Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05866/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05866-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andre Johnson
Plaintiff
Gail Lewis
Defendant

Document Text:

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1

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRE JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

vs.

GAIL LEWIS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

1:03-cv-05866-AWI-DLB-P

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS (Doc. 6)

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff, Andre Johnson (“Plaintiff”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a

United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

On May 3, 2006, the Magistrate Judge filed Findings and Recommendations that

recommended the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend because Plaintiff cannot

invalidate a conviction in a civil rights action. The Findings and Recommendations were served

on Plaintiff and contained notice that any objections to the Findings and Recommendations were

to be filed within thirty (30) days. On June 1, 2006, plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 73-305,

this court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file,

the court finds the Findings and Recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper

Case 1:03-cv-05866-LJO-DLB Document 8 Filed 09/13/06 Page 1 of 4
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analysis.

In the objections, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge misunderstood the basis of

this action. Plaintiff contends that this action is not about whether his current conviction is

valid. Rather, Plaintiff contends that a prior conviction, which was reversed on appeal, is being

used improperly by prison officials when classifying Plaintiff. Given the allegations in the

complaint, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the complaint fails to state a claim. 

However, because Plaintiff insists that this action concerns mistakes in classifying Plaintiff and

not the validity of a conviction, the court will dismiss the complaint with leave to amend. See 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9 Cir. 2000) (if court determines that complaint fails to state th

claim, leave to amend should be granted to extent that complaint’s deficiencies can be cured).

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of

action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a

liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due

Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983).

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in a particular

classification status. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88, n.9 (1976). The existence of a

liberty interest created by state law is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. 

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law are

generally limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Under

certain circumstances, labeling a prisoner with a particular classification may implicate a liberty

interest subject to the protections of due process. See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827 (9th

Cir. 1997) (“[T]he stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the ‘sex offender’ label

coupled with the subjection of the targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment program whose

successful completion is a precondition for parole eligibility create the kind of deprivations of

liberty that require procedural protections.”). 

In order to pursue a claim for relief against defendants for denial of procedural due

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process, Plaintiff must establish the existence of a liberty interest entitling him to procedural due

process protections. The law has not recognized that inmates necessarily have a liberty interest

in remaining free from segregation or solitary confinement, and Plaintiff has alleged no facts that

establish the existence of a liberty interest in remaining free from segregation or solitary

confinement. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate’s due

process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within

sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.

2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention in the SHU was within range of confinement normally

expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no

protected liberty interest in being free from confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted). 

Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that the prior conviction in Plaintiff’s prison file has

subjected him to conditions constituting an “atypical and significant” hardship. In addition,

while Plaintiff alleges that prison officials have illegally used the prior conviction in

classification, the complaint fails to identify which defendants, if any, participated in the alleged

mis-classification. Because the complaint fails to state a due process claim regarding Plaintiff’s

classification status, the court will dismiss the complaint with leave to amend. 

For the reasons stated in the Findings and Recommendations and in this order, the court

finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any cognizable claims for relief. However, in

the interests of justice, the court will provide Plaintiff with leave to amend those claims that he

believes, in good faith, are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is advised that Local

Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any

prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the

original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint,

as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be

sufficiently alleged.

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendations, filed May 3, 2006, are ADOPTED IN

FULL;

2. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of

service of this order;

4. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and

5. The failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order will result

in a dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 12, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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