Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-96-03030/USCOURTS-ca10-96-03030-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Artemio Garcia Moreno
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court II Appeals Tenth Circuit 

AUG 2 7 1996 

PUBLISH PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 96-3030 

v. 

ARTEMIO GARCIA MORENO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 95-40027-01-DES) 

On the briefs: 

J.C. Castillo, Houston, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Jackie N. Williams, United States Attorney, and James E. Flory, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 96-3030 Document: 01019280722 Date Filed: 08/27/1996 Page: 1 
Defendant Artemio Garcia Moreno appeals his conviction and sentence for 

possession of and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 84l(a)(l), 846. For the reasons set out below, we 

affirm. 1 

I 

On September 28, 1994, Kansas State Trooper B.K. Smith stopped a truck 

driven by Florencio 0. Vargas and Jaime R. Mendoza for a traffic violation. A 

search of the truck revealed approximately 512 pounds of raw marijuana in trash 

compactor bags. Mr. Vargas and Mr. Mendoza were arrested and indicted on 

federal drug charges. 

Special Agent Catheleen Elser of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation 

subsequently determined that the truck was registered to J .R. Motors in Houston, 

Texas. She telephoned J.R. Motors and spoke to an individual who identified 

himself as Artemio Moreno. Mr. Moreno confirmed his ownership of the truck 

and said he had loaned it to "Jose" and expected it to be returned in a few days. 

Mr. Moreno initially told Agent Elser that he did not know Jose's last name or 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a decision on the briefs 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case 

is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 96-3030 Document: 01019280722 Date Filed: 08/27/1996 Page: 2 
where he lived. 

Mr. Vargas and Mr. Mendoza pled guilty to possession charges pursuant to 

a plea bargain in which they agreed to identify others involved in the crime. The 

agreement also stated that the United States would file a motion for reduction of 

sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 should either Mr. Vargas or Mr. Mendoza 

provide "substantial assistance" in the prosecution of another person. Mr. Vargas 

and Mr. Mendoza both identified Mr. Moreno as the person who hired them to 

harvest the marijuana in Iowa and transport it to Texas. A grand jury indicted 

Mr. Moreno for possession of and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to 

distribute it. 

At trial, Mr. Vargas testified that he did some work for Mr. Moreno in 

Houston, and that Mr. Moreno had a motor home in which he let Mr. Vargas and 

Mr. Mendoza live for a short time. In September 1994, Mr. Moreno asked Mr. 

Vargas and Mr. Mendoza to drive to Iowa in the truck, and Mr. Moreno followed 

them a few days later in the motor home. Mr. Vargas and Mr. Mendoza harvested 

marijuana plants from a field to which they were directed by Mr. Moreno. They 

put the plants in plastic bags and compacted them in the motor home trash 

compactor. Mr. Moreno was to pay Mr. Vargas five thousand dollars and Mr. 

Mendoza three thousand dollars for their work. 

Mr. Vargas and Mr. Mendoza testified that Mr. Moreno registered them in 

-3-

Appellate Case: 96-3030 Document: 01019280722 Date Filed: 08/27/1996 Page: 3 
... \ 

two motels in Iowa. The manager for the I-80 Inn in Underwood, Iowa, testified 

that an Hispanic man by the name of "Art Marino" filled out a registration card at 

the motel. The registration card at the other motel listed the address of "Art 

Marino" as 11518 Beville in Houston, Texas. Mr. Moreno's address in Houston 

was 11518 Inga Drive. 

Defense counsel cross-examined Mr. Vargas and Mr. Mendoza at length 

about the plea agreement they had reached with the government, implying that 

they had fabricated the story about Mr. Moreno's involvement in order to secure a 

sentence reduction. In response and over defendant's objection, the goverment 

presented Mr. Vargas' attorney, who testified Mr. Vargas had told him of Mr. 

Moreno's involvement prior to the plea bargain. 

Mr. Moreno was found guilty on both counts. The district court sentenced 

him to concurrent 97 month terms. On appeal, Mr. Moreno challenges his 

conviction and sentencing. 

II 

Mr. Moreno contends the trial court erred in admitting the motel 

registration receipts into evidence, asserting that they constituted hearsay. 2 

2 As the government points out, Mr. Moreno only objected at trial to the 

I-80 Inn registration. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 96-3030 Document: 01019280722 Date Filed: 08/27/1996 Page: 4 
Both parties believe that United States v. Mcintyre, 991 F.2d 687 (lOth Cir. 

1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 736 (1994), applies and devote themselves to 

explaining why it supports their position. Mcintyre is inapposite, however, for 

there "[t]he government offered these documents for the truth of the matter 

asserted, namely that Vickie Hogg checked into the two motels on the dates 

recorded and paid for the rooms." Id. at 699. Here, as Mr. Moreno points out, 

the motel registration forms recorded a demonstrably different name from Mr. 

Moreno's and bore a different street address. The government did not seek 

admission of the forms to prove that the person named in the forms, Art Morino, 

actually checked into the motel. Rather, because the name and address in the 

forms were similar to Mr. Moreno's, the government was attempting to create the 

inference that Mr.Moreno had checked in under a false name. This case is thus 

governed by our decision in United States v. Cestnik, 36 F .3d 904, 908-09 & n.3 

(lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1156 (1995). We there held that money 

transfer documents containing alibis used by the defendant were not hearsay 

because they were not introduced to prove the identity of the sender but as 

circumstantial evidence linking the money transfers to the false names, which the 

government then linked to the defendants through other evidence. Because "Art 

Marino" was not Mr. Moreno's name, the motel registration cards were not 

introduced to establish Mr. Moreno's identity and were thus not hearsay. The 

-5-

Appellate Case: 96-3030 Document: 01019280722 Date Filed: 08/27/1996 Page: 5 
testimony of Mr. Vargas and Mr. Mendoza supported the government's contention 

that Mr. Moreno registered at the motels. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting the motel registration cards. 

III 

Mr. Moreno asserts the trial court erred in allowing counsel for Mr. Vargas 

to testify to statements Mr. Vargas made to him concerning Mr. Moreno's 

involvement in the crime. The court admitted the testimony as a prior consistent 

statement of Mr. Vargas under Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)( 1 )(B) because the statement 

was made prior to Mr. Vargas' plea bargain. 

Mr. Moreno relies upon Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696 ( 1995), 

which held that Rule 801 (d)( 1 )(B) "permits the introduction of a declarant's 

consistent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or 

improper influence or motive only when those statements were made before the 

charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." !d. at 705. 

Although the government suggests that Mr. Vargas had no incentive to fabricate a 

story prior to his plea-bargain agreement, Mr. Moreno claims that Mr. Vargas had 

a motive to lie as soon as he was arrested. 

Mr. Moreno's position is supported by the Second Circuit's decision in 

United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52 (2nd Cir. 1995). Forrester held that a 

-6-

Appellate Case: 96-3030 Document: 01019280722 Date Filed: 08/27/1996 Page: 6 
testifying co-defendant's "motive to fabricate arose as soon as she was arrested 

and, therefore, her statement was inadmissible hearsay." !d. at 64. We are 

persuaded similarly that Mr. Vargas had an incentive to concoct a story 

implicating Mr. Moreno as soon as he was arrested by Trooper Smith. Under 

Tome therefore, the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Mr. Vargas' 

counsel. 

Although "the court erred by admitting the evidence, this error [does] not 

require the reversal of [Mr. Moreno's] conviction. 'Error which does not affect 

substantial rights does not require reversal."' United States v. Olivo, 80 F .3d 

1466, 1469 (lOth Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 

1560 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1034 (1993)). Our review of the 

record convinces us the district court's error did not have "a 'substantial 

influence' on the outcome or leave[] one in 'grave doubt' as to whether it had 

such effect." United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (lOth Cir. 1990) (en 

bane) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). 

At trial, Mr. Moreno's defense was that Mr. Vargas and Mr. Mendoza 

implicated him to escape more severe punishment. Mr. Moreno repeatedly 

suggested that the two lied to Trooper Smith when they told him Mr. Moreno was 

involved, and that they misled their own attorneys during the plea-bargain 

negotiations. In these respects, some of the concerns of the Tome Court are less 

-7-

Appellate Case: 96-3030 Document: 01019280722 Date Filed: 08/27/1996 Page: 7 
pressing here. See Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 705 ("In response to a rather weak charge 

that A.T. 's testimony was a fabrication created so the child could remain with her 

mother, the Government was permitted to present a parade of sympathetic and 

credible witnesses who did no more than recount A. T. 's detailed out-of-court 

statements to them."). Here, Mr. Vargas and Mr. Mendoza testified at length and 

in detail about Mr. Moreno's involvement in the crimes, and their accounts were 

supported by considerable evidence. The similarity of the name and address on 

the motel registration to Mr. Moreno's name and address lends credence to their 

stories, as does the motel clerk's testimony that she saw three people enter the 

room. The jury also had before it Mr. Moreno's initial story to the investigator 

that he had loaned the truck to a man whose last name and address he did not 

know, and his assertion thereafter that he had loaned the truck to Mr. Vargas for a 

three-week test drive without a down payment or other security. Moreover, Mr. 

Vargas' counsel testified without elaboration that Mr. Vargas implicated Mr. 

Moreno before the plea bargain. Under these circumstances, we hold that the 

district court's error was harmless. 

IV 

Mr. Moreno contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his 

sentencing because his counsel stipulated to the total weight of the marijuana. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 96-3030 Document: 01019280722 Date Filed: 08/27/1996 Page: 8 
We have held that "[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in 

collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal. Such claims brought on direct appeal 

are presumptively dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed." United States 

v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (lOth Cir. 1995) (en bane). Nevertheless, we 

will dispose of Mr. Moreno's claims in this appeal because his argument that he 

was prejudiced3 by his trial counsel's actions fails as a matter of law. /d. 

Mr. Moreno claims that his counsel should not have stipulated to the weight 

of the drugs seized, and suggests the actual weight of the marijuana, less stalks 

and moisture, was less than the stipulated weight. However, the sentencing 

guidelines direct that "the weight of a controlled substance set forth in the table 

refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detect~ble 

amount of the controlled substance." U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c) (n.*). The Seventh 

Circuit has noted that "stalks of the marijuana plant, although excluded from the 

guideline definition of marijuana, can still constitute part of a 'mixture or 

substance' containing a detectable amount of marijuana for the calculation of 

weight of the controlled substance seized." United States v. Garcia, 925 F .2d 

3 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show 

both that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and that he was 

prejudiced as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); 

Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1475 (lOth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 743 

( 1996). In view of our discussion of prejudice, we need not address the first 

requirement. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 96-3030 Document: 01019280722 Date Filed: 08/27/1996 Page: 9 
170, 173 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Berry, 876 F.2d 55, 56 (8th Cir. 

1989)). Although Mr. Moreno contends that the stalks are not usable, it does not 

matter whether the substance is usable or marketable. See United States v. 

Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (lOth Cir. 1996) (en bane). We hold that Mr. 

Moreno's counsel did not prejudice him by stipulating to the weight of the drugs 

in the form they were seized. 

v 

Finally, Mr. Moreno asserts the district court erred by considering his 

previous conviction in determining his sentence. At the time of his prior 

conviction, Mr. Moreno was twenty-two years old and became eligible for a 

suspended sentence under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. Relying on Tuten 

v. United States, 450 U.S. 660 (1983), he argues that because his first sentence 

was set aside it should not have been counted in determining his criminal history 

for application of the sentencing guidelines. We considered and rejected this 

argument in United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1478-80 (lOth Cir. 1995), 

pet. for cert. filed June I 0, 1996 (No. 95-9284). Under Wacker, Mr. Moreno's 

earlier conviction was properly considered by the district court in assessing his 

criminal history. 

AFFIRMED. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 96-3030 Document: 01019280722 Date Filed: 08/27/1996 Page: 10