Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-07078/USCOURTS-caDC-07-07078-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Karim Clayton
Appellee
District of Columbia
Appellant
Hackley
Appellant
Grace Hudson
Appellee
Richard Merritt
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 2008 Decided March 3, 2009

No. 07-7078

GRACE HUDSON AND KARIM CLAYTON,

APPELLEES

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

No. 07-7082

GRACE HUDSON,

CROSS-APPELLANT

V.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ET AL.,

CROSS-APPELLEES

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv02217)

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James C. McKay, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General,

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia,

argued the cause for the appellants/cross-appellees. Peter J.

Nickles, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and

Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief. 

Gregory L. Lattimer argued the cause for the appellees and

cross-appellant.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellants the

District of Columbia (D.C.), Metropolitan Police Department

(MPD) Officer Richard Merritt and former MPD Officer John

Hackley (collectively, District) appeal jury verdicts finding them

liable to Karim Clayton for assault and battery, false arrest and

malicious prosecution under D.C. law and for using excessive

force against Clayton in violation of section 1 of the Civil Rights

Act of 1871, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. We conclude that

the district court erred when it allowed Clayton’s counsel to

question Merritt about disciplinary actions allegedly brought

against him for “improper use of force” and filing “false reports”

and then to argue to the jury, in inflammatory terms and

unpalliated by a curative instruction, that Merritt acted in

conformity with his past “bad cop” conduct when he struck and

arrested Clayton here. Because the challenged questioning and

argument invited the jurors to find Merritt used excessive force

against and falsely arrested Clayton based on similar “prior bad

acts,” in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)—an

invitation the jurors may well have embraced—we vacate the

verdicts in Clayton’s favor and remand for a new trial on the

underlying claims. In addition, we affirm the district court’s

post-trial grant of judgment as a matter of law setting aside the

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jury verdict in favor of Grace Hudson, Clayton’s grandmother,

on her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

I.

Sometime during the evening of November 8, 2001, Merritt

and Hackley, who were patrolling in a marked police car,

stopped in the 600 block of Keefer St. NW and got out of their

car. There followed a confrontation between the officers and

two individuals, Clayton and his friend Gad Doreus, the details

of which were disputed at trial. It is undisputed, however, that

during the encounter Merritt gave chase to Doreus, Clayton and

Doreus escaped into Hudson’s nearby house, closing the door

behind them, and Merritt pursued them inside. A scuffle ensued

during which Hudson was knocked to her living room floor and,

in the end, Clayton was arrested on the charge of assaulting an

officer. At some point Merritt struck Clayton at least once. In a

subsequent criminal trial in D.C. Superior Court, Clayton was

acquitted of one count of assault and one count of possessing a

prohibited weapon. 

On November 8, 2002, Clayton and Hudson filed the

complaint in this action, alleging causes of action for excessive

force, assault and battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution and

negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress based on

Merritt’s and Hackley’s conduct the night of November 8, 2001.

On September 2, 2005, after an eight-day trial, a jury returned a

verdict against the District, awarding Hudson compensatory

damages of $25,000 on her claim of negligent infliction of

emotional distress and Clayton compensatory damages totaling

$81,000 and punitive damages totaling $15,000 on his claims of

excessive force, assault and battery, false arrest and malicious

prosecution. 

On September 30, 2005, the District filed a motion for a new

trial on all of Clayton’s and Hudson’s successful claims, for

judgment as a matter of law on Clayton’s false arrest and

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malicious prosecution claims and for remittitur of Clayton’s false

arrest award. In a memorandum opinion and order filed April 2,

2007, the district court denied the motion as to Clayton’s claims

but granted judgment as a matter of law on Hudson’s claim for

negligent infliction of emotional distress, vacating her damage

award. Hudson v. District of Columbia, 517 F. Supp. 2d 40, 57

(D.D.C. 2007). The District and Hudson subsequently filed

notices of appeal.

II.

We address in turn the District’s and Hudson’s appeals.

A. The District

As a preliminary matter, Clayton challenges the court’s

jurisdiction on the ground that the District failed to file a timely

and effective notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure 3 and 4. We conclude that we have

jurisdiction over the District’s appeal. 

Under Rule 4(a)(1)(A), the District was required to file a

notice of appeal in the district court “within 30 days after the

judgment or order appealed from”—that is, no later than May 2,

2007, 30 days after the April 2, 2007 order disposing of the

District’s post-trial motions. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

Clayton does not dispute that the District filed a timely notice of

appeal on May 2, 2007 but argues it was ineffective because it

did not comply with the directive in Rule 3(c) that the “notice of

appeal must . . . designate the judgment, order, or part thereof

being appealed.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). Clayton argues

the notice was defective because it designated for appeal “the

judgment of this Court (Collyer, J.) entered on the 2nd day of

April, 2007 against defendants and in favor of Grace Hudson,”

Notice of Appeal, Hudson v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 02-

2217 (D.D.C. filed May 2, 2007), whereas their appeal was in

fact from the judgment against the defendants and in favor of

Karim Clayton. Clayton’s argument is hyper technical and

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ignores the rationale underlying Rule 3(c)’s requirements: to

ensure that an appellant provides “fair notice to the opposing

party and to the court,” Anderson v. District of Columbia, 72

F.3d 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The District’s notice of appeal

provided adequate notice to both Clayton and this court that “the

judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed,” Fed. R. App. P.

3(c)(1)(B), was, as identified in the notice, “the judgment . . .

entered on the 2nd day of April, 2007 against defendants.”

Although the additional phrase “and in favor of Grace Hudson”

was not technically accurate, this defect “did not mislead or

prejudice” Clayton, Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962),

because the notice “unambiguously inform[ed] the opposing

counsel and the district court” of the particular order being

appealed, Anderson, 72 F.3d at 168. Moreover, it was obvious

to both Clayton and the court that the District intended to appeal

the designated order filed April 2, 2007 insofar as the order

favored Clayton (rather than Hudson) as this was the only respect

in which the order was adverse to, and therefore appealable by,

the District. Thus, the notice of appeal was effective and we

have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the District’s appeal.

Cf. Foman, 371 U.S. at 181-82 (finding notice of appeal from

denial of post-dismissal motion to vacate provided “effective,

although inept” notice of intent to appeal dismissal itself);

Anderson, 72 F.3d at 168 (“because it was obvious in which

court his appeal properly lay, [appellant] gave fair notice to the

opposing party and the court” notwithstanding notice of appeal

“improperly designated the United States Supreme Court as the

court to which the appeal was taken”); Torres v. Oakland

Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1988) (although

requirements of Rules 3 and 4 are jurisdictional, “if a litigant

files papers in a fashion that is technically at variance with the

letter of a procedural rule, a court may nonetheless find that the

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1

In light of our disposition, we need not consider the District’s

contention that an amended notice of appeal, identified in the docket

as filed on May 3, 2007, was in fact filed after business hours on May

2, 2007.

litigant has complied with the rule if the litigant’s action is the

functional equivalent of what the rule requires”).1

The District contends that the district court abused its

discretion when it denied the District’s motion for a new trial on

all of the claims notwithstanding Clayton’s counsel’s improper

“prior bad acts” cross-examination and closing argument.

Hudson, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 51-55; see Muldrow ex rel. Estate of

Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(“We review the district court’s denial of [the] motion for a new

trial ‘only for an abuse of discretion.’ ” (quoting Daskalea v.

District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2000))). We

agree with the District that the trial court committed reversible

error and therefore remand for a new trial. 

During Clayton’s counsel’s cross-examination of Merritt,

the following colloquy occurred:

Q: Before we go on any further, would it be fair to say

that you have issues with anger?

A: No.

Q. Would it be fair to say that you have issues with

your veracity?

A. No, no more than anyone else.

[Defense Counsel]: I object unless there’s

some good faith belief that he can give a

positive answer to these questions.

[Clayton’s Counsel]: We’re getting there. 

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2

Under D.C. law, the mayor appoints “trial boards” to try

members of the MPD, D.C. Code § 5-133.06, and the chief of police

“refer[s] to a trial board for adjudication charges brought against any

member of the department,” D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 6A, § 800.11.

The Court: Well let us proceed. If there’s no

support for the questions, then we can direct

the jury.

Q. Now haven’t you in fact been disciplined for those

things? He can’t help you now.

[Defense Counsel]: Yes, I can because I

object. I don’t know what he is talking about.

I think we should take a proffer at the bench,

and then if he has some evidence because it’s

very prejudicial to imply stuff that he can’t

prove.

Transcript of Trial, Hudson v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 02-

2217, 103 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2005) (8/25/05 Trial Tr.). During

the ensuing bench conference, Clayton’s counsel assured the

court he had “[e]vidence of [Merritt’s] two trial boards and what

[Merritt] was charged with”2 but stated he would show the

evidence to defense counsel and the court only if Merritt denied

being disciplined—if Merritt did so, Clayton’s counsel was

“going to impeach [Merritt] with his own deposition,” in which

Merritt “admitted . . . that he has trial boards.” Id. at 104-05.

Clayton’s counsel asserted to the court that one “trial board” was

“[f]or being involved in an altercation with a female outside of

[a] club,” prompting defense counsel to respond: “Is this

evidence of prior misconduct to show on this particular date that

he is inconsistent [sic]? That’s not allowed by the rules.” Id. at

105. An extended discussion among court and counsel followed

and the court sent the jury to the jury room until the dispute

could be resolved. In response to the court’s repeated requests

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3

It was at this point the trial judge erroneously opened the door

for Clayton’s counsel to ask wide-ranging questions about Merritt’s

prior bad acts—an invitation Clayton’s counsel exploited. Even if the

earlier questions were arguably proper as impeachment, the inquiry

into the trial boards’ substance—to which defense counsel plainly

objected—was unrelated to anything but Merritt’s prior misconduct,

that he reveal what evidence he had, Clayton’s counsel instead

complained that at deposition Merritt refused to answer questions

about the trial board or his “administrative leave for disciplinary

purposes.” Id. at 110. In the end, Clayton’s counsel

“represent[ed]” to the court that Merritt’s trial board “found him

guilty of the specification that he was charged with” and the

court responded that “with that kind of a representation, . . . I

have to allow him to continue to ask his questions.” Id. at 113.

The court brought the jury back into the courtroom and Clayton’s

counsel then resumed his cross-examination:

Q. Officer Merritt, I was asking you isn’t it true that you

were brought up on charges based upon actions you took

relative to a female at a club?

A. Yes.

Q. And didn’t that involve accusations of you having taken

physical actions against her?

A. They were accusations.

Q. And you had a trial board about that, didn’t you?

A. Yes.

Q. And at that trial Board those accusations were sustained

were they not?

[Defense Counsel]: Objection, your Honor.

The Court: This is cross-examination. This is

legitimate cross-examination.[3]

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namely “improper use of force” and filing “false reports.” Allowing

such questioning lay the groundwork for Clayton’s counsel to exploit

the alleged prior misconduct in his closing as proof of conforming

misconduct in this case.

[To Clayton’s Counsel]: Continue . . . . 

By [Clayton’s Counsel]:

Q. Were they not?

A. No, not all.

Q. Some of them were?

A. Just, just the acts unbecoming.

Q. Acts unbecoming of a police officer?

A. Right.

Q. How many?

A. One.

Q. Just one?

A. One. It covered the whole, covered the whole thing.

That one statement, that one acts unbecoming covers the

whole thing. 

Q. Just one, nothing about false reports?

A. No, not that I can remember.

Q. And nothing about your use, your improper use of force?

A. Not that I can remember that, no.

Id. at 113-14.

During closing, Clayton’s counsel first purported to remind

the jurors that Merritt testified he had been suspended for

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“[m]aking a false statement” (which the court characterized as

“close to what the evidence was”) and “using . . . inappropriate

force on a woman outside of a night club.” 8/31/2005 Trial Tr.

at 88. The court overruled defense counsel’s objection to the

statements and refused his request to strike them. Clayton’s

counsel then continued (again over defense counsel’s objection):

That’s Merritt. He was only suspended for a year, a

year. As he says for conduct unbecoming an officer.

You’re kidding. Lying on a report and using

inappropriate force on a woman outside of a nightclub,

you’re right that its conduct unbecoming.

* * *

[B]efore coming back and getting on that beat, he had

been suspended for a year for misconduct.

Let me tell you something. You’re not a bad cop

on Monday and a good cop on Tuesday. It don’t work

like that. If you were a bad cop on Monday, you’re a

bad cop on Tuesday. You’re a bad cop on Wednesday,

you’re a bad cop on Thursday, and you’re a bad cop on

Friday. You may not get caught on Tuesday,

Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, but you are a bad

cop nevertheless.

And you know from Officer Merritt himself that he

was a bad cop. And Officer Merritt can’t change and

become a good cop overnight. Good cops don’t get,

good cops don’t get suspended from work.

Id. at 88, 93-94. At this point defense counsel interjected:

“Objection, Your Honor. This is arguing from past misconduct

that there is a future inclination for that which is our objection to

the original evidence and it’s a continuation.” Id. at 94. The

court responded: “I think you made that point. Why don’t you

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just move on.” Id. Clayton’s counsel then continued his closing

argument. 

After instructing the jury, the court asked counsel: “Is there

any other instructions that counsel wishes me to give the jury

before we release them to begin their deliberations?” 9/1/2005

Trial Tr. at 39. During the colloquy that followed, defense

counsel informed the court: “I just wanted to make a record

because we still have problems with [Clayton’s counsel]’s

argument yesterday that the cop is a bad cop on day one, day

two.” Id. at 41. The judge replied: “[Y]ou can expand on that

after the jury goes.” Id. The jury then retired to begin

deliberating. At that point, as directed by the judge, defense

counsel renewed his objection that Clayton’s counsel “made an

argument that [defense counsel did]n’t think is allowed under the

rules of evidence as propensity, that he’s claiming that the officer

had a propensity to be violent and to lie.” Id. at 44. In addition,

he requested a curative instruction, which the court denied

because it had “sustained” the defendants’ objection to the “bad

cop” argument and because she “d[id]n’t recall [a] request for a

curative instruction prior to the time that the jury retired to

deliberate” and she did not believe she could give such an

instruction at that time “without giving it unduly.” Id. at 45. 

It was a violation of Rule 404(b) for the trial judge to permit

Clayton’s counsel to elicit testimony about Merritt’s purported

history of anger, using “improper use of force” and filing “false

reports.” 8/25/05 Trial Tr. at 103, 114. Such testimony is

evidence of prior bad acts introduced “to show action in

conformity therewith” and is therefore prohibited under Fed. R.

Evid. 404(b). Cf. United States v. Simpson, 992 F.2d 1224,

1228-29 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (permitting prosecutor to crossexamine defendant about prior narcotics possession was

reversible error under Rule 404(b)). The court compounded its

error when it permitted Clayton’s counsel to exploit the 404(b)

questioning during closing to indict Merritt as a “bad cop” every

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day of the week and declined to provide a curative instruction

either sua sponte, in response to the District’s repeated

objections, or after the District expressly requested such an

instruction immediately after the jury retired to deliberate. See

United States v. Rhodes, 886 F.2d 375, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(noting prejudicial effect of prosecutor’s reference in closing

argument to impermissible 404(b) evidence). The cumulative

effect of the inadmissible evidence and the inflammatory

argument based on it is precisely what Rule 404(b) prohibits:

exhorting a jury to find against a defendant because he acted “in

conformity” with his bad acts—here, a purported history of

physical violence, “improper use of force” and filing “false

reports.” 8/25/2005 Trial Tr. at 113-14. And to all appearances,

the jury may well have been persuaded by the testimony. The

error cannot be deemed harmless as the trial was hotly contested

and turned largely on credibility.

Clayton and the trial court have asserted that the District

waived the Rule 404(b) objection by not making it at trial. See

Appellees’ Br. at 36; Hudson, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 52. But

defense counsel in fact made a timely objection during the trial.

As noted above, during the bench conference regarding the “trial

boards,” defense counsel addressed the court as follows: “Is this

evidence of prior misconduct to show on this particular date that

he is inconsistent [sic]? That’s not allowed by the rules.”

8/25/2005 Trial Tr. at 105. While the phrasing may have been

somewhat inartful (and perhaps mistranscribed), it was stated

with “enough specificity to alert the district court and opposing

counsel to the basis for the objection,” namely that the

examination violated Rule 404(b). United States v. David, 96

F.3d 1477, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Further, the District did not

waive the right to a curative instruction by waiting until after the

jury retired to request one. The trial court itself directed defense

counsel to wait until “after the jury goes” to “expand on” the

objection made after the instructions, see 9/1/2005 Trial Tr. at

41, and defense counsel merely obeyed the court’s directive.

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4

There is no question that Hudson’s notice of appeal—filed on

May 15, 2007, within the 14-day window following the timely filing

of the District’s notice on May 2, 2007—was timely. See Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(3) (“If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other

party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when

the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by

this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.”).

 B. Hudson

Next, we address Hudson’s appeal from the district court’s

judgment as a matter of law on her claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress and the vacatur of her damages

award.4 The court reviews de novo the trial court’s denial of a

motion for judgment as a matter of law and may reverse “only if

the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women

could not have reached a verdict in plaintiff's favor.” Muldrow,

493 F.3d at 165 (internal quotation omitted). We conclude that

the district court correctly granted judgment on Hudson’s claim.

At trial, Hudson sought to recover for the emotional distress

she allegedly suffered as a result of watching her grandson

Clayton’s being beaten by Merritt. She testified that, while

watching the altercation, she felt “afraid for him,”

“apprehensive” and “worried” and that for two days afterward

(before she saw him again) she was “apprehensive,” “wondering

how he was doing” and “just worried about him and also

[her]self” but she felt “better” after seeing him in the hospital.

8/24/2005 Trial Tr. at 18, 20-21, 29. She also said she was

“despondent” and “just ready to cry” when she looked at the

blood in her living room carpet. Id. at 26. Finally, she testified

she did not want Clayton at her home as much as before the

incident because she felt “tense” that there were “so many police

around [her] house or coming up [her] street” and she would

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“rather for him to stay with his mother and not come see

[Hudson] like he used to.” Id. at 30. 

In the April 2, 2007 memorandum opinion and order, the

court granted judgment as a matter of law on Hudson’s claim,

concluding that her “feelings, though arising from lamentable

circumstances [we]re not of sufficient duration or severity to be

considered serious under District of Columbia law.” 517 F.

Supp. 2d at 48. We agree with the district court’s determination

because the trial record reveals only general, subjective feelings

of worry and concern and not the kind of serious, verifiable

emotional injury that D.C. law requires to support a claim of

emotional distress. See Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1068

(D.C. 1990) (en banc) (“[I]n furtherance of the policy of

excluding recovery for trifling distress, the claimed distress must

be ‘serious’ and ‘verifiable.’ ”).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

judgment as a matter of law on Hudson’s emotional distress

claim, vacate the verdicts in Clayton’s favor on the excessive

force, assault and battery, false arrest and malicious prosecution

claims and remand for a new trial on the four latter claims. 

So ordered.

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