Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01364/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01364-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ron Davis
Respondent
Essie Patrick-Bell
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1), the parties have 

consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge 

to conduct all further proceedings in the case, including the entry 

of final judgment, by manifesting their consent in writings signed 

by the parties or their representatives and filed by Petitioner on 

August 31, 2012, and on behalf of Respondent on February 12, 2013.

Pending before the Court is the first amended petition (FAP), 

which was filed on October 29, 2012, after the Court dismissed 

without leave to amend three of the six claims set forth in the 

ESSIE PATRICK-BELL,

 Petitioner,

v.

RON DAVIS, Warden

Respondent.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01364-SKO

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S FIRST 

AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS (DOC. 9), DIRECTING THE 

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT, 

AND DECLINING TO ISSUE A 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

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initially filed petition. Respondent filed an answer to the FAP on 

February 11, 2013. Petitioner filed a traverse on March 19, 2013. 

On March 29, 2013, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion to add a 

page to the previously filed traverse but struck correspondence and 

related documents set forth in her motion.

In the FAP, Petitioner challenges her twelve-year sentence and 

the underlying 2009 conviction of voluntary manslaughter by plea 

bargain, raising issues concerning the upper term imposed by the 

sentencing court and the advice she received from counsel regarding 

entering a guilty plea. 

I. Jurisdiction

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the 

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The challenged judgment was rendered by the Superior Court of 

the State of California, County of Fresno (FCSC), which is located 

within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84(b), 2254(a), 

2241(a), (d). Petitioner claims that in the course of the 

proceedings resulting in his conviction, she suffered violations of 

her constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court has subject 

matter jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a) 

and 2241(c)(3), which authorize a district court to entertain a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant 

to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that the custody 

is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

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States. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. 

Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (per curiam). 

An answer was filed on behalf of Respondent, Ron Davis, who had 

custody of Petitioner at her institution of confinement. (Doc. 16.) 

Petitioner thus named as a respondent a person who had custody of 

Petitioner within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and Rule 2(a) of 

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the District Courts 

(Habeas Rules). See Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 

359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction 

over the person of the Respondent.

II. Background

A. Procedural Summary

On November 5, 2008, the Court of Appeal of the State of 

California, Fifth Appellate District (CCA) issued a decision 

reversing the judgment for the sole purpose of holding a new hearing 

on Petitioner’s motion to substitute appointed counsel (Marsden

motion) regarding counsel’s investigation of Petitioner’s claim that 

a mental impairment affected her capacity to enter into a guilty 

plea and regarding possible grounds for withdrawal of her plea. 

People v. Essie Patrick, case number F052926.1 Upon remand, the FCSC 

 

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the docket sheets of the proceedings 

involving Petitioner in the state courts. The Court may take judicial notice of 

facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, including undisputed information 

posted on official websites. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 

989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993); Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 

629 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). It is appropriate to take judicial notice of 

the docket sheet of a California court. White v Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th 

Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 332 (2010). The address of the official 

website of the California state courts is www.courts.ca.gov. 

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denied Petitioner’s motions, and Petitioner appealed. The CCA

issued a decision affirming the judgment. To permit Petitioner to 

file a petition for review, the decision affirming the conviction

was later vacated and was re-filed on February 9, 2012. People v. 

Essie Patrick-Bell, case number F058910 (dckt.); In re Essie 

Patrick-Bell on Habeas Corpus, case number F062972. Petitioner 

filed a habeas petition in the CSC which was denied on July 11, 

2012. In re Essie Patrick-Bell on Habeas Corpus, case number 

S202018 (dckt.).

B. Petitioner’s Offense

In a habeas proceeding brought by a person in custody pursuant 

to a judgment of a state court, a determination of a factual issue 

made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct; the 

petitioner has the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence 

to rebut the presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1); Sanders v. Lamarque, 357 F.3d 943, 947-48 (9th Cir. 

2004). This presumption applies to a statement of facts drawn from 

a state appellate court’s decision. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 

746 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The following statement of facts is taken from the opinion of 

the CCA in People v. Essie Patrick-Bell, case no. F058910, 2008 WL 

4816659, at *1 (Nov. 5, 2008).

PROCEEDINGS

Appellant, Essie Patrick Bell, was charged in a criminal 

complaint filed November 14, 2006, with first degree 

murder (Pen.Code, § 187, subd. (a)). FN1 The complaint 

further alleged that Bell used a knife in the commission 

of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). On February 5, 

2007, Bell entered into a plea agreement whereby she pled 

guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, 

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subd. (a)) and admitted the weapon enhancement for a 

maximum sentence of 12 years in prison. On May 4, 2007, 

the trial court sentenced Bell to the upper term of 11 

years for voluntary manslaughter plus one year for the 

weapon enhancement, for a total prison term of 12 years. 

The court imposed a restitution fine and granted 

applicable custody credits.

...

...

Facts

According to the probation report, Bell was in an 

altercation that involved a female and the brother of the 

victim, Danice Allen. Allen's brother was injured. Allen 

proceeded to the residence where appellant was still 

located and confronted her. A fight began between Bell and 

Allen. Witnesses did not agree as to who threw the first 

punch.

Bell, who was armed with a steak knife, stabbed Allen once 

in the heart. The fight continued down porch steps, along 

a walkway, and down the middle of the driveway. When 

police arrived, they found Bell in her car in the 

driveway. Bell told officers she was just moving her car 

in the driveway to give the police easier access. Bell 

told the officers she did not know why Allen was bleeding.

The police told Bell a witness had seen Bell with a knife. 

Bell initially laughed and said no one had seen her with a 

knife. When the police told Bell that Allen was going to 

die, Bell began to cry and said she had seen a knife by 

the ground. Bell remembered grabbing the knife, but not 

using it.

At the morgue, police found a knife blade wrapped up with 

some of the victim's clothing. The cause of death was a 

four-inch stab wound into Allen's heart.

People v. Essie Patrick-Bell, 2008 WL 4816659, at *1. 

C. Change of Plea

The facts concerning Petitioner’s entry of her guilty plea are 

set forth in the decision of the CCA filed on November 5, 2008. (LD 

16, I CT 2-17.) The entry of the plea followed Petitioner’s 

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unsuccessful attempts for substitution of new appointed counsel

based on lack of confidence in her appointed counsel due to 

counsel’s failure to protect Petitioner from a series of 

increasingly disadvantageous plea offers. (Id. at 5.) Petitioner 

executed a felony advisement, waiver of rights, and plea form in 

connection with an agreement to admit voluntary manslaughter and a 

weapon enhancement, with a maximum prison sentence of twelve years. 

The written form reflected that the sentencing court could consider 

police reports, pre-sentencing statements, and the probation report 

to find one or more factors in aggravation. No express reference to 

Blakely or Cunningham rights, or a waiver thereof, was set forth on 

the form. (Id. at 5-6.)

At the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor explained that 

Petitioner would plead to voluntary manslaughter with a sentencing 

range of three, six, or eleven years; admit using a knife; and waive 

any rights under Blakely and Cunningham. (LD 16, I CT 6.) 

Petitioner’s counsel stated that waiving the protections of Blakely

and Cunningham meant the court could make a determination on the 

potential factors in aggravation, even though defense counsel 

believed there were no aggravating factors. When asked if it was 

her understanding that she would admit an allegation of voluntary 

manslaughter and use of a knife for a sentence as long as twelve 

years, Petitioner replied in the affirmative. Petitioner was 

advised of her constitutional rights and the consequences of the 

plea, and waived her right to public jury or court trial. The court 

again stated that her maximum sentence exposure was twelve years. 

Defense counsel stated Petitioner could not receive a twelve-year 

sentence unless the court found one or more factors in aggravation, 

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and the court advised that pursuant to the plea, it could consider 

police reports, pre-sentencing statements, and the probation report 

in order to find one or more factors in aggravation. (Id.) 

Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter 

and admitted using a knife in the commission of the offense. The 

factual basis for the plea was Petitioner’s admission that she 

stabbed the victim “fatally while in a sudden quarrel and heat of 

passion.” (LD 16, I CT 6.) The court stated:

And on the front of the Change of Plea form where it

 indicates that the Court can consider the police reports,

sentencing report, the pre-sentence statements and 

testimony, the Court can find, if one were to be 

found, one or more factors in aggravation. May or 

may not find, I should say, one or more factors in 

aggravation. Is that being submitted upon by the

People as well?

Id. The prosecutor and Petitioner’s counsel replied “yes” to the

Court’s question; Petitioner said nothing. (Id.)

D. Sentencing

At sentencing, the court concluded that although Petitioner was 

a decent person who had admitted her guilt when she entered her 

plea, she had received a benefit from the plea bargain, which 

eliminated exposure to a life term. The sentencing court was 

concerned that the attack involved not only stabbing the victim, but 

also slamming the victim repeatedly to the ground with resulting 

head injuries. (LD 8, IV RT 990-92.) Petitioner had also been 

encountered at the scene as she was driving her car, which the Court 

interpreted as a potential flight situation. (Id. at 992.) The 

court concluded that her dismissive reaction to the statement that 

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others had seen her with a knife suggested Petitioner had concealed 

her attack with the knife. (Id. at 991-02.) Although Petitioner 

was sincerely apologetic and had no prior record, the court 

concluded the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, 

and it imposed the aggravated term of eleven years, enhanced by one 

additional year for the knife use. (Id. at 992.)

III. Violation of Rights to Trial by Jury and Proof Beyond

 a Reasonable Doubt by Imposing the Upper Term 

Petitioner alleges she suffered a violation of her rights as 

set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), when the 

sentencing court relied on a prior conviction, unsworn testimony, 

and elements of the crime (great violence, bodily harm, and cruelty, 

as well as conduct dangerous to society and a victim who was 

particularly vulnerable) as aggravating factors warranting an upper 

term. Petitioner contends that pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 

1170(b), only the middle term could be imposed in the absence of 

valid aggravating factors. Petitioner argues that a neighbor who 

was a witness could establish that the victim and the victim’s 

brother both descended upon Petitioner at her home and attacked her. 

Petitioner alleges that counsel assured her the court would impose 

the middle term of six years and a one-year enhancement. Petitioner 

asserts that she never understood Cunningham or waived her rights to 

a jury trial on the aggravating factors. (FAP, doc. 9 at 4, 11-13.)

A. Standard of Decision and Scope of Review

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides in pertinent part as 

follows:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

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behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

 judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

Clearly established federal law refers to the holdings, as 

opposed to the dicta, of the decisions of the Supreme Court as of 

the time of the relevant state court decision. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1399 (2011); Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

412 (2000).

A state court’s decision contravenes clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent if it reaches a legal conclusion opposite 

to, or substantially different from, the Supreme Court's or 

concludes differently on a materially indistinguishable set of 

facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. The state court 

need not have cited Supreme Court precedent or have been aware of 

it, "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts [it]." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 

(2002). A state court unreasonably applies clearly established 

federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule 

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but then applies it to a new set of facts in an objectively 

unreasonable manner, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly 

established legal principle to a new context in an objectively 

unreasonable manner. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142

(9th Cir. 2002); see, Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. 

An application of clearly established federal law is 

unreasonable only if it is objectively unreasonable; an incorrect or

inaccurate application is not necessarily unreasonable. Williams, 

529 U.S. at 410. A state court’s determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief as long as fairminded jurists 

could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision. 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Even 

a strong case for relief does not render the state court’s 

conclusions unreasonable. Id. To obtain federal habeas relief, a 

state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on a claim 

was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility 

for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87. 

Where the state court decides an issue on the merits

unaccompanied by an explanation, a habeas petitioner must show there 

was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784. This Court should perform 

an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state 

court decision was objectively unreasonable. Medley v. Runnels, 506 

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F.3d 857, 863 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1316 

(2008); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Independent review is not the equivalent of de novo review; the 

Court must still defer to the state court=s ultimate decision. 

Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). The § 2254 

standards are “highly deferential standard[s] for evaluating statecourt rulings” which require that state court decisions be given the 

benefit of the doubt, and the Petitioner bear the burden of proof. 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398.

In assessing under section 2254(d)(1) whether the state court’s 

legal conclusion was contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

federal law, “review... is limited to the record that was before the 

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Evidence introduced in federal court 

has no bearing on review pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 1400. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that in a habeas proceeding brought by 

a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court, a 

determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be 

presumed to be correct; the petitioner has the burden of producing 

clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of 

correctness. A state court decision on the merits based on a 

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless it was objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state proceedings. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

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322, 340 (2003).

The deferential standard of § 2254(d) applies only to claims 

the state court resolved on the merits; de novo review applies to 

claims that have not been adjudicated on the merits. Lambert v. 

Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 965 (9th Cir. 2004); Lewis v. Mayle, 391 

F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The last reasoned decision must be identified to analyze the 

state court decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Barker v. 

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1092 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005); Bailey v. Rae, 339 

F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner raised his 

sentencing claim before the CSC in a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, which was denied by the CSC. (LD 24.)

B. Analysis

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court held that any fact other 

than a prior conviction that is necessary to support a sentence 

exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea 

of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by a defendant or 

proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 

530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 

(2005). In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004), the 

Court held that the “statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the 

maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts 

reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” 

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. The Court in Cunningham v. California, 

549 U.S. 270 (2007), held that California's determinate sentencing 

law, which authorized the judge, not the jury, to find facts

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exposing a defendant to an elevated upper term sentence by a 

preponderance of the evidence violated the defendant's right to 

trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

However, the Court signaled that legislative action could eliminate 

the constitutional problems:

As to the adjustment of California's sentencing system in 

light of our decision, “[t]he ball... lies in 

[California's] court.” Booker, 543 U.S., at 265, 125 S.Ct. 

738; cf. supra, at 868. We note that several States have 

modified their systems in the wake of Apprendi and Blakely

to retain determinate sentencing. They have done so by 

calling upon the jury—either at trial or in a separate 

sentencing proceeding—to find any fact necessary to the 

imposition of an elevated sentence. As earlier noted, 

California already employs juries in this manner to 

determine statutory sentencing enhancements. See supra, at 

863, 869. Other States have chosen to permit judges 

genuinely “to exercise broad discretion... within a 

statutory range,” which, “everyone agrees,” encounters no 

Sixth Amendment shoal. Booker, 543 U.S., at 233, 125 S.Ct. 

738. California may follow the paths taken by its sister 

States or otherwise alter its system, so long as the State 

observes Sixth Amendment limitations declared in this 

Court's decisions. (Footnotes omitted.)

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. at 293-94.

 In response to Cunningham, the California legislature amended 

the state sentencing law by legislation effective March 30, 2007. 

(Cal. Stats. 2007, ch. 3.) The state’s sentencing rules were also 

amended effective May 23, 2007. Instead of requiring a middle term 

unless there was a specific finding by a preponderance of the 

evidence of an aggravating factor, the new state law made the choice 

of a lower, middle, or upper term within a stated statutory range 

discretionary with the sentencing court, subject to a requirement 

that reasons for any choice be stated. People v. Sandoval, 41 

Cal.4th 825, 846-47, 850-51 (2007). Thus, on October 20, 2009, when 

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Petitioner’s sentence was reinstated, state law permitted the

sentencing court to make a discretionary sentence choice. Id. at 

853-57. Thus, the state court could have concluded Petitioner’s 

upper term was not a violation of her right to a jury trial or to 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to aggravating factors.

As Respondent notes, an alternative ground for the CSC to deny 

Petitioner’s claim was Petitioner’s waiver of her Sixth Amendment 

protections. A waiver is permissible. Blakely v. Washington, 542 

U.S. at 310. A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known 

right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 

Here, Petitioner expressly agreed to a plea agreement after being 

informed that the court could impose a total term of twelve years, 

which required the upper base term. The colloquy included waiver of 

the protections of Blakely and Cunningham. 

To the extent Petitioner challenges her upper term based on an 

alleged error by the state court in interpreting and applying state 

sentencing law, Petitioner is not entitled to relief from this 

Court. A claim alleging misapplication of state sentencing law 

involves a question of state law which is not cognizable in a

proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 

U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (rejecting a claim that a state court 

misapplied state statutes concerning aggravating circumstances on 

the ground that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors 

of state law); Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(claims alleging only that the trial court abused its discretion in 

selecting consecutive sentences and erred in failing to state 

reasons for choosing consecutive terms are not cognizable); Miller 

v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 1989) (claim concerning 

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whether a prior conviction qualified as a sentence enhancement under 

state law was not cognizable). 

The Court will deny Petitioner’s claim that imposition of the 

upper term violated her rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey. 

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Advising Petitioner

 to Plead Guilty

Petitioner alleges trial counsel’s advice to take a plea with 

an upper term constituted ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in 

violation of her rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 

because counsel 1) failed to interview witness Santiago, who 

observed the victim start the fight, 2) advised Petitioner to plead 

and take an upper term even though Petitioner did not have a prior 

conviction and should have received a middle term, 3) failed to 

explain Cunningham to Petitioner; 4) failed to inform Petitioner 

that a consequence of her plea could be an upper term of eleven 

years and a one-year enhancement; and 5) instructed Petitioner to 

answer affirmatively to any question asked by the court during the 

plea colloquy (FAP, doc. 9, at 4, 14-15.) Petitioner appears to 

contend that it was objectively unreasonable to advise Petitioner to 

accept the plea instead of going to trial and presenting a defense 

of imperfect self-defense. 

Petitioner raised this claim in a habeas corpus petition filed 

in the CSC, which was summarily denied without any statement of 

reasoning or citation of authority. (LD 24.)

A. Legal Standards

The law governing claims concerning ineffective assistance of 

counsel is clearly established for the purposes of the AEDPA 

deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d). Premo v. 

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Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122-23 (2011); Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 

1229 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in violation 

of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a convicted defendant must 

show that 1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms in 

light of all the circumstances of the particular case; and 2) unless 

prejudice is presumed, it is reasonably probable that, but for 

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984); 

Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). A petitioner must 

identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged to have 

been deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. 690. 

In determining whether counsel=s conduct was deficient, a court 

should consider counsel’s overall performance from counsel’s 

perspective at the time of the representation. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689. There is a strong presumption counsel=s conduct was adequate 

and within the exercise of reasonable professional judgment and the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 688-90.

Establishing that a state court's application of the Strickland

standard was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. 

The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly 

deferential. Id., at 689 S.Ct. 2052; Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 

333, n.7 (1997). When the two apply together, review is doubly 

deferential. Knowles, 129 S.Ct. at 1420. The Strickland standard 

is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is 

substantial. Id. When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not 

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whether counsel's actions were reasonable -- the question is whether 

there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's 

deferential standard. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. at 122-23. 

If a prisoner pleads guilty on the advice of counsel, the

prisoner must demonstrate the advice was not within the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases because a guilty 

plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it 

in the criminal process. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 

(1973). When a criminal defendant has admitted in open court she is 

in fact guilty of the offense with which she is charged, she may not 

then raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of 

constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty 

plea; she may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of 

the guilty plea by showing the advice received from counsel was not 

within the range of reasonable competence. Tollett v. Henderson, 

411 U.S. at 267.

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in the context 

of a challenge to a guilty plea, a habeas petitioner must show that 

counsel's advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 

as well as a “reasonable probability” that, but for counsel's 

errors, the petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have 

insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59

(1985) (the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington applies to 

challenges to guilty pleas based on the ineffective assistance of 

counsel); Missouri v. Frye, – U.S. – , 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012)

(Hill is properly applied to claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel in the context of acceptance of a plea bargain); Padilla v. 

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (to obtain relief on this type of 

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claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to 

reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 

circumstances).

Here, with respect to the choice to plead guilty to the less 

serious offense of voluntary manslaughter, the state court could 

have concluded it was objectively reasonable to favor a plea to 

voluntary manslaughter to avoid conviction of the more serious 

charge of murder and a potential life sentence. If Petitioner had 

established self-defense at trial, it would have resulted in 

acquittal. However, even though the victim sought Petitioner out, 

the witnesses were in conflict as to the identity of the person who 

initiated the physical attack. Even if the evidence could be 

interpreted to support a finding that Petitioner was not the initial 

aggressor, the evidence strongly suggested that Petitioner used 

disproportionate or excessive force in response to the victim, or 

she misjudged the extent of any threat presented by the victim. She 

also arguably attempted to flee after the homicide, which reflected 

a consciousness of criminal responsibility. 

Counsel investigated witnesses as requested by Petitioner. (LD 

6, II RT 313.) As the facts set forth in the CCA opinion reflect, 

the identity of the person who actually initiated the physical 

altercation was not agreed upon by the witnesses. It cannot be said 

that it was objectively unreasonable to conclude that the 

justification of self-defense was not necessarily a successful 

approach. Prevailing on that defense at trial would result in only 

mitigation of the crime to voluntary manslaughter. People v. Cruz, 

44 Cal. 4th 636, 664 (2008). In light of the facts and 

circumstances of the case, it was objectively reasonable for the 

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state court to conclude that defense counsel was objectively 

reasonable in advising a plea to voluntary manslaughter to avoid an 

appreciable risk of conviction of murder. 

With regard to Petitioner’s allegation that his counsel was 

ineffective in failing to interview a witness who allegedly observed 

the victim start the fight, defense counsel has a duty to make a

reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable decision that makes

a particular investigation unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

691. A failure to investigate must be reasonable in light of all 

the circumstances. Id. What counsel knows may be a critical 

component in determining the reasonableness of a failure to 

investigate. As the Court in Strickland stated:

The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined 

or substantially influenced by the defendant's own 

statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually 

based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made 

by the defendant and on information supplied by the 

defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are 

reasonable depends critically on such information. For 

example, when the facts that support a certain potential 

line of defense are generally known to counsel because of 

what the defendant has said, the need for further 

investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated 

altogether. And when a defendant has given counsel reason 

to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be 

fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue 

those investigations may not later be challenged as 

unreasonable. In short, inquiry into counsel's 

conversations with the defendant may be critical to a 

proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions, 

just as it may be critical to a proper assessment of 

counsel's other litigation decisions.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 691. 

Petitioner has not shown that defense counsel failed to 

undertake an objectively reasonable investigation because counsel 

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interviewed witnesses as requested and at best was faced with 

conflicting evidence concerning the genesis of the physical 

confrontation. Petitioner has not established counsel engaged in 

objectively unreasonable conduct with respect to his advice 

regarding the plea. In light of the serious punishment for murder, 

Petitioner has also not shown she would have insisted on going to 

trial or she otherwise suffered any prejudice from counsel’s advice. 

Petitioner challenges counsel’s advice as to the sentence 

possible under the plea agreement, asserting 1) Petitioner had no 

prior conviction and should have received a middle term, 2) counsel 

failed to advise Petitioner that the consequences of the plea

included an upper term of eleven years plus a one-year enhancement.

First, the absence of a prior conviction was noted by the 

sentencing court, which considered Petitioner’s clean record to be a 

factor in mitigation. It was within the sentencing court’s 

discretion to weigh all the factors, which included multiple 

mitigating factors as well as possible aggravating factors. It was 

objectively reasonable for counsel to conclude that in light of 

multiple aggravating and mitigating factors, and considering the 

risk of a murder conviction, the plea was advisable. Petitioner has 

also not shown she would have insisted on going to trial. 

As to counsel’s advice as to consequences, the record shows 

Petitioner was advised of the consequences of the plea, and neither 

counsel nor petitioner registered surprise, made any inquiry, or 

objected to the sentence before the entry of the plea. Petitioner

confirmed there had been no other promises or agreements made for 

her to plead guilty. The court expressly asked her if anyone behind 

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the scenes had assured her that the court would give her a lesser 

sentence, and she replied in the negative. (LD 21, ART at 6-9.) 

The record supports a finding either that Petitioner was advised of 

the consequences, or that at the time she entered her plea in the 

presence of counsel, she was aware of the consequences and chose to 

proceed. A fairminded jurist could conclude there was no reasonable 

probability Petitioner would have proceeded to trial simply because 

counsel had not adequately described the consequences of the plea. 

Petitioner has not shown the state court’s decision was 

contrary to, or an unreasonably application of, clearly established 

federal law. Even if considered de novo, the claim should be denied 

because Petitioner has not shown her counsel engaged in objectively 

unreasonable conduct or that Petitioner suffered any legally 

cognizable prejudice from counsel’s advice. Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel will be 

denied.

V. Denial of a Modification Hearing

Petitioner alleges the state court’s failure to modify her 

sentence pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code 1170(d) deprived her of a statecreated liberty interest and was contrary to law. She alleges her 

right to due process was denied because under state law there was a 

procedure whereby the court could exercise its discretion to modify 

her sentence, and she was deprived of an opportunity to present a 

defense when the court lost its jurisdiction because of the passage 

of time and/or because of Petitioner’s poverty. Further, the state 

court took advantage of her by requiring a Cunningham waiver. 

Petitioner alleges she has undergone significant rehabilitation and 

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thus merits a middle term instead of an upper term. (FAP, doc. 9,

at 5, 16-17.)

Petitioner raised this claim in a habeas petition filed in the 

CSC, which denied the petition summarily. (LD 24.) Respondent 

notes that Petitioner may not have exhausted the entirety of this 

claim or may have procedurally defaulted on the claim in state 

court. (Ans., doc. 16 at 13-15.) 

Generally a habeas petitioner will not be afforded relief in 

the courts unless he has exhausted available state judicial and 

administrative remedies. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494-95 

(1973). However, a court may reach the merits of a claim even in 

the absence of exhaustion where it is clear that the claim is not 

colorable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the 

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the 

courts of the state); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35 

(1987); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Likewise, in a habeas case, the issue of procedural bar need not be 

resolved if another issue is capable of being resolved against the 

petitioner. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997). The 

procedural default issue, which may necessitate determinations 

concerning cause and miscarriage of justice, may be more complex 

than the underlying issues in the case and it may make more sense to 

proceed to the merits. See Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 

(9th Cir. 2002). The Court will thus reach Petitioner’s claim 

because of the nature of the claim to facilitate a complete 

disposition. 

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The standard analysis of claims of liberty interests under the 

Due Process Clause proceeds in two steps: a court first asks whether 

there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has 

been deprived, and if so, whether the procedures followed by the 

State were constitutionally sufficient. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 

U.S. 216, 219 (2011). Petitioner relies on a state statute that 

provides a court on its own motion within 120 days of commitment may

recall a commitment and resentence the prisoner. Cal. Pen. Code § 

1170(d)(1). The state statute does not contain any language 

conferring any right on Petitioner. The absence of a modification 

hearing does not appear to effectuate any atypical, significant 

deprivation of liberty. Cf. Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 485-86 

(1995). There is also no showing that the state court’s decision 

was irrational and arbitrary. Cf. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 

346 (1980). 

In essence, Petitioner is alleging a violation of state 

sentencing law. Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state 

court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify 

federal habeas relief. Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Petitioner has not shown any fundamental unfairness.

In summary, Petitioner has failed to show that he suffered a 

violation of due process of law from the absence of a modification 

hearing. Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner’s due process

claim concerning denial of a modification hearing.

VI. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

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from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Habeas Rule 11(a). 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. 

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

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manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court will decline to 

issue a certificate of appealability.

VII. Disposition

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that:

1) The first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus is 

DENIED; 

2) The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent; and 

3) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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