Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04486/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04486-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Yao Chen
Petitioner
D. Davey
Respondent

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

YAO CHEN, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

D. DAVEY, Warden, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 15-cv-04486-HSG (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Re: Dkt. No. 23 

Petitioner, a pro se prisoner, filed this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition as untimely, and Petitioner has filed 

an opposition. 

BACKGROUND 

On January 5, 1995, a San Francisco County jury convicted Petitioner of multiple 

violations of second-degree robbery, assault with a firearm, false imprisonment, attempted 

extortion, dissuading a witness, and second-degree burglary. See Ex. A.1 He was sentenced to an 

aggregate term of 45 years and 8 months in prison. Id. On April 11, 1997, the California Court of 

Appeal affirmed his conviction. Id. On July 16, 1997, the California Supreme Court denied 

review. Ex. B. The record shows that Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the 

United States Supreme Court, nor did he file any state habeas petitions. See Pet. at 20-21.2

Petitioner later filed this action, seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus. The petition has a 

 

1

 All references herein to exhibits are to the exhibits submitted by Respondent in support of the 

motion to dismiss. 

2

 All page numbers used herein refer to those affixed to the top of the page by the Court’s 

electronic filing program. 

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signature date of September 23, 2015 and was stamped “filed” at the Court on September 29, 

2015. As a pro se prisoner, Petitioner receives the benefit of the prisoner mailbox rule, which 

deems most documents filed when the prisoner gives them to prison officials to mail to the court. 

See Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court will assume Petitioner 

gave the petition to prison officials for mailing on the date he signed it, i.e., September 23, 2015, 

and deem the federal petition filed as of that date. 

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) became law on 

April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of 

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state 

convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the 

judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct 

review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was 

removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and 

made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during 

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending is 

excluded from the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2). 

Here, the judgment became final and the limitations period began on October 14, 1997, 

ninety days after the California Supreme Court denied review. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 

1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (if a petitioner fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States 

Supreme Court, the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period begins to run on the date the ninety-day 

period defined by Supreme Court Rule 13 expires). The presumptive deadline for Petitioner to file 

his federal petition was therefore October 13, 1998. He missed that deadline by almost seventeen 

years, so unless he qualifies for tolling, the petition is untimely. 

A. Statutory Tolling 

 Petitioner does not claim he is entitled to statutory tolling. Even if Petitioner had claimed 

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such tolling, however, he would not be eligible for it. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, the one-year 

limitations period is tolled for the “time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). An application for review remains “pending” in state court until it 

“has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 

536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). Here, Petitioner never filed a state habeas petition. Thus, there is 

nothing to toll. 

 Accordingly, the Court finds the petition is not rendered timely on the basis of statutory 

tolling. 

B. Equitable Tolling 

 AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate 

circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). “[A] petitioner is entitled to 

equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the 

failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.”). 

The diligence required to establish entitlement to equitable tolling is “reasonable diligence.” 

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565. 

 Petitioner bears the burden of showing “extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 

untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Where a petitioner fails to show “any causal connection” between the grounds 

upon which he asserts a right to equitable tolling and his inability to timely file a federal habeas 

application, the equitable tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 

(9th Cir. 2005). Further, such petitioner must show “his untimeliness was caused by an external 

impediment and not by his own lack of diligence.” Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 

1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Here, Petitioner asserts two reasons for the delay in filing his federal petition. First, 

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Petitioner claims that he had no knowledge that he could receive “federal court review on 

constitutional law principle[s].” Dkt. No. 28 at 5. However, ignorance of the law and lack of 

legal sophistication do not alone constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable 

tolling. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2006) (cataloguing cases from other 

circuits and holding that a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an 

extraordinary circumstance); see also Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrs., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (illiteracy of pro se petitioner insufficient cause to avoid procedural bar); Cantu-Tzin v. 

Johnson, 162 F.3d 295, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1998) (pro se status during state habeas proceedings did 

not justify equitable tolling); United States v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1993) (pro se

status, illiteracy, deafness and lack of legal training does not justify equitable tolling). Therefore, 

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling based on his ignorance of the law. 

Second, Petitioner claims that he is unable to read English and his primary language is 

Chinese. Dkt. No. 28 at 6, 10. “Extraordinary circumstances” that warrant equitable tolling may 

include a non-English speaker’s inability to procure either legal materials in his own language or 

translation assistance from an inmate, library personnel, or other source during the running of the 

limitations period. See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (remanding case 

to district court for development of facts concerning whether, as petitioner alleged, during the 

relevant time period he lacked “English language ability,” was denied access to Spanish-language 

legal materials, could not procure the assistance of a translator, and acted with due diligence). 

However, a petitioner’s language limitations do not per se justify equitable tolling; rather, 

equitable tolling may be justified only if language barriers actually prevent timely filing. See 

Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1069. 

Here, equitable tolling on this ground must be denied because Petitioner fails to show that 

this was the case. First, the delay was significant, not a few weeks or months, but years. Second, 

he sets forth no facts showing that during this time he made any attempt to procure Chineselanguage legal materials or translation assistance. In other words, Petitioner makes no showing 

whatsoever that, despite his lack of English language ability, he pursued his rights diligently. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling based on his language barriers. See 

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Northern District of Californi

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Case 4:15-cv-04486-HSG Document 29 Filed 08/15/16 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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Case 4:15-cv-04486-HSG Document 29 Filed 08/15/16 Page 6 of 6