Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-60044/USCOURTS-ca9-14-60044-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Orange County Probation Department
Appellee
Maria G. Rivera

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE MARIA G. RIVERA,

Debtor,

MARIA G. RIVERA,

Appellant,

v.

ORANGE COUNTY PROBATION

DEPARTMENT,

Appellee.

No. 14-60044

BAP No.

13-1476

OPINION

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Kirscher, Pappas, and Latham, Bankruptcy Judges,

Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 6, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed August 10, 2016

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, and Kim McLane Wardlaw,

Circuit Judges, and Mark W. Bennett,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

* The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 1 of 20
2 IN RE RIVERA

SUMMARY**

Bankruptcy

The panel reversed the judgment of the Bankruptcy

Appellate Panel, which had affirmed the bankruptcy court’s

denial of a debtor’s motion to sanction Orange County for

persisting post-discharge in its efforts to collect a debt arising

from the debtor’s son’s involuntary juvenile detention.

The panel held that the debtor’s liability for the costs of

support of her son while in detention was not a “domestic

support obligation” and thus was not excepted from discharge

in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).

COUNSEL

Brett H. Ramsaur (argued) and Todd E. Lundell, Snell &

Wilmer, Costa Mesa, California, for Appellant.

Adam C. Clanton (argued), Deputy; Laurie A. Shade, Senior

Deputy; Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel; Orange

County Counsel, Santa Ana, California; for Appellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 2 of 20
IN RE RIVERA 3

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

INTRODUCTION

We must decide whether a mother’s debt to Orange

County arising from her son’s involuntary juvenile detention

is a “domestic support obligation” and thus excepted from

discharge in bankruptcy. We conclude that it is not.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellant Maria Rivera is the mother of a minor who was

held in juvenile detention in Orange County for more than a

year, from 2008–2010. Upon her son’s release, the County

Probation Department sent Rivera a bill.

California law makes the parents of juvenile detainees

“liable for the reasonable costs of support of the minor while

the minor is” held in detention. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 903(a). A county may seek reimbursement under § 903

only “for food and food preparation, clothing, personal

supplies, and medical expenses,” id., and the statute imposes

a cap of $30 per day. § 903(c). Within those constraints, the

statute limits the bill to the parents’ “ability to pay” at the

time the debt is imposed. Id.

As a result, Rivera’s bill did not cover the entire cost to

the County of her son’s detention, but it was a large sum

nevertheless. The County sought to recover $23.90 from

Rivera for each day her son was detained, and $2,199 for

legal expenses. The total bill came to $16,372.

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 3 of 20
4 IN RE RIVERA

Rivera did her best to pay. After selling her house, she

paid $9,508 on May 10, 2010. Part of the debt remained,

however, and the County continued sending Rivera regular

bills. Eventually, she was served with an order to appear

before the juvenile court, and when she failed to do so, the

court entered a default judgment against her. The judgment

stated that she still owed the County $9,905, despite her

earlier payment.1

Several months later, in September 2011, Rivera filed for

bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. She

had no assets to distribute, only debts to discharge. In

January 2012, Rivera received a full discharge and, thus, the

“fresh start” that the protections of the BankruptcyCode seek

to provide. Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1835

(2015).

Orange County, however, persisted in its efforts to collect

Rivera’s debt even after the conclusion of her bankruptcy

case. The County believed that Rivera’s debt was a

“domestic support obligation” (“DSO”) like alimony or child

support – the kind of debt that is not dischargable in

bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).

Rivera believed that any remaining debt to the County

had been fully discharged. In her bankruptcy petition, she

had listed her unpaid obligation to the County as a priority

1 The County’s accounting in this case is highly questionable. It is

unclear how this amount was reached. Rivera’s son’s expenses totaled

$16,372. After Rivera’s payment on May 10, 2010, this would leave at

most $6,864. In addition, the child’s father negotiated with the County to

pay $3,336. If the father paid the full amount he promised, only $3,528

would appear to remain. At Oral Argument, County counsel was unable

to explain this apparent discrepancy.

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 4 of 20
IN RE RIVERA 5

unsecured debt, not a DSO, and the County did not object in

writing to this characterization. Rivera moved to reopen her

bankruptcy case and asked the bankruptcy court to sanction

the County for attempting to collect a discharged debt. The

court reopened the case, and issued a tentative ruling in

Rivera’s favor.

After further briefing, however, the bankruptcy judge

changed his mind and ruled in favor of the County. The

judge was persuaded that Congress expanded the category of

DSOs in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer

Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) to include Rivera’s debt. 

The judge agreed with the County that Rivera’s debt was in

the nature of support because the County sought to recover

only the costs of her son’s food, clothing, and medicine, not

the full cost of his detention. The Bankruptcy Appellate

Panel affirmed on largely the same ground, and Rivera

appealed. Whether Rivera’s debt to the County is a domestic

support obligation is the issue before us.

DISCUSSION

I.

Bankruptcy gives people from all walks of life a “fresh

start.” Harris, 135 S. Ct. at 1835. “[A] debtor who

successfully navigates the bankruptcy process is ordinarily

entitled to a discharge of all pre-petition debts.” In re

Leibowitz, 217 F.3d 799, 801 (9th Cir. 2000). Some debts,

however, are not eligible for discharge. Among them are

domestic support obligations – the financial obligations upon

which family members and former family members rely. 

Section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts DSOs

from discharge. The purpose of this exception is to ensure

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 5 of 20
6 IN RE RIVERA

that spouses and children continue to receive support even if

the support provider has declared bankruptcy. See In re

Chang, 163 F.3d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998). The exception

to discharge for DSOs thus “strikes a balance between

competing policies.” Id. On the one hand, bankruptcy

permits a petitioner to wipe his slate clean when debts

become impossible to overcome. “On the other hand, this

court has recognized an overriding public policy favoring the

enforcement of familial obligations.” Id. Bankruptcy

provides a way to leave one’s debts, but not one’s most

fundamental family obligations, behind.

Before 2005, the Bankruptcy Code provided that a debt

was a DSO and thus excepted from discharge if it was owed

“to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for

alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or

child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce

decree or other order of a court of record, determination made

in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental

unit, or property settlement agreement. . . .” 11 U.S.C.

§ 523(a)(5) (pre-2005). The definition also provided for

several exceptions.

Under this definition, it was clear that ordinary family

support obligations owed directly to a child or former spouse

were DSOs. Courts divided, however, on the DSO status of

debts owed to government agencies concerned with family

support. Compare, e.g., City of Oakland v. Fralick, 215 B.R.

132, 133 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (foster care debt is not a DSO

because it is “owed to an entity other than a child, spouse or

ex-spouse”); with In re Burton, 132 B.R. 575 (Bankr. N.D.

Ind. 1988) (foster care debt is a DSO because it is in the

nature of familial support). Compare also, e.g., In re

Spencer, 182 B.R. 263 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995) (a debt owed

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 6 of 20
IN RE RIVERA 7

to a state wardship unit is not a DSO because it is owed to a

government unit); with In re Canganelli, 132 B.R. 369

(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) (wardship debt is a DSO because it

is in the nature of domestic support). Compare also, e.g., In

re Linn, 38 B.R. 762, 762 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1984) (debt arising

from a “court appointed attorney and psychiatrist for [a]

minor child” in a custody proceeding is not a DSO because it

is owed to a government entity); with Chang, 163 F.3d at

1141 (debt arising from a court appointed guardian ad litem

and neutral mental health expert in a custody proceeding is a

DSO because it is in the nature of child support).

BAPCPA, the statute that modified the Bankruptcy Code

in 2005, resolved the dispute. Following the 2005

amendment, a debt does not lose its DSO status simply

because it is owed to a governmental unit. The statute now

states that a debt is a DSO if it is “owed to or recoverable

by. . . a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such

child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative” or “a

governmental unit” and is “in the nature of alimony,

maintenance, or support (including assistance provided by a

governmental unit) of such spouse, former spouse, or child of

the debtor or such child’s parent, without regard to whether

such debt is expressly so designated.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)

(emphasis added). This definition does not change the

substance or core meaning of the term DSO. It did, however,

remove any doubt that debts owed to various government

units for temporary child or spousal aid payments; for support

provided in foster care, wardship, and residential treatment

centers; or for expenses incurred for a child’s benefit in

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 7 of 20
8 IN RE RIVERA

divorce and custody proceedings could qualify as DSOs.2

Thus, BAPCPA carries forward the core purpose of the DSO

exception by ensuring that bankruptcy will not hinder the

enforcement of family obligations in circumstances in which

the government’s family support infrastructure – the network

of foster systems, aid agencies, family courts, and the like –

has intervened on a spouse’s, former spouse’s, or child’s

behalf.

The question before us, however, is whether debts owed

to government units that are not part of the government’s

family support infrastructure, and specifically debts to a

Probation Department for costs related to a juvenile’s

detention, are “in the nature of . . . support,” and thus are

DSOs. The answer to this question is the same after

BAPCPA as it was before, as BAPCPA changed only the

parties who could qualify as creditors to whom a DSO was

owed, not the definition or nature of family support itself.

II.

Rivera owes her debt to the Orange County Probation

Department – a law enforcement unit. The Department’s

mission statement describes it as a “public safety agency” that

makes use of “efficient and research supported corrections

practices to Reduce Crime[,] Assist the Courts in Managing

Offenders[,] Promote Lawful and Productive Lifestyles[, and]

2 This was already the general approach we preferred in this Circuit

before the BAPCPA amendments. See Chang, 163 F.3d at 1141

(explaining that the “identity of the payee is less important than the nature

of the debt”); Leibowitz, 217 F.3d at 803 (adopting the same approach and

explaining that the key question is whether the debt is “in the nature of

support”). Thus BAPCPA resolved the dispute in favor of this Circuit’s

approach.

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 8 of 20
IN RE RIVERA 9

Assist Victims.”3 The “support” that the Probation

Department provided to Rivera’s son in the course of his

detention was incidental to – and the price of – its larger

governmental purpose of promoting “public safety” and

“reduc[ing] crime” through “corrections practices.” In short,

the purpose of Rivera’s son’s detention was to enforce the

criminal law.

This sets Rivera’s case apart from all other cases in which

debts have been found to be covered by the statutory

definition of DSOs. The purpose of foster care and state

wardship, for example, is to provide for a minor’s safety,

well-being, and support. Foster systems and wardship units

are a part of the state’s child support infrastructure, not its

criminal justice system. This infrastructure is concerned with

child welfare, not the protection of society, and its institutions

assume custody over a minor because of problems with his

family home life or the absence of his parents; they seek to

reproduce for the child the kind of holistic support that

parents ordinarily provide.4 They are designed, in short, to

improve the child’s “domestic” circumstances. Accordingly,

many courts have found that foster care and wardship debts

are in the nature of support within the meaning of the

3 Orange County Probation Department, Mission Statement,

http://ocgov.com/gov/probation/about/mission (last visitedAug. 3, 2016).

4 Moreover, a noncustodial parent’s obligation to help bear a child’s

costs in foster care is similar to a typical domestic support obligation, in

which a noncustodial parent must support a child’s welfare in a different

home. See In re Hernandez, 496 B.R. 553 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2013) (finding

that a debt owed by an estranged mother to the state to assist foster parents

who began to care for the child after the death of the father was in the

nature of support). As a result, a foster care debt is not materially

different from an ordinary child support debt.

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 9 of 20
10 IN RE RIVERA

bankruptcy statute. See, e.g., Canganelli, 132 B.R. at

394–95; Burton, 132 B.R. at 584; In re Huber, 80 B.R. 531

(Bankr. D. Colo. 1987); In re Carlson, 176 B.R. 890, 894

(Bankr. D. Minn. 1995).

In another line of cases, we identified debts to

government units or related third parties as in the nature of

support where those debts were inherently intertwined with

the establishment of child support obligations. In In re

Leibowitz, we considered the case of a mother who left her

husband and applied for temporary financial support from a

County aid program. 217 F.3d at 801. A condition of the

County’s support was that if she later won a child support

order from her ex-husband, any benefits accrued during her

enrollment in the aid program would be credited back to the

County. Eventually, the court ordered the ex-husband to

make monthly support payments and also to reimburse the

County for its support of the mother after the separation but

before the entry of the order. The question we confronted

was whether the portion of the father’s child support order

owed directly to the County was in the nature of support. 

Similarly, in In re Chang, we considered whether the debt

arising from the cost of a court-appointed guardian ad litem

and neutral mental health expert in the course of custody

proceedings was in the nature of support. 163 F.3d at 1138.

In both cases, we decided that the debt was indeed in the

nature of support and thus excepted from discharge. Chang,

163 F.3d at 1141; Leibowitz, 217 F.3d at 803. The special

feature of Chang and Leibowitz is that the debts arose in the

course of custody and divorce proceedings – proceedings that

are integral to the creation of domestic support obligations –

and represented costs incurred to ensure the domestic welfare

of the child. The debts were also owed, as in the case of

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 10 of 20
IN RE RIVERA 11

foster care and wardship, to government units or actors for

which child support was the primary concern – to units that

were a part of the state’s family support infrastructure.

Rivera’s debt is different. It arises from her son’s

involuntary detention for law enforcement purposes by a

“public safety agency,” and the provision of food and

clothing is only incidental to such incarceration. Rivera’s son

was taken into custody not in order to provide a place where

he could secure a wholesome upbringing but because of his

criminal misbehavior; he was placed and remained in a

detention facility because of the state’s interest in enforcing

the law, not because of its interest in giving him a nourishing

home, affording him sustenance, ensuring his safety, or

providing him with an improved domestic environment. As

the Supreme Court explained, a state’s duty to provide basic

needs to an incarcerated person “arises not from the State’s

knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its

expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation

which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own

behalf.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Social Servs,

489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989). Moreover, Rivera’s debt is not

inherently intertwined with the establishment of child support

obligations. To the contrary: it comes not in the course of a

child custody hearing but in the wake of a criminal

proceeding that results in involuntary detention.

It is therefore both inaccurate and inconsistent with

precedent to characterize Rivera’s debt to the County as “in

the nature of . . . support” as that term is defined in the

Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). Unlike foster

care or wardship units, which seek to recreate a domestic

environment for children without a suitable home, and unlike

guardians and experts who are appointed on a child’s behalf

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 11 of 20
12 IN RE RIVERA

in family disputes in order to help protect a child’s domestic

welfare, juvenile detention serves not domestic but

correctional ends. In short, Rivera’s debt is not a domestic

support obligation and thus not excepted from discharge.

This conclusion is in harmony with the cases that have

directly addressed parents’ debts arising from a child’s

correctional detention. The one other bankruptcy court to

consider the dischargeability of parents’ juvenile detention

debts post-BAPCPA held that the debt “is not in the nature of

support,” reasoning that “an involuntary detention in a

juvenile facility hardly seems to fit within the purpose and

spirit of the statute.” In re Rosen, No. 11-07651-BHL-7,

2012 WL 1565617, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. May 2, 2012). 

The few pre-BAPCPA decisions dealing with such debts

concluded that they were not DSOs, but did not directly

address the question of whether the debt was in the nature of

support and instead based their holdings on the fact that the

debt was owed directly to a government unit. See In re

Erfourth, 126 B.R. 736, 741 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991); In re

Crouch, 199 B.R. 690, 693 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996). The

Seventh Circuit followed the same approach in holding a

parent’s debt in connection with a juvenile delinquent’s

custody dischargeable in In re Platter but tellingly observed

that “the ultimate purpose” of the debt “is not to provide the

debtor’s child with support; it is to provide the [County] with

reimbursement for its efforts.” 140 F.3d 676, 683 (7th Cir.

1998). That observation is equally pertinent here. 

Significantly, no court has previously held that a parent’s debt

resulting from a child’s juvenile detention is excepted from

discharge or that it constitutes a DSO.

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 12 of 20
IN RE RIVERA 13

III.

The conclusion that Rivera’s debt is not a domestic

support obligation as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A), and

thus not excepted from discharge in bankruptcy, vindicates

the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code and its discharge

exceptions.

“The principal purpose of the BankruptcyCode is to grant

a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor.” Marrama

v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007). 

“Congress normally confines [exceptions to discharge] to

circumstances where strong, special policy considerations,

such as the presence of fault, argue for preserving the debt.” 

Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1760

(2013). The exceptions to discharge that the Code spells out

(including the exception for DSOs) are to be construed

narrowly so as to make a fresh start possible unless Congress

has clearly created an exception. Id.

There can be no doubt that Rivera is an “unfortunate but

honest debtor.” Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367. She incurred her

debt through no fault of her own. In fact, she incurred it as a

result of somebody else’s fault. It was her son’s actions, not

hers, that led to his detention in juvenile hall, and thus his

actions, not hers, that enabled the County to burden her with

this debt under § 903. Nevertheless, in the wake of her

child’s incarceration – “[o]ne of the greatest misfortunes a

parent may suffer,” In re Jerald C., 36 Cal. 3d 1, 10 (1984) –

Rivera made a good faith effort to pay her bill. She has paid

over half of it already, at great personal sacrifice. Rivera’s

debt thus arises in precisely the circumstance in which the

Bankruptcy Code seeks to provide a fresh start.

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 13 of 20
14 IN RE RIVERA

The specific exception to discharge for DSOs is designed

to ensure the continued “enforcement of familial obligations”

even through bankruptcy proceedings. Chang, 163 F.3d at

1140. While bankruptcy provides a fresh start for almost

everything, it does not permit debtors to abandon their

financial obligations to their children, spouses, former

spouses, and other beneficiaries who relyon domestic support

or to government units that help administer or enforce such

support.

Here, however, a conclusion that Rivera’s debt is

excepted from discharge would not benefit her son but, as the

Seventh Circuit pointed out, would only detract from her

ability to fulfill her family support obligations. See Platter,

140 F.3d at 683 (“Excluding this debt from discharge . . . will

neither protect spouses, former spouses, or children from

being injured by a debtor’s discharge nor will it further the

bankruptcy goal of a fresh start for the debtor.”); see also

Crouch, 199 B.R. at 693 (explaining that “[a] finding that the

debt in question here is nondischargeable. . . would not

further the statutory policy of protecting family support

obligations” but instead “would detract from the fresh start

policy embodied in § 523(a)(5)”). While the discharge of a

typical DSO harms the beneficiaries of domestic support by

depriving them of that support – hence the Bankruptcy

Code’s exception – the discharge ofRivera’s debt will almost

certainly benefit her son, who has much to gain from his

mother’s fresh start. The only entity affected negatively by

discharge in this case is the County, which will suffer only by

losing the portion of its cost of incarceration that it seeks so

adamantly to recover, surely not a loss that is inconsistent

with furthering the objectives of family support. To allow the

County “to recover its debt without entering the creditors’

queue is counter to the Bankruptcy Code’s general purpose

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 14 of 20
IN RE RIVERA 15

and [the discharge exception’s] specific purpose.” Platter,

140 F.3d at 683.

IV.

The County’s arguments that Rivera’s debt is excepted

from discharge are unpersuasive. Contrary to the County’s

assertion, Rivera’s debt is not in the nature of domestic

support simply because it represents in part the costs of her

son’s basic needs. There is no doubt that the County

“supported” Rivera’s son during his detention, and that the

expenses for which the County seeks reimbursement fall

under the general rubric of support; but that is not sufficient

to make an obligation a DSO.5 A credit card company could

hardly claim that a credit card debt is “in the nature of . . .

support” as contemplated by § 101(14A) because the

underlying charge was for food, medicine, and clothing for a

dependent child. Nor could a retailer or a hotelier claim that

an unpaid bill creates a debt “in the nature of . . . support”

because that bill represents the cost of a minor’s basic needs. 

Rivera’s debt is not in the nature of support for the purposes

of the Bankruptcy Code simply because the underlying

expenses for which the County seeks reimbursement can be

described ordinarily as support expenses. Where the

principal purpose of the County’s custody over Rivera’s son

is public safety, not the son’s domestic well-being or welfare,

the debt does not qualify as a domestic support obligation.

5 The same is as true of room as of board. Indeed, under the County’s

theory, it could except almost the entire cost of incarceration from

discharge, should state law permit it to send a more expansive bill. 

Similarly, under that approach, the cost of a juvenile’s incarceration in an

adult prison could be excepted from discharge if a state sought to charge

his parents for such imprisonment.

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 15 of 20
16 IN RE RIVERA

For the same reason, Rivera’s debt is not in the nature of

support simply because state law limits the expenses for

which the County may legally seek reimbursement to certain

specific aspects of its total expenditure. We have said that

the way a state characterizes a debt is relevant, though not

conclusive, to its proper classification in bankruptcy, see

Chang, 163 F.3d at 1140, but the County draws the wrong

conclusion from the history of California Welfare and

Institutions Code § 903.

A previous version of the statute permitted counties to bill

parents for the full costs of their children’s detention. The

California Supreme Court found that version unconstitutional,

explaining that it is unacceptable to bill parents for the costs

of protecting society against the misdeeds of their children. 

Jerald C., 36 Cal. 3d at 10–11. The Court then upheld the

present version, noting that it properly limits the debt to “the

reasonable costs expended for the support and maintenance

of the minor.” Cty. of San Mateo v. Dell J., 46 Cal. 3d 1236,

1250 (1988).

While providing an explanation as to why state law limits

the expenses for which a County may seek reimbursement to

the costs of the minor’s basic needs, the legislative action

does not, contrary to the County’s argument, support the

conclusion that state law characterizes Rivera’s debt as in the

nature of support for the purposes of federal bankruptcy law;

nor does it show that the purposes of the DSO exemption

would be served by holding that such claims fall within the

statutory definition of that exception. At least as important,

the statute explicitly states that its purpose is to “protect the

fiscal integrity of the county. . .,” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 903(c), and at oral argument the County’s counsel stated

that the motivation for seeking to collect from Rivera was

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 16 of 20
IN RE RIVERA 17

indeed financial. The special federal policy excepting

domestic support obligations from discharge in bankruptcy

does not extend to the reimbursement of an obligation

assessed not to support a child or to help operate a

government department principally dedicated to the welfare

of children, but rather to protect the fiscal integrity of a

county’s juvenile detention system.

Finally, the county is wrong in arguing that BAPCPA

expanded the nature of the support that qualifies for

reimbursement as a DSO. We agree that BAPCPA provides

that debts to government units can now be DSOs and that

“assistance provided by a government unit” – like foster care,

residential treatment, or a court-appointed guardian – can

sometimes fall into that category. See 11 U.S.C.

§ 101(14A)(B). BAPCPA, however, did not alter the purpose

of the DSO discharge exception, nor did it change the

fundamental requirement that DSOs be for the purposes of

child or family support. See In re Hickey, 473 B.R. 361

(Bankr. D.Or. 2012) (“While § 523(a)(5) may have been

amended by BAPCPA, the changes did not change the

standard for whether a debt or obligation is in the nature of

support.”); In re Phegley, 443 B.R. 154, 157 (8th Cir. B.A.P.

2011) (“The BAPCPA amendments . . . did not change the

standard for whether an obligation is in the nature of

support.”). In sum, BAPCPA amended the Bankruptcy

Code’s DSO exemption so as to expand its scope to cases in

which “domestic support” is provided by a government

agency but not so as to change the nature of domestic support

itself.

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 17 of 20
18 IN RE RIVERA

CONCLUSION

Orange County’s persistence in collecting a debt of over

$9,000 from a bankrupt woman who has acted in good faith

in difficult circumstances has been nothing if not resolute. 

Rivera’s case is troubling, however, because the County’s

actions compromise the goals of juvenile correction and the

best interests of the child, and, ironically, impair the ability of

his mother to provide him with future support. Burdening a

minor’s mother with debts to be paid following his detention

– debts that she cannot escape even in bankruptcy – hardly

serves the future welfare of the child and hardly enhances the

Probation Department’s attempt to transform him into a

productive member of society. Most disturbing, however, is

that the County’s actions undermine the very domestic

“support” for which it is ostensibly seeking reimbursement. 

In relentlessly pursuing the debt’s collection and opposing its

discharge, the County raises yet another obstacle to Rivera’s

efforts to provide her son with the support about which the

County claims to be so deeply concerned. That “betray[s] a

misguided sense of values.” Jerald C., 36 Cal. 3d at 10.

The County’s actions also highlight a recurring problem

of public entities imposing fiscal burdens on those who can

least afford them. Orange County’s public budget shows that

the Probation Department relies on self-generated revenue for

more than 40% of its financing.

6 Seeking to obtain that

revenue by unremittingly pursuing legal actions against

disadvantaged individuals – the counterproductive practice at

6

See FY 2016–17 Orange County Recommended Budget: Public

Protection, http://bos.ocgov.com/finance/2017WB/p1_frm.htm.

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 18 of 20
IN RE RIVERA 19

issue here – can have damaging effects on the community.

7

Not only does such a policy unfairly conscript the poorest

members of society to bear the costs of public institutions,

operating “as a regressive tax,”8but it takes advantage of

people when they are at their most vulnerable, essentially

imposing “a tax upon distress.”9 Moreover, experience shows

that the practice undermines the credibility of government

and the perceived integrity of the legal process.10

7 The problem is not limited to probation costs. Raising money for

government through law enforcement whatever the source – parking

tickets, police-issued citations, court-imposed fees, bills for court

appointed attorneys, punitive fines, incarceration charges, supervision

fees, and more – can lay a debt trap for the poor. When a minor offense

produces a debt, that debt, along with the attendant court appearances, can

lead to loss of employment or shelter, compounding interest, yet more

legal action, and an ever-expanding financial burden – a cycle as

predictable and counterproductive as it is intractable. See ALICIA

BANNON,MITALINAGRECHA&REBEKAH DILLER,BRENNAN CENTER FOR

JUSTICE, CRIMINALJUSTICEDEBT:ABARRIER TO REENTRY 13–17 (2010),

http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%2

0Fines%20FINAL.pdf; Beth A. Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99 IOWA L.

REV. 1929 (2014).

8 Developments in the Law: Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV.

1706, 1734 (2015); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM

PROBATION (2014), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us021

4_ForUpload_0.pdf.

9

Jeremy Bentham, A Protest Against Law-Taxes, in 2 THE WORKS OF

JEREMY BENTHAM 573 (John Bowring ed., 1843).

10

See, e.g, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the

Ferguson Police Department (March 4, 2015) at 79 n.54 (reporting that

the revenue orientation of the Ferguson police, among other factors, has

“generated great distrust of Ferguson law enforcement, especially among

African Americans”).

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 19 of 20
20 IN RE RIVERA

Section 903 permits the County to impose debts on the

parents of children detained in juvenile hall, but it does not

require it to do so. Like so much else, it is a matter of the

County’s discretion whether to send the parent a bill in the

first place, and a matter of further discretion whether to

persist in collecting the debt when that parent’s circumstances

change for the worse. We would hope that in the future the

County will exercise its discretion in a way that protects the

best interests of minors and the society they will join as

adults, instead of following a directly opposite and harmful

course.11

***

For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel is REVERSED. Any further

proceedings below shall be consistent with this opinion.

11 Earlier this year, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors voted to

end the collection of juvenile probation fees under § 903, noting that “it

is in the interest of the County, of young people involved in the juvenile

justice system and their families, and of the larger community that

the County repeal the . . . juvenile probation fees.” Alameda Cty. Bd.

of Supervisors, Res. No. 2016-66 (Mar. 29, 2016),

http://www.acgov.org/board/bos_calendar/documents/DocsAgendaReg

_03_29_16/PUBLIC%20PROTECTION/Regular%20Calendar/Supervi

sor%20Valle_Supervisor%20Carson_229888.pdf.

 Case: 14-60044, 08/10/2016, ID: 10081764, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 20 of 20