Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01645/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01645-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pratap Lakshmi Narayan
Defendant
Damien Dwayne Olive
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAMIEN DWAYNE OLIVE,

Plaintiff,

v.

NARAYAN,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-01645 DLB

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Damien Dwayne Olive (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate in the custody of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on October 30, 2015. 

He names Pratap Lakshmi Narayan, M.D., as the sole Defendant.1

A. SCREENING STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

 

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Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on November 12, 2015.

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the actions 

or omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat superior 

liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 

F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 

2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a 

plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

B. ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT2

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison. 

Plaintiff states that he has had an “unequivocal diagnosis of bipolar I disorder” since 1996, 

with a history of suicide attempts. ECF No. 1, at 4. However, Defendant adamantly refused to 

treat his condition “sufficiently and satisfactorily.” ECF No. 1, at 4. 

 

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Plaintiff admits that he did not exhaust his claims, believing it to be futile. Failure to exhaust, however, is an 

affirmative defense. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2013).

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Plaintiff had an appointment with Defendant on October 13, 2015, for treatment of bipolar 

disorder and medication management. During the appointment, Plaintiff advised Defendant that 

he had recently been experiencing numerous psychiatric symptoms, including depression, recent 

suicide attempts, frequent suicidal ideation, loss of appetite, feelings of despondency, insomnia 

and extreme happiness at cycling intervals. He also complained that he had recently been hearing 

voices.

Defendant told Plaintiff that because he had insight into his illness, he would benefit from 

a mood-stabilizer and perhaps an anti-psychotic medication. He “blatantly refused” to prescribe 

any psychotropic medications, telling Plaintiff that his primary care doctor had prescribed 

medications that would “resolve and diminish” his psychiatric symptoms. ECF No. 1, at 6. 

Plaintiff told Defendant that he had been getting worse, and that when he is unmedicated, 

he is more likely to be placed into a mental health crisis bed. Defendant stated that he would be 

willing to put Plaintiff back on lithium carbonate, even though Defendant is aware that lithium 

caused Plaintiff problems in the past. He also stated that he would prescribe an anti-depressant. 

Plaintiff told him that in the past, anti-depressants had escalated his depressive symptoms.

Defendant discontinued a prescription for Plaintiff’s only remaining psychotropic 

medication abruptly and without explanation. Dr. Gill, the Chief Psychiatrist at KVSP, had 

written a prescription for Prazocin in July 2015, for excessive and intense nightmares. Defendant 

disagreed with this prescription because he believed that the medication was not effective in 

preventing nightmares. During a prior visit with Defendant, Plaintiff told him that the Prazocin 

was working. 

Defendant then falsely claimed that he did not know why Plaintiff was taking Prazocin. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s failure to prescribe any psychotropic medications was a failure to 

reasonably respond to his mental illness. He states that he is currently unmedicated and is 

depressed and hopeless on a daily basis. Plaintiff also states that he has vivid thoughts of suicide, 

and has acted on those thoughts in the past few days. 

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

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C. DISCUSSION

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to medical 

care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 

2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 

2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that 

failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096).

Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective 

recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation 

and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

Plaintiff’s claim is based on his belief that Defendant should have provided different 

medications. Specifically, Plaintiff appears to have wanted a psychotropic medication, which had 

been prescribed in the past. Plaintiff’s disagreement is nothing more than a disagreement with 

treatment, which is insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner - or between medical 

professionals - concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 

indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 

F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 

1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, Plaintiff “must show that 

the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and 

that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.” 

Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s failure to prescribe any psychotropic medications was an

unreasonable response to his mental health issues. However, his allegations demonstrate that 

Defendant had a reason for doing so- Plaintiff’s primary care provider had prescribed medications 

that Defendant believed would decrease his psychiatric symptoms. While Plaintiff may not have 

agreed with this decision, it was not a decision that was taken in conscious disregard to an 

excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to 

inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, 

even if harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844-45 (1994).

Plaintiff also contends that he is now unmedicated, and that this is causing mental health 

issues. The Court does not doubt that Plaintiff’s mental illness is a serious medical need. 

However, there is no indication that Plaintiff’s unmedicated state was caused by Defendant. 

Indeed, during the appointment, Defendant explained that because Plaintiff had insight into his 

illness, he would benefit from a mood-stabilizer and perhaps an anti-psychotic medication. 

Defendant also indicated that he would be willing to place Plaintiff back on lithium carbonate and 

an anti-depressant. In other words, Defendant offered Plaintiff numerous options. Perhaps 

Plaintiff declined the medications, but there is no indication that Defendant deliberately left 

Plaintiff without any medication.

For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant under the Eighth 

Amendment. He will be permitted to amend.

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims.

Plaintiff has not previously been provided with notice of the deficiencies in his claims and 

the Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if he believes, 

in good faith, he can cure the identified deficiencies. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 

(9th Cir. 2012); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 

1987). If Plaintiff amends, he may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 

claims in his amended complaint. George, 507 F.3d at 607.

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If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but under 

section 1983, it must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights and liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of 

respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-07. Although accepted as 

true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must

file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in 

this order, or file a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed, without

prejudice, for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 9, 2016 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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