Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02358/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02358-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Central Plastics
Appellee
Sandy Golgart
Appellant
Sandy Golgart Sales
Appellant

Document Text:

". 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH .CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United St.ates Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

SANDY GOLGART, an individual; 

SANDY GOLGART SALES, a California 

corporation; 

v. 

Plaintiffscounter-claim-defendantsAppellants, 

CENTRAL PLASTICS COMPANY, 

an Oklahoma corporation, 

Defendantcounter-claimantAppellee. 

· FEB O 61989 

> ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) · Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 87-2358 

) (D.C. No. 86-2026-W) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before MOORE, TACHA, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER*, Chief Judge. 

*Honorable Clarence A. 

District Court foir 

designation. 

Brimmer, Chief Judge, United States 

the District of Wyoming, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.8. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Appellate Case: 87-2358 Document: 01019962634 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 1 
This matter is before ·us on an order of the Supreme Court of 

the United States vacating our February 23, 1987, judgment of 

dismissal and remanding the matter · for further consideration- in 

light of Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 108 s. Ct. 1717 

(1988) and Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 10& S. Ct. 1130 (1988). 

A review of the procedural history of this appeal may aid in 

the understanding of our disposition. The underlying action was 

one based on contract claims and counterclaims, with jurisdiction 

predicated on 28 u.s.c. S 1332. Following a bench trial, the 

district court, on June 18, 1987, entered extensive findings of 

fact and conclusions of law but reserved entry of judgment pending 

receipt of an agreement regarding the return and use of certain 

confidential documents. Judgment was entered on July 10. Both 

the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment 

provided that the parties would bear their own attorney's fees and 

costs. 

On July 1, defendant filed a motion to amend the findings of 

the court with respect to the court's rulings on fees and costs 

only. On July 13, defendant filed in essence an identical motion, 

this one to amend both the findings and the judgment. Also on 

July 13, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal "from the final 

judgment entered on the 18th day of June, 1987." Obviously, 

plaintiffs meant the final judgment on the merits entered July 10. 

Defendant's motion to amend the judgment was pending at the time 

the July 13 notice of appeal was filed. The appeal was docketed 

as our No. 87-2023. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2358 Document: 01019962634 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 2 
-w' 

On July 21; plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed No. 87-2023, 

apparently of the view that defendant's July 13 motion to amend 

the judgment had completely nullified the finality of the July 13 

judgment, thus requiring a new notice of appeal after the motion 

was disposed of. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). Griggs v. Provident 

Consumer Discoun~ Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982). 

On August 5, the district court granted defen-dant' s request 

for attorney's fees but denied reconsideration of the ruling 

disallowing costs. As part of the August 5 order, the court 

specifically directed the parties to negotiate in good faith as to 

the amount of fees. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the 

August 5 order on September 2, 1987. This is our No. 87-2358. 

Further proceedings, including the filing of motions and 

briefs and the holding of a hearing on the fees issues, resulted 

in the district court's order entered October 26, 1987, fixing the 

amount of the fees at $44,895.69. (The order was amended 

October 28 to clarify that defendant, and not its attorneys, was 

awarded the fees.) No appeal was taken from the October 28 order 

setting the amount of the fees. 

On November 6, plaintiffs timely filed a motion to reconsider 

the October 28 order, arguing that defendant was not the 

prevailing party, and that the amount awarded was excessive. This 

motion was denied on November 17. No appeal was taken from the 

November 17 order, either. 

The parties were advised on November 23 of this court's 

concern that appellate jurisdiction might Be lacking. The parties 

were directed to address the following question: 

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Appellate Case: 87-2358 Document: 01019962634 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 3 
Whether the Motion to Amend (served on July 13, 1987), 

which only . related to the question of attorney fees and 

costs, triggered the application of Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(4)? See White v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 445, 102 

&. Ct. 1162 (1982); Autorama Cdrp. v. Stewart, 802 F.2d 

1284 (10th Cir. 1986); Cox v. Flood, 683 F.2d 330 (10th 

Cir. 1982). 

In White v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 445 (1982), the Supreme 

Court held that a post-judgment motion to amend a judgment to 

award attorney's fees under 42 u.s.c. S 1988 was not subject to 

the ten-day filing requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). This 

court in Cox v. Flood, 683 F.2d . 330 (10th Cir. 1982), applied 

White to hold that a judgment was final as to the merits even if a 

motion for fees had been expressly reserved for further 

consideration. In Autorama Corp. v. Stewart, 802 F.2d 1284 (10th 

Cir . 1986), we held timely an appeal taken within thirty days of 

the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider a post-judgment 

order denying attorney's fees. 

None of these cases, however, involved a single judgment 

which specifically ruled on both the merits and attorney's fees. 

The real question, then, was whether defendant's July 13 motion to 

amend the judgment destroyed the entire finality of the July 10 

judg~ent _o_r __ o_n_l_y.__t_h_a_t __ p_a_r_t_o_f_t_h_e_j_u_d~g~m_e_n_t_r_e_l_a_t_i_n_g~t_o_f_e_e_s_a~,n_d 

costs. 

If the motion to amend judgment tolled the running of the 

appeal period for the judgment as to the merits, then the August 5 

order granting the request for fees and denying costs would appear 

to be the "final" order with respect to the merits. The August 5 

order, however, was not final as to the question of fees, whether 

or not the September 2 notice of appeal in this case conferred 

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Appellate Case: 87-2358 Document: 01019962634 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 4 
jurisdiction on this court to review the merits. This is because 

the district court specifically contemplated further proceedings 

on the matter, i.e., determination of the amount. 

The district court's determination as to fees became' final 

with the October 28 (amended) entry of the amount of fees. Phelps 

v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 807 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. ~986). The 

· finality of that order was then nullified with the timely filing 

of a motion to reconsider on November 6. Autorama Corp. v. 

Stewart, 802 F.2d 1284 (10th Cir. 1986). When the motion to 

reconsider was denied on November 17,. the judgment assessing fees 

became final and appealable. 

The fact that attorney fee issues are regarded as 

independent for purposes of appeal .•• does not mean 

that disposition of the attorney fee claim itself is 

free from ordinary principles of finality. An order . 

that attorney fees be paid that reserves for later 

determination the amount of the fee is not itself final. 

15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and 

Procedure S 3915, at 357 (1988 Supp.); Vandenplas v. City of 

Muskego, 797 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir.)(award of fees when amount 

undetermined interlocutory order), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 

(1985); Interstate Pipe Maintenance, Inc., 775 F.2d 1495, 1497 

(11th Cir. i985)(award of fees not severable into discrete issues 

of entitlement and amount); Morgan v. Union Metal Mfg., 757 F.2d 

792, 795 (6th Cir. 1985)(award of fees is collateral to 

determination of entitlement). 

In vacating our order and judgment, the Supreme Court 

referred us to Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 108 S. Ct. 1717 

(1988) and Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1130 (1988). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2358 Document: 01019962634 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 5 
The opi~ion underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Budinich is 

found at Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 807 F.2d 155 . (10th 

Cir. 1986). This court held that an appeal taken after the 

district court's determination (of both liability and amount) of 

fees .was untimely as to the merits judgment, which had been 

entered three months earlier. The Supreme Court affirmed, 

adopting "a uniform rule that an unresolved issue of attorney's 

fees for the litigation in question does not prevent judgment on 

the merits from being final." Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 

108 S. Ct. at 1721-22. The Court concluded that: 

Courts and litigants are best served by the bright-line 

rule, which accords with traditional understanding, that 

a decision on the merits is a 'final decision' for 

purposes of § 1291 whether or not there remains for 

adjudication a request for attorney's fees attributable 

to the case. 

In Budinich, unlike this case, there was no initial ruling on 

the fees question contained in the merits judgment. In other 

words, the request for fees was first presented as a separate 

post-judgment motion. Also, the appeal to this court in Budinich 

was from an order determining both liability for and amount of 

attorney's fees. 

In . Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1130 (1988), the 

Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's application of a 

bright-line rule that all timely post-judgment motions would be 

treated under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The motion in question in 

Buchanan was one for costs. The Supreme Court held that the 

motion waa governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and 58, not Rule 

59(e), irrespective of the inaccurate labeling of the motion as 

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Appellate Case: 87-2358 Document: 01019962634 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 6 
• 

one to amend judgment. In our case, costs were denied defendant 

both initially on July 10, and upon reconsideration on August 5. 

Further, plaintif~s are not appealing the ruling on costs, since 

they prevailed on that issue. 

We therefore conclude that neither Budinich nor Buchanan is 

directly applicable to this appeal, which involves only the 

question of whether a fees order is final under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 

before the amount has been determined. 

In our February 23, 1987, order and judgment, we observed 

that defendant filed a motion to alter or amend the July 10 

judgment within the time allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 and 59. 

We did not specifically consider whether that motion nullified the 

district court's judgment as to the merits, or only that part of 

the judgment relating to fees and costs. Because defendant's 

motion did not seek reconsideration of the merits judgment, but 

only the fees and costs questions, we conclude that the July 10 

judgment as to the merits was not affected (i.e., the appeal 

period was not tolled) by the July 13 motion to amend the 

judgment. 

Thus plaintiffs' first appeal to this court (No. 87-2023) was 

timely as to the judgment on the merits. As noted earlier, 

however, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed that appeal. The only 

jurisdiction this court retains is that to recall the mandate and 

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Appellate Case: 87-2358 Document: 01019962634 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 7 
" . 

reinstate the merits appeal. - We cannot now review either the 

liability for or amount of the attorney's fees assessed. 

Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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