Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01216/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01216-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joshua Earl Beck
Petitioner
Mike Evans
Respondent

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSHUA EARL BECK, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

MIKE EVANS, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-cv-01216-LJO-TAG HC 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS FOR VIOLATION OF STATUTE OF

LIMITATIONS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS BE

FILED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant habeas petition was filed on September 27, 2005. 

(Doc. 1). On March 19, 2007, the Court issued an order to show cause why the petition should

not be dismissed for violating the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

(Doc. 6). Petitioner did not respond to the order to show cause. 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a

petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the

respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook,

260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001).

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The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner

adequate notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. 

Here, the Court advised Petitioner, in the order to show cause dated March 19, 2007, that the

Court was considering dismissal of the petition for untimeliness. The order gave Petitioner an

opportunity to respond and provide information that might affect the Court’s determination

regarding the petition’s timeliness. However, over six months has elapsed and yet Petitioner has

not responded in any way, despite being forewarned of the possibility that his petition may be

dismissed.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320

(holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after the statute’s enactment). The original

petition was filed on March 1, 2004 (Doc. 1), and thus it is governed by the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

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(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court on June

23, 2004. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Thus, direct review would conclude on September 21, 2004, when the

ninety-day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v.

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.1999); Smith v.

Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8th Cir.1998). Petitioner would then have one year from

September 21, 2004, or until September 21, 2005, absent applicable statutory or equitable tolling,

within which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The instant petition was filed on September 27, 2005, six days after the expiration of the

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, and therefore, absent applicable statutory or equitable

tolling, the instant petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In this case, Petitioner indicates in his petition that he did not seek any

collateral review in the state courts prior to filing his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on

September 27, 2004. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. 

The one-year period may also be subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on

time.” Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288-1299 (9th Cir.

1997), overruled on other grounds, Calderon v. United Sates District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998), itself abrogated by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003). “When external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim,

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

922 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

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The petition is signed by Petitioner and dated “8-24-05.” (Doc. 1, p. 6). However, from this document 1

alone, there is no way for the Court to determine whether Petitioner actually handed the petition to prison authorities

on this date or at any other time prior to September 21, 2005, thus availing Petitioner of the benefits of the “mailbox

rule.” 

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However, it is extremely difficult for a petitioner to establish equitable tolling. In order to

establish equitable tolling, a prisoner must demonstrate that “extraordinary circumstances beyond

[his] control” made it "impossible to file a petition on time.” (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288-1299. 

In Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800-801 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the

petitioner “must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the but-for and proximate

cause of his untimeliness.” More recently, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this rule in EspinozaMatthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). In that case, the Court pointed out

that the determination vis-a-vis equitable tolling is “highly fact-dependent” and that the petitioner

“bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.” Id. Here, Petitioner has

made no claim of equitable tolling. 

The only other way in which the one-year rule can be extended is via the “prison mailbox

rule.” The “prison mailbox rule” provides that a federal habeas petitioner’s petition is deemed

filed on the date the petitioner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing to the district court. 

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir.

2001)(citation omitted). Petitioner may have handed his petition over to prison authorities for

filing with this Court on or before September 21, 2005, thus making the petition timely.1

Unfortunately, Petitioner seems unaware of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations and has provided

no information in his petition regarding when he delivered the petition to prison authorities nor

has he provided any supporting documentation to substantiate such a claim. 

Thus, in the absence of statutory or equitable tolling, and without any information

regarding the potential applicability of the “mailbox rule,” the Court is left to conclude that this

petition is untimely and should be summarily dismissed.

 RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Doc. 1), be DISMISSED for failure to comply with the one-year statute of limitations. 

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These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The District Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 4, 2007 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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