Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-01132/USCOURTS-caDC-00-01132-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Drug Enforcement Administration
Respondent
Tourus Records, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 5, 2001 Decided August 17, 2001

No. 00-1132

Tourus Records, Inc.,

Petitioner

v.

Drug Enforcement Administration,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

United States Drug Enforcement Administration

Pleasant S. Brodnax, III argued the cause and filed the

brief for petitioner.

Laurel Loomis, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was

Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was

filed.

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Before: Randolph, Rogers, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Petitioner Tourus Records, Inc.

seeks review of the Drug Enforcement Administration's

(DEA's) denial of its application to proceed in forma pauperis

in a forfeiture proceeding. We find the DEA's decision to be

reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, and we

therefore affirm its denial of Tourus' application.

I

In October 1999, an officer of the Richmond Hill, Georgia

police department stopped a van occupied by three men. The

men told the officer that they were traveling to local colleges,

selling music recorded on compact discs. After searching the

van, the officer confiscated more than $50,000 in cash, as well

as a quantity of compact discs.

Beyond these core facts, the parties dispute the circumstances of the search and seizure. According to the officer's

report, he stopped the van because it had swerved onto the

highway's shoulder several times, and he searched the van

because his dog alerted to the rear of the vehicle. The officer

reported that he discovered burnt marijuana residue and

stems in the van's rear ashtray, a bag containing $50,860 in

cash bundled in increments of $1000, and 50 compact discs.

According to Tourus, the officer stopped the van without

cause, found no contraband, and seized $50,860 in cash plus

additional money taken from the pockets of the occupants

that was not reported to the DEA. Tourus also states that

the officer seized 700, rather than 50, discs. It asserts that

the three men were distributing compact discs for the company, and that the $50,860 in cash were the proceeds of disc

sales.

The Richmond Hill police transferred the $50,860 to the

DEA, which in December 1999 initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings pursuant to 21 U.S.C. s 881(d).1 On Janu-

__________

1 Section 881(a)(6) of Title 21 provides that proceeds of drug

offenses are subject to forfeiture to the United States. Section

ary 20, 2000, in order to have the opportunity to contest the

forfeiture in court, Tourus filed a claim of ownership. It also

completed an affidavit of indigency to support its request that

the DEA waive the $5000 cost bond ordinarily required to

contest a forfeiture, and permit the company to proceed in

forma pauperis.2 The affidavit filed by Tourus showed that

the company had no monthly income, no assets, no liabilities,

and no expenses. In support of the waiver application, the

president of Tourus, Paul Dowe, Jr., also filed an affidavit

setting forth his personal finances. The affidavit stated that

Dowe and his spouse had a combined monthly income of

$4855, savings of $950, a computer worth $5000, recording

gear valued at $3000, a home valued at $157,000, and two

motor vehicles valued at $13,000 and $17,400 respectively.

The Dowe affidavit further stated that the couple had two

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dependent children and monthly expenses totaling $3670.

On March 7, 2000, the DEA sent Dowe a letter, informing

him that it had denied the application to waive the bond and

proceed in forma pauperis. The letter stated, in relevant

part:

Your claim for the above-referenced seized property is

being returned to you because the deciding authority

found that the Affidavit of Indigency you submitted in

lieu of a cost bond is not adequately supported. As a

result, your petition to proceed In Forma Pauperis is

denied.

Resp't App. at 18. On March 23, 2000, Tourus filed a petition

in this court, seeking review of the DEA's denial of its

application to proceed in forma pauperis.

__________

881(d) makes the provisions of the customs laws regarding administrative forfeiture applicable to forfeitures under s 881.

2 Congress abolished the bond requirement for forfeiture proceedings commenced after August 23, 2000. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, ss 2(a), 21, 114 Stat.

202, 204, 225 (2000) (section 2(a) codified at 18 U.S.C.

s 983(a)(2)(E)). This opinion describes the law as applicable to the

forfeiture proceedings in Tourus' case, which commenced in December 1999.

II

Both Tourus and the government agree that we have

jurisdiction to consider Tourus' petition pursuant to 21 U.S.C.

s 877. We agree as well. Section 877 grants this court

jurisdiction to review "[a]ll final determinations, findings, and

conclusions of the Attorney General under this subchapter."

Because the provision under which the DEA initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings, 21 U.S.C. s 881(d), is part of

the same subchapter of the United States Code as s 877,3 we

have jurisdiction to review final determinations of the Attorney General under that provision. See Yskamp v. DEA, 163

F.3d 767, 770 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that s 877 provides

courts of appeals with jurisdiction to review DEA forfeiture

proceedings); Scarabin v. DEA, 925 F.2d 100, 100-01 (5th

Cir. 1991) (same). And by delegation from the Attorney

General, the DEA's decision to deny Tourus' in forma pauperis application became such a final determination, following its

approval by the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture and

Money Laundering Section.4 Cf. Roberts v. United States

__________

3 Both are in subchapter I ("Control and Enforcement") of Chapter 13 ("Drug Abuse Prevention and Control") of Title 21 ("Food

and Drugs") of the United States Code.

4 Except where delegated to another Department of Justice official, the Attorney General has delegated to the DEA certain

"functions vested in the Attorney General" by the Comprehensive

Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (as amended),

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which includes ss 877 and 881. 28 C.F.R. s 0.100(b) (2000). The

Attorney General has also delegated supervision of civil and criminal forfeiture actions to the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. See 28 C.F.R. s 0.55(c), (d) (2000). And the Department's

U.S. Attorneys' Manual provides that "[i]n cases where the seizing

agency believes there are clear and articulable reasons for denial"

of an in forma pauperis petition, "the request for waiver shall be

referred ... for final determination" to the Asset Forfeiture and

Money Laundering Section of the Criminal Division. U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual,

ss 9-112.220, 9-119.112. As discussed infra Part IV, the Asset

Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section made the final determination with respect to Tourus' application.

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Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844, 845 (1950) (holding that "denial by

a District Judge of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is

an appealable order"); Arango v. United States Dep't of the

Treasury, 115 F.3d 922 (11th Cir. 1997) (reviewing a Customs

Service denial of an in forma pauperis petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. s 1331).

Although the parties agree about our jurisdiction, they

disagree about the applicable standard of review. Tourus

contends that we should review the denial of its petition

under the familiar standard of the Administrative Procedure

Act (APA), and overturn the DEA's decision if we find it to be

arbitrary or capricious. See 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A). The government contends that our review is "strictly limited to

consideration of whether the appropriate procedural safeguards were made available to Petitioner," Gov't Br. at 5, and

that we lack authority to review the merits of the DEA's

decision, even under the APA's deferential standard.

Tourus' view is the correct one. The cases the government

cites as supporting extraordinarily limited review do not

involve denials of in forma pauperis status. Rather, those

cases involve review of a quite different kind of denial: the

denial of a request for the mitigation or remission of an

administrative forfeiture. See Yskamp, 163 F.3d at 770;

Scarabin v. DEA, 919 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g

denied, 925 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1991); In re $67,470.00, 901

F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Arango, 115 F.3d at

925; United States v. One 1987 Jeep Wrangler, 972 F.2d 472,

480 (2d Cir. 1992). To clarify the distinction, we briefly

review the procedural landscape.

Section 881 makes the provisions of the United States Code

that govern forfeitures for violations of the customs laws

applicable to forfeitures for violations of the drug laws. 21

U.S.C. s 881(d); see Small v. United States, 136 F.3d 1334,

1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Under those provisions and the applicable regulations, the DEA is authorized to subject seized

property to administrative forfeiture by sending written notice of its intent to forfeit to each party who appears to have

an interest in the property, and by publishing such notice in a

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cessive weeks.5 If, within twenty days after the first publication, a claimant submits a claim of ownership and posts a cost

bond of the lower of $5000 or 10% of the value of the

property, or successfully petitions to waive the bond and

proceed in forma pauperis, the administrative proceedings are

terminated and the government must proceed by filing a

claim for judicial forfeiture in a federal district court.6

If a claimant fails to submit a claim and post bond (or

successfully obtain a waiver), however, the property is administratively forfeited by default.7 Once property has been

administratively forfeited, the only option available to one

with an interest in the property is to file a petition for

remission or mitigation with the seizing agency.8 Treating an

agency's decision to grant such a petition as an "act of grace,"

the cases cited by the government hold that the courts may

not review the merits of an agency's decision to deny mitigation or remission, but may only determine whether the agency followed the applicable procedural requirements prior to

forfeiting the property. In re $67,470.00, 901 F.2d at 1543;

Scarabin, 919 F.2d at 338-39; see Yskamp v. DEA, 163 F.3d

at 770; Arango, 115 F.3d at 925; One 1987 Jeep Wrangler,

972 F.2d at 480; see also Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d

472, 475 (4th Cir. 1997). In so holding, these cases appear to

treat the decision to mitigate or remit as an "agency action

... committed to agency discretion by law," a category of

administrative decisions to which the judicial review provisions of the APA are inapplicable. 5 U.S.C. s 701(a)(2); see

__________

5 See 19 U.S.C. s 1607; 21 C.F.R. s 1316.75 (2000).

6 See 19 U.S.C. s 1608; 19 C.F.R. s 162.47 (2000); 21 C.F.R.

ss 1316.76(b), 1316.78 (2000); see also Ibarra v. United States, 120

F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997); Boero v. DEA, 111 F.3d 301, 304 (2d

Cir. 1997). But see supra note 2 (noting that Congress abolished

the bond requirement for forfeitures commenced after August 23,

2000).

7 See 19 U.S.C. s 1609; 19 C.F.R. s 162.46 (2000); 21 C.F.R.

s 1316.77 (2000); Small, 136 F.3d at 1335; Boero, 111 F.3d at 304.

8 See 19 U.S.C. s 1618; 21 C.F.R. s 1316.79 (2000); 28 C.F.R.

ss 9.1-9.9 (2000); Ibarra, 120 F.3d at 475.

28 C.F.R. s 9.7(a)(1) (2000) ("Whether the property or a

monetary equivalent will be remitted to an owner shall be

determined at the discretion of the Ruling Official.").

But whatever the appropriate standard may be for reviewing denials of petitions to mitigate or remit, the denial of an

application for in forma pauperis status is a fundamentally

different kind of decision--one that plainly is not committed

to the DEA's unreviewable discretion. The applicable regulation states: "Upon satisfactory proof of financial inability to

post the bond, [the deciding official] shall waive the bond

requirement for any person who claims an interest in the

seized property." 19 C.F.R. s 162.47(e) (2000) (emphasis

added).9 Nothing suggests that the question of "satisfactory

proof" under this regulation was intended to be determined at

the caprice of the agency. See Arango, 115 F.3d at 929 ("The

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indigency exception ... is an important means of affording

equal access to [judicial forfeiture] hearings and the right to

proceed as an indigent must not be arbitrarily denied.");

United States v. Evans, 92 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The

waiver of the bond is mandatory if the claimant is in fact a

pauper."). To the contrary, the regulation was adopted in

response to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Wiren v. Eide that

"application of the bond requirement ... [is] unconstitutional

with respect to indigent persons on due process and equal

protection grounds," because it has the effect of "depriving an

individual whose property has been seized of an opportunity

for a hearing solely because of inability to post a bond." 45

Fed. Reg. 84,993, 84,993 (Dec. 24, 1980) (citing Wiren v. Eide,

542 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1976)). The concerns expressed in

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9 Neither the governing statutes nor the DEA forfeiture regulations provide for proceeding in forma pauperis in lieu of posting a

bond. Section 881(d) of Title 21, however, makes relevant U.S.

Customs Service regulations, like 19 C.F.R. s 162.47(e), applicable

to DEA forfeiture proceedings. See Clymore v. United States, 164

F.3d 569, 572 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999); Small, 136 F.3d at 1335; see also

Jones v. DEA, 801 F. Supp. 15, 23 (M.D. Tenn. 1992); Resp't App.

at 2 (DEA notice form advising petitioner of the availability of

waiver on grounds of indigency).

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Wiren would hardly be ameliorated if, although the government permitted the filing of a waiver application, it retained

unreviewable authority to determine whether proof of indigency has been satisfactorily made. As Judge Posner put it

in Evans, "it would be anomalous if the government could

pauperize you by seizing all your property and then prevent

you from challenging the seizure by denying you pauper

status, thus requiring you to post a bond with money that you

don't have." Evans, 92 F.3d at 542-43.

The DEA's proposed standard of review is also inconsistent

with the statute the agency concedes grants us jurisdiction to

review this case, 21 U.S.C. s 877. Under that statute,

"[f]indings of fact by the Attorney General" are conclusive

upon the court, but only "if supported by substantial evidence." That provision necessarily requires the reviewing

court to determine whether the agency's findings have factual

support, and hence eliminates any claim to nonreviewability.

And while s 877 does not specify a standard for reviewing the

Attorney General's reasoning as distinguished from his factfinding, the APA provides the appropriate default standard:

A court must set aside agency action it finds to be "arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A).10 At a minimum, that

standard requires the agency to "examine the relevant data

and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the

choice made.' " Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States,

Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)

(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371

U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). We now proceed to determine whether

the agency has done so here.

__________

10 See Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting

that the APA provides the standard of review where none is

mentioned by the statute); Arango, 115 F.3d at 925, 928 (holding

that the APA's arbitrary or capricious standard applies to the denial

of in forma pauperis status in forfeiture proceedings); Evans, 92

F.3d at 542 (same).

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III

Tourus contends that the DEA's denial of its application for

in forma pauperis treatment, as embodied in the agency's

March 7, 2000 letter, was arbitrary and capricious, and that

the DEA's decision must therefore be vacated. Were that

letter the only record evidence of the agency's decisionmaking

process, we would agree. A "fundamental" requirement of

administrative law is that an agency "set forth its reasons"

for decision; an agency's failure to do so constitutes arbitrary

and capricious agency action. Roelofs v. Secretary of the Air

Force, 628 F.2d 594, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see State Farm,

463 U.S. at 43. That fundamental requirement is codified in

section 6(d) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. s 555(e). Section 6(d)

mandates that whenever an agency denies "a written application, petition, or other request of an interested person made

in connection with any agency proceeding," the agency must

provide "a brief statement of the grounds for denial," unless

the denial is "self-explanatory." This requirement not only

ensures the agency's careful consideration of such requests,

but also gives parties the opportunity to apprise the agency of

any errors it may have made and, if the agency persists in its

decision, facilitates judicial review.11 Although nothing more

than a "brief statement" is necessary, the core requirement is

that the agency explain "why it chose to do what it did."

Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 Duke L.J.

199, 222.

The DEA's letter denying Tourus' petition to proceed in

forma pauperis does not meet the APA standard. The letter

says nothing other than that the "Affidavit of Indigency you

submitted in lieu of a cost bond is not adequately supported."

Resp't App. at 18. That is not a statement of reasoning, but

of conclusion. It does not "articulate a satisfactory explanation" for the agency's action, State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43,

__________

11 See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973); Burlington

Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 167-69; Roelofs, 628 F.2d at 599-600;

Tabor v. Joint Bd. for the Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705,

711 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

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because it does not explain "why" the DEA regarded Tourus'

affidavit as unsupported, Friendly, supra, at 222.12 Nor are

the grounds for denying Tourus' application for indigent

status "self-explanatory," 5 U.S.C. s 555(e), since the company's affidavit is in the form required by the DEA and lists

zero assets and zero income. The letter thus provides no

basis upon which we could conclude that it was the product of

reasoned decisionmaking.

Ordinarily, the discovery of this kind of error would end

appellate consideration. When an agency provides a statement of reasons insufficient to permit a court to discern its

rationale, or states no reasons at all, the usual remedy is a

"remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation." Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729,

744 (1985).

In this case, however, the DEA's March 2000 letter does

not stand as the sole "explanation" of the agency's decisionmaking rationale. On appeal, the DEA submitted internal

agency memoranda, dated February 2000, that specify the

grounds upon which the DEA denied Tourus' petition. Although it is true that "courts may not accept appellate

counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action," Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168, the memoranda submitted by the DEA are not post hoc rationalizations of counsel.

Rather, they represent the "contemporaneous explanation of

the agency decision," and are therefore appropriate subjects

for our consideration. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143

__________

12 See Jones, 801 F. Supp. at 24-25 (reaching the same conclusion

with respect to the same form denial of waiver by the DEA); cf.

Philadelphia Gas Works v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,

989 F.2d 1246, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that FERC's approval

of a pipeline charge, on the ground of "unique facts and circumstances" and "equity," "leaves regulated parties and a reviewing

court completely in the dark as to the core of FERC's reasoning");

Washington v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 856 F.2d

1507, 1513 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that an agency denial of a

hearing on the ground that "the substantial expense and inconvenience ... is not warranted" was not " 'a brief statement of the

grounds for denial' as required under Section 555(e)").

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(1973); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.

Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (directing lower court to

examine the record that was before the agency at the time of

decision, in order to determine whether it "disclose[d] the

factors that were considered"). We now turn to an examination of these memoranda.

IV

The first memorandum submitted by the government, dated February 2, 2000, is from the DEA to the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, and

explains the DEA's decision to deny Tourus' application to

proceed in forma pauperis. Resp't App. at 16. The memorandum states that "it appears that Tourus Records, Inc. is a

mere shell corporation," because the corporation's affidavit

discloses that it has "no assets, no expenses, no liabilities, and

no income." The "true claimant," the memorandum continues, "appears to be its President, Paul Dowe, Jr., who appears to have sufficient assets to post the required bond of

$5,000." The memorandum notes that "[i]n his affidavit, Mr.

Dowe states that he and his spouse have an average income

of $4,855.00 per month and have $950.00 in a savings account," and that Dowe also has "two (2) vehicles worth a total

of $30,400.00, a computer worth $5,000.00, and recording gear

worth $3,000.00." Id.

The second memorandum is the Justice Department's February 28, 2000 reply, concurring in the DEA's view. Resp't

App. at 17. That memorandum states the Department's

agreement that Dowe is the true claimant. In assessing

Dowe's ability to post the bond, the memorandum reviews the

data cited by the DEA, and further notes that the Dowes own

real property valued at $157,000, that they have two dependents, and that their combined monthly expenses total $3670.

The memorandum then compares the Dowes' overall financial

situation with the "year 2000 Department of Health and

Human Services Poverty Guidelines[, which] set the poverty

threshold for a family of four at $1,421 per month," and

concludes that the "petitioner ... has sufficient assets with

which to post the required $5,000 bond without adversely

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affecting his ability to provide the necessities of life for

himself and his dependents." Id.

Unlike the DEA's March 2000 letter, the two February

memoranda adequately explain the government's rationale for

regarding Tourus Records as unqualified for in forma pauperis treatment. That rationale is neither arbitrary nor capricious. The government found that Tourus is not itself the

true claimant, and that the true claimant--Mr. Dowe--is not

indigent. Rather, the agency found that Dowe has the financial wherewithal to post the required bond, and hence that

waiver of the bond requirement is not justified. Cf. Unification Church v. INS, 762 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir. 1985)

(denying attorney's fees to otherwise eligible applicants because the real party in interest was ineligible for fees).

We also conclude that there is substantial evidence to

support the factual findings upon which the DEA's reasoning

is based. First, although Tourus represents itself as a company that produces and markets music recorded on compact

discs, its financial affidavit states that Tourus has no income,

no expenses, and no assets of any kind. The personal affidavit of Tourus' president, by contrast, states that Dowe does

have income, expenses, and assets, including the recording

gear that one might ordinarily expect a recording company to

have. While this might not require the conclusion the DEA

reached, it does adequately support the agency's determination that Tourus Records is merely a shell corporation, and

that Dowe is the real party in interest whose financial capacity should be evaluated in deciding whether to waive the bond

requirement.

Second, the evidence supports the DEA's conclusion that

Dowe himself does not qualify for in forma pauperis status.

That evidence includes family income of almost $60,000 per

year, well in excess of the family's annual expenses, plus

assets of approximately $200,000. This financial information

provides substantial evidence to support the DEA's finding

that Dowe is able to post the required $5000 bond--particularly in light of the fact that the DEA permits a claimant to

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post bond with either cash or sureties. See 21 C.F.R.

s 1316.76(a) (2000); Resp't App. at 2 (DEA notice form).13

V

Although the notice by which the DEA denied Tourus'

application to proceed in forma pauperis was insufficient to

satisfy the requirements of the APA, the internal memoranda

upon which it was based are sufficient. Those memoranda

make clear that the DEA's rationale for denying the application is reasonable, and that its findings are based on substantial evidence. Indeed, a remand to correct the initial notice

would serve no purpose, as the agency could and no doubt

would simply retransmit its internal memoranda to petitioner.

See Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,

194 F.3d 72, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that "reversal and

remand is 'necessary only when the reviewing court concludes

that there is a significant chance that but for the error the

__________

13 Tourus failed to file a reply brief in this case. At oral argument, petitioner noted that it is a Virginia corporation, and contended that Virginia law does not permit "piercing the corporate veil" in

a case like this. He also contended that, because the DEA's form

affidavit (which is itself a copy of the in forma pauperis affidavit set

forth in Form 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure) asks

the applicant to list asset "value" rather than "net value," Dowe's

net worth was overstated by an unstated amount of mortgage and

other debt. Petitioner has waived these contentions by waiting

until oral argument to raise them. See Galvan v. Federal Prison

Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1999). But even if the

arguments were not waived, neither would affect our conclusion.

The validity of the DEA's determination to treat Tourus as a shell

for purposes of its own bonding requirements is a question of

federal, not Virginia, law, and rests on whether that determination

satisfies the requirements of the APA. Cf. Chicago Sch. of Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Accreditation Alliance of Career Schs.

& Colleges, 44 F.3d 447, 449-450 (7th Cir. 1994). And even if

Dowe's net worth were lower than that which appears on the face of

his affidavit, it would not affect our conclusion that there is substantial evidence to justify the determination that he is capable of

securing a $5000 bond, particularly given the opportunity to utilize a

surety.

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agency might have reached a different result' " (quoting

Friendly, supra, at 211)). Accordingly, the DEA's denial of

Tourus Records' application to proceed in forma pauperis is

Affirmed.

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