Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01184/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01184-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Suzanne M. Jones
Defendant
William L. Magers
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM L. MAGERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUZANNE M. JONES,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-CV-1184-GEB-EFB 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST 

AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS

Defendant filed a motion seeking leave to file eight

counterclaims sixty-eight days after expiration of the pleading 

leave period prescribed in the scheduling order filed October 17, 

2014. The amended pleading deadline portion of the scheduling 

order states: 

Defendant states in the [Joint Status Report] 

. . . that she “anticipates filing a cross 

complaint on or before October 31, 2014.” 

(JSR 2:3-4.)

Defendant has until October 31, 2014, to file 

the referenced pleading.

No further service, joinder of parties, or 

amendments to the pleadings is permitted, 

except with leave of Court for good cause 

shown. 

(Status (Pretrial Scheduling) (“Scheduling Order”) Order 3:3-9,

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ECF No. 12.) 

Defendant‟s motion to amend is in essence a de facto 

motion to amend all dates prescribed in the scheduling order that 

would have to be amended if Defendant‟s amended pleading motion 

is granted: specifically, the April 30, 2015 discovery completion 

date, the June 15, 2015 last hearing date for motions, and the 

August 10, 2015 final pretrial conference. (Scheduling Order 

3:11; 3:23; 4:2-3.)

Defendant argues her motion should be granted for the 

following reasons:

At the time of the Joint Scheduling Report 

and this Court's order, Defendant and her 

counsel did not have all of the facts 

sufficient to plead the counterclaims 

contained in the [proposed amended pleading].

However, Defendant and her counsel were 

working diligently to obtain the necessary 

information and documents, including police 

reports and court documents from prior 

proceedings. Defendant and her counsel did 

not anticipate the length of time it would 

take to receive the documents and information 

requested from other institutions, despite 

their best efforts to gather the information 

before the deadline. Defendant recently 

obtained the facts to plead her counterclaims 

with sufficient specificity to show that 

Defendant is entitled to relief. 

(Mot. 1:26-2:6, ECF No. 13) (citations omitted.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing: 

Defendant offers no compelling reason why the 

proposed new pleading could not have been 

presented earlier. Defendant clearly knew the 

alleged facts on which the counterclaims are 

based at the time of filing the original 

answer, but did not assert them before the 

[s]cheduling [o]rder's deadline.

Motions for leave to add new claims are not 

reviewed favorably when the facts supporting 

the claims have been known to the party since 

before the pleading deadline . . . . The 

counterclaims are unquestionably based on 

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conduct and events that allegedly occurred 

from approximately July 2012 to February 

2013. Presumably these are the same 

counterclaims that Defendant “anticipated”

filing in the Joint Status Report dated 

October 10, 2014. Yet, in her motion, 

Defendant points to no specific facts that 

she could not have alleged before the 

pleading deadline. She fails to explain what 

necessary information was contained in 

“police reports and court documents” that she 

previously lacked. Presumably the information 

contained in the police reports was obtained 

directly from Defendant, given that she 

herself reported the alleged thefts on 

December 20, 2012, December 24, 2012 and 

February 8, 2013. It is questionable whether 

obtaining “police reports and court 

documents” was indeed necessary for Defendant 

“to plead her counterclaims with sufficient 

specificity,” but even if that were the case, 

the Rule 16(b)(4) inquiry focuses on 

diligence. Defendant reasonably should have 

foreseen or anticipated the issue at the time 

of the Rule 16 scheduling conference. 

Defendant's failure to raise the issue or 

seek modification of the Scheduling Order 

until December 15, 2014, nearly two months 

after the Scheduling Order issued, reinforces 

the conclusion that Defendant has not been 

diligent.

(Opp‟n to Mot. 1:24-27; 3:27-28; 4:21-5:8, ECF No. 14.) 

Defendant rejoins: “she was not aware of all the facts 

to support her counterclaims at the time of filing her original 

answer and . . . . [that the information she obtained] include[s] 

the details of the” events forming the basis of her counterclaims 

including “the dates of the alleged events [and] the estimated 

amounts of . . . stolen property,” which are “necessary [for her 

counterclaims] to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,” 

given that she “did not wish to rely solely on her recollection 

of the events to craft her counterclaims.” (Def.‟s Reply 3:1-10, 

ECF No. 15.) 

Defendant has not responded to Plaintiff‟s assertion 

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that Defendant herself is the source of “the information 

contained in the police reports.” (Opp‟n 4:26-28.) Defendant 

failed to state when she first realized she could not file an 

amended pleading before the deadline expired, failed to explain 

why she did not seek to amend the scheduling order before she 

filed her motion sub judice, and failed to “specify what new and 

previously unavailable information [she] obtained that leads 

[her] to believe that [her counterclaims]” could not have been 

filed on or before the pleading amendment deadline. Eckert Cold 

Storage, Inc. v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1233

(E.D.Cal.1996)(emphasis added).

Since Defendant did not comply with “the [amended 

pleading] deadline established in the scheduling order, . . . 

[she is] required to demonstrate „good cause‟ pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 16, justifying [her] . . . untimely 

request [for leave to file] . . . an amended pleading.”

Izaguirre v. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc., 523 Fed. App‟x. 482, 

483 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (citing Johnson v. Mammoth 

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608–09 (9th Cir. 1992)).

A court's evaluation of good cause is not 

coextensive with an inquiry into the 

propriety of the amendment under . . .

[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 15. 

Unlike Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment policy 

which focuses on the bad faith of the party 

seeking to interpose an amendment and the 

prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)'s 

“good cause” standard primarily considers the 

diligence of the party seeking the amendment. 

The district court may modify the pretrial 

schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met 

despite the diligence of the party seeking 

the extension.” Moreover, carelessness is not 

compatible with a finding of diligence and 

offers no reason for a grant of relief. 

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (citations omitted). Prejudice from a 

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delayed motion to amend “is not required” to deny a motion for 

leave to file an amended pleading under Rule 16. Coleman v. 

Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1295 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“Careful review of [Defendant‟s] motion to amend . . . 

reveals that [she] . . . did not [demonstrate] . . . with any 

specificity the good cause [she allegedly] . . . had for untimely

moving to” file counterclaims after the amended pleading 

deadline. Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., 487 F.3d 1361, 1367

(11th Cir. 2014). Specifically, Defendant fails to explain “what 

[previously unknown] facts support[] [her counterclaims] . . . 

and why those facts previously were undiscoverable” or unknown 

before the amended pleading deadline. Id. Defendant indicates she 

was aware of certain unspecified facts supporting her 

counterclaims before the amended pleading deadline and that she 

“did not wish to rely solely on her recollection of the events to 

craft her counterclaims;” however, conjecture is required 

concerning precisely what facts Defendant references and whether 

she had personal knowledge of the essential facts necessary to 

plead the counterclaims before the amended pleading deadline

expired. (Reply 3:9-10.) “„The good cause standard typically will 

not be met where the party seeking to modify the scheduling order 

has been aware of the facts and theories supporting amendment 

since the inception of the action.‟” In re W. States Wholesale 

Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(determining the district court‟s use of this language was not an 

abuse of discretion); Acri v. International Ass'n of Machinists & 

Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[L]ate 

amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed favorably when 

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the facts and theories have been known to the party seeking 

amendment since the inception of the action.”) 

Lastly, Defendant‟s conclusory and unsupported 

assertions of diligence do not satisfy her burden to demonstrate

precisely what she did that she opines constitutes diligence

under the circumstances.

Since “the focus of the [the good cause] inquiry is 

upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification,” and 

Defendant has not shown non-conclusory facts justifying the 

amendments to the scheduling order she seeks, she has not 

established that good cause justifies granting her motion. See

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (holding that even “carelessness is not 

compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a 

grant of relief.”) Therefore, Defendant‟s motion is DENIED.

Dated: February 25, 2015

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