Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01005/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01005-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition
Petitioner
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Stephen L. Johnson
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 16, 2007 Decided July 13, 2007

No. 06-1005

CEMENT KILN RECYCLING COALITION,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND

STEPHEN L. JOHNSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED

STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Richard G. Stoll, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With

him on the briefs was Katherine E. Lazarski.

David J. Kaplan, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were

John C. Cruden, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Laurel

Celeste, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

Cynthia J. Morris, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, entered

an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH, and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

USCA Case #06-1005 Document #1053375 Filed: 07/13/2007 Page 1 of 38
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The Cement Kiln Recycling

Coalition petitions for review of an Environmental Protection

Agency regulation that governs the permitting process for

facilities that burn hazardous waste as fuel. The Coalition also

petitions for review of a guidance document, the Human Health

Risk Assessment Protocol, that pertains to the same permitting

process. For the reasons stated below, we deny the petition for

review insofar as it challenges the regulation, and we dismiss the

challenge to the guidance document as outside our jurisdiction.

I

Hazardous waste combustors (HWCs) are facilities -- such

as incinerators, boilers, and industrial furnaces (including

cement kilns) -- that burn hazardous waste as fuel for their

operations. The Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition, the petitioner

in this case, is a trade association that includes manufacturers of

Portland cement that utilize hazardous waste as an alternative

fuel in some of their kilns. The Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) has authority to regulate this activity under both

the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), see 42

U.S.C. § 6924, and the Clean Air Act (CAA), see id. § 7412.

Subtitle C of RCRA, see 42 U.S.C. § 6921 et seq.,

“establishes a ‘cradle to grave’ federal regulatory system for the

treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes.”

American Portland Cement Alliance v. EPA, 101 F.3d 772, 774

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt,

504 U.S. 334, 337 n.1 (1992)). This system operates through a

combination of national standards established by EPA

regulations, and a permit program in which permitting

authorities -- either EPA or states that have hazardous waste

USCA Case #06-1005 Document #1053375 Filed: 07/13/2007 Page 2 of 38
3

programs authorized by the agency -- apply those national

standards to particular facilities. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924-26.

The national standards applicable to the petitioner are

authorized by RCRA § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924, which governs

“owners and operators of facilities for the treatment, storage, or

disposal of hazardous waste,” known as TSDs. 42 U.S.C. §

6924(a). For RCRA purposes, the burning of hazardous waste

is considered “treatment,” and thus falls within the statute. Id.

§ 6903(34); see Horsehead Res. Dev. Co. v. Browner, 16 F.3d

1246, 1252 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Section 3004(a), which

applies generally to all TSDs, directs EPA to “promulgate

regulations establishing such performance standards, applicable

to [TSDs], as may be necessary to protect human health and the

environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a). Section 3004(q)

specifically applies to facilities that burn hazardous waste as

fuel, including cement kilns and other types of HWCs. Id. §

6924(q)(1)(B). Like section 3004(a), this section directs EPA to

promulgate such standards “as may be necessary to protect

human health and the environment.” Id. § 6924(q)(1). 

In addition to the national standards authorized by section

3004, section 3005 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925, establishes a

case-by-case permitting process. Section 3005(a) directs EPA

to “promulgate regulations requiring each person owning or

operating an existing [TSD] or planning to construct a new

[TSD] to have a permit issued pursuant to this section.” Id. §

6925(a). Section 3005(b) mandates that “[e]ach application for

a permit under this section shall contain such information as

may be required under regulations promulgated by [EPA].” Id.

§ 6925(b). And section 3005(c)(3) -- which EPA refers to as the

“omnibus” provision -- provides that “[e]ach permit issued

under this section shall contain such terms and conditions as the

[permitting authority] determines necessary to protect human

health and the environment.” Id. § 6925(c)(3).

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1

Within eight years after EPA promulgates MACT standards, the

statute “returns to a risk-based analysis . . . , [and] requires EPA to

consider whether residual risks remain that warrant more stringent

standards than achieved through MACT.” Sierra Club, 353 F.3d at

980; see 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f).

Although RCRA gives EPA comprehensive authority to

regulate hazardous waste combustors, the fact that HWCs emit

air pollutants also gives the agency jurisdiction under the Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. Section 112 of the CAA, as

amended in 1990, directs EPA to issue national emission

standards for hazardous air pollutants. See id. § 7412. The

statute requires EPA to “promulgate technology-based emission

standards for categories of sources that emit [such pollutants].

These emission standards are to be based not on an assessment

of the risks posed by [hazardous air pollutants], but instead on

the maximum achievable control technology (MACT) for

sources in each category.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976,

980 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); see 42 U.S.C. §

7412(d).1

 Thus, EPA’s jurisdiction under RCRA § 3004 and §

3005 overlaps with its jurisdiction under CAA § 112 when the

source of hazardous air pollutants is also a TSD. 

Anticipating that EPA’s jurisdiction under RCRA would

overlap with its jurisdiction under other statutes, Congress

enacted RCRA § 1006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6905(b). This provision

requires EPA to “integrate all provisions of [RCRA] for

purposes of administration and enforcement and shall avoid

duplication, to the maximum extent practicable, with the

appropriate provisions of[, inter alia,] the Clean Air Act.” Id. §

6905(b)(1). 

In 1991, EPA promulgated RCRA regulations applicable to

boilers and industrial furnaces (including cement kilns) that treat

hazardous waste by burning it as fuel. See Burning of

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Hazardous Waste in Boilers and Industrial Furnaces, 56 Fed.

Reg. 7,134 (Feb. 21, 1991). The 1991 RCRA rule was

“principally designed to establish air emissions requirements”

pursuant to RCRA § 3004(q). Horsehead, 16 F.3d at 1251. 

Beginning in 1994, EPA began requiring every HWC that

applied for a RCRA permit to undergo a site-specific risk

assessment (SSRA). See Strategy for Hazardous Waste

Minimization and Combustion (1994), available at

http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/combust/general/strat

-2.txt. EPA intended the SSRA program to give permitting

authorities the ability to impose permit conditions beyond

national standards in order “to limit emissions on a case-by-case

basis as necessary to ensure protection of human health and the

environment.” Id. A human-health SSRA could include a

“direct exposure” assessment designed to predict the health

impact of breathing air in the vicinity of a facility; it could also

include an “indirect” exposure assessment designed to focus on

multi-pathway non-inhalation exposures, such as the

consumption of crops grown in soil upon which substances

emitted into the air are deposited. EPA did not enshrine the

SSRA program in specific regulations, maintaining that

authority was provided by RCRA’s “omnibus” provision, RCRA

§ 3005(c)(3). EPA did, however, issue guidance documents to

assist permitting authorities in conducting SSRAs.

In 1999, pursuant to the Clean Air Act, EPA promulgated

technology-based MACT standards to control hazardous

pollutants emitted by facilities that burn hazardous waste,

including incinerators and cement kilns. See Final Standards for

Hazardous Air Pollutants for Hazardous Waste Combustors, 64

Fed. Reg. 52,828 (Sept. 30, 1999). This court vacated those

standards in 2001, holding that EPA had not adequately

demonstrated that they satisfied the requirements of CAA §

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2

As noted above, EPA had historically relied solely on RCRA’s

“omnibus” provision, RCRA § 3005(c)(3), as authority for its SSRA

program. See Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 59,506. Although EPA

continued to maintain that the “omnibus” provision was sufficient, the

Final Rule codified the program in regulations issued pursuant to

RCRA § 3004(a), § 3004(q), and § 3005(b). See id.

112(d). See Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855,

857 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 

In 2005, following notice and comment, EPA promulgated

revised MACT standards for HWCs. See National Emission

Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Final Standards for

Hazardous Air Pollutants for Hazardous Waste Combustors, 70

Fed. Reg. 59,402 (Oct. 12, 2005) (“Final Rule”). At the same

time, EPA announced that the 1991 RCRA standards would “no

longer apply once a facility demonstrates compliance with” the

relevant 2005 MACT standards. Id. at 59,523. EPA issued this

“deferral” announcement pursuant to RCRA’s integration

provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6905(b), and the agency’s finding that the

new Clean Air Act MACT standards were generally “protective

of human health and the environment,” as required by RCRA.

See Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 59,517, 59,536. Concluding,

however, that “there may be instances where [the agency]

cannot assure that emissions from each source will be protective

of human health and the environment,” id. at 59,504, EPA

issued regulations that authorize permitting authorities to

conduct SSRAs on a case-by-case basis, see 40 C.F.R. §§

270.10(l), 270.32(b)(3).2

Those regulations, and particularly 40 C.F.R. § 270.10(l),

which is set out in full in the appendix to this opinion, are the

focus of the petition that is now before us. Section 270.10(l)

expressly authorizes a permitting authority to conduct an SSRA

-- that is, to “require the additional information or assessment(s)

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necessary to determine whether additional controls are necessary

to ensure protection of human health and the environment.” Id.

§ 270.10(l). “This includes information necessary to evaluate

the potential risk to human health and/or the environment

resulting from both direct and indirect exposure pathways.” Id.

A permitting authority may require an SSRA only if it

“concludes, based on one or more of the factors listed in

paragraph (l)(1) of [the regulation,] that compliance with the

[MACT standards] alone may not be protective of human health

or the environment.” Id. Finally, a companion regulation

provides that, if the permitting authority “determines that

conditions are necessary in addition to those required [by the

MACT standards] to ensure protection of human health and the

environment, [it] shall include those terms and conditions in a

RCRA permit for a hazardous waste combustion unit.” Id. §

270.32(b)(3). 

Although the 2005 Final Rule expressly authorized the

SSRA program by regulation, EPA declined to promulgate

regulations defining how SSRAs must be conducted. EPA

explained that “risk assessment -- especially multi-pathway,

indirect exposure assessment -- is a highly technical and

evolving field,” and that “[a]ny regulatory approach [it] might

codify in this area is likely to become outdated, or at least

artificially constraining, shortly after promulgation in ways that

[it] cannot anticipate now.” Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 59,512.

Instead, EPA issued a revised guidance document, the Human

Health Risk Assessment Protocol for Hazardous Waste

Combustion Facilities (HHRAP), containing technical

recommendations “for conducting multi-pathway, site-specific

human health risk assessments on” HWCs. HHRAP at 1-1

(Joint Appendix (J.A.) 453); see Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at

59,512-13.

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The Coalition now petitions for review pursuant to RCRA

§ 7006(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1), which gives this court

exclusive jurisdiction over “petition[s] for review of action of

the [EPA] in promulgating any regulation, or requirement under

[RCRA].” Id. § 6976(a)(1). The Coalition raises several

substantive and procedural challenges to the validity of 40

C.F.R. § 270.10(l). It also challenges the HHRAP guidance

document as a de facto legislative rule that was not promulgated

through notice-and-comment rulemaking, in violation of the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553. EPA

responds that the Coalition’s petition is not ripe for review and,

in the alternative, defends its actions on a number of other

grounds. We consider the ripeness question in Part II, the

Coalition’s challenge to the regulation in Part III, and its

challenge to the guidance document in Part IV.

II

The “basic rationale” of the ripeness doctrine “is to prevent

the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from

entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over

administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from

judicial interference until an administrative decision has been

formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,

148-49 (1967); see Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S.

726, 732-33 (1998). “Determining whether administrative

action is ripe for judicial review requires us to evaluate (1) the

fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to

the parties of withholding court consideration.” National Park

Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003)

(citing Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149).

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EPA contends that neither the Coalition’s challenge to §

270.10(l), nor its challenge to the HHRAP guidance document,

is ripe for review. We disagree on both counts.

A

The Coalition objects to § 270.10(l) on three grounds.

According to the petitioner, the regulation is: (1) contrary to

RCRA § 3005(b) -- which directs that RCRA permit

applications “shall contain such information as may be required

under regulations promulgated by” EPA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925(b) --

because it does not spell out the information that will be

required in a permit application; (2) contrary to RCRA, because

it fails to define with sufficient specificity when an SSRA will

be required, and under what circumstances a permit will be

granted or denied; and (3) in violation of the APA, because EPA

failed to provide notice and an opportunity to comment

regarding the rationale for subjecting only HWCs (and not other

TSDs) to the SSRA program, and arbitrarily failed to respond to

industry comments on the same topic.

“In determining the fitness of an issue for judicial review

we look to see whether the issue is purely legal, whether

consideration of the issue would benefit from a more concrete

setting, and whether the agency’s action is sufficiently final.”

Clean Air Implementation Project (CAIP) v. EPA, 150 F.3d

1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have further “observed that a purely legal claim in the

context of a facial challenge . . . is ‘presumptively reviewable.’”

National Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

417 F.3d 1272, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting National Mining

Ass’n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 

All of the Coalition’s challenges are to the facial validity of

§ 270.10(l), and all are “purely legal.” It is well-established that

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“‘[c]laims that an agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious or

contrary to law present purely legal issues.’” National Ass’n of

Home Builders, 417 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Atlantic States Legal

Found., Inc. v. EPA, 325 F.3d 281, 284 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). So,

too, do claims that an agency violated the APA by failing to

provide notice and opportunity for comment. See Better Gov’t

Ass’n v. Dep’t of State, 780 F.2d 86, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1986). To be

sure, “we have cautioned that sometimes ‘even purely legal

issues may be unfit for review.’” National Ass’n of Home

Builders, 417 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Atlantic States Legal

Found., 325 F.3d at 284). But EPA has offered no argument to

overcome the presumption that these purely legal issues are fit

for judicial decision. Because the issues are “purely legal,”

because the Coalition’s facial challenge would not “benefit from

a more concrete setting,” and because EPA’s action is

unquestionably “final,” the Coalition’s challenge to § 270.10(l)

is fit for judicial review. CAIP, 150 F.3d at 1204.

EPA further contends that, even if the issues are fit for

review, the Coalition cannot show that it would suffer hardship

if we deferred judgment. But “[w]here the first prong of the . .

. ripeness test is met and Congress has emphatically declared a

preference for immediate review[,] . . . no purpose is served by

proceeding to the [hardship] prong.” General Elec. Co. v. EPA,

290 F.3d 377, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Here, Congress has declared a preference for

immediate review by providing that a challenge to a final RCRA

regulation must be brought within ninety days of promulgation.

See 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1); see also Molycorp, Inc. v. EPA, 197

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3

Cf. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737 (finding that a challenge to

a Forest Service management plan was unripe, in part because

“Congress has not provided for preimplementation judicial review of

forest plans” under the National Forest Management Act, in contrast

to other statutes, like RCRA § 7006, under which “Congress has

specifically instructed the courts to review ‘preenforcement’”). 

4

Although we must decide threshold questions before reaching

the merits, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94

(1998), we may consider whether a case is ripe before determining

whether there is subject-matter jurisdiction, see Toca Producers v.

FERC, 411 F.3d 262, 265 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2005).

F.3d 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1999).3 We therefore hold that the

Coalition’s challenge to § 270.10(l) is ripe for review.

B

The Coalition objects to the HHRAP guidance document

solely on the ground that it is effectively a binding legislative

rule, and that it therefore should have been -- but was not --

promulgated pursuant to the APA’s notice-and-comment

requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c). As we discuss more

fully in Part IV below, the question of whether the guidance

document is a legislative rule that is subject to notice and

comment -- rather than a policy statement that is not -- turns on

“whether the agency action binds private parties or the agency

itself with the ‘force of law.’” General Elec., 290 F.3d at 382.

(As we also explain in Part IV, whether we have jurisdiction to

rule on the Coalition’s challenge turns on a similar inquiry.4

)

An “agency pronouncement will be considered binding as a

practical matter,” we have explained, “if it either [1] appears on

its face to be binding, or [2] is applied by the agency in a way

that indicates it is binding.” Id. at 383 (citation omitted). 

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5

See General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 451 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (holding that, “to the extent [the] petition challenges the

application of EPA’s regulatory interpretation to [petitioner’s] plants,

the challenge is unripe”); Hudson v. FAA, 192 F.3d 1031, 1034-35

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[W]e have often held that an early procedural

challenge to a purported policy statement [on the ground that it is

actually a legislative rule] is not ripe because it is not yet demonstrable

that the agency intends to treat it as having the characteristics of a

rule.”).

We have held that when a challenge to an agency document

as a “legislative rule is largely a legal, not a factual, question” --

that is, when it turns only on whether the document “on its face

. . . purports to bind both applicants and the Agency with the

force of law” -- the claim is fit for review. See id. at 380.

However, “[w]here we believed the agency’s practical

application of a statement would be important, we have found

the issue not” fit for judicial determination. Public Citizen, Inc.

v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 940 F.2d 679, 683 (D.C. Cir.

1991).5 Thus, whether the Coalition’s challenge to the HHRAP

guidance document is fit for review turns in significant part on

whether that challenge can be resolved on the face of the

document, or whether it depends as well on the way in which the

document will be applied.

EPA contends that the petition is unripe because the

Coalition “relies upon its own speculation that permitting

authorities will treat the Guidance as if it were legally binding

and that the Guidance will impose new and significant burdens.”

EPA Br. 26. The Coalition, however, disclaims any intent to

rely on how the guidance has been or will be applied to

particular facilities, declaring that its challenge is based solely

on “the words of the statute, the words of EPA’s regulations, the

guidance documents, and the case law.” Coalition Reply Br. 6.

Indeed, the petitioner insists that its challenge “does not involve

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any prediction of how EPA will actually implement this

regulatory regime,” id. at 2, and “can be fully evaluated without

waiting for [a particular HWC] project to arise,” id. at 7. 

Thus framed, the Coalition has limited its attack on the

HHRAP to purely legal issues. As we note in Part IV, this

creates a significant obstacle to the success of the Coalition’s

challenge. But it also renders it fit for review. See, e.g.,

General Elec., 290 F.3d at 380 (finding that a challenge to a

guidance document was fit for review because it “turn[ed] . . .

primarily upon the text of the Document”). And as we discussed

in Part II.A, that ends our ripeness analysis. We do not proceed

to the hardship prong when the issue is adjudged fit for judicial

determination and Congress has provided for immediate review.

If the Coalition is correct on the merits -- that is, if the HHRAP

is a final legislative rule -- then Congress has so provided here.

See 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1). We therefore conclude that the

Coalition’s challenge to the guidance document -- like its

challenge to § 270.10(l) -- is ripe for review.

III

As noted in Part II, the Coalition objects to § 270.10(l) on

three grounds. RCRA requires us to review those objections

under the standard set forth in the APA. See 42 U.S.C. §

6976(a) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706). As relevant here, we may

overturn the regulation only if we find that it is “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), or that it was

promulgated “without observance of procedure required by

law,” id. § 706(2)(D). 

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A

The Coalition’s first objection is that § 270.10(l) is “not in

accordance with law” because it fails to spell out the information

that is required in a permit application. RCRA § 3005(b) directs

that “[e]ach application for a permit under [section 3005] shall

contain such information as may be required under regulations

promulgated by” EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(b) (emphasis added).

In the Coalition’s view, § 270.10(l) does not satisfy this

statutory directive because the regulation does not “specify[]

[the] information to be submitted in a RCRA permit application

under [EPA’s] SSRA program.” Coalition Br. 21. That

information, the Coalition maintains, is specified only in the

HHRAP guidance document.

The Coalition’s contention relies on our decisions in MST

Express v. Department of Transportation, 108 F.3d 401 (D.C.

Cir. 1997), and Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 306 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir.

2002). The challenge in MST Express was based on the Motor

Carrier Safety Act, which directed the Secretary of

Transportation to “‘prescribe regulations establishing a

procedure to decide on the safety fitness of owners and operators

of commercial motor vehicles,’” including “‘a means of

deciding whether the owners, operators, and persons meet the

safety fitness requirements under’” the statute. MST Express,

108 F.3d at 402 (emphasis added) (quoting 49 U.S.C. §

31144(a)(1) (1997)). We concluded that the Department had not

carried out its statutory obligation because its regulations wholly

failed to “set[] forth ‘a means of deciding whether the owners,

operators, and persons meet the safety fitness requirements.’” Id.

at 406. 

In Ethyl Corp., the petitioner challenged a regulation

promulgated under CAA § 206, 42 U.S.C. § 7525, which

“charges [EPA] with testing new motor vehicles to ensure that

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each vehicle’s emissions will comply with federal emissions

standards throughout its ‘useful life.’” 306 F.3d at 1146

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1)). Subsection 206(d) states that

EPA “shall by regulation establish methods and procedures for

making tests under this section.” Id. (emphasis in original)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7525(d)). The challenged regulation,

however, did not “set out ‘methods and procedures for making

tests.’ Rather, it establishe[d] a framework for automobile

manufacturers to develop their own tests.” Id. Relying on MST

Express, we held that EPA had violated its statutory mandate to

issue test procedures “by regulation.” See id. at 1149-50.

We acknowledged in Ethyl Corp. that, when Congress has

“not specified the level of specificity expected of the agency, .

. . the agency [is] entitled to broad deference in picking the

suitable level.” Id. at 1149 (citing American Trucking Ass’ns v.

Dep’t of Transp., 166 F.3d 374, 379-80 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and

New Mexico v. EPA, 114 F.3d 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Here,

RCRA § 3005(b) does not mandate any particular level of

specificity at which EPA must define the information required

in permit applications, and under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,

467 U.S. 837 (1984), we must therefore defer to a reasonable

EPA interpretation as to the degree of detail required. See, e.g.,

American Trucking, 166 F.3d at 378 (“The Chevron test applies

to issues of how specifically an agency must frame its

regulations.”); see also Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v.

Glickman, 204 F.3d 229, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2000); New Mexico, 114

F.3d at 293. 

In Ethyl Corp., however, we noted that “Ethyl’s challenge

[was] not that the EPA was too general in establishing test

procedures by regulation, but that it didn’t establish them by

regulation at all.” 306 F.3d at 1149. There is a dispositive

difference, we said, between “promulgations of (1) vaguely

articulated test procedures (which would be reviewed

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deferentially under such cases as American Trucking) and (2)

procedures for later development of tests (invalid under MST

Express).” Id. at 1149-50. Finding that the challenged

regulation did “not claim to have itself articulated even a vague

durability test,” we held that it clearly fell “on the forbidden side

of the line.” Id. at 1150; cf. American Trucking, 166 F.3d at 379

(noting that “the regulations condemned in MST Express gave

no guidance at all”).

Recognizing the line that we drew in Ethyl Corp., the

Coalition insists that its argument “is not that § 270.10(l) is

‘impermissibly vague,’” but that “on its face, the regulation is

incomplete.” Coalition Reply Br. 13. In effect, the Coalition

maintains that its argument, like Ethyl’s, is “not that the EPA

was too general in establishing [information requirements] by

regulation, but that it didn’t establish them by regulation at all.”

Ethyl Corp., 306 F.3d at 1149. We disagree. 

Section 270.10(l) authorizes permitting authorities, upon a

finding that the MACT standards “alone may not be protective

of human health or the environment,” to “require the additional

information or assessment(s)” 

necessary to determine whether additional controls are

necessary to ensure protection of human health and the

environment. This includes information necessary to

evaluate the potential risk to human health and/or the

environment resulting from both direct and indirect

exposure pathways. 

40 C.F.R. § 270.10(l). The regulation then directs the permitting

authority to “base the evaluation of whether compliance with the

[MACT standards] alone is protective of human health or the

environment on factors relevant to the potential risk from a

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17

hazardous waste combustion unit, including, as appropriate, any

of the following” nine factors:

(i) Particular site-specific considerations such as

proximity to receptors (such as schools, hospitals,

nursing homes, day care centers, parks, community

activity centers, or other potentially sensitive

receptors), unique dispersion patterns, etc.;

(ii) Identities and quantities of emissions of persistent,

bioaccumulative or toxic pollutants considering

enforceable controls in place to limit those pollutants;

(iii) Identities and quantities of nondioxin products of

incomplete combustion most likely to be emitted and

to pose significant risk based on known toxicities

(confirmation of which should be made through

emissions testing);

(iv) Identities and quantities of other off-site sources of

pollutants in proximity of the facility that significantly

influence interpretation of a facility-specific risk

assessment;

(v) Presence of significant ecological considerations,

such as the proximity of a particularly sensitive

ecological area;

(vi) Volume and types of wastes, for example wastes

containing highly toxic constituents;

(vii) Other on-site sources of hazardous air pollutants

that significantly influence interpretation of the risk

posed by the operation of the source in question;

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18

(viii) Adequacy of any previously conducted risk

assessment, given any subsequent changes in

conditions likely to affect risk; and

(ix) Such other factors as may be appropriate.

40 C.F.R. § 270.10(l)(1).

The Coalition’s contention -- that § 270.10(l) does not set

forth (at all) the additional information that is required of permit

applicants when EPA mandates an SSRA -- is primarily based

on its assumption that the only parts of § 270.10(l) relevant to

information requirements are the six lines of the first indented

quotation in the preceding paragraph. In the Coalition’s view,

the balance of the regulation, including the nine factors listed in

§ 270.10(l)(1), relates only to what a permitting authority should

consider when deciding whether to require an SSRA in the first

place.

1. Even on the Coalition’s reading, it does not appear that

the information required by those six lines falls on the not

“establish[ed] by regulation at all” side of the boundary

demarked by Ethyl Corp. -- rather than on the “vaguely

articulated” side, as to which we owe EPA great deference. In

contrast to the situation in Ethyl Corp., here the agency does

“claim to have itself articulated [at least] a vague” information

requirement. Ethyl Corp., 306 F.3d at 1150. Indeed, EPA

claims to have articulated a reasonably narrow requirement. In

that respect, EPA stresses the context in which the information

at issue here may be required. 

First, as the Coalition concedes, other EPA regulations

specify in considerable detail information that is required in the

permit applications of all TSDs, including HWCs. See, e.g., 40

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19

6

This information includes, for example, a “general description

of the facility,” 40 C.F.R. § 270.14(b)(1), a “[c]hemical and physical

analysis of the hazardous waste . . . to be handled at the facility,” id.

§ 270.14(b)(2), and a “topographical map” of the surrounding area, id.

§ 270.14(b)(19). 

C.F.R. § 270.14.6 The issue here involves only the “additional

information” that is required of an HWC if an SSRA is

mandated. 40 C.F.R. § 270.10(l). Such information may be

required only if a permitting authority finds that “compliance

with the [MACT standards] alone may not be protective of

human health or the environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 270.10(l). 

Second, the Coalition also appears to concede that even the

six quoted lines would be satisfactory if the application at issue

were for a “waiver to a generally applicable requirement,”

Coalition Br. 28 (emphasis omitted), rather than for “a permit

under the established rules,” id. at 27. Yet, as EPA points out,

the SSRA program is part and parcel of what effectively is a

waiver program. As EPA explains in the Final Rule, it regards

the SSRA program as a necessary condition for its decision to

waive (in EPA’s parlance, to “defer”) the application of the

1991 RCRA standards and instead to rely on the MACT

standards alone. See, e.g., Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 59,512.

Although EPA believes that the MACT standards (without the

1991 RCRA standards) are sufficient to protect human health

and the environment in most situations, it cannot be certain that

is true at all sites. See id. at 59,504. It therefore promulgated §

270.10(l) to authorize SSRAs where permitting authorities found

that the MACT standards may not alone be sufficiently

protective. 

Third, the general language of § 270.10(l)’s information

requirement is narrowed by the circumstances under which it is

triggered. Because that additional information is not required

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20

7

This standard of review is appropriate even where, as here, the

agency’s interpretation of its regulation is set forth in its brief to this

court, because we “have ‘no reason . . . to suspect that [this]

interpretation’ is merely a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ of past agency

action, or that it ‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered

judgment on the matter in question.’” Long Island Care at Home,

Ltd., 127 S. Ct. at 2349 (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

unless the permitting authority “concludes . . . that compliance

with the [MACT standards] alone may not be protective of

human health or the environment,” 40 C.F.R. § 270.10(l), the

information that can be required is limited to that “necessary to”

make a comparison to the (quite specific) MACT standards, id.

2. But even if the six quoted lines would not survive

analysis under Ethyl Corp. and MST Express if they stood alone,

EPA contends that they do not stand alone. In contrast to the

petitioner, EPA regards the nine factors listed in § 270.10(l)(1)

as relating not only to what a permitting authority should

consider in deciding whether to require an SSRA, but also as

identifying the “range of considerations for which information

necessary to evaluate risks could be requested.” EPA Br. 30;

see Oral Arg. Recording at 1:20:21 (stating that the nine factors

listed in subsection 270.10(l)(1) “cabin[] the areas . . . for which

site-specific risk assessment information can be requested”).

Since this is EPA’s interpretation of its own regulation, it “is

‘controlling’ unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with’ the

regulation[].” Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S.

Ct. 2339, 2349 (2007) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,

461 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).7

 

Under this deferential standard of review, we have no

authority to disturb EPA’s reading of the regulation. Section

270.10(l)(1) states that a permitting authority “shall base the

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21

evaluation of whether compliance with the [MACT standards]

alone is protective of human health or the environment” on the

nine listed factors. 40 C.F.R. § 270.10(l)(1). The petitioner is

correct that this “evaluation” is central to the determination of

whether to require an SSRA -- which turns on the conclusion

“that compliance with the [MACT standards] alone may not be

protective.” Id. § 270.10(l). But it is also highly relevant to the

evaluation of what “additional information” is “necessary to

determine whether additional controls [beyond the MACT

standards] are necessary to ensure protection” -- the only

“additional information” that may be required in an SSRA. Id.

Thus, EPA’s interpretation is neither plainly erroneous nor

inconsistent with the regulation, and we are bound to accept it.

Once we determine that § 270.10(l)(1) relates to the

categories of information that can be required in a permit

application, the Coalition’s argument loses whatever force it

might otherwise have had. Following the framework set out in

Ethyl Corp., we must uphold the challenged regulation so long

as it establishes an identifiable standard governing the

information that permitting authorities may request. We can set

aside the regulation only if it creates no standard at all, instead

delegating the decision regarding what information is required

of permit applicants to permitting authorities. See 306 F.3d at

1149-50. We conclude that the regulation establishes an

identifiable standard. 

The first eight factors listed in the regulation are more than

sufficient to guide the type of information that can be required

of permit applicants. The regulation allows permitting

authorities to require information in concrete categories,

including: “[p]articular site-specific considerations such as

proximity to receptors (such as schools, hospitals, [etc.]), unique

dispersion patterns, etc.,” id. § 270.10(l)(1)(i); “[i]dentities and

quantities of nondioxin products of incomplete combustion most

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22

likely to be emitted and to pose significant risk based on known

toxicities,” id. § 270.10(l)(1)(iii); and “[p]resence of significant

ecological considerations, such as the proximity of a particularly

sensitive ecological area,” id. § 270.10(l)(1)(v). Far from being

standardless, the listed categories are relatively specific and

serve to cabin a permitting authority’s discretion with respect to

the type of information it may seek. Indeed, EPA stated in the

Final Rule and again at oral argument that the most important

factor is the eighth: the “[a]dequacy of any previously

conducted risk assessment, given any subsequent changes in

conditions likely to affect risk.” Id. § 270.10(l)(1)(viii); see

Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 59,515-16; Oral Arg. Recording at

1:04:00. As EPA explained, because all cement kilns subject to

the SSRA program currently have permits, see Oral Arg.

Recording at 43:04, “[i]nstances where a facility may need to

repeat a risk assessment would be related to changes in

conditions that would likely lead to increased risk.” Final Rule,

70 Fed. Reg. at 59,516. Hence, most information requests will

be targeted at determining whether there has been a change in

circumstances since the previous permitting process. 

To be sure, the regulation’s ninth provision -- which allows

permitting authorities to request information regarding “[s]uch

other factors as may be appropriate,” 40 C.F.R. §

270.10(l)(1)(ix) -- is general. But it does not render the

regulation standardless. The information requested under this

provision must still be “necessary to determine whether

additional controls are necessary to ensure protection of human

health and the environment,” id § 270.10(l), and “relevant to the

potential risk from a hazardous waste combustion unit,” id. §

270.10(l)(1). Moreover, under “the established interpretive

canon of ejusdem generis, ‘[w]here general words follow

specific words,’ the general words are ‘construed to embrace

only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the

preceding specific words.’” Edison Elec. Inst. v. Occupational

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23

8

EPA agrees with this construction. See Oral Arg. Recording at

1:02:53 (EPA counsel’s representation that the “catchall has to be

understood within the context of the limitations” enumerated in the

first eight factors). 

Safety & Health Admin., 411 F.3d 272, 281 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

(citation omitted). Thus, any information requested under the

regulation’s ninth factor must be “similar in nature” to that

identified in the first eight.8

In sum, in contrast to the regulations at issue in Ethyl Corp.

and MST Express, § 270.10(l) guides both regulated parties and

permitting authorities with respect to the types of information

that may be required in a permit application. As we

acknowledged in Ethyl Corp., “[t]here may, of course, be cases

in which it is hard to distinguish between” a regulation that

provides “vaguely articulated” guidance concerning a

requirement (which we would review deferentially) and one that

provides no guidance at all (and hence does not truly establish

the requirement by regulation). 306 F.3d at 1149. But this is

not one of those cases. Although the challenged regulation may

“not provide as much detail as the petitioner wishes,” Final

Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 59,513, section 3005(b) of RCRA does not

require more. 

B

The Coalition’s second objection to § 270.10(l) is that it is

“impermissibly vague” with respect to the “trigger[]” for

requiring an SSRA. Coalition Br. 35. In the Coalition’s view,

the regulation’s trigger -- a conclusion by the permitting

authority “that compliance with the [MACT standards] alone

may not be protective of human health or the environment”-- is

insufficiently specific to satisfy RCRA. The petitioner appears

to level the same objection against 40 C.F.R. § 270.32(b)(3), the

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24

companion regulation that articulates the standard for deciding

whether a permitting authority must add conditions before

approving a permit for a facility that has undergone an SSRA.

That standard depends on a determination that “conditions are

necessary in addition to those required under [the MACT

standards] to ensure protection of human health and the

environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 270.32(b)(3) (emphasis added).

Unlike the argument that the Coalition directed at the

information requirement of § 270.10(l), here its attack is clearly

on the “too general” rather than the “no regulation at all” side of

the line drawn by Ethyl Corp. See supra Part III.A. In fact, the

petitioner had little choice in the matter since, by contrast to

RCRA § 3005(b) -- which provides that permit applications

must contain information required “under regulations” -- the

Coalition concedes that no statute requires that the trigger for

ordering an SSRA or approving a permit on the basis of an

SSRA must be codified in a regulation. See Oral Arg.

Recording at 18:20, 1:30:52. Section 3004(q) of RCRA, upon

which EPA rests its authority to promulgate the challenged

regulation, merely authorizes the agency to promulgate such

“standards applicable to [HWCs] . . . as may be necessary to

protect human health and the environment.” 42 U.S.C. §

6924(q)(1); see supra note 2. RCRA’s “omnibus” provision,

upon which EPA also relies for authority to require SSRAs,

provides that “[e]ach permit issued under this section shall

contain such terms and conditions as the [permitting authority]

determines necessary to protect human health and the

environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6925(c)(3) (emphasis added). The

relevant Senate Report makes clear that: “This provision . . .

gives the Administrator . . . the authority to add permit terms

and conditions beyond those mandated in regulations . . . . The

provision is designed to deal with factors or situations different

from those addressed in the regulations.” S. REP. NO. 98-284,

at 31 (1983) (emphasis added). 

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9

Although the Coalition’s briefs appear to pose its specificity

challenge as an attack on EPA’s interpretation of RCRA, it might also

have intended to argue that the asserted vagueness of § 270.10(l)

renders the regulation arbitrary and capricious. But such an argument

would also fail because, as was true in Animal Legal Defense Fund,

“[t]he explanation that renders the [agency’s] interpretation of the

statute reasonable” -- which we discuss below -- “also serves to

establish that the final rule was not arbitrary and capricious.” 204

F.3d at 235. 

10See also Animal Legal Def. Fund, 204 F.3d at 235 (“[W]e

accord agencies broad deference in choosing the level of generality at

which to articulate rules.”); Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth.

Prof’l Fire Fighters Ass’n v. United States, 959 F.2d 297, 300 (D.C.

Cir. 1992) (“[J]udicial deference is at its highest in reviewing an

agency’s choice among competing policy considerations, including the

choice here of the level of generality at which it will promulgate

norms implementing a legislative mandate.” (citation omitted)). 

In short, the Coalition cannot argue that the triggers for

ordering SSRAs or approving permits transgress a statutory

command to set those triggers by regulation -- because there is

no such statutory command. Instead, the Coalition simply

argues that the triggers are impermissibly vague, an argument it

can win only if it can show that EPA’s failure to provide greater

specificity constitutes an unreasonable interpretation of RCRA.

See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund, 204 F.3d at 235; American

Trucking, 166 F.3d at 378; New Mexico, 114 F.3d at 293.9 As

we discussed in Part III.A, this is always a difficult burden for

a petitioner to overcome. See Ethyl Corp., 306 F.3d at 1149

(citing American Trucking, 166 F.3d at 379-80, and New

Mexico, 114 F.3d at 294).10 Here it is insurmountable, because

§ 270.10(l) does not merely define the triggers in terms of what

is “protective of human health or the environment.” Rather, as

discussed in Part III.A, the regulation provides nine relatively

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11For example, with respect to cancer risks, a risk threshold might

be presented as “1 x 10-5,” signifying that an individual “is estimated

to have up to a one in 100,000 chance of developing cancer during

his/her lifetime from the exposure being evaluated.” Coalition Br. 5;

see id. at 35. 

specific factors to guide that determination. RCRA does not

require more.

In its opening brief, the Coalition further argued that EPA

should have defined what is protective of human health or the

environment numerically, in terms of the threshold risk level

that will trigger an SSRA or dictate unconditional approval of a

permit.11 At oral argument, the Coalition receded from this

claim, see Oral Arg. Recording at 1:34:32, 1:35:34, and sensibly

so. There is nothing in the statutory language that compels such

a numerical definition. Cf. New Mexico, 114 F.3d at 293

(holding that a statutory mandate to set “criteria” for waste plan

certification “says nothing to suggest that the criteria must be

detailed or quantitative”). To the contrary, section 3004(q)’s

requirement that EPA promulgate “standards . . . as may be

necessary to protect human health and the environment,” 42

U.S.C. § 6924(q)(1), is reasonably read as authorizing standards

that allow a case-by-case analysis rather than a uniform risk

threshold. Moreover, section 3005(c)(3) -- which states that

“[e]ach permit . . . shall contain such terms and conditions as the

[permitting authority] determines necessary to protect human

health and the environment,” id. § 6925(c)(3) -- was plainly

intended to allow such an analysis. See S. REP. NO. 98-284, at

31 (1983) (“This amendment gives the Agency the authority to

address special cases and unique circumstances.”). And we

certainly cannot interpret section 3004 to prohibit what section

3005 allows. See National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders

of Wildlife, __ S. Ct. __, slip op. at 18 (June 25, 2007) (“In

making the threshold determination under Chevron, ‘a reviewing

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27

12See National Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 566-67

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (concluding that EPA reasonably interpreted Clean

Water Act § 301(b)(2) as permitting it to regulate color pollutants on

a case-by-case basis, because their impact “is driven by highly sitespecific conditions” (citation omitted)); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc.

v. EPA, 976 F.2d 2, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that the

corroborative testing requirement of a RCRA regulation was not

“impermissibly vague” and that details “can be resolved on a sitespecific, case-by-case basis”).

court should not confine itself to examining a particular

statutory provision in isolation.’” (quoting FDA v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)).

Moreover, EPA has reasonably explained why it chose the

case-by-case approach. A national risk threshold, the agency

explained, could not address unique site-specific considerations,

such as unusual terrain or dispersion features, proximity to

particularly sensitive populations, or unusually high contaminant

background concentrations. See Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at

59,505, 59,510-11. It “is important, and indeed essential,” the

agency said, “that risk managers be afforded sufficient

flexibility to apply different target [risk] levels as dictated by the

circumstances surrounding the combustor” at different sites.

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants:

Proposed Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Hazardous

Waste Combustors, 69 Fed. Reg. 21,198, 21,331 (Apr. 20, 2004)

(“Proposed Rule”). For example, EPA explained that “a risk

manager may wish to apply a more stringent carcinogenic target

level for a combustor that is located in a densely populated area

with a high concentration of industrial emission sources” than

for one in an area without sensitive receptors. Id. We find

nothing unreasonable about EPA’s refusal to interpret RCRA to

require a national standard for ordering an SSRA or granting a

permit.12

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For general support of its contention that EPA’s SSRA

regulation is impermissibly vague, the Coalition relies on South

Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974). In South

Terminal, the First Circuit vacated an EPA regulation that

conditioned construction of parking facilities in the Boston area

on the receipt of an EPA “permit stating that construction or

modification of such facility will not interfere with the

attainment or maintenance of applicable Federal air quality

standards.” Id. at 657 n.8 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 52.1135(d)

(1974)). The court struck the regulation down on the ground

that it “does not indicate how ‘interference’ is to be judged . . .

. The prospective applicant for a permit is utterly without

guidance as to what he must prove, and how.” Id. at 670.

Unlike the regulation invalidated in South Terminal, §

270.10(l) does “indicate” how the permitting authority is to

judge what is “protective of human health or the environment”:

by reference to the protection provided by the MACT standards

alone. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.10(l). And it provides still further

guidance by reference to a list of relatively detailed factors. See

supra Part III.A (citing 40 C.F.R. § 270.10(l)(1)(i)-(ix)). That

is more than sufficient to withstand a facial challenge -- which

the Coalition insists is the only kind of attack it is mounting in

this court. As we said in Atlas Copco, Inc. v. EPA: 

Admittedly, without express standards establishing

precise guidelines, application of the . . . regulation is

subject to abuse, but this is true of any testing

capability. The solution lies not in a challenge to the

facial validity of the program itself, for that is not

where the potential for abuse exists. Rather, objection

is more appropriately aimed at a particular application

of the program, where it can be reviewed against the

backdrop of its own particular circumstances. 

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13See Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir.

1993) (“The requirement that agency action not be arbitrary or

capricious includes a requirement that the agency . . . respond to

‘relevant’ and ‘significant’ public comments.” (citation omitted)). 

642 F.2d 458, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also 42 U.S.C. §

6976(b) (providing for judicial review, in the appropriate

regional circuit, of EPA “action . . . in issuing, denying,

modifying, or revoking any permit under” RCRA § 3005).

C

The Coalition’s final challenge to the regulation is that, in

promulgating § 270.10(l), EPA failed to provide adequate notice

of part of its rationale for the SSRA program, and likewise failed

to respond to the Coalition’s significant comments thereon. The

APA requires that an agency publish notice of proposed

rulemaking, including “either the terms or substance of the

proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues

involved,” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3), and that it “give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through

submission of written data, views, or arguments,” id. § 553(c).

A “notice of proposed rulemaking must provide sufficient

factual detail and rationale for the rule to permit interested

parties to comment meaningfully.” Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. EPA,

372 F.3d 441, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks

omitted). And an agency must “demonstrate the rationality of

its decision-making process by responding to those comments

that are relevant and significant.” Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal.

v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1998).13 Hence, the

Coalition suggests both that § 207.10(l) was promulgated

“without observance of procedure required by law,” 5 U.S.C. §

706(2)(D), and (implicitly) that it is “arbitrary [or] capricious,”

id. § 706(2)(A).

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The Coalition’s first contention is that EPA “failed to

provide adequate public notice regarding its reasons for

requiring SSRAs only from HWCs,” and not from other types of

hazardous waste management facilities (TSDs), such as

landfills. Coalition Br. 43. But EPA did provide “sufficient

factual detail and rationale for the rule to permit interested

parties to comment meaningfully.” Honeywell, 372 F.3d at 445.

The notice set forth the text of the proposed regulation (which

was expressly limited to HWCs) as well as its rationale. See

Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 21,325-31, 21,358-59, 21,383.

And while the discussion of the regulatory rationale did not

explicitly note why non-HWCs were not covered, at least part of

the reason was evident from the purpose of the rulemaking: it

was intended to integrate the 1991 RCRA standards and the new

Clean Air Act MACT standards for facilities subject to both.

See id. at 21,358-59. Hazardous waste facilities that are not

HWCs are not subject to both, because they do not produce

emissions and so are not subject to the CAA. In any event, it is

clear that the Coalition was in fact able to comment

meaningfully -- and critically -- regarding the regulation’s

differential treatment of HWCs and non-HWCs. See [Coalition]

Comments on the HWC MACT Replacement Standards

Proposed Rule, at 116-17 (July 6, 2004) (J.A. 167-68). And that

belies the petitioner’s claim that the notice was insufficient.

The Coalition’s second contention is that EPA failed to

respond to its critical comments. This contention is also without

merit. In the Final Rule, EPA specifically noted the Coalition’s

comments. See Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 59,512. It responded

by explaining that it was requiring SSRAs for HWCs in order to

ensure that the Clean Air Act’s MACT standards are sufficiently

protective to permit deferral of the 1991 RCRA standards; but

because the MACT standards are not applicable to nonemission-producing facilities, the rationale for requiring SSRAs

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31

for HWCs did not apply to such facilities. Id. EPA further

explained that HWCs

are distinct from other types of TSDs[, such as

landfills, land treatment systems, etc.,] due to the wide

array of waste streams being fed to the unit, the

complex chemical processes throughout the

combustion unit, stack emissions comprised of a wide

variety of compounds that are difficult to address, and

the potential to impact receptors for several square

miles due to stack dispersion. 

Id. Finally, the agency noted that, “to the extent permitting

authorities believe there are problems with other types of TSDs,

they can impose requirements and request additional

information, including an SSRA in accordance with [40 C.F.R.]

§ 270.10(k).” Id. This response to the Coalition’s comments

was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the APA.

IV

Finally, we consider the Coalition’s attack on the HHRAP

guidance document. The Coalition contends that the HHRAP is

invalid because it was not promulgated pursuant to the noticeand-comment procedures of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b),

(c). While the “APA exempts from notice and comment

interpretive rules or general statements of policy,” Syncor Int’l

Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing 5

U.S.C. § 553(b)), the Coalition maintains that the guidance

document is not a policy statement but a legislative rule that is

subject to those procedures. 

EPA correctly points out that the merits of this APA

challenge are inextricably linked to our jurisdiction to hear it.

RCRA § 7006(a)(1) invests this court with jurisdiction over

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14Compare General Motors, 363 F.3d at 448 (holding that “the

ultimate focus of the inquiry” into whether this court has jurisdiction

under RCRA “is whether the agency action partakes of the

fundamental characteristic of a regulation, i.e., that it has the force of

law” (quoting Molycorp, 197 F.3d at 545) (internal quotation mark

omitted)), and General Elec., 290 F.3d at 382 (holding, with respect

to a jurisdictional provision analogous to RCRA, that agency action

is reviewable if it “binds private parties or the agency itself with the

‘force of law’”), with McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838

F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that an agency

pronouncement is a “policy statement” exempt from APA notice and

comment if it “first, does not have ‘a present-day binding effect,’ that

is, it does not ‘impose any rights and obligations,’ and second,

‘genuinely leaves the agency and its decisionmakers free to exercise

discretion.’” (quoting Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d

943, 946 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987))). Indeed, our jurisdictional cases

routinely cite APA cases as authority. See, e.g., General Elec., 290

F.3d at 382 (citing McLouth and Community Nutrition); American

Portland Cement Alliance, 101 F.3d at 776 (citing McLouth).

petitions for review of EPA “action . . . in promulgating any

regulation, or requirement under [RCRA,] or denying any

petition for the promulgation, amendment or repeal of any

regulation under [RCRA].” 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1). We have

held that this provision gives us “jurisdiction over ‘only final

regulations, requirements, and denials of petitions to

promulgate, amend or repeal a regulation.’” General Motors,

363 F.3d at 448 (quoting Molycorp, 197 F.3d at 545); see, e.g.,

American Portland Cement Alliance, 101 F.3d at 774-76. Under

our precedents, the question of whether an agency document is

a final “regulation . . . or requirement” under RCRA is

substantially similar to the question of whether it is a legislative

rule under the APA.14 Thus, because we must decide whether

we have jurisdiction before we may reach the merits, see Steel

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998), and

because there is no dispute that the HHRAP guidance document

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33

was not issued pursuant to APA rulemaking procedures, there

are only two options: “Either the petition must be dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction” because the guidance is not a final

regulation under 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1), “or the . . . [g]uidance

should be vacated” on the merits because it is a final regulation

but was promulgated in violation of the APA. General Elec.,

290 F.3d at 385 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Three criteria determine whether a regulatory action

constitutes the promulgation of a regulation” for purposes of

RCRA § 7006(a)(1): “‘(1) the Agency’s own characterization

of the action; (2) whether the action was published in the

Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations; and (3)

whether the action has binding effects on private parties or on

the agency.’” General Motors, 363 F.3d at 448 (quoting

Molycorp, 197 F.3d at 545). The first two criteria militate

against our jurisdiction here: the HHRAP states that it is not “a

regulation itself,” HHRAP at ii (J.A. 424), and the document

was not published in either the Federal Register or the Code of

Federal Regulations. Nonetheless, we have held that these

criteria merely “‘serve to illuminate the third, for the ultimate

focus of the inquiry is whether the agency action partakes of the

fundamental characteristic of a regulation, i.e., that it has the

force of law.’” General Motors, 363 F.3d at 448 (quoting

Molycorp, 197 F.3d at 545).

Under this framework, we have jurisdiction to review the

HHRAP only if it “binds private parties or the agency itself with

the ‘force of law.’” General Elec., 290 F.3d at 382. “An agency

pronouncement [is] binding as a practical matter if it either

appears on its face to be binding, or is applied by the agency in

a way that indicates it is binding.” Id. at 383 (citation omitted).

As noted in Part II.B, the Coalition has expressly limited its

challenge to the face of the document, and makes no argument

that the agency has applied it in a way that indicates it is

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34

binding. Indeed, such an argument would be unavailable in any

event, as the HHRAP has not yet been applied to any facility.

See Oral Arg. Recording at 1:31:34. Similarly, the Coalition

insists, its challenge “does not involve any prediction of how

EPA will actually implement th[e] regulatory regime” in the

future. Coalition Reply Br. 2.

So limited, our disposition of the challenge is

straightforward. We see nothing on the face of the HHRAP to

suggest that it is binding. To the contrary, the document

declares that “this guidance does not impose legally binding

requirements on EPA, states, or the regulated community, and

may not apply to a particular situation based on the specific

circumstances of the combustion facility.” HHRAP at ii (J.A.

424). Its pages are replete with words of suggestion: its

provisions are described as “recommendations,” id., that

permitting authorities are “encourage[d]” to “consider,” id. at 1-

8 (J.A. 460). The document states that “EPA and state

regulators . . . retain their discretion to use approaches on a caseby-case basis that differ from those recommended in this

guidance where appropriate.” Id. at ii (J.A. 424). It further

states that “[w]hether the recommendations in this [document]

are appropriate in a given situation will depend on facilityspecific circumstances.” Id. Moreover, these statements are

fully in accord with EPA’s explanation of why “this is an area

that is uniquely fitted for a guidance approach, rather than

regulation”: “[R]isk assessors must have the flexibility to make

adjustments for the specific conditions present at the source, and

. . . should be free to use the most recent [assessment tools]

available rather than be limited to those that may be out-of-date

because a regulation has not been revised.” Proposed Rule, 69

Fed. Reg. at 21,330.

The Coalition rests its challenge to the HHRAP almost

exclusively on our decision in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,

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15To the contrary, the agency insists that the HHRAP does “not

impose mandatory requirements,” and that it “offers numerous

recommendations, but requires nothing.” Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at

59,513.

in which we found that another EPA guidance document was in

fact a binding legislative rule. See 208 F.3d 1015, 1020-23

(D.C. Cir. 2000). But the factors that led us to that conclusion

in Appalachian Power are not present here. Among other

things, the agency does not treat the HHRAP as binding,15 has

not “le[d] private parties or . . . permitting authorities to believe

that it will declare permits invalid unless they comply with [its]

terms,” id. at 1021, does not say that the HHRAP represents the

agency’s “settled position,” id. at 1022, and has not issued a

document that “reads like a ukase,” id. at 1023. Unlike the

guidance at issue in Appalachian Power, the HHRAP does not

“command[,]” does not “require[,]” does not “order[,]” and does

not “dictate[.]” Id. at 1023; cf. General Elec., 290 F.3d at 380,

384-85 (finding that an EPA risk assessment document was a

legislative rule, “because on its face it purports to bind both

applicants and the Agency with the force of law”). Moreover,

the Coalition has forsaken the contention -- also important in

Appalachian Power -- that permitting authorities, “with EPA’s

Guidance in hand, are insisting on” compliance with the

guidance during the site-by-site permitting process. 208 F.3d at

1023.

The Coalition protests that, although the current version of

the HHRAP employs language of suggestion, an earlier version

contained the language of command. It stresses that EPA issued

the current version after we issued Appalachian Power, and that

the agency expressly stated that it had edited the document’s

language in response to that decision. See Final Rule, 70 Fed.

Reg. at 59,513. But we can hardly fault EPA for responding to

an opinion of this court. There is nothing improper about an

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36

agency changing its language in light of one of our decisions or

relying on the new language to defend itself upon judicial

review. The Coalition is right, of course, that an agency’s

pronouncement that a document is non-binding will not make it

so where there is evidence -- or practice -- to the contrary. See

Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1023. But the Coalition points

to no such evidence here, and we have previously relied on

similar disclaimers as relevant to the conclusion that a guidance

document is non-binding. See Molycorp, 197 F.3d at 546;

American Portland Cement Alliance, 101 F.3d at 776.

In short, having limited itself to a challenge based solely on

whether the HHRAP guidance document is binding on its face,

the Coalition has failed to point to any evidence suggesting that

the document is anything other than what EPA asserts it is: a

non-binding statement of EPA policy. Accordingly, we

conclude that the HHRAP is not a final “regulation . . . or

requirement” under RCRA § 7006(a)(1), and therefore that we

are without jurisdiction to review it.

V

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the Coalition’s petition

for review with respect to its challenge to 40 C.F.R. § 270.10(l).

With respect to its challenge to the HHRAP guidance document,

we dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

So ordered.

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APPENDIX

40 C.F.R. § 270.10

§ 270.10 General application requirements.

* * * *

(l) If the Director concludes, based on one or more of the factors

listed in paragraph (l)(1) of this section that compliance with the

[MACT standards] alone may not be protective of human health

or the environment, the Director shall require the additional

information or assessment(s) necessary to determine whether

additional controls are necessary to ensure protection of human

health and the environment. This includes information

necessary to evaluate the potential risk to human health and/or

the environment resulting from both direct and indirect exposure

pathways. The Director may also require a permittee or

applicant to provide information necessary to determine whether

such an assessment(s) should be required.

(1) The Director shall base the evaluation of whether

compliance with the [MACT standards] alone is protective

of human health or the environment on factors relevant to

the potential risk from a hazardous waste combustion unit,

including, as appropriate, any of the following factors:

(i) Particular site-specific considerations such as

proximity to receptors (such as schools, hospitals,

nursing homes, day care centers, parks, community

activity centers, or other potentially sensitive

receptors), unique dispersion patterns, etc.;

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(ii) Identities and quantities of emissions of persistent,

bioaccumulative or toxic pollutants considering

enforceable controls in place to limit those pollutants;

(iii) Identities and quantities of nondioxin products of

incomplete combustion most likely to be emitted and

to pose significant risk based on known toxicities

(confirmation of which should be made through

emissions testing);

(iv) Identities and quantities of other off-site sources of

pollutants in proximity of the facility that significantly

influence interpretation of a facility-specific risk

assessment;

(v) Presence of significant ecological considerations,

such as the proximity of a particularly sensitive

ecological area;

(vi) Volume and types of wastes, for example wastes

containing highly toxic constituents;

(vii) Other on-site sources of hazardous air pollutants

that significantly influence interpretation of the risk

posed by the operation of the source in question;

(viii) Adequacy of any previously conducted risk

assessment, given any subsequent changes in

conditions likely to affect risk; and

(ix) Such other factors as may be appropriate.

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