Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02244/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02244-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Manuel Morales-Diaz
Appellee
Javier Ozuna-Fuentes
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Untcod States Cuutt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

SEP 6 1990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

&OBERT L. HOECKER . 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ADELA MORALES-ZAMORA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JAVIER OZUNA-FUENTES and, 

JOSE MANUAL MORALES-DIAZ, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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No. 89-2172 

No. 89-2244 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. Nos. CR-89-66 and CR-89-173) 

Clerk 

David N. Williams (William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, and 

Robert J. Gorence, Assistant United States Attorney, with him on 

the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, for PlaintiffAppellant, United States of America. 

Nancy Hollander, of 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

Zamora. 

Freedman, Boyd & Daniels, P.A., of 

for Defendant-Appellee Adela MoralesWilliam E. Parnall, of Albuquerque, New Mexico, for DefendantsAppellees Javier Ozuna-Fuentes and Jose Manuel Morales-Diaz. 

Teresa E. Storch, Assistant 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, for 

Fuentes. 

Federal Public 

Defendant-Appellee 

Defender, of 

Javier OzunaAppellate Case: 89-2244 Document: 01019708249 Date Filed: 09/06/1990 Page: 1 
Before TACHA and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and DUMBAULD, District 

Judge.* 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Edward Dumbauld, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the western District of Pennsylvania, sitting 

by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2244 Document: 01019708249 Date Filed: 09/06/1990 Page: 2 
Defendants Adela Morales-zamora, Javier Ozuna-Fuentes, and 

Jose Manual Morales-Diaz were indicted on drug charges after a 

trained narcotics detection dog alerted to their vehicles while 

they were detained at a roadblock operated by Socorro, New Mexico 

police authorities. The district court in both cases granted the 

defendants' motions to suppress on the ground that the dog sniff 

was a "search" under the fourth amendment, U.S. Canst. amend. IV, 

requiring a reasonable and articulable suspicion of drug-related 

criminal activity. We reverse. 

I. 

The factual circumstances of the two searches at issue are 

similar. On February 10, 1989, Adela Morales-Zamora (Zamora) and 

her seven-year-old son were traveling north on Interstate 25 when 

she was stopped at a roadblock operated by the Socorro, New Mexico 

police department. The stated purpose of the roadblock was to 

check drivers' licenses, vehicle registrations, and proofs of 

insurance. Zamora produced her driver's license, registration, 

and proof of insurance as requested. While one officer was 

checking her documents, another officer walked a trained 

narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of Zamora's car. The 

dog did not touch the car. Before the document check was 

finished, the dog alerted to the car. A subsequent search of the 

car revealed 126 pounds of marijuana hidden in luggage in the 

car's trunk. 

On March 16, 1989, Javier Ozuna-Fuentes (Fuentes) was driving 

a van north on Interstate 25. His sole passenger was Jose Manuel 

Morales-Diaz (Diaz). Fuentes and Diaz encountered the same kind 

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Appellate Case: 89-2244 Document: 01019708249 Date Filed: 09/06/1990 Page: 3 
of Socorro police department roadblock as did Zamora. While they 

were waiting in line at the roadblock and before a check of their 

documents had been made, a narcotics-detection dog alerted to the 

van. The dog did not touch the van. After Fuentes stepped out of 

the van, an officer frisked him and found a .25 caliber handgun in 

the front right pocket of his pants. A subsequent search of the 

van revealed 30 pounds of marijuana concealed in a false 

compartment under the van's chassis. 

Zamora later moved to suppress the evidence of contraband 

seized at the roadblock. After a hearing on March 31, 1989, the 

district court granted Zamora's motion to suppress, holding that 

when an officer has no reasonable and articulable suspicion of 

drug-related criminal activity, a canine sniff that occurs while 

the driver's documents are being examined violates the fourth 

amendment. See United States ~Morales, 714 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 

(D.N.M. 1989). 

Fuentes and Diaz also filed a motion to suppress. In a 

ruling from the bench, the district court in the Fuentes/Diaz case 

granted the defendants' motion to suppress for substantially the 

reasons expressed in the published opinion in the Zamora case. 

The government took an interlocutory appeal of the two district 

court rulings pursuant to 18 u.s.c. section 3731, which we 

consolidated on appeal. 

II. 

Our standard of review is well-established. When reviewing a 

grant of a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's 

findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See United States ~ 

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Appellate Case: 89-2244 Document: 01019708249 Date Filed: 09/06/1990 Page: 4 
Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1484 (lOth Cir. 1990). The ultimate 

determination of reasonableness under the fourth amendment is, 

however, a conclusion of law that we review de novo. Id. 

A. 

As a preliminary matter, we turn to the defendants' argument 

that their detention by the Socorro police at the roadblock was an 

unlawful seizure because the roadblock's stated purpose was a 

pretext for searching the stopped vehicles for drugs. Both 

district courts below did not address the defendants' arguments 

that the alleged purpose of the roadblocks was pretextual, ruling 

instead that even if the reason for the roadblock was not 

pretextual, the dog sniffs constituted illegal searches under the 

fourth amendment. 1 Because the district courts below assumed that 

the alleged purpose of the roadblock -- to check for valid 

drivers' licenses, vehicle registrations, and proofs of insurance 

-- was valid, we do also. Our holding today does not preclude the 

defendants from renewing their arguments concerning pretext to the 

district courts. 

B. 

The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of brief 

roadblock detentions not based on an individualized reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity in the context of a twenty-five 

second average detention at a sobriety checkpoint, see Michigan 

1 The district court in Morales found that it did not have to 

decide whether Zamora's initial stop was pretextual. Morales, 714 

F. Supp. at 1148 n.2. In the Fuentes-Diaz case the district court 

judge rendered his personal opinion that "had I been required to 

address that issue, I [would] conclude that [the alleged purpose 

of the roadblock] was pretextual," but went on to state that the 

issue was not properly before him. Rec. vol. III p. 94. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2244 Document: 01019708249 Date Filed: 09/06/1990 Page: 5 
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Dep't of State Police ~ Sitz, 58 U.S.L.W. 4781, 4782-84 (U.S. 

June 14, 1990), and a 3-5 minute average detention at an 

immigration checkpoint, see United States ~ Martinez-Fuerte, 428 

U.S. 543, 546-47, 562 (1976). This circuit previously has 

dismissed fourth amendment challenges against brief roadblock 

detentions not based on individualized reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity where the purpose of the roadblock is to check 

for valid drivers' licenses, vehicle registrations, and proofs of 

insurance. See United States ~Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1392 (lOth 

Cir. 1987) (driver's license, car registration, and proof of 

insurance check), cert. denied, 486 u.s. 1054 (1988); United 

States ~Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 547 (lOth Cir. 1985) (driver's 

license and car registration check); United States~ Obregon, 748 

F.2d 1371, 1376 (lOth Cir. 1984) (driver's license and car 

registration check); United States~ Prichard, 645 F.2d 854, 856-

57 (lOth Cir.) (driver's license and car registration check), 

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981). Assuming that the initial stop 

of the defendants was for the valid purpose of checking drivers' 

licenses, vehicle registrations, and proofs of insurance, we hold 

that the defendants' initial detention at the roadblock was not an 

unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment. 

To determine whether the defendants' vehicles were unlawfully 

detained after a lawful initial stop for the purpose of 

facilitating the canine sniff, we look to the timing of the events 

at the roadblock. 2 In both cases the narcotics-detention dog 

2 We find irrelevant the testimony of the private investigator 

who at both suppression hearings related that when she encountered 

(Footnote Continued on Following Page) 

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Appellate Case: 89-2244 Document: 01019708249 Date Filed: 09/06/1990 Page: 6 
' alerted to the defendants' vehicles before the Socorro police 

officer had completed his inspection of the defendants' documents. 

Because the defendants' vehicles were not detained beyond the 

measure of time required for the officer to complete his 

examination of the defendants' documents, the purpose for which we 

assume the defendants were lawfully detained, we hold that there 

was not a "seizure" of the defendants' vehicles for purposes of 

facilitating the canine sniff. 

c. 

We now turn to the question raised by this appeal that we 

expressly reserved in United States ~ Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 363 

n.2 (lOth Cir. 1989), namely, whether the police must have a 

reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity before 

employing a narcotics-detection dog to sniff a vehicle already 

lawfully detained by the police. We hold that the dog sniff, 

under these circumstances, is not a "search" within the meaning of 

the fourth amendment and therefore an individualized reasonable 

suspicion of drug-related criminal activity is not required when 

the dog sniff is employed during a lawful seizure of the vehicle. 

Accord United States ~Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 

(dog sniff in train aisle outside private compartment); United 

States~ Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir.) (en bane) (dog 

sniff of checked luggage at airport), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 1072 

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

a similar roadblock operated by the Socorro police on a different 

date, she was detained approximately two minutes after the officer 

completed his inspection so that the dog could sniff her car. We 

are concerned in this case only with the legality of the police 

conduct regarding Zamora, Fuentes, and Diaz. 

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(1984); United States~ Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361-62 (5th Cir. 

1981) (dog sniff of luggage in the possession of airline), cert. 

denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981). 

United States~ Place, 462 u.s. 696 (1983), is the leading 

Supreme Court case on canine sniffs as "searches." In Place, law 

enforcement officers at an airport seized the defendant's luggage 

to subject the bags to a "sniff test" by a narcotics-detection dog 

based on a reasonable suspicion that the luggage contained 

narcotics. The Court held that the canine sniff was not a 

"search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment: 

A "canine sniff" by a well-trained narcotics detection 

dog, however, does not require opening the luggage. It 

does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would 

remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an 

officer's rummaging through the contents of the luggage. 

Thus, the manner in which information is obtained 

through this investigative technique is much less 

intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff 

discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a 

contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff 

tells the authorities something about the contents of 

the luggage, the information obtained is limited. This 

limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the 

property is not subjected to the embarrassment and 

inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more 

intrusive investigative methods. 

In these respects the canine sniff is sui generis. 

We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is 

so limited both in the manner in which the information 

is obtained and in the content of the information 

revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that 

the particular course of investigation that the agents 

intended to pursue here exposure of respondent's 

luggage, which was located in a public place, to a 

trained canine -- did not constitute a "search" within 

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 

Id. at 707. 

The defendants argue, and the district courts below agreed, 

that Place requires an individualized reasonable suspicion of 

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drug-related criminal activity before the police may subject a 

vehicle lawfully detained at a roadblock to a canine sniff. In 

reaching this conclusion, the district court found Place 

distinguishable on the ground that in Place the brief detention of 

the luggage necessary to subject it to the canine sniff was lawful 

because the seizure was based on a reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that a drug-related crime was being committed, whereas 

the seizure of Zamora's car at the roadblock was lawful for 

reasons wholly unrelated to suspected drug-related activity. 

Morales, 714 F. Supp. at 1150. 

We disagree with the district court's reading of Place. 

Place analyzed whether a canine sniff was a "search" independently 

from the question of whether the detention of the luggage based on 

reasonable suspicion was justifiable under Terry ~ Ohio, 392 U.S. 

1 (1968). It was only after the Court found that a canine sniff 

was not a search, that the Court turned its attention to whether 

the 90-minute seizure of the luggage based on reasonable suspicion 

of drug-related activity satisfied Terry. The drug-related nature 

of the officer's reasonable suspicion was simply not a factor in 

the Court's determination that a canine sniff was not a search. 

See Place, 462 U.S. at 707; United States~ Scales, No. 89-2057, 

slip. op. at 9 (lOth Cir. May 14, 1990) (Place held that 

subjecting luggage to a canine sniff is not a "search" because 

both the manner of obtaining information and the information 

obtained are limited). 

Moreover, in United States~ Jacobson, 466 u.s. 109 (1984), 

the Court broadly construed Place in holding that a police 

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investigatory tool is not a "search" if it merely reveals the 

presence or absence of contraband because the privacy interest in 

possessing contraband is not one that society recognizes as 

reasonable. 

We must first determine whether [a cocaine field test] 

can be considered a "search" subject to the Fourth 

Amendment did it infringe an expectation of privacy 

that society is prepared to consider reasonable? 

The concept of an interest in privacy that society 

is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very 

nature, critically different from the mere expectation, 

however well justified, that certain facts will not come 

to the attention of the authorities .... 

A chemical test that merely discloses whether or 

not a particular substance is cocaine does not 

compromise any legitimate interest in privacy. . .. 

[E]ven if the [test] results are negative -- merely 

disclosing that the substance is something other than 

cocaine such a result reveals nothing of special 

interest. Congress has decided and there is no 

question about its power to do so -- to treat the 

interest in "privately" possessing cocaine as 

illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal 

whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 

"private" fact, compromises no legitimate privacy 

interest. 

This conclusion is dictated by United States ~ 

Place in which the Court held that subjecting luggage to 

a "sniff test" by a trained narcotics detection dog was 

not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment .. 

Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official 

conduct of the kind disclosed by the record will 

actually compromise any legitimate interest in privacy 

seems much too remote to characterize the testing as a 

search subject to the Fourth Amendment. 

Id. at 122-24 (footnotes and citations omitted). 

Together, Jacobsen and Place make clear that there is no 

intrusion on legitimate privacy interests (and hence no "search") 

where the only information revealed is limited to contraband 

items. See Colyer, 878 U.S. at 474 (Place and Jacobson stand for 

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the proposition that a possessor of contraband can maintain no 

legitimate expectation that its presence will not be revealed); 

see also Smith~ Maryland, 442 u.s. 735, 740 (1979) (second prong 

of inquiry defining a fourth amendment "search" under United 

States~ Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), 

is whether the individual's expectation of privacy is one that 

society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable"). 

We find the factual circumstances of the two searches at 

issue to be legally indistinguishable from the facts of Place. 

The canine sniffs were made of the exterior of the defendants' 

vehicles and did not invade their homes or bodily integrity. The 

vehicles were detained lawfully in a public area, and the sniff 

took place in that public area. As in Place, the sniffs did not 

subject the defendants to any embarassment or inconvenience. 

Finally, the sniffs did not inconvenience the defendants in any 

manner. In each case the dog alerted to the vehicle before the 

officer's inspection of the driver's license, vehicle 

registration, and proof of insurance had been completed; 

therefore, the defendants did not experience any additional delay 

to facilitate the canine sniff. 

Nevertheless, the defendants argue that they had a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the odor of narcotics detected by the 

dog because this odor emanated from inside their vehicles, a 

private area protected by the fourth amendment. Consequently, the 

defendants contend, the dog sniff was akin to an unlawful sniff of 

their persons, see Horton~ Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 

F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982) (pre-Place decision holding that large 

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dogs physically touching students with their noses is an 

unreasonable search), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983), or their 

private residence, see United States ~ Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d 

Cir.) (dog sniff of exterior of an apartment building is an 

illegal search), cert. denied, 474 u.s. 819 (1985). 

We reject defendants' argument for two reasons. First, we 

are unpersuaded by defendants' analogies because there is a lesser 

expectation of privacy in a vehicle than in a home or one's bodily 

integrity. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561. Second, we find 

that when the odor of narcotics escapes from the interior of a 

vehicle, society does not recognize a reasonable privacy interest 

in the public airspace containing the incriminating odor. See 

Goldstein, 635 F.2d at 361 (reasonable expectation of privacy does 

not extend to airspace around luggage). 

In holding that police officers do not need an individualized 

reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity before 

subjecting a vehicle lawfully detained to a dog sniff, we are 

cognizant of the concern that "[t]o so hold would give officers 

the right to subject vehicular traffic stopped at red lights to 

canine sniffs so long as the sniff was completed before the light 

changed." Morales, 714 F. Supp. at 1150; see also Jacobsen, 466 

U.S. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (under majority's reading of 

Jacobsen and Place, "law enforcement officers could release a 

trained cocaine-sensitive dog . . . to roam the streets at random, 

alerting the officers to people carrying cocaine"). This type of 

canine confrontation is not before us, however, and we reserve the 

question of the constitutionality of such hypothetical situations 

for another day. 

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' . 

D. 

The district court in the Fuentes-Diaz case also suppressed 

the evidence against Fuentes because he found that Fuentes had not 

voluntarily consented to the search of the van. The other 

district court judge suppressed the evidence against Zamora for 

the same reason. Morales, 714 F. Supp. at 1154. We need not 

reach the issue of consent because probable cause to search was 

supplied when the dog alerted to the vehicles. Under the "vehicle 

exception" to the general rule that searches are reasonable only 

if conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant, see United States 

~ Panitz, ____ F.2d ____ , (1st Cir. 1990) (available on 

1990 WL 95977, *3); United States~ Swingler, 758 F.2d 477, 489-

90 (lOth Cir. 1985), no warrant was necessary in this case for the 

search of the vehicles to be reasonable under the fourth 

amendment. 

III. 

The order granting the defendants' motions to suppress is 

REVERSED. 

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