Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-03658/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-03658-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
My Pillow, Inc.
Defendant
Richard Wuest
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD WUEST, on behalf of himself and

all others similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MY PILLOW, INC., and DOES 1 through 50,

inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. 18-03658 WHA

ORDER ON MOTION FOR

CLASS CERTIFICATION

AND MOTION TO SEAL

INTRODUCTION

In this putative privacy class action, plaintiff moves for class certification and defendant

moves to file under seal. For the reasons stated below, the motion for class certification is

DENIED. The motion to file under seal is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

STATEMENT

This is a putative class action by plaintiff Richard Wuest against defendant My Pillow,

Inc. Wuest asserts a single claim for violation of California Penal Code § 632.7 based on My

Pillow’s alleged unwarned and unconsented recording and monitoring of inbound calls and seeks

statutory damages. Most of the underlying facts were developed on briefing for the instant

motion and are briefly summarized herein.

My Pillow had toll-free numbers by which consumers could reach sales and customer

service agents (Dkt. No. 38-2 at 16:1–17:4, 32:1–21). Up until December 27, 2017, My Pillow

used a pre-recorded greetings, which informed all callers at the outset that their calls were

Case 3:18-cv-03658-WHA Document 51 Filed 08/06/19 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

recorded by My Pillow for quality assurance. The post-holiday rush, however, brought an

attendant influx of customer calls for exchanges and gift cards. On December 27, 2017, My

Pillow briefly changed allegedly for both sales and customer service numbers the automated

message to one that informed callers that, “due to very heavy call volume,” they would

experience “extremely long wait times” as a courtesy to its customers (Dkt. Nos. 32 at 7; 36-11

at 3). On February 19, 2018, three days after Wuest filed the instant class action, My Pillow

returned the automated message to again include a call recording warning (Dkt. Nos. 32-2, Exh.

B at 102:6–20; 36-11 at 3). 

It was during this brief period that Wuest called My Pillow on multiple occasions. On

January 22, 2018, Wuest called My Pillow’s sales number three times from his cell phone, while

in California, to inquire about the company’s products and to place an order (Dkt. No. 32-3 at

21:11–22:14). During the first call, Wuest asked the sales representative general questions of

inquiry. During the second call, Wuest placed an order. During the third call that day, Wuest

asked whether My Pillow recorded such calls, which the sales representative confirmed (Dkt.

Nos. 32 at 8; Grover Decl., Exhs. R–T). On February 8 and 9, 2018, Wuest called My Pillow’s

customer service line twice from his cell phone in California regarding the shipping status of his

order (Dkt. Nos. 32-8–32-9). It is undisputed that My Pillow’s customer service line did not

warn customers of the call recording during that time (see Dkt. No. 36-11 at 3). 

Wuest subsequently filed the instant action on February 16, 2018. He now seeks to

represent those who called My Pillow during the time period at issue. He has filed ten prior

CIPA class actions but always settled them before moving for class certification (see Dkt. No. 44

at 1–2). This is the first of his cases ever to reach the class certification stage. He seeks to

certify the following class pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) (Dkt.

No. 32 at 2):

Certifying a class (the “Class”) of all persons who, at any time during the

period from December 27, 2017 through February 19, 2018, inclusive,

called one or more of My Pillow, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) toll-free telephone

numbers using a cellular or cordless telephone with a California area code

while located within the State of California and who was connected to a

My Pillow representative. 

Case 3:18-cv-03658-WHA Document 51 Filed 08/06/19 Page 2 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Wuest also seeks in the alternative to certify certain subclasses.

In opposing the class certification motion, My Pillow contends that Wuest is an

inadequate class representative with atypical claims (Dkt. No. 36). It further opposes on the

ground that individual issues would predominate. This order follows full briefing and oral

argument. 

ANALYSIS

Class certification is appropriate when a plaintiff can show that all of the prerequisites of

Rule 23(a) and one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) has been met. Abdullah v. U.S. Sec.

Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2013). Rule 23(a) considers whether “(1) the class

is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact

common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the

claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately

protect the interests of the class.” This order holds that Wuest cannot be trusted to fairly and

adequately protect the class. 

A proposed class representative is adequate if he “will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class.” Rule 23(a)(4). Our court of appeals has explained that a representative

meets this standard if he (1) has no conflicts of interest with other class members, and (2) will

prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957

(9th Cir. 2003). 

Typicality is satisfied if “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of

the claims or defenses of the class.” Rule 23(a)(3). “The test of typicality is whether other

members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not

unique to the named plaintiff[], and whether other class members have been injured by the same

course of conduct.” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir.

2010) (quotations omitted). “Under the rule’s permissive standards, representative claims are

‘typical’ if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need not

be substantially identical.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998),

overruled on other grounds by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).

Case 3:18-cv-03658-WHA Document 51 Filed 08/06/19 Page 3 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 My Pillow requests judicial notice of various exhibits relating to Wuest’s prior litigation history and

the history of CIPA (Dkt. No. 37). A court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute

because it “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned.” FRE 201(b). Accordingly, the request for judicial notice is GRANTED. 

2

 Wuest has brought twelve class actions in total, including the instant action. Another class action

also remains pending, as discussed in the chart below. 

4

 “[C]lass certification should not be granted if ‘there is a danger that absent class members

will suffer if their representative is preoccupied with defenses unique to it.’ ” Hanon v.

Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Gary Plastic Packaging Corp.

v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990)). This

principle holds true “[r]egardless of whether the issue is framed in terms of the typicality of the

representative’s claims . . . or the adequacy of its representation.” Gary Plastic Packaging

Corp., 903 F.2d at 180; see also Petersen v. Costco Wholesale Co., Inc., 312 F.R.D. 565, 577

(C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2016) (Judge David Carter) (“Unique defenses can go to either the typicality

or adequacy of class representatives.”). 

My Pillow attacks the adequacy of Wuest’s representation and typicality of his claims by

highlighting Wuest’s prior CIPA litigation history and his multiple calls to My Pillow. These

facts, My Pillow contends, show that Wuest “has significant conflicts of interest”; that he would

not prosecute the instant action vigorously, as he has a “history of taking individual payoffs and

dismissing class claims each and every time he has served as a class representative”; and that he

remains vulnerable to unique defenses, thereby rendering his claim atypical and his

representation inadequate (Dkt. No. 36 at 11, 13). My Pillow argues that Wuest’s litigation

history shows that Wuest “has shirked his duties to class members for an individual payment on

ten previous occasions,” thereby “cast[ing] a shadow over his entire claim, his credibility, and

his motives” such that he cannot act as a proper fiduciary for the class (Dkt. Nos. 36 at 11–12;

35-6 at 30:17–23). This order agrees.1

Wuest settled ten of his eleven prior putative class actions — all of which (except for

one) were CIPA actions — on an individual basis, which amounted to zero dollars for the

putative class (see Dkt. No. 44 at 1–2).2

 None of those actions reached the class certification

Case 3:18-cv-03658-WHA Document 51 Filed 08/06/19 Page 4 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 This case was non-CIPA related (see Dkt. No. 44 at 1–2).

4

 Wuest is currently still litigating this case (Dkt. No. 47 at 7:1–5).

5

stage (Dkt. No. 44 at 12). The chart below summarizes Wuest’s prior actions, including (1) the

amount paid to him individually and to Keller Grover LLP as part of the settlements, and (2) the

number of phone calls made to each defendant (see Dkt. Nos. 36 at 2; 44 at 1–2; 47 at 6:3–7:8). 

Case $ to Wuest $ to Keller

Grover LLP

# of Calls

to Def.

Wuest v. Clearwire Corporation, et al., Case No. C 12-05061

JD (N.D. Cal. 2012)

$5,000 $15,000 10

Wuest v. BP Venture Management, Inc., Case No. C 13-01668

TLN (E.D. Cal. 2013)3

n/a n/a n/a

Wuest v. Complete Recovery Corp., Case No. C 17-01674 JD

(N.D. Cal. 2017) 

$10,000 $70,000 1

Wuest v. Comcast Corporation, et al., Case No. C 17-04063

JSW (N.D. Cal. 2017) 

$15,000 $175,000 1

Wuest v. PepsiCo (San Francisco County Superior Court Case

No. CGC-17-560169) (2017) 

$10,000 $25,000 2

Wuest v. Guitar Center Inc. (Sacramento County Superior

Court Case No. 34-2017-00216853) (2017) 

$2,500 $2,500 1

Wuest v. Purity Products Intl., Inc., Case No. C 17-06093 SI

(N.D. Cal. 2017) 

$15,000 $55,000 3

Wuest v. ICON Health & Fitness (Nordic Track) (Alameda

County Superior Court Case No. RG18901957) (2017)4

n/a n/a n/a

Wuest v. Asseenontvstore.com (Alameda County

Superior Court Case No. RG 18903495) (2018)

$5,000 $5,000 2

Wuest v. Augusta Precious Metals (Sacramento County

Superior Court Case No. 34-2018-00233802) (2018) 

$10,000 $42,500 2

Wuest v. NIU of Florida, Inc., Case No. C 18-01587 TLN (AC)

(E.D. Cal. 2018)

$10,000 $65,000 1

Wuest claims that he “intended to pursue the other cases on a class basis” but that “facts

outside his control prevented proceeding on a class basis in a number of those cases,” such as

discovery of arbitration clauses and financial inability to settle on a class-wide basis (Dkt. Nos.

32-6 ¶ 7; 40 at 5). He concedes that it is “completely unusual” that these allegedly showstopping

“odd facts” “are all happening to the same person” (Dkt. No. 47 at 9:15–17, 10:12–13). 

Case 3:18-cv-03658-WHA Document 51 Filed 08/06/19 Page 5 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Wuest’s litigation history is more than unusual. This order finds that it shows a pattern

of using the threat of class actions to extract an undeserved premium on an individual claim. 

This pattern is further evidenced by the fact that in several of the cases, both Wuest and his

counsel received settlement amounts disproportionate to maximum recovery allowed under the

statute. In Wuest’s suit against Complete Recovery Corporation, for example, Wuest received

one allegedly illicit phone call from the defendant. His statutory maximum recovery was thus

$5,000. See Cal. Pen. Code § 637.2. Yet Wuest received $10,000, thanks to the settlement —

i.e., double the statutory maximum amount. 

Equally bad, his counsel received $70,000 in that settlement despite the lack of any

statutory basis for recovery of attorney’s fees. The statute in question makes no provisions for

any attorney’s fees. Counsel falls back on Section 1021.5 of the California Code of Civil

Procedure, a private attorney general statute. It provides attorney’s fees to the prevailing party

“in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public

interest” under certain circumstances (Dkt. No. 44 at 2–3). Specifically, it provides that “[u]pon

motion, a court may award attorneys fees to a successful party . . . in any action which has

resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if . . . a significant

benefit . . . has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons.” Cal. Civ. Proc.

Code § 1021.5 (emphasis added). Putting aside the fact that no court ever awarded counsel the

fees in question, no significant benefit was ever conferred on the general public on a large class

of persons. The only beneficiary was Wuest himself. 

This order finds that Wuest used the threat of a class action to extract a premium deal far

in excess of the value of his individual case. The pattern is quite clear. The premium was

something rightfully due to the “class” but no absent putative class member ever got anything. 

Wuest and his counsel got it all.

Courts have long been wary of such abuse of the class action device. As one district

court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated, “an allegation of class representation is

attended by serious consequences” and “no litigant should be permitted to enhance his own

bargaining power by merely alleging that he is acting for a class of litigants.” Philadelphia Elec.

Case 3:18-cv-03658-WHA Document 51 Filed 08/06/19 Page 6 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (Judge Fullam). “The

classic example of such abuse is the use by a plaintiff and his attorney of class action allegations

as a ‘bargaining chip’ to produce settlement offers which would be unwarranted by the

individual claims of the representative plaintiff.” Smith v. Josten’s Am. Yearbook Co., 78 F.R.D.

154, 168 (D. Kan. 1978) (Judge Rogers), aff’d, 624 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1980). That district

court further noted that:

In the pre-certification context, the settlement problem will often arise in

the form of a motion to dismiss class allegations or to dismiss the action

altogether. Either of these motions may follow a legitimate decision that a

claim is atypical or meritless, but they may also be the culmination of a

process in which the representative plaintiff increases his bargaining

leverage by filing a class suit and then attempts to abandon the class when

his personal objectives have been met. Such a use of the class action may

properly be called an abuse because none of the policies underlying the

creation of the device are advanced.

Id. at 168–69 (quoting Note, Developments in the Law Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318,

1540 (1976) (footnotes omitted)). And, as another district court observed:

Armed with class action allegations in their complaint, and with the

possibility of amendment as of right, the named plaintiffs have additional

leverage when negotiating for settlements of their individual claims. This

is so because the defendants might well be willing to pay the named

plaintiffs a premium for the elimination of the class, a premium to which

they are, of course, not entitled.

Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (Judge Decker) (citing

Philadelphia Elec. Co., 42 F.R.D. at 328).

So too here. Plaintiff has abused the class action device whereby “the defendants might

well be willing to pay the named plaintiffs a premium for the elimination of the class.” Yaffe, 50

F.R.D. at 483. Someone who has abused the Rule 23 process in this way for his own benefit

should not be put in charge of protecting a class. Wuest is liable to abuse the class action device

again and to place his own interest above those of the class. 

Moreover, Wuest’s extensive CIPA litigation history renders him uniquely vulnerable to

a defense strategy. My Pillow’s opposition to the instant motion clearly foreshadows its intent to

concentrate its defense on Wuest’s litigation history to argue that he is “not an ‘aggrieved’ party

and has shirked his duties to class members for an individual payment on ten previous

Case 3:18-cv-03658-WHA Document 51 Filed 08/06/19 Page 7 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

occasions” (Dkt. No. 36 at 12). My Pillow plans to attack Wuest’s prior settlements as the

litigation proceeds and paint Wuest as “a semi-professional plaintiff” (id. at 12–13). Such

defenses would be unique to Wuest. As the undersigned judge previously held, class

certification should be denied where it was clear that the defendant would have pursued “a

defense strategy based in large part on attacking [the plaintiff’s] credibility and motives in light

of his litigation background,” and a jury “might [have] infer[red] that [the plaintiff was] not truly

an aggrieved consumer but a hired plaintiff executing his attorney’s raids on the deep pockets of

food manufacturers.” Backus v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. C 16-00454 WHA, 2016 WL

7406505, *4–6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2016). “The rub is that class certification should not be

granted if ‘there is a danger that absent class members will suffer if their representative is

preoccupied with defenses unique to it.’ ” Id. at *5 (citing Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508). 

Accordingly, this order finds that Wuest is an inadequate class representative and an

atypical plaintiff so as to preclude class certification under Rule 23(a). 

* * *

My Pillow seeks to file under seal in connection with the motion for class certification

certain portions of its opposition and certain exhibits designated as confidential by Wuest (Dkt.

No. 35). 

In this circuit, courts start with a “strong presumption in favor of access” when deciding

whether to seal records. Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.

2006) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Parties seeking to seal judicial records relating to motions that are “more than tangentially

related” to the merits bear the burden of overcoming the presumption with “compelling reasons”

that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure. Ctr. for

Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., 809 F.3d 1092, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2016). Furthermore, Civil Local

Rule 79-5(b) requires administrative motions to file under seal to “be narrowly tailored to seek

sealing only of sealable material.” Because the underlying motion for conditional certification is

more than tangentially related to the merits, this order applies the compelling reasons standard. 

Case 3:18-cv-03658-WHA Document 51 Filed 08/06/19 Page 8 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Wuest filed a supporting declaration stating that the information he seeks to seal relates

to confidential settlement information from other lawsuits in which he was a party and which

potentially contains attorney-client privileged communications. For the reasons stated during the

hearing on Wuest’s motion for class certification, the request to file under seal information

relating to Wuest’s prior litigation history is DENIED. 

As to Exhibit 4, however, which is the retainer agreement between Wuest and his

counsel, Wuest specifically seeks to seal information regarding Keller Grover LLP’s (Wuest’s

counsel) proprietary business practices and Wuest’s personal contact information (Dkt. No. 39 ¶

5). Wuest’s request to seal Exhibit 4 is GRANTED to the extent supported by Wuest’s supporting

declaration. 

My Pillow shall publicly refile the documents at issue in comport with this order by

AUGUST 13 AT NOON. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, class certification is DENIED. The motion to file under seal is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2019. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:18-cv-03658-WHA Document 51 Filed 08/06/19 Page 9 of 9