Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02359/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02359-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Election Commission
Respondent
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Marne K. Mitskog
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MARNE K. MITSKOG,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-2359

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-1221-14-1035-W-1.

______________________ 

Decided: March 13, 2017

______________________ 

MARNE K. MITSKOG, West Fargo, ND, pro se. 

CALVIN M. MORROW, Office of the General Counsel, 

United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G.

POLISUK.

______________________ 

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2 MITSKOG v. MSPB

Before DYK, MAYER, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Marne K. Mitskog petitions for review of a decision by 

the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dismissing 

her Individual Right of Action (“IRA”) appeal under the 

Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”) for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mitskog was a Trial Attorney in the Office of Consumer Litigation of the Department of Justice from 2010 

to 2011. Mitskog filed complaints with the Department’s 

Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) alleging that her 

supervisor, Ann Ravel, was improperly diverting funds 

designated by Congress for the prosecution of healthcarefraud cases to non-healthcare-fraud cases. Mitskog also 

sent letters to Members of Congress and the State Bar of 

California detailing her allegations against Ravel. The 

record does not indicate the outcome, if any, resulting

from Mitskog’s complaints. 

In 2012, Mitskog was hired by the Federal Election 

Commission (“FEC”) as an attorney in the agency’s Enforcement Division. Little more than a year later, on June 

21, 2013, President Barack Obama nominated Ravel to 

serve as an FEC Commissioner. Shortly thereafter, 

Mitskog sent Ravel a series of emails in which she threatened to “blow up [Ravel’s] nomination” and referenced the 

diversion of funds that was the subject of Mitskog’s complaints to OIG and others. Ravel forwarded these emails 

to FEC officials, who ultimately removed Mitskog from 

her position for “conduct unbecoming a federal employee.” 

S.A. 58. Mitskog’s removal from the FEC became effective 

on December 28, 2013. 

On January 17, 2014, Mitskog filed a whistleblower 

complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) 

alleging that her removal from the FEC constituted 

Case: 16-2359 Document: 40-2 Page: 2 Filed: 03/13/2017
MITSKOG v. MSPB 3 

reprisal for her disclosures to OIG, Members of Congress

and the State Bar of California. Mitskog later supplemented her OSC complaint with copies of emails between 

her and FEC officials regarding her removal. OSC terminated its investigation of Mitskog’s complaint on July 28, 

2014, and advised Mitskog that she was entitled “to seek 

corrective action from the . . . Board.” S.A. 44. 

Mitskog proceeded to file an IRA appeal with the 

Board, which determined that Mitskog had failed to 

exhaust her administrative remedies with OSC, and that 

in certain respects she had failed to nonfrivolously allege 

that she had engaged in protected activity. The Board 

therefore dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Mitskog petitioned our court for review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

We review jurisdictional determinations by the Board

de novo. See Serrao v. MSPB, 95 F.3d 1569, 1573 (Fed. 

Cir. 1996). To establish the Board’s jurisdiction over an 

IRA appeal, the employee bears the burden of proving

exhaustion of administrative remedies before OSC. See 5 

U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3). “In assessing whether an employee 

has exhausted . . . OSC remedies, we look to [the employee’s] OSC complaint, as well as written correspondence 

concerning [the employee’s] allegations.” McCarthy v. 

MSPB, 809 F.3d 1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “We require 

that the employee articulate with reasonable clarity and 

precision [before the OSC] the basis for [the employee’s] 

request for corrective action under the WPA to allow OSC 

to effectively pursue an investigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The record before us demonstrates that the information Mitskog provided to OSC falls short of meeting 

this standard. Her claims of retaliation based on disclosures made to Members of Congress and the State Bar of 

California were conclusory and not presented to OSC with 

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4 MITSKOG v. MSPB

sufficient specificity. Mitskog also argues that the Board 

erred by failing to consider her status as a “perceived 

whistleblower” and that the nature of her disclosures—

protected or not—are irrelevant under this doctrine. See 

Montgomery v. MSPB, 382 F. App’x 942, 947 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (“The perceived whistleblower doctrine prevents a 

supervisor from taking retaliatory action against an

employee, even if the employee’s disclosure is later found 

unprotected, so long as the retaliation was taken in 

response to the disclosure.”). But this theory was not 

mentioned in Mitskog’s submission to OSC. The record of 

her OSC submission reflects only her statement to FEC 

officials that she had “federal whistleblower status.” S.A. 

97. This unilateral assertion is insufficient to demonstrate 

that agency officials perceived her to be a whistleblower. 

With respect to Mitskog’s allegation of whistleblower 

retaliation based on her disclosures to OIG, Mitskog 

broadly asserted in her initial OSC complaint the existence of “[t]wo instances (civil cases) that [she] reasonably 

believed were evidence . . . [of] fraudulent[] diver[sion].” 

S.A. 73. Although this allegation alludes to Mitskog’s 

complaint to OIG, it lacks the precision necessary to have 

“allow[ed] OSC to effectively pursue an investigation.” 

McCarthy, 809 F.3d at 1374. Mitskog’s supplemental 

filings to OSC did not add any additional specificity to 

this claim. Thus, Mitskog failed to exhaust administrative 

remedies with respect to her OIG disclosures.

The Board’s dismissal of Mitskog’s appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction is

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 16-2359 Document: 40-2 Page: 4 Filed: 03/13/2017