Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02608/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02608-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gerardo Edmundo Andrada-Pastrano
Petitioner
USA
Respondent

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gerardo Edmundo Andrada-Pastrano,

Movant/Defendant, 

v. 

USA, 

Respondent/Plaintiff.

CV-14-02608-PHX-JAT 

CR-12-00877-PHX-JAT 

ORDER 

 Pending before this Court is Movant’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct 

sentence. The Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report and 

Recommendation (R&R) recommending that the Motion be denied. (Doc. 14).1

 

Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R (Doc. 15) and a request to supplement (Doc. 

16). This Court will review the portions of the R&R to which there is an objection de 

novo. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

Procedural History 

 As recounted in the R&R, Petitioner pleaded guilty on December 5, 2013 before a 

Magistrate Judge. (R&R at 2). On December 23, 2013, this Court adopted the findings 

and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge regarding the guilty plea. (R&R at 3-4). 

On April 14, 2014, Movant’s counsel moved to withdraw. (R&R at 4). This Court 

granted that motion and appointed new counsel. (R&R at 4). On June 4, 2014, this Court 

sentenced Movant. (R&R at 4). Now pending before this Court is Movant’s motion to 

 

1

 All docket number are in the civil case unless otherwise noted. 

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withdraw from his plea (and presumably proceed to trial) because his plea was not 

knowingly and voluntarily entered. (R&R at 5-6). Movant premises this argument on 

various theories of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R&R at 6). 

 As the R&R notes, Movant was sentenced to 57 months under the plea agreement. 

(R&R at 5). If Movant prevails on this motion and is later convicted at trial, he could be 

sentenced to life in prison. (R&R at 3). 

Legal Standard 

As the R&R discusses, Movant, via his plea agreement, waived his right to 

collaterally attack his sentence, including bringing this motion. (R&R at 7-9). Thus, 

Movant may only bring this motion if he can show that his claims support an argument 

that his plea agreement was not knowingly and voluntarily made. (R&R at 8-9). If 

Movant cannot make this showing, his waiver of his right to collaterally attack his 

sentence is enforceable, and the Court will not reach the merits of his Motion. (R&R at 

8). Movant has eight theories of ineffective assistance of counsel and one theory of 

prosecutorial misconduct which he claims support his argument that his plea was not 

knowingly and voluntarily made. See (Objections at 6-31). 

 The R&R goes through each theory of ineffective assistance of counsel argued by 

Movant. The R&R applies Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). (R&R at 9-

10). Movant objects to the application of Strickland in this case because he argues that 

his plea counsel had a conflict of interest and therefore all of his arguments should be 

analyzed under Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, (1980). (Objections at 4). Petitioner is 

correct that in certain circumstances, Cuyler is the appropriate standard to use for 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims specifically premised on a conflict of interest. 

A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 

“includes the entitlement to representation that is free from conflicts of 

interest.” United States v. Wells, 394 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2005). To 

establish a violation of this right, a defendant “must demonstrate that an 

actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Id.

(quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, (1980)). 

Murdaugh v. Ryan, 724 F.3d 1104, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013). 

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 Movant presumes his claims are covered by Cuyler because Movant presumes his 

counsel has a conflict of interest. It is true that when Movant’s counsel withdrew, 

counsel stated that he had a conflict of interest at that time that necessitated withdrawal. 

Doc. 614 in CR 12-877. However, Movant makes no showing that at the time his 

counsel advised him to plead guilty, or at the change of plea hearing, counsel was already 

suffering from a conflict of interest. “To make out [a Cuyler] claim, ‘a defendant who 

raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely 

affected his lawyer’s performance.’ Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.” Bemore v. Chappell, 788 

F.3d 1151, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2015). Here, because Movant made no objection at 

sentencing, and still fails to show that his counsel had an actual conflict during 

representation, the Court finds Strickland governs Movant’s claims. Thus, this objection 

is overruled.2

 Moreover, the reason Movant wants his claims to be considered under Cuyler

rather than Strickland is because Movant wants prejudice to be “presumed,” rather than 

Movant being required to show prejudice. (Objections at 4). However, in this case, 

counsel never engaged in joint representation of co-defendants as was this issue in 

Cuyler; thus, the prejudice prong of Strickland must still be proven by Movant. 

Specifically: 

In Mickens v. Taylor, the Supreme Court revisited the conflict issue and 

clarified its holding from Cuyler. The Supreme Court stated that the general 

rule requiring a showing of prejudice consistent with the standard set forth 

in the familiar Strickland standard still applies in the conflict context and 

identified Cuyler as an exception to this general rule applicable in cases of 

multiple representation. See 535 U.S. 162, 176, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 

L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). The Court characterized the Strickland prejudice 

requirement as an additional element for a conflict claim not involving 

multiple representation. See id. at 174. Therefore, under Cuyler, Bonin, and 

Rich, petitioner must demonstrate that an actual conflict adversely affected 

counsel’s performance. Under Mickens, petitioner must also demonstrate 

actual prejudice with respect to the outcome of the trial. 

 

2

 The R&R recounts the showing Movant must make under Strickland at pages 9- 10. 

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Edwards v. Scribner, 2007 WL 2729068, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007) report and 

recommendation adopted, 2008 WL 619063 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008). Accordingly, even 

if Movant’s legal objection was sustained, Movant would still be required to show the 

prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

Request for Evidentiary Hearing 

Movant objects to the R&R’s conclusion that no evidentiary hearing is required on 

Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Objections at 5). Movant argues that 

this Court erred by allowing his counsel to withdraw in the underlying case without a 

hearing. Id. Movant’s theory on this § 2255 Petition is that his counsel’s alleged conflict 

of interest caused deficient performance. Movant’s argument that he requires an 

evidentiary hearing now to determine whether this Court should have permitted counsel 

to withdraw in April 2014 (seemingly suggesting no actual conflict really existed) is 

irrelevant to the claims in Movant’s currently pending motion because the claims are 

based on the premise that counsel had a conflict. In other words, the Court has accepted 

that at the time of counsel’s withdrawal, there was a conflict of interest. 

 Moreover, plea counsel’s motion to withdraw was served on Movant on April 9, 

2014. At sentencing on June 4, 2014 (with new counsel), Movant raised no objections 

about prior counsel being allowed to withdraw, did not seek to withdraw from the plea, 

and did not seek a continuance (even though the Court offered one) to potentially raise 

these or any other issues. Thus, Movant’s request now for an evidentiary hearing to 

effectively seek reconsideration of this Court’s April 14, 2014 Order permitting 

withdrawal is untimely. See LR Crim. 12.1(a) incorporating LR Civ. 7.2 (LR Civ. 7.2(g) 

requires motions for reconsideration to be filed within 14 days). 

 Accordingly, no evidentiary hearing is necessary and this objection is overruled. 

See (R&R at 10-11). 

Alleged Ineffectiveness of Sentencing Counsel (Ground 3) 

Movant claims his sentencing counsel was ineffective in two ways. (R&R at 8, 

11). In his objections, Movant focuses on counsel’s failure to obtain more information 

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about the deferred adjudication out of Texas and alleged errors in the presentence report. 

(Objections at 29-31). These issues would not have impacted whether the plea was 

knowingly and voluntarily entered; thus, the Objection is overruled because it is barred 

by Movant’s waiver of his right to collaterally attack his sentence. Thus, relief on this 

theory is denied. Further, Movant’s request to supplement (Doc. 16) to add more 

evidence regarding this theory is denied because additional evidence would not change 

the outcome. 

Seven Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Plea Counsel (Ground 1) 

 1. Counsel’s alleged failure to pursue issues relating to the Traffic Stop 

The R&R discusses this issue at pages 11-14. The R&R concludes that counsel’s 

performance was not deficient regarding the traffic stop. Movant objects and argues his 

counsel should have filed a motion to suppress. (Objections at 6-7). As the R&R notes, 

counsel did file a motion to suppress. Moreover, an additional motion to suppress as 

identified by Movant would likely have been futile; and, regardless, was based on a case 

decided after Movant decided to plead guilty. (R&R at 12-13). The R&R concludes that 

because counsel’s performance is not judged based on hindsight, this argument fails for 

this alternative reason. (Id). This Court agrees with the R&R that counsel’s performance 

was not deficient. Accordingly, the plea was not rendered not knowing and voluntary 

based on this argument. 

 2. Counsel’s alleged failure to determine benefits to cooperating 

informant 

Movant argues that the informant received a benefit regarding a tax lien that his 

counsel failed to investigate. (R&R at 14-15). The R&R notes that counsel was aware of 

the alleged tax fraud and filed a motion to suppress the wiretap arising from the tax issues 

(because of Movant’s plea, the Court never resolved this motion). (Id). The Court agrees 

with the R&R that counsel’s performance regarding the issue of the informant and the 

benefit was not deficient. (Id). 

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 Movant’s objection that counsel should have done more with respect to the 

wiretap is overruled. (Objection at 7-12). Specifically, Movant continues to offer no 

evidence that he was intercepted on the wiretap or had standing to challenge the wiretap; 

accordingly, any arguments he claims counsel should have made in this regard would 

have been futile. (R&R at 15). Because counsel’s performance was not deficient, this 

theory of ineffective assistance also failure to show the plea was not knowing and 

voluntary; and relief based on this theory is denied. 

3. Counsel alleged failure to argue judicial bias 

Initially, Movant argued that the undersigned was biased based on a “reputation” 

for “never” granting motions to suppress. (R&R at 16). The R&R noted that this 

reputation was not true, and alternatively would not have provided a basis for a motion to 

recuse regardless. (R&R at 16-17). Therefore, counsel was not ineffective for not 

bringing a motion to recuse. (Id). 

 In his objections, Movant now argues that because the undersigned does grant 

motions to suppress, as noted in the R&R, his counsel was ineffective for not filing one. 

(Objections at 12-14). However, as already discussed above, with respect to the traffic 

stop, a further motion to suppress would have been futile. Accordingly, this objection is 

overruled. The Court agrees with R&R that counsel was not deficient in this regard; thus, 

the plea was still knowing and voluntary. 

4. Counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the section 851 enhancement 

Movant argues that his counsel was deficient for not investigating and obtaining a 

ruling from the trial court prior to his plea as to whether his deferred adjudication out of 

Texas could have been an enhancement to his sentence. (R&R at 17). The R&R 

concludes the Texas deferred adjudication could have been a valid enhancement; 

therefore, counsel was not deficient for cautioning Movant about it potentially increasing 

his sentence after trial. (R&R at 17-27). 

 Movant objects and argues that the enhancement was barred for various reasons. 

(Objection at 14-18). For the reasons stated in the R&R, the Court finds the enhancement 

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was not per se barred, and counsel’s performance regarding the potential § 851 

enhancement was not deficient. (R&R at 20-27). 

 5. Counsel’s alleged deficient performance regarding the career offender 

guidelines. 

Movant argues his counsel’s performance was deficient for advising him that he 

could be sentenced under the career offender guidelines. (R&R at 25). The R&R 

concludes that counsel’s advice was accurate; therefore, counsel’s performance was not 

deficient. (R&R at 25-27). 

 Movant objects and argues that his attorneys in his 1994 conviction and 1991 

conviction also had conflicts of interest. (Objections at 20-23). Thus, he concluded that 

the 1994 conviction should not count against him. (Objections at 23). For the legal 

reasons stated in the R&R with regard to the Texas conviction (R&R at 26-27), the Court 

similarly finds that Movant could not collaterally attack his 1994 in this case. Therefore, 

his counsel was not deficient for failing to do so and relief on this claim is denied because 

nothing in this argument renders Movant’s plea not knowing and voluntary. 

6. Counsel’s alleged failure to raise the buyer/seller defense 

Movant argues his counsel should have investigated the buyer/seller defense to the 

conspiracy count against him. (R&R at 27). The R&R concludes that the 169.4 pounds 

of marijuana seized in Movant’s case foreclosed counsel from arguing that the drugs 

were for personal use under the buyer/seller defense. (R&R at 27-29). 

Movant objects and argues he was not a member of the whole conspiracy. 

(Objections at 18-20; 24-25). For the reasons stated in the R&R (at 28-29), the evidence 

in this case foreclosed any buyer/seller defense and counsel’s performance was not 

deficient for failing to argue otherwise. Accordingly, this argument fails to render the 

plea not knowing and voluntary. 

7. Co-Defendants’ plea status 

Movant argues that his counsel lied to him about whether his co-defendants had 

signed plea agreements. (R&R at 29). The R&R concludes that the record reflects that 

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counsel’s representations were accurate and that even if inaccurate the representation did 

not prejudice Movant. (Id at 29-30). 

 Movant objects and argues that the Magistrate Judge should have gone through the 

record and determined the date each plea was signed. This objection is overruled. 

Nothing in Movant’s argument regarding the status of his co-defendants would render his 

plea not knowingly and voluntarily made. Therefore, relief on this basis is denied. 

Alleged Failure to Disclose Evidence by the Prosecution (Ground 2) 

 Movant argues his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he was 

constructively denied counsel by the prosecutor’s failure to give certain evidence to his 

counsel. (R&R at 30). Because the evidence at issue was potentially impeachment 

evidence of a witness, rather than exculpatory evidence for Movant, the failure to 

disclose it did not render the plea not knowingly and voluntarily made. (R&R at 31 

(citing Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ruiz, 536 

U.S. 622, 633 (2002))). 

 Movant objects and argues that the evidence would have been material. 

(Objections at 27-29). Even if Movant’s factual assertion is true, the law requires the 

evidence to be exculpatory to impact whether a plea is not knowing and voluntary. (R&R 

at 31). Movant makes no argument that the evidence is exculpatory. Accordingly, the 

objection is overruled and relief is denied on this claim. 

Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the plea agreement was knowingly 

and voluntarily entered into by Movant. Accordingly, the waiver of the right to 

collaterally attack the sentence is enforceable, and the Court will deny the motion to 

vacate, set aside or correct sentence on this basis. See (R&R at 2-4; 7-9). Thus, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Supplement (Doc. 16) is denied for the 

reasons stated above. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the R&R (Doc. 14) is accepted and adopted. 

The Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Doc. 1) is denied, with prejudice, 

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and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that, in the event an appeal is filed, a certificate of 

appealability is denied because the Motion is precluded by a plain procedural bar and 

jurists of reason would not find this Court’s procedural ruling debatable or wrong; 

alternatively, Movant did not make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.

 Dated this 11th day of April, 2016. 

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