Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01924/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01924-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Chicago
Appellee
Marc Debose
Appellee
Gregory Sobieraj
Appellee
Darnell Tolliver
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15‐1924

DARNELL TOLLIVER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:11‐cv‐008563 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.

ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2015 — DECIDED APRIL 12, 2016

Before KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. After pleading guilty to aggravated

battery to a peace officer, Darnell Tolliver brought claims

againstthe arresting officers for excessive force andconspiracy

to conceal the use of excessive force, and a claim against the

City of Chicago for indemnification of the officers. The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants

on the ground that Tolliver’s claims were barred by Heck v.

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2 No. 15‐1924

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Although it is certainly possible

in the abstract for a claim of excessive force to survive Heck,

Tolliver’s suit rests on a version of the event that completely

negates the basis for his conviction. His claim is therefore

barred by Heck and we affirm.

I.

The facts are hotly disputed but we must credit Tolliver’s

version and draw allreasonable inferences in his favor because

he is the party opposing summary judgment. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); McGreal v. Ostrov,

368 F.3d 657, 663 (7th Cir. 2004). In the evening of December 9,

2009, Tolliver drove to the home of his friend Kenyata Tyson,

near the intersection of Wabansia Avenue and Mobile Avenue

in Chicago. Tolliver had received a call earlier that evening

from Tyson’s girlfriend, asking for money to help Tyson

retrieve his car from the auto pound. Tolliver went into

Tyson’s house and handed over the requested money. He also

agreed to deliver drugs for Tyson and left the house with a

package of cocaine in his coat pocket. He returned to his white

Mitsubishi and pulled out onto Wabansia Avenue.

Unbeknownst to Tolliver, at roughly the same time, a

confidential informant was telling a Chicago police sergeant

thatpeople were packaging drugs at a house onWabansia with

a white Mitsubishi parked outside. When Tolliver was leaving

the house, the sergeant received another call informing him

that someone was leaving in the white Mistubishi. The ser‐

geant directed two officers on his gang team, Gregory Sobieraj

and Marc Debose, to stop the car. Officers Sobieraj and Debose

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No. 15‐1924 3

saw the car at the intersection of Wabansia and Moody1 and

pulled their unmarked Ford Crown Victoria in front of and

perpendicular to the Mitsubishi to effect the stop.

Both officers, who were in plain clothes, exited the car, but

Tolliver saw only Officer Sobieraj, who exited the driver’s side

and immediately pointed a gun at Tolliver. Because the car was

unmarked and lacked police mars lights, and because the

officers were in plain clothes, Tolliver did not immediately

realize that the men were police officers. He put his car in

reverse and slowly backed up a little more than a car length.

When he looked forward again, Tolliver realized from

Sobieraj’s demeanor that he was a police officer. Because he

did not want the officerto think that he was reaching for a gun,

Tolliver (who was unarmed) then sat motionless in the car,

with his hands on the steering wheel in the 10 o’clock and 2

o’clock position, and his foot on the brake, for approximately

thirty seconds. He could tell that the man with the gun was

shouting but he could not hear the words because music was

playing in the car.

After sitting motionless for thirty seconds, with the car

stationary and the gearshift still in reverse, Tolliver felt

something hit him in the chest. He looked down and realized

1

  At Tolliver’s plea hearing, the State’s version of the event placed the

incident at the intersection of Wabansia and Moody. Tolliver stated that

Tyson’s home was on Wabansia, and although he was not certain of the

cross‐street, he believed it was Mobile. Tolliver also stated that he was

traveling east on Wabansia when the officers stopped him. Moody is

approximately six blocks east ofMobile. The precise location ofthe shooting

is immaterial to the issues on appeal.

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4 No. 15‐1924

he had been shot. When he felt the bullet enter his chest, he

“ducked down to the right” (R. 33‐1 at 65) or “fell to the right”

(R. 33 at ¶ 26) and “couldn’t move.” R. 33‐1 at 66. See also R. 33

at ¶ 26 (“After Tolliver was shot the first time, he felt as if he

could not move and fell to the right as his car started moving

forward.”); R. 33‐1 at 66‐67 (clarifying that he could not move

anything once the bullet hit him, and recalling that he fell to

the right). Tolliver testified that after he felt the first bullet

strike him, he “just felt like [he] was paralyzed,” and that he

could not move anything but his eyeballs. R. 33‐1 at 66. He

could not move his left side at all and he was lying on his right

side, with his right arm trapped beneath him. R. 33‐1 at 69. His

body was “stuck in the middle [of the center console], under

the steering wheel, in between ... the gear shift ... and ... the

little panel partright in the middle.” R. 33‐1 at 69‐70. Afterthat

point, he could not touch the steering wheel because he could

not move his left side and he was lying on his right side.

R. 33‐1 at 68‐71. From that position, he felt the car roll forward

for a few seconds until it hit something and then stopped

rolling. R. 33‐1 at 67, 72‐73. Tolliver asserted that he “did not

intentionally put [the car] in drive,” but that a reasonable

inference “is that the car was knocked into drive when Tolliver

fell over to the right as he was shot since the gear shift is floor

mounted in the center console.” R. 32, at ¶ 32. He did not know

whether the car was rolling forward in a straight path but

knew only that it was coasting forward. R. 33‐1 at 68. He

denied driving the car toward the officer (R. 33‐1 at 101) but

assumed that the car went toward the officer because it was

rolling forward after he was shot. R. 33‐1 at 104. After the

Mitsubishi came to rest, someone then pulled him from the car

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No. 15‐1924 5

and laid him on the ground where he “felt like [he] went to

sleep.” R. 33‐1 at 79.

Although he never heard a gun being fired, Tolliver

eventually learned that the officers had fired fourteen times

and he had been struck by seven bullets which caused serious

andenduring physical and emotional injuries.The secondshot

hit him in the shoulder, back‐to‐back with the first. R. 33‐1 at

63‐64, 70. More shots followed, hitting his left shin bone, thigh,

inner left thigh, buttocks, chest and shoulder blade. He

underwent surgery five times in efforts to repair the damage

but suffers from lasting injuries. Tolliver asserts that before the

shooting and at the time of the shooting, he posed no danger

or threat of danger to either officer. Tolliver does not dispute

that Officer Sobieraj was injured during the incident, spraining

his ankle. As we noted above, Tolliver also claims not to have

intentionally driven the car towards the officers and that he

was paralyzed from the moment of the first unprovoked shot.

Nevertheless, he pled guilty to state charges of aggravated

battery of a peace officer and possession of a controlled

substance with intent to deliver. At his plea hearing, Tolliver

stipulated that, if the matter proceeded to trial, Sobieraj would

testify that:

he was working and on duty on December

9th of 2009 at approximately 11:14 P.M. He

would testify that he was in the area of

Waubansia [sic] and Moody Avenue in Chi‐

cago, Cook County, Illinois, on a narcotics

surveillance. He would testify that he ob‐

served the Defendant, whom he would iden‐

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6 No. 15‐1924

tify in open court, driving a vehicle. The

officer would testify that he attempted to

curb that vehicle, and he exited his vehicle

and approached the vehicle the Defendant

was driving. He would testify at that time

that the Defendant drove his vehicle towards

the officer, and in an attempt to escape from

the Defendant’s vehicle, Officer Sobieraj did

fall and sprain his ankle. He would further

testify that he was in fear for his safety, and

he fired shots at the vehicle striking the

Defendant. He wouldfurthertestify that after

the Defendant’s vehicle crashed, the Defen‐

dant was placed in custody, and a custodial

search of the Defendant was performed,

which revealed 278 plastic clear plastic [sic]

baggies with white chunky substance inside

them.

R. 26‐4, at 8‐9.

After entering his guilty plea, Tolliver filed a three count

complaint against Officers Sobieraj and Debose and the City of

Chicago, claiming that the officers violated his civil rights by

using excessive force and by conspiring to conceal their use of

excessive force. The claim against the City is limited to indem‐

nification of the officers. The district court concluded that the

claim for excessive force is barred by Heck, and that the other

two claims fail because they are entirely dependent on the

success of the first. Tolliver appeals.

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No. 15‐1924 7

II.

We review the district courtʹs grant of summary judgment

de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable to

Tolliver and construing all reasonable inferences from the

evidence in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Naficy v. Illinois

Depʹt of Human Servs., 697 F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 2012); Norman‐

Nunnery v. Madison Area Technical Coll., 625 F.3d 422, 428 (7th

Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are

no genuine disputes of material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Naficy, 697

F.3d at 509.

Under Tolliver’s theory of the case, the officers used

excessive force in shooting him before his car began moving

and in continuing to shoot him as his car rolled slowly in the

direction of Sobieraj. The district court granted judgment in

favor of the defendants after concluding that Tolliver’s claims

were barred by Heck. In that case, the Supreme Court held:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional convictionorimprisonment,

or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must

prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such determina‐

tion, or called into question by a federal

courtʹs issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28

U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing

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8 No. 15‐1924

that relationship to a conviction or sentence

that has not been so invalidated is not cogni‐

zable under § 1983. Thus, when a state pris‐

oner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the

district court must consider whether a judg‐

ment in favor of the plaintiff would necessar‐

ily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demon‐

strate that the conviction or sentence has

already been invalidated. But if the district

court determines that the plaintiffʹs action,

even if successful, will not demonstrate the

invalidity of any outstanding criminal judg‐

ment against the plaintiff, the action should

be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some

other bar to the suit.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87 (footnotes omitted). The question

for Tolliver, then, is whether his civil claims against the officers

necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction. See

also Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 489 (7th Cir. 2003) (a

convicted criminal may not bring a civil suit questioning the

validity of his conviction until the conviction has been set

aside).

Tolliver pled guilty to aggravated battery of a peace officer.

In Illinois, “[a] person commits aggravated battery when, in

committing a battery, other than by the discharge of a firearm,

he or she knows the individual battered to be ... [a] peace

officer ... performing his or her official duties.” 720 ILCS 5/12‐

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No. 15‐1924 9

3.05(d)(4)(I).2 In turn, “[a] person commits battery if he

intentionally or knowingly without legal justification and by

any means, (1) causes bodily harm to an individual or (2)

makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature

withanindividual.” 720 ILCS 5/12‐3.3 Illinois law alsoprovides

that “[a] material element of every offense is a voluntary act,

which includes an omission to perform a duty which the law

imposes on the offender and which he is physically capable of

performing.” 720 ILCS 5/4‐1. Thus, in order to be guilty of

aggravated battery to a peace officer, Tolliver must have (1)

known that Sobieraj was a peace officer performing his official

duties; and (2) intentionally or knowingly; (3) voluntarily; (4)

without legal justification; (5) caused bodily harm to Officer

Sobieraj.

In Tolliver’s current version of the shooting, he concedes

that he knew that Sobieraj was a peace officer performing his

duties and that Sobieraj was injured when he attempted to

move away from Tolliver’s car as it rolled towards him. But

Tolliver’s version of the event denies any act that was know‐

ing, intentional, voluntary and lacking legal justification that

2

  At the time of the shooting, section 720 ILCS 5/12‐4(b)(18) provided that,

“[i]n committing a battery, a person commits aggravated battery if he or

she ... Knows the individual harmed to be an officer or employee of the

State of Illinois, a unit of local government, or school district engaged in the

performance of his or her authorized duties as such officer or employee.”

That provision was amended and renumbered as quoted above but the

changes are not relevant to the issues on appeal.

3

  This is the version of the statute in effect at the time of the offense. A new

version took effect on July 1, 2011.

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10 No. 15‐1924

caused the harm to Officer Sobieraj. Instead, Tolliver affirma‐

tively asserts that he did not intentionally drive the car

towards the officers, and that after the first, unprovoked shot,

he was paralyzed, fell over, and could not see what was

happening. He argues that it is reasonable to infer that he

knocked the gear shift into a forward gear when he fell or

“ducked” to the right after being shot, and he assumes his car

drifted towards the officers.

Without any acknowledgment ofthemental state necessary

for a conviction for aggravated battery, Tolliver’s version of the

shooting thus implies the invalidity of his conviction. That is,

if the finder of fact were to accept his version of the event, the

officers shot him as he sat impassively in his car, posing no

threat to the officers. By his own account, the first shot that he

felt caused him to fall to the right, paralyzing his left side,

trapping his right arm, and rendering him unable to move

anything but his eyeballs. He could not see where the car was

going and could not direct its path or do anything to stop it. He

urges the court to interpret his statement that he “ducked” to

the right as the voluntary and intentional act that caused harm

to Officer Sobieraj. But even if he voluntarily ducked to the

right, and that action shifted the car into gear and caused it to

rolltowards the officers, he has affirmatively deniedintent and

knowledge of what happened next. Moreover, he would have

been legally justified in ducking if, as he also claims, he was

sitting impassively posing no threat to the officers when they

began to shoot him, even if the action of ducking then caused

injury to the officer. See 720 ILCS 5/7‐13 (delineating the

defense of necessity). Under Tolliver’s version of the facts, he

could not be guilty of aggravated battery because he did not

Case: 15-1924 Document: 26 Filed: 04/12/2016 Pages: 18
No. 15‐1924 11

intentionally drive towards the officers, did not knowingly roll

towards them, could not have stopped the car if he wanted to,

and placed the car into a forward gear through an act that can

be described as voluntary only if the finder of fact ignores the

majority of his deposition testimony. Moreover, in light of all

of his repeated testimony regarding falling to the right and

immediate paralysis, it is notreasonable to construe the phrase

“I ducked down to the right” as a voluntary act much less a

voluntary act that knowingly caused the injury to Sobieraj.

Because his version of the facts implies the invalidity of his

conviction for aggravated battery, his civil claims are barred by

Heck.

We note that there is nothing inherently contradictory

about pleading guilty to aggravated battery of a peace officer

and bringing a claim of excessive force. In Illinois, a person

may be guilty of aggravated battery of a peace officerfor either

causing bodily harm to an officer or making physical contact

of an insulting or provoking nature with an officer. 720 ILCS

5/12‐3. Thus, a person could theoretically be found guilty of

aggravated battery for crumpling up a parking ticket and

throwing it at the officer’s foot, Garcia‐Meza v. Mukasey,

516 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2008), or poking a police officer in

the chin, Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 686 (7th Cir. 2008). If

apolice officerrespondedto those relatively minorinsults with

deadly force, a claim for excessive force would not be barred

by Heck simply because the offender pled guilty to aggravated

battery of a peace officer. A civil suit for excessive force in

those circumstances would not imply the invalidity of the

conviction.

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12 No. 15‐1924

But if the plaintiff’s factual claims in the civil suit necessar‐

ily imply the invalidity of the criminal conviction, then Heck

bars the civil suit. We explained the distinction in Okoro. In that

case, a federal prisoner brought a suit against federal and state

officers, seeking the return of gems and cash that he claimed

the officers took from him in the course of a search of his home.

Okoro had been arrested in his home on suspicion of distribut‐

ing heroin, and it was during a search incident to his arrest that

the defendants allegedly stole the gems and cash from him. In

his civil suit, he insisted that he was not trying to sell heroin to

the officers, as they had testified. Instead, he asserted, he was

trying to sell them gems and the officers stole them. If his

version of the event was true, then he was convicted in error

because the officers’ testimony about the heroin was an

essential part of the evidence against him in his conviction. We

noted that if he could not prevail in his claim for the return of

the gems without undermining his conviction, then he was

barred by Heck until he had his conviction overturned:

It is irrelevant that he disclaims any intention

of challenging his conviction; if he makes

allegations that are inconsistent with the

convictionʹs having been valid, Heck kicks in

and bars his civil suit. Edwards v. Balisok, 520

U.S. 641, 646–48, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d

906 (1997); Ryan v. DuPage County Jury Com‐

mission, 105 F.3d 329, 330–31 (7th Cir. 1996)

(per curiam). He is the master of his ground.

Okoro, 324 F.3d at 490. Okoro could have said the officers took

his gems without making any claim about heroin, or he could

have said that they took both the heroin and his gems, and

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No. 15‐1924 13

neither of those scenarios would have implied the invalidity of

his conviction. But instead he challenged the validity of the

guilty verdict by denying that there were any drugs and

instead arguing that he was framed. His civil claims were

therefore barred by Heck. Okoro, 328 F.3d at 490.

Tolliver’s conviction was based on voluntarily, and

knowingly or intentionally causing bodily harm to Officer

Sobieraj, withoutlegaljustification.Butifthe incidentunfolded

as Tolliver alleges in his civil suit, then he could not have been

guilty of aggravated battery of a peace officer because the

officer shot him without provocation and was injured as a

result of involuntary and unintentional actions by a paralyzed

Tolliver. Because Tolliver is the master of his ground, and

because the allegations he makes now necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction, Heck bars his civil suit. Okoro,

324 F.3d at 490.

Tolliver could have brought a suit for excessive force that

occurred after the crime was complete. Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d

899, 901 (7th Cir. 2008) (Heck does not affect litigation about

what happens after the crime is completed). As we explained

in Gilbert, a contention that a guard struck back after being hit

is not incompatible with Heck. “Otherwise guards (and forthat

matter any public employee) could maul anyone who strikes

them, without risk of civil liability as long as the private party

is punishedby criminalprosecution or prison discipline forthe

initial wrong.” Gilbert, 512 F.3d at 901. If Tolliver had conceded

that he voluntarily and intentionally or knowingly drove

towards the officers, or if Tolliver had even remained agnostic

on who struck the first blow, he could have brought a claim

that the officers’ response of firing fourteen bullets at him

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14 No. 15‐1924

constitutedexcessive force andthat claim4 wouldnot be barred

by Heck. Gilbert, 512 F.3d at 902. But Tolliver’s version of events

negates the mental state necessary to support his conviction for

aggravated battery of a peace officer and thus necessarily

implies the invalidity of his conviction.

The district court relied entirely on Heck in ruling for the

defendants, declining to address their alternative argument

that they were also entitled to qualified immunity forthe shots

fired once Tolliver’s car began to move towards them. “The

doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials

‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutionalrights

of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The Supreme Court has held that

“[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the

suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the

officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to

prevent escape by using deadly force.” Tennessee v. Garner,

471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).5 See also Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 639 (7th

4

  We offer no opinion on the merits of such a claim. We note only that it

would not be barred by Heck.

5

  The Court noted that, when deadly force is used to prevent escape in

circumstances where a suspect has threatened an officer with a weapon, a

warning should be given first when feasible. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12.

Although Tolliver asserts that he was shot without warning, he also

concedes that the officers were pointing their weapons at him for at least

thirty seconds and that they were shouting at him. But he alleges that he

(continued...)

Case: 15-1924 Document: 26 Filed: 04/12/2016 Pages: 18
No. 15‐1924 15

Cir. 2003). If a suspect threatens the officer with a weapon, that

risk of serious physical harm has been established. Garner,

471 U.S. at 11. In assessing whether force was excessive, we

must analyze the actions of the officer from the objective

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than

with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d

752, 756 (7th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the reasonableness calculus

must allow for the fact that officers are often forced to make

split‐second decisions about what amount offorce is necessary

incircumstances that are tense,uncertainandrapidly evolving.

346 F.3d at 756.

Tolliver argues that the officers were not entitled to

qualified immunity because (1) they created the danger by

firing the first shot at a time when the car was stationary and

he presented no threat to their safety; and (2) once the car

started rolling towards the officers, it was moving so slowly

that Tolliver did not present a threat of serious physical harm

to the officers. As we have already noted, if the encounter

unfolded as Tolliver asserts, with the officers firing the first

shot as he sat stationary in the car, his version of events would

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction for aggra‐

vated battery of Officer Sobieraj. That eliminates Tolliver’s

argument that the officers unjustifiably created the danger.

As for his claim that the car was moving so slowly that he

did not place the officers in danger, the defendants point out

that Officer Sobieraj was in fact injured as he tried to flee from

5

  (...continued)

could not hear the words because of the music playing in his car.

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16 No. 15‐1924

Tolliver’s moving car. We will take that analysis a step further.

“The fact‐specific nature of whether an officer used excessive

force depends on the totality ofthe circumstances surrounding

the encounter.” Scott, 346 F.3d at 756. “[A]n automobile may be

used as a deadly weapon.” Scott, 346 F.3d at 757. Considering

the totality of the circumstances here, Tolliver asserts that his

car was moving no more than three miles per hour at the time

of the shooting. Three miles per hour is equivalent to 4.4 feet

per second. In his deposition, Tolliver stated that when the

officers pulled their car in front of his Mitsubishi to effect the

stop, the police car was seven or eight feet in front of him

(R. 33‐1, at 53, 55), and that Sobieraj was eight feet in front of

him when he exited the police car and pointed his gun at

Tolliver(R. 33‐1, at 55). Tolliverthen backed up approximately

one and a half carlengths (R. 33‐1, at 51, 56, 57). Assuming that

a car length is approximately sixteen feet, Tolliver backed up

approximately twenty‐four feet, putting a total distance of

thirty‐two feet (or approximately two carlengths) between his

Mitsubishi and Officer Sobieraj. A car traveling only three

miles an hour will traverse that distance in a little more than

seven seconds.6 Of course, when the car began moving in the

direction of the officers, they had no way of knowing whether

Tolliver would accelerate towards them, closing the distance

even faster. They knew only that they had stopped a car being

driven by a manpurportedly transporting cocaine, andthatthe

6

  A car traveling three miles per hour would close the gap in 7.27 seconds.

There are 5280 feet in a mile, and 3600 seconds in an hour. Three miles per

hour is equivalent to 15840 feet per 3600 seconds, or 4.4 feet per second. To

calculate the number of seconds it would take to close the gap, we divide

32 feet by 4.4 feet per second, and calculate 7.27 seconds.

Case: 15-1924 Document: 26 Filed: 04/12/2016 Pages: 18
No. 15‐1924 17

man had responded by first backing up and then by moving

towards them as they stood in front of the car. And as Tolliver

alleges, as his car moved towards the officers, he fell to his

right, under the steering wheel, and essentially disappeared

from the officers’ sight.

Qualified immunity applies to the actions of Officers

Sobieraj and Debose here. Reasonable officers in their circum‐

stances would have perceived the car as a deadly weapon that

created a threat of serious physical harm. The Mitsubishi was

only two car lengths from the officers when it began to move

in their direction, and even at slow speeds, the officers had

only seconds to react to the threat. Moreover, the officers had

no way of knowing whether Tolliver would accelerate,

shortening the space and time to react. By Tolliver’s own

account, the bullets were fired in rapid succession, over a

periodthat couldbe measuredin seconds.The officers stopped

firing when the vehicle stopped moving and the threat had

passed. During those few seconds, Sobieraj sprained his ankle

as he moved away from the car.

Tolliver encourages us to split the time line into the

moments before the car moved and the period after it began

moving. In his opening brief, he claims that it was excessive

force to shoot him before his car drove towards Sobieraj, and

it was also excessive force to continue to shoot him when his

car slowly moved towards Sobieraj. If the officers began

shooting before the car moved, the defendants agree that

qualified immunity would not apply but that scenario would

necessarily imply the invalidity of Tolliver’s conviction for

aggravated battery. Because of Heck, Tolliver would have to

obtain the reversal of his conviction before he could proceed

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18 No. 15‐1924

against the officers on that theory. And once the car began to

move towards the officers, as a factual matter, there was no

natural breaking point between the first few shots and the

remaining shots. Even if it were possible to discern in those

few seconds a meaningful break from the shots absolutely

necessary to protect the officers and those that were unneces‐

sary, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because

Tolliver had ducked out of sight, and the officers had no

reason to know that he was disabled or that there was no need

to continue firing. From a reasonable officer’s perspective, the

danger had not changed because the car continued to roll

forward. In the totality of these circumstances, qualified

immunity therefore applies to all of the officers’ actions once

the car began to move towards the officers.

As long as Tolliver’s conviction stands, he is confined to a

version of the facts that does not undermine the conviction.

Because Tolliver’s claim for excessive force fails under Heck, so

too do his claims for conspiracy to conceal the use of excessive

force and for indemnification.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 15-1924 Document: 26 Filed: 04/12/2016 Pages: 18