Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01330/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01330-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Agueda Valencia
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Agueda Valencia (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for supplemental security 

income (“SSI”) pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act.1 The matter is currently before the 

Court on the parties‟ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge 

Barbara A. McAuliffe. Having carefully considered the parties‟ briefs, as well as the entire record in 

this case, the Court finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be supported by 

substantial evidence in the record and based upon proper legal standards. Accordingly, the Court 

affirms the Commissioner‟s determination.

 

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to conduct all further proceedings in this case before the 

Honorable Barbara A. McAuliffe, United States Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 7, 9). 

AGUEDA VALENCIA,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-1330-BAM

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

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FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS2

Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income benefits on July 29, 2010. AR 

17. Plaintiff‟s application alleged disability beginning July 15, 2010. The Commissioner initially 

denied Plaintiff‟s claims on December 27, 2010, and upon reconsideration on June 17, 2011. AR 17. 

Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing and on September 4, 2012, Plaintiff, represented by James 

Witherow, testified at the hearing. AR 17. On November 21, 2012, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

Sharon L. Madsen denied Plaintiff‟s application. AR 23. After the Appeals Council denied review, this 

appeal followed. AR 1. 

Background 

Plaintiff was born in Mexico on July 8, 1965, has a sixth-grade education, and is a Spanish 

speaker. AR 31-32. While living in the United States, Plaintiff worked as a fruit sorter for six months 

and worked as a packager at a metal stamping facility. AR 33. In 2008, at the age of 43, Plaintiff 

suffered a cerebrovascular accident (a stroke) resulting in residual left extremity weakness. AR 222. 

In January 2009, a cardiac stress test revealed that she was at “moderate cardiac risk” and her 

“functional capacity was limited by exertion.” AR 217. Plaintiff also suffers from recurrent painful 

headaches and persistent left arm and left leg weakness. AR 212, 292, 358. 

Treatment notes indicate multiple visits to the hospital due to complaints of headaches, chest 

pain and left side weakness. In June 2010, Plaintiff reported to the Emergency Room with “pinching 

pain” on the left side of her head. AR 220. She reported to the Emergency Room physician that her

“symptoms began approximately one month ago when the left side of her body „gave out‟ while she 

was walking with her walker” and that since that time she experienced swelling and weakness on her 

left side. AR 220. The treating physician noted that “this patient is well known to me” and that “she 

has a history of complex migraines that have gone on for some time.” AR 200. The Emergency Room 

doctor further stated: 

[Plaintiff] has had an extensive workup...and they have never been able to find any 

abnormalities in her lab work. I think that it is very likely that this patient is suffering 

from somatization disorder and at this point in time, I think that is probably the most 

 

2 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page number.

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likely diagnosis. She does have an appointment to follow up with the neurologist who 

is following her for her headaches for which she continues to take Topamax and she 

has that appointment on 6/30/2010. I think she should keep that appointment. I would 

welcome their evaluation, their input and would be happy to follow any 

recommendations they would have

AR 220. 

On July 15, 2010, Plaintiff returned to the Emergency Room with chest pain radiating to her 

left back and shoulder with left arm numbness. AR 222. An echocardiogram indicated cardiac 

disease/symptomatic bradycardia and Plaintiff had surgery to implant a dual chamber pacemaker in 

her chest. AR 8-9, 13. 

In September 2010, Plaintiff continued to seek treatment for left-sided weakness and

headaches. AR 358, 366, 368. In November 2010, she was admitted to the hospital “with profound 

left-sided weakness.” AR 368. A treating physician‟s exam “showed 0/5 strength on left limbs and 

lack of pain/temp/fine-touch/proprioception modalities...[b]ased on neuro[logical] exam patient seems 

to have a left sided CN v VII and XI deficit. Location of deficits cannot be explained by an anatomical 

lesion.” AR 376. A treating psychiatrist diagnosed Plaintiff with “conversion disorder” noting that 

“[t]he presentation points to conversion disorder, but as to what is the underlying stressor remains 

undetermined.” AR 377. Additional medication was prescribed and Plaintiff was later discharged

after being hospitalized for three days. AR 368.

The following month, on December 2, 2010, State agency physician Dr. K. Quint considered 

the medical evidence and opined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform light 

work with frequent postural involvement, but no more than occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, and 

scaffolds. AR 227-29. Dr. Quint explained that Plaintiff‟s bradycardia was stable with the pacemaker. 

AR 230. 

From February 2011 through April 2011, Plaintiff attended eight physical therapy sessions. AR 

424. The sessions improved Plaintiff‟s ability to transfer from sitting to standing, increased her ability 

to ambulate slowly with an assistive device, and ability to balance. AR 424. Plaintiff was discharged 

with her treatment goals partially met; educational goals met; and recommendations to continue with 

her home exercise program. AR 424. 

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On June 4, 2011, Plaintiff underwent a complete psychiatric evaluation with Dr. Mary Lewis. 

AR 435-40. A mental status exam revealed good eye contact, cooperative behavior, and a pleasant 

attitude. AR 437. Plaintiff exhibited normal speech, normal thought processes, and euthymic mood. 

AR 437. Plaintiff was fully oriented, not significantly impaired in intellectual functioning, and 

demonstrated satisfactory attention and concentration. AR 437-38. Based on her examination, Dr. 

Lewis did not diagnose Plaintiff with any psychiatric impairment and opined that Plaintiff would have 

no mentally related functional impairments. AR 439-40. 

On June 16, 2011, State agency physician Dr. R. Tashjian reviewed the evidence of record and 

opined that Plaintiff‟s mental impairments were non-severe. AR 442, 452. 

In September 2011, Plaintiff was again hospitalized. Her Emergency Room physician 

described an “acute episode of left-sided weakness which was preceded by a headache in a patient 

with known history of complicated migraine headaches and psychiatric disorder.” AR 544. During her 

stay, progress notes indicated that “[p]er neurology there was convincing data that perhaps this was a 

malingering patient versus conversion disorder.” AR 541. 

In January 2012, Plaintiff presented to the hospital with “left-sided weakness” determined to be 

“due to chronic complex migraines vs. old [cerebral vascular accident] (“CVA”),” chronic headache, 

and chest pain. AR 524, 530. 

Plaintiff again reported to the hospital on May 2012, with “acute onset of left-sided weakness” 

(AR 516) and again of June 25, 2012, with complaints of chest pains while putting away groceries. 

Plaintiff was discharged in improved and stable condition with the assessment that the pain was likely 

musculoskeletal in origin. AR 487. A month later on July 31, 2012, Plaintiff was admitted to the 

hospital with severe migraines and left side weakness. AR 458. A neurologic exam noted Plaintiff 

was unable to shrug her left shoulder, had decreased sensation in her left arm, no sensation in her left 

leg, little strength and no reflexes in the left extremities. AR 460. The treating physician noted that a 

CVA was indicated, with left-sided weakness. AR 464. 

On August 28, 2012, Plaintiff was hospitalized with significant headache, nausea, vomiting 

and left-sided weakness and numbness. AR 624, 631. Upon physical exam, there were neurological 

findings of “diminished sensation left side” and “upper and lower extremities bilateral start off as 

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equal strength then suddenly the right increases in strength and the left decreases in strength.” AR 

624, 631. On August 30, 2012, Plaintiff was discharged with a diagnosis of “complex migraine vs. 

CVA” and a plan to admit her for a further work up and a neurologic evaluation. AR 632. 

Hearing Testimony

At the administrative hearing before ALJ Madsen on September 4, 2012, in Fresno, California, 

Plaintiff appeared and testified with the help of an attorney and a translator. Impartial Vocational 

Expert (“VE”) Susan Allison also appeared and testified. AR 27. 

Plaintiff was born on July 8, 1965, and was forty-seven years old at the time of her hearing. 

AR 30. At five feet three inches tall, Plaintiff weighs 190 pounds and is left handed. AR 30. Plaintiff

is not legally married and she has two children ages 14 and 11. AR 31. Plaintiff has a sixth grade 

education and did some of her schooling in Mexico before coming to the United States. AR 32. 

Plaintiff testified that in performing her activities of daily living, she needs help bathing and 

dressing, that she completed very few household chores because she experienced fainting spells, that 

she did no shopping, and that her daughters did the cooking. AR 32. Plaintiff stated that a typical day 

included watching television and taking naps. AR 32-33. 

When asked about her work history, Plaintiff explained that her past work included sealing 

packed wheelchair parts and sorting fruit. AR 33. Plaintiff also worked part-time at Fresno Unified 

doing “yard duty” which included watching children during their breaks. AR 34. 

When asked about her medical issues, Plaintiff alleged that her impairments included daily 

severe headaches, fainting spells, chest pains, weakness in her left side that caused her to fall, swollen 

feet, and minimal left eye vision. AR 35-38. Plaintiff felt she could stand for three minutes at a time, 

walk for ten minutes at a time, and sit for thirty minutes at a time. AR 38. Plaintiff testified that based 

on her impairments she could lift and carry three to five pounds, but that she was always dropping 

things. AR 38. 

Thereafter, the ALJ elicited the testimony of vocational expert Susan Allison. AR 40. The VE 

testified that Plaintiff‟s past relevant work included fruit sorter and hand packager. AR 40. The ALJ

then asked the expert to assume a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff‟s age, education, work 

experience, who could lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, sit/stand/walk six 

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hours in an eight-hour work day with occasional climbing of ladder, ramps, scaffolds, and no 

concentrated exposure to heights AR 41. The VE stated that such an individual could still perform 

Plaintiff‟s past relevant work as a hand packager and fruit sorter. AR 41. The ALJ reduced the 

hypothetical to sedentary with the ability to use a cane as necessary, and the VE testified that Plaintiff 

could perform her previous box sealer job as she actually performed it in the past. AR 41. Finally, the 

ALJ asked, and the expert confirmed, that her testimony was consistent with the information found in 

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. AR 41-42. 

Medical Record

The entire medical record was reviewed by the Court. AR 207-637. The medical evidence 

will be referenced below as necessary to this Court‟s decision.

The ALJ’s Decision

Using the Social Security Administration‟s five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff did not meet the disability standard. AR 17-23. More particularly, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since July 29, 2010. AR 19. 

Further, the ALJ identified bradycardia status post pacemaker placement, migraine headaches, 

conversion disorder, and obesity as severe impairments. AR 19. Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that 

the severity of Plaintiff‟s impairments did not meet or exceed any of the listed impairments. AR 20.

Based on his review of the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work including lifting and carrying twenty pounds 

occasionally and ten pounds frequently; Plaintiff could stand and/or walk for six hours in an eight hour 

day; and sit for six hours in an eight hour day with occasional climbing of ladders, ropes and scaffolds, 

and no concentrated exposure to heights AR 20. The ALJ found that Plaintiff is able to perform past 

relevant work as a fruit sorter and hand packager. AR 23. The ALJ therefore found that Plaintiff was 

not disabled under the Social Security Act. AR 23. 

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner‟s decision to 

deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this 

Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. 

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42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 

1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The record as a whole must be 

considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 

Commissioner‟s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the 

evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. E.g.,

Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold the decision if the 

ALJ applied the proper legal standards and made findings supported by substantial evidence. Sanchez 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Andrews v. Shalala, 

53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).

DISABILITY STANDARD

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage in 

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of no less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 

1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental impairment of such 

severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but cannot, considering his or 

her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which 

exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The 

claimant bears the burden of proof to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

In her opening brief, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ: (1) erred in evaluating the severity of her 

impairments; (2) improperly rejected the opinions of her treating physicians; (3) failed to establish a 

foundation as to her past relevant work, and (4) failed to consider all of her impairments in the residual 

functional capacity finding. (Doc. 13). 

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DISCUSSION3

1. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Impairments at Step Two 

Plaintiff first challenges that ALJ‟s findings at step two of the sequential analysis. Plaintiff 

argues that while the ALJ found that her conversion disorder—a psychiatric disorder—was a severe 

impairment, the ALJ later found that Plaintiff‟s “mental problems are non-severe.” According to 

Plaintiff, the ALJ made a contrary finding when she concluded that Plaintiff suffers from a severe 

psychiatric disorder while simultaneously concluding that her mental impairments were non-severe. 

Plaintiff‟s argument is unpersuasive. 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff‟s arguments concerning the “severity” of her specific mental 

impairments are moot. The severity requirement is a “de minimis screening device to dispose of 

groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 

U.S. 137, 140 (1987); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.921 (definition of a severe impairment). Here, the ALJ 

did not dispose of Plaintiff‟s conversion disorder impairment as “non-severe.” Rather, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff satisfied the severity requirement as to her conversion disorder, proceeded with the 

disability analysis, and considered all of the functional limitations established by the reliable evidence, 

not just the ones identified as severe. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2); AR 18 (“In making [the RFC 

finding], the undersigned must consider all of the claimant‟s impairments, including impairments that 

are not severe”). Thus, Plaintiff‟s assertion that certain impairments were considered “non-severe” is

immaterial; it is enough that the ALJ considered the functional limitations established by the reliable 

medical evidence, regardless of severity. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007)

Secondly, while Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she did not have a severe 

mental impairment, at step two of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found Plaintiff‟s conversion 

disorder was a severe impairment. This was not an inconsistent finding. A conversion disorder is “a

condition in which you show psychological stress in physical ways.”4(Retrieved on Nov. 9, 2015 from 

 

3

The parties are advised that this Court has carefully reviewed and considered all of the briefs, including 

arguments, points and authorities, declarations, and/or exhibits. Any omission of a reference to any specific argument or 

brief is not to be construed that the Court did not consider the argument or brief.

4

See Diseases and Conditions: Conversion Disorder, Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/conversion-disorder/basics/definition/con-20029533?reDate=07022016 (last accessed February 2, 2016). 

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http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/conversiondisorder/basics/definition/con-20029533). 

Given the nature of a conversion disorder, it was not error for the ALJ to find that Plaintiff suffered 

severe physical RFC limitations as a result of her conversion diagnosis, but not severe mental 

impairments. AR 19. Plaintiff fails to cite to any evidence that her conversion disorder resulted in 

significant mental functional limitations that would support her argument that the ALJ erred. See 

Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The mere existence of an impairment is 

insufficient proof of a disability” because the “claimant bears the burden of proving that an 

impairment is disabling”), citing Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1982) (same). 

For those reasons, the ALJ did not err at step two of the sequential evaluation.

2. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Evidence 

Second, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ‟s disability finding for failing to credit her treating 

physicians‟ opinions. (Doc. 13 at 8). More specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting 

evidence from her treating physicians that questioned whether her left-sided weakness was a result of 

her conversion disorder. AR 458, 500, 530. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ‟s decision “is utterly 

lacking in setting forth any explanation as to the basis for rejecting Plaintiff‟s treating physician‟s 

opinions.” (Doc. 13 at 8). In response to Plaintiff‟s argument, the Commissioner contends however, 

that the ALJ properly considered the weight of the medical evidence. 

It is well-established in the Ninth Circuit that a treating physician‟s opinions are entitled to 

special weight, because a treating physician is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know 

and observe the patient as an individual. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“The treating physician‟s opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive as to either a physical 

condition or the ultimate issue of disability.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The weight given a treating physician‟s opinion depends on whether it is supported by sufficient 

medical data and is consistent with other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). If the 

treating physician‟s opinion is controverted, it may be rejected only if the ALJ makes findings setting 

forth specific and legitimate reasons that are based on the substantial evidence of record. Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751; Winans v. Bowen, 853 

F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The ALJ may accomplish this task by setting out a detailed and 

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thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and 

making findings. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. He must offer more than merely his conclusions. He 

must set forth his interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctor‟s, are correct. Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-422 (9th Cir. 1988). On the other hand, if the treating physician‟s opinion is 

uncontroverted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Ninth Circuit, however, has also held that “[t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any 

physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately 

supported by clinical findings.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; see also Matney ex rel. Matney v. Sullivan, 

981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992). Additionally, a treating or examining physician‟s opinion based 

on the plaintiff‟s own complaints may be disregarded if the plaintiff‟s complaints have been properly 

discounted. Morgan v. Commissioner of the SSA, 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 

Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th 

Cir. 1995). Moreover, “[w]here the opinion of the claimant‟s treating physician is contradicted, and 

the opinion of a nontreating source is based on independent clinical findings that differ from those of 

the treating physician, the opinion of the nontreating source may itself be substantial evidence; it is 

then solely the province of the ALJ to resolve the conflict.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041; Magallanes, 

881 F.2d at 751; Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1985).

Based on a review of the record, the Court concludes that the ALJ adequately evaluated the 

medical record. While Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting her treating physicians‟ opinions 

regarding her conversion disorder and her resulting left-side weakness, the ALJ credited the medical 

evidence of Plaintiff‟s conversion disorder. AR 21. The ALJ found that Plaintiff‟s conversion 

disorder was a severe impairment, but explained that despite her condition Plaintiff was still able to 

return to her past relevant work. Accordingly, contrary to Plaintiff‟s argument, the ALJ did not reject

the evidence regarding the existence of her conversion disorder. Further, Plaintiff‟s treating 

physicians‟ comments that Plaintiff‟s symptom etiology is uncertain and attribution of her symptoms 

to conversion disorder is, in and of itself, neither significant nor probative as it does not indicate any 

specific functional limitations that the ALJ needed to include in her RFC finding. See e.g. Ukolov v. 

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Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2005) (portions of treatment records purporting to describe 

“objective” findings, including “weakness in the distal lower extremities” and a positive Romberg test, 

did not establish a medically determinable impairment because the doctor‟s “observations did not 

include a diagnosis or a finding of impairment”). 

Instead, the ALJ reasonably relied on the evidence of the state agency reviewing physicians 

that despite her complaints, Plaintiff was capable of light work. Further, although Plaintiff reported 

several impairments, various doctors, including Plaintiff‟s treating physicians found her only partially 

credible. The ALJ noted that even Plaintiff‟s treating physicians noted that “there was convincing data

that perhaps this was a malingering patient versus conversion disorder.” AR 23; AR 541-42. The 

ALJ was therefore entitled to rely on the opinions of the independent physicians‟ which were 

consistent with the medical record and demonstrated that Plaintiff could perform a restricted range of 

light work. AR 21. 

3. The ALJ’s Step Four Finding Was Not Error

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in identifying her work as a fruit sorter and hand 

packager as past relevant work for the purposes of the step four analysis, because Plaintiff did not 

perform her fruit sorter position at the substantial gainful activity level. (Doc. 13 at 9- 12). Defendant

contends, however, that the ALJ could reasonably find Plaintiff‟s work as a fruit sorter was substantial 

gainful activity, but even if she could not, the ALJ made an alternate finding at step four that Plaintiff 

could return to her past relevant work as a hand packager. (Doc. 20 at 9). 

At step four, the claimant bears the burden of showing that she does not have the RFC to 

engage in “past relevant work” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 

F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). Work experience is considered relevant if done within the last fifteen 

years, lasted long enough for claimant to learn it, and involved substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1565; 20 C.F.R. § 416.965; Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2001). If claimant 

can perform her past relevant work, then she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(e); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 515 (9th Cir. 2001).

“Substantial gainful activity is work activity that is both substantial and gainful.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1572; 20 C.F.R. § 416.72. Substantial and gainful activity is work done for pay or profit that 

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involves significant mental or physical activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a)(b); 20 C.F.R. §

416.72(a)(b). Work can be substantial activity “even if it is done on a part-time basis or if you do less, 

get paid less, or have less responsibility than when you worked before.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a); 20 

C.F.R. § 416.72(a). Work is gainful activity “if it is the kind of work usually done for pay or profit, 

whether or not profit is realized.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.72(b). Earnings can be a 

presumptive, but not conclusive, sign of whether a job is substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1574(b)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 416.974(b)(2).

Here, Plaintiff testified that she worked for approximately six months at Wawona Frozen 

Foods taking “out the fruit that was not good.” AR 33-34. Plaintiff‟s earnings record indicated that 

she worked at Wawona Frozen Foods in 2002—within the 15 year past relevant work period— for 

“maybe six months” and earned a total of $4,518.31. AR 34, 145. In 2002, work presumptively 

constituted substantial gainful activity if the monthly amount earned, on average, exceeded $780. 

Monthly Substantial Gainful Activity Amounts Chart, available at 

http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/sga.html. Plaintiff‟s average monthly earnings in 2002—which is 

calculated by dividing her earnings by the six months that she worked—were approximately $753.05, 

which is below the amount which presumptively constitutes substantial gainful activity. Nonetheless, 

the Court finds that any error in finding that Plaintiff can return to her position as a fruit sorter is 

rendered harmless by the ALJ‟s finding that Plaintiff can return to her previous work as a hand 

packager, which consisted of substantial gainful activity. 

To the extent that Plaintiff argues that her work as a “box sealer” does not qualify as past 

relevant work as a “hand packager,” Plaintiff‟s argument is without merit. (Doc. 13 at 11). The 

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) explanation of the hand packager job description states 

that the job duties might involve “Nails, glues, or closes and seals containers.” Packager, Hand; 

available at 1991 WL 687916. Furthermore, the vocational expert reviewed the vocational evidence in 

the record and classified Plaintiff‟s past relevant work as “hand packager.” AR 40. The ALJ was 

therefore entitled to rely on the expertise of the VE. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (“A VE‟s recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her testimony” 

and, therefore, “no additional foundation is required”). 

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4. The ALJ Propounded a Complete Hypothetical 

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ posed an incomplete hypothetical to the VE. More 

specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ questions to the VE failed to account for her left-side 

weakness. (Doc. 13 at 12). 

An ALJ may rely on VE testimony given in response to a hypothetical question that contains 

all of the limitations the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence. Bayliss, 427 F.3d 

at 1217-18. An ALJ is not required to include limitations that are not in his findings. Rollins v. 

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 

2001).

Here, no physician opined that Plaintiff‟s alleged weakness prevented her from performing 

work. To the contrary, the State agency physicians and the consultative examiners all found that 

Plaintiff was capable of work activity and none found supportable manipulative limitations in the 

record. See e.g. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In addition, the 

medical evidence, including Dr. Eather‟s report and Dr. Neville‟s report—which both found 

[claimant] could perform a limited range of work—support the ALJ‟s determination”). Because the 

“hypothetical that the ALJ posed to the VE contained all of the limitations that the ALJ found credible 

and supported by substantial evidence in the record,” the “ALJ‟s reliance on testimony the VE gave in 

response to the hypothetical therefore was proper.” Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217. 

Plaintiff has therefore failed to show that the ALJ erred by posing an incomplete hypothetical 

question to the VE. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175-76 (a claimant fails to prove that the ALJ 

gave an incomplete hypothetical when the claimant simply restates his arguments challenging the 

ALJ‟s other findings concerning claimant‟s limitations); Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (the ALJ “is free to accept or reject restrictions in a hypothetical question that are not 

supported by substantial evidence”). As analyzed above, the ALJ‟s decision with respect to Plaintiff‟s 

residual functional capacity is supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the limitations included in the 

ALJ‟s hypothetical question were consistent with Plaintiff‟s RFC and supported by the record. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to a reversal or remand based upon this issue. 

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ‟s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court 

DENIES Plaintiff‟s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 

The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff, Agueda Valencia.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 9, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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