Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01127/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01127-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent
National Association of Government Employees, Local R5-136
Petitioner
National Treasury Employees Union
Amicus Curiae for Petitioner

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 6, 2004 Decided April 6, 2004

No. 03-1127

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,

LOCAL R5–136,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Jennifer Wasserstein argued the cause and filed the briefs

for petitioner.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-1127 Document #814182 Filed: 04/06/2004 Page 1 of 19
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Gregory O’Duden, Barbara A. Atkin, and Kerry L. Adams

were on the brief for amicus curiae National Treasury

Employees Union in support of petitioner.

David M. Shewchuk, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations

Authority, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief were David M. Smith, Solicitor, and William R. Tobey,

Deputy Solicitor. James F. Blandford, Attorney, entered an

appearance.

Before: EDWARDS, GARLAND and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: This case involves two unfair

labor practice charges filed by the National Association of

Government Employees, Local R5-136 (‘‘Union’’), with the

Federal Labor Relations Authority (‘‘FLRA’’ or ‘‘Authority’’).

Based on these charges, General Counsel for the FLRA

issued two complaints charging the Department of Veterans

Affairs’ Ralph H. Johnson Medical Center (‘‘Medical Center’’)

with refusing to bargain over employee parking in violation of

the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute

(‘‘Statute’’), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (2000). The first complaint alleged that the Medical Center refused to bargain over

proposed changes to the Medical Center’s parking policies.

The second complaint alleged that the Medical Center unilaterally adopted a practice of permitting patients to park in a

designated ‘‘employee lot’’ without giving notice to, or bargaining with, the Union.

An Administrative Law Judge (‘‘ALJ’’) ruled against the

Medical Center on each complaint. The Authority reversed

the ALJ’s decision and dismissed the complaints. As to the

first complaint, the Authority found that the Medical Center

had complied with the Union’s request to maintain the status

quo pending completion of negotiations. The Authority

therefore concluded that the Medical Center had met its duty

to bargain by not taking any unilateral action until after the

period for timely submission of bargaining proposals had run.

As to the second complaint, the Authority determined that

the Medical Center had no mandatory duty to bargain over

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its decision to allow patients to park in the employee lot,

because the decision concerned a ‘‘means of performing work’’

under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1). The Authority further found

that the decision had no more than a de minimis impact on

bargaining unit employees and that the Medical Center consequently was not obligated to bargain over the ‘‘impact and

implementation’’ of the decision. The Union petitioned this

court for review of the Authority’s order.

We grant the petition for review in part and deny it in part.

The Authority’s decision to dismiss the first complaint is

premised on an entirely untenable interpretation of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (‘‘CBA’’). Accordingly,

we reverse the Authority’s dismissal of the first complaint as

arbitrary and capricious. As to the second complaint, we

uphold the Authority’s order. The Authority reasonably determined that allowing patients to park in the employee lot

was a ‘‘means of performing work’’ exempt from any mandatory duty to bargain. We are barred from considering the

Union’s claim that the impact of the Medical Center’s decision

on bargaining unit employees was more than de minimis,

because the Union failed to raise this claim before the Authority. We note that, in any event, the Authority’s finding

that the impact was de minimis was supported by substantial

evidence.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Context

The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute

grants federal government employees the right to organize

and engage in collective bargaining with respect to ‘‘conditions of employment.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 7102. The Statute makes

it an ‘‘unfair labor practice’’ for covered agencies to interfere

with this right or to refuse to negotiate in good faith over

conditions of employment. See 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(1), (5).

While the term ‘‘conditions of employment’’ is defined broadly

to include ‘‘personnel policies, practices, and matters TTT

affecting working conditions,’’ 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14), the

Statute exempts certain matters from the mandatory duty to

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bargain, including management rights identified in § 7106.

Section 7106(b)(1) identifies matters over which bargaining

may take place ‘‘at the election of the agency,’’ including

decisions concerning ‘‘the technology, methods, and means of

performing work.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1). ‘‘As to these

decisions, the agency is permitted but not required to negotiate with the labor organization.’’ Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2441 v. FLRA, 864 F.2d 178, 180

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (‘‘AFGE, Local 2441’’). Although an agency

is not required to negotiate over a decision falling within the

§ 7106(b)(1) exception, an agency must negotiate over the

‘‘impact and implementation’’ of any such decision if it has

more than a de minimis adverse effect on bargaining unit

members’ conditions of employment. See, e.g., Fed. Bureau

of Prisons Fed. Correctional Inst., Bastrop, Tex., 55 F.L.R.A.

848, 852 (1999) (‘‘Bureau of Prisons’’) (citing Dep’t of Health

& Human Servs., Social Security Admin., 24 F.L.R.A. 403,

407–08 (1986)); see also FLRA v. United States Dep’t of

Justice, 994 F.2d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

B. Factual Background

The collective bargaining relationship between the Union

and the Medical Center is governed, in part, by a master

collective bargaining agreement between the National Association of Government Employees and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Ralph H. Johnson

Med. Cent., Charleston, S.C., 58 F.L.R.A. 432, 440 (2003)

(‘‘Dep’t of Veterans Affairs’’). Article 39 of the CBA provides

that ‘‘[p]arking is subject to local negotiations.’’ Master

Agreement Between the National Association of Government

Employees and the Department of Veterans Affairs at 29

(‘‘CBA’’), reprinted in Joint Appendix (‘‘J.A.’’) 247, 279. Article 11, Section 2 of the CBA establishes procedures for

midterm negotiations (i.e., those occurring during the term of

the CBA), including the following requirements:

A. The Employer shall notify the Union prior to

the planned implementation of a proposed change to

conditions of employment. The notice shall advise

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the Union of the reason for the change and the

proposed effective date.

B. The Union shall have fifteen (15) calendar

days from the date of notification to request bargaining and to forward written proposals to the Employer except in emergency situations where a 15 day

notice would not be practicable.

C. If the Union does not request bargaining

within the time limit, the Employer may implement

the proposed change(s).

D. Upon timely request by the Union, bargaining will normally commence within ten (10) calendar

days, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.

Id. at 8-9, J.A. 258-59.

Under the Medical Center’s parking policy, a parking lot

located across the street from the rear of the Medical Center

(designated Zone 7) is reserved for employee parking. Dep’t

of Veterans Affairs, 58 F.L.R.A. at 441. Patients and visitors

are permitted to park in other areas. In addition to parking

at the facility itself, the Medical Center rented an off-site lot

known as the Elks Lot – with 50 to 100 spaces used primarily

for patient and visitor parking – up until the fall of 1999,

when the Medical Center lost its lease for the lot. The loss of

the Elks Lot contributed to a shortage of patient parking. At

any given time, 20 to 40 patients might be seen circling the

Medical Center looking for parking. Id. Officials from the

Medical Center’s police service decided to address this problem by allowing patients to park in the employee lot during

peak clinic hours, between 9:00 and 10:30 a.m., several days a

week. The Union received no official notice of this decision.

Id. at 442.

On August 24, 1999, the Union received a one-page notice

from the Medical Center proposing changes to the ‘‘ ‘Employee Parking Lot’ and Bravo Street’’ in order to ‘‘provide

additional patient parking and to preclude traffic congestion

on Bravo Street.’’ Id. at 440. Attached to the notice was a

revised parking policy for the Medical Center and a schematic

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drawing of the employee parking lot. The changes to the

parking policy included, inter alia, an increase in the fee for

failure to return a parking-gate card upon conclusion of

employment with the Medical Center. Id. The new parking

policy did not alter the preexisting reservation of the Zone 7

parking lot for employee use. Id. at 442. No specific information on changes to Bravo Street was provided. See id. at

441.

On August 31, 1999, the Union submitted to the Medical

Center a memorandum entitled ‘‘Proposed Parking Lot

Changes,’’ stating in relevant part:

1. The Union is in receipt of your memorandum

TTT concerning proposed changes in parkingTTTT

2. The Union hereby requests to negotiate the

proposed parking lot changesTTTT

3. The Union will submit its proposals upon review

when the information requested (attached) is

provided.

4. The Union proposes at this time that all conditions of employment remain status quo.

5. Should you have any questions, contact the undersignedTTTT

Joint Ex. 5, reprinted in J.A. 236. The attached information

request sought detailed information on changes to the Medical Center’s parking policies and practices and requested a

response by September 10, 1999. See Joint Ex. 6, J.A. 237-

38.

After receiving no response from the Medical Center, the

Union renewed its request for information on September 20,

1999, reiterating that it would submit proposals concerning

the proposed parking changes upon review of the information.

Joint Ex. 7, J.A. 239. In a memorandum dated October 27,

1999, the Medical Center responded to the information request. Joint Ex. 8, J.A. 240. On November 17, 1999 –

approximately 15 days after receipt of the Medical Center’s

response to its information request – the Union submitted

proposals regarding the Medical Center’s proposed parking

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changes. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 58 F.L.R.A. at 441. The

Union’s proposals addressed parking on Bravo Street (although the Medical Center apparently had not given official

notice of the proposed changes to Bravo Street), patient and

visitor parking, disabled parking, emergency parking, and

employee parking. See id.; see also Joint Ex. 9, J.A. 242.

After the Union submitted its November 17 proposals, the

Medical Center implemented changes to Bravo Street, which

runs along one side of the facility. The Medical Center hired

a contractor who converted Bravo Street from a two-way to a

one-way street, striped off approximately 24 parking spots on

one side of the street, and erected a fence so that the street is

no longer a through street. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 58

F.L.R.A. at 441. Around the time of these actions, the Union

president asked the Medical Center’s representative why the

Union had not received any response to its parking proposals.

The Medical Center representative verbally indicated that a

number of the Union’s proposals were untimely, but would

not specify which. Shortly after a December 21, 1999, meeting between Union and Medical Center representatives, the

Medical Center notified the Union in writing that the Medical

Center considered the Union’s parking proposals untimely

under the CBA. The Union requested an explanation but

received no response. Id.

C. Proceedings Below

The Union filed unfair labor practice charges against the

Medical Center, and the General Counsel of the FLRA issued

two complaints that were later consolidated. The first complaint alleged that the Medical Center had violated 5 U.S.C.

§ 7116(a)(1) and (5) by refusing to bargain in good faith over

the Union’s proposals concerning employee parking at the

facility. The second complaint alleged that the Medical Center had unilaterally implemented a change in bargaining unit

members’ conditions of employment, in violation of

§ 7116(a)(1) and (5), by permitting patients to park in the

employee parking lot without notifying the Union or bargaining.

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The ALJ decided both complaints in favor of the Union.

As to the first, the ALJ determined that the Union’s August

31 proposal to maintain the status quo was timely. The ALJ

found that the Medical Center failed either to bargain over

this proposal or to notify the Union that the Medical Center

considered the proposal to be non-negotiable. The Medical

Center therefore violated its duty to bargain in good faith

under § 7116(a)(1) and (5). Id. at 443-44. With regard to the

second complaint, the ALJ determined that the Medical Center’s decision to permit patients to park in the employee lot

was a unilateral change to a condition of employment of

bargaining unit members. The ALJ therefore concluded that

the Medical Center had violated its duty under the CBA and

§ 7116(a)(1) and (5) to notify the Union before making this

change. Id. at 444-45.

On appeal, the Authority reversed the ALJ’s decision and

dismissed both complaints, with one member of the Authority

dissenting. With regard to the first complaint, the Authority

found that the Union’s November 17 proposals were untimely

under the CBA, but that the August 31 ‘‘status quo’’ proposal

was timely. The Authority determined that the Medical

Center had fulfilled its bargaining obligations with respect to

the status quo proposal. Specifically, the Medical Center had

‘‘maintained the status quo well beyond the contractual period

authorizing bargaining’’ and had received no additional proposals within the CBA-mandated 15-day deadline. ‘‘Thus,’’

according to the Authority, ‘‘there was nothing further to

bargain and the [Medical Center] had no obligation to maintain the status quo until a non-existent bargaining obligation

was concluded.’’ Id. at 434-35.

Turning to the second complaint, the Authority determined

that, while employee parking is a mandatory subject of

bargaining, the Medical Center’s decision to permit patients

to park in the employee lot concerned patient parking. Relying on its decision in American Federation of Government

Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3399, 9 F.L.R.A. 1022 (1982)

(‘‘AFGE, Local 3399’’), the Authority held that providing

patient parking is a ‘‘means of performing work’’ under 5

U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1) and the decision at issue therefore was

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not a mandatory subject of bargaining. Dep’t of Veterans

Affairs, 58 F.L.R.A. at 435. The Authority determined,

moreover, that the Medical Center was not obligated to

bargain over the impact and implementation of its decision,

because the record did not support a determination that the

decision had more than a de minimis effect on bargaining

unit employees. Id. at 435-36.

The Union filed a timely petition for review with this court.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard and Scope of Review

We review the Authority’s order to determine whether it is

‘‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law.’’ 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), 7123(c)

(2000); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA,

464 U.S. 89, 97 n.7 (1983). Under this standard, we look to

whether the Authority has offered a rational explanation for

its decision, whether its decision is based on consideration of

the relevant factors, and whether the decision is adequately

supported by the facts found. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983);

FDIC v. FLRA, 977 F.2d 1493, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The

Authority’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by

‘‘substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.’’ 5

U.S.C. § 7123(c); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.

FLRA, 967 F.2d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1992). This standard

requires us to defer to the Authority’s factual determinations

if, taking into account any record evidence to the contrary,

the record contains ‘‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support’’ such determinations. Thomas v. NLRB, 213 F.3d 651, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(quoting Micro Pacific Dev. Inc. v. NLRB, 178 F.3d 1325,

1329 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also Lakeland Bus Lines, Inc. v.

NLRB, 347 F.3d 955, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Under

§ 7123(c) of the Statute, we have jurisdiction to consider only

those objections urged by the petitioner in proceedings before

the Authority, ‘‘unless the failure or neglect to urge the

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objection is excused because of extraordinary circumstances.’’

5 U.S.C. § 7123(c); EEOC v. FLRA, 476 U.S. 19, 23 (1986).

B. First Complaint: Duty to Bargain Over the Union’s

Proposals

1. Duty to Bargain Under the CBA

As noted above, the Authority found that the Union’s

August 31 proposal was timely submitted under the CBA and

interpreted the proposal as a request to maintain the status

quo pending completion of bargaining. Although the Medical

Center never bargained over the status quo proposal itself,

the Authority determined that the Medical Center had complied with the proposal by maintaining the status quo until

the CBA’s 15-day deadline for submission of proposals had

run. The Authority found that the Medical Center had no

obligation to consider the November 17 proposals, because

they were not timely submitted. The Authority’s determinations rest on an implausible interpretation of the CBA. Even

assuming that the Authority has the discretion to interpret a

collective bargaining agreement where necessary to resolve

an unfair labor practice claim, ‘‘we conclude that it abused

that discretion TTT by reaching a result that is illogical on its

own terms.’’ IRS v. FLRA, 963 F.2d 429, 439 (D.C. Cir.

1992). Accordingly, we set aside the Authority’s dismissal of

the first complaint as arbitrary and capricious.

As noted above, the CBA requires the Medical Center to

notify the Union of any proposed changes to a condition of

employment, and provides that the Union ‘‘shall have fifteen

(15) calendar days from the date of notification to request

bargaining and to forward written proposals’’ to the Medical

Center. CBA at 8, J.A. 258. The CBA authorizes the agency

to implement its proposed changes ‘‘[i]f the Union does not

request bargaining within the time limit.’’ Id. at 9, J.A. 259.

Furthermore, the CBA provides that ‘‘[u]pon timely request

by the Union, bargaining will normally commence within ten

(10) calendar days, unless otherwise agreed upon by the

parties.’’ Id.

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In its August 31 submission, the Union clearly and unequivocally (1) requested to bargain over the proposed parking

changes, and (2) proposed ‘‘at this time’’ that the status quo

be maintained. See J.A. 236. It is undisputed that the

August 31 submission was made within 15 days of notification

of the proposed parking changes. The Union therefore met

the CBA’s deadline for requesting negotiation and submitting

a written proposal.

At the same time, the Union requested further information

on the basis of which it would formulate and submit further

proposals. Id. The Union was entitled to make such a

request, and neither the agency nor the Authority suggests

otherwise. Subject to limited exceptions, the Statute requires the Medical Center to respond to a Union request to

furnish ‘‘data TTT which is reasonably available and necessary

for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation

of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining.’’ 5

U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4)(B); see also Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, Local 2343 v. FLRA, 144 F.3d 85, 86-87 (D.C. Cir. 1998);

United States Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Wash., D.C. v.

FLRA, 1 F.3d 19, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Medical Center

does not claim – and nothing in the record indicates – that the

Union’s information request in the instant case was somehow

improper. Indeed, the Medical Center confirmed the legitimacy of the request by responding to it, albeit over two

months later. Once the Union received the information it had

requested, it promptly submitted its November 17 parking

proposals – approximately 15 days after receipt of the information. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 58 F.L.R.A. at 441.

Nothing in the CBA insulates the Medical Center from its

duty to bargain over the Union’s August 31 and November 17

proposals. Article 11, Section 2B of the CBA requires that

the Union initiate the bargaining process by ‘‘request[ing]

bargaining’’ and ‘‘forward[ing] written proposals’’ within 15

days from notification of the proposed change. This provision

clearly requires the Union to submit an opening proposal

within 15 days, and the Union met this requirement with its

August 31 submission. But Section 2B cannot reasonably be

interpreted to require the Union to put all possible proposals

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on the table within that brief period, or to foreclose negotiation of any proposal submitted thereafter. Certainly nothing

in the express language of Section 2B itself requires or

supports this absurd reading of the parties’ agreement.

Moreover, Section 2C goes on to provide that, ‘‘[i]f the Union

does not request bargaining within the time limit, the Employer may implement the proposed change(s).’’ CBA at 9,

J.A. 259. The clear import of this provision is that once the

Union meets its obligation to submit a timely request for

bargaining, the Medical Center is foreclosed from implementing a proposed change in conditions of employment without

satisfying its duty to bargain.

In addition to departing from the CBA’s express terms, the

Authority’s reading of the CBA would lead to bizarre results.

It appears to lock the Union into its initial bargaining position

by permitting the agency to ignore as untimely any subsequent expression amplifying, supplementing, or clarifying the

initial proposal. And it would effectively prevent the Union

from developing proposals based on accurate information

properly and timely requested from, but not promptly delivered by, the agency. The agency would need only delay its

response to the Union’s request for information until the 15-

day period had elapsed – as the Medical Center did in this

case – in order to avoid bargaining over any proposal submitted after that time. The agency would be rewarded, under

this reading, for providing insufficient information when notifying the Union of proposed changes and for tardy responses

to valid information requests. This cannot be the intended

meaning of Article 11 of the CBA.

The fact that the Union’s initial proposal requested maintenance of the status quo ‘‘at this time’’ does not alter our

conclusion. Even if the Authority is correct in interpreting

the Union’s proposal to request maintenance of the status quo

only ‘‘until the completion of bargaining,’’ the Medical Center

did not ‘‘comply’’ with this proposal – much less satisfy its

bargaining obligations under the CBA and the Statute –

merely by delaying implementation of changes until 15 days

had elapsed. The Union timely initiated the bargaining

process with its August 31 submission. Because the Medical

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Center failed to respond, however, bargaining was never even

commenced, let alone completed. The Medical Center implemented its proposed changes without ever responding to the

Union’s request to negotiate and without ever bargaining over

the Union’s August 31 or November 17 proposals. In so

doing, the Medical Center violated the CBA and committed

an unfair labor practice under § 7116(a)(1) and (5) by refusing to bargain in good faith over a condition of employment.

2. Management Rights

In a brief footnote to its order, the Authority noted that the

Medical Center had characterized the parking policy changes

at issue in the first complaint as relating to ‘‘additional

patient parking.’’ Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 58 F.L.R.A. at

435 n.4. On this basis, the Authority found that the policy

changes governed patient, not employee, parking. The Authority therefore concluded that the policy changes implemented ‘‘means of performing work’’ under § 7106(b)(1) and

were exempt from mandatory bargaining. Id. This finding is

not supported by substantial evidence.

The ALJ determined that the parking policy changes at

issue in the first complaint governed employee parking, which

is a negotiable condition of employment. Id. at 442. The

Medical Center did not contest this determination. Indeed,

in the exceptions to the ALJ’s decision filed with the Authority, the Medical Center readily acknowledged that the decision

at issue in the first complaint ‘‘clearly affected the unit

employees’ conditions of employment’’ and was ‘‘fully negotiable.’’ Respondent’s Exceptions to the Decision of the ALJ at

10 (‘‘Exceptions’’), J.A. 46. In other words, the agency

effectively conceded that the decision was not exempt from

negotiation under § 7106(b)(1). As this issue was clearly

raised before the Authority, we are not barred from considering it under § 7123(c).

It seems doubtful that the Authority was serious in suggesting that § 7106(b)(1) provides an independent alternative

ground for dismissing the first complaint. The footnote looks

like an ill-considered afterthought in the Authority’s order.

The body of the order does not examine whether the Union’s

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counterproposal would ‘‘directly interfere’’ with the purportedly mission-related purpose of the Medical Center’s parking

policy changes. See AFGE, Local 2441, 864 F.2d at 181-82.

In addition, the order does not purport to address whether

the Medical Center was obligated to bargain over the ‘‘impact

and implementation’’ of the relevant decision on bargaining

unit employees, a relevant issue if a matter is exempt from

bargaining under § 7106(b)(1). See Bureau of Prisons, 55

F.L.R.A. at 852. And in the proceedings before this court,

the Authority did not seek to defend its decision on the first

complaint on the ground that the disputed policy changes

related to patient parking. In short, there is no serious

support for the alternative ground for dismissing the first

complaint.

In any event, we hold that the Authority clearly erred in

finding that the parking policy decision at issue in the first

complaint was exempt from negotiation under § 7106(b)(1).

The record here shows that the changes to the Medical

Center parking policy directly governed employee parking.

These changes included, for example, an increase in the

charge levied on employees for failing to return a parkinggate card upon completing their employment. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 58 F.L.R.A. at 440. And, as noted above, the

Medical Center expressly conceded that the parking policy

changes at issue in the first complaint ‘‘clearly affected the

unit employees’ conditions of employment’’ and were ‘‘fully

negotiable.’’ See Exceptions at 10, J.A. 46. The Authority’s

finding to the contrary cannot be sustained on the record

before us.

C. Second Complaint: Patient Parking in the ‘‘Employee

Lot’’

1. Management Rights

In disposing of the second complaint, the Authority determined that the Medical Center’s unilateral decision to allow

patients to park in the ‘‘employee lot’’ was a decision with

respect to a ‘‘means of performing work’’ under § 7106(b)(1)

and therefore was exempt from mandatory bargaining. The

Union objects that the FLRA has long held that parking is a

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fully negotiable condition of employment and that the decision

at issue falls within the Medical Center’s mandatory duty to

bargain. On the record at hand, we uphold the Authority’s

determination.

The parties agree that provision of employee parking is a

condition of employment that is fully negotiable under the

Statute. See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Labor, Wash., D.C.,

44 F.L.R.A. 988, 994 (1992) (‘‘Dep’t of Labor’’). However, it is

also clear that an agency’s decision regarding which of its

facilities it will use to provide patient parking is a determination relating to a ‘‘means of performing work’’ under

§ 7106(b)(1), regardless of whether the decision incidentally

affects employees. AFGE, Local 3399, 9 F.L.R.A. at 1023.

We find no merit in the Union’s contention that AFGE, Local

3399 is distinguishable because the parties’ collective bargaining agreement in this case makes parking subject to local

negotiations. Moreover, the FLRA decisions relied upon by

the Union do not support the proposition that all agency

decisions involving parking are subject to mandatory bargaining. These decisions all involve agency actions that directly

regulate the provision of employee parking, and none involves

an assertion of the agency’s rights under § 7106(b)(1). See

Dep’t of Labor, 44 F.L.R.A. at 994; United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 43 F.L.R.A. 3, 9-10 (1991);

Philadelphia Naval Base, Philadelphia Naval Station &

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, 37 F.L.R.A. 79, 87 (1990);

United States Dep’t of the Air Force, Williams Air Force

Base, Chandler, Az., 38 F.L.R.A. 549, 562 (1990).

An agency decision may fall within § 7106(b)(1)’s ‘‘means of

performing work’’ exemption where the subject of the decision has a ‘‘direct and integral relationship’’ to the agency’s

mission. See AFGE, Local 2441, 864 F.2d at 181; Dep’t of

Health & Human Servs., Indian Health Serv. v. FLRA, 885

F.2d 911, 913-14 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In this case, the Authority

reasonably determined that the provision of patient parking is

directly and integrally related to the Department of Veterans

Affairs’ mission to provide health services to veterans. See

38 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2000) (stating that the Department’s

purpose is ‘‘to administer the laws providing benefits and

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other services to veterans and the dependents and the beneficiaries of veterans’’). The Authority likewise reasonably determined that the Medical Center’s decision to allow patients

to park in a lot in which employees also park was a determination with respect to the provision of patient, rather than

employee, parking. The Medical Center’s actions did not

directly regulate employee parking, and any effect on bargaining unit employees was incidental. Accordingly, we uphold the Authority’s determination that the Medical Center’s

decision to allow patients to park in the same lot with

employees was exempt from mandatory bargaining under

§ 7106(b)(1).

2. Procedural Objection to the Authority’s Ruling

The Union contends that the Medical Center never argued – either before the ALJ or in its exceptions filed with

the Authority – that its decision to park patients in the

employee lot was an exercise of its management rights under

§ 7106(b)(1). The Union claims that the Authority’s sua

sponte consideration of the management rights issue was

forbidden by FLRA regulations. Section 7123(c) bars us

from addressing this claim, because the Union failed to raise

it below and no ‘‘extraordinary circumstance’’ excuses this

failure. See 5 U.S.C. § 7123(c).

Where the Authority makes a sua sponte determination,

the parties will not have had an opportunity to address the

relevant issue. Nevertheless, § 7123(c) precludes us from

considering a pertinent objection if the petitioner has not

raised the objection before the Authority in a request for

reconsideration. See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Commerce

v. FLRA, 7 F.3d 243, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1993). An exception

to this rule is recognized when a request for reconsideration

would be ‘‘patently futile’’ in light of recent Authority decisions squarely addressing the issue in question. See NLRB

v. FLRA, 2 F.3d 1190, 1196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United

States Dep’t of Interior Minerals Mgmt. Serv. v. FLRA, 969

F.2d 1158, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The Union argues that a

similar exception is warranted in the instant case, because the

FLRA’s dissenting member challenged the propriety of the

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Authority raising the § 7106(b)(1) argument sua sponte, thus

affording the Authority an opportunity to address the issue.

In other words, the Union suggests that, if a dissenting

member of the Authority could not persuade his colleagues, it

would have been futile for the Union to pursue a petition for

reconsideration.

The Union’s argument implicitly presupposes that a party’s

position is always coterminous with a dissenting opinion.

This is obviously incorrect. Indeed, it does not appear in this

case that the dissent squarely raised the specific argument

now asserted by the Union. The dissent argued that consideration of arguments not raised in the Medical Center’s

exceptions ‘‘violate[d] basic principles of appellate review, and

TTT denie[d] the General Counsel its right to respond.’’ Dep’t

of Veterans Affairs, 58 F.L.R.A. at 438. But the dissent

never suggested that sua sponte consideration of arguments

violates the procedural regulations (5 C.F.R. §§ 2423.40(d),

2429.5) upon which the Union premises its claim before this

court. The Union also appears to assume that the persuasive

power of a party’s argument can never exceed the quality of a

dissenting opinion. We reject this suggestion as well. Section 7123(c) requires a party to present its own views to the

Authority in order to preserve a claim for judicial review.

We recently held that § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) – which is an analog of 5 U.S.C.

§ 7123(c) – precluded us from considering an objection the

petitioner did not raise in proceedings before the National

Labor Relations Board, despite the fact that the same objection was raised by a dissenting member of the Board. Contractors’ Labor Pool, Inc. v. NLRB, 323 F.3d 1051, 1061 (D.C.

Cir. 2003). The relevant language of 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and 5

U.S.C. § 7123(c) is virtually identical, and we see no reason to

interpret the provisions differently in this context. See

EEOC, 476 U.S. at 23 (relying on the Court’s past interpretation of 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) to interpret 5 U.S.C. § 7123(c)).

Accordingly, we find that the dissent below did not excuse the

Union’s failure to raise its objections in a request for reconsideration.

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3. Impact and Implementation

Finally, the Authority found that the Medical Center was

not obligated to bargain over the impact and implementation

of its decision to allow patients to park in the employee lot,

because the record indicated that any adverse impact on

bargaining unit employees was de minimis. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 58 F.L.R.A. at 435-36. The Union claims that it

was improperly denied the opportunity to contest this finding,

because the impact-and-implementation issue was not the

subject of the hearing before the ALJ and the Authority

reached the issue sua sponte. The Union further asserts that

the record demonstrates that the Medical Center’s decision

had more than a de minimis impact on bargaining unit

employees. Again, § 7123(c) precludes us from considering

these claims, because the Union failed to raise them before

the Authority. If the Union was in a position to demonstrate

that the Medical Center’s actions had more than a de minimis impact on bargaining unit employees, it was obligated to

put this claim before the Authority in a motion for reconsideration. In failing to do so, the Union waived any right to raise

the claim before this court.

While we are precluded from reaching the merits of the

Union’s claim, we note that the Authority’s de minimis

finding is supported by substantial evidence on the record

considered as a whole. A number of Medical Center personnel testified in proceedings before the ALJ that (1) patients

were not permitted to park in the employee lot until 9:00 a.m.,

after the majority of the Medical Center’s employees had

already parked in the lot, see Tr. at 42-49, 63; (2) there was

ample space for patients to park in the back of the lot, see Tr.

at 42-49, 56-59, 63; and (3) no employees or Union representatives had made any complaint regarding the availability of

spaces in the lot, see Tr. at 63, 78-79, 94-95, 97. The only

evidence to the contrary was the testimony of Union president Fletcher Truesdell, who stated that parking in the

employee lot is ‘‘real tight’’ the majority of the time, that

‘‘there are times’’ employees could not find parking in the lot,

and that he had received unspecified complaints from two

Union members about parking. See Tr. at 35-37. Even

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taking Truesdell’s testimony into account, there is substantial

evidence to support the Authority’s conclusion that any adverse effect on Union members was de minimis. See Thomas, 213 F.3d at 657 (defining substantial evidence as ‘‘such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion’’).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we grant the Union’s

petition for review in part and deny it in part. We hold that

the Authority’s dismissal of the first complaint was arbitrary

and capricious and accordingly set aside that portion of the

order. Finding no reversible error in the Authority’s dismissal of the second complaint, we deny the petition for

review as to that portion of the order.

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