Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-02110/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-02110-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Diana Butler
Respondent
Terry Cook
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY COOK,

Petitioner,

 vs.

DIANA BUTLER, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 02-2110 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. The matter is submitted. 

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of assault by means of force likely to produce

great bodily injury, see Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1), and battery with serious injury, see

Cal. Penal Code, § 243(d). He was sentenced to six years in prison. The conviction and

sentence were affirmed by the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court

denied review. 

B. Factual History

Petitioner does not dispute the following facts, which are taken from the opinion of

the California Court of Appeal:

There were three eyewitnesses to the underlying

altercation: defendant Cook, victim Smith, and Lucinda Freeman,

who was working as the convenience store clerk that night. Ms.

Case 4:02-cv-02110-PJH Document 14 Filed 09/17/07 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Freeman testified that Smith was one of the regular customers she

considered a friend. Cook, she testified, was an occasional

customer she did not count among her friends. She testified that

Cook never visited with her when he entered the store, but just did

his business and left. 

All three witnesses agreed that the altercation occurred on

the evening of January 18, 1999, when Cook entered the

convenience store to purchase gasoline and cigarettes while Smith

was already inside, completing the purchase of a 12-pack of beer.

On his way toward the door, Smith--who is over six feet

tall–passed Cook, who is five feet eight inches tall, weighing 150

pounds. 

Cook said something to Smith, but the witnesses did not

agree on what it was. According to Smith and Ms. Freeman,

respectively, Cook either called Smith a “piece of shit” or an

“asshole.” Smith testified that he responded in kind. Ms. Freeman

testified that she could not hear Smith’s response. 

Cook, on the other hand, testified that his first words were

merely, “Hi, John,” to which Smith replied, “Fuck you, you piece of

shit,” with Cook rejoining, “Back at you.” Cook said that Smith

then seemed to head out of the store, but stopped in or near the

doorway to say something back to him, which Cook was unable to

understand. Cook testified that he then asked Smith whether he

wanted to “take it outside.” Smith and Ms. Freeman described this

as a more affirmative proposal to “take it outside.” Either way, all

agreed that Smith assented. Cook testified that he then said,

“Okay. I will be right out,” and turned back toward Ms. Freeman

at the counter. 

Smith set down the beer he was carrying on an ice cream

cooler. Then he approached the counter where Cook was still

conducting his business. Smith testified that his intention was

merely to remove his jacket, which he prized, in order to leave it

near the clerk for safekeeping. He testified that while he was

laying it on the floor at the end of the counter, “[T]he next thing I

know I hear this, ‘You stupid son of a---’ and that’s all I remember.”

He felt a blow to the left side of his face, in the cheek area. After

that, he testified, he remembered essentially nothing until he found

himself in a hospital two days later. 

Cook testified that after the two men agreed to “take it

outside,” he turned back around to face the clerk and complete his transaction. He laid $20 on the counter and said he wanted to buy a pack of cigarettes and pay for $5 worth of gas. Someone then

hit him in the back, “[j]ust above my hip on my right-hand side

about my kidney.” He turned to his right and saw Smith, who had

apparently just laid down his jacket, “raise up” with “his fist coming

at me.” Cook, who is left-handed, hit Smith with his left hand,

striking the cheekbone below the left eye. Smith “went . . . down

on one leg, got up, and grabbed” Cook by the straps of his tanktop shirt. Cook put one hand on each of Smith’s shoulders, spun

him around, and “put him right down on the ground.” Smith then

Case 4:02-cv-02110-PJH Document 14 Filed 09/17/07 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

tried to knee Cook in the crotch. Cook “struck him a few more

times [on] the right-hand side of the face.” “He tried it again so I

did it again.” Altogether Cook struck Smith five times, all with his

left hand. After four [sic] blows, he asked Smith, “Have you had

enough?” Smith said, “Yes.” Cook stood up, turned to face the

clerk, and asked for his cigarettes and change. She said he hadn’t

paid. He protested, saying in effect that he was missing the $20.

After looking on the floor he found his $20 lying underneath Cook.

He placed it on the counter and received his change. He told the

clerk she had better call the police and “the ambulance, too.” He

turned around and walked out. Asked why he didn’t wait, he

testified, “I didn’t feel I did anything wrong.”

Ms. Freeman testified that after Smith and Cook agreed to

take their dispute outside, Smith set his beer on top of the cooler

and took off his coat, which he brought up and laid next to the

counter. She testified that Smith did not bump into or touch Cook.

After laying down his coat, Smith turned around and headed

towards the door. Cook followed and hit Smith in the back from

behind. He grabbed Smith by the shoulder and spun him around.

He seemed to hit Smith with his fist. Smith fell against a rack, then

bounced off a plate glass window and went down on his back on

the floor. Cook got on top of Smith, either straddling his chest or

with one knee on his person and the other on the floor. Cook was

slugging him in the head and face–mostly with his right hand, but

the clerk thought “he got a few swings in with his left, too.” Smith

lay there moaning and trying to escape or push Cook off. Ms.

Freeman described him as “moving his legs,” with his knees going

up and down, “trying to get Terry off.” She testified that Cook hit

Smith at least 20 times, that “there were a lot more than ten

blows,” and that she heard more than four blows struck. Cook

stopped, got up, approached the counter, and said, “Give me my

change.” She gave him what she thought his change was. She

testified that Cook ran out the door and “exited very quickly.”

Ex. C at 1-4.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Case 4:02-cv-02110-PJH Document 14 Filed 09/17/07 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322 at

340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th

Cir.2000). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that because “his entire defense was that he acted in selfdefense,” his constitutional rights were violated by the court’s refusal to allow him to

present evidence relating to the victim’s character and threatening statements made by the

victim (Smith) prior to the fight. P. & A. in Support of Pet. at 22-23. 

In ruling on this issue, the California Court of Appeal hinted that exclusion of the

evidence probably was state law error, but declined to so hold, instead holding that any

Case 4:02-cv-02110-PJH Document 14 Filed 09/17/07 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

error was not prejudicial. Ex. C at 10-12. In so holding the court declined to apply the

standard for determining on direct review whether federal constitutional errors are

harmless, saying that “the error, if any, is strictly one of state law.” Id. at 10. This court

interprets this as a rejection of the contention that there was federal constitutional error.

I. Standard

“Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the

purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to

establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of the due process of law.”

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284

(1973), the Supreme Court held that the defendant was denied a fair trial when the state's

evidentiary rules prevented him from calling other witnesses who would have testified that

the first witness made inculpatory statements on the night of the crime. And in Crane v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986), the Court similarly held that the defendant's right to

have a fair opportunity to present a defense, whether rooted in the Fourteenth

Amendment's Due Process Clause or in the Sixth Amendment's confrontation or

compulsory process clauses, is violated by a trial court's exclusion of competent, reliable

evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession when such evidence is central to the

defendant's claim of innocence. See also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56-62 (1987)

(holding unconstitutional Arkansas per se rule excluding all hypnotically enhanced

testimony). 

The Ninth Circuit has summarized the rule as "states may not impede a defendants's

right to put on a defense by imposing mechanistic (Chambers) or arbitrary (Washington and

Rock) rules of evidence." LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998). The

rule is clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and a proper basis for

federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002).

II. Analysis

To prevail on his claim here, petitioner must show not only that the trial court error

deprived him of his rights to present a defense, but also that the error had such “a

Case 4:02-cv-02110-PJH Document 14 Filed 09/17/07 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” as to require

habeas relief. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). In other words, state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief are not entitled to it unless the constitutional error

resulted in "actual prejudice." Id. (citation omitted). The court will assume for purposes of

this decision, that there was constitutional error, and proceed to consider whether it was

prejudicial. 

There were only three witnesses to the fight: Petitioner, victim Smith, and the store

clerk, Freeman. The versions of what happened from petitioner and from Smith were

nearly mirror images: Petitioner contended Smith sucker-punched him, whereas Smith

contended that it was petitioner who sucker-punched him. The excluded evidence that

Smith had made prior threats against petitioner might have some marginal relevance to the

question of which version to believe, although the excluded evidence would not be all that

probative – it would not go directly to whether Smith was inclined to unsportsmanlike

attacks – but it pales into insignificance in the face of the testimony of the third eyewitness,

Freeman, who supported Smith’s version. Given the minimal value of the excluded

evidence on the only real issue in the case, namely which of the two launched the sneakattack, as compared to the testimony of the uninvolved eye-witness, exclusion of the

evidence could not have had “a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict.” The court concludes that exclusion of the evidence was not prejudicial,

so the state appellate courts’ rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court authority. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 17, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.02\COOK110.RUL.wpd 

Case 4:02-cv-02110-PJH Document 14 Filed 09/17/07 Page 6 of 6