Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-35379/USCOURTS-ca9-18-35379-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Tacoma
Appellant
Kristopher Clark
Appellant
Clarisse Orn
Appellee
Thalisa Orn
Appellee
Than Orn
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THAN ORN, individually; THALISA 

ORN, individually; CLARISSE ORN, 

Guardian on behalf of J. O. and 

C. O.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

CITY OF TACOMA, a municipal 

corporation; KRISTOPHER CLARK, in 

his individual capacity,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 18-35379

D.C. No.

3:13-cv-05974-

RBL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 11, 2019

Seattle, Washington

Filed February 3, 2020

Before: Danny J. Boggs,* Marsha S. Berzon,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Watford

* The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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2 ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s order, on 

summary judgment, denying qualified immunity to a police 

officer in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

alleging that the officer used excessive force when he shot 

and severely wounded plaintiff after a slow-speed car 

pursuit.

The panel first held that, viewing the facts in the light 

most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude 

that the police officer violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 

right to be free from the use of excessive force. Thus, the 

panel determined that defendant did not have an objectively 

reasonable basis for believing that plaintiff posed a threat of 

serious physical harm, either to the officer himself or to 

others. The panel noted that construing the facts in 

plaintiff’s favor, he never targeted officers with his vehicle 

or forced other vehicles off the road. In addition, he traveled 

at normal speeds and stopped at traffic lights and stop signs 

throughout the pursuit. 

Turning to the second step of the qualified immunity 

analysis, the panel held that plaintiff’s right to be free from 

the use of excessive force was clearly established at the time 

of the shooting. The panel noted that in October 2011, at 

least seven circuits had held that an officer lacks an 

objectively reasonable basis for believing that his own safety 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA 3

is at risk when firing into the side or rear of a vehicle moving 

away from him. The panel stated that, taking the facts in the 

light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could 

conclude both that the officer was never in the path of 

plaintiff’s vehicle and that he fired through the passengerside windows and rear windshield as the vehicle was moving 

away from him. The panel further held that under plaintiff’s 

version of events, he never engaged in any conduct that 

suggested his vehicle posed a threat of serious physical harm 

to another officer on the scene, or to anyone else in the 

vicinity.

COUNSEL

Jean P. Homan (argued), Tacoma City’s Attorney’s Office,

Tacoma, Washington, for Defendants-Appellants.

Loren A. Cochran (argued) and Darrell L. Cochran, Pfau 

Cochran Amala Vertetis PLLC, Tacoma, Washington; 

Thomas A. Balerud, Law Office of Thomas A. Balerud, 

Tacoma, Washington; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

OPINION

WATFORD, Circuit Judge:

Officer Kristopher Clark of the Tacoma Police 

Department shot and severely wounded Than Orn on the 

night of October 12, 2011. Orn sued Clark and the City of 

Tacoma under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his 

Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive 

force. Clark moved for summary judgment on the basis of 

qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, 

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4 ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA

and Clark has taken an interlocutory appeal from that order. 

We have jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine, see

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 771–72 (2014), and now 

affirm.

I

In an interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of 

qualified immunity, we must construe the facts in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 

378 (2007). Notwithstanding this clear rule, Clark asks us at 

several key junctures to credit his version of the facts and to 

assume that a jury would resolve factual disputes in his

favor. This we are not permitted to do. See Tolan v. Cotton, 

572 U.S. 650, 656–57 (2014) (per curiam); Brosseau v. 

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195 n.2 (2004) (per curiam). Unless 

Orn’s version of events is “blatantly contradicted by the 

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it,” we must 

assume that a jury could find Orn’s account of what 

happened credible, even if it conflicts with Clark’s account. 

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. Here, nothing in the record blatantly 

contradicts Orn’s account of the events in question. The 

narrative that follows therefore resolves all disputed factual 

issues in his favor.

At about 8:30 p.m., Orn was driving his wife’s 

Mitsubishi Montero on city streets when he noticed a police 

car with its lights activated attempting to pull him over. The 

officer sought to stop Orn because he was driving without 

his headlights on. Excerpts of Record (ER) 128, 133. Orn 

was driving with a suspended license at the time and had just 

smoked crack cocaine. Rather than pull over, he decided to 

return home to the apartment complex where he lived with 

his wife, as he knew she needed the car for work. As he 

made his way home, Orn traveled at 25–35 miles per hour 

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ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA 5

and stopped at traffic lights and stop signs. ER 133, 305, 

308, 351.

It took Orn roughly 15 minutes to drive home. Along the 

way, additional officers joined the slow-speed pursuit, 

including Clark and his partner Donald Rose, who were 

driving in a Tacoma Police Department sport utility vehicle. 

At one point, in an effort to get Orn to stop, several police 

units attempted unsuccessfully to box him in. ER 163–65. 

At another point, officers drove in front of Orn’s vehicle to 

block his path, but Orn drove onto a curb and down a portion 

of a closed roadway to avoid them. ER 269, 475, 478. Later 

in the pursuit, officers put down spike strips, which Orn 

managed to circumvent by swerving away from the officers 

and into the oncoming lane of traffic. No oncoming vehicles 

were traveling toward Orn at the time. ER 104–05, 351, 358.

As the pursuit progressed, officers correctly predicted 

that Orn might be returning home, since by then they had 

determined the address to which his vehicle was registered. 

Clark knew that Orn’s apartment complex had a long 

outdoor parking lot with only two entrances, one at the north 

end and the other at the south end. When Clark saw Orn 

head toward the south entrance, he drove to the north end of 

the complex and entered there. Clark positioned his SUV 

across a narrow point of the single access lane that ran the 

length of the parking lot, in an effort to prevent Orn from 

exiting the complex on the north end.

Orn pulled into the south entrance with a caravan of 

police vehicles following behind him. He proceeded slowly 

down the access lane toward the north end of the complex. 

When he approached Clark’s SUV and saw that it was 

blocking his path, he paused and came to a brief stop. 

ER 180, 353.

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6 ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA

The diagram below depicts the scene of the events that 

transpired next. ER 535. Clark was standing on the grassy 

area to the left of his SUV as Orn approached. ER 523. He 

had his gun drawn with the barrel pointed toward the ground 

and repeatedly yelled at Orn to stop. ER 341–42, 523. Clark 

had no reason to believe that Orn had a firearm, and in fact 

he did not. ER 165, 444. Orn saw Clark and heard his 

commands but ignored them. ER 342.

After briefly stopping in front of Clark’s SUV, Orn drove 

away from where Clark was standing and attempted to 

navigate through a narrow opening between the passenger 

side of Clark’s SUV and a nearby parked car. To do so, Orn 

had to drive up a curb onto a small patch of grass between 

the two vehicles and then turn his vehicle to the right. 

ER 342. Given the tightness of the space, Orn was driving 

very slowly as he attempted this maneuver. ER 179–80. He 

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ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA 7

estimated his speed at five miles per hour, as did officers at 

the scene. ER 193, 352.

When Orn began maneuvering around Clark’s SUV, 

another officer, Steven Butts, backed his patrol vehicle into 

Orn’s line of travel to cut off any path of escape through the 

complex’s north entrance. ER 416. That move caused Orn 

to turn his vehicle more sharply to the right to avoid hitting 

Officer Butts’s vehicle. ER 355.

As Orn moved past Clark’s SUV, the panel near the 

passenger-side rear wheel of Orn’s vehicle clipped the 

passenger-side rear quarter panel of Clark’s SUV. (Officer 

Rose, who remained inside the SUV and felt the impact, 

described it as a “glancing blow.” ER 109.) The left front 

corner of Orn’s vehicle also struck the right front corner of 

Officer Butts’s vehicle. Just after Orn’s vehicle moved past 

Clark’s SUV, Orn saw Clark run toward his vehicle on the 

passenger side and begin firing at him. ER 270, 354, 356. 

The first round entered through the front passenger-side 

window of Orn’s vehicle; the second and third rounds 

entered through the rear passenger-side window. ER 435, 

440–41, 513–15, 517–18. One of those rounds struck Orn in 

the spine, which caused Orn’s body to go numb. ER 357, 

362, 515. He slumped into the passenger seat and the engine 

of his vehicle revved loudly as his foot floored the 

accelerator. Clark ran behind Orn’s vehicle as it sped away, 

firing seven more rounds through the rear windshield. 

ER 212, 440.

Clark disputes this account of the shooting. His account 

differs from Orn’s in two key respects: the manner in which 

Orn maneuvered his vehicle around Clark’s SUV, and where 

Clark was standing when that occurred. According to Clark, 

as soon as he saw Orn drive up the curb onto the patch of 

grass, he ran from where he had been standing and took up a 

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8 ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA

position behind the rear bumper near the passenger side of 

his SUV, as depicted by the faint blue figure in the diagram 

above. ER 299, 524. Clark contends that, as Orn 

maneuvered between Clark’s SUV and the parked car, Orn 

turned his wheels sharply to the right, which placed Clark in 

the path of Orn’s vehicle. ER 299, 525. At the same time, 

Clark says, Orn stepped on the gas and propelled the vehicle 

toward him under “hard acceleration,” causing him to fear 

that he would be run over by Orn’s vehicle or pinned 

between his vehicle and Orn’s. ER 299, 524–25. According 

to Clark, he placed his left hand on the side of Orn’s vehicle 

to brace for the impact while simultaneously raising his right 

arm above his shoulder. He then fired one or two rounds 

downward into Orn’s vehicle as it passed by. ER 525. Clark 

asserts that he chased after Orn’s vehicle and continued to 

fire at it from behind because he feared for the safety of 

Officer Rose, who he thought might be standing in the area 

where Orn’s vehicle was headed. ER 523, 525.

After Clark stopped firing, Orn’s vehicle continued 

forward and hit several parked cars before crashing into a 

chain-link fence, which stopped the vehicle’s forward 

progress. Officers took Orn into custody and summoned 

medical help. In all, three of the ten rounds fired by Clark 

struck Orn. The bullet that lodged in his spine has left him 

paralyzed from the waist down.

County prosecutors charged Orn with using his vehicle 

to assault Clark and with attempting to elude a pursuing 

police vehicle. The jury acquitted Orn of the assault charge. 

ER 253. It also acquitted him of the eluding charge, 

convicting him instead of the lesser-included offense of 

failure to obey a law-enforcement officer. ER 254. Orn was 

ordered to pay a fine of $250.

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ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA 9

II

When an officer asserts qualified immunity as a defense, 

our analysis proceeds in two steps. We first ask whether the 

facts taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff show 

that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If so, we then ask 

whether the right in question was clearly established at the 

time of the officer’s actions, such that any reasonably welltrained officer would have known that his conduct was 

unlawful. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 

589 (2018); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1986). 

We have the discretion to skip the first step in certain 

circumstances, as when the officer is plainly entitled to 

prevail at the second step. See Pearson v. Callahan, 

555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Here, however, we think both 

steps of the analysis must be resolved against Clark.

A

At the first step, a reasonable jury could conclude that 

Clark violated Orn’s Fourth Amendment right to be free 

from the use of excessive force.

Determining whether an officer’s use of force violates 

the Fourth Amendment requires balancing “the nature and 

quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 

Amendment interests against the importance of the 

governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” 

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). That inquiry generally involves 

an assessment of factors such as “the severity of the crime at 

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the 

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively 

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). In the context 

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10 ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA

involved here, the Supreme Court has crafted a more 

definitive rule: An officer may use deadly force to 

apprehend a fleeing suspect only if “the officer has probable 

cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious 

physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Garner, 

471 U.S. at 11. A suspect may pose such a threat if “there is 

probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime 

involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 

physical harm,” or if the suspect threatens the officer or 

others with a weapon capable of inflicting such harm. Id.

The key question, then, is whether Clark had an 

objectively reasonable basis for believing that Orn posed a 

threat of serious physical harm, either to Clark himself or to 

others. See Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 474 (2012) (per 

curiam). Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Orn, 

and giving due deference to Clark’s assessment of the danger 

presented by the situation he confronted, see id. at 477, we 

conclude the answer is no.

1. We’ll begin with the threat to Clark himself. A 

moving vehicle can of course pose a threat of serious 

physical harm, but only if someone is at risk of being struck 

by it. According to Orn’s version of events, Clark was never 

at risk of being struck by Orn’s vehicle because he was never 

in the vehicle’s path of travel. As Orn’s vehicle moved past 

Clark’s SUV, Clark ran toward the passenger side of Orn’s 

vehicle and opened fire through the passenger-side windows. 

At that point, Clark could not reasonably have feared for his 

own safety because he was on the side of Orn’s vehicle as it 

was traveling away from him. See, e.g., Godawa v. Byrd, 

798 F.3d 457, 466 (6th Cir. 2015); Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 

766, 774 (6th Cir. 2005); Cowan ex rel. Estate of Cooper v. 

Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 763 (2d Cir. 2003); Abraham v. Raso, 

183 F.3d 279, 293–94 (3d Cir. 1999). And Clark was 

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ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA 11

obviously not in harm’s way as he chased after Orn’s vehicle 

and fired additional rounds at Orn through the rear 

windshield.

Clark does not dispute that an officer who fires into the 

side or rear of a vehicle moving away from him lacks an 

objectively reasonable basis for claiming that he did so out 

of fear for his own safety. He instead urges us to analyze the 

lawfulness of his actions under his version of events, in 

which he stood in the path of Orn’s vehicle as it accelerated 

toward him, causing him to fear for his life. As noted at the 

outset, we cannot analyze the case through that lens because 

Clark’s version of events conflicts with the facts construed 

in the light most favorable to Orn. Most fundamentally, 

Orn’s testimony provides an account of the shooting in 

which Clark was never at risk of being struck by Orn’s 

vehicle. Although Orn’s testimony alone would be 

sufficient to create a material factual dispute on this point, 

Officer Butts’s testimony provides additional support for 

Orn’s version of events. Officer Butts testified that he saw 

Clark standing behind the rear bumper of the SUV only after 

Clark fired the first round of shots, and that he did not see 

Clark make any physical contact with Orn’s vehicle. 

ER 194–96, 198–99. Officer Butts also testified that he 

heard Orn’s engine rev and saw the vehicle accelerate after 

the first shots were fired, not before as Clark maintains. 

ER 196–97, 201. A reasonable jury could find Officer 

Butts’s testimony significant because his vehicle was parked 

facing the rear passenger side of Clark’s SUV, giving him an 

up-close vantage point from which to see and hear what 

transpired just before the shooting.

In an effort to bolster his version of events and discredit 

Orn’s, Clark relies on two pieces of evidence that he views 

as critical. First, he points to a tire track left at the scene, 

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12 ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA

which he contends shows that Orn must have accelerated 

before being shot. ER 207, 462–63, 538, 562. Second, Clark 

notes that detectives found an unidentified palm print on the 

passenger side of Orn’s vehicle, in the area where Clark said 

he placed his hand to brace for the impact. ER 448–49. 

While these two pieces of evidence provide some support for 

Clark’s version of events, they are nowhere near conclusive 

enough to meet Scott’s “blatantly contradicts” standard, 

where the Court relied on a videotape clearly depicting the 

events in question. 550 U.S. at 379–80.

Even if a jury found that Clark was standing behind the 

rear bumper of his SUV, as he claims, it could still conclude 

that Clark lacked an objectively reasonable basis to fear for 

his own safety. As Orn’s vehicle approached, Clark 

concedes that he was not initially in the vehicle’s path of 

travel. ER 524. He contends that his safety was imperiled 

when Orn turned his wheels more sharply to the right to 

squeeze between Clark’s SUV and Officer Butts’s patrol car. 

At that point, Orn’s vehicle was moving at just five miles per 

hour. Clark could therefore have avoided any risk of being 

struck by simply taking a step back, a common-sense 

conclusion confirmed by Clark’s own admission that he 

“was able to step backwards and get out of the path of 

Mr. Orn’s vehicle.” ER 525. In similar circumstances, we 

held that a reasonable jury could find that an officer standing 

near a slow-moving vehicle “would not have perceived 

himself to be in danger of serious bodily harm,” because he 

could have avoided any risk of injury “by simply stepping to 

the side.” Acosta v. City & County of San Francisco, 83 F.3d 

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ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA 13

1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Abraham, 183 F.3d 

at 294.1

2. The remaining question is whether Clark had an 

objectively reasonable basis for believing that Orn posed a 

threat of serious physical harm to others. On this point, in 

both the district court and before our court, Clark has argued 

only that Orn posed a threat to his partner, Officer Rose. As 

noted earlier, Clark mistakenly (but reasonably) believed 

that Officer Rose had exited the SUV and may have been 

standing in the area where Orn’s vehicle was headed. In fact, 

Officer Rose remained inside the SUV until after the 

shooting.

Clark claims that he feared for the safety of Officer Rose 

because Orn had just attempted to run Clark over and thus 

might have been inclined to assault Officer Rose as well. 

ER 299–300, 525. But if a jury rejects Clark’s account of 

the shooting and concludes that Clark was never at risk of 

being struck by Orn’s vehicle, nothing else Orn had done 

suggested that he posed a threat to the safety of Officer Rose. 

1 We need not decide whether a jury could find Clark’s use of deadly 

force unreasonable based in part on his decision to move from the grassy 

area where he had been standing (a position of relative safety) to take up 

a more dangerous position behind the rear bumper of his SUV as Orn’s 

vehicle approached. The reasonableness of an officer’s use of force must 

be judged by considering “the totality of the circumstances,” Garner, 

471 U.S. at 8–9, and several circuits have held that “[w]here a police 

officer unreasonably places himself in harm’s way, his use of deadly 

force may be deemed excessive.” Kirby v. Duva, 530 F.3d 475, 482 (6th 

Cir. 2008); accord Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655, 667 (10th Cir. 

2010); Lytle v. Bexar County, 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 2009); Estate 

of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993). In County of Los 

Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017), the Supreme Court did not 

foreclose this theory of liability, even as it rejected our circuit’s former 

“provocation rule.” See id. at 1547 n.*

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14 ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA

Orn was driving at a slow speed in a non-reckless manner as 

he maneuvered around Clark’s SUV, and although his 

vehicle clipped Clark’s SUV and Officer Butts’s patrol car 

as he maneuvered between them, the contact was slight and 

clearly accidental. See Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541, 549–

50 (6th Cir. 2017) (accidental collision with police vehicle 

causing minor damage did not provide a basis for believing 

that suspect would harm officers); Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 

1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003) (same). In addition, at every 

juncture earlier in the evening, Orn had deliberately driven 

his vehicle away from nearby officers. Taking this view of 

the facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that Clark had no 

basis for believing that Orn’s vehicle posed a threat to 

Officer Rose. See Abraham, 183 F.3d at 294–95; cf. Scott v. 

Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2003) (suspect’s 

attempt to run over officer was relevant to the officer’s 

“perception that the bystanders were in danger”).

Clark has not argued that his use of deadly force was 

justified on the theory that permitting Orn to escape could 

have posed a threat to the safety of the general public. Nor 

is there any basis in the record for making such an argument. 

A fleeing suspect’s escape can pose a threat to the public 

when police have probable cause to believe that the suspect 

has committed a violent crime, see Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 

but neither of the offenses for which Orn was wanted 

involved any sort of violence. Such a threat can also exist 

when the suspect has driven in a manner that puts the lives 

of pedestrians or other motorists at risk, as by leading 

officers on a high-speed chase. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. 

Ct. 305, 306, 309 (2015) (per curiam) (suspect drove at over 

100 miles per hour and threatened to shoot police officers 

unless they abandoned the pursuit); Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 

776 (suspect swerved between congested traffic lanes at 

speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour); Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 

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ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA 15

(suspect engaged in “a Hollywood-style car chase of the 

most frightening sort”). In such cases, officers have an 

interest in terminating the suspect’s flight because the flight 

itself poses a threat of serious physical harm to others. But 

to warrant the use of deadly force, a motorist’s prior 

interactions with police must have demonstrated that “he 

either was willing to injure an officer that got in the way of 

escape or was willing to persist in extremely reckless 

behavior that threatened the lives of all those around.” 

Latits, 878 F.3d at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A reasonable jury could conclude that Orn did not 

engage in any such conduct here, and that Clark therefore 

had no basis for believing that Orn would pose a threat of 

serious physical harm to the general public if permitted to 

escape. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to 

Orn, he never targeted officers with his vehicle or forced 

other vehicles off the road. In addition, he traveled at normal 

speeds and stopped at traffic lights and stop signs throughout 

the pursuit. ER 305, 308, 351. Indeed, the Tacoma Police 

Department’s Pursuit Review Committee conducted a 

review of the pursuit and classified it as involving only a 

“Failure to Yield,” which occurs when a driver “fails or 

refuses to immediately bring his or her vehicle to a stop, and 

drives in a manner that is not reckless and does not pose an 

immediate threat to community safety.” ER 219.

In his brief before our court, Clark hints at a different 

view of the facts, but in doing so he simply highlights the 

factual disputes that a jury must ultimately resolve. For 

example, Clark asserts that when officers attempted to box 

Orn in, he deliberately swerved toward one of them, forcing 

the officer to veer into the next lane of traffic to avoid a 

collision. ER 161, 166. That incident, if it did occur, is 

irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis because Clark 

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16 ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA

did not witness it and a reasonable jury could conclude that 

he did not learn about it until after the shooting. See Deorle 

v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir. 2001). The 

officer involved in the alleged incident did not report it over 

the radio, ER 162, and Officer Rose, who was riding in the 

same vehicle as Clark, testified that he did not recall hearing 

any radio transmissions during the pursuit indicating that 

Orn’s driving had endangered other officers or the public, 

ER 105. Clark further asserts that Orn drove onto a 

pedestrian path during the pursuit, but Clark did not witness 

this incident either, and the officer who reported it over the 

radio stated only that Orn had “cut over the curb.” ER 306. 

Clark also points to Orn’s actions in evading the spike 

strips—something Clark did witness—but it is undisputed 

that Orn swerved away from the officers who deployed the 

strips and that he did not endanger any motorists in the 

oncoming lane of traffic because there were no motorists 

coming toward Orn.

In short, if Clark decides to pursue this line of argument 

at trial, a jury will have to determine whether Orn engaged 

in conduct that demonstrated a willingness either to injure 

officers or to “persist in extremely reckless behavior that 

threatened the lives of all those around.” Latits, 878 F.3d at 

548.

B

We turn next to the second step of the qualified immunity 

analysis, which asks whether Orn’s right to be free from the 

use of excessive force was clearly established at the time of 

the shooting. In making that determination, we are mindful 

of the Supreme Court’s repeated admonition not to define 

the right at issue at a high level of generality. See, e.g., 

Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam); 

City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 

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ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA 17

1775–76 (2015); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 

(2011). Qualified immunity is designed to ensure that 

officers receive fair notice of the illegality of their conduct, 

and general standards often fail to provide such notice in 

excessive force cases, where “the result depends very much 

on the facts of each case.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

In an “obvious case,” the general standards established 

in Garner and Graham can suffice to put an officer on notice 

that his conduct is unlawful. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199. But 

usually uncertainty will remain as to whether the particular 

set of facts confronting an officer satisfies those standards. 

See Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1777. When that is the case, an 

officer will be “entitled to qualified immunity unless existing 

precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue.” 

Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Stated differently, precedent in existence at the time of the 

officer’s actions must render the unlawfulness of his conduct 

“beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. That does not 

mean a plaintiff must identify prior cases that are “directly 

on point.” Id. The plaintiff must instead identify precedent 

that holds “certain conduct is a constitutional violation under 

facts not distinguishable in a fair way from the facts 

presented in the case at hand.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.

1. To the extent Clark seeks to justify his use of deadly 

force based on a threat to his own safety, existing precedent 

declared his conduct unconstitutional in circumstances 

indistinguishable from those present here. By the time of the 

shooting in October 2011, at least seven circuits had held 

that an officer lacks an objectively reasonable basis for 

believing that his own safety is at risk when firing into the 

side or rear of a vehicle moving away from him. See

Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183, 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 

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18 ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA

2009); Lytle v. Bexar County, 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 

2009); Kirby v. Duva, 530 F.3d 475, 482 (6th Cir. 2008); 

Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 482 (4th Cir. 2005); 

Cowan, 352 F.3d at 763; Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1327, 1330–

31; Abraham, 183 F.3d at 293–94; see also Scott, 346 F.3d 

at 757–58. To the same effect is our circuit’s decision in 

Adams v. Speers, 473 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2007), where we 

held that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment by firing 

through the front windshield of a vehicle moving backward 

away from him. Id. at 992–93. As discussed above, taking 

the facts in the light most favorable to Orn, a reasonable jury 

could conclude both that Clark was never in the path of Orn’s 

vehicle and that he fired through the passenger-side windows 

and rear windshield as the vehicle was moving away from 

him. On that score, “existing precedent squarely governs the 

specific facts at issue.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153.

Clark contests this conclusion only by urging us to credit 

his version of events, just as he did for purposes of the Fourth 

Amendment analysis at step one. He insists that “the 

specific facts at issue” are those in which he was standing in 

the path of a vehicle speeding toward him under “hard 

acceleration.” The cases on which he relies for support all 

involve officers who were in the path of vehicles moving 

toward them. See Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655, 665 

(10th Cir. 2010); Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 322 

(5th Cir. 2007); Troupe v. Sarasota County, 419 F.3d 1160, 

1168 (11th Cir. 2005); Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 

1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2005). These cases are inapposite here 

because we are not permitted to analyze Clark’s entitlement 

to qualified immunity under his version of the facts.

Even if the jury were to conclude that Clark was standing 

behind the rear bumper of his SUV as Orn’s vehicle 

approached, he would not be entitled to qualified immunity. 

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ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA 19

We held in Acosta that an officer’s use of deadly force 

violated the Fourth Amendment in circumstances similar to 

those present here. There, the defendant officer was 

standing in front of the suspect’s car “closer to the side than 

the dead-center,” 83 F.3d at 1146, and the vehicle was 

“moving or rolling very slowly from a standstill” as it 

approached him. Id. at 1147. We stated that the car was 

moving slowly enough that the officer could have avoided 

any risk of injury “by simply stepping to the side,” rendering 

his use of deadly force unreasonable. Id. at 1146. The facts 

of this case, taken in the light most favorable to Orn, are not 

fairly distinguishable from those in Acosta. If Orn was 

traveling at only five miles per hour as he maneuvered past 

Clark’s SUV, and if he did not accelerate until after being 

shot, a reasonable jury could conclude that Clark lacked an 

objectively reasonable basis to fear for his own safety, as he 

could simply have stepped back to avoid being injured.

2. Clark is not entitled to qualified immunity based on 

his claimed fear for the safety of others—in this case, Officer 

Rose. The objective reasonableness of Clark’s fear for 

Officer Rose’s safety is again dependent upon the jury’s 

acceptance of his account of the shooting. According to 

Clark, Orn nearly ran him over after turning the vehicle 

toward him and accelerating rapidly. But a reasonable jury 

could conclude, contrary to Clark’s version of events, that he 

was never at risk of being struck by Orn’s vehicle. And if 

the jury disbelieved Clark’s account of having been 

assaulted by Orn, it could also conclude that nothing else 

about Orn’s behavior that night, either during the course of 

the pursuit or in the parking lot, gave rise to a basis for 

believing that he posed a significant threat to Officer Rose. 

See, e.g., Lytle, 560 F.3d at 416–17; Abraham, 183 F.3d 

at 293.

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The cases Clark cites on this point are distinguishable 

when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Orn. 

In Brosseau, the suspect had a felony no-bail warrant out for 

his arrest and was attempting to elude capture by hiding near 

his mother’s house. 543 U.S. at 195. When officers found 

him, he ran to the driveway and jumped into his car, which 

was facing the street. Two vehicles directly blocked his 

path: a small car parked in the driveway facing the suspect’s 

car; and a pickup truck parked in the street blocking the 

driveway. Id. at 195–96. Both vehicles were occupied. The 

defendant officer believed that the suspect had sprinted to 

his car in order to retrieve a weapon, and she ordered him at 

gunpoint to get out of the car. When he refused to comply, 

the officer shattered the driver’s side window with her gun, 

reached in to try to grab the keys, and struck the suspect in 

the head with her gun. The suspect nonetheless started the 

car and began to move forward when the officer fired one 

round through the rear driver’s side window. She did so to 

protect the occupants of the two vehicles directly blocking 

the suspect’s path, as well as fellow officers who were on 

foot in the immediate area. Id. at 196–97. Given the 

suspect’s apparent determination to escape at all costs, 

notwithstanding the officer’s violent attempts to restrain 

him, the Supreme Court held that the officer had reasonable 

grounds to believe that the suspect would race out of the 

driveway—and recklessly endanger the lives of those in his 

path—if allowed to drive off.

In Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010), the 

suspect had engaged the police in a short pursuit before 

crashing into a telephone pole. Two officers, Key and 

Torres, approached the vehicle on foot. Key attempted to 

open the driver’s door but slipped and fell to the ground as 

the suspect’s vehicle began to move in reverse. Id. at 548–

49. The engine revved and the wheels were spinning and 

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ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA 21

throwing up mud due to the slippery conditions. As the 

vehicle accelerated backward, it arced toward the driver’s 

side, leading Torres to fear that Key had been run over and 

was in danger of being struck again. Torres fired through 

the passenger-side window to protect both Key and himself. 

Id. at 549. We held that the undisputed facts provided Torres 

with an objectively reasonable basis to fear for both Key’s 

safety and his own. Id. at 551–52.

The facts of this case bear no resemblance to those in 

Brosseau and Wilkinson. There were no officers or other 

individuals in Orn’s path. The only person Clark thought 

might be in the immediate area was Officer Rose. Yet under 

Orn’s version of events, he never engaged in any conduct 

that suggested his vehicle posed a threat of serious physical 

harm to Officer Rose, or to anyone else in the vicinity.

Finally, although Clark has not argued that Orn posed a 

threat to the safety of the general public, we do not think 

Clark could claim qualified immunity on that basis either. 

Officers may use deadly force to halt the flight (or continued 

flight) of a motorist who they reasonably believe will pose a 

deadly threat to the lives of pedestrians or other motorists. 

Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 777. But existing precedent made 

clear that Orn’s conduct prior to the shooting did not give 

rise to an objectively reasonable basis for believing that Orn 

posed such a threat.

The cases upholding the use of deadly force to protect 

the public from a fleeing motorist have typically involved 

suspects who drove at extremely high speeds, endangered 

other motorists on the road, or intentionally targeted police 

officers with their vehicles. See, e.g., Scott, 550 U.S. at 379–

80; Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1277–78, 1282–83 

(11th Cir. 2002); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1330–31, 

1333–34 (8th Cir. 1993); Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 

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22 ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA

344, 347 (6th Cir. 1992). In these cases, the suspect’s 

conduct before the shooting demonstrated that he “was likely 

to continue to threaten the lives of those around him in his 

attempt to escape.” Cupp, 430 F.3d at 775. As discussed 

above, Orn engaged in no such conduct here. In fact, his 

driving prior to the shooting was less hazardous than that of 

the suspects in Cordova and Lytle, two cases in which the 

courts held, after construing the facts in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiffs, that an officer’s use of deadly 

force violated the Fourth Amendment. See Cordova, 

569 F.3d at 1186, 1190 (suspect ran two red lights, crossed 

onto the wrong side of a highway, and attempted to ram 

police vehicles on two occasions); Lytle, 560 F.3d at 407, 

413 (suspect speeding through a residential area collided 

with a car in an oncoming lane of traffic).2

* * *

In the end, this is not a case in which the legality of the 

officer’s conduct falls within the “hazy border between 

excessive and acceptable force.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206 

(internal quotation marks omitted). When the facts are

viewed in the light most favorable to Orn, as they must be at 

this point in the litigation, Clark had “fair and clear warning 

2 In denying the officer qualified immunity, the Lytle court explained 

that the suspect had a clearly established right to be free from the use of 

deadly force because he did not “pose a sufficient threat of harm to the 

officer or others.” 560 F.3d at 417. The court in Cordova reaffirmed 

this principle, but ultimately granted qualified immunity to the officer in 

that case based on the specific facts at issue. 569 F.3d at 1193. In doing 

so, the court acknowledged that the outcome likely would have been 

different had the suspect posed a less substantial risk of harm to others, 

or at least the same degree of risk as the suspect in Lytle. Id. Because 

Orn presented even less of a risk of harm to third parties than the driver 

in Lytle, Cordova’s qualified immunity holding, if anything, supports our 

conclusion.

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ORN V. CITY OF TACOMA 23

of what the Constitution requires.” Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 

at 1778 (internal quotation marks omitted). What Clark 

most forcefully contests is whether his alternative account of 

the shooting should be accepted as true. Factual disputes of 

that order must be resolved by a jury, not by a court 

adjudicating a motion for summary judgment. Tolan, 

572 U.S. at 656; see Saucier, 533 U.S. at 216 (Ginsburg, J., 

concurring in the judgment).

AFFIRMED.

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