Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00968/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00968-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott Kernan
Respondent
Harold Kent Sutton
Petitioner

Document Text:

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 Respondent requests that Anthony J. Malfi, Acting Warden, be substituted for Scott Kernan, as the named 1

Respondent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

 All further references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

2

 Although Petitioner was initially charged with six counts of residential burglary, one count was later 3

dismissed. (See Exhibit 5, to Court Doc. 12.) 

 “CT” refers to the Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal; “RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal. 4

 The information had alleged Petitioner suffered five previous serious felony convictions (§§ 667(a)(1) & 5

667(b)-(I)) and had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5(b)). 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD KENT SUTTON,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTHONY J. MALFI, Warden

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-0968 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

1

BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in the Fresno County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted of

five counts of residential burglary (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 459/460) on March 1, 2002. (CT 252- 2 3

256, 259.) On April 3, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 125 years to 4

life, five consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life. In addition, Petitioner was sentenced to

two five-year terms for the section 667 enhancements and two one-year terms for the section 5

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 Prior to filing an answer, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as time barred on January 12, 6

2006. Petitioner filed an opposition on May 15, 2006. On June 12, 2006, the undersigned issued Findings and

Recommendation to deny the motion, which was adopted in full on July 31, 2006. (Court Docs. 16, 17.) 

2

67.5(b) enhancements for a total determinate term of twelve years. (RT 1105-1108.) 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. On January 22, 2004, the Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld the judgment

in its entirety. (See Exhibit 5, to Court Doc. 12.)

On March 2, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme

Court. The petition was denied on April 14, 2004. (See Exhibit 6, to Court Doc. 12.) 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 28, 2005. 

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on October 13, 2006, and Petitioner filed a traverse on

December 11, 2006. (Court Docs. 20, 25.) 

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Prosecution’s Case

Count One

Christina Evangelista was a student at California State University, Fresno and lived alone

at 4592 E. Sierra Madre, Apartment E, in Fresno, on July 25, 2000. (RT 409.) On the morning

of July 25, 2000, when she left for work her bedroom window was open about half an inch, and

she left a front room window slightly open. (RT 410.) 

When she arrived home from work, at approximately 2:30 p.m., she noticed the curtains

in the bedroom that had been closed were open. (RT 411-412.) She then noticed that the

bedroom window was open, the screen was missing, and she noticed fingerprints on the dusty

window sill along with footprints in the dust on the floor. In addition, a lounge chair had been

pushed against the wall. (RT 412.) She checked the apartment to make sure no one was there

and then called the police. (RT 412-413.) An officer came and took fingerprints from around the

window. (RT 413; 525-528.) She subsequently discovered that her wallet was missing, along

with her alarm clock, portable stereo, musical keyboard, a roll of quarters, portable CD player, a

green duffle bag, her high school ring, and all of her CDs, which she never got back. (RT 413-

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414.) 

Approximately a week after the burglary, a man knocked on her apartment door claiming

he was looking for someone. She told him the person did not live there and he left. (RT 416.) 

The same individual did the same thing about a week later. This time he asked if someone by the

name of “Frank” live there, which Ms. Evangelista said no and he left. (RT 417.) On both

occasions, Ms. Evangelista did not open the door and only looked through the peephole. (RT

417.) After the second incident, Ms. Evangelista thought this was the individual who had

burglarized her apartment. She then called the police, but by the time they came, the man had

left. (RT 418.) Ms. Evangelista told a defense investigator that she thought Petitioner was the

individual who had knocked on her door twice but she “couldn’t say for sure whether it was him

or not.” (RT 416.)

Police Supervising Identification Technician Patrice Clement who compares fingerprints

as part of criminal investigations, stated that the comparative quality of the fingerprints are sorted

into three categories: A, B, and C, with A being “excellent quality,” B being marginal quality and

C prints lacking sufficient ridge detail for comparison purposes. (RT 606.) The fingerprints

samples taken from Ms. Evangelista’s apartment were rated as A quality. (RT 609, 630.) The

fingerprints taken from the bedroom window matched positively with Petitioner’s prints taken

during trial. (RT 610-611; Exhibits 29 & 32.) 

Count Two

Kevin Davis, was also a student at California State University, Fresno, who was living

alone at 4550 E. Sierra Madre, Apartment D, on July 25, 2000. On that morning, he left for work

at approximately 7:30 a.m. (RT 426.) His bedroom window was left slightly open due to the

summer heat. When he returned home at approximately 4:00 p.m., he noticed that his back door

was unlocked. (RT 427.) He then noticed that the screen on the window that had been left

slightly open was sliced. (RT 428.) Davis reported it to the apartment manager and the police. 

(RT 428-429.) He subsequently discovered two “boom” boxes missing, along with an alarm

clock, a shoulder bag, and a watch. (RT 429.) 

Petitioner and the apartment manager viewed a surveillance video and they observed a

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man carrying what appeared to be Davis’s property down the back alley. (RT 430.) Detective

Dodd printed the still photos taken from the video which depicted a slender African-American

man carrying a CD “boom” box with dual speakers. (RT 432-435.) Davis acknowledged on

cross-examination that he was not for certain that the property carried by the individual in the

video was his property. (RT 437.) Davis reported that he never got any of his property back. 

(RT 438.) 

The police came and took fingerprints from the bedroom and outside of the apartment.

(RT 429.) Officer Donna Spenhoff lifted fingerprints from the bedroom window point of entry. 

(RT 532-534.) The prints were rated as C quality and were insufficient for comparison. (RT

613.) She also interviewed neighbors Kevin Wiere and Helen Sheppard and retrieved the

videotape from the manager. (RT 540-541.) 

Neighbor Helen Sheppard stated that an African-American man knocked on her door very

loudly asking for directions to an apartment. (RT 463.) She identified the individual in the video

as the same individual who knocked on her door. (RT 465.) The man told Ms. Sheppard he was

hunting for a friend in the apartments. When she asked for the friend’s name and said she would

look in the apartment address log, Petitioner stated “that would be alright, that he would come

back later” and he did not provide the friend’s name. (RT 470.)

Ms. Sheppard identified Petitioner, in court and on the video surveillance, as the

individual who knocked on her door. (RT 464-465.) She stated she was “most certainly”

confident that it was in fact him. (RT 471.) 

After encountering Petitioner at her residence on July 25, 2000, Ms. Sheppard later

learned that Kevin Davis’s apartment had been burglarized and she spoke to police regarding the

incident. (RT 463-464.) 

Count Three

Amy Boggs lived alone in an apartment at 2345 Shaw Avenue, Fresno, California on

August 1, 2000. (RT 387-388.) On that day, she was asleep and because of the heat she left the

bathroom window open slightly. She was awakened by the clicking of the light switch at the

entrance to the room and discovered a man standing in the doorway of her bedroom. (RT 388-

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389.) She yelled an obscenity at him, as she fled after him. (RT 388-389.) By the time she got

up from the bed, he was already out of her bedroom. (RT 400.) She did not get a good look at

the man, although she believed he was African-American and small in stature. (RT 389-390.) 

She gave up the chase after he fled from a rear window. (RT 390-391.) 

She then ran to her front door, which was still locked and yelled for help and neighbors

began chasing the man, while she called the police. (RT 391, 401.) She discovered that her

purse was missing from the living room coffee table, which contained her wallet, credit cards, a

cell phone and about $7 in cash. (RT 391-392, 402.) The purse was subsequently located empty

and she did not get this property back. (RT 393.)

When police arrived, the window ledge and window area were dusted for fingerprints. 

(RT 394.) Police officer David Scroggins determined that the point of entry was through the

kitchen window. (RT 546.) Officer Scroggins stated that Ms. Boggs told him that the window

had been left slightly open for ventilation and when he discovered it, it was fully open. Partial

prints and a palm print were lifted from inside the window. (RT 547-548; Exhibit 30.) They

were later compared with Petitioner and were a positive match. (RT 612-613.) Ms. Boggs was

unable to identify Petitioner as the man who entered her apartment. (RT 398.) 

Count Four

Judy Arrellano lived with her husband at 4909 N. Backer Avenue, Apartment 107, in

Fresno, California, with their two small children in August of 2000. On the morning of August

2, 2000, while her husband was at work, a short African-American man knocked on her

apartment door. She looked through the peephole but did not open it, believing it was a

salesman. She then heard a noise in her bedroom, as if someone was trying to remove the

window screen, which was open. The man knocked on the door again and this time leaned his

head against the door as attempting to hear if anyone was inside. (RT 440-444.) She did not

answer the door and saw him leave. (RT 444.) 

The man again moved the window and she could see him attempting to remove the

screen. He had one hand inside the window and the other one pulling on the screen. (RT 444-

445.) She yelled at him and he fled. (RT 446.) She then called the police. She identified

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Petitioner in court as the man who had attempted to remove the screen from the window. (RT

446-447.) 

Police took fingerprints from the area of the window, the apparent point of entry. (RT

559.) However, the fingerprints were insufficient to make a comparison. (RT 614.) 

Count Five

Brett Baize lived in a fraternity house at 5262 N. Sixth Street near the campus of Fresno

State University in August of 2000. (RT 510-511.) On August 8, 2000, Baize left for work and

as was his usual practice locked his door. (RT 518, 522.) Baize returned home from work

during his lunch break and as he was walking through the frat house he saw the hand of an

African-American male on the doorknob of his bedroom. He thought it was unusual because

there were no African-American males living in the frat house. He then backed down the

hallway and saw the person standing facing his bedroom door. (RT 513-514.) Baize identified

Petitioner as the individual he observed at the frat house standing near his bedroom. (RT 514.)

Baize confronted Petitioner and asked him what he was doing there. He said Petitioner

looked “kind of startled” and said he was looking for a friend but did not provide a name. Baize

told Petitioner, “No. You didn’t come here to see anyone. What are you doing here?” Petitioner

then changed his story saying he needed a drink of water because it was so hot outside. Baize

told Petitioner that he did not believe him and Petitioner told him to “calm down” and left out the

front door. (RT 514-515.) 

As Baize walked past his bedroom he noticed the door was open and he saw a black

shopping bag with some of his possessions on the floor. (RT 516.) He discovered a black neon

light and an alarm clock in the bag. (RT 517.) As he attempted to follow Petitioner, he called

the police on his cell phone. (RT 516.) Baize observed Petitioner jump over a gate and get

away. (RT 516.) Baize was subsequently shown a photographic lineup, and he identified

Petitioner as the person he observed in the frat house by his bedroom door, and stated he was

“absolutely positive” about the identification. (RT 519.) 

Baize later discovered that his stereo was missing, and police subsequently returned his

high school ring which he had not noticed was also missing. (RT 520.) 

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Petitioner’s Arrest

Claudio Rodriguez worked as a maintenance man and gardener at the Northpark

Apartments across the street from Fresno State University in August of 2000. (RT 565-566.) 

At this time, he was aware that there had been some recent burglaries of the apartments and there

was an individual going around turning doorknobs and knocking on doors. (RT 566.) Petitioner

had come to Rodriguez’s apartment door the day prior to his arrest looking for a different address

and Rodriguez directed him to another complex. (RT 567, 576.) 

Rodriguez saw Petitioner back at the complex, carrying a bag and wearing the same

clothes (RT 573), and Rodriguez became suspicious and followed him. He was “walking back

and forth in a zigzag manner” going into the breeze ways of apartments and then coming back

out. (RT 568-569, 573.) Rodriguez approached Petitioner who first said he wanted to get

something to eat then said he wanted to make a phone call. Rodriguez told Petitioner to wait

there while he called the apartment manager, when Petitioner took off running. Rodriguez

chased him and pinned him to a tree, and Petitioner was finally apprehended with the aid of a coworker while others called the police. (RT 568-569, 572, 583.) After police arrived, Petitioner

was placed in the back of the patrol car. (RT 570.) 

Rodriguez was not certain that Petitioner was the man he detained in August of 2000, as

it had been almost two years since the incident. (RT 569.) The parties stipulated that if Jose

Garcia had been called to testify, he would have testified that he and Rodriguez held Petitioner

against a tree until police arrived. (RT 790.) 

Police officer Daniel Law went to the Northpark Apartments on August 8, 2000, and saw

Rodriguez and Garcia pinning Petitioner to the ground. (RT 586.) Officer Law found an empty

ring box, a watch, an empty wallet, and a calculator within a few feet of where Petitioner was

being detained, and the items were taken. (RT 587-589.) Officer Law placed Petitioner in the

back seat of his patrol car. 

Judy Arrellano was called to make an identification of Petitioner. (RT 590.) Ms.

Arrellano was “relatively certain” that she had seen Petitioner before. (RT 591.) 

Judy Arrellano testified that she told the maintenance men that Petitioner was definitely

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the guy that was in her apartment. (RT 448-449.) She identified Petitioner as the individual to

the police. (RT 456.) 

Police officer Jerry Inchaurregui started his shift at 9 p.m. on August 8, 2000, and was

assigned the same patrol car that officer Law had used to transport Petitioner earlier that day. 

(RT 598.) As was normal police procedure, prior to beginning his shift, officer Inchaurregui

searched the patrol vehicle for any contraband that may have been left behind. He found a high

school class ring under the back seat. (RT 599.) The ring was subsequently given to Detective

Ken Dodd who later showed the ring to burglary victim Brett Baize, who confirmed it belonged

to him. (RT 599-600, 647-650.) Baize also identified the ring box as identical to his ring box,

however, he could not prove it belonged to him through any distinctive markings. (RT 651.) 

Police Interview of Petitioner 

Detective Ken Dodd investigated the series of burglaries that occurred in the area of

Maple and Shaw avenues near Fresno State University in July and early August of 2000. (RT

634.) Detective Dodd interviewed Petitioner at the police headquarters with Officer Rob

Beckwith present. (RT 640.) 

Petitioner was read his Miranda rights and stated that he understood those rights. (RT

643.) Detective Dodd then questioned Petitioner about the burglaries and he initially denied any

involvement. Dodd told him that he had a positive fingerprint, although Dodd was actually

unaware if there was a match. (RT 644-645.) Dodd stated that Petitioner’s eyes became red and

watery and he put his hand over his face and looked toward the ceiling, as he continued to deny

any involvement. (RT 645.) 

Detective Dodd asked Petitioner if he had burglarized the apartment of Ms Evangelista,

and gave him the address, and he stated “yes.” (RT 646.) Dodd showed him the still photos

taken from the surveillance camera at Kevin Davis’s apartment, and asked if that was him, he

stated, “I guess I’m screwed by the one case, so it’s not going to matter how many I did anyway.” 

(RT 646.) Petitioner admitted to burglarizing the apartment of Kevin Davis. (RT 647.) 

Detective Dodd testified that at the time he was interviewing Petitioner he aware that

there had been 11 burglaries in a single area near the university and he explained to Petitioner

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that he was willing to make a deal with him. (RT 658-659.) 

Dodd told Petitioner that if “he was willing to confess and give me some details on half

of those 11, then I would be willing to clear those cases out without charging him for those

additional counts of burglary.” Dodd said he later did, in fact, “clear” five of the cases that were

never charged. (RT 659.) 

Petitioner subsequently admitted to burglarizing the apartments of Ms. Boggs and Mrs.

Arrellano. (RT 660-662.) Detective Dodd did not discuss the burglary of Brett Baize because he

was unaware of it at that time. (RT 662-663.) Petitioner claimed that he found the property in

his possession at the time of arrest on the ground near the parking lot of the Village Greens

Apartments. (RT 664.) 

Petitioner told Detective Dodd that he was addicted to cocaine costing approximately

$100 a day, although Petitioner did not seem to have been under the influence of drugs at the

time of the interview or suffering from any withdrawals. (RT 676-677.) Petitioner told Dodd

that he took the alarm clocks because they could be sold for “beer money.” (RT 678.) 

Defense Case

Petitioner testified in his own defense. Petitioner had four prior felony convictions. (RT

700, 774-775.) First, Petitioner denied burglarizing the apartment of Ms. Evangelista, instead he

claimed that he met her two or three days earlier and was inside her apartment on July 22, 2000. 

(RT 700-701.) Petitioner stated that he was visiting a friend at the apartment complex when he

met Ms. Evangelista as she was coming out of the laundry room. (RT 703-704.) He stated she

was carrying laundry and a wood chair and he offered to help her carry it to her apartment. (RT

705.) He asked to use her restroom, and before he could leave she asked him to carry the chair

into the bedroom. (RT 708.) 

Petitioner stated that there conversation became intimate and the two began kissing and

had sexual intercourse for 10 to 15 minutes. Petitioner stated that he stayed in the apartment

until the next morning. (RT 714-715.) 

On the evening of July 28, 2000, Petitioner returned to Ms. Evangelista’s apartment and

knocked on the door. She did not open the door, she just told him to “Go away. I don’t feel

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good,” and he left. (RT 719.) 

Petitioner denied burglarizing the apartment of Kevin Davis and stated that he was not the

person on the surveillance videotape. (RT 720.) Petitioner also denied burglarizing the

apartment of Amy Boggs. (RT 720.) When he was asked to explain his fingerprints found on

the window sill of Ms. Boggs apartment, he stated that he met her on July 28, 2000, at a nearby

7-Eleven store and had a conversation with her. (RT 722.) He told Ms. Boggs he was attempting

to find the apartment of his friend “Josephine.” He then escorted Ms. Boggs to her apartment. 

(RT 723-726.) 

Petitioner stated that she invited him to her apartment on the next evening, July 29, 2000. 

He knocked on the door a couple time but she did not answer. He spoke with Ms. Boggs through

the open window as she was attempting to find the key to open the door. (RT 729.) He

ultimately opened the door and the two talked for approximately two and a half hours until 10

p.m. and he then went home. (RT 731.) He denied taking any property from the apartment or

turning on her light switch while she was asleep in the bed. (RT 732.) 

Petitioner denied ever knocking on the apartment door of Mrs. Arrellano, or ever seeing

or attempting to enter her apartment through a window. (RT 732-733.) 

Petitioner admitted entering the fraternity house of Brett Baize on August 8, 2000, to get

a drink of water. (RT 733.) Petitioner stated that the area was populated with a lot of Asians and

he did not want to ask them for water, so he entered the fraternity house. (RT 733-734.) He

stated the house was unlocked, and because it was so quiet he decided to leave. As he was

attempting to do so, Brett Baize asked him what he was doing there. (RT 735.) Petitioner stated

that he left. He denied entering any bedroom at the house or taking any property from it. (RT

756.) 

Petitioner walked to the Village Apartment complex, where he found a watch, a

calculator, an empty black wallet, and a ring case, just lying on the ground. (RT 737.) He then

bought a beer at the nearby 7-Eleven store and went across the street to the Northpark

Apartments and met a young man and engaged in a conversation with him. (RT 740.) He was

then walking through the apartment complex when he heard someone attempting to talk to him. 

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He walked back and saw two Mexican guys. (RT 741.) 

The men advised him that they wanted to talk to him to the apartment manager regarding

some recent burglaries. Petitioner did not want to talk to the manager and as he attempted to

walk away, one of the men twisted his arm. (RT 743.) The manager arrived and told Petitioner

that a resident had made a complaint about him. Rodriguez and the other man then “body

slammed” Petitioner onto the ground. Petitioner stated that he still had the watch, calculator and

ring box on his person. (RT 744-746.) The men held Petitioner down for approximately 15

minutes until the police arrived. (RT 747.) 

Petitioner denied telling Detective Doff that he had committed any burglaries. (RT 758.) 

Petitioner denied being the individual in the still photos taken from the video surveillance. (RT

760-761.) Petitioner stated that Detective Dodd told him that they found his fingerprints on the

boom box taken from the fraternity house. (RT 762.) Petitioner stated that Dodd then offered to

make him a deal in dismissing half of the burglary charges. (RT 762-763.) 

Petitioner stated that he told Detective Dodd that he was facing three strikes and it would

be senseless to admit to five burglaries if even one burglary would send him to prison for life. 

(RT 763-764.) Petitioner reiterated that he did not commit any of the burglaries. (RT 764.) 

Petitioner did acknowledge that he told Detective Dodd that he had a $100 a day cocaine

problem. (RT 765.) However, he denied that he told him he took the alarm clocks for “beer

money.” (RT 765-766.) 

Petitioner stated that Dodd read him the police report of the burglary of Amy Bogg’s

apartment, and he stated that he was not involved in that burglary. (RT 767.) Petitioner denied

the testimony to the contrary given by Detective Dodd. (RT 769.)

Petitioner stated that he was read several police reports regarding the burglaries and he

denied any involvement in the incidents. (RT 769-771.) 

Petitioner testified that he did not remember a conversation with Helen Sheppard, and he

never saw Claudio Rodriguez before the incident. (RT 777, 779.) Petitioner denied telling Brett

Baize that he was looking for a friend. (RT 778.) Although Petitioner admitted he had a ring at

the time of his arrest, he stated that it could not have fallen out in the police car because he was

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handcuffed, and it had fallen out of his hand at the time of arrest. (RT 779.) Petitioner denied

ever telling Detective Dodd about the ring. (RT 782.) 

Petitioner admitted that he never told Detective Dodd about his sexual relationship with

Christine Evangelista or that he had been invited into Amy Bogg’s apartment. (RT 780-781.) 

Petitioner denied ever making the statement admitting to any single one of the burglaries,

stating it would be a “ludicrous, asinine statement.” (RT 783.)

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Fresno County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

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respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Due Process/Fifth Amendment Violation

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his due process rights by ruling that the

involuntary confession could be introduced for impeachment purposes and subsequently allowing

it to be introduced in the prosecution’s case in violation of the Fifth Amendment. (Petition, at 5.)

This claim was presented on direct review to both the Fifth District Court of Appeal and

the California Supreme Court. Because the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in

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nature, this Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the

California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991)

(establishing, on habeas review, "look through" presumption that higher court agrees with lower

court's reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson,

217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9 Cir.2000) (holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court

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opinion in determining whether state court's rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1)). 

As summarized by the Fifth District Court of Appeal:

At trial, [Petitioner] moved to exclude his confession on Miranda and

involuntariness grounds. (See Evid. Code, § 402.) He contended he did not

affirmatively waive his rights after the Miranda admonition and that the

confession became involuntary when Dodd offered leniency in exchange for the

confession. The court granted the motion in part, finding the portion of the

confession following defendant’s confession to the first two charged burglaries

was involuntary due to the promise of leniency. The court added: “I’m not

making any ruling about should the defendant elect to testify in this case and

testify to something other than what he said in this statement to this officer. The

People may very well be entitled to impeach him with those previous statements,

but that’s a different issue. My ruling only applies to the case in chief.”

Trial proceeded. At the close of the prosecution’s case, after Dodd

testified about the first portion of the confession, defense counsel informed the

court he wished to withdraw his objection to admission of the entire confession

and that he intended to offer the confession into evidence “regardless of whether

[Petitioner] testifies in this case.” The court asked, “So you are waiving any

issues concerning the [c]onstitutionality of that statement, that statement being

obtained by the detective or issues about Miranda or otherwise, right?” Counsel

respondent [sic] he was waiving these issues because “I fully expect that

[Petitioner] would deny having committed those burglaries on the witness stand,

in which case [the prosecutor] would be able to introduce those statements in any

event to impeach his credibility. And so I simply believe it’s to our advantage to

bring it up now.” After Dodd’s testimony and the close of the prosecution case,

defense counsel asked for time to determine with [Petitioner] whether [Petitioner]

would be testifying. Counsel informed the court that “part of that decision

making process was going to be dependent upon how the examination of the

afternoon witnesses went, [and] I think it’s pretty clear at this point [Petitioner] is

going to be testifying tomorrow. I’ll take a couple minutes to talk to him.” The

next day, [Petitioner] testified, denying all of the burglaries and denying that he

confessed to any of the burglaries to Dodd.

(Exhibit 5, to Court Doc. 12, at 2-3.) 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeal held:

This argument is meritless. First, the court expressly declined to rule that

the excluded portions of the confession were or were not admissible for

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impeachment. While the law is clear that involuntary confessions are not

normally admissible as impeachment of a defendant (People v. Neal (2003) 31

Cal.4th 63, 79), the standards of appellate review are equally clear: we do not

presume error (see, e.g., Walling v. Kimball (1941) 17 Cal.2d 364, 373), and we

certainly do not presume that the trial court would have erred if it had eventually

ruled on an issue it had specifically reserved for future determination.

Second, defense counsel sought suppression of the entire confession; the

court excluded only a portion of the confession, allowing the use of [Petitioner’s]

confession to two of the charged crimes. After obtaining this mixed result,

counsel expressly waived any constitutional objection (and unless the method of

interrogation is so extreme as to constitute a due process violation in itself),

admission of the entire confession was not error. (People v. Millum (1954) 42

Cal.2d 524, 528; see People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 406.) 

(Id. at 4.)

It is established under the Fourteenth Amendment that an involuntary confession in a

state criminal case is inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment. See Blackburn v.

Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960); Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9 Cir. 1999). The th

Ninth Circuit has specifically noted, “[T]here is no such thing as an impeachment exception for

compelled, coerced, or involuntary statements.” Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1250 (9 Cir. th

1992); see also Franklin v. Henry, 122 F.3d 1270 (9 Cir. 1997). th

As stated the Court of Appeal, although the trial court excluded all but the confessions to

the first two burglaries of Ms. Evangelista and Mr. Davis, it expressly stated that it was not

making a ruling as to whether the confession could be used for impeachment purposes. The

ruling was restricted to the prosecution’s case in chief . (RT 346.) Notwithstanding the incorrect

inference by the trial court that the confession could potentially be used for impeachment

purposes, it is clear the trial court did not reach this issue because Petitioner waived it as a trial 

stratagem. Defense counsel was unequivocal that he intended to cross-examine Detective Dodd

regarding the confession regardless of whether Petitioner testified. (See RT 654.) Counsel’s

strategy was to argue that Detective Dodd did not follow the proper procedure in conducting the

investigation. (See RT 656.) 

Defense counsel expressed his desire to cross-examine Detective Dodd about the

additional confessions pursuant to Evidence Code section 356, which allows an opposing party to

probe additional portions of a statement introduced, only in part, by the other side. The trial

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court acknowledged that defense counsel could do so under section 356. (RT 656.) Petitioner

subsequently waived any challenge to the confessions for valid tactical reasons in support of his

defense, and given such waiver, the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to re-open

its case in chief and present the statements. The issue then became one of credibility, i.e. Dodd’s

credibility versus Petitioner’s credibility. (See RT 632-664, 669-773.) Based on the finding of

guilt, the jury obviously rejected Petitioner’s testimony regarding the factual circumstances

surrounding the burglaries. 

There is no dispute as to the admissibility of the confessions involving the burglaries of

Ms. Evangelista and Kevin Davis. Those confessions, along with the corroborating evidence,

were sufficient to convict Petitioner on counts one and two. Specifically, Petitioner’s

fingerprints were found inside Ms Evangelista’s apartment (see RT 610-611), and although

Petitioner testified that he was invited into her apartment and the two engaged in consensual

intercourse (see RT 700-705, 708, 714-715), the jury obviously rejected such testimony. 

With regard to the other three burglaries, Petitioner’s fingerprints were found inside Ms.

Bogg’s apartment, at 2345 E. Shaw Avenue, Fresno California. (RT 612.) Mrs. Arrellano

identified Petitioner as the man who tried to enter her apartment at 4909 N. Backer, Fresno

California. (RT 446-447.) Brett Baize identified Petitioner in court as the man who was trying

to turn his bedroom doorknob inside the fraternity house and identified as his, the ring found on

Petitioner at the time of his arrest. (RT 514, 519-520.) Accordingly, in light of the independent

evidence, there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Petitioner was guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of all five burglaries, without the involuntary confessions. It therefore cannot

be said that it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. 

See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 637.

D. Due Process Violation - Trial Court’s Ruling

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were denied when the trial court reserved

ruling on the admissibility of his confession pending his “exercise of his right to testify.” 

Specifically, Petitioner contends “once the trial court ruled that the confession was involuntary it

was inadmissible” and the “legal effect of the ruling was to preclude” its use in the prosecution’s

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case in chief “to impeach petitioner or in rebuttal.” (Petition, at 5.)

This claim is essentially a re-characterization of Petitioner’s prior claim, and fails for the

same reasons as the prior claim. As Respondent correctly points out, this claim was a part of

Petitioner’s previous argument as presented to the Court of Appeal, and that court’s holding is

equally applicable here. 

In addition, the state court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent when it

accepted defense counsel’s unambiguous decision to waive suppression of the confession. (See

Exhibit 5, to Court Doc. 12, at 3-4.) “[W]aiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of a known right.’” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993), citing

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). “Whether a particular right is waivable; whether

the defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required

for waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all

depend on the right at stake.” Olano, at 733. As previously stated, defense counsel’s statements

are unequivocal and his right to challenge the confession is clear. The challenge to the

constitutionality of the confession was validly and expressly waived in furtherance of the

presentation of his valid defense. The state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

E. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective when he “followed the trial court’s

erroneous advice about the admissibility of an involuntary confession. Defense counsel indicated

that the full confession would be admissible to impeach petitioner once petitioner testified in

which case the prosec[]utor would be able to impeach.” (Petition, at 6.) 

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe,

151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9 Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective th

assistance of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 Cir. 1994). First, th

the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that

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counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s

alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment

considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348

(9 Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. A court indulges

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a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v.

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9 Cir.1994). th

Second, the petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive

defendant of a fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must

also evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356,

1461 (9 Cir. 1994). More precisely, petitioner must show that (1) his attorney’s performance

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was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and, unless prejudice is presumed, that

(2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would

have been different. 

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since it is necessary to prove

prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. 

Tactical decisions of trial counsel are entitled to deference when counsel makes an

informed decision based on strategic trial considerations and the decision appears reasonable

under the circumstances. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d at 1456. 

 As with Petitioner’s prior claims, this claim was presented on direct review to both the

Fifth District Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. Because the California

Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, this Court "looks through" that decision and

presumes it adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have

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issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct.

2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look through" presumption that

higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion);

see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9 Cir.2000) (holding federal courts look th

to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court's rejection of petitioner's

claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1)). 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held:

The record is somewhat inconsistent in its reflection of defense counsel’s

thought processes. Counsel stated at one point that he wanted the entire

confession admitted “regardless of whether [Petitioner] testifies in this case.” 

This statement recognizes counsel’s victory in the suppression hearing was also a

partial loss: under the court’s ruling the jury would hear express confessions to

two counts. Counsel’s decision to expose the jury to the whole confession, as a

basis for arguing (as counsel did) that Dodd was willing to take investigatory

shortcuts (including making up confessions) to clear his caseload, was a plausible

trial tactic, given the otherwise-admissible evidence against his client. That this

trial strategy was an independent basis for permitting admission of the whole

confession is reflected not only by counsel’s initial statement, but also by the fact

that even after Dodd testified the question of [Petitioner’s] testimony had not been

finally settled between counsel and [Petitioner].

Even if we were to reject such a reading of the record, however, and

assume that counsel acted entirely on the basis of his misconception concerning

admissibility of the confession for impeachment purposes, such error by counsel

requires reversal only if a result more favorable to the defendant was reasonably

probable if counsel had not erred. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,

694.)

In the present case, the choices facing counsel were particularly stark.

[Petitioner] was confronted with eyewitness identification testimony, evidence his

fingerprints were inside the burgled premises, and evidence he possessed stolen

property at the time of his arrest. Counsel could have accepted the trial court’s

ruling, in which case, added to all of the foregoing evidence, the jury would hear

about [Petitioner’s] confession without any basis for counsel to show Dodd’s

motive for falsifying the confession. Or, using the entire confession, counsel

could establish a plausible motive - - clearing up a whole series of troubling

burglaries - - for such falsification of evidence by Dodd. When we examine

counsel’s first alternative, it becomes obvious that any erroneous basis for

choosing the second alternative did not result in prejudice to [Petitioner].

(Exhibit 5, to Court Doc. 12, at 4-5.)

Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, defense counsel did not heed to the trial court’s

incorrect advisement that the involuntary confession could potentially be used for impeachment

purposes, despite the reasonable inference that defense counsel may have incorrectly believed so

himself. Rather, it appears from the record that defense counsel had a valid tactical reason for

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subsequently waiving the challenge to the involuntary confession as part of the defense strategy

to undermine the credibility of Detective Dodd by attempting to establish the improbability of

Petitioner confessing to eleven burglaries, when in fact, he was aware that a confession to even

one would subject him to a life sentence as a three strike inmate. Thus, Petitioner has not, and

cannot, demonstrate that defense counsel was ineffective or that he was prejudiced thereby. 

Moreover, even if counsel was proceeding solely on his misconception regarding the

admissibility of the confession for impeachment purposes, for the same reasons stated by the

Court of Appeal, Petitioner has not and cannot demonstrate any resulting prejudice. 

Accordingly, the state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent as set forth in Strickland. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 28, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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