Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cr-01096/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cr-01096-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rafael Cruz-Ayon
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Rafael Cruz-Ayon, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CR 03-1096-PHX-SMM

No. CV 05-2576-PHX-SMM (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On August 25, 2005, Rafael Cruz-Ayon, (“Movant”), presently confined in the

Federal Correctional Institution in Safford, Arizona, filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside, or Correct Sentence By a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255

("Motion") (Doc. #47). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its

independent review of the record, enter an order dismissing Grounds One and Two of the

Motion and granting and evidentiary hearing as to Grounds Three.

Ordinarily, a court must conduct a hearing on a motion unless it "and the files and

records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief ...." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. The Motion, as well as the files and records, do conclusively establish that CruzAyon is not entitled to relief as to the first two grounds of the motion. See Shah v. United

States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1989). Hence, no hearing is required to rule on the first

two grounds of the present Motion. 

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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

On March 8, 2004, pursuant to a written plea agreement (Doc. #33), Cruz-Ayon pled

guilty to Count 1 of the Indictment (Doc. # 5), Possession With the Intent to Distribute

Methamphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

and 841(b)(1)(A). (Doc. #23.) 

The plea agreement contained several agreements regarding sentencing. First, the

Government agreed to stipulate to a reduction in the Adjusted Offense Level by three levels

if Cruz-Ayon made a full and complete disclosure to the Probation Office of the

circumstances surrounding the offense and if Cruz-Ayon demonstrated an acceptance of

responsibility. (Doc. # 33, p.2) The parties further agreed that 4 kilograms of

methamphetamine was readily provable as being in the possession of Cruz-Ayon for

purposes of distribution, and that, therefore, the offense level under the guidelines should be

determined only as to this agreed upon amount. (Id.) 

The plea was conditioned only upon the understanding that the maximum term CruzAyon could receive was a term of imprisonment of life and a maximum fine of

$4,000,000.00, and a minimum term of imprisonment of 10 years along with a term of

supervised release of at least 5 years. (Doc. # 33, p.1-2.) 

The United States agreed to bring no further charges against Cruz-Ayon arising from

information learned during the investigation. (Doc. # 33., p. 3.) 

Defense counsel submitted objections to the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report

(“PSR”). (Doc. # 31.) Specifically, counsel argued that Cruz-Ayon should have received

a minor role in the offense; counsel objected to the 2-point enhancement for a gun; and,

lastly, objected to not receiving “safety valve” in his guideline calculation. 

The PSR was revised following the Court's findings at sentencing to reflect a total

offense level of 23. The PSR reached this number after the Court determined the CruzAyon's Base Offense Level to be 30. 

Cruz-Ayon was sentenced on October 19, 2004. The Court sentenced him to a prison

term of 135 months. (Doc. # 35.) 

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On February 10, 2005, Cruz-Ayon filed a “MOTION: to withdraw the plea, or for

breach of contract, (plea agreement), or to reinforce the agreement.” (Doc. # 36.) He also

filed a “MOTION to take an appeal as of right.” (Doc. # 38.) The motion to take an appeal

was originally mailed to the Ninth Circuit, then sent to the District Court where, upon filing,

it was characterized as a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence. The Government

responded to the motion to withdraw the plea (Doc. # 39), and Cruz-Ayon filed a reply (Doc.

#40). 

In an order dated March 24, 2005, the District Court found the motion to withdraw

the plea untimely under Rule 11(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and denied

the motion to withdraw the plea without prejudice to Cruz-Ayon filing a § 2255 Motion. The

Court also found the recharacterization of the motion to take an appeal as a § 2255 motion

improvident, and instead, simply denied the motion without prejudice. (Doc. # 41.) 

Cruz-Ayon next filed the present § 2255 action. (Doc. #46.) He raises three grounds

for relief: (1) Fifth Amendment violation by breach of the plea agreement regarding the

sentencing range; (2) Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations by sentencing him under

mandatory, not advisory, sentencing guidelines; and (3) counsel was ineffective by failing

to file notice of appeal. (Doc. # 47.)

On September 8, 2005, the District Court called for an answer from the United States

Attorney. (Doc. # 48.) The Government filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Vacate,

Set Aside or Correct Sentence on November 30, 2005, with exhibits A and B attached. (Doc.

# 53.) The Government also filed an additional affidavit in support of its Response. (Doc.

# 54.) Cruz-Ayon submitted a Reply on January 25, 2006. (Doc. # 56.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a one year

period of limitations from the date on which the judgement of conviction becomes final has

been imposed on the filing of motions for collateral relief by prisoners in federal custody.

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28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Magistrate Judge finds, and the Government agrees, that the Motion

was timely filed.

B. Waiver

The Government asserts that the Court should deny the Motion because Cruz-Ayon

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence.

The right to petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is statutory. United States v.

Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651,

656 (1977) ("The right of appeal, as we presently know it in criminal cases, is purely a

creature of statute....")). A knowing and voluntary waiver of statutory rights under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 is enforceable, id. (citing United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321(9th

Cir.1990)), as long as the plea agreement expressly makes the waiver, United States v. Nunez,

223 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2000);United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994).

Neither concerns of public policy nor due process invalidate a valid waiver of statutory

rights, such as the statutory right of appeal. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321.

"'Generally, courts will enforce a defendant's waiver of his right to appeal if 1) the

language of the waiver encompasses the defendant's right to appeal on the grounds claimed

on appeal, and 2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made."' United States v. Martinez,

143 F.3d 1266, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation omitted). Although waiver

of the right to appeal would not prevent an appeal where the sentence imposed is not in

accordance with the negotiated agreement, a waiver is valid even if a defendant does not

know the exact nature of what appellate issues might later arise at the time the defendant

enters the waiver. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321. 

Cruz-Ayon raises several issues regarding the validity of the waiver in his Reply.

First, Cruz-Ayon asserts that, contrary to his trial attorney's affidavit, his trial attorney did

not discuss the plea agreement with him. (Doc. # 56, p. 1-2.) Cruz-Ayon asserts that his

attorney “just told me sign this plea agreement and you will get 87 months as a sentence. He

only told me I am your Lawyer trust me.” (Doc. # 56, p.2.) Second, Cruz-Ayon asserts that

he does not read English and that is the language his plea agreement was written in and his

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lawyer “never explained me I was surrendering my right to appeal or collaterally attack my

sentence.” (Id.) 

The record of the hearing, however, contradicts his allegations. The Plea Agreement

expressly waived Cruz-Ayon's right to collaterally attack the sentence. (Doc. # 33, p. 3.)

The Plea Agreement states that "Defendant hereby waives any right to appeal or collaterally

attack any matter pertaining to this prosecution and sentence if the sentence imposed is

consistent with the terms of this agreement." (Doc. # 33, p. 3.) The Plea Agreement further

stated that Cruz-Ayon agreed that his attorney had fully advised him of the nature of the

charges to which he was entering a plea, that the guilty plea was not the result of force,

threats, assurances or promises, that his acceptance of the plea was voluntary, and that he

agreed to be bound by its provisions. (Doc. # 33, p. 6.) 

At Cruz-Ayon's change of plea hearing, he was placed under oath and the Court

queried him on his ability to read and speak English. Cruz-Ayon responded that he did not

speak English, but that his lawyer explained the plea agreement to him, and translated it from

English to Spanish, and he understood what he translated. (Reporter's Transcript, Change

of Plea Hearing, p.5.) Cruz-Ayon acknowledged that he signed the plea agreement. (Id., p.

5-6.)

The court informed Cruz-Ayon of the constitutional rights he would forfeit by

pleading guilty. (Id., pp. 17-18.) The court specifically directed Cruz-Ayon's attention to

the waiver of appeal rights in the plea agreement. (Id., p. 12-13). Movant said he understood

and was willing to give up these rights by pleading guilty. (Id, p. 18.) The plea colloquy

indicates Cruz-Ayon was aware of the waiver provision in the plea agreement. See

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a

strong presumption of verity.”). Moreover, Cruz-Ayon's attorney provided an affidavit in

which he states Cruz-Ayon was aware of the waiver provision in the plea. (Doc. # 54, p.1)

The court concludes Cruz-Ayon was aware of the waiver provision in the plea

agreement when he pleaded guilty. The Plea Agreement signed by the Movant demonstrates

that Movant entered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal or

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1 The Court acknowledged at sentencing that the Movant waived his

right to appeal with the exception of one issue which arose between

Movant's change of plea hearing and sentencing hearing. The Court

granted Petitioner the right to file on that limited issue only. 

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collaterally attack any matter pertaining to the prosecution or sentence. The District Court

acknowledged this waiver at the time of sentencing1

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Hearing, p. 29.) The Magistrate Judge further finds that the Movant knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence. 

Did the Government breach the plea agreement?

Although Movant, having waived his rights pursuant to the plea agreement above has

thus waived any sentencing issues where the sentence imposed is in accordance with the

agreement, see Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321, this Court will address the sentencing issue

inasmuch as Movant asserts that the Government has breached the plea agreement. 

The Court finds that the Government did not breach the agreement. The parties

stipulated to a three level downward departure for acceptance of responsibility and that the

offense level under the guidelines would be determined based upon 4 kilograms of

methamphetamine. (Doc. # 33, p. 2.) The agreement acknowledged, as part of the factual

basis of the plea agreement, that a handgun was found in the garage of Cruz-Ayon's home.

Cruz-Ayon unsuccessfully objected to the use of the gun for purposes of enhancement in the

presentence report, and, during the change of plea hearing, acknowledged that the gun was

found, and that it would be an issue at sentencing. (Reporter's Transcript, Change of Plea

Hearing, p.22-23.) Cruz-Ayon acknowledged at sentencing that the sentence he received was

consistent with the terms of the plea agreement. (Reporter's Transcript, Sentencing Hearing,

p. 27-28.) 

Since the Government did not breach the agreement in pursuing a two level upward

adjustment based on the possession of a firearm during the offense, and since the sentence

imposed was within the negotiated agreement, Cruz-Ayon has waived his right to raise any

sentencing issues. 

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Ground One

The Magistrate Judge finds that Movant has waived his right to raise the issues set

forth in Ground One of his petition. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Judge, after its independent review of the record, enter an order dismissing Ground One of

the Petition.

Ground Two

Movant asserts in Ground Two of his motion that the Court's application of the

sentencing guidelines to determine his sentence was in violation of the Sixth Amendment as

confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125

S.Ct. 738 (2005). The Magistrate Judge finds that this issue was waived. 

Counsel brought the issue of the constitutionality of the guidelines to the attention of

the Court at sentencing, requested the Court preserve the issue on appeal, and received an

alternative sentence in the event the guidelines were later determined to not be mandatory.

(Reporters Transcript, Sentencing Hearing, pp. 19-22.) The Court preserved the issue,

allowing an exception to the waiver, (Id., p. 29) and, notified Cruz-Ayon that he could raise

the issue on appeal or in a writ of habeas corpus. (Id., p. 31.) Both Court and counsel were

unsure at that time how to appropriately raise the question, through appeal or through habeas.

(Id., p. 20.) 

The issue preserved, however, was the issue based upon the holding in United States

v. Detwiler, 338 F.Supp.2d 1166 (D.Or. 2004), that the sentencing guidelines were

unconstitutional in light of the Feeney Amendment, which violated separation of powers

principles. (See Reporter's Transcript, Sentencing Hearing, pp. 19-21.) A Booker argument,

on the other hand, is based on the Sixth Amendment's requirement that “[o]ther than the fact

of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the maximum penalty to which a defendant may

be subjected ] must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker,

543 U.S. at 231 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348,

(2000)). While the district judge's order in Detwiler suggested the remedy ultimately adopted

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by Booker, the constitutional basis for the claim is distinct. Thus, no Booker claim was

preserved in this instance, and no Detwiler claim is raised in this Motion.

Furthermore, the Government asserts correctly that, since Booker does not apply

retroactively to convictions that become final prior to its publication on January 14, 2005,

See United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005), and since Cruz-Ayon failed to file

a notice of appeal within ten days of his conviction, Booker does not apply and his claim

must fail. 

The Magistrate Judge finds that Movant has waived his right to raise the issues set

forth in Ground Two of his petition. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Judge, after its independent review of the record, enter an order dismissing Ground Two of

the Petition.

Ground Three

In his third ground for relief, Cruz-Ayon argues his counsel was ineffective when he

failed to file a notice of appeal. This argument is not forfeit by the waiver provision in the

plea agreement. See U.S. v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 “The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective

assistance of counsel.” Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 961(9th Cir. 2002), amended at, 311

F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). To

establish a violation of this right, the defendant must prove “counsel’s performance was

deficient” and the “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. To prove deficient

performance, a defendant can rely on evidence that he sufficiently demonstrated to counsel

his interest in an appeal. See Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1198. Prejudice exists if, but for

the lawyer's refusal, a defendant would have appealed. Id. A defendant need not show his

appeal is likely to have merit. Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 89 S.Ct. 1715

(1969). 

“If a defendant, even one who has expressly waived his right to appeal, files a habeas

petition after sentencing and judgment claiming that he ordered his attorney to appeal and

his attorney refused to do so, two things can happen. The district court can hold an

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evidentiary hearing to decide whether petitioner's allegation is true, and if it is, vacate and

reenter the judgment, allowing the appeal to proceed. Or, if the state does not object, the

district court can vacate and reenter the judgment without a hearing and allow the appeal to

proceed, assuming without deciding that the petitioner's claim is true.” Sandoval-Lopez, 409

F.3d at 1198. 

Section 2255 requires the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the

motions and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to

no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. An evidentiary hearing is usually required if the motion states

a claim based on matters outside the record or events outside the courtroom. United States

v. Burrows, 872 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). The district court may deny a

section 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing only if the movant's allegations, viewed

against the record, either do not state a claim for relief or are so palpably incredible or

patently frivolous as to warrant summary dismissal. Id.

As it has already been established that Cruz-Ayon has stated a claim for relief, and

that the claim is not patently frivolous, the district court may deny the claim without a

hearing only if the allegations, as viewed against the record, are palpably incredible.

Cruz-Ayon alleges that he told defense counsel to appeal. (Motion, p. 9.) Counsel,

in fact, preserved an issue for appeal at the time of sentencing. Four months after sentencing,

the District Court received Cruz-Ayon's untimely “Motion to take an appeal of right.” (Doc.

# 38.) The motion had been delayed, however, having been first filed in the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on January 6, 2005, only three months after Cruz-Ayon's

judgment and commitment. The motion demonstrated Cruz-Ayon's concern as to the status

of his appeal and an uncertainty as to whether or not his attorney had filed a notice of appeal

on his behalf. Correspondence from counsel to Cruz-Ayon indicates that counsel informed

Cruz-Ayon that he had waived his right to appeal. (Doc. # 40, Ex. 2.) Because the

correspondence is dated after the time to file a notice of appeal had expired, it is not clear if

counsel had previously declined filing a notice of appeal because he believed Cruz-Ayon had

waived the right to appeal. Counsel has filed an affidavit stating “That, through my

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communications with Rafael Cruz-Ayon, Rafael Cruz-Ayon did not direct me to file a

Notice of Appeal from the date of sentencing or at any time within ten days from the date of

the entry of his judgment.” (Doc. # 56.) 

Although Cruz-Ayon's credibility is strained before this Court, as noted by the

conflicting statements between his assertions in his reply and his assertions under oath in

court, Cruz-Ayon's actions demonstrate that he believed a notice of appeal had been filed.

Further, this Court finds that Counsel's affidavit is somewhat vague as to the

“communications” he had with Cruz-Ayon. For instance, it is not clear, if in fact, Cruz-Ayon

and counsel discussed the issue of an appeal. In this highly fact driven inquiry, failure to

discuss the prospects of an appeal after preserving the issue might itself be unreasonable. In

this respect, the allegations as viewed against the record are not palpably incredible. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge, after its

independent review of the record, enter an order granting an evidentiary hearing as to Ground

Three of the Petition.

RECOMMENDATION

After careful consideration of the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

and all papers filed in this action, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

enter an order denying Movant's motion as to Grounds One and Two and granting an

evidentiary hearing as to Ground Three.

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within 10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived.

If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case numbers: CR 03-

1096-PHX-SMM and CV 05-2576-PHX-SMM. 

DATED this 8th day of September, 2006.

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