Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-23-01723/USCOURTS-ca4-23-01723-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Merrick B. Garland
Respondent
Felix Jacobo Salomon-Guillen
Petitioner

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1723

FELIX JACOBO SALOMON-GUILLEN,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Argued: September 24, 2024 Decided: December 18, 2024

Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied in part and dismissed in part by published opinion. Chief Judge Diaz wrote 

the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Berner joined.

ARGUED: Benjamin Ross Winograd, IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE APPELLATE 

CENTER, LLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Petitioner. Craig Alan Newell, Jr., UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: 

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Rebekah Nahas, Senior 

Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

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DIAZ, Chief Judge:

Felix Jacobo Salomon-Guillen petitions for review of a final order of removal of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals. A temporary Board member—also called a Temporary 

Appellate Immigration Judge—who had served multiple six-month terms participated in 

his appeal. Salomon-Guillen asks us to decide whether such temporary judges’ terms are 

renewable under the regulatory provision in effect during his administrative appeal. We 

agree with the government that the answer is yes. 

Salomon-Guillen also challenges the Board’s denial of his applications for a waiver 

of inadmissibility and adjustment of status. But we lack jurisdiction over these issues. So 

we dismiss that part of his petition.

I.

A.

Salomon-Guillen and his wife, the recording artist Lucia Parker Salomon, are from 

El Salvador. They entered the United States in 2009. Parker Salomon entered the country 

on an O-1 visa—reserved for individuals with extraordinary abilities or achievements—

and later became a naturalized citizen. Salomon-Guillen was admitted on an O-3 visa—

reserved for family members of O-visa holders—as Parker Salomon’s husband. He later 

became a permanent resident. Salomon-Guillen was the manager of his wife’s music 

career.

In January 2013, Salomon-Guillen began working as a marketing director for a book 

publisher that HarperCollins later acquired. In that role, he issued marketing contracts to 

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a company that he controlled, without HarperCollins’s knowledge of his interest in the 

contractor. The contracts also inflated the value of the work performed. SalomonGuillen’s scheme cost HarperCollins about $1.4 million. 

The government indicted Salomon-Guillen for wire fraud. He pleaded guilty and 

was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. 

B.

Because Salomon-Guillen’s conviction is an aggravated felony as defined by the 

Immigration and Nationality Act, the government sought to remove him from the country. 

8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). Salomon-Guillen conceded that he was 

removable as charged, so he applied for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).

That application, if granted, would give Salomon-Guillen lawful permanent resident status. 

Since his conviction rendered him inadmissible to the United States and therefore ineligible 

for adjustment of status, he also applied for an inadmissibility waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 

1182(h).

The immigration judge denied Salomon-Guillen’s applications. The judge noted 

that the only obstacle to Salomon-Guillen’s statutory eligibility for adjustment of status

was his wire fraud conviction, which could be overlooked if he received the inadmissibility 

waiver he applied for. To get that waiver, Salomon-Guillen had to show that his removal 

would “result in extreme hardship” to a qualifying relative who is a United States citizen 

or lawful resident and that he merited a waiver in the exercise of the Attorney General’s 

discretion. Id. § 1182(h)(1)(B).

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Salomon-Guillen claimed that his removal would cause hardship to his wife and his 

mother, both of whom are citizens. Salomon-Guillen argued that his wife’s career would 

suffer if he were not in the United States to serve as her manager, that they could not afford 

to hire a manager to replace him, and that Parker Salomon wasn’t able to serve as her own 

manager since, as the immigration judge put it, she lacked “the capacity to do things such 

as contract negotiation.” J.A. 312. 

Salomon-Guillen also argued that his wife would experience “emotional and 

physical hardship” if he were removed. J.A. 312. She suffered from chronic mental health 

issues and was in the middle of a high-risk pregnancy at the time of the proceedings before 

the immigration judge. Salomon-Guillen argued that the medical care she could receive in 

the United States was superior to what she could receive in El Salvador. Salomon-Guillen 

also presented evidence that, were his wife to return with him to El Salvador, she would be 

unable to earn a living as a singer and would fear for her safety due to her status as a 

celebrity and familial ties to politicians belonging to the country’s minority party.

The immigration judge wasn’t convinced that the hardship to Parker Salomon

qualified as extreme. He found that whether Parker Salomon remained in the United States 

or returned to El Salvador with Salomon-Guillen, the financial consequences were selfinflicted. The immigration judge also found unpersuasive Parker Salomon’s assertions that 

she required specialized medical care in the United States and feared for her safety in El 

Salvador, reasoning that these claims relied on a series of hypotheticals.

As for Salomon-Guillen’s mother, Salomon-Guillen posited that she would 

experience financial and emotional hardship if he were removed because she (1) would be 

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unable to travel to El Salvador to visit him, (2) had suffered stress, anxiety, and insomnia 

since being separated from her son, and (3) would lose her son’s financial support if he 

were removed.

But here, too, the immigration judge was unpersuaded. The judge accepted that 

Salomon-Guillen’s mother would “experience some financial and emotional hardship”

should her son be removed, but concluded that these consequences did not “rise to the level 

of extreme hardship.” J.A. 317.

The immigration judge also concluded that, even assuming Salomon-Guillen had 

met his burden to show extreme hardship, he wouldn’t merit an inadmissibility waiver in 

the exercise of discretion because of the severity of his fraud offense and the fact that he 

“failed to express regret toward his fellow employees and former employers at 

HarperCollins, who suffered great financial harm due to [his] actions.” J.A. 319. 

Likewise, the judge concluded that even if Salomon-Guillen received an inadmissibility 

waiver and was therefore statutorily eligible for adjustment of status, he wouldn’t merit an 

adjustment as a matter of discretion. 

C.

The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed in an opinion written by Temporary 

Appellate Immigration Judge Denise G. Brown. The Attorney General appointed Judge 

Brown to a six-month term under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(1) and later reappointed her three 

times. Judge Brown was serving her fourth six-month term when she served on the threejudge panel that decided Salomon-Guillen’s case.

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The Board sustained the immigration judge’s finding that Salomon-Guillen’s 

removal wouldn’t result in extreme hardship to Parker Salomon.

1

 According to the Board, 

Salomon-Guillen waived any argument that Parker Salomon would experience extreme 

hardship if she were to remain in the United States since he failed to challenge that finding. 

As a result, the Board considered only whether Parker Salomon would suffer extreme 

hardship if she accompanied Salomon-Guillen to El Salvador. The Board concluded that 

Salomon-Guillen failed to show that (1) Parker Salomon couldn’t earn a living as a singer 

while living in El Salvador, (2) treatment for Parker Salomon’s medical issues would be 

unavailable in El Salvador, or (3) Parker Salomon would be unable to take security 

precautions to alleviate her safety concerns. 

The Board also reviewed de novo whether Salomon-Guillen should receive an 

inadmissibility waiver in the exercise of discretion. It concluded that the “positive 

equities” Salomon-Guillen presented (including the time he spent in the United States, his 

family ties to United States citizens, letters of support he submitted, and hardship to him 

and his family) didn’t outweigh the negative equities of his case (his serious criminal 

conduct). So the Board denied Salomon-Guillen’s applications.

This petition followed.

1 Salomon-Guillen didn’t raise the issue of hardship to his mother on appeal to the 

Board and does not do so here.

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II.

Salomon-Guillen first asks us to vacate the Board’s decision and remand for 

consideration by a “properly appointed” Board member. Pet’r’s Br. at 10. We decline to 

do so.

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(4), temporary Board members may be appointed to 

“adjudicate assigned cases.” The version of this regulation in effect when the Board 

decided Salomon-Guillen’s administrative appeal authorized the Director of the Executive 

Office for Immigration Review to make such appointments “for terms not to exceed six 

months.”2

 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(4) (2022).

Salomon-Guillen argues that Judge Brown unlawfully served for longer than six 

months when the Board decided his appeal. The government contests the substance of this 

argument, but also challenges Salomon-Guillen’s ability to make it. We conclude that 

Salomon-Guillen can indeed present this argument, but we find that it fails on the merits. 

A.

We begin with the government’s opposition to Salomon-Guillen’s ability to raise 

his procedural challenge.

As with all regulations, the regulation establishing the temporary Board member 

position was promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act. This statute identifies 

2 The regulation has since been amended to (1) clarify that the Attorney General 

appoints temporary Board members, and (2) reflect that such members are appointed “for 

renewable terms not to exceed six months.” Expanding the Size of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals, 89 Fed. Reg. 22630, 22636 (Apr. 2, 2024) (emphasis added) 

(codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(4)).

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two kinds of regulations. The first are “substantive” or “legislative-type” rules, which are 

said to “have the force of law.” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301–02 (1979). 

The second are “interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency 

organization, procedure, or practice.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).

The first category of rules must go through the typical notice-and-comment process 

and generally “create[] new law or impose[] new rights or duties.” Child.’s Hosp. of the 

King’s Daughters, Inc. v. Azar, 896 F.3d 615, 619–20 (4th Cir. 2018). The second category 

need not. 

Second category rules include agencies’ “internal house-keeping measures.” Am. 

Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation omitted). 

These rules may be promulgated under 5 U.S.C. § 301, which authorizes regulations “for 

the government of [a] department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and 

performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, 

and property.”

The government argues that the temporary Board member regulation falls into the

second category, and so doesn’t grant Salomon-Guillen rights that he can enforce. The 

government contends that neither the Administrative Procedure Act nor the Immigration 

and Nationality Act grants to Salomon-Guillen a “private cause of action” to enforce the 

temporary Board member regulation. And it notes that versions of the regulation were 

promulgated in part under § 301 without following notice-and-comment procedures. E.g., 

Board of Immigration Appeals: En Banc Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 31889, 31889 (June 11, 

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1998) (“Compliance with 5 U.S.C. [§] 553 as to notice of proposed rulemaking . . . is not 

necessary because this rule relates to internal agency procedure and practice.”).

Salomon-Guillen responds that his argument arises under the Immigration and 

Nationality Act, which authorizes those subject to removal to file petitions for review in 

the Courts of Appeals and preserves our jurisdiction over legal questions like his procedural 

challenge. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The Administrative Procedure Act, in his view, is 

irrelevant to his ability to challenge Judge Brown’s participation in his appeal before the 

Board.

We need not wade into this battle of competing statutes. That’s because SalomonGuillen’s challenge is proper even if the Administrative Procedure Act governs. If (as the 

government asserts) the regulation at issue rests partly on § 301, it still affects SalomonGuillen’s rights, which his challenge to Judge Brown’s appointment would vindicate.

“Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to 

follow their own procedures.” Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974). Thus, “one under 

investigation with a view to deportation is legally entitled to insist upon the observance of 

rules promulgated by the [Attorney General] pursuant to law.” Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 

135, 153 (1945) (quoting United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 

(1923)). Because the rules governing removal proceedings “are designed to protect the 

interests of the alien and to afford him due process of law,” id. at 152, immigrants subject 

to removal proceedings can properly argue that the proceedings against them are 

procedurally flawed.

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The Fifth Circuit has applied Bridges to permit a petitioner to challenge the 

appointment of temporary Board members. Mboba v. Garland, No. 21-60416, 2023 WL 

4836671, at *8 (5th Cir. July 27, 2023); see also Carreon v. Garland, 71 F.4th 247, 252–

53 (5th Cir. 2023) (rejecting the government’s argument that the appointment regulation 

governed internal agency procedures and concluding that a petitioner could challenge the 

authority of a temporary Board member as ultra vires). We agree, and therefore proceed 

to the merits of Salomon-Guillen’s challenge.

B.

Before engaging with Salomon-Guillen’s argument, we briefly sketch out the 

process for appointing temporary Board members.

The Board of Immigration Appeals is a creature of regulation. See Miscellaneous 

Amendments to Chapter, 23 Fed. Reg. 9115, 9117 (Nov. 26, 1958). Those regulations 

provide for the appointment of both permanent and temporary Board members. See 8 

C.F.R. § 1003.1. 

The version of § 1003.1 in effect when Salomon-Guillen’s appeal was decided 

authorized the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review to designate 

current and retired immigration judges and Board members “to act as temporary Board 

members for terms not to exceed six months.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(4) (2022). This 

provision also allowed the Director, “with the approval of the Deputy Attorney General,” 

to “designate one or more senior [Executive Office for Immigration Review] attorneys” to 

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“act as temporary Board members for terms not to exceed six months.”3

 Id. Temporary 

Board members could fully participate in deciding cases but couldn’t vote in “any matter 

decided by the Board en banc” or vote to designate a Board opinion as precedential. Id.; 

id. § 1003.1(g)(3).

Although the Board and the position of temporary Board member were created by 

regulation, the Attorney General by statute has

such authorities and functions under . . . all . . . laws relating to the 

immigration and naturalization of aliens as were exercised by the Executive

Office for Immigration Review, or by the Attorney General with respect to 

the Executive Office for Immigration Review, on the day before the effective 

date of the Immigration Reform, Accountability and Security Enhancement 

Act of 2002.

8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(1).4

 The Attorney General has broad power to delegate authority when 

he “determines [the delegation] to be necessary for carrying out” his responsibilities under 

§ 1103. Id. § 1103(g)(2).

3 The Attorney General appoints the Director of the Executive Office for 

Immigration Review. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a). Until earlier this year, the regulation at issue 

in this case allowed the Director to appoint temporary Board members. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.1(a)(4) (2022). In practice, however, the Attorney General appointed them himself. 

Expanding the Size of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 89 Fed. Reg. at 22632. The 

regulation now reflects that the Attorney General makes the appointments. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.1(a)(4) (2024).

4 Congress never enacted the Immigration Reform, Accountability and Security 

Enhancement Act of 2002, which Salomon-Guillen claims matters when considering the 

validity of Judge Brown’s reappointment. As we explain, his argument is wrong. 

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C.

The Attorney General appointed Judge Brown (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(1)) for a 

six-month term and then reappointed her to three more consecutive terms. SalomonGuillen argues that Judge Brown couldn’t continue serving as a temporary Board member 

after her first six-month term expired. He relies on the version of the temporary Board 

member regulation in effect when his administrative appeal was decided, which stated that 

Temporary Appellate Immigration Judges may serve “for terms not to exceed six months.” 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(4) (2022).

We reject this argument. 

1.

To begin, the regulation in force when Salomon-Guillen appealed to the Board 

didn’t apply to the Attorney General.5

 By its express terms, the provision described how 

the Executive Office for Immigration Review Director could appoint temporary Board 

members. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(4) (2022). As three of our sister circuits have held, nothing 

in the regulation’s text limits the Attorney General’s independent statutory power to 

delegate his authority under the immigration laws, as he did when he appointed Judge 

5 The government raised this argument for the first time in a Rule 28(j) letter. 

Although we normally don’t consider arguments raised in this posture, we “deviate from 

this rule in appropriate circumstances.” United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185, 191 (4th 

Cir. 2022). We do so here, because (1) the Rule 28(j) letter directed our attention to an 

opinion issued after the government’s brief was filed, (2) the opinion bears directly on the 

issue before us, (3) Salomon-Guillen responded to the letter and provided his argument on 

the significance of the case discussed, (4) the factual issues are fully developed, and (5) the 

legal analysis the letter raises is straightforward. See United States v. Holness, 706 F.3d 

579, 592–93 (4th Cir. 2013).

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Brown under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g). Bernardo-De La Cruz v. Garland, 114 F.4th 883, 891–

92 (7th Cir. 2024); Punin v. Garland, 108 F.4th 114, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2024); Rivera v. 

Garland, 108 F.4th 600, 606 (8th Cir. 2024).

Salomon-Guillen notes that the Attorney General cited § 1103(g)(1) when he 

appointed Judge Brown. That section grants the Attorney General the powers that “were 

exercised by the Executive Office for Immigration Review . . . on the day before the 

effective date of the Immigration Reform, Accountability and Security Enhancement Act 

of 2002.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(1). Because that act failed to pass, Salomon-Guillen suggests 

that (g)(1) never took effect. 

Even if Salomon-Guillen is right about the validity of § 1103(g)(1) (a question we 

don’t decide here), his argument still fails. Salomon-Guillen ignores that Congress 

separately gave the Attorney General the power to “delegate . . . authority” that the 

Attorney General “determines to be necessary for carrying out” his statutory powers. 8 

U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2). Salomon-Guillen doesn’t challenge the Attorney General’s authority 

over removal cases or the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and we have no

trouble concluding that the Attorney General could delegate that authority to Judge Brown 

under § 1103(g)(2). Punin, 108 F.4th at 128–29; Bernardo-De La Cruz, 114 F.4th at 892.

2.

We could end our analysis there. But even if we indulged Salomon-Guillen and 

supposed that the Attorney General was bound by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(4), we would reject 

Salomon-Guillen’s interpretation of that regulation. 

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According to Salomon-Guillen, the word “terms” in the regulation is plural because 

it modifies “temporary Board members,” which is itself plural. In his view, we shouldn’t 

infer that temporary Board members’ terms are renewable simply based on the use of the 

plural word “terms.” The problem for Salomon-Guillen is that the inference he would have 

us draw is inconsistent with the broad delegation authority granted to the Attorney General 

under § 1103(g)(2).

Salomon-Guillen next points to the separate regulation providing for the

appointment of temporary immigration judges, which expressly allows such judges to be 

appointed to “renewable terms not to exceed six months.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(e)(1) (2021). 

The contrast between the two regulations, says Salomon-Guillen, means that the Attorney 

General’s ability to appoint temporary Board members isn’t coextensive with his power to 

appoint temporary immigration judges.

Applying our “standard tools of interpretation,” that is, the text, structure, history, 

and purpose of § 1003.1(a)(4), we do not agree that omission of “renewable” from the 

temporary Board member provision makes a difference. Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 

573, 575 (2019).

Start with the text. The regulation applicable to Salomon-Guillen’s administrative 

appeal authorized the appointment of “temporary Board members for terms not to exceed 

six months.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(4) (2022). This language doesn’t restrict the power to 

appoint the same person to multiple consecutive terms. As a sister circuit has aptly noted, 

“[t]here is no ambiguity in the text of the regulation; it simply does not address the issue 

of additional terms.” Rivera, 108 F.4th at 606.

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The structure, too, runs contrary to Salomon-Guillen’s position. Although the 

regulation permitted temporary Board members to participate in cases warranting threemember panels, the time limit for disposing of such cases was 180 days (about six months), 

which could be extended. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(8)(i)–(ii) (2022). It would make no sense 

for the regulation to allow temporary Board members to participate in cases assigned to 

three-member panels but require their service to conclude before those cases might be 

decided.

Resisting this view, Salomon-Guillen points to the history of the regulations 

authorizing temporary immigration judges and temporary Board members. But that history 

supports the government’s reading of the regulations.

The temporary Board member provision was enacted first. In its original form, the 

regulation authorized the appointment of temporary Board members “for whatever time 

. . . deem[ed] necessary.” Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of Immigration 

Appeals; Designation of Judges, 53 Fed. Reg. 1,659, 1,660 (May 3, 1988). For reasons not 

stated in the record, it was later changed to limit temporary Board members’ terms to six 

months. Board of Immigration Appeals: En Banc Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31890. 

Even so, agency practice reveals that the terms of temporary Board members have 

been routinely renewed beyond the first six-month term. See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of 

Pub. Affs., Attorney General Holder Appoints New Member to the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (Aug. 3, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-appointsnew-member-board-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/6LMY-ZTJV] (stating that 

Judge John H. Guendelsberger served as a temporary Board member from May 2007 until 

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July 2009); Press Release, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., EOIR Swears in Eight Immigration 

Judges (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pr/eoir-swears-eight-immigrationjudges [https://perma.cc/HE5S-545N] (stating that Judge Elise Manuel served as a 

temporary Board member from 2012 until 2016).

The Attorney General promulgated the temporary immigration judge provision at 

issue in 2014. Designation of Temporary Immigration Judges, 79 Fed. Reg. 39953, 39956

(July 11, 2014). And it’s true that the text allows for the appointment of eligible individuals 

“to act as temporary immigration judges for renewable six-month terms.” Id. at 39,954 

(emphasis added). But we reject the notion that by enacting this regulation, the Attorney 

General intended to undo decades of agency practice as to the appointment of temporary 

Board members. Indeed, had the Attorney General done so without explanation or 

justification, his actions would likely have been arbitrary and capricious. See Bedford 

Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Health & Hum. Servs., 769 F.2d 1017, 1022 (4th Cir. 1985).

In fact, the recent amendment of the temporary Board member provision 

underscores that the Attorney General always intended for the terms of temporary Board 

members to be renewable. The amendment’s preamble explains that it was the long-held

understanding of the agency that temporary Board members’ terms were renewable and 

that the addition of the term “renewable” to the regulation was “in the interest of clarity.” 

Expanding the Size of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 89 Fed. Reg. 22630, 22631 (Apr. 

2, 2024). This clarifying amendment only confirms our view of the relevant history. 

We conclude that the version of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(4) in effect when SalomonGuillen appealed to the Board didn’t apply to the Attorney General or otherwise limit his

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ability to appoint temporary Board members. And we hold that this regulation authorized 

Judge Brown’s reappointment as a temporary Board member in any event. See Carreon, 

71 F.4th at 253–54 (rejecting an argument that § 1003.1(a)(4) prevents a temporary Board 

member from serving multiple terms); Brito v. Garland, 40 F.4th 548, 553 (7th Cir. 2022) 

(same). 

It follows that Judge Brown could lawfully participate in the adjudication of 

Salomon-Guillen’s case.6

III.

Next, we consider whether we may review the Board’s denial of Salomon-Guillen’s 

application for an inadmissibility waiver. We may not.

An otherwise inadmissible alien can obtain a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 

U.S.C. § 1182(h). To obtain such a waiver, the applicant must show “to the satisfaction of 

the Attorney General” that “denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to [his] 

United States citizen . . . spouse, parent, son, or daughter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). 

6 Salomon-Guillen also challenges the policy implications of our conclusion, 

complaining that authorizing renewable terms “would make [temporary Board] members 

far more susceptible to political pressures from within the department.” Pet’r’s Br. at 17. 

But to the extent that someone might be inclined to curry favor with the Attorney General 

to secure a temporary Board member appointment, that’s as likely to happen before the 

first appointment as it is during reappointments. In any event, we must look at the 

regulation’s “plain meaning,” not matters of policy. BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 593 

U.S. 230, 246 (2021).

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Additionally, the applicant must show that he merits a discretionary waiver. See Boggala 

v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 563, 570 (4th Cir. 2017).

We lack jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under 

[§] 1182(h).” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). But we retain jurisdiction to consider 

“constitutional claims or questions of law.” Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

The Board reviewed the immigration judge’s findings de novo and concluded that 

Salomon-Guillen failed to show “that his waiver of inadmissibility should be granted as a 

matter of discretion” given the equities of the case. J.A. 7. That conclusion is a 

discretionary determination over which we lack jurisdiction.

Salomon-Guillen argues that the jurisdictional bar does not matter. He says that the 

“extreme hardship” requirement is a statutory eligibility requirement that presents a 

reviewable mixed question of law and fact. See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 

227 (2020) (“questions of law” include “mixed questions of law and fact” like whether 

given facts satisfy a legal standard).

He contends that, if we were to agree with him that he proved extreme hardship, 

then the satisfaction of the requirement would be a positive equity that the Board would 

need to consider on remand when choosing to exercise its discretion. He relies on language 

from a Board opinion suggesting that an extreme hardship finding is a “favorable 

discretionary factor to be considered” when weighing the merits of an application for an 

inadmissibility waiver. Mendez-Moralez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 296, 301 (B.I.A. 1996) (en banc).

Salomon-Guillen’s reliance on Mendez-Moralez is misplaced. The language he 

cites, in context, shows that the Board need not make an extreme hardship finding to deny 

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an inadmissibility waiver application on discretionary grounds. That is, while extreme 

hardship may be a “favorable” factor, “an application for discretionary relief, including a 

waiver under [8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)], may be denied in the exercise of discretion without 

express rulings on the question of statutory eligibility.” Id.; see Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 

328, 332 (2022) (explaining that an immigration judge “need not address eligibility at all” 

if he or she would still deny a request for relief as a matter of discretion).

Salomon-Guillen would have us direct the Board to make an express ruling on 

extreme hardship in every case, since failing to do so could impact the equities of a 

discretionary denial. Thisreading of Mendez-Moralez proves too much and renders hollow 

the decision’s own holding that express findings on extreme hardship are not necessary. 

See Henry v. Mukasey, 264 F. App’x 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting the argument that the 

Board was “required to determine whether . . . removal would create an extreme 

hardship . . . in order to weigh all the relevant equities”).

Whether assessing extreme hardship or weighing the equities of removal to make a 

discretionary decision, the Board considers the same record. In this light, the only reason 

that an express extreme hardship finding could matter as to the discretionary analysis is 

that it bears the label “extreme.” At bottom, then, Salomon-Guillen’s argument goes to the 

weight that the Board gave to his evidence, which “presents a garden-variety abuse of 

discretion argument . . . that does not amount to a legal question.” Cobos-Gonzales v. U.S. 

Att’y Gen., 542 F. App’x 772, 774–75 (11th Cir. 2013).

Salomon-Guillen hasn’t raised a “constitutional claim[] or question[] of law.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). He directly challenges the Board’s discretionary decision not to 

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grant him an inadmissibility waiver based on the equities of his case. Because the Board 

denied Salomon-Guillen’s application as a “matter of grace,” we have no power to review 

that decision. Patel, 596 U.S. at 332; see Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 n.4 

(2024) (explaining that, since cancellation of removal is discretionary, an immigration 

judge’s ultimate decision on cancellation “is not reviewable as a question of law”).

IV.

For these reasons, we deny the petition for review as to Salomon-Guillen’s 

challenge to the procedural validity of the Board’s action and dismiss the rest of the 

petition.

PETITION DENIED IN PART

AND DISMISSED IN PART

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