricopa County told

Spanish-speaking voters that the November 6 election would

be held on November 8. Berman at 20. The county did not

make the same mistake in its English-language pamphlet. 

Four years later, Spanish-language ballots in Maricopa

County provided an incorrect translation of a ballot

proposition. Id.

(2) Voter Registration and Turnout

Voter registration of Arizona’s minority citizens lags

behind that of white citizens. In November 2016, close to

75 percent of white citizens were registered to vote in

Arizona, compared to 57 percent of Hispanic citizens. See

U.S. Census Bureau, Reported Voting and Registration by

Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for November 2016, tbl. 4b.

Arizona has one of the lowest voter turnout rates in the

United States. A 2005 study ranked Arizona forty-seventh

out of the fifty States. See Ariz. State Univ., Morrison Inst.

for Pub. Policy, How Arizona Compares: Real Numbers and

Hot Topics 47 (2005) (relying on Census data); see also

Tucker et al., Voting Rights at 359. In 2012, Arizona ranked

forty-fourth in turnout for that year’s presidential election. 

Rodden at 19.

The turnout rate for minority voters is substantially less

than that for white voters. In 2002, 59.8 percent of registered

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Hispanic voters turned out for the election, compared to

72.4 percent of total registered voters. Tucker et al., Voting

Rights at 359–60 (relying on Census data). In the 2012

presidential election, 39 percent of Arizona’s Hispanic

voting-age population and 46 percent of Arizona’s African

American voting-age population turned out for the election,

compared to 62 percent of Arizona’s white population. 

Rodden at 20–21. The national turnout rate for African

Americans in that election was 66 percent. Id. In the 2000

and 2004 presidential elections, turnout of Arizona’s

American Indian voters was approximately 23 percentage

points below the statewide average. Tucker et al., Voting

Rights at 360.

(H) District Court’s Assessment of Factor One

The district court recognized Arizona’s history of

discrimination, but minimized its significance. Quoting

Dr. Berman, the court wrote:

In sum, “[d]iscriminatory action has been

more pronounced in some periods of state

history than others . . . [and] each party (not

just one party) has led the charge in

discriminating against minorities over the

years.” Sometimes, however, partisan

objectives are the motivating factor in

decisions to take actions detrimental to the

voting rights of minorities. “[M]uch of the

discrimination that has been evidenced may

well have in fact been the unintended

consequence of a political culture that simply

ignores the needs of minorities.” Arizona’s

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recent history is a mixed bag of advancements

and discriminatory actions.

Id. at 875–76 (alterations in original).

The fact that each party in Arizona “has led the charge in

discriminating against minorities” does not diminish the legal

significance of that discrimination. Quite the contrary. That

fact indicates that racial discrimination has long been deeply

embedded in Arizona’s political institutions and that both

parties have discriminated when it has served their purposes. 

Further, the “mixed bag of advancements and discriminatory

actions” in “Arizona’s recent history” does not weigh in

Arizona’s favor. As Chief Judge Thomas wrote: “Rather,

despite some advancements, most of which were mandated

by courts or Congress [through Section 5 preclearance],

Arizona’s history is marred by discrimination.” DNC,

904 F.3d at 738 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). The “history of

official discrimination” in Arizona and its political

subdivisions “touch[ing] the right of the members of the

minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate

in the democratic process” is long, substantial, and

unambiguous. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–37 (quoting S. Rep.

at 28–29).

The district court clearly erred in minimizing the strength

of this factor in Plaintiffs’ favor.

ii. Factor Two: Racially Polarized Voting Patterns

Voting in Arizona is racially polarized. The district court

found, “Arizona has a history of racially polarized voting,

which continues today.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 876. In

recent years, the base of the Republican party in Arizona has

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been white. Putting to one side “landslide” elections, in

statewide general elections from 2004 to 2014, 59 percent of

white Arizonans voted for Republican candidates, compared

with 35 percent of Hispanic voters. The district court found

that in the 2016 general election, exit polls “demonstrate that

voting between non-minorities and Hispanics continues to be

polarized along racial lines.” Id. In the most recent

redistricting cycle, the Arizona Independent Redistricting

Commission “found that at least one congressional district

and five legislative districts clearly exhibited racially

polarized voting.” Id.

Voting is particularly polarized when Hispanic and white

candidates compete for the same office. In twelve nonlandslide district-level elections in 2008 and 2010 between a

Hispanic Democratic candidate and a white Republican

candidate, an average of 84 percent of Hispanics, 77 percent

of American Indians, and 52 percent of African Americans

voted for the Hispanic candidate compared to an average of

only 30 percent of white voters.

The district court did not clearly err in assessing the

strength of this factor in Plaintiffs’ favor.

iii. Factor Five: Effects of Discrimination

It is undisputed that “members of the minority group[s]”

in Arizona “bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as

education, employment and health, which hinder their ability

to participate effectively in the political process.” Gingles,

478 U.S. at 37 (quoting S. Rep. at 28–29). The district court

found, “Racial disparities between minorities and nonminorities in socioeconomic standing, income, employment,

education, health, housing, transportation, criminal justice,

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and electoral representation have persisted in Arizona.” 

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 876.

The district court made factual findings in four key

areas—education, povertyand employment, home ownership,

and health. The district court concluded in each area that the

effects of discrimination “hinder” minorities’ ability to

participate effectively in the political process.

First, the district court wrote:

From 1912 until the Supreme Court’s decision

in Brown v. Board of Education, segregated

educationwaswidespread throughout Arizona

and sanctioned by both the courts and the state

legislature. In fact, the Tucson Public Schools

only recently reached a consent decree with

the DOJ over its desegregation plan in 2013. 

The practice of segregation also extended

beyond schools; it was common place to have

segregated public spaces such as restaurants,

swimming pools, and theaters. Even where

schools were not segregated, Arizona enacted

restrictions on bilingual education. As

recently as 2000, Arizona banned bilingual

education with the passage of Proposition

203.

Arizona has a record of failing to provide

adequate funding to teach its non-English

speaking students. This underfunding has

taken place despite multiple court orders

instructing Arizona to develop an adequate

funding formula for its programs, including a

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2005 order in which Arizona was held in

contempt of court for refusing to provide

adequate funding for its educational programs. 

“According to the Education Law Center’s

latest National Report Card that provided data

for 2013, Arizona ranked 47th among the

states in per-student funding for elementary

and secondary education.”

Id. at 874–75 (internal citations omitted).

White Arizonans “remain more likely than Hispanics,

Native Americans, and African Americans to graduate from

high school, and are nearly three times more likely to have a

bachelor’s degree than Hispanics and Native Americans.” Id.

at 868. “[I]n a recent survey, over 22.4 percent of Hispanics

and 11.2 percent of Native Americans rated themselves as

speaking English less than ‘very well,’ as compared to only

1.2 percent of non-minorities.” Id. The district court found

that, due to “lower levels of [English] literacy and education,

minority voters are more likely to be unaware of certain

technical [voting] rules, such as the requirement that early

ballots be received by the county recorder, rather than merely

postmarked, by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.” Id.

Second, Hispanics and African Americans in Arizona live

in poverty at nearly two times the rate of whites. American

Indians live in poverty at three times the rate of whites. Id. 

“Wages and unemployment rates for Hispanics, African

Americans, and Native Americans consistently have

exceeded non-minority unemployment rates for the period of

2010 to 2015.” Id. The district court found that minority

voters are more likely to work multiple jobs, less likely to

own a car, and more likely to lack reliable access to

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transportation, id. at 869, all of which make it more difficult

to travel to a polling place—or between an incorrect polling

place and a correct polling place.

Third, the district court found that “[i]n Arizona,

68.9 percent of non-minorities own a home, whereas only

32.3 percent of African Americans, 49 percent of Hispanics,

and 56.1 percent of Native Americans do so.” Id. at 868. 

Lower rates of homeownership and correspondingly higher

rates of renting and residential mobility contribute to higher

rates of OOP voting.

Fourth, the district court found that “[a]s of 2015,

Hispanics, Native Americans, and African Americans fared

worse than non-minorities on a number of key health

indicators.” Id. at 868–69. “Native Americans in particular

have much higher rates of disability than non-minorities, and

Arizona counties with large Native American populations

have much higher rates of residents with ambulatory

disabilities.” Id. at 869. “For example, ‘17 percent of Native

Americans are disabled in Apache County, 22 percent in

Navajo County, and 30 percent in Coconino County.’” Id. 

“Further, ‘11 percent [of individuals] have ambulatory

difficulties in Apache County, 13 percent in Navajo County,

and 12 percent in Coconino County, all of which contain

significant Native American populations and reservations.’” 

Id. (alteration in original). Witnesses credibly testified that

ambulatory disabilities—both alone and combined with

Arizona’s transportation disparities—make traveling to and

between polling locations difficult.

The district court did not clearly err in assessing the

strength of this factor in Plaintiffs’ favor.

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iv. Factor Six: Racial Appeals in Political Campaigns

Arizona’s “political campaigns have been characterized

by overt [and] subtle racial appeals” throughout its history. 

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37 (quoting S. Rep. at 28–29). The

district court found that “Arizona’s racially polarized voting

has resulted in racial appeals in campaigns.” Reagan, 329

F. Supp. 3d at 876.

For example, when Raul Castro, a Hispanic man,

successfullyran for governor in the 1970s, Castro’s opponent,

a white man, urged voters to support him instead because “he

looked like a governor.” Id. “In that same election, a

newspaper published a picture of Fidel Castro with a headline

that read ‘Running for governor of Arizona.’” Id. In his

successful 2010 campaign for State Superintendent of Public

Education, John Huppenthal, a white man running against a

Hispanic candidate, ran an advertisement in which the

announcer said that Huppenthal was “one of us,” was

opposed to bilingual education, and would “stop La Raza,” an

influential Hispanic civil rights organization. Id. When

Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas, a white man,

ran for governor in 2014, he ran an advertisement describing

himself as “the only candidate who has stopped illegal

immigration.” Id. The advertisement “simultaneously

show[ed] a Mexican flag with a red strikeout line through it

superimposed over the outline of Arizona.” Id. Further,

“racial appeals have been made in the specific context of

legislative efforts to limit ballot collection.” Id. The district

court specifically referred to the “racially charged” LaFaro

Video, falsely depicting a Hispanic man, characterized as a

“thug,” “acting to stuff the ballot box.” Id.

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The district court did not clearly err in assessing the

strength of this factor in Plaintiffs’ favor.

v. Factor Seven: Number of Minorities in Public Office

The district court recognized that there has been a racial

disparity in elected officials but minimized its importance. 

The court wrote, “Notwithstanding racially polarized voting

and racial appeals, the disparity in the number of minority

elected officials in Arizona has declined.” Id. at 877. Citing

an expert report by Dr. Donald Critchlow—an expert whose

opinion the court otherwise afforded “little weight,” id.

at 836—the court wrote, “Arizona has been recognized for

improvements in the number of Hispanics and Native

Americans registering and voting, as well as in the overall

representation of minority elected officials,” id. at 877.

As recounted above, it is undisputed that American

Indian, Hispanic, and African American citizens are underrepresented in public office in Arizona. Minorities make up

44 percent of Arizona’s total population, but they hold

25 percent of Arizona’s elected offices. Id. Minorities hold

22 percent of state congressional seats and 9 percent of

judgeships. No American Indian or African American has

ever been elected to represent Arizona in the United States

House of Representatives. Only two minorities have been

elected to statewide office in Arizona since the passage of

the VRA. Arizona has never elected an American Indian

candidate to statewide office. No American Indian, Hispanic,

or African American candidate has ever been elected to serve

as a United States Senator representing Arizona.

Arizona’s practice of entirely discarding OOP ballots is

especially important in statewide and United States Senate

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elections. Some votes for local offices may be improperly

cast in an OOP ballot, given that the voter has cast the ballot

in the wrong precinct. But no vote for statewide office or for

the United States Senate is ever improperly cast in an OOP

ballot. Arizona’s practice of wholly discarding OOP ballots

thus has the effect of disproportionately undercounting

minority votes, by a factor of two to one, precisely where the

problem of under-representation in Arizona is most acute.

The district court clearly erred in minimizing the strength

of this factor in Plaintiffs’ favor.

vi. Factor Eight: Officials’ Responsiveness to the Needs

of Minority Groups

The district court found that “Plaintiffs’ evidence . . . is

insufficient to establish a lack of responsiveness on the part

of elected officials to particularized needs of minority

groups.” Id. In support of its finding, the court cited the

activity of one organization, the Arizona Citizens Clean

Elections Commission, which “engagesin outreach to various

communities, including the Hispanic and Native American

communities, to increase voter participation” and “develops

an annual voter education plan in consultation with elections

officials and stakeholders,” and whose current Chairman is an

enrolled member of the San Carlos Apache Tribe. Id. 

The district court’s finding ignores extensive undisputed

evidence showing that Arizona has significantly underserved

its minority population. “Arizona was the last state in the

nation to join the Children’s Health Insurance Program,

which may explain, in part, why forty-six states have better

health insurance coverage for children.” DNC, 904 F.3d

at 740 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). Further, “Arizona’s public

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schools are drastically underfunded; in fact, in 2016 Arizona

ranked 50th among the states and the District of Columbia in

per pupil spending on public elementary and secondary

education.” Id. “Given the well-documented evidence that

minorities are likelier to depend on public services[,] . . .

Arizona’s refusal to provide adequate state services

demonstrates its nonresponsiveness to minority needs.” Id.;

cf. Myers v. United States, 652 F.3d 1021, 1036 (9th Cir.

2011) (holding that the district court clearly erred when it

ignored evidence contradicting its findings).

Further, the district court’s finding is contradicted

elsewhere in its own opinion. Earlier in its opinion, the court

had written that Arizona has a “political culture that simply

ignores the needs of minorities.” Id. at 876 (citation omitted). 

Later in its opinion, the court referred to “Arizona’s history

of advancing partisan objectives with the unintended

consequence of ignoring minority interests.” Id. at 882.

The district court clearly erred in finding that this factor

does not weigh in Plaintiffs’s favor.

vii. Factor Nine: Tenuousness of Justification of the

Policy Underlying the Challenged Restriction

The ninth Senate factor is “whether the policy underlying

the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting

qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or

procedure is tenuous.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37 (quoting

S. Rep. at 28). The district court found that Arizona’s policy

of entirely discarding OOP ballots is justified by the

importance of Arizona’s precinct-based system of elections. 

The court held:

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Precinct-based voting helps Arizona

counties estimate the number of voters who

may be expected at any particular precinct,

allows for better allocation of resources and

personnel, improves orderly administration of

elections, and reduces wait times. The

precinct-based system also ensures that each

voter receives a ballot reflecting only the

races for which that person is entitled to vote,

thereby promoting voting for local candidates

and issues and making ballots less confusing. 

Arizona’s policy to not count OOP ballots is

one mechanism by which it strictly enforces

this system to ensure that precinct-based

counties maximize the system’s benefits. 

This justification is not tenuous.

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 878.

The court misunderstood the nature of Plaintiffs’

challenge. Plaintiffs do not challenge Arizona’s precinctbased system of voting. Indeed, their challenge assumes both

its importance and its continued existence. Rather, their

challenge is to Arizona’s policy, within that system, of

entirely discarding OOP ballots. The question before the

district court was not the justification for Arizona’s precinctbased system. The question, rather, was the justification for

Arizona’s policy of entirely discarding OOP ballots.

There is no finding by the district court that would justify,

on any ground, Arizona’s policy of entirely discarding OOP

ballots. There is no finding that counting or partially

counting OOP ballots would threaten the integrity of

Arizona’s precinct-based system. Nor is there a finding that

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Arizona has ever sought to minimize the number of OOP

ballots. The lack of such findings is not surprising given the

extreme disparity between OOP voting in Arizona and such

voting in other states, as well as Arizona’s role in causing

voters to vote OOP by, for example, frequently changing the

location of polling places.

The only plausible justification for Arizona’s OOP policy

would be the delay and expense entailed in counting OOP

ballots, but in its discussion of the Senate factors, the district

court never mentioned this justification. Indeed, the district

court specifically found that “[c]ounting OOP ballots is

administratively feasible.” Id. at 860.

Twenty States, including Arizona’s neighboring States of

California, Utah, and New Mexico, count OOP ballots. Id.;

Cal. Elec. Code §§ 14310(a)(3), 14310(c)(3), 15350; Utah

Code Ann. § 20A-4-107(1)(b)(iii), 2(a)(ii), 2(c); N.M. Stat.

Ann § 1-12-25.4(F); N.M. Admin. Code 1.10.22.9(N). The

district court wrote: “Elections administrators in these and

other states have established processes for counting only the

offices for which the OOP voter is eligible to vote.” Reagan,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 861. “Some states, such as New Mexico,

use a hand tally procedure, whereby a team of elections

workers reviews each OOP ballot, determines the precinct in

which the voter was qualified to vote, and marks on a tally

sheet for that precinct the votes cast for each eligible office.” 

Id.; see N.M. Admin Code 1.10.22.9(H)–(N). “Other states,

such as California, use a duplication method, whereby a team

of elections workers reviews each OOP ballot, determines the

precinct in which the voter was qualified to vote, obtains a

new paper ballot for the correct precinct, and duplicates the

votes cast on the OOP ballot onto the ballot for the correct

precinct.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 861. “Only the offices

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that appear on both the OOP ballot and the ballot for the

correct precinct are copied. The duplicated ballot then is

scanned through the optical scan voting machine and

electronically tallied.” Id.

Arizona already uses a duplication system, similar to that

used in California, for provisional ballots cast by voters

eligible to vote in federal but not state elections, as well as for

damaged or mismarked ballots that cannot be read by an

optical scanner. Id. The district court briefly discussed the

time that might be required to count or partially count OOP

ballots, but it did not connect its discussion to its

consideration of the Senate factors. The court cited testimony

of a Pima County election official that the county’s

duplication procedure “takes about twenty minutes per

ballot.” Id. The court did not mention that this same official

had stated in his declaration that the procedure instead takes

fifteen minutes per ballot. The court also did not mention

that a California election official had testified that it takes a

very short time to count or partially count the valid votes on

an OOP ballot. That official testified that it takes “several

minutes” in California to confirm the voter’s registration—

which is done for all provisional ballots, in Arizona as well as

in California. Once that is done, the official testified, it takes

one to three minutes to duplicate the ballot.

The district court clearly erred in finding that this factor

does not weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.

viii. Assessment of Senate Factors

The district court’s “overall assessment” of the Senate

factors was: “In sum, of the germane Senate Factors, the

Court finds that some are present in Arizona and others are

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not.” Id. at 878. Based on this assessment, the court held that

Plaintiffs had not carried their burden at step two. The

district court clearly erred in so holding. The district court

clearly erred in minimizing the strength in favor of Plaintiffs

of Senate factors one (official history of discrimination) and

seven (number of minorities in public office). Further, the

district court clearly erred in finding that Senate factors eight

(officials’ responsiveness to the needs of minority groups)

and nine (tenuousness of the justification of the policy

underlying the challenged provision) do not favor Plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs have successfully shown that all of the considered

Senate factors weigh in their favor. Most important, plaintiffs

have shown that the most pertinent factors, five and nine,

weigh very strongly in their favor.

c. Summary

We hold that the district court clearly erred in holding that

Plaintiffs’ challenge to Arizona’s OOP policy failed under the

results test. We hold that Plaintiffs have carried their burden

at both steps one and two. First, they have shown that

Arizona’s OOP policy imposes a significant disparate burden

on its American Indian, Hispanic, and African American

citizens, resulting in the “denial or abridgement of the right”

of its citizens to vote “on account of race or color.” 

52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). Second, they have shown that, under

the “totality of circumstances,” the discriminatory burden

imposed by the OOP policy is in part caused by or linked to

“social and historical conditions” that have or currently

produce “an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by

[minority] and white voters to elect their preferred

representatives” and to participate in the political process. 

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47; 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).

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We therefore hold that Arizona’s OOP policy violates the

results test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

3. H.B. 2023 and the Results Test

Uncontested evidence in the district court established that,

prior to the enactment of H.B. 2023, a large and

disproportionate number of minority voters relied on third

parties to collect and deliver their early ballots. Uncontested

evidence also established that, beginning in 2011, Arizona

Republicans made sustained efforts to limit or eliminate

third-party ballot collection. The question is whether the

district court clearly erred in holding that H.B. 2023 does not

violate the “results test” of Section 2.

a. Step One: Disparate Burden

The question at step one is whether H.B. 2023 results in

a disparate burden on a protected class. The district court

held that Plaintiffs failed at step one. The district court

clearly erred in so holding.

Extensive and uncontradicted evidence established that

prior to the enactment of H.B. 2023, third parties collected a

large and disproportionate number of early ballots from

minority voters. Neither the quantity nor the disproportion

was disputed. Numerous witnesses testified without

contradiction to having personally collected, or to having

personally witnessed the collection of, thousands of early

ballots from minority voters. There is no evidence that white

voters relied to any significant extent on ballot collection by

third parties.

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The district court recognized the disparity in third-party

ballot collection between minority and white citizens. It

wrote that “[t]he Democratic Party and community advocacy

organizations . . . focused their ballot collection efforts on

low-efficacy voters, who trend disproportionately minority.” 

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 870. “In contrast,” the court

wrote, “the Republican Party has not significantly engaged in

ballot collection as a GOTV strategy.” Id.

The district court nonetheless held that this evidence was

insufficient to establish a violation at step one. To justify its

holding, the court wrote, “[T]he Court finds that Plaintiffs’

circumstantial and anecdotal evidence is insufficient to

establish a cognizable disparity under § 2.” Id. at 868. The

court wrote further:

Considering the vast majority of Arizonans,

minority and non-minority alike, vote without

the assistance of third-parties who would not

fall within H.B. 2023’s exceptions, it is

unlikely that H.B. 2023’s limitations on who

may collect an early ballot cause a meaningful

inequality in the electoral opportunities of

minorities as compared to non-minorities.

Id. at 871.

First, the court clearly erred in discounting the evidence

of third-party ballot collection as merely “circumstantial and

anecdotal.” The evidence of third-party ballot collection was

not “circumstantial.” Rather, as recounted above, it was

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party ballot collection by others. Nor was the evidence

merely “anecdotal.” As recounted above, numerous

witnesses provided consistent and uncontradicted testimony

about third-party ballot collection they had done, supervised,

or witnessed. This evidence established that many thousands

of early ballots were collected from minority voters by third

parties. The court itself found that white voters did not

significantly rely on third-party ballot collection. No better

evidence was required to establish that large and

disproportionate numbers of earlyballots were collected from

minority voters.

Second, the court clearly erred by comparing the number

of early ballots collected from minority voters to the much

greater number of all ballots cast “without the assistance of

third parties,” and then holding that the relatively smaller

number of collected early ballots did not cause a “meaningful

inequality.” Id. at 871. In so holding, the court repeated the

clear error it made in comparing the number of OOP ballots

to the total number of all ballots cast. Just as for OOP ballots,

the number of ballots collected by third parties from minority

voters surpasses any de minimis number.

We hold that H.B. 2023 results in a disparate burden on

minority voters, and that the district court clearly erred in

holding otherwise. We accordingly hold that Plaintiffs have

succeeded at step one of the results test.

b. Step Two: Senate Factors

The district court did not differentiate between Arizona’s

OOP policy and H.B. 2023 in its discussion of step two. 

Much of our analysis of the Senate factors for Arizona’s OOP

policy applies with equal force to the factors for H.B. 2023. 

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Again, we regard Senate factors five (the effects of

discrimination in other areas on minorities access to voting)

and nine (the tenuousness of the justification for the

challenged voting practices) as particularly important, given

the nature of Plaintiffs’ challenge to H.B. 2023. We also

regard factor one (history of official discrimination) as

important, as it strongly supports our conclusion under factor

five. Though “not essential,” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15,

the other less important factors provide “helpful background

context.” Husted, 768 F.3d at 555.

We do not repeat here the entirety of our analysis of

Arizona’s OOP policy. Rather, we incorporate that analysis

by reference and discuss only the manner in which the

analysis is different for H.B. 2023.

i. Factor One: History of Official Discrimination

Connected to Voting

We recounted above Arizona’s long history of race-based

discrimination in voting. H.B. 2023 grows directly out of that

history. During the Republicans’ 2011 attempt to limit ballot

collection by third parties, Arizona was still subject to

preclearance under Section 5. When DOJ asked for more

information about whether the relatively innocuous ballotcollection provision of S.B. 1412 had the purpose or would

have the effect of denying minorities the right to vote and

requested more information, Arizona withdrew the

preclearance request. It did so because there was evidence in

the record that the provision intentionally targeted Hispanic

voters. In 2013, public opposition threatened to repeal H.B.

2305 by referendum. If passed, the referendum would have

required that any future bill on the same topic pass the

legislature by a supermajority. Republicans repealed H.B.

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2305 rather than face a referendum. Finally, after the

Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County eliminated

preclearance, Arizona enacted H.B. 2023, making third-party

ballot collection a felony. The campaign was marked by

race-based appeals, most prominently in the LaFaro Video

described above.

As it did with respect to OOP voting, the district court

clearly erred in minimizing the strength of this factor in

Plaintiffs’ favor.

ii. Factor Two: Racially Polarized Voting Patterns

H.B. 2023 connects directly to racially polarized voting

patterns in Arizona. The district court found that “H.B. 2023

emerged in the context of racially polarized voting.” Reagan,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 879. Senator Shooter, who introduced the

bill that became S.B. 1412—the predecessor to H.B. 2023—

was motivated by the “high degree of racial polarization in

his district” and introduced the bill following a close, racially

polarized election. Id.

The district court did not clearly err in assessing the

strength of this factor in Plaintiffs’ favor.

iii. Factor Five: Effects of Discrimination

H.B. 2023 is closely linked to the effects of

discrimination that “hinder” the ability of American Indian,

Hispanic, and African American voters “to participate

effectively in the political process.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37. 

The district court found that American Indian, Hispanic, and

African American Arizonans “are significantly less likely

than non-minorities to own a vehicle, more likely to rely upon

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public transportation, more likely to have inflexible work

schedules, and more likely to rely on income from hourly

wage jobs.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 869. In addition,

“[r]eady access to reliable and secure mail service is

nonexistent in some minority communities.” Id. Minority

voters in rural communities disproportionately lack access to

outgoing mail, while minority voters in urban communities

frequently encounter unsecure mailboxes and mail theft. Id.

These effects of discrimination hinder American Indian,

Hispanic, and African American voters’ ability to return early

ballots without the assistance of third-party ballot collection.

The district court did not clearly err in assessing the

strength of this factor in Plaintiffs’ favor.

iv. Factor Six: Racial Appeals in Political Campaigns

The enactment of H.B. 2023 was the direct result of racial

appeals in a political campaign. The district court found that

“racial appeals [were] made in the specific context of

legislative efforts to limit ballot collection.” Id. at 876. 

Proponents of H.B. 2023 relied on “overt or subtle racial

appeals,” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37, in advocating for H.B.

2023, including the “racially tinged” LaFaro Video, Reagan,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 876–77 (characterizing the LaFaro Video

as one of the primary motivators for H.B. 2023). The district

court concluded, “[Senator] Shooter’s allegations and the

LaFaro video were successful in convincing H.B. 2023’s

proponents that ballot collection presented opportunities for

fraud that did not exist for in-person voting.” Reagan, 329

F. Supp. 3d at 880.

The district court did not clearly err in assessing the

strength of this factor in Plaintiff’s favor.

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v. Factor Seven: Number of Minorities in Public Office

Because Arizona’s OOP policy had a particular

connection to the election of minorities to statewide office

and to the United States Senate, we concluded that the factor

of minorities in public office favored Plaintiffs. That

particular connection to statewide office does not exist

between H.B. 2023 and election of minorities. However,

H.B. 2023 is likely to have a pronounced effect in rural

counties with significant American Indian and Hispanic

populations who disproportionately lack reliable mail and

transportation services, and where a smaller number of votes

can have a significant impact on election outcomes. In those

counties, there is likely to be a particular connection to

election of American Indian and Hispanic candidates to

public office.

As it did with respect to OOP voting, the district court

clearly erred in minimizing the strength of this factor in

Plaintiffs’ favor.

vi. Factor Eight: Officials’ Responsiveness to the Needs

of Minority Groups

The district court found that “Plaintiffs’ evidence . . . is

insufficient to establish a lack of responsiveness on the part

of elected officials to particularized needs of minority

groups.” Id. at 877. As discussed above, this finding ignores

extensive evidence to the contrary and is contradicted by the

court’s statements elsewhere in its opinion.

The district court clearly erred in finding that this factor

does not weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.

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vii. Factor Nine: Tenuousness of Justification of the

Policy Underlying the Challenged Restriction

The district court relied on two justifications for H.B.

2023: That H.B. 2023 is aimed at preventing ballot fraud “by

creating a chain of custody for early ballots and minimizing

the opportunities for ballot tampering, loss, and destruction”;

and that H.B. 2023 is aimed at improving and maintaining

“public confidence in election integrity.” Id. at 852. We

address these justifications in turn.

First, third-party ballot collection was permitted for many

years in Arizona before the passage of H.B. 2023. No one

has ever found a case of voter fraud connected to third-party

ballot collection in Arizona. This has not been for want of

trying. The district court described the Republicans’

unsuccessful attempts to find instances of fraud:

The Republican National Lawyers

Association (“RNLA”) performed a study

dedicated to uncovering cases of voter fraud

between 2000 and 2011. The study found no

evidence of ballot collection or delivery fraud,

nor did a follow-up study through May 2015. 

Although the RNLA reported instances of

absentee ballot fraud, none were tied to ballot

collection and delivery. Likewise, the

Arizona Republic conducted a study of voter

fraud in Maricopa County and determined

that, out of millions of ballots cast in

Maricopa County from 2005 to 2013, a total

of 34 cases of fraud were prosecuted. Of

these, 18 involved a felon voting without her

rights first being restored. Fourteen involved

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non-Arizona citizens voting. The study

uncovered no cases of fraud perpetrated

through ballot collection.

Id. at 853 (internal citations omitted).

The district court wrote, “[T]here has never been a case

of voter fraud associated with ballot collection charged in

Arizona.” Id. at 852. “No specific, concrete example of

voter fraud perpetrated through ballot collection was

presented by or to the Arizona legislature during the debates

on H.B. 2023 or its predecessor bills.” Id. at 852–53. “No

Arizona county produced evidence of confirmed ballot

collection fraud in response to subpoenas issued in this case,

nor has the Attorney General’s Office produced such

information.” Id. at 853.

Ballot-collection-related fraud was already criminalized

under Arizona law when H.B. 2023 was enacted. Collecting

and failing to turn in someone else’s ballot was already a

class 5 felony. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(F). Marking

someone else’s ballot was already a class 5 felony. Id. § 16-

1005(A). Selling one’s own ballot, possessing someone

else’s ballot with the intent to sell it, knowingly soliciting the

collection of ballots by misrepresenting one’s self as an

election official, and knowingly misrepresenting the location

of a ballot drop-off site were already class 5 felonies. Id.

§ 16-1005(B)–(E). These criminal prohibitions are still in

effect. Arizona also takes measures to ensure the security of

early ballots, such as using “tamper evident envelopes and a

rigorous voter signature verification procedure.” Reagan,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 854.

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The history of H.B. 2023 shows that its proponents had

other aims in mind than combating fraud. H.B. 2023 does not

forbid fraudulent third-party ballot collection. It forbids nonfraudulent third-party ballot collection. To borrow an

understated phrase, the anti-fraud rationale advanced in

support of H.B. 2023 “seems to have been contrived.” Dep’t

of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019).

Second, we recognize the importance of public

confidence in election integrity. We are aware that the

federal bipartisan Commission on Federal Election Reform,

charged with building public confidence, recommended inter

alia that States “reduce the risks of fraud and abuse in

absentee voting by prohibiting ‘third-party’ organizations,

candidates, and political party activists from handling

absentee ballots.” Building Confidence in U.S. Elections

§ 5.2 (Sept. 2005). We are aware of the recent case of voter

fraud in North Carolina involving collection and forgery of

absentee ballots by a political operative hired by a Republican

candidate. And we are aware that supporters of H.B. 2023

and its predecessor bills sought to convince Arizona voters,

using false allegations and racial innuendo, that third-party

ballot collectors in Arizona have engaged in fraud.

Without in the least discounting either the common sense

of the bipartisan commission’s recommendation or the

importance of public confidence in the integrity of elections,

we emphasize, first, that the Supreme Court has instructed us

in Section 2 cases to make an “intensely local appraisal.” 

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 78. The third-party ballot collection

fraud case in North Carolina has little bearing on the case

before us. We are concerned with Arizona, where third-party

ballot collection has had a long and honorable history, and

where the acts alleged in the criminal indictment in North

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Carolina were illegal under Arizona law before the passage

of H.B. 2023, and would still be illegal if H.B. 2023 were no

longer the law.

We emphasize, further, that if some Arizonans today

distrust third-party ballot collection, it is because of the

fraudulent campaign mounted by proponents of H.B. 2023. 

Those proponents made strenuous efforts to persuade

Arizonans that third-party ballot collectors have engaged in

election fraud. To the degree that there has been any fraud,

it has been the false and race-based claims of the proponents

of H.B. 2023. It would be perverse if those proponents, who

used false statements and race-based innuendo to create

distrust, could now use that very distrust to further their aims

in this litigation.

The district court clearly erred in finding that this factor

does not weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor. This factor either weighs

in Plaintiffs’ favor or is, at best, neutral.

viii. Assessment

The district court made the same overall assessment of the

Senate factors in addressing H.B. 2023 as in addressing

Arizona’s policy of discarding OOP ballots. As it did with

respect to OOP ballots, the court concluded that Plaintiffs had

not carried their burden at step two. Here, too, the district

court’s conclusion was clearly erroneous. Contrary to the

court’s conclusion, Plaintiffs have successfullyshown that six

of the Senate factors weigh in their favor and that the

remaining factor weighs in their favor or is neutral.

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c. Summary

We hold that the district court clearly erred in holding that

Plaintiffs’ challenge to H.B. 2023 failed under the results test.

We hold that Plaintiffs have carried their burden at both steps

one and two. First, they have shown that H.B. 2023 imposes

a disparate burden on American Indian, Hispanic, and African

American citizens, resulting in the “denial or abridgement of

the right” of its citizens to vote “on account of race or color.” 

52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). Second, they have shown that, under

the “totality of circumstances,” the discriminatory burden

imposed by H.B. 2023 is in part caused by or linked to “social

and historical conditions” that have or currently produce “an

inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and

white voters to elect their preferred representatives” and to

participate in the political process. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47;

52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).

We therefore conclude that H.B. 2023 violates the results

test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

B. Intent Test: H.B. 2023

As indicated above, uncontested evidence in the district

court established that before enactment of H.B. 2023, a large

and disproportionate number of minority voters relied on

third parties to collect and deliver their early ballots. 

Uncontested evidence also established that, beginning in

2011, Arizona Republicans made sustained efforts to outlaw

third-party ballot collection. After a racially charged

campaign, they finally succeeded in passing H.B. 2023. The

question is whether the district court clearly erred in holding

that H.B. 2023 does not violate the “intent test” of Section 2.

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1. The Intent Test

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing

Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), provides the

framework for analyzing a claim of intentional discrimination

under Section 2. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of NAACP

v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 220–21 (4th Cir. 2016). Under

Arlington Heights, Plaintiffs have an initial burden of

providing “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or

purpose.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. Plaintiffs need

not show that discriminatory purpose was the “sole[]” or even

a “primary” motive for the legislation. Id. Rather, Plaintiffs

need only show that discriminatory purpose was “a

motivating factor.” Id. at 265–66 (emphasis added).

“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose

was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such

circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be

available.” Id. at 266. “[D]iscriminatory purpose may often

be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including

the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one

race than another.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242

(1976). Because “[o]utright admissions of impermissible

racial motivation are infrequent[,] . . . plaintiffs often must

rely upon other evidence,” including the broader context

surrounding passage of the legislation. Hunt v. Cromartie,

526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999). “In a vote denial case such as the

one here, where the plaintiffs allege that the legislature

imposed barriers to minority voting, this holistic approach is

particularly important, for ‘[d]iscrimination today is more

subtle than the visible methods used in 1965.’” N.C. State

Conference of NAACP, 831 F.3d at 221 (quoting H.R. Rep.

No. 109–478, at 6 (2006)).

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Arlington Heights provided a non-exhaustive list of

factors that a court should consider. Arlington Heights,

429 U.S. at 266. The factors include (1) the historical

background; (2) the sequence of events leading to enactment,

including any substantive or procedural departures from the

normal legislative process; (3) the relevant legislative history;

and (4) whether the law has a disparate impact on a particular

racial group. Id. at 266–68.

“Once racial discrimination is shown to have been a

‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind enactment of the

law, the burden shifts to the law’s defenders to demonstrate

that the law would have been enacted without this factor.” 

Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985). In

determining whether a defendant’s burden has been carried,

“courts must scrutinize the legislature’s actual non-racial

motivations to determine whether they alone can justify the

legislature’s choices.” N.C. State Conference of NAACP,

831 F.3d at 221 (emphases in original) (citing Mt. Healthy

City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287

(1977); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728

(1982)). “In the context of a § 2 discriminatory intent

analysis, one of the critical background facts of which a court

must take notice is whether voting is racially polarized.” Id. 

“[I]ntentionally targeting a particular race’s access to the

franchise because its members vote for a particular party, in

a predictable manner, constitutes discriminatory purpose.” 

Id. at 222.

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2. H.B. 2023 and the Intent Test

a. Arlington Heights Factors and Initial Burden of Proof

The district court wrote, “Having considered [the

Arlington Heights] factors, the Court finds that H.B. 2023

was not enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose.” 

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 879. The court then went on to

discuss each of the four factors, but did not attach any

particular weight to any of them. In holding that the

Plaintiffs had not shown that discriminatory purpose was “a

motivating factor,” the district court clearly erred.

We address the Arlington Heights factors in turn.

i. Historical Background

“A historical pattern of laws producing discriminatory

results provides important context for determining whether

the same decisionmaking body has also enacted a law with

discriminatory purpose.” N.C. State Conference of NAACP,

831 F.3d at 223–24; see Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267

(“The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary

source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions

taken for invidious purposes.”). As recounted above, the

Arizona legislature has a long history of race-based

discrimination, disenfranchisement, and voter suppression,

dating back to Arizona’s territorial days. Further, the history

of H.B. 2023 itself reveals invidious purposes.

In addressing the “historical background” factor, the

district court mentioned briefly the various legislative efforts

to restrict third-party ballot collection that had been

“spearheaded” by Senator Shooter, described briefly

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Senator Shooter’s allegations of third-party ballot fraud, and

alluded to the “racially-tinged” LaFaro Video. Reagan, 329

F. Supp. 3d at 879–80. But the district court discounted their

importance. We discuss the court’s analysis below, under the

third Arlington Heights factor.

ii. Sequence of Events Leading to Enactment

“The specific sequence of events leading up to the

challenged decision . . . may shed some light on the

decisionmaker’s purposes.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.

at 267. We recounted above the sequence of events leading

to the enactment of H.B. 2023. The district court

acknowledged this history but again discounted its

importance. We discuss the court’s analysis below, under the

third Arlington Heights factor.

iii. Relevant Legislative History

“The legislative . . . history may be highly relevant,

especially where there are contemporary statements by

members of the decisionmaking body[.]” Id. at 268. The

district court found that legislators voted for H.B. 2023 in

response to the “unfounded and often farfetched allegations

of ballot collection fraud” made by former Senator Shooter,

and the “racially-tinged LaFaro Video.” Reagan, 329

F. Supp. 3d at 880. As Chief Judge Thomas wrote: “Because

there was ‘no direct evidence of ballot collection fraud . . .

presented to the legislature or at trial,’ the district court

understood that Shooter’s allegations and the LaFaro Video

were the reasons the bill passed.” DNC, 904 F.3d at 748

(Thomas, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d

at 880) (emphasis in original).

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Senator Shooter was one of the major proponents of the

efforts to limit third-party ballot collection and was

influential in the passage of H.B. 2023. Reagan, 329 F. Supp.

3d at 879. According to the district court, Senator Shooter

made “demonstrably false” allegations of ballot collection

fraud. Id. at 880. Senator Shooter’s efforts to limit ballot

collection were motivated in substantial part by the “high

degree of racial polarization in his district.” Id. at 879. He

was “motivated by a desire to eliminate” the increasingly

effective efforts to ensure that Hispanic votes in his district

were collected, delivered, and counted. Id.

The LaFaro Video provides even stronger evidence of

racial motivation. Maricopa County Republican Chair

LaFaro produced a video showing “a man of apparent

Hispanic heritage”—a volunteer with a get-out-the-vote

organization—apparently dropping off ballots at a polling

place. Id. at 876. LaFaro’s voice-over narration included

unfounded statements, id. at 877, “that the man was acting to

stuff the ballot box” and that LaFaro “knew that he was a

thug,” id. at 876. The video was widely distributed. It was

“shown at Republican district meetings,” “posted on

Facebook and YouTube,” and “incorporated into a television

advertisement.” Id. at 877.

The district court used the same rationale to discount the

importance of all of the first three Arlington Heights factors. 

It pointed to the “sincere belief,” held by some legislators,

that fraud in third-party ballot collection was a problem that

needed to be addressed. The district court did so even though

it recognized that the belief was based on the false and racebased allegations of fraud by Senator Shooter and other

proponents of H.B. 2023. The court wrote: “Shooter’s

allegations and the LaFaro Video were successful in

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convincing H.B. 2023’s proponents that ballot collection

presented opportunities for fraud that did not exist for inperson voting[.]” Id. at 880.

We accept the district court’s conclusion that some

members of the legislature who voted for H.B. 2023 had a

sincere, though mistaken, non-race-based beliefthat there had

been fraud in third-party ballot collection, and that the

problem needed to be addressed. However, as the district

court found, that sincere belief had been fraudulently created

by Senator Shooter’s false allegations and the “raciallytinged” LaFaro video. Even though some legislators did not

themselves have a discriminatory purpose, that purpose may

be attributable to their action under the familiar “cat’s paw”

doctrine. The doctrine is based on the fable, often attributed

to Aesop, in which a clever monkey induces a cat to use its

paws to take chestnuts off of hot coals for the benefit of the

monkey.

For example, we wrote in Mayes v. Winco Holdings, Inc.,

846 F.3d 1274 (9th Cir. 2017):

[T]he animus of a supervisor can affect an

employment decision if the supervisor

“influenced or participated in the

decisionmaking process.” Dominguez-Curry

[v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t], 424 F.3d [1027,]

1039–40 [(9th Cir. 2017)]. Even if the

supervisor does not participate in the ultimate

termination decision, a “supervisor’s biased

report may remain a causal factor if the

independent investigation takes it into account

without determining that the adverse action

was, apart from the supervisor’s

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recommendation, entirely justified.” Staub v.

Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 421 (2011).

Id. at 1281; see also Poland v. Chertoff , 494 F.3d 1174, 1182

(9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f a subordinate . . . sets in motion a

proceeding by an independent decisionmaker that leads to an

adverse employment action, the subordinate’s bias is imputed

to the employer if the plaintiff can prove that the allegedly

independent adverse employment decision was not actually

independent because the biased subordinate influenced or was

involved in the decision or decisionmaking process.”).

The good-faith belief of these sincere legislators does not

show a lack of discriminatory intent behind H.B. 2023. 

Rather, it shows that well meaning legislators were used as

“cat’s paws.” Convinced by the false and race-based

allegations of fraud, they were used to serve the

discriminatory purposes of Senator Shooter, Republican

Chair LaFaro, and their allies.

We hold that the district court clearly erred in discounting

the importance of the first three Arlington Heights factors. 

We hold that all three factors weigh in favor of showing that

discriminatory intent was a motivating factor in enactingH.B.

2023.

iv. Disparate Impact on a Particular Racial Group

“The impact of the official action[,] whether it ‘bears

more heavily on one race than another,’ may provide an

important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern,

unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the

effect of the state action even when the governing legislation

appears neutral on its face.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.

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at 266 (internal citation omitted). As described above,

uncontested evidence shows that H.B. 2023 has an adverse

and disparate impact on American Indian, Hispanic, and

African American voters. The district court found that the

legislature “was aware” of the impact of H.B. 2023 on what

the court called “low-efficacy minority communities.” 

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 881.

It appears that the district court weighed this factor in

favor of showing discriminatory intent as a motivating factor

in enacting H.B. 2023. The court did not clearly err in so

doing.

v. Assessment

We hold that the district court clearly erred in holding that

Plaintiffs failed to carry their initial burden of proof of

showing that racial discrimination was a motivating factor

leading to the enactment of H.B. 2023. We hold that all four

of the Arlington Heights factors weigh in favor of Plaintiffs. 

Our holding does not mean that the majority of the Arizona

state legislature “harbored racial hatred or animosity toward

any minority group.” N.C. State Conference of NAACP,

831 F.3d at 233. “But the totality of the circumstances”—

Arizona’s long history of race-based voting discrimination;

the Arizona legislature’s unsuccessful efforts to enact less

restrictive versions of the same law when preclearance was a

threat; the false, race-based claims of ballot collection fraud

used to convince Arizona legislators to pass H.B. 2023; the

substantial increase in American Indian and Hispanic voting

attributable to ballot collection that was targeted by H.B.

2023; and the degree of racially polarized voting in

Arizona—“cumulatively and unmistakably reveal” that

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racial discrimination was a motivating factor in enacting

H.B. 2023. Id.

b. Would H.B. 2023 Otherwise Have Been Enacted

At the second step of the Arlington Heights analysis,

Arizona has the burden of showing that H.B. 2023 would

have been enacted without racial discrimination as a

motivating factor. Because the district court held that

Plaintiffs had not carried their initial burden, it did not reach

the second step of the Arlington Heights analysis.

Although there is no holding of the district court directed

to Arlington Heights’ second step, the court made a factual

finding that H.B. 2023 would not have been enacted without

racial discrimination as a motivating factor. The court

specifically found that H.B. 2023 would not have been

enacted without Senator Shooter’s and LaFaro’s false and

race-based allegations of voter fraud. The court wrote, “The

legislature was motivated by a misinformed belief that ballot

collection fraud was occurring, but a sincere belief that mailin ballots lacked adequate prophylactic safeguards as

compared to in-person voting.” Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at

882. That is, members of the legislature, based on the

“misinformed belief” created by Shooter, LaFaro, and their

allies and serving as their “cat’s paws,” voted to enact H.B.

2023. See Poland, 494 F.3d at 1182. Based on the court’s

finding, we hold that Arizona has not carried its burden of

showing that H.B. 2023 would have been enacted without the

motivating factor of racial discrimination.

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c. Summary

We hold that the district court clearly erred in holding that

Plaintiffs failed to establish that H.B. 2023 violates the intent

test of Section 2 of the VRA. A holding that H.B. 2023

violates the intent test of Section 2 necessarily entails a

holding that it also violates the Fifteenth Amendment.

III. Response to Dissents

We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleagues. 

For the most part, our response to their contentions is

contained in the body of our opinion and needs no

elaboration. Several contentions, however, merit a specific

response.

A. Response to the First Dissent

Our first dissenting colleague, Judge O’Scannlain, makes

several mistakes.

First, our colleague contends that H.B. 2023 does not

significantly change Arizona law. Our colleague writes:

For years, Arizona has restricted who may

handle early ballots. Since 1992, Arizona has

prohibited anyone but the elector himself

from possessing “that elector’s unvoted

absentee ballot.” 1991 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch.

310, § 22 (S.B. 1390) (West). In 2016,

Arizona enacted a parallel regulation, H.B.

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2023 (the “ballot-collection” policy),

concerning the collection of early ballots.

Diss. Op. at 116–117 (emphases added).

Our colleague appends a footnote to the first sentence in

the passage just quoted:

The majority’s effort to deny history can

easily be dismissed. Maj. Op. 104–105. As

Judge Bybee’s dissent ably recounts, not only

Arizona but 21 other states have restricted

early balloting for years. Bybee, J. Diss. Op.

157–158.

Our colleague fails to recognize the distinction between

“unvoted” and “voted” ballots. Contrary to our colleague’s

contention, H.B. 2023 is not “a parallel regulation” to already

existing Arizona law. Under prior Arizona law, possession of

an “unvoted absentee ballot” was forbidden. Arizona law in

no wayrestricted non-fraudulent possession of voted absentee

ballots (absentee ballots on which the vote had already been

indicated). Unlike our colleague, the district court recognized

the distinction. It wrote:

Since 1997, it has been the law in Arizona

that “[o]nly the elector may be in possession

of that elector’s unvoted early ballot.” A.R.S.

§ 16-542(D). In 2016, Arizona amended

A.R.S. § 16-1005 by enacting H.B. 2023,

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which limits who may collect a voter’s voted

or unvoted early ballot.

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 839 (emphases added). H.B.

2023 for the first time forbade non-fraudulent collection of

voted ballots. It was not a “parallel regulation.” It was a

fundamental change in Arizona law.

Second, our colleague repeats the potentially misleading

numbers and percentages of OOP voting recounted by the

district court. Our colleague writes:

Only 0.47 percent of all ballots cast in the

2012 general election (10,979 out of

2,323,579) were not counted because they

were cast out of the voter’s assigned precinct. 

[Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d] at 872. In 2016,

this fell to 0.15 percent (3,970 out of

2,661,497). Id.

Diss. Op. at 122–123. Our colleague, like the district court,

see Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 872, fails to mention that, as

a percentage of all in-person ballots, OOP ballots increased

between 2012 and 2016.

Third, our colleague quotes from a sentence in a footnote

in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gingles. Based on that

sentence, he insists that “substantial difficulty electing

representatives of their choice” is the governing standard for

the Section 2 results test in the case before us. Our colleague

writes:

[In Gingles], the Court observed that “[i]t is

obvious that unless minority group members

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experience substantial difficulty electing

representatives of their choice, they cannot

prove that a challenged electoral mechanism

impairs their ability ‘to elect.’” Gingles,

478 U.S. at 48 n.15 (quoting 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(b)) (emphasis added).

Diss. Op. at 124 (emphasis in original). He later writes:

Given the lack of any testimony in the record

indicating that the ballot-collection policy

would result in minority voters

‘experienc[ing] substantial difficulty electing

representatives of their choice,’ Gingles,

478 U.S. at 48 n.15, the district court did not

clearly err[.]

Id. at 132 (emphasis added).

Our colleague fails to distinguish between a vote dilution

case and a vote denial case. As we noted above, a vote

dilution case is one in which multimember electoral districts

have been formed, or in which district lines have been drawn,

so as to dilute and thereby diminish the effectiveness of

minority votes. Vote denial cases are all other cases,

including cases in which voters are prevented from voting or

in which votes are not counted. Gingles was a vote dilution

case, and the case before us is a vote denial case. Our

colleague fails to quote the immediately preceding sentence

in the Gingles footnote, which makes clear that the Court was

addressing vote dilution cases. The Court wrote, “In

recognizing that some Senate Report factors are more

important to multimember district vote dilution claims than

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others, the Court effectuates the intent of Congress.” Gingles,

478 U.S. at 48 n.15 (emphasis added).

The standard in a vote denial case is different, as

recognized by DOJ in its amicus brief in this case, and in

League of Women Voters where the Fourth Circuit struck

down a state statute that would have prevented the counting

of OOP ballots in North Carolina without inquiring into

whether the number of affected ballots was likely to affect

election outcomes. See 769 F.3d at 248–49. As we noted

above, there may be a de minimis number in vote denial cases

challenging facially neutral policies or law, but the 3,709

OOP ballots in our case is above any such de minimis

number.

Citing our en banc decision in Gonzalez, our colleague

contends that our case law does not differentiate between vote

denial and vote dilution cases. But the very language from

Gonzalez that he quotes belies his contention. We wrote in

text:

[A] § 2 challenge “based purely on a showing

of some relevant statistical disparity between

minorities and whites,” without any evidence

that the challenged voting qualification causes

that disparity, will be rejected.

Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 405. We then appended a footnote,

upon which our colleague relies:

This approach applies both to claims of vote

denial and of vote dilution. [Smith v. Salt

River Project Agric. Improvement & Power

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Dist., 109 F.3d 586,] 596 n.8 [(9th Cir.

1997)].

Id. at 405 n.32. The quoted language makes the obvious

point that in both vote denial and vote dilution cases, we

require evidence of a causal relation between a challenged

voting qualification and any claimed statistical disparity

between minority and white voters. However, this language

does not tell us that the predicate disparity, and its effect, are

the same in vote denial and vote dilution cases.

B. Response to the Second Dissent

Our second dissenting colleague, Judge Bybee, writes “to

make a simple point: The Arizona rules challenged here are

part of an ‘electoral process that is necessarily structured to

maintain the integrity of the democratic system.’” Diss. Op.

at 142 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441

(1992)). We respectfully disagree. There is nothing in

Arizona’s policy of discarding OOP votes or about H.B. 2023

that is necessary “to maintain the integrity” of Arizona’s

democratic system.

Our colleague writes, further, “Parties of all stripes should

have an equal interest in rules that are both fair on their face

and fairly administered.” Id. at 144. Our colleague

misunderstands the purpose of the VRA’s results test of

Section 2. The results test looks past the facial fairness of a

law to its actual results.

We take these two points in turn.

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1. Integrity of Arizona’s Democratic System

First, our colleague uses his “simple point” to justify

Arizona’s OOP policy and H.B. 2023 on the ground that they

are necessary to protect the integrity of Arizona’s system.

Our colleague argues that eliminating Arizona’s OOP

policy will “lower[] the cost to voters of determining where

they are supposed to vote, but only as to presidential, U.S.

Senate, and statewide races,” and will have “its own

consequences.” Id. at 151, 153. To illustrate those

consequences, our colleague imagines a voter from Tuscon

who votes in Phoenix. Based on his imagined voter, he posits

“two predictable ways” in which future elections in Arizona

will be “skew[ed]” if OOP votes are counted for the elections

in which the voter is entitled to vote. Id. at 152. Because his

imagined voter cares only about national elections, that voter

“may vote with impunity in the wrong precinct.” Id. at 152. 

This will result, first, in “overvalu[ing]” national elections,

and, second, in “undervalu[ing]” local elections. Id.

Our colleague speculates that Arizona’s OOP policy will

result in voters either finding the right precinct, or voting by

mail. He writes:

Under Arizona’s current OOP rule, a voter,

having gone to the trouble of going to a

precinct to vote in person and suffering the

indignity of having to fill out a provisional

ballot, is less likely to make the same mistake

next year. A voter who has had a ballot

disqualified is more likely to figure out the

correct precinct next time—or, better yet, sign

up for the convenience of early voting, a

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measure that avoids the conundrum of OOP

altogether.

Id. at 155.

Our colleague’s speculation leads him to predict that

Arizona’s OOP policy will lead to increased in-precinct

voting. There is nothing in the record that remotely supports

our colleague’s predicted consequences. Instead, the record

clearly shows the opposite. Arizona’s OOP policy has been

in place since at least 1970. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 840. 

The record shows that, despite its long-standing policy,

Arizona has consistently had by far the highest rate of OOP

voting of any State—in 2012, eleven times greater than the

second-place State. See Figure 6, supra at 13; see also

Rodden at 26 (describing OOP voting as a “persistent

problem” in Arizona).

Contrary to our colleague’s speculation, OOP voters are

unlikely ever to discover the “indignity” of having their

provisional ballots discarded. Our colleague quotes from an

Arizona statute requiring county recorders to establish a

“method” by which a voter casting a provisional ballot be

notified that his or ballot was not counted, and giving a

reason why it was not counted. Diss. Op. at 155 n.9. 

However, there is nothing in the record showing that county

recorders have in fact established, or followed, such a

“method.” Instead, there was uncontradicted testimony in the

district court by OOP voters that they were not directed to

their proper polling place and were never told that their vote

would not be counted if cast out of precinct. See Reagan,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 858 (finding that poll workers neither

directed OOP voters to the correct precinct nor told voters

that OOP ballots would be discarded).

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The persistence of OOP voting is unsurprising given the

actions of Arizona. Arizona changes polling places with

extraordinary frequency, and often locates them in

inconvenient and misleading places. This produces a high

rate of OOP voting, particularly in urban areas and

particularly for voters with high rates of residential mobility. 

The uncontested result is that minority voters cast OOP votes

twice as often as white voters.

Our colleague further argues that H.B. 2023 is an

appropriate measure to protect against voter fraud. He begins

by pointing out that many States forbid third-party ballot

collection. Diss. Op. at 158–160. But a simple numerical

comparison with other states fails to take into account, as the

VRA says we must, the particular geography, ethnic patterns,

and long history of third-party ballot collection in Arizona. 

See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 78 (a Section 2 analysis requires “a

blend of history and an intensely local appraisal”). Evidence

in the record shows that third-party ballot collection has long

had a unique role in Arizona, given the large numbers of

Hispanic and American Indian voters who have unreliable or

non-existent in-home mail service, who have unreliable

means of transportation, who live long distances from polling

places, and who have long-standing cultural traditions of

ballot collection. Evidence in the record shows that Arizona

has never, in its long history of third-party ballot collection,

found a single case of fraud.

Our colleague also argues that Arizona should not ignore

the recommendation of the report of the bipartisan

commission, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections (2005). 

Diss. Op. at 161–164. This is a reasonable argument, but it

has limited force when applied to Arizona. Forbidding thirdparty ballot collection protects against potential voter fraud. 

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But such protection is not necessary, or even appropriate,

when there is a long history of third-party ballot collection

with no evidence, ever, of any fraud and such fraud is already

illegal under existing Arizona law. Such protection is

undesirable, even illegal, when a statute forbidding thirdparty ballot collection produces a discriminatory result or is

enacted with discriminatory intent. The commission was

concerned with maintaining “confidence” in our election

system, as indicated by the title of its report. If there is a lack

of confidence in third-party ballot collection in Arizona, it is

due to the fraudulent, race-based campaign mounted by the

proponents of H.B. 2023.

Finally, our colleague points to third-party ballot

collection fraud perpetrated by a Republican political

operative in North Carolina. Id. at 164–166. Our colleague’s

argument ignores the different histories and political cultures

in Arizona and North Carolina, and puts to one side as

irrelevant the long and honorable history of third-party ballot

collection in Arizona. The argument also ignores the fact that

Arizona had long had statutes prohibiting fraudulent handling

of both unvoted and voted ballots by third parties, even

before the enactment of H.B. 2023. The actions of the North

Carolina Republican operative, if performed in Arizona,

would have been illegal under those statutes. H.B. 2023 does

not forbid fraudulent third-party ballot collection. Such fraud

is forbidden by other provisions of Arizona law. H.B. 2023

forbids non-fraudulent third-party ballot collection.

2. Rules that Are Fair on Their Face

Second, our colleague defends Arizona’s OOP policy and

H.B. 2023 as “rules that are . . . fair on their face.” Id. at 144.

The results test of Section 2 of the VRA is based on the

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understanding that laws that are “fair on their face” can, as in

this case, produce discriminatory results. Indeed, Congress

added the results test to the VRA precisely to address laws

that were fair on their face but whose result was unfair

discrimination.

Arizona’s OOP policy and H.B. 2023 both fail the results

test. The result of Arizona’s OOP policy is that twice as

many minority ballots as white ballots are thrown away. 

Prior to the enactment of H.B. 2023, third-party ballot

collectors, acting in good faith, collected many thousands of

valid ballots cast by minority voters. White voters rarely

relied on third-party ballot collection. The result of H.B.

2023 is that many thousands of minority ballots will now not

be collected and counted, while white ballots will be largely

unaffected.

IV. Conclusion

We hold that Arizona’s OOP policy violates the results

test of Section 2. We hold that H.B. 2023 violates both the

results test and the intent test of Section 2. We hold that H.B.

2023 also violates the Fifteenth Amendment. We do not

reach Plaintiffs’ other constitutional challenges.

We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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WATFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join the court’s opinion to the extent it invalidates

Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy and H.B. 2023 under the

results test. I do not join the opinion’s discussion of the

intent test.

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, with whom CLIFTON,

BYBEE, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:

We have been asked to decide whether two current

Arizona election practices violate the Voting Rights Act or

the First, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.1 Based on the record before us and

1

 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits a State from adopting

an election practice that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of

any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 

52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in

relevant part: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of

the people peaceably to assemble.” U.S. Const. amend. I.

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees: “No State shall make or

enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV.

The Fifteenth Amendment ensures that the right “to vote shall not be

denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,

color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. Const. amend. XV.

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relevant Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, the

answer to such question is clear: they do not. The majority,

however, draws factual inferences that the evidence cannot

support and misreads precedent along the way. In so doing,

it impermissibly strikes down Arizona’s dulyenacted policies

designed to enforce its precinct-based election system and to

regulate third-party collection of early ballots.

I respectfully dissent.

I

Given the abundant discussion by the district court and

the en banc majority, I offer only a brief summary of the

policies at issue here and discuss the district court’s factual

findings as pertinent to the analysis below.

A

Arizona offers voters several options: early mail ballot,

early in-person voting, and in-person Election Day voting. 

Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan (“DNC”), 329 F. Supp.

3d 824, 838 (D. Ariz. 2018).

1

Since at least 1970, Arizona has required that in-person

voters “cast their ballots in their assigned precinct and has

enforced this system by counting only those ballots cast in the

correct precinct.” Id. at 840. A voter who arrives at a

precinct in which he or she is not listed on the register may

cast a provisional ballot, but Arizona will not count such

ballot if it determines that the voter does not live in the

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precinct in which he or she voted. Id. For shorthand, I refer

to this rule as Arizona’s “out-of-precinct” or “OOP” policy.

Most Arizona voters, however, do not vote in person on

Election Day. Id. at 845. Arizona law permits all registered

voters to vote early by mail or in person at an early voting

location in the 27 days before an election. Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§§ 16-121(A), 16-541(A), 16-542(D). All Arizona counties

operate at least one location for early in person voting. DNC,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 839. Rather than voting early in person,

any voter may instead request an early ballot to be delivered

to his or her mailbox on an election-by-election or permanent

basis. Id. In 2002, Arizona became the first state to make

available an online voter registration option, which also

permits voters to enroll in permanent early voting by mail. 

Id. Voters who so enroll will be sent an early ballot no later

than the first day of the 27-day early voting period. Id. 

Voters may return early ballots in person at any polling place,

vote center, or authorized office without waiting in line or

may return their early ballots by mail at no cost. Id. To be

counted, however, an early ballot must be received by

7:00 p.m. on Election Day. Id.

2

For years, Arizona has restricted who may handle early

ballots.2

 Since 1992, Arizona has prohibited anyone but the

elector himself from possessing “that elector’s unvoted

absentee ballot.” 1991 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 310, § 22 (S.B.

2 The majority’s effort to deny history can easily be dismissed. Maj.

Op. 104–105. As Judge Bybee’s dissent ably recounts, not only Arizona

but 21 other states have restricted early balloting for years. Bybee, J. Diss.

Op. 157–158.

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1390) (West). In 2016, Arizona enacted a parallel regulation,

H.B. 2023 (the “ballot-collection” policy), concerning the

collection of early ballots.3 DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 839. 

Under the ballot-collection policy, only a “family member,”

“household member,” “caregiver,” “United States postal

service worker” or other person authorized to transmit mail,

or “election official” may return another voter’s completed

early ballot. Id. at 839–40 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-

1005(H)–(I)).

B

In April 2016, the Democratic National Committee, the

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, and the

Arizona Democratic Party (together, “DNC”) sued the State

of Arizona to challenge the OOP policy and the ballotcollection policy. The district court denied DNC’s motions

to enjoin preliminarily enforcement of both polices, and DNC

asked our court to issue injunctions pending appeal of such

denials. After expedited proceedings before three-judge and

en banc panels, our court denied the motion for an injunction

against the OOP policy but granted the parallel motion

against the ballot-collection policy. Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of

State’s Office, 840 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)

(mem.) (per curiam); Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office

(Feldman III), 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The

Supreme Court, however, stayed our injunction against the

ballot-collection policy and the OOP and ballot-collection

policies functioned in usual fashion. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s

Office v. Feldman, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016) (mem.).

3 While the majority refers to the legislation as “H.B. 2023,” I prefer

to call it the ballot-collection policy by which it is commonly known and

will do so throughout the dissent.

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In 2017, the district court proceeded to the merits of

DNC’s suit. In May 2018, after a ten-day bench trial, the

district court issued a decision supported by thorough

findings of fact and conclusions of law. DNC, 329 F. Supp.

3d at 832. The district court found that DNC failed to prove

any violation of the Voting Rights Act or the United States

Constitution and issued judgment in the state’s favor. Id.

at 882–83.

DNC timely appealed, and a three-judge panel of our

court affirmed the decision of the district court in its entirety. 

Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan (“DNC”), 904 F.3d 686

(9th Cir. 2018), vacated by order granting rehearing en banc,

911 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.). But today, the en banc

panel majority reverses the decision of the district court and

holds that the OOP and ballot-collection policies violate § 2

of the Voting Rights Act and that the ballot-collection policy

was enacted with discriminatory intent in violation of the

Fifteenth Amendment.

II

The first mistake of the en banc majority is disregarding

the critical standard of review. Although the majority recites

the appropriate standard, it does not actually engage with it.4

Maj. Op. 8–9. The standard is not complex. We review de

novo the district court’s conclusions of law, but may review

4 As the majority admits, we review the district court’s “overall

finding of vote dilution” under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act only for clear

error. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (emphasis added);

Maj. Op. 8–9. The majority quotes an elaboration of this standard by the

Supreme Court in Gingles. Maj. Op. 8–9. But the Court in Gingles

actually held that the district court’s ultimate finding was not clearly

erroneous. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80.

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its findings of fact only for clear error. Navajo Nation v.

U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc).

The majority’s disregard of such standard and, thus, our

appellate role, infects its analysis of each of DNC’s claims. 

The demanding clear error standard “plainly does not entitle

a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact

simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the

case differently.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,

470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Rather, we may reverse a finding

only if, “although there is evidence to support it, [we are] left

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.” Id. (quoting United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co.,

333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). To do otherwise “oversteps the

bounds of [our] duty under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]

52(a)” by “duplicat[ing] the role of the lower court.” Id.

at 573. As explained in Parts III and IV, I fail to see how on

the record before us one could be “left with a definite and

firm conviction” that the district court erred.

III

DNC first contends that Arizona’s policies violate § 2 of

the Voting Rights Act. A district court’s determination of

whether a challenged practice violates § 2 of the Voting

Rights Act is “intensely fact-based”: the court assesses the

“totality of the circumstances” and conducts “a ‘searching

practical evaluation of the past and present reality.’” Smith

v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvements & Power Dist.

(“Salt River”), 109 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986)). Thus,

“[d]eferring to the district court’s superior fact-finding

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capabilities, we review only for clear error its ultimate

finding of no § 2 violation.” Id. at 591 (emphasis added).

In relevant part, § 2 provides:

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to

voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall

be imposed or applied by any State . . . in a

manner which results in a denial or

abridgment of the right of any citizen of the

United States to vote on account of race or

color . . . .

(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established

if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is

shown that the political processes leading to

nomination or election in the State . . . are not

equally open to participation by members of a

class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in

that its members have less opportunity than

other members of the electorate to participate

in the political process and to elect

representatives of their choice.

52 U.S.C. § 10301 (emphasis added). “The essence of a § 2

claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure

interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an

inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white

voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Gingles,

478 U.S. at 47. To determine whether a practice violates § 2,

courts employ a two-step analysis. See Ohio Democratic

Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 637 (6th Cir. 2016); Veasey v.

Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 244 (5th Cir. 2016); Frank v. Walker,

768 F.3d 744, 754–55 (7th Cir. 2014); League of Women

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Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir.

2014).

The first step is asking whether the practice provides

members of a protected class “less ‘opportunity’ than others

‘to participate in the political process and to elect

representatives of their choice.’” Chisom v. Roemer,

501 U.S. 380, 397 (1991) (alteration in original) (quoting

52 U.S.C. § 10301). In other words, the challenged practice

“must impose a discriminatory burden on members of a

protected class.” League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 240

(emphasis added). To prevail at step one, the plaintiff

therefore “must show a causal connection between the

challenged voting practice and [a] prohibited discriminatory

result.” Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595 (alteration in original)

(quoting Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of City Comm’rs Voter

Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 312 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also

Ohio Democratic Party, 834 F.3d at 638. If a discriminatory

burden is established, then—and only then—do we consider

whether the burden is “caused by or linked to ‘social and

historical conditions’ that have or currently produce

discrimination against members of the protected class.” 

League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 240 (quoting Gingles,

478 U.S. at 47).

The majority agrees that this two-step analysis controls

but mistakenly applies it. According to the majority, DNC

has shown that the OOP policy and the ballot-collection

policy fail at both steps—and, presumably, that the district

court clearly erred in finding otherwise. Under an

appropriately deferential analysis, however, DNC cannot

prevail even at step one: it has simply failed to show that

either policy erects a discriminatory burden.

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A

As to the facially neutral OOP policy, DNC argues,

erroneously, that wholly discarding, rather than partially

counting, ballots that are cast out-of-precinct violates § 2 of

the Voting Rights Act because such policy imposes a

discriminatory burden on minority voters related to Arizona’s

history of discrimination. The district court, quite properly,

found that DNC failed to carry its burden at step one—that

the practice imposes a discriminatory burden on minority

voters—for two reasons. DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 873.

1

First, the district court determined that DNC failed to

show “that the racial disparities in OOP voting are practically

significant enough to work a meaningful inequality in the

opportunities of minority voters as compared to non-minority

voters.” Id. Thus, it ruled that DNC failed to show that the

precinct-based system has a “disparate impact on the

opportunities of minority voters to elect their preferred

representatives.” Id. at 872. To the contrary, the district

court made the factual finding that out-of-precinct “ballots

represent . . . a small and ever-decreasing fraction of the

overall votes cast in any given election.” Id.

Furthermore, the district court determined that “the

burdens imposed by precinct-based voting . . . are not severe. 

Precinct-based voting merely requires voters to locate and

travel to their assigned precincts, which are ordinary burdens

traditionally associated with voting.” Id. at 858. Indeed, the

numbers found by the district court support such conclusion. 

Only 0.47 percent of all ballots cast in the 2012 general

election (10,979 out of 2,323,579) were not counted because

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they were cast out of the voter’s assigned precinct. Id. at 872.

In 2016, this fell to 0.15 percent (3,970 out of 2,661,497). Id. 

And of those casting ballots in-person on Election Day,

approximately 99 percent of minority voters and 99.5 percent

of non-minority voters cast their ballots in their assigned

precincts. Id. Given that the overwhelming majority of all

voters complied with the precinct-based voting system during

the 2016 election, it is difficult to see how the district court’s

finding could be considered clearly erroneous. See also

Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198

(2008) (plurality opinion) (discussing “the usual burdens of

voting”). And it further ruled that DNC “offered no evidence

of a systemic or pervasive history of minority voters being

given misinformation regarding the locations of their

assigned precincts, while non-minority voters were given

correct information” to suggest that the burden of voting in

one’s assigned precinct is more significant for minority voters

than for non-minority voters. DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 873.

As Judge Ikuta explained in her now-vacated majority

opinion for the three-judge panel:

If a challenged election practice is not

burdensome or the state offers easily

accessible alternative means of voting, a court

can reasonably conclude that the law does not

impair any particular group’s opportunity to

“influence the outcome of an election,” even

if the practice has a disproportionate impact

on minority voters.

DNC, 904 F.3d at 714 (citation omitted) (quoting Chisom,

501 U.S. at 397 n.24). The “bare statistic[s]” presented may

indeed show a disproportionate impact on minority voters,

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but we have held previously that such showing is not enough. 

Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595 (“[A] bare statistical showing of

disproportionate impact on a racial minority does not satisfy

the § 2 ‘results’ inquiry.” (emphasis in original)). A court

must evaluate the burden imposed by the challenged voting

practice—not merely any statistical disparity that may be

shown. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 2 in Gingles

suggests the same. There, the Court observed that “[i]t is

obvious that unless minority group members experience

substantial difficulty electing representatives of their choice,

they cannot prove that a challenged electoral mechanism

impairs their ability ‘to elect.’” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15

(emphasis added) (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)). 

Furthermore, because “[n]o state has exactly equal

registration rates, exactly equal turnout rates, and so on, at

every stage of its voting system,” it cannot be the case that

pointing to a mere statistical disparity related to a challenged

voting practice is sufficient to “dismantle” that practice. 

Frank, 768 F.3d at 754; see also Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595.

The majority, however, contends that “the district court

discounted the disparate burden on the ground that there were

relatively few OOP ballots cast in relation to the total number

of ballots.” Maj. Op. 43. In the majority’s view, the district

court should have emphasized that the percentage of inperson ballots that were cast out-of-precinct increased, thus

isolating the specific impact of the OOP policy amongst inperson voters bound by the precinct-system requirements.

Contrary to the majority’s assertion, however, the legal

review at hand does not require that we isolate the specific

challenged practice in the manner it suggests. Rather, at step

one of the § 2 inquiry, we only consider whether minority

voters “experience substantial difficulty electing

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representatives of their choice,” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15,

“based on the totality of circumstances,” 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(b).5 Although the majority would like us to believe

that the increasing percentage of in-person ballots cast out-ofprecinct demonstrates that minorities are disparately

burdened by the challenged policy, the small number of

voters who chose to vote in-person and the even smaller

number of such voters who fail to do so in the correct precinct

demonstrate that any minimal burden imposed by the policy

does not deprive minority voters of equal opportunities to

elect representatives of their choice. A conclusion otherwise

could not be squared with our determination that a mere

statistical showing of disproportionate impact on racial

minorities does not satisfy the challenger’s burden. See Salt

River, 109 F.3d at 595. If such statistical impact is not

sufficient, it must perforce be the case that the crucial test is

5 The majority correctly asserts that Gingles was a vote dilution not

vote denial case. However, it incorrectly claims the standard in a vote

denial case is different and, without stating such standard, it simply

concludes that the 3,709 ballots cast out of precinct in the 2016 general

election in Arizona is more than any “de minimis number” below which

there is no Section 2 violation, without ever revealing what such minimum

threshold might be. Maj. Op. 107. The majority cites League of Women

Voters, a vote denial case, to reach this conclusion. See 769 F.3d at

248–49. Yet, in that case, the Fourth Circuit relies on Ginglesthroughout

to determine that the same analysis applies to vote denial and vote dilution

cases. Id. at 238–40. Earlier in its opinion, the majority itself uses

Gingles as the standard for analyzing a § 2 violation in a vote denial case. 

Maj. Op. 37. The distinction the majority attempts to draw fails because,

contrary to what the majority implies, “a § 2 challenge based purely on a

showing of some relevant statistical disparity between minorities and

whites, without any evidence that the challenged voting qualification

causes that disparity, will be rejected,” Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383,

495 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “[t]his

approach applies both to claims of vote denial and vote dilution.” Id. at

495 n. 32.

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the extent to which the practice burdens minority voters as

opposed to non-minority voters. But the en banc majority

offers no explanation for how or why the burden of voting in

one’s assigned precinct is severe or beyond that of the

burdens traditionally associated with voting.

The majority argues that there may be a “de minimis

number” below which no § 2 violation has occurred.6 Maj.

Op. 44. But we know from our own precedent that “a bare

statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial

minority does not satisfy the § 2 . . . inquiry.” Salt River,

109 F.3d at 595 (emphasis in original). And Chisom makes

clear that § 2 “claims must allege an abridgment of the

opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect

representatives of one’s choice.” 501 U.S. at 398 (emphasis

in original). As such, the inquiry must require consideration

of both the scope of the burden imposed by the particular

policy—not merely how many voters are impacted by it—and

the difficulty of accessing the political process in its entirety.

Thus, it cannot be true, as the majority suggests, that

simply showing that some number of minority voters’ ballots

were not counted as a result of an individual policy satisfies

step one of the § 2 analysis for a facially neutral policy.

2

Second, the district court made the factual finding that

“Arizona’s policy to not count OOP ballots is not the cause

6 As Judge Ikuta explained, “an election rule requiring voters to

identify their correct precinct in order to have their ballots counted does

not constitute a ‘disenfranchisement’ of voters.” DNC, 904 F.3d at 730

n.33; see also id. at 724 n.27.

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of [any identified] disparities in OOP voting.” DNC, 329 F.

Supp. 3d at 872. According to the OOP policy that is

challenged by DNC, a ballot is not counted if it is cast outside

of the voter’s assigned precinct. And the district court

pointed to several factors that result in higher rates of out-ofprecinct voting among minorities. For example, the district

court found that “high rates of residential mobility are

associated with higher rates of OOP voting,” and minorities

are more likely to move more frequently. Id. at 857, 872. 

Similarly, “rates of OOP voting are higher in neighborhoods

where renters make up a larger share of householders.” Id. at

857. The precinct-system may also pose special challenges

for Native American voters, because they may “lack standard

addresses” and there may be additional “confusion about the

voter’s correct polling place” where precinct assignments

may differ from assignments for tribal elections. Id. at 873. 

“Additionally”, the district court found, Arizona’s “changes

in polling locations from election to election, inconsistent

election regimes used by and within counties, and placement

of polling locations all tend to increase OOP voting rates.” 

Id. at 858.

But the burden of complying with the precinct-based

system in the face of any such factors is plainly

distinguishable from the consequence imposed should a voter

fail to comply. Indeed, as the district court found, “there is

no evidence that it will be easier for voters to identify their

correct precincts if Arizona eliminated its prohibition on

counting OOP ballots.” Id. Although “the consequence of

voting OOP might make it more imperative for voters to

correctly identify their precincts,” id., such consequence does

not cause voters to cast their ballots out-of-precinct or make

it more burdensome for voters to cast their ballots in their

assigned precincts.

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The majority goes astray by failing to recognize the

distinction between the burden of complying and the

consequence of failing to do so. In fact, the majority

undercuts its own claim by citing the same host of reasons

identified by the district court as the reasons why a minority

voter is more likely to vote out-of-precinct. Maj Op. 14–19. 

All the factors the majority seizes upon, however, stem from

the general requirement that a voter cast his or her ballot in

the assigned precinct—not the policy that enforces such

requirement. The importance of such distinction is made

clear by the relief that DNC seeks: DNC does not request that

Arizona be made to end its precinct-based system or to assign

its precincts differently, but instead requests that Arizona be

made to count those ballots that are not cast in compliance

with the OOP policy.

7 Removing the enforcement policy,

however, would do nothing to minimize or to extinguish the

disparity that exists in out-of-precinct voting.

Consider another basic voting requirement: in order to

cast a ballot, a voter must register. If a person fails to

register, his or her vote will not count. Any discriminatory

result from such a policy would need to be addressed in a

7 The majority suggests that DNC challenges only “Arizona’s policy,

within that system, of entirely discarding OOP ballots” as opposed to

counting or partially counting them. Maj. Op. 78. But this is not a

compromise position: there is no difference between counting and

partially counting a ballot cast out-of-precinct. Counting an OOP ballot

would entail evaluating the ballot to determine on which issues the person

would have been qualified to vote in his or her assigned precinct and

discarding the person’s votes as to issues on which he or she would not

have been qualified to vote. Certainly, the majority isn’t suggesting that

a person would ever be allowed to vote on issues which he or she would

not have been eligible to vote even in the assigned precinct. It is difficult

to discern any other possible meaning for what the majority refers to as

entirely “counting” out-of-precinct ballots.

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challenge to that policy itself. For example, if minorities are

underrepresented as a segment of registered voters, perhaps

they could challenge some discriminatory aspect of the

registration system. But they surely could not prevail by

challenging simply the state’s enforcement of the registration

policy by refusing to count unregistered voters’ ballots. 

Minorities in a jurisdiction may very well be

underrepresented as members of the registered electorate, but

the discrepancy between the protected class as a segment of

the general population and as a segment of the registered

voting population would not require that a state permit

unregistered voters to cast valid ballots on Election Day.

Similarly, the fact that a ballot cast by a voter outside of

his or her assigned precinct is discarded does not cause

minorities to vote out-of-precinct disproportionately. But

DNC does not challenge the general requirement that one

vote in his or her precinct or take issue with the assignment

of precinct locations—the very requirements that could lead

to a disproportionate impact. It may indeed be the case in a

precinct-based voting system that a state’s poor assignment

of districts, distribution of inadequate information about

voting requirements, or other factors have some material

effect on election practices such that minorities have less

opportunity to elect representatives of their choice as a result

of the system. But, in the words of the majority, DNC’s

challenge “assumes both [the]importance and [the] continued

existence” of “Arizona’s precinct-based system of voting.” 

Maj. Op. 78. Instead, DNC challenges only Arizona’s

enforcement of such system. Thus, even if there were a

recognizable disparity in the opportunities of minority voters

voting out-of-precinct, it would nonetheless not be the result

of the policy at issue before us.

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3

Ireject the suggestion implicit in the majority opinion that

any facially neutral policy which may result in some

statistical disparity is necessarily discriminatory under step

one of the § 2 inquiry. We have already held otherwise. Salt

River, 109 F.3d at 595. And the majority itself concedes that

“more than a de minimis number of minority voters must be

burdened before a Section 2 violation based on the results test

can be found.” Maj. Op. 44. Furthermore, I fail to see how

DNC—and the majority—can concede the importance and

continued existence of a precinct-based system, yet argue that

the enforcement mechanism designed to maintain such

system is impermissible.

Because DNC has failed to meet its burden under step one

of the Voting Rights Act § 2 inquiry—that the district court’s

findings were clearly erroneous—our analysis of its OOP

claim should end here.

B

As to the facially neutral ballot-collection policy, DNC

argues, erroneously, that it violates § 2 because there is

“extensive evidence” demonstrating that minority voters are

more likely to have used ballot-collection services and that

they would therefore be disproportionately burdened by

limitations on such services. Specifically, DNC relies on

anecdotal evidence that ballot collection has

disproportionately occurred in minority communities, that

minority voters were more likely to be without home mail

deliveryor access to transportation, and that ballot-harvesting

efforts were disproportionatelyundertaken bythe Democratic

Party in minority communities. And, DNC claims, such

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burden is caused by or linked to Arizona’s history of

discrimination.

The district court, quite properly, rejected such argument,

making the factual finding that DNC failed to establish at step

one that the ballot-collection policy imposed a discriminatory

burden on minority voters. DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 866,

871. Once again, the question is whether such finding was

clearly erroneous. Salt River, 109 F.3d at 591.

1

The district court found broadly that the non-quantitative

evidence offered by DNC failed to show that the ballotcollection policy denied minority voters of “meaningful

access to the political process.” DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d

at 871. As Judge Ikuta observed, to determine whether the

challenged policy provides minority voters “less opportunity

to elect representatives of their choice, [we] must necessarily

consider the severity and breadth of the law’s impacts on the

protected class.” DNC, 904 F.3d at 717.

But no evidence of that impact has been offered. “In fact,

no individual voter testified that [the ballot-collection

policy’s] limitations on who may collect an early ballot

would make it significantly more difficult to vote.” DNC,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 871 (emphasis added). Anecdotal

evidence of how voters have chosen to vote in the past does

not establish that voters are unable to vote in other ways or

would be burdened by having to do so. The district court

simply found that “prior to the [ballot-collection policy’s]

enactment minorities generically were more likely than nonminorities to return their early ballots with the assistance of

third parties,” id. at 870, but, once again, the disparate impact

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of a challenged policy on minority voters is insufficient to

establish a § 2 violation, see Salt River, 109 F.3d at 594–95.

The majority simply does not address the lack of evidence

as to whether minority voters have less opportunity than nonminority voters now that ballot collection is more limited. 

Instead, the majority answers the wrong question by pointing

to minority voters’ use of ballot collection in the past. The

majority offers no record-factual support for its conclusion

that the anecdotal evidence presented demonstrates that

compliance with the ballot-collection policy imposes a

disparate burden on minority voters—a conclusion that must

be reached in order to satisfy step one of the § 2 inquiry—let

alone evidence that the district court’s contrary finding was

“clearly erroneous.”

Given the lack of any testimony in the record indicating

that the ballot-collection policy would result in minority

voters “experienc[ing] substantial difficulty electing

representatives of their choice,” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15,

the district court did not clearly err in finding that, “for some

voters, ballot collection is a preferred and more convenient

method of voting,” but a limitation on such practice “does not

deny minority voters meaningful access to the political

process.” DNC ̧ 329 F. 3d Supp. at 871.

2

The district court further found that the ballot-collection

policy was unlikely to “cause a meaningful inequality in the

electoral opportunities of minorities” because only “a

relatively small number of voters have used ballot collection

services” in the past at all. DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 870–71. 

And, the district court noted, DNC “provided no quantitative

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or statistical evidence comparing the proportion that is

minority versus non-minority.” Id. at 866. “Without this

information,” the district court explained, “it becomes

difficult to compare the law’s impact on different

demographic populations and to determine whether the

disparities, if any, are meaningful.” Id. at 867. Thus, from

the record, we do not know either the extent to which voters

may be burdened by the ballot-collection policy or how many

minority voters may be so burdened.

Nonetheless, the district court considered circumstantial

and anecdotal evidence offered by DNC and determined that

“the vast majority of Arizonans, minority and non-minority

alike, vote without the assistance of third-parties who would

not fall within [the ballot-collection policy’s] exceptions.” 

Id. at 871. DNC—and the majority—argue that such finding

is not supported by the record, but, given the lack of

quantitative or statistical evidence before us, it is difficult to

conclude that such finding is clearly erroneous. The district

court itself noted that it could not “speak in more specific or

precise terms” given the sparsity of the record. Id. at 870. 

Drawing from anecdotal testimony, the district court

estimated that fewer than 10,000 voters used ballot-collection

services in any election. Id. at 845. Drawing even “the

unjustified inference that 100,000 early mail ballots were

collected” during the 2012 general election, the district court

found that such higher total would nonetheless be “relatively

few early voters” as compared to the 1.4 million early mail

ballots returned or 2.3 million total votes cast. Id. at 845. 

The majority further argues that the district court erred in

“discounting the evidence of third-party ballot collection as

merely ‘circumstantial and anecdotal’” Maj. Op. 83. But the

district court did nothing of the sort. To the contrary, the

district court considered whether the ballot-collection policy

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violated § 2 by making these estimates—and even generous

estimates—from the anecdotal evidence offered. And the

district court’s subsequent conclusion that the limitation of

third-party ballot collection would impact only a “relatively

small number of voters,” id. at 870, is clearly plausible on

this record, see Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573.

The majority also argues that the total number of votes

affected is not the relevant inquiry; the proper test is whether

the number of ballots collected by third parties surpasses any

de minimis number. Maj. Op. 84. But we already know “that

a bare statistical showing” that an election practice has a

“disproportionate impact on a racial minority does not

satisfy” step one of the § 2 inquiry. Salt River, 109 F.3d at

595 (emphasis in original). And, even if such impact were

sufficient, the record offers no evidence from which the

district court could determine the extent of the discrepancy

between minority voters as a proportion of the entire

electorate versus minority voters as a proportion of those who

have voted using ballot-collection services in the past. DNC,

329 F. Supp. 3d at 866–67.

3

As Judge Bybee keenly observed in a previous iteration

of this case (and indeed in his dissent in this case), “[t]here is

no constitutional or federal statutory right to vote by absentee

ballot.” Feldman III, 843 F.3d at 414 (Bybee, J., dissenting)

(citing McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chi.,

394 U.S. 802, 807–08 (1969)); accord Bybee, J. Diss.

Op. 156. Both today and in the past, Arizona has chosen to

provide a wide range of options to voters. But Arizona’s

previous decision to permit a particular mechanism of voting

does not preclude Arizona from modifying its election system

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to limit such mechanism in the future so long as such

modification is made in a constitutional manner. And, in fact,

Arizona’s modification here was made in compliance with

“the recommendation of the bipartisan Commission on

Federal Election Reform.” DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 855. 

Without any evidence in the record of the severity and

breadth of the burden imposed by this change to the ballotcollection policy, we cannot be “left with the definite and

firm conviction” that the district court erred in finding that

DNC failed to show that the policy violated § 2. See

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573; see also Salt River, 109 F.3d

at 591.

C

Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that

DNC has satisfied its burden at step one of the § 2 Voting

Rights Act inquiry, I would not reach step two. I therefore do

not address the majority’s consideration of the so-called

“Senate Factors” in determining whether the burden is “in

part caused by or linked to ‘social and historical conditions’

that have or currently produce discrimination against

members of the protected class.” League of Women Voters,

769 F.3d at 240 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47). These

factors—and the majority’s lengthy history lesson on past

election abuses in Arizona—simply have no bearing on this

case. Indeed, pages 47 to 81 of the majority’s opinion may

properly be ignored as irrelevant.

IV

DNC also contends that the ballot-collection policy

violates the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States

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Constitution.8 To succeed on a claim of discriminatory intent

under the Fifteenth Amendment, the challenger must

demonstrate that the state legislature “selected or reaffirmed

a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not

merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable

group.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279

(1979). Because discriminatory intent “is a pure question of

fact,” we again review only for clear error. PullmanStandard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287–88 (1982). 

“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was

a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such

circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be

available.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.

Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).

The district court concluded that the ballot-collection

policy did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment because it

made the factual finding that the legislature “was not

motivated by a desire to suppress minority voters,” although

“some individual legislators and proponents of limitations on

ballot collection harbored partisan motives” that “did not

permeate the entire legislative process.” DNC, 329 F. Supp.

3d at 879, 882 (emphasis added). Instead, “[t]he legislature

was motivated by . . . a sincere belief that mail-in ballots

lacked adequate prophylactic safeguards as compared to inperson voting.” Id. at 882. In analyzing DNC’s appeal from

such finding, the majority, once again, completelyignores our

demanding standard of review and instead conducts its own

8 The Fifteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enforce its

guarantee that the right “to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . by

appropriate legislation.” U.S. Const. amend. XV. Section 2 of the Voting

Rights Act is such legislation. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 536

(2013).

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de novo review. Maj. Op. 93. Our duty is only to consider

whether the district court clearly erred in its finding that the

ballot-collection policy was not enacted with discriminatory

intent. See Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573. And “to be

clearly erroneous, a decision must . . . strike [a court] as

wrong with the force of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead

fish.” Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., Inc., 953 F.2d

500, 502 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc.

v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988)).

The majority therefore fails to offer any basis—let alone

a convincing one—for the conclusion that it must reach in

order to reverse the decision of the district court: that the

district court committed clear error in its factual findings. 

Given the failure of the majority to conduct its review in the

proper manner, I see no reason to engage in a line-by-line

debate with its flawed analysis. Rather, it is enough to note

two critical errors made by the majority in ignoring the

district court’s determinations that while some legislators

were motivated by partisan concerns, the legislature as a body

was motivated by a desire to enact prophylactic measures to

prevent voter fraud.

A

First, the majority fails to distinguish between racial

motives and partisan motives. Even when “racial

identification is highly correlated with political affiliation,”

a partychallenging a legislative action nonetheless must show

that racial motives were a motivating factor behind the

challenged policy. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1473

(2017) (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243

(2001)). Nonetheless, the majority suggests that a legislator

motivated by partisan interest to enact a law that

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disproportionately impacts minorities must necessarily have

acted with racially discriminatory intent as well. For

example, the district court noted that Arizona State Senator

Don Shooter was, “in part motivated by a desire to eliminate

what had become an effective Democratic [Get Out The

Vote] strategy.” DNC, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 879. The majority

simply concludes that such finding shows racially

discriminatory intent as a motivating factor. But the

majority’s unsupported inference does not satisfythe required

showing. And the majority fails to cite any evidence

demonstrating that the district court’s finding to the contrary

was not “plausible in light of the record viewed in its

entirety.” Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574.

B

Second, in defiance of Supreme Court precedent to the

contrary, the majority assumes that a legislature’s stated

desire to prevent voter fraud must be pretextual when there is

no direct evidence of voter fraud in the legislative record. In

Crawford, the Court rejected the argument that actual

evidence of voter fraud was needed to justify the State’s

decision to enact prophylactic measures to prevent such

fraud. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195–96 . There, the Court

upheld an Indiana statute requiring in-person voters to present

government-issued photo identification in the face of a

constitutional challenge. Id. at 185. Although “[t]he record

contain[ed] no evidence of [voter] fraud actually occurring in

Indiana at any time in its history,” the Supreme Court

nonetheless determined that the State had a legitimate and

important interest “in counting only the votes of eligible

voters.” Id. at 194, 196; see also id. at 195 nn.11–13 (citing

“fragrant examples of” voter fraud throughout history and in

recent years). Given its interest in addressing its valid

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concerns of voter fraud, Arizona was free to enact

prophylactic measures even though no evidence of actual

voter fraud was before the legislature. Yet the majority does

not even mention Crawford, let alone grapple with its

consequences on this case.

And because no evidence of actual voter fraud is required

to justify an anti-fraud prophylactic measure, the majority’s

reasoning quickly collapses. The majority cites Senator

Shooter’s “false and race-based allegations” and the “LaFaro

video,” which the district court explained “showed

surveillance footage of a man of apparent Hispanic heritage

appearing to deliver early ballots” and “contained a narration

of [i]nnuendos of illegality . . . [and] racially tinged and

inaccurate commentary by . . . LaFaro.” DNC, 329 F. Supp.

3d at 876 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original). 

The majority contends that although “some members of the

legislature who voted for H.B. 2023 had a sincere, though

mistaken, non-race-based belief that there had been fraud in

third-party ballot collection, and that the problem needed to

be addressed,” a discriminatory purpose may be attributable

to all of them as a matter of law because any sincere belief

was “created by Senator Shooter’s false allegations and the

‘racially tinged’ LaFaro video.” Maj. Op. 99. The majority

claims that these legislators were used as “cat’s paws” to

“serve the discriminatory purposes of Senator Shooter,

Republican Chair LaFaro, and their allies.” Maj. Op. 100. 

Yet, the majority’s reliance on such employment

discrimination doctrine is misplaced because, unlike

employers whose decision may be tainted by the

discriminatory motives of a supervisor, each legislator is an

independent actor, and bias of some cannot be attributed to all

members. The very fact that some members had a sincere

belief that voter fraud needed to be addressed is enough to

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rebut the majority’s conclusion. To the contrary, the

underlying allegations of voter fraud did not need to be true

in order to justify the “legitimacy or importance of the State’s

interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters.” 

Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196. And the majority provides no

support for its inference of pretext where there is a sincere

and legitimate interest in addressing a valid concern. Maj.

Op. at 97–100. Instead, the majority accepts the district

court’s finding that some legislators “had a sincere, non-racebased belief that there was fraud” that needed to be

addressed. Nevertheless, unable to locate any discriminatory

purpose, it simply attributes one to them using the

inapplicable “cat’s paw doctrine.” Maj. Op. 99. Such

argument demonstrates the extraordinary leap in logic the

majority must make in order to justify its conclusion.

Let me restate the obvious: we may reverse the district

court’s intensely factual determination as to discriminatory

intent only if we determine that such finding was clearly

erroneous. Thus, even if the majority disagrees with the

district court’s finding, it must demonstrate that the evidence

was not “plausible in light of the record viewed in its

entirety.” Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574. Perhaps if the

majority had reminded itself of our appellate standard, it

would not have simply re-weighed the same evidence

considered by the district court to arrive at its own findings

on appeal.

V

The district court properly determined that neither

Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy nor its ballot-collection

policy violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth

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Amendment to the Constitution.9In concluding otherwise,

the majority misperceives the inquiry before us and fails to

narrow the scope of its review, instead insisting on acting as

a de novo trial court. That, of course, is not our role.

I would therefore affirm the judgment of the district court

and must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

BYBEE, Circuit Judge, with whom O’SCANNLAIN,

CLIFTON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, join,

dissenting:

The right to vote is the most fundamental of our political

rights and the basis for our representative democracy. “No

right is more precious” because it is a meta-right: it is the

means by which we select “those who make the laws under

which, as good citizens, we must live.” Wesberry v. Sanders,

376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). “Other rights, even the most basic, are

illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Id. Almost as

fundamental as the right to vote is the need for the electorate

to have confidence in the rules by which elections are

conducted.

9 Because the majority concludes that the OOP policy and the ballotcollection policy violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, it does not reach DNC’s

claim that such policies also violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution. I will not belabor such claims here; for

these purposes, it is sufficient to say that—for many of the reasons and

based on much of the evidence cited above—I would also conclude that

neither practice violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

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I write separately to make a simple point: The Arizona

rules challenged here are part of an “electoral process that is

necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the

democratic system.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441

(1992).1 The Constitution entrusts the “Times, Places and

Manner of holding Elections” to state legislatures, subject to

laws enacted by Congress to “make or alter such

Regulations.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. “‘Times, Places,

and Manner,’ . . . are ‘comprehensive words,’ which

‘embrace authority to provide a complete code for . . .

elections.’” Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc.,

570 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2013) (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S.

355, 366 (1932)); see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.

2484, 2495 (2019).

“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a

substantial regulation of elections if they are

to be fair and honest and if some sort of order,

rather than chaos, is to accompany the

democratic processes.” To achieve these

necessary objectives, States have enacted

comprehensive and sometimes complex

election codes. Each provision of these

schemes, whether it governs the registration

and qualifications of voters, the selection and

eligibility of candidates, or the voting process

itself, inevitably affects—at least in some

degree—the individual’s right to vote and his

right to associate with others for political

ends. Nevertheless, the State’s important

1

I join in full Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent. I write separately to place

the majority’s decision today in context of the American democratic

tradition.

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regulatory interests are generally sufficient to

justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory

restrictions.

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (citation

omitted) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730

(1974)).

Time, place, and manner restrictions are fundamentally

differently from provisions that affect the “Qualifications

requisite for Electors,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, and state

apportionments “according to their respective Numbers,” id.

art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The Constitution restricts with exactness the

qualifications states may require of their voters. See id.

amend. XV, § 1 (“race, color, or previous condition of

servitude”); amend. XIX (sex); amend. XXIV (“failure to pay

any poll tax or other tax”); amend. XXVI (those “eighteen

years of age or older, . . . on account of age”); Kramer v.

Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (property

ownership). Similarly, the constitutional imperative for one

person, one vote demands that apportionment be subject to

precision approaching “absolute population equality,”

Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983), “as nearly as

practicable,” Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531

(1969).

Time, place, and manner restrictions stand on different

footing from status-based restraints on vote qualifications and

legislative malapportionment. State requirements respecting

when and where we vote and how ballots will be counted are

“generally-applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect

the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.” 

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9. By contrast, for example,

“redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking

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in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws

district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status,

religions and political persuasion, and a variety of other

demographic factors.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646

(1993). Time, place, and manner restrictions are the rules of

the game, announced in advance, so that all voters will know

what they must do. Parties of all stripes should have an equal

interest in rules that are both fair on their face and fairly

administered.

Two such rules are challenged here: the rule about how

Arizona will count out-of-precinct votes (OOP) and the rule

about who may file another person’s absentee ballot (H.B.

2023). As rules of general applicability, they apply to all

voters, without “account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(a).2 Rather than simply recognizing that Arizona has

enacted neutral, color-blind rules, the majority has embraced

the premise that § 2 of the VRA is violated when any

minority voter appears to be adversely affected by Arizona’s

election laws. Although the majority abjures this premise for

now, claiming that it does “not need to go so far” as equating

“the case of an individually targeted single minority voter

who is denied the right to vote and the case where a facially

neutral policy affects a single voter,” Maj. Op. at 45, its

analysis necessarily rests on that premise. The majority has

2

In relevant part, § 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides that “[n]o

voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or

procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State . . . in a manner which

results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United

States to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). A

violation of § 2(a) may be shown “based on the totality of the

circumstances . . . [if] the political processes leading to nomination or

election in the State . . . are not equally open to participation by members

of a class of citizens [on account of race or color].” Id. § 10301(b).

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no limiting principle for identifying a de minimis effect in a

facially neutral time, place, or manner rule. The premise

finds its clearest expression in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in

League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d

224, 244 (4th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added): “[W]hat matters

for purposes of Section 2 is not how manyminority voters are

being denied equal electoral opportunities but simply that

‘any’ minority voter is being denied equal electoral

opportunities.” See Maj. Op. at 41–42, 45–46, 107 (relying

on League of Women Voters). Such a premise insists on a

precision that we have never demanded before.

By contrast, the Supreme Court explained that following

City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), “Congress

substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a violation could

be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and to

establish as the relevant legal standard the ‘results test,’

applied . . . in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).” 

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986). Yet in White,

the Court made clear that it “did not hold . . . that any

deviations from absolute equality, however small, must be

justified to the satisfaction of the judiciary to avoid

invalidation under the Equal Protection Clause.” 412 U.S. at

763–64. Rather, the Court recognized that any rule in an

election scheme might suffer “relatively minor population

deviations . . . . ‘based on legitimate considerations incident

to the effectuation of a rational state policy.’” Id. at 764

(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)).

A “rational state policy” surely includes the need for a

consistent, neutral set of time, place, and manner rules. The

majority’s reading of the Voting Rights Act turns § 2 into a

“one-minority-vote-veto rule” that may undo any number of

time, place, and manner rules. It is entirely results-bound, so

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much so that under the majority’s reading of the Voting

Rights Act, the same rules the majority strikes down in

Arizona may be perfectly valid in every other state, even

states within our circuit. It all depends on the numbers. 

Indeed, so diaphonous is the majority’s holding, that it may

be a temporary rule for Arizona. If Arizona were to reenact

these provisions again in, say, 2024, the numbers might come

out differently and the OOP and ballot collection rules would

be lawful once again.

The two Arizona rules at issue here—OOP and H.B.

2023—are rules of general applicability, just like the rules

governing voting on the day of the election, registering with

the Secretary of State, and bringing identification with you. 

Such “‘evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and

reliability of the electoral process itself’ are not invidious.” 

Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–90

(2008) (plurality opinion) (quotingAnderson, 460 U.S. at 788

n.9). Both rules the majority strikes down today have widelyheld, well-recognized—even distinguished—pedigrees. As

Ishow in Part I, the OOP is a long-standing rule that remains

in place in a majority of American jurisdictions. The rule the

majority prefers is a minority rule in the United States and,

more importantly, disregards Arizona’s interest in

encouraging voting in local elections and, in application, may

actually disadvantage minority voters. In Part II, I

demonstrate that, although H.B. 2023 is of more recent

vintage, similar rules are in place in other American

jurisdictions, and H.R. 2023 follows carefully the

recommendation of a bi-partisan commission on the integrity

of American elections.

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I

It has long been a feature of American democracy that, on

election day, voters must vote in person at an assigned polling

venue—an election precinct.

[I]t is the well established practice in nearly

every state to divide the county or city into a

number of geographical districts for the

purpose of holding elections. Each elector is

required to vote at the polling place of his

own precinct, which by custom is ordinarily

located within the precinct, and, in cities,

within a few blocks of his residence.

Joseph P. Harris, Election Administration in the United States

206–07 (1934). Like most American jurisdictions, Arizona’s

election rules require a non-absentee voter’s personal

presence at the polling place. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-411(A)

(“The broad of supervisors of each county . . . shall establish

a convenient number of election precincts in the county and

define the boundaries of the precincts.”). The reasons for

such a venue rule are

significant and numerous: it caps the number

of voters attempting to vote in the same place

on election day; it allows each precinct ballot

to list all of the votes a citizen may cast for all

pertinent federal, state, and local elections,

referenda, initiatives, and levies; it allows

each precinct ballot to list only those votes a

citizen may cast, making ballots less

confusing; it makes it easier for election

officials to monitor votes and prevent election

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fraud; and generally puts polling places in

closer proximity to voter residences.

Sandusky Cty. Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565,

569 (6th Cir. 2004).3 Precincts help to secure the orderly

administration of elections, which then assures all voters of

the integrity of the election.

A

Arizona’s out of precinct rule (OOP) is a standard feature

of American democracy. Under Arizona’s election code,

3

“One of the major voting innovations in certain states was the

increase in the number of polling places.” Robert J. Dinkin, Voting in

Revolutionary America: A Study of Elections in the Original Thirteen

States, 1776–1789, at 96 (1982). Among the states, New York led the

way, “enacting a law in 1778 which stated that all future elections should

be held ‘not by counties but by boroughs, towns, manors, districts, and

precincts.’” Id. at 97 (quoting Laws of New York, sess. 1, chap. 16

(1778)). In early America, polling places were located where the people

were:

voting . . . in barns, private homes, country stores, and

churches—almost anything that could separate voters

from the election officials and the ballot boxes they

tended. On the frontier, where buildings were even

harder to find, votes were sometimes cast in sodhouse

saloons, sutler stores near army forts, the front porches

of adobe houses, and temporary lean-tos thrown

together at desolate desert crossroads. In the larger

cities, fire stations, warehouses, and livery stables were

commonly used. One of the most common venues was

liquor establishments. . . . Such an arrangement made

an election noisy and, sometimes, violent.

Richard Franklin Bensel, The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth

Century 9 (2004).

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“[n]o person shall be permitted to vote unless such person’s

name appears as a qualified elector in both the general county

register and in the precinct register.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-

122. The election code provides extensive instructions for

electors who have changed their residence or whose name

does not appear on the precinct register; if there is any

question of the elector’s eligibility to vote in that precinct,

Arizona authorizes the filing of a provisional ballot. See, e.g.,

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-135, 16-583, 16-584, 16-592.

There is nothing unusual about Arizona’s OOP rule.4

Although there are variations in the way the rule is

formulated, by my count, twenty-six states, the District of

Columbia, and three U.S. territories disqualify ballots cast in

the wrong precinct.5 These states represent every region of

the country: The Northeast (Connecticut, Vermont), the midAtlantic (Delaware, District of Columbia, West Virginia), the

4 For many years, a voter was not even permitted to cast a provisional

ballot in a precinct other than her own. See Harris, Election

Administration in the United States, at 287–88. The Help America Vote

Act (HAVA) now requires states to permit voters to cast a provisional

ballot. 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a). HAVA, however, does not affect a state’s

rules about how to process a provisional ballot. It does provide that states

must create a toll-free number that “any individual who casts a provisional

ballot may access to discover whether the vote of that individual was

counted, and, if the vote was not counted, the reasons that the vote was not

counted.” 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(5)(B); see Blackwell, 387 F.3d at 576

(“HAVA is quintessentially about being able to cast a provisional

ballot. . . . [B]ut the ultimate legality of the vote cast provisionally is

generally a matter of state law.”).

5

I have listed all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and U.S.

territories, with relevant citations to their treatment of out of precinct

votes, in Appendix A. In Appendix B, I have categorized the jurisdictions

by rule.

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South (Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, South

Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Virgin Islands), the mid-West

(Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, South

Dakota, Wisconsin), the Southwest (Arizona, Oklahoma,

Texas), the Mountain States (Montana, Wyoming), and the

West (American Samoa, Hawaii, Nevada, Northern Mariana

Islands). Twenty states and two territories will count out of

precinct ballots, although the states are not uniform in what

they will count.6 They also represent a broad spectrum of the

country: The Northeast (Maine, Massachusetts, New York,

Rhode Island), the mid-Atlantic (Maryland, New Jersey,

Pennsylvania), the South (Arkansas, Louisiana, North

Carolina, Georgia, Puerto Rico), the mid-West (Ohio,

Kansas), the Southwest (New Mexico), the Mountain States

(Colorado, Utah), and the West (Alaska, California, Guam,

Oregon, Washington).7

Nowhere in its discussion of the “totality of the

circumstances” has the majority considered that Arizona’s

OOP provision is a widely held time, place, or manner rule. 

It is not a redistricting plan, see Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct.

1455 (2017); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,

548 U.S. 399 (2006); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); a

multimember district, see Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380

(1991); Gingles, 478 U.S. 30; or an at-large system, see

6 For example, five states will count an out-of-precinct vote, but only

if the ballot is filed in the voter’s county (Kansas, New Mexico,

Pennsylvania, Utah) or town (Massachusetts). Louisiana and Rhode

Island will only count votes for federal office. Puerto Rico will count only

votes for Governor and Resident Commissioner.

7 Four states (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota) are

not accounted for in either list because they allow same-day registration

and do not use provisional ballots.

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Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). Those

“circumstances” are as unique as a fingerprint, subject to

manipulation, and require “an intenselylocal appraisal” of the

state’s plan. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 78 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Arizona’s OOP applies

statewide; it is not a unique rule, but a traditional rule,

common to the majority of American states. The OOP rule,

as a rule of general applicability, is part of a “political

process[] . . . equally open to participation” by all Arizona

voters. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).

B

The majority asserts that “counting or partially counting

OOP ballots would [not] threaten the integrity of Arizona’s

precinct-based system.” Maj. Op. at 78. Effectively, the

majority holds that Arizona must abandon its traditional

polling venue rules and accept the ballots of voters who cast

their ballot in the wrong precinct, at least for national and

state-wide offices. Id. at 76–78 (citing the rules of California,

Utah, and New Mexico as an example of states partially

counting OOP ballots). Under the majority’s preferred

scheme, Arizona must count all votes for offices that are not

precinct dependent. As to the remainder of the ballot,

Arizona may—in accordance with its traditional rule—

disqualify the ballot for all offices for which the political

geography of the precinct matters. The majority has failed to

take into account that the rule it prefers has its own

consequences, including adverse consequences for minority

voters.

Let’s review an example to consider the unintended

consequences of the majority’s haste. Under Arizona’s

traditional rules, the state would disqualify the ballot of a

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voter from Tucson who votes in any precinct other than his

assigned precinct. Under the majority’s new rule, a voter

from Tucson may cross precinct lines and vote in any precinct

in Arizona—for instance, in Phoenix. His cross-precinct

ballot will be counted for those offices which are common to

ballots in his precinct-in-law in Tucson and his new precinctin-fact in Phoenix—such offices would include the

presidency, the U.S. Senate, and any statewide offices. His

ballot will be disqualified, however, for all state and local

offices defined by geographic boundaries that are not

common to the two precincts—for example, the U.S. House

of Representatives, the state legislature, and municipal offices

such as mayor, city council, and school board.

The majority’s rule will skew future elections in Arizona

in two predictable ways. First, it overvalues national

elections. Ballots for the presidency, the U.S. Senate, and

any state offices that would otherwise be disqualified must be

counted. Voters—whether intentionally or carelessly—may

vote with impunity in the wrong precinct, knowing that their

vote will count for the national and statewide offices.

Second, it undervalues local elections. Those same

ballots will not be counted toward those federal, state, and

local offices that are defined by geographic boundaries and

for which the voters from the outside precinct are not eligible. 

Non-conscientious voters—voters who care more about a

national or a statewide race than the local races—are

permitted to vote wherever they please, while conscientious

voters—those concerned with all the offices on the

ballot—are burdened by the requirement that they find their

way to their proper precinct. And if the conscientious voter

can’t get to the polling place on time, he will have cast no

ballot for any office, national, state, or local.

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The net result is that the majority has lowered the cost to

voters of determining where they are supposed to vote, but

only as to presidential, U.S. Senate, and statewide races. As

the majority no doubt intends, persons who didn’t know or

were confused about their polling place will have their vote

counted, but only in select races. But as the majority may not

have thought through, anyone in Arizona, including people

who know where they are supposed to vote in an election (but

for one reason or another would not have otherwise voted

because it was inconvenient or impossible to vote at their

home precinct), will also be able to vote—but again, only in

select races. Arizona can thus expect more votes in the

presidential, senatorial, and state races than would be cast

under its traditional rules. I suppose that in theory that’s a

good thing. What the majority has not counted on is the

effect its order will have on the races that depend on

geographic boundaries within Arizona: congressional, statelegislative, and local offices. When voters do not go to their

local precincts to vote, they cannot vote in those races. 

Voters who do not take the time to determine their

appropriate precinct—for whatever reason—and vote out of

precinct have disenfranchised themselves with respect to the

local races. That’s a bad thing.

Arizona’s longstanding, neutral rule gives voters an

incentive to figure out where their polling place is, which, in

turn, encourages voters to cast ballots in national, state, and

local elections. In effect, Arizona has stapled national and

statewide elections to other state and local elections. The

opportunity to vote in any one race is the opportunity to vote

in all races. It’s strong medicine, but Arizona’s rule is a selfprotective rule; it helps encourage voting and, presumably,

interest in local elections. The majority’s preferred rule gives

voters an incentive to vote wherever it is convenient for them

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which increases the likelihood they will vote in certain

national and statewide races, but decreases the likelihood they

will vote in other state and local races. It places a burden on

voters who wish to exercise their right to vote on all matters

to which they are entitled, a burden that simply would not

exist for the less-engaged voter. The majority’s rule

contradicts our most basic principles of federalism by

deeming elections for national and statewide offices more

important than those for lesser offices.

The majority’s concern is based on the fact that voters

who vote in the wrong precinct are more likely to be

minorities. Maj. Op. at 42–44. If that fact holds true in the

future—and it may not because, as I have explained, any

voter in Arizona (including those who know where to vote)

may take advantage of the majority’s new rule—then

minority ballots will be underrepresented in the local races. 

Under the majority’s preferred scheme, it is thus likely that

more minorities will fail to vote in local elections—elections

that most directly affect the daily lives of ordinary citizens,

and often provide the first platform by which citizencandidates, not endowed with personal wealth or name

recognition, seek on the path to obtaining higher office. In

any event, the court has just put a big thumb on the scale of

the Arizona elections—national, state, and local—with

unclear results.

These concerns are magnified when we consider the

relatively small number of OOP ballots. See Democratic

Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d 824, 873 (D. Ariz.

2018). It is more likely that these ballots would make a

difference in a local election than in a national or statewide

election. Arizona’s rule encourages its OOP voters—white,

African-American, Hispanic, or other—to vote in the correct

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precinct. Under Arizona’s current OOP rule, a voter, having

gone to the trouble of going to a precinct to vote in person

and suffering the indignity of having to fill out a provisional

ballot, is less likely to make the same mistake the next year.8

A voter who has had a ballot disqualified is more likely to

figure out the correct precinct next time—or, better yet, sign

up for the convenience of early voting, a measure that avoids

the conundrum of OOP altogether.9 The voter who only votes

8 The Majority dismisses this point by highlighting how Arizona has

frequently changed polling places in some localities. Maj. Op. at 111

(referring to Arizona’s high rate of OOP voting). But there is no evidence

in the record that the same voters’s ballots are excluded as OOP year after

year. My point is that a voter who has had her ballot excluded as OOP is

more likely to exercise greater care in finding the right polling location

next time.

9 The Majority worries that OOP voters may never come to know that

their votes were in fact rejected and, hence, will never learn from the

situation. Maj. Op. at 110. Whatever the cause for the Majority’s

concern, Arizona’s statutory law is not to blame. Arizona law specifically

requires county recorders to establish “a method of notifying the

provisional ballot voter at no cost to the voter whether the voter’s ballot

was verified and counted and, if not counted, the reason for not counting

the ballot.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-584(F) (2019). Thus, voters should

have the opportunity to find out whether their vote was counted.

Further, to the extent that voters inadvertently vote in the wrong

precinct, that is not a failing of Arizona law. Instead, the law requires that

voters’ names be checked on the precinct register. If a voter’s name does

not appear on the register, then the address is checked to confirm that the

voter resides within that jurisdiction. Id. § 16-584(B). Once the address

is confirmed to be in the precinct or the voter affirms in writing that the

voter is eligible to vote in that jurisdiction, the voter “shall be allowed to

vote a provisional ballot.” Id. Accordingly, under Arizona law, no voter

should inadvertently vote at the wrong precinct without some indication

that something is amiss.

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where it is convenient has disenfranchised himself from local

elections.

States such as California, Utah, and New Mexico have

made the same choice the majority forces on Arizona. Those

states may or may not have made the calculus I have set out

here and they may or may not have measured the costs and

benefits of their new rule; it’s theirs to experiment with. 

They may conclude that the new rule is the right one; they

may not. And if any of those states decides that the countthe-ballots-partially rule is not the best rule, those states will

be free to adopt a different rule, including the OOP rule the

majority strikes down today. After today’s decision, Arizona

has no such recourse.

II

H.B. 2023 presents a different set of considerations. 

There is no constitutional or federal statutory right to vote by

absentee ballot. See McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs

of Chi., 394 U.S. 802, 807–08 (1969) (“It is thus not the right

to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to receive

absentee ballots. . . . [T]he absentee statutes, which are

designed to make voting more available to some groups who

cannot easily get to the polls, do not themselves deny . . . the

exercise of the franchise . . . .”); see also Crawford, 553 U.S.

at 209 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“That the

State accommodates some voters by permitting (not

requiring) the casting of absentee or provisional ballots, is an

indulgence—not a constitutional imperative that falls short of

what is required.”); Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130

(7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the claim that there is “a blanket

right of registered voters to vote by absentee ballot” because

“it is obvious that a federal court is not going to decree

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weekend voting, multi-day voting, all-mail voting, or Internet

voting”).10 Nevertheless, if a state is going to offer absentee

ballots, it must do so on an equal basis. Arizona’s absentee

ballot rule, like its OOP rule, is a neutral time, place, or

manner provision to help ensure the integrity of the absentee

voting process. In fact, what is at issue here is not the right

of Arizona voters to obtain and return an absentee ballot, but

the question of who can physically return the ballot.

A

H.B. 2023 provides that “[a] person who knowingly

collects voted or unvoted early ballots from another person is

guilty of a class 6 felony.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-

1005(H) (codifying H.B. 2023). The law does not apply to

three classes of persons: (1) “[a]n election official,” (2) “a

United States postal service worker or any other person who

is allowed by law to transmit United States mail,” and (3) “[a]

10

“The exercise of a public franchise by proxy was illegal at common

law.” Cortlandt F. Bishop, History of Elections in the American Colonies

129 (1893). The Colonies experimented with proxy votes, with varying

degrees of success. Proxy voting was not a success in at least one colony. 

A 1683 letter to the Governor of South Carolina warned:

Wee are informed that there are many undue practices

in the choyce of members of Parlmt, and that men are

admitted to bring papers for others and put in their

votes for them, wh is utterly illegal & contrary to the

custome of Parliaments & will in time, if suffered, be

very mischeevious: you are therefore to take care that

such practices be not suffered for the future, but every

man must deliver his own vote & noe man suffered to

bring the votes of another . . . .

Id. at 139 (spelling in original) (citation omitted).

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familymember, household member or caregiver of the voter.” 

Id. § 16-1005(H)–(I)(2).

The Arizona provision is substantially similar to the laws

in effect in many other states. In Indiana, for example, it is a

felony for anyone to collect a voter’s absentee ballot, with

exceptions for members of the voter’s household, the voter’s

designated attorney in fact, certain election officials, and mail

carriers. Ind. Code § 3-14-2-16(4). Connecticut also restricts

ballot collection, permitting only the voter, a designee of an

ill or disabled voter, or the voter’s immediate family

members to mail or return an absentee ballot. Conn. Gen.

Stat. § 9-140b(a). New Mexico likewise permits only the

voter, a member of the voter’s immediate family, or the

voter’s caregiver to mail or return an absentee ballot. N.M.

Stat. Ann. § 1-6-10.1. At least seven other states (Georgia,

Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Ohio, and

Texas) similarly restrict who can personally deliver an

absentee ballot to a voting location. Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-

385(a) (limiting who may personally deliver an absentee

ballot to designees of ill or disabled voters or family

members); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.291(2) (restricting who can

personally deliver an absentee ballot); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 293.330(4) (making it a felony for anyone other than the

voter or the voter’s family member to return an absentee

ballot); Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 14-108(C) (voter delivering a

ballot must provide proof of identity); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.

§ 3509.05(A) (limiting who may personally deliver an absent

voter’s ballot); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 86.006(a) (permitting

only the voter to personally deliver the ballot).11

11 Until recently, two other states had similar provisions on the books. 

California formerly limited who could return mail ballots to the voter’s

family or those living in the same household. Compare Cal. Elec. Code

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Other states are somewhat less restrictive than Arizona

because they permit a broader range of people to collect early

ballots from voters but restrict how many ballots any one

person can collect and return. Colorado forbids anyone from

collecting more than ten ballots. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-7.5-

107(4)(b). North Dakota prohibits anyone from collecting

more than four ballots, N.D. Cent. Code § 16.1-07-08(1);

New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:63-4(a), and Minnesota,

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 203B.08 sbd. 1, three; Arkansas, Ark.

Code Ann. § 7-5-403(a)(1), Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-

943(2), and West Virginia, W. Va. Code § 3-3-5(k), two. 

South Dakota prohibits anyone from collectingmore than one

ballot without notifying “the person in charge of the election

of all voters for whom he is a messenger.” S.D. Codified

Laws § 12-19-2.2.

Still other states have adopted slightly different

restrictions on who may collect early ballots. California,

Maine, and North Dakota, for example, make it illegal to

collect an absentee ballot for compensation. Cal. Elec. Code

§ 3017(e)(1); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 791(2)(A)

(making it a crime to receive compensation for collecting

absentee ballots); N.D. Cent. Code § 16.1-07-08(1)

(prohibiting a person from receiving compensation for acting

as an agent for an elector). Florida and Texas make it a crime

to receive compensation for collecting certain numbers of

§ 3017(a)(2) (West 2019), with Cal. Elec. Code § 3017(a) (West 2015). 

It only amended its law in 2016. 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 820 (West). 

Illinois also used to make it a felony for anyone but the voter, his or her

family, or certain licensed delivery companies to mail or deliver an

absentee ballot. 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/19-6 (1996); 10 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 5/29-20(4). Illinois amended that provision in 2015 to let voters

authorize others to mail or deliver their ballots. 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.

5/19-6 (2015).

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ballots. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 104.0616(2) (making it a

misdemeanor to receive compensation for collecting more

than two vote-by-mail ballots); Tex. Elec. Code Ann.

§ 86.0052(a)(1) (criminalizing compensation schemes based

on the number of ballots collected for mailing).

Some of these laws are stated as a restriction on how the

early voter may return a ballot. In those states, the voter risks

having his vote disqualified. See, e.g., Wrinn v. Dunleavy,

440 A.2d 261, 272 (Conn. 1982) (disqualifying ballots and

ordering a new primary election when an unauthorized

individual mailed absentee ballots). In other states, as in

Arizona, the statute penalizes the person collecting the ballot. 

See Ind. Code Ann. § 3-14-2-16 (making it a felony

knowingly to receive a ballot from a voter); Nev. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 293.330(4) (making it a felony for unauthorized

persons to return an absentee ballot); Tex. Elec. Code Ann.

§ 86.006(f)–(g) (making it a crime for an unauthorized person

to possess an official ballot); see also Murphy v. State,

837 N.E.2d 591, 594–96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming a

denial of a motion to dismiss a charge for unauthorized

receipt of a ballot from an absentee voter); People v.

Deganutti, 810 N.E.2d 191, 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)

(affirming conviction for absentee ballot violation). In those

states, the ballot, even if collected improperly, may be valid. 

See In re Election of Member of Rock Hill Bd. of Educ.,

669 N.E.2d 1116, 1122–23 (Ohio 1996) (holding that a ballot

will not be disqualified for a technical error).

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In sum, although states have adopted a variety of rules,

Arizona’s ballot collection rule is fully consonant with the

broad range of rules throughout the United States.12

B

Even more striking than the number of other states with

similar provision is that H.B. 2023 follows precisely the

recommendation of the bi-partisan Carter-Baker Commission

on Federal Election Reform.13 TheCarter-Baker Commission

found:

Absentee ballots remain the largest source of

potential voter fraud. . . . Absentee balloting is

vulnerable to abuse in several ways: . . .

Citizens who vote at home, at nursing homes,

at the workplace, or in church are more

susceptible to pressure, overt and subtle, or to

intimidation. Vote buying schemes are far

more difficult to detect when citizens vote by

mail. States therefore should reduce the risks

of fraud and abuse in absentee voting by

prohibiting “third-party” organizations,

12 For context, Appendix C provides the relevant provisions of the

laws from all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories

regarding the collection and mailing of absentee ballots.

13 The Commission on Federal Election Reform was organized by

American University’s Center for Democracy and Election Management

and supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, The Ford

Foundation, the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, and the

Omidyar Network. It was co-chaired by former President Jimmy Carter

and former Secretary of State James Baker.

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candidates, and political party activists from

handling absentee ballots.

Comm’n on Fed. Elections Reform, Building Confidence in

U.S. Elections 46 (2005) (“Building Confidence”) (footnote

omitted). The Carter-Baker Commission recommended that

“States . . . should reduce the risks of fraud and abuse in

absentee voting by prohibiting ‘third-party’ organizations,

candidates, and political party activists from handling

absentee ballots.” Id. It made a formal recommendation:

State and local jurisdictions should

prohibit a person from handling absentee

ballots other than the voter, an acknowledged

family member, the U.S. Postal Service or

other legitimate shipper, or election officials. 

The practice in some states of allowing

candidates or party workers to pick up and

deliver absentee ballots should be eliminated.

Id. at 47 (Recommendation 5.2.1).

The Carter-Baker Commission recommended that states

limit the persons, other than the voter, who handle or collect

absentee ballots to three classes of persons: (1) family

members, (2) employees of the U.S. Postal Service or another

recognized shipper, and (3) election officials. H.B. 2013

allows two classes of persons to collect absentee ballots:

(1) election officials and (2) employees of the U.S. Postal

Service “or any other person who is allowed by law to

transmit United States mail.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(H). 

H.B. 2023 also provides that the prior restriction on collection

of ballots does not apply to “[a] family member, household

member or caregiver of the voter.” Id. § 16-1005(I)(2). With

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respect to election officials and mail delivery workers,

Arizona tracks exactly the recommendation from the

Commission. With respect to family, however, Arizona’s

provision is more generous than the Carter-Baker

Commission’s recommendation. Whereas the Commission

recommended that only family members be permitted to

handled a voter’s absentee ballot, Arizona expanded the class

of absentee ballot handlers to “household member[s]” and

“caregiver[s].”

I don’t see how Arizona can be said to have violated the

VRA when it followed bipartisan recommendations for

election reform in an area the Carter-Baker Commission

found to be fraught with the risk of voter fraud. Nothing

could be more damaging to confidence in our elections than

fraud at the ballot box. And there is evidence that there is

voter fraud in the collecting of absentee ballots. As the

Seventh Circuit described it: “Voting fraud is a serious

problem in U.S. elections generally . . . and it is facilitated by

absentee voting. . . . [A]bsentee voting is to voting in person

as a take-home exam is to a proctored one.” Griffin, 385 F.3d

at 1130–31; see also Wrinn, 440 A.2d at 270 (“[T]here is

considerable room for fraud in absentee voting and . . . a

failure to comply with the regulatory provision governing

absentee voting increases the opportunity for fraud.” (citation

omitted)); Qualkinbush v. Skubisz, 826 N.E.2d 1181, 1197

(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“[T]he integrity of a vote is even more

susceptible to influence and manipulation when done by

absentee ballot.”); Adam Liptak, Error and Fraud at Issue as

Absentee Voting Rises, N.Y. Times (Oct. 6, 2012),

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http://nyti.ms/QUbcrg (discussing a variety of problems in

states).14

Organized absentee ballot fraud of sufficient scope to

corrupt an election is no doomsday hypothetical: it happened

as recently as 2018 in North Carolina. In the state’s Ninth

Congressional District, over 282,000 voters cast ballots,

either in person or absentee. See Brief of Dan McCready at 7,

In re Investigation of Election Irregularities Affecting Ctys.

Within the 9th Cong. Dist. (N.C. State Bd. of Elections Feb.

12, 2019) [hereinafter McCready Br.]. North Carolina

permits “[a]ny qualified voter” in the state to vote by

absentee ballot. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163A-1295. However, like

Arizona, the state adheres to the Commission’s

recommendations and restricts the categories of persons who

may collect a voter’s absentee ballot. It is a Class I felony in

North Carolina for “any person except the voter’s near

relative or the voter’s verifiable legal guardian to assist the

voter to vote an absentee ballot.” Id. § 163A-1298.

In last year’s election in the Ninth Congressional District,

evidence suggested that a political activist hired by the

Republican nominee paid employees to collect absentee

ballots—possibly more than 1,000—from voters in violation

of § 163A-1298. See Indictment, State v. Dowless,

No. 19CRS001934 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 30, 2019);

McCready Br. at app. 2–3. An employee of the suspected

14 Pressure on absentee voters has long been noted. See Harris,

Election Administration in the United States, at 302 (“The amount of

intimidation now exercised by the precinct captain in many sections of

large cities is very great; with mail voting it would be enormously

increased. The overbearing and dominant precinct captain would insist

upon seeing howeach voter under obligation to himhad marked his ballot,

and the voter would have no protection against such tactics.”).

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activist testified that she personally collected about three

dozen ballots. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 150,

In re Investigation of Election Irregularities Affecting Ctys.

Within the 9th Cong. Dist. (N.C. State Bd. of Elections Feb.

18, 2019). She also helped fill in about five or ten

incomplete, unsealed ballots in favor of Republican

candidates. Id. at 67, 99, 152–53. The ballots were kept at

the activist’s home and office for days or longer before they

were turned in. Id. at 69. A voter testified that she turned

over her blank ballot to the activist’s employees in an

unsealed envelope, trusting that the activist would make a

good decision for her. Id. at 207–08, 214–15.

This coordinated ballot fraud led the state Board of

Elections to invalidate the results of the election, which had

been decided by only 905 votes—fewer than the amount of

suspected fraudulent ballots. Order at 10, 44–45, In re

Investigation of Election Irregularities Affecting Ctys. Within

the 9th Cong. Dist. (N.C. State Bd. of Elections Mar. 13,

2019). The residents of the district—some 778,447

Americans—were thus unrepresented in the House of

Representatives for the better part of a year. Perhaps the

more devastating injury will be the damage this episode does

to North Carolinians’ confidence in their election system.

The majority acknowledges that the Democratic Party

disproportionately benefits from get-out-the-vote efforts by

collecting mail-in ballots. See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 83 (quoting

Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 870). Further, the majority

acknowledges that Democratic activists have often led such

collection efforts. Id. Yet the experience of North Carolina

with Republican activists shows starkly the inherent danger

to allowing political operatives to conduct collections of

mail-in ballots. Arizona is well within its right to look at the

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perils endured by its sister states and enact prophylactic

measures to curtail any similar schemes. By prohibiting

overtly political operatives and activists from playing a role

in the ballot-collection process, Arizona mitigates this risk. 

And the State’s well-acknowledged past sins should not

prevent it from using every available avenue to keep safe the

public’s trust in the integrity of electoral outcomes.

Indeed, Arizona does not have to wait until it has proof

positive that its elections have been tainted by absentee ballot

fraud before it may enact neutral rules. “Legislatures . . .

should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the

electoral process with foresight rather than reactively.” 

Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986). 

In Crawford, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the

Carter-Baker Commission:

There is no evidence of extensive fraud in

U.S. elections or of multiple voting, but both

occur, and it could affect the outcome of a

close election. The electoral system cannot

inspire public confidence if no safeguards

exist to deter or detect fraud or to confirm the

identity of voters.

Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194 (quoting Building Confidence

at 18) (footnote omitted).

The majority today holds that, as a matter of federal law,

Arizona may not enforce a neutrally drawn statute

recommended by a bi-partisan commission criminalizing the

very conduct that produced a fraudulent outcome in a race for

Congress less than a year ago. When the Voting Rights Act

requires courts to consider the “totality of the circumstances,”

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it is a poor understanding of the Act that would strike

common time, place, and manner restrictions designed to

build confidence in the very voting system that it now leaves

vulnerable.

III

As citizens of a democratic republic, we understand

intuitively that we have a legal right and a moral duty to cast

a ballot in free elections. The states have long had the power

to fashion the rules by which its citizens vote for their

national, state, and local officials. Once we consider that

“totality of the circumstances” must take account of longheld, widely adopted measures, we must conclude that

Arizona’s time, place, and manner rules are well within our

American democratic-republican tradition. Nothing in the

Voting Rights Act makes “‘evenhanded restrictions that

protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process’

. . . invidious.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 189–90 (quoting

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9).

I would affirm the judgment of the district court, and I

respectfully dissent. 

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Appendix A

State and Territory Laws Regarding Treatment of

 Out-of-Precinct Provisional Ballots

Jurisdiction Citation

Alabama Ala. Code § 17-9-10 (2019) (providing

that voters must vote in their “county

and voting place” of domicile); see also

Davis v. Bennett, 154 So. 3d 114, 131

(Ala. 2014) (affirming that Alabama

law requires voters to cast ballots at the

correct voting place).

Alaska Alaska Stat. Ann. § 15.20.207(b) (West

2019) (failing to list out-of-precinct

voting as grounds for rejecting a

b a ll o t); Al a ska St a t. Ann .

§ 15.20.211(a) (West 2019) (providing

that a voter may cast a vote in another

house district for statewide and federal

offices); see also Hammond v. Hickel,

588 P.2d 256, 264 (Alaska 1978)

(“There is no constitutionalrequirement

of precinct residency, and there is clear

statutory authorization for persons

claiming to be registered voters to vote

a questioned ballot if there is no

evidence of registration in the precinct

in which the voter seeks to vote.”).

American

Samoa

Am. Samoa Code Ann. § 6.0223(b)–(c)

(providing that a voter’s right to vote

may be challenged if the voter “is not

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entitled to vote in that district” and, if

true, the ballot will be rejected).

Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-584(D)–(E)

(2018) (requiring confirmation that the

voter resided in the precinct).

Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-308(f) (West

2017) (requiring only that voters be

registered to vote in the state).

California Cal. Elec. Code § 14310(c)(3) (West

2019) (“The provisional ballot of a

voter who is otherwise entitled to vote

shall not be rejected because the voter

did not cast his or her ballot in the

precinct to which he or she was

assigned by the elections official.”).

Colorado 8 Colo. Code Regs. § 1505-1:17.2.9

(2019) (providing that if an elector used

the wrong ballot, then “only races and

issues for which the elector [was]

qualified to vote may be counted”).

Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-232, 9-232n

(West 2019) (requiring that only

provisional ballots by applicants

eligible to vote in a given town may be

counted).

Delaware D e l . Co d e A n n . t i t . 1 5 ,

§ 4948(h)(7)–(8) (West 2015)

(explaining that provisional ballots may

not be counted if cast by voters outside

of their election districts).

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District of

Columbia

D.C. Code Ann. § 1-1001.09(b)(3)

(West 2017) (providing that, aside from

those requiring accessible entrances,

“[n]o registered qualified elector of the

District may cast a vote in a precinct

that does not serve his or her current

residence”); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3,

§ 807 (2019) (stating that a provisional

ballot may be tabulated if, inter alia,

“the voter cast the Special Ballot at the

precinct in which the voter maintains

residence or at an early voting center

designated by the Board”).

Florida Fla. Stat. Ann. § 101.048(2)(a) (West

2019) (“The county canvassing board

shall examine each Provisional Ballot

Voter’s Certificate and Affirmation to

determine if the person voting that

ballot was entitled to vote at the

precinct where the person cast a vote in

the election . . . .”).

Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-419(c)(2) (West

2019) (stating that if a voter voted in

the wrong precinct, then races for

which the voter was entitled to vote

shall be counted).

Guam 3 Guam Code Ann. § 14105(a) (2016)

(“When a provisional voter casts a

provisional ballot in the incorrect

precinct, election officials shall count

the votes on that ballot in every race for

which the voter would be entitled to

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vote if he or she had been in the correct

precinct.”).

Hawai‘i Haw. Code R. § 3-172-140(c)(3) (2017)

(“If [the] county clerk determines the

individual is not eligible to vote in the

precinct where the provisional ballot

was cast, the provisional ballot shall not

be counted.”).

Idaho Does not use provisional ballots

because the state allows for electionday registration. See Idaho Code Ann.

§ 34-408A (West 2019).

Illinois 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/18A-15(b)(1)

(West 2015) (explaining that a

provisional ballot is valid if, inter alia,

“the provisional voter cast the

provisional ballot in the correct

precinct”).

Indiana Ind. Code Ann. § 3-11.7-5-3(a) (West

2019) (providing that a ballot is invalid

and may not be counted if “the

provisional voter is not a qualified voter

of the precinct”).

Iowa Iowa Code Ann. § 49.9 (West 2019)

(explaining that “a person shall not vote

in any precinct but that of the person’s

residence”).

Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3002(b)(3) (West

2019) (explaining that if a voter cast a

ballot for the wrong precinct, but was

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still within the same county, then votes

for which the voter was eligible will be

counted).

Kentucky 31 Ky. Admin. Regs. 6:020(14) (2019)

(“If the county board of elections

determines the individual is ineligible

to vote in the precinct in the election,

the vote shall not be counted . . . .”).

Louisiana La. Stat. Ann. § 18:556.2(F)(3)(a)–(b)

(2017) (stating that a provisional ballot

may be counted if the voter was a

registered voter in the parish and was

eligible to vote for the federal offices

cast).

Maine Me. Stat. tit. 11, § 50 (2019) (providing

that all ballots cast in Maine will be

counted so long as “challenged ballots

are insufficient in number to affect the

result of the election”).

Maryland Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 11-

303(e)(2) (West 2019) (stating that if

the voter voted out of precinct, “only

the votes cast by the voter for each

candidate or question applicable to the

precinct in which the voter resides” will

get counted).

Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 54, § 76C(d)

(West 2004) (“A provisional ballot cast

by a person whose name is not on the

voting list for the city or town in which

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they are claiming the right to vote, but

whom the city or town clerk determines

to be eligible to vote in another precinct

of the same city or town, shall be

counted in the precinct in which the

person cast the provisional ballot for all

offices for which the person is eligible

to vote.”).

Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 168.813(1)

(West 2018) (stating that provisional

ballots may only be counted “if the

identity and residence of the elector is

established”).

Minnesota Does not use provisional ballots

because the state allows for electionday registration. See Minn. Stat. Ann.

§ 201.061 subd. 3(a) (West 2017).

Mississippi 1 Miss. Admin. Code Pt. 10, Exh. A

(2019) (“Poll managers shall advise an

affidavit voter his/her ballot will not

count if he/she is voting at the wrong

polling place.”).

Missouri Mo. Ann. Stat. § 115.430(2)(1) (West

2019) (explaining that ballots voted in

a polling place where the voter was not

eligible to vote will not be counted).

Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 13-15-107 (West

2019) (stating that a ballot must be

rejected if the voter’s identity and

eligibility cannot be verified).

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Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-1002(5)(e)

(West 2019) (providing that a

provisional ballot shall not be counted

if “[t]he residence address provided on

the registration application completed

. . . is in a different county or in a

different precinct than the county or

precinct in which the voter voted”).

Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293.3085 (West

2019) (“A provisional ballot must not

be counted if the county or city clerk

determines that the person who cast the

provisional ballot cast the wrong ballot

for the address at which the person

resides.”).

New

Hampshire

Does not use provisional ballots

because the state allows for electionday registration. See N.H. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 654:7-a (2017).

New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:53C-17 (West

2019) (“If, for any reason, a provisional

ballot voter votes a ballot other than the

ballot for the district in which the voter

is qualified to vote, the votes for those

offices and questions for which the

voter would be otherwise qualified to

vote shall be counted. All other votes

shall be void.”).

New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-25.4(F) (West

2019) (“If the voter is a registered voter

in the county but has voted on a

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provisional paper ballot other than the

ballot of the voter’s correct precinct,

the county canvassing board shall

ensure that only those votes for the

positions or measures for which the

voter was eligible to vote are

counted.”).

New York N.Y. Elec. Law § 9-209(2)(a)(iii)

(McKinney 2019) (“If the board of

elections determines that a person was

entitled to vote at such election, the

board shall cast and canvass such ballot

if such board finds that the voter

appeared at the correct polling place,

regardless of the fact that the voter may

have appeared in the incorrect election

district.”).

North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163A1169(a)(4) (West 2019) (“If the county

board of elections finds that an

individual voting a provisional official

ballot (i) was registered in the county as

provided in G.S. 163A-1166, (ii) voted

in the proper precinct under G.S. 163A841 and G.S. 163A-842, and (iii) was

otherwise eligible to vote, the

provisional official ballots shall be

counted by the county board of

elections before the canvass. Except as

provided in G.S. 163A-1184(e), if the

county board finds that an individual

voting a provisional official ballot

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(i) did not vote in the proper precinct

under G.S. 163A-841 and G.S. 163A842, (ii) is not registered in the county

as provided in G.S. 163A-860, or (iii) is

otherwise not eligible to vote, the ballot

shall not be counted. If a voter was

properly registered to vote in the

election by the county board, no

mistake of an election official in giving

the voter a ballot or in failing to comply

with G.S. 163A-1184 or G.S. 163A1142 shall serve to prevent the counting

of the vote on any ballot item the voter

was eligible by registration and

qualified by residency to vote.”).

North Dakota North Dakota does not require voters to

be registered and does not utilize

provisional ballots. See N.D. Cent.

Code Ann. § 16.1-01-04 (West 2019).

Northern

Mariana Islands

1 N. Mar. I. Code § 6215(b)–(c) (2014)

(providing that a voter’s right to vote

may be challenged if the voter “is not

entitled to vote in that election district”

and, if true, the ballot will be rejected).

Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3505.183(D)

(West 2019) (stating that under certain

circumstances, if a voter cast a ballot in

the wrong precinct due to poll-worker

error, then the votes for which the voter

would have been eligible to cast are

counted).

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Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 7-116.1(C)

(West 2019) (“A provisional ballot

shall be counted only if it is cast in the

precinct of the voter’s residence . . . .”).

Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 254.408(6) (West

2018)(explaining that provisional votes

will be counted according to whether

“the elector is qualified to vote for the

particular office or on the measure”).

Pennsylvania 25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.

§ 3050(a.4)(7) (West 2012) (providing

that so long as a ballot is cast within the

voter’s county, if it is cast in the wrong

election district, then only votes which

the voter was entitled to make will be

counted).

Puerto Rico P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 16, § 4062 (2011)

(“If a voter votes in a precinct other

than the one where he/she is registered,

only the vote cast for the offices of

Governor and Resident Commissioner

shall be adjudicated during the general

canvass.”).

Rhode Island 410 R.I. Code R. § 20-00-13.7(C)(1)(b)

(2012) (stating that when a voter who

cast a provisional ballot lives outside of

the precinct, the ballot shall be marked

“Federal Offices Only” and only votes

for federal officials for whom the voter

was eligible to vote shall be counted).

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South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 7-13-830 (2019) (“If

the board certifies the person

challenged is not a qualified elector of

the precinct, this certification is

considered an administrative challenge

and is clear and convincing evidence

for the meeting authority to disallow

the ballot.”).

South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws § 12-20-5.1 (2019)

(“Prior to the official canvass, the

person in charge of the election shall

determine if the person voting by

provisional ballot was legally qualified

to vote in the precinct in which the

provisional ballot was cast.”).

Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-7-112(a)(3)(B)(v)

(West 2018) (explaining that a ballot

shall be rejected if it is determined that

the voter should not have cast the ballot

in the precinct).

Texas Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 65.054(b)(1)

(West 2012) (stating that a provisional

ballot shall be accepted only if the voter

was qualified to cast it); see also

Morales v. Segura, No. 04-15-365,

2015 WL 8985802, at *4 (Tex. App.

Dec. 16, 2015) (upholding the rejection

of a ballot voted in the wrong precinct).

Utah Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-107(a)–(c)

(West 2019) (explaining that a ballot

voted in the wrong precinct but the

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right county is able to have any votes

counted for which the voter was

eligible to vote).

Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2121(a) (West

2019) (explaining that a voter is

qualified to “register to vote in the town

of his or her residence”); see also id.

§ 2557(a) (stating that a provisional

ballot may be accepted once the town

clerk “determine[s] whether the

applicant meets all of the registration

eligibility requirements”).

Virgin Islands V.I. Code Ann. tit. 18, §§ 581(a), 587

(2019) (providing that voters must

reside in their election districts and that

poll workers must challenge an

individual that they believe does not

reside within the district).

Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-653(B) (West

2015) (“The electoral board shall . . .

determine whether each person having

submitted such a provisional vote was

entitled to do so as a qualified voter in

the precinct in which he offered the

provisional vote.”).

Washington Wash. Admin. Code § 434-262-032

(2019) (listing situations where a ballot

must be struck and failing to provide

out-of-precinct voting as reason for

disqualifying a ballot).

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West Virginia W. Va. Code Ann. § 3-1-41(d) (West

2016) (stating that poll clerks must

warn “that if the voter is casting a ballot

in the incorrect precinct, the ballot cast

may not be counted for that election”).

Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. § 6.97(4) (West 2018)

(providing that there must be a

determination of whether the

“individual who has voted under this

section is qualified to vote in the ward

or election district where the

individual’s ballot is cast”).

Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-15-105(b) (West

2019) (requiring voters to swear that

they are entitled to vote in the given

precinct).

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Appendix B

State and Territory Treatment of Out-of-Precinct

Provisional Ballots15

Do Not Tabulate Out-ofPrecinct BallotsTabulate Out-of-Precinct

Ballots

Alabama Alaska

American Samoa Arkansas

Arizona California

Connecticut Colorado

Delaware Georgia

District of Columbia Guam

Florida Kansas*

Hawai‘i Louisiana†

Illinois Maine

Indiana Maryland

Iowa Massachusetts*

Kentucky New Jersey

Michigan New Mexico*

15 Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and North Dakota are not

included because they do not use provisional ballots. See supra

Appendix A.

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Mississippi New York

Missouri North Carolina‡

Montana Ohio††

Nebraska Oregon

Nevada Pennsylvania*

Northern Mariana Islands Puerto Rico**

Oklahoma Rhode Island†

South Carolina Utah*

South Dakota Washington

Tennessee

Texas

Vermont

Virgin Islands

Virginia

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

* Requires the voter to be in the correct county, city, or

town.

† Tabulates votes for federal offices only.

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‡ There is some divergence among secondary sources

regarding whether North Carolina counts OOP ballots. 

Compare Provisional Ballots, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures

(Oct. 15, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/provisional-ballots.aspx, with What Is

Provisional Voting? Explained, democracy N.C.,

https://democracync.org/resources/what-is-provisionalvoting-explained (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). North Carolina

law generally favors counting only provisional ballots cast

within the correct precinct. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163A1169(a)(4) (West 2019) (“[I]f the county board finds that an

individual voting a provisional official ballot (i) did not vote

in the proper precinct . . . the ballot shall not be counted.”);

see also James v. Bartlett, 607 S.E.2d 638, 642 (N.C. 2005)

(“[V]oters must cast ballots on election day in their precincts

of residence.”). Nevertheless, North Carolina law appears to

allow an OOP vote to be tabulated in very narrow

exceptions—such as election-official error. See N.C. Gen.

Stat. Ann. § 163A-1169(a)(4) (“If a voter was properly

registered to vote in the election by the county board, no

mistake of an election official in giving the voter a ballot or

in failing to comply with G.S. 163A-1184 or G.S. 163A-1142

shall serve to prevent the counting of the vote on any ballot

item the voter was eligible by registration and qualified by

residency to vote.”). This dissent resolves doubt in favor of

listing North Carolina as a state that counts OOP

ballots—even though its current law and practice are not

entirely clear.

†† The ballot may be counted if, among other things, the

casting of the wrong ballot was a result of poll-worker error. 

Only offices for which the voter would have been eligible to

vote will be counted.

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** Only the votes for Governor and Resident

Commissioner will be canvassed.

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Appendix C

State and Territory Laws Regarding the

Collection of Absentee Ballots

Jurisdiction Citation

Alabama Ala. Code § 17-11-4 (2019):

An application for a voter who requires

emergency treatment by a licensed

physician within five days before an

election pursuant to Section 17-11-3

may be forwarded to the absentee

election manager by the applicant or his

or her designee.

Alaska Alaska Stat. Ann. § 15.20.072 (West

2019) (providing a method a personal

representative to handle and deliver

ballots for a special needs voter).

American

Samoa

Am. Samoa Code Ann. 6.1104(a):

The reply envelope shall bear upon the

face thereof the name, official title, and

post office address of the Chief

Election Officer and the words

“Absentee Ballot Enclosed”. The back

of the reply envelope shall contain a

statement to be subscribed to by the

qualified elector which affirms the fact

that he is the person voting.

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Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-1005(H)–(I)

(2016):

H. A person who knowingly collects

voted or unvoted early ballots from

another person is guilty of a class 6

felony. An election official, a United

States postal service worker or any

other person who is allowed by law to

transmit United States mail is deemed

not to have collected an early ballot if

the official, worker or other person is

engaged in official duties.

I. Subsection H of this section does not

apply to:

1. An election held by a special taxing

district formed pursuant to title 481 for

the purpose of protecting or providing

services to agricultural lands or crops

and that is authorized to conduct

elections pursuant to title 48.

2. A family member, household

member or caregiver of the voter. For

the purposes of this paragraph:

(a) “Caregiver” means a person who

provides medical or health care

assistance to the voter in a residence,

nursing care institution, hospice

facility, assisted living center, assisted

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living facility, assisted living home,

residential care institution, adult day

health care facility or adult foster care

home.

(b) “Collects” means to gain possession

or control of an early ballot.

(c) “Family member” means a person

who is related to the voter by blood,

marriage, adoption or legal

guardianship.

(d) “Household member” means a

person who resides at the same

residence as the voter.

Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-403(a) (West

2019):

(1) A designated bearer may obtain

absentee ballots for no more than two

(2) voters per election.

(2)(A) A designated bearer shall not

have more than two (2) absentee ballots

in his or her possession at any time.

(B) If the county clerk knows or

reasonably suspects that a designated

bearer has more than two (2) absentee

ballots in his or her possession, the

county clerk shall notify the

prosecuting attorney.

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(3)(A) A designated bearer receiving an

absentee ballot from the county clerk

for a voter shall obtain the absentee

ballot directly from the county clerk

and deliver the absentee ballot directly

to the voter.

(B) A designated bearer receiving an

absentee ballot from a voter shall obtain

the absentee ballot directly from the

voter and deliver the absentee ballot

directly to the county clerk.

(4)(A) A designated bearer may deliver

to the county clerk the absentee ballots

for not more than two (2) voters.

(B) The designated bearer shall be

named on the voter statement

accompanying the absentee ballot.

California Cal. Elec. Code § 3017(a)(2) (West

2019):

A vote by mail voter who is unable to

return the ballot may designate another

person to return the ballot to the

elections official who issued the ballot,

to the precinct board at a polling place

or vote center within the state, or to a

vote by mail ballot dropoff location

within the state that is provided

pursuant to Section 3025 or 4005. The

person designated shall return the ballot

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in person, or put the ballot in the mail,

no later than three days after receiving

it from the voter or before the close of

the polls on election day, whichever

time period is shorter. Notwithstanding

subdivision (d), a ballot shall not be

disqualified from being counted solely

because it was returned or mailed more

than three days after the designated

person received it from the voter,

provided that the ballot is returned by

the designated person before the close

of polls on election day.

Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1-7.5-

107(4)(b)(I) (West 2019)

The eligible elector may:

(A) Return the marked ballot to the

county clerk and recorder or designated

election official by United States mail

or by depositing the ballot at the office

of the county clerk and recorder or

designated election official or at any

voter service and polling center, drop

box, or drop-off location designated by

the county clerk and recorder or

designated election official as specified

in the election plan filed with the

secretary of state. The ballot must be

returned in the return envelope.

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(B) Deliver the ballot to any person of

the elector’s own choice or to any duly

authorized agent of the county clerk

and recorder or designated election

official for mailing or personal

delivery; except that no person other

than a duly authorized agent of the

county clerk and recorder or designated

election official may receive more than

ten mail ballots in any election for

mailing or delivery; or

(C) Cast his or her vote in person at the

voter service and polling center.

Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 9-140b(a)

(West 2019):

An absentee ballot shall be cast at a

primary, election or referendum only if:

(1) It is mailed by (A) the ballot

applicant, (B) a designee of a person

who applies for an absentee ballot

because of illness or physical disability,

or (C) a member of the immediate

family of an applicant who is a student,

so that it is received by the clerk of the

municipality in which the applicant is

qualified to vote not later than the close

of the polls; (2) it is returned by the

applicant in person to the clerk by the

day before a regular election, special

election or primary or prior to the

opening of the polls on the day of a

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referendum; (3) it is returned by a

designee of an ill or physically disabled

ballot applicant, in person, to said clerk

not later than the close of the polls on

the day of the election, primary or

referendum; (4) it is returned by a

member of the immediate family of the

absentee voter, in person, to said clerk

not later than the close of the polls on

the day of the election, primary or

referendum; (5) in the case of a

presidential or overseas ballot, it is

mailed or otherwise returned pursuant

to the provisions of section 9-158g; or

(6) it is returned with the proper

identification as required by the Help

America Vote Act, P.L. 107-252,1 as

amended from time to time, if

applicable, inserted in the outer

envelope so such identification can be

viewed without opening the inner

envelope. A person returning an

absentee ballot to the municipal clerk

pursuant to subdivision (3) or (4) of this

subsection shall present identification

and, on the outer envelope of the

absentee ballot, sign his name in the

presence of the municipal clerk, and

indicate his address, his relationship to

the voter or his position, and the date

and time of such return. As used in this

section, “immediate family” means a

dependent relative who resides in the

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individual’s household or any spouse,

child or parent of the individual.

Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 15, § 5507(4) (West

2018):

The elector shall return the sealed ballot

envelope to the Department by:

a. Depositing it in a United States

postal mailbox, therebymailing it to the

Department; or

b. Delivering it, or causing it to be

delivered, to the Department before the

polls close on the day of the election.

District of

Columbia

D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3, § 722.2 (2019):

A duly registered voter shall apply to

vote by emergency absentee ballot

according to the following procedure:

(a) The registered voter shall, by signed

affidavit on a form provided by the

Board, set forth:

(1) The reason why he or she is unable

to be present at the polls on the day of

the election; and

(2) Designate a duly registered voter to

serve as agent for the purpose of

delivering the absentee ballot to the

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voter, except than an officer of the

court in charge of a jury sequestered on

election day may act as agent for any

registered voter sequestered regardless

of whether the officer is a registered

voter in the District.

(b) Upon receipt of the application, the

Executive Director, or his or her

designee, if satisfied that the person

cannot, in fact, be present at the polling

place on the day of the election shall

issue to the voter, through the voter’s

duly authorized agent, an absentee

ballot which shall be marked by the

voter, placed in a sealed envelope and

returned to the Board before the close

of the polls on election day.

(c) The person designated as agent

shall, by signed affidavit on a form

prescribed by the Board, state the

following:

(1) That the ballot will be delivered by

the voter who submitted the application

for the ballot; and

(2) That the ballot shall be marked by

the voter and placed in a sealed

envelope in the agent’s presence, and

returned, under seal to the Board by the

agent.

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Florida Fla. Stat. Ann. § 104.0616 (West 2016):

(1) For purposes of this section, the

term “immediate family” means a

person’s spouse or the parent, child,

grandparent, or sibling of the person or

the person’s spouse.

(2) Any person who provides or offers

to provide, and any person who accepts,

a pecuniary or other benefit in

exchange for distributing, ordering,

requesting, collecting, delivering, or

otherwise physically possessing more

than two vote-by-mail ballots per

election in addition to his or her own

ballot or a ballot belonging to an

immediate family member, except as

provided in ss. 101.6105–101.694,

commits a misdemeanor of the first

degree, punishable as provided in s.

775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-385 (West

2019):

(a) . . . Such envelope shall then be

securely sealed and the elector shall

then personally mail or personally

deliver same to the board of registrars

or absentee ballot clerk, provided that

mailing or delivery may be made by the

elector’s mother, father, grandparent,

aunt, uncle, brother, sister, spouse, son,

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daughter, niece, nephew, grandchild,

son-in-law, daughter-in-law, mother-inlaw, father-in-law, brother-in-law,

sister-in-law, or an individual residing

in the household of such elector. The

absentee ballot of a disabled elector

may be mailed or delivered by the

caregiver of such disabled elector,

regardless of whether such caregiver

resides in such disabled elector’s

household. The absentee ballot of an

elector who is in custody in a jail or

other detention facility may be mailed

or delivered by any employee of such

jail or facility having custody of such

elector. An elector who is confined to a

hospital on a primary or election day to

whom an absentee ballot is delivered by

the registrar or absentee ballot clerk

shall then and there vote the ballot, seal

it properly, and return it to the registrar

or absentee ballot clerk. . . .

(b) A physically disabled or illiterate

elector may receive assistance in

preparing his or her ballot from any

person of the elector’s choice other than

such elector’s employer or the agent of

such employer or an officer or agent of

such elector’s union; provided,

however, that no person whose name

appears on the ballot as a candidate at a

particular primary, election, or runoff

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nor [specified relatives of a candidate]

to any elector who is not related to such

candidate. . . . The person rendering

assistance to the elector in preparing the

ballot shall sign the oath printed on the

same envelope as the oath to be signed

by the elector. Any person who

willfully violates this subsection shall

be guilty of a felony and, upon

conviction thereof, shall be sentenced

to imprisonment for not less than one

nor more than ten years or to pay a fine

not to exceed $100,000.00, or both, for

each such violation.

Guam 3 Guam Code Ann. § 10107 (2016):

The Commission shall deliver a ballot

to any qualified elector applying in

person at the office of said

Commission; provided, however, that

such applicant shall complete and

subscribe the application heretofore

prescribed by this Chapter; provided

further, that said application shall be

made not more than thirty (30) days nor

less than one (1) day before the date of

the election for which the vote is being

cast. It is provided further, that said

ballot shall be immediately marked,

enclosed in the ballot envelope, placed

in the return envelope with the proper

affidavit enclosed, and immediately

returned to the Commission.

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Hawai‘i Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-9 (West

2019):

(a) The return envelope shall be:

(1) Mailed and must be received by the

clerk issuing the absentee ballot no later

than the closing hour on election day in

accordance with section 11-131; or

(2) Delivered other than by mail to the

clerk issuing the absentee ballot, or to a

voter service center no later than the

closing hour on election day in

accordance with section 11-131.

(b) Upon receipt of the return envelope

from any person voting under this

chapter, the clerk may prepare the

ballots for counting pursuant to this

section and section 15-10.

(c) Before opening the return and ballot

envelopes and counting the ballots, the

return envelopes shall be checked for

the following:

(1) Signature on the affirmation

statement;

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(2) Whether the signature corresponds

with the absentee request or register as

prescribed in the rules adopted by the

chief election officer; and

(3) Whether the person is a registered

voter and has complied with the

requirements of sections 11-15 and 11-

16.

(d) If any requirement listed in

subsection (c) is not met or if the return

or ballot envelope appears to be

tampered with, the clerk or the absentee

ballot team official shall mark across

the face of the envelope “invalid” and it

shall be kept in the custody of the clerk

and disposed of as prescribed for

ballots in section 11-154.

Idaho Idaho Code Ann. § 34-1005 (West

2019):

The return envelope shall be mailed or

delivered to the officer who issued the

same; provided, that an absentee ballot

must be received by the issuing officer

by 8:00 p.m. on the day of election

before such ballot may be counted.

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Illinois 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/19-6 (West

2015):

It shall be unlawful for any person not

the voter or a person authorized by the

voter to take the ballot and ballot

envelope of a voter for deposit into the

mail unless the ballot has been issued

pursuant to application by a physically

incapacitated elector under Section 3-3

or a hospitalized voter under Section

19-13, in which case any employee or

person under the direction of the

facility in which the elector or voter is

located may deposit the ballot and

ballot envelope into the mail. If the

voter authorized a person to deliver the

ballot to the election authority, the

voter and the person authorized to

deliver the ballot shall complete the

authorization printed on the exterior

envelope supplied by an election

authority for the return of the vote by

mail ballot.

Indiana Ind. Code Ann. § 3-14-2-16(4) (West

2019):

A person who knowingly does any of

the following commits a Level 6

felony: . . .

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(4) Receives from a voter a ballot

prepared by the voter for voting,

except:

(A) the inspector;

(B) a member of the precinct election

board temporarily acting for the

inspector;

(C) a member or an employee of a

county election board (acting under the

authority of the board and state law) or

an absentee voter board member acting

under IC 3-11-10; or

(D) a member of the voter’s household,

an individual designated as attorney in

fact for the voter, or an employee of:

(i) the United States Postal Service; or

(ii) a bonded courier company;

(acting in the individual’s capacity as

an employee of the United States Postal

Service or a bonded courier company)

when delivering an envelope containing

an absentee ballot under IC 3-11-10-1.

Iowa Iowa Code Ann. § 53.17(1) (West

2019):

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a. The sealed return envelope may be

delivered by the registered voter, by the

voter’s designee, or by the special

precinct election officials designated

pursuant to section 53.22, subsection 2,

to the commissioner’s office no later

than the time the polls are closed on

election day. However, if delivered by

the voter’s designee, the envelope shall

be delivered within seventy-two hours

of retrieving it from the voter or before

the closing of the polls on election day,

whichever is earlier.

b. The sealed return envelope may be

mailed to the commissioner by the

registered voter or by the voter’s

designee. If mailed by the voter’s

designee, the envelope must be mailed

within seventy-two hours of retrieving

it from the voter or within time to be

postmarked or, if applicable, to have

the postal service barcode traced to a

date of entry into the federal mail

system not later than the day before the

election, as provided in section 53.17A,

whichever is earlier.

Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1221 (West 2019):

After such voter has marked the official

federal services absentee ballot, he or

she shall place it in the official ballot

envelope and secretly seal the same.

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Such voter shall then fill out in full the

form printed upon the official ballot

envelope and sign the same. Such ballot

envelope shall then be placed in the

envelope provided for such purpose and

mailed by the voter to the county

election officer of the county of the

voter’s residence.

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1124(d) (West

2019):

Any voted ballot may be transmitted to

the county election officer by the voter

or by another person designated in

writing by the voter, except if the voter

has a disability preventing the voter

from writing and signing a statement,

the written and signed statement

required by subsection (e) shall be

sufficient.

Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.086(1) (West

2019):

The voter returning his absentee ballot

by mail shall mark his ballot, seal it in

the inner envelope and then in the outer

envelope, and mail it to the county

clerk as shall be provided by this

chapter. The voter shall sign the

detachable flap and the outer envelope

in order to validate the ballot. A person

having power of attorney for the voter

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and who signs the detachable flap and

outer envelope for the voter shall

complete the voter assistance form as

required by KRS 117.255. The

signatures of two (2) witnesses are

required if the voter signs the form with

the use of a mark instead of the voter’s

signature. A resident of Kentucky who

is a covered voter as defined in KRS

117A.010 who has received an absentee

ballot transmitted by facsimile machine

or by means of the electronic

transmission system established under

KRS 117A.030(4) shall transmit the

voted ballot to the county clerk by mail

only, conforming with ballot security

requirements that may be promulgated

by the state board by administrative

regulation. In order to be counted, the

ballots shall be received by the clerk by

at least the time established by the

election laws generally for the closing

of the polls, which time shall not

include the extra hour during which

those voters may vote who were

waiting in line to vote at the scheduled

poll closing time.

Louisiana La. Stat. Ann. § 18:1308(B) (2017):

The ballot shall be marked as provided

in R.S. 18:1310 and returned to the

registrar by the United States Postal

Service, a commercial courier, or hand

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delivery. If delivered by other than the

voter, a commercial courier, or the

United States Postal Service, the

registrar shall require that the person

making such delivery sign a statement,

prepared by the secretary of state,

certifying that he has the authorization

and consent of the voter to hand deliver

the marked ballot. For purposes of this

Subsection, “commercial courier” shall

have the same meaning as provided in

R.S. 13:3204(D). No person except the

immediate family of the voter, as

defined in this Code, shall hand deliver

more than one marked ballot to the

registrar.

Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A,

§ 791(2)(A) (2009):

A person commits a Class D crime if

that person [d]elivers, receives, accepts,

notarizes or witnesses an absentee

ballot for any compensation. This

paragraph does not apply to a

governmental employee handling

ballots in the course of that employee’s

official duties or a person who handles

absentee ballots before the unvoted

ballots are delivered to the municipality

or after the voted ballots are returned to

the clerk.

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Maryland Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 9-307

(West 2019):

(a) A qualified applicant may designate

a duly authorized agent to pick up and

deliver an absentee ballot under this

subtitle.

(b) An agent of the voter under this

section:

(1) must be at least 18 years old;

(2) may not be a candidate on that

ballot;

(3) shall be designated in a writing

signed by the voter under penalty of

perjury; and

(4) shall execute an affidavit under

penalty of perjury that the ballot was:

(i) delivered to the voter who submitted

the application;

(ii) marked and placed in an envelope

by the voter, or with assistance as

allowed by regulation, in the agent’s

presence; and

(iii) returned to the local board by the

agent.

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Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 54, § 92(a)

(West 2019):

A voter who receives the ballot bymail,

as provided in subsection (a) of section

ninety-one B, may return it by mail to

the city or town clerk in the envelope

provided pursuant to subsection (d) of

section eighty-seven, or such voter or a

family member may deliver it in

person to the office of the city or town

clerk. A voter to whom a ballot was

delivered in person at the office of the

clerk as provided in said subsection (a)

of said section ninety-one Bshall return

it without removing the ballot from

such office.

Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 168.764a

(West 2019):

Step 5. Deliver the return envelope by

1 of the following methods:

(a) Place the necessary postage upon

the return envelope and deposit it in the

United States mail or with another

public postal service, express mail

service, parcel post service, or common

carrier.

(b) Deliver the envelope personally to

the office of the clerk, to the clerk, or to

an authorized assistant of the clerk.

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(c) In either (a) or (b), a member of the

immediate family of the voter including

a father-in-law, mother-in-law, brotherin-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law,

daughter-in-law, grandparent, or

grandchild or a person residing in the

voter’s household may mail or deliver

a ballot to the clerk for the voter.

(d) You may request by telephone that

the clerk who issued the ballot provide

assistance in returning the ballot. The

clerk is required to provide assistance if

you are unable to return your absent

voter ballot as specified in (a), (b), or

(c) above, if it is before 5 p.m. on the

Friday immediately preceding the

election, and if you are asking the clerk

to pickup the absent voter ballot within

the jurisdictional limits of the city,

township, or village in which you are

registered. Your absent voter ballot will

then be picked up by the clerk or an

election assistant sent by the clerk. All

persons authorized to pick up absent

voter ballots are required to carry

credentials issued by the clerk. If using

this absent voter ballot return method,

do not give your ballot to anyone until

you have checked their credentials. . . .

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All of the following actions are

violations of the Michigan election law

and are illegal in this state: . . . .

(4) For a person other than those listed

in these instructions to return, offer to

return, agree to return, or solicit to

return an absent voter ballot to the

clerk.

Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. § 203B.08 subd. 1

(West 2015):

The voter may designate an agent to

deliver in person the sealed absentee

ballot return envelope to the county

auditor or municipal clerk or to deposit

the return envelope in the mail. An

agent may deliver or mail the return

envelopes of not more than three voters

in any election. Any person designated

as an agent who tampers with either the

return envelope or the voted ballots or

does not immediately mail or deliver

the return envelope to the county

auditor or municipal clerk is guilty of a

misdemeanor.

Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-631(f) (West

2019):

Any voter casting an absentee ballot

who declares that he or she requires

assistance to vote by reason of

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DNC V. HOBBS 209

blindness, temporary or permanent

physical disability or inability to read or

write, shall be entitled to receive

assistance in the marking of his or her

absentee ballot and in completing the

affidavit on the absentee ballot

envelope. The voter may be given

assistance by anyone of the voter’s

choice other than a candidate whose

name appears on the absentee ballot

being marked, the spouse, parent or

child of a candidate whose name

appears on the absentee ballot being

marked or the voter’s employer, an

agent of that employer or a union

representative; however, a candidate

whose name is on the ballot or the

spouse, parent or child of such

candidate may provide assistance upon

request to any voter who is related

within the first degree. In order to

ensure the integrity of the ballot, any

person who provides assistance to an

absentee voter shall be required to sign

and complete the “Certificate of Person

Providing Voter Assistance” on the

absentee ballot envelope.

Missouri Mo. Ann. Stat. § 115.291(2) (West

2018):

Except as provided in subsection 4 of

this section, each absentee ballot that is

not cast by the voter in person in the

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office of the election authority shall be

returned to the election authority in the

ballot envelope and shall only be

returned by the voter in person, or in

person by a relative of the voter who is

within the second degree of

consanguinity or affinity, by mail or

registered carrier or by a team of

deputy election authorities; except that

covered voters, when sent from a

location determined by the secretary of

state to be inaccessible on election day,

shall be allowed to return their absentee

ballots cast by use of facsimile

transmission or under a program

approved by the Department of Defense

for electronic transmission of election

materials.

Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-201 (West

2019):

(1) A legally registered elector or

provisionally registered elector is

entitled to vote by absentee ballot as

provided for in this part.

(2) The elector may vote absentee by:

(a) marking the ballot in the manner

specified;

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(b) placing the marked ballot in the

secrecy envelope, free of any

identifying marks;

(c) placing the secrecy envelope

containing one ballot for each election

being held in the signature envelope;

(d) executing the affirmation printed on

the signature envelope; and

(e) returning the signature envelope

with all appropriate enclosures by

regular mail, postage paid, or by

delivering it to:

(i) the election office;

(ii) a polling place within the elector’s

county;

(iii) pursuant to 13-13-229, the absentee

election board or an authorized election

official; or

(iv) in a mail ballot election held

pursuant to Title 13, chapter 19, a

designated place of deposit within the

elector’s county.

(3) Except as provided in 13-21-206

and 13-21-226, in order for the ballot to

be counted, each elector shall return it

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in a manner that ensures the ballot is

received prior to 8 p.m. on election day.

Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-943(2) (West

2019):

A candidate for office at such election

and any person serving on a campaign

committee for such a candidate shall

not act as an agent for any registered

voter requesting a ballot pursuant to

this section unless such person is a

member of the registered voter’s

family. No person shall act as agent for

more than two registered voters in any

election.

Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293.330(4)

(West 2017):

[I]t is unlawful for any person to return

an absent ballot other than the voter

who requested the absent ballot or, at

the request of the voter, a member of

the voter’s family. A person who

returns an absent ballot and who is a

member of the family of the voter who

requested the absent ballot shall, under

penalty of perjury, indicate on a form

prescribed by the county clerk that the

person is a member of the family of the

voter who requested the absent ballot

and that the voter requested that the

person return the absent ballot. A

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person who violates the provisions of

this subsection is guilty of a category E

felony . . . .

New

Hampshire

New Hampshire recently enacted

legislation adding greater specificity to

is provision governing the delivery of

absentee ballots—N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 657:17. The new statute will read:

I. . . . . The voter or the person assisting

a blind voter or voter with a disability

shall then endorse on the outer

envelope the voter’s name, address, and

voting place. The absentee ballot shall

be delivered to the city or town clerk

from whom it was received in one of

the following ways:

(a) The voter or the voter’s delivery

agent may personally deliver the

envelope; or

(b) The voter or the person assisting the

blind voter or voter with a disability

may mail the envelope to the city or

town clerk, with postage affixed.

II. As used in this section, “delivery

agent” means:

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(a) The voter’s spouse, parent, sibling,

child, grandchild, father-in-law,

mother-in-law,son-in-law, daughter-inlaw, stepparent, stepchild; or

(b) If the voter is a resident of a nursing

home as defined in RSA 151–A:1, IV,

the nursing home administrator,

licensed pursuant to RSA 151–A:2, or

a nursing home staff member

designated in writing by the

administrator to deliver ballots; or

(c) If the voter is a resident of a

residential care facility licensed

pursuant to RSA 151:2, I(e) and

described in RSA 151:9, VII(a)(1) and

(2), the residential care facility

administrator, or a residential care

facility staff member designated in

writing by the administrator to deliver

ballots; or

(d) A person assisting a blind voter or a

voter with a disability who has signed a

statement on the affidavit envelope

acknowledging the assistance.

III. The city or town clerk, or ward

clerk on election day at the polls, shall

not accept an absentee ballot from a

delivery agent unless the delivery agent

completes a form provided by the

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secretary of state, which shall be

maintained by the city or town clerk,

and the delivery agent presents a

government-issued photo identification

or has his or her identity verified by the

city or town clerk. Absentee ballots

delivered through the mail or by the

voter’s delivery agent shall be received

by the town, city, or ward clerk no later

than 5:00 p.m. on the day of the

election. A delivery agent who is

assisting a voter who is blind or who

has a disability pursuant to this section

may not personally deliver more than 4

absentee ballots in any election, unless

the delivery agent is a nursing home or

residential care facility administrator,

an administrator designee, or a family

member, each as authorized by this

section.

New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:63-4(a) (West

2015):

A qualified voter is entitled to apply for

and obtain a mail-in ballot by

authorized messenger, who shall be so

designated over the signature of the

voter and whose printed name and

address shall appear on the application

in the space provided. The authorized

messenger shall be a family member or

a registered voter of the county in

which the application is made and shall

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place his or her signature on the

application in the space so provided in

the presence of the county clerk or the

designee thereof. No person shall serve

as an authorized messenger or as a

bearer for more than three qualified

voters in an election. No person who is

a candidate in the election for which the

voter requests a mail-in ballot shall be

permitted to serve as an authorized

messenger or bearer. The authorized

messenger shall show a photo

identification card to the county clerk,

or the designee thereof, at the time the

messenger submits the application

form. The county clerk or the designee

thereof shall authenticate the signature

of the authorized messenger in the

event such a person is other than a

family member, by comparing it with

the signature of the person appearing on

a State of New Jersey driver’s license,

or other identification issued or

recognized as official by the federal

government, the State, or any of its

political subdivisions, providing the

identification carries the full address

and signature of the person. After the

authentication of the signature on the

application, the county clerk or the

designee thereof is authorized to deliver

to the authorized messenger a ballot to

be delivered to the qualified voter.

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New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-10.1 (West

2019):

A. A voter, caregiver to that voter or

member of that voter’s immediate

family may deliver that voter’s

absentee ballot to the county clerk in

person or by mail; provided that the

voter has subscribed the official

mailing envelope of the absentee ballot.

B. As used in this section, “immediate

family” means the spouse, children,

parents or siblings of a voter.

New York N.Y. Elec. Law § 8-410 (McKinney

2019):

The absentee voter shall mark an

absentee ballot as provided for paper

ballots or ballots prepared for counting

by ballot counting machines. He shall

make no mark or writing whatsoever

upon the ballot, except as above

prescribed, and shall see that it bears no

such mark or writing. He shall make no

mark or writing whatsoever on the

outside of the ballot. After marking the

ballot or ballots he shall fold each such

ballot and enclose them in the envelope

and seal the envelope. He shall then

take and subscribe the oath on the

envelope, with blanks properlyfilled in.

The envelope, containing the ballot or

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ballots, shall then be mailed or

delivered to the board of elections of

the county or city of his residence.

North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163A1310(b)(1) (West 2018):

All ballots issued under the provisions

of this Part and Part 2 of Article 21 of

this Chapter shall be transmitted by

mail or by commercial courier service,

at the voter’s expense, or delivered in

person, or by the voter’s near relative or

verifiable legal guardian and received

by the county board not later than 5:00

p.m. on the day of the statewide

primary or general election or county

bond election. Ballots issued under the

provisions of Part 2 of Article 21 of this

Chapter may also be electronically

transmitted.

North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 16.1-07-08(1)

(West 2019):

Upon receipt of an application for an

official ballot properly filled out and

duly signed, or as soon thereafter as the

official ballot for the precinct in which

the applicant resides has been prepared,

the county auditor, city auditor, or

business manager of the school district,

as the case may be, shall send to the

absent voter by mail, at the expense of

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the political subdivision conducting the

election, one official ballot, or

personally deliver the ballot to the

applicant or the applicant’s agent,

which agent may not, at that time, be a

candidate for any office to be voted

upon by the absent voter. The agent

shall sign the agent’s name before

receiving the ballot and deposit with the

auditor or business manager of the

school district, as the case may be,

authorization in writing from the

applicant to receive the ballot or

according to requirements set forth for

signature by mark. The auditor or

business manager of the school district,

as the case may be, may not provide an

absent voter’s ballot to a person acting

as an agent who cannot provide a

signed, written authorization from an

applicant. No person may receive

compensation, includingmoney, goods,

or services, for acting as an agent for an

elector, nor may a person act as an

agent for more than four electors in any

one election. A voter voting by

absentee ballot may not require the

political subdivision providing the

ballot to bear the expense of the return

postage for an absentee ballot.

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Northern

Mariana Islands

1 N. Mar. I. Code § 6212(a) (2010):

The Commission shall provide to any

registered voter entitled to vote by

absentee ballot and who applied for

one, an official ballot, a ballot

envelope, an affidavit prescribed by the

Commission, and a reply envelope. The

absentee voter shall mark the ballot in

the usual manner provided by law and

in a manner such that no other person

can know how the ballot is marked. The

absentee voter shall then deposit the

ballot in the ballot envelope and

securely seal it. The absentee voter

shall then complete and execute the

affidavit. The ballot envelope and the

affidavit shall then be enclosed and

sealed in the covering reply envelope

and mailed via standard U.S. First Class

Mail only or sent by commercial

courier service to the commission at the

expense of the voter. Such ballots and

affidavits will not be counted by the

Commission unless mailed. For the

purpose of this part, the word “mailed”

includes ballots and affidavits sent

through the postal or courier services.

Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3509.05(A)

(West 2016):

The elector shall mail the identification

envelope to the director from whom it

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DNC V. HOBBS 221

was received in the return envelope,

postage prepaid, or the elector may

personally deliver it to the director, or

the spouse of the elector, the father,

mother, father-in-law, mother-in-law,

grandfather, grandmother, brother, or

sister of the whole or half blood, or the

son, daughter, adopting parent, adopted

child, stepparent, stepchild, uncle, aunt,

nephew, or niece of the elector may

deliver it to the director.

Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 14-108(C)

(West 2019):

Any voter who hand delivers his or her

ballot as provided in subsection A of

this section shall provide proof of

identity to the county election board

and shall hand deliver the ballot no

later than the end of regular business

hours on the day prior to the date of the

election. For purposes of this section,

“proof of identity” shall have the same

meaning as used in subsection A of

Section 7-114 of this title.

Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 254.470(6) (West

2018):

(6)(a) Upon receipt of any ballot

described in this section, the elector

shall mark the ballot, sign the return

identification envelope supplied with

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the ballot and comply with the

instructions provided with the ballot.

(b) The elector may return the marked

ballot to the county clerk by United

States mail or by depositing the ballot

at the office of the county clerk, at any

place of deposit designated by the

county clerk or at any location

described in ORS 254.472 or 254.474.

(c) The ballot must be returned in the

return identification envelope. If the

elector returns the ballot by mail, the

elector must provide the postage.

(d) Subject to paragraph (e) of this

subsection, if a person returns a ballot

for an elector, the person shall deposit

the ballot in a manner described in

paragraph (b) of this subsection not

later than two days after receiving the

ballot.

Pennsylvania 25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.

§ 3146.6(a)(1) (West 2019) (footnote

omitted):

Anyelector who submits an Emergency

Application and receives an absentee

ballot in accordance with section

1302.1(a.2) or (c) shall mark the ballot

on or before eight o’clock P.M. on the

day of the primary or election. This

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DNC V. HOBBS 223

envelope shall then be placed in the

second one, on which is printed the

form of declaration of the elector, and

the address of the elector’s county

board of election and the local election

district of the elector. The elector shall

then fill out, date and sign the

declaration printed on such envelope.

Such envelope shall then be securely

sealed and the elector shall send same

by mail, postage prepaid, except where

franked, or deliver it in person to said

county board of election.

Puerto Rico P. R. Laws Ann. tit. 16, § 4177 (2010):

Any voter entitled to vote as an

absentee voter in a specific election, as

established in § 4176 of this title, shall

cast his/her vote in accordance with the

procedure provided by the Commission

through regulations. Only those

absentee ballots sent on or before an

election, and received on or before the

last day of general canvass for that

election, shall be considered validly

cast pursuant to this Section. The

Commission shall establish through

regulations the manner in which the

mailing date of absentee ballots shall be

validated.

Rhode Island 17 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 17-20-2.1(d)

(West 2019):

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In addition to those requirements set

forth elsewhere in this chapter, a mail

ballot, in order to be valid, must have

been cast in conformance with the

following procedures:

(1) All mail ballots issued pursuant to

subdivision 17-20-2(1) shall be mailed

to the elector at the Rhode Island

address provided by the elector on the

application. In order to be valid, the

signature on all certifying envelopes

containing a voted ballot must be made

before a notary public or before two (2)

witnesses who shall set forth their

addresses on the form.

(2) All applications for mail ballots

pursuant to § 17-20-2(2) must state

under oath the name and location of the

hospital, convalescent home, nursing

home, or similar institution where the

elector is confined. All mail ballots

issued pursuant to subdivision 17-20-

2(2) shall be delivered to the elector at

the hospital, convalescent home,

nursing home, or similar institution

where the elector is confined; and the

ballots shall be voted and witnessed in

conformance with the provisions of

§ 17-20-14.

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(3) All mail ballots issued pursuant to

subdivision 17-20-2(3) shall be mailed

to the address provided by the elector

on the application or sent to the board

of canvassers in the city or town where

the elector maintains his or her voting

residence. In order to be valid, the

signature of the elector on the certifying

envelope containing voted ballots does

not need to be notarized or witnessed.

Any voter qualified to receive a mail

ballot pursuant to subdivision 17-20-

2(3) shall also be entitled to cast a

ballot pursuant to the provisions of

United States Public Law 99-410

(“UOCAVA Act”).

(4) All mail ballots issued pursuant to

subdivision 17-20-2(4) may be mailed

to the elector at the address within the

United States provided by the elector

on the application or sent to the board

of canvassers in the city or town where

the elector maintains his or her voting

residence. In order to be valid, the

signature on all certifying envelopes

containing a voted ballot must be made

before a notary public, or other person

authorized by law to administer oaths

where signed, or where the elector

voted, or before two (2) witnesses who

shall set forth their addresses on the

form. In order to be valid, all ballots

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226 DNC V. HOBBS

sent to the elector at the board of

canvassers must be voted in

conformance with the provisions of

§ 17-20-14.2.

South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 7-15-385 (2019):

Upon receipt of the ballot or ballots, the

absentee ballot applicant must mark

each ballot on which he wishes to vote

and place each ballot in the single

envelope marked “Ballot Herein”

which in turn must be placed in the

return-addressed envelope. The

applicant must then return the returnaddressed envelope to the board of

voter registration and elections by mail,

by personal delivery, or by authorizing

another person to return the envelope

for him. The authorization must be

given in writing on a form prescribed

by the State Election Commission and

must be turned in to the board of voter

registration and elections at the time the

envelope is returned. The voter must

sign the form, or in the event the voter

cannot write because of a physical

handicap or illiteracy, the voter must

make his mark and have the mark

witnessed by someone designated by

the voter. The authorization must be

preserved as part of the record of the

election, and the board of voter

registration and elections must note the

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DNC V. HOBBS 227

authorization and the name of the

authorized returnee in the record book

required by Section 7-15-330. A

candidate or a member of a candidate’s

paid campaign staff including

volunteers reimbursed for time

expended on campaign activity is not

permitted to serve as an authorized

returnee for any person unless the

person is a member of the voter’s

immediate family as defined in Section

7-15-310. The oath set forth in Section

7-15-380 must be signed and witnessed

on each returned envelope. The board

of voter registration and elections must

record in the record book required by

Section 7-15-330 the date the returnaddressed envelope with witnessed oath

and enclosed ballot or ballots is

received by the board. The board must

securely store the envelopes in a locked

box within the office of the board of

voter registration and elections.

South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws § 12-19-2.2 (2019):

If a person is an authorized messenger

for more than one voter, he must notify

the person in charge of the election of

all voters for whom he is a messenger.

Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-6-202(e) (West

2017):

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228 DNC V. HOBBS

After receiving the absentee voting

supplies and completing the ballot, the

voter shall sign the appropriate affidavit

under penalty of perjury. The effect of

the signature is to verify the

information as true and correct and that

the voter is eligible to vote in the

election. The voter shall then mail the

ballot.

Texas Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 86.006(f) (West

2017) (footnote omitted):

A person commits an offense if the

person knowingly possesses an official

ballot or official carrier envelope

provided under this code to another.

Unless the person possessed the ballot

or carrier envelope with intent to

defraud the voter or the election

authority, this subsection does not

apply to a person who, on the date of

the offense, was:

(1) related to the voter within the

second degree by affinity or the third

degree by consanguinity, as determined

under Subchapter B, Chapter 573,

Government Code;

(2) physically living in the same

dwelling as the voter;

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(3) an early voting clerk or a deputy

early voting clerk;

(4) a person who possesses a ballot or

carrier envelope solely for the purpose

of lawfully assisting a voter who was

eligible for assistance under Section

86.010 and complied fully with:

(A) Section 86.010; and

(B) Section 86.0051, if assistance was

provided in order to deposit the

envelope in the mail or with a common

or contract carrier;

(5) an employee of the United States

Postal Service working in the normal

course of the employee’s authorized

duties; or

(6) a common or contract carrier

working in the normal course of the

carrier’s authorized duties if the official

ballot is sealed in an official carrier

envelope that is accompanied by an

individual delivery receipt for that

particular carrier envelope.

Texas Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 86.0052(a)(1)

(West 2013) (making it a crime if a

person “compensates another person for

depositing the carrier envelope in the

mail or with a common or contract

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carrier as provided by Section

86.0051(b), as part of any performancebased compensation scheme based on

the number of ballots deposited or in

which another person is presented with

a quota of ballots to deposit”).

Utah Utah Code Ann. § 20A-3-306 (West

2019):

(1)(a) Except as provided by Section

20A-1-308, to vote a mail-in absentee

ballot, the absentee voter shall:

(i) complete and sign the affidavit on

the envelope;

(ii) mark the votes on the absentee

ballot;

(iii) place the voted absentee ballot in

the envelope;

(iv) securely seal the envelope; and

(v) attach postage, unless voting in

accordance with Section 20A-3-302,

and deposit the envelope in the mail or

deliver it in person to the election

officer from whom the ballot was

obtained.

(b) Except as provided by Section 20A1-308, to vote an absentee ballot in

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DNC V. HOBBS 231

person at the office of the election

officer, the absent voter shall:

(i) complete and sign the affidavit on

the envelope;

(ii) mark the votes on the absent-voter

ballot;

(iii) place the voted absent-voter ballot

in the envelope;

(iv) securely seal the envelope; and

(v) give the ballot and envelope to the

election officer.

(2) Except as provided by Section 20A1-308, an absentee ballot is not valid

unless:

(a) in the case of an absentee ballot that

is voted in person, the ballot is:

(i) applied for and cast in person at the

office of the appropriate election officer

before 5 p.m. no later than the Tuesday

before election day; or

(ii) submitted on election day at a

polling location in the political

subdivision where the absentee voter

resides;

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(b) in the case of an absentee ballot that

is submitted by mail, the ballot is:

(i) clearly postmarked before election

day, or otherwise clearly marked by the

post office as received by the post

office before election day; and

(ii) received in the office of the election

officer before noon on the day of the

official canvass following the election;

or

(c) in the case of a military-overseas

ballot, the ballot is submitted in

accordance with Section 20A-16-404.

(3) An absentee voter may submit a

completed absentee ballot at a polling

location in a political subdivision

holding the election, if the absentee

voter resides in the political

subdivision.

(4) An absentee voter may submit an

incomplete absentee ballot at a polling

location for the voting precinct where

the voter resides, request that the ballot

be declared spoiled, and vote in person.

Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2543 (West

2019):

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DNC V. HOBBS 233

(a) After marking the ballots and

signing the certificate on the envelope,

the early or absentee voter to whom the

same are addressed shall return the

ballots to the clerk of the town in which

he or she is a voter, in the manner

prescribed, except that in the case of a

voter to whom ballots are delivered by

justices, the ballots shall be returned to

the justices calling upon him or her, and

they shall deliver them to the town

clerk.

(b) Once an early voter absentee ballot

has been returned to the clerk in the

envelope with the signed certificate, it

shall be stored in a secure place and

shall not be returned to the voter for

any reason.

(c) If a ballot includes more than one

page, the early or absentee voter need

only return the page upon which the

voter has marked his or her vote.

(d)(1) All early voter absentee ballots

returned as follows shall be counted:

(A) by any means, to the town clerk’s

office before the close of business on

the day preceding the election;

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(B) by mail, to the town clerk’s office

before the close of the polls on the day

of the election; and

(C) by hand delivery to the presiding

officer at the voter’s polling place.

(2) An early voter absentee ballot

returned in a manner other than those

set forth in subdivision (1) of this

subsection shall not be counted.

Virgin Islands V.I. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 665 (2018):

(a) An absentee who has received an

absentee ballot may vote by mailing or

causing to be delivered to the board of

elections for the proper election district

such ballot marked and sworn to, as

follows:

After marking the ballot, the voter shall

enclose and seal it in the envelope

provided for that purpose. He shall then

swear and subscribe to a selfadministered oath which shall be

provided to the absentee on a printed

form along with the absentee ballot and

he shall further execute the affidavit on

such envelope and shall enclose and

seal the envelope containing the ballot

in the return mailing envelope printed,

as provided in paragraph 3 of

subsection (a) of section 663 of this

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DNC V. HOBBS 235

title, with the name and address of the

board of elections for the election

district in which he desires to vote,

endorse thereon his name and return

address, and shall then mail the

envelope, or cause it to be delivered, to

the board of elections; provided that

such envelope must be received by the

board no later than ten days after the

day of election for the absentee vote to

be counted. Absentee ballots received

from overseas in franked envelopes, or

from persons who are members of the

Uniformed Services of the United

States or a spouse of any member of the

Uniformed Services of the United

States, shall be counted if they are

received by the board no later than ten

(10) days after the day of the election.

In the case of a recount authorized by

the board, any ballot received by the

board no later than 5 p.m. the day

before the recount shall be counted.

(b) Any envelope containing an

absentee ballot mistakenly mailed by

the absentee voter to the Supervisor of

Elections contrary to the provisions of

this section shall be mailed or delivered

by the Supervisor of Elections to the

proper board of elections if it can be so

mailed or delivered by him before the

time for the closing of the polls on the

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day of election, and if the proper board

can be determined without breaking

open the inner envelope containing the

ballot.

(c) All mailing envelopes containing

absentee ballots received by a board of

elections under this section, whether

received in sufficient time for the

ballots to be counted as provided in this

chapter, or not, shall be stamped or

endorsed by a member of the board or

the clerk with the date of their receipt in

the board’s office, and, if received on

the day of election, with the actual time

of day received, and such record shall

be signed or initialed by the board

member or clerk making it.

Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-707(A) (West

2019):

After the voter has marked his absentee

ballot, he shall (a) enclose the ballot in

the envelope provided for that purpose,

(b) seal the envelope, (c) fill in and sign

the statement printed on the back of the

envelope in the presence of a witness,

who shall sign the same envelope,

(d) enclose the ballot envelope and any

required assistance form within the

envelope directed to the general

registrar, and (e) seal that envelope and

mail it to the office of the general

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DNC V. HOBBS 237

registrar or deliver it personally to the

general registrar. A voter’s failure to

provide in the statement on the back of

the envelope his full middle name or

his middle initial shall not be a material

omission, rendering his ballot void,

unless the voter failed to provide in the

statement on the back of the envelope

his full first and last name. A voter’s

failure to provide the date, or any part

of the date, including the year, on

which he signed the statement printed

on the back of the envelope shall not be

considered a material omission and

shall not render his ballot void. For

purposes of this chapter, “mail” shall

include delivery by a commercial

delivery service, but shall not include

delivery by a personal courier service

or another individual except as

provided by §§ 24.2-703.2 and 24.2-

705.

Washington W a s h . R e v . C o d e A n n .

§ 29A.40.091(4) (West 2019):

The voter must be instructed to either

return the ballot to the county auditor

no later than 8:00 p.m. the day of the

election or primary, or mail the ballot to

the county auditor with a postmark no

later than the day of the election or

primary. Return envelopes for all

election ballots must include prepaid

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postage. Service and overseas voters

must be provided with instructions and

a privacy sheet for returning the ballot

and signed declaration by fax or email.

A voted ballot and signed declaration

returned by fax or email must be

received by 8:00 p.m. on the day of the

election or primary.

West Virginia W. Va. Code Ann. § 3-3-5(k) (West

2010):

Absentee ballots which are hand

delivered are to be accepted if they are

received by the official designated to

supervise and conduct absentee voting

no later than the day preceding the

election: Provided, That no person may

hand deliver more than two absentee

ballots in any election and any person

hand delivering an absentee ballot is

required to certify that he or she has not

examined or altered the ballot. Any

person who makes a false certification

violates the provisions of article nine of

this chapter and is subject to those

provisions.

Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. § 6.87(4)(b) (West

2019):

The envelope shall be mailed by the

elector, or delivered in person, to the

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DNC V. HOBBS 239

municipal clerk issuing the ballot or

ballots.

Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-9-113 (West

2019):

Upon receipt, a qualified elector shall

mark the ballot and sign the affidavit.

The ballot shall then be sealed in the

inner ballot envelope and mailed or

delivered to the clerk.

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