Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00103/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00103-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shawnteia Gaston
Plaintiff
IQOR
Defendant
Steve Malone
Defendant
Devon Vericker
Defendant

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Shawnteia Gaston, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Steve Malone, Devon Vericker, IQOR, 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-00103-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 21), Plaintiff’s Response, and the Reply. For the following reasons, 

Defendants’ Motion will be granted. 

I. Legal Standard 

To state a claim for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a plaintiff must make “‘a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in 

order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations 

omitted). This “short and plain statement” must also be “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. at 679. A claim is plausible if it contains “[f]actual allegations 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555, and to permit a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct 

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alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all 

of Plaintiffs’ plausible factual allegations as true and construes the pleadings in a light 

most favorable to them. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). The 

principle that a court accepts as true all of the allegations in a complaint does not, 

however, apply to legal conclusions or conclusory factual allegations. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 

678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Rather, the plaintiff must at least “allege 

sufficient facts to state the elements of [the relevant] claim.” Johnson v. Riverside 

Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2008). 

II. Background 

Plaintiff Shawnteia Gaston (Ms. Gaston) filed suit against her former employer, 

Defendant iQor (iQor), her former supervisor at iQor, Defendant Steve Malone (Mr. 

Malone), and iQor Vice President Defendant Devon Vericker (Mr. Vericker) for multiple 

counts stemming from allegations of harassment in the workplace. iQor moved to 

dismiss many of the claims in Ms. Gaston’s Complaint (Doc. 6), after which Ms. Gaston 

filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 19). In this Motion, Defendants again move to 

dismiss many of Ms. Gaston’s claims for failure to state a claim. 

Taking all of the alleged facts in the Complaint as true and drawing all inferences 

in Ms. Gaston’s favor, the basis for Ms. Gaston’s claims is the alleged sexual harassment 

of her supervisor, Mr. Malone. Ms. Gaston was an employee of iQor from May 2011 

until iQor terminated her employment in in April 2012. Ms. Gaston was moved to Mr. 

Malone’s team at iQor in July 2011. Beginning in August 2011, Ms. Gaston alleges that 

Mr. Malone made a series of harassing remarks and gestures to Ms. Gaston on account of 

her sex. The alleged harassment culminated in February 2012, when Mr. Malone 

suspended Ms. Gaston and grabbed her by the arm to tell her to leave the office. Ms. 

Gaston complained about Mr. Malone’s actions to multiple iQor Vice Presidents, 

including Mr. Vericker. Ms. Gaston spoke with Mr. Vericker about Mr. Malone’s 

alleged harassment, and Mr. Vericker arranged for Ms. Gaston to be on paid suspension 

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while iQor investigated her complaints. 

Upon Ms. Gaston’s return to iQor after suspension, she was moved to work under 

several different supervisors in response to her complaints about Mr. Malone. 

Nonetheless, Ms. Gaston alleges that Mr. Malone continued to use his authority to make 

her uncomfortable. As a result, Ms. Gaston filed a grievance about Mr. Malone’s 

harassment with Mr. Vericker in March 2012. After receiving the grievance, Ms. Gaston 

alleges that Mr. Vericker threatened to terminate Ms. Gaston if she pursued her grievance 

further. On April 10, 2012, Ms. Gaston received an email from her new supervisor 

informing her that she had been terminated because she did not show up for work or did 

not make required calls. Ms. Gaston alleges that her absence from work had been 

approved in advance by another supervisor, and protested her termination, but iQor did 

not reinstate her employment. This lawsuit followed. 

III. Analysis 

Defendants move to dismiss all counts as against individual Defendants Mr. 

Malone and Mr. Vericker for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

Further, Defendants move to dismissed Counts II, IV, V, VI, and VII against Defendant 

iQor. 

A. Counts I-III, VI: Defendants Malone and Vericker 

Defendants move to dismiss Counts I-III and Count VI of Ms. Gaston’s claims 

against the individual defendants on the grounds that Title VII does not permit liability 

against individual managers or supervisors. The liability scheme for unlawful 

discrimination in the workplace under Title VII limits civil liability to the employer. 

Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993). Civil liability for 

employment discrimination under Title VII therefore “does not extend to individual 

agents of the employer who committed the violations, even if that agent is a supervisory 

employee.” Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 

1998). As a result, Title VII does not provide a cause of action for damages against 

supervisors or fellow employees, Holly D. v. California Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 

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1179 (9th Cir. 2003), and Ms. Gaston’s claims for employment discrimination against the 

individual defendants must be dismissed. Because none of the remaining claims in Ms. 

Gaston’s Complaint could fairly be read to be based on any of Mr. Vericker’s alleged 

acts, all of the remaining Counts against him must be dismissed as well. 

B. Count II: Discrimination in Violation of A.R.S. § 23-425 

Ms. Gaston has alleged that, in addition to violations of Title VII, Defendants 

violated Arizona’s prohibition on employee discharge or discrimination under its 

Employment Practices and Working Conditions statute, A.R.S. § 23-425. Defendants 

move to dismiss this count on the grounds that § 23-425 only addresses discrimination in 

response to an employee’s complaint regarding occupational safety and health standards, 

and does not provide a cause of action for discrimination generally. Section 23-425 

prohibits adverse employment action “against any employee because such employee has 

filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or 

related to this article.” A.R.S. § 23–425(A). The article to which § 23-425 refers is 

Article 10: Division of Occupational Safety and Health. A.R.S. §§ 23-401-433. As a 

result, § 23-425 prohibits adverse employment action against an employee who has made 

a complaint with respect to occupational safety and health standards. Ms. Gaston has not 

alleged that she made a complaint with respect to occupational safety and health 

standards at iQor, and so Count II of her complaint, to the extent that it relies on A.R.S. § 

23–425, will be dismissed. 

Ms. Gaston also alleges discrimination in violation of Title VII under the Count II 

heading. To the extent that Count II brings claims for unlawful discrimination or 

harassment in the workplace, those claims are duplicative of Ms. Gaston’s claims in 

Count I. Defendants do not move to dismiss Count I, and Ms. Gaston has adequately 

pled a claim for harassment in violation of Title VII against iQor in Count I. Count II 

does not, therefore, state an independent claim for relief under Title VII. Count II will be 

dismissed against iQor. 

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C. Count IV: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 

In Count IV, Ms. Gaston alleges that Defendants caused her severe distress as a 

result of Defendants’ negligent conduct. Despite Ms. Gaston’s inclusion of the word 

“Intentional” in the heading for Count IV, the claim is based on Defendants’ alleged 

negligent conduct. (Doc. 19 ¶50.) The Court will therefore treat Count IV as one for 

negligent infliction of emotional distress only. 

Arizona law requires that emotional distress “result[ ] in illness or bodily harm” in 

order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 

114, 593 P.2d 668, 669 (Ariz. 1979). A defendant is liable for negligently causing illness 

or bodily harm if he should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk 

of causing distress or should have realized that the distress he caused might result in 

illness or bodily harm. Ball v. Prentice, 162 Ariz. 150, 781 P.2d 628, 630 n. 1 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1989) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1965)). Illness or bodily 

harm is, however, “a broader concept under Arizona law than might be suggested by the 

common usage of the term. In particular it comprehends ‘substantial, long-term 

emotional disturbances’ unaccompanied by any physical injury.’” Harris v. Maricopa 

Cnty. Superior Court, 631 F.3d 963, 978 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monaco v. 

HealthPartners of Southern Arizona, 196 Ariz. 299, 303, 995 P.2d 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

1999)). And there are some circumstances in which an employer may be liable for 

negligent infliction of emotional distress for actions taken against an employee. Loos v. 

Lowe's HIW, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1021 (D. Ariz. 2011). 

Ms. Gaston has alleged that Defendants’ actions inflicted distress, humiliation, 

shame, and anxiety (Doc. 19 ¶32), and concludes that she has suffered ongoing severe 

physical and mental anguish as a result (Doc. 19 ¶50). Defendants contend that Ms. 

Gaston has failed to state a claim in Count IV because she has not alleged any physical 

injury. But Arizona law, as applied by the Ninth Circuit, does not require physical injury 

in order to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in cases of 

“substantial, long-term emotional disturbances.” Harris, 631 F.3d at 978. Even under 

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that standard, however, Ms. Gaston has failed to plead factual allegations sufficient to 

raise her right to relief on a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress above a 

speculative level. 

Ms. Gaston’s allegation that she suffered and will continue to suffer severe 

physical and mental anguish and emotional distress is merely a conclusory statement 

unsupported by factual allegations in the Complaint. Ms. Gaston’s feelings of distress, 

humiliation, and shame, the only factual allegations which could fairly support her 

conclusory statement, do not approach the level of “substantial, long-term emotional 

disturbances” that could justify an exception to the general rule requiring physical injury 

to state a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. Indeed, in Monaco, the case on 

which the Ninth Circuit relied for the proposition that physical injury is not always 

required to establish an illness or bodily harm under Arizona law, the plaintiff was 

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder after receiving a negligent medical care that 

could cause him to contract leukemia. Ms. Gaston has not alleged any similar facts that 

would support a claim that Defendants’ conduct caused her “substantial, long-term 

emotional disturbances.” Monaco, 196 Ariz. at 303. Because the facts as alleged in her 

Complaint are not sufficient to state the elements of a claim for negligent infliction of 

emotional distress, Ms. Gaston has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted 

and Count IV will be dismissed with leave to amend. 

D. Count V: Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 

In Count V, Ms. Gaston has alleged that Defendants violated the Fair and 

Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), an amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting 

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., by writing down consumer credit card information of its 

customers. Ms. Gaston does not have standing to bring a claim for violation of FACTA. 

In order to have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered a concrete and particularized 

injury in fact. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). According to 

Ms. Gaston, Defendants violated FACTA by writing down the credit card numbers of its 

customers. The alleged illegal act, then, could cause injury only to the customer whose 

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privacy was violated. Ms. Gaston has not alleged that Defendants misused her credit card 

information, and so cannot allege that she herself suffered a concrete injury from the 

Defendants’ alleged violation of FACTA. As a result, Count V will be dismissed for lack 

of standing. 

E. Count VI: Constructive Discharge 

Ms. Gaston alleges in Count VI that Defendants violated A.R.S. § 23-1502 by 

constructively discharging her. Though she titled this section of the Complaint 

“Wrongful Discharge,” Ms. Gaston’s claim is based entirely on A.R.S. § 23-1502. 

Section 23-1502 creates a cause of action for constructive discharge when an employee is 

forced to leave a position because of objectively difficult or unpleasant working 

conditions or because of a pattern of discriminatory harassment. But Ms. Gaston has 

alleged that Defendants terminated her employment, not that she was constructively 

discharged. To the extent that Ms. Gaston intended to allege a claim of wrongful 

termination under Title VII rather than a claim for constructive discharge under A.R.S. § 

23-1502, that allegation is fairly contained in Count III of her Complaint. (Doc. 19 ¶45.) 

As a result, Count VI will be dismissed 

F. Count VII: Assault 

Finally, in Count VII, Ms. Gaston brings a claim for the tort of assault against Mr. 

Malone and iQor. In order to state a claim for the intentional tort of assault in Arizona, a 

plaintiff must allege that the defendant intended to cause harm or offensive contact or 

intended to cause apprehension of an immediate harmful or offensive contact and did, in 

fact, cause apprehension of such contact. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965). 

Ms. Gaston alleges that Mr. Malone grabbed her by the arm in an effort to get her to 

leave the office more quickly (Doc. 19 ¶15.) Ms. Gaston has not, therefore alleged that 

Mr. Malone either intended to cause harmful conduct, or intended to cause apprehension 

of harmful conduct. Ms. Gaston also does not allege that Mr. Malone’s actions did, in 

fact, cause her apprehension of immediate harmful conduct. Because she has not alleged 

facts to support either of the elements of a claim for assault, Ms. Gaston’s Count VII will 

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be dismissed. 

G. Leave to Amend 

Leave to amend a complaint that fails to state a claim should be freely given 

“when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). And the Ninth Circuit has instructed 

district courts to grant leave to amend when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim 

“unless the court determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegations of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Because of the Court’s order 

discouraging motions to dismiss (Doc. 12), Ms. Gaston was able to amend the Complaint 

in light of Defendants’ arguments that the complaint was deficient. In addition, 

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) before Ms. Gaston amended her 

complaint, which Ms. Gaston used to structure her amending pleading. Ms. Gaston was 

therefore provided ample notice and opportunity to amend her complaint to state a claim. 

In light of these opportunities, and of the core legal deficiencies in the claims, further 

amendment of the pleadings would be futile for Counts II, V, VI, and VII. The 

deficiencies in Ms. Gaston’s complaint for those claims that will be dismissed would not 

be cured by allegations of other facts. As a result, the claims dismissed by this order will 

be dismissed with prejudice. 

In Count IV, Ms. Gaston has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted because she has not alleged sufficient facts to support her claim. As a result, it is 

possible that the deficiency in Count IV could be cured by the allegation of other facts, 

and Ms. Gaston will granted leave to amend on this Count only. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 21) is granted. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims against Defendant Devon Vericker 

are dismissed with prejudice. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII are dismissed 

against Defendant Steve Malone with prejudice. 

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 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts II, V, VI, and VII are dismissed against 

Defendant iQor with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count IV is dismissed against Defendants Steve 

Malone and iQor with leave to file an amended complaint with respect to Count IV only 

by May 10, 2013. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are Counts I and III against Defendant 

iQor only. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the 

Alternative, Motion to Strike (Doc. 6) is denied as moot. 

 Dated this 23rd day of April, 2013. 

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