Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-07084/USCOURTS-caDC-15-07084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
District of Columbia Nurses Association
Amicus Curiae for Appellant
Assane Faye
Appellee
International Union, Security, Police and Fire Professionals of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 2016 Decided July 15, 2016

No. 15-7084

INTERNATIONAL UNION, SECURITY, POLICE AND FIRE 

PROFESSIONALS OF AMERICA,

APPELLANT

v.

ASSANE FAYE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-02229)

James M. Moore argued the cause for appellant. On the 

briefs were Scott A. Brooks and Matthew J. Clark. Anton G. 

Hajjar entered an appearance. 

Jonathan G. Axelrod was on the brief for amicus curiae 

District of Columbia Nurses Association in support of 

appellant.

Eden Brown Gaines argued the cause and filed the brief 

for appellee.

Before: TATEL, KAVANAUGH, and MILLETT, Circuit 

Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: The Labor-Management Reporting 

and Disclosure Act sets out fiduciary duties that officers and 

other agents of unions owe the union that employs them. It 

also permits a union member to bring a lawsuit for breach of 

those duties in federal court “for the benefit of the labor 

organization,” but only after “the labor organization or its 

governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue or recover 

damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief 

within a reasonable time after being requested to do so.” 29 

U.S.C. § 501(b). The statute does not, however, expressly 

give the union itself a cause of action for breach of fiduciary 

duty in federal court. In this case, we must decide whether the 

statute contains an implied cause of action for the union itself.

Our decision on a closely related issue in Weaver v. United 

Mine Workers of America, 492 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per 

curiam), requires that we answer that question in the 

affirmative.

I.

Until September 24, 2009, Assane Faye was a nonmember employee of the International Union, Security, Police 

and Fire Professionals of America (the “Union”). The Union 

brought this suit alleging that while it employed him, Faye 

breached his fiduciary duties to the Union in a number of 

ways, including by encouraging union members to join a rival 

union. Specifically, the Union alleged that Faye breached his 

fiduciary duties under section 501 of the federal LaborUSCA Case #15-7084 Document #1624915 Filed: 07/15/2016 Page 2 of 39
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Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). The 

Union also asserted similar claims under state law, as well as 

a breach of contract claim under the Labor Management 

Relations Act (LMRA).

After several rounds of briefing, the district court 

concluded that the LMRDA provides a cause of action only to 

individual union members, not to the union itself, and that the 

LMRA provides no cause of action to a union seeking to sue a 

non-member employee. The district court concluded that 

because neither federal statute provided the Union with a 

cause of action, it lacked federal question jurisdiction over the 

case. And because no other ground for subject matter 

jurisdiction existed, the district court ruled that it had “no 

basis to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s 

state common law claims.” International Union, Security, 

Police & Fire Professionals of America v. Faye, 115 F. Supp. 

3d 40, 47 (D.D.C. 2015). The district court thus dismissed the 

Union’s entire suit without prejudice for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction.

The Union now appeals, contending that the LMRDA 

gives it a cause of action and that the district court thus also 

has supplemental jurisdiction over its state law claims. The 

Union offers no challenge to the district court’s dismissal of 

its LMRA claim. Our review is de novo. See El Paso Natural 

Gas Co. v. United States, 750 F.3d 863, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(“We review de novo the District Court’s dismissal of claims 

for want of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) or 

for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”).

II.

This case presents a single substantive issue: whether 

LMRDA section 501 provides a union with a federal cause of 

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action against its agent for breach of a fiduciary duty owed to 

the union. This question has been reserved by the Supreme 

Court, see Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension 

Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 374 n.16 (1990), and is already the 

subject of a circuit split, compare Building Material & Dump 

Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 

1989) (finding no implied cause of action), with International 

Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Ward, 

563 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 2009), and International Union of 

Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine & Furniture 

Workers, AFL-CIO v. Statham, 97 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1996) 

(finding an implied cause of action).

Before proceeding to the merits, we pause to clarify the 

nature of our inquiry. As noted above, the district court 

concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 

the LMRDA gives the Union no cause of action. Earlier 

decisions likewise tended to speak of the inquiry in 

jurisdictional terms. See, e.g., Guidry, 493 U.S. at 374 n.16 

(speaking in jurisdictional terms in the course of reserving the 

issue); Traweek, 867 F.2d at 505 (treating the matter as 

jurisdictional).

The Supreme Court has recently made clear, however, 

that the question whether the plaintiff has a cause of action is 

distinct from the question whether a district court has subject

matter jurisdiction. In Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 

510–16 (2006), the Court held that the fact that the defendant 

did not employ the number of employees statutorily required 

to hold it liable under Title VII went to the merits, not 

jurisdiction. And in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static 

Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 n.4 (2014) 

(quoting Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission 

of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002)), the Court wrote 

that “‘the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of 

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action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the 

court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the 

case.’” Here, as in Lexmark, the plaintiff’s claim is at least 

“arguable,” regardless of whether it is “valid.” Our inquiry 

thus goes to the merits, not jurisdiction, which exists under 

the general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. See District of Columbia Nurses Ass’n v. Brown, No. 

15-203, 2016 WL 29252, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2016) 

(reaching the same result).

In determining whether an implied cause of action exists, 

“[t]he judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has 

passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not 

just a private right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent 

on this latter point is determinative.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 

532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (internal citation omitted). Absent 

statutory intent to create a cause of action, none exists, and 

“courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that 

might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the 

statute.” Id. at 286–87.

Congress enacted the LMRDA in 1959 in response to 

various union corruption scandals and an associated 

congressional investigation. See 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) 

(explaining that Congress had found “a number of instances 

of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of 

individual employees, and other failures to observe high 

standards of responsibility and ethical conduct”). The 

LMRDA provision at issue in this case contains two relevant 

subsections. The first, section 501(a), bears the title “Duties of 

officers; exculpatory provisions and resolutions void,” and 

provides as follows:

The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other 

representatives of a labor organization occupy 

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positions of trust in relation to such organization and 

its members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of 

each such person, taking into account the special 

problems and functions of a labor organization, to 

hold its money and property solely for the benefit of 

the organization and its members and to manage, 

invest, and expend the same in accordance with its 

constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the 

governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain from 

dealing with such organization as an adverse party or 

in behalf of an adverse party in any matter connected 

with his duties and from holding or acquiring any 

pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with 

the interests of such organization, and to account to 

the organization for any profit received by him in 

whatever capacity in connection with transactions 

conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of 

the organization. A general exculpatory provision in 

the constitution and bylaws of such a labor 

organization or a general exculpatory resolution of a 

governing body purporting to relieve any such 

person of liability for breach of the duties declared 

by this section shall be void as against public policy.

Id. § 501(a). The second, section 501(b), bears the title, 

“Violation of duties; action by member after refusal or failure 

by labor organization to commence proceedings; jurisdiction; 

leave of court; counsel fees and expenses,” and provides as 

follows:

When any officer, agent, shop steward, or 

representative of any labor organization is alleged to 

have violated the duties declared in subsection (a) of 

this section and the labor organization or its 

governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue or 

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recover damages or secure an accounting or other 

appropriate relief within a reasonable time after 

being requested to do so by any member of the labor 

organization, such member may sue such officer, 

agent, shop steward, or representative in any district 

court of the United States or in any State court of 

competent jurisdiction to recover damages or secure 

an accounting or other appropriate relief for the 

benefit of the labor organization. No such proceeding 

shall be brought except upon leave of the court 

obtained upon verified application and for good 

cause shown, which application may be made ex 

parte. The trial judge may allot a reasonable part of 

the recovery in any action under this subsection to 

pay the fees of counsel prosecuting the suit at the 

instance of the member of the labor organization and 

to compensate such member for any expenses 

necessarily paid or incurred by him in connection 

with the litigation.

Id. § 501(b).

The statute thus gives union members an express federal 

cause of action against a union agent for breach of the 

fiduciary duties set forth in section 501(a). Union members 

may bring such a suit “for the benefit of the [union],” 

provided that they first satisfy certain procedural 

requirements. Central to this case, however, nothing in the

statute expressly gives the union itself such a cause of action.

In assessing whether a union nonetheless has an implied 

cause of action under section 501, we do not write on a clean 

slate. In Weaver v. United Mine Workers of America, 492 

F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam), this court faced issues 

closely related to those presented here. There, relying on 

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section 501’s express cause of action, union members sued 

union officers, as well as the union itself. Id. at 582. Only one 

of the plaintiff union members, however, had satisfied the 

statutory procedural requirements before bringing suit, and 

that plaintiff was murdered while the case was pending. Id.

The defendants, including the union, moved to dismiss on the 

ground that none of the remaining plaintiffs had satisfied the 

statute’s procedural requirements. Id. The district court denied 

these motions, but certified them for interlocutory review. Id.

at 582 & n.8.

While the appeal was pending, a union election occurred, 

and control shifted to new officers supported by and 

supportive of the plaintiffs (including some of the plaintiffs 

themselves). Id. at 582–83. The union then filed motions to 

withdraw its appeal, to intervene on behalf of the plaintiff

union members, and to dismiss the appeal filed by the 

defendant officers as moot in light of the union’s intervention 

as a plaintiff. Id. at 583.

This court granted the union’s motions and directed the 

district court to permit the union to realign as a party plaintiff. 

In doing so, the court analogized union member suits under 

section 501 to shareholder derivative suits. Id. at 586. The

court noted that the union “possesses exclusively the financial 

interest at stake,” and that, accordingly, “although under its 

former leadership the [union] was aligned as a 

defendant[,] . . . the litigation since its commencement has in 

reality been its own.” Id. at 585. “Moreover, in conditioning 

the availability of a derivative action under Section 501 on the 

refusal of a union to bring the action itself, Congress 

expressed its preference that the union prosecute a claim for 

breach of fiduciary duty against union officials.” Id. at 586

(internal citation omitted). Because “[a]llowing the [union] to 

assume the prosecution of this cause would further that 

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legislative preference,” the court concluded, the union “must 

be accorded that right.” Id. This court conceptualized the 

union as fully taking over control of the litigation and 

displacing the plaintiff union members, as demonstrated by its

“understanding that the [union-member plaintiffs] will move 

the District Court for leave to be dropped as party-plaintiffs,” 

id. at 587 n.35, as well as by its dismissal as moot of the 

defendant officers’ appeal challenging the remaining plaintiff 

union members’ failure to comply with the statute’s 

procedural requirements, id. at 587.

Weaver thus holds, at least, that where union members 

have properly sued under section 501, the union itself may 

take control of the suit and displace the union members. In 

this case, the district court distinguished Weaver on the 

ground that the opinion “did not address a union’s right to 

initiate suit on its own behalf.” Faye, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 44 

n.2. The district court and we are bound, however, “not only 

[by] the result” of a prior case, “but also [by] those portions of 

the opinion necessary to that result.” Seminole Tribe of 

Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996). In allowing the 

union to take over control of the litigation, the Weaver court 

necessarily determined that the union was a proper plaintiff in 

a section 501 fiduciary duty suit. Indeed, in language ignored 

by the dissent, it emphasized that “the litigation since its 

commencement has in reality been [the union’s] own.” 

Weaver, 492 F.2d at 585. Neither the district court nor Faye 

has offered any persuasive justification for reading the statute 

to require that a union “be accorded [the] right” to take over a 

suit that “since its commencement has in reality been its 

own,” id. at 585–86, but not to allow the union to simply 

bring “its own” suit in the first instance. Moreover, the 

Weaver court’s dismissal of the individual defendants’ appeal 

as moot necessarily means that it resolved the union’s right to 

litigate a section 501 suit.

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Accordingly, although Weaver did not squarely address 

the precise question of a union’s right to bring a section 501 

suit in the first instance, the reasoning necessary to that

decision compels the conclusion that a union may indeed do 

so. In contrasting a union’s ability to litigate under section 

501 as an intervening plaintiff with its ability to do so as an 

original plaintiff, the district court focused on a distinction 

without a difference. Weaver established both that a section 

501 suit is properly understood as belonging to the union and 

that the union is a proper party to litigate it. The question 

before us—whether section 501 gives a union a cause of 

action for breach of fiduciary duty—thus did not “‘merely 

lurk in the [Weaver] record, neither brought to the attention of 

the court nor ruled upon.’” See Dissenting Op. at 11 (quoting 

LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(en banc)). Rather, Weaver answered it in the affirmative.

Nor, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, id. at 7–8, are we 

free to ignore our precedent merely because a party 

incorrectly concedes that it fails to bind us.

The parties’ dispute over the Union’s state law claims 

requires much less attention. Because the Union’s section 501 

claim is properly before the district court, supplemental 

jurisdiction exists for the Union’s state law claims.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s 

order dismissing the Union’s claims under section 501 and 

state law for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

So ordered.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge, concurring: I write separately to 

explain why, even absent Weaver, I would conclude that 

LMRDA section 501 gives unions a cause of action. As I see 

it, the statute’s text and structure reveal Congress’s intent both 

to create federal rights and to allow unions to vindicate those 

rights in federal court. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 

275, 286 (2001) (“The judicial task is to interpret the statute 

Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an 

intent to create not just a private right but also a private 

remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative.”

(internal citation omitted)).

To begin with, section 501(a) creates federal rights. It 

contains express rights-creating language, specifying that 

union agents occupy “positions of trust in relation to [the 

union] and its members as a group,” and that, accordingly, 

such an agent has a series of specific duties, including “to 

hold [the union’s] money and property solely for the benefit 

of the organization and its members,” “to refrain from dealing 

with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf of an 

adverse party in any matter connected with his duties,” and 

“to account to the organization for any profit received by him 

in whatever capacity in connection with transactions 

conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of the 

organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 501(a).

To be sure, these duties correspond to state common law 

fiduciary duties, but their express delineation in a federal 

statute demonstrates that they reflect separate federal rights. 

Rather than simply adopting state law or using an unadorned 

common law term such as “fiduciary duty” without 

elaboration, section 501 not only lays out the relevant duties 

in some detail, but does so without any reference to state law. 

Indeed, the statute itself refers to “the duties declared by this 

section,” id. (emphasis added), and “the duties declared in 

subsection (a) of this section,” id. § 501(b) (emphasis added). 

To see that the statute does not simply incorporate state law, 

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consider a hypothetical state that expressly abolishes all state 

law fiduciary duties. In such a state, union agents would still 

owe the union the duties “declared” in section 501(a). 

Moreover, legislative history indicates that Congress was 

aware of state fiduciary law, but nonetheless “considered it 

important to write the fiduciary principle explicitly into 

Federal labor legislation.” H.R. Rep. 86-741 (1959), reprinted 

in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2479–80.

To the extent Faye argues that section 501 creates rights 

only in favor of union members rather than also in favor of 

the union itself, that argument falls short. The statute specifies 

that union agents occupy “positions of trust in relation to [the 

union] and its members as a group,” 29 U.S.C. § 501(a), not 

in relation to individual members. Moreover, the statute 

requires that many of the duties it specifies be performed for 

the union itself, such as the duty “to refrain from dealing with 

such organization as an adverse party or in behalf of an 

adverse party in any matter connected with [the agent’s]

duties.” Id. (emphasis added). And tellingly, the statute 

specifies that when union members bring suit under section 

501, they do so “for the benefit of the [union].” Id. § 501(b).

Of course, to provide unions an implied cause of action, 

the statute must not only give them federal rights, but also 

reveal that Congress intended to give them a private remedy. 

Section 501 reveals just such an intent. The statute refers to 

the “refusal or failure by labor organization to commence 

proceedings,” id., which is most naturally read as suggesting 

that a union may bring proceedings under the statute. 

Similarly, the statute allows a suit by a union member “for the 

benefit of the [union]” only after the union “refuse[s] or fail[s] 

to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other 

appropriate relief within a reasonable time after being 

requested to do so,” id. (emphasis added), further 

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emphasizing Congress’s understanding that unions have the 

capacity “to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting 

or other appropriate relief” regardless of state law.

Relying on these and other aspects of the statute, courts 

on both sides of the implied cause of action debate agree that 

union members’ suits are analogous to shareholder derivative 

suits. E.g., International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 

150, AFL-CIO v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276, 287–88 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(using the analogy in a case finding an implied cause of 

action); Building Material & Dump Truck Drivers, Local 420 

v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500, 506 (9th Cir. 1989) (using the 

analogy in a case finding no implied cause of action). But 

because shareholder derivative suits are brought on behalf of 

a corporation, such suits are typically allowed only after the 

corporation itself fails to bring suit on the same claims. See

Ward, 563 F.3d at 288 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 

531, 534 (1970)). “It would be anomalous indeed,” the 

Seventh Circuit pointed out, “to read this statutory scheme as 

remitting the union’s own suit—which is primary under the 

statutory hierarchy—to state court.” Id. Moreover, this 

“anomalous” result “would create perverse incentives” for 

unions to forgo filing suit to “manufactur[e] federal 

jurisdiction” so that a member could bring a section 501(b) 

suit in federal court. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although even Faye, the district court, and the dissent all 

acknowledge that the statute envisions that unions will have 

some ability to pursue fiduciary duty claims against their 

agents directly, they insist that section 501 contemplates suits 

by unions only in state court for violations of state law. 

Appellee’s Br. 5–6 (“Congress’[s] contemplation of a union’s 

right to sue is, in fact, evident in the language of the 

statute. . . . [I]t is not necessary to look beyond the language 

[of the statute] to find that the statute does not convey an 

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express or implied private right of action for a union to sue in 

federal court.”); International Union, Security, Police & Fire 

Professionals of America v. Faye, 115 F. Supp. 3d 40, 45

(D.D.C. 2015) (“Although the statutory language does reveal 

that Congress contemplated unions bringing suit in some 

forum, nothing in the statute suggests that Congress thought 

unions and union members required access to the same

forum.”); Dissenting Op. at 6 (“It is true that Congress 

assumed that unions would be able to bring suit to enforce the 

fiduciary duties imposed on union officers. But nothing in 

Subsection (b) suggests that Congress intended to allow 

unions to bring suit under federal law rather than under state

law.”). I disagree.

On this understanding of the statute, Congress intended to 

give union members a federal cause of action for violation of 

federal rights, but only when the union itself “refuse[d] or 

fail[ed]” to obtain relief in state court using state law, which 

may or may not overlap perfectly with the fiduciary duties 

imposed by section 501(a). This conception conflicts with the 

statutory description of the union member’s suit as “for the 

benefit of the [union],” 29 U.S.C. § 501(b), as well as with the 

virtually uniform characterization of the union member’s suit 

as a derivative suit ultimately belonging to the union itself. 

Far more likely to comport with congressional intent is the 

reading embraced by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. By 

creating federal rights and an express derivative federal cause 

of action for union members to bring “for the benefit” of the 

union—if the union does not itself “commence 

proceedings”—section 501 reveals Congress’s intent that the 

union be able to enforce the duties its agents owe it in federal 

court.

The arguments advanced by Faye and embraced by the 

district court are unconvincing. First, Faye argues that section 

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501 must be construed narrowly because it is a jurisdictional 

statute. As noted above, however, Majority Op. at 4–5, the 

issue in this case goes to the merits, not jurisdiction.

Faye also argues that in enacting section 501, Congress 

was concerned that unions were refusing to enforce their 

rights in state court, not that state law provided unions with 

inadequate remedies. On this theory, Congress designed the 

statute to benefit union members suffering from union 

corruption, and we should therefore not read it to give the 

union itself a federal cause of action. See also Dissenting Op. 

at 5–7. Faye is correct that Congress recognized that state 

common law remedies were available to unions. But Congress 

apparently found these remedies inadequate and chose to 

address the problem in a particular way: by declaring federal 

duties the union agents owed the union and creating a federal 

remedial scheme that includes a derivative-like suit. Such a 

scheme obviously depends for its coherence on the ability of 

the union to control the suit that, after all, ultimately belongs 

to it.

I am also unpersuaded by the arguments advanced by my 

two colleagues. First, to be sure, as Judge Kavanaugh points 

out, “‘where a statute expressly provides a remedy, courts 

must be especially reluctant to provide additional remedies.’” 

Id. at 5 (quoting Karahalios v. National Federation of 

Federal Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989));

see also Millett Concurring Op. at 4–5. But here, the textual 

and contextual evidence of statutory intent is strong, and the 

“additional remed[y]” consists merely of allowing the 

ultimate owner of a derivative claim to bring suit in its own 

name.

Similarly, because I read section 501 as reflecting 

congressional intent to create an implied cause of action, I am 

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untroubled that Congress also discussed “labor 

organization[s]” in various other provisions of the statute. 

Likewise, the inclusion of procedural prerequisites for union 

members bringing suits hardly suggests that unions are

powerless to sue. Rather, I read section 501 as a whole as 

reflecting an intent to give unions an implied cause of action

and the section 501(b) prerequisites as designed to prevent 

union members from hijacking lawsuits that unions

themselves are willing to pursue. See International Union of 

Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine & Furniture 

Workers, AFL-CIO v. Statham, 97 F.3d 1416, 1421 (11th Cir. 

1996) (“Here, section 501(b) clearly shows that it has not one, 

but two purposes: first, to enable individuals to sue on the 

union’s behalf, and second, to make sure that individuals do 

not preempt a union’s right to prosecute its own claims.”).

This conclusion applies with equal force to the potentially 

jurisdictional statutory prerequisite that union members

receive leave of court “for good cause shown” prior to 

bringing suit.

Finally, Judge Millett worries that “[a]llowing the union 

itself to take over enforcement of Section 501 rights would 

put back into the union’s hands the very authority Congress 

sought to confer on individual members, and would empower 

corrupt unions to throw the Section 501 litigation or enter into 

sweetheart settlements.” Millett Concurring Op. at 6. But that 

concern seems difficult to square with Congress’s willingness 

to allow unions to foreclose suits by their members by 

“commenc[ing] proceedings” when requested. In other words, 

on any reading of the statute, Congress gave unions 

significant leeway to preempt fiduciary duty suits by their 

members. And even if Judge Millett is correct that “Section 

501(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard protects the union member’s 

right to bring a federal suit to enforce federal rights if 

litigation shenanigans by the union in state court trenched 

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upon the rights and duties declared by Section 501(a),” id. at 

7 n.2, then the same standard would seem to protect against 

“litigation shenanigans” in federal court.

In sum, interpreting section 501 holistically and with due 

regard to both its text and its remedial structure, I am 

convinced that in enacting the LMRDA, Congress intended to 

allow the union to itself bring suit for violation of the federal 

rights Congress “declared” in section 501(a).

One final note. Faye’s reading of the statute becomes 

even less tenable when this court’s interpretation of section 

501 in Weaver is layered on top of it. Even if Weaver did not 

control here, it holds at least that a union may take over a suit 

properly brought by a union member under section 501. 

Faye’s position would thus suggest that the union has no 

ability to bring a federal suit in the first instance, but could 

displace its members and proceed to litigate the members’ suit 

against its agents in federal court. I would not read section 

501 as creating such a counterintuitive scheme.

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MILLETT, Circuit Judge, concurring: The issue in this 

case sounds simple: can a union file suit as a plaintiff to 

enforce the fiduciary duties Congress declared in 29 U.S.C. 

§ 501? But the answer is hard, lying at the intersection of 

important questions about the binding reach of circuit 

precedent, statutory construction, and constitutional 

avoidance. At bottom, I agree that Weaver v. United Mine 

Workers of America, 492 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per 

curiam), directs our disposition of this case, for the reasons so 

well explained by the majority opinion. I write separately to 

explain further my conviction that Weaver controls 

notwithstanding the arguments made in the dissenting 

opinion, and yet to acknowledge the force of the arguments 

against Weaver’s correctness, as well as to note the potential 

constitutional problems the issue raises.

A

A panel of this court is bound to adhere to the holdings of 

prior circuit precedent even if we might resolve the case 

differently were we to decide it in the first instance. See

United States v. Kolter, 71 F.3d 425, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 

(We are “bound by [an earlier] decision even if we d[o] not 

agree with it[.]”); cf. Hilton v. South Carolina Public 

Railways Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 198 (1991) (The principle 

of stare decisis is “most compelling” in statutory 

interpretation cases.).

Weaver’s holding alone would seem to end this case 

because this court explicitly ruled there that a union may, on

its own, prosecute as plaintiff an action to enforce the federal 

rights created by 29 U.S.C. § 501(a). Weaver, 492 F.2d at 

586–587. The union in this case seeks to do the same thing: 

to prosecute an action to enforce the rights under Section 

501(a) as the sole plaintiff. Asked and answered by Weaver.

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2

And Weaver’s influence does not stop there. As the 

majority opinion notes, we are bound not just by the bottomline holding of Weaver, but also by “those portions of the 

opinion necessary to that result.” Seminole Tribe of Florida 

v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996). The analysis on which the 

Weaver court predicated its holding seals the precedential 

deal.

Specifically, the Weaver court held that the union could 

be the sole plaintiff enforcing rights conferred by Section 

501(a) by analyzing the statutory structure, and explaining 

how, under Section 501, the union “retain[ed] the primary 

interest in the litigation.” 492 F.2d at 586. That was not just 

a procedural judgment. Rather, Weaver declared specifically 

that, given the union’s desire “to prosecute vigorously the 

action brought for its benefit, it must be accorded that right.” 

Id. (emphasis added). The only “right” the Weaver court 

could have recognized in that sentence was a right of action 

under Section 501(a). That, in fact, is what Weaver tells us in 

the preceding two sentences that describe “that right”: 

Congress expressed its preference that the union 

prosecute a claim for breach of fiduciary duty 

against union officials. Allowing the [union] to 

assume the prosecution of this cause would further 

that legislative preference.

Id.; see also id. (“The mere fact that individual members have 

initiated the action does not prohibit the [union] from * * *

taking the offensive in its prosecution.”). Thus, contrary to 

the claim in the dissenting opinion, see Dissenting Op. at 11, 

the Weaver court did not just have “thoughts” about whether 

Section 501 confers a right of action on unions; Weaver

expressly acknowledged and directly enforced the union’s 

“right” “to prosecute * * * the action” as plaintiff, 492 F.2d at 

586.

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3

Finally, unless the Weaver court specifically determined 

that the union had the lawful authority to independently 

enforce the rights conferred by Section 501(a), there would 

have been no basis for Weaver’s separate holding that 

arguments about whether other would-be plaintiffs could sue 

were moot. 492 F.2d at 587 (“[W]hether the action survived 

the death of the only plaintiff who complied with the 

prerequisite to a Section 501(b) suit [] has become 

academic.”); id. at 586 (noting union argument that, if the 

union “itself may assume the litigation as party-plaintiff,” that 

would “moot” the dispute over whether other plaintiffs could 

continue the lawsuit). There thus is nothing “lurk[ing],” see 

Dissenting Op. at 11, about Weaver’s express holding that the 

union’s right to bring suit as plaintiff legally moots the 

question of whether other would-be plaintiffs can prosecute 

the action.

The dissenting opinion would cast all of that aside for two 

reasons. First, that opinion describes Weaver as “completely 

miss[ing] the issue of whether Section 501 creates an implied 

cause of action for unions.” Dissenting Op. at 10. But 

Weaver specifically discussed how the union’s “right” to sue 

“further[ed] th[e] legislative preference,” 492 F.2d at 586. 

That the panel did not go on to “cite any precedent related to 

finding implied causes of action,” Dissenting Op. at 9, or to 

use a particular—and at that time rarely used—linguistic 

formulation is irrelevant to whether the prior panel holding 

binds us.1

Second, the dissenting opinion claims that Weaver’s

holding was limited to the narrow factual circumstance before 

that court: whether a union could “start on one side of a 

1 This court first employed the “implied cause of action” 

phraseology three years after Weaver. See Mason v. Belieu, 543 

F.2d 215, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

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4

Section 501 case and then—midway through—switch to the 

other side.” Dissenting Op. at 9. It certainly is true that the 

facts of Weaver differed from those here. Thankfully, we do 

not often encounter cases where the defendant orchestrates 

the murder of the plaintiff, has a change of heart, and then 

seeks to substitute itself as plaintiff in the litigation. But 

those tragic facts played no role in the Weaver court’s 

controlling legal analysis as to why the union could sue as 

plaintiff. Weaver instead relied upon the legal “right” of the 

union to prosecute the action, because it had the “primary 

interest in the litigation” and because “Congress expressed its 

preference” for that action in the design and structure of the 

statute. 492 F.2d at 586.

Indeed, what else could Weaver have meant? Surely it 

does not mean that persons who otherwise lack a right of 

action to enforce statutorily conferred rights can suddenly 

acquire such a right if they just murder the proper plaintiff 

and then step into the vacuum to prosecute the suit on their

own behalf. I am not wont to impute such a bizarre holding 

to a prior panel.

B

Were it not for Weaver, I might very well agree with the 

dissenting opinion that no right of action can be implied here. 

While Judge Tatel’s concurring opinion ably articulates the 

best arguments for implying such a right, in my mind four 

considerations weigh heavily against that conclusion. 

First, Congress spelled out in Section 501 precisely the

cause of action it wanted to create, along with specific 

conditions and limitations on the action. I am not aware of 

any case in which either this court or the Supreme Court has 

implied a right of action for one party where Congress

expressly bestowed that right on a different party and on 

different terms. Given that the bottom-line inquiry is whether 

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5

“evidence anywhere in the text * * * suggest[s] that Congress 

intended to create a private right,” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 

U.S. 275, 291 (2001), the better course in this case would be 

to assume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it 

said when it specifically designed the cause of action it 

thought best to enforce Section 501(a). 

Second, at every turn, the statutory text weighs against 

judicially implying a cause of action. To begin with, it is not 

as though Congress just overlooked unions as potential 

parties. Unions—“labor organizations”—are referenced all 

over Section 501. Section 501 reflects a deliberate effort by 

Congress to declare fiduciary duties owed to unions, and a

corresponding right to enforce them that was consciously not

vested in the unions, but was designed to be entirely separate 

and independent of those organizations.

On top of that, it seems textually impossible to shoehorn 

union-plaintiffs into the statute as Congress wrote it. Section 

501(b) repeatedly refers to the authorized plaintiff as a 

“member” of the labor organization in describing who may 

sue and how, as well as who can obtain attorneys’ fees and 

costs. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b). Needless to say, a union is not a 

member of itself. The statute also requires a plaintiff, before 

filing suit, to establish that the union itself “refuse[d] or 

fail[ed] to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or 

other appropriate relief within a reasonable time after being 

requested to do so by any member of the labor organization.” 

Id. The suit that Section 501(b) references there is a suit by 

the union under extant state-law causes of action—such as 

fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust 

enrichment, all of which long predated Section 501. See, e.g.,

H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959), reprinted 

in 1 NLRB Legislative History of the Labor-Management 

Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, at 839 (1959). Suing 

unions, by definition, cannot establish their own failure to 

bring suit.

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6

To allow unions to sue as plaintiffs under Section 501, 

courts would have to shrug off those textual preconditions.

But that would amount to defying, not implying, a statutory 

cause of action.

Third, there was good reason for all the procedural fences 

Congress erected against unions as plaintiffs: the whole point 

of Section 501 was to empower individuals to combat union 

corruption. See Mallick v. International Brotherhood of 

Electrical Workers, 749 F.2d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 

(describing Congress’s attempt “to end ‘autocratic rule by 

placing the ultimate power in the hands of the members, 

where it rightfully belongs, so that they may be ruled by their 

free consent, [and] may bring about a regeneration of union 

leadership’”) (quoting 105 Cong. Rec. 6472 (1959) (remarks 

of Sen. McClellan), reprinted in 2 NLRB, Legislative History 

of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 

1959, at 1099 (1959)).

Allowing the union itself to take over enforcement of 

Section 501 rights would put back into the union’s hands the 

very authority Congress sought to confer on individual 

members, and would empower corrupt unions to throw the 

Section 501 litigation or enter into sweetheart settlements. 

Weaver itself seemed to acknowledge that risk because the 

court went out of its way to find that the union’s efforts to 

proceed as plaintiff in that case were not in “bad faith” and 

did not entail any “conflict of interest.” 492 F.2d at 586. 

Indeed, suspicions about unions absolving corrupt officials 

are presumably what led Congress to outlaw “general 

exculpatory” union bylaws and resolutions that would 

otherwise purport to relieve officers of the fiduciary duties 

that Section 501(a) declared. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a). It would 

make little sense to empower unions to accomplish through 

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7

litigation tactics what Congress forbade through other union 

processes.2

Fourth, the statute requires would-be plaintiffs to obtain 

leave of the court “for good cause shown” before filing suit. 

29 U.S.C. § 501(b). That provision appears similar to 

certificates of appealability that many habeas petitioners must

obtain before filing suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). The

certification procedure in habeas cases is jurisdictional. See 

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012). If Section 

501(b)’s pre-litigation certification likewise is 

“jurisdictional”—as Congress labeled it in the heading to 

Section 501(b)—then implying a right of action that bypasses 

Section 501(b)’s “good cause” limitation (as the record 

suggests the union did here) would require courts to create 

their own jurisdiction under Section 501, not just a right of 

action. Courts absolutely cannot do that. See Kontrick v. 

Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004) (“Only Congress may 

determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter 

jurisdiction.”) (citing U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1).

Accordingly, if we were writing on a clean slate, the 

relevant indicia of statutory intent would, in my view and as 

well explained by the dissenting opinion, weigh heavily 

against implying a right of action for unions to prosecute

lawsuits under Section 501.

2 Judge Tatel’s concurring opinion suggests that the union could 

equally frustrate an individual member’s suit under Section 501 by 

collusively litigating its state-law cause of action. See Concurring 

Op. at 6. But Section 501(b)’s “good cause” standard protects the 

union member’s right to bring a federal suit to enforce federal 

rights if litigation shenanigans by the union in state court trenched 

upon the rights and duties declared by Section 501(a).

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C

Having said all of that, one thing would still give me 

pause about denying a union the right to sue under Section 

501: Unless the union can sue, the enforcement scheme that 

Congress devised could potentially run into some 

constitutional headwinds. 

For starters, Congress is clear that the fiduciary duties in 

Section 501(a) belong to the union, and to that end provides 

that any recovery also goes to the union itself. See, e.g., 29 

U.S.C. § 501(a) (declaring duties of union officials and agents 

to “hold [the union’s] money and property solely for the 

benefit of the organization and its members”); id. § 501(b)

(authorizing suit “to recover damages or secure an accounting 

or other appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor 

organization”). The ability of Congress to empower a third 

party—someone completely outside of the union’s control—

to independently enforce and definitively adjudicate the

union’s own rights would seem to raise due process concerns. 

Cf. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 896 (2008) (“[A] special 

statutory scheme may ‘expressly foreclose successive 

litigation by nonlitigants if the scheme is otherwise consistent 

with due process.’”) (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 

762 n.2 (1989)) (emphasis added) (alterations omitted).

It bears noting, in that regard, that individual member 

suits under Section 501(b) do not map exactly onto the

shareholder derivative model referenced in Weaver, 492 F.2d 

at 586 & n.27, and Judge Tatel’s concurrence, Concurring 

Op. at 3. That is because stockholders actually own a portion 

of the corporation and thus have individual property interests 

in corporate breaches of fiduciary duties. See Ashwander v. 

Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 318 (1936) 

(Shareholders may bring a derivative suit because, “[w]hile 

their stock holdings are small, they have a real interest[.]”);

see also 13 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations 

USCA Case #15-7084 Document #1624915 Filed: 07/15/2016 Page 25 of 39
9

§ 5972 (2015) (“[O]ne who does not own shares in a 

corporation is not qualified to bring a derivative action in its 

name.”).

Individual union members, by contrast, have no property 

interest in the union, and the broad fiduciary duties that 

Section 501(a) vindicates generally run to the union and 

union membership as a whole, rather than to individual union 

members.3 Construing the statute to permit unions to 

vindicate their Section 501(a) rights themselves should they 

choose to do so might arguably ameliorate the constitutional 

concern. See Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. 

v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern 

California, 508 U.S. 602, 528–529 (1993) (“Federal statutes 

are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their 

constitutionality.”) (quoting International Ass’n of Machinists 

v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749–750 (1961)).

On top of that, the ability of individual union members to 

sue in federal court to enforce the union’s legal rights—based 

on injuries inflicted only on the union or the membership as a 

whole and to obtain a recovery that runs 100% to the union—

may raise an Article III standing question. See Vermont 

Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex. rel. Stevens,

529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000) (“The Art. III judicial power exists 

only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the 

complaining party.”) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 

3 See 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (recovery is solely for the benefit of the 

organization as a whole); see also, e.g., Agola v. Hagner, 556 F. 

Supp. 296, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (complaint under Section 501 

failed to state a claim because the suit was “for the benefit of 

individual plaintiffs and not for the benefit of a labor 

organization”); cf. Goolsby v. City of Detroit, 358 N.W.2d 856, 863 

(Mich. 1984) (common-law duty of fair representation means that 

the union “must be faithful to each member, to be sure, but * * * 

must be faithful to all of the members at one and the same time”).

USCA Case #15-7084 Document #1624915 Filed: 07/15/2016 Page 26 of 39
10

499 (1975)) (emphasis in Vermont Agency). However, 

construing the statute to treat the union as the real party in 

interest and the individual litigant as something akin to an 

assignee for collection could—perhaps—reduce those 

concerns. See Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, 

Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 285 (2008) (“Lawsuits by assignees * * *

are ‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable 

to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’”) (quoting Vermont 

Agency, 529 U.S. at 777–778).

In sum, I find the statutory construction question legally 

betwixt and between, with text, structure, and purpose

pointing against recognizing an implied right of action, and 

the principle of constitutional avoidance pointing in the other 

direction. Weaver, however, forestalls that difficult debate 

for now. 

USCA Case #15-7084 Document #1624915 Filed: 07/15/2016 Page 27 of 39
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The Security, 

Police & Fire Professionals of America is a labor union that 

represents security personnel throughout the United States.

From 2004 to 2009, the Union employed Assane Faye as the 

District Director of its office in Washington, D.C. The 

relationship did not go well. The Union contends that Faye 

was not a loyal union officer. According to the Union, Faye

endeavored to establish a rival union and misused the Union’s 

resources to achieve that goal.

The Union sued Faye in U.S. District Court for violating 

his fiduciary duties to the Union. The Union sued under the

federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and 

under D.C. law. According to Faye, however, the federal Act

does not create a cause of action for a union to sue its former 

officer. Faye argued that the Union therefore could sue him 

only under D.C. law. The District Court agreed with Faye.

The majority opinion reverses the judgment of the

District Court and allows the Union to maintain its federal 

claim against Faye. I respectfully dissent because unions do 

not possess a federal cause of action to sue their officers for 

breaches of fiduciary duties.

I

A

In 1959, Congress passed and President Eisenhower 

signed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. 

See 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Congress was concerned about 

growing instances “of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of 

the rights of individual employees, and other failures to 

observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct” 

on the part of union officers. Id. § 401(b). By enacting this

statute, Congress sought to deter those problems, in part by 

making corrupt union officers civilly liable to union members.

USCA Case #15-7084 Document #1624915 Filed: 07/15/2016 Page 28 of 39
2

Section 501 of the Act sets forth the civil liability 

scheme. Subsection (a) of Section 501 imposes fiduciary 

duties on “officers, agents, shop stewards, and other 

representatives” of the union. Id. § 501(a). (I will use the 

term “officers” to refer collectively to those individuals.) 

Under the Act, union officers must manage the “money and 

property” of the union “solely for the benefit of the 

organization and its members.” Id. The union officers must 

also remain loyal to the union and refrain from any selfdealing. See id.1

Subsection (b) of Section 501 gives individual union 

members a federal cause of action in order to enforce the 

fiduciary duties created by Subsection (a). Any “member of 

the labor organization” may sue a union officer violating 

 1 Subsection (a) reads in full: “The officers, agents, shop 

stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization occupy 

positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members 

as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into 

account the special problems and functions of a labor organization, 

to hold its money and property solely for the benefit of the 

organization and its members and to manage, invest, and expend 

the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any 

resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain 

from dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf 

of an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and 

from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which 

conflicts with the interests of such organization, and to account to 

the organization for any profit received by him in whatever capacity 

in connection with transactions conducted by him or under his 

direction on behalf of the organization. A general exculpatory 

provision in the constitution and bylaws of such a labor 

organization or a general exculpatory resolution of a governing 

body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of 

the duties declared by this section shall be void as against public 

policy.”

USCA Case #15-7084 Document #1624915 Filed: 07/15/2016 Page 29 of 39
3

Subsection (a) “in any district court of the United States” in 

order “to recover damages or secure an accounting or other 

appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor organization.” 

Id. § 501(b).2

Because suits brought by union members under 

Subsection (b) are “for the benefit of the labor organization,” 

id., they are derivative suits. A union member therefore may 

bring suit under Subsection (b) only after meeting two 

procedural prerequisites. First, the union member may sue 

under Subsection (b) only after the union itself “refuse[s] or 

fail[s] to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or 

other appropriate relief within a reasonable time after being 

requested to do so.” Id. Second, the union member must

acquire “leave of the court obtained upon verified application 

and for good cause shown.” Id. If a union member meets

those procedural prerequisites, Subsection (b) provides the 

 2 Subsection (b) reads in full: “When any officer, agent, shop 

steward, or representative of any labor organization is alleged to 

have violated the duties declared in subsection (a) of this section 

and the labor organization or its governing board or officers refuse 

or fail to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other 

appropriate relief within a reasonable time after being requested to 

do so by any member of the labor organization, such member may 

sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in any 

district court of the United States or in any State court of competent 

jurisdiction to recover damages or secure an accounting or other 

appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor organization. No such 

proceeding shall be brought except upon leave of the court obtained 

upon verified application and for good cause shown, which 

application may be made ex parte. The trial judge may allot a 

reasonable part of the recovery in any action under this subsection 

to pay the fees of counsel prosecuting the suit at the instance of the 

member of the labor organization and to compensate such member 

for any expenses necessarily paid or incurred by him in connection 

with the litigation.”

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4

union member a cause of action to file suit against a union 

officer.

But Subsection (b), by its terms, does not give a union –

as opposed to union members – a cause of action. That 

statutory silence has precipitated a circuit split. The Seventh 

and Eleventh Circuits have held that unions have an implied 

cause of action under Section 501. International Union of 

Operating Engineers, Local 150 v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276 (7th 

Cir. 2009); International Union of Electronic, Electrical, 

Salaried, Machine & Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO v. 

Statham, 97 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit, 

by contrast, has held that unions do not have an implied cause 

of action under Section 501. Building Material and Dump 

Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 

1989). This case requires us to enter the fray.

B

“Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of 

action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress,”

not the Judicial Branch. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 

275, 286 (2001). Courts must therefore be “reluctant” to 

“provide a private cause of action where the statute does not 

supply one expressly.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 

692, 727 (2004). Courts may find an implied cause of action 

only if they determine that the statute “displays an intent to 

create not just a private right but also a private remedy.” 

Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286.

Applying the Supreme Court’s precedents regarding 

implied causes of action, I would conclude that Section 501 

does not create an implied cause of action for unions.

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5

To begin with, the text is clear. Subsection (b) of Section 

501 creates a cause of action for union members. It does not

create a cause of action for unions.

Indeed, the text of Section 501 strongly suggests that 

Congress did not want unions to have a federal cause of 

action. It is “an ‘elemental canon’ of statutory construction 

that where a statute expressly provides a remedy, courts must 

be especially reluctant to provide additional remedies.” 

Karahalios v. National Federation of Federal Employees, 

Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989) (citation omitted); see 

also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 

444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979); National Railroad Passenger 

Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 

U.S. 453, 458 (1974). After all, “express provision of one 

method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress 

intended to preclude others.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290.

Here, Congress chose to create a cause of action, but only 

for union members and not for unions. That decision strongly 

suggests that Congress intended to allow union members –

and only union members – to sue under Section 501. We 

should respect that congressional choice.

To be sure, some broader conceptions of statutory intent 

take account not just of the text of the statute, but also of

legislative history. But here, the legislative history supplies

zero indication that Congress wanted to create a federal cause 

of action for unions.

As Judge Millett’s concurrence explains in convincing 

detail, moreover, other contextual indications in this statutory 

scheme make it all but “impossible to shoehorn unionplaintiffs into the statute as Congress wrote it.” Millett 

Concurring Op. at 5. Notably, as far as anyone is aware, the 

Supreme Court has never found an implied cause of action for 

USCA Case #15-7084 Document #1624915 Filed: 07/15/2016 Page 32 of 39
6

one party to sue under a particular statute when Congress 

expressly created a cause of action for another party to do so. 

We should not start now.

With no text and no legislative history to support its 

argument, the Union relies heavily on the fact that union 

members may not bring suit under Subsection (b) until the 

union has refused or failed to do so itself. Subsection (b) 

therefore assumes that a union could have brought suit. 

According to the Union, Congress therefore must have

intended to give unions a federal cause of action to enforce 

Section 501. See also Ward, 563 F.3d at 287-88.

But the conclusion does not follow from the premise. It 

is true that Congress assumed that unions would be able to

bring suit to enforce the fiduciary duties imposed on union 

officers. But nothing in Subsection (b) suggests that Congress 

intended to allow unions to bring suit under federal law rather 

than under state law. When Congress enacted Section 501, it 

knew that unions already had state-law causes of action

available to them. See Tatel Concurring Op. at 5; see also

H.R. Rep. No. 86-741, at 81 (1959) (supplementary views). 

But at the time, the States generally did not provide causes of 

action to union members in order for them to sue corrupt 

union officers. See S. Rep. No. 86-187, at 72 (1959) 

(minority views); Statham, 97 F.3d at 1420. That disparity 

generated a problem: Although unions could sue their 

officers under state law, the unions were sometimes choosing 

not to do so for corrupt reasons – in part because the officers 

of the union usually determined whether a union should sue. 

See generally Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826, 828-29, 831-

32 (9th Cir. 1968). And union members had no recourse 

because, as noted above, they generally could not sue the

union officers under state law. To solve that problem, 

Congress enacted a new statute affording union members a 

USCA Case #15-7084 Document #1624915 Filed: 07/15/2016 Page 33 of 39
7

federal cause of action to sue crooked union officers when a 

union itself would not. But Congress did not need to allow

unions to sue under federal law because unions, unlike union 

members, already could bring suit against union officers

under state law. And so Congress did not need to – and did 

not – create a new federal cause of action for unions.

Sticking to the statute as Congress wrote it does not leave 

unions without remedies. To reiterate, they have state-law 

remedies. This suit demonstrates as much. In addition to the 

federal claim, the Union brought a host of other claims

against Faye under D.C. law. Those claims include 

conversion and breach of contract, along with a claim for 

breach of fiduciary duties imposed by D.C. law. See

Complaint at 4-6, International Union, Security, Police and 

Fire Professionals of America v. Faye, No. 09-2229 (D.D.C. 

Nov. 24, 2009), at Joint Appendix 8-10. In other words, even 

without a federal cause of action under Section 501, unions 

can still hold union officers accountable, including in this 

very case, but the unions must do so under state law.

Creating a federal cause of action for unions may or may 

not be “desirable” as a matter of policy. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 

at 287. But Congress did not create one in the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act, and we must

respect Congress’s policy choice.

II

The majority opinion sidesteps the merits of the Union’s 

argument. Instead, the majority opinion says this Court 

already decided the issue in Weaver v. United Mine Workers 

of America, 492 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In so 

ruling, the majority opinion ventures far beyond both the 

arguments of the parties in this case and the holding of 

Weaver itself.

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To start, even the Union here does not rely on Weaver to 

support its arguments. Think about that. In its opening brief, 

the Union did not rely at all on Weaver. See Union Br. 13. At 

oral argument, the Union was offered Weaver on a silver 

platter. See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 8. But the Union declined to 

indulge. In no uncertain terms, the Union said it would be too 

much of a reach to argue that Weaver had any relevance here:

“[G]iven th[e] rather unique circumstance of that case,” the 

Union explained at oral argument, Weaver “does not directly

address the issue before this Panel.” Tr. of Oral Arg. at 8-9. 

Again, remember that this was the Union speaking. Even the 

Union did not think it could make a good argument that 

Weaver controlled this case.

The Union expressly waived reliance on Weaver for good 

reason. As the Union acknowledged in its brief and at oral 

argument, the facts in Weaver presented a far different set of 

legal issues, and the Weaver Court quite plainly did not 

address much less resolve the question now before us.

Weaver involved a Section 501 suit brought by Joseph 

Yablonski, a member of the United Mine Workers of 

America. Weaver, 492 F.2d at 581-82. Yablonski believed 

that the union’s senior officers had been misappropriating

union funds. Id. at 582. So along with other members of the 

union, Yablonski sued three union officers and the union itself 

under Subsection (b) of Section 501. Id. at 581-82. Simple 

enough. But Yablonski and his family were murdered on the 

order of the union’s president before the court could reach the 

merits of Yablonski’s suit. Id. at 582; see also

Commonwealth v. Boyle, 447 A.2d 250 (Pa. 1982).

That created a potential problem for the pending suit. Of

the plaintiff union members in the suit, only Yablonski had 

met the procedural demand requirement for suit under 

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Subsection (b). Weaver, 492 F.2d at 582. So the defendant 

union officers and union moved to dismiss the suit, arguing 

that the remaining plaintiffs were not proper plaintiffs. Id.

The District Court denied the motion, and the defendant union 

officers and union filed interlocutory appeals. Id.

While the appeals were pending, the union held a new

election, and control of the union flipped: The election 

displaced the incumbent officers and ushered Yablonski’s 

supporters into power. Id. at 582-83. With its newly elected 

officers at the helm, the union asked this Court (i) to withdraw 

the union’s appeal, in which the union had been aligned with 

the old defendant union officers, and (ii) to permit the union 

to now intervene on behalf of the plaintiff union members

against the old defendant union officers. See id. at 583.

The question before the Weaver Court was thus a narrow 

one: Generally speaking, could a union start on one side of a 

Section 501 case and then – midway through – switch to the 

other side? See id. at 586. Weaver held that a union could do 

so. Id. at 586-87. In a brief discussion, the Court noted that 

the union had chosen “to assume a defensive role” in the suit 

initially, and that the defendant officers wanted this Court to

“compel the [union] to maintain [that] defensive role.” Id. at 

586. But the Court declined to force the union to stick to its 

original position, noting that the union was “at liberty to 

shape its own destiny within the boundaries set by law.” Id.

The Court held that “like any labor organization,” the union 

“is free to say which side of a controversy involving a 

legitimate institutional interest it will take.” Id.

Importantly for present purposes, Weaver completely 

missed (and thus said nothing about) the issue of whether 

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Section 501 creates an implied cause of action for unions.

3

Weaver did not cite any precedent related to finding implied 

causes of action. Nor did Weaver purport to analyze whether 

the union in that case could have brought a Section 501 claim 

in the first instance. Indeed, Weaver did not mention Section 

501 at all other than a passing reference to the “legislative 

preference” for unions themselves to prosecute claims “for 

breach of fiduciary duty against union officials.” Id. That 

silence should not be surprising: As the Union in this case 

observes, the Court in Weaver “took for granted that the 

Union was a proper party.” Union Br. 13. Therefore, as the 

Union here concedes, “the decision in Weaver turned on an 

issue of civil procedure, not an interpretation of § 501.” Id.

The majority opinion extracts a different lesson from

Weaver. With considerable understatement, the majority 

opinion acknowledges that “Weaver did not squarely address 

the precise question of a union’s right to bring a section 501 

suit in the first instance.” Maj. Op. at 10. But the majority

opinion nonetheless claims that Weaver “compels the 

conclusion” that a union may bring suit under Section 501. 

Id. The majority opinion reasons that by “allowing the union 

to take over control of the litigation, the Weaver court 

necessarily determined that the union was a proper plaintiff in 

a section 501 fiduciary duty suit.” Id. at 9.

Weaver said nothing of the sort. Simply put, the Weaver

Court missed a critical issue, presumably because the parties 

(in particular, the defendant union officers) failed to notice

and raise it and because the issue was not the kind of 

jurisdictional issue that courts must raise on their own. It 

 3 It is unclear why the union rather than the union officers was

originally a proper defendant in a case of this sort, much less a 

proper plaintiff after the switch. But neither question was 

addressed in the multi-stage litigation.

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therefore is entirely mistaken to think that the Weaver Court 

had any thoughts or made any rulings on the issue before us. 

The majority opinion’s contrary conclusion contravenes a 

longstanding principle of judicial precedent: “Questions 

which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the 

attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered 

as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.”

LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(en banc); see also United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 16 

(1994).

For its part, Judge Millett’s concurrence says that the 

question presented here was “[a]sked and answered by 

Weaver.” Millett Concurring Op. at 1. That is doubly 

mistaken, in my view. Review of the Weaver opinion reveals 

that this question was neither asked nor answered. The court 

simply missed the issue. That happens sometimes. Even in 

our court. Cf. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1896, slip op. 

at 12 (2016) (“All judges make mistakes. (Even us.)”). I 

would not impute to the Weaver Court rulings that it quite 

obviously never made.

* * *

This Court’s decision in Weaver does not control the 

outcome of this case, as even the Union has conceded. To 

come to the contrary conclusion, the majority opinion has not 

only re-engineered Weaver, but also jumped past the Union’s 

commendable, good-faith candor in refusing to rely on that 

inapposite case. Because Weaver does not control here and 

because Section 501 does not create a cause of action for

unions, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court

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dismissing the Union’s federal cause of action. I respectfully 

dissent.4

 4 The District Court dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. As the majority opinion notes, because the Union has 

an arguable cause of action, our inquiry “goes to the merits, not 

jurisdiction.” Maj. Op. at 5; see also Lexmark International, Inc. v. 

Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.4, slip op. 

at 9 n.4 (2014). But when a district court dismisses for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, this Court can “nonetheless affirm the 

dismissal if dismissal were otherwise proper based on failure to 

state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” 

Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2006). I would do 

so here.

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