Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03035/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03035-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arthur R. Andrews
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 23, 1997 Decided June 26, 1998

No. 97-3035

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Arthur R. Andrews,

Appellant

Consolidated with

No. 97-3036

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cr00139-01)

(No. 96cr00139-02)

L. Barrett Boss, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellants, with whom A.J. Kramer, Federal

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Public Defender, and Joseph R. Conte, appointed by the

court, were on the briefs.

Barbara J. Valliere, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee, with whom Mary Lou Leary, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Harry R. Benner, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys, were on the brief. Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant

U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Williams, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Appellants are the chief executive

officer and president of a corporation against which the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) secured a civil

monetary penalty in 1995. In 1996, a grand jury indicted

appellants for essentially the same conduct. Appellants contend that the SEC penalty constitutes a punishment that bars

their subsequent criminal prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We disagree. Whether or not such a penalty would implicate the Clause if

imposed on appellants, we hold that the penalty imposed on

the corporation constitutes neither a punishment of appellants, nor a sufficiently choate "attempt to punish" the appellants, to implicate their constitutional rights. Accordingly, we

do not reach the question whether the SEC penalty would

constitute a criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes under the test the Supreme Court recently announced

in Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997), which

replaced the test previously employed in United States v.

Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).

I

Appellant Arthur Andrews is the chief executive officer,

and appellant Thomas Green is the president, of Fulcrum

Holding Co., Inc., a District of Columbia corporation. Andrews is Fulcrum's sole shareholder. According to the SEC,

in 1994 Fulcrum offered prospective investors an opportunity

to purchase "prime bank bills of exchange," which it promised

would yield a return of at least 50% by the end of one year.

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One such investor was Bayport Holdings, Ltd., which in May

1994 wired Fulcrum $1.5 million for the purchase of prime

bank bills. Instead of using the money to buy an investment

for Bayport, however, the SEC contends that Fulcrum and its

principals used the money for a variety of unrelated purposes,

including the purchase of personal automobiles and jewelry,

and the payment of personal hotel bills. Moreover, Fulcrum

allegedly sent Bayport back some of Bayport's own money,

misrepresenting it as profit on the trading of prime bank

bills, in order to lull Bayport into believing that Fulcrum had

made the promised investment.

On October 31, 1994, the SEC filed a civil complaint against

Fulcrum and Andrews, charging that the prime bank bills

scheme violated the antifraud provisions of the securities

laws. The complaint did not name appellant Green. It

sought injunctive relief, disgorgement of the proceeds of the

illegal conduct, and civil penalties, against both Fulcrum and

Andrews.1

On February 10, 1995, the SEC moved for summary judgment solely against Fulcrum. The district court granted the

motion, and ordered Fulcrum to pay Bayport disgorgement in

the amount of $1.5 million and to pay the SEC a civil penalty

in the amount of $500,000. In response to Fulcrum's representation that it had filed for protection under the Bankruptcy Code, the district court suspended Fulcrum's obligation to

pay the disgorgement and penalty amounts pending further

order.

On June 1, 1995, the SEC moved for partial summary

judgment against Andrews, requesting injunctive relief and

disgorgement, but expressly not seeking civil penalties from

him. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 1

n.1, 12. The district court's final judgment, entered on July

__________

1 The complaint charged violations of Section 17(a) of the

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. s 77q(a), Section 10(b) of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. s 78j(b), and Rule 10b5, 17 C.F.R. s 240.10b-5. It sought civil penalties pursuant to

Section 20(d) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. s 77t(d), and Section

21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. s 78u(d)(3).

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31, 1995, granted the SEC's request for injunctive relief, and

held Fulcrum and Andrews jointly and severally liable for the

payment of $1.5 million in disgorgement to Bayport (plus preand post-judgment interest). The court noted that the SEC

had filed a status report indicating it no longer was seeking

civil penalties from Andrews. Accordingly, the court ordered

Fulcrum alone to pay the $500,000 civil penalty to the SEC.

On April 30, 1996, a grand jury in the District of Columbia

indicted appellants for essentially the same conduct at issue

in the civil suit, charging criminal violations of the federal

mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering statutes.2 Appellants moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy

grounds, arguing that the $500,000 penalty imposed on Fulcrum constituted prior punishment under the test employed

in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); that the

punishment was imposed for the same offense as that charged

in the indictment under the test employed in Blockburger v.

United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); and that the punishment

imposed on Fulcrum was effectively a punishment of its

officers, Andrews and Green.

The district court denied appellants' motion. The court did

not consider whether the civil penalty constituted punishment

under Halper, or whether the offenses were the same under

Blockburger. Instead, the court held the Double Jeopardy

Clause inapplicable because "[t]he prohibition against multiple punishments does not attach until a punishment is imposed," and because the judge in the SEC action had imposed

the civil penalty only against Fulcrum and not against Andrews or Green. Andrews and Green immediately appealed

the denial of their motion to dismiss.

II

We must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to

hear this interlocutory appeal. Under the final-judgment

rule, we ordinarily do not have jurisdiction to hear a defen-

__________

2 The indictment charged violations of 18 U.S.C. ss 2, 1341,

1343, 1956, 1957.

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dant's appeal in a criminal case prior to conviction and

sentencing. See generally 28 U.S.C. s 1291. In Abney v.

United States, however, the Supreme Court held that a

pretrial denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on double

jeopardy grounds was immediately appealable under the

" 'collateral order' exception to the final-judgment rule." 431

U.S. 651, 657, 659-62 (1977). Noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause "is a guarantee against being twice put to trial for

the same offense," the Court held that this aspect "of the

guarantee's protections would be lost if the accused were

forced to 'run the gauntlet' a second time before an appeal

could be taken." Id. at 661.

Abney involved the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection

against successive prosecution. But the Supreme Court has

held the Clause to have two prongs: it protects not only

against "successive prosecution," but also against "successive

punishment." Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96

(1995). See also United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135,

2139 (1996) (quoting United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696

(1993)).3 Appellants here do not allege a violation of the

successive prosecution prong; instead they charge that the

government is seeking to impose a second punishment.

It might be argued that a claim brought under the successive punishment prong does not require an interlocutory

appeal for its vindication. If appellants ultimately are acquitted, they will not have been punished twice; if they are

convicted, a court can vacate the second punishment on

appeal. Abney itself seemed to give support to such an

__________

3 The Court has described the successive prosecution prong as

protecting against two more distinct abuses: "a second prosecution

for the same offense after acquittal [and] a second prosecution for

the same offense after conviction." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395

U.S. 711, 717 (1969). The prohibition against successive prosecution

protects against a third distinct abuse as well: even without acquittal or conviction, this prong bars a second prosecution for the same

offense if the first prosecution is dismissed after jeopardy has

attached, see Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978), where the

dismissal was not caused by "manifest necessity," see United States

v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980).

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argument, for it noted that the protection against double

punishments, unlike the guarantee against being twice put to

trial, "can be fully vindicated on an appeal following final

judgment." 431 U.S. at 660.

This line of argument, however, was foreclosed by the

Court's subsequent opinion in Witte v. United States, 515 U.S.

389 (1995). There, the Court permitted an interlocutory

appeal alleging that a pending prosecution on cocaine charges

was barred by the successive punishment prong because the

conduct at issue had already been taken into account in

defendant's sentencing for a prior marijuana conviction. The

Court held that the defendant's successive punishment claim

was ripe for review, although he had not yet been convicted

or sentenced on the cocaine charges, because the Clause

protected not just against "more than one punishment for the

same offense" but also against "an attempt to secure that

punishment in more than one trial." 515 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added). Accordingly, multiple punishment claims, like

multiple prosecution claims, are appropriate subjects for interlocutory appeal. See United States v. Perez-Herrera, 86

F.3d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Baird, 63

F.3d 1213, 1215 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Woods,

949 F.2d 175, 177 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991).4

But that does not end the matter. A defendant cannot

obtain interlocutory review of a motion to dismiss an indictment simply by characterizing his claim as one involving

double jeopardy. If that were the rule, defendants could

disrupt their trials at will, pending the resolution of appeals.

Instead, the Supreme Court held in Richardson v. United

__________

4 Many other courts have assumed without discussion that

multiple punishment claims may be appealed before final judgment.

See United States v. Reyes, 87 F.3d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 1996); United

States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.

Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.

Louisville Edible Oil Prods., Inc., 926 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1991).

But cf. United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 714-15 (1st Cir. 1996)

(noting that, prior to Witte, the First Circuit had held Abney

inapplicable to multiple punishment claims).

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States that a claim of double jeopardy must be at least

"colorable" to confer interlocutory jurisdiction on an appellate

court. 468 U.S. 317, 322 (1984). The standard is a lenient

one. Indeed, the Court made clear just how lenient the

standard was in Abney itself where, although it found jurisdiction to hear the defendant's interlocutory appeal, it disposed of defendant's argument on the merits in a single

paragraph. See 431 U.S. at 664-65.

Even under this lenient standard, however, we cannot

describe Green's claim as colorable. He and Andrews contend that the civil penalty imposed on Fulcrum was effectively a prior punishment imposed on Fulcrum's officers. They

claim that the district court in the SEC civil litigation found

Fulcrum to be a mere sham, that that finding makes Fulcrum's corporate form void, "not merely voidable," and that

as corporate officers they therefore are liable for the judgment.

This novel claim must clear a number of logical hurdles

before it can prevail--hurdles which we explore in Part III

below with respect to Andrews. But whatever this argument's general difficulties, as applied to Green it fails at the

start. As the face of the pleadings makes clear, Green was

never a party to the SEC civil suit. The complaint did not

name him as a defendant; indeed, it did not mention him at

all.

The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is

"intrinsically personal." Department of Revenue v. Kurth

Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994) (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at

447). A defendant cannot invoke it to prevent his punishment

on the ground that another already has been punished. See

United States v. Louisville Edible Oil Prods., Inc., 926 F.2d

584, 586 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting claim that punishment of

Subchapter S corporation constituted punishment of employees paid on the basis of the corporation's profits); Woods, 949

F.2d at 177 & n.3 (action against corporation does not constitute punishment of its sole shareholder). As the Supreme

Court said in United States v. MacDonald, "a double jeopardy claim ... requires at least a colorable showing that a

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defendant once before has been in jeopardy...." 435 U.S.

850, 862 (1978). Moreover, "[w]ithout risk of a determination

of guilt, jeopardy does not attach...." Serfass v. United

States, 420 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1975).

Green has never been in that position. He owns no stock

in Fulcrum. He neither has been held liable for any monetary penalty, nor has he ever been party to a proceeding in

which he was at risk of being held liable for the penalty

imposed on Fulcrum. Indeed, defense counsel conceded at

oral argument, and the government did not dispute, that

Green was not and cannot be bound by the judgment in the

SEC action against Fulcrum.5 At a minimum, some additional proceeding will be necessary before the corporation's penalty can be imposed on Green--assuming, without deciding,

that such a penalty could be imposed on him at all. He thus

is in no more difficult a position than that of a yet-unindicted

grand jury subject who watches his confederate proceed to

trial. He may be apprehensive about his own fate, but until

he himself goes to trial he cannot claim to have been placed in

jeopardy. See generally United States v. Gartner, 93 F.3d

633, 635 (9th Cir. 1996) (no double jeopardy where defendant

was not jointly and severally liable for civil penalty assessed

in prior proceeding); Baird, 63 F.3d at 1219 (because defendant never became a party to forfeiture proceeding, he never

was placed in jeopardy); United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d

1463, 1465 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).

It is a "fundamental principle that an accused must suffer

jeopardy before he can suffer double jeopardy." Serfass, 420

U.S. at 393. Because Green never has "suffered jeopardy,"

__________

5 As the Supreme Court stated in Martin v. Wilks, "[i]t is a

principle of general application ... that one is not bound by a

judgment in personam in litigation in which he is not designated as

a party." 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (internal citation and quotations

omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds. See 18 Charles

A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure s 4449, at 411

(1981). Appellants do not suggest that any of the limited exceptions

to this general rule would apply here. See Martin, 490 U.S. at 761

n.2.

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his claim of double jeopardy is not colorable. Accordingly, we

dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Andrews presents a more complicated story. Unlike

Green, the SEC did file a civil complaint against him and did,

at least initially, seek the imposition of a civil penalty against

him. Moreover, as the sole shareholder and chief executive

officer of Fulcrum, he is not an unlikely target for liability

through piercing of the corporate veil, and the SEC action

has at least increased the chance that one day he will be held

liable. Hence, even if punishment has not yet been imposed,

we cannot dismiss as non-colorable the possibility that it has

been attempted in the Witte sense. Given the lenient standard employed by the Supreme Court for finding interlocutory jurisdiction, we must proceed to the merits of Andrews'

claims.

III

As already noted, the Supreme Court has held the Double

Jeopardy Clause to possess two prongs, protecting against

both multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments. In

Halper, the Supreme Court held that the protection against

multiple punishments was triggered where a civil sanction

was so "overwhelmingly disproportionate" to the damages the

defendant caused that it could not "fairly be characterized as

remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." 490 U.S. at

449.

Invoking Halper's formulation of the protection against

multiple punishments, Andrews argues that the civil money

penalty imposed on Fulcrum constituted punishment for his

allegedly fraudulent activities relating to Bayport and that

the Double Jeopardy Clause therefore bars his criminal prosecution. Apparently because of our decision in SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1994), holding that under

Halper disgorgement of ill-gotten gains in an action brought

by the SEC is remedial rather than punitive, Andrews does

not argue that the disgorgement remedy here was punitive.

Instead, he argues that because the money penalty was

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exacted on top of disgorgement, the punitive nature of that

penalty is manifest.

Like the district court, we do not determine whether the

SEC civil money penalty constituted a prior criminal punishment, or whether under Blockburger it covered the same

offenses as the indictment. Our consideration of the prior

punishment issue would be particularly problematic at this

stage, since after this court heard oral argument, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hudson v. United States,

118 S.Ct. 488 (1997). There, the Court disavowed Halper's

conclusion that punishment, rather than criminal punishment, could trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause. 118 S.Ct.

at 493-94. To determine whether criminal punishment was

at issue, the Court focused not just on whether a prior

penalty was proportional to a victim's injury, but rather on

the multi-factor test it previously had employed in United

States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). See 118 S.Ct. at 491, 493-

96. Although there are striking similarities between the

sanctions the Office of Comptroller of the Currency imposed

in Hudson, which the Court declined to characterize as

criminal, and the SEC civil money penalty sought in this

case,6 that issue was never briefed in this court and we are

loath to proceed without the views of the parties.

In any event, we find no need to consider the Hudson/Halper or Blockburger issues because we find that Andrews--like

Green--suffered no prior jeopardy, and hence could not have

suffered double jeopardy. The district court reached this

conclusion by finding that no punishment had yet been imposed on Andrews. We agree that no punishment has yet

been imposed although, as noted in Part IV infra, we are not

certain that necessarily disposes of the issue.

Andrews has two arguments in support of the claim that he

already has been punished. His first requires three steps:

(1) the district court in the SEC litigation "has already" found

__________

6 See SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1998)

(applying Hudson's analysis to hold that SEC civil monetary penalties are not criminally punitive).

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Fulcrum "to be merely a cloak for fraud"; (2) therefore, the

corporate form is void, "not merely voidable"; and (3) therefore, the judgment imposed on Fulcrum "immediately became

a liability of the defendants." See Appellants' Br. at 6, 10,

12.7 We need not examine the validity of the second and

third steps, because the premise is factually incorrect. The

district court did not find that Fulcrum was a sham. To the

contrary, the court paid obeisance to the corporate form,

accepting Fulcrum's representation that it had filed for bankruptcy protection and suspending payment of the judgment

pending further proceedings. Indeed, the court made virtually no findings at all. Because Fulcrum refused to answer the

complaint, citing purported Fifth Amendment concerns, the

district court treated the SEC's allegations as conceded and

entered judgment accordingly.

But, Andrews contends, because the SEC had alleged that

Fulcrum was merely a cloak for the fraudulent activities of its

officers, the court effectively adopted that allegation by treating it as conceded. Again, Andrews' problem is with his

factual premise. The SEC did not allege, as Andrews asserts, that Fulcrum was merely a "fraudulent enterprise

aimed at wealthy investors." Appellants' Br. at 12. That

quotation leaves out some important words from the SEC's

original sentence--which is found not in the complaint but in

an SEC memorandum in support of temporary relief. The

full sentence alleges that Fulcrum "embarked on a fraudulent

enterprise aimed at wealthy investors." Pl. Mem. in Supp. of

__________

7 Andrews does not argue that a sole or controlling shareholder

of a bona fide corporation would be punished for double jeopardy

purposes if punishment were imposed upon his corporation. Such

an argument was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Woods, on the

ground that "[a]bsent individual liability, there [is] no claim for

double jeopardy." 949 F.2d at 177 n.3. A similar argument made on

behalf of employees of a Subchapter S (26 U.S.C. s 1361 et seq.)

corporation was rejected by the Sixth Circuit in Louisville Edible

Oil Products, on the ground that the theory would extend protection from prosecution to any individual who receives income on a

percentage-of-profit basis from any entity if the entity were punished. See 926 F.2d at 586.

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Temp. Relief at 2 (emphasis added). That plainly is not an

allegation about what Fulcrum was, but about what it did.

The difference between being a fraud and conducting one is

important. Even a fully-capitalized, Fortune 500 corporation

can embark on a fraud, but that would not make its corporate

form a sham or its shareholders personally liable.

Andrews' second argument in support of the notion that he

has been punished is that even if the government has never

sought to pierce the corporate veil, "in this jurisdiction" he

has as much right to pierce it as the government does. For

this proposition, Andrews cites our opinion in Quinn v. Butz,

510 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

This argument suffers from a number of significant flaws.

Although Quinn does hold that penetration of the corporate

veil can be urged against as well as by the government, we

emphasized there that "the ultimate principle is one permitting its use to avoid injustice." 510 F.2d at 759. Avoiding

"injustice" is not the same as avoiding indictment. The

injustice Andrews claims here is that, unless the veil is

pierced, he will be subject to double jeopardy. In fact,

Andrews has the point backwards. Even on his own theory,

he will confront the possibility of double jeopardy only if the

veil is pierced. If it is not, he will not be liable for Fulcrum's

penalty and hence will not have been subjected to prior

jeopardy.

Moreover, Andrews' asserted right to pierce the veil runs

counter to the rule that piercing the corporate veil is an

equitable remedy, whose exercise is subject to the sound

discretion of the trial judge. See Valley Fin., Inc. v. United

States, 629 F.2d 162, 171-72 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Kinney

Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 211 (4th Cir. 1991). In

Quinn, for example, the court entertained the possibility of

piercing against the government only because it feared the

corporate form may have operated at an "innocent party's

expense." 510 F.2d at 758. But if Fulcrum is a sham, it is

because Andrews, as its sole shareholder and chief executive

officer, made it one in order to facilitate his fraudulent

scheme. Under such circumstances, Andrews cannot don the

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mantle of an innocent party in order to pierce the cloak of his

own fraud.

Finally, even if Quinn applied here, the veil would at best

be "pierce-able"; it has not yet been "pierced." See Quinn,

510 F.2d at 760 (petitioner entitled "to an opportunity to show

that the company was not in truth a corporation"). Nor is

Andrews quite so eager to pierce the veil as his briefs would

suggest. At oral argument, the court asked Andrews' counsel

whether his client actually concedes that Fulcrum was a

sham. Counsel demurred. He was not, he said, authorized

to make such a concession. But in the context of Andrews'

argument, this is not a concession--it is a cornerstone. Andrews, apparently, would like to have his cake and eat it too:

he would like to pierce the veil for the purpose of dismissing

the present indictment, but preserve it as a defense in case

the SEC ever does try to collect. We reject this argument

and conclude that no criminal punishment has yet been

imposed on appellant Andrews.8

IV

Andrews' brief states his agreement with the "undisputed

proposition, that a punishment must be imposed in the first

proceeding before jeopardy can attach." Appellants' Br. at

13. As discussed in Part III, if Andrews is correct about this

proposition, then his appeal must fail because no punishment

has yet been imposed upon him.

We are not certain, however, that Andrews is correct.

After all, we have Witte's admonition that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects not just against multiple punishments, but

__________

8 Because Andrews cannot even establish that the civil judgment imposed any obligation upon him, we need not consider

whether a judgment alone would have been enough to constitute the

imposition of punishment where the penalty has not only not yet

been paid, but has been suspended pending bankruptcy proceedings. Cf. United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 201

(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an unpaid judgment does not constitute

punishment, even where the defendant executes a promissory note

to pay it).

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against multiple attempts to punish. See Witte, 515 U.S. at

396; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2085

(1997) (citing Witte ). Indeed, in Hudson, the Court not only

repeated this admonition, it used it to support its conclusion

that Halper had applied the wrong analysis. Halper had

directed courts to look at the "sanction actually imposed" in

order to determine whether it was so disproportionate as to

be punitive. The consequence of this direction, the Hudson

Court said, was that it would "not be possible to determine

whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated until a

defendant has proceeded through a trial to judgment." 118

S. Ct. at 495. But that, the Court charged, "flies in the face

of the notion that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the

government from even attempting a second time to punish

criminally." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

We need not linger over this problem because not only was

no punishment imposed upon Andrews, none was attempted--at least not in any constitutional sense. For purposes of

the multiple prosecutions prong of the Double Jeopardy

Clause, an attempt does not attain constitutional significance

until jeopardy has attached. See Serfass, 420 U.S. at 390-92.

This accords with the language of the Clause itself, which

bars neither "attempts" nor "prosecutions," but rather prohibits being "twice put in jeopardy" for the same offense. In

a criminal trial, jeopardy does not attach until a jury is

empaneled and sworn or, in a non-jury trial, until the court

begins to hear evidence. See id. at 388. The underlying

principle is that "jeopardy does not attach, and the constitutional prohibition can have no application, until a defendant is

'put to trial before the trier of facts, whether the trier be a

jury or a judge.' " Id. (citation omitted).

Although the Supreme Court has not had occasion to

consider when jeopardy might attach outside the context of a

criminal trial, or whether the timing of attachment is different for the multiple punishments prong as compared to the

multiple prosecutions prong, no court has concluded that

attachment in such circumstances should come any earlier

than it would in a criminal trial. To the contrary, some

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courts have held it to come at an analogous time,9 while

others have found it to come considerably later.10

There are two stages of the civil SEC proceedings that one

might loosely characterize as "attempts" to impose punish-

__________

9 See Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465 (jeopardy attaches in civil forfeiture hearing when evidence is first presented to trier of fact); cf.

Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d at 201 (jeopardy attaches in action to

collect on notes when court begins to hear evidence).

After Hudson there is further reason to conclude that courts

should treat criminal trials and other proceedings that may lead to

double jeopardy in a similar way. The holding of Hudson, after all,

was not that the sanction imposed was civil rather than criminal,

but that the prior "administrative proceedings were civil, not criminal." 118 S. Ct. at 491 (emphasis added). See also id. at 496 n.6

(favorably citing Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781, for focusing on

whether the alleged punishment was "the functional equivalent of a

successive criminal prosecution"). Hence, the "attempting a second

time to punish criminally" proscription may not be a subsidiary

element of the multiple punishments prong, but rather a more

generalized restatement of the multiple prosecutions prong: that is,

double jeopardy protects against multiple punishments, and against

multiple attempts to impose criminal punishments--regardless

whether such attempts occur in the form of criminal trials or other

kinds of proceedings. See also Witte, 515 U.S. at 396 (appearing to

equate "attempting a second time to punish criminally" with "being

twice put in jeopardy for such punishment"). If the "attempts"

proscription is just a restatement of the multiple prosecutions

prong, then there would be good reason to apply as similar as

possible "attachment" rules regardless whether the attempt occurs

in a criminal trial or otherwise.

10 See, e.g., United States v. Tamez, 881 F. Supp. 460, 465-66

(E.D. Wash. 1995) (jeopardy does not attach in civil forfeiture

proceedings until final judgment is entered), aff'd, 95 F.3d 1160 (9th

Cir. 1996) (table); United States v. Polichemi, 1995 WL 387833

(N.D. Ill. 1995) (prohibition against multiple punishments does not

attach in SEC civil action until civil penalty is imposed); cf. United

States v. Von Moos, 660 F.2d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1981) (jeopardy on

multiple punishments claim involving multiple sentences does not

attach until defendant begins serving sentence).

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ment here. But even if we were to apply an analogy to the

attachment of jeopardy in a criminal trial, neither was sufficiently advanced to constitute attachment.

The first possible "attempt" was the filing of the SEC's

complaint, which named Andrews and sought penalties from

him. The closest criminal trial analogy would be to an

indictment. But the filing of an indictment does not create

jeopardy. As we have noted, a jury must be empaneled or a

judge must begin to hear evidence on the charge before

attachment occurs. See Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388-89. Neither

happened here. Evidently awakening--somewhat belatedly,

but still in time--to the possibility that it was creating a

"Halper " problem for future criminal prosecutors, the SEC

withdrew its request for civil penalties against Andrews before it ever presented evidence in support of that request.

Alternatively, one might characterize the judgment against

Fulcrum as an initial step in an "attempt" to hold Andrews

personally responsible for the monetary penalty. But this

step has not put Andrews at personal risk of paying that

penalty. Because the SEC civil action ended in a final

judgment that did not include a penalty against Andrews, a

new proceeding would still be required before the SEC could

collect anything from him. A complaint in that new proceeding, and further action on that complaint, would thus be the

earliest stage at which jeopardy could attach. Cf. United

States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 203 (5th Cir. 1991)

(although defendants executed promissory notes in acknowledgment of punitive civil fines, jeopardy would not attach

until government tried to collect on notes and "court begins

to hear evidence in that action").

In sum, we conclude that even were an "attempts" analysis

appropriate here, the SEC action simply did not progress

sufficiently against Andrews to constitute an attempt to impose criminal punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

V

We dismiss Green's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because

it does not present a colorable claim of double jeopardy.

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Andrews' appeal, while colorable, fails on the merits, and we

therefore affirm the district court's denial of his motion to

dismiss the indictment.

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