Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-19-20241/USCOURTS-ca5-19-20241-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jorge Madero-Gil
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-20241

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JORGE MADERO-GIL,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CR-594-1

Before KING, GRAVES, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Jorge Madero-Gil pleaded guilty to illegal reentry and was sentenced to 

15 months in prison and one year of supervised release. Although he was 

recently released from prison, his appeal of his conviction is not moot. See 

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1998); United States v. Lares-Meraz, 452 

F.3d 352, 355 (5th Cir. 2006).

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 18, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 19-20241

2

Madero-Gil’s guilty plea was conditional, reserving the right to challenge 

the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment. On appeal he 

reiterates his argument that the immigration court in his initial removal 

proceeding never acquired jurisdiction because his notice of removal failed to 

specify a date and time of appearance. As a result, he contends, the removal 

order entered against him is void, which left the Government unable to prove 

an essential element of the offense. As to the strictures of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), 

which limits an alien’s ability to collaterally attack a removal order, MaderoGil asserts that it poses no obstacle because his challenge is jurisdictional in 

nature and because, given the state of the law at the time of his initial removal 

proceeding, he is excused from meeting the requirements of § 1326(d)(1) and 

(2). 

Madero-Gil concedes that these arguments are foreclosed by United 

States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed 

(U.S. Nov. 6, 2019) (No. 19-6588), and for the most part we agree. There too 

the defendant argued that failure to include date-and-time information in a 

notice to appear is a jurisdictional defect, and we found this argument to be 

both without merit and barred by § 1326(d) for failure to exhaust. 933 F.3d at 

496-98. Madero-Gil’s identical and similarly unexhausted jurisdictional 

argument must accordingly fail for the same reasons. 

Pedroza-Rocha does not speak to Madero-Gil’s contention that he can 

escape the strictures of § 1326(d)(1) and (2) under a “futility” exception, but 

other authority shows this argument to be of no moment here. An alien “must 

prove all three prongs” of § 1326(d) to successfully challenge a prior removal 

order. United States v. Cordova-Soto, 804 F.3d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 2015). In 

claiming fundamental unfairness under the final prong of § 1326(d), MaderoGil relies solely on the jurisdictional argument that Pedroza-Rocha foreclosed. 

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No. 19-20241

3

Any argument as to prongs one and two is therefore moot. See United States 

v. Mendoza-Mata, 322 F.3d 829, 832 (5th Cir. 2003).

For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the Government’s motion for 

summary affirmance, DENY as unnecessary its alternative motion for an 

extension of time to file a brief, and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

Case: 19-20241 Document: 00515349982 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/18/2020