Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03205/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03205-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian Lawrence
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-3205

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BRIAN LAWRENCE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11-CR-396 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 10, 2014 — DECIDED JUNE 2, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and HAMILTON,

Circuit Judges.

 ROVNER, Circuit Judge. As part of a routine parole compliance check, state parole agents searched convicted felon 

Brian Lawrence’s residence and found cocaine and ammunition. A jury acquitted him of the ammunition charge, but 

convicted him of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. 

Lawrence appeals, arguing that the government failed to 

prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that the district 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
2 No. 13-3205

court improperly denied his motion in limine to preclude 

dog-sniff evidence and his motion for a mistrial, that the jury 

instructions were misleading and finally, that his sentence 

was unreasonable. We affirm on all grounds.

 I.

 In addition to regular parole visits, Illinois Department 

of Corrections parole agents also occasionally conduct parole 

compliance checks during which they arrive unannounced 

and search a parolee’s residence. On October 22, 2010, parole 

agents along with Chicago Police Department officers paid 

such an unannounced visit to Lawrence’s residence at 6:40 

a.m. Parole agents Louis Hopkins and James Hollenbeck 

knocked on the front door while another parole agent and 

two police officers, including Officer Lawrence Kerr, remained outside along the perimeter of the house. Lawrence’s 

fiancée, Phyllis Williams, opened the door. Agent Hopkins 

told Williams that they were performing a parole compliance check and were looking for Lawrence. Williams motioned them toward a first-floor bedroom. As the agents 

walked past the door, Agent Hopkins looked up the stairway and saw Lawrence in his underwear and a t-shirt, 

standing at the top of the stairs and beginning his descent 

down. Lawrence informed the officers that his bedroom was 

on the first floor and pointed to the same bedroom that his 

fiancée, Williams, had previously identified. The agents, after handcuffing Lawrence for their safety, decided to survey 

the second-floor area from where Lawrence came. They ascended the stairs to a dimly lit hallway, where, while shining 

their flashlights, they found a drawer on the floor in the 

middle of the hallway. Agent Hollenbeck took a photograph 

of the drawer exactly as he found it at the moment of disCase: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
No. 13-3205 3

covery and the photo showed a plastic box, a box of sandwich bags, numerous other bags containing a white powdery substance, and an amount of currency, later determined 

to be $1,564. The parties stipulated that the white substance 

was 492 grams of a mixture containing cocaine.

 Police officers then took over the investigation, photographing the drawer and taking the defendant and the 

drawer downstairs. Although the agents only had authorization to search areas of the residence under Lawrence’s control, they, along with the police officers, secured the rest of 

the second floor for their safety.1 Officers knocked on the 

remaining bedroom doors and found only sleeping or recently awakened and cooperative residents. They did not 

find any additional contraband, nor did they observe any 

furniture with a missing drawer. 

 In the bedroom that both Lawrence and his fiancée had 

identified as Lawrence’s bedroom, officers found a darkcolored nightstand missing a drawer. The color and trim of 

the drawer found in the hallway matched the nightstand 

and the drawer was the proper fit for the empty space in the 

nightstand. Agent Hopkins also noticed a dusting of white 

powder on top of the nightstand. 

1 Upon his release from prison on parole for first degree murder, Lawrence signed a Parole Compliance Agreement. Under the terms of that 

agreement, Lawrence consented to the search of his person, property, 

and residence during the applicable time period. (Tr. 7/18/12, 9:30 a.m., 

p.56.) (D. Ct. R. 99, p.33) (App. R. 9-2, p.166). In executing a search, officers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their 

own safety and the efficacy of the search. Los Angeles County, v. Rettel, 

550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007).

 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
4 No. 13-3205

 Inside the remaining part of the nightstand, officers 

found multiple pieces of mail with Lawrence’s name on 

them. Under the bed, the officers found a cardboard box 

with papers, including checks for an account with the name 

“Lawrence Construction,” some other correspondence with 

Lawrence’s name, and a shoebox, inside of which they found 

a small box of ammunition. Williams testified that the shoebox belonged to her and contained bullets she had taken 

from her son.

 Upon searching the closet, officers discovered clothing 

and shoes that fit Lawrence and a locked safe. Officers asked 

Lawrence how they could open the safe, but Lawrence initially denied having a combination or key to the safe. Agent 

Hopkins testified that eventually Lawrence agreed to disclose the location of the key if Hopkins would agree to give 

“two stacks” to his “old girl.” Agent Hopkins interpreted 

this as a request that he give $2,000 of the amount in the safe 

to Lawrence’s fiancée, Phyllis Williams. Lawrence subsequently told Agent Hopkins that he could find the key in his 

bedroom closet in the pocket of a white shirt with beige 

stripes, which is precisely where Hopkins found it. Inside 

the safe, agents and officers found a large sum of money and 

a purple Crown Royal Whiskey bag containing more money, 

the total of which was later determined to be $14,364.

 Officer Kerr testified that he kept the $14,364 recovered 

from the safe isolated from the $1,564 recovered from the 

drawer as the latter had clearly been contaminated with 

drug-related chemicals from its proximity to scales and cocaine. In later controlled testing, a certified drug-detecting 

dog, Achilles, alerted to the scent of drugs on both envelopes 

of currency.

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
No. 13-3205 5

 As for other evidence presented at trial, an expert fingerprint examiner was unable to find any usable fingerprints 

on the ammunition, razor blades, cocaine packaging, or the 

outside of the cocaine-dusted scale. He did find three latent 

fingerprints inside the battery cover of the scale, but they did 

not belong to Lawrence, his fiancée, or anyone else in the 

house. 

 The jury found Lawrence not guilty of count one—

knowingly possessing ammunition that had traveled in interstate commerce after having been previously convicted of 

a crime punishable by one year (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(2) and 

924 (e)(1)), and guilty on count two—knowingly possessing 

with intent to distribute cocaine. (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)). The 

district court sentenced Lawrence to the lowest sentence recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 262 

months’ imprisonment.

 II.

 A.

 Lawrence appeals five distinct issues, arguing first that 

the jury verdict should be overturned because the government failed to prove Lawrence guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. When asked to overturn a jury verdict, we must view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

and reverse only if the record is devoid of any evidence from 

which any rational jury could find guilt. U.S. v. Pereira, 783 

F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2015); U.S. v. Miller, 782 F.3d 793, 797 

(7th Cir. 2015). This is a momentous task and has been described as anything from “extremely difficult” to “a nearly 

insurmountable hurdle.” See, e.g., Miller, 782 F.3d at 797; 

U.S. v. Parker, 716 F.3d 999, 1007 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 134 S. 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
6 No. 13-3205

Ct. 532 (2013). Under this standard, we neither weigh evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as those tasks 

are for the trier of fact. U.S. v. Sewell, 780 F.3d 839, 847 (7th 

Cir. 2015).

 Lawrence argues that the jury had insufficient evidence 

to find that he possessed the crack cocaine. We conclude, 

however, that the jury had more than sufficient evidence before it to conclude just that. Lawrence presents a number of 

instances of conflicting evidence in his recitation of the facts. 

For example, he points to the fact that one agent thought 

Phyllis Williams took several minutes to open the door, 

while another agent testified that he did not think it took a 

suspiciously long time. One agent testified that Williams 

pointed to a bathroom when asked where Lawrence could 

be found; another agent testified that she pointed to a bedroom. One agent testified that Lawrence was walking down 

the stairs when he first saw him; the other agent reported 

that they met him at the base of the stairs. None of these discrepancies is significant (and most are not discrepancies at 

all, but rather a matter of viewpoint). As we just discussed, 

when reviewing a decision for sufficiency of the evidence we 

must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the government. U.S. v. Yu Tian Li, 615 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 

2010). But even if we were to consider the varying accounts, 

none of it conflicts with the verdict in any significant manner, and certainly not in a manner that would cause us to 

conclude that no rational jury could have made the finding 

that it did.2

2 The only materially conflicting testimony came from Lawrence’s fiancée Williams who testified that another resident of the house, Reginald 

Camphor, spontaneously announced to the police that the drugs and 

 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
No. 13-3205 7

 Because Lawrence was not caught actually holding or 

carrying the drugs, this case is one in which the government 

had to prove constructive possession. Constructive possession is a legal fiction in which a person is deemed to possess 

contraband even without immediate physical control of the 

object. U.S. v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2012). To 

prove constructive possession, the government must establish that the defendant knowingly had both the power and 

intention to exercise dominion and control over the object, 

either directly or through others. Id. at 695. Not only can 

possession be actual or constructive it can also be exclusive 

or joint. U.S. v. Gilbert, 391 F.3d 882, 886 (7th Cir. 2004). Lawrence and his fiancée, therefore, could have jointly possessed 

the contraband found in their bedroom. All forms of possession can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. 

at 886.

 In constructive possession cases the government can 

demonstrate the required nexus between the defendant 

and the contraband by showing either exclusive control or 

a substantial connection to the contraband. Griffin, 684 F.3d 

at 695. If a defendant lives alone in an apartment and a 

search reveals contraband, proving constructive possession 

is relatively easy. When a defendant shares living space 

with others, the proof requires a more exacting approach 

because a court must be careful to separate true possessors 

from mere bystanders. Id. Proximity to contraband or presmoney were his. (Tr. 7/19/12 9:55 a.m., p.364-65) (D. Ct. R. 100, p.829-30) 

(App. R. 9-2, p.474-75). The jury, who heard all of the evidence, was entitled to discredit the hearsay testimony of Camphor as reported through 

the defendant’s fiancée. 

 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
8 No. 13-3205

ence on the property or association with a person in actual 

possession is not enough. Id. at 696.

 This court has recently clarified how we ought to determine the substantial connection question in cases where 

the defendant shares a residence with others. In such an instance, the government must demonstrate a substantial 

connection between the defendant and the contraband. 

Griffin, 684 F.3d at 697. Lawrence, however, would like this 

court to go further. He argues that the government must 

show some unequivocal conduct on the part of the defendant connecting him to the drugs. But this is not what our 

case law requires. Griffin exhaustively examined this circuit’s law on constructive possession in jointly occupied 

properties and boiled it down as follows: “[w]hen a defendant jointly occupies a residence, proof of constructive 

possession of contraband in the residence requires the government to demonstrate a ‘substantial connection’ between 

the defendant and the contraband itself, not just the residence.” Griffin, 684 F.3d at 697. One way to establish such a 

connection is by demonstrating some conduct that links the 

individual to the illegal items, but that is not the only way. 

Id. at 696, 698; U.S. v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 

2009).

 In this case, the government had plenty of evidence 

from which a jury could connect Lawrence to the drugs even 

if he shared the residence with many people and shared his 

bedroom with his fiancée. When the agents knocked on the 

residence door, it took the defendant’s fiancée a longer-thanCase: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
No. 13-3205 9

usual amount of time to open the door.3 The defendant was 

standing at the top of the stairs in his underwear just a few 

feet from the drawer full of cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and 

a large amount of cash. The agent testified that Lawrence 

looked surprised and shocked to see him. Of course, Lawrence would have known that the agents could only search 

the room under his control, as that had been explicitly written into his parole agreement. The evidence painted a picture for the jury of a parolee startled awake by agents at his 

door, purposefully rushing to move contraband to another 

area of the house that he believed was outside of his control.

 Both Lawrence and his fiancée separately identified a 

bedroom on the first floor as the one they shared. Inside the 

room agents and officers found a nightstand adjacent to 

Lawrence’s bed that exactly matched the drawer they had 

seen earlier at the top of the stairs, and that was itself missing a drawer. The nightstand contained multiple pieces of 

mail addressed to Lawrence and bank checks from an account for “Lawrence Construction.” The room also contained clothes and shoes that fit the defendant and a locked 

safe. Lawrence was able to identify the exact location of the 

key that opened that safe. 

3 This is an example of a fact in which the jury could consider the credibility of various witnesses. Agent Hopkins testified that it took Lawrence’s fiancée, Phyllis Williams, several minutes to answer the door. 

Agent Hollenbeck testified that it did not seem like a long or suspicious 

amount of time had passed before Williams opened the door. These facts 

are not necessarily competing, but rather subjective interpretations of the 

events. The jury was entitled to give credence to either description and 

upon review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the facts in 

the light most favorable to the jury verdict. Li, 615 F.3d at 755.

 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
10 No. 13-3205

 These facts easily fall into line with others in which we 

have determined that a defendant had constructive possession of contraband found in a shared residence. See U.S. v. 

Reed, 744 F.3d 519, 526 -27 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 130 

(2014) (finding sufficient evidence of possession where 

drugs were found in the nightstand in the master bedroom 

in a residence shared by several others, where mail with the 

defendant’s name was also found in the nightstand, and 

where the drugs were in close proximity to other personal 

effects like shoes and appointment cards belonging to the 

defendant); U.S. v. Jones, 763 F.3d 777, 799-800 (7th Cir.), vacated, in part, on other grounds, 774 F.3d. 1104 (7th Cir. 2014) 

cert. denied, No. 14-9190, 2015 WL 1539028 (2015) (finding 

sufficient evidence to support a jury finding of constructive 

possession where the defendant’s cell phone and car were 

located at a residence the day of and five days before a raid 

that uncovered crack cocaine in common areas of the house); 

U.S. v. Alanis, 265 F.3d 576, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding sufficient evidence for a jury determination of constructive possession of a gun in a shared bedroom where the police found 

the gun in a nightstand next to the defendant’s bed, with his 

eyeglasses, clothing, and wallet nearby); U.S. v. Richardson, 

208 F.3d 626, 628, 632 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding sufficient evidence for jury determination of constructive possession of a 

gun where the gun was on a bed along with envelopes addressed to the defendant and prescription medications with 

his name and the same address on the labels); U.S. v. Kitchen, 

57 F.3d 516, 519-21 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding sufficient evidence for a jury determination of constructive possession in 

a shared residence where the police found papers and invoices with the defendant’s name next to the gun, along with 

a gold bracelet with his nickname and clothing in his size).

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
No. 13-3205 11

 There was also sufficient evidence that Lawrence trafficked in cocaine. An expert witness in narcotics trafficking 

testified that the quantity of narcotics far exceeded any 

amount one might have for personal use. He concluded that 

the 492 grams of cocaine found in the drawer would allow 

approximately 49,000 people to get high, and he estimated 

the street value at $40,000 to $100,000. He also described 

how the razor blades, scales, and plastic bags found in the 

drawer are all typical tools used to prepare cocaine for distribution. Finally, the expert testified that large amounts of 

cash, like that found in the drawer and safe are associated 

with drug trafficking, as drug sales generate large amounts 

of cash and because suppliers need large amounts to resupply their stock. The locked safe in the bedroom contained 

14,364 drug-contaminated dollars and the drawer contained 

another $1,564. 

 Lawrence argues that the absence of fingerprints on the 

drug evidence indicates that no rational juror could conclude that he possessed the drugs. The fingerprint examiner, 

however, testified that there are many reasons why useful 

fingerprints might not be left on an object.

 Lawrence appears to confuse circumstantial evidence 

with speculation. “A verdict may be rational even if it relies 

solely on circumstantial evidence. The question we must answer is whether each link in the chain of inferences the jury 

constructed is sufficiently strong to avoid a lapse into speculation.” U.S. v. Moore, 572 F.3d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). As we describe above, the links in the 

chain were all sufficiently strong.

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
12 No. 13-3205

 In sum, the amount of evidence of Lawrence’s guilt was 

overwhelming and was undoubtedly sufficient to support a 

reasonable jury determination of guilt.

 B.

 Lawrence argues next that the district court erred by 

denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence obtained by 

the drug-detecting dog. We review a district court’s decision 

to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Common v. City 

of Chicago, 661 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2011).

 As part of its case, the government presented evidence 

that the money discovered in the safe, as well as the money 

found in the nightstand drawer, had been tainted by drug 

residue—a sign that the money had been part and parcel of 

the drug trade. The government elicited lengthy testimony 

about how the money from the safe had been vigilantly segregated from other contaminated material, and that a highly 

trained and skilled drug-detecting dog had alerted to the 

scent of drugs on the currency after it had been hidden in a 

carefully controlled environment. The government’s presentation included detailed descriptions of its double blind 

methodology; controlled testing on freshly minted currency; 

and the dog’s testing, training, and qualifications.

 We need not detail all of that methodology here, as 

Lawrence does not argue that the dog was unqualified or 

that the circumstances surrounding the alert were uncontrolled or faulty. Instead, he argues that the whole of this 

genre of evidence is meaningless—that such a high percentage of U.S. currency is tainted with drugs that evidence of 

tainted currency provides no indication of when or how the 

cash became contaminated. Indeed, this was an argument 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
No. 13-3205 13

that was well-accepted by this court and many others 

throughout the 1990’s. The defendant cites our opinion in 

U.S. v. $506,231, 125 F.3d 442, 453 (7th Cir. 1997), as well as 

cases from several other jurisdictions for the proposition that 

a drug alert on currency is meaningless. Our position in the 

$506,231 case was a bit more nuanced than the defendant 

describes but, in any event, in 2005 this court, after reviewing the empirical and scientific evidence on contamination,

changed course:

Given the apparently rigorous empirical testing giving rise to this conclusion, it is likely 

that trained cocaine detection dogs will alert to 

currency only if it has been exposed to large 

amounts of illicit cocaine within the very recent 

past. As a result ... it seems that a properly 

trained dog’s alert to currency should be entitled to probative weight.

U.S. v. $30,670, 403 F.3d 448, 459 (7th Cir. 2005). This is not to 

say that a defendant could not attempt to present his own 

evidence of contaminated currency today. See, e.g., U.S. v. 

$100,120.00, 730 F.3d 711, 719-20 (7th Cir. 2013). But Lawrence did not do so. Instead he argues, without any reference 

to our more recent cases, that there is a per se rule that dog 

alerts to drug-contaminated currency are unreliable. Our 

current case law does not so hold. $30,670, 403 F.3d at 459.

 The government presented ample evidence of the training, controlled testing, certification, and reliability of the 

drug-detecting dog in this case. This was more than sufficient to support the district court’s finding that the results of 

the controlled canine drug-detection test offered probative 

value to the case and could be considered by a jury as eviCase: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
14 No. 13-3205

dence that the currency found in the drawer and in the safe 

had been in recent contact with drugs. 

 C.

 Among the uphill routes Lawrence plods is the one in 

which he asks this court to overturn the district court’s denial of a mistrial. We review a denial of a mistrial for an abuse 

of discretion with an extra helping of deference. U.S. v. Vargas, 689 F.3d 867, 873 (7th Cir. 2012). The district court, after 

all, “is in the best position to determine the seriousness of 

the incident in question, particularly as it relates to what has 

transpired in the course of the trial.” Id. citing U.S. v. Clarke,

227 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2000). We, therefore, “must affirm 

unless we have a strong conviction that the district court 

erred,” and the error committed was not harmless. Id. The 

ultimate inquiry is whether the defendant was deprived of a 

fair trial. Id. citing Clarke, 227 F.3d at 881.

 In this case, it is undisputed that an error occurred at 

trial. Agent Hopkins testified that after Lawrence first denied having access to the safe, he later offered to tell Hopkins where the key was if Hopkins would give “two stacks” 

($2,000) to his “old girl” (Lawrence’s fiancée, Williams). Defense counsel objected to the admission of this statement. In 

a side bar conference, Lawrence’s counsel stated that although he did not object to the statement about the location 

of the key, he believed that the government had not tendered the statement about the “two stacks,” as required by 

Rule 16(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

Rule 16(a)(1) requires the government, upon the defendant’s 

request, to disclose to the defendant the substance of any 

relevant oral statement made by the defendant, before or afCase: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
No. 13-3205 15

ter arrest, if the government intends to use the statement at 

trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1). 

 At the time of the side bar, the government lawyer 

thought that he had previously discussed the statement with 

Lawrence’s counsel and reported that he believed the conversation had been memorialized in a letter. After checking 

during the lunch break, however, the government reported 

back that it had not adequately memorialized the statement 

in its letter to defense counsel. The defendant moved for a 

mistrial. 

 After hearing the defendant’s arguments about the 

prejudice and the government’s reply, the district court denied the motion for a mistrial and instead, while Agent 

Hopkins was still on the stand, instructed the jury that the 

“testimony to the effect that the defendant requested from 

the parole agent that the parole agent give his girl Phyllis 

Williams two stacks or $2000 in exchange for information as 

to where the key to the safe was” had been improperly admitted and was stricken from the record. (Tr. 7/18/12 9:30 

a.m., p.115) (App. R. 9-2, p.225) (D. Ct. R. 99, p.92). The district court instructed the jury to disregard it “in every respect.” Id. Lawrence argues however that the error was so 

great that it “overpowered the district court’s instruction to 

the jury to disregard Agent Hopkins’ testimony,” (Lawrence 

Brief at 28), and the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.

 A new trial is “warranted only when all other, less drastic remedies are inadequate.” U.S. v. Warren, 454 F.3d 752, 

760 (7th Cir. 2006), and absent a showing of abuse of discretion and prejudice, the trial court is well within its rights to 

fashion a remedy for the government's noncompliance with 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
16 No. 13-3205

Rule 16. See id. A new trial is appropriate only if the alleged 

Rule 16 violation deprived Lawrence of a fair trial. Id.

 Our robust deference in this instance is warranted because district court judges are in the best position to evaluate 

the effect that an error may have on the overall course of the 

proceedings. U.S. v. Curry, 538 F.3d 718, 728 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Consequently, district court judges have broad discretion in 

deciding to give a cautionary instruction rather than to declare a mistrial. Id. Our case law requires us to assume that 

juries follow the corrective instructions they are given. 

U.S. v. Wilson, 237 F.3d 827, 835 (7th Cir. 2001).

 Curative instructions, although not perfect (see Maus v. 

Baker, 747 F.3d 926, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2014)), can alleviate prejudice. And they have long been accepted in this circuit as a 

reasonable use of a district court’s discretion to avoid a mistrial. See, e.g., Jones, 763 at 809; U.S. v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 

186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2864 (2014); Curry, 538 F. 

3d at 728. Thus the defendant’s citations to cases from half a 

century ago and other circuits do not offer us much guidance. 

 The government’s position—that it disclosed the statement in a pre-trial discussion, despite not having written 

confirmation to prove it—raises questions about whether 

there was any prejudice at all. In any event, even if the government had not disclosed the statement in any way, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant a 

mistrial. The district court issued a curative instruction after 

a short recess and while Agent Hopkins was still on the 

stand and the testimony was still fresh in the jurors’ minds. 

See U.S. v. Marr, 760 F.3d 733, 742 (7th Cir. 2014). The district 

court judge also instructed the jurors at the start and end of 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
No. 13-3205 17

trial not to consider any evidence that the court excluded or 

told them to disregard. 

 Admittedly, the comment demonstrated Lawrence’s 

control and ownership of the money in the safe. But the fact 

that Lawrence knew the exact location of the hidden key was 

just as demonstrative of his control as was the comment 

about the “two stacks” and the latter added little, if anything. Defense counsel also claims that Lawrence would be 

prejudiced by the introduction of an attempt to blackmail a 

parole agent. As the government points out, however, this 

was not blackmail in any traditional sense. Agent Hopkins 

did not testify that the defendant offered to pay the agent 

any money or that Lawrence threatened Hopkins in any way 

in order to obtain the money for himself. Instead, the agent 

testified that Lawrence offered to disclose the location of the 

key if the agent gave Lawrence’s fiancée some of the money. 

Certainly a reasonable jury could have viewed this as an endearing altruistic effort to help out his fiancée, rather than as 

an act of blackmail. But even if a jury might view it negatively (and we agree that many juries might), the district court 

did not abuse its discretion by determining that a curative 

instruction would rectify any potential prejudice. 

 D.

 In his fourth issue on appeal, Lawrence argues that the 

district court erred by allowing a non-pattern jury instruction on possession. We review de novo whether a challenged 

jury instruction fairly and accurately summarized the law, 

but the trial court's decision to give a particular instruction is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 

F.3d 983, 998 (7th Cir. 2014). We will reverse only if the inCase: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
18 No. 13-3205

structions, taken as a whole, misled the jury. U.S. v. Curtis, 

781 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2015).

 Lawrence objects to the non-pattern “possession” instruction without explaining to this court what particular 

portion of the instruction he objects to and why. In fact, nowhere in his brief does he even direct this court to a record 

cite of the jury instruction to which he objects. Nor does he 

explain his specific objection, other than to say that the explanation of the term “possession” was “overly broad,” and 

unnecessary. (Lawrence Brief at 30). 4

The instruction given to the jury was as follows: 

Possession of an object is the ability to control 

it. Possession may exist even when a person is 

4 The fact section of Lawrence’s brief (p.15) cites to some transcript pages 

about the jury instruction conference, but without any reference to the 

jury instructions themselves, or the particular portion of them to which 

Lawrence objects. Moreover, the defendant cites transcript pages 400, 

402, 404, etc. In this particular case, transcripts were submitted at two 

different points in the appellate court record, occur over the course of 11 

dates, and were not sequentially numbered originally. Each date was 

assigned a separate record number by the district court. It is difficult, 

therefore, for this court to find a particular transcript page without reference to a date or at least to a record number in the district court or this 

court. In short, there are many different possible locations for a page 404 

in the record. After a time-consuming search, we were able to track 

down the jury instruction discussion at Tr. 7/19/12, pp.404-434; (D. Ct. 

R. 100, pp.168-198) (App. Ct. R. 9-2, p.514-544). To make our cites explicitly clear, we have cited to a transcript date and page number, the district 

court record number and page number, and the appellate court record 

number and page number. Although such a duplicative system of citation might not always be required, we urge litigants before this court to 

use a system of record citation that is unambiguous and directs this court 

to the appropriate place in the record in the clearest manner possible.

 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
No. 13-3205 19

not in physical contact with the object, but 

knowingly has the power and intention to exercise direction and control over it, either directly or through others.

Also, an individual may possess an object if 

other individuals share the ability to exercise 

control over the object. Possession may be either sole or joint. If one person alone has possession of an object, possession is sole. If two or 

more persons share possession of an object, 

possession is joint. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly 

possessed the object in question, either alone or 

jointly with others, you should find that the defendant possessed the object. 

A person can possess an object without owning 

the object, provided that the person has the 

power and intention to control the object. 

(D. Ct. R. 61, p.15) (App. R. 5-3, p.94).

 Because we do not know to what the defendant objects, 

we assume, as the government did, that he objected in general to the instruction on joint possession. The district court 

found that an instruction on joint possession was essential:

[g]iven the testimony, especially the testimony 

of the defense witnesses, it’s important to instruct the jury that more than one person can 

possess an object. It is possible for the jury to 

draw the inference that both the defendant and 

Ms. Williams possessed the bullets from the 

testimony given. A rational person could draw 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
20 No. 13-3205

that inference, depending on what portions of 

the testimony of the government witnesses and 

Ms. Williams they believed. 

(Tr. 7/19/12, 1:20 p.m., p.412) (D. Ct. R. 100, p.176) (App. 

R. 9-2, p.522). Although the district court spoke here of the 

bullets that were found under the bed that Lawrence shared 

with his fiancée, it applies equally to both the drug and 

money evidence. The district court was correct in assuming 

that an instruction on joint possession was necessary.

 The jury instruction was not only necessary and did not 

mislead the jury, but it set forth a correct explanation of the 

law on joint possession in which possession may either be 

sole or joint. Jones, 763 F.3d at 800; U.S. v. Villasenor, 664 F.3d 

673, 681 (7th Cir. 2011). In fact, in the face of a comparable

challenge, this court has upheld a similar instruction that 

stated:

Possession may be sole or joint. If one person 

alone has actual or constructive possession of a 

firearm, possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual constructive possession of a 

firearm, possession is joint. An individual may 

possess a firearm even if other individuals may 

have access to a location where possession is 

alleged. Also, an individual may possess a firearm even if other individuals share the ability 

to exercise control over the firearm. Possession 

may be joint.

U.S. v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2006). See also, 

U.S. v. Aldaco, 201 F.3d 979, 989-90 (7th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Tirrell 120 F.3d 670, 675-76 (7th Cir. 1997). In the face of 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
No. 13-3205 21

Thornton’s objection that the instruction was too broad, a 

panel of this court held that the instruction accurately stated 

the law on joint possession. Thornton, 463 F.3d at 699.

 We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving the supplemental jury instruction, that it was 

a correct summary of applicable law, and did not mislead 

the jury. 

E.

 Our final deferential review is of Lawrence’s sentence 

which, because it was within the Guidelines, we presume to 

be reasonable. U.S. v. Moore, No. 14-3269, 2015 WL 1874216, 

at *5 (7th Cir., Apr. 24, 2015). The defendant does not contest 

the Guidelines calculation in this case, nor does he argue 

that the district court judge failed to apply the individual 

factors specified in § 3553 as required. See U.S. v. Lua-Guizar,

656 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 2011). The district court correctly 

calculated Lawrence’s Guidelines calculation as 262-327 

months and sentenced him at the lowest end of that range. 

Lawrence requested that the district court judge use his discretion to disregard the career offender enhancement and 

sentence him in the range of 92-115 months. 

 Lawrence’s counsel argues that even a sentence at the 

very lowest end of the Guidelines range was excessive. He 

argues that the offense of conviction was non-violent, Lawrence had less than a half kilogram of cocaine, he had obtained his GED and had a work history, had the support of 

his family members and friends, and that the bulk of his 

crimes had occurred when he was much younger. 

 Our review of sentencing decisions generally is limited 

to whether they are reasonable. Moore, 2015 WL 1874216 at 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
22 No. 13-3205

*3. The district court meticulously reviewed Lawrence’s 

criminal history and even particularly noted that he was 

“aware of the draconian effect of career offender status and 

the possibility for an unjust determination if that statute is 

applied and followed in sentencing technically without regard for nuances and differences in the backgrounds and 

criminal histories of different defendants.” (Tr. 8/22/13, p.9) 

(D. Ct. R.102, p.9) (App. R. 9-2, p.645). The district court then 

went on, however, to note Lawrence’s disturbing criminal 

history. At the age of nineteen, he was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm, armed violence, and four 

counts of aggravated battery for shooting another person. 

He served only two years of his six year sentence before being paroled. Then, four years later, he was convicted of first 

degree murder and, three days later, attempting to buy five 

kilograms of cocaine. He served only eight years of his twenty-year sentence for those crimes, and committed the offenses at issue in this case while on parole for the first degree 

murder conviction. The court concluded that he had spent 

the better part of his time since the age of 18 committing 

crimes of violence and dealing drugs. 

 The district court judge thoughtfully explained his reasoning for applying the career offender enhancement, noting 

that to ignore it would be unfair “to the public, the people 

that the defendant would be living with and in whose community he has been conducting crimes of violence and drugs 

since he was 18 years of age.” (Tr. 8/22/13, p.11) (D. Ct. 

R.102, p.11) (App. R. 9-2, p.647):

this defendant has been given three clear opportunities in his life to do right. He has been 

sentenced to increasingly heavy jail time in an 

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23
No. 13-3205 23

attempt to deter him from future criminal conduct. He has been placed on parole in an attempt to help him rehabilitate. And none of 

that has worked. He has committed serious offenses. He has done so repeatedly. He has done 

so in spite of having been previously incarcerated.

Id. The Judge concluded by noting that he had considered 

the § 3553 factors, that he had prioritized the need to protect 

the community from drugs and violence and considered the 

possibility of rehabilitation. The district court exercised discretion reasonably and thoughtfully in refusing to ignore the 

career offender enhancement. See, e.g., U.S. v. Jones, 739 F.3d 

364, 373-74 (7th Cir. 2014).

III.

 For the reasons articulated above we affirm the district 

court opinion in its entirety.

AFFIRMED

Case: 13-3205 Document: 29 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 23