Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02753/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02753-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lawrence Sedric Rowan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2753

___________

Lawrence Sedric Rowan, *

*

Petitioner-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

United States of America, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Respondent-Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: June 10, 2004

Filed: June 28, 2004

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Lawrence Rowan appeals from the district court’s1

 order denying his motion

for habeas relief brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court granted

Rowan a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether his counsel provided

ineffective assistance. We affirm.

Rowan was charged with four counts of violating federal drug law. He hired

an attorney who already represented one of his co-defendants, Kenric McMurtry. A

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hearing was held concerning the joint representation at which it was determined that

a conflict did not exist. Rowan signed a conflict waiver following the hearing.

Rowan and the Government subsequently entered into a written plea agreement in

which Rowan agreed to plead guilty to only Count 2 of the Superseding Indictment,

which charged him with possession with intent to distribute one kilogram of cocaine,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). The Government agreed that

it would move to dismiss the remaining counts at sentencing, including Count 4,

which charged Rowan with aiding and abetting the possession with intent to

distribute approximately 452 grams of cocaine base. However, the parties agreed that

Rowan would be accountable for relevant conduct of approximately 452 grams of

cocaine base. 

On May 2, 2001, the district court sentenced Rowan to 151 months’

imprisonment. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.

Rowan then filed the present § 2255 motion, arguing that his counsel was ineffective

because of an actual conflict of interest relating to the joint representation and

because his counsel allegedly told Rowan he would not be held accountable for the

452 grams of cocaine base if he pled guilty. The district court denied the motion

without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Because Rowan’s ineffective assistance claim presents a mixed question of law

and fact, we review the district court’s conclusion de novo and its findings of fact for

clear error. See United States v. White, 341 F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 2003). In order

to prevail on his ineffective assistance claim, Rowan must show that his counsel’s

“‘representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that ‘there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel[’s] unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.’” Whitmore v. Lockhart, 8 F.3d 614,

616-17 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694

(1984)).

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Rowan first claims he was sentenced for the crime charged in Count 4, even

though he was not convicted of that crime, which resulted in application of the

incorrect base offense level and imposition of an illegal sentence. Rowan argues he

was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to

object to these errors. We find no merit in Rowan’s argument. The record clearly

shows that Rowan was not sentenced for the crime charged in Court 4, but rather

according to the plea agreement. The parties stipulated in the plea agreement that

Rowan’s base offense level was 34 pursuant to § 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines

and that he would receive a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

The base offense level of 34 took into account the 452 grams of cocaine base for

which Rowan had agreed to be held accountable. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). The plea

agreement and plea colloquy make it clear that Rowan knew and understood that the

cocaine base would be considered relevant conduct and would affect his sentence.

He therefore has no basis on which to claim that he was sentenced for the wrong

crime or that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance with respect to his

sentencing.

Rowan also argues he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel due

to his attorney’s actual conflict of interest. In this regard, Rowan alleges that his

attorney failed to disclose to him or the district court that McMurtry was cooperating

with the Government concerning Rowan’s criminal activity. The district court found

that Rowan’s allegations could not be accepted as true because several facts in the

record showed McMurtry was not cooperating with the Government. We find no

error in the district court’s finding. Having no basis in fact to claim that his counsel

had an actual conflict of interest, Rowan’s claim that he was prejudiced by the alleged

ineffective assistance of his counsel fails.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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