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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Domenick Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 1997 Decided November 25, 1997 

No. 96-3157

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DOMENICK WILLIAMS, A/K/A EDWARD MILTON,

A/K/A DOMENICK MILLER WILLIAMS,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

No. 96-3175

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(91cr00612-02)

James M. Johnstone, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

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Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Eric H. 

Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, 

John R. Fisher and Kenneth C. Kohl, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: SILBERMAN, RANDOLPH, and GARLAND, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Pursuant to an agreement with 

the government, Domenick Williams pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846. He was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment, the 

maximum term within his Guideline range. We have consolidated his appeal from the sentence with his appeal from the 

district court's order denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255.

Only two of the issues Williams raises need concern us. 

The first is whether the sentencing court should have held an 

evidentiary hearing, and made more specific findings, regarding the quantity of crack within the scope of the conspiracy. 

The second is whether the government's failure to fulfill the 

plea agreement entitles Williams to withdraw his plea.

I

During the hearing immediately preceding Williams' plea of 

guilty, the government described a series of transactions in 

which Williams sold approximately 83 grams of crack to 

undercover officers. Although Williams admitted making the 

sales, he hedged about whether each transaction was part of 

the conspiracy to which he was pleading guilty. When sentencing took place, the district court used U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(c)(6)distribution of at least 50 grams but less than 

150 grams of cocaine baseto set Williams' base offense 

level.

Williams now contends that his statements during the plea 

proceedings did not provide a sufficient factual basis for his 

base offense level. He claims that rather than particularized 

findings, see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 

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254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 

693, 721-24 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the sentencing court gave only 

general conclusions regarding the scope of Williams' agreement with his coconspirator and the relationship to that 

agreement of each of the transactions in which Williams 

participated. He therefore requests that any remand be 

accompanied by an order for an evidentiary hearing to determine if his conspiracy encompassed 50 or more grams of 

crack.

An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. To the extent the 

sentencing court's findings fell short, the error was harmless. 

The quantity of drugs was not an element of the conspiracy. 

See United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d 682, 685 

(D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Garrett, 959 F.2d 1005, 

1006 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1992). It had importance only for sentencing. During the period beginning with and including the 

first and last sales involving both Williams and his coconspirator, Williams was personally involved in at least five separate 

drug sales. The total amount of crack exchanged in the sales 

exceeded 80 grams. This established that Williams was in 

fact responsible for distributing more than 50 grams of crack. 

Even if the sales were not part of the conspiracy, they qualify 

as relevant conductconduct Williams admittedwithin the 

meaning of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2), and hence bring Williams' 

base offense level up to the level used by the sentencing 

court. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) & Application Note 9(B) 

(Nov. 1993); id. §§ 2D1.1(c)(6), 3D1.2(d); United States v. 

Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 437-39 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States 

v. Wishnefsky, 7 F.3d 254, 256-57 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United 

States v. Salmon, 948 F.2d 776, 778 & n.* (D.C. Cir. 1991).

II

As to the plea agreement, the government promised to 

"bring to the Court's attention ... the nature and extent of 

[Williams'] cooperation." Plea Agreement ¶ 9 (italics added). 

After pleading guilty, but before his sentencing, Williams 

made four purchases of drugs at the government's instigation. 

When sentencing came, the prosecutor neglected to inform 

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the court of the full extent of Williams' assistance. The 

prosecutor said only that "[t]he one buy that [Williams] did 

make for usand he did provide some cooperation ..., he 

wasn't able to identify who the two participants ... were. 

He identified one, but ... [w]hen we ... tried to push him 

into helping us identify the other ..., he was either unable or 

unwilling ...." Motion Hearing Tr. at 12 (italics added).

The government concedes that the prosecutor erred in 

mentioning only one purchase, that the error left the court 

with a misimpression, that the misimpression "could have 

affected the sentence," Brief for Appellee at 23, and that 

Williams is therefore entitled to resentencing. The government nevertheless resists the conclusion that it "breached" 

the plea agreement, as if the label matters. The only thing 

one might say in the government's favor is that Williams 

should have corrected the prosecutor by telling the sentencing judge about the other three drug deals, or immediately 

objecting to the prosecutor's omission. But the government 

does not offer these arguments to forestall a remand. In any 

event, the plea agreement placed the duty of exposition 

squarely on the prosecutor, doubtless in the hope it would 

carry more weight.

That the prosecutor denied Williams his due is clear 

enough. That Williams might have received a lesser sentence 

absent the breach is also apparent. The only serious question deals with the remedy. Williams thinks resentencing is 

not sufficient recompense. He alleges other defects. His 

counsel was ineffective; there were factual inaccuracies in the 

Presentence Report; the government made false statements; 

the district judge relied on legally irrelevant factors. Put all 

of this together, add the breach of the plea agreement, and, 

Williams claims, it follows that he should be entitled to 

withdraw his plea.

We do not think it follows at all. At the time of the breach, 

Williams had already entered his plea and provided his 

assistance to the government. If the sentencing is redone, 

and the government fulfills its obligations to Williams, he will 

receive everything to which he was entitled, and no more. 

See, e.g., United States v. Kurkculer, 918 F.2d 295, 300 (1st 

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Cir. 1990); United States v. Brody, 808 F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir. 

1986). To allow him to withdraw his plea would be to turn 

back the clock further than necessary. The prosecutor's 

failure to reveal the entirety of Williams' cooperation neither 

deprived his plea of its voluntary character nor cast doubt on 

Williams' acknowledged guilt of the crime to which he pleaded 

guilty. See United States v. Hyde, 117 S. Ct. 1630, 1634 

(1997); United States v. Tobon-Hernandez, 845 F.2d 277, 281 

(11th Cir. 1988). Things might be different if the plea had 

rested on an unfulfillable promise, see United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563, 567 (10th Cir. 1995); or if specific performance would be meaningless, see Kingsley v. United States, 

968 F.2d 109, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1992); or if the government's 

breach had been deliberate or egregious, see 2 WAYNE R.

LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.2, at 

598 (1984). But the government's promise to Williams was 

not unfulfillable; specific performance will be meaningful; 

and the breach was neither deliberate nor egregious. See 

People v. Santobello, 331 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777-78 (N.Y. App. 

Div. 1972), on remand from Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 

257, 263 (1971). Because the original sentencing judge is no 

longer available to preside at resentencing, the problem posed 

in United States v. Wolff, No. 96-3145, slip op. (D.C. Cir. 

Oct. 21, 1997), is not present.

Our judgment that specific performance is the proper 

remedy is not affected by the other alleged defects Williams 

identifies. Nothing Williams tells us calls into question his 

admission of guilt or the validity of his plea. Nothing else, in 

other words, entitles him to proceed to trial or to plead anew. 

See, e.g., Hyde, 117 S. Ct. at 1634; United States v. Broce,

488 U.S. 563, 569, 571-74 (1989); Brady v. United States, 397 

U.S. 742, 750-58 (1970).

We therefore remand the case for resentencing, at which 

time Williams and the government shall be given an opportunity to object to the original or any new presentence report 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(6), and 

shall be entitled to the sentencing court's ruling on "any 

unresolved objections" to the report, see id. Rule 32(c)(1).

Vacated and remanded for resentencing.

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