Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00063/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00063-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
LaSonja Wright
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LaSONJA WRIGHT )

o/b/o CALLIE WRIGHT )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-00063-P-B

)

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, )

Commissioner of )

Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

LaSonja Wright brings this action on behalf of her daughter

Callie Wright (“Plaintiff”), seeking judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her

application for supplemental security income benefits under Title

XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-

1383c. This action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate

Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B). Oral argument was held on October 31, 2005. Upon

careful consideration of the record, the undersigned respectfully

recommends that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her first application for disability insurance

benefits on February 6, 2001, alleging that she became disabled on

June 1, 1999 because of chronic asthma, a slight speech impediment

and emotional problems. (Tr. 21, 25, 31-35, 53-59, 71).

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2

Plaintiff’s application was denied at the initial level on July 3,

2000, and she filed a request for reconsideration and timely

Request for Hearing on August 29, 2001. (Id. at 31-42, 95-101).

On January 7, 2003, Administrative Law Judge James D. Smith (“ALJ

Smith” or “ALJ”) conducted a hearing, which was attended by

Plaintiff and her mother. (Id. at 206-219). On April 14, 2003,

ALJ Smith entered an unfavorable decision finding that while

Plaintiff has the severe impairment of asthma, it does not meet or

medically equal a Listings impairment, and that she does not have

a medically determinable physical or mental impairment resulting in

marked and severe functional limitations. (Id. at 21-29).

Plaintiff sought to appeal the ALJ’s decision, and on December 9,

2004, her request for review was denied by the Appeals Council

(“AC”), thus making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security under 20 C.F.R. § 404.955. (Id. at

4-6). The parties agree that this case is ripe for judicial review

and is properly before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on September 30, 1990, and was 12 years old

at the time of the January 7, 2003. (Tr. 22, 31, 53, 60, 81, 209).

Plaintiff’s mother testified on her behalf at the administrative

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1

While not at issue here, the undersigned notes for the record that

Plaintiff and her mother were fully advised of their right to representation

at the hearing; however they elected to appear unrepresented.

2

Plaintiff had the repeat the 6th grade. (Id. at 210).

3

Plaintiff initially styles one of her issues on appeal as whether the

ALJ Committed reversible error in finding that the she did not meet, equal or

medically equal the requirements of Listing 103.03 in Appendix 1, Subpart P,

Regulations No. 4; however, in her brief, she argues a separate and distinct

issue, namely whether the ALJ erred in finding that she suffers a less than

3

hearing.1 (Id. at 206-219). Plaintiff is in the 6th grade,2 attends

regular classes, takes the bus to/from school each day, and is one

of six children living at home. (Id. at 209-210). She has

suffered with asthma attacks/allergies for 7 years, and has

required hospitalization or home visits by ambulance crews 3 times

since December 2001. (Id. at 211-213). According to her mother,

her condition has become severe in recent years. (Id. at 215-216).

Plaintiff is treated by Dr. Mobley, of the Franklin Clinic, more

than twice a month; and by Dr. Sindell, a lung specialist, of

Pulmonary Associates of Mobile. (Id. at 213-217). Plaintiff’s

mother indicated that she is not undergoing, nor has she

undergone, any mental health treatment for depression or any other

mental conditions. (Tr. 215). With respect to Plaintiff’s asthma,

her mother testified that her major concerns is that it has forced

Plaintiff to miss school and that it requires her to take many

medications (including Prednisone and Advair). (Id. at 216).

III. Issues On Appeal

A. Whether the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff has a less

than marked limitation in the domain of interacting and

relating with others?3

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marked limitation in the domain of interacting and relating with others). 

(Doc. 9 at 1, 4-5).

4

This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal

principles is plenary. Crawford & Co. v. Apfel, 235 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th

Cir. 2000). See also Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).

4

B. Whether the ALJ erred by failing to find that Plaintiff’s

depression is a severe impairment?

IV. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s role

is limited to determining whether the final decision is supported

by substantial evidence and free of legal error.4 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). See, e.g., Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th

Cir. 2002); Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439-1440 (11th Cir.

1997); Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1995); Martin

v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990); Walker v. Bowen,

826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d

1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). This Court may not decide the facts

anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of

the Commissioner. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir.

1986); Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. The Commissioner’s findings

of fact must be affirmed if they are based upon substantial

evidence. Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991);

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (concluding that substantial evidence

is defined as “more than a scintilla but less than a

preponderance[]” and consists of “such relevant evidence as a

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5

See also Robinson v. Massanari, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1280 (S.D. Ala.

2001).

6

On September 11, 2000, the Commissioner published Final Rules for

determining disability for a child under the age of eighteen. 65 Fed. Reg.

54,747, corrected by 65 Fed. Reg. 80,307. These rules became effective on

January 2, 2001 and thus apply to Plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 54,751.

5

reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a

conclusion[]”). See also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, this

Court must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence

favorable as well as unfavorable to the Commissioner’s decision.5

Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986); and Short v.

Apfel, 1999 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 10163 (S.D. Ala. 1999).

B. Childhood Disability Law

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996,

which amended the statutory standard for children seeking

supplemental security income benefits based on disability, became

effective on August 22, 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105

§ 211(b)(2) (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1382c). The definition

of “disabled” for children under 18 is:

An individual under the age of 18 shall be considered

disabled for the purposes of this subchapter if that

individual has a medically determinable physical or

mental impairment, which results in marked and severe

functional limitations, and which can be expected to

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i); and 20 C.F.R. § 416.906.6 The Social

Security Regulations provide a three-step sequential evaluation

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process for determining childhood disability claims. 20 C.F.R. §

416.924(a). 

At step one, a child’s age and work activity, if any, are

identified to determine if the child has engaged in substantial

gainful activity. At step two, the child’s physical and mental

impairments are examined to see if the child has an impairment or

combination of impairments that are severe. Under the regulations,

a severe impairment is one that is more than “a slight abnormality

or a combination of slight abnormalities that causes no more than

minimal functional limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). To the

extent the child is determined to have a severe impairment, at step

three, the child must establish that the impairment results in

marked and severe functional limitations. 42 U.S.C. §

1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). The regulations set forth that an “impairment(s)

causes marked and severe functional limitations if it meets,

medically equals or functionally equals the listings.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.924(d). A child’s impairment(s) meets the Listings’

limitations if the child actually suffers from limitations specified

in the Listings for that child’s severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. §

416.926(d). A child’s impairment medically equals the Listings if

the child’s limitations are at least of equal severity and duration

to the listed impairment(s). Id. Where, as in this case, a child’s

impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or medically

equal any Listing, then the Commissioner must determine whether the

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7

In making this assessment, the reports of the State Agency medical

consultants or other treating, examining and non-examining medical sources,

and, the claimant’s symptoms, including pain and the extent to which these

symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical

evidence and other evidence, are all taken into consideration. 20 C.F.R. §§

416.927 and 416.929; and SSR 96-5, 96-6p and 96-7p.

8

The degree of limitation in the relevant domains is then assessed

within four ranges: 1) no evidence of a marked limitation; 2) less than marked

limitation; 3) marked limitation; and 4) extreme limitation. 20 C.F.R. §

416.926a(b)(1).

9

The regulation sets forth the methods for using each domain to evaluate

functional equivalence to a Listing. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(f).

10Marked limitation also means a limitation that is: “‘more than

moderate but ‘less than extreme.’” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). “It is the

equivalent of the functioning we would expect to find on standardized testing

with scores that are at least two, but less than three, standard deviations

below the mean.” Id. A marked limitation may arise when several activities

or functions are limited or when one is limited. Id. A child has a marked

limitation when he has a valid score two standard deviations or more below the

mean, but less than three standard deviations, on a comprehensive standardized

7

impairment or combination of impairments results in limitations

which functionally equal the criteria for a Listing.7 Id. 

To determine whether a child’s impairment functionally equals

a listing, the regulations require consideration of six domains:8 1)

acquiring/using information; 2) attending/completing tasks; 3)

interacting/relating with others; 4) moving about/manipulating

objects; 5) caring for oneself; and 6) health/physical well-being.

20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(vi). To satisfy the functionally

equivalent standard, a child must have either a marked limitation

in two domains of functioning, or an extreme limitation in one

domain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a).9 A marked limitation in a domain

is defined as a limitation that “interferes seriously with . . .

[the child’s] ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete

activities.”10 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). An extreme

Case 1:05-cv-00063-KD-B Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 7 of 25
test designed to measure ability or functioning in that domain, and the

child’s day-to-day functioning in domain related activities is consistent with

the score. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(iii).

11Extreme limitation also means a limitation “more than marked” and may

arise when several activities or functions are limited or when one is limited.

20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i). 

8

limitation is defined as a limitation that “interferes very

seriously with . . . [the child’s] ability to independently

initiate, sustain or complete activities.”11 20 C.F.R. §

416.926a(e)(3)(i). In conducting this analysis, the ALJ may take

a wide range of evidence into account when making a determination

about a child’s impairments, including an individual’s statements

about symptoms, along with information provided by treating or

examining physicians, and all other relevant evidence in the record.

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.912, 416.913(d) and 416.924a; SSR 96-7p. See also

Shinn v. Comm’r of Social Security, 391 F.3d 1276, 1283-1284 (11th

Cir. 2004).

C. Discussion

In the case sub judice, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset

date of disability. (Tr. 28, Finding 2). The ALJ found that

Plaintiff suffers from the impairment of asthma, which is severe

under the Act. (Id., Finding 3). However, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff does not have an impairment or a combination of

impairments listed in, or medically equal to, an impairment listed

in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Regulations No. 4. (Id.,

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9

Finding 4). Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have

severely disabling limitations in specific functions caused by a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment, or disabling

limitations resulting from chronic illnesses characterized by

frequent illness or attacks, exacerbations or remissions, the nature

of treatment required or the effects of medication. (Id., Findings

5-7). The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff has no limitations in

the domains of acquiring/using information, attending/completing

tasks, moving about/manipulating objects, or caring for onself; a

less than marked limitation in the domain of interacting/relating

with others; and a marked limitation in the domain of

health/physical well being. (Id., Finding 8). The ALJ found

further, that Plaintiff’s assertions, relative to symptomatology,

functional limitations and restrictions of activities of daily

living, lack corroboration or substantiation in the medical evidence

and are not credible as to a disabling impairment. (Id., Finding

9). From this, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled.

(Tr. 28, Finding 10). 

The undersigned finds that substantial evidence of record

supports the ALJ’s decision. On June 12, 2001 C.C. Pujara, M.D.

(“Dr. Pujara”) examined Plaintiff and found as follows (Tr. 136-

137):

• she has a history of bronchial asthma since 6 years

old, which has become severe in the last 2 years and

has made her miss a lot of school. 

Case 1:05-cv-00063-KD-B Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 9 of 25
10

• she had a speech impediment in the past, but

received therapy, and now has no speech problems. 

• she gets upset when she takes her medication and

feels depressed.

• her diagnosis was that she has moderate to severe

bronchial asthma treated with medications and a

nebulizer machine, which should be continued. She

has allergies to fish, milk, cooking, etc., a

history of speech problems which has been resolved,

difficulty taking her mediation and difficulty

accepting her condition (advised her to have asthma

education and join a support group).

On June 13, 2001, Basivi Baddigam, M.D. (“Dr. Baddigam”)

completed a psychiatric report on Plaintiff noting the following

(Id. at 133-135):

• her mother reported that she is very sensitive and

cries because of her asthma and that her peers pick

on her and tease her because of her condition. 

• she admitted feeling sad for being teased and crying

when that happens; however, she reported that she

gets along well with others. 

• she does not argue/fight, has no major behavioral

problems, stays to herself most of the time and does

not interact with others as she gets tired from her

asthma and medication. 

• she was never admitted to a psychiatric hospital,

was never in treatment or on psychotropic

medications, has not been abused/neglected and has

no learning disability.

• she is not sleeping well, but her appetite is fair.

• she has had no speech problems in the last 2-3 years

after receiving therapy.

• she takes Nasonex, Flovent, Ventolin, Azmacort,

Albutrol in Nebulizer, Zyrtec and Singulair.

• for school history, she is in the 4th grade regular

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11

classes and she listens to teachers, gets along well

with peers, has no behavioral problems, has not been

suspended, has good grades, has no learning

disability, has no language delays, and there is no

family history of psychiatric illness.

• for daily activities, her motor development is

normal, she likes to swim, watch TV and play video

games, but does not play sports or do chores. She

does homework after school.

• for social interaction, she listens to her mother,

gets along “fair” with her siblings, has a few

friends and is able to maintain friendships but

likes to be alone.

• she had good eye contact, good attention span, fair

hygiene/grooming and she was cooperative and

pleasant, smiling frequently. She was also alert and

oriented with appropriate affect and euthymic mood.

• she was diagnosed with depressive disorder nos (Axis

I), asthma (Axis III), and GAF 70 (Axis V). She was

given a “guarded” prognosis.

Cheryl Parker, a counselor at the Dewey Center for Urban

Education (“Dewey”), completed a School Activities Questionnaire

dated June 1, 2001. (Id. at 91-92). In the Questionnaire, Ms.

Parker opined that Plaintiff has no speech problems or oral language

impairments limiting her ability to communicate; had no problems

with social relationships, including both peers and teachers; had

no problems with attention span, concentration and on-task behavior,

ability to work without supervision, understanding assignments and

completing them on time, responding to changes or routines in the

classroom, with age-appropriate self-care or hygiene, or with the

need for a structured setting, type of structure, and functioning

outside this setting. (Id.) Additionally, Ms. Parker noted that

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12Strangely, it was also “checked” that Plaintiff has an extreme

limitation in one domain; however, there was no explanation for this, much

less any identification or discussion of which domain. (Id. at 142).

12

she had not observed Plaintiff exhibit any inappropriate behavior.

(Id. at 92). 

Plaintiff’s school records from Dewey for the school year

ending June 2001 reveal that she made above average grades, and was

absent from school on 3 occasions. (Tr. 174). Plaintiff’s school

records from Pillans Middle School for the 2002-2003 School year

indicated that she made average grades, was absent from school 13

days, and was promoted to the 7th grade. (Id. at 170). 

On June 22, 2001, a State Agency Medical Consultant completed

a childhood disability evaluation for Plaintiff, and concluded that

she has no limitations in the domains of acquiring/using

information, attending/completing tasks, moving about/manipulating

objects and caring for yourself, and a less than marked limitation

in the domain of interacting/relating with others.12 (Id. at 138-

143). Additionally, records from the State of Michigan reflect that

in June 2001, Plaintiff qualified for the Children’s Special Health

Care Services program for “asthma w/o status asthm[]” and that she

was treated for various asthma attacks at Children’s Hospital of

Michigan. (Id. at 107-111). 

Plaintiff was treated for asthma at the “The Wellness Plan”

clinic from 1999 through 2002. (Id. at 104, 106, 112-132). The

records reflect that she was diagnosed as a severe asthmatic. (Id.)

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13

It was noted that she needs to be in a controlled environment and

that her medications cause her to sleep. (Tr. 104, 106, 112-132).

Plaintiff was also treated at USA Medical Center for asthma and

atypical pneumonia from November 4-6, 2002; for asthma on September

30, 2003; and for hitting her head on May 20, 2004. (Id. at 147-

167, 175-183, 201-203). On November 27, 2002, she was treated for

an asthma attack by Mobile Fire-Rescue Department, at her residence.

(Id. at 105). On March 5, 2004, Plaintiff was treated at the Mobile

Infirmary Medical Center for an asthma attack, vomiting, acute

dyspnea and hyperventilation. (Id. at 184-193). On October 7,

2004, she was treated at the Franklin Primary Heath Center for

complaints of headaches, stomachaches, vomiting and chest pain.

(Id. at 204-205). Her asthma/allergy medications include Flovent,

Singulair, Nasonex, Zyrtec, Albutural, Azmacort, Xeophonex,

Floradil, Advair, Proventil and Epipen. (Id. at 75, 102-103). 

1. Whether the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff has a less

than marked limitation in the domain of interacting and

relating with others?

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she has a

less than marked limitation in the domain of interacting/relating

with others based upon: 1) a June 13, 2001 psychological evaluation

conducted by Basivi Baddigam, M.D. (“Dr. Baddigam”) (which noted

that she suffered from depressive disorder NOS and his prognosis for

her was “guarded) (Tr. 133-135); 2) her mother’s reports in a May

20, 2001 daily activities questionnaire (that she does not do much

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14

or play with anyone but her sisters, she suffers mood swings and

could become very snappy and distant) (Id. at 87-90); and 3) the

June 22, 2001 findings of a State Agency medical consultant (that

she had a less than marked limitation in this domain) (Id. at 138-

143). (Doc. 9 at 5). 

As detailed supra, where, as in this case, a claimant’s

impairment(s) does not meet or medically equal any Listing, the ALJ

must determine whether the impairment(s) results in limitations

which functionally equal the criteria for a Listing. 20 C.F.R. §

416.926a(a). In assessing the domain of interacting/relating with

others, the ALJ is to “consider how well you initiate and sustain

emotional connections with others, develop and use the language of

your community, cooperate with others, comply with rules, respond

to criticism, and respect and take care of the possessions of

others.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(i). Here, the ALJ did just that, and

found no marked limitations in two domains of functioning, and no

extreme limitation in one domain of functioning, thus concluding

that Plaintiff’s impairment is not functionally equivalent to a

Listing. (Tr. 25-26, 28). Based upon a review of the record, the

undersigned finds that the ALJ did not err. 

Specifically, the record contains substantial evidence to

support the ALJ’s finding and reveals that he carefully considered

the evidentiary record as a whole, the testimony at the hearing,

arguments presented and applicable law and regulations, in finding

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15

that Plaintiff is not disabled. Finding that Plaintiff has only a

less than marked limitation in the domain of interacting/relating

with others, the ALJ stated that:

Based on the record, the claimant’s condition does not

meet or medically equal the criteria for any impairment

listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Part 404. As the

Administrative Law Judge has concluded that the child

does not have an impairment that meets or medically

“equals” the severity of a listed impairment, a

determination must be made as to whether the child’s

impairments are functionally equivalent in severity to

any listed impairment. In making this determination, the

functional limitations resulting from the claimant’s

impairments will be compared with the functional

limitations which result from listed impairments, whether

or not related to the claimant’s specific medical

condition. 

 * * *

For the purpose of analysis of functional equivalence,

consideration is given to six domains [one of which is]:

3) Interacting and relating with others (how well the

child initiates and sustains emotional connections with

others, develops and uses the language of the community,

cooperates with others, complies with rules, responds to

criticism, and respects and takes care of the possessions

of others);

* * *

Interacting and Relating With Others

In this domain, the undersigned agrees with the state

agency examiner that the claimant has a less than marked

limitation of functioning.

* * *

To summarize, the claimant does not have an “extreme”

limitation in one area of functioning or “marked”

limitation in two areas; therefore, it cannot be

concluded that the claimant is disabled on the basis that

she has impairments that are functionally equivalent in

severity to any listed impairment. The undersigned finds

that the claimant is limited to a degree because of her

asthma, but it is not an extreme limitation. She is able

to attend school regularly and even rides the bus to and

from school. She enjoys age-appropriate activities of

daily living. While her mother alleges that she suffers

from emotional difficulties and the consulting

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16

psychologist diagnosed her with depression, the

undersigned finds that the claimants’ mental impairments

do not cause marked limitations of functioning. This

conclusion is supported by the claimant’s GAF score of 70

which indicates only mild symptomatology, as well as the

report from the school counselor, and the observations of

the consulting psychologist during the claimant’s

evaluation. The claimant’s alleged speech impairment has

apparently been resolved and is non-severe.

The undersigned concludes that the claimant does not have

an impairment, or a combination of impairments, that

meets, medically equals or functionally equals any of the

impairments listed . . . .

* * *

(Tr. 22-27 (emphasis in original)). 

At the outset, no physician, treating or otherwise, ever

concluded that Plaintiff has a marked limitation in the domain of

interacting/relating with others. Additionally, Plaintiff’s school

teacher, Ms. Parker, reported in a June 2001 School Activities

Questionnaire that she has no problems with social relationships

(including peers and teachers) and that she has not ever been

observed exhibiting any inappropriate behavior or “behaviors of

concern.” (Tr. 91-92). Ms. Parker also found that Plaintiff has no

problems with attention span/concentration/on-task behavior, the

ability to work unsupervised, understanding assignments and

completing them on time, responding to change and routine in the

classroom or with age-appropriate self care and hygiene. (Id.)

Similarly, while Plaintiff’s mother complained to Dr. Baddigam that

Plaintiff was teased/picked on at school, keeps to herself most of

the time and does not interact with others, she then conceded that

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13Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584-585 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding

that an ALJ may properly rely upon the opinion of a non-examining physician

when consistent with the opinion of the examining physicians). See also

Perales, 403 U.S. at 408 (finding that the use of a non-examining medical

expert is proper); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f)(2); SSR 96-6p. 

17

Plaintiff does not have any major behavioral problems and that she

gets along well with her peers, makes good grades and has no

learning problems or language delays. (Id. at 133-135). Plaintiff

likes to watch television, play video games, swim, do homework, has

friends her own age, can make new friends, generally gets along with

her siblings, mother, other adults and school teachers, and once in

a while, she talks on the telephone with friends from school. (Id.)

Moreover, psychologist Dr. Baddigam observed during his evaluation

that Plaintiff was able to maintain friendships, was alert,

oriented, friendly and cooperative, smiled frequently, and had an

appropriate affect and euthymic mood. (Id.) Further, the State

Agency medical consultant concluded that Plaintiff has a less than

marked limitation in the domain of interacting and relating with

others.13 (Id. at 138-143). In sum, substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff has a less than marked limitation

in the domain of interacting/relating with others. Plaintiff has

not pointed to any evidence in the record which supports her claim

of a “marked” limitation in this domain. Thus, the ALJ properly

concluded that she is not disabled. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Barnhart,

130 Fed. Appx. 426, 432 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (per curiam).

2. Whether the ALJ erred by failing to find that Plaintiff’s

depression is a severe impairment?

Case 1:05-cv-00063-KD-B Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 17 of 25
14As asserted at the October 31, 2005 oral argument, but not in

Plaintiff’s brief.

18

As noted supra, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in

finding that she does not suffer from the severe mental impairment

of depression, based upon: 1) a July 6, 2001 disability examiner and

transmittal secondary diagnosis of an affective disorder (Tr. 31);

2) Dr. Baddigam’s June 13, 2001 consultative psychological

evaluation (depressive disorder NOA and prognosis of “guarded”

condition) (Id. at 133-145); 3) childhood disability evaluation form

which listed depression as a severe impairment (Id. at 138-143);14

and 4) her mother’s statements in a May 20, 2001 child disability

report (that she is very emotional about her asthma, cries a lot and

is so depressed that she will not communicate, is picked on by other

students) (Id. at 87-90). (Doc. 9 at 5-6). 

The undersigned is aware of the standard for a non-severe

impairment as set forth in Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th

Cir. 1984), which states that an impairment is severe if it causes

more than just a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect

on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with

the ability to work without regard to the plaintiff’s age, education

or work experience. However, the undersigned also recognizes the

standard for review, i.e., is there substantial evidence in the

record to support the ALJ’s finding. Substantial evidence which is

defined as “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance,”

Case 1:05-cv-00063-KD-B Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 18 of 25
19

consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would

accept as adequate so support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S.

at 401; Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. The “reasonable person”

standard dictates that if there is pertinent and adequate evidence

supporting a decision, it must be upheld. Martin v. Sullivan, 894

F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). This Court may neither substitute

its own judgment for the Commissioner’s nor reevaluate the evidence

unless the decision is clearly illogical and unsubstantiated.

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. See also Powell v. Heckler, 773 F.2d

1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985). Therefore, even when the evidence

appears to weigh against the Commissioner’s decision, this Court

must affirm the decision if there is sufficient supporting evidence.

Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529; Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239.

Upon consideration of the entire administrative record

including the testimony of Plaintiff’s mother at the administrative

hearing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, that

Plaintiff does not suffer from the severe mental impairment of

depression, is supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, at

the administrative hearing on January 7, 2003, the sum total of

testimony regarding Plaintiff’s depression consisted of the mother’s

testimony that Plaintiff does not see any type of counselor for

depression, other than talking with her pastor, and that she is not

being treated by anyone for depression. (Tr. 215). Interestingly,

at the oral argument held on October 31, 2005, Plaintiff’s counsel

Case 1:05-cv-00063-KD-B Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 19 of 25
20

admitted that Plaintiff’s mother was “not very diligent in getting

treatment for Plaintiff” for depression – that she only took her to

see her pastor in the past. See Audio Transcript 10/31/05 Hearing,

FTR Gold Program. The fact that Plaintiff received no treatment for

her allegedly disabling mental impairment is significant given that

she bears the burden of demonstrating that her impairment is severe.

See, e.g., Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987); Macia

v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 1009, 1012 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s mother’s reports of depression stemming

from her asthma (i.e, that her asthma condition makes her very

emotional and cry, that she is teased/picked on by other students

for her condition and has mood swings related to same), are

undermined by the record as a whole. See supra. Similarly, while

Dr. Baddigam concluded that Plaintiff had a depressive disorder and

that she was in a “guarded” condition,” his psychological

consultative examination did not provide any explanation for his

findings. (Tr. 133-135). In Dr. Baddigam’s report, he noted that

Plaintiff reported feeling sad when kids teased her, yet he assigned

her a GAF score of 70, which is indicative of only mild symptoms.

(Id.) In fact, the majority of Dr. Baddigam’s observations of

Plaintiff during the evaluation noted no signs of depression. (Id.)

To the contrary, Dr. Baddigam found that Plaintiff smiled frequently

during the evaluation, had good eye contact, had good attention

span, had normal gait, fair hygiene/grooming, was cooperative and

Case 1:05-cv-00063-KD-B Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 20 of 25
15Plaintiff’s counsel conceded, at the October 31, 2005 oral argument,

that the teacher’s reports are not favorable to Plaintiff.

21

pleasant, sensorium was alert and oriented, had no suicidal

thoughts, hallucinations, delusions or obsessions, had reasonable

three wishes, her psychomotor activity was within normal limits, had

a fund of general knowledge, had clear/spontaneous/coherent/goaloriented speech, her thinking process was well organized, her affect

was appropriate, she had a euthymic mood and her judgment was

correct. (Id.) Given these findings by Dr. Baddigam, and the other

evidence of record, the ALJ properly questioned Dr. Baddigam’s

conclusion of a “guarded” condition, as such conclusion lacked any

explanation and was inconsistent with the observations record by him

in his evaluation of Plaintiff. (Id. at 26). Accordingly, the ALJ

did not err in rejecting the ultimate conclusion contained in the

one-time consultative report, where as here, it is not consistent

with the other findings in the report, and is against the

substantial record evidence. See, e.g., Crawford v. Comm’r of

Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1160-1161 (11th Cir. 2004); Riley v.

Massanari, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1298-1299 (M.D. Ala. 2001); McSwain

v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s school counselor and teacher, Ms.

Parker,15 noted that during the August 2000 through June 2001 time

period, there were no problems with Plaintiff’s attention span, ontask behavior, concentration or ability to work without supervision.

Case 1:05-cv-00063-KD-B Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 21 of 25
22

(Tr. 91-92). She also noted that Plaintiff understood assignments

and completed them on time, responded adequately to change in the

classroom and engaged in age-appropriate behavior. (Id.) 

Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that Plaintiff is

suffering from any type of depressive disorder that limits her in

any way. The record reveals no mental health treatment, no

treatment for depression, no medication for depression, and no

findings of any type of mental impairment that would impair her

functioning. The record is simply devoid of any evidence which

shows treatment for depression, much less any finding by any

physician, treating or otherwise, that Plaintiff has any type of

functional limitations due to depression. While Plaintiff cites to

a June 22, 2001 childhood disability evaluation form which evaluated

her functionality, and which listed depression as a severe

impairment, the conclusion in that form was that her depression did

not meet, medically or functionally equal the Listings, and that she

functioned at her regular 4th grade level. (Tr. 138-143). 

Based on the substantial record evidence, the ALJ did not err

in finding that Plaintiff’s alleged depression is not a severe

impairment. See, e.g., Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th

Cir. 1999) (citing to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and Martin, 894 F.2d at

1529). Plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving that her

depression is a severe impairment, and the substantial evidence of

record does not conclusively establish that her alleged depression

Case 1:05-cv-00063-KD-B Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 22 of 25
23

results in any limitations or that it is anything more than slight.

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir. 1986).

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful

consideration of the administrative record, it is the recommendation

of the undersigned Magistrate Judge that the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for

disability insurance benefits, be AFFIRMED.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to this Report and Recommendation.

DONE this 31st day of March, 2006.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00063-KD-B Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 23 of 25
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this

document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court.

Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on

appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); and Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th

Cir. 1988). The procedure for challenging the findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more detail in

SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a

“Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with a

copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is

established by order. The statement of objection shall

specify those portions of the recommendation to which

objection is made and the basis for the objection. The

objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the

time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different

disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a

copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate

judge, although a copy of the original brief may be

submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief

in support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief in

support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of

the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of

Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can be

appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing party

may submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10) days of

being served with a copy of the statement of objection. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72; SD ALA LR 72.4(b).

Case 1:05-cv-00063-KD-B Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 24 of 25
3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate

judge finds that the tapes and original records in this action are

adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to

this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is

advised that a judicial determination that transcription is

necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost of

the transcript.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00063-KD-B Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 25 of 25