Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00965/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00965-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Omar Brown
Defendant
Christopher Compton
Defendant
County of Trinity
Defendant
Ron Hanover
Defendant
Eric Heryford
Defendant
Mike Rist
Defendant
Robert Michael Scharringhausen
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MICHAEL SCHARRINGHAUSEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF TRINITY; SGT. 

CHRISTOPHER COMPTON; CPL. OMAR 

BROWN; CPL. RON HANOVER; SGT. 

MIKE RIST (All Officers Serving 

on the Trinity County Narcotics 

Task Force); TRINITY COUNTY 

DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ERIC HERYFORD; 

and DOES 1 through 50,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-00965-JAM-CMK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants County of Trinity (“County”), Trinity County 

District Attorney Eric Heryford (“Heryford”), and Trinity County 

Sheriff’s Deputies Christopher Compton, Omar Brown, Ron Hanover, 

and Mike Rist (collectively “Deputies”) bring this motion to 

dismiss plaintiff Robert Michael Scharringhausen’s (“Plaintiff”) 

first amended complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the 

Court grants the motion.1

 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for August 21, 2013.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2014, Plaintiff was arrested for the 

alleged cultivation and possession of marijuana for sale. FAC 

¶ 15. Plaintiff was confined to Trinity County Jail from 

September 11, 2014, to October 12, 2014. Id. ¶ 13. 

Following arrest, Defendants allegedly concocted false 

felony convictions of Plaintiff for the manufacture of narcotics, 

attempted homicide, and assault. Id. ¶ 16. Defendants allegedly 

knew this false information would “mislead a magistrate into 

allowing a no-bail or ordering a new no-bail situation of 

confinement of the Plaintiff.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges that 

Defendants intentionally suppressed and hid evidence of 

Plaintiff’s innocence. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. The false accusations and 

hidden evidence caused Plaintiff to be denied bail, and Plaintiff 

was ultimately incarcerated for 31 days. Id. ¶¶ 17, 19.

Plaintiff’s initial complaint was dismissed with leave to 

amend (Doc. #16). Plaintiff then filed the FAC, which included

the following three causes of action: (1) “Conspiracy to violate 

Plaintiff’s civil rights by Defendants, cognizable under 42 

U.S.C. § 1988,” (2) “The right to privacy under federal common 

law and under California Constitutional Article 1, Section 1,” 

and (3) Monell – 42 USC § 1983.” Defendants now move to dismiss 

the entire FAC (Doc. #22). Plaintiff opposes dismissal (Doc. 

#24).

II. OPINION

A. Judicial Notice

Defendants seek judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Evidence 201 of seven documents: (1) September 11, 2014 Search 

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Warrant and Affidavit from Trinity County Case No. 14-00973 

(Exh. A); (2) September 11, 2014 Trinity County Booking Report 

No. 2014090024 (Exh. B); (3) September 14, 2014 Probable Cause 

Declaration in Trinity County Case No. 2014-00973 (Exh. C); 

(4) September 15, 2014 Complaint-Felony in Trinity County Case 

No. 14F174A (Exh. D); (5) September 15, 2014 arraignment minutes 

from Trinity County Case No. 14F174A (Exh. E); (6) Erik 

McDaniel’s Request for Informal Discovery in Trinity County Case 

No. 14F174 (Exh. F); and (7) Plaintiff’s Request for Discovery 

in Trinity County Case No. 14F174 (Exh. G). 

Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of the Amended Complaint 

filed by Defendants on September 26, 2014, which Plaintiff 

apparently intended to attach as Exhibit 1. Opp. at 8. 

However, Plaintiff failed to attach any exhibits. 

A court may take judicial notice of a fact that is not 

reasonably disputed if it “can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). On a motion to dismiss, 

courts are allowed to consider “matters of public record.” 

Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Investments, 779 F.3d 

1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2015).

Exhibits A and E are the only documents the Court has 

relied upon in its analysis. Plaintiff alleges that the 

statement of probable cause in Exhibit A is hearsay and is 

irrelevant to this case. Opp. at 7. The Court has not 

considered the statement of probable cause in Exhibit A. 

Instead, the Court has only considered the first two pages of 

Exhibit A, which are part the public record and are not subject 

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to reasonable dispute. As for Exhibit E, Plaintiff did not 

formally object to taking judicial notice of Exhibit E. Opp. at 

8. Just like Exhibit A, Exhibit E is part of the public record 

and is not subject to reasonable dispute. As such, the Court 

takes judicial notice of Exhibits A and E. Since the Court’s 

analysis does not incorporate any of the remaining exhibits, the 

Court need not take judicial notice of them.

B. Analysis

1. Constitutional Violations

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that Defendants 

violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) by conspiring to 

deprive Plaintiff of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures and his Eighth Amendment 

right to receive non-excessive bail. FAC ¶¶ 24-25.

a. Fourth Amendment

With respect to the Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his right “to be 

free from unreasonable arrest and seizure.” FAC ¶ 24. 

Defendants move to dismiss this claim because the allegation is 

conclusory and because the search of Plaintiff’s property was 

lawfully conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. Mot. at 

6-7. Plaintiff does not address either argument in his 

opposition. 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment allegations in the first cause 

of action are in fact conclusory. The only factual allegation 

made in support of the legal conclusion that Defendants deprived 

Plaintiff of his right “to be free from unreasonable arrest and 

seizure” is that Deputies “conducted a raid” on his property. 

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FAC ¶¶ 14, 24. This conclusory allegation by itself does not 

meet the plausibility standard for pleading a cause of action. 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). 

Moreover, Plaintiff did not address Defendants’ argument that 

the search was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant. 

Defendants’ Exh. A. The Court thus grants the motion to dismiss 

the Fourth Amendment claims in the First Cause of Action.

b. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated his Eighth 

Amendment right to receive non-excessive bail by intentionally 

suppressing and hiding evidence of Plaintiff’s innocence and by 

falsifying previous criminal convictions. FAC ¶¶ 18-19. The 

false accusations and hidden evidence allegedly caused Plaintiff 

to be denied bail. Id. ¶ 17. Defendants move to dismiss this 

claim for three reasons: (1) bail was offered in the amount of 

$300,000; (2) there is no allegation that the bail was 

unconstitutionally excessive or that the defendants overcame the 

freewill of the judge who determined bail; and (3) bail was 

determined based upon a complaint and booking report that 

contained no false convictions. Mot. at 5. In opposition, 

Plaintiff argues that the false convictions were included in an 

amended complaint filed on September 26, 2014, and that the 

September 26 complaint “led directly to Plaintiff’s status as a 

no-bail or increased bail defendant.” Opp. at 6. Plaintiff 

fails to address Defendants’ two other arguments.

A claim for the violation of one’s right to non-excessive 

bail requires alleging and proving two elements: (1) that law 

enforcement “deliberately or recklessly misled” the judicial 

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officer; and (2) that the plaintiff’s bail “would not have been 

unconstitutionally excessive but for the officers' 

misrepresentations.” Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 

652, 663-64 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The FAC contains a sufficient allegation that Deputies 

deliberately misled the magistrate. FAC ¶ 16. However, the FAC 

fails to allege that bail was set in a constitutionally 

excessive amount, that bail would not have been set at its level 

but for the Deputies’ alleged misrepresentations, or that 

Deputies’ false accusations actually prevented the magistrate 

from exercising her independent judgment. Plaintiff concedes 

that the false convictions were not included in the first 

criminal complaint on September 15, 2014, but argues that the 

accusations were included in the September 26, 2014, amended 

criminal complaint. Opp. at 6. Yet bail was determined on 

September 15, 2014. Defendants’ Exh. E. Thus, the magistrate 

could not have considered the allegedly false out-of-state 

convictions, and Plaintiff does not allege facts demonstrating 

that the bail was changed or modified after the filing of this 

amended criminal complaint. 

The Court therefore grants the motion to dismiss the Eighth 

Amendment claims brought under the First Cause of Action. 

2. Right to Privacy

Plaintiff alleges that his right to privacy was violated 

when Defendants “exceeded the scope of the search warrant by 

confiscating Plaintiff’s private papers and communications 

between Plaintiff and his attorneys” and “transmitted those 

documents to agencies and prosecutorial persons in San Diego 

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County.” FAC ¶¶ 32-33. Plaintiff’s privacy claim is allegedly 

based upon the California Constitution and federal common law. 

Id. at 7. Defendants seek to dismiss this cause of action 

because Plaintiff did not plead compliance with the California 

Government Claims Act and because there was no constitutional 

violation of privacy. Mot. at 7-10. 

a. California Privacy Claim

To the extent this cause of action arises under California 

law, Plaintiff must have presented his claim to the relevant 

public entity pursuant to California Government Code sections 

911.2 and 945.4. Plaintiff concedes that he did not plead 

compliance with the Government Claims Act. “Failure to timely 

present a claim . . . to a public entity bars a plaintiff from 

filing a lawsuit against that entity.” City of Stockton v. 

Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 (2007). Thus, the Court 

grants the motion to dismiss the state law privacy cause of 

action. 

b. Federal Privacy Claim

With respect to Plaintiff’s claim that the search and 

seizure of his confidential documents violated his federal 

common law right to privacy, the Court must make two inquiries: 

“(1) in what items does [Plaintiff] assert a legitimate 

expectation of privacy; and (2) as to each such item, did a 

Fourth Amendment violation occur (i.e., does the item fall 

within the scope of the warrant).” DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 

1505, 1508 (9th Cir. 1985).

Defendants seek dismissal of this cause of action on the 

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client communications that were improperly seized and that there 

was no Fourth Amendment violation. Mot. at 9-10. In 

opposition, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants make no claim 

that the warrant covered copies of the attorney/client files in 

the possession of the Plaintiff.” Opp. at 4.

A person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in their 

client files. DeMassa, 770 F.2d at 1508. Since Plaintiff 

alleged that “Defendants confiscated Plaintiff’s private papers 

and communications between Plaintiff and his attorneys,” 

Plaintiff adequately alleged that he had a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in any documents seized by Defendants 

that were part of his client file. 

However, Plaintiff failed to allege a plausible Fourth 

Amendment violation. Plaintiff simply states that Defendants 

“had in their possession all of the documents in which Plaintiff 

communicated and received communication from his lawyers.” FAC 

¶ 33. This allegation does not identify which items were seized 

in violation of the Fourth Amendment, thereby failing to place 

Defendants on notice as to the scope of Plaintiff’s claims. 

Additionally, the allegations fail to plausibly describe how the 

seizure violated the Fourth Amendment given that the search 

warrant clearly permitted the search and seizure of “records of 

sales” including “diaries” and “ledgers and notes.” Defendants’ 

Exh. A. As such, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action.

3. Monell Liability

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges that “highranking County of Trinity officials” knew of the Deputies’ acts 

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of misconduct and approved and authorized “the continuing 

pattern and practice of misconduct and/or civil rights 

violations.” FAC ¶¶ 36-37. Defendants move to dismiss this 

cause of action because Plaintiff’s allegations of a “grand 

conspiracy” are conclusory and there were no constitutional 

violations. Mot. at 13-14. Plaintiff’s opposition does not 

directly address these arguments; instead, Plaintiff argues that 

“Municipalities are not protected by a good faith defense.” 

Opp. at 8. 

To properly state a Monell claim, allegations in a 

complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of 

action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying 

facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 

defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of 

Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff cannot 

make conclusory allegations and must demonstrate that the claims 

for relief are plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56.

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s 

allegations are conclusory. Plaintiff merely alleges that 

“high-ranking police supervisors . . . knew or reasonably should 

have known about repeated acts of misconduct,” that they 

“approved, ratified, condoned, encouraged, sought to cover up, 

and/or tacitly authorized the continuing pattern and practice of 

misconduct,” and that they “encouraged [Deputies] to continue 

their course of conduct.” FAC ¶¶ 37-39. These allegations do 

not identify any underlying facts as to how these high-ranking 

officials engaged in this “cover up.” The allegations do not 

provide Defendants with sufficient notice as to what specific 

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conduct gave rise to their Monell liability. And the FAC as a 

whole fails to allege a plausible cause of action under Monell. 

Thus, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss the third 

cause of action.2

C. Leave to Amend

The Court previously granted Defendants’ first motion to 

dismiss with leave to amend with the admonishment that “failure 

to cure the defects identified in this Order will be grounds for 

dismissal without further leave to amend.” Order (Doc. #16) at 7 

(citing Dick v. Am. Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., CIV. 2:13-

00201 WBS, 2013 WL 5299180 at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2013)). Since 

Plaintiff has failed to cure the defects in its FAC, and any 

further attempt to amend would be futile, the Court grants the 

motion to dismiss with prejudice. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH 

PREJUDICE Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2016

 2 Defendants also raise immunity defenses in support of their 

motion to dismiss. The Court need not reach this issue in light 

of its decision to grant the motion herein on other grounds.

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