Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-35623/USCOURTS-ca9-15-35623-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Matteo Brunozzi
Appellant
Cable Communications, Inc.
Appellee
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association
Amicus Curiae - Pending

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MATTEO BRUNOZZI, an

individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CABLE COMMUNICATIONS,

INC., a foreign corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-35623

D.C. Nos.

3:14-cv-01128-MO

3:14-cv-01131-MO

CASEY MCCORMICK, an

individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CABLE COMMUNICATIONS,

INC., a foreign corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-35744

D.C. No.

3:14-cv-01128-MO

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael W. Mosman, Chief Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 10, 2016

Portland, Oregon

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2 BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

Filed March 21, 2017

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and William A. Fletcher,

Circuit Judges, and Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Dorsey

SUMMARY**

Labor Law

The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of the defendant in an action brought under the Fair

Labor Standards Act and Oregon state law by plaintiffs who

worked as technicians, installing cable television and internet

services.

The panel held that the defendant’s piece-work-based pay

plan, which included a bonus designed to decrease in

proportion to an increase in the number of overtime hours

worked, violated the Fair Labor Standards Act’s overtime

provisions.

The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment

on the technicians’ claims under Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.140(1),

which requires employers to pay all wages earned and unpaid

* The Honorable Jennifer A. Dorsey, United States District Judge for

the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 3

by the end of the first business day after a discharge or

termination.

The panel also reversed the district court’s summary

judgment on one technician’s retaliation claims under Or.

Rev. Stat. § 659A.199, which prohibits a private employer

from retaliating against an employee who has in good faith

reported information that the employee believes is a violation

of law, and Or. Rev. State. § 652.355, which prohibits an

employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating

against an employee who has discussed, made, or consulted

an attorney about a wage claim. The technician verbally

complained to his immediate supervisors that he was not

being property compensated for overtime, and he refused to

work any additional overtime hours unless he was paid an

overtime rate. The panel held that the term “reported” in

§ 659A.199 means a report of information to either an

external or internal authority. The panel held that the act of

complaining about inadequate wages is a protected activity

under § 652.355.

The panel remanded the case to the district court for

further proceedings.

COUNSEL

Phil Goldsmith (argued), Law Office of Phil Goldsmith,

Portland, Oregon; D. Michael Dale, Law Office of D.

Michael Dale, Cornelius, Oregon; David A. Schuck, Schuck

Law LLC, Vancouver, Washington; Corinna SpencerScheurich, Northwest Workers’ Justice Project, Portland,

Oregon; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

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4 BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

Mitchell C. Baker (argued) and Alexander A. Wheatley,

Fisher & Phillips, LLP, Portland, Oregon, for DefendantAppellee.

Shenoa Payne, Shenoa Payne Attorney At Law PC, Portland,

Oregon, for Amicus Curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers

Association.

OPINION

DORSEY, District Judge:

Matteo Brunozzi and Casey McCormick worked as

technicians for Cable Communications, Inc. (CCI) installing

cable television and internet services. They filed separate

lawsuits against CCI alleging that the company’s

compensation plan violates the overtime provisions of the

Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207, and

Oregon’s statutory requirement that an employer pay all

wages earned and unpaid after terminating an employee, ORS

652.140. Brunozzi additionally alleges that CCI violated

Oregon’s laws prohibiting discrimination against a private

employee who engages in whistleblowing (ORS 659A.199)

and wage-claim discussions (ORS 652.355). The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of CCI on those

claims. The technicians appealed. We reverse.

I. Background

A. Technician work and pay

CCI employs technicians to install cable television and

internet services for Comcast customers. McCormick worked

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BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 5

for CCI as a technician for almost one year. Brunozzi was

similarly employed by CCI for approximately five months. 

The unchallenged evidence shows that the technicians’ work

tasks are assigned by CCI on a daily basis. The company

schedules the appointments with the customers; the

technicians do not have authority to change appointment

times or complete a task on a different day. These

technicians’ workweeks ordinarily exceeded 40 hours, and

they were routinely scheduled to work six-day weeks.

CCI guarantees that its technicians will earn at least the

statutory minimum wage and pays them on a piece-work

basis. This means that the technician is paid a fixed rate for

each piece of work (i.e., task) that he completes.1 CCI’s

technicians sign a document entitled “Technician Pay Rate

Program.” The agreement states that the technician’s gross

earnings are the “[t]otal amount billed to the company by the

employee for Piece Rate jobs completed in the pay period

plus any bonus received . . . .”

2

It does not explain CCI’s

method for calculating the technicians’ pay, but the parties

mostly agree about how that is accomplished.

CCI begins by calculating the technician’s “Piece Rate

Total” for the week, which is the total value of the piece-work

tasks performed by him that week minus any adjustments

made for incomplete work or similar reasons. If the

technician worked over 40 hours, CCI divides the Piece Rate

1 The record does not reflect what work pieces the technicians

performed or the values that CCI assigned to them.

2 McCormick’s agreement refers to “Commission Rate” jobs while

Brunozzi’s refers to “Piece Rate” jobs. No party argues that there is a

distinction in this difference.

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6 BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

Total by the total number of hours worked to calculate his

“average hourly” rate of pay for that week.3 This hourly rate

is then divided by two, and the resulting quotient is multiplied

by the number of overtime hours the technician worked that

week to arrive at the technician’s base overtime pay—his

“Piece Rate OT Premium.”

CCI next calculates whether the technician has earned a

“Production Bonus” by dividing the Piece Rate Total by 60,

multiplying the quotient by 70, and subtracting from that

product his Piece Rate Total and any Piece Rate OT

Premium. Finally, if the technician earned a Production

Bonus and worked overtime, CCI calculates the overtime due

on the bonus—the Production Bonus OT Premium—by

dividing the Production Bonus by the total number of hours

worked in the week, dividing the resulting quotient by two,

and multiplying that quotient by the number of overtime

hours worked in the week. A technician’s pay each week is

his Piece Rate Total plus—to the extent that they are

earned—Piece Rate OT Premium, Production Bonus, and

Production Bonus OT Premium.

B. Procedural history of the technicians’ lawsuits

Brunozzi filed his complaint in state court alleging that

CCI violated: (1) Oregon’s overtime regulations4; (2) the

3 The technicians claim that CCI’s formula for calculating their

regular rate each week is (Piece Rate Total + Bonus)/total hours worked. 

They cite the district court’s orders for this proposition. But the district

court was reciting how the regular rate is calculated under the federal

regulations, not how it is calculated under CCI’s plan.

4 The district court dismissed this claim; Brunozzi does not challenge

that dismissal in this appeal.

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BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 7

FLSA’s overtime regulations; (3) Oregon’s wage-claim- and

whistleblowing-discrimination regulations; and (4) Oregon’s

wage-payment-on-termination regulations. After CCI

removed the case to federal court, the parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment: the company moved on all

of Brunozzi’s claims while he moved on his FLSA overtimeviolation and Oregon wage-payment-on-termination claims. 

The district court entered judgment in favor of CCI on

Brunozzi’s claims; Brunozzi timely appealed.

McCormick filed his complaint in state court alleging that

CCI violated: (1) Oregon’s overtime regulations; (2) the

FLSA’s overtime regulations; (3) Oregon’s wage-paymenton-termination regulations; (4) the Oregon Family Medical

Leave Act; (5) Oregon’s disability-discrimination regulations;

and (6) wrongful termination under Oregon common law. 

After CCI removed the case to federal court, the parties filed

cross-motions for summary judgment: the company sought

judgment on all of McCormick’s claims, and he sought

judgment on his FLSA overtime-violation and Oregon wagepayment-on-termination claims. The district court entered

judgment in favor of the company on McCormick’s FLSA

and Oregon wage-payment-on-termination claims. Then the

district court entered final judgment under FRCP 54(b) on

those claims. McCormick timely appealed.

II. Standard of Review

A district court’s decision to grant summary judgment is

reviewed de novo. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los

Angeles Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 2008). 

When the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment,

“we review each motion . . . separately, giving the nonmoving

party for each motion the benefit of all reasonable

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8 BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

inferences.” Id. “When the underlying facts are not in

dispute, th[is] court’s only function is to determine whether

the district court correctly applied the law.” Szajer v. City of

Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing

Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013,

1019 (9th Cir. 2004)). “We review the district court’s

interpretation of state law, including state statutes, de novo.” 

Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Group Long Term Disability

Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(citing In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1984)

(en banc)).

III. Discussion

A. The technicians’ FLSA overtime-violation claims

1. Overtime pay requirements under the FLSA

“Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 with the goal of

‘protect[ing] all covered workers from substandardwages and

oppressive working hours.’” Christopher v. SmithKline

Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2162 (2012) (alteration in

original) (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,

Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981)). Among other things, the

FLSA requires “employers to compensate employees for

hours in excess of 40 per week at a rate of 1 1⁄2 times the

employees’ regular wages.” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)). 

“The keystone of [this requirement] is the regular rate of

compensation. On that depends the amount of overtime

payments [that] are necessary to effectuate the statutory

purposes. The proper determination of that rate is therefore

of prime importance.” Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds

Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424 (1945) (“YoungermanReynolds”).

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BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 9

Although not defined in the FLSA, the Supreme Court has

interpreted “regular rate” to mean “the hourly rate actually

paid the employee for the normal, non-overtime workweek

for which he is employed.” Id. (citing Walling v. Helmerich

& Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 40 (1944)); Parth v. Pomona

Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 630 F.3d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 2010). 

“The regular rate by its very nature must reflect all payments

[that] the parties have agreed shall be received regularly

during the work week, exclusive of overtime payments.” Id.

In determining the statutory regular rate, “[w]e must look ‘not

to contract nomenclature’ but to all payments, wages, piece

work rates, bonuses, or things of value” that form “part of the

normal weekly income” of the employee. Walling v. Alaska

Pac. Consol. Min. Co., 152 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1945). 

“The ‘regular rate’ of pay under the [FLSA] cannot be left to

a declaration by the parties as to what is to be treated as the

regular rate for an employee; it must be drawn from what

happens under the employment contract.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 778.108 (citing Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron,

334 U.S. 446, 464 (1948)).

For employees who are paid “on a piece-rate basis, the

regular hourly rate of pay is computed by adding together

total earnings for the workweek from piece rates and all other

sources (such as production bonuses) and any sums paid for

waiting time or other hours worked (except statutory

exclusions).” Id. § 778.111(a). “This sum is then divided by

the number of hours worked in the week for which such

compensation was paid, to yield the pieceworker’s ‘regular

rate’ for that week.” Id. A pieceworker is entitled to be paid

“the total weekly earnings at this regular rate for all hours

worked” and overtime equal to “one-half this regular rate of

paymultiplied by the number of hours worked in excess of 40

in the week.” Id. “Only additional half-time pay is required

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10 BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

in such cases where the employee has already received

straight-time compensation at piece rates or bysupplementary

payments for all hours worked.” Id.

2. Comparing the FLSA’s requirements with CCI’s

pay plan

The technicians argue that CCI’s pay plan allows it to

skirt the full burden of the FLSA’s overtime pay requirement. 

The fault, they say, lies with the Production Bonus, which is

designed to decrease in proportion to an increase in the

number of overtime hours worked. CCIresponds that its plan

is legally sound because the FLSA does not regulate bonus

amounts and the technicians are paid their piece-rate wages

plus overtime premiums at 1⁄2 their regular rate as required by

29 C.F.R. § 778.111.

The crux of the issue is whether CCI’s plan properly

calculates a technician’s statutory regular rate. To determine

this, we must first determine what the parties agreed a

technician is to be paid in a normal, non-overtime workweek. 

See Youngerman-Reynolds, 325 U.S. at 424. We then

examine if CCI divides that sum by the total number of hours

worked in the workweek to determine a technician’s regular

hourly rate for that week. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.111(a).

The employment contract states that during a normal,

non-overtime workweek, a technician will receive the total

value of the piece-work tasks that he completed—his Piece

Rate Total—plus a Production Bonus in the amount of 1/6 his

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BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 11

Piece Rate Total.5 Because the Production Bonus is “a

portion of regular wages [that] the [technician] is entitled to

receive under his regular wage contract[,]” it is not a true

bonus as defined by the Department of Labor (DOL). 

29 C.F.R. § 778.502(a) (providing that a bonus is a sum paid

in “addition to total wages usually because of extra effort of

one kind or another, or as a reward for loyal service or as a

gift”). Having agreed that the Piece Rate Total plus 1/6 that

amount forms the technician’s normal weekly income, CCI

must divide the sum of those amounts by the total number of

hours worked in a particular week to properly determine the

technician’s regular hourly rate for that week. See

Youngerman-Reynolds, 325 U.S. at 424.

But that is not what CCI does during weeks when a

technician works overtime. Instead, CCI reduces the

Production Bonus paid during a regular forty-hour workweek

by the amount of overtime premium that it calculates is due

to the technician on his Piece Rate Total. Because a “bonus”

of 1/6 the technician’s Piece Rate Total forms part of the

technician’s income in a normal, non-overtime week,

diminishing or eliminating that “bonus” results in the

technician being paid at a reduced hourly rate during weeks

when he works overtime. An agreement, practice, or device

that lowers the hourly rate during statutory overtime hours or

weeks when statutory overtime is worked is expressly

prohibited under the regulations promulgated by the DOL

5 The formula provided in the agreement for calculating the bonus is

more complicated—(70*(Piece Rate Total/60)) - Piece Rate OT

Premium—but the parties agree in their supplemental briefs that it is

correctly simplified as (1/6)*Piece Rate Total for weeks when no overtime

is worked.

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12 BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

interpreting the FLSA.6 The regulations state that “the parties

cannot lawfully agree that the rate” that is “applicable to a

particular type of work” “shall be lower merely because the

work is performed during the statutory overtime hours, or

during a week in which statutory overtime is worked.” 

29 C.F.R. § 778.316. Similarly, when discussing schemes

that establish artificially low regular rates in violation of the

FLSA, the DOL cautions “that the hourly rate paid for the

identical work during the hours in excess of the applicable

maximum hours standard cannot be lower than the rate paid

for the nonovertime hours nor can the hourly rate vary from

week to week inversely with the length of the workweek.” 

Id. § 778.500(b). Agreements or practices that do this are

“ineffective.” See id. § 778.316.

The diminishing “bonus” device in CCI’s pay plan causes

it to miscalculate the technicians’ regular hourly rate during

weeks when they work overtime and allows CCI to pay the

technicians less during those weeks. We thus hold that CCI’s

pay plan violates the FLSA’s overtime provisions, and we

reverse the district court’s orders granting summary judgment

in CCI’s favor on the technicians’ FLSA claims.

B. The technicians’ claims alleging violations of ORS

652.140

Oregon Revised Statute section 652.140(1) requires

employers to pay “all wages earned and unpaid at the time of

6 The regulations contained in part 778 of title 29 of the Code of

Federal Regulations “constitute[ ] the official interpretation of the

Department of Labor with respect to the meaning and application of the

maximum hours and overtime pay requirements contained in section 7 of

the [FLSA].” 29 C.F.R. § 778.1.

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BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 13

discharge” by “the end of the first business day after the

discharge or termination.” The district court found that CCI’s

pay plan did not violate either Oregon law or the FLSA, so it

concluded that the technicians’ ORS 652.140 claims “fall

away” and, thus, entered judgment in favor of CCI on those

claims. Because we conclude that CCI’s pay plan violates the

FLSA’s overtime provisions, we reverse the district court’s

order granting summary judgment in CCI’s favor on the

technicians’ claims under ORS 652.140.

C. Brunozzi’s retaliation claim under ORS 659A.199

Oregon law prohibits a private employer from retaliating

against an employee who “has in good faith reported

information that the employee believes is evidence of a

violation of a state or federal law, rule[,] or regulation.” OR.

REV. STAT. § 659A.199(1). To establish a prima facie case

of retaliation under ORS 659A.199, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) he was engaged in a protected activity;

(2) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) there

was a causal link between the protected activity and the

adverse employment decision. C.f. Ruggles v. Cal. Poly. St.

Uni., 797 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 1986) (reciting elements of

a retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).

The record reflects that Brunozzi verbally complained to

his immediate supervisors on several occasions that he was

not being properlycompensated for overtime. Brunozzi’s last

complaint came two days before he was terminated, when he

told his supervisor that he would not work on Saturday, April

5, 2014, “Because I’m not being paid overtime, as far as I can

tell.” Because the district court interpreted “reported” in ORS

659A.199 to mean reports only to authorities that are external

to the employer, it found that Brunozzi’s complaints to his

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14 BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

supervisors did not constitute protected activity under the

statute and entered judgment against him on his retaliation

claim. Brunozzi argues that the district court erred when it

interpreted ORS 659A.199’s “reported” to include only

reports made to external authorities. We agree.

The legislature did not define the term “reported” as it is

used in ORS 659A.199, and no Oregon state court has

interpreted that term in the context of this statute. Our role

when interpreting a state statute as a matter of first

impression is to “determine what meaning the state’s highest

court would give to the law.” Bass v. Cty. of Butte, 458 F.3d

978, 981 (9th Cir. 2006). “Thus, we must follow the state’s

rules of statutory interpretation.” Id.

Under Oregon law, “[t]he first step [involves] an

examination of text and context.” State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d

1042, 1050–51 (Or. 2009) (en banc). In the second step,

“[t]he court will consult [proffered legislative history] after

examining text and context, even if the court does not

perceive an ambiguity in the statute’s text, where that

legislative history appears useful to the court’s analysis.” Id.

at 1050. Oregon places legislative history “on a par with

[the] text and context” of the statute. Id. at 1049. “However,

the extent of the court’s consideration of that history, and the

evaluative weight that the court gives it, is for the court to

determine.” Id. at 1050–51. In the third and final step, “[i]f

the legislature’s intent remains unclear after examining text,

context, and legislative history, the court may resort to

general maxims of statutory construction to aid in resolving

the remaining uncertainty.” Id. at 1051.

Textually, ORS 659A.199 is broad and places no limit on

the individual to whom the employee’s information must be

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BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 15

“reported.” The statute does not provide much context other

than to suggest that it is designed to safeguard an employee

who, “in good faith[,]” has “reported information” that he

“believes is evidence of a violation of a state or federal law,

rule, or regulation.” These clues do not guide us toward

either party’s interpretation, so we must consider other

cannons of construction.

If the legislature has not defined a statutory term, Oregon

courts “ordinarily look to the plain meaning of a statute’s text

as a key first step in determining what particular terms

mean.” Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue, 337 P.3d 768,

776 (Or. 2014) (en banc). This “frequently” includes “the

approach [of] . . . consult[ing] dictionary definitions of the

terms, on the assumption that, if the legislature did not give

the term a specialized definition, the dictionary definition

reflects the meaning that the legislature would naturally have

intended.” Id. Oregon courts regularly consult Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary. Id. at n.7.

According to that dictionary, “[t]he ordinary meaning of

the verb ‘report’ is ‘to give an account of: NARRATE,

RELATE, TELL.’” Roberts v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co.,

255 P.3d 628, 632–33 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Webster’s

Third New Int’l Dictionary 1925 (unabridged ed. 2002)). 

Oregon courts recognize that “the context in which the word

is used adds additional meaning to the definition.” Id. at 633. 

Examples of other uses of the verb “report” are “to ‘make a

charge of misconduct against [another]’” or “‘to make known

to the proper authorities: give notification of.’” Id. (alteration

in original) (quoting Webster’s at 1925). But the context of

ORS 659A.199 does not provide additional meaning to make

either alternative use of “report” applicable. C.f. id.

(discussing that ORS 659A.230(1) provides context of

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16 BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

criminal activity, complaint, investigation, and trial and civil

proceeding). We initially conclude from the text and context

of ORS 659A.199 that the Oregon legislature intended to use

the ordinary meaning of the verb “report” in this statute: to

narrate, relate, tell. This interpretation supports Brunozzi’s

argument that the legislature intended ORS 659A.199 to

cover both external and internal reports of violations.

The second step of Oregon’s statutory-interpretation

methodology is considering pertinent legislative history that

a party may proffer. Gaines, 206 P.3d at 1050. The district

court was not required to consider the legislative history of

ORS 659A.199 because no party proffered any portion of that

history to it. OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020(3). However,

Brunozzi and the Oregon Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA)

proffer pertinent portions of the legislative history to us; we

may consider that history “to the extent that [we find] it . . .

useful.” Powell’s Books, Inc. v. Kroger, 622 F.3d 1202, 1209

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Gaines, 206 P.3d at 1050–51)

(discussing Oregon’s rules of statutory construction and how

they contrast with standard federal statutory construction).

The proffered legislative history shows that ORS

659A.199 had its genesis in House Bill 3162, which was

introduced to the Oregon Legislative Assembly during the

2009 Regular Session.7 The bill’s chief sponsor was

Representative Stiegler, and it was referred to the House

Business and Labor Committee, which held a public hearing

7 HB 3162 Enrolled, Oregon Legislative Information, 2009 Regular

Session (available at: https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2009R1/Measures/

Overview/HB3162).

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BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 17

on the measure on April 10, 2009.8 During that hearing, Rep.

Stiegler stated that H.B. 3162 puts “private employees on

equal footing with public employees at this stage of the game

who alreadyhave a whistleblowing provision in ORS 659A.”9

She explained that H.B. 3162 “levels the playing field for the

private employee” who has “tried to do the right thing by

bringing” violations of state or federal law “to the attention of

a superior in the chain of command, and ha[s] ended up

paying the price either through demotion, reduction in salary,

or loss of employment altogether.”10 At a later hearing before

the Senate, Rep. Stiegler elaborated that H.B. 3162 gives an

employee “who wants to do the right thing[,] . . . [like]

bring[ing] a bad practice to the [attention of his] higher ups,

the ability to do so without repercussion, and hopefully

give[s] the employer the opportunity to rectify that

situation.”11 Representative Chris Edwards and Senator

Diane Rosenbaum similarly explained that H.B. 3162 would

encourage “more internal reporting” by employees “so that

the company, maybe even higher up the food chain than

whoever is the bad actor, can deal with it internally and [the

8

Id.

9 Hearing on H.B. 3162 Before the House Committee on Business and

Labor, First Public Hearing, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. at 1:22–1:40 (Or. Apr.

10, 2009) (“April 10 Hearing”) (statement from Rep. Judy Stiegler).

10 Id. at 1:40–2:13 (statement from Rep. Stiegler).

11 Hearing on H.B. 3162 A Before the Senate Committee on

Commerce and Workforce Development, Public Hearing and Work

Session, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. at 37:19–37:42 (Or. May 18, 2009) (“May

18 Hearing”) (statement from Rep. Stiegler).

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18 BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

company] can right [its] own ship without the involvement of

the government.”12

Numerous people testified in favor of H.B. 3162,

including two OTLA attorneys who stated that the bill was

necessary because Oregon law did not protect private

employees who internally report legal violations to their

employers like it protects public whistleblowers.13 And

several Oregonians who had been terminated after they

internally reported legal violations to their employers

likewise testified in favor of the bill.14

We find that the proffered legislative history is useful to

answer the question before us. Having examined the text,

context, and pertinent legislative history, we find that the

Oregon legislature intended the term “reported” in ORS

659A.199 to mean a report of information to either an

external or internal authority. We therefore reverse the

district court’s order granting summary judgment in CCI’s

favor on Brunozzi’s retaliation claim under ORS 659A.199.

D. Brunozzi’s retaliation claim under ORS 652.355

Brunozzi’s final challenge is to the district court’s entry

of summary judgment on his claim that CCI violated ORS

12 April 10 Hearing at 39:49–40:49 (statement from Rep. Edwards);

accord Hearing on H.B. 3162 A Before the Senate, Third Reading of

House Measures, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. at 1:30:00–1:33:00 (May 28,

2009) (“May 28 Hearing”) (statement from Sen. Rosenbaum).

13 May 28 Hearing at 4:13–8:41; May 18 Hearing at 42:56–49:01.

14 April 10 Hearing at 9:15–17:23, 20:39–28:25; May 18 Hearing at

49:07–57:10.

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BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 19

652.355, which prohibits an employer from discharging or

otherwise discriminating against an employee who has

discussed, made, or consulted an attorney about “a wage

claim.” Brunozzi complained to his supervisors on several

occasions that CCI had failed to properly pay him overtime

wages, and he refused to work any additional overtime hours

(and specifically on Saturday, April 5, 2014) “unless [he] was

paid an overtime rate of pay” for those hours. On this

evidence, the district court was inclined to find a triable issue

of fact regarding whether Brunozzi had made the type of

“wage claim” protected by ORS 652.355, but it concluded

that Oregon case law does not recognize complaining about

inadequate wages as such a claim.

Brunozzi relies on Brown v. American Property

Management Corp., 1 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2000), to

argue that Oregon law recognizes that the act of complaining

about inadequate wages is a protected activity under ORS

652.355. Brown sued his former employer, American

Property Management, for unlawful termination. Brown, 1

P.3d at 1053. Brown was a leasing agent for American and

contractually entitled to a commission on office space that he

leased. Id. Believing that he was not being properly

compensated, Brown wrote a letter to his supervisor

“complaining that [American] had not paid him for several

leases that he had negotiated” and noting that he “had

retained a lawyer who had advised him that his claims for

commissions were well-founded.” Id. at 1053–54.

But whether the employee had either filed or discussed

filing a wage claim within the meaning of ORS 652.355 was

not an issue in Brown. The Brown court focused on

causation: whether Brown had been suspended because he

discussed filing a claim or, as American claimed, to avoid

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20 BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

future liability. Brown thus cannot be read as interpreting

ORS 652.355 to provide a bright-line rule that an employee

makes, discusses, or inquires about a “wage claim” any time

he complains about inadequate wages.

Nor does De Bay v. Wild Oats Market, Inc., 260 P.3d 700

(Or. Ct. App. 2011), relied upon by the district court, control

this inquiry. The employee in De Bay argued “that the

allegations of his complaint [we]re sufficient to state a claim

for common-law wrongful discharge because they allege[d]

facts from which it can be shown that he was terminated for

exercising important societal obligations and rights

recognized in . . . ORS 652.355,” but the district court

dismissed this claim. De Bay, 260 P.3d at 703. The appellate

court affirmed for two reasons: (1) De Bay had “not alleged

that he made a wage claim or even discussed a wage claim

with anyone,” and (2) “[i]n any event,” “ORS 652.355

provides an adequate remedy for those who have suffered

retaliation for bringing a good faith wage claim[,]” so an

employee cannot bring “a common-law wrongful discharge

claim based on th[at] conduct.” Id. at 704 (citing Carlson v.

Crater Lake Lumber Co., 796 P.2d 1216 (Or. Ct. App. 1990),

adh’d to as modified on recons., 804 P.2d 511 (Or. Ct. App.

1991)). To the extent that De Bay can be read to construe and

applyORS 652.355, it is factually distinguishable because De

Bay’s complaints focused on management’s “criminal,

illegal, and fraudulent business practices” related to

communications to stockholders and other investors and “the

retaliatory reduction of his bonus” as a result of those

complaints, not inadequate wages. Id. at 703.

With no Oregon state-court opinion deciding whether

complaints like Brunozzi’s constitute a “wage claim” under

ORS 652.355, we turn to Oregon’s rules of statutory

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BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 21

interpretation. See Perri v. Certified Languages Intern., LLC,

66 P.3d 531, 539 (Or. Ct. App. 2003), overruled on other

grounds by, Cejas Comm. Interiors, Inc. v. Torres-Lizama,

316 P.3d 389 (Or. Ct. App. 2013). We again begin with the

text and context of the statute. ORS 652.355 makes it an

unlawful employment practice to fire or discriminate against

an employee because he has “made a wage claim or

discussed, inquired about[,] or consulted an attorney or

agency about a wage claim.” The legislature defined “wage

claim” in ORS 652.320(7) to mean “an employee’s claim

against an employer for compensation for the employee’s

own personal services, and includes any wages,

compensation, damages or civil penalties provided by law to

employee in connection with a claim for unpaid wages.”

Because this is a circular definition—a “wage claim” is

“an employee’s claim”—and the Oregon legislature has not

further defined “claim” in this context, we look to Webster’s,

which defines the noun “claim” to mean “an authoritative or

challenging request: demand. . . .” Webster’s Third New Int’l

Dictionary 414 (unabridged ed. 1986). It gives other

meanings for “claim,” but neither the text nor context of the

statute indicates that any meaning is more applicable than the

ordinaryone. Having examined the statute’s text and context,

we find that the Oregon legislature intended “wage claim” in

ORS 652.355 to mean a demand or request that an employee

has against his employer for compensation due and owing for

the employee’s personal services.15

Applying this definition to the facts of this case leads us

to conclude that part of Brunozzi’s claim for retaliation under

15 We do not consider the legislative history for ORS 652.355 or

652.320 because no party has proffered it.

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22 BRUNOZZI V. CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

ORS 652.355 survives summary judgment. Brunozzi

testified in deposition that he informed his supervisor that he

was not working on Saturday, April 5, 2014, “Because I’m

not being paid overtime, as far as I can tell.” He stated that

“[o]n or about April 5, 2014, I objected to [CCI’s] failure to

pay me my overtime wages, and I further notified [CCI] that

I would not work additional overtime hours unless I was paid

an overtime rate of pay.” And Brunozzi further stated that he

made other complaints to his supervisors that he was not

being paid overtime.

Brunozzi’s refusal to work additional overtime unless he

was paid an overtime rate for those hours was a demand for

future payment and does not qualify as a wage claim under

Oregon law. See Perri, 66 P.3d at 538–40 & n.8 (concluding

“that a wage claim for purposes of ORS 652.320(9)

[renumbered to subsection (7) when the statute was amended

in 2001] and ORS 652.355 must be either a claim for

payment for services previously rendered or a claim for

wages, compensation, damages, or civil penalties in

connection with a claim for unpaid wages—that is, a claim

for wages for services previously rendered”). But his

complaints that CCI had failed to properly compensate him

for overtime were at least discussions or inquiries about a

demand for past-due wages if not the actual making of such

a demand. These complaints were precursors to Brunozzi’s

filing of a formal demand in court for past-due overtime

wages, and they qualify for protection under ORS 652.355. 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order granting

summary judgment in CCI’s favor on Brunozzi’s ORS

652.355 claim.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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