Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05237/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05237-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David B. Nedley
Petitioner
D. L. Runnels
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID B. NEDLEY,

Petitioner,

 vs.

D. L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No C 03- 5237 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

(Docket No. 20)

INTRODUCTION

David B. Nedley , a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley

State Prison, filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment. Per order filed on February 26, 2004, the court found that the

petition, when liberally construed, stated a cognizable federal habeas action

under § 2254 and ordered Respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer. Petitioner subsequently

filed a traverse followed by a supplemental traverse. Petitioner filed motions

before this court for an evidentiary hearing and the appointment of counsel, both

of which were denied. On February 26, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion seeking

discovery and to expand the record (docket no. 21), which is DENIED for the

reasons set forth below. This pro se habeas petition is now before the court for

consideration of the merits. For the reasons discussed, the petition is denied. 

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 18, 2002, Petitioner was convicted in the Alameda County

Superior Court. The jury found Petitioner guilty of rape while acting in concert

(§§ 206(a)(2)/264.1), three counts of committing a lewd act upon a child (§

288(a)), and three counts of kidnapping (§ 207). He was later sentenced by the

trial court to 62 years-to-life incarceration. After filing a notice of appeal on

May 16, 2002, Petitioner personally requested that his appeal before the First

Appellate District be dismissed. Petitioner later filed for collateral relief before

the state superior, appellate and supreme courts. Petitioner timely filed the

instant federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This court has subject matter

jurisdiction over this habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and, because

Petitioner was convicted in Alameda County, this action is in the proper venue. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts underlying the charged offenses, as stated in Petitioner’s

probation report, are summarized below. Both Petitioner (in his supplemental

traverse) and Respondent (in the answer) incorporated the following statement of

facts excerpt verbatim:

On August 27, 2001, fourteen year-old Marquita Doe and her

fourteen year-old stepsister Vartisha Doe were in the area of Birch

Street and 82nd Avenue in East Oakland on the way to the store. En

route, they encountered defendant, who was casually known to

Vartisha as ‘Keith.’ Vartisha had a conversation with defendant

and he agreed to give the girls a ride to the store in his van. When

Marquita and Vartisha entered the van, defendant introduced

himself as ‘Keith” to Marquita.

Instead of going to the intended store, Nedley drove the girls to an

auto repair shop, where he had a tire repaired. During this period,

Marquita inquired as to whether or not they were still going to a

store. Nedley assured her that they were. When the van left the

auto repair shop, Nedley drove to a friend’s apartment located near

Eastmont Mall. The defendant, Marquita and Vartisha went into

the friend’s apartment and remained there for a while. During that

time, Nedley made Marquita uncomfortable when he rubbed her

arm while she and Nedley were talking in the friend’s bedroom. 

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Nedley, his friend, Marquita and Vartisha left the friend’s

apartment and got into the van. Again, Marquita was concerned

about still wanting to go to a store.

Rather than going to a store, Nedley drove the group to Dimond

Park. At the park, he poured some gin that his friend brought

along. All parties had some of the alcoholic beverage. After

consuming the gin, Nedley’s friend and Vartisha got out of the van

and Marquita and Nedley remained inside. Before Marquita had a

chance to get out, Nedley drove off, separating her from her

stepsister. Nedley drove Marquita to a remote area in the Oakland

hills. During the drive, Marquita asked repeatedly to be taken back

to her sister, asked where they were going and insisted that she

could not be separated from her stepsister. Nedley declared that he

wanted to be alone with her. Marquita did not want to be in the

van alone with Nedley, as she was not familiar with him or the

area. 

After passing by trees and as the night descended, Nedley parked

the van, demanding that Marquita take off her pants. She refused. 

Nedley folded out the back seat of his van, which converted into a

bed and told her that he would assist her in removing her pants. 

Again, Marquita refused, while Nedley told her to get out of the

van and it would be a long walk home. Feeling as if she had no

other options, Marquita got out of the van and began to walk along

the two-lane road. She was alone, it was getting dark and she was

scared. A car containing a family drove up to Marquita and asked

if she needed help. She said yes, and they drove her to a location

where 911 was called. The Oakland Police Department arrived,

took a statement from Marquita and took her home. Her

stepmother consoled Marquita.

After abandoning Marquita, Nedley returned to his friend and

Vartisha. Vartisha asked where Marquita was and Nedley told her

he took her home. Even though she did not believe him, Vartisha

agreed to get a ride to a nearby stop, where she took a bus home. 

She did not want Nedley to know where she lived. When she

arrived home, Marquita was there.

On Saturday October 6, 2001, thirteen year-old Nicole Doe and

thirteen year-old Crystal Doe were at the Hilltop Mall in

Richmond. They met defendant, age twenty, who was selling

bootleg CD’s inside of the mall. During the brief conversation, the

girls advised Nedley of their age and where they attended middle

school in Pinole. Nicole gave Nedley her home phone number,

while he gave her the number to his cellular phone and pager

number. Nedley told the girls that his name was ‘Keith.’ Nedley

asked Nicole if they could ‘kick it’ later that night. Nicole called

Nedley that night and they had a brief conversation.

The following Monday, Nedley phoned Nicole as she was getting

ready to go to school. He again asked if they could ‘kick it,’ or

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hang out and she told him that they could not. Nedley called

Nicole again on Tuesday and asked if she could hang out with him. 

He also stated that his ‘cousin’ wanted to hang out with Crystal. 

Nicole agreed, called Crystal and arranged for Crystal to meet them

in front of their school. Crystal was not fully informed as to what

was going to take place that morning between herself, Nicole and

the defendants. Nedley came to Nicole’s home in El Sobrante and

picked her up. Co-defendant Yahya Shabazz, twenty-three years

old, drove the van. They stopped at a gas station and Nicole,

Shabazz and Nedley took hits from a marijuana cigarette. They

proceeded to the middle school in Pinole where they saw Crystal at

a bus stop. Crystal informed Nicole that she wanted to go to a

nearby store and Nedley agreed to take her. Crystal was initially

apprehensive and hesitant to get into the van, but decided to go

along. 

Shabazz got onto the freeway and drove to Oakland. They stopped

at a gas station in East Oakland and then went to a park in the

Oakland Hills. At various points from the time the van left Pinole

until it reached Oakland, both girls asked to be taken back to

school. They repeatedly asked where they were going and

expressed a desire not to be in the van. Crystal started to cry and

she became very nervous. While they drove to Oakland, Nedley

told Crystal, ‘Let me see what you got,’ and put his hand in

Crystal’s shirt, touching her chest. Crystal attempted to move

away from him in the rear of the van.

Once they got the park, Shabazz and Nicole got out of the car and

Nedley and Crystal drove to another area nearby. Crystal was

unaware that Nedley was going to take her to another area,

however, before she could say anything Nedley was driving away

from Nicole and Shabazz. Nedley stopped the van in a secluded

location and told Crystal to go to the rear of the van. Nedley

placed a wrapped condom on his leg. Nedley started to pull up

Crystal’s shirt and tried to pull down her pants. Nedley told her to

shut up. Crystal continued to cry and resist Nedley until he

stopped. Nedley took Crystal to a nearby gas station and pushed

her out of the van. As she got out, he told her that ‘he would just

get some from her friend.’ A bystander consoled Crystal at the gas

station and asked what had happened. Crystal relayed what had

transpired and 911 was called. 

After Nedley dropped off Crystal, he went back to the area where

Nicole and Shabazz were located. They were talking on a bench

and no physical contact had taken place. Nicole and Shabazz

entered the van and Nicole saw that Crystal was not inside, yet her

backpack was still there. She inquired as to Crystal’s whereabouts

and Nedley stated that Crystal saw her father and went home.

Nicole got into the van, although she did not believe that Crystal

had in fact left with her father as Nedley claimed. Once inside the

van, Nedley and Nicole were in the rear area, where there was a

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bench seat. Shabazz drove the van. Nedley asked Nicole if she

could ‘hit it.’ Nicole told Nedley that he couldn’t (have sex). He

began to pull down her pants and underwear, as she resisted him. 

Nedley pulled down his pants and exposed his penis. He touched

her vaginal area with his hand. He put a condom and Nicole told

him ‘No.’ Nedley pushed her legs back to her chest and penetrated

her vagina with his penis. Nicole tried to get up but could not

under the full weight of his body. Nedley forcibly raped Nicole for

5 - 10 minutes as Shabazz drove the van and looked back at Nicole

and Nedley via the rearview mirror. There was no barrier between

the front seats and the bench seat in the rear of the van.

Nedley ejaculated and threw the condom out of the window. As

the van stopped, he then told Shabazz to ‘get some.’ Shabazz came

to the rear of the van and asked Nicole to perform oral sex on him,

as Nedley began to drive the van back toward the gas station where

Crystal was taken earlier. Nicole refused and said that she would

not have sex with him. Shabazz then touched Nicole’s vaginal area

without her consent, as the van neared the gas station. Nicole got

out of the van and started crying. She saw Crystal and the

bystander and arrived shortly before law enforcement arrived.

That day, the girls had contact with the Oakland Police

Department, the Pinole Police Department and personnel at

Children’s Hospital in Oakland. A sexual assault examination

performed on Nicole showed injuries consistent with sexual

intercourse and trauma to the vaginal area. Based on information

proved by the girls, Nedley and Shabazz were identified by both

girls in separate photo-lineups. Nedley was arrested on October

17, 2001 and Shabazz was arrested on November 8, 2001.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for habeas relief “in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The writ may not be granted unless the state

court’s adjudication of any claim on the merits: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. at §

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2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if a state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-12 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if a state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

Based on this deferential standard, federal habeas relief will not be

granted “simply because [this] court concludes in its independent judgment that

the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

Id. at 411. While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining

whether the state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent, the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks

to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of the petitioner’s

claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). When the state court decisions do not provide a reasoned opinion, as

in this case, the court must “perform an ‘independent review of the record’ to

ascertain whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable.” Himes

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v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

DISCUSSION

 In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner alleges ineffective

assistance of counsel based on the failure of his defense attorney to: (1) call Ann

Santiago and Oakland Police Officer Charles Stone as defense witnesses, and (2)

play taped statements of prosecution witnesses before the jury. 

A. Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of

denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only

assistance, but effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 686 (1984). See Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08

(2000). The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be

whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just

result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel

claim, Petitioner must establish two things. First, Petitioner must establish that

counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an "objective standard of

reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687-88. Second, Petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's

deficient performance and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The Strickland framework for

analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is considered "clearly

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established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. 

B. Analysis

 1. Failure to Present Witness Testimony

 Petitioner claims that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call

two witnesses to testify at trial: (1) Ann Santiago, the gas station cashier who

first encountered the victims, and (2) Oakland Police Officer Charles Stone, the

patrol officer who first arrived at the gas station and interviewed the victims. 

Petitioner contends that these two witnesses would have provided additional

evidence to demonstrate that the victims lied in their statements about being

forcibly abducted before the rape and damaged the credibility of the victims. 

(a) Deficient Performance

Defense counsel’s decision not to call these potential defense witnesses is

not unreasonable and does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness

under prevailing professional norms. Petitioner fails to demonstrate how his

attorney was incompetent or ineffective and does not satisfy his burden of

showing through evidentiary proof that counsel's performance was deficient. See

Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741, 743 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 960

(1990). Petitioner does not provide specifics as to what new or exculpatory

evidence these witnesses would have offered, aside from the conclusory claim

that both Officer Stone and Ann Santiago “made affidavitt [sic] statements that

are both material, favorable, and necessary.” Petition at 2. Petitioner first

alleged ineffective assistance during his trial motion for a continuance. 

Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 2461.

The failure to call a witness cannot establish ineffective assistance when

defense counsel is well-informed of the facts and circumstances of the witness’s

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account. Eggleston v. U.S., 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986). Defense counsel

“had complete access to all of the witness interviews and statements taken by the

government” and was clearly aware of the testimony that Officer Stone and Ann

Santiago might offer at trial. Id. During preliminary trial preparation before

testimony commenced, defense counsel informed the court that Petitioner wished

to subpoena Officer Stone and Santiago, but counsel believed that both witnesses

had already been subpoenaed by the district attorney and would potentially serve

as prosecution witnesses. RT at 63; see also, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 545

(prosecution’s proposed witness list, which included Ann Santiago and Officer

Charles Stone). 

This is not a case where defense counsel failed to conduct a reasonable

investigation necessary to make an informed decision or to make a reasonable

decision not to investigate further. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Sanders v.

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994). Defense counsel had in fact

followed up on Petitioner’s suggestion and had investigated Ann Santiago as a

possible witness. Following closing arguments at trial, Petitioner moved for a

continuance based on his attorney’s incompetence in failing to call Ann

Santiago. In explaining his decision not to call Ann Santiago, defense counsel

stated that he “called Ms. Santiago up and had a personal phone call with Ms.

Santiago. I did not record that phone call, but at the conclusion of that phone call

and having spoken personally and reviewed both the original statement and the

statement given to my investigator, I came to the conclusion that to call Ann

Santiago would be more hurtful than helpful to his case.” RT at 2463-64. 

In determining whether or not ineffective assistance of counsel occurred,

tactical decisions of trial counsel deserve deference when counsel makes an

informed decision based on strategic trial considerations and the decision appears

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reasonable under the circumstances. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th

Cir. 1994). A trial attorney’s strategic decisions are not ineffective assistance

simply because in retrospect better tactics are known to have been available. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981) (“[Petitioner’s] allegations amount

to nothing more than a difference of opinion with respect to trial tactics. That

alone generally does not constitute a denial of effective assistance of counsel”). 

The ultimate decision not to call witnesses at trial is well within counsel’s “full

authority to manage the conduct of the trial.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,

418 (1988) (“Putting to one side the exceptional cases in which counsel is

ineffective, the client must accept the consequences of the lawyer’s decision...to

decide not to put certain witnesses on the stand”).

Defense counsel’s decision not to call Ann Santiago was based on

reasonable strategic decisions. During Petitioner’s motion for a continuance,

trial counsel expressly stated that “it is my opinion now as it was my opinion

then that to call Ms. Santiago would not help Mr. Nedley in this case. If I

thought that it would, I would have called her.” RT at 2464. Based solely on the

investigator’s interview report, Petitioner claims that Ann Santiago’s

“observation of both [victims’] appeanse [sic] and behavior would dispute the

way a normal rape victim would conduct themselve [sic].” Traverse at 2. 

Santiago did not actually witness the crimes and she could only attest that, in her

personal observation of the victims arriving at the gas station following their

assaults, she had trouble believing their story. CT at 768. Aside from her

personal disbelief in the victims’ story, Petitioner has not established that

Santiago would have presented any new evidence that might have been helpful to

his defense. 

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Similarly, the record indicates that trial counsel’s decision not to call

Officer Stone was a reasonable strategic choice. Officer Stone and Officer Eric

Milina were the first police officers to interview the victims. Petitioner claims

that Officer Stone observed the victims fabricate their story on two separate

occasions, once where Officer Milina was not present. Officer Milina testified as

a witness for the prosecution and was cross-examined by defense counsel over

the course of two days. RT at 1037. In his testimony, Officer Milina stated that

he “didn’t really believe...the stories about being kidnapped [sic], but I thought

that something did happen and [Office Stone] told me that he felt the same way.” 

RT at 1086. 

In fact, the record actually suggests that Officer Stone was more

sympathetic towards the victims than Officer Milina and, therefore, his testimony

may have been detrimental to the defense. According to the testimony of Carol

Haskell, the gas station customer who called 911 on behalf of Crystal Doe,

Officer Stone was the only police officer who seemed “responsive” and

“concerned” while the other two officers “didn’t respond in a way that made me

feel like the girls were going to be in good hands with them.” RT at 1358-59;

1370. 

Defense counsel did not err in failing to call additional witnesses where

the court “find[s] their statements to be cumulative of the testimony given at

trial.” U.S. v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1984) and Petitioner has

not established otherwise. It is undisputed that the victims lied in their initial

statements about being involuntarily abducted into Petitioner’s van and other

witnesses testified at length during the trial about this fact. Both victims

confessed that they initially lied to the police due to fear of their parents’

reactions and concern that the police would not help them if they had voluntarily

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accepted a ride from Petitioner. RT at 130; 276. Petitioner has made no showing

that Officer Stone’s testimony would have done anything other than merely

reiterate the testimony of Officer Milina. See Toomey, 898 F.2d at 743. 

Petitioner has not established that counsel decision not to call witnesses Stone

and Santiago constitutes deficient performance.

 (b) Prejudicial Effect

Even if defense counsel’s failure to call potential defense witnesses was

found to be deficient, the second prong of the Strickland standard would not be

satisfied because Petitioner does not establish that he was prejudiced by

counsel’s performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92 (“An error by counsel,

even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment

of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment”). To

establish prejudice caused by the failure to call a witness, a petitioner must show

that the witness was likely to have been available to testify, that the witness

would have given the proffered testimony, and that the witnesses’ testimony

created a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a verdict more

favorable to the petitioner. Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 872-73 (9th Cir.

2003). 

In proving prejudice, Petitioner has the burden “to come forward with any

evidence suggesting that the presentation of different...testimony...might have

resulted in a different outcome.” Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 813 n.23 (9th Cir.

2002). Petitioner provides no specific examples of exculpatory evidence from

these witnesses and does not satisfy his burden of demonstrating prejudice from

counsel’s performance. 

It is not clear how either witness would have benefitted the defense and

there is reason to believe that, under cross-examination, the witnesses’ testimony

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would actually have damaged the defense. Officer Stone would have testified

that, while he doubted certain details of the victims’ kidnapping story, he still

believed something had actually happened to the victims. RT at 1086. Similarly,

from the investigator’s report, it is clear that while Ann Santiago may have

testified that she found the victims to be unbelievable, she also would have

described how the victims were upset and crying. CT at 768. 

Even if Ann Santiago’s lay opinion about the victims’ believability was

considered admissible evidence, the expert testimony regarding rape victim

trauma would have contradicted Santiago’s impressions. Officer Van Sloten, an

investigating officer in Petitioner’s case as well as a certified rape crisis

counselor, testified at length about her work with rape victims. RT at 1142. 

Based on her professional experience, Van Sloten described that victims of

sexual assault may display a wide range of emotional reactions and there is no

one normal reaction. RT at 1145. With juvenile victims, Van Sloten explained

they “get giggly often when talking about sexual acts” and they “don’t

necessarily know the laws as well, so they think they’ll get into trouble.” RT at

1147. Marsha Blackstock, the executive director of Bay Area Women Against

Rape (BAWAR), was also called by the prosecution to explain rape victim

trauma. RT at 1889. While Ann Santiago found the victims unbelievable

because they refused to go to the hospital, CT at 769, Blackstock stated that a

sexual assault exam “is an incredibly strange kind of exam that is degrading in

many ways” and often embarrassing and uncomfortable for rape victims,

particularly young victims. RT at 1934-35.

 Petitioner has not established that he suffered prejudice from counsel’s

failure to present the testimony of Officer Stone and Ann Santiago since there

was already ample evidence before the jury that the victims had originally

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fabricated their story of abduction and the prosecution conceded as much at trial. 

The jury was fully aware of the victims’ conduct upon arriving at the gas station

and still found Petitioner guilty. Calling Officer Stone and Ann Santiago as

witnesses would only have corroborated these already well-established facts and

would not have made a difference in the jury’s results. 

The evidence of Petitioner’s guilt was extremely strong and the

prosecution’s case against him was highly persuasive. See Luna v. Cambra, 306

F.3d 954, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (“we must consider the relative strength of the

prosecution’s case in analyzing whether counsel’s errors prejudiced

[Petitioner]”). After accepting a plea bargain, Petitioner’s co-defendant Yayha

Shabazz testified for the prosecution and completely confirmed the victims’

story. RT at 1376. Shabazz picked up both victims with Petitioner and also

drove the van while Petitioner raped Nicole Doe in the back seat. Through his

perspective from the rear view mirror, Shabazz witnessed the victim tell

Petitioner she did not want to have sex and observed that “[s]he was just frozen

when he was pulling her pants down.” RT at 1453. 

Petitioner’s own credibility was also severely undermined during crossexamination. Petitioner admitted to lying to the police, RT at 2174, and testified

that his indictment was the result of a conspiracy involving the district attorney,

the police, and the victims. RT at 2244-47. He accused one victim of being

“brainwashed,” RT at 2251, and argued another victim fabricated her entire story

because he “would not give her a ride back home.” RT at 2143. He could not

recollect the last names or contact information for Stacy, his father’s exgirlfriend, and Robert, his mechanic–two people who Petitioner maintained

would testify that his van was broken and being repaired the day he abducted

Marquita Doe. RT at 2188-95. Petitioner denied any sexual contact with the

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victims, yet the medical examination of Nicole Doe suggested recent vaginal

trauma and sexual intercourse. RT at 1301. In his probation report, Petitioner

even admitted to having sex with the victim, but claimed it was consensual. Ex.

C at 5. After confessing to their initial fabrication that they had been abducted,

the testimony of Crystal and Nicole Doe was consistent and corroborated by

witness accounts from police and observers. Petitioner’s testimony, however,

was fraught with contradictions, evasive responses, and incredible accusations

throughout. 

Due to the strength of the prosecution’s case, Petitioner is not able to

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. 

Strickland 466 U.S. at 694. Petitioner’s conclusory allegations “fail[] to allege

the specific mitigating evidence the witnesses would have presented” and this

Court concludes “that even if counsel had called the additional witnesses, their

testimony would have been either negative or cumulative.” Davis v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 628, 649 (9th Cir. 2004). 

2. Failure to Play Taped Witnesses Statements at Trial 

In his second claim, Petitioner alleges that his defense counsel refused to

investigate or introduce exculpatory evidence from taped statements made by

prosecution witnesses. At trial, Petitioner requested that he be afforded a tape

cassette player so he could personally listen to taped statements. CT at 548. The

court granted permission and Petitioner was provided access to the prosecution’s

tapes by order of the trial court. CT at 548 (ordering the Alameda County

Sheriff to provide Petitioner access to a cassette player). Petitioner contends that

the taped statements should have been played in court “so that the jury could

here [sic] one of the witnesses in the back-ground coaching the other witness

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(victim) as to what to say.” Supplemental Traverse at 9. However, Petitioner

does not specify which witness was being coached or what exculpatory

statements the witness made.

(a) Deficient Performance

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that his attorney was deficient in not

playing the witness statements during trial. At Petitioner’s request, defense

counsel informed the court that “Mr. Nedley has considered that I orally request

that the prosecution be required to play all of the tapes.” RT at 63. Defense

counsel was clearly aware of these witness recordings and that Petitioner

believed they were significant. 

Counsel’s decision not to play these recordings was clearly based on a

reasonable investigation and reflects a strategic trial tactic. See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 690. While Petitioner himself never specifies what the tapes contained,

defense counsel stated during a motion for continuance that Petitioner wanted to

“play in its entirety the physical tape of statements taken by Officer Van Sloten.” 

RT at 2464. In providing his rationale for not playing these tapes, counsel

explained that “[i]n my opinion, the cross-examination of Officer Van Sloten was

more appropriate and helpful than the playing of the entire tape.” RT at 2465. 

Petitioner’s habeas petition simply makes the conclusory contention that

the tapes “held material, favorable, exculpatory evidence in my defense.” Such

unsupported, general claims are insufficient to establish ineffective assistance. 

See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 666 (1984) (“Respondent can

therefore make out a claim of ineffective assistance only by pointing to specific

errors made by trial counsel”). Without specific details from Petitioner about

what exonerating statements were made and by whom, this Court cannot say that

Petitioner’s attorney was ineffective or incompetent for failing to play all the

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taped statements before the jury. 

(b) Prejudicial Effect

Petitioner has also failed to establish that defense counsel’s decision not to

play the taped statements was sufficiently prejudicial to undermine confidence in

the outcome of the proceedings. Petitioner fails to provide any evidence to

establish prejudice or prove that playing these recordings would have resulted in

a different outcome. See Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 813 n.23 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner does not establish what specific evidence would have been available

through the taped statements and, therefore, does not prove that, but for this

omission, there would have been a different trial outcome. See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. Even if Petitioner could establish that one of the witnesses was

coached, it is unlikely the error would be sufficient to establish “a reasonable

probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had reasonable

doubt respecting guilt.” Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). 

C. Motion for Discovery and Expansion of the Record

On February 26, 2007, Petitioner submitted a motion for discovery and

expansion of the record pursuant to Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (docket no. 20). Petitioner attached

two interrogatories to the motion and requests that his defense counsel be

compelled to answer his questions. In the interrogatories, Petitioner asks his

counsel to identify why witnesses Stone and Santiago were not called to testify

and why jurors were not presented with tapes of prosecution witnesses. 

According to Petitioner, these witnesses could have “stigmatized adverse

witnesses’ credibility” and the tapes would have offered “impeaching material”

in the form of “contradictions and coercion.” Motion at 2. 

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A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not

entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520

U.S. 899, 904 (1997). However, Rule 6(a) provides that a "party shall be entitled

to invoke the processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and

for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise." Before deciding

whether a petitioner is entitled to discovery under Rule 6(a), the court must first

identify the essential elements of Petitioner’s underlying claim and then

determine whether the petitioner has shown "good cause" for appropriate

discovery to prove his claim. See id. at 904. Good cause under Rule 6(a) is

shown when it is “essential” for the Petitioner to “develop fully” the underlying

claim. Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 2005); see Jones v. Wood,

114 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding good cause where petitioner

identified specific material he needed to argue effectively that trial lawyer had

rendered ineffective assistance, particularly where there was never any hearing

on ineffective assistance claim at state court level).

Petitioner has not shown “good cause” sufficient to grant his discovery

request and provides no “specific allegations” to demonstrate that he would be

entitled to relief “if the facts are fully developed.” Bracy, 520 U.S. 899 at 908-

09 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969)). Petitioner’s

interrogatories merely seek to ascertain counsel’s reasoning for failing to call

potential witnesses and not playing taped witness statements at trial. Compelling

defense counsel to provide his strategic reasoning for his trial decisions would

offer no additional evidence to develop Petitioner’s underlying claims. The trial

record already contains express statements from counsel explaining his reasons

for not calling witness Ann Santiago or playing the prosecution tapes. RT at

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2463-65. Requiring defense counsel to reiterate and elaborate on the reasoning

he offered at trial would provide no additional facts to help Petitioner fully

develop his claim. 

Judicial review of counsel performance is “highly deferential” and “the

defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689. Petitioner did not overcome this presumption and, in reviewing the

contested trial actions, the court has already found that counsel’s strategic trial

decisions did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Further,

defense counsel’s decision-making rationale has no bearing on the Court’s

independent finding that Petitioner fails to satisfy the Strickland requirements of

deficient performance and prejudice. Because Petitioner’s “purely speculative”

claims do not show “good cause,” the motion for discovery and expansion of the

record is DENIED. See McDaniel v. United States District Court (Jones), 127

F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1997) (docket no. 20).

 CONCLUSION

The state court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition is not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of established federal law determined by the

Supreme Court. Therefore, Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel are DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 20, 2007 _____________________

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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