Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10392/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10392-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Heidi Haischer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HEIDI HAISCHER,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10392

D.C. No.

2:11-cr-00267-

MMD-CWH-2

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda Du, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 14, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed March 25, 2015

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Clifton

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2 UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel vacated a judgment of conviction for

committing and conspiring to commit wire fraud in

connection with a scheme to secure mortgages by using false

information in loan applications and supporting documents.

The panel held that the district court’s decision to

exclude, as highly prejudicial and possessing no probative

value, evidence of the defendant’s alleged abuse at the hands

of her then-boyfriend (and alleged conspirator) Kelly Nunes,

and to instruct the jury to disregard this evidence in its

entirety, was error.

The panel held that evidence that the defendant’s leg was

broken and that Nunes required the defendant to sign the

loan papers before she could be taken to the doctor to have it

treated suggested that the defendant was under pressure to

sign the documents, and that had this evidence been before

the jury, a reasonable juror might have doubted whether the

defendant had the requisite knowledge and intent to commit

fraud. The panel wrote that the exclusion of the evidence of

abuse was particularly problematic in light of the district

court’s “deliberate ignorance” instruction. 

The panel took the opportunity to make clear that under

federal law, a defendant is not obligated to admit her guilt to

a crime as a precondition for raising an affirmative defense

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER 3

such as duress. The panel wrote that the widely-accepted

principle that a criminal defendant may assert inconsistent

defenses should apply with equal force where a defendant

seeks both to assert the defense that she acted under duress

and to hold the government to its burden of proof on the issue

of mens rea.

The panel concluded that the error was not harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt, and remanded for further

proceedings.

COUNSEL

Franny Forsman, Las Vegas, Nevada, for DefendantAppellant.

Mythili Raman, Denis J. McInerney, Thomas B.W. Hall,

Brian R. Young, and John-Alex Romano (argued), United

States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

Heidi Haischer appeals her jury trial conviction and

sentence for committing and conspiring to commit wire fraud

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and 18 U.S.C. § 1349. We

conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the

district court’s decision to exclude all evidence of Haischer’s

alleged abuse at the hands of her then-boyfriend (and alleged

co-conspirator), and to instruct the jury to disregard this

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4 UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER

evidence in its entirety, was error. Because this erroneous

evidentiary ruling violated Haischer’s due process right to

present a complete defense, and because the constitutional

error was not harmless, we vacate the judgment of conviction

and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

Haischer was indicted in 2011 on two counts: wire fraud,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and conspiracy to commit

wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. The indictment

alleged that Haischer participated in a scheme to secure

mortgages on two properties in Nevada in 2006 and 2007 by

using false information in loan applications and supporting

documents. She pled not guilty and went to trial.

The evidence presented at trial included the following. In

2006, Haischer was working in Las Vegas as a loan officer at

a mortgage brokerage firm. Haischer’s boyfriend at the time,

Kelly Nunes, was a senior loan officer at the same firm. In

late 2006, Nunes approached Haischer about purchasing some

properties as investments. Applicationswere submitted under

Haischer’s name to obtain loans of $540,000 and $135,000

for the purchase of a house located on Kantele Circle in

Henderson, Nevada. These applications falsely stated that

Haischer had a monthly income of $15,000, that she had a

bank account balance of $15,000 at the time, and that the

Kantele Circle property would be Haischer’s primary

residence. Shortly thereafter, additional applications were

submitted under Haischer’s name to obtain loans of $428,800

and $102,200 for the purchase of a second house, located on

Elche Court in Las Vegas. This set of applications falsely

stated that Haischer made $18,000 a month and that she had

a bank account balance of $38,000. It also failed to disclose

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UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER 5

that she owned the Kantele Circle property, despite the fact

that the Kantele Circle transaction had closed a few days prior

to the filing of the Elche Court applications. Lenders funded

loans for both properties in January 2007. Haischer managed

only a few payments on her loans before going into default,

and the properties were eventually sold via foreclosure

proceedings. The lenders incurred substantial losses.

In support of the applications, Nunes paid a third party

$300 to supply false verifications regarding Haischer’s

employment. False bank account statements were also

submitted along with the loan applications. Haischer testified

that she did not submit these supporting documents, and that

Nunes had access to her bank account statements. She further

testified that Nunes filled out the loan applications for both

properties, and that she deferred to his judgment because he

was her boyfriend and her senior loan officer.

Haischer also alleged that Nunes had abused her. Prior to

trial, the government moved in limine to exclude the evidence

of abuse and to preclude the defense from asserting a duress

defense. The district court denied the motion and concluded

that Haischer had made a facial showing of duress after

hearing testimony from Haischer’s sister. She testified that

she had witnessed Nunes yell at Haischer to sign some

papers, which Haischer testified were for the Kantele Circle

loan application. Haischer’s sister further testified that Nunes

did not allow Haischer to be taken to the doctor to treat a

badly swollen leg until after Haischer signed the papers. Xrays taken later that day showed that Haischer’s leg was

broken in multiple places.

The jury was not permitted to consider any evidence of

abuse, however. Haischer’s trial counsel abandoned the

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6 UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER

duress defense midway through the trial and instead asserted

a mens rea defense—specifically, that Haischer lacked the

necessary knowledge and intent to commit wire fraud. 

Following this change, the government sought to have

evidence of Haischer’s abuse excluded. The district court

agreed and instructed defense counsel that he could not

present evidence of abuse. Applying Federal Rule of

Evidence 403, the district court reasoned that the evidence of

abuse possessed no probative value and was “highly

prejudicial.” The court did permit Haischer to present

evidence of “the dynamics of the relationship.” As part of the

instructions given to the jury prior to deliberation, though, the

court told the jury “to disregard any testimony of alleged

abuse” of Haischer by Nunes.

The jury was also given a “deliberate ignorance”

instruction, over Haischer’s objection. This is sometimes

referred to as a Jewell instruction, after United States v.

Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc). Pursuant to

the Jewell instruction, the jury was instructed that it may find

that Haischer acted knowingly if she: “[1] was aware of a

high probability that the information that she included in

mortgage applications was false; and [2] deliberately avoided

learning the truth.” It was further instructed that it may not

find such knowledge if she “actually believed that the

information she included in the loan applications was

truthful” or “was simply careless.”

The jury convicted Haischer on both the conspiracy and

wire fraud counts. Haischer filed a motion for a new trial on

several grounds, including that the district court’s exclusion

of evidence of domestic violence had deprived her of a fair

trial because the evidence was relevant to show her good faith

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UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER 7

and lack of knowledge and intent to defraud. The district

court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a district

court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the

following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading

the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting

cumulative evidence.” “Unfair prejudice is an undue

tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,

commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. The

Rule requires that the probative value of the evidence be

compared to the articulated reasons for exclusion and permits

exclusion only if one or more of those reasons substantially

outweigh the probative value.” United States v. Anderson,

741 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

We review the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 for

an abuse of discretion. United States v. Garcia, 729 F.3d

1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2013). Where an evidentiary error has

occurred in a criminal prosecution, we then review de novo

whether the error “rises to the level of a constitutional

violation.” United States v. Pineda–Doval, 614 F.3d 1019,

1032 (9th Cir. 2010). If it does, we must reverse the

conviction unless we conclude that the error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1033–34. Because Rule

403 “requires an on-the-spot balancing of probative value and

[unfair] prejudice,” Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn,

552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted),

the “district court’s Rule 403 determination is subject to great

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8 UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER

deference,” United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1267

(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

We are also mindful, however, that the exclusion of

evidence offered by the defendant in a criminal prosecution

under Rule 403 is “an extraordinary remedy to be used

sparingly.” United States v. Mende, 43 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th

Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[T]he danger of [unfair] prejudice must not merely outweigh

the probative value of the evidence, but substantially

outweigh it.” Id. (emphasis in original). “[A]pplication of

Rule 403 must be cautious and sparing” because the Rule’s

“major function is limited to excluding matter of scant or

cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the

sake of its prejudicial effect.” United States v. Hankey,

203 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States

v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1983)).

The evidence that Haischer’s leg was broken and that

Nunes required Haischer to sign the loan papers before she

could be taken to the doctor to have it treated suggested that

Haischer was, at a minimum, under pressure to sign the

documents. Had this evidence been before the jury, a

reasonable juror might have doubted whether Haischer had

the requisite knowledge and intent to commit fraud. 

Although the evidence of abuse was less probative of

Haischer’s lack of knowledge or intent than it was of

Haischer’s potential duress defense, the evidence was not so

minimally probative that it was proper to exclude it entirely. 

The broken leg incident strongly supported one of Haischer’s

primary defenses, that she signed the documents without

knowing what they said because of pressure from Nunes,

such that she lacked the required knowledge and intent.

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UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER 9

“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it makes a conviction

more likely because it provokes an emotional response in the

jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the jury’s attitude

toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to his

guilt or innocence of the crime charged.” United States v.

Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807, 811 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in

original) (internal quotation mark omitted). Probative

evidence that incidentally happens to make a criminal

defendant more sympathetic is not properly subject to

exclusion under Rule 403.

The exclusion of the evidence of abuse in this case was

particularly problematic in light of the “deliberate ignorance”

instruction. Pursuant to this instruction, the jurors were told

that they could find that Haischer knowingly committed fraud

without actual subjective awareness if she: (1) was aware of

a high probability that the information she included in

mortgage loan applications was false; and (2) deliberately

avoided learning the truth. The second prong of the Jewell

instruction thus requires deliberate action, which we have

defined as action that is “intentional,” “premeditated,” and

“fully considered.” United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913,

920 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quoting BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 459 (8th ed. 2004)). “A decision influenced by

coercion, exigent circumstances or lack of meaningful choice

is, perforce, not deliberate,” we have held, and thus “[a]

defendant who fails to investigate for these reasons has not

deliberately chosen to avoid learning the truth.” Id. (footnote

omitted).

“[D]omestic violence is not an isolated, individual event,

but rather a pattern of perpetrator behaviors used against the

victim.” Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 837 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting Anne L. Ganley, Understanding Domestic

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10 UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER

Violence, in IMPROVING THE HEALTH CARE RESPONSE TO

DOMESTICVIOLENCE 18 (Carole Warshaw &Anne L. Ganley

eds., 1996)). The abusive relationship is defined by a

“pattern of coercion and control,” Evan Stark, Re-Presenting

Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to

Coercive Control, 58 ALB.L.REV. 973, 975 (1995), such that

it may even be said that “the unique profile of [the victim of

domestic abuse] arises as much from the deprivation of

liberty implied by coercion and control as it does from

violence-induced trauma,” id. at 986. Mindful of the

phenomena of “psychological abuse, coercive behavior, and

the ensuing dynamics of power and control,” Hernandez,

345 F.3d at 837, that inhere in the abusive relationship, we

conclude that the evidence of abuse that Haischer sought to

present at trial was sufficiently probative as to her knowledge

and intent, or lack thereof.

That evidence was, in particular, probative of whether

Haischer’s supposed “deliberate ignorance” was in fact

“influenced by coercion,” and thus, under our case law, not

deliberate at all. Heredia, 483 F.3d at 920. It was also

probative of whether Haischer “lacked meaningful choice”

with regard to reviewing the documents, when she would

only be taken to treat a broken leg once she signed them. Id. 

Had the evidence of abuse been admitted, a jury might have

been more likely to determine that the second prong of the

Jewell test was not satisfied.

Our concern is exacerbated by the broad language used by

the district court in instructing the jury on what evidence it

was to disregard. The government argues that the probative

value of the excluded evidence was slight in light of the

testimony that was allowed concerning Haischer’s

relationship with Nunes and instances of verbal badgering

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UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER 11

and intimidation by Nunes. In denying a post-trial motion the

district court similarly noted that Haischer had been permitted

to introduce evidence of the “coercive and manipulative

relationship” she had with Nunes, including “specific

instances of . . . Nunes’ verbal abuse of Haischer.” But after

Haischer abandoned the duress defense, the district court

ruled that evidence that previously had been admitted should

be excluded, and it instructed the jury “to disregard any

testimony of alleged abuse” of Haischer by Nunes. In light

of the broad meaning of the term “abuse,” this instruction

could reasonably have led the jury to disregard the very

evidence later cited by the government and the district court.

Defense counsel at trial might have abandoned the duress

defense because he was under the mistaken impression that

admitting to knowingly and intentionally committing the

fraud was a precondition for raising the defense. We take this

opportunity to make clear that under federal law, in contrast

to the law of certain states, a defendant is not obligated to

admit her guilt to a crime as a precondition for raising an

affirmative defense such as duress. “It is well established that

a defendant in a criminal prosecution may assert inconsistent

defenses.” United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th

Cir. 1975) (en banc) (footnote omitted). We see no reason

why this widely accepted principle, see Mathews v. United

States, 485 U.S. 58, 63–65 (1988), should not apply with

equal force where a defendant seeks both to assert the defense

that she acted under duress and to hold the government to its

burden of proof on the issue of mens rea by contending that

she did not commit the unlawful act with the required level of

knowledge or intent.

Duress and the absence of the required mens rea are not

the same thing. See United States v. Meraz–Solomon, 3 F.3d

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12 UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER

298, 300 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (“[T]he prosecution

must still establish beyond a reasonable doubt that

[defendant] knew he was importing cocaine, even if his

behavior might be excused by duress.”). Similarly, the

Supreme Court has stated that “the defense of duress does not

negate a defendant’s criminal state of mind when the

applicable offense requires a defendant to have acted

knowingly or willfully; instead, it allows the defendant to

‘avoid liability . . . because coercive conditions or necessity

negates a conclusion of guilt even though the necessary mens

rea was present.’” Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 7

(2006) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402

(1980)) (alteration in original). This language stands for the

proposition that knowledge is not categorically inconsistent

with duress. It does not engraft a knowledge or other mens

rea requirement onto the well-settled elements of the defense

of duress. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez–Landaver,

527 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating elements of

duress).1

Having concluded that an error occurred, we must

conduct a de novo review to determine whether that error

1 We recognize that a misreading of certain authorities might have

encouraged a contrary conclusion. For example, a comment to the Ninth

Circuit Model Instruction 6.5 (“Duress, Coercion or Compulsion (Legal

Excuse)”) provides that the instruction is to be used “when the defendant

alleges that by virtue of duress, coercion or compulsion, the defendant

knowingly or intentionally committed the criminal act.” That might be

read as implying that a defendant must admit knowledge or intent as a

precondition to asserting a duress defense, but such an inference would

not be consistent with our case law. See McDowell v. Calderon, 130 F.3d

833, 840 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), overruled in part on other grounds by

Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000) (wording of model instructions,

“although extremely useful, is not blessed with any special precedential

or binding authority”).

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UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER 13

“rises to the level of a constitutional violation.”

Pineda–Doval, 614 F.3d at 1032. “[T]he Constitution

guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense. This right includes, at a

minimum, . . . the right to put before a jury evidence that

might influence the determination of guilt.” United States v.

Stever, 603 F.3d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, while it is axiomatic

that “not every evidentiary error amounts to a constitutional

violation,” it nevertheless is “clear that the erroneous

exclusion of important evidence will often rise to the level of

a constitutional violation.” Id. (citations omitted).

An evidentiary error violates a defendant’s due process

rights when it excludes: “(1) the main piece of evidence,

(2) for the defendant’s main defense, to (3) a critical element

of the government’s case.” United States v. Evans, 728 F.3d

953, 967 (9th Cir. 2013). The evidence of abuse would have

been central evidence in support of Haischer’s mens rea

defense, particularly in light of the deliberate ignorance

theory as reflected in the Jewell instruction. Because

Haischer’s knowledge and intent were necessary elements of

wire fraud, the evidence related to a critical element of the

government’s case. We conclude that the exclusion of the

evidence violated Haischer’s due process rights.

When a constitutional error has been committed, “we

must reverse the guilty verdict unless the government

convinces us the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Leal–Del Carmen, 697 F.3d 964,

975 (9th Cir. 2012). The government has not met this high

burden.

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14 UNITED STATES V. HAISCHER

III. Conclusion

We vacate Haischer’s conviction for wire fraud under

18 U.S.C. § 1343 and conspiracyunder 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and

remand for further proceedings, which may include a new

trial. Because we set aside the judgment of conviction, we do

not reach the other issues that Haischer raised in this appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

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