Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03113/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03113-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William D. Hill
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 14, 1997 Decided December 23, 1997 

No. 96-3113

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WILLIAM D. HILL,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cr00312-01)

Evelina J. Norwinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant, with whom A.J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender, was on the briefs. Lisa B. Wright,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Carolyn E. Becker, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

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United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John 

R. Fisher, Thomas C. Black, and Robert A. Spelke, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and RANDOLPH, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

WALD, Circuit Judge: Appellant William D. Hill was arrested by police after he fled from his car carrying a gun 

following a traffic stop for allegedly failing to display a 

Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") on the temporary tags 

of his recently purchased car. In the district court, Hill filed 

a motion to suppress the handgun discovered by police in the 

yard where he threw it after fleeing the car, arguing that it 

was the fruit of an illegal search. The district court denied 

the motion, and Hill entered a conditional plea of guilty to one 

count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(1)(1994). The district court 

imposed a sentence of 96 months in prison followed by a 

three-year term of supervised release. Hill now seeks review 

of the district court's denial of suppression of the handgun 

and challenges the sentence imposed by the court. We hold 

that the district court failed to apply the correct legal standard in determining that the traffic stop was legal and 

therefore denied Hill's motion to suppress on an improper 

ground. Additionally, we hold that the district court impermissibly relied solely on the indictment in concluding that 

Hill's prior conviction for attempted robbery constituted a 

"crime of violence" and thus improperly set Hill's base sentencing offense level at 24. Accordingly, we reverse the 

conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

On the evening of November 7, 1995, Hill was traveling 

southbound on 11th Street near Irving Street in Northwest 

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Washington, D.C. in a car that he had recently purchased. 

The car was driven by a friend of Hill's; Hill was in the front 

passenger seat and two additional passengers were in the 

back. At approximately 9:20 p.m., two officers in a patrolling 

police car observed the car, which one of the officers later 

testified did not have a VIN on its temporary D.C. tags. The 

police activated their emergency lights to stop the car, but 

the car continued for one and a half blocks before stopping.

At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified 

that after the car stopped, Hill jumped out of the passenger 

side of the car, took a few steps, and then slipped on the wet 

ground. The officer saw a silver handgun fall from Hill's 

waist area and land in front of him. According to the officer, 

Hill picked up the gun and ran down the street into an alley. 

After a brief chase during which the police observed Hill 

throw the gun over a high fence, the police seized Hill. They 

later found the gun in a yard near the alley in which they 

apprehended Hill. During the police officers' chase of Hill, the 

car drove off with the remaining passengers. As a result, the 

police did not have an opportunity to verify the temporary tag 

number or the absence of a VIN on the tags. See Transcript 

of Motions Hearing and Plea Agreement at 12-24, 31-32 

(Mar. 25, 1996) ("Tr.").

Harry Proctor, a records historian for the D.C. Department 

of Motor Vehicles, testified at Hill's trial that Department 

records indicated that a set of temporary tags were issued to 

the auto dealer that sold the car to Hill, and then to Hill when 

he purchased the car.1 Tr. at 40-42. Hill testified that the 

__________

1 Apparently, Hill did not provide the car dealership with the 

identification ordinarily required of a new owner. According to 

Proctor, the dealer is supposed to get identification from the new 

owner and include that person's driver's license number on the 

temporary registration. Instead, the registration for the temporary 

tag submitted by the car dealership that sold the Chevy to Hill 

included the driver's license number of Darrin Gilliam, a friend of 

Hill's who accompanied him to the dealership. In addition, the 

application for title, which must contain the social security number 

of the owner, contained a number that "came up no record" of a 

driver's license. (In the District of Columbia, a person's driver's 

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temporary tags issued in his name contained a VIN when 

they were issued and that the VIN was on the tags on the 

night of the arrest. Tr. at 72, 82-83. The tags contained a 

VIN at the time they were entered into evidence by Hill's 

counsel. See Appendix for Appellant at 15-16 (Defendant's 

Exhibit 2) ("App.").

Hill filed a motion to suppress the handgun on the grounds 

that it was the fruit of an unlawful traffic stop. The district 

court denied the motion after a hearing. Hill then entered a 

conditional guilty plea to Count One of the grand jury's 

indictmentCwhich charged Hill with possession of a firearm 

after having been convicted of a felony in violation of 18 

U.S.C. ' 922(g)(1)Cwhile reserving the right to appeal the 

court's adverse suppression ruling. The court thereafter 

ordered that a presentencing report be prepared.

The presentencing report recommended an offense level of 

24 based on the fact that Hill had two prior felony convictions 

that qualified as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. ' 2k2.1 

(1997). At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued 

for an offense level of 20, noting that one of the convictionsC

for attempted robbery under D.C. lawCshould not count as a 

"crime of violence" because it was remote in time and did not 

have as an element the use of physical force. The court 

found that Hill's conviction for attempted robbery qualified as 

a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. ' 2k2.1 and determined 

on that basis that Hill's offense level was 24. Accordingly, 

the court sentenced Hill to 96 months in prison, followed by a 

three-year term of supervised release.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Motion to Suppress

Hill filed a motion to suppress the handgun discovered by 

police after the stop of Hill's car arguing that its seizure was 

__________

license number is generally identical to his or her social security 

number.) Moreover, although the D.C. government usually makes 

a copy of identification for its files, there was no copy of any 

identification belonging to Hill with the registration documents. 

See Tr. at 50-64.

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the fruit of an unlawful stop. The district court denied the 

motion to suppress on the ground that the police officer that 

stopped Hill's car believed that he had violated the traffic 

laws. Hill challenges the district court's decision, claiming 

that the district court applied a subjective, rather than objective, reasonableness test to the actions of the officers in this 

case. We agree that the district court failed to make any 

findings regarding the objective reasonableness of the officer's decision to stop Hill's car, and we therefore reverse the 

district court's denial of the motion to suppress the handgun 

and remand for consideration of whether it was objectively 

reasonable for the officers that observed Hill's car to conclude 

that a traffic violation had occurred.2

The Supreme Court has held that "[a]n automobile stop is 

... subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be 

'unreasonable' under the circumstances." Whren v. United 

States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). It is well-settled that in 

evaluating the reasonableness of a particular traffic stop, "it 

is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective 

standard: would the facts available to the officer at the 

moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was 

appropriate?" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). In 

other words, reasonable suspicion to stop and search a motorist depends on "the events which occurred leading up to the 

stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical 

facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable 

police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion." Ornelas v. 

United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661-62 (1996). The constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop therefore does not 

depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers 

involved. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774. Instead, the 

relevant determination is whether the "circumstances, viewed 

__________

2

In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, "[w]e review the 

trial court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard and 

its legal conclusions de novo." See United States v. Garrett, 959 

F.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

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objectively, justify" the action taken. Scott v. United States,

436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); see Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.

Here, the district court denied Hill's motion to suppress the 

gun because it found that the police officer that stopped the 

car believed that the temporary tags on the car did not 

contain a VIN. At the district court hearing, Hill submitted 

the temporary tags and bill of sale for his car, both of which 

contained a VIN. In addition, Hill testified that he had seen 

the dealer write the VIN on the temporary tags, that he had 

seen the dealer put the tags on his car, that the tags had not 

been tampered with, and that the tags were on his car the 

night of the stop. See Tr. at 69, 72, 82-83, 86. There was, 

however, testimony by a police officer indicating that he 

thought that the tags might have been altered. See Tr. at 25. 

Faced with this conflicting evidence, the court concluded that 

it was impossible to determine whether Hill's temporary tags 

actually had a VIN on them at the time Hill's car was 

stopped. The court therefore decided to base its suppression 

decision on the testimony of the parties involved in the stop, 

choosing to credit the officer's testimony that "he believed 

that the car did not have a VIN number," see Tr. at 136, over 

the testimony of Hill. The court explained:

... The evidence that I have heard indicates that a 

police officer believed that a vehicle was using the streets 

of the District of Columbia and that vehicle had temporary tags on it and that the officer did not see a VIN 

number.

I can't say whether the tags had a VIN number on 

them or not. But I know I can accept as true the 

officer's testimony that he believed that the car did not 

have a VIN number.

Id.

We agree with Hill that the district court failed to apply 

the correct test to the officer's decision to stop Hill's car. 

The above-quoted portion of the transcript indicates that the 

district court applied a subjective reasonableness test to the 

officer's decision to stop Hill's car, rather than the objective 

reasonableness test that is required in such situations. The 

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court noted that it accepted the officer's testimony that "he 

believed that the car did not have a VIN number," but the 

court never explicitly stated whether or not this belief was 

objectively reasonable. Indeed, the record before us contains 

no information regarding the conditions under which the 

officer first observed Hill's carCe.g., how far away the police 

cruiser was from Hill's car at the time the officer first 

observed the tags, the quality of the lighting, how quickly 

Hill's car was moving, etc.Cand whether, given those conditions, it was objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude 

that the tags were missing a VIN.3 We therefore reverse the 

district court's denial of Hill's motion to suppress and remand 

to the district court for a determination of whether it was 

objectively reasonable for the officer that observed Hill's car 

to conclude that a traffic violation had occurred. See United 

States v. Williams, 951 F.2d 1287, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 

(noting that remand to the district court is appropriate where 

neither the legal reasoning nor factual findings supporting 

the denial of a motion to suppress are apparent because it is 

not clear "[o]ne, that the district court asked the right legal 

questions in making its ruling; two, that it actually weighed 

the evidence bearing on the facts needed to answer them"); 

see also United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 840 (D.C.Cir.) 

(per curiam), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1030 (1993) (noting that 

court had previously remanded to the district court for clarification of its legal conclusions and factual findings); United 

States v. Jordan, 951 F.2d 1278, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (remanding for clarification of factual finding), appeal after 

__________

3

It was not necessary for the court to determine whether or not a 

VIN actually appeared on Hill's temporary tags at the time of the 

traffic stop. Even if the court assumed that, contrary to the 

testimony of the police officer, the tags contained a VIN at the time 

of the stop, the stop was still permissible as long as the officer's 

belief that the VIN was missing was objectively reasonable. See 

Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971) (noting that "sufficient 

probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under 

the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Glover, 725 F.2d 120, 

122 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 905 (1984) (quoting Hill v. 

California, 401 U.S. 797).

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remand, 958 F.2d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. 

Garrett, 720 F.2d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 

U.S. 1037 (1984) (noting that " 'where the correctness of the 

lower court's decision depends upon a determination of fact 

which only a [fact-finder] could make but which has not been 

made, the appellate court cannot take the place of the [factfinder]' ") (citation omitted). The district court may hold a 

new hearing to make the appropriate factual findings and to 

determine whether the stop complied with the relevant legal 

and constitutional standards. See United States v. Hodge, 19 

F.3d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (remanding to district court for a 

new evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress).

If the district court concludes that under the circumstances 

it was objectively reasonable for the police to believe that the 

car did not have a VIN on its temporary tags, we agree with 

the government that the absence of the VIN did " 'warrant a 

man of reasonable caution in the belief' " that a traffic stop 

was justified. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. The District of Columbia traffic regulations require that a VIN be placed on all 

temporary tags. The D.C. Municipal Regulations state that 

"[s]pecial use identification tags shall contain ... [a] description setting forth the vehicle's trade name, model, year as 

given by the manufacturer, body type, and vehicle identification number." 18 D.C. Mun. Reg. ' 426.11 (1995). It is 

irrelevant that under the D.C. municipal regulations, the car 

dealer is required to "prepare a special use certificate by 

printing or typing all of the information required on the 

certificate," D.C. Mun. Reg. ' 506.7 (1995). Regardless of 

whom the regulations are directed to, the absence of a VIN 

on temporary tags can provide a sufficient reason to "suspect 

a violation of traffic laws" and therefore to stop the car for 

further investigation. United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 

1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub. nom. Zollicoffer 

v. United States, 504 U.S. 924 (1992). Indeed, we have 

repeatedly found that " '[e]ven a relatively minor offense that 

would not of itself lead to an arrest can provide a basis for a 

stop for questioning and inspection of the driver's permit and 

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registration.' " Id. (citations omitted).4

B. Sentencing

Hill claims that the base sentencing offense level recommended in the presentencing report and adopted by the 

district court below is incorrect. The base sentencing offense 

level, Hill contends, should be set at 20, rather than at 24, 

because his 1976 conviction for attempted robbery was incorrectly designated as a "crime of violence." In particular, Hill 

argues that the offense of attempted robbery in D.C. is broad 

and includes non-violent offenses and therefore cannot constitute a "crime of violence" for purposes of setting Hill's base 

offense level under the sentencing guidelines. In response, 

the government argues that the substance of the indictment 

to which Hill pled guilty (albeit to a lesser included offense) 

makes clear that the offense was properly classified as a 

crime of violence. Contrary to the government's claim, we 

find that when a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser included 

offense of the offense charged in the indictment and the 

statutory definition of the lesser offense allows conviction for 

conduct that does not meet the definition of a "crime of 

violence," the indictment alone does not provide a sufficient 

basis for designating an offense a "crime of violence." We 

therefore reverse the district court's decision to set Hill's 

base sentencing level at 24 and remand for reconsideration of 

whether Hill's 1976 conviction for attempted robbery was 

properly classified a "crime of violence." 5

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4 This conclusion is consistent with decisions of this and other 

courts holding that expired license tags, Pennsylvania v. Mimms,

434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (per curiam), absence of a license plate, 

United States v. Russell, 655 F.2d 1261, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 

vacated in part on other grounds, 670 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1982), 

cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982), an illegible expiration date on a 

tag, United States v. Hill, 458 F. Supp. 31, 32 (D.D.C. 1978), and 

the absence of a front tag, Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383, 388 

n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1993), justified the police officers' decisions to 

engage in a traffic stop.

5 The district court's determination that a prior conviction qualifies as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. ' 2K2.1 is a question of 

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The sentencing guidelines provide for a base offense level 

of 24 if the offender has two prior felony convictions of a 

"crime of violence." U.S.S.G. ' 2K2.1(a)(2). A "crime of 

violence" is defined in the sentencing guidelines as an offense, 

punishable by more than one year in prison, that:

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 

another, or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves 

the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct 

that presents a serious potential risk of physical 

injury to another.

U.S.S.G. ' 4B1.2(a). The commentary to the guidelines further explains that the term "crime of violence" includes "the 

offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to 

commit such offenses." U.S.S.G. ' 4B1.2 Commentary 1.

Hill bases his challenge to his base sentencing offense level 

on the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. United States,

495 U.S. 575 (1990), and this court's decision in United States 

v. Mathis, 963 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1992).6 As this court noted 

in Mathis, Taylor established that "when deciding whether a 

prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory definition, not to the 

underlying facts or evidence presented." Mathis, 963 F.2d at 

408 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). The courts " 'should not

examine the actual conduct underlying the offense' when 

determining whether to include it as a predicate offense 

under ' 924(e).' " Id. (citation omitted). The court may 

__________

law we review de novo. See United States v. Mathis, 963 F.2d 399, 

404 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

6 Although Taylor and Mathis involved the interpretation of 18 

U.S.C. ' 924(e), rather than ' 4B1.2 of the sentencing guidelines, 

the cases are nonetheless controlling here because the language 

defining a "violent felony" under ' 924(e) is identical in all relevant 

respects to the language defining a "crime of violence" under 

' 4B1.2 of the sentencing guidelines. Indeed, ' 4B1.2 of the 

sentencing guidelines was explicitly derived from ' 924(e). See

U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 268.

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consider only the statutory definitions of the offenses of which 

the defendant has been convicted; the particular circumstances under which the predicate crime was committed are 

irrelevant in determining whether the conviction was for a 

felony that includes as an essential element the use, attempted use or threatened use or physical force. See Taylor, 495 

U.S. at 600-02. Alternatively, the sentencing court can consider the charging documents and jury instructions. See id.

at 602. As the Taylor Court explained:

We therefore hold that an offense constitutes 'burglary' 

for purposes of a ' 924(e) sentence enhancement if either 

its statutory definition substantially corresponds to 'generic' burglary, or the charging paper and jury instructions actually required the jury to find all the elements of 

generic burglary in order to convict the defendant.

Id.

In Mathis, this court applied these principles to hold that 

"robbery" as defined in D.C. Code Ann. ' 22-2901, includes 

conduct that is not a "violent felony" as defined by section 

924(e). See 963 F.2d at 409. That is, because the offense of 

"robbery" includes a non-violent taking " 'by sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching,' " the offense cannot be classified as 

a "violent felony" under section 924 on the basis of its 

statutory definition alone. Id. at 408-09. As this court 

explained, " 'stealthy seizure' under section 22-2901 is not a 

'violent felony' within the meaning of ' 924(e), because the 

proof required to satisfy the element of force in the local 

statute falls below that which Congress intended in enacting 

' 924(e)." Id. at 409. This court remanded to the district 

court for a determination of whether the indictment and/or 

jury instructions required the jury to find use or threatened 

use of physical force in order to convict the defendant of the 

offense of "robbery."

The case at hand resembles Mathis in some aspects. Hill 

pled guilty to an unindicted offense, "Count K," which 

charged simply "attempted robbery." This offense is a lesser 

included offense of Count Two of the indictment, which 

charged "robbery by force and violence and against resistance 

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and by putting in fear." App. at 33-36. The statute to which 

Hill pled guilty defines attempted robbery as: "Whoever 

attempts to commit robbery, as defined in ' 22-2901, by an 

overt act, shall be imprisoned for not more than 3 years or be 

fined no more than $500, or both." D.C. Code. ' 22-2902. 

The statute includes attempts to commit robbery "by sudden 

or stealthy seizure or snatching." D.C. Code ' 22-2901. 

Thus, as in Mathis, the defendant was convicted of an offense 

that includes non-violent crimes. Consequently, the statutory 

definition of the offense for which Hill was convicted does not 

meet the definition of a "crime of violence."

This case differs from Mathis, however, in two important 

ways. First, Hill pled guilty to the offense of attempted 

robbery, therefore there were no jury instructions to which 

the sentencing court could refer to determine whether Hill's 

conviction met the definition of a "crime of violence." Second, Hill pled guilty to a lesser included offense of the 

indicted offense, rather than to the indicted offense itself. 

Consequently, although the indictment of Hill does suggest 

that the attempted robbery of which Hill pled was not 

committed "by sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching," 7it is 

inappropriate for the sentencing court to rely upon this 

indictment alone as the basis for a determination that the 

offense constituted a crime of violence. The rationale for this 

principle is clear: The crime charged is not the crime of 

which the defendant was convicted.8It is therefore impossi-

__________

7 Count Two of the indictment reads: "On or about February 28, 

1975, within the District of Columbia, William D. Hill, Jr., and 

Herman B. Brisbon, by force and violence and against resistance 

and by putting in fear, stole and took from the person and from the 

immediate actual possession of Ricky Chaviz, property of value 

belonging to Ricky Chavis, consisting of money." App. at 36.

8

See United States v. Bennett, 108 F.3d 1315, 1317 (10th Cir. 

1997) ("The fact that [the defendant] was charged with a crime of 

violence ... is not dispositive for sentencing purposes.... '[T]he 

conduct of which the defendant was convicted [not charged] is the 

focus of the inquiry.' "); United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 940 

(11th Cir. 1995) (holding that "a district court may not rely on a 

charging document without first establishing that the crime charged 

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ble for the court to know, without more, what aspects of the 

indicted offense can be appropriately read into the lesser 

included offense to which the defendant pled guilty. Moreover, as the Taylor Court itself noted, "if a guilty plea to a 

lesser ... offense was the result of a plea bargain, it would 

seem unfair to impose a sentence enhancement as if the 

defendant had pleaded guilty [to the charged conduct]." Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601-02.

This does not mean, of course, that a defendant can escape 

application of U.S.S.G. ' 2K2.1(a)(2) by simply pleading 

guilty to a lesser included offense of a charged offense. 

Several circuits have considered what to do in the situation 

where a defendant pleads guilty to an offense, and there is no 

jury instruction to examine. They have concluded that the 

government may use some means other than a jury instruction to establish that a prior conviction resulted from a 

burglary involving force for purposes of base offense level 

enhancement under section 924(e). Eight circuits have held 

that where no jury instruction is available, the court may 

examine various court documents to determine whether a 

prior conviction resulted from a crime of violence.9 Such an 

__________

was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted"); cf. 

United States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1124 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding 

that when a defendant pled nolo contendere to a lesser included 

offense of an indicted offense, the district court could examine "only 

those charges in the indictment that are essential to the offense to 

which defendant entered his plea" and the defendant's plea agreement) (citation omitted).

9

See United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d 1234, 1236 (1st Cir. 1992) 

(noting that where defendant has pled guilty, sentencing court can 

look to the indictment, guilty plea, or presentence report to determine whether a prior offense constitutes a predicate offense); 

United States v. Damon, 127 F.3d 139, 147-48 (1st Cir. 1997) 

(noting that if the statute of conviction, charging instrument, and 

jury instructions do not indicate whether the offense is a crime of 

violence, the sentencing court may look to other "accurate, judicially 

noticeable sources"); United States v. Garza, 921 F.2d 59, 61 (5th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 825 (1991) (noting that the "absence of 

jury instructions in a guilty plea setting does not negate the

Note 9CContinued

application of the second half of Taylor 's generic burglary rubric"); 

United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir. 1994) (en 

banc) ("When the defendant's conviction is by way of guilty plea, it 

is appropriate under Taylor to look to the indictment and guilty 

plea."); United States v. Maness, 23 F.3d 1006, 1009-10 (6th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 906 (1994) (reviewing transcript of guilty 

pleas and indictments to determine whether defendant actually 

committed generic burglary when he pled guilty to charges that 

contained all of the elements of a generic burglary); United States 

v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 372 n.4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 

323 (1995) ("If necessary to resolve an ambiguity in the charging 

document, the courts may also, in some circumstances, examine the 

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presentence report, plea agreement, or factual findings of the 

sentencing court."); United States v. White, 997 F.2d 1213, 1217-18 

(7th Cir. 1993) (examining charging paper and preliminary hearing 

transcript in effort to determine whether the district court properly 

counted a burglary conviction for sentence enhancement purposes); 

United States v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 645 n.7 (7th Cir. 1990), 

cert. denied, 499 U.S. 908 (1991) (noting that when faced with an 

ambiguous statute, "a court should refer to the 'indictment or 

information and jury instructions,' or, in the case of a guilty plea, to 

the plea agreement or transcript, in order to determine if the 

conviction was for 'generic' ... burglary"); United States v. Taylor,

932 F.2d 703, 708 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 888 (1991) (noting 

that the absence of jury instructions in guilty plea proceedings does 

not negate the application of the second half of Taylor's generic 

burglary rubric); United States v. Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1476 (9th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 192 (1997) (holding that because "there 

are no jury instructions to consider when a defendant has pled 

guilty, courts must be able to consider documents other than the 

charging paper and the jury instructions," including the indictment, 

judgment of conviction, a signed guilty plea, plea transcript and 

other " 'documentation or judicially noticeable facts that clearly 

establish that the conviction is a predicate conviction for enhancement purposes' ") (citation omitted); United States v. Wood, 52 

F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 217 (1995) 

(holding that "sentencing courts may consider the statutory definition of the crime, any conduct charged in the indictment or information, the defendant's guilty plea or plea agreement, and any jury 

instructions"); United States v. Hill, 53 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir.) 

(en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 258 (1995) (holding 

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approach, these courts have noted, is consistent with the 

principles established in Taylor and with the guidelines and 

commentary thereto. We agree. We therefore hold that in 

__________

Note 9CContinued

that court may consider the text of a guilty plea and/or other 

documents that, coupled with the charging instrument, enable the 

court to determine that defendant's prior conviction constitutes a 

violent felony); United States v. Gacnik, 50 F.3d 848, 856 (10th Cir. 

1995) (holding that the court can examine the "charging papers, 

judgment of conviction, plea agreement or other statement by the 

defendant for the record, presentence report adopted by the court, 

and findings by the sentencing judge" to determine whether a prior 

offense was a crime of violence); United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 

724, 733-34 (10th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding that "a court can 

look beyond the statutory count of conviction in order to resolve a 

patent ambiguity caused by a broad state statute," however, the 

examination is limited to "the charging papers, judgment of conviction, plea agreement or other statement by the defendant for the 

record, presentence report adopted by the court, and findings by 

the sentencing judge") (citation omitted); United States v. Strahl,

958 F.2d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 1992) (" '[W]here enhancement is 

sought on the basis of a conviction obtained through a guilty plea, 

the sentencing court may look to the underlying indictment or 

information and the text of the guilty plea to determine whether the 

defendant was charged with and admitted conduct which falls 

without question within the ambit of Taylor's generic definition.' ") 

(citation omitted); United States v. Adams, 91 F.3d 114, 116 (11th 

Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 623 (1996) ("[U]nder 

Taylor the government may use some means, other than a jury 

instruction, to establish that the prior conviction resulted from a 

generic burglary."); cf. United States v. Barney, 955 F.2d 635, 639-

40 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that "where enhancement is sought on 

the basis of a conviction obtained through a guilty plea, the sentencing court may look to the underlying indictment or information and 

the text of the guilty plea to determine whether the defendant was 

charged with and admitted conduct wich falls without question 

within the ambit of Taylor's generic definition," but "[t]o the extent 

that the district court considered convictions of Mr. Barney not 

noticed and only mentioned in the presentence report, it erred").

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determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a predicate offense for purposes of U.S.S.G. ' 2K2.1(a)(2) when the 

statutory description of the offense includes non-violent as 

well as violent crimes and when the defendant has pled guilty 

to a lesser included offense of a charge in the indictment, the 

sentencing court may not rely solely on the indictment to 

determine whether the offense of which the defendant was 

convicted was a crime of violence. Instead, the court must 

consult other available indices to verify that the defendant 

was indeed convicted of a crime of violence.10 These other 

indices may include the judgment of conviction, plea agreement or other statement by the defendant on the record, 

presentencing report adopted by the court, and the findings 

of the sentencing judge. Accordingly, we remand for a new 

sentencing hearing to determine whether Hill's 1976 conviction for attempted robbery was properly classified a "crime of 

violence." 11

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's 

denial of Hill's motion to suppress and the district court's 

decision to set Hill's base sentencing offense level at 24, and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered. 

__________

10 Because "[t]he burden is on the government to prove facts in 

support of a sentence enhancement by a preponderance of the 

evidence," United States v. Washington, 115 F.3d 1008, 1010 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997), it is the responsibility of the government to produce such 

documents as are necessary to establish that a prior offense can be 

properly designated a "crime of violence."

11 We recently held that "upon a resentencing occasioned by a 

remand, unless the court of appeals expressly directs otherwise, the 

district court may consider only such new arguments or new facts 

as are made newly relevant by the court of appeals' decisionC

whether by the reasoning or by the result." United States v. 

Whren, 111 F.3d 956, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we note 

that on remand, the district court may consider any of the documents discussed above in determining whether the defendant's 

conviction for attempted robbery can be appropriately designated a 

"crime of violence."

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RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, concurring: I agree that the 

sentencing judge must look beyond the indictment to decide 

whether Hill's prior conviction was for a crime of violence. 

But I wonder whether there is any longer a good purpose for 

treating this factual inquiry differently than the other factual 

inquiries routinely required by the Sentencing Guidelines.

The Supreme Court adopted a categorical approach to 

deciding whether a prior conviction was a "violent felony" 

within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. ' 924(e), permitting the 

sentencing court to look at the "charging paper and jury 

instructions" only in a "narrow range of cases." Taylor, 495 

U.S. at 602. After Taylor, we held in Mathis that "when 

deciding whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate 

offense, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory 

definition, not to the underlying facts or evidence presented." 

963 F.2d at 408. This approach breaks down when the 

defendant's earlier conviction resulted from a plea agreement. 

And so we now join other circuits in concluding that an 

examination may be made of certain readily available court 

documents, including presentencing reports and plea transcripts. My question is why the sentencing court ought to be 

under any restrictions. Why, in other words, should the 

inquiry for the purposes of U.S.S.G. ' 2K2.1(a)(2) be any 

more restricted than for other instances of sentencing enhancement?

The Guidelines have pretty much rendered obsolete the 

concern, relied upon in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601, that sentencing hearings should not become mini-trials. Under the bifurcated fact-finding scheme of the Guidelines, certain factual 

issues allocated to the sentencing phrase can play a dispositive role in determining a defendant's sentence. A court 

must, for instance, consider all related acts proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence at sentencing, even if the 

defendant was not convicted of them. See U.S.S.G. ' 1B1.3. 

A defendant's base offense level is increased according to 

"specific offense characteristics"Csuch as the discharge of a 

firearm, more than minimal planning, or quantity of drugs 

involved. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. ' 2A2.2(b)(2)(A). Further adjustments in sentencing depend on the status of the victim, 

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the defendant's role in the offense, and whether the defendant willfully obstructed justice. See U.S.S.G. '' 3A1.1-

3C1.2. Evidence about such matters may be presented to the 

court through statements of counsel, affidavits of witnesses, 

or evidentiary hearings. See ' 6A1.3, comment. Furthermore, sentencing judges are not restricted to information that 

would be admissible at trial. See ' 6A1.3(a). They may 

consider any information, provided it has "sufficient indicia of 

reliability to support its probable accuracy." Id.

The time has come to rethink the subject and to consider 

whether the same sort of evidentiary presentation permitted 

for other sentencing issues ought to be allowed to prove or 

disprove the violent nature of a defendant's previous offense. 

Having said this, I recognize that the rethinking might have 

to be done by the Sentencing Commission or by Congress. 

See maj. op. at 10 & n.6.

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