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Parties Involved:
Mario Caviedes-Zuniga
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted January 21, 2020 

Decided January 27, 2020 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1104 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MARIO CAVIEDES-ZUNIGA, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 1:15-CR-00197(1) 

Robert W. Gettleman, Judge. 

O R D E R 

Mario Caviedes-Zuniga pleaded guilty to distributing 140 grams of heroin. 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). He was sentenced to 111 months’ imprisonment and four 

years of supervised release. Caviedes-Zuniga appealed, but his lawyer now moves to 

withdraw, arguing that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967). Caviedes-Zuniga did not file a response raising potential issues for appeal, 

see CIR. R. 51(b), but he apparently apprised counsel of the arguments he wants raised 

on his behalf. Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues 

that an appeal of this kind might be expected to raise. Because the analysis appears 

thorough, we limit our review to those issues. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 

(7th Cir. 2014). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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No. 19-1104 Page 2 

Between April 2010 and August 2013, Caviedes-Zuniga was involved in four 

drug transactions between Colombia (where he lived at the time) and Chicago, each 

involving a large quantity of heroin or methamphetamine. Unbeknownst to him, one of 

the people he coordinated with in Chicago was working for law enforcement. In April 

2015, Caviedes-Zuniga was charged with four counts of either distributing or 

attempting to distribute controlled substances. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. A 

month later, he was arrested in Colombia and detained for 9 months in Bogotá until his 

extradition. 

Eventually, Caviedes-Zuniga’s lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the indictment 

based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct. That motion primarily concerned the 

interaction between this case and a separate prosecution of Caviedes-Zuniga in the 

Southern District of Florida for counterfeiting money. He alleged that he had 

cooperated in the Florida case with a special agent, who told him not to talk to the 

authorities in Chicago (to his detriment in negotiating a deal). Caviedes-Zuniga had at 

that point been in pre-trial custody for over three years with no trial in sight. 

Before the district court ruled on the motion to dismiss, Caviedes-Zuniga 

decided to plead guilty. At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court found that 

Caviedes-Zuniga had knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty and accepted the plea. 

A week after entering his guilty plea, Caviedes-Zuniga sought to withdraw it. After 

conferring with counsel, however, he moved to withdraw both his motion to rescind his 

plea and his motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court deemed the motions 

withdrawn, and the case proceeded to sentencing. 

Counsel first explores whether Caviedes-Zuniga could challenge his conviction. 

He consulted with Caviedes-Zuniga regarding the risks and benefits of a challenge to 

the guilty plea and determined that Caviedes-Zuniga wants to withdraw his plea. 

See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 

287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). Because Caviedes-Zuniga ultimately stood by his 

guilty plea when he rescinded his motion to withdraw it, we would review a challenge 

for plain error. See United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 2010); Doe v. 

United States, 51 F.3d 693, 700–01 (7th Cir. 1995). 

Counsel considers arguing that the plea was not knowing or voluntary because, 

in the only deviation from the colloquy required by Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 11, the court did not inform Caviedes-Zuniga that it could impose restitution 

or enter a forfeiture judgment. See FED. R. CRIM P. 11(b)(1)(J), (K). But we agree with 

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No. 19-1104 Page 3 

counsel that a challenge on these grounds would be fruitless because the court did not 

order restitution or forfeiture of property. 

Next, counsel considers but rightly declines to raise three arguments that 

Caviedes-Zuniga believes should vitiate his guilty plea. First, Caviedes-Zuniga, who 

speaks limited English, says that he did not understand what was happening at his 

change-of-plea hearing and instead was simply responding “yes” during the Rule 11 

colloquy. But this argument contradicts his statements at the hearing, where CaviedesZuniga acknowledged that he understood the translation of the proceedings and that 

his attorney had explained, and he understood, everything in his plea agreement. He 

even spoke up when he did not understand something, prompting the court to rephrase 

its explanation in a way that he said he understood. Thus, to argue that he did not 

understand the proceeding, Caviedes-Zuniga would have to assert that he perjured 

himself in the district court—an argument that may be dismissed out of hand. 

See Thompson v. United States, 732 F.3d 826, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Caviedes-Zuniga also wants his lawyer to argue that the district court promised 

him a time-served sentence if he pleaded guilty. But, as counsel points out, the record 

does not support this assertion. Instead, the court told Caviedes-Zuniga that the length 

and circumstances of his pre-trial detention would be mitigating factors at sentencing, 

but that nobody could guarantee him a particular sentence. Finally, Caviedes-Zuniga 

contends that his lawyer lied to him to get him to plead guilty, but any claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel would be more appropriate for collateral review. See 

Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503–06 (2003); United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 

340–41 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Finally, as we say in the published decision issued contemporaneously with this 

order, counsel correctly declines to discuss potential challenges to the sentence because, 

after consultation with counsel about the risks and benefits, Caviedes-Zuniga 

determined he does not wish to challenge his sentence on appeal. 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. 

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