Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-00552/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-00552-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wayne Hiatt
Plaintiff
Sun City Festival
Defendant
Sun City Festival Community Association Incorporated
Defendant

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Before the Court is Wayne Hiatt’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

(Doc. 87). Having reviewed the parties’ briefing (Docs. 97, 104), and having held an 

evidentiary hearing on September 25 and September 26, 2024, the Court now rules as 

follows.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a two-count Complaint against Defendant Sun 

City Festival Community Association Incorporated (“Defendant” or the “Association”) 

alleging discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et seq., 

and the Arizona Fair Housing Act (“AZFHA”), A.R.S. § 41-1491.19(B). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff 

alleges that he is a disabled veteran who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder 

(“PTSD”), constant anxiety, and panic attacks. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 8; Doc. 87 at 3). Plaintiff alleges 

that woodworking helps reduce the symptoms associated with his disability. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 

10; Doc. 87 at 3). Plaintiff further alleges that his garage is the only place where he can 

engage in woodwork and achieve therapeutic benefits to his PTSD. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 10; Doc. 

Wayne Hiatt,

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Sun City Festival Community 

Association Incorporated,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-23-00552-PHX-SPL

ORDER

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87 at 3). The Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions 

(“CC&Rs”) prohibits open garage doors and further provides that “[g]arage doors shall 

remain closed at all times except when entering or exiting the garage.” (Doc. 7 at ¶ 6; Doc. 

97 at 16; Doc. 50-1 at 375, § 3(c)). Plaintiff, however, claims he needs to keep his garage 

door open while woodworking inside of his garage to avoid triggering his PTSD. (Doc. 1 

at ¶ 10; Doc. 87 at 4). 

In October 2022, a neighbor complained to the Association about Plaintiff leaving 

his garage door open, and the Association sent Plaintiff a notice of violation instructing 

him to keep the garage door closed. (Doc. 87 at 3–4). In November 2022, Plaintiff sent the 

Association a request for accommodation under the FHA to keep his garage door open 

while he is woodworking. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 11). In January 2023, the Association, through its 

legal counsel, denied Plaintiff’s accommodation request. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 16–17, Doc. 1-2 at 

2–3). Plaintiff filed this lawsuit shortly after. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for 

a Preliminary Injunction on August 29, 2024, nearly 17 months after filing the initial 

Complaint. (Doc. 87). Plaintiff’s Motion seeks an injunction preventing Defendant from 

enforcing its restriction against open garage doors against Plaintiff. (Id. at 1). On 

September 25 and September 26, 2024, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion 

and took the matter under advisement.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party seeking injunctive relief must show that: (1) it is likely to succeed on the 

merits; (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the 

balance of equities tips in its favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. 

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “The Ninth Circuit weighs these factors 

on a sliding scale, such that where there are only ‘serious questions going to the merits’—

that is, less than a ‘likelihood of success’ on the merits—a preliminary injunction may still 

issue so long as ‘the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor’ and the other 

two factors are satisfied.” Short v. Brown, 893 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Shell 

Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013)).

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“A preliminary injunction can take two forms. A prohibitory injunction prohibits a 

party from taking action and preserves the status quo pending a determination of the action 

on the merits.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 

878 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). In contrast, “[a] mandatory injunction 

orders a responsible party to take action.” Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(citation omitted). Thus, “[a] mandatory injunction goes well beyond simply maintaining 

the status quo pendente lite and is particularly disfavored. In general, mandatory 

injunctions are not granted unless extreme or very serious damage will result and are not 

issued in doubtful cases or where the injury complained of is capable of compensation in 

damages.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Scope of Relief Sought

As a threshold issue, Defendant argues that Plaintiff seeks relief beyond the scope 

of Plaintiff’s original Complaint in requesting an exception to the garage door rule for 

activities other than solely woodworking, and that Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to 

injunctive relief. (Doc. 97 at 8–9). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “there must be a 

relationship between the injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct 

asserted in the underlying complaint.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. 

Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015). “This requires a sufficient nexus between the 

claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying 

complaint itself.” Id. A sufficient nexus exists when the preliminary injunction would grant 

relief of the same nature as the complaint. Id.

While Plaintiff’s Complaint certainly primarily focused on woodworking, his 

accommodation request to Defendant also noted that he utilizes the garage as a safe place 

to be social without being overwhelmed. (Doc. 1 at 3, ¶ 13). Indeed, this Court has 

previously considered and accepted that Plaintiff seeks an accommodation for various 

therapeutic activities—including woodworking, drawing, and watching TV—that he 

enjoys from the comfort of his garage. (Doc. 82 at 6). Moreover, the relief Plaintiff seeks 

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for woodworking in his garage is the same relief Plaintiff seeks for engaging in other 

therapeutic activities, such as drawing: to be allowed to keep his garage door open while 

engaging in such activities. Because the preliminary injunction would grant “relief of the 

same character as that which may be granted finally,” the relief sought has the requisite 

clear nexus to the underlying complaint. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC, 810 F.3d at

636 (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945). Therefore, 

this Court has authority to provide injunctive relief.

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

To meet this factor, Plaintiff need only show a likelihood of success on the merits—

or serious questions—as to one of their claims for relief. Here, Plaintiff asserts two claims 

for relief: a violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act and a violation of the Arizona Fair 

Housing Act. Under the FHA, it is unlawful to “discriminate against any person . . . in the 

provision of services or facilities in connection with [his] dwelling, because of a handicap.” 

42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable 

accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may 

be necessary to afford [a disabled] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling . 

. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); 24 C.F.R. § 100.204. Arizona courts have noted that the 

AZFHA is “virtually identical” to the FHA. Canady v. Prescott Canyon Ests. Homeowners 

Ass’n, 60 P.3d 231, 233 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).

To show that a defendant has violated the FHA, a plaintiff must prove all of the 

following elements: (1) that the plaintiff is handicapped within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 3602(h); (2) that the defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to know of the 

handicap; (3) that accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the 

handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the 

accommodation is reasonable; and (5) that defendant refused to make the requested 

accommodation. Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 

1179 (9th Cir. 2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). “The reasonable accommodation 

inquiry is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination.” United States v. Cal.

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Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). 

Defendant primarily disputes whether Plaintiff’s requested accommodations are 

necessary to allow him to use and enjoy his home. (Doc. 97 at 4–5). Defendant also argues 

in its Response that Plaintiff is requesting an accommodation for claustrophobia, which is 

the trigger for Plaintiff’s PTSD and is not the specific disability for which he seeks an 

accommodation. (Id. at 3). However, after reviewing the record, it is clearly established 

that Plaintiff has PTSD, that Defendant knew of his condition, and that Defendant refused 

to meet Plaintiff’s requested accommodation. (See generally Doc. 67; Doc. 68 at ¶¶ 2, 14, 

21; Doc. 50 at ¶¶ 2, 14, 21). Indeed, this Court recognized in a September 19, 2024 Order 

determining the scope of the Preliminary Injunction hearing that these three elements 

(plaintiff’s handicap, defendant’s knowledge of the handicap, and defendant’s refusal to 

accommodate) were conceded by the parties. (Doc. 100 at 2).

Additionally, this Court settled the “reasonableness” element in its August 13, 2024 

Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. 82 at 5). Under the 

FHA, accommodations are reasonable if they do not impose a “fundamental alteration in 

the nature of the program” or “undue financial or administrative burdens.” Giebeler v. M 

& B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Defendant conceded

that Plaintiff’s accommodation does not impose any financial or administrative burdens. 

(Doc. 67 at 16 n.1). Instead, Defendant has argued that Plaintiff’s woodworking activities 

could impose a noise impact that could fundamentally alter the Association’s community. 

(Id. at 16). In its August 13, 2024 Order, the Court found that because Plaintiff seeks an 

accommodation for other therapeutic activities in his garage that do not have a noise 

impact, such as painting, Defendant’s general noise concerns do not rebut Plaintiff’s claims 

that allowing him to keep his garage door open is a reasonable accommodation. (Doc. 82 

at 5). Thus, the only element that remains unresolved is whether the accommodation is 

necessary under the FHA. 

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i. Necessity of Plaintiff’s Requested Accommodation

“To prove that an accommodation is necessary, ‘[p]laintiffs must show that, but for 

the accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing 

of their choice.’” Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1155 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see 

Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d at 1381 (“Without a causal link between 

defendants’ policy and plaintiff’s injury, there can be no obligation on the part of 

defendants to make a reasonable accommodation.”). Courts in this District have utilized a 

Seventh Circuit standard in assessing necessity, which considers whether the 

accommodation “will affirmatively enhance a disabled plaintiff’s quality of life by 

ameliorating the effects of the disability.” Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 838 

(7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Sw. Fair Hous. Council v. WG Chandler Villas 

SH LLC, No. CV-19-00178-TUC-RM, 2023 WL 5158889, at *7 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2023) 

(citing Dadian, 269 F.3d at 838); Ariz. Recovery Hous. Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health 

Servs., 462 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1003 (D. Ariz. 2020) (citing Dadian, 269 F.3d at 838). 

Plaintiff argues that the requested accommodation is necessary because without the 

ability to woodwork in his garage, Plaintiff does not have an equal opportunity to enjoy his 

housing. (Doc. 87 at 6). According to Plaintiff, the only other coping mechanism that has 

provided the same level of therapeutic benefits is scuba diving. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff took a 

five-month trip in 2023 to Bali, Indonesia, to scuba dive and repair his mental health, but 

this therapeutic method is not a long-term solution to his PTSD as he lives in Sun City, 

Arizona. (Id. at 3, 7; Doc. 104 at 6). Plaintiff also indicated that he began exploring other 

therapeutic options “before he realized how beneficial woodworking in his garage was to 

his efforts.” (Doc. 87 at 8). Plaintiff’s family healthcare provider, Nurse Practitioner Sarah 

Sonchik (“NP Sonchik”), signed off on Plaintiff’s accommodation request form, which 

included a checked box that the requested accommodation was necessary. (Doc. 50-1 at 

21–22). NP Sonchik’s internal notes stated that Plaintiff “enjoys wood working” and that 

it has a “mental benefit to him.” (Doc. 97 at 4). Plaintiff has not provided additional 

documentary evidence, such as a note from his psychologist Dr. Chokra, demonstrating 

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that the accommodation is necessary. 

Defendant argues that the accommodation is unnecessary because there is a 

woodshop in the community Plaintiff can use and because Plaintiff utilizes other 

therapeutic methods to cope with his PTSD, including medications, breathing exercises, 

and traveling to scuba dive. (Doc. 97 at 5). However, Plaintiff countered at the Preliminary 

Injunction hearing that the community woodshop is not an appropriate alternative, as 

working around others does not mitigate his symptoms and he cannot always get to the 

community shop quickly when he feels an episode arising. (Docs. 117 at 15–16). 

As this Court recognized in its August 13, 2024 Order, this element of Plaintiff’s 

FHA claim is highly contested. (Doc. 82 at 4). Plaintiff has attested that the therapeutic 

benefits of woodworking in his garage ameliorate the effects of his PTSD symptoms and 

enhance his quality of life. (Doc. 87 at 6–7). However, a question still exists as to whether 

“but for” being allowed to leave his garage door open while woodworking inside, Plaintiff 

will be denied an equal opportunity to enjoy his housing. In other cases granting relief for 

similar FHA claims, plaintiffs typically provided a greater showing of evidence on 

necessity, see Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1289 

(11th Cir. 2014) (where the plaintiff introduced multiple letters from treating psychiatrist 

to support history of PTSD and the curative impact of his requested accommodation), or a 

clearer link between their disability, the defendant’s policy, and the relief sought. See 

Holland v. Related Cos., Inc., No. C 15-03220 JSW, 2015 WL 4498776, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

July 23, 2015) (finding the plaintiff’s requested accommodation of moving to another 

apartment unit away from loud construction noise that triggered his PTSD necessary). 

Courts have declined to find this factor satisfied when healthcare providers opine that a 

requested accommodation is merely suitable or sufficient, without offering an opinion 

about what accommodation is necessary. See Norman v. Rancho del Lago Cmty. Ass’n, No. 

19-CV-00486-TUC-JAS-LCK, 2021 WL 5167305, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 5, 2021). To that 

end, courts have refused to find an accommodation necessary when plaintiffs provide only 

“unsupported averments” and “slight anecdotal evidence” of the requested 

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accommodation’s necessity. Prindable v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 

304 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1257 (D. Haw. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Dubois, 453 F.3d 1175. 

Additionally, courts are disinclined to find the necessity element satisfied when the 

requested accommodation provides a benefit unrelated to ameliorating the effects of a 

handicap or when the plaintiff cannot show that an alternative accommodation would not 

accommodate his disability equally as well. Norman, 2021 WL 5167305, at *6; see also 

Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard Cnty., Md., 124 F.3d 597, 605 (4th Cir. 1997). 

Here, Plaintiff has provided evidence of necessity in the form of his personal

opinion, NP Sonchik’s signing of the accommodation request form and acknowledgement 

that woodworking in the garage provides a “mental benefit,” and Plaintiff’s wife Maria 

Corella’s testimony that working in the garage helps Plaintiff manage his symptoms. (See

Docs. 106; 50-1 at 21–22; 118 at 7). While NP Sonchik signed the accommodation request 

form that Plaintiff prepared, which included a checked box certifying that the garage door 

exception was necessary, her records and hearing testimony did not clearly affirm that butfor Plaintiff’s ability to woodwork or engage in other activities with his garage door open, 

Plaintiff will be unable to enjoy his housing on equal terms with non-disabled neighbors. 

(See Docs. 50-1 at 21–22; 97 at 4; 118 at 33). Plaintiff’s other evidence largely relies on 

his own subjective opinion that the accommodation is necessary and that no alternative 

therapeutic methods provide sufficient relief. The Court recognizes that Plaintiff likely is 

best positioned to know the beneficial effect working in his garage with the door open has 

on his PTSD, as Plaintiff argued at the September 26, 2024 hearing. (Doc. 118 at 83–84). 

However, Plaintiff’s evidence falls short of that found sufficient to prove the necessity of 

an accommodation in other cases. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to

clearly establish a likelihood of success, but that he has posed a serious question to the 

merits of his FHA claim.

C. Irreparable Harm

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must “demonstrate that irreparable 

injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22; Boardman v. Pac. 

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Seafood Grp., 822 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2016) (“A threat of irreparable harm is 

sufficiently immediate to warrant preliminary injunctive relief if the plaintiff ‘is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered.’” (quoting Winter, 

555 U.S. at 22)). Irreparable harm is harm “that cannot be redressed by a legal or equitable 

remedy following trial.” Premier Nutrition, Inc. v. Organic Food Bar, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 

2d 995, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that delay in 

seeking a preliminary injunction is a factor to consider in evaluating irreparable injury. Arc 

of Cal. v. Douglas, 757 F.3d 975, 990 (9th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff’s “long delay before 

seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of urgency and irreparable harm.” Oakland 

Trib., Inc. v. Chron. Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985). However, the Ninth 

Circuit has held that delay alone is not dispositive “in the context of ongoing, worsening 

injuries.” Douglas, 757 F.3d at 990.

In the present case, Plaintiff moves for a Preliminary Injunction nearly 17 months 

after filing his initial Complaint. Plaintiff argues that absent an injunction, he will suffer 

irreparable harm because he “will continue to suffer, and his mental health will continue to 

deteriorate.” (Doc. 87 at 8). Additionally, Plaintiff states that he is currently unable to 

engage in his most effective alternative form of relief, scuba diving. (Id.) However, 

Plaintiff also indicated in his Reply and confirmed at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing 

that he has been back in Arizona—with limited opportunities to scuba dive—for nearly a 

year. (Docs. 104 at 6; 117 at 87; 118 at 101). Defendant argues an injunction is not 

warranted due to Plaintiff’s delay in seeking a preliminary injunction while living in 

accordance with the closed garage door rule for 18 months and Plaintiff’s failure to explain 

why injunctive relief is only necessary and appropriate now. (Doc. 97 at 14). Defendant 

also notes that Plaintiff has not presented documentary evidence, such as medical records 

or opinions, articulating how Plaintiff’s mental health will suffer irreparable harm. (Id. at 

15). 

In the Motion’s briefings, Plaintiff did not provide an explanation for the delay in 

seeking a preliminary injunction, but he did note that following the denial of his requested 

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accommodation “he worked with his counsel to develop his case against the association, 

so that he could prevail at a preliminary injunction hearing.” (Doc. 104 at 6). At the 

Preliminary Injunction hearing, Plaintiff argued that the delay was due to Plaintiff’s trip to 

Bali—from which he returned a year ago—and his attempts to implement other, ultimately 

unsuccessful therapeutic strategies in the meantime. (Doc. 118 at 82). The Court finds that 

this is not a compelling justification for the delay. That Plaintiff was able to withstand the 

harm from a lack of accommodation for such a significant length of time indicates that the 

harm is not of the immediate, irreparable consequence contemplated by preliminary 

injunctions. See Donaghey v. Moorpark Bellingham Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 2:22-

CV-08524-DSF-MAA, 2023 WL 9318509, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2023) (finding that 

plaintiff’s one-year delay in seeking preliminary injunction after filing FHA 

accommodation complaint undercut claim of urgent irreparable harm). Moreover, Plaintiff 

failed to show that the harm he faces moving forward is new or significantly worsening as 

to require injunctive relief. Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged at the Preliminary 

Injunction hearing on September 26, 2024 that there is no new harm and that Plaintiff will 

continue suffering the same harm. (Doc. 118 at 83); see Oakland Trib., Inc., 762 F.2d at

1377 (“Where no new harm is imminent, and where no compelling reason is apparent, the 

district court was not required to issue a preliminary injunction against a practice which 

has continued unchallenged for several years.”). All told, the bar to receive a preliminary 

injunction is a high one, and the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a likelihood 

of immediate, irreparable harm. 

D. Balance of Equities and Hardships

Plaintiff argues that there are no equities that tip in Defendant’s favor because 

Defendant can enforce or not enforce the garage door rule at its discretion. (Doc. 87 at 9). 

Defendant argues that it is legally obligated to enforce the rules in its government 

documents. (Doc. 97 at 15). Under the Association’s CC&Rs, the Board has discretion to 

enforce restrictions if a restriction is inconsistent with applicable law or if the Board 

“reasonably determines that the Association’s position is not strong enough to justify 

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taking enforcement action.” (Doc. 87 at 9 (citing Doc. 50-1 at 373, § 4.2)). As Defendant 

also has a legal obligation “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, 

practices, or services” under the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), Defendant’s obligation 

to enforce its rules and policies is outweighed by the obligation to abide by the FHA. See 

generally United States v. Wagner, 940 F. Supp. 972, 979 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (“Congress 

also stated that the FHA ‘prohibit[s] the application of special requirements through . . . 

restrictive covenants . . . that have the effect of limiting the ability of [disabled persons] to 

live in the residence of their choice in the community.’” (alterations in original) (citing 

H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2185)). 

Beyond Defendant’s obligation to enforce its CC&Rs, Defendant argues that 

Plaintiff’s activities disturb the quiet enjoyment and ambiance of the community. (Doc. 97 

at 16). However, Defendant conceded that Plaintiff’s accommodation does not impose any 

financial or administrative burdens. (Doc. 67 at 16 n.1). Additionally, Defendant conceded

at the September 26, 2024 hearing that it has little hardship to the extent Plaintiff engages 

in quiet activities with his garage door open and does not have woodworking materials 

placed outside of the garage on his driveway. (Doc. 118 at 103). 

Plaintiff has an obvious interest in obtaining his requested accommodation for his 

disability. If Plaintiff had established that an injunction was necessary to prevent 

irreparable harm, Plaintiff’s interest would likely outweigh Defendant’s interests under the 

balance of equities and hardships prong. However, because Plaintiff has not satisfied the 

irreparable harm element, the Court cannot find that “the balance of hardships tips sharply 

in the plaintiff’s favor” as required to grant a preliminary injunction when Plaintiff only 

poses a serious question, rather than a likelihood, of success on the merits. Short v. Brown, 

893 F.3d at 675.

E. Public Interest

Courts have widely recognized the general public interest in enforcing fair housing 

laws. See Johnson v. Macy, 145 F.Supp.3d 907, 921 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“[C]ourts have 

emphatically declared that the public interest is served by effective enforcement of the 

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FHA.”); Na’’im v. Sophie’s Arms Fine Residences, LLC, No. 3:13-CV-02515-JAH, 2013 

WL 8609251, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013) (“[T]he public interest has been 

authoritatively declared by Congress in its enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.”). While 

the Court recognizes the public interest in upholding restrictive covenants of residential 

communities, the Court finds that public policy favors effective enforcement of fair 

housing laws. The public interest factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to 

injunctive relief at this stage. While there is a question to the merits of Plaintiff’s FHA 

claim, he failed to carry his burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits. 

Moreover, Plaintiff did not make a clear showing of irreparable harm; indeed, his 

significant delay in seeking a preliminary injunction undercuts his claim that he faces 

immediate, irreparable harm. While the balance of equities and hardships and the public 

interest factors weigh in favor of enforcing a valid FHA claim, Plaintiff’s failure to meet 

the first two Winter factors entails that a preliminary injunction is inappropriate. Having 

considered all of the evidence and the arguments of the parties, and having individually 

considered the Winter factors with respect to both claims for injunctive relief, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 87) is 

denied.

Dated this 16th day of October, 2024.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

Case 2:23-cv-00552-SPL Document 121 Filed 10/16/24 Page 12 of 12