Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03110/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03110-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Army
Respondent
Harroll Ingram
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

HARROLL INGRAM,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3110

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-1221-14-0725-W-1.

______________________ 

Decided: August 10, 2015

______________________ 

HARROLL INGRAM, Sanford, FL, pro se.

RYAN MAJERUS, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BENJAMIN C.

MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., ELIZABETH M.

HOSFORD. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

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2 INGRAM v. ARMY

PER CURIAM. 

Harroll Ingram (“Ingram”) appeals from the final

decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“the 

Board”) denying his petition for review. See Ingram v. 

Dep’t of the Army, No. AT-1221-14-0725-W-1 (M.S.P.B. 

Feb. 3, 2015) (“Final Order”); (M.S.P.B. Sept. 24, 2014) 

(“Initial Decision”). Because the Board did not err in 

denying Ingram’s petition for review, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Ingram was employed by the Army as a Computer 

Engineer/Systems Engineer in the Program Executive 

Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation, in 

Orlando, Florida. Ingram filed an individual right of 

action (“IRA”) claim at the Office of Special Counsel 

(“OSC”), concerning his disclosure of a superior’s intention 

to proceed with a controversial work presentation despite 

a contrary recommendation from the Army’s legal department. In July 2011, the Board found that Ingram 

was entitled to corrective action from the Army for making a protected disclosure under the Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”). See Ingram v. Dep’t of the Army, 116 

M.S.P.R. 525, 533 (2011). The Army undertook the required corrective action, and the Board subsequently 

found that the agency complied with its final order. See

Resp’t’s App. 34. 

In May 2014, Ingram filed a second IRA claim, seeking corrective action at OSC, and on appeal at the Board, 

the Administrative Judge (“AJ”) denied Ingram’s request 

for corrective action. Initial Decision at 8. Ingram identified a number of alleged personnel actions that he claimed 

were taken in retaliation for his prior whistleblowing and 

IRA appeal: 

1. The [Army] failed to comply with the prior 

Board order in MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-

09-0874-B-1 by not increasing his perforCase: 15-3110 Document: 16-2 Page: 2 Filed: 08/10/2015
INGRAM v. ARMY 3

mance evaluation score to the highest possible rating;

2. The [Army] created a hostile work environment;

3. Lieutenant Colonel Wilson Ariza [(“Ariza”)]

scheduled [Ingram] to work 20 hours of overtime and refused to agree to give him either 

overtime pay or compensatory overtime for 

the period;

4. [Ariza] did not permit [Ingram] to take a hotel room for a local conference so that he 

would not have to drive home late, while affording that courtesy to others;

5. [Ariza] did not respond to [Ingram’s] e-mails;

6. [Ariza] recommended the issuance of a “letter 

of caution” for leaving a conference call early 

even though the colonel knew that [Ingram] 

needed to use the bathroom;

7. Ms. Fabiola Hoffman [(“Hoffman”)] failed to 

include [Ingram] in technical meetings denying [him] the opportunity to use his job skills;

8. Ms. Hoffman did not allow [Ingram] to serve 

as a technical representative on Medical 

Simulation Training Center (MSTC) Source 

Selection activities;

9. Ms. Hoffman brought [Ingram’s] work to [Ingram’s] supervisor for review;

10. Ms. Hoffman removed [Ingram] as a “Government Inspector of Simulators;”

11. Mr. Tony Marton [(“Marton”)] failed to take 

appropriate action to remedy Ms. Hoffman’s 

disrespectful and improper actions; and

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4 INGRAM v. ARMY

12. Mr. Marton issued [Ingram] a “letter of caution” for leaving a conference call early even 

though [Ingram] asserted that he needed to 

use the bathroom.

Id. at 3. The AJ then analyzed each claim, and concluded 

that Ingram failed to show by preponderant evidence that 

he suffered a personnel action within the meaning of the 

WPA. Id. at 8.

With respect to claim (1), the AJ found that 

“[n]oncompliance with a final Board order is not an enumerated personnel action within the meaning of the 

WPA,” and, in addition, the AJ found that the Army was 

in compliance with the order. Id. at 3–4. The AJ then 

found that Ingram failed to provide “specifics” for his 

hostile work environment claim (2), and failed to present 

evidence to substantiate the allegations relating to Ariza’s 

actions in claims (3), (4), and (5). Id. at 4–5. 

The AJ then found that Ariza’s letter of caution in 

claim (6) “merely admonishes [Ingram] to behave in a 

professional manner and treat others with respect.” Id. at 

6. As a result, the AJ found that claim (6) did not constitute a personnel action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(a)(2)(A) because the letter did not constitute a 

formal disciplinary event. Id. The AJ also found that 

claim (12), relating to Marton’s letter of caution, was the 

same letter of caution as in claim (6), and thus was also 

not a personnel action within the meaning of the WPA. 

Id. at 8.

Turning to claims (7)–(11), the AJ found that Ingram 

failed to show by preponderant evidence that he suffered 

a personnel action as a result of the actions of Hoffman or 

Ingram’s supervisor, Marton. Id. at 7. The AJ acknowledged that the Army appointed an investigating officer to 

examine claims (7)–(10) and that the investigator found 

that the claims could not be substantiated. Id. The AJ 

concluded, however, that he could not rely on the concluCase: 15-3110 Document: 16-2 Page: 4 Filed: 08/10/2015
INGRAM v. ARMY 5

sory statements of the investigator. Id. Nonetheless, 

according to the AJ, Ingram “failed to present evidence 

which demonstrates that he suffered a change in his 

working conditions” and “he [relied] on bare factual 

allegations without providing proof to support those 

claims.” Id.

Because the AJ found that Ingram failed to show that 

he suffered a personnel action within the meaning of the 

WPA, he did not reach the issue of whether the Army took 

those actions in retaliation for Ingram’s whistleblowing 

activity. Id. at 8. Ingram then filed a petition for review 

of the initial decision.

The full Board denied the petition for review and, as 

modified by the final order, affirmed the initial decision. 

Final Order at 2. The Board found that the applicable 

law and evidence of record supported “the [AJ’s] findings 

that [Ingram] failed to show by preponderant evidence 

that he suffered a personnel action within the meaning of 

the WPA, and, as a result, there was no need to reach the 

issue of whether the [Army] took those actions in retaliation for his whistleblowing activity.” Id. at 3. 

Ingram argued that the AJ failed to substantively 

address his claims regarding “a significant change in his 

duties, position removal attempts without cause, and 

denial of a promotion opportunity.” Id. at 4. Ingram also 

alleged that he was issued a letter of reprimand; that he 

was refused overtime pay; and that the Army took prohibited personnel actions against him in retaliation for his 

alleged whistleblowing. Id. The Board limited its analysis to those allegations explicitly identified in Ingram’s 

OSC complaint and addressed by the AJ. Id. The Board 

considered Ingram’s allegations of a reduction in duties

and a refusal of overtime pay, but found for each allegation that Ingram had either presented “limited probative 

evidence,” id., or “no evidence in the record,” id. at 5. 

The Board rejected Ingram’s claims and noted that it 

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6 INGRAM v. ARMY

“may only consider those disclosures of information and 

personnel actions that [Ingram] raised before OSC.” Id.

(citing Mason v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 116 M.S.P.R. 

135, ¶ 8 (2011)).

With respect to the “letter of reprimand,” the Board 

found that Ingram never received a “letter of reprimand,” 

but instead received a “letter of caution,” as concluded by 

the AJ in the initial decision. Id. at 5. The Board found 

that the AJ “thoroughly addressed the letter of caution 

and found that the letter only admonishes [Ingram] to 

behave in a professional manner and treat others with 

respect.” Id. Thus, because the letter did “not state that 

[Ingram] did anything wrong, or restrict behavior in any 

way,” the Board found that it did not constitute a personnel action within the meaning of the WPA. Id. at 5–6. 

The Board, however, did find that the AJ had failed to 

consider Ingram’s claim “that his supervisors created a 

Chief Engineer position on his team and then, without 

competition, filled that position with another individual 

from a different team.” Id. at 6. Nonetheless, the Board 

found that Ingram failed to raise this claim in his OSC 

complaint, and thus the “claim was not properly before 

the Board.” Id. (citing Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. at ¶ 8).

As a final matter, Ingram argued that the AJ incorrectly granted a motion by the Army to strike e-mails 

obtained by Ingram during discovery on the grounds of 

attorney-client privilege. The Board concluded that under 

5 C.F.R. § 1201.41, the AJ has substantial discretion to 

make rulings on motions, and the Board found that 

Ingram had “shown no basis upon which to disturb the 

[AJ’s] ruling.” Id. at 6.

Ingram appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

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INGRAM v. ARMY 7

DISCUSSION

The scope of our review in an appeal from a Board decision is limited. We may only set aside the Board’s 

decision if it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) 

obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see Briggs v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

We must set aside a Board decision “unsupported by 

substantial evidence when it lacks such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 

a conclusion.” McLaughlin v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 353 

F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted).

Ingram argues that the Board: (1) failed to substantively consider certain of his OSC allegations; (2) erred by 

relying on the self-serving results of an Army-led investigation; (3) erred in its characterization of the reprimand 

letter; and (4) erroneously granted the Army’s motion to 

strike certain e-mails during discovery. The government 

responds that the Board addressed each of Ingram’s 

allegations and correctly reviewed the initial decision for 

substantial evidence.

We agree with the government that the Board did not 

err in denying Ingram’s request for corrective action. As a 

result, the Board did not err in denying Ingram’s petition 

for review. The Board considered each of Ingram’s allegations and all of the relevant facts before denying Ingram’s 

request. 

Ingram alleges that the Board failed to consider certain OSC allegations, and, in addition, Ingram specifically 

argues that the Board failed to consider evidence supporting his allegations concerning Hoffman’s personnel actions. As we previously noted, the Board addressed 

Ingram’s allegations against Hoffman, and it held that 

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8 INGRAM v. ARMY

Ingram “failed to present evidence” and “relied on bare 

factual allegations without providing proof to support his 

claims.” Final Order at 4. Ingram fails to recite any 

additional evidence or allegations that were made before 

both OSC and the AJ that the Board failed to take into 

account. See Ward v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 981 F.2d 521, 

526 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he administrative judge justifiably refused to consider an issue that . . . had not properly 

[been] raised before the Special Counsel.”)

Ingram also argues that the AJ and the Board erroneously relied on the Army-led investigation of his allegations against Hoffman. As previously noted, however, the 

AJ expressly declined to consider the Army’s investigation, but nevertheless concluded that Ingram had failed to 

meet his burden of proof as to the allegations relating to 

Hoffman. Initial Decision at 7. Similarly, the Board did 

not rely on the results of the investigation, and instead 

concluded that Ingram had not suffered a personnel 

action because of the “limited probative evidence” presented on the issue. Final Order at 4. Thus, Ingram has 

failed to demonstrate that the AJ and Board incorrectly 

relied on the Army-led investigation.

Ingram’s arguments with respect to the “letter of caution” also fail to identify an error in the Board’s analysis. 

The AJ held that the letter could not constitute a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) because the 

letter was not a formal disciplinary event, and, in any 

event, the letter did not rise to the level of a threatened 

personnel action under § 2302(b)(8). Initial Decision at 6. 

The Board noted the AJ’s analysis and agreed that the 

letter could not constitute a personnel action under the 

WPA. Final Order at 5–6. The Board thus reasonably 

concluded that the letter did not amount to a threatened 

personnel action, and we decline to reweigh the evidence 

on appeal. See, e.g., Henry v. Dep’t of the Navy, 902 F.2d 

949, 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“It is not for this court to reweigh the evidence before the Board.”).

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INGRAM v. ARMY 9

Finally, Ingram challenges the Board’s decision affirming the AJ’s order to strike e-mails obtained by Ingram during discovery because they were attorney-client 

privileged. As the Board reasoned, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41

accords agencies substantial discretion to rule on motions, 

and Ingram fails to identify any error in the Board’s 

conclusion that the AJ did not abuse its discretion.

Because the Board’s decision that Ingram did not allege a personnel action under the WPA is supported by 

substantial evidence, the Board did not err in denying 

Ingram’s petition for review. We have considered Ingram’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are 

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of 

the Board is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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