Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06234/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06234-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ben Curry
Defendant
Anthony Singleton
Petitioner

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY SINGLETON,

Petitioner,

v.

BEN CURRY, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-6234 SI (pr)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS IN PART AND SETTING

BRIEFING SCHEDULE

A. Motion To Dismiss

Anthony Singleton, an inmate at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus with regard to a decision to deny him parole. The court

determined that the petition stated two due process claims: that the refusal to parole him

breached his plea agreement, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the parole denial.

See Order To Show Cause, p. 2. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ

should not issue.

Respondent now moves to dismiss the petition, arguing that it is deficient in two respects.

Respondent first contends that the petition failed to identify the particular parole decision

Singleton is challenging. Respondent is correct that the petition is deficient in this respect.

However, Singleton has now provided that information in his opposition to the motion to

dismiss: he is challenging the denial of parole at the June 15, 2005 parole hearing. The court

will deem the opposition brief to be an amendment to the petition to identify the June 15, 2005

parole decision as the one being challenged. Thus, respondent now knows what parole hearing

is being challenged and dismissal with leave to amend is not necessary to correct this deficiency.

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Respondent contends also that the claim regarding the plea agreement must be dismissed

as time-barred. Respondent notes that Singleton’s petition does not specify the term that

allegedly was breached. Respondent argues that, if it is an alleged agreement to be released

when the minimum eligible parole date (“MEPD”) arrived, that date came and went long ago (on

April 24, 1992) and it is too late to assert that claim. 

Singleton opposes the motion and contends that the relevant date is the date of the BPH’s

hearing, June 15, 2005, and that his petition was timely filed using that date. He does not dispute

respondent’s assertion that the alleged breach was the failure to release him when his MEPD

arrived and he does not assert that his plea agreement in 1982 included a term that he would be

released in June 2005.

“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The

limitations period applies to Singleton’s petition because he is in custody pursuant to a state

court judgment, even though he challenges an administrative decision rather than his conviction.

See Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2004); White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d

1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). There are four alternative starting dates under section 2244(d)(1),

and the one that is applicable here is the “date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D). See Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066; Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.

2003). 

Here, the factual predicate for Singleton’s claim is the state's failure to release him on

parole on his MEPD as allegedly required by the plea agreement. His MEPD was April 24,

1992. The breach of plea agreement claim is untimely under the statute of limitations because

it was not filed until about fourteen years after the factual predicate of the claim became known

to Singleton. See Redd, 343 F.3d at 1083 (date of the factual predicate is determined "by

inquiring when [the petitioner] could have learned of the factual basis for his claim through the

exercise of due diligence.") Even giving him the benefit of the one-year grace period for claims

that arose before the AEDPA was enacted in 1995 wouldn't help because Singleton still missed

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the deadline by about a decade. And even if Singleton contends that the plea agreement called

for him to be released when he had served 15 years of his 15-to-life sentence, the fifteenth year

ended in 1997. His state habeas petition was not filed until about 8 years later and his federal

petition was not filed until about 9 years later. Even using that later starting date wouldn’t help

Singleton, and his petition would still be barred by the statute of limitations. 

Singleton’s assertion that the one-year limitations period did not start until the parole

denial in June 2005 is incorrect. That is the starting date for the insufficient evidence claim but

not for the breach of plea agreement claim. Under his reasoning, a statute of limitations would

never bar a breach of contract kind of claim because one could simply demand further

performance on a long-breached contract that the other party had clearly shown he was not going

to perform and then file suit on it. But that is not the law. The limitations period clock starts

ticking when the breach occurs, and here that was when the allegedly agreed-upon date for

release arrived and Singleton remained in prison. Certainly if he thought the plea agreement

called for him to be released at his MEPD, he has known for 14 years that didn’t happen. 

The breach of contract claim is barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations.

Respondent’s motion to dismiss that claim is GRANTED. (Docket # 3.) 

B. Singleton's Request For Court To Make And Serve Copies Of His Filings

Singleton's request for the court to photocopy his documents and serve them on

respondent is DENIED. (Docket # 5.) The requirement that a petitioner serve a copy on

respondent's counsel a copy of each and every document he files with the court is not optional.

If Singleton fails to comply with the requirement, the court will disregard any document he files

that has not been served on his opponent. If Singleton has inadequate access to a photocopier

to make a copy, he must handwrite or type a complete and accurate copy of the document and

send that to respondent's counsel. The court notes that Singleton attached to his opposition brief

a proof of service showing that it was sent to respondent's counsel, which undermines his

contention that he cannot provide copies. The court also notes that -- unless there is dispute

about whether a particular document was filed -- it is almost always a waste of paper for a

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petitioner to attach to a filing copies of things that have already been filed in this action, as the

court already has the document if it has been filed in the action. 

C. New Briefing Schedule On Petition

With the dismissal of the claim that the plea agreement was breached, there still remains

to be litigated Singleton’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the denial of parole

at the June 15, 2005 hearing. The court now sets the following new briefing schedule on that

claim:

1. Respondent must file and serve his answer no later than May 25, 2007.

2. Petitioner must file and serve his traverse no later than June 29, 2007. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 10, 2007 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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