Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02326/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02326-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wesley Barber
Plaintiff
Cliff Simpson
Defendant
Unadell Turner
Defendant

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision *

without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h). 

All subsequent references to “Rules” are to the Federal 1

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESLEY BARBER, )

) 2:05-cv-2326-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

CLIFF SIMPSON, and )

UNADELL TURNER, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiff moves to amend the final judgment entered in favor

of Defendants on July 6, 2006, under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and in the alternative, moves for an injunction

pending appeal under Rule 62(c). (Pl.’s Mot. to Am. the J. at 1; 1

Pl.’s Mot. for an Injunction at 1.) Defendants oppose the motions. 

(Defs.’ Opp’n at 8-9.) 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 27, 2006, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment

on the issue of whether the Washoe Tribal Court exceeded its

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“Where an allotment is held in trust the title to and 2

control over the land remain in the United States, in trust for the

use and benefit of the allottee . . . . The allottee has equitable

title and the right to exclusive possession of the allotted land,

subject to the supervisory power of the government.” 42 C.J.S.

Indians § 85 (citing Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970),

and St. Marie v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 237 (S.D. Cal. 1938)).

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jurisdiction by adjudicating an eviction action Defendants brought

against Plaintiff in tribal court to regain possession of allotted

land held in trust for their benefit by the United States. (See 2

Order, filed July 6, 2006, at 4.) In his motion for summary judgment,

Plaintiff argued the Washoe Tribal Court had exceeded its jurisdiction

because “the United States was an indispensable party . . . [but] was

in fact not a party (and could not be made a party) to the

proceedings . . . .” (See id. at 7.) 

An Order filed July 6, 2006, observed “‘[a] long line of

cases . . . have consistently held that, whenever Indian tribes or

individual Indians sue to recover either tribal land or individual

allotments, the United States is not an indispensable party,’” and

under this line of cases “Indians and Indian tribes may maintain

actions to protect their interest in Indian lands without joining the

United States . . . .” (Id. at 7-8 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of

New York State v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527, 544 (N.D.N.Y.

1977), and citing Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d

1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 1983); Fort Mojave Tribe v. LaFollette, 478 F.2d

1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1973); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. E.L. France, 269

F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1959); Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. Seitz,

193 F.2d 456, 458 (10th Cir. 1952); Narragansett Tribe of Indians v.

S. Rhode Island Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 812 (D.C.R.I.

1976).) 

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Plaintiff had not cited any of these cases in his motion for

summary judgment, but rather relied on Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala

Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1272 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991), for

the proposition that the United States was an indispensable party to

the tribal court litigation. (See id. at 8.) However, the Order

found “the litigation involved in Imperial Granite . . .

distinguishable from that in the Washoe Tribal Court” since “‘the

litigation [in Imperial Granite] was instituted by non-Indians for the

purpose of effecting the alienation of tribal or restricted lands, not

by individual Indians or a tribe seeking to protect Indian land from

alienation.’” (Id. (quoting Puyallup Indian Tribe, 717 F.2d at 1255

n.1).) Since “Defendants brought the Washoe Tribal Court action to

protect, not alienate, Indian trust lands,” the Order concluded the

“United States was not an indispensable party to the Washoe Tribal

Court eviction action.” (Id. at 8-9.) Accordingly, the Order found

Plaintiff had not shown the Washoe Tribal Court exceeded its

jurisdiction, denied his motion for summary judgment, and denied his

claims for declaratory and injunctive relief since these claims were

premised on the lack of tribal court jurisdiction. (Id.) The Order

directed the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment in favor of

Defendants; that judgment was entered on July 6, 2006. (Id. at 9;

Judgment, filed July 6, 2006.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Amend the Judgment

“Rule 59(e) provides a mechanism by which a . . . [district

court] may alter, amend, or vacate a judgment.” Clipper Exxpress v.

Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (9th

Cir. 1982). A Rule 59(e) motion “should not be granted, absent

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In a footnote, Plaintiff acknowledges Oneida Indian 3

Nation, 434 F. Supp. at 554, stated “the United States is not an

indispensable party” when “individual Indians sued to recover . . .

(continued...)

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highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented

with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is

an intervening change in the controlling law.” 389 Orange Street

Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999); see also School

Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

First, Plaintiff argues the Court erred in distinguishing

Imperial Granite because “the tribal court litigation at issue here

was . . . instituted against an Indian . . . by Defendants . . . to

‘effect alienation of [his] interest in 425 Barber Road . . . .” 

(Pl.’s Mot. to Am. the J. at 5-6.) Although Plaintiff correctly notes

the context of the tribal court litigation, Imperial Granite applies

to litigation “‘instituted by non-Indians for the purpose of effecting

alienation of tribal land, not by individual Indians . . . seeking to

protect Indian land from alienation.’” (Order, filed July 7, 2006,

at 8 (quoting Puyallup Indian Tribe, 717 F.2d at 1255 n.1).) Since

Defendants, who are members of the Washoe Tribe, brought the tribal

court eviction action to protect their interest in allotted land,

Imperial Granite is inapplicable. (Id.)

Next, Plaintiff argues “the Court erred in applying the line

of cases” that hold the United States is not an indispensable party

when “Indian tribes or individual Indians sue to recover either tribal

land or individual allotments.” (Pl.’s Mot. to Am. the J. at 3-4.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff contends the “cases cited by the Court are

distinguishable” because “all of these cases involved Indian tribes

[rather than individual Indians] as plaintiffs.” (Id. at 4.) In 3

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(...continued) 3

individual allotments,” but argues this case “and other decisions

of district courts” should “not be followed” because they “are not

authoritative . . . [or] persuasive.” (Pl.’s Mot. to Am. the J.

at 5, n.3.) Although Oneida Indian Nation is not controlling

authority, the case is persuasive since it is consistent with the

rationale of Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians, 193 F.2d 456, (see

infra, pages 7-8), and since the Ninth Circuit cited it in Puyallup

Indian Tribe, 717 F.2d at 1255 & n.1.

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addition, Plaintiff argues “in equity and good conscience” these cases

should not apply because “if Plaintiff ultimately ‘prevails’ in the

tribal court, he gains nothing (because the United States is not bound

by the judgment) . . . [but] if Defendants ultimately prevail, they

gain everything (because Plaintiff is bound).” (Id. at 5.) Both of

these arguments require an examination of Choctaw and Chickasaw

Indians, 193 F.2d 456, a Tenth Circuit decision the Ninth Circuit

adopted as the basis for its decision in Skokomish Indian Tribe, 269

F.2d at 560, and relied upon in Puyallup Indian Tribe, 717 F.2d

at 1255, and Fort Mojave Tribe, 478 F.2d at 1018. 

In Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians, the Tenth Circuit

considered whether the United States was an indispensable party to an

action by the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations (“Nations”) “to recover

possession of, and establish their title to certain lands . . . .” 

193 F.2d at 458. The Tenth Circuit stated an “indispensable party is

one who has such an interest in the subject-matter of the controversy

that a final decree cannot be rendered between the other parties to

the suit without radically and injuriously affecting [its] interest,

or without leaving the controversy in such a situation that [the]

final determination may be inconsistent with equity and good

conscience.” Id. at 458. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that “[s]ince,

unless the United States becomes a party to the action it will not be

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bound by any judgment entered therein, a judgment entered as between

the Nations and the defendants . . . would not radically and

injuriously affect the interest of the United States.” Id. Thus,

“the question . . . narrow[ed] to whether a judgment could be entered

as between the Nations and the defendants . . . [that] would be

consistent with equity and good conscience.” Id.

The Tenth Circuit noted several Supreme Court cases had

“clearly recognized the rights of . . . Indians and Indian tribes to

maintain actions with respect to their lands, although the United

States would not be bound by the judgment in such an action, to which

it was not a party . . . .” Id. at 459 (citing Heckman v. United

States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912), Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S.

110 (1919), and United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926)); see

also Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 369 (1968) (stating

“the allotment system would be frustrated unless both the Indian and

the United States were empowered to seek judicial relief to protect

the allotment”). The Tenth Circuit reasoned the Supreme Court would

not have “dealt so extensively with the mere capacity of . . .

Indians, the tribes, and pueblos to sue and defend in respect to their

lands, if it regarded the United States as an indispensable party to

the action,” and concluded “the inference must be drawn that the

Supreme Court recognized the right of the . . . Indian, tribe, and

pueblo to maintain such an action without the presence of the United

States as a party.” Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians, 193 F.2d at 460. 

Finally, the Tenth Circuit observed that if “the United

States [was] an indispensable party, the Nations [would] be unable to

prosecute a suit to establish their title to, and recover possession

and use of, their lands,” but that “if they [were] permitted to

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prosecute suit, in the absence of the United States, a judgment in

favor of the defendants [would] not bind the United States.” Id. 

Thus, if “the United States [was] an indispensable party, the Nations

[would] be unable to assert their long-standing claim to the land,”

but if the “United States [was] not an indispensable party, the

defendants . . . [would] run the risk of . . . defending two lawsuits

. . . .” Id. at 461. The Tenth Circuit found “the equities presented

by the situation . . . weigh[ed] heavily in favor of the Nations,” and

concluded that a “final decree determining the title and right to

possession as between the Nations and the defendant would not leave

the controversy in a situation inconsistent with equity and good

conscience.” Id. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit found the United

States was not an indispensable party to the litigation. Id.

As the preceding discussion makes evident, the rationale of

Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians applies with equal force to a situation

where an individual Indian sues to recover title or possession of an

allotment, particularly since the Tenth Circuit found “the Supreme

Court [had] recognized the right of the [individual] Indian . . . to

maintain . . . an action [to protect allotted land] without the

presence of the United States as a party.” Id. at 460. Consequently,

Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians, and the Ninth Circuit decisions that

rely upon it, are not distinguishable on the basis that these cases

involve Indian tribes rather than individual Indians. Furthermore, as

in Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians, “equity and good conscience” favor

allowing individual Indians to maintain actions to protect allotted

land without joining the United States as a party; otherwise, these

individuals would “be unable to assert their . . . claim to the land.” 

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The Inter-Tribal Court of Appeals heard argument on 4

Plaintiff’s appeal in March 2006, but has not yet issued a

decision. (Pl.’s Mot. for an Injunction at 3.)

Plaintiff states he “intends to perfect an immediate 5

appeal to the Ninth Circuit” only if “the Court leaves undisturbed

(continued...)

8

See id. at 461 (finding “the equities presented by the situation . . .

weigh[ed] heavily in favor of the [Indian tribe]”). 

Consequently, Plaintiff has not shown the Court “committed

clear error.” School Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263. Accordingly, the

Rule 59(e) motion to amend the judgment filed July 6, 2006, is denied. 

II. Motion for an Injunction Pending Appeal

Plaintiff moves for an injunction pending appeal enjoining

Defendants “from interfering with [his] possession and enjoyment of

certain real property . . . known to the parties as 425 Barber

Road . . . .” (Pl.’s Mot. for an Injunction at 1-2.) Plaintiff

explains “last year [Defendants] obtained from the Washoe Tribal Court

a judgment and order evicting Plaintiff from his . . . home and

current residence,” but that “judgment is now stayed pending [his]

appeal to the Inter-Tribal Court of Appeals.” (Id. at 3.) Although 4

Plaintiff acknowledges Defendants cannot currently enforce the tribal

court judgment and evict him from the property, he contends “the

eviction order could be revived at any time” and that his requested

injunction is appropriate because “the balance of the hardships tips

sharply in [his] favor” and he “has raised ‘serious questions’ going

to the merits . . . .” (Id.) 

As a preliminary matter, a Rule 62(c) injunction appears

premature since Plaintiff has not yet filed an appeal to the Ninth

Circuit. Davila v. State of Tex., 489 F. Supp. 803, 810 (D.C. Tex. 5

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the existing final judgment.” (Pl.’s Mot. for an Injunction at 3.)

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1980) (stating “Rule 62(c) is not properly invoked until ‘an appeal is

taken’”). In addition, even if Plaintiff demonstrated the existence

of serious questions on the merits and a balance of hardships tipping

in his favor, these two factors are not dispositive in the context of

a Rule 62(c) motion. See Envtl. Prot. and Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest

Service, 2006 WL 2084856, *2, n.2 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2006)

(explaining that these factors are applicable to a request for

preliminary injunctive relief, but not for an injunction pending

appeal) (citing McAfee v. United States, 2006 WL 829135, *2 (E.D. Cal.

2006), and Digital Comm’n Network, Inc. v. AB Cellular Holding LLC,

1999 WL 1044234, *4 (C.D. Cal. 1999)). Rather, four factors, which

were articulated by the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Braunskill, 481

U.S. 770, 776 (1987), are examined when a party files a Rule 62(c)

motion: “(1) whether the . . . applicant has made a strong showing

that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant

will be irreparably injured absent a[n] injunction; (3) whether

issuance of the [injunction] will substantially injure the other

parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public

interest lies.” (Id.) 

As to the second factor, since Defendants cannot enforce the

eviction order while Plaintiff appeals the tribal court judgment to

the Inter Tribal Court of Appeals, Plaintiff has not demonstrated he

will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction does not issue at this

time. As to the third and fourth factors, Plaintiff has not briefed

or otherwise shown the public interest favors granting the proposed

injunction or that other parties would not be substantially injured by

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Although Plaintiff argues that the success on the merits 6

factor favors an injunction, this factor need not be addressed

since the other three factors do not favor an injunction.

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its issuance. Therefore, since three of the four Hilton factors

indicate an injunction should not issue, Plaintiff’s motion is

denied.6

CONCLUSION

For reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion to amend the

judgment filed July 6, 2006, and his motion for an injunction pending

appeal are denied. 

Dated: August 31, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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