Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03707/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03707-13/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Murray
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES MURRAY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant. 

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No. C-04-3707 SC

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff James Murray ("Plaintiff" or "Murray") brought this

action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et

seq., against the United States of America for injuries and

damages allegedly caused by the negligent driving of United States

Postal Service employee Cesar Delrosario ("Delrosario"). 

A three-day bench trial was held on March 27, 28, and 30,

2006 on the legal and factual issues in this case. As stated in

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings"), the

Court found that Murray was entirely at fault for the accident.

Presently before the Court is Murray's motion for a new trial

or to amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.

For the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES Murray's

motion. 

Case 3:04-cv-03707-SC Document 92 Filed 06/19/06 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 A detailed statement of the facts is in the Court's Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See Docket No. 82. 

2

II. BACKGROUND

The Court found that Defendant United States of America bore

no degree of fault for the accident, which instead lay entirely

with Plaintiff Murray, who, the Court found, failed to duly yield

to Delrosario, who was lawfully in the intersection.1 

Plaintiff has filed this motion, alleging that the Court made

certain errors of fact and law. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"There are three grounds for granting new trials in courttried actions under Rule 59(a)(2): (1) manifest error of law; 

(2) manifest error of fact; and (3) newly discovered evidence." 

Brown v. Wright, 588 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1978).

IV. DISCUSSION

Murray puts forth five contentions in his motion. The Court

will address each in turn. 

A. The Court's Reliance on Ball v. United States is Not

Misplaced

Murray contends that the Court's reliance on Ball v. United

States, 191 F. Supp. 467, 468 (N.D. Cal. 1961) is "in error"

because Ball is based on California Vehicle Code § 21755, "which

governs overtaking and passing vehicles on the right only under

conditions permitting such movement in safety. Said case did not

address California Vehicle Code § 21451 [one statute at issue in

the instant case] and the obligations of a driver facing a

circular green signal." Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of

Motion for a New Trial at 1-2 ("Pl's. Mem.").

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In the Findings, the Court stated that "it is negligent to

proceed into an intersection at a speed that makes it impossible

'to yield the right of way, if necessary,' Ball v. United

States...as Murray should have yielded to Delrosario." Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5 ("FF").

Murray's contention is not a ground for a new trial or for

amending the judgment. The Court did not rely on Ball for its

exposition of a section of the California Vehicle Code, but rather

for its general statement that drivers must travel at a reasonable

speed in order to yield to other drivers if necessary. As one

of Ball's cited authorities states:

The operator of an automobile is bound to anticipate that he

may meet persons or vehicles at any point of the street, and

he must in order to avoid a charge of negligence, keep a

proper lookout for them and keep his machine under such

control as will enable him to avoid a collision. 

Huetter v. Andrews et al., 91 Cal. App. 2d 142, 146 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1949) (citation and quotation marks removed).

The Court finds no reason to order a new trial or amend the

judgment based on this contention.

 B. The Court's Use of "Charging" Is Not a Ground for a New

Trial or a Reason to Amend the Judgment

Murray contends that the Court's "description of Murray's

movement just prior to impact as 'charging ahead' [] is not

supported by the facts and ignores the testimony" of a witness and

the accident reconstruction experts. Pl's. Mem. at 2. 

In bench trials, it is the judge's duty to weigh the

evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and decide

questions of fact and issues of law. See Cabrera v. Jakabovitz,

24 F.3d 372, 380 (2d Cir. 1994).

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United States District Court

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Plaintiff's contention is not a ground for a new trial or for

amending the judgment. By "charging ahead" the Court meant,

acting in its role as fact-finder, that it found that Murray drove

at a negligently high speed. This finding is supported by the

fact that Murray collided with the postal vehicle, not the postal

vehicle with him. Furthermore, the Court found it significant

that Murray's vehicle struck the postal vehicle not at its front,

but rather at its middle. Had Murray struck the vehicle's front,

it might well indicate that Delrosario was travelling at a speed

that made it impossible for Murray to avoid colliding with

Delrosario. It might also indicate that Murray was not travelling

at a negligently high speed. Yet, this is not what happened. 

Murray's striking the middle of the vehicle indicates that he was

indeed "charging ahead" at a negligent speed, depriving himself of

sufficient reaction time. 

In his third and similar contention, Murray declares that the

Court's "findings charge plaintiff with failing to notice that the

vehicles to his left had halted (impliedly after starting to move

forward) and would not have "charged ahead". [sic] This finding

completely ignores the testimony of both reconstruction experts

that it would take 1.5 and 2 seconds to perceive and react to an

event." Pl's. Mem. at 2. 

The Court finds that Murray's contention is not a ground for

a new trial or to amend the judgment. In fulfilling its duty as

the trier of fact, the Court duly considered the testimony of both

reconstruction experts. After weighing all the evidence, and

paying particular attention to the testimony of Delrosario and

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United States District Court

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Plaintiff and to the facts discussed above, the Court determined

that the question was not whether Plaintiff had time to react, but

whether he should have proceeded at all. The Court's answer to

this question was that because Plaintiff's view of traffic was at

all relevant times blocked by the vehicles to his left, it was

negligent for Plaintiff to move forward. 

C. The Court Did Not Ignore the Testimony of the

Reconstruction Experts

Murray contends that the Court's "findings are made without

reference to the testimony of plaintiff's expert James Hughes, who

was completely unrebutted by defendant's expert, Rajeev Kelkar, on

the issue of the velocity of the US Postal vehicle." Pl.'s Mem.

at 2. 

The Court finds that Murray's contention is not a ground for

a new trial or to amend the judgment. The Court duly considered

the testimony of Hughes and Kelkar, as well as the testimony of

Murray and Delrosario. After weighing all the evidence, and

paying particular attention to the testimony of Delrosario, the

Court found that Delrosario was at no time using excessive speed

and that he was lawfully in the intersection. (Also, as stated

above, that Murray struck the vehicle at the center of its side

indicates that he was travelling at a negligently high speed.)

Though the Court's Findings did not refer directly to the

testimony of Hughes and Kelkar, this evidence was duly weighed and

considered by the Court. 

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United States District Court

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D. Plaintiff's Case Citations Do Not Provide a Basis for

Granting the Motion

Plaintiff Murray contends that the Court and Defendant failed

to distinguish legal authority cited by Plaintiff in his proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law. Pl's. Mem. at 3. 

Specifically, Murray cites Bady v. Detwiler, et al., 127 Cal.

App. 2d 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) as an instance of this. In Bady,

two drivers collided in an intersection because a faulty traffic

signal displayed "GO" to each driver. Id. at 324. Murray quotes

the following from Bady: "A reasonable prudent person approaching

an intersection with a 'Go' signal naturally assumes that traffic

approaching on the intersecting street will stop...The law did not

impose the duty on either Perkins or Mrs. Detwiler to anticipate

negligence on the part of the other." Id. at 338. Significantly,

Plaintiff omits two sentences, one that falls where the ellipses

are interposed ("Neither driver had any notice of the defective

and dangerous condition of the signals") and the other after the

full stop: "The lookout required cash [sic] of them was such as a

reasonable person would maintain." Id. 

 These omissions highlight the distinguishing features of the

instant case and Bady. In Bady, it was unclear which driver - if

either - had the "true" green light - the defective traffic signal

made it impossible to tell - and therefore it was unclear who had

to yield to whom. A driver facing a green signal light is not

expected to consider whether a driver travelling perpendicular to

him also faces a green light. 

In the instant case, Murray was not misled as to his duty by

a faulty traffic light. Even though the green light authorized

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United States District Court

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Murray to move forward, he was still bound to, as Bady put it,

maintain a lookout such as a reasonable person would maintain. In

the instant case, though he faced a green light, Murray had the

obligation to yield to traffic lawfully in the intersection.

This obligation is summarized by another case Murray cites,

Freeman v. Churchill, 30 Cal. 2d 453 (Cal. 1947). The Freeman

court determined that the defendant was lawfully in the

intersection, a factual finding that placed defendant within the

ambit of the plaintiff's duty to "lookout for traffic lawfully on

the highway." Id. at 459. In the instant case, the Court found

that Delrosario was lawfully in the intersection and therefore

Plaintiff Murray had a duty to look out for, and yield to, him. 

Freeman cites another case Murray lists in his papers, Taylor

v. Sims, 72 Cal. App. 2d 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945). Plaintiff

quotes a valuable - and self-defeating - passage from Taylor: 

"The driver proceeding pursuant to the 'Go' signal is not to be

deemed negligent because he fails to maintain a lookout for a

vehicle which might enter the intersection in violation of the

signal." Id. at 64 (citations removed). On these facts, Taylor

is inapposite to the instant case - the Court determined that

Delrosario was lawfully in the intersection and therefore Murray

had a duty to maintain a lookout for him. 

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United States District Court

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V. CONCLUSION

The Court finds no reason to order a new trial or to amend

the judgment. Specifically, under Rule 59, the Court finds that

there was no manifest error of law or fact or any newly-discovered

evidence that would support the granting of Plaintiff's motion. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 19, 2006

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:04-cv-03707-SC Document 92 Filed 06/19/06 Page 8 of 8