Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02536/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02536-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Borren
Appellant
John Dentist
Not Party
Jane Doctor
Not Party
John Doctor
Not Party
Robert Fulton
Not Party
Harold E. Goldman
Not Party
Heriberto Martinez
Not Party
Scott Furman Maxey
Appellee
Julia Teska
Not Party

Document Text:

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLERK 

,ttitell jtates Qlo-urt o-f J\ppcals 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

January 5, 1990 

TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF .THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 87-2536 Maxey v. Fulton 

(D.C. No. 85-C-438-E) 

Filed November 29,. 1989, by Judge Tacha 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844·3157 

(FTS> 564·3157 

Attached is a new page 3 which should be substituted for· 

page 3 in the original opinion filed and sent to you on November 29, 

1989. 

Enclosure 

RLH:oac 

Very truly yours, 

ROr;HO::K , Clerk 

)(a, f t'4 M 

By Patrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 1 
Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 2 
James Borren, former superintendent of the Hissom Memorial 

Center, a state-institution for the mentally retarded, appeals the 

district court's order denying his motions for summary judgment or 

a protective order in two 42 u.s.c. section 1983 actions brought 

on behalf of Scott Furman Maxey and Joseph Donald Cole 

(''residents"), two former resident~ at Hissom. Botren bases his 

appeal on the district court's purported rejection of his 

qualified immunity defense. We reverse and remand for further 

proceedings. 

I. 

The residents filed amended complaints on December 20, 1985, 

which alleged numerous violations of their-constitutional, 

statutory and common law rights, including the rights to personal 

safety, freedom from harm, freedom from excessive restraint, 

adequate medical care, and minimally adequate habilitation. Both 

complaints alleged that Borren was the superintendent of Hissom 

during part of their residency and that he exercised general 

supervision over the complex. 

On January 28, 1986, Borren moved to dismiss the residents' 

section 1983 actions, arguing that the residents had not 

adequately pleaded his "personal participation'' in the wrongs 

alleged to.have occurred. Borren also argued that the alleged 

wrongs in the amended complaint were not deliberate violations of 

the residents' constitutional or other rights and that the 

complaints alleged only "negligent" conduct. The district court 

denied Borren's motion to dismiss. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 3 
Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 4 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SCOTT FURMAN MAXEY, a Minor, by his mother & } 

next friend, DIANNA MAXEY, } 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ROBERT FULTON, individually; JULIA TESKA, 

individually; HAROLD E. GOLDMAN, 

individually; HERIBERTO MARTINEZ, 

individually; JOHN DENTIST, individually; 

JOHN DOCTOR, individually; JANE DOCTOR, 

individually, 

Defendants, 

and 

JAMES BORREN, individually, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

} 

} 

} 

} 

} 

} 

) 

} 

} 

} 

} 

) 

) 

} 

) 

) 

} 

} 

} 

JOSEPH DONALD COLE, by his mother & } 

next friend, VIRGINIA COLE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

} 

v. ) 

) 

ROBERT FULTON; individually; JULIA TESKA, ) 

individually; HAROLD E. GOLDMAN, _ ) 

individually; LUIS A. REINOSO, individually; } 

JOHN DOCTOR, iridividually; JANE DOCTOR, } 

individually; JOHN DENTIST, individually, ) 

) 

Defendants, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

JAMES BORREN, individually, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. } 

1-'iL_g·b 

United State5 Ct.Jtft•c ~f Appe11ls 

Tentb Cr.r:.11·t 

NOV 2 3 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-2536 

No. 87-2539 

Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 5 
Robert A. 

and John 

him on the 

General of 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. Nos. 85-C-438-E & 85-C-439-E) 

Nance (Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of Oklahoma, 

Galowitch, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, with 

briefs), Chief, Federal Division, Assistant Attorney 

Oklahoma, for the Defendant-Appellant. 

Judith A. Gran (Louis A. Bullock, Esquire, and Patricia Bullock, 

Esquire, of Tulsa, Oklahoma; Raymond Yasser, Esquire, of the 

University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Frank J •. Laski, Esquire, and 

Timothy M. Cook, Esquire, of The Public Interest Law Center of 

Philadelphia, of Philadelphia, Pensylvania; and Allen Mitchell, 

Esquire, of Sapulpa, Oklahoma, with her on the briefs), The Public 

Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 

for the Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, MOORE and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 6 
James Borren, former superintendent of the Hissom Memorial 

Center, a state institution for the mentally retarded, appeals the 

district court's order denying his motions for summary judgment or 

a protective order in two 42 u.s.c. section 1983 actions brought 

on behalf of Scott Furman Maxey and Joseph Donald Cole 

(''residents"), two former residents at Hissom. Borren bases his 

appeal on the district court's purported rejection of his 

qualified immunity defense. We affirm in part, reverse in part, 

and remand for further proceedings. 

I. 

The residents filed amended complaints on December 20, 1985, 

which alleged numerous violations of their constitutional, 

statutory and common law rights, including the rights to personal 

safety, freedom from harm, freedom from excessive restraint, 

adequate medical care, and minimally adequate habilitation. Both 

complaints alleged that Borren was the superintendent of Hissom 

during part of their residency and that he exercised general 

supervision over the complex. 

On January 28, 1986, Borren moved to dismiss the residents' 

section 1983 actions, arguing that the residents had not 

adequately pleaded his "personal participation'' in the wrongs 

alleged to have occurred. Borren also argued that the alleged 

wrongs in the amended complaint were not deliberate violations of 

the residents' constitutional or other rights and that the 

complaints alleged only "negligent" conduct. The district court 

denied Borren's motion to dismiss. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 7 
One year later the residents sought to depose Borren, who 

refused to appear. On January 26, 1987, Borren filed a motion for 

protection from discovery and a motion for summary judgment on the 

grounds of qualified immunity. In an affidavit accompanying his 

motions, Borren denied the allegations of the complaint, stating 

that to his knowledge (1) no violations of constitutional or other 

rights had occurred; (2) if any violations had occurred it was 

without his personal participation; (3) the care provided to the 

residents was based on the professional judgment of the Hissom 

staff; and (4) such care was "consistent with staffing and funding 

levels." The residents filed a brief in opposition to the 

motions, but did not file affidavits in support of their brief 

opposing summary judgment. The residents also moved to compel 

discovery. Hearings on the motions were referred to a magistrate. 

The magistrate heard argument on these motions in a hearing 

on April 8, 1987. The magistrate recommended to the district 

court that Borren's motions for summary judgment and protection 

from discovery be denied and that the residents' motion to compel 

discovery be dismissed as moot. At the hearing, the magistrate 

observed: 

(I]n the interests of fairness I think I have to give 

the [residents] some opportunity to come up with an 

evidentiary basis in form usable for summary judgment 

purposes. Summary judgment Rule 56 expressly 

contemplates the use of depositions. It permits the use 

of affidavits and here without any opportunity at all ,to 

take depositions or to proceed with other methods of 

discoveryu I think it would be improper to grant this 

motion for summary judgment. However, in saying that, I 

am going to expressly say that I have absolutely no 

intention of limiting [Borren] from bringing or reurging 

a motion for summary judgment. at that point where a 

sufficient amount of discovery has been conducted and 

certainly I am not going to limit the reurging of such a 

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Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 8 
motion at that point where discovery is 

complete. 

entirely 

The magistrate also noted that he would consider protective orders 

if discovery became abusive or overly broad. The district court 

adopted the magistrate's recommendation over Borren's objections, 

and this appeal followed. 

II. 

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the 

magistrate's recommendation, adopted in the district court's 

order, denying Borren's motions for summary judgment or a 

protective order, impermissibly infringed Borren's qualified 

immunity interests, entitling him to an appeal of right to this 

court under the doctrine of Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 

(1985). We hold that the order did not conclusively and finally 

deny Borren's entitlement to qualified immunity, but merely 

deferred that issue pending development of a sufficient factual 

record. The order did infringe Borren's immunity interest in 

freedom from overly broad discovery, however, by failing to limit 

discovery to the issue of qualified immunity. 

In Mitchell~ Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), the Supreme 

Court examined .the appealability of denials of qualified immunity. 

The Court held that denials of immunity were appealable under the 

collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 

Corp.,. 337 U.S. 541 ( 1949), because the "entitlement [ to qual.if ied 

immunity] is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to 

liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost 

if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell, 472 

U.S. at 526 (emphasis in original). The Court also found that 

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Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 9 
denials of qualified immunity satisfied the other criteria of the 

collateral order doctrine, specifically the "conclusively 

determine the disputed question" criterion and the "separable 

from, and collateral to" the merits criterion. Id. at 527-30 

(quoting respectively Coopers~ Lybrand Y..!. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 

468 (1978), and Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546). The Court reasoned that 

a denial of qualified immunity is conclusive because the court is 

deciding either that (1) the defendant violated clearly 

established law and is not entitled to immunity, or (2) that if 

the facts are as-asserted by plaintiff, defendant is not immune. 

Id. at 527. In either situation, appealability is proper because 

"the court's denial of summary judgment finally and conclusively 

determines the defendant's claim of right not to stand trial on 

the plaintiff's allegations." Id. (emphasis in original). 

This circuit recognizes a third situation in which a 

defendant is entitled to appeal an order denying qualified 

immunity: where the trial court denies qualified immunity 

"grounded upon a finding that disputed material facts exist in the 

case." Devargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., 844 F.2d 

714, 719 (10th Cir. 1988). This result flows from the principle 

that qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial. A 

finding of disputed material fact defeats the purpose of qualified 

immunity because its effect, if erroneous, would compel the 

official to stand trial in derogation of his or her immunity. 

Together these three categories of permissible appeals cover most 

situations where a defendant's immunity interest in avoiding the 

burdens of trial might be impermissibly infringed. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 10 
Borren's situation does not fall within these three 

categories of appealable denials .. The magistrate did not "finally 

and conclusively" deny Borren's motions for summary judgment and a 

protective order based on qualified immunity; the magistrate 

specifically stated at the hearing that Borren was free to reurge 

his motions at any time. Nor did the magistrate determine that 

there was a disputed question of material fact requiring trial. 

Instead, the magistrate, and presumably the district court in 

adopting the magistrate's recommendation, temporarily denied 

Borren's motions to allow the parties to develop an adequate 

factual record on which to resolve Borren's immunity claim. 

Borren contends that Mitchell establishes qualified immunity 

as an immunity from discovery and that the district court's order 

foreclosed Borren's immunity to discovery. We disagree. The 

language in Mitchell does not sweep so broadly. Mitchell itself 

recognizes that there will be times when discovery is proper: 

Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of 

violation of clearly established law, a defendant 

pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal 

before the commencement of discovery. Even if the 

plaintiff's complaint adequately alleges the commission 

of acts that violated clearly established law, the 

defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery 

fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine 

issue as to whether the defendant in fact committed 

those acts. 

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (citation omitted). This language 

recognizes that discovery is permissible where the plaintiff 

adequately alleges a violation. We agree with the Fifth Circuit 

that: 

Harlow, Mitchell, and Jacquez make clear that qualified 

immunity does not shield government officials from all 

discovery but only from discovery which is either 

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Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 11 
avoidable or overly broad. Discovery designed to flesh 

out the merits of a plaintiff's claim before a ruling on 

the immunity defense or discovery permitted in cases 

where the defendant is cleary entitled to immunity would 

certainly fall within this category. Immediate appeal 

would lie from these orders because Harlow, Mitchell, 

and Jacquez require that immune defendants be exempt 

from avoidable, burdensome pretrial matters. 

Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1987). We also 

agree that 

Discovery orders entered when the defendant's immunity 

claim turns .at least partially on a factual question; 

when the district court is unable to rule on the 

immunity defense without further clarification of the 

facts; and which are narrowly tailored to uncover only 

those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim are 

neither avoidable or overly broad. Such orders are not 

immediately appealable. 

Id. at 507-08. Borren's immunity claim fits squarely within this 

rule of permissible discovery. 

Borren, in his motion to dismiss, challenged the residents' 

complaint as not stating a claim of violation of clearly 

established law. That motion was denied and Borren chose not to 

appeal. The denial of the motion to dismiss foreclosed Borren's 

claim of immunity from all discovery. The residents alleged a 

violation of clearly established law adequate to state a claim for 

relief, thus entitling them to discovery under Mitchell and to 

discovery on the fact-specific immunity claim under the rule in 

Lion Boulos. By choosing not to appeal the district court's 

denial of the motion to dismiss, Borren waived his right to object 

to discovery limited to the issue of his fact-specific qualified 

immunity claim. 

The magistrate's recommendation that Borren's motion for 

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity be denied was 

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Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 12 
not a conclusive determination of Borren's entitlement to 

immunity. The magistrate explicitly stated at the hearing that he 

would allow Borren to reurge his motions based on qualified 

immunity after some discovery had been completed. The magistrate 

recommended that Borren's motion be denied because he determined 

that additional facts were needed before a ruling on Borren's 

qualified immunity claim could be reached and that the residents 

were entitled to at least some discovery. We cannot say that the 

magistrate's recommendation or the district court's order adopting 

the recommendation was in error. The substantive record in this 

case consists only of the pleadings and Borren's affidavit, which 

merely denies the allegations in the complaint. This record is 

inadequate to determine Borren's fact-specific claim of qualified 

immunity. 

The district court's order adopting the magistrate's 

recommendation is thus akin to the nonappealable discovery orders 

discussed by the Fifth Circuit in Lion Boulos when the 

"defendant's immunity claim turns at least partially on a factual 

question." Lion Boulos, 834 F.2ed at 507-08. Like Lion Boulos 

discovery orders, the district court's denial of the summary 

judgment motion did not conclusively determine Borren's immunity 

but merely deferred final determination. 1 

The only remaining justification for considering this appeal 

would be if the discovery permitted by the district court were to 

l We recognize Borren's contentions that the complaint did not 

meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, and that the 

plaintiffs did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Because we 

have no jurisdiction over the denial of the motion for summary 

judgmen~, we do not reach those issues. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 13 
exceed that "narrowly tailored" to the question of qualified 

immunity. While the magistrate stated at the hearing that he 

would grant protective orders if discovery became abusive or 

overly broad, we cannot determine on this record if the district 

court's order included that restriction. Similarly, we cannot 

determine on this record whether the magistrate's statement was 

intended to limit discovery to the issue of qualified immunity or 

_to prevent abusive discovery practices generally. Given this 

uncertainty in the record and the policy interest in deferring 

discovery on the merits until after the question of qualified 

immunity is resolved, we hold that the district court's order did 

not adequately limit permissible discovery to the question of 

qualified immunity. We thus have jurisdiction over this appeal 

and remand for the entry of an appropriate protective order to 

protect Borren's immunity interests before discovery is permitted 

to continue. Both Borren's immunity interests and the residents' 

legitimate interest in limited discovery on the qualified immunity 

issue can be accommodated in this fashion. 

III. 

We have jurisdiction over this appeal because of the 

impermissible infringement on Borren's immunity interest in 

freedom from overly broad discovery. We determine that the 

district court's order denying summary judgment did not 

conclusively determine Borren's entitlement to qualified immunity. 

We also find that there is an inadequate basis in the record for 

determining Borren's entitlement to qualified immunity. 

Therefore, we REVERSE the denial of a protective order and REMAND 

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Appellate Case: 87-2536 Document: 010110136480 Date Filed: 11/29/1989 Page: 14 
with directions to limit discovery to the qualified immunity 

issue. Each party will bear its own costs in this appeal. 

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