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Parties Involved:
Bessemer City Board of Education
Appellee
Connie L. Morris
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11988

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

CONNIE L. MORRIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BESSEMER CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, 

Defendant-Appellee,

KEITH A. STEWARD,

individually and in his official capacity as 

Superintendent of the Bessemer Board 

of Education,

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11988

Defendant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-01231-AMM

____________________ 

Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Connie Morris appeals from the dismissal of her lawsuit following the district court’s order granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Ms. Morris argues that the district court misapplied Alabama contract law when it found that the parties had an 

enforceable contract. Upon review, we agree with Ms. Morris and

reverse. 

I

On August 1, 2019, Ms. Morris filed a complaint against her 

employer, the Bessemer City Board of Education, and Keith Steward, the Superintendent of the Bessemer Board of Education, alleging claims of age and gender discrimination and a claim for a 

violation of a right to a due process hearing. Both defendants 

moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Superintendent Steward’s motion and dismissed him from the case. The 

district court granted the Board’s motion in part and ordered Ms. 

Morris and the Board to mediation. The parties attended 

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22-11988 Opinion of the Court 3

mediation on February 9, 2022, where they agreed to settle the 

matter. To that end, the terms of a “settlement proposal” were set 

forth in a document the parties labeled a “Memorandum of Understanding.” The Memorandum provided, in part, as follows: 

The settlement proposal contemplated in this memorandum of understanding will be subject to a majority 

vote of the Board of Education.

For a 24-month period beginning on July 1, 2022, 

Plaintiff will be paid at Step 27 of the director pay 

scale. During this period, Plaintiff will receive any 

raises and bonuses applicable to other employees at 

her position on the pay scale and will continue to 

accrue vacation and sick leave. . . .At the end of this 

period, Plaintiff’s employment will terminate, 

through her retirement or otherwise. Defendant shall 

have no obligation to employ or re-employ Plaintiff 

thereafter. Plaintiff will be able to redeem unused 

vacation pay at the end of the period.

The parties’ fuller agreement incorporating these and 

more detailed terms will include a mutual 

nondisparagement clause, a comprehensive release of 

all claims, a no admission of liability clause, and other 

terms and provisions ordinarily included in a 

comprehensive settlement and release.

D.E. 125-1 at 1. Ms. Morris and at least one representative for the 

Board signed the Memorandum.

A few days after mediation, Ms. Morris decided that she no 

longer wanted to end her employment in the manner set forth in 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11988

the Memorandum. On February 14, 2022, counsel for Ms. Morris 

informed the Board’s counsel of Ms. Morris’ decision. The next 

day, on February 15, 2022, the Board voted to approve the terms set 

forth in the Memorandum. On February 21, 2022, the Board filed 

a motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Ms. Morris opposed 

the motion. 

The district court granted the Board’s motion, concluding 

that the Memorandum constituted a valid, enforceable contract

from which Ms. Morris could not withdraw. The Memorandum, 

the district court explained, was subject only to the Board’s approval—not Ms. Morris’ second thoughts, and if the parties intended to make the settlement “also subject to a revocation option 

for” Ms. Morris, they would have done so. The district consequently granted the Board’s motion and dismissed Ms. Morris’ suit

with prejudice. Ms. Morris timely appealed. 

On appeal, Ms. Morris argues that the district court wrongfully concluded that the memorandum constituted an enforceable 

contract. According to Ms. Morris, the Memorandum simply reflected the terms of an offer to settle, which she was free to withdraw at any time before the Board voted because the representatives who signed the Memorandum had no authority to bind the 

Board to the terms set forth therein. Although the Board agrees 

that its representatives had no authority to execute a binding contract, it argues that it subsequently ratified the agreement when it 

voted on February 15, 2022. 

II

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22-11988 Opinion of the Court 5

We review a district court’s order enforcing a settlement 

agreement for an abuse of discretion. Hayes v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., 196 

F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1990). The construction and enforceability of a settlement agreement is governed by state law. See id. And 

we review the interpretation of a settlement agreement de novo. See 

Managed Care Advisory Group, LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 

F.3d 1145, 1153 (11th Cir. 2019). See also Resnick v. Uccello Immobilien GMBH, Inc., 227 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Principles 

governing general contract law apply to interpret settlement agreements.”).

III

Settlement agreements are contracts and are thus subject to 

traditional principles of formation and enforcement of contracts. 

See Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th 

Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The parties agree that Alabama law 

governs the construction and enforcement of the Memorandum at 

issue here. 

“No contract is formed without an offer, an acceptance, 

consideration, and mutual assent to terms essential to the contract.” Steiger v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 653 So. 2d 975, 978 (Ala. 

1995). See also Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So. 2d 638, 656 (Ala. 2006)

(same). Generally speaking, the acceptance of an offer is valid only 

if it is done by one with authority to accept the offer, or if it is ratified before the offer is revoked. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 52 cmt. c (1981) (“Even an acceptance by a purported agent, 

acting without agency power, may in appropriate cases be ratified 

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11988

by the offeree. Ratification must occur, however, before the offeror 

manifests withdrawal from the transaction and before the termination of the offeree’s power of acceptance.”).

The parties agree that, despite their signatures on the Memorandum, the Board’s representatives had no authority to accept 

the “settlement proposal” or bind the Board to the terms set forth 

in the Memorandum. Only a majority of the Board, after a public 

vote, could accept and bind the Board to the terms set forth in the 

Memorandum. See Ala. Code § 36-25A-5(b). The Board, however, 

argues that this crucial defect should be ignored because the Board 

“ratified” the agreement a few short days after mediation. The 

problem with this argument is that any so-called ratification occurred after Ms. Morris informed the Board that she was no longer 

interested in settling the matter according to the terms set forth in 

the Memorandum. 

It is a basic tenet of Alabama contract law that no contract is 

formed without an offer and an acceptance. It is also well-established that revocation of an offer terminates the power of acceptance. The Board could not accept the terms of the proposed 

agreement (the Memorandum) until a public vote occurred. And

Ms. Morris communicated her revocation before the Board voted. 

Consequently, there was no contract on the table to accept when 

the Board voted. See Shoals Community College v. Colagross, 674 So. 

2d 1311, 1315 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (“[W]e note that all of the drafts 

of the ‘settlement agreement’ contain a specific provision stating 

that the agreement is ‘subject to the approval of Attorney General 

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James Evans.’ However, the record is devoid of any evidence that 

Attorney General Evans approved the agreement. Based on the 

foregoing reasons, it appears that there was no valid ‘settlement 

agreement’ for the trial court to enforce.”); DeWitt v. Gainous, 601 

So. 2d 103, 105 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (“A prospective resignation 

that is not unconditionally accepted may be withdrawn prior to its 

effective date. Here, Gainous’s acceptance of DeWitt’s resignation 

could be effective only if the Board gave its final approval. By submitting his letter of rescission prior to the Board’s October 25 meeting, DeWitt successfully withdrew his resignation before its unconditional acceptance.”).

While it is true that settlement agreements are favored and

will be summarily enforced, “the parties must first enter into a valid 

and binding settlement agreement before it will be enforced.” Sagamore Ins. Co. v. Sudduth, 45 So. 3d 1286, 1290 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)

(quoting Mays v. Julian LeCraw & Co., 807 So. 2d 551, 554 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 2001)). Because there was no acceptance before Ms. Morris’ 

revocation, there was no valid and binding settlement agreement. 

IV

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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