Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00225/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00225-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Craig Apker
Respondent
Ronald Laverne Halstead
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ronald Laverne Halstead,

Petitioner,

v. 

Lionel Craig Apker, Jr., 

Respondent. ______________________________________

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CV 11-0225 TUC-FRZ (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Ronald Laverne Halstead’s Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed under 28 U.S.C. §2241. In accordance with the Rules of

Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation.

As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an

independent review of the record, deny and dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Ronald Laverne Halstead, a federal prisoner who is currently incarcerated

at the Federal Prison Camp in Tucson, Arizona, is currently serving a 151 month sentence

from the Northern District of West Virginia for Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C.

§ 371), Health Care Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1347), and Conspiracy to Commit Money

Laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956). Return and Answer, Exhibit 1. 

Prior to sentencing on August 28, 2006, and for a short time thereafter until

Petitioner’s self-surrender, Petitioner was subject to an Order Setting Conditions of Release

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(“Release Order”) which was entered by District Judge Irene M. Keeley in the Northern

District of West Virginia on June 4, 2004. Petition, pp. 14-16. In the Release Order, the

court required Petitioner be subject to “Home Incarceration,” which ultimately lasted

approximately 28 months until his post-sentencing self-surrender on October 19, 2006.

Return and Answer, Ex. 1, Attach. 2. Petitioner now seeks credit against his sentence for the

time he spent under “Home Incarceration” prior to his self-surrender.

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Before petitioning the federal courts for credit for his “Home Incarceration,”

Petitioner must first exhaust his administrative remedies. Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d

1037, 1047 (9th Cir.2001), overruled on other grounds by, Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales,

548 U.S. 30 (2006). Respondent does not dispute, and the record reflects, that Petitioner did

exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing the instant action. See Petition, pp. 8-20.

B. Merits

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585, a defendant “shall be given credit toward the service of a

term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the

sentence commences . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Petitioner argues that his pre-sentencing

“Home Incarceration” constituted “official detention under § 3585 and that he is therefore

entitled to credit against his sentence for that time. The Supreme Court addressed a similar

argument in Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995). In that case, a Federal Magistrate Judge

entered a release order ordering respondent Koray released on bail pending sentencing and

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ordered that he be “‘confined to [the] premises’ of a community treatment center without

‘authoriz[ation] to leave for any reason unless accompanied’ by a Government special

agent.” Id. at 52-53. After he was sentenced, Koray requested the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”

or “Bureau”) credit toward his prison sentence the 150 days he spent at the community

treatment center. Id. at 53. In rejecting Koray’s argument, the Court found that the time

spent in the community treatment did not constitute official detention under § 3585(b). 

Petitioner attempts to distinguish the facts Koray from those he faced. In doing so,

he argues that he was sentenced to “Home Incarceration,” which he distinguishes from

“Home Detention,” which was a less restricted “confinement program” listed in the Release

Order signed by Judge Kelley. Petition, Exhibits at p. 15. Petitioner’s argument is

superficially appealing as his release left him subject to “Home Incarceration,” rather than

mere “Home Detention.” On “Home Incarceration,” Petitioner’s travel was limited to

leaving his house for medical and religious reasons and for court appearances. Id. Had he

been placed on “Home Detention,” he additionally would have been permitted to leave for

additional activities such as employment and educational reasons and attorney visits. Id.

However, while the restrictions of “Home Incarceration” were more limiting that those

imposed under “Home Detention,” they have no impact on the evaluation of whether

Petitioner was subject to “official detention” under § 3585(b).

As the Supreme Court explained in Koray:

Unlike defendants “released” on bail, defendants who are

“detained” or “sentenced” always remain subject to the control

of the Bureau. See Randall v. Whelan, 938 F.2d 522, 525 (CA4

1991). This is an important distinction, as the identity of the

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custodian has both legal and practical significance. A defendant

who is “released” is not in BOP’s custody, and he cannot be

summarily reassigned to a different place of confinement unless

a judicial officer revokes his release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b),

or modifies the conditions of his release, see § 3142(c)(3). A

defendant who is “detained,” however, is completely subject to

BOP’s control. And “[t]hat single factor encompasses a wide

variety of restrictions.” Randall, supra, at 525. “Detained”

defendants are subject to BOP’s disciplinary procedures; they

are subject to summary reassignment to any other penal or

correctional facility within the system, cf. Meachum v. Fano,

427 U.S. 215, 224-229, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538-2541, 49 L.Ed.2d

451 (1976); and, being in the legal custody of BOP, the Bureau

has full discretion to control many conditions of their

confinement. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88, n. 9, 97

S.Ct. 274, 279, n. 9, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976); Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U.S. 520, 544-548, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1876-1879, 60 L.Ed.2d 447

(1979).

Koray, 515 U.S. at 63. 

The considerations outlined in Koray apply equally and as unfavorably to Petitioner

here. While denominated “Home Incarceration,” the conditions of his release did not allow

for the BOP, without judicial intervention, to summarily reassign him to a different place of

confinement. Moreover, he was not completely subject to BOP’s control as he would be if

under official detention. He was free to move about his house and do anything he wished

without intervention from the authority of the BOP. As such, under Koray, Petitioner was

not officially detained during his period of “Home Incarceration,” and is not entitled to credit

to his sentence for that period of time.

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

III. RECOMMENDATION

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Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District

Court, after its independent review, deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Doc. 1).

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy

of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District

Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to

the objections. If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV

11-0225-TUC-FRZ. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination

of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir.2003) (en banc).

DATED this 8th day of November, 2011.

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