Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-08-04474/USCOURTS-ca6-08-04474-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Christman
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

*

The Honorable Patrick J. Duggan, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of

Michigan, sitting by designation.

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0181p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RICHARD CHRISTMAN,

Defendant-Appellee.

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No. 08-4474

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.

No. 04-00127-001—Susan J. Dlott, Chief District Judge.

Argued: June 11, 2010

Decided and Filed: June 22, 2010 

Before: MARTIN and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; DUGGAN, District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Benjamin C. Glassman, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. C. Ransom Hudson, LAW OFFICE, Cincinnati, Ohio,

for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Benjamin C. Glassman, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. C. Ransom Hudson, LAW OFFICE,

Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Richard Christman pled guilty to two

counts of possessing child pornography in January 2005 pursuant to a plea agreement

calling for dismissal of the remaining counts against him, four counts of distribution of

1

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child pornography. The district court sentenced him to 57 months in prison, a withinGuidelines sentence at the bottom of the 57-71 month recommended range. Several

months later, the district court admitted that it had relied on impermissible information

outside the pre-sentence report in sentencing Christman, and Christman appealed his

sentence to this Court. A panel of this Court agreed, and it vacated and remanded the

case for re-sentencing.

At re-sentencing, the district court, over the prosecution’s objection, sentenced

Christman to five days in prison—that is, the time that he had spent in custody when first

arrested—and fifteen years of supervised release. The court found that this sentence was

warranted because Christman had severe back pain, he was his elderly, ailing mother’s

primary caregiver, his family believed that he was remorseful, he was a musician and

composer, and he had complied with the restrictions of his release on bail. The

government appeals, arguing that the district court’s imposition of the nominal prison

term cannot reasonably be justified by the factors identified at re-sentencing. 

For the reasons set forth below, we find that the sentence was substantively

unreasonable, VACATE the new sentence, and REMAND for re-sentencing in light of

this opinion. We also direct that this case be assigned to a different judge for resentencing.

I.

A. Underlying Offense

The facts of the underlying offense are explained in our prior opinion in this case:

On May 13, 2004, an undercover special agent of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation in Little Rock, Arkansas, used an internet-connected

computer to initiate a “Kazaa” search, a software program that allows

peer-to-peer digital file sharing between internet users. The agent

initiated the search using keywords associated with child sexual abuse

imagery. As a result, the agent was able to download, from another

computer identified by a specific internet protocol (“IP”) address, child

sexual abuse images that showed minors engaging in various sex acts.

The images and still pictures included some that involved sadistic and

masochistic acts, as well as other acts of sexual violence between minors

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and children under the age of 12. The agent also downloaded movies

from this other computer, including some showing adult males engaging

in various sex acts with children.

The agent was able to determine that the IP address, from which the

images and movies were downloaded, belonged to defendant Christman.

Other FBI agents, operating independently in Oklahoma, also

downloaded child pornography from Christman’s computer using

Kazaa-enabled searches. After independent investigation by the

Cincinnati FBI Field Office confirmed the information that had been

forwarded to them from the Little Rock and Oklahoma City FBI offices,

agents sought and received a search warrant for defendant’s residence.

The warrant was executed on August 5, 2004. FBI agents recovered

computer-printed child sexual abuse images, as well as computers and

computer media. The seized items contained more than 600 images of

child pornography. Agents concluded that defendant was involved in file

sharing of child pornography on an international scale; defendant had

obtained images from all over the world, including Brazil and England,

and had transported these images via computer files to other individuals

all over the world. The investigation indicated that defendant did not sell

or advertise child pornography, but possessed and transported or shared

images internationally strictly for his personal use.

On October 20, 2004, a grand jury for the Southern District of Ohio

returned a two-count indictment against defendant, charging him with

distribution of child pornography. A six-count superseding indictment

filed on November 17, 2004, charged defendant with four counts of

transporting child pornography using his computer and two counts of

possession of child pornography. A forfeiture allegation was also

included in the superseding indictment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2253.

On January 7, 2005, defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea

agreement, to Counts Five and Six, possession of materials constituting

child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2),

18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2), and 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A).

United States v. Christman, 509 F.3d 299, 301-02 (6th Cir. 2007)

B. First Sentencing:

The circumstances of the first sentencing are also explained in our prior opinion:

A final presentence investigation report (“PSR”) was prepared and

transmitted to the district court on May 3, 2005. The PSR identified the

base level offense as 15 and added four enhancements—2 points because

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the material involved a minor under 12 years of age; 2 points because a

computer was involved; 4 points because the offense involved material

portraying sadistic or masochistic acts; and 5 points because more than

600 images were involved. Three points were subtracted for acceptance

of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 25. In evaluating

defendant's acceptance of responsibility, the PSR noted that defendant

“acknowledged possessing child pornography, but stated he does not

stalk children and would never harm them.” Another portion of the PSR

reiterated that defendant “told agents that he was not addicted to child

pornography and was different from individuals who molested children.”

The resultant total offense level of 25, combined with defendant’s

criminal history category I, indicated an advisory Guidelines sentencing

range of 57-71 months.

At the sentencing hearing held on October 28, 2005, defendant and his

counsel advanced several arguments in support of mitigation of sentence,

including defendant’s chronic back pain and depression and the fact that

he acted as caretaker for his elderly ill mother. Counsel for defendant

pointed out that defendant had no criminal history and that there was no

evidence that contact with children had ever occurred or been

contemplated by defendant. In this latter regard, defense counsel

submitted to the court a Psychological Assessment Report prepared by

psychologist Stuart W. Bassman, Ed.D., who, at defense counsel’s

behest, interviewed defendant to assess his psychological status. In his

report, Dr. Bassman noted defendant's contention that “his attraction is

at purely a fantasy level and that he would never harm children by acting

out sexually against them.” Dr. Bassman opined that:

The patient is seen as having pedophilia. Pedophilia

involves a sexual attraction to prepubescent children that

may or may not have been acted upon and which

attraction or fantasies are distressing to the individual.

The patient contends that he has never acted on his

attraction and fantasies. Nevertheless, because these

fantasies are present and cause him distress, he meets the

criteria for a diagnosis of pedophilia.

The district court declined to deviate downward from the recommended

Guidelines sentencing range and sentenced defendant to serve concurrent

terms of 57 months of incarceration, ordered defendant to pay a $1,000

fine and $200 special assessment, and further imposed three years of

supervised release. The district court identified the information upon

which it relied in imposing sentence:

The Court has received the presentence report prepared

April 27th, 2005. The Court has also received and

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reviewed the following documents relevant to sentencing:

One, the psychological assessment report by Dr. Stuart

Bassman; two, the defendant’s sentencing memorandum

filed October 20th, 2005; and, three, a letter from defense

counsel dated October 20th, 2005 enclosing letters from

Richard Christman, Mary Christman, Leonard Christman,

Jarold Christman, Ron Christman, and Eric Blair.

The court allowed defendant to remain out of prison on bond until

January of 2006, at which time he was ordered to voluntarily surrender

to authorities.

On January 25, 2006, the district court convened an in-chambers status

conference with counsel to discuss the following matter before issuance

of the judgment and commitment order:

What I want to make a record of and bring to your

attention is that, in addition to what's in the presentence

report and included with that I think is the psychiatric

report and everything that was submitted by the parties,

I had discussions that counsel was not privy to between

myself, a probation officer and a pretrial services officer.

And that influenced my decision.

And what they told me was contra to some of the facts in

the presentence report. They indicated to me that they

believed that Mr. Christman had acted on the pedophilia,

had in fact molested children. That was-and I accepted

what they said.

In hindsight, I realize that that’s totally inappropriate, and

I should have not accepted what they said. And therefore

I based my sentence on information that doesn’t-that is

opposite of what it states in the presentence report, that is

totally counter to the presentence report.

(Emphasis added.) The district judge elaborated:

But I feel awful about this. It was my fault, my fault

only, that I listened to hearsay, that there was no-there is

no basis in fact for that. They had-that was just feelings

that these two people had. It wasn't based on anything

they had observed or seen or done or conversations they

had with him. And, in fact, the psychiatric report says to

the contrary, and so does the presentence report.

So I think it’s very significant that, you know, when I

considered-when I decided that he had acted on his

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1

See generally, FED.R.CRIM. P. 35 and 36; United States v. Strozier, 940 F.2d 985, 987 (6th Cir.

1991) (“[O]nce the sentence has become a final non-appealable order, the district court may no longer

amend or modify a sentence without violating defendant’s due process rights. Further, the power of a

district court to amend a sentence only extends to a situation where the district judge has misapplied the

Sentencing Guidelines, not to situations where he simply changes his mind about the sentence.”) (citation

omitted).

pedophilia, I decided to go with the Guidelines. Had I

not taken that into consideration, I would have given him

a much lower sentence.

(Emphasis added.)

The following colloquy then occurred between the Assistant United

States Attorney (“AUSA”), who was not present at the original

sentencing, and the district court:

AUSA: And I didn’t know if-were these issues brought

up at that time [of the original sentencing]? It was

something that was determined after the fact?

THE COURT: Before the fact. What happened was I

had been contacted, I think, by both Probation and

Pretrial about this case. And I coincidentally had a

meeting with both of them at the same time. And it was

during that meeting that these officers expressed opinions

to me that were contrary to what was in the presentence

report. And instead of giving the parties an opportunity

to address that-or what I should have done was not

considered that, because it wasn’t part of the presentence

report and it was counter to what counsel thought I was

using as a basis for my sentencing. I mean, counsel

thought I was sentencing on the basis that he had never

acted on his pedophilia, when, in fact, I was influenced

by hearsay to the contrary.

* * * 

I apologize for this. My only explanation was I sentenced

28 people in that week, and I was just trying to get ready

for a long surgery and a long period out of the office.

And I didn't give this the time and thought that I should

have.

After questioning her authority to change the sentence previously

imposed,1

 the district judge thereafter entered the judgment of

conviction, which reflected the sentence that was announced on October

25, 2005.

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2

The government has not appealed this ruling.

Christman, 509 F.3d at 302-04. On November 20, 2007, a panel of this Court found that

“the district court’s reliance upon the undisclosed ex parte information of dubious

accuracy at sentencing violates Rule 32(i) and constitutes error that, under these

particular circumstances, requires vacation of his sentence and remand for resentencing.”

Id. at 304. 

C. Second Sentencing

The Probation Office prepared an updated presentence report, which differed

from the original in three respects: (1) the report advised that Christman had complied

with the terms of his release on bail; (2) Christman had “become annoyed with” his

primary physician “and as a result, has not seen him for follow-up medical examinations

in more than three months” and had also “stopped seeing his counselor, Eric Blair,

because he felt that their conversations and the treatment provided ‘had become

redundant’” (2008 PSR.); and (3) determined the advisory Guidelines range using the

2007 edition of the Guidelines. The Sentencing Commission had raised the base offense

level for child pornography crimes by three levels since Christman’s original sentencing.

Under the 2007 Guidelines, the suggested imprisonment range for Christman was 78-97

months, as opposed to 57-71 months under the 2004 Guidelines. The updated report

recommended sentencing Christman to a 78-month term of imprisonment.

At the re-sentencing hearing in September 2008, the district court sustained

Christman’s objection to the use of the current Guidelines. The court stated that the

“fact that the guidelines are now advisory do not remove the protections of the ex post

facto clause.” (2008 Sent. Tr. at 16.) Further, the court opined that it would “be

fundamentally unfair for Mr. Christman to be sentenced to 57 months in 2005, win his

appeal in 2007 in order to have an opportunity to further mitigate his sentence, and then

receive a higher sentence in 2008.” (Id. at 20.) Accordingly, the court determined that

the advisory Guidelines range for Christman was 57-71 months in prison.2

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Christman’s counsel then renewed his request for a downward variance, based

on “medical back issues” (id. at 17), Christman’s “family responsibilities, including

taking care of his mother which is what he was able to do as a result of his bond” (id. at

18), “educational, vocational issues” (id.), that Christman had not been involved in any

criminal activity during his release on bail (id.), and that “there was no allegation that

he’s ever touched children,” (id. at 19). 

The district court stated that it “agree[d] with the defendant’s arguments on a

departure and/or variance” and determined that a “below guidelines sentence is

warranted.” (Id. at 20.) The court took note of Christman’s “medical and back issues.”

(Id. at 28.) As it also noted that Christman had, since being placed on bail pending

appeals and re-sentencing, become his mother’s primary caregiver and that several

family members thought that Christman was remorseful for his crimes, the court found

that Guidelines section 5H1.6 (family ties and responsibilities) was applicable to

sentencing. Third, the court noted that Christman was a composer and musician and

considered that as a mitigating factor under section 5H1.2 (educational and vocational

skills). Fourth, because Christman had not violated the terms of his bail, the court stated

its belief that he was not a danger to the community. Finally, the court referenced Dr.

Bassman’s report, noting that “[b]y Mr. Christman’s own statements, actual contact with

children has never been contemplated” and that “Mr. Christman is amenable to

outpatient services.” (Id. at 31.) 

Christman’s counsel suggested that the court should consider “a sentence that’s

not involving prison.” (Id. at 33.) In contrast, the government argued that “a substantial

period of confinement is warranted in this case for a number of reasons.” (Id. at 38.)

The prosecutor emphasized that the child pornography business “has very, very, very

damaging effects on children who are abused and others who are given access to that

really degrading type of behavior.” (Id.) He went on to describe the characteristics of

Christman’s offense and “the policy of Congress in implementing these rather stiff

punishments for this type of offense.” (Id.) 

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3

While the court also initially imposed a $5,000 fine upon Christman, when it was pointed out

that Christman’s sole source of income was his Social Security Insurance Benefits, the court removed this

portion of the sentence. 

On September 26, 2008, over the prosecution’s objections, the district court then

sentenced Christman to five days in prison—that is, the time that he had spent in custody

when first arrested—and fifteen years of supervised release, the first eighteen months

subject to electronic monitoring.3 (Id. at 44.) In announcing the sentence, the court told

Christman “that you have been on supervised release now for four years and one month

which in some ways has been a term of imprisonment already. The Court does not feel

it’s fair to subject you to a much longer period than that. . . .” (Id. at 47.) The court

further stated that “the care of your mother” was “the other thing that really entered into

my consideration of this case,” stating that “I’m sentencing you, I’m not sentencing your

mother, and I feel like I would be imposing a death sentence on your mother if I were

to impose imprisonment time on you, and I simply cannot do that.” (Id. at 47-48.) An

amended judgment, correcting typographical errors, was entered on October 21, 2008.

The government timely appealed.

II.

Sentencing decisions are reviewed for procedural and substantive

unreasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 45, 50 (2007). We use an abuse

of discretion standard to assess whether a sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 45. In

applying the abuse of discretion standard, we must keep in mind that “the clear,

overriding import of [Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), Kimbrough v. United

States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)] is that

appellate courts must respect the role of district courts and stop substituting their

judgment for that of those courts on the front line.” United States v. Phinazee, 515 F.3d

511, 521 (6th Cir. 2008).

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4

This case is similar in sentence and in judge, if not in circumstance, to a case recently decided

by another panel of this Court, United States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276 (6th Cir. 2009), in which the lead

opinion found that the decision of the same district judge to give a one-day sentence to a defendant for

possession of child pornography was substantively reasonable. Judge Rogers dissented, stating that “The

one-day sentence in this case does not, with reasonable sufficiency, avoid disparity in sentencing or

provide for general deterrence. I would therefore vacate the sentence as substantively unreasonable, and

remand.” Id. at 290 (Rogers, J. dissenting). 

This case is distinguishable as in this case, though not in Stall, the prosecutor consistently

objected to the relevant issues at the sentencing hearing and the district court completely changed the

sentence and the reasoning for the sentence, relying almost entirely on discouraged factors, in resentencing Christman. Moreover, the facts of Stall were far less serious than those here, and the standard

of review differed, as Stall was evaluated under a plain error standard, and this case must be reviewed

under an abuse of discretion standard. Thus, Stall’s reasoning and conclusion are not binding here.

III.

The government argues that the district court’s re-sentencing of Christman was

unreasonable for three reasons: (1) the district court relied on several inappropriate

factors as mitigators; (2) the district court failed to address several section 3553(a)

factors relevant to sentencing; and (3) the district court’s re-sentencing rationale

contradicts what it said during the original sentencing.4

A sentence is substantively unreasonable if “the district court selects a sentence

arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant

sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.”

United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir. 2008). While a sentence within

the Guidelines range is presumed reasonable, a sentence outside the Guidelines range

is not presumed unreasonable. United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 755 (6th Cir.

2008). In assessing substantive unreasonableness, we look to “the totality of the

circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Gall,

552 U.S. at 51. In doing so, we “must give due deference to the district court’s decision

that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id.

While the standard of review does not change based on whether a sentence is

inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range, the greater the district

court’s variance, the more compelling the evidence must be. See id. at 50 (“We find it

uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant

justification than a minor one.”); United States v. Grossman, 513 F.3d 592, 596 (6th Cir.

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2008) (holding that it is not improper to “require some correlation between the extent of

a variance and the justification for it”).

A. Reliance on Inappropriate Factors

The government first argues that the district court relied on several inappropriate

factors as mitigators, as it contends that being a “musician and composer” is not itself

a cause for lenience and that providing care to a family member does not warrant the

elimination of prison altogether when that care is entirely replaceable.

In Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), the Supreme Court explained that,

while section 3553(b) authorizes district courts to depart from the applicable Guidelines

range in cases that feature aggravating or mitigating circumstances, district courts are

“not left adrift.” Id. at 94. “The Commission provides considerable guidance as to the

factors that are apt or not apt to make a case atypical, by listing certain factors as either

encouraged or discouraged bases for departure.” Id. Discouraged factors are those “not

ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the

applicable guideline range.” Id. at 95 (citing U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H, intro. comment).

Under the Guidelines, a “defendant’s family ties and responsibilities, [section]

5H1.6, his or her education and vocational skills, section 5H1.2, and his or her military,

civic, charitable, or public service record, section 5H1.11,” id., are discouraged factors

that are “‘not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be

outside the applicable guideline range.’” Id. (quoting 1995 U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H, intro.

comment). Moreover, the Guidelines suggest that only “in exceptional cases” should the

court consider such circumstances. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H, intro. comment; cf. Koon, 518

U.S. at 95. Of course, “[a]fter Booker, . . . the fact that a factor is discouraged or

forbidden under the guidelines does not automatically make it irrelevant when a court

is weighing statutory factors apart from the guidelines.” United States v. Husein, 478

F.3d 318, 326 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Aitoro, 446 F.3d 246, 255 n.9 (1st

Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Burton, 230 F. App’x 505, 509-10 (6th Cir. 2007).

Nevertheless, section 3553(a)(5) “requires that the district court consider applicable

policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, and the Guidelines’ disfavored

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view towards age and physical condition is, therefore, relevant to our reasonableness

review.” Burton, 230 F. App’x at 510.

At the 2008 re-sentencing hearing, the district court stated that:

Next, Mr. Christman’s educational and vocational skills. He’s also a

composer and musician. He composes music on a self-contained

synthesizer-type instrument that reproduces the sounds of many

instruments. At Mr. Christman’s original sentencing hearing in October,

2005, he played this music to the Court, and this factor can be considered

by the Court under Sentencing Guideline Section 5H1.2 which is

educational and vocational skills.

Educational and vocational skills, as described under section 5H1.2, are a discouraged

factor, and so should be relied upon only “‘in exceptional cases.’” Koons, 518 U.S. at

95 (quoting 1995 U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H, intro. comment). While it is not an abuse of

discretion for a judge to take note of a defendant’s educational background and skill, see

Stall, 582 F.3d at 288, neither is a defendant’s job, in and of itself, relevant to sentencing

absent unusual circumstances. Thus, the district court abused its discretion here in

finding, without explanation, that the fact that Christman writes and plays music is, in

and of itself, a mitigating factor.

The district court also found that the fact that Christman had, while on bail

pending his appeal, become the primary caregiver to his elderly mother, was a mitigating

factor under section 5H1.6 (family ties and responsibilities). “[F]amily circumstances

[are] a ‘discouraged’ factor under the Guidelines”. Husein, 478 F.3d at 326 (quoting

Koon, 518 U.S. at 95). Commentary recently added to section 5H1.6 offers guidance by

requiring the presence of the following four “circumstances” before a finding that

extraordinariness exists in this case: 

(i) The defendant’s service of a sentence within the applicable guideline

range will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of essential

caretaking, or essential financial support, to the defendant’s family. 

(ii) The loss of caretaking or financial support substantially exceeds the

harm ordinarily incident to incarceration for a similarly situated

defendant. For example, the fact that the defendant’s family might incur

some degree of financial hardship or suffer to some extent from the

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5

See United States v. Reed, 264 F.3d 640, 654-54 (6th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases illustrating that

this Court and other circuits have “generally not approved of downward departures for family

responsibilities based on a parent’s obligation to a child.”)

absence of a parent through incarceration is not in itself sufficient as a

basis for departure because such hardship or suffering is of a sort

ordinarily incident to incarceration. 

(iii) The loss of caretaking or financial support is one for which no

effective remedial or ameliorative programs reasonably are available,

making the defendant’s caretaking or financial support irreplaceable to

the defendant’s family. 

(iv) The departure effectively will address the loss of caretaking or

financial support. 

Id. at 326-27 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, cmt. 1(B)).

Here, defendant argues that “Christman can be relieved but not replaced.”

(Appellee’s Brief at 17.) However, in and of itself, this is not sufficient. When “there

are feasible alternatives of care that are relatively comparable to what the defendant

provides, the defendant cannot be irreplaceable.” United States v. Pereira, 272 F.3d 76,

83 (1st Cir. 2001). There is a feasible alternative available: should his siblings be

unable to provide care, a nursing home can provide the around-the-clock care that

Christman provides to his mother and that his family believes to be necessary. While

this is, of course, a substantial hardship to his mother, it is difficult to see how placement

in a nursing home is necessarily a death sentence upon her, as the district court argues.

Unlike in Husein, it has not been argued that Christman’s family cannot afford to place

his mother in a nursing home, just that they would prefer not to, so cost is not a relevant

consideration here; they argue only that “her quality of life would be greatly

diminished.” (Appellee’s Brief at 17.) As the government notes, many adults provide

care for their aged parents or their young children. See, e.g., United States v. Cantrell,

173 F.3d 430 (Table), 1999 WL 96656, at *3 (6th Cir. 1999). However, as long as

alternate arrangements for care can be made, which in the case of children may include

foster care,5

 a situation analogous to placement in a nursing home, this does not argue

for mitigation unless extraordinary circumstances exist. To say otherwise would be to

invite gross sentencing disparities based solely on whether one has a young child or an

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infirm dependant. As no extraordinary circumstances appear here, either as argued by

Christman’s attorney or in the statements of Christman’s family at the sentencing

hearing, we find that the district court abused its discretion in weighing this factor so

heavily in favor of mitigation.

B. Failure to Address Relevant Factors

The government also argues that the district court failed to address several

section 3553(a) factors that were relevant to sentencing, including deterrence,

unwarranted disparity, and the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the

offense, promote respect for the law, or provide just punishment. In the alternative, the

government argues that, if the court did consider those factors, it failed to explain how

the non-custodial sentence furthered them.

Section 3553(a) provides in relevant part that, when imposing sentences, courts

shall consider:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the

offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment

for the offense . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct

[and] to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. . . .

* * *

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants

with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1-2, 6).

While the district court recited the requirements of sentencing pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and section 3553(2)(A)(1), (2008 Sent. Tr. at 24-26), the court did

not later address the issues of deterrence, disparity, or the need for the sentence to be just

in any of its sentencing considerations or reasoning. The court did note that this is an

“unusual sentence.” (Id. at 47.) The court’s explanation that followed could be read as

an explanation of this disparity as based on Christman’s time on supervised release and

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6

As explained fully below, in the original sentencing, the court had focused heavily on the harm

caused to the victims of the creation of child pornography.

7

Unlike in Stall, here, the prosecutor’s statements focused on the issues of deterrence and

disparity, so the court had notice and was aware of the importance of these factors. 581 F.3d at 287. This

case is also distinguishable from Stall because here the district court did not conduct the “extensive

analysis of how a ten-year term of supervised release would restrict [the defendant’s] freedom and protect

the public explains why the district court believed this sentence will deter similar offenders and why this

case warranted a variance” which could excuse failure to conduct “a discrete analysis of each [statutory

factor]’s application.” Stall, 581 F.3d at 287. 

the impact on his family, specifically his mother. (Id. at 47-48.) Additionally, the

district court implicitly suggested, in one sentence, that the non-custodial sentence will

serve the interest of specific deterrence, as Christman did not violate the nearly identical

terms of his release pending appeal. (Id. at 30-31 (“[O]ne can conclude that

Mr. Christman is not a danger to the community since he has had no violations on home

detention with electronic monitoring for over four years. . . .”).) However, just because

Christman did not violate his release before, with the specter of this re-sentencing

hanging over his head, does not necessarily mean that supervised release is sufficient to

provide even specific deterrence. Moreover, the transcript makes no reference to general

deterrence. 

While the court named the relevant factors, mere recitation of the factors is not

sufficient to provide for meaningful appellate review. United States v. Fenderson, 354

F. App’x 236, 244 (6th Cir. 2009). As the district court merely impliedly addressed the

issues of specific deterrence and potential disparity, and did not address general

deterrence, or how this sentence could begin to address the harms to the victims,6

 the

court did not adequately address these issues.7 See United States v. Camiscione, 591

F.3d 823, 834 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that “[g]eneral deterrence is crucial in the child

pornography context,” and holding that a one-day sentence of incarceration for

possession of child pornography was substantively unreasonable where the district court

“gave [no] indication that it even considered how its admittedly ‘lenient’ sentence would

deter others generally from purchasing and viewing child pornography” and the

“sentence, which was devoid of any significant period of incarceration, home

confinement, or substantial fine undermines the purpose of general deterrence.”). Thus,

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the sentence was substantively unreasonable for failing to provide enough reasoning of

the section 3553(a) factors to provide for meaningful appellate review.

C. Contradictory Sentencing Rationales

The government last argues that the district court’s re-sentencing rationale

contradicts what it said during the original sentencing in two ways. First, it contends

that the district court first found Christman’s “medical and back issues” to be

unremarkable and unworthy of a variance but, in re-sentencing, found them to be

extraordinary and a basis for extraordinary lenience, though the facts asserted by

Christman were identical. Second, the government argues that, while the court had

placed regard for the true victims of child pornography possession—those children who

are severely abused to enable its production—at the center of its rationale during the first

sentencing, the victims went unmentioned during the court’s reasoning at re-sentencing.

First, in Christman’s original sentencing in 2005, in which he was sentenced to

57 months in prison, the district court stated that it had “considered the history of the

defendant, the defendant’s significant mental - medical problems, significantly long-term

back pain. The Court finds that this factor is not something that should affect sentencing

other than a recommendation to a Bureau of Prisons medical facility.” (2005 Sent. Tr.

at 11.) At the re-sentencing hearing, however, the district court, without further

explanation and without different facts or circumstances having been presented by

Christman, found that Christman’s “medical and back issues” “can be considered when

it is presented to an unusual degree, as in this case, under Sentencing Guidelines Section

5H1.4 which is physical condition.” (2008 Sent. Tr. at 29.) Additionally, according to

the 2005 pre-sentence report, Christman “is not severely infirm and confined to his

home, except by choice” (2005 PSR ¶ 117; 2008 PSR ¶ 124), and he committed all the

crimes of conviction from inside his house. Without further explanation to show how

the district court so drastically changed its understanding of Christman’s back pain, it

is impossible to know why this determination was reversed on re-sentencing. While

there does not appear to be a clear constitutional or statutory requirement that a court

view a defendant consistently, when the court makes such a strong statement as to find

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that medical and back issues are present in an unusual degree but had previously found

the identical issues in the same defendant to be insignificant, a failure to give any

explanation is unreasonable.

Second, in Christman’s original sentencing, the district court articulated the

following sentencing rationale:

For every bit of child pornography, there is some child who was hurt,

tortured, killed, whatever. A lot of these videos that there are child

pornography come from places like Brazil where children are kidnapped

off the street, raped, killed right on film with the sound and the pictures

for people to watch. There’s only one way to stop that distribution. We

can’t stop it at the end where it’s made, but we can stop it at the end

where it’s consumed. And if there aren’t any consumers for it, there

won’t be anyone making it hopefully. And I think that was Congress’

intent when it passed these laws, and it’s the Court’s duty to enforce it.

(2005 Sent. Tr. at 26.). However, the second sentencing transcript contains no mention

of the children who are the true victims of child pornography, and the district court did

not explain this change in the reasoning for its sentence, although the prosecution

forcefully explained the importance of this factor at the sentencing hearing, stating that

“he’s an end user of that child pornography, a business that has very, very, very

damaging effects on children who are abused and others who are given access to that

really degrading type of behavior.” (2008 Sent. Tr. at 38.) As previously noted, there

is no requirement that a district court be consistent upon re-sentencing; indeed, resentencing is required to correct a problem with the original sentencing. However, as

before, this is a drastic change in sentencing rationale; the district court on re-sentencing

seems concerned only with how the sentence will affect Christman and his mother.

While this is important, they are not the victims of the crime and it is not for their benefit

alone that the sentence must be imposed. The complete lack of explanation for this

change is, given the unique circumstances of this case, unreasonable.

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IV.

We therefore VACATE the sentence and REMAND for re-sentencing in light

of this opinion. While we make no recommendation as to the duration of the new

sentence, we also direct that this case be assigned to a different judge for re-sentencing.

See generally Bercheny v. Johnson, 633 F.2d 473, 476-77 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing with

approval, United States v. Robin, 533 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977), articulating the factors

to be considered in determining whether to remand to a different judge).

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