Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-3_11-cv-03770/USCOURTS-alnd-3_11-cv-03770-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeremy Keith Baker
Defendant
John Wesley Burch
Plaintiff
City of Florence
Defendant
Angie Hamilton
Defendant
Ronald Lansdell
Defendant
Luke McIntyre
Defendant
Kenneth Rager
Defendant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

JOHN WESLEY BURCH,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JEREMY KEITH BAKER, et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. CV-11-S-3770-NW

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,John Wesley Burch, commenced this action on October 28, 2011. His

pro se complaint was 32 pages long, and named five defendants: Jeremy Keith

Baker, an Alabama State Trooper; Angie Hamilton, an Assistant District Attorney for

Lauderdale County, Alabama; Ronald Lansdell, an investigator employed by the

Lauderdale County District Attorney; the City of Florence, Alabama; and Luke

McIntyre, an officer of the Florence, Alabama police force. Plaintiff’s claims arose

from an allegedly unlawful arrest that occurred on October 28, 2009. 

1

Before serving any of those defendants with process and copies of his original

complaint, however, plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 17, 2011. 

That pleading was 79 pages long — more than twice the length of the original. 

2

 Doc. no. 1 ¶¶ 3-7. 1

 Doc. no. 3. 2

FILED

 2013 Jan-02 PM 01:00

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 1 of 21
Defendants Angie Hamilton and Ronnie Lansdell jointly filed a motion for

more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(e) on

January 17, 2012. Defendant Jeremy Keith Baker filed a similar motion two days 3

later. Hamilton, Lansdell, and Baker argued that plaintiff’s amended complaint was 4

deficient for several reasons: e.g., it was a “shotgun” pleading; it was excessively

long; several of the numbered paragraphs contained multiple statements of fact, rather

than a single discrete fact; several of the paragraphs were misnumbered; the

complaint contained speculation and legal conclusions, rather than statements of fact;

and the complaint failed to divide plaintiff’s claims into discrete counts. All three

5

defendants requested that plaintiff be ordered to file an amended complaint that

complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion jointly filed by

Hamilton and Lansdell additionally requested that the amended complaint be limited

to ten pages in length. Plaintiff was ordered — not just once, but twice — to file his 6

responses to those motions by February 3, 2012, but he failed to do so. 

7

 Doc. no. 7. 3

 Doc. no. 10. 4

See generally doc. no. 8 (Brief in Support of Motion for More Definite Statement of 5

Lansdell and Hamilton), doc. no. 11 (Brief in Support of Motion for More Definite Statement of

Baker).

 Doc. no. 8, at 7. 6

 Doc. no. 9 (Jan. 18, 2012 Order to Respond To Hamilton and Lansdell motion); doc. no. 7

12 (Jan. 19, 2012 Order to Respond to Baker motion).

2

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 2 of 21
The City of Florence, Alabama, filed a motion to dismiss on February 2, 2012, 

based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). The City argued that the

complaint contained no factual allegations regarding the City as an entity, and that

the statute of limitations had expired. On the same day, defendant Luke McIntyre

8

filed a motion for a more definite statement, raising the same arguments stated in the

motions previously filed by the other individual defendants. McIntyre requested that 9

plaintiff be ordered to replead his complaint, and that the new complaint be limited

to twenty pages. McIntyre and the City of Florence also jointly filed a motion to 10

stay discovery and suspend their obligation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26,

pending disposition of the motions to dismiss and for more definite statement. The 11

court ordered plaintiff to respond to those motions by February 17, 2012. 

12

Plaintiff did not strictly respond to any of the pending motions. Instead, on

February 9, 2012, he filed a motion for leave to submit a “consolidated response.” 

Plaintiff stated that he “would be prejudiced by filing a response that addressed only

the issues and concerns aired in any one or multiple Defendant’s motion [sic] for

Doc. no. 13. As discussed below, the City was dismissed from the case after plaintiff filed 8

his second amended complaint that did not include the City as a defendant. See doc. no. 39 (Order

entered Apr. 16, 2012).

 Doc. no. 15. 9

Id. ¶ 7. 10

 Doc. no. 16. 11

 Doc. no. 17 (Order to Respond). 12

3

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 3 of 21
more definite statement without also addressing the issues and concerns raised in all

such filed motions”; therefore, he requested leave “to file a single more definite

statement that will function as a consolidated Response to Respective Defendant’s

Motions for More Definite Statement . . . .” Plaintiff requested the same filing 13

deadline already in place for his responses to the motions of the City and McIntyre: 

i.e., February 17, 2012. This court granted plaintiff’s motion. 

14 15

Thus, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on February 17, 2012. That

16

pleading removed the City of Florence as a defendant — thus ending its involvement

in this case — but added another defendant: Kenneth Rager, a digital forensics 17

investigator employed by the Alabama Department of Revenue. The second 18

amended complaint is 159 pages long, exclusive of exhibits. It contains 424 19

numbered paragraphs, twenty-four footnotes, and seven counts. 

20

In response to plaintiff’s second amended complaint, defendants McIntyre,

Hamilton and Lansdell jointly, and Baker filed on March 2, 2012 motions to dismiss

 Doc. no. 18, at 2 (emphasis in original). 13

Id. 14

 Doc. no. 19 (Order Granting Motion for Leave to File Consolidated Response). 15

 Doc. no. 20 (Second Amended Complaint).

16

 See doc. no. 39 (Order entered Apr. 16, 2012), at 2 (dismissing City from the case). 17

See id. ¶ 7. 18

See generally id. 19

 See generally id. 20

4

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 4 of 21
this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff timely 21

responded to those motions on March 20, 2012. 

22

Kenneth Rager, the new defendant named in the second amended complaint,

was served on March 16, 2012. After obtaining an extension of time to answer, 23

Rager filed his own motion for a more definite statement on April 12, 2012. That 24

motion differs from the motions for a more definite statement filed by the other

defendants, in that Rager’s motion addresses plaintiff’s second — rather than his first

— amended complaint. Rager subsequently filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 41(b). Plaintiff has not responded

25

to either of Rager’s motions.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) 

According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, when a plaintiff “fails to

prosecute or comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to

dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The power to

See doc. no. 22 (Motion to Dismiss by Luke McIntyre); doc. no. 23 (Motion to Dismiss by 21

Jeremy Keith Baker); doc. no. 26 (Motion to Dismiss by Angie Hamilton and Ronald Lansdell).

Doc. no. 32 (Plaintiff’s Response to McIntyre’s Motion to Dismiss); doc. no. 33 (Plaintiff’s 22

Joint Response to Motions to Dismiss by Baker, Hamilton, and Lansdell).

 Doc. no. 34 (Executed Summons). 23

 Doc. no. 37 (Motion for More Definite Statement by Kenneth Rager).

24

 Doc. no. 46 (Motion to Dismiss by Kenneth Rager). 25

5

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 5 of 21
dismiss under Rule 41(b) is discretionary. Even so, the district court’s discretion is

tempered by the requirement that there be “a clear record of ‘willful’ contempt and

an implicit or explicit finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Gratton v.

Great American Communications, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999); see also,

e.g., Reed v. Fulton County Government, 170 F. App’x 674, 675-76 (11th Cir. 2006)

(same); Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecommunications Inc., 146 F. App’x 368, 372 (11th

Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“Because dismissal with prejudice is a drastic sanction, a

district court may impose it only as a last resort, when: (1) the failure to comply with

a court order [or the federal rules] is a result of willfulness or bad faith, and (2) the

district court specifically finds that lesser sanctions will not suffice.”) (alteration

supplied, internal citations omitted). 

B. “Shotgun” Pleadings and Rules 8(a)(2), 8(d)(1), 10(b), and 12(e)

The Eleventh Circuit has frequently condemned so-called “shotgun pleadings.” 

See, e.g., Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1027 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(citing Morro v. City of Birmingham, 117 F.3d 508, 515 (11th Cir. 1997). “A shotgun

pleading is a pleading that incorporates every antecedent allegation by reference into

each subsequent claim for relief or affirmative defense.” Wagner v. First Horizon

Pharmacy Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2006); see also, e.g., Strategic

Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th

6

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 6 of 21
Cir. 2002); McMahon v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation Police Department, 455 F.

App’x 874, 877 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 

Shotgun pleadings implicate (and typically violate) several of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. For instance, Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain a

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”

and which gives the opposing party notice of the claim and its grounds. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis supplied); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007). Rule 8(d) states that “[e]ach allegation [in a pleading] must be

simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) (alterations and emphasis

supplied). Yet, there is nothing “short and plain,” or “simple, concise, and direct,”

about a shotgun pleading. If left undisturbed, such a pleading forces a court to “sift

through the facts presented and decide for [itself] which were material to the

particular cause of action asserted.” Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th

Cir. 1991) (alteration supplied). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 also provides

that: 

A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs,

each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A

later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading.

If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate

transaction or occurrence — and each defense other than a denial —

must be stated in a separate count or defense.

7

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 7 of 21
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (emphasis supplied). By definition, then, a shotgun pleading

“completely disregards Rule 10(b)’s requirement that discrete claims should be plead

in separate counts.” Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Anderson v. District Board of Trustees of Central FloridaCommunity College,

77 F.3d 364, 366-67 (11th Cir. 1996)). 

When a complaint takes the form of a “shotgun pleading,” the defendant is not

required to submit a responsive pleading. See Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366. Instead, the

defendant is encouraged — in fact, expected — to move for a more definite statement

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Id. If the defendant does not 26

take matters into his own hands, the court should address the issue sua sponte. See

Magluta, 256 F.3d at 1284-85 (noting that, when faced with a shotgun complaint, the

court should strike the complaint and require plaintiff to replead in accordance with

Rule 8); United States ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1354 n.6 (11th Cir.

2006); Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1133 (11th Cir. 2001). 

 The referenced Rule provides that: 26

A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a

responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party

cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a

responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details

desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed

within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court

may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

8

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 8 of 21
II. DISCUSSION

The original motions for a more definite statement filed by Baker, Hamilton

and Lansdell jointly, and McIntyre individually are due to be denied as moot. Those

27

motions addressed plaintiff’s first amended complaint, which has since been

superceded by his second amended complaint.

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is a classic “shotgun complaint” that

contravenes Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10. The first paragraph within

each numbered count realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth

in each of the preceding paragraphs of the complaint. The complaint does not offer

28

a “short and plain” statement of plaintiff’s claims, and its allegations are not “simple,

concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 8(d)(1). This court need not wade

through the entirety of the 159-page, 424-paragraph pleading in order to extensively

catalog how it violates Rule 8. Instead, the following extracts will serve to illustrate 29

the complaint’s typically verbose and convoluted nature. 

See doc. no. 7 (Motion for More Definite Statement by Angie Hamilton and Ronald 27

Lansdell); doc. no. 10 (Motion for More Definite Statement by Jeremy Keith Baker); doc. no. 15

(Motion for More Definite Statement by Luke McIntyre).

 Doc. no. 20-1 (Second Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 355, 363, 382, 391, 406, 411, 417. 28

Plaintiff contends that the length of a complaint is not sufficient, by itself, to render a

29

complaint improper. See doc. no. 32 (Response to McIntyre’s Motion to Dismiss) ¶ 4. But at

minimum, the length of a complaint is certainly a factor to be considered. Combined with its other

flaws, the court easily concludes that the second amended complaint does not meet the standards set

forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

9

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 9 of 21
240. Had Hamilton actually believed that probable cause existed

to believe that Plaintiff had committed the offense [sic] of stalking

offense as she advised Trooper Baker on seizing Plaintiffs property on

October 28, 2009, and then helped him draft the affidavit for search

warrant as to the stalking offense later that evening, and had Hamilton

actually believed that probable cause existed as to the same search

warrant as to the stalking offense, this time additionally bolstered by the

fabricated “smoking gun” images allegedly taken of Trooper Baker or

his car priorto the stop on October 28, 2009, and additionally bolstered

by the addition to her fraudulent presentation of Plaintiffs alleged

verbally communicated physical threat in the form of the notepad and

its transcribed writing of parts or all of the October 28, 2009 cellular

phone conversation between Plaintiff and Lansdell, then Hamilton, upon

the district court's supreme graciously finding as to probable cause as to

the stalking offense would have had no reason not to have sought an

indictment.

241. Had Hamilton sought an indictment, however, consistent

with her hard fought claims as to existence of probable cause as to the

stalking offense,she would have surely been familiar with the “smoking

gun” photographic evidence of Trooper Baker that she had reported in

the face of the Plaintiffs [sic] denials at the November 12, 2009 hearing

as Trooper Baker was the only individual described in the affidavit in

support of search warrant who — between Defendant Baker’s own

fabricated claim of Plaintiffs [sic] August 7, 2009 photography of he and

his nephew at a Pure Gas Station in Killen, Alabama at 3:30 pm and

Hamilton’s complementary bolstering in the form of the fabricated claim

of evidence of Plaintiffs pre-arrest photographic stalking of Trooper

Baker on October 28, 2009 — would have met the Alabama’s stalking

statute's requirement that the victim be repeatedly followed.

242. In addition, as there was absolutely no proof whatsoever that

any of the photographs alleged in the affidavit had ever, in fact, been

taken, the stalking photograph(s) that Hamilton had alleged that Plaintiff

had taken of Trooper Baker and/or his patrol vehicle prior to the October

28, 2009 stop would have been the only supporting photographic

evidence that Hamilton would have had available to present to the grand

10

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 10 of 21
jury. Even if Hamilton had somehow decided not to present such

photographs to a grand jury, there is no reasonable or rational theory that

Hamilton had sought an indictment on the stalking offense and not been

have become aware of the fact that the photographs that she had claimed

existed were nowhere to be seen.

243. Hamilton’s superficially nonchalant admission that she had

never seen the photographs of Plaintiff stalking Trooper Baker and/or

his patrol car on October 28, 2009 — the same photographs she

emphatically claimed existed against Plaintiff’ [sic] denials on

November 12, 2009 and that Hamilton should have been very interested

in analyzing given the potential danger that these photographs suggested

Trooper Baker and his family were in — coupled with her still-stated

belief that investigator Rager had, in fact, identified the photographs of

Trooper Baker that she had claimed revealed Plaintiff's October 28,

2009 pre-stop staling of Baker, is quite telling. 

244. Because these photographs that Plaintiff had, through his

denials as to having taken such photographs, ostensibly perjured himself

over, and that would tend to suggest that Trooper Baker and his family

were being stalked by Plaintiff, were centrally relevant to Hamilton’s

supposed interest in prosecuting the Plaintiff for stalking, Hamilton’s

casual admission that she had never seen these photographs, but

accompanying profession in a belief as to their existence, is only

rationally explained by Hamilton’s actual knowledge that the

photographs thatshe ordered Rager to fraudulently document in an

evidentiary report never, in fact, existed, thus explaining her lack of

concern as to where the photographs bearing on Baker’s safety were

located, an individual who she knew was never being stalked, followed,

or photographed by Plaintiff.30

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint also violates Rule 10(b). For instance,

with the sole exception of Count II, all remaining counts of the seven-count pleading

 Doc. no. 20-1(Second Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 240-244 (all emphasis in original). 30

11

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state claims against multiple defendants. Moreover, many of the individually 31

numbered counts contain multiple legal claims for relief. Thus, for example, Count

IV alleges “[v]iolations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [for] First Amendment Retaliation, False

Arrest and Imprisonment, Illegal Search and Seizure, Malicious Prosecution,

Selective Prosecution, Abuse of Process, Law Enforcement Retaliatory Conduct,”

while Count V alleges “[v]iolations of State Law [for] False Arrest and Imprisonment,

Malicious and Selective Prosecution/Equal Protection Claim; Abuse of Process;

Outrage; False Light; Invasion Of Privacy; Intentional and Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress.” 

32

Such pleadings should not be permitted, as they place heavy burdens on the

litigants, as well as the court. See Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C., 305 F.3d at 1296

nn.9-10 (noting the negative effects of shotgun pleadings); Bryne, 261 F.3d at 1129-

32 (discussing the evils associated with shotgun complaints). 

The issue that confronts this court is whether to dismiss the second amended

complaint or require plaintiff to replead his claims. Considerations that bear upon

that decision exist not only in the present case, but also another action that previously

was filed in this court and dismissed on December 17, 2012: i.e., John Wesley Burch

 See id. ¶¶ 355-424. 31

 Id. at 147 (Heading to Count IV), 151 (Heading to Count V). 32

12

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 12 of 21
v. City of Florence, Alabama; Luke McIntyre; and Philip Moss, Civil Action No. 10-

s-2417-NW (hereafter, “the City of Florence case”). 

In the present case, none of plaintiff’s three complaints have even closely

approximated the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 or 10. After the

opposing parties identified and catalogued the problems with his first amended

complaint, plaintiff indicated that he would “address the concerns raised in each of 33

the various Defendant’s [sic] motion[s].” 

34

Yet, his second amended complaint also failed to comply with the Rules;

indeed, at 159 pages and 424 paragraphs, it is not rationally possible to argue

reasonably that the document constitutes a “a short and plain statement of the

[plaintiff’s] claim[s] showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” or that each

allegation is “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1) (alterations

supplied). Additionally, plaintiff refused to comply with this court’s two orders

directing him to respond to the defendants’ motions for a more definite statement by

February 3, 2012. 

35

E.g., doc. no. 8 (Brief in Support of Motion for More Definite Statement by Hamilton and 33

Lansdell), at 2-7; doc. no. 11 (Brief in Support of Motion for More Definite Statement by Jeremy

Baker), at 5-10; doc. no. 15 (Motion for More Definite Statement by Luke McIntryre), at 1-5; see

doc. no. 22 (Motion to Dismiss by Luke McIntyre), at 9-10 ¶ 11. 

 Doc. no. 18 (Motion for Leave to File Consolidated Responses), at 2. 34

 See supra note 7. 35

13

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As noted previously, however, this is not the only case in which this court has

battled to procure plaintiff’s compliance with either the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure or this court’s orders. The City of Florence case illustrates the difficulties

encountered when indulging plaintiff. In the memorandum opinion granting

summary judgment in favor of the defendants in that action, this court listed examples

of plaintiff’s disregard for court-ordered deadlines and procedures. As illustrated in

the following extracts from pages 3 through 9 of that opinion, plaintiff’s

transgressions included: failure to timely provide initial disclosures; failure to

comply with the court’s order to respond to a motion to compel; delaying the

scheduling of his deposition for over six months; repeatedly requesting “emergency”

filing arrangements, after the normal closing hours for the Clerk of Court; filing a

repetitious motion to consolidate after the plaintiff’s motion for joinder had been

denied; multiple failures to timely respond to a motion for summary judgment; filing

documents in the wrong judicial district; and repeated violations of court-ordered

briefing requirements. This court began the City of Florence opinion by observing 36

that: 

Plaintiff did not submit any evidence, or a brief, in opposition to

defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In fact, plaintiff has a

Burch v. City of Florence, No. CV-10-S-2417-NW, slip op. at 3-12 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 17, 36

2010) 

14

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 14 of 21
history of missing court-ordered deadlines and disregarding the court’s

procedures throughout this litigation. For example, on August 17, 2011,

the court granted defendants’ motion to compel discovery and ordered

plaintiff to serve defendants with his initial disclosures and responses to

all of defendants’ written discovery requests. Plaintiff had failed to

comply with the court’s order to respond to defendants’ motion to

compel, and had instead attempted to provide discovery responses to

defendants’ attorney via electronic mail. Plaintiff was advised that he

would be required to strictly comply with the court’s orders in the

future, and that communicating with opposing counsel was not sufficient

to comply with his duty to respond to a court order. 

On December 2, 2011, after approximately six months of

unsuccessfully attempting to schedule plaintiff’s deposition and

otherwise obtain discovery from him, defendants filed a motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s claims for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff was ordered

to show cause why defendants’ motion should not be granted; and, while

he filed two separate responses to the show cause order, he never

explained his failures to meaningfully engage in the discovery process,

but instead filed more than sixty pages of argument on the merits of his

claims. Affording plaintiff leeway because of his pro se status, this

court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss on January 6, 2012, and

advised plaintiff that it would expect his future compliance with court

orders and the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

despite his pro se status. The court extended the discovery deadlines in

order to provide plaintiff yet another opportunity to comply with his

discovery obligations, and cautioned plaintiff that if he did not appear

for deposition at a time and place of defendants’ choosing by February

6, 2012, his case would be dismissed without further notice. 

Plaintiff later sought a further extension of the discovery

deadlines, which the court granted, but advised plaintiff that it would be

his final extension. The court also noted that plaintiff had developed an

unnecessary habit of requesting the Clerk of Court to make emergency

arrangements to accept his filings after hours, and informed plaintiff that

all future filings must be received by the Clerk no later than 4:30 o’clock

p.m. The court also stated:

15

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If plaintiff makes any future special requests for late

filings, he will be required to submit with the filing a

detailed, sworn statement of the nature of his alleged

emergency. If the court deems plaintiff’s statement to be

insufficient, plaintiff may be subject to sanctions, including

having his pleading stricken from the record, for abuse of

the court’s procedures. Forgetting a deadline or other lack

of diligence will not be an acceptable excuse. Even though

plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he still must be expected to

comply with basic court rules and procedures.

On May 25, 2012, plaintiff filed 304 pages of briefing and

evidence in support of a motion for joinder of this case with another

lawsuit he filed in this district. As plaintiff’s motion for joinder

essentially was a repetition of his previous motion to consolidate, it was

denied. In the order denying the motion for joinder, the court noted that

plaintiff had devoted the overwhelming majority of his voluminous brief

to a superfluous discussion of the merits of his claims. In order to

prevent any future waste of the court’s (and plaintiff’s) time, plaintiff

was cautioned that he should not argue the underlying merits of his case

in every filing, and that any future briefs filed in support of or in

opposition to a motion should address only the limited issues implicated

by such motions. The court also mandated that all future briefs by either

party should not exceed 40 pages of double-spaced, fourteen-point (or

larger) type, unless advance permission had been granted, and advised

that any non-compliant briefs would be stricken. 

Defendants filed their motions for summary judgment on June 11,

2012. The court entered two separate orders that same day, requiring

plaintiff to respond to both motions by July 3, 2012, and reminding him

that his responses must comply with the requirements of the Appendix

to the Uniform Initial Order. Plaintiff did not respond to either motion

for summary judgment before July 3. Instead, the Clerk’s Office notes

indicate that plaintiff telephoned that office at approximately 4:15

o’clock p.m. on July 2, to inquire who would be serving as the “after

hours clerk” that day. He also advised the Clerk’s Office staff that he

would be in Huntsville to file a pleading at approximately 5:15 or 5:30

16

Case 3:11-cv-03770-CLS Document 48 Filed 01/02/13 Page 16 of 21
o’clock p.m. that day. Plaintiff did not arrive in Huntsville by 5:30 on

July 2 to file his pleading. Instead, he placed it in the overnight drop

box at the Clerk’s Office of the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Alabama in Montgomery, Alabama. The Middle

District subsequently forwarded plaintiff’s pleading, which was a

motion for extension of time to respond to defendants’ motions for

summary judgment, and for leave to exceed the page limitation, to this

court for filing, and it was accepted and placed on the docket of this case

on July 5, 2012. This court leniently granted plaintiff an extension until

July 24 to respond to defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The

court also allowed plaintiff thirty pages to respond to the motion filed

by the City, and fifty pages to respond to the motion filed by McIntyre

and Moss. The court advised plaintiff that his briefs otherwise must

strictly comply with the requirements of the Appendix to the Uniform

Initial Order, and cautioned him that any non-compliant briefs would be

stricken. The court also ordered that all future filings by either party

were required to be made by 4:30 o’clock p.m. on the day they were due,

with no exceptions, and no provisions to be made for late or noncompliant filings.

Despite the court’s clear directives, plaintiff did not file a

response to either motion for summary judgment before July 24. Indeed,

the court heard nothing further from plaintiff until August 17, 2012,

when he filed a “motion requesting leave to file out of time motion to

strike with incorporated memorandum in excess of page limitation.”

The essence of plaintiff’s motion was a request for this court to strike

any affidavits from witnesses that had not previously been disclosed,

and to strike any testimony about subject matters that had not previously

been discussed. Plaintiff’s motion for leave wasthirteen pages long, and

the proposed motion to strike appended to the motion for leave was

ninety-two pages in length, and was accompanied by an additional

thirty-nine pages of exhibits. As plaintiff’s motion failed to comply with

the court’s previous directives, it was summarily denied on August 30,

2012. On September 21, 2012, plaintiff filed a “motion requesting leave

to file out of time motion to strike with incorporated memorandum of

law in excess of page limitation.” The motion to strike that plaintiff

sought to file covered eighty-seven pages and asked the court to strike

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defendants’ “dashcam evidence,” i.e., the patrol car video recording of

one of the primary incidents forming the basis of plaintiff’s claims. The

court summarily denied plaintiff’s motion on September 26, 2012 —

again, because it did not comply with the court’s prior, repeated

directives. 

Plaintiff never filed, or attempted to file, any response to

defendants’ summary judgment motion that would have come even close

to complying with the requirements of the Appendix to the Uniform

Initial Order. . . .

Burch v. City of Florence, No. CV-10-S-2417-NW,slip op. at 3-9 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 17,

2010) (footnotes omitted). 

37

With regard to the statement in the last paragraph of the quotation from the City of 37

Florence opinion — i.e., that plaintiff neither filed nor attempted to file a response to the defendants’

motion for summary judgment that complied with the requirements of the Appendix to the this

court’s “Uniform Initial Order” — that Appendix contains the following requirements, among

others: 

D. Manner of Stating Facts

All briefs submitted either in support of or opposition to a motion must begin

with a statement of allegedly undisputed relevant material facts set out in separately

numbered paragraphs. Counsel must state facts in clear, unambiguous, simple,

declarative sentences. All statements of fact must be supported by specific reference

to evidentiary submissions. 

1. Moving Party’s Initial Statement of Facts

The moving party shall list in separately numbered paragraphs each material

fact the movant contends is true and not in genuine dispute, and upon which the

moving party relies to demonstrate that it is entitled to summary judgment. Each

such statement must be followed by a specific reference to those portions of the

evidentiary record that the movant claims supports it.

2. Opposing Party’s Statement of Facts

Each party opposing a summary judgment motion also must submit a

statement of facts divided as follows.

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For such reasons, this court is sorely inclined to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

Even so, the court is not convinced that the Eleventh Circuit would approve of

basing such an extreme sanction on the plaintiff’s derelictions in a separate case. 

Stated differently, the court suspects that the Circuit might decide that each case, like

a pot, must sit upon its own bottom. Consequently, the court finds that the better

a. Response to Movant’s Statement

The first section must consist of only the non-moving party’s disputes, if any,

with the moving party’s claimed undisputed facts. The non-moving party’s response

to the moving party’s claimed undisputed facts shall be in separately numbered

paragraphs that coincide with those of the moving party’s claimed undisputed facts. 

Any statements of fact that are disputed by the non-moving party must be followed

by a specific reference to those portions of the evidentiary record upon which the

dispute is based. All material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving

party will be deemed to be admitted for summary judgment purposes unless

controverted by the response of the party opposing summary judgment.

b. Additional Undisputed Facts

The second section may contain additional, allegedly undisputed facts set out

in separately numbered paragraphs that the opposing party contends require the

denial of summary judgment. The second section of the opposing party’s statement

of facts, if any, shall be clearly designated as such. The opposing party should

include only facts which the opposing party contends are true and not in genuine

dispute.

c. Additional Disputed Facts

The third section may contain additional, allegedly disputed facts set out in

separately numbered paragraphs that the opposing party contends require the denial

of summary judgment. The third section of the opposing party’s statement of facts,

if any, shall be clearly designated as such. Each statement of allegedly disputed facts

must be followed by specific reference to those portions of the evidentiary record

which both support and contradict the alleged fact.

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course is to allow plaintiff one last opportunity — and one only — to comply with

both the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the orders

of this court. 

Consequently, the motions to dismiss filed by defendants Luke McIntyre,

Jeremy Keith Baker, Angie Hamilton, Ronald Lansdell, and Kenneth Rager are

overruled, but Kenneth Rager’smotion formore definite statement is GRANTED;

38 39

and, it is ORDERED that plaintiff, John Wesley Burch, file a third amended

complaint on or before Wednesday, January 16, 2013. It is further ORDERED that

such third amended complaint must fully comply with all of the following

requirements, without exception: 

1. The complaint must not exceed twenty (20) pages of double-spaced, 14-point

type. 

2. The complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 8 and 10 discussed above. 

3. The complaint must be filed in the Clerk’s office in the United States

Courthouse located at 101 Holmes Avenue, Huntsville, Alabama 35801, not

later than the close of business (i.e., 4:30 o’clock p.m. Central Standard

Time) on Wednesday, January 16, 2013. 

a. No “emergency,” after-hours filing will be permitted or accepted;

See doc. no. 22 (Motion to Dismiss by Luke McIntyre); doc. no. 23 (Motion to Dismiss by 38

Jeremy Keith Baker); doc. no. 26 (Motion to Dismiss jointly filed by Angie Hamilton and Ronald

Lansdell); and doc. no. 46 (Motion to Dismiss by Kenneth Rager). 

See doc. no. 37. 39

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and, without question, no filings in the Middle District of Alabama as

previously occurred in the City of Florence case will be sanctioned. 

Any deviation from the foregoing requirements will subject plaintiff to the sanction

of dismissal of all claims. 

DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of January, 2012. 

______________________________

United States District Judge

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