Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01919/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01919-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG
Appellee
Xilinx, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

XILINX, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

PAPST LICENSING GMBH & CO. KG,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1919

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 5:14-cv-04963-LHK, 

Judge Lucy H. Koh.

______________________ 

Decided: February 15, 2017

______________________ 

MATTHEW J. SILVEIRA, Jones Day, San Francisco, CA, 

argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

PATRICK THOMAS MICHAEL. 

NICOLE E. GLAUSER, DiNovo, Price, Ellwanger & Hardy LLP, Austin, TX, argued for defendant-appellee. Also

represented by ANDREW DINOVO, JAY D. ELLWANGER. 

CHARLES DUAN, Public Knowledge, Washington, DC, 

for amici curiae Public Knowledge, Electronic Frontier 

Foundation. Also represented by VERA RANIERI, Electronic 

Frontier Foundation, San Francisco, CA.

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2 XILINX, INC. v. PAPST LICENSING GMBH & CO. KG

STEVEN MOORE, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton 

LLP, San Francisco, CA, for amici curiae for AO 

Kaspersky Lab, Limelight Networks, Inc., QVC, Inc., SAS 

Institute Inc., Symmetry LLC, Vizio, Inc. 

HARRISON J. FRAHN, IV, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, 

LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for amici curiae Thirty-Four Law 

Professors. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, and DYK, Circuit 

Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

Xilinx, Inc., (“Xilinx”) appeals from a judgment of the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of 

California dismissing Xilinx’s declaratory judgment action 

against Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG (“Papst”) for 

lack of personal jurisdiction. Because we hold that the 

district court has specific personal jurisdiction over Papst

with respect to Xilinx’s declaratory judgment action, we 

reverse and remand. 

BACKGROUND

Xilinx is a Delaware corporation that is headquartered in San Jose, California. Xilinx designs, develops, 

and markets programmable logic devices for use in electronics systems. Papst is the assignee of U.S. Patent Nos. 

6,574,759 and 6,704,891 (collectively, “the patents-insuit”), which are directed to methods for generating and 

verifying memory tests in electronics. 

Papst is organized under the laws of Germany and 

has its principal place of business there. Papst is a nonpracticing entity that is solely in the business of monetizing and licensing intellectual property rights. According 

to Papst, it “has always been in the business of obtaining 

and licensing patents, it does not manufacture or sell any 

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XILINX, INC. v. PAPST LICENSING GMBH & CO. KG 3

consumer products, and it has always had fewer than 30 

employees.” J.A. 1133. Xilinx points to various Papst 

marketing materials and its website in which Papst 

describes itself as “a global patent licensing and monetization firm specialized in enforcing infringed patents with 

the goal to conclude a license agreement with the infringer.” Exhibit 9 at 1, Declaration of Jason M. Gonder, 

Xilinx, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG, No. 5:14-

cv-04963-LHK (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2015), ECF No. 53-9 

(“Exhibit 9”). 

These materials explain the business model by which 

Papst acquires and then asserts patent rights. “Before 

agreeing to purchase a patent,” Papst performs “due 

diligence” to “identify patent infringement by comparing 

the patent claims against the potentially infringing 

products.” J.A. 1733. Papst’s due diligence involves 

“identify[ing] the companies potentially involved in infringements, and the markets they are selling their 

product in—where they are located, and how large they 

are, including where the product is made as well as where 

it is sold.” Id. 

When Papst identifies infringers, it “notif[ies] them 

that [Papst] believe[s] they are infringing.” Id. Papst 

“then travel[s] extensively to visit the infringers.” Id. 

“After technical discussions confirming the infringement, 

the conversation moves towards licensing the patents 

through an agreement.” Id. “If negotiations fail, [Papst] 

is prepared to effectively enforce the respective patents in 

courts. Especially in the United States, Germany, and 

the Netherlands [Papst has] years and years of experience 

in patent litigation.” Exhibit 9 at 1. Papst’s marketing 

materials explain that Papst has “been very successful 

with legal actions. With [Papst’s] outside partners including attorneys, [Papst has] been very successful and won 

many high-profile patent cases.” J.A. 1733.

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Papst has repeatedly filed patent infringement suits 

in California federal courts. The record shows that Papst 

has filed patent infringement lawsuits in California at 

least seven times between 1994 and 2007 based on other 

patents in Papst’s portfolio. 

Papst’s actions leading up to the filing of this declaratory judgment action are consistent with Papst’s business 

model. Before acquiring the patents-in-suit in October 

2012, Papst performed its due diligence by investigating 

potential infringers and targets for licensing of those 

patents. Xilinx describes the investigation as involving 

twenty-nine target companies, twenty-eight of which are 

based, or have significant presence, in California. One of 

the companies that Papst investigated was Xilinx. 

In January 2014, Papst sent a patent-infringement 

notice letter to Xilinx. In the letter, Papst identified 

several of Xilinx’s products that allegedly infringed the 

patents-in-suit, and stated that “Papst proposes commencing discussions with Xilinx so that Xilinx can consider taking a license to the Papst Patents.” J.A. 1053. After 

Xilinx did not respond to Papst’s first set of letters, in 

April 2014, Papst sent a second letter, “again encourag[ing] Xilinx to participate in a dialogue regarding 

taking a license to the” patents-in-suit. J.A. 1056. On 

October 16, 2014, three representatives of Papst, including Papst’s managing director, its senior counsel, and its 

Texas-based outside counsel, traveled to California to 

meet with Xilinx. The purpose of the meeting was to 

discuss Papst’s allegations of infringement of the patentsin-suit and Xilinx’s potential licensing of these patents. 

No agreement resulted from these contacts.

On November 7, 2014, Xilinx filed this declaratory 

judgment action in the Northern District of California 

seeking a declaration that Xilinx’s products do not infringe the patents-in-suit and that the patents are invalid. 

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ment action in California, Papst filed an infringement suit 

against Xilinx in the District of Delaware asserting the 

same patents-in-suit. Papst moved to dismiss the California declaratory judgment action for lack of personal 

jurisdiction, or in the alternative, transfer the action to 

the District of Delaware. 

On July 9, 2015, the court granted Papst’s motion and 

dismissed the declaratory judgment action for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. The court first determined that it 

lacked general jurisdiction over Papst because it “is not at 

home in California,” recognizing that “Papst is not incorporated in California, nor does it have its principal place 

of business” there. J.A. 8–10. 

The court also held that it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Papst. The court observed that “Papst 

certainly has many connections to the state of California.” 

J.A. 22–23. However, relying principally on our decisions 

in Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 

F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and its progeny, the court 

recognized that “even if the ‘purposefully directed’ and 

‘arises out of’ prongs are satisfied by the defendant’s 

enforcement activities” in the forum, “[n]ot all assertions 

of jurisdiction based on enforcement activities comport 

with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” J.A. 11 (citing 

Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 

1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). The court determined that Papst’s 

California contacts were “either related solely to Papst’s 

attempts to license the patents, which the Federal Circuit 

has held insufficient, or according to Federal Circuit law 

are irrelevant to the parties’ instant dispute.” J.A. 23. 

With respect to Papst’s prior litigation in California, the 

court explained that these “enforcement activities regarding other patents are irrelevant to the question at hand: 

whether this Court can assert specific jurisdiction over 

Papst based on its efforts to enforce the patents-in-suit.” 

J.A. 22. “The Federal Circuit has ‘consistently’ made 

clear that the ‘other activities’ for purposes of personal 

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jurisdiction must relate to ‘the relevant patents.’” Id.

(quoting Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1334). The court concluded 

that “even when considered as a whole these connections 

are insufficient to vest this Court with specific jurisdiction 

over Papst.” J.A. 23. 

The court declined to allow additional discovery related to Papst’s prior enforcement activities in California. 

The court noted that Papst had already provided some 

discovery and concluded that additional discovery would 

be a waste of resources. 

Xilinx appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).1

DISCUSSION

I. MOOTNESS

Papst first argues that events post-dating Xilinx’s filing of this appeal render the appeal moot. We disagree. 

“A case becomes moot . . . ‘only when it is impossible for a 

court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 

669 (2016), as revised (Feb. 9, 2016) (quoting Knox v. Serv. 

Emps., 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012)). Following dismissal 

of Xilinx’s California declaratory judgment action in-

 

1 Altera Corporation (“Altera”) was also a party to 

this appeal. Like Xilinx, it filed a declaratory judgment 

action in the Northern District of California, and Papst 

filed an infringement suit in the District of Delaware. 

The Northern District of California also dismissed Altera’s declaratory judgment action for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. We subsequently granted Altera’s unopposed 

motion for a determination that its appeal was moot 

based on Altera’s filing of declaratory judgment counterclaims in Papst’s California patent infringement action 

after it was transferred from Delaware.

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volved in this appeal, on February 23, 2016, the District of 

Delaware transferred Papst’s infringement suit to the 

Northern District of California—the same court that had 

dismissed the declaratory judgment action. Papst argues 

that the transferred action has provided Xilinx another 

opportunity to bring its declaratory judgment action as a 

counterclaim in its desired forum, rendering this appeal 

moot. 

However, Xilinx has not asserted declaratory judgment counterclaims in the transferred action. The mere 

availability of this unpursued alternative route to relief 

does not render moot Xilinx’s action seeking the same 

relief. See Campbell-Ewald Co., 136 S. Ct. at 672 (“[A]n 

unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not 

moot a plaintiff’s case . . . .”). Accordingly, Xilinx’s appeal 

is not moot.

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The central issue in this case is whether the exercise 

of specific personal jurisdiction over Papst in California is 

fair and reasonable. “Personal jurisdiction is a question 

of law that we review de novo.” Autogenomics, Inc. v. 

Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 

2009). Because Xilinx’s declaratory judgment appeal 

involves only claims of patent noninfringement, “we apply 

Federal Circuit law because the jurisdictional issue is 

intimately involved with the substance of the patent 

laws.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1328). Where, as here, “the district 

court’s disposition as to the personal jurisdictional question is based on affidavits and other written materials in 

the absence of an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need 

only to make a prima facie showing that defendants are 

subject to personal jurisdiction.” Avocent, 552 F.3d at 

1329 (quoting Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 

1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). We, like the district court, 

“accept the uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s 

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complaint as true and resolve any factual conflicts in the 

affidavits in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id.

A 

“Determining whether jurisdiction exists over an outof-state defendant involves two inquiries: whether a 

forum state’s long-arm statute permits service of process 

and whether assertion of personal jurisdiction violates 

due process.” Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1017 (quoting 

Genetic Implant Sys., Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp., 123 F.3d 

1455, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). California’s long-arm statute permits service of process to the full extent allowed by 

the due process clauses of the United States Constitution.2 Elecs. for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1349; see also Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (West). Accordingly, “the two

inquiries collapse into a single inquiry: whether jurisdiction comports with due process.” Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

In the case of specific, as opposed to general jurisdiction, we have summarized the Supreme Court’s due 

process jurisprudence in a three-factor test: “(1) whether 

the defendant ‘purposefully directed’ its activities at 

residents of the forum; (2) whether the claim ‘arises out of 

or relates to’ the defendant’s activities with the forum; 

and (3) whether assertion of personal jurisdiction is 

 

2 As we explained in Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 

1541 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the due process inquiry implicates 

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the 

Fourteenth Amendment, because subject matter jurisdiction over a patent action exists by virtue of a federal 

question, not the diversity of the parties. Id. at 1544–45. 

Nonetheless, we have applied the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction regarding the demands 

of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to 

this context. Id.

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‘reasonable and fair.’” Inamed, 249 F.3d at 1360. “The 

first two factors correspond with the ‘minimum contacts’ 

prong of the [International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 

U.S. 310 (1945)] analysis, and the third factor corresponds 

with the ‘fair play and substantial justice’ prong of the 

analysis.” Inamed, 249 F.3d at 1360.

With respect to the first factor of the minimum contacts portion of specific personal jurisdiction analysis, “it 

is essential in each case that there be some act by which 

the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. 

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). As to the second 

factor, also part of the minimum contacts analysis, the 

court must determine whether “the suit ‘aris[es] out of or 

relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” 

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 

U.S. 915, 923–24 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting 

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 

408, 414 n.8 (1984)). 

Many of our recent cases have been concerned with 

the two minimum contacts factors of the analysis. We 

have considered forum-related activities of the patentee 

with respect to the patents in suit that do not necessarily 

relate to the particular controversy, such as exclusive 

licensing, though at the same time we have (appropriately) rejected the existence of contacts concerning other 

patents as being pertinent to the minimum contacts 

analysis. See Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1336 (explaining

relevant contacts are those that the “defendant patentee 

purposefully directs . . . at the forum which relate in some 

material way to the enforcement or the defense of the 

patent”); see also Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 

886 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (extra-judicial patent enforcement); 

Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 444 

F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (exclusive license); Elecs. 

for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1351 (hiring of in-forum attorney 

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to communicate with plaintiff); Inamed, 249 F.3d at 1361 

(exclusive license); Akro, 45 F.3d at 1548–49 (exclusive 

license).

Papst makes no argument that its activities directed 

to Xilinx in California do not satisfy the minimum contacts prong of the specific jurisdiction test. See Papst Br. 

at 21 (“A cease-and-desist letter to a forum resident may 

give rise to a declaratory judgment cause of action and 

satisfy[] the minimum contacts portion of the specific 

jurisdiction test.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, there is no 

question that Papst has the required minimum contacts 

with California. Papst purposefully directed its activities 

to California when it sent multiple notice letters to Xilinx 

and traveled there to discuss Xilinx’s alleged patent 

infringement and potential licensing arrangements. 

Xilinx’s declaratory judgment action of noninfringement certainly relates to these contacts. In the context of 

declaratory judgment actions involving assertions of 

patent noninfringement or invalidity, we have concluded

that cease-and-desist letters sent by the patentee defendant into the forum are relevant contacts in the personal 

jurisdiction analysis. Red Wing, 148 F.3d at 1360. Minimum contacts may be established by “the threat of an 

infringement suit, as communicated in a cease-and-desist 

letter.” Id.; see also id. (explaining that “cease-and-desist 

letters alone are often substantially related to the cause of 

action (thus providing minimum contacts)”). 

Even more significant than the notice letters is 

Papst’s visit to Xilinx in California, another activity that 

certainly “relate[s] in some material way to the enforcement or the defense of the patent.” Avocent, 552 F.3d at 

1336. As the Supreme Court has explained, “physical 

entry into the State—either by the defendant in person or 

through an agent, goods, mail, or some other means—is 

certainly a relevant contact.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 

1115, 1122 (2014). This court has previously recognized 

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that in-person visits to the forum are significant contacts 

in the declaratory judgment context. See Elecs. for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1351; Deprenyl Animal Health, Inc. v. 

Univ. of Toronto Innovations Found., 297 F.3d 1343, 1352 

(Fed. Cir. 2002). Therefore, the minimum contacts prong 

is satisfied here. 

B 

In arguing against personal jurisdiction, Papst focuses entirely on the “reasonable and fair” prong and argues 

that “exercising specific jurisdiction over a patentee based 

solely on cease-and-desist letters, which contain notice of 

the sender’s patent rights, accusations of infringement, 

and/or licensing offers, does not comport with fair play or 

substantial justice.” Papst Br. at 21–22 (citing Red Wing, 

148 F.3d at 1360–61). 

As the Supreme Court has made clear, the specific jurisdiction analysis is a two-step process, and the reasonableness prong is separate from the minimum contacts 

prong. The Court noted in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. 

Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014), “[f]irst, a court is to determine 

whether the connection between the forum and the episode-in-suit could justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Then, in a second step, the court is to consider 

several additional factors to assess the reasonableness of 

entertaining the case.” See also id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., 

concurring) (“Our personal jurisdiction precedents call for 

a two-part analysis. The contacts prong asks whether the 

defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum State to 

support personal jurisdiction; the reasonableness prong 

asks whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable under the circumstances.”); 4 Charles Alan 

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam N. Steinman, Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 1067.2 (4th ed. 2015) (explaining 

that the Supreme Court “case law reflects a two-step 

approach that requires both (1) that the defendant establish minimum contacts with the forum State, and (2) that 

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the assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and 

comports with fair play and substantial justice”). 

The inquiry under the reasonableness prong (step 

two) is not limited to the specific facts giving rise to, or 

relating to, the particular litigation. “Once it has been 

decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may 

be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport 

with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” Burger King 

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (emphasis 

added) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320). These other 

factors—the burden on the defendant, the plaintiff’s 

interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, etc., 

id. at 477—often cannot be analyzed without looking to 

circumstances beyond those that give rise or relate to the 

specific lawsuit. 

In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 

Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987), the one case where 

the Supreme Court held that the reasonableness requirement was not satisfied, the Court looked beyond 

minimum contacts to consider other factors. For instance, 

the Court explained that the distance between Asahi’s 

headquarters in Japan and the California forum, as well 

as subjecting a foreign company to United States law, 

would impose a heavy burden on Asahi. Id. at 114. The 

Court also explained that the plaintiff, another foreign 

entity, did not demonstrate that litigating in California 

would be more convenient than litigating in Taiwan or 

Japan. Id. 

While the reasonableness inquiry is not limited to 

considering the minimum contacts, the Supreme Court 

has made clear that the reasonableness prong is typically 

satisfied by a showing of minimum contacts. “Where a 

defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at 

forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must 

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present a compelling case that the presence of some other 

considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” 

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477; see also id. at 476 (explaining that where a defendant’s “activities are shielded by 

the benefits and protections of the forum’s laws it is 

presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit 

to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well” (quotation marks omitted)). The Court identified five considerations relevant to the reasonableness analysis: 

[C]ourts in “appropriate case[s]” may evaluate [1] 

“the burden on the defendant,” [2] “the forum 

State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” [3] 

“the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient 

and effective relief,” [4] “the interstate judicial 

system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient 

resolution of controversies,” and [5] the “shared 

interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” 

Id. at 477 (second alteration in original) (quoting WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).

Here, as discussed in Part II.A above, Papst has the 

required minimum contacts with California to make the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction presumptively reasonable. For the reasons that follow, Papst has failed to meet 

its burden to show a “compelling case” under Burger King

that jurisdiction is unreasonable. 471 U.S. at 477. 

Papst makes no argument that factors 2–5 weigh 

against a finding of personal jurisdiction, see id., nor could 

it. Xilinx, which is headquartered in California, indisputably has an interest in protecting itself from patent 

infringement by obtaining relief “from a nearby federal 

court” in its home forum.3 Breckenridge, 444 F.3d at

 

3 Absent an ability to litigate its declaratory judgment action in California, Xilinx would be remitted to 

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1367–68 (explaining that one reasonableness factor 

“requires the court to focus on the convenience and effectiveness of relief from the plaintiff’s perspective”). The 

Supreme Court has recognized the importance of declaratory judgment actions in patent cases for allowing accused 

infringers to secure a determination that their products 

do not infringe the patent or that the patent is invalid. 

See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 

134 S. Ct. 843, 849 (2014); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 

Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007). Likewise, California has 

“definite and well-defined interests in commerce and 

scientific development,” Viam Corp. v. Iowa Exp.-Imp. 

Trading Co., 84 F.3d 424, 430 (Fed. Cir. 1996), and “California has a substantial interest in protecting its residents from unwarranted claims of patent infringement,” 

Elecs. for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1352. Jurisdiction over 

Xilinx’s declaratory judgment claims in California would 

also result in an efficient resolution of the controversy. 

Finally, there does not appear to be any conflict between 

the interests of California and any other state, because 

“the same body of federal patent law would govern the 

patent invalidity claim irrespective of the forum.” Id. 

This leaves for our consideration the burden on the 

defendant. With respect to this factor, the Supreme Court 

has explained, “[w]hen minimum contacts have been 

established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the 

forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the 

serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.” Asahi, 

480 U.S. at 114. Thus, instances in which the fairness 

analysis will defeat “otherwise constitutional personal 

jurisdiction are limited to the rare situation in which the 

 

litigating on the opposite side of the country in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 

the statutory venue for actions against patentees not 

residing in the United States. See 35 U.S.C. § 293.

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plaintiff’s interest and the state’s interest in adjudicating 

the dispute in the forum are so attenuated that they are 

clearly outweighed by the burden of subjecting the defendant to litigation within the forum.” Akro, 45 F.3d at 

1549 (quotation marks omitted). 

Papst argues that its contacts with Xilinx in California are insufficient to justify the burden of litigating in 

that forum. Papst focuses on our prior cases holding that

because of “policy considerations unique to the patent 

context,” Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 

1194, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2003), a patentee’s sending of warning letters and offers to license, “without more, . . . are not 

sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Due Process in 

declaratory judgment actions.” Red Wing, 148 F.3d at 

1360. 

In Red Wing, we explained that although warning letters satisfy the requirement of minimum contacts, “such 

letters cannot satisfy the [fairness] prong of the Due 

Process inquiry.” Id. at 1361. We explained the rationale 

for this rule: “[p]rinciples of fair play and substantial 

justice afford a patentee sufficient latitude to inform 

others of its patent rights without subjecting itself to 

jurisdiction in a foreign forum.” Id. at 1360–61. To 

require a defendant to answer “in a distant foreign forum 

when its only contacts with that forum were efforts to give 

proper notice of its patent rights” would place an undue 

burden on the defendant.4 Id. at 1361.

 

4 The court further held that the inclusion of offers 

to license the patents “within a cease-and-desist letter 

does not somehow convert that letter into something more 

than it was already.” Id. The court explained that “[a]n 

offer to license is more closely akin to an offer for settlement of a disputed claim rather than an arms-length 

negotiation in anticipation of a long-term continuing 

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We disagree with Papst that this case is controlled by

Red Wing and its holding that certain types of contacts, 

by themselves, are not sufficient to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction. As we have discussed in the 

minimum contacts analysis, Papst has done more than 

just send letters to Xilinx. Representatives from Papst 

traveled to California to meet with Xilinx in person to 

discuss Papst’s infringement contentions and licensing 

offer with respect to the patents-in-suit.5 The Supreme 

Court noted in Burger King that “territorial presence 

frequently will enhance a potential defendant’s affiliation 

with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of 

suit there.” 471 U.S. at 476.

Moreover, there are other facts that, under the Burger 

King analysis, confirm the view that the burden on the 

defendant is not undue. For instance, the burden on 

Papst is mitigated by Papst’s status as a non-practicing 

patent holder residing outside the United States. This is 

not a case like Red Wing, where the defendant conducts 

its affairs in one state and is called to litigate in a distant 

state rather than its own residence. See 148 F.3d at 1357. 

By the very nature of its business, Papst must litigate its 

patents in the United States in fora far from its home 

 

business relationship” and that the policy favoring settlement “squarely invokes one of the considerations 

enumerated by the Supreme Court for the second prong of 

a proper Due Process analysis, namely, ‘the interstate 

judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient 

resolution of controversies.’” Id. (quoting World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).

5 We note that Papst also traveled twice to California to meet with Altera for the same purpose.

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XILINX, INC. v. PAPST LICENSING GMBH & CO. KG 17

office. In this context the burden on Papst to litigate in 

California appears not undue.6 

The lack of significant burden on Papst is also evidenced by Papst’s prior litigations in California itself. 

Papst has repeatedly availed itself of the California 

federal court system—at least seven times—by filing 

patent infringement lawsuits there. In this respect, this 

case is similar to Viam. In Viam, we held that requiring 

an Italian patent owner and its Iowa exclusive agent to 

litigate a declaratory judgment action in California was 

not unduly burdensome where those entities had initiated 

a suit enforcing the same patent in the same district in 

California against other parties. 84 F.3d at 430. Our 

reasoning that personal jurisdiction was fair rested in 

relevant part on the fact that the suit demonstrated that 

the patent owner “has found a way to shoulder successfully the burden of litigating in California.” Id. 

Our decision in Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan 

Pharmaceuticals Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 764 (Fed. Cir. 2016), 

makes clear the relevance of a defendant’s litigations in 

the forum. There we explained that the burden on an 

accused infringer answering an infringement lawsuit “will 

be at most modest, as [the accused infringer], a large 

generic manufacturer, has litigated many . . . lawsuits in 

[the forum], including some that it initiated.” Id. 

Finally, Papst has not made any demonstration that 

it would be unduly burdensome to litigate in California. 

For all of these reasons, therefore, we hold that Papst 

 

6 We do not suggest that the foreign location of a 

defendant itself supports personal jurisdiction. See Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1339. Rather, we note that Papst, as a 

non-practicing patent owner, necessarily must litigate its 

patents somewhere in the United States.

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18 XILINX, INC. v. PAPST LICENSING GMBH & CO. KG

would not be subject to undue burdens if forced to defend 

its patents in California. 

In light of the totality of circumstances present in this 

case, this is not “one of the ‘rare’ situations in which 

sufficient minimum contacts exist but where the exercise 

of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” Elecs. for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1352. In other words, there is simply no 

“compelling case” here that personal jurisdiction over 

Papst is unreasonable. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.

CONCLUSION

We hold that Xilinx has established that personal jurisdiction over Papst is proper in California. We need not 

address Xilinx’s additional arguments regarding the 

district court’s denial of jurisdictional discovery. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Xilinx’s 

declaratory judgment complaint with respect to its noninfringement claims and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to Xilinx.

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