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Parties Involved:
James Ray Erwin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

JAMES RAY ERWIN, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAY 1 61989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

87-2475 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CR 87-31) 

Stephen P. Mccue, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Paula G. Burnett, Assistant United States Attorney (William L. 

Lutz, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), District of 

New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before* LOGAN and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges, and ANDERSON, District 

Judge. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

* The >Honorable. Aldon J • .Anderson1 Se~Jor ·.United. S..t-ates Dis tr icL 

Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 87-2475 Document: 01019963551 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 1 
Defendant James Ray Erwin was charged with possession of 

_ :;_;;:. ,-.- -~-marijuana .... cwith ·,.i.ntent -·~to a-d.istr-ibu.te::dn,-,viola.tion._of 21 u.s.c. 

§ 84l(a)(l), and with aiding and abetting in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 2. He pleaded guilty to both charges, reserving the 

right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to 

suppress the marijuana seized during his arrest. On appeal, 

defendant ass~rts that (1) the district court erroneously held 

that he lacked standing to challenge the stop and search of a car 

in which he was a passenger, (2) the traffic stop was a pretext to 

conduct an otherwise illegal search for drugs, and (3) his consent 

to the search was involuntarily elicited. we find it necessary 

only to address defendant's first two contentions, and we affirm 

the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. 1 

1 We note that this court originally questioned whether the 

notice of appeal was filed within ten days of the district court's 

judgment as required by Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). On June 11, 1987, 

the district court sentenced defendant to five years followed by a 

special parole term of two years, pending a study of the sentence 

under 18 u.s.c. § 4205(c) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987). 

After a study under§ 4205(c) was conducted, the district court on 

September 23, 1987, affirmed the original sentence. Defendant 

filed a notice of appeal on October 1, 1987, within ten days of 

the resentencing. 

Both the government and defendant argue that the appeal was 

filed timely. We agree. In Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169 

(1963), the Court held that under old 18 u.s.c. § 4208(b), the 

statutory precursor to § 4205(c) which contained virtually identical language, a defendant lawfully could file a notice of 

appeal either after the original sentencing or after the postreview sentencing, provided the filing was within ten days of 

either date. Id. at 174-76. The legislative history of§ 4205(c) 

indicates a congressional intent to preserve § 4208(b) in 

pertinent part. Sees. Rep. No. 369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, and 

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 

1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 335, 344, 351, 357. We see no 

reason why Corey should not control our reading of§ 4205(c). See 

United States v. Meyer, 802 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1986), cert •.. ,, denied, · J.08 s·. ·Ct. 7·1-=-~( 1987.:)· ( f-i-nd-ing Corey's holdi-ng applicabl~ 

to§ 4205(c)). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2475 Document: 01019963551 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 2 
Defendant was a passenger in a station wagon automobile 

·. · c·· .,:.:; ;,dr iven __ .,_,b_y_.,c,~~"co:,·cdefe.ndant;;,rRobert, .. Cle.v.enger,,s.c-ha1⁄4.ccwas., stopped by New 

Mexico State Police Officer Forrest Smith for traveling sixtyseven miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone. While 

requesting Clevenger's drivers' license and registration, Officer 

Smith noticed a strong scent of air freshener and observed that 

Cleveriger was very nervous. Clevenger displayed a valid license 

but was unable to produce the automobile's registration. After 

informing Clevenger that he was going to issue a citation, Smith 

asked Clevenger what he was carrying in the back of the station 

wagon, and Clevenger responded that there were some clothes and 

baby items. Smith then asked if he could take a look, and 

Clevenger acceded • 

. Defendant, who was sleeping in the .back seat, had awakened by 

this time. Both he and Clevenger got out of the vehicle, and 

defendant opened the rear door of the station wagon with a key 

from his pocket. Officer Smith felt some handbags lying in the 

back, and lifted up the edge of a carpet that covered the entire 

rear section of the vehicle. Smith then observed a sheet of glass 

partially covering what appeared to be doors leading to the tire 

well. The doors were sealed shut by four silver screws that did 

not appear congruous with the rest of the car's interior. Smith 

detected the odor of raw marijuana emanating from a crack in the 

doors not covered by the glass. Smith returned to his vehicle and 

radioed for assistance. 

Smith subsequently discovered twelve plastic-wrapped packages 

.,.of -marijuana -in ·bhe.-ti·r-e»-well and-placed Clevenger and ·: defendant 

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Appellate Case: 87-2475 Document: 01019963551 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 3 
under arrest. Both moved the court to suppress the marijuana 

that neither defendant had legitimate expectations of privacy in 

the car sufficient to confer standing to challenge the search. 

The court also found that the stop by Smith was not a pretext to 

conduct an illegal search for drugs and that the defendants had 

consented to the search. 

I 

Defendant Erwin initially argues that the district court 

erred in finding he lacked standing to challenge the stop and 

subsequent search of the car. We believe that standing to 

challenge a stop presents issues separate and distinct from 

standing to challenge a search. Thus, defendant's challenge to 

the stop and search must be examined separately. 2 

A 

The Supreme Court has recognized that questions of "standing" 

to challenge a search and seizure are "more properly subsumed 

under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine." Rakas v. Illinois, 

439 u.s. 128, 139 (1978); see United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 

2 Even if defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of the 

car, if the initial stop was illegal, the seized contraband is 

subject to exclusion under the "fruit of the poison tree" 

doctrine. See,~, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 

(1963); United States v. Hill, 855 F.2d 664, 666 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(evidence found as fruit of an illegal arrest should be excluded); 

United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 1985) 

(illegal Terry stop results in suppression of "fruit of the 

unlawful detention"); United States v. Durant, 730 F.2d 1180, 1182 

(8th Cir.) ("evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal 

stop would be inadmissible under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree 

doctrine"'), certs. denied, 469 U.S. 843, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); 

_.United States _v. Williams, S!l~ F. 2d 210, 214 ( 5th Ci.r. 1979) 

-·--(same), aff 'd en bane, 617 F.2d 1063 (1980). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2475 Document: 01019963551 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 4 
592, 595 (10th Cir. 1988). The proper inquiry is whether a 

--~-'-'o--:;.. •. ,,cha:llenged,;_S.top . ...:and,.. .. sear"ch.;¥iol-ated::,the,']'our.th-;::-Amendment rights· of 

a criminal defendant making the challenge. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 

140. This inquiry requires a determination of whether the Fourth 

Amendment was designed to protect an interest of the defendant 

that was violated by the stop and s~arch. See id. Thus, the 

question presented here is whether a passenger of a vehicle has 

sufficient Fourth Amendment interests to challenge a traffic stop 

of that vehicle. 

We believe the traffic stop in this case implicates an 

interest of defendant that the Fourth Amendment was designed to 

protect. In challenging the stop, defendant is objecting to the 

seizure of his person, and the "Fourth Amendment applies to all 

seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a 

brief detention short of arrest." United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). It is beyond dispute that a 

vehicle's driver may challenge his traffic stop, and we see no 

reason why a person's Fourth Amendment interests in challenging 

his own seizure should be diminished merely because he was a 

passenger, and not the driver, when the stop occurred. Drivers 

and passengers have similar interests in seeing that their persons 

remain free from unreasonable seizure. Accord State v. Eis, 348 

N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1984); see also United States v. Hensley, 

469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985) ("stopping a car and detaining its 

occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment"); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (same). 

-Furthermor:e, - we··- rej·ect anys notion· that a vehicui"ar stop detains 

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Appellate Case: 87-2475 Document: 01019963551 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 5 
\ 

for Fourth Amendment purposes only the driver simply because the 

._passenger:1.c~;may .,be~,f_:r~~.:.:c.ta.~.depar.t .... ;. See ;Be-rkeme:t.;..v. .• ..McCarthy, 46.8 _ 

U.S. 420, 436 (1984) ("It must be acknowledged at the outset that 

a traffic stop significantly curtails the 'freedom of action' of 

the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained 

vehicle •••. Certainly few motorists would feel free either to 

disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a 

traffic stop without being told they might do so.") (citation and 

footnote omitted). Thus, we conclude that defendant may challenge 

the legality of the traffic stop in this case. 

B 

Before discussing the legality of the stop, we first consider 

whether defendant has standing to challenge the subsequent search 

by Officer Smith. Whether defendant can challenge the search 

requires a consideration of two primary factors: whether the 

defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the 

area searched and whether society is prepared to recognize that 

expectation as objectively reasonable. See California v. 

Greenwood, 108 s. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1988); Leary, 846 F.2d at 595; 

United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1988). In 

conducting this analysis, we must remember that Fourth Amendment 

rights are personal and a defendant cannot claim a violation of 

his Fourth Amendment rights based only on the introduction of 

evidence procured through an illegal search and seizure of a third 

person's property or premises. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134; United 

States v. Skowronski, 827 F.2d 1414, 1418 (10th Cir. 1987). We 

. -_,,-·.conclude. that -defendanb--has .,not~-met·h-is ·"burden ·of adducing facts 

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Appellate Case: 87-2475 Document: 01019963551 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 6 
at the suppression hearing indicating that his own rights were 

.·.··,N°io.lated~.bJL the:"':Chal:lenged, .. search .. 1~:c': Icfr., .. cat _. -·l:A·l-7-:-:1.8 (.footnote . 

omitted) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 131 n.l). 

First, defendant does not claim that he ·owned. the marijuana 

or secreted it away in the hidden compartment. Although ownership 

of the item seized is not determinative, it is an important 

consideration in determining the existence and extent of a 

defendant's Fourth Amendment interests. See,~, Rawlings v. 

Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 

448 U.S. 83, 91 & n.6 (1980); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130 n.l, 148. 3 

Defendant, however, contends that since he was charged with a 

possessory crime he must have an interest sufficient to challenge 

the search that uncovered it. This claim of "automatic standing" 

was rejected by the Supreme Court in Salvucci, when the Court 

"decline[d] to use possession of a seized good as a substitute for 

a factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the area search." 448 U.S. at 92. 

Second, defendant, who did not testify at the suppression 

hearing, failed to introduce any evidence to show legitimate 

ownership or possession of the automobile, which might establish a 

legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area searched. 

See Rakas, 349 u.s. at 148-49; Skowronski, 827 F.2d at 1418; 

United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (10th Cir. 1984); 

3 There is no possibility of self-incrimination from admitting 

ownership of seized goods or otherwise testifying to establish an 

expectation of privacy in support of a motion to suppress since 

such testimony may not be admitted as evidence of guilt at trial. 

See Salvucci, 448 U.S •. at 89.'.'.'.:9..0,; Simmons v. United States, 390 

U • S • 3 7 7 , 3 9 4 ( 19 6"8 ) • . . ---

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Appellate Case: 87-2475 Document: 01019963551 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 7 
United States v. Erickson, 732 F.2d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 1984) • 

. J;_",:.Neithe.t.,.,.,.·,def.endant,, .. _nox . ..,,,.~.e-1.e.v.enge,r.:1-~:-owned:' -.the ,"· .. car •. , At best, 

Clevenger's unclear testimony at the hearing4 raises the inference 

4 On direct examination, Clevenger was asked whether he had 

permission to use the station wagon, to which he replied in the 

affirmative. II R. 62. On cross-examination by the government, 

Clevenger testified as follows: 

"Q. Did you tell Officer Smith that, after he asked you 

who owned the car, [sic] told him that it was 

somebody by the name of Parmet, P-A-R-M-E-T? 

A. No, I didn't say that. 

Q. Who did own the car? 

A. I don't know who owns the car. 

Q. How did you get the key to the car? 

A. It was loaned to us. 

Q. By whom? 

A. By Mr. Erwin [defendant]. 

Q. You got the key from whom? 

A. From my friend Jim Erwin. 

Q. And when did you get the car? 

A. I don't know that either, the exact time. 

Q. What day? 

A. That, I can't answer either. 

Q. Was it on January 11? 

A. I don't know. 

Q. Where did you get the car? 

A. I don't know. I didn't receive it. I don't have 

that information. 

o~ Where was it you first got in the car, Mr. · ,Cleven<jt!r? · Continued to next page 

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Appellate Case: 87-2475 Document: 01019963551 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 8 
that he obtained possession or control of the vehicle from 

,~.-.;:~, .. ,,.~.~.,. ;;.,de,fendan-t .. -~,,.,,,Bu,b0,•the·r.e,.-wa-s,,,no ev-..i·cle-n-ce~--ooncer·ning,-where or from 

whom defendant obtained the vehicle or whether his apparent 

possession was lawful. The mere fact that defendant apparently 

transferred control of the vehicle to Clevenger is not sufficient 

to establish defendant's legitimate possession of the car or that 

he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. 

Finally, defendant stresses that he produced the rear door 

key for Smith, the investigating officer. Defendant's assertion, 

even if true, does not alter the fact that he failed to establish 

legitimate possession of the car. See,~, United States v. 

Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47, 64 (2d Cir. 1980) (mere possession of keys 

did not confer privacy interest where neither ownership of car nor 

permission from.owner shown). At the most, possession of the key 

indicates that defendant carried the key to the rear door. In the 

absence of other evidence, possession of a key does not establish 

a passenger's legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle. We 

hold that defendant failed to establish a legitimate expectation 

of privacy in the automobile, and thus his Fourth Amendment rights 

Continued from previous page 

A. In Phoenix. 

Id. at 66-67. Officer Smith testified on direct examination that 

he had asked Clevenger who owned the car and Clevenger replied 

that it was owned by a friend with a name that sounded like 

"Parmet." Id. at 10. According to the uncontradicted testimony 

of a DEA agent, the vehicle was registered to Leonard Parmet of 

Phoenix. Id. at 57. Before the incident in question, the car was 

sold to Donald Turley of Glendale, Arizona. When asked if Turley 

had mentioned anything about the vehicle being used by or loaned - -to .. defendant or ,- Clevenger, the .. .agenL,-...r.esponded, "Not to my 

knowledge;" Id. at 59. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2475 Document: 01019963551 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 9 
could not have been violated by the search • 

. II.-

Having determined that defendant has sufficient Fourth 

Amendment interests to challenge the stop, but not the subsequent 

search, we now must consider whether the stop was lawful. If it 

was unlawful, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine might 

dictate exclusion of the evidence discovered during the search. 

See ante n.2. Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the 

stop for speeding on the ground that it merely was a pretext to 

conduct an illegal search for drugs. 5 The district court found 

that "the stop was not a pretext • . . it was a legitimate stop at 

67 miles an hour." II R. 79. The court, however, was without the 

benefit of our opinion in United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 

(10th Cir. 1988). In Guzman we held that a stop for the violation 

of a traffic regulation may still violate the Fourth Amendment if, 

under identical circumstances, a reasonable officer would not have 

made the stop but for the existence of an impermissible purpose. 

Id. at 1517. We are unable to determine whether the district 

court in the instant case applied the objective reasonableness 

standard of Guzman to find no pretext, or whether it applied a 

5 Defendant alleges that Smith stopped the car only because the 

circumstances were consistent with a so-called "drug courier 

profile." If this were true, and a reasonable officer would not 

have otherwise stopped the car, the stop would not necessarily be 

illegal. Rather, we would examine whether Smith had a reasonable 

suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that drugs 

were being transported in that particular vehicle. See United 

States v. Sokolow, 57 u.s.L.W. 4401, 4.404 (U.S. AprilJ'; 1989) ("A 

court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion 

must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that 

conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a 

·.,'·profile' ·does· -- net·· somehow- detract from their evidentiary 

significance as seen by a trained agent."). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2475 Document: 01019963551 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 10 
subjective standard based on Smith's testimony. Regardless of 

-_;.;;;.,..,._,.;1..;Ecwhich~.standar.d--it:.appLied.,, .• ,we.,-·:belie.ve;,.,that.·d~over:whelming objective 

evidence" exists in this case to conclude that the stop was 

reasonable. 6 See Smith v. United States, 799 F.2d 704, 710 (11th 

Cir. 1986). In our view, under the circumstances presented here, 

a reasonable New Mexico patrol officer routinely would have 

stopped a vehicle traveling twelve miles over the speed limit even 

in the absence of the alleged illicit motive, and nothing in the 

record is to the contrary. 7 See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517, 1518; 

cf. Smith, 799 F.2d at 710-11. Because the stop was legal and not 

pretextual, and because defendant has no ·Fourth Amendment rights 

6 We believe that the suppression hearing "resulted in a record 

of amply sufficient detail and depth from which the determination 

-of [objective reasonableness] may be made." Brown v. Illinois, 

422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975). Now that Guzman has been decided, 

hereafter we expect the parties to produce at a suppression 

hearing the sort of objective evidence suggested in that opinion. 

See 864 F.2d at 1518. 

7 Defendant argues that pretext was demonstrated primarily by the 

alleged existence of a drug training program by the New Mexico 

State Police entitled "Operation Pipeline," Officer Smith's log 

showing that a majority of Smith's traffic citations were issued 

to out-of-state vehicles, Smith's testimony that he did not stop 

every vehicle he observed speeding, and the fact that Smith did 

not issue the speeding citation until he had already arrested the 

defendants and transported them to the station. 

As to the last of these contentions, it would be ludicrous to 

demand that Smith write the ticket on the side of the highway when 

he had two people under arrest for felony drug charges. The 

remaining contentions do not impress us. Officer Smith testified 

that he was traveling in the opposite direction of the vehicle 

occupied by Clevenger and defendant when he caught it on radar, 

and that he really could not make out the vehicle, its occupants, 

or the fact that it was from out-of-state until he had turned 

around and come up behind the car to pull it over. Smith also 

testified that he simply had stopped the car for speeding, and was 

ngt. suspicious of Bnything .. else until he began speaking to 

Clevenger. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2475 Document: 01019963551 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 11 
implicated by the subsequent search, we have no occasion to 

.address"w.het;he.r ... the~---consent,._,J:o tbe--tSear,cb~_,.was.Noluntary. 

AFFIRMED. 

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