Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-04159/USCOURTS-ca8-04-04159-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shawn Michael Olthoff
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-4159

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Minnesota.

Shawn Michael Olthoff, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 10, 2005

Filed: February 8, 2006

___________

Before BYE, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Michael Olthoff appeals the sentence imposed by the district court1

 following

his guilty plea. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Between November 20 and December 2, 2003, Olthoff and an associate went

on a crime spree, breaking into various homes and cars in Duluth, Minnesota, and

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Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).

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stealing firearms. Based on these events, on April 22, 2004, Olthoff pleaded guilty

to a one-count criminal information charging him with being a felon in possession of

a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Olthoff's prior felony

offense was burglary, a crime of violence, so his base offense level was adjusted

upward on that basis. His offense level was also increased because he possessed

firearms in connection with another felony offense–the burglaries he committed while

on the "crime spree." After these adjustments, Olthoff's sentencing range was 110 to

120 months. Additionally, the government filed a motion under United States

Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1, based upon Olthoff's substantial assistance to law

enforcement.

After considering the guidelines range and the government's section 5K1.1

motion, the district court sentenced Olthoff to 92-months' imprisonment, three years

of supervised release, and a mandatory $100 special assessment. Because Olthoff was

sentenced post-Blakely2

 but before the Supreme Court decided United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the district court noted that if the guidelines were

ultimately found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, it would consider them

advisory only, and would have sentenced Olthoff to the same sentence. Olthoff

appeals, contending that the district court erred when it adjusted his offense up four

levels for possessing firearms in connection with another felony offense, and by

finding that his prior burglary conviction was a crime of violence. Finally, Olthoff

argues the case should be remanded for resentencing in light of Booker.

II. DISCUSSION

After Booker, we review de novo the interpretation and application of the

guidelines, and we review the district court's factual findings for clear error. United

States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005).

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Howard involved the enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), which

requires that the defendant "used or possessed the firearm . . . in connection with . . .

a crime of violence." In Howard, we held that using a firearm in connection with a

particular crime could be analyzed the same way for purposes of section

4B1.4(b)(3)(A) and section 2K2.1(b)(5). 413 F.3d at 865.

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Firearm Enhancement

The Sentencing Guidelines impose a four-level enhancement for a felon in

possession of a firearm if the defendant "used or possessed any firearm or ammunition

in connection with another felony offense." United States Sentencing Guidelines §

2K2.1(b)(5). The phrase "in connection with" means that the firearm must actually

facilitate the other felony offense and not be merely present by accident or

coincidence. United States v. Fredrickson, 195 F.3d 438, 439-40 (8th Cir. 1999).

Olthoff argues that he should not have received this enhancement because his factual

scenario does not meet the Fredrickson standard. While Olthoff admitted in his plea

agreement that he illegally possessed firearms as a felon after he had stolen them, he

argues that the firearms in no way facilitated the felony burglary.

Our precedent belies Olthoff's argument. In United States v. Howard, 413 F.3d

861 (8th Cir. 2005), we held that a similar3

 gun enhancement was properly imposed

where the defendant committed burglary and stole a shotgun–the primary object of the

crime. We found that the stolen gun had the potential of facilitating the burglary

because "[a]t any time during the burglary, [defendant] could brandish the gun or

threaten injury or death, whether or not it was loaded." Id. at 865. See also United

States v. Hedger, 354 F.3d 792, 795 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that stealing a firearm

from a gun shop justified the enhancement). Like the Howard defendant, Olthoff

could have brandished the weapons that he stole at any point during the burglaries.

Accordingly, we find that the district court correctly applied this enhancement.

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As noted in the previous section, Olthoff admitted the factual allegations which

supported the enhancement. United States v. Alvarado-Rivera, 412 F.3d 942, 946 n.3

(8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3392 (Jan. 9, 2006).

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Crime of Violence

Olthoff next argues that his prior felony conviction for third-degree burglary

in Minnesota should not be construed as a "crime of violence" for sentencing

purposes. In the spring of 2003, Olthoff broke into the then-unoccupied Lutsen

Mountain Ski Resort ticket office and stole a safe. Burglarizing a commercial

building is a crime of violence. United States v. Peltier, 276 F.3d 1003, 1006 (8th Cir.

2002). Furthermore, even if this unoccupied structure was somehow not considered

a commercial building, we have repeatedly held that felony burglary is a crime of

violence, regardless of whether the burglary involved intent to harm or actual harm

to individuals. E.g., United States v. Mathijssen, 406 F.3d 496, 499 (8th Cir. 2005).

Olthoff's attempt to distinguish his burglary in the face of our precedent is unavailing.

Resentencing after Booker

Finally, Olthoff argues that he should be resentenced in light of Booker and

challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. As noted above, the district court

sentenced Olthoff post-Blakely and pre-Booker. Uncertain about the future of the

guidelines, the district court calculated Olthoff's mandatory guidelines sentence, but

also announced that even if the guidelines were ultimately found to be

unconstitutional, he would have given Olthoff the same sentence under an advisory

regime. Olthoff correctly preserved his Booker issue at sentencing, and we therefore

review for harmless error, with the government bearing the burden of proof. United

States v. Mendoza-Mesa, 421 F.3d 671, 672-73 (8th Cir. 2005). Because the error

was not of constitutional magnitude,4

 the government must prove that there is no

"grave doubt" as to whether the error substantially influenced the outcome of the

proceedings. United States v. Haidley, 400 F.3d 642, 644-45 (8th Cir. 2005). Based

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Olthoff's pending motion for remand for resentencing is denied.

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on the district court's pronouncement, we find that the government can meet its burden

in this case. We have no grave doubt that the district court's ultimate sentence would

have been the same had it been laboring under the advisory scheme established in

Booker. The district court expressly said that it would, despite defense counsel's

entreaties for a lower advisory sentence. The district court's error in applying the

mandatory guidelines was harmless.5

Olthoff next argues that his sentence was unreasonable because the district

court did not explicitly address the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

"A district court's ruling may be unreasonable if it fails to consider a relevant factor

that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper

or irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a

clear error of judgment by imposing a sentence that lies outside the limited range of

choice dictated by the facts of the case." United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909

(8th Cir. 2006).

We do not think the district court's sentence is plagued by any of the foregoing

pitfalls. And to the extent that Olthoff argues the district court was required to

"categorically rehearse" the factors in section 3553(a), we disagree. Id. In comparing

the sentencing transcript with section 3553(a), we find that the district court had those

factors in mind when sentencing Olthoff. At several points in the transcript the

district court referred to Olthoff's relatively young age, and his hope that Olthoff could

use his time in prison productively and start anew when released. See 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(1) & (2)(D). The court also noted the severity of the crime in deciding where

in the spectrum to place the final sentence. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). In sum, we find that

the district court properly considered the relevant factors, and that Olthoff's ultimate

92-month sentence was reasonable.

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III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court.

______________________________

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