Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01856/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01856-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charlton H. Bonham
Defendant
Fund for Animals
Amicus
Kamala D. Harris
Defendant
Humane Society of the United States
Amicus
Safari Club International
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAMALA D. HARRIS, in her

official capacity as the 

Attorney General of 

California; CHARLTON H. 

BONHAM, in his official 

capacity as the Director of 

the California Department of 

Fish and Wildlife,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-01856-GEB-AC

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Defendants seek dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s 

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). Defendants argue “even after 

amendment, [P]laintiff does not allege sufficient facts in 

support of its constitutional claims.” (Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss 

Pl.’s First Am. Compl. (“Mot.”) 2:10-11, ECF No. 42.) The Humane 

Society of the United States (“HSUS”) and The Fund for Animals 

(“The Fund”) (together “Amici”) filed an amicus curiae brief in 

support of Defendants’ dismissal motion.1

 

1 The Court granted Amici’s motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief on 

July 16, 2015. (Order Granting Amici’s Mot. for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae 

Br., ECF No. 43.)

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Plaintiff states in its FAC: “In this lawsuit, 

Plaintiff . . . challenges the State of California’s [statutory] 

ban on the importation, transportation, and possession in 

California of mountain lions hunted outside of California”

(referred to herein as “Import Ban”). (Pl.’s First Am. Compl. 

(“FAC”) 1:8-11, ECF No. 38.) California voters approved the 

Import Ban through ballot initiative Proposition 117 in the year 

1990; the Import Ban is prescribed in California Fish & Game Code 

§§ 4800(a), (b)(1). Plaintiff alleges the Import Ban “is 

unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause 

(art. I, § 8, cl. 3) and the Equal Protection Clause (amend. 

XIV).” (Id. at 1:12-13). 

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff also alleges in the FAC that the Import Ban 

“adversely and significantly burdens interstate commerce 

associated with the hunting of mountain lions” and “serves no 

legitimate state or local interest[;]” that its members “have 

affirmatively expressed a desire to . . . import into, transport 

within, and possess within California,” harvested mountain lions 

they have hunted or plan to hunt outside of California; and that 

the Import Ban “directly discourages California residents from 

traveling to other states” to fulfill these desires. ((FAC ¶¶ 1, 

2, 4.) Plaintiff further alleges: 

[A] large number of . . . residents of 

California . . . would make . . . plans to 

transport into California already harvested 

animals and hunt mountain lions outside of 

California if the Import Ban were not in 

place. . . . [N]umerous outfitters, 

taxidermists, and others would provide 

services related to mountain lion hunting 

outside of California to residents of 

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California interested in hunting mountain 

lions if the Import Ban were not in place. 

Many sporting goods stores . . . would be 

able to supply hunting and other equipment 

and gear needed for mountain lion hunting. 

But for the Import Ban, they would sell more 

products to more California hunters of 

mountain lions outside of California.

(Id. ¶ 43)

Plaintiff alleges:

The impact on interstate commerce is 

significant on an annual basis and even more 

excessive when considered in light of the 

commerce that would occur immediately after 

the Import Ban was lifted, combined with the 

commerce lost over the history of the Import 

Ban and expected continued duration of the 

ban. 

(Id. ¶ 75.) 

Plaintiff further alleges: “[t]he substantial impacts 

on interstate commerce are clearly excessive in relation to

[California’s] putative interest in habitat and wildlife 

conservation, health and safety of its residents, and alleged 

concern that legal mountain lion hunting in other states is 

‘animal cruelty,’ in part because these purposes are illusory or 

nonexistent.” (Id. ¶ 76.) Plaintiff alleges California “has no 

legitimate interest in discouraging” mountain lion hunting 

outside of California. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges: “[t]he Import Ban singles out and 

discriminates against the group of hunters who wish to hunt 

mountain lions out of state and import into, transfer and possess 

within California their harvested mountain lions;” (Id. ¶11) that 

the Import Ban “bear[s] [no] rational relation to any legitimate 

end;” (Id. ¶83) and that “[t]he Import Ban arbitrarily and 

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without justification denies” out-of-state mountain lion hunters 

the right to import harvested mountain lions into California 

while allowing other harvested animals to be imported. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, all 

well-pleaded facts in the complaint are “accepted as true”,

Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 

(9th Cir. 2010)(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)), 

and a judge draws “all reasonable inferences therefrom in the 

pleader's favor.” Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st 

Cir. 2011); Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 

783 (9th Cir. 2012)(“For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we 

accept all well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and 

construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.”). Under this pleading standard, a judge does “not accept 

legal conclusions in the complaint as true, even if [they are] 

cast in the form of factual allegations.” Lacano Inv., LLC v. 

Balash, 765 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Generally, a federal court “‘may not consider any 

material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion.’” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 998 

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 

(9th Cir. 2001)). However, well-pleaded allegations of material 

facts “may [be] augment[ed]” by “documents incorporated by 

reference into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts 

susceptible to judicial notice.” Haley, 657 F.3d at 46; see also

United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[a 

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federal] court may . . . consider certain materials [including] 

documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by 

reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial noticewithout converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment.”)

III. CONSIDERATION OF DOCUMENTS BEYOND THE PLEADINGS

Defendants include in their motion a request that 

judicial notice be taken of exhibit A, which is attached to their 

request. Exhibit A is the text of the California Ballot Pamphlet 

for Proposition 117, which contains the Import Ban. This pamphlet 

includes the argument that mountain lion hunting is “cruel and 

unnecessary.” (Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice (“Defs.’ RJN”) Ex. 

A, p. 42, ECF No. 42-1.) The California Ballot Pamphlet for 

Proposition 117 is part of the legislative history of the Import 

Ban. “Legislative history is properly a subject of judicial 

notice.” Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1094 n. 1 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1223 n. 8 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Therefore, the request that judicial notice be taken 

of Defendants’ exhibit A is granted. 

Amici request that judicial notice be taken of exhibits 

A, B and C attached to their Request for Judicial Notice. (Req. 

for Judicial Notice In Supp. Of Amicus Curiae Br. (“Amici’s 

RJN”), ECF No. 43-3.) Amici contend that Exhibit A is a “pamphlet 

prepared . . . for the voting public analyzing measures that

. . . appear[ed] on the ballot in the State’s 1996 primary 

election, including Proposition 197, a measure that sought to 

amend the [Import Ban] at issue in this litigation [and 

ultimately failed].” (Id. at 3:1-4.) Amici argue that “[a]s part 

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of the legislative history for the Mountain Lion Prohibition, 

Exhibit A is a proper matter for judicial notice.” (Id. at 3:6-

7.) Amici have failed to demonstrate that the pamphlet regarding 

Proposition 197 is part of the legislative history of the Import 

Ban, therefore this portion of the judicial notice request is 

denied. Exhibits B and C are newspaper articles containing 

discussion of the policy changes and public discourse leading up 

to the passage of Proposition 117. Amici argue they “rely on 

these published articles to establish that various bases and 

purposes for Propositions 117 were presented to the public, 

including arguments specifically relating to mountain lion 

hunting[; and that the Court] may take judicial notice of 

publications introduced to ‘indicate what was in the public realm 

at the time, not whether the contents of those articles were in 

fact true.’” (Id. 3:14-18) citing and quoting Von Saher v. Norton 

Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 

2010). Judicial notice is taken of Amici’s exhibits B and C

solely for purpose of ascertaining information in the public 

realm at the time the ballot measure was submitted to the voters.

Plaintiff includes in its Opposition a request that 

judicial notice be taken of exhibits A to and including M, which 

are attached to Plaintiff’s request. 

Exhibits A through J are printouts of documents found 

on the websites of state and federal agencies. (Pl.’s Req. for 

Judicial Notice (“Pl.’s RJN”) 5:4-6, ECF No. 48.)

Plaintiff argues exhibits A, C, D, E, F, G and I 

support Plaintiff’s argument that the Import Ban has a 

substantial monetary impact on interstate commerce. Plaintiff 

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argues exhibit A “is an U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 

Standards (“DOL”) website page that allows one to calculate the 

present value of an amount of money from a past year.” (Id. 6:2-

3.) Plaintiff argues that exhibits C through G “are documents 

from the websites of various state wildlife agencies that 

demonstrate that states that allow mountain lion hunting, 

including by non-residents, regularly do not fill their quotas 

for mountain lions.” (Id. 6:7-9.) “Exhibit I is a document from 

the U.S. Department of the Interior and U.S. Department of 

Commerce (Census Bureau) that calculates there were 377,000 

resident California hunters in 2011.” (Id. 6:16-18.) Exhibit I is 

available at the Census Bureau’s website. (Id. 6:18 n. 3.) 

Plaintiff argues it “intends to use” the contents of 

exhibits B and H to further its argument in “response to the 

State Defendant’s purported justification for the Import Ban.” 

(Id. 7:3-6.) “Exhibits B and H are documents from the Department 

[of Fish and Game’s] official website.” (Pl.’s RJN 6:17-19.) 

Plaintiff argues that exhibit B “provides information about the 

abundance and status of mountain lions in California.” (Id. 6:24-

25.) Plaintiff further argues exhibit H is “a chart prepared by 

the Department [of Fish and Wildlife] concerning the number of 

hunting licenses issued by the state from the years 2010-2015.” 

(Pl.’s RJN 7:1-3.) 

Plaintiff argues that exhibit J can be found on the 

California Department of Fish and Wildlife’s website and helps 

demonstrate that California allows “the same hunting methods” 

used to hunt Mountain Lions that are used to hunt “numerous other 

species.” (Id. 8:2-7.) Plaintiff contends “Exhibit J is the Guide 

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to Hunting Wild Pigs in California, [and that it] states that 

hunters can use dogs to hunt feral pigs.” (Id. 7:24-8:1.) 

“It is appropriate to take judicial notice of [the 

referenced public website] information, [since] it was made

publicly available by government entities . . . , and neither 

party disputes the authenticity of the web sites or the accuracy 

of the information displayed therein.” Daniels-Hall v. National 

Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore,

judicial notice is taken of Plaintiff’s Exhibits A to and 

including J.

Plaintiff also requests that judicial notice be taken 

of Plaintiff’s exhibits K, L and M. Exhibits K through M “are 

newspaper accounts of incidents involving mountain lions in 

California”. (Pl.’s RJN 8:9.) Plaintiff argues that exhibits K 

through M “help establish that Safari Club has a good faith basis 

for asserting that the Department uses dogs . . . to track 

mountain lions” and therefore exhibits K through M help prove 

“that the use of dogs to pursue game is not cruelty to animals as 

the State itself is using dogs to track and kill mountain lions.” 

(Id. 8:10-16.) This request has not been opposed and therefore 

judicial notice is taken of exhibits K through M. 

A. Equal Protection Clause

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s equal protection claim is 

premised solely on “conclusory allegations [which] do not satisfy 

[P]laintiff’s pleading burden . . . to state a cause of action 

for violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” (Mot. 17:15-16.) 

Specifically, Defendants argue:

The people [of California have] . . .

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determined that the hunting of mountain lions 

is cruel and unnecessary . . . [; and] [i]n 

keeping with these findings, California has 

determined that the mountain lion is a 

specially protected mammal under the laws of 

this state and that it should be unlawful to 

take, injure, possess, transport, import, or 

sell any mountain lion or part of a mountain

lion.

(Id. 17:27-18:3 (citing Cal. Fish & Game Code §4800).)

Defendants contend that because the Import Ban is 

“rationally related to the State’s interest in conserving and 

protecting mountain lions and in the prevention of animal 

cruelty, [P]laintiff cannot state an equal protection claim as a 

matter of law.” (Id. at 18:12-14.)

Plaintiff counters that mountain lion hunting is not 

animal cruelty and thus this “purported justification fails.” 

(Pl’s. Opp’n (“Opp’n”) 31: 23-24, ECF No. 50.) Plaintiff asserts

the prevention of animal cruelty justification is a post hoc 

justification that was not considered by the voters. Further 

Plaintiff alleges in the FAC that the Import Ban is “arbitrar[y] 

and without justification” because California allows “others to 

engage in the hunting of numerous other protected and unprotected 

species without restrictions as to importation, transportation, 

and possession within California.” (FAC ¶82 9-12.) Plaintiff 

argues “the Import Ban serves no legitimate state interest, and 

is not rational.” (Opp’n 33:8.)

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

"commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its 

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is 

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 

should be treated alike." City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne 

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Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). However, "[t]he 

Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall be denied the 

equal protection of the laws must coexist with the practical 

necessity that most legislation classifies for one person or 

another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or 

persons." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); see also

Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (holding that “the 

Constitutional demand is not a demand that a statute necessarily 

apply equally to all persons . . . legislation may impose special 

burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible 

ends.”)

The appropriate level of equal protection 

review in this case is the rational basis 

test, which applies to challenges of 

legislative acts that neither affect the 

exercise of fundamental rights, nor classify 

persons based on protected characteristics, 

such as race, alienage, national origin, or 

sex. Under this test, statutes are generally 

presumed to be valid and will be sustained if 

the classification drawn by the statute is 

rationally related to legitimate state 

interest. In essence, a legislative 

classification subject to rational basis 

scrutiny must be wholly irrational to violate 

equal protection. The challenger bears the 

burden of negating every conceivable basis 

which might support the legislative 

classification, whether or not the basis has 

a foundation in the record.

Fields v. Legacy Health Sys. 413 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted).

In “applying rational basis review . . . , any 

hypothetical rationale for the law [will] do.” Witt v. Dep’t of 

Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008). Additionally 

legislative action can pass rational basis review “even when 

there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.” Heller v. Doe, 

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509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).

Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead facts in the FAC 

that undermine the legitimacy of California’s interest in 

preventing cruelty to mountain lions. Whether or not animal 

cruelty was the formally stated purpose of the legislation is 

immaterial since “[i]t is entirely irrelevant for constitutional 

purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged 

distinction actually motivated the legislature.” F.C.C. v. Beach 

Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).

In addition, California’s allowance of similar hunting 

methods employed against other animals is not sufficient to 

defeat rational basis review since “reform may take one step at a 

time” to prevent perceived harm. Williamson v. Lee Optical of 

Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (internal citations 

omitted) (upholding a statute challenged under the Equal 

Protection Clause, reasoning that “[legislative] reform may take 

one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem 

which seems most acute to the legislative mind . . . [t]he 

legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy 

there, neglecting the others”); see also Minn. v. Clover Leaf 

Creamery Corp., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (quoting City of New 

Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)) (holding a

legislature may “adopt[] regulations that only partially 

ameliorate a perceived evil and defer[] complete elimination of 

the evil to future regulations.”)

For the stated reasons Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause claim is granted.

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B. Dormant Commerce Clause

Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s dormant 

Commerce Clause claim arguing: “[P]laintiff has failed to allege 

a substantial burden on interstate commerce,” as required to 

state a plausible claim under the dormant Commerce Clause. (Mot. 

9:25.) Defendants further contend that even assuming arguendo

that Plaintiff could plausibly allege a substantial burden “any 

burdens on interstate commerce caused by the [Import Ban] are not 

‘clearly excessive’ to its putative benefits” as required to 

plausibly allege this claim. (Id. 9:26-28.)

Plaintiff counters that the Import Ban is “a 

substantial burden on interstate commerce that outweighs the 

illusory and tenuous local interests purportedly served by the 

import ban.” (Opp’n 11:7-9.)

Plaintiff alleges in its FAC: 

[T]he impact on interstate commerce is 

significant on an annual basis and even more 

excessive when considered in light of the 

commerce that would occur immediately after 

the Import Ban was lifted, combined with the 

commerce lost over the history of the Import 

Ban and expected continued duration of the 

ban. 

(FAC ¶ 75.)

Plaintiff further alleges in the FAC that “the adverse 

impacts on interstate commerce . . . are clearly excessive in 

light of the asserted local interest the State Defendants might 

claim or have claimed is advanced by the Import Ban[;]” (Id.

¶ 75) “[m]ountain lion hunting is not animal cruelty” and “[t]he 

State has not adopted prevention of alleged animal cruelty as the 

purpose for the Import Ban.” (Id. ¶ 76)

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Plaintiff alleges in the FAC:

[T]he substantial impacts on interstate 

commerce are clearly excessive in relation to 

the State’s putative interest in habitat and 

wildlife conservation, health and safety of 

its residents, and alleged concern that legal 

mountain lion hunting in other states is 

‘animal cruelty,’ in part because these 

purposes are illusory or nonexistent . . .

.[T]he State can promote [any legitimate and 

non-illusory state interest] . . . with a 

lesser impact on interstate activities.”

(Id. ¶76:16-20; ¶77: 23.)

The Commerce Clause provides that “[t]he 

Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate 

Commerce ... among the several States.” Art. 

I, § 8, cl. 3. Though phrased as a grant of 

regulatory power to Congress, the Clause has 

long been understood to have a ‘negative’

aspect that denies the States the power 

unjustifiably to discriminate against or 

burden the interstate flow of articles of 

commerce.

Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or.,

511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994). 

This limitation on state power has come to be 

known as the dormant Commerce Clause. 

Modern dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence 

primarily “is driven by concern about 

economic protectionism — that is, regulatory 

measures designed to benefit in-state 

economic interests by burdening out-of-state 

competitors.” “The principal objects of 

dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes 

that discriminate against interstate 

commerce.” “The central rationale for the 

rule against discrimination is to prohibit 

state or municipal laws whose object is local 

economic protectionism,” because these are 

the “laws that would excite those jealousies 

and retaliatory measures the Constitution was 

designed to prevent.” Thus, a corollary 

concern of the dormant Commerce Clause is 

that “this Nation is a common market in which 

state lines cannot be made barriers to the 

free flow of both raw materials and finished 

goods.” 

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Given the purposes of the dormant Commerce 

Clause, it is not surprising that a state 

regulation does not become vulnerable to 

invalidation under the dormant Commerce 

Clause merely because it affects interstate 

commerce. A critical requirement for proving 

a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause is 

that there must be a substantial burden on 

interstate commerce. Most regulations that 

run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause do 

so because of discrimination, but in a small 

number of dormant Commerce Clause cases 

courts also have invalidated statutes that 

imposed other significant burdens on 

interstate commerce. These other significant 

burdens on interstate commerce generally 

result from inconsistent regulation of 

activities that are inherently national or 

require a uniform system of regulation. A 

classic example of this type of regulation is 

one that imposes significant burdens on 

interstate transportation. 

Although dormant Commerce Clause 

jurisprudence protects against burdens on 

interstate commerce, it also respects 

federalism by protecting local autonomy. 

Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that 

“under our constitutional scheme the States 

retain broad power to legislate protection 

for their citizens in matters of local 

concern such as public health” and has held 

that “not every exercise of local power is 

invalid merely because it affects in some way 

the flow of commerce between the States.”

Nat’l Ass'n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris 682 F.3d 1144, 

1147-48 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 

“[Ninth Circuit] precedents . . . preclude any judicial 

‘assessment of the benefits of [a state] law[ ] and the 

. . . wisdom in adopting’ it unless the state statute either 

discriminates in favor of in-state commerce or imposes a 

‘significant burden on interstate commerce.’” Chinatown 

Neighborhood Ass'n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Optometrists, 682 F.3d at 1156). “Here, 

. . . [P]laintiff[] do[es] not allege the [Import Ban] has any 

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discriminatory effect, and [it] cannot establish a significant 

burden on interstate commerce.” Id.; see also Chinatown 

Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1147 (finding “no significant 

interference with interstate commerce” because the challenged 

statute banning the importation of shark fins did "not interfere 

with activity that is inherently national or that requires a 

uniform system" and "[t]he purpose of the Shark Fin Law is to 

conserve state resources, prevent animal cruelty, and protect 

wildlife and public health").

Further, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that 

the hunting of mountain lions and showcasing them as trophies is 

“inherently national” nor that it requires a “uniform system of 

regulation.” Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists, 682 F.3d at 1148. 

Although Plaintiff points to lost profits resulting from the 

Import Ban, “[e]vidence that interstate . . . commerce is in some 

way affected by the [Import Ban] is not enough to meet 

[Plaintiff’s] burden.” Pac. Nw. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 

F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 1994).

The Ninth Circuit has held that when no significant 

burden on interstate commerce is found it is "inappropriate to 

determine [the law's] constitutionality . . . based on our 

assessment of the benefits of th[e] law [ ] and the state's 

wisdom in adopting [it]." Nat'l Ass'n of Optometrists 682 F.3d at 

1156-57; see also Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du 

Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 952 (9th Cir. 2013)(finding an 

inquiry into "whether the benefits of the challenged laws are 

illusory" unwarranted because the regulation of the foie gras

market is not inherently national). Since Plaintiff has failed to 

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allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce sufficient to 

state a plausible claim under the Dormant Commerce Clause, it 

would be improper for the Court to examine the benefits of the 

Import Ban. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Commerce Clause claim is granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

is GRANTED. However, Plaintiff is granted fourteen (14) days 

leave from the date on which this order is filed to file an 

amended complaint addressing the referenced deficiencies in any 

dismissed claim. 

Dated: January 5, 2016

Case 2:14-cv-01856-JAM-AC Document 57 Filed 01/06/16 Page 16 of 16