Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03047/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Matthews
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 11, 2014 Decided June 6, 2014

No. 13-3047

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MICHAEL MATTHEWS, ALSO KNOWN AS MICHAEL GARY

MATHEWS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cr-00066-1)

Jenifer Wicks, appointed by the court, argued the cause and

filed the briefs for appellant.

L. Jackson Thomas II, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the briefs were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, Elizabeth Trosman and Anthony

Scarpelli, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, WILKINS, Circuit Judge,

and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

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SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Michael Matthews was

tried and convicted for unlawful possession with intent to

distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine. The district

court entered a judgment sentencing Matthews to a period of

incarceration, followed by supervised release. Matthews

appeals from that judgment, arguing that the district court erred

in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of

a search warrant and in not granting the defense a “Franks

hearing” on the suppression issue. Because we conclude that

any error by the district court does not warrant reversal, we

affirm the judgment before us.

BACKGROUND

On December 2, 2011, officers of the District of Columbia

Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) and the United States

Drug Enforcement Administration executed a search warrant

obtained from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for

the defendant’s apartment. During the search, the officers

seized methamphetamine, cash, and various items of drug

paraphernalia. Following his arrest and the waiver of his

Miranda rights, Matthews was interviewed by an MPD officer

and admitted his possession of methamphetamine for

distribution. 

The United States obtained a single-count indictment

charging appellant with unlawful possession of fifty grams or

more of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Appellant moved to

suppress the tangible evidence seized in the search and the

statements obtained from him after the search, claiming they

resulted from a warrant issued without probable cause. The

district court, after reviewing the submissions of the parties and

the affidavit upon which the issuance of the warrant was based,

denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The case

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proceeded to a bench trial, in which the defense renewed the

motion to suppress, which was again denied. At the close of all

evidence, the court found the defendant guilty and thereafter

entered a sentence of confinement for 120 months, followed by

a five-year period of supervised release. 

Defendant appeals, alleging error in the denial of the

motions to suppress the evidence, and in the failure of the court

to provide a hearing on the suppression motion, pursuant to

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). For the reasons set

forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

ANALYSIS

Both issues in the case concern a Superior Court search

warrant issued upon the affidavit of a Metropolitan Police

officer. That affidavit, and therefore the search warrant,

depended almost entirely upon information obtained from “an

individual,” whom the officer referred to as “my ‘source.’”

While the affidavit disclosed that the affiant knew the identity

of the source, in order to protect the source from harm, the

officer did not use the source’s name, and indeed, avoided the

use of gender-specific pronouns, consistently referring to the

source as “it.” While we will not set forth the affidavit in its

entirety, an understanding of the issues in this case requires a

substantial disclosure of its language:

The source . . . stated that it knew of a person whose name

it gave me, which I am indicating here as “MM” or M------

M------. I am doing that to be certain that this person’s

name is not used in full in a public document until after it

has been charged. My source told me that MM has been

selling large quantities of methamphetamines in mid-town

Washington, D.C., for well more than three years. My

source told me that it had itself bought large amounts of

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methamphetamines regularly from MM at MM’s home at

apartment number two at 1500 Massachusetts Avenue,

N.W., and had seen MM sell quantities of

methamphetamine to other persons in this apartment being

sold by an occupant of 901 S Street N.W., Washington,

D.C. According to the source, MM sells methamphetamine

to support itself and runs this illegal business from its

home, which is the apartment for which I seek a warrant. 

The source has known MM for more than three years and

during that time has never known MM to hold any

employment other than selling illegal drugs.

The affiant further declared:

To corroborate this information, I went to 1500

Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., and spoke to persons

engaged in managing the apartment building. They showed

me the name of the person who is the tenant in apartment

number two. That name is the same as given me by my

source and is the same one I mean when I say MM in the

preceding paragraph.

The officer also swore that “[i]n addition to the corroboration”

of the name and address information, he believed the

information to be reliable and accurate for several reasons. For

example, he knew that the source had recently been found to be

in possession of a quantity of methamphetamine in “its”

residence. He, the officer, also knew that methamphetamine use

in Washington, D.C., was concentrated in a certain area of town,

within which the address lay. He independently knew that his

source was familiar with buyers and sellers of

methamphetamine. He also noted that his source was not

“working off a beef,” but was trying to get “a break” from the

police or the prosecutor’s office. 

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On the day after the warrant issued, Metropolitan Police

Department officers and United States Drug Enforcement agents

executed the warrant at Apartment 2, 1500 Massachusetts

Avenue, NW, the premises named in the warrant. The search

resulted in the seizure of crystal methamphetamine from a

Rubbermaid container, a hall closet, a vacuum-sealed bag found

in a safe in the apartment, and a plate in the apartment’s

bedroom. Additionally, the officers seized suspected crystalmethamphetamine residue from ziploc bags in the bedroom,

$6108 in cash found inside the safe, and additional cash from

appellant’s person. They also found a currency counter in the

livingroom, a supply of $1000 money wrappers, ziploc bags,

“cups with residue,” and digital scales in the hall closet, as well

as empty ziploc bags, a Tupperware container filled with unused

ziploc bags, small glass vials, various ziploc bags with different

colored name markings on them, and syringes that were located

in the bedroom closet.

In addition to the indicia of methamphetamine trade, the

searching officers seized evidence connecting Matthews with

the address. This evidence included mail, a United States

passport, a certificate from the Department of Health, and a title

issued by the District of Columbia—all bearing appellant’s

name— as well as appellant’s checkbook.

The officers arrested Matthews and advised him of his

Miranda rights. Matthews waived his rights and was

interviewed by the officer who had obtained the search warrant. 

In that interview, Matthews admitted that he possessed the

methamphetamine for distribution. 

The admissibility of all the incriminating evidence against

appellant depends upon the validity of the search. The

methamphetamine and other physical evidence was seized under

the warrant. The confession appears to be the fruit of that tree,

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which appellant contends is poisonous. See Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). His appeal questions both the

sufficiency of the showing of probable cause on which the

warrant is based, and the district court’s denial of his

suppression motion without an evidentiary hearing which, he

contends, deprived him of a safeguard to which he was entitled.

A. Probable Cause

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects the

people from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and requires

that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” 

U.S. Const. Amend. IV. By the terms of the amendment, the

sufficiency of the showing underlying the issuance of a search

warrant requires “not a prima facie showing” but only a

“probability.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). As

applied to the facts before us, the issuing judge was required to

determine that the illegal activity, contraband, or evidence of the

same was “probably” on the premises described in the warrant,

not that they were certainly there. 

The affidavit cited above stated that Matthews had been

selling large quantities of methamphetamine for over three

years, that the “source” had purchased drugs regularly from

Matthews at the described premises, that the source had seen

Matthews sell quantities of methamphetamine to other persons

at the premises, that Matthews supported himself by the sale of

methamphetamine, and was running an illegal business from his

home at that address. On first reading, this information would

certainly seem to support a probability that a search warrant

would reveal drugs and evidence of drug dealing at the

premises. The Supreme Court has advised repeatedly that “in

dealing with probable cause . . . we deal with probabilities. 

These are not technical; they are the factual and practical

considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent

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men, not legal technicians, act.” Brinegar v. United States, 338

U.S. 160, 175 (1949). However, appellant raises nonfrivolous

questions as to the legal sufficiency of the affidavit upon which

the Superior Court judge acted. More specifically, he contends

that the factual basis of the affidavit is “stale” and that the

affidavit does not reflect sufficient indicia of reliability on the

part of the source. 

Appellant argues that so far as appears from the affidavit,

the affiant’s information may have been out of date. He

contends that the source, even if truthful, may have bought

methamphetamines as much as three years before the issuance

of the warrant and that therefore, the affidavit is so stale as to

raise no probability that evidence of drugs or a drug enterprise

would still be present on the premises to be searched. As he

points out, “a statement by an untested informant that three

years earlier the defendant was involved in the drug trade carries

almost no weight in the analysis of probable cause . . . .” United

States v. Huggins, 299 F.3d 1039, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002)

(Fletcher, J., concurring). 

The United States contends that the quoted language from

the Ninth Circuit does not describe this affidavit. In its view, the

affidavit does not simply describe a single purchase years before

the issuance of the warrant. Instead, while averring that the

source was aware of “well more than three years” of drug sales

activity by MM at the described premises, the affidavit also

describes the source as having “bought large amounts of

methamphetamines regularly from MM” at the described

premises. It further averred that the source “had seen MM sell

quantities of methamphetamine to other persons” at the

premises. 

But the fact remains that the affidavit does not state dates

for any of the purchases. As we have stated:

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The likelihood that the evidence sought is still in place is a

function not simply of watch and calendar but of variables

that do not punch a clock: the character of the crime

(chance encounter in the night or regenerating conspiracy?),

of the criminal (nomadic or entrenched?), of the thing to be

seized (perishable and easily transferable or of enduring

utility to its holder?), of the place to be searched (mere

criminal forum of convenience or secure operational base?),

etc.

United States v. Bruner, 657 F.2d 1278, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The government contends that the affidavit falls

comfortably within the parameters of Bruner. That is, the

affidavit, which speaks in the present tense, as well as describing

activity relating back over three years, describes an ongoing

enterprise in a specified location, not a nomadic one likely to

have been moved or recently terminated.

The other matter of contention between the parties on the

subject of probable cause is whether the affidavit demonstrates

the reliability of the informant on whose information the

officer’s affidavit depends. In most cases, the reliability is

demonstrated by the source’s having provided accurate

information in the past, often on “numerous occasions.” Id. at

1296. There are, of course, other means of demonstrating the

reliability, including the circumstance that the information given

by the “reliable source” is against his penal interest. The United

States contends that that should apply here. The appellant

contends that it should not, because the portion of the

informant’s statements to the officer that are against its interest

are not those upon which the probable cause determination rests. 

In the end, we need not determine the vexing issue of probable

cause, as we conclude that even if probable cause is lacking, the

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admission of the evidence was not reversible error because of

the Leon exception, which we discuss below. 

B. The Leon Exception

The United States contends that even if we conclude that the

affidavit is insufficient to have supported the issuance of a valid

search warrant, we should nonetheless hold that the district court

did not err in denying appellant’s motion to exclude the fruits of

the search under the “good faith” exception recognized in

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). We agree. In Leon,

the Court observed that “‘[i]f the purpose of the exclusionary

rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained

from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the

law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be

charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional

under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 919 (quoting United

States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)).

Therefore, in Leon, the High Court held that “when an

officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search

warrant from a judge . . . and acted within its scope,” the

exclusionary rule should not be employed to “[p]enaliz[e] the

officer for the [judge’s] error.” 468 U.S. at 921. Such an

application of the exclusionary rule “cannot logically contribute

to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Id. As in

Leon, the officer here acted pursuant to a warrant, which “is a

judicial mandate to an officer to conduct a search . . . .” Id. at

920 n.21. The officer had “a sworn duty to carry out” the

provisions of the order. Id. Therefore, even if the affidavit was

not sufficient to support the issuance of the warrant, we hold, as

the Supreme Court did in Leon, that the evidence obtained in the

search is not required to be excluded.

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C. The Franks Hearing Argument

Appellant argues that even under the Leon good faith

exception, “[s]uppression . . . remains an appropriate remedy if

the magistrate or judge in issuing the warrant was misled by

information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or

would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of

the truth.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (citing Franks v. Delaware,

438 U.S. 154 (1978)). Appellant therefore contends that the

district court erred in denying his request for a Franks hearing. 

We disagree.

By its terms, the Franks opinion suggests the necessity for

a hearing to determine the truth of the affidavit underlying the

issuance of the warrant only where “the magistrate or judge, in

issuing a warrant, was misled by information in an affidavit that

the affiant knew was false or would have known was false

except for his reckless disregard of the truth.” Id. “Affidavits

or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be

furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained.” Franks,

438 U.S. at 171. 

In this case, there is no record support for the proposition

that the officer who obtained the warrant was guilty of any such

false swearing or reckless disregard for the truth. Appellant

relies principally on what he views as the omission of details

concerning the source’s drug use and current charges. However,

even if appellant’s factual assertions are correct, he presented

nothing to the district court that would warrant a hearing to

examine knowing false testimony or reckless disregard for the

truth on the part of the officer. The officer certainly alerted the

issuing judge to the source’s current legal difficulties and

involvement with drugs. Even without the “deference [paid] by

reviewing courts” to a determination of probable cause, see

Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (quotation marks and citations omitted),

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there is nothing to warrant a departure from the normal process

of reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit to support probable

cause without an evidentiary hearing.

As both parties note, this circuit has never determined

whether a district court’s decision not to hold a Franks hearing

is reviewed under the clearly erroneous or de novo standard of

review. See United States v. Becton, 601 F.3d 588, 594 (D.C.

Cir. 2010). The United States suggests that we should review

any necessary findings under a clearly erroneous standard and

any conclusions of law under a de novo standard. However, it

does not matter. As in Becton, we reiterate that “‘[t]o mandate

an evidentiary hearing,’ the movant’s attack on the affidavit

supporting the warrant ‘must be more than conclusory.’” Id.

(quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). Here, as in Becton, there is

no more than a conclusory claim that the officer may have

misled the issuing judge, and there is no support in the record

for the necessity of holding an evidentiary hearing under Franks.

CONCLUSION

To summarize, we hold that we need not decide the

sufficiency of the affidavit because the exclusionary rule is

inapplicable to the fruits of the search under Leon, 468 U.S. 897. 

We further conclude that the district court did not err in refusing

to hold an evidentiary hearing under Franks, 438 U.S. 154. We

therefore affirm the judgment below.

So ordered.

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