Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-01160/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-01160-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melanie Beauchamp
Plaintiff
Mary Kate Flaherty
Defendant

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Melanie Beauchamp,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Mary Kate Flaherty,

Defendant.

No. CV-24-01160-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

In this action, Plaintiff Melanie Beauchamp (“Plaintiff”), a former attorney who is 

proceeding pro se, asserts various tort claims against Defendant Mary Kate Flaherty 

(“Defendant”), a Massachusetts resident who has “never set foot in Arizona.” (Doc. 7 at 

2.) In an October 11, 2024 order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for lack of personal 

jurisdiction but also granted Plaintiff leave to amend. (Id.) 

Plaintiff has now filed an amended pleading, the First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”), and Defendant has again moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

(Doc. 9.) For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is again granted, this time 

without leave to amend. 

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Allegations

As alleged in the FAC, Plaintiff sells cosmetic products and resides in Arizona. 

(Doc. 8 ¶¶ 1, 10.) Defendant is a social media influencer. (Id. ¶ 4.)1 

1 Because Plaintiff did not provide a redlined FAC and instead included bullet points 

that purport to “amend” certain paragraphs of the original complaint, it is not always clear 

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On or about January 11, 2024, “Defendant contacted Plaintiff via text message . . . 

requesting samples of Plaintiff’s skincare products for promotional purposes, knowing that 

Plaintiff’s business, UluRX, is based in Arizona.” (Id.) The parties’ relationship continued 

until roughly March 26, 2024, when, “during a TikTok livestream, Defendant made false 

and defamatory statements about Plaintiff’s business practices.” (Id. ¶ 8.) “[D]uring this 

live stream Defendant expressly aimed at Plaintiff’s Arizona business and [was] critical of 

plaintiff’s business practices, customer service, and return policies, and she suggested that 

her followers take actions that could harm the plaintiff’s business.” (Id.) Following this, 

“Defendant and her agents opened fake accounts on TikTok, to disparage, defame and 

harass. Defendant and her agents began disparaging the products by, for example, alleging 

that the pharmacy was not real amongst other falsities that included both libel and slander.” 

(Id. ¶ 11.) This “campaign of disparagement . . . is ongoing and continues to the date of 

the filing of this Complaint.” (Id. ¶ 10.) “Defendant’s actions caused incalculable damage 

to Plaintiff’s reputation, inhibiting her ability to sustain her online marketing efforts, which 

were crucial for generating income. This resulted in a significant loss of projected and 

anticipatory revenue, as evidenced by Refunds and sudden revenue decline.” (Id. ¶ 24.) 

Based on these allegations, the FAC asserts tort claims against Defendant for (1) 

false light, (2) defamation, (3) business disparagement, and (4) intentional and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress. (Id. ¶¶ 32-38.) 

II. Procedural History

On April 1, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action in Maricopa County Superior 

Court. (Doc. 1-1 at 7-11.) 

On May 17, 2024, Defendant timely removed the action to this Court. (Doc. 1.) 

On May 21, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

what is being retained or eliminated from the original complaint. For example, in 

paragraph four of the original complaint (and still visible in the FAC), Plaintiff alleged that 

Defendant was a “social media influencer,” but in the “amended” bullet point, much of 

which contradicts the allegations in the original paragraph, that description is omitted. 

(Doc. 8 ¶ 4.) Nevertheless, other allegations in the FAC still seem refer to Defendant as a 

social media influencer. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 5 [“The parties agreed that Defendant would create 

social media content.”].)

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jurisdiction. (Doc. 4.) 

On October 11, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s motion. (Doc. 7.) The Court 

incorporated by reference the analysisin Beauchamp v. Muise, 2024 WL 4364058 (D. Ariz.

2024), which dismissed, for lack of personal jurisdiction, a near-identical action by Plaintiff 

against a New Hampshire-based social media influencer: “The Court has carefully 

reviewed that analysis, fully agrees with it, and concludes that it compels the same outcome 

here.” (Doc. 7 at 3.) The Court also granted Plaintiff leave to amend but clarified that the 

amendment deadline was “[w]ithin 14 days of the issuance of this order”—i.e., by October 

25, 2024—and specified that “[a]ny changes shall be limited to attempting to cure the 

deficiencies raised in this order and Plaintiff shall, consistent with LRCiv 15.1(a), attach a 

redlined version of the pleading as an exhibit.” (Id. at 5.)

On October 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed the FAC. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff did not attach a 

redlined version of the pleading as an exhibit. (Id.) 

On November 12, 2024, Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 9.) 

On November 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a response. (Doc. 10.) 

On December 10, 2024, Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. 11.)

Neither side requested oral argument. 

DISCUSSION

I. Procedural Failures

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendant argues that because Plaintiff filed the FAC three days after the 

amendment deadline and did not seek an extension or provide any explanation or 

justification for the delay, the SAC “is untimely and should be dismissed on that basis 

alone.” (Doc. 9 at 3.) According to Defendant, “[a]llowing Plaintiff to proceed despite the 

missed deadline would undermine the Court’s authority to enforce compliance with its 

orders and create undue delay in the proceedings.” (Id.) Defendant also argues that

dismissal is justified based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirement, set forth 

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both in the October 11, 2024 order and in LRCiv 15.1(a), of attaching a redlined version 

of the FAC as an exhibit. (Id.) 

In response, Plaintiff attempts to raise her own procedural argument—that 

Defendant failed to properly serve her with the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 10 at 1-2.) 

Plaintiff argues that by emailing her the motion, Defendant violated Rule 5 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id. at 1.) In response to Defendant’s untimeliness argument, 

Plaintiff argues that “there was an administrative error that resulted in Plaintiff being 

treated as an e-filer without her consent. The court’s order was emailed to Plaintiff, when 

it should have been mailed.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff argues that she “made best efforts to 

comply with the court’s order by attempting to file the [FAC] on October 25, 2024, as a 

new case due to the e-filing issue. However, Plaintiff was instructed by the clerk to file in 

person, which she did on October 28, 2024.” (Id.) Citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. 

Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), Plaintiff argues that “courts have 

discretion to accept late filings, especially when the delay is caused by issues related to 

service and does not prejudice the opposing party.” (Id.) Finally, as for the redlining issue, 

Plaintiff contends—incorrectly, as discussed in more detail below—that a “compliant” 

version of the FAC is enclosed as an attachment to her response brief. (Id. at 3.) 

In reply, Defendant argues that service of her motion through the ECF system 

complied with Rule 5(b) and that “by registering with ECF, Plaintiff consented to 

electronic service.” (Doc. 11 at 2.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff has, at any rate, 

demonstrated actual notice. (Id.) Defendant also notes that “since the inception of this 

case, Defendant has sent Plaintiff every filing via ECF and email, and [Plaintiff] has not 

raised any objections or issues, until she filed her Response.” (Id.) Defendant next 

addresses the untimeliness issue, arguing that Plaintiff’s failure to seek an extension for 

good cause pursuant to Rule 6(b) “undermines her argument” that she made best efforts to 

comply with the amendment deadline. (Id.) Defendant also argues that “the circumstances 

here do not rise to the level of excusable neglect under Pioneer. Courts assess excusable 

neglect by considering factors such as prejudice, the length of delay, the reason for delay, 

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and good faith. Plaintiff’s explanation—an alleged e-filing issue—is unpersuasive given 

her knowledge of the deadline and her failure to take alternative action promptly.” (Id. at 

2-3.) Next, Defendant argues that because Plaintiff has not sought leave to file a second 

amended complaint as required by Rule 15(a)(2), the proposed pleading that Plaintiff 

provided as an attachment to her response brief is procedurally improper and should be 

disregarded. (Id. at 3.) This impropriety, Defendant argues, “creates confusion, 

undermines Defendant’s procedural rights, and disrupts the orderly administration of 

justice.” (Id.) 

B. Analysis

“Failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal.” 

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). However, before dismissing for failure 

to follow a local rule, “the district court is required to weigh several factors: (1) the public’s 

interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; 

(3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 

cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Id. (cleaned up). 

“This test is not mechanical. It provides the district court with a way to think about what 

to do, not a set of conditions precedent for sanctions or a script that the district court must 

follow.” Parker v. Shaw & Lines, LLC, 2010 WL 1640963, *1 (D. Ariz. 2010) (citation 

omitted). See also United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Only in 

rare cases will we question the exercise of discretion in connection with the application of 

local rules.”). 

Plaintiff committed two distinct procedural errors—she filed the FAC after the 

amendment deadline, and she filed it without providing the required redlined copy 

indicating how it differed from the original complaint. Although the short delay would not 

alone warrant dismissal, the failure to comply with the redlining requirement is more 

serious. The point of that requirement is to enable the opposing party (and the Court) to 

easily identify the new factual allegations that didn’t appear in the earlier version of the 

complaint, which in turn makes it possible to determine whether those new allegations are 

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sufficient to cure the deficiencies identified in the earlier dismissal order. Courts in the 

District of Arizona routinely dismiss amended pleadings for failure to comply with the 

redlining requirement. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Schroeder, 2016 WL 354868, *2 (D. Ariz. 

2016) (“The District Court of Arizona routinely denies motions for leave to amend for 

failure to comply with LRCiv 15.1(a).”); Salako v. Franklin, 2025 WL 4475197, *3 (D. 

Ariz. 2024) (“The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend 

should be denied. Plaintiff failed to provide a redlined version of her proposed new 

pleading, as required by LRCiv 15.1(a). Plaintiff is aware of this rule . . . and she has not 

offered any explanation for her failure to comply in this instance—after Defendants filed a 

response brief pointing out this omission, Plaintiff declined to file a reply and otherwise 

failed to take corrective action.”). The Court specifically outlined this requirement in the 

October 11, 2024 order and Plaintiff provides no excuse for non-compliance.2 

Having considered the relevant factors under Ghazali, the Court concludes they 

support dismissal without prejudice here. Plaintiff’s non-compliance with the redlining 

requirement has thwarted the public’s interest in expedited resolution of litigation, has 

interfered with the Court’s ability to manage its docket (see, e.g., footnote 1, supra), and 

has exposed Defendant to a risk of prejudice from further delay. These considerations 

outweigh the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, and a withoutprejudice dismissal is the only feasible alternative to a with-prejudice dismissal.

II. Personal Jurisdiction

In an abundance of caution, the Court concludes that Defendant is also entitled to 

dismissal based on the merits of her jurisdictional challenge. In the October 11, 2024 order, 

which adopted Muise’s rationale for dismissing a nearly identical lawsuit that Plaintiff filed 

against a different New England-based social medial influencer, the Court concluded that 

Plaintiff failed to satisfy the “express aiming” prong of the purposeful direction test for 

establishing personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 7 at 3.) The FAC does nothing to change this 

2 Plaintiff purports to remedy this error by enclosing a “compliant” document as an 

attachment to her response brief. (Doc. 10 at 10-18.) However, this document does not 

contain any redlines, so it does not in fact remedy the error. 

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conclusion. 

First, the FAC realleges many of the same facts that were previously deemed 

insufficient to create personal jurisdiction—for example, the allegations that Defendant 

“reached out” to Plaintiff via text (Doc. 8 ¶ 4), that some sort of promotional agreement 

between the parties existed for roughly two months (id. ¶¶ 4-8), that Defendant committed 

an array of torts by disparaging Plaintiff’s products on TikTok (id. ¶¶ 32-38), and that this 

conduct caused harm to Plaintiff’s Arizona business (id. ¶¶ 22, 27-31). For the reasons 

identified in Muise and adopted in the October 11, 2024 order, such allegations fail to 

establish personal jurisdiction over Defendant in Arizona. 

Second, the FAC’s new allegations also fail to establish “express aiming.” 

Although Plaintiff now alleges that “Defendant expressly aimed at her Arizona business” 

(id. ¶ 8), this is a quintessential example of the sort of conclusory legal language that courts 

need not credit. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements 

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The FAC 

also contains more detailed allegations concerning the alleged financial harm to Plaintiff’s 

Arizona business and provides new calculations that purport to demonstrate that harm. (Id. 

¶¶ 14, 22-24, 27-31.) But as explained in Muise, such a “foreseeable effect alone would 

not establish purposeful direction.” Muise, 2024 WL 4364058 at *4. The FAC also alleges 

that Defendant’s TikTok post, “I hope everyone calls the Better Business Bureau,” implied 

“unethical conduct or a breach of professional duties related to Plaintiff’s business 

practices in Arizona.” (Doc. 8 ¶ 15.) But this new allegation does not remedy the 

deficiencies explained in Muise and adopted in the October 11, 2024 order. The Better 

Business Bureau is not an Arizona organization, nor does Defendant’s alleged statement 

target Arizona. Again, harm felt by Plaintiff’s Arizona business is not enough. Plaintiff 

still does not allege—nor do any of Plaintiff’s attachments indicate—that Defendant’s 

influencer brand was geared toward Arizona, that her audience was composed of many 

Arizonans, or that she targeted or even mentioned Arizona in any of her social media posts. 

For these reasons, Plaintiff has again failed to establish that Defendant expressly 

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aimed her conduct at Arizona. Consequently, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 

Defendant. 

III. Leave To Amend

The decision whether to grant leave to amend is governed by Rule 15(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which “advises the court that ‘leave [to amend] shall be 

freely given when justice so requires.’” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 

1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). “This policy is ‘to be applied with extreme liberality.’” Id. 

Thus, leave to amend should be granted unless “the amendment: (1) prejudices the 

opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue delay in litigation; or (4) is 

futile.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Leave to amend would be inappropriate here. Plaintiff was already given one 

opportunity to amend but failed to provide any new factual allegations sufficient to remedy 

the deficiencies identified in Muise and the October 11, 2024 order. It would be futile to 

provide her with yet another opportunity to amend under these circumstances. Ascon 

Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The district court’s 

discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously 

amended the complaint.”). Additionally, as discussed in the October 11, 2024 order, 

Plaintiff is a former attorney, so it is unclear that she “deserves the grace granted to other 

pro se individuals.” (Doc. 7 at 4 n.1, citation omitted.)

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) is granted. 

2. The FAC (Doc. 8) is dismissed without leave to amend.

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action.

Dated this 10th day of January, 2025.

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