Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03364/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03364-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Does
Appellee
United States of America
Appellee
Alma L. Van Skiver
Appellant
Raymond J. Van Skiver
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RAYMOND J. VAN SKIVER; ALMA L. VAN 

SKIVER, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; and JOHN 

DOES, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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FILED 

United States Co~<?£ Appeals Tent."l C1rcu1t 

APPEALS 0 E C 3 0 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-3364 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 89-1470-C) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Raymond J. Van Skiver, pro se. 

Shirley D. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, Gary R. Allen, 

William S. Estabrook, and Annette M. Wietecha, Tax Division, 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-3364 Document: 01019337696 Date Filed: 12/30/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs-appellants Raymond and Alma Van Skiver appeal from 

a district court order, reported as Van Skiver v. United States, 

751 F. Supp. 1522 (D. Kan. 1990), denying their motion to 

reconsider the district court's judgment entered in favor of 

defendants the United States and John Does. 1 Because we find no 

abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

Plaintiffs, acting pro se, brought this action against the 

United States and John Does alleging three causes of action: 

wrongful levy, unauthorized disclosure of tax return information, 

and quiet title to real and personal property seized by the 

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in partial satisfaction of 

plaintiffs' tax liability. The United States filed a motion to 

dismiss alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure 

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This motion 

was granted in part and denied in part by the district court. 

Subsequently, the district court, on July 16, 1990, entered a 

final order granting summary judgment in favor of the United 

States as to the claims that remained against it and dismissing 

the entire complaint as to the John Does since they had not been 

identified and the time for effecting service under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j) had expired. 

On July 31, 1990, plaintiffs filed their motion for 

reconsideration. See II R. tab 33. Their motion focused 

1 After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-3364 Document: 01019337696 Date Filed: 12/30/1991 Page: 2 
exclusively on plaintiffs' claim to quiet title. Plaintiffs' 

complaint sought to quiet title based on numerous procedural 

irregularities in the assessment of taxes and in the seizure and 

sale of property. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged in their 

complaint that the IRS (1) failed to assess their tax liability in 

accordance with the procedures required by 26 U.S.C. § 6203; 

(2) failed to serve the notices and demands required by 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6303; and (3) failed to comply with the service requirements of 

26 u.s.c. § 6335(a) and (b) for notices of sale and seizure. 

Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was directed at the 

district court's rejection of the alleged procedural lapses under 

26 u.s.c. §§ 6203 and 6335. The district court found the motion 

was not appropriate under the circumstances but also denied it on 

the merits on November 28, 1990. Plaintiffs filed their notice of 

appeal on December 7, 1990. 

This case illustrates the dangers of filing a self-styled 

"motion to reconsider." The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do 

not recognize a "motion to reconsider." Instead, the rules allow 

a litigant subject to an adverse judgment to file either a motion 

to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) 

or a motion seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). These two rules are distinct; they serve 

different purposes and produce different consequences. Which rule 

applies to a motion depends essentially on the time a motion is 

served. If a motion is served within ten days of the rendition of 

judgment, the motion ordinarily will fall under Rule 59(e). See 

Dalton v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 863 F.2d 702, 703-04 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-3364 Document: 01019337696 Date Filed: 12/30/1991 Page: 3 
(lOth Cir. 1988) ("post-judgment motions filed within ten days of 

the final judgment should, where possible, be construed as Rule 

59(e) motions"). If the motion is served after that time it falls 

under Rule 60(b). See Wilson v. Al McCord, Inc., 858 F.2d 1469, 

1478 (lOth Cir. 1988) ("Because more than ten days had elapsed 

before the filing of the motion to reconsider, we construe it as a 

motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) .... ") (citation 

omitted)). 

In this case, plaintiffs' motion to reconsider was not served 

within ten days of the district court's judgment. 2 Therefore, the 

motion must be construed as one pursuant to Rule 60(b). 

Plaintiffs' appeal from the denial of the motion raises for review 

only the district court's order of denial and not the underlying 

judgment itself. United States v. 31.63 Acres of Land, 840 F.2d 

760, 761 (lOth Cir. 1988); V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 

220, 224 (lOth Cir. 1979). 3 

2 The district court's judgment was filed July 16, 1990. Under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), the ten-day time period for plaintiffs to 

serve a Rule 59(e) motion expired on July 30, 1990. The 

certificate of service on plaintiffs' motion to reconsider is not 

dated. However, the motion itself is dated July 31, 1990, and the 

motion was filed with the district court on that day. 

3 There are no "unique circumstances" in this case which would 

permit us to overlook plaintiffs' failure to comply with the 

ten-day requirement under Rule 59(e) and treat this appeal as 

ra1s1ng the district court's underlying judgment for review. See 

Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 387 (1964); Stauber v. Kieser, 810 

F.2d 1, 1-2 (lOth Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court has recently 

articulated a strict construction of the "unique circumstances" 

doctrine and limited its application to situations "where a party 

has performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the 

deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance 

by a judicial officer that this act has been properly done." 

Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 u.s. 169, 179 (1989). Here, the 

district court, while considering plaintiffs' motion for 

Continued to next page 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-3364 Document: 01019337696 Date Filed: 12/30/1991 Page: 4 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. The district court noted 

that plaintiffs' brief in support of their motion "basically 

revisits, albeit in somewhat different forms, the same issues 

already addressed and dismissed by the court." 751 F. Supp. at 

1523. The court properly recognized that revisiting the issues 

already addressed "is not the purpose of a motion to reconsider," 

and "advanc[ing] new arguments or supporting facts which were 

otherwise available for presentation when the original summary 

judgment motion was briefed" is likewise inappropriate. On 

this basis alone we affirm the district court's denial of the 

motion to reconsider. 

This court need not, and does not, address the merits of the 

motion to reconsider because the plaintiffs have failed to 

demonstrate any basis for Rule 60(b) relief. See United States v. 

329.73 Acres of Land, 695 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1983). Relief 

under Rule 60(b) is discretionary and is warranted only in 

exceptional circumstances. Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill 

Hodges Trucking Co., 909 F.2d 1437, 1440 (lOth Cir. 1990). A 

litigant shows exceptional circumstances by satisfying one or more 

of Rule 60(b)'s six grounds for relief from judgment. 4 

Continued from previous page 

reconsideration on the merits, never 

plaintiffs that the motion was timely 

effective to toll the appeal period. 

action by the district court, the "un i_que 

is inapplicable. 

affirmatively assured 

under Rule 59(e) and 

In the absence of such 

circumstances" doctrine 

4 Rule 60(b) provides in pertinent part: 

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 

Continued to next page 

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Appellate Case: 90-3364 Document: 01019337696 Date Filed: 12/30/1991 Page: 5 
Plaintiffs' motion did not recite any of the exceptional 

circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b), nor does our 

reading of the record disclose any. In essence, plaintiffs' 

motion reiterated the original issues raised in their complaint 

and sought to challenge the legal correctness of the district 

court's judgment by arguing that the district court misapplied the 

law or misunderstood their position. Such arguments are properly 

brought under Rule 59(e) within ten days of the district court's 

judgment or on direct appeal but do not justify relief from the 

district court's judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). See,~, 

Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1988) (motion that 

"alleges no more than legal error and merely reiterates the 

arguments contained in the complaint" is a Rule 59(e) motion); 

31.63 Acres of Land, 840 F.2d at 761-62 & n.4 (argument that 

denial of attorneys' fees was based on a misapplication of the 

requirements of the Equal Access to Justice Act does not provide a 

basis for relief under Rule 60(b)); Swam v. United States, 327 

Continued from previous page 

may relieve a party or a party's legal representative 

from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 

following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 

or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 

which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 

time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 

(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse 

party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has 

been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 

judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 

otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 

judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any 

other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 

judgment." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-3364 Document: 01019337696 Date Filed: 12/30/1991 Page: 6 
F.2d 431, 433 (7th Cir.) (argument that district court 

"misconceived the character of the causes of action alleged in 

plaintiff's original complaint" does not come within the ambit of 

Rule 60(b)), cert. denied, 379 u.s. 852 (1964). 

The most favorable consideration that can be given to 

plaintiffs' motion, in light of their pro se status, see Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), is to treat it as one made under 

either Rule 60(b)(l) ("mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 

excusable neglect") or Rule 60(b)(6) ("any other reason justifying 

relief"). This court has recognized that in some instances relief 

may be granted under Rule 60(b)(l) on a theory of mistake of law, 

when, as here, the Rule 60(b) motion is filed before the time to 

file a notice of appeal has expired. Morris v. Adams-Millis 

Corp., 758 F.2d 1352, 1358 (lOth Cir. 1985). However, such relief 

is available only for obvious errors of law, apparent on the 

record. Alvestad v. Monsanto Co., 671 F.2d 908, 912-13 (5th Cir.) 

(relief under Rule 60(b)(l) limited to "perfunctory correction" of 

obvious errors of law), cert. denied, 459 u.s. 1070 (1982); ~ 

also Rocky Mountain Tool & Mach. Co. v. Tecon Corp., 371 F.2d 589, 

596-97 (lOth Cir. 1966) ("palpably erroneous award" of interest 

from date of filing counterclaim rather than from date of entry of 

judgment correctable under Rule 60(b)(l)). In this case, 

plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration did not allege any facially 

obvious errors of law. The motion argues issues primarily 

surrounding assessment of taxes in accordance with § 6203 and 

service requirements of § 6335. We do not intimate any view on 

the merits of the issues raised by plaintiffs, but we do recognize 

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Appellate Case: 90-3364 Document: 01019337696 Date Filed: 12/30/1991 Page: 7 
that the issues are arguable and do not rise to the level of 

facially obvious errors of law. Therefore, there is no basis for 

relief under Rule 60(b)(l). 

Rule 60(b)(6) has been described by this court as a "'grand 

reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case.'" 

Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 722 (lOth Cir. 1975) (en bane) 

(quoting Radack v. Norwegian Am. Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538, 

542 (2d Cir. 1963)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079 (1976). The kind 

of legal error that provides the extraordinary circumstances 

justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is illustrated by Pierce. 

In that case, this court granted relief under 60(b)(6) when there 

had been a post-judgment change in the law "arising out of the 

same accident as that in which the plaintiffs ... were injured." 

Pierce, 518 F.2d at 723. However, when the post-judgment change 

in the law did not arise in a related case, we have held that "[a] 

change in the law or in the judicial view of an established rule 

of law" does not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Collins v. 

City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (lOth Cir. 1958). In this 

case, plaintiffs' motion did not articulate any circumstances even 

remotely similar to Pierce, or any other unusual circumstances 

that would entitle them to relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of 

plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. We express no opinion on 

the merits of the arguments raised by plaintiffs in the motion and 

discussed by the district court. The United States' request for 

attorneys' fees on appeal is DENIED. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3364 Document: 01019337696 Date Filed: 12/30/1991 Page: 8