Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03378/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03378-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alan Echols
Appellant
Mike Kemna
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3378

___________

Alan Echols, * 

* 

Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

Mike Kemna, * 

* 

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: October 16, 2007

Filed: December 26, 2007 

___________

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Alan Echols was convicted of first degree murder and armed criminal action in

the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri. Before being sentenced, Echols fled

the jurisdiction and remained at large for eight years. After his capture, Echols was

sentenced to a term of life in prison without the possibility of parole for murder and

an additional eight years' imprisonment for his armed criminal action conviction.

Echols filed a direct appeal to challenge his convictions. The Missouri Court of

Appeals, despite the state of Missouri's objection on escape rule grounds, heard the

appeal and affirmed Echols's convictions on the merits. Echols then sought

postconviction relief but the Missouri courts denied him relief citing the Missouri

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The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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Nichols was killed after an altercation with Echols in a Kansas City nightclub

parking lot. Apparently, Nichols and Echols competed for the affections of Nichols's

wife, Billie Nichols. Billie moved in with Echols in early 1990 after separating from

Ronald. By September 1990, Billie decided to end the affair and return to her husband.

Echols, however, remained obsessed with Billie and reportedly "kept tabs" on her after

their affair ended. Echols told his business partner, Eugene Bailey, that he would kill

Ronald Nichols, if he knew it would not upset Billie. 

On October 12, 1990, Mr. and Mrs. Nichols went to Club 95 on a night out, and

at some point in the evening, Mrs. Nichols sent her husband outside the club to get

some medicine for her. Around this time, Echols came to the club with a military style

knife that he had stolen from his business partner. When Echols arrived at the club,

he attacked Mr. Nichols with a billy club and stabbed him 61 times in the head and

back. 

Echols told Bailey that Mr. Nichols had been killed, but Echols blamed the

killing on a robber. Bailey was suspicious of Echols's story and contacted the police

after he realized that his knife was missing and that it was possibly the murder

weapon. The police questioned Echols, searched his home, and discovered the knife

and Echols's bloody clothing.

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escape rule. Echols now seeks habeas relief. The district court1

 refused to hear his

petition for habeas relief because the court determined that the Missouri escape rule

is an adequate and independent state law ground barring recovery. We affirm.

I. Background

In October 1990, a Jackson County, Missouri jury convicted Echols of first

degree murder and armed criminal action for the stabbing death of Ronald Nichols.2

After the trial, the court allowed Echols to remain free on bond while he awaited

sentencing. Before he could be sentenced, Echols fled the jurisdiction and remained

a fugitive for eight years. In August 1999, the authorities arrested Echols in Louisiana

and brought him back to Missouri. At sentencing, Echols received a sentence of life

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in prison for the murder charge and a consecutive sentence of eight years'

imprisonment on the armed criminal action charge. 

Echols unsuccessfully raised one claim on direct appeal, challenging the use of

his confession at trial. After the failure of his direct appeal, he then filed for post

conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15. The Missouri

Circuit Court determined that the Missouri escape rule barred the hearing of Echols's

claim and dismissed his petition. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the

dismissal pursuant to the escape rule. 

After the Missouri state courts refused to hear his claims for postconviction

relief, Echols filed a habeas claim in federal district court. The district court

determined that the Missouri escape rule was an adequate and independent state

ground that barred his habeas claim and dismissed Echols's petition for habeas relief.

II. Discussion

We issued a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) whether Missouri's

escape rule is firmly established, regularly followed, and readily ascertainable when

applied; (2) whether Echol's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the

issue of diminished capacity.

A. Adequate and Independent State Law Analysis

We review de novo the district court's determination that Missouri's escape rule

is an adequate and independent state law ground that bars federal habeas review of

Echols's conviction. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002) (declaring adequacy

a federal question); see also Franklin v. Gilmore, 188 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 1999)

(stating that adequacy claims are reviewed de novo).

Generally, a defendant must exhaust all available state court remedies before

seeking habeas relief. Carney v. Fabian, 487 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2007). "If a

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While the escape must have an impact on the administration of justice before

the escape rule may be applied, the court is not required to make an explicit finding

on the record before applying the rule. See Laws v. State, 183 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Mo.

App. 2006) (holding that there was no error where the motion court denied the

defendant's motion for postconviction relief without an express finding that the

defendant's escape impacted the criminal justice system).

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petitioner has not presented his habeas corpus claim to the state court, the claim is

generally defaulted." Id. (quoting Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1161 (8th Cir.

1999)). The default of the federal claim applies even if the defendant's failure to

exhaust results from the application of state law. Lee, 534 U.S. at 375. (Federal courts

will not entertain the habeas claim "if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state

law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the

judgment.") (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). "The rule

applies with equal force whether the state-law ground is substantive or procedural."

Id. However, even if a state procedural rule is generally sound, it will not be adequate

to bar federal review, unless the rule is "strictly or regularly followed." Barr v. City

of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964). Further, a state procedural bar is adequate

only if state courts have applied the rule evenhandedly to all similar claims. See

Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 263 (1982).

The Missouri escape rule provides that state courts have the discretion to refuse

to hear a defendant's appeal when the defendant escapes from the control of the state.

See State v. Simpson, 836 S.W.2d 75, 77–78 (Mo. App. 1992). The Missouri courts'

authority to deny appellate or postconviction relief under this rule is triggered by

proof that the defendant has, in fact, escaped, see id. (reversing the application of the

escape rule where there was no loss of control over the defendant), and that the

defendant's escape has impacted the administration of justice. See State v. Brown, 974

S.W.2d 630, 631 (Mo. App. 1998).3

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Echols argues that the Missouri escape rule is inadequate to bar his federal

claim for habeas relief because of the broad discretion granted to courts in deciding

whether it should apply. Echols also alleges that Missouri has arbitrarily applied the

rule in the past. Echols's claims are without merit.

The relevant inquiry regarding the adequacy of the escape rule to bar habeas

relief is two fold. First, we must determine if the rule is strictly or regularly followed,

and then we will determine if the rule has been applied evenhandedly to all similar

claims.

1. Strictly or Regularly Followed

We are satisfied that Missouri's escape rule has been regularly followed in cases

similar to Echols's, that is, where the defendant has escaped for a substantial period

of time, without any mitigating circumstances. See generally Dobbs v. State, 229

S.W.3d 651 (Mo. App. 2007) (affirming the motion court's refusal to hear the

defendant's petition for postconviction relief where the defendant escaped while

awaiting sentencing and remained at large for several months before he was

recaptured); Pradt v. State, 219 S.W.3d 858 (Mo. App. 2007) (applying the rule where

the defendant escaped twice and in both circumstances, had to be forcefully brought

back before the court); Laws v. State, 183 S.W.3d 629 (Mo. App. 2006) (affirming the

motion court's refusal to hear the defendant's petition for postconviction relief where

the defendant fled from sentencing and remained at large for eighteen days before he

was recaptured); Crawley v. State, 155 S.W.3d 836 (Mo. App. 2005) (affirming the

motion court's refusal to hear the defendant's request for postconviction relief where

the defendant escaped before he could be sentenced on a probation violation and

remained at large for over eighteen months before being recaptured); State v. Surritte,

35 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Mo. App. 2001) (applying the escape rule to refuse to hear the

defendant's direct appeal of his conviction where the defendant escaped for four days

causing a 14-day delay in sentencing). 

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The recognized justifications for the escape rule are: (1) to maintain control

over the defendant while the case is being decided; (2) to reduce the possibility of

administrative problems that arise because of a defendant's long absence; (3) to protect

the State from unfair prejudice in the event that the case is remanded for a new trial;

(4) to prevent the defendant from selectively obeying court decisions; (5) to

discourage others from escaping; (6) to encourage defendants who escape to

voluntarily surrender; (7) to preserve respect for the criminal justice system; and (8)

to promote the dignified operation of the appellate courts. Pradt, 219 S.W.3d at 862.

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Missouri cases take note of the length of the escape, but the more important

consideration is whether the application of the rule furthers any of the eight

recognized rationales for the rule's maintenance. See Holmes v. State, 92 S.W.3d 193,

196 (Mo. App. 2002) (holding that "[t]here is no threshold amount of time an

appellant must have escaped justice before dismissal is allowed"); see also Pradt, 219

S.W.3d at 862 (enumerating the eight recognized justifications for the escape rule).4

Echols contends that the discretion given to the Missouri courts renders the

escape rule inadequate to default his habeas claims. We disagree. A rule is not

inadequate merely because its application is discretionary. The Supreme Court's

comments in Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989), contemplate instances where a rule

may be deemed adequate even though there is state court discretion in its enforcement.

In Harris, the issue before the court was whether the plain statement rule—a rule

requiring a clear and express statement from a state court that it is relying on a

procedural default to bar relief—should apply in habeas cases. In a footnote, the Court

stated, "in some instances state courts have discretion to forgive procedural defaults.

. . . The plain statement rule relieves a federal court from having to determine whether

in a given case, consistent with state law, the state court has chosen to forgive a

procedural default." Id. at 265 n.11. If a procedural rule that gave discretion to the

state was per se inadequate, the plain statement rule would be unnecessary. 

We conclude the Missouri escape rule is regularly followed.

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2. The Escape Rule is Applied 

Consistently to Similarly Situated Defendants

Echols's claim that the Missouri escape rule has been inconsistently applied is

also without merit. Echols raises two arguments to demonstrate that Missouri does not

consistently apply the escape rule to similarly situated defendants and that its

application of the rule is arbitrary. First, he cites several cases involving similar escape

periods and notes that the Missouri courts applied the escape rule differently. Second,

Echols asserts that his own state appellate process reflects arbitrary enforcement.

None of the cases Echols cites show that a defendant, similarly situated to him,

received postconviction appellate review. Echols remained at large for eight years

before his capture. In State v. Kearns, the Missouri Court of Appeals applied the

escape rule to deny the defendant a direct appeal of his conviction after the defendant

escaped and remained a fugitive for more than five years. 743 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. App.

1987). The court determined that application of the rule was appropriate primarily

because the defendant's absence caused great delay in sentencing, created a high risk

of prejudice to the state if the court ordered a remand for a new trial, and demonstrated

the defendant's contempt for the criminal justice system. Id. at 554. Kearns is similar

to this case and indicative of the Missouri courts' handling of similar cases. Echols has

not shown that Missouri treated him differently than it would another similarly

situated defendant.

Finally, Missouri's application of the rule in Echols's case was not arbitrary.

Under Missouri precedent, the escape rule can be applied by either the state appellate

court—both on direct review of the conviction and on appeal in a postconviction

proceeding—or by the state circuit court when the circuit court is petitioned to

conduct a collateral review of a conviction. In Echols's case, the Missouri Court of

Appeals chose not to apply the escape rule to bar Echols's direct appeal, choosing

instead to summarily deny him relief on the merits of his claim. State v. Echols, 32

S.W.3d 623 (2000). When the case came before the circuit court for postconviction

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review, the circuit court dismissed the petition pursuant to the escape rule. On appeal,

the court of appeals merely upheld the circuit court's decision to dismiss the case

under the escape rule. 

Missouri's escape rule is governed by an identifiable standard and is thus not

arbitrarily applied. "The relevant inquiry in determining whether to apply the escape

rule is deciding whether the escape adversely affected the criminal justice system."

State v. Ore, 192 S.W.3d 723, 725 (Mo. App. 2006) (quoting Smith v. State, 174

S.W.3d 74, 75 (Mo. App. 2005)). The standard, while broad, is not illusory. In fact,

the Missouri Court of Appeals recently reversed a motion court's decision to refuse

to hear a defendant's application for postconviction relief finding that "the trial court

abused its discretion in the application of the escape rule because the failure of

Movant to appear at the first sentencing hearing did not hinder the administration of

justice." Smith v. State, 173 S.W.3d 928, 930 (Mo. App. 2005). If this standard was

truly illusory, there would have been no basis on which the appellate court could have

found an abuse of discretion.

Because the Missouri escape rule is regularly followed, and the rule is applied

consistently to similarly situated defendants, the rule is adequate to bar Echols from

federal habeas relief.

B. Echols's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Because we determine that Echols's petition for habeas relief is barred by the

Missouri escape rule, we make no determinations as to the merits of his Sixth

Amendment claim.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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