Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01231/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01231-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ruben Plaza-Uzeta
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Ruben Plaza-Uzeta, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV-09-1231-PHX-GMS

 CR-05-0225-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Ruben Plaza-Uzeta’s (“Plaza-Uzeta”) Motion

to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence (Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On

November 18, 2010, Magistrate Judge Jay R. Irwin issued a Report and Recommendation

(“R & R”) (Doc. 22), recommending that the motion be denied. On December 3, 2010, PlazaUzeta filed Objections to the R & R (Doc. 23). For the reasons stated herein, the Court

accepts Judge Irwin’s R & R and denies Plaza-Uzeta’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Movant was arrested in connection with a large scale alien smuggling operation. (Doc.

22). Following his arrest, he admitted to visiting the stash house and identified co-defendant

Gerardo Lazaro-Ascencio aka “Rojo” and 27 alien smugglers after being shown photographs

by the agent interviewing him. (Doc. 16; 22). On October 19, 2006, Plaza-Uzeta was

convicted for the following: Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking; Hostage Taking;

Conspiracy to Harbor Illegal Aliens; Harboring Illegal Aliens; and Possession or Use of a

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Firearm in a Crime of Violence. (Doc. 16). Movant was sentenced to a term of life

imprisonment on Counts One and Two, a term of 120 months on Counts Three and Four, a

term of 84 months on Count 5, and 5 years on supervised release. (Doc. 1). On June 10,

2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Plaza-Uzeta’s conviction and sentence, see United States

v. Plaza-Uzeta, 282 Fed.Appx. 522 (9th Cir. 2008). (Doc. 16).

On June 8, 2009, Movant filed a pro se motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which

“provides ‘a remedy [in the sentencing court] exactly commensurate with that which had

previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was

confined.’” United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hill v.

United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962)). A motion brought under § 2255 “may only be used

to collaterally attack a conviction and sentence ‘upon the ground that the sentence was

imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255). Movant asserts he was denied effective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 1). He also

asserts that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the government

permitted one of its witnesses to commit perjury and that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment

rights were violated when he was denied the assistance of a qualified interpreter.

DISCUSSION

Federal district courts “‘may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].’” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)); Carrillo-Lozano v. Stolc,

669 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1076 (D. Ariz. 2009). Under § 636(b)(1) a “district judge must review

the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not

otherwise.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121.

I. Procedural Default

Generally “claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review

unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500,

504 (2003) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–68 (1982)). However, an

exception to this rule exists when a criminal defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance

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1

 Plaza-Uzeta requests that the Court hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether

or not he put the trial court on notice of a conflict between Movant and his trial counsel.

(Doc. 23). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b), the Court must grant a request for evidentiary hearing

“[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner

is entitled to no relief . . . .” Plaza-Uzeta has also filed an affidavit with the Court in which

he describes the contents of the lost letter. (Doc. 19). Because the Court assumes that the

letter contained the statements that Movant includes in his affidavit, the Court need not hold

a hearing to determine the contents of the letter.

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of counsel. Id. (petitioner may raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in a § 2255

proceeding “whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal”).

II. Denial of Effective Assistance of Counsel (Ground one)

Movant objects to the R & R’s recommendation that the claim be dismissed for failure

to put the trial court on notice that an irreconcilable conflict had arisen between Plaza-Uzeta

and his trial counsel. (Doc. 23). He asserts that he alerted the trial court in a letter dated

September 9, 2006, about four weeks before trial, that there was an irreconcilable conflict.

The letter now cannot be located.1

 The next day, defense counsel filed a formal motion,

however the motion did not specify the reasons for the request of substitution of counsel.

(Doc. 22). On September 15, 2006, the trial court denied the request, stating that “[n]either

the Motion nor the defendant’s letter has presented an appropriate basis for granting of said

Motion.” (Doc. 1, Ex. 5(2); Doc. 16). The trial court did not make any inquiry into PlazaUzeta’s complaint before issuing the order.

A few days after the motion was denied, Plaza-Uzeta had his counsel file a motion to

proceed pro per. (Doc. 1, Ex. 5(2); Doc. 22). Shortly thereafter, the trial court held a hearing

on defendant’s motion to represent himself. (Doc. 22). Movant objects to the R & R’s

reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that he had multiple opportunities to state his basis for

his request for substitution of counsel, but failed to do so. Movant concedes that at the

hearing he did not elaborate on his reasons for his request, but argues that his motion for

appointment of new counsel had already been denied, so he could not be expected to assert

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2

 In addition, Plaza-Uzeta claims that he did not raise issues regarding the

“irreconcilable conflict” with his attorney during the hearing because his motion to proceed

pro se, which was filed less than a week after his motion for substitution of counsel was

denied, was for a “total [sic] different issue.” (Doc. 23). At the same time, he contends that

it never occurred to him that he would need to restate his complaints because he believed that

his letter and motion regarding the substitution of counsel were already in the record.

3

 Movant also concedes that, even now, he has failed to “relate any circumstances

which would evidence that an irreconcilable conflict actually existed at the time of his

motion hearing regarding Pro Per status”, but argues that, nevertheless, the trial court should

have inquired into the extent of the conflict. (Doc. 23).

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those reasons again and no additional reasons existed. (Doc. 23).2

 Movant further concedes

that, “although there’s very little evidence of irreconcilable conflict between petitioner and

its counsel”, the court should nevertheless grant relief. (Id.).3

 Finally, Movant asserts that at

the time of the hearing on his motion to proceed pro per, he had no headphones and therefore

could not fully understand the translation.

As noted in the R & R, this issue was raised on direct appeal to the Ninth Circuit. That

court stated that the district court should have made a better record and inquired into the

circumstances that prompted Plaza-Uzeta to request appointment of new counsel. PlazaUzeta, 282 Fed.Appx. at 523. Nevertheless, the court determined that reversal was not

warranted because Plaza-Uzeta had not established the basis for the purported conflict, even

on appeal. Id. As noted above, the court also highlighted the fact that Plaza-Uzeta had the

opportunity to state his basis for the request–presumably either in the letter or later during

the hearing on his motion to proceed pro se–but did not do so. Id. The court concluded that

“[a]bsent any evidence that the defendant made some claim of [irreconcilable] conflict, we

cannot conclude that the district court was required to conduct any further inquiry.” Id. at

524. The court did clarify that “[b]ecause Plaza’s claim that substitute counsel should have

been appointed for him appears to require gathering evidence beyond the existing record,”

Plaza-Uzeta could renew his claim on collateral review. Id. 

“The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a ‘meaningful relationship’ between a

client and his attorney.” Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

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Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)). However, if a conflict between a defendant and his

counsel rises to the level of “irreconcilable”, forcing the defendant to go to trial with that

counsel may constitute a “constructive denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id.

The district court’s denial of a motion for substitution of counsel is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 503 (9th Cir. 1991). When reviewing a

denial of a motion to substitute counsel, three factors are considered: (1) the adequacy of the

district court’s inquiry; (2) the extent of any conflict; and (3) the timeliness of the motion.

United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Stenson, 504

F.3d at 886 (a court must consider these three factors in determining whether a conflict rises

to the level of “irreconcilable”).

Timeliness is not an issue in this case. Movant sent his letter and request

approximately four weeks before the trial was set to begin. See Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d

at 780 (noting that a motion for substitution of counsel filed six weeks in advance of trial was

timely, and the fact that the last motion was made only one day before trial did not

necessarily make it untimely). Moreover, the district court did not indicate that timeliness

was a factor in its denial of Plaza-Uzeta’s motion.

In this case, it is uncontested that the district court did not inquire into Plaza-Uzeta’s

complaint and request for substitution of counsel. Plaza-Uzeta contends that although he has

presented “very little evidence of irreconcilable conflict”, the Court should grant relief

simply because of the district court’s failure to inquire into the situation. (Doc. 23). However,

the Ninth Circuit considered this fact on direct appeal and nevertheless concluded that the

lack of inquiry did not per se establish a Sixth Amendment violation. 282 Fed.Appx. at 523;

see also United States v. Smith, 282 F.3d 758, 764 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that, although the

circuit’s case law “favors an inquiry when a party seeks substitute counsel”, under certain

circumstances, “the failure to conduct a hearing is not by itself an abuse of discretion”

(internal citations omitted)); United States v. McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1986).

The only new evidence before this Court related to this issue is Movant’s own affidavit, in

which he states that his letter informed the trial judge that there was a lack of communication

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4

 In his Objections, Movant states that his request for substitution of counsel was

based on “lack of communication and dissatisfaction with counsel performance.” (Doc. 23).

5

 Movant also concedes that after he filed his motion to proceed pro se just days after

his motion for substitution of counsel was denied, the trial judge held a hearing on the matter,

during which he did not raise any specific concerns about defense counsel. 

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with his counsel and that he believed his counsel was not considering his best interests.4

(Doc. 19). Movant does not claim that he identified any specific circumstances or concerns

in his letter. 

Even considering Movant’s affidavit, the trial court was only generally put on notice

of some conflict between the defendant and counsel. In addressing this issue on direct appeal,

the Ninth Circuit mentioned several observations from the record. It noted that the “conflict,

if any, does not appear to have been ‘so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication

preventing an adequate defense.’” Plaza-Uzeta, 282 Fed.Appx. at 523 (quoting United States

v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1979)). Specifically it noted that “Plaza and his counsel

conferred and communicated throughout the proceedings”, and “Plaza later decided to

rescind his Faretta waiver and re-accept his attorney as counsel of record . . . .” Id. (internal

citation omitted).5

 Taking these points into consideration, the district court’s decision not to

inquire further into Movant’s complaint did not necessarily constitute an abuse of discretion.

See McClendon, 782 F.2d at 789 (explaining that, if the “[defendant’s] description of the

problem and the judge’s own observations provide[] a sufficient basis for reaching an

informed decision”, then the trial court’s “failure to conduct a formal inquiry [is] not fatal

error”). 

The final factor before this Court is whether there is evidence that the conflict was

irreconcilable. An irreconcilable conflict “occurs only where there is a complete breakdown

in communication between the attorney and client, and the breakdown prevents effective

assistance of counsel.” Stenson, 504 F.3d at 886; see Smith, 282 F.3d at 765 (considering

fact that defense counsel’s work was not ineffective and district court’s observations of

normal communications between defendant and counsel); McClendon, 782 F.2d at 789

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6

 On page 4 of Movant’s Objection to the R & R, he states the following: “the first

plea offer [] was made a day or two before the letter requesting change of counsel was sent

to the trial court, and after counsel told petitioner that he was not facing death sentence.”

However, on page 7, Movant states “after the first plea bargain was rejected trial counsel

reveled [sic] to petitioner that he was not facing death sentence, this revelation made

petitioner very upset and thus he lost all trust, confident [sic] and communication with

counsel.”

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(considering fact that record did not reveal “lack of communication” between defendant and

counsel, but rather showed that “counsel was vigorous and well prepared in his argument”).

As the Ninth Circuit noted, there is not much evidence of the extent of the conflict between

Movant and his trial counsel. In fact, as noted above, Movant argues that relief should be

granted, “although there’s very little evidence of irreconcilable conflict between petitioner

and its counsel.” (Doc. 23).

Movant now asserts in his Objections to the R & R that several factors justified

substitution of counsel. First, he refers to a letter sent to him by defense counsel, indicating

that the charges filed may make him death eligible. (Id.). Movant contends that once he

discovered that the maximum possible sentence was life imprisonment, he no longer trusted

his attorney. Second, he asserts that counsel visited him on several occasions without a

qualified interpreter. Movant does not allege that he alerted the district court to these issues

at the time he requested a substitution of counsel or during the hearing on his motion to

proceed pro per. 

Neither of these claims establishes an irreconcilable conflict between Movant and

defense counsel. It is clear from the record that in November 2005, defense counsel sent

Plaza-Uzeta a letter, in which she indicated that he was facing a “‘life’ sentence or a ‘death’

eligible sentence.” (Doc. 1, Ex. 4(C)). As the R & R noted, the “most stringent possible

sentence seemed to be life.” (Doc. 22). It is unclear when exactly Movant discovered that he

could not be sentenced to death,6

 but, in any event, Movant asserts that defense counsel

informed him of this fact before he sent the letter to the district court requesting a substitution

of counsel. (Doc. 23). Although Movant claims that this incident created an irreconcilable

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conflict and caused him to lose faith in his attorney, the record seems to demonstrate that

after his request was denied, defense counsel negotiated with the government to get PlazaUzeta a better plea offer of seven to fifteen years. (Doc. 22; 05-CR-225, Doc. 142). In fact,

at the October 6, 2006 hearing on Plaza-Uzeta’s motion to proceed pro se, defense counsel

made a record of the plea offer, stating the following: 

[Plaza] had proposed some changes to that offer, and the Government conceded to

those changes, and those changes were to the factual basis that would eliminate the

number of aliens involved, [resulting in a] four point

deduction [based on the] number of aliens involved, and they removed the phrase that

would place him in a role of leadership, thereby reducing him further . . .

for calculation purposes. The Government conceded those two requests,

and thereafter Mr. Uzeta still rejected the seven to 15 year range.

(05-CR-225, Doc. 142). Plaza-Uzeta did not challenge defense counsel’s recitation of the

facts. This description of events, which occurred after the denial of his motion for

substitution of counsel, demonstrates that defense counsel was advocating vigorously for her

client to get him a good plea offer, and that she was working closely with Plaza-Uzeta to

ensure that he was comfortable with the terms of the offer. Plaza-Uzeta appears to have

conveyed his concerns to defense counsel, who then addressed those concerns with

government counsel. Although Plaza-Uzeta’s discovery that he was not in fact facing the

death penalty certainly could have put a strain on his relationship with defense counsel,

Plaza-Uzeta has failed to demonstrate that this incident led to a complete breakdown in

communication. 

Plaza-Uzeta raises the interpreter issue to support both this claim as well as his claim

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 23). Movant asserts that defense counsel

visited him several times at the beginning of October 2006 without a qualified interpreter.

Plaza-Uzeta’s trial counsel has filed an affidavit in which she avows that she never met with

her client without a qualified interpreter. (Doc. 17, Ex. 1). To the extent that Movant relies

on these alleged incidents to support his claim that there was a total breakdown of

communication at the time he submitted his letter to the district judge, his claim fails because

these incidents took place a number of weeks after the letter and motion were filed. He also

asserts that on one occasion, defense counsel was visiting her clients, but left before speaking

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7

 Because Movant did not object to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that an

evidentiary hearing was not necessary to address this ground, the Court need not address that

issue.

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with Movant. (Doc. 23). He claims that this is a “clear sign of total breakdown in

communication.” (Id.). Even assuming that defense counsel for whatever reason forgot to

meet with Plaza-Uzeta on one occasion, this incident alone does not establish a total

breakdown in communication. Because Movant has failed to set forth facts that would

support a finding of an irreconcilable conflict, the Court denies relief.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel (Ground two)7

Movant objects on two grounds to Judge Irwin’s conclusions regarding his ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claim. (Doc. 23). First, he asserts that trial counsel failed to

investigate certain defenses, including interviewing several witnesses proposed by Movant,

who would have presented testimony favorable to him. Second, he contends that trial counsel

met with him and discussed matters important to his trial on several occasions without the

assistance of a qualified interpreter. Movant asserts that this occurred at key moments,

including when defense counsel met with him to discuss a plea offer with a range of seven

to fifteen years. He now claims that he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s conduct because

had he fully understood the terms of this offer, he would have considered entering into a plea.

He also claims that had he known that defense counsel did not plan to call any witnesses in

his defense, he would never have gone to trial.

Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a criminal

defendant has a right to “effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 686 (1984). Strickland requires the defendant to show that (1) his counsel’s performance

was deficient to the point that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed” by the Sixth Amendment and (2) that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. To be deficient, defense counsel’s conduct

must have fallen below an “objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687–88. To be

prejudicial, a defendant must show that any mistakes made by defense counsel created a

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8

 As the R & R noted, Movant attached a document that appears to be an unnotarized

affidavit of Fabian Franco, a potential witness who allegedly would have provided favorable

testimony. (Doc. 1, Ex. 5). However, Movant did not assert in his § 2255 motion that he

mentioned this potential witness to defense counsel. Movant cannot establish a deficiency

on defense counsel’s part if his counsel was not aware of this potential witness. Morever, the

affidavit does not describe any specific facts or testimony that Mr. Franco would have

offered in Movant’s defense. The affidavit simply states that Plaza-Uzeta “is not involved

in any manner in the crime that was committed between January 25 and 28 at the recidence

[sic] located at 6221 North 27 Dr. Phoenix AZ.” (Id.).

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“reasonable probability that, but for [the] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. at 694.Counsel’s performance is strongly presumed to “fall[]

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” unless Movant can show

otherwise. Id. at 689; see also United States v. Fredman, 390 F.3d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir.

2004).

Movant asserts that his trial counsel failed to interview or call as witnesses four

individuals who Movant claims would have provided favorable testimony. (Doc. 23). He

objects to Judge Irwin’s determination that Movant failed to establish either of the Strickland

elements because he has not set forth any evidence of what Rigoberto Trujillo or Felix Najera

Escobar would have testified to. Movant simply states that they could not be located, but had

they testified truthfully, they would have provided favorable testimony. As Judge Irwin

noted in the R & R, counsel’s failure to investigate a meritorious defense may constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel if the defendant can show that the error “prejudiced” him.

(Doc. 22 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985))). Assuming that Plaza-Uzeta

provided defense counsel with the names of these witnesses, he still must establish prejudice.

As Judge Irwin correctly noted, “[s]peculation about what [a witness] could have said is not

enough to establish prejudice.” Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997)). Thus,

Movant has not established prejudice as to any failure on the part of defense counsel to

consider these two potential witnesses.

Movant also asserts that he provided defense counsel with the name of Jaime Cisneros

Ruiz. (Doc. 1).8

 He objects to Judge Irwin’s conclusion that defense counsel may have made

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a tactical decision not to call Mr. Ruiz as a witness because Movant was named as an

additional smuggler in Mr. Ruiz’s plea agreement, a fact which Movant conceded in his

Reply. (Doc. 18). Movant contends that Judge Irwin’s conclusion must be rejected as mere

speculation. (Doc. 23).

Movant has failed to show that defense counsel’s performance fell below an

“objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. The Court reiterates

that there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance.” Fredman, 390 F.3d at 1156. As Judge Irwin noted, Mr.

Cisneros’ affidavit acknowledges that Movant accompanied Mr. Franco, a person involved

in the conspiracy of which Movant was convicted, on a visit to the drop house. (Doc. 1, Ex.

5 (7)). This statement, combined with those in Mr. Cisneros’ plea agreement, identifying

Movant as a smuggler, suggest that Mr. Cisneros’ testimony could have damaged Movant’s

case, as much if not more than it could have helped his case. Thus, even if defense counsel’s

decision not to interview Mr. Cisneros as a potential witness constituted a deficient

performance, Movant has not established that the failure to call Mr. Cisneros as a witness

caused him any prejudice in light of the facts that likely would have come out during Mr.

Cisneros’ testimony.

Movant also asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his defense

attorney’s alleged failure to communicate with him. In the R & R, Judge Irwin recommended

a denial of relief because Movant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by any failure

to communicate. (Doc. 22). The R & R acknowledged that defense counsel did not call any

witnesses on Movant’s behalf, but noted that Movant has failed to show “any witness that

would have been, on the whole, of significant benefit to Movant’s defense.” (Id.).The R &

R also noted that Movant was unable to establish that any failure to communicate negatively

impacted his counsel’s performance at trial. Movant now asserts that had there have been

better communication with defense counsel, he would have understood that she did not plan

to call any witnesses, and therefore, would have given more thought to the plea offer with

a seven to fifteen year range. (Doc. 23). He asserts that, although defense counsel met with

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9

 Rule 6 of the rules governing § 2255 allows the Court, “for good cause”, to authorize

a party to conduct discovery. Movant requests various surveillance tapes from meetings that

took place in October 2006. (Doc. 19). The Court is skeptical that these tapes still exist after

almost six years. Furthermore, there is sufficient evidence before the Court to conclude that

Movant cannot meet his burden of establishing a deficient performance and prejudice.

Therefore, the Court denies Movant’s request for discovery. 

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him to discuss the conditions of this plea offer on three occasions, she did not bring a

qualified interpreter with her, and thus, Movant was unable to fully understand the offer. He

also asserts that at the beginning of trial and during the course of trial, counsel spoke with

Movant several times, to keep him informed, but these communications took place without

the assistance of an interpreter. Movant requests that the Court obtain surveillance tapes from

several dates in October 2006 to establish that defense counsel met with him without an

interpreter.9

As noted earlier, Movant’s trial counsel filed an affidavit, in which she avowed that

she met with Movant on more than twenty occasions, in addition to court appearances. (Doc.

16, Ex. 1). She also avowed that she never visited Plaza-Uzeta without a Spanish language

interpreter. Movant asserts that trial counsel met with him on the following dates without a

qualified interpreter: October 2, 2006, October 3, 2006, and October 4, 2006. According to

the record, these appear to be the meetings leading up to the settlement conference, scheduled

on October 4, 2006, during which Movant and trial counsel likely would have discussed the

second plea offer of seven to fifteen years. (Doc. 17; 05-cr-225, Doc. 79; Doc. 82–83). The

hearing on Movant’s motion to proceed pro se took place just two days later, on October 6,

2006. However, Movant concedes that he never raised any issues about lack of

communication or lack of assistance of a qualified interpreter during this hearing.

Furthermore, the record shows, and the R & R mentions, that one interpreter stated during

the October 6, 2006 hearing that she attended the settlement conference that had just taken

place, and “the defendant did not require the services of an interpreter. He assured Judge

Anderson that he understood everything and we did not interpret for him, and at the end of

the hearing Judge Anderson again asked him if he had understood everything, and he said

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yes.” (05-cr-225, Doc. 142). Taking into consideration this evidence in the record, together

with defense counsel’s affidavit, the Court concludes that Movant has not established that

defense counsel’s performance was “outside the wide range of professionally competent

assistance” or that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

690.

III. Other Claims (Grounds four and five)

Plaza-Uzeta raised in his petition two additional claims: (1) that his Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the government allowed a key witness to

testify untruthfully, and (2) that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when

he was deprived of assistance of a qualified interpreter. Neither of these claims was presented

on direct appeal. (Doc. 5, Ex. A). As a result, Judge Irwin determined that Petitioner’s claims

were procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 22 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622

(1998))). In his objection to the R & R, Petitioner does not contest this determination, but

rather asserts that he has established cause resulting from ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel and prejudice because “had appellate counsel presented these grounds on direct

appeal there is a reasonable possibility that it woulded [sic] have succeed [sic].” (Doc. 23).

Petitioner does not specifically address the prejudice stemming from the violation of his right

to assistance of a qualified interpreter. He simply states that “[t]here’s no doubt that

government’s witnesses lie several times . . . [and] [g]overnment may not allow a witness to

give false testimony.” (Id.). Further, Petitioner does not object to Judge Irwin’s determination

that Petitioner has not met his burden of presenting evidence to establish his actual

innocence. 

As noted in the R & R, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may constitute

cause but only if it “amounts to an independent constitutional violation.” Ortiz v. Stewart,

149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998). In cases involving a federal habeas corpus petition filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[t]o constitute cause for

procedural default of a federal habeas claim, the constitutional claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel must first have been presented to the state courts as an independent claim.”

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10 In his Motion to Vacate, Movant raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

based on appellate counsel’s failure to raise a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to

sustain his conviction on firearms charges. (Doc. 1). Movant did not object to the magistrate

judge’s conclusion that this claim was without merit, and in any event, the basis of that

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is irrelevant to the claims raised in grounds four and

five. 

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Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court noted above that a criminal

defendant may raise for the first time an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a § 2255

proceeding. However, Plaza-Uzeta did not raise an independent claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel related to these claims in his Motion to Vacate, but rather

raised it to establish cause in his Reply to the Motion to Vacate. (Doc. 18).10 Accordingly,

appellate counsel’s performance cannot constitute cause. See Cockett, 333 F.3d at 943.

Because Movant has not otherwise established cause, the Court need not address his claim

of prejudice. Movant’s default is not excused, and therefore, the Court will not review these

two claims.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Magistrate Judge Irwin’s R & R (Doc. 22) is ACCEPTED.

2. Movant’s Motion to Vacate (Doc. 1) is DENIED.

3. The Clerk of the Court shall TERMINATE this action.

/ / /

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4. The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of this

decision would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 30th day of June, 2011.

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