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Parties Involved:
Ramon E. Jurado Lopez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted March 3 2010

Decided March 4, 2010

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

   

No. 09‐2480

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

RAMON E. JURADO LOPEZ,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 08‐CR‐116‐C‐02

Barbara B. Crabb,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Ramon Jurado Lopez pleaded guilty to knowingly and intentionally distributing a

mixture or substance containing cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2, and was

sentenced to 66 months’ imprisonment.  Lopez appeals, but his appointed counsel has

concluded that the case is frivolous and moves to withdraw.  See Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  Lopez declined an invitation to respond to counsel’s submission, see

CIR. R. 51(b), and so we confine our review to the potential issues outlined in counsel’s

facially adequate brief.  See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002).

After Lopez pleaded guilty, a probation officer prepared a presentence investigation

report.  The PSR estimated Lopez’s relevant conduct to be 9.2 kilograms of cocaine: 204

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐2480 Page 2

grams supplied in controlled purchases to an undercover officer in 2008 (the offense

conduct), 500 grams sold to a confidential informant in 2008, 490 grams recovered from the

home of another confidential informant (who identified Lopez as his source) in 2006, and 8

kilograms seized in 2008 from the truck of someone later seen at Lopez’s residence.  Based

on information from the controlled purchases and witness statements, the probation officer

also recommended a two‐level increase in Lopez’s offense level for being a manager or

supervisor.  See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).  

Lopez responded with a memo of objections primarily attacking the calculated

amount of drugs.  He objected to the inclusion of the 8 kilograms, asserting that there was

no corroborating evidence connecting him to the drugs.  He also objected to the inclusion of

the 490 grams from 2006, asserting that these drugs were not part of the same course or

scheme attributed to him in the offense conduct from 2008.  Finally, Lopez objected to the

application of § 3B1.1(c) on grounds that information from one of his associates was

unreliable, since he was also negotiating a plea at the time.

The government subsequently informed the district court that it could not meet its

burden of proof to connect Lopez to the 8 kilograms recovered from the truck, and so the

probation officer revised the PSR accordingly, leaving Lopez responsible for 1.2 kilograms

of cocaine.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing (at which Lopez did not re‐assert his

objections about the drug quantity), the district court adopted the revised guideline

calculations in the PSR.  Lopez faced a guidelines range of 57 to 71 months, given a base

offense level of 26, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7) (between 500 grams and 2 kilograms of

cocaine), with two additional levels for his role as a manager or supervisor, see id. § 3B1.1(c),

a three‐level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1, and criminal history

category of I.  The court noted that Lopez was part of a large‐scale drug operation across

several states and sentenced him to 66 months.

At the outset we note that Lopez does not want his guilty plea set aside, and so

counsel appropriately refrains from examining the adequacy of the plea colloquy or the

voluntariness of the plea. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel first assesses whether Lopez could potentially challenge the district court’s

guideline calculations, including the amount of drugs attributed to Lopez or the adjustment

for his role as manager/supervisor.  But as counsel notes, the district court adopted the

calculations and findings from the PSR, and Lopez did not object to any of these findings at

sentencing.  The district court properly based its findings on the uncontradicted factual

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No. 09‐2480 Page 3

information in the PSR.  See United States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 700‐01 (7th Cir. 2006);

United States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 587‐88 (7th Cir. 2004); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.

32(i)(3)(A).  Moreover, Lopez’s decision not to assert his objections at sentencing effectively

waived those arguments on appeal.  See United States v. Venturella, 585 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th

Cir. 2009) (collecting cases); United States v. Sensmeier, 361 F.3d 982, 986‐87 (7th Cir. 2004).

Any potential argument based on the court’s guideline calculations would be frivolous.

Counsel also considers whether Lopez could potentially argue that his prison

sentence is unreasonable.  Lopez’s sentence is within the guideline range, however, and we

therefore presume it to be reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United

States v. Cano‐Rodriguez, 552 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2009).  Further, the district court

sufficiently considered the § 3553 factors at sentencing, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); United States

v. Martinez‐Martinez, 442 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2006).  The court acknowledged that Lopez

“care[s] a lot about his children,” see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), but found him extremely

culpable in light of the “significant period of time” of the “large‐scale drug distribution”

that took place, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).  The court downplayed Lopez’s minimal criminal

history and his record of steady employment, noting that he “really earned [his] living

through drug trafficking,” see id. § 3553(a)(1).  The court found that a mid‐guideline range

sentence would “provide [Lopez] with the opportunity for rehabilitative programs and

achieve parity with the sentences of similarly situated offenders.”  See id. § 3553(a)(2)(D),

(a)(6).  Any potential argument that the court failed to meaningfully consider the factors set

forth in § 3553(a) would be frivolous.

Accordingly, we GRANT counselʹs motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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