Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01271/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01271-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lou Hesse
Appellee
James Arthur Taylor
Appellant
Duane L. Woodard
Appellee

Document Text:

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Unired States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAMES ARTHUR TAYLOR, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v . 

LOU HESSE and DUANE L. WOODARD, 

Attorney General, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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APR 2 9 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1271 

(D.C. No. 90-C-1237) 

(District of Colorado) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

James Arthur Taylor, an inmate at Fremont Correctional Facility in Canon City, Colorado, appeals the district court's adoption 

of the magistrate judge's recommendation dismissing Mr. Taylor's 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 u.s.c. S 2254 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1271 Document: 010110105220 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 1 
• (1988). Both the magistrate judge and the district court found 

that Mr. Taylor had not exhausted his state remedies. 

In his petition, Mr. Taylor asserts three allegations of constitutional error in his state court conviction: (1) the admission of testimony relating to his past incarceration violated his 

constitutional right to a fundamentally fair trial; (2) the use of 

constitutionally infirm prior convictions for the enhancement of 

his current sentence violated his constitutional right to due 

process; and (3) the introduction of a bloodied hammer of only 

conjectural relevance violated his constitutional rights of due 

process and a fair trial. 

A habeas petitioner must exhaust state remedies before bringing an action in federal court. See 28 u.s.c. S 2254 (1988). 

Under principles of federal-state comity, the statutory exhaustion 

requirement is met only when the substance of the federal habeas 

claim has been "fairly presented" to a state court. Picard v. 

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 

1250, 1252 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989). The 

sole issue before us is whether Mr. Taylor's allegations of constitutional violations were fairly presented to the state courts. 

It is clear that Mr. Taylor raised claims relating to each of 

the issues before us in state court. See Colorado v. Taylor, No. 

85CA1029 (Colo. Ct. App. April 21, 1988). On direct appeal, the 

petitioner argued: (1) the admission of testimony regarding his 

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Appellate Case: 90-1271 Document: 010110105220 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 2 
past incarceration violated Rule 403 of the Colorado Rules of 

Evidence; (2) the trial court erroneously relied on constitutionally infirm pleas of guilty in its application of the state's 

habitual offender statute; and (3) the admission of the bloodied 

hammer was error. As the district court noted, however, those 

claims must have sufficiently alerted the state court of the 

claims' federal nature to have been "fairly presented." See 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). 

In arguing that the state court was apprised of the claims' 

federal nature, the petitioner urges this court to adopt the 

standard set forth by the Second Circuit in Daye v. Attorney 

General of the State of New York, 696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1982) (en 

bane). The court in Daye stated: 

[T]he ways in which a state defendant may fairly present 

to the state courts the constitutional nature of his 

claim, even without citing chapter and verse of the 

Constitution, include (a) reliance on pertinent federal 

cases employing constitutional analysis, (b) reliance on 

state cases employing constitutional analysis in like 

fact situations, (c) assertion of the claim in terms so 

particular as to call to mind a specific right protected 

by the Constitution, and (d) allegation of a pattern of 

facts that is well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation. 

Id. at 194; ~ also United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Fairman, 

731 F.2d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1984); Franklin v. Rose, 811 F.2d 322, 

326 (6th Cir. 1987). We have before us only the state court appellate opinion to determine whether the claims were fairly presented; the petitioner did not provide in the record the briefs 

filed before that court~ 

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It is clear from the opinion, which cited Boykin v. Alabama, 

395 U.S. 238 (1969), that the state court squarely addressed the 

constitutional validity of his conviction under the habitual criminal provision. The opinion, however, does not cite federal or 

state authority employing constitutional analysis when evaluating 

petitioner's other two claims. Nor does it otherwise employ 

constitutional doctrine. The petitioner instead bases his exhaustion arguments for these two claims on the last standard set forth 

in Daye. Mr. Taylor argues that he sufficiently alleged in the 

state court a pattern of facts that is well within the mainstream 

of constitutional litigation. We disagree. 

Even if we were to adopt the test set out in Daye, we do not 

find that the factual pattern alleged in Mr. Taylor's remaining 

two claims are intrinsically federal in nature. The state appellate court upheld the admission of testimony concerning the 

petitioner's prior criminal record squarely on a state evidentiary 

ruling. That the state's evidentiary rule patterns Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 403 does not demonstrate the federal nature of the claim or 

otherwise put the state court on notice of the argument's 

constitutional dimension. The state court was not therefore given 

a "'fair opportunity' to apply controlling legal principles to the 

facts bearing upon [the petitioner's] constitutional claim." 

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). The claim that 

evidence should not have been admitted pursuant to a state 

evidentiary rule is not the substantial equivalent to a claim that 

the admission of that evidence deprived the defendant of a fair 

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Appellate Case: 90-1271 Document: 010110105220 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 4 
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trial. Nor do we infer constitutional dimension in the state 

appellate court's treatment of the admissibility of the bloodied 

hammer. The relevancy issue addressed by the state court, 

combined with the underlying facts, do not necessarily bring the 

due process clause to mind. Cf. Nelson v. Solem, 714 F.2d 57, 60 

(8th Cir. 1983). 

A habeas petitioner must exhaust available state court 

remedies on all claims before filing a petition in federal court. 

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). Because we find that the 

petitioner exhausted only one of the three claims before us in 

state court, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED. The 

mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-1271 Document: 010110105220 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 5