Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05036/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05036-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maria C. Engfelt
Defendant
Innovative Technology & Trading, Inc.
Plaintiff
Stuart I. Mackenzie
Defendant
Kristina Ciunkaite Zhou
Defendant
Jing Fu Zhou
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Mr. Zhou is proceeding pro se and purports to represent both himself and ITT. The

Court notes that “a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed

counsel.” See Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993); see also Civil

Local Rule 3-9(b). However, because the Court is dismissing the entire action for lack of

jurisdiction, the Court need not address whether ITT is properly in this action.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JING FU ZHOU and INNOVATIVE

TECHNOLOGY & TRADING, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

STUART I. MACKENZIE, MARIA C.

ENGFELT, and KRISTINA CIUNKAITE

ZHOU,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 06-05036 JSW

ORDER TO DISMISS

COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF

SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION 

Now before the Court is the motion to dismiss filed by defendants Stuart I. MacKenzie

(“MacKenzie”) and Maria C. Engfelt (“Engfelt”). The Court finds that this matter is

appropriate for disposition without oral argument and it is hereby deemed submitted. See Civ.

L.R. 7-1(b). Accordingly, the hearing set for April 6, 2007 is HEREBY VACATED. Having

carefully considered the parties’ arguments and relevant legal authority, the Court hereby grants

MacKenzie and Engfelt’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Jing Fu Zhou (“Mr. Zhou”) and Innovative Technology & Trading, Inc.

(“ITT”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendants Kristina Ciunkaite Zhou

(“Ms. Zhou”), MacKenzie, and Engfelt (collectively, “Defendants”).1

 Plaintiffs initially filed an

Case 3:06-cv-05036-JSW Document 26 Filed 04/02/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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action asserting various federal claims. On January 11, 2007, Plaintiffs filed an amended

verified first amended complaint (“FAC”), asserting only state law causes of action.

Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Zhou “is a Chinese-born electrical engineer of Canadian

citizenship and residence status, living in Fremont, California and working under a valid H1-B

visa ... in Milpitas, California. (FAC, ¶ 1.) ITT “is a California corporation ... with operations

and business headquarters located in the [sic] Fremont, California.” (Id., ¶ 2.) Ms. Zhou is a

citizen of both Lithuania and Canada, and currently resides in Canada. (Id., ¶ 3.) MacKenzie

and Engfelt both live in California. (Id., ¶ 4; see also Declaration of Stuart I. MacKenzie, ¶ 3;

Declaration of Maria C. Engfelt, ¶ 3.).)

MacKenzie and Engfelt filed a motion to dismiss based on the following three grounds:

(1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); (2)

the Domestic Relations Exception; and (3) the Younger abstention doctrine.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards Applicable to a Motion to Dismiss.

When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint or claim for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the court has jurisdiction to decide the

claim. Thornhill Publ’n Co. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Federal courts can only adjudicate cases which the Constitution or Congress authorize them to

adjudicate: those cases involving diversity of citizenship (where the parties are from diverse

states), or a federal question, or those cases to which the United States is a party. See e.g.,

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). This Court only has

original subject matter jurisdiction in diversity cases where the matter in controversy exceeds

the sum of $75,000 and is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. No plaintiff

can be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267,

267 (1806); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 358 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“Diversity jurisdiction under § 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship, each of the

plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants.”). 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be

“facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004.) 

Where an attack on jurisdiction is a “facial” attack on the allegations of the complaint, the

factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true and the non-moving party is entitled to

have those facts construed in the light most favorable to him or her. Federation of African

Amer. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996). If the jurisdictional

attack is “factual,” a defendant may rely on affidavits or other evidence that would be properly

before the Court, and the non-moving party is not entitled to any presumptions of truthfulness

with respect to the allegations in the complaint. Rather, he or she must come forward with

evidence establishing jurisdiction. Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. 

B. MacKenzie and Engfelt’s Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiffs assert only state-law causes of action against Defendants, and thus, they must

demonstrate the existence of diversity jurisdiction. MacKenzie and Engfelt contend that federal

jurisdiction is lacking because there is not complete diversity between the parties. As stated

above, there must be complete diversity, meaning no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state

as any of the defendants. Strawbridge, 7 U.S. at 267; see also Allstate, 358 F.3d at 1095.

For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is considered a citizen of the state in

which it is incorporated and the state in which it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. §

1332(c); see also Industrial Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990). 

According to the complaint, ITT is incorporated and has its principal place of business in

California, and thus, is a citizen of California. (FAC, ¶ 2.) MacKenzie and Engfelt are citizens

of California. Mr. Zhou and Ms. Zhou are both aliens for diversity jurisdiction purposes. See

Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1983) (in order to be a

“citizen” of a state under § 1332, “it is elementary law that one must first be a citizen of the

United States.”) (citations omitted).

To the extent ITT, as a corporation not being represented by counsel, is a plaintiff

properly before the Court, the Court finds there are California citizens as both plaintiffs and

defendants, and thus, complete diversity is lacking. Even if ITT is not properly a party in this

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United States District Court

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2 Because the Court is granting MacKenzie and Engfelt’s motion to dismiss for lack

of jurisdiction, the Court need not address their additional bases for dismissal raised in their

motion, the Domestic Relations exception and the Younger abstention doctrine.

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action, diversity jurisdiction is destroyed by the presence of aliens, Mr. Zhou and Ms. Zhou, on

both sides of the litigation. See Faysound Ltd. v. United Coconut Chemicals., Inc., 878 F.2d

290, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1989).

In an effort to demonstrate complete diversity, Mr. Zhou seeks to amend the complaint

in his opposition to the motion to dismiss. If the complaint were amended as Mr. Zhou seeks,

Mr. Zhou would bring several causes of action against MacKenzie and Engfelt and ITT would

bring the remaining causes of action against Ms. Zhou. Thus, according to Mr. Zhou, there

would be complete diversity if the Court considered each cause of action separately. However,

there must be complete diversity between all parties in an action. See Newman-Green, Inc. v.

Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 829 (1989) (“When a plaintiff sues more than one defendant in

a diversity action, the plaintiff must beet the requirements of the diversity statute for each

defendant or face dismissal”) (emphasis in original). Based on the absence of complete

diversity in this action, the Court grants MacKenzie’s and Engfelt’s motion to dismiss.2

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS MacKenzie’s and Engfelt’s motion to

dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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