Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04405/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04405-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alexander Reid
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-4405

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ALEXANDER REID, a/k/a Batman,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District

Judge. (2:97-cr-00577)

Submitted: November 19, 2007 Decided: December 11, 2007

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Kevin Holmes, THE STEINBERG LAW FIRM, LLP, Charleston, South

Carolina, for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney,

Alston C. Badger, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston,

South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Alexander Reid appeals the district court’s order

imposing a thirty-seven month sentence following revocation of his

supervised release. Reid contends the district court improperly

classified his failure to stop for a blue light as a Class A

violation. Finding no error, we affirm.

Reid was charged with violating his supervised release in

various ways, including driving under the influence, failure to

report as instructed, and failing to stop for a blue light, in

violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-750 (2006). The district court

found Reid guilty of violating the conditions of his supervised

release by being charged with new criminal conduct and sentenced

him to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment, a term within the

guidelines range. The district court based its guidelines

calculation in part upon the Government’s representation that

failing to stop for a blue light was a Grade A violation under USSG

§ 7B1.1. Reid argues that the district court erred in its

calculation because failure to stop for a blue light is not a crime

of violence and thus is not a Grade A violation.

The sentencing guidelines for supervised release

violations provide that a Grade A violation is comprised of: 

conduct constituting (A) a federal, state, or

local offense punishable by a term of

imprisonment exceeding one year that (i) is a

crime of violence, (ii) is a controlled

substance offense, or (iii) involves

possession of a firearm or destructive device

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of a type described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a); or

(B) any other federal, state, or local offense

punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding

twenty years.

USSG § 7B1.1(a)(1) (2006). Failing to stop for a blue light in

South Carolina is punishable by a maximum of three years’

imprisonment. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-750(B)(1). 

Chapter seven of the guidelines, governing probation and

supervised release violations, notes that § 4B1.2 defines a “crime

of violence.” USSG § 7B1.1, cmt. n.2. Section 4B1.2 provides:

The term “crime of violence” means any offense

under federal or state law, punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,

that –-

(1) has as an element the use, attempted

use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person of another,

or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or

extortion, involves use of

explosives, or otherwise involves

conduct that presents a serious

potential risk of physical injury to

another.

USSG § 4B1.2(a) (2006). 

Failing to stop for a blue light does not have as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force

against another person. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-750; see also

United States v. James, 337 F.3d 387, 390 (4th Cir. 2003). Nor is

the crime one specifically enumerated as a crime of violence; thus

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the question becomes whether it “involves conduct that presents a

serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”

This question is determined by a “categorical approach,”

in which the court looks at the statutory definition of the

offense, “‘and not to the underlying facts of a specific

conviction.’” James, 337 F.3d at 390 (quoting United States v.

Thomas, 2 F.3d 79, 80 (4th Cir. 1993)). In other words, the

sentencing court must ask “whether that crime, ‘in the abstract,’

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical

injury to another.” United States v. Dickerson, 77 F.3d 774, 776

(4th Cir. 1996). In the abstract, failing to stop for a blue light

constitutes a crime of violence, as the statute “generally

proscribes conduct that poses the potential for serious injury to

another.” James, 337 F.3d at 390-91. Therefore, the district

court properly classified failing to stop for a blue light as a

Grade A violation, as it is a crime of violence punishable by a

maximum term of more than one year.

Reid argues that a categorical approach is not

appropriate for classifying conduct under the guidelines, because

the sentencing guidelines differ from the armed career criminal

enhancement, which was at issue in James. However, we have adopted

such a categorical approach in determining whether a crime is one

of violence under the guidelines when the indictment contained

“very few facts” specifying the circumstances surrounding the

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charge. Dickerson, 77 F.3d at 776 (holding that felony attempted

escape from custody constitutes a crime of violence under the

sentencing guidelines). As the petition for warrant or summons for

Reid similarly does not detail the specific circumstances

surrounding his arrest for failure to stop for a blue light, the

district court properly applied a categorical approach and

refrained from engaging in a fact-specific analysis. 

 For these reasons, the district court properly classified

Reid’s failure to stop for a blue light as a Class A violation

under the sentencing guidelines. Accordingly, we affirm Reid’s

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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