Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-01284/USCOURTS-caDC-95-01284-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Canadian American Oil Co.
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

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1Although a Board's decision in a certification proceeding is not directly reviewable in the

courts, an employer may challenge a certification decision indirectly by refusing to bargain with

the union and then raising its election objection in the ensuing unfair labor practice proceedings. 

See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476-77 (1964); Amalgamated Clothing &

Textile Workers v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559, 1561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 26, 1996 Decided April 23, 1996

No. 95-1284

CANADIAN AMERICAN OIL CO.,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order

of the National Labor Relations Board

Lisa P. Sullivan argued the cause for petitioner, with whom Kent C. Jonas was on the brief. Ronald

I. Tisch entered an appearance.

Meredith L. Jason, Attorney, NationalLabor Relations Board, argued the cause for respondent, with

whom Linda R. Sher, Associate General Counsel, and Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate

General Counsel, were on the brief. Linda Dreeben, Supervisory Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: The unfair labor practice charge in this appeal1arises out of a union

election held at the Divisidero Touchless Car Wash ("Car Wash"). After Local 350 of the Sanitary

Truck Drivers and Helpers, International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("the union") won the election

and was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of Car Wash's employees, Car Wash

sought to have the election set aside because of alleged threats of violence by union representatives

during the campaign. Prior to the hearing on these election objections, Car Wash also alleged that

union officials were threatening employees with retaliation if they testified against the union.

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2Car Wash submitted the following three employee declarations alleging impermissible

pre-election conduct:

Employee A:

Claiming that the employees would be too afraid to testify in the face of these threats, Car Wash

requested that the hearing officer close the hearing to everyone but each side's attorneys during the

taking of testimony, and then bar the attorneys from revealing the identities of employee witnesses.

The hearing officer rejected this proposal. When none of the employees subsequently showed up to

testify at the hearing, Car Wash sought to admit their redacted statements into evidence as a

substitute, but the hearing officer refused to admit the declarations. As a result, Car Wash was left

with no evidence to support its objections to the election, and the hearing officer recommended that

the Board rule against the employer. The National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") agreed and

certified the union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Car Wash's employees.

Car Wash seeks invalidation of this result, on the ground that the Board was obligated to

accommodate threatened employees by shielding their identities from union representatives during

the hearing. Although we are disturbed by the Board's inflexible response to allegations which, if

true, give rise to reasonable fears of retaliation that would inhibit the employees from testifying, the

Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Car Wash's specific proposals.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 19, 1994, the union filed a petition to represent the employees of Divisidero

Touchless Car Wash, an entity owned by Canadian American Oil Company. The Board conducted

an election on September 7, 1994; of the 86 eligible Car Wash employees, 58 voted for the union,

21 voted against the union, and 4 ballots were challenged. Car Wash filed objections to the election,

arguing that the union had unlawfully intimidated employees who voiced anti-union sentiments and

promised unlawful financial rewards to pro-union workers. In support of its objections, Car Wash

submitted several declarations by employees who claimed that pro-union workers threatened them

with physical violence and hefty union membership fees if they did not vote for the union. One

employee also stated that he was threatened with loss of his job if he did not support the union.2

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(1) ... Julio [Delgado] told me that if I didn't vote for the Union, I would have to

pay US $375.00 in order to continue working at the car wash. And he told me

that if I voted, I didn't have to pay anything....

(2) ... I told them [Delgado and Tomas] that I didn't want the Union because it

didn't give me the job, but Roy did. And later, they told me that when the Union

was elected that I would be the first one to be fired.

(3) And since mid August, the people who support the Union have told me that if I

didn't help them I knew what could happen to me. They threatened me, not with

their hands, but with other people, who could do it.

... (5) They were talking to other employees the same way they were talking to me. 

If they didn't vote for the Union they would have to pay US $375.00 to get in and

work in the car wash.

Employee B:

(1) Tomas[,] Julio[,] Hector Reyes[,] Gabriel. These four (4) people told me that

if I didn't sign, I would have to pay $300.00.

(2) Tomas and Julio told me to vote this way. They told me that they were going

to watch out for me [redacted]. They were going to kick my ass.

Employee C:

[Redacted] threats I have received from fellow workers because I do not support

the strike and because I do not agree with many of the points raised at the Union

meetings. I was threatened along with fellow workers: [redacted]. One of them

even told me that if he didn't vote for the Union, the other fellow workers would

"take care" of him and of us. The people who made the threats were Julio

Delgado and Thomas Aguilar.... [Mr. Morales] also said that there were some kiss

asses and dumb suckers who had told Roy that he, Mr. Morales, had offered us

money to vote against the car wash company, and that Mr. Morales had said that

those people who had betrayed the Union would be taken to court where they

were to loose [sic] face. And that when the other workers found out who they

were, they would take care of them. I, on my part, was very stubborn. I was

constantly told, indirectly, that I was a spy, that I have told everything to

everybody. [redacted] Many workers feel the same way I do but they, maybe

because of insecurity or because they are afraid of the other workers, do not

[redacted].... 

Based on these declarations, the NLRB's Regional Director scheduled a hearing on the election

objections.

Prior to the hearing, counsel for the employer wrote to the Regional Director, claiming that

the employees whom Car Wash intended to call as witnesses against the union were afraid to appear.

She stated:

... [These employees] have expressed grave fear of physical violence against them if

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3Both in its reply brief and at oral argument, counsel for Car Wash indicated that it had also

submitted complete, unredacted declarations to the NLRB, although it is unclear whether those

declarations were submitted to the Regional Director who ordered a hearing on the election

objections, the hearing officer, or the Board itself on review of the union's unfair labor practice

charge. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 11 ("[T]he Board had copies of complete, unredacted

declarations. The Car Wash submitted these same declarations, in unredacted form, to the Board

when the Car Wash requested a hearing on its election objections. The Board concluded that the

unredacted declarations were compelling enough to warrant a hearing." (emphasis omitted)). 

they testify at the upcoming hearing. This fear was heightened when, at a recent

union meeting, union officials said that they were anxious "to see the faces of those

who are providing information against the union, so we can take care of them." One

high-ranking union official said that once he saw the faces and learned the names of

those who provided information against the union, he would tell others that they

could "kick and break their ass" or kill them.

In this letter, Car Wash's counsel requested that the Board adopt special procedures to protect the

identities of employee witnesses. Specifically, Car Wash proposed that the Board hold an

"attorneys-eyes-only" hearing, excluding everyone but counsel for each party from the proceedings

and prohibiting counselfromrevealing the identity of employee witnessesto anyone else in the union.

The Board's Regional Office Director rejected this proposal, informing Car Wash that the Board

appreciated its concerns, but had no mechanism through which it could protect the identity of the

witnesses.

On the hearing date, none of the employees subpoenaed by Car Wash showed up. The

hearing officer asked Car Wash if it wanted the subpoenas enforced against its employees, but Car

Wash declined, expressing reluctance to force its workers to identify themselves to the union

representatives present at the hearing. The employer then tried to submit three declarations by

employees who claimed to have been the subject of union intimidation and threats, with all

information about their identities redacted.3 The union objected, arguing that as hearsay, the

affidavitswere admissible onlyfor cross-examinationand could not be substituted for direct testimony

of live witnesses. The hearing officer refused to admit the declarations into evidence, but reminded

Car Wash that the Board's Regional Office was willing to investigate allegations that union

representatives had threatened retaliation against any employees who testified at the hearing. Car

Wash turned down this offer for the same reason it chose not to have the subpoenas enforced: any

investigation would result in eventual disclosure of the threatened employees' identities to the union

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officials named as the sources of those threats.

Without live witnesses or admissible declarations, Car Wash had no case, and the hearing

officer recommended that the Board overrule Car Wash's objections to the election. His report first

addressed the Regional Director's decision to deny Car Wash's request for an "attorneys-eyes-only"

hearing. He concluded that the Board's rules, which permit each party to have a representative of its

choice at a hearing, precluded Car Wash's proposal. The hearing officer then explained why he had

excluded the employee declarations, noting that settled case law and Board rules permit the use of

affidavits only for impeachment of witnesses testifying on cross-examination, not as admissible

evidence in lieu of oral testimony, and reasoning that even if the declarations were otherwise

admissible, undisclosed evidentiaryproblems would have precluded their admission in redacted form.

The Board accepted these recommendations and certified the union as the exclusive bargaining

representative of Car Wash's employees.

Car Wash, however, refused to bargain in order to challenge the Board's resolution of its

election objections. After the union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Car Wash, alleging

that its refusal to bargain violated §§ 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board

granted summary judgment against Car Wash. Car Wash now asks us to vacate the Board's order,

claiming that the hearing officer's refusal to hold an "attorneys-eyes-only" hearing or permit the

admission of the redacted employee declarations denied it a meaningful opportunity to present its

election objections.

II. CAR WASH'S TWO PROPOSALS

Before turning to the Board's ruling on each of Car Wash's proposals to preserve witness

anonymity, we briefly set forth the applicable standard for reviewing the Board's decisions. On

questions regarding representation, we accord the Board an especially "wide degree of discretion."

NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946); see also C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d

880, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers, 736 F.2d

at 1564 ("the scope of our review ofthe Board's decisionsin casesinvolving certification is extremely

limited" (citing Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 818, 827 (D.C. Cir.

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1970)). We will affirm the Board's order to bargain unless the Board abused its discretion in

overruling Car Wash's objections in the underlying election proceeding. See C.J. Krehbiel Co., 844

F.2d at 881-82.

A. "Attorneys-Eyes-Only" Hearing

Car Wash argues that the Board misinterpreted its own rules and abused its discretion by

refusing to conduct an "attorneys-eyes-only" hearing. The hearing officer stated that the Board's

rules, which give each party the right to have a representative of its choice present at a hearing,

precluded use of the restricted type of hearing procedures requested by Car Wash. Rule 102.66(a)

provides in relevant part that "[a]ny party shall have the right to appear at any hearing in person, by

counsel, or by other representative." 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(a) (1995). Car Wash contends that instead

of affirming the hearing officer's construction of the rule, the Board should have interpreted it as

allowing the presence of either an attorney or a representative at a hearing, but not necessarily both.

Had the Board adopted this construction of the Rule, it could have assented to the

"attorneys-eyes-only" request.

The Board's interpretation of its own rule is given controlling weight, unless it is plainly

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation itself. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410,

413-14 (1945); S.G. Loewendick & Sons, Inc. v. Reich, 70 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2386 (1994) (quoting Bowles v.

Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))). The Board's failure to interpret its rules so as to

accommodate potentialwitnessesin some mannereven ifit did not adopt the "attorneys-eyes-only"

procedure proposed byCar Washistroubling,since the serious allegationsleveled against the union

by Car Wash were never investigated. But this decision is not such an egregious error as to require

vacation of the Board's order, for several reasons.

First, the Board's decision to reject the specific procedure advanced by Car Wash was

permissible. Rule 102.66(a), on which the Board relied, does not expressly bar attendance by counsel

plus some other representative, and petitioner has not pointed to any statutory provision that would

require the Board to restrict attendance to counsel alone. Nor is the Board's construction of the rule

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4The employee declarations submitted by Car Wash were originally given in Spanish, and

translated into English by a third party. Although this suggests that at least some of the

employees speak Spanish, there is no evidence in the record as to whether the union officials

accused of misconduct also speak Spanish. 

as barring an "attorneys-eyes-only" procedure otherwise without reason. What Car Wash asked the

Board to do was to conduct a hearing on allegations of illegal threats by union members, without

permitting the union's attorney to disclose the identities of adverse witnesses to those officials in the

course of defending them. When asked at oral argument how the union officials could have defended

against these charges if the hearing officer had used an "attorneys-eyes-only" procedure, counselfor

Car Wash suggested the officials make a blanket claim that they never threatened any employees.

That approach leaves much room for an erroneous decision. It might be the case, for example, that

a union representative made a remark which was misunderstood by an employee, perhaps because

of language barriers,4or one which, in context, is more accurately characterized as part of the

give-and-take of a union campaign, rather than an impermissible threat of reprisal. A union official

would be able to offer a credible defense along these lines only if he knew the identity ofthe employee

witness, so that he could provide the hearing officer with additional details about the incident. Or,

it might be that the employee declarations are untrue, and motivated by animosity between the

employee declarants and the union officials that is unrelated to the union election. If the identity of

employee declarantsis not disclosed to the union representatives accused ofmisconduct, their ability

to provide additional information necessary to a fair decision could be significantly diminished.

Even if the Board did not abuse its discretion in construing § 102.66(a) as prohibiting an

"attorneys-eyes-only" procedure, the question remains whether its failure to make some other

accommodation for employee witnesses requires reversal. The Board did nothing to reassure the

employees that if they testified against the union, their safety would be protecteda step that is

certainly not barred by § 102.66(a) or any other Board rule or regulation that we have uncovered.

For example, it might have issued a protective order prohibiting union officials from intimidating

employee witnesses or restricting their contact with those employees. Or, the Board itself could have

suggested an alternative hearing procedure, perhaps one which would include negotiations between

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5At oral argument, counsel for the Board justified its failure to pursue this matter because it

had only the employer's counsel's word to rely upon as evidence that the threats took place. We

are unpersuaded that the sworn employee declarations regarding pre-election threats of violence,

coupled with counsel's statement that post-election threats had also been made, were insufficient

to warrant the Board's further investigation. 

6Our research suggests that only in rare cases (for example, when national security is at stake)

may an agency adjudicate charges against someone without revealing the identity of the accuser. 

See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a), (c) (1995) (INS regulations authorizing immigration judge to

consider nonrecord material in deportation proceedings without disclosing it to illegal alien, if

disclosure would endanger national security); see also Suciu v. INS, 755 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.

1985) (rejecting due process challenge to 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a), (c) (citing Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S.

345, 357 n.21, 360-61 (1956))). 

the union and the company as to who would serve as the union's representatives. Yet it did none of

the above. Nor did the Board explain why it did not independently investigate Car Wash's allegations

of threats made against potential witnesses, or even take in camera testimony from those witnesses

to determine if further steps were warranted.5

On the other hand, the Board's Regional Director did offer to investigate the allegations of

witness intimidation, and indicated that the anonymity of witnesses could be maintained until the

investigation was taken over by a U.S. Attorney, who presumably would have even more weapons

at his disposal for protecting potential witnesses. Car Wash, however, rejected that offer, both in

conversations with theRegionalDirector and again before the hearing officer. More importantly, Car

Wash took the position that it would not accept any hearing procedures that did not guarantee

witness anonymity. While it might well be an abuse of discretion for the Board to interpret its rules

in a manner that fails to protect witnesses, it is reasonable for the Board to refuse to conduct its

hearings without revealing the identity of witnesses to an accused party.

6 Although we would be

more inclined to vacate the Board's order had Car Wash indicated its amenability to some alternative

accommodation directed at the employees' safety, rather than only their continued anonymity, that

was not petitioner's stance before the Board's hearing officer. Accordingly, the Board did not abuse

its discretion in construing § 102.66(a) to prohibit the use of an "attorneys-eyes-only" procedure.

B. Redacted Employee Declarations

Car Wash also contends that the Board abused its discretion by refusing to admit into

evidence the declarations of Car Wash's employees with all identifying information redacted. In

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7The hearing officer also identified two other reasons for excluding the redacted employee

declarations. First, the officer cited NLRB Rule 102.118(b)-(c), which permits an Administrative

Law Judge ("ALJ") to order production of witness statements for use in cross-examination. 

Although he appears to have interpreted the rule as providing exclusive grounds for the admission

of witness statements, it seems more likely that this rule gives an ALJ authority to order the

production of witness statements for use in cross-examination. Second, the hearing officer noted

that "a plethora of evidentiary problems would have precluded ... admission [of the redacted

declarations] into evidence," but did not detail what those problems might be. Absent further

analysis by the hearing officer on this point, it is difficult to determine whether this conclusion was

reasonable. In any case, Rule 102.66(a)'s preference for live oral testimony provides sufficient

support for the Board's refusal to admit the declarations as evidence in redacted form. 

excluding the declarations, the hearing officer relied uponRule 102.66(a), which providesin relevant

part that "[w]itnesses shall be examined orally under oath." That construction accords with Board

precedent expressing a strong preference for live oral testimony. See, e.g., Waterbed World, 301

N.L.R.B. No. 82 (1991) ("affidavits are not admissible in lieu oftestimony unlessthe witnessis either

deceased or so seriously ill that accepting the oral testimony poses a threat to the health of the

witness" (citations omitted)), enf'd by NLRB v. Omnix Intern. Corp., 974 F.2d 1329 (1st Cir. 1992).

The Board's interpretation is also a permissible one in light of the facts of this case, even though Car

Wash was left with no admissible evidence as a result. As with its proposal for an

"attorneys-eyes-only" hearing, Car Wash focused its request to admit redacted declarations on the

need to keep secret the identities of witnesses who testified against the union. Reviewing the Board's

rejection of this proposal, though, is an easier call than evaluating its decision on the

"attorneys-eyes-only" hearing. Not only would the identities of witnesses remain undisclosed to the

union officialsthemselvesifthe redacted declarations were admitted, they would be kept secret from

union attorneys. Moreover, the hearing officer would be deprived of the manifold benefits that live

oral testimony offers in comparison to documentary evidence. Thus, the Board did not abuse its

discretion in denying this request.7

Finally, Car Wash contends that the Board's negative decisions on its two requests violated

its due process rights. Petitioner has not framed its due process argument with much precision. In

its brief to this court, Car Wash appears to contend that the due process clause confers the right to

a meaningful hearing prior to government action, so that the Board was required to accept at least

one ofthe two specific proposals Car Wash made to keep secret the identities of employee witnesses.

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See Petitioner's Brief at 16-20. At oral argument, however, counsel for Car Wash argued that the

Board violated its right to a fair hearing by failing to come up with some alternative mechanism to

protect the employees, given that it had decided not to adopt either of the two suggestions put forth

by Car Wash. Whichever way we consider this objection to the Board's ruling, it does not merit

reversal. In determining what procedural safeguards are required before the Board may certify the

union, we must weigh the private interest affected by the official action, the risk of an erroneous

deprivation under existing procedures and the probable value of additional safeguards, and the

government's interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Here, we conclude the

Board was not constitutionallyrequired to adopt proceduresthat concealed the identities of employee

witnesses from the accused union officials. By offering to take reasonable steps to ensure the safety

of witnesses, the Board could presumably fulfill any due process obligation it might have to protect

Car Wash's interest in a fair adjudication of its election objections, without the increased risk of an

erroneous decision that stems from witness anonymity. The Board's failure in this instance to take

any steps on its own to assuage employees' fears or even to further investigate the credibility of

counsel's allegations is sufficiently disturbing to make this a close case, but understandable in view

of petitioner's rigid position that only a guarantee of witness anonymity would permit the hearing to

move forward. In light of that stance, we can understand the Board's reluctance to prod

uncooperative parties on both sides of this dispute into an investigation of Car Wash's allegations.

* * *

In sum, we cannot say that the Board abused its discretion in denying the two requests of Car

Wash. Accordingly, we uphold the Board's order certifying the election and ordering Car Wash to

bargain, although we strongly urge the Board in the future to make more aggressive efforts to insure

that threats of violence do not impugn the integrity of Board hearings by intimidating witnesses into

not testifying. The petition for reversing the order of the Board is hereby denied, and the Board's

order is

Enforced.

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