Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-00092/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-00092-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Victoria Bennett
Defendant
Sandy Buchanan
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANDY BUCHANAN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant. /

No. C 10-00092 WHA

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS AND

SUBSTITUTING THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA AS DEFENDANT AND

VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this tort action, defendant moves to substitute the United States of America as

defendant in place of Victoria Bennett under the Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. 2679. 

Plaintiff does not oppose defendant’s motion for substitution. Defendant moves to dismiss the

personal injury complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1) and (6). 

Plaintiff does not oppose defendant’s motion for dismissal. For the following reasons,

defendant’s motions are GRANTED. 

Plaintiff requests leave to amend the complaint to plead facts in support of the doctrine of

equitable tolling. For the following reasons, plaintiff’s request is DENIED. The hearing set for

Thursday, March 4, 2010, is VACATED. 

STATEMENT

Sandy Buchanan and Victoria Bennett were involved in an automobile accident on

August 1, 2007. When the automobile accident occurred, Ms. Bennett was acting within the

Case 3:10-cv-00092-WHA Document 17 Filed 02/23/10 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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scope of her federal employment with the National Credit Union Administration (Dkt. No. 2). 

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Ms. Bennett in Contra Costa Superior Court on July 31, 2009. 

The state court action was removed to the United States District Court on January 7, 2010. 

On January 12, defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss and request to substitute the

United States as defendant. As of January 12, over two years after the motor vehicle accident

at issue, the NCUA had not received an administrative claim from plaintiff (Decl. ¶ 4). 

The opposition asserts that the filings by the United States constituted plaintiff’s first notice that

Ms. Bennett was a federal employee. 

ANALYSIS

1. SUBSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AS DEFENDANT.

Under 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(2), once a defendant is certified as acting within the scope of

federal employment during the incident in question, such a claim will be considered an action

against the United States. Section 2679(d)(2) expressly states:

Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant

employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment

at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil

action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a State court

shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by the

Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the

district and division embracing the place in which the action or

proceeding is pending. Such action or proceeding shall be deemed

to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States

under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the

United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. 

Ms. Bennett has been certified by the Attorney General as having been acting within the scope

of her federal employment during the incident alleged in the complaint (Dkt. No. 2). 

Accordingly, the request to substitute the United States as defendant in the instant action is

GRANTED. 

2. MOTION TO DISMISS.

A motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims

alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Business v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.

1995). All material allegations of the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1996). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed

factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s

elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (citation omitted). 

Under FRCP 12(b)(1), a court should dismiss a complaint where there is no subject-matter

jurisdiction. A district court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over a tort action against the

United States unless the plaintiff has first presented a claim to the appropriate agency, and either

(1) the claim was “finally decided” in writing, or (2) six months have passed since the claim was

submitted. The FTCA expressly provides: 

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United

States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal

injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission

of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope

of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first

presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim

shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by

certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final

disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the

option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial

of the claim for purposes of this section.

28 U.S.C. 2675(a). 

It is undisputed that plaintiff did not file a claim to the appropriate Federal agency in

accordance with the FTCA. Plaintiff does not oppose defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff in

fact states that “Ms. Buchanan does not and cannot allege exhaustion of administrative remedies

prior to filing of suit” (Opp. 3). Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 

3. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND.

FRCP 15(a) establishes that after a response to the complaint has been filed, “a party may

amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court

should freely give leave when justice so requires.” The district court “may in its discretion deny

leave to amend due to undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the party of the movant,

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Zucco Partners LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009). In assessing these

factors, all inferences should be made in favor of granting the motion. Griggs v. Pace American

Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The final factor, whether the proposed amendment would be futile, is applicable to the

instant case. An “amendment should not be barred as futile if the underlying facts may be a

proper subject of relief.” Breier v. Northern California Bowling Proprietors’ Ass’n, 316 F.2d

787, 790 (9th Cir. 1963) (citing Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). But the amendment

must also be able to survive a motion to dismiss. Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843

(9th Cir. 1991). 

Plaintiff requests leave to amend in order to assert facts to show that she was unaware that

Ms. Bennett was a federal employee and is therefore entitled to equitable tolling of the two-year

claim presentation requirement under 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). Section 2401(b) states:

A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless

it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within

two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within

six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail,

of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was

presented.

Plaintiff’s opposition contends that in the instance where the claimant does not know or have

reason to know that the FTCA is applicable, baring claims after the two-year statute period has

run “would be tantamount to denying claimant a remedy” (Opp. 5). Plaintiff’s claim, however, is

not time-barred. Under 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(5), in an action where the United States is substituted

as defendant and the claim is dismissed for failure to present the required administrative claim,

such a claim will be considered timely if: 

(A) the claim would have been timely had it been filed on the date

the underlying civil action was commenced, and

(B) the claim is presented to the appropriate Federal agency within

60 days after dismissal of the civil action. 

28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(5)(A) and (B). Plaintiff filed this action in state court on July 31, 2009, within

the two-year deadline. As stated above, this order grants defendant’s motion to dismiss and

request to substitute the United States as defendant as unopposed. Under Section 2679, plaintiff

will have sixty days after dismissal to file the appropriate administrative claim. Therefore, the

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request for leave to amend to present facts that plaintiff was unaware of the applicability of the

FTCA is unnecessary. Since plaintiff’s claim is not time-barred, it is unnecessary for this order to

address the argument of equitable tolling. 

Additionally, leave to amend is not proper where the amendment cannot survive a motion

to dismiss. Even if plaintiff were able to assert facts to toll to two-year FTCA deadline, plaintiff

would still be required to exhaust her administrative remedies under 28 U.S.C. 2675(a) by filing a

claim within the new sixty-day deadline. Such a claim must be “finally denied” by the Federal

agency before this Court could have jurisdiction. Accordingly, even the proposed amended

complaint would fail to survive a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(1) and (6). 

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and

substitute the United States as defendant in place of Victoria Bennett is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is DENIED. Plaintiff should be advised that the deadline

to file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency is sixty days after the dismissal

of this action. The hearing set for Thursday, March 4, 2010, is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 23, 2010. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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