Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-09-01148/USCOURTS-ca4-09-01148-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alton H. Piester, LLC
Petitioner
Darrell Chapman
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ALTON H. PIESTER, LLC, 

Petitioner,

v.  No. 09-1148

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

BOARD,

Respondent. 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 

BOARD,

Petitioner,  No. 09-1255

v.

ALTON H. PIESTER, LLC,

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review and Cross-application

for Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board.

(11-CA-21531)

Argued: October 28, 2009

Decided: January 15, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and

DUNCAN and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

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Petition for review denied; cross-application for enforcement

granted by published opinion. Chief Judge Traxler wrote the

majority opinion, in which Judge Duncan joined. Judge Agee

wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in

part.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Charles F. Thompson, Jr., MALONE, THOMPSON & SUMMERS, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for

Alton H. Piester, LLC. Milakshmi V. Rajapakse, NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for the

Board. ON BRIEF: Michael D. Malone, Columbia, South

Carolina, for Alton H. Piester, LLC. Meredith L. Jason,

Supervisory Attorney, Ronald Meisburg, General Counsel,

John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy

Associate General Counsel, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for the Board. 

OPINION

TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

Alton H. Piester, LLC ("the Company") petitions this court

for review of a decision of the National Labor Relations

Board ("the Board") finding that the Company violated

§ 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act ("the Act"), see

29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1) (West 1998). The Board crossapplies for enforcement of its order. For the reasons stated

below, we deny the Company’s petition for review and grant

the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. 

I.

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act ("the Act")

guarantees employees not only the "right to self-organization,

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to form, join, or assist labor organizations, [and] to bargain

collectively," but also the right "to engage in other concerted

activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection." 29

U.S.C.A. § 157 (West 1998). Section 8(a)(1) implements

these guarantees by making it an unfair labor practice for an

employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in

the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157." 29

U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1).

The complaint in this case alleged that the Company violated § 8(a)(1) on January 13, 2007, by impliedly threatening

to discharge its employees if they continued to engage in protected, concerted activity, and on April 2, 2007, by impliedly

threatening to discharge—and then actually discharging—employee Darrell Chapman for engaging in protected,

concerted activity. An administrative law judge dismissed the

allegations, and the General Counsel filed exceptions to each

of the dismissals. 

The Board, acting through a two-member quorum,1 found

the following facts:

[The Company] is a trucking company. On January, 13, 2007, the [Company’s] owner, Alton Piester,

announced a proposed change to its billing and

bookkeeping practices regarding fuel surcharges

("the fuel surcharge change"). The change would

decrease the drivers’ net pay. Though many drivers

protested, Piester told them that his mind was made

up and that the change would proceed regardless of

their objections. Piester told the objecting drivers

that if they didn’t like it, they could "clean out their

truck and move to another job."

1We have held that the Board can delegate its authority to a panel of

three members and that two members are authorized to do that panel’s

work with a two-member quorum. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 153(b) (West 1998);

Narricot Indus. v. NLRB, No. 09-1164, 2009 WL 4016113, at *2-*4 (4th

Cir. Nov. 20, 2009). 

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"Clean out your truck" has a special meaning for

the [Company] and its drivers. A driver will typically leave personal items in a truck if he expects to

use it again. Therefore, a supervisor’s statement to a

driver to "clean out your truck," conveys the message that the driver will no longer be operating that

truck, i.e., that he is discharged.

After the January 13 meeting, and up to the time

of Chapman’s discharge, employees frequently complained among themselves about the fuel surcharge

change. Employees also complained directly to

Piester and the [Company’s] secretaries, although

only Chapman continued to complain to the [Company] after January. On several occasions, however,

owner-operator Adger McAlister informed Piester

that the drivers continued to complain among themselves about the unfairness of the fuel surcharge

change.

On April 2, Chapman spoke with Derrick, the

[Company’s] secretary, who also had various

accounting duties. Chapman repeated the complaint

he (and others) had voiced about the fuel surcharge

change, and asked that the surcharge change be

reflected on his paycheck stub. During this conversation, Chapman spoke loudly, then went into Piester’s

adjoining office to further discuss his concerns. Derrick followed Chapman into the office.

Chapman reiterated to Piester the same complaint

and request he made to Derrick, at which point Derrick interjected that if Chapman was unhappy working there, he "should clean out" his truck. Chapman

protested that Derrick did not have authority to discharge him. Chapman became louder, got up from

his chair, and stepped toward Derrick. Piester then

told [Chapman] to clean out his truck, which, as

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Piester acknowledged at the hearing, meant that

Chapman was discharged.

Piester testified that Chapman’s shouting on April

2 was the latest in a series of misconduct, and was

the "last straw" in deciding to discharge him. However, Piester did not mention any prior misconduct to

Chapman, and the only reason listed for Chapman’s

discharge on the form filed with the South Carolina

Employment Security Commission was "Disorderly

Conduct in office, 4-02-7." On that form, Piester

directly linked Chapman’s April 2 conduct to the

January 13 meeting by stating that "meet 1st part of

Jan 07 that fuel surcharge would be taken out due to

customer didn’t want share."

J.A. 234-35 (footnotes omitted). 

Regarding Piester’s January 13 statement that the drivers

could clean out their trucks if they did not like the surcharge

change, the Board noted that the ALJ had found that the drivers were engaged in protected, concerted activity that day

when they protested the change and that the Company had not

excepted to this finding. The Board also determined that

Piester’s statement constituted an implied threat to discharge

the employees for their protected, concerted activity, and, that

even if it meant only that the drivers were free to leave if they

did not like the new system, it was still unlawfully coercive.

As for Derrick’s April 2 suggestion to Chapman that he

should clean out his truck if he was unhappy, the Board noted

that the ALJ had found that Derrick was acting as the Company’s agent when she made the statement and that the Company did not except to that finding. The Board found that the

remark, like Piester’s similar January 13 statement, constituted an implied threat of discharge. The Board also determined that Derrick’s remark was directed at Chapman’s April

2 protected activity, for reasons that the Board discussed in

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detail in its analysis of the Company’s discharge of Chapman.

The Board found, therefore, that the statement was unlawfully

coercive.

Regarding the discharge itself, the Board found that "Chapman’s conduct on April 2[ ] amounted to a continuation of the

earlier concerted employee complaints about the adverse

change to the fuel surcharge." J.A. 237. The Board cited testimony from secretary Sherry Marntin, Piester, and Derrick in

support of its finding and found that Piester, from his conversations with owner-operator McAllister, knew that the

employees continued to oppose the surcharge change. The

Board was not swayed by the fact that Chapman was the only

driver who requested that the surcharge be shown on his pay

stub. It noted that other drivers had requested that the surcharge calculation be included on worksheets showing how

their pay was calculated and that Chapman’s "unique" request

was made in the context of his general reiteration of the

shared complaint that the policy was unfair. The Board also

found that Piester himself viewed Chapman’s April 2 conduct

as an extension of the January 13 concerted activity, as evidenced by the fact that Derrick’s statement was almost identical to Piester’s January 13 response and the fact that Piester

linked the January 13 and April 2 events in the explanation he

gave for Chapman’s discharge on the South Carolina Employment Security Commission form. The Board further found

that Chapman’s protected conduct was a motivating or substantial factor for his discharge and that the Company had not

proven that it would have discharged Chapman absent the

protected, concerted activity. 

Finally, the Board found that Chapman did not forfeit the

Act’s protection by speaking loudly to Derrick and taking a

step in her direction. Applying the test set out in Atlantic Steel

Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979), the Board found that all

four factors favored a conclusion that Chapman did not lose

the protection of the Act: The incident took place in an office

where no unit employee witnessed it, the subject of the dis6 PIESTER v. NLRB

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cussion related to protected activity, the nature of the outburst

was relatively mild and brief, and the outburst was provoked

by Derrick’s unlawful statement. The Board thus concluded

that the Company’s discharge of Chapman constituted a

§ 8(a)(1) violation. On that basis, the Board ordered the Company to offer Chapman full reinstatement or the substantial

equivalent, as well as backpay. 

II.

The Company first argues that the Board erred in finding

that Piester’s statement at the January 13 meeting constituted

a § 8(a)(1) violation. Although the Company does not dispute

that its employees were engaged in protected, concerted

action at the meeting by protesting the surcharge change, it

contends that Piester’s statement was merely intended to convey that he had made up his mind regarding the surcharge

change and that any further complaints by the drivers would

be fruitless.2 The Company further argues that was the meaning Piester intended and that no evidence showed that anyone

at the meeting interpreted it otherwise.

Section 10(e) of the Act states that "[t]he findings of the

Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be

conclusive." 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e) (West 1998). "Substantial

evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." NLRB v.

Gen. Wood Preserving Co., 905 F.2d 803, 810 (4th Cir. 1990)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

When an employer’s actions affect conduct protected by

§ 7, the actions violate § 8(a)(1) if, "under all the circum2The Company also maintains that the Board erred in relying on Chapman’s testimony, which the Company contends was perjurious. However,

the Board’s order reflects that it in fact did not rely on Chapman’s testimony, and the Company does not explain why it believes otherwise. 

PIESTER v. NLRB 7

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stances, the employer’s conduct may reasonably tend to

coerce or intimidate employees." Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v.

NLRB, 142 F.3d 733, 745 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Under this objective test, "[i]t does not matter

whether the particular conduct by the employer was actually

coercive," NLRB v. Transpersonnel, Inc., 349 F.3d 175, 180

(4th Cir. 2003), or whether the employer actually intended to

coerce, see Medeco Sec. Locks, 142 F.3d at 747. Rather, the

salient inquiry is whether the "conduct may reasonably tend

to coerce or intimidate employees." NLRB v. Grand Canyon

Mining Co., 116 F.3d 1039, 1044 (4th Cir. 1997). Determinations concerning tendency to coerce are "essentially for the

specialized experience of the" Board. Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). We therefore grant "considerable deference"

to the Board’s decisions on such matters. Medeco Sec. Locks,

142 F.3d at 745.

The Board has often found employers’ statements to be

unlawfully coercive when they have invited employees to quit

their jobs in response to employees’ § 7 conduct. See, e.g.,

House Calls, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 311, 313 (1991) (finding violation when employer told employees who protested their late

paychecks that they could quit if they did not like it). Such

statements have been determined to be coercive because they

tend to imply that continuing to engage in protected activity

is incompatible with continued employment and would be

looked upon with disfavor by the employer. See Conley v.

NLRB, 520 F.3d 629, 638-39 (6th Cir. 2008) (per curiam);

Rogers Elec., Inc., 346 N.L.R.B. 508, 515 (2006). We see no

reason not to defer to the Board’s similar conclusion here. As

we have explained, the test to be applied by the Board was an

objective one. Thus, neither Piester’s intentions nor the reactions of those who heard his statement are dispositive. 

The Company argues that the Board’s decision amounts to

a bright-line rule that an employer acts illegally any time he

suggests that his employees can quit if they do not like an

objected-to decision. The Board did not purport to base its

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decision on such a broad rule, however. It simply determined

that on the facts before it, where the statement was made in

response to the drivers’ concerted protest of the Company’s

new policy, the statement had the potential to coerce employees. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the

Board’s decision. 

III.

The Company next challenges the Board’s finding that

Piester’s discharge of Chapman constituted a § 8(a)(1) violation. Specifically, the Company contends that no substantial

evidence supported the determination that Chapman was

engaged in protected, concerted activity on April 2. We disagree.

Whether particular conduct constitutes "concerted

activit[y]," as that term is used in § 7 is a question for the

Board’s specialized expertise, and we review the Board’s

determination only for reasonableness. See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829-30 & n.7 (1984). "The

term ‘concerted activit[y]’ is not defined in the Act but it

clearly enough embraces the activities of employees who have

joined together in order to achieve common goals." Id. at 830.

To be engaged in concerted activity, employees need not

"combine with one another in any particular way." Id. at 835.

If "a single employee, acting alone, participates in an integral

aspect of a collective process," the conduct may be found to

be concerted. Id. In this regard, a conversation involving only

a speaker and a listener may constitute concerted activity.

Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 307

(4th Cir. 1980). To do so, however, "it must appear at the very

least that [the conversation] was engaged in with the object of

initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or that it

had some relation to group action in the interest of the

employees.’" Id. (quoting Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB,

330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964)). Courts have held that

"[t]he lone act of a single employee is concerted if it ‘stems

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from’ or ‘logically grew’ out of prior concerted activity."

NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 53 F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir.

1995) (quoting Ewing v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 353, 361 (2d Cir.

1988)). And even if the speaker was never selected as a

spokesperson, individual protests of a management decision

may properly be characterized as concerted action so long as

those disagreeing with the decision "considered that they had

a grievance and decided, among themselves, that they would

take it up with management." Guernsey-Muskingum Elec.

Coop. Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir. 1960); see Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1355 (3d Cir. 1969).

As we have explained, the Company does not challenge the

fact that Chapman and other drivers engaged in protected,

concerted activity by collectively taking up their grievance

with management at the January 13 meeting. The Company

takes issue, however, with the Board’s finding that Chapman’s April 2 conduct amounted to a continuation of the drivers’ January 13 complaints.3

In challenging this determination, the Company first attacks

the Board’s underlying factual finding that, in addition to asking that the surcharge be shown on his paycheck stub, Chapman "reiterated the shared employee complaint about the fuel

surcharge change" in the Company’s office on April 2. J.A.

237. We conclude that the finding is supported by substantial

evidence.

The Board cited testimony from Piester, Marntin, and Derrick in finding that Chapman complained about the surcharge

that day. See J.A. 126 (Piester’s testimony that Chapman

3The Company also argues that even if Chapman was engaged in protected conduct, the Board erred in finding that he did not forfeit his protective status for engaging in egregious conduct. General Counsel argues that

this issue is not properly preserved for our review. Even assuming that this

issue has not been waived, however, we conclude that the Board’s determination that Chapman’s conduct did not lose its protected status was

clearly supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

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"mentioned . . . the fuel surcharge situation" on April 2); J.A.

166, 167 (Marntin’s testimony that Chapman "was complaining about the fuel surcharge" when he came into her office on

April 2 and that he went into Piester’s office and "started discussing the fuel surcharge"); J.A. 180 (Derrick’s testimony

that when Chapman came in on April 2, "he was complaining

about the fuel surcharge and wanted it show[n] on his check

stub"). The Company contends, however, that the testimony,

viewed as a whole and in conjunction with Chapman’s testimony, makes clear that "Chapman was not complaining on

April 2 about the surcharge" but was "instead asking how his

deduction was calculated and asking that the surcharge

‘deduction’ show up on his paycheck." Brief of Appellant, at

20-21. We disagree.

Marntin and Chapman both testified that Chapman had

complained to the secretaries on multiple occasions about the

surcharge change between January 13 and April 2. Marntin

testified that she believed Chapman was substantially mistaken concerning the amounts being taken out of his paychecks as a result of the change:

[Chapman], along with a couple of other drivers, had

c[o]me in and complained to me about the fuel surcharge. I had recalculated the worksheet as though

there was no fuel surcharge and told [Chapman] he

was losing anywhere from twelve . . . to fifteen dollars . . . per load alone. I never understood . . . why

he was thinking he lost between two . . . and three

hundred dollars . . . until I re-examined the worksheets [and] realized he was counting a hundred percent of what the truck makes and the driver can’t do

that.

J.A. 165. Marntin testified that although she had repeatedly

tried to explain to Chapman that the surcharge was not costing

him nearly as much as he thought, he still "believed that [his]

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check was down several hundred dollars" when he entered the

Company office on April 2. J.A. 178. 

Marntin testified that when Chapman came in, he "was

complaining about the fuel surcharge. He had told [Derrick]

that he was wanting it to show on his check stub." J.A. 166.

Derrick also testified that when Chapman came in that day,

"he was complaining about the fuel surcharge and wanted it

show[n] on his check stub." J.A. 180. 

Chapman’s account of the complaints he made when he

came in to the office on April 2 appears largely consistent

with Marntin’s and Derrick’s testimony. He testified,

[Marntin] was in the office . . . doing the payroll. I

started talking to her about it. And I asked her if

she’d pull my record up showing me how things

were being paid. And . . . I said [Marntin], there’s no

way that that’ll work. And she said, "What do you

mean?", and I said, "I can’t figure it out. From what

you told me, this is what’s happening, I can figure it

up it’s not working". So, . . . [Marntin] called [Derrick]. And so I walked over to [Derrick], and . . . I

said, "[Derrick], just tell me how you all are doing

our payroll, how you’re doing the surcharge on our

checks". And she said, ". . . this is how we do it". I

said, "But that don’t amount up to what you all is

telling us that would be coming out of our checks, it

don’t amount up". She said, "What do you mean?"

I said, "I figured it up and every time I’m figuring,

I’m not coming up with that". She said, "Well,

[Chapman], that’s how we do it".

J.A. 94-95. Chapman testified that at that point, he went into

Piester’s office and told Piester: "I cannot keep making it like

this right here. . . . My check is way less than what it used to

be. . . . This fuel surcharge is killing us . . . . ; there’s no way

I can make it like that." J.A. 95 (internal quotation marks

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omitted). Chapman testified that in response, Piester "got a

pencil and paper out and he started doing some figuring," J.A.

96, after which Derrick walked in and told Piester that Chapman had requested that his surcharge be shown on his paycheck stub.

Piester’s testimony regarding the substance of his April 2

conversation with Chapman was largely consistent with

Chapman’s account. He testified that on April 2, "Chapman

mentioned . . . the fuel surcharge situation and I didn’t have

any problems with that. And I tried to explain the thing to him

again." J.A. 126. 

From all of this testimony, several facts are clear. First,

since the January 13 meeting, Chapman had repeatedly complained, including on April 2, about what he believed to be

the substantial effect that the surcharge was having on his

income. Second, in the context of that protest, Chapman had

been engaging in an ongoing debate with the Company concerning exactly how much was being taken from his paycheck

as a result of the surcharge change. And third, as this debate

continued on April 2, Chapman claimed that the Company’s

figures did not add up. 

What is unclear is whether Chapman was asserting that the

Company was taking more than Piester said on January 13

would be taken or whether he was asserting that the Company

was taking more than Piester and his secretaries claimed to be

taking during the ongoing debate that continued after January

13. If Chapman was making the former assertion, then it

would appear that he was raising a complaint distinct

from—albeit related to—the complaint raised by the drivers

at the January 13 meeting. But, if he was merely rejecting the

Company’s claim that the change did not have as large a

financial impact as he believed, then it would appear that his

primary objection was the one that he and the other drivers

had expressed on January 13, namely, that the surcharge

change was unfair and too costly to the drivers. 

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In our view, none of the testimony clearly resolves this

question. The best testimony for the Company would seem to

be Derrick’s answer to the question of whether Chapman felt

the Company was "taking out more than [it] should have"

from his check. J.A. 189. Derrick responded, "Yes. Yes, I

believe he thought we were taking out more — he was coming up with a different figure somehow." J.A. 189-90. This

answer is less than clear, however, and Piester’s description

of Chapman’s complaints—"he mentioned . . . the fuel surcharge situation, and I didn’t have any problems with that,"

J.A. 126—seems more consistent with the notion that Chapman had repeated the familiar shared general complaint about

the surcharge.4 Derrick’s response that Chapman should clean

out his truck if he was unhappy working for the Company

also seems a more likely response to a reiteration of the January 13 complaint than to the complaints the Company claims

Chapman was making. In the end, we conclude that this is

simply a very close factual issue, and, regardless of how we

would have resolved it in the first instance, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Chapman was reiterating the shared employee complaint. 

Relying on Manimark Corp. v. NLRB, 7 F.3d 547 (6th Cir.

1993), the Company next argues that even if Chapman did

repeat his opposition to the surcharge change in the Company’s offices on April 2, his actions were not protected because

he was acting only on his own behalf, not on behalf of other

drivers. In Manimark, the court determined that an employee’s action was not "concerted" within the meaning of § 7,

even though the employee had raised concerns to his

employer that were shared by other employees. See Manimark, 7 F.3d at 550-51. We do not find Manimark to have

much bearing on the result here, however. Critical to the

Manimark court’s decision was the fact that the conversation

4And, of course, Chapman’s own testimony that he told Piester, "This

fuel surcharge is killing us," J.A. 95, also is more consistent with the latter

interpretation. 

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between the employee and employer took place because the

employer had summoned the employee to discuss a separate

matter that affected only the employee. See id. at 550. After

disagreeing with the employer concerning that matter, the

employee brought up the unrelated complaint at issue only "as

an afterthought." Id. Also important in Manimark was the fact

that while the complaint at issue was one shared by other

employees, there was "nothing to indicate that [the employees] had decided to act upon those" complaints. Id. at 551. 

In contrast to Manimark, here it is undisputed that the drivers acted in concert in jointly protesting the surcharge change

at the January 13 meeting. The narrow question for the Board,

therefore, was whether Chapman’s April 2 conduct was a continuation of that action. We conclude that the Board was on

firm ground in finding that it was. The Board found as a fact

that after the drivers jointly presented their complaints on January 13, the controversy had continued unabated prior to

April 2 as the drivers continued to repeatedly discuss the surcharge among themselves and Chapman continued to complain to the secretaries and to Piester. Moreover, the Board

found that Piester knew that the other drivers continued to

complain about the change amongst themselves. Cf. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. at 832 (holding that a "lone employee’s invocation of a right grounded in his collectivebargaining agreement is . . . a concerted activity in a very real

sense" because the employee is in effect reminding his

employer of the power of the group that brought about the

agreement and that could be reharnessed if the employer

refuses to respect the employee’s objection). In fact, evidence

in the record suggested that Piester himself understood Chapman’s April 2 complaints to be an extension of the January 13

concerted activity. A South Carolina Employment Security

Commission form signed by Piester listed the reason for

Chapman’s termination as "meet 1st part of Jan 07 that fuel

surcharge would be taken out due to customer didn’t want

share. Disorderly conduct in office, 4-2-07." J.A. 216. For all

of these reasons, we believe that, even though Chapman’s

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continued protests were presented individually, they were reasonably understood by the Board to be a continuation of the

drivers’ mutual decision "to take [their grievance] up with

management." Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285

F.2d at 12; see Hugh H. Wilson Corp., 414 F.2d at 1355.

We note that our conclusion is strongly supported by Dayton Typographic Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 1188 (6th

Cir. 1985), which reached a similar result on closely analogous facts. In that case, an employee and several of his

coworkers complained to their supervisor at a meeting about

several working conditions, including the fact that they were

often required to work overtime on Saturdays for no pay. See

id. at 1189. When the complaint went unaddressed, the

employee reiterated his concerns regarding unpaid Saturday

work on two more occasions, one about a month after the

original complaint, and one about a month after that. See id.

Subsequently, he and another employee argued heatedly when

their supervisor told them that one of them would have to

work the next Saturday. See id. at 1189-90. The employee

continued to argue that employees should be paid for their

Saturday work. See id. at 1190. The court found reasonable a

Board finding that the subsequent complaints constituted a

continuation of the initial joint complaints. See id. at 1191-92.

The court found non-dispositive the fact that the employee

had not been chosen by his fellow employees as a spokesman

for their joint complaints and noted that although the company claimed the other employees had lost interest in the

issue, the company did not present any evidence of that fact.

See id. at 1192. Rather, the court concluded that it was sufficient to warrant protection that the employees had decided

amongst themselves to bring their collective concern to management. See id. at 1191-92.

The Company emphasizes that Chapman’s request to have

the surcharge shown on his pay stub was a request that no

other driver had made and that his protests were always

framed in terms of how much money he personally was los16 PIESTER v. NLRB

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ing. However, we conclude that it was reasonable for the

Board to find these facts not dispositive. In the weeks after the

January 13 meeting, the group opposition to the surcharge

change had spawned a number of requests that the surcharge

be shown in worksheets explaining how the drivers’ wages

were calculated. Chapman’s request to have the surcharge

shown on his pay stub was only a slight variation on those

requests, and it was presented "in the context of [Chapman’s]

underlying complaints about the fuel surcharge change." J.A.

238. As for the fact that Chapman stated his objections in

terms of the effect that it was having on his paycheck, that

would at most show only that it was his concern for his own

finances rather than those of the group that motivated his support for the drivers’ collective position. See Joanna Cotton

Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1949)

(explaining that individual’s personal motivation for attempting to further group action does not prevent the conduct from

being protected). There was no testimony that Chapman

sought a personal exemption from the surcharge change that

would not have applied to the other drivers as well. We therefore conclude that the Board’s decision that Chapman was

engaged in protected, concerted activity on April 2 was a reasonable one. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the Company’s petition

for review of the Board’s order and grant the Board’s crossapplication for enforcement.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED;

CROSS-APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT GRANTED

AGEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part: 

I concur with the majority opinion that Alton Piester’s

comment to "clean out your truck" on January 13 constituted

PIESTER v. NLRB 17

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a violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)

based on the standard of review applicable in this case. See

Smithfield Packing Co. v. NLRB, 510 F.3d 507, 515 (4th Cir.

2007) ("[W]e must defer to the Board where it has chosen

‘between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court

would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter

been before it de novo.’") (quoting Universal Camera Corp.

v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)). However, I write separately because I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion

as to the April 2 events. In particular, I do not agree with the

majority’s determination that "even though [Darrell] Chapman’s continued protests were presented individually, they

were reasonably understood by the Board to be a continuation

of the drivers’ mutual decision to take their grievance up with

management." Supra at 15-16 (internal quotations omitted).

Nor do I agree with the majority that whether Chapman "was

reiterating the shared employee complaint" is a "close factual

issue." Supra at 14. The evidence in the record plainly shows,

as the ALJ found, that Chapman’s complaints on April 2 were

directed at his own inability to calculate the fuel surcharge,

not the drivers’ collective dissatisfaction with imposition of

the fuel surcharge in the first instance. As such, there is not

substantial evidence from which to conclude that Chapman

was engaged in "concerted" activity at the time of his discharge. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from that portion of

the opinion holding that Chapman’s discharge violated

§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.

I.

With respect to Chapman’s discharge claim, the General

Counsel alleged "that Chapman engaged in concerted activities with other employees for their ‘mutual aid or protection’"

during his discussions with Sherry Marntin, Renee Derrick,

and Piester on April 2, 2007. J.A. 243. Specifically, the General Counsel argued "that Chapman’s April 2 conduct was a

continuation of the employee protests at the January 13 meet18 PIESTER v. NLRB

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ing, and therefore protected."1

 J.A. 246. The ALJ disagreed,

finding that "over time, employee discontent with the [fuel

surcharge] abated" but "Chapman . . . continued to complain

about" it. J.A. 245. In particular, the ALJ determined that

[t]he credited testimony establishes that when Chapman spoke with Derrick on April 2, he was concerned that the fuel surcharge amount did not appear

on his pay stub. Derrick offered an explanation.

Chapman remained unsatisfied and ultimately spoke

with Piester.

. . . .

Chapman spoke only about his own pay and pay

documents and not those of any other employee.

Additionally, the record fails to establish that Chapman indicated in any way that he intended to speak

on behalf of any other employees or that any other

employees had asked him to act on their behalf.

. . . .

The credited evidence does not establish that Chapman said anything which would lead Piester to conclude that he was continuing the earlier protest.

Considering the amount of time which had elapsed,

it would not be self-evident that Chapman’s complaints, focused solely on his own pay documentation, actually constituted activity on behalf of other

employees. I conclude that [Piester] had no reasonable basis to believe that Chapman was acting on

behalf of anyone but himself.

1There is no question that, as Piester concedes and the ALJ and the

Board found, the employees were engaged in protected, concerted activity

when they voiced their group complaints about imposition of the fuel surcharge during the January 13, 2007 meeting. 

PIESTER v. NLRB 19

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J.A. 245-46. According to the ALJ, the two and one-half

months between the January 13 meeting and Chapman’s

objections on April 2, combined with the lack of evidence that

Piester was hostile to the employees’ protest about the fuel

surcharge, necessitated the conclusion that the General Counsel did not carry its "burden of showing a link between the

protected activity [at the January 13 meeting] and" Chapman’s discharge. J.A. 246.

It is worth noting that in reaching his conclusions the ALJ

also made significant first-hand determinations of witness

credibility and expressly found that Chapman’s testimony did

"not ring true," was not to be credited, and was not "reliable."

J.A. 241. In contrast, the ALJ found that Derrick’s testimony

"merit[ed] the greatest confidence," and that testimony by

Marntin and Piester should be credited. J.A. 245. "We owe

deference to such witness credibility assessments." NLRB v.

Mining Specialists, Inc., 326 F.3d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 2003)

(citing Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993)); Sam’s Club, a Div. of

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 173 F.3d 233, 240 (4th Cir.

1999) ("An ALJ’s credibility determinations should be

accepted by the reviewing court absent exceptional circumstances."). The Board did not reject the credibility findings by

the ALJ.

Despite the ALJ’s fact and credibility determinations, the

Board found that Chapman’s complaints on April 2 were "a

continuation of the earlier concerted employee complaints

about the adverse change to the fuel surcharge." J.A. 237. The

Board reached this conclusion notwithstanding its determination "that Chapman made an individualized request for a notation on his pay stub" during the April 2 meeting. J.A. 238.

According to the Board, "that request was made in the context

of his underlying complaints about the fuel surcharge

change." Id. (emphasis added). Based on the record, I do not

agree.

20 PIESTER v. NLRB

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II.

During the process of reviewing the entire record

for substantial evidence, a reviewing court must not

only consider the evidence used to support the

Board’s factual conclusion, but it also "must take

into account whatever in the record fairly detracts"

from the Board’s factfinding. Universal Camera, 340

U.S. at 487-88, 71 S.Ct. 456. "When the Board purports to be engaged in simple factfinding, . . . it is

not free to prescribe what inferences from the evidence it will accept and reject, but must draw all

those inferences that the evidence fairly demands."

Allentown Mack, 118 S.Ct. at 829. "Courts performing substantial evidence review, therefore, must

examine whether the Board considered all of the reasonable inferences compelled by the evidence in

reaching its decision." Pirelli Cable Corp., 141 F.3d

at 514.

Sam’s Club, 173 F.3d at 239-40 (emphasis added). 

The Board (and the majority) primarily rely on testimony

by Marntin and Derrick as evidence that Chapman reiterated

protected group complaints made at the January meeting

when he met with Marntin, Derrick, and Piester in April.

Chapman’s own testimony, however, aptly illustrates the particular grievance he sought to address with Marntin and Derrick on April 2:

I asked her if she’d pull my record up showing me

how things were being paid. And I said, you know

I said to myself, I said Sherry [Marntin], there’s no

way that’ll work. And she said "what do you

mean?", and I said, "I can’t figure it out . . . ." And

so I walked over to [Derrick] and [Derrick] and I

started talking. And I said, "[Derrick], just tell me

PIESTER v. NLRB 21

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how you all are doing our payroll, how you’re doing

the surcharge on our checks."

J.A. 94 (emphasis added). 

Chapman then described his conversation in Piester’s office

this way:

She (Derrick) walks in. She sits across from where

I’m sitting. I’m in front of [Piester’s] desk. And she

said — he asked her, he said, "What do he want?"

[sic] She said, "Well he want the money that we’re

talking [sic] out of their check, he wanted it shown

on his check stub". Alton repeated, "No, we can’t do

that". I said, "Why you can’t do that? You’re taking

it out of our check. Why you can’t show it?"

J.A. 96 (emphasis added).

According to the majority, it is "clear" that (1) Chapman

repeatedly complained about the effect of the surcharge on

"his income," and that (2) Chapman had been in an ongoing

debate with the Company concerning the amount taken from

"his paycheck." Supra at 13. It is patently clear from the context of the testimony, as it was to the ALJ who heard it firsthand, the gravamen of Chapman’s complaint on April 2 was

that he did not understand how the surcharge was being calculated (and thus how it was affecting his pay), not the fact that

a surcharge was company policy.

Marntin testified that Chapman 

was complaining about the fuel surcharge. He had

told [Derrick] that he was wanting it to show on his

check stub and she advised him she couldn’t put it

on his check stub due to he’d be taxed by the IRS

and he couldn’t be taxed on money that didn’t

belong to him. That wouldn’t benefit him at all.

22 PIESTER v. NLRB

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. . . .

[Then] he had went back there and him and [Piester]

had started discussing it.

J.A. 166. 

From this testimony the Board excerpted Marntin’s broad

characterization of Chapman’s complaint as being "about the

fuel surcharge," J.A. 237, in total isolation from her specific

description of Chapman’s actual, specific complaint during

his visit to the company’s office. Moreover, Marntin’s statement that Chapman and Piester were discussing "it" clearly

refers to Chapman’s desire to have the information included

on his pay stub, as explained by Marntin’s description of the

meeting between Chapman and Piester:

[Piester] called [Derrick] back there and told [Derrick] what [Chapman] was wanting. He was wanting

the fuel surcharge to show on his checks. [Derrick]

explained to [Piester], she said, "That’s going to be

the IRS taxing that money and," she said, "the

money don’t belong to [Chapman] anyway, we cannot put it on his check stubs.["]

J.A. 167-68. 

Finally, the ALJ specifically asked Marntin whether Chapman said "anything about just himself or other employees as

well as himself" when he "came in and he talked about his

payroll and his paycheck." J.A. 178. Marntin replied "just

himself." Id. Marntin then reiterated that Chapman "always

spoke about his check."2 J.A. 179. 

2The circumstances surrounding the April 2 meeting also emphasize the

individual nature of Chapman’s actions. His truck had a flat tire and he

was instructed to pull around and have it fixed. While it was being

repaired, he took the opportunity to go to the company’s office and speak

PIESTER v. NLRB 23

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The Board likewise read Derrick’s testimony out of context. She testified that Chapman "stood in between our desks

and he was complaining about the fuel surcharge and wanted

it showed [sic] on his check stub." J.A. 180 (emphasis added).

The Board cited this description as evidence that Chapman

was complaining about the fuel surcharge and thus making a

group complaint when, in context, Derrick undoubtedly conveyed that Chapman’s purpose in speaking with Derrick was

to have the fuel surcharge shown on his pay stub. Derrick’s

description of Chapman’s spontaneous meeting with Piester

mirrored that of Marntin: "[Piester] called me back there to

help him explain what I had already explained to [Chapman].

I explained to [Piester] why it couldn’t be on his check stub

and explained it again to [Chapman]." J.A. 181.

Piester’s testimony is also consistent with that of Marntin

and Derrick. The General Counsel called Piester as a witness

and he testified as follows:

Counsel: And when [Chapman] came in, he was

talking to you about the fuel surcharge.

Isn’t that correct?

Piester: The — yes, sir.

. . . .

Counsel: Isn’t it true that [your affidavit] says that

you were trying to explain how it worked

to him, to Mr. Chapman? Isn’t that what it

says?

with Marntin and Derrick. The fact that Chapman came to the office to

speak with the administrative personnel indicates that he did not intend to

plea for rescission of the surcharge, because Piester was the only one with

authority to change that policy. Chapman’s impromptu meeting with

Piester only occurred because Derrick was unable to resolve his pay stub

issue. 

24 PIESTER v. NLRB

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Piester: Yes sir. . . .

. . . .

Counsel: Isn’t it true that [your affidavit], the bottom line, the last line there says that you

were trying to explain how it worked.

Piester: Yes.

Counsel: How the fuel surcharge worked.

Piester: Yes.

. . . .

Counsel: Okay. Didn’t he ask that it be put on the

pay stub so he could see it and figure it

out?

. . . .

Piester: I’m not sure about that now. I’m not sure

whether it was on the worksheet or the pay

stub.

J.A. 30-35 (emphasis added). This testimony by Piester is

utterly in accord with the testimony given by Marntin and

Derrick. It shows, again, that the purpose of Chapman’s

requests on April 2 was to obtain further explanation of how

the surcharge was being calculated and to request that it be

shown on his pay stub.

The majority concludes "that substantial evidence supports

the Board’s finding that Chapman was reiterating the shared

employee complaint" about the fuel surcharge expressed by

the group at the January meeting. Supra at 14. But when the

testimony is read in context, the Board did nothing more than

PIESTER v. NLRB 25

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improperly "prescribe what inferences from the evidence it

[would] accept and reject" and the inferences it makes are not

"reasonable inferences compelled by the evidence." Sam’s

Club, 173 F.3d 239-40. The Board’s observation that Chapman complained "about the fuel surcharge" is not a fair reading of the evidence and does not support the conclusion that

his actions on April 2 were "a continuation of" the drivers’

complaints. Supra at 15. In my view, the evidence compels

the conclusion reached by the ALJ "that Chapman was raising

a personal pay computation issue on April 2 . . . ." J.A. 236-

37. By accepting the Board’s unreasonable reading of the testimony out of its context, the majority fails to "take into

account" the parts of the record that "fairly detracts from the

Board’s factfinding." Sam’s Club, 173 F.3d at 239 (internal

quotations omitted). 

III.

"There can . . . be no violation of § 8(a)(1) by the employer

if there is no underlying § 7 conduct by the employee. Conduct must be both concerted and protected to fall within § 7."

Yesterday’s Children, Inc. v. NLRB., 115 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir.

1997).

Employee activity protected under section 7 of the

NLRA includes "the right to self-organization, to

form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain

collectively through representatives of their own

choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities

for the purpose of collective bargaining or other

mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).

We recognize that this language is broadly-worded.

However, it is not without limits. As we have noted,

"[t]he purpose of the act was not to guarantee to

employees the right to do as they please." Joanna

Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 752 (4th

Cir. 1949)(internal citation omitted).

26 PIESTER v. NLRB

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TNT Logistics of N. Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 413 F.3d 402, 406-407

(4th Cir. 2005). 

The ALJ found that while there was evidence that the fuel

surcharge "remained a subject of discussion among employees even at the time of Chapman’s discharge in April, . . .

Chapman was the only driver who still was voicing objections." J.A. 242. As explained by the ALJ:

Chapman’s protest, of course, would still be protected even if he were the lone holdout trying to rally

other employees to support this cause. Indeed, an

individual employee’s complaints aimed at instigating group action is quintessential concerted activity.

However, the credible evidence does not establish

that Chapman was trying to enlist the support of

other employees or that, on April 2, 2007, he

intended to speak for anyone but himself. On that

date, Chapman sought, in effect, that [Piester] treat

the reduction in pay as a deduction from pay and list

it on the paycheck stub. The record does not establish that any other employees wanted, or had asked

for, such a change. Therefore, I conclude that Chapman was acting by himself, and not continuing the

employees’ January 13, 2007 concerted activity.

Credible evidence does not establish that, on April

2, 2007, [Piester] regarded Chapman as speaking or

attempting to speak for anyone other than himself.

Accordingly, it is difficult to find a nexus between

Chapman’s discharge on that date and his protected

activity several months earlier.

J.A. 242.

In reversing the ALJ’s decision, the Board concluded that

"Chapman’s repetition of the complaint about the fuel surPIESTER v. NLRB 27

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charge change on April 2 was a continuation of earlier protected concerted activity." J.A. 238. However, this faulty

conclusion rests on the Board’s erroneous determination that

Chapman’s request on April 2 "was made in the context of his

underlying complaints about the fuel surcharge change." J.A.

238. Although the Board’s decision is somewhat confusing on

this point, it appears to have relied on two items of evidence

when it overruled the ALJ’s decision regarding "concerted

activity": (1) "that the employees continued to complain

among themselves about the fuel surcharge change and that

[Piester] knew of this continuing dissatisfaction," J.A. 237,

and (2) that "other employees also had requested that the fuel

surcharge information be included on their worksheets."3 J.A.

238. The Board’s reliance on this evidence as a basis that

Chapman acted with a "concerted voice" is unreasonable and

is not supported by substantial evidence. 

As the majority notes, we agreed in Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980), that concerted activity can occur even when it involves only a speaker

and a listener. We also explained, however, that

[i]t will not satisfy this condition [(concerted action)]

for Board action under Section 7 that an employee’s

complaint may be directed at working conditions

which affect all employees; "(i)t is . . . necessary . . .

that the employee’s actions themselves at least contemplate such group activity [in order to support

Board jurisdiction]. As was explained in Indiana

Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir.

1967), "in order to prove a concerted activity under

3Each driver receives a worksheet with his paycheck showing information about each load he picked up, including "where [he] picked it up from

and delivered to and how many times." J.A. 158. It also shows "the rate,

. . . the fuel surcharge, and the dollar amount that the truck makes. Then

depending on what the truck makes, what percentage [the driver] makes."

Id.

28 PIESTER v. NLRB

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Section 7 of the Act, it is necessary to demonstrate

that the activity was for the purpose of inducing or

preparing for group action to correct a grievance or

a complaint." Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d

23, 28 (7th Cir. 1980). This construction of the statutory language determinative of when the action of a

single employee will be deemed "concerted activity"

within Section 7, is illustrated by Mushroom Transportation Company v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d

Cir. 1964):

It is not questioned that a conversation may

constitute a concerted activity although it

involves only a speaker and a listener, but

to qualify as such, it must appear at the

very least that it was engaged in with the

object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or that it had some

relation to group action in the interest of

the employees.

635 F.2d at 307 (emphasis added).

We have also explained that

[d]etermining whether activity is protected or not

depends on a proper identification of the activity’s

purpose. "[I]t is not the motive of the participants

that we are concerned with here but the purpose of

the activity." Id. at 753. To be protected "the purpose

of the concerted activities must be the mutual aid or

protection of the employees." Id. By contrast, "personal missions are not the sort of concerted activity

which the statute protects." Media Gen. Operations,

Inc. v. NLRB, 394 F.3d 207, 212 (4th Cir. 2005). 

TNT Logistics, 413 F.3d at 407 (emphasis added).

PIESTER v. NLRB 29

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As the majority explains, it was Chapman who had "repeatedly complained . . . about what he believed to be the substantial effect that the surcharge was having on his income."

Supra at 13 (emphasis added). It was Chapman who "had

been engaging in an ongoing debate with the Company concerning exactly how much was being taken from his paycheck." Id. (emphasis added). It was Chapman who,

according to the Board, "made an individualized request for

a notation on his pay stub." J.A. 238 (emphasis added). Consistent with these findings, Derrick’s testimony during crossexamination by the General Counsel ably illustrates the purpose of Chapman’s visit to the company office on April 2:

Counsel: He also wanted the surcharge to be shown

on the pay stubs of all the employees, isn’t

that correct?

. . . .

Derrick: He never said anything about all the

employees.

Counsel: Well, what did he say?

Derrick: He was complaining about hisself and his

paycheck.

Counsel: Didn’t he say that the surcharge should be

put on the pay stubs?

Derrick: He said that he would like it shown on his

pay stub.

J.A. 190.

Other testimony shows that Chapman’s complaints

diverged from those of the other drivers not long after the January meeting. Derrick testified on cross-examination that "[a]

30 PIESTER v. NLRB

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few" of the "other employees came in and complained about

[the] surcharge" but that those complaints "only lasted for a

week or two" after the January meeting. J.A. 191, 193

(emphasis added). She also testified as follows: 

Counsel: But everybody complained about — most

of the employees, the drivers, did complain in some way about the surcharge.

Derrick: Once[,] until I explained it to them in a

better manner.

Counsel: Didn’t they feel that they were losing

money, the employees felt that they were

losing money?

Derrick: At the beginning until it was explained to

them correctly.

J.A. 191. Marntin likewise testified that "Chapman and Mr.

Brian Smith and several other drivers" complained "[w]hen

they [first] saw the deduction on their pay" in late January but

that she had to explain the calculation of the surcharge to

Chapman "a couple of times" because he didn’t seem to

understand it.4 J.A. 173-74. Neither Marntin, Derrick, nor

Piester testified that any other driver complained about how

the surcharge was calculated.

Despite Marntin and Derrick’s testimony, the Board found

relevant the fact that "Piester, via [driver] McAlister, knew

that the issue remained a concern to the employees." J.A. 237.

4Derrick agreed that Chapman and Smith "were the most vocal complainers about this surcharge" but because Smith quit the week after the

surcharge was instituted, Chapman was the only driver continuing to

express concerns. J.A. 191. Smith did not complain to Derrick or Marntin

until after he quit. Smith said he quit "because of the fuel surcharge" and,

indeed, nothing in his testimony indicates he complained to anyone at the

Company about calculation of the surcharge. J.A. 62-63. 

PIESTER v. NLRB 31

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But, here again, "the issue" referenced by the Board was the

drivers’ resentment "about the fuel surcharge," not Chapman’s continued complaints about how it was being calculated vis-à-vis his paycheck. McAlister testified that the

employees talked about "it" everyday — "it" being "the

increase in the surcharge" or the "money being taken out of

their pay." J.A. 79-80. According to McAlister, he "told

[Piester] it wasn’t right for him taking the fuel surcharge out

of the drivers’ pay" and that it "wasn’t fair." J.A. 83. But

nothing in McAlister’s testimony indicated that anyone

besides Chapman had expressed confusion over calculation of

the surcharge or wanted it shown on their pay stub.5 As the

Board acknowledges, the ALJ "found no evidence that other

employees wanted or sought similar changes to their pay

stubs." J.A. 237.

The Board also relied on the fact that "other employees also

had requested that the fuel surcharge information be included

on their worksheets," J.A. 238, to conclude that "[t]he mere

fact that [the other drivers] had not additionally requested that

the information be reflected on their pay stubs, does not

exclude Chapman’s request from the scope of protected concerted activity." Id. But the fact that the employees received

the worksheets only bolsters the conclusion that Chapman’s

"purpose" on April 2 did not involve group concerns. The

worksheets allowed each employee, concurrent with receipt of

5

In light of my view of the record in this case, the majority’s citation

to Dayton Typographic, 778 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1985), is unpersuasive.

In that case the only complaint from the employees was having to work

on Saturdays without pay. Here, as discussed, the evidence shows that

Chapman’s complaints leading to his discharge were categorically different. Even more pertinent to the finding of concerted action in Dayton

Typographic was the fact that the company put forth no evidence showing

the employees did not continue to be "interested in the Saturday work

issue." Id. at 1192. In the case at bar, the evidence demonstrates that while

the drivers continued to complain about the surcharge, none other than

Chapman had continued to seek explanations of how it was calculated or

asked that it be put on their pay stub. 

32 PIESTER v. NLRB

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their paycheck, to see the fuel surcharge as it pertained to

their individual loads hauled. Given that the drivers had the

surcharge information on their worksheets and their complaints stopped once it had been explained to them by Derrick, there was simply no evidence in the record that, despite

their ongoing private grumblings "about the fuel surcharge,"

any driver other than Chapman was unsatisfied with, or did

not understand, how the surcharge was being calculated.6

Not only is the purpose of Chapman’s discussion with

Marntin, Derrick and Piester on April 2 clear, the only evidence that Chapman intended to act on behalf of the group on

April 2 came from his wholly discredited testimony that he

told a another driver he had been fired "because I was talking

about our money." J.A. 100. That driver expressly disputed

Chapman’s claim, as the ALJ noted:

Chapman’s interest in the outcome of this proceeding — he stood to regain his job with backpay —

may have affected his recollection. For example,

Chapman described a conversation he had with

another driver on April 2, 2007, just after [Piester]

discharged him. Chapman testified that he told this

driver that Piester fired him "because I was talking

about our money." However, according to the other

driver . . . Chapman said he had been fired because

"he got loud in the office."

J.A. 241. There is also no evidence in the record that any of

the other drivers encouraged, endorsed or even knew about

Chapman’s effort on April 2 to have the fuel surcharge shown

on his pay stub. 

6

In fact, the most reasonable inference is that the other drivers would

not want surcharge information on their pay stubs because, as Derrick

explained, there would be adverse tax and payroll implications to the drivers for doing so. Doing so would not be "in the interest of the employees."

Mushroom Trans. Co., 330 F.2d at 685. 

PIESTER v. NLRB 33

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A fair reading of the testimony as a whole shows that the

drivers’ continued complaints "about the fuel surcharge" is

simply not the same "activity" in which Chapman was

engaged on the date of his discharge. The record clearly

establishes that Chapman’s purpose on April 2 was to try,

again, to understand for himself how the surcharge was being

calculated and to have it placed on his pay stub. By accepting

the Board’s view that Chapman’s actions on April 2 constituted "concerted protected activity," the majority effectively

accepts as sufficient evidence, contrary to Krispy Kreme, the

fact that Chapman’s "individualized request for a notation on

his pay stub" might "affect all employees." 635 F.2d at 307.

It reaches this conclusion despite no evidence that his efforts

were "for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection," 29

U.S.C.A. § 157 (West 1998), or "for the purpose of inducing

or preparing for group action to correct a grievance or a complaint." Krispy Kreme, 635 F.3d at 307 (internal quotations

omitted). For these reasons I find the Board’s determination

that Chapman was engaged in concerted action to be wholly

unreasonable and I would, accordingly, reverse the Board’s

determination that the company violated § 8(a)(1) on April 2,

2007, either by threatening to discharge Chapman or by actually discharging him.7

7Given my conclusion based on the record that Chapman’s complaints

in April were not a continuation of the group complaints at the January

meeting, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of Manimark

Corp. v. NLRB, 7 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1993). See supra at 15 (distinguishing

Manimark because "while the complaint at issue in Manimark was one

shared by other employees, there was ‘nothing to indicate that [the

employees] had decided to act upon those’ complaints."). Here, not only

is there no evidence showing the employees shared Chapman’s complaints

expressed on April 2, there is no evidence that Chapman "was acting in

anyone’s interest but his own on [April 2]." Manimark, 7 F.3d at 551. 

34 PIESTER v. NLRB

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