Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05153/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05153-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patricia A. Brannan
Appointed Amicus Curiae for Appellant
Commissioner of Social Security
Appellee
Alfonso T. Javier
Terminated Party
Rosita S. Javier
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 4, 2004 Decided May 20, 2005

No. 03-5153

ROSITA S.JAVIER,

APPELLANT

V.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv01433)

Lorane F. Hebert, appointed by the court, argued the cause as

amicus curiae in support of the appellant. Patricia A. Brannan

was on brief.

Rosita S. Javier, pro se, was on brief for the Appellant.

Fred E. Haynes, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. Kenneth L. Wainstein, United States

Attorney, Michael J. Ryan, Assistant United States Attorney,

and Daniel Y. Balsam, Attorney, Social Security Administration,

were on brief. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States

Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

HENDERSON Circuit Judge: Alfonso T. Javier was a

naturalized United States citizen who lived in his native country,

the Philippines, from the late 1970s until his death on July 17,

2004. Based on his long-time employment in the United States,

Javier qualified as an insured individual and received retirement

benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.

(Act). In addition, his wife and two sons received Social

Security benefits for many years until the Social Security

Administration (SSA or Administration) terminated the benefits

in 1996. This appeal results from the decision of the SSA to

terminate Javier’s wife’s and children’s benefits on the basis of

blood tests demonstrating that Javier was not the children’s

biological father. Both the administrative law judge and the

district court upheld the SSA’s action. Because the parties do

not contest that the Act’s choice of law provision dictates the

application of Philippine law, under which the SSA lacks

standing to challenge Javier’s paternity, we now reverse in part.

I.

Alfonso Javier was born in the Philippines on January 19,

1904 and became a naturalized United States citizen on March

20, 1943. Javier began receiving Social Security benefits in

1970. He later returned to the Philippines and, in October 1977,

he married Rosita Suguitan (Mrs. Javier). The dispute between

Javier and the SSA centers on Mrs. Javier’s delivery of three

children, ostensibly the offspring of Javier, between 1983 and

1986. Allen S. Javier was born October 25, 1983. On June 26,

1984, Mrs. Javier applied for “[w]ife’s insurance benefits,” 42

U.S.C. § 402(b), and “[c]hild’s insurance benefits,” id. § 402(d),

on behalf of Allen. SSA conducted a brief investigation to

confirm the Javiers’ claim for benefits and ascertained that Allen

was living in the Javiers’ custody. SSA authorized Social

Security benefits for Mrs. Javier and Allen, effective November

1983. Philip G. Javier was born September 17, 1984 and on

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December 19, 1984, Mrs. Javier applied for “child’s insurance

benefits,” id., on Philip’s behalf. An SSA field examiner

determined that the child was entitled to benefits, effective

October 1984. In response to an anonymous letter questioning

Javier’s paternity of the two boys, the SSA conducted another

investigation in June 1985. This investigation, which included

a visit to the Javiers’ home, interviews with neighbors and a

review of Mrs. Javier’s hospital records, again resulted in a

favorable determination of Javier’s paternity.

Mrs. Javier then gave birth to a daughter, Felrosh Ann, on

December 5, 1986. Javier was 82 years old at the time of

Felrosh Ann’s birth. The Javiers applied for citizenship on

behalf of Felrosh Ann on September 18, 1989. The United

States Department of State, which had previously issued a

Certification of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of

America both to Allen and to Philip, launched an investigation

into the paternity of all three children. Each member of the

family submitted to a blood test, with surprising results. Javier

was determined not to be the father of any of the children. Mrs.

Javier was eliminated as the biological mother of Allen but the

tests demonstrated a 91.6 per cent probability of maternity with

respect to Philip and Felrosh Ann. 

The State Department relied on the results of the blood tests to

deny Felrosh Ann’s application for citizenship and to revoke

Allen’s and Philip’s citizenship. For reasons not explained in

the record, the results were not forwarded to the SSA until

November 29, 1995. The SSA reopened its paternity

investigation in March 1996 and terminated Mrs. Javier’s,

Allen’s and Philip’s benefits in April of that year. The SSA

sought $26,315.30 in “overpayment” from Mrs. Javier, Letter

from SSA to Rosita S. Javier (May 24, 1996), $29,633.30 from

Allen, Letter from SSA to Rosita S. Javier for Allen S. Javier

(May 24, 1996), and $29,486 from Philip, Letter from SSA to

Rosita S. Javier for Philip G. Javier (May 24, 1996). Javier

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allowed the SSA to garnish $300 per month from his benefits to

help repay the amount owed. Javier also sought reconsideration

of his wife’s and sons’ eligibility for benefits, which was denied

by the SSA. 

Javier then sought and received a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ interpreted the

Social Security Act to require the application of the law of the

insured’s domicile in determining whether an applicant for

benefits constitutes “the child ... of a fully or currently insured

individual” under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A). The ALJ

found that neither Allen nor Philip qualified as a “‘child’ of the

wage earner under the laws of the Philippines,” which law, the

ALJ concluded, permits a child’s paternity to “be impugned” if

“it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the

child could not have been that of the husband.” Philippines

Family Code Art. 166 (Article 166). Javier sought judicial

review of the ALJ’s decision in the district court under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court affirmed the ALJ, adopting

his legal analysis with respect to the choice of law rule

mandated by the Social Security Act and his conclusion that

Article 166 provided a legal basis for the termination of Mrs.

Javier’s and the children’s benefits. Javier v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 00-1433 (D.D.C. June 6, 2002) (Mem. Op.) at 6–7.

Javier filed a “Motion for Reconsideration, or, in the

Alternative, Motion for Formal Appeal” in district court on July

19, 2002. The court interpreted the motion as one made under

FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 60(b), and denied it on August 21, 2002. In

a subsequent order on January 10, 2003, the district court

vacated in part its August 21 order, ordering Javier’s Motion for

Formal Appeal to be docketed as of the date of filing. Thus,

Javier’s appeal was timely filed and is properly before us.

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II.

The Social Security Act guarantees benefits to “[e]very child”

of an “insured individual” under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1).

The Act also provides spousal benefits to the mother of a

qualified child. See id. § 402(b)(1)(B). The Act establishes the

following procedure to determine whether an individual

qualifies as a “child.” “Child” is defined, inter alia, as “the

child or legally adopted child of an individual.” Id. § 416(e).

To determine whether an applicant meets the Act’s definition of

“child,” the SSA must:

apply such law as would be applied in determining the

devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of

the State in which such insured individual is domiciled

... or, if such insured individual is ... not so domiciled

in any State, by the courts of the District of Columbia.

Applicants who according to such law would have the

same status relative to taking intestate personal

property as a child or parent shall be deemed such. 

Id. § 416(h)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The District of Columbia

applies the law of the domicile of the decedent to determine

intestate succession. See In re Gray’s Estate, 168 F. Supp. 124,

126 (D.D.C. 1958) (finding “no local cases on ... point” but

adopting rule “that the law of the domicile of decedent governs

distribution of personal property”). Javier, as well as Mrs.

Javier and the three children, are all domiciled in the

Philippines. The parties agree that we decide this case under

Philippine law.

The Philippine Civil Code vests intestate inheritance rights in

“the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the

surviving spouse, and in the State.” Philippine Civil Code art.

961. A child born during a valid marriage “shall be considered

legitimate although the mother may have declared against its

legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.”

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1 The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child

within the period prescribed [by Article 170] only in the following

cases: 

(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period

fixed for bringing his action; 

(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having

desisted therefrom; or 

(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

Philippine Family Code Art. 171.

Philippine Family Code art. 167. Article 166(2) of the

Philippines Family Code permits the legitimacy of a child to be

impugned on the ground that “for biological or other scientific

reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband.” Id.

at art. 166(2). Using Article 166(2), both the ALJ and the

district court ruled in favor of the SSA. Article 166, however,

addresses only the basis for a paternity challenge, not the issue

of standing to mount the challenge. Article 170 of the

Philippines Family Code provides that:

[t]he action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall

be brought within one year from the knowledge of the

birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband

or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the

city or municipality where the birth took place or was

recorded.

Id. at art. 170. The Philippine Supreme Court has interpreted

Article 170 to bar all persons other than the husband (or his

heirs, in certain circumstances)1from challenging paternity.

“The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child

born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances

the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the

legitimacy of a child born to his wife.” De Jesus v. Estate of

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2 All citations to decisions by the Philippine Supreme Court are to the

Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA), published and distributed

by Central Book Supply, Inc., Manila, Philippines.

Dizon, 366 SCRA 499, 506 (2001) (emphasis and footnotes

omitted);2see also Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 100

SCRA 73, 89 (1980) (“The right to repudiate or contest the

legitimacy of a child born in wedlock belongs only to the alleged

father, who is the husband of the mother ... and only in a direct

suit brought for the purpose.”) (emphasis in original & internal

citations omitted).

The Administration argues that the application of Philippine

law would invite fraud against the government because paternity

would be effectively unchallengeable. But the SSA has not

brought a fraud action against Javier; it is contesting whether

Allen and Philip qualify as children within the meaning of the

Act. No evidentiary record has been developed regarding fraud,

leaving this court in no position to evaluate whether the actions

of Javier’s family were fraudulent. Moreover, our decision in

this case does not prevent the SSA from pursuing a fraud action

against the Javiers. 

The SSA also relies on 20 C.F.R. § 404.355, which provides:

We [the SSA] will not apply any State inheritance law

requirement that an action to establish paternity must be

taken within a specified period of time measured from

the worker’s death or the child’s birth, or that an action

to establish paternity must have been started or

completed before the worker’s death. If applicable State

inheritance law requires a court determination of

paternity, we will not require that you obtain such a

determination but will decide your paternity by using

the standard of proof that the State court would use as

the basis for a determination of paternity.

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3 The SSA’s claim that the blood test does not constitute the mother’s

testimonial declaration against legitimacy that would violate Lord

Mansfield’s Rule — which provides that a wife and husband may not

testify against a child’s legitimacy — misses the mark. See Voss v.

Shalala, 32 F.3d 1269, 1272 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) (tracing Lord

Mansfield’s Rule to Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777)).

Javier asserts no defense based on Lord Mansfield’s Rule; moreover,

Lord Mansfield’s Rule is directed at the admissibility of evidence

rather than standing — the critical issue here — and thus is

inapplicable. See Becker v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 895 F.2d

34, 36 (1st Cir. 1990) (describing Lord Mansfield’s Rule as

“evidentiary rule”).

20 C.F.R. § 404.355(b)(2). Under no natural reading, however,

does this regulation confer standing on a third-party—including

the SSA—to challenge a child’s legitimacy. It is intended

instead to allow a child to establish a filial relation without

regard to state statutes of limitation that would otherwise bar a

paternity suit as well as state statutes requiring a judicial

declaration of paternity.3 

Moreover, the SSA’s entire line of argument misunderstands

the public policy implicit in both the Act and the Philippine

Civil Code. Defining family relationships is a matter

traditionally left to the States under the United States

Constitution. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615

(2000) (identifying “family law” as area of “traditional state

regulation”). The Act dictates that an applicant for benefits

“shall be deemed” to “have the same status” as that conferred by

the intestate succession law of the insured’s domicile. 42 U.S.C.

§ 416(h)(2)(A). This language reflects the Congress’s decision

to defer to the States (or, here, the District of Columbia) on

policy choices regarding familial status. The Philippines has

made its own policy determination: “There is perhaps no

presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on

sounder morality and more convincing reason than the

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4 Mrs. Javier’s right to spousal benefits during the period at issue in

this case is contingent on Philip’s eligibility. The Act provides that a

wife is entitled to benefits if she “has in her care (individually or

jointly with [the insured individual]) ... a child entitled to a child’s

insurance benefit.” 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(B). Philip’s eligibility, as

noted earlier, results from his being Mrs. Javier’s biological child who

was born during her marriage to Javier and whose legitimacy has not

been impugned under Philippine law.

presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.” De

Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, 366 SCRA 499, 504 (2001) (footnote

omitted). For this reason, under Article 170 and Article 171 of

the Philippine Family Code “only the father, or in exceptional

instances [his] heirs” has standing to contest paternity. De

Jesus, 366 SCRA at 506 (emphasis omitted). The limited

relevant case law that exists supports our conclusion here. See

Gray v. Richardson, SSR No. 83-37c, 1983 WL31272, at *2–3

(1983) (interpreting section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act to require

SSA to accept paternity determination of state court based on

state intestacy law); cf. Sanders v. Apfel, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1275,

1281 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (reversing SSA’s denial of application

for child’s benefits and finding inadmissible under state law

contrary scientific evidence after paternity acknowledged by

father). Thus, under the current statutory and regulatory

scheme, Philip and, therefore, Mrs. Javier are eligible to receive

Social Security benefits.4

III.

A different analysis is required with respect to Allen’s claim

for benefits. Article 163 of the Philippine Family Code states

that the “filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption.

Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate.” Intestate

succession under the Philippine Civil Code is applicable to a

natural legitimate or illegitimate heir as well as an adoptee, see

Arts. 961, 979, but not to an individual who is neither adopted

nor the natural child of the testator. Thus, Philippine courts

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have entertained challenges to maternity where the biological

relation of the child to the mother is questioned. In Babiera v.

Catotal, 333 SCRA 487 (2000), the Philippine Supreme Court

held that Article 171 presents no bar to standing if “the

prayer...is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate

child...but to establish that the former is not the latter’s child at

all.” Babiera, 333 SCRA at 495. Article 171 “presupposes that

the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother.” Babiera,

333 SCRA at 495. As Allen appears, from the record, to be

neither the natural nor adopted child of Mrs. Javier, he enjoys no

presumption of filiation. Thus, the SSA is free to challenge

Allen’s status as a “child” under the Act.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed in part and reversed in part and the Social Security

Administration is ordered to reinstate benefits to Mrs. Javier and

Philip, including any funds wrongfully withheld.

So ordered.

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