Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00127/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00127-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chief Jerry Dyer
Defendant
City Of Fresno
Defendant
Sergeant Larry Hustedde
Defendant
Officer Jeffrey Kaiser
Defendant
Idalia J. Morgutia-Johnson
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IDALIA J. MORGUTIA-JOHNSON,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

SERGEANT LARRY HUSTEDDE AND 

OFFICER JEFFREY KAISER,

 Defendants.

1:14-cv-127-LJO-SKO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 37)

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 28, 2014, Plaintiff Idalia J. Morgutia-Johnson (“Plaintiff”) brought suit against 

Defendants Sergeant Larry Hustedde (“Hustedde”) and Officer Jeffrey Kaiser (“Kaiser”) (collectively, 

“Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) on the ground they violated her civil rights during her 

arrest on August 24, 2010, and by subsequently charging her with various criminal offenses. See Doc. 1, 

Complaint (“Compl.”) at ¶¶ 11-22. Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims 

against them. Doc. 37.

The Court finds it appropriate to rule on the motion without oral argument.1See Local Rule 

230(g). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the motion in its entirety.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

 

1 On November 6, 2014, the Court reset case deadlines, including setting the hearing deadline for any motion for summary 

judgment for April 15, 2015. Defendants violated that order by setting the hearing for their motion for summary judgment for 

April 23, 2015.

2

Plaintiff filed numerous objections to Defendants’ evidence and “requests that the Court rule on each of [them] before 

ruling on the motion for summary judgment.” Doc. 52 at 1. Because the Court will consider only admissible and competent 

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A. Undisputed Facts.

This case arises out of Defendants’ arrest of Plaintiff on the afternoon of August 24, 2010, at Big 

Mama’s Restaurant (“Big Mama’s” or “the restaurant”) in Fresno, California. UMF31. At the time, 

Plaintiff was a 15-year-old student at Hoover High School (“Hoover”), which is located near Big 

Mama’s. Id. Although the parties have varying recollections of what transpired there between Plaintiff 

and Defendants, the following facts are undisputed.

Hoover students frequented Big Mama’s after school. See Doc. 37, Ex. I, Deposition of Ebrahim 

Hussein (“Hussein Depo.”) at 18:8-11; Doc. 37, Ex. G, Deposition of Larry Hustedde (“Hustedde

Depo.”) at 24:6-15. According to Ebrahim Hussein (“Hussein”), who was a manager at Big Mama’s in 

August 2010, large groups of Hoover students frequently would meet at Big Mama’s and would “go 

wild” in and around the restaurant. Hussein Depo. at 24:4-9 (e.g., “Loud. Jumping off tables. Playing. 

Running. Opening doors and coming in . . . not all of them ordering food.”). Hussein further testified 

that fights between Hoover students broke out on an almost-daily basis. See Hussein Depo. at 18:8-11; 

see also Doc. 37, Ex. J, Deposition of Sadiq Aljomae (“Aljomae Depo.”) at 17:10-25 (Aljomae 

testifying that fights between Hoover students frequently happened in and around Big Mama’s). Many

students would “hang out” at Big Mama’s without ordering anything. See id. at 18:21-21.

Because of Hoover students’ behavior and their loitering without ordering food or drinks, Big 

Mama’s employees frequently had to call the police. See Hussein Depo. at 20:3-10; see also Aljomae 

Depo. at 18:11-21. Among other things, the Fresno Police Department had received multiple reports of 

fights between and among Hoover students at Big Mama’s, which Hustedde had witnesses on prior 

 

evidence, the Court need not rule on Plaintiff’s objections prior to resolving Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

3

“UMF” stands for the parties’ “undisputed material facts.” The Court notes that there are recurring problems with the 

parties’ UMFs. Specifically, many of Defendants’ UMFs are not sufficiently supported (or not supported at all) by the cited 

evidence. See, e.g., UMF 5, 9, 11, 12, 36. In addition, the parties’ record citations routinely are unspecific, incomplete, or 

otherwise unclear. Further, Defendants cite to evidence (namely, deposition testimony) not contained in the record. See id.

Finally, Plaintiff makes numerous baseless objections to Defendants’ UMFs and the evidence cited in support. Those 

objections are OVERRULED unless otherwise indicated.

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occasions. Hustedde Depo. at 24-25. Kaiser also had talked with Big Mama’s employees about these 

problems. Doc. 37, Ex. H, Deposition of Jeffrey Kaiser (“Kaiser Depo.”) at 37:3-23.

Because of these recurrent problems with Hoover students after school, Big Mama’s instituted a 

“no loitering policy” permitting students in Big Mama’s only if they purchased something (or were in 

the process of doing so) and were in the process of consuming it. See Hussein Depo. at 24:11-17. If they 

were not purchasing or consuming something, they would be asked to leave. Id.

In the early afternoon before school let out on August 23, 2010, Hustedde met with Hussein to 

discuss the problems associated with Hoover students gathering and loitering at Big Mama’s after 

school. Hustedde Depo. at 42:20-21. Hustedded explained to Hussein that he would be there later that 

afternoon to help enforce the restaurant’s no loitering policy, but he advised Hussein that he “wasn’t 

going to come every day and enforce [the] restaurant rules.” Id. at 42:9-13.

At some point before school let out on August 24, 2010, Big Mama’s posted a conspicuous sign 

on the window near the entrance that read: “Please no loitering. Only students buying food orders 

allowed to stay while eating or drinking at Big Mama’s. We reserve the right to refuse service or ask non

paying customer[s] to vacate the premises.” Doc. 37, Ex. C (emphasis omitted); see also Hustedde

Depo. at 42:20-43:10. Big Mama’s also posted “no trespassing” signs in the parking lot. Aljomae Depo. 

at 21:6-11.

Hustedde went to Big Mama’s shortly before school was let out with the intention of helping to 

enforce its no loitering policy. Hustedde Depo. at 43:10-13, 46:6-9. Shortly after school let out on 

August 24, 2010, Plaintiff went to Big Mama’s. Id. at 46:13-16; Doc. 50, Declaration of Idalia 

Morgutia-Johnson (“Idalia Decl.”) at ¶ 3. Plaintiff and her friends were standing in the patio area outside 

of the restaurant when Hustedde asked them to either go inside or leave, id. 52:18-23; Idalia Decl. at ¶ 5, 

so they went inside. Idalia Decl. at ¶ 6; Hustedde Depo. at 53:20-24.

Shortly thereafter, Hustedde went inside Big Mama’s. Plaintiff and her friends were sitting at a 

booth, and Hustedde approached them. Idalia Decl. at ¶ 6; Hustedde Depo. at 53:20-24. Plaintiff and 

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Defendants provided significantly different accounts as to what happened next.

B. Plaintiff’s Version of Events.

Plaintiff claims that “[o]nce inside Big Mama’s, [her] friend Unique Dawson [(“Unique”)] 

offered to go place our food order.” Idalia Decl. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff was “sitting in the booth for a few 

minutes waiting for [her] food order and talking with friends when [Hustedde] came up on [her] left 

hand side.” Id. at ¶ 7. Hustedde then “looked down at [her] direction and said words to the effect [of] 

‘you’ve been here too long, it’s time for you to go.” Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff “told [Hustedde] that [she] was 

waiting for [her] order,” and he then asked for her receipt. Id. Unique approached the booth and gave 

Plaintiff the receipt so that she could pick up her order. Id. Hustedde then asked Plaintiff to get into line 

to place a food order. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff showed Hustedde the receipt and explained that her order 

already had been placed and she was still waiting for it. Id.

“In response [Hustedde] said ‘you don’t want to listen, fine’ . . . then grabbed [Plaintiff] by [her] 

arm and yanked [her] out of the booth, slammed [her] onto the table where [she] was seated, and twisted 

[her] right arm behind [her] back.” Id. at ¶ 10. Hustedde then “pulled [Plaintiff] back to an upright 

position and walked [her] out using [her] body to shove open the front door.” Id. at ¶ 12. Once outside, 

“Hustedde slammed [her] onto the trunk area of his patrol car.” Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff felt the wind 

knocked out of her, which caused her to fall to the ground. Id. Plaintiff claims that she “did not flail or 

pull [her] arms away” or “try to break free or run away from [Hustedde].” Id. at ¶ 13. 

Hustedde “then reached down and forcibly pulled [Plaintiff] off the ground by [her] pony tail and 

upper arm.” Id. at ¶ 14. Hustedde “wrapped his arms around [Plaintiff’s] chest and breast area and held 

[her] in a tight bear hug type hold.” Id. at ¶ 15. Plaintiff “was freed from the hold, and [Hustedde] bent 

over to pick up his sunglasses while holding onto [Plaintiff’s] wrist.” Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff claims that she 

“did not try to escape when [she] was released from the hold.” Id.

When Plaintiff was standing next to Hustedde, “out of nowhere [she] felt someone come from 

behind without warning, and [she] felt an arm go around [her] neck in a choking motion.” Id. at ¶ 19. 

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Plaintiff “later learned that this was done by [Kaiser].” Id. Kaiser had not asked Plaintiff any questions, 

nor did Plaintiff hear him speak with Hustedde, who was standing right next to her at the time. Id.

Plaintiff “was not flailing [her] arms when [Kaiser] arrived and put [her] in a chokehold.” Id. Plaintiff 

had difficulty breathing due to the chokehold, so she “used her hands to try to get [Kaiser] to loosen the 

pressure around [her] neck because she was suffocating.” Id. Plaintiff heard Hustedde tell Kaiser to let 

her go because she was choking, but “[i]nstead of letting go . . . Kaiser put his hand over [her] mouth 

and nose,” which felt like he was choking her harder. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. Plaintiff began to “see[] things go 

white” and felt her eyes “rolling to the back of [her] head.” Id. at ¶ 22. She “was not flailing [her] arms 

or trying to escape.” Id.

The next thing that Plaintiff remembers “is sitting in [Kaiser’s] patrol car with [her] knees facing 

outside and [her] feet on the rim of the door.” Id. at ¶ 23. Kaiser ordered her to put her legs inside the 

car, but she pled with “Kaiser to leave the door open because [she] was having difficulty breathing”; 

however, Kaiser “put [her] legs inside the patrol car and closed the door.” Id. Plaintiff’s friends were 

yelling “she can’t breathe” and “she needs help.” Id. at ¶ 24. Kaiser “opened the door momentarily, 

looked inside, laughed, and said ‘she’s ok.’” Id. Plaintiff “do[es] not believe the air conditioner was on 

because [she] felt hot and was sweating while inside the patrol unit.” Id.4 Kaiser “did not leave the door 

open to allow [Plaintiff] to get more air.” Id. at ¶ 25. 

Plaintiff asserts that she “was at Big Mama’s as a paying customer and was not trespassing or 

doing anything disruptive,” and “did not resist arrest, attempt to escape, and did not hit or strike 

[Defendants].” Id. at ¶ 27. Plaintiff “was injured during the incident and [she] continue[s] to have pain 

from [her] injuries.” Id. at ¶ 30.

C. Defendants’ Version of Events.

On August 24, 2010, Hustedde arrived at Big Mama’s around 2:20 P.M., shortly before school 

 

4 The parties do not dispute that it was hot outside on August 24, 2010.

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let out; Kaiser arrived sometime shortly afterward. Hustedde Depo. at 43:12-13. Hustedde noticed 

Plaintiff and her friends on the patio outside of the restaurant “[b]ecause she seemed to be upset” or mad 

at another girl due to the language she was using and how she was talking. Id. at 46:17-21, 50:19-23.

Hustedde told Plaintiff and her friends to go inside Big Mama’s and buy food or to leave. Id. at 52:18-

22. Plaintiff and her friends went inside. Id. at 52:23-25.

Shortly afterward, Hustedde went inside and, at some point, he informed two Hoover students of 

the no loitering policy, but they refused to purchase food and refused to leave. Id. at 44:7-20. Hustedde

therefore arrested them. Id.5 

Later, Hustedde noticed that Plaintiff and her friends were sitting at a booth but had not 

purchased anything. Id. at 54:21-55:6. Hustedde informed the group of the rules at Big Mama’s, to 

which Plaintiff replied “I ain’t talking to no cop.” Id. at 56:6-9. When Hustedde tried to address 

Plaintiff, she turned her back toward him. Id. at 57:15-19. Hustedde asked Plaintiff to show him proof of 

a receipt of purchasing something, which she did not do. Id. at 56:18-22. Plaintiff refused to talk to 

Hustedde. Id. at 57:15. Hustedde “tapped [Plaintiff] on the shoulder, and she said don’t fucking touch 

me.” Id. at 59:23-24. 

Hustedde then said “okay, that’s it . . . you’re under arrest for trespassing. Get out of the booth.” 

Id. at 59:24-25. Plaintiff responded: “[D]on’t touch me, leave me alone, F you,” so Hustedde “grabbed 

her left arm and pulled . . . her toward [him].” Id. at 60:1-3. Hustedde pulled Plaintiff “out of the booth, 

spun her around, and grabbed her by both of her upper arms and helper her up and started to walk her 

out of the restaurant backwards.” Id. at 60:4-6. 

At that time, someone came up to Hustedde, reached across the booth, and tried to hand Plaintiff 

a receipt, saying, “here, you can have my receipt.” Id. at 62:8-12; id. at 58:10-11. This occurred 

approximately one to two minutes after Hustedde first approached Plaintiff at the booth. Id. at 57:13, 

 

5

Plaintiff denies observing Hustedde arresting the two Hoover students. Idalia Decl. at ¶ 7.

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59:3-4. Hustedde replied that it was “too late” because Plaintiff “was under arrest for not following the 

rules; she did not have a receipt; she was not standing line; she did not have food; and . . . refused to 

acknowledge any of the above.” Id. at 62:8-16. 

Hustedde did not attempt to determine whether the receipt offered to Plaintiff was in fact hers or 

otherwise confirming that someone else had purchased something for Plaintiff. See id. at 58:19-22. He 

refused to look at the receipt because he “was physically holding [Plaintiff] and had her under arrest” by 

that point. Id. at 59:7-8. 

Hustedde held Plaintiff by her upper arms and walked Plaintiff outside while holding her. Id. at 

59:10, 62:18-19. He denied that he used Plaintiff’s body to shove the front door open. Id. at 62:22-24.

Once outside, Hustedde attempted to handcuff Plaintiff, but she broke Hustedde’s grasp on her 

left arm and almost lost his grasp on her right arm when Plaintiff began to run. Id. at 67:19-21, 69:12-13. 

Hustedde then “grabbed [Plaintiff’s] pony tail and she collapsed . . . and fell down on the ground.” Id. at 

67:21-23. Hustedde still had a grip on Plaintiff’s right arm, so he picked her back up. Id. at 68:24-69:2. 

Eventually, Hustedde held Plaintiff in a bear hug with his arms across her collar bone to restrain her 

because she was “putting up an active fight” by flailing her arms and trying to loosen Hustedde’s grasp. 

Id. at 69:19-23, 71:8-9, 72:4-7. In addition, Plaintiff’s skin was sweaty and slippery because of the heat. 

Id. at 71:12-13. 

Hustedde then radioed for assistance. Id. at 72:12-14. When requesting assistance, Hustedde did 

not provide any information to dispatch as to why he needed resistance. See id. at 73:11-19. He did not, 

for instance, indicate that he was struggling with Plaintiff or that he urgently needed assistance. Id. at 

14-19; see also Kaiser Depo. at 57:16-17 (Hustedde “just—he asked for another unit to assist him at Big 

Mama’s”). By that point, Hustedde had positioned himself and Plaintiff behind his patrol car, which was 

parked by the curb outside Big Mama’s, because of the group of Hoover students who had gathered and 

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were yelling at him. See Hustedde Depo. at 70:2-71:6, 73:20-21.6 Hustedde told Plaintiff to stop fighting 

him, he did not want to fight her, and to open the door to his patrol car and sit down. Id. at 75:19-21. 

Plaintiff said something to the effect of “I’m not going in there.” Id. at 76:2-3. 

Hustedde then released Plaintiff from the bear hug, held her by one arm, and reached down to 

pick up his sunglasses. Id. at 76:10-17. Hustedde told Plaintiff to calm down and to not fight him, and 

explained that he was going to let her go and was only going to hold her arm. Hustedde Depo. at 76:21-

24. Plaintiff appeared to be compliant at that point and stopped flailing her arms. Id. at 77:1-3. 

Kaiser heard Hustedde’s call for assistance and headed to Big Mama’s. Kaiser Depo. at 57:5-10. 

To Kaiser, the crowd in the background on Hustedde’s call sounded loud, close to Hustedde, and 

“intense.” Id. at 58:1-3. 

Kaiser appeared at the scene at that time and approached from Plaintiff’s left rear. Hustedde

Depo. at 77:14-18, 79:5-9. Kaiser observed Plaintiff standing next to Hustedde, who was holding her 

“somewhere on the arm.” Id. at 60:1-5. As Kaiser approached them, Hustedde told Kaiser that Plaintiff 

was under arrest, “so [he] took her by the left arm, [with] both hands.” Id. at 60:11-16. Plaintiff 

“immediately yanked free of [Kaiser’s] grip.” Id. at 60:18. Although Plaintiff did not “take any 

assaultive actions towards” Kaiser or Hustedde, id. at 65:5-10, Kaiser considered her to be actively 

resisting and attempting to escape. Id. at 67:12-16.

In an effort to control Plaintiff, Kaiser grabbed her by her left wrist, placed his right arm around 

her neck and collarbone area, his left arm around her left arm, and began to carry her away behind his 

patrol car, which was parked next to Hustedde’s. Hustedde Depo. at 79:10-80:20; Kaiser Depo. at 62:13-

14, 63:19-20, 65:11-15, 68:6-19. Hustedde was still holding onto Plaintiff’s arm. Kaiser Depo. at 63:23-

25. Kaiser carried Plaintiff approximately the length of his patrol car to its trunk on the passenger side. 

Id. at 79:9-20. In Kaiser’s view, Plaintiff was still resisting arrest in that she was pulling at Kaiser’s arm, 

 

6

Plaintiff also submitted an approximately 2.5-minute-long video taken by a witness to the incident that shows, among other 

things, Hustedde restraining Plaintiff behind his patrol car and a group of approximately 10 people standing immediately next 

to the patrol car. See Doc. 38, Ex. E, Video of Incident Scene (“Video”), at 00:00:12.

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trying to pull her head out of his grip, kicking at his legs, and once pushing off his patrol car in what he 

perceived to be an attempt to knock him off balance. Id. at 81:16-82:25.

Hustedde approached Kaiser approximately thirty seconds later. Hustedde Depo. at 80:21-81:1; 

Kaiser Depo. at 69:13-16. Hustedde informed Kaiser that Plaintiff appeared to be choking and having 

difficulty breathing. Hustedde Depo. at 81:20-82:2. Kaiser stated that he was not choking her, but that 

Plaintiff was “pushing [his] arm into her throat.” Id. at 82:9-10. Eventually, it appeared to Hustedde that 

Kaiser was not choking Plaintiff, but that she was attempting to make it look like he was doing so. Id. at 

83:4-8. Kaiser held onto Plaintiff with his left arm to hold onto her, but he denies that he put Plaintiff in 

a choke hold. Kaiser Depo. at 62:7-12, 69:5-9. He “was not cutting off her air at all.” Id. at 86:12-13. 

Kaiser believed Plaintiff’s reaction “was a show” and that she “was playing to the crowd.” Id. at 87:3-4.

Hustedde handcuffed Plaintiff and told Kaiser to release her. Hustedde Depo. at 84:17-19. 

Hustedde then “used a foot sweep to take [Plaintiff] to the ground.” Id. at 84:21-22. Eventually, they 

placed Plaintiff into Kaiser’s patrol car with the air conditioning on and closed the door. Kaiser Depo. at 

87:14-25, 88:23-25. Kaiser did not hear Plaintiff complain that she was having trouble breathing, but did 

hear Plaintiff’s friends say she was. Id. at 88:10-21. Kaiser opened the door and Plaintiff “swung her 

legs out onto the pavement,” and stood next to the open door for two to three minutes “allowing 

[Plaintiff] to breathe or do whatever she needed to do.” Id. at 89:9-12. Plaintiff remained handcuffed in 

the patrol car, did not try to escape, and did not say anything to Kaiser. Id. at 90:1-8. Kaiser then 

transported Plaintiff to Hoover. Id. at 90:9-10.

D. Video Evidence.

Plaintiff submitted an approximately 2.5-minute-long video taken by a witness to Plaintiff’s 

arrest at Big Mama’s (“the video”). See Doc. 38, Ex. E, Video of Incident Scene (“Video”). Both parties 

assert that it supports their respective accounts of the incident and, in turn, contradicts the opposing 

party’s account. See Doc. 48 at 7; Doc. 54 at 2. The Court has reviewed the video, which is incorporated 

by reference herein. A Court-provided summary of the video, except in a general way, would rise to 

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subjective interpretation, something the Court will not do.

E. Procedural History.

It is undisputed that, due to the incident at Big Mama’s, Plaintiff was charged with trespassing, 

battery on a police officer, and resisting arrest, but those charges were dropped in February 2012. See 

UMF 25, 27. In addition, Plaintiff was expelled from Hoover, but was reinstated after her expulsion was 

overturned. UMF 28. 

Plaintiff brought this case on January 28, 2014. Compl. at 1.7Plaintiff brings three causes of 

action against Defendants under § 1983.8Section 1983 creates a cause of action “against any person 

acting under color of law who deprives another of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution and laws of the United States.” Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 

887 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s first cause of action against Defendants alleges that Defendants violated 

her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at ¶¶ 26-37. Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants unlawfully detained and arrested her, and used unlawful excessive force in doing 

so. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29.

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is for “constitutional violations.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants violated her Fourth, Fifth,9and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at ¶ 39. Specifically, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her right to be free “from unreasonable seizures in the form of 

the use of excessive force by police officers . . . from a deprivation of liberty without due process of law 

. . . and from summary punishment.” Id. at ¶ 44.

Plaintiff’s third cause of action against Defendants is for malicious prosecution. Id. at 18.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest and charge Plaintiff for any crime. 

 

7

Plaintiff named as Defendants in her complaint the City of Fresno and Chief Jerry Dyer; however, Plaintiff dismissed those 

Defendants in March 2015. Doc. 30.

8

Plaintiff brought her third and fourth causes of action against the dismissed Defendants only. See Compl. at 11, 15.

9 Neither party mentions Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment-based allegations in their respective briefs.

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Id. at ¶ 84. Plaintiff further alleges Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process 

of law by falsely accusing her of committing crimes that she in fact did not commit, which led to her 

being “wrongfully, unjustly, and falsely charged.” Id. at ¶ 83. 

As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff alleges she suffered and continues to suffer from 

various emotional and physical injuries. See id. at ¶ 83.Among other things, Plaintiff seeks punitive 

damages. Id. at ¶ 87.

Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. See Doc. 37 at 2-3. 

Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims because they had probable 

cause to arrest Plaintiff, conducted a reasonable seizure of her, and did not use excessive force on her. 

See id. at 2. Defendants alternatively argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, 

Defendants assert Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages because she has produced no evidence that 

Defendants’ conduct would justify punitive damages. Id. at 3.

The thrust of Plaintiff’s opposition is that this case is rife with genuine issues of material fact.

See Doc. 48 at 8. Plaintiff maintains that whether Defendants lawfully arrested her, used excessive force, 

and maliciously prosecuted are questions properly reserved for a jury. See id.

III. STANDARD OF DECISION

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, disclosure materials, discovery, and any 

affidavits provided establish that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that may affect the 

outcome of the case under the applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict 

in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id.

The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the 

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes 

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demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The exact nature of this responsibility, however, varies 

depending on whether the issue on which summary judgment is sought is one in which the movant or the 

nonmoving party carries the ultimate burden of proof. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 

978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007); Cecala v. Newman, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132 (D. Ariz. 2007). If the movant 

will have the burden of proof at trial, it must demonstrate, with affirmative evidence, that “no reasonable 

trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. In contrast, if the 

nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, “the movant can prevail merely by pointing out 

that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 323).

If the movant satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the allegations in 

its pleadings to “show a genuine issue of material fact by presenting affirmative evidence from which a 

jury could find in [its] favor.” FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in

original). “[B]ald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence” will not suffice in this regard. Id. at 929; see 

also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“When the 

moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that 

there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (citation omitted). “Where the record as a 

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue 

for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 289 (1968)).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, “the court does not make credibility determinations or 

weigh conflicting evidence.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. That remains the province of the jury or fact 

finder. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Instead, “[t]he evidence of the [nonmoving party] is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Id. Inferences, however, are not 

drawn out of the air; the nonmoving party must produce a factual predicate from which the inference 

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may reasonably be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 

1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Unlawful Detention and Arrest.

Plaintiff alleges she “was detained and arrested without legal cause or justification by” 

Defendants. Compl. at ¶ 28. Plaintiff claims that, “[a]t the time of the unlawful detention and arrest, 

[she] was a lawful patron of Big Mama’s restaurant and was simply waiting for the arrival of her food 

order.” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct “constituted an unlawful arrest 

without probable cause.” Id. at ¶ 29. 

1. Detention.

In her opposition, Plaintiff asserts that Hustedde did not have a reasonable suspicion that 

Plaintiff had committed a crime when he first approached her at Big Mama’s. Doc. 48 at 13. Thus, 

Plaintiff maintains that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to “whether [Hustedde] detained her 

unnecessarily and for too long a period of time.” Id. at 14.

Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s detention claim in their moving papers or their reply. They 

do not mention Plaintiff’s detention claim. Summary judgment on the claim is Denied.

2. Arrest.

a. Probable Cause for Arrest. 

The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrantless arrest be supported by probable cause. See 

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). “Probable cause for a warrantless arrest arises 

when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent 

person to believe that the suspect has committed ... an offense.” Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 

406, 432 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In determining whether there was 

probable cause to arrest, a court must look to “the totality of circumstances known to the arresting 

officers, [to determine if] a prudent person would have concluded there was a fair probability that [the 

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defendant] had committed a crime.” Id. 

In most cases, in establishing probable cause, “officers may not solely rely on the claim of a 

citizen witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must independently investigate the basis of the 

witness’s knowledge or interview other witnesses.” Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 

F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). For example, the complaint in Arpin survived a motion to dismiss where 

the arrestee alleged that the arresting officer “refused to identify himself, would not inform [the arrestee] 

of the reason she was being arrested, and did not allow [her] to explain her side of the story prior to 

arresting her.” Id. Likewise, in Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 767 (9th Cir. 2009), an eye-witness 

testified that Hopkins caused a minor automobile collision, his breath smelled of alcohol, he appeared 

intoxicated, and he ran into a nearby house. On that basis, the police entered Hopkins’ house to arrest 

him. Id. Noting that the police failed to interview anyone else and did nothing to corroborate the 

witness’s account, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the witness’s “cursory and conclusory” statements 

“without further investigation by the police” were “insufficient to support probable cause.” Id. However, 

corroborating evidence is not absolutely required in every instance. Probable cause may be based upon a 

victim’s statement alone “if the victim provides facts sufficiently detailed to cause a reasonable person 

to believe a crime had been committed and the named suspect was the perpetrator.” Peng v. Mei Chin 

Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted). 

“As a corollary ... of the rule that the police may rely on the totality of facts available to them in 

establishing probable cause, they also may not disregard facts tending to dissipate probable cause.” 

United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted); see also 

Merriman v. Walton, 856 F.2d 1333, 1335 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that even though an initial report that 

a suspect had committed a kidnapping might have established probable cause, because the officer 

received exculpatory information before arresting the suspect, a reasonable officer would have 

investigated further before making the arrest); Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999) (“An 

officer need not conduct a ‘mini-trial’ before making an arrest, but probable cause does not exist when 

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‘minimal further investigation’ would have exonerated the suspect.”) (internal citations omitted); BeVier 

v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1986) (“A police officer may not close her or his eyes to facts that 

would help clarify the circumstances of the arrest. Reasonable avenues of investigation must be pursued 

especially when ... it is unclear whether a crime had even taken place.”). Yet, once probable cause is 

established, a law enforcement officer is not “required by the Constitution to investigate independently 

every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of 

requisite intent.” See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979) (discussing obligations of officers 

executing a valid arrest warrant). 

b. Analysis.

Plaintiff asserts there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants had probable 

cause to arrest her. Doc. 48 at 15. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Hustedde did not have 

probable cause to arrest her because he incorrectly assumed she was not a paying customer at Big 

Mama’s (and therefore trespassing and loitering), refused to listen to her explanation that a friend had 

placed her order for her and she was waiting for it to be ready, and refused to verify her explanation with 

her friend, who handed Def. Hustedde their receipt, which Def. Hustedde refused to examine. Id. at 16. 

Thus, in Plaintiff’s view, “Hustedde patently ignored information readily available to him that would 

have instantly allayed any doubts whether his initial suspicion was correct” and he “based his decision to 

arrest Plaintiff on less than complete information and on unreasonable suspicions.” Id. at 18. Because 

Plaintiff maintains she was a paying customer at Big Mama’s, she asserts Defendant Hustedde cannot 

“claim that he had probable cause to arrest her for trespassing” because he failed to “properly 

investigat[e] whether she was a paying customer.” Id.

Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Def. Hustedde “clearly had probable cause to arrest 

plaintiff for trespassing at Big Mama’s.” Doc. 37 at 14. Defendants argue that it undisputed that Plaintiff 

was sitting at the booth without any food or drink, she refused to follow Def. Hustedde’s commands to 

either purchase something or leave, and her friend did not show a receipt to Def. Hustedde until he had 

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already arrested Plaintiff. Id. at 15; see also Doc. 54 at 7. Accordingly, Defendants assert that Def. 

Hustedde reasonably believed Plaintiff was trespassing and, therefore, probably cause to arrest her 

existed. Id. Finally, Defendants argue that Kaiser is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

unlawful arrest claim because “it is undisputed that [he] did not arrest plaintiff but arrived on the scene 

pursuant to [Hustedde’s] call for assistance after he had arrested plaintiff.” Id. at 15.

(1) Defendant Hustedde.

As discussed above, the parties present starkly different accounts as to what occurred between 

the time when Def. Hustedde approached Plaintiff at the booth and when he arrested her. According to 

Plaintiff, she tried to explain to Def. Hustedde that her friend Unique had ordered her food and they 

were waiting for it, but Def. Hustedde refused to consider her explanation and arrested her without 

determining whether her explanation was true. According to Def. Hustedde, Plaintiff refused to talk to 

Def. Hustedde or acknowledge his commands, and did not state that her friend had bought her food for 

which they were still waiting. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, genuine issues of material fact exist 

as to whether Hustedde had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for trespassing. Assuming the truth of 

Plaintiff’s testimony, Unique proffered a receipt to Def. Hustedde corroborating Plaintiff’s explanation 

as to why she was sitting at the booth without any food or drink. To have had probable cause to arrest 

her for trespassing, Def. Hustedde must have performed at least some form of minimal investigation to 

verify whether Plaintiff had in fact purchased something or whether she was in violation of Big Mama’s 

rules, thereby trespassing. But, according to Plaintiff’s testimony, Def. Hustedde made no attempt to 

verify whether Plaintiff had purchased something, refused to look at the proffered receipt, and 

disregarded Plaintiff’s explanation. Assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s testimony, because she had 

purchased something, she was not trespassing (or loitering). Thus, genuine issues of material fact exist

as to whether Def. Hustedde had probable cause to arrest her for trespassing. See Lopez, 482 F.3d at1073

(police officers “may not disregard facts tending to dissipate probable cause”); Hucal, 806 F.2d at 128 

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(“A police officer may not close her or his eyes to facts that would help clarify the circumstances of the 

arrest.”). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

claim that Hustedde unlawfully arrested her for trespassing without probable cause.

Plaintiff, however, also was arrested and charged for resisting arrest and battery on a police 

officer. The record is unclear concerning the grounds for these charges. That is, the record does not 

indicate whether Plaintiff was charged for allegedly resisting arrest by Def. Hustedde or Kaiser (or 

both), nor does it indicate whether Plaintiff was charged for allegedly battering Defs. Hustedde or Kaiser 

(or both). 

 “The legal elements of a [§ 148(a)] violation . . . are as follows: (1) the defendant willfully 

resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the officer was engaged in the performance of 

his or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was 

a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties.” In re Muhammed C., 95 Cal. App. 4th 

1325, 1329 (2002) (citations omitted). “For a § 148(a)(1) conviction to be valid, a criminal defendant 

must have ‘resist[ed], delay[ed], or obstruct[ed]’ a police officer in the lawful exercise of his duties . . . ; 

the lawfulness of the officer’s conduct is an essential element of the offense of resisting, delaying, or 

obstructing a peace officer.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) 

(citations omitted). 

The crime of battery on a peace officer in violation of California Penal Code § 243(c)(2) is (1) 

the willful and unlawful use of force (2) upon a peace officer in the performance of his or her duties (3) 

by a person who knows or reasonably should know that the victim was a peace officer performing his or 

her duties. See People v. Lindsay, 209 Cal. App. 3d 849, 857 (1989).

Def. Hustedde claims—and Plaintiff denies—that Plaintiff resisted arrest. The video is not 

determinative, which creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiff resisted Def. 

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Hustedde’s arrest.10 Likewise, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff battered 

Def. Hustedde during her arrest. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that Def. Hustedde arrested her for resisting arrest and battery on a peace 

officer without probable cause.

(2) Defendant Kaiser.

Neither party makes much of an effort to differentiate Def. Hustedde’s conduct from Def. 

Kaiser’s. Plaintiff asserts that both arrested Plaintiff without probable cause. Compl. at ¶¶ 28-29; Doc. 

48 at 19 (“Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to support her claim that Defendants Hustedde and 

Kaiser wrongfully arrested her.”). Defendants argue that “[i]t is undisputed that . . . Kaiser did not arrest 

plaintiff but arrived on the scene pursuant to . . . Hustedde’s call for assistance.” Doc. 37 at 22.

Defendants contend that “[a]ny reasonable officer with . . . Kaiser’s knowledge of the events would 

believe that assistance to . . . Hustedde was supported by probable cause.” Id.

Defendants’ argument is somewhat ambiguous. To the extent Defendants argue that it is 

undisputed that Kaiser arrived on the scene pursuant to Def. Hustedde’s call for assistance, they are 

correct. However, to the extent that Defendants suggest that it is undisputed that Def. Kaiser did not 

arrest Plaintiff because he did not arrive until Def. Hustedde had already arrested Plaintiff, Defendants 

are incorrect. Plaintiff argues that she “has presented sufficient evidence to support her claim that 

Defendants Hustedde and Kaiser wrongfully arrested her.” Doc. 48 at 19. 

Based on the undisputed evidence, Def. Kaiser did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for 

trespassing. It is undisputed that Def. Hustedde did not explain why he requested assistance, and 

although he told Def. Kaiser that Plaintiff was under arrest, there is no evidence that he explained why 

she was under arrest. According to Def. Kaiser, he arrived at the scene, observed Officer Hustedde 

 

10 Plaintiff appears to suggest that she cannot be charged for resisting arrest under § 148 because that provision does not make 

it a crime to resist unlawful orders.” Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) 

(citing Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). 

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holding Plaintiff with one arm, Def. Hustedde told him she was under arrest—but did not explain to him 

why or for what crime she was under arrest—and Def. Kaiser immediately grabbed her arms to assist 

with her arrest. Def. Kaiser therefore did not have probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had been 

trespassing and to arrest her for doing so.11 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim against Def. Kaiser for arresting her for trespassing without 

probable cause.

But, as discussed above, Plaintiff also was charged for resisting arrest and battery on a police 

officer. Def. Kaiser testified—and Plaintiff denies—that when he tried to grab Plaintiff’s arms to effect 

her custody, she yanked her arms free of his grip and resisted. Def. Kaiser claims that Plaintiff forcibly 

continued to resist arrest. According to Plaintiff, Def. Kaiser arrived at the scene unbeknownst to her, 

did not talk to Def. Hustedde, and immediately placed his right arm around her neck and began carrying 

her away.12 Further, Plaintiff claims she did not resist Def. Kaiser’s arresting her in any way. Thus, 

genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Kaiser had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for 

resisting arrest.

13 Similarly, the video shows that Plaintiff was kicking and pulling at Def. Kaiser’s 

arm as he carried her away, and apparently pushed off his patrol car with her feet. In Def. Kaiser’s view, 

Plaintiff was continuing to resist arrest and, by pushing off his patrol car, attempting to knock Def. 

Kaiser over. Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims she was not resisting arrest and suggests that she was 

pulling at Def. Kaiser’s arm because she was choking. Thus, genuine issues of material fact exist as to 

whether Def. Kaiser had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for battery. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that Def. 3Kaiser unlawfully arrested her

 

11 To the extent Kaiser could have based probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for trespassing on information possessed by officer 

Hustedde, Kaiser would not be entitled to summary judgment because Hustedde’s basis for asserting probable cause 

regarding any trespass violation is disputed. 

12 Neither party testified as to how much time elapsed between the time Hustedde released Plaintiff from restraomt until 

Kaiser arrived on the scene. The video is not determinative. 

13 Because Plaintiff also disputes Hustedde’s claim that she forcibly resisted arrest, genuine issues of material fact also exist 

as to whether Hustedde had probable cause to arrest her for resisting arrest or battery on a peace officer.

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for resisting arrest and battery on a police officer without probable cause.14

B. Excessive Force.

Plaintiff asserts Defendants used excessive force when arresting her, in violation of her Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights.15 Doc. 48 at 15. Defendants maintain their use of force was 

reasonable under the circumstances. Doc. 37 at 16. 

Under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 

shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The Fourth Amendment does not 

proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.” 

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Chan-Jimenez,

125 F.3d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997) (“For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when a 

law enforcement officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some way restrains the 

liberty of a citizen.”). 

The Fourth Amendment requires police officers making an arrest to use only an amount of force 

that is objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances facing them. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 

7-8 (1985). Neither tackling nor punching a suspect to make an arrest necessarily constitutes excessive 

force. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“‘Not every push or shove, even if it may seem 

unnecessary in the peace of the judge’s chambers,’ . . . violates the Fourth Amendment”) (quoting 

Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). But “even where some force is justified, the 

amount actually used may be excessive.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002). The 

question in all cases is whether the use of force was “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and 

circumstances confronting” the arresting officer(s). Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (internal quotation marks 

 

14 Plaintiff was also charged with battery on a peace officer. The record is unclear as to whom she purportedly battered. 

15 As noted, Plaintiff brings her excessive force claim under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, Compl. at ¶ 39, 

but neither party addressed the Fifth Amendment in their briefs. 

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omitted).

Claims of excessive force are analyzed under an objective reasonableness standard. Scott v. 

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007). Determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred

requires a “careful balancing” of the extent of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights 

against the government’s interests to determine whether the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable 

based on the totality of the circumstances. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97; Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 968 

(9th Cir. 2008); Miller v. Clark Cnty., 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). 

This balancing requires a three-step analysis. The first step requires an assessment of the severity 

of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights by evaluating “the type and amount of 

force inflicted.” Miller, 340 F.3d at 964; Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 

1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). The second step requires evaluation of the government’s interests by 

assessing (i) the severity of the crime; (ii) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officers’

or public’s safety; and (iii) whether the suspect was resisting arrest or attempting to escape. Chew, 27

F.3d at 1441; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The third step requires balancing the force that was used by the 

officers against the need for such force to determine whether the force used was “greater than is 

reasonable under the circumstances.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir. 2002); Miller, 340 

F.3d at 964 (a court must “balance[s] the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against the 

government’s need for that intrusion.”). “Because this inquiry is fact-sensitive, summary judgment 

should be granted sparingly.” Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(citing Santos, 287 F.3d at 853); see also Espinosa v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 

(9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]his court has often held that in police misconduct cases, summary judgment should 

only be granted ‘sparingly’ because such cases often turn on credibility determinations by a jury.”).

Defendants acknowledge that “reasonableness of a police use of force is ordinarily a question of 

fact for the jury.” Doc. 37 at 16. As the Ninth Circuit has observed, this is so because the three-step 

balancing analysis of an excessive force claim “nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed 

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factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom.” Santos, 287 F.3d at 853.

As it stands, the record is rife with material factual disputes between the parties. The only 

evidence thus far submitted concerning what transpired between Plaintiff and the two officers is their 

testimony and the video. As outlined above, the parties’ respective testimony paints irreconcilable 

differences of what occurred. 

Citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, Defendants argue that the video evidence corroborates their 

version of events. See Doc. 54 at 6. Defendants “ask that the Court deem the videotape as the undisputed 

facts since plaintiff’s declaration is so contrary to the undisputed videotape as to be laughable” because 

it “clearly shows plaintiff kicking [and] flailing in response[] to the officers’ attempts to restrain her.” Id.

Even deeming the video as undisputed evidence, it does not render the numerous disputed facts 

undisputed. The video sheds no light on what happened leading up to Plaintiff’s arrest nor does it 

establish whether Def. Hustedde used excessive force prior to the point where the video begins. Second, 

the video is low quality—it is grainy and shaky, at times not focused on Plaintiff and Defendants, and 

the bystanders frequently obfuscate the view. (“In light of the factual disputes regarding the amount of 

force used, the circumstances under which it was applied, and the extent of the plaintiffs' injuries, the 

question is properly for the jury whether the force applied by the officers was objectively reasonable 

under the totality of the circumstances.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is DENIED.

C. Malicious Prosecution.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants maliciously prosecuted her by, among other things, arresting her 

without probable cause, falsifying evidence, distorting their reports, providing false declarations, and 

recommending that she be charged and prosecuted for various offenses. Compl. at ¶¶ 81-84. As a result, 

Plaintiff was “wrongfully prosecuted and unjustly charged” with assault on a peace officer, resisting 

arrest, and trespassing. Id. at ¶¶ 83, 85.

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim on the 

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grounds that, because they had probable cause to arrest her, “they had probable cause to initiate criminal 

proceedings against her” and Plaintiff “has produced no evidence that such criminal proceeding[s] were 

brought with malice or bad faith.” Doc. 37 at 15-16. 

To prevail on her malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff “must show that the defendants 

prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying 

her equal protection or another specific constitutional right.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 

1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, “probable cause is an absolute 

defense to malicious prosecution.” Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 

2009). 

As discussed, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendants had probable cause 

to arrest Plaintiff for any of the offenses for which she was charged. And because those issues remain 

disputed, whether Defendants acted with malice also remains disputed. See Titus v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 

308 Fed. App’x 210, 212-13 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Assuming it is also found that the [malicious prosecution]

action was brought without probable cause, a reasonable jury could find that [the defendants] acted with 

malice.”) Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

malicious prosecution claim.

D. Qualified Immunity.

Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The protection of qualified 

immunity applies regardless of whether the government official makes an error that is “a mistake of law, 

a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “The principles of qualified immunity 

shield an officer from personal liability when an officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct 

complies with the law.” Id. at 245.

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Defendants bear the burden of proving that they are entitled to qualified immunity, Moreno v. 

Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 2005), and the Court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff as the party asserting a constitutional injury. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 

201 (2001). To determine if qualified immunity applies, the Court asks (1) “whether the facts that a 

plaintiff has . . . shown . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and, if so, (2) “whether the 

right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Wilkinson v. 

Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). Thus, “[t]he threshold 

inquiry in a qualified immunity analysis is whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a 

constitutional violation.” Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2003).

Defendants maintain that they are entitled to qualified immunity on all of Plaintiff’s claims. 

Defendants contend that, “even if . . . Hustedde did not actually have clear probable cause to arrest 

plaintiff for trespassing . . . it was certainly reasonable for [him] to believe he had probable cause and 

thus is entitled to qualified immunity on the basis of reasonable mistake of fact.” Doc. 37 at 21. 

Defendants contend “it is undisputed that plaintiff had no food or drink when [Hustedde] approached her 

and recited the rules and ask her to leave . . . [but] Plaintiff did not obey [his] commands.” Id.

Defendants further contend that it is undisputed that it was not until “plaintiff was arrest did a third 

party, whose testimony has not been offered by the plaintiff, place a putative receipt for food on 

plaintiff’s table.” Id. at 22. Defendants therefore assert that Hustedde had probable cause to arrest 

Plaintiff because he reasonably believed Plaintiff was trespassing. Id.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on her unlawful arrest 

claim. Doc. 48 at 25. Plaintiff claims that, because there are disputed material facts as to whether Def. 

Hustedde had probable cause and whether any force was necessary, the Court cannot determine whether 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See id. at 25-26.

“Where a Fourth Amendment violation is claimed, the factual issues that may preclude a 

determination of qualified immunity on summary judgment fall into two categories.” Act Up!/Portland 

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v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993). “First, a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable 

cause requires an inquiry as to the facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge . . . . These are 

matters of fact to be determined, where genuine disputes of a material nature exist, by the fact finder.” 

Id. (citations and footnote omitted). Thus, whether an officer made a “‘reasonable mistake’ of fact or 

law . . . may depend on the jury’s resolution of disputed facts and the inferences it draws therefrom.” 

Santos, 287 F.3d at 855 n.12.

As discussed above, the parties provide drastically different accounts of why Defendants arrested 

Plaintiff and what occurred while they did so. As a result, there are few undisputed material facts

concerning whether Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and whether they used excessive 

force in doing so.16

In other words, essentially all of the material facts underlying Plaintiff’s claims are disputed. The 

Court therefore cannot properly assess whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on those 

claims unless and until the material factual disputes have been determined by the jury. See Cameron v. 

Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The County Defendants are not entitled to qualified 

immunity at this juncture as the record does not permit us to decide whether they violated clearly 

established law.”); Espinosa, 598 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2010) (“In this case, the district court properly 

denied the summary judgment motion because there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether the 

officers violated [the plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment rights. Those unresolved issues of fact are also 

material to a proper determination of the reasonableness of the officers’ belief in the legality of their 

actions.”); Santos, 287 F.3d at 855 n. 12 (finding it premature to decide whether the officer-defendants 

were entitled to qualified immunity “because whether the officers may be said to have made a 

 

16 The only undisputed material facts establish that Kaiser did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff 

for trespassing, and the only argument Defendants provide concerning whether Kaiser is entitled to 

qualified immunity for his involvement in Plaintiff’s arrest erroneously asserts that Kaiser in fact did not 

arrest Plaintiff. Kaiser therefore is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s claim that he arrested 

her for trespassing without probable cause.

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‘reasonable mistake’ of fact or law may depend on the jury’s resolution of disputed facts and the 

inferences it draws therefrom”). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment on the ground they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s claims.

D. Punitive Damages.

Punitive damages may be awarded in a § 1983 case where a defendant acts with malice toward 

the plaintiff. See Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 

(1986). Because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendants acted maliciously toward 

Plaintiff, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s request for 

punitive damages. For trial, counsel can count on this aspect of the case will be bifurcated, only to be 

addressed if the jury first makes the requisite findings.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its 

entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 23, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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