Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03086/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03086-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barry William Gewin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 12, 2006 Decided December 22, 2006 

No. 05-3086 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

V. 

BARRY WILLIAM GEWIN, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 03cr00366-01) 

Bruce C. Bishop argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs was Mark J. Hulkower. 

Demetra Lambros, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause and filed the brief for appellee. Ellen R. 

Meltzer, Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Before: TATEL and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

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WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: A federal grand jury 

indicted Barry Gewin and several co-defendants on one count 

of conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud, one 

substantive count of securities fraud, and six counts of wire 

fraud, all in connection with the alleged manipulation and 

fraudulent trading of stock in a company called “2DoTrade.” 

Gewin and two colleagues were tried jointly before a jury; 

three others pled guilty, two of them testifying against Gewin 

at trial. Two co-defendants, living overseas, were not 

apprehended. 

The government describes the case as involving a “pump 

and dump” scheme. It argued at trial that Gewin and his coconspirators orchestrated a “reverse merger” of a public shell 

company and 2DoTrade, a private Nevada corporation which 

had no employees or operations and $26 in assets. The group 

allegedly secured hidden control of most of the merged 

entity’s publicly tradable stock, pumped up the share price 

through a campaign of strategically-timed, fraudulent press 

releases, and sold its holdings into the artificially inflated 

market. 

The jury convicted Gewin of conspiracy to commit 

securities fraud, the substantive securities fraud count, and 

two of the six wire fraud counts. The trial court sentenced 

him to 108 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised 

release, ordered him to pay $1,975,786 in restitution jointly 

and severally with his co-conspirators, and imposed a 

$500,000 fine. 

On appeal, Gewin argues that the district court erred in 

allowing him to represent himself at trial without finding that 

he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, in 

admitting into evidence statements of Gewin’s co-conspirators 

over hearsay objections, and in imposing the $500,000 fine. 

We affirm. 

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* * * 

Some two months before trial, Gewin discharged his 

retained counsel and declared his intention to conduct plea 

negotiations on his own behalf. The court urged Gewin to 

hire a lawyer, arranged for him to meet with the Federal 

Public Defender, and held a hearing on whether Gewin 

intended to waive his right to counsel. In the end Gewin 

represented himself at trial, for the most part rejecting even 

the assistance of stand-by counsel appointed by the court. His 

theory that the trial court inadequately vetted his waiver rests 

mainly on his contention that the waiver colloquies related 

solely to plea negotiations, not trial itself. 

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to 

represent himself at trial if he knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waives his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). So that the 

“record will establish that [the defendant] knows what he is 

doing and his choice is made with eyes open,” he must be 

made aware of the “dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). That 

a waiver must be “intelligent” doesn’t mean it must be wise or 

even reasonable; it is “undeniable that in most criminal 

prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s 

guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.” Id. at 834; see 

also United States v. Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385, 1391 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998). A defendant’s technical legal knowledge is, 

therefore, “not relevant to an assessment of his knowing 

exercise of the right to defend himself.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 

836. 

To satisfy Faretta, a trial court must engage the defendant 

in a “short discussion on the record” about the dangers and 

disadvantages of self-representation. United States v. Brown, 

823 F.2d 591, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1987). We have characterized as 

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“model” one such colloquy in which the court cautioned the 

defendants about the seriousness of the charges against them 

and warned that the judge could not assist in their defense, 

that the trial would be conducted under the Federal Rules of 

Evidence and Criminal Procedure, and that proceeding 

without the assistance of a trained lawyer would constitute a 

“distinct handicap.” Id. The court asked the defendants 

“many times” whether they understood the court’s remarks or 

had any questions. Id.

We review de novo whether the record demonstrates a 

knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. 

Cunningham, 145 F.3d at 1392. A district court’s 

determination about whether a defendant understood warnings 

against self-representation, however, is a “pure question of 

fact” that we disturb only if clearly erroneous. Id.

At its Faretta hearing, the trial court here engaged in a 

wide-ranging colloquy with Gewin, covering topics germane 

to both plea negotiations and trial: the elements of offenses 

charged; Gewin’s potential sentencing exposure; jury 

selection; possible trial defenses and motions; the right to 

confront and cross-examine witnesses, remain silent, testify, 

subpoena witnesses, and appeal; and the consequences of 

taking or not taking the stand. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 82-

87/16-29. The court warned Gewin that it could not advise 

him how to try his case or conduct plea negotiations; that the 

trial would be conducted according to the Federal Rules of 

Evidence and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; that 

Gewin could face special risks proceeding pro se at a trial in 

which his co-defendants had legal representation; and that 

Gewin would face complications raising objections, crossexamining witnesses, and conducting direct examination 

without a lawyer. J.A. 86/26-27, 88-89/35-37. Gewin 

repeatedly indicated he didn’t want a lawyer and that he 

understood the risks involved. J.A. 82-89/16-37. 

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In context, the statements Gewin cites to show that the 

hearing was limited to plea negotiations merely reflected the 

court’s attention to logistical questions that might arise if 

Gewin’s case proceeded to trial. The court’s statements that 

“we will have a further discussion” if plea negotiations failed 

and could “make an independent decision” at that time, for 

instance, were made in the course of an extensive discussion 

about the merits of securing stand-by counsel early, so that, if 

the plea negotiations were to fail, counsel could be available 

at trial (both to advise Gewin and be ready to become active 

counsel if Gewin gave up self-representation). J.A. 84/18, 89-

90/40-43; see also Order, Apr. 29, 2004, J.A. 121-22 (citing 

United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-25 (D.C. 

Cir. 1972) (suggesting “utility” of making amicus counsel 

available to pro se defendants)). 

The broad range of trial-related concerns discussed at the 

Faretta hearing—and the court’s repeated efforts to confirm 

there that Gewin understood the discussion and intended to 

proceed without a lawyer—amply support the conclusion that 

Gewin knowingly and intelligently waived the right to 

counsel. Gewin’s contention that he subjectively understood 

the waiver to be limited to plea negotiations is also undercut 

by his colloquies with the court on the eve of trial, explicitly 

addressing the implications for trial of the choice between 

self-representation (with or without stand-by counsel) and 

representation by counsel. See, e.g., J.A. 206/53-55 (May 5 

status conference). 

Gewin also asserts that his trial-day request for additional 

time to seek counsel demonstrates that he didn’t intend to 

waive his Sixth Amendment right. Appellant’s Br. at 14-15, 

29-30. But in the lead-up to trial Gewin explicitly and 

repeatedly stated that he wanted to proceed without a lawyer. 

Just five days before trial, for instance, Gewin stated flatly, “I 

am going to not have counsel.” J.A. 210/71; see also J.A. 

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199-200/6-11, 206/55. The district court quite justifiably 

characterized Gewin’s trial-day request as “dilatory.” J.A. 

303/19.

Viewing the record as a whole, we find the trial court’s 

conclusion fully entitled to deference, and hold that Gewin’s 

statement does not preclude a finding that he knowingly and 

intelligently waived the right to counsel. (We note that Gewin 

concedes that the district court acted within its discretion in 

denying his request for a continuance, Appellant’s Br. at 15, 

30, and does not claim that his trial-day request constituted a 

revocation of an earlier waiver.)

Gewin finally points to his pro se, pre-trial submissions to 

the court as proof of the pudding—evidencing such a 

misunderstanding of the legal system as to foreclose a finding 

of intelligent waiver. But the Supreme Court has explicitly 

rejected the argument that competence to waive the right to 

counsel is predicated on competence to represent oneself at 

trial. A defendant’s ability to represent himself “has no 

bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation”; 

technical legal knowledge is simply “not relevant” to the 

Faretta inquiry. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-400 

(1993); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836. And, as we have said, the 

record more than supports the conclusion that Gewin in fact 

understood the “dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation” when he waived his right to counsel. 

* * * 

The district court admitted, over hearsay objections and 

“subject to connection,” testimony by Gewin’s co-defendants 

about the conduct and statements of the scheme’s participants. 

At the close of the government’s case, the district court ruled 

that a preponderance of the evidence supported a finding that 

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the group had engaged in a common enterprise of stock 

promotion, Mem. Op. (June 2, 2004) at 14, J.A. at 771, 784, 

which in fact defendant didn’t dispute, id. at 11, J.A. 781. 

The court rejected Gewin’s claim, renewed here, that Rule 

801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires, before 

admission of co-conspirators’ out-of-court statements, a 

showing of an unlawful conspiracy, not merely action in 

concert toward a common goal. Id. at 1-10, J.A. at 771-80. 

A district court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence is a question of law, which we review de novo. See, 

e.g., United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 432-35 (D.C. Cir. 

1983); accord Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 555 (2d 

Cir. 1996). 

Rule 801(d)(2)(E) authorizes the admission of an out-ofcourt statement “by a coconspirator of a party during the 

course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Where a 

defendant objects to such an admission, however, the district 

court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that a 

conspiracy existed and that the defendant and declarant were 

members of that conspiracy. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 

U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987). Although Bourjaily allowed courts 

to consider the content of the out-of-court statements in 

making this determination, id. at 181, and left open whether 

such statements alone could support the necessary finding, id., 

our circuit has held that the finding must rest on some 

independent evidence of the conspiracy. United States v. 

Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1520-21 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A court can 

preliminarily admit hearsay statements of co-conspirators, 

subject to connection through proof of conspiracy. See United 

States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 

(approving procedure). 

Although Rule 801(d)(2)(E) refers to “conspiracy” and 

“coconspirators”—potentially giving Gewin’s argument some 

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force on first impression—our precedents hold that the 

doctrine is not limited to unlawful combinations. Weisz, 718 

F.2d at 433. Rather, the rule, based on concepts of agency 

and partnership law and applicable in both civil and criminal 

trials, “embodies the long-standing doctrine that when two or 

more individuals are acting in concert toward a common goal, 

the out-of-court statements of one are . . . admissible against 

the others, if made in furtherance of the common goal.” Id. 

In support we quoted the 1974 Senate Advisory Committee 

note to Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which said that the rule was “meant 

to carry forward the universally accepted doctrine that a joint 

venturer is considered as a coconspirator for the purpose of 

this [R]ule even though no conspiracy has been charged.” Id.

(alteration and emphasis added in Weisz); see also United 

States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562 (1988) (invoking 

Advisory Committee note in interpreting Federal Rules of 

Evidence). 

United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992), 

is not to the contrary. There, we affirmed a conviction on the 

ground that hearsay evidence had been properly admitted 

under the adoptive admissions exception, Fed. R. Evid. 

801(d)(2)(B). 968 F.2d at 51. We discussed (and rejected) 

the co-conspirator exception, and noted in passing that the 

evidence did not show a “common unlawful objective.” Id. 

More pertinently we said that there was, in fact, “scant basis 

for inferring . . . a criminal enterprise or . . . any sort of prior 

agreement.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus Beckham’s holding 

was simply that the co-conspirator exception does not apply 

where the evidence fails to show any common undertaking at 

all, and its language asserted no requirement that the prior 

agreement be unlawful. 

Gewin asserts, in turn, that because the joint venture in 

Weisz—bribing a United States Congressman—was inherently 

illegal, Weisz could not have held that statements of legal joint 

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venturers are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), and its 

discussions of the record were only to show that illegality had 

been shown by independent evidence. But Weisz’s discussion 

of the record evidence was made in the alternative to its 

central holding that such a showing was not required. 718 

F.2d at 434.

Gewin also asserts that Weisz should be read not for the 

rule that statements of legal joint venturers are admissible 

under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), but rather for a narrower proposition 

relating to the evidence a court can consider in ruling on 

admissibility. In the pre-Bourjaily world of the Weisz

decision, out-of-court declarations were admissible only if a 

court found conspiracy entirely on the basis of independent 

evidence; hearsay could not, it was said, “bootstrap” itself into 

evidence. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75 

(1942). In Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 

229 (1917)—a pre-Bourjaily suit by an employer for an 

injunction against the attempted unionization of his coal 

mine—the Supreme Court held that, at common law, although 

independent evidence was required to show the existence of a 

combination before out-of-court statements of co-conspirators 

were admissible, “[t]he element of illegality may be shown by 

the [out-of-court] declarations themselves.” Id. at 249. 

Gewin argues that Weisz (decided after the enactment of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence) should be read for the analogous 

proposition that in deciding admissibility under Rule 

801(d)(2)(E), a court must find independent evidence of a 

joint venture, but can consider the out-of-court statements in 

showing that venture’s illegality. Appellant’s Br. at 35-36. 

But this argument cannot survive Weisz’s clear 

statements, cited above, that Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is based on 

principles of agency and partnership law, that the use of the 

term “conspiracy” does not limit the doctrine to unlawful 

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combinations, and that the doctrine applies equally in civil 

and criminal cases. 

In short, we follow our decision in Weisz and hold that 

the district court properly admitted out-of-court statements 

upon finding a lawful joint enterprise. Given our holding, 

Gewin plainly cannot succeed in arguing that the district 

court’s 801(d)(2)(E) ruling constituted a tacit concession that 

the government had not shown an unlawful purpose by a 

preponderance. The district court simply and properly applied 

the law. 

* * * 

Finally, Gewin claims that the district court erred in 

finding that he was or would become able to pay a $500,000 

fine. 

The now non-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines advise a 

district court to impose a fine “except where the defendant 

establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become 

able to pay any fine.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 5E1.2(a) (2004). While the Guidelines indicate that a court 

should consider the defendant’s ability to pay in determining 

the amount of the fine, id. § 5E1.2(d), the sentencing judge is 

not required to make explicit findings of fact. United States v. 

Mastropierro, 931 F.2d 905, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1991). We 

typically review a district court’s implicit findings for clear 

error, id. at 907, but the government asserts that the plain error 

standard applies here because Gewin did not preserve the 

matter for appeal. Because the record provides several 

reasons to believe that Gewin was at least “likely to become” 

able to pay, we find no error—much less clear or plain error. 

Thus we affirm the fine without resolving the parties’ dispute 

over the standard of review. 

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Gewin rests on United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331 

(D.C. Cir. 1994), rev’d in part on other grounds, 59 F.3d 1323 

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), in which we overturned as clearly 

erroneous the imposition of a $1,000,000 fine. There, 

recognizing that defendant’s net worth was only about 

$96,000, the district court noted vaguely that the defendant 

might have additional money in Panama. Id. at 358. But the 

record appears to have suggested that such resources were at 

best a dim possibility. We observed that “[n]othing in the . . . 

record . . . even remotely suggests that [the defendant] could 

ever pay a $1,000,000 fine.” Id. The defendant had a net 

worth of less than ten percent of the fine imposed, would be 

“rather old” to work off the fine after serving his 53-year, 9-

month sentence, and, as an illegal alien, would be subject to 

deportation on his release. Id. 

Further, as the “not likely to become able to pay” formula 

in § 5E1.2(a) indicates, the existence of some uncertainty 

about future ability to pay doesn’t preclude imposition of a 

fine. In Mastropierro, 931 F.2d at 907-08, for instance, we 

affirmed a $5,000 fine despite evidence that defendants had 

no “substantial assets”; they could in the future become 

employed and pay their fines over time. Moreover, in United 

States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1127, 1140-41 & n.14 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998), we affirmed a finding that the defendant had the 

ability to pay $254,000 in restitution despite his “limited” 

assets and life sentence, based on an admittedly “speculative” 

prospect of future earnings from writing books or articles 

about his crimes. 

Gewin points to statements from his sentencing hearing 

he believes evidence a record as inadequate as that in 

Anderson. But Gewin’s situation is quite different. Before 

imposing the $500,000 fine, the district court noted that 

Gewin claimed $651,541 in various accounts and stock worth 

some $1.5 million. The court did acknowledge a dispute 

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between Gewin and a co-defendant over the stock, and, in part 

because of this uncertainty, ultimately rejected the 

government’s request for a larger fine. But the court also 

reasoned Gewin might not have to pay the entire $1,975,786 

in restitution, given that some injured investors wouldn’t ever 

seek compensation, and that Gewin’s co-defendants were 

jointly and severally liable for whatever amount was claimed. 

Moreover, the record suggests that Gewin was less than 

forthright with the court about the state of his finances. The 

district court commented that Gewin had “stonewalled” the 

court from obtaining updated and accurate financial 

information. J.A. 1080-87. As we said in Anderson, “it 

makes good sense to burden a defendant who has apparently 

concealed assets” to prove that “he has no such assets and thus 

cannot pay the fine.” 39 F.3d at 358. But Gewin claimed a 

net worth of more than $2 million, will be in his mid-40s 

when released, and is a college graduate and a licensed pilot. 

Thus, the record as a whole amply supports the view that 

Gewin was able or likely to become able to pay the fine 

imposed. 

* * * 

Because we find no merit in Gewin’s claims, his 

conviction and sentence are hereby 

Affirmed. 

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