Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01198/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01198-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dana Bostic
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LADONTA GILL and DANA BOSTIC,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

Nos. 10 CR 673-7 & 10 CR 673-1 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 5, 2016 — DECIDED MAY 31, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Defendants-Appellants Ladonta 

Gill and Dana Bostic both pled guilty to participating in a 

heroin distribution conspiracy. Gill challenges his sentence 

as procedurally unsound, disputing his criminal history 

point assessment and supervised release conditions. Bostic 

challenges his sentence as procedurally unsound and substantively unreasonable. We vacate and remand Gill’s senCase: 15-1198 Document: 46 Filed: 05/31/2016 Pages: 23
2 Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198

tence for complete resentencing, and we affirm Bostic’s sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Gill was a high-level member of the New Breeds street 

gang and associated large heroin distribution operation controlled by Bostic. United States v. Adams, 746 F.3d 734, 737–38 

(7th Cir. 2014). The Bostic organization’s daily heroin sales

totaled between $4,000 and $10,000. Id. at 738.

The Bostic organization controlled an area “bordered by 

Pulaski, Van Buren, Congress, and Karlov Streets” on the 

west side of Chicago. Id. The Bostic organization maintained 

control over its territory through the use of guns, violence, 

and threats of violence. Id. at 748–49.

In August 2008, Bostic was shot and his brother was 

murdered. The Bostic organization retaliated against a rival 

street gang who they believed responsible. As part of the resulting violence, Gill and another Bostic organization member shot at two men, one of whom suffered gunshot wounds 

to his legs. Subsequently, Chicago Police Department officers arrested Gill. Gill pled guilty to aggravated unlawful use 

of a weapon (AUUW), in violation of 720 ILCS 5/24–1.6(a)(1),

and on November 24, 2008, he was sentenced to three years’ 

imprisonment.

The Chicago Police Department and Drug Enforcement 

Agency launched an investigation into the Bostic organization in the fall of 2009. The investigation included controlled 

heroin purchases, surveillance, interviews of informant and 

cooperating witnesses, court-authorized wiretaps, and seizure of over eight kilograms of heroin and numerous firearms. Adams, 746 F.3d at 737.

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Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 3

As a result of this investigation, on November 3, 2010, a 

federal grand jury returned a twenty-two count indictment 

charging Gill, Bostic, and others with various drug offenses. 

On December 21, 2011, Gill pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute controlled 

substances, namely 1000 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Bostic pled guilty to one count of the 

same offense on February 22, 2012.

A. Gill

Gill’s first sentencing occurred in July 2012. At sentencing, Gill challenged the application to his sentence of the 2-

level enhancement for maintaining a drug premises, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) (“stash house enhancement”). 

Gill contended that application of the stash house enhancement violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because his offense 

conspiracy ended on or about August 10, 2010, but the stash 

house enhancement was not effective until November 1, 

2010. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. The district court expressed 

sympathy but found that the stash house enhancement applied under then-existing Seventh Circuit precedent.

The district court determined Gill’s guideline range was 

360 months to life. His criminal history category was III, 

based on an assessment of six criminal history points—three 

points for his previous AUUW conviction, one point for a 

juvenile drug possession conviction, and two points for being on parole at the time of commission of his AUUW offense. U.S.S.G § 4A1.1(a), (c), (d). His adjusted offense level 

was 40, which included a 2-level dangerous weapon enhancement and the 2-level stash house enhancement. 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), (12). The court also made findings of 

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4 Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198

Gill’s involvement in violent activity. With the twenty-year 

mandatory minimum in place, the court sentenced Gill to 

329 months’ imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release, with standard conditions. Judgment was entered 

against Gill on July 9, 2012.

On July 28, 2012, Gill filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging only the district court’s application of the stash 

house enhancement. As Gill’s first appeal was pending, on 

June 10, 2013, the Supreme Court decided Peugh v. United 

States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013), which held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated “when a defendant is sentenced under 

Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts 

and the new version provides a higher applicable Guidelines

sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the 

offense.” Id. at 2078.

In Adams, this court vacated and remanded Gill’s first

appeal for resentencing in light of Peugh. 746 F.3d at 743. 

Specifically, the Adams court remanded Gill’s case “for the 

limited purpose of sentencing him based on the correct 

guideline level” but held that “[t]his limited remand does 

not, however, limit the district court’s discretion to hold (or 

not hold) further proceedings and consider further arguments to determine Gill’s sentence based on the § 3553 factors.” Id. at 744–45.

On September 25, 2014, the district court held Gill’s second sentencing, or resentencing, hearing. The court found

that Gill had a criminal history category of III and an adjusted offense level of 36, after a 2-level reduction for removal of 

the stash house enhancement and a further 2-level reduction

in anticipation of Amendment 782 to the sentencing guidelines, which would take effect on November 1, 2014. With 

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Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 5

the statutory twenty-year mandatory minimum in place, the 

district court determined that Gill’s effective guideline range 

was 240 to 293 months’ imprisonment. The government and 

Gill agreed.

After hearing arguments from both sides regarding the 

§ 3553(a) factors, the district court “re-adopt[ed]” all of its 

prior findings regarding Gill’s involvement in violent activity. The district court then declared: “I don’t think [Gill] warrants a sentence at the low end of the guideline range or 

close to it because of his involvement in violent activity.” 

(Gill Sent. Tr. 22, Sep. 25, 2014).

In conclusion, the district court sentenced Gill to 280 

months’ imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release, 

with standard conditions. Judgement was entered against 

Gill on September 26, 2014. Gill’s second appeal follows.

B. Bostic

In August 2012, the district court held Bostic’s first sentencing hearing. Bostic challenged the application of the 2-

level stash house enhancement, arguing violation of the Ex 

Post Facto Clause because his offense conspiracy ended on or 

about August 10, 2010, but the stash house enhancement 

was not effective until November 1, 2010. As with Gill, the 

district court expressed sympathy but found that the stash 

house enhancement applied under then-existing Seventh 

Circuit precedent.

The district court then determined that Bostic’s guideline 

range was 360 months to life, based on a criminal history 

category of II and an adjusted offense level of 42, which included the 2-level stash house enhancement. The court sentenced Bostic to 456 months’ imprisonment and 10 years of 

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6 Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198

supervised release, with standard conditions. The court entered judgement against him on August 13, 2012.

On August 27, 2012, Bostic filed a timely notice of appeal. 

In Bostic’s first appeal, he raised three challenges. First, he 

argued that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. 

Second, Bostic contended the district court committed procedural error when it held him responsible for some of the 

violence undertaken by the New Breed gang without identifying the specific violent acts. Third, Bostic claimed that application of the stash house enhancement was an ex post facto

violation. As Bostic’s first appeal was pending, the Supreme 

Court decided Peugh.

In Adams, this court decided Bostic’s first appeal. The Adams court began by rejecting Bostic’s first two claims, holding that Bostic’s guilty plea was valid and no procedural error had occurred at his sentencing. Adams, 746 F.3d at 745–

49. However, in light of Peugh, this court vacated and remanded Bostic’s case for resentencing based on his third 

claim against application of the stash house enhancement. Id.

at 749. As with Gill, the Adams court remanded Bostic’s sentence for “the limited purpose of correcting the sentencing 

range” but “d[id] not limit the district court’s discretion to 

hold (or not hold) further proceedings and consider further 

arguments based on the § 3553 factors.” Id.

On January 14, 2015, the district court held Bostic’s second sentencing, or resentencing, hearing. Consistent with 

the first sentencing, the court found that Bostic had a criminal history category of II and offense level of 38, after a 2-

level reduction for removal of the stash house enhancement 

and a further 2-level reduction in anticipation of Amendment 782. With the statutory twenty-year mandatory miniCase: 15-1198 Document: 46 Filed: 05/31/2016 Pages: 23
Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 7

mum in place, the district court determined that Bostic’s 

guideline range was 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The 

government and Bostic agreed.

After hearing arguments from both sides regarding the 

§ 3553(a) factors, the district court incorporated most of its 

comments from Bostic’s first sentencing, including those regarding Bostic’s conduct and involvement in violent acts. 

The court then explained that at the first sentencing, it had 

accounted for the ex post facto nature of the stash house enhancement and therefore had considered Bostic to have an

effective guidelines range of 324 to 405 months. The court 

further explicated that at the first sentencing, it had imposed 

a sentence of 456 months’ imprisonment, an effective aboveguidelines sentence, because the effective guidelines range 

did not capture the full range of Bostic’s conduct and involvement in violent acts. Applying this same reasoning, the 

resentencing court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 

360 months’ imprisonment because the guidelines did not 

capture the full range of Bostic’s involvement in violent acts. 

The court entered judgment against Bostic on January 26, 

2015. Bostic’s second appeal follows here.

II. ANALYSIS

Both Gill and Bostic challenge their respective sentences. 

We begin with Gill’s appeal, which disputes the district

court’s determination of his criminal history score and imposition of conditions of supervised release. Then, we address Bostic’s appeal, which challenges the procedural 

soundness and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

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8 Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198

A. Gill

“When reviewing a criminal sentence for procedural error, we apply de novo review.” United States v. Bour, 804 F.3d 

880, 885 (7th Cir. 2015).

Gill raises two procedural challenges to his sentence. 

First, he argues that the district court erred in its determination of his criminal history score and category, specifically its 

reliance on his conviction under the Illinois AUUW statute, 

applicable portions of which have been found unconstitutional by this court and the Illinois Supreme Court. See Moore 

v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012); People v. Burns, 2015 

IL 117387 (Ill. 2015). Second, Gill contends that the court 

erred in not making adequate findings when imposing conditions of supervised release, pursuant to United States v. 

Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015).

1. Waiver or Forfeiture

The government contends that Gill waived both of his 

claims because he did not raise them prior to this appeal. 

Therefore, we must determine whether Gill waived or merely forfeited his arguments below.

This court’s precedent regarding the waiver or forfeiture 

of a criminal defendant’s rights is well established. United 

States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007). “Waiver occurs when a criminal defendant intentionally relinquishes a 

known right. Forfeiture occurs when a defendant negligently 

fails to assert a right in a timely fashion. Waiver of a right 

extinguishes any error and precludes appellate review, 

whereas forfeiture of a right is reviewed for plain error.” Id. 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

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Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 9

We start our waiver-forfeiture analysis with Gill’s criminal history claim and next turn to his supervised release

conditions claim.

The government argues that Gill waived his right to challenge the assessment of criminal history points for the 

AUUW conviction. This argument fails because it is similar 

to the one rejected by this court in United States v. Jenkins, 772 

F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 2014).

In Jenkins, defendant Jenkins challenged the assessment 

of criminal history points based on an Illinois AUUW conviction, also under 720 ILCS 5/24–1.6(a)(1), which had been 

held facially unconstitutional at the time of his sentencing.

Jenkins, 772 F.3d at 1096. The government in Jenkins argued 

that Jenkins had waived, rather than forfeited, his right to 

challenge the assessment of points for the AUUW conviction. Specifically, the government asked this court “to infer 

that Jenkins knew about and intentionally chose not to raise 

the AUUW argument, noting that Jenkins was represented 

by counsel, reviewed the PSR, and raised a different objection to the PSR’s assessment of points.” Id.

The Jenkins court rejected this argument. The court noted 

that without the three points attributable to the AUUW conviction, Jenkins would have been assessed a lower criminal 

history category, which would have “significantly” lowered 

his guidelines range. Id. The court then declared, “We can 

conceive of no reason why Jenkins would have intentionally 

relinquished an objection certain to result in a lower criminal 

history score and sentencing range, nor has the government 

offered one.” Id. Consequently, the court held that Jenkins’s 

failure to challenge the points assessment resulted from “an 

oversight by defense counsel and was therefore accidental 

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10 Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198

rather than deliberate. This is the hallmark of forfeiture, 

which is the failure to timely assert a right.” Id. (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

Jenkins controls this part of Gill’s case; the facts are virtually indistinguishable. In the present case, in arguing waiver, 

the government is asking us to infer that Gill “knew about 

and intentionally chose not to raise the AUUW argument,” 

the very contention we rejected in Jenkins. Id. Additionally, 

like in Jenkins, without the points attributable to the AUUW 

conviction, Gill would have been assessed a lower criminal 

history category, which would have significantly lowered his 

guidelines range.1 Therefore, Gill forfeited, rather than 

waived, his criminal history assessment claim.

The government attempts to distinguish Jenkins by arguing that Gill’s criminal history claim exceeds Adams’s limited 

remand and that Gill “should not be able to use the accident 

of a remand to raise in a second appeal an issue that he 

could just as well have raised in the first appeal.” (Appellee

Br. 14.)

 

1 At resentencing, the district court adopted the PSR, which assessed Gill 

a criminal history category of III, based on six criminal history points: 

three points for his previous AUUW conviction, one point for a juvenile 

drug possession conviction, and two points for being on parole at the 

time of commission of his AUUW offense. Removing the three points for 

his AUUW conviction would leave Gill with a criminal history category 

of II, based on three criminal history points. Further removing the two 

points for being on parole during commission of his AUUW offense 

would leave Gill with a criminal history category of I, based on one criminal history point. Thus, without his AUUW conviction, Gill would have 

been assessed a lower criminal history score and category.

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Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 11

This is a distinction without a difference. In Adams, this 

court stated: “While we call this a limited remand, the remand is still very broad. But a court may fashion a limited 

remand as narrowly or broadly as it deems appropriate.” 

746 F.3d at 745. In other words, while we provided guidance 

in the form of a limited remand, it was not meant to infringe 

upon the district court’s properly exercised discretion. In 

fact, there is no dispute, by either party, regarding the district court’s adjustment of Gill’s guideline range in anticipation of Amendment 782. Just as that adjustment was not precluded by Adams’s limited remand, neither is Gill’s criminal 

history score challenge.

Jenkins itself provides further guidance. In determining 

that Jenkins only forfeited his argument, the Jenkins court 

underscored:

Indeed, not only did defense counsel overlook the 

error, but the Assistant United States Attorney and 

Probation did so as well. As a result, the error was 

not brought to the attention of the district court. As 

we have previously noted, it would be unjust to 

place the entire burden for these oversights on [the 

defendant].

Jenkins, 772 F.3d at 1096–97 (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted). In the case at hand, defense 

counsel, the government, and probation all overlooked the 

error in Gill’s criminal history score. Indeed, the only notable 

distinction between Jenkins and Gill’s case is that here, these 

oversights occurred twice.

We now turn to Gill’s supervised release conditions challenge and find that he forfeited, rather than waived, this 

claim. This court recently held that “the imposition of waiver 

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12 Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198

is inappropriate in light of developments in the law since 

[the defendant’s] first appeal,” in response to a defendant’s 

challenge, on a second appeal, to standard conditions of supervised release imposed prior to Thompson. United States v. 

Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Thompson, 

777 F.3d at 368). Here, Gill’s first appeal and resentencing 

preceded Thompson and therefore waiver is inappropriate.

In conclusion, we reiterate that this court has “consistently held that waiver principles should be construed liberally 

in favor of the defendant.” Jenkins, 772 F.3d at 1096 (collecting cases). Accordingly, Gill merely forfeited his claims and 

plain-error review applies.

2. Criminal History Point Assessment

“Under the plain error standard, we will reverse the district court’s sentencing determination only when we find: (1) 

an error or defect (2) that is clear or obvious (3) affecting the 

defendant’s substantial rights (4) and seriously impugning 

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1096 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Jenkins also controls the plain error analysis of Gill’s criminal history claim. In Jenkins, we determined plain error had 

occurred because “under Application Note 6 to Section 

4A1.2, the trial court erred when it assigned three criminal 

history points as arising from [the defendant’s] previously 

invalidated AUUW conviction.” Id. at 1098.

Here, we apply the same analysis as the Jenkins court, id.

at 1097–99, and conclude that the district court committed 

plain error with regard to Gill’s criminal history score. 

This court has “repeatedly held that ‘a sentencing based 

on an incorrect Guidelines range constitutes plain error and 

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Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 13

warrants a remand for resentencing, unless we have reason 

to believe that the error in no way affected the district court's 

selection of a particular sentence.’” Id. at 1097 (quoting United States v. Love, 706 F.3d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 2013)).

Under the sentencing guidelines, Gill was assessed five 

points for his AUUW conviction—three points for the actual 

conviction and two additional points for being on parole at 

the time of the commission of his AUUW offense. U.S.S.G. 

§ 4A1.1(a), (d).

But, an exception to this rule appears in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2

n.6:

Sentences resulting from convictions that (A) have 

been reversed or vacated because of errors of law 

or because of subsequently-discovered evidence 

exonerating the defendant, or (B) have been ruled 

constitutionally invalid in a prior case are not to be 

counted.

This court has read Subsection (B) to contain two requirements: “(i) the sentence resulted from a conviction that was 

ruled constitutionally invalid; and (ii) that ruling occurred in 

a prior case.” Jenkins, 772 F.3d at 1097.

Gill meets the first requirement because both this court

and the Supreme Court of Illinois have held the applicable 

portion of the AUUW statute to be constitutionally invalid.

See id. at 1097.

In December 2012, in response to a facial challenge, this 

court in Moore held that provisions of the Illinois AUUW 

statute, notably the “flat ban on carrying ready-to-use guns 

outside the home,” violated the Second Amendment. 702 

F.3d at 940, 942. In September 2013, in Aguilar, the Supreme 

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14 Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198

Court of Illinois held that applicable portions of the AUUW 

statute were facially unconstitutional, but limited its holding 

to the “Class 4” form of the offense. 2 N.E.3d at 327–28. Recently, in Burns, the Supreme Court of Illinois “clarif[ied]” 

Aguilar and held that the “[AUUW] statute is facially unconstitutional, without limitation.” 2015 IL 117387 at *6.

In Illinois, when a statute is held to be facially unconstitutional, it renders a defendant’s conviction void because 

“‘the statute under which [the defendant] was charged and 

prosecuted was not in effect when the alleged offenses occurred.’” Jenkins, 772 F.3d at 1097–98 (citing People v. Tellez–

Valencia, 723 N.E.2d 223, 225 (Ill. 1999)) (alteration in original). Therefore, in light of Moore and Burns, Gill has met the 

first requirement of Subsection (B).

The government seeks to distinguish Gill’s alleged “Class 

2 form” AUUW conviction from Jenkins and Aguilar, both of 

which concerned a “Class 4 felony” AUUW conviction.2 The 

government’s argument fails. In clarifying Aguilar, the Burns

court explicitly declared that “[t]here is no ‘Class 4 form’ or 

‘Class 2 form’ of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon,” and 

it ultimately held that the AUUW was statute “facially unconstitutional, without limitation.” 2015 IL 117387 at *4, *6.

Gill also fulfills the second requirement of Subsection (B) 

because his sentence was ruled constitutionally invalid “in a 

prior case.” Gill was resentenced after both Moore and Agui-

 2 The record does not clearly state whether Gill’s AUUW conviction was 

a “Class 2 felony” or “Class 4 felony.” However, the PSR description of 

his conviction—“Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon in A Vehicle 

With A Previous Conviction”— suggests a “Class 2 felony” via 720 ILCS 

5/24–1.6(d)(3).

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Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 15

lar were decided: Moore predated Gill’s sentencing by twenty-one months and Aguilar by nine months. See Jenkins, 772 

F.3d at 1098 (determining that the defendant met the second 

requirement of Subsection (B) because Moore and Aguilar

predated his sentencing).

We conclude that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 n.6, the 

district court erred when it assigned five criminal history 

points based on Gill’s previously invalidated AUUW conviction. And this court has held that “[a] district court’s adoption of erroneous information in a PSR that results in an incorrect Guidelines range, however correct such information 

appears, constitutes plain error on review.” Jenkins, 772 F.3d 

at 1098 (collecting cases). Thus, the district court committed

plain error in its assessment of Gill’s criminal history.

3. Supervised Release Conditions

We now turn to Gill’s challenge to his supervised release 

conditions.

This court’s recent jurisprudence holds that a sentencing 

court must make adequate findings regarding the conditions 

of supervised release. See e.g., Thompson, 777 F.3d 368; United 

States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. 

Armour, 804 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the district court 

did not do so, though we recognize that it did not have the 

benefit of guidance provided by Thompson and its progeny.

Consequently, we agree with the government and Gill 

that Gill’s sentence should be vacated and remanded to allow the district court to make adequate findings with regards to the supervised release conditions. (Appellant Gill

Br. 17–21; Appellee Br. 15–16.)

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16 Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198

We conclude Gill’s case with a brief note on the scope of 

the remand. Because “there might properly be an interplay 

between prison time and the term and conditions of supervised release,” this court has held that the appropriate relief 

for error in the conditions of supervised release is complete 

resentencing. Kappes, 782 F.3d at 867. Therefore, we vacate 

Gill’s entire sentence and remand for complete resentencing, 

consistent with our foregoing reasons.

B. Bostic

Bostic challenges the procedural soundness and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. However, Bostic’s specific claims are confusing. It appears that he is arguing that the 

district court erred, either procedurally or substantively or 

both, in Bostic’s first sentencing by failing to account for the 

ex post facto nature of the stash house enhancement and not 

alerting him to the fact that it was imposing an effective

above-guidelines sentence. Although Bostic’s first sentence 

was vacated, we address his claims because they pertain to 

determinations made by the first sentencing court that were

discussed and incorporated at resentencing.

“We review a district court’s choice of sentence in two 

steps. First, we assess de novo whether the court followed 

proper procedures. If the decision below is procedurally 

sound, then we ask whether the resulting sentence is substantively reasonable.” United States v. Warner, 792 F.3d 847, 

855 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted); see also United States v. 

Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2008).

1. Procedural Error

Procedurally, we ask district courts to do the following at 

sentencing: “(1) calculate the applicable Guidelines range; (2) 

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Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 17

give the defendant an opportunity to identify any of the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors that might warrant a non-Guidelines 

sentence; and (3) state which factors influenced the final sentence.” United States v. Abebe, 651 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2011)

(internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “[a]s a 

general matter, the record must merely assure us that the 

court thoughtfully considered the statutory provisions.” 

United States v. Nania, 724 F.3d 824, 838 (7th Cir. 2013).

In the present case, at resentencing, the district court met 

its procedural requirements. As an initial matter, there is no 

dispute regarding the first two procedural requirements—

the district court correctly calculated the guidelines range 

and gave Bostic ample opportunity to raise arguments under 

the § 3553(a) factors. (Bostic Sent. Tr. 3–4, 10–25, 27–29, Jan. 

14, 2015.)

Bostic’s challenge, as we understand it, pertains only to 

the third procedural requirement—that the district court did 

not state which factors influenced the final sentence. We find 

Bostic’s challenge to be without merit.

At both Bostic’s first sentencing and resentencing, the 

district court stated which factors influenced the final sentence. At Bostic’s first sentencing, the district court met its 

procedural requirements, leading the Adams court to reject 

Bostic’s procedural challenge in his first appeal. Adams, 746 

F.3d at 747–49. At resentencing, the district court incorporated many of its comments from the first sentencing, including the following: Bostic committed a narcotics offense, 

he was involved in an organization that used violence to accomplish its goals, he was the leader of a drug organization 

that was associated with or part of a street gang, he had a 

disadvantaged upbringing, the full scope of his conduct was 

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18 Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198

not captured by the sentencing guideline range, and his 

criminal history category of II was appropriate. (Bostic Sent.

Tr. 29–33, Jan. 14, 2015.) Then, the resentencing court explicitly explained that, at the first sentencing, it had already accounted for the ex post facto nature of the stash house enhancement, which resulted in an effective guideline range of 

324 to 405 months and an effective above-guidelines sentence of 456 months:

And so in terms of the guideline calculation, that’s 

different because the stash house guideline enhancement no longer applies to Mr. Bostic. That 

said ... I took that into account before. I made a 

comment about that at sentencing ... What I said 

was: I’m applying it. I reject the ex post facto argument, but 3553(a) entitles me and it requires me 

to consider whether a sentence is just. And I 

thought it was unjust or retroactively applies something, and so I did not apply that guideline enhancement in the actual sentence. I said that I was 

considering it as a 3553(a) factor, and that’s what I 

meant.

So effectively, though Mr. Bostic’s ... criminal history category 2 and previously [sic] offense level of 

42 gave him a range, advisory range, of 360 months 

to life, and I made some comments about where I 

was sentencing him within that range, which I will 

come back to, effectively I was considering him 

somebody who had an effective sentencing guideline range of 324 to 405 months. When I made the 

comment at the end of the sentencing, on page 302 

after I went through all the considerations, I said: 

“The sentencing I’m imposing is a sentence of 38 

years. That translates to – I’m going to do the math 

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Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 19

again – 456 months. It’s all on Count 1. That’s in the 

middle of the guideline range, I guess.”

I said that as an observation, not because I thought 

that I was sentencing him in the middle of the effective guideline range because I wasn’t. I was effectively sentencing Mr. Bostic above what I considered to be the effective guideline range of 324 to 

405 months. I gave him a sentence that was 51 

months higher than that. And the reason I did that 

was all of the other stuff that I discussed at the sentencing; namely, the fact that his guideline range 

didn’t capture the full range of his conduct, this issue about violence, his direct participation and the 

attribution of other things to him to the extent I 

concluded that that happened.

So the stash house thing is what gets us back here. 

It’s a change in terms of the guideline calculation. 

It’s really not a change in terms of the sentence that 

I imposed.

Id. at 33–34. After expounding on its reasoning in imposing 

an effective above-guidelines range sentence at the first sentencing, the district court then utilized a similar reasoning to 

impose an actual above-guidelines range sentence of 360 

months’ imprisonment at resentencing:

[W]hat I effectively did before was I effectively 

considered Mr. Bostic as somebody who had an 

advisory range of 324 to 405 months, and I essentially sentenced him about 51–exactly 51 months 

above the top end of the range, about one-eighth

above the top end of the range. In other words, 50 

is one-eighth of 405.

Case: 15-1198 Document: 46 Filed: 05/31/2016 Pages: 23
20 Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198

I think the appropriate sentence now is 360 months, 

which is essentially proportionately the same, 

roughly the same, amount of increase over the top 

end of the actual guideline range now.

Id. at 36. This extensive and detailed discussion at resentencing more than demonstrates that the district court “state[d]

which factors influenced the final sentence.” Abebe, 651 F.3d 

at 656 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Therefore, we find no procedural error.

2. Substantive Reasonableness

In reviewing for substantive reasonableness under an 

abuse of discretion standard, this court “will uphold an 

above-guidelines sentence so long as the district court offered an adequate statement of its reasons, consistent with 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a), for imposing such a sentence.” Abebe, 651 

F.3d at 657 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“There is no presumption that a sentence outside the 

guidelines’ range is unreasonable. The fact that we might 

reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district 

court.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

This court’s review “must take into account that a sentencing 

judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their 

import under [section] 3553(a) in the individual case.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 

As such, this court “must defer, absent an abuse of discretion, to [the district court’s] ruling.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Case: 15-1198 Document: 46 Filed: 05/31/2016 Pages: 23
Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 21

Here, the district court provided an adequate statement 

of its reasons for imposing such a sentence, consistent with 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

As discussed, the district court at resentencing explained,

in detail, its reasons for imposing an above-guidelines sentence. The district court incorporated many of its comments 

from the first sentencing, including those relating to Bostic’s 

conduct and involvement in violent acts. The district court 

then explained that at the first sentencing, it had accounted 

for the ex post facto nature of the stash house enhancement 

and therefore had considered Bostic to have an effective 

guidelines range of 324 to 405 months. The district court further explicated that at the first sentencing, it had imposed a 

sentence of 456 months’ imprisonment, an effective aboveguidelines sentence, because the effective guidelines range 

did not capture the full range of Bostic’s conduct and involvement in violent acts. Finally, in resentencing Bostic, the

district court applied the same reasoning it used at the first

sentencing—imposing a sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment, an actual above-guidelines sentence, because the actual guidelines range did not capture the full range of Bostic’s 

conduct and participation in violent activity. This discussion 

is more than sufficient to demonstrate the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in imposing an above-guidelines sentence at resentencing.

Bostic argues that the first sentencing court erred because 

it did not account for the ex post facto nature of the stash 

house enhancement. This argument makes no sense. At resentencing, the district court unambiguously declared that it 

had already accounted for the ex post facto nature of the stash 

house enhancement at the first sentencing: “I thought it was 

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22 Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198

unjust or retroactively applies something, and so I did not 

apply that [stash house] guideline enhancement in the actual 

sentence. I said that I was considering it as a 3553(a) factor, 

and that’s what I meant.” (Bostic Sent. Tr. 29, 33, Jan. 14, 

2015.)

Bostic also contends that the first sentencing court erred 

because it did not alert him that it was imposing an effective 

above-guidelines sentence. Specifically, he asserts that his 

first sentence was based on the district court’s “unspoken 

private beliefs” because the first sentencing court had described Bostic’s first sentence as “in the middle of the guideline range,” undercutting the resentencing court’s claim of 

imposing an effective above-guidelines sentence. (Bostic 

Sent. Tr. 68, Aug. 3, 2012.) This argument is without merit. 

At resentencing, the district court explicitly rejected the 

claim that there was any meaning to its prior observation: “I 

said that as an observation, not because I thought that I was 

sentencing him in the middle of the effective guideline range 

because I wasn’t. I was effectively sentencing Mr. Bostic 

above what I considered to be the effective guideline range 

of 324 to 405 months.” (Bostic Sent. Tr. 34, Jan. 14, 2015.)

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in imposing an above-guidelines sentence.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Gill’s sentence is VACATED 

and REMANDED to the district court for complete resentencing,3 and Bostic’s sentence is AFFIRMED.4

 3 For Gill’s case, we note a clerical error in the record. As part of the remand, we direct the district court to amend the written judgment and 

commitment orders to reflect that the offense was 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 

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Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 23

 

846, to match the indictment and oral pronouncement of the district 

court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.

4 For Bostic’s case, we note a clerical error in the record. We order the 

clerk of the district court to amend the written judgment and commitment orders to reflect that the offense was 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, to 

match the indictment and oral pronouncement of the district court. Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 36; United States v. Anobah, 734 F.3d 733, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2013)

(“Rule 36 is equally available to the court of appeals and the district 

court.”). This modification does not affect our ruling.

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