Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01332/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01332-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Teresa Irwin
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TERESA IRWIN, AS HEIR AND 

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE 

OF STEVEN L. IRWIN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-1332 AC 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff sought judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”), denying the application for a period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits (“DIB”) benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), of her late 

husband, Mr. Steven L. Irwin. On September 25, 2015, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and 

remanded the action to the Commissioner with instructions to award benefits. ECF No. 26. 

 Now pending before the court is plaintiff’s May 12, 2016 motion for an award of 

attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 30. On June 8, 2016, defendant filed a 

response asserting that defendant “is not in a position to either assent or object” to the fee request. 

ECF No. 32. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted. 

Case 2:14-cv-01332-AC Document 34 Filed 08/19/16 Page 1 of 4
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I. REASONABLENESS OF FEE REQUEST 

 At the outset of the representation, plaintiff and her counsel entered into a contingent-fee 

agreement. ECF No. 30-1. Pursuant to that agreement plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s 

fees in the amount of $14,539.50, which represents 25% of the $58,158.00 in retroactive 

disability benefits received by plaintiff on remand ($43,618.50 paid, plus $14,539.50 withheld for 

attorney’s fees), for 37.1 hours of attorney time expended on this matter. ECF Nos. 30 ¶¶ 2-4, 

30-2. 

 Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 

security claimants: 

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under 

this subchapter who was represented before the court by an 

attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment 

a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 

of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled 

by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social 

Security may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such 

attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due 

benefits. 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 

U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 

party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The goal of fee awards under 

§ 406(b) is “‘to protect claimants against “inordinately large fees” and also to ensure that 

attorneys representing successful claimants would not risk “nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.”’” 

Parrish v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gisbrecht,

535 U.S. at 805). 

 The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 

ensure that the fee requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“406(b) does not 

displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 

to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). “Within the 25 percent 

boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable 

for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable 

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fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 

arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 

Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). 

 In determining whether the requested fee is reasonable, the court considers “‘the character 

of the representation and the results achieved by the representative.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 

(quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). In determining whether a reduction in the fee is warranted, 

the court considers whether the attorney provided “substandard representation or delayed the 

case,” or obtained “benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Id. Finally, 

the court considers the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing 

charge for non-contingent cases. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 

808); see also, E.D. Cal. R. 293(c)(1) (in fixing attorney’s fees the court considers “the time and 

labor required”). Below, the court will consider these factors in assessing whether the fee 

requested by counsel in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable. 

 Here, plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced attorney who secured a successful result for 

plaintiff. See Declaration of Vijay J. Patel (“Patel Decl.”) (ECF No. 30) ¶ 6. There is no 

indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard performance by counsel. 

There is also no evidence that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any dilatory conduct resulting in 

excessive delay. The court finds that the $14,539.50 fee, which represents 25% of the $58,158.00 

in past-due benefits paid to plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to the benefits awarded. In 

making this determination, the court recognizes the contingent fee nature of this case and 

counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated in agreeing to represent plaintiff on 

such terms. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152 (“[t]he attorneys assumed significant risk in 

accepting these cases, including the risk that no benefits would be awarded or that there would be 

a long court or administrative delay in resolving the cases”). Finally, counsel has submitted a 

detailed billing statement in support of the requested fee. ECF No. 30-3. 

 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by 

counsel pursuant to § 406(b) are reasonable. 

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II. OFFSET FOR EAJA FEES 

 An award of § 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of attorney’s fees granted 

under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. 

Here, plaintiff’s attorney was previously awarded $6,400.00 in EAJA fees. See ECF No. 29. 

Counsel therefore must remit that amount to plaintiff. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (ECF No. 30), is 

GRANTED; 

 2. Counsel for plaintiff is awarded $14,539.50 in attorney’s fees under § 406(b); the 

Commissioner shall certify that amount to be paid to counsel from the funds previously withheld 

for the payment of such fees (see ECF No. 30-2 at 3); and 

 3. Counsel for plaintiff is directed to remit to plaintiff the amount of $6,400 for EAJA 

fees previously paid to counsel by the Commissioner. 

DATED: August 18, 2016 

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