Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03584/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03584-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert J. Miller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐3584

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ROBERT J. MILLER,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 3:09‐cr‐30039‐RM‐BGC‐1 — Richard Mills, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED MAY 23, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 10, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and ROVNER,

Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. The defendant pleaded guilty to

possessing crack cocaine with intent to sell it, in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and in 2010 he was sentenced to

210 months’ imprisonment (the bottom of the applicable

guidelines range), which the district judge reduced by 20

percent—to 168 months—the following year at the request of

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2   No. 15‐3584

the government in exchange for cooperation given to it by

the defendant.

Four years later the defendant sought a further reduction

in his prison term, to 134 months, because Amendment 782

to the Sentencing Guidelines had made a retroactive two‐

level reduction in the guidelines sentencing range that had

been applicable when he was sentenced. See U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.10(d). The comments accompanying the amendment

say that in deciding whether to grant such a motion the

district judge must consider “the nature and seriousness of

the danger to any person or the community that may be

posed by a reduction in the defendant’s term of

imprisonment” and may consider the defendant’s post‐

sentencing conduct. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 Application Notes

1(B)(ii), (iii).

The government acknowledged that the change in the

guidelines range authorized the 34‐month sentence

reduction that the defendant’s lawyer had asked for, but

nevertheless opposed it, arguing that according to

statements by witnesses the defendant had been at times

armed while engaged in his illegal drug dealing, and

furthermore that over a period of almost six years during his

current imprisonment he had committed five disciplinary

infractions: two for possessing homemade alcohol, two for

possessing an item usable as a weapon, and one for

destroying property. Yet the alcohol infractions had

occurred before the government had requested and the

judge had ordered the first reduction in the length of the

defendant’s sentence but had not dissuaded the government

from moving for the 20 percent reduction in the defendant’s

sentence, which the judge had granted.

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No. 15‐3584   3                                                

Yet the judge was persuaded to deny the defendant’s

latest motion for a reduction in his sentence, though he

didn’t rely on the evidence that the defendant had been

armed in some of his drug dealing. Instead he emphasized

that the disciplinary infractions had “occurred relatively

recently” (which was untrue; the most recent one had

occurred three years earlier) and were “serious” (which may

not have been true of the two alcohol offenses, or at least

may not have been thought by the government to be true

when it sought the 20 percent sentence reduction), and that

the defendant “remains a significant danger to the

community,” though the real question is whether he is likely

to remain a significant danger to the community when he is

released, which won’t be for another five years or so even if

he receives the further reduction that he’s asking for. And

the court did not explain why the two alcohol offenses were

now to be counted against the grant of a sentence reduction

when they had not been previously.

The defendant points out that the judge did not consider

his positive achievements in prison, such as the reduction in

his security classification from high to medium and his

completion of a number of vocational and adult‐education

courses, which will help him to obtain his GED. In fairness

to the judge, the defendant did not submit in the district

court certificates documenting his enrollment in the courses.

But he has submitted them on appeal, and though that is

irregular it is notable that the government doesn’t question

their authenticity. Although litigants generally are not

allowed to bypass the district court and present evidence for

the first time to the court of appeals, see Fed. R. App. P.

10(e); United States v. Elizalde‐Adame, 262 F.3d 637, 640–41

(7th Cir. 2001), we’ve allowed exceptions. See Brown v.

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Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 604 note 1 (7th Cir. 2010) (“although

we generally decline to supplement the record on appeal

with materials not before the district court, we have not

applied this position categorically”); Ruvalcaba v. Chandler,

416 F.3d 555, 562 note 2 (7th Cir. 2005); Charles Alan Wright

et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3956.4 (4th ed. 2008; 2016

supplement); George C. Harris & Xiang Li, “Supplementing

the Record in the Federal Courts of Appeals: What If the

Evidence You Need Is Not in the Record?,” 14 J. Appellate

Practice & Procedure 317, 323, 332 & note 50 (2013).

Apart from the fact that the government does not

question the certificates’ authenticity and could not have

objected to their admission in the district court had they

been introduced there, the failure to submit them in that

court was the fault not of the defendant but of his lawyer.

The lawyer knew about the certificates—he had written his

client eight days after filing his motion for a further

reduction in the defendant’s sentence, acknowledging

receipt of his “awards and certificates.” But instead of

passing this information on to the district court, or using it to

counter the government’s response in opposition, the lawyer

simply told the defendant that he would put digital copies of

the documents “into our file for use in any hearing that may

be held in reference to your contested sentence reduction.”

We can’t begin to understand why, rather than sit back

waiting for a hearing that never happened, the lawyer didn’t

use the documents to help support his client’s motion to

reduce sentence. Had the lawyer followed his client’s

instructions the district judge would have seen the

certificates and the defendant’s case would have been

strengthened. And before deciding that reducing the

defendant’s sentence would pose a danger to society, the

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No. 15‐3584   5                                                

judge could have asked the government for a statement by

the prison warden concerning the defendant’s current

behavior in prison, an inquiry that would probably have

yielded information about the defendant’s efforts to obtain a

GED.  

It’s true that the client is usually held to answer for the

mistakes of his lawyer, but the mistake in this case has been

so easily rectified on appeal by the now lawyerless appellant

that we think it should be overlooked. Since the district

judge might decide to grant the sentence reduction once he’s

assured that the defendant has taken courses toward the

GED, since the judge erred in describing the defendant’s

disciplinary infractions as recent, and since he seems not to

have considered whether the defendant is likely to remain a

danger to the community when he is released from prison,

years from now, we vacate the judgment and remand the

case for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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