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Parties Involved:
Jerry Scott Drilling Company, Inc.
Appellee
Linda Slane
Appellant
Richard Slane
Appellant
Tuney Burger
Appellee
Tuney Burger, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RICHARD SLANE and LINDA SLANE, 

Husband and Wife, 

Plaintiff-Appellants, 

PILED 

Uoited Stat~p Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

NOV e 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 88-1264 

. ) 

JERRY SCOTT DRILLING COMPANY, Inc.,) 

an Oklahoma corporation; TUNEY ) 

BURGER, INC., an Oklahoma ) 

corporation; TONEY BURGER, ) 

Individually, ) 

Defendant-Appellees. 

) 

) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-86-2489-P) 

Larry Tawwater (Ben T. Lampkin, John E. Vitali with him on the 

briefs), of Lampkin, Mccaffrey & Tawwater, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, attorney for Appellants. 

Earl D. Mills (Joseph T. Acquaviva with him on the brief), of 

Mills, Whitten, Mills, Mills & Hinkle, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

attorney for Appellee Jerry Scott Drilling Company, Inc.; Jim w. 

Lee (Manville T. Buford and C. Scott Buech with him on the brief) 

of Lee, Beuch, Buford, Durocher & Mauritson, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, attorneys for Appellees Tuney Burger, Inc. and Tuney 

Burger, Individually. 

Before BALDOCK, BARRETT and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-1264 Document: 01019945165 Date Filed: 11/02/1990 Page: 1 
Richard and Jane Slane appeal from a judgment entered 

following a jury trial and verdict granted in favor of Jerry Scott 

Drilling Company (Scott Drilling), Tuney Burger, Inc. (Burger), 

and Tuney Burger, individually. The Slanes initiated this action 

after Richard was severely burned following an explosion on an oil 

drilling rig where he was working. The relevant facts are not in 

dispute. 

In early 1985, Wessley· Energy (Wessley), a non-party to this 

action, commenced drilling an oil well (Cargo 1-4) in McClain 

County, Oklahoma. Wessley contracted separately to obtain Scott 

Drilling as its drilling contractor, and Tuney Burger, doing 

business as Tuney Burger, Inc., as its consultant and on-site 

supervisor. Wessley also hired Monarch Testers, Inc. (Monarch) to 

conduct drill stem tests on the well. Monarch employed Richard 

Slane as a drill stem tester and assigned him to Cargo 1-4. 

Drill stem tests are utilized to obtain well information 

including bottom hole pressure, types of fluids, and the amount 

of flow at specific depths within a well. Such tests are 

generally performed by "pulling wet" or "reverse circulation." 

Pulling wet involves pulling the drill pipe from the well with 

the oil and gas in place through the process. Reverse circulation 

involves pumping mud into the well bore under pressure and forcing 

the oil and gas to the surface and into a tank or pit. Of the 

two methods, reverse circulation is considered the safest but less 

satisfactory for obtaining certain geological data. 

On February 5, 1985, Burger called Wessley and 

whether to conduct a wet or dry (reverse circulation) 

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inquired 

drill stem 

Appellate Case: 88-1264 Document: 01019945165 Date Filed: 11/02/1990 Page: 2 
test on Cargo 1-4. Wessley instructed Burger to "pull wet." 

Burger, in turn, instructed Richard Slane to perform the drill 

stem test by pulling wet. During the test, Richard was seriously 

injured following an explosion and subsequent fire. 

The Slanes subsequently sued Scott Drilling and Burger, 

alleging that they were wholly and solely responsible for the 

safe operation of the rig at Cargo 1-4 and that Richard's injuries 

were the direct result of their negligence. 

damages of $2,500,000.00. 

Within its answer, Burger denied 

affirmative defenses, Burger alleged that: 

result of the . negligence of a third party 

control or supervision; Richard was guilty 

The Slanes sought 

any liability. As 

the accident was the 

over whom they had no 

of negligence of a 

greater degree than any negligence of Burger and Scott Drilling; 

and Richard's negligence bars any recovery aga'inst Burger and 

Scott Drilling. Burger also alleged that the accident was 

unavoidable and occurred without any negligence on the part of 

Burger and Scott Drilling. 

Within its answer, Scott Drilling also denied any liability, 

and alleged that: the Slanes' complaint failed to state a viable 

cause of action; Richard was negligent and his negligence caused 

or contributed to the accident; Richard voluntarily assumed the 

risk of a known danger; Scott Drilling was confronted with a 

sudden emergency not brought about by its negligence and it 

reacted as a reasonable and prudent person would have reacted 

under the circumstances; and the accident was proximately caused 

by the negligence of a third party over whom Scott Drilling had no 

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Appellate Case: 88-1264 Document: 01019945165 Date Filed: 11/02/1990 Page: 3 
control. Scott Drilling also cross-complained against Burger for 

indemnity and/or contribution. 

During the trial, the Slanes presented evidence that pulling 

wet was dangerous, that Burger instructed the tool pusher on the 

well to begin the test in question, and that Burger directed 

Richard to conduct the test by pulling wet. The Slanes' expert 

witness testified that he never pulled wet under conditions which 

existed in this case because· the risk of exposing liquid carbons 

on the rig floor was unjustified. He opined that pulling wet was 

an unnecessary risk in this case. 

Richard testified during direct examination that he had 

worked in the oil fields for approximately thirty years; Monarch 

did a lot of work for Wessley; he had worked with Burger and Scott 

Drilling crews on prior occasions; he knew it was dangerous to 

pull wet; he had worked with Burger on 60 to 75 tests where he had 

pulled wet; a wet test is dangerous only 15 to 20 per cent of the 

time; and, although he had an assumption, a calculated guess, he 

did not know what ignited the fire. 

On cross-examination, Richard testified that "any time you 

pull a wet string of hydrocarbons it can be dangerous" (R., Vol. 

II at p. 157); he had pulled probably 300 wet tests overall; he 

had never experienced an explosion until this one; the oil-gas 

ratio on this well was higher than on most he had worked on but 

was perhaps equal to many that he done in the past; he had never 

before had an accident during a test; he had worked with the 

Scott Drilling crew before and found the crew to be a highly 

proficient group of individuals ("it's probably one of the best 

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Appellate Case: 88-1264 Document: 01019945165 Date Filed: 11/02/1990 Page: 4 
drill stem test crews I've ever worked with in my life.") (R., 

Vol. II at p. 171); he had worked with Burger before and did no~ 

remember Burger starting a fire before; occasionally people get 

injured through no fault of anybody; Burger was "the authority on 

location" (R., Vol. II at p. 171); Burger was responsible to see 

that Richard performed his job to completion; Burger did not tell 

Richard how to set his tool; when he is out on a rig, he is in 

charge of his safety; and experienced men always watch out for 

themselves first and one other man. 

Burger defended on the basis that Wessley was at all times 

the owner of the well and, as such, controlled the methods and 

procedures by which the well was to be drilled and tests to be 

conducted; Burger, as Wessley's consultant, relayed Wessley's 

orders and directions and was at the well to assure compliance 

with Wessley's orders and directions; Scott Drilling contracted 

separately with Wessley and provided all of its own equipment and 

personnel; Monarch was Wessley's preferred drill stem tester and 

Burger was to have Monarch perform the drill stem tests if 

Monarch was available; Richard was the drill stem tester usually 

furnished by Monarch and Richard was in charge during the course 

of the drill stem test; and Wessley made the decision to pull wet 

on the drill stem test being conducted at the time of the 

accident. 

Scott Drilling defended on the basis that it was hired by 

Wessley to drill the well; Burger, as the drilling supervisor/ 

consultant, was the highest ranking person on the well; Richard 

was very knowledgable in the oil field and his knowledge as a 

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Appellate Case: 88-1264 Document: 01019945165 Date Filed: 11/02/1990 Page: 5 
drill stem tester was superior to that of anyone else on Scott 

Drilling's crew; Richard appreciated the dangers of pulling wet; 

there was sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that none 

of the defendants was negligent; although the evidence was 

conflicting on certain issues, the effect and weight to be given 

conflicting testimony was for the jury to decide; and there was 

sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that 

Richard was fully aware of the risks associated with a drilling 

rig and oil field operations and that he voluntarily assumed the 

risks. 

During closing arguments, counsel for Burger suggested that 

perhaps Richard was contributorily negligent. The Slanes objected 

at the conclusion of Burger's closing arguments and the court 

directed the jury to disregard any suggestions of contributory 

negligence. Within its instructions to the jury, the court 

instructed on sudden emergency and assumption of risk in accordance with the affirmative defenses advanced by Scott Drilling. 

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Burger and Scott 

Drilling and against the Slanes. The Slanes subsequently moved 

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, an amendment of the 

judgment, and, in the alternative, a new trial. In support of 

their motions, the Slanes argued that the court's instructions on 

assumption of risk and sudden emergency were improper and that the 

closing argument comments of Burger's counsel regarding 

contributory negligence were highly prejudicial requiring a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The motions were denied via a 

minute order. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1264 Document: 01019945165 Date Filed: 11/02/1990 Page: 6 
On appeal, the Slanes contend: (1) the sudden emergency 

instruction misled the jury; (2) the court erred in giving an 

assumption of risk instruction; and (3) Burger's counsel committed 

reversible error by introducing extraneous matter during closing 

arguments. 

I. 

The Slanes contend that the sudden emergency instruction 

misled the jury. The Slanes argue that the evidence did not 

support a sudden emergency instruction and that the instruction 

given to the jury did not represent the law of Oklahoma. 

Although the determination of the substance of a jury 

instruction in a diversity case is a matter-of state law, Farrell 

v. Klein Tools, Inc., 866 F.2d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1989), 

the grant or denial of tendered instructions is governed by 

federal law and rules. Harvey by Harvey v. General Motors 

Corporation, 873 F.2d 1343, 1352 (10th Cir. 1989), citing Brownlow 

v. Aman, 740 F.2d 1476, 1490 (10th Cir. 1984). Where an erroneous 

instruction is given, we review the record to determine if 

prejudice resulted. Palmer v. Krueger, 897 F.2d 1529, 1532 (10th 

Cir. 1990). We find reversible error in a trial court's jury 

instructions only if we have substantial doubt that the instructions, taken together, properly guided the jury in its 

deliberations. Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 896 F.2d 463, 

468 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ 1990. 

Under Oklahoma law, 

emergency only if (1) there 

a trial court may instruct on sudden 

are facts sufficient to raise an 

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Appellate Case: 88-1264 Document: 01019945165 Date Filed: 11/02/1990 Page: 7 
inference of sudden emergency, and (2) it is made to appear that 

the emergency was not created by the party seeking the 

instruction. Johnson v. Wade, 642 P.2d 255, 260 (Okla. 1982), 

quoting Carnes v. White, 511 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1973). Oklahoma 

recognizes the existence of a sudden emergency as a separate, 

pleadable defense, and a defendant is obligated "to both plead 

the existence of such condition and to prove that he did not 

contribute to its creation.~ Lilly v. Scott, 598 P.2d 279, 282 

(Okla. App. 1979), citing Vaughn v. Baxter, 488 P.2d 1234 (Okla. 

1971). 

Applying these standards to the facts herein, we hold that 

the court erred in instructing on sudden emergency.

1 

Although only Scott Drilling plead the defense of sudden 

emergency, the court instructed the jury: 

One of the defenses plead by the defendants in this 

case is that of sudden emergency. If you find that the 

defendants were faced with a sudden emergency and 

reacted to that emergency as a reasonable person would 

have acted under the circumstances, then your verdict 

must be for the defendants and against the plaintiffs. 

(Emphasis supplied.) 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 65, Instruction 14). 

Burger did not plead the existence of sudden emergency. Even 

so, the court's sudden emergency instruction improperly applied to 

1 We also have reservations whether the sudden emergency 

instruction was appropriate in any respect. The Slanes did not 

allege any negligence on the defendants' part after the explosion 

and fire. Rather, the Slanes alleged only that the defendants 

were negligent in the events leading up to the explosion and 

fire, during which there was no sudden emergency. However, 

assuming that the instruction was otherwise warranted, we hold 

that the dis.trict court nonetheless erred in the manner in which 

the instruction was given. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1264 Document: 01019945165 Date Filed: 11/02/1990 Page: 8 
all the defendants. As such, the instruction violated Lilly v. 

Scott, supra, in which the court held that a defendant was 

"obliged" to plead the existence of sudden emergency. 

Furthermore, the sudden emergency instruction given stated 

the law of Oklahoma incorrectly in that it failed to inform the 

ju_ry that the defense was not available to the party or parties who 

created the emergency, Johnson v. Wade, supra. The absence of 

this element from the instruction given in this case misguided the 

jury. 

Inasmuch as the court's sudden emergency instruction 

erroneously included all the defendants and misstated that defense 

under the laws of Oklahoma, we hold that the instruction gave rise 

to reversible error. Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corporation, supra. 

II. 

Even though the Slanes opposed giving any assumption of the 

risk instruction, they did submit such an instruction which the 

court accepted and gave. On appeal, the Slanes contend that the 

court erred in giving an assumption of risk instruction and that 

the evidence offered at trial simply did not support 

instruction. We disagree. 

that 

"The defense of ... assumption of risk shall, in all cases 

whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall, at all times, be left 

to the jury." Okla. Const., Art. 23, § 6. In Thomas v. Holliday, 

764 P.2d 165, 169 (Okla. 1988), the court held: 

Another aspect of risk assumption arises from Roman 

law and is the source of much confusion. This concept 

is encapsulated in the maxim volenti non fit injuria, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1264 Document: 01019945165 Date Filed: 11/02/1990 Page: 9 
which means: If one, knowing and comprehending the 

danger, voluntarily exposes himself to it, though not 

negligent in so doing, he is deemed to have assumed the 

risk and is precluded from recovery for the resulting 

injury. The maxim is predicated upon the theory of 

knowledge and appreciation of the danger and voluntary 

assent. A subjective standard is applied in evaluating 

plaintiff's knowledge, comprehension and appreciation of 

the risk. 

The touchstone of the assumption-of-risk defense is 

consent to harm and not heedlessness or indifference. 

We recently followed Thomas v. Holliday, supra, in Palmer v. 

Krueger, 897 F.2d 1529, 1534 (10th Cir. 1990) where we held: 

Under the law of Oklahoma, the "touchstone" of the 

assumption of risk defense in a negligence action is 

"consent to harm and not heedlessness or indifference." 

See Thomas v. Holliday, 764 P.2d 165, 169 (Okla. 1988). 

Also, 'knowledge of the danger is an essential of the 

defense of assumption of risk, and the doctrine does not 

apply unless the one alleged to have assumed the risk 

can be found to have known or to have been charged with 

knowledge of the danger.' Briscoe v. Oklahoma Natural 

Gas Co., 509 P.2d 126, 129 (Okla. 1973) (quoting 

syllabus to s. H. Kress & Co. v. Maddox, 201 Okla. 190, 

203 P.2d 706 (1949). 

Applying these standards to the facts herein, we hold that 

the court did not err in instructing on assumption of risk. 

Richard was imminently aware of the inherent dangers in and about 

the oil field and uniquely aware of the dangers of a drill stem 

test. As such, once he voluntarily went to Cargo 1-4 to perform 

the drill stem test, he was "deemed to have assumed the risk and is 

precluded from recovery for the resulting injury." Thomas v. 

Holliday, supra. 

It was uncontested that Richard had over thirty years 

experience in oil field work and was considered to be a very good 

tester. Richard personally testified that: he was the supervisor 

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Appellate Case: 88-1264 Document: 01019945165 Date Filed: 11/02/1990 Page: 10 
for the drill stem test; he had pulled some 300 wet drill stem 

tests; he knew it was dangerous to pull wet; he considered the oil 

field, at its best, to be somewhat dangerous and, at its worst, to 

be deadly; when on a rig he was in charge of his own safety; and 

experienced men always watch out for themselves first and one other 

man. 

III. 

The Slanes contend that counsel for Burger committed 

reversible error by improperly introducing extraneous matter during 

closing argument. Prior to closing arguments the court instructed 

counsel not to discuss comparative negligence. Notwithstanding 

this admonition, counsel for Burger made the following statements 

during his closing arguments: 

And was Mr. Slane at fault for not telling Tuney 

Burger, 'Hey, this is really a bad one. I think that it 

is dangerous. I think that we ought to talk about it.' 

He didn't even do that. Did that make him at fault? 

To use the logic that Tuney Burger was at fault for 

doing the same thing, for not saying this to the 

company--which he did say, by the way--makes Mr. Slane 

just as [much] at fault. I cannot see the negligence on 

anybody in this case. 

(R., Vol. IV at p. 655). 

The Slanes did not object at the time that the comments were 

made. However, they did object at the conclusion of Burger's 

closing arguments. Thereupon, the court instructed the jury that 

contributory negligence was not an issue in the case and "therefore, 

if any such suggestion was made to you ... and I'm not prepared to 

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Appellate Case: 88-1264 Document: 01019945165 Date Filed: 11/02/1990 Page: 11 
say it was. But if any suggestion like that was made to you, you 

should disregard it." (R., Vol. IV at p. 659). 

We will not reverse on an improper closing argument unless it 

obviously prejudiced one of the parties. Smith v. Atlantic 

Richfield Company, 814 F.2d 1481, 1488 (10th Cir. 1987). Although 

not proper, we hold that the closing argument of Burger did not 

obviously prejudice the Slanes. Notwithstanding the Slanes' failure 

to object-in a timely manner, the court nonetheless instructed the 

jury to disregard any suggestion of contributory negligence. Under 

such circumstances, the prejudice to the Slanes, if any, was 

minimal. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent 

herewith. 

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