Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-06884/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-06884-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ralph William Campos
Petitioner
Bill Lockyer
Respondent

Document Text:

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RALPH WILLIAM CAMPOS,

Petitioner,

vs.

BILL LOCKYER,

Respondent.

Case No. CV F-00-6884 JKS

O R D E R

Ralph William Campos was convicted in California state court of willful infliction of

corporal injury on the mother of his child, and assault by means of force likely to produce great

bodily injury. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 273.5, 245(a)(1). In a separate proceeding the court found

true allegations that Campos had a previous conviction for willful infliction of corporal injury on the

mother of his child within seven years of the instant violation, and that he was a third strike

offender. Accordingly, the court sentenced Campos to two terms of 25 years to life imprisonment

and stayed the second term. Campos has exhausted his state remedies and brings this petition for

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Docket Nos. 1 (Pet.); 10 (Answer); 20 (Traverse). 

Campos raises two issues in his petition. He argues that there was insufficient evidence to

sustain his conviction for assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. He also

argues that the use of evidence of a prior incident of domestic violence under California Evidence

Code § 1109 violated his federally protected due process and equal protection rights. The Court

will address the arguments in that order.

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ORDER 

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DISCUSSION

Campos’s petition post-dates the April 24, 1996 enactment of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which governs federal court procedure for habeas corpus

petitions. AEDPA permits a federal court to grant relief in habeas petitions only if the state court’s

decision: (1) was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) “was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). “The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual

determinations.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). A state

court’s determination is “‘contrary to’ federal law if the state court (1) ‘applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law’ set forth in Supreme Court case authority or (2) applies controlling

law to a set of facts that are ‘materially indistinguishable’ from a Supreme Court decision but

nevertheless reaches a different result.” Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir.

2003) (citing and quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)). A state court’s decision is

an “unreasonable application” of federal law if it is “objectively unreasonable,” which “requires the

state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75.

I. Insufficient Evidence

Campos argues that his conviction for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury

was unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. “[T]he critical inquiry on review of sufficiency

of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury

was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a

finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Va., 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). This

requires the reviewing court to analyze whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” not whether “it believes that the

evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319 (quoting Woodby v.

INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966)). 

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ORDER 

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Turning to the specific facts of this case, the Court concludes that a “rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements” of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury

beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. The offense does not require that great bodily injury actually

occur, but rather that the force used was “likely” to cause great bodily injury. See Cal. Penal Code §

245(a)(1). There was evidence that the victim of the assault suffered bruising and swelling of her

face and bruising to her chest. See Docket No. 1, Ex. A at 13. The evidence also showed that she

was struck six times in the chest, and that the injuries she sustained as a result of the blows

continued to cause her pain for two weeks after the assault. Id. Based on the language of the statute

and the facts at hand, the California Court of Appeal concluded that “the jury reasonably could have

concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed an assault likely to produce great

bodily injury.” Docket No. 1, Ex. A at 13. The California court’s determination was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor was the decision based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)–(2). 

II. Admission of Evidence of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence

Campos next argues that California Evidence Code § 1109, when interpreted to permit

evidence of a prior incident involving the same victim, violates federal due process and equal

protection. Over an earlier objection by Campos’s attorney, the trial judge admitted evidence

pursuant to section 1109 of prior acts of domestic violence committed by Campos against the same

victim. See Reporter’s Supplemental Transcript on Appeal at 11–12; Reporter’s Transcript on

Appeal at 70–71. The California Court of Appeal analogized section 1109 to a California evidence

section that has passed constitutional muster and held that the application of section 1109 in

Campos’s case did not violate his due process or equal protection rights. Docket No. 1, Ex. A at 7

(citing People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903 (Cal. 1999), People v. Johnson, 77 Cal. App. 4th 410

(Cal. App. 2000), and People v. Fitch, 55 Cal. App. 4th 172 (Cal. App. 1997)).

Section 1109 provides in relevant part: “in a criminal action in which the defendant is

accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of other

domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 110 if the evidence is not inadmissible

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ORDER 

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pursuant to Section 352.” Cal. Evid. Code § 1109(a)(1). Section 1101(a) disallows character

evidence to prove conduct on a specific occasion. Section 1101(b) permits the admission of

uncharged acts when relevant to establish some fact other than a person’s character or disposition,

such as motive, intent, identity, or common scheme or plan. Section 352 provides, “[t]he court in its

discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability

that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of

misleading the jury.” Cal. Evid. Code § 352. 

1. Due Process

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not include a domestic violence exception to the general

exclusion of propensity evidence. However, section 1109 is analogous to Federal Rule of Evidence

414, which governs the admissibility of prior conduct in child molestation cases. Rule 414 provides

that “evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is

admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” Fed. R.

Evid. 414. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that because “[p]otentially devastating

evidence of little or no relevance would have to be excluded under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 403. .

. . Rule 414 is constitutional.” United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Like the interplay between Rule 414 and Rule 403, section 1109 operates under the broad

prohibition on the admission of unduly prejudicial evidence contained in section 352. Thus where

the probative value of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence against the same victim is

outweighed by the probability that the evidence will “create substantial danger of undue prejudice,

of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury,” the evidence will not be admitted. See Cal. Evid.

Code § 352. Section 352 ensures that evidence that is so prejudicial as to interfere with the right to

a fair trial under the due process clause will not be admitted under section 1109. Campos has not

shown that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of his due process claim was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

2. Equal Protection

Precedent addressing the constitutionality of Federal Rule of Evidence 414 also provides

guidance on Campos’s equal protection claim. In LeMay the Ninth Circuit held that Rule 414 does

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1Section 2253 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in relevant part:

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention

complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

ORDER 

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not violate the equal protection clause. The Court reasoned that the rule does not discriminate on

the basis of any suspect or quasi suspect class, and that there is no fundamental right to a trial free

from relevant evidence that is not unduly prejudicial. LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1030. The Court further

stated that prosecuting crime is a legitimate governmental interest and that Rule 414 bears a

reasonable relationship to that interest. Id. 

For purposes of an equal protection analysis, section 1109 is analogous to Rule 414. 

Domestic violence defendants are not a suspect or quasi suspect class, section 352 ensures that

prejudice does not outweigh the probative value of evidence admitted at trial, and the government

clearly has a legitimate interest in prosecuting crimes of domestic violence. Section 1109 bears a

reasonable relationship to this interest by aiding in the prosecution of such offenders. Campos has

failed to show that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of his equal protection argument was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

Campos’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Docket No. 1, is DENIED. Campos’s

subsequent motions for assistance of counsel at Docket Nos. 26 and 27, and motion to proceed in

forma pauperis at Docket No. 25 are DENIED AS MOOT. All three motions were made long after

Campos filed his traverse. See Docket No. 20. The Court is of the view that the issue of a

certificate of appealability should be addressed now rather than after Petitioner’s claims and the

issues they present fade with memory. Appeal may not be taken without a certificate of

appealability from either this Court or from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2253.1

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(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which

specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

ORDER 

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The standard for granting a certificate of appealability has been stated as follows: “Where a district

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits . . . [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong.” United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Campos has made no such showing. For these reasons a

certificate of appealability for this case is DENIED. Campos may seek a certificate of appealability

directly from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ motions panel.

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 21 day of July 2005.

 /s/ James K. Singleton 

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR. 

United States District Judge 

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