Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00433/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00433-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Regents of the University of California
Defendant
Stevan Valadez
Plaintiff

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1 The court uses “defendant” instead of “defendants”

because the Does were never named.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

STEVAN VALADEZ,

NO. CIV. S-03-0433 WBS GGH

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER RE: COSTS

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA, DOES 1 through

20, inclusive

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

On June 29, 2005, the court entered final judgment in

favor of defendant. The court granted summary judgment to

defendant1 on plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, and remanded

plaintiff’s remaining claims to state court. Defendant initially

submitted a bill of costs totaling $16,214.45. In its reply,

defendant concedes the merit of some of plaintiff’s objections

and lowers that total to $14,044.45. 

Plaintiff objects to the amount submitted on four

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grounds: (1) defendant’s bill of costs is untimely; (2) defendant

is not the prevailing party; (3) equitable principles weigh in

favor of not awarding costs to defendant; and (4) witness fees

and fees for service are improperly charged.

Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and Local Rule 54-292(f) govern the taxation of costs to losing

parties, subject to limits set under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See 28

U.S.C. § 1920 (enumerating taxable costs); Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(d)(1) (“costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as

of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise

directs . . . .”); L.R. 54-292(f); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.

Gibbons, 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987)(limiting taxable costs to those

enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920). There is a strong presumption

in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party. Miles v.

State of California, 320 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 2003). The

district court has discretion to determine what constitutes a

taxable cost within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Amarel v.

Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1523 (9th Cir. 1996). The losing party

has the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of awarding

costs to the prevailing party. Russian River Watershed

Protection Comm. v. City of Santa Rosa, 142 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th

Cir. 1998).

Defendant’s bill of costs was timely submitted. Final

judgment was entered on June 29, 2005, and the bill of costs was

filed on July 13, 2005. Local Rule 54-292 provides that the cost

bill is to be submitted within ten days of judgment. Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) permits the party submitting a cost

bill electronically an additional three days. Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 6(a) provides that “[w]hen the period of time

prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate

Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the

computation.” The rule in this circuit is that Rule 6(a),

eliminating federal holidays and weekends from the computation of

time, is applied before Rule 6(e), which adds three days for

electronic service. Tushner v. United States Dist. Court For the

Cent. Dist. Of Cal., 829 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 1987). The

court takes notice that July 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 16, and 17, 2005 are

therefore all excluded from the computation under Local Rule 54-

292 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6. Therefore,

defendant’s bill of costs was timely submitted.

Defendant is also the prevailing party. “There is a

‘prevailing party’ when there has been a ‘material alteration of

the legal relationship of the parties.’” Miles, 320 F.3d at

989(quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of

Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001)). Here, the

legal relationship between the two parties was altered in

defendant’s favor when the court granted summary judgment to

defendant on plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

Plaintiff’s third argument is that it would be

inequitable to award costs to defendant. According to

plaintiff’s attorney, and not plaintiff himself,

[p]laintiff is unemployed and has been unemployed since his

termination in 2004. He is currently on social security and

does not earn an income. To award a costs bill against him

especially when the information defendant learned through

discovery will be used to defend the state court action

would be inequitable and a great hardship to him. 

(Telfer Decl. in Supp. of Pl’s Objections to Def.’s Cost Bill ¶

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7). Plaintiff’s attorney does not state plaintiff’s net worth.

“[L]imited financial resources of a plaintiff may be

considered when making costs awards.” Wrighten v. Metro. Hosps.,

Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984). There is an emerging

consensus among courts that consider this issue that, to overcome

the strong presumption in favor of awarding costs, the losing

party must document his inability to pay. In Chapman v. AI

Transport, the Eleventh Circuit held that a non-prevailing

party’s financial status may be considered by the district court

in awarding costs. 229 F.3d 1012, 1039 (2000). However, “[i]f a

district court in determining the amount of costs to award

chooses to consider the non-prevailing party’s financial status,

it should require substantial documentation of a true inability

to pay.” Id.(citing McGill v. Faulkner, 18 F.3d 456, 459 (7th

Cir. 1994)(non-prevailing party offered no documentary support,

relying instead on unsupported, self-serving statements); Cherry

v. Chamption Int’l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir. 1999)(no

reduction in cost award despite proof that plaintiff had no

independent income and owned no property in her own name because

she had sufficient access to marital property and a 401(k)

plan)); see also Wyne v. Medo Indus., 329 F.Supp.2d 584, 588 (D.

Md.)(“Merely stating that one is of ‘modest means’ is

insufficient to overcome the presumption that the losing party

must pay the prevailing party’s costs.”); Richins v. Deere and

Co., 2004 WL 3413123 at *2 (D.N.M. Oct. 21, 2004)(showing of

inability to pay can only be made by “providing actual

documentation” and “a party must show more than a drop in

income”); Young v. Trinity Property Consultants, LLC, 2004 WL

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2042902 at *2-3 (N.D. Cal.)(plaintiff provided evidence of low

income and high expenses, but absent documentation of net worth,

court would not deny or reduce costs to prevailing party).

In this case, the only evidence before the court that

purports to represent plaintiff’s condition is plaintiff’s

attorney’s statement. This statement by itself lacks foundation. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 602(“A witness may not testify to a matter

unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding

that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”). Does

plaintiff’s attorney know of plaintiff’s status as unemployed and

on social security, because he told her, because she has reviewed

documents, or because she is guessing? The source of plaintiff’s

attorney’s unsupported conclusion remains unknown.

Furthermore, defendant correctly points out that the

fact that a person is presently receiving social security

payments and is unemployed does not necessarily mean that that

person is indigent, or even that the person is poor. Plaintiff

may have other sources of income or may have enough net worth to

be able to comfortably pay costs. Plaintiff has not shown

otherwise.

The court next considers plaintiff’s specific

objections to defendants’ bill of costs. Plaintiff argues that

the expert witness fees charged by Dr. Jo Danti and the airfare

of witness Victoria Simmons are not recoverable. Plaintiff

further argues that the costs of serving subpoenas are not

recoverable.

Defendant concedes that the entire $2,250 witness fee

paid to Dr. Danti is not recoverable. However, 28 U.S.C. §

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1821(b) allows a party to collect $40 for each day’s attendance. 

Therefore, defendant may collect $80 for Dr. Danti’s two days of

appearances. Travel expenses are also recoverable, provided the

witness “utilize[s] a common carrier at the most economical rate

reasonably available.” 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1). Here, defendant

provides a receipt for Simmons’ air travel using Southwest

Airlines between Los Angeles and Sacramento in the amount of

$220.20. Because defendant does not document the $5 Simmons

incurred in parking fees, the court reduces the fee award by this

amount.

“[P]rivate process servers’ fees are properly taxed as

costs.” Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 914 F.2d 175,

178 (9th Cir. 1990). Therefore, plaintiff’s objection on this

ground is without merit. 

After reviewing the bill, the court finds the following

costs taxable:

Fees of the court reporter $12,221.74

Fees for witnesses $ 300.20

Fees for copies and service of process $ 1,367.67

Docket fees $ 150.00

Accordingly, costs of $14,039.61 will be allowed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 17, 2005

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