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Parties Involved:
La Taberna Del Alabardero, Inc.
Appellee
Valerie Rheinstein
Appellant
Catherine Schuchart
Appellant

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 1, 2004 Decided April 20, 2004

No. 03–7105

CATHERINE SCHUCHART AND

VALERIE RHEINSTEIN,

APPELLANTS

v.

LA TABERNA DEL ALABARDERO, INC.,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv01166)

Rodney R. Sweetland III argued the cause and filed the

briefs for appellants.

Daniel R. Lanier argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: RANDOLPH, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The disposition of this appeal depends on the proper application of District of Columbia

common law. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304

U.S. 64 (1938). Although the District of Columbia has long

recognized the common law tort of invasion of privacy and

relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ formulation in

‘‘determining the appropriate contours of a cause of action for

invasion of that right,’’ Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, 492 A.2d

580, 587 (D.C. 1985); see Restatement § 652A (1977), District

of Columbia law is ‘‘genuinely uncertain,’’ see Dial A Car, Inc.

v. Transp., Inc., 132 F.3d 743, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1998), concerning whether, under the constituent tort of intrusion upon

seclusion, a business may be held liable when it discloses to a

third person its customer’s credit card information or details

about its patrons’ dining habits. Because, under the circumstances, it would be inappropriate for this court to speculate

on a matter of ‘‘local doctrine,’’ East v. Graphic Arts Indus.

Joint Pension Trust, 107 F.3d 911, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(quoting Delahanty v. Hinckley, 845 F.2d 1069, 1070 (D.C.

Cir. 1988)), we certify several questions of law to the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals.

This appeal is before the court following the grant of

judgment on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Thus,

the facts on appeal are those alleged in the complaint, which

must be read in the light most favorable to the non-moving

parties, here appellants, granting them all reasonable inferences. See Henthorn v. Dept. of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 684 (D.C.

Cir. 1994). On January 31, 2003, appellants Catherine Schuchart and Valerie Rheinstein, who are residents and citizens of

Virginia, ate lunch at appellee restaurant La Taberna del

Alabardero in Washington, D.C. Schuchart paid for the

lunch with her personal credit card. On or about February 3,

2003, Taberna provided a copy of Schuchart’s credit card

receipt to appellants’ employer, Mauro Mujica, without appellants’ consent. This receipt contained confidential, personal

financial information. The dissemination of this information

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was highly offensive to them. They were injured by the

disclosure of the financial information and the details about

their dining habits. Invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1332, they sued

appellee Taberna, with each seeking $250,000 in compensatory damages, and $500,000 in punitive damages. Although

appellants’ complaint generally alleged the tort of invasion of

privacy, in opposing Taberna’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings, appellants simply argued that they had pleaded

one of the four invasion of privacy torts, intrusion upon

seclusion. The district court ruled that if there was any

intrusion into appellants’ seclusion, it was perpetrated not by

appellee Taberna, but by their employer, who is not named as

a defendant, and granted appellee’s motion for judgment

under Rule 12(c).

Appellants contend on appeal that ‘‘[t]he pleadings alone in

this case do not foreclose the possibility as a matter of law

there was an intrusion into [appellants’] zone [of privacy],’’

Appellants’ Br. at 12, and the district court therefore erred in

granting judgment in favor of appellee Taberna, because a

Rule 12(c) motion, like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, should be

granted only where ‘‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.’’ Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45–46 (1957). First, they maintain their employer, to whom

the confidential personal information was provided, and appellee Taberna are jointly liable for the intrusion upon their

seclusion. Citing Leiken v. Wilson, 445 A.2d 993, 999 (D.C.

1982), for the proposition that any single joint tortfeasor may

be sued for the full amount of a plaintiff’s injuries, and their

motion to disqualify, which argued that a reasonable defense

attorney would seek to join appellants’ employer as a third

party defendant, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a), they argue the

district court erred in dismissing for failure to sue the proper

party. Second, they maintain that the disclosures of both

confidential personal financial information and their dining

habits fall within the bounds of the tort. They argue that the

nature of the Taberna restaurant rebuts any notion that they

did not enjoy a zone of privacy while dining there. Appellants also maintain that the district court abused its discretion

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in failing to grant them leave to amend their complaint, an

issue we do not reach because the need for amendment

hinges on whether, under District of Columbia law, appellants

have stated a claim for intrusion upon seclusion or another

common law tort. Similarly, although appellee Taberna contends on appeal that the complaint fails to state a claim for

intrusion upon seclusion because it did not allege sufficient

facts to establish the tort’s first two elements, consistent with

the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), the

complaint is sufficient, see Warren v. District of Columbia,

353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004), depending on District of

Columbia law, insofar as the elements of intrusion and seclusion are implicit in appellants’ claims that Taberna disclosed

confidential personal information to their employer without

their consent.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B sets forth three

elements for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion: ‘‘[1] One

who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, [2] upon

the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or

concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his

privacy, [3] if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a

reasonable person.’’ The leading case in this jurisdiction on

intrusion upon seclusion is Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1214

(D.C. 1989). In describing the kinds of intrusions this tort

seeks to redress, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in

Wolf illustrated circumstances where a defendant’s liability

rested on an investigation or examination that offensively

pried into a plaintiff’s zone of privacy. For instance, liability

could exist for: peeping through windows at a location where

the plaintiff secluded herself; opening personal mail; eavesdropping on personal conversations; searching personal belongings without permission; and examining the plaintiff’s

private bank account. Id. at 1217–18. Addressing a claim

based on the use of publicly known or accessible information

in the preparation of a magazine article that the plaintiff

sought to discourage, the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals explained:

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This tort [of intrusion upon seclusion] was not created to protect against TTT the garnering of information from third parties, and the culling of facts from

public records. Gathering information about [the

plaintiff] from third parties, ‘‘even if pursued using

subterfuge and fraud, cannot constitute TTT an intrusion upon [the plaintiff’s] solitude or seclusion. The

Court has found no authority, nor has [the plaintiff]

cited any, which suggests the contrary.’’

Id. at 1218 (quoting Rifkin v. Esquire Publishing, 8 Media L.

Rptr. (BNA) 1384, 1386 (C.D. Cal. 1982)).

Notwithstanding Wolf’s guidance that a party requesting

information is not subject to tort liability, the opinion does not

settle the question of whether liability exists for a third party

who discloses information lawfully obtained but which may be

impliedly limited to use for only certain purposes, such as to

secure payment for a purchase. Although courts applying

state common law have found defendants liable for invasion of

privacy where they exceeded the scope of a plaintiff’s implied

limited consent, see, e.g., O’Brien v. Papa Gino’s of America,

Inc., 780 F.2d 1067, 1072 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying New

Hampshire law); see also David A. Elder, The Law of Privacy § 2:12, at 72 (1991), the states are far from unanimous

about whether the intrusion upon seclusion tort encompasses

not only wrongful procurement of information, see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, cmt. b, illus. 4 (recommending tort liability for a party who uses a forged court

order to obtain a plaintiff’s bank records), but also its wrongful disclosure (e.g., holding a bank liable for disclosing financial records to a third party not engaging in deceit). Cf.

Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy

§ 5.10(A)(1) & n.9 (1993). Some courts reject intrusion upon

seclusion liability in such circumstances, although they may

identify other torts, such as breach of a confidential relationship, that protect against, for instance, the disclosure of

information voluntarily given by a plaintiff to the disclosing

party. This was the case where a doctor disclosed a birth

mother’s identity to her child, whom she had given up for

adoption decades earlier. See Humphers v. First Interstate

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Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 532–33 (Or. 1985). Others take the

opposite approach, holding disclosing parties liable where

their handling of information exceeds the implied limited

consent given by the plaintiff. For instance, an employer

could be held liable for intrusion upon seclusion where it used

its employees’ confidential medical information to purchase

insurance policies payable to the employer upon an employee’s death. See Rice v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 2003 DNH

166, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17288 at *9–10 (applying New

Hampshire law) (unpublished); see also Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1008 (N.H. 2003); Pulla v. Amoco

Oil Co., 882 F. Supp. 836, 867 (S.D. Iowa 1994), aff’d in part

& rev’d in part on other grounds, 72 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1995)

(applying Iowa law). In either approach, the scope of any

implied consent may turn on local or general custom as well

as the conduct of the parties. See Elder, § 2:12 at 68.

In Wolf, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated

that ‘‘the acquisition of information is not a requisite element

of a § 652B [intrusion upon seclusion] cause of action. Rather, it is the nature of the intrusion which initially fixes

liability.’’ 553 A.2d at 1217 (citations omitted). It is conceivable, then, that the disclosure of private information to a third

party recipient already in possession of the information may

inform whether the disclosing party is liable, because the

third party’s preexisting state of knowledge may affect the

‘‘nature of the intrusion.’’ On the other hand, it is conceivable

that, because a plaintiff’s legal injury is not limited to harm

suffered indirectly as a result of an intrusion but also includes

the intrusion itself, a defendant disclosing information without

consent should not be shielded from liability merely because

the recipient of the information happens already to have come

into possession of the same information. Cf. Sutherland v.

Kroger Co., 110 S.E. 2d 716, 724 (W. Va. 1959); Terrell v.

Rowsey, 647 N.E. 2d 662, 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (Sullivan,

J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). In light of the

district court proceedings, it appears the effect of appellants’

employer’s possible prior knowledge of Schuchart’s credit

card information could become relevant.

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Given the differing positions of the states concerning these

common law issues, it is unclear what approach the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals would endorse. See Nationwide

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 270 F.3d 948, 956 (D.C. Cir.

2001). This is especially so with respect to appellant Schuchart’s claim based on the disclosure of her personal financial

information, which is an area that some courts have singled

out for especially vigilant protection in light of the vast social

cost inflicted by identity theft. See, e.g., Remsburg, 816 A.2d

at 1008. Further, state courts are not unanimous on the

question of whether a restaurant’s disclosure of its patrons’

dining habits is actionable under the intrusion upon seclusion

tort. Cf. Stessman v. American Black Hawk Broadcasting

Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa 1987). The question of

whether businesses are legally bound to protect a customer’s

privacy interests arising from the payment for goods or

services is likely to recur.

Because the degree of protection afforded privacy interests

like those at issue is a matter of public importance, see

Richardson, 270 F.3d at 950; see also Joy v. Bell Helicopter

Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 563–64 (D.C. Cir. 1993), in which

the District of Columbia has a substantial interest in balancing the individual and societal interests, see Eli Lilly & Co. v.

Home Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 876, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and

involves likely recurring questions of local common law that

are appropriately resolved by the District of Columbia’s

highest court, see Richardson, 270 F.3d at 950; Delahanty,

845 F.2d at 1070, the court exercises its discretion, see Joy,

999 F.2d at 563 (citing Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386,

391 (1974)), to certify, pursuant to D.C. Code § 11–723, the

following questions of law to the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals: Under District of Columbia law, does a customer

state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, or another common

law tort, where (1) a business discloses without consent a

customer’s personal credit card information to a third party

not involved in processing payment (specifically, the customer’s employer), and does the result differ if the credit card

information is disclosed to a party who already possesses that

information, and (2) a restaurant discloses to a third party the

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dining habits of a patron without the patron’s consent? An

appropriate order will issue.

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