Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cr-00182/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cr-00182-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Chelgren
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, CR-S-10-182 KJM 

vs.

CHRISTOPHER CHELGREN, 

Defendant. ORDER

 /

Defendant Christopher Chelgren is charged in an information as follows: 

possession of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844, careless or reckless driving in violation

of 36 C.F.R. § 261.54(f) and minor in possession of alcohol in violation of 36 C.F.R. 

§ 261.58(bb). He has filed a motion to suppress physical evidence seized and all statements

obtained on February 6, 2010 following a traffic stop. He argues that the stop was not justified

by reasonable suspicion of any traffic violation; the stop was improperly prolonged; he did not

consent to the search of his car; he was questioned improperly before he was given Miranda

warnings; and both his waiver of his right to remain silent and his statements were not voluntary. 

On July 28, 2010, the court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress. 

Rebecca Kaiser, Certified Law Student, appeared for defendant, who was present; Robert

Sweetin, Certified Law Student, appeared for the government. 

Case 2:10-cr-00182-KJM Document 13 Filed 08/10/10 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The court relies on the DVD of the encounter, submitted by the defense, without objection 1

from the government, and on the testimony taken at the hearing. Although the parties have not

addressed the question of defendant’s standing to challenge the search, the court finds that defendant,

driving his mother’s car, demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in the car, as demonstrated

by his refusal to consent to search and the storage of his possessions in the car, and this expectation

is one society would find to be reasonable. See Johnson v. United States, 604 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th

Cir. 2010). 

2

I. Facts1

Ken Marcus has been a law enforcement officer with the United States Forest

Service since 2007. As part of his training, he received instruction on identifying the objective

signs of marijuana use, which include red, dilated eyes, debris in the mouth, and tremors. He

relies on a card, entered into evidence as Government’s Exhibit 1, which lists some of the

symptoms of such use. 

Officer Marcus also has been trained on identifying the drug by smell and sight. 

Since becoming a law enforcement officer, he has had numerous encounters with people using

marijuana in the national forest. 

On February 6, 2010, Officer Marcus was on patrol in the Placerville District of

the El Dorado National Forest, in Sierra Tahoe’s Parking Lot E, a special use area. The parking

lot was perhaps seven-eighths full, pedestrians were in the area and there were some people

sledding on a nearby hill. At 12:04 p.m., Marcus saw a car, a Subaru, in a sideways skid and

stopped it for reckless driving. 

When Officer Marcus reached the car, he asked defendant, the driver, for his

license, registration and proof of insurance. He also asked why defendant and his two passengers

were not wearing their seatbelts and then inquired, “Who has marijuana in this vehicle?” Officer

Marcus testified he could smell freshly burnt marijuana as he stood at the driver’s window. 

The car’s occupants denied having any marijuana and claimed they had not

unfastened their seatbelts until the car stopped. Defendant said he had to get out of the car to

comply with Marcus’s renewed request for his driver’s license. As defendant got out, Marcus

Case 2:10-cr-00182-KJM Document 13 Filed 08/10/10 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2

3

recognized him and his mother’s car from an arrest for possession of “hash” two years before. 

Defendant asked for defendant’s consent to search the car, but defendant said, “It’s not necessary,

sir.” Defendant continued to look for proof of insurance and called his mother to ask about the

registration. 

Officer Marcus walked back to his own vehicle, but then returned to defendant’s

Subaru when one of the passengers said he had the registration. Marcus took the proffered

documents. Standing at the passenger window, Marcus said, “Now I’m telling you for a fact I

smell marijuana.” He testified that the odor of marijuana was much stronger from the passenger

side of the car. He acknowledged that the back seat passenger was smoking a cigarette, but

testified at hearing that the smell of marijuana is different and distinct from cigarette smoke. 

Officer Marcus then questioned defendant and passengers about the presence of

marijuana or a pipe or the use of the car to transport marijuana earlier. Defendant conceded he

may have had marijuana in the car after he picked up his prescription from “the cannabis club”

sometime earlier, but denied there was any marijuana or a pipe in the car. 

Officer Marcus said he had probable cause for a search of the car. At 12:11 p.m.,

he ordered defendant and the passengers out of the car so he could undertake the search. In the

back seat, Marcus found three beers and an open bottle of hard lemonade. One passenger, who

claimed to be twenty-one, said the alcohol was his. After Marcus warned him that making a false

statement was an offense and administered Miranda warnings, the passenger denied the alcohol 2

was his. Marcus told defendant he would be cited for being a minor in possession of alcohol

because it was his car. 

 Officer Marcus then continued his search and found a plastic grocery bag

containing a sealed jar of a substance he believed to be unburnt marijuana and a marijuana pipe

and a pack of cigarettes. Defendant denied the marijuana was his. The passenger who had been

Case 2:10-cr-00182-KJM Document 13 Filed 08/10/10 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

seated closest to the marijuana also denied it was his. Marcus Mirandized the passenger, who

invoked his right to remain silent, and handcuffed him as part of the investigation. Around 12:23

p.m., Marcus Mirandized defendant, but did not handcuff him or tell him he was under arrest

because he was being basically cooperative. He asked if defendant wanted to talk to him and

defendant said yes. Marcus had defendant stick out his tongue and saw a green stripe of

marijuana debris, which is one sign of marijuana use as listed on Exhibit 1. When defendant said

he had not smoked that day, Deputy Frisby -- an El Dorado County Sheriff’s officer who had

arrived on the scene -- asked if defendant was stupid because he was arguing with someone who

had been doing this longer than defendant had been alive. Marcus also noticed that defendant ’s

pupils were dilated, which is another possible sign of marijuana use. Although Marcus believed

defendant had used marijuana, a reasonable inference to be drawn from his testimony is that he

did not believe defendant was under the influence of the drug. 

Officer Marcus continued his search and found two small baggies of marijuana in

the driver’s area of the car, each labeled as medical marijuana. 

There were vehicles and pedestrians in the area, as well as Sierra-Tahoe security

guards. As noted, Deputy Frisby from the El Dorado County Sheriff’s Department had arrived. 

At the conclusion of the search, Marcus took defendant and one of the passengers

to the Sierra Tahoe Security Office because the resort had asked that any employees found to

have smoked marijuana be brought to the office. Defendant was eventually released and his car

was not impounded. 

In Office Marcus’s previous encounter with defendant, he took defendant to El

Dorado County Jail, but later took him to juvenile hall because he was underage at the time. 

Defendant testified that on February 6, 2010 he worked at Sierra Tahoe as a

parking lot attendant. He got to work at 7:00 a.m. and took his lunch break at noon. He had not

smoked marijuana that day. 

Case 2:10-cr-00182-KJM Document 13 Filed 08/10/10 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

II. The Initial Stop, Its Duration, And The Search Of The Car 

Because a traffic stop implicates the Fourth Amendment, it must be based on a

reasonable suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants have broken the law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440

U.S. 648, 663 (1979; United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002). An

officer’s reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated a traffic law is a sufficient basis for a

stop. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Whether an officer has a reasonable

suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred is based on the totality of the circumstances. 

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). In this case, Marcus’s testimony is bolstered

by the DVD submitted by the defense showing that portion of defendant’s driving prompting the

stop. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The video shows the Subaru skidding

sideways in the parking lot, as well as other vehicle traffic in the area. Officer Marcus’s

testimony confirms there were pedestrians in the parking lot and people sledding on a hill nearby. 

Officer Marcus testified that he stopped defendant because he believed he had

violated 36 C.F.R. § 261.54(f). That regulation provides, in relevant part:

When provided by an order, the following are prohibited:

. . . . . . . . . . 

(f) Operating a vehicle carelessly, recklessly or without regard for the

rights or safety of other persons or in a manner or at a speed that would

endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property.

Although the court has found no case law interpreting this subsection, there are

cases that consider traffic stops based on similar regulations or statutes. For example, in United

States v. Kikimura, 698 F.Supp. 546 (D.N.J. 1988), the defendant was cited for violating a New

Jersey statute that prohibits driving “carelessly, or without due caution or circumspection, in a

manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or property . . . .” Id. at 556. The

officer had stopped the defendant after observing him driving 25 m.p.h. in a parking lot and

coming within five feet of parked cars. The court credited the officer’s testimony that by coming

/////

Case 2:10-cr-00182-KJM Document 13 Filed 08/10/10 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

within five feet of parked cars, the defendant might have injured someone leaving one of those

cars. The court upheld the stop. 

Similarly, in United States v. Edwards, 563 F.Supp.2d 977 (D. Minn. 2008),

police stopped the defendant, who had been squealing his tires as he went around corners and

who sped up and made some erratic turns after the officer pulled up behind him. The court

upheld the stop based on a violation of the Minnesota law that criminalized driving “carelessly or

heedlessly in disregard of the rights of others, or in a manner that endangers or is likely to

endanger any property or any person, including the driver or passengers. . . .” Id. at 1002. 

In this case, defendant’s car skidded in a parking lot busy with other cars and

pedestrians and near a hill where people were sledding. Officer Marcus’s stop was based on his

reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving in a manner likely to endanger others. 

This determination does not end the inquiry, for “a seizure that is justified solely

by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged

beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.

405, 407 (2005). 

Pursuant to a valid traffic stop, an officer can request a driver’s

license, insurance papers, vehicle registration, run a computer

check thereon, and issue a citation. The detention must be

temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the

purpose of the stop . . . .

United States v. Banuelos-Romero, 597 F.3d 763, 766-67 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see

also United States v. Munoz, 590 F.3d 916, 920-21 (8th Cir. 2010) (“After making a traffic stop,

an officer may detain the driver while he completes a number of routine but somewhat timeconsuming tasks related to the traffic violation, such as computerized checks of the vehicle’s

registration and the driver’s license and criminal history, and the writing up of a citation or

warning.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir. 2002) (“To

detain the motorist any longer than is reasonably necessary to issue the traffic citation, . . ., the

officer must have reasonable suspicion that the individual has engaged in more extensive

Case 2:10-cr-00182-KJM Document 13 Filed 08/10/10 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

criminal conduct.”). If the traffic stop could be deemed to be prolonged in this case, it was not

the result of Officer Marcus’s actions, but rather stemmed from the length of time it took

defendant and his passengers to produce the documentation Marcus sought: as the video shows,

defendant could not produce his driver’s license without getting out of the car and rummaging

around in the back and did not know where to look for the registration without calling his

mother. It was at 12:11 p.m., or seven minutes after the initial stop, that the passenger called

Marcus back to the car to retrieve the registration and Marcus determined that he had probable

cause to search the car based on the stronger smell of marijuana emanating from the passenger

side. 

Although the stop of a car based on reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation

does not justify the search of the car, probable cause to search the car may arise during the course

of the detention and may justify the warrantless search of the car, including the search of

containers in the car that may conceal the object of the search. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S

295, 301 (1999); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980); Banuelos-Romero, 597 F.3d at

767. In this case, before Officer Marcus had completed the checks and the paperwork reasonably

related to the purpose of the stop, he detected the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the

interior of the car. This smell alone established probable cause to search the interior of the car. 

Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (warrantless search justified by probable cause to

believe car contains contraband); United States v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 602-03, 604 (1st Cir.

1996) (when nothing contradicted officer’s statement that he smelled marijuana, he had probable

cause to search interior of the car even though he did not mention the odor when he first detected

it); United States v. Mosby, 541 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir. 2008) (smell of marijuana is enough to

justify search of car); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1999) (same). 

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:10-cr-00182-KJM Document 13 Filed 08/10/10 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

II. Miranda Warnings

Defendant argues he was in custody and thus should have been given Miranda

warnings before Officer Marcus elicited his many denials of the presence of marijuana in the car. 

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that 

the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or

inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the

defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards

effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By

custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

Id. at 444. A person is in custody for Miranda purposes when there is “a formal arrest or restraint

on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest,” which is to be

determined by considering “how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have

understood his situation.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 324 (1994) (internal

quotation omitted). 

In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), the Supreme Court considered

“whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should

be considered ‘custodial interrogation’” for purposes of Miranda. Id. at 435. The Court rejected

the idea that every contact between law enforcement officers and suspects or citizens should be

preceded by Miranda warnings even though a person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes

when stopped for a traffic violation, finding two factors important. First, the detention associated

with a traffic stop is presumptively brief, unlike questioning at the police station, which often

continues until it yields the answers sought by police. Second, a motorist generally does not feel

completely at the mercy of the police during a traffic stop because “[p]assersby, on foot or in

other cars, witness the interaction,” and because there generally are only one or two officers

involved. Id. at 438-39. It found “the atmosphere . . . substantially less ‘police dominated’” than

a typical Miranda situation. Id. 

/////

Case 2:10-cr-00182-KJM Document 13 Filed 08/10/10 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

The defense seeks to distinguish Berkemer on the ground that the stop quickly

turned from the processing of a traffic violation into a criminal investigation outside the scope of

Berkemer. It relies on Ninth Circuit authority on the question of custody for Miranda purposes. 

Under that authority, this court must consider several, non-exclusive factors: 

(1) the language used to summon the individual; (2) the extent to

which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt; (3) the

physical surroundings of the interrogation; (4) the duration of the

detention; and (5) the degree of pressure used to detain the

individual.

United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2002). It is undisputed that when Officer

Marcus first approached the car, he asked about marijuana; then five minutes later, he said he

smelled marijuana and had probable cause to search the car. It also is undisputed that Marcus

asked defendant about his prior possession of hash and about the presence of marijuana in the

car, and accused him of having smoked marijuana after looking at his tongue. The video also

shows that someone, presumably Deputy Frisby, called defendant “stupid” for questioning

Marcus’s conclusions. On the other hand, the encounter was brief – Marcus read the Miranda

warnings to defendant approximately sixteen minutes after stopping the car – and occurred

during the day in a public parking lot. Moreover, the encounter was not police dominated; while

Deputy Frisby and some Sierra Tahoe security guards were somewhere off-camera, Frisby

chimed in only once during the search and questioning, leaving Marcus to deal alone with

defendant and his passengers. Finally, defendant retained his cell phone, which he used to

contact his mother to ask about the registration papers. The court does not find that defendant

was in custody for Miranda purposes.

III. Involuntary Miranda Waiver And Statements

Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that defendant is arguing that both his

waiver of his Miranda rights and the ultimate statements he made were not voluntary. He alleges

that Officer Marcus’s repeated accusations, coupled with his application of handcuffs to a

 /////

Case 2:10-cr-00182-KJM Document 13 Filed 08/10/10 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

passenger after the latter invoked his right to remain silent, were coercive. The standard for

determining voluntariness is the same in both instances:

First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in

the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice

rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver

must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of

the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to

abandon it. Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding

the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite

level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the

Miranda rights have been waived.

Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987) (citation omitted); Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d

411, 415 (9th Cir. 1991) (test is the same for voluntariness of statements). A statement given

after a voluntary Miranda waiver is rarely found to be involuntary. DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556

F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 183 (2010). 

Although Officer Marcus’s questioning was pointed and accusatory, it was brief

and occurred out in the open. Compare Jackson v. McKee, 525 F.3d 430, 433-34 (6th Cir. 2008)

(collecting cases where length of interrogation rendered waiver or statement involuntary). It also

is true that Marcus handcuffed the passenger after that person declined to waive his Miranda

rights, but courts have found arrests or threats to arrest others coercive only when those others

were family members and when the arrests were not supported by probable cause. See United

States v. Finch, 998 F.2d 349, 356 (6th Cir. 1993) (threat to arrest mother and girlfriend coercive

when nothing suggested the women knew anything about defendant’s drug activities); compare

United States v. Ortiz, 499 F.Supp.2d 224, 232-33 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (threat to arrest family

member not coercive if arrest would be supported by probable cause); see also United States v.

Cotton, 223 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1048 (D.Neb. 2002) (handcuffing passenger was not the equivalent

of interrogation). The court finds that defendant’s Miranda waiver was voluntary. 

/////

/////

Case 2:10-cr-00182-KJM Document 13 Filed 08/10/10 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. The motion to suppress (docket no. 7) is denied; and

2. This matter is placed on calendar on August 26, 2010 for status. 

DATED: August 9, 2010. 

2

chel0182.mts 

Case 2:10-cr-00182-KJM Document 13 Filed 08/10/10 Page 11 of 11