Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03193/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03193-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Health and Human Services
Respondent
Grady W. Renville
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GRADY W. RENVILLE,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3193

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DE-0752-14-0309-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: November 9, 2015

______________________ 

GRADY W. RENVILLE, Albuquerque, NM, pro se. 

ERIC JOHN SINGLEY, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, DOUGLAS K.

MICKLE; JAMES M. CRIBARI, Office of General Counsel, 

United States Department of Health and Human Services. 

______________________ 

Case: 15-3193 Document: 21-2 Page: 1 Filed: 11/09/2015
2 RENVILLE v. HHS

Before LOURIE, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Mr. Renville appeals a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”). Because the Board 

properly dismissed Mr. Renville’s claims, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

I.

Mr. Renville worked as a Community Health Director 

for the Indian Health Service, an operating division 

within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). In October 1996, HHS suspended 

Mr. Renville for forty days for misuse of a government 

vehicle, misuse of official time, and demonstrating behavior unbecoming of a government official. The following 

month, Mr. Renville timely appealed his suspension to the 

Board. In January 1997, HHS removed Mr. Renville from 

his position and from the Federal service altogether. 

HHS claimed Mr. Renville failed to adequately perform 

the budgetary duties of the Community Health Director. 

Mr. Renville timely appealed again. 

Before a hearing occurred, Mr. Renville and HHS settled their dispute. Under the settlement, Mr. Renville 

agreed to voluntarily retire from the Federal service, to 

not reapply for employment with the Indian Health 

Service in the Aberdeen Area Office, and to withdraw his 

appeals before the Board. In exchange, HHS issued 

Mr. Renville back pay, eliminated the suspension and 

removal actions from his record, provided him with a 

letter of recommendation, and paid his attorney’s fees. 

The Administrative Judge dismissed Mr. Renville’s 

appeals after finding that the parties negotiated in good 

faith, entered into the agreement freely, and understood 

the terms by which they were bound. The dismissal order

Case: 15-3193 Document: 21-2 Page: 2 Filed: 11/09/2015
RENVILLE v. HHS 3

indicated that, absent a petition for review, it would 

become final on April 25, 1997. Neither party petitioned 

for review, causing the dismissal order to become final.

II.

Seventeen years later in 2014, Mr. Renville filed a 

new appeal with the Board challenging the same removal 

action underlying the appeals he settled with HHS. 

While raising many of the same arguments that he raised 

in his earlier appeals, Mr. Renville also lodged several 

new allegations, including that (1) his separation from the 

Federal service violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”); 

(2) his separation violated the Veterans Employment 

Opportunities Act of 1998 (“VEOA”); and (3) his retirement under the settlement agreement was involuntary. 

The Board dismissed Mr. Renville’s appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. The Board determined that collateral estoppel precluded Mr. Renville from re-litigating the claims he 

brought in his 1997 appeals and that res judicata precluded his USERRA claim. The Board also determined 

that Mr. Renville could not properly bring a VEOA claim, 

as that statute did not exist when he separated from the 

Federal service. Finally, the Board determined that a 

new appeal was not the proper mechanism to contest the 

validity of the settlement agreement.

Mr. Renville timely appealed and we have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

We review decisions of the Board on a limited basis, 

setting aside Board actions, findings, or conclusions only 

if we find them to be “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 

(2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Whether the 

Case: 15-3193 Document: 21-2 Page: 3 Filed: 11/09/2015
4 RENVILLE v. HHS

Board had jurisdiction over Mr. Renville’s claims and 

whether the Board properly precluded his claims are 

questions of law that this court reviews de novo. 

Whiteman v. Dep’t of Transp., 688 F.3d 1336, 1340 

(Fed. Cir. 2012); Phillips/May Corp. v. United States, 

524 F.3d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

We agree with the Board that Mr. Renville’s claims 

regarding his separation are precluded by law, but we

believe the more fitting preclusion doctrine in this instance is res judicata, rather than collateral estoppel as 

applied by the Board. See, e.g., Ford-Clifton v. Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, 661 F.3d 655, 660-61 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

(rejecting use of law of the case doctrine to afford a prior 

settlement agreement preclusive effect and relying instead on res judicata). Res judicata precludes a party 

from asserting claims raised in an earlier action that 

reached a decision when: “(1) the prior decision was 

rendered by a forum with competent jurisdiction; (2) the 

prior decision was a final decision on the merits; and 

(3) the same cause of action and the same parties or their 

privies were involved in both cases.” Carson v. Dep’t of 

Energy, 398 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 

(1979). 

The factors of this test are met here. It is undisputed 

that the Board had jurisdiction over the 1997 appeals that 

Mr. Renville filed regarding the suspension and removal 

actions by HHS. Further, the settlement agreement and 

the subsequent dismissal by the Board resulted in a final 

decision on the merits. See Ford-Clifton, 661 F.3d at 660 

(“It is widely agreed that an earlier dismissal based on a 

settlement agreement constitutes a final judgment on the 

merits in a res judicata analysis.”). Finally, Mr. Renville 

raises the same cause of action—improper separation 

from the Federal service—as he did in his 1997 appeals. 

Therefore, we affirm the Board’s conclusion that 

Mr. Renville was precluded from re-litigating his separaCase: 15-3193 Document: 21-2 Page: 4 Filed: 11/09/2015
RENVILLE v. HHS 5

tion from the Federal service and, as a result, the Board 

lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims.

Mr. Renville’s claim under USERRA is also barred 

under the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata serves to 

limit not only claims that a party actually raised, but also 

claims that the party could have raised in an earlier 

action arising from the same transaction or occurrence. 

See Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1052, 1055 

(Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. 

Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984) (“Claim preclusion 

refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing litigation 

of a matter that never has been litigated, because of a 

determination that it should have been advanced in an 

earlier suit.”). Because Mr. Renville’s USERRA claim 

relates to the same transactional facts—his separation 

from the Federal service—which were resolved by the 

settlement agreement, the Board was correct in dismissing the claim on res judicata grounds.

As for Mr. Renville’s VEOA claim, the timing of his

separation from the Federal service prevents him from 

recovering under that statute. Congress enacted the 

VEOA on October 31, 1998. Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–339, 112 Stat. 

3182. We have made it clear that the VEOA has no 

retroactive effect. Lapuh v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 284 F.3d 

1277, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the VEOA “does 

not confer jurisdiction on the Board to adjudicate claims 

of violation of veterans’ preferences when the alleged

violative acts occurred before the effective date of the 

Act”). As the events forming the basis of Mr. Renville’s 

VEOA claim occurred at least eighteen months before 

enactment of the VEOA, he has no VEOA claim to bring. 

Therefore, we agree with the Board’s determination of no 

jurisdiction.

Finally, Mr. Renville argues that his 1997 settlement 

agreement with HHS is invalid because its terms are 

Case: 15-3193 Document: 21-2 Page: 5 Filed: 11/09/2015
6 RENVILLE v. HHS

contrary to law and because HHS induced him to enter it 

using duress, undue influence, and fraud. The validity of 

the 1997 settlement agreement is not properly before us. 

The Administrative Judge who dismissed Mr. Renville’s 

1997 appeals found that the parties had “freely accept[ed] 

the terms of the agreement.” Attacks going to the validity

of settlements found by the Board to be voluntary may 

only be brought through a petition for review of the Board 

order entering the settlement. See Harris v. Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, 142 F.3d 1463, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 

(“[T]he Board only entertains allegations that a settlement agreement is invalid in a petition for review.”). 

Thus, a new appeal filed seventeen years later, as 

Mr. Renville filed here, is not the correct vehicle for 

attacking the validity of his settlement agreement with 

HHS. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs. 

Case: 15-3193 Document: 21-2 Page: 6 Filed: 11/09/2015