Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02173/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02173-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Manuel Benitez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

ROBERT 1.. HOECKER 

;lniteb jtates alourt of l\ppeah~ 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

01"1"1CE OP' THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVEJit. COLORADO 80294 

April 11, 1990 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED APPEAL 

RE: Nos. 88-2117 and 88-2173 

USA v. Jose Manuel Benitez 

The opinion in the captioned case was filed March 

TELEPHONE 

L:S03> 844•3US7 

(FTS> IS84·3US7 

30t 1990. Attached is the corrected opinion which 

includes page 6. Please substitute this opinion for . 

the previous opinion. 

Very truly yours, 

ROBErJ .. ~O~CK~rk 

sy, Y tc·Ltct \ j.J-L '-

Ratrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

F 1LED 

Uoirt-d Scates Courc of Appeals 

Tenth Cirruir 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 3 0 1990 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOSE MANUEL BENITEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

NO. 88-2117 1 88-2173 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR 87-468 JC) 

Pres iliano A. Torrez, Assistant United States Attorney (Will iam L. 

Lutz, United States Attorney, on the brief), Al buquerque, New 

Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Charles Louis Roberts, (Gary Hill and Robert Ramos, El Paso, Texa s, 

on the brief), El Paso, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, circuit Judges, and THEIS,* Di stri ct 

Judge. 

THEIS, District Judge. 

*The Honorable Frank G. Theis, District Judge, United Stat es 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

This is an appeal from a final judgment and commitment in a 

criminal case. The appel lant, Jose Manuel Benitez, wa s indicte d 

for possession of a controlled substance wi th intent to distr ibute 

and aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a) (1) a nd 

1 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 2 
18 u.s.c. § 2. The appellant's motion to suppress evidence was 

denied by the district court. Following the denial of his motion 

to suppress, the appellant entered a guilty plea and reserved the 

right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 

As stated by the appellant, th~ issues presented on appeal 

are: whether the detention and seizure of the appellant and his 

vehicle went beyond that authorized at a Border Patrol checkpoint 

and thus violated the fourth amendment to the United States 

• Constitution; whether the appellant gave a knowing and voluntary 

consent to the search . of his vehicle; and whether the evidence 

seized from the appellant's vehicle and the fruits thereof should 

be suppressed because the search was neither supported by probable 

cause nor by a knowing and voluntary consent. Brief of Appellant 

at 2. · 

A. Jurisdiction 

This court requested briefing on whether we have appellate 

jurisdiction. On April 26, 1988, the district court heard and 

denied the appellant's motion to suppress. That same day, the 

appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty. On July 27, 1988, 

the court imposed sentence. Final judgment was docketed on 

July 28, 1988. On July 1 1 , 1988, the appellant filed an untimely 

notice of appeal with respect to the initial judgment. on July 18, 

1988, the court entered an amended judgment and commitment. The 

amendment related to the conditions of supervised release following 

confinement. On July 21, 1988, the appellant filed a notice of 

appeal from the amended judgment. on August 3, 1988, appellant 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 3 
filed a motion pursuant to Rule 4 {b) of the Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure for a thirty day extension of time for filing 

the notice of appeal. The government did not oppose the motion. 

The district court granted the motion on the same date. 

Both the appellant and the gov~rnment argue that this court 

has appellate jurisdiction since the two notices of appeal were 

filed within the thirty day extension period. The dis trict court 

order granted the maximum extension of thirty days, or until 

August 7, 1988, to file the notice of appeal. Both notices of 

appeal were filed within that time frame. We conclude that we have 

jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 

B. Merits of the Appeal 

The testimony given at the suppression hearing indicates that 

in the early afternoon of November 5, 1987, appellant and his wife 

drove into a permanent United States Border Patrol checkpoint on 

Interstate Highway 25 near Truth or Consequences, New Mexico. 

Border Patrol Agent Robert H. Dunlap questioned appellant regarding 

his citizenship. Appellant indicated he was a United states 

citizen. Appellant's wife presented an alien registration card. 

R. Vol. II, at 6. Agent Dunlap testified that appellant was very 

tense. Dunlap further testified that he asked for permissi on t o 

look in the trunk of the appellant's automobile. The appellant 

immediately exited the car and opened the trunk. R. Vol. II, at 

7. Dunlap noted a large amount of luggage and clothing in the 

trunk of the car. When asked if they were moving, the appellant 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 4 
replied that they were merely going to Albuquerque for the weekend . 

R. Vol. II, at 8. 

Dunlap testified that he then asked for permission to search 

the 1 uggage. Appellant did not respond verbally; instead he 

unzipped the suitcase. Dunlap observed inside the sui tease a 

plastic-wrapped package similar to marijuana packages he had 

confiscated in the past month. Inside the package was marijuana. · 

R. Vol. II, at 9. 

The appellant testified at the hearing that he interpreted 

Dunlap's statements as orders to open both the trunk and the 

suitcase and that he complied accordingly. R. Vol. II, at 24-26. 

The district court found that Agent Dunlap had reasonable 

suspic.ion, based on appellant 1 s _nervous conduct, prior to asking 

for consent to search. The court found that Dunlap did not order 

app~llant to open the trunk or the suitcase; rather, he requested 

consent. Finally, the court found that the appellant had 

voluntarily consented to the search. R. Vol. II, at 37. 

The standard of review is well established: 

In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the trial 

court's finding of fact must be accepted by this court 

unless clearly erroneous, United States v. Cooper, 733 

F.2d 1360, 1364 (lOth Cir. 1984), with the evidence 

viewed in the light most favorable to the district 

court's finding. United states v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 

1371, 1376 (lOth Cir. 1984). 

United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (lOth Cir. 1986) 

(quot.ing United states v. Lopez, 777 F. 2d 543, 548 (lOth cir. 

1985)). 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 5 
The appellant first argues that his detention at the Border 

Patrol checkpoint went beyond an authorized investigatory stop and 

thus was an unconstitutional seizure of his person. The appellant 

argues that detention at a permanent Border Patrol checkpoint is 

lawful when the inquiry is brief and concerns only the citizenship 

of the occupants of the vehicle. Appellant argues that any further 

detention, inquiry into other matters, or search must be supported 

by probable cause. 

The Border Patrol maintains permanent checkpoints on important 

roads leading away f:r:om the border.. At these checkpoints, a 

vehicle may be stopped and its occupants may be questioned briefly, 

even if there is no reason to believe the particular vehicle 

contains illegal aliens. United States v. Villamonte-Marguez, 462 

u.s. 579, 587 (1983) (citing United States v. Martinez -Fuerte, 428 

u.s. 543, 545 (1976)). The occupants ot the vehicle may be 

required to answer a few questions regarding their citizenship or 

to produce documentation evidencing a right to be in the United 

States. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 u.s. at 558 (quoting United States 

v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873, 880 (1975)). Additionally, the 

Border Patrol may ask the driver and passengers to explain 

suspicious circumstances. United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 

891 (lOth Cir. 1986). In a case decided this term we have 

reaffirmed the authority of the Border Patrol to question 

individuals regarding suspicious circumstances, in addition to 

citizenship matters, when those individuals are stopped at a 

permanent checkpoint. United States v. Johnson, __ F.2d (lOth 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 6 
Cir. 1990). At permanent checkpoints removed from the border, 

however, officers may not search a private vehicle without consent 

or probable cause. United states v . Orti z , 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 

(1975). 

In the present case, the district court found that Agent 

Dunlap had reasonable suspicion, based on appella nt's nervous 

conduct, to question appellant further and to request permission 

to search . R. Vol. II, at 37. The finding of reasonable suspicion 

is not specificall y challenge d on appeal ; however, we hold that 

this finding is not clearly erroneous. Agent Dunlap t e stified t hat 

appellant demonstrated several indicia o f nervousness. Appell a nt 

was gripping the steering wheel tightly, his knuckles were white , 

his Adam's apple was moving up and down, he stuttered when he 

answered Dunlap ' s questions, and he was s weating alt hough it was 

fairly cool that day. R. Vol. I I , at 20. Appellant' s nervousness 

gave rise to reasona ble suspici on which j ustified Ag ent Dunlap ' s 

f u rther questioning and request for consent to search . 

Appe llant next argues that he d i d not knowingly and 

voluntari ly consent to a search of his v ehicle . Appe llant never 

verbally consented ·t o t h e s earch; howe ver, i n r e sponse t o u .e 

agent's statements, appellant exited the v ehicle, opened the trunk, 

and opened a suitcase contained in the trunk. The dis trict cour t 

found that the agent did not order appel lant to ope n the trunk , 

that ins tead he asked to look i n the trunk, and that the appellant 

voluntarily opened both the trunk and the s uitcase. 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 7 
Whether a consent to search is voluntary or was a product of 

quress or coercion is a question of fact to be determined from the 

totality of the circumstances. United States v. Mendenha-ll, 446 

u.s. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 227 

(1973). This court has previously/ set forth the three-tiered 

analysis for determining whether the government has sustained its 

burden of showing that consent ·to search was voluntary: 

First, there must be clear and positive testimony that 

the consent was unequivocal and specific, and freely and 

intelligently given. Second, the Government must 

establish that consent was given without duress or 

coercion. Finally, we evaluate the first two standards 

with the traditional indulgence of the courts against a 

presumption of waiver of constitutional rights. 

United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1453 (lOth Cir. 1985) 

(citing United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (lOth Cir. 

1977); Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (lOth cir. 

1962)) . Applying these standards to the facts of the case, we 

conclude that appellant voluntarily consented to t he search of his 

vehicle. 

Appellant was stopped during the daytime at a permanent Border 

Patrol checkpoint where all vehicles are stopped briefly. As he 

drove up to the checkpoint, appellant should have seen that all 

vehicles were being stopped at the checkpoint. Appellant should 

have seen visible signs of the officers' authority, from Agent 

Dunlap's uniform to the Border Patrol insignia on the checkpoint. 

R. Vol II, at 18. The appellant was not ill and did not have 

trouble understanding English. R. Vol. II, at 27-18. Agent Dunlap 

testified that he did not demonstrate an authoritative demeanor; 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 8 
rather, he attempted to "keep it real light." R. Vol. II, at 30. 

The situation was not coercive in nature. 

Agent Dunlap testified that he asked if appellant "minded if 

we looked in the trunk" and later he asked if appellant "mind[ed] 

if we look in the suitcases." R. Vol. II, at 9, a. Appellant 

immediately opened the trunk and unzipped the suitcase. R. Vol. 

II, at 7, 9. Whether Agent Dunlap's words constituted an order or 

a request with which the appellant voluntarily complie d presented 

a credibility issue for the district court. This court's review 

of the transcript of hearing indicates that the issue was close. 

The appellant's testi mony was directly at odds with Agent Dunlap's 

testimony. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the district court's decision and giving due deference to the 

district court's credibility findings, we hold that the distric t 

court's finding of voluntariness is not clearly erroneous. 

Appellant's final argument is that the evidence should be 

suppressed because it was seized without probable cause or consent 

to search, in violation of the fourth amendment. The initial stop 

of appellant at the checkpoint is not challenged. We have held 

that the continued detention at the checkpoint was based on 

reasonable suspicion and that the search was consensual. Finding 

nothing clearly erroneous in its ruling, we affirm the district 

court's denial of the appellant's motion to suppress and the 

appellant's conviction and sentence in this case. 

AFFIRMED. 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 9 
ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLI:ftK . 

~niteo ~tates (fiuurt of ~penis 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OI"I"ICE: 01" THE CLIIIIIK 

C<&O<& UNITED !'!TATES COURTHOUSE 

OENVEA. COLORADO 80294 , 

April 2, 1990 

TELEPHONE 

(3031 844·3UJ7 

<FTSl !564•31!57 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED APPEAL 

RE: Nos. 88-2117 and 88-2173 

USA v. Jose Manuel Benitez 

It has been noted that page 6 of the opinion issued 

March 30, 1990, in the. above captioned appe~l, is 

missing. Upon receipt of page 6 in this office, you 

will be forwarded a copy of such. 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT() HOECKER~,, G~e;k 

By: {.J.w. C\ \, , ~ atrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 10 
PUBLISH 

F' lLED 

U-nir(.'Ci Scares Court of Appeals 

Tench Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS. MAR 3 0 1990 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOSE MANUEL BENITEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L HOECKER 

Clerk 

NO. 88-2117, 88-2173 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR 87-468 JC) 

Presiliano A. Torrez, Assistant United States Attorney (William L. 

Lutz, United States Attorney, on the brief), ·Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Charles Louis Roberts, (Gary Hill and Robert Ramos, El Paso, Texas, 

on the brief), El Paso, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and THEIS,* District 

Judge. 

THEIS, District Judge . 

*The Honorable Frank G. Theis, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

This is an appea l from a final judgment and commitment in a 

criminal case. The appellant, Jose Manuel Benitez, was indicted 

for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 

and aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a} (1) and 

1 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 11 
18 u.s.c. § 2. The appellant's motion to suppress evidence was 

denied by the district court. Following the denial of his motion 

to suppress, the appellant entered a guilty plea and reserved the 

right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 

As stated by the appellant, th~ issues presented on appeal 

are: whether the detention and seizure of the appellant and his 

vehicle went beyond that authorized at a Border Patrol checkpoi nt 

and thus violated the fourth amendment to the Uni ted states 

' Constitution; whether the appellant gave a knowing and voluntar y 

consent to the search. of h i s vehiclei and whether the evidence 

seized from the appellant's vehicle and the fruits thereof should 

be s uppressed because the s earch was neither supported by proba ble 

cause nor by a knowing and voluntary consent. Brief of Appellant 

at 2. 

A. Jurisdi ction 

This court requested briefing on whether we have appell a te 

jurisdiction. On April 26, 1988, the distri ct court heard a nd 

denied the appellant's moti on to suppress. That same day, the 

appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty. On J u ly 27, 1988 , 

the court imposed sentence. Final judgment was docketed on 

July 28, 1988. On July 11, 1988, the appella nt filed an untimely 

notice of appeal with respect to the initial judgment. On July 18, 

1988, the court entered an amended judgment and commitment. The 

amendment related to the conditions of supervised releas e following 

confinement. On July 21, 1 9 88, the appellant filed a notice of 

appeal from the amended judgment. On August 3, 1988, appellant 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 12 
filed a motion pursuant to Rule 4 (b) of the Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure for a thirty day extension of time for filing 

the notice of appeal. The government did not oppose the motion. 

The district court granted the motion on the same date. 

Both the appellant and the gove.rnment argue that this court 

has appellate jurisdiction since the two notices of appeal were 

filed within the thirty day extension period. The district court 

order granted the maximum extension of thirty days , or until 

August 7, 1988, to file the notice of appeal. Both notices of 

appeal were filed within that time frame . We conclude that we have 

jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 

B. Merits of the Appeal 

The testimony given at the suppression hearing indicates that 

in the early afternoon of November 5, 1987, appellant and his wife 

drove into a permanent United states Border Patrol checkpoint on 

Interstate Highway 25 near Truth or Consequences, New Mexico. 

Border Patrol Agent Robert H. Dunlap questioned appellant regarding 

his citizenship. Appellant indicated he was a United States 

citizen. _Appel lant's wife presented an alien registration card . 

R. Vol. II, at 6. Agent Dunlap testified that appellant was very 

tense. Dunlap further testified that he asked for permission to 

look in the trunk of the appellant's automobile. The appellant 

immediately exited the car and opened the trunk. R. Vol. II, at 

7. Dunlap noted a large amount of luggage and clothing in the 

trunk of the car. When asked if they were moving, the appellant 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 13 
replied that they were merely going to Albuquerque for the weekend. 

R. Vol . II, at 8. 

Dunlap testified that he then asked for permission to search 

the 1 uggage. Appellant did not respond verbally; instead he 

unzipped the sui tease. Dunlap obs.¢rved inside the . sui tease a 

plastic-wrapped package similar to marijuana packages he had 

confiscated in the past month. Inside the package was marijuana . 

R. Vol. II, at 9. 

The appellant testified at the hearing that he interpreted 

Dunlap 1 s statements as orders to open both the trunk and the 

suitcase and that he complied accordingly. R. Vol. II, at 24-26. 

The district court found that Agent Dunlap had reasonable 

suspicion, based on appellant's nervous conduct, prior to asking 

for consent to search. The court found that Dunlap did not order 

appellant to open the trunk or the suitcase: rather, he requested 

consent. Finally, the court found that the appellant had 

voluntarily consented to the search. R. Vol. II, at 37 . 

The standard of review is well established: 

In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the trial 

court's finding of fact must be accepted by this court 

unless clearly erroneous, United States v. Cooper, 733 

F.2d 1360, · 1364 (lOth Cir. 1984) 1 with the evidence 

viewed in the light most favorable to the district 

court's finding. United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 

1371, 1376 (lOth cir. 1984). 

United States v. Espinosa, 782 F. 2d 888 1 892 (lOth cir. 1986) 

(quot,ing United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (lOth Cir. 

1985)). 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 14 
The appellant first argues that his detention at the Border 

Patrol checkpoint went beyond an authorized inve~tigatory stop and 

thus was an unconstitutional seizure of his person. The appellant 

argues that detention at a permanent Border Patrol checkpoint is 

lawful when the inquiry is brief and concerns only the citizenship 

of the occupants of the vehicle. Appellant argues that any further 

detention, inquiry into other matters, or search must be supported 

by probable cause. 

The Border Patrol maintains permanent checkpoints on important 

roads leading away f:r:om the border.. At these checkpoints, a 

vehicle may be stopped and its occupants may be questioned briefly, 

even if there is no reason to believe the particular vehicle 

contains illegal aliens. United States v. Villamonte-Marguez, 462 

U.S. 579, 587 (1983) (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 

u.s. 543, 545 -(1976)). The occupants of the vehicle may be 

required to answer a few questions regarding their citizenship or 

to produce documentation evidencing a right to be in the United 

States. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 u.s. at 558 (quoting United States 

v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873, 880 (1975)). Additionally, the 

Border Patrol may ask the driver and passengers to explain 

suspicious circumstances. United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 

891 (lOth Cir. 1986). In a case decided this term we have 

reaffirmed the authority of the Border Patrol to question 

individuals regarding suspicious circumstances, in addition to 

citizenship matters, when those individuals are stopped at a 

permanent checkpoint. United states v. Johnson, F.2d (lOth 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 15 
Whether a consent to search is voluntary or was a product of 

duress or coercion is a question of fact to be determined from the 

totality of the circumstances. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 

u.s. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 u.s. 218, 227 

{1973). This court has previously set forth the three-tiered / 

analysis for determining whether the government has sustained its 

burden of showing that consent to search was voluntary: 

First, there must be clear and positive testimony that 

the consent was unequivocal and specific, and freely and 

intelligently given. Second, the Government must 

establish that consent was given without duress or 

coercion. Finally, we evaluate t~e first two standards 

with the traditional indulgence of the courts against a 

presumption of waiver of constitutional rights. 

United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1453 (lOth Cir. 1985) 

(citing United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (lOth Cir. 

1977) ; Villano v. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 684 (lOth Cir. 

1962)). Applying these standards to the facts of the case, we 

conclude that appellant voluntarily consented to the search of his 

vehicle. 

Appellant was stopped during the daytime at a permanent Border 

Patrol checkpoint where all vehicles are stopped briefly. As he 

drove up to the checkpoint, appe llant should have seen that all 

vehicles were being stopped at the checkpoint. Appellant should 

have seen visible signs of the officers' authority, from Agent 

Dunlap's uniform to the Border Patrol insignia on the checkpoint. 

R. Vol II, at 18. The appellant was not ill and did not have 

trouble understanding English. R. Vol. II, at 27-18. Agent Dunlap 

testified that he did not demonstrate an authoritative demeanor; 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 16 
rather, he attempted to "keep it real light. 11 R. Vol. II, at 30. 

The situation was not coercive in nature. 

Agent Dunlap testified that he asked if appellant "minded if 

we looked in the trunk" and later he asked if appellant "mind[ed] 

if we look in the suitcases." R. yol. II, at 9, 8. Appellant 

immediately opened the trunk and unzipped the suitcase. R. Vol. 

II, at 7, 9. Whether Agent Dunlap's words constituted an order or 

a request with which the appellant voluntarily complied presented 

a credibility issue for the district court. This court's review 

of the transcript of hearing indicates that the issue was close. 

The appellant's testimony was directly at odds with Agent Dunlap's 

testimony • . Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the district court 1 s decision and giving due deference to the 

district court's credibility findings, we hold that the district 

court's finding of voluntariness 'is not clearly erroneous. 

Appellant's final argument is that the evidence should be 

suppressed because it was seized without probable cause or consent 

to search, in violation of the fourth amendment. The initial stop 

of appellant at the checkpoint is not challenged. We have held 

that the continued detention at the checkpoint was based on 

reasonable suspicion and that the search was consensual. Finding 

nothing clearly erroneous in its ruling, we affirm the district 

court's denial of the appellant 1 s motion to suppress and the 

appella~t's conviction and sentence in this case. 

AFFIRMED. 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2173 Document: 01019748711 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 17