Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-01292/USCOURTS-caDC-00-01292-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Digital PCS, LLC
Intervenor
Federal Communications Commission
Appellee
High Plains Wireless, L.P.
Appellant
Tritel Communications, Inc.
Intervenor

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 10, 2001 Decided January 11, 2002

No. 00-1292

High Plains Wireless, L.P.,

Appellant

v.

Federal Communications Commission,

Appellee

Digital PCS, LLC and Tritel Communications, Inc.,

Intervenors

Appeal from an Order of the

Federal Communications Commission

Eliot J. Greenwald argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Stanley Scheiner, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief

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were Jane E. Mago, General Counsel, Daniel M. Armstrong,

Associate General Counsel, and Thomas Chandler, Counsel.

Thomas Gutierrez argued the cause for intervenors Digital

PCS, LLC and Tritel Communications, Inc. With him on the

joint brief was Russell D. Lukas.

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Edwards and Sentelle,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Chief Judge: High Plains Wireless, L.P. appeals

an order of the Federal Communications Commission awarding 32 licenses to Mercury PCS II, LLC, now called Tritel

Communications, Inc. High Plains and Mercury both bid at

an auction conducted by the Commission for licenses to

provide personal communications services (PCS). See Mercury PCS II, LLC, 15 F.C.C.R. 9654 (2000) (Mercury). High

Plains asserts that the Commission unreasonably refused to

disqualify Mercury from receiving the licenses even though

Mercury concededly violated the Commission's rule against

collusion. High Plains also alleges that Mercury orchestrated

a slew of unlawful ex parte contacts in an attempt to influence

the investigation into its bidding practices. We hold that,

insofar as High Plains has standing to appeal, it has not

shown that the award to Mercury was arbitrary or irrational,

and we therefore affirm the order of the Commission.

I. Background

Broadband PCS is a group of technologies that allow

mobile communication using the electromagnetic spectrum.

See Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules to Establish New

Personal Comms. Servs., 8 F.C.C.R. 7700 at p 24 (1993) (2d

R&O). Advanced cellular telephones, portable facsimile machines, and many other methods of wireless communication

are based upon broadband PCS. See id. at p 18. Recognizing the commercial and technological potential of broadband

PCS, the Commission reserved 120 MHz of spectrum for

provision of these services. See 47 C.F.R. s 24.200.

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Before a party may use the spectrum to provide broadband

PCS, it must get a license from the Commission. See 47

U.S.C. s 301. In 1993 the Congress directed the Commission

to choose between mutually exclusive applications for a license through a system of competitive bidding, see 47 U.S.C.

s 309(j)(1); 47 C.F.R. s 24.701; the Commission has since

held several of the highest value auctions in history. See

Remarks of then-Chairman Reed Hundt at the Inst. for Int'l

Econ., Washington, D.C. (Oct. 23, 1996), at http:

//www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh647.txt (visited Dec. 18,

2001) (comparing himself to Genghis Khan as one of the

"most profit-generating" officials ever).

The Commission divided the 120 MHz of spectrum reserved for broadband PCS in two ways. First, it partitioned

the spectrum into six blocks: three of 30 MHz each (A, B,

and C) and three of 10 MHz each (D, E, and F). See 2d R&O

at p 56. Second, it divided the spectrum into geographic

service areas. Licenses for the A and B blocks of spectrum

were established for each of the 51 Market Trading Areas

into which the United States and its territories were divided

in the Rand McNally Commercial Atlas & Marketing Guide

(1992). See id. at p p 64, 76. Licenses for the C, D, E, and F

blocks were established for each of the 493 Basic Trading

Areas (BTAs) defined by the same source. See id. Between

August 26, 1996 and January 14, 1997 the Commission auctioned off the D, E, and F block licenses in all 493 BTAs. See

Mercury, 15 F.C.C.R. 9654 at p 2.

The DEF auction was open, simultaneous, and ascending.

That the auction was "open" means that, in contrast to a

sealed-bid auction, the participants became aware of each

others' bids as they were cast. The auction was "simultaneous" in that the D, E, and F licenses for each of the 493

BTAs were open for bidding at the same time, and the

auction was "ascending" in the sense that bidding on the

licenses continued through successive rounds until no new

high bid was cast. The Commission built these features into

the auction to maximize the revenue it would generate and

the allocative efficiency it would achieve. See generally Peter

Cramton, The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions, 41 J.

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L. & Econ. 727, 728-35 (1998). Because the bidding was

open, however, any bidder could send all other bidders a

message encoded in the digits of its bid. See Peter Cramton

& Jesse A. Schwartz, Collusive Bidding: Lessons from FCC

Spectrum Auctions, 17 J. Reg. Econ. 229, 237 (2000). In this

way, participants could collude through the auction process

itself.

Mercury and High Plains both bid on the licenses for the F

block of spectrum in Lubbock and for the D and F blocks in

Amarillo, Texas. See Mercury, 15 F.C.C.R. 9654 at p 2.

High Plains was the successful bidder for the F block license

in Amarillo. See id. at p 2 & n.9. Mercury acquired the F

block license in Lubbock as well as 31 other licenses for which

High Plains did not bid. See id. at p 2 & n.10.

Mercury used so-called "reflexive bidding," a tactic for

deterring would-be competitors from bidding on a particular

license, to dissuade High Plains from bidding on the F block

license for Lubbock. See id. at p 5 & n.23. Specifically,

Mercury made the last three digits of its bids for the F block

licenses in Lubbock and in Amarillo the same as the Commission's numeric designations for the Amarillo and Lubbock

BTAs respectively. See Mercury PCS II, LLC, 13 F.C.C.R.

23755 (1998) p 3 (NALF Rescission). In one round of the

auction, for example, Mercury bid $1,375,013 on the F block

license in Lubbock, "013" being the BTA for Amarillo; after

High Plains bid again for the F block license in Lubbock,

Mercury bid $1,615,264 on the F block license in Amarillo,

"264" being the BTA for Lubbock. See id. By repeatedly

thus encoding its bids, Mercury was able to warn High Plains

that if High Plains did not stop bidding, then Mercury would

drive up the price of the F block license in Amarillo. See id.

at p 4.

The message was not lost on High Plains, which stopped

bidding for the F block license in Lubbock, see id., and filed

with the Commission an emergency motion to disqualify

Mercury from the auction. High Plains alleged that Mercury

violated the anti-collusion rule, which prohibited bidders

"from cooperating, collaborating, discussing or disclosing in

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any manner the substance of their bids or bidding strategies"

during the auction. 47 C.F.R. s 1.2105(c) (2000), amended by

Competitive Bidding Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 54447, 54447-

48 (Oct. 29, 2001). When the auction ended without the

Commission having acted upon the motion, High Plains filed a

motion to deny the award to Mercury of any licenses in the

DEF auction. During ensuing investigations conducted separately by the Commission and by the Department of Justice,

the executive responsible for formulating Mercury's bidding

strategy admitted that Mercury had used reflexive bidding to

threaten other bidders. See Mercury, 15 F.C.C.R. 9654 at

p 16 n.57. Mercury claimed, however, that reflexive bidding

was a common practice and did not violate the rule against

collusion. See NALF Rescission, 13 F.C.C.R. 23755 at p 4.

While the investigation into Mercury's bidding practices

was ongoing, High Plains again complained to the Commission, this time about ex parte contacts between Members of

Congress and the staff of the Commission. At least 27

Members inquired of the Commission about Mercury's licenses and the delay in their award. After yet another investigation, the Office of General Counsel (OGC) dismissed the

charge, finding that the contacts were all congressional "status inquiries" exempt from the ban on ex parte contacts

under the Commission's rules. 47 C.F.R. s 1.1202(a).

Also while the investigation into Mercury's bidding practices was ongoing, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau

(WTB) of the Commission awarded Mercury all but nine of

the licenses for which the company was the high bidder. See

Mercury PCS II, LLC, 13 F.C.C.R. 5756 (1997) p 1. When

the investigation was over, the Commission imposed upon

Mercury a $650,000 forfeiture, see Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 12 F.C.C.R. 17970 (1997) p 1 (NALF Order); the WTB granted Mercury the remaining nine licenses,

including the F block license for Lubbock; High Plains filed

an application for review of that order; and the Commission

rescinded its earlier forfeiture order. See NALF Rescission,

13 F.C.C.R. 23755 at p 1. In the rescission order, the Commission found that Mercury was not on notice that reflexive

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bidding would violate the rule against collusion, see id. at p 10,

and therefore declined to punish the company. See id.

The Commission consolidated High Plains' applications to

review (1) the OGC's determination that Mercury had not

violated the ban against ex parte contacts and (2) the WTB's

award of licenses to Mercury, and affirmed on both counts.

See Mercury, 15 F.C.C.R. 9654 at p p 13, 26. It also rejected

High Plains' new contention that Mercury had shown a lack

of candor during the investigations into its bidding practices

so egregious as to disqualify it from holding a Commission

license. See id. at p p 14-21. High Plains appealed to this

court and Mercury intervened in the case.

II. Analysis

High Plains presents three issues on appeal. First, it

challenges the Commission's award of licenses to Mercury on

the ground that Mercury violated the rule against collusion

and the Commission had so held. Second, High Plains asserts that this court should reverse the decision of the

Commission because it erred in holding that Mercury did not

violate the rules against ex parte communications. Third,

High Plains renews its claim that Mercury exhibited a disqualifying lack of candor. We turn to these claims only after

considering whether High Plains has standing under Article

III of the Constitution of the United States to bring this

appeal. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env., 523 U.S.

83, 94-95 (1998); see also United Transp. Union-Ill. Legis.

Bd. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 175 F.3d 163, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

("[W]e must determine whether the court has jurisdiction of

the case before we may turn to the merits").

A. Standing and Jurisdiction

The Commission and Mercury, which has intervened, advance numerous arguments that High Plains is without standing to assert some or all of its claims on appeal. We consider

the objections of the litigants, fully aware of our independent

obligation to be sure we have jurisdiction.

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The "irreducible constitutional minimum" that High Plains

must show for standing to maintain this appeal is that it

suffered an injury in fact, that the conduct of which it

complains caused the injury, and that a favorable decision of

this court would redress the injury. U.S. Airwaves, Inc. v.

FCC, 232 F.3d 227, 231-32 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This court has

had occasion in prior cases to tailor the application of these

prerequisites specifically to complaints arising from the Commission's auctions of spectrum. We have held that "[a]

bidder in a government auction has a 'right to a legally valid

procurement process'; a party allegedly deprived of this right

asserts a cognizable injury." Id. at 232 (quoting DirecTV,

Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). A disappointed bidder need not show that it would be successful if

the license were auctioned anew, but only that it was able and

ready to bid and that the decision of the Commission prevented it from doing so on an equal basis. See id. The bidder

may satisfy the requirement of redressability by showing that

" 'it is ready, willing, and able' to participate in a new auction

should it prevail" in court. Id. (quoting Orange Park Fla.

T.V., Inc. v. FCC, 811 F.2d 664, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

Insofar as the appellant challenges the award to Mercury

of the F block license for Lubbock, it meets these requirements. High Plains complains that it was injured because

the Commission awarded the license to Mercury, which had

violated the anti-collusion rule, instead of holding a new

auction in which High Plains could bid free of the illicit

influence of reflexive bidding. Further, High Plains has

expressed its willingness to bid in a reprise of the vendue for

the F block license in Lubbock; and it is obvious that the

court could redress High Plains' injuries by ordering the

Commission to auction the license anew. High Plains' contentions that Mercury tried to mislead the Commission and to

influence the Commission through illicit ex parte contacts also

assert a cognizable injury, that of deprivation to a valid,

impartial administrative proceeding, which injury this court

could redress by reversing the Commission. Accordingly,

High Plains has standing to appeal the Commission's award

to Mercury of the F block license for Lubbock.

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The Commission contends separately that High Plains

does not have standing to challenge the award of the 31 other

licenses that Mercury acquired in the DEF auction, and High

Plains does not counter the Commission's argument. We

agree with the Commission (as does the intervenor, not

surprisingly). High Plains did not compete against Mercury

for those licenses. Nor does it allege that the award of those

licenses somehow deprived it of a valid auction process with

respect to the lots for which it did bid. It follows that

denying those 31 licenses to Mercury will not redress the

injury that High Plains suffered in its attempt to acquire the

F block license in Lubbock. Accordingly, we hold that High

Plains' challenge to the award of licenses other than the F

block license in Lubbock is not within the jurisdiction of this

court.

Standing aside, Mercury argues that the court lacks jurisdiction over the entire dispute, but its objections are predicated upon technical and not upon constitutional grounds. Mercury's principal claim is that in order to raise to this court any

objection to the award of licenses to Mercury based upon the

anti-collusion rule, High Plains should have sought review of

the NALF Rescission order, which is now barred by the 60-

day limitation in the Hobbs Act. See 28 U.S.C. s 2344. The

point is not well taken: High Plains could not have gotten

review of the NALF Rescission because it did not have

standing to object to the agency's refusal to sanction Mercury. See Branton v. FCC, 993 F.2d 906, 910-11 (D.C. Cir.

1993) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973)).

When the Commission later disposed of High Plains' consolidated applications for review, the company had and took its

first opportunity to seek judicial review of the Commission's

award of the Lubbock license to Mercury. For the same

reason, we reject Mercury's second contention, namely, that

High Plains is precluded from asserting its objections in this

appeal because it could have done so when the Commission

issued the NALF Rescission order. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments s 28(1).

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B. The Anti-Collusion Rule

High Plains argues that the Commission's decision to

award the license to Mercury despite its having violated the

anti-collusion rule was "neither plausible nor reasonable."

We understand High Plains to object to the decision under

two theories: First, that the Commission erred in holding the

rule against collusion too ambiguous to put Mercury on notice

reflexive bidding was a violation; and, second, that the Commission unreasonably departed from a putative policy making

violation of the rule a ground for forfeiture.

As for the first theory, our review is deferential: the

agency's interpretation of its own rule is given "controlling

weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation." Capital Network Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 201,

205 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The issue for the court, then, is

whether the Commission plainly erred or contravened the

rule against collusion when it read the rule as not providing

notice that reflexive bidding was prohibited. Here is the rule

in relevant part:

[A]fter the short-form application filing deadline, all applicants are prohibited from cooperating, collaborating,

discussing or disclosing in any manner the substance of

their bids or bidding strategies ... with other applicants

until after the down payment deadline....

47 C.F.R. s 1.2105(c)(1) (2000). Plainly, the rule does not

refer specifically to reflexive bidding. To engage in reflexive

bidding, however, is to "disclos[e] ... bidding strategies," and

Mercury unquestionably did that during the period covered

by the rule. Therefore, the rule probably did prohibit Mercury's conduct, but that is not the question before the court.

Our task is to determine only whether the Commission reasonably could conclude the rule failed to put Mercury on

notice that reflexive bidding was impermissible.

The Commission itself did not anticipate that participants

might collude through the bidding process. After High

Plains filed its emergency motion to prevent Mercury from

bidding for licenses at the auction, for example, the WTB

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declared that it had "reached no determinations on the merits

of [the] argument" that reflexive bidding violated the anticollusion rule. NALF Rescission, 13 F.C.C.R. 23755 at p 10

n.20. As the Commission later noted, this "neutral pronouncement immediately following the initial allegation of

reflexive bid signaling could reasonably have been interpreted

by auction participants as indicative of an undefined position

on whether reflexive bid signaling was covered under the

anti-collusion rule." Id. at p 10.

To the extent the Commission ever contemplated that

participants would convey information about their bidding

strategies through the act of bidding, it considered the exchange of information to be a virtue of the open auction. See

2d R&O, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700 at p 83 ("Multiple round bidding

provides information about other bidders' estimates of common values, allowing all bidders to improve their estimates of

these common values."). The Commission did anticipate that

an auction with multiple rounds of bidding might increase the

opportunity for collusion, but only because the regime could

facilitate enforcement of collusive agreements reached elsewhere, see id. at p 85 ("Using a single sealed bid could reduce

the likelihood of such collusive behavior since it provides

colluding bidders greater incentive to defect"), not because

the participants could use the open, iterative bidding process

itself to collaborate. Not until after the DEF auction was

over did the Commission identify the sorts of disclosure that,

if encoded within a bid, would violate the anti-collusion rule.

See NALF Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 17981 (concurring statement

of Commissioner Ness).

In sum, whether reflexive bidding violated the rule against

collusion appears to have been an unsettled -- indeed, an

unasked -- question before the DEF auction. In this circumstance it was not unreasonable for the Commission to have

deemed the rule ambiguous with respect to whether reflexive

bidding was prohibited.

Having determined that the Commission reasonably

deemed the anti-collusion rule ambiguous, we may dispose in

short order of High Plains' argument that the Commission

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nevertheless erred in awarding to Mercury the licenses for

which it had bid using that tactic. That the rule did not

afford adequate notice reflexive bidding was unlawful is itself

sufficient justification for the Commission not to penalize

Mercury. See Satellite Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3

(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Traditional concepts of due process incorporated into administrative law preclude an agency from penalizing a private party for violating a rule without first providing adequate notice of the substance of the rule").

High Plains' other arguments -- for example, that Mercury's use of reflexive bidding makes it unfit to hold a license

from the Commission -- misconceive the relationship between the court and the Commission. We do not review the

decisions of the agency de novo. We inquire whether Commission action was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law; and we uphold the

agency's decision when it is reasonable. See Global Naps,

Inc. v. FCC, 247 F.3d 252, 257-58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Therefore, we reject summarily the appellant's other arguments;

aimed only at showing the agency was wrong, they have not

the power to persuade that the agency was unreasonable.

C. The Ex Parte Rules

With certain exceptions clearly not applicable here, the

Commission prohibits "ex parte presentations" during the

pendency of an administrative adjudication and any subsequent judicial review. 47 C.F.R. s 1.1208. The regulations

define a "presentation" as a "communication directed to the

merits or outcome of a proceeding." Id. at s 1.1202(a). A

written presentation is "ex parte" if it is "not served on the

parties to the proceeding." Id. at s 1.1202(b). Thus, a

written presentation comes within the prohibition of the rules

only if it is both "directed to the merits or outcome of a

proceeding" and "not served on the parties." Responsibility

for a violation of the ex parte rules extends to a party that

"solicit[s] or encourage[s] others to make any improper presentation," id. at s 1.1210, as High Plains alleges Mercury did

in this case. See Freeman Eng'g Assocs. v. FCC, 103 F.3d

169, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (listing factors that inform the

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analysis whether a proceeding is "irrevocably tainted" by ex

parte contacts and therefore void).

High Plains does not identify a single written contact

between a Member of Congress and the Commission that

meets both criteria. The appellant does refer the court to

some congressional letters that arguably called upon the

Commission to give Mercury the licenses being withheld

during the inquiry into its bidding practices. High Plains

also avers that it was not served with copies of certain

congressional correspondence, but there is no overlap in the

two epistolary lists.

In its brief High Plains also claims it did not receive some

of the congressional letters written on behalf of Mercury

"until the FCC submitted the Certified List of Items in the

Record to the Court," that is, well after the Commission had

closed its inquiry into Mercury's bidding practices. If High

Plains did not receive the letters until then, and if the letters

addressed the merits of the licensing dispute, then reversal of

the order and remand to the Commission might have been

appropriate. At oral argument, however, High Plains acknowledged that it had received the letters long before the

Commission closed the record; indeed, the company attached

the letters as exhibits in a proceeding before the Commission

more than three years ago. See High Plains' Opp. to Mercury's Pet. for Recons. at Exh. C (Oct. 7, 1997).

In the end High Plains has not proffered a single instance

in which a congressional contact violated the ex parte rules.

We conclude, therefore, that the Commission had substantial

evidence that High Plains did not orchestrate a campaign of

such contacts.

D. Candor

Finally, High Plains argues that Mercury was not candid

with the Commission during the investigation into its bidding

tactics, and that its lack of candor disqualifies Mercury from

holding a Commission license. The Commission found that

Mercury never attempted to mislead the Commission about

its having used bids to convey messages; Mercury's defense

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had always been that the rule against collusion did not

prohibit its reflexive bidding.

The gravamen of High Plains' factual claim is that a

representative of Mercury falsely declared in a submission to

the Commission that Mercury had not "utilized trailing numbers to send secret signals to anyone as alleged by High

Plains," and that Mercury had used reflexive bidding only to

"bluff or confuse other bidders as to Mercury's overall auction

strategy." In a later deposition this same person admitted he

used reflexive bidding "to threaten High Plains that I was

fixing to come blister their butt in Amarillo." Mercury, 15

F.C.C.R. 9654 at p 17 n.57. The Commission did not consider

the apparent contradiction, but neither did the appellant first

present it to the Commission. The matter is therefore beyond our ken. See 47 U.S.C. s 405(a)(2) (requiring a litigant

first to present an argument to the Commission on reconsideration if it "relies on questions of fact or law upon which the

Commission ... has been afforded no opportunity to pass").

High Plains also adduces some lesser inconsistencies in

Mercury's submissions to the Commission as evidence of

Mercury's disdain for the truth. Again, however, High Plains

attempts to persuade the court that the Commission was

wrong, not that it was unreasonable. There being no claims

to the contrary, we must conclude that the decision of the

Commission is reasonable and is supported by substantial

evidence on the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(C).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commission

to award to Mercury the F block license for Lubbock is

Affirmed.

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