Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00372/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00372-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hallie S. Dixon
Defendant
Bruce Keishawn Salter
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRUCE KEISHAWN SALTER *

 * 

Plaintiff, *

 *

vs. * CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00372-KD-B

 *

HALLIE S. DIXON *

 *

Defendant. *

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter, which was referred to the undersigned 

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), is before 

the Court on Defendant Hallie S. Dixon’s Motion to Dismiss and 

accompanying brief in support (Doc. 15, 16), Plaintiff Bruce 

Keishawn Salter’s Response in Opposition (Doc. 21), and 

Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 22). Upon a careful review of the 

motion, briefs, and the applicable case law, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS that the motion be GRANTED, and that this action be 

DISMISSED.

I. Background

Plaintiff Bruce Keishawn Salter (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or 

“Salter”) filed this action against Defendant Hallie S. Dixon 

(hereinafter “Defendant” or “Dixon”) in her official capacity as 

District Attorney of Baldwin County, Alabama. (Doc. 1). 

According to Salter, he reached an immunity agreement with 

Dixon, and Dixon has violated the agreement by filing criminal 

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charges against him in the Circuit Court of Baldwin County. 

Salter seeks an order enjoining the state criminal prosecution, 

and an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, expenses and costs.

In his complaint, Salter alleges that a homicide occurred 

in Fairhope, Alabama on or about January 14, 2013, and that a 

few days later, he reached out to Dixon, through his counsel, 

regarding his knowledge of the homicide. (Id.). Salter further 

alleges that a meeting was conducted which resulted in an 

immunity agreement between him and Dixon, acting on behalf of 

the State of Alabama. According to Salter, he agreed to offer 

knowledge about the homicide in exchange for “immunity and/or 

use immunity”. (Id.). “Under the agreement, Salter agreed to 

proffer his knowledge about the homicide, and Dixon agreed, on 

behalf of the State of Alabama, and in her capacity as District 

Attorney of Baldwin County, to grant Salter immunity/and or use 

immunity, in that Dixon agreed that any truthful information 

given by Salter, or any information derived from his statements 

and information, would not be used against him.” (Id. at 3-4).

After reaching this agreement, Dixon left the meeting, and 

Captain Steve Arthur and Sergeant Michael Gaull of the Baldwin 

County Sheriff’s Department questioned Salter extensively about 

the details of the homicide and examined his phone. (Id. at 4). 

The officers also conducted follow up interviews with Salter. 

Salter contends that based on information he provided, a suspect 

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was apprehended and charged. Later, on June 24, 2013, a warrant 

was issued for Salter’s arrest on capital murder charges. (Id.

at 5) Salter was arrested and a grand jury in the Circuit Court 

of Baldwin County, Alabama returned a six-count indictment 

against him. (Id. at 6). 

In this action, Salter claims that he performed fully and 

completely under the immunity agreement between himself and 

Dixon, and that Dixon has violated the agreement by instituting 

criminal charges against him. (Id.). Salter contends that the 

only basis for the criminal charges against him are the 

statements he made to Dixon under the promise of immunity, and 

that Dixon turned around and used the information to obtain the 

capital murder indictment against him. (Id.). Salter also 

contends that the breach of the immunity agreement deprives him

of his fundamental Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and his due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. (Id. at 7).

As noted supra, pending before the Court is Dixon’s motion 

to dismiss. (Doc. 15). Dixon contends that Salter’s complaint 

should be dismissed because it does not allege the breach of any 

purported agreement, as there is no evidence that any immunized 

statements made by Salter will be used as evidence in his trial 

and the mere act of issuing an indictment against Salter does 

not breach the proffer agreement. (Doc. 15). Dixon further 

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argues that even if Salter had alleged a breach of the

agreement, Salter has failed to set forth facts which 

demonstrate the showing of bad faith necessary to sustain an 

action and come within an exception to the Younger abstention

doctrine. (Id.). According to Dixon, this case does not fall 

under the exception to Younger abstention recognized by the 

Eleventh Circuit in Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 

1982) because Rowe dealt specifically with transactional 

immunity, not the use immunity present in the instant case. 

In Salter’s response in opposition, he contends that he has 

pled sufficient facts to survive dismissal because he has 

alleged the existence of an immunity agreement, his performance 

under the agreement, and the fact that Dixon secured an 

indictment against him using the very information that he 

provided pursuant to the proffer agreement. (Doc. 21). He 

further claims that federal court is his only available avenue

because pursuant to Ex parte Graddick, 501 So.2d 444 (Ala. Crim. 

App. 1978), the Alabama Supreme Court does not recognize 

immunity agreements unless they are signed by both the district 

attorney and the trial court judge. Therefore, he must turn to 

this Court for the protection of his fundamental due process 

rights. (Id.). 

Salter also claims that his case falls within an exception 

to the Younger abstention doctrine because of the presence of 

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exceptional circumstances involving bad faith. Relying on Rowe 

v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524 (llth Cir. 1982), Salter argues that in 

that case, the Eleventh Circuit enjoined a criminal prosecution, 

and made clear that “where state courts fail, for whatever 

reason, to protect fundamental constitutional rights, it is the 

federal court’s obligation to intervene.” (Doc. 21 at 14). 

Salter contends that regardless of whether transactional 

immunity or use immunity is at issue, the Court’s analysis in 

Rowe came down to the defendant’s reasonable expectations, and 

in this case, he had a reasonable expectation that if he gave 

truthful information, the information would not be used to 

prosecute him. He relied on Dixon’s promise, and now she is 

seeking to use the very information that he provided to her to 

prosecute him.

II. Discussion

a. Legal Standard 

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court 

accepts the non-moving party’s allegations as true; however, the 

court is not required to accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 

L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (noting “the tenant that a court must 

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint 

is inapplicable to legal conclusions”). In evaluating the 

sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleadings, the court makes 

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reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, “but [is] not 

required to draw [p]laintiff’s inference.” Aldana v. Del Monte 

Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Similarly, “unwarranted deductions of fact” in a complaint are 

not admitted as true for the purpose of testing the sufficiency 

of plaintiff’s allegations. Id.; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 

1951 (stating conclusory allegations are “not entitled to be 

assumed true”). 

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated that although Rule 8 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require 

detailed factual allegations, it does demand “more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. A complaint must state a plausible 

claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged.” Id. The mere possibility the defendant 

acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 

Id. The well-pled allegations must nudge the claim “across the 

line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). 

The plaintiff is required to give the defendant fair notice of 

the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds on which it rests. See

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 

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2d 1081 (2007)(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 

1955, 1964 (2007)). 

b. Analysis 

Because Salter's state criminal prosecution is ongoing, the 

Supreme Court's decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 

S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971) is controlling. In Younger, 

the Supreme Court held that federal courts "should not act, and 

particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, 

when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not 

suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." Id. at 

43-44. The Younger abstention doctrine is premised upon a 

fundamental "public policy against federal interference with 

state criminal prosecutions." Id. at 43. Exceptions to Younger

are made in only three circumstances: "(1) there is evidence of 

state proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2) irreparable injury 

would occur, or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum 

where the constitutional issues can be raised." Hughes v. 

Attorney Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1263 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004). 

As noted supra, Salter relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s 

decision in Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F. 2d 524 (llth Cir. 1982) to 

argue that this Court should enjoin his state prosecution 

because Dixon is violating his immunity agreement. In Rowe, the 

Eleventh Circuit addressed Younger and observed that:

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“Ordinarily a federal court should refrain from 

interfering with a pending state criminal prosecution, 

either by injunction or declaratory judgment. Younger 

v. Harris, supra; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 

S. Ct. 764, 27 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1971). Equitable 

intervention is appropriate only when there exist 

special circumstances which create a threat of great, 

immediate, and irreparable injury. Kugler v. Helfant, 

421 U.S. 117, 123, 95 S. Ct. 1524, 1530, 44 L. Ed. 

2d 15 (1975); Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 91 S. Ct. at 

751. Prosecutions taken in bad faith or for the 

purpose of harassment fall within this exception. 

Younger, 401 U.S. at 49-54, 91 S. Ct. at 753; 

Fitzgerald v. Peek, 636 F.2d 943, 944 (5th Cir. 1981); 

cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916, 101 S. Ct. 3051, 69 L. Ed. 

2d 420 (1981); Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1381 

(5th Cir. 1979), aff'd after remand, 638 F.2d 801 (5th 

Cir. 1981); Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113, 119-22 

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024, 93 S. Ct. 

467, 34 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1972).

Id. at 525-526. 

Rowe involved a situation in which the State of Alabama 

charged a former cooperator with murder several years after he 

provided cooperation against others involved in the same crime. 

Id. at 525. Among other things, the defendant (1) testified at 

several trials about his involvement in the murder; (2) was 

relocated and provided with a new job and identification by the 

FBI for his protection as a result of his extensive cooperation; 

and (3) the prosecutor on the prior case testified that the 

defendant was offered immunity. Id. The only question before the 

court was whether the admitted agreement extended beyond the 

term of the then-sitting State Attorney General. Id. at 530 n. 

4. The Rowe court found that the defendant had clearly 

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demonstrated an unambiguous agreement not to prosecute at any 

time, that such an agreement had induced the defendant's 

substantial cooperation, and that “in the absence of credible 

evidence that Rowe testified untruthfully or otherwise failed to 

perform his part of the bargain”, his prosecution, after being 

assured of immunity from prosecution by state prosecutors, was a 

per se bad faith prosecution. 

Unlike Rowe, Salter has failed to demonstrate that his case 

falls within one of the Younger exceptions. First, Salter has 

pointed to no facts which suggest the presence of bad faith or 

exceptional circumstances. In his complaint, Salter alleges 

that “Dixon agreed...to grant Salter immunity and/or use 

immunity, in that Dixon agreed that any truthful statement given 

by Salter, or any information derived from his statements and 

information, would not be used against him”. (Doc. 1 ¶ 10). 

Salter further alleges that Dixon “promised that if Salter 

provided truthful statements and information, she would not use 

Salter’s statements against him in order to prosecute him”. 

(Doc. 1 ¶ 33). Additionally, Salter contends that: 

The only substantive evidence available against 

Salter in the ongoing criminal prosecution comes 

directly from his statements to Dixon and the 

investigators, and the information contained therein. 

But for Salter’s immunized statements, the state of 

Alabama would not have sufficient evidence to 

prosecute Salter or any other person for [the 

victim’s] death. 

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(Doc. 1 ¶ 22). The clear import of Salter’s allegations is that 

Dixon agreed that the statements and other information that he 

provided to her would not be used to prosecute him, not that he 

would not be prosecuted1. Thus, unlike the situation in Rowe, in 

this case, there is no evidence of an unambiguous agreement not 

to prosecute. Moreover, there is no evidence that Dixon has in 

fact breached the alleged agreement not to use the information 

that Salter provided. While Salter speculates that Dixon must 

have used the information he provided to secure an indictment 

against him, he has not offered any facts to support his 

assertions. In the absence of such facts, he has failed to make 

a plausible showing of bad faith or exceptional circumstances 

that would warrant an exception to the Younger doctrine.

Likewise, Salter’s assertion that federal court is the only 

avenue available to him to enforce his immunity agreement is 

without merit. According to Salter, in Ex Parte Graddick, 501 

 1 Courts recognize two types of immunity agreements. Transactional 

immunity "accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense 

to which the compelled testimony relates." United States v. 

Harvey, 869 F.2d 1439, 1445 (llth Cir. 1989) (citing Kastigar v. 

United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 1661, 32 L. 

Ed. 2d 212 (1972)). Use immunity prohibits the use of compelled 

testimony, or any evidence derived directly or indirectly from 

that testimony, against the witness in a criminal prosecution. 

In contrast to transactional immunity, use immunity does not 

prohibit the government from prosecuting the witness for crimes 

about which he testified, provided the government proves that it 

has other evidence to support the prosecution that is derived 

from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled 

testimony. Id. at 1445 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 

U.S. 441, 453, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 1661, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972)). 

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So.2d 444, 446 (Ala. 1986), the Alabama Supreme Court held that 

“...in order for an immunity agreement to be valid it must be 

signed by the district attorney and approved by the trial 

judge”. Thus, his agreement would not be recognized by Alabama 

courts, and in fact, his motion to dismiss the indictment based 

on the alleged immunity agreement was rejected by the state 

trial court. Notwithstanding his assertions to the contrary, 

Salter has an adequate remedy at law. A review of the Ex Parte 

Graddick decision reveals that it did not involve nor address a 

federal constitutional claim. Further, there is no question 

that Salter may raise his constitutional claims in his state 

court criminal proceeding at trial, and in any direct and 

collateral appeals he may file if convicted.2

 2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a federal court may 

grant a state prisoner a writ of habeas corpus when his federal 

constitutional claim has been "adjudicated on the merits in 

State court" if the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

[*738] Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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Finally, Salter has not established irreparable harm that 

would warrant intervention. In Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 

123-25, 95 S. Ct. 1524, 44 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1975) 3 , the Supreme 

Court made clear that irreparable injury does not include injury 

which is incidental to every prosecution brought lawfully and in 

good faith. See also Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (“the cost, 

anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single 

criminal prosecution could not, by themselves, be considered 

“irreparable” [injury] in the special legal sense of the 

 3 In Kugler, the Court explained that:

The policy of equitable restraint expressed in 

Younger v. Harris, in short, is founded on the premise 

that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides 

the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for 

vindication of federal constitutional rights. See

Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460, 94 S. Ct. 

1209, 1216, 39 L. Ed. 2d 505. Only if "extraordinary 

circumstances" render the state court incapable of 

fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues 

before it, can there be any relaxation of the 

deference to be accorded to the state criminal 

process. The very nature of "extraordinary 

circumstances," of course, makes it impossible to 

anticipate and define every situation that might 

create a sufficient threat of such great, immediate, 

and irreparable injury as to warrant intervention in 

state criminal proceedings. But whatever else is 

required, such circumstances must be "extraordinary" 

in the sense of creating an extraordinarily pressing 

need for immediate federal equitable relief, not 

merely in the sense of presenting a highly unusual 

factual situation.

421 U.S. at 124-25, 95 S. Ct. at 1530-31

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term.”). Accordingly, the mere fact of a criminal prosecution is 

not sufficient to establish irreparable harm.

III. Conclusion 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that this Court is 

compelled under Younger to abstain from considering the merits 

of Salter’s claims regarding the breach of his alleged immunity 

agreement in his pending criminal case as such claim is not 

cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action at this time. Younger,

401 U.S. at 43-44. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that 

Dixon’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED, and this action be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE4 . See Smith v. Mercer, 266 F. App'x 

906, 908 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting that "[a] 

dismissal pursuant to the Younger doctrine is without prejudice, 

and does not preclude later re-filing of the complaint").

Notice of Right to File Objections 

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects 

 4 In a § 1983 action, a prosecutor has absolute immunity for 

damages for all activities that are "'intimately associated with 

the judicial phase of the criminal process.'" Van de Kamp v. 

Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341, 129 S.Ct. 855, 859, 172 L.Ed.2d 

706 (2009) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 

S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)). That is, a prosecutor 

is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from damages in a 

§ 1983 action for performing her function as an advocate for the 

government. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73, 113 

S.Ct. 2606, 2615, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993); Rehberg v. Paulk, 

-- U.S. --, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1503, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012). 

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to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. GenLR 72(c). The 

parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] 

party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to 

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was 

informed of the time period for objecting and he consequences on 

appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper 

objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain 

error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-

1. In order to be specific, an objection must identify the 

specific finding or specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s 

report and recommendation where the disputed determination is 

found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or 

refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not 

specific. 

ORDERED this 29th day of August, 2016.

 /s/ Sonja F. Bivins *

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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