Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03352/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03352-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General of Kansas
Appellee
James M. Edens
Appellant
Robert D. Hannigan
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAMES M. EDENS, 

Petitioner - Appellant, 

. FILED 

Vo1ted States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

JUN 2 0 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

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No. 94-3352 

V. 

ROBERT D. HANNIGAN and 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS, 

Respondents- Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 92-CV-3418) 

David J. Gottlieb, University of Kansas School of Law, Kansas Defender Project, 

Lawrence, Kansas, for Petitioner/ Appellant. 

Jon P. Fleenor, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Topeka, 

Kansas, for Respondents/ Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 94-3352 Document: 01019279379 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 1 
Before EBEL and LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and HOLMES, District Judge.* 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

In October of 1979, a jury convicted James M. Edens of felony murder, aggravated 

robbery, conspiracy, and aiding a felon. After exhausting his state remedies, Edens filed 

a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of 

Kansas pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2254, claiming that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel. Edens' counsel also represented a co-defendant. Although Edens did 

not object to the dual representation at the time of trial, he asserts in this action that his 

counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest which adversely affected his counsel's 

performance, thereby entitling him to a new trial. We agree, and reverse the district court 

ruling which had denied Edens' petition. 1 

* The Honorable Sven Erik Holmes, District Court Judge of the Northern 

District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

1 Edens filed a notice of appeal on October 12, 1994. The district court 

granted a certificate of probable cause on October 17, 1994, and permitted Edens 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 

On April 24, 1996 the President signed into law significant habeas corpus 

amendments (Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214). These amendments were 

enacted as Title I of the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996" 

(formerly S. 735). The amendments affect 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253, 2254, 2255, 

Appellate Rule 22, and 21 U.S. C. § 848( q). The amendments also create a new 

chapter 154 in Title 28, which provides special habeas corpus procedures in 

capital cases. The only effective date provision specified within Title I of the 

habeas corpus amendments is under the special death penalty litigation 

procedures, which states that those provisions shall apply to cases pending on or 

after enactment. ~ § 107(c). Edens filed his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

(continued ... ) 

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Appellate Case: 94-3352 Document: 01019279379 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 2 
BACKGROUND 

By a complaint filed January 15, 1979, Edens was charged in the District Court of 

Sedgwick County, Kansas, with felony murder, robbery, aiding a felony, and illegal 

possession of a weapon. The charges arose out of the robbery of a pharmacy that 

occurred on December 15, 1978. Also charged with Edens were codefendants Glendal A. 

Rider and Clark W. Lemons. The following are the facts of this case as the Supreme 

Court of Kansas found them in 1981. ~State v. Rider, 625 P.2d 425, 428-29 (Kan. 

1981). 

In late 1978, Rider was residing at Larned State Security Hospital as a result of 

pleading guilty to previous charges of burglary, robbery, felony murder and other crimes. 

On December 5, Rider escaped from Larned and fled to Wichita where he established 

contact with Edens. Edens arranged for Rider to stay at the home of John and Carol 

Leisek while Rider decided what to do next. 

On December 15, Edens, Rider, and Lemons had a conversation in Leisek's home. 

Leisek testified that he overheard either Lemons or Edens use the words "robbery" and 

"Hudson Pharmacy." After this conversation, Rider stole a 1972 yellow Chevrolet 

1

( ... continued) 

2254 in the district court on November 16, 1992; he filed his notice of appeal on 

October 12, 1994; and a certificate of probable cause was issued pursuant to Rule 

22 on October 17, 1994, all well before the new habeas corpus amendments were 

enacted. Under these facts we conclude that the new law does not apply to this 

case. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3352 Document: 01019279379 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 3 
Malibu to use in the robbery of Hudson Pharmacy. Later that evening, Edens drove Rider 

and Lemons to where the stolen car was parked. Rider and Lemons then drove the car to 

within one block of the Hudson Pharmacy, and parked the car. The two men entered the 

pharmacy by walking through a nearby yard. 

Rider and Lemons entered the pharmacy brandishing handguns and demanding 

money and narcotics. The pharmacy phone rang constantly throughout the robbery. As 

the two men fled, Rider shot at an elderly man the two men encountered as they crossed 

the yard of a neighboring home. Also, as Rider began to drive away from the curb, 

another car was passing and the two cars almost collided. This near collision caused an 

altercation which ultimately resulted in Rider shooting and killing the other driver. Rider 

testified that he shot the man because it appeared the man had a gun, although it turned 

out that he had only a knife. Rider and Lemons then fled in the stolen Malibu. 

Edens returned to the Leisek residence about 7:30 p.m. Edens and Leisek then 

drove to the convenience store across the street from the Hudson Pharmacy, where Leisek 

retrieved a piece of paper from the telephone booth near the store, tore it up and threw it 

away. After determining that Rider and Lemons were not at the designated pickup 

location, Edens and Leisek went to Lemons' house where they joined Lemons and Rider. 

Two days after the robbery and murder, Rider was apprehended. Shortly thereafter, 

Lemons was arrested. Edens was arrested approximately thirty (30) days later. Leisek 

was ultimately given immunity for his testimony. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3352 Document: 01019279379 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 4 
At trial, Edens and codefendant Lemons were represented jointly by Russell 

Schultz. Edens was Lemons' brother-in-law and Lemons' family paid for the 

representation of both defendants. At trial Rider testified the shooting was in selfdefense. Lemons testified that his actions were compelled by his fear of Rider. Edens 

did not testify or put on evidence in his defense. 

In October 1979, Edens was convicted of felony murder, aggravated robbery, 

conspiracy, and aiding a felon, and was sentenced to life in prison. His conviction was 

affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kansas on March 18, 1981. State y. Rider, 625 P.2d 

425 (Kan. 1981).2 Seven years after the appeal, on July 25, 1988, Edens filed a prose 

application to vacate his conviction and sentence in the Sedgwick County, Kansas District 

Court pursuant to K. S.A 60-1507. The court denied relief and Edens appealed. The 

Kansas Court of Appeals reversed Edens' conviction of aggravated robbery, but denied 

his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on joint representation. Edens y. 

Stm, No. 64,111 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1990)(unpublished opinion). The Supreme 

Court of Kansas denied Edens' Petition for Review on November 13, 1990. 

On November 16, 1992, Edens filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the 

United States District Court for the District of Kansas pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2254. 

Once again Edens raised his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to joint 

representation. On April1, 1993, the state filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. 

2 Edens' trial counsel, Russel Schultz, died in October 1982. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3352 Document: 01019279379 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 5 
Civ. P. 9(a), claiming respondents had been prejudiced by Edens' delay in filing the 

petition. The state argued that because trial counsel was dead, respondents could not 

adequately respond. However, the district court denied this motion, holding that Schultz 

died so soon after Edens' direct appeal was resolved that it was inevitable Schultz would 

have been deceased before Kansas could have considered Edens' collateral attack, no 

matter how promptly such a challenge had been filed. Hence, Kansas was not prejudiced 

by Edens' delay in filing his state habeas action. The state does not appeal that ruling so 

we do not consider it further. 

Edens argues there was a conflict of interest between him and codefendant 

Lemons, and that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 

counsel when Schultz represented both of them. Because Edens failed to raise this Sixth 

Amendment objection at trial, the district court determined that his conviction could be 

overturned only if Edens were able to demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest 

adversely affected his lawyer's performance. ~United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 

1500 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

In an attempt to show specific instances of an actual conflict adverse to his 

interests,~ U.S. v. Martin, 965 F.2d 839, 842 (lOth Cir. 1992), Edens cited seven 

errors: (1) Edens was instructed by his attorney that he could not testify because it would 

jeopardize Lemons' defense; (2) Edens' attorney did not pursue plea negotiations on 

behalf of Edens once it became clear that there would be no deal for his codefendant, 

Lemons; (3) Edens' attorney did not cross-examine codefendant Lemons when it would 

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Appellate Case: 94-3352 Document: 01019279379 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 6 
have been in Edens' best interest to do so; (4) Edens' attorney did not cross-examine 

Leisek when Leisek implicated Edens as the individual who telephoned the pharmacy; ( 5) 

Edens' attorney did not interview or call a witness who would have testified that Leisek 

was the telephone caller; ( 6) Edens' attorney presented no defense for Edens; and (7) 

Edens' attorney favored codefendant Lemons because Lemons and his family provided 

the fee for both Lemons and Edens. 

In determining there was no actual conflict, the district court held that although 

Edens may not have received a perfect trial, he did receive effective assistance of counsel. 

On September 13, 1994, the district court issued a final order and judgment dismissing 

the petition and denying all relief. 

DISCUSSION 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Whether multiple representation in a particular case gave rise to a conflict of 

interest presents a mixed question oflaw and fact. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 698 (1984). We review de novo the district court's determination of whether an 

actual conflict existed. United States v. Martin, 965 F.2d 839, 841 (lOth Cir. 1992). We 

review the district court's resolution of the underlying facts for clear error. ld.. The state 

court findings of fact made in the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are entitled 

to deference, and are presumed to be correct. ~Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; 28 U.S. C. 

§ 2254. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3352 Document: 01019279379 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 7 
LEGAL CONTEXT OF THE CLAIM 

The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant in a criminal case to the effective 

assistance of competent counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The standard 

for attorney performance is that of "reasonably effective assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 687. "When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's 

assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness." Id.. at 687-88. Reasonableness is evaluated under prevailing 

professional norms and is considered in light of all the circumstances. Id.. at 688. 

Courts should be highly deferential in reviewing counsel's performance, and every 

effort should be made to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight" so that the 

challenged conduct is evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time the events took 

place. Id.. at 689. "[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant 

must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

might be considered sound trial strategy." Id.. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Special considerations apply, however, when a defendant's counsel has a conflict 

of interests. United States v. Winkle, 722 F.2d 605, 609 (lOth Cir. 1983). Edens bases 

his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on his assertion that Schultz, his attorney, 

had a conflict of interest arising from the joint representation of Edens and his 

codefendant Lemons. Multiple representation is not per se ineffective assistance. 

Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978). We have warned, however, that such 

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Appellate Case: 94-3352 Document: 01019279379 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 8 
representation "should be undertaken very cautiously because of the great potential for 

conflicts of interest." United States v. Dressel, 742 F.2d 1256, 1257-58 (lOth Cir. 1984); 

see also Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490 (" [I]n a case of joint representation of conflicting 

interests the evil ... is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from 

doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the 

sentencing process.") (emphasis in the original). We have further stated that " [ d]efense 

counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to advise the 

court promptly when a conflict of interest arises during the course of trial." Dressel, 742 

F.2d at 1258 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980)). 

Edens failed to raise his Sixth Amendment objection at trial. Therefore, in order 

to establish his claim now, he must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest 

adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 

(1980); Selsor v. Kaiser, 22 F.3d 1029, 1032 (lOth Cir. 1994); United States v. Bowie, 

892 F.2d 1494, 1500 (lOth Cir. 1990). Duringjoint representation, an actual conflict of 

interest arises if the codefendants' interests "diverge with respect to a material factual or 

legal issue or to a course of action." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 356 n.3; see also Bowie, 892 

F.2d at 1500 (holding that "defense counsel's performance was adversely affected by an 

actual conflict of interest if a specific and seemingly valid or genuine alternative strategy 

or tactic was available to defense counsel, but it was inherently in conflict with his duties 

to others .... "). Edens has the burden of showing specific instances to support his claim 

of actual conflict of interest. United States y. Martin, 965 F.2d 839, 842 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

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Appellate Case: 94-3352 Document: 01019279379 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 9 
If Edens is able to show that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, 

prejudice will be presumed and he will be entitled to relief. ld..; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-

50. Having reviewed the record, we believe that Edens has made such a showing here. 

EDENS' ARGUMENTS lN SUPPORT OF HIS CLAIM 

Edens argues on appeal that his lawyer labored under a conflict of interest because 

he failed to investigate and call certain witnesses, failed to seek separate plea negotiations 

for Edens, failed to cross-examine inculpatory testimony at trial, and failed to present a 

defense on behalf of Edens and refused to permit Edens to testify in his own defense. In 

addition, Edens argues he never waived his right to conflict-free counsel. 

A. Actual Conflict of Interest 

At trial, the State of Kansas did not contend that Edens was present at the scene of 

the robbery or subsequent murder. The State's theory regarding Eden's involvement was 

that he acted as an aider and abettor. The State claimed that: (1) Edens was present at 

the table in the Leisek home when conversations took place between Rider, Lemons and 

Leisek, in which Rider proposed that the men rob a pharmacy; (2) Edens drove Lemons 

and Rider to a car that was later used in commission of the robbery and subsequent 

murder; and (3) Edens served as a lookout for Rider and Lemons by phoning the 

pharmacy from a pay phone across the street during the robbery. 3 

3 The men allegedly had agreed that if the phone were to stop ringing at the 

(continued ... ) 

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The evidence presented by the State in support of its case against Edens consisted 

of testimony from Leisek, Rider and Lemons. Lemons, although acknowledging that 

Edens said he wanted no part of the robbery, testified that Edens was present at Leisek's 

home during conversations which focused on planning the robbery, that Edens drove him 

and Rider to the car later used in the robbery, and that Edens was supposed to pick 

Lemons and Rider up after the robbery. Leisek received immunity from prosecution in 

exchange for his testimony, and his testimony indicated that Edens had been the lookout 

and that he believed he heard Edens participate in the planning conversation at Leisek's 

home. 4 Leisek also testified that he and Edens retrieved a piece of paper from the phone 

booth across the street from the pharmacy sometime after the robbery that Leisek thought 

contained the phone number to the pharmacy. In addition, Leisek claimed that Edens told 

him that Rider and Lemons were not at the location where Edens was supposed to pick 

them up. Finally, Rider testified that while he was at the Leisek's house, he told Lemons 

and Edens of his plans to rob the pharmacy and that both men refused to help. While 

acknowledging that Edens commented that the robbery was unwise and a foolish thing to 

do, Rider nevertheless implicated Edens in the crime by stating that Edens had given him 

3

( ••• continued) 

pharmacy during the robbery, Lemons and Rider were to leave the scene 

immediately. 

4 Leisek testified with uncertainty that he heard "either Lemons or Edens" 

use the words "robbery" and "Hudson Pharmacy" that afternoon. State v. Rider, 

625 P.2d 425, 429 (1981 ). 

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and Lemons a ride to the car Rider had obtained earlier and had told Rider to be careful. 

In March of 1981, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the testimony of Leisek, Rider 

and Lemons was sufficient to convict Edens of aiding and abetting. 5 

Schultz apparently provided two defense strategies for codefendant Lemons: (1) 

Schultz contended that Lemons was compelled by Rider to take part in the robbery; and 

(2) Schultz attacked the pharmacy employee's identification of Lemons as one of the 

perpetrators. Schultz, however, made no opening statements on behalf of Edens and 

essentially called no witnesses on his behalf. 6 On appeal, Edens argues "Schultz was 

5 The Kansas Supreme Court held the following: 

The trial court properly ruled there was sufficient evidence to 

overrule the motion for judgement of acquittal as to Edens on 

the charges of conspiracy, aggravated robbery, and felony 

murder. John Leisek's testimony established a basis for the 

jury to reasonably conclude that Edens, Rider, and Lemons 

had a mutual understanding or tacit agreement for the 

accomplishment of the Hudson Pharmacy robbery .... There 

was also competent evidence that Edens intentionally 

participated in the conspiracy to further the success of the 

robbery .... There were sufficient facts upon which the jury 

could conclude Edens telephoned the pharmacy and kept the 

phone ringing during the robbery, and attempted to pick up 

Rider and Lemons after the robbery .... The jury could 

reasonably conclude Edens willfully participated as an aider 

and abettor, to further the success of the robbery, thus 

supporting his conviction as a principal for the offense of 

aggravated robbery and felony murder. 

State v. Rider, 625 P.2d 425, 434 (Kan. 1981). 

6 Schultz did recall John Leisek purportedly as Edens' witness. However, 

Schultz only elicited from Leisek the fact that he had not seen Rider threaten 

(continued ... ) 

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burdened by [a] conflict of interest to such an extent that he was unable to present any 

discernible defense" on Edens' behalf. We agree. 

The only way Edens could have avoided criminal liability in this case would have 

been for him to have presented the defense that he had not participated in any way in the 

robbery. A successful effort on Edens' behalf, however, necessarily would have damaged 

his codefendant, Lemons. That is, Edens' only defense was in conflict with the defense 

presented for Lemons. For example, in order to establish that Edens had not given Rider 

and Lemons a ride to the car used in the robbery, as both Rider and Lemons testified, 

Schultz would have had to cross-examine and impeach his own client Lemons. Likewise, 

in order to establish that Edens had not participated in the conspiratorial conversations at 

Leisek's house, Schultz would have had to let Edens testify that he had refused to 

participate in the robbery. Such testimony would have tended to refute Lemons' claim 

that Rider used compulsion to secure Lemons' participation. 

The record reflects that the conflict between Edens' and Lemons' defenses was 

consistently resolved in favor of Lemons and at Edens' expense. Schultz never articulated 

what defense, if any, was contemplated for Edens and he put on no evidence on Edens' 

behalf. Edens was not permitted to testify and Schultz never cross-examined Lemons or 

Rider with respect to their inculpatory testimony that Edens had provided a ride to the car 

6

( ... continued) 

Lemons or Edens. 

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used in the robbery.' Furthermore, the district court's conclusion that Schultz' crossexamination of Leisek was "thorough" is unsupported by the record Leisek testified to 

the planning conversation that was held in his home, but Schultz failed to probe Leisek 

concerning Leisek's inability to identify whether the speaker at the table discussing the 

robbery was Lemons or Edens. 8 Schultz' conflict here was clear. Any effort by Schultz 

to prove that Edens was not the one who used the words "robbery" and "Hudson 

Pharmacy" during that conversation necessarily would have established that those words 

were spoken by Lemons, his other client. In order for Schultz adequately to crossexamine Leisek on behalf of either of his clients, he would unavoidably implicate the 

other. 

Even the trial prosecutor in this case had concerns that there might be a conflict in 

Schultz' joint representation of both Lemons and Edens. Trial prosecutor Steve Robinson 

7 Appellees incorrectly assert that Edens failed to claim in the district court 

that Schultz did not adequately cross-examine Rider, and that Edens raises this 

issue for the first time on appeal. Edens' memorandum in support of his petition 

in the district court clearly raised the issue of Schultz' failure to cross-examining 

Rider. R.O.A., Vol. I, Doc. 2, at 10. Thus, there is no bar to our review of the 

issue here. 

8 Appellees assert, as they did before the district court, that Edens' claim that 

Schultz failed to adequately cross-examine Leisek was not raised in the state 

court proceedings and thus should not be reviewed for the first time in a federal 

habeas corpus action. ~Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (holding that a 

district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing any claims that have not 

been exhausted in state court). We agree, however, with the district court's 

conclusion that this claim was adequately raised in the state court proceedings 

and thus can be reviewed on federal habeas. S.e..e. Edens' Petition in state post 

conviction proceeding, No. 88-C-2606. 

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testified at the state court's post conviction hearing that he became concerned about the 

possibility of inconsistent defenses when he learned the defense of compulsion was being 

presented on behalf of Lemons, but not Edens. The record in this case also suggests that 

Schultz was aware of the conflict and simply failed to address it. Lemons testified at the 

state court hearing that Schultz told him that it would be advantageous to have Edens as a 

codefendant because Edens could not then be used as a state's witness against Lemons. 

The district court below characterized Schultz' decision not to allow Edens to 

testify as proper trial strategy. The court agreed with the Kansas Court of Appeals' 

conclusion that Edens testimony was not necessary because Lemons' testimony was 

"generally exculpatory." This conclusion, however, ignores the fact that Lemons testified 

that Edens drove Lemons and Rider to the car used in the robbery. Regardless of the rest 

of Lemons testimony with respect to Edens, this testimony clearly implicated Edens and 

provided the evidence by which a jury could conclude that Edens had assisted the other 

two defendants in the execution of the robbery. Although Edens at the post conviction 

hearing denied that he drove the car, he was prevented from testifying to that effect at 

trial by his counsel and Schultz never cross-examined Lemons on Edens' behalf. In fact, 

at the state court hearing Lemons testified that Schultz told him Edens was not going to 

be permitted to testify in part because he feared what Edens might say. All of the other 

defendants testified to advance their own particular defenses. Only Edens, who also 

wanted to testify to say he simply was not involved, was told by his counsel, Schultz, that 

he could not testify. Schultz told Edens to just "go along with everything." Lemons' 

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testimony implicating Edens created a conflict of interest for Schultz and Schultz resolved 

the conflict in Lemons' favor. 

Edens also argues that Schultz' failure to pursue separate plea negotiations on his 

behalf was motivated by a conflict of interest. Trial prosecutor Robinson testified that 

Schultz approached him regarding a possible plea bargain, offering only a joint deal for 

Lemons and Rider. Robinson testified that Schultz never distinguished between Lemons 

and Edens when discussing a possible plea agreement. The record also reflects that 

Schultz did not pursue separate plea negotiations for Edens when it became clear the 

government was not interested in a joint plea agreement for Lemons and Edens. 

Settlement negotiations on Edens' behalf alone, however, might have produced a plea 

offer from the government. In exchange for a favorable plea, Edens apparently could 

have provided valuable testimony undermining Lemons' defense. Edens had witnessed 

the conspiratorial conversation that took place between Lemons and Rider and arguably 

could have testified that Lemons was not forced to participate in the robbery, contrary to 

Lemons' claim. It appears that Edens was the least culpable defendant in this case and 

his observations regarding his more culpable codefendant Lemons might have been 

offered in exchange for a plea agreement with the government. No such effort was made 

on Edens' behalf because such an arrangement would have been in direct conflict with 

Lemons' defense. ~ Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 

456 U.S. 1011 (1982) (holding that defense counsel suffered from an actual conflict of 

interest in representing two codefendants because had the attorney not been facing a 

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conflict of interest, he might have been able to negotiate a plea agreement on one 

defendant's behalf in return for becoming a prosecution witness against the codefendant). 

Finally, Edens contends that Schultz failed to investigate and pursue Kay Thacker 

to testify on Edens' behalf because her testimony would have harmed Lemons. After 

Carol and John Leisek testified at the preliminary hearing, Edens told Schultz that part of 

their testimony was false and that he could prove it by calling as a witness Carol Leisek's 

sister, Kay Thacker. The Leiseks had testified that no one besides them was present 

during the conversations involving Rider, Edens and Lemons. Edens wanted Thacker to 

testify because she had been present the day of the conversation. Schultz, however, 

refused to call Thacker to testify on Edens' behalf because he felt it would not help Edens 

and that it would hurt Lemons. Schultz gave no explanation for his assertion that 

Thacker's testimony would hurt Lemons. 9 The record does, however, show that 

Thacker's testimony could have been helpful to Edens' defense. Although her memory of 

the events after ten years was uncertain, Thacker testified at the state post-conviction 

hearing that she remembered that Carol Leisek had told her that it was Leisek who was to 

signal to the robbers from a phone across the street, not Edens. Thacker also testified that 

in May, 1989, she told an investigator with the public defender's office that Carol had 

told her that Leisek had taken part by making the phone calls. Therefore, notwithstanding 

Thacker's uncertain memory, it is clear she may have been helpful to Edens' defense and 

9 The record reflects that Schultz made this assertion without even 

interviewing Kay Thacker. 

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should have at least been interviewed by Schultz. Schultz' decision not to pursue her 

testimony on Edens' behalf based upon his concern for Lemons' defense is evidence of an 

actual conflict of interest. 

B. Waiver 

Even assuming an actual conflict, Respondent-Appellee argues that Edens 

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to conflictfree representation. ~Holloway, 435 U.S. at 483 n.5 (noting that "a defendant may 

waive his right to the assistance of an attorney unhindered by a conflict of interests"). 

"Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, 

intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 

consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). In reviewing the 

Respondent's argument based upon waiver, we must indulge every reasonable 

presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 

60, 70 (1942). After review of the record before us, we conclude Edens did not waive his 

Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation. 

Edens testified that he was told by Schultz that they would have to have a hearing 

before the trial judge because the judge was concerned about a conflict. At the pretrial 

hearing Schultz stated that the Lemons' family was paying him to represent both Lemons 

and Edens. He told the court that both men understood that the jury would have to reach 

a decision on each count and that the possibility existed that those counts in which they 

were charged together could be "a subject of separate decisions" and that they could 

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possibly receive separate sentences. Edens and Lemons both acknowledged that they had 

been so advised. 

There was no discussion during the hearing, however, of the risks associated with 

Schultz' dual representation and there was no inquiry by the court on this matter. The 

limited colloquy that occurred during the pretrial hearing does not reflect that Edens was 

at all apprised of the possibility of conflicts arising from inconsistent defenses. The fact 

that Edens understood, for example, that he might receive a different sentence from 

Lemons does not demonstrate that he understood that his defense could possibly conflict 

with Lemons' defense at some point during trial, presenting a conflict of interest for his 

attorney. Nor is it clear that Edens understood that such a conflict had the potential for 

undermining his defense. Nor does the record reflect that Edens ever understood that 

Schultz' dual representation might impair his ability to negotiate a separate plea 

agreement. On the record before us, there is simply no basis for us to conclude that 

Edens knowingly and intelligently assumed the risks associated with Schultz' 

representation of both Edens and Lemons. 

CONCLUSION 

Based upon the forgoing discussion, we conclude that Schultz labored under an 

actual conflict of interest which adversely affected his representation of Edens, and that 

Edens did not waive his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. We therefore 

REVERSE the district court's order and REMAND the case to the district court with 

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Appellate Case: 94-3352 Document: 01019279379 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 19 
instructions that the district court grant Edens habeas relief unless the state chooses to 

retry him within a reasonable time. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3352 Document: 01019279379 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 20