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Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Allen Clark
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED 

United States Court of AppealJ 

Tenth Cirr.uit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 1 3 i995 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JEFFREY ALLEN CLARK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

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PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-8093 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-61) 

Submitted on the briefs. 

John R. Barksdale, Assistant United States Attorney, Casper, 

Wyoming, for appellee. 

Corinne A. Miller, Casper, Wyoming, for appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BARRETT, Circuit Judge, and 

DAUGHERTY*, District Judge. 

*The Honorable Frederick A. Daugherty, Senior Judge, United States 

District Court for the Northern, Eastern and Western Districts of 

Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-8093 Document: 01019279470 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Jeffrey Allen Clark (Clark) appeals from his conviction and 

sentence in the district court on two counts of possession and 

distribution of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 

8 41 ( a) ( 1 ) and 8 41 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) . 

Facts 

On April 2, 1994, at approximately 6:10p.m., Clark was 

stopped in Casper, Wyoming, by Wyoming Highway Patrol Officer 

Lawrence Jordan (Officer Jordan) for improper use of a turn signal. A license check revealed that Clark had a suspended Wyoming 

driver's license and an outstanding bench warrant for his arrest 

for probation revocation in a Wyoming state district 

ficer Jordan arrested Clark on the bench warrant. 

court. OfPursuant to 

the arrest, Officer Jordan arranged to have Clark's car towed and 

he transported Clark to the Natrona County Jail. 

At the jail, Clark told Officer Jordan that he had five 

ounces of 11 crank 11 (methamphetamine) in his front coat pocket. 

(R., Vol. II, p. 47). Officer Jordan testified that Clark also 

told him that he was trying to get enough money from selling the 

methamphetamine to get home. Id. at 48. However, Clark claims 

that he did not make this latter statement, but told Officer 

Jordan that he had just got done setting up enough money to get 

back home. (R., Vol. III, p. 76). A search of Clark's front coat 

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pocket revealed approximately five grams of methamphetamine in 

individually wrapped one-gram baggies and $ 0.76. 

At about 8:00 p.m. that evening, Wyoming Division of Criminal 

Investigation (DCI) Special Agents Cameron Ritter and Christopher 

Walsh (the DCI Agents) interviewed Clark for approximately two 

hours. The interview was neither audio taped nor video recorded. 

The DCI Agents testified that Clark was given a Miranda warning, 

which he waived.1 Id. at 7-8. However, Clark did not sign a 

waiver of his Miranda rights nor did he sign or write a statement.2 

The DCI Agents testified that Clark told them that: he had 

traveled from Albuquerque, New Mexico, with three ounces of 

methamphetamine which he planned to sell; he had sold two ounces 

at three local (Casper) bars to various persons for $ 150 per 

gram; and he had a one ounce stash of methamphetamine in a hole in 

the wall of the community bathroom at the Aristo Apartments. (R., 

Vol. II, p. 70-78; Vol. III, p. 9-11). Based upon Clark's detailed description, the DCI Agents searched the Aristo Apartments 

where Clark told them the methamphetamine was stashed and found a 

brown paper bag with 15 individually wrapped one-gram baggies of 

methamphetamine in the exact location specified by Clark. The 

total weight of methamphetamine, including the stash and what was 

1 Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before any 

custodial interrogation, a defendant must be warned that he has 

the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be 

used as evidence against him, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one 

will be provided for him. 

2 On appeal, Clark does not challenge the admissibility of his 

confession testified to by the DCI Agents. 

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found in Clark's pocket, was 23.4 grams, about 1 ounce. No drugs, 

drug paraphernalia, drug ledgers, or money were found in Clark's 

car. 

Clark denied that he had sold or intended to sell any methamphetamine. (R., Vol. III, p. 64). Clark testified that: he 

had traveled from Albuquerque, New Mexico, with a girlfriend, 

Joyce, for the purpose of visiting her son; they had stayed at a 

motel on Wyoming Boulevard across from the Flying "J"; Joyce had 

returned from her visit with a brown paper bag containing several 

individual baggies of methamphetamine; he did not know where she 

had obtained the drugs; and they got high and partied throughout 

the night. Id. at 61-63, 75. Clark further testified that the 

next day after Joyce left to visit her son, he got high, stashed 

the brown paper bag in the hole in the wall at the Aristo Apartments, and drove around Casper until he was arrested. Id. at 64-

65. 

Clark asserts that he willingly spoke with the DCI Agents 

because he could smoke cigarettes and believed he would receive 

lenient treatment. Clark denied that he intended to sell the 

methamphetamine and claimed it was for his own personal use. Id. 

at 64. 

On May 17, 1994, Clark was indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and distribution of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 841(b) (1) (C). 

On July 27, 1994, Clark was convicted of both counts after a 

two-day jury trial. On September 22, 1994, Clark was sentenced to 

74 months imprisonment followed by four years· supervised release. 

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Issues 

On appeal, Clark contends that: (1) there was insufficient 

evidence to support his conviction for possession with intent to 

distribute methamphetamine and distribution of methamphetamine, 

and (2) the district court's calculation of the quantity of 

drugs at three ounces for the base offense level and sentence was 

clearly erroneous. 

Discussion 

I. 

Clark contends that there was insufficient evidence presented 

at trial to support his conviction for possession with intent to 

distribute methamphetamine and distribution of methamphetamine. 

Clark argues that his confession cannot serve as the basis 

for a conviction absent some independent corroborating evidence 

establishing either the trustworthiness of the statement or the 

actual occurrence of the offense; that the government must prove 

that the 20 packets of methamphetamine were more than that which 

Clark would possess for his own personal use; that this court must 

reverse the conviction, where the evidence, as here, gives "equal 

or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a 

theory of innocence of the crime charged;" and that the DCI Agents 

created a confession out of his answers to hypothetical questions. 

Although "a criminal conviction cannot be sustained when the 

offense is proven solely by an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession," United States v. Chimal, 976 F.2d 608, 610 (lOth Cir. 

1992), cert. denied, U.S. (1993); Smith v. United States, 

348 U.S. 147, 152 (1954), corroborating evidence is adequate if it 

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"supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a 

jury inference of the truth" of the confession. Opper v. United 

States, 348 u.s. 84, 93 (1954). The quantity and type of independent corroborating evidence depends upon the facts of each 

case. Id. However, circumstantial evidence can be used to corroborate a confession. Chimal, 976 F.2d at 611. 

In Chimal, this court affirmed the defendant's conviction for 

embezzlement that was primarily based upon her confession to FBI 

agents. 976 F.2d at 610. When questioned at her home before 

trial, the defendant admitted to the FBI agents that she had embezzled funds on two separate occasions; at trial, the defendant 

denied stealing and testified she had put the money in the safe. 

Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that there was no direct 

evidence of her guilt and that the government failed to prove a 

corpus delicti independent of her confession. Id. In holding 

that her confession was sufficiently corroborated to establish its 

trustworthiness, we relied on the testimony of the defendant's 

coworkers that: she altered deposit slips, she substituted vendor 

checks for cash, she failed to record the vendor checks in the 

deposit log, cash taken from the deposits never appeared in the 

bank account or the safe, and she was often seen carrying large 

amounts of cash at work. Id. at 611. 

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the evidence sufficiently corroborates Clark's extrajudicial confession. 

The evidence shows that the DCI Agents recovered 15 individually 

wrapped one-gram baggies of methamphetamine in the exact location 

described in detail by Clark in his confession. This evidence 

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sufficiently establishes the trustworthiness of Clark's confession. 

Once it has been determined that evidence exists to corroborate the trustworthiness of the confession, the evidence as a 

whole must be sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Chimal, 976 F.2d at 611. "Evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction if a reasonable jury 

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given 

the direct and circumstantial evidence, along with reasonable 

inferences therefrom, taken in a light most favorable to the 

government." United States v. Mains, 33 F.3d· 1222, 1227 (lOth 

Cir. 1994); United States v. Ray, 973 F.2d 840, 841-42 (lOth Cir. 

1992). 

We hold that the government 

from which a reasonable jury 

presented sufficient evidence 

could have found Clark guilty of 

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and distribution of methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt, and we reject 

Clark's argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict 

him because the evidence could support a finding that the methamphetamine was for personal use and not for distribution. Although 

it is possible to hypothesize from circumstantial evidence that 

the 20 individually wrapped one-gram baggies of methamphetamine 

were for Clark's own personal use, "the evidence required to 

support a verdict need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and need not negate all possibilities except 

guilt." United States v. Parrish, 925 F.2d 1293, 1297 (lOth Cir. 

1991). See United States v. Alonso, 790 F.2d 1489, 1493 (lOth 

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Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Henry, 468 F.2d 892, 894 

(lOth Cir. 1972)). 

II. 

Clark contends that the district court erroneously calculated 

the quantity of methamphetamine used for his base level offense 

and sentence. Clark does not challenge the application of the 

sentencing guidelines; rather, he simply challenges the quantity 

of methamphetamine attributable to him. 

Clark asserts that the accurate quantity of methamphetamine 

that should have been used to determine his base offense level was 

the 23.4 grams actually introduced at trial and that the sole 

basis for using three ounces was his alleged statements to the DCI 

Agents, i.e., that he had traveled from Albuquerque to Casper with 

three ounces of methamphetamine which he planned to sell, that he 

sold two ounces and stashed one ounce in a hole in the wall at the 

Aristo Apartments. Clark argues that, in any event, without any 

independent corroboration, his hearsay statements3 are insufficient grounds on which to calculate the relevant conduct. 

The government has the burden of proving the quantity of 

drugs for sentencing purposes by a preponderance of the evidence. 

United States v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1508 (lOth Cir. 1993); 

United States v. Ortiz, 993 F.2d 204, 207 (lOth Cir. 1993). "We 

review this determination under a clearly erroneous standard, and 

we will not disturb it unless it has no support in the record, or 

3 Contrary to Clark's characterization, his statements to the 

DCI Agents were not hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d) (2). 

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unless after reviewing all the evidence we are firmly convinced 

that an error has been made." United States v. Cook, 949 F.2d 

289, 296 (lOth Cir. 1991). See United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 

973, 981 (lOth Cir. 1993); United States v. Earls, 42 F.3d 1321, 

1325 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, U.S. (1995). We 

defer to the district court 

witnesses on whose testimony it 

findings. Cook, 949 F.2d at 296. 

when reviewing the credibility of 

relies in making its factual 

In Earls, the defendants challenged the district court's 

reliance on testimony at sentencing for the determination of the 

quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy. 42 F.3d at 1325. 

The declarant testified that he went to California every five to 

six weeks and picked up five to six pounds of drugs. Id. at 1326. 

The defendants attacked the credibility of the declarant and argued that his testimony was wholly uncorroborated. Id. We 

pointed out that the district court found the testimony to be a 

"truthful account," which was corroborated by telephone toll 

records, body mike conversations, and tape-recorded phone calls 

collected by the government. Id. Based on this evidence, we 

could not find that the declarant's "testimony was too unreliable 

to support the trial judge's conclusions." Id. Therefore, we 

held that the district court's determination of the quantity of 

drugs based on this testimony was not clearly erroneous. Id. 

Here, the district court relied upon the testimony of the DCI 

Agents relating Clark's confession for the drug quantity of three 

ounces of methamphetamine. The district court found that the 

testimony of the DCI Agents was "reliable" and had "the minimum 

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indicia of reliability" which was more than a preponderance of the 

evidence. (R., Vol. V, p. 22-23). In addition, the out-of-court 

statements made by Clark during his questioning by the DCI Agents 

concerning his transportation of three ounces of methamphetamine 

from Albuquerque to Casper, sale of two ounces, and stash of one 

ounce were sufficiently corroborated when the DCI Agents searched 

the Aristo Apartments and found the 15 one-gram baggies in the 

exact location related to them by Clark. 

Information relied on by the district court at sentencing 

must have "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its 

probable accuracy." U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a); Ortiz, 993 F.2d at 207. 

We find nothing in the record to undermine the district court 

finding. With all due regard given to the district court's 

credibility determinations, we hold that the district court's 

calculation was not clearly erroneous. 

AFFIRMED. 

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