Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-08132/USCOURTS-ca10-93-08132-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
E. LaVay McKinley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED ~a tJ Uecl StateS Court ot Appta 

n Tenth CircUit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 2 7 1995 

PATRICK FISHER -------------- Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

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Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 93-8132 

E. LaVAY McKINLEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. 92-CR-128) 

David A. Kubichek, Assistant U.S. Attorney (David D. Freudenthal, 

U.S. Attorney, and Patrick J. Crank, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with 

him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney, Casper, 

Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Clifford J. Barnard, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before HENRY, Circuit Judge, McKAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

KANE,* Senior District Judge. 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

E. LaVay McKinley appeals his convictions in federal court of 

mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341; wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 

1343; money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i); and 

conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering 

* Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

1 

Appellate Case: 93-8132 Document: 01019279878 Date Filed: 06/27/1995 Page: 1 
under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Mr. McKinley contends that his convictions 

must be reversed because the district court denied his motion to 

represent himself in contravention of the rule announced by the 

Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). We 

agree that Mr. McKinley was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 

self-representation, and therefore reverse and remand the case for 

a new trial.1 

BACKGROUND 

On December 4, 1992, a nine-count indictment was filed in the 

district court naming Mr. McKinley as a defendant.2 On December 

9, 1992, Mr. McKinley filed a pro se motion to refuse courtappointed counsel, Mr. Pretty, and to retain counsel of his 

choice. Mr. McKinley's "counsel of choice" was a Mr. Thomas M. 

Dalby, "Constitutional Counsel and Agent," who was not an 

attorney. Mr. McKinley supplemented this motion with a notarized 

document purporting to grant a power of attorney to Mr. Dalby and 

a pro se brief in support of the motion, in which he argued that 

the right to counsel encompasses the right to be represented by 

someone other than a "so-called 'licensed attorney.'" See Rec. 

val. I, doc. 30. Mr. McKinley's arraignment was held the same 

day. The district judge raised the issue of representation by Mr. 

1 Although Mr. McKinley raises a number of other evidentiary 

and sentencing issues on appeal, we need not reach them given this 

court's disposition on the Sixth Amendment issue. 

2 Count nine, criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (1) 

was subsequently dismissed at the government's request. 

2 

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Dalby and made clear that he would not allow Mr. McKinley to be 

represented by lay counsel. Mr. McKinley was less than 

cooperative at that hearing.3 

3 The following exchange took place: 

[THE COURT]: Now, there was a fellow 

that called our Clerk's Office last night from 

Florida, and we quickly checked with the 

Florida State Bar Association and learned that 

there is nobody listed by that name as an 

attorney. Now, you're not going to have him. 

Do you see that bar? Do you see those 

gates back there? That's the bar of the 

court. Nobody that is not a lawyer gets 

through that bar. And I've got a couple of 

great big marshals to make sure that they 

don't. 

That fellow can be here, he can sit in 

the front row, he can sit in the back row. He 

can sit anyplace in the courtroom except 

within the bar, and we're not--you can talk to 

him at recesses or anything like that, but 

we're not going to have a charade by some guy 

that isn't a member of the bar. 

Now is that clear? If it isn't, I'll say 

it again, you're not going to have this guy 

from Florida as your attorney. You're going 

to have an attorney. I've appointed Mr. 

Pretty. Mr. Pretty stands appointed until you 

get somebody at your own cost that enters an 

appearance. By that he signs his name and 

files an appearance. When you get somebody 

like that, I'll dismiss Mr. Pretty and you can 

have your lawyer. Do we understand each 

other? 

THE DEFENDANT: (No response.) 

THE COURT: I'm not going to say it 

again. We're going to go forward. Did you 

understand your rights? 

THE DEFENDANT: Could you read this? 

MR. PRETTY: . Your honor, for the record 

my client would like me to read something that 

says attention United States District Court 

3 

Appellate Case: 93-8132 Document: 01019279878 Date Filed: 06/27/1995 Page: 3 
On January 6, 1993, Mr. McKinley filed a "Demand" for 

information, purporting to proceed "Propia [sic] Persona." In the 

demand, Mr. McKinley made several inquiries of the court, 

which I have filed with the Court. 

THE COURT: I didn't ask you that 

question. I asked you, Mr. McKinley, did you 

understand your rights? Answer yes or no. 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

THE COURT: You don't understand. What 

is there that you didn't understand about 

them? 

THE DEFENDANT: I understand under the 

Constitution I have a right to counsel and 

that doesn't necessarily mean an attorney. 

THE COURT: I pointed out that you have a 

right to counsel, and it does mean that you 

have an attorney, and if you don't like that, 

you can appeal me to the Court of Appeals. 

But that's the rules by which we play. I make 

the rules. Do you understand that? 

THE DEFENDANT: Then I would say that weTHE COURT: Now, let me say one more 

thing. 

THE DEFENDANT: --we will appeal that. 

THE COURT: Let me say one more thing. 

You're verging on the borderline of getting 

sassy with the Court, and I don't take that 

either. If you do that, do anything like 

that, I'm going to make a mark and that will 

be the first mark and that will be worth 30 

days for contempt of court at the end of your 

trial after you're sentenced on these pending 

charges. If you do it again, I'm going to 

make a second mark and that's going to be 

worth 60 days, and if you do it a third time, 

it's going to be another mark and that will be 

90 days, and it will increase until you learn 

your lesson. 

Now, you and I are going to understand 

4 

Appellate Case: 93-8132 Document: 01019279878 Date Filed: 06/27/1995 Page: 4 
including whether the charges against him were civil or criminal 

in nature and, if criminal in nature, whether the court proceeded 

under "Common Law Jurisdiction" or under "the criminal aspects of 

Admiralty Jurisdiction." See Rec. vol. I, doc. 68. Also on that 

each other, and I'm going to tell you now, I'm 

not going to take anything from you. You got 

the message? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Either you do or you don't. 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: All right. Did you 

understand the basic rights that I told you 

about? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, I didn't. 

THE COURT: Well, that's a darn lie 

because it was pretty apparent, and in 17 

years on this bench, that's the first time 

somebody has said no. 

Let me point this out to you: You have a 

right to a jury trial at which you're presumed 

to be innocent, a right to confront the 

witnesses against you and to have your own 

witnesses produced in court and to have the 

jury decide your guilt or innocence. If you 

plead guilty to these charges, you'll waive 

these rights. But if you plead not guilty to 

these charges, you avail yourself of them. Do 

you understand that point? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: Very well. Is there any 

reason, Mr. Pretty, why we should not go 

forward? 

MR. PRETTY: No, Your Honor. 

Rec. supp. vol. I, at 10-13. 

5 

Appellate Case: 93-8132 Document: 01019279878 Date Filed: 06/27/1995 Page: 5 
date, Mr. McKinley filed a "Demand for Assitance [sic] of 

Competent Counsel" of his choice and a "Notice of Rescindtion 

[sic] of All Signatures Including But Not Limited to the Request 

for Court Appointed Counsel." Rec. vol. I, docs. 69-70. On 

January 11, 1993, Mr. McKinley's court-appointed counsel, Mr. 

Pretty, filed a motion to withdraw due to his belief that Mr. 

McKinley's family had hired a private attorney for his defense. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 73. 

The district court held a hearing on January 24, 1993 to 

dispose of these motions. Mr. Pretty's motion to withdraw was 

denied by the district court because the private attorney 

apparently never·entered an appearance in the case. See Rec. vol. 

XLVII, at 13-14. During the hearing, the court gave Mr. McKinley 

the opportunity to orally argue his pro se motions, and the 

following exchange took place: 

DEFENDANT McKINLEY: Okay. Thank you. Your 

Honor, I am here under a special appearance, 

and let the record show that the accused is 

standing sui jurist [sic] , and being denied 

his Sixth Amendment rights --

THE COURT: You are not sui jurist. 

DEFENDANT McKINLEY: and defending himself. 

THE COURT: You are represented here by an 

attorney, you are not representing yourself. 

DEFENDANT McKINLEY: I demand that right to 

represent myself. 

THE COURT: Well, I am going to have Mr. 

Pretty continue to represent you, because I 

think that a man trying to represent himself 

is a lot like a man trying to take out his own 

appendix on the kitchen table, and I don't 

think you are competent to represent yourself, 

Mr. McKinley. 

6 

Appellate Case: 93-8132 Document: 01019279878 Date Filed: 06/27/1995 Page: 6 
Rec. vol. XLVII, at 42-43. 

On February 10, 1993, Mr. Pretty filed a "Motion to Have 

Defendant Represent Self." Through this motion Mr. McKinley 

argued that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), he was entitled to proceed pro 

se. He also requested that, pursuant to Faretta, the court hold a 

hearing with regard to the issue of self-representation. 

On February 19, 1993, the district court entered an Order 

Denying Defendant's Motion to Represent Himself. The court's 

Order stated: "For several reasons, this Court is persuaded that 

defendant McKinley remains unaware of the dangers and 

disadvantages of self-representation." Rec. vol. II, doc. 115, at 

2. The court first cited Mr. McKinley's "prose-styled motions," 

id. at 3, stating that one "exhibited a fundamental 

misunderstanding of criminal jurisdiction and spent precious 

judicial resources on a patently frivolous inquiry." Id. at 2.4 

The court concluded: 

4 The court also stated that Mr. McKinley filed a pro se motion 

to substitute new counsel, but subsequently opted to retain Mr. 

Pretty without informing Mr. Pretty of his decision. The court 

stated that this had caused Mr. Pretty to be unprepared to argue a 

motion to dismiss and caused other confusion in the case. 

To the extent the district court relied on this finding to 

support its denial of Mr. McKinley's right to self-representation, 

we hold it to be clearly erroneous. It is clear from the record 

that Mr. Pretty filed the motion at issue, not Mr. McKinley. Mr. 

McKinley's attempts to proceed pro se were therefore irrelevant to 

any procedural delay or confusion arising out of the filing of 

this motion. Additionally, the record does not reflect a decision 

by Mr. McKinley to retain Mr. Pretty. To the contrary, Mr. 

McKinley continually refused representation by Mr. Pretty, well 

beyond the date that the district court denied his motion to 

represent himself. See infra note 4. 

7 

Appellate Case: 93-8132 Document: 01019279878 Date Filed: 06/27/1995 Page: 7 
Id. at 3. 

The Court further observes that defendant 

McKinley's desire to proceed pro se is 

motivated as much by his desire to delay and 

disrupt the proceedings against him as it is 

his desire to properly defend himself. 

McKinley's pro se-styled motions thus far 

exhibit little understanding of the criminal 

law and severely prejudice the case against 

him. The Court must conclude that defendant 

McKinley's self-representation "will cause 

procedural confusion without advancing any 

significant strategic interest of the 

defendant." [Faretta,] 422 U.S. at 805 

(Blackmun, J. dissenting). 

The case at bar is an exceptionally 

complicated one. The government has accused 

McKinley of conspiring with other defendants 

in mail fraud, wire fraud, and money 

laundering. Many of the witnesses and much of 

the evidence must be obtained from outside 

this country. The complicated nature of the 

case combined with defendant McKinley's 

performances at the various pretrial hearings 

strongly suggest that the accused has little. 

understanding of criminal law and therefore 

cannot competently represent himself. 

The case proceeded to trial on June 30, 1993 in front of a 

different district judge. Mr. McKinley was represented by Mr. 

Pretty.5 The jury returned a verdict finding Mr. McKinley guilty 

on all eight counts, and the district court sentenced him to 342 

5 Mr. McKinley continued to file various pro se motions and 

refused to cooperate with Mr. Pretty for some time after the 

denial of his motion to represent himself. See Rec. vol. II, doc. 

116 ("Notice of Document for 'Revocation of Signature and Grant of 

Power of Attorney and Consent' and Demand of Document Return" 

filed prose); Rec. vol. II, doc. 117 ("Demand that the Court 

Refuse Ronald G. Pretty Requests for Funding for Trip to England" 

filed pro se); Rec. vol. II, doc. 118 ("Notice of Seizure of 

Evidence" filed pro se and alleging that Mr. McKinley was 

"personally handling the accusations" against him); Rec. vol. II, 

doc. 121 ("Motion to Require Access to Client" filed by Mr. Pretty 

because Mr. McKinley had refused to meet with him). 

8 

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months imprisonment, $5,475,668.52 in restitution, and $400.00 in 

special assessments. 

DISCUSSION 

A criminal defendant is both constitutionally and statutorily 

entitled to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and proceed 

pro se in a federal criminal trial. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-

36; 28 U.S.C. § 1654 ("In all courts of the United States the 

parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by 

counsel .. "). When a court improperly denies the right to 

self-representation, that denial is not subject to harmless-error 

analysis. Peters v. Gunn, 33 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); McKaskle, 

465 U.S. at 177-78 n.8). In order to invoke the right, however, 

the defendant must "clearly and unequivocally" assert his 

intention to represent himself, United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 

1504, 1510 (lOth Cir. 1994), and this assertion must be timely, 

see United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1475, 1478 (lOth Cir.) 

(holding that the third day of trial was too late to invoke the 

right to self-representation), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 981 (1989). 

The government first argues that Mr. McKinley never 

unequivocally asserted his right to represent himself. 

Specifically, the government argues that 

the closest the Defendant came to an 

unequivocal demand to proceed pro se was the 

written motion filed on his behalf by his 

appointed counsel. But even that request was 

not unequivocal, because it sought the right 

for the Defendant to participate only as lead 

counsel, and it likewise requested the court 

9 

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to appoint counsel to assist him in his 

defense. 

Brief of Appellee at 27-28. While it is certainly true that there 

is no constitutional right to a hybrid form of representation, see 

United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 49 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976), we do not agree with the government 

that this motion could be construed as a request for anything 

other than self-representation. First, the motion was entitled, 

"Motion to Have Defendant Represent Self." Rec. vol. II, doc. 

113. The motion went on to assert that Mr. McKinley "fe[lt] that 

he [wa]s competent to represent himself" and that he "ha[d] the 

right to defend himself" under the Sixth Amendment and Faretta. 

Once in this motion Mr. McKinley stated that he had "the right to 

be lead counsel." Later in the motion he stated that if the 

district court determined at a hearing that he could represent 

himself, the court should also decide "whether or not he should 

have Court appointed counsel to assist him in his defense."6 We 

do not construe either of these statements to infer that Mr. 

McKinley was really asking for some form of hybrid representation. 

We note that the district court also made no mistake as to the 

. . form of relief sought in the motion. See Order Denying 

Defendant's Motion to Represent Himself, Rec. vol. II, doc. 115. 

The government does not cite, nor do we find, any evidence in the 

6 "[O]nce a defendant has declared his desire to proceed pro 

se, appointment of standby counsel is a preferred, though not 

mandatory, practice." United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 959 

(lOth Cir. 1987). 

10 

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record that Mr. McKinley later withdrew or undermined this request 

so as to make it equivocal. Further, this request for selfrepresentation was made four and one-half months before trial. We 

therefore hold that the motion served to unequivocally and timely 

invoke Mr. McKinley's right to self-representation. 

Even if a defendant properly invokes the right to selfrepresentation, however, there must still be a showing that he 

"knowingly and intelligently" relinquishes the benefits of 

representation by counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. "Ideally, 

the trial judge should conduct a thorough and comprehensive formal 

inquiry . . . on the record to demonstrate that the defendant is 

aware of the nature of the charges, the range of allowable 

punishments and possible defenses, and is fully informed of the 

risks of proceeding prose." United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 

1384, 1388 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1106 (1992). 

The Supreme Court has recently reiterated that "the 

competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his 

right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the 

competence to represent himself." Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 

2680, 2687 (1993). Explaining the Faretta holding, the Court 

continued: 

[In Faretta] we made it clear that the 

defendant's "technical legal knowledge" is "not 

relevant" to the determination whether he is 

competent to waive his right to counsel, and we 

emphasized that although the defendant "may 

conduct his own defense ultimately to his own 

detriment, his choice must be honored." Thus, 

while "[i]t is undeniable that in most criminal 

prosecutions defendants could better defend 

with counsel's guidance than by their own 

unskilled efforts," a criminal defendant's 

ability to represent himself has no bearing 

11 

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upon his competence to choose selfrepresentation. 

Id. (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 834) (alteration in 

original) (citations omitted) . 

The district court in the instant case never held a hearing to 

determine Mr. McKinley's competency to waive his right to counsel. 

We must therefore examine the di~trict court's reasons for denying 

self-representation, in light of the evidence in the record before 

it, to determine whether Mr. McKinley's Sixth Amendment rights were 

violated. 

It is clear from Godinez that the district court erred to the 

extent that it relied upon Mr. McKinley's purported inability to 

competently represent himself. See also Peters, 33 F.3d at 1192 

("The 'competent' language in Faretta is directed at the 'knowing 

and voluntary' nature of the defendant's choice, not at the ability 

of the defendant to mount a successful defense."); Orazio v. 

Dugger, 876 F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1989) ("A defendant need not 

be technically competent in the law to act in his or her own 

defense but must be competent to make the choice to proceed pro 

se."); United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669, 675 (9th Cir. 1989) 

("[T]he Sixth Amendment does not permit denying a defendant the 

right to self-representation on the basis that the defendant cannot 

represent himself with the degree of competence a lawyer might 

have."); Johnstone v. Kelly, 808 F.2d 214, 216 (2d Cir. 1986) 

("[The district court] denied th[e] request [to proceed prose] on 

the ground that Johnstone lacked the 'requisite education, 

background or training or experience.' Faretta imposes no such 

12 

Appellate Case: 93-8132 Document: 01019279878 Date Filed: 06/27/1995 Page: 12 
qualifications on the right to defend prose.") (citation omitted), 

recall of mandate denied, 812 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), 

cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987); Bennett, 539 F.2d at 51 ("[A] 

court determination that an accused lacks expertise or professional 

capabilities cannot justify denying the right of selfrepresentation. The only relevant determination is whether the 

accused makes an understanding waiver of his right to counsel.") 

(citations omitted). 

However, the government argues that the district court cited 

two proper grounds for denying Mr. McKinley's motion to represent 

himself. First, the district court found that Mr. McKinley 

"remain[ed] unaware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation." Rec. vol. II, doc. 115, at 2. As support for 

this finding, the district court relied on Mr. McKinley's lack of 

legal expertise in his prior appearances before the court. As we 

have already stated, Mr. McKinley's legal prowess is not relevant 

to whether he should be allowed to represent himself. Nor do we 

believe that a defendant's waiver of counsel is not knowing and 

intelligent merely because he attempts self-representation in the 

face of what most would consider unquestionably inferior skills. 

Rather, the district court's role is to ensure that the defendant 

understands that "[w]hen an accused manages his own defense, he 

relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional 

benefits associated with the right to counsel." Faretta, 422 U.S. 

at 835. The record must therefore "establish that 'he knows what 

he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Id. (quoting 

Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). 

13 

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The district court in this case never held a hearing to 

determine whether Mr. McKinley's attempted waiver of counsel was 

knowing and intelligent. Additionally, the district court did not 

cite, nor have we been able to discover, any evidence in the record 

before it that indicated Mr. McKinley was not competent to waive 

his right to counsel. Consequently, the district court's finding 

that Mr. McKinley was incompetent to waive his right to counsel 

because he "remain[ed] unaware of the dangers and disadvantages of 

self-representation" is clearly erroneous. 

The government also argues that because the district court 

found that "McKinley's desire to proceed pro se is motivated as 

much by his desire to delay and disrupt the proceedings against him 

as it is his desire to properly defend himself," Rec. vol. II, doc. 

115, at 3, the district court's decision may be affirmed in light 

_of the Supreme Court's holding in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 

(1984). In McKaskle, the Supreme Court stated: "[A]n accused has 

a Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own defense, provided only 

that he knowingly and intelligently forgoes his right to counsel 

and that he is able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and 

courtroom protocol." McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added); 

see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46 ("[T]he trial judge may 

terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately 

engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct."). We note that 

the district court in this case did not cite McKaskle as a basis 

for its decision. Additionally, the district court again relied 

upon Mr. McKinley's purported inability·to competently conduct his 

own defense to support the conclusion that he intended to disrupt 

14 

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and delay the proceedings. However, a defendant's mere 

incompetency in self-representation is not a sufficient basis for 

inferring a desire to delay and disrupt the proceedings. See 

Flewitt, 874 F.2d at 675 ("The government seems to contend that the 

appellants were disruptive because of their continual motions . 

and their failure to utilize the discovery materials . . This 

is not the kind of disruption meant by the Supreme Court .. 

[T]he Sixth Amendment does not permit denying a defendant the right 

to self-representation on the basis that the defendant cannot 

represent himself with the degree of competence a lawyer might 

have.") .7 Because the district court cites no other basis for its 

conclusion that Mr. McKinley intended to delay and disrupt the 

proceedings, this finding is clearly erroneous.8 

Mr. McKinley unequivocally and timely asserted that he wanted 

to represent himself. There is no suggestion in the record that 

7 We also do not believe that Mr. McKinley's behavior at his 

arraignment rose to such a level that the district court could 

reasonably have believed Mr. McKinley's desire to proceed pro se--

asserted two months after his arraignment and four months before 

his trial--was motivated by a desire to delay and disrupt the 

proceedings. 

8 The government has filed a motion to supplement the record in 

this case. In the motion, the government asks this court to 

consider the record in a civil proceeding in which Mr. McKinley 

sought to impose liens against the property of the presiding 

district judge and one of the Assistant United States Attorneys 

who worked on the prosecution of this criminal proceeding. The 

liens were apparently in contemplation of a future civil rights 

action. See United States v. McKinley, Nos. 93-8075, 93-8111, 

1995 WL 257257 (10th Cir. May 2, 1995). We note, however, that 

these liens were filed after the district court denied Mr. 

McKinley's request to represent himself, and therefore the record 

in that case is not relevant to this court's analysis. The 

government's motion is therefore denied. 

15 

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his intended waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent. 

Nor is there sufficient evidence in the record that Mr. McKinley 

intended to disrupt or delay the proceedings. As we previously 

noted, see note 8, the evidence relied on by the government is not 

relevant to the extent that Mr. McKinley's behavior occurred after 

the district court's denial of his motion. 

We are not unmindful of the difficulties district courts face 

in dealing with prose litigants. See. e.g., Padilla, 819 F.2d at 

959.9 

However, we believe that Faretta and its progeny compel us to 

reverse Mr. McKinley's conviction and remand the case for a new 

trial free from constitutional error. This means that Mr. McKinley 

must be allowed to exercise all of his constitutional rights, 

11 including the right to have assistance of counsel and the right to 

represent himself." Johnstone v. Kelly, 812 F.2d 821, 822 (2d 

Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987). Mr. McKinley should 

note, however, that if he chooses to exercise his right to selfrepresentation in his new trial, the district court 

may--even over objection by the accused--

appoint a 11 Standby counsel 11 to aid the accused 

if and when the accused requests help, and to 

be available to represent the accused in the 

9 In Padilla, this court recognized the potential benefits of 

appointing standby counsel in such cases. We stated that 11 appointment of standby counsel is a preferred, though not 

mandatory, practice. 11 Padilla, 819 F.2d at 959. Additionally, 

the Faretta Court stated that standby counsel may be appointed 11 even over objection by the accused . . . to aid the accused if 

and when the accused requests help, and to be available to 

represent the accused in the event that termination of the 

defendant's self-representation is necessary. 11 Faretta, 422 U.S. 

at 834-35 n.46. 

16 

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event that termination of the defendant's selfrepresentation is necessary. 

The right of self-representation is not a 

license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. 

Neither is it a license not to comply with 

relevant rules of procedural and substantive 

law. 

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46 (citation omitted). 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

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