Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-30679/USCOURTS-ca5-15-30679-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Narissa Dawn Bradford
Appellant
Law Firm of Gauthier, Houghtaling & Williams, L.L.P.
Appellee
Earl G. Perry
Appellee
James M. Williams
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-30679

Summary Calendar

NARISSA DAWN BRADFORD, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

THE LAW FIRM OF GAUTHIER, HOUGHTALING & WILLIAMS, L.L.P.; 

JAMES M. WILLIAMS, Esquire; EARL G. PERRY, Esquire, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:13-CV-2407

Before KING, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In February 2012, Plaintiff–Appellant Narissa Bradford retained 

Defendants–Appellees Gauthier, Houghtaling & Williams, L.L.P., James 

Williams, and Earl Perry (collectively, “GHW”) to assist in an ongoing civil suit

in an Italian court brought by Bradford against her former companion. After 

the Italian civil suit was unsuccessful, Bradford filed the present pro se action 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 12, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-30679 Document: 00513379537 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/12/2016
No. 15-30679

2

against GHW, alleging that GHW had committed legal malpractice during the 

course of its representation.1 On September 8, 2014, the district court granted 

GHW’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Bradford’s claims with 

prejudice. On May 15, 2015, Bradford filed a Rule 60(b) motion, requesting 

relief from the earlier judgment on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, 

fraud by GHW, and any other reason that justifies relief. The district court 

denied the Rule 60(b) motion, and Bradford timely appeals that denial.2

“[T]he decision to grant or deny relief under Rule 60(b) lies within the 

sound discretion of the district court and will be reversed only for abuse of that 

discretion.” Edwards v. City of Hous., 78 F.3d 983, 995 (5th Cir. 1996) (en 

banc). Bradford argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying 

her relief on the grounds of “newly discovered evidence,” fraud, and “any other 

reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)–(3), (6). We disagree.

First, in order to prevail on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, “a

movant must demonstrate: (1) that [she] exercised due diligence in obtaining 

the information [and] (2) that the evidence is material and controlling and 

clearly would have produced a different result if presented before the original 

judgment.” Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2005) 

 

1 While Bradford’s complaint does not expressly allege a claim for legal malpractice, 

“[a] pro se complaint is to be construed liberally.” Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th 

Cir. 1993). Bradford’s amended complaint relies on certain actions taken, or failures to take 

action, by GHW during its representation of Bradford. Therefore, like the district court, we 

construe her complaint as raising a legal malpractice claim against GHW. See La. Stat. Ann. 

§ 9:5605 (noting that an action for legal malpractice may be “based upon tort, or breach of 

contract, or otherwise”). 

2 Bradford filed her Rule 60(b) motion eight months after the district court entered 

final judgment, and therefore “it did not restart the time limit for filing a timely notice of 

appeal from the dismissal of [her] suit.” Chhim v. Univ. of Hous., 582 F. App’x 406, 406 (5th 

Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). Bradford timely 

appealed the district court’s denial of Rule 60(b) relief, but “an appeal from the denial of Rule 

60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review.” Williams v. Chater, 87 

F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1996). We therefore only consider Bradford’s appeal of the district 

court’s denial of the Rule 60(b) motion.

 Case: 15-30679 Document: 00513379537 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/12/2016
No. 15-30679

3

(quoting Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d 238, 257 (5th Cir. 2003)). In

particular, the movant must have “used due diligence to discover the evidence 

at the time of trial.” Johnson Waste Materials v. Marshall, 611 F.2d 593, 597 

(5th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). Bradford has failed to demonstrate that she 

exercised due diligence because the “newly discovered evidence” consists of 

documents and emails that were in the possession of Marco Chiari, Bradford’s 

Italian counsel (and GHW’s former co-counsel) in the Italian civil suit. 

Bradford has provided no explanation for why she had not previously obtained 

this evidence and expressly stated that she only initiated her investigation into 

the evidence after her claims were dismissed with prejudice.3 The district 

court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under Rule 

60(b)(2).

Second, Bradford alleges that GHW engaged in fraud by withholding 

documents during discovery, and therefore the district court erred by not 

granting relief under Rule 60(b)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) (providing relief 

if an opposing party commits “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or 

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct”). However, the movant must 

establish not only that the adverse party engaged in fraud or other misconduct, 

but that “this misconduct prevented the moving party from fully and fairly 

presenting [her] case.” Hesling, 396 F.3d at 641 (emphasis added). Even if 

GHW had wrongfully withheld documents during discovery,4 Bradford has 

 

3 Moreover, while Bradford relies heavily on an expert report she submitted with her 

Rule 60(b) motion, she previously waived her right to utilize expert testimony, and she has 

not provided any plausible ground for why she did not previously pursue such an expert 

report.

4 Throughout the proceedings below, Bradford repeatedly made conclusory allegations 

that GHW withheld documents during discovery without providing significant evidentiary 

support. See Hesling, 396 F.3d at 641 (“The moving party has the burden of proving the 

misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.”). And, as the district court correctly noted, 

the majority of the “newly discovered evidence” involved emails sent and received by Chiari 

 Case: 15-30679 Document: 00513379537 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/12/2016
No. 15-30679

4

failed to show that she was prevented from presenting her case because she 

could have easily obtained those documents from Chiari. Indeed, attached to 

Bradford’s Rule 60(b) motion were multiple exhibits where Chiari stated that

he still possessed the original documents from the Italian civil suit. 

Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in denying relief under Rule 

60(b)(3).

Finally, Bradford was not entitled to relief for “any other reason that 

justifies relief.”5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Bradford has failed to advance any 

separate ground for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) that is not already covered by

Rule 60(b)(2) and (b)(3). See Hesling, 396 F.2d at 643 (“The reason for relief 

set forth under 60(b)(6) cannot be the reason for relief sought under another 

subsection of 60(b).”); Hess v. Cockerill, 281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2002) 

(“[Rule 60(b)(6)] is a catch-all provision, meant to encompass circumstances not 

covered by Rule 60(b)’s other enumerated provisions.”). 

We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

 

that were not in GHW’s possession, custody, or control. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) (allowing a 

party to request certain items within the “responding party’s possession, custody, or control”). 5 While Bradford contends that the district court failed to address her request for relief 

under Rule 60(b)(6), the district court expressly held that “[Bradford] is not entitled to relief 

from final judgment [under Rule 60(b)(3)] or any other basis.”

 Case: 15-30679 Document: 00513379537 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/12/2016