Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-mc-80237/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-mc-80237-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vance S. Elliott
Plaintiff
Telerico
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

VANCE S. ELLIOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

TELERICO,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-mc-80237-WHO 

ORDER REGARDING PRE-FILING 

REVIEW; GRANTING APPLICATION

TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 

AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 1

INTRODUCTION 

On February 15, 2006, Judge Patel declared plaintiff Vance Elliot a vexatious litigant and 

required him to obtain leave of court “before filing any motion, complaint, or other papers 

involving any claims that have been the subject of or are related to claims in [that] action.” Elliot 

v. Marsh, No. 04-cv-01600. This order concerns (1) a complaint that Elliot sought to file on 

August 15, 2014 and that was sent to this Court for pre-filing review pursuant to Judge Patel’s 

vexatious litigant order, and (2) Elliot’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons 

discussed below, the Clerk shall FILE Elliot’s complaint and assign this action a civil case 

number, Elliot’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, and his complaint is 

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

DISCUSSION 

I. PRE-FILING REVIEW 

Elliot’s complaint is hard to decipher, but it is apparent that its allegations concern matters 

that were not the subject of Elliot v. Marsh and are not related to any claims in that action. In 

Marsh, Elliot accused the sole defendant, John Marsh, “of posing as a minister of the First 

Unitarian Universalist Church and using the collection dish to pilfer more than $100,000.” Marsh, 

No. 04-cv-01600, Dkt. No. 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). Elliot also alleged that Marsh 

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assaulted “the Intern Rali” and conspired to murder an unnamed third party. Id. 

The sole named defendant in this action is Dr. Telerico, who is described in the complaint 

as a doctor at the Veterans Affairs (“VA”) Medical Center at Fort Miley. Dkt. No. 1. Elliot 

accuses Dr. Telerico of amputating the big toe on his right foot without first obtaining his consent. 

Id. This alleged incident is no way connected to the facts and claims underlying Marsh. Elliot’s 

complaint is beyond the scope of the pre-filing review order, and Elliot does not need leave of the 

Court to file it. Accordingly, the Clerk is instructed to FILE Elliot’s complaint and to assign this 

action a civil case number. 

II. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

 When presented with an application to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must first decide 

whether the applicant satisfies the economic eligibility requirements of 28 U.S.C § 1915(a). See 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984). The court must then determine 

whether to dismiss the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Id. Section 1915(e)(2) requires 

dismissal of a case prosecuted by a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis if the court determines 

“at any time” that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

Elliot satisfies the economic eligibility requirements of section 1915(a), and his application 

to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. 

Having reviewed Elliot’s complaint, however, I find that it fails to state a claim for relief 

and must be dismissed under section 1915(e)(2). The complaint is handwritten, and much of it is 

illegible and/or incomprehensible. To the extent that the complaint can be understood, Elliot 

appears to accuse Dr. Telerico of amputating the big toe on his right foot without first obtaining 

his consent. Elliot alleges that he was “unconscious from the moment the ambulance in which 

[he] was transported entered [the medical center] until [he] woke up,” at which point he was 

“horrified [to] see that [his] big toe was missing.” Dkt. No. 1. He states that he was told that Dr. 

Telerico amputated the big toe because it was gangrenous, but that in fact Dr. Telerico performed 

the amputation “maliciously and for his own amusement,” and because, “as a diagnosed 

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schizophrenic, [Elliot] is regarded by both staff and employees of the [medical center] as 

something less than human, and in this case as a guinea pig.” Id. Elliot states that between the 

time that he stepped on a piece of glass in his room until the time of the operation, not enough 

time passed “for the bacteria to invade the wound, nor was [there] any sign of dead tissue caused 

by that invasion.” Id. He seeks $100,000 in damages but does not identify under what statute or 

legal theory he brings his claims.

 “[M]edical malpractice claims may be based on negligence, . . . [o]r they may be based on 

alleged lack of consent, therefore qualifying as batteries.” Levin v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1224, 

1231 (2013). Because it is not clear which of these two theories provides the basis for Elliot’s 

claims, I consider both. 

To the extent that Elliot’s claims are based on negligence, they are barred by 38 U.S.C § 

7316 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Section 7316 “confers immunity on medical 

personnel of the Department of Veterans Affairs.” Levin v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1224, 1234 

(2013). It does this by limiting a claimant’s remedies for personal injuries “arising from 

malpractice or negligence of a health care employee of the [Veterans Health] Administration in 

furnishing health care or treatment while in the exercise of that employee’s duties” to those 

available under the FTCA.1 See 38 U.S.C. § 7316(a)(1); see also Ingram v. Faruque, 728 F.3d 

1239, 1245 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The VA Immunity Statute,” i.e., section 7316, “applies the remedy 

available against the United States under the FTCA to damages arising from the provision of 

medical services by health care employees of the VA.”). 

“The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for actions in tort and 

vests the federal district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over suits arising from the negligence of 

 

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Section 7316 defines “health care employee of the [Veterans Health] Administration” as 

a physician, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, optometrist, nurse, 

physician assistant, expanded-function dental auxiliary, pharmacist, 

or paramedical (such as medical and dental technicians, nursing 

assistants, and therapists), or other supporting personnel. 

38 U.S.C. § 7316(a)(2). 

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[United States] employees.” Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, the Act further provides that before an individual 

can file an action against the United States in district court, he must seek an administrative 

resolution of his claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).2 This 

administrative exhaustion requirement “is jurisdictional [and] must be strictly adhered to.” Brady 

v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where an 

FTCA claimant fails to establish that he properly exhausted his administrative remedies, his 

claims must be dismissed. See, e.g., id. at 502-03 (affirming dismissal of FTCA claim for failure 

to exhaust administrative remedies); Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(same). 

Under these principles, Elliot’s complaint is fatally flawed because it contains no 

allegations indicating that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Moreover, the only proper 

party defendant in an FTCA action is the United States. Kennedy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 

1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of FTCA claims against federal agency and 

federal official); accord Freeman v. United States, No. 13-cv-02421-WHO, 2014 WL 1117619, at 

*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014) (dismissing with prejudice FTCA claims against VA Medical Center 

and several individual defendants); McAllister v. United States, No. 11-cv-03858-MEJ, 2013 WL 

2551990, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2013) (noting that courts have “dismissed individual 

defendants [from FTCA actions] where no other basis for jurisdiction exists except the FTCA”) 

 

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Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2675 provides in relevant part: 

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United 

States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal 

injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission 

of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of 

his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first 

presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim 

shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by 

certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final 

disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the 

option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial 

of the claim for purposes of this section . . . 

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) 

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(citing cases). Elliot’s complaint names Dr. Telerico as the sole defendant, not the United States. 

These deficiencies – i.e., failure to establish exhaustion of administrative remedies and failure to 

name the United States as a defendant – require the dismissal of Elliot’s complaint to the extent 

that it is based on negligence. See Sanders v. Schneider, No. 09-cv-00673, 2009 WL 3878285, at 

*1-2 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 18, 2009) (pursuant to section 7316 and the FTCA, dismissing claims 

arising from allegedly inadequate medical treatment received at VA hospital because “the United 

States is the only proper defendant in an action under the [FTCA],” and because the plaintiff “fails 

to make any showing that he exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 

2675”); Hickerson v. V.A.R.O., No. 08-cv-01515, 2009 WL 7808950, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 11, 

2009) (for same reasons, dismissing claims arising from treatment at VA medical center) 

Elliot’s claims also fail to the extent that they are based on alleged lack of consent or 

battery. Unlike the immunity conferred by the FTCA – which does not extend to battery or the 

other intentional torts enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) – the immunity conferred by section 

7316 applies even to claims for battery and other intentional torts. See 38 U.S.C. § 7316(f); see 

also Ingram, 728 F.3d at 1245-46, 1248-49 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 7316(f) “expands [28 U.S.C. 

§ 7316(a)(1)] to provide a remedy under the FTCA for intentional torts arising in the context of 

VA health care employees providing medical care or treatment”). “In other words, [28 U.S.C. § 

2680(h)] does not bar application of the FTCA to intentional tort claims arising out of the conduct 

of VA medical personnel” acting within the scope of section 7316. Ingram, 728 F.3d at 1246

(internal alterations omitted); see also Levin, 133 S. Ct. at 1234-35 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 

7316(f) “expresses Congress’s intent to abrogate [28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)]” for the purposes of 

section 7316). The upshot is that even if Elliot means to recover on a theory of battery as opposed 

to negligence, his claims are still governed by the FTCA and are still barred for the reasons stated 

above. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Clerk shall FILE Elliot’s complaint and assign this action a 

civil case number. Elliot’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, and his complaint 

is DISMISSED. The Clerk shall assign the case directly to me instead of through the ordinary 

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case assignment process. Although I am skeptical that Elliot will be able to cure the pleading 

deficiencies discussed above, in light of his pro se status I will allow him leave to amend. He shall 

file his amended complaint, if any, on or before August 7, 2015. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 8, 2015 

______________________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge 

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