Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00524/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00524-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
D. Bunch
Defendant
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Defendant
S. Clement
Defendant
Ron Davis
Defendant
R. Fleming
Defendant
R. Quesada
Defendant
Benjamin Stroman
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

----oo0oo---- 

BENJAMIN STROMAN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RON DAVIS; S. CLEMENT; R. 

FLEMING; D. BUNCH; R. 

QUESADA; and DOES 1-100, 

Defendants. 

CIV. NO. 2:14-524 WBS CKD 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

TO DISMISS 

----oo0oo---- 

 Plaintiff Benjamin Stroman brought this civil rights 

action against five employees of Valley State Prison (“VSP”) 

arising out of injuries he allegedly suffered while incarcerated 

there. Defendants Ron Davis and R. Quesada now move to dismiss 

plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.1 

 1

 Because oral argument will not be of material 

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

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I. Factual & Procedural History 

 On March 10, 2013, plaintiff was allegedly attacked by 

three inmates at VSP. (Compl. ¶ 19 (Docket No. 1).) These 

inmates bound him to a railing on the top tier of the housing 

unit and doused him with water. (Id.) They then carried 

plaintiff downstairs into cell #125, which was used as the inmate 

restroom. (Id. ¶ 20.) One of the inmates ran out of cell #125, 

obtained an ADA chair with wheels and no seat bottom, and brought 

the chair into the cell. (Id. ¶ 23.) 

 Plaintiff then alleges that the inmates stripped him 

naked from the waist down, tied him to the chair, and wheeled him 

out of cell #125 into the day room. (Id. ¶ 24.) The inmates 

then pushed plaintiff around the day room while yelling 

homophobic slurs, asking if the other inmates wanted to “take a 

ride,” and inviting other prisoners to “come and get some.” (Id. 

¶ 25.) They then pushed plaintiff to the base of the stairs, 

poured a white, powdery substance on plaintiff, and rubbed this 

substance on plaintiff’s face and genitals. (Id. ¶ 26.) 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant S. Clement, a correctional 

officer at VSP, yelled that plaintiff should be thankful “because 

now he was white.” (Id.) 

 After pouring powder on plaintiff, one of the inmates 

allegedly grabbed what appeared to be a broomstick or plunger and 

simulated shoving the object into plaintiff’s anus. (Id. ¶ 27.) 

At this point, another inmate, Mr. Franklin, demanded that the 

three inmates stop. (Id. ¶ 28.) After a brief verbal 

 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).

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altercation, the inmates released plaintiff from his restraints. 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that VSP staff, including defendants 

Clement, R. Fleming, and D. Bunch, watched and laughed as these 

events transpired. (Id. ¶ 29.) 

On March 15, 2013, Lieutenant Quesada allegedly 

summoned Darryl Geyer, an inmate who witnessed these events, to 

his office. (Id. ¶ 30.) Quesada told Geyer that he was going to 

write up the three inmates for “excessive horseplay.” (Id.) 

Quesada allegedly instructed Geyer to falsify his report of the 

incident to state that the three inmates were merely “running 

around the dayroom, snapping towels at each other and throwing 

water on each other.” (Id.) He specifically told Geyer to omit 

any details about any inmate being tied up or abused. (Id.) 

Plaintiff brought this action against Clement, Bunch, 

Fleming, Quesada, and Davis, the Warden of VSP.2 Plaintiff 

asserts the following claims against all defendants: (1) a claim 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 premised on violations of the Eighth 

Amendment; (2) a claim under § 1983 premised on violations of the 

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) a claim 

for violations of Article I, section 7(a) of the California 

Constitution; (4) a claim for violations of Article I, section 17 

of the California Constitution; (5) two claims under section 52.1 

of the California Civil Code premised on violations of sections 

7(a) and 17 of the California Constitution; and (6) a claim for 

 2

 Plaintiff has not yet served Clement, Bunch, or Fleming 

with the Complaint. Although plaintiff also named the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) as a 

defendant, the court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against CDCR 

with prejudice because those claims are barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment. (Docket No. 13.) 

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intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Warden 

Davis and Lieutenant Quesada (collectively “moving defendants”) 

now move to dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. (Docket No. 16.) 

II. Discussion 

 On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court 

must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by 

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 

319, 322 (1972). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff 

must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). This “plausibility standard,” however, “asks 

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully,” and where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely 

consistent with a defendant’s liability,” it “stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

 A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

 In relevant part, § 1983 provides: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 

. . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or 

other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. While § 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, it provides a cause of action against any 

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person who, under color of state law, deprives an individual of 

federal constitutional rights or limited federal statutory 

rights. Id.; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 

1. Claims Against Warden Davis 

 Government officials are not vicariously liable for 

their subordinates’ wrongdoing under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 676. In order to allege a § 1983 claim against a supervisor 

defendant, a plaintiff must allege either that the supervisor had 

some “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation” or 

that there was “a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” 

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). 

 Plaintiff alleges that Davis was the Warden of VSP and 

that he was “responsible for the oversight, maintenance, and 

policy making decisions of VSP.” (Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff 

alleges no other facts suggesting that Warden Davis knew of any 

other defendant’s alleged misconduct, let alone that he had any 

personal involvement in the events giving rise to this lawsuit. 

Absent any allegations suggesting that Warden Davis was involved 

in or sufficiently connected to the misconduct alleged in the 

Complaint, plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against him. 

See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207. Accordingly, the court must grant 

Davis’s motion to dismiss this claim. 

 2. Lieutenant Quesada 

 Plaintiff’s claims against Lieutenant Quesada turn on 

the allegation that Quesada covered up other defendants’ 

misconduct by instructing an inmate, Darryl Geyer, to submit a 

false incident report. (Compl. ¶ 30.) “Allegations that 

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officials engaged in a cover-up state a constitutional claim only 

if the cover-up deprived plaintiff of his right of access to 

courts by causing him to fail to obtain redress for the 

constitutional violation that was the subject of the cover-up.” 

Lee v. Whitten, Civ. No. 2:12-2104 GEB KJN P, 2012 WL 4468420, at 

*4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2012) (citing Karim-Pahani v. L.A. Police 

Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

 In order to prevail on a cover-up claim, a plaintiff 

must offer more than a “mere[] guess” that the defendant’s 

conduct will result in the defeat of his constitutional claims. 

Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998). Rather, he 

must allege that the defendant’s conduct actually prevented him 

from litigating that constitutional claim--in other words, that 

he was “shut out of court” as a result of the defendant’s efforts 

to cover up the constitutional violation. Christopher v. 

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). 

 Here, plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting 

that Lieutenant Quesada’s conduct has prevented him from 

litigating his constitutional claims against Bunch, Clement, or 

Fleming; in fact, none of those three defendants have yet been 

served. Plaintiff therefore has not alleged, and cannot allege, 

that he has been denied access to the courts. See Delew, 143 

F.3d at 1223. Accordingly, the court must grant Lieutenant 

Quesada’s motion to dismiss this claim. 

 B. California Constitution & Civil Code Section 52.1 

 In addition to his constitutional claims under the 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, plaintiff asserts two claims 

under the California Constitution: (1) an equal protection claim 

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under Article I, section 7(a), and (2) a cruel and unusual 

punishment clause claim under Article I, section 17. Plaintiff’s 

claims under the California Constitution are unavailing, however, 

because neither provision creates a private right of action. See 

Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 29 Cal. 4th 300, 329 (2000) 

(no private right of action under section 7(a)); Giraldo v. Cal. 

Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 4th 231, 256 (1st Dist. 

2009) (no private right of action under section 17). 

 Although California does not recognize a private right 

of action under sections 7(a) or 17, it permits plaintiffs to sue 

for violations of these provisions under section 52.1 of the 

California Civil Code, which is “the California state law analog 

to section 1983.” Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 724 

F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013). However, not all violations of 

the California Constitution are cognizable under section 52.1. 

In order to prevail on his claim under section 52.1, a plaintiff 

must allege not only that the defendant deprived him of an 

interest protected by the California Constitution, but that he 

did so using “threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 52.1(a); Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 334 

(1998). 

 As the court has explained, plaintiff has not alleged 

that Warden Davis was personally involved in any of the events 

alleged in the complaint, let alone that he ever threatened, 

intimidated, or coerced plaintiff. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). 

Plaintiff therefore has not stated a claim against Warden Davis 

under section 52.1. 

 With respect to Lieutenant Quesada, plaintiff alleges 

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only that he instructed another inmate, Geyer, to submit a false 

incident report. (Compl. ¶ 30.) As a preliminary matter, it is 

not clear that section 52.1 permits a claim premised on coercion 

directed towards a third party. See Rodriguez v. City of Fresno, 

819 F. Supp. 2d 937, 954 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (Ishii, J.) (holding 

that a section 52.1 claim could not be premised on application of 

force to a bystander absent a showing of coercion directed 

towards the plaintiff). The court need not resolve this 

question, however, because plaintiff has not alleged any facts 

suggesting that Lieutenant Quesada coerced or attempted to coerce 

Geyer into submitting a false incident report and therefore has 

not stated a section 52.1 claim against Lieutenant Quesada. 

 Accordingly, because plaintiff has not alleged a 

deprivation of any right by “threats, intimidation, or coercion,” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a), the court must grant the moving 

defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims. 

 C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

 In California, the tort of IIED has three elements: 

“(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the 

intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of 

causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe 

or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate 

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous 

conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “A defendant’s 

conduct is outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all 

bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. 

at 1050-51 (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 

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“[T]he defendant’s conduct must be intended to inflict injury or 

engage in with the realization that injury will result.” Id. at 

1051 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Here, plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting 

that Warden Davis or Lieutenant Quesada engaged in extreme or 

outrageous conduct, let alone any facts suggesting a causal 

connection between that conduct and any purported emotional 

distress he suffered. Rather, this claim consists of a 

boilerplate, four-sentence recitation of the elements of IIED. 

(See Compl. ¶ 74-75.) This is the exact sort of “unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” that does not 

constitute a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss does not identify any reason why he states a plausible 

claim for IIED; in fact, it does not even address this claim. 

(See Docket No. 17.) Accordingly, the court must grant moving 

defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that moving defendants’ motion 

to dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint as against them be, and the same 

hereby is, GRANTED. 

 Plaintiff may file an amended Complaint within twenty 

days of the date this Order is signed, if he can do so consistent 

with this Order. 

Dated: August 5, 2014 

 

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