Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-19-01728/USCOURTS-ca4-19-01728-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Javon S. Jones
Appellant
United Health Group Incorporated
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-1728

JAVON S. JONES,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC.,

 Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

James K. Bredar, Chief District Judge. (1:17-cv-03500-JKB)

Submitted: March 25, 2020 Decided: April 21, 2020

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Corlie McCormick, Jr., MCCORMICK LAW FIRM, LLC, Annapolis, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Donald E. English, Jr., Mary M. McCudden, JACKSON LEWIS P.C., 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 19-1728 Doc: 27 Filed: 04/21/2020 Pg: 1 of 8
2

PER CURIAM:

Javon S. Jones appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment 

to her former employer United Health Group Incorporated, alleging retaliation, 

constructive discharge and hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2018) (Title VII). Jones’s complaint 

asserted that various retaliatory actions by United Health constituted a constructive 

discharge, resulting in her resignation. We affirm.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “viewing all facts 

and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 

Frederick Cty., 673 F.3d 333, 336 (4th Cir. 2012). In determining whether a genuine issue 

of material fact exists, we view the facts, and draws all reasonable inferences therefrom, in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 

(4th Cir. 2011).

To defeat summary judgment, however, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence 

to allow reasonable jurors to find she has proven her claims by a preponderance of the 

evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). To 

accomplish this task, a plaintiff “must do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Indeed, to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff “must 

USCA4 Appeal: 19-1728 Doc: 27 Filed: 04/21/2020 Pg: 2 of 8
3

rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference 

upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather, 731 

F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).

First, Jones asserts that United Health retaliated against her for filing a 

discrimination complaint by changing an agreement not to require Jones to work with a 

co-worker (“D.U.”) who allegedly harassed her. To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff 

must allege that she engaged in protected conduct, that she suffered an adverse employment 

action, and that a causal link exists between the protected conduct and the adverse action. 

See Coleman v. Md. Ct. of App., 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). If a plaintiff puts forth 

sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation and the employer offers a 

non-retaliatory explanation for the adverse employment action, the burden shifts back to 

the plaintiff to “persuad[e] the factfinder that the employer’s proffered explanation is 

merely a pretext for [retaliation].” Sharif v. United Airlines, Inc., 841 F.3d 199, 203 (4th 

Cir. 2016). To satisfy the pretext prong of a Title VII retaliation claim, the plaintiff bears 

the ultimate burden of establishing that her protected activity was a “but-for” cause of the 

adverse action. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).

When Jones initially complained of harassment, United Health investigated and 

found the complaint unsupported. However, Jones’s supervisor, Robin Christman, offered 

Jones a new work area, further away from D.U., and stated that Jones would not have to 

work with him. Sometime later, Jones’s new supervisor, Robin Robertson, directed Jones 

to work on a project with D.U. When Jones objected, Robertson found another coworker 

USCA4 Appeal: 19-1728 Doc: 27 Filed: 04/21/2020 Pg: 3 of 8
4

to work with Jones, but noted that Jones might be required to work with D.U. in the future, 

should business needs require it. 

Jones contends that United Health failed to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

basis for its decision to change the “agreement.”*

 However, as the district court noted, 

United Health merely reserved the right to change the agreement in the future, if “business 

needs arise,” noting that Jones’s underlying complaint was found to be unsubstantiated. 

While this reason is vague, Jones was never actually required to work with D.U. Had she 

been so required, United Health would likely have been required, and presumably would 

have been more able, to provide more specific reasoning as to why its business needs 

necessitated a change in the prior agreement.

Next, Jones asserts that she provided sufficient evidence of pretext. First, she claims 

that Robertson’s assertion that she did not know of Jones’ prior complaint when she 

assigned Jones and D.U. to work together was false. In support, Jones relies on 

Christman’s testimony that she informed Robertson of the complaint. However, the cited 

testimony, while describing such a conversation, does not state the date. Moreover, this 

evidence is irrelevant as Jones only asserts on appeal that Robertson improperly changed 

the agreement, which happened after Robertson indisputably became aware of the prior 

complaints.

 * The record reveals that this “agreement” was an informal oral discussion, rather 

than a negotiated settlement.

USCA4 Appeal: 19-1728 Doc: 27 Filed: 04/21/2020 Pg: 4 of 8
5

Second, Jones contends that the change to the agreement occurred close in time to 

a racial discrimination complaint Jones filed concerning a Corrective Action Process 

(“CAP”) in which she was placed and that United Health provided no reason why business 

needs had changed. Again, however, United Health only stated that business needs might

require the two to work together sometime in the future. Thus, United Health was not 

alleging that business needs had changed at the time it informed Jones, but instead was 

merely stating that such might happen in the future. Thus, Jones’s contention that United 

Health failed to explain why it failed to return to the original agreement to separate the 

employees, is misleading, because the original agreement was never violated. Moreover, 

aside from the proximity in time, Jones has provided no evidentiary support for the 

conclusion that her discrimination complaint was the “but-for” cause of any change to the 

agreement. See Gibson v. Geithner, 776 F.3d 536, 541 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that, while 

proximity can establish a prima facie case of causation, it is insufficient to alone establish 

pretext). Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim.

Jones next contends that she presented sufficient evidence of pretext to avoid 

summary judgment on her claim that her CAP was retaliation for her complaints about a 

work-at-home policy. Jones relies on the following: (1) temporal proximity between her 

complaints and the CAP; (2) Jones was not placed on a CAP after her January 2016 review, 

and there was no evidence of changed circumstances (aside from the telework complaint); 

and (3) allegations that Robertson’s testimony was not credible. We conclude that Jones

has failed to present evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment.

USCA4 Appeal: 19-1728 Doc: 27 Filed: 04/21/2020 Pg: 5 of 8
6

First, as discussed above, temporal proximity, without more, does not support a 

finding of pretext. Next, Jones ignores the content of her January 2016 review and the 

evidence of her behavior the next couple of months. Jones was explicitly told in her 

January 2016 review that she needed to spend less time on the internet. Despite being 

provided the opportunity to comment, Jones did not dispute that this was an issue. Once 

Jones received the review, she officially transferred to Robertson’s group, but Robertson 

did not notice any improvement and, in fact, noted that Jones was often gone from her desk 

and making personal calls. In addition, human resources received two anonymous 

complaints about Jones’s excessive cellphone and personal internet use. Thus, contrary to 

Jones’s contentions, there was a logical reason why her behavior did not require a CAP in 

January, but did in March. Simply, Jones was given a chance to improve, but she did not. 

In fact, Jones admitted in her deposition that, even in response to the CAP, she did not 

change her behavior because she denied any performance issues. 

Finally, Jones asserts that Robertson was not credible in her assessment of Jones’s 

internet use. However, there is no evidence in the record to support this conclusion other 

than Jones’s speculation, which by itself cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. 

Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).

Finally, Jones challenges the district court’s conclusion that she failed to make a 

prima facie showing that she was constructively discharged. “[A]n employee’s reasonable 

decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal 

discharge for remedial purposes.” Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004). 

To establish a constructive discharge claim, a plaintiff must show that she was 

USCA4 Appeal: 19-1728 Doc: 27 Filed: 04/21/2020 Pg: 6 of 8
7

discriminated against by her employer to the point where a reasonable person in her 

position would have “felt compelled to resign” and that she actually resigned. Green v. 

Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 1776-77 (2016). “Unless conditions are beyond ‘ordinary’ 

discrimination, a complaining employee is expected to remain on the job while seeking 

redress.” Evans v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 183, 193 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (noting that important factor is frequency of discrimination). 

“[D]issatisfaction with work assignments, a feeling of being unfairly criticized, or difficult 

or unpleasant working conditions are not so intolerable as to compel a reasonable person 

to resign[,]” however. Honor v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 383 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir. 

2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Jones asserts that the following constituted constructive discharge: placement on a 

CAP, a requirement that she needed to work with her harasser, improperly strict 

construction of the work-at-home policy, and the fact that white employees were allegedly 

treated differently with regard to these policies. We find that these allegations are 

insufficient to avoid summary judgment. First, the CAP did not affect Jones’s workload, 

assignments, or benefits. Second, she was never actually required to work with her 

harasser. Third, the evidence in the record does not support the conclusion that the 

work-at-home policy was applied in a discriminatory manner, but even if it was, the 

requirement to work in the office is not objectively intolerable. Finally, preferential 

treatment of white employees would certainly be upsetting, unfair, and highly improper, 

but, without more, such allegations cannot be the basis of a constructive discharge claim. 

See Evans, 936 F.3d at 193 (explaining that a “plaintiff must show ‘something more’ than 

USCA4 Appeal: 19-1728 Doc: 27 Filed: 04/21/2020 Pg: 7 of 8
8

the showing required for a hostile work environment claim” to support a constructive 

discharge claim (citation omitted)); cf. Amirmokri v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 

1132 (4th Cir. 1995) (subjecting the plaintiff to “almost daily” racial epithets raised a 

question of fact regarding whether plaintiff’s working conditions were sufficiently 

“intolerable” to support a constructive discharge claim). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

USCA4 Appeal: 19-1728 Doc: 27 Filed: 04/21/2020 Pg: 8 of 8