Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35856/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35856-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon
Amicus Curiae
C.R.
Appellant
Eugene School District 4J
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

C.R., by and through his parents and

next friends, Mark and Kathryn

Rainville,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

EUGENE SCHOOL DISTRICT 4J, an

Oregon public school district,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-35856

D.C. No.

CV 12-01042 TC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Thomas M. Coffin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 16, 2015

Portland, Oregon

Submission Vacated October 19, 2015

Resubmitted January 19, 2016

Filed September 1, 2016 

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2 C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J

Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit

Judges and Larry A. Burns,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Tashima

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of the Eugene School District 4J in an action brought

by a middle school student suspended for harassment, who

challenged his suspension under the First Amendment,

arguing that because the harassment occurred off-campus, in

a public park, the school lacked the authority to discipline

him. 

The panel held that under the unique facts presented by

this case, the School District had the authority to discipline

plaintiff for his off-campus, sexually harassing speech. The

panel noted that the speech at issue occurred exclusively

between students, in close temporal and physical proximity

to the school, on property that was not obviously demarcated

from the campus itself, and that a school may act to ensure

students are able to leave the school safely without

implicating the rights of students to speak freely in the

* The Honorable Larry A. Burns, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J 3

broader community. The panel further held that the School

District’s decision to suspend plaintiff for two days for sexual

harassment was permissible under Tinker v. Des Moines

Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). The

panel concluded that plaintiff’s suspension was permissible

under the First Amendment.

Rejecting plaintiff’s due process claims, the panel held

that taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the

uncontroverted facts showed that he was provided the

informal procedures that the Constitution requires for a twoday, out-of-school suspension. The panel further held that

plaintiff failed to show that he has a substantive due process

interest in maintaining a clean, non-stigmatizing school

disciplinary record. 

COUNSEL

Marianne Dugan (argued), Eugene, Oregon, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Blake H. Fry (argued), Mersereau Shannon LLP, Portland,

Oregon, for Defendant-Appellee.

Peter D. Hawkes, Lane Powell PC, Portland, Oregon; Kevin

Díaz, ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc., Portland, Oregon;

for Amicus Curiae The American Civil Liberties Union of

Oregon.

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4 C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

C.R., a student in the Defendant Eugene School District

4J (the “School District”), was twelve years old when he was

suspended from Monroe Middle School for sexually

harassing two younger students. The incident that led to his

suspension was the last in an escalating series of encounters

with two younger students at the school. It occurred about

five minutes after school let out, a few hundred feet from

campus. C.R. challenged his suspension in district court

under the First Amendment, arguing that because the

harassment occurred off-campus, in a public park, the school

lacked the authority to discipline him. C.R. also challenged

his suspension on due process grounds. The district court

rejected C.R.’s claims and granted the School District’s

motion for summary judgment.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm.

I.

C.R. was a seventh-grade student at Monroe Middle

School when the incident at issue occurred. In October 2011,

C.R., along with a few other seventh-grade boys, began

following two sixth-grade students home. The two sixthgraders, a girl (A.I.) and a boy (J.R.), were both disabled. All

of the children took the same route home: a bike path leading

from the school, across a public park, to a neighboring street. 

The park borders the school’s athletic fields, but there is no

visible boundary to indicate where school property ends and

the park begins. On the far side of the park, across from the

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C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J 5

school, is a track belonging to the School District. The

school’s administrators casually refer to the park, track, and

fields collectively as “the back field.”

Over the course of several days, the older boys engaged

in teasing behavior, which quickly escalated. The boys began

by giving the younger students vulgar fake names, like “AssJulio,” and insisting the sixth-graders repeat them. Soon, the

boys’ jokes became sexual in nature. On the day in question,

the group of older boys circled the younger students. The

boys asked the younger students if they watched

pornography. The boys asked if A.I. and J.R. were dating,

and one boy suggested that J.R. take A.I. to the local B.J.’s

Restaurant. This set off a series of comments – puns – on the

similarity between the restaurant’s name and an abbreviation

for the slang term “blowjob,” referring to oral sex. One boy

told the younger students that there was a “really good”

sandwich at B.J.’s that “takes two to eat.” He suggested J.R.

and A.I. try it together.

Tracy Parks, an instructional aide in the School District,

was biking home from school with her daughters when she

rode past the group of students. Parks was a friend of C.R.’s

mother and had known C.R. since he was in kindergarten. 

Concerned by the group’s posture, Parks approached. She

noticed that A.I. looked “a little scared.” Parks asked both

A.I. and J.R. if they felt comfortable, and although J.R. said

“yes,” A.I. said “no.” Parks told the boys to leave and walked

the two younger students home. Along the way, A.I.

recounted what had happened, telling Parks that the boys

“were talking about [B.J.’s] restaurant, but she thought it was

[actually] something else.” A.I. repeated to Parks that she

was uncomfortable with what had happened.

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6 C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J

On Monday, Parks called the school to report what she

had seen. Parks spoke with Katherine Kiraly, the school’s

vice principal. Although she did not know the other boys,

Parks told Kiraly that she knew C.R. and could identify him

as a participant. Kiraly conferred with then-principal Peter

Tromba about Parks’ report. She then began an informal

investigation.

Kiraly met first with A.I. and J.R. A.I. recounted the

series of encounters with the older boys, including their use

of vulgar fake names, increasingly sexual comments, and the

B.J.’s puns. She told Kiraly that the final encounter made her

feel unsafe. Kiraly also interviewed J.R., who did not report

feeling uncomfortable during the encounter. Tromba recalled

later overhearing the students discussing the incident at lunch

with their friends, who were upset to hear how A.I and J.R.

had been treated.

Kiraly next interviewed the boys she suspected had been

involved in the incident, including C.R. C.R. denied any

involvement and insisted that nothing inappropriate had

happened. The administrators asked C.R. not to tell the other

boys about the interview. C.R. ignored their request and

discussed his interview at lunch that same day.

The other boys involved in the incident confirmed A.I.’s

story. They admitted making inappropriate comments,

including the B.J.’s puns. The boys were clear that they

intended their comments about B.J.’s to refer to oral sex. The

boys also confirmed that C.R. had participated in the incident,

and at least one indicated that C.R. was the ringleader. Called

in for a second interview, C.R. admitted that he had made a

comment about B.J.’s and that his behavior was

inappropriate. Based on these interviews, administrators

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C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J 7

determined that the incident fell within the School District’s

definition of sexual harassment and that C.R. had participated

in that harassment.

Tromba and Kiraly disciplined all of the boys involved in

the incident, including C.R. In an email, the administrators

informed C.R.’s parents of the basis of that decision: Not

only had C.R. participated in the incident, he also lied to

administrators in his first interview and disobeyed their

request to refrain from discussing the interview with his

friends. Under the School District’s “door-to-door” policy,

the administrators determined that they had the power to

discipline C.R. for his off-campus speech.1 Accordingly, the

school imposed a two-day, out-of-school suspension.

One year later, C.R.’s parents sued the School District on

his behalf, alleging violations of C.R.’s First Amendment and

due process rights.2 The parties filed cross-motions for

summary judgment. The district court granted summary

judgment to the School District and denied C.R.’s crossmotion for summary judgment. C.R. timely appealed.

 

1 The parties dispute whether C.R. waived his arguments under Monell

v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658

(1978), that school administrators acted pursuant to the School District’s

policy, custom, or practice when it suspended C.R., precluding him from

pursuing his claims against the School District. See Lytle v. Carl,

382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004). Having reviewed the summary

judgment papers, we are satisfied that C.R. sufficiently raised the issue. 

Because the cover of the student handbook defining the door-to-door

policy is labeled “Eugene School District 4J,” we further conclude that

C.R. has adequately shown that administrators disciplined him pursuant

to a School District policy.

2 C.R. also brought several state-law causes of action that are not at issue

in this appeal.

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8 C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J

II.

The parties do not dispute the basic facts of the case, as

outlined above. Both parties generally agree that a group of

boys, including C.R., surrounded A.I. and J.R. in a public

park, several hundred feet from the school’s property line,

and made a series of comments to the younger students about

B.J.’s Restaurant. Where, as here, the underlying facts are

not in dispute, “the only question . . . is whether the district

court correctly applied the law.” Universal Health Servs.,

Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004). We

review the district court’s grant of summary judgement de

novo. Szajer v. City of L.A., 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir.

2011). We may affirm the grant of summary judgment on

any ground supported by the record. Video Software Dealers

Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 956 (9th Cir. 2009).

C.R. attempts to cast the school’s characterization of the

incident as sexual harassment as a factual dispute, requiring

reversal of summary judgment. It is not. Federal courts owe

significant deference to a school’s interpretation of its own

rules and policies. See Bd. of Educ. of Rogers, Ark. v.

McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966, 970 (1982); Wood v. Strickland,

420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975). We uphold a school’s disciplinary

determinations so long as the school’s interpretation of its

rules and policies is reasonable, and there is evidence to

support the charge. See McCluskey, 458 U.S. at 970; Wood,

420 U.S. at 326. The School District’s policy defines sexual

harassment to include “verbal . . . conduct of a sexual nature”

including “sex-oriented verbal kidding, teasing, or jokes.” 

Eugene School District 4J, Student Rights & Responsibilities

Handbook (2008). As described above, the school

administration’s investigation uncovered at least some

evidence that C.R. participated in sexually suggestive joking

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C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J 9

directed at A.I. and J.R. The School District’s

characterization of this behavior as sexual harassment in its

Student Handbook is reasonable. Thus, we defer to the

School District’s determination that C.R. participated in

sexual harassment.

III.

We begin by summarizing the framework for analyzing

school regulation of student speech under the First

Amendment. To determine whether a school properly

disciplined a student for off-campus speech requires us to

answer two questions: First, we consider the threshold

question of whether the school could permissibly regulate the

student’s off-campus speech at all. Next, we consider the

question of whether the school’s regulation of the student’s

speech complied with the First Amendment’s requirements. 

We conclude that C.R.’s suspension was permissible under

the First Amendment.

A. First Amendment Framework: School Regulation

of Student Speech

“[S]tudents in public schools do not ‘shed their

constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the

schoolhouse gate.’” Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist.,

978 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Tinker v. Des

Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 

At the same time, “[t]he First Amendment rights of public

school students ‘are not automatically coextensive with the

rights of adults in other settings.’” Id. (quoting Bethel Sch.

Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). The

“basic educational mission” of the school may at times

conflict with the speech rights of its students. Fraser,

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10 C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J

478 U.S. at 685. Thus, our precedent recognizes that

“[s]chools must achieve a balance between protecting the

safety and well-being of their students and respecting those

same students’ constitutional rights.” LaVine v. Blaine Sch.

Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Karp v.

Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973)).

The Supreme Court has outlined four types of student

speech that schools may restrict, each governed by its own

lead case: “(1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive

speech is governed by Fraser; (2) school-sponsored speech

is governed by Hazelwood [School District v. Kuhlmeier,

484 U.S. 260 (1988)];” (3) “speech promoting illegal drug

use” is governed by Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007);

and (4) “speech that falls into [none] of these categories’ is

governed by Tinker.” Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist.,

728 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Each of these leading cases,

however, concerns only a school’s ability to regulate

students’ on-campus speech. Whether and how these

precedents apply to off-campus speech are questions the

Supreme Court has yet to answer. See Morse, 551 U.S. at

401.

We have twice considered whether schools may regulate

students’ off-campus speech. Both times, we concluded that

the school’s regulation was permissible. Wynar, 728 F.3d at

1072; LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989.

In LaVine, a high school student wrote a poem from the

perspective of a school shooter. Id. at 983–84. Two or three

months after he wrote the poem, the student rediscovered it

in his living room and brought it to school for his teacher’s

feedback. Id. at 984. The teacher was disturbed by the poem

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C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J 11

and shared it with the school’s administration, who decided

to “emergency expel” the student out of caution. Id. at

984–86. The student sued the school, alleging a First

Amendment violation. Id. at 986. We held that the school

did not violate the student’s free speech rights when it

expelled him based on the poem’s violent content. Id. at 992. 

Although we did not explicitly address the poem’s offcampus origin, we later interpreted LaVine to stand for the

proposition that while “the location of the speech can make

a difference . . . not . . . all off-campus speech is beyond the

reach of school officials.” Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1068.

In Wynar, a student was expelled for a series of messages

threatening to commit a school shooting, sent to friends via

the social website MySpace. Id. at 1065–66. The messages

were written and sent from the student’s home computer after

school hours. Id. Nevertheless, we concluded that the school

did not violate the student’s First Amendment rights when it

suspended him. Id. at 1070. We held that, “when faced with

an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may take

disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech . . . .” 

Id. at 1069.

Wynar identified two tests used by our sister circuits to

determine when a school may regulate off-campus speech. In

Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir.

2011), the Fourth Circuit applied a “nexus” test, asking

whether a student’s off-campus speech was tied closely

enough to the school to permit its regulation. Id. at 573. In

S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R–7 School District, 696 F.3d 771

(8th Cir. 2012), the Eighth Circuit applied a test asking

whether it was “reasonably foreseeable” that off-campus

speech would reach the school. Id. at 777. “[R]eluctant to try

and craft a one-size fits all approach,” Wynar declined to

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12 C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J

choose between these tests, holding that both were satisfied

in the case of a threatened school shooting. Wynar, 728 F.3d

at 1069.3

More recently, the Fifth Circuit en banc also held that

schools may sometimes discipline students for off-campus

speech. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379

(5th Cir. 2015) (en banc). In Bell, a student was disciplined

for uploading a rap video containing vulgar and arguably

threatening lyrics to the websites Facebook and YouTube. Id.

at 383. The student recorded and uploaded the video at

home. Id. Even so, the court concluded that the school

permissibly regulated the student’s speech. Id. at 400. In

reaching its decision, the court declined “to adopt or reject

approaches advocated by other circuits,” instead holding that

a school may regulate students’ off-campus speech “when a

student intentionally directs at the school community speech

reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass,

and intimidate a teacher . . . .” Id. at 396. Whatever the legal

test ultimately applied, courts consistently engage in a

circumstance-specific inquiry to determine whether a school

permissibly can discipline a student for off-campus speech.

Once the court has determined that a student’s off-campus

speech was susceptible to regulation by the school, we apply

Tinker to evaluate the constitutionality of the school’s

imposition of discipline. See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1070–71;

3 Wynar noted that, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the

Weedsport Central School District, 494 F.3d 34 (2nd Cir. 2007), the

Second Circuit also considered the question of discipline for off-campus

student speech. That court declined to decide whether to apply the Eight

Circuit’s “reasonably foreseeable” test or its own variation of that test. 

See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1068 (discussing Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39).

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C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J 13

LaVine, 257 F.3d at 992. “Under Tinker, schools may restrict

speech that ‘might reasonably lead school authorities to

forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with

school activities’ or that collides ‘with the rights of other

students to be secure and to be let alone.’” Wynar, 728 F.3d

at 1070 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 514). Thus, for its

actions to survive First Amendment scrutiny, the School

District must show both that it had the authority to reach

C.R.’s off-campus speech and that the imposition of

discipline complied with Tinker.

B. The School District Had the Authority to

Discipline C.R. for His Off-Campus, Sexually

Harassing Speech

We have not yet considered whether a school may

discipline a student for off-campus sexual harassment. Nor

are there any directly analogous decisions from any other

circuit. Rather, the vast majority of the law in this area

concerns school officials’ authority to discipline students for

internet speech. In this case, nothing was put into writing,

and the students’ speech was never shared online; the

offending comments were made in person, just as school was

letting out, a few hundred feet from the school’s property

line.

We follow Wynar in applying both the nexus and

reasonable foreseeabilitytests to C.R.’s speech. We conclude

that under either test, the School District had the authority to

discipline C.R. for his off-campus speech.

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14 C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J

1. Nexus

Although the harassment at issue in this case took place

off school property, it was closely tied to the school. First, all

of the individuals involved were students, a fact that typically

counsels in favor of finding that a student’s speech was

susceptible to school discipline. See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069

(finding school showed nexus in part because all individuals

involved were students); Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (same). 

Next, the incident took place on a path that begins at the

schoolhouse door. The path then runs from the school’s

fields across a public park that shares a boundary with school

property, before eventuallymeeting a neighboring street. A.I.

and J.R. had not yet reached the street when the older boys

caught up to them. As a result, the students were only a few

hundred feet from the school door when the harassment

began. Moreover, while the park is technically city property,

it is referred to by school administrators as part of “the back

field.” There is no visual marker (i.e., a fence or other

boundary) to indicate where school property ends and the city

park begins; it is therefore unclear whether the students even

recognized that they had left school property.

Furthermore, all of the students had been let out of school

just minutes before the incident. The school’s schedule thus

brought the students together on the bike path. Had all of the

students not been released from school at the same time and

walked home along the same path, the older students would

not have had the same opportunity to sexually harass the

younger students. The record does not reflect whether there

were alternative routes home available to the younger

students, but it is clear that it was school itself that brought

the children together on the path. Moreover, it is a reasonable

exercise of the School District’s in loco parentis authority to

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C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J 15

be concerned with its students’ well being as they begin their

homeward journey at the end of the school day. See Fraser,

478 U.S. at 684; Veronica Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.

646, 654–56 (1995) (collecting cases).

2. Reasonable Foreseeability

Because the harassment happened in such close proximity

to the school, administrators could reasonably expect the

harassment’s effects to spill over into the school environment. 

Simply seeing their harassers in the hallway could well be

disruptive for affected students. Similarly, a student who is

routinely subject to harassment while walking home from

school may be distracted during school hours by the prospect

of the impending harassment. A student’s ability to focus

during the day could be impaired by intrusive worries about

whether she or he would once again face uncomfortable and

sexuallyintimidating comments immediatelyafter school lets

out.

Administrators could also reasonably expect students to

discuss the harassment in school. Indeed, A.I. was upset

enough about the incident to discuss it with her friends in the

lunch room. And administrators likely could not disregard

the possibility that the older students would continue to

harass their targets if they encountered one another in the

hallways or the school yard. Because the harassment in this

case was so closely connected to campus – on the students’

walk home, a few hundred feet from the school, immediately

after school let out – administrators could reasonably expect

that the effects of the speech would extend to the students’ inschool experience. Cf. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (“[Plaintiff]

also knew . . . that the fallout from her conduct and the speech

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16 C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J

within the [MySpace page] would be felt in the school

itself.”).

Under either the nexus test or the reasonable

foreseeability test, the School District could take reasonable

disciplinary action against C.R.’s off-campus speech.

C.R. contends that finding for the School District on this

point would dangerously expand its reach, permitting schools

to regulate student speech in public places, like a shopping

mall, bookstore, or movie theater, where children might stop

on the way home from school. But we do not hold that either

test extends the school’s authority so far – that is a question

for another day.

4

Our decision is necessarily restricted to the unique facts

presented by this case: The speech at issue occurred

exclusively between students, in close temporal and physical

proximity to the school, on property that is not obviously

demarcated from the campus itself. A school may act to

ensure students are able to leave the school safely without

implicating the rights of students to speak freely in the

broader community. In short, the School District’s actions

were reasonable under Wynar. For all of the foregoing

4

It suffices for now to observe that, typically, malls, bookstores, and

movie theaters are located more than a few hundred feet from the

schoolhouse door. And unlike the field next to the school, such venues are

unlikely to be confused with school property. Presumably, students also

would have more optionsto avoid any such place ofsuspected harassment

or could ask an older sibling or parent to accompany them there. Unlike

in this case, the school’s schedule would not directly lead to the students’

encounter. Both Wynar tests rely on the speech’s close connection with

the school to permit administrative discipline. That connection is missing

in the scenarios C.R. conjures.

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C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J 17

reasons, we conclude that the School District had the

authority to discipline C.R. for his off-campus, sexually

harassing speech.

C. C.R.’s Suspension Was Permissible Under Tinker

Tinker permits schools to restrict student speech in two

broad sets of circumstances: if the speech “might reasonably

lead school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or

material interference with school activities,” or, alternatively,

if the speech “collides ‘with the rights of other students to be

secure and to be let alone.’” Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1070

(quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 514). The School District’s

decision to discipline C.R. falls squarely within Tinker’s

second set of circumstances.

“The precise scope of Tinker’s interference with the rights

of others language is unclear.” Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1072

(quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200,

217 (3rd Cir. 2001)). We have held, however, that speech

that “is merely offensive to some listener” is not sufficient,

and does not fall within Tinker’s scope. Id. Sexually

harassing speech is more than that. In Wynar, we held that

MySpace messages threatening a school shooting “represent

the quintessential harm to the rights of other students to be

secure.” Id. Almost by definition, the speaker’s explicit,

physical threat prevented the targeted students from feeling

safe in school.

Sexual harassment also implicates the rights of students

to be secure. Such harassment is harmful because it positions

the target as a sexual object rather than a person, threatening

the individual’s sense of physical, as well as emotional and

psychological, security. Often, the threat of an unwanted

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18 C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J

physical intrusion is implicit even within the context of

purely verbal sexual harassment. Schools therefore must

have the authority to discipline students for engaging in

sexually inappropriate and harassing speech. Cf. Fraser,

478 U.S. at 685 (“We hold that [the] School District acted

entirelywithin its permissible authorityin imposing sanctions

upon [a student] in response to his offensively lewd and

indecent speech.”).

The facts of this case illustrate the point. Both of the

targeted students were unable to return home after school

without being subjected to questions about sex acts and

whether they were dating – inappropriate and unsettling

questions for students just out of elementary school. 

Unsurprisingly, A.I. reported feeling scared and

uncomfortable after the encounter. The school could

therefore reasonably expect that those feelings would cause

A.I. to feel less secure in school, affecting her ability to

perform as a student and engage appropriately with her peers. 

Moreover, the harassment had already begun to escalate from

the repetition of curse words to sexual comments directed at

the victims. The school could reasonably expect the

harassment to escalate further if allowed to continue

unchecked. Without intervening administrative action, the

younger students would be deprived of their right to be secure

at school.

The targeted students’ age is also relevant to the analysis. 

The Supreme Court has recognized that overtly sexual speech

“could well be seriously damaging to its less mature

audience” when that audience was younger than 14 years old

“and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.” Id.

at 683; see also Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd.

of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649 (1999) (noting that, when it

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C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J 19

comes to student sexual harassment, grade schools may

exercise a greater degree of control over student speech than

colleges). Because C.R.’s speech interfered with the younger

students’ rights to be secure and let alone, we conclude that

his suspension was permissible under Tinker.

5

In sum, we conclude: First, the district court correctly

held that the School District could discipline C.R. for his offcampus speech. Second, the School District’s decision to

suspend C.R. for two days for sexual harassment was

permissible under Tinker. Sexually harassing speech, by

definition, interferes with the victims’ ability to feel safe and

secure at school. The district court did not err in granting

summary judgment to the School District on C.R.’s First

Amendment claims.

IV.

C.R.’s due process claims also fail.

A. Procedural Due Process

The Constitution requires only informal procedures when

schools suspend students for ten days or fewer. “[T]he

5 The School District’s disciplinary action may also have been

permissible under the Tinkertest’s “substantial disruption” language. See

Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574 (holding that “schools have a compelling

interest in regulating speech that interferes with or disrupts the work and

discipline of the school, including . . . student harassment and bullying,”

and that interest justifies punishing off-campus sexual harassment under

Tinker in order to provide “a safe school environment conducive to

learning” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because we conclude that

the School District’s disciplinary action falls within the Tinker test’s

“rights of others” language, however, we do not reach this issue.

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20 C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J

student [must] be given oral or written notice of the charges

against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the

evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present

his side of the story.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581

(1975). The school need not outline specific charges and

their potential consequences or notify parents of the charges

prior to the student’s suspension. Wynar, 728 F.3d at

1072–73. “In the great majority of cases the disciplinarian

may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the

student minutes after it has occurred.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 582.

We require “only that, in being given an opportunity to

explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the student

first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of

the accusation is.” Id.

It is undisputed that, in his interviews, C.R. received

informal notice of the charges against him and an opportunity

to tell his side of the story. C.R. testified that Kiraly and

Troma expressed concern about the way A.I. and J.R. had

been treated and suspicion that the younger students had been

harassed, before asking C.R. for “the whole story.” Taken in

the light most favorable to C.R., the uncontroverted facts

show that he was provided those informal procedures that the

Constitution requiresfor a two-day, out-of-school suspension.

C.R. contends that the school did not provide him with

sufficient notice of the specific nature of the allegations, or of

how his conduct violated the school rules. It is not

constitutionally required that the school inform a student of

the specific rules or policies he allegedly violated. Wynar,

728 F.3d at 1073. Accordingly, the school also need not take

the extra step of informing the student exactly how his

conduct violated the specific rules at issue – no bill of

particulars is required. C.R. further contends that the school

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C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J 21

did not provide him an adequate opportunity to gather

relevant evidence to rebut the school’s charges. This, too, is

not constitutionally required. Goss, 419 U.S. at 582.

Finally, C.R. contends that the school violated his

procedural due process rights by not following its own

policies regarding suspension. However, school

administrators’ “purported failure to comply with their own

administrative procedure does not, itself, constitute a

violation of constitutional due process.” Wynar, 728 F.3d at

1073. Thus, even assuming that C.R. is correct that the

School District did not follow its own procedures for issuing

a suspension in his case, he still cannot state a claim for

deprivation of procedural due process on this basis. The

district court thus correctly concluded that the School District

afforded C.R. all the process that he was due.

B. Substantive Due Process

C.R. contends that the school violated his substantive due

process rights when it recorded the reason for his suspension

as “harassment - sexual.”6 According to C.R., the stigma

from this label was so strong that he was deprived of his right

to a good reputation.

C.R. fails to show that he has a substantive due process

interest in maintaining a clean, non-stigmatizing school

disciplinary record. “Substantive due process refers to certain

6 After being suspended for sexual harassment, C.R. was later suspended

for stealing office supplies. The discipline record (somewhat

dramatically) refers to the incident as “theft - major.” C.R. included this

designation in his substantive due process claim and the following

discussion applies equally to both record designations.

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22 C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J

actions that the government may not engage in, no matter

how many procedural safeguards it employs.” 

Wedges/Ledges of Cal. v. City of Phoenix, Ariz., 24 F.3d 56,

66 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F.2d

1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1988)). Generally speaking,substantive

due process protects an individual’s fundamental rights to

liberty and bodily autonomy. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas,

539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168

(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.

1, 12 (1967). Here, no fundamental rights are at stake. There

is no reason why a school should not be permitted to record

the reason for a student’s suspension, however unsavory, so

long as it applied the appropriate procedural safeguards while

pursuing its investigation. C.R. fails to raise any viable

substantive due process claim.7

V.

In our digital age, a school’s power to discipline students

for off-campus speech has become an increasingly salient

question for the courts. This case, however, presents us with

7 C.R. also contends that the district court erred in dismissing his motion

to compel further discovery as moot, once it had ruled on the crossmotions for summary judgment. We will not disturb such a denial of

discovery “except upon the clearest showing that the denial . . . results in

actual and substantial prejudice . . . .” Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,

342 F.3d 1080, 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks

omitted). C.R. did not file his motion to compel until two months after the

expiration of the discovery cutoff date and more than a month after he

filed his own motion for summary judgment. The motion was, therefore,

untimely, and the district court had no obligation to consider it. See

Laborde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 686 F.2d 715, 719 (9thCir. 1982). 

Moreover, C.R. made no showing that he suffered any prejudice as a result

of the ruling. We thus conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in dismissing C.R.’s motion as moot.

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C.R. V. EUGENE SCH. DIST. 4J 23

an analog problem: Whether the School District overstepped

its authority when it disciplined C.R. for engaging in sexual

harassment a few hundred feet from the school’s physical

boundaries, a few minutes after class let out. Under this set

of facts, we conclude that C.R.’s speech was tied closely

enough to the school to subject him to the school’s

disciplinary authority. As imposed by the school, that

discipline complied with the requirements of Tinker. Finally,

we conclude that the School District afforded C.R. all of the

process the Constitution requires.

The district court’s order granting the School District’s

motion for summary judgment and denying C.R.’s crossmotion for summary judgment, and its order dismissing the

action are

AFFIRMED.

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