Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01703/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01703-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
Defendant
Leticia Ceja-Corona
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LETICIA CEJA-CORONA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CVS PHARMACY, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01703-AWI-SAB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE 

GRANTED

ECF NO. 27

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 

(14) DAYS

On February 28, 2014, Defendant CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (“Defendant” or “CVS”) filed a 

motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 27.) Plaintiff Leticia Ceja-Corona (“Plaintiff”) filed 

oppositions to the motion on March 28, 2014 and April 1, 2014. (ECF Nos. 33, 35.) Defendant 

filed a reply on April 15, 2014. The motion was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for 

findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.

The hearing on Defendant’s motion took place on April 23, 2014. Counsel Hugo Gamez 

appeared on behalf of Plaintiff via telephone. Counsel Caryn Anderson appeared on behalf of 

Defendant by telephone. Counsel Ricardo Aranda was also present on behalf of the trustee in 

Plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceeding by telephone.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment should be granted.

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I.

BACKGROUND

This action was removed from the Superior Court of California for the County of 

Stanislaus on October 16, 2012. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s complaint originally raised eight 

causes of action arising from her employment with Defendant. Plaintiff generally alleged that 

she suffered a work related injury and Defendant failed to accommodate her. Plaintiff was 

eventually terminated from her job.

Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on April 9, 2010. (CVS’s Reply Statement of 

Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) No. 1.) Plaintiff did not disclose any claims against CVS in her 

Schedule of Assets filed with her bankruptcy petition. (SUF No. 2.) Plaintiff did not disclose 

any alleged claim against CVS in her Schedule of Assets field with her Voluntary Petition (SUF 

No. 2.) Plaintiff never amended or supplemented her Schedule of Assets in her bankruptcy 

proceedings.1 (SUF No. 17.) On July 23, 2010, Plaintiff’s bankruptcy closed. (SUF No. 3.)

No one at CVS told Plaintiff that she was terminated because of her disability. (SUF No. 

4.) CVS’s job description for the “Stocker” position requires that the employee have the ability 

to push/pull heavily loaded carts, perform constant medium-heavy lifting of over 20 pounds and 

occasional heavy lifting of over 75 pounds. (SUF No. 5.) CVS’s job description for the 

“Selector/Picker” position requires that the employee have the ability to perform frequent 

medium heavy lifting of 1 to 20 pounds with occasional very heavy lifting of up to 75 pounds. 

(SUF No. 6.) Currently, Plaintiff is restricted to lifting no more than 10 pounds. (SUF No. 7.)

CVS accommodated Plaintiff with a leave of absence beginning on October 23, 2010. 

(SUF No. 8.) CVS’s policies prohibit discrimination of any kind and provide mechanisms for 

reporting any suspected discrimination, including a 24 hour a day ethics hotline which can be 

called anonymously. (SUF No. 9.)

/ / /

/ //

 

1

Plaintiff contends that this fact is disputed, but cites no evidence and makes no argument which contradicts this 

fact.

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Plaintiff signed her administrative EEOC complaint with the Department of Fair Housing 

and Employment on August 6, 2011.2 (SUF No. 19.) 

Plaintiff settled her Workers’ Compensation claims against CVS on November 2, 2011. 

(SUF No. 10.)

Plaintiff has not applied for work since October 2010.3 (SUF No. 12.) Plaintiff, to this 

day, avoids lifting anything with her left hand.4 (SUF No. 25.)

II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[a] party may move for summary judgment ... 

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Summary judgment must be entered “against a party 

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case...” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[A] party seeking summary 

judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 

motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.

III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant raises ten arguments in its motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment with respect to 

 

2

Plaintiff contends that this fact is disputed, but cites no evidence and makes no argument which contradicts this 

fact. Plaintiff does note that the EEOC complaint was not received until September 14, 2011.

3

Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff has not applied for work “because of her medical 

restrictions.” Instead, Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff has not applied for work because “[s]he simply questions who 

will hire her if she has to present these restrictions to a new employer.”

4

Plaintiff contends that this fact is disputed, but cites no evidence and makes no argument which contradicts this 

fact. Plaintiff merely argues that the fact is immaterial, which is not the case, as discussed in more detail below, 

because the reasons Plaintiff has not applied to work speak to whether she was capable of working. Moreover, in 

analyzing whether a fact is disputed, the Court looks to whether there is any evidence that contradicts the fact, not 

whether the fact is immaterial or relevant.

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Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim and Plaintiff’s related claims because there is no 

genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Plaintiff is capable of performing her job 

duties, with or without accommodation. Accordingly, the Court need not address the remaining 

arguments raised in Defendant’s motion pertaining to the statute of limitations or the exclusive 

remedy established by worker’s competition law.

A. Plaintiff’s Discrimination Claim

Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s disability 

discrimination claim because Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 

“When entertaining motions for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases arising 

under state law, federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting scheme as a federal procedural rule.” Zeinali v. Raytheon Co., 636 F.3d 544, 552 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In order to defeat a defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment, the plaintiff/employee must first establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination. Id. If the plaintiff/employee does, the employer must articulate a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. Id. If the employer satisfies this burden, the 

plaintiff/employee must show that the reason is pretextual, either directly by persuading the court 

that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 

employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Id.

“Under California law, a prima facie case of discrimination requires the plaintiff to 

‘provide evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the 

position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an 

adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) 

some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.’” Id. (quoting Guz v. Bechtel Nat. 

Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000)). “In light of the similarities between FEHA and Title VII, 

courts routinely rely on both California and federal case law.” Id.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination 

because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she was qualified for the position she sought or was 

performing competently in the position she held. While FEHA prohibits employment 

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discrimination based upon an employee’s disability, FEHA:

does not prohibit an employer from refusing to hire or discharging 

an employee with a physical or mental disability ... where the 

employee, because of his or her physical or mental disability, is 

unable to perform his or her essential duties even with reasonable 

accommodations, or cannot perform those duties in a manner that 

would not endanger his or her health or safety or the health or 

safety of others even with reasonable accommodations.

Cuiellette v. City of Los Angeles, 194 Cal. App. 4th 757, 766 (2011) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 

12940(a)(1)) (internal quotations omitted). “Therefore, in order to establish that a defendant 

employer has discriminated on the basis of a disability in violation of the FEHA, the plaintiff 

employee bears the burden of proving he or she was able to do the job, with or without 

reasonable accommodation.” Id. (citing Green v. State of California, 42 Cal. 4th 254, 262 

(2007)).

1. Evidence Relating to Plaintiff’s Discrimination Claim

Defendant predominantly relies upon Plaintiff’s deposition testimony in support of their 

contention that Plaintiff cannot perform her essential job duties. Plaintiff testified:

Q. Okay. So when you took over -- when you worked as a 

stocker for Longs -- or excuse me, for CVS, would it also be true 

that on a regular daily basis, numerous times a day, that you would 

be required to pick up and move a box that weighed more than 25 

pounds?

A. Yes.

(Decl. of Jody A. Landy in Supp. of Def. CVS Pharmacy Inc.’s Mot. for Summ. J. or, in the 

Alternative, Part. Summ. J. (“Landy Decl.”) Ex. A 35:19-36:4, ECF No. 27.5.)

Q. Okay. And as a stocker at CVS, when you were -- you 

would be continuously throughout the day required to pick up 

boxes or items that weighed more than 25 pounds?

A. Yes.

(Landy Decl., Ex. A 48:15-19, ECF No. 27.5.)

Q. Okay. You said it was also typical that in each day you 

would have to pick up a box that weighed more than 50 pounds. Is 

that correct?

A. Yes.

(Landy Decl., Ex. A 49:7-10, ECF No. 27.5.)

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Defendant also contends that a job description for Plaintiff’s “stocker” position described 

the physical demands of the position to require constant lifting of over 20 pounds and occasional 

lifting of up to 75 pounds, which Plaintiff confirmed as consistent with her experience. (Landy 

Decl., Ex. A 51:22-53:22, ECF No. 27.5.) Plaintiff testified that some aisles did not have items 

that weighed more than 25 pounds, but Plaintiff was never assigned to those aisles. (Landy 

Decl., Ex. A 54:5-17, ECF No. 27.5.) The job description for the “picker” or “selector” position 

required frequent lifting of 1-20 pounds and occasional lifting of up to 75 pounds, which Plaintiff 

confirmed as consistent with her experience. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 58:21-59:21, ECF No. 27.5.)

Plaintiff testified that she could not carry out her job duties as a stocker without forceful 

gripping activities or without lifting anything over 25 pounds. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 88:11-21, 

ECF No. 27.5.) Plaintiff testified that, at the time she was terminated, she was not capable of 

performing her job duties as a stocker or as a selector. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 176:1-15, ECF No. 

27.5.)

After Plaintiff injured her wrist, her doctor sent her back to work with restrictions. 

(Landy Decl., Ex. A 68:9-10, ECF No. 27.5.) Restrictions continue to exist as of the date of 

Plaintiff’s deposition. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 68:17-19, ECF No. 27.5.) In 2007, those restrictions 

included “[n]o grasping, no pulling, no lifting more than five pounds, no pushing, and no lifting 

over [Plaintiff’s] head.” (Landy Decl., Ex. A 68:22-24, ECF No. 27.5.) Plaintiff admits that she 

could not perform the job duties of a “selector” with the restrictions. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 69:4-

6, ECF No. 27.5.) Plaintiff attempted to continue to work for a while, but complained to her 

supervisors, who told her to just try her best. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 69:7-70:3, ECF No. 27.5.) In 

early 2008, Plaintiff’s job restrictions were initially 15 pounds, but later went up to 25 pounds. 

(Landy Decl., Ex. A 71:19-22, ECF No. 27.5.)

In 2008, Plaintiff moved from working in the “damage area” and returned to her job as a 

selector. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 75:19-22, ECF No. 27.5.) In mid-2009, Plaintiff applied for and 

put in a stocker position. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 76:1-15, ECF No. 27.5.) Plaintiff worked as a 

stocker and as a selector throughout 2009. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 77:4-8, ECF No. 27.5.)

/ / /

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At some point, Plaintiff spoke to a supervisor, who assigned Plaintiff to “light duty,” 

which involved putting on labels for ads and involved carrying a box less than 20 pounds. 

(Landy Decl., Ex. A 80:10-81:9, ECF No. 27.5.) However, placing labels for ads was a task only 

done on Thursdays and Fridays--there was no full-time position dedicated to placing labels for 

ads. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 182:10-13, ECF No. 27.5.) After a few months, Plaintiff was placed 

back in the damage area. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 81:10-15, ECF No. 27.5.)

In September 2010, Plaintiff was again advised by her doctor not to lift anything over 25 

pounds. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 94:5-95:2, ECF No. 27.5.) Plaintiff testified that she felt she could 

not lift items over ten or fifteen pounds at this point in time without pain and that she did not lift 

anything with her left hand if she could avoid it. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 95:3-21, ECF No. 27.5.)

Plaintiff contends that Defendant hired someone for a position in the office after Plaintiff 

stopped going to work. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 117:4-118:14, ECF No. 27.5.) Plaintiff contends 

that she was unaware of the position because it was posted on the bulletin board after Plaintiff 

could not return to work and nobody called Plaintiff to inform her about the position. (Landy 

Decl., Ex. A 117:14-25, ECF No. 27.5.) At the time she was terminated, Plaintiff was not aware 

of any open positions that Plaintiff was qualified to fill with her restrictions. (Landy Decl., Ex. 

A 176:17-21, ECF No. 27.5.)

In May 2011, Plaintiff’s doctor gave Plaintiff more restrictions, and Plaintiff could not 

lift anything over ten pounds. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 127:5-17, ECF No. 27.5.) In June 2011, 

Plaintiff applied for state disability benefits. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 127:24-128:1, ECF No. 27.5.) 

In connection with Plaintiff’s application, a Dr. Rollins opined that Plaintiff had not been capable 

of working her regular work since November 2007. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 128:14-20, ECF No. 

27.5.) Plaintiff submitted her application and began receiving disability benefits for about a 

year. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 131:2-13, ECF No. 27.5.) Plaintiff also applied for Social Security 

benefits, but her application has not been approved. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 172:3-15, ECF No. 

27.5.)

/ / /

/ / /

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During Plaintiff’s deposition, Plaintiff was asked whether she was capable of working:

Ms. Landry: You felt that you’ve been capable of working 

anywhere since October of 2010 to the present?

Mr. Gamez: Objection, speculation.

The Witness: No.

Ms. Landry:

Q. Have you applied to work anywhere since October of 2010 

to the present?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. Because since I have that restriction saying that I can’t lift, 

I can’t push, I can’t grab, I can’t use my hand constantly, I have to 

put it on the application. Who is going to hire me with that?

(Landy Decl., Ex. A 187:11-25, ECF No. 27.5.) Plaintiff was also served with a request for 

admission asking Plaintiff to “[a]dmit that you have not considered yourself able to work in any 

capacity since May 1, 2013.” (Landy Decl., Ex. G, pg. 3, ECF No. 27.6.) Plaintiff so admitted. 

(Id.)

2. No Material Dispute That Plaintiff Was Not Qualified For The Position She Held

Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case for disability 

discrimination because she cannot satisfy the second element of a prima facie claim: that 

Plaintiff was qualified for the position she sought or was performing competently in the position 

she held.

Plaintiff contends that she could perform her essential job duties as a stocker or as a 

selector. However, the evidence suggests otherwise and Plaintiff has not cited any contrary 

evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. As a starting point, the Court notes that Plaintiff 

admitted during her deposition that she was unable to work as a stocker or a selector. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that her daily job duties involved lifting and carrying boxes and 

other objects heavier than her medically-imposed restrictions allowed. Additionally, 

Defendant’s job descriptions state that the stocker and selector positions involve physical 

activities beyond that which Plaintiff’s medical restrictions allowed.

Plaintiff argues that the lifting requirements described in Defendant’s job descriptions are 

not necessarily “essential.” While that may be true in a hypothetical sense, Plaintiff must present 

evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact in order to avoid summary 

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judgment. Plaintiff’s conjectures are not sufficient to rebut the evidence in the record regarding 

the stocker and selector job requirements and Plaintiff’s own admission that she could not 

perform her work duties without accommodation. Moreover, Plaintiff admitted that she could 

not perform her job duties as a stocker or a selector.

Plaintiff further argues that she could perform her job duties with reasonable 

accommodations. Plaintiff contends that Defendant could have given her assignments involving 

less strenuous work, such as working in aisles with lighter products or given assignments placing 

labels on boxes. Plaintiff also contends that an office position was open sometime around the 

time she was terminated and Defendant could have reassigned her into that position.

However, the record shows that Plaintiff could not perform any work. Plaintiff testified 

during her deposition that she felt that she could not work anywhere since October 2010. In May 

2011, Plaintiff’s doctor restricted Plaintiff from lifting anything over ten pounds. Plaintiff also 

admitted, in a request for admission, that she felt that she could not perform work in any capacity 

since May 1, 2013. Plaintiff has not applied for any other work under the belief that her 

limitations would preclude any employers from hiring her. Moreover, Plaintiff applied for state 

disability benefits as well as disability benefits under the Social Security Act.5 In support of her 

application for disability benefits, Plaintiff’s physician opined that Plaintiff had not been capable 

of working her regular work since November 2007.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant temporarily accommodated her by giving her 

assignments to place labels for ads. However, Plaintiff also admitted that this task was only 

performed on Thursdays and Fridays, when new ads came out, and there was no full-time 

position dedicated to the task. “[A]n employer is not required to create light-duty positions for 

purposes of accommodating a disabled employee unable to perform the essential functions of the 

position for which he or she was hired [and] an employer who has created such a temporary 

assignment has no duty to transform that accommodation into a permanent position...” Raine v. 

 

5 Claims for disability benefits do not automatically preclude claims for disability discrimination, but a plaintiff’s 

prior representations on benefits applications are relevant in the discrimination context and “may be so strong and 

definitive that they will defeat the plaintiff’s prima facie case on traditional summary judgment grounds.” Johnson 

v. State, Oregon Dept. of Human Resources, Rehabilitation Div., 141 F.3d 1361, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1998).

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City of Burbank, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1215, 1224 (2006). Accordingly, Defendant has no duty 

under FEHA to create a new position for Plaintiff dedicated to placing labels for new ads.

Plaintiff has not carried her burden of proving she was able to do her job, with or without 

reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to overcome her own 

admissions and her prior representations in her disability benefit applications to create a genuine 

issue of material fact with respect to her ability to work with reasonable accommodation. The 

evidence suggests that Plaintiff cannot perform any work. Plaintiff and her physician stated that 

Plaintiff cannot work in any capacity and nothing in the record rebuts this conclusion and creates 

a triable issue of material fact with respect to whether Plaintiff can work with accommodations 

or in a different position.

Plaintiff contends that Belva Biagas, CVS’s human resources manager, determined that 

Plaintiff could be accommodated to perform the essential functions of her stocker position. (Pl’s 

Corrected Separate Statement of Disputed Facts Related to Def. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.’s Mot. for 

Summ. J. or, in the Alternative, Part. Summ. J. No. 88, ECF No. 35.1.) However, the evidence 

cited does not support this fact. Plaintiff cites Plaintiff’s declaration, which states that Biagas did 

not find any accommodations for Plaintiff. (Decl. of Leticia Ceja-Coronoa in Opp’n to Def.’s 

Mot. for Summ. J. or, in the Alternative, Part. Summ. J. ¶ 22, ECF No. 33.3.) Plaintiff also cites 

Biagas’ deposition testimony, wherein Biagas testifies that no accommodations could be found. 

(Pl. Leticia Ceja-Corona’s Not. of Filing Exceprts of Cited Dep. Transcripts in Opp’n to Def.’s 

Mot. for Summ. J. or, in the Alternative, Part. Summ. J., Ex. 2 57:4-59:25; 102:21-103:2; 

103:24-124:2.; 93:12 -124:2, ECF No. 33.16.) Biagas’ testimony only states that Plaintiff could 

perform some job duties, but also identifies other specific job duties that Plaintiff could not 

perform, such as cutting certain boxes, removing empty pallets, pushing merchandise carts and 

moving products over 25 pounds.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a 

genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether Plaintiff could perform her job 

duties with or without reasonable accommodation. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot make a prima 

facie claim for disability discrimination and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment with 

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respect to this claim.

B. Plaintiff’s Claim for Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for failure to engage in the interactive process 

must fail because Plaintiff cannot show that reasonable accommodation was possible and 

because any breakdown in the interactive process was caused by Plaintiff.

“The interactive process required by the FEHA is an informal process with the employee 

or the employee’s representative, to attempt to identify a reasonable accommodation that will 

enable the employee to perform the job effectively.” Scotch v. Art Institute of California-Orange 

County, Inc., 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 1013 (2009) (quoting Wilson v. County of Orange, 169 Cal. 

App. 4th 1185, 1195 (2009). “The interactive process imposes burdens on both the employer 

and employee.” Id. The employee has the burden of initiating the process, the employer has a 

continuous obligation to engage in the process in good faith, and both parties have the obligation 

to keep communications open and neither has a right to obstruct the process. Id. at 1013-14. An 

employer may prevail on summary judgment on a claim of failure to reasonably accommodate if 

it establishes through undisputed facts that there simply was no vacant position within the 

employer’s organization for which the disabled employee was qualified and which the disabled 

employee was capable of performing with or without accommodation. Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman 

Marcus Group, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 4th 952, 979-81 (2008).

As discussed above, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether a 

reasonable accommodation existed. See discussion, supra, Part III.A.2. Accordingly, Defendant 

is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for failure to engage in the 

interactive process because there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether a 

reasonable accommodation exists.

C. Plaintiff’s Claim for Failure to Prevent Discrimination

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for failure to prevent discrimination must fail if 

the underlying claim for disability discrimination fails. Since Defendant is entitled to summary 

judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s discrimination claim, Defendant is also entitled to summary 

judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s failure to prevent discrimination claim. See Trujillo v. North 

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County Transit Dist., 63 Cal. App. 4th 280, 286-289 (1998).

D. Plaintiff’s Claim for Retaliation

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation fails because Plaintiff cannot 

demonstrate that a causal link exists between any protected activity of Plaintiff and any adverse 

employment action. Defendant contends that there is no evidence of any causal link between 

Plaintiff’s termination and her medical leaves on one hand, and Plaintiff’s requests for 

accommodation on the other. In support of their position, Defendant notes that during her 

deposition, Plaintiff testified that she never heard anyone at CVS say anything negative about her 

disability or injury. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 175:1-25, ECF No. 27.5.). Plaintiff also testified that 

she does not believe her leave of absence was related to her termination. (Landy Decl., Ex. A 

176:23-177:5, ECF No. 27.5.) Defendant also notes that Plaintiff can articulate legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for Plaintiff’s termination--Plaintiff could not perform her job duties and 

could not return to work after her medical leave. See discussion, supra, Part III.A.2.

“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) 

he or she engaged in a “protected activity,” (2) the employer subjected the employee to an 

adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the 

employer’s action.’” Scotch v. Art Institute of California-Orange County, Inc., 173 Cal. App. 

4th 986, 1020 (2009) (quoting Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005)). 

“Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to offer a legitimate, 

nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Akers v. County of San Diego, 95 

Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1453 (2002) (citing Morgan v. Regents of University of California, 88 Cal. 

App. 4th 52, 68 (2000)). If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse 

employment action, the presumption of retaliation “drops out of the picture,” and the burden 

shifts back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation. Id. (citing Morgan, 88 Cal. App. 4th 

at 68).

For the reasons discussed previously, the undisputed facts support Defendant’s 

contention that Plaintiff was placed on medical leave and terminated for a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason--namely that Plaintiff was unable to perform her regular job duties. The 

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burden shifts back to Plaintiff to prove intentional retaliation. However, the record is devoid of 

evidence of intentional retaliation. The only evidence cited by Plaintiff is the fact that Plaintiff 

was terminated after taking a protected leave of absence. A reasonable trier of fact could not 

draw a reasonable inference of retaliatory motive from the record before the Court. See Scotch, 

173 Cal. App. 4th at 1020-21 (temporal proximity between protected action and adverse 

employment action insufficient to withstand summary judgment). Accordingly, Defendant is 

entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

E. Plaintiff’s Wrongful Termination and Unfair Competition Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s remaining claims for wrongful termination and unfair 

competition must fail because they are derivative of Plaintiff’s claim for disability 

discrimination.

Under California law, if an employer did not violate FEHA, the employee’s claim for 

wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails. Esberg v. Union Oil Co., 28 Cal. 4th 

262, 272-73 (2002). Since Defendant is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s 

FEHA claims, Defendant is also entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s 

wrongful termination claim.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s unfair competition claim was premised on the contention that 

Defendant’s conduct was unlawful under FEHA. (See Compl. ¶ 75.) Plaintiff did not allege that 

Defendant violated California’s unfair competition laws in any manner distinct from the alleged 

violation of FEHA and the other causes of actions raised in the complaint. Therefore, since there 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment with respect to the claims which also serve as the 

foundation of Plaintiff’s unfair competition claim, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment 

with respect to Plaintiff’s unfair competition claim. See Asencio v. Miller Brewing Co., 283 

Fed. Appx. 559, 561-62 (9th Cir. 2008).

F. Plaintiff’s Prior Bankruptcy Proceedings

Alternatively, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s present claims are barred because 

Plaintiff failed to disclose the existence of her claims during her bankruptcy proceedings. 

Failure to disclose claims in bankruptcy proceedings implicates the doctrine of judicial estoppel:

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Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party 

from gaining an advantage by asserting one position, and then later 

seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position. 

Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600-

601 (9th Cir. 1996); Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th 

Cir. 1990). This court invokes judicial estoppel not only to prevent 

a party from gaining an advantage by taking inconsistent positions, 

but also because of “general consideration[s] of the orderly 

administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial 

proceedings,” and to “protect against a litigant playing fast and 

loose with the courts.” Russell, 893 F.2d at 1037.

Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001)

The Court may look to three factors in determining whether to apply the doctrine of 

judicial estoppel: first, the party’s later position must be “clearly inconsistent” with its earlier 

position. Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 782. Second the court should inquire whether the party has 

succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance 

of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the perception that either the first or 

the second court was misled. Id. Third, the court considers whether the party seeking to assert 

an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the 

opposing party if not estopped. Id. at 783.

“In the bankruptcy context, a party is judicially estopped from asserting a cause of action 

not raised in a reorganization plan or otherwise mentioned in the debtor’s schedules or disclosure 

statements.” Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 783. “Judicial estoppel will be imposed when the debtor has 

knowledge of enough facts to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of 

the bankruptcy, but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify the cause of 

action as a contingent asset.” Id. at 784. Thus, judicial estoppel will apply in the bankruptcy 

context even if the debtor does not file the lawsuit until after filing for bankruptcy. Id. On the 

other hand, “generally, a debtor has no duty to schedule a cause of action that did not accrue 

prior to bankruptcy.” Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

However, “accrual” in this context is distinguishable from principles of accrual in other contexts, 

such as in the statute of limitations context. See id. To determine when a cause of action 

accrues, the court looks to state law. Id. Under California law, a cause of action generally 

accrues “when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.” Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 

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21 Cal. 4th 383, 397 (1999); see also In re Brown, 363 B.R. 591, 605 (D. Montana 2007) (cause 

of action accrues when the claim “could have been brought”).

In this case, Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on April 9, 2010. Since Plaintiff did 

not report any causes of action in her bankruptcy schedules, any cause of action which accrued 

prior to April 9, 2010 would potentially be barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

Defendant contends that July 23, 2010, the date Plaintiff’s bankruptcy closed, should be 

the relevant date for determining which claims should be barred. However, in Chapter 7 actions, 

the bankruptcy estate only includes causes of action which existed as of the date the petition was 

filed--causes of action which accrued post-petition are not part of a Chapter 7 estate. 11 U.S.C. § 

541(a)(1) (“Such estate is comprised of all of the following property ... all legal or equitable 

interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”) (italics added); see also

In re Brown, 363 B.R. 591, 604 (D. Mont. 2007). (“If the cause of action accrued prior to a 

debtor’s petition date, it is an asset that must be scheduled.”). Defendant does not demonstrate 

how judicial estoppel would apply to claims which accrued after the petition date in light of the 

fact that there is no apparent unfair advantage gained by Plaintiff for failing to report causes of 

action which accrued post-petition. Such claims would not be part of Plaintiff’s estate and the 

failure to report them would have no bearing on the bankruptcy proceeding.

Certain claims raised in Plaintiff’s complaint did not accrue prior to April 9, 2010. 

Plaintiff did not receive the initial termination letter until February 3, 2011. Accordingly, claims 

based upon Plaintiff’s termination did not accrue until after the filing of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy 

petition and therefore would not be barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

However, Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges that Defendant ignored Plaintiff’s requests for 

accommodations for her disability between 2008 and October 2010. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Under the 

doctrine of judicial estoppel, Plaintiff would be barred from seeking recovery for claims based 

upon the failure to accommodate which accrued prior to April 9, 2010, but would be allowed to 

litigate claims which accrued after April 9, 2010. See Cusano, 264 F.3d at 947-48 (debtor 

permitted to pursue claims on an open book account for balances past due post-bankruptcy 

petition, but not pre-petition).

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Plaintiff argues that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that should not be applied in 

circumstances where her failure to disclose her claims during bankruptcy was not deliberate. 

Plaintiff cites In re Cheng, 308 B.R. 448, 460-61 (9th Cir. BAP 2004) for the proposition that the 

“correct solution” is to reopen bankruptcy when a debtor “forgets” to schedule a cause of action. 

However, In re An-Tze Cheng has no applicability because it concerns the appropriate 

application of judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy court context. When a debtor is before the 

bankruptcy court and forgets to schedule a cause of action, a defendant in the bankruptcy action 

may ask that the bankruptcy proceeding be terminated on the grounds that the debtor is judicially 

estopped from proceeding. Id. at 460. However, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 

stated that, instead, the “correct solution is often to reopen the bankruptcy case and order the 

appointment of a trustee who, as owner of the cause of action, can determine whether to deal 

with the cause of action for the benefit of the estate.” Id. This “solution” has no applicability in 

the civil context in a case before this Court, since the Court is unaware of any authority to reopen 

Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case or order the appointment of a trustee to “deal with the cause of 

action.” Moreover, the “solution” in the bankruptcy context is premised on the fact that, in the 

bankruptcy context, “the victims are the debtor’s creditors” and “[t]he equitable balance compels 

consideration of whether the economic consequences of a judicial estoppel are borne by third 

parties.” Id. Allowing a trustee to deal with the cause of action would redress the debtor’s 

wrong with respect to the debtor’s creditors, who were damaged by the debtor’s failure to fully 

disclose his or her assets. There are no third party economic consequences in this case, because 

allowing Plaintiff to litigate her claims will provide no benefit to Plaintiff’s creditors.

Plaintiff also cites Donato v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 230 B.R. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 

as support for the proposition that judicial estoppel should not apply when the failure to disclose 

the cause of action in bankruptcy was inadvertent. Donato is distinguishable from this case. In 

Donato, the court made a factual finding that the bankruptcy court did not rely on the plaintiff’s 

prior inconsistent statement. Id. at 423. The court reviewed Donato’s bankruptcy proceeding 

and noted that Donato’s Chapter 13 plan repaid all of Donato’s creditors 100 per cent on their 

claims. Id. Thus, none of the creditors in Donato were prejudiced by Donato’s failure to 

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disclose and judicial estoppel did not apply.

Notably, the Ninth Circuit did not analyze whether the debtor’s failure to schedule their 

causes of action in Hamilton nor Cusano was deliberate or inadvertent. Following Hamilton and 

Cusano, this Court finds that judicial estoppel is appropriate in the case, but only with respect to 

Plaintiff’s claims that accrued prior to April 9, 2010. Plaintiff is barred from bringing any claim 

in this action which Plaintiff could have asserted on April 9, 2010. The Court grants summary 

judgment in favor of Defendant on those claims.

IV.

PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff filed objections to Defendant’s evidence submitted in support of its motion for 

summary judgment. Plaintiff raises fifteen objections to materials submitted by Defendant.

The Court need not address Plaintiff’s Objection Number 1, as it concerns matters not 

relevant to the Court’s analysis (the date when CVS processed Plaintiff’s termination).

The Court overrules Plaintiff’s Objection Numbers 2-14. These objections concern Belva 

Biagas’ deposition testimony regarding the job requirements and duties for the CVS stocker and 

selector positions. Biagas stated that she is currently the Employee Relations Manager and 

Human Resources Manager for CVS’ distribution center in Patterson, California. Biagas stated 

that she is responsible for overseeing the human resources function, has access to employee 

information, worked with management regarding employees with disabilities and requests for 

accommodations, and her statements are based on her personal knowledge and her review of 

CVS’ corporate records maintained in the regular course of business. The Court finds that 

Biagas has personal knowledge of the various job duties and requirements for the stocker and 

selector positions at the CVS distribution center in Patterson, California. Her testimony has 

foundation and is not irrelevant. The Court disregards Plaintiff’s objections based upon the fact 

that her declaration contradicts sworn deposition testimony, as Plaintiff makes no effort 

whatsoever to identify the sworn deposition testimony which contradicts Biagas’ declaration. 

The Court finds that the statements are not unduly prejudicial. Plaintiff’s hearsay objections 

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have no merit, as Biagas’ statements are her own, not based upon statements of other witnesses.6

Finally, the CVS job descriptions for stockers and selectors do not lack authentication.

The Court overrules Plaintiff’s Objection Number 15, which concerns the statement of 

Defendant’s attorney, Ricardo Ramirez, regarding Plaintiff’s admission, during her deposition, 

that she applied for Social Security benefits. This statement is not hearsay, as it is an admission 

by a party-opponent. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). This statement does not lack foundation or 

personal knowledge, does not contradict deposition testimony, is not unduly prejudicial and is 

not irrelevant.

V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary 

judgment. The Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether 

Plaintiff could perform her job duties, with or without reasonable accommodation. The Court 

further finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Defendant 

intentionally retaliated against Plaintiff for her protected activity. Moreover, the Court finds that 

the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Plaintiff’s claims which accrued prior to April 9, 2010 due 

to Plaintiff’s failure to disclose the existence of those claims during her bankruptcy proceedings.

Based upon the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment be GRANTED;

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the 

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections 

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections 

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” The Court will then review the 

 

6

For example, Plaintiff raised a hearsay objection to Biagas’ statement that “Stockers are assigned to specific aisles 

of the warehouse and handle merchandise from only their assigned aisles.” (Pl. Leticia Ceja-Corona’s Obj. to Evid. 

in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ J. or, in the Alternative, Partial Summ. J. 3:25-28, ECF No. 33.4.) There is no 

reference to any statement made by anyone other than Biagas in that statement.

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Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2014 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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