Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00153/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00153-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Mize
Defendant
Michael Pack
Defendant
Randolph Picchi
Defendant
Tina Picchi
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

ROSS PEARSON

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

RANDOLPH PICCHI ET AL.,

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:19-CR-00153-DAD-BAM

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

AND ORDER

DATE: May 11, 2020

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

This case is set for status conference on May 11, 2020. On April 17, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 617, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California scheduled to 

commence before June 15, 2020, and allows district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date 

after June 1. This and previous General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to 

COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

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or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice 

continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that 

the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless 

“the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the 

ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 1

 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and 

through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 11, 2020. 

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until 

September 28, 2020, and to exclude time between May 11, 2020, and September 28, 2020, under Local 

Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes over 7,000 pages of police reports, FBI serials, wiretap documents, intercepted calls and 

text messages, photographs, cell phone reports, and other media. This discovery has been either 

produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. All of this 

discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and 

copying.

b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, review 

discovery, research the charges, discuss potential resolutions with their clients, and otherwise 

prepare for trial. In addition, as a result of the public health emergency, defense counsels’ ability 

to communicate with their clients has been largely limited to telephone. This limited access 

requires significant additional time to convey discovery to their clients, and to consult with and 

review discovery and other case matters.

c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 617, and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because some of the parties are high-risk due to factors such as age and medical 

conditions. Counsel for the parties have also been limited in their ability to conduct investigation 

and research the case due to shelter-in-home orders and remote working limitations.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the 

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original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 11, 2020 to September 28, 

2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants’ request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

[Remainder of Page Left Blank]

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IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: May 4, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ ROSS PEARSON

ROSS PEARSON

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: May 4, 2020 /s/ JOHN F. GARLAND

JOHN F. GARLAND

Counsel for Defendant 

RANDOLPH PICCHI

(Authorized by email on May 4, 

2020)

Dated: May 5, 2020 /s/ VIRNA SANTOS

VIRNA SANTOS

Counsel for Defendant 

TINA PICCHI

(Authorized by email on May 5, 

2020)

Dated: May 4, 2020 /s/ ROGER WILSON

ROGER WILSON

Counsel for Defendant 

MICHAEL MIZE

(Authorized by email on May 4, 

2020)

Dated: May 4, 2020 /s/ JAI GOHEL

JAI GOHEL

Counsel for Defendant 

MICHAEL PACK

(Authorized by email on May 4, 

2020)

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ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED that the Status Conference is continued from May 11, 2020 to September 

28, 2020 at 1:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Time is excluded pursuant to 

18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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