Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05156/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05156-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles F. Bolden
Appellee
Ahmad B. Nurriddin
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 2015 Decided April 5, 2016

No. 14-5156

AHMAD B. NURRIDDIN,

APPELLANT

v.

CHARLES F. BOLDEN, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL 

AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:04-cv-02052)

Joshua David Rogaczewski argued the cause for 

appellant. With him on the briefs were Paul M. Thompson

and Jeffrey W. Mikoni. 

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Vincent H. 

Cohen, Acting U.S. Attorney, and Andrea McBarnette, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: BROWN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

Opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge

WILKINS.

PER CURIAM: This is the second time Ahmad Nurriddin

has brought suit against his former employer, the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”), claiming 

unlawful discrimination. In his first appeal to us, we affirmed 

grant of summary judgment to NASA on Nurriddin’s various 

claims of discrimination and retaliation over a six-year period. 

Nurriddin v. Griffin (Nurriddin II), 222 F. App’x 5 (D.C. Cir. 

2007). Now focusing on a series of events occurring between 

1996-2004, Nurriddin once more claims discrimination and 

retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII. We 

affirm the District Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the 

former claims, and grant of summary judgment to the agency 

on the latter.

I.

To provide some necessary context, we begin at the 

beginning. Nurriddin is an African-American, Muslim male. 

He worked in NASA’s Educational Affairs Division, first as a 

Publication Specialist, and eventually as an Education 

Programs Specialist. For more than a decade Nurriddin has 

accused NASA management of discrimination. Beginning in

1991, Nurriddin believed he should have been converted to a 

full-time civil servant position at a grade higher than his GS12 level. Nurriddin v. Goldin (Nurriddin I), 382 F. Supp. 2d 

79, 86 (D.D.C. 2005). Thereafter, he sought for years to 

obtain a promotion. Id. at 95, 102. He eventually brought 

suit pro se under Title VII on the basis of this denied 

promotion, as well as additional incidents of alleged 

discrimination. Id. at 90. These incidents included, among 

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others, being denied funds to travel to a Conference of 

Engineering Deans of Historically Black Colleges and 

Universities, id. at 101, and being exposed to his then coworker, later first-level supervisor’s computer desktop, which 

contained empty folders titled, “racist jokes and stories” and 

“W/American Heritage,” id. at 87, 108. We summarily 

affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to 

NASA. Nurriddin II, 222 F. App’x at 6.

This suit concerns the time period from 1996 until 

Nurriddin’s termination in 2004. By 1996, Nurriddin was still 

employed within the Education Division at a GS-12 level. 

His “first-level” supervisor was Malcolm Phelps, and his 

“alternate first-level supervisor” was Sherri McGee. His 

“second-level supervisor” was Frank Owens. These three and 

several other human resources directors and employees were 

to become the subject of nine EEO complaints by Nurriddin 

between June 1997 and June 2004. 

In 1996, Nurriddin received a performance evaluation of 

“Outstanding” for the time period 1995-1996, which was the 

highest possible rating on the five-level scale used by the 

agency at the time. He received a non-competitive promotion 

to the GS-13 level in November 1997. Still, Nurriddin 

believed NASA was discriminating against him for previously

filing EEO complaints. He filed two complaints in 1997

naming Owens, McGee, and Phelps as the responsible 

management officials.

Nurriddin filed two more EEO complaints in 1998 that 

also named these three supervisors. The first, filed in April of 

1998, was predicated in part on a coworker’s comment to 

Nurriddin that Phelps said his performance evaluation would 

be lowered because he attended “too many minority 

conferences.” Nurriddin filed the second complaint in 

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September 1998, after he received his performance review for 

the 1997-1998 period. That year, NASA switched to a passfail system. Nurriddin received a “pass” and an $800 

performance award. Phelps, however, noted on the evaluation 

form a “pattern of missed deadlines and unresponsiveness to 

his management that must be addressed and improved during 

the next year for [his] work to continue to be judged 

satisfactory.” In his evaluation meeting, Nurriddin contends 

that Phelps “lashed out,” calling his EEO complaints “a bunch 

of bull and a crock of s-h-i-t.” 

As the administrative investigation into his complaints 

proceeded, Nurriddin’s white coworker received a grade 

increase from GS-13 to GS-14. Nurriddin did not. Around 

this same time, Nurriddin’s health began to decline on 

account of depression, anxiety, and back pain, all allegedly 

related to his job and confrontations with his supervisors. He 

and Phelps exchanged numerous correspondence on the 

proper medical documentation necessary for approval of his 

sick leave. In October of 1998, his doctor recommended to 

NASA that it transfer him to another department to alleviate 

his job-related stress. In November and December of 1998, 

Nurriddin also requested permission to travel to two “minority 

conferences,” which NASA denied. 

NASA eventually approved a detail for Nurriddin. 

Though, when first exploring the possibility, a human 

resources official wrote that one particular office might only 

agree to the arrangement “subject to some conditions such as 

resolution of the EEO complaints.” Nurriddin filed another

EEO complaint thereafter in January of 1999. In February 

1999, Nurriddin began a one-year long detail with the 

National Science Foundation (“NSF”). His NSF supervisor 

described his performance as “superb” and praised his 

“excellent skills in adapting to the rigors of a new office.” 

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In August 1999, Nurriddin filed an EEO complaint naming 

his NASA supervisors, which for the first time included a 

claim of disability discrimination. 

Nurriddin returned to NASA in the spring of 2000. He 

requested transfer to a different office as a reasonable 

accommodation and soon took medical leave. He did not 

return again except for a few days in May and September. 

He and management attempted to reach agreement on the 

proper medical documentation for his periods of absence. 

By this point, Nurriddin had joined NASA’s Voluntary 

Leave Transfer Program, which allows eligible employees to 

receive annual leave donated by other federal employees. 

Yet, his status was changed to “AWOL,” or away without 

leave. In a June 19, 2000 email, a human resources official 

reminded that Nurriddin had been accepted into the leave 

transfer program. In response, human resources director Al 

Castillo wrote: “Yegads! Will we ever finish with this guy? . . 

. For the time being, I’m going to let the AWOL stand as 

charged. If we need to correct it as a result of our discussion, 

I don’t have a problem stating so in writing.” Nurriddin 

remained on AWOL status from September 12, 2000 through 

December 1, 2000. Eventually, 737.5 hours of donated leave 

were credited to him. 

In September of 2000, Phelps denied Nurriddin a “WGI,” 

or Within Grade Increase. These increases are automatically 

awarded to federal employees after satisfactorily completing a 

certain number of calendar weeks in service. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 5335. Phelps justified the denial on the basis that Nurriddin 

had not worked in the office long enough in the past year for 

his performance to be rated acceptable. Around December 

2000, Nurriddin began receiving workers’ compensation 

benefits. Nurriddin filed another EEO complaint that same 

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month naming as responsible management officials, among 

others, Owens, Phelps, and Al Castillo and Vicki Novak from 

Human Resources. 

In 2001, NASA commenced a job search to find 

Nurriddin another position. In October 2001, it offered him a 

“new” job in his same position, this time under the 

supervision of McGee and Owens. NASA arrived at this 

decision after discussing various options over email 

throughout September 2001. In a message with the subject 

line, “Favorite Subject,” Vicki Novak wrote: “I really do not 

want to offer him another job in F. He’s not qualified and 

he’ll just create major problems if he should accept.” 

Castillo responded: 

[L]egal counsel, below Bob’s level, asked if CP 

could find him a job and make an offer to close off 

the [Office of Workers’ Compensation Program

(“OWCP”)] claim (expecting that he won’t take it 

and therefore lose his case at OWCP). That claim, 

backed by his doc and supported by the OWCP 

doc’s, is that he CANNOT work in FE because 

that’s the source of his “medical” problem. The 

offer of a job is a tactical ploy to chip away at all 

his complaints.

The Office of Workers’ Compensation Program 

originally found the job offer suitable and gave Nurriddin 30 

days either to accept the offer or to provide an explanation for 

refusal. In January 2002, Nurriddin filed another EEO 

complaint, this time naming Mark Batkin from the General 

Counsel’s Office, Dorothy Egbert from Human Resources, as 

well as Castillo, Novak, and Owens. OWCP reevaluated the 

job offer and found it unsuitable since his supervisors would 

remain Owens and McGee, who were named in the original 

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complaint. In the meantime, Nurriddin received his WGI to a 

GS-13 level step 5. 

Also in 2002, NASA underwent a reorganization. 

Clifford Houston replaced Phelps as Nurriddin’s first-level 

supervisor. With Nurriddin still out of the office, in October 

2003, Houston ordered another job search be conducted, but 

the search revealed no vacant positions suitable for Nurriddin. 

Houston subsequently proposed that Nurriddin be terminated;

he needed someone to fill the position and help ease the 

office’s workload. In 2004, Nurriddin’s new third-level 

supervisor, Angela Phillips Diaz, terminated his position

effective February 6, 2004. The termination letter’s stated 

rationale was that Nurriddin was “medically unable to 

perform [his] duties, and that this action [wa]s necessary in 

order to promote the efficiency of the service.” Nurriddin had 

not worked since 2000.

Nurriddin, originally pro se, filed suit under Title VII and 

the Rehabilitation Act. In 2009, the District Court granted in 

part and denied in part NASA’s motion to dismiss or in the 

alternative for summary judgment. Nurriddin v. Bolden

(Nurriddin III), 674 F. Supp. 2d 64, 97 (D.D.C. 2009). The 

court dismissed Nurriddin’s claims of disability 

discrimination and retaliation, as well as his hostile work 

environment claim.

1

 It permitted eight Title VII claims to 

proceed, including discrimination and retaliation based on: 1) 

denial of a noncompetitive promotion in 1998; 2) an $800 

performance award in 1998; 3) denial of two travel requests in 

1998 (retaliation claim only); 4) denial of a performance 

 1 The court furthermore dismissed Nurriddin’s request for injunctive relief 

to prevent NASA from communicating with the Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Program, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 95, as well as a claim against 

various agency officials for conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights, 

id. at 81.

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award in 1999; 5) designation as AWOL for 59 days in 2000; 

6) denial of donated leave after 2000, 7) denial of a WGI 

before 2001, and; 8) termination in 2004. 

After discovery and retaining counsel, Nurriddin filed a 

motion for partial summary judgment, while NASA filed its 

own summary judgment motion. The court granted NASA’s 

motion. Nurriddin v. Bolden (Nurriddin IV), 40 F. Supp. 3d 

104, 110 (D.D.C. 2014). Nurriddin now timely appeals.

II.

We first tackle the District Court’s dismissal in 2009 of 

Nurriddin’s Rehabilitation Act claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

2

 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We assume the truth of all wellpleaded factual allegations and construe reasonable inferences 

from those allegations in a plaintiff’s favor. Sissel v. U.S.

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 760 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 

2014). We need not, however “accept inferences drawn by 

[a] plaintiff[] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts 

set out in the complaint.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 

F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Nor must we accept legal 

conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678.

 2 On brief, NASA focused on whether Nurriddin produced enough 

evidence of disability discrimination to survive summary judgment, but 

the district court dismissed Nurriddin’s Rehabilitation Act claims under 

Rule 12(b)(6). See Nurriddin III, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 79, 84-85.

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A.

Nurriddin alleged that he was the subject of adverse 

actions because of his disability or perceived disability, based 

on his depression, anxiety, and back pain. The Rehabilitation 

Act prohibits federal agencies from engaging in employment 

discrimination against disabled individuals. See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 791(b); Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 942 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

It requires federal employers to provide “reasonable 

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations 

of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.” Doak 

v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1096, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing 42 

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). 

A person is disabled if she has 1) a physical or mental 

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 

activities; 2) a record of such an impairment; or 3) if she is 

regarded as having such an impairment.3

 See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 705(20) (B) (cross-referencing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). 

Assuming that working is a major life activity, see Adams, 

531 F.3d at 945, “one must be precluded from more than one 

type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice” in 

order to be considered “substantially limited” in working,

Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 

1114 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, 

527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999)). The third, “regarded as” prong of 

the statute is likewise satisfied only where one is “regarded as 

precluded from more than a particular job.”4 Adams, 531 

 3 The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the definition of “disability” from 

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 705(20)(B) (cross-referencing 42 U.S.C. § 12102); see also 29 U.S.C. 

§ 791(f) (incorporating ADA standards); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(b).

4 Congress amended the ADA, effective January 1, 2009, to broaden the 

definition of a disability. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 

110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The amendments retained § 12102(1) but 

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F.3d at 945 (quoting Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 

U.S. 516, 523 (1999)). 

B.

Upon review of the record, we find that Nurriddin 

essentially “plead[ed] himself out of court by alleging facts 

that render success on the merits impossible.” Trudeau v. 

Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(citing Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1116 

(D.C. Cir. 2000)). He did not allege that he is substantially 

limited in working, which requires inability to perform a 

broad range of jobs. See Duncan, 240 F.3d at 1114. In his 

complaint, Nurriddin explains that his “medical conditions 

[major depression and back pain] were the result of continued 

and relentless harassment by management officials in the 

Education Division.” J.A. 33 (¶ 23) (alteration in original). 

His factual allegations, however, give rise to an inference that 

his impairment related only to his particular job. See, e.g., 

J.A. 44 (¶ 93) (describing his success working for the 

National Science Foundation). Moreover, Nurriddin directly 

concedes that despite this condition, he “was able to perform 

some of the positions within NASA.” J.A. 53-54 (¶¶ 167, 

176). 

For similar reasons, the District Court properly dismissed 

Nurriddin’s claim that NASA regarded him as having a 

disability. Nurriddin offers a conclusory allegation that “[a]t 

all times since August 5, 1998,” he “has been responded to 

 clarified in paragraph three of that section that an individual is protected 

from adverse action taken by an employer “because of an actual or 

perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment 

limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 

12102(3)(A) (emphasis added). These amendments are not retroactive and 

do not affect our case. See Lytes v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 

936, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

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[by NASA] as an individual . . . perceived to have a 

disability.” J.A. 52 (¶ 163); see also J.A. 53 (¶ 172). At other 

parts of the complaint, though, he provides facts that indicate 

NASA perceived him as being capable of working outside of 

his division. J.A. 45 (¶ 99) (medical letter presented to 

NASA that Nurriddin could “transfer to a less stressful work 

site”); J.A. 45 (¶ 102) (NASA email characterizing 

Nurriddin’s actions as targeting one division – “resist[ing] 

working in [the Education Division] in any way he can”); J.A.

47 (¶ 119) (NASA email suggesting the agency did not 

believe Nurriddin had a disability, and had no “compelling 

reason for further accommodations, medical or otherwise”); 

J.A. 49 (¶ 132) (NASA email mentioning detail to a different 

office as a “strong possibility”); J.A.49 (¶ 133) (NASA email 

rejecting a detail as inappropriate not because of Nurriddin’s 

disability, but because it “does nothing positive for us except 

delay whatever will happen”). 

These facts do not give rise to an inference that NASA 

regarded Nurriddin as unable to perform a broad range of 

jobs. Without a disability within the meaning of the statute, 

or NASA regarding him as so impaired, Nurriddin’s claim of 

discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act fails.

5

 5 The District Court apparently dismissed Nurriddin’s claim of retaliation 

under the Rehabilitation Act because it determined that he could not meet 

the statutory definition of a disability. See Nurriddin III, 674 F. Supp. 2d 

at 85. Because Nurriddin has not challenged this ruling on appeal, we do 

not reach it, but we note that under Title VII, an employee’s retaliation 

claim does not rise or fall on the success of her underlying, good-faith 

discrimination claim, see Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 

Chairman, 709 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 899 

(2014), and our sister circuits overwhelmingly agree the same is true in the 

disability rights context, see Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 577 (6th 

Cir. 2007) (“A plaintiff may prevail on a disability-retaliation claim even 

if the underlying claim of disability fails.” (quotation marks omitted)); 

Cassimy v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.3d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 2006); Coons v. Sec'y 

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III.

We move on to Nurriddin’s Title VII claims. We review 

the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the agency 

de novo. Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 604 

(D.C. Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate where 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. A 

dispute over a material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” George, 407 F.3d at 410 (quoting 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 

In making this determination, we view all of the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

A.

A plaintiff may prove her Title VII discrimination or 

retaliation claim with direct evidence, for example through a 

statement that itself shows racial bias in the employment 

decision. See Vatel v. All. of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 

1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Alternatively, a plaintiff may base her 

claim on circumstantial evidence under the familiar 

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See George, 

407 F.3d at 411; Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007). After the plaintiff makes out her prima facie 

 

of U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004); Heisler v. 

Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Mondzelewski v. 

Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 786 (3d Cir. 1998)); Selenke v. Med. 

Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1264 (10th Cir. 2001); Sarno v. Douglas 

Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1999); Standard 

v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998); Soileau v. 

Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997). 

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case,6 the employer must articulate a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, after which the 

plaintiff has an opportunity to show the employer’s stated 

reason was pretextual. See George, 407 F.3d at 411. 

At the summary judgment stage, once the employer has 

claimed a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, this 

burden-shifting framework disappears. See Jones v. 

Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009). We no longer

consider whether the plaintiff properly made out her prima 

facie case. See Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 

490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing the prima facie burden 

at this point as a “largely unnecessary sideshow”). The “one 

central inquiry” that remains is whether a reasonable jury 

could infer retaliation or discrimination from all the evidence. 

Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 

see also Jones, 557 F.3d at 677. We evaluate this question 

“in light of the total circumstances of the case,” asking

“whether the jury could infer discrimination from the 

combination of (1) the plaintiff's prima facie case; (2) any 

evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer's 

proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any further 

evidence of discrimination that may be available to the 

plaintiff . . . or any contrary evidence that may be available to 

the employer.” Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1351 (quoting Aka v. 

Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 

 6 A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing 

that she: 1) is a member of a protected class; 2) suffered an adverse 

employment action; and that 3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an 

inference of discrimination. George, 407 F.3d at 412. A prima facie case 

of retaliation requires that a plaintiff demonstrate she: 1) engaged in a 

statutorily protected activity; 2) suffered a materially adverse action by her 

employer; and that 3) a causal connection existed between the two. Wiley, 

511 F.3d at 155.

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1998) (en banc)); see also Pardo-Kronemann, 601 F.3d at 

604.

The District Court granted summary judgment to NASA 

on Nurriddin’s Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims, 

which, as discussed above, were based on eight events: 1) 

denial of a noncompetitive promotion in 1998; 2) an $800 

performance award in 1998; 3) denial of two travel requests in 

1998 (retaliation claim only); 4) denial of a performance 

award in 1999; 5) designation as AWOL for 59 days in 2000; 

6) denial of donated leave after 2000, 7) denial of a WGI 

before 2001, and; 8) termination in 2004. 

We can affirm the District Court on several of these 

claims at the outset. Nurriddin simply offers conclusory 

statements, with little citation to the record, in order to rebut

NASA’s proffered legitimate reasons for denying two travel 

requests in 1998, designating him as AWOL in 2000, and 

awarding his WGI in 2001 rather than in 2000. Furthermore, 

there is no evidence that NASA denied him donated leave in 

2000. Even assuming all of these discrete events are 

actionable, there is no basis whatsoever for a reasonable jury 

to infer either discrimination or retaliation.

Nurriddin does not fare much better with regard to his 

claims based on 1) denial of a noncompetitive promotion in 

1998; 2) an $800 performance award in 1998; 3) denial of a 

performance award in 1999, or; 4) his termination in 2004. 

Still, we consider these claims in more detail as follows. 

B.

Nurriddin argues that he was denied a promotion in 1998 

as a result of discriminatory and retaliatory animus. The 

District Court granted summary judgment to NASA, in part 

because the white co-worker Nurriddin offered as an alleged 

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comparator was not sufficiently similarly situated. Nurriddin 

IV, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 121. Nurriddin claims this was in error, 

and also spills much ink criticizing the District Court’s 

alleged reliance on whether he made out a prima facie case.

We note that it is unclear whether the District Court

believed that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a “similarly 

situated” employee outside of her protected class received a 

promotion as part of her prima facie case. See id. at 120

(citing Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 

2003)). Such a showing is not required. See Stella v. Mineta, 

284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that prior 

decisions “created confusion on this point”); see also Brady,

520 F.3d at 494 n.2 (“[T]o make out a prima facie case, a 

plaintiff need not demonstrate that he or she was treated 

differently from a similarly situated employee or that the 

position was filled by a person outside the plaintiff's group.”);

Wiley, 511 F.3d at 156.

In any case, the issue before us is not Nurriddin’s prima 

facie burden. And we disagree with Nurriddin that the 

District Court fundamentally erred in its discussion of the 

prima facie case at the summary judgment stage. The court 

was explicit that it was analyzing “the prima facie case not to 

evade[ ] the ultimate question of discrimination vel non, but 

rather because [the plaintiff's] prima facie case is part of the 

evidence [the Court] must consider in addressing that 

question.” Nurriddin IV, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 120 (quotation 

marks omitted) (alterations in original); see also id. at 118

(citing Brady, 520 F.3d at 494). Some portions of the District 

Court’s opinion are admittedly in tension with this correct 

statement of the law. See, e.g., id. at 118 (reconsidering 

whether “Nurriddin meets his burden under the McDonnell 

Douglas framework”); id. at 127 (“Nurriddin fails to make out 

a prima facie case.”). Ultimately, though, the court

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articulated the correct legal standard, and we review its

decision de novo in any event.

All this said, Nurriddin has not established that he was 

denied a promotion as a result of illegal discrimination or 

retaliation. He seems to argue generally that he was due for 

an accretion of duty promotion. Such promotion 

opportunities arise where the “position is reclassified at a 

higher grade because the duties and responsibilities of the 

position have increased over a period of time.” See Wiley, 

511 F.3d at 156 (quotation marks omitted). But Nurriddin 

nowhere explains this process, why it applies to his position, 

what his original duties were, or how they had evolved by the 

time he was denied a promotion. Without any evidence that 

“the duties and responsibilities of [his] job had increased so as 

to warrant an accretion of duty promotion,” he fails to 

demonstrate the lack of promotion was either a pretext for 

discrimination or retaliation. Id. at 157.

C.

Next, Nurriddin claims NASA discriminated and 

retaliated against him when it awarded him a “mere $800 

performance award in 1998.” Apparently Nurriddin first 

claimed that he was denied a performance award in 1998 for 

the 1997-1998 period, after which NASA responded that he in 

fact received an $800 award. Nurriddin IV, 40 F. Supp. 3d. at 

124. In his opposition to NASA’s motion for summary 

judgment, he then conceded that he received $800, but that 

“only an $800 performance award” was nonetheless 

discrimination and retaliation. Id. In support of this 

argument, Nurriddin presents what he believes to be two 

pieces of direct evidence of animus: 1) Nurriddin’s statement 

that a co-worker told him that Phelps said Nurriddin’s 

performance evaluation would be lowered because of his 

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work as a minority advocate; and 2) Nurriddin’s statement 

that Phelps said Nurriddin’s EEO complaints were a “crock of 

s-h-i-t.” 

Even though denial of a discretionary bonus is an 

actionable adverse employment action, see Douglas v. 

Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009), Nurriddin does 

not succeed in rebutting the agency’s explanation. NASA’s 

proffered legitimate reason for the award is that Nurriddin’s 

performance did not merit a higher one. Indeed, Nurriddin 

received $800 despite the fact that his review for the same 

time period noted “a pattern of missed deadlines and 

unresponsiveness to his management.” 

When it comes to retaliation, Nurriddin offers no 

evidence supporting a causal connection between any 

protected activity and the $800 award. Nurriddin’s contention 

that a co-worker told him that Phelps said he was going to 

lower Nurriddin’s evaluation is inadmissible double hearsay. 

See Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199 

F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he evidence still must 

be capable of being converted into admissible evidence.”). 

Furthermore, Nurriddin offered absolutely no evidence to the 

district court about when Phelps’ alleged “crock of s-h-i-t” 

comments occurred. See Nurriddin IV, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 124 

(“[N]either in his deposition nor in his brief does Nurriddin 

provide a date when this alleged statement was made.”). 

Even assuming this confrontation happened on October 1, 

1998, as Nurriddin attempts to convince us on appeal, this 

would have been after both receipt of the award on August 17, 

1998, and his filing of a September 9, 1998 EEO complaint. 

His retaliation claim therefore fails for lack of any causal 

connection.

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D.

We move on to 1999. Nurriddin did not receive any 

performance award, and thinks he should have. NASA 

explains the lack of an award because he had been on leave a 

significant part of the time from August 1998 through January 

1999, and then went on detail to NSF in February 1999 for a 

year. Nurriddin claims he presented the District Court with

evidence that this explanation is pretext, including evidence 

that: 1) awards were given to several of his coworkers; 2) 

NASA meant to condition his detail assignment on the 

“resolution” of his EEO complaints, as shown in a November 

3, 1998 email and; 3) the high quality of his work while on 

detail. 

Despite his allegations, Nurriddin cannot point to any 

evidence of discrimination. The best evidence demonstrating 

unequal treatment would be a comparison. 1 Barbara 

Lindemann & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination 

Law 73 (4th ed. 2007) (“In most cases the key to proving 

pretext is comparative evidence.”). Here, that would be 

another employee assigned to detail that NASA treated more 

favorably than Nuriddin. But Nurriddin has provided no 

evidence of such an employee. In fact, Nurriddin has not 

provided any evidence that would undermine NASA’s 

about conferring discretionary awards to employees assigned 

on detail.

Our dissenting colleague quibbles with NASA’s 

proffered justification for not rewarding Nurriddin for 

satisfactory performance while away on detail. The best the 

dissent can do is point to a constellation of facts that indicate 

Nurridin’s time at NSF may have warranted an award and that 

NASA had the discretionary authority to reward Nurridin—

even if NSF declined to do so. But again, that is not evidence 

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suggesting NASA’s stated reasons are pretextual. Instead, the 

record makes clear that performance awards are 

discretionary. NSF, despite an otherwise positive evaluation 

letter, chose not to reward Nurriddin’s performance during his 

detail. NASA declined to reward Nurriddin’s performance 

because, in management’s estimation, Nurriddin’s 

performance did not merit reward. Without evidence that a 

similarly situated employee received special recognition 

denied to Nurriddin, or evidence NASA is “lying about the 

underlying facts that formed the predicate” for their decision 

not to confer a performance award, Brady, 520 F.3d at 495, 

we cannot conclude that NASA’s decision to withhold his 

discretionary award was discriminatory.

E.

Nurriddin lastly claims that he was wrongfully terminated 

in 2004 as a result of both discrimination and retaliation. To 

conclude the saga, we remind the reader that Nurriddin had 

last attended work in the spring of 2000. After yet another 

job search in October 2003 did not return any vacant 

positions, Houston proposed removing Nurriddin. Diaz made 

the final decision to terminate, effective February 2004, based 

on Nurriddin’s medical inability to perform his duties. 

Houston, who replaced Phelps as Nurriddin’s supervisor,

joined the agency in February 2003 and had never met 

Nurriddin before then. Diaz had been on detail to an external 

office since 1998, and only returned to the Education Division

as Nurriddin’s third-level supervisor in October 2003. 

Nonetheless, Nurriddin offers us a conspiracy theory 

dating back to 2001. He points to an email from September 

18, 2001, where Human Resources used the words, “tactical 

ploy,” to describe a potential course of action: offering 

Nurriddin a position with a different first-level supervisor 

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that, if he did not accept, would foreclose his OWCP claim. 

As it turned out, OWCP did not require Nurriddin to accept 

that job offer, because even though the agency offered to 

switch his first-level supervisor, Nurriddin had also named 

that individual in his numerous EEO complaints over the 

years. Nurriddin explains that if the 2001 job offer had been 

extended in good faith, he would have returned to work at that 

time, meaning he would not have suffered a gap in 

employment, and Diaz would have had no reason to terminate 

him in 2004. 

Nurriddin’s evidence is insufficient to prove any pretext 

on the part of NASA. Nurriddin had left the office back in 

2000. By 2004, he had been assigned new supervisors. 

Houston and Diaz had no involvement in his long dispute 

with previous management. As Houston described, NASA 

was implementing new initiatives that required gearing up its 

educational programs. The agency needed to free up 

Nurriddin’s position to meet this need. The 2001 email, 

written by different individuals three years prior, simply does 

not give rise to an inference that Nurriddin was terminated on 

the basis of discrimination. See Vickers v. Powell, 493 F.3d 

186, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing a subordinate’s bias as 

irrelevant where the ultimate decision maker is not influenced 

by the subordinate).

Nurriddin’s reliance on the September 2001 email as 

evidence of retaliatory termination is similarly unconvincing. 

Nurriddin ignores the fact that, to succeed on this claim, he 

must connect the termination decision to some activity 

protected under the statute. Even considering that he named a 

human resources official and Office of General Counsel 

attorney – Dorothy Egbert and Mark Batkin – in a January 

2002 EEO complaint, his termination occurred more than two 

years later in February 2004. See Payne v. D.C. Gov't, 722 

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F.3d 345, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (rejecting, without any further 

evidence, an eight-month gap between the protected activity 

and alleged retaliation as proof of a causal connection). Diaz 

of course made the decision to terminate in consultation with 

human resources and agency counsel. But that alone does not 

suffice to show that a retaliatory reason more likely than not 

motivated NASA’s decision to terminate Nurriddin. 

***

Nurriddin’s lengthy dispute with NASA thus comes to a 

close. The District Court did not err in dismissing

Nurriddin’s claims under the Rehabilitation Act, and properly 

granted summary judgment to the agency on his Title VII 

claims.

Our employment discrimination laws are meant to protect 

against more than just decisions an employee believes to be 

unfair. See Patterson v. Johnson, 505 F.3d 1296, 1301 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District 

Court’s judgment in its entirety.

So ordered.

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WILKINS, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

While I join the bulk of the Court’s opinion, I must part 

ways with my colleagues on Nurriddin’s Title VII claims

related to NASA’s decision not to give him a performance 

award in 1999. I believe a reasonable jury could infer this 

decision was motivated by unlawful discrimination or 

retaliation.

The “‘central question’ at summary judgment becomes 

whether ‘the employee produced sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted 

nondiscriminatory or non-retaliatory reason was not the actual 

reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated or 

retaliated against the employee.’” Walker v. Johnson, 798 

F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Allen v. Johnson, 

795 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (brackets omitted)). 

I disagree with the majority that Nurriddin needs to point 

to a comparator to survive summary judgment. See Maj. Op. 

18 (objecting that Nurriddin has provided “no evidence” of an 

employee treated more favorably than him). Nurriddin 

certainly is not required to come forth with evidence that 

NASA treated similarly situated employees more favorably. 

While that is one potential avenue, he can also support an 

inference of discrimination by exposing NASA’s explanation 

as “inconsistent or dishonest.” Walker, 798 F.3d at 1092; see 

also Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 495 

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Alternatively, the employee may attempt to 

demonstrate that the employer is making up or lying about the 

underlying facts that formed the predicate for the employment 

decision.”). He has done so here.

NASA’s proffered legitimate reason for not giving a 

1999 bonus is that Nurriddin worked elsewhere during that 

time. According to a 2001 affidavit from Malcolm Phelps, 

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2

Nurriddin’s first-level supervisor, no award was given 

“because [Nurriddin] had not worked in the office for the 

entire year.” Also in a 2001 affidavit, alternate first-level 

supervisor Sherri McGee explained that “in management’s 

estimation, there was no ‘performance’ that justified an 

award.” NASA contends that it was up to the detail agency, 

the National Science Foundation (“NSF”), to provide the 

bonus.

NASA’s proffered reason is flatly contradicted elsewhere 

in the record. Deposition testimony by human resources 

official Inez Hunter reveals that if a detail office was not 

willing to fund a bonus, NASA could still fund it – at 

management’s discretion. “[I]f the work was actually 

outstanding,” explained Hunter, “. . . what the [employee] 

would get, that would be management’s discretion.” When 

asked if an employee’s detail was a valid reason to deny a 

performance award, Hunter answered, “no.” 

NASA does not engage with this contradiction but 

instead simply maintains that Nurriddin’s detail office “did 

not fund” an award. For support, the agency cites to an 

evaluation letter from the NSF. The letter is entirely glowing 

of Nurriddin’s performance but does not say one way or 

another whether the NSF provided money for an award. The 

only conclusion this letter supports is that Nurriddin’s work 

on detail “was actually outstanding.” 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Nurriddin, his supervisors gave reasons for not providing a 

bonus that a reasonable jury could find false. See Walker, 798 

F.3d at 1092 (“A plaintiff may support an inference that the 

employer's stated reasons were pretextual . . . by citing the 

employer’s . . . inconsistent or dishonest explanations . . . or 

other relevant evidence that a jury could reasonably conclude 

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3

evinces an illicit motive.”). Human Resources contends 

Phelps and McGee did have the discretion to give Nurriddin 

an award. The District Court confirmed that “other NASA 

managers received performance awards while on detail.” 

Nurriddin IV, 40 F. Supp. 3d. at 127. Furthermore, the 

agency was caught in a November 1998 email chain 

discussing Nurriddin’s placement options on detail in terms of 

“conditions such as resolution of the EEO complaints,” after 

which Nurriddin filed another EEO complaint naming Phelps 

and McGee as responsible management officials in January of 

1999. All of this evidence combined gives rise to an 

inference that Nurriddin did not receive a bonus on account of 

unlawful discrimination or retaliation.

When considering the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Nurriddin, as we must, I do not believe that 

NASA has met its burden of proving “that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact” regarding whether it was up to 

the detail agency to award a bonus, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a),

and I would reverse the District Court on these discrimination 

and retaliation claims alone.

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