Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05189/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05189-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joan B. Claybrook
Appellant
Rodney E. Slater
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 24, 1997 Decided April 29, 1997

No. 96-5189

JOAN B. CLAYBROOK,

APPELLANT

v.

RODNEY E. SLATER, ADMINISTRATOR,

FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cv02240)

David C. Vladeck argued the cause for the appellant. 

Michael E. Tankersley was on brief. Lucinda A. Sikes

entered an appearance.

Jonathan T. Foot, Attorney, United States Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for the appellee. Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United 

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Slater has since been appointed Secretary of the Department of 

Transportation. 

States Attorney, and Mark B. Stern and Michael S. Raab,

Attorneys, United States Department of Justice, were on 

brief.

Before: WILLIAMS, HENDERSON and RANDOLPH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: An advisory 

committee to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA or 

agency) passed a resolution criticizing purported inaccuracies 

in the fund-raising literature of an organization called Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways (CRASH). Appellant 

Joan Claybrook (Claybrook), who is CRASH's co-chair, sued 

Rodney Slater (Slater), the FHWA Administrator at that 

time,1claiming he failed to prevent the advisory committee 

from taking the allegedly ultra vires action. She asserted 

that the committee should not have voted on the resolution 

because the agenda for the committee meeting at which the 

resolution passed did not include the resolution and, further, 

that Slater had a duty to prevent the vote. The district court 

dismissed the action on Claybrook's lack of standing. We 

affirm, albeit on a different ground.

I. FACTS

In 1994, Slater established the National Motor Carrier 

Advisory Committee (NMCAC or Committee) to provide 

advice on FHWA's motor carrier programs, including its 

highway safety efforts. JA 52-55. One of NMCAC's members was a representative of the American Trucking Association (ATA).

According to the complaint, Claybrook, as co-chair of 

CRASH, is an advocate for highway safety measures, including safety restrictions that apply to trucks. In connection 

with its lobbying efforts decrying the North American Free 

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The proposed resolution cited a General Accounting Office 

report contradicting CRASH's claim that triple trailers are "extremely" dangerous, JA 150, accused CRASH of libeling and slandering government officials and requested the FHWA Administrator both to "correct the errors and slanderous statements in the 

CRASH campaign piece" and to "call on CRASH to publicly retract 

its errors and attacks on public officials." Id. None of these 

matters is addressed in the resolution as passed. Instead, the final 

resolution states that "the CRASH campaign relies on untrue 

statements such as: " "Monster Trucks" with three trailers can 

swarm across the Mexican ... borders into the U.S.,' when the 

truth is that triple trailers are not even allowed to operate in 

Mexico" and "the Committee urges the Administrator to write to 

CRASH to point out inaccuracies and provide accurate information." Id. at 80. 

Trade Agreement's effect on U.S. highway safety laws, 

CRASH issued a fund-raising letter stating that "heavier

dangerously heaviertrucks and "Monster Trucks' with three 

trailers can swarm across the Mexican and Canadian borders 

into the U.S." Id. at 73 (emphasis omitted). According to 

Claybrook, the statement is accurate because Mexico allows 

heavier trucks than does the United States and three-trailer 

trucks are authorized in Canada. Appellant's Br. 10. Threetrailer trucks, however, are not authorized in Mexico.

ATA took issue with CRASH's literature and prepared for 

NMCAC's consideration a resolution criticizing CRASH for 

making allegedly false statements. JA 137. Although the 

matter was not on its agenda, NMCAC voted on and approved a modified version of the resolution at its September 

13, 1995 meeting.2Id. at 80. Jill Hochman (Hochman), 

FHWA's representative on NMCAC, attended the meeting 

and was concerned that the Committee would adopt the 

resolution but did not adjourn the meeting or otherwise 

attempt to block the resolution. Id. at 114.

The Committee sent the resolution to Slater for him to take 

"appropriate action." Id. at 80. Slater's only action was to 

write to the Committee rejecting the resolution and expressing his concern that the Committee had been used as a 

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Slater wrote that he had "considered this recommendation of 

the NMCAC and intend[ed] not to take action on it." JA 123. 

She also claimed that NMCAC's composition violated FACA's 

requirement that advisory committee membership be "fairly balanced." 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(2). The district court did not reach 

the claim although it indicated it would have ruled against her had 

it reached the merits. JA 158; see generally Public Citizen v. 

National Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods,

886 F.2d 419, 426-30 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Silberman, J., concurring) 

(balanced representation provision not justiciable). Claybrook did 

not pursue this claim on appeal. 

Slater also challenges, in summary fashion, the redressability of 

Claybrook's injury. Appellant's Br. 28 ("[T]he relief sought ... 

does not provide redress for failure to provide access."). Because 

we conclude that Claybrook has not identified a legally protected 

interest, we do not reach the redressability issue. Neither do we 

address whether Claybrook's injury is sufficiently particularized 

and actual. 

vehicle for one private entity to criticize another.3Id. at 123. 

ATA subsequently featured the resolution prominently in an 

advertising campaign opposing CRASH's lobbying efforts. 

Id. at 149.

Claybrook brought an action alleging that Slater violated 

the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 

(FACA or the Act), by allowing NMCAC to pass a resolution 

criticizing CRASH even though the matter was not on the 

Committee's agenda and was, in Claybrook's view, outside the 

Committee's authority.4 The district court concluded that 

Claybrook lacked standing to bring the suit and therefore 

granted Slater's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for 

summary judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

A party has standing if he suffers an "injury in fact," the 

injury is "fairly traceable" to the defendant's challenged 

action and a favorable decision likely will redress the injury. 

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 

(1992). An injury in fact occurs when the defendant has 

invaded the plaintiff's legally protected interest and the resulting injury is particularized and actual or imminent. Id. at 

560. The primary issue in dispute is whether Claybrook 

possesses a legally protected interest in enforcing FACA.5

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In Slater's view, the FACA provisions Claybrook relies upon 

do not create a legal duty the non-performance of which 

invaded her legally protected interest. Specifically, he contends that FACA does not require an agency representative 

who is a member of an advisory committee to prevent the 

committee from acting on a non-agenda, and therefore unauthorized, item. If Hochman, FHWA's representative on the 

Committee, had no duty to prevent NMCAC from voting on 

the resolution, then Claybrook's interest in Hochman's preventing the vote is not legally protected. In that case, she 

has not suffered an injury in fact and thus lacks standing.

Whether a plaintiff has a legally protected interest (and 

thus standing) does not depend on whether he can demonstrate that he will succeed on the merits. Otherwise, every 

unsuccessful plaintiff will have lacked standing in the first 

place. Thus, for example, one can have a legal interest in 

receiving government benefits and consequently standing to 

sue because of a refusal to grant them even though the court 

eventually rejects the claim. See generally Public Citizen v. 

United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (plaintiffs 

had standing to bring suit under FACA although claim 

failed). Indeed, in Lujan the Court characterized the "legally 

protected interest" element of an injury in fact simply as a 

"cognizable interest" and, without addressing whether the 

claimants had a statutory right to use or observe an animal 

species, concluded that the desire to do so "undeniably" was a 

cognizable interest. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63.

On the other hand, if the plaintiff's claim has no foundation 

in law, he has no legally protected interest and thus no 

standing to sue. See, e.g., Arjay Assocs. v. Bush, 891 F.2d 

894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("We hold that appellants lack 

standing because the injury they assert is to a nonexistent 

right...."); ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 

1975) ("If ACLU's claim is meritorious, standing exists; if 

not, standing not only fails but also ceases to be relevant.");

United Jewish Org. of Williamsburg v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 

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521 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Whether our decision on this point is cast 

on the merits or as a matter of standing is probably immaterial."), aff'd, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). This is such a case: 

whether Claybrook has standing depends principally on 

whether FACA imposes the legal duty she says it does.

Slater argues that Claybrook lacks standing because the 

legal duty she claims he violated does not exist. Under 

Slater's reasoning, the district court should have addressed 

the legal underpinning of Claybrook's claim. See, e.g., ACLU,

523 F.2d at 1348 (after concluding existence of standing 

depended on resolution of merits, court turned to merits). 

Instead, the court determined that Claybrook lacked standing 

on the ground that ATA and its advertising campaign were 

intervening factors between Slater's action (or, more accurately, inaction) and Claybrook's asserted harm. Claybrook 

v. Slater, No. CA 95-02240, at 4 (D.D.C. May 8, 1996), 

reprinted, at JA 152, 155 ("The major defect in plaintiff's 

allegation of injury is that it is based upon the independent 

actions of a third party...."). The court also observed that 

NMCAC's resolution did not constitute final agency action. 

Id. at 5, reprinted, at JA 156; see also Public Citizen v. 

United States Trade Rep., 5 F.3d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1993), 

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1041 (1994). The district court, however, said nothing about whether FACA imposes the legal duty 

upon which Claybrook's asserted injury depends. Without 

finding that the resolution constituted final agency action, we 

affirm the district court on another jurisdictional ground. Cf. 

Allnet Communication Serv., Inc. v. National Exch. Carrier 

Ass'n, Inc., 965 F.2d 1118, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (affirming 

district court's dismissal of suit on alternative ground).

As Slater points out, FHWA and Hochman complied with 

the express requirements of FACA and the duty upon which 

Claybrook's claims depend is not expressly provided for in 

FACA. Of significance in this case, FACA requires the 

sponsoring agency to file a charter specifying, inter alia, the 

scope of an advisory committee's mission, 5 U.S.C. app. 

§ 9(c)(B), requires the committee's meetings in general to be 

open to the public, id. § 10(a)(1), requires "timely notice" of 

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Claybrook directs our attention in particular to the portion of 

the House Report explaining that "one of the greatest dangers in the unregulated use of advisory committees is that special interest groups may use their membership on such bodies to promote their private concerns." H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017 at 6 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3491, 3496. First, the statement appears in a section of the report discussing "Responsibilities of Committees of Congress" and bears primarily on Congress's oversight role rather than on the sponsoring agency's duties. Moreover, the statement relates to the FACA provision requiring balanced representation on advisory committeesand, as noted, Claybrook has dropped her balanced representation claim on appeal. 

each meeting to be published in the Federal Register, id.

§ 10(a)(2), and requires an agency representative to attend 

each committee meeting and approve the agenda, id. § 10(e), 

(f). There is no suggestion that Slater, FHWA or Hochman 

violated any of these duties.

Instead, Claybrook contends that the requirement to approve the agenda as well as Congress's hortatory language in 

section 2(b)(6) that "all matters under [an advisory committee's] consideration should be determined, in accordance with 

law, by the official, agency, or officer" forbid an advisory 

committee from taking any action not approved by the agency 

representative and included on the committee's agenda. Assuming arguendo she is correct, it means at most that the 

Committee should not have done what it did (a proposition 

Slater himself seems to have endorsed in his letter responding to the resolution, JA 123), not that Slater or Hochman 

had a duty to intervene.

Claybrook also relies on legislative history indicating that 

FACA is designed to prevent special interest groups from 

using advisory committees to further their own interests. 

See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017, at 6 (1972), reprinted in 1972 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3491, 3496. If statutory language is clear, 

however, it is both unnecessary and inappropriate to track 

legislative history. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Claybrook tries to find ambiguity in FACA by suggesting that 

Congress must have intended someone to be responsible for 

enforcing the restrictions the Act imposes on advisory committees. But the statute is not ambiguous merely because it 

lacks something Claybrook believes should be there. In any 

event, regardless what the legislative history says about what 

an advisory committee should and should not do, it no more 

manifests that the agency (or its representative) has a duty to 

prevent unauthorized committee actions than does the statute 

itself.6

FACA is not entirely silent regarding the agency representative's role at an advisory committee meeting. Although he 

is not required to do so, the agency representative may chair 

the committee and "is authorized, whenever he determines it 

to be in the public interest, to adjourn" a committee meeting. 

5 U.S.C. app. § 10(e). Claybrook contends that from this 

provision springs the agency representative's duty to prevent 

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an advisory committee from taking any non-agenda action. 

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, which governs judicial review of agency actions, however, the courts lack jurisdiction to review agency decisions "committed to agency 

discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); see generally Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Whether to adjourn an 

advisory committee meeting is a decision committed to agency discretion.

An agency decision is considered "committed to agency 

discretion by law" under 5 U.S.C. § 702(a)(2) "if no judicially 

manageable standards are available for judging how and 

when an agency should exercise its discretion." Heckler, 470 

U.S. at 830. Adjourning a meeting in "the public interest" is 

the kind of decision that resists judicial review. See Webster 

v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (50 U.S.C. § 403(c), allowing 

termination of employee when Central Intelligence Agency 

head deems it "necessary or advisable in the interests of the 

United States," "fairly exudes deference"); see also Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528-29 (1988) 

(whether grant of security clearance is "clearly consistent 

with the interests of national security" unreviewable decision). 

Because the decision must be made on the spotunder time 

pressure and in the middle of an ongoing meetinga court 

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should hesitate to second-guess it. Cf. Southern Ry. Co. v. 

Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 457 (1979) 

("disruptive practical consequences" militate against reviewing Interstate Commerce Commission's rate decisions made 

on 30-day schedule).

Furthermore, the decision to allow a meeting to continue 

does not invoke the government's coercive power in the way 

the decision to adjourn would. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 

("[W]hen an agency refuses to act it generally does not 

exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty or 

property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that 

courts often are called upon to protect." (emphasis in original)). If the agency representative decides the public interest 

requires him to adjourn a meeting, the decision "at least can 

be reviewed to determine whether the agency exceeded its 

statutory powers." Id. His failure to adjourn is not so 

easily challenged as an excessive exercise of power.

Finally, section 10(e)'s plain language reinforces the conclusion that the decision whether to adjourn is committed to 

agency discretion. Rather than allowing adjournment when 

it is in the public interest, section 10(e) authorizes the agency 

representative to determine whether adjournment is in the 

public interest. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 600 (giving weight 

to fact that statute authorizes termination when agency head 

"shall deem [it] necessary or advisable" rather than when it 

"is" necessary or advisable). In addition, under section 10(e) 

if the agency representative finds it to be in the public 

interest, he is simply authorized to adjourn the meeting; he is 

not required to do so. Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 

560, 567 n.7 (1975) (Labor Secretary's decision not to file suit 

where statute provides he "shall investigate ... and ... shall 

... bring a civil action" if he finds probable cause under 

specified factors reviewable); Citizens to Preserve Overton 

Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 405, 416 (1971) (Transportation 

Secretary's decision to approve highway through park where 

statute provides he "shall not approve" such work if "feasible 

and prudent" alternative exists reviewable). On the other 

hand, provisions of FACA that we have deemed reviewable 

require agency action. See, e.g., Food Chemical News v. 

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Claybrook's assertion that her injury also flows from FHWA's 

failure to include the resolution on the Committee's published 

agenda gets her no further. There is nothing to show that Hochman was aware of the resolution, or should have been, before it 

came up at the meeting. In any event, while it seems appropriate 

and fair that an agenda provided to the public should accurately 

reflect what will occur at a meeting, nothing in FACA expressly 

prohibits an advisory committee from considering matters not on its 

published agenda. In fact, the notice requirement and the approved agenda requirement are separate. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(2), 

(f). Under the statute, the required notice of a meeting does not 

expressly include the agenda. Even under the implementing regulations, notice of an advisory committee meeting need only include 

"[a] summary of the agenda." 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1015(b)(1)(iii). 

Department of Health & Human Servs., 980 F.2d 1468, 1471-

72 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (alleged violation of section 10(b)'s requirement that advisory committee documents "shall be available for public inspection and copying" reviewable). Even 

assuming we could conclude that adjournment would have 

been in the public interest, we nonetheless could not say that 

the agency representative violated section 10(e) by not adjourning the meeting.

In sum, we are left with no law to apply to Claybrook's 

claim and consequently Claybrook lacks standing.7 This being so, the district court's judgment dismissing the action is

Affirmed.

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