Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02110/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02110-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Stokes
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL . J 

United States Co\. : i; af Appealr Ttmth Ci!-r.ult 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FEB 2 3 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

GERALD STOKES, a/k/a Jerry 

Stokes, and ROBERT STOKES, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Nos. 92-2109, 92-2110 

(D.C. Nos. CIV-92-0175-JB; 

CIV-92-0176-JB; CR-88-31-03; 

CR-88-31-04) 

(D. New Mexico) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(e); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate the 

imposition of sentence filed under 28 u.s.c. § 2255. The sentence 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-2110 Document: 010110175844 Date Filed: 02/23/1993 Page: 1 
under attack is a guideline sentence entered as an alternative to 

a contemporaneous non-guideline sentence. The procedure was 

adopted by the sentencing court prior to Mistretta v . United 

States, 488 U. S. 361 (1989), but after the sentencing court had 

held the guidelines unconstitutional. We affirm. 

At the time of the imposition of sentences in these cases, 

the sentencing court had ruled guideline sentences would be 

"precluded" because of the court's prior determination on the 

constitutionality of the guidelines. That ruling notwithstanding, 

after pronouncing a non-guideline sentence, the court stated: 

"Further, in the event the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is found 

to be constitutional, the following sentence is imposed in ·the 

alternative." The court then proceeded to impose a sentence in 

d . h h 'd 1· 1 

accor ance wit t e gui e ines. Neither defendant objected, even 

though both now claim they were not given notice of the court's 

intent to impose an alternative sentence and were surprised by the 

court's action, and neither appealed the imposition of the 

guideline sentence . 

Consequently, the questions of the so-called "dual sentence" 

and the lack of notice thereof were not raised until the filing of 

the§ 2255 petition some three and a half years later. 

appeal follows the district court's denial of the petition. 

This 

Defendants urge we should be guided by United States v. 

Martin, 913 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1990 ) , which held, under the 

circumstances of that case, the district court's imposition of a 

1 Although the defendants were sentenced at.different hearings, 

the identical statement was used by the court in both instances. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2110 Document: 010110175844 Date Filed: 02/23/1993 Page: 2 
"dual sentence" was improper. 

Martin than the case warrants. 

Defendants place more faith in 

In a split decision, the Sixth Circuit ruled an alternative 

guideline sentence invalid on jurisdictional grounds. Instead of 

incorporating the guideline and non-guideline sentences in the 

written judgment of conviction, the sentencing court first entered 

a formal written judgment on the non-guideline sentence and then 

recorded its guideline sentence in a journal entry twenty days 

later. After Mistretta, the district court attempted to revive 

the alternative guideline sentence. On its own motion, 134 days 

after entry of the original sentence, the district court entered 

an order effecting the guideline sentence. The circuit court 

pointed out, however, the period for appealing the original 

sentence had expired; therefore, the district court's sentencing 

jurisdiction had lapsed, and it was powerless to enter the 

'd 1 · 2 gui e ine sentence . That is not the situation here. 

In this instance, the written judgment of conviction contains 

both sentences. Since the guideline sentence was included in the 

original judgment, the jurisdictional problem solved by the Martin 

court does not even arise. 

Defendants raise an additional point. They argue once the 

district court accepts the terms of a plea agreement, it is bound 

thereby . Thus, they contend, the district court had to apply the 

plea agreement, and sentence them under the pre-guideline law. 

2 Although defendants suggest in their brief the case was 

decided on due process grounds, that issue was not present in the 

case. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2110 Document: 010110175844 Date Filed: 02/23/1993 Page: 3 
Implicit in the argument is the fact that defendants entered into 

a plea agreement which mandated use of pre-guideline sentencing. 

There is no plea agreement in the record, and nothing indicates 

such a term was incorporated into the plea agreement actually 

approved by the district court. Thus, the record does not supply 

a factual basis for the argument, and the cases relied upon by 

defendants requiring a district court to enforce plea agreements 

are inapposite. 

The government cites, and the district court relied upon, 

United States v . Brittman, 872 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 493 U.S. 865 (1989) , 3 which held valid a sentencing scheme 

comparable to that employed by the district court in this case. 

We agree with the Eighth Circuit's analysis, 

defendants argue the case is distinguishable. 

even though 

Defendants contend because the district court in this case 

had advised them they would not be sentenced under the guidelines, 

it should be forced to abide by its promise. To the extent that 

argument could be well taken, it has been waived by the 

defendants' failure to object and to appeal from the sentence. 

We have previously held the failure to raise a nonconstitutional issue on direct appeal when the defendant was able 

to do so ordinarily will bar collateral review of that issue under 

§ 2255. United States v. Gattas, 862 F.2d 1432, 1435 (10th Cir. 

1988). We have also held § 2255 cannot be used to test the 

3 The government also cites United States v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 

250 (10th Cir. 1989), cert . denied, 494 U.S. 1070 (1990), but 

because the issue of the validity of the dual sentencing was not 

before the court, the statement we made about it is pure dictum. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2110 Document: 010110175844 Date Filed: 02/23/1993 Page: 4 
legality of matters which should have been raised on appeal. 

United States v. Khan, 835 F.2d 749, 753 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. 

denied, 487 U.S. 1222 (1988). A defendant can overcome this bar 

only by showing cause for the procedural default and actual 

prejudice resulting from the alleged sentencing error. United 

States v. Frady. 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982) . Defendants have 

done neither. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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