Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00481/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00481-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
AVA Columbus Holdings, LLC
Defendant
AVA Douglas Holdings, LLC
Defendant
AVA Duval Holdings, LLC
Defendant
AVA Newnan Holdings, LLC
Defendant
AVA Saint Louis Holdings, LLC
Defendant
AVA Sarasota Holdings, LLC
Defendant
AVA Valley Holdings, LLC
Defendant
American Vascular Access, LLC
Defendant
Janet R. Dees
Defendant
Vascular Ventures, LLC
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

VASCULAR VENTURES, LLC, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-00481-KD-B

 : 

AMERICAN VASCULAR ACCESS, LLC, :

et al., :

 :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case is before the Court on Plaintiff Vascular 

Ventures, LLC’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 7), Defendant American 

Vascular Access, LLC’s Motion to Transfer (Doc. 2), the “AVA 

Affiliates” and “Nominal” Defendants’1 Motion to Dismiss for Lack 

of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 3), and Defendants American 

Vascular Access, LLC and Janet R. Dees’ Motion to Dismiss for 

Failure to State a Claim. (Doc. 4). The motions, which have 

been fully briefed and are ripe for resolution, have been 

referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation 

 1 The “AVA Affiliates” Defendants are: AVA Sarasota Holdings, 

LLC; AVA Newnan Holdings, LLC; AVA Columbus Holdings, LLC; AVA 

Douglas Holdings, LLC; AVA Saint Louis Holdings, LLC; AVA Valley 

Holdings, LLC; and AVA Duval Holdings, LLC. (Doc. 3 at 1). The 

“Nominal” Defendants are: Foothill Vascular Center, Inc.; 

Manasota Vascular Center, LLC; Newnan Vascular Center, LLC; 

Columbus Vascular Center, LLC; Gateway Vascular Center, LLC; 

Valley Interventional Medical Associates, PLLC; and Duval 

Vascular Center, LLC. (Id.).

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 1 of 53
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c).

Upon consideration of all matters presented, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS, for the reasons stated herein, that Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Remand (Doc. 7) be DENIED, that Defendant’s Motion to 

Transfer be DENIED (Doc. 2), that the AVA Affiliates and Nominal 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 

(Doc. 3) be GRANTED, and that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for 

Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 4) be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED 

IN PART. 

I. Background Facts

Plaintiff Vascular Ventures, LLC (“Vascular Ventures”) 

commenced this action in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, 

Alabama on August 9, 2016, against Defendants American Vascular 

Access, LLC (“American Vascular”), Janet R. Dees (“Dees”), the 

AVA Affiliates Defendants, the Nominal Defendants, and various 

fictitious defendants. (Doc. 1-2 at 2-3). In the complaint, 

Plaintiff alleges claims against Defendants American Vascular and 

Dees for Breach of Contract (Count One), Negligent/Reckless 

Misrepresentation (Count Two), Promissory Fraud (Count Three), 

Fraudulent Suppression (Count Four), and Fraud in the Inducement 

(Count Five); against Defendants American Vascular, Dees, and the 

AVA Affiliates for Conspiracy (Count Six); and against Defendants 

AVA Affiliates for Intentional Interference with a Contractual 

Relation (Count Seven) and Intentional Interference with a 

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Business Relationship (Count Eight).2 (Doc. 1-2 at 10-19). 

According to Plaintiff, in 2009, Defendants American Vascular and 

Janet Dees began negotiating with the doctor members of Plaintiff

Vascular Ventures to purchase a 40% interest in their lab-based 

interventional nephrology practice in Mobile, Alabama, and, as 

incentive for the doctors selling a 40% interest in their 

practice, Defendants promised the doctors and Vascular Ventures

the opportunity to invest, up to 10%, in Defendant American 

Vascular’s future business ventures. (Id. at 6-7; Doc. 11 at 3). 

On September 12, 2016, Defendant American Vascular filed a 

Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446 on the 

basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). On September 12, 

2016, Defendant American Vascular filed a Motion to Transfer this 

action to the Middle District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1404(a) on the grounds of forum non conveniens and the parties’ 

agreed forum under a forum selection clause. (Doc. 2). On 

September 12, 2016, the AVA Affiliates and the Nominal Defendants 

filed a Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. (Doc. 3). On September 12, 2016, Defendants 

American Vascular and Dees filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to 

Dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 4). On September 

30, 2016, Plaintiff Vascular Ventures filed a Motion to Remand 

this action to state court alleging that Defendant American 

Vascular did not meet its burden of establishing diversity 

 2 Plaintiff asserts no claims against the Nominal Defendants. 

(Doc. 1-2).

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jurisdiction because it failed to adequately establish the 

requisite amount in controversy. (Doc. 7 at 2). These motions 

have been fully briefed and are now ready for resolution.

II. Motion to Remand

A. Standard of Review

As set forth above, this action was removed by Defendant 

American Vascular pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446 on the 

basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 

1). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides, in relevant part:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by 

Act of Congress, any civil action brought in 

a State court of which the district courts 

of the United States have original 

jurisdiction, may be removed by the 

defendant or the defendants, to the district 

court of the United States for the district 

and division embracing the place where such 

action is pending. 

In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides in part:

The notice of removal of a civil action or 

proceeding shall be filed within 30 days 

after the receipt by the defendant, through 

service or otherwise, of a copy of the 

initial pleading setting forth the claim for 

relief upon which such action or proceeding 

is based, or within 30 days after the 

service of summons upon the defendant if 

such initial pleading has then been filed in 

court and is not required to be served on 

the defendant, whichever period is shorter.

It is well established that, “[i]n a removal action, the 

party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing 

proof of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” 

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Wiltew v. Parker, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101741, *1-2, 2009 WL 

3615041, *2 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 30, 2009); Lowery v. Alabama Power 

Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1210 (11th Cir. 2007)). In a removal 

action, the burden is upon the defendant. Id.; see also 

Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th 

Cir. 2008) (“A removing defendant bears the burden of proving 

proper federal jurisdiction . . . [and] [a]ny doubts about the 

propriety of federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of 

remand to state court.”)). In addition, “[b]ecause removal

infringes upon state sovereignty and implicates central concepts 

of federalism, removal statutes must be construed narrowly, with 

all doubts resolved in favor of remand.” Holloway v. Morrow, 

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10318, *5, 2008 WL 401305, *2 (S.D. Ala. 

Feb. 11, 2008) (citing University of South Alabama v. American 

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that 

strict construction of removal statutes derives from 

“significant federalism concerns” raised by removal 

jurisdiction); see also Russell Corp. v. American Home Assur., 

Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Federal courts are 

courts of limited jurisdiction, and there is a presumption 

against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all 

uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved in 

favor of remand.”). “Thus, under § 1446(b), in assessing the 

propriety of removal, the court considers the document received 

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by the defendant from the plaintiff -- be it the initial 

complaint or a later received paper -- and determines whether 

that document and the notice of removal unambiguously establish 

federal jurisdiction.” Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1213.

Where the alleged basis for federal jurisdiction is 

diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the removing defendant has the 

burden of demonstrating that there is (1) complete diversity of 

citizenship and (2) an amount-in-controversy greater than 

$75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, the parties do not 

dispute that there is complete diversity of citizenship between 

the parties. Rather, the sole question before the Court on 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is whether the removing Defendant 

has established the requisite amount in controversy. (Doc. 7).

With respect to the amount in controversy requirement, 

where the plaintiff “has not pled a specific amount of damages, 

the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the 

jurisdictional requirement.” Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza, II, 

Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2010). A removing defendant 

need only show that “the amount in controversy more likely than 

not exceeds the . . . jurisdictional requirement.” Roe v. 

Michelin N.A., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1357 

(11th Cir. 1996)). A removing defendant is not required “to 

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prove the amount in controversy beyond all doubt or to banish 

all uncertainty about it.” Renfroe v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. 

Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111336, *6, 2010 WL 4117038, * 2 

(S.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 2010) (quoting Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754). 

“When the complaint does not claim a specific amount of damages, 

removal from state court is proper if it is facially apparent 

from the complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds the 

jurisdictional requirement.” Beasley v. Fred’s Inc., 2008 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 26210, *3-4, 2008 WL 899249, *1 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 

2008) (quoting Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 

(11th Cir. 2001)). “If the jurisdictional amount is not 

facially apparent from the complaint, the court should look to 

the notice of removal and may require evidence relevant to the 

amount in controversy at the time the case was removed.” Id. 

In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that “courts 

may use their judicial experience and common sense in 

determining whether the case stated in a complaint meets federal 

jurisdictional requirements.” Roe, 613 F.3d at 1062.

B. Analysis

In the complaint in this case, Plaintiff seeks unspecified 

compensatory and punitive damages, as well as equitable relief,

for Defendants’ alleged breach of contract and intentional torts 

(including fraud, conspiracy, and intentional interference with 

contractual and business relationships) arising out of a joint 

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business venture in which Defendants allegedly failed to fulfill 

their obligations to offer Plaintiff and its member doctors the

opportunity to participate in future joint investment ventures.3 

(Doc. 1-2 at 2-19). Because the amount in controversy is not 

facially apparent from the complaint, the Court considers other 

relevant evidence of the amount in controversy in this case. 

The evidence shows that on September 12, 2016, Defendant 

Janet Dees submitted an affidavit in which she attested that she

is the President of Defendant American Vascular Access, LLC, 

whose affiliates include the Defendant AVA Affiliates, and that 

she is a member of Defendant American Vascular, as well as each 

of the Defendant AVA Affiliates and the Nominal Defendants. 

(Doc. 1-1 at 2-5). Defendant Dees attested that, as a result of 

the AVA Affiliates’ investments in the Nominal Defendants, the 

AVA Affiliates have received more than $750,000 in distributed 

earnings or dividends, and 10% of those earnings or dividends 

received from their investments would exceed $75,000. (Id. at 

5). 

Defendant Dees also submitted a supplemental affidavit on 

October 17, 2016, in which she further attested that she is the 

 3 According to Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint, those 

future investment opportunities included the opportunity to 

invest in (and own up to 10% of) each of the AVA Affiliates and 

Nominal Defendants. (Doc. 1-2 at 7, 9-10).

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manager of the Nominal Defendants Columbus Vascular Center,

LLC; Douglas Vascular Center, LLC; Duval Vascular Center,

LLC; Gateway Vascular Center, LLC; and Newnan Vascular 

Center, LLC, and she was the former manager and a member of 

AVA Affiliates Defendant Sarasota Holdings, LLC. (Doc. 19 at 

2). Defendant Dees attested that, given her positions in 

these companies, as well as her prior experience and training 

in the industry as a dialysis nurse, she is familiar with the 

industry-wide accepted valuation methods for vascular centers

and has applied those valuation tools to develop, buy, and 

sell centers for approximately ten years. (Id. at 2-3; Doc. 

1-1 at 2). Defendant Dees attested that in 2015 and 2016, 

five of the AVA Affiliates had collective annualized earnings 

of at least $1,075,000 and that the industry standard in 

valuing vascular centers is five to eight times earnings. 

(Doc. 19 at 4). Thus, Dees attested that Plaintiff’s claimed 

10% interest in these entities would necessarily exceed 

$75,000. (Id.).

In its Motion to Remand, Plaintiff argues that Dees’ 

testimony is vague and speculative and does not take into 

account whether a profit has been realized by each entity. 

(Doc. 7 at 9). The Court disagrees. Having carefully reviewed 

the evidence at issue, the Court finds that Defendant Dees’ 

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affidavit testimony is a reasonable estimate of the actual value 

of the contested entities and Plaintiff’s claimed 10% interest.4

Thus, it is relevant evidence that supports Defendants’ argument 

that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000. 

In addition, as stated above, Plaintiff seeks punitive 

damages in this case against multiple defendants for intentional 

torts including fraud, conspiracy, and tortious interference 

with contractual and business relationships. “Punitive damages 

must be considered when determining the jurisdictional amount in 

controversy in diversity cases.” Rae v. Perry, 392 Fed. Appx.

753, 755 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Benandi v. Mediacom S.E., 

LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125084, *13, 2011 WL 5077403, *4 

(S.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 

2011 WL 5077108 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 2011) (it is “appropriate to 

consider claim for punitive damages when determining the 

jurisdictional amount in controversy.”).

Eleventh Circuit precedent permits district 

courts to make “reasonable deductions,

reasonable inferences, or other reasonable 

extrapolations” from the pleadings to 

determine whether it is facially apparent

that a case is removable. See id. at 754. 

Put simply, a district court need not

“suspend reality or shelve common sense in

determining whether the face of a complaint

 4 The Court notes that Plaintiff does not disclaim damages in 

excess of $75,000 but, rather, simply challenges the adequacy of 

Defendants’ proof of the amount in controversy. 

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... establishes the jurisdictional amount.”

See id. at 770 (quoting Roe v. Michelin N.

Am., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 995, 999 (M.D.

Ala. 2009)); see also Williams, 269 F.3d at 

1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (allowing district 

courts to consider whether it is “ facially 

apparent” from a complaint that the amount

in controversy is met). Instead, courts 

may use their judicial experience and 

common sense in determining whether the

case stated in a complaint meets federal 

jurisdictional requirements. This approach

is consistent with those of other circuits.

Roe, 613 F.3d at 1062.

Having considered the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, 

as well as Defendant Dee’s affidavit testimony concerning the 

reasonable estimate of the value of the entities in which 

Plaintiff claims entitlement to a 10% interest, and Plaintiff’s 

multiple claims for punitive damages, the Court finds that 

Defendants have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the amount in controversy in this action exceeds $75,000, 

exclusive of interest and costs. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Remand (Doc. 7) is due to be denied.

III. Motion to Transfer

As set forth above, Defendant American Vascular filed a 

Motion to Transfer this action to the Middle District of Florida 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Defendant argues that

the parties to this action agreed in a December 30, 2009, 

Purchase Agreement that venue for any dispute arising out of the 

agreement would be in St. Petersburg, Florida, which is in the

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Middle District of Florida, and, further, that this action is 

due to be transferred to the Middle District of Florida on the 

basis of forum non conveniens. (Doc. 2 at 1-3). Having 

reviewed this issue at length, the Court disagrees.

Defendant bases its first argument for transfer on a Forum 

Selection Clause contained in a Purchase Agreement entered on 

December 30, 2009, between AVA Mobile Holdings, LLC (“AVAMH”)(a

non-party to this action), Mobile Vascular Labs, LLC (“MVL”) (a 

non-party to this action), and nine individual doctors (all nonparties to this action). (Doc. 1-1 at 9, 26, 28-30). 

Notwithstanding American Vascular’s repeated representations in 

its briefs to this Court that it is a party to the Purchase 

Agreement, the agreement itself places the matter beyond dispute 

that Defendant American Vascular is neither a signatory nor a 

party to that agreement.5 

It is elementary that “[a] third person has no rights under 

a contract between others unless the contracting parties intend 

that the third person receive a direct benefit enforceable in 

court.” Russell v. Birmingham Oxygen Serv., Inc., 408 So. 2d 90, 

93 (Ala. 1981) (citations omitted) (“Since it is apparent from 

the face of the contract that Southeastern Medical is not a third 

party beneficiary, Southeastern Medical has no standing to 

enforce it in court.”). Here, Defendant American Vascular does 

 5 Counsel for Defendant American Vascular conceded at a hearing 

conducted on November 7, 2016, that American Vascular is neither 

a signatory nor a party to the agreement.

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not claim that it is a third-party beneficiary of the Purchase 

Agreement between non-parties AVAMH, MVL, and the nine individual 

doctors who entered the agreement. Therefore, its attempt to 

enforce the Forum Selection Clause in an agreement to which it is 

not a party is completely without merit.6

Second, Defendant American Vascular argues that this action 

is due to be transferred to the Middle District of Florida on the 

basis of forum non conveniens. (Doc. 2 at 3). 28 U.S.C. 

1404(a) provides that, “[f]or the convenience of parties and 

witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may 

transfer any civil action to any other district or division where 

it might have been brought or to any district or division to 

which all parties have consented. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a). 

“District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to 

transfer an action to a more convenient forum.” Continental 

Motors, Inc. v. Jewell Aircraft, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1312

(S.D. Ala. 2012) (quoting A.J. Taft Coal Co. v. Barnhart, 291 F.

 6 The Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that, 

although it admittedly is not a party to the Purchase Agreement, 

it should be allowed to enforce the forum selection clause in 

the agreement because Plaintiff is attempting to enforce other 

portions of that same agreement against the Defendant. Indeed, 

it has not been lost on the Court that both Plaintiff and 

Defendants have unnecessarily complicated the issues in this 

case by loosely and inaccurately referencing the actual parties 

to the subject Purchase Agreement when it suited their own 

purposes. The Court will address Plaintiff’s claims related to 

the Purchase Agreement in its discussion of Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. For now, as concerns 

Defendant’s Motion to Transfer, the Court declines to accept 

Defendant’s invitation to suspend the basic rules of contract 

law for either party’s advantage. 

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Supp. 2d 1290, 1307 (N.D. Ala. 2003)). “[I]n the usual motion 

for transfer under section 1404(a), the burden is on the movant 

to establish that the suggested forum is more convenient.” Id.

at 1312-13 (quoting In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th 

Cir. 1989)).

Under the circumstances presented, Defendant’s argument that 

the venue of this action should be moved from this district to 

the Middle District of Florida is unavailing. First, it is wellsettled that the plaintiff’s choice of forum (in this case, 

Vascular Ventures’ decision to file suit in a state court found 

in the Southern District of Alabama) “is entitled to substantial 

weight and will not lightly be cast aside.” Continental, 882 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1313 (citing Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 

F.3d 253, 260 (11th Cir. 1996)) (“The plaintiff’s choice of forum 

should not be disturbed unless it is clearly outweighed by other 

considerations.”); Bartronics, Inc. v. Power–One, Inc., 510 F.

Supp. 2d 634, 637 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (“a plaintiff’s choice of 

forum should be honored so long as venue is proper there, unless 

substantial countervailing considerations militate to the 

contrary”).

Further, even under a traditional § 1404(a) balancing test, 

Defendant American Vascular has failed to establish that the 

proposed new forum is more convenient than Vascular Ventures’ 

selected forum. In this analysis, once it is established that 

the action could originally have been brought in the proposed 

transferee forum (which it could have been, inasmuch as a 

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substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim allegedly 

occurred there),7 courts examine “whether a balancing of the 

convenience of the parties and the interest of justice favors 

transfer in the specific case.” Continental, 882 F. Supp. 2d at

1313 (citations omitted). In performing this analysis, relevant 

factors include: “(1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the 

location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to 

sources of proof; (3) the convenience of the parties; (4) the 

locus of operative facts; (5) the availability of process to 

compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative 

means of the parties; (7) a forum’s familiarity with the 

governing law; (8) the weight accorded a plaintiff’s choice of 

forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice, 

based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1314 

(quoting Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th 

Cir. 2005)).

With respect to witnesses, it does not appear that Alabama 

is an inconvenient forum, given that many of the witnesses are

already in this district, and others are located nearby in an 

adjacent state. Further, although Defendant argues that two 

“third-party” witnesses are outside of the forum, one of those 

witnesses would have to travel from Missouri regardless of which 

forum was chosen. (Doc. 2 at 4). As to the convenience of the 

 7 American Vascular asserts that its negotiations with Plaintiff 

were made from its office in Palm Harbor, Florida, which is 

located in the Middle District of Florida. (Doc. 1-1 at 6).

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parties, there undoubtedly will be some inconvenience to the 

defendants attendant to defending themselves in Alabama; however, 

as the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, “modern methods of 

transportation and communication have lessened the burden of 

defending a suit in a foreign jurisdiction.” Continental, 882 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1314 (quoting Mutual Service Ins. Co. v. Frit 

Industries, Inc., 358 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2004)). This is 

particularly true where, as here, many of the defendants are 

based in a neighboring state, such that vast geographic distances 

(and the associated inconveniences and expenses of same) are not 

at play. Similarly, the remaining factors either favor Alabama 

as a more convenient forum, or the two forums are roughly equal:

e.g., this Court will be more familiar with the governing Alabama 

law; all or most of the relevant documents can be produced 

without regard to location; significant underlying events 

occurred in both Alabama and Florida; the relative means of the 

parties is a non-issue here; and there appears to be little 

genuine risk of unwilling witnesses who are beyond the subpoena 

power of the forum court. 

After careful consideration, based on the totality of the 

circumstances and the interests of justice, the Court concludes 

that Defendant American Vascular has not met its heavy burden 

under § 1404(a) of showing that the desired transferee forum is 

so much more convenient than Alabama that it should override 

Plaintiff’s choice of forum. In fact, the Court is far from 

convinced that the Southern District of Alabama is, on balance, 

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any less convenient as a forum for trial than the Middle 

District of Florida. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to 

Transfer Venue (Doc. 2) is due to be denied.

IV. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

As set forth above, the AVA Affiliates Defendants and the 

Nominal Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), arguing that 

the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over each of them.8 (Doc. 

3 at 1). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that 

their Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted.

A. Standard of Review

It is well settled that the plaintiff “has the burden of 

establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.” 

Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 

F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff meets its 

burden if it “presents enough evidence to withstand a motion for 

directed verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

When a “defendant submits affidavits contrary to the allegations 

in the complaint, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 

produce evidence supporting personal jurisdiction, unless the 

defendant’s affidavits contain only conclusory assertions that 

 8 Defendants American Vascular and Janet Dees do not challenge 

personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 3 at 2).

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the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction.” Id. When a 

plaintiff’s “complaint and supporting affidavits and documents 

conflict with the Defendants’ affidavits,” the court “must 

construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”

Id.

In reviewing a challenge to personal jurisdiction, the 

court must undertake a two-part analysis. The court must 

evaluate its jurisdiction under the state long-arm statute and 

then determine whether jurisdiction comports with the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cable/Home

Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855-56 

(llth Cir. 1990). In Alabama, the limits of long-arm 

jurisdiction are coextensive with due process under the federal 

constitution; thus, the court need undertake only one analysis. 

Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Civ. P.;9 Frye v. Smith, 67 So. 3d 882, 892

(Ala. 2011); see also Clark v. Deal, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

 9 Alabama’s long-arm statute provides, in part:

An appropriate basis exists for service of 

process outside of this state upon a person or 

entity in any action in this state when the 

person or entity has such contacts with this 

state that the prosecution of the action against 

the person or entity in this state is not 

inconsistent with the constitution of this state 

or the Constitution of the United States. . . . 

Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(b) (Effective August 1, 2004).

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26420, 2009 WL 902533, *2 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2009). 

The due process inquiry has two requirements. The 

defendant must have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum 

State. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 

310, 316 (1945). In addition, the exercise of jurisdiction over 

the defendant must not offend “traditional notions of fair play 

and substantial justice.” Id. 

There are two types of personal jurisdiction: “general” and 

“specific.” There is general personal jurisdiction over a party 

when “the cause of action does not arise out of . . . the 

[party’s] activities in the forum State,” but there are 

“continuous and systematic” contacts between the two. 

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 

414-15 (1984). Specific jurisdiction is based on the party’s 

contacts with the forum State that are related to the cause of 

action. Id. at 414 n.8. 

In this case, there is no allegation that Defendants have 

had general contacts with Alabama unrelated to this lawsuit. 

Thus, the only issue is whether asserting specific personal

jurisdiction over these Defendants comports with due process.

For specific personal jurisdiction, the contacts at issue 

must satisfy the “minimum contacts” test. “Minimum contacts”

involve three criteria: First, the contacts must be related to 

the plaintiff’s cause of action or have given rise to it. 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 19 of 53
20

Second, the contacts must involve some purposeful availment of 

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum, thereby 

invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Finally, the 

defendant’s contacts within the forum state must be such that 

“[it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 

there.” Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 

631 (llth Cir. 1996)(citations omitted). 

The minimum contacts analysis is related to the requirement 

of the Due Process Clause that “individuals have fair warning 

that a particular activity may subject [them] to the 

jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (internal quotation marks

omitted). This is because a defendant who has “purposefully 

directed his activities at residents in the forum,” such that 

“litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or 

relate to those activities,” can expect to be liable to suit in 

that forum. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 

924 (2011) (the court must determine whether the defendant 

engaged in some act by which the defendant “purposefully 

avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities 

within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws.”).

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 20 of 53
21

B. Analysis

Plaintiff filed suit in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, 

Alabama, against the AVA Affiliates Defendants and the Nominal 

Defendants on August 9, 2016. (Doc. 1-2). Plaintiff asserts 

claims against the AVA Affiliates (along with Defendants American 

Vascular and Dees) for conspiracy (Count Six) and intentional 

interference with contractual and business relations (AVA 

Affiliates only) (Counts Seven and Eight). (Doc. 1-2 at 15-19). 

Plaintiff asserts no claims against the Nominal Defendants. 

(Id.). 

Specifically, in Count Six of the complaint, Plaintiff 

alleges that the Defendant AVA Affiliates are managed and 

controlled by Defendant Janet Dees; that Defendant American 

Vascular is managed and controlled by Defendant Janet Dees; that 

Dees’ knowledge of Plaintiff’s rights pursuant to the December 

30, 2009, incentive agreement is imputed to the AVA Affiliates; 

and that the AVA Affiliates conspired with Defendants Dees and 

American Vascular to “fraudulently misrepresent and/or suppress 

the existence of joint ventures and business opportunities in 

which Plaintiff was contractually entitled to purchase up to a 

10% interest.” (Doc. 1-2 at 15-16). In addition, in Counts 

Seven and Eight, Plaintiff alleges that the “December 30, 2009

incentive agreement constitutes a valid contractual relationship 

between the Plaintiff and Defendant [American Vascular];” that 

the AVA Affiliates are not parties to the contractual and 

business relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant American 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 21 of 53
22

Vascular; that Janet Dees manages and controls the AVA Affiliates 

and Defendant American Vascular; that Dees’ knowledge of 

Plaintiff’s business relationship with American Vascular and 

Plaintiff’s rights pursuant to the December 30, 2009, incentive 

agreement are imputed to the AVA Affiliates; and that the AVA 

Affiliates “intentionally interfered [“for an improper purpose”] 

with this contract by doing business and entering into contracts 

and other business arrangements with third-parties, despite 

having knowledge that the Defendants had breached the December 

30, 2009 incentive agreement and that every contract entered into 

by an AVA Subsidiary violated the terms of the December 30, 2009 

agreement.” (Doc. 1-2 at 16-19). 

The AVA Affiliates and the Nominal Defendants maintain that 

the Court lacks both general and specific personal jurisdiction 

over them and that Plaintiff’s action against them is, therefore, 

due to be dismissed. In support of their Motion to Dismiss, 

Defendants submit the affidavit of Defendant Dees, in which she 

attests that the AVA Affiliates Defendants (which include AVA 

Sarasota Holdings, LLC; AVA Newnan Holdings, LLC; AVA Columbus 

Holdings, LLC; AVA Douglas Holdings, LLC; AVA Saint Louis 

Holdings, LLC; AVA Valley Holdings LLC; and AVA Duval Holdings, 

LLC) are all Florida limited liability companies whose members 

are citizens of either Florida, Ohio, Missouri, or New York.10 

 10 Defendant Dees attested that she is a citizen of the State of 

Florida, and American Vascular is a Florida limited liability 

company whose members are all citizens of the State of Florida. 

(Doc. 3-1 at 2). 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 22 of 53
23

(Doc. 3-1 at 3). According to Dees, none of the AVA Affiliates 

Defendants is an Alabama limited liability company, nor are any 

of their members citizens of the State of Alabama. (Id.). Dees 

further attests that none of the Nominal Defendants is an Alabama 

limited liability company, nor are any of their members citizens 

of the State of Alabama. (Id. at 5-6). Dees attests that 

neither the Nominal Defendants nor the AVA Affiliates has any 

connection with the State of Alabama or the Purchase Agreement at 

issue, and none of these Defendants is registered to do business 

in Alabama. (Id. at 6). In other words, the AVA Affiliates and 

the Nominal Defendants have no contacts whatsoever with the State 

of Alabama.

Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ evidence but responds 

that the Court can still assert specific personal jurisdiction 

over these defendants,11 despite the lack of any contacts with the 

State of Alabama, based on two theories: (1) the conspiracy 

theory of personal jurisdiction; and (2) the intentional tort 

theory of jurisdiction.12 (Doc. 11 at 6-10). The Court 

disagrees.

 11 The Court rejects Plaintiff’s alternative argument that it is 

not required to establish personal jurisdiction over the 

“Nominal” Defendants in this case. (Doc. 11 at 5 n.4). 

Plaintiff has cited no binding authority which would support 

that argument, and the Court’s research has revealed no such 

authority.

12 The Court notes that Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant 

Janet Dees, over whom the Court does have personal jurisdiction, 

is the mere “alter ego” of these Defendants based on her 

membership in and/or management of these Defendants. (Doc. 11). 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 23 of 53
24

First, with respect to the conspiracy theory of personal 

jurisdiction, Plaintiff cites Bowman v. Hodge Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82950, *17, 2016 WL 3483170, *6 (N.D. Ala. 

June 27, 2016), in which the court discussed the conspiracy

theory of personal jurisdiction, explaining:

“Alabama courts have recognized that, in an 

appropriate case, specific jurisdiction can 

be based upon the purposeful conspiratorial 

activity of a nonresident defendant aimed at 

an Alabama plaintiff.” Ex parte Alamo Title 

Co., 128 So. 3d 700, 713 (Ala. 2013) (citing 

Ex prate Reindel, 963 So. 2d 614, 622-24 

(Ala. 2007) and Ex parte Barton, 976 So. 2d 

438, 443-44 (Ala. 2007)). To establish 

personal jurisdiction under a conspiracy 

theory, “the plaintiff must plead with 

particularity ‘the conspiracy as well as the 

overt acts within the forum taken in 

furtherance of the conspiracy.’” Id.

(quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 

806-07 (Ala. 2001)) (some quotation marks 

omitted). The elements of civil conspiracy 

in Alabama are: (1) concerted action by two 

or more persons (2) to achieve an unlawful 

purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful 

means. Luck v. Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., 

Inc., 763 So. 2d 243, 247 (Ala. 2000). 

Although “the conspiracy averments . . .

must exceed “bald speculation” and mere 

conclusory assertions, the burden is not 

heavy, especially “[w]hen determination of 

the jurisdictional facts is intertwined with 

and may be dispositive of the questions of 

ultimate liability.” Ex parte Reindel, 963 

F.3d 614, 623 (Ala. 2007) (quoting 

McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. at 513, 

530 (D. Md. 1977)).

Bowman, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82950 at *17, 2016 WL 3483170 at

*6.

With respect to this theory of personal jurisdiction, the 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 24 of 53
25

Court need go no further than Plaintiff’s allegations regarding 

the “overt acts” of the conspiracy taken within the forum to 

dispose of this argument. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendants Dees, American Vascular, and the AVA Affiliates 

conspired to fraudulently misrepresent and/or suppress the 

existence of future business opportunities by American Vascular 

in which Plaintiff was contractually entitled to purchase a 10% 

interest. (Doc. 1-2 at 15-16). According to Plaintiff, future 

business opportunities arose after December 30, 2009, those 

being, the formation of the AVA entities named herein as 

Defendants (i.e., the AVA Affiliates and the Nominal Defendants). 

(Id. at 7-9). Plaintiff alleges that Dees, American Vascular, 

and the AVA Affiliates conspired to defraud about the investment 

opportunities that arose in forming the AVA entities. (Id. at 6-

7, 15-16). 

The problem for Plaintiff lies in the timing of the overt 

acts of the conspiracy that occurred in Alabama. According to 

Plaintiff, the overt acts by Dees and American Vascular (which 

Plaintiff seeks to impute to the AVA Affiliates) occurred on or 

before December 30, 2009, when Dees and American Vascular 

contacted Plaintiff and its member doctors in Alabama to 

negotiate the purchase of the interventional nephrology practice 

in Mobile, Alabama, on which the December 30, 2009, Purchase 

Agreement was based. (Id. at 6-7). In other words, the overt 

acts alleged to have taken place within the forum in furtherance 

of the conspiracy occurred before the AVA Affiliates Defendants 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 25 of 53
26

allegedly entered the conspiracy. Indeed, the overt acts alleged 

to have taken place in Alabama occurred before these Defendants 

even existed. Thus, those overt acts cannot be imputed to the 

AVA Affiliates for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction

over them.13

Second, with respect to the intentional tort theory of 

personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff again cites Bowman, wherein the 

court exercised personal jurisdiction over a bank based on 

allegations that the bank had intentionally interfered with the 

plaintiff’s business relations with other defendants to cut 

plaintiff out of a commission on the sale of the bank’s airplane. 

In Bowman, the plaintiff alleged that he contacted the bank to 

discuss the sale of its aircraft, that the bank knew of his 

broker contract with the potential buyer, that the bank went 

around him to sell the aircraft directly to the buyer, thus 

“target[ing]” him in the forum. Bowman, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

82950 at *17, 2016 WL 3483170 at *7. The court found that the 

bank’s intentional conduct outside the forum “was calculated to 

cause injury to the plaintiff in the forum,” and, thus, the bank 

“c[ould] not claim to be surprised at being haled into court in 

the forum.” Id., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82950 at *17, 2016 WL 

3483170 at *6-7. 

Defendants argue, however, that those contacts do not exist 

 13 Plaintiff does not allege that the Nominal Defendants were 

involved in the alleged conspiracy. Thus, Plaintiff’s attempt 

to establish personal jurisdiction over the Nominal Defendants 

based on this theory is unavailing for this reason as well. 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 26 of 53
27

in the present case and, further, that the mere allegation of an 

intentional tort that causes injury within a forum is 

insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over an out-ofstate defendant. The Court agrees. 

In Walden v. Fiore, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123, 188 

L. Ed. 2d 12 (2014), the Supreme Court expressly held that a 

“forum State’s exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state 

intentional tortfeasor must be based on intentional conduct by 

the defendant that creates the necessary contacts with the 

forum.” The Walden case involved a defendant/federal agent who 

searched and seized cash from plaintiffs while at an airport in 

Georgia. The plaintiffs sued the defendant in Nevada, despite 

the fact that the defendant had never traveled to, conducted 

activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or 

anyone to Nevada. In reversing the Ninth Circuit’s holding that 

the federal district court in Nevada could exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over the Georgia defendant, the Supreme Court 

discussed its earlier decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 

(1984), a case relied upon by Plaintiff here. The Court 

explained: 

[O]ur “minimum contacts” analysis looks to 

the defendant’s contacts with the forum 

State itself, not the defendant’s contacts 

with persons who reside there. See, e.g., 

International Shoe, supra, at 319, 66 S. Ct. 

154 (Due process “does not contemplate that 

a state may make binding a judgment in 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 27 of 53
28

personam against an individual . . . with 

which the state has no contacts, ties, or 

relations”); Hanson, supra, at 251, 78 S.

Ct. 1228 (“However minimal the burden of 

defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant 

may not be called upon to do so unless he 

has had the ‘minimal contacts’ with that 

State that are a prerequisite to its 

exercise of power over him”). Accordingly, 

we have upheld the assertion of jurisdiction 

over defendants who have purposefully 

“reach[ed] out beyond” their State and into 

another by, for example, entering a 

contractual relationship that “envisioned 

continuing and wide-reaching contacts” in 

the forum State, Burger King, supra, at 479–

480, 105 S. Ct. 2174, or by circulating 

magazines to “deliberately exploi[t]” a 

market in the forum State, Keeton, supra, at 

781, 104 S. Ct. 1473. And although physical 

presence in the forum is not a prerequisite 

to jurisdiction, Burger King, supra, at 476, 

105 S. Ct. 2174, physical entry into the 

State — either by the defendant in person or 

through an agent, goods, mail, or some other 

means — is certainly a relevant contact. 

See, e.g., Keeton, supra, at 773–774, 104 S.

Ct. 1473.

But the plaintiff cannot be the only link 

between the defendant and the forum. Rather, 

it is the defendant’s conduct that must form 

the necessary connection with the forum 

State that is the basis for its jurisdiction 

over him. See Burger King, supra, at 478, 

105 S. Ct. 2174 (“If the question is whether 

an individual’s contract with an out-ofstate party alone can automatically 

establish sufficient minimum contacts in the 

other party’s home forum, we believe the 

answer clearly is that it cannot”); Kulko v. 

Superior Court of Cal., City and County of 

San Francisco, 436 U.S. 84, 93, 98 S. Ct. 

1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978) (declining to 

“find personal jurisdiction in a State . . . 

merely because [the plaintiff in a child 

support action] was residing there”). To be 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 28 of 53
29

sure, a defendant’s contacts with the forum 

State may be intertwined with his 

transactions or interactions with the 

plaintiff or other parties. But a 

defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or 

third party, standing alone, is an 

insufficient basis for jurisdiction. See

Rush, supra, at 332, 100 S. Ct. 571 

(“Naturally, the parties’ relationships with 

each other may be significant in evaluating 

their ties to the forum. The requirements of 

International Shoe, however, must be met as 

to each defendant over whom a state court 

exercises jurisdiction”). Due process 

requires that a defendant be haled into 

court in a forum State based on his own 

affiliation with the State, not based on the 

“random, fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts 

he makes by interacting with other persons 

affiliated with the State. Burger King, 471 

U.S., at 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

These same principles apply when intentional 

torts are involved. In that context, it is 

likewise insufficient to rely on a 

defendant’s “random, fortuitous, or 

attenuated contacts” or on the “unilateral 

activity” of a plaintiff. Ibid. (same). A 

forum State’s exercise of jurisdiction over 

an out-of-state intentional tortfeasor must 

be based on intentional conduct by the 

defendant that creates the necessary 

contacts with the forum.

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S. Ct. 

1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, illustrates the 

application of these principles. In Calder, 

a California actress brought a libel suit in 

California state court against a reporter 

and an editor, both of whom worked for the 

National Enquirer at its headquarters in 

Florida. The plaintiff’s libel claims were 

based on an article written and edited by 

the defendants in Florida for publication in 

the National Enquirer, a national weekly 

newspaper with a California circulation of 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 29 of 53
30

roughly 600,000.

We held that California’s assertion of 

jurisdiction over the defendants was 

consistent with due process. Although we 

recognized that the defendants’ activities 

“focus[ed]” on the plaintiff, our 

jurisdictional inquiry “focuse[d] on ‘the 

relationship among the defendant, the forum, 

and the litigation.’” Id., at 788, 104 S.

Ct. 1482 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S., at 204, 

97 S. Ct. 2569). Specifically, we examined 

the various contacts the defendants had 

created with California (and not just with 

the plaintiff) by writing the allegedly 

libelous story.

We found those forum contacts to be ample: 

The defendants relied on phone calls to 

“California sources” for the information in 

their article; they wrote the story about 

the plaintiff’s activities in California; 

they caused reputational injury in 

California by writing an allegedly libelous 

article that was widely circulated in the 

State; and the “brunt” of that injury was 

suffered by the plaintiff in that State. 465 

U.S., at 788–789, 104 S. Ct. 1482. “In sum, 

California [wa]s the focal point both of the 

story and of the harm suffered.” Id., at 

789, 104 S. Ct. 1482. Jurisdiction over the 

defendants was “therefore proper in 

California based on the ‘effects’ of their 

Florida conduct in California.” Ibid. . . .

Applying the foregoing principles, we 

conclude that petitioner lacks the “minimal 

contacts” with Nevada that are a 

prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction 

over him. Hanson, 357 U.S., at 251, 78 S.

Ct. 1228. It is undisputed that no part of 

petitioner’s course of conduct occurred in 

Nevada. Petitioner approached, questioned, 

and searched respondents, and seized the 

cash at issue, in the Atlanta airport. It is 

alleged that petitioner later helped draft a 

“false probable cause affidavit” in Georgia 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 30 of 53
31

and forwarded that affidavit to a United 

States Attorney’s Office in Georgia to 

support a potential action for forfeiture of 

the seized funds. 688 F.3d, at 563. 

Petitioner never traveled to, conducted 

activities within, contacted anyone in, or 

sent anything or anyone to Nevada. In short, 

when viewed through the proper lens —

whether the defendant’s actions connect him 

to the forum — petitioner formed no 

jurisdictionally relevant contacts with 

Nevada. . . . 

Relying on Calder, respondents emphasize 

that they suffered the “injury” caused by 

petitioner’s allegedly tortious conduct 

(i.e., the delayed return of their gambling 

funds) while they were residing in the 

forum. . . . This emphasis is likewise 

misplaced. As previously noted, Calder made 

clear that mere injury to a forum resident 

is not a sufficient connection to the forum. 

Regardless of where a plaintiff lives or 

works, an injury is jurisdictionally 

relevant only insofar as it shows that the 

defendant has formed a contact with the 

forum State. The proper question is not 

where the plaintiff experienced a particular 

injury or effect but whether the defendant’s 

conduct connects him to the forum in a 

meaningful way.

Walden, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. at 1122-25. See also Murphy v. 

Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94251 * 34, 2015 

WL 4379834, *11 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2015)(“[u]nlike the 

defendants in Calder, it has neither been alleged nor shown that 

the defendants took any particular, meaningful actions in 

California. That Plaintiff lives here, and suffered alleged 

financial harm here, is not a basis for personal jurisdiction 

over the moving defendants.”).

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 31 of 53
32

Applying the foregoing authorities to the present case, 

Plaintiff’s allegations of injury alone do not evince a 

connection between the AVA Affiliates and Alabama and, thus, are 

insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over these

Defendants, who admittedly have no contacts with the State of 

Alabama other than Plaintiff’s allegations that they 

intentionally caused injury to Plaintiff in the State of 

Alabama.14 Accordingly, this theory of personal jurisdiction 

fails.

For the foregoing reasons, the AVA Affiliates and the 

Nominal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction (Doc. 3) is due to be granted. 

V. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

As set forth above, Defendants American Vascular and Janet 

Dees have filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

(Doc. 4 at 1). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds 

that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted in part 

and denied in part.

 14 As previously noted, Plaintiff does not allege that the Nominal 

Defendants were involved in any intentional wrongful conduct. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s attempt to establish personal jurisdiction 

over the Nominal Defendants on this theory is unavailing for 

this reason as well.

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33

A. Standard of Review

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. “The 

standard of review for a motion to dismiss is the same for the 

appellate court as it [is] for the trial court.” Stephens v. 

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir.

1990). “When considering a motion to dismiss, all facts set 

forth in the plaintiff’s complaint ‘are to be accepted as true 

and the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and 

exhibits attached thereto.” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 

F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting GSW, Inc. v. Long 

County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993)). All “reasonable 

inferences” are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. St. George v. 

Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim, the complaint “does not need detailed factual 

allegations”; however, the “plaintiff’s obligation to provide 

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level . . ., on the assumption that all the 

allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 33 of 53
34

fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(internal citations omitted). The plaintiff must plead “enough 

facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 

570. Unless a plaintiff has “nudged [his] claims across the 

line from conceivable to plausible,” the complaint “must be 

dismissed.” Id.

“[U]unsupported conclusions of law or of mixed fact and 

law” will not defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for dismissal. 

Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th 

Cir. 2001)). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the 

court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the 

complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’ — that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 679 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The U.S. 

Supreme Court has suggested that courts adopt a “two-pronged 

approach” when considering motions to dismiss: “1) eliminate any 

allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; 

and 2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, ‘assume 

their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give 

rise to an entitlement to relief.’” American Dental Ass’n v. 

Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664). Importantly, “courts may infer from 

the factual allegations in the complaint ‘obvious alternative 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 34 of 53
35

explanation[s],’ which suggest lawful conduct rather than the 

unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” 

Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682).

B. Analysis

As discussed above, Defendants American Vascular and Dees 

have filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to 

Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract (Count One); Fraud 

(Counts Two, Three, Four and Five); Conspiracy (Count Six); and 

Intentional Interference with Contractual and Business Relations 

(Counts Seven and Eight). The Court will address each of those 

claims in turn. 

1. Breach of Contract (Count One)

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants American 

Vascular and Janet Dees entered into a contract with Plaintiff

Vascular Ventures, LLC, on December 30, 2009; that Vascular 

Ventures fulfilled it obligations under the agreement; that 

American Vascular and Dees breached their contractual obligations 

to offer Vascular Ventures and its doctors an option of 

purchasing a 10% stake in their future ventures; and that 

Vascular Ventures has been damaged by American Vascular’s and 

Dees’ breaches. (Doc. 1-2 at 10-11). More precisely, Plaintiff 

alleges in the complaint that, in 2009, Defendants American 

Vascular and Dees negotiated with Vascular Ventures to buy an 

interventional nephrology practice in Mobile, Alabama. (Id. at 

6). As a material inducement to the purchase, Defendants Dees 

and American Vascular promised Vascular Ventures that any future 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 35 of 53
36

joint business venture involving Defendant American Vascular 

would be presented to Plaintiff Vascular Ventures for investment. 

(Id. at 6-7). This proposed agreement was discussed in a March 

11, 2009, Letter of Intent from Dees and American Vascular and 

was ultimately agreed upon in a letter dated December 30, 2009

(referred to by Plaintiff as the “Side Letter agreement.”). (Id.

at 7). Plaintiff alleges:

35. To complete the negotiated deal, by letter 

dated December 30, 2009 and addressed to the

Plaintiff-Mobile resident, Defendant Janet R.

Dees promised/contracted: 

“As additional incentive to Vascular 

Ventures or its physician members, American 

Vascular (AVA) will reserve a minimum of up 

to 10% of AVA’s portion of any future joint

venture or business opportunity that may

arise out of AVA’s general course of 

business, for Vascular Ventures doctors to 

invest. Vascular Ventures and its physicians 

will be offered the same terms and 

conditions as other investors and may elect

or be offered additional ownership beyond

10%, but will always be offered at least

10% of AVA’s position.”

(Id.). According to Plaintiff, pursuant to this December 30, 

2009, agreement, the nine physicians (who formed Plaintiff 

Vascular Ventures LLC on that same date) sold a 40% interest in 

Mobile Vascular Labs, LLC, to AVA Mobile Holdings, LLC, an 

affiliate of Defendant American Vascular.15 (Id.). However, 

 15 Plaintiff explains that, in anticipation of closing the deal 

with American Vascular on its purchase of 40% of the outpatient

lab-based interventional nephrology practice in Mobile, Alabama, 

the parties all created new LLC’s. (Doc. 13 at 3-6). The 

lab/nephrology practice became an entity known as Mobile 

(Continued)

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 36 of 53
37

when Dees and American Vascular subsequently formed future 

vascular entities (those entities being the AVA Affiliates and 

Nominal Defendants in this case), they breached their agreement

to offer Vascular Ventures or its doctors/members a chance to 

buy into the ventures. (Id. at 7-10).

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants Dees and American 

Vascular argue that the Purchase Agreement entered on December 

30, 2009 (Doc. 1-1 at 9) does not include the Side Letter 

agreement contained in the letter written by Dees on December 

30, 2009; that the Purchase Agreement contains a merger and 

integration clause prohibiting reference to the Side Letter 

agreement; and that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim

for breach of contract upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 

4 at 7). 

Plaintiff Vascular Ventures counters that its breach of 

contract claim is based on two agreements: (1) the Side Letter 

agreement, which is a “stand alone” contract between Plaintiff 

Vascular Ventures and Defendants Dees and American Vascular, and 

(2) the Side Letter agreement incorporated as an “ancillary 

agreement” into the Purchase Agreement.16 (Doc. 13 at 12-15). 

 

Vascular Labs, LLC (“MVL”), a non-party to this action; the 

doctors/sellers formed an entity known as Vascular Ventures, LLC 

(the plaintiff here), which was conveyed a 60% interest in MVL; 

and Defendant American Vascular formed an entity known as AVA 

Mobile Holdings, LLC (“MVAMH”), a non-party to this action, 

which was conveyed a 40% interest in MVL. (Id. at 5-6). 

16 “Ancillary agreements” are defined in the Purchase Agreement as 

(Continued)

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38

As a preliminary matter, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s 

second argument related to the Purchase Agreement. It is 

without dispute in this case that the parties to the December 

30, 2009, Purchase Agreement are nine individual doctors

(“Sellers”) (all non-parties to this case), MVL (“Seller”) (a 

non-party to this case), and AVAMH (“Buyer”) (a non-party to 

this case). (Doc. 1-1 at 10, 28-30). Neither Plaintiff nor any 

Defendant in this case alleges that it is a party or an intended

third-party beneficiary to that Purchase Agreement. Therefore, 

even if the Side Letter agreement were assumed to be a part of 

the Purchase Agreement, there is no party in this lawsuit who 

can enforce it, nor is there any party against whom to enforce 

it. See Russell, 408 So. 2d at 93 (“[a] third person has no 

rights under a contract between others unless the contracting 

parties intend that the third person receive a direct benefit 

enforceable in court. . . . Since it is apparent from the face 

of the contract that Southeastern Medical is not a third party 

beneficiary, Southeastern Medical has no standing to enforce it 

in court.”). 

On the other hand, with respect to Plaintiff’s claim that 

the Side Letter agreement is a stand alone contract between 

Vascular Ventures, Dees, and American Vascular, the Court agrees 

 

“all of the agreements being executed and delivered pursuant to 

this Agreement, including, but not limited to, the Operating 

Agreement. (Doc. 1-1 at 10; Doc. 1-1 at 34).

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39

that Plaintiff has at least stated a claim against these 

Defendants for breach of contract as to this agreement. “In the 

ordinary breach of contract action, the claimant must prove: (1) 

the existence of a valid contract binding the parties in the 

action, (2) his own performance under the contract, (3) the 

defendant’s nonperformance, and (4) damages.” Southern Med. 

Health Sys., Inc. v. Vaughn, 669 So. 2d 98, 99 (Ala. 1995). 

“The basic elements of a contract are an offer and an 

acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent to the essential 

terms of the agreement.” Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth 

Bank, 817 So. 2d 665, 673 (Ala. 2001) (citations omitted).

The Side Letter document shows an executed, binding 

agreement signed by Dees, ostensibly on behalf of American 

Vascular, to reserve a minimum of 10% of American Vascular’s 

future business ventures for investment by Vascular Ventures and 

its doctor members, in exchange for which Plaintiff/its doctor 

members would sell 40% of MVL to American Vascular’s affiliate, 

AVAMH.17 (Doc. 13-8 at 2). While Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff offered no consideration for this agreement, Plaintiff

alleges in the complaint that it negotiated with Defendants to 

have its doctor members sell 40% of their nephrology practice to 

 17 Plaintiff points out that, on the morning of closing on the 

subject Purchase Agreement on December 30, 2009, American 

Vascular’s attorney confirmed the Side Letter agreement by 

email, stating: “You have previously received the executed side 

letter. When we have received copies of your clients

signature pages, we will send the wired proceeds to your trust

account.” (Doc. 13-9 at 1). 

Case 1:16-cv-00481-KD-B Document 28 Filed 12/07/16 Page 39 of 53
40

American Vascular’s affiliate, AVAMH. (Doc. 1-2 at 6-7). The 

Court finds that the allegation that Plaintiff caused its 

members to sell a portion of their practice to Defendants’ 

affiliate constitutes sufficient consideration for the promises 

made directly to Plaintiff by Defendants. 

Plaintiff further alleges that it performed its obligations 

under the agreement; that Defendants breached their obligations 

under the agreement by failing to offer Plaintiff and its member 

doctors the opportunity to invest in their future ventures; and 

that Plaintiff was damaged thereby. (Doc. 1-2 at 6-11). 

Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the elements of a breach of 

contract claim in Alabama based on the Side Letter agreement. 

The Court rejects Defendant Dees’ argument that her Motion 

to Dismiss should be granted because she signed the Side Letter 

agreement only on behalf of American Vascular. The document 

itself is unclear as to the precise capacity in which Dees was 

signing and, thus, that issue will be have to be resolved at a 

later stage of this litigation. For now, Plaintiff’s 

allegations are sufficient to state a claim for breach of the 

Side Letter agreement by both Defendant Dees and Defendant 

American Vascular. 

Accordingly, Defendants Dees and American Vascular’s Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim (Count One) 

based on the December 30, 2009, Purchase Agreement is due to be 

granted, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of 

contract claim based on the stand alone Side Letter agreement is 

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41

due to be denied.

2. Fraud (Counts Two-Five)

In the motion to dismiss and accompanying brief, Defendants 

move to dismiss Plaintiff’s fraud claims (Counts Two-Five) for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 

4 at 8-15). Because Plaintiff alleges fraud, the substantive 

allegations in the complaint must comply not only with the 

plausibility criteria articulated in Twombly and Iqbal, but also 

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s heightened pleading 

standard. See Harris v. Hancock Bank, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

40834, *8, 2011 WL 1435500, *2 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 14, 2011)

(“Substantive fraud allegations ‘must comply not only with the 

plausibility criteria articulated in Twombly and Iqbal but also 

with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard, which 

requires that in alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state 

with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or 

mistake.”). 

Rule 9(b) requires that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a 

party must state with particularity the circumstances 

constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Under 

Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must allege: “(1) the precise statements, 

documents, or misrepresentations made; (2) the time, place, and 

person responsible for the statement; (3) the content and manner 

in which these statements misled the Plaintiffs; and (4) what 

the defendants gained by the alleged fraud.” Ambrosia Coal & 

Const. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 

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42

2007) (citing Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 

116 F.3d 1364, 1380–81 (11th Cir. 1997)). 

“Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard may be applied 

less stringently . . . when specific ‘factual information [about 

the fraud] is peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge or 

control.’” Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 

27956, *10, 2003 WL 22019936, *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) 

(citations omitted). In addition, allegations of intent or 

knowledge “need only give rise to a strong inference that the 

defendants possessed the requisite fraudulent intent.” Lawrence 

Holdings, Inc. v. ASA Int’l, Ltd., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

154246, *29, 2014 WL 5502464, *12 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 

2014)(citations omitted). “[C]onditions of a person’s mind, 

such as intent or knowledge, may be alleged generally.” Id.

(citations omitted).

The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s fraud claims in the 

present case. 

a. Negligent/Reckless Misrepresentation

 (Count Two)

In Count Two of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges 

“Negligent/Reckless Misrepresentation” against Defendant Janet 

Dees and Defendant American Vascular, stating: “[o]n or around 

December 30, 2009, Defendants Janet R. Dees and [American 

Vascular] negligently or recklessly made a false representation 

that they would offer Plaintiff Vascular Ventures, LLC and the 

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43

doctors of Plaintiff Vascular Ventures, LLC the option to 

purchase up to a 10% interest in all future joint ventures and 

business opportunities arising out of Defendant [American 

Vascular’s] general course of business;” in reliance on this 

misrepresentation, Plaintiff and its member physicians were 

induced to sell 40% of MVL to American Vascular; Plaintiff’s 

reliance was reasonable as there was no reason to believe that 

Defendants would not fulfill their “promise;” and Plaintiff was 

damaged thereby. (Doc. 1-2 at 11-12) (emphasis added).

The elements of the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation are 

(1) a false representation (2) regarding a material existing

fact, (3) which the plaintiff relies upon, and (4) damages 

proximately caused by the misrepresentation. Smith v. J.H. Berry 

Realty Co., 528 So. 2d 314, 316 (Ala. 1988) (emphasis added).

“[A] promise to perform a future act,” on the other hand, “would 

be a claim of promissory fraud.” Southland Bank v. A & A Drywall 

Supply Co., 21 So. 3d 1196, 1211 (Ala. 2008) (“Any species of 

fraud based on the promise to do something in the future . . .

would be a claim of promissory fraud.”). 

In the present case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dees 

and American Vascular promised that they would offer Plaintiff 

the option of purchasing up to a 10% interest in all future joint 

ventures arising out of American Vascular’s general course of 

business. Clearly, these allegations sound in promissory fraud, 

not misrepresentation of an existing material fact. Indeed, 

Plaintiff concedes in its brief that its claim sounds more in 

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44

promissory fraud than in fraudulent misrepresentation. (Doc. 13 

at 17 n.7). 

Accordingly, Defendants Dees and American Vascular’s Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Negligent/Reckless Misrepresentation 

(Count Two) is due to be granted.

b. Promissory Fraud (Count Three)

In Count Three, Plaintiff expressly alleges a claim for 

“Promissory Fraud” against Defendants Dees and American Vascular, 

restating: “[o]n or around March 11, 2009 and December 30, 2009, 

Defendants Janet R. Dees and [American Vascular] made a false 

representation that they would offer Plaintiff Vascular Ventures, 

LLC and the doctors of Plaintiff Vascular Ventures, LLC the 

option to purchase up to a 10% interest in all future joint 

ventures and business opportunities arising out of Defendant 

[American Vascular’s] general course of business;” “[a]t the time 

the representation was made, Defendants Janet R. Dees and 

[American Vascular] had no intention of providing Plaintiff with 

any option to buy into such future business opportunities;” 

Plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation and its 

members were induced by this representation to sell 40% of MVL to 

American Vascular; there was no reason to believe that Defendants 

would fail to fulfill their promise; and Plaintiff was damaged 

thereby. (Doc. 1-2 at 12-13).

As discussed, these allegations of fraud based on the 

promise to do something in the future clearly sound in promissory 

fraud. When asserting a claim for promissory fraud, “[t]he 

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45

burden is on the plaintiff to prove that when the promise was 

made the defendant intended to deceive.” Southland Bank, 21 So. 

3d at 1212 (citations omitted). “The plaintiff cannot meet his 

burden merely by showing that the alleged promise ultimately was 

not kept; otherwise, any breach of contract would constitute a 

fraud.” Id. (citations omitted). “[I]n order for a promise to 

constitute a fraudulent misrepresentation, there must have been 

at the time the promise was made an intention not to perform, and 

such a promise must have been made with the intent to deceive.” 

Id. (citations omitted). “[A] defendant’s intent to deceive can 

be established through circumstantial evidence that relates to 

events that occurred after the alleged misrepresentations were 

made.” Id. (citing Byrd v. Lamar, 846 So. 2d 334, 343 (Ala.

2002)).

In the present case, Plaintiff alleges that, despite 

Defendants’ promise to offer Plaintiff and its member doctors the 

opportunity to invest up to 10% in “all future joint ventures and 

business opportunities arising out of [American Vascular’s] 

general course of business” (Doc. 1-2 at 12), Defendants Dees and 

American Vascular formed approximately fourteen new businesses, 

i.e., the entities referred to herein as the AVA Affiliates and 

the Nominal Defendants, without including Plaintiff or its member 

doctors as investors in a single venture. (Doc. 1-2 at 7-9). 

Thus, Plaintiff alleges, on approximately fourteen separate

occasions, one of which was only five weeks after the 

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46

agreement/promise was made,18 Defendants Dees and American 

Vascular failed to keep their promise to allow Plaintiff and its 

doctors to invest. Assuming Plaintiff’s allegations are true, a 

jury could infer from these circumstances, including the timing, 

number, and consistency of the breaches, that Defendants did not 

intend to perform this promise at the time that it was made. 

Accordingly, Defendant Dees and American Vascular’s Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s promissory fraud claim (Count Three) is 

due to be denied. 

c. Fraudulent Suppression (Count Four)

In Count Four of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges 

“Fraudulent Suppression” against Dees and American Vascular, 

stating: “[s]tarting December 30, 2009, Defendants Janet R. Dees 

and [American Vascular] had a duty to disclose all future joint 

ventures or business opportunities arising out of Defendant 

[American Vascular’s] general course of business;” “[s]ince 

December 30, 2009, Defendants Janet R. Dees and [American 

Vascular] have failed to disclose material facts about future

joint ventures and business opportunities that have arisen out of 

[American Vascular’s] general course of business;” and Plaintiff 

has been damaged thereby. (Doc. 1-2 at 13-14).

When asserting a claim for fraudulent suppression, Plaintiff 

must allege that: “(1)[t]he defendant had a duty to disclose an 

 18 Plaintiff alleges that AVA Newnan Holdings, LLC was formed on 

or about February 8, 2010, only five weeks after Defendants 

promised to allow Plaintiff and its member doctors to invest in 

all future ventures. (Doc. 1-2 at 4). 

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existing material fact; (2) the defendant concealed or suppressed 

that material fact; (3) the defendant’s suppression induced the 

plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; and (4) the plaintiff 

suffered actual damage as a proximate result.” Cockrell v. 

Pruitt, 2016 Ala. LEXIS 82, *34, 2016 WL 3551542, *13 (Ala. June 

30, 2016) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff has alleged that, after December 30, 2009, 

Defendants failed to disclose/suppressed the fact that they were 

forming new entities (i.e., the AVA Affiliates and Nominal 

Defendants), ventures in which Plaintiff was entitled to invest 

and about which Defendants had a duty to disclose based on its 

December 30, 2009, agreement with Plaintiff. (Doc. 1-2 at 13). 

However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that, after 

December 30, 2009, Defendants’ suppression induced Plaintiff to 

act or refrain from acting. See Cockrell, 2016 Ala. LEXIS 82, at 

*34, 2016 WL 3551542, at *13.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

fraudulent suppression claim (Count Four) is due to be granted.

d. Fraud in the Inducement (Count Five)

In Count Five of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges “Fraud in 

the Inducement” against Defendants Dees and American Vascular, 

stating: “[o]n or around December 30, 2009, Defendants Janet R. 

Dees and [American Vascular] made a false representation that 

they would offer Plaintiff Vascular Ventures, LLC and the doctors

of Plaintiff Vascular Ventures, LLC the option to purchase up to 

a 10% interest in all future joint ventures and business 

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48

opportunities arising out of Defendant [American Vascular’s] 

general course of business;” [a]t the time the representation was 

made, Defendants Janet R. Dees and [American Vascular] had no 

intention of providing Plaintiff with any option to buy into such 

future business opportunities;” Plaintiff reasonably relied on 

this false representation and was induced to sell 40% of MVL to 

American Vascular; Plaintiff’s reliance was reasonable because 

there was no reason to believe that Defendants would fail to 

fulfill their promise; and Plaintiff was damaged thereby. (Doc. 

1-2 at 14-15).

“Fraud in the inducement consists of one party’s 

misrepresenting a material fact concerning the subject matter of 

the underlying transaction and the other party’s relying on the 

misrepresentation to his, her, or its detriment in executing a 

document or taking a course of action.” Oakwood Mobile Homes, 

Inc. v. Barger, 773 So. 2d 454, 459 (Ala. 2000). With respect to 

Plaintiff’s claim for fraud in the inducement, rather than 

alleging the misrepresentation of a material fact, Plaintiff 

merely restates its allegations that Defendants’ false promise to

Plaintiff that Vascular Ventures and its member doctors would 

have the opportunity to invest up to 10% in American Vascular’s 

future ventures induced Plaintiff/its member doctors to sell 40% 

of MVL to Defendant American Vascular/AVAMH.19 (Doc. 1-2 at 6-7, 

 19 While not material to the Court’s ruling on this claim, the 

Court notes that Plaintiff conflates the names of the “sellers” 

and the “buyer” in this Count. As previously discussed, the 

Purchase Agreement shows, and the parties do not dispute, that 

(Continued)

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14-15). These allegations essentially mirror those contained in 

Plaintiff’s claim for promissory fraud. 

The Alabama Supreme Court has stated that, “[t]he only basis 

upon which one may recover for fraud, where the alleged fraud is 

predicated on a promise to perform or abstain from some act in 

the future . . . is when the evidence shows that, at the time of 

the promises of future action or abstention were made, the 

promisor had no intention of carrying out the promises, but 

rather had a present intent to deceive.” Purcell Co. v. Spriggs 

Enters. Inc., 431 So. 2d 515, 519 (Ala. 1983); see also Robinson 

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 399 So. 2d 288, 290 (Ala. 1981) (“The 

pleader attempts to predicate fraud on a promise which is not a 

representation of a material fact.”).

Having already found that Plaintiff’s fraud allegations 

based on Defendants’ promise of future action sound in promissory

fraud, Defendants Dees and American Vascular’s Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claim for fraud in the inducement (Count Five) is due 

to be granted. 

3. Conspiracy (Count Six)

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, the AVA 

Affiliates, Dees, and American Vascular conspired to fraudulently 

misrepresent and/or suppress the existence of joint ventures and 

business opportunities in which Plaintiff was entitled to 

 

the sellers in the underlying transaction were MVL and the nine 

individual doctors (who formed Plaintiff Vascular Ventures) and 

that the actual buyer was AVAMH. (Doc. 1-1 at 10, 29-30).

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purchase up to a 10% interest and that Plaintiff was damaged 

thereby. (Doc. 1-2 at 15-16). Having already found that the AVA 

Affiliates Defendants are due to be dismissed from this case for 

lack of personal jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to discuss them 

further.20 

Turning now to Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy against 

Defendants Dees and American Vascular, it is well settled that 

“Alabama recognizes civil conspiracy as a substantive tort.” 

Blake v. Bank of Am., N.A., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1214 (M.D. Ala. 

2012) (quoting DGB, LLC v. Hinds, 55 So. 3d 218, 234 (Ala.

2010)). “Civil conspiracy is an agreement between two or more 

people to do something unlawful or something lawful by unlawful 

means. Id. (citing Purcell, 431 So. 2d at 522). “[A] plaintiff 

alleging a conspiracy must have a valid underlying cause of 

action.” Id. (quoting Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 

619 So. 2d 1280 (Ala. 1993)). 

In the present case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dees 

and American Vascular agreed to do something unlawful, i.e., 

commit fraud, in order to prevent Plaintiff from knowing about,

and taking advantage of, investment opportunities that Defendants 

created after December 30, 2009, in which Plaintiff was entitled 

to invest. Plaintiff further alleges that it was damaged by this 

conspiracy. (Doc. 1-2 at 15-16). Based on these allegations, 

 20 Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the AVA 

Affiliates Defendants, all of Plaintiff’s claims against the AVA 

Affiliates Defendants are due to be dismissed.

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51

the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim for civil 

conspiracy. 

Accordingly, Defendants Dees and American Vascular’s motion 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim (Count Six) is due 

to be denied.

4. Intentional Interference with Contractual and 

 Business Relations (Counts Seven and Eight)

Last, Plaintiff alleges that the AVA Affiliates Defendants 

intentionally interfered with its business and contractual 

relations with Defendant American Vascular. (Doc. 1-2 at 16-19). 

Having found that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the 

AVA Affiliates Defendants, Plaintiff’s claims (Counts Seven and 

Eight) are due to be dismissed.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned hereby

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 7) is due to 

be DENIED; that Defendant American Vascular’s Motion to Transfer 

Venue (Doc. 2) is due to be DENIED; that the AVA Affiliates and 

Nominal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction (Doc. 3) is due to be GRANTED; and that Defendants 

Dees and American Vascular’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to 

state a claim (Doc. 4) is due to be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED 

IN PART as follows: 

(Count One) Breach of Contract – Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim based on the 

Purchase Agreement is due to be GRANTED, and Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim based on the

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Side Letter Agreement is due to be DENIED; 

(Count Two) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

negligent/reckless misrepresentation claim is due to be GRANTED;

(Count Three) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

promissory fraud claim (Count Three) is due to be DENIED;

(Count Four) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

fraudulent suppression claim (Count Four) is due to be GRANTED;

(Count Five) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s fraud 

in the inducement claim is due to be GRANTED;

(Count Six) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s civil 

conspiracy claim is due to be DENIED;

(Counts Seven and Eight) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claims for intentional interference with business and 

contractual relations (Counts Seven and Eight) is due to be 

GRANTED.21

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects 

to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

 21 The Court recognizes that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

intentional interference claims was filed by Defendants Dees and 

American Vascular, not by the AVA Affiliates Defendants against 

whom the claims are alleged. However, having found that the 

Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the AVA Affiliates, all 

of Plaintiff’s claims against the AVA Affiliates are due to be 

dismissed, regardless of who filed the motion. 

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written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. GenLR 72(c). The 

parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] 

party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives 

the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order 

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the 

party was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of 

a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for 

plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th 

Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must 

identify the specific finding or recommendation to which 

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An 

objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the 

briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 7th day of December, 2016.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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