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Sealed Case

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 1, 1996 Decided February 7, 1997

No. 95-3206

IN RE: SEALED CASE

(SENTENCING GUIDELINES' "SAFETY VALVE")

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cr00031-02)

-

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Relying on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' "safety valve" provision,

appellant sought a departure from the mandatory minimum sentence for the drug trafficking offense

to which he had pled guilty. The district court refused to apply the safety valve because it found,

based on either co-conspirator liability or constructive possession, that appellant had possessed a

firearm in connection with the offense. Holding that co-conspirator liability cannot establish

possession under the safety valve and concluding that the record contains insufficient evidence to

support the district court's finding of constructive possession, we vacate appellant's sentence and

remand for resentencing pursuant to the safety valve.

I

Acting to prevent themandatoryminimumsentencesfor certain drug trafficking offensesfrom

causing the "least culpable offenders[to] receive the same sentences astheir relatively more culpable

counterparts," H.R. REP. NO. 103-460, at 4 (1994), Congress added the so-called "safety valve"

provision to the Sentencing Guidelines in 1994, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Reform Act of

1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. VIII, 108 Stat. 1796, 1895-96 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)). The

safety valve requires district courts to disgregard these statutory minimum sentences and instead to

sentence pursuant to the Guidelines when a defendant satisfies five indicators of reduced culpability:

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1) the defendant has no more than one criminal history point; 2) the defendant "did not use violence

or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another

participant to do so) in connection with the offense"; 3) the offense did not result in death or serious

bodily injury; 4) the defendant was not a leader or organizer of the offense; and 5) the defendant has

fully cooperated with the government. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (1995); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2) (1994).

The second indicatorpossession of a firearmis the focus of this case.

Count One of a three-count information charged appellant and his brother with conspiracy

to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 846. Counts Two and Three charged appellant's brother with using and carrying a firearm

during a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and with possession of an

unregistered firearmin violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Appellant pled guilty to the first count. His

brother pled guilty to all three counts. Because appellant and his brother cooperated with the

government in the investigation of other suspects, the records of this case are sealed to protect the

brothers' identities.

The drug conspiracy count to which appellant pled guilty rested on four sales to an

undercover government agent that took place over the course of two and a half months. The district

court rejected the safety valve because of the presence of a gun at the fourth sale. That sale occurred

outside a fast food restaurant. Appellant's brother, sitting in his car parked near the restaurant, waited

for the buyer, i.e., the undercover agent. When the agent arrived, the brother made a telephone call.

Shortly thereafter, another person delivered to the brother approximately a kilogramof cocaine. The

brother in turn gave the cocaine to the undercover agent in exchange for approximately $21,000 in

cash. During the entire transaction, appellant remained in the restaurant. Immediately after the sale,

law enforcement officers arrested appellant and his brother. Searching the brother's car, the officers

found a revolver under the driver's seat.

If the district court had sentenced appellant under the Sentencing Guidelines, he would have

faced a prison term in the range of 46 to 57 months. Conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of

cocaine, however, carries a statutory minimum prison sentence of five years, i.e., 60 months. 21

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U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), 846 (1994). Relying on the safety valve, appellant sought sentencing

under the Guidelines rather than for the statutory minimum. The Government conceded that

appellant met four of the safety valve's five criteria, but contended that he failed to qualify for the

safety valve because he had possessed a firearm during the crime. Agreeing with the Government,

the district court refused to apply the safety valve and sentenced appellant to the statutory minimum

of five years.

II

The sole issue on appeal is the propriety of the district court'srefusal to sentence pursuant to

the safety valve. We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo, its factual findings under

the clearly erroneous standard, and its application of the Guidelines to the facts with due deference.

United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1994).

At the sentencing hearing, the district judge explained the basis for her finding that appellant

had possessed the gun found in his brother's car as follows:

... Let me just say this with respect to the legal issues that have been argued to me.

I conclude, based upon what has been presented to me, that [appellant] is not entitled

to the safety valve. I mean, you know, just common sense tells me that he and his

brother, who have gone up from a few gram deliveries to a kilogram delivery, fully

recognized how much drugs they had with them, they recognized the profit they

would make from those drugs, and the two of them conspired to sell those drugs, and

the two of them, as far as I'm concerned, are both responsible for having a gun to

protect the drugs and/or the money that they would get.

Now, you say they didn't bring the drugs with them. That's true. But they

knew they were dealing illegally, they knew that somebody was going to come and

bring the drugs, they didn't know who they were dealing with, and they stood

prepared to protect those drugs or to protect the income from those drugs, and

Ithere's just no question in my mind but he and his brother conspired together to

do this, and they were using this gun to protect themselves, to protect the drugs,

protect the money, and as such, ... I find that he is not entitled to the safety valve.

Tr. (Dec. 13, 1995) at 33-34. The judge's statement is consistent with two possible rationales for

finding that appellant possessed the gun discovered in his brother's car: co-conspirator liability and

constructive possession. In our view, neither approach is appropriate in this casethe first as a

matter of law, the second because of insufficient evidence.

Under the doctrine of co-conspirator liability, conspirators are responsible for the reasonably

foreseeable acts of fellow conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. See, e.g., Pinkerton v.

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United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946); cf. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (1995). Although well

accepted in substantive criminal law, co-conspirator liability cannot establish possession under the

Guidelines' safety valve, as the Government seems to have acknowledged by virtually dropping this

argument on appeal. The safety valve's application note four provides that, "[c]onsistent with §

1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), the term "defendant,' as used in subdivision (2), limits the accountability

of the defendant to his own conduct and conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, commanded,

induced, procured, or willfully caused." Id. § 5C1.2, comment., n.4. This language parallels the

wording of one of the two principal provisions defining the scope of relevant conduct for which

defendants are held liable under the Guidelines: "all acts and omissions [they] committed, aided,

abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused." Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).

Notably absent from application note four, however, is any mention of the other principal provision

defining the scope of relevant conduct, which holds defendants liable for "all reasonably foreseeable

acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity." Id. §

1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Omission of this co-conspirator liability language, we think, can hardly have been

inadvertent. Its omission, moreover, is consistent with the safety valve's basic purpose: to spare

certain minor participants in drug trafficking enterprises from mandatory minimum sentences when

imposition of the mandatory sentences would be disproportionate to the defendants' culpability. See

H.R. REP. NO. 103-460, at 2-4. Given the great likelihood that at least one member of a drug

distribution conspiracy will possess a firearm, see, e.g., United States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062, 1065

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting courts' widespread recognition that guns are common "tools of the trade"

for drug dealers), incorporating co-conspirator liability into the safety valve's weapon possession

element would render the safety valve virtually useless.

We recognize the tension between application note four's definition of "defendant," U.S.S.G.

§ 5C1.2, comment., n.4 (1995), and application note three's broad definition of "offense," which

includes "all relevant conduct," id. § 5C1.2, comment., n.3; cf. Id. § 1B1.1, comment., n.1 (l). Cf.

United States v. Hallum, 1996 WL 742317, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 31, 1996). Applying the principle

that the specific trumps the general, however, we read application note four, which addresses only

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the weapon possession element, as restricting the meaning of application note three, which applies

to severalelements ofthe safetyvalve. Indeed, application note four describes the weapon possession

element's use of the term"defendant" as "limiting" defendants' liability, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, comment.,

n.4 (1995), a limitation that would have no function if application note three incorporated

co-conspirator liability into the weapon possession element. We also think it significant that, by

comparison to the provision enhancing drug sentences for gun possession, which uses the passive

voicerequiring enhancement if a firearm "was possessed," id. § 2D1.1(b)(1)and omits any

reference to the defendant, the safety valve speaks in the active voice, requiring that "the defendant"

must do the possessing, id. § 5C1.2(2). And most fundamentally, we think our interpretation of the

safety valve is faithful to its purpose.

Having abandoned co-conspirator liabilityas a basisfor establishingweaponpossessionunder

the safety valve, the Government arguesthat the district court nevertheless properly refused to apply

the safety valve because appellant constructively possessed the gun found under the seat of his

brother's car. A defendant constructively possesses an object when he is "knowingly in a position to,

or ha[s] the right to exercise "dominion and control' over" the object, e.g., United States v. Jenkins,

981 F.2d 1281, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), either

personally or through others, see, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65, 71 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 502 U.S. 953 (1991); cf. County Ct. of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 161, 164 (1979)

(discussing similar definition under New York law). In most constructive possession cases, the

defendant's knowledge of the contraband flows from its being in plain view at the site of the

defendant's arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 99 F.3d 439, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United

States v. Dunn, 846 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Although the defendant's proximity to the

contraband is relevant to his ability to exercise dominion and control over the contraband, we have

repeatedly held that establishing dominion and control requires more than just proximity. See, e.g.,

United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d

418, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 850 (1992). " "[T]here must be some action, some

word, or some conduct that links the individual to the [contraband] and indicates that he had some

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stake in [it], some power over [it].' " United States v. Thorne, 997 F.2d 1504, 1510 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 999 (1993) (quoting United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

Additional factors linking the defendant to the contraband and establishing his ability to exercise

dominion and control over it include " "proof ofmotive, a gesture implying control, evasive conduct,

or a statement indicating involvement in an enterprise.' " Morris, 977 F.2d at 620 (quoting United

States v. Gibbs, 904 F.2d 52, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).

In this case, the district court could reasonably find the first element of constructive

possessionthat appellant knew the gun was in his brother's car. In a statement to law enforcement

officers shortly after his arrest, appellant expressly acknowledged that "[t]here was a gun in [my

brother's] car." Government's Memo in Aid of Sentencing (Nov. 9, 1995), Attach. A, reprinted in

Appellant's Appendix at 77. Claiming that he did not learn about the gun until after his arrest,

appellant argues that his admission, read in the context of his entire statement, fails to demonstrate

that he knew the gun was present in his brother's car at the time of the fourth cocaine sale. Although

appellant's interpretation is certainly plausible, his statement may also be read quite naturally as

recounting the events and circumstances of the fourth sale, thus suggesting that he did know about

the gun at the time of the sale. Facing a statement with two plausible interpretations, the district

court did not clearly err by choosing one interpretation over the other and concluding that appellant

knew the gun was in his brother's car at the time of the sale. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer

City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) ("Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the

factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.").

We have a different view of the district court's conclusion that appellant was in a position to

exercise dominion and control over the gun, the second element of constructive possession. To begin

with, one of the usual factors establishing the ability to exercise dominion and controlthe

defendant's proximityto the contrabandismissing in this case. Appellant remained in the restaurant

throughout the transaction while the gun remained in the car. By itself, this lack of proximity makes

it highly unlikely that appellant could have controlled his brother's gun during the sale. Nor does

anything in the record suggest that appellant was anywhere near the gun immediately prior to the sale.

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Contrary to the Government's inaccurateand to us troublingassertion, Appellee's Br. at 2-3,

nothing in the record suggests that appellant arrived at the restaurant in his brother's car.

Lack of proximity to the gun also distinguishes this case from the cases cited by the

Government in which we found constructive possession of guns or drugs by passengers in cars. In

allofthose cases, the defendantsfound to have constructivelypossessed contraband, unlike appellant

here, were sitting in the cars containing the contraband when they were stopped by police. Also

unlike appellant, most of them had been observed in the cars for some time prior to their arrest. See

Jenkins, 981 F.2d at 1282-83; Harrison, 931 F.2d at 66, 72; United States v. Hernandez, 780 F.2d

113, 115-117 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In the one case where we singled out a defendant as not

constructively possessing contraband discovered in a car occupied by his confederates, we relied in

part on the fact that he, like appellant, was not in the vehicle when arrested. See Jenkins, 981 F.2d

at 1282, 1283-84.

The Government arguesthat even though appellant was not near his brother's gun at the time

of his arrest, we should affirm the district court's finding that appellant could exercise dominion and

control over the gun because he and his brother were joint participants in an ongoing criminal

enterprise. Although our cases hold that a defendant's proximity to contraband, combined with

"evidence linking the accused to an ongoing criminal operation of which ... possession [of the

contraband] is a part," may support a finding of constructive possession, United States v. Staten, 581

F.2d 878, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see United States v. Evans, 888 F.2d 891, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1989),

cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990); see also Williams, 952 F.2d at 420; Dunn, 846 F.2d at 763-64,

those cases differ significantly from the case before us. For one thing, all involved defendants

arrested in proximity to the contraband. In none of the cases did we hold that participation in an

ongoing drug business by itself could support a finding of constructive possession.

In three ofthe four cases, moreover, we held that participation in a drug distribution operation

could support a finding of constructive possession of drugs, not of guns. Linking participation in an

ongoing drug trafficking enterprise to constructive possession of a gun requires an additional

inferential step, one that we think should not be made automatically, i.e., without some additional

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evidence supporting that step. For example, in the only cited case where we found constructive

possession of guns based in part on the defendants' participation in a common drug enterprise, we

observed that each defendant had brandished one of the guns during the course of their jointly

organized drug transactions. See Evans, 888 F.2d at 896. The record in the case before us contains

no such evidence. Appellant's brother testified that he did not even acquire the gun until after the

completion of three of the four transactions charged in the conspiracy. According to his

uncontradicted testimony, he purchased the gun to protect himselffroma particular assailant who had

attacked him in the past, an assailant having no apparent link to appellant. And nothing in the record

establishes that appellant had ever held the gun or, as noted above, that he had arrived at the scene

of the fourth sale in the car containing the gun.

Finally, none of the cases cited by the Government concerned the Sentencing Guidelines'

safetyvalve; all addressed the evidentiary requirements for constructive possession under substantive

criminal statutes. Although we do not suggest that constructive possession means one thing under

the safety valve and something else in substantive criminal law, we do think that the term "possess,"

as used in the safety valve, must be interpreted and applied in light of the safety valve's clearly stated

purpose: to prevent mandatory minimum sentences from causing the "least culpable offenders [to]

receive the same sentences as their relatively more culpable counterparts." H.R. REP. NO. 103-460,

at 4. Leaping automatically from a defendant's participation in an ongoing drug business to a finding

that he constructivelypossessed aweaponowned byanother participantwithout making anyfurther

assessment of the "likelihood that in some discernible fashion the accused had a substantial voice

vis-a-vis" the weapon, Staten, 581 F.2d at 884; see also Jenkins, 981 F.2d at 1283; United States

v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1087, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1986)would undermine the purpose of the safety valve

by rendering ineligible for it many of those less culpable participants in drug trafficking enterprises

whom Congress intended to relieve from statutory minimum sentences. This statutory objective

reinforces our view that finding a participant in a drug operation constructively possessed someone

else's weapon requires some additional evidence linking the participant to the weapona link

nowhere evident in the record before us.

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We vacate appellant's sentence and remand for resentencing in accord with the safety valve.

So ordered.

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