Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02142/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02142-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerry Lynn Simons
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2142

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Jerry Lynn Simons, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 10, 2010

Filed: July 21, 2010

___________

Before SMITH, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Jerry Simons pled guilty to failing to register as required by the Sex Offender

Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16991, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The district court sentenced Simons to 24 months

imprisonment and 20 years of supervised release. In addition to the standard

conditions of supervised release, the court imposed 18 special conditions. Simons

appeals four of those special conditions. Because the district court plainly erred in

imposing one of the special conditions, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand

for further proceedings. 

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In February 2005, Simons’s Kansas probation was revoked for the following

violations: (1) new convictions in Missouri and Oklahoma; (2) failure to attend

treatment; (3) leaving the jurisdiction without permission; (4) failure to make

payments; and (5) failure to complete an evaluation. Simons served 14 months in

prison for the violations. (See PSR ¶ 29.)

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I.

On December 4, 2008, a criminal complaint was filed against Simons, charging

him with failure to register as a sex offender as required by SORNA, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The following day, Simons was arrested by United States

Marshals in Omaha, Nebraska. A grand jury returned an indictment against Simons

on December 17, charging that, having previously been convicted in Kansas of an

offense that required him to register as a sex offender, he traveled in interstate

commerce to Nebraska and failed to register there. On January 29, 2009, Simons pled

guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) identified two prior convictions

that are relevant here: (1) a 2003 Kansas conviction for attempted indecent liberties

with a child, for which Simons received 24 months probation,1

 and (2) a 2005

Oklahoma conviction for first degree rape by force and fear, for which Simons

received a 30-year suspended sentence. As a result of his 2003 Kansas conviction,

Simons was required to register as a sex offender under SORNA; Simons had last

registered in Kansas in 2007. Simons had a base offense level of 16, which the district

court reduced to 13 based on his acceptance of responsibility pursuant to United States

Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §3E1.1(b) (Nov. 2009). Given Simons’s

4 criminal history points, his advisory Guidelines sentencing range was 24-30 months

imprisonment. Pursuant to the plea agreement, both parties asked the district court to

sentence Simons at the low end of the Guidelines range. The plea agreement was

silent as to any conditions of supervised release to be imposed by the court.

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The district court followed the parties’ recommendations and sentenced Simons

to 24 months imprisonment. The court also placed Simons on supervised release for

a term of 20 years. In addition to the standard conditions of supervised release, the

district court imposed 18 special conditions of release recommended by the probation

office, of which 4 are relevant here:

3. Paragraph # 7 of the Standard Conditions of supervision is

modified, i.e., instead of merely refraining from excessive use of

alcohol, the defendant shall not purchase or possess, use,

distribute, or administer any alcohol, just the same as any other

narcotic or controlled substance. . . .

5. The defendant shall have no contact, nor reside with children

under the age of 18, including his/her own children, unless

approved in advance by the U.S. Probation Officer in consultation

with the treatment providers. The defendant must report all

incidental contact with children to the U.S. Probation Officer and

the treatment provider. Should the defendant have incidental

contact with a child, the defendant is required to immediately

remove him/herself from the situation and notify his/her U.S.

Probation Officer within 24 hours of this contact.

6. The defendant shall not access or come within 500 feet of schools,

school yards, parks, arcades, playgrounds, amusement parks, or

other places used primarily by children under the age of 18 unless

approved in advance by the U.S. Probation Officer. . . .

13. The defendant shall neither possess nor have under his/her control

any material, legal or illegal, that contains nudity or that depicts

or alludes to sexual activity or depicts sexually arousing material.

This includes, but is not limited to, any material obtained through

access to any computer, including a computer for employment

purposes, or any other material linked to computer access or use.

(Appellant’s Add. 4-5.) The district court did not explain why it imposed any of the

special conditions, noting only that 20 years of supervised release was “the best thing

that we can do to help [Simons] and to keep him in line.” (Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 8.)

Because Simons’s attorney had not discussed the probation office’s sentencing

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While we agree with the government’s belated argument that we should review

only for plain error, we note that the government’s failure to raise this argument in its

brief or its letter to this Court under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) has

hindered Simons’s ability to adequately respond and, in turn, our ability to decide the

issue after hearing reasoned argument from both parties.

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recommendations with him, Simons first learned of these special conditions at his

sentencing hearing. Simons objected to the special conditions generally, but did not

note any specific condition to which he objected or present any argument to support

his objection. The district court denied the objection, and this appeal followed.

II.

Simons appeals the imposition of the four special conditions of his supervised

release detailed above. We generally review the imposition of special conditions for

an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Carlson, 406 F.3d 529, 531 (8th Cir.

2005); United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667 (8th Cir. 2007). However, when,

as here, a defendant fails to timely and specifically object to such conditions at the

sentencing hearing, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Stults, 575

F.3d 834, 854 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1039 (2010); Carlson, 406 F.3d

at 531. In their briefing to this court, both parties argued that we should review for

abuse of discretion. For the first time at oral argument, however, the government

argued that Simons’s objection at the sentencing hearing was insufficient to preserve

the issue for appeal, therefore we should review only for plain error. Having reviewed

the transcript of the sentencing hearing, it appears that Simons’s attorney presented

only a general objection to the special conditions imposed by the court, noting neither

the basis for his objection nor the specific conditions to which he was objecting. (See

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 14 (“Judge, my client has got some -- some concerns, and

probably the best thing to do would be just me object to the -- to the special conditions

and then I talk to him and at least there’s a record there in case he needs to appeal

them.”).) Thus, we must review only for plain error.2

 “Plain error occurs if the

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district court deviates from a legal rule, the error is clear under current law, and the

error affects the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Crose, 284 F.3d 911,

912 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). The error must also “seriously affect the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Davis, 452

F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736

(1993)).

Although a district court “is afforded wide discretion when imposing terms of

supervised release,” United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2005), 18

U.S.C. § 3583(d) limits that discretion, providing that a court may impose special

conditions only if three requirements are met:

First, the special conditions must be “reasonably related” to five matters:

the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and

characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the

public from further crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s

educational, vocational, medical or other correctional needs. 18 U.S.C.

§§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D); United States

v. Fields, 324 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 2003). Second, the

conditions must “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is

reasonably necessary” to advance deterrence, the protection of the public

from future crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s correctional

needs. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(2), 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D).

Finally, the conditions must be consistent with any pertinent policy

statements issued by the sentencing commission. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)(3). 

Crume, 422 F.3d at 733. This “inquiry must take place on an individualized basis.”

United States v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).

Applying these standards, we consider each of Simons’s objections in turn.

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Manic-depressive disorder, also called bipolar disorder, is a mood disorder

“characterized by episodes of a very high, often irritable, expansive mood that can be

accompanied with things like impulsive behavior, disturbed sleep, decreased need for

sleep, [and] rapid speech,” combined with “separate depressive episodes which are

low, depressed, sad moods that also have sleep/appetite disturbances.” Sigala v.

Quarterman, 338 F. App’x 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished per curiam); see also

Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 382-

401 (4th ed. text revision 2000). 

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A.

It is a standard condition of supervised release that the defendant “refrain from

excessive use of alcohol.” USSG §5D1.3(c)(7). Special condition 3 modifies that

standard condition, providing that Simons “shall not purchase or possess, use,

distribute, or administer any alcohol.” Simons argues that this condition is not

reasonably related to him, his offense, deterrence, or protection of the public, as

required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). He argues that there is no evidence that he is an

alcohol abuser or that alcohol contributed in any way to his present conviction. The

government counters that Simons’s self-reported manic-depressive disorder,3

combined with his dishonesty about his alcohol use, was a sufficient basis for the

district court to impose a complete ban on alcohol.

The evidence before the district court at the sentencing hearing was that Simons

consumed alcohol one to three times per month, with his last reported use in

December 2008. Simons also reported that he first used marijuana at the age of 12,

and that he used it a few times until June 2003. Simons reported that he was

diagnosed with manic-depressive disorder as a child and that he was prescribed and

took medication for this condition while he was incarcerated in 2007. However, he

could not provide the names of the medications he took nor the name of the institution

where he was diagnosed. Additionally, the district court was aware that an application

to revoke Simons’s suspended 30-year Oklahoma sentence had been filed for his

“failure to report to the probation office, failure to provide an accurate address, failure

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to pay fines and costs, and failure to successfully complete sex offender counseling,

as well as the results of a polygraph examination showing that he was being deceptive

concerning the use of alcohol and having contact with minor children.” (PSR ¶ 30.)

Our prior reviews of special conditions imposing complete bans on alcohol

have yielded mixed results. In general, we have upheld such bans for defendants with

substance-abuse problems. See United States v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772, 778-79 (8th

Cir. 1999) (upholding ban on alcohol for a drug-trafficking defendant with a

significant history of substance abuse because alcohol use was inconsistent with the

defendant’s rehabilitation process and because “the evidence . . . indicated that any

use of alcohol would limit [his] ability to maintain a drug-free lifestyle”); United

States v. Cooper, 171 F.3d 582, 584, 586-87 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding ban on

alcohol for defendant, an over-the-road truck driver convicted of transporting

explosive materials, because “there [was] some evidence that [the defendant] abused

his wife and children, that he and his wife consumed large quantities of alcohol on

weekends when he was employed as a truck driver, and that the couple argued more

when [he] had been drinking” and because being a truck driver was “particularly

incompatible with alcohol consumption”). But see United States v. Bass, 121 F.3d

1218, 1219, 1223-25 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing alcohol ban for defendant convicted

of conspiracy and possession of crack cocaine who admitted to smoking marijuana

approximately twice per week). In cases where the defendant’s history or crime of

conviction did not support a complete ban on alcohol, we have reversed. See, e.g.,

United States v. Prendergast, 979 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (8th Cir. 1992) (reversing

alcohol ban for defendant convicted of fraud because there was “no evidence

indicating that [he] suffers from alcoholism or that the use of alcohol in any way

contributed to the commission of the offense for which he was sentenced”). 

Given this precedent, we question whether Simons’s self-reported manicdepressive disorder, coupled with an application to revoke his suspended sentence in

Oklahoma due, at least in part, to dishonesty about his alcohol use, is sufficient to

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justify a 20-year ban on using or possessing alcohol. However, even assuming the

district court erred in imposing this special condition, we do not believe that it rises

to the level of plain error. See United States v. Bongiorno, 139 F.3d 640, 640-41 (8th

Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (declining to review, under plain error, a special condition of

supervised release forbidding the use or possession of alcohol); United States v.

McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 720-24 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a district court did not

plainly err in imposing a complete ban on alcohol possession for a defendant

convicted of armed bank robbery). As such, we will not disturb it on appeal. 

B.

Special condition 5 prohibits Simons from having any contact with children

under the age of 18, including his own children, unless the contact is approved in

advance by his probation officer. It also requires Simons to report any incidental

contact he has with children. Simons argues that prohibitions on contact with children

are appropriate only for defendants convicted of serious crimes, such as possession

of child pornography, and not for what he characterizes as relatively minor offenses,

such as failure to register as a sex offender. Thus, he argues that the condition

involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).

Simons is correct that we have often upheld conditions like special condition

5 for defendants convicted of child pornography offenses. See, e.g., United States v.

Kerr, 472 F.3d 517, 521-23 (8th Cir. 2006) (possessing and distributing child

pornography); United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1051, 1056-57 (8th Cir.

2006) (receiving child pornography); United States v. Mark, 425 F.3d 505, 506-08

(8th Cir. 2005) (possessing child pornography); Crume, 422 F.3d at 730, 734

(receiving and possessing child pornography); United States v. Heidebur, 417 F.3d

1002, 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 2005) (possessing materials involving the sexual

exploitation of a minor). But Simons is incorrect in inferring that possession of child

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pornography is the only type of offense for which a prohibition on contact with

children is appropriate. For example, in United States v. Levering, 441 F.3d 566, 569-

70 (8th Cir. 2006), we upheld a prohibition on contact with female children under the

age of 18 unless the defendant had prior approval of the probation office. There, the

defendant had pled guilty to knowingly using force to engage in a sexual act with his

13-year-old cousin. Id. at 568. In upholding the special condition, we noted that “we

have, on several occasions, approved virtually identical supervised release conditions

for defendants guilty of less egregious conduct[.]” Id. at 569 (quotation omitted). 

In many of our cases affirming no-contact conditions, we have cited a

defendant’s history of sexual abuse of minors as a factor in our decisions. See, e.g.,

Mark, 425 F.3d at 508 (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion by

imposing condition limiting contact with minors without permission, where defendant

had a history of violating conditions of release and the record reflected some sexual

exploration with a minor); Crume, 422 F.3d at 734 (finding no abuse of discretion

where district court imposed a no-contact condition because the child with whom the

defendant desired contact was conceived as a result of his impregnating a

fourteen-year-old girl). Furthermore, § 3583(d) requires us to examine a defendant’s

history and personal characteristics. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1) (citing 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(1)). Here, Simons has two convictions involving minor victims: (1) his 2003

Kansas conviction for attempted indecent liberties with a child, and (2) his 2005

Oklahoma conviction for first degree rape by force and fear. It appears that the victim

of Simons’s Oklahoma rape was his 15-year-old sister-in-law. We conclude that

Simons’s criminal record adequately supports the district court’s no-contact condition,

protecting the public from his future crimes. Moreover, we note that the condition is

not a complete ban, as Simons can still have contact with minors, including his own

children, if he obtains permission from his probation officer. Thus, because

“requiring prior approval before [Simons,] a convicted sex offender[,] has contact with

minors is a reasonable means of ensuring that such contact remains appropriate[,]”

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Mickelson, 433 F.3d at 1057, we hold that special condition 5 is not unreasonably

restrictive, and the district court did not plainly err in imposing it.

C.

Special condition 6 prohibits Simons from coming within 500 feet of schools,

parks, playgrounds, or other places used primarily by children under the age of 18,

unless he secures prior approval from his probation officer. Simons argues that this

condition is unnecessarily restrictive, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1), as it

bears no relationship to his offense or criminal history. 

We have previously upheld conditions prohibiting a defendant from visiting

places where children congregate. See Crume, 422 F.3d at 730, 733-34 (upholding

special condition prohibiting a child-pornography defendant from visiting “places

where minor children under the age of 18 congregate” without permission of his

probation officer); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 693, 696-97 (8th Cir. 2003)

(same). But see Bender, 566 F.3d at 753-54 (reversing, as a greater deprivation of

liberty than was reasonably necessary, a condition that prohibited a defendant from

frequenting places minors are known to frequent without permission, and then only

in the presence and supervision of a responsible adult). As Simons points out, special

condition 6 goes beyond Crume and Ristine in that it prohibits him not just from going

to places where children congregate, but from even coming within 500 feet of such

places. However, in Stults, we addressed an identical condition that prohibited a

defendant from coming “within 500 feet of schools, school yards, parks, arcades,

playgrounds, amusement parks, or other places used primarily by children under the

age of 18 unless approved in advance and in writing by the probation officer.” 575

F.3d at 851. Given the defendant’s history of sexually abusing minors, and the fact

that he could get permission from his probation officer to come within 500 feet of

places used primarily by children, we upheld the condition. Id. at 853.

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We find the reasoning in Stults persuasive. First, given Simons’s history of

committing crimes against children, a ban on coming near places where children

congregate is consistent with the district court’s duty to protect the public from

Simons’s future crimes. Second, as in Stults, Crume, and Ristine, special condition

6 is not a complete ban. Simons may still come within 500 feet of places used

primarily by children, as long as he has the prior approval of his probation officer.

Such “[c]onditions requiring the prior approval of a probation officer are consistently

upheld.” Stults, 575 F.3d at 853 (quotation omitted). Finally, although a prohibition

on coming within 500 feet of a place where children congregate is stricter than a

prohibition on merely being in such places, this does not change our analysis.

Although Simons claims that this will “restrict where [he] lives, works, drives, shops,

and eats,” those concerns are alleviated by the fact that his probation officer can

approve, in advance, certain exceptions to the 500-foot prohibition. Thus, we hold

that the district court did not plainly err in imposing special condition 6.

D.

Special condition 13 prohibits Simons from possessing or having under his

control “any material, legal or illegal, that contains nudity or that depicts or alludes

to sexual activity or depicts sexually arousing material.” (Appellant’s Add. 5.)

Simons argues that the condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, infringing

on what he alleges to be his First Amendment right to view nonobscene material that

contains nudity. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1975);

see also United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 261-62, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding

that a prohibition on possessing pornography violated the defendant’s First

Amendment rights because it “might apply to a wide swath of work ranging from

serious art to ubiquitous advertising” and “to any art form that employs nudity”); cf.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (noting that “obscene material is

unprotected by the First Amendment”). Simons also argues that the condition grants

too much discretion to the probation officer in deciding what constitutes “sexual

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activity” and “sexually arousing material,” and is not sufficiently related to his crime,

his criminal history, or the sentencing purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). 

Prohibitions on the possession of pornographic materials are not unusual special

conditions, and they have often withstood First Amendment challenges. See, e.g.,

Stults, 575 F.3d at 854-55 (upholding, on plain error review, a child-pornography

defendant’s ban on “accessing, viewing, or possessing any pornographic sexually

oriented or sexually stimulating materials”) (quotation and alteration omitted); Boston,

494 F.3d at 667-68 (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing

a ban on “view[ing] or possess[ing] any form of pornography, sexually stimulating or

sexually oriented material”); Ristine, 335 F.3d at 694-95 (upholding, on plain error

review, a ban on possessing pornographic materials for a defendant convicted of

receiving child pornography). The portion of special condition 13 that prohibits

Simons from possessing or viewing material that depicts or alludes to sexual activity

or depicts sexually arousing material is very similar to the conditions we upheld in

Stults and Boston. As a whole, however, special condition 13 goes beyond those

cases, prohibiting Simons from possessing any material that depicts nudity. By its

terms, it would prohibit Simons from viewing a biology textbook or purchasing an art

book that contained pictures of the Venus de Milo, Michelangelo’s David, or

Botticelli’s Birth of Venus, all of which depict nudity. 

To our knowledge, the Seventh Circuit is the only federal court to have

addressed a special condition similar to the one at issue here. In United States v.

Holm, 326 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2003), the defendant had pled guilty to possession of

child pornography. Id. at 874. In addition to challenging the constitutionality of his

conviction, the defendant challenged a number of his conditions of supervised release,

one of which prohibited “possession of material containing nudity.” Id. His

discussion of the supervised release issues on appeal, however, was “brief to the point

of brushing up against full-blown waiver,” as the “entire discussion of the subject

[was] contained within slightly more than a single page” of his brief, and included “no

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Although the definition of “obscenity” has been thoroughly examined by the

Supreme Court, culminating in the now-familiar Miller test, see Miller v. California,

413 U.S. 15 (1973), “[d]efining pornography is notoriously difficult[,]” Cass R.

Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589, 591. In Miller,

the Court used only a footnoted dictionary definition of the word, see 413 U.S. at 18

n.2, and the Court has not subsequently addressed the term outside the context of

pornography involving or depicting children. To be sure, not all material that

qualifies as pornography would also meet the Miller test of obscenity. See Ashcroft

v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002).

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citations to additional material in the record, beyond the court’s judgment itself, that

might help to illuminate the basic contours of his claims.” Id. at 877. Nevertheless,

the court “look[ed] briefly at [the defendant’s] claims” and affirmed the special

condition prohibiting possession of material containing nudity without discussion. Id.

Without some guidance from the Seventh Circuit about the reasoning for its decision

or information about why the district court imposed the special condition on that

particular defendant, Holm does little to assist our analysis here. 

The government attempts to save special condition 13 by analogizing it to cases

like Stults, Boston, and Ristine, which upheld prohibitions on possessing

pornography, essentially arguing that special condition 13 was intended to prohibit

Simons from viewing or possessing pornography. But special condition 13 goes well

beyond the conditions upheld in those cases. Whatever the definition of

“pornography,”4

 it includes more than mere nudity. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S.

153, 161 (1974) (“[N]udity alone is not enough to make material legally

obscene . . . .”); United States v. Kemmerling, 285 F.3d 644, 645-46 (8th Cir. 2002)

(“We have held that more than mere nudity is required before an image can qualify

as ‘lascivious’ within the meaning of the [child pornography statute].”). Indeed, if the

district court was attempting to prohibit Simons’s possession of pornography, a ban

on materials that contain nudity may have been superfluous; a ban on “material that

depicts or alludes to sexual activity or depicts sexually arousing material” would also

ban pornography, at least under some definitions of the word. See Black’s Law

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Dictionary 1279 (9th ed. 2009) (defining pornography as “[m]aterial (such as writings,

photographs, or movies) depicting sexual activity or erotic behavior in a way that is

designed to arouse sexual excitement”); Miller, 413 U.S. at 18 n.2 (defining

pornography as “a depiction (as in writing or painting) of licentiousness or lewdness:

a portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement.” (quoting

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged 1969))). Thus, our prior

decisions upholding prohibitions on possessing pornography are insufficient to save

special condition 13. 

The government also argues that the probation office and, ultimately, the

district court can act to limit the reach of special condition 13 to obscene materials or

pornography, thereby bringing it within the reach of Stults, Boston, and Ristine. In

essence, the government argues that if special condition 13 is administered in a way

that infringes on Simons’s First Amendment rights, the district court can step in and

correct the problem. The plain language of special condition 13, however, includes

no mechanism for prior approval by the probation office, unlike special conditions 5

and 6. And having the district court determine, on a case-by-case, if material that

Simons possesses violates special condition 13 is an inefficient way of determining

the lawful scope of the condition. While it is true that “[c]ondemned to the use of

words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language[,]” Grayned

v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972), and district courts must be granted

some leeway in fashioning conditions of supervised release that are consistent with

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), if the district court wished to limit Simons’s access to

pornography, we see no reason why special condition 13 could not have been written

to state exactly that. As it is currently written, however, special condition 13 involves

a “greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary[,]” 18 U.S.C. §

3583(d)(2), which affected Simons’s substantial First Amendment rights. Thus, we

hold that the district court plainly erred in imposing special condition 13, and we

vacate that condition and remand for additional findings of fact and resentencing.

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III.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm special conditions 3, 5, and 6, vacate

special condition 13, and remand to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. 

______________________________

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