Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00016/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00016-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sandra Bonner
Defendant
Matt Durani
Defendant
First NLC Financial Services, LLC
Defendant
Golden State Financing Corporation
Defendant
Faridoon Lodin
Defendant
Tim Nawabi
Defendant
Prime Funding Solution
Defendant
Wilshire Credit Corporation
Defendant
Glenlyn A. Zimmer
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GLENLYN A. ZIMMER,

 NO. CIV. 07-16 WBS KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION

TIM NAWABI, an individual; MATT

DURANI, an individual; PRIME

FUNDING SOLUTION, an unknown

entity; FARIDOON LODIN, an

individual; GOLDEN STATE

FINANCING CORPORATION, a

California corporation; SANDRA

BONNER, an individual; FIRST NLC

FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, a

California limited liability

company; and WILSHIRE CREDIT

CORPORATION, a Nevada

corporation,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Glenlyn A. Zimmer initiated this action in

state court after refinancing her home through defendant Golden

State Financing Corporation (“Golden State”). Defendants removed

the action to federal court and plaintiff now moves for summary

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adjudication with respect to three of her claims against

defendants Golden State, its employee Tim Nawabi, and broker

Faridoon Lodin (“defendants”). 

I. Factual & Procedural Background

Plaintiff, who is over eighty years old, owned a home

in Stockton, California. (Pl.’s Stmt. of Undisputed Facts ## 1-

2.) In November 2005, a Golden State employee contacted

plaintiff and discussed the possibility of plaintiff refinancing

her home. (Id. at ## 7-11.) She pursued the option and, on

January 18, 2006, plaintiff applied for a loan. (Id. at ## 11-

12.) In a personal meeting twelve days later, Nawabi allegedly

informed plaintiff of the details of the loan, including

plaintiff’s new monthly payments, the amount of cash she would

receive at the close of escrow, and the total personal debt that

would be paid from the loan proceeds. (Id. at ## 13-15.) At the

close of the meeting, plaintiff signed all of the loan documents. 

(Id. at # 16.) 

Later that day, plaintiff discovered that not only were

the terms and benefits of the loan different than those Nawabi

allegedly described, but what she believed would be one loan was

actually two. (Id. at ## 17-18.) The following day, plaintiff

contacted Nawabi to rescind the loans; however, Nawabi’s alleged

representations persuaded her not to rescind. (Id. at ## 19-21.) 

Lodin brokered both loans, which closed on February 24, 2006.

Contrary to Nawabi and other Golden State employees’

alleged representations to plaintiff, plaintiff’s refinance

resulted in a substantially higher monthly payment. (Id. at ##

10, 18.) She also allegedly received less cash at the close of

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1 “In the absence of special circumstances, stays

pursuant to section 362(a) are limited to debtors and do not

include non-bankrupt co-defendants.” Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp.

v. Miller Mining Co., 817 F.2d 1424, 1427 (9th Cir. 1987); see

also Cohen v. Stratosphere Corp., 115 F.3d 695, 697 (9th Cir.

1997) (“The automatic stay does not preclude us from deciding

this appeal with regard to all parties other than [the bankrupt

party], and we now proceed to do so.”).

On February 1, 2008, this court requested that the nonbankrupt parties submit briefs regarding the effect § 362 has on

future proceedings in this action. In the only brief submitted,

plaintiff argued that § 362 does not prevent plaintiff from

proceeding against the non-bankrupt defendants. None of the

defendants submitted briefs or argued that special circumstances

warranted staying the action as to the non-bankrupt defendants. 

3

escrow than promised and was charged undisclosed broker and

financing fees. (Id. at ## 25-31.) 

After plaintiff hired counsel, Nawabi allegedly

contacted plaintiff and offered her a third loan to reduce her

monthly payments. (Id. at ## 32-35.) When plaintiff met with

Nawabi about the potential loan, Nawabi, another Golden State

employee, and Lodin offered plaintiff $3,500.00 as a “courtesy

check.” (Id. at ## 36, 40.) When plaintiff signed what she

believed was a receipt for the check, defendants allegedly

attached her signature to a release of liability. (Id. at ## 41-

43.) Golden State never provided a new loan for plaintiff, and

she ultimately moved out of her home in June 2007 due to an

impending foreclosure. (Id. at ## 46, 50-51.)

On November 7, 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint in

state court alleging state law claims and a violation of 12

U.S.C. § 2607. Defendants subsequently removed the action to

this court. After it filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, all claims

against First NLC Financial Services, LLC were automatically

stayed on January 22, 2008 pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).1 

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Section 362, therefore, automatically stays plaintiff’s third,

eighth, and ninth causes of action against only First NLC

Financial Services, LLC. 

4

Plaintiff now moves for summary adjudication against

Golden State, Nawabi, and Lodin with respect to her state law

claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of oral contract, and

financial elder abuse. Via a counter-motion and pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), defendants request the

court to continue plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication for

sixty days to permit defendants to obtain an affidavit from

Nawabi. Plaintiff opposes defendants’ Rule 56(f) counter-motion.

II. Discussion 

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c); Mora v.

Chem-Tronics, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

Summary adjudication is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery

and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). 

The party moving for summary adjudication bears the

initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

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there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides that,

“[i]f a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, for

specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify

its opposition, the court may: (1) deny the motion; (2) order a

continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to

be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or (3) issue any

other just order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). 

For a court to grant a Rule 56(f) motion, the party

requesting it “must show (1) that they have set forth in

affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to elicit from

further discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that

these sought-after facts are ‘essential’ to resist the summary

judgment motion.” California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th

Cir. 1998). A court must liberally construe a Rule 56(f) motion

and “should continue a summary judgment motion upon a good faith

showing by affidavit that the continuance is needed to obtain

facts essential to preclude summary judgment.” Id.; Visa Int’l

Serv. Ass’n v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th

Cir. 1986).

 In moving for summary adjudication against only

defendants Golden State, Nawabi, and Lodin, plaintiff relies

almost exclusively on oral representations that Nawabi allegedly

made to plaintiff. (Pl.’s Stmt. of Undisputed Facts ## 13-17,

19-21, 27, 34-36, 39-45, 47.) If Nawabi denies making the

alleged representations to plaintiff, this court would likely be

precluded from granting summary adjudication because granting

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plaintiff’s motion would require the court to find that Zimmer’s

recollection of the facts is more credible than Nawabi’s. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (in

deciding a motion for summary adjudication, a court cannot engage

in credibility determinations or weigh the evidence). 

Defendants contend Nawabi will dispute some or all of

plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts, thereby creating a

material issue of disputed fact to withstand plaintiff’s motion

for summary adjudication. (Cammack Decl. 3:19-24, 4:16-22.) 

Defendants cannot, however, obtain Nawabi’s affidavit in time to

oppose plaintiff’s motion because he is currently in Afghanistan

and is not expected to return until late February or early March. 

(Id. at 4:12-14; Zabi Nawabi Decl. ¶ 3-4.) The instability in

that country has also limited defense counsel’s contact with

Nawabi and has apparently prevented counsel from obtaining an

affidavit electronically. (Cammack Decl. 2:8-11.) While

defendants can obtain an affidavit from Lodin in time to oppose

plaintiff’s motion, it would be insufficient because Lodin lacks

personal knowledge as to Nawabi’s alleged statements to

plaintiff. (Id. at 3:26-28; Lodin Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6.)

Plaintiff opposes defendants’ Rule 56(f) countermotion, arguing that 1) defendants filed their counter-motion

three days late and two months after plaintiff moved for summary

adjudication; 2) Nawabi has been “uncooperative throughout the

course of the litigation,” including failing to file an answer

until plaintiff sought a default judgment and forcing plaintiff

to compel discovery; and 3) Nawabi’s return from Afghanistan is

uncertain and, given the pending lawsuit, unlikely. (Pl.’s Mem.

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in Opp’n to Defs.’ Counter-Mot. 2-5.) The court is mindful of

plaintiff’s concerns and, while Nawabi’s conduct does not

preclude a finding of good faith at this time, continued conduct

of the same nature would likely prevent this court from granting

a second Rule 56(f) request. 

Accordingly, because Nawabi’s affidavit is essential

for defendants to oppose plaintiff’s motion for summary

adjudication and the affidavit cannot be obtained in time for the

current hearing date, the court will grant defendants’ Rule 56(f)

counter-motion to continue the hearing on plaintiff’s motion for

summary adjudication. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the hearing on plaintiff’s

motion for summary adjudication be, and the same hereby is,

CONTINUED to April 28, 2008 at 2:00 p.m. Defendants’ opposition

to the motion and plaintiff’s reply shall be filed in accordance

with the time requirements of Local Rule 78-230(c) and (d)

DATED: February 13, 2008

 

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