Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-17-72914/USCOURTS-ca9-17-72914-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William P. Barr
Respondent
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Amicus Curiae
Claudia Erika Prado
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CLAUDIA ERIKA PRADO, AKA 

Claudia Erika Prado Ramirez,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 17-72914

Agency No. 

A036-724-746

ORDER AND 

AMENDED 

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted April 19, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed May 10, 2019

Amended February 3, 2020

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins and Milan D. Smith, Jr., 

Circuit Judges, and Barbara M. G. Lynn,* District Judge.

Order;

Opinion by Judge Hawkins

* The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, Chief United States District 

Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

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2 PRADO V. BARR

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel filed: 1) an order amending its prior opinion, 

denying panel rehearing, and denying, on behalf of the court, 

rehearing en banc; and 2) an amended opinion denying 

Claudia Prado’s petition for review of a decision of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals. In the amended opinion, the 

panel held that Prado’s felony conviction for Possession of 

Marijuana for Sale under California Health & Safety Code 

§ 11359 made her removable even though the conviction had 

been recalled and reclassified as a misdemeanor under 

California’s Proposition 64.

Based on her conviction, the Department of Homeland 

Security charged Prado as removable for: (1) committing an 

offense relating to a controlled substance; and (2) 

committing an aggravated felony, illicit trafficking in a 

controlled substance. While her removal charges were 

pending, Prado applied to the Superior Court of California 

to have her conviction reduced to a misdemeanor under 

California’s Proposition 64, the Control, Regulate, and Tax 

Adult Use of Marijuana Act (the “Act”), which permits 

individuals who have completed their sentences under 

various statutes to have their felony convictions 

“redesignated” as misdemeanors. The state court granted 

Prado’s application, but the immigration judge and BIA 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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PRADO V. BARR 3

found Prado removable as charged and denied relief from 

removal.

Before this court, Prado claimed that her conviction was 

no longer a predicate to removal because it had been recalled 

and reclassified under the Act. The panel concluded that her 

argument failed because federal immigration law does not 

recognize a state’s policy decision to expunge (or recall or 

reclassify) a valid state conviction. In this respect, the panel 

explained that a conviction vacated for reasons unrelated to 

the merits of the criminal proceedings – such as equitable, 

rehabilitation, or immigration hardship reasons – may be 

used as a conviction in removal proceedings, whereas a 

conviction vacated because of a procedural or substantive 

defect in the criminal proceedings may not. The panel 

concluded that Prado’s conviction retained its immigration 

consequences because it was reclassified for policy reasons 

of rehabilitation, rejecting her attempt to characterize 

California’s decision that its marijuana policy was flawed as 

proof of a “substantive” flaw in her conviction.

The panel also concluded that Prado’s argument – that 

the reclassification of her conviction eliminated its 

immigration consequences – failed because the Act merely 

reclassified her sentence as a matter of California law, rather 

than fully expunging it. The panel explained that common 

sense and this court’s precedent dictate that partial 

expungement or reclassification cannot eliminate the 

immigration consequences of a conviction.

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4 PRADO V. BARR

COUNSEL

Hadiya Deshmukh (argued) and Sean P. McGinley (argued), 

Certified Law Students; Kari Elisabeth Hong (argued), 

Supervising Attorney; Boston College Law School, Ninth 

Circuit Appellate Project, Newton, Massachusetts; for 

Petitioner.

Genevieve M. Kelly (argued), Attorney; Bryan S. Beier, 

Senior Litigation Counsel; Cindy F. Ferrier and John W. 

Blakeley, Assistant Directors; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 

Attorney General; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C.; for Respondent.

Stephen Manning, Innovation Law Lab, Portland, Oregon, 

for Amicus Curiae Immigrant Legal Resource Center.

ORDER

The opinion filed on May 10, 2019, and published at 

923 F.3d 1203, is amended by the opinion filed concurrently 

with this order.

With these amendments, the panel votes to deny the 

Petitioner’s petition for panel rehearing.

Judge Smith has voted to deny the petition for rehearing 

en banc, and Judges Hawkins and Lynn so recommend. The 

full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en 

banc and no judge of the court has requested a vote on 

whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

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PRADO V. BARR 5

Petitioner=s petition for rehearing and petition for 

rehearing en banc are DENIED.

OPINION

HAWKINS, Senior Circuit Judge:

Claudia Prado (“Prado”) seeks review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ conclusion that her California felony 

conviction for possession of marijuana was an “aggravated 

felony” and an offense “relating to a controlled substance” 

that rendered her removable. See 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (a)(2)(B)(i). Prado claims this 

conviction is no longer a predicate to removal because it was 

recalled and reclassified as a misdemeanor under 

California’s Proposition 64. Because valid state convictions 

retain their immigration consequences even when modified 

or expunged for reasons of state public policy, we deny her 

petition.

BACKGROUND

Born in Mexico, Prado entered the United States with her 

parents in 1972, when she was approximately six months 

old. She became a lawful permanent resident on 

December 29, 1980. Thereafter, she resided in the United 

States but never became a United States citizen.

On May 28, 2014, Prado pled guilty to one felony count 

of Possession of Marijuana for Sale, in violation of 

California Health and Safety Code (“CHSC”) Section 

11359. The Superior Court of California, County of Orange, 

placed her on probation for three years.

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Two years later, the United States Department of 

Homeland Security (“DHS”) encountered Prado at the 

Orange County Jail, where she was serving time on a 

subsequent drug conviction. DHS charged Prado with two 

violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 

both arising from her conviction under CHSC § 11359, and 

either of which would render her removable: (1) committing 

an offense “relating to a controlled substance,” in violation 

of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); and (2) committing an 

aggravated felony, illicit trafficking in a controlled 

substance, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).

While her removal charges were pending, Prado applied 

to the Superior Court of California to have her conviction 

reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor under California’s 

Proposition 64, the Control, Regulate, and Tax Adult Use of 

Marijuana Act (the “Act”). The Act permits individuals who 

have completed their sentences under various statutes, 

including CHSC § 11359, to have their felony convictions 

“redesignated” as misdemeanors. See CHSC §§ 11359(b), 

11361.8(e). The court granted Prado’s application in an 

order stating, “The following felony conviction(s) is/are 

recalled and reclassified as misdemeanor conviction(s) and 

any enhancements are dismissed by operation of law: 

11359.”

Thereafter, Prado applied for asylum, withholding of 

removal, cancellation of removal, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture. After several hearings, an 

immigration judge (“IJ”) denied all of these applications and 

found Prado removable as charged. The IJ noted that, 

although Prado’s conviction was reduced from a felony to a 

misdemeanor, “the conviction remains a conviction for 

[i]mmigration purposes,” and “[t]he fact that it has been 

reduced to a misdemeanor does not change the fact that it is 

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PRADO V. BARR 7

a controlled substance related offense and that it still 

contains the trafficking element.” The IJ concluded, “The 

Court does believe that at this point the respondent’s 

conviction remains both a controlled substances offense and 

an aggravated felony.”

Prado timely appealed the IJ’s determinations that she 

was removable and ineligible for asylum. In her pro se brief 

to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), Prado argued 

her conviction did not constitute an “aggravated felony” or 

an offense “relating to a controlled substance” because it was 

recalled and reclassified under the Act. In support of this 

argument, she submitted a report by the Immigrant Legal 

Resource Center on Proposition 64, which noted that the Act 

could reduce the immigration consequences of certain 

marijuana offenses but acknowledged that a marijuana 

conviction eliminated for rehabilitative purposes “remains a 

conviction for immigration purposes.”

The BIA dismissed Prado’s appeal. In response to 

Prado’s argument that California recalled and reclassified 

her conviction as a misdemeanor, thereby eliminating its 

immigration consequences, the BIA observed that Prado 

failed to identify any authority in support of her position. 

Instead, the BIA held that Prado’s appeal was foreclosed by 

Roman-Suaste v. Holder, 766 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2014), 

which held that a “conviction under CHSC § 11359 

categorically qualifies as an aggravated felony, namely 

‘illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.’” See id. at 1037 

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B)). The BIA also 

dismissed Prado’s appeal of the IJ’s finding that she was 

convicted of an offense “relating to a controlled substance.”

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8 PRADO V. BARR

DISCUSSION

Prado does not contest that a conviction under CHSC 

§ 11359, as it stood on the day of her guilty plea, would be 

grounds for removal. Instead, Prado argues that the 

reclassification of her conviction under the Act means she is 

no longer removable. First, she argues that the Act’s 

reclassification of her initial conviction eliminated its 

immigration consequences. Second, she argues that she was 

re-convicted under the modified terms of CHSC § 11359, 

and that her new conviction is neither an “aggravated 

felony” nor an “offense relating to a controlled substance,” 

because the Act’s definition of “marijuana” is broader than 

the definition used in the INA. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 

569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013) (a state offense must be a 

“categorical match” to the offense listed in the INA in order 

to serve as a predicate for removal).

Prado’s argument fails because federal immigration law 

does not recognize a state’s policy decision to expunge (or 

recall or reclassify) a valid state conviction. “A conviction 

vacated for reasons ‘unrelated to the merits of the underlying 

criminal proceedings’ may be used as a conviction in 

removal proceedings whereas a conviction vacated because 

of a procedural or substantive defect in the criminal 

proceedings may not.” Poblete Mendoza v. Holder, 

606 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Nath v. 

Gonzales, 467 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2006)). Thus, an 

individual remains removable based on a conviction that was 

vacated “for equitable, rehabilitation, or immigration 

hardship reasons.” See Nath, 467 F.3d at 1188–89. This is 

because “Congress intended to establish a uniform federal 

rule that precluded the recognition of subsequent state 

rehabilitative expungements of convictions.” See MurilloEspinoza v. I.N.S., 261 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2001) 

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PRADO V. BARR 9

(deferring to BIA’s interpretation of the INA); see also 

United States v. Campbell, 167 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1999) 

(“[W]hether one has been ‘convicted’ within the language of 

[federal] statutes is necessarily . . . a question of federal, not 

state, law, despite the fact that the predicate offense and its 

punishment are defined by the law of the State.”) (second 

and third alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

Prado’s conviction was reclassified for policy reasons of 

rehabilitation, rather than because it was substantively or 

procedurally flawed. The Act permits individuals who have 

completed their sentences under statutes criminalizing the 

sale, possession, production, or transportation of marijuana 

to have their convictions reclassified and reduced. See 

CHSC § 11361.8(e). Thus, the Act resembles other statutes 

we have deemed “rehabilitative.” See, e.g., MurilloEspinoza, 261 F.3d at 774 & n.3 (describing as 

“rehabilitative” a statute permitting individuals to apply to 

have judgments against them set aside after completing their 

sentence (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-907(A))); ChavezPerez v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 2004) (same 

(citing Or. Stat. § 137.225(1)(a))).

The rehabilitative purpose of the Act is further 

demonstrated by Prado’s own citation to materials showing 

why California voters passed the Act. See In re Lance W., 

694 P.2d 744, 754 (Cal. 1985) (“In construing . . . statutory 

provisions, whether enacted by the Legislature or by 

initiative, the intent of the enacting body is the paramount 

consideration.”). For instance, Prado cites the Official Voter 

Information Guide’s statement that “Prop. 64 will stop 

ruining people’s lives for marijuana,” as well as thenLieutenant Governor Gavin Newsom’s statement that “the 

true promise of Proposition 64 [is] providing new hope and 

opportunities to Californians, primarily people of color,

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10 PRADO V. BARR

whose lives were long ago derailed by a costly, broken and 

racially discriminatory system of marijuana 

criminalization.” Considering these statements and the 

structure of the Act, it seems the Act’s reclassification of 

Prado’s conviction was intended to reduce the ongoing 

negative effects of her conviction for rehabilitative purposes.

We are not persuaded by Prado’s attempt to characterize 

California’s decision that its marijuana policy was flawed as 

proof of a “substantive” flaw in her conviction. Prado

explains that California voters passed Proposition 64 

because they believed California’s marijuana laws were 

unjust, and claims that California’s “enforcement of its old 

laws presents constitutional and legal defects in Ms. Prado’s 

initial conviction.” However, Prado merely asserts that 

California’s pre-Act drug enforcement policies were illegal 

or unconstitutional, without attempting to show how the 

proceedings against her were defective in any way. Because 

Prado does not challenge the validity of her conviction, it 

retains its immigration consequences.

Finally, Prado’s argument fails because the Act merely 

reclassified her sentence as a matter of California law, rather 

than fully expunging it.1 As we explained in RamirezCastro v. I.N.S., even “assuming that some state 

expungement statutes could eliminate completely the 

immigration consequences of a state conviction,” a statute 

that “provides only a limited expungement even under state 

law” is not such a statute. 287 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 

1 While the Act permits a person who has completed his or her 

sentence under CHSC § 11359 to apply to “have the conviction 

dismissed and sealed because the prior conviction is now legally 

invalid,” Prado neither requested nor received this form of relief. See 

CHSC § 11361.8(e).

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2002). The Act did not completely eliminate the 

consequences of Prado’s conviction under CHSC § 11359 

even as a matter of state law; rather, it reclassified that 

conviction to a misdemeanor, under the modified terms of 

CHSC § 11359. See CHSC § 11361.8(e); see People v. Lin, 

236 Cal. Rptr. 3d 818, 825 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2018) 

(“[A]fter Proposition 64, possession of marijuana with intent 

to sell . . . remain[s] subject to criminal condemnation. The 

penalties are simply lower.”) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). Common sense and our precedent dictate that 

partial expungement or reclassification cannot eliminate the 

immigration consequences of a conviction.

Thus, we agree with the BIA that Prado’s initial 

conviction retained its immigration consequences and 

rendered her removable. See Roman-Suaste, 766 F.3d 

at 1037. We need not consider Prado’s argument, relying on 

Moncrieffe, that a conviction under the modified terms of 

§ 11359 would not be a predicate for removal.

PETITION DENIED.

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