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Parties Involved:
Michael Jefferson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 19, 1998 Decided March 10, 1998

No. 96-3159

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CALVIN SUMLER,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with 

Nos. 96-3160, 96-3161

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(95cr00154-02) 

(95cr00154-04) 

(95cr00154-08)

Edward C. Sussman, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed the briefs for appellant Calvin Sumler.

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Roberto Iraola, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

for appellant Michael Jefferson, with whom Benjamin B. 

Klubes, appointed by the court, was on the briefs.

William J. Garber, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed the briefs for appellant Gerald Smith.

Stuart G. Nash, Assistant United States Attorney, argued 

the cause for appellee, with whom Mary Lou Leary, United 

States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John R. 

Fisher, Michael L. Volkov, and James H. Dinan, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and HENDERSON, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: Appellants were convicted of 

first degree murder while armed, D.C. CODE §§ 22-2401, 3202 

(1981), and killing in furtherance of a continuing criminal 

enterprise (CCE), 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) (1994). They 

contend that the imposition of cumulative sentences for these 

two offenses is improper because the federal murder convictions merge with the D.C. Code convictions. We affirm.

I.

Appellants belong to the so-called Fern Street Crew, an 

organization which distributed crack cocaine for seven years 

in the District of Columbia and Maryland. The Crew's 

activities were facilitated by its use of violence to defend 

territory from rival drug dealers and subvert the efforts of 

the criminal justice system. Following a four month trial, 

appellants were convicted of numerous offenses, including 

murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, and drug and RICO 

conspiracies; each was given multiple life sentences and other 

assorted prison terms. Appellants bring numerous challenges to their convictions, only one of which merits discussion.1 They contend it was an error of law for the district 

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1 We have fully considered all other arguments advanced by 

appellants and are satisfied that the district court's judgments 

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court to sentence them to two life terms for the same killing, 

one sentence for violation of the federal CCE murder statute 

and the other for violation of the District's first degree 

murder statute.2 They argue that in the absence of clear 

legislative intent, defendants may not receive multiple punishments for the same act under federal and D.C. statutory 

schemes. Such sentences, they claim, run afoul of the Fifth 

Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy.

II.

While literally proscribing successive prosecutions for the 

same offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause also has been 

interpreted to bar the imposition of multiple punishments for 

the same offense. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 

(1981). Because certain offenses, while nominally distinct, 

might be considered the same, our inquiry is directed to 

legislative intent. The Double Jeopardy Clause is only impli-

__________

should stand with the following exceptions. The government concedes that appellant Smith, under District law, cannot stand convicted of both first degree murder (premeditated) while armed and 

first degree murder (felony murder) while armed with respect to 

the same killing. See Byrd v. United States, 500 A.2d 1376, 1384 

(D.C. 1985), adopted en banc 510 A.2d 1035, 1037 (D.C. 1986). We 

therefore vacate Smith's conviction for the felony murder of Ucal 

Riley. The government also concedes that Jefferson and Smith 

cannot stand convicted of both felony murder and the underlying 

felony. See Leasure v. United States, 458 A.2d 726, 730-31 (D.C. 

1983). We therefore vacate the convictions of Jefferson and Smith 

for the attempted robbery of Marcus Murray.

2 Appellant Sumler was convicted of one count of premeditated 

first degree murder while armed and one count of CCE murder for 

the killing of Anthony Hinton. Appellants Jefferson and Smith 

were convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder while 

armed and two counts of CCE murder for the killings of Marcus 

Murray and Victor Hartnett. Appellant Smith was also convicted 

of one count of premeditated first degree murder and one count of 

CCE murder for the killing of Ucal Riley (Smith's additional 

conviction for felony murder regarding the Riley killing was vacated 

earlier in the opinion. See supra note 1.)

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cated if the legislature intended for two "separate" crimes to 

be treated as the same offense. United States v. Hoyle, 122 

F.3d 48, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 

359, 366 (1983). To determine Congress' intent, we apply the 

test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 

(1932). If, in comparing the elements of the two crimes, 

"each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the 

other does not," id. at 304, then the offenses are not the 

same. If, however, one offense contains all of the elements of 

the other offense, then the offenses are presumed to be the 

same and multiple punishments may not be imposed unless 

the legislature clearly indicated otherwise. United States v. 

Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1494 (9th Cir. 1995).

In this case, appellants concede that the CCE murder 

offense and the District's first degree murder offense each 

requires an element not included in the other.3 They claim, 

however, that the Blockburger test in this instance should 

begin but not end the analysis. They point to a line of our 

cases from the 1970s which suggests that even though a 

District offense and a federal offense may, under Blockburger, "require different elements of proof, there must still be a 

determination that Congress intended the provisions to bear 

separate punishments when applied to a single act or transaction." United States v. Canty, 469 F.2d 114, 127 (D.C. Cir. 

1972). Appellants then assert that Congress did not intend 

multiple punishments to be imposed for the same killing 

under the District's first degree murder statute and the 

federal CCE murder statute.

To be sure, support exists in prior case law, at least in 

dicta, for appellants' contention. They rely on two notions to 

__________

3 To prove a CCE murder violation, the government must 

establish the existence of a continuing criminal enterprise, an 

element not required by either the premeditated murder or felony 

murder variation of the District's statute. Conversely, the District's felony murder statute requires that the killing occur during 

the perpetration of a specified felony, an element not included in the 

CCE murder offense. And the District's premeditated murder 

statute requires proof of premeditation, an element not necessary to 

establishing a CCE murder violation.

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support their argument that we must go beyond Blockburger

in assessing whether multiple punishments may be imposed 

in cases where a defendant commits a federal crime and a 

District crime in the same transaction. Appellants first point 

to the general proposition that "in the absence of plain 

legislative intention 'doubt will be resolved against turning a 

single transaction into multiple offenses.' " United States v. 

Knight, 509 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Bell v. United 

States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955)). Bell, however, dealt with the 

appropriate unit of prosecution under a single statutory provision. The question there was whether the transportation of 

more than one woman across state lines for the purposes of 

prostitution in a single transaction would be considered one 

violation or multiple violations of the Mann Act. The Supreme Court, however, quickly clarified that Bell's rule of 

lenity did not apply to violations of "separate offenses created 

by Congress at ... different times." Gore v. United States,

357 U.S. 386, 391 (1958). And while there has been division 

within the Supreme Court recently over whether a "sameconduct" inquiry should be added to the Blockburger test in 

cases involving successive prosecutions, see Grady v. Corbin,

495 U.S. 508 (1990), rev'd by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 

688 (1993), the Court has held consistently that satisfying 

Blockburger is sufficient for cases involving multiple punishments. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 (Scalia, J., opinion of the 

court); Dixon, 509 U.S. at 745-46 (Souter, J., concurring in 

the judgment and dissenting in part).

We have also expressed concern about a more specific 

issue: the fairness of multiple punishments in the context of 

D.C. CODE § 11-502(3)(1981), which authorizes the United 

States Attorney to combine in one indictment, triable in the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 

criminal violations of both federal and District law. This 

provision places District defendants in the unique position of 

being tried under two statutory schemes at the same time; 

although the United States Constitution does not bar a 

defendant in any one of the 50 states from being charged and 

punished under federal law and state law for the same 

conduct, see, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), 

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such prosecutions must be separate.4 Given that successive 

federal and state prosecutions are relatively rare, § 11-502's 

joinder provision means that District residents, as a practical 

matter, are much more likely to be prosecuted under separate 

statutory schemes for the same conduct, and hence, receive 

more severe punishments. Though we once suggested that 

such a disparity implicates "constitutional considerations," see 

United States v. Knight, 509 F.2d at 361, we later rejected 

the argument that this result violated the Equal Protection 

Clause. See United States v. Jones, 527 F.2d 817, 822 (D.C. 

Cir. 1975).

Because District residents live under only one sovereign 

while most Americans live under two, current double jeopardy jurisprudence guarantees that some inconsistency will 

exist between the treatment of defendants in the District and 

their counterparts in the 50 states. While District defendants 

suffer to the extent that they are far more likely to be 

charged, convicted, and punished under two different statutory schemes, they also benefit in important respects. A 

person acquitted of a crime under District law may not be 

charged with that same crime under federal law in a successive prosecution (or vice versa); the same sovereign may not 

take a second bite at the apple. See, e.g., United States v. 

Shepard, 515 F.2d 1324, 1331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1975). A defendant across the border in Virginia, however, who has been 

acquitted in a state proceeding, may be prosecuted again for 

the same conduct under an identical federal statute. Moreover, District defendants cannot be given cumulative sentences for a federal offense and a District offense that fail the 

Blockburger test, but the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 

Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the imposition of multiple 

__________

4 A defendant may be tried and punished under state law then 

federal law in any of the 50 states. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 132. 

But the Double Jeopardy Clauses of certain state constitutions have 

been interpreted, under many circumstances, to prohibit state 

prosecution of a criminal act that has already been the subject of a 

federal prosecution. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mills, 286 A.2d 

638 (Pa. 1971).

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punishments when a federal offense and a state offense fail 

Blockburger.

To take appellants' approach would exacerbate an aspect of 

inequality that already works in favor of District defendants. 

Under the rule they urge, District defendants could not be 

given cumulative sentences for a federal offense and a District offense committed in a single transaction absent some 

clear indication of congressional intent, even if these distinct 

offenses satisfy Blockburger. But since a federal offense and 

a state offense do not even have to pass the Blockburger test 

in order for multiple sentences to be imposed, the addition of 

a more searching examination of legislative intent in the case 

of District defendants would only heighten the degree of the 

disparate treatment.

We do not believe that such an outcome is mandated by 

precedent. Appellants rely on cases that do not speak precisely to the issue at hand. In United States v. Spears, 449 

F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1971), we interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 2114 

(1964) to proscribe assaults which are part of "an unsuccessful attempt to rob a mail carrier." Id. at 953 (emphasis 

added). We therefore held that one could not be convicted of 

both a completed robbery under the D.C. Code and an assault 

under 18 U.S.C. § 2114. Spears turns not on the question of 

when to apply Blockburger, but our inquiry into the meaning 

of the mail robbery statute.

In United States v. Canty, 469 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 

we held that a defendant could not be sentenced for both 

federal bank robbery by force or violence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2113(a) (1970) and assault with a dangerous weapon under 

D.C. CODE § 22-502 (1967). While the two offenses do satisfy 

Blockburger by requiring different elements of proof, we 

nevertheless noted that the federal bank robbery statute 

established "a comprehensive scheme for prosecuting and 

punishing persons who rob federally-insured banks" and 

"subdivide[d] the offense into a series of stepsa continuum 

running from entry with intent to rob ... to robbery resulting in death or kidnapping." Id. at 127. As Congress had 

only provided in the federal bank robbery statute for a 

maximum punishment of 25 years for thefts involving assaults 

with a dangerous weapon, we thought it impermissible for a 

defendant to receive a maximum sentence of 30 years by 

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dividing the offense up into bank robbery by force or violence 

under the federal statute (20 years) and assault with a 

dangerous weapon under the D.C. Code (10 years). By 

neglecting to prosecute entirely within the federal bank robbery scheme, the government sought to evade Congress' 

"carefully crafted hierarchy of penalties." Id. at 128.

Applying the principle of Canty in United States v. Knight,

we considered the hierarchy of penalties imposed by the mail 

robbery statute. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1970), an offender 

could receive a maximum of 10 years for mail robbery or 

assault of a mail custodian with intent to rob and 25 years for 

putting a mail custodian's life in jeopardy during such a 

robbery by the use of a dangerous weapon. In Knight,

appellants had been convicted of mail robbery and robbery 

while armed under D.C. CODE § 22-2901 (1967). Examining 

the mail robbery statute, we concluded that Congress had 

"deliberately addressed itself to the distinction between simple mail robbery and the case where a dangerous weapon is 

involved, and ... provided an increase of punishment only if 

the use of the dangerous weapon puts the life of the mail 

custodian in jeopardy." Knight, 509 F.2d at 362 (emphasis 

added). This hierarchy of penalties, however, would have 

been undermined had the District's armed robbery statute 

been used to enhance penalties in cases where the jury failed 

to find that the weapon had put the mail custodian's life in 

jeopardy. The cumulative sentences at issue in Knight,

therefore, could not stand.

While delineating coherent principles from this line of cases 

may not be easy, we think it is clear that appellants' sentences are not implicated. We have concluded that a defendant may not be sentenced under both federal and District 

statutory schemes only in cases "where the federal offense 

and local offense are identical or one would be a lesser 

included offense of the other." Jones, 527 F.2d at 821. This 

is not the case here. Moreover, the federal CCE murder 

statute is not a comprehensive scheme with a step-by-step 

hierarchy of increasing penalties as in Canty and Knight.

Those who added the murder provision to the CCE statute 

obviously must have had full knowledge that first degree 

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murder was already illegal in every state of the Union and 

the District of Columbia, and there is no evidence that 

Congress intended for the punishment under the CCE murder statute to be exclusive. If a defendant in Virginia may be 

prosecuted and punished under both the CCE murder statute 

and the Old Dominion's first degree murder statute, we see 

little problem with allowing a similar outcome in the District.

* * * *

With the exception of the sentencing mergers conceded by 

the government, appellants' convictions are hereby affirmed.

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