Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05157/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05157-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ford Motor Company
Appellee
Anita Maxine Slay
Not Party
James H. Slay
Not Party
Marilyn Slay
Appellant
Marilyn L. Slay
Appellant

Document Text:

' FILED 

United Stttli Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Cfroiit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MARILYN SLAY, as Personal Representative) 

of the Estate of JAMES ALBERT "BERT" ) 

SLAY, Deceased, on behalf of the Estate) 

of JAMES ALBERT "BERT" SLAY, Deceased; ) 

MARILYN L. SLAY, Surviving Spouse and ) 

Widow of JAMES ALBERT "BERT" SLAY; ) 

MARILYN L. SLAY, as Natural Mother and ) 

Next Friend of MELISSA F. SLAY and ) 

JAMES AARON SLAY, Minor Children of ) 

JAMES ALBERT "BERT" SLAY, Deceased, ) 

Plaintiff-Appellant 

JAMES H. SLAY; ANITA MAXINE SLAY, 

Surviving Parents of JAMES ALBERT 

SLAY, Deceased, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

"BERT") 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER ARD JUDGMENT* 

DEC 211990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-5157 

(D.C. No. 87-C-930-E) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 1 
The Appellant (hereinafter "Plaintiff") in this case is the 

widow of James Albert "Bert" Slay. 1 She presses this appeal, 

raising numerous issues, following a jury verdict for the Appellee 

Ford Motor Company (hereinafter "Ford"). The separate issues 

raised by the Plaintiff are dealt with in the body of this order 

and judgment and, for the reasons that follow, we affirm the 

1 There is a threshold question about whether the parents of 

James Slay are appealing from the district court's judgment. This 

question exists because of discrepancies in the notice of appeal 

and the Plaintiff's brief. 

The body of the notice of appeal states: "MARILYN SLAY, 

Plaintiff above named, by and through her attorney of record, 

Glenn R. Beustring, hereby appeals .... " However, the caption in 

the notice of appeal lists all the parties from the district court 

and the Plaintiff's brief on appeal says it is filed by "MARILYN 

SLAY, as Personal Representative of the Estate JAMES ALBERT 'BERT' 

SLAY, and on behalf of _herself as surviving widow, the minor 

children and parents of JAMES ALBERT 'BERT' SLAY .... " (Emphasis 

added.) 

Our rules provide: "The notice of appeal shall specify the 

party or parties taking the appeal." Fed. R. App. P. 3(c). 

Because the body of the notice of appeal fails to state the 

parents are appealing, they arguably are not before this court and 

any reference to them in any document filed on appeal is 

irrelevant. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 

317 (1988) (Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) is a jurisdictional requirement 

and is never waived); In re Woosley, 855 F.2d 687, 688 (10th Cir. 

1988) (same). See also Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting 

Equip., Inc., 857 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir. 1988) (when text of 

notice of appeal omits names contained in the caption, the text 

governs so only those named in the body of the notice of appeal 

are proper parties on appeal). But~ King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 

F.2d 438, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1988) (defendant had adequate notice 

even though notice of appeal caption did not name children, but 

only named father who was appealing on behalf of himself and his 

children). The Slay notice of appeal caption lists the parents as 

separate parties from Marilyn Slay and no mention is made of the 

parents in the body of the notice of appeal. Assuming, however, 

the parents would raise the same issues as Marilyn Slay, their 

presence or absence as parties is of no consequence to our 

decision. 

Finally, for purposes of clarity, any reference in this order 

and judgment to Plaintiff's brief in this court is actually a 

reference to Plaintiff's amended brief filed November 16, 1989. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 2 
judgment of the district court 

addressing Plaintiff's arguments, 

facts. 

I. 

as to all 

we first 

issues. Before 

briefly review the 

This case is a manufacturer's product liability action 

brought under diversity jurisdiction, 28 u.s.c. § 1332, following 

an accident involving the deceased and a 1982 Ford LTD automobile. 

The deceased, a police officer, was injured when he was pinned by 

the LTD, which was his police car, against another vehicle while 

he was on duty. The accident happened on October 28, 1986 when 

the deceased stopped and got out of the car to write some parking 

tickets. While unoccupiedj the car began to move toward a nearby 

parked truck and the deceased, alerted by a witness who saw what 

was happening, made a futile attempt to stop the car by pushing on 

its front. The car hit the truck, pinning the deceased between 

the two vehicles and breaking his hips. He died fourteen days 

later from complications attributable to the accident . 

. The deceased's family sued Ford for manufacturer product 

liability. They contended the car was "defective and unreasonably 

dangerous to its expected and foreseeable users and bystanders." 

They claimed the LTD automatic overdrive transmission (the "AOD 

transmission") was defectively designed. They said the 

transmission 

park. This 

unknowingly 

allowed a driver to make an incomplete gear shift to 

defect, they charged, would cause a driver to 

leave the car in neutral and allow the car to roll. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 3 
They further argued Ford was aware of the defect and failed to 

recall the car or warn customers and drivers. 

~ord denied the allegations and said the deceased did not put 

the car in park before exiting. Ford claimed there was no 

transmission failure. Instead, Ford said the deceased left the 

car in drive and blamed the accident on his alleged failure to use 

"ordinary care in the operation of the vehicle and his disregard 

of the dictates of common sense and safe and reasonably prudent 

procedures for the operation of such a vehicle." Having 

summarized the case, we now turn to the issues on appeal. 

II. 

Plaintiff believes the trial court erred by prohibiting her 

from presenting evidence to the jury concerning incidents 

occurring prior to 1980 relating to the alleged Ford transmission 

defect. 

said: 

At the pre-trial conference of May 8, 1989, the court 

The Court's view of the limitation of this case, 

after we have had our discussions here this afternoon, 

is that in its present posture we will deal with the AOD 

transmission which started in 1980 and plaintiff will 

present evidence of the alleged defects in the AOD 

transmission starting in 1980. However, X would allow 

the plaintiff to show~ basis for the development of the 

AOD transmission 12Y the letter that went out to Ford 

customers in 1981 dealing with transmissions between 

1971 to 1979. However, the plaintiff would be precluded 

from bringing forth incidents prior to 1980, incidents 

prior to the development of the AOD transmission. And 

that in my view is about the only fair way to 

circumscribe this case in its present posture, because 

the defendants have been dealing with a 1982 Ford LTD 

AOD transmission in their preparation. The plaintiffs 

say there is no possible way they could think that would 

be the limitation of it, but they represent to the Court 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 4 
that has been it. The plaintiff has been dealing in his 

preparation from the late 1960s forward. 

(Emphasis added.) Plaintiff wanted to introduce evidence about 

the alleged AOD transmission defect dating back to 1968. 

Plaintiff contends the limit on pre-1980 evidence prevented the 

jury from rendering a verdict on the merits of their claim, and 

argues the court's limit was "totally arbitrary and against the 

great weight of prior pleading and conduct of the parties." She 

believes the "jury is entitled to know Ford's knowledge and the 

historical background for the defect being contested." 

in original.) 

(Emphasis 

Ford responds by arguing the Plaintiff did not sufficiently 

cite to the trial record in her appellate brief indicating where 

she objected to the exclusion of this evidence during trial. 2 

Assuming Plaintiff properly briefed the issue to this court, Ford 

goes on to argue the trial judge correctly refused the evidence as 

cumulative and hearsay. According to Ford, the evidence could 

only be admitted to show Ford had notice and knowledge of the 

alleged transmission defect. Moreover, even if the judge could 

have admitted the evidence, Ford contends its exclusion damaged no 

2 Our rule regarding citation to the record provides: 

Whenever an appeal is based upon a failure to admit 

or exclude evidence, or the giving or refusal to give a 

particular jury instruction, or any other act or ruling 

for which a party must record an objection to preserve 

the right to appeal, the party shall state where in the 

record a proper objection was made to the ruling and 

whether the objection is recorded and ruled upon. 

10th Cir. R. 28.2(e). 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 5 
substantial right of the Plaintiff so as to require reversal on 

appeal under Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). 3 Ford believes the Plaintiff 

suffered no harm by excluding the evidence of the alleged 

transmission defect prior to 1980 because Ford admitted it 

"received notice of a claimed defect from owners and operators of 

motor vehicles that unexpected, inadvertent vehicle movement had 

resulted in situations where vehicles, unattended and attended, 

had moved and the customers were claiming that the vehicles moved 

as a result of a vehicle malfunction or vehicle fault." 

Plaintiff objected to this admission by Ford by stating it 

would prevent her from proving Ford knew of a transmission problem 

in the early 1970s and "Ford's knowledge of pre-1980 history of 

the design defect ... to establish the predicate for the duty to 

warn and on the foundation for punitive damages." The pre-trial 

order is part of the record on appeal and Plaintiff referred to 

this admission in her brief. Also, Ford refers to the transcript 

in its brief where the parties discussed at trial whether the 

Plaintiffs could make references to incidents of the alleged 

transmission defect before 1980. Thus, our attention is 

sufficiently directed to this issue on appeal. 

In its brief, Ford points out the trial court admitted a 1981 

letter from Ford informing owners the National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration ("NHTSA") determined pre-1980 Ford vehicle 

3 Fed. R. Evid. 103(a) states in relevant part: "Error may not 

be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 

unless a substantial right of the party is affected." 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 6 
transmissions were defective. 4 Also admitted was a Ford warning 

sticker and letter from Ford to its dealers discussing how to 

answer consumer questions about the alleged defect. 5 Furthermore, 

a forlller Ford engineer testified at trial that the first time he 

investigated an accident and determined it was caused by the 

consumer leaving the gear shift between park and reverse was 1977 

or 1978. Finally, the jury heard Ford's admission concerning the 

alleged transmission defect during jury instructions. 

As previously stated, Plaintiff believes the trial court's 

exclusion of voluminous pre-1980 evidence of the alleged 

transmission defect irreparably damaged her case. Plaintiff 

asserts the court was "vapor-locked" by its decision and argues 

the ruling deprived her of the legitimate moral force of her 

evidence. Plaintiff cites Wigmore for the proposition that a 

4 This exhibit was identified at trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit 

166-A. The NHTSA letter states, in relevant part: 

5 

On June 9, 1980, the National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA) made an initial 

determination that a defect which relates to motor 

vehicle safety exists in 1970-1979 and certain 1980 Ford 

vehicles equipped with FMX, C-3, C-4, C-6 or JATCO 

automatic transmissions. According to NHTSA's initial 

determination, the park gear may not be securely engaged 

after the operator has attempted to shift the gear 

selector lever to "P" (Park) and the transmission may 

shift to reverse by itself without warning, allowing the 

vehicle to move when it is unattended. NHTSA also 

initially determined that such uncontrolled vehicle 

movement may result and has resulted in injury to or 

death of the occupants of the vehicle or to persons 

outside the vehicle. 

The warning sticker accompanied the NHTSA letter sent to owners 

and was admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 166-B. The letter to Ford 

dealers was received as Plaintiff's Exhibit 154. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 7 
• "colorless admission by the opponent may sometimes have the effect 

of depriving the party of the legitimate moral force of his 

evidence; furthermore, a judicial admission may be cleverly made 

with grudging limitations or evasions or insinuations ... , so as 

to be technically but not practically a waiver of proof." 

9 Wigmore on Evidence § 2591 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (emphasis in 

original). 

The district court's decision to limit Plaintiff's 

introduction of pre-1980 evidence is a decision on whether to 

admit or exclude evidence and is generally governed by federal 

law. Romine v. Parman, 831 F.2d 944, 944-45 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Such a decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Boren v. 

Sable, 887 F.2d 1032, 1033 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. 

Rodriguez-Pando, 841 F.2d 1014, 1018 (10th Cir. 1988). 

noted: 

We have 

Fed. R. Evid. 103 instructs that unless a 

substantial right of the objecting party is affected, 

any error in the admission or exclusion of evidence is 

harmless. Consequently, we review the district court's 

evidentiary rulings by considering the record as a 

whole. The onus of establishing reversible error rests 

with the complaining party. 

Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(citations omitted). 

With this standard in mind, we affirm the district court's 

ruling rejecting the introduction of pre-1980 evidence of the 

alleged transmission defect. The court clearly did not prevent 

Plaintiff from introducing all evidence about Ford's notice and 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 8 
., knowledge. For example, there was no total ban on evidence 

addressing Ford's notice and knowledge going back almost seven 

years from the date of the October 1986 accident that injured 

Officer Slay. In addition, Ford admitted "notice of a claimed 

[transmission] defect from owners and operators of motor 

vehicles." This admission was read to the jury and Plaintiff's 

counsel was free 

Moreover, despite 

one instance during 

to refer to it during closing argument. 

the court's limiting order there was at least 

the trial where a former Ford engineer 

testified he was investigating transmission defect accidents as 

early as 1977 or 1978. Finally, the jury had three pieces of 

documentary evidence to refer to during deliberations indicating 

Ford knew of possible car transmission problems in 1980. 

Armed with this evidence, Plaintiff's counsel could plausibly 

argue to the jury that Ford had notice and knowledge about the 

alleged transmission defect well before Officer Slay was injured. 

There was sufficient evidence for counsel to argue there was both 

a "historical background" and a "predicate on Ford's duty to 

warn." Accordingly, we hold the district court's ! ·imitation on 

the introduction of old and cumulative evidence regarding Ford's 

notice and knowledge was not an abuse of discretion and no 

substantial right was affected. Fed. R. Evid. 103. 

We further perceive from Plaintiff's amended brief on appeal 

a complaint about the disclosure of information Ford made during 

discovery. Apparently, Plaintiff complains Ford was not 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 9 
forthright and intentionally failed to deliver reports of 

transmission defects requested during discovery. Ford identifies 

the problem as a difference between the parties in interpreting 

the scope of an interrogatory propounded by the Plaintiff to Ford. 

Reviewing the pre-trial conference transcript where this issue was 

discussed, we agree it was a discovery dispute between the 

parties. This dispute influenced the district court's decision to 

preclude the Plaintiff from introducing voluminous evidence at 

trial focusing on the alleged transmission defect prior to 1980, 

and to elicit the compromise admission from Ford concerning the 

complaints about its transmissions. The court was justifiably 

concerned at the pre-trial conference about the need to "define 

the issues to be tried in this case at this point because here we 

are moving the monster down to trial." 

While the Plaintiff unnecessarily provided us with a twentythree volume record plus three addenda to review on appeal, we 

have not found anywhere in this material the disputed 

interrogatory or Ford's response. 6 Nevertheless, viewing this 

6 Our rules are plain enough. Unnecessary transcripts contribute 

to the delay and expense of an appeal. 10th Cir. R. 10.1.1. 

"Only those portions of the transcript and original papers filed 

in the district court which are relevant to specific arguments 

made in the briefs may be designated for inclusion in the record 

on appeal. References to the record should not be made unless 

essential to the issues on appeal." 10th Cir. R. 10.2.1. 

When an 

admission 

pages of 

evidence, 

and any 

included. 

reproduced 

appeal is based upon a challenge to the 

or exclusion of evidence ... a copy of the 

the reporter's transcript at which the 

offer of proof, instruction, ruling, or order 

necessary objection are recorded must be 

It is intended that the number of pages 

from the reporter's transcript be strictly 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 10 
contention as a discovery dispute, which it was, we affirm the 

district court's decision by applying the abuse of discretion 

standard already mentioned. Our review of the record as a whole 

convinces us the district court did not abuse its discretion. 

Wheeler, 862 F.2d at 1407. See also Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 

478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984) (trial court decision to allow or deny 

discovery reviewed only for abuse of discretion). 

Plaintiff's next apparent comp~aint is that four pieces of 

documentary evidence were not admitted at trial. Three of the 

documents are Ford memoranda dating from 1971 and we find no error 

in their exclusion because they are merely cumulative evidence. 7 

The fourth document, which is also cumulative, is a 1985 

letter from a consumer to Ford complaining about an accident where 

she said she was injured by her Ford LTD Crown Victoria. She 

claimed the car started to roll after she parked it. The exhibit 

was offered and rejected by the trial court at a hearing. 

limited to those absolutely essential for review. 

10th Cir. R. 10.2.3 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff's counsel ignores these rules. For example, Volume 

IV of Plaintiff's record is labeled as an offer of proof that was 

presented to the trial judge. This "offer of proof" consists of 

two depositions of 189 pages and 139 pages respectively, given by 

a Ford witness from two other cases where he participated. Giving 

us complete and lengthy depositions from other cases is totally 

unnecessary and does not aid this Court in focusing on the legal 

issues necessary to decide this case. By so doing, Plaintiff's 

counsel violates our rules and acts without common sense. 

7 These documents are: Plaintiff's Exhibit 143; Plaintiff's 

Exhibit 144; and Plaintiff's Exhibit 145. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 11 
Plaintiff argued the exhibit was admissible on the issue of notice 

and for the reasons established in Rexrode v. American Laundry 

Press Co., 674 F.2d 826 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 

(1982). 8 

8 At the hearing concerning the admission of the document, the 

Plaintiff's attorney was questioning Lee Carr, a former Ford 

engineer, about his knowledge of the incident described in the 

letter. The following exchange took place: 

Q. (By Mr. Beustring) Are you familiar with an 

incident involving a 1984 LTD Crown Victoria and a lady 

by the name of Ms. Ida Fillion, F-I-L-L-I-O-N? 

A. I'm not sure. If I could see it perhaps I could 

tell you. 

MR. BEUSTRING: And marked Exhibit 282-AZ. 

Q. (By Mr. Beustring) 

incident, sir? 

Are you familiar with that 

A. No, sir, I am not. I have not investigated that. 

I have not seen any materials about it before. 

MR. BEUSTRING: I would offer then 282-AZ on the 

issue of notice and under the guidelines of Rexrode for 

the purpose of this hearing. 

THE COURT: The offer will be denied. 

MR. BEUSTRING: And in connection with the offer, 

while he's looking at the other one, if I might for the 

purpose of the record. This involved a lady who was 

married to a Ford person, a part-time salesman at a Ford 

agency. She stepped out of her car, placing it in park, 

she stepped out to check the mailbox. She hadn't closed 

the door yet but she noticed the car was rolling. Her 

first impulse was to get back in and reach for the 

brake. It sounds almost identical to the case that we 

are involved in. It rolled forward, she saw it coming, 

she grabbed the door, held on as tight as she could. 

She was not killed being the difference. The letter is 

dated October 22, 1985. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 12 
In Rexrode, the jury was present when counsel asked a witness 

if he was familiar with similar accidents involving a laundry 

press. On appeal, the defense objected to mentioning other 

accidents in front of the jury when the witness had no knowledge 

of them. In our decision, we expressed a preference for 

admissibility hearings conducted outside the presence of the jury. 

Id. at 830. Although that preference was not followed in Rexrode, 

we found no prejudice warranting reversal by the mere mention of 

the other cases in the jury's presence. Id. 

In this case, the court properly had an evidentiary hearing 

with the jury absent. Furthermore, while • evidence of similar 

accidents is admissible for purposes of notice of the alleged 

defect, admitting this exhibit would not establish notice since 

the witness testified at the hearing he had no knowledge of the 

incident recounted in the exhibit. Supra note 8. Moreover, 

because he had no knowledge of the incident described, the exhibit 

was also useless as an impeachment tool. Julander v. Ford Motor 

Co., 488 F.2d 839, 846 (10th Cir. 1973) (where witness testifies 

he has no personal knowledge of the complaints contained in an 

exhibit, the exhibit cannot be used to impeach the witness). 9 

9 In negligence cases, Julander allows admission of documents 

from other accidents "tending to show negligent design." 488 F.2d 

at 845. The Plaintiffs here did not sue for negligence. Their 

only cause of action was for manufacturer's product liability, 

more commonly known as strict liability. Oklahoma recognizes both 

causes of action. Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1308 

(Okla. 1975); Cochran v. Buddy Spencer Mobile Homes, Inc., 618 

P.2d 947, 949 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980). 

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Our review of the document convinces us exclusion is 

permissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 10 While the rule is to be 

used sparingly to exclude evidence, Wheeler, 862 F.2d at 1408, 

exclusion is allowed when there is a danger of jury confusion and 

unfair prejudice due to inflammatory and cumulative evidence that 

may unduly prolong the trial. Fed. R. Evid. 403. We do not 

reverse a trial court's decision to exclude evidence unless our 

review convinces us the trial court clearly abused its discretion 

and adversely affected the substantial rights of the parties. KB. Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1155-56 (10th 

Cir. 1985); see also Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). 

Most recently, we approved of the exclusion of cumulative 

evidence in C.A. Assoc. v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 89-1216, slip op., 

1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 2015 (10th Cir. Nov. 16, 1990). C.A. 

Associates sued Dow claiming a building material made by Dow was 

defective. The plaintiffs sought to introduce evidence from over 

twenty other buildings where the Dow material was used. Slip. op. 

at 11. The trial court, however, limited the plaintiffs to 

similar evidence from fifteen other buildings and we affirmed. 

Id. at 10. "In confining the number of buildings admissible at 

10 The rule states: 

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 

cumulative evidence. 

Fed. R. Evid. 403. We assume all evidence discussed in this order 

and judgment is relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402. 

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trial, the lower court prevented the jury from inferring that 

Sarabond was defective simply because many buildings had been 

investigated." Id. at 12. The same is true here. By limiting 

the number of reports of other accidents through exclusion of this 

letter and others, the trial judge made certain the jury would not 

prejudicially infer the AOD transmission was defective simply 

because Ford received letters from consumers. As we commented in 

C.A. Associates: 

In the context of rulings under Fed. R. Evid. 403, 

the task of the trial judge is one of 'balancing the 

probative value of and need for the evidence against the 

harm likely to result from its admission.' This is a 

task to which the trial judge is particularly suited 

because of his familiarity with the full array of the 

evidence. Thus, we will not reverse absent a clear 

abuse of discretion. 

Id. at 8 (citations omitted). 

We have already recognized the jury's awareness of other 

incidents of alleged defects, accidents and injuries involving 

Ford AOD transmissions. It might be a different matter if the 

witness knew about the incident the letter reported, or if the 

letter was the only evidence of a similar accident involving a 

Ford LTD that would have been available to the jury had it been 

admitted. There might also be sufficient cause to reverse where a 

defendant used an admission to block the introduction of all 

evidence concerning similar accidents. This is not the case here, 

and we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

rejecting the 1985 consumer letter to Ford. 

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• III. 

Other issues raised by Plaintiff require only brief 

discussion. Plaintiff asserts the trial court's exclusion of a 

written out-of-court statement given by a witness to the accident 

was wrong. The witness testified at trial via a videotape 

deposition and his testimony was consistent with the written 

statement. Plaintiff admits this consistency. There was no error 

in excluding the written statement, which was hearsay. 

Evid. 80l(d)(l)(B), 802. 

Fed. R. 

Plaintiff strenuously argues that lawyer-conducted voir dire 

of potential jurors is constitutionally required. This position 

is meritless. United States v. Ainesworth, 716 F.2d 769, 770 

(10th Cir. 1983); Perry v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 489 F.2d 

1349, 1351-52 (2d Cir. 1974); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 

796 n.149 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 47(a). 

Plaintiff next complains the trial judge did not ask 

potential jurors questions about biases against lawsuits due to 

the so-called "tort reform" crisis, but cites no place in the 

record where she raised this objection. Ford, however, shows us 

where the court asked whether any juror possessed "any religious 

belief or attitudes toward lawsuits that oppose the filing of a 

lawsuit by anyone that could affect your view of this case." 

"With respect to each issue raised on appeal, the party shall 

state where in the record the issue was raised and ruled upon." 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 16 
• 10th Cir. R. 28.2(d). Plaintiff's failure to meet this basic 

requirement means we defer to the district court's determination 

of the issue. Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1160 n.6 

(10th 'Cir. 1990) (appeals court will not consider argument on 

appeal where there is no indication in the record on appeal or in 

the brief that shows the argument was presented to the district 

court); Moore v. Subaru of America, 891 F.2d 1445, 1448 (10th 

Cir. 1989) ("Without the record before us to substantiate the 

general allegations of error, we must defer to the trial court's 

decisions in these areas."). Even if we considered the merits, 

the record reference provided by Ford strongly suggests the 

Plaintiff got the inquiry she wanted. 

The next issue raised by Plaintiff deals with testimonial 

reference during trial to an Oklahoma statute. Okla. Stat. tit. 

47 § 11-1101 (1988) makes it illegal to park a car without "first 

stopping the engine, and effectively setting the brake." Id. 

Plaintiff objects to any reference to this statute by maintaining 

it goes to a contributory negligence defense, which is an improper 

defense in an Oklahoma manufacturer product liability case. Ford 

counters the statute was used only for impeaching the police 

officers who testified they never set their parking brake, and to 

refute Plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim. The trial court twice 

gave limiting instructions restricting the jury's consideration of 

the statute to these two narrow points. The limiting instructions 

adequately circumscribed the jury's consideration of the statute. 

Admitting the statute for such limited purposes was not a clear 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 17 
abuse of discretion. Dow Chem. Co. v. Weevil-Cide Co., 897 F.2d 

481, 486 (10th Cir. 1990). Cf. Harvey ex rel. Harvey v. General 

Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 1343, 1356 (10th Cir. 1989) ("Evidence 

prope+lY excluded in one context is not automatically admitted 

erroneously in a separate context."). 

Plaintiff's counsel alleges fraud by Ford in its evidence 

preparation. The trial court, which heard the accusations during 

an in limine evidentiary hearing, precluded Plaintiff's counsel 

from arguing fraud to the jury. He was free to present evidence 

highlighting discrepancies he believed existed in Ford's evidence 

without mentioning fraud.We find no error. 

The remaining issues are patently frivolous and have either 

been withdrawn by Plaintiff or waived. They deserve no 

discussion. In closing, we feel obliged to comment on the 

unprofessional conduct of Plaintiff's counsel in this court. He 

included in his appellate brief a picture of the deceased and his 

family in an apparent effort to gain sympathy for the family of 

Officer Slay. This tactic is wholly inappropriate at the 

appellate court level. We resolve appeals on the basis of the 

fair and equal application of law. Our judgments are not, and 

cannot, be swayed by a pedestrian attempt to appeal to sympathy. 

Suffice it to say we have great sympathy for both the deceased and 

his family. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 18 
All outstanding motions pending in this appeal are DENIED and 

the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in all respects. 

We commend the district court for its conduct during this case and 

REMAND the case to the district court so it may address any 

remaining motions before it, such as motions for costs and 

sanctions. 

AFFIRMED and REMANDED. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 89-5157 Document: 010110097300 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 19