Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-07118/USCOURTS-ca10-93-07118-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Javilo McCullah
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

., 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Court of Ap~c~'!.J 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 0 5 1996 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerit 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. No. 93-7118 

JOHN JAVILO McCULLAH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-92-32-S) 

Gary Peterson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Stephen J. Greubel and 

Stephen J. Knorr of the Office of the Federal Public Defender, 

Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Defendant-Appellant. 

Robert J. Erickson, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C. (John Raley, United States Attorney, Sheldon J. Sperling and 

Paul G. Hess, Assistant United States Attorneys, Muskogee, 

Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

This appeal challenges a death sentence imposed under the 

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848(e). Defendantappellant John Javilo McCullah was convicted of drug conspiracy, 

21 u.s.c. § 846 (Count 1); conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 13); 

interstate travel with intent to commit murder, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1958, 

2 (Count 14); and murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal 

enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 16), and 

Appellate Case: 93-7118 Document: 01019276438 Date Filed: 02/05/1996 Page: 1 
sentenced to death on the capital murder charge. Mr. McCullah 

appeals both his conviction and sentence on the capital charge as 

well as his convictions and sentences on other related counts. We 

affirm all of Mr. McCullah's convictions, but we remand the case 

for resentencing. 

Background 

This case arises from the activities of a large Californiabased drug organization managed by Joesph "Eddie 11 Arvizu. The 

Arvizu organization distributed cocaine and marijuana across the 

country in trucks. Members of the organization included: Ray 

Molina, Mr. Arvizu's cousin and confidante; Norwood Hutching, an 

Oklahoma rancher and businessman who oversaw the cross-country 

transportation; Tony Wiscowiche, a close confidante of Mr. Arvizu; 

Thomas 11 Stimey 11 Sanchez, a guard and occasional drug courier; and 

Gabriel Lozano, another guard and courier. 

In April 1991, a pickup truck containing nearly 100 kilograms 

of cocaine was stolen from the Arvizu organization by James Shiew, 

one of the organization's cross-country drivers. The truck was 

parked at the Hulbert, Oklahoma, residence of Ruth Ford at the 

time of the theft. Upon learning of the truck's disappearance, 

Mr. Hutching launched a search, offering a reward for the truck's 

recovery. Both Mr. Hutching and Mr. Arvizu questioned Mr. Shiew 

about the theft, but he skillfully diverted suspicion from himself 

and instead implicated a man named Avery Rogers. Mr. Rogers, who 

operated a combination used car lot and pig farm, was a friend of 

Ruth Ford, from whose residence the truck had been stolen. Mr. 

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Hutching and Mr. Arvizu soon began to suspect that Mr. Rogers and 

Ms. Ford were behind the theft. 

The Arvizu organization, led by Mr. Arvizu himself, set up 

headquarters in Tulsa, Oklahoma, to oversee the recovery of the 

stolen drugs. The organization attempted to kidnap Ms. Ford and 

make her reveal the whereabouts of the drugs, but this plan was 

thwarted when Ms. Ford refused to open her door. 

Mr. Arvizu's next plan involved an attempted kidnapping and 

torture of Mr. Rogers. This plan was abandoned when one of Mr. 

Rogers' farm animals began making noise, betraying the kidnappers' 

presence. 

Mr. Arvizu then decided to attempt a roadside ambush of Mr. 

Rogers. As Mr. Rogers drove home along a wooded road in his 

truck, a car blocked the road ahead of him while a van blocked the 

rear. Mr. Molina and Mr. Sanchez emerged from the car and began 

firing at Mr. Rogers. Mr. Rogers backed his truck off the road 

out of the ambush and eventually smashed his truck into a tree in 

the woods. Under cover of the woods, Mr. Rogers returned to his 

home on foot and notified the police. After the failure of this 

ambush, Mr. Arvizu and his party returned to California. 

Mr. Arvizu continued to plot against Mr. Rogers after his 

return to California. In May 1991, Mr. Arvizu hired three nonEnglish-speaking Mexican gunmen--"pistoleros"-- and had Mr. 

Wiscowiche drive them to Oklahoma. Meanwhile, Mr. Molina 

recruited Joe Mendoza and Mr. McCullah in California to assist in 

the recovery of the stolen drugs. Mr. McCullah, Mr. Molina, Mr. 

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Mendoza, and Mr. Sanchez all drove from California to Oklahoma 

together in late May. 

Mr. Molina's group rendezvoused with the pistoleros at a lake 

house in Wagoner, Oklahoma. They were joined there by two other 

Mexican nationals, bringing the total to five: Poncho, Carlos, 

Juan, Mikey, and Roberto. Mr. Arvizu and Mr. Hutching arrived at 

the lake house shortly thereafter, the latter bringing a large 

cache of firearms. Mr. Arvizu and Mr. Hutching then departed the 

lake house, never to return. 

The group remained at the lake house for about two weeks 

under the supervision of Mr. Molina. During that time, several 

plans were devised to kill Mr. Rogers. The initial plan, 

formulated by Mr. Arvizu and Mr. Molina, was to kidnap and torture 

Mr. Rogers until he revealed the whereabouts of the drugs, then 

kill him. A second plan, suggested by Mr. Molina, was to go to 

Mr. Rogers' used car lot and kill everyone there and then to go 

after Ms. Ford. The plan finally adopted, designed by either Mr. 

Wiscowiche and Mr. McCullah, or by Mr. Sanchez, Mr. McCullah and 

Poncho, was to lure Mr. Rogers away from the used car lot and kill 

him. Mr. McCullah, being the lone non-Hispanic, volunteered to 

act as the lure, reasoning that he would arouse less suspicion 

than the others. 

The group then undertook the necessary preparatory steps. 

Mr. Wiscowiche and Mr. McCullah, acting on Mr. Arvizu's 

instructions, purchased a total of four used vehicles for the 

operation. At Mr. Molina's direction, Mr. McCullah and Mr. 

Wiscowiche also purchased ammunition for the various weapons, and 

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Mr. Wiscowiche cleaned the weapons. Mr. Wiscowiche, Mr. McCullah, 

and Poncho drove around the region and selected an appropriate 

ambush site. Mr. McCullah, accompanied by Mr. Wiscowiche, 

reconnoitered the area around the used car lot. Finally, Mr. 

Wiscowiche attempted to cut the telephone line leading to Mr. 

Rogers' car lot, but inadvertantly only cut the ground wire. 

On June 3, 1991, Mr. McCullah, posing as a prospective 

customer, met Mr. Rogers' at his used car lot. Mr. Rogers took 

Mr. McCullah for a test drive in a Pontiac Fiero, driving out to 

the ambush site. At the conclusion of the test drive, Mr. 

McCullah stated that he would return later that day, but he failed 

to do so. Mr. McCullah reported back to the lake house that Mr. 

Rogers was "going for the bait." 

The next morning, Mr. Molina departed for Los Angeles. He 

gave Mr. Wiscowiche $5000 to distribute among the people remaining 

at the lake house, with $2000 to go to Mr. McCullah. Mr. 

Wiscowiche distributed the money as directed. 

Pursuant to the ambush plan explained by Mr. McCullah and 

Poncho, the other participants drove to their assigned places. 

Mr. McCullah returned to Mr. Rogers' used car lot, chose another 

car and asked to test drive it. Unable to accompany him, Mr. 

Rogers asked one of his employees, Jewell Leon Collins, primarily 

a detail man, to accompany Mr. McCullah on the test drive. Mr. 

Collins bore no resemblence to Mr. Rogers. Regardless, Mr. 

McCullah departed the lot with Mr. Collins in a 1975 Chevrolet. 

Mr. McCullah drove the Chevrolet to the prearranged ambush 

site with Poncho and Carlos following them in another car. Mr. 

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Mendoza and Juan were already on-site in another car to pick up 

the gunmen. Upon arrival at the ambush site, Mr. McCullah stopped 

the car and quickly exited the vehicle, leaving Mr. Collins in the 

vehicle. At the same time Poncho emerged from the trailing car, 

ran to the Chevrolet, and fired a single shot at point-blank range 

into Mr. Collins' head, killing him instantly. Mr. McCullah drove 

away in Poncho and Carlos's car, while Poncho and Carlos joined 

Mr. Mendoza and Juan in the waiting vehicle. The four drove onto 

a nearby dirt road and discarded their firearms in the 

undergrowth. 

The entire group except for Mr. McCullah, who apparently 

returned to California by himself, rendezvoused at a restaurant in 

Wagoner, Oklahoma, and then proceeded to the Tulsa airport. Mr. 

Wiscowiche, Carlos and Poncho flew back to Los Angeles, and the 

others returned by car or bus. 

Soon after the murder, the Arvizu organization's drug 

trafficking operation came under the scrutiny of California law 

enforcement officials. As the investigation progressed, some 

members of the organization, including Mr. Lozano, Mr. Wiscowiche 

and Mr. Shiew, were persuaded to come forward and cooperate with 

the investigation. This allowed the FBI to piece together what 

happened in Oklahoma and led to the eventual arrest and 29-count 

superseding indictment of Mr. McCullah, Mr. Molina, Mr. Mendoza, 

Mr. Sanchez, and Mr. Hutching. Mr. Arvizu fled to Mexico in 

January 1992 and has not been seen since. Before the trial began, 

Mr. Mendoza negotiated a plea bargain in return for his 

cooperation and trial testimony. 

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After a one month trial, the jury found Messrs. Molina, 

Sanchez and McCullah guilty on all counts with which they were 

charged, respectively, and Mr. Hutching guilty on all counts 

except counts 26 and 27. The government sought the death penalty 

against Messrs. Hutching, Molina and McCullah. The jury 

separately considered the death penalty for each defendant, 

beginning with Mr. Hutching, then Mr. Molina, and finally Mr. 

McCullah. The jury rejected the death penalty as to Mr. Hutching 

and Mr. Molina, but sentenced Mr. McCullah to death. 

Mr. McCullah filed a timely notice of appeal, alleging 

numerous errors in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. 

Discussion 

Guilt Phase Challenges 

I. Assistance of Counsel 

Mr. McCullah claims that the district court committed 

multiple errors in its provision of counsel for him. Mr. McCullah 

argues that two counsel were not properly appointed, that his 

counsel were not "learned in the law", and that his counsel 

operated under a conflict of interest. The construction of 

statutes regarding the appointment of counsel in capital cases is 

a legal question subject to de novo review. United States v. 

Walker, 947 F.2d 1439, 1441 (lOth Cir. 1991). The trial court's 

ruling on whether to appoint additional counsel beyond those 

required by statute is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Steel, 759 F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 1985). The 

trial court's determination regarding a conflict of interest is 

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subject to de novo review. United States v. Martin, 965 F.2d 839, 

841 (lOth Cir. 1992). Subsidiary factual findings concerning the 

disqualification of an attorney are reviewed for clear error. 

Martin, 965 F.2d at 841; United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 

628, (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 u.s. 920 (1991). 

A. Appointment of Counsel 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3005, the defendant in a capital case is 

entitled, upon request, to the appointment of two defense counsel. 

18 U.S.C. § 3005. In this case, the trial court actually 

appointed only one lawyer, the Federal Public Defender, to 

represent Mr. McCullah. However, Mr. McCullah failed to object on 

this ground below, so his claim is reviewable only for plain 

error. United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). 

Before and during the trial Mr. McCullah was represented by 

Mr. Greubel and Mr. Bryant, both of the Federal Public Defender's 

office. Only Mr. Bryant was identified as Mr. McCullah's 

appointed counsel in the docket sheet, but the court was informed 

that both Mr. Greubel and Mr. Bryant would jointly represent Mr. 

McCullah. Although no formal appointment was entered designating 

Mr. Greubel as Mr. McCullah's counsel, this clerical oversight 

does not amount to plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Mr. 

McCullah has failed to make any showing that the lack of a formal 

appointment affected his representation or his substantive rights. 

Mr. McCullah also claims that the trial court erred in 

failing to appoint additional counsel for him at his request. The 

trial court denied Mr. McCullah's motion for additional counsel, 

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finding that "[t]he defendant has very adequate representation by 

experienced trial counsel " While this was a complex and 

difficult case, the trial court found Mr. McCullah's two counsel 

up to the task, and in light of the record we cannot say that this 

finding is clearly erroneous. Cf. Collins, 920 F.2d at 628. 

Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

declining to appoint additional counsel. See Steel, 759 F.2d at 

710. 

B. Learned in the Law 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3005 as it existed at the time of Mr. 

McCullah's trial,1 a capital defendant is entitled to "counsel 

learned in the law." 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1982). Mr. McCullah 

argues that the phrase "learned in the law" requires that counsel 

have prior capital punishment experience. We disagree. 

The plain meaning of the phrase "learned in the law" refers 

to a person who has received a regular legal education, generally 

signified by admission to the bar. See Black's Law Dictionary 889 

(6th ed. 1990). The plain meaning of the phrase does not imply 

any specialized death penalty experience. If Congress intended 

that counsel be learned in the law applicable to capital cases, it 

could have so stated, which it did when it amended the statute in 

1994. See 18 U.S.C. § 3005. Despite Mr. McCullah's contention to 

the contrary, the 1994 amendment did not merely "clarify" the law 

but rather substantively changed it, creating a new requirement 

which previously had not existed. 

1 This part of the statute was amended in 1994. 

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Further evidence that the former § 3005's "learned in the 

law" requirement referred only to law generally is found in 21 

U.S. C. § 848 (q) (5). Under 21 U.S.C. § 848 (q) (5), enacted in 1988, 

a capital defendant is entitled to at least one attorney who has 

been admitted to practice for at least five years and has at least 

three years' experience in the actual trial of felony 

prosecutions. Id. If the former § 3005's "learned in the law" 

requirement referred to capital punishment experience, as Mr. 

McCullah contends, Congress would hardly have created a special 

expertise requirement framed in terms of "felony prosecutions" in 

a later statute. 

Mr. McCullah's counsel were both experienced public defenders 

who had been admitted to practice for ten years. While they may 

have lacked capital punishment experience, Mr. McCullah does not 

challenge their general practice or felony litigation credentials. 

We find that Mr. McCullah was properly represented by counsel 

"learned in the law" under the former Section 3005. 

C. Conflict of Interest 

Mr. McCullah contends that his Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel was violated because of a conflict of interest on the part 

of his counsel. Rodger Emberson, a prospective government 

witness, was being represented by Mr. Nigh, another assistant in 

the same federal public defender office that represented Mr. 

McCullah. Mr. McCullah argues that this representation 

disqualified all members of that federal public defender office. 

He further contends that the prospect of Mr. Emberson's trial 

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testimony threatened Mr. McCullah's counsel's professional 

judgment on behalf of Mr. McCullah. 

The mere possibility of a conflict of interest "is 

insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction." Cuyler v. 

Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). "Prejudice is presumed only 

if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented 

conflicting interests' " Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 692 (1984). However, where the defendant makes a timely 

objection pointing out a conflict of interest, prejudice is 

presumed if the trial court fails to make an adequate inquiry into 

the situation and take appropriate steps. Selsor v. Kaiser, 22 

F.3d 1029, 1032-33 (lOth Cir. 1994) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 

435 u.s. 475, 484 (1978)). 

The trial court made adequate inquiry and found that no 

conflict existed, especially after it determined that Mr. 

Emberson's testimony would not be admissible.2 Mr. McCullah has 

failed to demonstrate an actual conflict on the part of his 

counsel, nor has he adequately shown any adverse effects. There 

is no evidence suggesting that privileged information was shared 

between Mr. McCullah's counsel and Mr. Nigh. Mr. Nigh's 

representation of Mr. Emberson may have disqualified Mr. Nigh from 

also representing Mr. McCullah, but it was not Mr. Nigh who 

represented Mr. McCullah. Mr. McCullah was represented by other 

attorneys in the same federal public defender office, not by the 

same attorney as Mr. Emberson. Accord United States v. Trevino, 

2 The record reveals that the trial court thought that any 

possibility of conflict was mooted by denying Mr. Emberson's 

testimony. 31 R. 2334. 

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992 F.2d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The potential for such 

conflicts, however, does not necessarily exist when ... 

codefendants are represented by different attorneys, albeit in the 

same public defender office"). 

Even assuming that a potential conflict existed, that 

conflict never materialized because Mr. Emberson was not allowed 

to testify at Mr. McCullah's trial. See United States v. Dressel, 

742 F.2d 1256, 1260 (lOth Cir. 1984) (because "conflicted" witness 

never testified, defendant's attorney was not prevented from 

cross-examining a government witness). Accord Wycoff v. Nix, 869 

F.2d 1111, 1117 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989) (no 

actual conflict because "conflicted" witness did not testify) . 

Mr. McCullah claims that the spectre of Mr. Emberson's testimony 

may have affected his counsel's professional judgment on his 

behalf, but we find that this "conflict" is too speculative and 

hypothetical to impugn his conviction. The record reveals that 

the trial court assessed the risk of conflict and properly 

determined that disallowing Mr. Emberson's testimony adequately 

eliminated any risk. 

II. Voir Dire 

Mr. McCullah contends that the trial court erred in failing 

to remove prospective juror Dehart, a prison guard at a state 

minimum security prison, for cause, forcing Mr. McCullah to use 

one of his peremptory challenges to remove him. The trial court's 

decision to refuse a for-cause dismissal is reviewed only for 

clear abuse of discretion, United States v. Mcintyre, 997 F.2d 

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687, 697 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 736 (1994), 

although review of legal questions, such as the statutory 

qualifications for jurors, is de novo, see United States v. Protex 

Indus .. Inc., 874 F.2d 740, 743 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b) (6) (B), members of the fire or 

police departments of any State are barred from jury duty. 28 

U.S.C. § 1863(b) (6) (B). Mr. McCullah seeks to equate "prison 

guard" with "police officer", relying on an Oklahoma statute which 

invest prison guards with the powers of "peace officers" and 

another statute which defines "police officer" and "peace officer" 

similarly. See 57 Okla. Stat. § 510(3); 21 Okla. Stat. § 648(A). 

Mr. McCullah's interpretation of § 1863(b) (6) (B) goes against the 

plain language of the statute which clearly refers to only "police 

officers", a specific, narrow category of persons. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1863(b) (6) (B). While prison guards may have some police-like 

duties, they are not members of the police department. Had 

Congress intended to exclude a broader class of persons from jury 

service, it could have simply used a broader term, such as "law 

enforcement officer." The fact that the state of Oklahoma may, in 

certain instances, consider prison guards officers of the law, see 

Snyder v. State, 738 P.2d 548, 550 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) 

(corrections officers within scope of statute prohibiting assaults 

on police officers), does not alter§ 1863(b) (6) (B)'s definition 

of "police officer" to include prison guards. 

"Generally, a court must grant a challenge for cause if the 

prospective juror's actual prejudice or bias is shown." Vasey v. 

Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1467 (lOth Cir. 1994). The 

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trial court and counsel thoroughly examined prospective juror 

Dehart regarding his employment as a prison guard and any 

potential bias or prejudice his employment might cause. We agree 

with the Second and Seventh Circuits that 11 a trial court 'is not 

required to excuse any juror on the basis of his occupational 

background so long as the court is able to conclude that the juror 

would be able to view the evidence and decide the case without 

bias.' 11 United States v. Nururdin, 8 F.3d 1187, 1191 (7th Cir. 

1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1328 (1994) (quoting United States 

v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 970-71 (2d Cir. 1990)). Dehart 

stated that he believed himself to be fair and impartial and that 

he had no fixed opinion about inmates or criminals. Thorough 

questioning by the trial court and counsel failed to reveal any 

bias; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

not removing prospective juror Dehart for cause. Accord Nururdin, 

8 F.3d at 1190-91 (four potential jurors related to law 

enforcement were not dismissed for cause); United States v. 

McCord, 695 F.2d 823, 828 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073 

(1983) ( 11 [O]ne's official position as a member of the law 

enforcement community does not require a court in the exercise of 

its discretion to excuse a juror for cause where the juror has 

stated that he or she could remain impartial 11 ). 

III. Coerced Statements 

Mr. McCullah claims that the trial court erred in admitting 

statements coerced from him by a government agent. Mr. Lozano, in 

cooperation with the FBI, staged a monitored conversation with Mr. 

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McCullah. Mr. Lozano, a former Arvizu employee, took Mr. McCullah 

on a long drive into the mountains. Before the drive was 

underway, Mr. Lozano gave Mr. McCullah approximately twenty 

dollars, which Mr. McCullah claims he used to purchase heroin 

which he used immediately. During the three-hour drive, Mr. 

Lozano told Mr. McCullah that the Arvizu organization was planning 

to kill him because of the fiasco in Oklahoma and offered to 

intercede with Arvizu on Mr. McCullah's behalf provided that he 

tell him the truth about the events in Oklahoma. Mr. McCullah 

proceeded to tell Mr. Lozano about the happenings in Oklahoma, 

discussing the small sum he was paid and expressing his 

willingness to go back to Oklahoma and do the job himself. Later 

in the conversation, Mr. McCullah grew frightened of Mr. Lozano, 

seeming to believe that Mr. Lozano may have been the one assigned 

to kill him. 

Mr. McCullah moved to suppress his statements to Mr. Lozano 

at trial on the basis that the statements were involuntary due to 

the influence of drugs and due to the government's "outrageous" 

conduct in obtaining the statements. Contrary to the goverment's 

assertion that Mr. McCullah raised only the intoxication issue, 

the issue of governmental conduct, including Mr. Lozano's threats, 

was adequately, if ineloquently, raised by Mr. McCullah's 

allegation of "outrageous" conduct. The trial court treated the 

two grounds as distinct and addressed them separately. The trial 

court denied Mr. McCullah's motion, finding that any drug use was 

voluntary and that the government's other conduct fell within the 

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"wide latitude" given to the government in criminal 

investigations. 

The voluntariness of a confession is a legal question subject 

to review de novo based on the entire record. United States v. 

Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1307 (lOth Cir. 1987). Subsidiary factual 

findings are subject to review under the clearly erroneous 

standard. Id. at 1307-08. The prosecution has the burden of 

proving by at least a preponderance of evidence that the 

confession was voluntary. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 

(1972). If a coerced statement is admitted in error, reversal is 

required unless the Government can show that the error was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 

u.s. 279, 295-96 (1991). 

A defendant's confession is involuntary if the government's 

conduct causes the defendant's will to be overborne and "his 

capacity for self-determination critically impaired." Schneckloth 

v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973). In determining 

whether the defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, 

the court examines "the totality of all the surrounding 

circumstances--both the characteristics of the accused and the 

details of the interrogation." Id. at 226. 

The circumstances in this case are substantially similar to 

those in Arizona v. Fulminante. In Fulminante, the defendant, a 

prison inmate at the time, was approached and befriended by 

another inmate who was a FBI informer. The informer told the 

defendant that he knew the defendant was starting to get some 

rough treatment from other inmates and offered to protect the 

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defendant from other inmates if the defendant gave him the full 

facts of the alleged crime. The defendant then made incriminating 

admissions which were used against him at trial. 

The Supreme Court held that the defendant's statements in 

Fulminante were coerced. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 287. 11 [C]oercion 

need not depend upon actual violence by a government agent; a 

credible threat is sufficient ... Id. Similarly, in this case, Mr. 

McCullah's statements to Mr. Lozano were coerced by a credible 

threat of violence. Mr. Lozano told Mr. McCullah that the Arvizu 

organization was out to kill him, a credible threat coming from a 

former member of the organization. As in Fulminante, Mr. Lozano 

offered to intercede to protect Mr. McCullah from the threat if 

Mr. McCullah confessed. Indeed, this case presents a stronger 

example of coercion than Fulminante because in this case Mr. 

Lozano fabricated the threat to Mr. McCullah. 

Mr. McCullah also claims that his statements to Mr. Lozano 

were rendered involuntary by Mr. McCullah's alleged heroin use at 

the time of the statements. While any drug use may have made the 

coercion more effective, see United States v. Haddon, 927 F.2d 

942, 946 (7th Cir. 1991), we need not reach this issue because we 

find that regardless of whether Mr. McCullah's resistance was 

weakened by drugs at the time, the threat and offer of protection 

by Mr. Lozano clearly coerced Mr. McCullah's statements.3 

3 We note that a state of intoxication does not automatically 

render a statement involuntary. United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 

1018, 1022 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 114. S. Ct. 575 (1993). 

Further, any drug use was completely voluntary on Mr. McCullah's 

part and not the product of government action. See Colorado v. 

Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) ( 11 [C]oercive police activity is 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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The erroneous admission of a coerced confession is subject to 

harmless error review. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. "When 

reviewing the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession, 

the appellate court . . . simply reviews the remainder of the 

evidence against the defendant to determine whether the admission 

of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 

The Supreme Court has stated: 

A court must approach [the harmless error issue] by 

asking whether the force of the evidence presumably 

considered by the jury in accordance with the 

instructions is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that 

evidence would have been the same in the absence of the 

[coerced confession] . 

Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404-05 (1991). Reviewing the 

evidence against Mr. McCullah, we find that there was overwhelming 

evidence to convict Mr. McCullah of the crimes charged even in the 

absence of his coerced statements. The coerced statements mainly 

pertained to Mr. McCullah's actions in Oklahoma, and the record is 

replete with a tremendous amount of other evidence as to Mr. 

McCullah's actions in Oklahoma. Evidence of fingerprints together 

with the testimony of several witnesses placed Mr. McCullah in 

Oklahoma at the lake house and at the homicide scene. Several 

witnesses testified to Mr. McCullah's pivotal role in both the 

planning and execution of the murder, as well as to the payment he 

received. We find that with regard to Mr. McCullah's convictions, 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 

'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment"). The coercion in this instance came not 

from the alleged drugs but from Mr. Lozano's statements. 

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the admission of Mr. McCullah's statements to Mr. Lozano was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 295. 

Having concluded that the use of the coerced statements was 

harmless error in the guilt phase does not end our inquiry in this 

case. We must next consider the effect, if any, of these coerced 

statements on the penalty phase. Mr. McCullah's coerced 

statements were prominently featured by the government in the 

penalty phase of the trial. Mr. McCullah's statements regarding 

the paltry sum he received for the murder and his offer to go back 

and do the job himself were the only evidence of his unrepentance. 

These statements were emphasized by the government, and we cannot 

say beyond a reasonable doubt that these remarks may not have 

influenced the jury in their findings of aggravating and 

mitigating factors, as well as affecting the weighing process 

itself. There was no evidence of Mr. McCullah's willingness to 

murder again other than these coerced statements. Mr. McCullah's 

statements may have had a significant impact on the penalty phase 

decision of the jury, and we cannot say that the admission of Mr. 

McCullah's coerced statements was harmless error during the 

penalty phase of the trial. Accordingly, we remand for a new 

penalty phase proceeding. 

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Mr. McCullah challenges his convictions, claiming that they 

are not supported by sufficient evidence. In reviewing the 

sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, we examine the 

evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in 

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the light most favorable to the government and "'ask whether any 

rational juror could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" United States v. Levine, 41 

F.3d 607, 610 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. 

Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1116 (lOth Cir. 1993)). "We consider both 

direct and circumstantial evidence and accept the jury's 

resolution of conflicting evidence and its assessment of the 

credibility of witnesses." Levine, 41 F.3d at 610. 

A. Homicide 

Mr. McCullah was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (1) (A), 

which refers to intentional homicides committed by "any person . 

. working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise." 

See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (1) (A). Mr. McCullah contends that his 

conviction on this count should be overturned because he lacked 

the knowledge needed to "work in furtherance of" the Arvizu 

criminal enterprise and because the killing of Collins was not in 

furtherance of the organization's objectives. We find both of 

these reasons unpersuasive. 

i. Knowledge of the enterprise 

Section 848 does not define the phrase "working in 

furtherance of." See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (section 848(c) defines 

"engaging in"). Absent any statutory definition, terms should be 

given their ordinary meaning. United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 

1154, 1165 (7th Cir. 1994). Mr. McCullah contends that "working 

in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise" should be 

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defined with reference to the law of conspiracy and seeks to 

impute the knowledge requirement of conspiracy law to§ 848(e). 

While knowledge of the nexus between the homicide and the 

continuing criminal enterprise is necessary under§ 848(e), the 

defendant need not be a "conspirator" nor have full knowledge of 

the objectives or extent of the continuing criminal enterprise in 

order to be "working in furtherance of" the enterprise. Cf. 

Cooper, 19 F.3d at 1164-65; United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 

1073, 1096 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2724 (1994). 

The evidence presented at trial indicated that Mr. McCullah knew 

that the planned murder was being carried out on behalf of the 

Arvizu drug organization and knew that the murder was being 

committed to further the organization's criminal objectives. This 

knowledge suffices to make Mr. McCullah's actions "working in 

furtherance of" the Arvizu continuing criminal enterprise. The 

fact that Mr. McCullah was not engaged in the drug trafficking 

portion of the Arvizu criminal enterprise is irrelevant; the reach 

of section 848(e) extends to hired henchmen, like Mr. McCullah, 

who commit murder to further a drug enterprise in which they may 

not otherwise be intimately involved.4 Cooper, 19 F.3d at 1164-

65. 

4 Similarly, outside "hitmen" hired by a continuing criminal 

enterprise are subject to prosecution under§ 848(e), provided 

that they know the are working to the benefit of a criminal 

enterprise. It is inconsequential that the hitmen may not 

otherwise be involved with the organization; so long as they 

realize that they are working to further such an enterprise, they 

are subject to§ 848(e). 

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ii. "In furtherance" of the enterprise 

The fact that the intended victim, Avery Rogers, was not the 

person actually killed does not mean that the murder was not "in 

furtherance" of the Arvizu enterprise. The murder of Mr. Collins 

may have actually furthered the Arvizu organization by sending a 

powerful message to Mr. Rogers and others that the organization 

would stop at nothing to recover its stolen drugs. To the extent 

that fear is a powerful element of the Arvizu enterprise, the 

murder of Mr. Collins likely furthered the organization's image 

and reputation. 

Further, a murder may be committed "in furtherance" of a 

continuing criminal enterprise even though it does not actually 

further the enterprise's goals. Cf. United States v. Mayes, 917 

F.2d 457, 464 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1125 (1991) 

("in furtherance" does not require actual furtherance of the 

conspiracy but rather an intent to promote conspiratorial 

objectives). The key factor is that the murder was designed and 

intended to further the enterprise, notwithstanding any failure to 

fulfill that goal. 

Mr. McCullah contends that the murder of Mr. Collins was not 

intended by the Arvizu organization but by Mr. McCullah alone and 

thus was not "in furtherance" of the continuing criminal 

enterprise. This is too narrow a view of "in furtherance." The 

murder of the wrong victim is still in furtherance of the criminal 

enterprise because the crime, as planned by the Arvizu 

organization, was designed to further the enterprise. The fact 

that the crime did not go as planned -- that Mr. McCullah took it 

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upon himself to substitute the victim -- does not alter the fact 

that the murder was aimed at furthering the enterprise. 

The fact that the actual victim was not the intended victim 

is irrelevant to the statute. Section 848(e) is not victimspecific but rather refers broadly to "the intentional killing of 

an individual." See 21 U.S. C. § 848 (e) (1) (A). As long as the 

required nexus between the murder and the continuing criminal 

enterprise is established, the identity of the actual victim 

matters not. 

B. Drug Conspiracy 

Mr. McCullah was convicted of conspiring to possess and 

distribute marijuana and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 

Mr. McCullah contends that there was insufficient evidence linking 

him to the drug conspiracy and that he merely associated with the 

conspirators. We disagree. 

A person "must have a 'general awareness of both the scope 

and the objective of the enterprise to be regarded as a 

coconspirator.'" United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1563 

(lOth Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. 

Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 670 (lOth Cir. 1992}). In order for there to 

be a conspiracy, there must at some point be a meeting of the 

minds as to the common purpose of the conspiracy. Anderson, 981 

F.2d at 1563. 

The government concedes that there was no evidence that Mr. 

McCullah actually trafficked in drugs for the Arvizu organization, 

but the evidence did indicate that McCullah was affiliated with 

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the organization and participated in one of the organization's key 

drug-related operations, namely the recovery of the stolen drugs 

and the punishment of the drug thieves. Contrary to Mr. 

McCullah's assertions that he merely associated with the members 

of the Arvizu organization, the evidence indicates Mr. McCullah 

took an active part in the planning of the drug-related operation. 

Mr. Mendoza testified that Mr. McCullah helped with the plan 

to kidnap and torture Avery Rogers, then helped to change that 

plan and to formulate the new plan to murder Mr. Rogers, and that 

Mr. McCullah volunteered to draw Mr. Rogers out. Mr. McCullah's 

active involvement in the operation to recover the stolen drugs 

leads to the reasonable inference that Mr. McCullah was part of 

the conspiracy to distribute the drugs, once recovered. Far from 

being a complete outsider, Mr. McCullah was familiar with the 

Arvizu organization and understood the objectives of the 

conspiracy; Mr. McCullah understood that the murder of Rogers was 

not an end in itself but rather was part of the Arvizu 

organization's larger drug distribution operation. See id. The 

jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that there was a 

meeting of the minds between Mr. McCullah and the others as to a 

general awareness of the scope and the objective of the Arvizu 

drug conspiracy, and this sufficiently supports the jury's verdict 

on the drug conspiracy charge. Id. 

C. Conspiracy to, and violation of, 18 U.S.C. § 1958 

Mr. McCullah was convicted of "travel ... in interstate 

commerce . . . with intent that a murder be committed . . . as 

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consideration for a promise or agreement to payn in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1958(a), 2. Mr. McCullah was also convicted of 

conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a), in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 371. Mr. McCullah contends that there was insufficient 

evidence to support his conviction on these counts. We disagree. 

The government concedes that there is no direct evidence that 

Mr. McCullah knew of the murder plan at the time of the interstate 

travel, but from the evidence the jury could reasonably infer that 

Mr. McCullah was knowingly recruited in California to participate 

in a murder in Oklahoma. The evidence revealed that the Arvizu 

organization had already decided to murder Rogers before they 

recruited Mr. McCullah and that Mr. McCullah was specifically 

recruited to participate in the drug recovery and murder scheme. 

The other recruits -- Mr. Mendoza and the Mexican pistoleros --

all knew the purpose of the trip to Oklahoma was to eliminate the 

drug thief. The jury could reasonably infer that Mr. McCullah, 

too, must have known the purpose of the trip; indeed it would be 

difficult to hide the purpose from him even had they wanted to. 

Mr. McCullah knew that he was 11 to do a job for Ray [Molina] 11 , 21 

R. 51, and presumably, he knew what that job was before he 

undertook it. In light of all the evidence, the jury could 

reasonably infer that Mr. McCullah must have known about the 

homicidal purpose behind the trip from California to Oklahoma 

before he undertook the venture, and thus the convictions under 18 

U.S.C. §§ 1958, 371 are sufficiently supported by the evidence. 

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V. Drug Conspiracy Conviction 

Mr. McCullah challenges his drug conspiracy conviction, 

claiming that this count is a lesser included offense in his § 

848(e) murder conviction and that the drug quantity used for 

sentencing under the drug conspiracy conviction was erroneous. 

Mr. McCullah failed to raise either of these claims in the 

district court, so we review only for plain error. See Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 52(b). 

A. Multiplicity with Homicide Count 

Generally, a conspiracy charge and a substantive charge are 

separate offenses, and one offense is not a lesser included 

offense of the other. See United States v. Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 

744-45 (lOth Cir. 1991). The situation is even more clear where 

the substantive offense is not the object of the conspiracy. In 

this case, Mr. McCullah was convicted of drug conspiracy under § 

846 and capital murder under§ 848(e). The conspiracy charge is 

separate and distinct from the murder charge, not a lesser 

included offense. 

A violation of § 848(e) requires that the murder be committed 

by a person "engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing 

criminal enterprise." 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) {1) (A). A violation of§ 

846 requires that a person "attempt or conspire" to commit a drug 

offense. 21 U.S.C. § 846. Mr. McCullah seeks to equate the 

continuing criminal enterprise requirement of § 848(e) with 

conspiracy, claiming that furtherance of a continuing criminal 

enterprise necessitates participation in a conspiracy. However, 

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as we discussed supra, a person may further a continuing criminal 

enterprise without necessarily being a full member of the 

underlying conspiracy. 

Reliance on United States v. Stallings, 810 F.2d 973 (lOth 

Cir. 1987), is misplaced. In Stallings, the defendant was charged 

with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise as well as 

conspiracy, but the conspiracy alleged was the continuing criminal 

enterprise. By contrast, here the continuing criminal enterprise 

requirement is part of a greater offense, capital murder, which is 

separate from the drug conspiracy charge. 

Further, we note that under Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 

368-69 (1983), Congress could specifically authorize cumulative 

punishment under two statutes even if both statutes prohibit the 

11 same 11 conduct. Congress has clearly expressed its intention that 

the § 848(e) punishment be cumulative with any other applicable 

punishment, stating in the statute that the§ 848(e) penalties are 

11 [i]n addition to the other penalties set forth in this section. 11 

See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (1). Thus, even if we found the offenses 

duplicative, cumulative sentences would still be appropriate. 

B. Drug Quantity 

Mr. McCullah was sentenced on the drug conspiracy count based 

on the size of the 91 kilogram cocaine shipment which the 

conspiracy sought to recover. See U.S.S.G. 2Dl.l(a) (3). He 

challenges this drug quantity, contending that this quantity was 

not reasonably foreseeable by him and thus cannot be used in 

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sentencing him. Mr. McCullah failed to raise this issue below, 

and again we review only for plain error and find none. 

Mr. McCullah contends that there was no evidence that he 

knew about the stolen drugs in Oklahoma or that he knew the drugs 

weighed 91 kilograms. However, the evidence showed that he was 

aware that the purpose behind the planned kidnapping and murder of 

Avery Rogers was the recovery of a quantity of drugs. The fact 

that Mr. McCullah did not know the exact amount is irrelevant; Mr. 

McCullah was an active participant in a conspiracy to recover and 

distribute 91 kilograms of cocaine, and thus this amount is 

properly attributable to him in sentencing. See United States v. 

Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1444-45 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. 

Ct. 133 (1995). 

Mr. McCullah contends that the drug quantity must be 

"reasonably foreseeable," relying on Sentencing Guideline§ 

1Bl.3(a) (1) (B). See also Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1445 (lOth Cir. 

1995). However, Sentencing Guideline§ 1Bl.3(a) (1) (A) makes a 

defendant responsible for "all acts . . . committed, aided, [and] 

abetted . by the defendant" without regard to foreseeability. 

The Guideline Commentary example makes this abundantly clear: 

Defendant A is one of ten persons hired by Defendant B 

to off-load a ship containing marihuana. The offloading of the ship is interrupted by law enforcement 

officers and one ton of marihuana is seized (the amount 

on the ship as well as the amount off-loaded). 

Defendant A and the other off-loaders are arrested and 

convicted of importation of marihuana. Regardless of 

the number of bales he personally unloaded, Defendant A 

is accountable for the entire one-ton quantity of 

marihuana. Defendant A aided and abetted the offloading of the entire shipment of marihuana by directly 

participating in the off-loading of that shipment ... Therefore, he is accountable for the entire shipment 

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under subsection (a) (1) (A) without regard to the issue 

of reasonable foreseeability. 

U.S.S.G. 1B1.3 Commentary 2 (a) (1) (Illustrations of Conduct for 

Which the Defendant is Accountable). Similarly, by directly 

participating in the drug recovery scheme, Mr. McCullah is 

responsible for the entire quantity of drugs sought to be 

recovered regardless of reasonable foreseeability. Accord United 

States v. Pessefall, 27 F.3d 511, 517 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. 

denied, 115 S. Ct. 1154 (1995); United States v. Corral-Ibarra, 25 

F.3d 430, 438 (7th Cir. 1994). 

Sentencing Phase Challenges 

VI. Non-statutory Aggravating Factors 

The district court submitted four non-statutory aggravating 

factors to the jury, and the jury found all four. The four 

factors were: 1) a deadly weapon was used in the killing; 2) Mr. 

McCullah had previously been convicted of two or more state or 

federal offenses punishable by imprisonment for more than one 

year; 3) Mr. McCullah committed the offenses as to which he was 

charged in the indictment; and 4) repeated attempts to 

rehabilitate Mr. McCullah or deter him from future criminal 

behavior had been unsuccessful. 

A. 

Under 21 U.S.C. § 848, the prosecutor has the discretion to 

urge aggravating factors not enumerated in Section 848{n) provided 

that proper advance notice is given. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 

848(h) (1} (B), (j), (k), (n). Mr. McCullah contends that the 

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prosecutor's power to promulgate non-statutory aggravating factors 

amounts to an unconstitutional delegation of power to the 

Executive Branch. Whether Congress has unconstitutionally 

delegated its authority is a question of law subject to de novo 

review. See generally United States v. Allen, 24 F.3d 1180, 1182 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 493 (1994). 

The Supreme Court has long recognized that the federal 

sentencing function is "a peculiarly shared responsibility among 

the Branches of Government and has never been thought of as the 

exclusive constitutional province of any one Branch." Mistretta 

v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390 (1989). In Mistretta the 

Court stated: 

We ... have recognized ... that the separation-ofpowers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in 

particular, do not prevent Congress from obtaining the 

assistance of its coordinate Branches .... So long as 

Congress "shall lay down by legislative act an 

intelligible principle to which the person or body 

authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is 

directed to conform, such legislative action is not a 

forbidden delegation of legislative power." ... Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to 

delegate power under broad general directives. 

Mistretta, 488 u.s. at 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. 

United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). The prosecutoral 

discretion to promulgate non-statutory aggravating factors falls 

squarely within the permissible delegation of power to the 

Executive Branch. 

At the selection stage of a capital proceeding, the focus is 

on "an individualized determination on the basis of the character 

of the individual and the circumstances of the crime." Zant v. 

Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) (emphasis in original). In 

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light of this purpose, Congress, recognizing that it could not 

adequately account for all the possible aggravating and mitigating 

factors inherent in any particular homicide, allowed factors to be 

considered which it did not specifically enumerate in the statute. 

See 21 U.S.C. § 848(h) (1) (B), (m) (10). To achieve the goal of 

individualized sentencing, Congress has properly delegated some 

degree of discretion to the Executive Branch, limited by the 

directive that the factors must be "aggravating" and further 

constrained by the requirement of notice. See 21 U.S.C § 

848(h) (1) (B). The established notion of "aggravating factors", 

coupled with the principle of individualized sentencing and 

notice, provides an "intelligible principle" to which the 

executive branch must conform its exercise of the delegated power. 

See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. Further, the limited nature of 

the delegated power should also be noted; an (n} (1) statutory 

aggravating factor must be present for a defendant to be deatheligible, and only then do the non-statutory factors come into 

play. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(k). 

The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of non-statutory 

aggravating factors in state capital punishment statutes and has 

held the use of non-statutory aggravating factors permissible. 

Zant, 462 U.S. at 878. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 966-

67 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (the Constitution does not 

require that statutory aggravating factors be "exclusive"). In 

Zant the Court stated: 

Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating 

circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function 

at the stage of legislative definition: they 

circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death 

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penalty. But the Constitution does not require the jury 

to ignore other possible aggravating factors in the 

process of selecting, from among that class, those 

defendants who will actually be sentenced to death. 

Zant, 462 U.S. at 878. To the extent that some delegation of 

discretion to the executive branch is necessary to achieve the 

individualized sentencing mandated by the Constitution, clearly 

the delegation itself cannot be unconstitutional. 

B. 

Mr. McCullah challenges the constitutional validity of 

several of the non-statutory aggravating factors presented to the 

jury, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence supporting one of 

the factors. The constitutional validity of aggravating factors 

is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Allen, 24 

F.3d at 1182. The sufficiency of evidence supporting an 

aggravating factor is reviewed under the same standard as the 

sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction; we determine if 

the evidence, including reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom, when taken in the light most favorable to the 

government, is sufficient that a reasonable jury could find the 

aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. See 21 U.S.C. § 

848(j); United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1531 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986). 

i. 

Mr. McCullah argues that the "use of a deadly weapon" cannot 

be an aggravating factor because this factor adds nothing beyond 

the essential elements of the offense of murder and does not 

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narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. Mr. McCullah 

claims that by definition a deadly weapon is inherent in every 

homicide. We disagree. 

The plain, everyday meaning of the term "deadly weapon" 

necessarily implies an inherently dangerous instrumentality 

designed for use as a weapon. Such an instrumentality is not 

necessarily present in every homicide. For example, homicides are 

often accomplished by strangulation, but the reasonable juror 

would not presume that this was accomplished by "use of a deadly 

weapon." Thus, "use of a deadly weapon" may properly be used as 

an aggravating factor because this factor genuinely narrows the 

class of defendants eligible for the death penalty and aids in 

individualized sentencing. See Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 

1542 (1993); Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 2635 (1994). 

ii. 

Mr. McCullah contends that "conunission of the charged 

offenses" cannot be used as a non-statutory aggravating factor 

because this factor adds nothing above and beyond the elements of 

the offense itself. We disagree. 

In Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988), the 

Supreme Court held it permissible to count an element of the 

underlying offense as an aggravating factor where the "narrowing" 

function is performed at the guilt phase. Lowenfield involved a 

Louisiana capital punishment case where the statutory aggravating 

factor, "the offen~er knowingly created a risk of death or great 

bodily harm to more than one person," was also an element of first 

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degree murder under the Louisiana statute. The Court in 

Lowenfield stated: 

The fact that the sentencing jury is also required to 

find the existence of an aggravating circumstance in 

addition is no part of the constitutionally required 

narrowing process, and so the fact that the aggravating 

circumstance duplicated one of the elements of the crime 

does not make this sentence constitutionally infirm. 

Id. at 246. The Court found that the narrowing function was 

adequately performed by the statute itself, and the statutory 

aggravating factor merely repeated one of the narrowing 

conditions. 

Similarly, in this case the federal statute narrows the class 

of death-eligible defendants by restricting the possibility of 

capital punishment to certain situations. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (1). 

Under Lowenfield, an aggravating factor that does not add anything 

above and beyond the offense is constitutionally permissible 

provided that the statute itself narrows the class of deatheligible defendants. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 246. Thus, although 

the non-statutory aggravating factor, "committed the offenses 

charged in the indictment", may be seen as simply restating the 

elements of the offenses, this is not an unconstitutional 

aggravating factor under Lowenfield because the statute itself 

under which Mr. McCullah was indicted specifically narrows the 

field of death-eligible defendants. "Committed the offenses 

charged in the indictment" is essentially equivalent to restating 

the elements of each offense individually, which falls squarely 

within Lowenfield. 

The government correctly points out that the aggravating 

factor "committed the offenses charged in the indictment" allowed 

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the jury to consider the circumstances of McCullah's criminal 

activity. This aggravating factor allowed the jury to consider 

the fact that the murder was committed in furtherance of an 

illegal drug operation. The jury is entitled to consider the 

circumstances of the crime in determining whether to impose the 

death penalty. Zant, 462 U.S. at 879. 

iii. 

Mr. McCullah claims that the evidence did not support a 

finding that "repeated attempts to rehabilitate the defendant 

. or deter him from future criminal behavior have been 

unsuccessful." We again disagree. 

The record shows, and Mr. McCullah concedes, that the 

government presented evidence of three separate felony convictions 

against Defendant, all of which resulted in prison terms. The 

fact that Mr. McCullah continued to commit crimes after his 

release from prison indicates that prison failed to deter Mr. 

McCullah's future criminal conduct. This is sufficient to support 

the jury's finding that attempts to rehabilitate McCullah or to 

deter his future misconduct have been unsuccessful. Contrary to 

McCullah's contention, no evidence of more specific rehabilitative 

or deterrent efforts need be shown. 

VII. Statutory Aggravating Factors 

The district court submitted four statutory aggravating 

factors to the jury, and the jury found all four. The four 

factors were 21 U.S.C. § 848(n) (1) (C) ("The defendant 

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intentionally engaged in conduct intending that the victim be 

killed or that lethal force be employed against the victim, which 

resulted in the death of the victim11 ), (n) (1) (D) ( 11 The defendant 

intentionally engaged in conduct which (i) the defendant knew 

would create a grave risk of death to a person, other than one of 

the participants in the offense; and (ii) resulted in the death of 

the victim11 ), (n) (7) ( 11 The defendant committed the offense as 

consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the 

receipt, of anything of pecuniary value 11 ), and (n) (8) ( 11 The 

defendant committed the offense after substantial planning and 

premeditation11 ). Mr. McCullah contends that these statutory 

aggravating factors were erroneously submitted to the jury. 

A. 

Mr. McCullah argues that the statutory (n) (1) factors are 

merely eligibility factors which Congress did not intend to be 

weighed against mitigating factors in the selection phase of the 

sentencing process. The clear language of the statute refutes 

this contention. 

In interpreting a statute we look first to the plain meaning 

of the words of the statute, and if the words of the statute are 

unambiguous, our inquiry ends. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 113 

S.Ct. 1119, 1122-23 (1993). Section 848(n) (1) is listed along 

with eleven other factors (§ 848(n) (2)- (12)) in a subsection 

entitled, 11Aggravating factors for homicide ... 21 U.S.C. § 848(n). 

The plain language of § 848(k) clearly contemplates the weighing 

of (n) (1) factors as aggravating factors and is unambiguous as to 

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this point. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(k). Section 848(k) states, in 

pertinent part: 

If an aggravating factor set forth in subsection (n) (1) 

of this section and one or more of the other aggravating 

factors set forth in subsection (n) of this section are 

found to exist, the jury, or if there is no jury, the 

court, shall then consider whether the aggravating 

factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh any 

mitigating factor or factors found to exist, or in the 

absence of mitigating factors, whether the aggravating 

factors are themselves sufficient to justify a sentence 

of death. 

Id. The statutory language refers to all aggravating factors, 

which clearly includes the (n) (1) factors. In considering the 

references to "aggravating factors", it is dispositive that (n) (1) 

factors are specifically denominated as "aggravating factors" by 

the statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(k), (n). 

The fact that Congress changed the capital sentencing scheme 

for other crimes six years after the adoption of § 848(e) et seg. 

does not alter the plain language interpretation of § 848(e). The 

Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 created a new capital sentencing 

scheme for many federal offenses, but significantly did not alter 

§ 848(e). See Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-

322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 

Even had the 1994 Act been an amendment to § 848, it would merely 

indicate that Congress can, and did, alter the federal capital 

sentencing scheme for drug conspiracies. However, this does not 

in any way indicate any error in the prior scheme; there is more 

than one proper method of structuring a capital sentencing scheme. 

See Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1034-35 (1995). Further, 

there is simply no merit to Mr. McCullah's argument that the 1994 

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Act should be construed as "clarifying" a provision it did not 

even purport to amend. 

B. 

Mr. McCullah argues that the § 848(n) (1) aggravating factors 

encompass the full universe of defendants eligible for the death 

penalty, making the factor constitutionally infirm because it 

fails to adequately narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. 

While a capital sentencing scheme must adequately narrow the 

class of death-eligible defendants, the narrowing function may be 

performed by jury findings at either the sentencing phase of the 

trial or the guilt phase. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244-45. See 

Part VI(B) (ii), supra. Congress has statutorily narrowed the 

field of death eligible defendants by limiting the possibility of 

capital punishment to homicides in furtherance of continuing 

criminal enterprises or other specified offenses. See 21 U.S.C. § 

848(e) (1). Thus, contrary to McCullah's assertion, only a small 

subset of all potentially death-eligible defendants are subject to 

capital punishment under the federal scheme, and thus the 

requisite narrowing is present. While the factors in§ 848(n) (1) 

may mirror the intent element found at the guilt phase, this is 

permissible under Lowenfield. The narrowing function of § 848(e) 

makes further narrowing by§ 848(n) (1) unnecessary. Furthermore, 

§ 848 requires that the jury find at least one other aggravating 

factor from the list of (n) (2)- (n) (12) before the death penalty 

can be imposed, further reducing the field of death-eligible 

defendants. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k). The narrowing functions of §§ 

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848(e} and 848(k) clearly satisfy the constitutional requirements 

of Lowenfield. Accord Chandler, 996 F.2d at 1093. 

Mr. McCullah suggests that Lowenfield is distinguishable 

because the aggravating factor was not as broadly inclusive as the 

factor here. However, the difference is merely illusory; indeed 

the federal capital sentencing scheme is more lenient than the one 

upheld in Lowenfield. The Louisiana capital punishment statute 

made "first degree murder" a capital offense and defined "first 

degree murder" to include "when the offender has a specific intent 

to kill ... more than one person." Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 242. 

The statute made "knowingly created the risk of death . . . to 

more than one person" a statutory aggravating factor. Id. at 243. 

Therein, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder on the 

basis of his intent to kill more than one person and sentenced to 

death on the basis of that sole statutory aggravating factor as 

well. Thus no narrowing function was served by the aggravating 

factor, but rather the narrowing occurred in the statutory 

definition of first degree murder. 

Similarly, in the federal scheme the (n) (1) factor does not 

narrow the field of death-eligible defendants, rather the 

narrowing is accomplished by statutory definition in§ 848(e). 

Mr. McCullah suggests that the federal scheme is different from 

the Louisiana statute in Lowenfield because the (n} (1) factor does 

not exactly duplicate the § 848(e) narrowing factors, but is 

broader than§ 848(e}. This difference is immaterial because the 

practical effect is the same regardless of whether the aggravating 

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factor exactly mirrors the statutory elements or extends slightly 

beyond. 

Mr. McCullah argues that the Supreme Court's decision in 

Arave v. Creech requires that aggravating factors must play a 

narrowing role. See Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1542. However, this is 

incorrect. Arave is distinguishable because the capital 

punishment statute in that case was "defined broadly to include 

all first-degree murderers ... [a]nd the category of firstdegree murderers is also broad." Id. at 1542-43. Thus, a broad 

capital punishment statute necessitates that the narrowing 

function be performed by the aggravating factors, whereas here the 

narrowing function was performed by the statute itself. See 

Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244-46. 

c. 

The jury found as a statutory aggravating factor that Mr. 

McCullah "committed the offense after substantial planning and 

premeditation." See 21 U.S.C. § 848(n) (8). Mr. McCullah contends 

that this factor was submitted in error because the statutory 

language is unconstitutionally vague and that the evidence fails 

to support the jury's finding. 

i. 

The Supreme Court has announced that a vagueness review 

should be "quite deferential" because "mathematical precision" is 

not possible in the definition of aggravating factors. Tuilaepa, 

114 S.Ct. at 2635. The "basic principle" is that "a factor is not 

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unconstitutional if it has some 'commonsense core of meaning ... 

that criminal juries should be capable of understanding.'" Id. at 

2635-36 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (White, 

J., concurring)). Nevertheless, an aggravating factor may be 

unconstitutionally vague if it "leave[s] the sentencer without 

sufficient guidance for determining the presence or absence of the 

factor." Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926, 2928 (1992). 

Mr. McCullah argues that the word "substantial" is inherently 

ambiguous and vague. We disagree. In the context in which it 

appears, the term clearly has a commonsense meaning of 

"considerable in quantity: significantly large," which criminal 

juries are capable of understanding. See Webster's Ninth New 

Collegiate Dictionary 1176 (1991). In the context in which it 

appeared, it could not be reasonably confused with the alternative 

definition denoting mere existence, as in the sense of having 

substance. 

Mr. McCullah requested that the district court instruct the 

jury that: "'Substantial' planning means considerably more 

planning than is typical for the commission of the crime at issue, 

in this case, murder." The district court instead instructed the 

jury that: "'Substantial' planning means planning which is 

considerable or ample for the commission of the crime at issue." 

We find no error in the district court's definition. 

"Substantial" planning does not require "considerably more 

planning than is typical" but rather it means "considerable" or 

"ample for commission of the crime." 

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ii. 

Mr. McCullah argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

support a finding of substantial planning because the murder 

victim was not the intended victim. We disagree. Section 

848(n) (8) is not drafted in a victim-specific fashion, nor should 

it be construed that way. The plain language of the statutory 

factor states: "The defendant committed the offense after 

substantial planning and premeditation." 21 U.S.C. § 848(n) (8). 

The "offense" refers to Section 848(e), which is also not drafted 

in a victim-specific fashion, referring only to the "intentional 

killing of an individual." See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (e) (1) (A). In this 

case, substantial planning and premeditation resulted in the 

construction of a deadly encounter, and the fact that the eventual 

victim was not the intended victim does not alter the fact that 

the killing of an individual was accomplished by the premeditated 

plan. 

D. 

The jury found as a statutory aggravating factor that Mr. 

McCullah "committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, 

or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary 

value." See 21 U.S.C. § 848(n) (7). Mr. McCullah contends that 

the evidence was insufficient to support this finding because any 

compensation received was for the killing of Rogers, not Collins, 

the eventual victim. This argument is disingenuous. 

Like section 848 (e), section 848 (n) (7) is not framed in 

victim-specific terms. Mr. McCullah committed the offense for 

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pecuniary gain, even if he did not kill the right person. Mr. 

McCullah does not, and indeed could not, dispute the fact that he 

participated in the murder for pecuniary reward, and that more 

than satisfies the statutory factor. 

VIII. Duplicative Aggravating Factors 

Mr. McCullah contends that the district court erred in 

submitting duplicative and cumulative aggravating factors to the 

jury. We agree. 

The district court submitted to the jury both the § 

848(n) (1) (C) statutory aggravating factor, "intentionally engaged 

in conduct intending that the victim be killed or that lethal 

force be employed against the victim, which resulted in death of 

the victim," and the non-statutory aggravating factor, "committed 

the offenses as to which he is charged in the indictment." These 

two factors substantially overlap with one another. In order for 

the jury to find that Mr. McCullah committed the offenses with 

which he was charged, the jury necessarily had to conclude that 

Mr. McCullah did intentionally kill an individual, or did 

intentionally counsel, command, induce, procure, or cause the 

killing of an individual, and such killing did result or happen. 

See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e). 

The district court also submitted to the jury both the 

Section 848 (n) (1) (C) and (n) (1) (D) statutory aggravating factors. 

The (n) (1) (D) factor requires that the defendant intentionally 

engages in conduct which he knows creates a grave risk of death 

and that such death results. 21 U.S.C. § 848(n) (1) (D). This 

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substantially overlaps with the (n) (1) (C) factor which refers to 

intentional conduct intending that the victim be killed. See 21 

U.S.C. § 848(n) (1) (C). Any intentional conduct aimed at producing 

death is by definition conduct done with knowledge of grave risk 

of death. While the factors are not identical per se, the 

(n) (1) (C) factor necessarily subsumes the (n) (1) (D) factor. 

Such double counting of aggravating factors, especially under 

a weighing scheme, has a tendency to skew the weighing process and 

creates the risk that the death sentence will be imposed 

arbitrarily and thus, unconstitutionally. Cf. Stringer v. Black, 

112 S. Ct. 1130, 1137 (1992). As the Supreme Court of Utah 

pointed out, when the same aggravating factor is counted twice, 

the "defendant is essentially condemned 'twice for the same 

culpable act,'" which is inherently unfair. Parsons v. Barnes, 

871 P.2d 516, 529 (Utah) (quoting Cook v. State, 369 So.2d 1251, 

1256 (Ala. 1979)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 431 (1994). While the 

federal statute at issue is a weighing statute which allows the 

jury to accord as much or as little weight to any particular 

aggravating factor, the mere finding of an aggravating factor 

cannot but imply a qualitative value to that factor. Cf. Engberg 

v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 89 (Wyo. 1991). When the sentencing body 

is asked to weigh a factor twice in its decision, a reviewing 

court cannot "assume it would have made no difference if the thumb 

had been removed from death's side of the scale.'' Stringer, 112 

S. Ct. at 1137. In Stringer the Supreme Court made it clear that: 

When the weighing process itself has been skewed, only 

constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing at 

the trial or appellate level suffices to guarantee that 

the defendant received an individualized sentence. 

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Id. We hold that the use of duplicative aggravating factors 

creates an unconstitutional skewing of the weighing process which 

necessitates a reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating 

factors. 

To the extent that Congress wants a particular aggravating 

factor to receive enhanced weight in the sentencing process, it 

can provide for such enhancement in the statute itself. However, 

Congress elected not to do so, and the prosecutor cannot attempt 

to circumvent Congress's inaction by introducing the same factor 

in a different guise a second time. 

IX. Mitigating Factors 

The district court submitted sixteen mitigating factors to 

the jury. While at least one juror found the existence of every 

factor, only three factors were found by a consensus. Mr. 

McCullah claims that the jurors erred in failing to find three 

mitigating factors established by uncontradicted evidence. We 

disagree. 

Under Section 848(k), mitigating factors are weighed by each 

juror individually. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k). However, if the evidence 

does not support a juror's failure to find a mitigating factor, 

the resulting death sentence is unsound. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (3). 

The defense has the burden of proving mitigating factors by a 

preponderance of the evidence. 21 U.S.C. § 848(j). 

The government questions whether Mr. McCullah may seek review 

of the jury findings because at least one juror found each 

mitigating factor. The statute refers to the "failure to find 

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. any mitigating factors," but does not specify whether a finding 

by a single juror suffices to preclude judicial review. See 21 

U.S.C. § 848(q) (3) (B). We believe that a non-unanimous finding is 

subject to appellate review. Any other result would be contrary 

to the intent of the statute and would preclude appellate review 

where an incontrovertible fact is denied by all but one juror. 

Indeed, it seems clearly contrary to the spirit and intent of the 

statute to provide for appellate review where no juror finds a 

mitigating factor, but to deny such review where but a single 

juror finds such a factor. 

We review a juror's finding concerning the absence of 

mitigating factors in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Jurors are not 

required to believe the testimony of witnesses simply because the 

testimony is not directly contradicted. See Maggio v. Fulford, 

462 u.s. 111, 117-118 (1983). The credibility of witnesses is an 

issue that is the proper province of the trier of fact, and thus 

as an appellate court we must be cautious and deferential in our 

review of factual findings of jurors. 

Mr. McCullah argues that he presented uncontradicted 

testimony from Dr. Randall Price that his I.Q. is currently 80, 

and yet one juror refused to so find. A review of the record 

reveals several facts which may have lead a reasonable juror to 

conclude that Mr. McCullah failed to prove his I.Q. to be 80. In 

his testimony, Dr. Price announced his finding that McCullah's 

full scale I.Q. was 80, but noted an unusually large discrepancy 

between Mr. McCullah's verbal I.Q., 77, and his performance I.Q., 

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91. 38 R. 179-80. Further, an earlier I.Q. test placed 

Defendant's I.Q. at 96. 38 R. 184. On cross-examination Dr. 

Price indicated that motivation was a factor in the score, and an 

unmotivated individual might score lower than his actual 

abilities. 38 R. 196-97. Dr. Price also conceded that Mr. 

McCullah might have incentive to distort his abilities considering 

the context of the criminal proceeding. 38 R. 201-02. Under 

these circumstances, a reasonable juror might well have concluded 

that Dr. Price's opinion as to Mr. McCullah's I.Q. was suspect and 

not credible considering McCullah's incentive to distort his 

abilities and in light of the anomalous test results. 

Mr. McCullah challenges the finding by four jurors that he 

did not suffer from brain dysfunction. Mr. McCullah again relies 

on the testimony of Dr. Price who stated that Mr. McCullah's 

learning problems were "probably due to organic brain 

dysfunction." 38 R. 181. However, Dr. Price admitted on crossexamination that he lacked "hard medical evidence" to support this 

proposition but rather was relying on neuropsychological evidence. 

38 R. 201. Considering Mr. McCullah's incentive to distort his 

condition in his interview with Dr. Price as discussed above, and 

in light of the shakiness of Dr. Price's "conclusion", a 

reasonable juror could certainly have concluded that Mr. McCullah 

failed to prove that he suffered from brain dysfunction. 

Mr. McCullah also challenges the finding of ten jurors who 

determined that he failed to prove that he suffered from 

attention-deficit disorder. Again, Mr. McCullah primarily relies 

upon Dr. Price's testimony, which as we stated above, a reasonable 

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juror could certainly have questioned. Mr. McCullah also relies 

upon the equivocal testimony of Jean Williamson, a school 

psychologist who worked with him over twenty years ago, who stated 

that he "demonstrated symptoms" of attention-deficit disorder. 38 

R. 73. This testimony and that of Dr. Price simply do not compel 

the conclusion that Mr. McCullah suffered from attention-deficit 

disorder, and as an appellate court we will not question jurors' 

findings supported by the record. 

X. Amendment of the Aggravating Factors 

Mr. McCullah contends that the district court erred by 

submitting a new aggravating factor to replace an erroneous one 

after closing arguments in the penalty phase. We do not need to 

reach this issue because we remand the sentencing phase 

proceedings. However, we note that the trial court's failure to 

comply with Rule 30 constitutes reversible error only if the party 

was "unfairly prevented from arguing his defense to the jury or 

was substantially misled in formulating his arguments." United 

States v. Smith, 629 F.2d 650, 653 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 449 

U.S. 994 (1980). The record in this case does not indicate that 

Mr. McCullah was unfairly prejudiced in his arguments, especially 

since Mr. McCullah's counsel recognized that the new factor 

properly stated the law. Importantly, although Mr. McCullah 

argues that he would have modified his summation had he known 

about the amended instruction, Mr. McCullah's counsel did not 

object on that basis, nor did he seek leave to present additional 

argument in light of the amended instruction. Further, Mr. 

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McCullah has failed to demonstrate how he was substantively 

prejudiced-- how the argument and result would have been any 

different. 

XI. Voir Dire on Mitigating Factors 

Mr. McCullah contends that the district court erred by 

restricting the voir dire regarding the jurors' ability to 

consider mitigating factors. We have reviewed the record and 

disagree. 

The trial court retains great latitude in its oversight of 

voir dire. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424, 427 (1991). In 

Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2229-30 (1992), the Supreme 

Court held that a juror who would automatically vote for the death 

penalty in every case was not impartial because the presence of 

aggravating or mitigating factors was irrelevant to such a juror. 

Voir dire must adequately identify such unqualified jurors, and to 

this end, certain inquiries must be made in capital cases. 

Morgan, 112 S.Ct. at 2230. 

Under Morgan, general fairness and "follow the law" questions 

alone are insufficient to insure against a death-biased jury. Id. 

at 2232-2233. However, despite Mr. McCullah's assertions to the 

contrary, the voir dire in this case extended beyond mere general 

impartiality and "follow the law" questions and adequately 

explored jurors' views on mitigation. The district court was not 

required, as Mr. McCullah suggests, to allow inquiry into each 

juror's views as to specific mitigating factors as long as the 

voir dire was adequate to detect those in the venire who would 

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automatically vote for the death penalty. See id. at 2232. The 

record reveals that the district court specifically asked each 

juror whether he would recommend against the death penalty if the 

law and the evidence justified it and allowed counsel to elicit 

information on jurors' views toward mitigating circumstances and 

toward automatic imposition of the death penalty. Morgan requires 

no more. 

XII. Prosecution's Penalty Phase Statements, Penalty Stage Trial 

Format, Proportionality of the Death Sentence and Method of 

Execution 

Because we remand the case for resentencing, we need not 

reach these issues. 

Issues Raised by Codefendants 

Mr. McCullah adopts the arguments made by his codefendants in 

their appeals. We have carefully considered all of these 

arguments and find them without merit. 

We AFFIRM all of Mr. McCullah's convictions, but we REMAND 

the case for a new penalty phase proceeding consistent with this 

opinion. 

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