Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01129/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01129-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Bruce Cramer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1129

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Jeffrey Bruce Cramer, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 14, 2004

Filed: July 21, 2005

___________

Before RILEY, LAY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Jeffrey Bruce Cramer pleaded guilty to transporting a minor with intent to

engage in criminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). In his plea

agreement, Cramer stipulated to the application of United States Sentencing

Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") § 4B1.5(a) as a repeat and dangerous sex offender against

minors. Over Cramer's objection, the government sought and received an upward

departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 because Cramer's criminal history was substantially

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The Honorable William R. Wilson Jr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas. 

2

18 U.S.C. § 2423(a).

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underrepresented. Cramer contends that no reliable grounds existed to support the

district court's1

 upward departure. We find no error and affirm.

I. Background

On March 20, 2002, police arrested Cramer, a truck driver, in West Memphis,

Arkansas. Police found him with a sixteen-year-old runaway girl who had been

missing from Arizona since May 2000. The minor had been traveling with Cramer in

his tractor-trailer truck for nearly two years. The officers searched Cramer's truck and

found Polaroid photographs of the girl stashed in a first-aid kit. Many of the

photographs depicted the girl engaging in sexually explicit activities with Cramer. In

addition, some of the pictures depicted the teenage girl performing explicit sexual

acts upon herself with various inanimate objects. Those objects were also found in

Cramer's truck along with several magazines containing pornographic images of

minors. 

Cramer was indicted by a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Arkansas

on four charges: (1) transporting a minor for the purpose of producing child

pornography; (2) transporting a minor with the intent to engage in sexually explicit

conduct;2

 (3) transporting child pornography; and (4) possessing child pornography.

Cramer pleaded guilty to the second charge and the government dismissed the

remaining three. 

In the plea agreement, Cramer stipulated that he should be sentenced as a

repeat child sex offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5. Cramer also reserved the right to

seek a downward departure. However, the government reserved the right to seek an

upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Cramer's presentence report (PSR) stated

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that his criminal history category substantially underrepresented the seriousness of

his criminal history or his likelihood to recidivate thus making him eligible for an

upward departure based on U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Cramer objected to the statement in the

PSR that he had failed to complete a state-court-ordered sex-offender program and

to its conclusion that he had a likelihood to recidivate. 

At Cramer's sentencing hearing, the government called the probation officer

who prepared the PSR and the officer who investigated the case to testify in defense

of the PSR and in support of the government's upward departure motion. The district

court overruled Cramer's objections to the PSR. Cramer also objected to the

application of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, arguing that the § 4B1.5(a) enhancement to his

offense level had already taken into consideration his likelihood to recidivate. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted the government's motion for an

upward departure. Applying U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a), the district court raised Cramer's

criminal history category to a level V and set a guidelines sentencing range of 168 to

210 months. The district court then applied U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 and made an upward

departure, sentencing Cramer to 235 months' imprisonment along with five years'

supervised release.

On appeal, Cramer makes two arguments against the district court's upward

departure for inadequacy of criminal history category under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. First,

he contends that the upward departure unfairly double counts when an enhancement

based on § 4B1.5(a) has already been imposed. Second, he argues that there is

insufficient evidence to support the district court's upward departure. 

II. Discussion

A. Booker Error

Prior to oral argument, Cramer filed a letter pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j)

arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated under authority of the United

States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).

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We note that Cramer's additional belated argument based on Shepard v. United

States, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005), likewise fails under the plain error standard of review.

See United States v. Johnson, 408 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The Supreme Court

has never overruled its decision in Almendarez-Torres, and Shepard did not alter the

rule that a court may consider prior criminal history as a sentencing factor."). 

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The reasoning in Blakely was extended to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See

United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (Stevens, J.). Cramer, however, failed

to make a Sixth Amendment argument to the district court. As such, we will review

his Booker claim for plain error. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550–51

(8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 

To establish plain error, Cramer must show that (1) there was an error; (2) the

error was plain; and (3) that the error affected substantial rights. Johnson v. United

States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). Even when

all three conditions are met, relief is discretionary with an appellate court and will be

exercised only when "the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. (internal quotations omitted). In Pirani, we

held that a Booker error is plain. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 552–53. However, we explained

that the error only "affects substantial rights" if there is a reasonable probability that

but for the error the defendant would have received a more favorable sentence. Id.

Nothing in the record indicates that the district court would have imposed a more

favorable sentence under an advisory system, and, thus, Cramer cannot show that the

Booker error affected his substantial rights. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 547.3

B. Duplication of Sentencing Enhancements

Cramer argues that the district court erred in departing upward based upon an

understatement of his criminal history when the district court had already elevated his

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criminal history based upon his prior conviction for a sex offense. We review the

district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v.

Clawson, 408 F.3d 556, 558 (8th Cir. 2005). The pertinent sections of the United

States Sentencing Guidelines provide:

§ 4B1.5. Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors

(a) In any case in which the defendant's instant offense of

conviction is a covered sex crime, § 4B1.1 (Career Offender) does

not apply, and the defendant committed the instant offense of

conviction subsequent to sustaining at least one sex offense

conviction:

(1) The offense level shall be the greater of:

* * * * 

§ 4A1.3. Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category

(Policy Statement)

(a) Upward Departures.– 

(1) Standard for Upward Departure.–If reliable information

indicates that the defendant's criminal history category

substantially under-represents the seriousness of the

defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the

defendant will commit other crimes, an upward departure

may be warranted.

(2) Types of Information Forming the Basis for Upward

Departure.–The information described in subsection (a)

may include information concerning the following:

(A) Prior sentence(s) not used in computing the

criminal history category (e.g., sentences for foreign

and tribal offenses).

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(B) Prior sentence(s) of substantially more than one

year imposed as a result of independent crimes

committed on different occasions.

(C) Prior similar misconduct established by a civil

adjudication or by a failure to comply with an

administrative order.

(D) Whether the defendant was pending trial or

sentencing on another charge at the time of the

instant offense.

(E) Prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting

in a criminal conviction.

U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.5(a), 4A1.3.

According to the commentary, § 4A1.3 authorizes "the consideration of a

departure from the Guidelines in the limited circumstances where reliable information

indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness

of the defendant's criminal history or likelihood of recidivism." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3,

cmt. background. Cramer points to United States v. Fawbush, 946 F.2d 584 (8th Cir.

1991) to support his argument that an upward departure is invalid if it is based on a

factor already considered in increasing a defendant's offense level and punishment.

Fawbush is distinguishable. 

In Fawbush, we held that a district court erred in making an upward departure

from the Guidelines based on the victim's age when the relevant provision of the

Guidelines had already accounted for victims of young age. The initial guideline

considered by the trial court specifically increased Fawbush's offense level four steps

based on the age of the victim. Id. at 585 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(2)(A)). In this

case, however, § 4B1.5(a) does not specifically consider the likelihood of recidivism

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or consider conduct that did not result in a conviction. Indeed, § 4B1.5(a) prohibits

consideration of conduct that did not result in a conviction. 

After holding that the trial court erred in departing upward based on the

victim's age, we held that the trial court properly considered prior conduct that

escaped conviction. Fawbush, 946 F.2d at 587. We explained that "[t]he guidelines

expressly permit upward departures where 'prior similar adult criminal conduct not

resulting in a criminal conviction' exists." Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(e) (1991)).

Fawbush sought reversal of the district court's upward departure, arguing that the

court erred in relying on the repetitive nature of his conduct. He contended his prior

conduct should have only been used to calculate his criminal history. We rejected

Fawbush's argument, and held that conduct that escapes conviction cannot be used

to calculate a defendant's criminal history score. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2).

Pointedly stated, conduct which escapes conviction cannot be used to calculate

criminal history, but can be used to make an upward departure under § 4A1.3. 

In the instant case, application of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a) and U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3

do not double count. Section 4B1.5(a) requires that the defendant have at least one

prior sex-offense conviction. In contrast, § 4A1.3 takes into account evidence of prior

sex-offense conduct that did not result in a sex-offense conviction.

 Cramer's prior sexual offense conviction was for raping a fifteen year old girl

in Oregon. This offense was used to compute his criminal history category. In making

the upward departure under § 4A1.3, the district court considered several factors

other than the Oregon conviction. In the seven years following that conviction,

Cramer engaged in sex-offense conduct that did not result in a conviction.

Specifically, Cramer violated his probation conditions by continuing to have contact

with minors and particularly minor females. Several times Cramer failed to comply

with his sex-offender treatment program. Notes from the treatment sessions he did

attend revealed that Cramer watched ten XXX-rated movies in adult bookstores.

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Moreover, his probation officer seized more than $300 in sexually explicit

pornography. Additionally, Cramer admitted to dreaming about touching the genitals

of minor-teenage girls. He possessed sexually explicit photographs of the victim in

this case along with magazines showing sexually explicit photographs of teenage

girls. These facts were not considered when calculating Cramer's criminal history

category and therefore can be used to establish a basis, independent of § 4B1.5(a), to

make an upward departure. 

Cramer also directs the court to the commentary accompanying § 4B1.5. The

commentary states:

The guideline is intended to provide lengthy incarceration for offenders

who commit sex offenses against minors and who present a continuing

danger to the public. It applies to offenders whose instant offense of

conviction is a sex offense committed against a minor victim. The

relevant criminal provisions provide for increased statutory maximum

penalties for repeat sex offenders and make those increased statutory

maximum penalties available if the defendant previously was convicted

of any of several federal and state sex offenses (see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2247,

2426). In addition, section 632 of Public Law 102–141 and section 505

of Public Law 105–314 directed the Commission to ensure lengthy

incarceration for offenders who engage in a pattern of activity involving

the sexual abuse or exploitation of minors. Section 401(i)(1)(A) of

Public Law 108–21 directly amended Application Note 4(b)(i), effective

April 30, 2003.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5, cmt. background (emphasis added). The commentary indicates that

§ 4B1.5 was intended to address, in some degree, the recidivism often associated with

sexual abuse. This comment notwithstanding, Cramer's exact argument has been

rejected, "[i]nclusion of a factor in the Guidelines calculation does not proscribe

departure based on consideration of the factor." United States v. Searcy, 299 F. Supp.

2d 1285, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (citing United States v. Melvin, 187 F.3d 1316, 1322

(11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96, 116 S. Ct. 2035,

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Prior to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Booker, we reviewed the

imposition of an upward departure for an abuse of discretion under the PROTECT

Act of 2003. United States v. Long Turkey, 342 F.3d 856, 859 (8th Cir. 2003). The

Supreme Court has directed circuit courts to apply its holdings in Booker to all cases

on direct review. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (Breyer, J.) (citing

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)). While we review Cramer's Sixth

Amendment argument for plain error, we recognize that we are still obliged to apply

the appropriate standard of review on appeal. 

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135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996))). Whatever overlap between § 4B1.5(a) and § 4A1.3 exists,

it is insufficient to bar their simultaneous application in this case. As such, the district

court did not err in applying § 4A1.3 after Cramer stipulated to the application of §

4B1.5(a). 

C. Sufficiency of Credible Evidence to Depart

Finally, Cramer contends that the government failed to produce sufficient facts

to justify an upward departure based on U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. We will not overturn

factual determinations unless such findings are clearly erroneous. United States v.

Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir.2005). We review the sentence imposed for

unreasonableness, judging it with regard to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United

States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (Breyer, J.).4

Cramer objected to paragraphs 36 and 37 of the PSR that referenced notes

made by his prior sexual-treatment doctors. Nonetheless, in his objection, Cramer

acknowledged that some of the evidence was relevant and requested that paragraphs

36 and 37 be reduced to stating "that he failed sexual offender treatment and that the

doctor believed he was at a high risk to recidivate." Cramer did not object, however,

to paragraph 25 of the PSR, which reflects Cramer's multiple violations of probation

and parole for failing to attend sex-offender treatment and for continuing to have

contact with minors–both male and female.

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When a defendant fails to make an objection to "specific factual allegations

contained in the PSR, a district court may accept the facts as true for purposes of

sentencing." United States v. Bougie, 279 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 2002). Cramer did

not contest that he violated probation and parole by failing to attend sex-offender

treatment and continuing to have contact with male and female minors. He

continually viewed pornographic materials and kept photographs of the victim in this

case stashed away in his truck. Cramer also admitted to dreaming about touching the

genitals of minor-teenage girls. In addition, he conceded that his doctors considered

him to be at a high risk to recidivate. These facts support the district court's finding

that Cramer's prior criminal record of a single child sex offense substantially

underrepresented his criminal history and likelihood to recidivate. Therefore, we

conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support an upward departure under

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Cramer's sentence is reasonable and

affirm.

______________________________

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