Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-04-03233/USCOURTS-ca10-04-03233-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maurice Ivory
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAY9 2005 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

V. 

MAURICE IVORY, 

Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 04-3233 

(D.C. No. 03-20167-JWL) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, Mc WILLIAMS, and KELLY, Circuit Judges .•• 

The government appeals from the district court's order granting 

Defendant-Appellee Maurice Ivory's motion to exclude evidence as a sanction for 

a discovery violation. Mr. Ivory was indicted for possession with intent to 

distribute crack cocaine, possession of a firearm in a drug trafficking crime, and 

being a felon in possession of a firearm. The evidence excluded was DNA testing 

• This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court 

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order 

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

•• This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court 

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order 

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 3 6.3. 

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tending to show that Mr. Ivory had handled a firearm. Our jurisdiction arises 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and we reverse. On remand the district court may 

consider a lesser sanction than exclusion of the DNA evidence. 

Background 

On January 8, 2004, after arraignment, a standard order of discovery was 

entered requiring the government to copy or let the def end ant copy " [ w] ithin a 

reasonable time period after arraignment[:]" 

[ a]ny results or reports of ... scientific tests or experiments, or 

copies thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of 

the government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise 

of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the 

government, and which are material to the preparation of a defense or 

are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the 

trial. 

Aplt. App. 17-18; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(F). With ajurytrial 

scheduled for July 6, 2004, defense counsel on June 2, 2004, sought to have an 

independent fingerprint analysis performed on a gun found in a vehicle used by 

Mr. Ivory. Although fingerprint and DNA testing by local law enforcement had 

occurred in October 2003, the government contends that the report never made it 

to its investigative file. Once the government obtained the report, it learned that 

the gun had been swabbed for DNA, a procedure not requested by the 

government. 

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The government then advised defense counsel that the DNA swab was 

being tested, and furnished the curriculum vitae of its DNA expert who was 

scheduled to be on leave during the July 6, 2004, jury trial. Upon learning the 

inculpatory results of the DNA test, the government advised defense counsel and 

proposed various alternatives to the expert's appearance at the July 6 trial. 

Ultimately, defense counsel indicated that he would oppose a continuance or a 

deposition of the DNA expert. The government filed a motion so requesting, and 

defense counsel filed a motion to exclude the DNA evidence on the grounds that 

the government had failed to comply with the discovery order. 

The district court granted defense counsel's motion, applying the factors in 

United States v. Wicker, 848 F.2d 1059, 1061 (10th Cir. 1988); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 16(d)(2)(C). The court found that the government had violated the 

discovery order by not exercising due diligence to obtain and produce the report 

in a timely fashion, but it had not acted in bad faith. According to the district 

court, Mr. Ivory was prejudiced because he did not receive the results of the DNA 

test implicating him until June 22, leaving too little time for defense counsel to 

procure an expert to meet the DNA evidence at trial. The court acknowledged 

that it could continue the trial to allow Mr. Ivory an adequate time to prepare 

consistent with the Speedy Trial Act. But the court held that such a continuance 

would prejudice Mr. Ivory because, should he be unable to rebut the DNA 

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evidence after a continuance, he would have been better off with the July 6 trial 

date, as the government's DNA expert was not available, or not available in 

person. 

In excluding the DNA evidence, the court placed the most weight on a 

deterrence rationale-deterring the government's future non-compliance with its 

discovery orders. The court noted that in some cases a sanction may be necessary 

even absent prejudice to the defendant. As support for this rationale, the court 

catalogued discovery problems in four unrelated criminal cases. The court noted 

that the government attorneys were overworked, but more attention needed to be 

paid to complying with discovery obligations earlier, rather than later, so as to 

avoid these disputes which often resulted in delay and continuances. Aplt. App. 

I 67. 

Discussion 

We review the district court's sanction for an abuse of discretion. Wicker, 

848 F .2d at I 060. In Wicker, we explained: 

When the government fails to comply with a discovery order, the 

factors the district court should consider in determining if a sanction 

is appropriate are (I) the reasons the government delayed producing 

the requested materials, including whether or not the government 

acted in bad faith when it failed to comply with the discovery order; 

(2) the extent of prejudice to the defendant as a result of the 

government's delay; and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice 

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with a continuance. 1 

Id. Though not delineating the bounds of the district court's discretion, these 

factors are subject to the principle that any sanction should be the least severe to 

accomplish compliance with the court's discovery orders. Id. at 1060. In the 

absence of prejudice, the court must also consider whether such a sanction is 

necessary to maintain the "integrity and schedule" of the court. Id. at 1061. 

Judged against these principles, the district court abused its discretion. We 

do not fault the district court in finding that its discovery order had been violated, 

and that such violation, while not in bad faith, was a product of inattention. Nor 

do we fault the district court for finding that Mr. Ivory needed additional time to 

meet the government's DNA evidence. The district court expressly found that it 

could have remedied the preparation problem with the grant of a continuance. 

Aplt. App. 163. In such circumstances, a continuance, or a lesser sanction 

accompanied by a continuance, ought to occur. United States v. Golyansky, 291 

F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 

1285, 1293 (10th Cir. 1999) (suggesting lesser sanctions such as censuring the 

1 We have remarked that the third factor is "essentially irrelevant" when a 

defendant opposes a continuance. United States v. Ivy. 83 F.3d 1266, 1281 (10th 

Cir. 1996). Ivy did not consider the interests of the government in curing any 

prejudice with a continuance, as opposed to exclusion, and possible lesser 

sanctions. Given the posture of this case ( exclusion of evidence by the district 

court), the government has raised these issues. 

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government attorney). "It would be a rare case where, absent bad faith, a district 

court should exclude evidence rather than continue the proceedings." Golyansky. 

291 F .3d at 1249. This is not that rare case, particularly given that trial was not 

underway (nor had a jury been empaneled), and a relatively short continuance 

( one month according to defense counsel at oral argument) would solve the 

problem with respect to Mr. Ivory without impairing his speedy trial rights. 

We reject the district court's finding that Mr. Ivory would have suffered 

prejudice because his trial date necessarily would have coincided with the absence 

of the government's DNA expert. See Aplt. App. 163 ("So ironically here while 

the prejudice in that sense [inability to meet the DNA evidence] could be cured in 

terms of giving the defendant some time to prepare, it would actually in many 

ways work to the defendant's disadvantage because it would play right into what 

the government really wants to have, which is more time - - or, pardon me, an 

opportunity to have the witness available in person."). First, such a finding is 

counter-factual. At the hearing, the government represented that its DNA expert 

was under subpoena and would be at trial if the court refused to continue the trial 

and would not allow for a deposition. Aplt. App. 154. Second, even assuming 

that the witness would have been absent, such a claim of prejudice is inimical to 

the truth-seeking function of a trial. Cf. Gonzales, 164 F .3d at 1292 (noting that 

the discovery sanction must bear some relationship to the purposes the law is to 

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serve including protection of the defendant and the public). 

Even in the absence of bad faith and prejudice, our cases suggest that the 

district court theoretically could impose such a sanction. United States v. Russell, 

109 F.3d 1503, 1511 (10th Cir. 1997); Wicker, 848 F.2d at 1061; but see 

Gonzales, 164 F.3d at 1292 (noting that the Supreme Court has never approved 

exclusion of evidence as a sanction absent a constitutional or statutory violation); 

United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1262 (10th Cir. 1999) (same). We see 

two errors here. First, the court's reliance upon four other cases involving the 

government's discovery conduct without prior notice to the government was error. 

The government had no way of knowing that the district court would consider 

these cases. Mr. Ivory certainly did not argue them in his motion. Aplt. App. 

116-122. Thus, the government lacked any opportunity to discuss or distinguish 

them. That has led to the government's improper (but understandable) attempt to 

supplement the record below and in this court and Mr. Ivory's (also 

understandable and legally justified) opposition. See Fed. R. App. P. 10( e )(I) 

(permitting the district court to conform record to what occurred in district court); 

United States v. Kennedy, 225 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2000) (court of appeals 

does not consider material not before the district court). 

Second, we question whether this case is the proper vehicle for finding 

heretofore unannounced discovery violations by the government in those other 

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cases. The cases do not appear to be related except in the most general terms--

three of four involve different government counsel. Cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 

U.S. 400,416 n.22 (1988) (unrelated discovery violations in other cases by 

defense counsel normally could not preclude defendant's right to present a 

complete defense). In light of our resolution, we need not pass on whether the 

discovery sanction of exclusion of evidence in one case may ever be based upon 

discovery violations in another. On remand, the district court may consider a 

lesser sanction. 

The dissent suggests that the district court's suppression order should be 

affirmed based upon its evaluation of the three Wicker factors. As discussed 

above, we conclude that the district court's evaluation of those factors was legally 

erroneous. Alternatively, the dissent contends that the order is supported by 

Taylor v. Illinois insofar as imposing a remedy of suppression and relying upon 

discovery violations in other cases. Taylor is readily distinguishable and must be 

read against its facts. That case involved a "willful and blatant" discovery 

violation (failure to timely disclose a defense witness) that appeared to be an 

attempt to gain tactical advantage and introduce fabricated testimony. Taylor, 

484 U.S. at 416-417. These circumstances led the Court to conclude that "the 

case fits into the category of willful misconduct in which the severest sanction is 

appropriate." Id. at 41 7. None of those circumstances are present here. 

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The Court in Taylor rejected reliance upon unrelated discovery violations to 

impose such a sanction, although it did leave the door open to discovery 

violations by the same attorney. llL, at 416 n.21. The problem with the latter 

rationale in this case is that the judge expressly found that the reason for nondisclosure of fingerprint reports in the other case "was understandable" because a 

report had "mistakenly indicated that the fingerprint examination was negative." 

Aplt. App. at 165. The court predicted that had there been earlier disclosure, the 

government would have found the error "and might have been able to alleviate the 

necessity of a last minute fight." Id. at 166. Regardless, this combined with what 

occurred in this case does not justify the drastic sanction of exclusion of evidence 

without consideration of lesser sanctions. As for discovery violations involving 

other attorneys in the U.S: Attorneys' Office, we continue to believe that there 

must be a more developed record with notice and an opportunity to be heard 

before making that link. That said, we hope the government's statement in its 

brief will cap the matter: "By his decision in this case, [the trial judge] has sent 

the message loudly and clearly that the United States must be more consistently 

proactive in monitoring law enforcement's investigation and reporting, and that 

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message has been received and understood." Aplt. Br. at 15. 

REVERSED. 

Entered for the Court 

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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No. 04-3233, United States v. Ivory 

Seymour, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

Due to my disagreement with the majority's conclusion that the district 

court abused its discretion by excluding DNA evidence in response to the 

government's discovery violations, I respectfully dissent. 

On the day of Mr. Ivory's arraignment, January 8, 2004, the district court 

entered a General Order of Discovery and Scheduling in which it instructed the 

parties to comply with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including Rule 

16: 

Within a reasonable time period after arraignment, the government 

shall comply with Rules 12( d)(2) and 16 and Brady/Giglio. Pursuant 

to Rule 16, the government shall copy for the defendant or permit the 

defendant to inspect and copy or photograph: ... 

Any results or reports of physical or mental examinations and or 

scientific tests or experiments, or copies thereof, which are within 

the possession, custody or control of the government, the existence of 

which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become 

known .... 

Aplt. App., vol. I, at 17-18. The Order also stated that a request is not necessary 

to trigger the operation of the Rules and that absence of a request may not be 

asserted as a reason for noncompliance. Id. at 17. 

Nearly six months after the Order was issued, defense counsel sent the 

government a written request to take possession of a firearm found in a vehicle 

used by Mr. Ivory for independent fingerprint testing. Prompted by this request, 

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on June 10, 2004, the government provided defense counsel with reports 

indicating that both a fingerprint analysis and DNA swabbing of the firearm had 

been conducted in October 2003. The government also advised defense counsel 

that their forensic expert's report comparing the DNA on the firearms with Mr. 

Ivory's DNA would not be available until June 23, 2004. Trial was set to begin 

July 6. Defense counsel filed a motion to exclude the DNA evidence, which the 

district court granted, on the grounds that the government had violated the 

discovery order and Rule 16. The question before this court is whether the 

district court's exclusionary sanction in response to the government's unexcused 

discovery violations constitutes an abuse of discretion. I conclude that it does 

not. 

Rule 16 warns the parties of the consequences of failing to comply with 

discovery orders and invests the district court with broad discretion in coping 

with discovery violations: 

(2) Failure to Comply. If a party fails to comply with this rule, the 

court may: 

(A) order that party to permit the discovery or inspection; 

specify its time, place, and manner; and prescribe other just 

terms and condition; 

(B) grant a continuance; 

(C) prohibit that party from introducing the undisclosed 

evidence; or 

(D) enter any other order that is just under the circumstances. 

FED. R. CRIM. P. 16( d)(2) ( emphasis added). As explained by the majority, the 

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test for determining whether the district court properly excluded evidence 

pursuant to Rule 16( d)(2) was expressed in United States v. Wicker, 848 F .2d 

1059 (10th Cir. 1988): 

When the government fails to comply with a discovery order, the 

factors the district court should consider in determining if a sanction 

is appropriate are ( 1) the reasons the government delayed producing 

the requested materials, including whether or not the government 

acted in bad faith when it failed to comply with the discovery order; 

(2) the extent of prejudice to the defendant as a result of the 

government's delay; and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice 

with a continuance. 

Id. at 1061. In Wicker, the court went on to note that "these three factors should 

merely guide the district court in its consideration of sanctions; they are not 

intended to dictate the bounds of the court's discretion." Id. 

The record indicates that the district court weighed the first Wicker factor. 

The court emphasized that although more than five months had passed since the 

government knew or should have known about the scientific tests that had been 

conducted on the firearm, the government provided no explanation for the delay 

in notifying defense counsel. We have consistently held that a district court may 

justifiably exclude evidence "on the basis of its unexplained untimeliness alone." 

See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001) (per 

Kelly, J.). As the district court noted here, "[t]here is simply no explanation why 

the government didn't follow the order and make some inquiry at an earlier date." 

Aplt. App., vol. I, at 159. Thus, solely on the basis of the government's excessive 

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and unexcused delay, the district court was entitled to suppress the DNA 

evidence. 

The court also weighed the second Wicker factor and concluded that the 

defendant was prejudiced because the government's delay in producing the DNA 

test results implicating Mr. Ivory left far too little time for defense counsel to 

procure an expert of its own to rebut the government's evidence at trial. The 

government concedes that Mr. Ivory was so prejudiced. 

Finally, the court analyzed the feasibility of curing the prejudice with a 

continuance and decided that a continuance would not remedy the violation for 

two reasons. First, because the United States Attorney's Office had expressly 

requested a continuance in order to have its DNA expert available for trial, 

granting that request would have resulted in the bizarre outcome of rewarding -

rather than punishing - the government for its discovery violations. While the 

government was prepared to subpoena the witness if the district court denied its 

motion, it did not prefer this course of action given the short notice to the witness 

and her family vacation plans. Second, because the government had failed to 

provide evidence to defense counsel in a timely manner in several other cases 

recently before the court, the evidence needed to be suppressed as a prophylactic 

measure. The district court stated: 

This is not the first time this kind of issue has come up before this 

court. It's not the first time even in a long time that this issue has 

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come up. On repeated occasions over the last several weeks and 

months this court has been confronted with the government having 

been in a position where it did not supply information to the other 

side in a way timely enough to have a proceeding go forward without 

having some in depth discussion about why something wasn't 

disclosed, what the reasons were, what had happened, and so 

forth .... [T]he cumulative effect of those cases is to tell me that a 

continuance in this case would not help address the prophylactic 

issue, and that is that I believe the government needs to get these 

matters worked out earlier rather than later so that the court and the 

defense counsel are not left scrambling at the last minute to deal with 

the fact that the government has not looked at exhibits, found reports, 

etc., until the last month before trial. 

Aplt. App., vol. I, at 164. 

We have repeatedly recognized that "[ o ]n occasion the district court may 

need to suppress evidence that did not comply with discovery orders to maintain 

the integrity and schedule of the court even though the defendant may not be 

prejudiced." Wicker, 848 F.2d at 1061 ; see also Adams, 271 F.3d at 1244 ("even 

in the absence of prejudice, a district court may suppress evidence that 'did not 

comply with discovery orders to maintain the integrity and schedule of the 

court'"); United States v. Russell, 109 F.3d 1503, 1512 (10th Cir. 1997) 

("Wicker's admonition that the trial court must impose 'the least severe sanction 

that will accomplish ... prompt and full compliance with the court's discovery 

orders' ... does not mean that a continuance is necessary just because it will cure 

the prejudice."). This is because a district court has "inherent power to control 

and supervise its own proceedings." United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 

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603 (10th Cir. 1986). 

The government contends, and the majority agrees, that the district court 

did not have authority to rely on discovery violations in other cases in 

determining sanctions in the present case. I reject this argument for two reasons. 

First, even assuming the government is correct, the district court did not have to 

rely on a pattern or practice of discovery violations on the part of the government 

in order to justify its exclusion of the DNA evidence in this case. As discussed 

above, the court's determination that all three Wicker factors weighed in favor of 

Mr. Ivory was more than enough to entitle it to suppress the evidence, a remedy 

explicitly authorized by Rule 16. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2)(C). 

Second, Supreme Court case law strongly suggests the government's 

argument lacks merit given the particular circumstances of this case. In Taylor v. 

Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1988), the Court upheld the trial court's refusal to 

allow a witness to testify as a sanction for a defendant's discovery violation. The 

Court rejected an argument similar to the one advanced by the government here, 

that the sanction was "unnecessarily harsh," due to its concern with the impact of 

the discovery violation on the "integrity of the judicial process." Id. at 416. 

According to the Court, 

[i]t may well be true that alternative sanctions are adequate and 

appropriate in most cases, but it is equally clear that they would be 

less effective than the preclusion sanction and that there are instances 

in which they would perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice [to the 

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other party] and the harm to the adversary process. 

Id. at 413. Moreover, in a footnote, the Court explained that the trial judge had 

expressed concern about discovery violations in other trials and, while unrelated 

violations in other cases would not normally provide a proper basis to exclude the 

evidence, "[i]f those violations involved the same attorney ... they were 

relevant." Id. at 416 n.22. Here, not only was the prosecutor in the instant 

controversy involved in one of the other cases cited by the district court for a 

pattern and practice of discovery violations, all of the cases involved attorneys 

from the same office - the United States Attorneys' Office for the District of 

Kansas. Thus, the violations cited by the district court as a basis for its 

prophylactic sanction were relevant, and not the sort of "[ u]nrelated discovery 

violations" on which it would have been improper for the district court to rely. 

Id. In Taylor, the sanction was against defense counsel; obviously discovery 

violations by other defense counsel in unrelated cases would be totally irrelevant. 

I also disagree with the majority's assertion that the district court's 

reliance, "without prior notice," on four other cases involving the government's 

discovery conduct was error and forced the government to attempt to improperly 

supplement the record on appeal. One of those prior cases involved the same 

lawyer arguing the government's motion for a continuance, so she clearly had 

prior notice. Moreover, if the government wished to discuss or distinguish those 

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prior cases, it should have filed a motion for reconsideration in the district court 

before it filed its notice of appeal. Instead, it dilatorily waited six months to 

attempt to supplement the record in the district court, an attempt the district court 

justifiably dismissed as untimely. To reward the government under these 

circumstances certainly runs counter to the district court's right to protect the 

integrity of its docket by sanctioning the government for a pattern and practice of 

discovery violations. 

In sum, because the government concedes it violated both the discovery 

order and Rule 16, the district court properly considered each of the Wicker 

factors, and the court determined that the maintenance of the integrity and 

schedule of the court required suppression due to a pattern or practice of 

discovery violations on the part of the United States Attorneys' Officer for the 

District of Kansas, I cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion. 

That court is in the best position to assess the proper sanction to cure the 

government's pattern and practice of discovery violations, and I think we should 

honor the court's decision rather than undermine it. For the aforementioned 

reasons, I dissent. 

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