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Parties Involved:
Paul Talcott Currier
Appellant
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 14, 1998 Decided November 13, 1998

No. 98-7020

Paul Talcott Currier,

Appellant

v.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc.,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(97cv01619)

---------

Peter C. Cohen argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Gil A. Abramson argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the brief were David G. Leitch and Catherine E. Stetson.

Before: Silberman, Rogers, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Silberman, Circuit Judge: Appellant brought a Title VII

suit against his employer. The employer moved for summary

judgment, asserting that appellant's suit was barred because

he had not timely exhausted his administrative remedy with

the EEOC. Rejecting appellant's contention that he had filed

his EEOC complaint on time and his alternative argument

that equitable principles should operate to toll the filing

requirement, the district court granted summary judgment in

favor of the employer. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

I.

Appellant Paul Currier was hired as an independent contractor by appellee Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., a

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non-profit Delaware corporation with primary operations in

Prague, the Czech Republic. Appellant was to serve as a

computer network engineer and systems analyst at the

Prague location, and entered into a six-month contract with

appellee to begin December 31, 1995 and to expire on June

30, 1996.1

In February or March 1996, Currier went to a restaurant

in Prague after work. Candace O'Brien, appellee's Director

of Human Resources, was seated at a table with other coworkers. O'Brien, apparently inebriated, made disparaging

comments regarding appellant's sexual prowess. She then

unbuttoned his pants, squeezed his penis, and exposed his

testicles. The following day, O'Brien--a supervisory official

who had authority to fire appellant--instructed him that "he

had better get in line [with her version of what happened] or

__________

1 Of course we take the facts and all reasonable inferences

therefrom in the light most favorable to appellant, the nonmoving

party. See, e.g., Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

We note that appellant, then acting pro se, alleged neither his

finality nor his equitable estoppel argument in his complaint, but

only in his opposition papers to appellee's motion for summary

judgment. Although appellee raises the issue of whether appellant

should be entitled to amend his complaint in the absence of a formal

request under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, we assume without deciding that

appellant would be entitled to amend his complaint. We think this

course proper given the district court's disposition of the summary

judgment motion in light of all of appellant's allegations, see Civ.

No. 97-1619, Mem. Op. at 11 n.3 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 1998).

he would have a problem with her." (O'Brien's "official

version" maintained that appellant had voluntarily exposed

himself at the table.) O'Brien further threatened that if

appellant discussed the actual incident, his employment contract would not be renewed and he would have problems

during the remainder of his existing contract. Appellant took

O'Brien's threats seriously, and refrained from mentioning

the incident. But O'Brien often recounted the "official version," and when appellant was asked for his account by a coworker in O'Brien's presence, he disputed the "official version." O'Brien warned appellant not to make such a mistake

again.

Soon thereafter, Currier encountered one of the "problems"

that O'Brien had promised. At a workplace social event,

appellant had a heated discussion with a female co-worker

about the definition of sexual harassment. The following day,

he learned that O'Brien was investigating the incident and

that he was suspected of sexual harassment against the

female co-worker. Although the investigation was without

basis in fact, he received a termination letter from O'Brien on

May 14, 1996. He viewed this accusation as a pretext for

retaliating against him because of his earlier opposition to

O'Brien's sexual harassment of him.

Less than a week after receiving O'Brien's termination

letter, Currier met with Robert Gillette, appellee's Director of

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Broadcasting and a higher ranking management official than

O'Brien. Appellant told Gillette that his previous encounters

with O'Brien made it impossible for O'Brien to conduct a

neutral investigation of appellant's asserted sexual harassment of the female co-worker. Gillette promised to conduct a

second investigation that would be fair and impartial, and

assured Currier that there would be "no final determination"

regarding his employment status until that second investigation was concluded.

Appellant stopped coming to work after receiving his termination letter, and his contract expired by its terms on June

30, 1996. But he did not give up his efforts to return to

appellee's employ. Rather, he inquired several times about

the status of Gillette's investigation. Shortly before Thanksgiving 1996, he met with his former supervisor, Tom Morgan,

and Gillette. Appellant was told that the investigation was

still continuing and had not yet been concluded. Gillette

referred to Morgan as appellant's present "boss" and said

that Morgan "will always be your boss."

Appellant filed an administrative complaint with the San

Francisco office of the EEOC on March 28, 1997. The EEOC

issued a notice of right to sue, and appellant brought suit

against appellee in the district court under Title VII, contending, first, that O'Brien had sexually harassed him, and second,

that she had retaliated against him for opposing her advances

by terminating his employment. Appellee moved to dismiss

the complaint, or in the alternative for summary judgment, on

the ground that appellant had not filed his EEOC complaint

in the time required by 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(e)(1) (1994).

Appellant argued in opposition that it was improper to start

the clock when he received the termination letter because

that termination decision was not a final decision. Alternatively, he argued that one of appellee's officials had misled

him into believing that he would be rehired, and therefore

that appellee should be equitably estopped from asserting the

statutory deadline. The district court disagreed and granted

summary judgment in favor of appellee.

II.

42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(e)(1) requires that "[a] charge ...

shall be filed [with the EEOC] within one hundred and eighty

days after the alleged unlawful unemployment practice occurred."2 Only after exhausting this administrative remedy

can an aggrieved person bring suit in district court. Jarrell

v. United States Postal Serv., 753 F.2d 1088, 1091 (D.C. Cir.

__________

2 A three-hundred-day time limit applies when the aggrieved

person has initially instituted proceedings with a state or local

agency with authority to grant or seek relief from the unlawful

practice. See 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(e)(1). The district court concluded that this longer time limit did not apply to appellant, because

appellant never instituted proceedings with the District of Columbia

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Office of Human Rights and because that office would not have had

1985) (citing Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820,

832-33 (1976)). Here, the parties agree that appellant filed

his EEOC complaint on March 28, 1997. For appellant's

EEOC complaint to have been timely, the precise " 'unlawful

employment practice' of which he complains," Delaware State

College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980), must have occurred

within 180 days of his EEOC filing, i.e., on or after September 29, 1996.

The parties disagree on when the unlawful employment

practice occurred, and thus on when the statutory clock

started ticking. Appellee argues that we should count from

the date appellant received his termination letter, May 14,

1996; thus measured, appellant did not file his EEOC complaint for 328 days, which is too late. Appellant, while not

offering a specific starting date, contends that the clock did

not start ticking until long after May 14, 1996, because the

May 14 termination decision was not yet a final decision.

Alternatively, he argues that appellee's manager's misleading

assurances of reinstatement should equitably estop appellee

from asserting the statutory filing deadline.3 Under either of

appellant's approaches, of course, he would not be deemed to

have failed to exhaust his administrative remedy.4

__________

subject matter jurisdiction over his charge in any event. Appellant

does not challenge these conclusions on appeal.

3 Appellant argues in his reply brief that appellee waived its right

to assert the statute of limitations by raising that defense in its preanswer motion rather than in its answer--which has yet to be filed.

This argument could not prevail because appellant asserted it for

the first time on appeal. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 119

(1976). In any event, it is without merit given our recent decision

in Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C.

Cir. 1998), where we held that "an affirmative defense may be

raised by pre-answer motion under Rule 12(b) when the facts that

give rise to the defense are clear from the face of the complaint."

4 Appellant focuses on the equitable estoppel argument in his

brief and does not clearly articulate the finality argument as a

separate issue. For ease of analysis, we treat the issues separately.

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A.

We begin with the question of when (if ever) appellant had

notice that the termination decision was final so as to start

the clock on the EEOC filing deadline. See Ricks, 449 U.S.

at 261 (holding that the starting point for the deadline occurs

when plaintiff has notice of an official, i.e., not "tentative,"

decision). The parties agree that appellant received the

termination letter from O'Brien on May 14, 1996,5 and that

O'Brien had the authority to fire him.

But were the circumstances such that O'Brien's decision

was not actually final? Appellant claims that Gillette, a

manager directly superior to O'Brien in appellee's organizational hierarchy, assured him less than a week after May 14

that O'Brien's decision was not a "final determination." Gillette is claimed to have again told Currier around Thanksgiving that the investigation was still ongoing; Currier was not

told that Gillette's investigation had concluded by the time he

filed his charges with the EEOC's San Francisco office the

following March. Appellee reminds us that in Ricks, the

Supreme Court was careful to point out that an employer that

expresses an "official position" and simultaneously "indicate[s] a willingness to change its [official position]" based on

the outcome of a pending grievance proceeding does not

thereby render that "official position" a "tentative" decision.

Ricks, 449 U.S. at 261. And appellee refers us to our recent

warning that "a plaintiff [may not] avoid the holding in Ricks

simply by labeling the final decision 'preliminary' and procedures to review that decision an 'integral part' of the decision

process rather than collateral review of the final decision."

Harris v. Ladner, 127 F.3d 1121, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

__________

5 That appellant's six-month contract expired by its own terms on

June 30, 1996 does not have any relevance for the start date

because appellant does not allege any continuing violation between

May 14, 1996 and June 30, 1996. See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257 ("Mere

continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong

the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination.").

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It is true that the reconsideration of Currier's termination

would not alone render the initial decision "preliminary"

rather than "final." But we think appellant points to more

than mere reconsideration in his effort to identify a later

starting date for the statutory clock. He claims that a

supervisor of the initial decision-maker informed him shortly

after that initial decision that "there would be no final

determination ... until the conclusion of his investigation."

In other words, an authoritative voice (Gillette) expressly

disavowed the finality of the initial determination,6 which

implies a later starting date--though it remains unclear exactly when the decision became final--that could bring appellant's EEOC complaint within the statutory time limit.

Whether Gillette did indeed make such an assurance and

whether, if he did, it was true, may well be contested.7 At

this juncture, however, appellant has created a genuine issue

on this material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

__________

6 We note that to our knowledge appellee did not have in place a

formal direct or collateral review procedure for personnel decisions.

Cf. Harris, 127 F.3d at 1125 (distinguishing Ricks on the ground

that the formal reconsideration process in Ricks resembled collateral review rather than direct review). In such a situation, it seems

appropriate to put stock in a manager's characterization of the

decisionmaking process.

7 If Gillette's description of O'Brien's decision as non-final were a

falsehood, appellee might be equitably estopped, see Part II.B infra,

from asserting Title VII's EEOC filing deadline as an affirmative

defense. Cf. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 261 (holding that an employer's

offer to reconsider a final decision does not toll the limitations

period as a matter of equity, but making no mention of the

possibility that a false offer could equitably estop the employer). If

appellant fails on remand to prove the facts underlying his finality

argument, he still may attempt to prove the facts underlying his

equitable estoppel argument under our alternative holding in Part

II.B infra.

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B.

Even if we viewed the May 14, 1996 letter as a final

decision that started the statutory clock, we would still conclude that the district court improperly granted summary

judgment in favor of appellee because appellant has pointed

to sufficient facts in his affidavit to create a genuine issue as

to whether equitable principles should toll the EEOC filing

deadline.

Title VII's time limit on filing a complaint with the EEOC

is not jurisdictional and is subject to "estoppel[ ] and equitable tolling." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.

385, 393 (1982). Both equitable estoppel and equitable tolling

operate, in a practical sense, to toll a limitations period.

Although the Supreme Court and our court have occasionally

conflated the two doctrines, see, e.g., Irwin v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Bowden v. United

States, 106 F.3d 433, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1997), they have distinct

criteria. Whereas equitable tolling allows a plaintiff to avoid

the bar of the limitations period if despite all due diligence he

is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence

of his claim, Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d

575, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1998), equitable estoppel in the statute of

limitations context prevents a defendant from asserting untimeliness where the defendant has taken active steps to

prevent the plaintiff from litigating in time, id. at 580; see

also Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-52

(7th Cir. 1990). Here, we treat appellant as asserting the

latter.

Again we begin with Ricks. There the Supreme Court

reaffirmed that "the pendency of a grievance, or some other

method of collateral review of an employment decision, does

not toll the running of the limitations periods." Ricks, 449

U.S. at 261 (citing International Union of Elec., Radio, and

Mach. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236-

40 (1976)). Appellee contends that because appellant's equitable estoppel argument rests only on an allegation that the

termination decision was being reconsidered, it is foreclosed

by Ricks. If that were all Currier alleges, we would agree.

In that regard, Gillette's statement promising appellant a

"fair and impartial investigation," standing alone, provides

inadequate support for appellant's equitable estoppel theory.

Similarly insufficient, by themselves, are Morgan's instruction

to "hang tight" and his assurance that "it's not over yet."

We think, however, that an employer's affirmatively misleading statements that a grievance will be resolved in the

employee's favor can establish an equitable estoppel. See

Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518,

1532 (11th Cir. 1992) (sex discrimination plaintiff was given

"repeated assurances" that her salary would be raised to the

level that other workers were receiving); Coke v. General

Adjustment Bureau, 640 F.2d 584, 595 (5th Cir. 1981) (employer misrepresented to employee that it would reinstate

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him). Under those circumstances, an employee understandably would be reluctant to file a complaint with the EEOC for

fear he would jeopardize his chances to gain relief voluntarily.

Appellant has identified statements made by one of his

supervisors from which he concluded not only that he was

being reconsidered, but that he would be reinstated. Specifically, he asserted the following in his affidavit, describing a

meeting shortly before Thanksgiving 1996, "Mr. Gillette referred to Mr. Morgan as 'my boss.' Mr. Gillette said that Mr.

Morgan was my boss and would always be my boss," which,

in context, could be understood to mean that Currier would

be triumphant. To be sure, it is a bit of a stretch for

appellant to have inferred from these statements that appellee intended to continue to employ him. But we cannot say,

at the summary judgment stage, that no reasonable factfinder

could find that this inference was plausible and that appellant

made the inference at the time. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249.8

__________

8 Although appellant's contract would have expired by its terms

on June 30, 1996 wholly apart from the May 14, 1996 termination

decision, appellant had earlier been involved in negotiations with

several of appellee's managers regarding a contract renewal. Appellant thus might reasonably have inferred from Gillette's stateUSCA Case #98-7020 Document #396052 Filed: 11/13/1998 Page 8 of 9
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III.

Thus far we have discussed only appellant's retaliation

claim. Appellant also asserted in his complaint a claim of

hostile work environment sexual harassment, and did not

carefully explain to the district court or to us how the finality

and equitable estoppel arguments were applicable to his

hostile environment theory.

Here we can be brief. As with his retaliation claim,

appellant was obliged to file an EEOC complaint within 180

days of the "[precise] unlawful employment practice," Ricks,

449 U.S. at 257, of which he complains. The last day on

which he could have been subjected to hostile environment

sexual harassment was his last day at work; thereafter he

was not in a work environment, let alone a hostile one. See

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993);

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67

(1986). Giving appellant the factual benefit of the doubt, the

district court assumed his last day of work to be the day his

contract expired, June 30, 1996. Counting from that date,

appellant's EEOC complaint was filed 281 days later on

March 28, 1997, which is too late.

Appellant's finality and equitable estoppel arguments are

inapposite to his hostile environment claim. Gillette's assurance that O'Brien's termination decision was not a final

determination goes only to the allegedly retaliatory termination--the hostile environment occurred, and appellant had

notice of it, when he was at work. Similarly, Gillette's

misleadingly optimistic statements suggesting that appellant

would be rehired could not have been misleading as to

appellee's position toward the hostile environment allegedly

created by O'Brien. Those statements could only lull appellant into believing that his retaliation claim would be remedied, not into believing that the already experienced harm from

the episodes of hostile environment sexual harassment would

somehow be cured. Accordingly, the district court correctly

__________

ments that, in addition to the grievance being resolved in his favor,

a new contract was on the horizon.

granted summary judgment in favor of appellee on the hostile

environment claim.

* * * *

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's decision to

grant summary judgment to appellee is reversed on appellant's retaliation claim and affirmed on appellant's hostile

work environment claim.

So ordered.

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