Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00478/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00478-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rayford Campbell
Defendant
Federal National Mortgage Association
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 

ASSOCIATION

Plaintiff,

:

:

:

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 15-478-KD-M

:

RAYFORD CAMPBELL

Defendants.

:

:

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 3) has been 

referred for report and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72. After consideration of 

Plaintiff’s motion and Defendant’s response (Doc. 10)1, it 

is recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 3) 

be granted and that this action be remanded to the Circuit 

Court of Mobile, Alabama. 

Facts and Proceedings

On December 10, 2014, Plaintiff, Federal National 

Mortgage Association (hereinafter referred to as “Fannie 

Mae” or “Plaintiff”) filed a statutory ejectment action 

against Rayford Campbell in the Circuit Court of Mobile 

County, Alabama. (Doc. 6-1, at 4). Defendants Carol 

																																																							 1 After being given two extensions of time to file a response to 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, Defendant filed a Response on November 

23, 2015, which was untimely. Nevertheless, this Court will consider 

Defendant’s response as if it were timely filed.

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Rayford and Shelia Campbell were added as named defendants 

on December 30, 2015, and February 11, 2015, respectively. 

(Id. at 14, 26). Thereafter, Defendants, Rayford Campbell 

and Shelia Campbell, each filed an Answer on March 24, 

2015, and March 30, 2015, respectively. (Docs. 6-2, at 2-

18, 34-50). Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 

on May 26, 2015, (Doc. 6-4) and on July 10, 2015, a hearing 

was held on the same. (Doc. 3, at 3). During the hearing,

Defendants informed the court that they had filed a 

responsive pleading to Plaintiff’s motion earlier in the 

morning, of which Plaintiff and the court were unaware. As 

such, the court postponed the hearing. Id. The court 

ultimately reset Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion for 

hearing on September 18, 2015. (Id. at 3-4). On the 

morning of the second hearing, Defendant, Rayford Campbell

filed a Notice of Removal (Doc. 1). According to the 

Notice, removal is warranted because “The Damages Is Over 

($75,000.00) and this involves the United States Government 

Under The United States District Court Jurisdiction.” 

(Doc.1, at 2).2 In its Motion to Remand, Fannie Mae argues

																																																							 2 Various other counterclaims are asserted within the Notice of Removal, 

including Fraud upon the Court, Counter Claim in 337 Proceedings, Civil 

Action for Deprivation of Rights, Property Rights of Citizens, 

Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights, etc.; however, because of 

the reasoning mentioned above and because removal is improper both 

procedurally and substantively, this Court will not indulge in an 

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that this action is not removable based on both procedural 

and substantive grounds. (Doc. 3). 

Discussion

This Court interprets Defendant’s Notice of Removal to 

allege that federal jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1331, 1332, 1441, and 1446. (Doc. 1). A civil case filed 

in state court may be removed by the defendant to federal 

court if the case could have been brought originally in 

federal court. See 28 U.S.C § 1441(a). A federal court 

may exercise diversity jurisdiction over all civil actions 

where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive 

of interest and costs, and the action is between citizens 

of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 

In a removal action, the party asserting jurisdiction 

has the burden of establishing proof of it by a 

preponderance of the evidence. See Lowery v. Alabama Power 

Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub 

nom Hanna Steel Corp. v. Lowery, 553 U.S. 1080 (2008).

However, “[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant 

federalism concerns, federal courts are directed to 

construe removal statutes strictly. Indeed, all doubts 

about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to 

state court.” Univ. of South Alabama. v. American Tobacco 

																																																																																																																																																																				 analysis of these claims individually, as they have no bearing on the 

removability of this action.

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Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal and 

external citations omitted). “Therefore, when an action is 

removed from state court, the district court first must 

determine whether it has original jurisdiction over the 

plaintiff’s claims.” Id. at 410. (citation omitted). “If 

at any time before final judgment it appears the district 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be 

remanded to the state court from whence it came.” Id. 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). 

Before considering whether federal diversity or 

subject matter jurisdiction exits, this Court will first 

address the procedural implications of Defendant’s Notice 

of Removal raised by Fannie Mae. Specifically, whether 

Defendant, Shelia Campbell, consented to removal and 

whether removal was timely. 

In the Eleventh Circuit, “[t]he unanimity requirement 

mandates that in cases involving multiple defendants, all 

defendants must consent to removal.” Russell Corp. v. 

American Home Assurance Co., 264 f.3d 1040, 1044 (11th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). The removing defendant must 

“receive the consent of all then-served defendants at the 

time he files his notice of removal.” Bailey v. Janssen 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 

2008). In the present action, the underlying state court 

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complaint names both Shelia Campbell and Rayford Campbell 

as defendants (See Doc. 6-1; Complaint and Second Amended 

Complaint)3 and the Notice of Removal (Doc. 3) solely names 

Rayford Campbell as the removing party. Furthermore, Shelia 

Campbell has not filed any pleading consenting to the 

removal of this action, nor has she joined in on any of the 

pleadings filed in this action after the Notice of Removal 

was filed. (See Docs. 5, 8, and 10). Because the record 

does not contain any statement or supportive pleading from 

which the consent of Shelia Campbell could be ascertained, 

unanimity does not exist and this action should be remanded

to state court. 

To the extent that unanimity does exist, Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Remand is still due to be granted on procedural 

grounds because removal was untimely.

The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding 

shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the 

defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of 

the initial pleading setting forth the claim for 

relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, 

or within 30 days after the service of summons upon 

the defendant if such initial pleading has then been 

																																																							 3 There is no dispute that the Amended Complaint also names Carol 

Rayford as a Defendant (Doc. 6-1, Amended Complaint); however, the 

Answers filed by both Shelia and Rayford Campbell (Doc. 6-2) indicate 

they do not know a Carol Rayford and Carol Rayford never filed an 

answer in state court. As a procedural matter, Carol Rayford’s consent 

may be necessary for removal, however, because Shelia Rayford has not 

consented and unanimity already fails, this Court believes the lack of 

consent of Carol Rayford, to the extent it is required, is only 

compounding and, therefore, this Court will not analyze whether Carol 

Rayford is a proper party or whether service was proper such that her 

consent to removal must be required. 

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filed in court and is not required to be served on the 

defendant, whichever period is shorter.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). “Removal is a privilege 

accorded by statute, and a removing party must comply with 

the statutory requirements in order to invoke the statute.“ 

Clingan v. Celtic Life Ins. Co., 244 F.Supp.2d. 1298, 1302 

(M.D. Ala. 2003) (citation omitted). “The time limit in 28 

U.S.C. § 1446(b) is ‘mandatory and must be strictly 

applied.’“ Id. (citations omitted).		 In the present action, 

Defendants4 sought removal on September 18, 2015, nine (9) 

months after the initial complaint was filed against 

Rayford Campbell and seven (7) months after Shelia Campbell 

was added as a named defendant. (See Doc. 6-1; Complaint 

and Second Amended Complaint.) Furthermore, the removal 

was filed approximately six (6) months after both Shelia 

and Rayford Campbell filed their respective answers. As a 

result, it is clear that removal is untimely and remand is 

warranted. See HSBC Bank USA Nat. Ass’n v. Bobrowski, 2015 

WL 4506824, *2 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 2015)(“Defendants 

purport to remove a foreclosure complaint filed on July 26, 

2012. Defendants' notice of removal filed on July 20, 2015, 

																																																							 4 Because any analysis on the merits of the removability of this action 

must be based on a finding that both Rayford Campbell and Shelia 

Campbell have consented to removal, and because there is no dispute 

that both of these individuals are defendants in this action, the 

remaining portions of this recommendation will use the term 

“Defendants.” 

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is therefore untimely.”).

B. Diversity Jurisdiction 

Assuming arguendo, that the above-mentioned procedural 

defects are not dispositive of Defendants’ Notice of 

Removal, this Court will briefly analyze the substantive 

jurisdictional issues raised in Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Remand (Doc. 3), i.e., whether original or diversity 

jurisdiction exists. 

Federal courts may exercise diversity jurisdiction 

over all civil actions where the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs and the 

action is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332. Diversity jurisdiction requires complete 

diversity; every plaintiff must be diverse from every 

defendant. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 

1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “A party 

removing a case to federal court based on diversity of 

citizenship bears the burden of establishing the 

citizenship of the parties. “ Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. 

Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 

2004) (citing to Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 

1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Because this case was originally 

filed in state court and removed to federal court by [the 

Defendant], [the Defendant] bears the burden of proving 

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that federal jurisdiction exists.”). A removing defendant 

bears the same burden with regard to the amount in 

controversy. See Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service, 77 F. 3d 

1353, 1355 (11th Cir. 1996) abrogated on other grounds by 

Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(“[A]removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely 

than not exceeds the [$75,000] jurisdictional 

requirement.”).

 In the instant action, Defendants have failed to 

allege, much less prove by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that the parties are completely diverse. (Doc. 1) In fact, 

the notice filed by Defendants is completely silent as to 

the citizenship of any party, such that diversity could 

ostensibly be determined. Id.; See also Bobrowski, supra, 

at *2 (“[I]t is unclear from Defendants' notice of removal 

whether the requirements of diversity jurisdiction have 

been met. They do not allege that the parties are diverse 

or that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Thus, 

they have not met their burden to establish diversity 

jurisdiction under § 1332.”). Nevertheless, even if the 

parties were diverse, removal is still improper. “An instate plaintiff may invoke diversity jurisdiction, but § 

1441(b) bars removal on the basis of diversity if any 

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‘part[y] in interest properly joined and served as [a] 

defendan[t] is a citizen of the State in which [the] action 

is brought.’” Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 

90, 126 S.Ct. 606, 613, 163 L.Ed.2d 415 (2005). See also 

Goodwin v. Reynolds, 757 F.3d 1216, 1218 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(“Pursuant to the so-called ‘forum-defendant rule,’ a 

state–court action that is otherwise removable to federal 

court solely on the basis of diversity of citizenship is 

not removable if any of the ‘parties in interest properly 

joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State 

in which such action is brought.”). The state court 

complaint filed by Fannie Mae asserts only a state court 

action for ejectment under Alabama law against Defendants 

and based on a review of the state court file, Rayford 

Campbell appears to be a citizen of Alabama.5 (Doc. 1, at 

20-21; Doc 6-2, at 17-18). As a result, it is apparent 

that any potential removal of this action based on 

diversity is barred under § 1441(b)(2). 

Defendant has additionally failed to establish the 

minimum amount in controversy requirement under § 1332(a) 

in support of removal. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not seek 

																																																							 5 While the citizenship of Rayford or Shelia Campbell has not been 

asserted within the Notice of Removal, it is evident that Rayford 

Campbell resides at 5321 Oak Bend Court in Mobile, Alabama and 

therefore, the unknown citizenship of Shelia Campbell does not affect 

whether this action is barred under § 1441(b)(2).

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any specific amount of damages. (Doc 6-1, at 4-6).

Therefore, the burden is on Defendants to establish that 

the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of 

interest and costs. The only assertion made by Defendants 

simply states, “The Damages Is Over ($75,000.00)”. (Doc.

1, at 2). Defendants have not offered any evidence in 

support of this contention and, therefore, they have failed 

to meet their burden. To the extent that Defendants rely 

upon their counterclaim of thirty-two million dollars 

($32,000,000.00)6 to justify the amount in controversy 

requirement, the same is improper because a counterclaim 

cannot “be considered in determining the amount in 

controversy [in the context of removal jurisdiction].” 

Merion Realty Management, L.L.C. v. Henry 2010 WL 5140571 

*4 (S.D. Ala. November 19, 2010), report and recommendation 

adopted, 2010 WL 5339425 (S.D. Ala. December 9, 2010).

Lastly, the amount in controversy requirement cannot be 

satisfied by the value of the property which was foreclosed 

upon by Plaintiff (assuming such an assertion can be 

																																																							 6 Defendants have additionally asserted that “[t]he damages is over 

(three million dollars that was casued (sic) by fraud and fraud upon 

the court caused by (Seterus) and their law firm and lawyers.” (Doc. 

10, at 14). Nevertheless, regardless of the amount of damages 

asserted by Defendants, either thirty-two million or three million, the 

same cannot be considered for purposes of determining the amount in 

controversy. 

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interpreted from Defendants’ removal notice)7 and, as a 

result, Defendants have not established that removal 

pursuant to § 1332 is proper. See MacMillan Bloedell, Inc. 

v. Ezell, 475 So.2d 493, 496 (Ala. 1985) (recognizing that 

statutory ejectment under §6-6-280(b) is possessory in 

nature); cf. AMD Property Management, supra, at *4 (“’As a 

dispossessory proceeding under Georgia law is not an 

ownership dispute, but rather only a dispute over the 

limited right to possession, title to property is not at 

issue and, accordingly, the removing defendant may not rely 

on the value of the property as a whole to satisfy the 

amount in controversy requirement.’”); CitiMortgage, Inc., 

v. Dhinoja, 705 F.Supp.2d 1378, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 

2010)(“[T]his court has held that as a matter of law, a 

claim seeking only ejectment in a dispossessory action 

cannot be reduced to a monetary sum for purposes of 

determining the amount in controversy.”). Because the 

amount in controversy has not been established by the 

Defendants, removal is improper. 

B. Federal Question

																																																							 7 Defendant’s Response (Doc. 10) states “[t]he home is valued over 

($75,000) and the damages to Mr. Rayford Campbell credit and equity and 

assets that was tied up by this company between (2009-2010) [...]”. This 

is the only statement that could ostensibly be read to establish the 

amount in controversy. However, for the reasons set forth above, 

neither of these assertions would establish the requisite amount in 

controversy even if they were proven as true.

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Defendants’ removal also appears to assert federal 

subject matter jurisdiction and despite the procedural 

concerns previously addressed, this Court will briefly 

analyze whether federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. 

28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that federal courts possess 

“original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under 

the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 

Id. “[U]nless the face of a plaintiff’s complaint states a 

federal question, a defendant may not remove a case to 

federal court on [a federal question] basis, even though a 

possible defense might involve a federal question.” Ervast 

v. Flexible Products Co., 346 F.3d 1007, 1012 (11th Cir. 

2003) (emphasis supplied), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 808, 125 

S.Ct. 30, 160 L.Ed.2d 10 (2004). Furthermore, federal 

question jurisdiction cannot be based upon an actual or 

anticipated counterclaim. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 

49, 60, 129 S.Ct. 1262, 1272, 173 L.Ed.2d 206 (2009); 

Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, 

Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830, 122 S.Ct. 1889, 1893, 153 L.Ed.2d 

13 (2002) (“[T]he well-pleaded complaint rule, properly 

understood [does not] allo[w] a counterclaim to serve as 

the basis for a district court’s ‘arising under’ 

jurisdiction.”); Bobrowski, supra, at *2 (“[T]he assertion 

of federal counterclaims is insufficient to confer federal 

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question jurisdiction under § 1331.”). In the instant 

action, the Complaint is one for statutory ejectment under 

Alabama law. As such, original jurisdiction of this matter 

does not lie in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

CONCLUSION

After reviewing all of the relevant pleadings of 

record, the Court finds that Defendants have not 

demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

removal is proper. Thus, it is recommended that 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand be granted, and that this 

action be remanded to the Circuit Court of Mobile County, 

Alabama. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

FED.R.CIV.P. 72(B); S.D. ALA. GenLR72. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding 

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

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disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

DONE this 1st day of December, 2015.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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