Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_16-cr-00855/USCOURTS-azd-4_16-cr-00855-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alfredo Enos Landeros
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Alfredo Enos Landeros, 

Defendant. 

No. CR-16-0855-TUC-RCC (BGM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Currently pending before the Court are Defendant’s Amended Motion to Suppress 

(Doc. 17) and Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19). The Government has filed its responses. 

Govt.’s Response to Def.’s Mot. to Suppress (Doc. 26); Govt.’s Response to Def.’s Mot. 

to Dismiss (Doc. 27). Defendant replied (Docs. 28 & 29). As such the motions are full 

briefed and ripe for review. 

 Defendant is charged with one (1) count of being a felon in possession in violation 

of Title 8, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Indictment (Doc. 1) at 

1–2. Defendant seeks suppression of the bullets found on his person as a result of an 

allegedly unlawful seizure. See Def.’s Mot. to Suppress (Doc. 17). Defendant further 

seeks dismissal of the indictment based on officers allegedly ignoring his cries of pain, 

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which Defendant urges was outrageous conduct amounting to “torture.” See Def.’s Mot. 

to Dismiss (Doc. 19).

 Pursuant to LRCrim. 5.1, this matter came before Magistrate Judge Macdonald for 

an evidentiary hearing and a report and recommendation. On December 12, 2016, an 

evidentiary hearing was held before Magistrate Judge Macdonald regarding the two 

motions. Minute Entry 12/12/2016 (Doc. 32). The Magistrate Judge recommends that 

the District Court, after its independent review, deny Defendant’s motions. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 On February 9, 2016, at approximately 12:16 a.m., Pascua Yaqui Police 

Department (PYPD) Officer Clinton Baker conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle that was 

traveling westbound on Valencia Road adjacent to Casino Del Sol. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 

(Doc. 38) at 5:10–7:3. Officer Baker has been a PYPD officer for nine (9) years. Id. at 

5:12–14, 27:8–10. Officer Baker observed that the vehicle appeared to be traveling in 

excess of the posted speed limit of 25 miles per hour, and confirmed with his radar gun 

that the vehicle was traveling 36 miles per hour. Id. at 5:10–7:3, 30:1–7. Officer Baker 

initiated the traffic stop, and the vehicle pulled into the Casino del Sol parking lot. Id. at 

7:15–25. When Officer Baker approached the vehicle, he observed four occupants. Id. at 

8:3–9. Officer Baker advised the driver, Fernando Padilla, that the reason for the stop 

was because Padilla was speeding. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 9:9–17. Padilla 

apologized for speeding. Id. at 9:9–17. Officer Baker testified that he could smell 

alcohol in the car and observed two female passengers in the back seat, whom he 

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believed were under the age of twenty-one (21).1 Id. at 9:9–17, 47:8–25 Officer Baker 

further testified that there was a male passenger in the front seat, and identified him as the 

Defendant. Id. at 10:2–5, 12:8–21. 

 Officer Baker testified that the smell of alcohol suggested underage drinking, and 

he proceeded to ask for identification of all the passengers. Id. at 10:12–19, 47:8–25. 

Officer Baker also testified that it is standard procedure to identify every person in the 

vehicle during a traffic stop, because individuals in the vehicle may have an outstanding 

warrant, there could be an alert such as mental health or missing persons, or other alerts 

that may impact officer safety. Id. at 48:7–25. Officer Baker further testified that the 

female passengers in the back seat gave him their identification, which indicated that they 

were twenty-one (21) and nineteen (19) years of age. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 

10:12–19. Officer Baker testified that the Defendant refused to provide identification, 

and became very argumentative, interrupting and yelling while Officer Baker attempted 

to speak with the driver and other passengers. Id. at 10:12–11:2, 35:5–23. Officer Baker 

further testified that Defendant continued to refuse to provide him identification or any 

other information, and in light of the number of individuals in the vehicle, Officer Baker 

called for assistance. Id. at 11:3–8, 35:5–23. 

 PYPD Officer Frank Romero arrived on scene and observed Officer Baker 

addressing the driver of the vehicle. Id. at 57:12–19. Officer Romero testified that as he 

approached he could hear another person, the front seat passenger, yelling out toward 

 1

 Officer Baker’s second supplemental report indicates that he believed that back 

seat passengers were under the age of eighteen (18). Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 

32:11–34:12. 

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Officer Baker. Id. at 57:12–58:2, 66:10–67–19. Officer Baker asked Officer Romero to 

speak to Defendant, to find out why he was upset and obtain his name. Hr’g Tr. 

12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 11:15–12:7, 58:3–8, 67:20–23. Officer Romero also identified the 

front seat passenger as Defendant Landeros. Id. at 52:9–18. Officer Romero knocked on 

the front passenger window and asked the Defendant for his identification. Id. at 58:20–

25. The Defendant responded, “Fuck no.” Id. at 59:1–2. Officer Romero testified that 

he asked Defendant to exit the vehicle, and Defendant refused. Id. at 59:3–9. Officer 

Romero further testified that after he asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle, Landeros 

opened the passenger vehicle door slightly, and then quickly shut it again. Hr’g Tr. 

12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 60:12–17, 70:9–13. The Defendant yelled, “This is bullshit, I ain’t 

gonna step out, fuck these cops.” Id. Officer Romero requested that his sergeant, PYPD 

Sergeant Jose Montano, respond to assist as well. Id. at 60:18–19. 

 Officer Romero testified that while he was waiting for Sergeant Montano to 

respond, Officer Baker came around to the passenger’s side of the vehicle and together 

requested Defendant step out of the vehicle. Id. at 61:8–22. Officer Baker confirmed 

that he, along with Officer Romero, commanded the Defendant to exit the vehicle. Id. at 

11:15–12:7, 36:7–13. Officer Baker also testified that either he or Officer Romero 

opened the door slightly before Defendant slammed it shut again. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 

(Doc. 38) 11:15–12:7, 36:14–21. Officer Romero testified that the female passengers 

repeatedly told the Defendant, whom they called “Alfredo” or “Sauce,” to “come on” and 

get out of the vehicle. Id. at 61:8–22. Eventually, the Defendant stepped out of the 

vehicle. Id. at 37:1–2, 61:8–22. Sergeant Jose Montano, Jr. arrived on scene while 

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Officers Baker and Romero were trying to get the Defendant out of the vehicle. Id. at 

81:15–21, 88:10–90:2. 

 Officer Romero testified that after Defendant exited the vehicle, the officer 

continued to ask him his name. Id. at 61:23–62:13. Defendant continued to refuse to 

respond. Id. Officer Romero further testified that in light of Defendant’s reluctance to 

step out of the vehicle and his generally aggressive nature, the officer asked if he had any 

weapons. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 62:14–22, 71:6–72:5. Defendant responded 

affirmatively, and indicated that he had a knife in one of his pockets. Id. 62:23–63:3, 

71:6–72:5. Officer Romero testified that he asked for permission to search, which 

Defendant granted. Id. at 63:4–6, 71:6–72:5. Officer Romero further testified that after a 

search of Defendant’s person, he discovered a glass smoking pipe with some residue in it, 

and six (6) nine (9) millimeter Luger rounds of bullets. Id. at 63:7–11. Defendant 

refused to answer any further questions regarding drugs and guns by Officer Romero, so 

the officer detained him, placed his handcuffs on Defendant, and placed him in the back 

of his vehicle. Id. at 63:12–23. Officer Romero testified that he was the one who 

initially handcuffed the Defendant. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 63:24–64:1. Officer 

Romero further testified that although Defendant was resistant to being handcuffed, the 

officer’s usual technique is to place two fingers between the wrists and the actual 

handcuff to ensure that the cuffs are not too tight. Id. at 64:2–14, 72:17–73:1. Officer 

Romero further testified that he double locked the handcuffs to ensure that they would 

not accidentally get tighter. Id. at 64:15–19. Officer Romero also testified that he did not 

remember Defendant saying anything about the handcuffs being too tight. Id. at 64:20–

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22. Officer Romero testified that he did not recall having any concerns regarding the 

handcuffs, and escorted Defendant back to one of the patrol vehicles. Id. at 65:1–13. 

Officer Baker’s also testified that Defendant had not said anything while being 

handcuffed. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 14:18–24. 

 Sergeant Montano testified that he heard Defendant complain that his handcuffs 

were too tight. Id. at 82:23–3. Sergeant Montano checked the handcuffs and was able to 

place his index finger between Defendant’s wrists and the cuffs. Id. at 80:22–81:3, 83:4–

15. Sergeant Montano also ensured that the handcuffs were double locked. Id. at 80:22–

81:3, 83:16–17. 

 Officer Baker testified that as soon as the Defendant exited the vehicle, he 

observed two (2) open containers of alcohol—Negro Modelo 12 ounce bottles, several 

pocket knives, and a large machete in the front passenger seat where the Defendant had 

been sitting. Id. at 11:15–12:7, 12:23–13:16, 37:1–9. Officer Baker further testified that 

once he saw the open containers, he called out for an arrest time. Id. 13:23–14:5. Officer 

Baker also testified that having an open container in a moving vehicle is a violation of 

Arizona and Pascua Yaqui law. Id. at 14:6–10. 

 Officer Baker testified that after Defendant exited the vehicle and was placed 

under arrest, he began conducting a search incident to the arrest. Id. at 13:17–15:8. 

Officer Romero apprised Officer Baker of the pipe and ammunition that was found on 

Defendant’s person. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 14:25–15:13. Officer Baker again 

attempted to ascertain the Defendant’s name. Id. at 15:14–22. The Defendant confirmed 

his first name was Alfredo and that he was Native American, but refused to provide his 

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last name or date of birth. Id.

 Officer Baker testified that Defendant was screaming and yelling about his 

handcuffs being too tight. Id. at 15:23–16:4. Officer Baker further testified that he 

checked the handcuffs, and was able to place a finger between Defendant’s wrist and the 

handcuff. Id. at 15:23–16:14, 49:24–50:20. Officer Baker also testified that he observed 

that the handcuffs were double locked and not pinching. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 

15:23–16:14, 49:24–50:20. Officer Baker denied observing any physical injuries on 

Defendant’s person. Id. at 16:15–20. Officer Baker testified that Defendant had been 

and continued to be noncompliant throughout the duration of the stop. Id. at 17:1–7. 

Officer Baker further testified that after he removed Defendant from the patrol car to 

check the handcuffs, Defendant refused to return to the vehicle and had to be physically 

placed back in the patrol car. Id. at 17:1–12. Officer Baker testified that the force used 

by the officers was not excessive. Id. Sergeant Montano testified that the Defendant 

complained of his hand being broken after the struggle to return him to the vehicle; 

however, the sergeant did not observe any injuries. Id. at 85:6–23, 92:19–93:23. 

 Officer Baker testified that he spoke with the other occupants of the vehicle, but 

was unable to determine from them who the Defendant was. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 

38) 17:20–18:8. Officer Baker described the female back seat passengers as generally 

cooperative, indicated that he did not smell alcohol on them, and that they advised him 

that they had not been drinking. Id. at 18:1–14. Sergeant Montano spoke with the driver 

and attempted to obtain Defendant’s name. Id. at 84:7–21. 

 Officers Baker and Romero conducted a search of the vehicle after removing all of 

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the occupants. Id. at 18:15–18. Officer Baker stated that in the backseat they found two 

purses, which the females claimed, and a black backpack, which the females advised 

belonged to Alfredo. Id. at 18:19–19:1, 38:17–39:3. Officer Baker testified that the 

officers found more drug paraphernalia, baggies containing a white crystal substance, and 

a bank card belonging to Alfred Landeros. Id. at 19:2–9. A field test indicated that the 

white substance tested positive for methamphetamine. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 

21:18–23. Officer Baker further testified that he entered the name on the bankcard into a 

police database, which returned a picture of Defendant. Id. at 19:10–20. Officer Baker 

testified that he then called for a Pascua Yaqui detention officer to come pick up 

Defendant. Id. at 19:21–20. Officers Baker and Romero testified that during the vehicle 

search, Defendant was screaming, yelling, and kicking in the back of the patrol vehicle. 

Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 20:2–21, 39:4–14, 65:14–66:11. Sergeant Montano 

corroborated this testimony. Id. at 86:1–16. 

 Officer Thomas Valenzuela of the Pascua Yaqui Detention arrived on scene to 

transport the Defendant. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 101:7–19. Sergeant Montano 

testified that the Defendant refused to get into the detention vehicle, creating another 

struggle. Id. at 86:19–87:3. Officer Baker described Defendant unwilling to get into the 

detention vehicle and kicking his feet in an attempt not to get into the vehicle. Id. at 

20:22–21:5, 53:20–54:2. Officer Valenzuela corroborated these accounts. Id. at 103:7–

15. Officer Valenzuela and Sergeant Montano both testified that they did not observe 

Defendant to be in any pain at that time. Id. at 87:19–22, 103:16–18. 

 Officer Valenzuela transported Defendant to the Pascua Yaqui detention center. 

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Id. at 103:19–104:6. Officer Valenzuela testified that Defendant complained that the 

handcuffs were too tight. Id. at 104:17–105:8. Upon arriving at the detention facility, 

Officer Valenzuela checked the handcuffs and was able to place his finger between 

Defendant’s wrists and the handcuffs. Id. Officer Valenzuela did not observe any 

injuries to Defendant’s hands or wrists or feel any abnormalities. Id. at 105:9–20. 

Officer Valenzuela further testified that while processing Defendant, he did not complain 

of any injuries. Id. at 105:24–106:18. 

 Allison Cunningham testified that Defendant was her boyfriend of approximately 

three (3) years, and that she was one of the backseat passengers during the February 9th 

incident. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 108:16–109:9. Ms. Cunningham denied 

drinking that evening. Id. at 110:9–10. Ms. Cunningham testified that during the stop, 

the officer requested that they roll that the passengers roll their windows down and 

provide identification because they looked under eighteen (18) and it was past curfew. 

Id. at 112:2–21. Ms. Cunningham further testified that Alfredo never identified himself 

to the extent that the police officers requested. Id. at 112:22–113:1. Ms. Cunningham 

denied that the officer ever requested that Alfredo get out of the vehicle, but eventually 

just pulled him out. Id. at 113:2–20, 119:8–14. 

 Ms. Cunningham testified that after Defendant was out of the vehicle she heard 

him screaming in pain. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) at 114:4–21. Ms. Cunningham 

further testified that she attempted to get out of the vehicle to record what was happening 

on her cell phone, but an officer prevented her from doing so. Id. at 114:19–115:10, 

120:10–14. Ms. Cunningham claimed that there were lacerations from handcuffs and 

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bruising on Defendant’s wrist after this incident. Id. at 116:11–23. Ms. Cunningham 

also testified that she took pictures of the injuries; however, her cell phone was broken 

and she no longer has the photographs. Id. at 122:12–123:14, 125:10–126:4. 

 Ms. Teresa Fields, the other backseat passenger also testified, and denied drinking 

that evening. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 129:18–22. Ms. Fields testified that the 

police officer asked for identification because it was past curfew and he wanted to ensure 

everyone was of age. Id. at 130:13–24. Ms. Fields testified that the officers pulled 

Defendant out of the vehicle and she heard him yelling afterward. Id. at 131:19–133:2. 

Ms. Fields further testified that when they got out of the vehicle to record a video, they 

were handcuffed, briefly patted down, and sat down on the curb. Id. at 133:3–22. Ms. 

Fields also testified that she did not know who the backpack belonged to. Id. at 134:10–

22. Ms. Fields testified that she saw the injury on Defendant’s wrist when she attended 

his court date with Ms. Cunningham. Id. at 135:16–136:5, 138:10–139:5. 

 On November 20, 2013, Defendant Alfredo Enos Landeros was convicted of 

Criminal Damage, Solicitation to Unlawfully Possess a Narcotic Drug and Unlawful 

Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in Arizona State Court. See Ariz. Superior Ct., County 

of Pima, Case No. CR20134259. As such, on April 27, 2016, the Defendant was indicted 

by a Federal Grand Jury on one (1) count of Possession of Ammunition by a Convicted 

Felon. Indictment (Doc. 1).

 . . . 

 . . . 

 . . . 

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Suppress 

Defendant seeks suppression in this case, asserting that he was unlawfully seized 

and that the bullets were only found as a result of this unlawful seizure. See Def.’s Mot. 

to Suppress (Doc. 17).

 1. Fourth Amendment—In General. 

 “The Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ by the 

Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles 

that fall short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 

744, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 

L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 

L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). For the police to conduct a valid stop, they must “have a 

reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” 

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) 

(internal quotes and citation omitted). “[T]he level of suspicion required for a Terry 

stop[, however,] is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.” Id. at 8, 109 

S.Ct. at 1585 (internal citations omitted). “An investigatory stop of a vehicle is 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer reasonably suspects that a traffic 

violation has occurred.” United States v. Miranda-Guerena, 445 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 714 (9th Cir. 2005)). It is wellestablished law that “the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops [does not] depend[] 

on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” United States v. Whren, 

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517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). 

 “Reasonable suspicion is defined as ‘a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Id. (quoting United States 

v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)). “The reasonable-suspicion 

standard is not a particularly high threshold to reach.” Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1078. 

Furthermore, although “a mere hunch is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of 

criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls 

considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. (quoting 

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 When making a reasonable-suspicion determination, the reviewing court “must 

look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer 

has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United 

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) 

(citations omitted); see also United States. v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 836 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In so doing, officers are allowed “to draw on their own experience and specialized 

training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information 

available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” Id. at 273, 122 S.Ct. at 

750-51. (citations omitted); see also Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1078. Moreover, what 

may seem to be innocuous conduct when viewed in isolation may be appropriately 

considered when considering the totality of the circumstances; thus, it is inappropriate to 

view factors in isolation and to give no weight to factors which may have an innocent 

explanation. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273-75, 122 S.Ct. at 750-51; see also Cotterman, 709 

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F.3d at 970 (“It is not our province to nitpick the factors in isolation but instead to view 

them in the totality of the circumstances.”). Furthermore, “A determination that 

reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” 

Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1078-79 (citing Arvizu, 534 at 277, 122 S.Ct. 744) (alterations 

in original). 

 2. Authority to initiate stop.

 Defendant argues that PYTP Officer Baker was “not authorized to conduct such a 

stop outside of the Pascua Yaqui reservation boundaries.” Def.’s Amended MTS (Doc. 

17) at 6. The Government concedes that its initial disclosure “was unclear as to whether 

Officer Baker was [Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training Board (“AZPOST”)] 

certified at the time of subject traffic stop.” Def.’s Response to Amended MTS (Doc. 26) 

at 4. Subsequently, however, the Government has “obtained documentation confirming 

Officer Baker’s AZPOST certification at the time of the incident.” Id. at 4–5. The 

information was provided to Defendant and the parties agree that this issue is moot. Hr’g 

Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 140:4–10. Accordingly, Officer Baker had authority to conduct 

the traffic stop. 

 3. Extension of the seizure.

 Defendant asserts that “the seizure of the car and its passengers became unlawful 

because Officer Baker chose to investigate the perceived offense of a curfew violation, 

even though the passengers had not been within tribal jurisdiction.” Def.’s Amended 

MTS (Doc. 17) at 7. The Government contends that Officer Baker executed a valid 

traffic stop and then smelled alcohol leading to investigation of the newly suspected 

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crimes of underage drinking and driving while under the influence. Govt.’s Response to 

MTS (Doc. 26) at 6. 

 As an initial matter, “mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure unless 

it prolongs the detention of the individual, and, thus, no reasonable suspicion is required 

to justify questioning that does not prolong the stop.” United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 

1077, 1080 (quoting Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 

299 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]hether questioning unrelated to the 

purpose of the traffic stop and separate from the ticket-writing process that prolongs the 

duration of the stop may nonetheless be reasonable . . . [upon] examin[ation] [of] the 

totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop, and [a] determin[ation] whether 

[Officer Baker’s] conduct was reasonable.” United States v. Turvin, 517 F.3d 1097, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

 Here, Officer Baker had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had 

occurred when he clocked the vehicle traveling in excess of the posted speed limit. See 

Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) at 5:10–7:3, 30:1–7. As such, his decision to stop the 

vehicle was constitutionally valid. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 

1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an 

automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic 

violation has occurred.”). While stopped, Officer Baker smelled alcohol in the vehicle. 

Id. at 9:9–17, 47:8–25. Officer Baker also believed that the two female passengers were 

under the age of eighteen (18). Id. at 32:11–34:12. Officer Baker’s decision to 

investigate further to ensure that there was no underage drinking or a curfew violation 

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was not unreasonable. Neither was the duration of the stop in light of these additional 

concerns. As such, Defendant’s motion must fail. 

 4. Demand for identification.

 Defendant asserts that Officer Baker arrested him for failing to identify himself, 

which is not a crime. Def.’s Amended MTS (Doc. 17) at 11. The Government asserts 

that Defendant was lawfully arrested for refusing to obey law enforcement commands 

and possession of open containers of alcohol in a vehicle. Govt.’s Response to MTS 

(Doc. 26) at 7. 

 Arizona state law provides “[i]t is unlawful for a person, after being advised that 

the person’s refusal to answer is unlawful, to fail or refuse to state the person’s true full 

name on request of a peace officer who has lawfully detained the person based on 

reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit 

a crime. A person detained under this section shall state the person’s true full name, but 

shall not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of a peace officer.” A.R.S. §13-2412. 

Arizona state law further provides that “[a] person shall not willfully fail or refuse to 

comply with any lawful order or direction of a police officer invested by law with 

authority to direct, control or regulate traffic.” A.R.S. § 28-622. Furthermore, “[t]he 

police may ask people who have legitimately been stopped for identification without 

conducting a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.” United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 

494 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (request for passenger’s identification after a 

legitimate traffic stop not in abrogation of the Fourth Amendment). 

 Here, officers asked for Defendant’s identification and requested that he step out 

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of the vehicle. Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) 10:12–12:7, 35:5–23, 36:7–13, 58:20–

60:19, 61:8–22. The Court finds the officers testimony credible regarding the 

circumstances surrounding their encounter with Defendant. Defendant was belligerent 

and yelled at officers. Id. Officers were investigating possible underage drinking, as 

well as following their standard protocol for obtaining identification from all passengers 

during a legitimate traffic stop. Id. Upon Defendant exiting the vehicle, Officer Baker 

saw two open containers of alcohol in the vehicle’s passenger compartment, which is in 

violation of both Pascua Yaqui and Arizona law. Id. at 11:15–12:7, 12:23–14:10, 37:1–9. 

As such, the arrest was legal and Defendant’s motion should be denied. 

 5. Search of Defendant.

 Defendant seeks suppression of the bullets found on his person during his arrest. 

Def.’s Amended MTS (Doc. 17) at 14. 

 It is well-established that a search incident to a lawful arrest is an exception to the 

warrant requirement. Gant, 556 U.S. at 338, 129 S.Ct. at 1716; Cupp v. Murphy, 412 

U.S. 291, 295, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 2003, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 

U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). The warrantless search incident to 

arrest serves the purpose of “protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence 

of the offense that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 339, 129 

S.Ct. at 1716. 

 Here, Defendant indicated that he had a knife on his person and he was being 

arrested for failure to comply with the officers’ directions and open container. Hr’g Tr. 

12/12/2016 (Doc. 38) at 13:17–15:8, 62:14–63:3, 71:6–72:5. Furthermore, Defendant 

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consented to the search of his person. Id. at 63:4–6, 71:6–72:5. The search was lawfully 

conducted in conjunction with arrest. As such, suppression is inappropriate. 

B. Motion to Dismiss

 Defendant seeks dismissal of the Indictment because he asserts that the officers 

ignored his cries for help due to the pain that the handcuffs were causing him and that 

their conduct was outrageous. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 19). He further alleges 

that this amounted to “torture.” 

 Each officer that came in contact with Defendant double-checked to ensure that 

his handcuffs were not too tight. See Hr’g Tr. 12/12/2016 (Doc. 38), testimony of 

Officers Baker, Romero, Valenzuela, and Sergeant Montano. The Court finds the 

testimony of these officers credible. Moreover, none of the officers observed any injury 

when checking Defendant’s handcuffs. See id. Nor did Defendant report any injury or 

pain to Officer Valenzuela when he was processing him at the detention center. Id. at 

105:24–106:18. 

 The two female passengers testified that they observed extensive bruising to 

Defendant’s wrist a week after the stop, the evidence does not support that this occurred 

as a result of the conduct of the PYPD officers on the night of February 9, 2016. 

III. CONCLUSION 

The Court finds that there were no violations Fourth Amendment violations 

related to the traffic stop or Defendant’s arrest in this case. As such, suppression is 

inappropriate. The Court further finds that PYPD officers did not act outrageously.

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IV. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Judge DENY Defendant Alfredo Enos Landeros’s Amended Motion to Suppress 

Statements (Doc. 17) and Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19). 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 59(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. No reply shall be filed 

unless leave is granted from the District Court. If objections are filed, the parties should 

use the following case number: CR-16-0855-TUC-RCC. 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 59 may result in waiver of the right 

of review. 

 Dated this 24th day of January, 2017. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald

United States Magistrate Judge 

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