Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01054/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01054-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dupont Teijin Films
Not party
Mitsubishi Polyester Film, Inc.
Not party
Nan Ya Plastics Corporation, Ltd.
Appellant
SKC, Inc.
Not party
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

NAN YA PLASTICS CORPORATION, LTD.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

DUPONT TEIJIN FILMS, MITSUBISHI 

POLYESTER FILM, INC., SKC, INC.,

Defendants

______________________ 

2015-1054

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:11-cv-00535-LMG, Judge Leo M. Gordon.

______________________ 

Decided: January 19, 2016

______________________ 

PETER J. KOENIG, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

DAVID D’ALESSANDRIS, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, PATRICIA M.

MCCARTHY; MICHAEL THOMAS GAGAIN, Office of the Chief 

Case: 15-1054 Document: 68-2 Page: 1 Filed: 01/19/2016
2 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES

Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compliance, United 

States Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and WALLACH,

Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

The instant appeal concerns the United States Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) administrative 

review of the antidumping duty order covering polyethylene terephthalate film, sheet, and strip from Taiwan 

(“subject merchandise”) for the period July 1, 2009 to 

June 30, 2010. See Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, 

Sheet, and Strip from Taiwan, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,941 (Dep’t 

of Commerce Dec. 9, 2011) (“Final Results”) (final admin. 

review); Memorandum from Christian Marsh, Deputy 

Assistant Sec’y for Antidumping & Countervailing Duty 

Operations, Dep’t of Commerce, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., Dep’t of Commerce (Dec. 5, 

2011) (S.A.1 226–35); see also Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand (Dep’t of Commerce May 23, 

2013) (S.A. 105–47). Appellant Nan Ya Plastics Corporation, Ltd. (“Nan Ya”) contends that the United States 

Court of International Trade (“CIT”) erred in sustaining 

Commerce’s determination on remand in which it assigned an adverse facts available rate of 74.34% to Nan 

Ya’s entries of subject merchandise entered during the 

1 “S.A.” refers to the supplemental appendix filed by 

Appellee United States. Prior to filing its response brief, 

Appellee “w[as] unable to obtain a copy of the draft appendix from counsel for plaintiff-appellant” and, thus, 

filed “a supplemental appendix to [its] brief.” Appellee’s 

Br. 2 n.2. Appellant Nan Ya Plastics Corporation, Ltd. 

subsequently adopted Appellee’s supplemental appendix. 

Appellant’s Adoption of Appellee’s R. App. 1–3.

 

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NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 3

period of review. See Nan Ya Plastics Corp. v. United 

States (Nan Ya II), 6 F. Supp. 3d 1362 (Ct. Int’l Trade 

2014) (sustaining remand determination); Nan Ya Plastics Corp. v. United States (Nan Ya I), 906 F. Supp. 2d 

1348 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013) (remanding Final Results to 

Commerce). We affirm the CIT, although we sustain 

Commerce’s determination on different grounds.

BACKGROUND

I. Legal Framework

The antidumping statute provides for the assessment 

of remedial duties on foreign merchandise sold, or likely 

to be sold, in the United States “at less than its fair 

value.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006).2 At the conclusion of an 

investigation, if Commerce and the United States International Trade Commission have made the requisite 

findings, Commerce publishes an order that directs customs officers to assess duties on imports of goods covered 

by the investigation. Id. § 1673e(a).

Each year after the order is published, Commerce 

provides interested parties with an opportunity to request 

an administrative review of the order. If Commerce 

receives a request, it conducts a review of the order. Id.

§ 1675(a)(1). Each review constitutes a separate segment 

within the same administrative proceeding. See 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.102(b)(47) (2009).

2 During the pendency of the appeal, Congress 

amended various statutes that Commerce administers, 

including provisions at issue in this appeal. See Trade 

Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 

§ 502, 129 Stat. 362, 383–84 (2015). However, the 

amendments do not apply to final determinations that 

Commerce made prior to the date of enactment. See Ad 

Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 802 

F.3d 1339, 1348–52 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

 

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4 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES

For each review, the statute requires Commerce to 

“determine the individual weighted average dumping 

margin for each known exporter and producer of the 

subject merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(1). A dumping margin reflects the amount by which the “‘normal 

value’ (the price a producer charges in its home market) 

exceeds the ‘export price’ (the price of the product in the 

United States) or ‘constructed export price.’” U.S. Steel 

Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A)) (footnote omitted).

“Although Commerce has authority to place documents in the administrative record that it deems relevant, 

the burden of creating an adequate record lies with interested parties and not with Commerce.” QVD Food Co. v. 

United States, 658 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). 

The placement of the burden on interested parties stems 

from the fact that the International Trade Administration, the relevant agency within Commerce, has no subpoena power. See Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 

899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Accordingly, each 

interested party that appears before Commerce must 

cooperate “to the best of its ability” with Commerce’s 

requests for information, 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b), which 

means that each party must “do the maximum it is able to 

do,” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 

1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “While the standard does not 

require perfection and recognizes that mistakes sometimes occur, it does not condone inattentiveness, carelessness, or inadequate record keeping.” Id.

If a respondent withholds requested information, fails 

to provide such information in the form or manner requested, or provides information that cannot be verified, 

the statute requires Commerce to use whatever facts are 

available to make its determination. 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677e(a)(2). If Commerce finds that a respondent has 

“failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability 

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NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 5

to comply with a request for information,” the statute 

permits the agency to draw adverse inferences commonly 

known as “adverse facts available” when selecting from 

among the available facts. Id. § 1677e(b). Commerce 

“may employ [such] inferences . . . to ensure that the 

party does not obtain a more favorable result by failing to 

cooperate than if it had cooperated fully.” Statement of 

Administrative Action accompanying the Uruguay Round 

Agreements Act (“SAA”), H.R. Rep. No. 103-316, vol. 1, at 

870 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4199.3 

In selecting from among the adverse facts available, 

Commerce may rely upon information derived from: (1) 

the petition filed to initiate the investigation; (2) a final 

determination in the investigation; (3) a previous administrative review; or (4) “any other information placed on 

the record.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). Once it selects particular facts, Commerce uses them to assign a dumping 

margin for each non-cooperating respondent that it reviews.

If Commerce “relies on secondary information rather 

than on information obtained in the course of . . . [the] 

review,” the statute requires that the agency “shall, to the 

extent practicable, corroborate that information from 

independent sources that are reasonably at [its] disposal.” 

Id. § 1677e(c). “Secondary information is information 

derived from the petition that gave rise to the investigation . . . , the final determination [from the investigation], 

or any previous review . . . concerning the subject merchandise.” SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199. 

3 The SAA “shall be regarded as an authoritative 

expression by the United States concerning the interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round Agreements 

and this Act in any judicial proceeding in which a question arises concerning such interpretation or application.” 

19 U.S.C. § 3512(d).

 

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6 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES

Secondary information does not include information 

obtained from the subject segment, which is known as 

“primary information.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c); see also 

Gallant Ocean (Thai.) Co. v. United States, 602 F.3d 1319, 

1324 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

II. Administrative Proceedings

In July 2002, Commerce published in the Federal 

Register notice of the antidumping duty order covering 

the subject merchandise. See Polyethylene Terephthalate 

Film, Sheet, and Strip (PET Film) from Taiwan, 67 Fed. 

Reg. 44,174 (Dep’t of Commerce July 1, 2002) (antidumping duty order), as corrected, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,566 (Dep’t of 

Commerce July 15, 2002). Upon timely submitted requests, Commerce initiated the subject administrative 

review in August 2010. See Initiation of Antidumping 

and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and 

Deferral of Initiation of Administrative Review, 75 Fed. 

Reg. 53,274, 53,275 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 31, 2010) 

(initiation of review). The review covered three respondents, including Nan Ya and Shinkong Materials Technology Corporation (“Shinkong”).4 See id. In December 

2010, without providing a reason, Nan Ya informed 

Commerce that it would not participate in the review. 

S.A. 271–72. It subsequently submitted no information to 

Commerce.

Commerce issued the preliminary results of the review in August 2011. See Polyethlene Terephthalate Film, 

4 During the review, Commerce found that 

Shinkong is affiliated with another entity, Shinkong 

Synthetic Fibers Corporation. See Polyethlene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Taiwan, 76 Fed. Reg. 

47,540, 47,541 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 5, 2011) (preliminary results of review), unchanged in Final Results, 76 

Fed. Reg. 76,941. 

 

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Sheet, and Strip from Taiwan, 76 Fed. Reg. 47,540 (Dep’t 

of Commerce Aug. 5, 2011) (preliminary results of review). Because Commerce determined that Nan Ya failed 

to act to the best of its ability when it withheld information, and that it significantly impeded the proceeding, 

it applied an adverse inference to Nan Ya in selecting 

among the facts available. Id. at 47,544. In selecting 

among the adverse facts available, Commerce assigned a 

99.31% rate to Nan Ya, which represented a transactionspecific rate that Commerce calculated for Nan Ya in the 

immediately-preceding review. Id.

In the Final Results, although Commerce continued to 

find it appropriate to apply adverse facts available to Nan 

Ya, it lowered the rate that it assigned to Nan Ya. Commerce determined that “data from the current [period of 

review] can form the basis for Nan Ya’s [adverse facts 

available] rate in this review.” S.A. 231 (footnote omitted). It relied upon the highest transaction-specific margin of 74.34% that it calculated for the other mandatory 

respondent in the review—Shinkong.5 S.A. 231. Commerce reviewed the underlying transaction that forms the 

basis of the 74.34% rate and found it non-abberant because it “falls within a range of margins” and it was 

otherwise not unusual. S.A. 231 (footnote omitted). 

Commerce also observed that “the data from the most 

recent review in which Nan Ya participated show that 

[Commerce] calculated numerous margins for Nan Ya far 

above 74.34[%],” meaning that the 74.34% rate reflects 

prices at which Nan Ya could have sold the subject merchandise. S.A. 258. Commerce made these findings but 

5 Nan Ya argued in its administrative case brief 

submitted after the preliminary results, but before the 

Final Results, that Commerce should use information 

obtained during the subject review from Shinkong. S.A. 

199–200.

 

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8 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES

did not corroborate Shinkong’s information pursuant to 19 

U.S.C. § 1677e(c), finding the corroboration requirement 

inapplicable because Shinkong’s data reflected primary, 

rather than secondary, information. S.A. 233. Nan Ya 

subsequently appealed to the CIT. 

III. CIT Proceedings

In February 2013, the CIT remanded to Commerce so 

that the agency could address various arguments that 

Nan Ya raised for the first time in the litigation. Nan Ya 

I, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 1355. The CIT noted that Nan Ya’s 

rate changed between the preliminary and Final Results, 

such that Nan Ya’s first opportunity to challenge the 

revised margin arose in the litigation. Id. at 1354. It also 

directed Commerce to further explain whether the corroboration requirement under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) applied to 

Shinkong’s information obtained during the subject 

review in light of this court’s opinion in F.lli De Cecco Di 

Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 216 F.3d 

1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000).6 Id. at 1354–55.

On remand, Commerce rejected Nan Ya’s arguments 

and continued to apply the 74.34% adverse facts available 

rate. S.A. 117–25. Commerce determined that, under the 

second step in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984), a 

permissible construction of “any other information placed 

on the record” in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(4) permits it to use 

6 In relevant part, De Cecco explains that “Congress’s imposition of the corroboration requirement in 19 

U.S.C. § 1677e(c) [demonstrates] that it intended for an 

adverse facts available rate [based on secondary information] to be a reasonably accurate estimate of the respondent’s actual rate, albeit with some built-in increase 

intended as a deterrent to non-compliance.” 216 F.3d at 

1032.

 

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the highest transaction-specific margin from the subject 

review. S.A. 110–14. It also found that it need not corroborate Shinkong’s information and that § 1677e(c)’s

corroboration requirement did not apply because the 

information that it used as adverse facts available came 

from the record of the subject review, rather than from a 

separate segment of the proceeding. S.A. 108–10 & n.2. 

It also found that De Cecco “highlights [the] distinction 

requiring corroboration of only secondary information.” 

S.A. 110 n.3.

The CIT subsequently sustained Commerce’s remand 

redetermination. Nan Ya II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1371. As to 

the corroboration requirement of § 1677e(c), the CIT

observed that “Commerce makes a fairly airtight argument” under “a straightforward Chevron step one interpretation that focuses on the plain meaning” of the 

corroboration requirement as set forth in § 1677e(c). Id. 

at 1367. Nevertheless, it observed that in the Final 

Results and in its remand redetermination “Commerce did 

not simply select Shinkong’s highest transaction specific 

margin in setting Nan Ya’s rate, and leave it at that. 

Commerce went further and measured the rate’s appropriateness by analyzing Nan Ya’s own prior transactionspecific data.” Id. (citations omitted). Because Commerce 

“followed its standard corroboration playbook to tie the 

selected [adverse facts available] rate . . . to . . . Nan Ya,” 

the CIT held that the corroboration requirement of 

§ 1677e(c) and De Cecco’s reasonableness requirement

“appl[y] after all.” Id. at 1367–68 (citations omitted).

Although the CIT regarded Nan Ya’s arguments as 

“hav[ing] some merit,” it held that “they do not render 

Commerce’s use of [the 74.34% rate] unreasonable because other competing record information suggests that 

the [rate] was not aberrational.” Id. at 1369. It held that 

substantial evidence supported Commerce’s selection of 

the 74.34% rate, including the fact that the transaction 

underlying that rate “involved a larger quantity than 

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10 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES

many of Shinkong’s other sales and differed from other 

models in ‘the least important physical characteristics.’” 

Id. (citation omitted). It also considered significant the 

fact that Shinkong did not ask Commerce to exclude the 

transaction as aberrational. Id. Finally, the CIT found 

that Nan Ya applied its arguments only to Shinkong’s 

information, “leav[ing] unchallenged Commerce’s corroborative justification for the reasonableness of the 74.34[%] 

rate: ‘Nan Ya was capable of dumping at’ 74.34[%] as 

evidenced by Nan Ya’s own data” from the immediatelypreceding review. Id. at 1370 (citation omitted).

Nan Ya appeals the CIT’s final judgment. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2012).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The court applies the same standard of review as the 

CIT, upholding Commerce determinations that are supported “by substantial evidence on the record” and otherwise “in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). Although we review the decisions of 

the CIT de novo, “we give great weight to the informed 

opinion of the [CIT] . . . and it is nearly always the starting point of our analysis.” Ningbo Dafa Chem. Fiber Co. 

v. United States, 580 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). 

The court reviews de novo whether Commerce’s interpretation of the statute is in accordance with law, doing so 

within the two-step framework established in Chevron. 

Under the first step, we must determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” 

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If Congress’s intent is clear, 

“that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 

agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 

intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–43. Under the second step 

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of Chevron, “if an agency’s statutory interpretation promulgated under the authority delegated [to] it by Congress 

is ‘reasonable’ it is ‘binding [o]n the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or 

manifestly contrary to the statute.’” Ningbo Dafa Chem. 

Fiber Co., 580 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Wheatland Tube Co. 

v. United States, 495 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007))

(second alteration in original); see also United States v. 

Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 316 (2009) (“[Commerce’s] 

interpretation governs in the absence of unambiguous 

statutory language to the contrary or unreasonable resolution of language that is ambiguous.”).

II. Commerce’s Determination Accords with Law

Nan Ya does not contest Commerce’s decision to apply 

adverse facts available in determining its dumping margin, but principally argues that Commerce applied the 

incorrect legal standard in determining the margin. 

Appellant’s Br. 5 (“The [adverse facts available rate] here 

is contrary to . . . law.”); Appellant’s Reply Br. 1 (“Our 

argument is as to legal standards that Commerce must 

use for [a] lawful” adverse facts available rate. (emphasis 

modified)). Specifically, Nan Ya contends that Commerce 

violated 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) and (c) when it assigned the 

74.34% rate to Nan Ya. See Appellant’s Br. 5. As discussed below, Commerce’s determination does not conflict 

with law.

A. Nan Ya Misunderstands Commerce’s Duties Under the 

Statutory Scheme

As an initial matter, Nan Ya bases a number of its allegations on the legal premise that Commerce must select 

an adverse facts available rate that reflects “commercial 

reality” and is “accurate.” Appellant’s Br. 5, 7, 8, 10, 14, 

16, 18–19, 27, 31–32 (discussing “commercial reality”); id.

at 3–4, 6, 20, 25–26, 34 (discussing “accurate”). Nan Ya’s 

arguments borrow these terms from past decisions of this 

court. The CIT similarly has relied upon these terms in 

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12 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES

recent decisions, not only in cases involving adverse facts 

available determinations but also in other areas. See, e.g., 

Baoding Mantong Fine Chemistry Co. v. United States, 

No. 12-00362, 2015 WL 6685530, at *6 (Ct. Int’l Trade 

Nov. 3, 2015) (discussing “commercial reality” in adverse 

facts available context); Dongguan Sunrise Furniture Co. 

v. United States, No. 10-00254, 2015 WL 179003, at *1–5 

(Ct. Int’l Trade Jan. 14, 2015) (same); see also Vinh Hoan 

Corp. v. United States, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1302–06, 

1321 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015) (discussing the term “accurate” 

in the selection of a surrogate country and surrogate 

values under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(2), (4)); Albemarle 

Corp. v. United States, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1291–92 (Ct. 

Int’l Trade 2013) (discussing “commercial reality” in the 

selection of the rate assigned to non-individually examined respondents in nonmarket economy antidumping 

proceedings). Our jurisprudence to date has not straightforwardly defined these terms; today, we clarify their 

meaning.

In the early 1990s, we began to use the terms “commercial reality” and “accurate” in our trade remedy decisions in a variety of contexts. For example, we held: (1) 

that Commerce, consistent with the statute in effect at 

the time, may rely upon a rebuttable presumption that 

the highest margin calculated in a prior segment of the 

proceeding reflects a non-cooperating respondent’s pricing 

behavior during a later period, Rhone Poulenc, 899 F.2d 

at 1191 (using “accurately” to sustain Commerce’s interpretation of the predecessor to § 1677e(b));7 (2) that 

7 The predecessor statute stated:

In making [its] determinations under this subtitle, [Commerce] . . . shall, whenever a party or any 

other person refuses or is unable to produce information requested in a timely manner and in 

the form required, or otherwise significantly im-

 

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Commerce must consider a widely-accepted accounting 

principle in imputing costs and may support its decision 

by relying upon a respondent’s records kept in the ordinary course of business, LMI-La Metalli Industriale, 

S.p.A. v. United States, 912 F.2d 455, 457–58, 460–61 

(Fed. Cir. 1990) (favorably quoting Commerce’s use of 

“accurate” in calculating a respondent’s warehousing costs 

and discussing “commercial reality” in the context of time 

value of money); (3) that Commerce cannot assume absolute consistency in prices, but may compare foreign and 

domestic goods based on shared physical characteristics, 

U.H.F.C. Co. v. United States, 916 F.2d 689, 697–98, 701 

(Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing “commercial reality” in the 

context of consistency of prices and “accurate” when 

describing Commerce’s decision to match products with 

similar physical characteristics); and (4) that Commerce 

must account for a particular company’s sales practice 

when interpreting a contract, Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. 

United States, 106 F.3d 376, 379, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1997)

(using “commercial reality” and “accurate” to discuss 

contract terms). We also used the term “accurate” in 

maintaining that, when Commerce uses secondary information as adverse facts available, that secondary information must reflect an “estimate” constructed pursuant to 

the statutory method for calculating dumping margins to 

meet the corroboration requirement under § 1677e(c). De 

Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1032. And we used the terms while 

observing that a respondent’s dumping margin may 

change if the respondent changes its pricing behavior. 

See Parkdale Int’l v. United States, 475 F.3d 1375, 1380 

(Fed. Cir. 2007) (using “commercial realit[y]” and “accurate[]” to describe the attendant changes in a dumping 

pedes an investigation, use the best information 

otherwise available.

19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (1988).

 

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margin following a respondent’s change in pricing behavior). 

Since 2010, we began to use the terms with greater 

frequency. For example, in reviewing a Commerce adverse facts available determination made during the first 

administrative review of an order, we said that the petition rate Commerce selected “did not . . . represent commercial reality” within the industry in light of the 

dumping margins calculated at the end of the investigation for cooperative respondents. Gallant Ocean, 602 F.3d 

at 1323–24; see also id. (favorably quoting the use of 

“accurate” in De Cecco). We have repeated that statement 

when reviewing the same kind of Commerce determination in other appeals. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Shrimp, 802 F.3d 

at 1361 (quoting Commerce’s use of “commercial reality”

and favorably quoting the use of “accurate” in De Cecco); 

Dongtai Peak Honey Indus. Co. v. United States, 777 F.3d 

1343, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (using “commercial reality” to 

describe a margin that Commerce calculated using another respondent’s verified information and that Commerce 

applied as adverse facts available in a later segment and 

holding that accuracy concerns cannot overcome Commerce’s ability to enforce its procedural deadlines); KYD, 

Inc. v. United States, 607 F.3d 760, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2010)

(favorably quoting use of “commercial reality” in Gallant 

Ocean). We also have stated that the rate Commerce 

assigns to a non-individually examined respondent in a 

nonmarket economy antidumping proceeding should 

reflect that respondent’s “commercial reality.” See Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United States, 716 F.3d 

1370, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also id. (favorably 

quoting use of “accurate” in Rhone Poulenc and Gallant 

Ocean);8 cf. Changzhou Wujin Fine Chem. Factory Co. v. 

8 Our decision in Bestpak used “commercial reality” 

and “economic reality” synonymously. 716 F.3d at 1378–

 

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United States, 701 F.3d 1367, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

(favorably quoting use of “accurately” and “accurate” in 

Parkdale and Gallant Ocean, respectively); id. at 1384 

(Reyna, J., dissenting) (explaining that an adverse facts 

available rate need not reflect a non-individually examined respondent’s “commercial reality”).

We clarify that “commercial reality” and “accurate” 

represent reliable guideposts for Commerce’s determinations. Those terms must be considered against what the 

antidumping statutory scheme demands. See Chevron, 

467 U.S. at 842–43 (holding that agencies and the courts 

must follow Congress’s unambiguous directive or the 

agencies otherwise must provide a permissible construction of an ambiguous statute). The term “commercial 

reality” does not appear in the statutes that Commerce 

administers, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 et. seq, and the term “accurate” appears only once, id. § 1677m(b) (explaining that a 

party that provides factual information to Commerce 

“shall certify that such information is accurate and complete to the best of that person’s knowledge”).9 Congress 

has provided specific methods for Commerce to employ 

when it executes its duties, such as in calculating normal 

value or export price, §§ 1677a (export price), 1677b 

(normal value), or when the agency assigns rates on the 

basis of adverse facts available, § 1677e(b). When Congress directs the agency to measure pricing behavior and 

80. In that decision, we borrowed the statement “economic reality” from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Eurodif, 

id. at 1378, which held that “public law is not constrained 

by private fiction” because the statute directed Commerce 

to treat the leasing arrangements at issue in that case as 

sales of goods, rather than services rendered. See Eurodif, 555 U.S. at 317–18.

9 None of our decisions to date have quoted the 

term “accurate” from § 1677m(b).

 

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otherwise execute its duties in a particular manner, 

Commerce need not examine the economic or commercial 

reality of the parties specifically, or of the industry more 

generally, in some broader sense. See Eurodif, 555 U.S. 

at 317–18 (explaining that “public law is not constrained 

by private fiction” when Congress has entrusted Commerce to take particular action). The statute, or Commerce’s permissible interpretation of it, provides the 

backdrop against which we must review the agency’s 

determination. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

Our case law and the statute thus teach that a Commerce determination (1) is “accurate” if it is correct as a 

mathematical and factual matter, thus supported by 

substantial evidence; and (2) reflects “commercial reality” 

if it is consistent with the method provided in the statute, 

thus in accordance with law. See Essar Steel Ltd. v. 

United States, 678 F.3d 1268, 1275–76 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 

(sustaining a Commerce determination as “accurate” 

because it was supported by substantial evidence and 

“determined in accordance with the statutory requirements” (citation omitted)); KYD, 607 F.3d at 768 (discussing same); see also Gallant Ocean, 602 F.3d at 1323–24 

(explaining that a rate did not reflect “commercial reality” 

because of concerns that the numbers used in the underlying calculations later proved not to be “credible,” meaning 

that Commerce had not used a lawful method to assign a 

dumping margin under § 1677e(b) (citation omitted)). 

Our holding reflects what the statutory scheme already 

requires of Commerce to support its determinations. 19 

U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (explaining that Commerce’s 

determination will be sustained unless it is “unsupported 

by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law”). And it reflects the familiar principle that “[a]dministrative decisions should be set 

aside . . . only for substantial procedural or substantive 

reasons as mandated by statute, . . . not simply because 

the court is unhappy with the result reached.” Vt. Yankee 

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NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 17

Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 

U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (internal citation omitted). As we 

have said before about the antidumping law, “[o]ur duty is 

not to weigh the wisdom of, or to resolve any struggle 

between, competing views of the public interest, but 

rather to respect legitimate policy choices made by [Commerce] in interpreting and applying the statute.” Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 

966 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

The court does not use “accurate” and “commercial reality” in some broader sense, such as to require Commerce 

to apply the statutory methods to determine the industrywide “commercial realities prevailing” during a particular 

time period. Albemarle, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 1292. Nor 

must Commerce “prove a negative” about a respondent’s 

pricing behavior if that respondent fails to provide evidence that would yield more representative calculations of 

its pricing behavior, see, e.g., Home Meridian Int’l, Inc. v. 

United States, 772 F.3d 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2014), for 

the statute permits Commerce to use adverse facts available in that situation to assign the respondent a margin, 

19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b); see also PSC VSMPO–Avisma Corp. 

v. United States, 688 F.3d 751, 760 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that “absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances[,] the administrative 

agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of 

procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of 

permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties”

(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)). The statutory scheme measures through specific 

methods non-commercial pricing behavior deemed unfair 

by Congress—namely, dumping. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 et. seq. 

To obligate Commerce to account for other market conditions that the statute does not “misconceives not only the 

scope of the agency’s statutory responsibility, but also the 

nature of the administrative process,” Vt. Yankee Nuclear 

Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 550, and could subject ComCase: 15-1054 Document: 68-2 Page: 17 Filed: 01/19/2016
18 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES

merce to allegations that it acts ultra vires in future 

administrative proceedings, see City of Arlington v. FCC, 

133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2013) (explaining that an agency’s 

“power to act and how [it is] to act is authoritatively 

prescribed by Congress, so that when [it] act[s] improperly, . . . what [it] do[es] is ultra vires”). It also would 

permit courts to reach “results-oriented” outcomes not 

intended by Congress. See, e.g., Viraj Grp. v. United 

States, 476 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (a court errs 

in adopting an interpretation of a statute that “would 

create a tremendous burden on Commerce that is not 

required or suggested by the statute”); see also JBF RAK 

LLC v. United States, 790 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 

2015) (discussing same). “Indeed, the pursuit of what the 

court perceives to be the best or correct result would 

render judicial review totally unpredictable.” PSC, 688 

F.3d at 761 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Nan Ya Fails to Demonstrate Error by Commerce

Nan Ya alleges that Commerce’s determination does 

not comport with what 19 U.S.C. 1677e(b) and (c) demand. Appellant’s Br. 5–35. We discuss each set of 

arguments in turn.

1. Commerce’s Decision to Use Shinkong’s Highest Transaction-Specific Margin as a Total Adverse Facts Available

Rate Is Permitted by the Plain Terms of 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677e(b)(4)

Section 1677e(b)(4) permits Commerce to use “any 

other information placed on the record” as adverse facts 

available. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(4). In its remand redetermination, Commerce found that language ambiguous 

because it does not directly address whether the agency 

may use the highest “transaction-specific margin from an 

ongoing segment . . . as a total [adverse facts available] 

rate.” S.A. 111. Nevertheless, Commerce found that the 

statute reasonably could be read to allow such use beCase: 15-1054 Document: 68-2 Page: 18 Filed: 01/19/2016
NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 19

cause it reflects “a model-specific comparison of a respondent’s U.S. sale price to its home market sale price—

the quintessential comparison for a dumping margin.” 

S.A. 112–13. Finally, it found that the SAA supports its 

interpretation. S.A. 113.

We disagree with Commerce that the phrase “any 

other information placed on the record” in 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677e(b)(4) is ambiguous and, instead, hold that the 

statute’s plain terms permit the agency to apply 

Shinkong’s highest transaction-specific margin as Nan 

Ya’s adverse facts available rate. Under the first step of 

Chevron, “we must first carefully investigate the matter 

to determine whether Congress’s purpose and intent on 

the question at issue is judicially ascertainable,” using 

“traditional tools of statutory construction.” Timex V.I., 

Inc. v. United States, 157 F.3d 879, 881–82 (Fed. Cir. 

1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

One such canon explains that, in the absence of a statutory definition, “we construe . . . statutory term[s] in accordance with [their] ordinary or natural meaning.” FDIC 

v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (citation omitted).

The statute does not define the phrase “any other information placed on the record.” The word “any” is the 

key modifier in the phrase in question. “Any” means “one 

that is selected without restriction or limitation of choice.” 

Any, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the 

English Language Unabridged (1986). The absence of a 

“restriction or limitation” means that the statute gives 

Commerce substantial discretion to decide which record 

information to use and certainly encompasses Shinkong’s 

single highest transaction-specific margin. That conclusion finds support in the broad reach that the Supreme 

Court has given to the word “any.” See, e.g., United States 

v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 (1945) (equating “any” 

with “all”); see also Barseback Kraft AB v. United States, 

121 F.3d 1475, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing same). 

And our conclusion is consistent with what we have said 

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20 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES

before, albeit not in precise Chevron terms. See Ta Chen 

Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, 298 F.3d 1330, 

1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is within Commerce’s discretion to presume that the highest prior margin reflects the 

current margins.” (citation omitted)).

Our conclusion finds further support in the structure 

of § 1677e. As explained below, Congress did not require 

Commerce to corroborate information that it uses in the 

subject review if the agency obtained the information in 

the course of that segment; however, Congress required 

Commerce to corroborate information from a prior segment of the proceeding that it uses as adverse facts available in a later segment. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)–(c). That 

Congress decided not to require Commerce to corroborate 

information obtained in this review, such as Shinkong’s, 

further evinces that Commerce has broad discretion to 

choose among the available record information. See, e.g.,

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) 

(“‘[W]here Congress includes particular language in one 

section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is 

generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 

purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” (citation omitted)). Because the statute’s text “answers the 

question, that is the end of the matter.”10 Timex, 157 

F.3d at 882 (citation omitted).

Nan Ya alleges that Commerce unlawfully interpreted 

“any other information placed on the record” in 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677e(b)(4) as allowing it to use the highest transactionspecific margin on the record of the review. According to 

Nan Ya, Commerce’s interpretation unreasonably: (1) 

10 We observe that the SAA mentions only that 

Commerce may use “other information placed on the 

record”; it does not provide any limitation on which information the agency may use. SAA at 870, 1994 

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199. 

 

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NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 21

incorporates within its ambit “a de minimis amount of 

sales” that results in a margin “that is many multiples 

more than all calculated margins,” Appellant’s Br. 5 

(capitalization omitted); (2) permits the agency to use a 

margin that is “aberrant” and otherwise falls outside the 

“continuum” of calculated margins in view of various 

statistical analyses, id. at 8, 13–17; (3) relies upon incomplete criteria in light of other statutory and regulatory 

criteria, id. at 17–21; (4) relies upon the absence of a 

request from Shinkong to exclude the transaction giving 

rise to the 74.34% rate, id. at 23–25; and (5) creates a per 

se rule that is inconsistent with agency practice, id. at 21–

23. 

As an initial matter, we observe that Nan Ya fails to 

make these arguments within the operative Chevron 

framework. That misstep typically warrants a finding of 

waiver. See United States v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 738 F.3d 

1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“It is well established that 

arguments that are not appropriately developed in a 

party’s briefing may be deemed waived.” (citations omitted)); Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 

1983) (finding waiver when “counsel has made no attempt 

to address the issue” because “[t]he premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as selfdirected boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued 

by the parties before them”); see also Zhejiang Sanhua Co. 

v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1358 (Ct. Int’l 

Trade 2015) (citing Great American Insurance and Carducci in holding that a party waived its arguments for 

failing to raise them within the operative Chevron framework); JBF RAK LLC v. United States, 991 F. Supp. 2d 

1343, 1356 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014) (citing Great American 

Insurance in reaching the same conclusion); MTZ 

Polyfilms, Ltd. v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 

1308–09 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009) (citing Carducci in reachCase: 15-1054 Document: 68-2 Page: 21 Filed: 01/19/2016
22 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES

ing same conclusion). Nevertheless, for clarity, we address Nan Ya’s contentions.

Nan Ya fails to recognize that neither “any other information placed on the record” in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(4), 

nor any other provision in subsection (b) contains any of 

the requirements it alleges. Section 1677e(b) states:

If [Commerce] . . . finds that an interested party 

has failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of 

its ability to comply with a request for information 

from [Commerce] . . . , [Commerce] . . . , in reaching the applicable determination under this subtitle, may use an inference that is adverse to the 

interests of that party in selecting from among the 

facts otherwise available. Such adverse inference 

may include reliance on information derived 

from— 

(1) the petition,

(2) a final determination in the investigation under this subtitle,

(3) any previous review under section 1675 of this 

title or determination under section 1675b of this 

title, or

(4) any other information placed on the record.

19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). The statute simply does not require 

Commerce to select facts that reflect a certain amount of 

sales, yield a particular margin, fall within a continuum 

according to the application of particular statistical methods, or align with standards articulated in other statutes 

and regulations. Congress decided what requirements 

Commerce must fulfill in reaching its determinations, 

§ 1677e(b), and we do not impose conditions not present in 

or suggested by the statute’s text. See, e.g., JBF, 790 F.3d 

at 1368; Viraj Grp., 476 F.3d at 1357–58.

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NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 23

Nan Ya’s remaining arguments also fail. Although 

Nan Ya alleges that Commerce’s remand redetermination 

establishes “that Commerce may per se use the highest 

calculated dumping margin as [adverse facts available],” 

Appellant’s Br. 25, its argument ignores Commerce’s 

statement in that determination, S.A. 127 (Commerce’s 

remand redetermination “does not create a per se rule 

that automatically requires use of the highest transaction-specific margin.”); S.A. 127 (explaining that Commerce “ultimately applied a margin significantly lower 

than Nan Ya’s highest transaction-specific margin [from 

the immediately-preceding review that is] on the record” 

of this review). Commerce articulated that the use of the 

highest transaction-specific margin will depend upon the 

facts of a particular case. S.A. 120, 127 (explaining that, 

if the highest weighted-average margins from any segment of the proceeding are “insufficient to induce cooperation,” then it will use other transaction-specific margins).

Finally, Nan Ya argues that Commerce’s decision to 

apply adverse facts available impermissibly “rest[s]

wholly (100%) on deterrence (punishment).” Appellant’s 

Br. 25–28. The legislative history belies Nan Ya’s argument. The SAA explains that

[w]here a party has not cooperated, Commerce . . . may employ adverse inferences about 

the missing information to ensure that the party 

does not obtain a more favorable result by failing 

to cooperate than if it had cooperated fully. In 

employing adverse inferences, one factor [Commerce] will consider is the extent to which a party 

may benefit from its own lack of cooperation.

SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199. On remand, 

Commerce explained that, “[b]ecause the highest 

weighted calculated margin applied in this proceeding is 

Nan Ya’s own previous [adverse facts available] rate of 

18.30[%], a major consideration for [Commerce] was 

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24 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES

selecting a rate sufficient to induce Nan Ya to cooperate 

in the future.” S.A. 127–28; see also S.A. 231 (finding that 

the 18.30% rate “was calculated for Nan Ya during the 

most recently completed administrative review and Nan 

Ya still chose to not cooperate” (emphasis added)). Thus, 

Commerce’s consideration of the deterrent effect of its 

determination reflects the law’s expectation.

2. Commerce Correctly Followed the Unambiguous Terms 

of the Statute and Found that the Corroboration Requirement in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) Does Not Apply

Nan Ya next argues that Commerce’s determination 

“violates the statutory corroboration requirement” because Commerce did not corroborate Nan Ya’s information from the immediately-preceding review that it 

used to support its selection of the 74.34% rate. Appellant’s Br. 28 (capitalization omitted). Nan Ya’s argument 

overlooks the plain language of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c).

Before we address Nan Ya’s argument, we first must 

determine what § 1677e(c) requires. Section 1677e(c) 

states that

[w]hen [Commerce] . . . relies on secondary information rather than on information obtained in the 

course of an investigation or review, [Commerce] . . . shall, to the extent practicable, corroborate that information from independent sources 

that are reasonably at [its] disposal.

19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c).

Commerce properly found that § 1677e(c) unambiguously does not require the agency to corroborate information obtained during the course of the subject segment 

(i.e., primary information) when it uses that information 

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NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 25

as facts available, adverse or otherwise.11 S.A. 108–10 & 

nn.2 & 3. The statute’s text contrasts “information obtained in the course of . . . [a] review,” such as Shinkong’s, 

with information from a prior segment of the proceeding 

(i.e., secondary information). 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). That 

dichotomy supports Commerce’s interpretation that the 

corroboration requirement does not apply when Commerce uses primary information, rather than secondary 

information, when selecting from among the adverse facts 

available. See Russello, 464 U.S. at 23. The SAA confirms that primary information does not meet the definition of “secondary information” that requires 

corroboration. See SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199 

(contrasting primary and secondary information, defining 

the latter as “information derived from the petition that 

gave rise to the investigation . . . , the final determination 

[from the investigation], or any previous review . . . concerning the subject merchandise”). And we 

previously have recognized, albeit not in precise Chevron 

terms, that § 1677e(c) unambiguously does not require 

Commerce to corroborate primary information. See 

Gallant Ocean, 602 F.3d at 1324 (“Ta Chen was not a 

corroboration case as Commerce relied on primary information.” (discussing 298 F.3d at 1339)).

The CIT erred to the extent that it held that the corroboration requirement in § 1677e(c) applies when Commerce relies upon primary information. Nan Ya II, 6 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1367–68. It found that Commerce made “a 

fairly airtight argument” under “a straightforward Chevron step one” analysis of § 1677e(c), in which the agency 

11 During oral argument, Nan Ya conceded that 19 

U.S.C. § 1677e(c) unambiguously does not require Commerce to corroborate primary information. See Oral

Argument at 8:28–9:54, http://oralarguments.cafc.us

courts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-1054.mp3.

 

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26 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES

determined that it is not required to corroborate primary 

information. Id. at 1367. Nevertheless, the CIT held the 

corroboration requirement under § 1677e(c) applies to 

primary information and, thus, so does De Cecco. Id. at 

1367–68. That holding conflicts with the plain language 

of § 1677e(c), the guidance provided in the SAA, and other 

CIT decisions. See § 1677e(c) (contrasting “information 

obtained in the course of . . . [a] review” with secondary 

information); SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199 

(same); see also iScholar Inc. v. United States, No. 10-

00107, 2011 WL 109014, at *2–3 (Ct. Int’l Trade Jan. 13, 

2011) (where the CIT did not require Commerce to corroborate adverse facts available pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677e(c) when the agency selected information from the 

subject segment); Ass’n of Am. Sch. Paper Suppliers v. 

United States, 32 Ct. Int’l Trade 1196, 1202–04 (2008) 

(same). The CIT’s interpretation of § 1677e(c) appears 

motivated by the fact that “Commerce did not simply 

select Shinkong’s highest transaction specific margin in 

setting Nan Ya’s rate, and leave it at that.” Nan Ya II, 6 

F. Supp. 3d at 1367. That Commerce relied upon corroborating evidence (i.e., Nan Ya’s data from the immediatelypreceding review) to support its use of primary information does not change the text of § 1677e(c), which 

explains that Commerce is not required to corroborate 

primary information. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (holding that agencies and the courts must follow Congress’s 

unambiguous directive).

Turning to Nan Ya’s argument, the statute does not 

require Commerce to corroborate corroborating data (i.e., 

Nan Ya’s data from the immediately-preceding review); 

rather, it explains that Commerce “shall, to the extent 

practicable, corroborate [secondary] information.” 19 

U.S.C. § 1677e(c). As the CIT correctly observed, to hold 

otherwise would lead to the absurd result in which ComCase: 15-1054 Document: 68-2 Page: 26 Filed: 01/19/2016
NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 27

merce corroborates “ad infinitum.” Nan Ya II, 6 F. Supp. 

3d at 1371.12

3. Exhaustion and Waiver Bars Nan Ya’s Remaining 

Arguments

Finally, Nan Ya asserts that other “popular statistics 

methodologies”—namely, the “Hampel Identifier Test” 

and the “Box & Whisker Plot”—demonstrate that the 

transaction from which Commerce derived the 74.34% 

rate is an outlier. Appellant’s Br. 16, 32. Nan Ya never 

raised these statistical methodologies in its comments on 

12 Notwithstanding its unequivocal statement that it 

has raised only legal challenges in this appeal, Appellant’s Reply Br. 5, Nan Ya contends that “even erroneously assuming use of uncorroborated data is permissible, 

Commerce’s own continuum test as to such data indicates 

that the 74.34% [adverse facts available rate] is not 

supported by substantial evidence,” Appellant’s Br. 29 

(capitalization omitted); see id at 29–35 (discussing other 

evidence). It also contends that Commerce erred in 

relying upon the absence of a request from Shinkong to 

exclude the transaction giving rise to the 74.34% rate. Id. 

at 23–25. These arguments contest the weight that 

Commerce afforded to competing evidence, which we may 

not disturb. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United 

States, 750 F.2d 927, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In any event, 

we agree with the CIT that substantial evidence supports 

Commerce’s selection of the 74.34% rate because the 

transaction underlying that rate “involved a larger quantity than many of Shinkong’s other sales and differed 

from other models in the least important physical characteristics” and “Nan Ya was capable of dumping at 

74.34[%] as evidenced by Nan Ya’s own data” from the 

immediately-preceding review. Nan Ya II, 6 F. Supp. 3d 

at 1369–70 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

 

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28 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES

Commerce’s draft remand or in its opening brief, remand 

comments, or reply to remand comments before the CIT. 

S.A. 59–75 (reply to remand comments), 77–96 (remand 

comments), 148–58 (comments on draft remand), 162–81 

(opening brief). Nan Ya has thus both failed to exhaust 

its remedies before the agency and also waived these 

arguments. See, e.g., Qingdao Sea-Line Trading Co. v. 

United States, 766 F.3d 1378, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(“Commerce regulations require the presentation of all 

issues and arguments in a party’s case brief, and we have 

held that a party’s failure to raise an argument before 

Commerce constitutes a failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.” (footnote omitted)); Sage Prods., Inc. v. 

Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 

(“With a few notable exceptions, . . . appellate courts do 

not consider a party’s new theories[] lodged first on appeal.”). Nan Ya conceded during oral argument that it 

had not preserved these arguments for appeal. See Oral 

Argument at 0:59–1:35, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-1054.mp3.

CONCLUSION

Commerce may use, as adverse facts available pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(4), the highest transactionspecific margin on the record of the subject review. If 

Commerce selects the highest transaction-specific margin 

from the subject review from among the adverse facts 

available, it need not corroborate that information pursuant to § 1677e(c). Although the provisions of the Trade 

Preferences Extension Act of 2015 do not govern our 

review of Commerce’s determinations in this appeal, Ad 

Hoc Shrimp, 802 F.3d at 1348–52, we note that Congress 

confirmed there that Commerce has the “discretion to 

apply [the] highest rate” and need not demonstrate that a 

particular dumping margin “reflects an alleged commercial reality of the interested party,” Trade Preferences 

Extension Act of 2015, Sec. 502(3), § 1677e(d)(2), (3)(B), 

129 Stat. at 384.

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NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 29

We have considered Nan Ya’s remaining arguments 

that have been exhausted and not waived and find them 

unpersuasive. Accordingly, the decision of the United 

States Court of International Trade is

AFFIRMED

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