Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-08-04309/USCOURTS-ca7-08-04309-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael D. Reilly
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued November 18, 2009

Decided January 6, 2010

Before

    DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

    TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐4309

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL D. REILLY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 06 CR 877‐1

Blanche M. Manning,

Judge.

O R D E R

Michael Reilly pleaded guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and was

sentenced to a total of 151 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the applicable guidelines

range.  Reilly argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the district court failed to

adequately consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  We affirm the judgment.

In November 2006 Reilly robbed a branch of TCF Bank in Chicago, Illinois, by

holding his hand in his pocket and claiming to have a gun.  He pleaded guilty to bank

robbery despite asserting that he committed the offense during an alcohol‐induced

blackout.  The district court calculated Reilly’s imprisonment range using a total offense

level of 29.  See U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1, 3E1.1.  That offense level, coupled with Reilly’s criminal

history category of VI, yielded a guidelines imprisonment range of 151 to 188 months.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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At sentencing Reilly had no objections to the calculation of the guidelines

imprisonment range.  He argued, however, that the district court should minimize the effect

of his career‐offender status on his sentence because his chronic alcoholism was the “driving

force” behind his current offense and prior convictions.  Reilly has 50 prior convictions for

misdemeanors (mostly theft) and 6 prior convictions for felonies, including 3 robberies.

Reilly explained that he had no control over his alcohol addiction and that stealing was his

way of coping.  Reilly contended that his criminal history did not exhibit the premeditation

and violence typical of career offenders.

Reilly also argued that the district court should impose a sentence below the career‐

offender guidelines range because, although he needed treatment for his alcohol addiction,

he was not guaranteed a spot in the Bureau of Prisons’ substance‐abuse treatment program.

To support this point, Reilly submitted the psychological evaluation of Dr. Michael Fields

who opined that Reilly needs long‐term individual therapy, long‐term substance‐abuse

treatment, and psychiatric evaluation to determine whether medication can alleviate some

of his emotional and social problems.  Although Reilly maintained that a shorter prison

sentence would allow him to receive his needed treatment sooner, the presentence

investigation report explained the Reilly’s past treatment for alcoholism outside of prison

had been ineffective.  Also, in her sentencing memorandum, Reilly’s counsel acknowledged

that Reilly had been released from federal custody just weeks before the bank robbery in

this case and that, after brief stays in a homeless shelter and in jail, he went on a drinking

binge before robbing the same TCF Bank branch that he had robbed six years earlier.  

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, after considering Reilly’s arguments for

a below‐guidelines sentence, the district court recognized the influence that alcoholism has

had on Reilly’s life and his need for treatment.  Although it initially asked counsel what

psychological evidence Reilly relied on for his claim that alcoholism affected his behavior,

the court later acknowledged that “the Bureau of Prisons will see fit to provide some kind of

treatment and counseling” because of Reilly’s “major problem in terms of alcoholism.”  The

court then concluded that 151 months’ imprisonment was an appropriate sentence given the

nature of the present offense, Reilly’s long criminal history, the danger he posed to the

public, and the prospect that he would receive needed substance‐abuse treatment in prison.

Before entering judgment, the district court held a second hearing to evaluate the prospects

of Reilly receiving the necessary treatment in prison.  Reilly’s lawyer stated that Reilly was

eligible for the Bureau of Prisons’ intensive drug‐treatment program but that a judicial

recommendation would help ensure that he received a spot in the program.  After agreeing

to recommend that Reilly receive needed substance‐abuse treatment in prison, the court

announced that the 151‐month prison sentence would stand.

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On appeal Reilly argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the district court

failed to adequately consider the effect of his alcoholism and related mental conditions, as

contemplated by § 3553(a).  In particular, Reilly contends that the district court may not

have reviewed the psychological assessment that he submitted in support of his argument

for a below‐guidelines sentence because the district court seemed initially unaware that he

had submitted a psychological evaluation.  Reilly also maintains that the district court failed

to appreciate that he was not guaranteed placement in the prison treatment program for

curbing his alcohol‐influenced criminal behavior.

Whether a district court followed the proper procedure for imposing sentence after

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), is a question of law that this court reviews de

novo. United States v. Mendoza, 510 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2007).  The sentencing court is not

required to discuss each of the statutory sentencing factors under § 3553(a); it is enough if

the record confirms meaningful consideration of the types of factors set forth in § 3553(a).

United States v. Laufle, 433 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2006).  But the sentencing court must

respond to a defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments for leniency.  See United States v. Acosta,

474 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th

Cir. 2005)).

To support his argument that the district court’s sentence was procedurally

unreasonable because it supposedly ignored his psychological assessment and need for

treatment, Reilly relies on United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2007), and United

States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2005).  In Miranda, this court vacated the

defendant’s sentence because the district court failed to address the defendant’s argument

that his Schizoaffective Disorder reduced the need for deterrence and rendered him less

deserving of punishment.  505 F.3d at 794.  Similarly, in Cunningham, this court remanded

for resentencing because the district court “passed over in silence the principal argument

made by the defendant” that his long history of psychiatric illness and substance abuse

called for a below‐guidelines sentence.  429 F.3d at 679.

This case differs from both Miranda and Cunningham because, rather than ignoring

Reilly’s principal argument for leniency—his alcoholism and need for treatment—the

district court expressly recognized his “major problem” with alcoholism.  Furthermore,

because of its awareness of Reilly’s alcoholism and need for treatment, the court held a

second hearing on the likelihood of treatment in prison and, as a result, promised to make

“a very strong recommendation to whatever facility [he is] sent to, that they provide [him]

treatment.”  It is true, as Reilly argues, that the district court initially asked defense counsel

if a psychological evaluation supported counsel’s claim that alcoholism influenced Reilly’s

behavior, even though counsel had already submitted a psychological evaluation to the

court.  But later, the court, in the context of discussing Reilly’s need for counseling and

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No. 08‐4309                                                                                                                           Page 4

treatment, openly recognized his mental‐health issues as reflected in that evaluation.  See

United States v. Nurek, 578 F.3d 618, 626 (7th Cir. 2009).  Moreover, in the judgment, the

district court indicated that it was adopting the facts from the presentence investigation

report, which included details regarding Reilly’s lifelong struggle with alcoholism.

Accordingly, the district court did not “pass[] over in silence” Reilly’s alcoholism and

treatment needs.  

In arriving at a sentence, § 3553(a) requires the district court to consider other factors,

in addition to Reilly’s psychological condition.  The court had to consider Reilly’s life long

history of committing thefts and robberies, the need to punish Reilly and to protect the

public, and the kinds of sentences available.  The court also had to consider the likelihood

that prison would enable Reilly to receive effective treatment (a possibility that counsel

acknowledged, even though it was not guaranteed) against the reality that, when not in

prison, Reilly had either foregone or received ineffective treatment.  Reilly’s poor

performance during his recent period of supervised release was also a relevant

consideration.  Under these circumstances, the district court reasonably determined that,

despite Reilly’s serious alcoholism, a sentence of 151 months’ imprisonment with the

possibility of effective treatment was appropriate.

The district court’s choice of sentence is not unreasonable simply because it rejected

Reilly’s plea for leniency.  See United States v. Trice, 484 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

128 S. Ct. 297 (2007); United States v. Gipson, 425 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2005).  The reasons

given by the court for imposing a prison sentence of 151 months address the arguments that

counsel made, demonstrate meaningful consideration of the record and of the § 3553(a)

factors, and are therefore procedurally reasonable.  See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358

(2007); United States v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879, 891‐92 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1460

(2008).  Moreover, this court presumes that Reilly’s sentence is substantively reasonable

because it falls within the properly calculated guidelines range, see Miranda, 505 F.3d at 791,

and because nothing in the record overcomes this presumption, this court should conclude

that Reilly’s sentence is reasonable, see United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 540 (7th Cir.

2009); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005).  

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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