Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00624/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00624-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kenneth Augustine
Plaintiff
Marin County
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH AUGUSTINE,

Plaintiff,

v

MARIN COUNTY,

Defendant. /

No C-04-0624 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiff brings suit against defendant based on events

that led to his jailing for two days in the Marin County jail. 

Defendant moves for summary judgment. Doc #20. Plaintiff failed

to file a timely opposition and the court ordered plaintiff to show

cause why defendant’s motion should not be treated as unopposed. 

Doc #22. Plaintiff responded, Doc ##24, 26, and the court agreed

to consider plaintiff’s response in ruling on the summary judgment

motion. Doc #25. Defendant has filed a reply, Doc #28, and the

motion is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that follow,

the court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

/

Case 3:04-cv-00624-VRW Document 29 Filed 05/18/05 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The pages of plaintiff’s declaration and the exhibits thereto

are unnumbered. The cited pagination refers to sequential numbering

of the pages.

2

I

As the nonmoving party facing a motion for summary

judgment, plaintiff is entitled to have all evidence construed in

the light most favorable to him. Anderson v Liberty Lobby, 477 US

242, 255 (1986). Accordingly, to the extent there are disputes

about issues of fact, the factual recitation that follows presents

the factual record in plaintiff’s favor.

During a traffic stop on December 9, 2002, plaintiff

was arrested for having no license, for turning right on a red

arrow and for failing to provide proof of insurance. 

Augustine Decl (Doc #26) Ex 2 at 2.1

 He was arraigned that

day and released on his own recognizance. The matter was

continued to December 12, 2002, at 9:00 am. Plaintiff (along

with an acquaintance who styles himself “Robert-John:Foti”)

was present at the Marin superior court’s December 12, 2002,

calendar, but his case was never called. Augustine Decl (Doc

#26) ¶3; Ex 3 at 14, 16. Plaintiff pursued the matter with

the clerk of court, but received no explanation for why his

case was not called (or what he should do next). Id Ex 3 at

14-17.

Nonetheless, a bench warrant was issued on January

9, 2003, by Judge Graham of the Marin superior court for

plaintiff’s arrest. Id Ex 3 at 19; Licatovich Decl (Doc #21)

¶4, Ex B. The warrant was executed on January 26, 2003, by

Case 3:04-cv-00624-VRW Document 29 Filed 05/18/05 Page 2 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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officer Kasrack of the San Rafael Police Department (SRPD). 

Id ¶¶4-5, Exs A, C; Pl Opp (Doc #24) at 4; Augustine Decl (Doc

#26) Ex 3 at 29. Plaintiff was turned over to the custody of

the Marin County jail, where he was held for two days before

being released on bail. Id Ex 3 at 24-25, 27; Licatovich Decl

(Doc #21) ¶4. The substantive charges against plaintiff were

dismissed a few weeks later on procedural grounds. Augustine

Decl (Doc #26) Ex 3 at 37.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Doc #3, which appears to

seek relief both under state tort law and 42 USC § 1983, contains

three causes of action. First, plaintiff seeks to have his

“original traffic arrest file” made available to him. The second

cause of action is for “false arrest,” on the ground that there was

not probable cause to arrest him because the bench warrant was

issued despite the fact that he was in court at the time he was

told to appear. The third cause of action is for false

imprisonment. Marin County is the only named defendant.

II

A

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must

determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving

any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. “[S]ummary

judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is

‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 US

at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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of summary judgment.” Id. And the burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving

party. Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 322-23 (1986). When

the moving party has the burden of proof on an issue, the party’s

showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable

trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. 

Calderone v United States, 799 F2d 254, 258-59 (6th Cir 1986). 

Summary judgment is granted only if the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,

however, but must produce significant probative evidence supporting

its claim that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec

Serv v Pacific Elec Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir

1987). The evidence presented by the nonmoving party “is to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his

favor.” Anderson, 477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not

himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter

but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id

at 249.

B

Plaintiff’s first cause of action -- by which he seeks to

obtain the court records of his arrest and prosecution for traffic

violations -- is moot. As plaintiff himself states in the filing

that contains those records:

I have attempted to obtain records from the

Marin County Court Records Department at least

10 times over the last 2 years, and only

yesterday, at approximately 2:30 PM was I able

to obtain a partial copy of the criminal file

Case 3:04-cv-00624-VRW Document 29 Filed 05/18/05 Page 4 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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in which I was arrested, and subsequently

released. I had to go back today and obtain a

complete copy of my file, and get it certified.

Augustine Decl (Doc #26) ¶1. Accordingly, the first cause of

action is DISMISSED as moot.

C

The second cause of action, which is for false arrest,

fails as against the named defendant because it is undisputed that

the SRPD, not Marin County, arrested plaintiff. Accordingly,

summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of defendant on the second

cause of action.

D

The court will consider plaintiff’s third cause of

action, which he designates as false imprisonment, under both

California tort law and as a Fourth Amendment violation actionable

under 42 USC § 1983. Under both regimes, an individual or entity

that in good faith relies on a facially valid arrest warrant is not

liable for false imprisonment or an illegal seizure.

Cal Civil Code § 43.55 provides that “[t]here shall be no

liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise

against, any peace officer who makes an arrest pursuant to a

warrant of arrest regular upon its face if the peace officer in

making the arrest acts without malice and in the reasonable belief

that the person arrested is the one referred to in the warrant.” 

Under Cal Penal Code § 4015(a), “[t]he sheriff shall receive all

persons committed to jail by competent authority.” Failure to

fulfill this duty is a felony under Cal Penal Code § 142(a). Cal

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Penal Code § 847(b) provides that “[t]here shall be no civil

liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise

against, any peace officer * * * acting within the scope of his or

her authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out

of any arrest * * * made pursuant to the requirements of Section

142 * * *.” Of course, by their terms these sections apply to

individuals, not public entities such as defendant, but public

entities are liable for the torts of their employees only on a

respondeat superior theory, and if the employee is not liable (e g,

because he is immune), then neither is the employer entity. See

Cal Gov’t Code § 815.2(a)-(b).

As for federal law, an official has qualified immunity

from suit unless a reasonable officer would have known that the

warrant was invalid. See Malley v Briggs, 475 US 335, 344-45

(1986), cited in Groh v Ramirez, 540 US 551, 565 & n8 (2004). 

Hence, the federal and state law to be applied here are roughly

congruent and thus turn on the same factual issues.

The bench warrant here at issue, Licatovich Decl (Doc

#21) Ex B, was facially valid and a reasonable officer would not

have known otherwise. Plaintiff identifies nothing deficient about

the warrant besides his contention that an affidavit establishing

probable cause for the warrant’s issuance should have been attached

to the warrant. But plaintiff cites no authority for such a

requirement, and indeed there is no such requirement. To be sure,

warrants may only be issued if “supported by Oath or affirmation,”

US Const Amend IV, and there is a jurisprudence interpreting this

requirement in the context of bench warrants, see Wayne R LaFave,

Search & Seizure § 5.1 n377 (West, 4th ed). But none of that is

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important here; there is no attachment requirement, the warrant was

facially valid and defendant and its agents were entitled to rely

on the warrant. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that

anyone from the SRPD or Marin County did not act in good faith.

There is an alternative ground for granting summary

judgment in defendant’s favor on the federal claim. Local

governments -- such as defendant -- are “persons” subject to

liability under 42 USC § 1983 only where official policy or custom

causes a constitutional tort. See Monell v Department of Social

Services, 436 US 658, 690 (1978). A city or county may not be held

vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees

under the theory of respondeat superior. See Board of County

Commisioners v Brown, 520 US 397, 403 (1997); Monell, 436 US at

691; Fuller v City of Oakland, 47 F3d 1522, 1534 (9th Cir 1995). 

Rather, to impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation

of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the

plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which he or she was

deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this

policy amounts to deliberate indifference (or worse) to the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the

moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v

School District #40, 130 F3d 432, 438 (9th Cir 1997).

Plaintiff has put forward no evidence of any policy of

defendant that caused the putative constitutional deprivation here;

at most he alleges that defendant was somehow negligent in failing

to train its officers regarding the law, but he provides no

evidence to support this assertion.

Accordingly, summary judgment in GRANTED in defendant’s

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favor on plaintiff’s third cause of action.

III

Plaintiff has indicated that he wishes to amend his

complaint to include additional defendants such as California, the

SRPD, the arresting officers and Scott Licatovich (a recordkeeper

for the Marin County jail, see Licatovich Decl (Doc #21) ¶1-2). Pl

Opp (Doc #24) at 5.

“[A] party may amend the party’s pleading * * * by leave

of court * * * and leave shall be freely given when justice so

requires.” FRCP 15(a). The Ninth Circuit directs district courts

to apply the policy of Rule 15(a) with “extreme liberality.” 

Morongo Band of Mission Indians v Rose, 893 F2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir

1990) (citing DCD Programs, Ltd v Leighton, 833 F2d 183, 186 (9th

Cir 1987)). This liberality, however, is “subject to the

qualification that amendment of the complaint [1] does not cause

the opposing party undue prejudice, [2] is not sought in bad faith

and [3] does not constitute an exercise in futility.” DCD

Programs, 833 F2d at 186 (internal citations omitted). 

The relevant qualification here is the potential futility

of plaintiff’s desired amendments. “A proposed amendment to a

complaint is ‘futile only if no set of facts can be proved under

the amendment * * * that would constitute a valid and sufficient

claim.’” Fischer v City of Portland, 2003 US Dist LEXIS 25613, *6

(D Ore 2003) (quoting Sweaney v Ada County, Idaho, 119 F3d 1385,

1393 (9th Cir 1997)). “A plaintiff should be afforded an

opportunity to test his claim on the merits rather than on a motion

to amend unless it appears beyond doubt that the proposed amended

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complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a claim under

[FRCP] 12(b)(6).” Id.

Here, the court’s holding necessarily establishes that an

amendment to add the SRPD, SRPD officers or Marin County personnel

would be in vain; all were entitled to rely on the facially valid

warrant, both in arresting and in imprisoning plaintiff. Claims

against California would be barred by sovereign immunity. See,

e g, Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1 (1890). Accordingly, plaintiff may

not amend his complaint to add any of these defendants. As

plaintiff does not seek to add other defendants, the clerk is

DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file.

IV

In sum, defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc #20)

is GRANTED and the clerk is DIRECTED to ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of

defendant, close the file and terminate all motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:04-cv-00624-VRW Document 29 Filed 05/18/05 Page 9 of 9