Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03145/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03145-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Austin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED Unit.<~ Sta~ Cc tr' oi Appeals rr"~.,."' ";_,..,,:t. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. . . No. 90-3145 

JAMES AUSTIN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

. . 

. . 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 89-30012-01) 

Mark w. Works, of Works, Works & Works, Topeka, Kansas, for 

Appellant. 

Tanya J. Treadway, Assistant United States Attorney (Lee Thompson, 

United States Attorney, with her on the brief), for Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,* 

District Judge. 

CHRISTENSEN, District Judge. 

Defendant-appellant James Austin was convicted in the 

district court by verdict of a jury on a one-count indictment for 

resisting three correctional officers at the United States 

Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, in violation of 18 u.s.c. 

§ 111, with reference to 18 u.s.c. § 1114. He seeks reversal on 

the contentions that the district court erred in overruling his 

* Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, Senior Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Utah, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-3145 Document: 01019292095 Date Filed: 05/13/1991 Page: 1 
motion to suppress a statement elicited from him by an FBI agent 

in violation of the Miranda rule, excluding from the jury evidence 

of his mental illness, and giving instructions at variance with 

the indictment. Having concluded that one of these claims to the 

prejudice of the defendant has been sufficiently made out, we 

reverse. 

It was contended on behalf of the defendant throughout the 

proceedings that at the time of the alleged offense, as well as 

when his pretrial statement was given, he was mentally ill. His 

motion to suppress was denied and the agent later gave trial 

testimony concerning the statement. 

Defendant's counsel as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.2(a) 

for such purpose gave notice of intent to rely upon the defense of 

insanity. The government moved pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 4241 for a 

hearing to determine the mental capacity of the defendant to stand 

trial and requested the court to order a psychiatric examination 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 4247(b) and (c). The court so ordered and 

added that the report from the Medical Center for Federal 

Prisoners should include also "an examination as to whether the 

defendant was insane at the time of the offense charged." Upon 

receipt of the report of examination and after hearing the court 

ruled that the defendant was competent to stand trial. 

Counsel for the defendant moved for an independent 

psychiatrist's examination, submitting that "intent to commit a 

crime under mental defect" would be a trial issue, that without 

such help he could not present "a defense of mens rea or 

diminished mental capacity," and that the defendant was without 

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funds to secure an expert. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), 

and Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203 (lOth Cir. 1986), were 

cited in support of this request, which was summarily denied by 

the district court and trial was set to begin within a week. 

The defendant was found guilty by the jury and the court 

sentenced him to eighteen months' imprisonment to follow the 

unexpired term of another sentence and to the payment of fifty 

dollars for the crime victims' fund. Represented by his trial 

attorney, he has timely appealed to this court. 

I 

The day following the assault, a special agent for the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation interviewed the defendant. After 

being read a Miranda warning from the usual advice of rights form, 

he said he understood his rights and would talk to the agent 

without an attorney being present. He refused, however, to sign a 

written waiver form. 

In the course of the thirty-minute interview, the defendant 

in substance stated that he was mentally ill -- a paranoid/ 

schizophrenic; that when officers came to his cell to let out 

another prisoner he himself wanted to get out; that he had had a 

problem with two of the people in the cell; that when the door was 

opened he pushed against an officer and ended up struggling on the 

floor; that he recalled hitting an officer but did not recall 

biting anyone and that he did recall blows being exchanged. 

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Defendant's counsel moved to suppress this statement on the 

ground that there was no valid consent as the defendant was 

mentally ill within the contemplation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

u.s. 436, 444-45 (1966). At the hearing on the motion the agent 

testified to the above-mentioned statement and its circumstances, 

adding that because he thought what Austin was "going after" was 

that "I done this [and] I did this because I'm a nut case," he 

asked Dr. Thomas White, the prison psychologist, to look at 

Austin. Without objection the witness was permitted to testify 

that "he [Dr. White] did not conclude that he was suffering from 

mental illness according to that memo." Tr. of suppression 

hearing at 14-15. There was no evidence of any coercion, pressure 

or other overreaching directed against the defendant in connection 

with the interview, nor did the defendant offer any other evidence 

at the suppression hearing. 

The court denied defendant's motion to suppress, stating: 

"There's nothing before this court, in all the examinations that 

we've had of this defendant or anything else, that would give the 

court a basis for finding that he was incompetent at any time 

during or after the incident in question or during the 

investigation of this case." Tr. of suppression hearing at 15-16. 

We review factual findings of the trial court on the motion 

to suppress under the clearly erroneous rule, with a de novo eye 

to the ultimate legal question of voluntariness. See United 

States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1307-08 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. 

denied, 488 u.s. 983 (1988). 

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Upon the record before the district court at that time, we 

cannot say that there was not substantial evidence of a competent, 

knowing and voluntary waiver of defendant's Miranda rights nor 

that the ruling was contrary to law. 

II 

In addition to the testimony of the FBI agent repeated at the 

trial concerning defendant's pretrial statement, the following 

summary of the other trial testimony about defendant's conduct 

will provide helpful context for our discussion of the 

admissibility of medical reports offered on his behalf and 

rejected by the trial court, as well as any prejudicial effect of 

such rejection. 

A correctional officer not involved in the scuffle testified 

that he heard a noise and looked down the range about sixty feet 

and saw two other officers attempting to restrain Austin, although 

at the time he couldn't identify any of the participants. "It 

appeared that the officer was trying to restrain the inmate and 

the inmate was resisting ...• Just struggling. He was on the 

floor and the officers were trying to hold him down." At no time 

did he see the officers strike at the inmate and did not see "who 

threw the first punch or push anyone." Tr. Vol. Two at 13-15. 

Corrections officer Charles Nance testified that he had just 

returned another inmate to the cell and had completed taking off 

his handcuffs when he heard a scuffle behind him and saw that 

Officers Luongo and Woodward had Austin on the floor in a prone 

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position and were attempting to apply hand restraints and the 

witness then lent assistance. At that time Austin was on the 

floor and had both hands under his body. When he attempted to 

remove one of Austin's hands from behind his back, the witness 

testified Austin hit him. He believed Austin was trying to kick 

Officer Luongo. The latter and Officer Woodward were trying to 

remove Austin's other hand from behind his body to get the 

handcuffs on. The affair according to Nance lasted two or three 

minutes. At the time they were transporting Austin to a security 

cell, the witness testified he heard Austin say at least two times 

that "he was crazy and was not responsible for his actions." Tr. 

Vol. Two at 19-23. 

Officer James Luongo testified that following a prior change 

of cells because of Austin's complaints, he had been moved to the 

cell in which the difficulty occurred and had complained about two 

fellow inmates there; that as he was removing one of these other 

inmates to take him to the law library and was putting Austin's 

bedding inside the cell from his former cell, he was unable to 

close the door because Austin's body was blocking the doorway; 

that Austin "started scratching" at Officer Woodward's neck and 

they "took inmate Austin to the floor [and] there was a scuffle 

and a wrestling match on there." 

Well, he proceeded -- we proceeded to the floor where we 

was trying to control the arms and his legs. He was 

kicking me and he was finishing (sic) me right at the 

back with his one leg. . . . He was still scratching 

and throwing punches at Officer Woodward when we went to 

the floor with him. . . . I had hooked his leg with my 

leg in order to take him down on the floor. . . • He 

bit me on my right index finger because I had his hand 

pressed down on the floor next to his head . . . in 

order to, I guess, try to release his hand. 

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Officer Luongo testified that Austin wrote him a letter after his 

release from segregation. The letter was entitled "Peace, Peace, 

Peace, Peace," and in it Austin asked "the good Lord to bless 

[Luongo]." Tr. Vol. Two at 30-37. 

Officer Woodward, the third of the three who entered the 

cell, having left his employment at the prison, did not testify. 

Austin testified on his own behalf. He understood he was in 

prison "for [e]xtortion, frightened-- threatened others." After 

discursive references to his troubles at the institution, he 

testified at length about his version of the occurrence in 

question of which the following is a sample of the nearest he came 

to a coherent account: 

Q. Could you tell me in your own words what exactly 

happened with the officers involved? 

A. When they played the cell routine with me two days 

in a row, on the 15th of June, '87, which was on a 

Monday - I was housed on the second floor in the special 

housing unit - they carried me down on the first floor. 

They talked with a case manager by the name of Kevin 

Pardo. After I finished talking with him they locked me 

up on the first floor, and the place they carried me 

back upstairs on the second floor, they locked me up on 

the first floor in the cell with two other inmates. 

So then Officer James Howard Luongo takes and 

brings me my property. He had everything tied up in a 

sheet in a big bundle. So he has to-- he took-- he 

opened the door and handed it to me. So I say, "Look 

here, I like you to take me back upstairs." He closed 

the door and walked away. So I took my property and 

just sit it on my bed. 

About 20 minutes later he come back and let this 

inmate out to make a phone call. I don't recall his 

name. So when he did, I just grabbed my property and 

walked out. I didn't run. I walked at a moderate pace, 

and him-- and he had officer James Woodward with him, 

and they-- as I was coming-- stepping out the cell they 

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slammed the door on me, trapping me between the cell 

door and the wall. 

I managed to come on out on the range with my 

bundle of property in my hands. They grabbed me, 

wrestle me down, and I don't know which one it was, but 

one of them - it was either Luongo or Woodward - they 

was calling Officer Nance. They called Officer Nance. 

And three of them they wrestled me down, and when 

they did, my bundle of property was on top of me in my 

midsection, my solar plexus area, because there was a 

large big bundle tied up in a sheet. So now they 

wrestle me down and put cuffs on me on the floor like--

they're talking about I'm hitting them when I was on the 

floor and kicking them. No, no, I did not do that. 

They're making that up. And they saying that just to 

make me look bad and trying to make themselves look 

good. 

Q. Mr. Austin, you testified basically that you tried 

to act in self-defense. Is that correct? 

A. Yeah, if you want to call it that, but I didn't 

throw no punches at them. I had my property in my hand 

- see what I'm saying - and it was a big bundle tied up 

in a sheet. I grabbed my property and just walked on 

out as-- you know, as the doors unlocked. 

Tr. Vol. Two at 49-50, 53-54, 56. 

Austin testified that he had been dropped on his head by his 

mother when he was young and confined to mental institutions on 

nine different occasions, the first being at Lima State Hospital 

in Lima, Ohio, returning there on several different occasions 

which he dated with apparent precision: "Okay? That's the four 

times I was housed at the mental institution in Lima, Ohio." He 

then similarly specified the four times he said he was at the 

psychiatric unit of the Springfield Medical Center and said he had 

also been in the psychiatric unit of the federal institution at 

Butler, North Carolina. Tr. Vol. Two at 56-58. 

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Defendant's counsel offered in evidence exhibits 404, 405, 

407 and 408, containing medical reports of some of these state 

hospitalizations. 1 

Counsel for the government objected to the tendered exhibits 

on the grounds of remoteness and that they lacked probative value 

on the issue of whether or not the defendant at the time of the 

offense on June 16, 1987, was able to appreciate the wrongfulness 

of his acts and because the reports were prepared by doctors and 

medical people not present with foundation established for their 

1 Exhibit 404, the report of the prison psychologist dated 

April 5, 1978. While the report discusses the possibility that 

the "patient may be consciously exaggerating or malingering" as an 

alternative to his being acutely disturbed, the psychological 

finding was that there was the apparent presence of a psychotic 

process as well as some clinical indication of brain damage and 

the diagnosis referred to "evidence of an active psychotic process 

that would be known and attributed as [sic] Chronic Organic Brain 

Syndrome, with Psychosis." 

Exhibit 405 is a psychiatric report from Dr. Lewis A. 

Lindner, M.D., of an examination on March 2, 1978. This report 

contained the following observations, among others: "The patient 

manifested klang, florid, paranoid delusions .•.. is clearly 

mentally ill, and due to that illness, dangerous to himself and 

others •... IMPRESSION: (1) Paranoid Schizophrenia ..•• 

Borderline Mental Retardation .... PROGNOSIS: Poor, due to 

chronicity." 

Exhibit 407 is a psychologist's report and is the earliest of 

the proposed exhibits being dated January 27, 1976. It describes 

his condition as "placid," likely due to medication of 100 mg. of 

Thorazine twice a day. The psychologist's opinion was that the 

patient was "of borderline mentally defective intelligence and 

that he is not brain damaged nor psychotic." The report 

concludes, nonetheless, that until the patient can prove himself 

able to adjust to rules and regulations at the Lima State 

Hospital, "the patient could be considered mentally ill because of 

his current unmanageability." 

Exhibit 408, being a report of an examination by Dr. Lindner 

dated September 19, 1979, reported after reciting more moderate 

symptoms "IMPRESSION: (1) Paranoid Schizophrenia (DSM II 295.3), 

in partial remission. PROGNOSIS: (1) Poor, due to chronicity. 

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admissibility. The trial judge overruled the objections grounded 

on lack of foundation, recognizing that the indigent defendant had 

no means of getting the doctors present in court and that it would 

be "total error" to rule them out "based on that lapse." But, 

observing that the most recent report tendered was at least eight 

years before the alleged offense and ten years earlier than the 

trial, he sustained the government's objection on the sole ground 

of remoteness because the reports were "not probative on what his 

condition was in 1987," adding: "However, it's not on the 

foundation, not on hearsay, it's based on the fact that they're 

prehistoric as far as this crime is concerned, and that will be 

the ruling of the Court." Tr. Vol. Two at 60-65. 

On cross-examination, counsel for the government developed 

its apparent theory that Austin's claim of mental illness was a 

pretense to avoid the rigors of ordinary prison life. 

Q. If you have mental problems that require some sort 

of psychiatric care, whatever, you're given a lesser 

custody institution, you're given other benefits, are 

you not, if, in fact, that's the case. 

A. Not-- I don't quite understand or know what you're 

getting at. 

Q. Well, if you're a-- if you actually need mental-- a 

doctor's counseling, let me put it that way, psychiatric 

care, you wouldn't be housed at Leavenworth, they would 

send you to another institution, wouldn't they? 

A. You got to try to understand this here. I'm trying 

to bear with you. Okay? Now, these staff members--

now, I'm not, you know, trying to change the subject or 

nothing like that. Like I say, I'm trying to bear with 

you. These staff members, Kurt, when an inmate arrive 

at the institution, the only thing they looked at in the 

inmates record is why they were sent to the 

penitentiary. See? See what I'm saying? Why the--

okay. Like I say, I'm trying to bear with you. 

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Q. The fact is, Mr. Austin, that you did this because 

you thought it would benefit you, didn't you, trying to 

exit the cell? You would get out of that cell and you 

wouldn't be in that cell anymore, right, on June 16th? 

A. What it was, Kurt, hey, I didn't like the idea of 

the staff member playing the cell routine. I feel they 

had some type of trick up their sleeves. See what I'm 

saying? That's the reason why I left there. 

Q. Okay, because you didn't like it. Right? That was 

your decision. You didn't like it so you were going to 

change it. Right? 

A. Well, like I said now, Kurt, I didn't belong in 

there in the first place. I wasn't trying to change 

nothing. 

Q. It was kind of like back in the Ohio system that 

your attorney mentioned where you wrote a threatening 

letter to either the president or Ex-President Carter at 

that time, you did that, too, because you thought it 

would benefit you, didn't you? You'd get into court and 

you could get off your medication. It's the same sort 

of thing, isn't it, Mr. Austin. Your actions on June 16 

were taken because you thought you would benefit from 

it. Isn't that right? 

A. No, no. No, no. 

when I did this here, 

have been in my right 

saying? 

Inasmuch as I was on medication 

and on top of that, I couldn't 

frame of mind. See what I'm 

Q. And if you're not in your right frame of mind, then 

you get to transfer to Springfield again, don't you? 

A. Kurt, try to understand this here. 

Tr. Vol. Two at 78-80. 

Having been prevented from getting before the jury his 

earlier medical records while in state custody, although the 

government without foundation brought in the "Ohio system" in the 

above-quoted extract from its cross-examination of the defendant, 

the defendant was unable to fully explore more recent reports 

concerning his mental condition. 

THE COURT: Do you have anything further? 

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MR. WORKS [counsel for defendant]: Yes, Judge. I 

would like to call Mr. Schnake to introduce some 

medical--Mr. Austin's medical record. 

THE COURT: Very well. 

(THEREUPON, the following proceedings were had at 

the bench:). 

MR. SHERNUK: The witness they're going to call is 

a custodian of records from Leavenworth Penitentiary who 

has the entire medical file-- Federal medical file of 

this defendant. I don't know what Mr. Works intends to 

offer here, but certainly the entire file is not 

relevant to this matter. If he has specific documents 

he wants to enter, then let's talk about specific 

documents, but I think the entire file is way out of 

line here, and certainly it has a lot of irrelevant 

information. And I'm not sure what is in that is 

relevant, that's number one. 

Number two, while this witness may be the custodian 

of the records, he didn't prepare these. The doctors 

are available and were available to be subpoenaed. In 

fact, Doctor White is going to testify here, who is the 

Chief Psychologist at the Leavenworth Penitentiary, so 

he is the Government's rebuttal witness. Those are the 

proper people to testify about the contents of those 

reports and not the reports themselves. I can't crossexamine a report, Judge. 

THE COURT: All right. Tell us what you have in 

mind. 

MR. WORKS: Judge, maybe-- the only thing I 

understand is that he can't testify to what's in the 

records. All he can testify to is they are genuine and 

authentic. I think it's-- the important thing is to let 

the jury examine the medical record. I don't see any 

reason to exclude it. It's important to the defense of 

mental illness here. 

The medical record does reflect-- the first 

document I used in the file indicated that his paranoid 

schizophrenic was an admission, but also diagnosed him 

as having a antisocial personality. I think that's 

always important to the issue of the intent in this 

case, Judge, that-- Mr. Austin's mental status at the 

time of the accident. There are records in there that 

are very recent. There are also some notes that may be 

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helpful to the jury to determine what his status is-- or 

was in 1987. 

THE COURT: You're actually offering the entire 

file with his sick calls and everything like that? 

MR. WORKS: Yes, Your Honor. If you want me to dig 

some documents out for--

THE COURT: I don't think you can put the whole 

file in. I would only be confusing to the jury and 

would have nothing to do with the issues in this case. 

If you've got something as to how he was treated at the 

time of the incident or what his situation was at that 

time, that's something else. But just a general record 

is not admissible as I see it. 

Unless you can give me some other reason, I don't 

think there's any basis for just putting a blanket 

medical file into the record. I think that would be 

very confusing to the jury. I would stir up an issue 

that's not even here, as I see it. So, consequently, 

objection sustained. You may proffer-- we'll accept it 

as a proffer, but its admission is denied, so there is 

no need to call the witness. 

MR. WORKS: Thank you, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: All right. 

Tr. Vol. Three at 101-04. 

The government called on rebuttal Dr. Thomas W. White, Chief 

Psychologist at the Leavenworth Penitentiary, who conceded that 

many of the things the defendant did were somewhat bizarre or 

unusual, but was permitted over the objection of defendant's 

counsel to broadly relate Austin's situation to his observations 

of the general prison population: 

Q. You did note in your report, did you not, that the 

defendant sometimes acted -- his behavior was sometimes 

bizarre? 

A. Yeah. Many of the things that he did or does are 

unusual that you wouldn't consider normal, quote/ 

unquote, but that doesn't necessarily imply, then, that 

he's mentally ill. I think that he's in control of 

those behaviors, and many of those behaviors are really 

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just immature reactions to frustrations, and et cetera, 

but not necessarily mental illness. 

Q. Based upon your training and experience, do people 

sometimes claim to have a mental illness when they may 

not? 

A. Oh, sure. 

Q. Why? Especially within the prison setting, Why? 

A. Well, there are a number of--

MR. WORKS: Judge, I object. Who are we talking 

about here? Are we talking about Mr. Austin or just the 

general population of the prison? 

THE COURT: Objection overruled. Do you understand 

the question? 

DOCTOR WHITE: Sure. 

THE COURT: You may answer. 

I think there are a number of reasons why 

individuals might want to do that. Number 1, in some 

cases by trying to present yourself as mentally ill, it 

can lessen the impact of disciplinary proceedings if you 

had been charged with something. Many people view being 

in a mental hospital, such as Springfield or something,-

as less aversive as remaining in Leavenworth. 

In addition to that, there is often a benefit for 

an inmate, if other inmates view him as unstable or 

unpredictable, that it allows him to be left alone by 

other inmates in the population, and that can have an 

advantage for many individuals. 

And it also in some cases just serves as a way for 

individuals to have a reputation that they might not be 

able to get some other way. 

Q. Does it offer also the opportunity for recognition 

that might not otherwise be attainable for an inmate? 

A. Yeah, it can. It's some way to be known. 

Tr. Vol. Three at 112-13. 

During the cross-examination of Dr. White, counsel for the 

defendant attempted, but only fragmentally succeeded, in getting 

into the record portions of the prison file concerning defendant's 

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mental condition: 

Q. Doctor, you have in your possession the central 

medical file from Mr. Austin. Is that correct? 

A. Right. 

Q. Can you just read -- I mean you indicated 

what you reviewed in preparation of your -- is that 

A. I cannot tell you specifically if, when I wrote the 

memo, I looked at this or not, although it is quite 

likely that over the course of dealing with him [the 

defendant] I may have reviewed it, yes. 

Q. More likely or not you reviewed it? 

The Court: Say that he has. Go ahead and ask your 

questions. 

Q. Doctor, did you make any notations in the file as to 

what that first page indicated? 

A. Not in here, no. 

Q. What does that first page indicate? 

A. Well, what you're looking at here is an inpatient 

record which was from Springfield, dated 11-17-87 which 

is just basically kind of a discharge summary of what 

they felt about him at the time. 

Q. What would those diagnoses have been? 

A. They have here schizophrenia paranoid type in 

remission and Axis I and Axis II antisocial personality 

disorder. 

Q. Do you know the last time Mr. Austin was on 

medication? 

A. No, I don't. I mean, I'm sure if we went through 

this that I could determine it. 

The Court: I'm not going to allow you to have him 

examine that record. You asked about that one question, 

and he's answered it. Now, if there is another question 

specifically, I think we're going to have to stay within 

some rules here. These are not his records, they're 

just records that belong to the defendant [sic]. 

Counsel for Defendant: That's all I have, Judge. 

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Tr. Vol. Three at 116-20. 

As debatable as they may have been, insanity and the related 

absence of criminal intent were virtually the only defenses 

interposed on behalf of the defendant and available to him. The 

lay witnesses for the government, as well as the defendant 

himself, as we have seen, presented testimony of bizarre conduct 

and statements compatible with opposing inferences: At the time 

of the alleged offense the defendant was suffering from mental 

illness that affected his conduct, or that he feigned mental 

illness to secure custodial treatment more agreeable to him. 

This case is perplexing because other rulings of the trial 

court resulting in a strikingly disparate situation with reference 

to expert psychiatric or psychological support have not been 

preserved for review or assigned as error on this appeal. 

But the refusal of the trial court to receive in evidence 

exhibits numbered 404, 405, 407 and 408 has been assigned and 

vigorously argued on this appeal upon a record below making clear 

that their exclusion was on the ground solely of remoteness. 

Whether that ruling was proper and, if not, whether it was 

prejudicial to the rights and interests of the defendant in the 

light of the totality of circumstances reviewed here is squarely 

before us. 

We review the trial court's exclusion of evidence under the 

abuse of discretion standard of review. United States v. 

Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 272 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 

110 s.ct. 1306 (1990). 

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But in making such judgment in present circumstances, we must 

be mindful of due process implications. The Supreme Court has 

long recognized that "when a State brings its judicial power to 

bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must 

take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to 

present his defense." Ake, 470 u.s. at 76. This principle is 

grounded in part on the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 

guarantee. It is especially pertinent when, added to poverty, the 

disability of a defendant may include mental illness and is 

highlighted by the importance of psychiatric assistance in 

preparing a defense based on insanity. As to the latter, 

psychiatric assistance may well be crucial. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 

79-80. 

In United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 929 (lOth Cir. 

1985), importantly guided by the doctrine of Ake, we said 

it is evident when an indigent accused makes a clear 

showing to the trial judge that his mental condition 

will be a significant factor at trial, the judge has a 

clear duty upon request to appoint a psychiatric expert 

to assist in the defense of the case. That duty cannot 

be satisfied with the appointment of an expert who 

ultimately testifies contrary to the defense on the 

issue of competence. The essential benefit of having an 

expert in the first place is denied the defendant when 

the services of the doctor must be shared with the 

prosecution. In this case, the benefit sought was not 

only the testimony of a psychiatrist to present the 

defendant's side of the case, but also the assistance of 

an expert to interpret the findings of an expert witness 

and to aid in the preparation of his cross-examination. 

Without that assistance, the defendant was deprived of 

the fair trial due process demands. United States v. 

Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1973). The judgment of the 

district court is reversed and the case remanded for a 

new trial. 

Long before Ake, we were similarly sensitive to corresponding 

considerations relating to proof of mental illness. We have 

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recognized that generally when insanity is an issue all evidence 

of mental difficulties either before, after, or on the date of the 

alleged offense is admissible. Davis v. United States, 364 F.2d 

572, 574 (lOth Cir. 1966); cf. United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 

45, 52-53 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976). 

In this context, we have never placed a temporal limit on 

relevant proof of mental illness and are unwilling to do so now in 

view of its frequently long duration, its possible chronicity as 

suggested by the tendered exhibits and its recurrent 

manifestations within the common knowledge. 

In upholding the exclusion of psychiatric testimony where a 

competency defense had been disaffirmed, we yet expressed concern: 

While the exclusion of proof which touches on 

competency causes concern, we feel there was no 

reversible error. In connection with a competency issue 

the general rule is that the trial court should freely 

admit all evidence which appears to be relevant, as then 

Judge Blackmun cautioned. See Pope v. United States, 

372 F.2d 710, 736 (8th Cir.), vacated and remanded on 

other grounds, 392 U.S. 651, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 

1317, see also Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 430 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 377 u.s. 946, 84 S.Ct. 1354, 

12 L.Ed.2d 309. However, as noted defense counsel here 

had disclaimed a competency defense and offered proof on 

the theory of explanation by the scientist as to 

defendant's state of mind and intent in the 

circumstances. This is the theory recognized in United 

States v. Brawner, 153 U.S.App. D.C. 1, 471 F.2d 969 

that expert proof may be admitted as tending to show, in 

a responsible way, that the accused did not have the 

specific mental state required for a particular crime or 

degree of crime. 

Bennett, 539 F.2d at 52-53. 

Our other decisions relied upon by the government to justify 

the exclusion of the reports in question here are clearly 

distinguishable from the present case. 

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The government argues that even should it be assumed that the 

trial court abused its discretion, "this abuse of discretion did 

not cause the defendant to suffer any prejudice worthy of reversal 

and a new trial." Br. at 13. We do not agree. 

In addition to the important interests of the defendant and 

the government, we must consider also that of our system of 

justice. See Ake, 470 u.s. at 77. To take away the little 

residual of professional support that remained to him in the 

excluded reports supporting his theory of defense could be deemed 

not of less but of greater prejudice than if the other possible 

assistance from professional opinion had been made available to 

the defendant in the course of trial. 

We recognize both the wide latitude of a trial judge's 

discretion to exclude evidence that is only marginally relevant 

and the traditional reluctance of reviewing courts to impose 

constitutional restraints on ordinary evidential rulings. Yet, we 

are also mindful of the teaching of Major Crane v. Kentucky, 476 

U.S. 683, 690 (1986), that the exclusion of evidence concerning 

the mental condition of an accused under some circumstances may 

become so pervasive as to impinge upon the constitutional right to 

due process. 

Concerned about the latter problem on the record as a whole, 

but short of any such broad inquiry here, we hold that the 

exclusion of proffered exhibits numbered 404, 405, 407 and 408 on 

the ground of remoteness constituted an abuse of discretion 

prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. 

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III 

Appellant's final contention that variance between the 

language of the indictment and the jury instructions constituted 

prejudicial error need detain us little longer. Considering the 

issue as one of law reviewable de novo, we find this contention 

without merit. 2 

The statute foundational to the indictment, 18 u.s.c. § 111, 

provides in the disjunctive that whoever "forcibly assaults, 

resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any 

person designated in section 1114 of this title [and the officers 

referred to in the indictment were so designated] while engaged in 

or on account of the performance of his official duties" is guilty 

of the offense charged. The indictment alleged in the conjunctive 

that the defendant did all of these things. 

During jury deliberations the foreman sent the following 

inquiry to the judge (with another not relevant here): 

"Instruction #2 [quoting the statute] states an 'and' statement. 

However, instruction #7 states an Or statement. Which is correct? 

Under section lll(a)(l) --law or indictment--." 

The court answered the inquiry by informing the jury: "You 

should determine the case on the basis of instruction 7 [stating 

the proscribed methods by which the offense could be committed in 

the disjunctive. The law is clear that such submission to the 

jury was proper, no fatal variance being involved. United States 

2 Arguments made in defendant's brief suggesting also the per ~ invalidity of the indictment for related and other reason are 

frivolous and warrant no further comment. 

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v. Miller, 471 u.s. 130, 135-38 (1985); United States v. Parrish, 

925 F.2d 1299 (lOth Cir. 1991), quoting United States v. Gunter, 

546 F.2d 861, 868-69 (lOth Cir. 1976), cert. denied 430 u.s. 947 

(1977), and 431 u.s. 920 (1977): "A crime denounced in the 

statute disjunctively may be alleged in an indictment in the 

conjunctive, and thereafter proven in the disjunctive." 

To some jurors the unexplained difference between the 

conjunctive and disjunctive statements might be confusing. The 

court in response to the jury's question appropriately and 

accurately resolved any possibility of misunderstanding. 

For the reasons before stated, we reverse the judgment of the 

district court and remand for further proceedings. 

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