Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01022/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01022-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sumalee Chinsomboon
Appellant
Vichol Chinsomboon
Appellant
Hong Kong TV Video Program, Inc.
Appellee
N. Techapaikaweekul
Not Party
Thai Imports, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

HONG KONG TV VIDEO PROGRAM, INC., 

a California corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

and Cross-Appellant, 

FI LED 

Uaitcd States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

SEP 6 - 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

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Nos. 88-1022, 88-1063 

(D.C. No. 87-K-1126) 

( D. Colo.) 

SUMALEE CHINSOMBOON, dba Thai 

Grocery, an individual residing 

Colorado; THAI IMPORTS, INC., a 

Colorado Corporation, dba Thai 

Grocery; VICHOL CHINSOMBOON, an 

individual residing in Colorado, 

and 

Defendants-Appellants 

and Cross-Appellees. 

in) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

N. TECHAPAIKAWEEKUL, dba Krung Thai) 

Grocery, an individual residing in) 

Colorado, ) 

Defendant. 

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) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, TACHA, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-1022 Document: 01019973409 Date Filed: 09/06/1989 Page: 1 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the cause is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This case is a copyright infringement action in which the 

district court entered a default judgment against defendants. 

Defendants Vichol and Sumalee Chinsomboon appeal from the district 

court's denial of their motion to quash service of process. The 

Chinsomboons and Thai Imports, Inc. appeal from the denial of 

their motion to reopen the district court's August 28, 1987 

default judgment. Plaintiff cross-appeals from the denial of its 

motion for attorney's fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 

Defendants raise the following issues on appeal: (1) whether 

the district court erred in ruling that service of process on the 

Chinsomboons was effective and (2) whether the district court 

abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to reopen and 

set aside the default judgment. We affirm for substantially the 

reasons stated by the district court in its December 4, 1987 

ruling. 

Plaintiff served process upon the Chinsomboons' 17 year old 

son, Mac, at the Thai Grocery Store, located at 1001 South Federal 

Boulevard, Denver, Colorado. The Chinsomboons argue that 

plaintiff's service failed to comply with Colo. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(l) 

and that the district court therefore lacked personal 

jurisdiction. 

As the district court noted, Colorado courts have interpreted 

the rule governing service of process with some latitude. See 

Martin v. District Court, 375 P.2d 105 (Colo. 1962) (delivery of 

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Appellate Case: 88-1022 Document: 01019973409 Date Filed: 09/06/1989 Page: 2 
summons and complaint to defendant's secretary at defendant's 

usual place of business constitutes effective personal service); 

Stubblefield v. District Court, 603 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1979) 

(upholding lower court ruling that delivery of summons and 

complaint to person holding herself out as stenographer or chief 

clerk satisfied Colo. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(l)). The evidence suggests 

that Mac Chinsomboon held himself out as the manager of the 

Federal Boulevard store. See Tr. Vol. IV at 28, 39. Therefore, 

we agree with the district court that Mac Chinsomboon qualifies as 

the ''chief clerk" of that store. Plaintiff has thus satisfied the 

requirements of Colo. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(l). 

We also affirm the district court's denial of defendants' 

motion to reopen and set aside the default judgment pursuant to 

Rules 55(c) and 60(b). We review that decision under an abuse of 

discretion standard. See Republic Resources Corp. v. ISI 

Petroleum West Caddo Drilling Program, 836 F.2d 462, 465 (10th 

Cir. 1987); Cessna Finance Corp. v. Bielenberg Masonry 

Contracting, Inc., 715 F.2d 1442, 1445 (10th Cir. 1983); see also 

11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2857 at 

157-58 (1973). 

There was ample evidence in the record supporting the 

district court's conclusion that defendants retained sufficient 

control over the Colfax Avenue store to warrant the imposition of 

liability under the federal copyright laws. See Tr. Vol. IV at 

76- 79; R. Doc. 14, Burton Aff. II 3, 5, 7; Tr. Vol.Vat 5. In 

light of that evidence, and in light of the fact that defendants 

waited more than two months before attempting to set aside the 

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default judgment, we conclude that the district court has not 

abused its discretion in deciding not to reopen the August 28, 

1987 judgment. 1 

1 The Chinsomboons also argue that the district court erred in 

holding them personally liable for the misconduct of Thai Imports, 

Inc. Thai Imports, Inc. was not a corporation in good standing at 

the time the alleged violations occurred or at the time the 

judgment was entered. The Chinsomboons argue that because Thai 

Imports subsequently was reinstated, its corporate status should 

be given retroactive effect to the date on which the suspension 

began. See Rocky Mountain Sales & Service, Inc. v. Havana RV, 

Inc., 635 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1981); Dominion Oil Co. v. Lamb, 201 

P.2d 372 (Colo. 1949). 

In both Rocky Mountain Sales & Service and Dominion Oil the 

corporation was revived before a final judgment was rendered. 

There is no authority to suggest that Colorado courts would give 

retroactive effect to a reinstatement that occurs after the 

rendering of a final judgment. A few decisions from other states 

contain dicta suggesting that courts should not give retroactive 

effect where a corporation is not revived before final judgment. 

A.R.D.C., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 619 S.W.2d 843, 

848 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (Clark, J., concurring) ("A pending cause 

by a defunct corporation is therefore of uncertain status 

depending on whether rescission is effected before judgment."); 

Kennedy v. Strand Radio Sales & Service, Inc., 437 N.E.2d 241, 242 

(Mass. Ct. App. 1982). The Kennedy case suggests that, for 

purposes of determining whether a reinstatement occurred after a 

final judgment, a judgment is not ''final" until after the 

expiration of the time allowed for taking an appeal. Kennedy, 437 

N.E.2d at 242. However, if no appeal is, in fact, taken, the key 

date is the date of judgment rather than the date when the party's 

appeal right expired. The evidence is inconclusive here as to 

whether Thai Imports was revived before or after the time for 

appeal had elapsed. See R. Doc. 13, Plaintiff's Response to 

Motion to Reopen and Set Aside Default and Default Judgment ,1 7; 

but see Brief of Defendants-Appellees, Addendum No. 2 (Certificate 

of Good Standing issued by State of Colorado dated Nov. 2, 1987). 

However, it is clear that the corporation had not been reinstated 

as of the date that judgment was entered and no appeal was in fact 

taken. Accordingly, it appears that the corporate shield is not 

available to these individual defendants, and they remain 

personally liable. 

In any event, the copyright laws impose liability on 

''[a]nyone'' infringing another's copyrights. 17 U.S.C. 50l(a). 

The courts have consistently imposed liability on individual 

employees who control an infringing corporation as well as 

individual employees who actually commit the infringing acts. 

[Footnote continued ••• ] 

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We also affirm the district court's denial of plaintiff's 

motion for attorney's fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. This 

Court "appl[ies] an abuse of discretion standard across the board 

to all Rule 11 issues." .Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 673 (10th 

Cir. 1988). The Advisory Committee Note on the 1983 Amendment to 

Rule 11 states: 

The procedure [for determining whether to assess 

sanctions] obviously must comport with due process 

requirements. The particular format to be followed 

should depend on the circumstances of the situation and 

the severity of the sanction under consideration. In 

many situations the judge's participation in the 

proceedings provides him with full knowledge of the 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

See,~, Nick-O-Val Music Co. v. P.O.S. Radio, Inc., 656 F. 

Supp. 826 (M.D. Fla. 1987) ("[A]n individual who is the dominant 

influence in a corporation and has the capacity to control the 

acts of that corporation may be held jointly liable with the 

corporation for any proved infringements, even in the absence of 

the individual's actual knowledge that the infringements 

occurred."); Boz Scaggs Music v. KND Corp., 491 F. Supp. 908, 914 

(D. Conn. 1980); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 487 

(9th Cir. 1937). Plaintiff alleged that the Vichol and Sumalee 

Chinsomboon acted as "the moving force behind the infringing 

activities of Thai Imports, Inc." and that Vichol Chinsomboon was 

"the moving force behind the infringing activities of Thai Grocery 

located at 8141 East Colfax Avenue." Complaint at 2, ,1 9. 

Plaintiff further alleged that Vichol and Sumalee Chinsomboon 

"willfully and deliberately induced, aided and abetted past and 

continued infringement by Thai Imports, Inc." Id. In light of 

the evidence that plaintiff presented in support of its argument 

that defendants controlled the Colfax Avenue store, there is a 

sufficient basis to conclude that Vichol and Sumalee Chinsomboons 

were "infringers." Therefore, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in holding the Chinsomboons personally liable under 

the federal copyright laws. 

In their motion to reopen and set aside the default judgment, 

defendants also alleged that plaintiff's counsel "affirmatively 

misled" defendants' counsel as to "the type of action and the 

relief sought." R. Doc. 9, Motion to Reopen and Set Aside Default 

and Default Judgment ,1 8. The district court rejected that 

argument. Because defendants have not raised the issue on appeal, 

we do not address it. 

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' . 

relevant facts and little further inquiry will be 

necessary. 

(Emphasis added.) 

Neither Rule 11 nor the Due Process Clause requires a court to 

hold a hearing or make detailed findings before it can deny a 

motion for sanctions. 2 The district court in this case 

reasonably concluded that no further inquiry was needed to rule on 

plaintiff's motion. Because there is no basis for finding that 

the district court abused its discretion, we affirm that 

conclusion. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

2 See Hashemi v. Campaigner Publications, Inc., 784 F.2d 1581, 

1585 (11th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff erroneously relies on cases 

stating that persons against whom sanctions are sought are 

entitled to some form of hearing before sanctions may be imposed. 

See,~' Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.) (per 

curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Hyde v. Van Wormer, 474 U.S. 827 

(1985); Bygott v. Leaseway Transportation Corp., 637 F. Supp. 

1433, 1446-47 (E.D. Pa. 1986). However, there is no basis for 

extending that principle to persons who ask the court to award 

them sanctions. ~ 

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