Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00855/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00855-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Hayward Police Department
Defendant
J. Cristofani
Defendant
D. Dorn
Defendant
Kevin R. Gray
Plaintiff
E. Hutchinson
Defendant
B. Matthews
Defendant
D. Olsen
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN R. GRAY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF HAYWARD POLICE

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

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No. C 05-0855 MMC (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION;

DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE

NOTICE RE: INTENT TO PROSECUTE

(Docket No. 23)

On February 28, 2005, plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the

above-titled civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging defendants Officer B.

Matthews (“Matthews”), Officer J. Cristofani (“Cristofani”), Officer D. Olsen (“Olsen”),

Officer D. Dorn (“Dorn”), and Officer E. Hutchinson (“Hutchinson”) of the City of Hayward

Police Department (“HPD”) used excessive force against plaintiff in the course of his arrest. 

Plaintiff also named the HPD itself as a defendant. After reviewing the complaint, the Court

found the allegations stated a cognizable claim for the violation of plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and ordered the

complaint served upon all of the defendants. Now before the Court is defendants’ motion for

summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication of issues. Although given an

explanation of a motion for summary judgment, a warning as to the possible consequences of

such a motion, and the opportunity to file an opposition, plaintiff has not filed a response. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

Except where noted, the facts described in this section are undisputed.

2

Carpenter is not named as a defendant.

2

BACKGROUND1

In April 2004, plaintiff was wanted for arrest on numerous charges, including

kidnaping, rape and assault. Due to the nature of these charges, as well as plaintiff’s criminal

history, which included arrests for resisting arrest and assault and battery upon police

officers, plaintiff was considered by the HPD to be “armed and dangerous.” On April 28,

2004, HPD officers, including the individual officers named as defendants herein, surrounded

the building where plaintiff was staying, for purposes of arresting him. The parties disagree

as to what happened thereafter.

A. Plaintiff’s Account

The following facts are alleged in plaintiff’s verified complaint. Plaintiff was in his

garage when his daughter approached him, crying and saying, “They’re going to shoot you.” 

He heard “a lot of yelling” outside, and when he stepped outside of his garage, he heard “get

down, shoot him, theirs [sic] a color[ed] guy a nigger around the building.” He then saw two

men approach him with rifles, wearing cargo pants and black shirts. Because they did not tell

him they were police officers, he ran up a flight of stairs onto a deck. When he saw a man

pointing a rifle at him, he said to the “officer,” “I surrender please don’t kill me.” Plaintiff

put his hands up, jumped to the ground, and put his hands “in a surrendering position.” He

then was tackled by Cristofani and Dorn, and was immediately handcuffed. While plaintiff

remained handcuffed, Cristofani and Dorn “beat him,” after which beating Officer Carpenter

(“Carpenter”)2

 approached and kicked plaintiff in the back. The three officers then dragged

plaintiff, who was still in handcuffs, to the stairs, at which point Hutchinson and Matthews

approached. Hutchinson punched plaintiff in the face “busting [plaintiff’s] lip,” hit plaintiff

in the back, face and arms with his baton, and pepper-sprayed him. Plaintiff screamed for

help, “beg[ged] them not to kill [him],” and shouted “for them to stop beating [him]” and that

“[he] could not breath[e].” Matthews told plaintiff to shut up and that he was going to shoot

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3

Divinagracia is not named as a defendant.

4

The other defendants have not submitted declarations nor have declarations been

submitted by any of the other officers present at the scene.

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Dorn does not further identify these officers.

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him. Matthews then hit plaintiff in the face and on the top of the head with the scope of his

rifle, “busting [plaintiff’s] head wide open,” and pointed the barrel of the rifle at plaintiff’s

face. Hutchinson next told Officer Divinagracia (“Divinagracia”)3

 to release a police dog to

bite plaintiff, after which the dog bit him on the legs and wrist. While plaintiff was “bleeding

profusely” from his head and face, defendant Olsen “slapped” plaintiff, told him to “shut up,”

and ordered another officer to put a cloak over plaintiff’s head. Thereafter, plaintiff was

taken to the hospital. At all times during the beating, plaintiff remained handcuffed.

B. Defendants’ Account

Defendants attach to their motion declarations by Matthews and Dorn in which said

officers set forth an account that differs from plaintiff’s account in a number of respects.4

Matthews states that after the officers arrived at plaintiff’s house, plaintiff climbed out of a

window onto a deck, ignored repeated commands by officers to “stop running” and to “get on

the ground,” ran onto an adjacent roof, and jumped to the ground. (Matthews Decl. ¶¶ 14-

20.) According to Matthews and Dorn, plaintiff “lowered his right shoulder” and “ran

directly at” Officer Dorn, who “tackled” plaintiff to the ground, and plaintiff struck Dorn in

the head with his right elbow. (Matthews Decl. ¶¶ 20-23; Dorn Decl. ¶¶ 12-14.) Dorn states

that plaintiff’s left arm was concealed, that Dorn “remained on [plaintiff]’s back” and tried to

“control his arms,” and that “[o]ther officers began to assist [him]”5

 and “took over the

attempt to control [plaintiff’s] right arm” while Dorn pulled at plaintiff’s left arm and shouted

to plaintiff to give the arm to him. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.) Dorn further states that when plaintiff

continued to hold his left arm tightly against his side, Dorn attempted to administer a

“Carotid restraint,” which attempt he then “aborted,” and eventually he and the other officers

controlled plaintiff’s arms and handcuffed him. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-16.) Matthews states that while

Dorn and plaintiff were on the ground, Matthews struck plaintiff once in the head with his

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6

Matthews does not further identify these officers. 

7

These officers are not further identified by Matthews or Dorn.

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“department issued weapon,” but plaintiff continued resisting and plaintiff’s left hand

remained concealed. (Matthews Decl. ¶¶ 24-25). According to Matthews, “several other

officers converged on plaintiff,”6

 Matthews shouted at plaintiff to stop resisting, but plaintiff

continued to “actively resist,” “violently thrashing” and “kicking”; eventually, plaintiff’s

arms “were secured” and he was handcuffed. (Matthews Decl. ¶ 25.) Matthews and Dorn

also state that after plaintiff was handcuffed, he kicked, screamed and spit saliva and blood at

“several” officers,7

 who “had to hold him down,” place him in a “wrap restraint,” and put a

“spit shield” on his head. (Matthews Decl. ¶ 26; Dorn Decl. ¶ 17.) Matthews states he did

not strike plaintiff after he was handcuffed, and did not hear any officer shout “Shoot him.” 

(Matthews Decl. ¶ 28.) After plaintiff was restrained, he was taken by ambulance to a

hospital for treatment of injuries sustained during the incident. (Id. at ¶ 26.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show there

is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those that may affect the

outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.

The court will grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248 (holding a fact is material if it might affect the

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outcome of the suit under governing law, and that a dispute about a material fact is genuine

“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party”). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record

that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to

the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the

‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e)). 

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; if, as to any given fact, evidence produced

by the moving party conflicts with evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court

must assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that

fact. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). The court’s function on

a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec.

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

B. Analysis

1. Evidence Considered

Defendants have submitted declarations by Dorn and Matthews, but not by the other

three individual defendants or other witnesses to the arrest. In addition to these two

declarations, defendants have attached to their motion a declaration by their attorney, Jeff

Cambra (“Cambra”), who attaches thereto “copies of incident reports, arrest records, and

medical records from the Hayward Police Department pertaining to the allegations contained

in the complaint.” A district court may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a

motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d

764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). Unauthenticated documents and hearsay evidence are not

admissible, and, consequently, may not be considered on summary judgment. See id. at 773-

74, 778. The documents attached to Cambra’s motion are not admissible evidence in that

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Police officers may be held liable if they have an opportunity to intercede when their

fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a plaintiff but fail to do so. See

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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they have not been properly authenticated, and contain hearsay evidence for which

defendants have not suggested any applicable exception to the hearsay rule. Because these

documents are not admissible evidence, they will not be considered by the Court in

connection with defendants’ motion.

As noted, plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 

Where the plaintiff does not file an opposition to a motion for summary judgment, but, as

here, has verified his complaint, the Court treats the allegations in the verified complaint as

an opposing affidavit to the extent such allegations are based on the plaintiff’s personal

knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. McDonald,

55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995). 

2. Individual Defendants

 The constitutional right at issue where it is alleged that a law enforcement officer

used excessive force in the course of an arrest or other seizure is the Fourth Amendment right

to be free from “unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure

is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and

quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (internal quotation and citation

omitted). Because the reasonableness standard is not capable of precise definition or

mechanical application, “its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether

the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. The reasonableness

inquiry in excessive force cases is an objective one, the question being whether the officer’s

actions, and/or failure to act,8

 are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and

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circumstances confronting him, without regard to his underlying intent or motivation and

without the “20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. 

The Court’s consideration of whether a particular use of force was reasonable “must

embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the

amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97. Not every push or

shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the

Fourth Amendment. Id. at 396. 

Here, the facts are in dispute as to whether plaintiff was resisting the officers when

they used force against him. First, there is a dispute concerning whether plaintiff surrendered

and showed his hands to the officers. As noted, plaintiff alleges that after he ran up to the

deck, he saw a man holding a rifle pointed at him, at which point plaintiff said “I surrender,”

put his hands up, jumped to the ground and “put [his] hands in a surrendering position.” By

contrast, Dorn and Matthews state in their declarations that plaintiff, after jumping to the

ground, rushed at Dorn, elbowed him in the face, and, after being tackled to the ground,

continued to resist and kick, concealed his left hand, and refused to allow the officers to

control his arms. (Matthews Decl. ¶¶ 20-25; Dorn Decl. ¶¶ 12-14.) Second, there is a

dispute as to the time at which plaintiff was handcuffed in relation to the officers’ use of

force. Plaintiff alleges he was handcuffed as soon as Dorn and Cristofani tackled him to the

ground, and before Matthews, Dorn and the other officers struck him. Defendants contend

plaintiff was handcuffed after Matthews had struck him and the other officers had joined in

the melee, and that plaintiff was never struck after being handcuffed. (Matthews Decl. ¶¶ 25-

28; Dorn Decl. ¶¶ 13-17.)

The next area of disputed fact concerns the amount of force that was applied by the

defendants and other officers. Plaintiff alleges that after he was tackled to the ground and

handcuffed, Cristofani and Dorn “beat him,” Carpenter kicked him in the back, these three

officers dragged him to the stairs in handcuffs, defendant Hutchinson punched him in the

face and hit him in the back, face and arms with a baton, Hutchinson pepper-sprayed him,

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Although the police reports attached to Cambra’s motion are not admissible evidence,

and thus are not relied upon herein, the Court notes they contain a report by Hutchinson

stating he hit plaintiff eight times in the face with “palm-heel strikes,” a report by Cristofani

stating he hit plaintiff “three to four times” on the arm with his baton, and a report by

Divinagracia that he released a police dog who bit and punctured plaintiff’s calf.

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Matthews threatened to shoot him while pointing a gun at his face, Matthews struck him in

the face and on the top of the head with the scope of a rifle, “busting [his] head wide open,” 

Hutchinson directed Divinagracia to release a police dog which bit plaintiff on the legs and

wrist, and Olsen “slapped” him. Matthews states that after Dorn tackled plaintiff to the

ground, he struck plaintiff once in the head with his weapon, but denies having heard any

officer threaten to shoot plaintiff. (Matthews Decl. ¶ 24). According to Dorn, after tackling

plaintiff to the ground, he tried to pull at plaintiff’s left arm, and attempted but did not

complete a “Carotid restraint.” (Dorn Decl. ¶¶ 14-15.) The declarations submitted do not

address plaintiff’s allegations of the use of force by the other defendants and officers present,

but in their motion defendants concede “other officers” used “baton strikes, open hand

strikes, and for a brief moment a K9” in the attempt to subdue plaintiff.9

Assuming plaintiff’s version of these events is true, as the Court must do at this stage

of the proceedings, plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact, as he has alleged facts

from which a finding could be made that the officers’ actions were unreasonable under the

circumstances. Certainly, the officers, at the outset, had reason to be concerned for their

safety, as there is no dispute that plaintiff had a history of violence with the police, was

wanted for violent crimes, and initially had run from his house to the deck. Plaintiff states,

however, that once he was on the deck, he told the officers he was surrendering and showed

them his hands, after which he was handcuffed. Thereafter, according to plaintiff, defendants

and other officers participated in a beating in which they kicked him, dragged him, punched

him in the face, hit him with a baton in the back, face and arms, pepper-sprayed him, pointed

a gun at his face and threatened to shoot him, hit him in the face and the head with the scope

of a rifle, and released a police dog who bit him on the legs and wrist. It is undisputed that at

least seven police officers and a police dog were present, and there is no evidence plaintiff

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was armed. Further, it is undisputed plaintiff was injured and bleeding as a result of the

altercation, and was immediately taken to a hospital by ambulance for treatment of his

injuries. See Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1199 (9th

Cir. 2001) (“Headwaters”) (holding that whether use of force poses risk of significant injury

is factor considered in evaluating need for amount of force used), judgment vacated on other

grounds, 534 U.S. 801 (2001). 

Because, under plaintiff’s version of the events, he was effectively under police

control and no longer a danger, the considerable amount of force alleged by him would not

have been reasonable. See e.g. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1058-60 (9th

Cir. 2003) (finding that once suspect handcuffed on ground without offering resistance, two

officers who knelt on him and pressed their weight against his torso and neck despite his

pleas for air used excessive force); Robinson v. Solano, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (9th Cir.

2002) (en banc) (finding excessive force where police pointed gun at head of suspect who

was outnumbered by police, was approaching them peacefully, and no longer carried shotgun

as previously reported). Accordingly, an issue of material fact exists as to whether

defendants Hayward Police Officers Matthews, Cristofani, Olsen, Dorn and Hutchinson used

excessive force against plaintiff in the course of his arrest. See Headwaters, 240 F.3d at 1198

(noting unreasonable force claims are generally questions of fact for jury because Fourth

Amendment test for reasonableness is inherently fact-specific).

Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is only

available where it would not have been clear to a reasonable defendant, under the facts

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that his conduct violated the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001) (“If the law did not

put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment

based on qualified immunity is appropriate.”). Here, the facts, viewed in the light most

favorable to plaintiff, are that after plaintiff surrendered and was handcuffed, seven police

officers, including the five defendants, struck him with multiple blows to the head, face and

body with their fists, feet and weapons, and that while one defendant pointed a gun at

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plaintiffs face and threatened to shoot him, another defendant ordered a police dog to attack

him. Under the authority set forth above, no reasonable official could have believed that

applying such force against plaintiff after he had surrendered and was handcuffed was lawful. 

Accordingly, on the current record, the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified

immunity.

3. Municipal Defendant

In the complaint, plaintiff names the HPD as a defendant, as well as the individual

HPD officers described above. A city or county governmental entity may not be held

vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees under a theory of respondeat

superior. Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Rather, local

governments are “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where official policy

or custom results in a violation of a constitutional right. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Under Monell, to impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a

violation of a constitutional right, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a

constitutional right of which he or she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy;

(3) that such policy amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights;

and (4) that such policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See

Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). 

As discussed above, because plaintiff has not filed an opposition, the Court is limited

to the factual allegations in his complaint. The complaint does not allege the existence of

any policy on the part of the HPD, much less that any policy was the moving force behind

the officers’ use of excessive force. The complaint merely alleges the facts surrounding

plaintiff’s arrest, including the officers’ alleged use of excessive force on that occasion. 

Even viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, an allegation of the use of force on a

single occasion does not give rise to a reasonable inference that the force was employed

pursuant to policy. As plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

the constitutional violations alleged herein were committed pursuant to a policy of the HPD,

the HPD is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows:

1. The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to defendant City of

Hayward Police Department. The motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to the

remaining defendants, specifically, Officer B. Matthews, Officer J. Cristofani, Officer D.

Olsen, Officer D. Dorn, and Officer E. Hutchinson of the City of Hayward Police

Department.

2. As plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment or

to defendant’s prior motion to dismiss, and has not filed a document in this matter in over

eight months, it is unclear whether he wishes to proceed with the action. Accordingly, within

thirty days of the date this order is filed, plaintiff shall notify the Court as to whether he

intends to prosecute this matter. Plaintiff is hereby advised that his failure to do so will

result in the dismissal of the above-titled action for failure to prosecute, pursuant to

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

This order terminates Docket No. 23.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 2, 2007 _____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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