Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02016/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02016-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bufford McDonald
Appellant
George E. Sullivan
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OP APP.EALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

I 

FILED 

United Scat~ C·)urt of AppcRL'I 

·.rtm:-. Ci~ ---. ;~ 

BUFFORD MCDONALD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

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NOV 1 J 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. No. 89-2016 

GEORGE E. SULLIVAN 

Defendant-Appellee. 

(D. C. No. 87-1545-JC 

(D. N.M.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* NOV l ~/ 198'.7 

Before MOORE, BARRETT and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(1); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is t~erefore ord~red 

Appellant filed a prose complaint against the warden of the 

New Mexico State Penitentiary. The complaint was based upon a 

violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The District Court dismissed the 

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be 

for 

res 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-2016 Document: 01019961133 Date Filed: 11/13/1989 Page: 1 
complaint, sua sponte, finding that Appellant's claims did not 

rise to a violation of plaintiff's civil rights. 

Appellant's complaint, most liberally construed, alleges: 

(l} that the warden of the Penitentiary ordered Appellant, while 

an inmate, to participate in a theft by loading some razor wire 

into a pickup truck; (2) the warden informed the police at 

Appellant's new place of residence that Appellant was a "terrible 

child molester"; (3) the warden, after Appellant's release, 

intercepted Appellant's correspondence to an inmate; and (4) the 

warden, during ·Appellant's confinement, intercepted Appellant's 

letters to the Duran Consent Decree Lawyers regarding the "razor 

wire" incident and admonished the Appellant to "keep his mouth 

shut." 

It is axiomatic that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not create a 

remedy for every wrong committed under color of state law; only 

deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the 

United States are actionable. 

Looking first to the allegation that the warden ordered 

Appellant to load some razor wire into a truck (an act which he 

alleges worked a theft of government property), we find no 

infringement of an actionable right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Appellant does not allege that his participation in this activity 

violated any rights secured to him under the Constitution or the 

laws of the United States. The availability of the S 1983 remedy 

does not attach by assertion alone. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 

1333 (10th Cir. 1981}; Wells v. Ward, 470 F.2d 1185, 1188-89 (10th 

Cir. 1972). We therefore hold that Appellant's forced 

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participation in an activity that he believed to be a theft of 

government property, without more, fails to state a cause of 

action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. 

Looking next to the allegation regarding the warden notifying 

police that Appellant was a child molester, we likewise find the 

law clear that defamation by itself does not constitute a cause of 

action for deprivation of a constitutional right. McGhee v. 

Draper, 639 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1981). This court in McGhee held 

that stigmatization or reputation damage alone, no matter how 

. egregious; is not sufficient to support a cause of action under 42 

U.S.C. S 1983 .. Such damage is properly vindicated through state 

court actions. In order to justify relief under the liberty 

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution via S 1983, ·plaintiff's alleged reputational damage 

must be entangled with some other "tangible interests such as 

employment." Id. at 643; P~ul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-713 

(1976). The Appellant here has not identified a tangible interest 

thus affected by the alleged defamatory statements. We therefore 

hold that Appellant's allegation in this regard fails to state a 

cause of action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. 

Turning our attention to the allegation that Appellant's mail 

to an inmate in the Penitentiary was intercepted, we find the rule 

to be well established that the regulation of mail to and from a 

penal institution is essentially an administrative matter and the 

institut1on official's action in regard thereto is not subject to 

judicial review except under the most unusual circumstances. 

Evans v. Moseley, 455 F.2d 1084 (lO ~h Cir.), cert. denied, 409 

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Appellate Case: 89-2016 Document: 01019961133 Date Filed: 11/13/1989 Page: 3 
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U.S. 889 (1972); Wilkerson v. Warden, 465 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 

1972). We therefore hold that Appellant's allegations in this 

regard fail to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. 

Finally, however, the Appellant's last allegation may present 

an exception to the general rule of Evans v. Moseley and Wilkerson 

v. Warden. Both cases provide that a prisoner is entitled to 

correspond with his attorneys, or the courts, or appropriate state 

legal officials regarding the legality of his conviction or 

conditions of his incarceration. Evans, 455 F.2d at 1087. 

Appellant's assertions in this regard, liberally construed, may 

state a claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 sufficient to survive a 

motion to dismiss. 

Still, we find another reason to af~irm the trial court as to 

this last allegation. 

regarding his efforts 

Appellant has made no affirmative assertion 

to exhaust the administrative remedies 

available to him. We have previously held that the district 

courts may dismiss S 1983 petitions for failure to utilize 

administrative review or may order them referred to prison 

officials for an administrative review before the trial court 

considers them further. Brice v. Day, 604 F.2d 664, 668 (10th 

Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086 (1980). This requirement 

applies even where the petitioner seeks damages for alleged 

constitutional violations. Id. at 667. We therefore hold that 

the petition should have been dismissed for failure to allege 

exhaustion of administrative remedies. 

The decision of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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