Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04293/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04293-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
T.R.E.
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4291

___________

E.J.R.E., *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

___________

Appeals from the United States

No. 05-4293 District Court for the

___________ District of South Dakota.

T.R.E., *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

Appellate Case: 05-4293 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/18/2006 Entry ID: 2068393
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See 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,

Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 12301, 116 Stat. 1758 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.

§ 5037 (2003)). 

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___________

No. 05-4294

___________

C.R., *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

___________

Submitted: June 12, 2006

Filed: July 18, 2006

___________

Before BYE, LAY, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LAY, Circuit Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 2, 2002, an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 5037(a) became effective

vesting federal district courts with the express statutory authority to impose a juvenile

sentence that includes a period of detention followed by a term of juvenile delinquent

supervision.1

 E.J.R.E., C.R., and T.R.E. (collectively “Appellants”), were each

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The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, Chief United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota. 

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T.R.E.’s sentence has since expired, while both E.J.R.E. and C.R. are presently

serving terms on juvenile delinquent supervision. Although each juvenile’s case was

adjudicated separately below, Appellants’ claims were subsequently consolidated into

one single appeal. Therefore, because one of the parties retains a “cognizable interest

in the outcome,” the case is not moot. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496-97

(1969).

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adjudicated delinquent and subsequently sentenced to detention followed by a term

of juvenile delinquent supervision for conduct that occurred before November 2,

2002.

On May 21, 2004, we held, in United States v. J.W.T., 368 F.3d 994, 996-97

(8th Cir. 2004), that the amendment to § 5037 expressly authorizing juvenile

delinquent supervision could not be applied to acts of delinquency committed prior

to November 2, 2002. In light of our ruling, Appellants filed § 2255 motions in

federal district court to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences. E.J.R.E. and C.R.

filed their motions on May 17, 2005, and T.R.E. filed his motion on May 23, 2005.

The district court2

 denied all three motions as untimely. Appellants now challenge

this ruling. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Paragraph 6(4) of 28 U.S.C. § 2255

Appellants first argue that 28 U.S.C.§ 2255 para. 6(4) renders their respective

§ 2255 motions timely.3

 We review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss

Appellants’ § 2255 motions based on the statute of limitations. See Snow v. Ault, 238

F.3d 1033, 1034 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299,

1300 (11th Cir. 2001).

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28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 6 provides that:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by

governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from

making a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence. 

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Under paragraph 6(4), a § 2255 petition is timely if it is filed by a federal

prisoner within one year of “the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”4

 The

plain language of paragraph 6(4) makes clear that Appellants must show the existence

of a new fact, while also demonstrating they acted with diligence to discover the new

fact. Appellants contend the Eighth Circuit’s decision in J.W.T. constitutes a new

“fact” under paragraph 6(4). In support of this argument, Appellants cite the United

States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295

(2005). 

In Johnson, petitioner Robert Johnson was convicted of a federal drug crime

and was subsequently sentenced as a career offender under the United States

Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 298. The career offender enhancement was predicated

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on Johnson’s two prior state court convictions for cocaine distribution. Id.

Thereafter, Johnson petitioned for writ of habeas corpus in state court, and one of the

convictions used by the federal district court to enhance his sentence was vacated. Id.

at 300-01. Johnson then filed a § 2255 motion in district court to vacate his enhanced

federal sentence, which was denied. Id. at 301. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed,

reasoning that a state court order vacating a conviction was not a fact for purposes of

paragraph 6(4). Id. at 301-02. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 302.

Although the Court ultimately concluded that petitioner did not qualify for relief under

paragraph 6(4) because he failed to act with diligence, id. at 311, it did, as a

preliminary matter, note that Johnson’s vacated state court conviction was a qualifying

fact under paragraph 6(4). Id. at 306-07. This is because a predicate conviction has

long been understood to be “subject to proof or disproof like any other factual issue.”

Id. at 307. 

Here, however, there is no operative fact to invalidate. A decision such as the

one promulgated in J.W.T., unlike a predicate conviction, is a ruling exclusively

within the domain of the courts and is incapable of being proved or disproved. See

Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We would never, for

example, ask a jury to decide whether a judicial decision had indeed changed a state’s

law in the relevant way, nor would the parties introduce evidence on the question.”).

Moreover, even assuming J.W.T. could qualify as a new fact under paragraph 6(4),

Appellants did not contest the district court’s sentence by filing a direct appeal and,

therefore, cannot demonstrate they acted with the requisite diligence after final

judgment was entered. See Johnson, 544 U.S. at 310 (requiring petitioner to act

diligently after the district court enters judgment to preserve eligibility to invoke the

statute of limitations under § 2255 para. 6(4)). 

Finally, we note that paragraph 6(3) further supports the conclusion that a

decision taken from a federal court of appeals does not provide an independent basis

to trigger the one-year statute of limitations provided under § 2255. Paragraph 6(3)

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states that the statute of limitations will begin to run only where the Supreme Court

recognizes a new right that it applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.

§ 2255 para. 6(3). We believe Congress, by limiting paragraph 6(3) in this fashion,

impliedly rejected the notion that the creation of a new right by the Supreme Court

that is not made retroactive to cases on collateral review, other rulings of law by the

Supreme Court, and decisions taken from the courts of appeal in all instances, could

trigger any of the limitations periods enumerated under § 2255. Therefore, the district

court’s ruling was proper. 

B. Equitable Tolling

Appellants next contend the doctrine of equitable tolling should be applied to

toll the one-year statute of limitations provided under § 2255. We review this claim

de novo. United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089, 1093 (8th Cir. 2005). Equitable

tolling is only appropriate in instances where extraordinary circumstances beyond a

petitioner’s control prevent timely filing. See id. at 1093. The petitioner must also

demonstrate he acted with due diligence in pursuing his petition. See id. at 1095. 

Even if this court’s decision in J.W.T. could constitute an “extraordinary

circumstance,” we can reference no impediment whatsoever that would have inhibited

Appellants’ ability to file a timely § 2255 petition. The mere fact that our ruling in

J.W.T. made it more likely that Appellants’ collateral attack would be successful does

not change the reality that Appellants were free, at any time, to file their § 2255

petitions after final judgment was entered and before the one-year statute of

limitations period had expired. § 2255 para. 6(1). Further, Appellants’ failure to file

a direct appeal demonstrates a lack of diligence and, as such, the district court’s ruling

was proper. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm.

______________________________

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