Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02101/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02101-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Corrections Medical Services
Appellee
Michael Groose
Appellee
Holtmeier
Appellee
Mike Kemna
Appellee
Dwight L. Laughlin
Appellant
CO-1 Oliver
Appellee
CO-1 Ring
Appellee
Dora Schriro
Appellee
CO-1 Wright
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-2101

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Dwight L. Laughlin,

Appellant,

v.

Dora Schriro, Director,

Department of Corrections;

Michael Groose, Associate

Director, Department of

Corrections; Mike Kemna,

Superintendent, Cross Roads

Correctional Center; CO-1 Ring,

Correctional Officer, Cross Roads

Correctional Facility; Corrections

Medical Services, Inc.; CO-1

Wright, Correctional Officer,

Cross Roads Correctional Center;

CO-1 Oliver, Correctional Officer,

Cross Roads Correctional Center;

Holtmeier, Correctional Medical

Services, Inc.,

Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Western District of Missouri.

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Submitted: October 12, 2005

 Filed: December 7, 2005 

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

Appellate Case: 04-2101 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/07/2005 Entry ID: 1983002
1

The Appellees that are parties to this appeal are: Dora Schriro, the Director of

the Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC”); Michael Groose, the Associate

Director of the MDOC; Mike Kemna, the Superintendent of the CrCC; and CrCC

Correctional Officers Ring, Wright and Oliver. The claims against Appellees

Corrections Medical Services, Inc. and Holtmeier previously were dismissed by the

district court and are not at issue in this appeal.

2

The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Dwight L. Laughlin, an inmate at the Cross Roads Correctional Center in

Cameron, Missouri (“CrCC”), sued the Appellees1

 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

The district court2

 granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. For the

reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. Background

Laughlin asserts that during the morning of September 7, 1997, he experienced

physical symptoms which he believed indicated that he was having a heart attack. As

a result, he pressed the call button in his cell at 7:30 a.m. He asserts that when no

guard responded, he pressed his call button again at 8:15 a.m. At approximately 8:35

a.m., Appellee Ring responded to Laughlin’s call button. Laughlin advised Ring that

he believed he was having a heart attack. Approximately twenty minutes later,

Appellee Oliver came to Laughlin’s cell. Laughlin informed Oliver that he believed

he was having a heart attack. Oliver then called for medical assistance, which arrived

approximately fifteen minutes later. Laughlin was taken to the medical unit, where

Appellate Case: 04-2101 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/07/2005 Entry ID: 1983002
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he was examined by a physician and treated with an over-the-counter antacid.

Laughlin was returned to his cell at 9:47 a.m. Later that day, at 2:43 p.m., medical

assistance again responded to Laughlin’s cell. A few minutes later, Laughlin was

taken to the medical unit and then was admitted to the CrCC infirmary. The following

day he was taken from the infirmary to Heartland Hospital in St. Joseph, Missouri,

where he was diagnosed as having suffered a small acute myocardial infarction. He

received angioplasty treatment on September 15, 1997. 

II. Discussion

“We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying

the same standards as the district court.” Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237

(8th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record indicates that “there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). We review the facts

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). Summary judgment is proper

“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The Eighth Amendment obligates state prison officials to provide inmates with

medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). To prevail on a claim that

a delay in medical care constituted cruel and unusual punishment, an inmate must

show both that: (a) the deprivation alleged was objectively serious; and (b) the prison

official was deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s health or safety. Beyerbach v.

Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir. 1995). When the inmate alleges that a delay in

medical treatment rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, “the objective

seriousness of the deprivation should also be measured ‘by reference to the effect of

delay in treatment.’” Id. (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Ctr., 40

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F.3d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994). To establish this effect, the inmate “must place

verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay

in medical treatment . . .” Crowley v. Hedgepeth, 109 F.3d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Hill, 40 F.3d at 1188). While Laughlin submitted evidence documenting his

diagnosis and treatment, he offered no evidence establishing that any delay in

treatment had a detrimental effect and thus failed to raise a genuine issue of fact on

an essential element of his claim. As such, the grant of summary judgment in favor

of the Appellees was proper. Dulaney, 132 F.3d at 1243 (holding that summary

judgment in favor of the defendants was not in error as to inmate-plaintiffs Anderson

and Allen, where neither Anderson nor Allen submitted verifying medical evidence

indicating that a delay in treatment of her acute cardiac condition resulted in an

adverse effect).

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

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Appellate Case: 04-2101 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/07/2005 Entry ID: 1983002