Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02545/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02545-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Miguel Soto
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2545

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Miguel Soto

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Fort Smith

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 Submitted: January 12, 2015

 Filed: February 24, 2015

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

Miguel Soto pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The district court sentenced Soto to 87 1

months imprisonment. Soto appeals his sentence, arguing the district court failed to

The Honorable P.K. Holmes III, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

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the Western District of Arkansas.

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(1) provide notice of an upward departure from the United States Sentencing

Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32(h), and (2) allow his attorney “a meaningful opportunity” to comment

on Soto’s role in the conspiracy in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

32(i)(1)(C). After filing his brief in our court, Soto filed in the district court an

unopposed motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which

the district court granted. With appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we

affirm Soto’s sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

Soto pled guilty, pursuant to an agreement with the government, to conspiring

to distribute methamphetamine. Before sentencing, a probation officer prepared a

presentence investigation report (PSR) calculating a two-level reduction to Soto’s

Guidelines base offense level, based on U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), for being a minor

participant in the conspiracy, which would require a commensurate four-level

reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5)(iii). Based on these and several other

reductions, the PSR ultimately computed an offense level of 27. Considering Soto’s

criminal history level I, the PSR reached an advisory Guidelines range of 70 to 87

months imprisonment. In Soto’s plea agreement, the government agreed “not to

object to a finding by the probation office or a ruling by the court which awards the

defendant an appropriate level decrease in the base offense level for [his] role in the

offense.”

At the same time, Soto acknowledged in his plea agreement that the district

court “may sentence [Soto] to any sentence within the statutory range.” Soto also

“acknowledge[d] that discussions have taken place concerning the possible guideline

range which might be applicable to this case” and “agree[d] that any discussions

merely attempt to guess at what appears to be the correct guideline range and do not

bind the district court.” 

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Although the government did not object to the minor participant reduction, the

district court rejected it, explaining, “The Court does not believe that Mr. Soto was

a minor participant and is not entitled to a mitigating role, but I am going to give Mr.

Soto’s counsel an opportunity to argue this point, if he wishes to make argument.” 

After describing Soto’s role in the conspiracy, the district court stated, “[T]he Court

does not believe that [Soto] is a minimal [sic] participant and, therefore, is going to

deny [the reduction] . . . there may be other facts that are not in the [PSR], if you wish

to make that argument, you may.” Soto’s attorney responded, “No, sir, Your Honor. 

At this point in time I would ask the Court to accept the recommendation of the

probation officer about his role as being minor in the offense.” The district court

adopted the probation officer’s recommendations in the PSR except for the minor

participant reduction and found Soto’s offense level to be 33, with an advisory

Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months.

Next, the district court granted the government’s motion for a downward

departure for substantial assistance pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and reduced Soto’s

offense level by four levels, from 33 to 29. The district court then found Soto’s final

advisory Guidelines range was 87 to 108 months.

Finally, the district court considered the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and

heard argument from Soto’s attorney for a downward variance. Based on Soto’s

involvement in the conspiracy and the seriousness ofthe offense, the district court did

not vary downward and sentenced Soto to a term of imprisonment at the bottom of

the advisory Guidelines range, 87 months. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because Soto did not raise his present objections before the district court, we

review for plain error. See United States v. Troyer, 677 F.3d 356, 358-59 (8th Cir.

2012) (explaining plain error review). 

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B. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h)

Soto characterizes the district court’s decision not to reduce his base level

under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) for a minor role in the conspiracy as an “upward

departure” and claims the district court procedurally erred by not giving notice as

required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h)

(“Before the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range on a ground not

identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a party’s prehearing

submission, the court must give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating

such a departure.”). Soto misstates the district court’s analysis and decision. 

“‘Departure is a term of art under the Guidelines and refers only to nonGuidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines,’” 

United States v. Omoware, 761 F.3d 951, 952 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Irizarry v.

United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2008)), such as the downward departure granted

to Soto for substantial assistance pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. In an attempt to

avoid misunderstandings like Soto’s, we have advised district courts on an

appropriate process for sentencing hearings:

Since [United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)], we have

attempted to carefully distinguish between sentencing departures, which

are provided for in Chapter 5, Part K of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines (USSG) Manual . . . , and sentencing variances, which are

non-Guidelines sentences based on the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). In order to maintain this distinction and to facilitate

meaningful appellate review, we have directed district courts to follow

a three-step sentencing process. First, the district court must calculate

the appropriate advisory Guidelines range based on the applicable

offense level and the criminal history category. Then, the district court

should consider whether any traditional Guidelines-based departures

apply. And only after completing steps one and two should the district

court then consider the other § 3553(a) factors to decide whether to

impose a Guidelines or non-Guidelines sentence [i.e., whether to vary].

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United States v. Solis-Bermudez, 501 F.3d 882, 884 (8thCir. 2007) (internal citations

omitted). The district court correctly followed our proposed sequence when it

(1) found the applicable offense level—without the minor participantreduction—and

calculated the advisory Guidelines range; (2) applied a four-level downward

departure in recognition of Soto’s substantial assistance to the government; and

(3) then considered the § 3553(a) factors and any possible variance.

The district court did not “depart” when it assessed Soto’s role in the

conspiracy and decided to forego the minor participantreduction. Rather, the district

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court performed step one of the process, calculating the advisory Guidelines range. 

Rule 32(h) by its terms applies to departures only, not to the initial calculation of the

Guidelines range. Soto does not cite any case, nor have we found one, that supports

extending the requirements of Rule 32(h) to the initial Guidelines range calculation.

We conclude “such an extension [would be] apt to complicate rather than to simplify

sentencing procedures.” Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 716; cf. United States v. Foy, 617 F.3d

1029, 1035 (8th Cir. 2010) (“As we have explained, . . . ‘notice pursuant to Rule

32(h) is not required when the adjustment to the sentence is effected by a variance,

rather than by a departure.’” (quoting United States v. Long Soldier, 431 F.3d 1120,

1122 (8th Cir. 2005))).

In support of his argument, Soto also asserts the district court did not address

the § 3553(a) factors before making the minor participant decision. Soto concludes

then the decision must have been a departure and not a variance. Soto is only

factually correct: The district court could neither discuss the § 3553(a) factors nor

consider whether to vary from the advisory Guidelines range before the district court

determined the range in the first place. The district court atstep one set forth in detail

Soto claims the district court “by its own language, called its upward ruling

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a ‘departure.’” After careful scrutiny of the sentencing hearing transcript, we find the

district court did not use the term “departure” in connection with the proposed, and

rejected, minor participant reduction.

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its reasons for denying the minor participant reduction, some of which overlap with

the § 3553(a) factors. The district court then invited Soto’s attorney to make an

argument in favor of the reduction, which Soto’s attorney declined, other than

referring to the PSR recommendation. 

Soto bore the burden of persuading the district court to apply the two-level

minor participant reduction. See United States v. Pruneda, 518 F.3d 597, 606 (8th

Cir. 2008). That Soto claims he was “blindsided” by the district court’s decision and

did not have “any clue” the issue would be contested does not absolve him of his well

established burden. The PSR itself twice put the issue in the conditional, noting what

would result “[i]f the defendant” received the reduction. First, for the minor

participant reduction: “If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal

activity, decrease by 2 levels. USSG § 3B1.2(b).” Second, for the corresponding

reduction: “If the defendant receives an adjustment under USSG § 3B1.2 and the

base offense level under subsection (c) is 38, decrease by 4 levels. USSG

§ 2D1.1(a)(5)(iii).” Soto’s purported surprise does not trigger Rule 32(h). See

Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 716 (“‘Garden variety considerations of culpability, criminal

history, likelihood of re-offense, seriousness of the crime, nature of the conduct and

so forth should not generally come as a surprise to trial lawyers who have prepared

for sentencing.’” (quoting United States v. Vega-Santiago, 519 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.

2008) (en banc))). The district court did not need to provide Rule 32(h) notice to

determine Soto’s advisory Guidelines range.

C. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(C) 

Soto also claims the district court plainly erred by not “allow[ing] the parties’

attorneys to comment on the probation officer’s determinations and other matters

relating to an appropriate sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(C). On the contrary,

the district court invited Soto’s attorney to address the court regarding the (1) minor

participant reduction to the offense level; (2) downward departure for substantial

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assistance; and (3) § 3553(a) factors. The district court properly followed the dictates

of Rule 32(i)(1)(C).

III. CONCLUSION

Finding no error, we affirm Soto’s sentence.

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