Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05271/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05271-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Willard Dunn
Petitioner
Michael Knowles
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLARD DUNN, CASE NO. CV-F-04-5271 AWI WMW HC

Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

vs. RE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

 CORPUS 

MICHAEL KNOWLES,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with counsel in a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 22, 2000, following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted in Tulare County Superior

Court of twenty-one sex-related felony counts. The court sentenced Petitioner to serve a term of thirtythree years and four months in prison.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal and the California Court of Appeal, FifthAppellateDistrict(Court

of Appeal), affirmed his conviction and sentence on December 9, 2002, in an unpublished opinion in

case number F037048. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, which

the court denied on February 19, 2003.

//

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504

fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Tulare County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the

court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997);

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9

th Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769

(5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after

statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed on February 11, 2004, after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with respect

to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless

the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);Lockyer v. Andrade, 123

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S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d

1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may

not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at

1174 (citations omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations

omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal conviction

is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual determinations must be

presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made by the state court unless

the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S.

99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9

th Cir. 1997). 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity

to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111

S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo

v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9

th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear

a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes,

504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

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When the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, however, this court "looks

through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last

state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3,

111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look through" presumption

that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion);

see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9th Cir.2000) (holding federal courts look to last

reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court's rejection of petitioner's claims was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1)). In the present case,

Respondent admits that Petitioner has exhausted his two stated grounds for relief.

DISCUSSION

USE OF EXPUNGED FELONY PRIORS

Petitioner contends that the use of expunged felony priors for impeaching him violated his

Constitutional rights to due process and to compulsory process, and his privilege against compulsory

incrimination. He claims that the prejudicial effect of the impeachment with the expunged priors

infected his entire trial with errors of constitutional dimension. Respondent disputes this contention.

The Court of Appeal described the factual background as follows:

Appellant suffered two prior related felony convictions that the prosecutor wanted to use

for impeachment purposes. The first conviction arose out of an incident in Contra Costa County

in 1979. The second conviction was for sexual battery that occurred in 1984 in Alameda

County. The victim in the Alameda County case was Brenda.

Both of the prior convictions were ultimately expunged pursuant to section 1203.4. As

part of the plea agreement, the conviction in the Contra Costa County case was reduced to a

misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b) before it was expunged. The Alameda

County prior was not reduced to a misdemeanor before being expunged, although appellant

asserted there had been a “contract” at the time of the felony plea that the charge would later be

reduced to a misdemeanor. 

Appellant’s counsel argued that the prosecution was precluded from using these

convictions since they had been reduced to misdemeanors before being expunged. The trial

court held that a felony conviction was a basis to impeach appellant despite the fact it was

expunged. However, the court also noted that a felony conviction reduced to a misdemeanor

prior to dismissal could not be used to impeach appellant. As a result, the court allowed the

prosecution to impeach appellant with the Alameda County conviction, but not the prior from

Contra Costa County. The court also held appellant’s plea in the Alameda County case

constituted an admission and was admissible on that basis as well. Appellant was subsequently

questioned at trial about the prior Alameda County conviction.

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Unpublished opinion in case number F037048, 14 -15. In addressing the merits of Petitioner’s

contention, the Court of Appeal held as follows:

We reject appellant’s claim that he has a right to give testimony immune from such

challenge. The procedure of impeaching by proof of prior felony conviction originated at

common law and has long been authorized by our Legislature. It is settled that such

impeachment does not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of either the federal

or the state Constitution (People v. Roberts (1966) 65 Cal.2d 514, 522; People v. House (1970)

12 Cal.App.3d 756, 764; People v. Harris (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 534, 538; People v. Stewart

(1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 1, 7), the federal or California privilege against self-incrimination

(McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183, 215; People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378,

388), nor the requirements of the Sixth Amendment (People v. House, supra, at p. 764.)

Unpublished opinion in case number F037048, 15. 

In the present petition, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Specifically, Petitioner provides no citation to clearly established Federal

law holding that the use of expunged felony convictions cannot be used for impeachment purposes.

Accordingly, the court must find that this contention presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.

JUROR MISCONDUCT

Petitioner contends that juror misconduct in the form of introduction of extrinsic evidence into

the deliberation process violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, necessitating

a new trial. Petitioner argues that the alleged juror misconduct was evidenced by an affidavit from

Juror No. 4, which read in part as follows:

During deliberations about one count involving the Porterville Fairgrounds parking lot, one of

the female jurors (35) told the other jurors that she knew the parking lot well, described it and

it was nothing like the defense was portraying it. A second juror (#11) concurred with her

opinions. 

"In all criminal prosecutions," state and federal, "the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial

. . . by an impartial jury,"U.S. Const., Amends. 6 and 14; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

In reviewing a claim of juror misconduct, "[t]he test is whether or not the misconduct has prejudiced the

defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial." United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974). Although it is generally preferred that a trial court hold

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an evidentiary hearing when allegations of juror misconduct arise, it is not always required, particularly

when the court knows the exact scope and nature of the misconduct. See United States v. Halbert, 712

F.2d 388, 389 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.1977); see also

United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1187 (10th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1148 (1999).

The Court is mindful of the fact that “it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or

influence that might theoretically affect their vote." Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118 (1983), quoting

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). When the alleged misconduct is intra-jury, it has been

widely held that the trial court is entitled to greater deference in its review, because the misconduct is

less serious than extra-jury influences. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117- 21 (1987);

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982);Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 228-30 (1954); Mattox

v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892); United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1393 (3d Cir.1994)

("[I]ntra-jury communications pose a less serious threat to a defendant's right to an impartial trial than

do extra-jury influences, and therefore district courts are entitled to even greater deference in their

responses to them than in responses to outside influences."). United States v. Ford, 840 F.2d 460, 465-66

(7th Cir.1988); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140 (3d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424

U.S. 917 (1976); Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) (juror may only testify post-verdict on the question whether

extraneous influence was brought to bear on jurors). Petitioner has the burden of showing that internal

juror misconduct prejudiced him. See United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir.1999).

The Court of Appeal addressed the issue, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in determining no prejudicial juror misconduct occurred. It specifically found that the extraneous

comments made by jurors relating to the parking lot were irrelevant and immaterial to Petitioner’s guilt,

and that any misconduct was not prejudicial to Petitioner. 

Petitioner has presented this court with nothing showing that the state courts’ adjudication of the

juror misconduct claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Instead, Petitioner

simply disagrees with the courts’ conclusions. Accordingly, this court must find that Petitioner has

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failed to carry his burden and that this contention provides no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ of habeas

corpus be DENIED and that judgment be entered for Respondent. 

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District Court

Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules

of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days

after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on

all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus

three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The court will then review the Magistrate

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 16, 2006 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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