Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-02141/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-02141-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Pawnbrokers Association, Inc.
Plaintiff
Ashton B. Carter
Defendant
United States Department of Defense
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA PAWNBROKERS 

ASSOCIATION, INC., a 

California Non-Profit 

Corporation, on behalf of 

itself and its members,

Plaintiff,

v.

ASHTON B. CARTER, in his 

official capacity as 

Secretary of Defense; and THE 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-02141-JAM-KJN

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

This matter is before the Court on California Pawnbrokers 

Association’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

against Ashton B. Carter and the United States Department of 

Defense (collectively “Defendants”). A hearing on this Motion 

took place on November 1, 2016. For the reasons set forth below, 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied. 

///

///

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Department of Defense (“Department”) is responsible for 

promulgating regulations to implement the Military Lending Act 

(“MLA”). The purpose of the MLA is to protect members of the

military and their dependents from the financial pitfalls related 

to consumer credit and ensure military readiness. See Memorandum 

Opinion, Huntco Pawn Holdings, LLC v. U.S. Department of Defense, 

Civil Action No. 16-cv-1433 (CKK) (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2016) at 3

(“Huntco”). The MLA achieves this by limiting the interest-rates 

that lenders can impose on loans and requiring lenders to fulfill 

certain other terms and conditions when extending credit to 

covered borrowers. See Limitations on Terms of Consumer Credit 

Extended to Service Members and Dependents, 80 Fed. Reg. 43560, 

43560 (Jul. 22, 2015) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 232)

(“2015 Rule”). Prior to 2015, the Department limited the 

definition of consumer credit to payday loans, vehicle title 

loans, and refund anticipation loans. Opp. at 3. The Department

also created a safe harbor by which creditors could avoid the 

MLA’s restrictions and penalties if they obtained a disclosure 

statement from the applicant stating that the applicant was not a 

covered borrower (“self-certification”). Id. Use of the selfcertification was entirely optional and creditors were free to 

use other means to determine whether an applicant would be 

covered under the MLA, though other means would not qualify for 

the safe harbor. Id. 

In 2015, after notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Department 

changed its regulations, expanding the definition of consumer 

credit and changing the terms of the safe harbor provision. 2015 

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Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 43560. “Consumer credit” now includes all 

credit currently “subject to the disclosure requirements of the 

Truth in Lending Act [(“TILA”)], codified in Regulation Z.” Id.; 

32 C.F.R. § 232.3(f)(1). With this expansion, the MLA, for the 

first time, covers pawn transactions. Mot. at 4; see Truth in 

Lending, 61 Fed. Reg. 14952 (Apr. 4, 1996) (to be codified at 12 

C.F.R. § 226) (amending official staff interpretation to include 

pawn transactions). The new safe harbor “permits a creditor to 

legally conclusively determine whether a consumer is a covered 

borrower by using information obtained either: (i) Directly or 

indirectly from the MLA Database or (ii) in a consumer report 

from a nationwide consumer reporting agency or a reseller who 

provides such a consumer report.” 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 43560, 

43577; 32 C.F.R. § 232.5(b). “A search of the Department’s 

database requires the entry of the consumer’s last name, date of 

birth, and Social Security number.” 32 C.F.R. 

§ 232.5(b)(2)(i)(A). 

CAPA filed the present suit seeking to stay and ultimately 

enjoin enforcement of the sections of the 2015 Rule that include 

pawn transactions and pawnbrokers in their definitions of 

consumer credit and creditor. Mot. at 1. Alternatively, CAPA 

seeks to stay the new safe harbor provision and restore the 

borrowers’ self-certification from the prior rule. Id. CAPA 

filed an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order on 

September 16, 2016, to stop the 2015 Rule from going into effect 

on October 3rd. ECF No. 11. This Court denied the Ex Parte 

Motion and set the matter for hearing to determine whether the 

Court should issue a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 15. On 

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October 12, 2016, the District Court for the District of Columbia 

made a final ruling on the merits in Huntco, a case raising 

similar challenges to the 2015 Rule. See Order Granting Joint 

Motion to Convert Opinion and Order into Final Judgment, Huntco 

Pawn Holdings, LLC v. U.S. Department of Defense, Civil Action 

No. 16-cv-1433 (CKK) (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2016). This Court ordered 

supplemental briefing with respect to Defendants’ Motion to 

Change Venue (not at issue here) and the preclusive effect, if 

any, of the Huntco decision on this matter.1 ECF 21. 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that 

may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 

entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 

Counsel, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To obtain a preliminary 

injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) it is likely 

to succeed on the merits, (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable 

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of 

equities tips in its favor, and (4) an injunction is in the 

public interest. Boardman v. Pacific Seafood Grp., 822 F.3d 

1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).

B. Analysis

Applying the Winter factors to the present matter, the Court 

finds that CAPA has not shown it is likely to succeed on the 

merits or that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm. Given 

 

1 The Court and the parties lack sufficient information about the 

parties to determine res judicata at this time.

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that these conclusions warrant denial of Plaintiff’s motion, the 

Court need not and will not also address the balance of the 

equities and public interest factors. 

1. Likelihood of Success On the Merits

CAPA’s Complaint contains four separate counts each of which 

CAPA argues is likely to succeed on the merits. Mot. at 17–18.

a. CAPA Is Not Likely to Succeed On the

Merits of Count 1

Under Count 1, CAPA claims that the 2015 Rule’s “inclusion 

of non-resource pawn loans within the scope of the MLA is 

arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion not in 

accordance with law.” Compl. at 19. 

Preliminarily the Court finds that CAPA may challenge the 

2015 Rule based on the inclusion of pawn transactions because 

other pawnbrokers groups raised the issue during the notice-andcomment rulemaking process. See Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 

(“This court has excused the exhaustion requirements for a 

particular issue when the agency has in fact considered the 

issue.”); 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 43560, 43562.

As for judicial review of agency action, federal courts 

first ask whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 

question at issue. Providence Yakima Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 611 

F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 

(1984)). “[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 

to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 

agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 

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statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. “If Congress has explicitly 

left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation 

of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of 

the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are 

given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, 

or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 843–44. The 

Ninth Circuit has further explained: 

An arbitrary and capricious challenge requires us to 

adhere to a narrow scope of review, wherein we are not 

to substitute our judgment for that of the agency. The 

agency, however, is required to examine the relevant 

data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its 

action including a rational connection between the 

facts found and the choices made and we in turn must 

review that explanation, considering whether the 

decision was based on a consideration of the relevant 

factors and whether there has been a clear error of 

judgment. A rule is arbitrary and capricious if the 

agency has relied on factors which Congress has not 

intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an 

important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation 

for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 

before the agency, or is so implausible that it could 

not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product 

of agency expertise.

Providence Yakima Med. Ctr., 611 F.3d at 1190 (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). 

Congress delegated the authority to promulgate regulations 

to effectuate the Military Lending Act to the Department of 

Defense. See 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 43560, 43567. This 

authority includes the authority to define “consumer credit” and 

therefore the MLA’s application to different lenders. See 10 

U.S.C. § 987(i)(6). 

CAPA argues that the inclusion of nonrecourse pawn loans 

within the scope of the MLA is arbitrary and capricious. CAPA 

points out that the 2015 Rule “includes nonrecourse pawn 

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transactions within the scope of the MLA even though payment is 

not ‘deferred.’” Mot. at 9 (citing 32 C.F.R. § 232.3(f)(1)). 

The same 2015 Rule defines “credit” as “the right granted to a 

consumer by a creditor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt 

and defer its payment.” Id. (citing 32 C.F.R. § 232.3(h)). CAPA 

claims that redemption and payment of a pawn loan is optional and 

there is no cognizable “debt” assignable to the pledger. Id. It 

further argues that the 2015 Rule does not provide “any logical 

reasoning articulating how pawn transactions are ‘predatory’” or 

“why pawn transactions are now included under the definition of 

‘consumer credit.’” Id. CAPA argues that the Department failed 

to review relevant data and provide any explanation for the 

application of the 2015 Rule to pawn transactions. Id. Further, 

CAPA points out that Congress passed the MLA in response to a 

Department report on predatory lending practices and pawn 

transactions were not included in that report; only a few 

practices were identified and the first Rule promulgated by the 

Department to enforce the MLA only addressed those identified 

practices. Id. at 8–9.

Defendants argue that the Department “reasonably explained 

its decision to expand the MLA protections to include any credit 

transaction subject to the requirements of the TILA regulation, 

including pawn loans, and to exclude only those types of credit 

transactions exempted by Congress itself in the MLA.” Opp. at 9. 

Even if the Department did not include a specific explanation as 

to why pawn loans would be covered under the 2015 Rule, 

Defendants argue that the Department addressed the pawnbrokers’ 

request “as part of its broader discussion to reject any 

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exceptions not required by statute.” Id. (citing 2015 Rule, 80 

Fed. Reg. 43560, 43561-62, 43568-69). The 2015 Rule explicitly 

acknowledged the pawnbrokers’ request for exemption and thus the 

Departments’ broad discussion of its reasoning applied to that 

request. Id.

Judge Kollar-Kotelly evaluated a claim substantially similar 

to CAPA’s in Huntco and found that the Huntco plaintiffs were not 

likely to succeed on the merits of the claim. Huntco at 19–20. 

In that case, plaintiffs Huntco Pawnholdings, LLC, and the 

National Pawnbrokers Association (“NPA”) argued, inter alia, that 

the 2015 Rule is arbitrary and capricious. Huntco at 15. Even 

though that decision is not binding on this Court, Judge KollarKotelly’s reasoning provides guidance to the Court on this issue.

The analysis in Huntco tracks Defendants’ arguments in the 

present case. Judge Kollar-Kotelly recognized: 

The Department expressly noted that pawnbrokers were 

among the commenters requesting exemptions, stating 

that “pawnbrokers and their representatives explain 

that traditional pawn transactions are different in 

kind from other types of credit transactions, 

principally because a pawn transaction typically is a 

non-recourse loan, and should be exempt from the scope 

of ‘consumer credit’ regulated under the MLA.”

Huntco at 17; 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 43560, 43562. The court 

held that the “Department’s failure to specifically discuss its 

rationale for denying pawn loans a special exemption from the 

Final Rule does not render the rule arbitrary or capricious.” 

Id. at 16. It found that the Department “discussed” the 

comments from financial institutions requesting exemptions, 

including pawnbrokers, “as a group,” id. at 17, and accepted the 

Department’s response to those exemptions as a “reasoned 

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explanation,” id. at 18. The Huntco court pointed out that the 

Department particularly took note of the comment submitted by 

U.S. Senators “that urged the Department to widely expand the 

definition of ‘consumer credit’ to close the ‘existing MLA 

loopholes’” and “asserted that creditors were able to evade the 

law by crafting loans that fell just barely outside the 

parameters of the definition of ‘consumer credit.’” Id. Noting 

the Department’s reasoning that “all ‘high cost loans’ pose some 

‘risks to covered borrowers,’” the Huntco court concluded that 

“[t]his rationale applies with full force to pawn loans, which, 

despite the NPA’s attempt to distinguish them in numerous ways 

from other types of harmful lending, are indisputably ‘high 

cost.’” Id. at 18–19. It found the Department’s general 

response in the 2015 Rule adequate to address the pawnbrokers’

exemption request and stated that “Plaintiffs cite[d] no 

authority requiring the Department to separately address each and 

every exemption requested, especially where approximately fifty 

such requests were made.” Id. at 19. 

The 2015 Rule provides a lengthy explanation of the 

Department’s purpose and justification for expanding the scope of 

the regulation. Based on comments submitted on the Proposed 

Rule, its consultations with a number of other federal agencies, 

and “its experience administering the existing regulation for 

over seven years,” the Department decided to broaden the 

regulation to cover credit that is already subject to the Truth 

in Lending Act. 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 43560, 43560. The 

Department “believes that this final rule is appropriate in order 

to address a wider range of credit products[.]” Id. The 

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Department cited to hundreds of comments, the majority of which 

expressed support for the new Rule, including support from a 

number of U.S. Senators and Attorneys General. Id. at 43561–62. 

It further stated that over 350 groups, trade associations, and 

business submitted comments, many of which expressed concerns or 

opposition to the new Rule. Id. “Most financial institutions, 

through approximately 50 comments, urge[d] the [Department] to 

adopt in the final rule an exemption for certain types of 

creditors or, more narrowly, one or more exemptions for certain 

types of credit products.” Id. at 43561. After describing some 

of these specific requests, the Department noted the specific 

exemption requested by pawnbrokers. Id. at 43562.

As background, the Department explained that “the narrowly 

defined parameters of the credit products regulated as ‘consumer 

credit’ under the [previous] rule [did] not effectively provide 

the protections intended to be afforded to Service members and 

their families under the MLA.” Id. at 43563. Particularly, the 

Department discussed the “need to address risks posed by high 

cost consumer credit” and rejected the position that the enabling 

statute is intended solely to address so-called “predatory” loan 

products:

Even though the Department’s initial proposal, issued 

in April 2007, referred to various studies and reports 

(including reports and other initiatives by the 

Department) that describe ‘predatory’ lending 

‘practices,’ the Department broadly described its 

overarching aim, namely, to promote readiness by taking 

steps to reduce the risk that a Service member or his 

or her family could get caught in a ‘debt trap.’ . . . 

When implementing the regulation in 2007, the 

Department acted in light of the short timetable for 

the effective date of 10 U.S.C. 987 and the instruction 

to act swiftly[.] . . . Still, the Department elected 

to act judiciously by initially regulating only certain 

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credit products that, at that time, the Department 

believed posed the most severe risks to Service members 

and their families. . . . As the Department explained 

when issuing the Proposed Rule, ‘a broader range of 

closed-end and open-end credit products carry high 

costs, many of which far exceed the interest rate limit 

established in 10 U.S.C. 987(b), and thereby pose risks 

to Service members and their families.’ The Department 

believes, and comments amply support the view, that the 

scope of consumer credit reasonably could apply to 

credit products that are subject to the requirements of 

Regulation Z in order to reduce the risks to covered 

borrowers posed by high-cost loans, and still preserve 

access to a wide range of products, including ‘much 

needed, good, small-dollar credit options,’ for those 

borrowers.

Id. at 43566–68. The Department went on to specifically discuss 

why it chose not to create an exemption for an insured depository 

institution or insured credit union and then also explained its 

reasons for creating conditional exclusions for credit card 

accounts. Id. at 43568. It did not specifically explain its 

reasoning for including pawn transactions in the 2015 Rule, but 

neither did it explain its basis for including every other 

creditor or credit device that the 2015 Rule ultimately swept 

into its coverage. 

The Department has provided an adequate explanation of its 

reasons for expanding the definition of the rule. The Department 

specifically acknowledged that pawnbrokers were one of the many 

affected creditors that requested an exemption and provided a 

rationale—though general—explanation for why it chose to expand 

the regulation to the extent that it did. This decision does not 

appear arbitrary or capricious and CAPA is not likely to succeed 

on the merits of this claim.

b. CAPA Is Not Likely to Succeed On the 

Merits of Count 2

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Under Count 2, CAPA claims that the 2015 Rule violates equal 

protection and is thus unconstitutional. Compl. at 22. CAPA 

argues that the 2015 Rule impacts California pawnbrokers 

differently than it does pawnbrokers elsewhere because California 

pawnbrokers are subject to the California Unruh Civil Rights Act 

(“Unruh Act”). Mot. at 11 (citing Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51(b), 

51.5(a)). Under the Unruh Act, one who denies or discriminates 

against a consumer based on that consumer’s immigration status 

may be subject to a fine of $4,000 or more. Mot. at 11–12 

(citing Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a)). CAPA argues that the Unruh Act 

will prevent California pawnbrokers from being able to utilize

the 2015 Rule’s safe harbor provision without facing liability, 

thus denying them equal protection of the law. Id. at 10–12. 

CAPA acknowledges that if the safe harbor is mandatory, it 

preempts state law. Rep. at 5; 10 U.S.C. § 987(d). CAPA argues 

that it is precisely due to the fact that the safe harbor is 

“optional” that it violates their constitutional rights because 

CAPA members cannot avail themselves of the safe harbor’s 

protection without violating the Unruh Act. Id.

Defendants argue that CAPA’s equal protection claim fails 

because nothing in the 2015 Rule prohibits the extension of 

credit to individuals who lack a SSN. Opp. at 13. Building on 

this point, they argue that the alleged injury to CAPA’s members 

follows from California state law, not the 2015 Rule. Id. at 13–

14. Further, even if CAPA has an equal protection claim, 

Defendants argue the 2015 Rule would survive rational basis 

review. Id. at 14. 

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Although the Court acknowledges that CAPA members face a bit 

of a Morton’s Fork,2 CAPA’s equal protection theory is not likely 

to succeed. An equal protection claim typically arises where the 

government makes a distinction between groups that burdens some 

but not others. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.

Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The 2015 Rule does not distinguish 

between lenders in different states or single out lenders in

California in particular. The Rule applies to all covered 

creditors all over the United States. CAPA’s argument rests on 

the premise that a rule that applies to creditors across the 

nation but impacts pawnbrokers in California in a different way

violates equal protection. Although disparate impact may trigger

a heightened standard of review in discrimination cases, Cf.,

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 

252 (1977), CAPA has failed to provide this Court with any 

jurisprudence or special facts that supports their theory. 

Furthermore, CAPA members are still able to minimize their risk 

of liability by continuing to use a self-certification or other 

method to verify covered borrower status. See 32 C.F.R. 

§ 232.5(a). While they may choose not to use the legally 

conclusive safe harbor due to fear of liability under California 

law, they are still authorized to use other means of verification 

to all but ensure compliance with the MLA. 

Even if the 2015 Rule does raise equal protection concerns, 

 

2 Moore v. Czerniak, 574 F.3d 1092, 1166 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(Callahan, J., dissenting) (“‘Morton’s Fork’-a choice between two 

equally unpleasant alternatives.”).

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the parties agree that rational basis is the appropriate standard 

of review. Rational basis is a highly deferential standard: “The 

burden [on the challenger] is to negative every conceivable basis 

which might support [the law] whether or not the basis has a 

foundation in the record.” Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. 

Mgmt., 824 F. Supp.2d 968, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). The Department offered a lengthy 

explanation for its decision to promulgate the new safe harbor 

provision and move away from the self-certification procedure. 

2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 43560, 43576–77. This explanation 

withstands rational basis review.

c. CAPA Is Not Likely to Succeed On the 

Merits of Count 3

Under Count 3, CAPA claims that the safe harbor provision of 

the 2015 Rule contravenes Section 7 of The Privacy Act of 1974. 

Compl. at 24. Section 7 of that Act states: “It shall be 

unlawful for any Federal, State or Local Government Agency to 

deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided 

by law because of such individual’s refusal to disclose his 

social security account number.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a note. The 

Section does not apply to disclosures required by federal 

statute. Id. CAPA argues that this Section applies to 

pawnbrokers because under the 2015 Rule pawnbrokers are 

“deputized” as government agents when they obtain SSNs from their 

customers. Mot. at 12-13. Because, CAPA argues, SSN collection 

is essentially mandatory due to the safe harbor provision, there 

is a close nexus or impetus for collection that stems from the 

regulation. As such, CAPA claims that the safe harbor violates 

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the Privacy Act and must be declared void. Id. at 13–16.

Defendants argue that the Privacy Act applies to government 

agencies, not private businesses. Opp. at 15. They reiterate 

that collection of SSNs is not compelled and that pawnbrokers are 

free to reduce their risk of liability via the safe harbor or 

choose not to do so. Id. at 12–13. Turning to the cases CAPA’s 

theory of deputization is premised on, Defendants argue that any 

perceived obligation on the part of the pawnbrokers to collect 

SSNs does not give rise to the type of government commandeering 

of private entities that has only been found in extreme 

situations. Id. at 15. 

The Department went to great lengths in the 2015 Rule to 

explain that use of the safe harbor, and collection of SSNs, is 

not mandatory. 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 43560, 43576. It pointed

out that nothing in the MLA “mandates the provision of any safe 

harbor for a covered borrower check.” Id. Rather, the 

Department has chosen to provide a safe harbor on its own 

volition. Use of the provision is optional and the 2015 Rule 

does not prescribe a method for a covered borrower check: “A 

creditor is permitted to apply its own method to assess whether a 

consumer is a covered borrower.” 32 C.F.R. § 232.5(a). 

CAPA cites two district court cases to support its argument. 

First, in Joliet Oil Corp. v. Brown, 55 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Ill. 

1943), gasoline dealers were found to be agents of the government 

where they were required to follow orders of the president during 

the president’s wartime rationing program. Second, in Yeager v. 

Hackensack, 615 F. Supp. 1087 (D. N.J. 1985), a private water 

company’s collection of SSNs from customers during a drought 

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emergency was imputed to the state for Privacy Act purposes. In 

that case, after declaring a drought emergency, the Governor 

ordered certain government agents to take whatever steps were 

necessary to alleviate the emergency. Id. at 1088. The relevant 

Administrative Order delegated primary monitoring and threshold 

enforcement function to individual water purveyors and local 

governments, permitting the purveyor to require names of 

individuals in residential units and directing those purveyors to 

provide appropriate officials with information needed to carry 

out enforcement actions. Id. at 1089. Defendant, a purveyor, 

sent out postcards seeking the names of individual household 

members and SSNs. Id. Even though the Administrative Order did 

not specifically authorize collection of SSNs, the postcards 

indicated that a failure to provide such information could result 

in sanction. Id. The Yeager court concluded: “In short, 

[defendant] was authorized by the state to take whatever action 

it deemed necessary, including the collection of its customers’

social security numbers, to enforce the state’s water rationing 

program. Sufficiently onerous punitive measures were threatened 

to insure compliance with [defendant’s] requests for 

information.” Id. at 1089–90. Citing to Jackson v. Metropolitan 

Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the court reasoned that “in 

certain situations, where there is a close nexus between the 

state and an action by a regulated entity, the action of the 

latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself” and 

held that the defendant’s action would be imputed to the state. 

Id. at 1091. 

CAPA has not shown that its members face an analogous 

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situation. The availability of an optional safe harbor provision 

in the 2015 Rule, which involves entering SSNs into a database to 

check for covered borrower status, does not parallel the 

situations presented in Joliet Oil and Yeager. Each of those 

cases involved the effectuation of emergency government actions 

through private businesses where those businesses provided some 

sort of necessity (gasoline, water) that the government aimed to 

closely regulate and provide access to. CAPA’s inability to 

present authority much more analogous to its situation in the 

instant case leads this Court to conclude that CAPA is unlikely

to prevail on this claim.

d. CAPA Is Not Likely to Succeed On the 

Merits of Count 4

Under Count 4, CAPA claims that the safe harbor provision 

contravenes The Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”) of 1978. 

Compl. at 27. The RFPA makes it unlawful for any government 

authority “to have access to or obtain copies of, or the 

information contained in the financial records of any customer 

from a financial institution” unless certain conditions are met. 

12 U.S.C. § 3402. CAPA argues that pawnbrokers are “financial 

institutions” for the purposes of the RFPA, Mot. at 16, and that 

pawnbrokers choosing to avail themselves of the safe harbor—thus 

collecting, maintaining, and disseminating personal information 

like the name, birthday, and SSNs from every potential customer—

would be in violation of the RFPA. Mot. at 16–17. In support of 

its argument, CAPA cites only Black’s Law Dictionary, which 

defines financial institution as “a business, organization, or 

other entity that manages money, credit or capital, such as a 

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bank, credit union, savings-and-loan association, securities 

broker or dealer, pawnbroker, or investment company.” Rep. at 7. 

Defendants argue that pawnbrokers do not fall within the

legal definition of a “financial institution.” Opp. at 16. They 

point to “the only court of appeals decision on point,” which 

squarely rejected CAPA’s argument herein. Id. (citing Winters v. 

Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 4 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1993)). Furthermore, 

Defendants argue that the 2015 Rule does not authorize the 

government to obtain customers’ records; rather, the database is 

a tool for the pawnbroker to use to check for a covered borrower

and does not send information collected by the pawnbroker to the 

Department. Opp. at 16–17. 

Under the RFPA, a financial institution is defined as “any 

office of a bank, savings bank, card issuer . . ., industrial 

loan company, trust company, savings association, building and 

loan, or homestead association (including cooperative banks), 

credit union, or consumer finance institution[.]” 12 U.S.C. 

§ 3401. Defendants are correct that the Winters court explicitly 

found that pawnshops are not considered financial institutions

under the RFPA. The recent inclusion of pawnbrokers in the MLA 

regulations may cast some doubt on that conclusion. Even so, 

Defendants have the stronger argument that the safe harbor 

provision does not involve the transfer of financial records from 

pawnbrokers to a government authority and, therefore, does not 

violate the RFPA. 

//

//

//

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e. CAPA’s Arguments On Counts 2, 3, and 4 

Are Waived

Defendants argue that CAPA waived their equal protection, 

Privacy Act, and RFPA claims because neither CAPA nor anyone else 

raised these issues during the notice-and-comment rulemaking 

process. Opp. at 11. CAPA does not assert that any such 

arguments were presented to the Department during that period. 

CAPA argues that “a failure to object during the rulemaking 

process [cannot] waive unforeseen unconstitutional consequences 

of a proposed rule for all of time.” Rep. at 2. It cites Wind 

River Min. Corp. v. U.S., 946 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1991), for the 

proposition that “an action challenging the constitutional or 

statutory authority of an agency to promulgate a rule has no 

statute of limitations.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit has unequivocally held that, unless there 

are exceptional circumstances, a party’s failure to make an 

argument before the administrative agency in notice-and-comment

on a proposed rule bars it from raising that argument on judicial 

review. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 

1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. EPA, 217 

F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2000)). In so holding, the court noted 

that its decision is “consistent with the decisions of every 

other circuit to have addressed the issue of waiver in notice-and 

–comment rulemaking.” Id. (collecting cases). 

The only authority CAPA cites to the contrary is Wind River. 

Rep. at 2. CAPA reads too much into that decision. The Wind 

River court dealt with a statute of limitations question, holding 

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that “a substantive challenge to an agency decision alleging lack 

of agency authority may be brought within six years of the 

agency’s application of that decision to the specific 

challenger.” Wind River, 946 F.2d at 716. Thus, Wind River

stands for the proposition that the statute of limitations to 

challenge the agency’s decision as exceeding constitutional or 

statutory authority runs from the date of the adverse application 

to that particular challenger, rather than from the date that the 

agency’s decision was first made (i.e. publication in the Federal 

Register). Id. at 15–16. Wind River does not address the 

question of issue waiver.

This Court agrees with Defendants that the waiver rule

applies to CAPA’s claims. Although neither party could point the 

Court to a completely analogous case, Ninth Circuit precedent 

weighs in favor of application in these circumstances. See

Universal Health Servs., 363 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding 

the hospitals’ arguments waived because they were not raised in 

the annual notice-and-comment rulemakings); Exxon Mobil Corp v. 

U.S. EPA, 217 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Petitioners have 

waived their right to judicial review of these final two 

arguments as they were not made before the administrative agency, 

in the comment to the proposed rule, and there are no exceptional 

circumstances warranting review.”); see also Huntco at 32–33 

(finding that Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Department failed to 

consider pawnshops an “affected business” in the Final Rule and 

that the Department failed to consider the Final Rule’s impact on 

small businesses in different geographic locations were each 

waived because they were not presented to the Department during 

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the rulemaking process). The strongest authority supporting 

CAPA’s contrary position is Reid v. Engen where the Ninth Circuit 

stated: 

We may decide an issue not raised in an agency action 

if the agency lacked either the power or the 

jurisdiction to decide it. This situation is typified 

by challenges to the constitutionality of a statute or 

challenges to the constitutionality of a regulation 

promulgated by the agency. 

765 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir. 1985). Reid, however, involved an 

enforcement action against the petitioner and her subsequent 

appeal from the Administrative Law Judge’s ruling, not a facial 

challenge to a rule or regulation like CAPA’s challenges in this 

case. If an enforcement action or lawsuit is brought against a 

CAPA member they may have an opportunity to raise the claims 

asserted here. But for the purposes of this action, the Court 

finds that CAPA’s claims under Counts 2, 3, and 4 are waived 

unless CAPA can direct this Court to evidence that the Department 

had an opportunity to consider them. See Portland Gen. Elec. Co. 

v. Bonneville Power Admin., 501 F.3d 1009, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“In general, we will not invoke the waiver rule in our review of 

a notice-and-comment proceeding if an agency has had an 

opportunity to consider the issue.”). 

2. Likelihood Of Irreparable Harm

“[P]laintiffs may not obtain a preliminary injunction unless 

they can show that irreparable harm is likely to result in the 

absence of the injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 

Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). “A plaintiff must 

do more than merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish 

standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened 

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injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.” 

Caribbean Marine Serv. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668 (9th 

Cir. 1988). “[M]onetary injury [from lost revenues] is not 

normally considered irreparable.” Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum 

Commission v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th 

Cir. 1980). A court may also consider timing; a delay in seeking 

a preliminary injunction “implies a lack of urgency and 

irreparable harm.” Oakland Trubune, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 

Inc., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985). 

CAPA has an uphill battle because it waited until September 

16, 2016, to file its Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining 

Order (here considered as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction) 

even though the 2015 Rule was published on July 22, 2015. ECF 

No. 11; 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 43560. Over a year passed 

between publication and the October 3, 2016 compliance date. 

Furthermore, the Proposed Rule, which included the new definition 

of consumer credit and the new safe harbor provision, was 

published on September 29, 2014, giving affected parties an 

additional nine months’ notice. Limitations on Terms of Consumer 

Credit Extended to Service Members and Dependents, 79 Fed. Reg. 

58602 (Sep. 29, 2014) (proposed rule). Just as the delay 

justified this Court’s denial of TRO, it weakens CAPA’s 

irreparable harm argument here.

CAPA alleges that its members will suffer irreparable harm 

because they will lose business due to having to use the safe 

harbor, will suffer a constitutional equal protection violation, 

and will face criminal and civil penalties either under Federal 

or California law. Mot. at 18–19. CAPA argues that “California 

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pawnbrokers are going to face substantial business losses due to 

having to utilize the ‘safe harbor’ and necessarily deny loans to 

individuals without Social Security numbers.” Mot. at 19. It 

offers several declarations in support of these contentions. 

Declaration of Israel Adato (“Adato Decl.”), ECF No. 11-2; 

Declaration of Pat Rogers (“Rogers Decl.”), ECF No. 11-5; 

Declaration of Tony DeMarco (“DeMarco Decl.”), ECF No. 11-6; 

Declaration of Stan Lukowicz (“Lukowicz Decl.”), ECF No. 11-7.

These declarations suggest that pawnbrokers will feel compelled 

to use the safe harbor to protect themselves from liability under 

the MLA and will have to turn away customers who are unable to 

provide SSNs. Mot. at 19. For example, Israel Adato states that 

he owns pawnshops near the Mexico border and estimates that 40-

50% of his loans are issued to immigrants. Adato Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 

11. Adato declares that he will avail himself of the safe harbor 

provision of the 2015 Rule in order to avoid liability under the 

MLA and will decline to offer loans to immigrants and foreign 

nationals who do not have SSNs, thus causing him to lose half of 

his business and close some or all of his stores. Id. at ¶¶ 12–

14. Adato also fears suit under California’s Unruh Act. The 

other three declarations make similar claims regarding lost 

business and their intent to make use of the safe harbor 

provision. See Rogers Decl., DeMarco Decl., & Lukowicz Decl. 

Additionally, two of the declarations allege that many of their 

customers (25% to 33%) will not be willing to provide their SSNs 

for fear of identity theft. See Rogers Decl. at ¶ 7; Lukowicz 

Decl. at ¶ 7. 

Defendants argue that the harm CAPA alleges is not 

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irreparable because use of the safe harbor is not mandatory; CAPA 

members are free to use other means to reduce the risk of lending 

to a covered borrower. Opp. at 19–20. Defendants contend that 

the argument regarding business losses in pawnshops serving many 

immigrants and foreign nationals should fail because such 

individuals are highly unlikely to be covered borrowers; 

pawnbrokers can assess this risk by looking at the identification 

each borrower already presents pursuant to state law. Opp. at 

20–21. Defendants argue that pawnbrokers are still free to 

verbally confirm or use a check box on a loan application to 

determine whether an applicant is a covered borrower and that 

business loss is not necessary. Opp. at 21. Furthermore, 

Defendants point out that pawnbrokers only risk committing a 

misdemeanor if they “knowingly” violate the statute. Opp. at 22 

(citing 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(1)). As for civil liability, the MLA 

provides a defense for unintentional violations that “result from 

a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures 

reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” Id. at 22–23 

(citing 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(5)(D)). Finally, Defendants argue

that CAPA’s equal protection allegations do not constitute 

irreparable harm because where plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a 

sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their 

constitutional claims, the presumption of irreparable harm is 

inapposite. Id. at 23.

The Huntco court decided that the Huntco plaintiffs would 

not suffer irreparable harm due to the safe harbor provision 

because the plaintiffs’ arguments were “based on the false 

premise that the Final Rule requires creditors to search the MLA 

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Database.” Huntco at 45. It further asserted that “there are a 

number of other ways to lessen th[e] risk, if not eliminate it 

altogether, without using a covered borrower check, such as 

continuing to use self-certifications.” Id. The court pointed 

to the “knowingly” standard for criminal penalties and the “bona 

fide error” defense for civil penalties. Id. The court also 

found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate certain economic 

harm and loss of customer goodwill. Huntco at 46–47. 

Irreparable injury due to lost business is not clear in this 

case. Many of the declarants’ concerns are speculative: 

customers not being willing to provide SSNs, lawsuits under the 

Unruh Civil Rights Act. More importantly, the alleged harm would 

be due to the pawnbrokers’ choice to only extend loans to 

borrowers willing to provide an SSN; the 2015 Rule does not 

require collection. See Citizens of the Ebey’s Reserve for a 

Healthy, Safe, & Peaceful Env’t v. U.S. Dept. of the Navy, 122 

F.Supp. 3d 1068 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (“Not surprisingly, a party may 

not satisfy the irreparable harm requirement if the harm 

complained of is self-inflicted.”). Although it is 

understandable that a shop owner would choose to collect SSNs 

from every customer out of an abundance of caution, the shop 

owner could mitigate its risk by utilizing other means of 

coverage assessment for those customers who do not wish to 

provide one. 

On the question of potential liability, the Huntco court’s 

analysis is instructive, but only to a certain extent. As that 

court recognized, use of the safe harbor is not technically 

mandatory and the availability of other risk reduction methods 

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cuts against CAPA’s concern that its members will face criminal 

and civil liability. Despite the protections against liability 

built into the MLA, this Court remains concerned that the “bona 

fide error” defense will not actually protect pawnbrokers from 

civil liability where they use their own method to determine 

covered borrower status. The “bona fide error” defense, 10 

U.S.C. § 987(f)(5)(D), reads: 

A person may not be held liable for civil liability 

under this paragraph if the person shows by a 

preponderance of evidence that the violation was not 

intentional and resulted from a bona fide error 

notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures 

reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. Examples 

of a bona fide error include clerical, calculation, 

computer malfunction and programming, and printing 

errors, except that an error of legal judgment with 

respect to a person's obligations under this section is 

not a bona fide error.

(Emphasis added.) Neither the Huntco court nor Defendants 

address the final sentence of this subsection or explain how a 

pawnbroker’s use of a different covered borrower determination 

method (i.e. self-certification) would qualify as a “bona fide 

error.” It appears to this Court that a “bona fide error” would 

be an inadvertent mistake—like punching in the wrong SSN or a

software malfunction—and may not offer much civil liability 

protection. Even so, CAPA members’ potential civil liability 

under the statute is not an imminent, irreparable harm warranting 

preliminary injunctive relief.3

On the equal protection challenge, CAPA is correct that an 

 

3 For example, before a pawnbroker utilizing a self-certification 

method would face civil liability it would have to extend a loan 

to a covered borrower who lied about their covered borrower 

status and that covered borrower would then have to file a 

lawsuit against that pawnbroker. CAPA has not demonstrated that 

such an event is likely. 

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alleged constitutional infringement may constitute irreparable 

harm. See Goldies Bookstore, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of State of 

Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984). Where the 

constitutional claim is tenuous, however, irreparable harm will 

not be found likely to occur. See id. CAPA’s equal protection 

claim is unlikely to succeed on the merits. Thus, CAPA members 

are not likely to suffer constitutional harm constituting 

irreparable injury. 

Finally, CAPA contends that this Court must issue injunctive 

relief for its Privacy Act claim because damages are not 

available as a remedy under the legislative scheme. Rep. at 8. 

CAPA states: “injunctive relief is the necessary and proper 

relief granted to citizens by the Privacy Act.” Id. But CAPA 

does not bring this suit on behalf of individuals who have been 

denied a right due to their refusal to disclose a SSN. In each 

case CAPA cites, injunctive relief was awarded to an individual 

where an authority required that individual to give their SSN in 

order to receive a right or privilege. Ingerman v. Del. River 

Port Auth., 630 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D. N.J. 2009) (senior citizen 

required to provide SSN for senior citizen discount program); 

Stollenwerk v. Miller, No. Civ.A. 04-5510, 2006 WL 463393 (E.D. 

Penn. Feb. 24, 2006) (Pennsylvania citizen required to provide an 

SSN to buy a hand gun under state law); Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 

699 A.2d 856 (R.I. 1997) (depositors whose names, SSNs, and 

account balances were released to the media by the governor had 

standing to sue for injunctive relief under the Privacy Act). 

These cases do not support CAPA’s argument that this Court must 

award injunctive relief where business owners fear they may be 

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held liable for violating the Privacy Act when they ask borrowers 

for their SSN to check their covered borrower status. 

On the whole, CAPA’s delay in bringing this action, the fact 

that CAPA members are not required to collect SSNs, and the fact 

that CAPA’s constitutional claim is not likely to succeed on the

merits weigh against a finding that irreparable harm is likely.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction: 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2016

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