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Parties Involved:
Johnnie Edward Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12618

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHNNIE EDWARD JOHNSON, 

Defendant- Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cr-00065-TKW-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12618

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Johnnie Johnson pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a 

felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the district court imposed a 57-month sentence. On appeal, he argues that the district 

court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement based on its determination that Johnson recklessly created a substantial risk of 

death or serious bodily injury to another person while fleeing from 

a law enforcement officer. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual

§ 3C1.2. After careful consideration, we affirm. 

I.

While on patrol, a sheriff’s deputy observed that Johnson 

was driving a vehicle with a window tint that was too dark. The 

deputy turned on his lights and sirens to initiate a traffic stop. But

Johnson ignored the deputy and continued traveling at a high rate 

of speed. While fleeing, Johnson lost control of his vehicle, which 

flipped over. The vehicle had extensive damage, and its engine area 

caught fire. The deputy grabbed a fire extinguisher from his vehicle, approached Johnson’s vehicle, and put out the fire.

The deputy ordered Johnson to leave the vehicle, but he did 

not cooperate. When additional deputies arrived on the scene, they 

got Johnson out of the vehicle. The deputies detained him and then 

searched the vehicle where they found a bag of marijuana and a 

handgun. 

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23-12618 Opinion of the Court 3

In an interview with law enforcement, Johnson reported 

that he fled from the traffic stop because he believed he had an outstanding warrant for failing to pay child support. He admitted that 

he had a firearm in the vehicle.

A grand jury charged Johnson with one count of possessing 

a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

He pleaded guilty.

Before sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSR”). The PSR recounted the facts 

that led to Johnson’s arrest, including that he fled from the deputy

at a high speed and crashed his vehicle, causing a fire.

The PSR set Johnson’s base offense level at 20 because he 

unlawfully possessed a firearm after sustaining a felony conviction 

for “a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). It then 

applied a two-level enhancement because Johnson “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another 

person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” Id.

§ 3C1.2. And it included a three-level reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility. See id. § 3E1.1. Based on a total offense level of 19 

and a criminal history category of IV, the PSR calculated Johnson’s 

Sentencing Guidelines range as 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. 

Johnson objected to the PSR’s calculation of his base offense 

level, arguing that his earlier felony conviction did not qualify as a 

controlled substance offense for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. But he did not object to the PSR’s description of his offense 

conduct, which included his flight from the deputy, or to the

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12618

enhancement for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or 

serious bodily injury while fleeing a law enforcement officer. Indeed, Johnson conceded that he was “not contesting” this enhancement and admitted his conduct was “dangerous.” Doc. 51 at 25–

26.1 At the sentencing hearing, the district court overruled Johnson’s objection to his base offense level and determined that his 

Guidelines range was 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment.

Johnson asked the court to impose a sentence below this 

range. He urged the court to consider his mental health and 

pointed out that he had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder as well as post-traumatic stress disorder. Johnson’s brother testified that at the time of the offense Johnson was off his medication 

and “wasn’t in his right state of mind.” Id. at 14.

The district court imposed a sentence of 57 months. It 

acknowledged that Johnson had mental health challenges. It nevertheless concluded that a sentence at the high end of the guidelines range was appropriate given Johnson’s conduct, which included high-speed flight from law enforcement. The court explained that Johnson’s flight put law enforcement and the public at 

risk. The court stated that it was “just luck that there wasn’t another car there, just luck that there wasn’t a person crossing the 

street, [and] just luck that law enforcement wasn’t harmed.” Id. at 

34. 

This is Johnson’s appeal. 

1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

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23-12618 Opinion of the Court 5

II.

We typically review a district court’s factual findings for 

clear error and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines to those 

facts de novo. United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th 

Cir. 2006). But when a defendant raises an issue for the first time 

on appeal, we review for plain error only. United States v. Johnson, 

694 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2012). To show plain error, a defendant must establish (1) there was error; (2) that was plain; (3) that 

affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. An error is plain only if it is contrary to a federal statute or on-point precedent from this Court or the United States Supreme Court. United States v. Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th 

Cir. 2013).

III.

The Sentencing Guidelines call for a two-level increase in offense level when the defendant “recklessly created a substantial risk 

of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of 

fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. “‘Reckless’ refers to a situation in which the defendant was aware of the 

risk created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and 

degree that to disregard that risk constituted a gross deviation from 

the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such 

a situation.” United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1197 (11th Cir. 

2015). 

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For the enhancement to apply, the defendant’s conduct during flight must have, through recklessness, created a situation 

where “there was a substantial risk that something could have gone 

wrong and someone could have died or been seriously injured.” Id. 

at 1198. Without more, a defendant’s flight from law enforcement 

does not warrant application of the enhancement. See United 

States v. Wilson, 392 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004). But it is not 

required that the defendant’s conduct cause an actual death or serious injury. See Matchett, 802 F.3d at 1197–98. We have affirmed 

application of the enhancement when the defendant, while fleeing 

law enforcement, drove a car at high speed in an area where people 

were likely to be found, even though there was no evidence that 

anyone was injured. See Washington, 434 F.3d at 1267–68. 

Johnson argues that the district court erred in applying an

enhancement under § 3C1.2. He says that the enhancement was 

unwarranted because the record shows that his conduct during 

flight jeopardized “only . . . his own safety.” Appellant’s Br. 11 (emphasis in original). Because he raises this issue for the first time on 

appeal, we review for plain error. 

We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in applying the enhancement. Although no one was injured as a result 

of Johnson’s conduct, his actions nonetheless created a substantial 

risk that another person—for instance, the deputy who tried to stop 

him—could have been seriously injured. After all, the deputy encountered a situation in which Johnson fled at a high rate of speed 

and then flipped his vehicle, which caught fire. To put out the 

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23-12618 Opinion of the Court 7

blaze, the deputy had to approach the vehicle with a fire extinguisher while Johnson refused to cooperate. Given the totality of 

the circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not 

plainly err when it concluded that Johnson’s conduct recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another 

person. See Matchett, 802 F.3d at 1197–98.

Johnson disagrees and points to our decision in Wilson in 

which we reversed the application of the enhancement when a defendant fled from law enforcement on foot and an officer injured 

his finger when he tackled the defendant. 392 F.3d at 1244. We held

that the district court erred in applying the enhancement because 

the defendant’s conduct did not create a substantial risk of serious 

injury to another. Id. Although the officer was injured, we noted

that he suffered the “kind of injury [that] may occur anytime a defendant flees,” and concluded that this type of injury did not warrant the application of the enhancement. Id.

Wilson does not change our analysis. Nothing in Wilson establishes that the district court plainly erred when it concluded that 

Johnson’s conduct, in which he led a deputy on a high-speed chase 

that ended with his vehicle flipping over and catching fire, created

a substantial risk of harm. Because the district court did not plainly 

err when it applied the two-level enhancement under § 3C1.2, we 

affirm Johnson’s sentence. 

AFFIRMED.

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