Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01171/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01171-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe A. Lizarraga
Respondent
Brandon W. Rackliffe
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON W. RACKLIFFE,

Petitioner,

v.

JOE A. LIZARRAGA,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01171 MJS (HC)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 16]

Petitioner is a state prisoner with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. He is represented by Charles W. Coppock. Respondent, Warden of 

Mule Creek State Prison is represented in this action by John W. Powell, of the Office of 

the Attorney General for the State of California.

Both parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (ECF Nos. 2, 13.)

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno. (Reptr. Tr. 

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at 202.) On January 6, 2011, Petitioner plead no contest to battery on a nonprisoner by a 

prisoner. (Id.) On the same date he was sentenced to a determinate term of six years in 

state prison. (Id.)

On February 20, 2013, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 

affirmed the judgment. (Mot. To Dismiss, Ex. A, ECF No. 16.) Petitioner did not seek 

review in the California Supreme Court. Petitioner proceeded to file two collateral 

appeals to his conviction in state court. (See Lodged Docs. 6-9.) The petitions were filed 

as follows:

1. Fresno County Superior Court

Filed: January 24, 2013

1

; 

Denied: April 2, 2013;

2. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: December 14, 2014; 

Denied: February 19, 2015;

(Lodged Docs. 6-9.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on July 6, 2015. (Pet.) On 

November 11, 2015, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition as being filed 

outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and for failure 

to exhaust judicial remedies. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11.) Petitioner did not file an 

opposition to the motion. The matter stands ready for adjudication. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to 

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases.

 

1 Under the mailbox rule, the Court deems petitions filed on the date Petitioner handed a petition 

to prison authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385, 101 L. Ed. 2d 

245 (1988); Hernandez v. Spearman, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16252 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2014); see also Rule 

3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Here, all the petitions were filed by legal counsel for 

Petitioner and are not subject to the ‘prison mailbox’ rule. 

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The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an 

answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being 

in violation of the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 

420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using 

Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); 

Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a 

respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court 

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & 

n. 12.

For the sake of judicial efficiency, the Court shall review Respondent's motion to 

dismiss based on a violation of the one-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1), rather than the failure to exhaust judicial remedies. Because Respondent's 

claim is similar in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state 

remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal 

answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority 

under Rule 4.

B. Commencement of Limitations Period Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). AEDPA imposes various requirements on all 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 

521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on July 6, 2015, and is subject to the provisions 

of AEDPA. AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file

a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 

2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

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habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing 

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 

under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period begins running on the date that the 

petitioner's direct review became final or the date of the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review. On February 20, 2013, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, affirmed the judgment. (Mot., Ex. A.) Petitioner did not seek review in the 

California Supreme Court. Accordingly, for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner's 

judgment of conviction became final on April 1, 2013, upon expiration of the forty-day 

period within which to file and serve a petition for review with the California Supreme 

Court. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653-654, 181 L. Ed. 2d 619 (2012); Cal. 

Rules of Court 8.387(b)(1); 8.500(e)(1). The AEDPA statute of limitations began to run 

the following day, on April 2, 2013. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 

2001).

Petitioner would have one year from April 2, 2013, absent applicable tolling, in 

which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed in 

filing the instant petition until July 6, 2015, over a year after the statute of limitations 

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period expired. Absent the later commencement of the statute of limitations or any 

applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred as untimely.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year 

limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held 

the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction 

relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one state court's disposition of 

a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the state court 

system. 536 U.S. 214, 216 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year statute of limitations 

under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction petition was 

timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or 

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the 

requirements for statutory tolling. Id.

According to the state court records provided by Respondent, Petitioner filed his 

first petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 24, 2013. The application was 

therefore filed prior to the commencement of the limitations period. A collateral action 

filed prior to the effective date of the statute of limitations has no tolling consequence. 

Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) (Although the filing of a state habeas 

petition “would otherwise have tolled the running of the federal limitations period, since it 

was denied before that period had started to run, it had no effect on the timeliness of the 

ultimate federal filing.”). While the petition has no effect for the time it was filed prior to 

the limitation period, Petitioner is entitled to tolling for the period after the limitation 

period commenced that his state petition was still pending. In this case the limitation 

period began on April 1, 2013, and his first state petition was denied on April 2, 2013. 

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Petitioner is entitled to one day of tolling for the state petition. 

Accordingly, the limitations period commenced on April 3, 2013 and expired one 

year later on April 2, 2014. 

The statute of limitations expired over a year before the instant federal petition 

was filed on July 6, 2015. While Petitioner filed a second post-conviction challenge on 

December 24, 2014, petitions filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations period 

have no tolling effect. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003) ("section 

2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before 

the state petition was filed.").

The present petition was filed on July 6, 2015, over a year after the expiration of 

the year statute of limitations period. The instant federal petition is untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-62 (2010); 

quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo. Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would 

give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th 

Cir. 1993). Petitioner has not presented any argument that he is entitled to equitable 

tolling of the petition.

E. Exhaustion

Respondent, in his motion to dismiss, asserts an alternative ground for dismissal 

based on failure to exhaust state remedies. (See Mot. to Dismiss at 4-6.) As the petition 

is untimely and subject to dismissal, in an exercise of judicial efficiency, the Court will not 

address Respondent's claims regarding failure to exhaust judicial remedies.

IV. CONCLUSION

As explained above, Petitioner failed to file the instant petition for Habeas Corpus 

within the one year limitation period required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner was 

given the benefit of statutory tolling but not entitled to equitable tolling. Regardless, the 

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petition remains untimely filed. Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Respondent’s 

motion to dismiss.

///

V. ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16) is GRANTED; 

2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED with prejudice as 

untimely; 

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a Certificate of Appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (in order to obtain a 

COA, petitioner must show: (1) that jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the petition stated a valid claim of a denial of a constitutional right; 

and (2) that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district 

court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack, 529 U.S. 484. In the 

present case, jurists of reason would not find debatable whether the 

petition was properly dismissed with prejudice as time-barred under 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 13, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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