Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00886/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00886-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Safety-Kleen Systems, Inc.
Defendant
David Stegall
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMUNDO PEREZ, et al.,

Plaintiff, No. C 05-5338 PJH 

v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 SAFETY-KLEEN SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

DAVID STEGALL,

Plaintiff, No. C 07-0886 PJH 

v.

 SAFETY-KLEEN SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing on May 30, 2007. 

Barron Ramos, Jeremy Fietz, Donald Edgar, and Kristin Caverly appeared for plaintiffs; 

Robert Tollen and Janine Simerly appeared for defendant. Having read all the papers

submitted and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the court hereby GRANTS

in part and DENIES in part defendant’s motion for the following reasons and for the

reasons stated at the hearing.

BACKGROUND

These actions arise from defendant Safety-Kleen Systems, Inc.’s (“Safety-Kleen”) 

alleged failure to provide meal and rest breaks to its employees. There are two separate

complaints at issue. Plaintiffs Reymundo Perez and Jerrell Doane allege the following

causes of action in their complaint: (1) Unlawful Failure to Pay Required Overtime (Wage

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Order No. 7-2001, California Labor Code Sections 510, 1194, 1198); (2) Unjust

Enrichment/ Quantum Meruit; (3) Conversion; (4) Waiting Time Penalties (California Labor

Code Sections 201-203); (5) Failure to Provide Itemized Wage Statements (California

Labor Code Section 226); (6) Failure to Provide Meal Periods and Rest Breaks (California

Labor Code Sections 226.7, 512, and Wage Order No. 7-2001); and (7) Unfair Practices

Under Unfair Competition Act (California Business and Professions Code Sections 17200-

17208). David Stegall’s complaint alleges claims for: (1) Failure to Provide Meal Periods

and Rest Breaks (California Labor Code Section 226.7); and (2) Unfair Practices Under

Unfair Competition Act (California Business and Professions Code Sections 17200). Perez

and Doane’s first and fourth causes of action (overtime and waiting time claims) were

dismissed by stipulation on May 23, 2006. Defendant moves for summary judgment with

respect to all other remaining causes of action in the two complaints. 

A. Statutory Background

 California Labor Code § 512 governs the provision of meal periods. This provision

was enacted as part of the Eight-Hour-Day Restoration and Workplace Flexibility Act of

1999, 1999 Stats. Ch. 124 (AB 60). This statute provides that:

An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than

five hours per day without providing the employee with a meal period of

not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total work period per day of

the employee is no more than six hours, the meal period may be waived

by mutual consent of both the employer and employee. An employer may

not employ an employee for a work period of more than 10 hours per day

without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less

than 30 minutes, except that if the total hours worked is no more than 12

hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the

employer and the employee only if the first meal period was not waived.

It also states that the Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) may adopt an order

“permitting a meal period to commence after six hours of work if the commission

determines that the order is consistent with the health and welfare of the affected

employees.” Cal. Labor Code § 512.

In September of 2000, the California Labor Code was further amended to add

another provision regarding meal and rest periods, providing that “[n]o employer shall

require any employee to work during any meal or rest period mandated by an applicable

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1 Safety-Kleen concedes that Wage Order 7-2001 applies to its business. Plaintiff notes

that Wage Order 4-2001 may also apply to Safety-Kleen’s business, but acknowledges Wage

Order 7-2001 applies for purposes of this motion.

3

order of the Industrial Welfare Commission.” Cal. Labor Code § 226.7(a). It further states

that if “an employer fails to provide an employee a meal period or rest period in accordance

with an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, the employer shall pay the

employee one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation for

each work day that the meal or rest period is not provided.” Cal. Labor Code § 226.7(b).

Both labor code sections refer to IWC wage orders. Prior to enactment of Labor

Code § 512, the IWC’s wage orders required meal periods. It issued new wage orders in

2000, including Wage Order 7-2001 (effective January 1, 2001).1

 While the IWC was

de-funded by the California Legislature effective July 1, 2004, its wage orders, which

govern wages, hours and working conditions in California, are still in effect. Regarding

meal periods, the IWC order states:

Unless the employee is relieved of all duty during a 30 minute meal

period, the meal period shall be considered an "on duty" meal period and

counted as time worked. An "on duty" meal period shall be permitted only

when the nature of the work prevents an employee from being relieved of

all duty and when by written agreement between the parties an on-the-job

paid meal period is agreed to. The written agreement shall state that the

employee may, in writing, revoke the agreement at any time.

Wage Order 7-2001 ¶ 11. It also governs rest periods, providing that:

Every employer shall authorize and permit all employees to take rest

periods, which insofar as practicable shall be in the middle of each work

period. The authorized rest period time shall be based on the total hours

worked daily at the rate of ten (10) minutes net rest time per four (4) hours

or major fraction thereof. However, a rest period need not be authorized

for employees whose total daily work time is less than three and one-half

(3 1⁄2) hours. Authorized rest period time shall be counted as hours

worked for which there shall be no deduction from wages.

In addition to providing for meal and rest periods, California law requires that

employers provide itemized wage statements to their employees:

Every employer shall, semimonthly or at the time of each payment of

wages, furnish each of his or her employees, either as a detachable part of

the check, draft, or voucher paying the employee's wages, or separately

when wages are paid by personal check or cash, an accurate itemized

statement in writing showing (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours

worked by the employee, except for any employee whose compensation is

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

solely based on a salary and who is exempt from payment of overtime

under subdivision (a) of Section 515 or any applicable order of the

Industrial Welfare Commission, . . . and (9) all applicable hourly rates in

effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours

worked at each hourly rate by the employee.

Cal. Labor Code § 226(a).

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff Stegall was employed by Safety-Kleen from November 1998-November

2004 as a Customer Service Representative (“CSR”), an employee who drives a truck and

visits Safety-Kleen’s customers to service their equipment as part of Safety-Kleen’s waste

management services. Upon his employment, Stegall signed an agreement limiting his

ability to commence suit against the company to six months after the employment action in

dispute. He knew that employees in California had the right to take rest and meal breaks,

but nobody at Safety-Kleen ever told him he was entitled to do so or that he could not do

so. He felt that there was too much pressure to make his numbers to stop for breaks, but

admitted that a person could arrive at work an hour earlier and take their breaks. He

usually ate while driving, but took lunch breaks a few times a month. Safety-Kleen paid him

a base salary plus commission. 

Plaintiffs Jerrell Doane and Reymundo Perez were also employed by Safety-Kleen

as CSRs. Doane was paid salary plus commissions. He was not paid by the hour, nor was

he paid overtime. He knew that he was entitled to take breaks, but did not do so because

he had too much work to do. Plaintiff Perez was paid salary plus commissions, but not

overtime. Sometimes he took meal breaks. No supervisor ever told him not to, but none

ever told him to do so. He did not know that he was entitled to take breaks. 

All three plaintiffs received bi-monthly pay stubs that reflected they had worked 80

hours per pay period. Plaintiffs maintain that, on average, they worked in excess of 100

hours per pay period.

///

///

///

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment shall be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of

the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to

a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a

verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The court must view the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and give it the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be

drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of

the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof

at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other

than for the moving party. On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out to the district court that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id. If the moving

party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific facts showing

that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. 

“To show the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue, . . . [a plaintiff] must produce at least

some significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Smolen v. Deloitte,

Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted). The court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. City

of Tacoma, 332 F.3d 574, 578 (9th Cir. 2003). The court must not weigh the evidence or

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

determine the truth of the matter, but only determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). If the nonmoving party

fails to show that there is a genuine issue for trial, “the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Regardless of whether plaintiff or defendant

is the moving party, each party must “establish the existence of the elements essential to

[its] case, and on which [it] will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322. 

B. Defendant’s Motion

Safety-Kleen moves for summary judgment on the following bases. First, it argues

that all of Stegall’s claims must be dismissed because his claims are limited by a

contractual limitations clause. Second, Safety-Kleen argues that plaintiffs’ claims for meal

and rest period violations fail, because it provided them with those break periods. Third,

Safety-Kleen maintains that plaintiffs cannot recover for its failure to accurately record their

hours worked, because they cannot show the requisite injury and intent.

1. Stegall’s Claims

Safety-Kleen first argues that Stegall’s claims must be dismissed because he signed

an agreement with Safety-Kleen that he would not commence any action or suit against it

more than six months after the employment action in dispute. He terminated his

employment in November 2004 and did not commence suit until September 28, 2006. 

Specifically, Stegall signed the same agreement twice – on October 27, 1998 and

November 30, 1998 – which stated that “Employee further agrees. . . [t]hat Employee will

not file a charge or complaint or commence any action or suit relating to Employee’s

employment with Safety-Kleen more than six months after the employment action in

dispute and that Employee waives any statute or limitations to the contrary.” 

The Ninth Circuit has analyzed contractual six-month limitation provisions under

California law, noting that “[m]any California cases have upheld contractual shortening of

statutes of limitations in different types of contracts, including employment situations.” 

Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding summary

judgment in defendant’s favor). The Ninth Circuit has found that such provisions are not

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

unconscionable under California law. Even though plaintiffs in Soltani submitted evidence

of procedural unconscionability, the court found that “California case law strongly indicates

that the six-month limitation provision is not substantively unconscionable.” Id. at 1043

(citations omitted). “Given a sliding scale analysis, even assuming that the contract was a

non-negotiable adhesion contract, the substantive prong controls. Indeed, California courts

have upheld shortened limitation periods in insurance contracts, which are quintessential

adhesion contracts.” Id. at 1044-45. 

The contractual agreement signed by Stegall is therefore valid and enforceable. 

While Stegall argues that the contract lacks foundation and has not been properly

authenticated, Stegall admits that the signatures on the contracts are his own. While he

testified that he does not recall signing the contracts, he authenticated the document by

authenticating his signature on the contract. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(2). Plaintiff provides

no evidence suggesting that the document is fraudulent, and it is therefore admissible. 

Stegall also maintains that California Labor Code § 219 makes the contract

unenforceable, as it states “[n]othing in this article shall in any way limit or prohibit the

payment of wages at more frequent intervals, or in greater amounts, or in full when or

before due, but no provision of this article can in any way be contravened or set aside by

private agreement, whether written, oral, or implied.” The article to which Labor Code 

§ 219 refers includes Labor Code § 226.7, which governs the right to meal and rest

periods. The contract Stegall signed, however, did not “contravene” or “set aside” his right

to meal and rest periods – it shortened the time period in which he could bring suit against

Safety-Kleen. The statute of limitations for meal and rest period claims is not governed by

the Labor Code – it is set by Code of Civil Procedure § 338. See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole

Productions, Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1101 (2007). Labor Code § 219, therefore, does not

invalidate Stegall’s contract.

Stegall also argues that Safety-Kleen waived the 6-month contractual limitation

defense. However, “an affirmative defense based upon a contractual limitations period

may be raised for the first time on summary judgment if no prejudice is caused to the

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

nonmoving party.” Han v. Mobil Oil Corp., 73 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1995). Stegall does

not claim prejudice. In any event, Safety-Kleen specifically asserted the contractual

limitation defense in its answer to Stegall’s amended complaint. 

Finally, Stegall claims that Safety-Kleen’s May 2004 employee handbook

superseded the agreement containing the contractual limitations clause, because the

handbook explicitly supersedes “all previously issued handbooks, prior statements by the

Company or by any employee of the Company, and any other document inconsistent with

this Employee Handbook and the policies and procedures herein.” However, a contract in

writing may be modified only by another contract in writing, by an oral agreement to the

extent it is executed by the parties, or by an oral agreement supported by new

consideration. Cal. Civil Code § 1698. The handbook explicitly states that it is not a

contract and may be unilaterally changed by the company, so it does not have the power to

alter the 1998 contracts. In addition, the handbook does not address when suit may be

brought against the company and does not contradict the contracts. Nor does the

handbook’s provision that state law “shall control” in “the event of a conflict” between such

laws and the handbook invalidate the contractual limitation, as state law allows contractual

modification of statute of limitations. Summary judgment, therefore, is proper as to all of

Stegall’s claims, as they are barred by the contractual limitations clause.

2. Meal and Rest Period Claims

"An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than five

hours per day without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30

minutes,” although the meal period may be waived by “mutual consent” under certain

conditions. Nor may an employer “employ an employee for a work period of more than 10

hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than

30 minutes” except that this period may also be “waived by mutual consent” in certain

circumstances. Cal. Lab. Code § 512(a). 

Safety-Kleen argues that the statute only requires that an employer “provide” an

employee with a meal period, meaning that defendant need only “furnish, supply, make

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

available, or afford” such breaks. Safety-Kleen argues that “the nature of plaintiffs’ work”

provided them with the opportunity to take meal periods, because plaintiffs were truck

drivers working solo away from the employer’s premises. There is no authority to support

Safety-Kleen’s argument that merely being off-site and away from management constitutes

“provision” of breaks. Certainly, employers could instruct their drivers not to take breaks, or

otherwise imply that they may not take breaks. Just because an employee works on the

road does not end the inquiry as to whether meal periods were provided under the statute.

The court has examined all of the facts here in a light most favorable to plaintiffs and

finds a dispute as to whether Safety-Kleen “provided” meal periods. Safety-Kleen has no

policy regarding meal breaks for CSRs. Safety-Kleen does not have a method of

determining how many hours a CSR in California works during the day. See Williams

Depo. Tr. at 102, 135. Only since May 2004 have Safety-Kleen’s employees had an

employee handbook which states “your manager is responsible for providing you the local

procedures regarding breaks and meal periods, subject to state and local laws and

regulations. If you are a non-exempt employee, you are required to take one meal break of

at least 30 minutes each workday.” This handbook does not state that exempt employees

have a right to a meal period as well.

Stegall, Perez, and Doane all declare that they were never relieved of all duty during

any meal or break period. They were on call at all times and were required to carry a

company cell phone to maintain constant contact with the branch. They were required to

complete a detailed log each day which specifically stated they were on duty from the time

they arrived at the branch until going home at the end of the day. See Stegall Decl. ¶ 7;

Perez Decl. ¶ 6; Doane Decl. ¶ 6. 

At his deposition, Stegall testified that the Safety-Kleen managers never told him to

stop and take a meal or rest breaks during the day. Nor did they tell him not to. See

Stegall Depo Tr. at 43-44. He knew there were posters at the branch where he worked, but

never saw a poster about the right to take rest breaks and meal breaks. Id. at 45. He

recalls one time when another employee was criticized by the manager for stopping to have

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

breakfast with another employee. Id. at 46. There was a lot of pressure to hit revenue

numbers each day, and the customers they were servicing closed around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. 

The CSRs attended weekly meetings stressing revenue and productivity, and the

employees were questioned about how many customers they serviced during the day. Id.

at 51, 83. 

While Stegall knew he had a right to breaks based on prior work experience, Perez

testified that he knew nothing about his right to take a rest or meal break when he worked

for Safety-Kleen. Perez Depo. Tr. at 22. He was never told to make sure he took his

break, or that he had a right to a break, or to record his breaks. He was only told to go out

there and get his work done. Id. at 23. He also said that he did not take breaks because

he had too much work to do, and he did not want to work later. Nobody ever told him not to

take breaks, but he does not recall anyone telling him to take breaks. He speculated that

other employees decided whether or not to take a rest break. Id. at 72. Doane stated that

the handheld he was given by Safety-Kleen would say “break” on it, but sometimes it would

list no breaks on a given day. Doane knew from prior experience that he had a right to take

a meal break and that he was entitled to two short rest breaks for an eight hour shift, but he

did not know how long these breaks were supposed to be. Id. at 57. His supervisor did not

encourage him to take breaks. He speculates that “the ultimate decision [whether to take

breaks] was mine.” Id. at 71.

There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Safety-Kleen provided meal

periods to plaintiffs, particularly given the lack of a policy for meal breaks, the fact that

plaintiffs were never told to take breaks, the fact that Perez did not even know he had a

right to take breaks, the general pressures of the position, and the fact that plaintiffs were

required to fill out a call log stating they were on duty all day long. These facts also reveal

a dispute as to whether Safety-Kleen “authoriz[ed] and permit[ted] rest periods” as required

by Wage Order 7-2001 ¶ 12. See also Cal. Labor Code § 226.7 (authorizing pay where

“employer fails to provide an employee a meal period or rest period in accordance with an

applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission”).

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

In light of the above, the court need not resolve plaintiffs’ argument that California

law “does not permit an employee . . . to decide to take a break or not take a break.” The

court, however, notes that the applicable IWC Wage Order indicates that an employer must

do something affirmative to provide a meal period, and may not merely assume such

breaks are taken. The Wage Order states that “[n]o employer shall employ any person for

a work period of more than five hours without a meal period of not less than thirty minutes,”

and also states that “unless the employee is relieved of all duty during a 30 minute meal

period, the meal period shall be considered an ‘on duty’ meal period and counted as time

worked.” IWC Wage Order 7-2001. While Safety-Kleen argues that this IWC Order is not

within the scope of the authority conferred by the legislature because its mandatory

language contradicts Labor Code § 512, the court need not resolve this issue. At the very

least, consistent with Labor Code § 512, the Wage Order requires the employer to

affirmatively provide a meal break and provide the opportunity for the employee to be

“relieved of all duty during a 30 minute meal period.” 

This result is consistent with California court decisions on meal and rest period

provision. In Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 4th 949 (2005), the California

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in defendant’s favor

on violations of California statute and regulations relating to meal periods, rest breaks, and

itemized wage statements. Regarding meal periods, the court first noted that the

evidentiary burden rests with the employer, and the employer’s failure to keep the required

statutory records falls on it. Id. at 961. Defendant’s manager declared that the drivers

were protected by a collective bargaining agreement that provided them with meal breaks,

and that they were constantly on the road, had the power to decide whether to take breaks,

and so their activity could not be regulated by defendant. Defendant assumed that the

drivers took breaks. Id. at 962. The court found that defendant had the ability to monitor its

drivers’ activities, and did so with respect to other activities. The court found “defendant’s

obligation to provide the plaintiffs with an adequate meal period is not satisfied by assuming

that the meal periods were taken, because employers have ‘an affirmative obligation to

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

ensure that workers are actually relieved of all duty.’” Id. (citing DLSE Opinion Letter No.

2002.02.28 (Jan. 28, 2002)). The court also found that defendant did not “authorize and

permit” rest periods as required, noting that defendant’s computer system did not contain a

code for rest breaks and that drivers felt pressured not to take such breaks because they

were not on a list of paid delays. Id. at 963. The employer petitioned for review, but the

petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied.

Similar to the employer in Cicairos, Safety-Kleen assumed that plaintiffs knew they

had the right to take a meal break without ever actively providing breaks (or even telling its

employees they had that right) or monitoring whether breaks were taken. Safety-Kleen

argues that Cicairos carries little weight, because it relied on a DLSE opinion letter which

has no legal force or effect, and, in any event, DLSE subsequently changed its position to

state that the Labor Code required that the employer “make a meal period available and to

give the employee an opportunity to take it.” But even if Safety-Kleen is correct and it had

no “affirmative obligation to ensure” that its workers are actually relieved of duty, it was

obligated to provide off-duty meal and rest breaks. See Murphy, 40 Cal. 4th 1094

(California’s meal time provisions are to be “interpreted broadly in favor of protecting

employees”). 

In light of the disputed facts here, summary judgment is not proper as to Perez and

Doane’s claims for meal and rest period violations. Stegall’s claims, however, fail for the

contractual limitations reasons discussed above. Summary judgment is also denied as to

Perez and Doane’s derivative claims (California Business and Professions Code § 17200,

unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and conversion). These claims are predicated on

Safety-Kleen’s alleged failure to provide meal and rest periods, and Safety-Kleen argued

no separate grounds for dismissing these claims.

3. Itemized Wage Statement Claim

Safety-Kleen concedes it failed to record total hours worked on plaintiffs’ wage

statements as it was obligated to do under California Labor Code § 226(a)(2). But it argues

that plaintiffs cannot prove the requisite intent or injury under the statute, which provides

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

that “[a]n employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure by an

employer to comply with subdivision (a) is entitled to recover . . . not exceeding an

aggregate penalty of four thousand dollars.” Cal. Labor Code § 226(e).

Safety-Kleen maintains that its failure to accurately record the number of hours was

not “knowing and intentional” because defendant was unaware that recording the number

of hours was required under California law. Defendant, however, concedes that it

knowingly and intentionally provided wage statements containing the incorrect total hours

worked. Ignorance of the law, however, does not excuse Safety-Kleen. See People v.

Snyder, 32 Cal. 3d 590, 592-593 (1982) (“It is an emphatic postulate of both civil and penal

law that ignorance of a law is no excuse for a violation thereof.”). In Wang v. Chinese Daily

News, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (C.D. Cal. 2006), the court found a violation of California

Labor Code § 206, noting that defendants conceded they knew their wage statements did

not comply with California law, citing to evidence that the wage statements always listed

their hours at 86.66. Id. at 1051. So too here, where Safety-Kleen’s statements always list

80.00 hours per two week period regardless of hours actually worked. The Wang court

also noted that defendants had the “responsibility to ameliorate the problem,” but their

failure to do so and their position that the “violations are merely technical also demonstrate

that the violations were knowing and intentional.” Id. Here, Safety-Kleen’s own person

most knowledgeable testified that Safety-Kleen has no method of calculating how many

hours a CSR works in a given day, indicating it has not ameliorated the problem, even

though it issued a California law handbook in 2005. Therefore, there is a question of fact

as to Safety-Kleen’s intent, and summary judgment is improper on this basis. 

Regarding the statute’s injury requirement, Safety-Kleen argues that neither Perez

nor Doane were injured by the omission of accurate hours on their wage statement,

because they were salaried employees who were not paid overtime. While plaintiffs do not

make any claim that they are entitled to overtime, the "lawsuit, and the difficulty and

expense Plaintiffs have encountered in attempting to reconstruct time and pay records, is . .

. evidence of the injury suffered as a result of [the] wage statements." Wang, 436 F. Supp.

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

2d at 1050. Plaintiffs will need to engage in “discovery and mathematical computations” in

order to calculate meal and rest period payments they claim they are entitled to. Id. 

Plaintiffs testified that they typically worked 100 hours or more per two week period, and

took rest and meal periods rarely, if at all. While it is true that the employer bears “the

consequences for . . . failure” to keep records under the statute, plaintiffs will have to

determine their own damages for missed meal and rest periods due to the absence of

records. Cicairos, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 961. This is sufficient to establish a triable issue as

to injury. Summary judgment on this claim is therefore not proper at this time.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part

defendant’s motion. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED as to Stegall’s claims. This order terminates the

Stegall case (Case No. C 07-0886 PJH) and any pending motions in that case. The clerk

shall close that case file. 

Summary judgment is DENIED as to the claims in the Perez case (Case No. C 05-

5338 PJH). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 27, 2007

_________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:07-cv-00886-PJH Document 14 Filed 06/27/07 Page 14 of 14