Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-08-04730/USCOURTS-ca3-08-04730-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A.S.
Appellant
Bayonne Board of Education
Appellee
D.S.
Appellant

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 08-4730

 

 

D.S., individually and as Guardian ad litem of D.S.,

A.S., individually and as Guardian ad litem of D.S.,

Appellants

v.

BAYONNE BOARD OF EDUCATION,

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 2:08-CV-01726)

Honorable William J. Martini, District Judge

 

Submitted March 9, 2010

 

BEFORE: MCKEE, BARRY, and 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

Filed: April 22, 2010

Case: 08-4730 Document: 003110112687 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/22/2010
2

 

Lori M. Gaines

Staci J. Greenwald 

Sussan & Greenwald

1249 South River Road

Suite 104

Cranbury, NJ 08512

 Attorneys for Appellants

James L. Plosia, Jr.

Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro & Murphy, P.C.

25 Independence Boulevard

P.O. Box 112

Liberty Corner, NJ 07938

 Attorneys for Appellee

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal

from an order of the District Court, entered on November 19,

2008, terminating the obligation of Appellee Bayonne Board

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3

of Education (“Bayonne”) to pay the tuition of Appellants’

son D.S. at the Banyan School, a private school for learning

disabled children in Little Falls, New Jersey, and denying

Appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees, costs, and interest.

The District Court’s order reversed a decision of a New Jersey

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who held Bayonne liable

for the cost of D.S.’s tuition at the Banyan School. The ALJ

ordered relief because of her conclusions that Bayonne had

failed to provide D.S. with a free and appropriate public

education during the 2006-2007 school year in violation of

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20

U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and that D.S.’s placement at the

Banyan School would satisfy the IDEA. The District Court

adjudicated the case on the record compiled before the ALJ

but reached a conclusion opposite of that of the ALJ as the

Court believed that Bayonne had provided D.S. with a free

and appropriate public education. For the reasons that follow,

we will reverse the order of the District Court and will

reinstate the decision of the ALJ. We will provide, however,

that the Court on remand determine the details of the relief to

be granted to Appellants.

II. BACKGROUND

Before setting forth a detailed analysis of the

proceedings and evidence and addressing Appellants’ claims

on the merits, we will outline the framework of the IDEA

pursuant to which states provide education to children with

disabilities.

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A. Statutory Framework

The IDEA requires that states to receive federal

education funding make available a free and appropriate

public education to all children with disabilities residing

within their borders. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). In particular the

IDEA specifies that the education the states provide to these

children “specially [be] designed to meet the unique needs of

the handicapped child, supported by such services as are

necessary to permit the child to benefit from the instruction.”

Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89, 102 S.Ct.

3034, 3042 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although a state is not required to supply an education to a

handicapped child that maximizes the child’s potential, it

must confer an education providing “significant learning” and

“meaningful benefit” to the child. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v.

N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, “the provision

of merely more than a trivial educational benefit” is

insufficient. L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 390

(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ.,

205 F.3d 572, 577 3d Cir. (2000) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). In addition to establishing educational standards,

the IDEA includes a “mainstreaming” component requiring

the placement of a student with disabilities in the least

restrictive environment that will provide the child with a

meaningful educational benefit. Id.

The IDEA contemplates that school districts will

achieve these goals by designing and administering a program

of individualized instruction for each special education

student set forth in an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”).

20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d). The IEP is so significant

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State and federal regulations detail the method for 1

implementing the IDEA’s requirements. S.H. v. State-Operated

Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 2003). New

Jersey’s requirements for developing an IEP follow the federal

requirements. Id. (internal citations omitted).

5

that the courts have characterized it as the “centerpiece” of the

IDEA’s system for delivering education to disabled children.

Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d

171, 173 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,

311, 108 S.Ct. 592, 598 (1988)). “An IEP consists of a

specific statement of a student’s present abilities, goals for

improvement of the student’s abilities, services designed to

meet those goals, and a timetable for reaching the goals by

way of the services.” Holmes v. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist.,

205 F.3d 583, 589 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 20 U.S.C. §

1401(a)(20)). A team consisting of the student’s parents and

teachers, a curriculum specialist from the local school district,

and, if requested, a person with special knowledge or

expertise regarding the student must develop an IEP. 20

U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). The IEP team will review the IEP at

least annually to determine whether the stated goals for the

student are being achieved. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4). When

appropriate the team will revise the IEP to address, among

other things, lack of progress, necessary changes arising from

reevaluation of the child, and parental input. 20 U.S.C. §

1414(d)(4). 

1

Though the IEP must provide the student with a “basic

floor of opportunity,” it need not necessarily provide “the

optimal level of services” that parents might desire for their

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After Appellants initiated the administrative proceedings in this 2

case, New Jersey enacted legislation placing the burdens of

proof and production on school districts in due process hearings

under the IDEA. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:46-1.1 (West 2009).

6

child. See Holmes, 205 F.3d at 590 (quoting Carlisle Area

Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 533-34 (3d Cir. 1995)).

Nevertheless, “at a minimum, ‘[t]he IEP must be reasonably

calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful

educational benefits in light of the student’s intellectual

potential.’” Chambers v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d

176, 182 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd.

of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004)). When a

state is unable to provide a free and appropriate public

education to a child but a private school can provide that

education, the state must reimburse the child’s parents for the

private school costs. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d at 389-

90 (citing Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d at 577). 

If parents believe that an IEP fails to provide their

child with a free and appropriate public education, they may

challenge the IEP in an administrative proceeding. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(b)(6). But in the apparent interest of minimizing the

stress and expense of an adjudicatory administrative

proceeding, New Jersey requires parents and a school board

disputing the adequacy of an IEP initially to mediate their

dispute. Then, if mediation is unsuccessful, there will be a

“due process hearing” held before an ALJ to seek a resolution

of their dispute. Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381

F.3d at 198. At an administrative hearing challenging an IEP,

the party seeking relief bears the burden of proof. Ramsey 2

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This legislation, however, has no bearing in this case, as it

applies only to due process hearings requested after January 13,

2008, the effective date of the act. See id., historical and

statutory notes. 

7

Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d at 392 (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546

U.S. 49, 62, 126 S.Ct. 528, 537 (2005)). A party to the due

process hearing aggrieved by its outcome has the right to

bring a civil action challenging the decision in any state court

of competent jurisdiction or in a federal district court, without

regard to the amount in controversy. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). 

B. Factual Background

When D.S. was six years old, he began to suffer from

epileptic seizures attributable to brain tumors. The treatment

for the seizures included the use of large quantities of antiepileptic medicine. Unfortunately D.S.’s condition and

treatment combined to place severe limits on his cognitive

abilities as demonstrated by the circumstance that he had a

full scale IQ within the mentally retarded range. D.S. began

attending Bayonne public schools in the second grade. After

D.S. repeated the second grade, Bayonne classified him as

“other health impaired” and provided him with a special

education program in the third grade during the 2000-2001

school year. D.S. underwent brain surgery in 2001 and 2003,

in which the tumors were removed successfully. D.S.’s

seizures abated completely following the 2003 operation

allowing him to cease taking preventive medication. As a

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result, although he still suffered from significant learning

difficulties, his condition improved. Thereafter D.S.

remained a student in the Bayonne schools into the ninth

grade during the 2006-2007 school year. At that level the

Bayonne schools placed D.S. in the school’s self-contained

“cluster” program in which special education teachers educate

special education students in a classroom environment distinct

from that of the general student population.

1. Report of Neuropsychologist Maria

DiDonato

Notwithstanding D.S.’s placement in the cluster

program, Appellants obviously were dissatisfied with D.S.’s

progress in the Bayonne schools for they retained the services

of several professionals to evaluate D.S. for a better

understanding of his educational needs and abilities. Thus in

April and May of 2006, they retained a neuropsychologist, Dr.

Maria DiDonato, to administer a series of aptitude and

achievement tests to D.S. while he was in the eighth grade.

Based on an evaluation of D.S.’s cognitive reasoning skills

using the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children IV

(“WISC IV”), DiDonato determined that D.S. had a full-scale

IQ score of 81, within the low average range of intellectual

functioning, signaling that his intellectual capacity had

improved following the surgeries. Nevertheless, D.S.

evidenced below grade level achievement and in the Wechsler

Individual Achievement Test II (“WIAT”) scored at the 6.6

grade level for basic reading skills, the 4.2 grade level for

reading comprehension, the 7.2 grade level for numerical

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operations, the 5.4 grade level for math reasoning, the 5.5

grade level for spelling, and the 6.2 grade level for written

expression. 

DiDonato also administered the Standard Reading

Inventory-Second Edition test to D.S. which yielded results

indicating that his reading comprehension skills were at the

third-grade level and showed that he experienced fourth-grade

level frustration when reading. In addition, DiDonato

determined, based on answers that D.S. and his parents

supplied in response to a behavioral health questionnaire, that

D.S.’s emotional health reflected clinically significant signs

of withdrawal, problems with attitude towards his school and

teachers, and internalization of problems causing feelings of

depression and inadequacy. 

Predicated on these evaluations, DiDonato

recommended, inter alia, moving D.S. away from distracting

stimuli during instruction, providing written instructions

verbally as well as on the blackboard, using repetition and

overlearning of novel information, rephrasing or representing

information in different words when there is evidence that

D.S. might not understand what is being asked or presented,

using multi-sensory instruction whenever possible, breaking

assignments into shorter tasks, teaching encoding strategies

such as mnemonics and “chunking,” allowing extra time for

tests, and, when possible, giving tests orally.

2. Report of Speech-Language Pathologist

Inna Levine

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DiDonato referred D.S to a speech-language

pathologist, Inna Levine of the Robert Wood Johnson

University Hospital. Levine examined D.S. in June of 2006,

administering a series of tests to determine his strengths and

weaknesses in a variety of linguistic tasks. The results of

these tests led Levine to conclude that although D.S.

displayed strengths in a number of areas—including

comprehension of direct commands, practical verbal

reasoning, problem solving, sentence comprehension, and

spelling—he had significant problems understanding oral

communications consisting of more than a sentence or two.

Levine found that D.S. struggled in that function to such an

extent that he was unable to process and retain any

information presented in a short one-paragraph narrative of

fourth or fifth grade level material. Levine also noted that

D.S. struggled to express himself both orally and in writing

due to immature organization, immature vocabulary, and

insufficient specificity. 

Based on her observations, Levine recommended that

D.S.’s school provide him with individual pull-out speech

therapy three times a week to focus on auditory

comprehension, memory, and word finding, and additional

speech therapy two times a week in a small group setting to

focus on developing conversation skills and building

vocabulary. Levine also recommended that these speech

therapy sessions address various “life skills” to help prepare

D.S. for post-school career planning. But inasmuch as Levine

did not analyze D.S.’s reading comprehension ability, she

recommended that he meet with a reading specialist to

determine the optimal complexity of the instructional material

used in D.S.’s education.

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In particular, Sgarlato-Inducci recommended that the school 3

provide D.S. with intensive remediation instruction in reading,

writing, comprehension, and spelling using a research-driven

multisensory program such as the Lindamood-Bell, Wilson, or

Orton-Gillingham programs.

11

3. Report of Audiologist Lorraine SgarlatoInducci

Several months later on October 9, 2006, after D.S.

had begun his ninth grade year at Bayonne High School, his

parents took him to audiologist Dr. Lorraine Sgarlato-Inducci,

who like Levine, was from the Robert Wood Johnson

University Hospital, for a central auditory processing

assessment. Sgarlato-Inducci concluded that D.S. displayed a

severe deficit in central auditory processing skills, with

specific deficits in the areas of auditory decoding, auditory

memory, phonemic conceptualization, and binaural

separation. Thus, she concluded that D.S. had significant

difficulties processing and retaining verbal information. Not

surprisingly, these difficulties were magnified both by the

presence of auditory distractions and an increase in the length

of the verbal information to be processed. Sgarlato-Inducci

recommended, inter alia, that the school provide D.S. with

intensive speech therapy, small group language-based

instruction on an ongoing basis, and instruction using a multisensory educational and remedial approach. She also

3

recommended that the teachers provide information to D.S. in

small, easily decipherable “chunks” to facilitate

comprehension, storage, and recall, and that the teachers seat

him away from possible distractions. Moreover, she

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recommended that the teachers test him in an untimed and

quiet environment, repeat and rephrase information as needed,

and use an FM desk-top amplification system to help D.S.

hear their voices over ambient noise in the classroom.

4. The 2006-2007 IEP

In letters they sent on June 8, July 13, September 6,

and October 30, 2006, Appellants shared the evaluations they

had obtained from DiDonato, Levine, and Sgarlato-Inducci

with Bayonne and requested to meet with a child study team

from Bayonne High School to incorporate the findings and

recommendations from those evaluations into D.S.’s ninth

grade IEP. Although Bayonne initially did not respond to

Appellants’ letters, eventually there was an IEP meeting to

consider D.S.’s case in November 2006. Appellants, D.S.’s

teachers, his case manager Sharon Peraino, and DiDonato

attended that meeting. In the letters preceding the IEP

meeting and at the meeting itself, Appellants expressed

concern that D.S. was not making sufficient academic

progress in the Bayonne public school system. 

An updated IEP was issued on November 29, 2006,

summarizing the reports of DiDonato, Levine, and SgarlatoInducci, and D.S.’s teachers’ comments for the 2006-2007

school year. By and large, D.S.’s teachers indicated that D.S.

was a polite, pleasant, and hard-working student, albeit

somewhat shy, and that he was meeting academic

expectations, even though he at times struggled in certain

areas. D.S.’s English and language arts teachers noted that he

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“Use manipulative” appears in that form in the original. 4

13

had difficulties with vocabulary, grammar, comprehension,

and recall. D.S.’s pre-algebra teacher noted that he struggled

when taking tests, becoming nervous and anxious, but that if

given the same assignment without calling it a “test” he would

achieve a grade of 90% or above. 

For each area of D.S.’s instruction, the IEP

recommended the follow ing mo d ifi ca tio ns and

accommodations:

Tests/exams may be taken in the special education

classroom with extended time

Homework assignments may be modified as needed

Classwork may be modified as needed

Criteria for grading may be modified

Extra set of textbooks may be kept at home

Tests/exams may be reformatted

Tests may be administered orally

Directions may be repeated/rephrased/clarified

Break down tasks into manageable units

Provide student with preferential seating

Provide student with study guides

Highlight key words 

. . . . 

Provide a highly structured environment

Use drill and repetitive practice

Use multi-sensory approach

Use manipulative4

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App. at 121-32. Appellants, however, refused to sign the

updated IEP because they believed that it failed to address

D.S.’s educational needs. Nevertheless, because they did not

submit any additional proposals to modify the IEP, and did

not seek to challenge the IEP through mediation or at a due

process hearing, the IEP became effective 15 days after

Appellants had received it. See N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-

2.3(h) (2010).

5. Dr. DiDonato’s Classroom Observation

Appellants continued to consult outside evaluators

throughout the 2006-2007 school year. At their request and

with Bayonne’s permission, DiDonato observed D.S. at

Bayonne High School on January 5, 2007, from

approximately 9:20 A.M. until 1:30 P.M., for the purpose of

evaluating his educational program. In particular she

observed classes in mathematics, general science, English,

introduction to technology, world history, gym, and lunch.

Based on her observations, DiDonato issued a report

reflecting her conclusions that the educational program

Bayonne High School was supplying D.S. was inappropriate

for his specific learning needs. According to DiDonato, in

most of the classes she observed, D.S. struggled to process

information quickly enough to keep up with the pace of

instruction. She also noted that D.S. seemed to be

experiencing difficulty interacting socially with other

students.

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Although in some instances DiDonato criticized D.S.’s

teachers for failing to comply with the IEP—such as by not

providing a quiet environment for test-taking—she placed

greater blame on the IEP itself, concluding that “[t]he goals

and objectives in the IEP and the current instructional

program being implemented do not adequately address the

needs that have been identified.” App. at 155. Ultimately,

DiDonato concluded that D.S. required “placement within a

small, highly structured school for students with learning

disabilities” as only such a school would be able to address

D.S.’s academic and social needs. Id. at 157. On March 19,

2007, after they received DiDonato’s report, Appellants

commenced the administrative proceedings underlying this

appeal by filing a petition for a due process hearing with the

New Jersey Department of Education Office of Special

Education seeking an order directing Bayonne to pay for an

out-of-district placement for D.S. at the Banyan School.

6. Expert Report of Dr. Brooks

After they initiated the administrative proceedings,

Appellants sought and obtained a report on D.S.’s case from

Dr. Jill Brooks, a licensed speech and language pathologist

and clinical neuropsychologist. Brooks interviewed

Appellants and reviewed D.S.’s medical and educational

record from 1997, when D.S.’s tumors first were diagnosed,

until 2007, including the 2006 IEP and DiDonato’s in-class

observation reports. Based on this review, Brooks concurred

with the evaluations and recommendations that other

professionals who had met with D.S. had made, and

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16

emphasized the need for a structured, intensive reading

program—such as the Lindamood-Bell, Wilson, or OrtonGillingham programs—and recommended that D.S.

participate in a social skills group for training in social skills

and pragmatic language. In her analysis of the education that

Bayonne was providing to D.S., Brooks was “struck by the

minimal services offered to [D.S.] throughout his academic

career,” and concluded that Bayonne had “not taken the

responsibility of evaluating or remediating” any of D.S.’s

academic and behavioral problems. App. at 177. 

7. Hackler and Wilkinson Evaluations

Though Appellants had obtained numerous evaluations

of D.S., the evaluation process was not one-sided for in May

2007 Bayonne designated learning consultant Lucy Hackley

and school psychologist Mary Beth Wilkinson to evaluate

D.S. to determine his cognitive level. Hackler administered

Woodcock-Johnson III (“Woodcock-Johnson”) achievement

tests to gauge D.S.’s grade-level proficiency in several

academic areas. In these tests D.S. scored at the 3.8 grade

level for reading comprehension, the 6.8 grade level for math

calculation, the 5.3 grade level for math reasoning, the 5.7

grade level for basic writing skills, and the 5.8 grade level for

written expression. In each of these subject areas in terms of

grade-level equivalence D.S. scored lower than he had scored

approximately one year earlier when he took the WIAT

achievement test that DiDonato administered. Wilkinson’s

psychological evaluation consisted of an IQ test and a

Multidimensional Self Concept Scale exam, which assessed

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17

social-emotional adjustment. D.S’s IQ was assessed using the

WISC-IV test at 78, within the borderline range of intellectual

functioning. When D.S. had taken this test approximately one

year earlier, the result was a slightly higher IQ score of 81,

within the low average range of intellectual functioning. On

the Multidimensional Self Concept Scale exam, D.S. received

a total score of 70, indicating that he had a very negative selfimage.

8. D.S.’s Final Grades for the 2006-2007

School Year

At the completion of the 2006-2007 school year, D.S.

received a cumulative final grade point average of 92 for his

major subjects. He received scores of 95 in general sciences,

95 in English, 93 in language arts, 87 in math, and 90 in world

history. His overall cumulative grade point average in major

subjects for the 2006-2007 school year increased over his

previous averages for in each of the previous four years D.S.

had received an average in the mid to high 80s. 

C. Procedural History

1. State Administrative Proceedings

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18

In early 2007, while D.S. was in ninth grade,

Appellants concluded that Bayonne was failing to provide

D.S. with a free and appropriate public education, a

conclusion leading them on March 19, 2007, as we already

have indicated, to file their petition for a due process hearing

challenging Bayonne’s education treatment of D.S. The

Department of Education transmitted the case to the New

Jersey Office of Administrative Law which assigned an ALJ

to the case who conducted the hearing over a period of

months in 2007. 

At the hearing, the ALJ reviewed the reports that the

parties had compiled and heard testimony from D.S.’s father

as well as from a number of educators and health

professionals who had worked with or evaluated D.S. There

was substantial focus at the hearing on determining the

significance of D.S.’s high final grades for the 2006-2007

school year in light of the decrease in grade-level proficiency

when his 2007 scores on the Woodcock-Johnson tests were

compared to his 2006 scores on the WIAT tests. It is clear

that Bayonne’s witnesses, in particular D.S.’s teachers and his

case manager Peraino, believed that D.S.’s high marks in all

of his classes demonstrated that D.S. had made academic

progress during the 2006-2007 school year. To Bayonne

these high marks seemed particularly significant because its

Director of Special Services Carol Trojan and its learning

consultant Hackler testified that standardized test scores were

not a reliable indicator of academic progress. Yet there was a

clear and well-defined dispute between the two camps of

expert witnesses with respect to the significance of the results

of standardized testing when compared to the grades in

school. In this regard we point out that contrary to Trojan’s

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and Hackler’s views, DiDonato, Banyan School consulting

psychiatrist Dr. Steven Tobias, and Brooks testified that

standardized tests were a better measure of academic progress

than grades, which can be subjective. Through their

testimony and evaluation reports, Appellants’ witnesses

expressed their belief that D.S. was not receiving meaningful

educational benefits at Bayonne High School.

On March 6, 2008, the ALJ issued her decision. After

reviewing “the applicable law, the evidence and credible

testimony,” she made 71 separate findings of facts. App. at

39. These findings included her conclusions that the

November 2006 IEP conference was completed without

agreeing to incorporate into the IEP any of the

recommendations outlined in the reports from the

neuropsychological, speech-language, and central auditory

processing evaluations, or from teachers. Moreover, she

found that the IEP did not provide goals or address D.S.’s

need for reading and language remediation and speech

therapy or his weak auditory memory skills and socialization

issues.

The ALJ ultimately concluded that Bayonne had failed

to create an IEP for D.S. sufficient to address his educational

needs, and that as a result D.S. had not received a free and

appropriate public education conferring a meaningful

educational benefit in the least restrictive environment, and

thus his education did not satisfy federal law. After

considering the testimony from the psychologist at the

Banyan School and taking into consideration the evaluations

and assessments regarding D.S.’s educational and social

needs, the ALJ concluded that the Banyan School would be

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According to Appellants’ brief, the Banyan School placement 5

has been continued at their expense since the time that the

District Court reversed the decision of the ALJ thereby relieving

Bayonne of the obligation to pay D.S.’s expenses at that school.

The parties in their briefs do not indicate that they offered to 6

present live evidence in the District Court.

20

an appropriate placement and ordered his placement there at

Bayonne’s expense, a direction carried out in April 2008.5

2. District Court Proceedings

Following the ALJ’s decision and D.S.’s transfer to the

Banyan School, Appellants filed a complaint in the District

Court requesting reimbursement from Bayonne for attorney’s

fees and costs incurred in the administrative action pursuant

to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Bayonne countered with its

own complaint requesting that the District Court reverse the

ALJ’s decision providing for the Banyan School placement.

The District Court consolidated the cases and, on the basis of

the record from the administrative proceedings, in a letter

opinion dated November 14, 2008, and order entered

November 19, 2008, denied Appellants’ request for

reimbursement for attorney’s fees and costs and reversed the

decision of the ALJ as the Court concluded that Bayonne had

provided D.S. with an education that met federal requirements

in its public schools. The Court predicated its conclusion 6

principally on the bases that D.S. had received high grades

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21

during the 2006-2007 school year, an achievement that it

believed the ALJ failed to consider, and its belief that the ALJ

“over-relied on D.S.’s standardized test scores when reaching

her decision.” App. at 11. Furthermore, the Court also

considered that D.S.’s teachers were using a multi-sensory

learning approach and were following certain of Appellants’

consultants’ recommendations.

III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction to review the

decision of the state educational agency under 20 U.S.C. §

1415(i)(2), and we exercise jurisdiction over the final order of

the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When

considering an appeal from a state administrative decision

under the IDEA, district courts apply a nontraditional

standard of review, sometimes referred to as “modified de

novo” review. See P.P. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585

F.3d 727, 734 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting S.H. v. State-Operated

Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2003)).

Under this standard, a district court must give “due weight”

and deference to the findings in the administrative

proceedings. Id. (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. at

3051). “‘Factual findings from the administrative

proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct,’ and if

the reviewing court does not adhere to those findings, it is

‘obliged to explain why.’” Id. (quoting State-Operated Sch.

Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d at 270). The “due weight”

obligation prevents district courts from imposing their own

view of preferable educational methods on the states. Oberti

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22

v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051).

Even though on an appeal in an IDEA case from a

decision of an ALJ a district court exercises a modified de

novo standard of review, when, as here, an ALJ has heard live

testimony and determined that one witness is more credible

than another witness, her determination is due special weight.

Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d at 199.

“Specifically, this means that a District Court must accept the

state agency’s credibility determinations ‘unless the nontestimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a

contrary conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Carlisle Area Sch., 62

F.3d at 529) (emphasis in original). In Shore we opined that

in this context, the word “justify” requires that the applicable

standard of review be essentially the same as that a federal

appellate court applies when reviewing a trial court’s findings

of fact. Id.

Within the confines of these standards, a district court

is authorized to make findings based on the preponderance of

the evidence and grant the relief it deems appropriate,

including an award of attorney’s fees, a requirement for

reimbursement for a private educational placement, and a

direction for the provision of a compensatory education. See

A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 802 (3d Cir.

2007) (en banc); Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993

F.2d 1031, 1034 (3d Cir. 1993). We review a district court’s

findings of fact for clear error, but we exercise plenary review

over the legal standards that a district court applies and over

its legal conclusions. Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia,

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23

575 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Shore Reg’l High

Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d at 199).

IV. DISCUSSION

The District Court reversed the ALJ’s finding that

D.S.’s ninth grade IEP was inappropriate. “The issue of

whether an IEP is appropriate is a question of fact.” StateOperated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d at 271 (citing

Carlisle Area Sch., 62 F.3d at 526). “When parents challenge

[the adequacy of] a school’s provision of a [free and

appropriate public education] to a child, a reviewing court

must (1) consider whether the school district complied with

the IDEA’s procedural requirements and (2) determine

whether the educational program was ‘reasonably calculated

to enable the child to receive educational benefits.’” Mary T.,

575 F.3d at 249 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct.

at 3051). But a court should determine the appropriateness of

an IEP as of the time it was made, and should use evidence

acquired subsequently to the creation of an IEP only to

evaluate the reasonableness of the school district’s decisions

at the time that they were made. Susan N. v. Wilson Sch.

Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 762 (3d Cir. 1995). 

A. Bayonne Complied with the IDEA’s Procedural

Requirements

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24

The Supreme Court has made clear that the IDEA’s

“procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid,” as “Congress

placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with

procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of

participation at every stage of the administrative process, as it

did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a

substantive standard.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-06, 102 S.Ct.

at 3050 (internal citation omitted). Appellants argue that

Bayonne ran afoul of the IDEA’s procedural requirements

because (1) D.S.’s ninth-grade IEP failed to program for

D.S.’s areas of educational need, and (2) Bayonne failed to

make timely responses to the letters Appellants sent to

Bayonne on June 8, July 13, September 6, and October 30,

2006, requesting a meeting to discuss creating a ninth grade

IEP for D.S. that incorporated the recommendations of

Appellants’ private evaluators. 

Appellants’ first argument misses the mark. The

content of an IEP as such does not implicate the IDEA’s

procedural requirements for content is concerned with the

IEP’s substance, i.e., whether the IEP “reasonably [is]

calculated to enable to enable the child to receive educational

benefits.” Id. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051. Appellants’ second

argument, however, does present a procedural question. New

Jersey regulations require a school district to respond in

writing within 20 calendar days to inquiries such as those

Appellants made in their letters. See N.J. Admin. Code §

6A:14-2.3(h)(5) (2010). Appellants’ letters, however,

remained unanswered for months. The District Court did not

specifically address the implications of this delay, but it

nevertheless found that the IDEA’s procedural requirements

were satisfied because Appellants played a “significant role”

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25

in crafting D.S.’s IEP. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49,

53, 126 S.Ct. 528, 532 (2005). 

We agree with the District Court on this point. A

procedural violation is actionable under the IDEA only if it

results in a loss of educational opportunity for the student,

seriously deprives parents of their participation rights, or

causes a deprivation of educational benefits. Winkelman v.

Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26, 127 S.Ct. 1994,

2001 (2007) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)); J.L. v. Mercer

Island Sch. Dist. 592 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus,

though it is important that a school district comply with the

IDEA’s procedural requirements, rather than being a goal in

itself, such compliance primarily is significant because of the

requirements’ impact on students’ and parents’ substantive

rights. Here although Bayonne’s initial unresponsiveness in

the face of Appellants’ concerns was unfortunate and

undoubtedly frustrating to them, they ultimately had an

opportunity to participate meaningfully in the creation of an

IEP for D.S. that was in effect for most of his ninth-grade

year. Appellants and one of their outside experts (DiDonato)

were present at the November 2006 IEP meeting at which

they made suggestions, some of which were incorporated in

the IEP. Moreover, the revised IEP was presented to

Appellants for their approval. 

We are mindful that Appellants did not sign the IEP,

but we have found levels of parental involvement similar to

those in this case to be sufficient to comply with the IDEA.

See Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1036. Though Appellants contend

that D.S. was deprived of educational benefits, this alleged

deprivation cannot reasonably be traced to Bayonne’s delay in

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26

responding to Appellants’ letters. In these circumstances we

find that Bayonne substantially satisfied the IDEA’s

procedural requirements and that any deficiency in its

compliance with the requirements is not a basis for granting

relief to Appellants.

B. The District Court Failed to Afford Due Weight

to the ALJ’s Factual Findings

We now come to the heart of this appeal. In her

decision, the ALJ found, “based on the scoring results from

evaluations and assessments and the weight of testimony from

teachers and medical experts,” that D.S.’s ninth grade IEP

failed to incorporate the recommendations necessary to

address D.S.’s needs, which included: 

reading goals, individualized basic phonetics

training, placement in a multi-sensory reading

program that addresses reading comprehension

skills (Lindamood-Bell, Wilson, or the OrtonGillingham), intensive speech/language therapy,

intensive auditory therapy regimens, an

academic environment for small group

lang uag e-based classroom instruction,

remediation instruction for reading, writing,

comprehension and spelling, usage of visual

aids, FM desk-top amplification system and

other educational supports. 

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App. at 57. The absence of these recommendations, or any

alternatives reasonably calculated to confer an educational

benefit to D.S., led the ALJ to find the IEP inappropriate. 

The District Court reversed this finding because D.S.’s

ninth grade IEP indicated that his teachers were using a multisensory learning approach and rephrasing and restating

instructions when necessary as recommended by Appellants’

educational consultants, the IEP incorporated a number of the

consultants’ other proposed recommendations, and, most

significantly, D.S. received high marks in his ninth grade

classes. The Court acknowledged that the IEP failed to

contain reading goals and did not include all of the

recommendations of the educational consultants, but stated

that “even without these goals, D.S. received meaningful

educational benefit during the 2006-2007 school year, as

evidenced by the high marks D.S. earned.” App. at 14.

We agree with the District Court that the IEP did

incorporate certain instructional techniques that were

consistent with Appellants’ consultants’ recommendations,

such as “[t]ests/exams may be taken in the special education

classroom with extended time,” “[d]irections may be

repeated/rephrased/clarified,” “[b]reak down tasks into

manageable units,” “[p]rovide student with preferential

seating,” “[u]se drill and repetitive practice,” and “[u]se

multi-sensory approach.” App. at 121-32. Nevertheless, we

disagree with the District Court that the presence of these

generalized instructions in the IEP contradicts the ALJ’s

ultimate factual conclusions—which a reviewing court is

obliged to consider prima facie correct—that (1) in order for

D.S.’s ninth grade IEP to be reasonably calculated to enable

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For example, the reports of Sgarlato-Inducci and Brooks both 7

stated that D.S. needed an intensive remedial multi-sensory

program for instruction in reading comprehension and writing,

and recommended the use for that purpose of a program such as

the Lindamood-Bell, Wilson, or Orton-Gillingham programs.

By holding that inclusion of such a program was necessary for

D.S. to receive a meaningful educational benefit, the ALJ

implicitly accepted these reports as credible. In contrast to these

specific recommendations, the IEP recommends only that D.S.’s

English instructors “[u]se multi-sensory approach.” App. at

121-22. This recommendation, as well as all the others in the

“Goals and Objectives” section of the IEP, is repeated verbatim

for each subject area.

We hasten to add that we are not holding that an IEP

must incorporate specific remedial techniques and provisions for

accommodations merely because evaluators propose them.

After all, the team may have good reason to reject these

proposals. Thus, we only are deciding that on this record the

ALJ’s conclusions with respect to remedial techniques and

provisions for accommodations are unassailable and our opinion

should not be read overly broadly.

28

D.S. to receive a meaningful educational benefit, it needed to

incorporate the specific remedial techniques and provisions

for accommodations that the teachers and evaluators who

worked with him had proposed, and (2) the IEP failed to

incorporate these specific remedial techniques and provisions

for accommodations.7

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29

As we have indicated, the District Court also found

that the IEP was appropriate because the high grades that he

received in all of his classes demonstrated that he made

meaningful academic progress during his ninth grade year. It

certainly was reasonable for the Court to consider D.S.’s

academic progress in evaluating the appropriateness of the

IEP for “evidence of a student’s later educational progress

may [] be considered in determining whether the original IEP

was reasonably calculated to afford some educational

benefit.” Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1040. Moreover, the

Supreme Court has indicated that a special education student

who “is being educated in the regular classrooms of a public

school system” and who is performing well enough to

advance from grade to grade generally will be considered to

be receiving a meaningful educational benefit under the

IDEA. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203, 102 S.Ct. at 3049.

Nevertheless, though the Court has stated that the “grading

and advancement system” constitutes “an important factor in

determining educational benefit,” it also has made clear that it

was not holding “that every handicapped child who is

advancing from grade to grade in a regular public school

system is automatically receiving a ‘free appropriate public

education.’” Id. at 203 & n.25, 102 S.Ct. at 3049 & n.25. 

D.S., however, was not being educated in Bayonne’s

regular classrooms. To the contrary, Bayonne was giving him

all of his academic instruction in classes composed entirely of

special education students in its “cluster” program. The

District Court apparently did not view this distinction as

significant because “[i]n Bayonne, state core curriculum

standards underlie the core curriculum content for all of its

students, including special education students.” App. at 11.

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30

Rowley, however, does not support the District Court’s

position that high scores achieved in special education

classrooms are unambiguous evidence of an IEP’s

sufficiency. In this regard it is important to reiterate that in

Rowley the Supreme Court made its statements regarding the

limited significance of grade-to-grade advancement in the

situation before it in which the “mainstreaming” preference of

the IDEA had been met and the Court was “presented with a

handicapped child . . . who is performing above average in the

regular classrooms of a public school system.” Rowley, 458

U.S. at 202-03, 102 S.Ct. at 3049 (emphasis added). Thus,

our reading of Rowley leads us to believe that when the

“mainstreaming” preference has not been met so that high

grades are achieved in classes with only special education

students set apart from the regular classes of a public school

system, the grades are of less significance than grades

obtained in regular classrooms.

Moreover, quite aside from Rowley, our precedents do

not afford the significance the District Court afforded to

D.S.’s high scores in special education classrooms in this case

for we consistently have declined to adopt bright line rules to

determine whether a student is receiving a meaningful

educational benefit under the IDEA. See, e.g., Ridgewood

Bd. of Educ., 172 F.3d at 247 (what benefit is “appropriate”

under the IDEA is gauged in relation to child’s potential);

Polk, 853 F.2d at 184 (“The educational progress of a

handicapped child . . . can be understood as a continuum

where the point of regression versus progress is less relevant

than the conferral of benefit.”); Carlisle Area Sch., 62 F.3d at

534 (“. . . the [IDEA] requires that school districts prepare the

IEP’s based on the student’s needs; so long as the IEP

Case: 08-4730 Document: 003110112687 Page: 30 Date Filed: 04/22/2010
We are not implying that we question the integrity of 8

Bayonne’s marking system for special education students. Quite

to the contrary, we merely are considering the significance of

D.S.’s achievements within the context of the entire case.

31

responds to the needs, its ultimate success or failure cannot

retroactively render it inappropriate.”). Overall, we think that

it is clear that a court should not place conclusive significance

on special education classroom scores, a conclusion that we

believe is reinforced by the circumstance that, as here, there

may be a disconnect between a school’s assessment of a

student in a special education setting and his achievements in

that setting and the student’s achievements in standardized

testing. When there is such a disconnect we think that there 8

should be an especially close examination of the

appropriateness of the student’s education.

We recognize that the District Court reached its

conclusion on the basis of testimony from Carol Trojan,

Bayonne’s Director of Special Services, who testified in the

administrative proceedings that D.S., by receiving high marks

in his special education classes, demonstrated mastery of the

regular ninth grade curriculum just as if he was in a regular

classroom, and whose testimony was recorded in the ALJ’s

decision. Appellants’ witnesses, on the other hand,

thoughtfully expressed their beliefs that D.S. had not made

grade level progress during the 2006-2007 school year. App.

at 21-23 (summarizing DiDonato’s testimony). The ALJ

chose to credit Appellants’ witnesses, and, under the

applicable standard of review the District Court was not at

liberty to credit the witnesses who expressed a contrary

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32

opinion without a showing that there was good reason to do

so, a showing that Bayonne did not make. See Shore Reg’l

High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d at 200. 

The District Court also supported its conclusion by

stating that the ALJ over-relied on D.S.’s standardized test

scores, i.e., his 2006 scores on the WIAT tests and his 2007

scores on the Woodcock-Johnson tests. The Court stated that

Appellants had failed to meet their burden of showing that an

apt comparison can be made between scores from the two

different types of tests. But the ALJ heard testimony

regarding the standardized testing and on the basis of that

testimony used the test results to measure D.S.’s progress.

Moreover, the District Court did not point to nontestimonial

evidence that undermined the ALJ’s conclusion on this point.

If we give as we should “due weight” to the ALJ’s

determination that D.S.’s ninth grade IEP was not reasonably

calculated to enable D.S. to receive a meaningful educational

benefit, we find no basis in the record for overturning that

determination. See Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381

F.3d at 201. Accordingly, the District Court’s contradictory

determination was clearly erroneous. See id. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the

order of the District Court of November 19, 2008, and remand

the case for entry of judgment in favor of the Appellants to

the end that the ALJ’s decision of March 6, 2008, that

Bayonne was not supplying D.S. with a free and appropriate

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33

public education and that the Banyan School would be an

appropriate placement so that D.S. be placed in that school at

Bayonne’s expense, is reinstated. In this regard we note that

Appellants in their brief indicate that they are seeking

reimbursement for their tuition and transportation costs in

continuing D.S. in the Banyan School after the District Court

reversed the ALJ’s decision. We, however, will leave the

determination of the precise relief to be given to Appellants to

the District Court on the remand. In addition on the remand

the District Court should determine the amount of attorney’s

fees, costs, and interest for which Bayonne is responsible.

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