Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01873/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01873-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Extended Disc North America, Inc.
Appellee
Target Training International, Ltd.
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TARGET TRAINING INTERNATIONAL, LTD.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

EXTENDED DISC NORTH AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1873, 2015-1908

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Texas in No. 4:10-cv-03350, Judge 

Gray H. Miller.

______________________ 

Decided: April 22, 2016

______________________ 

CHRISTINE MARIE LEBRON-DYKEMAN, McKee, Voorhees & Sease, P.L.C., Des Moines, IA, argued for plaintiffappellant. Also represented by EDMUND J. SEASE, ROBERT 

SCOTT JOHNSON. 

STEPHEN F. SCHLATHER, Collins, Edmonds, Pogorzelski, Schlather & Tower PLLC, Houston, TX, argued for 

defendant–appellee. Also represented by JOHN J.

EDMONDS, SHEA NEAL PALAVAN. 

______________________ 

Case: 15-1873 Document: 44-2 Page: 1 Filed: 04/22/2016
2 TARGET TRAINING INT’L v. EXTENDED DISC N. AM. 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK and O’MALLEY, Circuit 

Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Target Training International, Ltd. (“TTI”) 

brought suit against Extended DISC North America, Inc. 

(“EDNA”) alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 

7,249,372 (“the ’372 patent”). While the suit was pending, 

third-party Extended DISC International Oy Ltd. (“EDI”) 

initiated an ex parte reexamination of all claims of the

’372 patent. The district court litigation was stayed

pending the resolution of the reexamination and the 

issuance of the reexamination certificate. The Patent 

Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) ultimately determined 

that claims 1-11 (“the original claims”) of the ’372 patent 

were invalid, but confirmed that thirty claims that were 

newly added during the reexamination—claims 12-41

(“the newly added claims”)—were patentable, and this 

court affirmed that decision under Federal Circuit Rule 

36. Following the issuance of a reexamination certificate, 

the district court granted EDNA’s motion to dismiss the 

case as moot, despite the existence of the newly added 

claims. Target Training Int’l, Ltd. v. Extended Disc North 

Am., Inc., No. 4:10-cv-03350, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

159526 (S.D. Tex. June 1, 2015). Because we agree with 

the district court that the newly added claims were not 

asserted in the district court litigation prior to dismissal, 

we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

TTI is engaged in the business of producing and 

providing individual employee assessments throughout 

the United States. It is the assignee of the ’372 patent 

which issued on July 24, 2007. The patent relates to a 

method of distributing and displaying documents on a 

website, accepting responses to the documents on the 

website, processing the responses into a report for an 

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TARGET TRAINING INT’L v. EXTENDED DISC N. AM. 3

interested party, and delivering the report to one or more 

locations. ’372 patent col. 2 ll. 24-28. 

Defendant EDNA is a Texas-based company with its 

principal place of business in Texas. EDI, the defendant 

in the companion case to this appeal, No. 2015-1856, is a 

Finnish company with its principal place of business in

Finland. EDI produces and provides personality reports

through its “Extended DISC System.” See TTI’s Preliminary Infringement Contentions at 2, Ex. B to Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment, Target Training, 2015 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159526 (No. 4:10-cv-03350), ECF. No. 

252-3. EDI had a franchise agreement with EDNA beginning in 1996 or 1997 under which EDNA, the franchisee, was given exclusive rights to distribute EDI’s product 

in the United States and Canada. 

On September 17, 2010, TTI filed a patent infringement claim against EDNA. On January 14, 2011, thirdparty EDI filed a request for ex parte reexamination of all

of the original claims of the ’372 patent. TTI provided 

Preliminary Infringement Contentions on February 18, 

2011 alleging infringement of claims 1, 2, and 5-11. 

EDNA moved to stay the district court proceedings pending the outcome of the reexamination, but the court 

denied its motion. The PTO then initiated reexamination 

proceedings. The court denied three more motions to stay 

brought by EDNA, including one filed after the PTO 

issued an initial rejection of all claims and another after 

the PTO issued a final office action rejecting all claims on 

January 6, 2012. 

In July 2011, TTI filed a second complaint, this time 

against EDI, after learning through discovery in the 

EDNA matter of EDI’s ownership interest in, and exclusive franchise arrangement with, EDNA. On October 6, 

2011, EDI filed two motions to dismiss, one for lack of 

personal jurisdiction and one for the plaintiff’s failure to 

state a valid claim. 

Case: 15-1873 Document: 44-2 Page: 3 Filed: 04/22/2016
4 TARGET TRAINING INT’L v. EXTENDED DISC N. AM. 

On March 26, 2012, the court in the EDI matter 

stayed its case pending resolution of the reexamination 

process. On July 25, 2012, the court in the EDNA matter finally stayed that case until the PTO concluded 

reexamination and a certificate of reexamination was 

issued. On September 28, 2012, the court supervising the 

EDNA case entered a subsequent order stating that the 

case was “administratively closed pending the issuance of 

the certificate of reexamination.” Order Administratively 

Closing Case, Target Training, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

159526 (No. 4:10-cv-03350), ECF. No. 243.

During the stay, TTI appealed the PTO’s determination of invalidity for anticipation to the Board, which 

affirmed on September 20, 2013. TTI then appealed to 

this court, and, after briefing and oral argument, we 

issued a Rule 36 summary affirmance. On January 12, 

2015, the PTO issued a reexamination certificate cancelling claims 1-11, but issuing thirty new claims—claims 12 

through 41—and confirming those claims as patentable. 

The district court reopened the EDNA case on January 12, 2015. On January 22, 2015, EDNA moved for 

summary judgment of noninfringement and invalidity, 

and, alternatively, moved to dismiss the action as moot. 

A few days later, TTI filed a notice with the court informing it of the reexamination certificate, stating that thirty

new claims were added during the reexamination, and 

requesting a scheduling conference to discuss setting any 

additional or modified deadlines in order to, inter alia, 

update discovery, contentions, and expert reports. The 

court never responded to this request. 

TTI then moved to strike EDNA’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was untimely under the 

original scheduling order. The court denied the motion to 

strike, reasoning that “the original scheduling order is no 

longer applicable, as . . . the case [was] stayed” and “there 

is not a scheduling order in place.” Order Denying Motion 

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TARGET TRAINING INT’L v. EXTENDED DISC N. AM. 5

to Strike at 3, Target Training, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

159526 (No. 4:10-cv-03350), ECF. No. 262. The court 

ordered TTI to provide a substantive response to the 

motion for summary judgment. In that substantive 

response, TTI argued that the district court was required 

to analyze whether the new claims of the ’372 patent were 

“substantively identical” to the cancelled claims before 

they could be dismissed. EDNA replied, arguing that, 

because the new claims were not included in TTI’s 3-1 

Infringement Contention Disclosures, they should not be 

considered part of the current suit. Rules of Practice for 

Patent Cases in the S.D. Tex. Rule 3-1, at http://

www.txs.uscourts.gov/page/district-local-rules-practicepatent-cases. 

On June 1, 2015, the court granted EDNA’s motion to 

dismiss the case as moot, and thus did not address the 

motion for summary judgment. The court noted that the 

complaint was for infringement of the patent and, with 

the exception of claim 1, did not specify the particular 

claims infringed. “[S]ince none of the new claims were 

even part of the patent when the complaint was filed, 

[however,] TTI obviously was not alleging that EDNA was 

infringing the new, narrower claims of the reexamined 

patent. Moreover, the court agree[d] with EDNA’s contention that the disclosure pursuant to [P.R. 3-1 bound] 

TTI to its preliminary infringement contentions [ ] unless 

TTI [sought] leave of court to amend its contentions.” 

Target Training, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159526, at *8. 

The court acknowledged TTI’s arguments that: (1) the 

new claims could be identical in scope to the original 

claims such that the case could continue under Fresenius 

USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013), and (2) even if the new claims were substantively different in scope, the case could continue based on 

ongoing infringement after the issuance of the newly 

added claims. Target Training, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

159526, at *9. Nevertheless, on June 1, 2015, the court 

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6 TARGET TRAINING INT’L v. EXTENDED DISC N. AM. 

relied on Fresenius to dismiss the case “because all of the 

claims TTI asserted were being infringed were canceled in 

the reexamination.” Id. at *10-11. The court’s order did 

not specify whether it was dismissing with or without 

prejudice. 

EDNA thereafter filed a Bill of Costs in the amount of 

$34,047.72, which the court taxed to TTI. On appeal, TTI 

states that, “in the event TTI’s appeal is successful, 

EDNA will no longer be the prevailing party, and this 

Court should reverse the taxing of costs.” Appellant’s Br. 

16. 

In parallel, the EDI companion case was reopened on 

January 23, 2015. The magistrate judge issued a recommendation that EDI’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for 

lack of personal jurisdiction be granted. On June 4, 2015, 

Judge Gilmore adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation in its entirety and entered a final judgment of 

dismissal. 

TTI timely appeals the court’s order of dismissal and 

order taxing costs in the EDNA case. TTI also appeals 

the court’s order of dismissal in the EDI case, the companion case on appeal. This opinion addresses only the 

EDNA case, but we are issuing our opinions in both cases

concurrently. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

The jurisdictional doctrine of mootness derives from 

Article III section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which limits

a federal court’s jurisdiction to live cases or controversies.1 A justiciable controversy “must be definite and 

 

1 Courts often treat justiciability doctrines, including standing and mootness, as a subset of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. 

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TARGET TRAINING INT’L v. EXTENDED DISC N. AM. 7

concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having 

adverse legal interests.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 

300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937). “A justiciable controversy is 

thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic 

or moot.” Id. at 240 (citing United States v. Alaska S.S. 

Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920)). A moot case must, therefore, be dismissed. In re Scruggs, 392 F.3d 124, 128 (5th 

Cir. 2004). Moreover, “an actual controversy must be 

extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the 

complaint is filed.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 

459 n.10 (1974). 

We review a district court’s dismissal for the jurisdictional question of mootness de novo. Ford Motor Co. v. 

United States, 688 F.3d 1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing

King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1282 

(Fed. Cir. 2010)). See also Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. 

v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

(citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 

482 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 

We first turn to the original claims, which were found 

anticipated and were cancelled as a result of the reexami-

 

Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1532 (2013) (holding that 

district court appropriately dismissed suit for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction when the case was moot). 

Nevertheless, the concepts derive from different textual 

sources in the Constitution and are conceptually distinguishable. See Katherine Mims Crocker, Justifying A 

Prudential Solution to the Williamson County Ripeness 

Puzzle, 49 GA. L. REV. 163, 201, n.204 (2014) (“Justiciability can thus be thought of as a threshold concern with 

whether courts in general are equipped to resolve a dispute in the abstract, whereas subject-matter jurisdiction can be viewed as a logically subsequent inquiry into 

whether a particular court can actually do so.”). 

Case: 15-1873 Document: 44-2 Page: 7 Filed: 04/22/2016
8 TARGET TRAINING INT’L v. EXTENDED DISC N. AM. 

nation. Fresenius makes clear that “when a claim is 

cancelled, the patentee loses any cause of action based on 

that claim, and any pending litigation in which the claims 

are asserted becomes moot.” 721 F.3d at 1340. With 

respect to the original cancelled claims of the ’372 patent, 

therefore, we uphold the district court’s finding that 

Fresenius rendered the suit moot to the extent those were 

the only claims asserted in the litigation. 

We turn, next, to the fact that new claims were approved on reexamination. TTI argues that the fact that 

new claims were added and confirmed as patentable 

through the ex parte reexamination distinguishes this 

case from Fresenius. Where newly added claims are 

substantially identical to cancelled claims, TTI argues, 

the cancellation of the original claims “shall not affect any 

action then pending nor abate any cause of action then 

existing.” 35 U.S.C. § 252. See 35 U.S.C. § 307(b). Thus, 

TTI continues, rather than dismiss the case as moot 

under Fresenius, the district court should have substantively compared the scope of the original and newly added 

claims, taking into consideration, inter alia, the specification, prior art references that occasioned the reexamination, and the prosecution history, to determine whether 

the newly added claims are “substantially identical” to the 

original claims. If found “substantially identical,” then 

dismissal of the original cause of action would be inappropriate, as the original claims effectively would have

survived reexamination. Indeed, Fresenius states that 

the reexamination statute preserves the patentee’s “ability to enforce the patent’s original claims to those claims 

that survive reexamination in ‘identical’ form.” 721 F.3d 

at 1339. 

TTI further asserts that, even if the court, having performed this analysis, determined that the newly added 

claims were not substantially identical, it still should 

have allowed the proceedings to continue because TTI 

could sue EDNA for any ongoing infringement of the 

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TARGET TRAINING INT’L v. EXTENDED DISC N. AM. 9

newly added claims. See Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 

F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (a patentee is entitled to 

damages for infringement for the period following the 

issuance of the substantively different claims from a 

reexamination).

TTI’s characterization of Fresenius is not controversial. The question before us, however, is whether it was 

appropriate for the district court to dismiss the case when 

TTI failed to amend its infringement contentions to assert 

infringement of any of the thirty newly added claims. TTI 

argues that it was not; we disagree because the newly 

added claims were never actually asserted in the existing 

litigation. 

The district court found that TTI never asserted or 

sought to assert the newly added claims. Specifically, the 

district court found that (1) TTI “obviously” did not allege 

that EDNA infringed on the new claims at the time it 

filed its complaint because the newly added claims did not 

exist, and (2) “the disclosure pursuant to Rule 3-1 [ ] binds 

TTI to its preliminary infringement contentions.” Target 

Training, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159526, at *9-10. It is 

undisputed that TTI’s preliminary infringement contentions only specified infringement of claims 1-2 and 5-11. 

See TTI’s Preliminary Infringement Contentions at 2, Ex. 

B to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Target 

Training, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159526 (No. 4:10-cv03350), ECF. No. 252-3. And, TTI does not dispute that

P.R. 3-1 requires, in relevant part, that TTI identify “each 

claim of each patent-in-suit that is allegedly infringed by 

an opposing party.” Pursuant to P.R. 3-6 and 3-7, “good 

cause” must be shown in order to obtain leave to amend 

infringement contentions except in certain circumstances 

not alleged here. TTI cites no authority for the proposition that unasserted patent claims must be considered by 

the district court prior to the dismissal of a case based on 

cancelled asserted claims. We know of no authority that 

so states. 

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10 TARGET TRAINING INT’L v. EXTENDED DISC N. AM. 

TTI’s principal contention is that the district court 

erred in failing to permit TTI to amend its infringement 

contentions to assert the newly added claims. Appellant

Br. 12; Appellant Reply Br. 8. TTI did not argue in its 

briefs that it had requested or moved for leave to amend 

its infringement contentions or that the court ever denied 

such a request or motion. Despite this, TTI’s counsel

initially contended at oral argument that TTI had sought 

leave to amend and that the court failed to act on its 

request, pointing to (1) TTI’s request for a scheduling 

conference in order to set deadlines for, inter alia, updating contentions, and (2) a footnote in its substantive 

opposition to EDNA’s summary judgment motion stating

that, “TTI is prepared to provide amended Preliminary 

Infringement Contentions . . . pursuant to a new schedule.” Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment at 2, n.1, Target Training, 2015 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 159526 (No. 4:10-cv-03350), ECF. No. 263. 

When pressed on whether TTI actually requested 

leave to amend its infringement contentions to allege 

infringement of the newly added claims, however, the

following exchange took place:

Q: Was there anything that prevented you from 

making a motion to amend the infringement contentions? 

A: I would say your honor, just the fact that we 

were waiting on the court’s response to our request for this conference to have a scheduling order in play. 

Q: So there wasn’t any order of the court that prevented you from making such a motion?

A: No. But the court didn’t address the issue of 

additional contentions to say whether or not we 

had the right to amend them until the dismissal 

order, at which point, of course, the case was over. 

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TARGET TRAINING INT’L v. EXTENDED DISC N. AM. 11

Oral Argument at 09:49-10:20, available at

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

15-1873.mp3. TTI’s counsel thus conceded that there was 

nothing preventing it from making a formal motion leave 

to amend its infringement contentions.2 

In fact, although TTI stated that it refrained from 

making a request because it was waiting for the court’s 

response to its request for a scheduling conference, it 

knew when the court denied its motion to strike EDNA’s 

motion for summary judgment that there was “not a 

scheduling order in place.” Order Denying Motion to 

Strike at 3, Target Training, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

159526 (No. 4:10-cv-03350), ECF. No. 262. If there was 

any confusion before, that denial should have been TTI’s 

cue that it was permissible for it to move for leave to 

 

2 The closest TTI came to making a formal motion 

for leave to amend appears in the last paragraph of its 

motion to strike, where it closed with: 

TTI respectfully requests this Court to strike 

EDNA’s Motion for Summary Judgment and reopen discovery in the case to allow the parties to 

take discovery and amend its complaint and infringement contentions to reflect the newly added 

claims of the ’372 Patent. Alternatively, if this 

Court does not strike EDNA’s Motion for Summary Judgment as untimely and not compliant 

with the Federal Rules, TTI requests an extension 

to provide a substantive opposition relating to the 

motion’s merits. 

TTI’s Motion to Strike at 7, Target Training, 2015 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 159526 (No. 4:10-cv-03350), ECF. No. 257

(emphasis added). This request arguably was conditioned 

on the court granting TTI’s motion to strike, however, 

which the court did not do. 

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12 TARGET TRAINING INT’L v. EXTENDED DISC N. AM. 

amend its infringement contentions. Instead, TTI proceeded only to file its court-ordered substantive opposition 

to defendant’s motion. A district court has no obligation 

to provide relief not sought. Because TTI failed to assert 

the newly added claims, despite opportunities to do so, the 

district court did not err by dismissing the case as moot. 

We now address TTI’s concern that affirming the dismissal of the proceedings would render illusory its statutory right to add new claims during reexamination under 

35 U.S.C. § 305. Appellant Br. 15-16. TTI cites Senju 

Pharm. Co. v. Apotex Inc., 746 F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 

2014) as potentially precluding it from asserting the 

newly added claims in a future action, despite the fact 

that EDNA has been on notice of TTI’s intent to enforce 

the ’372 patent for five years. 

To be clear, the claim preclusion principles set forth in 

Senju would not bar a future suit on the facts of this case. 

TTI would be free to commence a new litigation asserting 

infringement of the newly added claims, and could even 

request the incorporation of discovery from the case that 

was dismissed so as not to waste judicial resources. 

Senju rests on a specific set of facts not at issue here. 

Senju recognized that claim preclusion requires “(1) a 

final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving[ ] (2) 

the same parties or their [privies]; and (3) a subsequent 

suit based on the same cause of action.” Senju, 746 F.3d 

at 1348 (citing CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 

176 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Senju, 746 

F.3d at 1348 (“[U]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a 

judgment ‘on the merits’ in a prior suit involving the same 

parties or their privies bars a second suit based on the 

same cause of action.”) (quoting Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen 

Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955)). In Senju, the 

district court in the prior action had issued findings of fact 

and conclusions of law holding that the accused product 

infringed the claims, but also that the claims were invalid 

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TARGET TRAINING INT’L v. EXTENDED DISC N. AM. 13

as obvious. 746 F.3d at 1347. Thus, “both parties 

agree[d] that Senju meets the first two of the three requirements for claim preclusion,” but disagreed only with 

respect to the third requirement. Id. at 1348-49. 

As a preliminary matter, the panel in Senju explicitly 

declined to opine on whether “a reexamination could ever 

result in the issuance of new patent claims that were so 

materially different from the original patent claims as to 

create a new cause of action.” Id. at 1353. More importantly, by contrast to Senju, the district court here 

never reached a judgment on the merits. Instead, the 

court dismissed TTI’s claims as moot, and a dismissal for 

mootness is a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not a dismissal on the merits. 

Rather, the Supreme Court has specifically rejected 

deciding the merits of a case where the court lacks jurisdiction because jurisdiction is a threshold question, and 

“[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in 

any cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 

U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 

506, 514 (1869)). See also Orff v. United States, 358 F.3d 

1137, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing, inter alia, Cupey 

Bajo Nursing Home, Inc. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 406, 

412 (1991) (“It is well settled that a question relating to 

subject matter jurisdiction goes to the very heart of our 

power to hear a controversy, and any decision on the 

merits rendered in the absence of such authority would, of 

course, be a nullity.”)). 

In addition, we have held that, in patent cases, res judicata does not apply to bar the assertion of new claims 

acquired during the pendency of a litigation that could 

have been, but were not, litigated or adjudicated in the 

action. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 

F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“While a party may seek 

to pursue claims that accrue during the pendency of a 

lawsuit adjudicated in that lawsuit, the party is not 

required to do so, and res judicata will not be applied to 

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such accruing claims if the party elects not to have them 

included in the action.”) (citing Gillig v. Nike, Inc., 602 

F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 

Nothing in this opinion shall be construed as passing

judgment on whether we believe a future action brought 

by TTI against EDNA and EDI for alleged infringement of 

the ’372 patent ultimately would be successful on the 

merits. If that suit were brought, it would be up to the 

district court to assess whether the newly added claims 

are of the same substantive scope as the cancelled claims 

and to proceed from there. A finding that the new claims 

are not substantively identical in scope would result in

the limitation of TTI’s potential recovery only to infringement of the claims for the period following the 

issuance of the reexamination certificate, but it would not 

preclude those claims. Laitram, 163 F.3d at 1346. 

CONCLUSION

Because the district court did not err in dismissing 

the suit as moot in light of the cancellation of the only 

claims asserted in the case, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED

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