Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01412/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01412-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Abell Foundation, Inc.
Appellant
Ford Motor Company
Appellee
Paice LLC
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PAICE LLC, THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.,

Appellants

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1412, 2016-1415

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. 

IPR2014-00571, IPR2014-00579.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

PAICE LLC, THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.,

Appellants

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1745

______________________ 

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2 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2014-

00884.

______________________ 

Decided: March 7, 2017

______________________ 

RUFFIN B. CORDELL, Fish & Richardson, PC, Washington, DC, argued for appellants. Also represented by 

TIMOTHY W. RIFFE, LINDA KORDZIEL, DANIEL TISHMAN, 

BRIAN JAMES LIVEDALEN. 

MATTHEW J. MOORE, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by 

GABRIEL BELL; ANDREW B. TURNER, JOHN P. RONDINI, 

FRANK A. ANGILERI, SANGEETA G. SHAH, Brooks Kushman 

PC, Southfield, MI.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, SCHALL and STOLL, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM. 

Opinion dissenting-in-part filed by Circuit Judge 

STOLL.

PER CURIAM. 

This is an appeal from final written decisions by the 

Patent Trial and Appeal Board in three inter partes

review proceedings that invalidated various claims of

Paice’s patent relating to hybrid vehicle control strategies. 

Paice contends that the Board misconstrued two claim 

terms and lacked substantial evidence to support its 

obviousness findings. We disagree with Paice and affirm 

the Board’s decisions.

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PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 3

BACKGROUND

In early 2014, Paice LLC and the Abell Foundation 

(collectively, “Paice”) sued Ford Motor Company for 

infringement of several patents covering hybrid vehicle 

technology, including U.S. Patent No. 7,104,347. Hybrid 

cars, in general, contain both a gas-powered engine and 

one or more battery-powered electric motors that can be 

used in isolation or in tandem to propel the car. The ’347

patent teaches a vehicle control strategy to reduce emissions that operates the engine only when it is efficient to 

do so and uses the motor to propel the vehicle in scenarios 

where the engine cannot operate efficiently. The efficient 

range for engine operation is determined, in part, based 

on the vehicle’s instantaneous torque demands, or road 

load (“RL”). ’347 patent col. 19 ll. 54–56, col. 12 ll. 38–43. 

Typically, this efficient range occurs when the vehicle’s 

road load is a substantial percentage of the engine’s 

maximum torque output (“MTO”), i.e., when the torque 

demand is greater than 30% of MTO. Id. at col. 20 ll. 52–

60, col. 13 ll. 60–61. 

The ’347 patent teaches that the vehicle can operate 

in multiple different modes depending on its instantaneous torque requirements, the battery’s state of charge, 

and other operating parameters. Id. at col. 19 ll. 54–56. 

Three possible operating modes include: 1) an electric 

mode used during low-speed driving in which the required 

torque is provided to the wheels only by the motor, id. at 

col. 35 l. 66 – col. 36 l. 7; 2) an engine mode used during 

highway cruising where the engine alone provides the 

required torque, id. at col. 36 ll. 23–39; and 3) a hybrid 

mode that is used when the torque required is above the 

engine’s MTO and the motor provides the additional 

torque above that provided by the engine, id. at col. 36 

ll. 40–46. Claim 1 is illustrative and recites:

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4 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

1. A hybrid vehicle comprising:

an internal combustion engine controllably coupled to road wheels of said vehicle;

a first electric motor connected to said engine [a]nd operable to start the engine responsive to a control signal; 

a second electric motor connected to road 

wheels of said vehicle, and operable as a motor, to apply torque to said wheels to propel 

said vehicle, and as a generator, for accepting 

torque from at least said wheels for generating current; 

a battery, for providing current to said 

motors and accepting charging current from at 

least said second motor; and 

a controller for controlling the flow of electrical and mechanical power between said engine, first and second motors, and wheels,

wherein said controller starts and operates

said engine when torque require[d] to be produced by said engine to propel the vehicle 

and/or to drive either one or both said electric 

motor(s) to charge said battery is at least equal

to a setpoint (SP) above which said engine 

torque is efficiently produced, and wherein the 

torque produced by said engine when operated 

at said setpoint (SP) is substantially less than 

the maximum torque output (MTO) of said 

engine.

Id. at col. 58 ll. 13–37 (emphasis added). 

Following Paice’s assertion of its patents against Ford 

in the district court, Ford filed a series of inter partes

review petitions, three of which were instituted for the 

’347 patent: the 884, 571, and 579 petitions. The Board 

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PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 5

construed the terms “setpoint” and “road load” in all three 

decisions, but each of the petitions addressed different 

combinations of prior art references. For example, the 

884 petition invalidated claims 1, 7, and 10 of the ’347 

patent as obvious in light of the Caraceni reference. Ford 

Motor Co. v. Paice LLC, IPR2014-884, 2015 WL 8536739, 

at *12 (PTAB Dec. 10, 2015) (“884 Board Decision”). In 

the 571 petition, the Board concluded that the Severinsky 

reference rendered obvious claims 23 and 36 and found 

that claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, and 21 would have been obvious 

over a combination of Severinsky and the Ehsani reference. Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC, IPR2014-571, 2015 

WL 5782084, at *13 (PTAB Sept. 28, 2015) (“571 Board 

Decision”). Finally, the Board found claims 1, 7, 8, 18, 21, 

23, and 37 would have been obvious over the collective 

teachings of the Bumby references in the 579 petition, 

which was combined with the 571 petition on appeal to 

this court. Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC, IPR2014-579, 

2015 WL 5782085, at *17 (PTAB Sept. 28, 2015) (“579 

Board Decision”). 

Paice appeals from the Board’s final written decisions 

in all three petitions. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

35 U.S.C. § 141(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). 

DISCUSSION

Paice raises four main arguments on appeal. First, 

Paice asserts that the Board improperly construed “setpoint” and “road load” in the ’347 patent. Second, Paice 

faults the Board for concluding that Caraceni teaches 

certain disputed limitations of claims 1, 7, and 10. Paice 

next argues that the Board erred in concluding that

Severinsky renders obvious claims 23 and 36 and that 

Severinsky in combination with Ehsani renders obvious 

claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, and 21. Finally, Paice challenges the 

Board’s conclusion that a POSA would have been motivated to combine the Bumby references and that they 

teach the limitations of claims 1, 7, 8, 18, 21, 23, and 37.

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6 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

A claim is unpatentable as obvious “if the differences 

between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 

prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole 

would have been obvious at the time the invention was 

made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” 

35 U.S.C. § 103.1 We review the Board’s ultimate obviousness determination de novo and underlying factual 

findings for substantial evidence. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid 

Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938). Factual findings underlying the obviousness 

inquiry include the scope and content of the prior art, the 

differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, whether there is a motivation to combine prior art 

references, the level of ordinary skill in the art, and 

relevant secondary considerations. Merck & Cie v. Gnosis 

S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 

137 S. Ct. 297 (2016). 

I. 

Paice first alleges that the Board erred by construing

the claim term “setpoint” as a “predetermined torque 

value that may or may not be reset.” 884 Board Decision, 

2015 WL 8536739, at *4. Paice asserts that the Board’s 

construction misses the fundamental purpose of the

setpoint, which Paice claims is to trigger a transition 

between operating modes, and that this purpose should be 

included in the construction. We see no error in the 

Board’s construction and decline to read a requirement 

 

1 Given the effective filing date of the ’347 patent’s 

claims, the version of 35 U.S.C. § 103 that applies here is 

the one in force preceding the changes made by the America Invents Act. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 

Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(n), 125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011).

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PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 7

that the setpoint trigger a transition between operating 

modes into the construction. 

When construing claims, the Board must apply the 

broadest reasonable construction in light of the patent’s 

specification. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 

2131, 2142 (2016). “We review intrinsic evidence and the 

ultimate construction of the claim de novo.” SightSound 

Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 

2015). 

Like the Board, we start with the plain claim language. Claim 1, for example requires the controller to 

“start[] and operate[] said engine when torque require[d] 

to be produced by said engine . . . is at least equal to a 

setpoint (SP).” ’347 patent col. 58 ll. 29–33 (emphasis 

added). This language equates the setpoint to a torque 

value and makes clear that the transition requirement

Paice urges us to read into the meaning of “setpoint” is 

included in the claim’s structure and need not be read into 

the definition of setpoint. The claim itself calls for the 

controller to start the engine, i.e., transition between 

modes, when the torque required by the engine reaches a 

setpoint, i.e., a “predetermined torque value that may or 

may not be reset,” 884 Board Decision, 2015 WL 8536739, 

at *4.

The specification and dependent claims demonstrate 

that transitions can occur before a setpoint is reached, in 

addition to not occurring despite reaching a setpoint, 

which further bolsters our conclusion that this requirement should not be included in the term’s construction. 

For example, the specification describes a scenario where 

the driver rapidly depresses the accelerator pedal while in 

low-speed operation—indicating an urgent need for full 

power—which causes the engine to start “before the road 

load reaches any particular setpoint SP.” ’347 patent 

col. 41 ll. 14–19 (emphasis added). The specification also 

teaches hysteresis in the mode-switching determination, 

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8 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

meaning that a new mode might be entered “only after 

the road load exceeded a first, lower setpoint SP for an 

extended period of time.” Id. at col. 41 ll. 41–43 (emphasis 

added). Similarly, several claims that depend from claim 

1 show that a transition will only occur if the setpoint has 

been maintained for a period of time. Claim 3 uses the 

controller to effect a transition “only when RL>SP for at 

least a predetermined time.” Id. at col. 58 ll. 41–46 (emphasis added). Claim 4 requires the controller to switch 

from engine propulsion to motor propulsion but “only 

when RL<SP for at least a predetermined time.” Id. at 

col. 58 ll. 48–52 (emphasis added). Accordingly, for all 

these reasons, we agree with the Board’s construction of 

setpoint.

We also discern no error in the Board’s construction of 

the term “road load” as “the amount of instantaneous 

torque required to propel the vehicle, be it positive or 

negative.” 884 Board Decision, 2015 WL 8536739, at *3. 

The Board’s construction is amply supported by the 

specification, which repeatedly defines the road load as 

the vehicle’s instantaneous torque requirement. See, e.g., 

’347 patent col. 12 ll. 38–42 (“The ’817 and ’743 applications also disclose that the vehicle operating mode is 

determined by a microprocessor responsive to the ‘road 

load’, that is, the vehicle’s instantaneous torque demands, 

i.e., that amount of torque required to propel the vehicle 

at a desired speed.”); id. at col. 38 ll. 41–42 (“FIG. 7(a) 

shows the vehicle’s instantaneous torque requirement, 

that is, the ‘road load’ . . . .”); id. at col. 36 ll. 8–10, col. 40 

ll. 24–25. 

Despite acknowledging that the Board “properly construed” road load, Paice alleges that the Board impermissibly broadened the construction during its invalidity 

analysis to encompass not only the instantaneous torque 

required to propel the vehicle—the Board’s construction—

but also the driver’s request for torque “as indicated by 

mere accelerator pedal position.” Appellant Br. 29 (16-

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PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 9

1745 appeal). According to Paice, the accelerator pedal 

position alone does not identify the road load, and the 

Board’s application of this broader construction to the 

prior art references was error. We view Paice’s argument 

as a challenge to the Board’s application of its claim 

construction, which we address in various sections below 

and review for substantial evidence. We also note that 

the ’347 patent itself does not disclose how to determine 

road load other than by reference to the accelerator pedal 

position. In discussing the prior art, for example, the 

specification states: “the operator’s depressing the accelerator pedal signifies an increase in desired speed, i.e., an 

increase in road load, while reducing the pressure on the 

accelerator or depressing the brake pedal signifies a 

desired reduction in vehicle speed.” ’347 patent col. 12 

ll. 46–50 (emphasis added); see also id. at col. 30 ll. 1–2 

(determining road load “by measuring the rate at which 

the operator depresses accelerator pedal”).

II. 

Paice next articulates several reasons for reversing 

the Board’s conclusion that claims 1, 7, and 10 are obvious 

over the Caraceni reference. First, with respect to all 

three claims, Paice alleges that Caraceni fails to disclose 

using a setpoint to start and operate the gas engine. 

Next, Paice claims that Caraceni does not disclose a 

battery for providing current to the first and second 

electric motors, as required by all three claims. Finally, 

Paice contends that Caraceni does not meet the road load 

limitation of claim 7. We find none of these arguments 

persuasive and that substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s contrary fact findings. 

A.

Paice first argues that the decision to operate the engine in Caraceni is a manual one and that there is no 

disclosure in Caraceni’s hybrid mode of starting the 

engine because of a setpoint, as required by claims 1, 7, 

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10 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

and 10. Paice also contends that the contrary testimony 

of Ford’s expert, Dr. Davis, is nothing more than hindsight bias that relies on the teachings of the ’347 patent to 

explain how to use its patented method to accomplish 

Caraceni’s goal of operating the gas engine when the 

specific fuel consumption is low. These arguments were 

considered and rejected by the Board. And we find that

substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that, 

when operating in hybrid mode, Caraceni compares “the 

torque require[d] to be produced by said engine to propel 

the vehicle” to a torque-based setpoint and starts the 

engine if that torque is at least equal to the setpoint, as 

required by claims 1, 7, and 10.2 

Although the driver in Caraceni manually selects the 

vehicle’s mode of operation—all-electric, engine-only, or 

hybrid—substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding 

that, once the driver selects the hybrid mode, Caraceni’s 

vehicle management unit (“VMU”) maximizes fuel efficiency by automatically splitting power between the 

 

2 Paice also contends that the Board lacks substantial evidence to support its finding that Caraceni uses a 

torque-based setpoint to start and operate the gas engine 

to charge the battery. We need not reach this argument

because the broadest reasonable construction of claim 1

only requires that the torque-based setpoint be used 

either to start and operate the engine to propel the vehicle 

or to charge the battery, but not both. ’347 patent col. 58 

ll. 29–33 (requiring a “controller [to] start[] and operate[] 

said engine when torque require[d] to be produced by said 

engine to [1] propel the vehicle and/or [2] to drive either 

one or both said electric motor(s) to charge said battery is 

at least equal to a setpoint (SP)” (emphasis added)). 

Indeed, Paice admitted in its briefing for the related 16-

1412 and 16-1415 appeals “that the limitation is written 

in the disjunctive.” Appellant Reply Br. 27.

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PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 11

engine and electric motor according to the control algorithm depicted graphically in Figure 9 of Caraceni. 884 

Board Decision, 2015 WL 8536739, at *8. As the Board 

emphasized in its decision, Caraceni states that, in “hybrid mode,” the VMU “activates the two drive trains

through the inverter for the electric motor and the engine 

electronic control unit respectively.” Id. (quoting 

J.A. 1392).3 Thus, contrary to Paice’s suggestion, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the 

VMU, not the driver, activates the engine and motor in 

hybrid mode. The Board’s finding is further supported by 

the testimony of Ford’s expert, Dr. Davis, who cited 

portions of Caraceni to reasonably demonstrate that, in 

the hybrid mode, Caraceni’s VMU sends control signals to 

start and operate the gas engine. J.A. 1893–94. 

The Board’s finding that Caraceni discloses a hybrid 

mode in which the VMU starts and operates the engine 

when the torque required to propel the vehicle is at least 

equal to a torque-based setpoint is further supported by 

Dr. Davis’s annotated version of Caraceni Figure 9 and 

supporting testimony. Annotated Figure 9 is shown 

below: 

 

3 Appendix citations in this section are to the 16-

1745 appeal materials. 

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12 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

884 Board Decision, 2015 WL 8536739, at *9 (reproducing

figure on J.A. 1904). As Dr. Davis explained and annotated Figure 9 fairly clearly depicts, the engine is off in 

region 1 and the motor alone propels the vehicle. Id.

(citing J.A. 1902–05, ¶¶ 275–79). Dr. Davis further 

testified that, in the transition between regions 1 and 2, 

as the driver’s request for torque increases above a predetermined threshold level—noted by Dr. Davis using a 

green dashed line—the engine is automatically activated 

by Caraceni’s VMU. Id. We find that Dr. Davis’s testimony and annotated Figure 9 provide substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that Caraceni’s

engine is started and operated based on a setpoint when 

in hybrid mode. 

B.

In addition, substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

finding that Caraceni discloses a traction battery for 

providing current to the engine starter and electric motor, 

thus satisfying the requirement of claims 1, 7, and 10 of a 

battery that provides current to the first and second 

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PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 13

electric motors. It is true that, as Paice points out, Caraceni does not depict a connection between the traction 

battery and the engine starter. Nor does Caraceni state 

that such a connection exists. But, as the Board explained, Caraceni’s engine starter must be connected to a 

battery to operate, and Caraceni discloses only one battery—the traction battery. Id. at *10–11; see also

J.A. 1392 (Figure 10). These two facts are undisputed on 

the record and provide substantial evidence in support of 

the Board’s finding that one of ordinary skill in the art 

would have understood that the traction battery needed to 

be connected to the engine starter. 

In its opinion, the Board relied on “common sense” to 

conclude that “a skilled artisan would have readily understood that the ‘engine starter’ needed to be connected, 

directly or indirectly, to one of the battery packs that 

make up the ‘traction battery.’” 884 Board Decision, 2015 

WL 8536739, at *11. Citing Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 

832 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016), Paice argues that the 

Board erred by relying on “common sense” to supply a 

missing element in the claims. First, we note that the 

Board only resorted to common sense as a secondary 

rationale for its conclusion that Caraceni’s engine starter 

receives current from the traction battery. 884 Board 

Decision, 2015 WL 8536739, at *11 (introducing the

common sense argument with the phrase “[e]ven so”). 

In any event, we conclude that the Board did not err 

by invoking common sense in its analysis. In Arendi, this 

court held that the Board can rely on common sense to 

inform its obviousness analysis “if explained with sufficient reasoning.” Arendi, 832 F.3d at 1361. Continuing, 

this court explained that the Board’s “common sense” 

determination cannot be conclusory or unsupported by 

substantial evidence. Id. at 1366. In this case, the 

Board’s conclusion that, “as a matter of common sense,” a 

skilled artisan would have understood that the engine 

starter needed to be connected to the traction battery was 

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14 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

supported by the undisputed fact that Caraceni’s engine 

starter must be connected to a battery and Caraceni only

discloses one battery. Because it was supported by substantial evidence, the Board’s common sense analysis did 

not run afoul of Arendi. As such, we conclude that the 

Board properly relied on a common sense analysis.

Finally, we address Paice’s factual assertion that 

Caraceni’s engine starter would have been connected to a 

standard battery because it would have been too small to 

accept current from the traction battery. As the Board 

noted, “[n]owhere does Caraceni disclose that the ‘engine 

starter’ is connected to a standard battery.” 884 Board 

Decision, 2015 WL 8536739, at *11. The Board also 

credited Dr. Davis’s testimony, including his testimony 

explaining that one of ordinary skill in the art reading 

Caraceni would have understood that Caraceni’s engine 

starter was an electric motor that could not operate 

unless a current is supplied from the car battery. Though 

not specifically cited by the Board, Dr. Davis testified at 

length that, by 1993, there were several well-known 

techniques for providing power to a starter motor using a 

hybrid battery like the traction battery. On this record, 

we find substantial evidence to support the Board’s holding that this limitation is obvious in view of Caraceni.

C.

Paice also alleges that Caraceni does not disclose 

claim 7’s requirement that the vehicle is operated in one 

of a plurality of operating modes based on a comparison of 

road load to a setpoint. According to Paice, the Board 

erred by relying solely on Caraceni’s required traction 

torque, which is set by the accelerator pedal position, to 

teach road load because road load also must account for 

external factors such as wind, rolling friction, and grade. 

The Board’s finding to the contrary, however, is supported 

by substantial evidence. 

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PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 15

As stated above, we agree with the Board that the 

term “road load,” properly construed, means “the amount 

of instantaneous torque required to propel the vehicle, be 

it positive or negative.” When applying this construction, 

the Board correctly noted that the ’347 patent’s specification itself undermines Paice’s argument by tying the 

accelerator pedal position to road load: “the operator’s 

depressing the accelerator pedal signifies an increase in 

desired speed, i.e., an increase in road load.” 884 Board 

Decision, 2015 WL 8536739, at *3 (quoting ’347 patent 

col. 12 ll. 45–51). In fact, the ’347 patent’s specification 

does not disclose how to determine road load other than 

by reference to the accelerator pedal position. The Board 

also properly relied on the testimony of Ford’s expert, 

Dr. Davis, in concluding that Caraceni’s use of the required traction torque to select whether to operate the 

engine, motor, or both in Caraceni’s hybrid mode is no 

different than using road load as recited in claim 7. Id. at 

*11 (citing J.A. 1913–26, ¶¶ 297–317). Given this record, 

we conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s finding that Caraceni discloses the road load 

limitations in claim 7. 

III. 

Paice also challenges the Board’s conclusion that 

claims 23 and 36 are obvious in view of Severinsky and 

that claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, and 21 are obvious based on

Severinsky in combination with Ehsani. Specifically, 

Paice advances a series of interrelated arguments focusing on whether Severinsky discloses the use of road load 

and a setpoint to make decisions on the operating mode 

and charging of the battery. We find that substantial 

evidence supports the Board’s fact findings, and we discern no error in its conclusion that the claims are obvious. 

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16 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

A.

Paice first asserts that the Board erred in finding that 

Severinsky4 teaches a comparison of road load to a setpoint to determine when to operate the engine as required 

by claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, 21, 23, and 36. According to Paice, 

Severinsky’s microprocessor uses speed to make such

determinations regarding operation of the engine. There 

is substantial evidence, however, to support the Board’s 

determination that, although Severinsky describes the 

use of speed as a factor considered by the microprocessor, 

it also uses the vehicle’s torque requirements, or road 

load, in determining when to operate the engine. For 

example, the Board relied on the following passage from 

Severinsky: “It will be appreciated that according to the 

invention the internal combustion engine is run only in 

the near vicinity of its most efficient operational point, 

that is, such that it produces 60-90% of its maximum 

torque whenever operated.” U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970 

col. 20 ll. 63–67 (emphasis added); 571 Board Decision, 

2015 WL 5782084, at *8. The Board found Dr. Davis’s 

interpretation of this passage credible when he explained 

that “[t]he lower end of the 60-90% range disclosed by 

Severinsky ’970 would also be known as the proposed 

‘predetermined torque value’ or ‘setpoint’ below which the 

engine does not operate.” J.A. 1586, ¶ 204; 571 Board 

Decision, 2015 WL 5782084, at *10.5 The Board was 

further persuaded by Dr. Davis’s testimony that Severinsky “is generally, if not always, using torque/road load in 

its mode decisions.” 571 Board Decision, 2015 WL 

 

4 The Severinsky reference was incorporated into, 

and shares an inventor with, the ’347 patent. ’347 patent 

col. 10 ll. 37–41.

5 Appendix citations in this section and Section IV, 

infra, are to the materials from the combined joint appendix in the 16-1412 and 16-1415 appeals. 

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PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 17

5782084, at *10 (quoting J.A. 3326, ¶ 19). After reviewing 

the record and the Board’s analysis, we conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s fact finding 

that Severinsky teaches a comparison of road load to a 

setpoint to determine when to operate the engine. 

B.

Even if Severinsky does rely on torque as a control 

variable, Paice alleges that Severinsky’s discussion of the 

60-90% efficient torque range refers to output torque as 

opposed to input torque and, thus, the Board erred in 

finding claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, 21, 23, and 36 obvious in view 

of Severinsky or based on Severinsky in view of Ehsani. 

The Board concluded that road load is an output torque, 

not an input torque, “for the simple reason” that the 

claims compare road load to the engine’s maximum torque 

output. Id. at *11. We disagree with the Board’s reinterpretation of “road load” as including output torque. As we 

noted above, the Board properly construed “road load” as 

“the amount of instantaneous torque required to propel 

the vehicle, be it positive or negative.” The Board erred 

by reinterpreting the claim. 

Nonetheless, the ’347 patent itself admits that Severinsky discloses a torque-based control mode, stating: “an 

important aspect of the invention of the [Severinsky] ’970 

patent” is improving efficiency “by operating the internal 

combustion engine only at relatively high torque output 

levels.” ’347 patent col. 25 ll. 4–7. Although this passage 

refers to output torque, the next sentence discusses the 

required torque, or input torque: “[w]hen the vehicle 

operating conditions require torque of this approximate 

magnitude, the engine is used to propel the vehicle” and 

“when less torque is required, an electric motor powered 

by electrical energy stored in a substantial battery bank 

drives the vehicle.” Id. at col. 25 ll. 8–13 (emphases 

added). These “same advantages,” the ’347 patent notes, 

are “provided by the system of the present invention.” Id.

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18 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

at col. 25 ll. 15–16. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

Board’s finding that Severinsky relies on road load to 

start and operate the engine and motor was supported by 

substantial evidence. 

C.

Paice also argues that Severinsky does not render 

claims 23 and 36 obvious because Severinsky uses speed 

and the battery’s state of charge as the two criteria for 

determining when to charge the battery, not road load 

and the state of battery charge as recited by claim 23.6 

The claim requires an exception to the general rule of not 

operating the engine when road load is less than the 

setpoint; specifically, the claim requires operating the 

engine when road load is less than the setpoint and “the 

state of charge of said battery indicates the desirability of 

doing so.” ’347 patent col. 60 ll. 46–51. 

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding 

that Severinsky discloses this same operation. The Board 

found that Severinsky, like the ’347 patent, teaches a

battery charging mode that is responsive to the state of 

charge of the battery. 571 Board Decision, 2015 WL 

5782084, at *12. We agree.

At the outset, we observe that this recitation has two 

components: (1) “using the torque between RL and SP to 

drive said at least one electric motor;” and (2) “to charge 

said battery when the state of charge of said battery 

indicates the desirability of doing so.” ’347 patent col. 60 

ll. 46–51. In other words, the first component evaluates 

the magnitude of the torque used to charge the battery 

and the second requires the state of charge to indicate the 

desirability of doing so. The Board’s decision, and the 

 

6 The Board also rejected claim 9 and its battery 

charging limitation for the same reasons as claim 23. 571 

Board Decision, 2015 WL 5782084, at *13.

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PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 19

parties’ arguments to the Board, primarily focused on the 

second component of this recited feature. See 571 Board 

Decision, 2015 WL 5782084, at *12 (“But the problem 

with [Paice’s] argument is that the claimed invention 

recites the same approach as Severinsky—using the ‘state 

of charge of the battery’ to indicate when charging is 

necessary.”). Yet on appeal, Paice primarily focuses on 

the first component; in particular, whether Severinsky 

uses the excess road load to charge the battery. During 

oral argument, Paice conceded the conventional nature of 

at least using excess torque to charge the battery: 

COURT: “Do you think it’s conventional, the part 

in the claim that talks about . . . the excess 

amount of energy, which is defined in the claim as 

SP minus RL, do you think . . . that part is conventional?” 

MR. CORDELL (counsel for Paice): “No because 

SP is not conventional. . . . [I]t is conventional to 

use excess torque from the engine or energy . . . it 

is conventional to use excess power to charge the 

battery because it’s free . . . .”

Indeed, Severinsky confirms Paice’s concession that it 

is conventional to use excess torque to charge the battery. 

See ’970 patent col. 10 ll. 32–36 (describing a downhill 

scenario in which the driver removes his foot from the 

accelerator pedal and the engine’s excess torque can be 

used to charge the batteries). As cited above, Paice, 

however, does not concede that using the difference 

between setpoint and road load is conventional. But as 

Dr. Davis explained, a POSA would understand from this 

passage that, even though the torque required to propel 

the vehicle may be less than the setpoint because the car 

is traveling downhill, the engine will continue to operate

above the setpoint and will use its excess torque to charge 

the battery if the battery requires charging. J.A. 1623–

25, ¶¶ 296–97. This constitutes substantial evidence to 

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20 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

support the Board’s finding that Severinsky discloses the 

battery charging limitation in claims 23 and 36. 

IV. 

Finally, Paice asserts that the Board erred in holding 

claims 1, 7, 8, 18, 21, 23, and 37 obvious in view of the 

Bumby references. Specifically, Paice asserts that the 

Board lacked a motivation to combine the Bumby references for purposes of its obviousness analysis, that the 

Board impermissibly cherry-picked elements from distinct 

embodiments disclosed by the Bumby references, and that 

several claim limitations were not satisfied by the Bumby 

references. We disagree.

First, Paice argues that the Board did not establish a 

motivation to combine the Bumby references—five articles sharing one common author—which Paice views as a 

series of disparate references relating to various different 

aspects of hybrid vehicle design. Motivation to combine 

prior art references is a question of fact, Merck, 808 F.3d 

at 833, and Paice’s arguments cannot overcome the substantial evidence relied on by the Board to support its 

reasons for combining the references. 

The Board found that “the Bumby references document, chronologically, the evolution of a hybrid vehicle 

project undertaken by Professor James Bumby and his 

team.” 579 Board Decision, 2015 WL 5782085, at *9. 

This finding was supported by a later-published thesis by

Philip Masding—an author on two of the Bumby references—which “brings together the five Bumby references 

in a single compilation and summarizes the efforts” of 

Dr. Bumby and his team. Id. 

In addition, Paice asserts that the Board erred by 

combining elements from separate, allegedly incompatible 

embodiments in the Bumby references without providing 

a supporting rationale for the specific combination. Paice

cites Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 

Case: 16-1412 Document: 46-2 Page: 20 Filed: 03/07/2017
PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 21

554 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2009) for support. In Boston 

Scientific, one reference disclosed all of the asserted

claim’s elements, but those elements were taught by two 

different embodiments that were pictured side-by-side in 

the patent. This court nonetheless found that claim 

obvious because “[c]ombining two embodiments disclosed 

adjacent to each other in a prior art patent does not 

require a leap of inventiveness.” Id. at 991. We also

acknowledged that as long as a POSA “can implement a 

predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” 

Id. (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 

417 (2007)). Here, the Board combined portions of the 

optimal and sub-optimal control strategies that are disclosed in the Bumby II and Bumby III references, each of 

which provides a method for controlling the performance 

of a hybrid vehicle. Bumby II acknowledges that the suboptimal strategy was derived from the optimal strategy by 

simplifying its algorithm based on the tendencies of the 

optimal strategy to select engine operation whenever an 

operating point can be obtained near the high-efficiency 

region. J.A. 5629–30. And Bumby III discusses these two 

embodiments in sequential subsections of its “Control of 

the Hybrid Electric Drivetrain” section. J.A. 5638–41. 

Like the combination of two side-by-side embodiments in 

Boston Scientific, we view the combination of elements 

from the optimal and sub-optimal embodiments as a 

“predictable variation” that does not “require a leap of 

inventiveness.” Boston Sci., 554 F.3d at 991. As such, we 

discern no error in the Board’s opinion.

Paice also asserts that the Board lacked substantial 

evidence to support its findings that the Bumby references disclosed several limitations of the challenged 

claims. First, Paice argues that the Bumby references do 

not use road load and a setpoint to determine when and 

how to charge the battery, as required by claims 1 and 23. 

The Board disagreed, relying on passages from Bumby II 

and Bumby V that it found “suggest that, when the torque 

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22 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

required to propel the vehicle is less than a certain value, 

or setpoint, the excess torque output of the engine is used 

to charge the battery.” 579 Board Decision, 2015 WL 

5782085, at *16. Dr. Davis’s expert report supported the 

Board’s conclusion, see J.A. 5783–85, ¶¶ 284–86;

J.A. 5846–51, ¶¶ 438–49, and the Board also noted that 

its understanding was confirmed by Dr. Davis’s deposition 

testimony. Based on this record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the 

Bumby references teach the battery charging limitations 

in claims 1 and 23. 

Paice also argues that the Bumby references rely on 

demand power, instead of road load, as the control variable and focus on selecting the optimum gear ratio rather 

than comparing road load to a setpoint. The Board considered and rejected these arguments, and its contrary 

conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. Even 

though demand power is an input, the Board found that 

“the suboptimal control algorithm converts the instantaneous power and speed requirement into a torque and 

speed demand.” 579 Board Decision, 2015 WL 5782085, 

at *12 (quoting J.A. 5630). The Board found that the 

Bumby references teach using those torque and speed 

demands to select the mode of operation. Id. Indeed, the 

Board reasoned that the fact that the sub-optimal control 

strategy is based on a boxed region defined by upper and 

lower torque and speed bounds “would have suggested to 

a skilled artisan a setpoint that utilizes torque as a factor 

in determining the operational mode.” Id. at *11. Moreover, the Board relied on passages from the Bumby references that expressly disclose calculations to determine the 

required torque at the wheels (albeit in the optimal control strategy), and on Dr. Davis’s expert report, which 

“confirm[ed] that a skilled artisan would have understood 

these references as speaking to the road load required to 

propel the vehicle.” Id. at *13. 

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PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 23

CONCLUSION

We have considered Paice’s remaining arguments and 

find them unpersuasive. For the reasons stated above, 

the Board’s claim constructions were not erroneous and 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s fact findings 

and legal conclusions in holding the challenged claims 

invalid on obviousness grounds. Accordingly, we affirm 

the Board’s decisions in the appealed IPRs.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Costs to Appellees.

Case: 16-1412 Document: 46-2 Page: 23 Filed: 03/07/2017
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PAICE LLC, THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.,

Appellants

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1412, 2016-1415

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. 

IPR2014-00571, IPR2014-00579.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

PAICE LLC, THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.,

Appellants

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1745

______________________ 

Case: 16-1412 Document: 46-2 Page: 24 Filed: 03/07/2017
2 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2014-

00884.

______________________ 

STOLL, Circuit Judge, dissenting-in-part.

I respectfully dissent with respect to Section III.C on 

the ground that there is no substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that claims 9, 23, and 36 

would have been obvious in view of Severinsky. The 

Board’s decision does not adequately explain its bases for 

concluding that Severinsky teaches “employing said 

engine to propel said vehicle when the torque RL required 

to do so is less than said lower level SP and using the 

torque between RL and SP to drive said at least one 

electric motor to charge said battery when the state of 

charge of said battery indicates the desirability of doing 

so,” ’347 patent col. 60 ll. 46–52, as required by claims 23 

and 36. Nor has the Board provided sufficient rationale 

to support its conclusion that Severinsky teaches claim 9’s 

specific requirement of “a low-speed battery charging 

mode II.” Id. at col. 59 ll. 13–24. 

Case: 16-1412 Document: 46-2 Page: 25 Filed: 03/07/2017