Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00092/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00092-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shea Homes Limited partnership
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHEA HOMES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-0092 TEH

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS CLAIMS FOUR THROUGH

TEN

 

This matter came before the Court on July 11, 2005, on Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss the fourth through tenth claims in this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), or

alternatively, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Defendant contends that this Court is barred, under

Section 113(h) of CERCLA, from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s fourth through

tenth claims because they improperly seek to challenge the government’s ongoing clean up

of a contaminated site. Defendant also contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s fifth through tenth claims on the ground that they are barred by the discretionary

function and misrepresentation exceptions to the FTCA. Having carefully considered the

parties’ extensive written and oral arguments, supplemental filings, and the entire record

herein, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

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On September 2, 1999, Plaintiff, Shea Homes Limited Partnership (“Shea”)

purchased a 10 acre parcel of property in Novato, California, which was previously part of

the Hamilton Air Force Base (“HAFB”) prior to its closure in 1974. On December 30,

1999, Shea acquired an adjoining 18 acre parcel. The combined 28 acre property adjoins a

part of the former HAFB which used to be the primary repository for garbage generated at

the HAFB (including solid and hazardous wastes) from the early 1940s until 1974. This

area is now referred to as Landfill 26 (“LF 26"). It is roughly 47 acres in size, and consists

of a 200 foot buffer zone surrounding a 30 acre landfill “cap” that covers the area where

the garbage was formerly deposited. Shea, a large residential housing developer,

developed the 28 acres it purchased in 1999, and has transferred ownership of some or all

of the property to third-parties. It contends, however, that Defendant, the United States,

failed to meet its obligations to address the contamination at LF 26, causing Shea to suffer

damages.

Since 1986, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) has been in

engaged in various efforts to investigate, remediate, and monitor the waste in LF 26

pursuant to the Defense Environmental Restoration Program –Formerly Used Defense

Sites (“DERP-FUDS”) and orders issued by the Regional Water Quality Control Board

(“RWQCB”). The basic remedy chosen was the installation of the cap, referenced above,

which was installed in 1994-95 and covers the landfill, a ground water treatment system,

and a gas perimeter monitoring network. 

In June 1996, methane in excess of 5.7% by volume was detected at one of the LF

26 perimeter gas monitoring probes (“GMP”) - GMP No. 5. Further sampling in early

and mid 1999 did not detect methane in excess of 5% by volume. In September 1999,

however, after Shea’s purchase of the first 10 acre parcel, methane was again detected in

excess of 5 % by volume at GMP 5 (17.3%) and GMP 9 (9.8%). Subsequent monitoring

in October 1999 and December 1999 did not detect methane in excess of 5%.

In October 1999, the RWQCB did not approve final closure of the site and ordered

further landfill gas sampling. In June 2000, the Corps began a supplemental testing

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program. By the Fall of 2000, the Corps determined that methane might be migrating offsite from LF 26 in excess of 5% by volume and that further action was required. On

February 7, 2001, the RWQCB directed the Corps to submit a plan to, inter alia, reduce

methane to below compliance levels. In March 2001, the Corps proposed and evaluated

seven approaches for controlling methane migration. In April 2001, the RWQCB raised

various concerns with respect to the proposed remedial options, and directed the Corps to

implement (1) an interim stopgap measure to immediately intercept gas migrating from LF

26 and towards the Hamilton Meadows development, (2) a long-term management plan of

methane at its source, and (3) a time-schedule for implementing the gas collection and

treatment activities. 

In December 2001, the RWQCB issued Cleanup and Abatement Order (“CAO”) 01-

139 requiring the Corps to investigate, design, and implement a final remedy with respect

to the methane or face civil penalties. Between January 2002 and January 2003, the

Corps installed a 1600 foot Vent Trench with an impermeable liner in the buffer zone area

between the landfill cap and Shea’s property in order to intercept any landfill gas prior to

migrating off-site. The Corps is currently evaluating the effectiveness of the Trench. The

Corps is also working under a RWQCB-imposed deadline of September 30, 2006 for the

installation and operation of a “Landfill Corrective Action [gas control system].” See

Def.’s Ex. 31 at 10.

Shea does “not challenge[] the remedy selected by Defendant to abate the

contamination.” Pl.’s Opp. at 2. It complains, however, that the Corp has failed to properly

and timely implement its remedy and to satisfactorily abate the contamination, causing it

to suffer damages. Id. at 1-2. The instant action seeks monetary damages and injunctive

relief. Specifically, the complaint asserts claims for (1) cost recovery and contribution

under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., (2) for injunctive relief under the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and (3) tort damages

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1 While Defendant alternatively moves for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ.

56(c), the Court notes that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction may properly be

decided under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560

(9th Cir. 1988). In addressing this issue, the Court is not limited to the face of the

pleadings but may consider evidence outside the complaint and resolve factual issues

that go to the issue of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 

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based on claims of public and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, negligence per se and

equitable indemnity.

Defendants subsequently filed the instant motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) to

dismiss the RCRA and tort-based claims on the ground that the claims are barred by (1)

exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act, and/or (2) section 113(h) of CERCLA.1 The

Court addresses these arguments in turn.

II. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

Defendant contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law tort

claims because they fall within the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”), which provides for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity from

claims for damages against the United States. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315

(1991). It is the government’s burden to demonstrate that this exception applies. Prescott

v. U.S., 973 F.2d 696, 703 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The discretionary function exception to the FTCA “is a statutory reservation of

sovereign immunity for a particular class of tort claims.” Gager v. United States, 149

F.3d 918, 920 (1998). It provides that liability under the FTCA shall not extend to a claim:

based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform

a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an

employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved is

abused.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The basic purpose of the exception is to protect the government from

“judicial ‘second guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,

economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.” United States v.

Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984). It “marks the boundary between Congress’

willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain

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governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals.” Aragon v. United

States, 146 F.3d 819, 822 (10th Cir. 1998).

In Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988), the Supreme Court established a

two-tier analysis for identifying which governmental functions are discretionary for

purposes of the exception. First, a court must examine whether the challenged conduct

involves an element of judgment or choice, since “conduct cannot be discretionary unless it

involves an element of judgment or choice.” Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. Conversely, the

exception does not apply if the statute, regulation, or policy at issue prescribes a specific

course of action. Aragon v. United States, 146 F.3d 819, 823-24 (10th Cir. 1983). In such

a case, the employee has "no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.” Id. 

If the Court finds that the challenged conduct was “discretionary,” then the court must

analyze whether the discretion exercised was of the type that the exception was designed to

shield -- i.e., choices that are grounded in social, economic, and political policy. Gaubert,

499 U.S. 315. The exception extends from broad policy decisions made at the highest

levels to “low-level employees making discretionary day-to-day management decisions

based on policy considerations.” Childers v. U.S., 40 F.3d 973, 974 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Whether the government in fact abused its discretion or was negligent is not relevant to

determining the applicability of the exception. Id. at 974; Aragon, 146 F.3d at 822. 

1. Whether the challenged conduct was discretionary

As noted above, the government can not satisfy the first prong of the discretionary

function test if there is a “ federal statute, regulation, or policy in place that specifically

prescribed a particular course of action.” Miller v. U.S., 163 F.3d 591, 594 (1998)

(emphasis added); Aragon, 146 F.3d at 823-24 (finding that government regulations

“prescribed a specific, mandatory course of conduct regarding the disposal of waste water

from aircraft washdown operations at the Base”); see also Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. If a

particular course of action is prescribed then the government employee has no choice but to

follow it and the discretionary function exception does not apply.

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2

 Similarly, 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-8(a)(1)(2) just sets a numeric standard. 

Specifically, it provides that : “The concentration of explosive gases generated by the

facility or practice shall not exceed: (1) Twenty-Five percent (25%) of the lower

explosive limit for the gases in facility structures . . . ; and (2) The lower explosive limit

for the gases at the property boundary.”

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In this case, the regulations at issue fail to prescribe a specific course of action that the

Corps failed to follow. Shea points to sections 20921(a) and 20937(a)(1) of Title 27 of the

California Code of Regulations, which the Corps is required to comply with by way of

federal regulations and policies. Section 20921(a), however, only sets a numeric standard –

that is, it provides that methane gas migrating from the landfill “must not exceed 5% by

volume in air at the facility property boundary. . . ”2 A bare, numeric standard, however, is

not a specific course of conduct. 

In contrast, section 20937(a)(1) does prescribe a “course of action” in the event that the

5% standard is violated. The prescribed course of action, however, is not specific. Rather,

this section states, in relevant part, that:

When the results of gas monitoring indicate concentrations of methane in

excess of the compliance levels required by § 20921(a), the operator shall:

(1) Take all immediate steps necessary to protect public health and safety, and

the environment .

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 27 § 20937(a)(1). On its face, this language fails to mandate a specific

course of action. Instead, it calls for discretionary judgments as to the immediacy and

nature of the risk – i.e. what, if any, “immediate” steps are “necessary” to “protect public

health and safety, and the environment” – and, if so, judgments as to the substance and

timing of those specific steps. 

Shea also points to the Regional Water Board’s Order 96-113 which mandates that the

“treatment, discharge or storage of waste or materials shall not be allowed to create a

condition of . . . nuisance.” Again, however, this language does not prescribe a specific

course of action that must be followed. Rather, it is more in the nature of setting an

objective or general standard that must be met without prescribing the particular actions 

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government employee(s) must take to satisfy the standard, or in this case, avoid creating a

nuisance. See also Aragon, 146 F.3d at 825.

Nor does Shea’s reliance on Starret v. United States, 847 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1988),

and Clark v. United States, 660 F.Supp. 1164 (W.D. Wash. 1987), aff’d, 856 F.2d 1433

(9th Cir. 1988), advance its cause. In Starret, the Executive Order at issue required a

specific course of action: the implementation of a “secondary treatment, or its equivalent,

for all wastes except cooling water and fish hatchery effluents.” Id. at 541. While there was

a dispute as to whether the government had, in fact, undertaken a “secondary treatment,” the

directive calling for the secondary treatment was both mandatory and specific. In contrast,

here, the far more general directive to take all immediate steps necessary to protect health

and the environment – or to prevent a nuisance – does not involve an equally delineated

course of conduct. Nor does Clark assist Plaintiff.. As courts have observed, Clark was

decided prior to Berkovitz, and its analysis “strays significantly from presently accepted

discretionary function analysis.” Aragon, 146 F.3d at 823, n.4; see also OSI, Inc. v. United

States, 285 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir. 2002) (same).

In short, the governing regulations in this case do not prescribe a specific course of

action but rather demand the exercise of judgment and discretion. As such, the Court turns

to the second tier of the analysis to determine whether the discretionary actions taken are of

the type that are susceptible to policy considerations. Miller, 163 F.3d at 594 (“The

decision need not be actually grounded in policy considerations, but must be, by its nature,

susceptible to a policy analysis”). 

2. Whether actions taken are susceptible to policy considerations

 Here, the Corps has been required to exercise its discretion with respect to how to

evaluate threats to public health and the environment and how to best address those threats. 

These kinds of judgments implicate policy choices and decisions of the type that Congress

intended to protect from judicial second guessing. See e.g. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972

F.2d 1527, 1541 (10th Cir. 1992) (translation of health and safety provisions that require

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3

 Cases involving very narrow technical issues, as opposed to mandates to

protect the public health and safety of the environment, are similarly distinguishable.

See e.g. Arizona Maintenance Co. v. United States, 864 F.2d 1497, 1504 (9th Cir.

1989) (involving single, objective question of proper amount of dynamite to use for

particular task); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1992) (involving

narrow objective of issue of how to configure wiring of add-on lights for particular

project). Notably, Plaintiff is not challenging some technical aspect of the remedy

selected – e..g., the design of the vent trench; rather, it is challenging the more policy

oriented issue of how quickly certain remedies needed to be implemented to protect

public safety. 

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measures “necessary to prevent, minimize or mitigate damage to the public health” into

concrete plans involves policy choices protected by the discretionary function exception);

Lockett v. United States, 938 F.2d 630, 638-39 (6th Cir. 1991) (EPA’s discretion to

determine response to evidence of PCB spill involved judgment calls protected by

discretionary function exception); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States,

837 F.2d 116, 122-23 (6th Cir. 1988) (execution of CERCLA program to protect public

from dangers of abandoned toxic waste involves protected policy judgments). 

Plaintiff cites to cases that involve matters relating to minor or routine maintenance.

See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (involving failure to maintain

a light in a lighthouse); Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176 (3rd Cir. 1997) (involving

failure to provide a handrail and light on one 20 foot footpath to a trailer). Such cases do

not implicate the same kinds of policy judgments that arise when evaluating and responding

to public health and environmental hazards. 

While neither party cites to a case exactly on point, the Court concludes that this case is

more akin to cases such as Daigle, Lockett, and Fidelity, that involve environmental clean up

directives than to cases involving minor housekeeping maintenance.3 The Court’s

conclusion is also consistent with the presumption that “[w]hen established governmental

policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a

Government agent to exercise discretion . . . the agent’s acts are grounded in policy when

exercising that discretion.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324; Western Greenhouses v. United

States, 878 F.Supp. 917, 928 (N.D. Tex. 1995).

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4 Plaintiff also contends that the Corps can not invoke the discretionary function

exception based on budgetary considerations because the regulation at issue here does

not expressly permit the government to balance cost against other considerations. As

the court stated in National Union Fire Insur. v. United States, 115 F.3d 1415, 1422

(9th Cir. 1997), when a statute requires a particular action, the government has no

discretion to spend its money doing something else instead. This is not a case,

however, where the government failed to take a mandated action because of cost. 

Rather, in this case the Corps was required to decide what immediate steps were

necessary to protect public safety and the environment, and it concluded, based on its

assessment of the immediacy of the risks, or lack thereof, that a certain schedule was

appropriate. See Hedgpeth Decl., Ex. HH at 3930-3933; Def.’s Ex. 19 at ¶ ¶ 6-21.

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Plaintiff also emphasizes that the Court should give great weight to the fact that the

government in this case is not acting in a core government capacity or making decisions

unique to the agency’s core mission, but rather is performing ordinary activities that

commercial landfill owners perform every day. In such cases, Plaintiff argues, the

government can not satisfy the second prong of the discretionary function test. For support,

Plaintiff cites to Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t. of the Army, 835 F.Supp. 803 (M.D.

Pa. 1993). Subsequent decisions have concluded, however, and this Court agrees, that

Redland’s limited view of the discretionary function exception is at odds with Gaubert’s

holding that the discretionary function exception protects all governmental discretionary

decisions that are susceptible to policy analysis and not just decisions made by high level

policy makers or decisions that go to the core of the agency’s mission. See e.g. Aragon v.

United States, 950 F.Supp. 321, 326-27 (D.N. Mex. 1996); Western Greenhouses, 878

F.Supp. at 928-29 (Redland is inconsistent with Gaubert and the assumptions underlying

the discretionary function doctrine); see also Childers v. United States, 40 F.3d 973, 974

n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) (discretionary function exception applies not just to high-level

government employees but also to “low-level employees making discretionary day-to-day

management decisions based on policy considerations.”).4

In sum, the Court concludes that the government has satisfied its burden of

demonstrating that Plaintiff’s fifth through tenth causes of action, alleging state law tort

claims, fall within the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. As

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5 Given this conclusion, the Court does not reach Defendant’s alternative

argument that Shea’s tort claims fall within the misrepresentation exception to the

FTCA.

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such, the Court lacks jurisdiction over such claims and they must be dismissed. Berkovitz, 

486 U.S. at 535-36.5

II. CERCLA SECTION 113(h)

As discussed earlier, Defendant also argues that section 113(h) of CERCLA deprives

this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s fifth through tenth state law tort

claims, as well as Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief under RCRA. The Court’s ruling above

renders this aspect of Defendant’s motion moot with respect to the state law tort claims. 

The Court considers this argument, however, with respect to Plaintiff’s RCRA claim.

In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA to add section 113(h) which bars federal

courts from exercising jurisdiction over “any challenges” to removal or remedial

environmental response actions taken pursuant to section 9604 of CERCLA, 46 U.S.C.

§104, while those response action are ongoing – except for five exceptions not applicable

here. McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (“MESS”) v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 330 (9th

Cir. 1995). Specifically, § 113(h) provides as follow:

(h) Timing of Review. 

No federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than under

section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or

under State law which is applicable or relevant and appropriate under section

9621 of this title (relating to cleanup standards) to review any challenges to 

removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to

review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title, in any action

except one of the following . . . 

46 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis added). In short, § 113 (h) amounts to a “clear and

unequivocal. . .‘blunt withdrawal of federal jurisdiction’” with respect to any challenges to

clean ups conducted under the authority of section 104 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604. 

MESS, 47 F.3d at 328.

 As a threshold issue, the parties dispute whether the clean up in this action is

proceeding under the authority of section 104. While the government contends that it is,

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Plaintiff argues that the clean up is being undertaken pursuant to the authority of section 120

of CERCLA, 46 U.S.C. § 9620, and thus is properly categorized as a § 120 clean up. 

Section 120 contains provisions applicable to clean ups on federal facilities, such as the

former Hamilton Air Force base.

The issue is significant because the Ninth Circuit held, in Fort Ord Toxics Project,

Inc. v. California E.P.A., 189 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1999), that when a clean up is conducted

pursuant to the authority of § 120, the jurisdictional bar in section 113(h) only applies to

removal, and not remedial actions – and it is Plaintiff’s position that the response actions at

issue in this case are remedial actions. Plaintiff concludes, therefore, that under Fort Ord,

the jurisdictional bar set forth in section 113(h) is inapplicable to this case.

This Court concludes, however, that this case does not fall within the facts or

rationale of Fort Ord. In Fort Ord, the Court found that “§ 120 created a grant of authority

separate from § 104.” 189 F.3d at 833. In so finding, the Court relied on those provisions

of § 120 that vest authority in the Administrator of EPA to undertake remedial actions. 

Thus, the Court cites to § 9620(e)(2), which grants the Administrator of the EPA the 

“authority to conduct remedial actions on federal property,” and § 9620(g) which provides

that “‘[No] authority vested in the Administrator under this section may be transferred, by

executive order of the President or otherwise, to any other officer . . . or person.” 189 F.3d

at 833-34 (emphasis added). The Court also notes that other provisions of CERCLA that

address remedial actions distinguish between § 104 and § 120. See e.g. 42 U.S.C. §

9613(g) (“. . . if the President is diligently proceeding with a remedial investigation. . . under

section 104(b) or section 120"); id. at 833. Other provisions in § 120 also address the

Administrator’s authority with respect to remedial clean ups at federal cites. See e.g. 42

U.S.C. § 9620 (e) - (f).

In light of § 120's separate grant of authority to EPA to conduct remedial actions on

federal facilities, Fort Ord concludes that claims challenging such actions are not barred by

section 113(h) – which applies only to clean ups authorized by § 104 . It further notes,

however, that section 120 does not also grant the Administrator authority to conduct

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removal actions. Id. at 834. Thus Fort Ord also holds that removal actions on federal

property still fall under the general ambit of § 104, and thus are protected by the

jurisdictional bar of section 113(h). Id.

Importantly, it was undisputed in Fort Ord that the clean up at issue was a remedial

action being conducted by EPA pursuant to the grant of authority created by § 120. Fort

Ord, 189 F.3d at 834. The site at Fort Ord was placed by the EPA on its National Priorities

List and the clean up was being conducted pursuant to EPA’s delegated authority through an

interagency agency agreement between the EPA, the Army, and California state agencies.

Fort Ord, 189 F.3d at 830. Indeed, the EPA administrator has been delegated much of the

authority for administering CERCLA. See U.S.C. § 9615; Exec. Order 12580, 52 Fed. Reg.

2923, 2924 (Jan. 23, 1987).

 In this case, however, the site at issue is not included on the National Priorities List

and the EPA is not involved. As a result, authority to undertake the clean up has been

delegated to the Secretary of Defense. See Section 104 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604

(authorizing the President to act in response to releases of hazardous wastes); Exec. Order

12580 at § 2(e) (delegating authority under § 104 to the Department of Defense with

respect to contamination on Defense Department facilities; see also Def.’s Ex. 21 at 2.

 Thus the rationale underlying the holding in Fort Ord – the creation of a separate

authority in § 120 for the Administrator to conduct remedial actions at federal facilities – 

is simply not applicable here. Fort Ord, of course, did not have occasion to address the

relationship between § 120 and § 113(h) in cases, such as this, where the clean up is not

being conducted pursuant to the Administrator’s authority. Given however, that Fort Ord

carved out an exception to the general jurisdictional bar in § 113(h), the Court is not

persuaded that is appropriate to extend Fort Ord beyond the clear rationale and facts of that

case. As such, it rejects Plaintiff’s contention that this case is governed by Fort Ord, and

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 This is not to say that § 120 has no bearing on federal facilities that are not

listed on the NPL. For example, § 120(a)(4) provides that a federal agency conducting

removal or remedial actions at a facility not listed on the NPL must comply with

applicable State laws. Such a provision, however, does not create a separate source of

clean up authority. 

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s post-1999 work was conducted pursuant to

orders issued by the RWQCB, rather than § 104 of CERCLA, and therefore Plaintiff is

not subject to the restrictions in § 113(h). While the Corps incorporated state

requirements into its response action, Plaintiff’s attempt to entirely erase the

underlying § 104 authority from this action is not persuasive.

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concludes that the response actions in this case were authorized by § 104 and thus are

governed by § 113(h).6

Given the above, the Court now turns to the effect of § 113(h) on Plaintiff’s fourth

claim for injunctive relief under RCRA. As noted above, §113(h) serves as a jurisdictional

bar to “any challenges” to an ongoing CERCLA clean up. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s

fourth claim for relief under RCRA constitutes such a challenge while Plaintiff asserts that

it does not. In particular, Plaintiff argues that it is not seeking to delay or obstruct the

chosen remedy; rather, it simply seeks to enforce governing state laws, regulations, and

orders.

In McClellan, however, the Ninth Circuit took a broad view of the scope of 

§ 113(h). There, the plaintiffs made an argument similar to that advanced here: that their

RCRA claim was not a “challenge” under § 113(h) because it was not attempting to delay or

obstruct the remedy, but rather was only seeking to compel the defendant’s compliance with

RCRA’s requirements. 47 F.3d at 330-31. The Court held that while tangentially related

claims, such as those to enforce minimum wage requirements, would not constitute a

challenge under §113(h), that the plaintiffs’ claim was “far more directly related to the goals

of the cleanup itself.” Id. at 330. The Court also concluded that for “all practical purposes”

the plaintiffs were effectively seeking to “improve” the clean up. Id. As such, it found that

the plaintiff’s claim was a “challenge” barred by § 113(h). Id.

 Here, Shea also argues that it is merely seeking to enforce Defendant’s compliance

with applicable state laws and requirements. See Pl.’s Opp. at 30. It is apparent, however,

that it has a different view of what state law requires than does Defendant; otherwise it would

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7 Courts in other circuits have also emphasized the broad sweep of § 113(h). See

e.g. North Penn Water Authority v. Bae Systems, Inc., 2005 WL 1715718, *9 (E.D.

Pa.) (“Although in enacting § 113(h) Congress may have been primarily concerned with

preventing . . . delay[] or obstruct[ion]. . . federal courts have held that, other than the

five enumerated exceptions, § 113(h) ‘effectuates a ‘blunt withdrawal of federal

jurisdiction,’ despite its more limited rationale.’” (citations omitted); Oil, Chemical &

Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Pena, 62 F. Supp.2d 1, 12 (D.C.D.C. 1999)(“Section

113(h) is very clear, however, that courts are not to interfere with ongoing cleanup

actions”). 

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have no purpose in seeking injunctive relief. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that the Corps’

response has not adequately contained or controlled the migration of landfill gas and that it

should be “enjoined to abate the migration.” See Compl. ¶¶ 72-75. Plaintiff also contends,

as noted above, that the Corps has made improper choices with respect to the timing of

certain elements of the remedy. As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiff effectively

seeks injunctive relief to “improve” the on-going clean up. As such, Plaintiff’s RCRA claim

is plainly related to the goals of the clean up – and would likely require some interference

with on-going clean up plans. Accordingly, the RCRA claim constitutes a “challenge” for

purposes of § 113 (h), and must therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See also

Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1482 (9th Cir. 1995)

(“We held in Razore v. Tulalip Tribes, 66 F.3d 236 (9th Cir. 1995) that ‘[a]n action

constitutes a challenge if it is related to the goals of the cleanup’”).7

Plaintiff nonetheless urges the Court to allow its RCRA claim to proceed, citing

United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that an

action to enforce state law is not a challenge under § 113(h). To the extent that Colorado is

inconsistent with Ninth Circuit precedent, it is not persuasive. More fundamentally,

however, Colorado is clearly distinguishable in that the Court premised its ruling on the fact

that the party asserting the RCRA claim was a state, rather than a private party. Id. at 1576

(“In light of § § 9652(d) and 9614(a) [of CERCLA], which expressly preserve a state’s

authority to take such action, we cannot say that Colorado’s efforts to enforce its EPAdelegated authority is a challenge to the Army’s undergoing CERCLA response action”)

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(emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to find that Colorado justifies

permitting Shea’s RCRA claim in this case.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, this Court concludes that:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth through Tenth Claims for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to § 113(h) of CERCLA.

3. Plaintiff’s Fifth through Tenth Claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction on the ground that United States has not waived its sovereign immunity with

respect to these claims under FTCA.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 9, 2005 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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