Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00232/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00232-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leo Robert Ayers
Defendant
County of Merced
Defendant
John L. Fagundes
Defendant
Richard Graves
Defendant
John Herrell
Defendant
George Jercich
Plaintiff
Deidre Kelsey
Defendant
Leon Martinez
Defendant
William Nicholsen
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE JERCICH,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MERCED, JOHN

HERRELL, DEIDRE KELSEY, JOHN

L. FAGUNDES, LEON MARTINEZ,

WILLIAM NICHOLSEN, LEO ROBERT

AYERS, and RICHARD GRAVES;

DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

1:06-CV-00232 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R.

CIV. P. 41(b)

1. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on Defendants’ motion to

dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Plaintiff filed a

complaint on May 11, 2006 alleging a conspiracy by Defendants to

violate his constitutional rights. On October 4, 2006 the court

granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with

leave to amend. Plaintiff was given 20 days to amend his

complaint and, to date, has failed to do so. Defendants now move

for dismissal with prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to

prosecute. 

2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on February 28, 2006. 

(Doc. 1, Complaint.) On May 11, 2006 Defendants filed a motion

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to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc.

13, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.) Plaintiff failed to oppose

the motion. 

On August 7, 2006 Plaintiff made an appearance at the

hearing on the motion to dismiss and made a motion to continue

the hearing claiming that he could not properly oppose the

motion. Over Defendants’ objections the court granted the

motion. As a result, the hearing on the motion was continued to

November 6, 2006 so that Plaintiff could file his opposition. 

Plaintiff was ordered to file his opposition by October 9, 2006. 

On October 3, 2006 the court received a letter from

Plaintiff requesting an additional 30 days to file his opposition

citing health reasons for his inability to oppose the motion. On

October 4, 2006 the court granted Plaintiff an additional 30 days

to file his opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc.

28, Order.) As a result of the extension, the hearing on the

motion to dismiss was again rescheduled from November 6, 2006 to

December 11, 2006. (Id.) 

In spite of the extension, Plaintiff did not file an

opposition to the motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was

granted with leave to amend on December 19, 2006. (Doc. 32,

Memorandum Decision and Order.) Plaintiff was given 20 days from

the date of the Order to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff

did not file his amended complaint by the 20 day deadline and did

not petition the court for an extension of time. 

On January 18, 2007 Defendants filed this motion to dismiss

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Plaintiff has not filed an

opposition to the motion and has yet to file his amended

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complaint. 

The court learned of a motion for continuance by Plaintiff

from Defendants’ moving papers. According to Defendants, on

January 12, 2007 Plaintiff faxed Defendants a motion for

continuance to file his amended complaint. However, Plaintiff

did not file this motion with the court and the motion is nowhere

to be found in the record. The court was given a copy of the

motion by Defendants the week before the hearing on this matter. 

Plaintiff has yet to formally file this motion for continuance

with the court. 

This motion was heard in open court on April 2, 2007. 

Plaintiff did not appear for the hearing on this motion. 

3. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that, “[f]or

failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with [the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or any order of court, a

defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim

against the defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

District courts have inherent power to control their

dockets. In the exercise of that power they may impose

sanctions including, where appropriate, default or

dismissal. Dismissal, however, is so harsh a penalty it

should be imposed as a sanction only in extreme

circumstances. [Courts] have repeatedly upheld the

imposition of the sanction of dismissal for failure to

comply with pretrial procedures mandated by local rules

and court orders. However, because dismissal is such a

severe remedy, [courts] have allowed its imposition in

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... circumstances only after requiring the district court

to weigh several factors: 

(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of

litigation; 

(2) the court’s need to manage its docket; 

(3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; 

(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on

their merits[;] and 

(5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.

Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th

Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).

“[W]hen a plaintiff fails to amend his complaint after the

district judge dismisses the complaint with leave to amend, the

dismissal is typically considered a dismissal for failing to

comply with a court order rather than for failing to prosecute

the claim.” Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 986

(9th Cir. 1999.)

Yourish (and Ferdik [v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir.

1992]) can be understood as limited to circumstances in which the

plaintiff did not... give the court “notice of intent not to file

an amended complaint,” but instead simply failed to take any

action. Yourish and Ferdik both arose when plaintiffs, given the

opportunity to amend or be dismissed, did nothing. In that

situation, resources continue to be consumed by a case sitting idly

on the court’s docket. The failure of the plaintiff eventually to

respond to the court’s ultimatum -- either by amending the

complaint or by indicating to the court that it will not do so --

is properly met with the sanction of a Rule 41(b) dismissal....

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Hence we understand the Ferdik-Yourish rule to require a threatened

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal to ferment into a Rule 41(b) dismissal only

upon a plaintiff’s inaction. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d

1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

4. DISCUSSION

Under the first factor, “the public’s interest in

expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” 

Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990. The Plaintiff filed his complaint on

February 28, 2006. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged a

conspiracy in violation of constitutional rights that dates back

to 2002. It has now been four years since the alleged conspiracy

and one year since the filing of his complaint. Plaintiff has

done nothing for ten months, despite three opportunities and

extension of time. A public interest exists in the expeditious

resolution of this matter. 

Under the second factor, a court should “determine what

period of delay can be endured before its docket becomes

unmanageable.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 400

(9th Cir. 1998)(quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423

(9th Cir. 1986)). “It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its

docket without being subject to routine noncompliance of

litigants....” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir.

2002). A plaintiff may not cause “the action to come to a

complete halt” and “control the pace of the docket rather than

the Court.” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990. In this case, there have

been several delays imposed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff first failed

to oppose Defendants motion to dismiss on Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) grounds. The court, not having heard from plaintiff,

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scheduled a hearing on the initial motion to dismiss. Plaintiff

appeared at the motion and was given an extension of time to file

his opposition. As a result, the hearing on the motion to

dismiss was rescheduled. Shortly before the deadline for filing

his opposition, Plaintiff then requested an additional 30 days to

file his opposition. The court granted him the further extension

and again rescheduled a hearing on the motion. In spite of these

extensions, Plaintiff never filed an opposition to the motion to

dismiss. Plaintiff has also failed to amend his complaint, has

failed to oppose the current motion to dismiss, and did not

appear at the hearing of this motion. .

Under the third factor, “[t]he law presumes injury from

unreasonable delay. However, this presumption of prejudice is a

rebuttable one ....” Moneymaker v. CoBen (In re Eisen), 31 F.3d

1447, 1452-1453 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A weak excuse [by the plaintiff for his delay] may

suffice if there has been no prejudice; an exceedingly

good one might still do even when there has been some.

Thus, delay alone should not be deemed to create a

presumption of prejudice, save in the sense that if the

plaintiff proffers no pleading or presents no proof on

the issue of (reasonableness), the defendant wins.

The plaintiff, of course, has the ultimate burden of

persuasion both as to the excuse for his own delay and as

to lack of prejudice to the defendant.

Nealey v. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S.A., 662 F.2d 1275,

1280 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Thus, “the

burden of production shifts to the defendant to show at least

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some actual prejudice,” only “[w]hen a plaintiff has come forth

with an excuse for his delay that is anything but frivolous.” 

Moneymaker, 31 F.3d at 1453. 

Plaintiff has not formally filed pleadings explaining his

delay in prosecuting his case. Plaintiff has not opposed this

motion, did not appear in court, and has not filed his amended

complaint. The court learned of a motion for continuance that

Plaintiff faxed to Defendants on January 12, 2007. In the

document, Plaintiff has cited a litany of reasons for the delay

including health problems, failure to secure an attorney,

insufficient funds to prosecute the case, and accidents he has

suffered since the filing of his complaint. Plaintiff has also

failed to provide the court with any evidence corroborating these

reasons, such as doctor’s declaration or other tangible proof. 

Plaintiff did provide Defendants with an MRI bill totaling

$3,494.00. However, this document, without more, fails to show

that Defendants’ will not be further prejudiced by Plaintiff’s

inaction. The events giving rise to the claims are almost five

years old. 

The fourth factor “usually weighs against dismissal.” Hyde

v. Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1994). The

“policy favoring resolution on the merits ‘is particularly

important in civil rights cases.’” Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 399

(quoting Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally

construe the inartful pleading of pro se litigants. It is

settled law that the allegations of [a pro se litigant’s

complaint] however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent

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standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers ....” 

Eldridge, 832 F.2d at 1137 (brackets in original).

Plaintiff was given the opportunity to file an amended

complaint by January 10, 2007. Plaintiff has yet to file an

amended complaint or any opposition to this motion with the

court. While policy favors resolution of this case on the

merits, Plaintiffs inaction has prevented the case from moving

forward. 

Under the fifth factor: 

[a]lternative sanctions include: “a warning, a formal

reprimand, placing the case at the bottom of the

calendar, a fine, the imposition of costs or attorney

fees, the temporary suspension of the culpable counsel

from practice before the court,... dismissal of the suit

unless new counsel is secured [,]... preclusion of claims

or defenses, or the imposition of fees and costs upon

plaintiff’s counsel... .” Titus v. Mercedes Benz of

North America, 695 F.2d 746, 749 n.6 (3d Cir. 1982). In

addition, “providing plaintiff with a second or third

chance following a procedural default is a ‘lenient

sanction,’ which, when met with further default, may

justify imposition of the ultimate sanction of dismissal

with prejudice.”

Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 132 n.1

(9th Cir. 1987). “[W]arning a plaintiff that failure to obey a

court order will result in dismissal can suffice to meet the

‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement.” Id. at 132. 

However, if there is a willful violation of a pretrial order, a

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“plaintiff can hardly be surprised by a harsh sanction in

response.” Id. at 133. “[A]t least in a case involving

‘egregious circumstances,’” an explicit warning is unnecessary. 

United States use of Wiltec Guam, Inc. v. Kahaluu Constr. Co.,

857 F.2d 600, 604 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff has been given several opportunities to prosecute

the case and relief from his failure to meet deadlines on three

prior occasions. The option to impose an alternative sanction is

unavailable as Plaintiff is pro se. Plaintiff has not contacted

the court, provided no explanation, and has not filed a motion or

request for an extension of time to amend his complaint. The

court learned of his intention to ask for more time from

Defendants. Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to prosecute this

case, defendants are prejudiced by the delay. Any alternative

sanction to dismissal with prejudice is unavailable. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice is GRANTED.

5. CONCLUSION

This motion to dismiss is GRANTED for failure to prosecute. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 23, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

dd0l0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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