Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02403/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02403-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Barry
Defendant
County of Sacramento
Defendant
Mary C. Engel
Plaintiff
Hammer
Defendant
Sowles
Defendant
Scott Sparks
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY C. ENGEL,

2:03-CV-2403-MCE-KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MICHAEL BARRY, et. al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Mary Engel

(“Plaintiff”) claims that Defendants Michael Barry, Deputy Brian

Hammer, Deputy William Sowles, and Scott Sparks (collectively,

“Defendants”) violated her civil rights during the course of her

arrest for felony child endangerment.

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Through Defendants’ prior Motion to Dismiss, a number of 1

Plaintiff’s claims have been disposed. Specifically, in an Order

dated August 17, 2004, the Court dismissed without leave to amend

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims alleging false arrest, false

imprisonment, cruel and unusual punishment, violation of right to

counsel, and deliberate indifference for improper training

claims. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim alleging illegal search

and seizure has also been dismissed. See Mem. & Order, December

15, 2006. 

Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges federal claims under the Civil

Rights Act of 1871 (“Section 1983”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including

false arrest, false imprisonment, assault under color of law,

assault and battery, cruel and unusual punishment, violation of

right to counsel, illegal search and seizure, taking of personal

property without due process or just compensation (“Extortion”),

racial discrimination, conspiracy, and negligence/deliberate

indifference (“Federal Claims”). In addition, Plaintiff raises

state claims of trespass to land, trespass to chattel, and

invasion of privacy (“State Claims”).

Defendants are now seeking summary judgement, or in the

alternative, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s remaining

Federal and State Claims. For the reasons set forth below, 1

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication is granted as to

Plaintiff’s remaining Federal Claims. In addition, the Court

declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction regarding

Plaintiff’s State Claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s remaining

State Claims are dismissed without prejudice.2

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3

BACKGROUND

The Court has already set forth a detailed factual

background for this action in its Order of August 17, 2004, which

is incorporated by reference and need not be reproduced herein.

Mem. & Order 2-5, August 17, 2004.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

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4

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323(quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987).

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5

Stated another way, “before the evidence is left to the jury,

there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there

is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a

jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party

producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442,

448, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained,

“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c),

its opponent must do more that simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

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6

ANALYSIS

I. Qualified Immunity

A private right of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

exists against law enforcement officers who, acting under the

color of authority, violate federal constitutional or statutory

rights of an individual. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609,

119 S. Ct. 1692, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999). The defense of

qualified immunity, however, shields an officer from trial when

the officer “reasonably misapprehends the law governing the

circumstances she confronted,” even if the officer’s conduct was

constitutionally deficient. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,

125 S. Ct. 596, 599, 160 L. Ed. 2d 583 (2004)(per curiam).

Where, as here, some or all of the defendants seek qualified

immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the

proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided

where the defense is dispositive. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). In Saucier, the

Supreme Court laid out the framework for determining an officer’s

entitlement to qualified immunity. The threshold inquiry

requires a court to ask, “taken in the light most favorable to

the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 201. 

The inquiry ends at this stage if no constitutional right is

found to have been violated; the plaintiff cannot prevail. Id.

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7

If, on the other hand, the plaintiff’s allegations do make

out a constitutional injury, then the court must determine

whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the

time of the violation. Id. If the right was not clearly

established, the qualified immunity doctrine shields the officer

from further litigation. Id. Finally, even if the violated

right was clearly established, the Saucier court recognized that

it may be difficult for a police officer fully to appreciate how

the legal constraints apply to the specific situation he or she

faces. Under such a circumstance, “if the officer’s mistake as to

what the law requires is reasonable, . . . the officer is

entitled to the immunity defense.” Id. at 205.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants are estopped from seeking

Summary Adjudication because this Court earlier denied

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that

material issues of fact exist in this case. See Mem. & Order,

December 15, 2005. Plaintiff’s, however, misapprehend the

standard when a qualified immunity defense has been plead. As

noted above, the issue is no longer whether material facts are

disputed but instead whether the facts, taken in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, show the Defendants’ conduct violated a

constitutional right.

1. Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that Defendants used

excessive force against her during her arrest for felony child

endangerment.

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8

Specifically, Plaintiff first avers that the force used against

her in effecting her arrest was unreasonable because Officer

Sowles elected to charge Plaintiff with felony child endangerment

which provides for an arrest rather than misdemeanor child

endangerment which is generally a cite and release offense. 

Pl.s’ Opp., p. 6:6-11. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion,

Officer Sowles was constitutionally permitted to arrest Plaintiff

if he had probable cause to believe she committed a criminal

offense. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 350

(2001). In Atwater, the Supreme Court held that if an officer

has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed

even a very minor criminal offense, he may, without violating the

Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender. Id. at 354. Here,

Officer Sowles unquestionably had probable cause to believe

Plaintiff committed a crime giving him authority both legally and

constitutionally to arrest her.

Next, Plaintiff argues that Officer Sowles used excessive

force when he “banged her head into the hood of her car and

jammed his thumb behind her jaw.” Pl.s’ Opp., p. 6:18-19. 

Plaintiff contends that Officer Sowles’ use of force and a

control hold to secure her prior to and during the course of her

arrest constituted excessive force. The Court disagrees.

In order to defeat Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity,

Plaintiff must allege a constitutional violation. Plaintiff has

alleged that Officer Sowles violated the Fourth Amendment. The

Fourth Amendment, however, does not prohibit a police officer’s

use of reasonable force during an arrest. See Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989)

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9

(“the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily

carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion

or threat thereof to effect it” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1, 22-27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968))).

The salient inquiry here is whether Officer Sowles’ actions

were “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting him. See id. at 397. The Court must

consider the facts underlying an excessive force claim from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, without regard

to the arresting officer’s subjective motivation for using force. 

See id. at 396-97. Whether a particular use of force was

“objectively reasonable” depends on several factors, including

the severity of the crime that prompted the use of force, the

threat posed by a suspect to the police or to others, and whether

the suspect was resisting arrest. See id. at 396.

Plaintiff came upon the scene of social services officers

preparing to remove her children from her residence on charges of

child endangerment. In addition, animal control officers were

simultaneously preparing to remove her animals from her residence

based upon animal cruelty. The uncontroverted evidence

establishes that Plaintiff was visibly upset and using profanity

when she arrived at her residence. See Mary Engel Depo., p.

147:7-8 (“I told [Deputy Sowles], ‘Get those people the fuck off

my property.’”); see also Sowles Decl., ¶10; Michael Berry Decl.,

¶16. Plaintiff refused to obey Sowles’ commands to calm down and

stop screaming prompting him to handcuff Plaintiff and place her

in his patrol vehicle. Sowles Decl., ¶10.

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10

In addition, considering as the Court must, whether Officer

Sowles’ actions were objectively reasonable in light of the

foregoing facts and circumstances confronting him, the Court

finds in the affirmative. The criminal conduct underlying

Plaintiff’s arrest and ultimate conviction were emotionally

charged. Plaintiff expressly refused to follow Officer’s Sowles

instruction that she calm down and instead continued to hurl

profanities and disrupt the officers from their tasks. Sowles

Decl., ¶10. Before leaving the residence, Plaintiff began

screaming in the back of the patrol car. Id. at ¶16. She

continued screaming virtually incessantly until the patrol

vehicle reached the main jail. Id. Inside the booking area of

the jail, Plaintiff remained belligerent requiring deputies to

prepare a restraint chair in anticipation of her arrival. Id.

Faced with a potentially violent suspect, behaving erratically

and resisting arrest, it was objectively reasonable for Officer

Sowles to use force in the form of handcuffs and a nerve

stimulation technique to secure Plaintiff. See Tatum v. City &

County of San Francisco, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8011, 10-11 (9th

Cir. 2006). The Court finds that Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity on the charge of excessive force. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication as to

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is granted.

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11

2. Due Process

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants deprived her of

protections under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments. Pl’s. Compl. 10-11. Plaintiff is relying on 42

U.S.C. § 1983 to support her claim that Officer Sparks and

Officer Sowles deprived her of her personal property under color

of law and without due process. 

Ordinarily, due process of law requires notice and an

opportunity for some kind of hearing prior to the deprivation of

a significant property interest. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water

Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19, 56 L. Ed. 2d 30, 98 S. Ct. 1554

(1978). However, summary governmental action taken in

emergencies and designed to protect the public health, safety and

general welfare does not violate due process. It is well-settled

that protection of the public interest can justify an immediate

seizure of property without a prior hearing. Soranno's Gasco,

Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1318 (9th Cir. 1989). Government

officials need to act promptly and decisively when they perceive

an emergency, and therefore, no pre-deprivation process is due.

Plaintiff’s allegation that Deputy Sowles and Officer Sparks

deprived her of her personal property without due process of law

was an act by government officials for a purpose designed to

protect the public health and general welfare as well as the

welfare of the animals. Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that

she kept numerous dogs and cats inside the residence.

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12

Animal control was called to the scene by law enforcement and

Officer Sparks ultimately sought and obtained a field release

from Plaintiff to collect the animals from the home. Undisp.

Fact #11 & #12. Plaintiff vehemently argues that she signed the

field surrender form under duress. Even assuming that to be the

case, the Court finds that the animals were removed to protect

the public health in accord with due process principles. In

addition, Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to air her due

process claim during her criminal proceeding wherein the court

conditioned her plea on the requirement that she retain only one

animal. Undisp. Fact #14. Here, the facts, taken in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, show that Defendants’ conduct did

not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional right to due process

because Defendants were acting in an emergency circumstance and

were only required to provide a post-deprivation hearing which

was timely accorded. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Adjudication of Plaintiff’s due process claim is granted.

3. Equal Protection

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted in concert to

racially discriminate against her in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. In

particular, Plaintiff alleges that upon seeing a sign in her yard

emblazoned with her surname, one of the Defendants asked if her

husband’s name was “Morris.” Plf.s’ Compl. ¶12.

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Plaintiff claims the name Morris is traditionally associated with

the Jewish culture and that Defendants’ reference to that name

indicated their anti-semitic bias. Defendants rebut that

Plaintiff has no standing to bring this claim because she is not

a member of the protected class.

In fact, the Ninth Circuit teaches that a plaintiff

generally does not have standing under Section 1983 solely for

the purpose of vindicating the rights of minorities who have

suffered from discrimination. RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of

Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1055-1056 (9th Cir. 2002)(citing Maynard

v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1994)). But

plaintiffs who are not members of the protected class have

standing to challenge racially discriminatory conduct in their

own right when they are the direct target of the discrimination. 

Id. (citing Estate of Amos v. City of Page, 257 F.3d 1086,

1093-94 (9th Cir. 2001); Maynard, 37 F.3d at 1403). The Ninth

Circuit clarified there is no bar to standing under the Equal

Protection Clause where an individual alleges a personal injury

stemming from his or her association with members of a protected

class. Id. While the foregoing clarifies that Plaintiff, as the

target of the alleged discrimination, has standing to assert an

equal protection claim, this does not end the inquiry.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

states: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

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14

The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that the Equal

Protection Clause requires proof of discriminatory intent or

motive. Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir.

1995)(internal citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiff has

failed to allege any discriminatory intent or motive associated

with Defendants’ questioning Plaintiff as to her husband’s first

name. The mere commonality of the name “Morris” among those of

Jewish heritage in no way evidences a discriminatory motive on

Defendants’ part. The Court finds the question in and of itself

evidences no bias or discrimination whatsoever. Consequently,

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of this claim is

granted. 

4. Conspiracy

Plaintiff also alleges Defendants’ acted in concert to

deprive her of her constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1985

creates a civil action for damages caused by two or more persons

who “conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving” the injured

person of “the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws” and take or cause to be

taken “any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy.”

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The absence of a section 1983 deprivation

of rights precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim predicated on

the same allegations. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d

1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Because Plaintiff can not sustain a Section 1983 claim, she

cannot sustain her Section 1985 conspiracy claim. Accordingly,

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s

conspiracy claim is granted.

5. Deliberate Indifference

A municipality will only be found liable under section 1983

for a policy of inadequate training or supervision in limited

circumstances. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387

(1989). Inadequacy of training "may serve as the basis for

section 1983 liability only where the [municipal entity’s]

failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights

of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id.

Moreover, a plaintiff alleging municipal liability under Section

1983 must show there is a direct causal link between a municipal

policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id.

at 385.

As this Court stated in its Memorandum and Order dated

December 15, 2005, Plaintiff offers no evidence whatsoever to

establish the material facts underpinning her claim. Rather, she

simply avers that the County of Sacramento indifferently trained

Defendants. Plaintiff argues at length that Officer Sowles has

engaged in discriminatory conduct both before and after his

interaction with Plaintiff as evidenced by his ultimate

termination from the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department.

As an initial matter, the Court finds this evidence to be wholly

irrelevant to the case at bar.

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Even assuming it were relevant, however, it does nothing to

bolster Plaintiff’s claim of departmental indifference. In fact,

precisely the opposite is true. Officer Sowles’ termination on

the ground that he engaged in discriminatory conduct shows a

commitment to discipline and stamp out unethical conduct among

its employees. 

The Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s claim that the

County of Sacramento was deliberately indifferent to the rights

of persons with whom the police come into contact. Therefore,

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication on Plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claim is granted.

6. Right of Privacy

In its Order dated December 15, 2005, the Court construed

Plaintiff’s privacy claim as if it were brought on federal

grounds. Defendants pointed out that Plaintiff’s Complaint

frames her right of privacy claim as a strictly state law claim.

The Court reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and agrees with

Defendants that its earlier construction of Plaintiff’s right of

privacy claim was in error. Paragraph 14 of Plaintiff’s

Complaint clarifies that Plaintiff was asserting a violation of

her right to privacy under the “California State Constitution and

California law.” See Plf.s’ Compl. ¶14. In order to remove any

potential uncertainty as to the foregoing, the Court hereby

orders, nunc pro tunc, to its December 15, 2005, Order, that

Plaintiff’s right of privacy claim is strictly a state law claim.

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7. State Law Claims

The dismissal of Plaintiff’s Federal Claims eliminates the

federal question upon which jurisdiction in this Court was based. 

When all bases of federal jurisdiction are removed, a district

court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over remaining non-federal claims. See Acri v.

Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en

banc). Because original jurisdiction no longer exists in this

case, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s

State Claims and the Court hereby dismisses those State Claims

without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, due

process claim, equal protection claim and conspiracy claim is

GRANTED. Plaintiff’s State Claims are hereby dismissed without

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 21, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:03-cv-02403-MCE -KJM Document 91 Filed 04/24/06 Page 17 of 17