Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00598/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00598-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Butte County
Defendant
Tom Fisher
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

TOM FISHER,

NO. CIV. S-05-0598 WBS KJM

Plaintiff, NO. CIV. S-05-0600 WBS KJM

v.

BUTTE COUNTY; and DOES 1-25, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

inclusive, ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

Defendants.

______________________________

TOM FISHER,

Plaintiff,

v.

BUTTE COUNTY; BUTTE COUNTY

COURTHOUSE; SUPERIOR COURT OF

CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF BUTTE;

and DOES 1-20, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff brought this action under the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and California

Government Code §§ 4450 et seq., alleging a violation of his

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civil rights. The parties entered into a settlement, and

plaintiff now seek attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and

costs.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Tom Fisher is a disabled individual, confined

to a wheelchair as a result of childhood polio. (Mot. for Attys’

Fees 2.) On November 3, 2003, plaintiff visited the Butte County

Veterans’ Service Office Building (“Veterans’ Building”), and

encountered numerous obstacles to accessing the building’s

facilities and services, including: inability to find a vanaccessible parking space, difficulty traversing from the parking

lot to the building, difficulty opening the excessively front

door, an excessively high service counter, and improperly

designed bathrooms that resulted in minor injury and a

“humiliating urination incident.” (Id. at 3.) On July 7, 2004,

plaintiff returned to the Veterans’ Building and again faced

similar difficulties. (Id.)

On April 1, 2004, plaintiff visited the Butte County

Courthouse (which shares the same parking lot with the Veterans’

Building), and encountered numerous similar obstacles to the

buildings services and facilities, including: difficulties

finding van-accessible parking, improperly constructed ramps into

the building, an excessively heavy front door, an excessively

high service counter, and improperly configured bathrooms, which

led to another “humiliating urination accident.” (Id. at 4.) On

August 26 and September 15, 2004, plaintiff filed complaints for

damages with the County of Butte, stemming from his visits to the

Veterans’ Building and the Butte County Courthouse, respectively. 

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Plaintiff observes that this letter constituted a 1

“rejection” of plaintiff’s claims. (Barbosa Decl. ¶ 5.)

3

(Barbosa Decl. Exs. 1-2.)

Upon receipt of plaintiff’s tort claims, defendants’

counsel Brad Stephens, Deputy County Counsel for Butte County,

responded by letter on October 18, 2004. (Stephens Decl. Ex. 1.) 

Though lacking in any reference to damages, the letter addressed

each of plaintiff’s noted violations, pointing out what

improvements had since been made (or would soon thereafter be

made) to remedy the problems. (Id.) On February 11, 2005, 1

plaintiff’s counsel Patricia Barbosa visited the Veterans’

Building and Butte County Courthouse with an expert access

consultant, Barry Atwood of Accessible Environments, Inc., in

order to assess the validity of plaintiff’s claims and evaluate

the changes noted by Stephens. (Barbosa Decl. ¶ 5.)

On March 14, 2005, Barbosa sent a letter to defendants

with a settlement demand. (Barbosa Decl. Ex. 3.) The letter

sought $15,000 in damages, and requested injunctive relief for

the barriers Fisher encountered, as well as various miscellaneous

statutory violations (not mentioned in plaintiffs claims to the

county) that Atwood uncovered during his visit. (Id.) The

letter also contained a demand for attorneys’ fees and costs, in

the amount of $32,910, and professed a desire to settle the

litigation before a federal complaint was filed. (Id.)

On March 17, 2005, Stephens responded to Barbosa’s

March 14 letter, noting that the attachments to her letter had

not been transmitted. (Stephens Decl. Ex. 1.) Stephens also

indicated that because plaintiff’s letter contained new

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While the two parallel cases addressed by this order 2

are not technically related cases, (June 23, 2005 Order), both

actions are essentially the same in substance, both were resolved

by a singular settlement agreement, and all filings related to

this motion were filed identically, under both cases. For these

reasons, the court now considers them together in one order.

Plaintiff takes issue with defendants’ response to some 3

of the newly discovered access barriers, in which defendants

promise that “[t]he County will make its programs and services

accessible.” Defendants argue that such a promise is so vague

and ambiguous as to make it “impossible to enforce any

settlement” entered into on that basis. (Barbosa Decl. ¶ 6.) 

4

allegations of noncompliance, not referenced in the previous

claims filed by Fisher, the letter was being forwarded to the

County’s Department of Facilities Services, as well as an

independent ADA consultant, for evaluation. (Id.) He noted that

he expected to respond in substance to their settlement demand in

“a couple of weeks.” (Id.) Nonetheless, eight days later, on

March 25, 2005, plaintiff filed two complaints in this court

alleging violations of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

and similar California statutory authority. (Compl.) 2

On May 4, 2005, defendants responded by letter to

plaintiff’s March 14 settlement demand. (Barbosa Decl. Ex. 4.) 

The letter addressed each access barrier encountered by Fisher,

as well as those later discovered by the Atwood, noting which

problems had been corrected or would be fixed in the future.3

(Id.) As to the issue of damages, defendants offered three

thousand dollars ($3,000.00) to plaintiff in compensatory

damages, as well as five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) to

plaintiff’s counsel to settle outstanding attorneys’ fees and

costs. (Id.)

Plaintiff declined this settlement counteroffer, and

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The court notes with some confusion the impossibility 4

of Barbosa’s assertion that “due to defendants’ unreasonable

position . . . plaintiff declined defendants’ counter-offer and

filed his two federal complaints. . . .” (Barbosa Decl. ¶ 6.) 

Both federal complaints were filed on March 25, 2005, almost 6

weeks before defendants’ May 4, 2005, counteroffer.

5

went forward with the litigation. The parties attended a 4

settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Kimberly Mueller on

November 29, 2005, at which they reached a tentative conceptual

agreement on injunctive relief. (Stephens Decl. ¶ 5.) The

parties agreed to resolve these terms before possibly returning

for a second settlement conference to discuss damages. 

Meanwhile, plaintiff served discovery on defendants in late

December. In March, 2006, defendants served settlement offers on

plaintiff pursuant to Rule 68, which plaintiff accepted. (Austin

Decl. Ex. 7.)

By agreement of the parties, the settlement offers were

incorporated into stipulations for dismissals of both cases

before this court. (Rein Decl. Exs. 8-9.) According to the

agreement, defendants agreed to provide substantial injunctive

relief to remedy existing barriers, and to pay plaintiff

$8,002.00 in compensatory damages ($4,001.00 for each case). 

(Id.) The settlement also dictated that plaintiff was “entitled

to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, if any, as

provided by law.” (Id.) Pursuant to that provision, plaintiff

now brings a motion to recover $127,083 in attorneys’ fees and

$8,372 litigation expenses and costs.

///

///

///

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II. Discussion

A. Right to Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The ADA permits the “prevailing party” to recover

attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Barrios

v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir.

2002). According to the Ninth Circuit, a party prevails “when he

or she enters into a legally enforceable settlement agreement

against the defendant.” Id. In this case, defendants do not

appear to dispute that the settlement agreements entered into by

the parties, and incorporated into the stipulations for

dismissal, establish that plaintiff is the “prevailing party” for

the purposes of attorneys’ fees under the ADA.

Both parties note that attorneys’ fees are available

under both the ADA, as well as applicable California statutes. 

(Mot. for Attys’ Fees 8.) Defendant does so in an effort to

import a California requirement, followed by some California

courts, that unless a plaintiff provides “pre-litigation notice

of intent to sue,” and gives defendant a reasonable opportunity

to cure the violations, attorneys’ fees shall not be awarded. 

(Opp’n to Mot. for Attys’ Fees 5.) Because plaintiff is entitled

to recover fees under federal law, however, the court need not

consider such a state requirement. See Botosan v. Paul McNally

Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that notice is

not required).

Plaintiff raises state attorneys’ fees law in an

attempt to make use of a multiplier utilized by California courts

in some instances. The court recognizes that there are

differences between state and federal law with regard to

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multipliers for attorneys’ fees. See Mangold v. Cal. Public

Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that a

contingency fee multiplier is available under California’s feeshifting statutes, but not under similar federal statutes); Weeks

v. Baker & McKenzie, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1128, 1172 (1998) (noting

that a fee enhancement may be appropriate for some cases in which

the “public impact of the results” warranted creating incentives

for representation). Because plaintiff would be entitled to fees

under California statutory law, notwithstanding federal

entitlement under the ADA, the court will also consider these

factors in making any adjustments to the award.

B. Lodestar Calculation 

The court determines the amount of attorneys’ fees to 

award by using the lodestar calculation - the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable

hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Under federal law, there is a strong presumption that the

lodestar amount is reasonable. Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214

F.3d 1115, 1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000). However, the court may

adjust the federal lodestar figure if various factors overcome

the presumption of reasonableness. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34.

The court may adjust the lodestar figure on the basis

of the Kerr factors:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and

difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4)

the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due

to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances,

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According to plaintiff’s motion, Paul Rein billed a 5

total of 105.2 hours and Patricia Barbosa billed a total of 125.4

hours. (Mot. for Attys’ Fees 24.) The invoices submitted,

however, reflect totals of 101.2 and 124.3 hours, respectively,

which the court will abide by. 

8

(8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9)

the experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11)

the nature and length of the professional relationship

with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.

Morales, 96 F.3d at 363 n.8. (citing Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras,

Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975)). Many of the Kerr factors

have been subsumed in the lodestar approach. Id. (citing

Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir.

1988)). Moreover, the court should consider the factors

established by Kerr, but need not discuss each factor. Sapper v.

Lenco Blade, Inc., 704 F.2d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 1983).

1. Hours Reasonably Expended

“Counsel for the prevailing party should make a goodfaith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary . . . .” Hensley,

461 U.S. at 434. When the hours worked or the rates claimed are

not supported by evidence or adequate documentation, the district

court may reduce the award accordingly. Id. at 433. Plaintiff

submits detailed billing records for three plaintiff’s attorneys

who worked on this matter: Patricia Barbosa submits bills

totaling 124.3 hours; Paul L. Rein submits bills totaling 101.2

hours; and Julie McLean submits bills totaling 101.1 hours.5

(Barbosa Decl. Ex. 8; Rein Decl. Ex. 13; McLean Ex. 1.) Paul

Rein and Julie McLean additionally submit bills totaling 20.2 and

21 hours, respectively, for work done since the filing of the

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original motion. (Supplemental McLean Decl. Ex. 1; Supplemental

Rein Decl. Ex. 1.)

a. Pre-Litigation Efforts

Defendants’ primary objection to plaintiff’s current

motion for attorneys’ fees is based on the belief that the “same

results could have and should have been obtained without

litigation.” (Opp’n to Mot. for Attys’ Fees 10.) In essence,

defendants argue that plaintiff’s attempts to reach a prelitigation settlement were a sham, citing as evidence the

similarity between the October 18, 2004, pre-litigation

settlement offer, and the eventual Rule 68 offers accepted in

March, 2006. (Id. at 7-8.) Defendants thus assert that any fees

and costs which accrued after a viable reasonable settlement

might have been reached should not be awarded. Defendants’

argument, however, is without merit. The fact that the

injunctive relief that was ultimately settled upon closely

resembled early offers is of no consequence. A civil rights

plaintiff may recover attorneys’ fees even for an unsuccessful

stage of litigation, provided that the unsuccessful stage was a

necessary step toward her ultimate victory. Cabrales v. County

of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff obtained substantial relief as a result of

the settlement reached in the two cases at issue--including

damages and court-enforceable injunctive relief remedying all

barriers that plaintiff encountered during his three visits. In

the October 18, 2004, letter, no mention was made of damages,

whereas settlement of the litigation ultimately yielded statutory

damages in the amount of $8,002.00 for plaintiff. Moreover,

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additional injunctive relief was achieved, beyond those access

barriers addressed in the October 14 letter, such as signage and

an electric door for the Veterans’ Building. (Opp’n to Mot. for

Attys’ Fees 7-8.) Defendants argue that plaintiff should have

given them a chance to remedy the violations before filing a

federal complaint. However, as noted above, there is no

requirement under federal law that plaintiff notify defendant

before bringing suit. Botosan, 216 F.3d at 832. 

In addition, defendants argue that in light their

continuing willingness to settle, plaintiff’s repeated failure to

do so constitutes an unnecessary inflation of attorneys’ fees and

costs. Plaintiff, however, was under no obligation to settle

with defendants on their terms. While this court is sympathetic

to the difficulties defendants encountered in achieving a final

settlement, plaintiff cannot be denied attorney’s fees for

continuing to litigate a case, rightly brought, based on the

parties’ inability to reach an accord.

b. Apportionment of Work to Superior Court of

California

While both the Veterans’ Building and the Courthouse

are owned by Butte County, which is thus responsible for the

physical configuration of each building, plaintiff was required

to add as defendant the Superior Court of California, which

operated the Courthouse and is responsible for policy changes

therein. (Mot. for Attys’ Fees 5.) The Superior Court of

California, however, was dismissed as a defendant by stipulation

of the parties, and plaintiff concedes that any work done

directed against that party will not be compensated. (Id.) 

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Plaintiff contends that 5% of the overall work done was directed

specifically at the Superior Court, while defendants assert that

the percentage is closer to 33%. (Id.; Opp’n to Mot. for Attys’

Fees 10-11.)

In arriving at 33%, however, defendants appear to

confuse the distinction between all work related to the

Courthouse case (including physical access barriers attributable

to Butte County), and work done specifically against the Superior

Court of California as a party. Plaintiff’s sole argument

against the Superior Court of California (which was solely

responsible for policy issues at the Courthouse) demanded that

the Superior Court to adopt a written policy as to how disabled

persons would be served at a lowered counter at the Courthouse. 

Because of the limited scope of this issue, and its early

dismissal, the court will accept as reasonable plaintiff’s

estimate of a deduction of 5% in fees.

c. Disallowance for Particular Motions

Defendants’ attorneys’ fees expert, James Schratz,

argues that plaintiff’s counsel billed an unreasonable amount for

its preparation of the motion for summary judgment and this

motion for attorneys’ fees. (Schratz Decl. 17.) With regard to

the motion for summary judgment, which was never filed in this

case, the court is sympathetic to the fact that the work done was

made superfluous by the eventual settlement. However, it would

be unreasonable for defendants to expect plaintiff’s counsel to

halt all work in an ongoing litigation to await the results of

repeatedly unsuccessful settlement efforts. 

Taken together, plaintiff’s counsel expended over 70

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For work on this motion, the time records indicate 6

totals in the amount of: 40.6 hours for Mr. Rein, 6.9 for Ms.

Barbosa, and 24.4 hours for Ms. McLean. Accordingly, the court

will reduce counsels’ hours by 20.3, 3.45, and 12.2,

respectively.

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hours solely on the present motion for attorneys’ fees, which

this court finds to be excessive. As Mr. Rein and colleagues’

declarations make clear, plaintiff’s counsel has decades of

experience prosecuting disability access claims. Such a wealth

of experience should no doubt increase the efficiency with which

they are able produce a motion for fees and costs. 

Moreover, neither this motion, nor defendants’

opposition, presents any novel or complicated issues of law--

clearly plaintiffs’ attorneys need not reinvent the wheel each

time they seek to recover fees. Indeed, upon reviewing

plaintiff’s counsels’ motion for attorneys’ fees in a case

previously before this court, Millard v. La Baer Inn, et al.,

CIV. S-03-1468 slip op. at 18 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2005), the court

notes that over half of the language in plaintiff’s present

motion is copied verbatim therefrom. Accordingly, the court will

reduce the hours worked on this motion by 50%, for a total of

35.95. 

6

d. Internal Conferencing

Defendants, through their expert Mr. Schratz, assert

that the 44.8 hours spent on general conferencing between

plaintiff’s attorneys is excessive and should be reduced. Mr.

Rein spent 16.3 hours conferencing; Ms. Barbosa spend about 15.8

hours conferencing; and Ms. McLean spent about 12.7 hours doing

the same. Excessive conferencing between attorneys is grounds

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Accordingly, Mr. Rein’s hours will be reduced by 11.3; 7

Ms. Barbosa’s will be reduced by 10.8; and Ms. McLean’s hours

will be reduced by 7.7.

13

for reducing fees. Kona Enters. v. Estate of Bishop, 1999 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 22853 (D. Haw. Apr. 6, 1999). As noted above, it is

beyond dispute that plaintiff’s attorneys have a wealth of

experience specializing in this exact type of litigation. 

Moreover, this case does not present any complicated or novel

issues of law--indeed, defendants never even contested the

existence of the access violations noted. The only real

continuing dispute was what settlement amount the parties would

agree to, and this court finds it hard to believe that

necessitated 44.8 hours of conferencing. The court will

therefore allow only 5 hours of conferencing per attorney.7

2. Reasonable Rate

To determine the reasonableness of hourly rates

claimed, the court looks to the prevailing market rates in the

relevant community for similar work performed by attorneys of

comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Blum v. Stenson,

465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796

F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986). Under federal law, the

relevant community is generally the forum in which the district

court sits as opposed to where counsel is located. Barjon v.

Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997).

This court is mindful of the need to avoid setting an

hourly rate so low as to discourage competent attorneys from

handling this type of case. On the other hand, the court must

recognize that the hourly rate at which counsel should be

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compensated is determined by the forces of the marketplace, i.e.

by the law of supply and demand. One way of making that

determination would be to look to the hourly rates which the

attorneys in this case are able to bill and collect from clients

in other, similar cases. But counsel here acknowledges that he

has never billed or collected a fee directly from any client. 

The court must thus look elsewhere to determine the reasonable

hourly rate that defendants should be required to pay for the

services of plaintiff’s attorneys in this case. 

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a compensation rate of $395

per hour for Mr. Rein, $375 per hour for Ms. Barbosa, and $250

per hour for Ms. McLean. (Mot. for Attys’ Fees 24.) In support

of this rate, Mr. Rein cites several cases from the Northern and

Central Districts of California where such a rate has been

approved. While the court is aware of Mr. Rein and Ms. Barbosa’s

extensive experience, in this district $250 per hour has been

found to be the prevailing rate for even the most experienced

attorneys. See, e.g., Millard v. La Baer Inn, et al., CIV. S-03-

1468 slip op. at 18 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2005) (where this court

previously applied a rate of $250 for Mr. Rein and Ms. Barbosa,

and a rate of $225 for Ms. McLean); White v. GMRI, Inc., CIV. S04-0620 slip op. at 16 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2006) (where this

court applied the same rates for highly experienced counsel).

This is based on the fact that these rates generally

prevail in the Sacramento area, where this court sits. Loskot v.

U.S.A. Gasoline Corp., No. 01-2125, slip op. at 11 (E.D. Cal.

Apr. 26, 2004) (applying those same rates); see also Sanford v.

Thrifty Payless, Inc., No. 02-480, 2005 WL 2562712, at *4 (E.D.

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Plaintiff argues that paragraph 15a of Mr. Schratz’s 8

declaration should be stricken, as it contains impermissible

legal conclusions regarding appropriate billing rates. Because

the court need only look to the local community and relevant case

law to determine the prevailing market rate, the court does not

rely on this portion of Mr. Schratz’s declaration and plaintiff’s

objection is immaterial.

15

Cal. Oct. 11, 2005) (same); Hiram C. v. Manteca Unified Sch.

Dist., No. 03-2568, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2004)

(same). Thus far, the court has observed no shortage of 8

competent attorneys in this district who are willing to handle

cases of this type at these rates. 

At oral argument, Mr. Rein repeatedly highlighted his

superior expertise in this field, which he contended should

justify a departure from the standard rate awarded in this

district. Importantly, the determination of a reasonable rate

must consider prevailing market rates for “similar work”

performed by comparable attorney’s in the district. White, CIV.

S-04-0620 slip op. at 9-10 (citing Chalmers v. City of Los

Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1997)). The present

case is not markedly different or more complex than any number of

similar cases brought by other plaintiff’s attorneys in this

district. From the very outset, the issues in this case were

simple and straightforward, and did not require any great level

of expertise. 

This case did differ in one significant respect from

other similar cases routinely brought in this court, in that it

involved public entity defendants, which necessarily required

some expertise in the filing and processing of county

administrative claims. That procedure is not especially complex,

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Defendant Butte County filed objections to the 9

declarations of John Poswall and Christopher Whelan, submitted by

plaintiff in support of the present motion in an effort to

support their proposed hourly rate. The court need not address

these objections, because it finds these two declarations to be

of negligible value in determining an appropriate rate, and thus

affords them minimal weight. Both Mr. Poswall and Mr. Whelan are

well known to the court, and because of their specialized skills

in areas not involved here, they are able to bill and collect at

much higher hourly rates than for the kind of work involved here.

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and many lawyers in this district are awarded $250 per hour or

less in cases against county entities which involved the

processing of administrative claims as a prerequisite to bringing

suit in this court. However, a case such as this one involving

both claims under the ADA and the filing of administrative claims

with the county was somewhat unique, justifying an adjustment in

the hourly rate generally awarded.

Accordingly, the court will adjust Mr. Rein’s and Ms.

Barbosa’s hourly rate from $250 to $275. However, the court will 

reduce Ms. McLean’s billing rate to $225 per hour, given Ms.

McLean’s relative inexperience compared to Mr. Rein and Ms.

Barbosa, as well as this court’s recent determination that such a

rate is proper. Id. In making this adjustment, the court wishes 9

to emphasize that it does not signal an intent to increase the

hourly rate to be awarded to other attorneys or in other ADA

cases. Every extra dollar awarded to plaintiffs’ attorneys is a

dollar that comes out of the pockets of the business people of

this community, in this case the County taxpayers. The hourly

rate allowed here is the result of the peculiar circumstances of

this case.

3. Adjusting the Lodestar Amount

a. Unsuccessful Claims

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Defendants contend that not all of the claims in the

lawsuit were successful, and thus an award of attorneys’ fees

should be adjusted downward accordingly according to Kerr. In

support of this argument, defendants cite to: 1) the lack of an

agreement as to a written policy about services at the lowered

windows in the Courthouse; and 2) various “Miscellaneous

Barriers” listed at both buildings which remain unremedied. The

issue regarding a written policy at the Courthouse was the issue

litigated against the Superior Court of California--the court has

already determined that a 5% deduction is proper.

With regard to the “Miscellaneous Barriers” cited in

plaintiff’s March 14, 2005, letter, it is true that the Kerr

factors allow the court to consider “(8) the amount involved and

the results obtained.” Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70. However, the

simple fact that plaintiff agreed to make concessions in reaching

a settlement agreement does not change the fact that plaintiff is

the prevailing party, and entitled to attorneys’ fees. Id.;

Barrios, 277 F.3d 1128. Moreover, this circuit disfavors

consideration of subsumed reasonableness factors after the

lodestar has been calculated. Morales, 96 F.3d at 364 n.9. In

light of the damages awarded and the injunctive relief achieved,

which remedied all barriers encountered by plaintiff during his

three visits to the sites in question, the court declines to make

a downward departure based on this factor.

b. Contingent Risk

Plaintiff seeks an upward adjustment of the lodestar

amount (or the application of a multiplier) based on “(5) the

contingent nature of the fee agreement.” Morales, 96 F.3d at 363

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n.8; see also Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001). 

First, it bears repeating that, as above, the Ninth Circuit

disapproves of consideration of subsumed Kerr factors after the

calculation of the lodestar amount. Morales, 96 F.3d at 364 n.9. 

In addition, it does not appear that plaintiff’s counsel were

undertaking any great risk in pursuing this litigation. As early

as the October 14, 2004, letter (5 months before a complaint was

ever filed), defendants admitted the existence of almost all of

the barriers encountered by plaintiff. Given such a posture by

Butte County, this court finds it hard to believe plaintiff’s

counsel were at great risk of going uncompensated for their

efforts. The court thus declines to apply a multiplier on this

basis.

c. Public Interest Purpose

Plaintiff also seeks an upward adjustment of the award

based on some California courts’ recognition of the value of

providing incentives to attract competent counsel to handle cases

that are in the public interest. Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th 1122;

Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 52 (1977). However, this court

believes plaintiff’s counsel will be adequately compensated for

their work by the rates set forth in this order. Moreover, the

substantial number of attorneys specializing in the area of

disability law illustrates that sufficient competent counsel are

being attracted to this area of law. Mr. Rein’s declaration

additionally highlights this fact, as it demonstrates the great

number of cases which Mr. Rein has successfully taken on and won. 

(Rein Decl. ¶¶ 32-47.) The court thus declines to apply a

multiplier or upward adjustment on this basis.

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C. Costs

Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and Local Rule 54-292(f) govern the taxation of costs to losing

parties, which are generally subject to limits set under 28

U.S.C. § 1920. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (enumerating taxable costs);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (“costs other than attorneys’ fees shall

be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court

otherwise directs . . . .”); L.R. 54-292(f); Crawford Fitting Co.

v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987) (limiting taxable

costs to those enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920). 

Defendants object to “approximately $8,000 in expert

costs based solely on counsel’s declarations that the expenses

were incurred.” (Opp’n to Mot. to Attys’ Fees 11.) Contrary to

defendants’ assertion, plaintiff has submitted documentation for

some of its costs, but the burden is on the fee applicant to

submit proper documentation for all fees sought. Hensley, 461

U.S. at 434. Any inadequately documented fees may be subtracted

from an award. Id. The court agrees that several of the

submitted costs lack sufficient documentation. 

Specifically, plaintiff seeks $1,511 for “copying

costs, photos,” but this court only finds documentation in the

amount of $29.56 ($11.98 for two disposable cameras and $17.58

for development). This expense will thus be reduced by

$1,481.44. Plaintiff also seeks reimbursement for Federal

Express charges in the amount of $211, but this court only finds

documentation in the amount of $147.13. This expense will thus

be reduced by $63.87. Finally, plaintiff seeks $209 in

miscellaneous “travel/lodging/parking” expenses, but this court

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only finds documentation in the amount of $9.00. This expense

will thus be reduced by $200.00. Plaintiff’s request for

$8,327.00 in expenses and costs will therefore be reduced by a

total of $1,745.31.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing discussion, attorneys’

fees, litigation expenses, and costs are awarded in the following

amounts:

Mr. Rein 121.4 hrs (-31.6) x $275/hr = $24,695.00 +

Ms. Barbosa 124.3 hrs (-14.25) x $275/hr = $30,263.75 +

Ms. McLean 122.1 hrs (-19.9) x $225/hr = $22,995.00 =

= $77,953.75 -

(Work against Superior Court of Cal.) 5% ($3,897.69) =

---------------

(Attorneys’s Fees Subtotal) = $74,056.06 +

Expenses $8,327.00 - $1,745.31 = $6,581.69

Total = $80,637.75

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

attorneys’ fees and costs be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in

the total sum of $80,637.75.

DATED: December 15, 2006

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