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Parties Involved:
Kenneth D. Caswell
Appellee
Donald W. Doyle
Appellee
Donald J. Green
Appellee
Independent School District No. I-3
Appellee
Byron A. Phipps
Appellee
Bob J. Piguet
Appellee
Johnny Lee Rankin
Appellant
Edward Roberson
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOHNNY LEE RANKIN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appan.1!3 Tenth Circuit 

JUNO 21989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) NOo 87-1751 

) 

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT ) 

NO. I-3, NOBLE COUNTY, ) 

OKLAHOMA, BOB J. PIGUET, ) 

individually and in his official ) 

capacity as SUPERINTENDENT OF ) 

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT ) 

NO. I-3, NOBLE COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, ) 

DONALD J. GREEN, BYRON A. PHIPPS, ) 

KENNETH D. CASWELL, each of them, ) 

individually and in their official ) 

capacities as MEMBERS OF THE BOARD) 

OF EDUCATION OF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL) 

DISTRICT NO. I-3, NOBLE COUNTY, ) 

OKLAHOMA, DONALD W. DOYLE, ) 

EDWARD ROBERSON, in their official ) 

capacities only as MEMBERS OF THE ) 

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF INDEPENDENT ) 

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. I-3, NOBLE ) 

COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellees. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-85-1321-A) 

Alexander L. Meszaros (James B. Browne, James B. Browne and 

Associates, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the brief), 

Lexington, Kentucky, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Stephen Jones (Craig Bryant, Jones, Bryant & Nigh, Enid, Oklahoma, 

John Gladd and Oliver w. Arbogast of Gibbon, Gladd & Associates, 

Tulsa, Oklahoma with them on the brief) of Jones, Bryant & Nigh, 

Enid, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 87-1751 Document: 01019785746 Date Filed: 06/02/1989 Page: 1 
.·:. Bef0re -McKAY, .;BARRETT ;-.. and ·SEYMOUR,. Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Johnny Lee Rankin brought this action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 

(1982) against Independent School District Number I-3, the 

District Superintendent, and members of the District school board. 

Rankin, a tenured teacher employed by the District, alleged that 

the nonrenewal of his teaching contract violated his First and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights by punishing him for the exercise of 

his right to free speech, and by depriving him of his liberty and 

property interests without due process. The district court 

granted defendants' motion for summary Judgment on the due process 

claims, concluding that the Oklahoma statute requiring tenured 

teachers to pay half the cost of a due process hearing.is 

constitutional and that Rankin waived his right to due process by 

failing to proceed under the statute. After Rankin presented his 

First Amendment case to the jury, the court granted defendants' 

motion for a directed verdict, concluding that Rankin had failed 

to produce any evidence of protected speech. On appeal, Rankin 

argues that he was denied due process (1) because the state 

statute imposes an impermissible burden on the due process rights 

of nonrenewed tenured teac~erst and (2) because he was not 

provided a hearing before the state published stigmatizing reasons 

for his discharge. He also argues that (3) he presented 

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sufficient evidence of protected speech to withstand a motion for 

~ .... ,di reo.ted .. verdict-..... we.,f,ind-,merit. ,in,.,two .. of ,.these ... contentions and 

reverse. 

I. 

DUE PROCESS 

Rankin's right to due process protection in connection with 

his property and liberty interests is undisputed. As a tenured 

teacher, he had a constitutionally protected entitlement to his 

employment. Defendants concede that his nonrenewal on a charge of 

immorality1 implicated his liberty interest as well. We address 

his two due process contentions in turn. 2 

A. 

Rankin first argues that he did not waive his right to a due 

process hearing because the state unconstitutionally burdens that 

right. Under Oklahoma law, a tenured teacher who is not 

1 The immorality charge stems from an incident in the teachers 

lounge during which Rankin, in a heated argument with another 

teacher, swore either at the teacher or at a piece of office 

equipment. 

2 We are not here concerned with the nature of the process due 

Rankin. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 ( 1981), 

cited by defendants, thus sheds no light on our inquiry. That 

case considered the requirements of due process under the 

circumstances, not whether the due process right itself was 

improperly burdened. 

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reemployed is entitled to have a hearing conducted by a hearing 

-':-,-,,, .. panel., , .. See··;Qkla. Stat.,. t.it •"·· 7.0 §. 6.,-,103 ... -.4 :.(-1981).:~ .. The threemember panel consists of a hearing judge selected jointly by the 

tenured teacher and the school board from a list of statedesignated attorneys, id. § 6-103.5, plus one person selected by 

the teacher and one selected by the board, id. § 6-103.6C. Both 

the teacher and the board have the right to have an official 

transcript of the hearing made. Id. § 6-103.7.6. The statute 

provides compensation for the hearing panel, and further states: 

"The local board of education and the tenured teacher shall each 

be responsible for fifty percent (50%) of the expenses and cost of 

the hearing and the official transcript, excluding attorney's fees 

of the parties involved." Id. § 6-103.lOB (emphasis added). The 

record contains evidence that, in addition to the cost of the 

transcript, the cost of the hearing includes up to $250 per day 

compensation for the hearing judge, $50 per day for each of the 

other panel members, and numerous miscellaneous per diem expenses. 

See rec., vol. III, at 4. The losing party has the right to 

appeai the decision to the state district court. See Okla. Stat., 

tit. 70 § 6-103.12. Rankin asserts that by requiring him to pay 

for the hearing which the District is required to give him, the 

cost-sharing statute imposes an impermissible burden on his right 

to due process. 

When a state statute penalizes the exercise of a 

constitutional right, the statute is subject to exacting judicial 

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scrutiny. See,~-, Meyer v. Grant, 108 s.ct. 1886, 1891 (1988) 

. c.:·,::,( strict :sc.r.utiny of. statute .:burdening plaintiff} s F.irst .. Arnendment 

rights); Smith v. Paulk, 705 F.2d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 1983) 

(strict scrutiny of statute penalizing plaintiff's exercise of 

constitutional right to interstate travel). Accordingly, the 

statute at issue here, which imposes a substantial and open-ended 

financial burden on the right to procedural due process, must be 

justified by a compelling state interest and must be narrowly 

tailored so as to impose no greater a burden than necessary. 3 

Smith, 705 F.2d at 1284. 

Defendants have suggested no specific state interest, 

compelling or otherwise, beyond a general reference to the 

fairness of requiring Rankin to bear his share of the cost of a 

3 The dissent starts off on the wrong foot by assuming the 

majority opinion is employing an overbreadth analysis. We do not 

do so. The overbreadth doctrine is inapplicable here. This 

doctrine has been "carved out in the area of the First Amendment." 

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973). In order to give 

the First Amendment "breathing space," id., the Supreme Court "has 

altered its traditional rules of standing to permit -- in the 

First Amendment area -- 'attacks on overly broad statutes with no 

requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his 

own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the 

requisite narrow specificity.'" Id. (quoting Dombrowski v. 

Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)"'):" In the instant case, Rankin 

has not challenged the Oklahoma statute under the First Amendment. 

Nor has he alleged that while his own conduct is subject to 

regulation, the statute could conceivably be applied 

unconstitutionally to others. He contends that the statute on its 

face impermissibly burdens his own constitutional right to 

procedural due process. As set forth in the text supra, we have 

followed the precedent of both the Supreme Court and this circuit 

in applying strict judicial scrutiny to this claim to determine 

whether the statute is facially invalid. 

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heating. This cost-recoupment argument ignores the fact that it 

iscdefendartts.•. affirmati.v;e-, Gbligat-ion ... to, •. f.ur.nish.,.Rankin .a due 

process hearing when they take action adverse to his liberty or 

property interests. Defendants have failed to demonstrate any 

compelling state interest in requiring Rankin to pay an 

unrestricted amount for that which they are constitutionally 

required to provide him. The trial judge likewise articulated no 

state interest upon which the statute could be upheld, basing his 

decision solely on his unsubstantiated belief that Rankin should 

have been able to afford the cost on his teacher's salary. See 

Rec., vol IV, at 15. Not only is Rankin's actual ability to pay a 

matter of considerable dispute on the summary judgment record, 4 it 

is irrelevant to determining whether the state has shown a 

compelling interest in requiring him to do so. 

Our conclusion that the statute here cannot withstand strict 

scrutiny is supported by the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut, 

401 U.S. 371 (1971). The Court held in Boddie that mandatory 

court fees and costs imposed a significant burden on the ability 

4 In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Rankin 

filed an affidavit stating that he could not afford the costs of 

the due process hearing. Rec., vol. I, doc. 25 at 3-4. Rankin 

had recently taken bankruptcy, and he had lost a child custody 

fight for which he owed attorneys fees. Rec., vol. IV, at 13-14. 

His attorney had advised him that a two or three-day hearing would 

cost him a thousand or fifteen hundred dollars. Id. at 14. 

Defendants.argue that Rankin should have requestedthat the costs 

of the hearing be waived, if he could not afford to pay. Given 

the mandatory language of the statute (the parties "shall each be 

responsible for fifty percent (50%) of the expense"), we decline 

to hold Rankin responsible for failing to request a waiver. 

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of those unable to pay to obtain a divorce. The Court further 

,., .. , ,held that .. ,.,i.n,,.view-- of :.the., f,undamental 0 -na,ture of the .. right to .adjust 

the marital relationship and the state's monopolization of the 

means of doing so, a state statute imposing a sign.ificant hurdle 

to that means must be justified by "a countervailing state 

interest of overriding significance." Id. at 377. The Court 

summarily rejected the state's asserted interest in resource 

allocation or cost recoupment. 5 Id. at 382. 

A tenured teacher's right to procedural due process 

protection of his liberty and property rights in his employment is 

as constitutionally substantial as the right to divorce. 

Moreover, the state here has created the need for the process by 

not renewing Rankin's contract. As in Boddie, the state provides 

no way to exercise the right other than in a manner penalizing 

those seeking to assert it. 6 We therefore decline to afford cost 

5 The dissent is correct in pointing out that the Court in 

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), held the statute there 

invalid as applied, while the statute here is challenged as 

invalid on its face. However, that distinction is irrelevant to 

our citation to Boddie. The strict scrutiny test contains the 

same requirement when applied to either type of claim: the state 

must demonstrate a compelling state interest. See,~, Boddie, 

401 U.S. at 377 (state interest must be of "overriding 

significance"); Smith v. Paulk, 705 F.2d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 

1983) ( statute must be justified by "compelling state interest") •. 

Thus, the point we found significant in Boddie, that cost 

recoupment is not a compelling state interest, is not affected by 

the fact that Boddie involved a challenge to a statute as applied. 

6 In Winston v. City of New York, 759 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1985), 

the court considered facts more closely analogous to those before 

us. There, teachers facing charges giving cause for dismissal 

could either resign or challenge the charges in a hearing. 

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recoupment any greater weight here than the Court did in' Boddie. 

We reject defendants' attempt to bring this case within the 

holdings of Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam), 

and Otasco v. United States (In re South), 689 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 

1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983), because those cases are 

readily distinguishable. In Ortwein, the plaintiffs challenged a 

$25 filing fee required to obtain judicial review of agency 

decisions reducing their welfare benefits. The Court upheld the 

fee, pointing out that the right to increased welfare payments has 

far less constitutional significance than the interest burdened in 

Boddie, and that the free administrative hearing provided an 

alternative unburdened means of obtaining due process. See 410 

U.S. at 659-60. Here, to the contrary, Rankin's right to due 

process is of weightier constitutional significance and the state 

provides no alternative means to that burdened by substantial 

cost. In In re South, we upheld a $60 filing fee imposed on 

creditors who initiate adversary bankruptcy proceedings. In so 

doing, we relied on "Otasco's ability to pay the fee, the 

Teachers who resigned while under charges received pension 

benefits, while those dismissed for cause did not. A teacher's 

exercise of the constitutional right to a hearing was thus chilled 

by the prospect that an adverse decision would result in the loss 

of pension benefits. The court balanced "the need for the 

challenged statute against its chilling effect on the exercise of 

the parties constitutional rights", id. at 246, and held that the 

automatic penalty "places an unconstitutional burden on a 

teacher's right to a hearing," id. at 245. Although the court 

employed a slightly different analysis than we do here, it reached 

the same result. 

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nonfundamental nature of Otasco's interest and the government's 

- 0 ··, ,;.,,-... ·legitima,te 0 i.nte.rest.J,n,,levy.i.ng .the, fee." -689 .F •. 2d,at 166. '"Those 

factors compel a different result here. 

Unlike the filing fee cases discussed above, the chilling 

effect of the penalty here is magnified because a tenured 

teacher's potential liability for costs is unrestricted and is the 

result in part of factors outside his control. The length of the 

hearing will depend upon the extent to which a school board offers 

evidence to support its decision. Moreover, even if a teacher 

prevails and decides to forego a transcript, the board has the 

right to request one for an appeal and to require the teacher to 

pay half the cost. For these reasons, we conclude that the 

statute challenged here is unconstitutional on its face because it 

imposes a significant and unjustified open-ended penalty on the 

exercise of a constitutional right. 7 

7 The dissent's suggestion that we certify the due process 

question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court is manifestly 

inappropriate. Under our Tenth Circuit Rule 27.1, this court may 

certify to the state court "questions arising under the laws of 

that state which may control the outcome of a case pending in the 

federal court." The dissent suggests that certification would 

allow the Oklahoma Supreme Court to decide the du~ process issue 

"either under the Oklahoma Constitution or the United States 

Constitution." Dissent, slip. op. at 4. That the validity of·the 

statute under the federal constitution is a question of federal 

rather than state law is too obvious to require discussion. The 

validity of the statute under the state constitution, while 

undoubtedly a question of state law, is not a question in this 

case because Rankin has not challenged the statute as violative of 

the state constitution. 

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B. 

Rankin also contends that due process requires a hearing 

prior to the publication of stigmatizing charges in connection 

with an adverse employment decision. We disagree. When the 

termination of a public employee "is accompanied by public 

dissemination of the reasons for dismissal, and those reasons 

would stigmatize the employee's reputation or foreclose future 

employment opportunities, due process requires that the employee 

be provided a hearing at which he may test the validity of the 

proffered grounds for dismissal." Miller v. City of Mission, 705 

F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1983). Thus, one's liberty interest is 

not implicated until the stigmatizing information is published. 

While the advantages of a prepublication hearing should be obvious 

to a prudent public employer who wishes to avoid liability for a 

liberty interest deprivation, a name-clearing hearing may be 

constitutionally adequate even if it occurs after publication. 

See,~, Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977); Board of 

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 & n.12 (1972); Lentsch v. 

Marshall, 741 F.2d 301, 303-04 (10th Cir. 1984). We therefore 

reject Rankin's argument that procedural due process requires a 

prepublication hearing. 

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II. 

FIRST AMENDMENT 

Rankin challenges the district court's grant of a directed 

verdict for defendants on his First Amendment claim. In Saye v. 

St. Vrain Valley School Dist. RE-IJ, 785 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 

1986), we addressed the standard of review applicable to a grant 

of a directed verdict when a plaintiff claims that an adverse 

employment decision violates her right to free speech. Although 

the protected status of the speech at issue is subject to our 

independent constitutional judgment, the sufficiency of the 

underlying historical facts upon which the constitutional claim is 

grounded is determined by the traditional standard of review. Id. 

at 865. Accordingly, we must view the historical facts most 

favorably to Rankin, giving him the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. "A directed verdict is 

appropriate only when the facts and inferences, thus viewed, point 

so strongly in favor of one party that reasonable minds could not 

come to a different conclusion." Id. 

In granting defendants' motion for directed verdict, the 

district court stated that there was "a total failure of proof in 

this case as to exactly, or even approximately; what was said, to 

whom, and under what conditions." Rec., vol. I, doc. 103, at 2-3. 

Relying on Ewers v. Board of County Comm'rs., 802 F.2d 1242, 1246 

(10th Cir. 1986), rehearing granted on other grounds, 813 F.2d 

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1583 (10th Cir. 1987), the court concluded that a directed verdict 

, .-.was;;..,pr-ope.r .. because !'the .record before,. the Court .does not contain 

any particular evidence of protected speech." Rec., vol. I, doc. 

103, at 3. In so doing the court adopted an overly restrictive 

standard unwarranted by Ewers and the law upon which Ewers is 

based. 

In Ewers, we held that the trial court's submission of the 

plaintiff's First Amendment claim to the jury was erroneous on two 

interrelated grounds: the jury had no basis for a verdict when 

the court's instruction failed to identify the protected speech 

allegedly motivating the adverse action, and the record itself 

contained no evidence of any such protected speech. Id. at 1246-

47. Our reference in Ewers to the "necessity of presenting 

precise evidence of the alleged protected conduct, or speech with 

a degree of specificity," id. at 1246, must therefore be read in 

the context of a total failure by either the judge or the 

plaintiff to identify the speech allegedly motivating the 

defendants' conduct toward the plaintiff. 

The record in this case stands in clear contrast to the Ewers 

record. Rankin alleged that the nonrenewal of his contract was in 

retaliation for his speaking out on the District's method of 

disciplining its students. He presented evidence that following 

an incident in which a student was administered corporal 

punishment, public concern over school disciplinary practices ran 

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high. Indeed, the evidence is undisputed that a school board 

···,.·~ Y-.·,1:meeting -at."'which.·,discipline.,was,,discussed began, at. 7 :-00 p.m. and 

ran until at least 3:00 a.m. The record contains testimony that 

Ra~kin spoke publicly on the issue of school discipline, both with 

parents and at school board meetings. In addition, there is 

evidence that Rankin was openly critical of the District for 

failing to have a written discipline policy and for failing to 

administer punishment even-handedly. 

The parties and the district court agreed that the issue of 

student discipline was a matter of public concern in the District 

during the relevant period. "There exist few questions within the 

area of education which are of more interest to the public than· 

the one which raises the possibility of th_e physical mistreatment 

of students in the community schools." Bowman v. Pulaski Cty. 

Special School Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1983). However, 

plaintiff must also present evidence that his speech, by its 

content, form and context, was itself of general interest rather 

than of purely personal concern. See Saye, 785 F.2d at 866; Wren 

v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 & n.l (10th Cir. 1986), cert. 

denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987); Wilson v. City of Littleton, 732 

F.2d 765, 768-69 (10th Cir. 1984). Rankin met this burden with 

evidence that his speech was made publicly to parents and at 

school,board meetings, that the speech occurred at a time of great 

general interest in the District's discipline policy and in the 

context of a public debate on the issue, and that the content of 

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his speech contributed to that debate. 

.644..-.45. 

See Bowman, 723 F.2d at 

The dissenting opinion's quotations and summarizations from 

the record support the above conclusion. It is not surprising 

that defendant board members who voted against Rankin "can't 

recall" whether Rankin spoke out at board meetings on the clearly 

volatile subject of disciplining school children. As the dissent 

recognizes, however, Donald Doyle, a board member who voted in 

favor of Rankin, clearly testified that: 

"Rankin had attended the board meetings and spoke on 

the problems of discipline (R., Vol. VII at p. 332); 

that the spanking of Theresa Johnson and others was a 

matter of concern in the community, id.; all the board 

members were concerned about Rankin speaking out on 

matters of discipline, ·id. at p. 342; Rankin's 

appearances at board meetings and statements about 

discipline were some of the things that irritated Dr. 

Piguet, id. at 348; Dr. Piguet never actually related 

that Rankin spoke too much or too often at meetings or 

any place else, id. at p. 352; the town was 

factionalized over 'the way stuff was handled at 

school,' id; and that Rankin was not, to his knowledge, 

a member of any group or faction, id." 

Dissent, slip. op. at 19. In addition, Rankin testified that he 

spoke publicly about the need for a written, evenly-applied 

discipline policy, and two parents likewise testified that Rankin 

came to board meetings and spoke out on discipline, rec., vol. 

VIII, at 479-83, 513. The dissent inexplicably fails to view this 

evidence most favorably to Rankin, concluding instead that "there 

is a total failure of proof in this case as to exactly, or even 

approximately, what (constitutionally protected speech) was said, 

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to whom, and under what conditions." Dissent, slip op. at 21. 

· ·- .,·.Yet-,., the- -r,ecord·,,_clearly .reflects that '"the .protected speech was 

Rankin's outspoken articulation of his views on the manner and 

even-handedness of discipline in the public schools ("what''), and 

that these views were expressed to parents and to the school board 

at public meetings ("to whom" and "under what conditions''). It is 

apparent that the content, form, and context of Rankin's speech 

was of public, not private, concern, and that Rankin's speech was 

therefore constitutionally protected. 8 

The dissent also claims there was no evidence that Rankin's 

speech on the subject was a motivating factor in his termination. 

However, "[t]he trial court's entry of a directed verdict for the 

District was based upon Rankin's failure to meet his initial 

burden, that of establishing protected speech." Brief of 

Appellee, at 28. The trial court's decision did not rest on any 

failure by Rankin to present evidence that his speech was a 

motivating factor in his termination, see rec., vol. I, doc. 103, 

at 3 (order granting defendants' motion for directed verdict), and 

8 In determining whether a public employee's speech on a matter 

of public concern is constitutionally protected, a court must 

balance the employee's interest in exercising his First Amendment 

rights and the employer's interest in efficient government 

services. See .Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 

(1968); Bowman v. Pulaski Cty. Special School Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 

644-45 (8th Cir. 1983). That balancing test is not at issue here. 

Defendants do not argue that the decision not to renew Rankin's 

contract was based on a conclusion that his speech was too 

disruptive; rather, defendants argue that Rankin's speech played 

no part in their decision. See Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School 

Dist., 785 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 1986). 

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defendants do not raise this issue on appeal. In any event, the 

,record.-.,.as .,quoted ·by the d.issent-... reflects. that Rankin's protected 

speech was a source of irritation to defendants, evidence which 

supports a reasonable inference that his speech was a motivating 

factor in their decision. 

We conclude that the record here, viewed most favorably to 

Rankin, adequately identifies the constitutionally protected 

speech that Rankin claims was a motivating factor in the 

nonrenewal decision, and thus satisfies the concerns voiced in 

Ewers. His failure to offer evidence specifying the dates and the 

exact words of his speech is not therefore fatal to his cause of 

action. Accordingly, the district court erred in directing a 

verdict for defendants. 9 

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

9 Rankin also contends that the trial court erred in excluding 

evidence offered under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) relevant to the First 

Amendment claim. In view of our holding that this case must be 

retried, and the possibility that this issue may not arise again 

in the same context, we decline to assess the merits of this 

claim. 

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No. 87-1751 - JOHNNY LEE RANKIN v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 

I-3, ET AL., ETC. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 

in part: 

I concur in IB of the majority opinion rejecting Rankin's 

contention that procedural due process required a prepublication 

hearing. 

I dissent from the majority's holding that (1) Oklahoma's 

statutory procedure, i.e., Okla. Stat. Tit. 70 § 6-103.4, et seq.~ 

(1981), which provides a tenured teacher a hearing when his 

teaching contract is, for cause, to be terminated or not renewed 

is unconstitutional on its face because it imposes a significant 

and unjustified open-ended penalty on the exercise of a 

constitutional right, and (2) Rankin did provide evidence of the 

content, form, and context of his speech su~ficient to enable the 

court to determine whether it was constitutionally protected. 

I. 

I do not agree with the majority's holding that the Oklahoma 

statutory procedure, Okla. Stat. Tit. 70 § 6-103.4, et seg., 

(1981), providing a tenured teacher an independent hearing after 

the school board has given notice of its intention, for cause, 

either to terminate or not to renew the teacher's employment 

contract, is unconstitutional on its face because it assesses onehalf of the costs of the proceeding to the teacher. 

Facial overbreath challenges are "manifestly strong medicine" 

which must be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." 

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). When a party 

Appellate Case: 87-1751 Document: 01019785746 Date Filed: 06/02/1989 Page: 17 
asserts such a challenge, the overbreath "must not only be real, 

.... ""but _substantial. -as .well., ... ".judged i_n . relation .. to the statute's 

plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 615. 

The majority states that the defendants have not demonstrated 

a compelling state interest in requiring Rankin to pay one-half of 

the hearing costs. This presupposes that Rankin's entitlement to 

~ due process hearing requires that the Board bear all of the 

costs of the hearing. I am not willing to write that requirement 

into the Oklahoma statute. If the causes given by the Board for 

the non-renewal of Rankin's contract should be found to be valid, 

there is no reason the Board should bear all of the costs of a 

proceeding requested by Rankin to challenge those causes. It also 

ignores the fact that Rankin elected not to accept the Board's 

invitation to meet with the Board to discuss the matters involved 

in the notice of his contract nonrenewal, notwithstanding the 3 to 

2 vote of the Board members, and the fact that the statutory 

hearing panel of three judges is to be selected independent of the 

Board. Furthermore, it is uncontested that Rankin did not inform 

the Board of his inability to pay any portion of the costs of the 

statutory hearing. The defendants have stated categorically on 

the record that "[I]f he had, the defendants would have offered to 

assume the entire cost of the due process hearing." (R., Vol. II, 

Tab 51, p. 9). It was not until Rankin filed the instant suit 

that .he. executed an affidavit stating, inter alia: "7. That he 

could not and cannot afford the price of the due process rights 

provided by the statutes of the State of Oklahoma." (R., Vol. I, 

Tab 25). Such an affidavit is conclusory in nature. It does not 

contain facts relative to Rankin's financial status. There 

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is nothing in the record on appeal which specifically relates to 

Rankin.' s ... inabiTiJ:y ,;to pay one:--half ·of .the,. hearing costs. 

The majority relies on Boddie v. Connecticut,. 401 U.S. 371 

(1971) for its conclusion that the Oklahoma hearing statute 

cannot stand strict scrutiny and is unconstitutional on its face 

"because it imposes a significant and unjustified open-ended 

penalty on the exercise of a constitutional right." I reject this 

position. 

The challenges in Boddie were not posited to _the statutes on 

their face, but rather, and significantly, as applied. Thus, 

unlike the instant case, the Boddie plaintiffs established with 

concrete evidence that they were indigent and totally unable to 

pay the requisite costs and filing fees to bring divorce· actions 

in Connecticut state courts. In Boddie, the Court found that the 

state's interest in allocating scarce resources and balancing the 

rights of the parties could not override the interest of the 

.indigent plaintiffs in having access to the only route open for 

dissolving their allegedly untenable marriages. Id. at 381. 

Further, the Court stated that "we wish to re-emphasize that we go 

no further than necessary to dispose of the case before us. A 

case where the bona fides of both appellants' indigency and desire 

for divorce are here beyond dispute. We do not decide that access 

for all individuals to the court is a right that is, in all 

circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise may not be placed beyond 

the reach of any individual, for, as we have already noted, in the 

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case before us this right is the exclusive precondition to the 

.. ~ .... adjus.tment of_a :.fundamen·taL human ,.·relationship •. '.~. Id. at .. pp .. 3.82-

83. 

As previously observed, there is no evidence in our case 

beyond Rankin's self-serving conclusory statement to demonstrate 

his inability to pay one-half of the hearing costs. Under these 

circumstances, this court should refrain from striking down the 

Oklahoma statute, and particularly so in view of the fact that the 

identical due process challenge presented here may be decided on 

state constitutional grounds. 

Federal courts should refrain from striking down state 

statutes as unconstitutional where the challenge to the statutes 

has not been presented to the state courts. Here, certification 

from this court to the Oklahoma Supreme Court is an available 

procedure. See, Okla. Stat. Tit. 20 § 1602, et seg. Such 

procedure would permit the Oklahoma Supreme court to decide the 

issue either under the Oklahoma Consti~ution or the United States 

Constitution. § 1602, supra, provides, inter alia, that the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court may anl!3wer "questions of law of this state 

which may be determinative of the cause then pending" where there 

are no controlling Oklahoma state court decisions. I recognize 

that abstention is not necessary in a case such as this, but as a 

matter of comity, federal courts should stay their hands whenever 

it - .is .,feasible . to refer the validity of a .. state statute to the 

state courts. In the instant case, the relevant facts concerning 

the due process challenge are not in dispute. This, then, in my 

view, presents ·a case whereby this court should decline to 

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exercise it's power in favor of that of the Oklahoma Supreme 

.. ,. Court .•.. By _,exercising .such -restraint, the:, Oklahoma -Supreme Court 

would be granted the initial opportunity to examine the Oklahoma 

statute here challenged and to adjudicate its 

both under the Oklahoma Constitution and 

Constitution. 

constitutionality, 

the United States 

In Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975) this 

court observed that the proposed certification to the Colorado 

Supreme Court, while requesting ~n interpretation of doubtful 

state law, also improperly requested that court to answer a 

federal law question, i.e., whether the transfer of property 

arising from a property settlement agreemen~ constitutes a taxable 

event for purposes of federal income taxation. Unlike the federal 

law question posed in Imel which was a question exclusively 

reserved to the federal courts, in the case at bar the federal 

constitutional challenge based on due process may also be 

presented and decided in state courts. Furthermore, just as there 

is no requirement that the state courts answer the questions 

certified, there is nothing in the law which requires the referral 

court to accept the answers to the questions certified. 

The certification procedure would afford the Oklahoma Supreme 

Court the initial opportunity to judge the constitutionality of 

the challenged statutes in an important area of state function. 

It might significantly-avoid-unnecessary friction in federal-state 

relations. In Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 95 L. Ed. 

2d 1, 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987), the Supreme Court held in a 42 

u.s.c. § 1983 action challenging a Texas state court ordered 

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supersedeas bond under the equal protection and due process clause 

.: ... "_of~ .t.he '-Fourteenth., Amendment, .,,that ~federal court .abstention was 

required in light of the need to avoid a determination of federal 

constitutional questions if the state courts could resolve the 

case on state statutory or constitutional grounds. Furthermore, 

the Court stated that if the matter may not be resolved on state 

statutory or constitutional grounds, still the state courts are 

required to resolve federal constitutional questions. The Court 

observed that the state's interests in the proceeding were so 

important that abstention was required with regard to the comity 

between the states and the federal government. The Court 

emphasized that both the district court and the court of appeals 

· failed to recognize the significant state interests involved, and 

further that when federal courts interpret state statutes in a way 

that raises federal constitutional questions, such a reading is 

not binding on state courts and may be discrediied at any time. 

Finally, the court observed that Article VI of the United States 

Constitution declares that "the Judges in every state shall be 

bound" by the Federal Constitution, laws and treaties. 

II. 

The majority plainly misses the mark in holding, contrary to 

the district court, that Rankin provided evidence of the content, 

form, and context of his speech sufficient to enable the court to 

determine- whether .it was constitutionally protected. The record 

tells us otherwise. Furthermore, there is a total failure on the 

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part of Rankin to show that his "protected speech" was the 

, _,motivating factor .. in his contract .-nonrenewal. 

It was plaintiff Rankin's obligation to establish that 

certain speech-expressions made by him .and communicated to the 

defendants were constitutionally protected under the First 

Amendment. I agree with the trial court's finding that "[T]here 

is a total failure of proof in this case as to exactly, or even 

approximately, what was said to whom, and under what conditions." 

The district court correctly observed that jurors must be 

knowledgeable of the protected speech in order to find that such 

speech was the motivating factor in the action (nonrenewal of 

Rankin's teaching contract) being challenged. In my view, the 

majority has failed to recognize the legal burden imposed on 

Rankin and has ignored the trial court's precise factual 

determinations which are solidly supported by the record. 

The majority opinion does not even pretend to identify any 

First Amendment speech made by Rankin which could be considered as 

the "motivating factor" for the Board's decision not to renew his 

contract, notwithstanding the fact that Rankin was legally charged 

with the burden of establishing that his constitutionally 

protected speech was the "motivating factor" in the adverse 

employment decision. Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. 

Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School Dist. 

RE-lJ, 785 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 1986). Iri my view, Rankin 

utterly failed to carry his burden of proof in his case-in-chief 

as required under Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 

450 U.S. 248 (1981) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

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792 (1973). Thus, I conclude that the district court quite 

,..- ·:,:,,properly. granted ... the,.defendan.ts' .-mo.tion .· for a directed verdict. 

At the close of the Rankin's case, the Board moved for a 

directed verdict. Counsel for the Board pointed out that there 

were two relevant matters which Rankin must have. presented 

sufficient evidence of for the case to go to the jury. First, 

Rankin must show that he engaged in constitutionally protected 

speech; second, that the speech was a substantial and motivating 

factor in the non-renewal of his contract. (R. Vol. IX, p. · 571.) 

Counsel for the Board observed that there were three points upon 

which Rankin based his argument of protected speech. 

The first was an incident involving a boy named Henry Grant 

who apparently suffered from some form of lukemia. Mr. Rankin 

escorted the boy who started a scuffle with Harry Grant to the 

principal's office. Grant's parents were not notified of the 

incident. Counsel for the Boar~ correctly pointed out that the 

evidence showed only that there was some talk of a lawsuit and 

that Rankin may have agreed to testify. However, no lawsuit was 

filed and there is no evidence that the Board members or the 

school superintendent knew of any involvement Rankin might have in 

the matter. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any protected 

speech on Rankin's part involving the matter. 

The second occasion Rankin relied on was an incident 

involving Theresa Johnson. She was-swatted and-Rankin viewed the 

result of the blow. Apparently, a lawsuit was filed and Rankin 

indicated that he would be willing to testify, although the record 

is silent as to what he might testify to. Rankin was never called 

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as a witness, nor was his name included in the witness portion of 

·the ... pr.etr ial order. :,:.The .. only ,,.,evidence. o.f·,,any ,speech by Rankin in 

connection with that incident is that he spoke privately with 

Theresa's parents. 

The third point was that Rankin spoke· out generally on 

subjects relating to discipline at school board meetings. The 

evidence in that regard is very sk~tchy and vague. One witness, 

Mrs. Grant, did testify that she was at a school board meeting 

when Rankin spoke out against putting a boy out of school because 

of a disciplinary problem. 

The trial judge pointed out that, in light of Mrs. Grant's 

testimony, there was not a total absence of evidence as to what 

Rankin stated at a board meeting. Counsel for the defendants 

argued, however, if that was the case, there was no evidenqe that 

Rankin's protected speech, if there was any, was a substantial and 

motivating factor in the Board's nonrenewal action. 

The court, out of concern for the absence of evidence, 

inquired of Rankin's attorney what, specifically, was the 

protected speech he relied upon and what evidence there may be 

that the speech was the motivating factor for the Board's action. 

The responses were completely unsatisfactory and identified no 

specific evidence. 

In granting the defendants' motion for a directed verdict, 

the court cited a passage from Ewers v. Board of County Comm'rs, 

802 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1986) (consolidated cases No. 84-2437 and 

No. 84-2477), reh'g granted on other grounds (No. 84-2437), 813 

F.2d 1583 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied (No. 84-2437), 108 s. Ct. 

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704 ( 1988), which he believed to be particularly apposite. "The 

-~•,_. ," ·.necessity of. precise0 -evidence -of- the .. ,al.leged pr;.otected,-conduct or 

speech with a degree of specificity in a damage [suit] such as 

this is obvious: Jurors must be knowledgeable of the protected 

conduct or speech in order to find that the conduct was a 

motivating factor in the action being challenged." (R., Vol. IX, 

p. 598). The court found no evidence sufficient to go to the jury 

on the content, form and context of the protected speech as 

required by Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). The court 

noted that the record indicates a reasonable suspicion that Rankin 

may have been non-renewed for reasons other than those stated, but 

that it's "wholly speculative as to what those other reasons may 

be, personality conflict, a sense he wasn't part of the team, a 

generalized feeling of an uncooperative stance by Plaintiff as 

against the School Board or a sense that he simply was not as 

adequate a teacher as the School Board was willing to retain, 

notwithstanding his tenured status." (R., Vol. IX, p. 549). 

The court, having reviewed the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Rankin, found that there was no evidence of the 

content, form and context of any protected speech. Neither could 

the court find any evidence that any speech by Rankin was a 

motivating factor in the Board's non-renewal of his contract. I 

agree. 

After reviewing .the entire record with the district court's 

comments in mind, I conclude that there is no evidence of 

constitutionally protected speech which Rankin could rely upon in 

regard to the Board's decision not to renew his contract: 

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RANKIN - DIRECT TESTIMONY: 

.. _ -Ooc Did · you- .. actually . attend 

discuss discipline? 

A. Yes, several times. 

Board . .cmeetings and 

Q. Now, tell us, just tell the Jury what you would 

say at Board Meetings, what the problems were and what 

positions you took. 

A. Well, it depended -- it would depend upon what 

was being discussed at the time. The policy -- it was 

just like they were going to pass the policy that 

whoever was the sponsor of an activity was required to 

make sure all students that were at the activity stay 

within the guidelines of the school district. That 

would mean, like if I went to a stock show, then I would 

be required to go out on the midway to make sure 

students from the school were not smoking or chewing 

tobacco or doing anything against school policy. And I 

stated at that time that I didn't have time to be a 

policeman and run around outside when I had my job to 

take care of the animals and prepare the students, make 

sure they got to the show ring on time and made sure 

their animals were fit to be shown. 

(R., Vol. V, p. 20). 

RANKIN - CROSS EXAMINATION: 

Q. I see. Now, 

attended a number of 

discussed present at 

that correct? 

A. Yes. 

Mr. Rankin, you say that you 

Board Meetings in which you 

the Board, discipline policy, is 

Q. And you think that because you spoke out at 

those Board Meetings that that was a factor in their 

terminating you. 

A. Yes. 

Q. And what facts do you base that on? 

A. bn. the.opinion that I was a local citizen, that 

I would question purchases that were made of why they 

wanted to buy any type of equipment for the school, that 

I didn't feel like the school didn't have no need for an 

infrared security system, that's one of the purchases 

they wanted to spend $85,000 on a security system, why 

does the school need an infrared security system. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1751 Document: 01019785746 Date Filed: 06/02/1989 Page: 27 
Q. Mr. Rankin, where in your lawsuit do you claim 

that you were fired because you opposed an $85,000 0

: .inf rared; security: system. 

A. There was none. 

Q. I understand the basing of your claim is that 

you were fired because you criticized at the public 

meeting the Board's disciplinary policy as it related to 

students. 

A. Yes. 

Q. I asked you what information or facts you ha~, 

you answered the question by stating your opinion. Is 

that what you're basing it, on your opinion? 

A. I was vocal at Board meetings and I felt like 

they resented the fact that I would question their 

decisions. 

Q. And that's your opinion? 

A. That's my opinion, yes. 

(Id., p. 59-60) 

* * * 

Q. My question to you, sir: If in the three 

previous years some or all of these Board Members had 

voted with you and against Doctor Piguet, what caused 

them to change their mind in March of 84? 

A. Well, the situations were different. 

Q. I see. 

A. I had become more vocal. 

Q. Because you were coming to the Board Meetings? 

A. Because I was present at the Board Meetings and 

because I was questioning some of the policies they were 

making, if they were really legitimate reasons. 

(Id., p. 77) 

DOYLE .(member of the School Board who voted to renew 

Rankin's employment contract) - CROSS EXAMINATION: 

Q. In the executive session meeting was there 

comments from any of the Board Members or the 

Superintendent or the Principal with respect to Mr. 

Rankin's conduct or his appearances or his speaking out 

on matters of interest to the operation of the school? 

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f 

THE 

interest 

school! 

COURT: Let's just add to that, matters of 

concerning discipline of children in the 

A. I don't remember as a specific answer or 

question in the session directly about John Rankin due 

to the discipline matters, it was common knowledge; and 

part of these allegations, in my opinion, come through 

this. 

(R., Vol. VIII, p. 393) 

* * * 

DOYLE - CROSS EXAMINATION: 

Q. Now, you say Mr. Rankin attended meetings and 

spoke on the discipline matters? 

A. Yes. As I recall, we had three or four 

meetings that discipline was a pretty good issue in. 

* * * 

Q. All right. 

meeting? 

What did he say at the first 

A. I don't remember the specific, other than 

people expressed concerns and --

Q. How many people expressed concern at the first 

meeting that he spoke? 

A. I would think there was several. 

Q. ·How long did he speak? 

A. Nobody spoke too awful long as an individual. 

Q. Can you remember anything he said? 

A. I can remember some words. 

Q. What did he say? 

A. I say I can remember some words, no words as 

such but more of the emotion. 

(Id., p. 424-25) 

* * * 

Q. My question is what do you recall he said, not 

what other people said but what Mr. Rankin said at the 

second meeting. 

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A. As individual words, I don't remember; it .... involves .. two .... subjects, spanking 

Q. Do you remember he spoke on those two subjects 

or are you just recalling generally that's what other 

people talked about? 

A. That's the only two subjects that was talked 

about as discipline. 

Q. Do you have a memory of Mr. Rankin speaking on 

those two subjects? 

A. I believe I do. 

Q. What do you believe your memory tells you? 

A. It involved a or two problems, double 

standards and corporal punishment. 

Q. All right. What did Mr. Rankin say on double 

standards? 

A. Jus·t the punishment involved whose child it 

was. 

Q. Well, did he give any examples? 

A. I don't remember. 

Q. And on corporal punishment what did he say? 

A. This I can't really remember, I think one 

overlaps the other one. 

Q. At the third meeting, do you recall when that 

was that he spoke? 

A. Do I remember him a-speaking at the meeting? 

Q. At a third meeting, yes, sir. 

A. I remember him speaking at a meeting, whether 

it was a third meeting I don't know. 

Q. While-, Mr. Rankin was speaking at any of these 

meetings, did Donnie Green do anything in your presence 

that indicated that he was aggravated that Mr. Rankin 

was speaking? 

A. Nothing verbally. 

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Q. Well, other than verbally what did he do? 

A. I don't know whether uneasiness --

A. How was that expressed, Mr. Doyle? 

A. I don't know, maybe the way a person sets or 

shifts or looks or as anybody uneasy may do. 

Q. Can you be more specific than that? 

A. Not really. 

Q. How about Mr. Phipps, did he say or do anything 

that you could see or hear that would indicate that he 

was upset at any of these meetings that Mr. Rankin was 

speaking? 

A. No. 

Q. And, 

do anything at 

speaking? 

Mr. Caswell, did you see him or hear him 

these meetings while Mr. Rankin was 

A. He wasn't on the Board. 

Q. All right. How about Doctor Piguet, did you 

see him do anything or hear him say anything at the 

meeting that indicated he was upset with Mr. Rankin 

speaking at the meetings? 

A. I believe the expression on his face and the 

way he would move, you could tell he was annoyed. 

Q. You could tell he was annoyed. 

A. Uh-huh. 

Q. Okay. How could you tell that? 

A. As you would tell if anybody was annoyed. 

Q. Well, how did you know he was annoyed at Mr. 

Rankin? 

on. 

A. They were talking. 

Q. Who was talking? 

A. I suppose when this discipline deal was going 

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Q. You mean Doctor Piguet and Mr. Rankin were 

.talking? 

A. They usually didn't talk directly to one 

another, somebody got up and said whatever they said. 

Q. Well, I thought you said that with Doctor 

Piguet it was the expression on his face, not what he 

was saying. 

A. Uh-huh. 

Q. What was the expression on his face that made 

you think he way annoyed at Mr. Rankin? 

A. Just an expression of annoyance. 

(R., Vol. VIII, p. 427-30) 

LAFOE (parent who attended board meetings) 

EXAMINATION: 

DIRECT 

Q. All right. 

the Board Meetings. 

Meetings? 

You indicated you attended most of 

Did Mr. Rankin attend the Board 

A. I don't know that he attended all of them, but, 

yes, I seen him there. 

Q. And at the Board Meetings would he speak out? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Now, do you know whether or not John Rankin 

openly spoke out on issues involving discipline during 

that period of time? 

A. You mean at the Board Meetings? 

Q. At the Board Meetings or individually to 

parents. 

A. Yes, I mean a lot -- a lot of people discussed 

it and I know he had discussed it, yes. 

Q. Do you know of anyone you observed him being 

critical of at the Board Meetings or anywhere else? 

A. I couldn't say right off, it's been two years 

ago. 

(Id., p. 479-80) 

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MRS. GRANT (Parent who attended School Board meeting) 

•CROSS·EXAMINATION: 

Q. Have you ever been at any Board Meetings where 

Mr. Rankin spoke out on issues of discipline or 

occurrences in the school? 

A. Mr. Rankin -- yes, I would say that Mr. Rankin, 

yes. 

Q. 

might 

about? 

Can you recall any specifics 

subject matter or whatever 

about what he 

he was talking 

A. It's been so long ago, I think there was I 

think one of the times he was trying to help the Fink 

boy because they just wanted to totally put him out of 

school. 

Q. Okay. How would he try to help the Fink boy,. 

for example? 

A. Well, there would be a time when people could 

speak and Mr. Rankin might, you know, stand up and, you 

know, say, couldn't we do this, or isn't there some way 

we could do that, or something like that order. 

(Id., p. 513) 

During trial, Rankin called each of the five board 

members serving at the time that his contract was not 

renewed: 

Kenneth Coswell, who voted not to renew Rankin's --------- contract, testified, inter alia, that: he had attended 

several meetings prior to his election to the board and there 

was never, to his knowledge, any discussion by board members 

that people should not be so vocal about disciplinary matters 

within.the.schools (R., Vol. VII,.p. 213); while on the board 

he never observed any board member or the superintendent, Dr. 

Bob Piguet, ever try to silence someone or · try to keep 

someone from speaking their piece at a board meeting (Id., p. 

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217); teachers frequently addressed board meetings and 

-.·-everyone .. had .,~a",chance to .voice their opinions, id., at 218; 

he did not remember Rankin ever addressing the board, id. at 

p •. 220; he did not remember Rankin speaking to the board 

about student discipline, id.; he did not vote to terminate 

Rankin because he was allegedly speaking out on student 

discipline,.id.; and that the main reason Rankin was fired 

was his failure to do his duty, his willful neglect, id. at 

p. 226. 

Byron Phipps, who voted not to renew Rankin's contract 

testified, inter alia, that: Rankin had had a "cuss fight" 

with a teacher, an act for which he could not forgive Rankin 

(R., Vol. VIII at p. 277); he did not remember that anybody 

was "just out to see" that Rankin lost his job, id. at p. 

282; he did not believe that people tried to justify Rankin's 

termination after the fact, id.; he did not remember Rankin 

speaking to the board about Theresa Johnson's paddling, id.; 

he did not recall Rankin speaking to the board at the 

January, 1985, meeting, id. at p. 285; he did not recall the 

board discussing during their January, 1985, executive 

committee meeting any comments that Rankin might have made 

relative to discipline problems at the school, id. at p. 285; 

Rankin's performance, both good and bad, was discussed during 

the March 4, 1985 meeting, ,.,id., p. 288; and that he did not 

make a private investigation of the eight or nine reasons 

given by Dr. Piguet for not retaining Rankin. Id. p. 290. 

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Donald Green, a board member who voted not to renew 

,., ~ ... ,Rank.in:' s :, "-contract testified, "inter· alia: he ·d-id not- remember 

Rankin attending board meetings and speaking out on 

discipline (R., Vol. VII at p. 315); it was possible that 

Rankin could have attended meetings which he did not 

remember, id.; discipline within the district was a subject 

of ~oncern for parents during January, 1985, but he did not 

recall Rankin speaking about discipline during the January, 

1985, board meeting, id. at p. 317; and that he knew of no 

instance where Dr. Piguet told patrons who were trying to 

speak about discipline to sit down and be quiet and not talk, 

id. 

Donald Doyle, a board member who voted to renew Rankin's 

contract testified, inter alia: Rankin had attended the 

board meetings and spoke on the problems of discipline (R., 

Vol. VII at p. 332); that the spanking of Theresa Johnson and 

others was a matter of concern in the community, id.; all the 

board members were concerned about Rankin speaking out on 

matters of discipline, id. at p. 342; Rankin's appearances 

at board meetings and statements about discipline were some 

of the things that irritated Dr. Piguet, id. at 348; Dr. 

Piguet never actually related that Rankin spoke too much or 

too often at meetings or any place else, id. at p. 352; the 

town, was factionalized over."the way. stuff .was handled at 

school," id; and that Rankin was not, to his knowledge, a 

member of any group or faction,· id. 

Edward Roberson, a board member who voted t0 renew 

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Appellate Case: 87-1751 Document: 01019785746 Date Filed: 06/02/1989 Page: 35 
Rankin's contract, testified, inter alia: he did not believe 

-that .. the, board .. had any. formal. or·"i·nformal. .custom or ·policies 

during September, 1985 - March, 1985 regarding the treatment 

of dissenters or people who disagreed with the actions of the 

board or administrators (R., Vol. VIII at p. 526); the board 

did discuss limiting how long a person could speak in view of 

the number of people attending the board meetings, id. at p. 

527; parents who attended the board meetings were allowed to 

speak even when they were not on the agenda, id. at p. 528; 

and that anyone who wanted to speak to the board whether 

parent, teacher, contractor or member of the public, was 

allowed to do so, id. at pp. 529-30. 

Patricia Jaynes, a teacher at the same school where 

Rankin was employed testified, inter alia: she was involved 

in an incident with Rankin during which he used a profanity 

(R., Vol. VII at p. 304); the incident was settled later 

during the same day and there were no hard feelings between 

them, id. at p. 305; she had seen Rankin at board meetings, 

id. at p. 307; she did not recall Rankin ever criticizing Dr. 

Piguet or any board members during a board meeting; she 

didn't recall Rankin ever standing up and criticizing any 

board policy at any board meeting; and that she didn't recall 

Rankin criticizing any teacher at any board meeting. 

Thus, my detailed_review of~the-record shows that the 

district court was correct in finding that there is a total 

failure of proof in this case as to exactly, or even 

approximately, what (constitutionally protected speech) was 

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Appellate Case: 87-1751 Document: 01019785746 Date Filed: 06/02/1989 Page: 36 
said, to whom, and under what conditions or that the speech 

. was .a: motivating .factor in,the-Board':s ,decision:. not to renew 

Rankin's employment contract. I would affirm the district 

court's grant of the defendants' motion for a directed 

verdict. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1751 Document: 01019785746 Date Filed: 06/02/1989 Page: 37