Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-05332/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-05332-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Briggs
Petitioner
Spearman
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 It appears that when this petition was filed, petitioner was incarcerated on a different

underlying conviction. See Briggs v. State of California, No. C 15-4576 (N.D. Cal. 2015);

People v. Briggs, 2014 WL 4471546, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 11, 2014).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

KEVIN BRIGGS,

Petitioner,

 vs.

WARDEN SPEARMAN,

Respondent. /

No. C 15-5332 NJV (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

Petitioner, a former state prisoner, proceeds with a pro se petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered Petitioner to show cause

why this case should not be dismissed as untimely and as moot. (Doc. 12.) Petitioner has

filed a response. (Doc. 17.) 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner challenges a parole revocation from November 2006. He appears to

argue that the legislation and injunction stemming from Valdivia v. Brown, No. C 94-0671

LKK GGH (E.D. Cal.), which provided inmates facing parole revocation with certain rights,

should be made retroactive to his 2006 hearing. He seeks a restoration of one year of

credits and a removal of the violation from his record.1

 Petitioner was released from prison

on February 25, 2016. Docket No. 19. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

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custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Habeas corpus petitions must meet

heightened pleading requirements. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). An

application for a federal writ of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner who is in state custody

pursuant to a judgment of a state court must “specify all the grounds for relief available to

the petitioner ... [and] state the facts supporting each ground.” Rule 2(c) of the Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. “‘[N]otice’ pleading is not sufficient, for the

petition is expected to state facts that point to a ‘real possibility of constitutional error.’” 

Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir.

1970)). “Habeas petitions which appear on their face to be legally insufficient are subject

to summary dismissal.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Nicolaus), 98 F.3d 1102,

1108 (9th Cir. 1996) (Schroeder, J., concurring). 

B. Analysis

Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences

must be filed within one year of the latest of the dates on which: (1) the judgment became

final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2)

an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was

removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted

was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the

claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). Petitioner challenges a 2006 parole revocation and has not sufficiently

addressed why this case should not be dismissed as untimely. He did not appeal his

parole revocation in state court until 2014, nine years after the revocation. He is not

entitled to statutory tolling for this period and has not presented any arguments for

equitable tolling. This case is untimely as it was filed many years after the expiration of the

statute of limitations.

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Petitioner has already served the one year parole revocation term and while he was

recently incarcerated for another conviction, he has been released from custody. Article III,

§ 2, of the Constitution requires the existence of a case or controversy through all stages of

federal judicial proceedings. This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff or

petitioner “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the

defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v. Continental

Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). Once the petitioner’s sentence has expired,

however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or

parole—some “collateral consequence” of the conviction—must exist if the suit is to be

maintained and not considered moot. Id.

The presumption of collateral consequences that is applied to criminal convictions

does not extend to parole revocations. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 13 (1998);

Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1982). A petitioner who seeks to challenge the

revocation of his parole must demonstrate that continuing collateral consequences exist if

the underlying sentence has expired, see Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14-18, or if the term

imposed for violating parole has been served, see Cox v. McCarthy, 829 F.2d 800, 803 (9th

Cir. 1987) (claim moot because petitioner cannot be released from term imposed for

violating parole that he has already served). Claims of detriment in a future parole or

sentencing proceeding, impeachment in a future criminal or civil proceeding, or use against

him should he appear as a defendant in a future criminal proceeding do not constitute

sufficient proof of collateral consequences. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14-16.

Petitioner argues that as a result of the parole revocation he must be held at a

higher security level while in prison, is restricted from general population or low level

security yards, cannot go to fire camps, and cannot earn good time credits. Yet, petitioner

was released from custody so all of the alleged restrictions are moot. His arguments that

the prior revocation could prevent further parole if he is again incarcerated do not

demonstrate sufficient collateral consequences. See Spencer. For all these reasons, the

petition is dismissed.

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CONCLUSION 

The petition is DISMISSED. Because reasonable jurists would not find the result

here debatable, a certificate of appealability (“COA”) is DENIED. See Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000) (standard for COA). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2016. 

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

 

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