Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-24-01848/USCOURTS-ca13-24-01848-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Justice
Respondent
Jose C. Ybarra
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

JOSE C. YBARRA,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Respondent

______________________

2024-1848

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CH-0752-17-0422-I-2.

______________________

Decided: January 10, 2025

______________________

JOSE C. YBARRA, Charlotte, MI, pro se. 

 EVAN WISSER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA 

M. MCCARTHY. 

 ______________________

Before REYNA, TARANTO, and STARK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

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2 YBARRA v. DOJ

The U.S. Department of Justice employed Jose Ybarra

as a special agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) until charging him with unprofessional off-duty 

conduct and removing him from employment. After 

unsuccessfully appealing his removal to the FBI’s 

Disciplinary Review Board, Mr. Ybarra appealed his 

removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). 

The Board’s assigned administrative judge rejected his 

challenges to the agency’s removal decision, Ybarra v. 

Department of Justice, No. CH-0752-17-0422-I-2, 2018 WL 

2463376 (M.S.P.B. May 30, 2018) (Initial Decision), and 

the full Board agreed, adopting the Initial Decision as the 

Board’s final decision, supplemented by one more finding 

of fact supporting the result, Ybarra v. Department of 

Justice, No. CH-0752-17-0422-I-2, 2024 WL 1231943, at 

*1 (¶ 1), *7 (¶ 21) (M.S.P.B. Mar. 21, 2024) (Final Order).

Mr. Ybarra now appeals his removal to us. We affirm. 

I

A

Mr. Ybarra joined the FBI as a Criminal Investigator 

in 1998 and was later promoted to a GS-1811-13 Special 

Agent position. In 2003, the Office of Professional

Responsibility (OPR) within the Department of Justice

proposed to remove Mr. Ybarra for several instances of 

misconduct, as characterized by the Board: 

threatening the physical safety of a support 

employee; making inappropriate remarks to 

female associates that were considered sexual in 

nature; leaving an inappropriately aggressive 

voice-mail message for a member of the public; 

leaving unprofessional voice-mail messages for 

female coworkers; and multiple interactions with 

associates that disrupted the office. 

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YBARRA v. DOJ 3

Initial Decision, at 2.1 The relevant OPR official 

sustained the charges but mitigated the penalty to a 45-

day suspension in 2004. Id. The official told Mr. Ybarra 

that this would be his “final notice that offensive 

interpersonal interactions will not be tolerated by the 

Bureau” and that he would be removed if he “engage[d] in 

any further misconduct involving the utterance of words 

or actions of a threatening, offensive and/or sexual 

nature.” Id.

In 2006, the FBI assigned Mr. Ybarra to the Detroit 

Division, Lansing Resident Agency, to investigate crimes 

against children. And no further incidents were reported 

until years later. Between 2014 and 2016, Mr. Ybarra 

engaged in several instances of misconduct, for which he 

was suspended and otherwise penalized but not removed. 

In March 2016, a female cashier at Meijer’s, a grocery 

store, filed a police complaint against Mr. Ybarra for 

persistent and unwanted advances. A few months later, a 

minor employed at Dairy Queen and her mother also filed 

a police complaint against Mr. Ybarra for inappropriate 

behavior and harassment.

In January 2017, OPR issued a Report of 

Investigation that recommended removal of Mr. Ybarra

from his employment because of “Unprofessional Conduct

- Off Duty” (FBI Offense Code 5.21)2—specifically, “his 

behavior at Meijer’s and Dairy Queen.” Id. at 4. In May 

2017, the OPR deciding official sustained the charge, and 

the agency removed Mr. Ybarra from his position effective 

1 For the Initial Decision, we cite the page numbers 

of the version as provided in the Supplemental Appendix

filed in this court by respondent. 

2 The FBI Offense Code was not included in the 

record here or before the Board, but “the agency’s 

description of what the Code contains does not appear to 

be in dispute.” Final Order, at *5 (¶ 16). 

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4 YBARRA v. DOJ

June 1, 2017. Mr. Ybarra sought review of the removal 

decision by FBI’s Disciplinary Review Board, which 

affirmed OPR’s finding of misconduct and sustained the 

removal. Id. at 5.

B

Mr. Ybarra appealed his removal to the Board. In its

Initial Decision, issued May 30, 2018, the Board found 

that the agency had proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence that Mr. Ybarra had engaged in misconduct 

against employees at Meijer’s and Dairy Queen and that 

the agency established a nexus between his misconduct 

and the work of the FBI. Regarding nexus, the Board

found that his misconduct contravened the agency’s 

primary mission—protecting people, especially protecting

children under the age of 18—as evidenced by the fact 

that two individuals, one a minor, filed police reports “for 

protection against him.” Id. at 7. It added that Mr. 

Ybarra’s conduct affected management’s trust and 

confidence in his job performance, as evidenced by his 

local supervisor’s belief that Mr. Ybarra needs

“‘professional assistance’ before performing his full duties” 

(earlier he had received “Excellent” ratings) and local law 

enforcement partners’ indications that “they are 

uncomfortable with [Mr. Ybarra] and do not want to work 

with him.” Id.

The Board also upheld the agency’s removal penalty. 

The Board recited the often-used analytic factors: “(1) the 

type of offense the appellant committed, (2) his type of 

employment, (3) his past disciplinary record, (4) his past 

work record, (5) the effect of his conduct upon the service, 

(6) penalties imposed for similar offenses, (7) standard 

agency penalties, (8) any notoriety, (9) whether the 

appellant was on notice to avoid the particular 

misconduct at issue, (10) his potential for rehabilitation, 

(11) any mitigating circumstances, and (12) the 

availability of alternative sanctions.” Id. at 8 (citing 

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YBARRA v. DOJ 5

Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305–

06 (1981)). And it concluded that the penalty was “within 

the tolerable bounds of reasonableness.” Id.

The Board found the following: Mr. Ybarra’s 

misconduct demonstrated “a serious lack of judgment,”

that his interaction with the minor was “in direct 

contravention of the FBI’s mission and his work 

investigating crimes against children,” and ultimately 

that because “he lost credibility and damaged his 

relationships with the local law enforcement community,”

he was “unable to fulfill critical responsibilities as an

agent.” Id. Mr. Ybarra’s type of employment weighed 

against him because “[l]aw enforcement officers may be 

held to a higher standard of conduct than other federal 

employees.” Id. (citing Negron v. Department of Justice, 

95 M.S.P.R. 561, 573 (2004)). Mr. Ybarra’s disciplinary 

record, namely, his 45-day suspension for misconduct in 

2003, was a significantly aggravating factor. Removal 

was within the range of penalties for the offense of 

unprofessional conduct off-duty where an aggravating 

factor is present. Id. at 9. Based on the penalties that 

FBI previously imposed on Mr. Ybarra for his offensive 

interpersonal actions and a police warning regarding the 

Meijer’s incident, he was “clearly on notice to refrain from 

offensive behavior with women.” Id. And although there 

was “evidence of [his] positive rehabilitative potential” 

(refraining from pursuing the Meijer’s cashier after 

receiving a police warning, acknowledging his poor 

judgment, and expressing remorse), id., other record 

evidence—that he did not control his behavior, did not 

seek out the professional assistance his supervisor 

believed he needed, and “deflect[ed] responsibility for the 

inappropriate conduct from himself to a teenage service 

worker and her mother”—weighed against his 

rehabilitative potential, id. at 9–10. The Board found 

that the deciding official had considered mitigating 

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6 YBARRA v. DOJ

circumstances and determined that the Douglas factors 

weighed in favor of the removal decision. Id. at 10. 

C

On Mr. Ybarra’s petition for review, the full Board

upheld the removal by adopting the Initial Decision and 

adding one fact providing further support for the nexus 

finding—that Mr. Ybarra’s “persistent and inappropriate 

advances toward the Meijer’s cashier adversely affected 

the agency’s reputation because that individual was

aware that the appellant was an FBI agent.” Final Order, 

at *3 (¶ 11); id. at *7 (¶ 21). The Board then considered 

and rejected Mr. Ybarra’s challenges to the Initial 

Decision’s penalty analysis. Id. at *4–7 (¶¶ 12–21). 

Mr. Ybarra contended that the Board in the Initial 

Decision should not have considered his 2003 suspension 

as an aggravating factor because it “was too remote in 

time.” Id. at *5 (¶ 17) (first citing Kehrier v. Department 

of Justice, 27 M.S.P.R. 477 (1985); and then citing Bennett 

v. Department of Transportation, 15 M.S.P.R. 686 (1983)). 

The Board disagreed, explaining as follows: 

[I]t was permissible for the agency to consider the

appellant’s 2003 suspension as an aggravating 

factor but that the passage of time lessens its 

import. Although none of the case law seems to 

bar consideration of prior discipline due merely to 

passage of time, we find that passage of time may 

go to the weight that the prior discipline should be 

accorded, along with the severity of the prior 

discipline and whether the current disciplinary 

action is being taken for similar reasons.

Id. at *6 (¶ 19). The Board then determined that “the 

agency did not abuse its discretion in giving the 

appellant’s 2003 suspension significant weight as an 

aggravating factor” because Mr. Ybarra’s “prior discipline

was serious,” he had received an explicit warning that it 

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YBARRA v. DOJ 7

was his “final notice,” and “the prior suspension was 

based largely on the same general type of behavior 

underlying the removal at issue here, i.e., inappropriate 

comments to female coworkers.” Id.

Mr. Ybarra also argued that his “excellent 

performance history” constituted “evidence of his 

rehabilitative potential.” Id. at *4 (¶ 14). But the Board 

agreed with the administrative judge’s finding in the 

Initial Decision that Mr. Ybarra “exhibited poor 

rehabilitative potential.” Id. at *6 (¶ 20). While his work 

performance was excellent, the Board stated, his charged 

offense “[did] not relate to the appellant’s performance in 

his position, but rather to his interpersonal conduct 

outside the workplace.” Id. In particular, the Board 

continued, weighing against his rehabilitative potential 

were his response to the notice of proposed removal 

(stating that “had the Dairy Queen service worker’s 

mother called him instead of the police, he would have 

known whether this girl was having issues that were 

causing her to ‘engage superfluously’ with him and he 

could perhaps have been recruited as a father figure or 

‘standby babysitter’”) and his “lack of appreciation for the 

seriousness of his misconduct” (as indicated by the fact 

that the behavior he characterized as “off-duty flirtation” 

led two people to seek police protection). Id. The Board

upheld the removal penalty. Id. at *7 (¶ 21).

Mr. Ybarra timely petitioned for review by this court.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) and 5 

U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).

II

We may set aside the Board’s decision only if it is “(1) 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without 

procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 

been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial 

evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). The petitioner bears the 

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8 YBARRA v. DOJ

burden of establishing reversible error in the Board’s final 

decision. Sistek v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 955 

F.3d 948, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2020). We review the Board’s 

legal decisions without deference and its findings of fact 

for substantial evidence. McIntosh v. Department of 

Defense, 53 F.4th 630, 638 (Fed. Cir. 2022). “Substantial 

evidence consists of ‘such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Frederick v. Department of Justice, 73 F.3d 

349, 352 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Consolidated Edison 

Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

To remove an employee, the government must prove, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, that “(1) the charged 

misconduct occurred, (2) there is a nexus between what 

the employee did and disciplining the employee to 

promote the efficiency of the service, and (3) the 

particular penalty is reasonable.” Hansen v. Department 

of Homeland Security, 911 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 

2018). We “will not disturb a choice of penalty within the 

agency’s discretion unless the severity of the agency’s 

action appears totally unwarranted in light of all the 

factors.” Mings v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 384, 

390 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 

1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

Mr. Ybarra challenges the Board’s ruling only on the 

ground that “the Board committed error and an abuse of 

discretion by sustaining the removal penalty.” Ybarra 

Informal Br. at 1. He argues that the Board erred in two 

respects: its reliance on his 2003 suspension as an 

aggravating factor and its finding that he lacked 

rehabilitative potential. We reject both arguments. 

A

Mr. Ybarra first argues that the Board’s reliance on 

his 2003 suspension—14 years before his 2017 removal—

as an aggravating factor was legal error. Id. at 2. He 

contends that the Board’s precedent precludes it from 

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YBARRA v. DOJ 9

considering discipline that was imposed so long ago. Id.

at 2–4 (relying on Bennett, 15 M.S.P.R. at 687, and 

Kehrier, 27 M.S.P.R. at 480 n.1). 

We are not persuaded by Mr. Ybarra’s argument that 

“the passage of time alone” necessarily renders past 

discipline irrelevant for the purpose of aggravation. Id. 

He identifies no statute or rule or precedent of this court 

so stating, and he does not explain why there should be 

such a constraint on a federal employer. As for the two 

Board decisions he cites, Bennett and Kehrier, neither one

establishes the rule that Mr. Ybarra proposes: At most, 

they establish that timing can be a consideration, not that 

the passage of time alone must render past discipline 

irrelevant. Moreover, the specific reasoning in the two 

decisions does not establish Mr. Ybarra’s proposed rule. 

See Bennett, 15 M.S.P.R. at 687 (holding that a disparate 

treatment claim could not invoke penalties imposed on air 

traffic controllers who struck in 1970 in assessing 

penalties imposed on air traffic controllers who struck in 

1981); Kehrier, 27 M.S.P.R. at 480 n.1 (holding that an 

employee’s “1974 suspension may be deemed too remote in 

time to justify consideration in determining an 

appropriate penalty for current charges,” which occurred 

in 1982 (emphasis added)). 

In this case, there is a reasonable justification for

considering Mr. Ybarra’s 2003 suspension as an 

aggravating factor. His “prior discipline was serious,” he 

had received an assertedly “final notice that offensive 

interpersonal interactions will not be tolerated by the 

Bureau,” and “the prior suspension was based largely on 

the same general type of behavior underlying the removal 

at issue here.” Final Order, at *6 (¶ 19). And contrary to 

Mr. Ybarra’s contention, this consideration was not the 

lone one supporting removal. The Board, in the Initial 

Decision, recited others. See, e.g., Initial Decision, at 8 

(“According to [the deciding official], the appellant is 

unable to fulfill critical responsibilities as an agent 

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10 YBARRA v. DOJ

because he lost credibility and damaged his relationships 

with the local law enforcement community.”); id. at 10 

(“[The deciding official] told the appellant he displayed a 

‘disturbing lack of reality awareness regarding the 

consequences of [his] actions’ and determined he was 

unsuitable for employment with the FBI.”). We see no 

reversible error in the consideration of the 2003 

suspension.

B

Mr. Ybarra argues that the Board failed to take into 

account his “rehabilitative potential in assessing the 

penalty of removal,” particularly as shown by his 

“excellent performance.” Ybarra Informal Br. at 6–7

(citing multiple cases emphasizing the importance of 

rehabilitative potential in a Douglas factor analysis). We 

see no reversible error in this respect. Both the agency 

and the Board did consider Mr. Ybarra’s rehabilitative 

potential, including his performance record, and both 

determined, on a reasonable basis, that the potential was 

low. Initial Decision, at 9 (noting that Mr. Ybarra made 

no claims “to have placed [] controls, internal or external, 

on his behavior”), 10 (“[T]he record does not show [Mr. 

Ybarra] received the help his supervisor believes was 

required for full rehabilitation.”); Final Decision, at *6 

(¶ 20) (discussing Mr. Ybarra’s “disturbing” response to 

the notice of proposed removal and the fact that “he still 

does not seem to understand” the “seriousness of his 

misconduct.”). 

III

We affirm the Board’s decision. 

The parties shall bear their own costs. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 24-1848 Document: 18 Page: 10 Filed: 01/10/2025