Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50286/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50286-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Guadalupe Rosales-Gonzales
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GUADALUPE ROSALES-GONZALES,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50286

D.C. No.

3:14-CR-00523-

LAB-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 3, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed September 16, 2015

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Barry G. Silverman,

and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge D.W. Nelson

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2 UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Affirming a sentence for being a removed immigrant

found in the United States, the panel held that a fast-track

departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 is purely discretionary,

such that the parties’ joint request does not necessitate that

the district court grant it. 

The panel held that the district court neither committed

procedural error nor imposed a substantively unreasonable

sentence. 

COUNSEL

Holly S. Hanover (argued), The Law Offices of Holly S.

Hanover, SpringValley, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Steven Lee (argued), Special Assistant United States

Attorney, Laura Duffy, United States Attorney, and Bruce

Castetter, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, San

Diego, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES 3

OPINION

D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

Guadalupe Rosales-Gonzales appeals his 27-month

sentence following his guilty plea and conviction for being a

removed immigrant found in the United States. RosalesGonzales contends that the district court erred in not granting

him a fast-track departure, which the parties jointly requested. 

We hold that the fast-track departure is purely discretionary,

such that a joint request does not necessitate departure under

the Guidelines. Because Rosales-Gonzales’s sentence was

substantively reasonable, we affirm the sentencing and

judgment.

I. Background

On February 4, 2014, U.S. Customs and Border

Protection arrested Rosales-Gonzales as a removed immigrant

found in the U.S. in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The

government filed a one-count information charging RosalesGonzales with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Rosales-Gonzales

pled guilty to the charged violation pursuant to a written plea

agreement. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the parties

agreed to request jointly, among other recommendations, a

four-level departure pursuant § 5K3.1 of the Sentencing

Guidelines based on Rosales-Gonzales’s participation in a

fast-track/early disposition program.

On June 9, 2014, the district court held a sentencing

hearing. At the outset of the hearing, the district court judge

provided what he termed as “preliminary thoughts” on the

parties’ sentencing recommendations. Specifically, the

district court judge noted that he was not inclined to grant the

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4 UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES

requested fast-track departure because of Rosales-Gonzales’s

prior convictions for the same offense and because the

requested sentence of nine months’ imprisonment would be

less than Rosales-Gonzales’s previous 14-month sentence for

an identical offense. After the government amended its

sentencing request to a 15-month term, the district court

judge again stated that he was not inclined to “go along with

that” and “was not on board with 15 months.”

The district court then heard argument from both defense

counsel and the government, and permitted Rosales-Gonzales

to speak. Defense counsel focused her argument almost

entirely on Rosales-Gonzales’s physical condition,

specifically the effects of a stroke he had suffered. The

district court judge then questioned the government about

why it had recommended the fast-track departure in a case in

which the defendant had been deported 35 times. The

government responded that it had considered the sentencing

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. The government also

noted that Rosales-Gonzales settled his case “in an expedient

manner” and waived both indictment and his right to appeal. 

Following the parties’ arguments, the district court judge

explained that he agreed with the parties as to the first part of

the Guidelines calculation, including that the base offense

level was eight, Rosales-Gonzales’s four prior felony

convictions added four points, but that he had accepted

responsibility, which dropped the offense level to ten. The

district court also agreed with the parties that RosalesGonzales’s criminal history category was five, thus, the

sentence range would be 21 to 27 months. The district court

judge disagreed with the parties, however, that the fast-track

departure under § 5K3.1 applied and declined to apply it. 

The district court judge then determined that an “upper end”

Guidelines sentence was warranted and sentenced Rosales-

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UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES 5

Gonzales to 27 months’ imprisonment. Rosales-Gonzales

timely appealed his sentence to this court.

II. Standard of Review

We analyze challenges to criminal sentences in two steps:

First, we “consider whether the district court committed

significant procedural error.” United States v. Carty,

520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Second, “we

consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” Id.

Where the district court has “committed a significant

procedural error, such as a material error in the Guidelines

calculation that serves as the start point for the district court’s

sentencing decision, we will remand for resentencing

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f).” United States v. Pham,

545 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). We review the substantive

reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2009).

III. Discussion

This case requires us to determine whether a district court

must grant a departure under § 5K3.1 of the Sentencing

Guidelines for participation in a fast-track program when the

parties jointly request this departure. In answering this

question, we consider both procedural error and the

substantive reasonableness of Rosales-Gonzales’s sentence.

A. Procedural Error

Rosales-Gonzales argues the district court procedurally

erred by denying the parties’ joint request for the fast-track

departure under § 5K3.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and by

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6 UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES

not using the Sentencing Guidelines as its starting point. We

evaluate these arguments in turn.

1. Denial of the Fast-Track Departure Under

§ 5K3.1

Post-Booker1

,

we elect to review the district court’s

application of the advisory sentencing

guidelines only insofar as they do not involve

departures. To the extent that a district court

has framed its analysis in terms of a

downward or upward departure, we will treat

such so-called departures as an exercise of

post-Booker discretion to sentence a

defendant outside of the applicable guidelines

range.

United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2006);

see also United States v. Vasquez-Cruz, 692 F.3d 1001, 1008

(9th Cir. 2012) (reaffirming that departures are reviewed as

part of the substantive reasonableness analysis and not for

procedural error). As such, “we do not need to consider

whether the district court correctly applied [the relevant

departure provision]; rather, we review the district court’s

deviation from the applicable guidelines range for

reasonableness.” United States v. Tankersley, 537 F.3d 1100,

1114 (9th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d

882, 890–91 (9th Cir. 2008) (reviewing the district court’s

denial of a downward departure under § 5K2.13 of the

 

1 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

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UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES 7

Sentencing Guidelines only as part of the substantive

reasonableness analysis).

Thus, our case law is clear that we do not review the

denial of a departure under § 5K of the Sentencing Guidelines

for procedural error. See United States v. Ellis, 641 F.3d 411,

420–21 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we reject RosalesGonzales’s argument that the district court committed

procedural error by declining to grant him a four-level

downward departure under § 5K3.1. We address his

additional arguments concerning the denial of this departure

below in our analysis of the substantive reasonableness of his

sentence.

2. Sentencing Guidelines as the “Starting Point”

The Sentencing Guidelines establish a three-step

procedure that district courts must follow in determining the

proper sentence: (1) calculate the appropriate Guidelines

range, including the offense level and criminal history

category of the defendant; (2) consider any applicable

departures under § 5H or § 5K of the Guidelines; and

(3) consider the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1 (2014); see also

United States v. Lee, 725 F.3d 1159, 1165 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013)

(per curiam) (same). The Supreme Court has held that even

though the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, district

courts must use the Guidelines as the “starting point” for

determining a sentence. See, e.g., Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). While the district court may impose

a sentence outside the Guidelines range, “it may not

manipulate the calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines

in order to produce a Guidelines range that will allow it to

impose the sentence it prefers.” Lee, 725 F.3d at 1164.

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8 UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES

Although Rosales-Gonzales contends his case is

analogous to Lee, we find the facts sufficiently

distinguishable to conclude the district court did not err. In

Lee, the district court began by finding a base offense level of

38. 725 F.3d at 1162. The probation officer then recalculated

the defendant’s offense level as 35, based on a three-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a

sentencing range of 188–235 months and a mandatory

minimum of 120 months. Id. The government subsequently

moved for a ten-level reduction under § 5K1.1 based on the

defendant’s substantial assistance and requested a 96-month

sentence. Id. at 1163. The district court granted the request

for a reduction under §5K1.1. Id. The district court then

incorrectly calculated the defendant’s new offense level after

the departure as 28, and, also incorrectly, stated that the

appropriate Guidelines range was 78–97 months. Id. Before

the court could impose the final sentence, the probation

officer interrupted to explain that, with a ten-level departure,

the defendant’s offense level was actually 25, not 28,

resulting in a Guidelines range of 63–78 months, so a

sentence exceeding 78 months would be an above-Guidelines

sentence. Id. at 1163–64. The government then stated that “it

believed ‘96 months was appropriate, whatever level one has

to depart to, to get that.’” Id. at 1164. Thereafter, the district

court granted the government’s amended request for a sevenlevel departure—resulting in a Guidelines range of 87–108

months—and sentenced the defendant to 96 months’

imprisonment. Id. Thus, the district court appeared to

manipulate the Guidelines range to impose a 96-month

sentence.

Here, however, the district court did not engage in

calculation or recalculation in an attempt to get to a specific

sentence requested by the government or preferred by the

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UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES 9

district court. The district court judge noted that he had

reviewed the parties’ filings, including the request for the

fast-track departure, but stated, from the outset, that he did

not believe Rosales-Gonzales was entitled to the fast-track

departure. The district court then heard argument from both

parties, as well as Rosales-Gonzales’s statement, before

imposing the final sentence. In doing so, the court first

calculated an offense level of 10 and a criminal history

category of 5, resulting in a Guidelines range of 21–27

months, a calculation that Rosales-Gonzales does not dispute. 

The court explained that it disagreed with the government’s

assessment that Rosales-Gonzales qualified for the fast-track

departure and declined to apply it to his sentence.2 The court

concluded that the § 3553(a) factors warranted an “upper

end” Guidelines sentence and imposed a 27-month prison

term.

Although at times the district court judge indicated he

would not sentence Rosales-Gonzales to 15 months or

fewer—stating he would not “go along with that” and “was

not on board with 15 months”—the court also expressed that

his thoughts were preliminary and provided the parties an

opportunity to argue. Of course, simply terming a

predetermination as a “preliminary thought” would not be

sufficient, on its own, to distinguish this case from Lee in a

2 The district court based much of its reasoning on a memorandum from

the Department ofJustice to United States Attorneys regarding when fasttrack departure is applicable. See Memorandum for All United States

Attorneys from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General (Jan. 31, 2012),

available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-program.pdf. RosalesGonzales has not challenged the district court’s reliance on this

memorandum. Additionally, the factors discussed by the memorandum,

at least as noted by the district court, overlap significantly with the

§ 3553(a) factors.

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10 UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES

meaningful way. However, we do not find the district court’s

phrasing here to be disingenuous. The district court calculated

the proper Guidelines range at step one, considered the

applicable fast-track departure but declined to grant it at step

two, and evaluated the § 3553(a) factors at step three. The

district court did not commit procedural error.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

Rosales-Gonzales challenges the reasonableness of his

sentence based on the denial of the fast-track departure and

the “parsimony principle” of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United

States v. Chavez, 611 F.3d 1006, 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam). Although we have explained that sentences

involving departures are “subject to a unitary review for

reasonableness,” Mohamed, 459 F.3d at 987, we analyze his

arguments related to the fast-track departure separately to

clarify the nature of the departure and provide guidance for

future cases.

1. Denial of the Fast-Track Departure Under

§ 5K3.1

Rosales-Gonzales principallyargues that the district court

lacked discretion to deny the fast-track departure under

§ 5K3.1. Specifically, Rosales-Gonzales urges us to read

United States v. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736 (9th Cir.

2009), as prohibiting district courts from denying a properlyrequested fast-track departure. We disagree and hold that

district courts retain discretion to reject fast-track departures

under § 5K3.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.

As noted, we have declined to consider whether a district

court has properly granted or denied a departure under § 5K

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UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES 11

of the Sentencing Guidelines post-Booker. See, e.g., Blixt,

548 F.3d at 890–91. Further, we have explained that “[t]he

old departure scheme is relevant today only insofar as factors

that might have supported (or not supported) a departure may

tend to show that a non-guidelines sentence is (or is not)

reasonable.” Tankersley, 537 F.3d at 1114. We have

described all departures as “exercise[s] of discretion,”

Mohamed, 459 F.3d at 986, and we have not found, nor could

counsel identify, any other departures under § 5K that we

have treated as mandatory.

In addition, the statutory text at issue supports our view. 

The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the

Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003,

which implements the fast-track departure, reflects no

indication that Congress intended the departure to be

mandatory. As is relevant here, the PROTECT Act provides

only that the Sentencing Commission must promulgate “a

policy statement authorizing a downward departure of not

more than 4 levels if the Government files a motion for such

departure pursuant to an early disposition program authorized

by the Attorney General and the United States Attorney.” 

Pub. L. No. 108–21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675

(2003). Additionally, the language of § 5K3.1 itself provides

that “[u]pon motion of the Government, the court may depart

downward not more than 4 levels pursuant to an early

disposition program,” again indicating that the court retains

discretion to decide whether or not to grant the departure. 

U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1.

Moreover, Rosales-Gonzales’s reliance on GonzalezZotelo is misplaced. In that case, we held that the district

court committed plain error by granting the defendant a fourlevel fast-track departure even though the government had not

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12 UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES

requested one. 556 F.3d at 741. We explained that district

courts may consider only unwarranted sentencing disparities. 

Id. at 739. Sentencing disparities between fast-track and nonfast-track defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) are not

unwarranted because the differences in those sentences “are

justified by the benefits gained by the government when

defendants plead guilty early in criminal proceedings.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). We held that while the

Supreme Court’s decision in Kimbrough v. United States,

552 U.S. 85 (2007), allows district courts to depart from the

Guidelines based on a disagreement with Guidelines policy,

it does not allow district courts to sentence in contravention

to congressional policy. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d at

740–41.

However, where a district court denies a jointly requested

fast-track departure, the district court does not contravene the

congressional policy at issue in Gonzalez-Zotelo. The

relevant congressional policy in Gonzalez-Zotelo was that

Congress had authorized the fast-track program and, thus, had

authorized disparities between fast-track and non-fast-track

defendants, such that consideration of these disparities was

improper. See 556 F.3d at 739–40. Gonzalez-Zotelo, thus,

says nothing about whether congressional policy dictates that

the particular departure at issue here—the fast-track departure

itself—is mandatory upon motion of the government or upon

joint recommendation of the parties. On this point, the

Second Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Shand,

739 F.3d 714 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam), is instructive. In

Shand, the defendant similarly argued that the district court

lacks discretion to deny a fast-track departure when the

government properly requests it. Id. at 715. The Second

Circuit rejected this argument, relying mainly on the text of

the § 5K3.1, explaining that the permissive use of “may”

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UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES 13

distinguished this section of the Guidelines from other

mandatory ones. Id. at 715–16.

We also reject Rosales-Gonzales’s arguments that

allowing district courts to deny fast-track departures would

interfere with prosecutorial discretion or have a chilling effect

on plea bargaining. Rosales-Gonzales’s plea agreement was

made pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

11(c)(1)(B), which provides that the government will

“recommend, or agree not to oppose the defendant’s request,

that a particular sentence or sentencing range is appropriate

or that a particular . . . policy statement . . . does or does not

apply (such a recommendation or request does not bind the

court).” Even where the parties make a joint recommendation

for a sentence in such cases, the district court may

nevertheless exercise its discretion to reject the joint

recommendation. See, e.g., United States v. Camarillo-Tello,

236 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, we see no reason

why the rejection of a sentencing proposal recommending a

fast-track departure would uniquely interfere with

prosecutorial discretion or chill the plea bargaining process.

This is not to say, however, that a district court can

simply ignore the fast-track departure, or other discretionary

departures under § 5K of the Sentencing Guidelines. As we

have previously noted in the context of accepting or rejecting

plea agreements, “the existence of discretion requires its

exercise, and when a court establishes a broad policy based

on events unrelated to the individual case before it, no

discretion has been exercised.” In re Morgan, 506 F.3d 705,

712 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks, alterations,

citations omitted). Just as it would be an abuse of discretion

for a district court judge to have a blanket policy against

accepting plea agreements with binding sentences

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14 UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES

incorporating the fast-track departure, see United States v.

Gonzalez, 502 F. App’x 665, 667 (9th Cir. 2012), so too

would it be an abuse of discretion for a district court judge to

implement a blanket policy against granting recommended

fast-track departures in plea agreements with non-binding

sentences, cf. United States v. Odachyan, 749 F.3d 798,

804–05 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., concurring)(explaining

that a district court judge’s statement indicating the judge

considered the defendant to be part of a group of immigrants

that “prey on this government’s institutions” was adverse to

§ 3553(a)’s requirement of an individualized determination

at sentencing). Though counsel for Rosales-Gonzales

contended that the district court judge here was more reticent

than other judges to grant the fast-track departure, she

conceded—and the record does not contradict—that the

district court judge does not have a blanket policy of denying

the fast-track departure.

2. Parsimony Principle

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court shall

“impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,

to comply with the purposes set forth” in § 3553(a)(2). This

provision, also known as the “parsimony principle” or

“‘parsimony clause,’” “is a guidepost, an overarching

principle that directs judges in the appropriate exercise of

their sentencing discretion within the sentencing range

authorized and consideration of factors prescribed by

Congress.” Chavez, 611 F.3d at 1010. As such, challenging

a sentence as violating the “parsimony principle” is simply

another way of stating that the sentence is unreasonable. See

United States v. Crowe, 563 F.3d 969, 977 n.16 (9th Cir.

2009).

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UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES 15

The district court properly considered the relevant

§ 3553(a) factors and did not abuse its discretion in

sentencing Rosales-Gonzales to 27 months’ imprisonment. 

In discussing whether to grant the fast-track departure and

determining the proper sentence, the district court properly

considered Rosales-Gonzales’s past criminal and immigration

history. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1) (“the history and

characteristics of the defendant”), 3553(a)(2)(A)(“to promote

respect for the law”), 3553(a)(2)(B) (“to afford adequate

deterrence to criminal conduct”). The district court also

heard argument from defense counsel regarding RosalesGonzales’s health, asked questions about his physical

condition, and considered these issues in determining the

sentence. Ultimately, the district court weighed in RosalesGonzales’s favor the fact that he was not a dangerous

criminal. However, the district court weighed RosalesGonzales’s multiple felony convictions for this same offense

and multiple removals against him. The district court also

found the need to deter future criminal activity warranted an

“upper end” Guidelines sentence. Thus, the district court

imposed a 27-month sentence.

Rosales-Gonzales’s further arguments lack merit. First,

he contends that the court misunderstood the deterrent value

of an increased sentence. In other words, the district court

reasoned that the prior sentence did not work because it did

not deter Rosales-Gonzales from committing the same crime. 

Thus, the court imposed a harsher sentence to deter him from

reentering the country illegally. Rosales-Gonzales mentions

empirical evidence that undermines this reasoning, though he

does not appear to have presented this evidence to the district

court, nor does he ask us to take judicial notice of it. 

Moreover, this argument does not account for the fact that the

longer sentence imposed in this matter resulted largely from

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16 UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES

a Guidelines calculation that takes into account criminal

history. Here, the Guidelines range was 21–27 months based

on the applicable offense level and criminal history category. 

See United States v. Gonzalez Vazquez, 719 F.3d 1086, 1089

(9th Cir. 2013) (discussing criminal history in sentencing).

Second, Rosales-Gonzales argues that the district court

failed to take into account “the real conduct and

circumstances,” at issue, Gall, 552 U.S. at 54 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted), and instead focused on

imposing a higher sentence than Rosales-Gonzales had

received in a previous case. The record belies this claim. As

explained, the district court evaluated the § 3553(a) factors

and considered the relevant circumstances.

Finally, Rosales-Gonzales posits that his sentence was

longer than necessary to protect the public. This contention

fails to account for his recidivism. In sum, Rosales-Gonzales

has not established that his within-Guidelines sentence was

unreasonable. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 994 (noting “a

Guidelines sentence ‘will usually be reasonable’” (quoting

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)).

IV. Conclusion

The district court neither committed procedural error nor

imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. The district

court had discretion to reject the parties’ joint request for a

four-level departure under § 5K3.1 of the Sentencing

Guidelines for Rosales-Gonzales’s participation in a fasttrack program, and the district court properly considered the

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors.

AFFIRMED.

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