Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-13-01706/USCOURTS-ca2-13-01706-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nathan Brown
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee USA

Document Text:

13‐1706

United States v. Brown

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

____________________

August Term, 2014

(Submitted: February 17, 2015     Decided:  June 14, 2016)

Docket No. 13‐1706

1 

2 ____________________

3 

4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                

5    

6       Appellee,            

7     v.

8 

9 NATHAN BROWN,

10 

11         Defendant‐Appellant.

12 

13 ____________________

14 

15 Before: POOLER, SACK, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

16 

17 Appeal from a January 29, 2013 judgment of the United States District

18 Court for the Northern District of New York (Sharpe, J.), sentencing Defendant‐

19 Appellant Nathan Brown to 60 years’ imprisonment. The sentencing transcript

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1 suggests that the district court may have based its sentence on a clearly

2 erroneous understanding of the facts. Accordingly, we remand for resentencing.

3 Judge Droney dissents in a separate opinion.

4 ____________________

5 Brenda K. Sannes and Richard D. Belliss, Assistant

6 United States Attorneys, for Richard S. Hartunian,

7 United States Attorney for the Northern District of New

8 York, Syracuse, NY, for Appellee.

9 

10 S. Michael Musa‐Obregon, Maspeth, NY, for Defendant‐

11 Appellant.

12 

13 POOLER, Circuit Judge:

14 Nathan Brown pleaded guilty to three counts of production of child

15 pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), and two counts of possession of

16 child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The district court

17 (Sharpe, J.) imposed a sentence of 60 years’ imprisonment. Brown now

18 challenges that sentence, arguing that the district court miscalculated his

19 guidelines range and that the sentence is otherwise procedurally and

20 substantively unreasonable. We reject Brown’s challenge to the guidelines

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1 calculations, but we remand for resentencing to ensure that the sentence is not

2 based on a clearly erroneous understanding of the facts.

BACKGROUND1 3 

4 In February 2012, federal investigators discovered eleven images on a

5 child‐pornography website that appeared to have been uploaded by the same

6 person. Two of the images depicted the same eight‐year‐old girl. By examining

7 metadata from one of the images, investigators determined that the image had

8 been taken using a Motorola Droid X cell phone. The metadata also revealed GPS

9 coordinates associated with the image. With assistance from the cell phone

10 carrier in that region for the Motorola Droid X, investigators determined the

11 approximate area where the photograph was taken. They then spoke with the

 

1 We set forth the facts in detail because we think it important to a full

appreciation of the rationale underlying the district court’s sentence. See United

States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 378‐404 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing in detail

the injury suffered by victims as a result of the dissemination of child

pornography), vacated on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d

204 (2d Cir. 2013); cf. also Reingold, 731 F.3d at 233 (Sack, J., concurring) (“I have

no doubt that there are appeals in such cases that require the reviewing court to

engage in a carefully, even painfully, detailed analysis of the child pornography

and abuse at issue.”). We do so with some misgivings, however, as we fear that

an easily accessible detailed description of the events might worsen the mental

anguish suffered by the victims.  

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1 superintendent of schools within that area, who identified the girl after viewing a

2 sanitized version of the photograph.  

3 Federal agents visited the girl’s home and spoke with her mother, who

4 identified her daughter in four images of child pornography. The girl’s mother

5 also recognized her thirteen‐year‐old niece in two of the images. The mother told

6 investigators that the two girls would sometimes spend time together at a trailer

7 home that had been rented by defendant Nathan Brown and the mother’s sister.

8 Investigators interviewed the eight‐year‐old girl, who told them that,

9 while babysitting, Brown would “play house” with the girls, and she would play

10 the “baby” and wear a diaper. Brown would periodically “change” the diaper as

11 if it were soiled. She reported that, while doing so, Brown had touched her as he

12 “cleaned” her vaginal area with a baby wipe. Brown also took pictures of the

13 girls as this was occurring.

14 Both girls recognized themselves in the photographs that they were shown

15 by investigators, and they remembered a number of the pictures that had been

16 taken while they were awake. One of the girls told investigators that Brown

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1 offered to buy her an iPad if she allowed him to take more pictures of her, which

2 she refused.

3 Based on the information provided by the girls and their parents, federal

4 agents obtained a search warrant for Brown’s residence and electronic devices.

5 They executed the warrant at Brown’s home and found him attempting to delete

6 child pornography from his computer. The agents arrested Brown and seized his

7 computers, cell phones, storage devices, and cameras.  

8 After his arrest, Brown told investigators that he had been viewing child

9 pornography online daily using software that hid his IP address. He admitted to

10 taking nude photographs of children with his phone, including approximately

11 100 photographs of the two girls depicted on the child‐pornography website that

12 he uploaded from his phone to his computer. Images of the eight‐year‐old girl

13 included a picture of her wearing only a shirt, with her vagina exposed, and with

14 an open diaper next to each of her legs. In another, the girl was naked in a

15 bathtub, again with her genitalia exposed. Additional pictures included close‐up

16 images of the girl’s vagina, an image of a male hand pulling aside the girl’s

17 underwear, and an image of a child’s hand holding an adult penis. The girl is

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1 sleeping in several of these images. The images of the girl’s cousin showed her

2 sleeping, with her underwear pulled to the side and her vagina exposed, with

3 her breast exposed, with an adult penis next to her mouth, and with an adult

4 penis on her lips. The images also included close‐up pictures of her vagina.  

5 Brown told investigators that he had also taken sexually explicit

6 photographs and videos of a third victim, who was eight years old at the time.

7 Investigators found images and videos of this third victim on Brown’s computer.

8 One video showed Brown touching his penis to her hand and ejaculating on it.

9 Another showed him ejaculating on her feet, and a third showed him pulling

10 down her underwear and spreading her vagina with his fingers. Brown admitted

11 to pulling down her underwear and photographing her while she was sleeping.

12 The third victim was “asleep the entire time during the production of the images

13 and videos” and has “no knowledge of having been victimized by Brown.” PSR

14 ¶ 35.  

15 After Brown’s arrest, investigators conducted forensic analysis of his

16 computers and phones. They found the eleven images that originally prompted

17 the investigation on Brown’s computers. They also discovered photos that Brown

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1 had taken by hiding a pinhole camera in the bathroom of a home during a pool

2 party and in the bathroom of a hotel at a public water park. The presentence

3 report indicates that Brown also produced 33 files of a “Victim #4” and 2 files of a

4 “Victim #5.” PSR ¶ 36.  The images of Victim #4 “depicted a female

5 approximately eight to nine years old with black hair opening her vagina,” and

6 the images of Victim #5 “depict an unknown infant.” PSR ¶ 37.

7 Brown’s computers collectively contained over 25,000 still images and 365

8 videos of child pornography, including approximately 4 still images involving

9 torture, 60 displaying bondage, 30 depicting bestiality, 1,873 involving sexual

10 intercourse, 160 involving objects, and 18 involving infants. In total, 299 victims

11 were identified in these images.

12 A grand jury indicted Brown with three counts of producing child

13 pornography and two counts of possessing child pornography. Brown pleaded

14 guilty to all five counts pursuant to a plea agreement. Under the plea agreement,

15 Brown faced a mandatory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment, and he reserved

16 the right to appeal any sentence greater than 405 months’ imprisonment.  

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1 The probation office prepared a presentence investigation report in

2 advance of Brown’s sentencing. In determining Brown’s guidelines range, the

3 presentence report “grouped” Counts 1, 4, and 5, because those counts involved

4 “substantially the same harm.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b). The base offense level for this

5 group was 32. The base offense level was then increased 14 levels because of five

6 sentencing enhancements: (1) a four‐level increase pursuant to Section

7 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) because “the offense involved a minor who had . . . not attained

8 the age of twelve years;” (2) a two‐level increase pursuant to

9 Section 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) because “the offense involved[] the commission of . . .

10 sexual contact;” (3) a four‐level increase pursuant to Section 2G2.2(b)(4) because

11 the offense “involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or

12 other depictions of violence;” (4) a two‐level increase pursuant to

13 Section 2G2.1(b)(5) because “the minor was . . . in the custody, care, or

14 supervisory control of the defendant;” and (5) a two‐level increase pursuant to

15 Section 3A1.1(b)(1) because “the defendant knew or should have known that a

16 victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim.” These enhancements increased

17 Brown’s adjusted offense level for this group to 46.

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1 The presentence report then repeated this process for Groups 2 and 3,

2 which corresponded to Counts 2 and 3, and determined that each of those counts

3 carried a total offense level of 42. This resulted in a “combined adjusted offense

4 level” on all counts of 49.Brown received another five‐level enhancement

5 pursuant to Section 4B1.5(b) because he “engaged in a pattern of activity

6 involving prohibited sexual conduct,” raising the adjusted offense level to 54.

7 Finally, Brown received a three‐level reduction pursuant to Section 3E1.1 because

8 he accepted responsibility for his crimes, resulting in a total offense level of 51.

9 This was “treated as” an offense level of 43, the maximum offense level under the

10 guidelines. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, application note 2.

11 At criminal history category I and offense level 43, Brown’s recommended

12 sentence under the guidelines was initially life imprisonment. Because each

13 count was subject to a statutory maximum, however, Brown’s recommended

14 sentence became 110 years’ imprisonment.  

15 At sentencing, the government requested this maximum sentence. Defense

16 counsel requested the mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment.

17 The court heard from the families of the victims, who described the significant

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1 behavioral issues from which the victims suffer and how they struggled to

2 maintain relationships with family and friends. One victim’s family told the

3 court that the family “fel[t] violated in the worst imaginable way” and that the

4 victim “lives in fear” and continues to “struggle with what happened.” App’x at

5 83.  The third victimʹs mother, however, did not submit a victim impact

6 statement because her daughter “was unaware of the abuse” and there was “no

7 negative impact” on her daughter. PSR ¶ 51.

8 The district court began its remarks at sentencing by discussing the various

9 sentencing enhancements that applied in Brown’s case. The court then discussed

10 the seriousness of Brown’s crimes, noting “the trauma to these three children [as]

11 reflected in the presentence report [and] the statements of the relatives who have

12 appeared on their behalf,” which the court said “demonstrate[d] how drastic and

13 dramatic the criminal conduct [was] here.” App’x at 100. With respect to the

14 possession counts, the court stated that the children depicted in the photographs

15 Brown possessed “were hijacked by people exactly like . . . Brown, put through

16 [torture, sexual intercourse, bestiality, and bondage], [and] photographed,” and

17 that the children would worry “for the rest of their li[v]e[s]” that ʺthose

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1 photographs are out there forever.” App’x at 100. The court also said that

2 Brown’s crimes were “as serious . . . as federal judges confront” and that Brown

3 was “the worst kind of dangerous sex offender.” App’x at 101‐02. In discussing

4 the need to protect the public from Brown, the court said to him, “[I]t may be

5 true that you could not help yourself, but it’s also true that y[ou] destroyed the

6 lives of three specific children . . . .” App’x at 101.  

7 The court then imposed a sentence of 60 years’ imprisonment. It explained

8 its selection of this sentence as follows:

9 Each of the first three counts deal with each of the three documented

10 victims here, Jane Does I, II[,] and III; each of [th]em contains a

11 mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a statutory maximum

12 sentence of 30 years. So, on each of Counts I through III, youʹre

13 looking at 15 to 30. Counts IV and V have a statutory maximum of

14 10 years each, and those are the counts that deal with the

15 photographs obtained over the internet. When I look at the first

16 three counts and look at the specific children that are involved, then

17 I have to say to myself[,] which one of [th]em didn’t you abuse? And

18 my answer to that is there isn’t none of the three that you didn’t

19 abuse.  

20 So when I look at the mandatory minimum on each of those

21 children, I’m not willin[g] to walk away from any of the three. And

22 as to those three counts, it is my sentence and I hereby sentence you

23 to 20 years on each of those three counts to be served consecutively

24 for a total of 60 years. On each of the production counts, there are a

25 hundred ninety plus victims on those, I sentence you to the statutory

26 maximum of 10 years on each of those two counts to be served

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1 concurrently with the 60 years I have imposed as consecutive

2 sentences on Counts I through III.  

3 App’x at 102. In addition to the 60 years’ imprisonment, the district court

4 sentenced Brown to a lifetime of supervised release and restitution in the amount

5 of $10,416.00.  

6 Brown now appeals from this sentence, arguing that the district court

7 miscalculated his guidelines range and that the sentence is otherwise

8 procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

9 DISCUSSION

10 “We review a sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness,

11 which is akin to a ‘deferential abuse‐of‐discretion standard.’” United States v.

12 McCrimon, 788 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d

13 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008)). We “must first ensure that the district court committed

14 no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly

15 calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing

16 to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous

17 facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an

18 explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States,

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1 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “Once we have determined that the sentence is

2 procedurally sound, we then review the substantive reasonableness of the

3 sentence, reversing only when the trial court’s sentence ‘cannot be located within

4 the range of permissible decisions.’” United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 179 (2d

5 Cir. 2010) (quoting Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189).

6 We first address Brown’s argument that the district court miscalculated his

7 guidelines range. We then turn to whether Brown’s sentence was otherwise

8 procedurally and substantively reasonable.

9 I. Brown’s Challenge to the Guidelines Calculation

10 A. Waiver

11 As an initial matter, the government argues that Brown has waived any

12 objection to the guidelines calculation because his attorney did not object to that

13 calculation in the district court. The government argues that Brown’s attorney’s

14 failure to object means that this Court cannot conduct even plain error review of

15 the district court’s guidelines calculation.

16 “[W]aiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known

17 right.’” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,

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1 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). “[C]ourts applying [the] waiver doctrine have focused

2 on strategic, deliberate decisions that litigants consciously make.” United States v.

3 Dantzler, 771 F.3d 137, 146 n.5 (2d Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Yu‐Leung, 51

4 F.3d 1116, 1122 (2d Cir. 1995) (“If . . . the party consciously refrains from

5 objecting as a tactical matter, then that action constitutes a true ‘waiver,’ . . . .”). A

6 true waiver will “extinguish” an error in the district court, precluding appellate

7 review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. By contrast, “[i]f a party’s failure to [object] is

8 simply a matter of oversight, then such oversight qualifies as a correctable

9 ‘forfeiture’ . . . .” Yu‐Leung, 51 F.3d at 1122. Where a party forfeits an argument,

10 we review for plain error. See id. Under that standard, an appellant must

11 demonstrate that “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather

12 than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s

13 substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of

14 the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness,

15 integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” McCrimon, 788 F.3d at 78

16 (quoting United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010)). “[T]he plain error

17 doctrine,” however, “should not be applied stringently in the sentencing context,

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1 where the cost of correcting an unpreserved error is not as great as in the trial

2 context.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wernick, 691 F.3d 108,

3 113 (2d Cir. 2012)).

4 There appears to be some tension in our case law concerning whether a

5 defendant’s failure to object to the guidelines calculation constitutes a “true

6 waiver.” Compare McCrimon, 788 F.3d at 78 (reviewing challenge to guidelines

7 calculation not raised in district court for plain error), Wernick, 691 F.3d at 113

8 (same), and Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 179 (same), with United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47,

9 66 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that failure to object to enhancement constituted

10 true waiver), United States v. Eberhard, 525 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2008) (same), and

11 United States v. Soliman, 889 F.2d 441, 445 (2d Cir. 1989) (same). We need not

12 conclusively decide whether Brown’s challenge to the guidelines calculation was

13 waived or forfeited, however, because, for the reasons explained below, he fails

14 to demonstrate plain error.

15 B. Grouping and Stacking  

16 Brown first argues that the district court erred in its application of the

17 guidelines’ grouping and stacking provisions.  

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1 Chapter 3, Part D of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides rules for

2 determining a single offense level when a defendant is convicted of multiple

3 counts. See generally United States v. Feola, 275 F.3d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 2001)

4 (summarizing these rules). First, counts “involving substantially the same harm”

5 are “grouped” together. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. Next, an offense level for each group is

6 determined by using the offense level, enhanced by relevant conduct, for the

7 most serious offense within the group. Id. § 3D1.3(a). The combined offense level

8 is then determined by using the offense level for the group with the highest level,

9 increasing that offense level based on the offense levels of the other groups, and

10 finally decreasing the offense level as appropriate if the defendant accepts

11 responsibility for his offense. Id. §§ 3D1.4, 3E1.1.    

12 The district court correctly applied these provisions. As noted, the district

13 court grouped Counts 1, 4, and 5 because they involved substantially the same

14 harm. The court was required to group Counts 2 and 3 separately because

15 Section 3D1.2(d) specifically prohibits grouping counts charging production of

16 child pornography. The court then determined a combined offense level by using

17 the offense level for Group 1, the group with the highest level, increasing that

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1 offense level based on the levels of Groups 2 and 3, and decreasing the offense

2 level based on Brown’s acceptance of responsibility. We see no error, much less

3 plain error, in how the district court grouped Brown’s counts of convictions.

4 Nor do we see any error in the district court’s application of the stacking

5 provisions found in Chapter 5 of the Guidelines Manual. Section 5G1.2(d)

6 provides that where there are multiple counts and the guidelines range exceeds

7 the highest statutory maximum, the sentences are stacked and run consecutively

8 “to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total

9 punishment.” Hence, the district court correctly determined that the guidelines

10 range here was 110 years based on the stacking of the statutory maximums for

11 the three production counts, which each carried a statutory maximum of 30

12 years, and the two possession counts, which each carried a statutory maximum

13 of 10 years.

14 C. The Enhancement for Violent and Sadomasochistic Conduct

15 Brown next argues that the district court erred by applying a four‐level

16 sentencing enhancement for an “offense involv[ing] material that portrays

17 sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence,” U.S.S.G. §

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1 2G2.2(b)(4), despite the fact that Brown did not produce any sadistic images.

2 Since it was Brown’s production count that carried the highest offense level in

3 Group 1, Brown is correct that his offense level should not have been increased

4 based on the Section 2G2.2(b)(4) enhancement governing possession of child

5 pornography. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(a) & cmt. 2.  

6 Nonetheless, Brown cannot demonstrate plain error because he cannot

7 show that any error affected his substantial rights. See McCrimon, 788 F.3d at 78.

8 Because Brown’s total offense level of 51 exceeded the highest offense level listed

9 in the sentencing table by more than four levels, Brown’s guidelines range would

10 have been identical even absent this enhancement. Any misapplication was

11 therefore harmless. See United States v. Cramer, 777 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 2015)

12 (“An error in Guidelines calculation is harmless if correcting the error would

result in no change to the Guidelines offense level and sentencing range.”).2 13    

 

2 If, on remand, the district court considers applying the parallel Section

2G2.1(b)(4) enhancement governing the production of child pornography, it

must first decide whether the possession of sadomasochistic material was

“relevant” to Brown’s production of child pornography. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1,

application note 1(H); id. § 1B1.3(a)(1); see also United States v. Ahders, 622 F.3d

115, 120 (2d Cir. 2010). To make such a finding, the district court must “provide

at least some analysis of the relatedness . . . between [defendant’s] possession of

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1 II. Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness

2 Brown also raises a more general challenge to the procedural and

3 substantive reasonableness of his sentence.  

4 As noted, in addition to ensuring that the district court properly calculated

5 the guidelines range, we must also ensure that the district court committed no

6 other significant procedural error, such as “treating the Guidelines as mandatory,

7 failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly

8 erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552

9 U.S. at 51; see also United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2015). We will

10 not uphold a sentence as substantively reasonable unless we can first conclude

11 that the district court adhered to these procedural requirements. See United States

12 v. Sindima, 488 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2007).  

13 At sentencing, the district court noted “the trauma to these three children,”

14 the fact that “three children” would have to “worry for the rest of their li[v]e[s]”

15 about the photographs, and that Brown “destroyed the lives of three specific

 

the images and his production of child pornography” and “point to facts in the

record supporting its conclusion.” Ahders, 622 F.3d at 122; see also id. at 123

(listing relevant factors for the district court to consider).   

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1 children.” App’x at 100‐01. The district court’s explanation suggests that the

2 individual harm suffered by each of Brown’s three victims played a critical role

3 in the district court’s decision to impose three consecutive 20‐year sentences. But

4 the sentencing transcript also suggests that the district court may have

5 misunderstood the nature of that harm as to Brown’s third victim. Three times

6 the court emphasized the mental anguish that “three specific children” would

7 suffer as a result of Brown’s abuse. App’x at 100‐01. Brown’s third victim,

8 however, has “no knowledge of having been victimized by Brown.” PSR ¶ 35.

9 Her mother declined to submit a victim impact statement specifically because her

10 daughter “was unaware of the abuse” and had experienced “no negative

11 impact.” PSR ¶ 51.To be sure, the district court was entitled to punish Brown for

12 that abuse regardless of whether the victim was aware of it. But given the district

13 court’s repeated emphasis on the fact that Brown had destroyed the lives of

14 “three specific children,” we conclude that it is appropriate to remand for

15 resentencing to ensure that the sentence is not based on a clearly erroneous

understanding of the facts. 16 3 See, e.g., United States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366, 376 (2d

 

3 Our concern is not simply, as the dissent suggests, that the district court “did

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1 Cir. 2013) (remanding for resentencing because record was ambiguous as to

2 whether district court improperly treated the statutory maximum as the only

3 reasonable sentence); United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 88‐89 (2d Cir. 2011)

4 (remanding for resentencing where it was unclear whether district court

5 sentenced defendant based on an appropriate or inappropriate consideration);

6 United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2007) (remanding for resentencing

7 where there was “uncertainty from both the sentencing transcript and the

8 written order surrounding whether and to what extent the district judge based

9 his sentencing enhancement on the assumption that Juwa had engaged in

10 multiple instances of sexual abuse, as opposed to the single instance to which

Juwa had anticipated pleading guilty in state court” (emphasis omitted)).4 11 

 

not acknowledge” that the third victim “was sleeping at the time she was

abused.” Dissenting Op., post at 6. Rather, our concern is that the district court

imposed a 20‐year, consecutive sentence on Count Three because the court was

under the mistaken impression that the third victim’s life had been “destroyed,”

App’x at 101, when in fact she has “no knowledge of having been victimized by

Brown,” PSR ¶ 35, and, in the words of her mother, has suffered “no negative

impact,” PSR ¶ 51.  

4 The dissent contends that Brown did not sufficiently present this issue on

appeal. Dissenting Op., post at 7‐8. But, as the dissent acknowledges, we have

discretion to consider arguments outside of an appellant’s brief where “manifest

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1 It is possible that, on remand, the district court will reimpose the same 60‐

2 year sentence that it imposed at the original sentencing. Although we express no

3 definitive view on the substantive reasonableness of that sentence at this time,

4 we respectfully suggest that the district court consider whether an effective life

5 sentence is warranted in this case. See United States v. Craig, 703 F.3d 1001, 1002‐

6 04 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., concurring) (expressing “the importance of careful

7 consideration of the wisdom of imposing de facto life sentences”).  

8 We understand and emphatically endorse the need to condemn Brown’s

9 crimes in the strongest of terms. But the Supreme Court has recognized that

10 “defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are

11 categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are

12 murderers.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010). As the Court explained in

13 Graham,

 

injustice otherwise would result.” See United States v. Babwah, 972 F.2d 30, 35 (2d

Cir. 1992). Here, it is necessary to ensure that the sentence is not based on a

clearly erroneous understanding of the facts before we can adequately review the

substantive reasonableness of Brown’s sentence. See Sindima, 488 F.3d at 85 (“Our

ability to uphold a sentence as reasonable will be informed by the district court’s

statement of reasons (or lack thereof) for the sentence that it elects to impose.”

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)).   

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1 There is a line between homicide and other serious violent offenses

2 against the individual. Serious nonhomicide crimes may be

3 devastating in their harm[,] but in terms of moral depravity and of

4 the injury to the person and to the public, they cannot be compared

5 to murder in their severity and irrevocability. This is because life is

6 over for the victim of the murderer, but for the victim of even a very

7 serious nonhomicide crime, life is not over and normally is not

8 beyond repair. Although an offense like robbery or rape is a serious

9 crime deserving serious punishment, those crimes differ from

10 homicide crimes in a moral sense.

11 Id. (citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). The sentencing

12 transcript suggests that the district court may have seen no moral difference

13 between Brown and a defendant who murders or violently rapes children,

14 stating that Brown’s crime was “as serious a crime as federal judges confront,”

15 App’x at 101, that Brown was “the worst kind of dangerous sex offender,” App’x

16 at 102, and that he was “exactly like” sex offenders who rape and torture

17 children, App’x at 100.  

18 Punishing Brown as harshly as a murderer arguably frustrates the goal of

19 marginal deterrence, “that is, that the harshest sentences should be reserved for

20 the most culpable behavior.” United States v. Newsom, 402 F.3d 780, 785‐786 (7th

21 Cir. 2005). And “[t]hose who think that the idea of marginal deterrence should

22 play some part in criminal sentences . . . might find little room left above

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1 [Brown’s] sentence for the child abuser who physically harms his victims, who

2 abuses many different children, or who in other ways inflicts greater harm on his

3 victims and society.” Id. at 781, 785‐86 (ordering limited remand for

4 consideration of whether 324‐month sentence imposed would be affected by

5 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), where father produced child

6 pornography of his daughter and his ex‐girlfriend’s daughter); cf. also United

7 States v. Aleo, 681 F.3d 290, 293‐95 (6th Cir. 2012) (vacating 60‐year sentence for

8 child pornography offenses as substantively unreasonable where grandfather

9 filmed himself digitally penetrating his granddaughter). Moreover, while the

10 district court appropriately recognized the need for the sentence imposed to

11 afford adequate general deterrence, “sentencing judges should try to be realistic

12 about the incremental deterrent effect of extremely long sentences.” Craig, 703

13 F.3d at 1004 (Posner, J., concurring).  

14 Finally, to the extent that the district court believed it necessary to

15 incapacitate Brown for the rest of his life because of the danger he poses to the

16 public, we note that defendants such as Brown are generally less likely to

17 reoffend as they get older. See id. at 1003‐04 (citing studies showing that “[o]nly

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1 1.1 percent of perpetrators of all forms of crime against children are between 70

2 and 75 years old and 1.3 percent between 60 and 69”). If Brown were ever

3 released, he would still be subject to a lifetime term of supervised release and be

4 required to register as a sex offender, further reducing his risk of recidivism.

5 We understand that balancing these and other concerns to arrive at a just

6 sentence is a difficult and delicate task, and one that our system places primarily

7 in the hands of district court judges. Our role as an appellate court is to

8 determine only whether the sentence can be located within the “range of

9 permissible decisions,” and we will vacate a sentence as substantively

10 unreasonable only when it is “so shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise

11 unsupportable as a matter of law that allowing [it] to stand would damage the

12 administration of justice.” Aldeen, 792 F.3d at 255 (internal quotation marks

13 omitted). Again, we express no view at this time as to whether a 60‐year sentence

14 for Brown’s crimes meets this high standard. We will revisit that issue should the

15 district court decide to reimpose the same 60‐year sentence on remand.

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1 CONCLUSION

2 Because the sentencing transcript suggests that the district court may have

3 based its sentence on a clearly erroneous understanding of the facts, we

4 REMAND for resentencing in accordance with the procedures set forth in United

5 States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994), and in light of this opinion.

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