Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02031/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02031-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jews for Jesus
Appellee
Marsha Polin
Appellant
Paul William Polin
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Coprt(?f Appeafa 

Tenth C1rcu1t 

AUL WILLIAM POLIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

MARSHA POLIN, 

Plaintiff· 

v. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JEWS FOR JESUS, aka Hineni Ministries, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

) 

) 

) 

1 

) 

) 

) 

SEP 1 6 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) No. 88-2031 

)(D.C. No. 87-C-38-C) 

) (N. Dist. Okla.) 

) 

) 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SETH and BARRETT. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Paul William Polin (Polin) appeals from an order of the 

district court granting summary judgment in favor of Jews for 

Jesus (JFJ). Polin initiated this diversity action by suing JFJ 

for damages under the Oklahoma tort of invasion of privacy/false 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 1 
' 

light following JFJ's publication of three articles1 relating to 

the guardianship trial of Polin's daughter, Robin. 

Robin is the congenitally deaf child of Paul and Marsha 

Polin. The Polins are Jewish. They did not raise their daughter 

to be a Christian. After Robin became a believer in Jesus, the 

Polins gave her an alternative to either obey their wishes or 

leave home. Robin subsequently left home. Thereafter, Polin filed 

a guardianship hearing in which he claimed that Robin was 

incapable and incompetent to handle her affairs and estate and 

that she was being deceived and imposed upon by artful, deceiving 

and designing persons. (R., Order, June 3, 1988, p. 2) . 

During the guardianship hearing, which was widely covered by 

the news media, there was conflicting testimony as to Polin's 

treatment of Robin and Polin's physical confrontation with Robin. 2 

During the hearing Robin testified that she did not want to go to 

Boston as suggested by her father because she feared that her 

father's friends would kidnap her. Robin was subsequently found 

to be judgmentally immature and incompetent under Oklahoma's 

guardianship statute. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 

reversed with directions to vacate the order appointing a guardian 

and to dismiss the action. Thereafter, Polin sued JFJ for damages 

1 The articles included a letter, an advertisement, and a story. 

2 Number 15 of the parties' joint statement of undisputed facts 

provides in part: 

Robin testified that her father hit her in the mouth with his 

knuckles. Paul said he hit her with the back of his hand in 

self defense. 

(R., Order, June 3, 1988, page 3). 

-2-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 2 
alleging that the JFJ articles relating to the guardianship trial 

had cast him in false light. 

Prior to trial, JFJ moved for summary judgment. During the 

motion hearing, the parties agreed to submit the matter to the 

court for determination while reserving objections to various 

exhibits. Counsel for Polin conceded that the publicized matter 

was true, and that Polin had to prove actual malice under Oklahoma 

law to prevail on his false light claim. Thereafter, the court, 

in a detailed order, granted summary judgment in favor of JFJ, 

finding that truth was an absolute defense to Polin's action. The 

court also found that it was not necessary to rule on the 

objections to the exhibits because none of the exhibits 

demonstrated that the publications were false. 

On appeal, Polin contends: (1) the false impression given 

by the articles gave rise to a false light cause of actio; (2) the 

defense of truth applies to the truth of the impression of the 

articles; (3) the court erred in its analysis of the elements of 

false light under Oklahoma law; (4) the court's findings of fact 

and conclusions of law were not based on the evidence submitted; 

(5) the court erred in finding that none of the exhibits 

demonstrated that the publications were false; (6) the First 

Amendment freedom of the press does not give JFJ right to publish 

a one-sided biased report of a judicial proceeding for the purpose 

of influencing the public and a judge for its own personal gain; 

and (7) assuming that the First Amendment freedom of the press 

permits malicious, biased, selective editing by the news media of 

-3-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 3 
accounts of judicial proceedings, this "constitutional safeguard" 

should not apply to the non-media defendant. 

We have carefully reviewed Polin's contentions on appeal and 

hold that they are without merit. The summary judgment order of 

the district court was based on undisputed facts. Polin's counsel 

conceded that the publicized matter was true. Under the law of 

Oklahoma, truth is an absolute defense in an invasion of privacy/ 

false light action. 

We AFFIRM the district court's order and judgment, 

substantially for the reasons set forth in its Order of June 3, 

1988, which is attached hereto. 

We AFFIRM. 

Judge Holloway may file a separate opinion. 

-4-

Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 4 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

i ,,.. ~ • .,-,.,. ~" •i 

:~ ·,' ~ ·:·.:·:: tJr .., !. .. - .) k ~ 'J r 

~' ". C!< r. . : ! _'-_· :- ~· \ C!_ E:~:\ 

PAUL WILLIAM POLIN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

JEWS FOR JESUS a/k/a 

HINENI MINISTRIES, 

Defendant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

0 R D E R 

! ?. :; _ r·.: ·.~ : \: ·: : c~ .u;: r 

No. 87-C--38-C / 

This matter came on for hearing before the Court on February 

18, 1988, on the motion of the plaintiff for summary judgment. 

During the hearing, both parties agreed to submit the matter to 

the Court for determination, while reserving objections to 

various exhibits. 

thereto. 

The Court now enters its Order in regard 

The parties submitted a joint statement of undisputed facts, 

which the Court recites below: 

1. Robin Polin is the congenitally deaf child of Paul and 

Marsha Polin. 

2. Mr. and Mrs. Polin are Jewish. They did not raise 

their daughter to be a Christian. 

3. Robin became eighteen (18) years of age on December 27, 

1982. 

4. Robin became a believer in Jesus in 1982. 

(: 

t 

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 5 
5. Robin was reluctant to tell her parents about her faith 

in Jesus. 

6. In mid-April 1983, Paul removed the coupling device to 

Robin's TTY machine, did not allow her to use the car, and 

removed the captioned device to the television in Robin's bedroom. 

7. Robin was allowed to attend school during this period 

in April, 1983. 

8. On April 22-23, 1983, Robin's parents gave her ultimatums to obey their wishes or to leave home. Attached [to the 

parties' submitted statement were] copies of the ultimatums and 

exchanges. 

9. On April 25, 1983, Robin ceased living in her parents' 

home. 

10. Paul and Marsha went to the Tulsa Police and stated 

that their daughter was missing. The report states that the 

Polins tried to file kidnapping charges. 

11. Paul filed a guardianship proceeding in the District 

Court of Tulsa County, case No. PG 83-76, styled "In the Matter 

of the Guardianship of Robin Andrea Polin". 

12. The guardianship Petition claimed that Robin was 

incapable and incompetent to handle her affairs and estate, and 

that she was being deceived and imposed upon by artful, deceiving 

and designing persons. 

13. A hearing in the guardianship case was held between the 

dates of May 5-12, 1983. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 6 
I 

14. During the guardianship proceeding, there was conflicting testimony concerning the reason why Paul removed the coupling 

device to Robin's TTY machine, did not allow her to use the car, 

and removed the captioned device to the television in Robin's 

bedroom. 

' 15. During the guardianship proceeding, there was conflicting testimony concerning the nature and cause of the physical 

confrontation between Paul and Robin. Robin testified that her 

father hit her in the mouth with his knuckles. Paul said he hit 

her with the back of his hand in self defense. 

16. During the guardianship proceeding, there was conflicting testimony by Robin and Paul concerning their discussions 

about Jesus. 

17. Paul has had no formal training in sign language. 

18. During the guardianship proceeding, th13 testimony was 

conflicting concerning Robin's ability to adequately communicate 

in writing. 

19. During the guardianship proceeding, Robin stated that 

she did not want to go to Boston because she feared that her 

father's friends would kidnap her. 

20. There was conflicting testimony in the guardianship 

proceeding concerning the nature and reasons for the Boston trip. 

21. Prior to the hearing, Paul told Susan Perlman in a 

telephone conversation his view of the reasons for the Boston 

trip. Robin told Susan Perlman her view of the reason for the 

Boston trip. Susan Perlman and Moishe Rosen had independent 

knowledge of the Our Way organization in Boston. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 7 
22. On May 12, 1983, the Judge assigned to the guardianship 

case found Robin to be "Judgmentally Immature" and incompetent 

under the Oklahoma guardianship statutes. 

23. Attorney John Mark Young, who represented Robin during 

and after the guardianship proceeding, told Moishe Rosen and 

Susan Perlman about the hearing. 

24. Moishe Rosen reviewed transcripts of the guardianship 

proceedings, newspaper accounts, and talked and listened to Susan 

Perlman, Donna Hull, and attorney John Mark Young and others 

prior to publication of the May 12, 1983 letter and the May 18, 

1983 advertisement. 

and statements. 

Susan Perlman related to him Robin's views 

25. The Polin matter, Robin leaving home, t h e guardianship 

proceedings, etc. was widely covered in the news media. Attached 

[to the parties' statement were] copies of some of the news 

articles published in the Tulsa papers and revi1~wed by Moishe 

Rosen prior to the May 12, 1983 letter and the May 18, 1983 

advertisement. 

26. Moishe Rosen, Executive Director of Jews for Jesus, 

mailed a letter to all of the Jews for Jesus supporter!? in 

Oklahoma (approximately 2,200) on May 12, 1983. A true and 

correct copy of that letter and one of the envelopes used for its 

dissemination [was] attached [to the parties' statement]. 

27. Moishe Rosen authored the newspaper advertisements 

published by Jews for Jesus in the Tulsa World and Tulsa Tribune 

on May 18, 1983, a true and correct copy of which [was] attached 

[to the parties' statement]. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 8 
r 

28. The statements in the May 12, 1983 letter and the May 

18, 1983 advertisements are substantially the same. 

29. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma on November, 29, 1983, 

reversed the decision of the Trial Court with directions to 

vacate the order appointing [a] guardian and to dismiss the 

action. [Matter of Guardianship of Polin, 675 · P. 2d 1013 (Okla. 

1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 850 (1984).] 

30. In 1984, Jews for Jesus published an article in its 

newsletter, authored by Susan Perlman, entitled Robin's Story, A 

Happy Ending. The newsletter was distributed to Jews for Jesus 

supporters throughout the United States. A true and correct copy 

of the article [was] attached [to the parties' statement). 

31. Susan Perlman, who had been in Tulsa during part of the 

guardianship proceedings, reviewed transcripts of those proceedings, newspaper accounts, and talked and listened to Robin, Donna 

Hull, and attorney John Mark Young and others, including Moi~he 

Rosen, prior to publication of Robin's Story, A Happy Ending in 

1984. 

3 2. At all times material hereto, Moishe Rosen and Susan 

Perlman were employees of defendant and were acting within the 

course and scope of their employment with defendant. 

A general discussion of this area of the law is necessary in 

order to place the case at bar in proper context. A relatively 

recent legal development is the judicial recognition of a right 

of privacy, with attendant tort actions for invasion of that 

right. In Munley v. ISC Financial House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336 

(Okla. 1978), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma first recognized a 

-5-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 9 
r -

cause of action for invasion of privacy. In McCormack v. Okla. 

Pub. Co., 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980), the same court specifically 

addressed what has come to be known as a "false light" cause of 

action. Specifically, the court quoted the elements set forth in 

§652E of the Restatement of the Law of Torts (Second) , as follows: 

One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another 

that places the other before the public in a false 

light is subject to liability to the other for invasion 

of his privacy, if 

(a) the false light in which the other was placed 

would be highly offensive to a reasonable 

person, and 

(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the 

publicized matter and the false light in 

which the other would be placed. 

Id. at 740 (emphasis added). Concurrently with this development 

in Oklahoma tort law, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the constitutional implications of a "false light" claim. 

The Supreme Court first addressed the parameters of such a claim 

in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In a suit under a 

New York privacy statute, the Court held that the "actual malice" 

standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 

requiring "proof that the defendant published the report with 

knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth," 

applied to such a claim. Hill, supra, 385 U.S. at 388. In Gertz 

v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court 

ruled that the "actual malice" standard did not apply in a libel 

action brought by a private individual. The Court stated that 

"so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the 

-6-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 10 
r 

States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of 

liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood 

injurious to a private individual." Id. at 347. The Gertz 

decision necessarily raised the issue of whether the Hill decision remained sound, i.e., whether the "actual malice" standard 

still applied in false light cases. The Court mentioned the 

issue in Cantrell v. Forest City Puhl. Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), . 

but ruled that it need not decide it under the facts of that 

case. Id. at 250. The issue has yet to be resolved by the 

Supreme Court. 

In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), a decision 

upon which the plaintiff in the case at bar heavily relies, a 

libel action was brought after a magazine reported that a divorce 

had been granted on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery, when 

in fact the state court had not stated those grounds. The 

Supreme Court applied the Gertz standard, rather than the New 

York Times "actual malice" standard, finding that the plaintiff 

was not a "public figure" nor was the divorce a "public controversy". At oral argument, plaintiff's counsel referred to 

passages from Firestone in relation to his argument concerning 

liability for failure to publish a "fair and true" report of a 

judicial proceeding. While the Court rejects that argument, as 

explained below, the Court recognizes that these same passages 

would form the basis for an argument that the "actual malice" 

standard does not apply in a false light case. One treatise has 

concluded that "[t]he rationale of Firestone should indicate that 

Time v. Hill no longer governs the standard for 'false light' 

-7-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 11 
r 

privacy suits which cause the plaintiff mental anguish and 

humiliation." 3 R.Rotunda, J.Nowak & J.Young, Treatise on 

Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, §20.35 at 182 

(1986). 

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma disagrees. In Colbert v. 

World Publ. Co., 747 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1987), the court held that 

the Hill "actual malice" standard still applied in false light 

cases. Id. at 291. 1 It is against this doctrinal background 

that the parties presented their arguments to this Court. 

Plaintiff has referred to 12 O.S. §1443.1, which provides in 

relevant part as follows: 

A. A privileged publication or communication is one 

made: 

Third. By a fair and true report of any legislative or 

judicial or other proceeding authorized by law, or 

anything said in the course thereof, and any and all 

expressions of opinion in regard thereto, and cri ti-: 

cisms thereon, and any and all criticisms upon the 

official acts of any and all public officers, except 

where the matter stated of and concerning the official 

act done, or of the officer, falsely imputes crime to 

the officer so criticized. 

B. No publication which under this section would be 

privileged shall be punishable as libel. 

1 Neither party has noted that a federal court is not bound by state 

court determinations of what the Constitution requires. Southwest Offset, 

Inc. v. Hudco Pub. Co., Inc., 622 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1980). The law of 

defamation is a constitutional issue intimately related to the ccmron law. 

The Suprerre Court has granted states freedan in establishing standards of 

fault in defamation actions. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 

347 (1974). However, under the facts of the case at bar, this Court need not 

determine whether Colbert was correctly decided. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 12 
r 

He has also referred to §611 of the Restatement of Torts (Second), which provides: 

The publication of defamatory matter concerning another 

in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a 

meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of 

public concern is privileged if the report is accurate 

and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence 

reported. 

The plaintiff's argument apparently is that the defendant's 

publications were not a "fair and true report" of the judicial 

proceedings involving the plaintiff, demonstrating "reckless 

disregard" or "actual malice", and that defendant is therefore 

liable. 

The Court has concluded that the plaintiff's reliance upon 

these provisions as the sole source of defendant's right to 

publish is misplaced. As §1443.l(B) indicates, a finding that a 

publication comes within the ambit of the statute mandates a 

conclusion that the publication is privileged and that no liability may be imposed. It does not follow, however, that a finding 

that a publication does not fall within the statute mandates a 

conclusion that liability must be imposed. The issue of privilege is a separate protection, but the constitutional burden of 

proof must still be met. See Restatement of •rorts (Second), 

§611, comment b; see also Ricci v. Venture Magazine, Inc., 574 

F.Supp. 1563, 1571 (D.Mass. 1983). Therefore, as plaintiff 

conceded at oral argument, the "actual malice" standard must 

still be applied in Oklahoma. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 13 
The difficulty presented by the Colbert decision is the 

focus of the "actual malice" or the "reckless disregard". The 

Supreme Court of Oklahoma made the following statement: 

We have previously considered the test by which recovery of this sort is to be measured, and have adopted 

the Restatement view--that the defendant must have 

knowledge of, or act in reckless disregard as to the 

falsity of the publicized matter or the false light in 

which another would be placed. This is the equivalent 

of the Hill teaching that actual malice must be proven 

with convincing clarity by showing that the defendant 

had a high degree of awareness of probable falsity or 

in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of 

the publication. 

Colbert, 747 P.2d at 291 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 

The court in Colbert stated that it was adopting the Restatement 

view, which it had quoted previously from the McCormack decision. 

See Colbert, 747 P.2d at 290. However, the statement from 

Colbert quoted above is not the Restatement view. The Restatement says, and was quoted in McCormack as saying, that the actor 

must have had knowledge or acted in reckless disregard as to (1) 

the falsity of the publicized matter and (2) the false light in 

which the other would be placed. The Colbert court replaces the 

"and" with "or", indicating that reckless disregard either toward 

falsity or false light is sufficient for liability. This . distinction is critical in the case at bar because the plaintiff has 

conceded that the publicized matter was true, but argues that the 

intentional selection of certain items coupled with exclusion of 

other items, resulted in the placing of the plaintiff in a false 

light. 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in 

discussing §652E, the same Restatement section addressed in 

-10-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 14 
--

Colbert, said that "essential to both a false light privacy claim 

and a defamation claim is a determination that 'the matter 

published concerning the plaintiff is not true'." Rinsley v. 

Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1983). Similarly, in 

Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986), the court said 

that "falsity must be shown to state a false light cause of 

action." Id. at 53. The plaintiff in Machleder argued that a 

broadcast television interview had been selectively edited so as 

to tend to portray plaintiff as impliedly admitting guilt over an 

improper toxic waste dump. 

stating that 

The court rejected this argument, 

recovery for a false light tort may not be predicated 

on a rule that holds a media defendant liable for 

broadcasting truthful statements and actions because it 

failed to include additional facts which might have 

cast the plaintiff in a more favorable or balanced 

light. To permit recovery in such circumstances 

violates the First Amendment since "[t] he choice of 

material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made 

as to limitations on the size and content of the paperr 

and treatment of public issues and public officials 

whether fair or unfair -- constitute the exercise of 

editorial control and judgment." 

A court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the 

press by requiring the press to present an article or. 

broadcast in what the court believes is a. balanced 

manner. It may only assess liability when the press so 

oversteps its editorial freedom that it contains 

falsity and does so with the requisite degree of fault. 

Id. at 55 (citations omitted) •

2 

~e fact that the Machleder court refers to a rredia defendant raises the 

issue of the viability of a media/non-rredia distinction in cases of this type. 

(Footnote Continued) 

-11-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 15 
--

Counsel for the plaintiff stated at the hearing that the 

statements contained in the defendant's publications were true. 

THE COURT: Then what you're saying is not 

what was published was false, but that 

the total story wasn't published that 

gave the false impression, that is what 

you're saying. 

MR. HARLAN: Yes, that's correct. 

THE COURT: All right. So that which was 

published is not what you are objecting 

to; it's the fact that it was published 

without the full story being told. 

MR. HARLAN: Yes, oh, yes. 

(Transcript, p.13 LL.17-24). In a false light privacy action, 

truth is an absolute defense. Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 

1307 fl0th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, the Court must conclude that 

the defendant has established its defense to the plaintiff's 

action, and therefore that judgment must be entered in favor of 

the defendant. The Court need not rule upon the objections to 

exhibits because none of those exhibits demonstrate that the 

publications were false. 

It is the Order of the Court that the motion of the plaintiff, Paul William Polin, for summary judgment is hereby DENIED. 

(FCX)tnote Continued) 

The issue has not been definitively resolved. Canpare Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 

777 F. 2d 1403, 1409-1411 (10th Cir. 1985) (rejecting distinction regarding 

criticism of local governrrent in libel action and quoting supporting language 

fran Suprerre Court decisions) and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 

U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986) (" [we need not consider what standards would apply] 

if the plaintiff sues a non-rredia defendant." In its first paragraph, the 

Colbert court identified one question presented as "whether rrere negligence by 

a rredia defendant is sufficient to allCM recovery for false light invasion of 

privacy. 11 Colbert, 747 P.2d at 287 (ercphasis added). Ho.<1ever, under the 

facts of this case, the Court need not resolve the issue. 

-12-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 16 
r 

It is the further Order of the Court that judgment is hereby 

entered in favor of the defendant, Jews for Jesus a/k/a Hineni 

Ministries. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this day of June, 1988. 

'>/\£;<.~ 6~) H. DALE COO 

Chief Judge, u. s. District Court 

-13-

Appellate Case: 88-2031 Document: 010110090153 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 17