Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50386/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50386-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fidel Castro-Verdugo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FIDEL CASTRO-VERDUGO,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50386

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-03560-LAB-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 7, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed May 6, 2014

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Susan P. Graber,

Circuit Judge, and Charles R. Breyer,*

 Senior District

Judge.

Opinion by Judge Graber;

Dissent by Judge Breyer

* The Honorable Charles R. Breyer, Senior United States District Judge

for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s 2013 revocation of

probation and the sentence imposed upon revocation, in a

case in which the district court’s 2011 imposition of the

underlying probation was defective.

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that

because of the defect in the underlying sentence, the district

court in 2013 lacked jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)

to revoke the probation. The panel held that because the

defendant never moved to correct the 2011 sentence under

28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the term imposed had not expired, he

was still serving a term of probation when he violated the

conditions of his probation, thus satisfying the criteria to

create jurisdiction under § 3565(a).

The panel held that the district court committed no

procedural error in imposing a term of supervised release in

connection with the 2013 probation violation, where the

district court, in applying U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1, noted facts

specific to the defendant’s case that suggested the advisability

of an added measure of deterrence. The panel also held that

the imposition of supervised release was not substantively

unreasonable.

Dissenting, District Judge Breyer wrote that he cannot

concur in an opinion that upholds clear error.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO 3

COUNSEL

Matthew W. Pritchard (argued), Federal Defenders of San

Diego, Inc., San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Steven Lee (argued), Special Assistant United States

Attorney; Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney; Bruce R.

Castetter, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellant

Section Criminal Division, San Diego, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Fidel Castro-Verdugo was convicted of illegal

reentry in 2011. At sentencing, the district court imposed a

period of probation along with a stayed custodial sentence,

thereby exceeding the court’s authority under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3561(a)(3). In 2013, Defendant again was convicted of

illegal reentry which, in addition to constituting a new crime,

violated the conditions of his 2011 sentence of probation. On

appeal from the probation revocation proceedings, Defendant

argues that the district court in 2013 lacked jurisdiction

because of the defect in the underlying 2011 sentence. 

Because Defendant never moved to correct the underlying

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, he was in fact still serving

a term of probation at the time of the new offense, so the

district court in 2013 properly assumed jurisdiction under

18 U.S.C. § 3565(a). We therefore affirm.

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4 UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant is a Mexican citizen and national. In 2011, he

pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and

a five-year term of probation. The imposition of probation

along with a custodial sentence was improper under

18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(3), which precludes probation for a

defendant who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the

same offense. United States v. Forbes, 172 F.3d 675, 676

(9th Cir. 1999). Although the sentence imposed was clearly

erroneous and Defendant was represented by counsel,

Defendant did not move to vacate, amend, or correct the

sentence.

Among the conditions of Defendant’s 2011 probation

were requirements that he (1) not violate any federal, state, or

local laws and (2) not reenter the United States illegally. The

court noted that Defendant had no criminal history but that he

had already been removed, and told not to reenter illegally,

about 30 times. As a condition of the plea agreement,

Defendant waived the right to appeal or collaterally attack the

court’s judgment, except for a collateral attack predicated on

ineffective assistance of counsel. The court stayed

Defendant’s custodial sentence, and he was removed.

In 2013, Defendant again pleaded guilty to illegal reentry,

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The district court sentenced

Defendant to six months’ imprisonment and three years’

supervised release for the new offense. As part of his plea

agreement, Defendant again waived the right to appeal or

collaterally attack the conviction or sentence, except for a

collateral attack predicated on ineffective assistance of

counsel.

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UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO 5

The United States Probation Office petitioned the court

for a warrant to revoke probation in connection with

Defendant’s violation of his 2011 probation agreement. At

the probation revocation proceedings, Defendant objected to

the 2013 district court’s jurisdiction on the ground that the

2011 imposition of probation was improper under Forbes,

172 F.3d at 676. The district court concluded that it had

jurisdiction to revoke Defendant’s probation. The court did

so and sentenced Defendant to a prison term of six months

and one day, to run consecutively with his term of

imprisonment for the new offense, plus one year of

supervised release, to run concurrently with the term of

supervised release for the new offense. Defendant timely

appeals the probation revocation and associated sentence.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s assumption of

jurisdiction over probation revocation proceedings. United

States v. Daly, 839 F.2d 598, 599–600 (9th Cir. 1988). If

jurisdiction was proper, we review for abuse of discretion the

district court’s sentence of supervised release. United States

v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2008).

DISCUSSION

A. The District Court Had Jurisdiction to Revoke

Probation.

Defendant argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction

to revoke his probation in 2013 because, when the district

court imposed probation in 2011, it did so in conjunction with

a sentence of imprisonment, which it lacked authority to do

under 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(3). Forbes, 172 F.3d at 676. As

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6 UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO

an initial matter, the now-conceded defect in the 2011

sentence, although clear error, was not jurisdictional. 

“[J]urisdiction means today . . . the courts’ statutory or

constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” United States v.

Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The district court in 2011 had jurisdiction over

Defendant’s federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. It had

authority to impose a sentence following his conviction under

18 U.S.C. § 3551 but exceeded its statutory authority under

18 U.S.C. § 3561 by imposing probation along with a

custodial sentence. A sentence imposed by a court that lacks

jurisdiction and an excessive sentence are two different

grounds for post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Hitchcock v.

United States, 580 F.2d 964, 965 (9th Cir. 1978)

(enumerating the four distinct grounds for relief under

28 U.S.C. § 2255). “[A] rule should not be referred to as

jurisdictional unless it governs a court’s . . . subject-matter or

personal jurisdiction . . . even if important and mandatory

. . . .” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct.

1197, 1202 (2011) (citations omitted).

But regardless of the nature of the underlying error, the

validity of the 2011 sentence is not properly before us. “An

appeal challenging a probation revocation proceeding is not

the proper avenue through which to attack the validity of the

original sentence.” United States v. Gerace, 997 F.2d 1293,

1295 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Simmons,

812 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A]n appeal from a

probation revocation is not the proper avenue for a collateral

attack on the underlying conviction.”). Gerace controls. As

here, the defendant in Gerace argued on an appeal from a

probation revocation proceeding that there were legal defects

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UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO 7

in the imposition of the original sentence of probation.1 We

held that we could not reach the merits of the defendant’s

argument, because anychallenge to the underlying conviction

should be brought as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition. See

Gerace, 997 F.2d at 1295. This holding is consistent with the

rule from other circuits that have addressed the question. See

United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 395 (6th Cir. 2007);

United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316, 317–18 (11th Cir.

1993); Atehortua v. Kindt, 951 F.2d 126, 128–29 (7th Cir.

1991); United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 828 (5th

Cir. 1975). And, as we discuss in more detail below, the rule

is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Defendant argues that he is not attacking the original

2011 sentence, but is instead challenging the jurisdiction of

the district court in 2013 to conduct a probation revocation

1

In Gerace, the defendant used an appeal from a 1992 probation

revocation proceeding, in which a stay of his five-year suspended sentence

was lifted, to challenge the underlying 1989 sentence, which had been

imposed as part of a plea agreement. 997 F.2d at 1294. One of his two

arguments was that the district court had erred in 1989 when it modified

the sentence that had been proposed as part of the underlying plea

agreement. Id. The five-year term of imprisonment imposed in 1992

stemmed from the defendant’s 1989 modified sentence and, on appeal

from the 1992 probation revocation proceedings, we held that we could

not reach the portion of the defendant’s argument that concerned the

alleged error in the 1989 sentencing. Id. at 1294–95. Gerace, like

Simmons, stands for the simple proposition that we cannot reopen the

underlying proceedings at which probation originally was imposed when

the subject before us is probation revocation. This rule is so well settled

and grounded in the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 that we generally apply it in

a single sentence of a memorandum disposition. See, e.g., United States

v. Juda, 510 F. App’x 564, 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2401

(2013); United States v. Estrada, 360 F. App’x 880, 881 (9th Cir. 2009);

United States v. Christensen, 356 F. App’x 965, 965 (9th Cir. 2009)

(unpublished decisions).

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8 UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO

hearing. Because he was not serving a “valid” term of

probation at the time of the probation revocation hearing,

Defendant reasons, the district court lacked jurisdiction under

18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) to revoke his probation. But Defendant

was serving a term of probation at the time of the probation

revocation proceedings, albeit one imposed in error. He is

attacking the validity of the original sentence, which must be

done in a § 2255 petition, not in a probation revocation

proceeding. Gerace, 997 F.2d at 1295. Indeed, our holding

in Gerace recognizes that an underlying sentence may not

always be valid, but that a court tasked with conducting or

reviewing probation revocation proceedings may not

investigate the validity of the original sentence. Id.; see also

Simmons, 812 F.2d at 563 (“[A] court should consider the

petition for probation revocation as if the underlying

conviction was unquestioned.”).

In short, the only criteria necessary to create jurisdiction

over probation revocation proceedings are (1) that the

defendant still be serving a term of probation and (2) that the

defendant violate its conditions. Under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3565(a)(2), “[i]f the defendant violates a condition of

probation at any time prior to the expiration or termination of

the term of probation, the court may . . . revoke the sentence

of probation and resentence the defendant.” Because

Defendant had not moved to vacate, correct, or amend his

2011 sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the term imposed

had not expired, he was still serving a term of probation when

he violated the conditions of his probation, thus satisfying the

criteria to create jurisdiction in 2013.

Nothing in the two cases that Defendant cites, United

States v. Schmidt, 99 F.3d 315 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on

other grounds by United States v. Palomba, 182 F.3d 1121,

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UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO 9

1123 (9th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Vargas-Amaya,

389 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2004), suggests that Gerace does not

control here. Schmidt and Vargas-Amaya considered for how

long a district court retains jurisdiction to conduct probation

revocation or parole revocation hearings, respectively. Title

18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) gives the district court authority to

continue or revoke probation “at any time prior to the

expiration or termination of the term of probation,” while

18 U.S.C. § 3565(c) allows the court to retain jurisdiction

after the term of probation expires for “any period reasonably

necessary for . . . adjudication” so long as the warrant or

summons was issued before the term expired. Consistent

with that statutory text, Schmidt, 99 F.3d at 317, held that a

district court that issued a summons during a defendant’s

term of probation retained jurisdiction over probation

revocation proceedings even after that term expired. 

Similarly, Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d at 906–07, held that,

under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (the analogous statute governing

parole revocation proceedings), the district court lacked

jurisdiction because it had failed to issue a warrant or

summons before the defendant’s term of parole expired.

We have consistently recognized that an appeal from a

probation revocation or parole revocation proceeding is the

proper way to challenge the timing of that revocation

proceeding—an issue completely independent from the

validity of the underlying sentence (and an issue that

necessarily could not have been appealed in a prior

proceeding). See, e.g., United States v. Morales-Isabarras,

745 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 2014) (considering, on appeal from a

supervised release revocation proceeding, what delays are

“reasonably necessary” to adjudication under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(i)); United States v. Grant, 727 F.3d 928, 931–33 (9th

Cir. 2013) (considering, on appeal from a probation

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10 UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO

revocation proceeding, the circumstances that toll probation

for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3565(c)). Those cases do not

change our clear rule that the validity of an underlying

sentence of probation must be challenged under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. Gerace, 997 F.2d at 1295.

As a three-judge panel, we are bound by Gerace. United

States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 133 S. Ct. 775 (2012). We also are convinced that it

was correctly decided. The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255,

outlines procedures for challenging the validity of a sentence

that a district court “was without jurisdiction to impose . . . or

that . . . was in excess of the maximum authorized by law.” 

Id. § 2255(a). The petitioner must first move the court that

“imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct” the

verdict. Id. “If the court finds that the judgment was

rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed

was not authorized by law,” the court then has a number of

options, including setting the judgment aside, resentencing

the prisoner, or correcting the sentence. Id. § 2255(b). The

statute “confers upon the district court broad and flexible

power in its actions following a successful § 2255 motion.” 

United States v. Handa, 122 F.3d 690, 691 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Had a § 2255 motion

been brought before the district court, it could have corrected

the sentence.2 But the collateral challenge that Defendant

2 The dissent argues that such a motion would have been doomed to fail,

because it would have been brought before the same district court that

continued to insist on the lawfulness of the 2011 sentence. Dissent at 19.

Had the district court been presented with a § 2255 petition and a cogent,

well-argued explanation of the problem, we are inclined to take a less

cynical view and think that the court would have been willing to correct

its mistake. In any event, had the district court denied a timely § 2255

petition, Defendant could have appealed to this court from a posture that

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UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO 11

seeks to bring in this appeal would circumvent the statutorily

defined procedure.

Allowing a collateral attack on the underlying sentence of

probation in an appeal from a probation revocation

proceedingwould also thwart Congress’ statute of limitations

for correcting a sentence. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), a

petitioner has one year from “the date on which the judgment

of conviction becomes final” to bring a motion under § 2255. 

Were we to entertain a challenge to a 2011 sentence via a

collateral attack initiated in 2013, not only would we be

ignoring the procedures outlined in § 2255, but we also would

be defeating the statute of limitations that Congress imposed.

In short, Congress has told us in § 2255 both how and

when we may entertain a challenge to a sentence that was

imposed in excess of statutory authority. The dissent’s policy

arguments fail to identify an alternate source of authority

pursuant to which we may rule on the validity of the

underlying sentence. The dissent argues that the legal

avenues available to Defendant were impractical, and that he

lacked incentive to petition for relief in a timely fashion. 

Dissent at 19–23. But § 2255’s time bar is the incentive. 

Collateral consequences are not always apparent

immediately—indeed, in many cases, as in Defendant’s, they

become meaningful only upon a later conviction. But after

the one-year statute of limitations has passed, we may

consider a § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a

sentence only if the petitioner establishes eligibility for

equitable tolling by showing “‘(1) that he has been pursuing

his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.’” 

allowed us to consider the validity of the 2011 sentence.

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12 UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO

United States v. Buckles, 647 F.3d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)).3

We do not have a freestanding mandate to fix every

mistake that we see. For example, we may not consider an

asylum applicant’s claim, however compelling, that is not

first exhausted before the Board of Immigration Appeals. 

Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2004). 

We lack jurisdiction over any appeal, no matter how strong

the merits, that is untimely filed. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S.

205, 213 (2007). And we may not use an appeal from a

probation revocation proceeding to reach back in time and

revisit Defendant’s underlying sentence of probation, in

contravention of the procedures set by Congress under

§ 2255.

However much we may agree that the 2011 sentence was

imposed in error and that Defendant’s 2011 counsel should

have moved to correct it promptly, Defendant in fact was still

serving a term of probation in 2013. The district court in

2013 therefore had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a).

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in

Imposing a Term of Supervised Release.

In the alternative, Defendant challenges the imposition of

a term of supervised release in connection with his 2013

probation violation. “On appeal, we first consider whether

3 We express no opinion as to whether Defendant could still bring a

claim for ineffective assistance of counsel or some other claim, and

whether equitable tolling would apply to such a claim on account of

factors such as those described by the dissent, because those questions are

not before us.

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UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO 13

the district court committed significant procedural error, then

we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” 

United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc).

The district court committed no procedural error. In

applying United States Sentencing Guideline § 5D1.1,4

the

district court noted two facts specific to Defendant’s case that

suggested the advisability of an added measure of deterrence: 

(1) Defendant’s high number of prior reentries; and (2) the

fact that Defendant had promised the district court during the

prior proceeding that he would not reenter again, but then he

reentered anyway. Nor did the district court commit

procedural error in considering the relevant sentencing

factors. “The district court need not tick off each of the

 

4

 Guideline § 5D1.1(c) reads:

The court ordinarily should not impose a term of

supervised release in a case in which supervised release

is not required by statute and the defendant is a

deportable alien who likely will be deported after

imprisonment.

Application note 5 to the Guideline explains:

Application of Subsection(c) — . . . . If such a

defendant illegally returnsto the United States, the need

to afford adequate deterrence and protect the public

ordinarily is adequately served by a new prosecution. 

The court should, however, consider imposing a termof

supervised release on such a defendant if the court

determines it would provide an added measure of

deterrence and protection based on the facts and

circumstances of a particular case.

U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), cmt. n.5.

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§ 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them.” 

Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. The record reflects that the district

court considered Defendant’s arguments and evidence. 

Daniels, 541 F.3d at 922. For example, the district court

specifically noted that Defendant did not have a criminal

record apart from his repeated illegal reentries. Because the

district court understood its discretion and considered the

specific facts of the case, there is no procedural error. Carty,

520 F.3d at 994–95.

Finally, the imposition of supervised release was not

substantively unreasonable. We have upheld as substantively

reasonable terms of supervised release for other defendants

who were to be removed at the end of their custodial

sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Valdavinos-Torres,

704 F.3d 679, 692–93 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding as

reasonable a sentence of supervised release for a removable

defendant where the facts of the case supported the district

court’s conclusion that an added measure of deterrence was

necessary), cert. denied, 2014 WL 1515736 (U.S. Apr. 21,

2014) (No. 13-7521). Where, as here, “the district court

considered the specific facts presented by this case and . . . its

sentence was consistent with its assessment of these facts,”

we find no substantive unreasonableness. United States v.

Apodaca, 641 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2011).

AFFIRMED.

BREYER, Senior District Judge, dissenting:

Today the majority affirms an illegal sentence while

acknowledging that “the sentence imposed was clearly

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UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO 15

erroneous,” Majority Op. at 4, and offers no practical remedy

to correct the wrong. I cannot concur in an opinion that

upholds clear error, and therefore respectfully dissent.

There is no disagreement that the district court’s 2011

sentence of probation coupled with imprisonment was

erroneous. This Court has held that such a sentence is illegal,

as it exceeds the statutory authority granted by Congress. 

18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(3); United States v. Forbes, 172 F.3d

675, 676 (9th Cir. 1999). Nor is there an issue as to whether

the Defendant lawfully waived a challenge to an illegal

sentence at the time of his plea. Again, this Court has wisely

held, along with many of its sister circuits, that appellate

courts must reject such a waiver if to enforce it would result

in the affirmance of an illegal sentence. See United States v.

Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 2007).1

So then what is the rationale supporting an affirmance in

this case? The majority relies on two cases discussing

remedies, and then offers a wrongly sentenced defendant two

options, neither of which make sense.

1

See also United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891–92 (8th Cir. 2003)

(“[A] defendant has the right to appeal an illegal sentence, even though

there exists an otherwise valid waiver.”); United States v. Thornbury,

670 F.3d 532, 539 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We have indeed used the term

‘illegal’ to describe sentences the appeal of which survive an appellate

waiver, but we have done so only where the sentence is alleged to have

been beyond the authority of the district court to impose.”); United States

v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that courts

should refuse to honor the waiver if the district court plainly errs in

sentencing); United States v. Polly, 630 F.3d 991, 1001 (10th Cir. 2011)

(stating that a waiver would be enforced unless it would result in “a

miscarriage ofjustice”); United States v. Soon Dong Han, 181 F. Supp. 2d

1039 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (Breyer, J.) (discussing problems with prospective,

open-ended waivers).

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16 UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO

As an initial matter, the majority is correct that the district

court had jurisdiction over the Defendant for purposes of a

motion to revoke probation. However, that there was

jurisdiction misses the point: the district court clearly

exceeded its statutory authority on two occasions. First, the

district court erred by imposing an illegal term of probation

in 2011. Second, the district court erred in 2013 by revoking

probation and thereupon imposing a sentence of confinement. 

The Defendant appeals here from the district court’s second

error. That the district court had jurisdiction does not correct

the plain error committed in 2011 and again in 2013. Plain

error is for a reviewing court to correct, but apparently not

here.

The majority contends that the appellate remedy chosen

by the Defendant is barred by controlling Ninth Circuit

precedent, and cites United States v. Gerace, 997 F.2d 1293

(9th Cir. 1993), and United States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561

(9th Cir. 1987), to that effect. Majority Op. at 6–7. Neither

case is on point.

Both Gerace and Simmons involved collateral attacks on

underlying convictions based on factors wholly outside the

scope of probation revocation proceedings. Neither case

involved a claim of lack of statutory authority like the one

here. In Gerace, the appeal did not challenge the district

court’s imposition or revocation of probation. Rather, as the

very first sentence of that opinion makes clear, “Gerace

argue[d] that he [wa]s entitled to a new sentencing hearing or

to withdraw his plea of guilty because the government

breached a plea agreement.” Gerace, 997 F.2d at 1293. 

Here, Defendant seeks neither a new sentence nor to

withdraw his plea; he simply challenges the authority of the

district court to revoke his illegally imposed probation.

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UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO 17

To the extent Gerace establishes the broad holding that

“[a]n appeal challenging a probation revocation proceeding

is not the proper avenue through which to attack the validity

of the original sentence,” id. at 1295 (citing Simmons,

812 F.2d at 563), it does so relying entirely on Simmons. 

Simmons, like Gerace, considered an appeal seeking to

withdraw a guilty plea. See Simmons, 812 F.2d at 563

(“Simmons challenges the guilty plea which led to

probation.”). The holding in Simmons on which Gerace

relies is clear: “an appeal from a probation revocation is not

the proper avenue for a collateral attack on the underlying

conviction.” Id. That the opinion in Gerace recited the

holding more broadly as “[a]n appeal challenging a probation

revocation proceeding is not the proper avenue through which

to attack the validity of the original sentence” is of no

moment in light of the facts of those cases.2It bears

repeating: both Simmons and Gerace considered an appeal

seeking to withdraw a guilty plea.3 Here, Defendant seeks no

2 Nor are the out-of-circuit cases the majority cites on this point

persuasive. None of the cases involved either (1) the defendant’s removal

from the country, or (2) a clearly erroneous sentence. Moreover, illegal

reentry cases present unique circumstances which inform defense

counsel’s judgment as to whether the harm of an illegal sentence is

speculative as it depends on a future event, and when appellate review is

appropriate in light of the potential for additional time in custody.

3 The language the majority relies on from Gerace, unsurprisingly,

comes from the section of the opinion discussing Gerace’s contention that

the district court judge, in changing Gerace’s sentence, violated Rule 11’s

prohibition against court participation in plea negotiations. Gerace’s

argument on appeal was that the court’s participation rendered the plea

agreement invalid, thereby rendering his conviction invalid. In that sense,

because Gerace was challenging the validity of his conviction, the court

appropriately relied on Simmons. Here, Defendant is explicitly not

challenging the validity of his conviction, nor could he. His conviction

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18 UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO

such thing. There is no dispute that the imposition of a

term of probation and a term of imprisonment violated

18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(3). Faced with a clearly erroneous

sentence, the majority suggests that Defendant should have

“moved to correct the underlying sentence under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255” or that defense counsel should have “move[d] to

vacate, amend, or correct the [2011] sentence.” Majority Op.

at 3–4. These two proposed remedies ignore the realities of

this case.

Defendant was an alien who had conceded his

removability as part of the 2011 plea agreement. Defendant’s

2011 custodial sentence was for two months time served with

the remainder of a six month sentence stayed. This means

that Defendant would have been released from custody and

transferred to immigration custody immediately after

sentencing on September 19, 2011. The time Defendant

spent in immigration custody would have been

extraordinarily brief.4 For example, the median time spent by

defendants in immigration custody prior to a removal in Fall

of 2012 (including people who did not concede removability)

was 10 days, with 40 percent of aliens spending three days or

less in immigration detention prior to their removal.5See

TRAC Immigration, Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest

ICE Detention (2013), available at http://trac.syr.edu/

was valid, but his sentence was not.

4

In fact, although not part of the record on review before this Court,

immigration records confirm that Defendant was removed from the

country on September 20, 2011.

5

In 2013, for example, Defendant was released from federal criminal

custody on January 27, 2014 and removed from the country by

immigration enforcement on the same day.

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UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO 19

immigration/reports/321/ (compiling data from the U.S.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency’s removal

statistics available at http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/

index.htm).

The majority suggests that the Defendant could have filed

a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or

that he could have moved to correct his sentence, presumably

under Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 35. Majority Op. at 3–4. These

remedies are impractical for three related reasons: (1) futility;

(2) timeliness; and (3) mootness. First, it would have been

futile to file a Rule 35 motion to correct the sentence or a

habeas petition under § 2255 with the same “court which

imposed the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Even if

Defendant had filed a Rule 35 motion or a § 2255 petition,

the district court almost certainly would have denied relief. 

The district court continued to believe, even two years later,

that the Ninth Circuit was wrong and that the district court

was right: “I do continue to disagree that after imposing a

time-served sentence, I was foreclosed from putting him on

probation. I think probation was a legal sentence.” It is

wishful thinking to suggest that the district court would have

changed its mind in 2011 in the context of a Rule 35 motion

or a habeas petition when the same judge explicitly stated two

years later that he still believed the clearly erroneous sentence

was lawful. Such a motion would have been futile.

Second, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for

Defendant to timely file either a motion to correct his

sentence or a habeas petition, even had his counsel noticed

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the error.6 Rule 35(a) states that “Within 14 days after

sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted

from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” Fed. R.

Crim. Proc. 35(a). “This and other circuit courts have held

that the fourteen-day deadline is jurisdictional, thus divesting

the district court of the power to amend the sentence after

fourteen days.” United States v. Aguilar-Reyes, 653 F.3d

1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, the district court would

only have had jurisdiction to consider the remedy the

majority suggests, a Rule 35 motion to correct the sentence,

for fourteen days after the imposition of sentence.7

Moreover, the Defendant was deported the day after the

erroneous sentencing. See note 4, supra. Once Defendant

was removed and no longer represented by a federal defender,

surely there was no way, nor reason why, he would have filed

a pro se motion or habeas petition from abroad. As the

majority points out, Defendant would have just “one year

from ‘the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes

final’ to bring a motion under § 2255.” Majority Op. at 11

quoting § 2255(f)(1). In other words, by the time Defendant

was taken into custody in the United States in 2013, both the

fourteen-day Rule 35 window and the one-year habeas

window had long since closed. Thus, it is difficult to see how

 

6

 The sentence imposed “was plain error, which was not waived by the

failure of counsel to object at the time of sentencing.” United States v.

Lawton, 193 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) superseded in part on other

grounds as recognized in United States v. Tapia, 665 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th

Cir. 2011).

7 While there was much discussion over whether the district court had

jurisdiction to revoke Defendant’s probation in 2013, it is beyond dispute

that the district court did not have jurisdiction to correct its illegal sentence

pursuant to a Rule 35 motion after the fourteen-day window had closed. 

Aguilar-Reyes, 653 F.3d at 1055.

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UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO 21

Defendant could have timely availed himself of either of the

remedies the majority suggests.8

Finally, once the Defendant was removed from the

country, the day after the district court committed its plain

error at sentencing, any attempt to correct the error likely

would have been denied as moot.9 The only harm improperly

imposed on Defendant was the illegal term of probation. The

imposition of probation would not “continue to present a live

controversy after the petitioner’s release or deportation,”

Abdala v. I.N.S., 488 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007), until

and unless he reentered the United States. As long as

8 A third potential remedy is filing a notice of appeal from the

sentencing or the denial of the hypothetical Rule 35 motion in 2011; that

again makes no sense. If filed, Defendant would already have been

removed. See note 4, supra. It is difficult to understand the incentive to

file a notice of appeal, unless Defendant was contemplating, at the time of

his removal, an illegal return to the United States and his subsequent

apprehension.

Also, such a remedy would have necessitated substantial delays. The

median time from filing a notice of appeal to a final disposition in this

Circuit was 17.4 months in 2011. U.S. Court of Appeal - Judicial

Caseload Profile - Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (2012), available at

http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/statistics/appeals_court.pdf. Meanwhile,the

median prison term imposed on a person convicted of an immigration

offense in 2011 in this Circuit was 15 months, meaning half of all people

convicted of an immigration offense served less than 15 months in

custody. United States Sentencing Commission, Statistical information

Packet Fiscal Year 2011 Ninth Circuit 10 (2011), available at

http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics

/State_District_Circuit/2011/9c11.pdf.

9 While this Court has held that a sentence “of probation meet[s] the ‘in

custody’ requirement for section 2255 jurisdiction,” United States v.

Spann, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996), here there was no actual

harm until and unless Defendant returned to the United States.

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Defendant was in Mexico, the imposition of probation, albeit

illegal, was moot and the case or controversy requirement

could not have been satisfied where, as here, the Defendant

does not “continue[]to suffer actual collateral consequences.” 

Zegarra-Gomez v. I.N.S., 314 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir.

2003). Thus, even if defense counsel had realized the error

and timely filed a motion to correct or a habeas petition, the

relief sought was moot unless and until Defendant reentered

the country. The majority seems to suggest that a habeas

petition would allow the federal courts to provide prospective

relief in the face of uncertain, speculative future harm. 

Surely it is in the interests of judicial economy and consistent

with the well-established doctrine of justiciability for

Defendant to have waited to challenge the illegality of the

term of probation until the harm from that sentence became

real.

Nor is the majority persuasive in suggesting that this

Court lacks a “source of authority pursuant to which we may

rule on the validity” of the imposition of punishment after the

revocation of Defendant’s probation. Majority Op. at 11. 

“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals

from all final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. An order revoking probation is a final judgment

subject to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See, e.g., United

States v. Vasquez, 160 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 1998) (reviewing

the imposition of punishment upon a revocation of probation

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291). This Court has jurisdiction

and with jurisdiction comes a source of authority to correct

the clear error in this case.

What happened in this case is analogous to the following

hypothetical. A removable alien defendant is convicted of a

Class C felony and sentenced to a five-year term of

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UNITED STATES V. CASTRO-VERDUGO 23

supervised release in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 which

clearly prohibits a term of supervised release greater than

three years for a Class C felony. The defendant has no

incentive to file a habeas petition or a direct appeal, either of

which could require him to spend months in custody awaiting

a disposition or to litigate an effectivelymoot habeas petition

seeking prospective relief for an as yet unrealized harm. In

fact, the illegal sentence would only impact the defendant if

he is apprehended within the United States during the fourth

or fifth year of supervised release. During the first three

years, the imposition of supervised release was lawful. After

the fifth year, the illegal portion of the supervised release

would have expired. Thus, there would be a narrow window

of time during which the illegal sentence might possibly

prove detrimental to the defendant, but challenging the

sentence outside of that window would ensure the defendant

spend longer in custody or waste judicial resources resolving

a moot habeas petition. In these circumstances, no effective

counsel would challenge or move to correct the illegal

sentence until the defendant entered the United States and

was apprehended during the two year window and the

prospective harm became concrete.

In 2012, the more than 6,000 criminal cases with an

illegal reentry charged in district courts within this

Circuit accounted for more than 29 percent of all criminal

defendants in the Circuit. United States Courts for

the Ninth Circuit, 2012 Annual Report 65 (2013),

available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/publications/

AnnualReport2012.pdf. Unlike almost all other criminal

cases, people convicted of immigration violations are, with

few exceptions, deported upon completion of their sentences. 

Therefore, it is essential that judges follow the law in

imposing sentence. That did not happen here, as the majority

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admits. This appeal presented an entirely appropriate remedy

to correct the error upon the revocation of probation in 2013. 

The majority chose to ignore it, under a flawed analysis of

precedent. Therefore, I cannot concur in the judgment.10

10 Because this court should have reversed and corrected the clear error

below, the panel need not have reached the issue of whether the

imposition of a term of supervised release was an abuse of discretion. 

However, having reached the issue, I agree that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in imposing a term of supervised release even though

Defendant was a deportable alien. The application note to Guideline

§ 5D1.1(c) makes clear that a court may impose supervised release on a

removable alien “if the court determines it would provide an added

measure of deterrence.” The record indicates that Defendant’s family is

in Mexico. Thus, the imposition of supervised release served as an added

deterrent to reentry because a violation of supervised release would result

in a longer separation from Defendant’s family than would a conviction

for another reentry alone.

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