Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03102/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03102-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Lamont Gartmon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 9, 1997 Decided July 14, 1998

No. 96-3102

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Richard Lamont Gartmon,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cr00271-01)

Paul L. Knight, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

James E. Boasberg, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S.

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John R. Fisher, Roy

W. McLeese, III, Katherine Winfree, and Douglas F. Gansler, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Henderson and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Appellant Richard Gartmon was

convicted of interstate transportation of securities obtained

by fraud and of money laundering in connection with a

scheme to defraud the George Washington University Health

Plan. Gartmon challenges his convictions on the grounds

that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his

physical and verbal intimidation of a confederate; (2) the

prosecution made improper statements during closing arguments; (3) the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial

after federal agents spoke with an excused alternate juror

who subsequently was re-empaneled; and (4) the evidence

was insufficient to establish venue in the District of Columbia

on most of the money laundering counts. He also contends,

and the government agrees, that the sentence he received on

the money laundering counts exceeds the maximum permitted

by statute. We affirm Gartmon's convictions against all of his

challenges and remand the case for correction of the sentence.

I

On December 11, 1995, a grand jury in the District of

Columbia indicted Gartmon, Donna Rouse, and Pamela Glascoe on charges of interstate transportation of securities taken

by fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 2314, and of money

laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1956(a)(1).1 Gartmon

and Rouse proceeded to trial, while Glascoe pled guilty and

testified for the United States.

According to the government's evidence, Pamela Glascoe

first met Richard Gartmon in November 1994. At the time,

Glascoe worked as a secretary in the marketing and sales

department of the George Washington University Health

__________

1 Gartmon, alone, was also charged with subornation of perjury,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1622. The jury acquitted Gartmon on

that charge.

Plan (GWUHP or George Washington), a health maintenance

organization located in Bethesda, Maryland. Among other

activities, Glascoe's department sponsored various healthrelated special events.

Gartmon and Glascoe soon began dating. The morning

after their first date, Gartmon asked Glascoe for money to

invest, and shortly before Christmas she gave him $850.

When she asked him to return some of the money in order to

buy her daughter Christmas presents, he told her she was not

a "woman of execution" and asked her whether there was a

way she could get more money for him. Glascoe then told

Gartmon about the special events GWUHP sponsored, and

Gartmon proposed the idea of a "hair show"--a competition

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between hair salons. When Glascoe was unable to secure

GWUHP's sponsorship of such an event, Gartmon again

criticized her failure of "execution." On her own, Glascoe

then submitted a forged request to GWUHP for a $12,500

check, payable to Gartmon, for a fictitious "run-a-thon."

George Washington's finance department cut the check and

Glascoe delivered it to Gartmon.

Although Glascoe told Gartmon she did not want to submit

any more fraudulent check requests to GWUHP, in early

January he again told her he needed money to invest. Gartmon provided the names of suggested payees including codefendant Rouse--all former or current girlfriends of his,

with the exception of one payee who was a cousin--and

Glascoe forged the authorizing signatures on the check requests. After the initial "run-a-thon" check, Glascoe submitted eight more check requests from January to March 1995,

in amounts ranging from $3,600 to $8,600. After receiving

the checks, she delivered them to Gartmon, who in turned

delivered them to the payees. The payees cashed the

checks--one at a bank in the District of Columbia, the rest at

banks in the suburbs--and gave the money to Gartmon.

Gartmon and Glascoe also developed a second scheme to

defraud George Washington. Gartmon procured blank invoices from a printing company called Underground Printing,

and Glascoe filled out and submitted the invoices requesting

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payment from George Washington for the performance of

fictitious printing services. Pursuing this scheme from January to March, 1995, Glascoe obtained eight additional

GWUHP checks, in amounts ranging from $16,825.80 to

$84,603.40. At Gartmon's instruction, Glascoe made Rouse

the payee on all of the checks. Glascoe delivered the checks

to Gartmon, and all were deposited in a bank account in

Rouse's name. One of the checks was deposited in the

District of Columbia; the rest were deposited in the suburbs.

All of the GWUHP checks involved in both schemes were

drawn on an account GWUHP maintained with Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C., which processed all checks

cashed outside of the District of Columbia at its operations

center in the District.

In late February 1995, in the midst of these schemes,

Glascoe called Gartmon from work and told him she did not

want to continue defrauding her employer. Gartmon asked

her to leave work and come to his house because he was sick

and needed medicine. According to her testimony, when she

arrived and entered his bedroom, Gartmon "told me to take

off my clothes and lay down in the bed with my head at the

foot of the bed.... [H]e . . . told me to open up my legs and

he put a gun up my vagina.... He told me that I will listen

to everything he says and do as he says." Trial Tr. 353-54

(Mar. 14, 1996). Thereafter, Glascoe continued to submit

fraudulent check requests to GWUHP.

Gartmon used the money obtained from George Washington to purchase a hair salon, three sports cars, and a Jacuzzi

and gazebo for his house--putting title in the names of other

people or using checks drawn on the Rouse account. He also

used two Rouse checks to loan $30,000 to an acquaintance,

Sandra Yates, in exchange for cash repayment (with $4,500 in

interest) within two months. Some time later, Yates met

with Gartmon in a parking lot to discuss another loan. He

told her to get in his car, and then drove away so quickly as

to frighten her. When they reached Gartmon's home, he

asked her to lift her skirt so he could determine whether she

was wearing a "wire" for recording the conversation. He

then warned her that if she were setting him up, he would kill

her.

In March 1995, George Washington fired Glascoe after

discovering that she was forging check requests. After

speaking with the FBI, Glascoe agreed to tape-record telephone conversations with Gartmon. In the taped conversations, Gartmon implicated himself and used profane and

abusive language. Eight of the conversations were admitted

into evidence and played to the jury.

Gartmon did not testify in his own behalf. Instead, he

called two employees from the hair salon he purchased, who

testified that in the spring of 1995 they recalled meeting with

a woman from GWUHP regarding health insurance. Gartmon also called a comedian who testified that he performed at

a hair show in Maryland in late 1994 or early 1995, and that

he heard the show was sponsored by GWUHP. Finally,

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Gartmon called his mother and sister to testify that they had

seen Glascoe in the presence of three of Gartmon's children.

The latter testimony was offered to impeach Glascoe who had

testified that she thought Gartmon had only one child. In

closing argument, defense counsel contended that Gartmon

did not know Glascoe had obtained the GWUHP checks by

fraud, and that Glascoe perpetrated the fraud on her own in

order to benefit from the money Gartmon received.

II

Gartmon challenges the trial court's admission of Glascoe's

testimony regarding the gun incident in his bedroom, and its

admission of the telephone conversations tape-recorded by

Glascoe. Admission of this evidence, he contends, violated

Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice...." The standard of review applicable to these determinations by the district court is abuse of discretion. See Old

Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 647 n.1, 651 n.7 (1997).

It is a standard we apply "most deferentially." United States

v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1998), petition for

cert. filed, No. 97-9019 (May 7, 1998). We find no such abuse

here.

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A

With respect to the gun incident, Gartmon contends both

that the court never conducted any balancing of the incident's

probative value and prejudice, and that if it had, admission of

Glascoe's testimony would have come out on the short end of

such a balance.

Gartmon's first contention is wrong on the facts because

the district court plainly did conduct a balancing. Prior to

trial, Gartmon filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude this

evidence on the ground that it violated Rule 403, as well as on

the ground that it violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),

which bars evidence of other crimes offered to prove a

defendant's character "in order to show action in conformity

therewith." The district court conducted a hearing, which

explored both the Rule 404(b) question and the question of

the incident's probative value and potential prejudicial effect

under Rule 403. Citing our decision in United States v.

Allen, 960 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1992), the district court

ruled that the evidence did not fall within the coverage of

Rule 404(b) because it was not an "other crime," but instead

was "inextricably intertwined" with the conduct charged in

the indictment. See Mem. Order at 2, 6.2 With respect to

Rule 403, the court said it was "satisfied that in the 403

balancing analysis the probative value of this evidence outweighs the prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 6. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the incident "both

illuminates why Glascoe would continue to defraud her employer on behalf of Gartmon, as well as demonstrating the

manner in which Gartmon committed the crimes for which he

was indicted." Id. at 3; accord id. at 6 & n.5. This record is

more than sufficient to establish that the district court conducted the balancing contemplated by Rule 403.

We also find no abuse of discretion in the district court's

substantive determination that the balance came out in favor

of admission of the testimony. The probative value of the

__________

2 Gartmon does not press the Rule 404(b) claim here.

incident is plain. It constituted direct evidence of Gartmon's

knowing involvement in, and direction of, the scheme to

defraud George Washington. And by making clear the nature of the relationship between Gartmon and Glascoe, it

went a long way toward explaining why a woman who did not

benefit monetarily would have entered into and continued in

the scheme charged in the indictment. In so doing, the

testimony rebutted Gartmon's contention that Glascoe's motive was personal monetary gain independent of any influence

of his. Although Glascoe conceded that the incident "wasn't

the whole reason" she continued with the scheme, she said

that "it was a part of it." Trial Tr. 470 (Mar. 15, 1996). If

anything, her honest admission of mixed motives simply adds

to the credibility, and probativeness, of her testimony.

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But even if the evidence were probative, Gartmon claims, it

was simply too prejudicial to be admitted. As proof, Gartmon

cites the district court's own characterization of the gun

incident, at sentencing, as "outrageous[ ]." Sentencing Tr. 79

(Aug. 12, 1996). There is no question but that the conduct

portrayed by the testimony was outrageous, and that it may

dramatically have injured Gartmon's cause. But that is not

sufficient reason to exclude the testimony. See United States

v. Munoz, 36 F.3d 1229, 1233 (1st Cir. 1994). Rule 403 does

not provide a shield for defendants who engage in outrageous

acts, permitting only the crimes of Caspar Milquetoasts to be

described fully to a jury. It does not generally require the

government to sanitize its case, to deflate its witnesses'

testimony, or to tell its story in a monotone. Cf. Old Chief,

117 S. Ct. at 656 ("[T]he prosecutor's choice will generally

survive a Rule 403 analysis when a defendant seeks to force

the substitution of an admission for evidence creating a

coherent narrative of his thoughts and actions in perpetrating

the offense for which he is being tried."). It does not bar

powerful, or even "prejudicial" evidence. Instead, the Rule

focuses on the "danger of unfair prejudice," and gives the

court discretion to exclude evidence only if that danger

"substantially outweigh[s]" the evidence's probative value.

See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (emphases added).

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Quoting the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 403, the

Supreme Court has explained that the term "unfair prejudice" means " 'an undue tendency to suggest decision on an

improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.' " Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650. Gartmon contends

this incident had that effect here, inciting the jury to convict

him not because of the fraud, but because of his behavior

toward Glascoe.

We should note first that the testimony at issue was not

offered for an unfair purpose. It was not offered on an

ancillary issue or to inflame the jury. To the contrary, it was

offered as evidence of defendant's intent and controlling role

in the fraud, and in direct rebuttal to his claim that he had

neither. If the jury believed the testimony, a conviction

would be fully justified.

Of course, the fact that the testimony was not offered for

an unfair purpose does not mean a juror could not have used

it for one. But because the "natural use of the testimony

would be for its appropriate use, proving intent," United

States v. Moore, 732 F.2d 983, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1984), we are

loath to upset the determination of the trial court. Although

there may have been some risk that a recitation of the facts

of the incident would evoke emotions in the courtroom, that

risk was comparatively small, and it alone did not render the

testimony "unfair" or "substantially outweigh[ ]" its probative

value. As we said in Moore, "the balance [under Rule 403]

should generally be struck in favor of admission when the

evidence indicates a close relationship to the event charged."

Id. at 989.

Defendant's trial counsel conceded as much. At a time

when he did not know whether the incident occurred before

or after all the fraudulent check requests had been submitted

to George Washington, counsel agreed that if the incident had

occurred before, "[i]t would be a much more difficult argument to make that the prejudicial impact substantially outweighed the probative value...." Trial Tr. 36 (Mar. 12,

1996). Although counsel did say that he "would nevertheless

make that argument," id., his honest appraisal of the difficulty of his position was correct.

B

As with the gun incident, Gartmon moved in limine to

exclude the recordings of his telephone conversations with

Glascoe. The court ruled that they were admissible as admissions of a party opponent pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) and rejected Gartmon's contention that

they were barred by Rule 403 because of their tone and

profanity. The prosecution played portions of eight of the

telephone calls to the jury. In the calls, Gartmon used

profane and abusive language towards Glascoe. Gartmon

once again contends that the trial judge never conducted a

Rule 403 balancing and that an appropriate balancing must

come out in his favor.

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It is true that, in contrast with its treatment of the gun

testimony, the district court did not issue an opinion explicitly

balancing the prejudice and probative value of the recordings

or explicitly announcing that the balance favored admission of

the evidence. The hearing transcript makes plain, however,

that the court well-understood the need to balance prejudice

and probativeness, and that its ultimate conclusion that the

material was admissible was based on the result of such a

balancing. See Hr'g Tr. 163-64 (Mar. 7, 1996). We do not

require a district court to recite the formula of Rule 403 in

haec verba in order to be sustained. See United States v.

Bradshaw, 935 F.2d 295, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Indeed, " '[a]s

long as it appears from the record as a whole that the trial

judge adequately weighed the probative value and prejudicial

effect ..., we conclude that the demands of Rule 403 have

been met.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d

1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1978)). It is apparent that the trial judge

did so here.

It also is apparent that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the tape recordings. The tapes were probative because they revealed Gartmon's consciousness of guilt.

For example, Glascoe told Gartmon that she had retained a

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cussed what Glascoe should tell the lawyer about the checks

paid to co-defendant Rouse, purportedly for the work of

Underground Printing:

Glascoe: Suppose he asks me, "Where did the checks

come from?"

...

Gartmon: I mean, that's what you gotta be creative at.

I mean, you gotta know what you did. I

mean, just tell him you sent them out. Tell

him.... Just, just, let's simply tell him that

they were a black minority company that you

were giving a break to, that you were trying

to help out.

...

Gartmon: And they're gonna ask why weren't they

made out to the company and you just simply

tell them that it wasn't made out to the

company for the reason that um, that his

company a year before last had a problem

with the Internal Revenue Service and that

was their way of doing it. And that's the

way he decided they're doin' it.

...

Glascoe: What about the receipts? ... You know, the

receipts that I got, from Underground. I

want them, I don't want it to say that you

gave me.... You want me to say you gave

them to me?

Gartmon: No, I, you don't put my name in it at all.

Appellant's App. at 79-81.

On the other side of the balance, the tapes did not disclose

any unrelated crimes or conduct that might have unfairly

prejudiced the jury against Gartmon. And whatever minor

prejudice may have been risked by the fact that he "raise[d]

his voice to Ms. Glascoe and use[d] profanity," Gartmon Br. at

27, it was appropriately mitigated by a limiting instruction the

court gave to the jury. Although the instruction did not track

the original language proposed by Gartmon's counsel, the

court crafted the final instruction with the aid of both the

defense and prosecution, and Gartmon's counsel did not object to its final formulation. See, e.g., United States v. Small,

74 F.3d 1276, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

III

Gartmon contends that in their closing arguments, the

prosecutors improperly called him a liar and an abuser of

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sized the gun incident and the tape recordings. He also

contends that the prosecutors mischaracterized the evidence

regarding both the threat he made to Sandra Yates and the

gun incident, and that they then compounded their misconduct by misstating Glascoe's testimony about the latter.

Because Gartmon failed to raise these objections below, we

review his challenge for plain error under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 52(b). See United States v. Young, 470

U.S. 1, 6 (1985); Small, 74 F.3d at 1281. The Supreme Court

has explained that under this standard, "there must be (1)

'error,' (2) that is 'plain,' and (3) that 'affect[s] substantial

rights.' " Johnson v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549

(1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732

(1993)). The third element "in most cases ... means that the

error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the

outcome of the district court proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S.

at 734. Moreover, "[i]t is the defendant rather than the

Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect

to prejudice." Id. Finally, "[i]f all three conditions are met,

an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a

forfeited error, but only if (4) the error 'seriously affect[s] the

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ings.' " Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S.

at 732) (other citations omitted). It is not likely an error can

have that effect where the evidence against the defendant is

"overwhelming," the Court has said, because reversal in such

an instance would itself seriously affect the fairness, integrity

and public reputation of judicial proceedings. See id. at 1550.

Applying this test, we readily dismiss most of Gartmon's

challenges to the government's summations.

A

First, it was not error for the prosecution to call Gartmon a

liar, or to describe various of his statements and actions as

"lies." We do not, of course, condone the use of insults or

slurs in lawyers' arguments. But here the words were not

used as free-floating allegations about Gartmon's character or

as expressions of the prosecutor's opinion. Rather, they were

tied to specific conduct at issue in the trial--ranging from the

falsehoods Gartmon told Glascoe in order to control her, to

the false claims for compensation they submitted to George

Washington. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 1168 (Mar. 25, 1996) ("That

letter [to GWUHP] was a complete and utter lie because

Richard Gartmon had no intention of using that money for

the ... hair show ...."); see also id. at 1165-69, 1183, 1187.

When a "lie" is an accurate description of the conduct at

issue, we will not reverse a conviction because the prosecutor

did not use a more delicate term. See United States v.

Donato, 99 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding conviction where prosecutor called defendant charged with fraud a

liar); United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 665-66 (D.C. Cir.

1995) (same, where defendant charged with perjury).

Nor was it error for the prosecution to say that Gartmon

abused women and to refer to the gun incident and phone

calls as examples of that abuse. Again, the rhetoric was not

used as a generalized attack on Gartmon's character, but as a

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description of the manner in which he conducted the scheme

charged in the indictment--that is, by abusing his relationship with Glascoe and the other women who served as fictitious payees. "[T]he way he got the money," the prosecutor

said, "was by using and abusing the people closest to him--

girlfriends, cousins, friends, associates." Trial Tr. 1045 (Mar.

25, 1996) (emphasis added). Moreover, the prosecutor tied

this allegation directly to the evidence the jury had just

heard: "We heard how he did it over the last two weeks," the

prosecutor said, and then detailed the specific ways in which

Gartmon used his girlfriends in the fraudulent scheme. The

prosecutor also reminded the jury of the testimony that when

Gartmon was arrested, he admitted to the FBI that he made

his money "through his girlfriends." Trial Tr. 973-74 (Mar.

20, 1996). And because we have upheld the district court's

admission of the gun incident and the tape recordings, there

was no error in the prosecution's reference to this evidence

and suggestion that the jurors review it.3

Finally, to the extent Gartmon's argument on these points

rests on an allegation that the tone rather than the substance

of the prosecution's remarks inflamed the jury, we simply are

not in a position to make such an assessment and instead

must "grant great deference to the district court's judgment

as to '[w]hether the prosecutor has struck a foul blow instead

of just a hard one.' " United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511,

1524 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Dean, 55 F.3d at 665). However, the fact that the prosecution's argument did not draw a

__________

3 Gartmon also contends that one of the prosecutors stated her

opinion that Glascoe was a "bad person." In fact, the prosecutor's

remarks were made in rebuttal to defense counsel's contention that

Glascoe, not Gartmon, was the criminal actor in the scheme. The

prosecutor's response was to indicate that Glascoe's behavior was

no excuse for Gartmon's, and that the testimony showed both were

complicit in the fraud:

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contemporaneous objection from defense counsel, or a sua

sponte admonition from the trial court, is a substantial indication that the tone was not inappropriate.

B

Gartmon also contends that the prosecution mischaracterized the trial evidence by saying that Gartmon "kidnaped"

Sandra Yates when he drove her to his home, see Trial Tr.

1077 (Mar. 25, 1996), and by referring to the gun incident

involving Pamela Glascoe as a "rape," see id. at 1048. Although "kidnaping" may not have been a technically accurate

description of the wild car ride, in context it is clear that the

prosecutor used the word in a figurative sense and that there

was no ambiguity about the precise incident to which he was

referring. "Rape," on the other hand, may well have been a

technically accurate description of what Gartmon did to Glascoe. See D.C. Code Ann. ss 22-4102, 22-4103. What is more

important, however, is that the prosecutor's meaning and

reference were again clear. Given that clarity, the use of the

terms was not error, and in any event could not have constituted plain error as it could not have "affected the outcome"

of the proceeding. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.

Gartmon further contends that the prosecution misstated

Glascoe's testimony regarding the gun incident, specifically

regarding the threat he made to force her to continue submitting fraudulent check requests. The prosecution, he notes,

told the jury that Glascoe testified Gartmon said: "If you

__________

[W]hat [defense counsel] wants you to do is to rely on Pamela

Glascoe for the things that make her look really really bad, but

not to rely on Pamela Glascoe for the things that make Richard

Gartmon look really really bad, and there's a lot of both of

those things, because you know what? They're both bad.

Trial Tr. 1164 (Mar. 25, 1996).

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don't keep doing it, I'm going to pull the trigger." Her actual

testimony, by contrast, was: "He told me that I will listen to

everything he says and do as he says." Compare Trial Tr.

1048 (Mar. 25, 1996), with Trial Tr. 353-54 (Mar. 14, 1996).

Gartmon is correct that there was a misstatement. Moreover, because it constituted a " 'statement[ ] of fact to the jury

not supported by proper evidence introduced during trial,' "

the prosecutor's "remarks were error to the extent that they

overstated [Glascoe's] testimony." United States v. Perholtz,

842 F.2d 343, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Gaither v. United

States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1969)); accord Donato,

99 F.3d at 432. This is so "[w]hether or not those [remarks]

were slips of the tongue in the heat of oral argument."

United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1990).4

Although the prosecution's misstatement was error, we still

must determine whether it was plain error. See Young, 470

U.S. at 6, 14; United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 872 (D.C.

Cir. 1995). In making that determination, the critical question is whether the error prejudiced defendant in a way that

affected the outcome of the trial. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734;

see also Young, 470 U.S. at 12 ("[T]he Court must consider

the probable effect the prosecutor's [statement] would have

on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly."). This

court has used a relatively consistent set of criteria for

evaluating the potential prejudice of closing argument errors.

We have

generally looked to three factors in determining whether

improper remarks by the prosecutor sufficiently preju-

__________

4 The misstatement does in fact appear to have been a slip of

the tongue. Apparently Glascoe originally described the incident to

the government in the form recited by the prosecutor; that was the

form of the expected testimony the government recited in its Rule

404(b) notice, see Gov't App. at 41-42; and the trial judge described

it in the same way in his opinion on defendant's motion to exclude

the testimony, see Mem. Order at 3. The absence of any objection

by defense counsel suggests that both parties were confused as to

what Glascoe actually had said in court.

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diced a defendant: "the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps

taken to mitigate the effects of the error." We have also

framed the test for prejudice in terms of the severity of

the prosecutor's misconduct, the measures adopted to

cure the misconduct, and the certainty of conviction

absent the improper remarks.

North, 910 F.2d at 895 (citations omitted). We have applied

these factors--severity, centrality, mitigation, and closeness

of the case--regardless of whether the context was review for

harmless error because defense counsel objected at trial, or

for plain error because he did not.5 Compare, e.g., Gaither,

413 F.2d at 1079-80 (harmless error review), with Perholtz,

842 F.2d at 361 (plain error review).6 Applying these factors

here, we conclude that the prosecution's misstatement did not

prejudice Gartmon in the outcome of his trial.

First, although Gartmon complains about many parts of the

prosecution's argument, we have concluded above that only

the misquotation of Glascoe constituted error. That misquotation was made only once in a relatively lengthy argument.

As we have previously held, "[w]ithout other compelling factors, a single misstatement confined to a closing argument

rarely amounts to severe misconduct." North, 910 F.2d at

897; cf. Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 361.

Second, it is true that the issue affected by the error--

whether Gartmon controlled or participated in the submission

__________

5 An important difference, however, is that the burden is on the

government in the first instance and on the defendant in the second.

See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.

6 We also have referred, in shorthand, to the application of

these factors as a review for "substantial prejudice." See, e.g.,

Small, 74 F.3d at 1280.

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of the fraudulent requests by Glascoe--was central to the

case. However, the disparity between the actual and the

misstated testimony was not of central importance. The

misquotation may well have been more powerfully put than

Glascoe's actual words, although even that is not clear.7 But

if believed, either version would have been more than sufficient to establish Gartmon's intent and role in the offense.

Third, the judge gave the standard limiting instruction that

lawyers' arguments are not evidence and that the jury's

recollection of the evidence controls. We have repeatedly

said this kind of instruction can mitigate the impact of

erroneous jury argument. See, e.g., Gatling, 96 F.3d at 1524;

United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1995);

Boyd, 54 F.3d at 872; North, 910 F.2d at 897; Perholtz, 842

F.2d at 361.

Finally, this was not a close case. To the contrary, the

evidence of Gartmon's guilt was overwhelming. In addition

to Glascoe, six of the payees testified that they performed no

services to justify receipt of checks from GWUHP, that

Gartmon gave them the checks to cash, and that they returned almost all of the money to him. There was no

evidence that any of the special events for which GWUHP

gave the checks occurred, or that the printing company

performed any work for GWUHP beyond a single, $401.75

order of business cards. Gartmon presented virtually no

defense. His lawyer's argument that Gartmon did not know

of the fraud was incredible in light of the testimony of the

payees, which he neither contested nor explained except to

argue that Gartmon did not "treat all those people right."

Trial Tr. 1104 (Mar. 25, 1996). Viewed against this background, there is no possibility that the difference between

__________

7 Given the physical context in which the words were spoken,

the unstated implication that "pulling the trigger" would be the

consequence if Glascoe did not "do as he says" may have had an

even more powerful impact on the jury than if Gartmon had made

the threat expressly, as the prosecutor thought he had.

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Glascoe's actual and quoted testimony could have made a

difference in the trial's outcome.

IV

After the court read its final instructions to the jury, it

excused the six alternate jurors, including Juror No. 2. At

that point, counsel for Gartmon's co-defendant noted that one

of the unexcused jurors had displayed enormous displeasure

at being selected and asked the court to remove him. With

the agreement of all counsel, the court told the jury that it

had made a mistake in designating the alternates, excused the

disgruntled juror, and recalled Juror No. 2 who was still in

the hall outside. The jury retired to the jury room at 2:00

p.m. After learning that an FBI case agent and postal

inspector had spoken with Juror No. 2 while he was in the

hall, the prosecution advised the court, which at 2:20 p.m.

directed the jury to stop deliberating.

The court immediately conducted a hearing regarding the

possible prejudice flowing from this contact. The FBI agent,

corroborated separately by the postal inspector, testified that

when the group of excused alternates came out of the jury

room the agent thanked them and asked, "Is there anything

the government could have done to make the case better or

more understandable?" Trial Tr. 1282 (Mar. 26, 1996). Juror No. 2 then nodded his head, laughed and said, "Yeah, I've

got questions, a lot of questions." Id. at 1287. The postal

inspector asked what kind of questions. Referring to codefendant Rouse, Juror No. 2 said he wondered what kind of

knowledge Rouse had and what Gartmon had told her. See

id. at 1282-83. The FBI agent said "okay" once or twice. At

that point, the courtroom deputy came down the hall and the

conversation with Juror No. 2 ceased.

After this testimony, the court denied Gartmon's initial

request for a mistrial. At the request of both the government and defense counsel, and with their help in phrasing

questions, the court then asked Juror No. 2 whether he had

spoken with anyone after his dismissal from the jury, whether

that contact influenced his ability to proceed with deliberations, and whether he had told the other empaneled jurors

about the contact. Juror No. 2 related the same story as the

federal agents, stated that it would not affect his ability to

deliberate because he had his own mind, and said that he had

not told the other jurors of the incident. Gartmon again

moved for a mistrial. The court denied Gartmon's motion,

finding that there was no discrepancy between the accounts

of the three parties to the conversation, that neither agent

said anything inappropriate to Juror No. 2, that the agents

did not respond to the questions of Juror No. 2, and that it

was clear that Juror No. 2 could still be fair and impartial.

See id. at 1317-20.

Appellant contends that the district court erred in not

declaring a mistrial. Both appellant and the government

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agree that the standard of review is for abuse of discretion by

the district court. See United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d

1174, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Gartmon argues that the government is unable to overcome "the heavy burden of rebutting

the presumption of prejudice arising from" the contact with

the agents. See Gartmon Br. at 33. His legal analysis is

based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Remmer v. United

States, which held that "any private communication ... with a

juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury

is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial."

347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). The "presumption is not conclusive," the Court said, "but the burden rests heavily upon the

Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the

defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to

the defendant." Id.

The government argues that "Remmer's presumption of

prejudice no longer applies; instead, the trial court determines whether a likelihood of prejudice exists before assigning the government the burden of proving harmlessness."

Gov't Br. at 46. But notwithstanding the view of the Sixth

Circuit that Remmer is no longer controlling because of the

Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Smith v. Phillips,

455 U.S. 209 (1982), see United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d

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521, 532 (6th Cir. 1984), many of our cases have continued to

recognize the presumption of prejudice and to place the

burden of disproving it on the government. See United

States v. Butler, 822 F.2d 1191, 1195-96 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(discussing Phillips and Pennell); see also United States v.

Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Williams, 822

F.2d at 1188. On the other hand, the government correctly

points out that in United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d

490 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 986 (1997), this

court questioned the continued breadth of Remmer, suggesting that subsequent Supreme Court cases, including Smith v.

Phillips and United States v. Olano, seem to have "narrow[ed]" or "reconfigure[d]" the Remmer presumption. See

90 F.3d at 496. The Williams-Davis court suggested that

the cases no longer treat the presumption "as particularly

forceful," and approved the Fourth Circuit's view that " 'while

a presumption of prejudice attaches to an impermissible

communication, the presumption is not one to be casually

invoked.' " See id. at 496-97 (quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 745 (4th Cir. 1988)).

We need not resolve this debate, nor any tension in our

own cases, in order to dispose of Gartmon's challenge. Here,

the district court followed Remmer to the letter. As Remmer

directed, the district court "determine[d] the circumstances,

the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was

prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted

to participate." Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230. On the basis of

that hearing, and particularly on the basis of its appraisal of

the credibility of the juror's statement that he had not been

influenced, see Trial Tr. 1310 (Mar. 26, 1996), the court found

no prejudice even on the Remmer standard, see id. at 1314

(indicating that "even though there may be a presumption of

prejudice," it was overcome); see also id. at 1313-16. On

appeal, this court gives substantial deference to a district

court's appraisal of whether a juror contact resulted in prejudice to the defendant. See Fafowora, 865 F.2d at 363;

Butler, 822 F.2d at 1196; Williams, 822 F.2d at 1188-89. We

have no difficulty sustaining the district court's determination

in this case.

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The context of the contact with Juror No. 2 belies Gartmon's assertion that prejudice always arises "from a contact

by a federal law enforcement officer" because an "agent is a

scary person to the average layman." Gartmon Br. at 34.

Here, the contact occurred in a non-threatening setting, with

several fellow alternates present, after an accidental meeting

in the hall, and after both sides thought the juror's service

had concluded. The agents' questions were innocuous, communicating no threats or effort to influence the juror. See

Butler, 822 F.2d at 1196; Williams, 822 F.2d at 1189. Nor

was any extra-judicial information passed to the juror. See

Butler, 822 F.2d at 1196. Indeed, the circumstances here do

not even approach those in other, far more egregious cases in

which this court has sustained findings of an absence of

prejudice. See, e.g., Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 495, 497

(forewoman's husband urged her to "nail" the defendants);

Fafowora, 865 F.2d at 363-64 (third party told juror he would

give "anything" for information on deliberations); Butler, 822

F.2d at 1194-96 (defendant approached juror in elevator,

complimented her, and told her his version of the events at

issue; and where most of jury learned of the incident);

Williams, 822 F.2d at 1186, 1189-90 (defense witness contacted three jurors, inquired into status of deliberations, and

complained that deliberations were only continuing so jurors

could collect fees; and where entire jury learned of incident).

In addition to the context of the contact, we also have the

juror's statement at the hearing that the contact would not

influence him. See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 230 n.7; Butler, 822

F.2d at 1196-97. The district court, having observed the

demeanor of the juror, is in the best position to determine the

credibility of that assurance. Moreover, the court's determination that the juror was credible is supported both by the

nature of the agent's question to the juror, and by what the

juror said in reply. "Yeah, I've got questions, a lot of

questions," is not the kind of remark one would expect from a

citizen who has been cowed by the presence of an FBI agent.

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tion would not influence him because "I have my own mind."

Trial Tr. 1310 (Mar. 26, 1996).

Finally, as in our assessment of potential prejudice from

the prosecution's misstatements in closing argument, we are

mindful of the fact that this case was not a close one.

Measured against the overwhelming evidence of Gartmon's

guilt, we are unable to view this contact as materially contributing to the verdict against him.

In addition to contending that the denial of his motion for

mistrial was an abuse of discretion, Gartmon also contends

that we should use our "supervisory power" to reverse his

conviction because the agents' conduct violated District Court

Rule 115. The government concedes that the agents violated

that Rule, which provides that "[n]o ... person acting on

behalf of a party or attorney, shall communicate directly or

indirectly with a juror or an excused juror ... during the

trial." D.C. Dist. Ct. R. 115(a). The Rule also bars communication after the verdict except with the express permission of

the court, see D.C. Dist. Ct. R. 115(b). We analyze this

violation under the plain error standard because Gartmon did

not mention either Rule 115 or the courts' supervisory power

below. But the posture of our review is immaterial because

the Supreme Court has instructed that we may not utilize our

supervisory power to reverse a conviction unless the government's misconduct has prejudiced the defendant. See United

States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983); see also Bank of

Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988). As

we already have sustained the district court's conclusion that

Gartmon was not prejudiced, reversal of appellant's conviction

would not be justified either under the plain error rule or as

an exercise of our supervisory power.

V

Appellant's remaining arguments relate to venue and sentencing. He contends that venue was insufficient for those

money laundering counts where the GWUHP check was not

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ing that Riggs National Bank processed all of the checks in

the District. We may dispense with this contention without

further discussion because Gartmon waived it by failing to

raise it below. See United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498,

1517 & n.22. (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Naranjo

v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 865 (1998); United States v.

Rodriguez, 67 F.3d 1312, 1317-18 (7th Cir. 1995); United

States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 791 (2d Cir. 1984); Charles

Alan Wright, 2 Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal

2d s 306 (2d ed. 1982).

As the government concedes, however, Gartmon's objection

to his sentence is valid. The district court sentenced Gartmon to 140 months to be served concurrently on all twentyeight counts of conviction. Although that sentence was within

the appropriate range for the thirteen money laundering

counts, it exceeded the 120-month statutory maximum on the

fifteen counts charging interstate transportation of securities

obtained by fraud. See 18 U.S.C. s 2314 ("Whoever transports [interstate securities obtained by fraud] ... [s]hall be

... imprisoned not more than ten years") (emphasis added).

Accordingly, we accept the suggestion of both the defendant

and the government that we remand the case for resentencing to correct this error.

VI

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and

remand the case for re-sentencing in conformity with this

opinion.

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