Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05492/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05492-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David C. Belt
Appointed Amicus Curiae for Appellant
Keith Maydak
Appellant
United States Department of Justice
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 3, 2000 Decided July 18, 2000

No. 98-5492

Keith Maydak

Appellant

v.

United States Department of Justice,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01830)

Keith Maydak, appearing pro se, was on the brief for

appellant.

David C. Belt, appointed by the court, argued the cause as

amicus curiae on the side of appellant. With him on the

briefs was Deanne E. Maynard.

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Daria J. Zane, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

Before: Silberman, Sentelle and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Keith Maydak seeks the release

under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") of copies of

law enforcement records compiled by the U.S. Attorney's

Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania in connection

with his criminal prosecution for various offenses. The government originally denied Maydak's FOIA request by invoking FOIA Exemption 7(A), which permits the withholding of

law enforcement records which if produced "could reasonably

be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings." 5

U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)(A) (1994). The district court granted summary judgment for the government on that basis, holding that

it could withhold the documents. Having now abandoned its

assertion of Exemption 7(A), however, the Department of

Justice ("DOJ") seeks a remand of this case so that it might

defend the applicability of other FOIA exemptions. Because

the DOJ has failed to explain adequately why it could not

have pleaded the other exemptions on which it wished to rely

in the original district court proceedings, we deny the motion

for remand, reverse the district court's judgment, and order

the release of all requested documents to Maydak.

I. Background

Maydak was convicted of wire fraud, mail fraud, access

device fraud, and money laundering in the United States

District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in

1994. He currently remains incarcerated for those crimes.

On September 23, 1994, while his appeal from his criminal

conviction was pending, Maydak filed with the United States

Attorney's Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania a

request under FOIA and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. s 552a,

for "copies of any and all documents which pertain to me,

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mention me, or list my name." On October 6, 1994, that

request was forwarded to the Executive Office for United

States Attorneys ("EOUSA").

On November 15, 1994, the EOUSA by letter denied Maydak's request in full, relying solely on FOIA Exemption 7(A).

Exemption 7(A) exempts from FOIA disclosure requirements

"records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes ... to the extent that the production of such law

enforcement records or information ... could reasonably be

expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings...." 5

U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)(A). The principal purpose of Exemption

7(A) is to prevent disclosures which might prematurely reveal

the government's cases in court, its evidence and strategies,

or the nature, scope, direction, and focus of its investigations,

and thereby enable suspects to establish defenses or fraudulent alibis or to destroy or alter evidence. See NLRB v.

Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 227, 241-42 (1978);

see also 37A Am. Jur. 2d Freedom of Information Acts s 303

(1994). Another recognized goal of Exemption 7(A) is to

prevent litigants from identifying and intimidating or harassing witnesses. See Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 239-40. In its

denial letter, the EOUSA stated that "portions of the information" contained in Maydak's file were "being considered in

connection with" his pending appeal, and thus that the government was withholding all of the requested documents

pursuant to Exemption 7(A). Maydak filed a timely appeal of

the EOUSA's denial with the Department of Justice's Office

of Information and Privacy ("OIP"). On August 8, 1995, the

Third Circuit affirmed Mayak's conviction and sentence. See

United States v. Maydak, 66 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 1995) (table).

On May 29, 1996, the OIP informed Maydak that it was

remanding his FOIA request for reprocessing because the

EOUSA had concluded that Exemption 7(A) no longer applied.

On August 23, 1996, Maydak filed in the Western District

of Pennsylvania a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2255 to

vacate his sentence. Maydak had waived his right to counsel

at sentencing. In his s 2255 motion, he claimed that the

waiver was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent because the

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court had not first explained to him the consequences of

proceeding pro se, and thus that he was entitled to a new

sentencing. On September 11, 1996, the district court dismissed Maydak's s 2255 motion. In November 1996, Maydak filed a motion in the Third Circuit for a certificate of

appealability to challenge that dismissal. On February 7,

1997, EOUSA again denied Maydak's FOIA request on Exemption 7(A) grounds because of the pending s 2255 motion.

Maydak again filed a timely appeal with the OIP. On April

10, 1997, the Third Circuit denied Maydak's motion for a

certificate of appealability. And on June 12, 1997, the OIP

informed Maydak that it was again remanding his FOIA

request for reprocessing because the EOUSA had concluded

that Exemption 7(A) no longer applied.

In response to the OIP's July 1997 remand of his FOIA

request, on August 13, 1997, Maydak filed a complaint in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

seeking an order requiring the government to provide the

records and a list of all documents withheld. In proceedings

before the district court, Maydak asserted that the documents

he requested were not exempt from disclosure under FOIA

Exemption 7(A). Because he had already been convicted,

Maydak contended that there were no "enforcement proceedings" pending with which release of the requested documents

could interfere. The DOJ maintained that Exemption 7(A)

continued to apply because the proceedings addressing Maydak's post-conviction motions (including but not limited to the

August 23, 1996, s 2255 motion pending when his FOIA

request was reprocessed) derived from and were part of the

original law enforcement proceedings, and disclosure would

interfere with the DOJ's ability to respond to those motions.

The DOJ also argued that, should any of the motions result in

the vacating of Maydak's conviction, disclosure of the requested documents could interfere with the government's ability to

prosecute him again.

To support its argument that disclosure would interfere

with those ongoing proceedings and to satisfy the government's burden of proof in denying a FOIA claim, the DOJ

presented declarations from Paul E. Hull, the AUSA in the

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Western District of Pennsylvania who prosecuted Maydak,

and from John F. Boseker, an attorney adviser in the

EOUSA. The declarations grouped the requested records

into categories and offered generic reasons for withholding

the documents in each. It is well established that the government can satisfy its burden of proof under Exemption 7(A) by

utilizing this format. See, e.g., Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 236;

Bevis v. Department of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1390 (D.C. Cir.

1986); Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,

789 F.2d 64, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

While his FOIA case was pending, on September 18, 1997,

Maydak filed in the Western District of Pennsylvania a

motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. On

March 25, 1998, the district court denied the motion, and

Maydak appealed. On May 27, 1999, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. See United States v.

Maydak, 182 F.3d 904 (3d Cir. 1999) (table). On September

16, 1999, Maydak filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the

United States Supreme Court, which petition was subsequently denied on November 29, 1999. See Maydak v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 556 (1999).

Additionally, on October 22, 1997, Maydak filed in the

Third Circuit a motion for leave to file another s 2255

petition, seeking to reassert the invalid waiver of counsel at

sentencing issue. On November 17, 1997, the Third Circuit

denied that motion as well, but stayed its denial pending

disposition of another case. The Third Circuit finally disposed of Maydak's motion to file another s 2255 petition on

January 11, 2000.

Returning to Maydak's FOIA claim, on September 1, 1998,

the district court agreed with the DOJ that the release of the

requested documents would interfere with enforcement proceedings in the event that Maydak's pending post-conviction

motions and appeals succeeded. Accordingly, the court held

that the government properly withheld the records under

Exemption 7(A), and granted summary judgment in favor of

the DOJ. Maydak appealed the district court's decision to

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this court. We appointed an amicus curiae ("Amicus") and

certified two questions: (1) whether FOIA Exemption 7(A)

continues to apply as long as a criminal defendant is pursuing

a post-conviction collateral attack on the judgment or sentence entered in a criminal enforcement proceeding to which

the withheld records relate; and (2) whether the DOJ,

through its submissions below, met its burden of justifying its

invocation of Exemption 7(A) to shield all the records it

identified as falling within the various record categories, as

well as the residual records not specifically categorized.

On June 18, 1999, the DOJ conceded partial error with

respect to the second of these issues, allowing specifically that

the statement in the Hull declaration that "[m]ost of the

documents can be placed into one of the [listed] categories"

was inadequate to meet the government's burden under Exemption 7(A) with respect to those documents which had not

been categorized. The DOJ requested a remand to the

district court so that it might present evidence to justify the

withholding of the uncategorized documents.

Subsequently, the DOJ informed Maydak and Amicus on

July 30 and August 2, 1999, respectively, that "[d]ue to the

change in circumstances regarding a previously pending law

enforcement matter in which [Maydak] was involved," the

government was abandoning its assertion of Exemption 7(A)

with respect to Maydak's FOIA request. On August 6, 1999,

Amicus notified the DOJ that Maydak intended to appeal the

Third Circuit's May 27, 1999, decision to the Supreme Court,

and that his motion for leave to file a second s 2255 petition

was still pending in the Third Circuit. Nevertheless, on

August 26, 1999, the DOJ filed with this court a second

motion for remand based on changed circumstances, confirming that it had abandoned its reliance on Exemption 7(A) and

requesting the opportunity for the EOUSA to reprocess

Maydak's FOIA request and determine whether other FOIA

exemptions might apply.

On November 23, 1999, we dismissed as moot the government's original motion for remand to review and categorize

the documents overlooked in the original proceedings and

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ordered briefing and oral argument on the DOJ's second

motion for remand. A few days prior to oral argument,

Amicus notified this court that the EOUSA had released

some of the requested materials, but had invoked FOIA

Exemptions 2, 3, 5, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E), 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(2),

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(D), and (b)(7)(E) (1994), in withholding 1,524 pages of documents and redacting several of the

released documents. Amicus also indicated that the EOUSA

refused to release requested documents which originated

from other agencies and which the EOUSA had "forwarded"

back to them.

II. Analysis

We turn now to the DOJ's motion for remand. The

government bears the burden of proving the applicability of

any statutory exemption it asserts in denying a FOIA request. We have plainly and repeatedly told the government

that, as a general rule, it must assert all exemptions at the

same time, in the original district court proceedings. See

Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health &

Human Servs., 795 F.2d 205, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Ryan v.

Department of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 789, 792 (D.C. Cir.

1980); Jordan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753,

779-80 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc), overruled on other grounds

by Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670

F.2d 1051, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc). FOIA was

enacted to promote honesty and reduce waste in government

by exposing an agency's performance of its statutory duties to

public scrutiny. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772-73 &

n.20 (1989). "The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an

informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic

society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the

governors accountable to the governed." Robbins Tire, 437

U.S. at 242. As we have observed in the past, the delay

caused by permitting the government to raise its FOIA

exemption claims one at a time interferes both with the

statutory goals of "efficient, prompt, and full disclosure of

information," Senate of Puerto Rico v. United States Dep't of

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Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Jordan,

591 F.2d at 755), and with "interests of judicial finality and

economy." Id. (quoting Holy Spirit Ass'n v. CIA, 636 F.2d

838, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Requiring the simultaneous invocation of exemptions also respects the general principle that

appellate courts do not normally consider issues that were

neither raised nor decided below. See Ryan, 617 F.2d at 789;

Jordan, 591 F.2d at 779. We note that other circuits also

require the government to assert all exemptions in the original district court proceedings. See, e.g., Crooker v. United

States Parole Comm'n, 760 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1985); Fendler

v. United States Parole Comm'n, 774 F.2d 975, 978 (9th Cir.

1985).

Although not its primary argument here, the DOJ suggests

that it adequately raised other FOIA exemptions before the

district court. Yet the DOJ acknowledges that it did not

"formally" invoke other FOIA exemptions in the original

district court proceedings. We have said explicitly in the past

that merely stating that "for example" an exemption might

apply is inadequate to raise a FOIA exemption. See Ryan,

617 F.2d at 792 n.38a. Instead the government must assert

the exemption in such a manner that the district court can

rule on the issue. See id. Nevertheless, the DOJ maintains

that references to other exemptions made in its motion for

summary judgment and in the Hull and Boseker Declarations

were adequate to preserve those issues.

A review of the record demonstrates that, while those

filings all mentioned the potential applicability of other exemptions, the DOJ has to date made no attempt to substantiate those claims. Nor has the government even been consistent in specifying which other exemptions would apply.

Ultimately, after reprocessing Maydak's FOIA request in

the days immediately prior to oral argument, the EOUSA

withheld requested documents pursuant to Exemptions 2, 3,

5, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E). In its brief before us, however, the

DOJ claimed the applicability of Exemptions 3, 5, 6, 7(C),

and 7(D). Meanwhile, the DOJ's motion for summary judgment suggested only Exemptions 3, 5, and 7(D) as possibilities; the Hull Declaration offered that Exemptions 3, 4, 5, 6,

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7(C) and 7(D) "may be applicable"; and the Boseker Declaration asserted conclusorily and without elaboration that all

the requested records were subject to Exemptions 3, 4, 5, 6,

7(C), 7(D), 7(E), and 7(F). Neither declaration made any

attempt to substantiate the applicability of other exemptions,

and the DOJ has never, at any time, offered further support

for such claims. These cursory, equivocal, and inconsistent

assertions are clearly inadequate to the task. The district

court had nothing upon which to rule one way or the other

with respect to the applicability of other FOIA exemptions.

Accordingly, under the standard articulated in Ryan, the

DOJ did not adequately assert other FOIA exemptions in

the proceedings below.

Indeed, unlike in many of the cases it cites as supporting a

remand--cases in which the DOJ merely fell short in its good

faith attempts to carry its burden of proof with respect to

other asserted exemptions, see, e.g., North v. Walsh, 881 F.2d

1088, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Bevis, 801 F.2d at 1390--here

the DOJ does not even claim that it tried to satisfy that

burden. Instead, the DOJ maintains that it should not have

to. The DOJ's primary argument before us is that the

unique nature of its burden of proof under Exemption 7(A)

relieves it of the burden of proving its case with respect to

other exemptions it seeks to assert in the original district

court proceedings. As noted above, under Robbins Tire and

its progeny, the DOJ satisfies its burden of proof under

Exemption 7(A) by grouping documents in categories and

offering generic reasons for withholding the documents in

each category. See, e.g., Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 236;

Bevis, 801 F.2d at 1390; Crooker, 789 F.2d at 66-67. The

DOJ maintains that, if it has to assert other exemptions

simultaneously with Exemption 7(A), that it will be forced to

produce a Vaughn index, see Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136

(D.C. Cir. 1975), to satisfy its burden of proof with respect to

the other exemptions. The DOJ contends that the mere act

of producing a Vaughn index for the purpose of substantiating its invocation of another FOIA exemption will itself

disclose the very information that the more generalized categorical showing required for Exemption 7(A) was designed to

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protect, and thereby undermine the very purposes of Exemption 7(A). To avoid this result, the DOJ seeks a blanket rule

that, if the government invokes Exemption 7(A) in the original district court proceedings, then the government does not

have to claim the applicability of or satisfy its burden of proof

with respect to any other exemption until such time as the

government decides that Exemption 7(A) no longer applies or

a court tells the government that Exemption 7(A) does not

apply. In the DOJ's view, after the government or the courts

conclude that Exemption 7(A) is inapplicable, then the government should be allowed to start back at the beginning in

assessing the applicability of and satisfying its burden under

other exemptions. We disagree.

First and foremost, the statute says nothing that would

indicate that Exemption 7(A) is so unique. See 5 U.S.C.

s 552(b). Instead, the statute merely lists several exceptions

to FOIA's general policy of disclosure of all federal records

not otherwise exempt. See id. Nothing in the statute, either

express or implied, suggests that Exemption 7(A) should be

singled out for preferential treatment by the courts. Exemption 7(A) is simply one exception on a list of many. Numerous cases exist in this and other circuits in which the government has asserted Exemption 7(A) and other exemptions at

the same time, presumably without the dire consequences the

DOJ alleges here. See, e.g., Manna v. United States Dep't of

Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1162 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1995); Mapother v.

Department of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Moreover, despite the DOJ's concerns, the government

does not necessarily have to produce a Vaughn index to

justify denying a FOIA request under other exemptions,

either. Specific holdings of this court and the Supreme Court

permit the satisfaction of the government's burden of proof

under many of the other exemptions claimed here through

generic, categorical showings similar to that for Exemption

7(A). See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice v. Landano,

508 U.S. 165, 179-80 (1993) (discussing circumstances in

which the government can substantiate a claim of Exemption

7(D) generically); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the

Press, 489 U.S. at 777-80 (holding that the Robbins Tire

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categorical approach to Exemption 7(A) is appropriate for

Exemption 7(C), and citing Federal Trade Comm'n v. Grolier

Inc., 462 U.S. 19 (1983), as establishing the same for Exemption 5); Church of Scientology v. Internal Revenue Service,

792 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (permitting the IRS to support

its Exemption 3 claim generically with affidavits instead of a

Vaughn index). Indeed, in Church of Scientology, we recognized that "when ... a claimed FOIA exemption consists of a

generic exclusion, dependent upon the category of records

rather than the subject matter which each individual record

contains, resort to a Vaughn index is futile." Church of

Scientology, 792 F.2d at 152. To that end, on other occasions,

based upon the circumstances at hand, we have upheld the

government's assertion of FOIA exemptions other than 7(A)

based on something less than a Vaughn index. See, e.g.,

Brinton v. Department of State, 636 F.2d 600, 606 (D.C. Cir.

1980) (upholding invocation of Exemption 5 on the basis of

affidavits and no Vaughn index).

Given the posture of this case, we are in no position to

decide whether affidavits alone would have sufficed to substantiate claims of other exemptions by the government here.

Nevertheless, some of the categories identified by the Hull

Declaration for purposes of Exemption 7(A) are of a nature

which would lend themselves to generic and categorical justification under other exemptions. For example, the Hull

Declaration identified among the requested documents

"grand jury materials," which the DOJ could have claimed

were also protected by FOIA Exemption 3 and Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 6(e); and "attorney client/work product materials," which the government could have asserted fell

within FOIA Exemption 5. Yet before us the DOJ concedes

that it did not even attempt to substantiate its claims with

respect to these other exemptions. The DOJ's only justification for that failure was its insistence that such assertions

would have required it absolutely to produce a Vaughn index,

an excuse plainly contradicted by the above-mentioned precedents.

The DOJ may be correct that, in some cases, a Vaughn

index could disclose too much and undermine these goals,

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particularly where trial or equivalent administrative hearing

has not yet occurred. See Solar Sources, Inc. v. United

States, 142 F.3d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing this

concern); Curran v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 473, 475

(1st Cir. 1987) (same). In fact, the same could be said with

respect to other exemptions as well. See Hayden v. National

Sec. Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1384-85, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1979)

(acknowledging similar objections with respect to substantiating withholding under Exemptions 1 and 3). And in FOIA

cases, there is always the possibility that the district court

may conclude that the affidavits offered are inadequate to

satisfy the government's burden of proof. In such a case, the

government can still request that the court deny a plaintiff's

request for a Vaughn index in favor of more detailed affidavits, or that the court review the index or the requested

documents in camera, on the grounds that the production and

disclosure of a Vaughn index will in fact disclose the very

information the government seeks to protect. In other

words, the government has mechanisms by which it can

accomplish the goal of protecting sensitive information while

at the same time satisfying its burden of proof with respect to

other exemptions in the original district court proceedings.

Despite the bulk of precedent contradicting its position, the

DOJ contends that our opinion in Senate of Puerto Rico, 823

F.2d at 580-81, supports its characterization of Exemption

7(A) as meriting unique treatment. In Senate of Puerto Rico,

while the district court was in the process of considering

motions for summary judgment with respect to Exemption

7(A), the relevant criminal trials ended with guilty verdicts.

The DOJ by affidavit acknowledged that Exemption 7(A) no

longer applied, and the district court said that the agency

could present evidence to demonstrate that the requested

documents were properly withheld under other exemptions.

Upon review, after discussing at length the competing public

policy concerns, we concluded only that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in its handling of the case. See id.

We can find nothing in Senate of Puerto Rico that should be

construed as supporting the proposition that, when the government withdraws its reliance on Exemption 7(A) after the

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district court has reached a final decision and an appeal has

been filed, the appropriate course of action is necessarily

remand to the agency for reprocessing of the FOIA request

in question. Accordingly, we conclude not only that the DOJ

did not genuinely assert exemptions other than Exemption

7(A) in the court below, but also that it had no legitimate

excuse for its failure to do so.

We have recognized two exceptions for unusual situations,

largely beyond the government's control: specifically, extraordinary circumstances where, from pure human error, the

government failed to invoke the correct exemption and will

have to release information compromising national security or

sensitive, personal, private information unless the court allows it to make an untimely exemption claim; and where a

substantial change in the factual context of the case or an

interim development in the applicable law forces the government to invoke an exemption after the original district court

proceedings have concluded. See id. (relying on Jordan, 591

F.2d at 780). As to the first of these, DOJ does not claim

that human error was the cause of its failure to assert other

FOIA exemptions; and as to the second, the only change in

this case is the simple resolution of other litigation, hardly an

unforeseeable difference.

The DOJ contends that the existence of at least the first

round of Maydak's collateral attacks made the possibility of a

new trial sufficient to justify the continued application of

Exemption 7(A). Although Maydak still has collateral attacks pending just like those that existed at the time the

EOUSA reprocessed his FOIA request, the DOJ suggests

that the Third Circuit's May 27, 1999, decision regarding

Maydak's motion for a new trial rendered sufficiently de

minimis the likelihood that further collateral attacks might

succeed, and thereby reduced the potential for future enforcement proceedings, so that the government could no longer

justify withholding under Exemption 7(A). In other words,

according to the DOJ, the Third Circuit's May 27, 1999, order

affirming the district court's decision to dismiss Maydak's

motion for a new trial represents a substantial change in

circumstances, both factual and legal, governing Maydak's

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FOIA request. The DOJ offers no analysis, however, as to

why that particular decision crossed any such threshold.

Moreover, the DOJ's argument about the decreasing likelihood that Maydak's attacks on his conviction will succeed is

inconsistent with the concern, expressed both in its brief and

at oral argument, that Maydak will use the requested records,

once released, to craft new and improved challenges against

his conviction and sentence. The law of the case created by

the Third Circuit's denial of Maydak's motion for new trial

expressing one legal theory would not preclude that court

from granting a motion for new trial based on a different

legal theory derived from the requested documents. Accordingly, we hold that there has been no substantial change in

the factual or legal context of this case, and thus that there is

no reason for us to deviate from our usual rule of requiring

the government to assert all its FOIA exemption claims in the

original district court proceedings.

In a final effort to obtain a remand, the DOJ argues that

public policy concerns about disclosing information that might

otherwise be exempt require this court to exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. s 2106 to remand the case for further

consideration of the applicability of other FOIA exemptions.

That provision provides that "[any] court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any

judgment ... and may remand the cause ... as may be just

under the circumstances." 28 U.S.C. s 2106 (1994). We

remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2106 when doing so best

serves such interests as judicial finality and economy and

avoiding just the sort of delay that is inappropriate in FOIA

cases, see, e.g., Trans-Pacific Policing Agreement v. United

States Customs Serv., 177 F.3d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1999), or

basic justice and fairness. See Powell v. United States

Bureau of Prisons, 927 F.2d 1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Our precedents applying 28 U.S.C. s 2106 do not support

the DOJ's argument. In Trans-Pacific, for example, after

concluding that the district court had an affirmative duty to

consider sua sponte whether the agency could have segregated the exempt portions of the requested records despite the

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manded the case because, otherwise, the plaintiffs could

merely file another, more specific FOIA request, which would

merely result in a new lawsuit, wasting time, expense, and

judicial resources. See Trans-Pacific, 177 F.3d at 1023,

1027-29. In the present case, the DOJ does not allege that

the district court failed to consider an issue that it properly

should have; moreover, the waste in time, expense, and

judicial resources is more likely to occur if we grant the

remand that the DOJ seeks than if we deny it.

Similarly, in Powell, this court considered the situation of a

pro se prisoner plaintiff appealing the district court's conclusion that an internal agency manual was wholly exempt and

not segregable under FOIA Exemption 2. The court appointed an amicus curiae to represent the plaintiff on appeal, and

the amicus located an unpublished opinion in another FOIA

case which demonstrated that portions of the manual had

already been released. This court exercised its discretion to

grant a remand as serving "the interests of justice and

fairness" and the purposes of FOIA on the grounds that the

unpublished opinion was directly relevant to the plaintiff's

claim that the manual was segregable, yet was unavailable to

him at the time of the district court proceedings. Powell, 927

F.2d at 1243. The equities of the present case are not

comparable. The DOJ was not demonstrably unable to prove

its assertion of other FOIA exemptions; it simply chose not

to try.

The DOJ again raises Senate of Puerto Rico as an example

of this court exercising its discretion under 28 U.S.C. s 2106

to allow the government to invoke other FOIA exemptions

after Exemption 7(A) was deemed no longer to apply. Contrary to the DOJ's argument, however, in that case, we

explicitly left open the applicability of 28 U.S.C. s 2106 in a

case such as this one. See Senate of Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d at

581. Moreover, we explicitly said that "[w]e will not allow an

agency 'to play cat and mouse by withholding its most

powerful cannon until after the District Court has decided the

case and then springing it on surprised opponents and the

judge.' " Id. at 580 (quoting Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp.

v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in

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which this court upheld an agency's motion for rehearing in

which it raised for the first time a claim of executive privilege).

The DOJ's expressed concerns about public policy are so

general as to apply in virtually all situations in which the DOJ

declined for whatever reason to raise one or more FOIA

exemptions the first time around. The record before us

offers no more direct evidence of the applicability of other

exemptions than the general and conclusory assertions of the

Hull and Boseker Declarations. There is simply nothing in

the record to substantiate the DOJ's claims that dire consequences will flow from the release of the requested documents. Furthermore, the DOJ's repeated statements that

other specified FOIA exemptions might apply, coupled with

its abject failure even to try to substantiate those assertions

generically through affidavits, strongly suggests the sort of

tactical maneuvering at a plaintiff's expense that we have

explicitly rejected. If anything, the notions of judicial finality

and economy, avoiding delay, and fairness prominent in our

s 2106 jurisprudence dictate an order in Maydak's favor.

Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion under that

provision to remand the case for further proceedings.

Conclusion

Because the DOJ failed to raise the other exemptions upon

which it wished to rely in the original district court proceedings, and because the DOJ has offered no convincing reason

why it could not have done so, we deny the government's

motion for remand, reverse the district court's judgment, and

order the release of all requested documents to the appellant.

So ordered.

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