Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00344/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00344-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marie Elayne Calagna
Defendant
Scott N. Johnson
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT N. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff, 2:06-cv-0344-GEB-GGH

vs.

MARIE ELAYNE CALAGNA, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

__________________________________/

On September 14, 2006, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations

(“F&Rs”) that recommend granting default judgment against Defendant Marie Elayne Calagna,

individually and as trustee for the Calagna Survivor’s Trust in the amount of $4,000. The F&Rs

issued following Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, filed July 28, 2006, in which he

requested that “[t]he Court grant[] judgment in Plaintiff’s favor and against Marie Elayne

Calagna for damages, pursuant to the California Civil Code Section 52(a) in the amount of

$8,000.” (Mot. for Default J. at 3.) The magistrate judge stated, however: “While plaintiff seeks

$4000 for each actual visit to the restaurant and each foregone visit (see Motion for Default

Judgment, at p. 3, and Complaint, at p. 18), he has pled only that he visited the restaurant parking

lot one time, on September 28, 2004 (Complaint, at p. 3); plaintiff’s general statement he “would

like to be able to return” is inadequate to demonstrate a foregone visit.” (F&Rs at 3 n.3.)

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Since Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment only seeks damages under California

law, it will be decided whether exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims is appropriate in this case.

Federal question jurisdiction exists in this action under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and supplemental jurisdiction is exercised over Plaintiff’s state law

claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Only injunctive relief may be sought under the ADA. 

Plaintiff’s default judgment motion demonstrates he has abandoned his ADA injunctive relief

claims, and that a state law claim for damages is the only claim at issue. 

The “issue [of] whether . . . [supplemental] jurisdiction has been properly

assumed is one which remains open throughout the litigation.” United Mine Workers of

America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966). Once the “nature of [a plaintiff’s] proofs and the

relative importance of [a plaintiff’s] claims” becomes apparent, the federal court need not

“tolerate a litigant’s effort to impose upon it what is in effect only a state law case.” Id. Thus,

“[o]nce it appears that a state claim constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim

is only an appendage, the state claim may fairly be dismissed.” Id.; see also Borough of West

Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 789 (3rd Cir. 1995) (“Given the origin of the ‘substantially

predominate’ standard, a district court’s analysis under § 1367(c)(2) should track the Supreme

Court’s explication of that standard in Gibbs.”). “While discretion to decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered by the presence of one of the

conditions in § 1367(c), it is informed by the Gibbs values of economy, convenience, fairness,

and comity.” ACRI v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal

quotation omitted).

The values of fairness and comity strongly favor dismissing the state claims, since

it is evident the real body of Plaintiff’s case is an action for damages under state law and the

ADA federal claims are “only an appendage” to the state damage claims. Plaintiff seeks $8,000

in damages under state law, but does not seek injunctive relief, which makes it apparent that

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damages are the essence of Plaintiff’s claim, and that he should have litigated this claim in state

court rather than federal court. The ADA is designed to remove barriers; it does not award

damages. Where, as here, the federal ADA claims appear wholly insubstantial and were brought

solely to gain access to federal court, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction should be declined

and “the state claim[s] may fairly be dismissed.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. Further, as the United

States Supreme Court has stated: “Needless decisions of state law should be avoided as a matter

of comity.” Id. at 726. Therefore, the fairness and comity values predominate and result in the

values pointing toward declining exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.

Since the real body of Plaintiff’s case is a claim for damages under state law,

Plaintiff’s state law claims are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367 (c)(2) and (3). Further, this

federal action is dismissed since Plaintiff abandoned his ADA claims. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 15, 2006

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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