Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03055/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03055-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Kani Xulam
Appellant

Document Text:

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*Judge Ginsburg would deny the motion for the reasons stated

in his dissent. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

-

Filed May 14, 1996

No. 96-3055

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

KANI XULAM A/K/A

STEVEN BARRY CITRON A/K/A

SERENO CITRON,

APPELLANT

-

On Motion for Release Pending Appeal

96MS00255-01

-

BEFORE: WALD, GINSBURG,

* and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

O R D E R

Upon consideration of appellant's motion for release pending

appeal of a pretrial detention order, the opposition thereto, and

the reply, it is 

ORDERED that the District Court's detention order be revoked

for the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum. The Clerk

is directed to issue forthwith to the District Court a certified

copy of this order in lieu of a formal mandate.

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Per Curiam

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed May 14, 1996

No. 96-3055

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v.

KANI XULAM A/K/A STEVEN BARRY CITRON 

A/K/A SERENO CITRON,

APPELLANT

On Motion for Release Pending Appeal

No. 96MS00255-01

-

Before: WALD, GINSBURG, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

PER CURIAM: This appeal from an order of detention pending

trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 raises troubling issues as to the

quantum of evidence necessary to detain an individual prior to

trial on the ground that "no condition or combination of conditions

will reasonably assure" the presence of the appellant at future

court proceedings. This appellant, a Kurd from Turkey, has been an

international human rights worker resident in the District of

Columbia for over three years and a well-known and admired member

of the national human rights community. He has no criminal record,

but has been charged with making a false statement in a passport

application in 1988. In short, after arriving here from Canada on

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1In the event that appellant is released in the wake of this

order, the INS may request the criminal justice agency now

holding appellant to "maintain custody of the alien for a period

not to exceed forty-eight hours, in order to permit assumption of

custody by the Service." 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a)(4). In a

supplemental memorandum to this court, the government states that

it "has no representations to make to the Court about whether the

INS intends to take appellant into custody. The fact that a

detainer has been lodged does not mean appellant necessarily will

be taken into custody by the INS if released by this Court." 

Appellee's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's

Motion for Release Pending Appeal, at 4 n.1. 

a temporary student visa, he applied for and obtained an American

passport under a false name. If convicted, he likely faces a

maximum sentence of six months under the federal sentencing

guidelines. The Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") has

served notice that it is undertaking an investigation which may

result in appellant's possible deportation and has lodged a

detainer to take effect upon his release.1 The magistrate judge

and the district court, on motion of the government, ordered his

detention pending trial in the Central District of California

solely as a flight risk, conceding he posed no danger to the

community or any of its citizens. At the present time, a pretrial

detention hearing has been scheduled before the California court.

The Bail Reform Act requires release of a defendant prior to

trial unless a judicial officer determines that no conditions or

combination of conditions exist which will "reasonably assure the

appearance of the person." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (1994). Under the

Act, when the government seeks pretrial detention of an individual

on the ground that he poses a risk of flight, the standard it must

satisfy is a "preponderance of the evidence." United States v.

Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987). That preponderance

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must, of course, go to the ultimate issue: that no combination of

conditionseither those set out in the Bail Reform Act itself or

any others that the magistrate or judge might find usefulcan

"reasonably" assure that the defendant will appear for trial. 18

U.S.C. § 3142(c). The Act sets out a number of conditions which

may be used to ensure appearance, including, inter alia, remaining

in custody of a designated person who agrees to assume supervision

and to report any violation of a release condition; maintaining

employment; abiding by restrictions on place of abode or travel;

reporting on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement

agency; complying with a curfew; executing a bail bond; and a

final catch-all for any condition that the magistrate or judge

deems "reasonably necessary" to assure appearance. 18 U.S.C. §

3142(c). Section 3142(g) of the Act sets out the factors to be

considered by the magistrate or judge in deciding whether available

conditions will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance: the

nature and circumstances of the offense, particularly its

nonviolent nature; the weight of the evidence; the history and

characteristics of the person, including his character, family

ties, employment, length of residence in the community, community

ties, past conduct, criminal history, and record of court

appearances; and the danger the defendant poses to the community

if released.

In every category mentioned in the statute, this appellant was

a prime candidate for release. His nonviolent charge carried a

maximum of six months imprisonment under the sentencing guidelines;

he had no criminal record or record of failure to appear; he was

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employed and had a wide circle of respected acquaintances and close

friends in the community who testified as to his "spiritual" and

"intellectual" integrity; and the government acknowledged that he

posed no threat to the community. Indeed, the district court

admitted that if he were facing only the criminal charge, his

"chances [of appearing] might be good." Nonetheless, the

magistrate and district court judge refused to release him pending

trial. What militated against him, in the judge's view, was that

the government witness testified that he might be facing

deportation to Turkey, where as a Kurd he might be persecuted. The

court also believed that "he will go to any other ends ... to

address [the] cause [of Kurdish rights], especially when he now

realizes there's a possibility he could be deported." For that

reason, the judge concluded that there would be "no way that [a

third-party custodian] can lock him up or restrain him from

leaving." Obviously troubled, he added that the magistrate to whom

the appellant is presented after transportation to California "may

very well decide to disagree with the decision this court has made"

and "nothing in my decision should suggest to [the California

magistrate] that ... he does not have jurisdiction to fully

consider the issue of bond." It was then clearly the appellant's

alleged crimethe false identity he claimed to obtain a passport,

for which he is presumed innocentand the possibility of his

deportation to Turkey that fueled the judge's decision.

There are several reasons why we do not believe those factors

alone provided a legitimate ground for ordering pretrial detention.

First, we are not convinced that the government satisfied its

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burden of showing a risk of flight. Cf. United States v. Friedman,

837 F.2d 48, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1988) (vacating pretrial detention

order on grounds that government had not established risk of

flight; although charges for sending and receiving child

pornography were serious, chance of flight was reduced by absence

of prior criminal record, lack of known ability to flee,

employment, and family and community ties); United States v.

Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1986) (reversing pretrial

detention order because government did not show risk of flight by

preponderance of evidence; even though defendant was clearly

capable of obtaining false identification, as demonstrated by prior

conviction for crime involving fraudulent identification, family

ties and past record of appearing in court as required diminished

defendant's flight risk). Appellant's strong commitment to

advocating his Kurdish cause in the United States, cited by the

district court as enhancing his risk of flight, would seem to

militate against, not in favor of, flight, since the only way he

can pursue that cause is publicly, within the human rights

community, and disappearing or fleeing would render him permanently

impotent in that respect. How would he be regarded in that

community, for instance, if he violated the trust of his

third-party custodians, or forfeited bonds or assets they pledged

for his release? On a more practical level, the government has

taken away all his passports and travel documents, so it is

unlikely he could go far even if he wished to. In addition, as

explained above, the INS has itself addressed any concerns

regarding appellant's risk of flight by lodging a detainer against

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appellant, which permits his retention for 48 hours after he is

otherwise ordered released, and at that point, the agency may opt

to take appellant into custody pending deportation proceedings. 8

C.F.R. § 242.2(c).

Second, any or all of the conditions listed above were

available in this case, but there is no indication in the record

that the magistrate judge or the district court judge fully

explored the commitments offered by appellant's witnesses or the

appellant's proffer that he was willing to abide by whatever

conditions the court imposed. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 845

F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1988) (pretrial detention order

vacated for failure adequately to consider statutory factors

relevant to determination whether conditions are sufficient to

assure appearance in court). One of appellant's witnesses, Sister

Patricia Krommer, testified that she would "absolutely" be willing

to ensure appellant's return to court. When then asked, "And what

kinds of assistance could you offer in that regard?", she answered:

"Well, first of all, I would keep in contact with him daily. I

would provide transportation. If he needed to appear in court, I

would bring him in. I would be happy to monitor his whereabouts

each day." A second witness, Kathryn Cameron Porter, president of

an international human rights organization (the Human Rights

Alliance) and the wife of an eight-term Republican Congressman,

John Edward Porter, the founder and co-chair of the Congressional

Human Rights Caucus, offered a room in her home, stating that she

"most definitely would" be willing to ensure appellant's return to

court and that she "would have no hesitancy to be responsible or

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custodian, or whateverwhatever the correct legal term is. I would

have no hesitancy." Joseph Eldridge, director of the Lawyers'

Committee for Human Rights, also testified on appellant's behalf.

Yet, the magistrate judge concluded that "[t]heir testimony

was devoid of any facts from which [the court] could find that [the

witnesses] have any means of monitoring [appellant's] whereabouts.

Perhaps most significantly, nothing in the witnesses' testimony

suggests that defendant would be amenable to supervision by any of

them." The district court reiterated that finding, noting that "it

is clear that if the accused chose to leave, [Ms. Porter and Sister

Krommer] could not stop him." However, appellant's attorney

proffered, and the district court accepted as accurate, that

appellant was "completely willing to comply with the conditions of

release of the court, to work with the nun, Sister Pat Krommer, or

Kathryn Porter, or whoever else the court would require to comply

with the conditions of release and to return to court. He has no

intentions of fleeing." In view of the immense harm to their

reputations that Sister Krommer and Ms. Porter would suffer if

appellant were to flee and appellant's proffer that he would comply

with any conditions of release imposed upon him, the government

failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "no

condition or combination of conditions" would "reasonably assure"

appellant's appearance in court. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).

Finally, there is no outstanding deportation order against

this appellant. Moreover, section 3142(d) has a specific provision

for a ten-day temporary hold on a defendant who is not a citizen,

during which time the government attorney is to notify the

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2He subsequently made two name changes as to which he

notified the passport authoritiesthe last one being a

politically significant appellation comparable to Malcolm X or

David Ben Gurion, names adopted by mission-oriented leaders of

other cultures. 

appropriate INS officials so that they may act against the

appellant if they choose. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(1)(B). After that

time, "[i]f the official fails or declines to take the person into

custody ..., the person shall be treated in accordance with the

other provisions of this section [3142], notwithstanding the

applicability of other provisions of law...." 18 U.S.C. §

3142(d)(2). When the government did not move here for temporary

detention under section 3142(d), it does not seem legitimate for it

to now introduce the specter of a possible deportation through the

back door as a principal reason for detention.

We cannot but conclude that a serious error has been made

here. A first-time offender accused of a nonviolent crime with

strong community ties and respected members of that community

willing to supervise his release in any manner the court finds

necessary, including designated residences, curfews, reporting in,

is incarcerated pending trial, despite the fact that his entire

lifestyle and mission strongly suggest he will stay in place, and

his charged misdeed (if, indeed, he is found guilty) was to falsify

information on a passport in order to remain in this country.2 The

pretrial detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 were

not intended to apply to such an appellant. The magistrate judge

and district court referred several times to the notion that if the

defendant were to flee, his supervisors could not stop him. That,

of course, is true of every defendant released on conditions; it

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3We recognize that appellant is currently being held in the

Central District of California. Counsel for the government has

advised us that a pretrial hearing is scheduled for Wednesday,

May 15, 1996. We therefore revoke the district court's detention

order Note 3Continued entirely rather than remanding for further

proceedings, since another hearing in the District Court for the

District of Columbia would simply interfere with the California

proceedings. 

is also not the standard authorized by law for determining whether

pretrial detention is appropriate. Section 3142 speaks of

conditions that will "reasonably" assure appearance, not guarantee

it. See also H. REP. NO. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1984),

reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3198 (acknowledging

feasibility of conditions even "where there is a substantial risk

of flight"). The record here contains more than enough to satisfy

the "reasonable" assurance test, and not enough to show by a

preponderance of the evidence that no combination of conditions

will assure the defendant's appearance.

Thus, despite the large discretion normally accorded the trial

court in this area, we revoke the order of detention.3

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The defendant stands

charged with making a false statement on a passport application in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542. According to the testimony of a

Special Agent of the Department of State Security Service, in 1986

the defendant procured a passport in the name of a deceased person,

Steven Barry Citron. In 1988, based upon a court document

attesting to a change of name, he was issued a new passport, this

time in the name of Sereno Citron. In 1993 he obtained yet another

passport, this time in the name of Kani Xulam, again based upon a

purported change of name. During a search of defendant's office,

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agents recovered a Turkish passport with a photograph of defendant

and a Canadian social security card, both in the name of Namet

Gunduez.

Because the defendant is apparently subject to deportation as

an illegal alienthe INS has instituted an investigation and lodged

a detainer against himand has a demonstrated ability to obtain

false travel and other documents, the Government suggested that the

risk he would flee is sufficiently high that he should be detained

pending trial, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142. The district court

held a hearing at which the defendant made the best record he could

in support of the proposition that he should be released into the

custody of certain respected citizens willing to serve in that

capacity. The court then granted the Government's detention

request on the ground that "no condition or combination of

conditions" of release could reasonably assure that the defendant

would appear as required for future hearings.

As for the testimony of the two witnesses who offered to

supervise defendant's release, the district judge explained at some

length why he considered their offers inadequate to assure the

defendant's appearance. Basically, having first concluded that the

defendant is likely to flee, the court found that "those persons

... could not stop him."

Moreover, the Magistrate Judge who compiled the record upon

which the district court actedand who had also concluded that no

condition or combination of conditions of release would be

adequatemade the following findings of fact. (1) Both of the

persons who offered to assume custody of the defendant, and the

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third witness who testified in opposition to his detention, have

"an acquaintance [with him] which is superficial." They did not

know "his name, other names he has used, where he is from and where

his family is...." Nor did they know his immigration status. (2)

"[N]othing in the witnesses' testimony suggests that defendant

would be amenable to supervision by any of them."

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals, which has no firsthand

knowledge of the defendant or of his witnesses, revokes the

district court's order of detention. Do my colleagues know

something that the district court does not? Yes: They know that

this "international human rights worker" and advocate for the Kurds

of Turkey, who might be deported to Turkey where, he claims, he

would be persecuted, would not, if released pending trial, flee in

pursuit of personal safety and the opportunity to continue his

human rights work from another capitol, because that would do

"immense harm to [the] reputation" of the two acquaintances who

vouchsafed his appearance. This is nothing more than a leap of

faith on the part of my colleagues.

The court devotes most of its opinion to the claim that the

district court could have devised "some combination of conditions"

calibrated reasonably to assure that the defendant would not

fleeanother leap of faith, it seems, for the defendant proposed no

such combination of conditions, the district court concluded none

exists, and the Court of Appeals itself is silent upon what that

combination might be. In any event, having made that argument, the

court then revokes the detention order unconditionally, thereby

conferring upon the defendant more relief than the court has tried

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to justify and indeed more than the defendant has requested. The

defendant at least proposed that he be released into the custody of

one of his two acquaintances. By omission, the court has rejected

even that slight concession by the defendant to the concerns

expressed not only by the Government but by the magistrate and the

district judge as well.

The court explains its decision to "revoke the district

court's detention order entirely rather than remanding for further

proceedings" as an effort to avoid interfering with proceedings now

pending in California. Releasing the defendant to the custody of

his sponsors, however, as he proposed, would not interfere with the

California proceedings at all. Moreover, the court's apparent

complacency about the Government's ability to retain custody of the

defendant in California is unwarranted. First, the California

hearing has already been stayed once, and we have no way of knowing

when it will be completed; in the interim the defendant could, he

argues, be released on the ground that the detainer has expired.

Second, the inclination of the INS to pursue the defendant's

deportation is entirely irrelevant to our responsibility to assure

that the defendant does not flee in contemplation of his possible

deportation. Third, the district court expressly deferred to the

judgment of the California magistrate; even if we were to affirm

the district court, therefore, the Government would still be

obliged to make its case in yet another forum or, if necessary, to

invoke whatever detention arrangements are permitted under the

deportation provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.

Why my colleagues take it upon themselves to become advocates

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for the defendantwho is zealously represented by counsel of his

ownis a mystery to me. One thing is clear, though: In view of

the record, the district court was well within what the court

acknowledges is "the large discretion normally accorded the trial

court in this area."

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