Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03995/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03995-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Chillicothe
Appellee
D. John Edwards
Appellee
Charles Haney
Appellee
Pam Jarding
Appellee
Richard L. Knouse
Appellee
Russell J. Morris
Appellant
Earle Teegarden
Appellee
Maurice Zion
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The individual defendants are Police Chief Richard L. Knouse, City

Administrator D. John Edwards, and city council members Charles Haney, Earle

Teegarden, Maurice Zion, and Pam Jarding. The City of Chillicothe, Missouri, is also

a defendant.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3995

___________

Russell J. Morris, * 

* 

Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for Western

* District of Missouri.

City of Chillicothe; Richard L. Knouse; * 

D. John Edwards; Charles Haney; *

Earle Teegarden; Maurice Zion; and * 

Pam Jarding, * 

* 

Appellees. * 

___________

Submitted: October 18, 2007

Filed: January 14, 2008

___________

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Russell J. Morris brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the

police chief of the Chillicothe, Missouri, Police Department ("the department"),

various Chillicothe city council members, and the City of Chillicothe (collectively the

defendants)1

 terminated him in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment right

Appellate Case: 06-3995 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/14/2008 Entry ID: 3391349
2

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

-2-

of freedom of association with an attorney. The district court2

 granted summary

judgment for defendants, concluding that Morris failed to show that his hiring an

attorney was a substantial or motivating factor in his termination. Morris appeals,

arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because there was

sufficient circumstantial evidence to show (1) defendants' firing motive was his

retaining an attorney; and (2) the reasons proffered by defendants were pretextual. He

also appeals the district court's finding that he neither pleaded nor proved a right of

access claim. We affirm. 

I. Background

The following facts are recited in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party, Russell Morris. Morris was hired by the department, as an entry level police

officer, in January 1998. He was promoted to sergeant in April 2001, and he remained

in that position until his termination on April 5, 2004. 

Morris's pre-firing employment record included documented performance

problems. Specifically, Morris had difficulty resolving conflicts with other employees.

Also, Morris ranked in the bottom one-third among other officers in the department

for the number of traffic stops executed over the final four years of his employment.

In 2002, Morris's captain formally notified him of concerns that Morris may have

misused sick time. In 2003, via an employee performance appraisal, Morris was

advised to pay closer attention to the image he projected in his work product and his

accountability in covering his shift. Also in 2003, Morris was reprimanded for

attending only half of the training sessions at a conference that the department paid

for him to attend. According to Morris, this was a misunderstanding because he told

the department that he would not attend the sessions in which he had prior training.

Appellate Case: 06-3995 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/14/2008 Entry ID: 3391349
-3-

Morris also experienced interpersonal problems with other department

employees. The department's personnel policy states that an employee may be

disciplined for making false or malicious statements concerning any employee or

officer. Morris was aware that violations of this policy could lead to termination, but

admits that he told police chief Richard Knouse that another officer had taken a bribe

without knowing if the accusation was true. Morris also told fellow officers that a

particular female office manager's appearance made him think she was promiscuous.

Late in the fall of 2003, Morris told a city councilman that the department was

experiencing morale problems. This councilman then told the city administrator,

defendant D. John Edwards, and the city attorney about Morris's concerns. On

February 10, 2004, Morris, along with officer Jason Sackrey, submitted a written

grievance letter to Administrator Edwards outlining problems they observed in the

department. The letter alleged that a fellow officer had used excessive force on an

arrestee, that the department had improperly expended city funds for overtime, and

that other police officers had falsified time reports. Within two weeks of the letter's

submission, Chief Knouse and Administrator Edwards met with the city attorney to

discuss the possibility of demoting Morris for spreading rumors and excessive use of

sick time. The city attorney recommended that Morris be terminated, but no decision

was made at that time.

On February 27, 2004, the officer accused by Morris and Sackrey of using

excessive force assaulted Sackrey on city property. Soon after, on March 2, 2004, the

department held a mandatory meeting for all employees. During this meeting various

officers referred to Morris as a "back-stabber" as well as insulting him by calling him

various other names. Chief Knouse took no disciplinary action against the namecalling officers. Morris, in light of the meeting, felt he needed to retain an attorney.

In the weeks after this meeting, several officers filed written grievances and

complaints against Morris.

Appellate Case: 06-3995 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/14/2008 Entry ID: 3391349
-4-

On March 29, 2004, the city council met to consider Morris's status. Chief

Knouse recommended to the city council that Morris be reduced in rank because of

various complaints and Morris's previous performance issues. Approval by the city

council is necessary for all employee terminations or suspensions, and these actions

are generally based on a recommendation by the department head. Administrator

Edwards concurred with Chief Knouse's recommendation to demote Morris. The city

council, however, voted to suspend Morris, with the understanding that Administrator

Edwards would meet with Morris to discuss his employment situation. Chief Knouse

then suspended Morris based on the city council's action.

On March 30, 2004, Morris's attorney sent a letter to the city attorney,

Administrator Edwards and Chief Knouse, advising them that Morris was now

represented by counsel. The next day, Chief Knouse sent an email to the entire

department advising that Morris had retained counsel and that department personnel

were not to speak to Morris regarding department or city matters.

Chief Knouse ordered Morris to attend a meeting with Administrator Edwards

and himself on April 1, 2004. Morris did not attend this meeting because his counsel

could not be present. Morris's counsel sent the department a letter stating that he could

not attend. Morris's counsel instructed him not to attend.

Also on April 1, the city council met again to discuss Morris's employment

status. The city attorney recommended that Morris be terminated, and three city

council members voted to give Administrator Edwards the authority to handle this

employment action against Morris. The city council gave Administrator Edwards the

authority to offer Morris a resignation option with a severance package. Defendant

council member Pam Jarding based her vote on Morris's failure to attend the meeting

in violation of a direct order to attend. Defendant council member Earle Teegarden's

vote was purportedly based on the city attorney's recommendation regarding Morris's

poor performance. Defendant council member Maurice Zion testified that he voted to

give Administrator Edwards the authority to take action because he believed that

Appellate Case: 06-3995 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/14/2008 Entry ID: 3391349
-5-

Morris disrupted the department, affecting the safety of the other officers and the

community. 

Morris claims that this city council meeting was improperly called to retaliate

against him for hiring an attorney, however city council members do not recall getting

new information about Morris's counsel between the two meetings on March 29, 2004

and April 1, 2004. After rejecting the city's offer to resign, Morris was subsequently

dismissed for "dereliction of duty, insubordination and creating a hostile work

environment" on April 5, 2004. At that same time Sackrey was told that the

department would be willing to reinstate him if he would sign a release regarding all

claims against the city. Sackrey rejected the offer and he was also terminated. 

On December 21, 2005, Morris filed the present action claiming that he was

terminated in violation of his First Amendment rights of free speech and free

association—Morris has since abandoned the free speech claim. Morris's complaint

included the following: "Defendants terminated plaintiff's employment in retaliation

for plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights of free speech and expression on

matters of public concern and of association (after his retention of legal counsel to

represent him) and to suppress from further disclosure to the general public, the

citizens of the City of Chillicothe, and other governmental officials the information

reported and disclosed by plaintiff."

On November 1, 2006, the district court granted defendants' motion for

summary judgment, finding that Morris did not produce any facts in support of his

contention that his retention of an attorney was a substantial or motivating factor in

his dismissal. The court also found that Morris failed to plead or provide evidentiary

support for his right of access claim.

II. Discussion

Morris appeals, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment. Specifically, Morris contends that he adduced sufficient circumstantial

Appellate Case: 06-3995 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/14/2008 Entry ID: 3391349
-6-

evidence to show that his retention of an attorney was a substantial or motivating

factor for the defendants' decision to terminate him. He further contends that the

defendants' proffered reasons were a pretext for the retaliatory termination. Morris

also appeals the district court's finding that he neither pleaded nor proved a right of

access claim. When considering the district court's grant of summary judgment, we

review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. ACLU

Nebraska Foundation v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 775 (8th Cir. 2005).

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is justified if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give him

the benefit of all reasonable inferences in the record. Morgan v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,

Inc., 486 F.3d 1034, 1039 (8th Cir 2007). "The party opposing summary judgment

cannot rest solely on the pleadings, but instead must set forth specific facts showing

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. . . . Mere allegations, unsupported by

specific facts or evidence beyond the nonmoving party's own conclusions, are

insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Id. (internal citations

omitted). 

In considering a motion for summary judgment the court does not weigh the

evidence, make credibility determinations, or attempt to discern the truth of any

factual issue. Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 526–27 (8th Cir. 2007). Rather, we

focus on whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial—an issue of material

fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury verdict for the

nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Morris contends that the district court ignored his circumstantial evidence,

accepted defendants' version of the facts and neglected to give Morris the benefit of

Appellate Case: 06-3995 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/14/2008 Entry ID: 3391349
-7-

all reasonable inferences. After careful review of the record, we find Morris's

contention is unsupported. The district court included, and properly construed and

addressed, all facts relevant to Morris's freedom of association claim. We note the

district court did not address facts related to Morris's initial grievance, Sackrey, or the

potentially false complaints against Morris. Those facts, however, while they provide

background, are not relevant to Morris's freedom of association claim.

B. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

This court has found that the First Amendment restrains the government from

retaliating against a public employee based on the employee's speech or associations.

Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1418 (8th Cir. 1983). In order for an employee to

state a claim under the First Amendment, he must show that his conduct was

constitutionally protected and that the protected conduct was a "substantial" or

"motivating" factor in the defendant's action which resulted in dismissal. Green v. St.

Louis Housing Authority, 911 F.2d 65, 70 (8th Cir. 1990). Whether the protected

conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in an employment decision is a question

of fact, but the sufficiency of the evidence to create an issue of fact for the jury is

solely a question of law. Cox v. Miller County R-I School Dist., 951 F.2d 927, 931

(8th Cir. 1991).

We analyze First Amendment employment retaliation claims with a three-step

burden-shifting test. First, a public employee must show that he suffered an adverse

employment action that was causally connected to his participation in a protected

activity. Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2002). Once the employee

satisfies his initial burden, the burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for his or her actions. Id. If the employer meets this burden,

the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the employer's actions were a

pretext for illegal retaliation. Id. This third step of showing that a defendant's

justification for firing is unworthy of credence is harder to overcome than the prima

facie case because evidence of pretext is viewed in the light of the employer's

justification. Smith v. Allen Health Systems, Inc. 302 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir. 2002).

Appellate Case: 06-3995 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/14/2008 Entry ID: 3391349
-8-

Morris argues that the district court erred in its analysis by merging the prima

facie requirements into the issue of pretext. However, assuming without deciding that

Morris satisfied his initial burden of the prima facie case, summary judgment was still

proper because Morris has not shown that defendants' justifications were a pretext for

illegal retaliation. See Putman v. Unity Health System, 348 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir.

2003). 

Assuming that Morris met his burden under the prima facie case, we must next

consider if the defendants presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Morris's

termination. Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 991–92 (8th Cir. 2002). Defendants

have met their burden here. Unrefuted evidence shows Morris's performance issues

predated his protected association with his attorney, including his ranking in the

bottom third of traffic stops, his spreading of a rumor, his abuse of sick leave, and his

non-attendance at a conference paid for by the department. Further, the record shows

that the city council voted to suspend Morris even before the department knew that he

had retained counsel, and the council's stated reasons for authorizing his termination

centered on the performance issues previously discussed.

As the burden shifts back to Morris, he contends that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment for defendants because there was sufficient circumstantial

evidence to show that defendants' reasons for his termination were pretextual. Duffy

v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 991–92 (8th Cir. 2002). Meeting the burden under this

third step is more difficult for a plaintiff than at the prima facie stage because, here,

evidence of pretext and discrimination are viewed in the light of the employer's

justification. Smith, 302 F.3d at 834. Morris has not provided a basis upon which a

reasonable jury could find that defendants' justifications were pretextual. 

Pretext may be shown with evidence that an employer has proffered an

explanation with no basis in fact, with evidence that the plaintiffs recently received

favorable reviews, or with evidence that the employer's proffered reason for its

employment decision has changed substantially over time. Id. Here, defendants'

Appellate Case: 06-3995 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/14/2008 Entry ID: 3391349
-9-

nondiscriminatory explanation has a basis in the factual record, defendants'

justification for Morris's termination has been consistently centered on his

performance issues, and the record does not contain any recent favorable reviews for

Morris. 

Morris emphasizes the time-line of events to support his allegations—on March

29th the city council voted only to suspend Morris, on March 30th Morris's attorney

made himself known to the department and the city, and on April 1st the city council

voted to give Edwards the authority to terminate Morris. Temporal proximity alone,

however, is not enough to support a finding of pretext. We have held that the fact that

a plaintiff is terminated after engaging in a protected activity is not sufficient to

support an inference of pretext, even though temporal proximity may sometimes be

enough to get a plaintiff past the prima facie stage. Smith, 302 F.3d at 834. In this

case, the timing of events is not enough to support a finding of pretext. Here, the

record reflects that defendants' were concerned about Morris's performance long

before he retained counsel. 

Morris also claims that the department's departure from their progressive

discipline policy shows pretext. Deviance from a progressive discipline policy can be

evidence of pretext, but here, the department's employee manual and related

documents specifically state that the department is not bound by any number of

warnings and that it can fire at-will employees without warning if necessary. We have

found such caveats in an employee policy negate its persuasiveness in showing

pretext. Id at 835. 

Morris also focuses on the council's treatment of his co-officer, Sackrey, as

evidence of pretext. Sackrey is not a party to this case, but, as explained above,

Sackrey filed the same grievance against the department as Morris and was later

terminated. Morris points out that one city council member claims she made the

decision to terminate Morris based on the fact that he had been insubordinate by not

attending the April 1st meeting. Morris draws attention to the fact that Sackrey also

Appellate Case: 06-3995 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/14/2008 Entry ID: 3391349
-10-

did not attend that meeting, and instead of deciding to terminate Sackrey based on that

fact, the city council decided he could stay with the department if he waived his claims

against the department. However, this comparison hurts Morris more than it helps him

because Sackrey and Morris hired the same attorney, and Sackrey hired the attorney

before Morris did. The city knew Sackrey had hired this attorney and yet they offered

to keep Sackrey on the force. If the department and the city wanted to retaliate against

officers for hiring attorneys, they likely would not have offered Sackrey continued

employment.

Viewing the evidence in the light of the employer's justification, Morris has not

provided a basis upon which a reasonable jury could find that defendants'

justifications for terminating Morris were pretextual. Therefore, the district court did

not err in granting summary judgment for defendants. 

C. Right of Access

Lastly, Morris argues that the district court erred in finding that he had not

sufficiently pled his right of access claim. We review this issue de novo. ACLU

Nebraska Foundation, 419 F.3d at 775. 

We have held that "[t]he right of access to the courts is well-established. The

right applies not only to the actual denial of access to the courts, but also to situations

in which the plaintiff has been denied meaningful access by some impediment put up

by the defendant. While the right to access the courts exists, the Supreme Court and

our court have recognized that the constitutional basis for the right is 'unsettled.'"

Scheeler v. City of St. Cloud, 402 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2005). In some

circumstances, we have held that the right to access derives from the First

Amendment. Id. In order to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must show that the

defendants acted with some intentional motivation to restrict his access to the courts.

Id. The plaintiff must show government action was designed to prevent access to the

courts. Id.

Appellate Case: 06-3995 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/14/2008 Entry ID: 3391349
-11-

The district court found that in Morris's complaint, he did not plead a right of

access claim. The language where Morris alleges that he pleaded this claim follows:

"Defendants terminated plaintiff's employment in retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of

his First Amendment rights of free speech and expression on matters of public concern

and of association (after his retention of legal counsel to represent him) and to

suppress from further disclosure to the general public, the citizens of the City of

Chillicothe, and other governmental officials the information reported and disclosed

by plaintiff." We agree with the district court that Morris's complaint fails to plead a

right of access claim. The defendants could not have been put on notice by this

language that they were alleged to have denied Morris access to the courts.

Further, reviewing the record in the light most favorable to Morris, he has not

provided evidence that defendants intentionally conspired to keep him out of court.

Morris claims that once the city council heard that he had an attorney they called a

special meeting to fire him, but he has presented no evidence to support that claim.

Thus, Morris has failed to provide evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find

that he was terminated as a result of defendants' intentional motivation to deny him

access to the courts. 

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-3995 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/14/2008 Entry ID: 3391349