Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05074/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05074-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gina McCarthy
Appellee
Susan M. Morris
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 16, 2015 Decided June 14, 2016

No. 14-5074

SUSAN M. MORRIS,

APPELLANT

v.

GINA MCCARTHY, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 

PROTECTION AGENCY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-00701)

Ellen K. Renaud argued the cause for appellant. With her 

on the briefs were David H. Shapiro and Richard L. Swick.

Brian P. Hudak, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and 

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: GRIFFITH and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: This case stems from two 

adverse employment actions taken against appellant Susan 

Morris while she worked for the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA): a seven-day suspension without pay in 2008

and a termination in 2010. Morris claims that both actions 

violated Title VII. The district court granted summary 

judgment against Morris’s suspension claims and dismissed 

her termination claims. We reverse in part the grant of 

summary judgment, concluding that a reasonable jury could 

find that Morris’s suspension was motivated by racial 

discrimination. We affirm the dismissal of her termination 

claims because she failed to exhaust her administrative 

remedies.

I

A

Morris, a white woman, worked as a manager in EPA’s 

Office of Civil Rights (OCR) for ten years, most recently as 

Assistant Director for Affirmative Employment. Her 

supervisor was Director Karen Higginbotham, who in turn 

reported to Ray Spears, EPA’s Deputy Chief of Staff. Both 

Higginbotham and Spears are African-American. 

Morris received several awards for leadership and service 

during her time at EPA, but her career path at the agency hit a 

snag in 2007 when she disagreed with EPA employee Nancy 

Tommelleo over the naming of an agency advisory group that 

was asked to look into the concerns of gay and lesbian 

employees. Because we are, in part, reviewing a grant of 

summary judgment to EPA, we recount the facts of this 

conflict over the group’s name in the light most favorable to 

Morris. 

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Tommelleo and Morris discussed the naming issue in a 

conference call with Higginbotham in August 2007. 

Afterward, Tommelleo sent a memo to her supervisor and 

other EPA officials complaining that Morris had behaved 

unprofessionally during the call. On September 21, 2007, 

Tommelleo’s supervisor forwarded this memo to 

Higginbotham, Spears, and other officials, along with her own 

memo objecting to Morris’s conduct.

Higginbotham was “surprised” to receive Tommelleo’s

memo, as she had found Morris “forceful” but not 

disrespectful during the call. Higginbotham Decl. ¶ 8. 

Higginbotham told Morris about the memo shortly after 

receiving it, but despite Morris’s requests, did not provide her 

with a copy until December 21, 2007. Higginbotham told 

Morris, “Do not respond to this memo. I will prepare the 

response and you will be copied on my reply.” J.A. 358 

(emphasis in original). 

When Higginbotham had not responded to the memo by 

February 2008, Morris emailed a document that she called an 

“issue sheet” to Higginbotham, Spears, and the members of 

the agency’s Human Resources Council. According to Morris, 

EPA encourages employees to submit issue sheets to air 

personnel grievances. Morris’s issue sheet complained that

EPA employees outside OCR were exercising undue sway 

over the agency’s equal employment policies and that 

Morris’s reputation had been attacked in a number of ways—

including by Tommelleo’s memo and the accompanying 

memo written by Tommelleo’s supervisor, by 

Higginbotham’s failure to respond as promised, and by 

Higginbotham’s refusal to allow Morris to reply. The issue 

sheet also quoted passages from the memos penned by 

Tommelleo and her supervisor. 

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Higginbotham immediately emailed Morris to say that

she believed the issue sheet directly violated her order not to 

respond to Tommelleo’s memo, and that she would consider 

disciplinary action as a result. In reply, Morris defended 

herself by arguing that she had not responded to the memo 

and thus Higginbotham had no basis for disciplinary action. A 

month later, Higginbotham proposed to Spears that Morris be 

suspended without pay for seven days. Spears approved the 

suspension on April 28, 2008.

Morris’s difficulties at the agency continued after the 

suspension. Two years later, in March 2010, Higginbotham 

proposed terminating Morris’s employment for reasons 

including insubordination and misuse of supervisory 

authority. The day after Morris learned of the proposed 

termination, she filed a whistleblower complaint with the 

Office of Special Counsel (OSC)—an independent 

prosecutorial agency that investigates federal employees’ 

claims of prohibited personnel practices—alleging that EPA 

proposed terminating her because she had exposed 

wrongdoing within the agency. The complaint’s precise 

content is not pertinent here, but its impact on Morris’s 

termination is: at the OSC’s request, EPA agreed to delay 

firing Morris pending the investigation of her whistleblower

complaint. But in August 2010, EPA declined to delay further

and Spears terminated Morris’s employment. 

B

Morris filed suit in district court on April 8, 2011, 

alleging that both her suspension and termination violated 

Title VII. As relevant here, she claimed that the agency took 

these actions against her because of her race and because she 

complained of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 

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Title VII plaintiffs must exhaust their administrative 

remedies before bringing their claims to court. Payne v. 

Salazar, 619 F.3d 56, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2010). But the actions a 

federal employee must take to satisfy the exhaustion 

requirement differ based on a number of factors, including the 

severity of the adverse employment action at issue. See 

BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT 

DISCRIMINATION LAW 32-35 (5th ed. 2012). For a suspension

of fourteen days or fewer, like Morris’s, a federal employee 

must first consult an equal employment opportunity (EEO)

counselor at her agency to “try to informally resolve the 

matter.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). After informal counseling, 

an employee whose concerns are not resolved may file a 

formal complaint with her agency’s EEO office. 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1614.106(a), (b). Finally, if that office finds against her, she 

may appeal further to the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (EEOC) or file suit in district court. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-16(c); see Howard v. Pritzker, 775 F.3d 430, 438-39 

(D.C. Cir. 2015).

This process varied slightly for Morris. Because her 

complaint implicated personnel in her agency’s civil rights 

office, agency procedures enabled her to consult an 

independent EEO counselor from the Department of Energy 

and to file a formal complaint with that agency. The district 

court found that Morris timely took these steps. It held that 

she exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to her 

claim that her suspension violated Title VII. 

Morris’s claim that her termination violated Title VII

involved a more serious personnel action and therefore 

triggered different options for exhausting her administrative 

remedies. See Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1349-50

(D.C. Cir. 2012). One option for an employee who alleges

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that she was fired because of discrimination or retaliation is to 

pursue a complaint with her agency’s EEO office. See id.; 5 

C.F.R. § 1201.154(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b). If she does

not prevail there, she may either file a discrimination suit in 

federal district court or appeal to the Merit Systems Protection 

Board (MSPB), an agency that adjudicates federal 

employment disputes. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(b); 29 C.F.R. 

§§ 1614.302(d)(1)(i), 1614.310(a). Another option is to 

sidestep the agency’s EEO office entirely and file an appeal 

directly with the MSPB. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(a); 29 

C.F.R. § 1614.302(b). Morris chose the latter route: she 

appealed her termination to the MSPB on September 8, 2010. 

At the MSPB, an administrative judge takes evidence and 

issues a decision. That decision becomes final after 35 days if 

the parties do not seek review by the full Board. See 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.113. The employee may then challenge the agency’s

decision by filing suit in district court within 30 days of 

receiving notice of the MSPB’s “judicially reviewable

action.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). She may also bring suit in 

district court if the MSPB takes no “judicially reviewable

action” within 120 days of the date she files her appeal. Id. 

§ 7702(e)(1)(B).

Morris’s course before the MSPB took a number of 

twists. First, at the OSC’s request, the MSPB ordered that

Morris be reinstated at EPA while the OSC investigated her 

whistleblower complaint, until January 21, 2011. Then, in 

October 2010, the MSPB administrative judge asked the 

parties to weigh in on whether, in the interest of judicial 

economy, Morris’s MSPB appeal should be dismissed without 

prejudice while the OSC investigation proceeded. EPA 

favored dismissal. Morris requested that the administrative 

judge hold the MSPB proceedings in abeyance until the 

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completion of the OSC investigation. Should the judge 

dismiss the case, however, Morris asked her to provide 

“assurances” that Morris had not “waiv[ed] any right to seek 

relief in the event that the matter [was] not resolved at the 

conclusion of OSC’s investigation.” Mot. to Stay Proceedings 

Pending Outcome of Investigation by the Office of Special 

Counsel at 2-3, Morris v. EPA, No. DC-0752-10-0865-I-1 

(M.S.P.B. Oct. 18, 2010). 

The administrative judge dismissed Morris’s MSPB

appeal without prejudice on October 20, 2010, explaining that 

regulations permit the MSPB to hold cases in abeyance only 

to facilitate settlement or discovery. However, the judge

ordered that Morris’s appeal be automatically refiled upon the 

expiration of her temporary reinstatement at EPA. This 

automatic refiling was intended to provide the “assur[ance]” 

Morris requested: that her right to seek relief before the 

MSPB would not be prejudiced by the dismissal, which was 

entered, not as a determination of the merits of her appeal, but

simply because the OSC investigation might provide the relief 

Morris sought. Morris v. EPA, No. DC-0752-10-0865-I-1, at 

3 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 20, 2010). Pursuant to the administrative 

judge’s order, Morris’s MSPB appeal was automatically 

refiled on January 24, 2011, after Morris’s reinstatement at 

EPA expired. But in April 2011, three days before her 

scheduled MSPB hearing, Morris withdrew her MSPB appeal 

and filed suit in district court.

The district court dismissed Morris’s claim that her 

termination violated Title VII, holding that she failed to 

exhaust her administrative remedies because she did not allow 

the MSPB sufficient time to adjudicate her appeal. And 

although Morris’s claims regarding her suspension survived

dismissal, the district court ultimately disposed of them at 

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summary judgment. According to the district court, no 

reasonable jury could find that Morris’s suspension was 

motivated by discrimination because she had not shown that 

EPA’s proffered explanation for suspending her was mere 

pretext for racial animus. The court also rejected Morris’s 

claim that her suspension was retaliatory, reasoning that she 

had not shown that Spears, the final decisionmaker, knew she 

had engaged in any activity protected by Title VII.

Morris appeals both the dismissal of her terminationbased claims and the grant of summary judgment on her 

suspension-based claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291.

II

Morris first argues that the district court erred in 

dismissing her termination-based claims. We review de novo 

a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Schlottman v. Perez, 739 F.3d 21, 

25 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Like the district court, we hold that 

Morris failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. 

Morris filed suit in district court on April 8, 2011—74 

days after her appeal was automatically refiled with the 

MSPB on January 24, 2011. The district court reasoned that 

Morris failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because 

she did not give the MSPB 120 days from the January refiling 

date to adjudicate her claims, as required by statute. See 5 

U.S.C. § 7702(e)(1)(B). Before us, Morris contends that she 

allowed the agency sufficient time because she first filed her 

appeal with the MSPB in September 2010. The MSPB’s 

October 2010 dismissal without prejudice was not, she argues, 

a “judicially reviewable action.” She urges that because the 

MSPB took no judicially reviewable action within 120 days 

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of her September 2010 filing date, she was entitled to sue in 

district court under section 7702(e)(1)(B). EPA responds that 

the MSPB took a judicially reviewable action when the 

administrative judge dismissed Morris’s appeal without 

prejudice in October 2010. If Morris wanted to challenge this 

dismissal, the agency contends, she should have done so 

within 30 days of the date the MSPB decision became final—

by December 24, 2010. 

Regardless of whether the October 2010 dismissal was 

judicially reviewable, we conclude that Morris has failed to 

exhaust her administrative remedies. Morris invited the

MSPB to delay the processing of her appeal when she asked 

the administrative judge to suspend the proceedings. Having 

requested this postponement, Morris cannot now argue that 

the agency failed to promptly adjudicate her claim. Cf. Bhd. of 

R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R.

Co., 380 F.2d 605, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“A party may not 

allege on appeal as error an action which he had induced [an 

administrative] tribunal to take[.]”). Indeed, finding the 

exhaustion requirement of section 7702(e)(1)(B) satisfied here

would create a problematic loophole. Future litigants wishing 

to avoid agency adjudication could request a delay before the 

MSPB, wait 120 days, and then file in district court without 

ever advancing their claims in the administrative forum. See 

Vinieratos v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 939 F.2d 762, 774 n.11 

(9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the 120-day rule “is not an 

escape valve” allowing a claimant to postpone his MSPB 

appeal to pursue remedies in another administrative forum 

and “nonetheless obtain a hearing in federal court”). 

When litigants bypass administrative resolution in this 

manner, the substantial benefits of exhaustion are lost. As the 

Supreme Court has explained, exhaustion serves two main 

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purposes: it “protects administrative agency authority” by 

allowing the agency to correct its own mistakes and by 

discouraging disregard of its procedures, and it “promotes 

efficiency” by building a useful record for judicial review 

and, in some cases, eliminating the need for judicial review 

altogether. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We decline to read the 120-day 

timer of section 7702(e)(1)(B) in a manner that would 

undermine these goals.

Morris argues that she should be permitted to pursue her 

claims in district court despite her request to postpone 

adjudication before the MSPB. She contends that she did not 

initiate the October 2010 dismissal; rather, the MSPB did 

when it asked whether Morris’s appeal should be dismissed 

without prejudice. See Oral Arg. at 9:30-9:55. Had Morris 

preferred not to delay the MSPB proceedings, however, her 

recourse was simple: she could have said so. Instead, she 

requested that the MSPB postpone her appeal. She further 

argues that because she requested a stay before the MSPB, 

and not a dismissal, she did not “abandon” her MSPB appeal. 

See Oral Arg. at 2:11-2:57. But our holding does not hinge on 

the precise nature of Morris’s request. What matters is that 

Morris received the outcome she invited: a lag of more than 

four months between when she first filed and when her case 

proceeded before the MSPB. She cannot argue that the agency

should have processed her appeal during this interval.

Morris therefore did not allow the agency the requisite 

120 days to adjudicate her appeal. In reaching this conclusion, 

we need not decide whether the statute’s 120-day timer began 

ticking when Morris first filed her appeal or when her appeal 

was automatically refiled. Counting from either date, her 

appeal was not actively pending before the MSPB for 120 

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days.1 As a result, the district court properly dismissed her 

termination claims for failure to exhaust her administrative 

remedies. 

III

Morris next challenges the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment on her claims that her suspension was 

discriminatory and retaliatory in violation of Title VII. We 

review that decision de novo, Hairston v. Vance-Cooks, 773 

F.3d 266, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2014), viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to Morris, drawing all reasonable 

inferences in her favor, and avoiding weighing the evidence 

or making credibility determinations, Hamilton v. Geithner, 

666 F.3d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2012). We may affirm the 

district court’s judgment only if no reasonable jury could 

reach a verdict in Morris’s favor. Id.

Under Title VII, the federal government may not 

discriminate against employees on the basis of race, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e–16(a), or retaliate against them because they 

complain of discrimination, id. § 2000e–3(a). See Barnes v. 

Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Morris claims 

that EPA did both to her.

We analyze Morris’s claims using the familiar framework 

set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 

(1973). Under this formula, an employee must first make out 

 1 From Morris’s initial September 8, 2010, filing date, 42 days 

elapsed until the MSPB dismissed her appeal on October 20, 2010. 

Another 74 days passed between January 24, 2011, when the appeal 

was refiled, to April 8, 2011, when Morris filed in district court. 

Morris’s appeal was actively pending before the MSPB, then, for 

no more than 116 days. 

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a prima facie case of retaliation or discrimination. Reeves v. 

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). 

The employer must then come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for the challenged 

action. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 

248, 254-55 (1981). If the employer meets this burden, the 

McDonnell Douglas framework falls away and the factfinder 

must decide the ultimate question: whether the employee has 

proven intentional discrimination or retaliation. St. Mary’s 

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-12 (1993). The 

employee can survive summary judgment by providing 

enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the 

employer’s proffered explanation was a pretext for retaliation 

or discrimination. Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1351; see also Brady 

v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008).

Evaluating whether an employee may proceed to trial, we 

ask whether a reasonable jury could infer discrimination or 

retaliation from “all the evidence, which includes not only the 

prima facie case but also the evidence the plaintiff offers to 

attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its action and 

[any] other evidence.” Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc., 601 F.3d 565, 

577 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 

670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). A jury may infer discrimination 

from, among other things, “evidence of discriminatory 

statements or attitudes on the part of the employer.” Aka v. 

Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en 

banc). To avoid summary judgment, employees need not 

necessarily provide evidence beyond that rebutting the 

employer’s stated explanation. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-

48.

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A

We start with Morris’s claim that her suspension was 

motivated by racial discrimination. She argues that 

Higginbotham’s alleged racial bias influenced Spears’s

decision to suspend her. In other words, Morris asserts that 

Spears was the conduit of Higginbotham’s discriminatory 

motives—her “cat’s [] paw.” Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 

1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Under a cat’s-paw theory of 

discrimination, an employer may be held liable for 

discriminatory acts by a direct supervisor—even where that 

supervisor is not the final decisionmaker—if “[1] [the]

supervisor performs an act motivated by [discriminatory]

animus [2] that is intended by the supervisor to cause an 

adverse employment action, and . . . [3] that act is a proximate 

cause of the ultimate employment action.” Staub v. Proctor 

Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011); see Burley v. Nat’l 

Passenger Rail Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 297 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 

2015) (applying Staub in the Title VII context). Here, Staub’s

second prong is easily met: Higginbotham’s recommendation 

that Morris be suspended for insubordination was clearly 

intended to cause such a suspension. The first and third 

prongs of Staub warrant discussion, but we ultimately 

conclude that Morris has introduced sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable trier of fact to find in her favor.

i

Under the first prong, a reasonable jury could find that 

the insubordination charge was pretextual and that 

Higginbotham was motivated by discriminatory animus when 

she recommended suspending Morris. We base this 

conclusion on evidence that Higginbotham harbored bias 

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toward white employees, as well as on the weaknesses Morris

identifies in EPA’s explanation for the suspension. 

Morris’s strongest evidence of Higginbotham’s

discriminatory attitude consists of race-based remarks she 

allegedly made. An EPA employee supervised by Morris, 

Alease Wright, recalled that around 2005 or 2006, 

Higginbotham said of Morris, “[T]he little white woman 

better stand in line . . . . [T]his is EPA[;] we can whip her into 

shape.” Wright Decl. ¶ 7. Wright also testified that

“Higginbotham told me that John Newton, an AfricanAmerican, could not get a promotion from a white woman, so 

she told Ray Spears to send him down to [Higginbotham’s]

office and she would give him a [promotion to pay-scale 

level] GS-15.” Id. ¶ 6. Similarly, Morris attested that 

Higginbotham once said, “[I]f the white woman up there 

won’t promote [Newton], I will.” Morris Decl. ¶ 13. Morris

further testified that on one occasion Higginbotham referred 

to a group of young men working at EPA as “nasty little white 

boys.” Id. ¶ 21; see also Morris Dep. at 82. Another time, at a 

staff meeting discussing an unrelated incident in which EPA 

was found to have discriminated against an employee, 

Higginbotham told the staff that “those white boys . . . will 

learn a lesson now.” Morris Dep. at 86.

In granting summary judgment to EPA, the district court 

discounted these statements one by one: the comment that 

Morris “better stand in line” was made too long before 

Morris’s suspension to be probative; Wright’s statement about 

Newton was belied by the record; and the remaining 

comments were “stray remarks” unrelated to Morris’s 

suspension. 

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We disagree with the district court’s treatment of these 

remarks. For starters, the determination that the record did not 

support Wright’s statement about Newton improperly credits

EPA’s evidence over Morris’s. The district court found that

Newton was not promoted into his position at OCR and that 

his prior supervisor was not a white woman but an AfricanAmerican man. As such, the district court discredited 

Wright’s testimony. But this evidence merely creates a 

question of fact as to whether Higginbotham actually made 

the statement Wright attributed to her: that Newton “could not 

get a promotion from a white woman” and that Higginbotham 

would therefore promote him. It is the jury’s role—not the 

court’s—to determine the weight to give Wright’s 

recollection in light of evidence casting doubt on its accuracy. 

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986) (“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s 

function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine 

the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a 

genuine issue for trial.”).

Moreover, in dismissing Higginbotham’s comments 

about “nasty little white boys” and “white boys . . . learn[ing] 

a lesson” as immaterial “stray remarks”—that is, statements 

unrelated to Morris’s suspension—the district court failed to 

view the record in the light most favorable to Morris.

Although we have found that an isolated race-based remark 

unrelated to the relevant employment decision could not, 

without more, permit a jury to infer discrimination, see, e.g., 

Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 996-97 

(D.C. Cir. 2002), we have not categorically labeled such 

comments immaterial. To the contrary, we have found these 

types of statements to support a verdict for a Title VII 

plaintiff. See, e.g., Evans v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 617, 622-23 

(D.C. Cir. 2013); Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 312-13 

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(D.C. Cir. 2011); Anderson v. Grp. Hospitalization, Inc., 820 

F.2d 465, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 

152-53 (cautioning lower courts against discounting 

discriminatory statements “not made in the direct context” of 

the challenged employment action). The same is true of 

remarks made significantly before the relevant employment 

action, such as Higginbotham’s statement that “the little white 

woman better stand in line.” Even if such a statement carries 

less weight than one made at the time of the suspension, it is 

nonetheless probative evidence of a supervisor’s 

discriminatory attitude, at least when it is targeted directly at 

the plaintiff or is one of a pattern of similar remarks. Instead 

of reviewing each racially charged remark individually and 

finding it insufficient, we consider it alongside any additional 

statements—and all other evidence—to determine whether a 

plaintiff has met her burden. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290 

(explaining that at summary judgment, “the court must 

consider all the evidence in its full context”).

Here, Morris introduced evidence that Higginbotham 

made multiple racially biased statements about white 

employees—including one about Morris. EPA points to no 

case in which we have affirmed a grant of summary judgment 

to an employer despite racially charged statements of the 

number and tenor of those here, and we have found none.2

These remarks are readily distinguishable—whether because 

of their pervasiveness, severity, or the role of the speaker in 

the adverse action—from those this court has said would not 

 2 When asked at oral argument to identify such a case, counsel 

for EPA pointed to Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 

983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992). See Oral Arg. at 34:45-35:49. But the 

remarks in Ezold were attributed to a company executive who took 

no part in the ultimate employment decision at issue. See 983 F.2d 

at 543-47.

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permit a jury to infer discrimination. See, e.g., Hampton v. 

Vilsack, 685 F.3d 1096, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (single 

statement by individual uninvolved in the challenged 

employment decision); Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg.

Corp., 328 F.3d 647, 654-55 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (single email 

sent by individual uninvolved in the challenged employment 

decision); Waterhouse, 298 F.3d at 996-97 (general statement 

regarding diversity efforts made by supervisor years after the 

challenged employment action; statement that the office had 

“too many white managers” made by supervisor in the same 

year he hired plaintiff, a white manager); Hall v. Giant Food, 

Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1079-80 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (single 

statement made after the challenged employment decision by 

individual uninvolved in that decision). Considered together,

Higginbotham’s statements could lead a reasonable juror to 

find that she harbored a discriminatory attitude toward white 

employees.

Of course, Morris must show more than a general bias

against white employees; she must also introduce enough 

evidence for a reasonable jury to find that her suspension was 

motivated by that bias. To make this showing, Morris relies 

on weaknesses in EPA’s explanation. Specifically, she 

contends that a reasonable jury could find that her issue sheet

was not a “response” to Tommelleo’s memo, and could 

therefore infer that Higginbotham did not honestly believe 

Morris had violated the instruction not to respond. For its part, 

EPA argues that under Title VII, an employer need not be 

correct in its nondiscriminatory reason for disciplining an 

employee; it need only honestly believe the reason and 

therefore lack a discriminatory motive. Morris’s subjective 

opinion that her issue sheet did not “respond” to the critical 

memo, EPA contends, is irrelevant. 

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EPA is correct that a Title VII plaintiff cannot survive 

summary judgment merely by asserting that her employer 

made a bad decision. Rather, she must raise a genuine dispute 

over the employer’s honest belief in its proffered explanation. 

See Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Once the employer has articulated a nondiscriminatory explanation for its action . . . the issue is not 

‘the correctness or desirability of [the] reasons offered . . . 

[but] whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it 

offers.’” (quoting McCoy v. WGN Cont’l Broad. Co., 957 

F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992))). A plaintiff can meet this 

burden by casting doubt on the objective validity of the 

employer’s explanation.3 See, e.g., Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143-

46. 

Morris does precisely that. She challenges the objective 

validity of EPA’s insubordination explanation in an effort to 

call into question whether Higginbotham honestly believed 

that justification. She argues that a reasonable jury could find 

that she did not violate Higginbotham’s order, but rather

wrote a human resources complaint protesting (1) the 

involvement of EPA staff outside of OCR in the agency’s 

equal employment policies and (2) Higginbotham’s refusal to 

respond to the allegations in the memo. She asserts that she 

did not send the issue sheet to Tommelleo or Tommelleo’s 

supervisor and did not answer their accusations at any length, 

although she “recount[ed]” some of their charges against her. 

Appellant’s Br. at 30. Further, she adds that Higginbotham’s 

 3 The cases EPA cites do not dispute this point. Rather, they 

merely stand for the principle that a plaintiff cannot survive 

summary judgment unless there is a genuine dispute as to the 

employer’s sincerity—that is, a dispute that would allow a 

reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff. See Hairston, 773 F.3d at 

273; Brady, 520 F.3d at 496 & n.4.

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reasons for failing to respond to the memo were feeble.

Higginbotham said that other work priorities overwhelmed 

her during the fall of 2007 and that she was dealing with her 

own medical issues and those of her ailing brother. But 

Morris presents evidence that the medical issues were largely 

resolved by mid-September 2007, and that the additional 

work priorities wrapped up in November—before 

Higginbotham ever told Morris in December 2007 that she 

would reply to the memo.

Drawing all inferences in Morris’s favor, then, the 

following sequence of events emerges: Higginbotham knew 

that Morris, a senior manager in her group, had been wrongly 

accused of unprofessional conduct. She forbade Morris from 

responding to those accusations, promising that she would do 

so herself. But she failed to reply for some two months after

sending Tommelleo’s memo to Morris (five months after

receiving it in the first place) and offered unpersuasive 

explanations for that failure. Morris, forbidden from 

responding to the allegations herself and finding her 

supervisor unwilling to step in, ultimately submitted a human 

resources complaint protesting her supervisor’s handling of 

the incident and broader office policies, taking care not to 

reply directly to the employees who had made the 

accusations. She was then charged with insubordination for 

violating the order not to “respond.” Viewed from this 

perspective, a reasonable jury could be “quite suspicious” of 

the sincerity of Higginbotham’s insubordination charge. 

Evans, 716 F.3d at 622. And combined with evidence that 

Higginbotham had made repeated, disparaging comments 

about white employees, including one statement about Morris,

that jury could find that the insubordination charge was 

pretext for racial discrimination. See id.

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Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Morris, we cannot say as a matter of law that Higginbotham 

honestly believed the nondiscriminatory reason she provided. 

While a reasonable jury might infer from these facts that 

Higginbotham’s justification was sincere, it might instead 

infer that in charging Morris with insubordination, 

Higginbotham was dissembling to cover up a discriminatory 

motive. Resolving such conflicting inferences is precisely the 

type of function we leave to the jury, not to a judge ruling on 

a summary judgment motion. See Pardo-Kronemann v. 

Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Morris

therefore survives summary judgment on the first Staub

prong.

ii

Staub’s third prong requires that the biased supervisor’s 

act be a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action. 

EPA argues, and the district court found, that Spears’s 

independent investigation of the insubordination charge 

insulated his decision to suspend Morris from 

Higginbotham’s racial bias. In effect, EPA contends that any 

animus on Higginbotham’s part was not a proximate cause of 

Morris’s suspension because Spears’s investigation was an 

intervening, superseding cause. We disagree. 

Proximate cause requires only “some direct relation”

between the injury asserted and conduct alleged and excludes 

only those “link[s] that are too remote, purely contingent, or 

indirect.” Staub, 562 U.S. at 419 (quoting Hemi Group, LLC 

v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)). A jury could 

reasonably find that Higginbotham’s proposal to suspend 

Morris directly related to Spears’s ultimate decision to 

suspend her. In his written decision, Spears explicitly noted 

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that he was approving the suspension “as proposed by Ms. 

Higginbotham.” J.A. 395.

The closer question is whether Spears’s investigation was 

a superseding cause—that is, a “cause of independent origin 

that was not foreseeable,” Staub, 562 U.S. at 420. The “mere 

conduct of an independent investigation” does not break the 

causal chain between a supervisor’s bias and an adverse 

employment action. Id. at 421. Rather, the supervisor’s biased 

recommendation may still influence the ultimate decision if 

the final decisionmaker “takes it into account without 

determining that the adverse action was, apart from the 

supervisor’s recommendation, entirely justified.” Id.

A reasonable juror could determine that Higginbotham’s 

report colored Spears’s evaluation of the incident at hand.

That report contained subjective observations that Morris had 

“difficulty getting along with others,” was not “appropriately 

diplomatic,” and had “acrimon[ious]” interactions with 

colleagues. J.A. 360-61. Spears’s suspension decision 

repeatedly referenced Higginbotham’s report, and in fact 

expressly agreed with a portion of her assessment that 

considered subjective factors. EPA does not argue that Spears 

had personal knowledge of the facts underlying 

Higginbotham’s subjective observations. The case upon 

which the district court relied, Hampton v. Vilsack, is 

distinguishable. See 685 F.3d 1096. There, the allegedly 

biased supervisor played virtually no role in the decision to 

terminate the plaintiff. See id. at 1101-02. Here, although 

Spears considered some facts that were objectively 

verifiable—for example, the statements Morris made in her 

issue sheet—we cannot be confident that his decision was 

insulated from Higginbotham’s subjective views. As a result,

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we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that his decision 

was swayed by Higginbotham’s subjective judgments.

In sum, Morris introduced enough evidence for a

reasonable jury to find that (1) Higginbotham was motivated 

by racial animus when she recommended Morris’s 

suspension, (2) the recommendation was intended to cause the 

suspension, and (3) the recommendation was a proximate 

cause of Spears’s ultimate decision. We therefore reverse the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment on Morris’s claim

that her suspension was motivated by racial discrimination.

And because Morris’s cat’s-paw argument entitles her to 

proceed to trial on this claim, we need not review the district 

court’s rejection of her alternative theory that Spears was 

independently motivated by racial bias. See Wilson v. Cox, 

753 F.3d 244, 248-49 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (declining to consider 

an alternative theory of liability after concluding that an 

employment-discrimination plaintiff was entitled to a trial).

At trial, the parties will have a “fresh opportunity” to present 

evidence about the motivation for Morris’s suspension, and 

the “factfinder will assess and determine, in light of all of that 

evidence, whether the decision stemmed from a 

discriminatory motive.” Id.

B

Finally, we address Morris’s claim that EPA suspended 

her in retaliation for her complaints of employment

discrimination. Title VII bars retaliation against employees 

who participate in a Title VII proceeding or oppose practices 

made illegal by Title VII. See Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. 

Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981). To establish either 

type of retaliation claim, an employee must have engaged in 

protected participation or opposition activity about which the 

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employer knew. See Jones, 557 F.3d at 679 (explaining that 

an employee’s supervisors “could not have retaliated against 

him unless they had knowledge of his protected activity”). 

Morris contends that a reasonable jury could infer that both 

Spears and Higginbotham knew she had engaged in protected 

activity. We disagree and therefore hold that the district court 

properly granted summary judgment on Morris’s retaliation 

claim.

According to Morris, Spears learned of her protected 

activity by reading her issue sheet and her attorney’s written 

response to the proposed suspension. Those documents assert

that Morris engaged in protected activity by articulating 

positions on behalf of OCR and engaging in debates about 

equal employment issues. But such job-related policy 

discussions are not protected. They do not amount to 

participation in a Title VII proceeding. Nor are they protected 

opposition activity, because they do not oppose any discrete

practice that Morris reasonably could have believed 

discriminated on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 

national origin. See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of 

Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2006)

(holding that “basic [] advocacy” on an issue does not 

constitute opposition to an illegal employment practice). 

Labeling generalized policy disagreements a form of 

protected activity would risk insulating employees in civil 

rights roles from adverse employment action, because such

debates are presumably part of their everyday duties. See 

BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT 

DISCRIMINATION LAW 15-30 (5th ed. 2012) (explaining that 

employees who are “simply doing the job for which they were 

hired . . . may not have engaged in protected activity at all”).

Because Morris points to no legitimate protected activity of 

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which Spears might have known, she cannot survive summary 

judgment on this basis.

Morris next argues that a reasonable jury could infer that 

Higginbotham knew Morris had participated in the Title VII 

process by asking to meet with an EEO counselor. In support, 

Morris contends that she told Higginbotham in late 2007 she 

would “not [] stand for any [] more discrimination or 

retaliation.” Morris Decl. ¶ 35. Higginbotham also testified 

that in early 2008 she was aware that an OCR employee had 

asked to meet with an EEO counselor—a preliminary step in 

filing a Title VII complaint. And finally, also in early 2008, 

Morris told Higginbotham and other officials “multiple times” 

that “the Agency was required to provide an EEO counselor 

in a timely manner.”4 Id. ¶ 37. Taken together, Morris 

contends, her statements informed Higginbotham that Morris

was the employee requesting EEO counseling.

Morris’s argument is too speculative to defeat summary 

judgment. And an employee cannot survive summary 

judgment if a jury can do no more than “speculate” that her 

employer knew of her protected activity. Talavera v. Shah, 

638 F.3d 303, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Morris never asserts that 

she told Higginbotham the request was hers. Nor does Morris 

contend that EPA in general was aware of her request, or that 

Higginbotham as a result could have known about it. Contra 

Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1358. Instead, during this period, it was 

the Department of Energy—not EPA—that handled EEO 

counseling requests for employees in Morris’s office.

Moreover, Morris’s statements would not necessarily have put 

Higginbotham on notice. To the contrary, Morris’s comment 

 4 Although Morris was entitled to meet with an independent 

EEO counselor from the Department of Energy, EPA had to 

provide funds for the counseling. 

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that OCR was “required to provide an EEO counselor in a 

timely manner” was hardly extraordinary in an office devoted 

to compliance with employment law. It thus reads as a senior 

manager’s reminder to her superior of the office’s general 

compliance obligations—not an admission that Morris wanted 

to meet with a counselor or was assisting another employee in 

obtaining such a meeting apart from her ordinary job duties.

No reasonable jury could find that Morris’s reminder notified

Higginbotham that Morris was personally involved in the 

complaint process.

Because Morris has not introduced evidence sufficient for 

a reasonable jury to infer that either Higginbotham or Spears 

knew of any protected activity, the district court properly

granted summary judgment to EPA on Morris’s retaliation 

claim.

IV

We affirm the district court’s orders dismissing Morris’s 

termination claims and granting summary judgment on her 

claim that her suspension was retaliatory. We reverse the 

district court’s order granting summary judgment on Morris’s 

claim that her suspension was motivated by racial

discrimination and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

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