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Parties Involved:
Carter Christian
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1 

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 15a0259p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CARTER CHRISTIAN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 13-6530 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis. 

No. 2:12-cr-20364—Jon Phipps McCalla, District Judge. 

Argued: August 4, 2015 

Decided and Filed: October 30, 2015 

Before: SUTTON and DONALD, Circuit Judges; ZOUHARY, District Judge.*

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Kevin M. Schad, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cincinnati, 

Ohio, for Appellant. Brian K. Coleman, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Memphis, 

Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kevin M. Schad, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Cincinnati, Ohio, Howard B. Manis, MANIS LAW FIRM, Memphis, Tennessee, 

for Appellant. Brian K. Coleman, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Memphis, 

Tennessee, for Appellee. 

 *

The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by 

designation. 

>

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_________________ 

OPINION

_________________ 

 ZOUHARY, District Judge. Carter Christian spent Halloween 2013 masquerading as the 

lawful operator of a semi-truck pulling a load of tires. The semi he drove was in fact stolen. So 

was its load. Memphis police saw through the disguise and arrested Christian. The arrest would 

have been bad enough, but Christian was expected in federal court the next morning, when a 

district judge would sentence him for a different conviction of possession of stolen goods, the 

underlying offense in this case. Worse still, the earlier possession offense centered on 

Christian’s role in another truck theft ring. 

 Christian appeals his conviction and 105-month sentence. We agree with Christian that 

the district court erred in applying a two-level upward adjustment based on Christian’s alleged 

managerial role in the theft ring. We therefore vacate the sentence and remand. 

BACKGROUND

 Christian was part of a four-member Memphis truck theft ring, working alongside Patrick 

Dubose, Leonard Davis, and co-defendant Marcus Lanton. The theft ring first struck in May 

2011, stealing a Mayflower moving truck. In August 2011, the thieves traveled to Big M 

Transportation in northern Mississippi, where they stole two semis containing 2,800 tires. And 

finally, in June 2012, the theft ring stole an SDR Trucking semi loaded with tires. A sting 

operation caught Davis selling tires. Davis unwittingly led police to a Hickory Hills Road 

storage unit in Memphis, rented by Christian’s girlfriend. There, police observed Christian, 

Lanton, and Davis loading stolen tires into Lanton’s car. 

 Memphis police arrested the three men. We do not know what became of Davis, because 

only Lanton and Christian were prosecuted in federal court. Lanton and Christian lingered for a 

while in state court, before state authorities dismissed theft charges against the pair in favor of 

federal prosecution. At that time, Christian had a second, unrelated state prosecution. On that 

second case, he was represented by the same attorney who then represented Lanton in this case. 

On Lanton’s orders, Lanton’s girlfriend and the attorney convinced Christian to sign an affidavit 

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affirming that “Lanton had no knowledge about the heist,” a statement Christian knew was not 

true. 

 In December 2012, a federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Lanton 

and Christian, charging the possession offense. Christian pled guilty pursuant to a written plea 

agreement. 

 The pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”) calculated a total offense level of 19, 

applying three adjustments. First, Christian faced a fourteen-level specific offense characteristic 

based on the amount of loss caused by the theft ring. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). Second, 

because the PSR found Christian played a managerial role in the theft ring, Christian received a 

two-level upward adjustment. See id. § 3B1.1(c). And third, the PSR recommended a threelevel downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. See id. § 3E1.1. A lengthy rap 

sheet landed Christian in criminal history category VI. The PSR therefore set the guideline range 

at 63–78 months of imprisonment. The Government separately said it would move the court for 

a substantial-assistance departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. 

Christian objected to the PSR, writing he was not “a leader of the theft crew” and at all 

times Lanton “was the leader of the group” who issued orders to Christian. Christian’s objection 

drew a PSR addendum, which explained the leadership allegations were “taken directly from the 

investigative file and confirmed through discussions with the” Government. 

 What next? Christian’s sentencing picture became bleaker. Because he told the 

Government about the false affidavit during proffer sessions, the Government abandoned plans 

for a Section 5K1.1 motion. Christian’s Halloween 2013 arrest doomed his hopes for an 

acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment -- Christian knowingly drove a stolen truck at the 

request of a person who “was part of the theft group.” And after that arrest, Christian’s attorney 

abandoned objections to the PSR’s amount-of-loss calculation. As a result, the guideline range 

stood at 84–105 months. 

 Christian testified at sentencing. The court overruled Christian’s objection to the 

managerial-role adjustment, sentencing him to 105 months of imprisonment. 

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DISCUSSION

Legal Standard. We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error, and defer to 

its legal conclusion that a defendant had a managerial role in criminal activity. See United States 

v. Washington, 715 F.3d 975, 982–83 (6th Cir. 2013). The Government has the burden of 

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Section 3B1.1 applies. See United States v. 

Wright, 747 F.3d 399, 412 (6th Cir. 2014). 

 Section 3B1.1 and its Commentary contain an adjustment and a departure provision, each 

applying to different sets of defendants. The adjustment provision directs that “[i]f the defendant 

was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity” involving fewer than 

five “participants,” the offense level should increase two levels. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). The 

departure provision explains that an “upward departure may be warranted . . . [for] a defendant 

who did not organize, lead, manage, or supervise another participant, but who nevertheless 

exercised management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal 

organization.” Id. § 3B1.1, app. n.2 (emphasis added). “[T]he method by which the defendant’s 

sentence is increased [therefore] depends on whether the defendant exercised control over an 

individual or over tangible property, assets or activities of a criminal enterprise.” United States 

v. Gort-DiDonato, 109 F.3d 318, 321 (6th Cir. 1997). 

 The distinction between an adjustment and departure matters. See United States v. 

Ochoa-Gomez, 777 F.3d 278, 285 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2015) (Prado, J., concurring). The district 

court considers the Section 3B1.1 adjustment while calculating a defendant’s total offense level. 

See U.S.S.G. § 1B.1(a)(3). “Once a sentencing court makes a factual finding as to the 

applicability of a particular adjustment provision, the court has no discretion, but must increase 

the offense level by the amount called for in the applicable provision.” United States v. 

Feinman, 930 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing Section 3B1.1). And the adjustment has 

a determinate impact on a defendant’s guideline range, raising the offense level by two to four 

levels. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)–(c). 

 Contrast the adjustment framework with the departure provision. A departure is not 

mandatory, see id. § 3B1.1, app. n.2, and Application Note 2 does not dictate the extent of the 

departure, see United States v. McFarlane, 64 F.3d 1235, 1240 n.7 (8th Cir. 1995). The 

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departure does not shift the guideline range. A departure “means . . . imposition of a sentence 

outside the applicable guideline range or of a sentence that is otherwise different from the 

guideline sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, app. n.1(E); see United States v. Pembrook, 609 F.3d 

381, 385 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A] defendant’s guideline range is the range produced under the 

guidelines’ sentencing table after a correct determination of the defendant’s total offense level 

and criminal history category but prior to any discretionary departures.” (quotation marks 

omitted)). A district court therefore does not consider an upward departure until after calculating 

the defendant’s total offense level, fixing a criminal history category, and selecting the 

applicable guideline range. See U.S.S.G. § 1B.1(a)(3) & (5)–(7), (b). 

 District Court Findings. The court applied a two-level, managerial-role adjustment, but 

never clearly stated the object of Christian’s control. Its oral findings contain contradictory 

statements, suggesting the court found Christian managed truck-theft-ring participants or, 

alternatively, only truck-theft-ring property. 

 The court began by citing the adjustment provision and quoting the departure provision. 

It then rejected the Government’s claim that Christian’s directions to his girlfriend showed 

control over a co-participant, after Christian testified his girlfriend did not know how Christian 

planned to use the storage unit. The court next mentioned unspecified cases where “individuals 

received points as an accountant,” even though the person “didn’t manage any people, but 

[instead] managed the assets of the criminal enterprise.” The court stated, “it was clear [that the 

accountant] actually had management authority” because “they could say, no, you can’t have the 

[assets or], yes, you can.” (Our review of this Court’s published opinions, filed since the 

Sentencing Commission adopted Application Note 2 in 1993, shows no case upholding an 

adjustment based solely on a defendant’s management of criminal assets.) 

 The court then brought its accountant analogy to bear on Christian’s case. On crossexamination, Christian explained how Lanton accessed the Hickory Hills storage unit when 

Lanton had a buyer for the stolen tires. Access to the storage unit required a code -- presumably 

used for the storage facility’s drive-up gate -- as well as a key to the storage unit’s padlock. 

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Q. So [Lanton] was doing the selling of the tires, you were creating a place 

for the tires to be stored? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And then when he had a buyer for the tires, you allowed him to go into the 

storage facility and gave him those tires for him to sell? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And did you retain the key the entire time? 

A. Did I keep the key? 

Q. Yes. 

A. No, sir, he had the key, but I had the -- I didn’t ever give him the code 

because he was -- 

Q. So he needed you to get in the code -- to get in the facility? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. So if he had wanted to sell tires, he needed you to get access to those tires, 

is that correct? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And he couldn’t have sold those tires without you, isn’t that true? 

A. Yes, sir. 

 The court explained how it viewed this evidence. 

So you can be a person who manages property, and the government says, well, in 

this case he managed property because he maintained control of the access to the 

property. He could say yes or no, and he maintained control of the code. That is 

a type of management. If you can say yes, you can get tires or no, you cannot get 

tires by denying access to the code, and he clearly understood he was maintaining 

control, he has testified to that effect, and that’s clear, then you are a manager 

under the application note. 

 From there, the court considered Christian’s role in the Halloween 2013 theft, reasoning 

that, because Christian drove the stolen truck on his own, his “role has . . . been more than just a 

pickup guy.” At the same time, the court recognized that Christian “wasn’t the guy in charge at 

all,” and stated “we have identified people who were in charge here, but he did have control of 

property.” The district court concluded: 

So I think the government is right that the two points [are] appropriate. I do think 

it’s a pretty close question, but factually, the government has submitted evidence, 

and it preponderates in favor of a determination that he was not just a plain 

ordinary old participant, he was somebody who had managerial supervisory 

authority at a lower level, and that’s why you get two points, you don’t get three, 

you don’t get four, so I think that that’s correct. 

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Procedural Sentencing Error. As these statements show, the court emphasized 

Christian’s control of tires and commented that, because of that control, he was a manager 

“under the application note.” The court likewise stated that other people were in charge, and said 

it agreed with the Government’s theory of Christian’s role in the offense: Christian “was, in fact, 

managing and supervising the items that are the subject of the heist” because he held the storage 

unit code. The court did not state that Christian controlled a co-participant. 

 We give deference to a district court finding that a defendant played a leadership role in 

criminal activity; such a legal conclusion “depends on a number of factual nuances that a district 

court is better positioned to evaluate.” Washington, 715 F.3d at 983. However, when a court 

determines a defendant’s role extended only to management of a criminal enterprise’s property, 

the court errs by applying an adjustment. “To qualify for an adjustment . . . , the defendant must 

have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants.” 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, app. n.2. The Government may show control over co-participants in many 

ways, see United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 473 (6th Cir. 2009), but cannot base an 

adjustment on property management alone, as was done here. 

 The Government urges affirmance, stressing the court said Christian “maintained control 

of the access to the property. He could say yes or no, and he maintained control of the code. 

That is a type of management.” The Government parses that statement to contain a participantcontrol finding: “But for the Defendant’s actual presence and permission, Lanton could not 

convert the stolen property.” We disagree with the Government’s reading for two reasons. 

 First, the court stated that a defendant with such control is “a manager under the 

application note,” and the parties only discussed Application Note 2 for its treatment of a 

property-manager defendant. Second, there is insufficient evidence supporting the essential part 

of the Government’s argument: Lanton needed Christian’s permission to access the storage unit. 

 Christian did testify that, because Lanton did not know the storage unit code, Lanton 

“needed [Christian] to get access to th[e] tires.” While Lanton may have depended on Christian 

to access tires, that does not mean Christian controlled Lanton. Offenders often depend on 

subordinates to sell stolen goods. What is missing in this case is any evidence that Christian 

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could have, or did, deny Lanton access to the storage unit or its code. There is no explanation 

why Christian, not Lanton, had the code. 

 Instead, the record shows the primary ringleader was Lanton. It was Lanton who Patrick 

Dubose called “the head man over the Mayflower trailer load.” It was Lanton who offered to sell 

tires from the Big M heist to a confidential source, and only Lanton received payment from that 

source. It was Lanton who “advised Christian to rent the [Hickory Hills] storage unit for the 

purpose[] of storing stolen tires in [Christian’s girlfriend’s] name.” And it was Lanton who sold 

the tires from the SDR Trucking heist that were stored at the Hickory Hills storage facility, and 

who initially gave Christian 125 tires for helping pull the heist. 

 For purposes of the adjustment, more than one defendant can lead participants in criminal 

activity. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, app. n.4. However, that provision does not help the 

Government, because all the evidence depicting Lanton and Christian’s relationship shows 

Lanton controlling Christian. A few days after Lanton gave Christian his 125-tire share of the 

SDR Trucking heist, Lanton reneged and “took over and started selling the [same] tires.” 

 Perhaps most telling, Christian knowingly signed a false affidavit exculpating Lanton at 

Lanton’s request. Christian’s action had serious consequences. Before he signed the false 

affidavit, Christian’s PSR-calculated guideline range stood at 63–78 months, with a Government 

recommendation pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a below-guideline-range sentence. Thereafter, 

Christian lost acceptance-of-responsibility credits and any hope of a Section 5K1.1 motion, 

raising his PSR-calculated guideline range to 84–105 months. And while Christian likely did not 

know how his false statement would affect his sentencing range, he certainly knew that by 

exculpating his sole co-defendant, he effectively agreed to be the “fall guy.” That is a sacrifice 

that a criminal manager rarely makes for a subordinate. 

 Aside from its purported permission finding, the court made none of the factual findings 

typical of our Section 3B1.1 adjustment cases. Christian did not receive a larger share of the 

theft-ring proceeds than other participants. In fact, the record lacks proof that Christian received 

any payment, other than a share of the SDR Trucking heist that Lanton promptly took back. 

See United States v. Bazazpour, 690 F.3d 796, 805 (6th Cir. 2012). He did not recruit others to 

join the truck theft ring. See United States v. Castilla-Lugo, 699 F.3d 454, 460–61 (6th Cir. 

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2012). He did not help plan any of the thefts. See United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 

700 (6th Cir. 2000). He lacked special expertise on which the truck theft ring depended. 

See United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2005). He did not provide the group 

with information that facilitated the crimes. See United States v. Dupree, 323 F.3d 480, 494 

(6th Cir. 2003). And he did not issue orders to any group member. See United States v. Khalil, 

279 F.3d 358, 370 (6th Cir. 2002). Without even one of these factual findings, the Government’s 

position is essentially that a “defendant who supplies a good or service to a criminal operation . . 

. automatically qualif[ies] for the leadership [adjustment] because he or she could potentially 

leverage that role to control the other participants in the operation. Such an outcome is contrary 

to the letter and spirit of the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Cameron, 573 F.3d 179, 

185 (4th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 

 The evidence simply does not support a Section 3B1.1 adjustment. “[A]n incorrect 

calculation of the defendant’s Guidelines range is reversible procedural error.” United States v. 

Kamper, 748 F.3d 728, 749 (6th Cir. 2014). That error requires remand because the court “failed 

to consider the correct Guidelines range.” United States v. Lane, 509 F.3d 771, 775 (6th Cir. 

2007) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

CONCLUSION

 The Government has not asked for a second chance to support the Section 3B1.1 

adjustment on remand and, indeed, expressly stated in the district court that it had no other 

evidence to support the adjustment. Therefore, on remand the district court should re-sentence 

Christian using a guideline range that is not based on a Section 3B1.1 adjustment. Because we 

vacate Christian’s sentence, we do not decide whether that guideline range should include a 

fourteen- or twelve-level amount-of-loss adjustment, nor do we reach Christian’s other 

sentencing arguments. Our remand allows the district court to administer Rule 11(c)(5) warnings 

in the course of re-sentencing, so we do not decide whether the district court’s Rule 11 colloquy 

was plain error. 

 For these reasons, we vacate Christian’s sentence and remand for re-sentencing. 

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