Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03026/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03026-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Harris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 6, 2006 Decided June 22, 2007

No. 05-3026

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ANTHONY HARRIS,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

05-3033

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cr00157-01-02)

Matthew D. McGill and James W. Beane, Jr., appointed by

the court, argued the causes for appellants. With them on the

briefs was Miguel A. Estrada.

Nicholas P. Coleman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy

W. McLeese, III and Martin D. Carpenter, Assistant U.S.

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Attorneys. Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney,

entered an appearance.

Before: GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

Opinion dissenting in part filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: This case arises from a peculiar

example of urban entrepreneurship—the drive-by drug bazaar.

The essential components of these enterprises include a wholesaler with an appreciable stash of drugs (the “bagman”), one or

more retail clerks to handle individual transactions (“runners”),

and a handy supply of customers who wait in vehicles, engines

idling, while the merchandise is delivered. At about 2:30 A.M.

on March 3, 2004, Metropolitan police officers noticed (as one

would later testify) “a long line of cars that appeared to be

getting served by hand-to-hand transactions . . . like a drivethrough.” Trial Tr. 79, Oct. 13, 2004. One man “was standing

on the curbside” while two others “were flagging down and

running up to cars” bringing what appeared to be currency from

the cars to the bagman and clear plastic bags from the bagman

to the cars. Id. at 108. The police moved in for the bust. One

of the two runners, Anthony Harris, promptly surrendered. The

other, Antonio Roundtree, led police on a quarter-mile chase and

then “gave up. . . . [H]e said he was too tired and couldn’t run

no more.” Id. at 84. The bagman ran and escaped. A search of

Roundtree and Harris yielded neither drugs nor money, but

where the bagman had been standing, officers found tucked

behind a street sign a plastic bag containing 37.6 grams of crack

cocaine in 101 small baggies. Roundtree and Harris were

arrested; by the end of March, they were indicted for possession

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with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii). The two pled

not guilty, went to trial on October 13, and were convicted on

October 18. 

On appeal, Harris and Roundtree present one individual

claim each and share two claims in common. Harris argues his

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Speedy Trial

Act claim. Roundtree argues the district court committed

reversible error by curtailing testimony from favorable witnesses. Both defendants claim the trial judge’s ex parte contact

with the deliberating jury prejudiced the verdict. And both

defendants protest an approach to aiding and abetting that makes

them liable for the quantity of five grams or more of crack

cocaine. Finding that the district court did not violate the

Speedy Trial Act, abuse its discretion in circumscribing direct

examination, substantially and injuriously influence the jury’s

verdict through its ex parte contact, or err in its approach to

aiding and abetting, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

We begin in the pretrial period with Anthony Harris’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. About six months went

by between indictment and trial in this case. During that time,

Antonio Roundtree was released on bail, while Anthony Harris,

a young man with what the district court called a “ridiculous”

criminal history (including fifteen convictions, among them

contempt, escape, and violation of the Bail Act, and about twice

as many arrests), was held as a flight risk. Sentencing Hr’g Tr.

26, Feb. 18, 2005. Arguing his lengthy pretrial detention

violated the Speedy Trial Act, which requires that a criminal

trial “shall commence within seventy days from the filing date

. . . of the information or indictment” barring periods of

excludable delay, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), Harris claims his trial

counsel was constitutionally deficient for not saying so, and that

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but for this deficiency, a timely motion would have led to his

release.

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim, according to the

Strickland v. Washington two-prong test, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),

requires determining, first, on a “highly deferential” standard of

review and with great regard for counsel’s “strategic choices,”

whether counsel’s performance was so deficient as to fall

“below an objective standard of reasonableness” and deprive

defendant of the “‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment,” and, second, whether counsel’s deficient performance

was prejudicial, i.e., whether “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 687–94. This test

is fact-intensive, and the facts at issue are often orthogonal to

those explored at trial. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500,

505 (2003) (“The evidence introduced at trial . . . will be

devoted to issues of guilt or innocence, and the resulting record

in many cases will not disclose the facts necessary to decide

either prong of the Strickland analysis.”). Thus where a

defendant asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for

the first time on direct appeal, as Harris does, “this court’s

general practice is to remand the claim for an evidentiary

hearing unless the trial record alone conclusively shows that the

defendant either is or is not entitled to relief.” United States v.

Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 909–10 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Fennell, 53

F.3d 1296, 1303–04 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same). We do not

reflexively remand. Rather, we interrogate the trial record

according to Strickland’sfamiliar two prongs, remanding for an

evidentiary hearing if the record is anything less than conclusive

on a relevant matter of fact. Here, both sides claim the record is

conclusive in their favor and, in the alternative, call for a

remand. 

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1This circuit has spoken decisively to the issue of whether to

exclude the particular day on which an indictment or pretrial motion

is filed. United States v. Fonseca, 435 F.3d 369, 371–73 (D.C. Cir.

2006). The seventy-day clock starts ticking “the day after the filing

date of an indictment,” id. at 373 (emphasis in original), because the

statutory language requires trial “within seventy days from the filing

date,” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (emphasis added). In contrast, the

exclusionary period begins “on the date of the filing of a pretrial

motion,” Fonseca, 435 F.3d at 373 (emphasis in original), because the

statutory language tolls the clock “from the filing of the motion,” 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (emphasis added). It is but a short step to add

that the particular date on which the hearing is held is also part of the

exclusionary period, since the statute excludes the whole period “from

the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or

other prompt disposition of, such motion.” Id. (emphasis added).

Finally, a logical consequence of not counting the date of indictment

toward the seventy-day total is that we must count the date of trial, as

Fonseca assumes, 435 F.3d at 372, and Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 45(a)(3) indicates. In the instant case, then, we do not

We begin with the threshold legal question of whether the

delay between Harris’s indictment and trial violated the Speedy

Trial Act at all, for it is difficult to see how counsel could be

deficient for failing to protect speedy trial rights that were never

infringed, and very difficult to see how a defendant could be

prejudiced by the omission of a meritless motion. Harris was

indicted on March 30, 2004; his trial began on October 13.

Between those two dates, there is no dispute that pending

motions tolled the Speedy Trial Act clock from May 10 through

August 5 (when the court held a hearing and disposed of some

motions) and September 30 through October 13 (when trial

began). See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (excluding “delay

resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion

through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt

disposition of, such motion”). This leaves ninety-six days either

untolled or disputed.1

 The dispute centers on a document the

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count March 30 (the date of indictment), May 10 (the date on which

Harris filed a pretrial motion), August 5 (the date of the court’s

motions hearing), or September 30 (the date on which Harris filed

another pretrial motion), while we do count October 13 (the date on

which trial began), toward the seventy-day total. 

government filed on May 10, entitled “Government’s Notice of

Intent To Impeach Defendant [Harris] with His Prior Convictions Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 609.” 

The first issue is whether to regard this document as itself

a pretrial motion tolling the speedy trial clock. This is easily

resolved: Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) (along with

Rule 47) governs pretrial motions. Rule 12(b)(4)(A) creates a

category fitted out for the document at issue here: “[T]he

government may notify the defendant of its intent to use

specified evidence at trial in order to afford the defendant an

opportunity to object before trial under Rule 12(b)(3)(C).” Rule

12(b)(3)(C) concerns “motion[s] to suppress evidence.” Thus

the government’s notice was not a motion, but Harris’s response

“request[ing] that the Court preclude the admission of the above

mentioned evidence at trial” was one, and it tolled the clock (or

would have, were the clock not already tolled) from the date of

its filing on May 12. See also Melendez v. United States, 518

U.S. 120, 126 (1996) (“[T]he term ‘motion’ generally means

‘[a]n application made to a court or judge for purpose of

obtaining a rule or order directing some act to be done in favor

of the applicant.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1013 (6th ed. 1990))). 

The more difficult question is when the clock started ticking

again. At the August 5 hearing, which the court had scheduled

at the outset (and then rescheduled) to hear pretrial motions, the

district judge took up the Rule 609 issue and expressly stated his

intention to rule on it. But the motion was lost in the shuffle that

day and, since Harris did not take the stand, never revisited. The

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2 If the district court requests additional material after the hearing,

such as supplemental briefs, a third excludable period is added under

subsection (F). Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 331 (1986)

(“[S]ubsection (F) excludes time after a hearing has been held where

a district court awaits additional filings from the parties that are

needed for proper disposition of the motion.”); United States v. Sutter,

340 F.3d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]hree distinct categories of

time are excludable: (1) the time from the filing of the motion to the

hearing (whether or not such time was reasonably necessary); (2)

additional time required to receive supplemental briefing or additional

factual materials; and (3) an additional 30 days during which the

matter is ‘under advisement.’”). On the whole, “[t]he provisions of

the Act are designed to exclude all time that is consumed in placing

the trial court in a position to dispose of a motion,” Henderson, 476

U.S. at 331, together with thirty days afterwards for the district court

to consider and act on the matter.

government thus characterizes the unresolved motion after the

hearing as “under advisement,” which alludes to another

exclusion on the Speedy Trial Act’s list, this one for “delay

reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days,

during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(J).

In effect, the government reads subsections (F) and (J) together

such that, when pretrial motions are filed and a hearing on them

held, a first period from filing to hearing is excluded under (F),

and then a second period extending not longer than thirty days

from the conclusion of the hearing to the resolution of the

motions is excluded under (J).2

 Harris counters that the

excludable period for a pretrial motion ends simply “with the

conclusion of the hearing,” but in this the government is surely

correct. United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 292 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (“Once the hearing has been held . . . the statute also calls

for the exclusion of a period ‘not to exceed thirty days’ during

which the court actually holds the motion under advisement.”);

United States v. Wilson, 835 F.2d 1440, 1442 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

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(“The two subsections [(F) and (J)] taken together thus exclude

the time between the filing of a motion and the date it is taken

under advisement by the court, plus the time during which the

court holds the motion under advisement (up to 30 days).”); see

also United States v. Sutter, 340 F.3d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003)

(same); United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 55 (1st Cir. 2001)

(same); United States v. Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1228 (11th

Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 326

(6th Cir. 1988) (same). 

So Harris retreats to an alternative argument, capitalizing on

the Supreme Court’s reading of subsection (F): “Subsection (F),

written in the disjunctive, excludes time in two situations. The

first arises when a pretrial motion requires a hearing . . . . The

second situation concerns motions that require no hearing and

that result in a prompt disposition” pursuant to the thirty-day

time limit in subsection (J). Henderson v. United States, 476

U.S. 321, 329 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

According to Harris, the Rule 609 dispute did not require a

hearing, so the clock started ticking from the date the court was

briefed (May 12) and ran out thirty days later—long before the

August 5 hearing. But where a district court chooses to address

a motion at a hearing, there is no precedent for finding the

hearing un-required for purposes of Henderson or subsection

(F), and some precedent to the contrary. See, e.g., United States

v. Stafford, 697 F.2d 1368, 1373 (11th Cir. 1983) (“If a hearing

is held, (F) by its terms excludes without qualification the entire

period between the filing of the motion and the conclusion of the

hearing.” (emphasis added)). More often the situation is one in

which the district court did not hold a hearing, or did not hold

one for many months, and the question is whether to toll the

clock under (F) or under (J). See, e.g., United States v. Bush,

404 F.3d 263, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2005). In any case, given the

substance of the government’s notice and Harris’s response, the

issue here was whether the probative value of Harris’s conviction for felony escape was substantially outweighed by the

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dangers of unfair prejudice. This is obviously a matter on which

a district court might want some facts, and require a hearing. 

Thus we subtract, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(J),

thirty days after August 5 from Harris’s ninety-six-day total.

The sixty-six remaining are within the Speedy Trial Act’s

seventy-day limit. With no Speedy Trial Act violation, Harris

can make no case for ineffective assistance of counsel.

II

We turn now to Antonio Roundtree’s claim that the district

court improperly limited the testimony of three witnesses in his

favor: his mother, his girlfriend (and son’s mother), and a coworker, Lawrence Winters, from a charitable organization at

which Roundtree volunteered. Roundtree did not call a fourth

witness, this one an acquaintance from a fatherhood program,

because the court’s sharp oversight made the testimony, in

Roundtree’s judgment, “futile.” Appellants’ Br. 43. 

Roundtree’s mother took the stand first. Counsel first asked

her whether she saw her son on the night of his arrest (“We

talked in the kitchen.”) and whether he had a job (“He’s a move

technician.”). Trial Tr. 28–29, Oct. 14, 2004. When counsel

asked, “Does Antonio have a family? . . . Describe his family

for us,” the government objected, and both parties approached

the bench:

THE COURT: You can make that objection right out in

front of everybody. It’s irrelevant. . . . [A]re you going to

put his character in issue?

[COUNSEL]: Yes. Squarely.

THE COURT: Well, the question is did he or did he not

deal the drugs, period. It’s irrelevant. 

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Id. at 30. Counsel then quickly brought the examination to a

close.

Roundtree’s girlfriend testified next. Counsel asked her to

“[t]ell us about [the] day” on which Roundtree was arrested, id.

at 33, and the court immediately initiated a bench conference:

THE COURT: Is she a witness, an eyewitness to anything

that happened that night?

[COUNSEL]: She dropped him off. In other words,

Antonio keeps their child, he kept their child that day all

day, and then they went to her house for the evening for

dinner. . . . 

THE COURT: What does that have to do with this case?

This is another way of putting on the evidence that he’s a

good father and takes care of his child and all that. That’s

irrelevant. . . . The evidence may refer to character for

truthfulness or untruthfulness.

[COUNSEL]: And I’m getting there.

THE COURT: No, you’re not going to get there. . . . When

and if he testifies and when and if his credibility is attacked,

and when you can make a proffer that her testimony will go

directly to his character for truthfulness, then you can put

this witness on. But this business of showing that he’s a

devoted husband and father, forget it. 

[COUNSEL]: Well, can she at least establish she dropped

him off at a certain time?

THE COURT: No. That’s irrelevant. 

[COUNSEL]: He didn’t have any drugs on him at the time

that she dropped him off.

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THE COURT: How does she know that? . . . I’ll let you

save enough face by getting her off the stand to testify what

time she dropped him off, period. That’s it. 

Id. at 33–35. Again, the questioning came quickly to a close. 

Lawrence Winters took the stand after Roundtree himself

had testified to his innocence (“I was talking to [friends] . . .

[a]nd . . . police just came up,” id. at 41) and had his credibility

challenged on cross-examination (“Now I’m confused, because

you just said you didn’t see [Harris] that night,” id. at 54). The

court twice interrupted Winters’s testimony. When counsel

asked if Winters had been able to “form an opinion with regards

to [Roundtree’s] truthfulness,” the court interjected: “Now, wait

a minute, Counsel. We’re talking reputation testimony.” Id. at

65. When counsel asked about Roundtree’s reputation for

truthfulness, the Court asked: “In what community? Among

what people? I need a better foundation than that, Counsel.

This is a very narrow question.” Id. at 66. Ultimately the witness testified that Roundtree is known for truthfulness

“[a]mongst the people that [he] interacts with.” Id. The witness

left the stand moments later, and Roundtree rested without

calling the second character witness he had scheduled. 

Roundtree makes three arguments on appeal. First, he

claims the court wrongfully limited testimony from his mother

and girlfriend geared to showing he had no drugs on the night in

question and lacked the demeanor of a man about to deal drugs.

Second, he claims the court prevented him from presenting

testimony from all three witnesses (and the fourth he would have

called but for the sharpness of the court’s oversight) that would

have demonstrated his truthful character. And third, he makes

the same claim for all his witnesses with respect to a second

character trait, one he did not mention at trial but mentions on

appeal: law-abidingness. The latter two arguments concern the

district court’s exclusion of character evidence; we review for

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abuse of discretion. In re Sealed Case, 352 F.3d 409, 411 (D.C.

Cir. 2003) (“This court reviews a district court’s exclusion of

character evidence for abuse of discretion.”); see also Michelson

v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480 (1948) (Jackson, J.) (“Both

propriety and abuse of . . . reputation testimony . . . depend on

numerous and subtle considerations difficult to detect or

appraise from a cold record, and therefore rarely and only on

clear showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion will Courts of

Appeals disturb rulings of trial courts on this subject.”). The

first argument concerns mixed issues of character evidence,

relevancy, and the probity/prejudice balance; again, we review

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Fonseca, 435 F.3d 369,

373 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating that we generally review a district

court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion); United States

v. West, 393 F.3d 1302, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying abuse

of discretion standard to district court’s relevancy determination

under Federal Rule of Evidence 401); United States v. Gartmon,

146 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying abuse of

discretion standard to district court’s probity-versus-prejudice

determinations under Federal Rule of Evidence 403). Although

Roundtree ultimately bases his arguments on a criminal defendant’s right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his

favor, U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.

14 (1967) (identifying compulsory process right as fundamental

and incorporating it into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause), he does not claim that the district court’s

conduct, if consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence, might

still violate his constitutional rights. We thus confine our

analysis to the Rules.

The district court’s toughest evidentiary rulings, those

against the mother and girlfriend, show one persistent aim: to

prevent testimony whose purpose was, in the court’s judgment,

purely or mainly to cast Roundtree in the sympathetic light of a

dedicated family man who spent the evening before his criminal

adventure talking with his mother, playing with his son, and

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caring for his girlfriend. This evidentiary position is unassailable; it is familiar ground that while a criminal defendant can

put character in issue, the evidence can concern only a “pertinent trait of character,” FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1), and even then

may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,” FED. R. EVID. 403.

United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998)

(“Furthermore, courts apply Rule 403 in undiluted form to Rules

404(a)(1)-(3) . . . .”); see also United States v. Angelini, 678

F.2d 380, 381 (1st Cir. 1982) (“The word ‘pertinent’ is read as

synonymous with ‘relevant.’”); United States v. Hewitt, 634

F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); 22 CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT &KENNETH W.GRAHAM,JR.,FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 5236 (1978) (same). But see United States v.

Han, 230 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Federal R. Evid.

404(a)(1) applies a lower threshold of relevancy to character

evidence than that applicable to other evidence.”). Thus

Roundtree studiously avoids defending the admissibility of

evidence related to his family, arguing instead that when counsel

asked Roundtree’s mother to “[d]escribe his family for us,” and

his girlfriend to “[t]ell us about [the] day” on which he “kept

their child” until they “went to her house for the evening for

dinner,” he was only seeking testimony about Roundtree’s

demeanor and circumstantial evidence of whether Roundtree

was carrying drugs. One can understand the district court’s

suspicions. But let us take Roundtree’s stated goal for the

testimony at face value for the moment. What exactly is the

demeanor of a man about to deal drugs? Furtive? Drug-dealing

is not the most hot-blooded of crimes, particularly when the

dealing is as orderly and routinized as “a drive-through.” Trial

Tr. 79, Oct. 13, 2004. And as to the girlfriend’s testimony about

whether Roundtree had drugs when she dropped him off, even

setting aside the court’s sensible question (“How does she know

that?”), the government never suggested that Roundtree brought

the drugs to the scene. Quite the opposite: The government

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presented Roundtree as a runner for a bagman who got away. In

these circumstances, even if the district court had believed

Roundtree was seeking to air relevant demeanor and

circumstantial evidence rather than prohibited forms of character

evidence (something the court was not obligated to believe), the

court was nonetheless free to find the evidence excessively

prejudicial. We find no abuse of discretion on these matters.

Turning to Roundtree’s second argument, his attempt to

demonstrate truthful character, the point is simply a nonstarter

with respect to his mother’s and girlfriend’s testimony. Rule

608(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: “[E]vidence of

truthful character is admissible only after the character of the

witness for truthfulness has been attacked . . . .” Roundtree had

at that time not yet taken the stand—and indeed, the court told

Roundtree’s counsel: “When and if . . . his credibility is

attacked . . . you can make a proffer that her testimony will go

directly to his character for truthfulness . . . .” As to Winters,

the court permitted his testimony to Roundtree’s truthfulness,

and at a bench conference had pre-approved the same testimony

from the uncalled fourth witness. (When Winters testified, the

court appears to have interjected to clarify whether he was

giving opinion or reputation testimony, but the court did not

indicate it was excluding either and in fact had pre-approved

both at the bench conference.) Thus Roundtree’s only option is

to argue that Winters’s reputation testimony was inadequate

because he was not “permitted to offer testimony regarding the

specifics of his interaction with Roundtree.” Appellants’ Br. 43.

But of course a witness’s credibility may not be defended on the

basis of specific acts of conduct. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). The

district court’s rulings on these matters were not abuses of

discretion; indeed, they may have been nondiscretionary. 

Roundtree claims the excluded testimony of all three

witnesses, plus the uncalled fourth witness, would have demonstrated his character for law-abidingness. The district court

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twice indicated second thoughts on his own rulings in this

regard. At a hearing after the close of all evidence but before

closing arguments, the court said: “I may have called that game

a little close on the defense . . . . There is a place for opinion

testimony on general character of law abidingness, of course,

but I did not understand, nor was any proffer made to me that

that’s what was coming down.” Trial Tr. 83–84, Oct. 14, 2004.

This is certainly true; there is no indication in the trial record of

Roundtree’s counsel ever mentioning the character trait of lawabidingness. “And the other information about the defendant,

just to paint him as a good son, father, caretaker, and so forth,”

the court explained, “not only dealt with a trait of character that

is not relevant to the crime involved in this case, but even if it

were, I would have excluded it on 403 grounds.” Id. at 84. The

court then invited Roundtree’s counsel to speak in order to

“make your own record” on the issue. Id. At a status hearing

four months later, the court returned to the theme: “On a review

of the record, I think it is pretty clear that I did erroneously limit

the defendant’s ability to call a reputation witness; that is, a

character witness for the defendant’s reputation for lawfulness

in the community. However, at a later point in the record I did

what I could to redress that situation,” by permitting

Roundtree’s counsel “to respond or to make his own record.”

Tr. Status Hr’g 4, Feb. 16, 2005. The court concluded: “And I

suppose we’re going to have to leave it to the Court of Appeals

to parse the exact words that were said . . . but I still don’t see,

reading the record, that [Roundtree’s counsel] ever proffered

actual character testimony on the defendant’s character as a lawabiding citizen.” Id. 

Roundtree now seeks to treat these statements from the

district court as admissions of error analogous to an opposing

party’s concessions, closing off analysis on appeal and shifting

this court to the position of examining admitted error for

harmlessness. But a party’s concession wipes away a dispute

and with it, in most cases, our purpose in hearing an issue. A

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16

district court’s second thoughts do not make an issue disappear.

And in any case, our purpose is to evaluate the evidentiary

rulings themselves, not the court’s later remarks about them.

We cannot find fault with those rulings. Actually, the trial judge

may have been a little hard on himself. He suggested the

appellate court would have “to parse the exact words that were

said.” We have done so. Roundtree indeed made no proffer

concerning his character for law-abidingness; at trial, the only

character trait he mentioned to the court was truthfulness. There

is thus no erroneous ruling to complain of, and it is not clear

what the district court could have done differently. 

III

The jury began deliberating on Thursday afternoon. Shortly

before close of business on Friday, the judge received a note

from the foreman: “Can we be excused for the day? Juror 6

needs to leave to pick up her daughter. We are not unanimous!”

(emphasis in original). As the judge later explained: 

I went into the jury room, as is my practice, to release

the jury. . . . I told them that they could go home, of course,

and I complimented them on their hard work, and tried to

say nothing else. 

But the jury wanted to talk a little bit. I was reluctant,

of course, to talk to them at all except to tell them that they

could go home. But they began to say things like: “[A]t

what point do we—what do we do if we can’t decide?”

And I said, “Well, I can’t really talk to you about a subject

like that without the attorneys being present.” “Well,” they

said, “maybe we need some more instruction.” And I said,

“Well, have a nice weekend. We’ll talk about it on Monday

morning.”

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17

Trial Tr. 2–3, Oct. 18, 2004. Immediately afterwards, the judge

sent counsel an email stating he wished to speak to the jury

Monday morning and asking counsel to attend. That day, before

the jury filed in, the judge reported to counsel his interaction

with the jury on Friday (as quoted above), stated his intention to

read to the jury the anti-deadlock instruction recommended by

the Council for Court Excellence, and stated his intention to reread the instruction inviting a verdict as to just one of the two

defendants, if they were unable to reach a verdict on both. He

invited objections, but almost immediately after that discussion

began (with a question from the government), he received a note

from the jury stating that it had a unanimous verdict. About half

an hour into the morning, the jury pronounced both defendants

guilty. 

Harris and Roundtree claim the judge’s ex parte conversation with the jurors while they were deliberating constitutes

reversible error under both the statutory and constitutional

dimensions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a)(2):

“Unless this rule . . . provides otherwise, the defendant must be

present at . . . every trial stage . . . .” See United States v.

Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“As [a restatement

of existing law], Rule 43 embodies the protections afforded by

the sixth amendment confrontation clause, the due process

guarantee of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and the

common law right of presence.”). Defendants’ argument has

three steps. First, they argue that any ex parte contact between

a judge and a deliberating jury constitutes error. See United

States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 460–62 (1978)

(observing the “hazards of ex parte communications with a

deliberating jury” and finding the practice “pregnant with

possibilities for error”); Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35,

39–41 (1975) (holding a trial judge’s ex parte response to a

jury’s question to violate Rule 43); United States v. Yarborough,

400 F.3d 17, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding ex parte communications between the judge and deliberating jury “fraught with the

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18

potential for jury coercion”); Walker v. United States, 322 F.2d

434, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (“[Rule 43] prohibits the judge from

communicating with the jury in any way, either before or after

it has begun to deliberate, when the defendant is absent.”).

Second, they argue that where a jury is both deliberating and

deadlocked, a judge’s ex parte communications are presumptively prejudicial. See United States v. Mejia, 356 F.3d 470 (2d

Cir. 2004) (vacating a conviction because the district court’s

implicit direction to “continue deliberations” despite deadlock,

delivered ex parte, plausibly “induced unanimity” (internal

quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Thomas,

449 F.2d 1177, 1182–84 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc) (reversing

a district court for insisting that a jury keep deliberating, thus

potentially “prying individual jurors loose from beliefs they

honestly have”). They add that where the government’s evidence of guilt is “‘conflicting or ambiguous,’” as they claim it

was here, “‘the danger that an error will affect the jury’s verdict

is almost always substantial.’” United States v. Cunningham,

145 F.3d 1385, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted)

(quoting United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1392 (D.C. Cir.

1996)); see also Thomas, 449 F.3d at 1183. They also add that

where a jury returns its verdict soon after a judge’s ex parte

communication, there is reason to suspect the communication

“induced unanimity.” Rogers, 422 U.S. at 40; Mejia, 350 F.3d

at 477. Having engineered this hair-trigger standard for

prejudice, it remains only for defendants to interpret the trial

judge in the instant case as stepping over the line. Thus, third,

they characterize the judge’s Friday afternoon remarks as

implicitly charging the jury to keep deliberating, and then

characterize the jury’s verdict on Monday morning—coming

“after just 28 minutes of additional deliberation” (not to

mention two-and-a-half weekend days apart)—as the effect of

that coercion. Appellants’ Reply Br. 11. 

This is a sophisticated argument, but it must contend with

the plain fact that when the jury asked to talk about the case

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19

3We would, however, caution the district court against ex parte

contact with a deliberating jury in the future, even if the contact is

intended merely to show gratitude for the jurors’ hard work or wish

them a good evening. Precedents like U.S. Gypsum, Rogers,

Yarborough, and Walker show that such communications are too

perilous for even the most conscientious judge to venture.

4 It must be said that the judge in the instant case came perilously

close to delivering the Council for Court Excellence charge, stating his

intention to do so just before getting the jury’s verdict note, which

would have made this a very different case.

outside the presence of counsel, the judge politely but utterly

refused to do so. Presumptions may not entirely substitute for

facts. We need not decide whether the ex parte contact was

error.3

 The question is whether such a minimal and constrained

degree of contact could fail harmless error review. 

The precedents defendants cite do not alter the manner of

that review. In fact, those precedents largely concern an issue

foreign to the instant case: the issue of how a judge may instruct

a deadlocked jury. On the one hand, trial judges may encourage

deadlocked jurors to reconsider their positions, Allen v. United

States, 164 U.S. 492, 501–02 (1896); on the other hand, trial

judges may not coerce a verdict, Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S.

231, 241 (1988). “This tension,” Yarborough explains, “became

the subject of countless criminal appeals.” 400 F.3d at 21. We

sought to stem the tide by approving a standardized instruction

in Thomas, 449 F.2d at 1187, and we insisted on that standardized instruction in Yarborough, reversing a trial judge for

instructing a deadlocked jury with the Council for Court Excellence’s somewhat stronger anti-deadlock charge, 400 F.3d at

21–22. But the trial judge in the instant case did not deliver the

Council for Court Excellence charge or any other deadlock

instruction.4

 

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20

The best defendants can argue, then, is that what the judge

did say—“I can’t really talk to you about a subject like that

without the attorneys being present,” and “We’ll talk about it on

Monday morning”—amounted to an implicit but nonetheless

coercive message to reach unanimity contrary to the spirit of the

Thomas-Yarborough line of cases. As Harris’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument, “What my case does depend on is

that you find that in sum and substance the judge instructed the

jury to continue its deliberations here.” Defendants are somewhat aided in this argument by United States v. Mejia, in which

the Second Circuit reversed a trial court for “its failure to

respond to the report of deadlock,” which “in effect directed the

jury to continue deliberations . . . [and] may have induced

unanimity.” 356 F.3d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Mejia jury had been deadlocked

for three days, repeatedly sent deadlock notes to the judge, and

already received supplementary instruction encouraging

unanimity. Finally, it sent a note stating: “We the Jury can’t

come to an agreement—we have exhausted all possibilities &

have had the same vote for the past 21⁄2 full days 11–1.” Id. at

473 (emphasis in original). The court responded with a rebuke

for reporting the 11–1 division, and a unanimous verdict came

back a few minutes later. Even were it authoritative within our

circuit, these facts are much more extreme than those in the

instant case. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the jury in our case

was deadlocked. The record makes clear the jurors hadn’t

arrived at unanimity as of Friday afternoon; that is all. Precedents about how to instruct a deadlocked jury do not control

where the jury was neither deadlocked nor instructed as to

deadlock. 

We therefore scrutinize the trial judge’s ex parte contact

with the deliberating jury in the usual way, to determine

harmlessness or prejudice. See id. at 476 (“It is well settled,

however, that an ex parte communication by a judge to a jury in

response to a jury inquiry may be considered harmless error

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21

5We normally apply Kotteakos where trial errors do not implicate

constitutional rights and the more stringent Chapman v. California

standard, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (requiring the government to prove

harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt), where they do. United

States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 460–61 (1986). Rule 43, as noted above,

is a peculiar hybrid, codifying rights with origins in the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses, the Sixth

Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, and the common law right of

presence. United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir.

1987); United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 986–87 & n.5 (6th Cir.

1978); see also United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985).

Although defendants assert that the trial judge’s error implicated their

due process rights, we see no due process violation according to the

standard Justice Cardozo promulgated in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291

U.S. 97, 107–08 (1934): “[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition

of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be

thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” See also Gagnon,

470 U.S. at 526–27 (finding no due process violation for brief and

nonsubstantive ex parte contact between judge and jurors). 

where the communication cannot be said to have prejudiced the

defendant.”). We apply the Kotteakos standard for testing

harmlessness, evaluating whether it is “highly probable that the

error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.

750, 776 (1946).5 What is the injurious influence here?

Defendants offer only the suggestion already discussed, that the

judge’s remark, “We’ll talk about it on Monday morning,”

threatened the jurors with indefinite deliberation until unanimity. The suggestion would be at least a little more plausible if

the judge had said, “We’ll talk about it next Friday.” Monday

was the next working day after an early dismissal on Friday

afternoon. Had the judge resolved at the moment he walked into

the jury room to declare a hung jury and a mistrial at the first

opportunity, he would have said the same. 

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22

IV

Harris and Roundtree join in a final argument, this one cast

as a sufficiency of the evidence claim and aimed at their

conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), giving a fiveyear minimum for possessing with intent to distribute the

quantity of five grams or more of cocaine base. Drug dealing

operations often employ “runners,” who don’t control the stash,

and “holders,” who do; the runners help secure customers for the

holders. United States v. Monroe, 990 F.2d 1370, 1372 (D.C.

Cir. 1993). Harris and Roundtree were runners. The evidence

at trial gave no indication that they ever personally controlled

the plastic bag filled with 37.6 grams of crack cocaine, or even

carried as much as five grams back and forth to the waiting cars.

The government proceeded on an aiding and abetting theory

under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (holding aiders and abettors punishable as

principals under federal criminal law), and defendants argue the

evidence was insufficient to show they aided and abetted in

possessing “more than five grams of cocaine base,” Appellants’

Br. 44 (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Lam

Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[A]n

indictment need not specifically include an aiding and abetting

charge because, whether specified or not, the federal statute

creating liability for aiding and abetting is considered embodied

in full in every federal indictment.” (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted)). We review sufficiency of the

evidence claims on a “demanding” standard, id., investigating

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in

original). 

There is law exactly on point in our circuit. In United

States v. Monroe, a woman (Monroe herself) sold an undercover

officer 0.41 grams of crack. The officer asked how he could get

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23

more. “I only have this one,” she said, “but you can get one

from my buddy,” who was sitting beside her and had 13 grams

of crack. 990 F.2d at 1372. Monroe was convicted, on an

aiding and abetting theory, of possession with intent to distribute

all 13 grams. This circuit ruled against her sufficiency of the

evidence appeal, stating that under 18 U.S.C. § 2: “It is enough

for the Government to establish Monroe’s involvement in the

general scheme, thereby assisting or encouraging [her friend’s]

possession of the drugs with intent to distribute them. The

evidence is sufficient to support Monroe’s conviction if the

Government proves that Monroe acted as a middleman—

procuring the customers and maintaining the market in which

the possession is profitable.” 990 F.2d at 1374 (internal

quotation marks omitted); accord Nye & Nissen v. United States,

336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949) (finding sufficient evidence for

conviction as an aider and abettor where a defendant “‘in some

sort associate[s] himself with the venture . . . participate[s] in it

as in something that he wishes to bring about . . . seek[s] by his

action to make it succeed’” (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100

F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (L. Hand, J.))); United States v.

Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding sufficient

evidence for conviction as an aider and abettor where a narcotics

defendant lacked actual or constructive possession of the drugs

and served only as a lookout); United States v. Raper, 676 F.2d

841, 848–52 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding sufficient evidence for

conviction as an aider and abettor where a narcotics defendant

acted as a runner for a bagman, collecting money but never

directly handling drugs).

Harris and Roundtree attempt to argue their position under

Monroe, interpreting the case to require that they “encourage[]

the bag man not simply to possess contraband, but rather to

possess more than five grams of contraband by creating an

environment in which possession of that amount was profitable.” Appellants’ Reply Br. 23 (emphasis in original). But

here, as in Monroe, a rational jury could find that the joint

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24

venture aimed, and defendants aimed, to distribute the entire

stash. See Raper, 676 F.2d at 849 (“What is required on the part

of the aider is sufficient knowledge and participation to indicate

that he knowingly and willfully participated in the offense in a

manner that indicated he intended to make it succeed.”).

Defendants can do little else but urge us to abandon Monroe,

claiming it is inconsistent with the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and Nye

& Nissen. But even if this panel had authority to overturn

Monroe, the case is plainly a faithful if expansive interpretation

of § 2’s laconic text, as was Nye & Nissen itself. 

* * *

The judgment of the district court is therefore 

Affirmed.

USCA Case #05-3026 Document #1048798 Filed: 06/22/2007 Page 24 of 30
 WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: 

Although I don’t think the court is necessarily wrong in its 

analysis of the Speedy Trial Act issue, I think the decision is 

at least questionable—and in the end avoidable because, even 

if there was a violation, trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue 

probably didn’t demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel 

within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). Accordingly, I think a remand to the trial court would 

be the better course. 

* * * 

The relevant facts are these: On May 10 the government 

gave notice of its intent to impeach Harris with his prior 

convictions, and Harris responded on May 12 by filing a 

motion asking the court to exclude any such evidence. The 

government filed no opposing papers. There the matters 

languished until August 5, when the court held a hearing to 

wrap up pending motions, namely, Harris’s requests for 

suppression and for exclusion of the Rule 609 evidence. At 

that time both Harris and the government made clear that as to 

the Rule 609 motion they intended to file no further papers, 

and sought neither argument nor an evidentiary hearing. The 

court on August 5 denied the suppression motion, but no one 

said anything on the merits of Harris’s effort to exclude the 

prior convictions. We may infer that at that point the Rule 

609 motion was taken “under advisement,” a critical condition 

under the Act, if it wasn’t already under advisement. 

According to the majority, the Act directs exclusion of 

the entire time from May 12, 2004 (when the defendant filed 

his motion in response to the government’s Rule 609 notice) 

until 30 days after August 5, the date of the omnibus hearing 

on pending pre-trial motions. 

USCA Case #05-3026 Document #1048798 Filed: 06/22/2007 Page 25 of 30
2

The relevant provisions of the Act are exclusions under 

subsections (F) and (J) of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1). Subsection 

(F) excludes 

delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing 

of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or 

other prompt disposition of, such motion. 

Id. § 3161(h)(1)(F). Subsection (J) excludes 

delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed 

thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the 

defendant is actually under advisement by the court. 

Id. § 3161(h)(1)(J). Because Harris makes no real objection 

to the exclusion of the period from May 12 to August 5, the 

only question is how much time thereafter, if any, can be 

excluded on the basis of the Rule 609 motion. That in turn 

depends on whether the motion came “under advisement” by 

the court on August 5 or sooner. 

 To be clear, my disagreement with the majority concerns 

only the treatment of the Rule 609 motion. The question is 

when that motion came under advisement. If that happened 

only on August 5, as the court says, another 30 days are 

excluded pursuant to subsection (J); if it came under 

advisement before August 5, then the 30 days afforded by 

subsection (J) started running before August 5. Depending on 

when that moment was, some or all of the 30 days available 

for the Rule 609 motion under subsection (J) may have run 

concurrently with the days concededly excluded between May 

10 and August 5. 

The Supreme Court in Henderson v. United States, 476 

U.S. 321 (1986), held that subsection (F) announces a general 

rule of exclusion, irrespective of the reasonableness of the 

delay, subject to the limit imposed by subsection (J). See id. 

USCA Case #05-3026 Document #1048798 Filed: 06/22/2007 Page 26 of 30
3

at 326–29. According to the Court, only 30 additional days 

can be excluded under subsection (J) once a “district court has 

a motion ‘under advisement,’ i.e., 30 days from the time the 

court receives all the papers it reasonably expects.” Id. at 329. 

Henderson goes on to depict two possible scenarios, one 

where a motion “requires a hearing,” and the other where it 

does not. Id. (Henderson doesn’t say whether these two 

exhaust the possibilities.) As to the first, subsection (F) 

excludes all of the time from the filing of the motion until the 

hearing, and subsection (J) excludes up to 30 days thereafter. 

As to the second, where no hearing is required, subsection (J) 

is triggered at the point where “the court receives all the 

papers it reasonably expects.” Id. By this the Henderson 

Court likely meant the period allowed under court rules for 

responses and replies, see id. at 328, subject to a trial court’s 

case-specific adjustments. 

The court finds subsections (F) and (J) fully applicable by 

describing the trial court as having chosen “to address [the 

Rule 609] motion at a hearing,” i.e., the August 5 event. 

Majority Op. at 8. On that view the majority excludes the 

entire time from May 12 to August 5 under subsection (F) (a 

matter not very important in itself because of the defendant’s 

concession), plus 30 days after August 5 under subsection (J). 

A proceeding in which evidence is taken, or the merits of a 

motion are argued, qualifies as a “hearing” that triggers 

subsection (J), i.e., the moment of a motion’s coming “under 

advisement,” but it seems to me questionable to give that 

effect to a proceeding that features no substantive colloquy on 

the motion whatever, and occurs long after the filing of papers 

has drawn to a close. Why didn’t the motion come “under 

advisement” at the point where the government’s time to 

respond expired, which under D.D.C. Crim. R. 47(b) would 

appear to have occurred 11 days after Harris’s May 12 

motion? 

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4

There is a path by which one might arrive at the court’s 

conclusion. Henderson divided the universe into motions 

requiring a hearing and ones requiring no hearing, but left 

unclear whether there might be other categories. What of 

motions for which the need for a hearing is uncertain at the 

time of filing, or at the time when all further filings are 

complete or time-barred? Assuming Harris’s Rule 609 

motion fell into that category until August 5, when it became 

clear that neither party felt any need for evidence, oral 

argument, or further papers, perhaps it was only at that 

moment that the court reasonably understood itself to have 

“receive[d] all the papers it reasonably expect[ed],” thus 

triggering subsection (J). A difficulty with this analysis is that 

it leaves unexplained why the mere possibility of a hearing 

should stop the clock. Or must the defendant flag the 

government’s non-response in order to restart the clock? If 

the courts are to pursue this approach, they will have to invent 

all the subsidiary rules themselves, with no help from the Act. 

Moreover, any such rationale for the court’s result is at 

least in tension with the First Circuit’s decision in United 

States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2001). There the district 

court had scheduled a hearing for September 16, 1999, but the 

hearing didn’t take place because of bad weather; the parties 

then made clear that they were content to submit their motions 

on the filings. Four months later, the district court called for 

supplemental briefing. Id. at 54. Although a literal reading of 

Henderson might yield the conclusion that the district court 

had not taken the motion “under advisement” on September 

16 because the court had not “receive[d] all the papers it 

reasonably expect[ed],” Henderson, 476 U.S. at 329, the First 

Circuit decided that this limbo period could not be excluded: 

The [Act] makes no provision for what the district 

court did here: not decide the motion for 124 days and 

then retroactively seek to explain the lack of prompt 

USCA Case #05-3026 Document #1048798 Filed: 06/22/2007 Page 28 of 30
5

disposition by saying it needed additional filings, 

although it had taken the matter under advisement earlier. 

Nor does the [Act] make any provision for a district court 

effectively to take a matter under advisement for 

decision, but then to avoid the [Act’s] timeline by saying 

that matter was not under advisement within the meaning 

of the [Act]. We do not think the [Act] permits either 

course of action. Such an approach would undermine the 

purposes of the [Act]. 

Scott, 270 F.3d at 56. Scott is plainly distinguishable, to be 

sure. There everything suggested that the motion had come 

under advisement on September 16, whereas here the question 

of when the motion came under advisement is unresolved—

though it is hard to see why it should have been later than the 

point where a government response was time-barred 

(evidently 11 days after Harris’s May 12 motion). If 

subsection (J) was triggered well before August 5, as seems 

likely, the district court would still have been free to conduct a 

hearing. But under subsection (J) it would have had to reach 

that decision within 30 days after the matter came under 

advisement, or risk restarting the Speedy Trial Act clock. 

There are, to be sure, many complex permutations. For 

example, as the paragraph above suggests, the court may take 

a motion under advisement but later determine that further 

briefing or argument is necessary. In such a situation, if the 

court called for the submissions within 30 days, the period up 

to that call would be excluded under subsection (J), the time 

allotted for submissions would be excluded under subsection 

(F) (because the motion would no longer be under 

advisement), and only then would the 30-day subsection (J) 

time limit begin to run again (starting at zero, or subtracting 

the time elapsed before the call for more submissions?). Also, 

as other circuits have noted, the 30-day limit of subsection (J) 

might not apply rigidly when multiple motions are pending 

USCA Case #05-3026 Document #1048798 Filed: 06/22/2007 Page 29 of 30
6

before a district court. See Scott, 270 F.3d at 57 n.19; United 

States v. Tibboel, 753 F.2d 608, 611–12 (7th Cir. 1985). 

Under Tibboel the multiplicity of motions might call for a 

period under advisement exceeding 30 days, so that a finding 

of no violation might be correct even if the Rule 609 motion 

came under advisement well before August 5. A remand here 

could disclose details governing the application of this latter 

exception, if it proved necessary. 

* * * 

 Because of the uncertainty surrounding the alleged 

Speedy Trial Act violation, particularly the date on which the 

Rule 609 motion should be considered as having been taken 

“under advisement,” I would remand the case so that the 

district court could resolve the issue in the most economical 

way. The briefing suggests (though the trial court may know 

better) that this would be by first deciding whether, assuming 

there was a violation, Harris’s attorney’s conduct amounted to 

ineffective assistance under Strickland. Then, if necessary, 

the court would decide whether there was a Speedy Trial Act 

violation, taking into account whatever might shed light on 

the effects of the parties’ collective inactivity after May 12 

with respect to the Rule 609 motion. 

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