Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01540/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01540-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jason A. Andrus
Petitioner
J. Sullivan
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON A. ANDRUS,

Petitioner,

v.

J. SULLIVAN,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:19-cv-01540-JDP

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PETITION 

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR 

FAILURE TO EXHAUST

OBJECTIONS DUE IN THIRTY DAYS

ECF No. 1

Petitioner Jason A. Andrus, a state prisoner without counsel, petitioned for a writ of 

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. Petitioner claims that the prison’s late 

service of a rules violation report caused petitioner to lose 121 days of credit. Id. at 7. Petitioner 

has not stated that he sought any state-level judicial review of his claims before filing the instant 

petition, and he has provided no proof of any such proceedings. We will order petitioner to show 

cause why his petition should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust his claims.

Discussion

This matter is before the court for preliminary review under Rule 4 of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. Under Rule 4, the judge assigned to a habeas proceeding must 

examine the habeas petition and order a response thereto unless it “plainly appears” that the 

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petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2019); 

Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Absent rare circumstances, a state prisoner shall not be granted federal habeas relief 

unless “the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the [s]tate.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest 

state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the 

federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 

365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). The exhaustion doctrine is based on 

comity; it gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state’s alleged constitutional 

deprivations. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 

518 (1982). If petitioner is currently pursuing relief in state court—and we have no indication 

that he is—the existence of such a parallel proceeding would warrant the court’s abstinence from 

considering this case to allow state courts the first opportunity to address petitioner’s claims. See

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 

States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 

Here, it appears that petitioner has not sought any remedy in state court. See generally

ECF No. 1. If so, this amounts to a failure to exhaust his claims. See Murray v. Schriro, 882 

F.3d 778, 807 (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, petitioner must show cause why his petition should 

not be dismissed for failure to exhaust. If petitioner has not exhausted his claims at the state 

level, he may move to withdraw his entire petition and return to federal court when he has 

exhausted his state court remedies.1 Alternatively, petitioner may move to stay and hold in 

abeyance the petition while he exhausts his claims in state court. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 

269, 277 (2005); Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2002).2 Finally, if petitioner 

 

1 Although the limitations period tolls while a properly filed request for collateral review is 

pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not toll for the time a federal habeas 

petition is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001). 

2 Although two procedures, Rhines and Kelly, are available to stay a petition and hold it under 

abeyance, petitioner’s circumstances likely dictate that a Rhines stay is the appropriate procedure 

here. Under Rhines, a “stay and abeyance” is available only when: (1) there is “good cause” for 

the failure to exhaust; (2) the unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless”; and (3) the 

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has exhausted his claims, he may file a first amended complaint which demonstrates this 

exhaustion. 

Order

1. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, petitioner must respond to 

our order to show cause. 

2. The clerk’s office is directed to send petitioner a Section 2254 petition form.

3. Petitioner’s failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this 

action.3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

No. 206.

 

petitioner did not intentionally engage in dilatory litigation tactics. 544 U.S. at 277-78. If 

petitioner wishes to stay his petition under Rhines, he must demonstrate that he meets the three 

requirements of Rhines in his response to this order to show cause. On the other hand, a Kelly

stay is available where a petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Because all 

claims in the petition appear to be unexhausted, a Kelly stay is not appropriate here. 

3 Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order may result in a recommendation for 

dismissal of the petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (a petitioner’s failure 

to prosecute or to comply with a court order may result in a dismissal of the action).

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