Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04122/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04122-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John L. Irby
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-4122

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JOHN L. IRBY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District

Judge. (7:06-cr-00087-sgw)

Argued: January 31, 2008 Decided: March 10, 2008

Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Paul Graham Beers, GLENN, FELDMANN, DARBY & GOODLATTE,

Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Jean Barrett Hudson, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney,

Jennie L. M. Waering, Assistant United States Attorney, Andrew

Fowler, Third Year Law Student, Mariam Tadros, Third Year Law

Student, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Appellant John Irby (“Irby”) challenges his conviction for

creating a disturbance on Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”)

property, in violation of 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a)(5), on the grounds

that the government failed to prove an element of the offense--that

notice of the regulation was posted at the site. Because we find

that such posting is not an element of the offense, we affirm

Irby’s conviction.

I.

Irby is an elderly veteran of the Vietnam War who, at the time

of his arrest, was a participant in a VA program serving homeless

veterans. On June 11, 2006, Irby was sitting outside a building at

a VA hospital complex, talking with a group of friends. A VA nurse

noticed that Irby smelled of alcohol and called the VA police.

Officer Lisk responded to the call. Neither Officer Lisk nor the

nurse knew Irby, nor his business at the VA.

Officer Lisk approached the group and asked to speak with

Irby. Irby rose and approached Officer Lisk. Noticing that Irby

smelled of alcohol, Officer Lisk asked Irby if he had been

drinking, and Irby admitted that he had. To confirm, Officer Lisk

again asked him if he had been drinking. This time, Irby replied

in the negative. Officer Lisk continued to question Irby, who grew

angry, cursed, and walked away.

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Irby was also charged with assaulting an officer in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 111. The magistrate judge found, after trial,

however, that “the government failed to prove the assault was

forcible under the peculiar facts of this case,” J.A. 133, and

dismissed the charge.

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Officer Lisk pursued him across several parking lots on the VA

property, asking for Irby’s name so he could complete his incident

report. Irby continued to curse and shout derogatory comments at

Officer Lisk, who then called for backup. Officer Fieschel caught

up with the pair, and attempted to engage Irby in conversation.

According to the Officer Fieschel, Irby began pushing him, and

adopted a boxing stance towards the two policemen. When Irby

allegedly moved to strike Officer Fieschel again, Officer Lisk

deployed his pepper spray, hitting Irby in the side and back of the

head. Officer Fieschel grabbed Irby, handcuffed and arrested him.

Irby was charged with, as relevant here, the misdemeanor of

creating a disturbance on VA property in violation of 38 C.F.R.

§ 1.218(a)(5).1 Irby moved for a judgment of acquittal before the

magistrate judge, arguing that the government had failed to offer

into evidence any proof that the regulations under which he had

been charged were posted at the property, as required by 38 U.S.C.

§ 901(d) and 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a). The Magistrate Judge denied the

motion in a written order, then entered judgment against Irby.

Irby was sentenced to two days’ imprisonment, with credit for time

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2A defendant may appeal to the district court a conviction for

any misdemeanor tried before a Magistrate Judge under Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 58(b)(3)(A). Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(g)(2)(B).

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served, and a $35 fine. On appeal to the district court,2

 Irby’s

conviction was affirmed. Irby timely appealed.

II.

As Irby’s appeal presents a pure question of law, we review de

novo the district court’s denial of Irby’s motion for judgment of

acquittal. United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 700 (4th Cir.

2006).

To understand Irby’s argument that the regulations and

authorizing statute make the posting of notice an element of his

offense, we must begin with the plain language of the statute.

Farmer v. Employment Sec. Comm’n of N.C., 4 F.3d 1274, 1279 (4th

Cir. 1993). Section 901(a)(1) of Title 38 requires the Secretary

of Veterans Affairs (the “Secretary”) to “prescribe regulations to

provide for the maintenance of law and order and the protection of

persons and property on [VA] property.” 38 U.S.C. § 901(a)(1).

The Secretary has done so, prohibiting a number of unseemly

activities, including “[e]ntering property under the influence of

any . . . alcoholic beverage,” 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a)(7), and

creating a disturbance, which includes “[c]onduct on property which

creates loud or unusual noise” and “the use of loud, abusive, or

otherwise improper language,” id. § 1.218(a)(5). In this case,

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Irby’s suspected alcohol use, in violation of § 1.218(a)(7),

initiated the police confrontation that led to his being charged

for creating a disturbance, § 1.218(a)(5).

Neither the authorizing statutory subsection, nor the

regulation subsection describing the offense of creating a

disturbance, includes a requirement that the regulations be posted

on VA property. Such requirement is found elsewhere in the statute

and regulation. Section 901(d) of the authorizing statute

provides:

The rules prescribed under subsection (a) [requiring the

Secretary to promulgate regulations], together with the

penalties for violations of such rules, shall be posted

conspicuously on property to which they apply.

38 U.S.C. § 901(d). The regulations mirror this requirement:

Authority and rules of conduct. Pursuant to 38 U.S.C.

§ 901, the following rules and regulations apply at all

property under the charge and control of VA . . . and to

all persons entering in or on such property. The head of

the facility is charged with the responsibility for the

enforcement of these rules and regulations and shall

cause these rules and regulations to be posted in a

conspicuous place on the property.

38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a). 

Irby’s sole argument on appeal is that, according to the plain

meaning of § 901(d), “[t]he misdemeanor regulations ‘apply’ at only

those Department of Veterans Affairs facilities where they have

been posted.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. Because the posting of the

regulations is a condition precedent to their application, he

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argues, the government must prove that the regulations were posted

in order to convict him thereunder of creating a disturbance.

Irby’s reading of the statute is precisely backwards. Section

901(d) assumes first that the regulations will be promulgated and

will apply at certain VA properties, then, referring to those

defined properties, requires that “[t]he rules . . . shall be

posted conspicuously” there. The regulations only confirm this

straightforward reading of § 901(d), stating matter-of-factly that

“the following rules and regulations apply at all [VA] property,”

38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a), with no suggestion that the rules only apply

at properties where notice is first posted. Irby’s argument simply

does not comport, therefore, with a plain reading of the statute.

Undeterred, Irby proffers an analogy to the (now-revised)

statute governing the posting of notice on General Services

Administration properties:

The Administrator of General Services or officials of the

General Services Administration duly authorized by him

are authorized to make all needful rules and regulations

for the government of the property under their charge and

control, and to annex to such rules and regulations such

reasonable penalties, within the limits prescribed in

section 318c of this title, as will insure their

enforcement: Provided, That such rules and regulations

shall be posted and kept posted in a conspicuous place on

such property.

40 U.S.C. § 318a (2002) (revised and recodified at 40 U.S.C.

§ 1315(c)(1)). A number of federal courts interpreting thencurrent § 318a read the “Provided” clause to render the authority

of the Administrator of General Services to make rules and impose

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penalties subject to the regulations first being “posted in a

conspicuous place on such property.” See, e.g., United States v.

Brice, 926 F.2d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.

Strakoff, 719 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v.

Boyer, 935 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (D. Colo. 1996). Irby argues that,

just as superceded § 318a made posting an element of offenses

detailed in the underlying regulation, so too does § 901(d) of

Title 38 require the government to prove that notice of the

regulations was posted.

Again, Irby’s argument ignores the plain language of § 901(d).

In unequivocal terms, the superceded § 318a, by using the word

“[p]rovided,” underlined for emphasis, made the application of the

section contingent on satisfaction of the notice-posting condition

described in the limiting clause. Rather than supporting Irby’s

argument, § 318a demonstrates, to the contrary, that when Congress

wishes to make posting an element of an offense, it is well aware

of how to do so. Under the VA statute before us, the Secretary’s

authority to promulgate regulations is found in the non-conditional

§ 901(a); the posting requirement is situated elsewhere, in the

unrelated § 901(d). Because the notice requirements in subsection

(d) are not married to, nor made an express proviso of, the

authority-granting provision in subsection (a), we find it clear

that Congress did not intend that the posting of notice should be

considered an element of any offense depicted in the regulations.

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This result is eminently reasonable. “The general rule that

ignorance of the law . . . is no defense to criminal prosecution is

deeply rooted in the American legal system.” Cheek v. United

States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991). This ancient maxim is no less

potent simply because the conduct here is criminalized by “duly

promulgated and published regulation” and not directly by statute.

United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563

(1971). Indeed, it should come as no surprise that engaging in a

physical altercation with police officers is conduct likely to be

punishable under the criminal law in any setting. We therefore

hold that the posting of notice of the regulations promulgated

under § 901(a) is not properly considered an element of the offense

of creating a disturbance on VA property in violation of 38 C.F.R.

§ 1.218(a)(5).

III.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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