Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02343/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02343-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brent F. Englehart
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2343

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Brent F. Englehart

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

____________

 Submitted: November 20, 2015

 Filed: January 27, 2016

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BEAM and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

The United States appeals the district court's grant of Brent Englehart's motion

to suppress in this criminal action. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse.

Appellate Case: 15-2343 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/27/2016 Entry ID: 4360319 
I. BACKGROUND

First and notably, all partiesinvolved in this case to-date, including the district

court, believed they were "flying blind" to some degree, in that the entirety of the

factual record was based on only a visual, soundless, recording of the encounter

between Omaha Police Officer Liebe and Englehart, along with the officers'

testimony and written reporting subsequent to the stop and interview. The district

court, understandably, found itself somewhat hindered by this fact. The recording

submitted with the record on appeal, however, has audio. Therefore, the timing of the

stop, the sequence of questions and reactions between Englehart and Officer Liebe,

and all other necessary objective observations have been viewed and documented by

this court. That said, with a few key highlights or distinctions, the facts relied upon

by the magistrate judge and district court closely track the encounter between Officer

Liebe and Englehart. Below, we recite the previously relied-upon facts, altering or

supplementing where necessary to accurately portray the encounter.

On June 29, 2014, Officer Liebe observed Englehart operating a Chevy

Avalanche, traveling westbound on Interstate 80 in Omaha, Nebraska. Officer Liebe

initiated a traffic stop of Englehart for following too closely behind another vehicle. 

A camera in the police cruiser recorded the stop. 

After Officer Liebe activated his lights, Englehart pulled over, parking his

vehicle on the inside shoulder ofInterstate 80 westbound, thus positioning the driver's

side of the vehicle nearest the center cement divider and farthest away from

westbound traffic. According to Officer Liebe'stestimony, he approached Englehart

in his vehicle, introduced himself, explained the reason for the traffic stop, and asked

for Englehart's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Officer Liebe testified

that he noticed a strong odor of air freshener from inside Englehart's vehicle. Officer

Liebe also recalled that when he asked Englehart where he was headed, Englehart

responded that he was going hiking in Wyoming. Further, Officer Liebe noticed a

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cooler on the passenger floorboard, a large amount of luggage, and sacks and debris

from a gas station or fast-food restaurant, from which the officer deduced Englehart

was not local and had been traveling for some time. Officer Liebe requested that

Englehart sit in the patrol car while he prepared a written warning for the traffic

violation and Englehart complied. Once inside the patrol car, the audio and visual

recording documented the encounter between the two men. Englehart sat beside

Officer Liebe in the front seat of the patrol car because it was a K-9 unit and the dog

cage abutted the front compartment of the officer's vehicle. 

In the vehicle, as Officer Liebe was completing the checks necessary to issue

the warning citation, he again explained to Englehart the reason he pulled him over

and asked Englehart if he understood what that meant. Then, Officer Liebe asked

Englehart a series of questions, specifically inquiring about the location of

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (which appeared to be the city noted on Englehart's driver's

license as his home address), the purpose of Englehart's travels, where Englehart was

headed for his camping trip, who he was meeting, the kind of work Englehart did, and

other small talk. Englehart explained that he was from central Pennsylvania, was

headed to Wyoming to meet his cousin to go camping, and explained that he worked

for a Hampton Inn and Suites hotel. When asked directly where in Wyoming he was

going camping, Englehart could not remember, explaining that he was meeting his

cousin who lived there and who worked on a horse ranch. Englehart additionally

explained that he would be camping for a week and that he had to get back to work

because two weeks was his limit. Before running Englehart's driver'slicense, Officer

Liebe asked Englehart if it had ever been suspended or revoked and whether

Englehart had any previous arrests. Englehart responded that he wasfairly certain his

license was not suspended (although he remembered a time when such action was

threatened) and that he had never been arrested. 

Twice during the time Officer Liebe was completing the issuance of the

warning, Englehart expressed notable confusion or frustration: once regarding the

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reasons for a certain question about how much he weighed, and later, his discomfort

about sitting in the patrol car, stating that it made him feel like he did something

wrong. As to the former, Officer Liebe explained that he inquired about Englehart's

weight because his computer system requested that information from the driver's

license, which had not scanned into the system correctly. Officer Liebe later testified

that he found Englehart's reactions in these instances significant because people

typically do not get concerned about something as simple as, say, a question about

their weight. This initial encounter in the patrol car between Officer Liebe and

Englehart during which the two visited and Officer Liebe completed the checks

necessary to issue the traffic warning took approximately twelve minutes. Once

Officer Liebe received word on the radio that Englehart's license was valid and that

there were no other problems, he handed Englehart his license, registration, and proof

of insurance. 

As Englehart collected his materials and opened the door to leave, Officer

Liebe said, "here you go, sir, I appreciate you being cooperative, hope you have a safe

camping trip, hey mind if I ask you a quick question?" Englehart stayed seated and

turned to Officer Liebe. Officer Liebe then explained his responsibility not only to

monitor traffic safety but to look for people involved in criminal activity, smuggling

narcotics and firearms and large sums of cash, and the like. Officer Liebe asked

Englehart if he had any firearms, illegal narcotics, or large sums of cash. Englehart

answered "no" to each question. When specifically asked, Englehart stated he had

"about a grand" in cash on him and initially answered "no" when Officer Liebe asked

if he had any "personal use narcotics." Officer Liebe then asked, "do you have a

problem if I search your car?" Englehart did not answer unequivocally, but stated

that he did not see the need for it given his cooperation, that he did not think that he

had given Officer Liebe a reason to get to that point, and he expressed his displeasure

with the proposition of having his trunk ripped apart on the interstate. Officer Liebe

assured Englehart that he would not do that and then stated, "I'll tell you what I'll do,"

and said he would just run his dog around the vehicle quick, telling Englehart that if

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the dog alerts, he would search the truck but if it did not, Englehart would be sent on

his way. Less than two minutes had passed from the time Officer Liebe completed

the traffic warning citation to when Officer Liebe announced that he would conduct

the dog sniff. Officer Liebe later testified that he felt that Englehart was agitated by

his questions and that although he never received a direct response from Englehart

regarding his request to search, Officer Liebe interpreted Englehart's subsequent

statements and "perturbed" or annoyed demeanor as a refusal to search.

Officer Liebe called for backup to conduct the K-9 search. While they waited,

Officer Liebe asked Englehart if he had previously had a bad run in with police, and

Englehart stated that he had–that in the past his experience was that the police went

out of their way to make things harder than needed. Officer Liebe then explained that

given his experience, the fact that Englehart was traveling across country on his own

and was unsure exactly where in Wyoming he was headed, left Officer Liebe unsure

asto whether Englehart wasinvolved in criminal activity. Again, Officer Liebe asked

Englehart directly if he was involved in criminal activity. Englehart was visibly

agitated, exclaimed "no," and expressed frustration with having to sit in the patrol car

to receive his warning for following too close, explaining that he was not used to such

a procedure and that he was concerned with Officer Liebe's call for backup, and the

like–that now he really felt like he did something wrong. Officer Liebe stated that

the backup was called for his safety given their location on the busy interstate and

then stated:

Just bear with me. I'm just gonna wait for one of them to show up here

so we can get it and I'll run my dog quick. If my dog doesn't alert, then

we'll send you on your way. Is there any reason why he would, or, . . .

'cause you seem kinda irritated with it. I'm kinda wonderin' if maybe

you're nervous, got some personal use, because I'll tell ya right now,

man, I'm, I'm not too concerned about personal use.

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At this point Englehart immediately stated, "Yeah, I do have a little bit of personal

use in there." Englehart made this statement sixteen minutes after initially sitting

down in the patrol car, just over four minutes after Officer Liebe completed the

traffic warning citation, and just under three minutes after Officer Liebe stated that

he intended to conduct a dog sniff of Englehart's vehicle. Englehart confirmed, when

asked directly by Officer Liebe, that his "personal use" was marijuana. While the two

waited for the backup to arrive, Officer Liebe repeatedly stated to Englehart during

conversation (no less than thirteen times) that he wasn't concerned about a personal

use amount of drugs, that he wasn't worried about it, that he wouldn't write a ticket

for it, and that he wouldn't arrest Englehart for personal use–that that's what he

(Officer Liebe) would do for Englehart. Officer Liebe explained that his job was to

locate large amounts of drugs or cash and large-scale smugglers. The two waited

approximately eight more minutes from the time of Englehart's confession regarding

the personal use narcotics before Officer Liebe searched Englehart's vehicle. In the

end, however, Officer Liebe never employed his dog to sniff Englehart's vehicle. 

During the search, Officer Liebe located a small amount of hash in the center

console of Englehart's vehicle as well as a toolbox containing $351,360.00. Officer

Liebe returned to the patrol car and arrested Englehart "for the marijuana," and

indicated that investigators would likely want to talk to Englehart about the cash. 

Thereafter, Officer Liebe transported Englehart to theOmaha Police Impound Facility

where the truck wasfurther searched and Englehart was questioned by Omaha Police

Officer Andersen and Omaha Police Sergeant Worley. The officers advised

Englehart of his Miranda rights and Englehart agreed to answer questions. Englehart

was not charged with any crimes that day. Englehart disclaimed ownership of the

cash recovered in his vehicle and was released along with his vehicle. In the

Disclaimer of Ownership of Assets form, Englehart indicated that the assets came into

his possession fromfive to seven years ofselling "weed." The investigation remained

ongoing and five months later, Englehart was indicted on multiple counts, including

conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, attempted

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possession with intent to distribute marijuana, traveling in interstate commerce with

the intent to distribute proceeds of and promote an unlawful activity, promotion of

money laundering, and forfeiture. 

Englehart filed a motion to suppress evidence, asking that the district court

suppress the $351,360.00 that wasremoved fromhis vehicle, as well as all statements

he made on the grounds that he had been illegally detained and that the search lacked

legal justification. Discussed more thoroughly below, the district court granted the

motion. The government appeals. 

II. DISCUSSION

"In reviewing the district court's grant of [Englehart's] motion to suppress, we

review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear

error." United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 952 (8th Cir. 2012). 

Very generally, the magistrate judge determined that after Officer Liebe told

Englehart he was free to leave, Englehart agreed to answer additional questions, and

thus that portion of the encounter was consensual. However, the magistrate judge

held that the consensual nature changed once Englehart resisted Officer Liebe's desire

to conduct a discretionary sniff of the vehicle and, additionally, that Officer Liebe

lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop in order to conduct the dog

sniff. Given these conclusions and applying the then-recent Supreme Court precedent

in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-16 (2015), which held that

absent reasonable suspicion a police officer's extension of a traffic stop in order to

conduct a dog sniff violatesthe Fourth Amendment, the magistrate judge held that all

statements made by Englehart after he resisted Officer Liebe's desire to employ his

K-9, as well as the physical evidence obtained thereafter, were obtained in violation

of Englehart's Fourth Amendment rights and should be suppressed. The district court

adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in its entirety, clarifying

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that Officer Liebe unlawfully detained Englehart and noting that, at the point

Englehart indicated he did not want his vehicle searched the encounter was no longer

consensual, and Officer Liebe lacked reasonable suspicion to continue the detention. 

The district court additionally addressed the government's alternative argument,

acknowledging that the recent Supreme Court pronouncement in Rodriguez did not

apply in the instant analysis, but nonetheless held that the thirty-minute detention here

was not de minimis. 

1

As noted by the magistrate judge and the district judge, the legitimacy of the

initial stop is not in question here. Nor does Englehart argue that it was improper for

Officer Liebe to collect his documentation, run the necessary checks, or ask questions

about his travel plans. Officer Liebe completed the necessary steps to complete the

traffic warning citation. "After a law enforcement officer initiates a traffic stop, the

officer 'may detain the offending motorist while the officer completes a number of

routine but somewhat time-consuming tasks related to the traffic violation.'" United

States v. Quintero-Felix, 714 F.3d 563, 567 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.

Barragan, 379 F.3d 524, 528 (8th Cir. 2004)). These routine tasks include

"computerized checks of the vehicle's registration and the driver's license and

criminal history, and the writing up of a citation or warning." Barragan, 379 F.3d at

Eighth Circuit precedent at the time of the stop had permitted a de minimis

1

extension of a stop to employ a dog. United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905, 907

(8th Cir. 2014), overruled by Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. Although Rodriguez

was overruled prior to the district court's analysis in the matter, we apply the law of

the circuit as it existed at the time of the stop. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct.

2419, 2423-24 (2011) ("Because suppression would do nothing to deter police

misconduct in these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to both

the truth and the public safety, we hold that searches conducted in objectively

reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary

rule."). Thus the inquiry here requires an application of the then-existing Eighth

Circuit precedent allowing for a de minimis extension in some circumstances. United

States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.3d 1222, 1224 (8th Cir. 2015).

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528-29. Too, "[a]n officer also may request that the driver sit in the patrol car to

answer questions and may ask questions about his itinerary." Quintero-Felix, 714

F.3d at 567. 

Our focus today is on the encounter between Englehart and Officer Liebe once

the officer concluded the work necessary to resolve the traffic violation for which he

had pulled Englehart over, handed Englehart his belongings, and indicated he was

done. In the normal course, once the officer finishes the tasks involved with the

traffic violation "the purpose of the traffic stop is complete and further detention of

the driver or vehicle would be unreasonable, unless something that occurred during

the traffic stop generated the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify further

detention or unless the continued encounter is consensual." Id. at 567 (quoting

United States v. Flores, 474 F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 2007)). Whether a particular

detention is reasonable is a fact-intensive question, measured in objective terms by

examining the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 567. 

Here, the government does not challenge the district court's determination that

Officer Liebe did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to detain Englehart beyond

what the government calls "the consensual encounter phase" of the traffic stop. 

Rather, the government argues that, applying then-existing circuit precedent, any

extension of the stop following the issuance of the traffic warning citation was de

minimis, and therefore legal on these facts. Under this court's prior precedent, even

without reasonable suspicion following the completion of a traffic stop, "seizures of

less than ten minutes [were permissible] as de minimis intrusions [and did] not

amount to an unreasonable seizure." United States v. Robinson, 455 F.3d 832, 834

(8th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Mohamed, 600 F.3d 1000, 1005 (8th Cir.

2010) (canine search conducted within five minutes of conclusion of a lawful stop

was a de minimis intrusion on driver's personal liberty); United States v. Suitt, 569

F.3d 867, 873 (8th Cir. 2009) (canine sniff approximately three minutes after the

conclusion of traffic stop constituted no more than a de minimis extension of the

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stop); United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006) (detention of

at most four minutes from the point defendant notified he would receive a warning

ticket to the time of the dog sniff only a de minimis intrusion). Such was the case in

Rodriguez, mentioned previously, where this court initially held that a seven- or

eight-minute delay in the deployment of a dog following the completion of the traffic

stop was reasonable and constituted a de minimis intrusion on the defendant's

personal liberty. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d at 907-08, overruled by Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct.

1609. 

"Timing is everything" in many things but is especially important in this case. 

Defining the contours ofthe various, legally relevant time framesin this matter is key. 

The district court held that the approximately thirty-minute detention was not de

minimis, as contemplated by this circuit's then-existing precedent. The district court

clearly erred, however, in looking at the duration of the majority of the entire stop in

its analysis of this issue. The legally significant time calculation begins at the time

the purpose of the stop was completed; here, at the time Officer Liebe handed

Englehart his belongings, and indicated he was done. Mohamed, 600 F.3d 1004-05

(analyzing the legal relevance of a continued detention from the time the purpose of

the stop was completed to the time of a dog alert during a canine search). Officer

Liebe completed the issuance of the traffic warning citation approximately twelve

minutes after the two entered the patrol car. It is at this point that we must begin to

quantify the time. 

The district court and the magistrate judge both determined that at least some

of the encounter between Officer Liebe and Englehart just following the completion

of the traffic stop was consensual. The court did not clearly err in that conclusion.

2

The magistrate judge, whose report and recommendation was adopted by the

2

district court in its entirety, held that the consensual encounter began when Officer

Liebe told Englehart he was free to leave and Englehart agreed to answer additional

questions, and "changed once [Englehart] resisted Officer Liebe's desire to conduct

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Officer Liebe handed Englehart his license, registration, and proof of insurance, and

as Englehart collected his materials and opened the door to leave, Officer Liebe said,

"here you go, sir, I appreciate you being cooperative, hope you have a safe camping

trip, hey mind if I ask you a quick question?" Englehart stayed seated and turned to

Officer Liebe and answered several questions. Identifying these events as a

consensual encounter was not clear error. See Quintero-Felix, 714 F.3d at 568

(holding that the district court did not clearly err in holding that an officer could have

reasonably believed the suspect consented to the extension of the stop when the

officer told him he was free to leave, he opened the door to exit, but remained in the

vehicle and continued answering the officer's questions).

The other legally significant time in the encounter between Officer Liebe and

Englehart occurred when Englehart admitted to possessing a personal use amount of

an illegal narcotic. Just about four minutes after the completion of the stop, Englehart

stated that he had a "little bit of personal use in [his vehicle]" and that it was

marijuana. At this point, the landscape shifts regarding the subsequent search of the

vehicle and the retrieval of the hash and cash because when Englehart told Officer

Liebe there was marijuana in his vehicle, Officer Liebe had probable cause to search

the vehicle for drugs. United States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 336 (8th Cir. 2012). 

"If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the

search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the

search." Id. (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)); see also

a discretionary sniff of the vehicle," which occurred just under two minutes after the

completion of the traffic stop. The district court, however, appears to place the

relevant time as to when the encounter changed from consensual to nonconsensual

at the point Englehart "indicated he did not want his car searched, and the Officer

understood the same," which is, actually, a different time, and occurred just under one

minute following the completion of the traffic stop. We include both suppositions in

our analysis concerning the legal relevance of this time frame, as the conclusion

remains unchanged on these facts no matter which point in time is used. 

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United States v. McCarty, 612 F.3d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2010) (admission there was

marijuana in vehicle established probable cause to search for it, and discovery of

marijuana provided probable cause to search the entire vehicle). Accordingly, the

ultimate search of the vehicle by Officer Liebe, which produced the hash and,

ultimately, the discovery of the cash, was lawful. 

The time between the completion of the traffic stop and Englehart's admission

regarding his possession of drugs (which effectively truncates any further analysis of

the proverbial ticking, de minimis clock) likewise does not run afoul of constitutional

constraints. First, as noted above, part of the encounter between the two during that

time was consensual (whether that ended when Officer Liebe believed Englehart had

effectively refused his request to search the vehicle, or the time when Officer Liebe

informed Englehart that he intended to employ his K-9 to conduct a sniff of the

vehicle). Second, even despite a determination as to whether a portion was

consensual, the entire time was a de minimisintrusion on Englehart's personal liberty

under this circuit's then-existing precedent. AssumingEnglehart consented to answer

some of Officer Liebe's questions, at most only about three and one-half minutes

passed before Englehart admitted to possessing drugs, which gave Officer Liebe

probable cause to search. And, even were we to assume that none of the extended

time was consensual, only about four and one-half minutes passed before Englehart

stated that he had drugs in his vehicle. Under this circuit's then-existing precedent,

this minimal extension did not constitute an intrusion on Englehart's personal liberty

and Officer Liebe had not unreasonably extended the stop at the time Englehart made

his admission. See, e.g., Mohamed, 600 F.3d at 1004-05 (reviewing the legally

significant time as the time the purpose of the stop was completed, when the officer

told the defendant he was "good to go," and the defendant stayed to answer a few

questions, without discussion asto whether the encounterwas consensual); Robinson,

455 F.3d at 834. 

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That said, the most significant fact in this case is that Englehart admitted to

possession of drugs during the relevant time frame under review. At the time of

Englehart's admission, Officer Liebe had informed Englehart that he was going to

employ his K-9 to conduct a sniff and had called for backup assistance to do so. If

Englehart had not admitted to possessing drugs, this would very well be a different

case, but the facts dictate the result here. As it is, the brief extension of the traffic

3

Englehart argues, without supporting case citation references, that his

3

admission was elicited by Officer Liebe's promise to let him go if he only had a small

amount of marijuana in the vehicle. He claims "any citation of authority [on this

point] would be sheer pedantry." Supporting citations would have been helpful,

however, as such tactics on the part of the police are not uncommon and do not

further bear on the instant analysis since Englehart's admission occurred during a de

minimis, and therefore permissible, extension of the traffic stop. "The test for

determining the voluntariness of a confession is whether the police extracted the

confession by threats, violence, or direct or implied promises, such that the

defendant's will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically

impaired." United States v. Estey, 595 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United

States v. Gannon, 531 F.3d 657, 661 (8th Cir. 2008)). Here, most importantly, before

Englehart's admission, Officer Liebe had only once commented that he was not "too

concerned about personal use." Thus, on these facts, Officer Liebe's comment cannot

be accurately portrayed as a legally meaningful promise or inducement in support of

a voluntariness challenge. Even were we to indulge that discussion, however, the

single comment by Officer Liebe, on these facts, would not render Englehart's

admission involuntary. See United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th

Cir. 2002) (noting that raised voices and promises of leniency do not render a

confession involuntary); United States v. Kilgore, 58 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 1995)

(promise of leniency, by itself, does not make confession involuntary). "[A] promise 

made by law enforcement not to arrest or prosecute does not render a confession

involuntary." United States v. Thunderhawk, 799 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 2015)

(reiterating that the polestar is always to determine whether or not the authorities

overbore the defendant's will and critically impaired his capacity for selfdetermination); see also Dowell v. Lincoln Cty., Mo., 762 F.3d 770, 775-76 (8th Cir.

2014). We recognize that following Englehart's admission Officer Liebe made

multiple statements to Englehart that he would not cite him or arrest him for the

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stop was merely a de minimis intrusion on Englehart's personal liberty and the

resulting search and arrest was supported by probable cause. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the district court's grant of Englehart's

motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings. 

______________________________

marijuana and would, in fact, let him go if that is all that was found. However,

because those statementsfollowed Englehart's admission (the key point in the instant

analysis) they are not relevant to the inquiry, no matter that there might be varying

opinions about such tactics. Officer Liebe had probable cause to search the vehicle

and the discovery of the hash supported the ultimate arrest. See United States v.

Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 749-50 (8th Cir. 2010). 

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