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Parties Involved:
Jose V. Sanchez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 18, 2024 

Decided December 19, 2024 

Before

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge

NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge

No. 24-1916 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOSE V. SANCHEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Illinois. 

No. 3:22-CR-30055-DWD-2 

David W. Dugan, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Jose Sanchez pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to conspiracy to 

distribute methamphetamine. The district court imposed 210 months’ imprisonment

and 5 years’ supervised release. Sanchez appeals, but his appointed lawyer asserts that 

the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967). We notified Sanchez of counsel’s motion, and he did not respond. See CIR. R. 

51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses one of the issues that 

an appeal of this kind would be expected to involve. Because counsel’s brief addresses 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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only one potential argument, we review the record for others. We grant the motion and 

dismiss the appeal. 

In May 2022, Drug Enforcement Administration agents arrested Sanchez and his 

co-defendant, Christopher Palmer, after a traffic stop. Sanchez had been driving closely 

behind Palmer, and the two cars appeared to be traveling together. Agents stopped 

Palmer’s vehicle, and Sanchez drove away. Palmer attempted to flee, but the agents 

detained him. A search of Palmer’s car uncovered over 17 kilograms of 

methamphetamine, other drugs, two phones, bundles of cash, and a gun. During the 

search, agents heard a phone call through the car’s speakers. The caller asked Palmer if 

he ran, so other agents began a search for the car Sanchez was driving. Those agents 

quickly found Sanchez in a nearby Walmart parking lot. 

A search of Sanchez’s car revealed a large amount of cash and multiple rounds of 

ammunition. Meanwhile, a Walmart employee told the agents that Sanchez had 

discarded items near a storm drain and trash can. There, agents found parts of a 

disassembled gun, ammunition, and currency sleeves. Video surveillance showed 

Sanchez discarding the disassembled gun components in the trash. The gun 

components were all from the same gun, which agents were later able to reassemble 

into a SCCY 9mm pistol. After his arrest, Sanchez initially denied any connection to 

Palmer, but he eventually admitted that he knew Palmer, was aware Palmer had drugs 

in his car, and knew that the drugs were bound for Indianapolis. A search of Sanchez’s 

phone records also revealed that he had extensive contact with other uncharged 

members of the drug conspiracy, including the alleged leader. 

Based on these events, Sanchez pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to 

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 

methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii); 846. At the change-of-plea 

hearing, Sanchez confirmed under oath that his plea was voluntary and that he 

understood the charges and applicable penalties, his trial rights, and the role of the 

Sentencing Guidelines. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(C)-(N). The court found an adequate

factual basis and accepted Sanchez’s plea. 

In the same hearing, Sanchez received his sentence. The U.S. Probation Office 

had prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR) before Sanchez pleaded guilty. 

Applying the Sentencing Guidelines, the PSR listed Sanchez’s base offense level as 38 

because his offense involved at least 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(c)(1). The PSR then added two levels because Sanchez and Palmer possessed

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firearms during the commission of the charged offense, see § 2D1.1(b)(1), and removed 

three levels for acceptance of responsibility, see § 3E1.1(a)–(b). Based on a total offense 

level of 37 and Sanchez’s criminal history category of I, the range for his sentence was 

210 to 262 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. 

A; § 5D1.2(c); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 

Before the hearing, Sanchez had objected to the PSR’s addition of two offense 

levels for possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. Sanchez insisted the 

increase was not applicable because he possessed only gun parts and had no knowledge 

that Palmer had a gun. Sanchez had also argued that he should have received 

reductions for being a minor participant, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, and for being a zero-point 

offender, see § 4C1.1. Finally, he had argued that the 10-year statutory minimum for his 

offense was not applicable because he was eligible for the “safety-valve” provision in 

the guidelines. See § 5C1.2. 

 

At the hearing, Sanchez expressly withdrew his objection to the two-level

increase for possessing a firearm. The district court overruled Sanchez’s objection that 

he was a minor participant, finding that Sanchez played an integral role in furthering 

the conspiracy. The court also overruled Sanchez’s objection that he qualified for the 

safety valve, finding that he possessed a firearm and had not truthfully provided to the 

government all information about the offense. The court did not address Sanchez’s 

objection based on his status as a zero-point offender. The court then adopted the PSR’s 

calculations. 

Next, the court heard arguments from both parties about the appropriate 

sentence. The government requested a within-guidelines sentence of 236 months 

because of the seriousness of Sanchez’s involvement in drug trafficking. Sanchez

requested a sentence of 210 months because it was his first offense. Then, Sanchez 

provided an allocution, during which he recounted a difficult childhood where he was 

forced to take care of his siblings and mother because his father was absent. He also 

described how he had two children of his own who depended upon him. After 

considering the arguments and weighing the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court 

imposed 210 months’ imprisonment followed by 5 years’ supervised release. 

In his Anders brief, counsel does not say that he consulted with Sanchez about 

whether he wishes to challenge his guilty plea on appeal, as our court requires. 

See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024); United States v. Konczak, 

683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012). But the information contained in counsel’s brief, 

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coupled with our own review of the record, assures us that a challenge to the district 

court’s acceptance of Sanchez’s guilty plea would be frivolous. 

Sanchez did not move in the district court to withdraw his plea, so our review of 

the plea’s acceptance would be for plain error, United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 

618 (7th Cir. 2013), and we see none. The district court properly found that Sanchez was 

competent to enter a plea and that his plea was voluntary and supported by an 

adequate factual basis. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2)–(3). The court also ensured that 

Sanchez knew the nature of the charges against him, the possible penalties he faced, the 

rights he would waive by pleading guilty, and the role of the Sentencing Guidelines. 

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1); Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349. 

The court omitted some warnings from the plea colloquy, but we conclude that 

these omissions were harmless. First, the court did not warn Sanchez that lying under 

oath could lead to a prosecution for perjury,see FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(A), but nothing 

in the record suggests that he faces any risk of such a prosecution, see United States v. 

Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 597–98 (7th Cir. 2016). Second, the court did not clearly inform 

Sanchez of his right to plead not guilty. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B). But that 

omission could not have affected Sanchez’s substantial rights—he “knew he could 

plead not guilty because he previously had pleaded not guilty.” United States v. Brown, 

973 F.3d 667, 717 (7th Cir. 2020). We are thus satisfied that Sanchez could not plausibly 

argue that the court plainly erred in accepting his plea. 

We also conclude that any procedural challenges to Sanchez’s sentence would be 

frivolous. Counsel considers whether Sanchez could argue that the district court erred 

when it found that he possessed a firearm in connection with drug trafficking and 

imposed a two-level increase to his base offense level. Counsel considers the merits of 

this argument and concludes that it would be frivolous because the evidence presented 

at sentencing supported a finding that Palmer possessed a gun in furtherance of the 

jointly undertaken drug trafficking and that possession was reasonably foreseeable to 

Sanchez. We agree that any challenge would be frivolous, but for a different reason. At 

the sentencing hearing, Sanchez expressly withdrew his objections related to the two–

level increase and conceded that it applied, a fact that counsel overlooks. Sanchez has 

thus waived this argument on appeal. See United States v. Syms, 846 F.3d 230, 234 

(7th Cir. 2017). 

Any arguments about the district court’s handling of Sanchez’s other, non–

withdrawn objections to the guidelines calculations would be equally frivolous. We see 

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no error in the court’s refusal to apply the “safety valve” provision based on Sanchez’s 

own possession of a disassembled firearm and his failure to provide complete and 

truthful information about the offense to the government. See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2), (5). 

Sanchez’s possession of gun components (including the frame or receiver) that were

readily reassembled into a complete gun meets the definition of a firearm. See § 1B1.1, 

cmt. n.1(H). And Sanchez did not truthfully provide the government with all of the 

information related to the offense because he maintained throughout his case that he 

was not in possession of a firearm, and that he did not know who was leading the drug 

operation despite having extensive contact with the alleged organizer in the days 

leading up to the arrest. 

Sanchez also could not argue that the court clearly erred in finding that he was 

not “substantially less culpable than the average participant” in the conspiracy, 

see United States v. Guzman-Ramirez, 949 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2020), and that he was 

thus ineligible for a minor-role adjustment, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Indeed, Sanchez had 

knowledge of the scope and structure of the conspiracy as well as extensive 

communication with its alleged leader. See United States v. Freyermuth, 76 F.4th 616, 619 

(7th Cir. 2023) (discussing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C)). 

Further, although the district court did not address this written objection (and 

Sanchez did not raise it again at the sentencing hearing), we see no error in the court’s 

conclusion that Sanchez was not eligible for a reduction based on his status as a zero–

point offender. Sanchez would not meet the criteria for the adjustment because he 

possessed and disposed of readily reassembled firearm components. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 4C1.1(a)(7) (adopting definition of firearm in commentary to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1). 

Finally, we conclude that any challenge to the substantive reasonableness of 

Sanchez’s within-guidelines sentence would be frivolous. Such a sentence is 

presumptively reasonable, and we would affirm it if the judge provides an “adequate 

statement of reasons.” United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384–85 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation 

omitted). Here, the district court explained the sentence with reference to the § 3553(a) 

factors, highlighting the serious nature of the drug trafficking, Sanchez’s significant 

involvement in the trafficking operation, the need for deterrence, and Sanchez’s lack of 

criminal history. Likewise, Sanchez’s five-year term of supervised release is within the 

guidelines range and presumed reasonable. See United States v. Lickers, 928 F.3d 609, 621 

(7th Cir. 2019). Five years is the statutory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). And

Sanchez confirmed at the sentencing hearing that he had read the proposed conditions 

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of release, and he raised no objections. See United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449–50 

(7th Cir. 2019). 

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal. 

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