Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00767/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00767-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Jerry Upton
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY UPTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-0767-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) 

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons discussed below, the court 

will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion 

for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born July 28, 1987, applied for SSI benefits on June 29, 2011, alleging disability 

beginning June 1, 1994. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 118, 224-33. Plaintiff alleged he was 

unable to work due to an oppositional/defiant disorder, a learning disability, bipolar disorder, 

major depression, asthma, migraine headaches, and back problems. AT 239. In a decision dated

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December 5, 2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.1 AT 12-24. The ALJ 

made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since June 29, 2011, the application date.

2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: 

borderline intellectual functioning, mood disorder with psychotic 

features, obsessive compulsive disorder.

3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the 

undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional 

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 

burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but 

with the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant could 

perform simple repetitive one to two step job tasks, with occasional 

coworker contact. The claimant should avoid public contact.

5. The claimant has no past relevant work.

6. The claimant was born on July 29, 1987 and was 23 years 

old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date 

the application was filed.

7. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able 

to communicate in English.

8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the 

claimant does not have past relevant work.

9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform.

10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in 

the Social Security Act, since June 29, 2011, the date the 

application was filed.

AT 14-24.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff’s sole argument is that the ALJ erred by finding plaintiff not disabled because she 

improperly failed to include all of plaintiff’s limitations supported by the record in her residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) determination.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

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“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ did Not Err in Assessing Plaintiff’s RFC

In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff solely argues that the ALJ committed 

prejudicial error by not including all of plaintiff’s limitations supported by the record in the RFC 

assessment. More specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly assigned “substantial 

weight” to the opinion of State agency examining psychologist Dr. Nakagawa despite the fact that 

Dr. Nakagawa opined limitations that the ALJ appeared to impliedly reject by determining that 

plaintiff had an RFC that did not specifically contain such limitations.

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a 

greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

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F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In 

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical 

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, 

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a 

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

Dr. Nakagawa performed a psychological examination of plaintiff on October 14, 2011, 

which involved an interview with plaintiff and several tests measuring plaintiff’s cognitive 

abilities. AT 504-07. Based on this examination, Dr. Nakagawa opined that plaintiff could 

“carry out simple job instructions.” AT 507. She further opined that plaintiff’s “emotional issues 

. . . can negatively impact his ability to consistently respond to co-workers, supervisors, and the 

public, and his ability to respond to usual work situations and deal with changes in routine work 

settings.” Id. Nevertheless, Dr. Nakagawa determined that “[w]ith appropriate treatment, 

[plaintiff] may become stabilized and engage in viable work behaviors.” Id.

The ALJ assigned Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion “considerable weight” because it comported 

with the objective medical evidence in the record and the opinions of the State agency reviewing 

physicians. AT 23. Plaintiff does not appear to contend that this reasoning was improper. 

Rather, plaintiff argues that the limitations contained in the ALJ’s RFC determination did not 

accurately reflect some of Dr. Nakagawa’s functional findings, therefore implying that the ALJ 

improperly rejected those aspects of Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion without providing any reasons for 

doing so. In particular, plaintiff asserts that Dr. Nakagawa opined that plaintiff was fully 

restricted from interacting with supervisors, coworkers, and the public and that the ALJ’s RFC 

determination did not adequately reflect that assessed limitation because the ALJ assessed no 

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restrictions regarding contact with supervisors and only limited plaintiff to occasional coworker 

contact. Plaintiff’s argument is without merit.

As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held, an ALJ may interpret assessed limitations 

into an RFC assessment without repeating each functional limitation verbatim in the RFC 

assessment provided that the limitations contained in the RFC determination accurately capture 

the claimant’s level of functioning supported by the evidence. Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 

1173-74. Here, the ALJ’s RFC determination was consistent with Dr. Nakagawa’s findings, 

including those plaintiff argues the ALJ impliedly rejected. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, Dr. 

Nakagawa did not opine that plaintiff was restricted from all interaction with supervisors, 

coworkers, and the public. Rather, she opined that “emotional issues . . . can negatively impact 

his ability to consistently respond to co-workers, supervisors, and the public,” but that appropriate

treatment would result in an improvement. AT 507 (emphasis added.) The ALJ construed this 

somewhat vague opinion to mean that plaintiff “had possible issues getting along with others, but 

. . . was still able to perform work activity.” AT 23 (emphasis added). This was a reasonable 

interpretation of Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion that was adequately encompassed by the ALJ’s RFC 

determination that plaintiff had no limitations regarding interaction with supervisors, could 

engage in occasional interaction with coworkers, and could not interact with the public. AT 16. 

Even if a different interpretation could be given to Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion, the court is required 

to uphold the ALJ’s rational conclusion. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's 

conclusion that must be upheld.”).

Moreover, the ALJ did not just rely on Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion to arrive at her RFC 

determination regarding plaintiff’s limitations regarding workplace social functioning. The ALJ 

also assigned “great weight” to the opinions of the State agency physicians who reviewed 

plaintiff’s records, which included Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion. AT 23, 105-17, 119-27. Dr. 

Gottschalk, the initial reviewing physician, opined that plaintiff was able to perform “1-2 step 

tasks, not requiring significant, close, coordinated interactions.” AT 114. This opinion was 

reaffirmed upon review by a second State agency physician. AT 124. The ALJ properly 

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considered this opinion in addition to Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion and made an RFC determination 

that reasonably encompassed both physicians’ findings regarding the limitations plaintiff had with 

respect to social functioning. Indeed, the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff was limited from all 

public contact, moderately limited in his ability to interact with coworkers, and not limited with 

regard to contact with supervisors was a reasonable synthetization of the limitations opined by 

both Dr. Nakagawa and Dr. Gottschalk.

Finally, the medical evidence in the record provided substantial support for the ALJ’s 

RFC determination. Plaintiff’s mental health records from throughout the relevant period show 

that plaintiff did not exhibit behaviors or other signs indicating that he could not interact with 

supervisors and had no more than moderate limitations with regard to his ability to interact 

appropriately in a social setting. E.g., AT 505 (noting that plaintiff’s “[m]ood was dysphoric,” 

but that his “[s]ocial judgment was fair.”), 515 (“He has a normal mood and affect. His behavior 

is normal.”), 557 (describing plaintiff’s mood as “anxious,” but noting that he was “[c]ooperative, 

attentive, and [made] continuous eye contact”). To be sure, the only evidence in the record 

indicating that plaintiff exhibited serious antisocial behaviors were those records issued in 

connection with the times when he was admitted to mental health treatment facilities for 

emergency care due to psychotic behavior resulting from cocaine or other amphetamine use, 

which stabilized after plaintiff was no longer intoxicated. AT 450-53, 457-64. The ALJ 

reasonably construed the findings provided in plaintiff’s treatment and examination records to 

indicate that plaintiff had the social limitations provided in the ALJ’s RFC determination.

The ALJ relied on substantial evidence from the record to support her RFC determination 

regarding plaintiff’s social limitations that properly and reasonably encompassed the limitations 

contained within Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion and the other physician opinions in the record. 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in considering Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion or in assigning it great 

weight in support of the RFC determination. In addition, there was substantial evidence in the 

record to support the ALJ’s overall RFC determination.2 Therefore, the ALJ’s use of the 

 

2

The ALJ’s determination that plaintiff was limited to simple repetitive one to two step job tasks

mirrored the limitations opined by Dr. Nakagawa and Dr. Gottschalk with regard to that area of 

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limitations contained in that determination in the hypotheticals she posed to the vocational expert 

and her subsequent reliance on the vocational expert’s testimony to find plaintiff not disabled at 

step five was not in error.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is denied;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 20) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

Dated: March 17, 2016

11 upton0767.ss

 

mental functioning. AT 16, 114 (opining that plaintiff could carry out “1-2 step tasks”), 507 

(“[Plaintiff] can carry out simple job instructions.”). Plaintiff does not appear to contest this 

determination. Similarly, plaintiff does not appear to contest the ALJ’s physical RFC 

determination that plaintiff could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels. A review 

of the medical record regarding plaintiff’s physical functioning reveals that there was substantial 

evidence to support the ALJ’s determination. Therefore, the aspects of the ALJ’s RFC 

determination not directly contested by plaintiff were supported by substantial evidence.

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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