Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02773/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02773-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Greg Hargrave
Defendant
Guenet Kelelatchen
Defendant
Hilton Hospitality, Inc.
Defendant
Hilton Sacramento Arden West
Defendant
Interstate Management Company, LLC
Defendant
Liisa Nikcevich
Plaintiff

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28 * This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 )

)

)

LIISA NIKCEVICH, )

) 2:06-cv-2773-GEB-EFB

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

INTERSTATE MANAGEMENT COMPANY LLC )

dba HILTON SACRAMENTO ARDEN WEST; )

HILTON HOSPITALITY, INC.; )

GUENET KELELATCHEN, individually; )

CRAIG HARGRAVE, individually; )

DOES 1-10; DOE 11 CORPORATION )

through DOE 20 CORPORATION, )

inclusive; DOE 21 PARTNERSHIP )

through DOE 30 PARTNERSHIP, )

inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendant Guenet Kelelatchen (“Kelelatchen”) and Defendant

Greg Hargrave (“Hargrave”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint (“Complaint”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Defendant Interstate Management Company, LLC (“Interstate”)

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1 Three separate motions to dismiss are pending. 

2 Interstate does business as Hilton Sacramento Arden West.

(Compl. ¶ 2.)

2

moves for partial dismissal of the Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the

motions.1 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Liisa Nikcevich is a former employee of Interstate

who was granted family medical leave prior to the termination of her

employment.2 (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 14, 17.) Kelelatchen and Hargrave were

Plaintiff’s supervisors. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Prior to the expiration of

her family medical leave, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. (Id.

¶ 17.) Plaintiff alleges in this action wrongful termination and

discrimination in violation of the California Family Rights Act

(“CFRA”) contained within the California Fair Employment and Housing

Act (“FEHA”); intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”);

negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”); wrongful

termination in violation of public policy embodied in FEHA; and

violation of California Labor Code section 201 et seq. (Id. ¶¶ 16-

40.) 

DISCUSSION

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if Plaintiff

failed to (1) present a cognizable legal theory, or (2) plead

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). 

When considering a motion to dismiss, all material allegations in the

Complaint must be accepted as true and construed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974);

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996).

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3 Interstate does not move to dismiss the statutory claims; it

only moves to dismiss the IIED and NIED claims. (See Interstate’s Mot.

to Dismiss (“Interstate’s Mot.”) at 3:25-26, 5:16-19.) 

4 Kelelatchen and Hargrave’s motions and replies, as well as

Plaintiff’s oppositions to these motions, are identical; therefore, they

are treated as one and the same for purposes of this Order. 

3

In addition, Plaintiff is given the benefit of every reasonable

inference that can be drawn from the allegations in the Complaint. 

Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Shermahorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). 

Accordingly, a motion to dismiss must be denied “unless it appears

beyond doubt that [Plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of

[its] claim which would entitle [it] to relief.” Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 

I. FEHA and California Labor Code Section 201 et. seq. Claims3

Kelelatchen and Hargrave argue that Plaintiff cannot state a

CFRA claim because the CFRA is only applicable to employers, not

employees. (Kelelatchen’s and Hargrave’s Mot. (“Supervisors’ Mot.”)

at 4:14-23.)4 They also argue that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy because it “is only

valid [if] brought directly under FEHA.” (Id. at 5:8-11.) Finally,

Kelelatchen and Hargrave seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s California

Labor Code section 201 et seq. claim “because the requirements and

protections of California wage and hours laws . . . apply only when

employer-employee relationship exists.” (Id. at 7:11-13.) 

Plaintiff concedes in her Opposition that “claims . . . for

discrimination based upon violation of FEHA and violation of

California Labor Code Section 201 et seq. must fail . . . .” (Opp’n

to Supervisors’ Mot. at 2:3-5.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against

Kelelatchen and Hargrave for violation of the CFRA, wrongful

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termination in violation of public policy under FEHA, and violation of

California Labor Code section 201 et. seq., are dismissed. 

II. IIED and NIED Claims

A. Kelelatchen and Hargrave

Kelelatchen and Hargrave argue that the IIED claim fails

because they are not “liable for [their] alleged conduct under []

FEHA, and [Plaintiff] cannot circumvent these limitations on liability

by asserting common law claims based upon the same conduct.” 

(Supervisors’ Mot. at 6:11-12.) They also argue that “Plaintiff’s

NIED claim fails [because] it is preempted by the California Workers’

Compensation Act [which provides that] [a]ll industrial injuries

caused by employer negligence are compensable exclusively within the

workers’ compensation system.” (Id. at 7:1-4.) Plaintiff counters

that “claims under California law for [IIED and NIED] are not

preempted by the California workers’ compensation statute when the

claims implicate fundamental public policy considerations.” (Opp’n to

Supervisors’ Mot. at 2:19-22.) Kelelatchen and Hargrave rejoin that

Plaintiff’s “argument fails as to both the IIED and NIED claims

because the validity of those claims presupposes the validity of the

underlying statutory claim for discrimination in violation of FEHA,

and [Plaintiff] has conceded she has no FEHA claim.” (Supervisors’

Reply at 2:21-24.) 

The Workers’ Compensation Act (section 3600 et. seq. of the

California Labor Code): 

establishes an employee’s right to workers’

compensation, providing that “[l]iability for the

compensation provided by this division, in lieu of

any other liability whatsoever to any person . . .

shall . . . exist against an employer for any

injury sustained by his or her employees arising

out of and in the course of employment.” Further,

California Labor Code [section] 3602 provides

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that, where [section] 3600 applies, “the right to

recover such compensation is . . . the sole and

exclusive remedy of the employee.” [T]hese

provisions apply to all injuries that result from

an employment relationship, including injuries for

[emotional distress]. 

Miniace v. Pac. Maritime Ass’n, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1181 (N.D. Cal.

2006) (internal citations omitted); see also Livitsanos v. The

Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 2 Cal. 4th 744, 754 (1992) (“an

employee’s emotional distress injuries are subsumed under the

exclusive remedy provisions of workers’ compensation.”). However, if

the employer’s conduct “contravenes fundamental public policy[,]” the

Act’s exclusivity provisions do not apply. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at

754 (internal citations omitted). A fundamental “public policy that

gives rise to a wrongful termination action [must] have ‘a basis in

either constitutional or statutory provisions.’” Green v. Ralee

Eng’g, Co., 19 Cal. 4th 66, 80 (1998) (internal citation omitted). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any basis for her contention that

the IIED and NIED claims are grounded in fundamental public policy,

particularly in light of her concession that she cannot state claims

for violations of FEHA and California Labor Code section 201 et. seq. 

(See Opp’n to Supervisors’ Mot. at 2:3-5.) Accordingly, the IIED and

NIED claims against Kelelatchen and Hargrave are dismissed. 

B. Interstate

Interstate argues that the NIED claim should be dismissed

because “it is preempted by the California’s Workers’ Compensation

Act” since “[a]ll industrial injuries caused by employer negligence

are compensable exclusively within the workers’ compensation system.” 

(Interstate’s Mot. at 5:7-10.) Plaintiff responds that the NIED claim

is “not preempted by the California workers’ compensation statute

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[because it] implicate[s] fundamental public policy considerations.” 

(Opp’n to Interstate at 2:13-15.)

Interstate’s conduct allegedly violates FEHA and thus has

“‘a basis in [a] statutory provision[]’” implicating a violation of a

fundamental public policy. Green, 19 Cal. at 80; see also Ely v. WalMart, 875 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (“a claim for relief

premised on a violation of [FEHA] is based upon clear public policy

which is fundamental . . . .”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s NIED claim is

not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation

Act. See Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 754 (the Act’s exclusivity

provisions do not apply where the alleged wrongful conduct is in

violation of a fundamental public policy); see also Phillips v. Gemini

Moving Specialists, 63 Cal. App. 4th 563, 577 (1998) (“a plaintiff can

recover [outside the exclusive remedies of the worker’s compensation

law] for infliction of emotional distress if he or she has a tort

cause of action for . . . wrongful termination in violation of an

express statute.”). 

Interstate also argues that Plaintiff’s NIED claim fails on

the merits “because the conduct on which the claim is based,

specifically the allegedly wrongful termination of [Plaintiff’s]

employment and alleged denial of family medical leave, is inherently

intentional rather than negligent and therefore cannot support a cause

of action for [NIED].” (Interstate’s Mot. at 4:28, 5:1-3.) “‘An

employer's supervisory conduct is inherently ‘intentional.’ Thus,

where the conduct alleged is intentional, it cannot be used as a basis

for a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.” Edwards v.

U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 848 F. Supp. 1460, 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1994)

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(quoting Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 1105 (1990)). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s NIED claim is dismissed.

Interstate further contends that the IIED claim fails on the

merits because “the conduct alleged was personnel management activity

and not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law.” (Interstate’s

Mot. at 4:9-10.) To state a claim for IIED, Plaintiff must show “(1)

outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of

causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional

distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional

distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional

distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Trerice v. Blue

Cross of Cal., 209 Cal. App. 3d 878 at 883 (1989) (internal citation

omitted). Conduct is outrageous if it is “so extreme as to exceed all

bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” Id. 

“[A] claim for IIED is possible even if the alleged

wrongdoing by [Interstate] consists only of personnel management

activity such as a termination.” Jelincic v. Xerox Corp., 2004 WL

2217643, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2004) (relying on Phillips, 63 Cal.

App. 4th at 577). However, “the [C]omplaint does not delineate the

outrageous conduct by [Interstate] or its employees giving rise to the

IIED claim.” Id. at *7; (see Compl. ¶ 26, where it states that the

alleged conduct was “intentional and malicious” and “done with wanton

and reckless disregard for the consequences to Plaintiff and were

uncivilized and illegal.”). Accordingly, since Interstate “is

entitled to fair notice of the general conduct which [Plaintiff]

asserts as [her] IIED claim, [Plaintiff] is ordered to provide a more

definite statement in support of this claim.” Jelincic, 2004 WL

2217643, at *7; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e); see also Wright & Miller,

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5 In her Opposition to Defendants’ motions, Plaintiff requests

“that the case be remanded to the state court.” (Opp’n to Supervisors’

Mot. at 3:13-14, Opp’n to Interstate’s Mot. at 3:6-7.) Plaintiff has

not explained why her request should be granted. Therefore, her request

for remand to the state court is denied. 

8

Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d § 1378 (“when a party moves to dismiss for

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) but the district judge

feels that a motion under Rule 12(e) would be more appropriate, some

courts automatically treat the motion as one for a more definite

statement.”). Plaintiff shall file the more definite statement no

later than twenty (20) days after this Order is filed. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Kelelatchen and Hargrave’s motions

to dismiss are granted and Interstate’s motion is granted in part and

denied in part.5

 Further, if Plaintiff can cure any of the

deficiencies identified herein, she may amend those claims in the

Amended Complaint to be filed in the time prescribed above.

Dated: March 7, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

 

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