Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03487/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03487-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clayton Edwards
Appellant
Jeremiah Ervin
Not Party
Lt. Jim Hale
Not Party
Dan Jarry
Not Party
David Kenyon
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3487

___________

David Kenyon, *

*

Plaintiff/Appellee, *

*

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

Clayton Edwards, individually, * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas.

Defendant/Appellant, *

*

Lt. Jim Hale, individually; Jeremiah *

Ervin, individually; Dan Jarry, *

individually, originally sued as *

"Van Jarry," *

*

Defendants. *

*

___________

Submitted: April 11, 2006

Filed: September 7, 2006

___________

Before RILEY, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Clayton Edwards, a deputy sheriff for White County, Arkansas, brings this

interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment

based on qualified immunity. David Kenyon (Kenyon) sued Edwards and three White

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668
-2-

County deputy sheriffs: Lieutenant Jim Hale, Sheriff Jeremiah Ervin, and Sheriff Dan

Jarry. 

I. BACKGROUND

We recount the facts in the light most favorable to Kenyon, the party asserting

the injury in this qualified immunity case. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

On September 13, 2003, Edwards responded to a report of an altercation at a

demolition derby being held at the White County fairgrounds in Searcy, Arkansas. 

Edwards arrived to see an irritated Stephen Kenyon being restrained by a member of

a large crowd that had gathered near the derby pits. Edwards noticed that Stephen

looked as though he had been in a fight. Edwards asked what was going on, and

Stephen replied, "He hit my mother." Edwards could tell Stephen was indicating that

his mother was Shirley Cox, and so Edwards went over to her. Edwards described

Cox's nose as being flat against her face, and that she was bleeding profusely from her

nostrils. He noted that he was among a crowd of between one-hundred and twohundred people, and described the environment as an "atmosphere of hostility" where

weapons of opportunity, such as crowbars and hammers, were readily available. At

first, Cox did not respond to Edwards' questions about what had happened because she

was in pain. Edwards told Cox that an ambulance was on the way. Eventually, Cox

told Edwards that it was David Kenyon who had hit her. Edwards learned that David

Kenyon was Cox's ex-husband, and realized he had a domestic battery situation on his

hands. 

 Edwards addressed the crowd around him and asked if there were any

witnesses to the events. He also asked where David Kenyon was. No one answered

at first, but then someone called out, "There he is." The crowd parted, leaving Kenyon

in the middle. Edwards and the other officers on the scene approached Kenyon, and

Edwards put his hand on Kenyon's elbow and asked his name. When Kenyon

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668
1

The record indicates that Kenyon admitted that Edwards had probable cause

to arrest Kenyon for both domestic battery and public intoxication.

-3-

answered, Edwards told him he was under arrest.1

 Kenyon raised his arms in an

inquiring gesture and asked, "For what?" Edwards then grabbed Kenyon's wrist and

took his arm behind his back. Though precisely what happened next is in dispute, we

must, as we have said, credit Kenyon's version of the facts for purposes of the

qualified immunity analysis. Under that version, Edwards threw Kenyon onto the

hood of a nearby car and pulled Kenyon's arms up high behind his back in order to

handcuff him. Kenyon told Edwards that he was hurting his arms, but Edwards

persisted until Kenyon was handcuffed. Kenyon resisted because his arms were in

pain from the handcuffing, and the officers told Kenyon to stop resisting. Kenyon

claims he suffered a torn rotator cuff, requiring surgery, and continues to have pain.

Kenyon's suit against the four police officers ended with a jury finding in favor

of the officers, save Edwards. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the excessive

force claim against Edwards, and the court declared a mistrial. After the court

scheduled a new trial, Edwards moved for summary judgment based in part on

qualified immunity. The district court accepted Kenyon's version of the facts as true

for purposes of qualified immunity, and found that on those facts, Edwards' actions

violated Kenyon's constitutional rights. But the court said it was impossible at the

summary judgment stage to answer whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that Edwards' conduct was unlawful in the situation he faced–that is, whether the

constitutional right at issue was clearly established–because it found that a material

question of fact remained. The court did not explain at that point what fact remained

in dispute, but elsewhere in its opinion, the court stated a material question of fact

remained as to whether the force Edwards used was objectively reasonable under the

circumstances.

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668
-4-

II. DISCUSSION

A district court's order denying summary judgment is generally not appealable.

Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497, 501 (8th Cir. 2006). However, this court has

limited authority to review the denial of summary judgment based on qualified

immunity to the extent the appellant seeks review of purely legal determinations. Id.

Edwards does not seek review of any factual determinations, but argues, in essence,

that Kenyon has failed to show that Edwards used excessive force in his arrest, and

that even if Edwards did, Kenyon's right to be free from such force under these

circumstances was not clearly established. We find that Edwards is entitled to

summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

A. The Qualified Immunity Analysis

Saucier provides the marching orders for courts considering qualified immunity

claims. Under Saucier, courts presented with a motion for summary judgment on the

basis of qualified immunity undertake a two-step inquiry. The threshold question asks

"[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts

alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" 533 U.S. at 201.

If, on the facts as alleged, no constitutional violation could be shown were the

allegations established, the inquiry ends, and the defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity. "On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view

of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was

clearly established." Id. The second question must be asked in a "particularized"

sense: "'[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Id. at 202 (quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). That is, the essential question at

step two is "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id.

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668
-5-

B. No Constitutional Violation

Edwards first argues that because Kenyon has failed to point to the violation of

an "objective law enforcement standard" during the arrest, Kenyon has failed to show

that reasonable officers would disagree on the proper course of action in the situation.

Thus, Edwards says, there is nothing for a jury to decide. This somewhat convoluted

argument challenges the district court's finding that the facts as alleged by Kenyon

show that Edwards used excessive force during the arrest, violating Kenyon's Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure.

Excessive force claims are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's

reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). In

determining whether the amount of force used is reasonable, courts must balance "the

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests

against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Id. at 396 (internal

quotations and citation omitted). This analysis requires "careful attention to the facts

and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,

and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id.

"The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective

of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."

Id. Finally, judges must allow for the fact that police officers often make split-second

decisions about the amount of force necessary in tense, uncertain, and rapidly

changing circumstances. Id. at 396-97.

Taking the facts as alleged by and in the light most favorable to Kenyon,

Edwards threw Kenyon onto the hood of a car and pulled his arms up high behind his

back in an "unnatural" manner in an attempt to arrest and handcuff Kenyon for

domestic battery and public intoxication. Kenyon kept asking why he was being

arrested, as he continued to resist, albeit because of the pain from the handcuffing.

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668
-6-

The encounter took place amidst a large crowd of people in an atmosphere of hostility

where weapons of opportunity were available. Based on all of the factors in Graham,

Edwards did not use excessive force. Though the encounter apparently resulted in

injury to Kenyon's rotator cuff, we believe under the circumstances that Edwards' use

of force was reasonable in order to bring a potentially volatile situation under control.

C. Right Not Clearly Established

Even if it could be said, on the facts as alleged, that Edwards' use of force was

unreasonable, and thus unlawful, it would not necessarily have been clear to a

reasonable officer that the amount of force used was problematic. That is, it could not

be said that the right to be free from the kind of force Edwards used in the situation

was clearly established. Because an outstanding issue of material fact remained as to

whether Edwards used excessive force, the district court did not analyze whether a

reasonable officer would know that the force used was unlawful. But in Saucier, the

Supreme Court rejected this approach. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, which

had upheld the district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified

immunity because an issue of material fact remained on the excessive force claim.

The Ninth Circuit viewed the question of whether an officer was reasonable in

believing his actions were lawful in light of clearly established law, and the question

of reasonableness on the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim, as the same inquiry.

However, the Supreme Court made clear the importance of proceeding in order

through both steps–determining whether the facts alleged showed a constitutional

violation, and then whether a reasonable officer would believe his actions were

unlawful in light of clearly established law. This, the Court noted, allows for the

elaboration of and advancement toward an understanding of the law from case to case.

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The Court said:

[t]he approach the Court of Appeals adopted–to deny summary judgment

any time a material issue of fact remains on the excessive force

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668
-7-

claim–could undermine the goal of qualified immunity to avoid

excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many

insubstantial claims on summary judgment. If the law did not put the

officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary

judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.

Id. at 202 (internal quotation and citations omitted).

Thus, on the facts alleged by Kenyon, we do not believe the state of the law at

the time of this incident was such that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that

Edwards' conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted at the derby. Kuha v.

City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590, 601-02 (8th Cir. 2003). Though it is clearly

established that the Fourth Amendment bars the use of excessive force generally, we

must keep in mind that the right must be clearly established "in a more particularized

. . . sense" such that the "contours of the right" make it clear to officers what the law

is in a given circumstance. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (internal quotations omitted). 

Kenyon points principally to Goff v. Bise, 173 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1999),

Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 956 (2004), and

Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2001), to argue that the right to be

free from the force Edwards used in the situation he faced was clearly established.

But these cases do not present facts akin to those faced by Edwards in his

confrontation with Kenyon. In Goff, we affirmed the denial of qualified immunity

where a police officer and town mayor arrested the plaintiff, tightly cuffed him, threw

him to the ground, and choked him to unconsciousness in a situation where personal

animosity may have motivated the arrest and where the plaintiff did not pose a threat.

In Kopec, a police officer handcuffed the plaintiff so tightly that he began to faint and

writhed in pain on the ground for about ten minutes after the plaintiff refused to

provide the officer personal information, following the officer's demand that the

plaintiff and his girlfriend desist their frolicking trespass onto a frozen pond. The

court in Kopec held that the officer's failure to respond promptly to the plaintiff's

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668
-8-

painful pleas in what were "rather benign circumstances" where the officer did not

face a "dangerous situation" constituted excessive force. 361 F.3d at 777. In

Kostrzewa, the court denied qualified immunity where the plaintiff was stopped for

a routine traffic violation, tightly handcuffed, and then battered about the back of a

squad car by the intentionally reckless driving of the arresting officers. In Kukla v.

Hulm, 310 F.3d 1046 (8th Cir. 2002), the court upheld the denial of qualified

immunity where officers arrested plaintiff for refusing to sign a ticket for failure to

produce a trucker log book, and in the process forced him against his truck, twisted

his arm high behind his back injuring his collar bone, and broke his wrist with the

handcuffs. The court found that the minor infraction and lack of a safety threat

merited denial of immunity. In none of these cases did the officers face the charged

and potentially dangerous atmosphere that Edwards faced in arresting Kenyon, where

physical violence had already occurred and a large crowd with access to weapons of

opportunity stood nearby.

Based on the state of the law and given the facts as alleged by Kenyon, we do

not find that a reasonable officer would have believed that the force Edwards used was

unlawful.

III. CONCLUSION

Because, given the facts as alleged by Kenyon, we believe no constitutional

violation occurred and, alternatively, that a reasonable officer would not believe the

force used here to be excessive, we find that Edwards is entitled to qualified

immunity. We therefore reverse and remand.

SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. When reviewing a grant or denial of qualified immunity,

we recite the facts and view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668
2

A jury acquitted Kenyon on the third-degree battery charge, and the public

intoxication charge was dismissed. The majority makes no mention of any of this.

Instead, the majority implies Kenyon's guilt on the charges. 

-9-

Kenyon, accepting his account of the facts as true where there are material

inconsistencies. E.g., Guite v. Wright, 147 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 1998). The majority

opinion, however, gives too little deference to Kenyon's version of the facts. The facts

alleged by Kenyon, if true, establish that Edwards violated a clearly established

constitutional right to be free from excessive force. 

Kenyon alleged that as he was being handcuffed—in what several witnesses

testified was an unnatural motion—he yelled that Edwards was badly hurting his arm.

Edwards replied, "If you don't shut your mouth, I'm gonna break the thing off."

Several witnesses at trial, including Kenyon, also testified that Kenyon did not resist

arrest and that he only told the deputies that they were hurting his arm. Virginia Noah,

Judith Rhodes, and Karen Cummins testified that Kenyon's head was banged

repeatedly against the car during the handcuffing. Assuming, as we must, that Kenyon

did not resist, Edwards's conduct potentially classifies as gratuitous and excessive

force. 

The majority adopts Edward's characterization of the crowd, viewing it as

hostile and with easy access to weapons, and also ignores the fact that four armed

policemen were present during the handcuffing. The threat posed by the crowd, if any,

to Edwards is a fact that should be resolved by the jury. The threat posed by Kenyon,

if any, was minor, according to his account and that of several witnesses at trial.

Although Kenyon was arrested on two misdemeanor charges, he was acquitted of one

and the other was dismissed.2

Finally, the majority makes no mention of the testimony favorable to Kenyon's

claim that Edwards used an unorthodox method of handcuffing that was not officially

sanctioned. Officer Folk, who received training from the same employer as Edwards,

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668
-10-

testified that when properly handcuffing an arrestee, one should bring the arm and

hand down by the arrestee's side and then around to the back. Edwards contends that

Officer Folk's testimony supports the notion that the technique of bringing a suspect's

raised arm behind his back represents a law enforcement technique that is taught in

training classes, pointing to Officer Folk's statement that "[w]ell, it depends on which

training class you take" after he was asked if the raised-arm technique was proper.

However, Edwards's argument takes Officer Folk's statements out of context. Folk

went on to state that he had been shown the raised-arm technique informally by an exMarine in 1969. He further stated that "I never did hear nothing about using that style

but he [the ex-Marine] wasn't certified back then" and that his training updates have

continued to teach the method of bringing the arm behind the back after it has been

lowered. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Kenyon, it appears that

Officer Folk considered the raised-arm technique unorthodox and not officially

sanctioned. 

These questions—whether Kenyon was resisting; whether Edwards made

comments indicating an intent to cause gratuitous injury; whether the four deputies

actually had control over the crowd; and whether the handcuffing technique was

unorthodox—constitute material, disputed issues of material fact that should not be

tried by this court on appeal. 

 I also disagree with the majority on the qualified immunity analysis. "We

analyze excessive force claims occurring in the context of seizures under the Fourth

Amendment, using its reasonableness standard." Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497,

502 (8th Cir. 2006). "To establish a constitutional violation under the Fourth

Amendment's right to be free from excessive force, the test is whether the amount of

force used was objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances." Id.

(quoting Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 583 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Greiner v.

City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir.1994))) (internal quotations omitted).

"Circumstances such as the severity of the crime, whether the suspect posed a threat

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668
3

Kenyon presented sufficient proof to allow a jury to reasonably conclude that

the force used against him was objectively unreasonable: First, Officer Folk testified

that the proper manner of handcuffing someone was to bring the arm and hand down

by their side and then around to the back. Officer Folk also indicated that the raisedarm technique is unorthodox. Second, Kenyon presented the testimony of several

witnesses to his arrest, all of whom testified that Kenyon was not resisting arrest other

than to the extent that he sought to avoid sustaining injury to his arm from Edwards's

technique. Third, Kenyon was being arrested for misdemeanors. Fourth, at the time

that Edwards allegedly used excessive force, Kenyon was immobilized. Deputies

Edwards and Hale held Kenyon by the arms with his face down on a car, and Edwards

proceeded to handcuff Kenyon. Edwards testified that he had control of Kenyon even

before Hale arrived. (App. 62). Again, several witnesses testified that Kenyon was not

resisting arrest. Fifth, Kenyon's alleged injury, a torn rotator cuff that required surgery,

tends to establish that excessive force may have been used by Edwards. Cf. Wertish

v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2006) ("[B]ecause some force was

reasonably required to arrest and handcuff [the plaintiff], his relatively minor scrapes

and bruises and the less-than-permanent aggravation of a prior shoulder condition

were de minimis injuries that support the conclusion that [the officer] did not use

excessive force.").

Edwards's torquing of Kenyon's arm "may have been a 'gratuitous and

completely unnecessary act of violence,'" in violation of Kenyon's Fourth Amendment

rights. Henderson, 439 F.3d at 503 (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880

(9th Cir. 2001)) (brackets omitted). Accepting these facts as true, which we must at

this procedural posture, Kenyon presented sufficient proof in support of his claim to

allow a jury to conclude reasonably that the degree of force used was not objectively

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

-11-

to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the suspect was resisting arrest are

all relevant to the reasonableness of the officer's conduct." Id. (quoting Foster v.

Metro. Airports Comm'n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989))). At this procedural juncture, we must decide

whether Kenyon "presented sufficient proof in support of his claim, if believed, to

allow a reasonable jury to find the degree of force used against him was not

'objectively reasonable.'" Id. On this record, Kenyon satisfies this standard.3

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668
-12-

"The right to be free from excessive force is a clearly established right under

the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person."

Guite, 147 F.3d at 750 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. 386); accord Henderson, 439 F.3d

at 503. The right "must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court

can determine whether it was clearly established." Craighead v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954,

961 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 472 (2005) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 202 (2001); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199–200 (2004) (per curiam)).

"Although earlier cases involving 'fundamentally similar' facts can provide especially

strong support for a conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not

necessary to such a finding." Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002))

(internal quotations omitted). Instead, the issue is whether prior cases would have put

a reasonable officer on notice that the degree of force used would violate the plaintiff's

right not to be subjected to excessive force. Craighead, 399 F.3d at 962–63. 

The relevant case law supports the conclusion that the right to be free from

excessive force in handcuffing was clearly established when Edwards arrested

Kenyon—in this circuit and in other circuits. Goff v. Bise, 173 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th

Cir. 1999); accord Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 2004); Kostrzewa v. City

of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 641 (6th Cir. 2001); see Henderson, 439 F.3d at 503; Guite,

147 F.3d at 750.

Goff bolsters the denial of qualified immunity in the case at bar. In Goff, the

plaintiff was tightly cuffed and choked, receiving a less substantial injury than

Kenyon's torn rotator cuff. Moreover, although personal animosity was present in

Goff, Edwards's comments during his arrest of Kenyon could indicate an intent to

cause gratuitous injury. Whether an officer's desire to inflict unnecessary pain is

motivated by personal animosity, as in Goff, or by some other inappropriate intent is

immaterial. Furthermore, Edwards testified that he had control of Kenyon even before

the other three deputies arrived. Considering that four deputies were present and that

Kenyon was not resisting, it is unclear how Kenyon posed any more of a threat than

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668
-13-

did the plaintiff in Goff—both men were subdued before the unnecessary force was

used against them. In sum, Goff supports Kenyon's contention that the right to be free

from excessive force in handcuffing was clearly established. 

Other circuits have held that the right to be free from excessive force in

handcuffing is clearly established. E.g., Kopec, 361 F.3d at 777–78 (holding that

officer used excessive force by placing excessively tight handcuffs on the plaintiff and

refusing to loosen them for ten minutes); Kostrzewa, 247 F.3d at 641 (holding that

allegation of excessively tight handcuffing establishes constitutional violation). In

Kostrzewa, the Sixth Circuit stated, "This circuit has held that the right to be free from

excessive force, including 'excessively forceful handcuffing,' is a clearly established

right for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis." 247 F.3d at 641 (citations

omitted). Given this language, Kostrzewa turned upon the tight handcuffing of the

plaintiff independently and without regard to the officers' intentionally reckless

driving, as the majority indicates.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-3487 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/07/2006 Entry ID: 2086668