Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01789/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01789-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A
Defendant
David E. Jensen
Plaintiff
Quality Loan Service Corp.
Defendant
Washington Mutual Bank, FA
Defendant

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 As stated in its moving papers, JPMorgan brings this motion 1

on its behalf and as “an acquirer of certain assets and liabilities

of Washington Mutual Bank from the FDIC acting as receiver.”

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID E. JENSEN,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP;

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA; JP

MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA; and DOES 1-

10, INCLUSIVE,

 Defendants.

09-CV-01789-OWW-DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS OR, IN THE

ALTERNATIVE, FOR A MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is a motion to dismiss or, in the

alternative, a motion for a more definite statement filed by

Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (“Defendant” or “JPMorgan”).1

The motion is directed at all claims asserted by pro se Plaintiff

David E. Jensen (“Plaintiff”) in his First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) for damages, declaratory and injunctive relief. The

following background facts are taken from the FAC and other

documents on file in this case.

II. BACKGROUND

A. General Background And Procedural History

This is a mortgage fraud case concerning Plaintiff’s residence

in Bakersfield, California. On or about June 26, 2006, Plaintiff

obtained a home loan from Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. (“WAMU”).

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(Doc. 2, Ex. 1 at 33.) WAMU subsequently assigned the loan, i.e.,

the Note and Deed of Trust, to JPMorgan Chase. (Id. at 29.) On

February 17, 2009, a Notice of Default was recorded indicating that

Plaintiff had defaulted on his monthly loan obligations. On May

18, 2009, a Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded and served on

Plaintiff. 

On June 5, 2009, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Kern County

Superior Court. On or about September 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed his

FAC against WAMU, JPMorgan and Quality Loan Service Corp, which

alleged several state law claims and, for the first time, a federal

claim under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12

U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. The case was removed to federal court on the

basis of federal question jurisdiction over the RESPA claim and

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 

B. The FAC

The FAC alleges claims for: (i) declaratory relief; (ii)

fraud; (3) violation of RESPA; (4) reformation; (5) “to quiet title

and set aside foreclosure”; (5) violation of California’s Unfair

Competition Law, Business & Professions Code § 17200; (6) violation

of California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“RFDCPA”); (6) violation of California Civil Code § 1572; (7) and

“injunctive relief.” In the injunctive relief claim, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants “will foreclose” upon the property and that

“injunctive relief is necessary to enjoin defendants from

foreclosing.” These allegations reveal that a foreclosure sale of

the property has not occurred. 

Although each claim in the FAC appears to be asserted against

JPMorgan, there are very few allegations which identify JPMorgan’s

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role in the events pled. Much of the FAC refers to “defendants”

globally.

C. JPMorgan’s Motion

JPMorgan moves to dismiss all claims in Plaintiff’s FAC,

raising various legal arguments as to why each claim fails. A

general premise running through many of its arguments is that

Plaintiff fails to allege how JPMorgan was involved in the alleged

illegality, making it difficult to discern the basis for each claim

as to JPMorgan. If dismissal is not appropriate, JPMorgan requests

a more definite statement. 

Originally, Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the

motion. He, however, appeared at the original hearing scheduled

for this motion and orally requested time to file an opposition

brief. Plaintiff’s request was granted and he filed an opposition.

III. STANDARDS OF DECISION

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the

complaint lacks sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal

theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1990). To sufficiently state a claim to relief and survive a

12(b)(6) motion, the pleading "does not need detailed factual

allegations" but the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Mere "labels and conclusions"

or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do." Id. Rather, there must be "enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. In

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other words, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has

summarized the governing standard, in light of Twombly and Iqbal,

as follows: "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to

dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable

inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a

claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

This standard, which is derived from Rule 8, applies to

pleadings drafted by attorneys as well as pro se litigants. See

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the

pleading standard for ‘all civil actions.’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 1)); Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008)

(applying Twombly to pro se complaint); Wisdom v. Katz, 308 F.

App’x 120, 121 (2009) (same). Nevertheless, when reviewing the

sufficiency of a complaint drafted by a pro se litigant, the

pleading is to be “liberally construed” and viewed “less

stringent[ly]” than formal pleadings prepared by attorneys.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

Apart from factual insufficiency, a complaint is also subject

to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) where it lacks a cognizable legal

theory, Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699, or where the allegations "show

that relief is barred" for some legal reason, Jones v. Bock, 549

U.S. 199, 215 (2007). In deciding whether to grant a motion to

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dismiss, the court must accept as true all "well-pleaded factual

allegations" in the pleading under attack. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

1950. A court is not, however, "required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see, e.g., Doe I v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 2009). 

B. Rule 9(b)

In terms of factual sufficiency, Rule 9(b), when it applies,

imposes an elevated pleading standard. Rule 9(b) provides:

In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or

mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions

of a person's mind may be alleged generally.

“To comply with Rule 9(b), allegations of fraud must be specific

enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which

is alleged to constitute the fraud . . . .” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476

F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Allegations of fraud must include the “time, place, and specific

content of the false representations as well as the identities of

the parties to the misrepresentations.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). The “[a]verments of fraud must be accompanied by

the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged.”

Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff alleging fraud

“must set forth more than the neutral facts necessary to identify

the transaction. The plaintiff must set forth what is false or

misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” Vess v.

Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis

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 Because Plaintiff's FAC was filed in state court, his 2

declaratory relief claims are construed as brought under California

law. 

6

and internal quotation marks omitted).

C. Rule 12(e)

"If a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner

that provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a more

definite statement under Rule 12(e) before responding."

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). Under Rule

12(e), “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a

pleading” when it is “so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot

reasonably prepare a response.” 

A Rule 12(e) motion is proper only if the complaint is so

indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain the nature of the

claim being asserted, i.e., so vague that the defendant cannot

begin to frame a response. See Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros.

Stores, Inc., 525 F.Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981). The motion

must be denied if the complaint is specific enough to notify

defendant of the substance of the claim being asserted. See

Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1996); see

also San Bernardino Pub. Employees Ass'n v. Stout, 946 F. Supp.

790, 804 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“A motion for a more definite statement

is used to attack unintelligibility, not mere lack of detail, and

a complaint is sufficient if it is specific enough to apprise the

defendant of the substance of the claim asserted against him or

her.”). 

IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. Declaratory Relief2

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In what may be a drafting mistake, Plaintiff alleges two

separate claims for declaratory relief relating to his residence

and the anticipated foreclosure. Although pled as two separate

claims, they both request “a judicial determination of Defendants

rights, obligations and duties, and a declaration as to who owns

Plaintiff’s Subject Property.” Because these claims request the

same declaratory relief (and share the same defects), these claims

will be referred to in the singular, i.e., as one claim for

declaratory relief. 

Declaratory relief "operates prospectively, and not merely for

the redress of past wrongs." Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841,

848 (1971); see also County of San Diego v. California, 164 Cal.

App. 4th 580, 607 (2008). A declaratory relief action "serves to

set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of

obligations, invasion of rights or commission of wrongs; in short,

the remedy is to be used in the interests of preventive justice, to

declare rights rather than execute them." Babb, 3 Cal. 3d at 848

(internal quotation marks omitted). As recently stated in Meyer v.

Sprint Spectrum L.P., 45 Cal. 4th 634, 647 (2009) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted):

The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to serve some

practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or

disputed jural relation. Another purpose is to liquidate

doubts with respect to uncertainties or controversies

which might otherwise result in subsequent litigation.

One test of the right to institute proceedings for

declaratory judgment is the necessity of present

adjudication as a guide for plaintiff's future conduct in

order to preserve his legal rights. 

Courts have recognized that where “a party has a fully matured

cause of action for money, the party must seek the remedy of

damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim.” Canova v. Trs.

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of Imperial Irrigation Dist. Employee Pension Plan, 150 Cal. App.

4th 1487, 1497 (2007); see also Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Assocs.,

98 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1404 (2002). Similarly, where a plaintiff

has alleged a substantive cause of action, a declaratory relief

claim should not be used as a superfluous “second cause of action

for the determination of identical issues” subsumed within the

first. Hood v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 4th 319, 324 (1995)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gen. of Am. Ins. Co.

v. Lilly, 258 Cal. App. 2d 465, 470 (1968).

Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief fails for at least

two reasons. First, as JPMorgan correctly argues, the declaratory

relief claim is entirely duplicative of Plaintiff’s other claims.

For example, a resolution of Plaintiff’s quiet title claim will

necessarily determine “who owns Plaintiff’s Subject property.”

Plaintiff’s separate declaratory relief claim should not be used,

as here, to determine identical issues subsumed within other

claims. See Camillo v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., No. 1:09-CV-1548 AWI

SMS, 2009 WL 3614793, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2009) (dismissing

declaratory relief claim as redundant where there was no reason to

believe it would “resolve any issues aside from those already

addressed by the substantive claims” in the case) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

Second, and more fundamentally, as revealed in Plaintiff’s

opposition brief, the entire premise of Plaintiff’s declaratory

relief claim is flawed. Plaintiff argues that declaratory relief

is warranted because defendants “are implementing a foreclosure

proceeding” prematurely and “without authority” because they

“fail[] to have possession of the promissory note which underlies

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Plaintiff’s discussion of judicial foreclosure and the 3

California Commercial Code is beside the point. See Pok v. Am. Home

Mortgage Servicing, Inc., No. CIV 2:09-2385 WBS EFB, 2010 WL

476674, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010) (“[S]ection 3301 [of the

California Commercial Code] reflects California's adoption of the

Uniform Commercial Code, and does not govern non-judicial

foreclosures, which is governed by California Civil Code section

2924.”). 

9

the collateral.” (Doc. 15 at 4.) This argument lacks merit.

California law “does not require possession of the note as a

precondition to non-judicial foreclosure under a Deed of Trust.”

Alicea v. GE Money Bank, No. C. 09-00091 SBA, 2009 WL 2136969, at

*2 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2009); see also Molina v. Wash. Mut. Bank,

No. 09-CV-00894-IEG (AJB), 2010 WL 431439, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan.

29, 2010 ) (non-judicial foreclosure under California law does “not

require possession and production of the note”); Castaneda v. Saxon

Mortgage Servs., Inc., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2009 WL 4640673, at *7

(E.D. Cal. 2009) (“Under California law, there is no requirement

for the production of the original note to initiate a non-judicial

foreclosure.”); Nool v. HomeQ Servicing, 653 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1053

(E.D. Cal. 2009) (“It is well-established that non-judicial

foreclosures can be commenced without producing the original

promissory note.”); Connors v. Home Loan Corp., No. 08cv1134-

L(LSP), 2009 WL 1615989, at *9 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2009) (“[U]nder

Civil Code section 2924, no party needs to physically possess the

promissory note.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).3

Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief is DISMISSED WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND.

B. Fraud

Plaintiff has alleged two fraud claims, both of which are

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subject to, and fail to meet, Rule 9(b)’s elevated pleading

standard. 

1. First Fraud Claim

Plaintiff’s first fraud claim contains allegations regarding

a fraudulent “scheme” and instances of false representations and/or

omissions. With respect to the fraudulent scheme, Plaintiff

alleges:

24. Plaintiff allege[s] Defendants, and each of them,

were engaged in an illegal scheme the purpose of which

was to execute loans secured by real property in order to

make commissions, kick-backs, illegal undisclosed yield

spread premiums, and undisclosed profits by sale of any

instruments arising out of the transaction.

. . . .

43. Plaintiff is informed and believe[s] and thereupon

allege[s] that Defendants, and each of them, entered into

a fraudulent scheme, the purpose of which was to make a

loan modification to Plaintiff, which Defendants, and

each of them, were keenly aware that Plaintiff could not

afford, at a cost way above the then prevailing market

rate, made loans to Plaintiff and falsely represented to

Plaintiff that they could not qualify for any other

financing, that Plaintiff could not qualify under any

reasonably [sic] underwriting guidelines, that such

scheme was devised to extract illegal and undisclosed

compensation from Plaintiff.

. . . .

55. Plaintiff is informed and believe[s] and thereupon

allege[s] that Defendants, and each of them, entered into

a fraudulent scheme, the purpose of which was to make a

loan to Plaintiff, which Defendants, and each them, were

keenly aware that Plaintiff could not afford, at a cost

way above the then prevailing market rate, made loans to

Plaintiff and falsely represented to Plaintiff that they

could not qualify for any other financing, that Plaintiff

could not qualify under any reasonably underwriting

guidelines, that such scheme was devised to extract

illegal compensation from Plaintiff by virtue of an

undisclosed yield spread premium and which Defendants,

and each of them, shared in some presently unknown

percentage. 

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As to JPMorgan, the complaint’s allegations do not specify the

“who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged.”

Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124 (internal quotation marks omitted). The

complaint provides no particular details on what specific role

JPMorgan played in the fraudulent scheme, or when and where the

scheme occurred. See Swartz, 476 F.3d at 764-65 (concluding that,

in a fraud suit involving multiple defendants, a plaintiff must

“identif[y] the role” each defendant played “in the alleged

fraudulent scheme,” informing “each defendant separately of the

allegations surrounding his alleged participation in the fraud”)

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Vess,

317 F.3d at 1106 (concluding that a fraudulent conspiracy claim

failed to satisfy Rule 9(b) because, among other things, the

pleading failed to “provide the particulars of when, where, or how

the alleged conspiracy occurred”). In addition, the complaint

fails to provide the details on the specific misrepresentation(s)

involved in the fraudulent scheme. 

The FAC does contain some allegations regarding alleged

representations that were made relating to Plaintiff’s loan. The

extent to which these representations were made in connection with,

or apart from, the fraudulent scheme is unclear:

26. Plaintiff allege[s] that Defendant, and each of

them, presented a loan to Plaintiff whereby their [sic]

represented that they did qualify for underwriting, and

the loan was within Plaintiff’[s] personal financial

needs and limitations given the confidential information

that Plaintiff shared with Defendants.

27. Plaintiff allege that Defendants, and each of them,

had a duty to disclose the true cost of the loan which

was made to Plaintiff, and the fact that Plaintiff could

not afford the loan in the first instance.

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28. Plaintiff acquired the foregoing property by virtue

of the said funding based on the representations of

Defendants, and each of them, that the loan was the best

they could obtain for him, and that the loan was well

within Plaintiff’[s] financial needs and limitations.

29. Plaintiff is informed and believe[s] and thereupon

allege that Defendants, and each of them, represented to

Plaintiff that Defendants, and each of them, were working

for the benefit of Plaintiff and in their particular best

interest to obtain for them the best loan and at the best

rates. 

30. That at the time Defendants, and each of them, made

the foregoing false representations to Plaintiff they

knew that they were untrue and that the representations

were material misrepresentations.

These allegations fail to meet Rule 9(b)’s requirements. Even

making the assumption that JPMorgan, the entity which allegedly

received the loan through an assignment, engaged in all of the

alleged false representations, including falsely representing that

the loan was “within Plaintiff’[s] personal financial needs and

limitations,” the FAC does not include the necessary particulars.

Missing from the FAC are facts that specify, and tie together, when

these false representations were made, where these representations

were made, what specifically was stated or represented that is

false, and why each alleged misrepresentation is actually false. 

Plaintiff’s first fraud claim is insufficiently pled under

Rule 9(b) and is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Any amended

pleading should address these deficiencies. 

Apart from any Rule 9(b) deficiencies, JPMorgan also moves to

dismiss the fraud claim on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to

plead sufficient facts on certain elements of fraud including

JPMorgan’s intent to induce reliance and Plaintiff’s actual

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reliance on misrepresentation by JPMorgan. In California, “[t]he

elements of fraud, which give[ ] rise to the tort action for

deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation,

concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or

scienter); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d)

justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” Small v. Fritz

Companies, Inc., 30 Cal. 4th 167, 173 (2003) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

If Plaintiff claims that JPMorgan committed its own common law

fraud (apart from asserting liability on a fraudulent scheme or

conspiracy theory), Plaintiff must allege facts relating to each

element of fraud as to JPMorgan, including JPMorgan’s intent to

induce reliance and Plaintiff’s actual reliance on JPMorgan’s

misrepresentation. To the extent Plaintiff asserts such a claim,

it is insufficiently pled. There are no facts pled regarding

JPMorgan’s intent to induce reliance and Plaintiff’s actual

reliance on any misrepresentation by JPMorgan. 

2. Second Fraud Claim

The second fraud claims largely overlaps the first. The

second fraud claim includes allegations regarding a fraudulent

scheme and instances of false representations and/or omissions. 

As to the fraudulent scheme, the FAC alleges:

120. Plaintiff allege[s] that circa June, 2006,

Defendants, and each of them, were engaged in an illegal

scheme the purpose of which was to execute loans secured

by real property in order to make commissions, kickbacks, illegal undisclosed yield spread premiums, and

undisclosed profits by the sale of any instruments

arising out of the transaction and to make loans to

borrowers that they could not afford to repay given their

stated financial situation. 

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. . . .

122. Plaintiff allege[s] that the loans provided by

Defendants, and each of them, the loan contained

excessive financing was approved to allow closing costs

to be financed, that Defendants failed to utilize

adequate due diligence regarding Plaintiff’[s] ability to

repay the loan, Defendants’ as part of their continuing

scheme intentionally placed Plaintiff[] in an option arm

loan to the benefit of the Defendants with excessively

high interest rates, Defendants failed to provide

Plaintiff mandated disclosures, and Defendants repeatedly

employed coercive tactics in order to force Plaintiff to

sign the loan documents. 

. . . .

137. Plaintiff is informed and believe[s] that

Defendants, and each of them, at the time of the

execution of the Deed of Trust and Note maintained an

interest in the Subject Property, however, at the time

the Note and Deed of Trust were assigned to Defendant

JPMORGAN, the Note was no longer negotiable and the power

of sale was not conveyed during the assignment,

notwithstanding the foregoing, Defendants, and each of

them, foreclosed on Plaintiff’[s] Trust Deed, in concert

with their scheme to defraud Plaintiff out of their

property. 

. . . .

140. Plaintiff allege[s] Defendants, and each of them,

intentionally and fraudulently converted Plaintiff’[s]

right, title and interest to their property, and any

equity therein. 

Despite the repeated allegations concerning the fraudulent scheme,

the FAC does not specifically identify JPMorgan’s role in the

fraudulent scheme, specify when and where the scheme occurred, or

provide the details on the particular misrepresentation(s) involved

in the fraudulent scheme. 

The second fraud claim does contain some allegations regarding

representations made by Defendants. Again, the extent to which

these representations were made in connection with, or apart from,

the fraudulent scheme is unclear:

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121. On or about June 23, 2004, representatives, agents,

and/or employees of Defendants, and each of them, made

false representations to Plaintiff in order to fund a

loan, in which Plaintiff’[s] personal residence was to be

security therefore. Plaintiff allege[s] that Defendants,

and each of them, made certain representations regarding

their honesty, that they were experts in obtaining loans

which borrower’s could afford and that they were experts

in obtaining loans which borrowers could afford and that

they would only offer Plaintiff a loan which was in their

best interests given their credit history and financial

needs and limitations and that Plaintiff could trust the

representations of Defendants, and each of them.

Plaintiff allege[s] that based upon the representations

made by Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff

reasonably reposed their trust in Defendants’

representations and disclosed their private financial

information to Defendants, in order that Defendants could

in keeping with their representations, find a loan which

was in the best interests of Plaintiff given their

financial needs and limitations. More particularly,

Defendants, and each of them, represented that they would

not make a loan to Plaintiff unless he could afford the

loan, and that they would not make the loan unless and

until he had passed the underwriting guidelines of the

lender, which further assured that the loan being offered

to Plaintiff was in fact in the Plaintiff’s best

interests, and that the loan was within Plaintiff’[s]

financial needs and limitations. 

. . . .

125. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, and each of

them, presented a loan to Plaintiff whereby Defendants

represented that they did qualify for ordinary

underwriting, and that the loan was within Plaintiff’[s]

personal financial needs and limitations given the

confidential financial information that Plaintiff shared

with Defendants, however, the true [sic] that the loan

payments exceeded Plaintiff’[s] established income. 

126. Plaintiff allege[s] that Defendants, and each of

them, had a duty to disclose the true cost of the loan

which was made to Plaintiff, and that the fact that

Plaintiff could not afford the loan in the first

instance. 

. . . .

128. Plaintiff acquired the foregoing property by virtue

of said funding through WAMU based on representations of

Defendants, and each of them, that the loan was the best

they could obtain for him, and that the loan was well

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within Plaintiff’[s] financial needs and limitations. 

. . . .

132. Plaintiff was in fact induced to and did take these

loans based on the said fraudulent representations. 

Even making the assumption that JPMorgan engaged in all of the

alleged false representations, Plaintiff’s fraud claim does not

include the necessary Rule 9(b) particulars. Missing from the FAC

are facts that specify, and tie together, when each of these false

representations were made, where these misrepresentations were

made, what specifically was stated that is false, and why each

alleged misrepresentation is actually false. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s second fraud claim is insufficiently pled under Rule

9(b) and is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Any amended pleading

should address these deficiencies, and it should combine both fraud

claims under one heading. 

JPMorgan also moves to dismiss the fraud claim on the ground

that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts, including

JPMorgan's intent to induce reliance and Plaintiff's actual

reliance on misrepresentation by JPMorgan. 

If Plaintiff claims that JPMorgan committed its own common law

fraud (apart from asserting liability on a fraudulent scheme or

conspiracy theory), Plaintiff must allege facts relating to each

element of fraud as to JPMorgan, including JPMorgan’s intent to

induce reliance and Plaintiff’s actual reliance. To the extent

Plaintiff asserts such a claim, it is insufficiently pled. There

are no facts pled regarding JPMorgan’s intent to induce reliance

and Plaintiff’s actual reliance on any misrepresentation by

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JPMorgan. 

JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss the fraud claims is granted, and

these claims are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

C. Civil Code § 1572

Plaintiff alleges a separate claim under California Civil Code

§ 1572. As JPMorgan correctly notes, this claim is redundant of

Plaintiff’s fraud claims. 

Section 1572 states: 

Actual fraud, within the meaning of this Chapter,

consists in any of the following acts, committed by a

party to the contract, or with his connivance, with

intent to deceive another party thereto, or to induce him

to enter into the contract:

1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is

not true, by one who does not believe it to be

true;

2. The positive assertion, in a manner not

warranted by the information of the person

making it, of that which is not true, though

he believes it to be true;

3. The suppression of that which is true, by

one having knowledge or belief of the fact;

4. A promise made without any intention of

performing it; or,

5. Any other act fitted to deceive.

This statute codifies elements of common law fraud. See Lazar v.

Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 644 (1996); LiMandri, v. Judkins,

52 Cal. App. 4th 326, 337 & n.5 (1997); City of Atascadero v.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 4th 445,

481 (1998). Plaintiff has pled separate claims for common law

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fraud, which already incorporate the elements in § 1572.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s separate claim under § 1572 is redundant.

Plaintiff’s separate claim under § 1572 is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE

TO AMEND.

D. RESPA Claim

The FAC asserts a RESPA claim under “§ 2607(b).” It appears,

however, that Plaintiff also meant to assert a RESPA claim under §

2605. Regardless of which section Plaintiff intended to invoke,

his RESPA claim is subject to dismissal. 

1. Claim Under § 2607(b)

a. Sufficiency of Allegations

Section 2607(b) of RESPA provides:

No person shall give and no person shall accept any

portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or

received for the rendering of a real estate settlement

service in connection with a transaction involving a

federally related mortgage loan other than for services

actually performed.

12 U.S.C. § 2607(b). With respect to this claim, the FAC alleges

in haec verba:

149. That the failure to respond to Plaintiff’s

R.E.S.P.A. [notice] constitute a violation of 12 USC

2607(b) and that therefore as provided by statute are

entitled to and seek treble damages therefore in a sum

subject to proof at time of trial. 

Section “§ 2607(b)” has nothing to do with any alleged failure to

respond to a RESPA notice (or a qualified written request). To the

extent Plaintiff is really alleging a claim under “§ 2607(b),”

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim

for relief. The complaint lacks non-conclusory factual content

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plausibly suggesting that JPMorgan, or any other defendant,

violated § 2607(b). For this reason, Plaintiff’s alleged claim

under § 2607(b) is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

b. Statute Of Limitations

Apart from factual insufficiency, JPMorgan argues that

Plaintiff’s § 2607 claim should be dismissed because it is barred

by the statute of limitations and Plaintiff has not adequately pled

any “extenuating circumstances to otherwise extend” the limitations

period. 

Under RESPA, any action pursuant to § 2607 may be brought

within one year “from the date of the occurrence of the violation.”

12 U.S.C. § 2614. “The primary ill that § 2607 is designed to

remedy is the potential for ‘unnecessarily high settlement

charges,’ § 2601(a), caused by kickbacks, fee-splitting, and other

practices that suppress price competition for settlement services.

This ill occurs, if at all, when the plaintiff pays for the

[tainted] service, typically at the closing.” Snow v. First Am.

Title Ins., Co., 332 F.3d 356, 359-60 (5th Cir. 2003); see also

Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205 (C.D. Cal.

2007). Consistent with this understanding, courts have considered

the “occurrence of the violation” as the date the loan closed. See

Finley v. Lasalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. C 09-2965 SI, 2009 WL

3401453, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2009); Kotok v. Homecomings

Fin., LLC, No. C09-622 RSM, 2009 WL 2057046, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July

14, 2009); Ayala v. World Sav. Bank, FSB, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1007,

1020 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 

As alleged, Plaintiff obtained the loan on or about June 26,

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2006. He filed his FAC, which contained his RESPA claim, on or

about September 4, 2009, more than three years later, well beyond

the one-year period. Accordingly, his claim under § 2607 is timebarred absent equitable tolling. See Bassett v. Ruggles, No. CV-F09-528 OWW/SMW, 2009 WL 2982895, at *10-12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14,

2009) (concluding, in line with other cases, that RESPA claims may

be equitably tolled). 

“Equitable tolling may be applied if, despite all due

diligence, a plaintiff is unable to obtain vital information

bearing on the existence of his claim." Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell,

202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Garcia v. Brockway,

526 F.3d 456, 465 (9th Cir. 2008). “Fairness, without more, is not

sufficient justification to invoke equitable tolling . . . .”

Garcia, 526 F.3d at 466.

With respect to the RESPA claim, the FAC alleges that the

claim is “not time barred as the purpose of the fees were not

explained to Plaintiff at the time of the closing.” Exactly how

this allegation relates to Plaintiff’s claim under § 2607(b) is

unclear. Plaintiff’s allegations do not show how he was misled or

otherwise prevented from discovering facts bearing on his claim

under § 2607(b). Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to

invoke equitable tolling. 

Plaintiff’s RESPA claim under § 2607 is DISMISSED on the

grounds that it is insufficiently pled and time-barred. Given

Plaintiff’s apparent attempt to invoke equitable tolling, Plaintiff

is given LEAVE TO AMEND to plead facts suggesting that he was

“unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his

claim,” Garcia, 526 F.3d at 465, under § 2607. Any amended

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complaint should contains facts suggesting what information

Plaintiff was unable to obtain, why he was unable to obtain the

information, and how the information relates to a claim under §

2607.

2. Claim Under § 2605

The FAC alleges that on or about May 1, 2009, Plaintiff served

on “Defendants WAMU and JPMORGAN, N.A.” a “Notice of Dispute &

Request for Accounting, Notice Pursuant to R.E.S.P.A.; Qualified

Written Request.” The contents of this purported Qualified Written

Request are unclear. The “said defendants” allegedly “failed to

respond to said notice by Plaintiff and have substantially failed

to respond to all other communications and inquiries by Plaintiff.”

Section 2605 (not 2607) of RESPA requires loan servicers of

federally related mortgage loans to respond to written inquiries

from borrowers known as “qualified written request(s).” 12 U.S.C.

§ 2605(e). More specifically, § 2605(e)(1)(A) requires a loan

servicer “who receives a qualified written request from the

borrower (or an agent of the borrower) for information relating to

the servicing of such loan” to provide the borrower with a written

acknowledgment of receipt within twenty days. 

A “qualified written request” is a “written correspondence”

that (i) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify,

the name and account of the borrower; and (ii) includes a statement

of the reasons for the borrower’s belief that the account is in

error or provides sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other

information sought by the borrower. § 2605(e)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). The

term “servicing” means “receiving any scheduled periodic payments

from a borrower pursuant to the terms of any loan . . . and making

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A loan “servicer” means “the person responsible for 4

servicing of a loan (including the person who makes or holds a loan

if such person also services the loan).” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(2).

22

the payments of principal and interest and such other payments with

respect to the amounts received from the borrower as may be

required pursuant to the terms of the loan.” § 2605(i)(3). 

After receiving a qualified written request under §

2605(e)(1)(A), no later than sixty days afterwards, the loan

servicer is required to respond by making appropriate corrections

to the borrower's account, if necessary, and, after conducting an

investigation, providing the borrower with a written clarification

or explanation. § 2605(e)(2). 

To the extent the FAC attempts, however inartfully, to assert

a claim under § 2605, the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to

state a claim. The FAC fails to allege that JPMorgan was a loan

servicer under RESPA. The FAC also fails to allege facts 4

indicating that the written correspondence served on JPMorgan

concerned the servicing of Plaintiff’s loan, which is required to

qualify the correspondence as a “qualified written request” under

RESPA. A conclusory allegation that the correspondence was a

“Qualified Written Request” is insufficient. See Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555 (mere "labels and conclusions" are insufficient to state a

claim); see also Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 683

(9th Cir. 2009). Because the FAC lacks sufficient facts to state

a claim under § 2605 against JPMorgan, any such claim is DISMISSED

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

JPMorgan also argues that to the extent Plaintiff asserts a

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RESPA claim under § 2605, Plaintiff fails to allege facts regarding

any actual damages he sustained as a result of the alleged

violation. In terms of civil liability, “[w]hoever fails to

comply” with § 2605(e), or any provision of § 2605, is liable to

the borrower for “any actual damages to the borrower as a result of

the failure” and “any additional damages, as the court may allow,

in the case of a pattern or practice of noncompliance with the

requirements of this section, in an amount not to exceed $1,000.”

§ 2605(f)(1)(A)-(B).

Absent factual allegations suggesting that Plaintiff suffered

actual damages, Plaintiff’s RESPA claim is insufficiently pled and

subject to dismissal. Molina v. Washington Mutual Bank, No. 09-CV00894-IEG (AJB), 2010 WL 431439, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010)

(concluding that a RESPA claim was infirm because the plaintiffs

“failed to sufficiently plead pecuniary loss"); Lemieux v. Litton

Loan Servicing, LP, No. 2:09-cv-02816-JAM-EFB, 2009 WL 5206641, at

*3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2009) (“Plaintiffs have not pled facts

showing they suffered actual damages. Their failure to do so

defeats their RESPA claim.”); Garcia v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., __

F. Supp. 2d __, 2009 WL 3837621, at *10 (C.D. Cal. 2009)

(dismissing RESPA claim because Plaintiff “failed to allege damages

under Section 2605"). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts

suggesting he sustained any actual damages as a result of a § 2605

violation, and his conclusory allegation that he “suffered damages”

is insufficient. Accordingly, to the extent the FAC asserts a §

2605 claim, it is insufficiently pled and DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND. Plaintiff is cautioned that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of

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Civil Procedure requires grounding in fact and in law to assert a

claim. 

E. Reformation

Plaintiff’s reformation claim cites California Civil Code §

3399 as providing the authority upon which his loan contract can be

reformed. That section reads:

When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties,

or a mistake of one party, which the other at the time

knew or suspected, a written contract does not truly

express the intention of the parties, it may be revised,

on the application of a party aggrieved, so as to express

that intention, so far as it can be done without

prejudice to rights acquired by third persons, in good

faith and for value.

Cal. Civ. Code. § 3399 (emphasis added). Nowhere in the FAC does

Plaintiff allege or suggest that a mutual mistake was made between

the contracting parties. Plaintiff’s reformation claim appears to

be based on alleged fraud.

The “intention of the parties,” as stated in § 3399, “refers

to a single intention which is entertained by both parties.” Shupe

v. Nelson, 254 Cal. App. 2d 693, 700 (1967). “The essential

purpose of reformation is to reflect the intent of the parties.”

Jones v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 381, 389

(2003). “Although a court of equity may revise a written instrument

to make it conform to the real agreement, it has no power to make

a new contract for the parties . . . .” American Home Ins. Co. v.

Travelers Indemnity Co., 122 Cal. App. 3d 951, 963 (1981) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

JPMorgan argues that Plaintiff’s reformation claim is

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 JPMorgan also argues that because it as assignee, not an 5

original contracting party, no claim for reformation lies against

it. JPMorgan does not cite any case law in support of this

argument. “An assignment transfers the interest of the assignor to

the assignee. Thereafter, [t]he assignee stands in the shoes of the

assignor, taking his rights and remedies, subject to any defenses

which the obligor has against the assignor prior to notice of the

assignment.” Manson, Iver & York v. Black, 176 Cal. App. 4th 36,

49 (2009). If Plaintiff could assert reformation against WAMU,

there is no apparent reason why Plaintiff cannot maintain such a

claim against JPMorgan who now “stands in the shoes” of WAMU.

Moreover, California case law has recognized that reformation

claims can be brought by an assignee to the contract. See American

Home Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 122 Cal. App. 3d 951, 964

(1981); Cal. Pacific Title Co. v. Sacramento Division v. Moore, 229

Cal. App. 2d 114, 117 (1964). It would be incongruous to conclude

that while an assignee can assert a reformation claim against the

original contracting party, the original contracting party cannot

25

insufficiently pled because there is no allegation that the

instrument does not reflect the contracting parties’ intent. This

is true, there are no allegations that suggest that the loan

contract, as drafted, did not reflect the intent of the contracting

parties. Plaintiff merely concludes that the loan did not reflect

“the intention of Plaintiff.” Absent any allegations suggesting

that the loan agreement does not reflect the contracting parties'

intent, Plaintiff’s reformation claim is insufficiently pled. In

addition, to the extent Plaintiff’s reformation claim is premised

on fraud (or mistake), it is subject to the heightened pleading

requirements of Rule 9(b) and fails for the same reasons as

Plaintiff’s claims for fraud. The necessary Rule 9(b) particulars

are lacking. 

Plaintiff’s reformation claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

5

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assert a reformation claim against the assignee. JPMorgan has not

demonstrated that Plaintiff cannot assert a reformation claim

against it because of its assignee status. JPMorgan’s argument on

this ground does not supply a separate basis for dismissal.

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F. Quiet Title And Set Aside Foreclose

1. Quiet Title

Plaintiff brings a quiet title claim against “all Defendants,”

alleging that “due to the fraud of Defendants WAMU and JPMORGAN,

the title to the subject property has been rendered unmarketable in

that WAMU, JPMORGAN, QUALITY and their assigns, have caused to be

recorded as against the subject property documents which have

clouded Plaintiff’s title thereto.” 

The purpose of a quiet title action is to determine “all

conflicting claims to the property in controversy and to decree to

each such interest or estate therein as he may be entitled to.”

Newman v. Cornelius, 3 Cal. App. 3d 279, 284 (1970) (internal

quotation marks omitted). California Code of Civil Procedure §

761.020 provides that a complaint for quiet title “shall be

verified” and shall include the following:

(a) A description of the property that is the subject of

the action.... In the case of real property, the

description shall include both its legal description and

its street address or common designation, if any.

(b) The title of the plaintiff as to which a

determination under this chapter is sought and the basis

of the title....

(c) The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff

against which a determination is sought.

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(d) The date as of which the determination is sought. If

the determination is sought as of a date other than the

date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include

a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that

date is sought.

(e) A prayer for the determination of the title of the

plaintiff against the adverse claims.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 761.020. JPMorgan argues that the FAC does

not allege the title of the Plaintiff, the basis of the title, and

the adverse claims to the title. JPMorgan is correct. Plaintiff

has not alleged these items. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s quiet title

claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

JPMorgan also argues that Plaintiff’s quiet title claim is

duplicative of his fraud claims and does nothing to afford

Plaintiff different or additional relief. JPMorgan cites

California Code of Civil Procedure § 760.030(a) in support of its

argument. That section provides “the remedy provided in this

chapter [quiet title] is cumulative and not exclusive of any other

remedy, form or right of action, or proceeding provided by law for

establishing or quieting title to property.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§ 760.030(a). This section does not support JPMorgan’s position.

This section confirms that a statutory quiet title action, like the

one Plaintiff brings, does not exclude the use of other actions

provided by law to establish or quiet title to property. This

section does not, as JPMorgan suggests, support the conclusion that

if one claim in a case can already establish title to property, a

separate statutory quiet title claim should be dismissed for

redundancy. JPMorgan’s underdeveloped redundancy argument does not

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supply a separate basis for dismissal. 

2. Set Aside Foreclosure

Nominally, Plaintiff has alleged a claim to “set aside

foreclosure.” This claim, as JPMorgan notes, is fatally flawed

because a foreclosure sale has not yet occurred. Elsewhere in the

FAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “will foreclose” upon

Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff’s claim to “set aside foreclosure”

is premature and therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling.

G. UCL Claim

Plaintiff asserts a claim under California’s Unfair

Competition Law (“UCL”). Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.

Plaintiff's UCL claim, in its entirety, takes up one half a page in

the FAC. 

Section 17200 prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent

business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or

misleading advertising.” “[A] plaintiff must have suffered an

‘injury in fact’ and ‘lost money or property as a result of the

unfair competition’ to have standing to pursue either an individual

or a representative claim under the California Unfair Competition

Law.” Hall v. Time, Inc., 158 Cal. App. 4th 847, 849 (2008); see

also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204.

JPMorgan argues that Plaintiff has not alleged what money or

property Plaintiff allegedly lost as a result of any purported

violation of § 17200. The FAC is conclusory as to lost money.

Plaintiff merely alleges that he has “incurred out of pocket

monetary damages” and he “continues to incur monetary damages.”

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Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that he has lost any property,

only that he “will” lose his personal residence if a non-judicial

foreclosure occurs. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting

that he has lost money or property as a result of the alleged §

17200 violation. See Saldate v. Wilshire Credit Corp., __ F.R.D.__,

2010 WL 582074, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2010) (dismissing UCL

claim due to the “complaint’s absence of facts” regarding the

“money or property allegedly lost due to a UCL violation”). For

this reason, Plaintiff’s § 17200 claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

JPMorgan also contends that Plaintiff has otherwise failed to

plead sufficient facts to support a UCL claim. The UCL prohibits

unfair competition including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent

business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Because

the statute is written in the disjunctive, it applies separately to

business acts or practices that are (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, or

(3) fraudulent. See Pastoria v. Nationwide Ins., 112 Cal. App. 4th

1490, 1496 (2003). “Each prong of the UCL is a separate and

distinct theory of liability; thus, the ‘unfair’ practices prong

offers an independent basis for relief.” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1127.

As to the unlawful prong, the UCL incorporates other laws and

treats violations of those laws as unlawful business practices

independently actionable under state law. Chabner v. United Omaha

Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000). As to the

“unfair” prong, “[a]n unfair business practice is one that either

‘offends an established public policy’ or is ‘immoral, unethical,

oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.’”

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McDonald v. Coldwell Banker, 543 F.3d 498, 506 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc., 159 Cal.

App. 3d 509, 530 (1984)). As to the fraudulent prong, “fraudulent

acts are ones where members of the public are likely to be

deceived.” Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137,

1151-52 (9th Cir. 2008). For UCL claims, "[a] plaintiff must state

with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory

elements of the violation." Khoury v. Maly's of Cal., Inc., 14 Cal.

App. 4th 612, 619 (1993).

Plaintiff’s UCL claim has several deficiencies. First,

Plaintiff’s UCL allegations do not specify the basis for his claim,

i.e., whether it is based on an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent

practice, let alone state, with reasonable particularity, the facts

supporting the statutory elements of the violation. Second, to the

extent Plaintiff asserts a UCL claim based on a violation of other

law, his complaint fails to state a claim for a violation of RESPA,

the RFDCPA, or any other law. Accordingly, to the extent the UCL

claim is predicated on the violation of other law, it is

insufficiently pled. Third, to the extent Plaintiff asserts a UCL

claim that is based on or grounded in fraud, it must meet the

requirements of Rule 9(b), Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124-27, Vess, 317

F.3d at 1103-04, which it does not. The complaint fails to specify

what particular role JPMorgan played in the fraudulent scheme, when

and where the scheme occurred, or details on the specific

misrepresentation(s) involved in the fraudulent scheme. 

Plaintiff’s UCL claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

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H. RFDCPA Claim

Plaintiff alleges a claim for violation of § 1788.17 of the

RFDCPA. The RFDCPA forbids a “debt collector” from engaging in

various unfair and oppressive methods to collect a consumer debt.

See Cal. Civil Code §§ 1788.10-1788.16. In addition, § 1788.17 of

the RFDCPA makes it unlawful for a “debt collector” to violate

provisions of the federal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.

The RFDCPA was enacted “to prohibit debt collectors from

engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the collection

of consumer debts, and to require debtors to act fairly in entering

into and honoring such debts.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.1. Under the

RFDCPA, a “debt collector” is defined as “any person who, in the

ordinary course of business, regularly, on behalf of himself or

herself or others, engages in debt collection.” Cal. Civ. Code §

1788.2(c). The term “debt collection” means “any act or practice

in connection with the collection of consumer debts,” § 1788.2(b),

and “consumer debt” means “money, property or their equivalent, due

or owing or alleged to be due or owing from a natural person by

reason of a consumer credit transaction,” § 1788.2(f). In turn,

“consumer credit transaction” means “a transaction between a

natural person and another person in which property, services or

money is acquired on credit by that natural person from such other

person primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” §

1788.2(e). 

The “law is clear that foreclosing on a deed of trust does not

invoke the statutory protections of the RFDCPA.” Collins v. Power

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Default Servs., Inc., No. 09–4838 SC, 2010 WL 234902, at *3 (N.D.

Cal. Jan. 14, 2010) (collecting numerous cases). “[F]oreclosure

pursuant to a deed of trust does not constitute debt collection

under the RFDCPA.” Castenda v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., Inc., __ F.

Supp. 2d __, 2009 WL 4640673, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also

Gonzalez v. First Franklin Loan Servs., No. 1:09-CV-00941 AWI-GSA,

2010 WL 144862, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2010) (“[F]oreclosure

related actions . . . do not implicate the RFDCPA.”). The conduct

Plaintiff complains of concerns foreclosure related actions in

connection with his residential mortgage. This conduct, as

JPMorgan correctly argues, is not covered by the RFDCPA. For this

reason, Plaintiff’s RFDCPA claim is subject to dismissal. 

In his opposition brief, Plaintiff requests dismissal of this

claim. Accordingly, the RFDCPA claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

I. Injunctive Relief

With respect to certain claims, the FAC requests injunctive

relief. The FAC also asserts a separate claim for “Injunctive

Relief Against Defendants.” 

“A request for injunctive relief by itself does not state a

cause of action . . . .” Mbaba Indymac Federal Bank F.S.B., No.

1:09-CV-01452-0WW-GSA, 2010 WL 424363, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27,

2010); see also Edejer v. DHI Mortgage Co., No. C. 09-1302 PJH,

2009 WL 1684714, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2009). An injunction

is a remedy, not a separate claim or cause of action. A pleading

can, as the FAC does here, request injunctive relief in connection

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with a substantive claim, but a separately pled claim or cause of

action for injunctive relief is inappropriate. 

Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is DISMISSED WITHOUT

LEAVE TO AMEND. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated:

1. As to the declaratory relief claim, the motion to dismiss

is GRANTED and this claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

2. As to the fraud claims, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED,

and these claims are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

3. As to the California Civil Code § 1572 claim, the motion

to dismiss is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

4. As to the RESPA claim, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED,

and this claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

5. As to the reformation claim, the motion to dismiss is

GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

6. As to the quiet title claim, the motion to dismiss is

GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

7. As to the claim to set aside foreclosure, the motion to

dismiss is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

8. As to the UCL claim, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and

this claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

9. As to the RFDCPA claim, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED

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and this claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

10. As to the injunctive relief “claim,” the motion to

dismiss is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

In light of the ruling on the motion to dismiss, the motion

for a more definite statement is DENIED as moot. 

Any amended pleading is due within thirty (30) days of

electronic service of this Memorandum Decision. 

Defendant JPMorgan shall submit a form of order consistent

with, and within five (5) days following electronic service of,

this Memorandum Decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 19, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

9i274f UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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