Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-03-01411/USCOURTS-ca10-03-01411-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Debra Applewhite
Appellant
Cari M. Dominguez
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED ST ATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAY 19 2005 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

DEBRA APPLEWHITE, 

Plain ti ff-Appellant, 

V. 

CARI M. DOMINGUEZ, Chairwoman, 

Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 03-1411 

(D.C. No. 00-MK-1373 (MJW)) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HARTZ, McKAY, and PORFILIO, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination 

of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The case is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court 

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order 

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 03-1411 Document: 010110642408 Date Filed: 05/19/2005 Page: 1
Plaintiff Debra Applewhite, who for the most part proceeded pro se in 

district court, 1 sued her former employer, the United States Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging racial and disability discrimination, 

harassment, retaliation and failure to accommodate her disability under Title VII 

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the 

Administrative Procedures Act. 2 The district court granted the EEOC's motion to 

dismiss five claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and granted its 

motion for summary judgment on the other claims. Ms. Applewhite appeals. We 

exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

In her amended complaint, Ms. Applewhite alleged the following legal and 

factual issues: (1) she was discriminated against on the basis of race and 

disability; (2) she was wrongfully terminated after she was given a two-year 

temporary assignment instead of a permanent assignment; (3) she was deceived 

into believing she was required to disclose her disability to be considered for 

employment with the EEOC and was misguided regarding personnel actions; 

( 4) she was tricked into giving up a career appointment and accepting a temporary 

Ms. Applewhite was represented by court-appointed counsel later in the 

proceedings. Specifically, counsel prepared and filed objections to the magistrate 

judge's recommendation that the EEOC's motion for summary judgment be 

granted and participated in the final pretrial order. 

2 Although the named defendant in the action is the chairwoman of the 

EEOC, Cari M. Dominguez, we refer to the defendant as the EEOC. 

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assignment; (5) she was prevented from competing for promotions based on her 

temporary assignment; ( 6) her managers failed to accommodate her disability and 

instead terminated her employment; (7) the EEOC breached confidentiality with 

respect to her disability and employment matters; (8) she did not receive a hearing 

or thorough administrative investigation of her complaints; (9) she was not 

converted to competitive service, although a Caucasian comparator with less time 

in grade was; ( 10) she was terminated after complaining of unfair treatment and 

harassment and filing complaints; ( 11) she was required to disclose a mental 

disability; (12) her doctor requested an accommodation; (13) the EEOC set up a 

plan to terminate her employment; (14) she was assigned a greater workload than 

other employees; ( 15) she was held to a higher standard of performance than other 

employees; ( 16) she was retaliated against because she sustained an on-the-job 

injury; ( 17) the on-the job injury was intentionally caused without regard to her 

disability; (18) her employment was terminated based upon a false character 

record; ( 19) other positions existed which would accommodate her disability; 

( 20) a Hispanic employee with prior United States Postal Service employment was 

given a career appointment, but she was not; (21) she was deprived of due process 

prior to her termination; (22) she was deprived of the right to pursue relief with 

the Merit Systems Protection Board; and (23) the EEOC failed to correct her 

improper appointment to one which would have entitled her to due process rights. 

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Citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) and (6), the EEOC filed a motion to dismiss 

the following five claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies: (1) she 

was tricked into (a) giving up a career appointment to accept a trial appointment 

with the EEOC and (b) disclosing a disability; (2) the EEOC prevented her from 

competing for promotions; (3) the EEOC breached confidentiality concerning her 

disability; ( 4) she was denied a hearing before her termination; and (5) the EEOC 

interfered with her efforts to avail herself of the Merit Systems Protection Board. 

The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation to grant the 

motion. Thereafter, the EEOC failed to file an answer. At Ms. Applewhite's 

request, the district court clerk entered a default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 

The district court, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation, however, 

denied her motion for default judgment and granted the EEOC' s motion to set 

aside the entry of default and permitted the agency to file an answer. 

After filing an answer, the EEOC filed a motion for summary judgment on 

the remainder of Ms. Applewhite's claims. The district court adopted the 

magistrate judge's recommendation to grant the motion. 3 In doing so, the district 

court determined that ( 1) there were no genuine issues of material fact on her 

claim that she was not selected for the investigator position based on race, 

3 Ms. Applewhite did not object to the magistrate judge's recommendation 

that the failure to promote claim be dismissed. The district court therefore did 

not review this claim. 

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because the EEOC official who made the hiring decision was not aware she had 

applied and because only competitive applicants were considered for the position; 

(2) there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning her race-based 

hostile work environment claim, because no evidence showed she was subject to 

pervasive or severe harassment or that she was harassed on the basis of race; (3) 

she failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination concerning her 

claim that the EEOC failed to convert her employment to competitive service; ( 4) 

she had no disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act for her 

complaints of a stressful job, which subjected her to criticism; (5) reasonable 

accommodation was not possible as a matter of law; (6) she was terminated 

because she was not performing her essential job functions and there were no 

genuine issues of material fact concerning the reasons she was terminated; (7) she 

had not shown she was not selected for the investigator position due to retaliation, 

because she had not submitted any discrimination complaints to the EEOC before 

the position was filled and because the person who made the hiring decision did 

not know she had applied for the position; (8) her termination was based on many 

performance deficiencies brought to her attention during the course of her 

employment; and (9) she did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation or 

genuine issues of material fact. 

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On appeal, Ms. Applewhite, who is proceeding pro se, challenges the three 

district court's decisions as follows: ( 1) the district court should have considered 

all of the evidence in the record; (2) the district court should have appointed 

competent counsel for her from the time she filed her case in order to provide her 

with adequate representation; (3) the district court precluded her from presenting 

all of her claims and improperly dismissed claims for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies, even though she had alleged that the EEOC violated 

administrative procedures; ( 4) the district court improperly denied her a default 

judgment against the EEOC; (5) the district court failed to liberally construe her 

pro se pleadings; ( 6) the district court showed prejudice by stating that she failed 

to present competent evidence; (7) the district court failed to consider that her 

claim before the United States Department of Labor was decided in her favor; 

(8) the district court decided disputed factual issues, including whether she was 

disabled and had a record of disability and whether she had engaged in the 

interactive process with the EEOC regarding her request for accommodation; 

(9) the district court failed to consider that she was a career employee with the 

United States Postal Service before being hired at the EEOC and that the EEOC 

did not obtain written confirmation that she was giving up career status; ( 10) the 

district court did not consider the Employee Personnel Department guidelines for 

hiring disabled persons or that the guidelines were not applied by the EEOC; 

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(11) the district court failed to consider that EEOC headquarters had sent 

managers to investigate discrimination in the Denver EEOC office, where she had 

worked; and (12) the district court worked in concert with the EEOC attorneys to 

cover-up this case because there are elements of criminal conduct. 

We review de novo the district court's Rule 12(b)(l) and (6) dismissal of 

the unexhausted claims. See US West, Inc. v. Tristani, 182 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th 

Cir. 1999) (Rule 12(b )( 1 )); Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F .3d 

1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) (Rule 12(b)(6)). We review the district court's 

decision to deny default judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Ashby v. 

McKenna, 331 F.3d 1148, 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 2003). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law. We review a grant of summary judgment de nova, 

applying the same standard as the district court. We examine the 

record to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact was in 

dispute; if not, we determine whether the substantive law was applied 

correctly, and in so doing we examine the factual record and 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

party opposing the motion. 

Sealockv. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). 

Having reviewed the briefs, the record and the applicable law pursuant to 

these standards, we conclude that Ms. Applewhite has asserted no reversible error 

on appeal concerning the district court's grant of the EEOC' s motion to dismiss, 

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denial of her motion for default judgment, and grant of the EEOC's motion for 

summary judgment. We therefore AFFIRM the challenged district court decisions 

for substantially the same reasons stated by that court in its thorough orders of 

April 10, 2001; October 11, 2002; and July 15, 2003. See R., vol. I, doc. 39; id. 

vol. II, doc. 78, 126. In affirming, we specifically note that the district court 

carefully considered all relevant evidence presented. 

We reject Ms. Applewhite's argument that the district court should have 

appointed counsel for her from the time she filed her case. Ms. Applewhite had 

no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel. See Castner v. Colo. 

Springs Cablevision, 979 F .2d 1417, 1420 (10th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, on 

October 23, 2000, the district court granted her motion for appointment of counsel 

within three days of its filing, directed the court clerk to make a good faith effort 

to secure pro bono counsel, and directed that the case would proceed pro bono 

until counsel was secured. The court clerk's efforts to obtain pro bono counsel, 

however, were unsuccessful until January 7, 2003. Ms. Applewhite does not 

indicate how she was prejudiced by this delay, how she would have proceeded 

differently with the case if counsel had been appointed sooner, or what the court 

clerk could have done to obtain counsel sooner. Although there was time to do 

so, appointed counsel did not file an amendment to her pro se response to the 

motion for summary judgment. Under the circumstances, we conclude she has not 

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shown that the district court abused its discretion. Cf id. (recognizing district 

court has extremely broad discretion in deciding whether to appoint counsel in 

employment discrimination case). 

Contrary to Ms. Applewhite's argument, the magistrate judge's summary 

judgment recommendations and the district court's default judgment and summary 

judgment orders state, and clearly reflect, that her pleadings were liberally 

construed, see R., vol. II, doc. 78 at 1; id. doc. 104 at 17-18; id. doc. 126 at 9, just 

as we have liberally construed her appellate brief and district court pleadings. 

See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellman, 935 F.2d 

1106, 1110 n.3 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Although we afford liberal construction, we "will not construct arguments 

or theories for [Ms. Applewhite] in the absence of any discussion of those 

issues." Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991). 

She has failed to discuss any of her issues on appeal and has failed to provide 

record cites or legal authority to support her bare assertions. See Fed. R. App. P. 

28(a)(9)(A) (requiring appellant's brief to contain "appellant's contentions and 

the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on 

which the appellant relies"). Also, her attempt to adopt arguments made in her 

district court filings is unacceptable appellate argument. See Gaines-Tabb v. IC! 

Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 625 (10th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we 

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conclude Ms. Applewhite's conclusory assertions are insufficient for us to 

consider the issues. Cf Murrell v. Shala/a, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 

1994) ( deciding that where appellant "fail [ ed] to frame and develop an issue," 

there was insufficient basis to invoke appellate review); Ambus v. Granite Bd. of 

Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1558 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992) (deciding that issue mentioned 

on appeal, but not addressed, is waived), modified on other grounds on reh 'g, 

995 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1993). 

Nonetheless, as indicated above, we have reviewed the record, and 

conclude the district court should be affirmed. Furthermore, our careful review of 

the record fails to show any evidence supporting Ms. Applewhite's conclusory 

assertions that the district court was prejudiced against her or that the district 

court worked in concert with the EEOC attorneys to cover-up any wrongful 

actions by the EEOC. Accordingly, we reject these unsupported assertions. 

Finally, we reject any other arguments made by Ms. Applewhite not specifically 

addressed in this order and judgment. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue 

forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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