Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01840/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01840-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antwaen D. Reliford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The HONORABLE FERNANDO J. GAITAN, United States District Judge for

the Western District of Missouri

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1840

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Antwaen D. Reliford, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 26, 2006

Filed: December 26, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

Antwaen Reliford pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). At sentencing, the district court1

 concluded that he

is an armed career criminal, making him subject to a mandatory minimum fifteen-year

prison sentence and an advisory guidelines base offense level of 34. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). The court sentenced Reliford to 188 months in

prison, the bottom of his advisory guidelines range. Reliford appeals, arguing that the

government failed to prove that his prior state court convictions for tampering by

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operation and for criminal threat were violent felonies under § 924(e), and that his

sentence is unreasonable. We affirm. 

I. The Armed Career Criminal Issues

A person convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm is an armed

career criminal for sentencing purposes if he has three prior convictions that were

either "serious drug offense[s]" or "violent felon[ies]." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

Reliford concedes that his prior Missouri conviction for sale of a controlled substance

was a serious drug offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A). But he argues that his

1996 Missouri conviction for automobile tampering and his 1998 Kansas conviction

for criminal threat were not violent felonies. That term is defined in 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B), which provides in relevant part:

(B) the term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that -- 

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened

use of physical force against the person of another; or 

(ii) . . . otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious

potential risk of physical injury to another. 

We review this issue de novo. United States v. Johnson, 417 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 285 (2006).

In determining whether an offense under state law is a violent felony for

purposes of § 924(e)(2)(B), we apply the “formal categorical approach” adopted by

the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990), an analysis

that focuses on the statutory elements of the offense rather than the particular facts

underlying the defendant’s prior conviction. When applying § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), the

issue is whether those elements included the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

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physical force against a person. When applying the "otherwise involves" provision

in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), the issue is whether those elements “described conduct that

necessarily entails a serious potential risk of physical injury.” United States v.

McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quotation omitted). An

affirmative answer to either question means that the offense is eligible for the violent

felony classification. 

When an offense is eligible for violent felony classification but the state

criminal statute is over-inclusive -- that is, the elements of the offense also encompass

conduct that does not constitute a violent felony -- the sentencing court must consider

the facts underlying the defendant's conviction to determine whether it was a violent

felony for purposes of § 924(e)(2)(B). However, to avoid the practical difficulties and

potential unfairness of retrying the prior case, this inquiry is conducted by examining

a limited universe of judicial documents to determine whether the state court jury

found, or the defendant admitted, that he was guilty of conduct constituting a violent

felony. See McCall, 439 F.3d at 973-74, applying Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601-02, and

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). In these circumstances, if the

defendant fails to object to fact statements in the presentence investigation report

(PSR) establishing that a prior offense was a violent felony conviction, the

government need not introduce at sentencing the documentary evidence that Taylor

and Shepard otherwise require. McCall, 439 F.3d at 974; United States v. Menteer,

408 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 2005). 

A. The Automobile Tampering Conviction. In 1996, Reliford was convicted

of first degree motor vehicle tampering, a Missouri offense defined as “knowingly

receiv[ing], possess[ing], sell[ing] . . . or unlawfully operat[ing] an automobile . . .

without the consent of the owner.” Mo. Ann. Stat. § 569.080.1(2). A violation of this

statute is a violent felony under the "otherwise involves" provision in 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) if the defendant in fact operated the motor vehicle without the

owner's consent. Like vehicle theft, tampering by operation of the vehicle creates the

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risks of physical confrontation with the owner or police when the vehicle is taken and

of a high-speed chase when the perpetrator attempts to escape. See United States v.

Bockes, 447 F.3d 1090, 1092 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson, 417 F.3d at 999. However,

some violations of the Missouri tampering statute are not violent felonies, such as

mere possession of another person's vehicle without consent. See United States v.

Adams, 442 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 13, 2006.

Therefore, a Missouri motor vehicle tampering conviction is a violent felony for

purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) only if the government proves at sentencing, by means

of evidence authorized by McCall, that the offense conduct included tampering by

operation.

In this case, Reliford argues the sentencing record is insufficient to establish

that his 1996 conviction involved tampering by operation. We disagree. Paragraph

33 of the PSR recited that Reliford was arrested while “driving” a stolen vehicle and

that he later admitted to “driving the stolen vehicles and knowing the vehicles were

stolen.” Reliford filed no objection to paragraph 33. Therefore, the district court did

not err in concluding that his tampering conviction involved tampering by operation,

a violent felony within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. The Criminal Threat Conviction. Paragraph 36 of Reliford 's PSR recited

that in April 1998 he was convicted of a Kansas charge that he "did unlawfully,

willfully and feloniously threaten to commit violence and communicated said threat

with intent to terrorize another [person]." At sentencing, Reliford objected to the

underlying facts set forth in paragraph 36 but admitted that this conviction included

as an element “the making of a threat to commit violence.” 

On appeal, Reliford argues that this was not a violent felony conviction because

a “conviction for threats . . . presents neither an inherent potential for harm to others

nor carries a serious risk of physical injury.” However, as the government notes, this

contention ignores the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), which defines

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2

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3419(a) contains two other subparts that expand the

definition of criminal threat to include threats to contaminate food, drugs, or a public

water supply, and to expose animals to contagious diseases. Because 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is limited to the threatened use of physical force against the person

of another, a conviction for committing one of these additional types of criminal threat

might not be a violent felony for purposes of § 924(e).

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“violent felony” to include the “threatened use of physical force against the person of

another.” Thus, Congress has decided that convictions for threats to use physical

force against another person are violent felonies. The question is whether that type

of threat was an element of Reliford's 1998 Kansas conviction. 

Section 21-3419(a)(1) of the Kansas Penal Code defines criminal threat as

including a threat to:

(1) Commit violence communicated with intent to terrorize another, or

to cause the evacuation of any building, place of assembly or facility of

transportation, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror

or evacuation . . . .

Like the Tenth Circuit, we conclude that a conviction for a threat to commit violence

communicated with the intent to terrorize another person is a violent felony within the

meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). See United States v. Treto-Banuelos, 165 Fed. Appx.

668, 670-71 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 2876 (2006); United States v. Mulay,

77 Fed. Appx. 455, 457-58 (10th Cir. 2003).2

 As Reliford admitted making this type

of threat, the district court correctly concluded that his Kansas conviction was a

violent felony and that he is therefore an armed career criminal.

II. The Reasonableness Issue

Reliford next argues that his 188-month sentence is unreasonable. At

sentencing, Reliford’s counsel urged the court to impose the mandatory minimum

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fifteen-year sentence. Noting Reliford’s extensive criminal history, the court instead

imposed a sentence at the bottom of Reliford's advisory guidelines range, eight

months above the mandatory minimum 180-month sentence. On appeal, Reliford

argues that the district court failed to consider his addiction to marijuana and cocaine,

and his limited education, lack of employable skills, troubled upbringing, and mental

health issues. The PSR recited that the twenty-eight-year-old Reliford has fourteen

juvenile and adult convictions, including multiple drug and firearm offenses as well

as the tampering by operation and criminal threat offenses. When arrested for this

offense, Reliford was driving a stolen motor scooter and carrying twenty three small

bags of crack cocaine. He committed this offense while on probation and less than

two years after his release from custody for a prior drug conviction. On this record,

the district court’s decision to impose a sentence at the bottom of Reliford’s advisory

guidelines range was not unreasonable.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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