Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cr-02095/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cr-02095-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Miguel Angel Carrizoza
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Miguel Angel Carrizoza, 

Defendant.

CR 14-02095-TUC-RCC(EJM)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is the defendant’s Motion for Return of Property filed 

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(g).1

 (Doc. 29.) Plaintiff filed a response to the motion and 

both parties filed supplemental pleadings. (Docs. 30, 37, and 38.) The issues raised by 

the defendant are: (1) whether U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (“CBP”) Notice of 

Seizure and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application to Mr. Carrizoza constituted sufficient 

notice in accordance with due process of law (Doc. 29–1 at 3, 7); (2) whether the Notice 

of Seizure was unexpectedly “bifurcated” into a two-step process (Doc. 37 at 2); 

 

1

 Rule 41(g), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: 

A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of 

property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return. The motion must be filed in the district 

where the property was seized. The court must receive 

evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the court must return the property to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect 

access to the property and its use in later proceedings. 

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(3) whether CBP’s IFP application is unapproved by CBP’s procedures (Doc. 37 at 5); 

and (4) whether CBP was required to accept a federal judge’s finding that Mr. Carrizoza 

was indigent on a related criminal matter as satisfactory proof of Mr. Carrizoza’s inability 

to pay the bond in the forfeiture proceeding. (Doc. 37 at 5.) 

This Court concludes that due process was violated both by CBP’s inadequate 

notice to Mr. Carrizoza of the IFP application process for the administrative forfeiture 

proceeding, and by CBP’s failure to notify the defendant of the denial of his request for a 

waiver of bond and failure to provide him with an opportunity to post a bond.2

 

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the District Court void the forfeiture and 

order CBP to either return the seized property to Mr. Carrizoza or begin judicial 

forfeiture proceedings. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On November 19, 2014, in Nogales, in the District of Arizona, the defendant, 

Miguel Angel Carrizoza, presented himself for inspection into the United States from 

Mexico at the Mariposa Port of Entry. (Doc. 38 at 1.) Mr. Carrizoza was the driver, 

registered owner and sole occupant of the 1994 Dodge Ram 2500 truck. Id. Mr. Carrizoza 

was arrested for importing a controlled substance into the United States. (Doc. 29–1 at 

1.) At the time of the defendant’s arrest, CBP seized Mr. Carrizoza’s truck because it 

was subject to forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(a) based on a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 

952, 841. (Doc. 29–1 at 1.) 

 On November 20, 2014, Mr. Carrizoza had his Initial Appearance on the drug 

charge. At that hearing, the Magistrate Judge made a finding that the defendant was 

indigent and appointed Mr. Jonathan Young as counsel. (Doc. 2.) 

 On December 30, 2014, CBP sent Mr. Carrizoza a Notice of Seizure and 

Information to Claimants NON-CAFRA Form (“Notice of Seizure”) via certified mail. 

(Doc. 29–1 at 1.) There is no dispute that Mr. Carrizoza received the Notice of Seizure, 

 2

 Because the undersigned recommends that the District Court rule in favor of 

defendant based on the due process violations, the undersigned declines to address the 

other issues raised by defendant in his motion. 

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but there is no evidence of when he received this document as neither party submitted the 

return-receipt for the certified mail. 

 The Notice of Seizure sets forth four options for a potential claimant, and those 

options are also reflected in the “Election of Proceedings” Form that was included with 

the Notice of Seizure. First, a claimant may file a petition under 19 U.S.C. § 1618 within 

30 days of the date of the Notice of Seizure seeking remission of the forfeiture. The 

Notice of Seizure explains that the petition need not be in any specific form, but must 

describe the property involved, the date and place of seizure, proof of the claimant’s 

interest in the property, and all facts and circumstances warranting relief from forfeiture. 

The Notice of Seizure advises that if a claimant chooses this option, Box #1 on the 

Election of Proceedings form should be checked. The Notice of Seizure further advises 

that by completing Box #1, the claimant is requesting an administrative processing of the 

case by CBP, requesting that CBP refrain from beginning forfeiture proceedings while 

the petition is pending, or halt administrative forfeiture proceedings if they have already 

commenced. 

 Second, at any time prior to forfeiture, a claimant may make an “Offer in 

Compromise” under 19 U.S.C. § 1617 and 19 C.F.R. §§ 161.5 and 171.31. If the claimant 

offers money in settlement of the case, the offered payment must be sent to CBP at the 

time of the offer (and would be returned if CBP rejected the offer). The Notice of Seizure 

advises that if the claimant chooses this option, then Box #2 on the Election of 

Proceedings form should be checked. 

 Third, the claimant may abandon or claim no interest in the property. If this option 

is chosen, Box #3 on the Election of Proceedings form should be checked. The Notice of 

Seizure advises that under option three, the government may proceed with forfeiture 

proceedings without further involving the potential claimant. 

 Fourth, a claimant may request to have the forfeiture matter referred to the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office for institution of judicial forfeiture proceedings. The Notice of Seizure 

advises that if a claimant chooses this option, then Box #4 on the Election of Proceedings 

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form should be checked. The Notice of Seizure advises that if option four is chosen, the 

claimant must submit to CBP a claim and cost bond in the penal sum of $5,000 or 10% of 

the value of the claimed property, whichever is less, but in no case shall the amount of 

the bond be less than $250.00. Once the claim and cost bond are filed, the case will be 

promptly referred to the U.S. Attorney for institution of judicial proceedings in 

accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1608 and 19 C.F.R. § 162.47. The Notice of Seizure 

provides that the failure to submit a bond with the claim will render the request for 

judicial proceedings incomplete, and therefore, defective— meaning that the case will not 

be referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office. 

 However, the Notice of Seizure advises that if a claimant cannot afford to post the 

bond, the claimant should contact CBP so that the agency can make a determination of 

the claimant’s financial ability to pay the bond. If CBP determines that the claimant is 

unable to pay the bond, the cost of the bond may be waived in its entirety. In that event, 

the case will promptly be referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the claimant may file 

a petition for relief with the Department of Justice pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Pt. 9. 

 Option four does not set forth any time deadlines for submitting a claim to have 

the forfeiture referred for judicial proceedings. There are also no deadlines specified for 

either submitting the cost bond or requesting a waiver of the bond due to indigency. 

Finally, neither the Notice of Seizure nor the Election of Proceedings form mentions an 

IFP application or how indigency must be demonstrated by a claimant. 

 After going through these four options, the Notice of Seizure explains that if a 

claimant chooses to do nothing, CBP may seek to forfeit the property and, if so, will 

publish notice of seizure and intent to forfeit for 30 consecutive days. When those 30 

days expire, the government acquires full title to the seized property. Finally, the Notice 

of Seizure explains that the first notice will be posted on or about 30 days from the date 

of the Notice of Seizure. 

On January 24, 2015, Mr. Young responded to CBP’s Notice of Seizure, via 

certified mail, stating that he represents Mr. Carrizoza on the criminal matter and that Mr. 

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Carrizoza was found indigent for purposes of the criminal case; he also requested a 

waiver of bond in the forfeiture proceedings because Mr. Carrizoza has no financial 

assets (or a checking or savings account) and owns no real estate or personal property 

other than the truck. (Doc. 29–1 at 6–7.) Along with his letter, Mr. Young submitted Mr. 

Carrizoza’s Election of Proceedings form with Box #4 checked, requesting that CBP send 

his case to the United States Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) in order to institute Court 

Action. (Doc. 29–1 at 8.) CBP received this letter and Election of Proceedings form on 

January 27, 2015. 

 On February 6, 2015, in response to Mr. Young’s letter and the Election of 

Proceedings form, CBP sent Mr. Young an IFP application in addition to a letter 

indicating that CBP was requesting additional information to prove Mr. Carrizoza’s 

inability to post bond. (Doc. 29–1 at 10.) This correspondence was not sent via certified 

mail like the initial Notice of Seizure. (Doc. 29–1 at 9.) The letter advised Mr. Young 

that if a completed IFP application was not received within 15 days of the date of the 

letter, administrative forfeiture proceedings would be initiated. 

 Mr. Young did not receive CBP’s February 6, 2015 letter and the IFP application 

until June 16, 2015. (Doc. 29–1 at 12.) In a letter to CBP dated June 17, 2015, Mr. 

Young explained that, through no fault of his or Mr. Carrizoza’s, the U.S. Post Office 

temporarily misplaced all of his mail, including CBP’s February 6, 2015 letter. (Doc. 29 

at 2–3.) A completed IFP application was included with Mr. Young’s letter. (Doc. 29–1 

at 11–14.) On June 25, 2015, CBP responded to Mr. Carrizoza with a letter, sent via 

certified mail, stating that CBP had received Mr. Carrizoza’s completed IFP application 

and letter, but the administrative process had concluded and the truck was forfeited to the 

government on April 16, 2015. (Doc. 29–1 at 15–16.)

 On July 28, 2015, Mr. Carrizoza filed his Motion for Return of Property. (Doc. 

29.) Mr. Carrizoza argues that CBP’s February 6, 2015 IFP application unexpectedly 

added a second step to the process to refer the forfeiture matter to a judicial forum (Doc. 

37 at 1–2), and that CBP failed to provide Mr. Carrizoza reasonable notice of seizure 

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because CBP did not send the IFP application via certified mail. (Doc. 37 at 4–5.) 

Additionally, Mr. Carrizoza argues that CBP’s IFP application is unapproved by CBP, 

and that CBP was required to accept a federal judge’s finding that Mr. Carrizoza was 

indigent on the related criminal matter as evidence of his inability to post bond in the 

forfeiture proceeding. (Doc. 37 at 5.) 

 The government argues that CBP provided Mr. Carrizoza due process of law prior 

to forfeiting his truck to the United States. (Doc. 38 at 5.) The government also argues 

that it is not required to comment on CBP’s internal procedures (Doc. 38 at 5), and that 

the only question before the court is whether CBP sent sufficient notice of the forfeiture 

proceedings to Mr. Carrizoza, allowing him a meaningful opportunity to reply. (Doc. 38 

at 3.) 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Jurisdiction and Notice Required Under the Due Process Clause 

 “[F]ederal Courts always possess jurisdiction to review whether the notice given 

in an administrative forfeiture proceeding afforded the claimant constitutional due 

process.” Garcia v. Meza, 235 F.3d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. 

Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Clagett, 3 F.3d 1355, 1356 

(9th Cir. 1993). “Because forfeitures are disfavored, forfeiture laws and their notice 

provisions are strictly construed . . . against the government.” United States v. Ritchie, 

342 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The 

statutory and regulatory guidelines for forfeitures are interpreted in light of constitutional 

due process concerns regarding notice of impending legal proceedings.” Ritchie, 342 

F.3d at 910. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any 

proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them 

an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 

Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).3

 

 

3

 “Absent exceptional circumstances, written notice of forfeiture by certified mail 

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 “If the notice fails to comport with the requirements of due process, the 

underlying forfeiture is void.” Garcia, 235 F.3d at 290; see Marolf, 173 F.3d at 1216. 

“The district court must then set aside the declaration of forfeiture and order the Customs 

Service to return [the seized property] or begin judicial forfeiture in the district court.” 

United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1995). 

B. Administrative Forfeiture Provisions 

The Customs Laws set forth procedures for institution and maintenance of 

administrative forfeiture proceedings. See U.S.C. §§ 1607–1609. The statutory 

requirements for commencing an administrative forfeiture proceeding and providing 

notice to a property owner of a seizure and the intent to forfeit property are found in 19 

U.S.C. § 1607(a). That statute provides that if the value of a seized vehicle does not 

exceed $500,000.00 and the vehicle was used to import a controlled substance, the 

appropriate customs officer shall send written notice of seizure together with information 

on the applicable procedures to each party who appears to have an interest in the seized 

vehicle. Generally, the U.S. Customs Service will send written notice of seizure to all 

known interested parties as soon as practicable, and in no case may notice be sent more 

than sixty (60) calendar days after the date of seizure. 19 C.F.R. § 162.92. 

The statutory requirement for making a claim to seized property and requesting 

judicial forfeiture is found in 19 U.S.C. § 1608, which provides that: 

any person claiming such . . . vehicle . . . may at any time 

within twenty days from the date of the first publication of the notice of seizure file with the appropriate customs officer a claim stating his interest therein. Upon the filing of such claim, and the giving of a bond to the United States in the 

penal sum of $5,000 or 10 percent of the value of the claimed 

property, whichever is lower, but not less than $250 . . . such 

customs officer shall transmit such claim and bond . . . to the 

United States attorney for the district in which seizure was 

made, who shall proceed to a condemnation of the 

merchandise or other property in the manner prescribed by 

law. 

 to the claimant’s residence satisfies due process, even if the claimant does not receive 

actual notice.” Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 

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Neither Section 1608 nor any other statute in Title 19 addresses waiver of a bond 

because a claimant is indigent. Waiver of bond is dealt with in 19 C.F.R. § 162.47(e), 

which provides that “[u]pon satisfactory proof of financial inability to post the bond, 

[CBP] shall waive the bond requirement for any person who claims an interest in the 

seized property.” 

If the requirements set forth in Section 1608 are not met by the property owner, 

then the property is forfeited to the government. Specifically, Section 1609(a) provides 

that “[i]f no such claim is filed or bond given within the twenty days hereinbefore 

specified” (which presumably means the 20 day time period set forth in Section 1608), 

the property is deemed forfeited to the United States and may be sold or otherwise 

disposed of. 19 U.S.C. § 1609(a) (italics added). 

Here, Mr. Carrizoza filed a claim to the seized property and a request for waiver of 

bond based on his indigency within the 20 day period provided for in 19 U.S.C. § 1609. 

As a result, the “claimant effectively halt[ed] the administrative proceedings by 

compelling the seizing agency to refer the matter to the United States Attorney . . . for the 

institution of judicial forfeiture proceedings.” Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 

(4th Cir. 1997). However, the administrative proceedings were not halted and the 

forfeiture was not referred for judicial proceedings. Rather, CBP administratively 

forfeited the defendant’s truck. 

Apparently CBP made the determination that Mr. Carrizoza did not comply with 

Section 1609(a) because he did not either file a bond or prove indigency using the IFP 

application provided by CBP. CBP did not claim that Mr. Young’s assertions about the 

defendant’s indigency were facially unreasonable, but rather had some additional 

questions on this subject and wanted the IFP application completed. However, in doing 

so, the CBP imposed a 15 day time limit to supply the completed IFP application, or else 

concede to forfeiture, which is not found in any statute or regulation governing 

administrative forfeiture. 

To be sure, this extra step of requiring a completed IFP application to be submitted 

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within 15 days in order to halt administrative proceedings and refer the matter for judicial 

action is not necessarily at odds with the statutes or regulations governing administrative 

forfeitures; nor does this extra step, in and of itself, violate a property owner’s due 

process rights. However, “[b]ecause forfeitures are disfavored, forfeiture laws and their 

notice provisions are strictly construed . . . against the government.” United States v. 

Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, this Court finds that this extra step did 

violate Mr. Carrizoza’s due process rights given: (1) the manner in which the IFP 

application was sent to defendant; (2) the failure of CBP to follow up with the defendant 

concerning his claim to the seized property, his allegation of indigency, and his request 

for judicial forfeiture, and (3) CBP’s failure to notify the defendant that his request for a 

waiver of bond was denied and provide him with an opportunity to post a bond. 

C. CBP’s Notice of the IFP Application and Bond Waiver Process was 

Constitutionally Deficient 

 The first issue the Court must address is the sufficiency of the notice of CBP’s 

requirement to submit a completed IFP application within 15 days in order for the 

forfeiture to be referred for judicial forfeiture proceedings. This Court may determine, 

with some flexibility, what procedural due process was required in sending the IFP 

application. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 657. As mentioned earlier, “[a]bsent exceptional 

circumstances, written notice of forfeiture by certified mail to the claimant’s residence 

satisfies due process, even if the claimant does not receive actual notice.” Lobzun v. 

United States, 422 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc). However, where the 

administrative agency knows for a fact that the defendant has not received notice for an 

impending administrative process, the agency must act reasonably and attempt another 

written notice to the property owner. Garcia v. Meza, 235 F.3d 287 (7th Cir. 2000); 19 

U.S.C. § 1607(a). While that is not precisely the case here, Garcia is instructive to the 

Court’s due process analysis.

In Garcia, the INS seized $21,700.00 in cash from Mr. Garcia’s home. The 

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government used Federal Express to send notice to all interested parties, including Mr. 

Garcia; however, the letter was returned to the government five (5) days later marked 

undeliverable. Garcia, 235 F.3d at 290. The court stated that the agency’s notice to Mr. 

Garcia was adequate at the time that it was sent, yet it was important to determine 

whether the agency was required to do more because it knew that Mr. Garcia never 

received the notice. Id. at 291. 

 The Garcia court declined to adopt a per se rule that would only examine notice at 

the time that it was sent while turning a blind eye to subsequent events. Id. However, the 

court also declined to impose an affirmative duty upon the government to seek out 

claimants when the initial notice is returned undelivered or to require actual notice in 

every case. Id. Relying on Mullane, the court construed its responsibility as having to 

consider all circumstances of the individual case in order to determine whether notice 

was reasonably calculated to apprise a claimant of the impending proceeding. Id. 4

 

 The court ultimately found that the notice provided violated the property owner’s 

due process rights. The court found it significant that the government was aware that the 

plaintiffs were actively pursuing their interest in the forfeited property. Id. Indeed, the 

court found it was ironic that the government could not provide the plaintiff with actual 

notice of the forfeiture proceedings given that the government was involved in extended 

litigation with the property owners. Id.

 This Court finds that Garcia and the due process clause require that notice must be 

reasonably calculated to apprise a claimant of the importance of the IFP application in 

halting the administrative forfeiture process and referring the matter for judicial action. 

Mr. Carrizoza sent CBP an Election of Proceedings form requesting the transfer of the 

forfeiture proceedings to the USAO (Doc. 29–1 at 7–8) and a letter claiming he was 

indigent. Upon receiving the Election of Proceedings form, CBP sent Mr. Young a letter 

 

4

 Subsequent to Garcia, the Ninth Circuit joined many other circuit courts in holding that “when initial personal notice letters are returned undelivered, the 

government must make reasonable additional efforts to provide personal notice.” Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 911. As in Garcia, the Ninth Circuit held that “[w]hat additional efforts are 

reasonable will depend on the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. 

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on February 6, 2015, along with the IFP application, stating that more information was 

needed to satisfactorily prove Mr. Carrizoza’s financial inability to post bond. (Doc. 29–1 

at 10.) The IFP application was not sent via certified mail, which, absent exceptional 

circumstances, is generally sufficient to afford a claimant with due process. Moreover, 

Mr. Young had no reason to expect an IFP application because the Notice of Seizure and 

Election of Proceedings form did not mention an IFP application that was required to be 

completed in order to waive bond, halt administrative forfeiture, and have the case 

referred for judicial proceedings. By the time Mr. Young actually received the IFP 

application on June 16, 2015, the truck had already been forfeited (i.e., on April 16, 

2015).5

 Id. 

Over two months elapsed between the time CBP sent the IFP application on 

February 6, 2015, and CBP’s forfeiture of Mr. Carrizoza’s truck on April 16, 2015. 

Clearly, unlike Garcia, CBP did not know that the defendant had not received the IFP 

application. However, there is also no evidence that CBP contacted Mr. Carrizoza or Mr. 

Young about the status of the IFP application when it was not returned within the 15 day 

period noted in CBP’s letter (or at any time prior to forfeiture). The failure to conduct any 

follow-up with Mr. Carrizoza or Mr. Young about whether the IFP application would be 

submitted was significant because CBP knew that Mr. Carrizoza wanted the 

administrative forfeiture to be halted and the matter referred to the USAO, as well as his 

reasonable assertion of indigency. Again, Mr. Young had no reason to follow up with 

CBP because he did all that the Notice of Seizure and Election of Proceedings form had 

asked him to do—file a claim to the seized property and request that the bond be waived 

based on the defendant’s reasonable representations that he was indigent. 

This Court concludes that, like in Garcia, because CBP was aware that the 

 

5

 Interestingly, although the February 6, 2015 letter from CBP containing the IFP application says that the property would be forfeited if the IFP application was not received within 15 days, the truck was forfeited approximately 40 days after the date of 

the CBP letter. This fact undercuts the notion that this 15-day time limit is strictly enforced by CBP and administrative forfeiture is initiated immediately if this deadline is not complied with. 

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defendant was actively pursuing his interest in the forfeited property, it was required to 

take reasonable steps to ensure notice of the IFP application. The IFP application is 

clearly significant to the administrative forfeiture process because the letter enclosed with 

the application sets forth CBP’s requirement that Mr. Carrizoza provide CBP with his 

completed IFP application within 15 days of the letter or else his truck would be 

forfeited. Id. Given the importance of the IFP application to the forfeiture process as well 

as CBP’s awareness that the defendant wanted to contest this forfeiture using the court 

process, this Court concludes that CBP did not take reasonable steps to ensure that Mr. 

Carrizoza was provided with constitutionally sufficient notice of the need for a completed 

IFP application in order to transfer the forfeiture for judicial proceedings. 

Specifically, CBP’s decision to use standard postage mail for the IFP application, 

which is just as important as the Notice of Seizure (at least to CBP), created an 

unreasonable risk to Mr. Carrizoza’s ability to protect his property interest. Mullane, 339 

U.S. at 659. The administrative forfeiture process, as interpreted by CBP, makes the IFP 

application integral to a property owner’s ability to permanently halt the administrative 

forfeiture process and obtain judicial action. Indeed, the IFP application is essentially part 

and parcel of the Notice of Seizure for an indigent claimant, given that a failure to submit 

the completed IFP application within a short time frame adversely impacts the property 

owner’s interest. Thus, CBP should have either sent the IFP application via certified mail, 

as it did for the Notice of Seizure and the letter advising Mr. Young that the truck had 

been forfeited, or followed up with Mr. Young or Mr. Carrizoza when the IFP application 

was not returned executed within the 15-day time period. Id. 

This Court does not believe its decision places a substantial fiscal or 

administrative burden upon CBP. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 909 (1976). 

Indeed, CBP could simply include the IFP application along with the Notice of Seizure 

and Election of Proceedings form (or at least mention the IFP application in those 

documents), both of which are required to be submitted to CBP in order for a property 

owner to halt the administrative forfeiture and request a judicial forfeiture proceeding, 

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rather than create this two-step process. Because CBP requires that both steps in this 

process must be completed in order to request judicial forfeiture, it is not burdensome for 

the government to either send the correspondence necessary for this process in either one 

mailing, use certified delivery/receipt for both mailings, or conduct some minimal 

follow-up with the property owner to determine whether proof of indigency will be 

provided, a bond will be posted, or if the property owner is abandoning any claim to the 

property. 

D. CBP’s Failure to Provide Notice of the Denial of the Waiver of Bond Violated 

Due Process 

While this issue is not raised by the defendant, this Court finds that another due 

process violation occurred in this case aside from notice used for the IFP application and 

the process for the determination of indigency. That is, CBP’s failure to notify the 

defendant that his request for a waiver of a bond was denied, and provide him with the 

opportunity to post a bond. See Application of Williams, 628 F. Supp. 171 (E.D.N.Y. 

1986). 

 In Application of Williams, the district court dealt with the constitutionality of 

IFP applications in the context of the Customs administrative forfeiture statutes. The 

government initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings against currency seized from 

the property owners. 628 F. Supp. at 172. The property owners sent a notice of claim 

requesting judicial forfeiture proceedings along with pauper’s affidavits to the 

government. Id. Five weeks after receiving the claim, the government rejected the 

pauper’s affidavits as lacking merit. Id. The property owners then sued to obtain the 

release of the currency. Id.

The issue before that court was whether the IFP provisions for administrative 

forfeiture proceedings deprived the property owners of their constitutional right not to be 

deprived of property without due process of law. The government argued that the IFP 

petition must be meritorious in the eyes of the government. Id. at 173. The property 

owners argued that “a pauper’s affidavit alone complies with the bond requirement, even 

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if the [government] concludes that the affidavit lacks merit, for to allow any discretion to 

the agency would unite the functions of adversary and arbiter.” Id.

The court first noted that IFP provisions are constitutionally mandated for the 

indigent in forfeiture proceedings. Id. However, the court further noted that “[i]n forma 

pauperis claims raise practical as well as constitutional issues. The forfeiture situation is 

one of inherent tension, with an individual’s rights temporarily suspended. Action favors 

the person claiming the rights to seized property; inaction the government, which has the 

property.” Id. The court held that an “appropriate balance requires a reasonable or good 

faith claim of indigency. Where there is a doubt, the claimant must be afforded the right 

to have the court determine good faith.” Id.

The court pointed out that the government “does not warn a claimant of adverse 

consequences if the [pauper’s] affidavit is deemed not meritorious. It does not give notice 

that compliance with the technical requirements must satisfy the agency director as to its 

overall merit and honesty.” Id. For those reasons, the court held that if the government 

should “reject a pauper’s affidavit that is not facially unreasonable, procedural fairness 

dictates that it must allow petitioners to subsequently file the bond.” Id. 

In the case at hand, the Notice of Seizure does not even mention an IFP 

application or explain what must be shown to demonstrate indigency, let alone advise a 

claimant of the adverse consequences if the IFP application is deemed not meritorious. 

Application of Williams makes clear that even if Mr. Carrizoza had received and 

completed the IFP application within the 15-day limit imposed by CBP, the agency was 

obliged under the due process clause to notify the defendant of the agency’s 

determination of his request for a bond waiver, and afford him the opportunity to post a 

bond if the waiver request was denied. The same is true here when the defendant made 

reasonable allegations of indigency, albeit not using the IFP application required by CBP. 

Due process required CBP to notify the defendant that his bond waiver was denied—

either because he did not use the correct form to prove indigency or based on Mr. 

Young’s representations about the defendant’s financial condition—and provide him with 

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a reasonable opportunity to post a bond. That was not done in this case. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that this due process violation voids the forfeiture as well. 

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that the minimum due process 

requirements of Mullane were violated both by (1) CBP’s failure to send the IFP 

application by certified mail or take other reasonable steps to ensure notice of the need 

for a completed IFP application, and (2) CBP’s failure to notify the defendant of the 

denial of his request for a waiver of bond and allow him to post a bond. As such, the 

undersigned recommends that the District Court void the forfeiture and order CBP to 

either return the seized property to Mr. Carrizoza or begin judicial forfeiture proceedings. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), the parties have fourteen (14) days from the 

date of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections to these findings and 

recommendations with the District Court. Any objections and Responses to objections 

filed should be filed as CR 14-02095-TUC-RCC. No Replies shall be filed unless leave 

is granted from the District Court. 

Dated this 18th day of April, 2016. 

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