Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-30185/USCOURTS-ca9-12-30185-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Francisco Salgado Martinez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FRANCISCO SALGADO MARTINEZ,

AKA Crisoforo Salgado Martinez,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-30185

D.C. No.

2:11-cr-06071-

FVS-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Fred L. Van Sickle, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 8, 2013

Submission Withdrawn and Deferred March 14, 2013

Resubmitted May 8, 2015

Seattle, Washington

Filed May 28, 2015

Before: William A. Fletcher, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and David M. Ebel,* Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson

* The Honorable David M. Ebel, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of the

defendant’s motion to dismiss an indictment alleging that he

was found in the United States subsequent to an order of

removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and remanded.

The panel held that the defendant was not removable

based on an aggravated felony because a conviction for thirddegree child molestation under Wash. Rev. Code § 9A44.089

(2001) does not categorically meet the generic definition of

sexual abuse of a minor due to missing elements in the

statute.

The panel was unable to resort to the modified categorical

approach because the Washington statute is indivisible and is

missing elements of the generic definition of sexual abuse of

a minor: “abuse” based on “physical or psychological harm

in light of the age of the victim in question,” and a “sexual

act” involving skin-to-skin contact.

COUNSEL

Rebecca L. Pennell (argued), Federal Defenders of Eastern

Washington & Idaho, Yakima, Washington, for DefendantAppellant.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ 3

Michael C. Ormsby, United States Attorney, and Alison L.

Gregoire (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, Yakima,

Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Francisco Salgado Martinez (Martinez)

challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss

an indictment alleging that he was found in the United States

subsequent to an order of removal in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326. Martinez asserts that the underlying removal order

was invalid because his conviction for third-degree child

molestation in violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.089

(2001) was not an aggravated felony. Because recent

developments in the law support Martinez’s claim, we reverse

the district court’s denial of Martinez’s motion to dismiss the

indictment.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2001, Martinez pled guilty to third-degree child

molestation in violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.089. 

Martinez, a lawful permanent resident, was subsequently

served with a notice to appear because his conviction was an

aggravated felony “relating to . . . the sexual abuse of a

minor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). The Immigration Judge

ordered Martinez’s removal from the United States based on

his admission to the charges in the notice to appear.

In 2011, Martinez was indicted for being found in the

United States subsequent to his removal in violation of

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4 UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ

8 U.S.C. § 1326. Martinez filed a motion to dismiss the

indictment premised on a challenge to the validity of the

underlying removal order. Martinez asserted that his removal

violated his due process rights because his state conviction

was not an aggravated felony. According to Martinez,

Washington’s third-degree child molestation offense was

broader than the generic offense of sexual abuse of a minor

because it criminalized sexual contact involving the touching

of a minor over clothing.

The district court denied Martinez’s motion to dismiss the

indictment. The district court concluded that Martinez’s

removal comported with due process requirements because

Martinez’s third-degree child molestation conviction

categorically qualified as sexual abuse of a minor. Relying

on our decision in Jimenez-Juarez v. Holder, 635 F.3d 1169

(9th Cir. 2011), the district court opined that Martinez’s

conviction was a categorical match to the generic offense of

sexual abuse of a minor because, under Jimenez-Juarez, the

act of sexual touching of a 14- or 15-year old victim by one

who is at least 48 months older constitutes, at a minimum,

“maltreatment of a child and impairs the child’s mental wellbeing,” id. at 1171, and was therefore categorically “abuse.” 

Id.

Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss an

indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 when the motion is based

on alleged due process defects in an underlying deportation

proceeding.” United States v. Alvarado-Pineda, 774 F.3d

1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

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UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ 5

III. DISCUSSION

Martinez contends that his prior removal was invalid

because his third-degree child molestation conviction did not

categorically qualify as an aggravated felony.

“To convict an alien criminal defendant of illegal reentry

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the government must prove that the

alien left the United States under order of exclusion,

deportation, or removal, and then illegally reentered.” Id.

(citation omitted). “A noncitizen charged with illegal reentry

therefore has a Fifth Amendment right to collaterally attack

his removal order because the removal order serves as a

predicate element of his conviction. . . .” Id. (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). “An underlying order is

fundamentally unfair if (1) a defendant’s due process rights

were violated by defects in his underlying deportation

proceeding, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result of the

defects.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Where a prior removal order is premised on the commission

of an aggravated felony, a defendant who shows that the

crime of which he was previously convicted was not, in fact,

an aggravated felony, has established both that his due

process rights were violated and that he suffered prejudice as

a result. See United States v. Camacho-Lopez, 450 F.3d 928,

930 (9th Cir. 2006).

In ascertaining whether Martinez’s removal was validly

premised on his commission of an aggravated felony, “we

employ the categorical approach. That is, we compare the

elements of the statute forming the basis of [Martinez’s]

conviction with the elements of the generic crime.” 

Alvarado-Pineda, 774 F.3d at 1202 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “The prior conviction qualifies as

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6 UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ

the generic offense only if the statute’s elements are the same

as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.” Id.

(citation and alteration omitted). “A state offense qualifies as

a generic offense—and therefore, in this case, as an

aggravated felony—only if the full range of conduct covered

by the state statute falls within the meaning of the generic

offense.” Id. (citation, alteration, and internal quotation

marks omitted).

At the time of Martinez’s conviction, Wash. Rev. Code

§ 9A.44.089 (2001) provided:

(1) A person is guilty of child molestation in

the third degree when the person has, or

knowingly causes another person under the

age of eighteen to have, sexual contact with

another who is at least fourteen years old but

less than sixteen years old and not married to

the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least

forty-eight months older than the victim.

(2) Child molestation in the third degree is a

class C felony.

Under Washington law, “‘[s]exual contact’ means any

touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person done

for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party or

a third party.” Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.010(2) (2001)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that Martinez’s conviction for third-degree

child molestation does not categorically qualify as an

aggravated felony. An aggravated felony is defined by

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), inter alia, as “murder, rape, or

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UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ 7

sexual abuse of a minor[.]” The issue raised in this appeal is

whether the Washington offense of third-degree child

molestation constitutes “sexual abuse of a minor.” Id. In a

series of opinions, we have articulated an evolving generic

definition of this offense. In Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey,

546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), overruled on other

grounds by United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d

915 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (per curiam), abrogated by

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), we held

that “the generic offense of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ requires

four elements: (1) a mens rea level of knowingly; (2) a

sexual act; (3) with a minor between the ages of 12 and 16;

and (4) an age difference of at least four years between the

defendant and the minor.” Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at

1152 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507 (9th Cir.

2009), we determined that the generic offense of sexual abuse

of a minor was not limited to the elements delineated in

Estrada-Espinoza. Instead, we reasoned that EstradaEspinoza’s definition “encompassed statutory rape crimes

only—that is, sexual offenses involving older as well as

younger adolescents, not crimes prohibiting conduct harmful

to younger children specifically. . . .” Id. at 514. We have

since interpreted Medina-Villa and its progeny as recognizing

“a residual category of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ . . . that

encompasses statutes where (1) the conduct proscribed is

sexual; (2) the statute protects a minor; and (3) the statute

requires abuse. . . .” United States v. Gomez, 757 F.3d 885,

904 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation, alteration, and some internal

quotation marks omitted).

In Gomez, we applied this definitional framework in

concluding that an Arizona statute prohibiting “attempted

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8 UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ

sexual conduct with a minor under the age of 15” was not

categorically an offense involving sexual abuse of a minor. 

Id. at 900, 902. At issue in Gomez was whether the

defendant’s conviction for violating Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

1405 warranted a sixteen-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) as a crime of violence. See id. at 902. 

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1405:

A. A person commits sexual conduct with a

minor by intentionally or knowingly engaging

in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact

with any person who is under eighteen years

of age.

B. Sexual conduct with a minor who is under

fifteen years of age is a class 2 felony and is

punishable pursuant to § 13-705. Sexual

conduct with a minor who is at least fifteen

years of age is a class 6 felony. Sexual

conduct with a minor who is at least fifteen

years of age is a class 2 felony if the person is

or was the minor’s parent, stepparent,

adoptive parent, legal guardian or foster

parent or the minor’s teacher or clergyman or

priest and the convicted person is not eligible

for suspension of sentence, probation, pardon

or release from confinement on any basis

except as specifically authorized by § 31-233,

subsection A or B until the sentence imposed

has been served or commuted.

In determining that the Arizona statute was missing elements

of the generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor, we held:

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UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ 9

A conviction under this statute does not meet

the definition set forth in Estrada–Espinoza

for two reasons: (1) it lacks the age difference

requirement; and (2) is broader than the

generic offense with respect to the age of the

minor because the statute applies to persons

under eighteen years of age. Here, analyzing

the ‘under fifteen’ version of § 13–1405, the

statute continues to lack the age difference

element. Section 13–1405 also does not meet

the generic definition of sexual abuse of a

minor under the Medina–Villa framework as

it lacks the element of ‘abuse.’ Again,

analyzing the ‘under fifteen’ version, the

statute continues to lack the element of

‘abuse’ because the statute may apply to

victims who are not younger than fourteen

years.

Id. at 904 (citations and some internal quotation marks

omitted).

We similarly conclude that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.089

(2001), an indivisible statute, does not categorically meet the

generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor due to its

missing elements. Indeed, the Washington statute

“criminalizes a broader swath of conduct than the relevant

generic offense,” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281, because it

criminalizes touching over clothing as opposed to the generic

offense’s requirement of skin-to-skin contact. See State v.

Soonalole, 992 P.2d 541, 544 & n.13 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)

(holding that “the fondling and thigh rubbing over the

victim’s clothes” constituted a separate act of third-degree

child molestation for double jeopardy purposes); see also

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10 UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ

United States v. Castro, 607 F.3d 566, 570 (9th Cir. 2010), as

amended (holding that a California statute prohibiting lewd

and lascivious acts on a child was categorically broader than

the generic definition for sexual abuse of a minor because

“[l]ewd touching [under the state statute] can occur through

a victim’s clothing and can involve any part of the victim’s

body”).

“In the absence of a categorical match, we may, in some

circumstances, apply the modified categorical approach,

under which we consider whether certain documents in the

record or judicially noticeable facts show that the conviction

qualifies as an aggravated felony. . . .” Aguilar-Turcios v.

Holder, 740 F.3d 1294, 1301 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). However, we are unable

to resort to the modified categorical approach because the

Washington statute “has a single, indivisible set of elements”

and is missing elements of the generic definition of sexual

abuse of a minor. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2282; see also

Gomez, 757 F.3d at 903–04. The Washington offense is

missing the element of “abuse” as required under the MedinaVilla standard, because it does not require “abuse” based on

“physical or psychological harm in light of the age of the

victim in question.” Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 513 (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted). The Washington

offense is also missing the element of a “sexual act” as

required under the Estrada-Espinoza analysis, because a

conviction may be based on touching over clothing while the

generic offense “requires, at a minimum, an intentional

touching, not through the clothing, of a minor’s genitalia.” 

Castro, 607 F.3d at 570. Because the state offense is missing

elements of sexual abuse of a minor, we may not consult the

relevant documents relating to Martinez’s conviction in

ascertaining whether he committed an aggravated felony. See

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UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ 11

United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626, 637 (9th Cir.

2014), as amended (“Because the statute is missing an

element of the generic crime, our inquiry ends here—we do

not undertake a modified categorical analysis.”) (citation and

alterations omitted).1

Applying Jimenez-Juarez, the district court reached an

opposite conclusion and held that Martinez’s prior conviction

was categorically an aggravated felony because it

encompassed “abuse.” However, in Jimenez-Juarez, we

confined our analysis to whether the petitioner’s conviction

under Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.089 constituted “child

abuse” as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E), and did not

otherwise address whether the offense was an aggravated

felony involving sexual abuse of a minor. See JimenezJuarez, 635 F.3d at 1170 & n.1.2 We therefore applied the

less stringent definition for child abuse which relates to “any

offense that (1) involves an intentional, knowing, reckless, or

criminally negligent act or omission that (2) constitutes

maltreatment of a child or that impairs a child’s physical or

mental well-being, including sexual abuse or exploitation.” 

Id. at 1171 (citation omitted). In contrast, the generic offense

of sexual abuse of a minor categorically corresponds only to

those crimes that fit the narrower definitions set out in

1 Gomez and Castro apply to Martinez’s collateral challenge to the

underlying removal order because his appeal “concerns not the duty to

inform the noncitizen of his eligibility for relief in a removal proceeding,

but whether he was removable at all.” Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d at 631

(emphases in the original).

2 The Notice To Appear in this case charged Martinez as removable only

because he had committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(A), for a crime of “sexual abuse of a minor.”

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12 UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ

Estrada-Espinoza (for statutory rape crimes) and MedinaVilla (for crimes of “abuse”).

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that Martinez was not removable based on

an aggravated felony. A conviction premised on a violation

of Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.089 (2001) does not

categorically meet the generic definition of sexual abuse of a

minor due to the missing elements in the statutory provision. 

Because the Washington statute is indivisible, we may not

resort to the modified categorical approach in determining

whether Martinez’s conviction constituted an aggravated

felony that would warrant his removal. Reversal of the

district court’s denial of Martinez’s motion to dismiss the

indictment is justified because the government is unable to

demonstrate, as required for a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326,

that Martinez was removed pursuant to a valid removal order. 

See Alvarado-Pineda, 774 F.3d at 1201 (articulating that “the

removal order serves as a predicate element of [the

defendant’s] conviction”) (citations omitted).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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