Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-19-07048/USCOURTS-caDC-19-07048-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
D.C. Public Schools
Appellee
District of Columbia
Appellee
Sylvia Sanchez
Appellant
Z.B.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 19-7048 September Term, 2019

FILED ON: MAY 15, 2020

SYLVIA SANCHEZ AND Z.B., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS MOTHER SYLVIA SANCHEZ,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND D.C. PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:18-cv-00087)

Before: MILLETT, WILKINS, and KATSAS, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

The Court has considered this appeal on the record from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia and on the parties’ briefs. The Court has accorded the issues full 

consideration and has determined they do not warrant a published opinion. See FED. R. APP. P. 36;

D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). It is

ORDERED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.

This case involves a dispute about which private school Z.B., a child with autism, should 

have attended for seventh grade. In 2017, the D.C. Public Schools (DCPS) sought to transfer Z.B. 

from Kingsbury Day School to Kennedy Krieger. Sylvia Sanchez, Z.B.’s mother, contends that 

the transfer would have violated her son’s right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) 

under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Sanchez blocked the transfer, began 

paying Z.B.’s tuition at Kingsbury, and now seeks reimbursement for that expense. 

The IDEA requires school districts to offer the parents of a disabled child an opportunity

to participate in meetings about the child’s “educational placement,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1), and 

to be involved in decisions about it, id. § 1414(e). But a violation of these procedural provisions 

results in the denial of a FAPE “only if the procedural inadequacies—(I) impeded the child’s right 

to a free appropriate public education; (II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to 

participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public 

USCA Case #19-7048 Document #1842954 Filed: 05/15/2020 Page 1 of 2
education to the parents’ child; or (III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.” Id.

§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii). Sanchez argues—under prong II—that DCPS “significantly impeded the 

parents’ opportunity to participate” in decisions about Z.B.’s transfer. 

We assume arguendo that the proposed transfer would have changed Z.B.’s educational 

placement and thus triggered the IDEA’s parental-participation requirements. Nonetheless, 

Sanchez failed to show that any procedural missteps significantly impeded the opportunity for 

parental participation. 

As both the hearing officer and the district court explained, DCPS actively worked to 

involve Sanchez in its decisionmaking process. For over a year, DCPS encouraged Sanchez to 

visit, allow Z.B. to visit, and provide input regarding possible schools for Z.B. Sanchez declined

to participate in these efforts, despite DCPS’s concern that Kingsbury was not serving Z.B.’s 

needs. In the spring of 2017, DCPS repeatedly tried to meet with Sanchez to discuss a possible 

transfer. Yet Sanchez offered only an unreasonably small window of availability and rejected 

many proposed meeting times, including some that fell within her preferred timeframe. Although 

DCPS officials thus were unable to meet with Z.B.’s mother, they did meet with his father, who 

became actively involved in the decisionmaking process. He visited Kennedy Krieger, was 

impressed with the school, and facilitated his son’s referral to it. On this record, Sanchez has failed 

to establish that DCPS “significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the 

decisionmaking process.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II). 

Sanchez further contends that DCPS improperly predetermined Z.B.’s 2017 Individualized 

Education Program (IEP) by assigning him to Kennedy Krieger without appropriate parental 

participation. But in the administrative hearing, Sanchez neither argued predetermination nor 

raised any other challenge to the IEP. Because Sanchez failed to exhaust her challenge to the IEP, 

the district court properly declined to consider it. See Cox v. Jenkins, 878 F.2d 414, 422 (D.C. Cir. 

1989).

For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is affirmed. The Clerk is directed to 

withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for 

rehearing or rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

 Daniel J. Reidy

 Deputy Clerk

USCA Case #19-7048 Document #1842954 Filed: 05/15/2020 Page 2 of 2