Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50441/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50441-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maricela Long
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GERARD SMITH, AKA Gerard

Robert Smith,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50440

D.C. No.

2:13-cr-00819-PA-3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARICELA LONG,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50441

D.C. No.

2:13-cr-00819-PA-7

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GREGORY THOMPSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50442

D.C. No.

2:13-cr-00819-PA-1

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2 UNITED STATES V. SMITH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICKEY MANZO, AKA Mickey

Shane Manzo,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50446

D.C. No.

2:13-cr-00819-PA-4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SCOTT CRAIG, AKA Scott Alan

Craig,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50449

D.C. No.

2:13-cr-00819-PA-6

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

STEPHEN LEAVINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50455

D.C. No.

2:13-cr-00819-PA-2

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JAMES SEXTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50583

D.C. No.

2:13-cr-00819-PA-5

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 5, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed August 4, 2016

Before: Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Richard R. Clifton,

and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fernandez

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4 UNITED STATES V. SMITH

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

In an opinion addressing challenges to jury instructions,

the panel affirmed the district court in a case in which seven

defendants, who were members of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s

Department, were convicted for their roles in interfering with

a federal investigation into civil rights abuses at Los Angeles

County jails.

Rejecting an argument by six of the defendants (the Joint

Appellants) that the instructions misstated the intent element

of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)), the panel

held that the instructions were correct and did not permit the

jury to convict the Joint Appellants for obstructing an

independent FBI investigation rather than for obstructing the

grand jury.

The panel rejected arguments that a defendant’s unlawful

purpose to obstruct justice must be sole or primary. The

panel wrote that use of “merely incidental” or “dominant”

should be eschewed, but on this record found no reversible

error in the instruction given. The panel rejected a claim by

James Sexton, who was tried separately, that the degree of

unlawful purpose required by § 1503 is so ambiguous that the

statute must be construed in his favor.

Rejecting the Joint Appellants’ challenge to the adequacy

of the district court’s good faith instruction, the panel held

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 5

that the instruction properly conveyed that good faith as to

one purpose did not mean good faith as to all of them.

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to give an additional innocent intent

instruction.

The panel held that in light of a clear instruction regarding

the Joint Appellants’ authority to investigate, any error in an

instruction regarding whether or not federal agents violated

California law was harmless.

Rejecting Scott Craig and Maricela Long’s challenge to

instructions regarding false statement counts, the panel wrote

that neither the dual-purposes instruction nor the good faith

instruction applied to the false statement counts, and that the

false-statement instructions in any event left no room for the

jury to convict Craig and Long if they acted entirely in good

faith.

The panel addressed other challenges to the defendants’

convictions and sentences in a memorandum disposition.

COUNSEL

William J. Genego (argued), Law Office of William Genego,

Santa Monica, California, for Defendant-Appellant Gerard

Smith.

Karen Lee Landau (argued), Law Offices of Karen L.

Landau, Oakland, California, for Defendant-Appellant Scott

Craig.

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6 UNITED STATES V. SMITH

Todd W. Burns (argued), Burns & Cohan, Attorneys at Law,

San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant Stephen

Leavins.

Thomas P. O’Brien (argued), Paul Hastings LLP, Los

Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellant James Sexton.

Hillary Potashner, Federal Public Defender; Gail Ivens and

Elizabeth Richardson-Royer, Deputy Federal Public

Defenders; Federal Public Defender’s Office, Los Angeles,

California; for Defendant-Appellant Maricela Long.

Kevin McDermott, Law Offices of Kevin Barry McDermott,

Irvine, California, for Defendant-Appellant Gregory

Thompson.

Matthew J. Lombard, Matthew J. Lombard Law Offices, Los

Angeles,California,forDefendant-Appellant MickeyManzo.

L. Ashley Aull (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Lawrence S. Middleton, Chief, Criminal Division; Eileen M.

Decker, United States Attorney; Office of the United States

Attorney, Los Angeles, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge:

Gerard Smith, Maricela Long, Gregory Thompson,

Mickey Manzo, Scott Craig, Stephen Leavins (collectively,

the “Joint Appellants”), and James Sexton each appeal their

convictions for obstruction of justice and conspiracy to

obstruct justice. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1503(a). Long and

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 7

Craig also appeal their convictions for making false

statements. See id. § 1001(a)(2). Craig and Leavins also

appeal their sentences. The Joint Appellants and Sexton raise

a number of challenges to the jury instructions.1 We affirm.

BACKGROUND2

The Joint Appellants and Sexton were all members of the

Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD), and were

convicted for their roles in interfering with a federal

investigation into civil rights abuses at Los Angeles County

jails. Leavins, Craig, and Long were members of the Internal

Criminal Investigations Bureau (ICIB), an LASD unit that

investigates criminal activity by LASD employees. Leavins

was a lieutenant, while Craig and Long were sergeants. 

Thompson was a lieutenant who oversaw Operation Safe Jails

(OSJ), an LASD unit that investigates inmates. Smith,

Manzo, and Sexton were OSJ deputies.

A federal grand jury began to investigate allegations of

civil rights violations in LASD jails in June 2011. The grand

jury issued subpoenas to LASD that month, seeking

documents regarding “use of force” incidents in jails. The

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assisted the grand jury

with its investigation. By late-August 2011, a number of

grand jury subpoenas had been served, and were circulated

1 They have also raised several other challenges to their convictions and

sentences. We have addressed those in a memorandum disposition filed

on the same date as this opinion.

2

In setting forth the background, we have “consider[ed] the evidence

presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” United

States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

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8 UNITED STATES V. SMITH

among LASD personnel, including some of the Joint

Appellants.

As part of the federal investigation, in July 2011, the FBI

used an undercover agent to bribe LASD Deputy Gilbert

Michel to smuggle a cell phone to Anthony Brown, a

cooperating inmate at LASD’s Men’s Central Jail (MCJ). 

The phone was intended to allow Brown to communicate

contemporaneously with the FBI about claims of civil rights

violations.

On August 8, 2011, LASD personnel found and seized the

cell phone. Brown’s possession of the cell phone was treated

much like similar conduct by other inmates, until August 18,

2011, when Smith, Manzo, and Thompson learned that

Brown and his cell phone were linked to an FBI civil rights

investigator. That prompted Thompson to impose stringent

restrictions on Brown, including “no phones, no visits,

especially from outside LE [law enforcement] without my

approval.” It also prompted Smith and Manzo, later joined by

Leavins, to interview Brown regarding the cell phone, civil

rights violations, and the nature of Brown’s involvement with

the FBI.

On August 23, 2011, FBI Agents Leah Marx, Wayne

Plympton, and David Dahle went to MCJ to interview Brown

and determine what happened to the cell phone. About an

hour after the interview began, it was terminated by an LASD

sergeant who entered the room shouting that the FBI agents

did not have permission to interview Brown; Brown was

taken away, and the FBI agents left after telling Brown they

would return for him. Shortly thereafter, Smith, Manzo,

Leavins, and LASD Captain William Carey interviewed

Brown about the details of his meeting with the FBI,

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 9

including whether Brown was going to testify. Leavins told

Brown that he would be transferred to another jail for his

safety, and promised Brown additional privileges there.

Brown was moved to a medical ward in MCJ while they

decided where to transfer him, and by that night, he was

under 24-hour guard by OSJ deputies. The guards were told

that no one, including federal law enforcement, could visit or

see Brown. One guard testified that he knew that the FBI had

given Brown a phone in connection with the investigation of

illegal use of force in MCJ, and that the reason Brown had to

be removed from MCJ was because the FBI was going to

come to get him.

On August 24, 2011, Brown was interviewed again, this

time by Manzo, Smith, Leavins, Craig, and Long. The

interview immediately focused on the FBI, with Long asking

Brown when he first came in contact with the FBI, what they

were interested in, and who Brown’s FBI contacts were. 

Brown told them that the FBI was primarily focused on

assaults in the jail.

Meanwhile, believing that their investigation may have

been compromised, the FBI approached both Deputy Michel

and his girlfriend, Deputy Angela Caruso, on August 24,

2011. They served Deputy Caruso with a grand jury

subpoena.

On August 25, 2011, the federal district court issued a

writ for Brown’s testimony before the federal grand jury; the

writ required Brown’s production on September 7, 2011. The

United States Marshals employee responsible for serving

writs followed her usual practice of calling LASD prior to

service; she was initially told that Brown could not be found,

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10 UNITED STATES V. SMITH

and then that the person would have to speak to a supervisor. 

The employee remembered faxing or emailing the writ to

LASD thereafter, and telephone records confirmed two

different faxes from the Marshals to LASD on the morning of

August 25, 2011. LASD had no record of receiving the writ,

but LASD personnel did become aware of it.3

Later that afternoon, OSJ deputies went to LASD’s

records office and asked that Brown be the released from the

computer system. Although the clerks in the records office

were reluctant to do so without a court order, they ultimately

relented and “released” Brown. Sexton used his knowledge

of LASD’s computer systems to assist in rebooking Brown

under an alias; Brown was thereafter released and rebooked

under a series of aliases, each time without information

linking the alias to his true identity. That made it impossible

for the FBI, the Marshals, and anyone in LASD’s Warrants

and Detainers section to find Brown.

By the next day, August 26, 2011, Brown had been

moved from MCJ to a jail in San Dimas, California. He

continued to be guarded around the clock, and Deputy Sexton

was one of those guards. Smith told one of Brown’s guards

that the FBI should not be allowed to speak to Brown, and

that he needed to be hidden from any federal agency.

4 At

3

In grand jury testimony that was admitted at his trial, Sexton said that

he learned from LASD personnel in the Warrants and Detainers section

that a writ for Brown had been received, and that he told Smith and

Manzo.

4 There was testimony that around this time, LASD personnel were told

that, if a federal agent came to a facility to serve a writ for Brown, LASD

Undersheriff Paul Tanaka’s cell phone should be called and the writ not

honored. The message was disseminated in person so that there would be

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 11

10:30 that night, Craig and Long interviewed Brown again,

mocking whether the FBI would return for him and whether

the FBI could “take the [LASD] house down,” as they had

promised to do, since “the house [was] still there.”

Several days later, on August 30, 2011, Leavins, Craig,

and Long interviewed Deputy Michel. Michel told them that

the FBI had questioned him about the use of excessive force

in the jail, subpoenaed his girlfriend (Deputy Caruso), and

asked him to cooperate with their investigation into

misconduct. Leavins, Craig, and Long sought to dissuade

Michel from cooperating, telling him that the FBI was

manipulating him, lying to him, threatening him, and

blackmailing him. Craig ordered Michel not to discuss these

matters with anyone, including the FBI.

That afternoon, Leavins, Craig, and Long interviewed

Deputy William Courson, who had alerted his supervisors

that he had contact with Agent Marx outside of work. 

Leavins, Craig, and Long attempted to discourage Courson

from cooperating with the FBI by leading him to believe he

“was played” and “lied to” by Agent Marx. Craig and

Leavins told Courson not to talk to anyone about this, and

Craig told him that if he was threatened with a “Federal

Grand Jury Subpoena” or “[s]ome nonsense like that” he

should call Craig.

That same day, LASD received three additional grand

jury subpoenas dated August 24, 2011, which included

requests for records regarding Brown and Deputies Michel

and Caruso. On August 31, 2011, Manzo’s investigation

no written record of it and no chance for it to be captured on telephones

that could be “bugged.”

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12 UNITED STATES V. SMITH

notebookmemorializeda meeting regarding “Fed. Grand Jury

Inv. Subpoenas” and listed categories of documents requested

with dates corresponding to the due dates of the August 24th

subpoenas.

Brown was returned to MCJ by September 2, 2011, where

he was interviewed briefly by Smith. Brown told Smith that

he would have “nothing to do with [the FBI] anymore.” The

next day, Brown wrote a letter addressed to several LASD

personnel, including Long and Leavins, confirming that he

would not testify for the FBI, and that the evidence he had

given to them would therefore “mean[] nothing.” On

September 12, 2011, Sexton re-booked Brown under his true

name, and Brown was transferred to state custody that night.

Sometime during September 2011, an ICIB task force was

created to investigate the use of force in jails and the cell

phone found in Brown’s possession. Leavins was the lead

lieutenant, Craig and Long were lead investigators, and Smith

and Manzo were members. In that first week after the

creation of the task force, a shared drive that included all the

federal grand jury subpoenas was established for the task

force members.

On September 8, 2011, Craig applied for a state-court

order requiring the FBI to produce materials regarding its

investigation, but it was denied for lack of jurisdiction. The

next day, Craig left a voicemail on a phone he believed to be

Agent Marx’s, stating that he was working on a warrant for

her arrest. On September 13, 2011, members of the LASD

Special Operations Group began to surveil Agent Marx at

Craig’s request. They tracked her to her apartment, identified

her car, and followed her to work. Long and Craig then

confronted Marx outside her apartment on September 26,

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 13

2011. Craig asked Marx if she knew she was “a named

suspect in a felony complaint,” and told her that he was “in

the process of swearing out a declaration for an arrest warrant

for you.”

After this confrontation, Marx returned to the FBI office

at the direction of her supervisor, Agent Narro. Narro called

Craig and Long to ask them if there would be a warrant for

Marx’s arrest, and Long told him “[t]here’s going to be,” and

that it could be issued as soon as the next day. After the

phone call, Long mocked Narro, saying “They’re scared!

They’re like, do you know when[] is the warrant—” and the

room broke into laughter before the recording ended. As a

result of these threats to Marx, the FBI agents postponed

going to the jail to interview inmates and gather information

because they were concerned that Marx would be arrested. 

No one on the investigation team returned to the jail for three

months.

The Joint Appellants and Sexton were indicted for

obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice. In

addition, Craig and Long were indicted for making false

statements to the FBI. The Joint Appellants were tried, were

convicted on all counts, and were sentenced to prison terms. 

Sexton was tried separately. His first trial ended in a mistrial,

but his second trial resulted in his conviction on all counts. 

He was then sentenced to a prison term. These appeals

followed.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)

and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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14 UNITED STATES V. SMITH

We review the district court’s “precise formulation” of

jury instructions for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Lloyd, 807 F.3d 1128, 1165 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United

States v. Dixon, 201 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2000); see also

United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1485 (9th Cir. 1995). 

We review constitutional challenges,5and whether the jury

instructions misstated an element of the crime or adequately

presented the defendant’s theory of his case,6 de novo.

We review for plain error those claimed errors that were

not brought to the attention of the district court. Fed. R.

Crim. P. 52(b); see also United States v. Pelisamen, 641 F.3d

399, 404 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gomez-Norena,

908 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1990).

DISCUSSION

There is little dispute about the conduct on which the

Joint Appellants’ and Sexton’s indictments and convictions

were predicated. Certain of them guarded Brown, transferred

him to a new jail under various aliases, discouraged Brown

and Deputies Michel and Courson from cooperating with the

FBI, confronted FBI Agent Marx, and lied to her and her

supervisor. Tape recordings, documents, and witness

testimony (including fromsome ofthe appellants themselves)

confirmed those activities. But whether the Joint Appellants

and Sexton were guilty of the charged crimes crucially turned

on the intent with which they acted. According to the

Government, all acted with unlawful intent, and all were

5 United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809, 811 (9th Cir. 2001); United

States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

 

6 Lloyd, 807 F.3d at 1164–65; see also Sarno, 73 F.3d at 1485.

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 15

therefore guilty. According to the Joint Appellants and

Sexton, all acted in good faith, motivated by an intent to

follow orders, or to protect Brown from harm, or to

investigate the FBI’s complicity in smuggling contraband, or

to conduct their own investigation into civil rights abuses. 

The juries in each trial determined that the Government’s

version was correct and convicted the Joint Appellants and

Sexton.

Appellants now claim that a number of instructional

errors undermined the verdicts. The Joint Appellants and

Sexton all challenge jury instructions from their respective

trials. In reviewing those challenges we will keep in mind the

admonition that an instruction “may not be judged in artificial

isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall

charge,” and “the relevant inquiry is whether the instructions

as a whole are misleading or inadequate to guide the jury’s

deliberation.” Lloyd, 807 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Dixon,

201 F.3d at 1230).

(1) Intent required for obstruction of justice

The Joint Appellants argue that the jury instructions

misstated the intent that the Government had to prove for

obstruction of justice,7 which, they assert, allowed the jury to

7 As relevant to this argument, the instructions given to the jury read as

follows:

In order for each defendant to be found guilty of

[obstruction of justice], the Government must prove

each of the following elements beyond a reasonable

doubt.

First, the defendant influenced obstructed or

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16 UNITED STATES V. SMITH

convict them merely for obstructing an FBI investigation,

rather than for obstructing the grand jury. We do not agree.

In order to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a), a defendant must

have acted “with an intent to influence . . . grand jury

proceedings,” not to influence “an investigation independent

of the . . . grand jury’s authority.” United States v. Aguilar,

515 U.S. 593, 599, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2362, 132 L. Ed. 2d 520

(1995). This court has already held that “a grand jury

investigation constitutes a judicial proceeding for purposes of

§ 1503.” United States v. Duran, 41 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir.

1994); see also United States v. Macari, 453 F.3d 926, 936

(7th Cir. 2006). Thus, the district court’s use of the phrase

impeded or tried to influence, obstruct, or impede a

federal grand jury investigation;

And second, the defendant acted corruptly with

knowledge of a pending federal grand jury investigation

and with the intent to obstruct the federal grand jury

investigation.

As used in Section 1503 “corruptly” means that the

act must be done with the purpose of obstructing

justice. The government does not need to prove that

defendants’ conduct had the actual effect of obstruction. 

However, the Government must prove that the

defendants’ actions would have had the natural and

probable effect of interfering with the grand jury

investigation.

. . . .

One element the Government must prove beyond

a reasonable doubt with respect to the obstruction of

justice charges is that the defendant had the unlawful

intent to obstruct a grand jury investigation.

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 17

“grand jury investigation,” rather than “grand jury

proceeding,” was neither misleading nor an abuse of

discretion in these circumstances.

We also see no possibility that the jury understood “grand

jury investigation” to refer to things the FBI may have done

as part of an investigation independent of the grand jury’s

authority. First, the jury instructions referred to a grand jury

investigation, not an FBI investigation, and we presume that

jurors follow their instructions. See United States v. Heredia,

483 F.3d 913, 923 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Second, the

evidence showed that the investigation was a grand jury

investigation into civil rights abuses at LASD jails, and there

was no evidence that the FBI’s efforts during this period were

undertaken independently of the grand jury. See United

States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 1999); see also

United States v. Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 544 F.3d 149,

169 (2d Cir. 2008); cf. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600–601, 115 S.

Ct. at 2362–63.

There was no need for the district court to give an

additional instruction proposed by the Joint Appellants which

stated that it was insufficient for the Government to show that

they obstructed an FBI investigation, as opposed to a grand

jury investigation. To the extent that the FBI was operating

as an arm of the grand jury, the trial jury was entitled to

consider the Joint Appellants’ obstructive acts as they related

to the FBI. See Macari, 453 F.3d at 936–38; see also

Triumph Capital, 544 F.3d at 169; cf. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at

600–601, 115 S. Ct. at 2362–63. It was not told to do

otherwise. Although the Joint Appellants now claim that the

district court should have given yet another instruction

explaining what the Government must show to demonstrate

that the FBI was acting as an arm of the grand jury, they

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18 UNITED STATES V. SMITH

never proposed one. Review is therefore for plain error,8but

the Joint Appellants have not cited to any case that requires

an instruction on that point and have not demonstrated that

one was needed here. In fact, the other instructions told the

jury that the Joint Appellants had to act with an intent to

obstruct the grand jury investigation itself. Even if the failure

to give an arm of the grand jury instruction sua sponte might

be plain error in some circumstances, it would undoubtedly

be harmless on this record. See United States v. Cherer,

513 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2008). The evidence at trial

pointed to the FBI’s acting for the grand jury, and the Joint

Appellants do not identify any evidence on which the jury

could rely to find that the FBI was acting “separate and apart”

from the grand jury investigation. See Macari, 453 F.3d at

936–38.

There was also no plain error in the district court’s failure

to give an instruction sua sponte that the Joint Appellants had

to know that their conduct would have the “natural and

probable effect” of influencing a grand jury investigation. 

See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S. Ct. at 2362 (quoting

United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993); see

also Duran, 41 F.3d at 544. They claim that is required by

Aguilar, but we have previously described that decision as

requiring that there be a nexus between the agency (here the

FBI) activity and the judicial proceeding, and that the jury

can infer that nexus “if the ‘natural and probable effect’ of the

defendant’s conduct vis à vis the [FBI] proceeding would

8

See Henderson v. United States, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1124,

1126–27, 1130–31, 185 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2013); see also United States v.

Houser, 130 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 1997) (review is for plain error when

no alternative instruction was proposed and no objection was made to the

failure of the district court to give an alternative instruction).

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 19

obstruct justice.” United States v. Bhagat, 436 F.3d 1140,

1147 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599,

115 S. Ct. at 2362). The district court here gave a nexus

instruction that was substantively identical to the one that was

jointly proposed by the Joint Appellants and the

Government,9and that accurately reflected the law. See

United States v. Fleming, 215 F.3d 930, 938 (9th Cir. 2000);

see also United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d 582, 587–88 (9th

Cir. 2015) (en banc) (N.R. Smith, J., concurring).10 To the

extent that Triumph Capital states that an additional

instruction is required,11 we disagree. Aguilar12

does not

require that essentially redundant instruction. Moreover, the

instructions did require that the Government prove not only

that the Joint Appellants’ actions would have had the natural

and probable effect of interfering with the grand jury

investigation,13but also that the Joint Appellants did those

 

9

See supra note 7 (fourth paragraph of quoted material).

10 In Bonds, the “natural and probable effect” element of § 1503 was

characterized as a “materiality requirement.” Framed either as a nexus

element or a materiality element, there is no requirement that the

defendant, in addition to the specific intent to obstruct justice, also have

knowledge that his acts may have the “natural and probable effect” of

interfering with justice.

 

11 Triumph Capital, 544 F.3d at 166–67 & n.16.

 

12 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S. Ct. at 2362.

 

13 Id. at 601, 115 S. Ct. at 2363.

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20 UNITED STATES V. SMITH

acts “corruptly,” that is, with the purpose of obstructing

justice.14

The district court’s instructions regarding the intent

required for obstruction of justice were correct and did not

permit the jury to convict the Joint Appellants on the invalid

theory that they obstructed an independent FBI

investigation.15 We see no reason to believe that the jury’s

general verdict was based on a failure to follow the specific

instructions regarding grand jury investigations while

concomitantly seizing upon and crediting the factuallyunsupported theory that the Joint Appellants obstructed an

independent FBI investigation. See Griffin v. United States,

502 U.S. 46, 59–60, 112 S. Ct. 466, 474, 116 L. Ed. 2d 371

(1991) (refusing to negate a verdict on the chance “that the

jury convicted on a ground that was not supported by

adequate evidence when there existed alternative grounds for

which the evidence was sufficient” (quoting United States v.

Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1414 (7th Cir. 1991))); see also

United States v. Fulbright, 105 F.3d 443, 451 n.5 (9th Cir.

1997), overruled on other grounds by Heredia, 483 F.3d at

921–22; cf. McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. __, __,

136 S. Ct. 2355, 2374–75, __ L. Ed. 2d __ (2016).

14 United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981). The

Joint Appellants also challenge Rasheed’s definition of “corruptly” as

overly broad, but we are bound by that precedent and apply it here. See

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

15 We also reject the Joint Appellants’ argument that tampering with

grand jury witnesses is not a legally permissible theory under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1503. See United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir.

1984). This court has already held to the contrary. See United States v.

Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1337–38 (9th Cir. 1998). We are bound by that

precedent. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 899.

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 21

(2) Dual purposes

The Joint Appellants and Sexton challenge an instruction,

given by the district court in each trial, which told the jury

that the Government did not need to prove that the

defendants’ sole or primary purpose was to obstruct justice.16

They all argue that the instruction should have required the

Government to prove that their unlawful purpose was the sole

or primary purpose. Sexton further explicates that position by

arguing that the district court should have instructed the jury

that the unlawful purpose had to be dominant.

We reject the claim that a defendant’s unlawful purpose

to obstruct justice must be sole or primary. A defendant’s

unlawful purpose to obstruct justice is not negated by the

simultaneous presence of another motive for his overall

conduct. We noted that over two decades ago. See United

States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 537 (9th Cir. 1988). In that

case, the Internal Revenue Service sent a summons to a

company of which Laurins was a director. It sought

production of books and records, but Laurins concealed them

instead. Id. at 533–34. He was prosecuted for obstruction,

and we held that the concealment fell within the definition of

corruptly obstructing justice. Id. at 536–37. He claimed that

 

16 In the Joint Appellants’ trial, the instruction said:

The Government need not prove that the defendants’

sole or even primary purpose was to obstruct justice so

long as the Government proves beyond a reasonable

doubt that one of the defendants’ purposes was to

obstruct justice. The defendants’ purpose of

obstructing justice must be more thanmerely incidental.

The instruction was the same in Sexton’s trial, mutatis mutandis.

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his intent was to wait until he was personally summoned so

that he could “assert his fifth amendment privilege.” Id. at

537. While that was a benign motive, we declared that it did

not suffice to overcome the evidence of his corrupt motive to

frustrate enforcement of the original summons. Id. at 537;

see also United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th

Cir. 1990) (“conduct [must be] prompted, at least in part, by

a ‘corrupt motive’” (quoting United States v. Brand, 775 F.2d

1460, 1465 (11th Cir. 1985))); United States v. Howard,

569 F.2d 1331, 1336 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); United States

v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir. 1975) (the good motive

was “outweighed” by the bad motive). And in a different

context, we have recognized that where the purpose of an act

was necessary to a conviction, it was not required to be the

“primary or sole purpose” of that act. United States v. Banks,

514 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir. 2008).

The evidence was sufficient to suggest various motives

for the Joint Appellants’ and Sexton’s conduct, so it was

appropriate for the court to give an instruction regarding dual

purposes. See Heredia, 483 F.3d at 923–24. Alternatively,

the jury could have found that the Joint Appellants and

Sexton undertook certain actions without a purpose to

obstruct, but had that obstructive purpose with respect to

other actions. See id. The instruction properly conveyed that

concept. See Banks, 514 F.3d at 964–65, 969–70.

Sexton, however, adds that the district court’s

clarification that “the purpose must be more than merely

incidental” was not specific enough about where the strength

of the purpose must fall on a continuum between “merely

incidental” and sole or primary. At the district court he

indicated that the jury should be told that the obstruction

motive must be dominant and nothing less than that would

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 23

do. The district court did not accept his position. Sexton

relied on Banks in support of his argument. However, what

Banks said was that in the “gang or racketeering enterprise”

area the “purpose does not have to be the only purpose or the

main purpose.” Id. at 969. “But it does have to be a

substantial purpose.” Id. Banks then went on to say that it

must be “one of the defendant’s general purposes or dominant

purposes.” Id. at 970.

“Incidental” itself can be commonly defined as

“subordinate, nonessential, or attendant in position or

significance . . . .” Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 1142 (Philip Babcock Gove, 3d ed. 1986). Thus,

it would seem that, under the instruction given, the jury

would have understood that the purpose must be essential in

some sense—that is, substantial. Taken alone, “dominant”

has a meaning of “commanding, controlling, or having

supremacy or ascendancy over all others.” Id. at 671. 

Plainly, however, we did not mean in Banks that the purpose

in question must be the dominant purpose, hence our use of

the phrase “one of.” As we made clear in Banks, in the gang

or racketeering area, when a person has two criminal

purposes neither has to dominate (be the main purpose), but

then neither can be “merely incidental” either. More simply

put, perhaps, both purposes must be substantial. In any event,

our effort in Banks does demonstrate the difficulty in

attempting to wrap words around the common sense idea that

in order to be liable for a crime premised on gang

involvement a person’s criminal purpose must not only

include the commission of a substantive crime, but also must

include the additional criminal purpose of committing that

crime as a gang-oriented activity. See Banks, 514 F.3d at

969.

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Nonetheless, we see the use of the phrase “merely

incidental” in instructions as infelicitous. So, too, is use of

the word “dominant.” Both should be eschewed. 

“Incidental” has a flavor that suggests that the standard is

very low, even if that is not true as a definitional matter. 

“Dominant” has a flavor that suggests that the standard is

very high. “Substantial” would convey the idea with more

precision, but we decline to engage in the fascinating pursuit

of choosing the exact word at this time—should it be

“substantial” or “considerable” or “essential” or “significant”

or “important” or “integral” or “strong,” etc.? We decline

because, regardless of the exact word used, on this record the

jury would not have been misled by the instruction that was

given. The jury was not asked to decide an issue where one

alleged purpose was very strong and the other very weak. It

had to choose between two starkly different stories and

readings of the evidence, but none of the argued purposes

appeared to be asthenic in nature. In another case, the “more

than merely incidental” formulation may well lead to error,

and that makes its use rather dangerous at best; thus, our

admonition against using it. But on this record, we find no

reversible error in the instruction given.

We also reject Sexton’s claim that the degree of unlawful

purpose required by 18 U.S.C. § 1503 is so ambiguous that

the statute must be construed in his favor. He has identified

no “grievous ambiguity” in the statute, and we see none. See

Banks, 514 F.3d at 968. Moreover, we are confident that the

mens rea required for a violation of the statute provides

sufficient protection from conviction for law enforcement

officers who are conducting lawful investigations without the

requisite unlawful intent. See United States v. Lee, 183 F.3d

1029, 1032–33 (9th Cir. 1999).

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 25

(3) Good faith

Although in general “[a] defendant is not entitled to a

separate good faith instruction,”17the district court gave one. 

The Joint Appellants challenge the instruction18on the ground

that it suggested that good faith was merely some evidence

inconsistent with unlawful intent, not a complete defense to

the charged crime. Of course, as described above, the

evidence adduced at trial suggested that the Joint Appellants

may have had a variety of motives for their conduct—some

of which were consistent with good faith, and some of which

were consistent with a purpose to obstruct justice. Good faith

as to one purpose did not mean good faith as to all of them,

and the good faith instruction properly conveyed that concept. 

Because the instruction was correct, it is immaterial that its

17 United States v. Green, 745 F.2d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1984); see also

United States v. Shipsey, 363 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2004).

 

18 The instruction provided:

Evidence that a defendant relied in good faith on

the orders the defendant received from the defendants’

superior officers and that the defendant reasonably and

objectively believed those orders to be lawful is

inconsistent with an unlawful intent and is evidence

you may consider in determining if the Government has

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had

the required unlawful intent.

If you find, however, that a defendant carried out

those orders with an unlawful intent to obstruct a grand

jury investigation or that a defendant did not reasonably

and objectively believe the superiors’ orders to be

lawful, the defendants’ conduct is not excused by a

claim or evidence that the defendant might have been

following orders of his or her superiors.

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26 UNITED STATES V. SMITH

precise wording differed from the one used in a different trial.

See United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1249 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2009).

To the extent that the Joint Appellants claim that this

instruction may have allowed the jury to convict them of

obstruction even if it determined that they acted exclusively

in good faith, we are not convinced. Read in the context of

the other instructions,19 which specified that the Government

had to show that the defendants “acted corruptly . . . with the

intent to obstruct the federal grand jury investigation,” “with

the purpose of obstructing justice,” and with “the unlawful

intent to obstruct a grand jury investigation,” there is no real

likelihood that the jury would have drawn that far-fetched

inference. See Thomas, 612 F.3d at 1122; Kilbride, 584 F.3d

at 1249–50; see also Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 438,

124 S. Ct. 1830, 1833, 158 L. Ed. 2d 701 (2004) (per curiam)

(proposed “interpretation would require . . . a rare

combination of extremely refined lawyerly parsing of an

instruction, and extremely gullible acceptance of a result that

makes no conceivable sense”).20

 

19 See Lloyd, 807 F.3d at 1164.

20 We also reject the Joint Appellants’ claim that the prejudice they

suffered from this instruction was exacerbated by the district court’s

finalizing the instruction after closing arguments. Indeed, they have not

demonstrated that their closing arguments were undermined by the

change. Moreover, they were given an opportunity to object both before

and after the court delivered the instructions but did not do so. Cf. United

States v. Liu, 731 F.3d 982, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2013). Finally, they did not

express surprise or seek further argument time. Cf. United States v.

Hannah, 97 F.3d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1996).

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 27

(4) Innocent Intent

Joint Appellants also assert that the district court erred

because it failed to give an instruction proposed by some of

them which was intended to indicate that the Joint

Appellants’ intent was innocent—not unlawful—because

they relied on orders from superior officers whom they

reasonably believed had authority to issue the orders.21

Essentially, that is an innocent intent defense. As we said in

United States v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 1994):

[T]he defendant may allege that he lacked

criminal intent because he honestly believed

he was performing the otherwise-criminal acts

in cooperation with the government. 

“Innocent intent” is not a defense per se, but

a defense strategy aimed at negating the mens

rea for the crime, an essential element of the

prosecution’s case . . . .

Id. at 881 (second alteration in original) (quoting United

States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.18 (11th

 

21 The proposed instruction read:

The defendants contend that to the extent he

committed the acts alleged to constitute the charged

crimes, his acts were authorized by a law enforcement

official who he reasonably believed had such authority.

In order for the defendant to be guilty of the

charged offenses, the government must prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s acts were not

authorized by a law enforcement officer or that it was

not reasonable for the defendant to believe the law

enforcement had such authority.

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Cir. 1994)); see also United States v. Jumah, 493 F.3d 868,

873–75 (7th Cir. 2007). That is, they do not seek to rely upon

an excuse for the commission of a crime,22rather they assert

that they committed no crime at all. It is notable, however,

that the Joint Appellants do not contend that they were

committing criminal acts under orders or otherwise. Their

contention is not that they were ordered to do anything that

would be criminal (for example, hiding a person for the

purpose of obstructing a grand jury investigation), but rather

that the acts were intrinsically innocent (for example, hiding

a person to shield him from danger). In any event, what their

proposed instruction amounted to was a claim that they acted

in good faith, and the good faith instruction that was given

did incorporate the superior-officer order concept already.23

The instructions adequately covered the Joint Appellants’

claim that they did not have the requisite intent to obstruct. 

See United States v. Sayakhom, 186 F.3d 928, 939–40 (9th

Cir.), amended by 197 F.3d 959, 959 (9th Cir. 1999). The

district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give

the additional innocent intent instruction.

(5) California law

The Joint Appellants also argue that the district court

wrongly instructed the jury regarding the legality of the FBI’s

actions under California law. The instruction told the jury

that certain sections of the California penal code “require the

possession or introduction of contraband to be unauthorized

in order for crimes to occur,” and that “[i]f Anthony Brown

22 See United States v. Doe, 705 F.3d 1134, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2013);

Jumah, 493 F.3d at 874–75.

 

23 See supra note 18.

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 29

possessed any contraband including a cellular phone at the

direction of the FBI, such possession or introduction of

contraband would be authorized and no violation of these

California Penal codes would have occurred.” See Cal. Penal

Code §§ 4573(a), 4575(a).

The Joint Appellants and the Government dispute whether

that instruction was correct as a matter of California law, and

what impact the Supremacy Clause24

has in these

circumstances. But we need not parse those issues for

purposes of this opinion because even if we assume, without

deciding, that the instruction was incorrect, it is not a basis

for overturning the verdicts.

The Joint Appellants were not prejudiced by any error. 

See United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 806 n.16 (9th Cir.

1999); see also Cherer, 513 F.3d at 1155. They claim

otherwise on the theory that if there was no crime, they could

not investigate. However, that incorrect view was explicitly

contradicted by the jury instructions. The jury was told that

“[a] local officer has the authority to investigate potential

violations of state law,” which “includes the authority to

investigate potential violations of state law by federal

agents.” The district court also told counsel that they could

argue that the Joint Appellants had the right to conduct their

investigation. In light of the clear instruction regarding the

Joint Appellants’ authority to investigate, any error in the

instruction regarding whether or not federal agents actually

violated California law was undoubtedly harmless. See

Cherer, 513 F.3d at 1155.

 

24 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

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(6) Instructions regarding the false statement counts

Craig and Long challenge the district court’s instructions

regarding the false statement counts, primarily on the ground

that the district court’s dual purposes instruction erroneously

told the jury that it could convict them if they acted in good

faith.25 But the dual purposes instruction did not apply to the

false statement charges; it applied to the obstruction charges. 

It mentions obstruction of justice three times,26

and appears

in a section of the instructions discussing obstruction of

justice.

Similarly, the good faith instruction did not apply to the

false statement count, nor was the court asked to give one for

that count. In any event, because the jury was properly

instructed on the elements of the false statement offense,27the

25 We do not consider Craig and Long’s claim that an innocent intent

instruction should have been given with respect to the false statement

counts because they did not propose one and raised the issue only in their

reply brief. See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2006).

 

26 See supra note 16.

 

27 The district court instructed:

[T]he Government must prove each of the following

elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First the defendant made a false statement in a

matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Second, the defendant knew the statement was

false.

Third, the defendant acted willfully.

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UNITED STATES V. SMITH 31

district court was not required to instruct on good faith.28In

short, the false-statement instructions required the jury to find

that Craig and Long acted willfully with a purpose to disobey

the law. Those instructions left no room for the jury to

convict Craig and Long if they acted entirely in good faith. 

See Green, 745 F.2d at 1210.

CONCLUSION

There is little dispute about what Appellants did, but a

good deal of conflict about why they did it—their intent, their

motives, their purposes. They say that all was done for

benign purposes but the Government says that what they did

And fourth, the statement was material to the

activities or decisions of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. That is, it had a natural tendency to

influence or was capable of influencing the agency’s

decisions or activities.

. . . .

The word “willfully” means that the defendant

made the statement voluntarily and purposely and with

knowledge that the defendants’ making ofthe statement

was unlawful. That is, the defendant must have made

the statement with a purpose to disobey or disregard the

law.

This is in accord with the statutory language of the offense. See

18 U.S.C. § 1001; see also United States v. Camper, 384 F.3d 1073, 1075

(9th Cir. 2004) (“The government must prove five elements to obtain a

conviction for making a false statement under § 1001; (1) a statement,

(2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4) specific intent, (5) agency jurisdiction.”). 

Craig and Long do not argue that the instruction was incorrect.

 

28 See Shipsey, 363 F.3d at 967; Green, 945 F.2d at 1209.

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32 UNITED STATES V. SMITH

was for criminal purposes. Ultimately, a properly instructed

jury had to decide whose narrative it believed—the

amaranthine essence of the jury function. These juries were

properly instructed, and accepted the Government’s position.

AFFIRMED.

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