Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03893/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03893-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bryan Betrand
Appellee
Cost Planning and Management International
Appellee
Peter Goodwin
Appellee
Andrea Groves
Appellant
Richard Janssen
Appellee

Document Text:

*

The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3893

___________

Andrea Groves, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Cost Planning and Management *

International, Inc.; Richard Janssen; * [PUBLISHED]

Peter Goodwin; Bryan Betrand, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: June 18, 2004

Filed: June 25, 2004

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Faced with a downturn in business, Cost Planning and Management

International, Inc. (CPMI) decided to cut its staff. Two people were let go in the

reduction in force, a man and a pregnant woman, cost estimator Andrea Groves.

Groves brought this Title VII action against CPMI and several of its employees,

alleging she was discriminated against based on her gender and her pregnancy. The

district court*

 granted summary judgment to CPMI. Groves appeals, and we affirm.

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The district court applied the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden shifting

analysis to Groves’s discrimination claim. Under that analysis, the employee must

first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Allen v. City of Pocahontas, 340

F.3d 551, 557-58 (8th Cir. 2003). If the employee does so, the burden shifts to the

employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment

action. Id. at 558. If the employer satisfies its burden, the employee then must show

that the nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination, id., and in reduction

of force cases, that the protected criteria, here gender or pregnancy, was a factor in

the adverse employment decision, see Chambers v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins.,

351 F.3d 848, 855-56 (8th Cir. 2003) (age discrimination case). 

The district court held that assuming Groves had established a prima facie case,

CPMI articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, specifically,

a reduction in force due to decreased revenue. The district court then concluded

Groves did not come forward with sufficient evidence to show the reasons for her

termination were a pretext for discrimination. The district court rejected Groves’s

assertion that the proximity between the disclosure of her pregnancy on an insurance

application and her termination was enough to permit a jury to find her pregnancy

was a motivating factor in her termination. The court held the proximity evidence did

not sufficiently undermine CPMI’s justifications to create a material question of fact

on pretext. 

On appeal, Groves first contends the district court should have applied Desert

Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003) (holding plaintiff need not present direct

evidence of discrimination to obtain a mixed motive jury instruction under Title VII),

rather than the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to this case. Groves

failed to address the possible impact of Costa in her resistance to CPMI’s motion for

summary judgment, however, and conceded the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies.

Groves next argues the district court committed error in holding she failed to

generate material factual issues on all elements of her prima facie case of pregnancy

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discrimination. Because the district court assumed Groves had established a prima

facie case, this argument fails.

Groves also contends there are genuine issues of material fact about whether

CPMI’s reasons for discharging her are a pretext for discrimination. According to

Groves, the district court failed to critically examine CPMI’s stated reasons for firing

her and simply accepted those reasons at face value. The district court was not

supposed to evaluate the veracity of CPMI’s offered reasons, however. See Reeves

v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (employer’s burden is

one of production, not persuasion, and involves no credibility assessment). CPMI

stated that in deciding to cut staffing, the company fired the least valuable employee

in each department, considering several factors, including productivity, project load,

flexibility, and seniority. Groves failed to show by a preponderance of evidence that

CPMI’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Id. at 143. As the district

court noted, timing alone does not sufficiently undermine CPMI’s justifications to

create a genuine issue of fact on pretext. See Sprenger v. Federal Home Loan Bank

of Des Moines, 253 F.3d 1106, 1114 (8th Cir. 2001). Further, CPMI’s discussion of

Groves’s pregnancy with their new insurance company’s representatives occurred

after her termination and to determine whether Groves would have continuing

coverage under the newly adopted plan. Last, Groves’s allegation that another

employee should have been fired instead questions a reasonable business decision by

CPMI, a decision courts do not second guess. See Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas

Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995). 

Relying on Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, Groves next argues the district court

erroneously applied a “pretext plus” requirement. The Reeves case did not involve

a reduction in force, however, and we have confirmed after Reeves that in addition

to showing pretext, plaintiffs in reduction of force cases must also show their

protected status was a factor in the adverse employment decision. See Chambers, 351

F.3d at 855-56. Groves contends that even if this is the law, a reasonable jury could

find her pregnancy was a motivating factor in CPMI’s decision to fire her. The

district court stated Groves did not present sufficient evidence from which a rational

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jury could infer that CPMI decisionmakers knew of Groves’s pregnancy when they

decided to terminate her. We agree with the district court’s assessment. The

undisputed testimony and exhibits show that CPMI decided to terminate Groves by

October 17, before they knew she was pregnant and before Groves disclosed her

pregnancy on an insurance form. 

Finally, Groves asserts the district court committed error in failing to recognize

CPMI destroyed documents and in failing to infer the documents would have helped

prove Groves’s case. This assertion is without merit. CPMI’s correspondence with

potential insurance providers is not a relevant personnel record as defined in Title

VII. See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14. Further, Groves has not shown that the

correspondence would have favored her case and that CPMI destroyed the records to

suppress the truth. See Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir.

2003). Thus, the district court did not commit error in failing to draw an adverse

inference from CPMI’s failure to preserve the correspondence. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor

of CPMI. 

______________________________

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