Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cr-00153/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cr-00153-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Mario Quintero Beltran
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

CHRISTOPHER D. BAKER

Assistant United States Attorney

4550 California Avenue, Suite 640

Bakersfield, CA 93309

Telephone: (661) 489-6150

Facsimile: (661) 489-6151

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

JOSE MARIO QUINTERO BELTRAN,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 5:21-MJ-00015-JLT

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: June 1, 2021

TIME: 2:30 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Jennifer L. Thurston

This case is set for a preliminary hearing on June 1, 2021. May 13, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until further 

notice.” Under General Order 618, a judge “may exercise his or her authority to continue matters, 

excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act with reference to the court’s prior General Order 611 issued 

on March 17, 2020 . . . with additional findings to support the exclusion in the Judge’s discretion.” 

General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). In addition, any judge “may order case-by-case 

exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions “at the discretion of that Judge or upon the request of 

counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order will 

impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). This and previous 

General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Pursuant to F.R.Cr.P. 5.1(c) and (d), a preliminary hearing must be held “no later than 14 days 

after initial appearance if the defendant is in custody,” unless the defendant consents and there is a 

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“showing of good cause”, or if the defendant does not consent and there is a “showing that extraordinary 

circumstances exist and justice requires the delay.” Here, the defendant consents and there is good 

cause.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case.

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617 and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-ofjustice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his 

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable 

unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that 

the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency).

The coronavirus poses a similar, albeit more enduring, “appreciable difficulty” to the prompt 

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proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. Recently, the Ninth Circuit enumerated a “nonexhaustive” list of seven factors it found to be “relevant” in considering ends-of-justice Speedy Trial Act 

continuances “in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.” United States v. Olsen, --- F.3d ---, 2021 WL 

1589359 at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2021). That non-exhaustive list includes: (1) whether a defendant is 

detained pending trial; (2) how long a defendant has been detained; (3) whether a defendant has invoked 

speedy trial rights since the case’s inception; (4) whether a defendant, if detained, belongs to a 

population that is particularly susceptible to complications if infected with the virus; (5) the seriousness 

of the charges a defendant faces, and in particular whether the defendant is accused of violent crimes; 

(6) whether there is a reason to suspect recidivism if the charges against the defendant are dismissed; 

and (7) whether the district court has the ability to safely conduct a trial. Id.. 

In light of the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding 

excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) 

(Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the preliminary hearing. 

United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be 

“specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for preliminary hearing on June 1, 2021. 

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the preliminary hearing until June 

15, 2021, at 2:30 p.m. and to exclude time between June 1, 2021, and June 15, 2021, under18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that initial discovery associated with this case 

consists primarily of reports, recordings and photographs, and the government provided the 

defendant with initial discovery on April 16, 2021, and invited defense counsel to arrange to 

inspect and copy additional materials.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review the discovery, consult 

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with this client, conduct further investigation, and discuss a possible resolution with the 

government.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Pursuant to F.R.Cr.P. 5.1(c) and (d), a preliminary hearing must be held “no later 

than 14 days after initial appearance if the defendant is in custody,” unless the defendant 

consents and there is a “showing of good cause”. Here, the defendant consents and there is good 

cause as set forth herein.

f) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 617 and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because counsel and other relevant individuals have been encouraged to telework and 

minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible. It will be difficult to avoid personal 

contact should the preliminary hearing proceed.

g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in an indictment or trial 

within the original dates prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which an indictment must be filed and within which a trial must commence, the 

time period of June 1, 2021 to June 15, 2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18

U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by 

the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served 

by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy 

indictment/trial.

[Remainder of page intentionally left blank.]

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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which an 

indictment must be filed and a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: May 17, 2021 PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

/s/ CHRISTOPHER D. BAKER

CHRISTOPHER D. BAKER

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: May 17, 2021 /s/ DAVID A. TORRES

DAVID A. TORRES

Counsel for Defendant 

JOSE MARIO QUINTERO 

BELTRAN

[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 18th day of May, 2021.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 18, 2021 _ /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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