Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03119/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03119-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael D. Thompson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 2001 Decided February 15, 2002

No. 00-3119

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Michael D. Thompson,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00016-02)

Adam H. Kurland, appointed by the court, argued the

cause for the appellant.

John K. Han, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the

cause for the appellee. Kenneth L. Wainstein, Acting United

States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and John R.

Fisher and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant United States

Attorneys, were on brief for the appellee.

USCA Case #00-3119 Document #658520 Filed: 02/15/2002 Page 1 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Henderson, Circuit Judge,

and Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Michael D.

Thompson was convicted on one count of unlawful distribution

of fifty grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.

s 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(a)(3). He appeals, contending that the

district court erroneously excluded evidence and erroneously

charged the jury; he also challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to support his conviction. We affirm the district

court's rulings and uphold his conviction.

I.

On October 22, 1997 Detective David Dessin of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and a confidential informant (Robert) approached Mitchell Douglas (Douglas) to buy

cocaine base. Gov't App. Tab B, at 6-7. Dessin was working

as an undercover agent for the High Intensity Drug-Trafficking Area Task Force, a joint task force of the MPD and the

United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

8/29/00 Tr. 5-6. Douglas agreed to sell but told Dessin that

he would complete the transaction--$1500 for 62 grams of

cocaine base--the next day at 5:00 p.m. in a nearby Popeye's

Chicken parking lot. Id.

On October 23, 1997 Dessin waited in an unmarked police

car, a Lexus, in the restaurant parking lot. Shortly after

Dessin arrived, Robert drove into the parking lot and parked

next to Dessin. Dessin did not expect to see him because

Robert had earlier told him that he could not participate in

the bust. 8/29/00 Tr. 14. Dessin told him to get into the

Lexus so that the targets would not become suspicious of his

separate arrival. Id. at 15.

At approximately 5:10 p.m., an unknown person later identified as appellant Thompson approached Dessin and asked,

"Are you Rob's boy?" 8/29/00 Tr. 16. Dessin responded,

"Yeah." Id. Thompson then stated, "Mitch told me to give

you this." Id. Dessin told Thompson to get into the car.

USCA Case #00-3119 Document #658520 Filed: 02/15/2002 Page 2 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Thompson opened the driver's side rear door and sat behind

Dessin. Dessin asked him, "Do you have that joint?" Id. at

18. Thompson responded by handing him a large Burger

King cup with a lid on it. The cup was later shown to have

contained cocaine base. Dessin then gave Thompson a bundle of money in exchange. Thompson asked, "What's this?"

Dessin responded, "15" (meaning $1500). Id. at 25. Thompson asked, "Are you straight?", to which Dessin replied, "I'm

straight." Id. Thompson got out of the car and walked out

of the parking lot.

Thompson and Douglas were subsequently indicted on various drug charges. Douglas was charged in all four counts of

the indictment, which included two separate acts of distribution and two telephone facilitation counts. Thompson was

named in count four only, which charged both Thompson and

Douglas with unlawful distribution of more than 50 grams of

cocaine base on or about October 23, 1997. Douglas pleaded

guilty and was ultimately sentenced to 70 months' imprisonment.

Thompson proceeded to trial as the sole defendant on count

four of the indictment. Following a three-day jury trial,

Thompson was found guilty of unlawful distribution of fifty

grams or more of cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(a)(3). On November 14, 2000 the district court

sentenced Thompson to 188 months' imprisonment, followed

by a four-year term of supervised release.

II

A. Excluded Testimony

At trial, Thompson's defense was that he lacked the requisite mens rea because he did not know the cup he delivered to

Dessin contained cocaine base. Thompson testified that before the transaction with Dessin, Douglas asked him to deliver a Burger King cup that Douglas said contained $2600 to a

Lexus in the Popeye's Chicken parking lot. Thompson assumed that the money was to pay a gambling debt because

Douglas was a "compulsive gambler and owes people at

USCA Case #00-3119 Document #658520 Filed: 02/15/2002 Page 3 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

times." 8/30/00 Tr. 21. The government objected to Douglas's statements as hearsay. The district court overruled the

objection, explaining that the statements were offered for the

non-hearsay purpose of "prov[ing] ... the defendant's state

of mind." 8/30/00 Tr. 12.1 Thompson also tried to testify

about what Douglas told him immediately after the event

when he returned with the $1500 Dessin had given him.

8/30/00 Tr. 23. According to Thompson, the evidence was

critical to his defense because it explained the otherwise

unlikely sequence of events, that is, that Thompson received

$1500 in exchange for what he thought was in the cup--

money to pay a gambling debt. Appellant's Br. at 8. Nevertheless the district court sustained the government's hearsay

objection to any testimony regarding Douglas's posttransaction statements.

On appeal, Thompson argues that Douglas's posttransaction statements, like Douglas's pre-transaction statements, were offered to show Thompson's state of mind and

therefore should not have been excluded as hearsay.2 Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the

matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). An out-of-court

statement that is offered to show its effect on the hearer's

state of mind is not hearsay under Rule 801(c). See United

States v. Baird, 29 F.3d 647, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (district

court improperly excluded evidence bearing on officer's state

of mind as hearsay); United States v. Detrich, 865 F.2d 17, 21

(2d Cir. 1988) (exclusion of evidence of defendant's state of

mind as hearsay reversible error). Regardless of the actual

contents of the closed cup, the jury might have been able to

draw from Douglas's statements an inference as to Thompson's guilty knowledge vel non of the cup's contents. If

Thompson offered Douglas's post-transaction statements only

__________

1 The district court also offered to give a limiting instruction that

the testimony could be "considered only with reference to the

defendant's state of mind and [ ] not ... as evidence of the truth of

what was, in fact, stated to him." 8/30/00 Tr. 12.

2 We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Warren, 42 F.3d 647, 655 (D.C.

Cir. 1994).

USCA Case #00-3119 Document #658520 Filed: 02/15/2002 Page 4 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

as they might tend to bear on his state of mind, the testimony

would not have been hearsay.3

Rule 103(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however,

provides that an error may not be predicated upon a ruling

excluding evidence unless "the substance of the evidence was

made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the

context within which questions were asked." Fed. R. Evid.

103(a)(2). The proponent of excluded evidence must alert the

trial court, in some fashion, to the substance of his proposed

testimony. See United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266, 1272

(D.C. Cir. 1985) (defendants's failure to make known basis for

seeking to admit excluded evidence barred appellate review).4

But defense counsel simply attempted unsuccessfully to rephrase his question and then finally moved on without apprising the trial court of the substance of the excluded evidence.

8/30/00 Tr. 22-23.5 Because Thompson did not proffer his

__________

3 On appeal, the government acknowledges that Douglas's statements would not be hearsay if offered to show Thompson's state of

mind. Nonetheless, it contends the statements were properly

excluded because they were "clearly irrelevant." See Appellee's Br.

at 12. It suggests that statements made by Douglas to Thompson

minutes after the transaction are irrelevant because they do not

ascertain Thompson's state of mind at the time of the transaction.

Id. The fact that the statements occurred immediately after the

event does not automatically mean that they were not probative of

the defendant's intent. Douglas's post-transaction statements to

Thompson could tend to make Thompson's knowledge of what was

in the cup "more or less probable." See Fed. R. Evid. 401.

4 In Lavelle, 751 F.2d at 1272 n.7, the court cited approvingly the

Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 710 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979), which established that

appellate review of a trial court's exclusion of evidence requires that

an offer of proof be made at trial. Winkle, 587 F.2d at 710; see

also Stockstill v. Shell Oil Co., 3 F.3d 868, 872-73 (5th Cir. 1993),

cert. denied 510 U.S. 1197 (1994).

5 The relevant discussion at trial went as follows:

USCA Case #00-3119 Document #658520 Filed: 02/15/2002 Page 5 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

intended response or otherwise inform the court of the nature

of the evidence sought to be adduced or, at minimum, the

purpose for which the evidence was being offered, we are

substantially hindered in reaching the conclusion that the

district court erred. See United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d

1091, 1098-99 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (exclusion of threatening phone

call as hearsay not error under Rule 103 because defendant

failed to inform district court of nature of testimony); see also

Chedick v. Nash, 151 F.3d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (plaintiff's appeal of exclusion of emotional distress evidence fore-

__________

Q: [Defense Counsel] Then what happened after you asked

him, "Are you all right?" You said, "Are you straight?" What

happened?

A: [Thompson] I got out of the car, and I left. I went back

across the street towards Mitchell Douglass. I was kind of

confused because I couldn't understand why this guy was

giving me money for money. When I got across the street, my

first intention was to ask Mitchell what was in that cup. But

when I got to him, he was sitting on the railing. He looked like

he was a little upset about something. I went over to him. I

gave him the money. And I sat on the rail beside him. And

he told me that--

[Prosecution] Objection, your Honor. Hearsay.

The Court: Sustained.

Q: [Defense Counsel] What did you do with the money that

you took from the person in the car?

A: I gave it to Mitchell.

Q: Then what happened?

A: Mitchell told me that--

[By the Prosecution] Objection, your Honor.

The Court: Sustained.

Q: [Defense Counsel] What did you hear Mitchell say after

you gave him the money?

[Prosecution] Objection, your Honor.

The Court: Sustained.

9/30/00 Tr. 22-23.

closed because of her failure to inform trial court of legal

basis of admissibility).

Even if a party fails to comply with Rule 103(a), review is

nonetheless available under the "plain error" provision of

Rule 103(d) which states, "[n]othing in this rule precludes

taking notice of plain error affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court."

Fed. Evid. R. 103(d). Under the plain error standard, "before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial,

there must be (1) 'error,' (2) that is 'plain,' and (3) that

'affect[s] substantial rights.' " United States v. Webb, 255

F.3d 890, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. United

States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (quotation omitted)). "If

all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then

USCA Case #00-3119 Document #658520 Filed: 02/15/2002 Page 6 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if

(4) the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Id. (quoting

Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467). Under this stringent standard,

the district court's decision to exclude the post-event testimony did not constitute plain error affecting substantial rights

because it did not "gravely hamper" Thompson's presentation

of his mens rea defense. Wright, 783 F.2d at 1099 (erroneous

exclusion not plain error where duress defense nonetheless

presented). Reviewing Thompson's testimony, we note that

he did testify that Douglas told him before the transaction

that the cup contained money and that he was "confused" by

Dessin's delivery of $1500 in exchange. In the absence of a

proffer showing otherwise, it appears the excluded testimony

was cumulative. In addition, the evidence of Thompson's

guilt was fairly strong. Most of the facts supporting his

conviction were undisputed. See supra 2-3. The only disputed issue at trial was whether Thompson knew that the cup

contained cocaine base which, based on the evidence before it,

the jury could reasonably find that he did. Thompson thus

incurred no significant prejudice from the erroneous ruling.

We conclude therefore that the exclusion of the evidence did

not constitute plain error and, accordingly, we affirm the

district court's ruling.

USCA Case #00-3119 Document #658520 Filed: 02/15/2002 Page 7 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

B. Aiding and Abetting Instruction

Thompson next argues that the trial court erred by giving

an aiding-and-abetting jury instruction that was unsupported

by the evidence. Thompson further contends that the erroneous instruction encouraged the jury to convict him without

finding that he possessed the requisite criminal knowledge.

We conclude that the instruction was proper or, at worst,

harmless error.

At trial, Thompson objected to the aiding-and-abetting

instruction on the ground that the government failed to prove

that Thompson and Douglas had a "shared intent" to commit

the crime. 8/30/00 Tr. 79. Thompson acknowledges that his

challenge to the aiding-and-abetting instruction on appeal is

based on a different ground from the one he asserted at trial.

See Appellant's Br. at 13. Objection to a jury instruction is

properly made only if it is couched in terms that alert the

trial court to the substance of the party's position. See

United States v. Breedlove, 204 F.3d 267, 270 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Because Thompson failed to object on the ground he asserts

on appeal, he can prevail only if the instruction given constitutes plain error. See United States v. Halliman, 923 F.2d

873, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 30; Fed.

R.Crim.P. 52(b). Accordingly, we review Thompson's claim

on appeal for plain error. See Webb, 255 F.3d at 897.

At the outset, we believe that the trial court did not err in

giving the instruction because the jury could have reasonably

concluded, based on the evidence before it, that Thompson

aided and abetted Douglas, the principal, in the distribution of

cocaine base to Dessin. Thompson is under the misconception that because he physically handed the drugs to Dessin,

he is the only person who could be a principal. See Appellant's Br. at 18.6 Douglas, however, was the original target of

__________

6 Thompson relies exclusively on the holding in United States v.

Martin, 747 F.2d 1404, 1407 (11th Cir. 1984), that an aiding and

abetting instruction can be reversible error if there is no evidence

of any person other than the defendant culpably involved in the

offense. Id. at 1406. The Tenth Circuit, interpreting Martin in

circumstances like those here, concluded that an aiding and abetting

USCA Case #00-3119 Document #658520 Filed: 02/15/2002 Page 8 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the sting operation, set up the transaction with Dessin, arranged the location for the sale, provided the narcotics (and

the cup to transport them), chose Thompson as his agent and

was the financial beneficiary of the transaction. Under these

circumstances, the jury could have reasonably found that

Thompson aided and abetted the distribution committed principally by Douglas. Cf. United States v. Edmonds, 765

F. Supp. 1112 (D.D.C. 1991) (defendant not required to

personally transfer drugs to undercover agent to support

cocaine distribution conviction; constructive transfer sufficient), rev'd in part on other grounds, 69 F.3d 1172 (D.C. Cir.

1995).7

Even if there were no record evidence to support an aidingand-abetting instruction, the error would nonetheless be

harmless. Thompson's complaint, namely, that the instruction "invited the jury to find Thompson guilty as an 'aider and

abettor' without requiring the jury to find that [he] possessed

the requisite criminal knowledge," Reply Br. 12, is without

merit in view of the instructions given as well as the government's focus on the criminal state-of-mind issue. The district

court first laid out the requirements for the offense of possession with intent to distribute.8 The court then correctly

__________

instruction is proper if there is evidence from which a reasonable

jury could conclude that the defendant aided someone in committing

arson. See United States v. Yost, 24 F2d 99, 104 (10th Cir. 1994).

7 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) makes it unlawful "to ... distribute ... a

controlled substance." "[T]o distribute" means "to deliver," and

"delivery" is defined as "the actual, constructive, or attempted

transfer of a controlled substance, whether or not there exists an

agency relationship." 21 U.S.C. s 802(8) and (11). See also United

States v. Waller, 503 F.2d 1014, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.

denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975) (rejecting defendant's argument that

she did not distribute drugs because she did not physically hand

them to buyer). That Douglas did not physically transfer the drugs

to Dessin is of no consequence because the evidence plainly supports Douglas's role as principal in the constructive distribution of a

controlled substance.

8 The court explained in part that:

USCA Case #00-3119 Document #658520 Filed: 02/15/2002 Page 9 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

advised the jury of the requirements of aider and abettor

liability, repeatedly referring to the intent element.9 A reasonable jury would understand that to convict Thompson,

whether as principal or aider and abettor, the government

had to prove that he had the requisite criminal state of mind.

At oral argument, Thompson emphasized that the harm to

him stemmed primarily from the government's use of the

instruction. We disagree. In fact, the government emphasized the criminal intent element in its closing argument. See

8/30/00 Tr. 93-96.10 For the foregoing reasons, we reject

Thompson's challenge to the jury charge.

C. Sufficiency of Evidence

Finally Thompson contends that his conviction should be

reversed for insufficiency of intent evidence. In reviewing a

__________

The essential elements of distribution of a controlled substance,

each of which the government must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt, are: ... 2. That the defendant distributed the controlled substance knowingly and intentionally. This means

consciously, voluntarily and on purpose, not mistakenly, accidentally or inadvertently.

8/30/00 Tr. 123 (emphasis added).

9 The court instructed the jury:

Any person, who in some way intentionally participates in the

commission of a crime, aids and abets the principal offender.... To find that the defendant aided and abetted in

committing a crime, you must find that the defendant knowingly associated himself with the person who committed the crime,

that he participated in the crime as something he wished to

bring about, and that he intended by his actions to make it

succeed.... It is sufficient if you find beyond a reasonable

doubt that the crime was committed by someone and that the

defendant knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the

principal offender in committing the crime.

8/30/00 Tr. 124-25 (emphasis added).

10 The government quoted the text of the instruction that the jury

must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the "defendant knowingly

and intentionally aided and abetted the principal offender in committing the crime." 8/30/00 Tr. 93.

conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, the court need only

determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. See United States v. Logan, 998 F.2d

1025, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Thompson, however, has waived

his right to raise a sufficiency of the evidence claim on appeal

by failing to renew his motion for judgment of acquittal at the

close of all of the evidence. See United States v. Sherod, 960

F.2d 1075, 1077 (D.C. Cir.) (failure to renew motion for

acquittal at close of all evidence means there is "nothing to

review"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 980 (1992). In Sherod, we

endorsed an exception to the rule if declining to consider the

sufficiency of the evidence on waiver grounds caused a "manifest miscarriage of justice." Id. (quotation omitted). BeUSCA Case #00-3119 Document #658520 Filed: 02/15/2002 Page 10 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

cause the record is not devoid of evidence pointing to Thompson's knowledge of the cup's true contents, cf. United States

v. Spinner, 152 F.3d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Patel v.

Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 1996), his case does not

fit the exception and his conviction is affirmed.

So 

ordered.

USCA Case #00-3119 Document #658520 Filed: 02/15/2002 Page 11 of 11