Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03061/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03061-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey L. Morgan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 8, 2004 Decided December 21, 2004

No. 03-3061

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JEFFREY L. MORGAN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cr00180-10)

Michele J. Woods, appointed by the court, argued the cause

for appellant. With her on the briefs was Joseph M. Catoe.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese, III,

and Laura A. Ingersoll, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: EDWARDS, HENDERSON, and ROBERTS, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

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EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: Appellant Jeffrey Morgan

appeals from his conviction in the District Court for receiving

stolen federal property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000).

His sole contention on appeal is that venue was improper in the

District of Columbia ("District" or "D.C.").

Appellant's prosecution arose out of an indictment charging

him, along with 10 co-conspirators, with participating in an

elaborate conspiracy to defraud the United States. Appellant

was also charged with receiving stolen government property, the

only charge of which he was convicted. The evidence

introduced at trial regarding appellant's role in the conspiracy

related solely to one stolen computer that was ultimately found

in his possession. It is undisputed that appellant physically

received this computer (which was stolen in the District) in

Maryland, and that the computer thereafter remained in

Maryland until it was recovered by the authorities.

The Government claims that venue was proper in the

District of Columbia on two alternative grounds. First, the

Government asserts that appellant "constructively received" the

computer at the moment it was stolen. Second, the Government

argues that the offense for which appellant was convicted is one

"involving . . . transportation in interstate . . . commerce," and,

under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2000), may therefore be prosecuted

in any district through which the computer moved. We reject

both of these contentions.

All of appellant's conduct constituting his alleged

commission of the offense occurred in Maryland. The evidence

in this case does not permit the conclusion that appellant

constructively possessed the computer at any time while it was

in the District, and we therefore need not reach the question

whether a conviction for receiving stolen government property

under 18 U.S.C. § 641 can be premised on a theory of

constructive receipt. Furthermore, appellant's conviction was

not for an "offense involving" transportation in interstate

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commerce as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) ¶ 2. Accordingly,

we hold that venue in the District of Columbia is improper and

reverse appellant's conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

The charges in this case arose from an elaborate conspiracy

centered around Elizabeth Mellen and her scheme to defraud her

employer, the U.S. Department of Education ("Department").

Mellen, appellant's aunt, worked as a senior telecommunications

manager for the Department at an office building located in the

District. She was responsible for the Department's

telecommunication expenditures and for ordering its related

goods and services. Mellen's responsibilities also included

supervising the Department's telephone installations and

maintenance and the technicians who performed that work.

Robert Sweeney was one of those technicians. Sweeney

was employed by Bell Atlantic Federal Systems and was

assigned to work on the telecommunication systems at the

Department. Sweeney was required to account for his time and

the materials he ordered to perform his work. At the end of each

month, Sweeney would present his expenses to Mellen for her

approval. After Mellen signed off, Sweeney would submit them

to Bell Atlantic, which, in turn, billed the Department.

At some point, Mellen began to ask Sweeney to run

personal errands for her. In return, Mellen permitted Sweeney

to submit false claims for overtime pay. Eventually, Mellen had

Sweeney order and obtain various telephones, computers,

printers, cameras, and copiers for her personal use. Sweeney

knew that these items, the expenses for which were ultimately

billed to the Department, were not legitimate items for him to

order.

Items that Sweeney ordered would arrive at a large Bell

Atlantic warehouse located at 58-62 L Street in Northeast

Washington, D.C. When the items arrived, Sweeney would call

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Mellen for further instructions, retrieve the items from the

warehouse, and deliver them in accordance with Mellen's

instructions. Sometimes he would simply deliver the items to

Mellen's office or to an unlocked car which would be parked

outside of the building in which Mellen worked. Other times,

Sweeney would deliver the items to various locations that

Mellen would specify.

On one occasion, Mellen had Sweeney order five

computers, one of which is the subject of appellant's conviction.

After picking up the computers at the warehouse, Sweeney and

Lewis Morgan (a Department employee, unrelated to appellant,

who also made deliveries for Mellen not in connection with his

official duties) used a Bell Atlantic van to deliver them to

locations specified by Mellen.

One of those computers was to be delivered to Susanne

Morgan's house in Maryland. Susanne Morgan, who also

worked at the Department, was appellant's mother and Mellen's

twin sister. Sweeney contacted appellant – who was living at his

mother's house at the time – advising him that the computer was

going to be delivered and requesting that appellant be present to

accept it. As a result, appellant was present when Sweeney and

Lewis Morgan arrived at Susanne Morgan's house and delivered

the computer.

The computer was initially set up in the basement of

Susanne Morgan's house. In the spring or summer of 1999,

appellant moved out of his mother's home and into the home of

his brother, which was also located in Maryland. Appellant

brought the computer with him to his brother's home and kept it

next to his bed, where, months later, it was ultimately found and

seized by federal agents.

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review and General Principles Governing

Venue

The Government bears the burden of establishing by a

preponderance of the evidence that venue is proper with respect

to each count charged against the defendant. United States v.

Haire, 371 F.3d 833, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing United States

v. Lam, 924 F.2d 298, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). In reviewing

whether the Government has properly established venue, we

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Government. Id.

Proper venue in criminal proceedings was "a matter of

concern to the Nation's founders." United States v. Cabrales,

524 U.S. 1, 6 (1998). Indeed, the Constitution "twice safeguards

the defendant's venue right: Article III, § 2, cl. 3, instructs that

'Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State where the said

Crimes shall have been committed'; the Sixth Amendment calls

for trial 'by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the

crime shall have been committed.'" Id.; see also United States

v. Passodelis, 615 F.2d 975, 977 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that

although, read literally, the provision in the Sixth Amendment

is a vicinage rather than venue provision, because it specifies the

place from which the jurors are to be selected rather than the

place of trial, the distinction has never been given any weight,

"perhaps . . . because the requirement that the jury be chosen

from the state and district where the crime was committed

presupposes that the jury will sit where it is chosen").

Mindful that "[q]uestions of venue in criminal cases . . .

raise deep issues of public policy," the Supreme Court has

articulated a rule endorsing a restrictive construction of venue

provisions:

If an enactment of Congress equally permits the underlying

spirit of the constitutional concern for trial in the vicinage

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to be respected rather than to be disrespected, construction

should go in the direction of constitutional policy even

though not commanded by it.

United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944). Although

the specific holding in Johnson was mooted by statute in 1948,

the rule of construction announced in that case survives. See,

e.g, United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958) ("The

provision for trial in the vicinity of the crime is a safeguard

against the unfairness and hardship involved when an accused

is prosecuted in a remote place. Provided its language permits,

the Act in question should be given that construction which will

respect such considerations."); see also United States v.

Brennan, 183 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that Johnson

rule of construction retains vitality).

B. The Locus Delicti

Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides that, unless otherwise permitted by statute or the Rules,

"the government must prosecute an offense in a district where

the offense was committed." FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. When the

statute proscribing the offense does not contain an express venue

provision, "'[t]he locus delicti must be determined from the

nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts

constituting it.'" Cabrales, 524 U.S. at 6-7 (quoting United

States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946)). "In performing

this inquiry, a court must initially identify the conduct

constituting the offense (the nature of the crime) and then

discern the location of the commission of the criminal acts."

United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279 (1999).

Here, Morgan was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 641.

That statute provides that any person who "receives, conceals,

or retains [any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the

United States or of any department or agency thereof] with

intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been

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embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted" commits a criminal

offense. It is undisputed that Morgan did not receive the

computer until it arrived in Maryland. It is also undisputed that

the computer thereafter remained in Maryland until it was

recovered by the authorities. The Government contends,

however, that Morgan "constructively received" the computer at

the moment Sweeney removed the computer from the

warehouse, and therefore Morgan committed acts constituting

the offense within the District of Columbia. The Government's

position is meritless.

Because a person may be said to "receive" a thing when he

"take[s] possession" of it, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1894 (1993), and because it is

well settled that criminal possession may be either actual or

constructive, see, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116,

127 (D.C. Cir. 2003), it is plausible that one may receive stolen

property within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 641 by obtaining

constructive possession of it. See also 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,

SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 20.2(b), at 157 (2d ed. 2003); 3

CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 444, at 612-

15 (15th ed. 1995). However, we have never explicitly held that

a conviction for receiving stolen property may be premised upon

such a theory of constructive receipt, and we have no need to do

so today. For even assuming that a conviction under § 641 can

be had on such evidence, we conclude that the evidence in this

case does not support a finding that Morgan constructively

possessed the computer within the District.

A finding of constructive possession requires evidence

establishing that the defendant had the ability to exercise

"knowing dominion and control" over the items in question.

Alexander, 331 F.3d at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The evidence proffered by the Government in this case, even

when viewed in the light most favorable to it, does not permit

the conclusion that Morgan had the ability to exercise knowing

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dominion and control over the computer within the District of

Columbia.

The Government relies on two pieces of evidence in support

of its argument: (1) evidence indicating that, at some time prior

to the delivery of the computer, Jeffrey Morgan approached

Sweeney and Lewis Morgan at the Department of Education and

asked them when he would be receiving his computer; and (2)

evidence that Sweeney called Jeffrey Morgan to arrange for the

delivery of the computer to Susanne Morgan's address. From

these pieces of evidence, the Government argues that it is

reasonable to infer that both Sweeney and Jeffrey Morgan

considered Jeffrey Morgan to be the intended recipient of the

computer, even though it was being delivered to Susanne

Morgan's address. However, even assuming that the

Government is correct that this evidence supports the inference

that both parties considered appellant to be the intended

recipient of the computer, this, without more, is simply

insufficient to support a finding that appellant had the ability to

exercise "knowing dominion and control" over the computer

when it was in the District of Columbia.

On the contrary, the evidence in this case indicates that if

anyone exercised dominion and control over the computers

Sweeney was transporting, it was Mellen. It is undisputed that

Sweeney ordered the computers at Mellen's direction and

delivered them according to Mellen's instructions and to the

locations she specified. Moreover, although Sweeney contacted

appellant to arrange for delivery of one of the computers to

Susanne Morgan's address (at Mellen's direction), there is no

indication that Mellen relinquished her control over the

computer. Indeed, on one occasion, Mellen directed Sweeney

to pick up a television from the Bell Atlantic warehouse and

bring it to a location in D.C. While Sweeney was in transit,

however, Mellen redirected the delivery to a new location in

Maryland. See Trial Tr. of 10/29/02 a.m. session at 52-53,

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reprinted in Appendix at 159-60. The Government identifies

nothing to suggest that Mellen could not similarly have

redirected the computer in question before it arrived at Susanne

Morgan's house.

In short, the evidence identified by the Government does

not permit the conclusion that appellant constructively possessed

the computer once Sweeney removed it from the warehouse.

Therefore, we reject the Government's argument that venue lies

because appellant constructively received the computer in the

District of Columbia.

C. Continuing Offense Under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)

The Government additionally relies on 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)

as a basis for venue in the District. This general venue provision

deals with so-called continuing offenses, and provides that:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment

of Congress, any offense against the United States begun in

one district and completed in another, or committed in more

than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any

district in which such offense was begun, continued, or

completed.

Any offense involving the use of the mails,

transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, or the

importation of an object or person into the United States is

a continuing offense and, except as otherwise expressly

provided by enactment of Congress, may be inquired of and

prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such

commerce, mail matter, or imported object or person

moves.

18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).

The Government does not invoke the first paragraph of §

3237(a). Instead, the Government relies only on the second

paragraph, contending that, because the computer was

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transported across state lines, Morgan was convicted of an

offense involving transportation in interstate commerce. Thus,

according to the Government, venue is proper in D.C. or

Maryland. 

There is no doubt that Sweeney transported the computer in

interstate commerce when he drove it from D.C. to Maryland.

But this information, without more, is no more telling than is

information about the state in which the computer was

manufactured before it was shipped to D.C. The important

question here is whether Morgan's receipt of the computer in

Maryland – the offense for which he was convicted – was an

"offense involving" interstate transportation under § 3237(a) ¶

2. We conclude that it was not.

The most natural reading of § 3237(a) ¶ 2 is to construe

"any offense involving" by reference to the elements of the

offense at issue. "Offense" obviously refers to a particular

crime, so the language of the statute invites consideration of

only the elements of that crime in determining whether the

offense involved "the use of the mails," "transportation in

interstate or foreign commerce," or "the importation of an object

or person into the United States." For example, in a case in

which a man drives from his home in D.C. to New York,

strangles a federal officer to death in New York in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000), then returns to his home in D.C., the

circumstances surrounding the crime include the killer's travel

in interstate commerce, but his crime is not an "offense

involving" transportation in interstate commerce. In other

words, a faithful reading of the precise words of the statute in

the order in which they are written suggests that an "offense

involv[es]" transportation in interstate commerce only when

such transportation is an element of the offense. 

In United States v. Brennan, 183 F.3d 139 (2d. Cir. 1999),

the Second Circuit held that the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §

1341 (1994) – which makes it unlawful to "place[]," "deposit[],"

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or "take[] or receive[]" any mail matter as part of a scheme to

defraud – does not proscribe conduct involving "the use of the

mails" within the meaning of § 3237(a) ¶ 2. Brennan, 183 F.3d

at 146-47. The court concluded that "§ 3237(a) is best read as

not applying to statutes, like the mail fraud statute, that specify

that a crime is committed by the particular acts of depositing or

receiving mail, or causing it to be delivered, rather than by the

more general and ongoing act of 'us[ing] the mails.'" Id. at 147

(alteration in original); accord United States v. Ross, 205 F.2d

619, 621 (10th Cir. 1953) ("[T]he unlawful act defined in [18

U.S.C.] § 1461 [(1952)] is the deposit for mailing and not a use

of the mails which may follow such deposit. That act is

complete when the deposit is made and is not a continuing act.

It does not involve a use of the mails."). 

In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit noted that

the relevant portion of § 3237(a) was passed by Congress in

response to the Supreme Court decision in United States v.

Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944). Johnson involved a

prosecution under the National Denture Act of 1942, 56

Stat. 1087, the current version of which is codified at 18

U.S.C. § 1821. The statute generally made it unlawful "to

use the mails or any instrumentality of interstate commerce

for the purpose of sending or bringing into" any state or

territory a denture constructed from a cast not taken by a

dentist licensed to practice in the state into which the

denture was sent. The defendants were charged with

having violated the statute by depositing illicit dentures into

the mails at Chicago for delivery in Delaware. See 323

U.S. at 274. The government filed an information against

defendants in Delaware. See id. The information was

quashed on the ground that venue was proper only in the

Northern District of Illinois. See id.

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The Supreme Court affirmed, construing the statute to

permit "trial of the sender of outlawed dentures to be

confined to the district of sending, and that of the importer

to the district into which they are brought." Id. at 275. The

Court acknowledged that Congress was empowered

expressly to create a "continuing offense" by, in effect,

defining "the locality of a crime [to] extend over the whole

area through which force propelled by an offender

operates"; if Congress had utilized this power in the denture

context, the Court stated, the sender would have been

subject to prosecution in the district of sending, in the

district of arrival, and in any intervening district. See id.

However, "such leeway not only opens the door to needless

hardship to an accused by prosecution remote from home

and from appropriate facilities for defense. It also leads to

the appearance of abuses, if not to abuses, in the selection

of what may be deemed a tribunal favorable to the

prosecution." Id.

Emphasizing that "[t]hese are matters that touch closely

the fair administration of criminal justice and public

confidence in it, on which it ultimately rests," Johnson

articulated a rule favoring restrictive construction of venue

provisions: "[i]f an enactment of Congress equally permits

the underlying spirit of the constitutional concern for trial

in the vicinage to be respected rather than to be

disrespected, construction should go in the direction of

constitutional policy even though not commanded by it."

Id. at 276. . . . 

As noted, Congress passed § 3237(a) in response to

Johnson. See Reviser's Note, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237(a); Pratt

v. First California Co., Inc., 517 F.2d 11, 13 (10th Cir.

1975). In doing so, Congress did what Johnson indicated

it could: it expressly determined that offenses involving

"the use of the mails" were "continuing offenses." . . . 

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Passage of § 3237(a), however, could not and did not

alter the constitutional and policy concerns underlying the

Court's restrained view of venue; and it did not affect the

general validity of the Johnson rule of construction. 

Brennan, 183 F.3d at 146-47 (citations omitted) (alterations in

original).

Thus, under the Brennan and Ross constructions of §

3237(a) ¶ 2, what was relevant was whether the statute

specifying the offense included "the use of the mails" as an

element. Under this approach, receipt of stolen property under

18 U.S.C. § 641 is not an "offense involving" transportation in

interstate commerce, for it does not require any such

transportation for the commission of the offense. 

The Government insists that whether an offense involves

interstate transportation under § 3237(a) ¶ 2 "is not a question

to be answered by looking to the elements of the offense, but

instead to be answered by looking to the facts in each particular

case." Br. for Appellee at 34. This is gobbledygook. In an

effort to confine this otherwise unintelligible argument, the

Government urges that Morgan's offense "involv[ed]"

transportation in interstate commerce because "the

transportation in interstate commerce was integral to [Morgan's]

actual, physical receipt of the stolen government property." Id.

at 40. More gobbledygook. 

The Government's position appears to be almost limitless in

its expansion of the availability of venue under § 3237(a) ¶ 2.

Under its approach, venue in a prosecution for receiving stolen

property would lie in any district through which the goods had

passed. Thus, if the computer in this case had been driven from

California, rather than from D.C., venue would apparently lie in

each and every district through which the delivery truck drove.

Indeed, we cannot discern any reasonable principle that would

confine the Government's logic to the offense of receiving stolen

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property. The implication of the Government's approach is that

any offense involves transportation in interstate commerce so

long as the interstate transportation is among the circumstances

related to the commission of the offense. It is rare that a crime

does not involve circumstances in which a person or

instrumentality related to the crime has not passed through

interstate commerce. Thus, under the Government's theory, §

3237(a) ¶ 2 would apply to almost every offense. This view is

obviously untenable.

Although § 3237(a) ¶ 2 has been applied by other courts in

a variety of contexts, see 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 303, at 319 n.19 (3d ed. 2000)

(collecting and describing cases), the Government can identify

no case in which a court has construed § 3237(a) ¶ 2 so

expansively. See Recording of Oral Argument at 13:20-:37.

And we have found none. Even in the few cases in which courts

have applied § 3237(a) ¶ 2 to offenses that do not include

transportation in interstate commerce as an element, they have

always required a tight connection between the offense and the

interstate transportation.

For example, the Eleventh Circuit has employed § 3237(a)

¶ 2 in two cases where the offense occurred on a form of

interstate transportation. See United States v. Breitweiser, 357

F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2004) (offenses committed while on an

airplane); United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346 (11th Cir.

1982) (same). The court reasoned that § 3237 was "designed to

prevent a crime which has been committed in transit from

escaping punishment for lack of venue." Breitweiser, 357 F.3d

at 1253-54 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Government cites United States v. DeKunchak, 467

F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1972), but the decision in that case plainly

does not support the expansive reading of § 3237(a) ¶ 2 that the

Government advances here. In DeKunchak, the defendant was

convicted for receiving, selling, and disposing of stolen goods

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in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1970). That offense, however,

by its terms applies only to goods "which are a part of, or which

constitute interstate or foreign commerce." Indeed, the Second

Circuit noted that the legislative history explicitly states that

Congress intended § 2315 and the related 18 U.S.C. § 2314

(which criminalizes the transportation of stolen goods in

interstate commerce) to be covered by § 3237.

In sum, we refuse to countenance the Government's theory

that Morgan's receipt of the computer was an "offense

involving" transportation in interstate commerce simply because

the computer traveled across state lines before reaching Morgan.

It is not surprising that no court has ever approved the theory

submitted by the Government here, for such an interpretation

would result in a stunning expansion of permissible venue sites

under § 3237(a) ¶ 2. As the Supreme Court instructed in

Johnson: "[i]f an enactment of Congress equally permits the

underlying spirit of the constitutional concern for trial in the

vicinage to be respected rather than to be disrespected,

construction should go in the direction of constitutional policy

even though not commanded by it." 323 U.S. at 276. We adopt

a restrictive construction of the venue provision in § 3237(a) ¶

2, both because the statute commands it and because, even if the

statute admits of two equally plausible constructions, "the

constitutional concern for trial in the vicinage" controls. The

Government's position urging otherwise is entirely untenable,

and we reject it.

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that the District of Columbia was an improper

venue for appellant's prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 641.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed. 

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