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Parties Involved:
Kenneth Currier
Appellant
Postmaster General
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 5, 2002 Decided October 4, 2002

No. 01-5248

Kenneth Currier,

Appellant

v.

Postmaster General,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cv03037)

Joel P. Bennett argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

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Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge; Sentelle and Randolph,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the order

of the district court dismissing Kenneth Currier's claim alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act. Although the district court framed the

order as if it were granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the

court considered and relied on material outside the amended

complaint. This converted the order into one of summary

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, which the Postal Service

had sought in the alternative. "If, on a motion ... to dismiss

for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to

and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as

one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in

Rule 56...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).

Plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases, like plaintiffs

in other cases, bear the burden of proof at trial. At the

summary judgment stage, Currier had to show only that

there was a genuine issue of material fact and that the Postal

Service was therefore not entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

The issue before us deals with Currier's reassignment when

the Postal Service implemented a reduction in force--or

RIF--in 1995, an act of discrimination by his lights. There is

no dispute that Currier retained the same pay and benefits

after the 1995 RIF as he had before it. Even so, he could

make out an actionable injury if there were "materially

adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges" of his employment that a reasonable finder of fact

could conclude caused him "objectively tangible harm."

Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999). This

calls for a comparative judgment: what was the situation

immediately before the alleged adverse personnel action, and

what was the situation after it? Currier claimed that he was

reassigned to a "materially lower position with materially

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lower duties." But by his own admission, the job he held

immediately before the 1995 RIF was a "do nothing position."1 After the RIF he became a manager for legislative

support in government relations. He had general budget

duties for an office and supervised up to a dozen workers.

He thus went from a position before the RIF with no duties

to a position after the RIF with some duties. No material

facts were thus in dispute on the determinative issue: as a

matter of law, Currier did not experience any adverse personnel action, an essential element of his cause of action.

Brown, 199 F.3d at 455.

Currier would like us to contrast his post-RIF assignment

with a position he held from 1982 until November 1992. But

that is the wrong comparison. The proper inquiry is to

determine how the alleged discriminatory action, which occurred in 1995, affected his employment status in 1995.

Currier's job changed in 1992, but he does not allege the

change resulted from unlawful discrimination. It would be

senseless to say, for instance, that an employee's promotion

from shop clerk to assistant supervisor in the year 2000 was

an adverse employment action because the employee years

ago held the position of supervisor. To state the obvious, the

employee must be worse off after the personnel action than

before it; otherwise, he has suffered no objectively tangible

harm.

Affirmed.

1 The following exchange in Currier's deposition describes his

job before the RIF:

Q So you stayed at Merrifield. What were your duties at

Merrifield?

A None.

Q None?

A [sic] Did you work while you were out there?

A No.

Q What did you do all day?

A Occupied an office.

Currier Dep. at 40 (July 22, 1999).

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