Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-20-01265/USCOURTS-ca7-20-01265-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lindani Mzembe
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 20-1265

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LINDANI MZEMBE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:15-cr-00087-RLM-MGG-2 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED JULY 8, 2020* — DECIDED NOVEMBER 9, 2020

____________________

Before KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents several related issues about how federal judges should decide whether 

sentences in federal prosecutions should run consecutively to 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because 

the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, 

and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See Fed. R. App. 

34(a)(2)(C).

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
2 No. 20-1265

or concurrently with separate sentences in unrelated state 

prosecutions. The issues arise in an unusual way in this case 

because the state court had already decided to impose a long 

sentence consecutive to the federal offender’s federal sentence. Intervening changes in federal law then required resentencing in federal court, where the consecutive v. concurrent 

question could be revisited. The defendant-appellant argues 

that, in refusing to make the new federal sentence concurrent 

with the intervening state sentence, the district judge erred 

(a) by giving an inadequate explanation for his decision, 

(b) by deferring to the state court’s intervening judgment to 

make the sentences consecutive, and (c) by imposing an unreasonably severe sentence that is a de facto life sentence. We 

find no reversible error, so we affirm the new federal sentence.

I. The Defendant and His Crimes and Punishment

A. The Defendant’s Federal Crimes and Original Sentence

In 2015, defendant Lindani Mzembe and two other men 

kidnapped another man, shot him, beat him (including beating his head with at least one handgun), and held him for ransom. When they thought their victim’s injuries might prove 

fatal, Mzembe and the others abandoned him in an alley, 

bleeding and blindfolded with duct tape. Separate juries in 

the Northern District of Indiana found the three men guilty of 

multiple federal crimes.

The district court imposed heavy sentences: forty-four 

years in prison for Mzembe, fifty-four years and eight months 

for Derek Fields, and thirty-seven years for Ivan Brazier. All 

three appealed. In those appeals, intervening changes in law 

required us to vacate Mzembe’s and Fields’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for discharging a firearm in a crime of 

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
No. 20-1265 3

violence. United States v. Brazier, 933 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 

2019). In that opinion, we affirmed all other convictions and 

Brazier’s sentence, but we remanded for resentencing of 

Mzembe and Fields on the convictions that still stood. Upon 

remand, Fields was resentenced to forty-three years in prison 

and did not appeal.

B. The Intervening State Convictions and Sentence

All issues in this second appeal by Mzembe arise from an 

unexpected development between Mzembe’s two federal sentencing hearings. In between, Mzembe was convicted in an 

Indiana state court for other serious and violent crimes that 

he had committed before the kidnapping.

In 2014, Mzembe and another man committed a brutal 

home invasion, beating and terrorizing a family to rob them 

of money and property. Frustrated because they could not 

find enough valuables to steal, Mzembe and the other robber 

forced the entire family to kneel and face a couch, with a gun 

aimed at the pregnant wife and mother. At some point, the 

husband and father reached for the gun and struggled with 

the robbers. Mzembe somehow managed to get away before 

the police arrived. The other robber was caught quickly, 

though, and he identified Mzembe as his partner in the 

crimes. Mzembe v. State, 113 N.E.3d 812 (Ind. App. 2018) 

(mem.) (affirming convictions and sentence).

The judge in the state case imposed a sentence of sixty-two 

years, consisting of sixteen years for robbery resulting in bodily injury, thirty years for burglary armed with a deadly 

weapon, and sixteen years for robbery by putting someone in 

fear resulting in bodily injury, all consecutive to each other. 

Knowing that Mzembe had already been sentenced to fortyCase: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
4 No. 20-1265

four years in federal prison, the judge also ordered the state 

sentence to run consecutive to the original federal sentence. 

By the time Mzembe was ready for resentencing in federal 

court, the state sentence was final.

C. Resentencing in Federal Court

After we set aside Mzembe’s firearm conviction under 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c), he still stood convicted of kidnapping (18 

U.S.C. § 1201), making a ransom demand (18 U.S.C. § 875(a)), 

and being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1)). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, he qualified for 

criminal history category VI, and his total offense level 

worked out to level forty-four, which is literally off the chart, 

as the federal Sentencing Guidelines top out at level fortythree. At that level, the Guidelines advise a life sentence even 

for an offender in criminal history category I, let alone for 

someone like Mzembe in category VI. The parties agree that 

the guideline range for Mzembe’s federal crimes upon resentencing was life in prison. 

Judge Miller resolved all guideline issues and other objections to the presentence report and heard the parties’ presentations on the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as 

well as Mzembe’s allocution. The government recommended 

a new federal sentence of 480 months (forty years). Mzembe 

proposed a federal sentence of 408 months (thirty-four years). 

Mzembe also argued that his state sentence was so heavy 

that the federal sentence should run concurrently with it. The 

government argued that the court did not have the power or 

discretion to impose a sentence concurrent with the state sentence, and that the sentences should be consecutive in any 

event. Judge Miller imposed a new federal sentence of thirtyCase: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
No. 20-1265 5

six years, and he explained it both orally and in a written opinion, pursuant to his usual and helpful practice. The judge denied Mzembe’s request for concurrent sentences and ordered 

the newly reduced federal sentence to run consecutively, consistent with the state judge’s intervening sentencing decision. 

There were, so to speak, a lot of moving parts in the resentencing. The guideline range had changed for several reasons, 

rising to life in prison on the federal crimes alone. The court 

addressed the principal defense arguments, including the evidence that co-defendant Fields had coerced Mzembe to commit crimes with him by breaking his jaw two weeks before the 

kidnapping. (Apparently Mzembe had owed money to Fields 

and could not pay it.) The court rejected a minor-role adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 but said that a below-guideline 

sentence would be appropriate for the federal crimes, particularly in light of the coercion by Fields, even though, as the 

court also pointed out, once Mzembe had joined in, he had 

participated enthusiastically in the kidnapping and beating 

and had brought a gun to commit those crimes. The judge also 

considered the evidence of Mzembe’s efforts at rehabilitation 

in prison. These included earning his GED degree, going 

through alcohol- and drug-abuse treatment, turning to religion, and for the first time expressing remorse in court for 

what happened to the man who was kidnapped, beaten, and 

shot.

After announcing the proposed federal sentence, the judge 

turned to the issue with the biggest practical impact, which 

was whether to make the new federal sentence concurrent 

with or consecutive to the intervening state sentence, in whole 

or in part. The judge’s oral and written remarks on that subject were brief—the defense argues much too brief—coming 

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
6 No. 20-1265

right after the explanation of the sentence for the federal offenses. In the hearing, the judge said:

I don’t know if I have the authority to run the 

sentences concurrent rather than consecutively. 

I think I do, but I haven’t looked it up because I 

didn’t know we were coming here. And, of 

course, that’s responding to what’s being raised 

fluidly. But if I do have the authority to order 

them concurrent, I don’t think it would be an 

appropriate exercise of my authority to do that.

The state sentencing judge—I don’t know 

whether he or she—had the full federal record 

available to him or her when fashioning the sentence for your state crime, and that judge decided that the reasonable punishment for the 

state’s crime included consecutive sentencing, 

that the sentence that was imposed was not just 

62 years but also the provision that you not even 

start serving it for 45, 46 years, whatever it was 

then.

It’s one thing for a federal court to modify a federal sentence in light of changes in federal law. 

That’s what I’m doing here today. It would be a 

far different thing for me to restructure your 

state sentence, and I really think that’s what I 

would be doing if I ordered these [to] run concurrently. And so while assuming that I do have 

the authority to do it, I don’t think this would 

be the appropriate case to do it in and will—

well, I guess I should—I’m not sure I’m supposed to add anything to the—well, just so the 

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
No. 20-1265 7

Bureau of Prisons knows what I provided, I will 

order them to run consecutively.

SA61–62. The judge’s written explanation, after summarizing 

the parties’ positions, was consistent and even more concise:

Assuming that the court has the authority to 

structure a federal sentence as it sees fit, to do as 

Mr. Mzembe asks would be inappropriate in his 

case. The sentencing state judge had the full federal record available when fashioning the sentence for Mr. Mzembe’s state crime, and decided that a reasonable punishment included 

consecutive sentencing: 62 years in custody, not 

to begin until the (then) 44-year federal sentence 

is completed. It is one thing for a federal court 

to modify a federal sentence in light of changes 

in federal law, but it would be a far different 

thing for a federal court to restructure the state 

sentence. The court will order the sentences run 

consecutively.

SA20−21.

II. Analysis

In some cases with defendants who are already subject to 

another undischarged term of imprisonment, and this is an 

example, the consecutive v. concurrent question may have 

greater practical consequences than any other aspect of the 

sentence. As noted, Mzembe sees three related errors in the 

court’s handling of this issue. First, he argues that the court 

failed to provide an explanation sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review of this discretionary decision. Second, he 

argues that the district court erred by relying on a legally 

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
8 No. 20-1265

impermissible factor (consistency with the state court’s decision) and failed to explain the decision in terms of § 3553(a), 

as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b). Third, he argues that consecutive sentences are substantively unreasonable because 

the combination of state and federal sentences is a de facto life 

sentence. 

We review de novo claims of procedural error, such as 

Mzembe’s first two arguments. United States v. Marin-Castano, 

688 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2012). When considering an argument that a sentence is substantively unreasonable, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion. Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Mzembe’s issues are so 

closely related that we address them together. We reject, however, the government’s argument that Mzembe waived his 

procedural objections by failing to raise them in the district 

court. Appellate challenges to the sufficiency of sentencing explanations can be headed off if the sentencing judge asks 

counsel specifically if they believe more of an explanation is 

needed. The judge did not ask such a specific question here. 

A general invitation for objections or asking “anything else?” 

at the end of the hearing is not sufficient, however, to show a 

waiver of challenges to the sufficiency of an explanation. See 

United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 857−58 (7th Cir. 2016), discussing United States v. Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 

2013), and United States v. Donelli, 747 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 

2014).

The government now agrees that the district court had discretionary authority to make Mzembe’s new federal sentence 

either concurrent with or consecutive to the intervening state 

sentence. Section 3584(b) of the criminal code provides: “The 

court, in determining whether the terms imposed are to be 

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
No. 20-1265 9

ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider, 

as to each offense for which a term of imprisonment is being 

imposed, the factors set forth in section 3553(a),” which is the 

general statement of the purposes of factors relevant to federal sentences.

Section 3584(b) thus directs a sentencing court to § 3553(a), 

which in paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(5) directs the court to consider the advice of the Sentencing Guidelines. Section 5G1.3 

applies to decisions about consecutive and concurrent sentences for a defendant subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment or an anticipated state term of imprisonment. 

Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of that provision do not apply 

here, and subsection (d) is a policy statement that allows the 

district court to impose concurrent, consecutive, or partially 

concurrent sentences “to achieve a reasonable punishment for 

the instant offense.” Relevant to such a discretionary decision 

about consecutive or concurrent sentencing for unrelated 

cases, the Guidelines offer the following in an application note 

for U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d):

(A) In General.—Under subsection (d), the court 

may impose a sentence concurrently, partially 

concurrently, or consecutively to the undischarged term of imprisonment. In order to 

achieve a reasonable incremental punishment 

for the instant offense and avoid unwarranted 

disparity, the court should consider the following:

(i) the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a));

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
10 No. 20-1265

(ii) the type (e.g., determinate, indeterminate/parolable) and length of the prior undischarged sentence;

(iii) the time served on the undischarged sentence and the time likely to be served before release;

(iv) the fact that the prior undischarged sentence may have been imposed in state court rather than federal court, or at a different time before the same or different federal court; and

(v) any other circumstance relevant to the determination of an appropriate sentence for the instant offense.

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 cmt. n. 4(A). The note thus refers specifically 

to whether the other sentence was imposed by a state or federal court, though without explaining the significance of the 

factor. The note also includes the open-ended invitation to 

consider any other relevant circumstances.

A district court must “explain its sentence by reference to 

the sentencing criteria set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and is 

best advised to limit its discussion of “extraneous” details lest 

we conclude the sentence was based on “irrelevant considerations.” See United States v. Robinson, 829 F.3d 878, 880 (7th 

Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Mzembe 

points out that the district court did not provide any separate 

explanation of the § 3553(a) factors in deciding to keep the 

sentences consecutive. He cites United States v. Jackson, 546 

F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2008), in which we vacated a federal sentence where the court had not sufficiently explained its decision to make the sentence consecutive to a state sentence for 

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
No. 20-1265 11

some of the same conduct. The court had explained why the 

sentence was in the middle of the guideline range but had offered only a “brief, cryptic response” to the defendant’s argument for concurrent sentences. Id. at 472. We found that was 

not sufficient and remanded for further consideration. 

Mzembe also cites United States v. Patrick, 707 F.3d 815 (7th 

Cir. 2013), where the government and defense had argued for 

a federal sentence to run concurrently with a related state sentence, particularly because the defendant had offered substantial cooperation to both state and federal prosecutors. Despite those recommendations, the district court imposed a 

consecutive sentence that amounted to a de facto life sentence. 

We concluded that the district court’s terse explanation did 

not show that the court had appreciated and considered the 

relevant factors, including the defendant’s cooperation. Id. at 

819−20.

From Jackson and Patrick and § 3584(b), Mzembe argues 

that when a district court exercises its discretion in choosing 

between concurrent and consecutive sentences, the judge 

must explain that specific decision, not just the overall sentence, in terms of the § 3553(a) factors, and with much more 

of an explanation than the judge provided here.

We need not decide here whether the reasoning of Jackson

and Patrick would render the explanation here insufficient or 

even substantively off-target if it had been the explanation 

given in an original sentencing hearing. In this case of resentencing, after an intervening and consecutive state-court sentence, we see no reversible error in the extent or the content of 

the explanation. We rely here on the unusual circumstances 

presented by the sequence of Mzembe’s original and long federal sentence, the later and even longer state sentence that the 

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
12 No. 20-1265

state judge chose to impose consecutively for completely independent crimes, and our appellate remand for resentencing 

on the remaining federal charges.

By the time of the resentencing, Judge Miller knew this 

case and the sentencing issues thoroughly. He had carefully 

considered the many aggravating and mitigating circumstances both in the original sentencing and with new information for the resentencing. He had carefully explained his 

thinking in both sentencing decisions in terms of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines and § 3553(a). 

To be sure, in resentencing Mzembe on the federal 

charges, the judge explained that he was focusing first only 

on those crimes and not on the question of consecutive v. concurrent for the intervening state sentence. And the district 

court’s analysis of one of the § 3553(a) factors (“the need for 

the sentence imposed to protect the public from future crimes 

of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(2)(c)) did not acknowledge that 

the state sentence would incapacitate Mzembe for decades in 

all events. When the judge turned to the consecutive v. concurrent question, he did not go through a fresh analysis of the 

§ 3553(a) factors. 

Viewed in isolation, these stray statements and omissions 

could suggest that the district judge was unaware of the 

§ 3553(a) factors’ relevance to the consecutive determination. 

But he introduced argument by counsel on the § 3553(a) factors by noting that the statutory factors were “hard to separate” from the other sentencing issues “given the request for 

concurrent sentencing.” In imposing the consecutive sentence, moreover, the judge could not have forgotten what he 

had said just minutes before. His explanation for keeping the 

sentences consecutive focused on two additional facts: the 

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
No. 20-1265 13

state sentence had been imposed after the original federal sentence, and the state-court judge had known of both the federal 

crimes and sentence when he decided to impose a heavy, consecutive sentence for the unrelated but similarly violent and 

terrifying crimes prosecuted in state court. Those facts convinced the district judge not to impose concurrent sentences 

so as to “restructure,” which in context would have meant to 

reverse, the state court’s decision about how to marginally 

punish Mzembe for the serious and violent state crimes.

Mzembe argues that “deference to the state court” is not a 

factor under § 3584 and that the district court’s consideration 

of that factor amounted to a legal error. We disagree. The district court was not required to treat the state court’s independent, intervening decision as legally irrelevant to the federal resentencing. As noted, § 3584(b) directs the court to § 3553(a), 

which directs the court to, among other factors, the Sentencing Guidelines, which in turn call for consideration of the 

non-federal nature of the intervening sentence and “any other 

circumstance relevant” in note 4 to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. 

We find no legal error in the district court’s recognizing 

that another judge who knew about both the state and federal 

crimes had exercised his judgment and had ordered that the 

two sentences run consecutively, and deciding that the other 

judge’s decision deserved at least some deference. The district 

court had the authority and discretion to reach a different result. It was not compelled to do so, however, and could choose 

to respect and leave essentially intact the decision of the state 

court. That result was not unreasonable, given the nature and 

circumstances of both sets of violent crimes and the history 

and characteristics of the offender, who qualified for criminal 

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
14 No. 20-1265

history categories V and VI at the times of his original and 

second federal sentences, respectively.1

In arguing that his new federal sentence is substantively 

unreasonable, Mzembe emphasizes that the combined state 

and federal sentences clearly amount to a de facto sentence of 

life in prison. See United States v. Wurzinger, 467 F.3d 649, 652 

(7th Cir. 2006) (noting “worthy tradition that death in prison 

is not to be ordered lightly, and the probability that a convict 

will not live out his sentence should certainly give pause to a 

sentencing court,” but affirming within-guideline sentence 

longer than defendant’s life expectancy). 

We recognize that making these sentences consecutive 

amounts to a de facto life sentence, as did Judge Miller and 

surely the state court judge as well.2 That fact does not persuade us that the new and consecutive federal sentence was 

substantively unreasonable. Mzembe presented some new 

evidence in mitigation, which the district court heard and 

considered. At the same time, the serious and violent 

1 Mzembe also cites United States v. Lacy, 813 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2016),

where the federal prosecutor had recommended that the federal sentence 

run consecutively to any sentence in a then-pending state prosecution “as 

a courtesy” to the state prosecutor. We said in dicta that extending such a 

“courtesy” to a state prosecutor would not be proper sentencing consideration. Id. at 658. We agree with that point but do not find comparable 

the district court’s recognition in this case that another judge had already 

looked at Mzembe’s full criminal history and had concluded that consecutive sentences were appropriate for the unrelated crimes, even where

they would amount to a de facto life sentence. 

2 The state sentence alone might also be deemed a de facto life sentence, depending on when in 2014 Mzembe committed the home-invasion 

offenses. See Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.1 (chapter on good-time credits 

amended as applied to crimes committed after June 30, 2014).

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15
No. 20-1265 15

character of Mzembe’s federal crimes called for a life sentence 

under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, without taking into 

account his state crimes and sentence. We also recognize, as 

Judge Miller did, that the concurrent sentences that Mzembe 

sought would have reduced his federal sentence in effect to 

zero. There would have been no marginal punishment for the 

serious federal crimes, as opposed to the sentence the district 

judge thought was appropriate in the first place. The choice 

was not binary and all-or-nothing—sentences may also be 

partially concurrent and partially consecutive—but where the 

crimes were so serious, so violent, and completely unrelated, 

it was not unreasonable for the judge to reject that proposed 

sentence.

Especially when the independent, violent, and brutal 

home invasion is added into the mix, we do not find the resulting de facto life sentence was an abuse of the district 

court’s discretion. Sentencing convicted offenders is generally 

recognized as the most difficult part of the job of a United

States District Judge. Judge Miller is a veteran judge who is 

thoroughly familiar with those difficulties. At every stage of 

this case, he exercised his judgment carefully and thoughtfully. We find no reversible error.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Case: 20-1265 Document: 29 Filed: 11/09/2020 Pages: 15