Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01908/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01908-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe Aguilar
Defendant
Moses Jesus Duron
Plaintiff
Neal
Defendant
Kevin Yau
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOSES JESUS DURON,

Plaintiff,

v.

KEVIN YAU, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01908-YGR (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Moses Jesus Duron, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at San Quentin State 

Prison (“SQSP”), filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning

Defendants’ responses to his medical needs. His complaint is now before the Court for review 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Plaintiff names the following Defendants: Licensed Vocational Nurses Kevin Yau and 

Neal; and Registered Nurse Joe Aguilar. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which will be granted in 

a separate written Order. 

Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the claim are alleged to have occurred at 

SQSP which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

For the reasons outlined below, the complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND.

DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which 

are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se

pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 

Case 4:15-cv-01908-YGR Document 12 Filed 10/07/15 Page 1 of 6
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants responded inadequately to his medical 

needs by failing to provide him with methadone1for three days—from July 16, 2014 through July 

18, 2014. Dkt. 1 at 3. 

In support of his claim, Plaintiff asserts the following facts. On July 15, 2014, Defendant 

Yau informed Plaintiff that his “medication was expiring.” Id. Plaintiff claims that he “went 

without” it for the next three days; however, Defendant Yau “signed for [Plaintiff’s] methadone as 

if [Plaintiff] did in fact take it.” Id. Meanwhile, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Neal “saw 

[Plaintiff] at the main clinic for the next 3 days”—from July 16 through 18—”trying to refill 

[Plaintiff’s] medication because [he] was withdrawing without it.” Id. At 5:30 p.m. on July 18, 

2014, Defendant Aguilar contacted a physician “so [Plaintiff] could get [his] medication that 

night.” Id. Plaintiff claims that he suffered “withdrawal symptoms that were extreme from not 

having [his] medication that was prescribed for [him].” Id. He adds that “[i]n addition to being 

sick for three weeks after [his] lower back hasn’t been the same and [he is] in severe pain all the 

time.” Id. 

To prove that the response of prison officials to an inmate’s medical needs was 

constitutionally deficient, the inmate must establish (1) a serious medical need and (2) deliberate 

indifference to that need by jail officials. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th 

Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner 

faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable 

measures to abate it. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 844 (1994). 

 

1

Plaintiff claims his medication is “methodone,” which the incorrect spelling of his 

medication. Dkt. 1 at 3. The Court uses the correct spelling—methadone—in this Order.

Case 4:15-cv-01908-YGR Document 12 Filed 10/07/15 Page 2 of 6
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Here, as explained below, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted against any Defendant. Plaintiff must file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies 

discussed in this Order. 

First, the complaint does not include any allegation that suggests deliberate indifference to 

a “serious medical need” as defined under federal law. At most, Plaintiff’s claim—that 

Defendants failed to provide him with his medication for three days—amounts to negligence. It is 

well-established federal law that a claim of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to 

state a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (9th 

Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no merit in 

claims stemming from alleged delays in administering pain medication, treating broken nose and 

providing replacement crutch, because claims did not amount to more than negligence).

Negligence itself does not create a federal claim nor does is necessarily create a federal 

question. See Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997) (To state a 

claim arising under federal law, it must be clear from the face of Plaintiff’s well-pleaded 

complaint that there is a federal question.). Here, liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint as this 

Court is required to do, see Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), Plaintiff’s claims could

potentially state an Eighth Amendment violation if Plaintiff can sufficiently plead his allegations. 

As mentioned above, to state a claim for “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment, 

the Court must examine two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the 

nature of the defendant’s response to that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. At this time, 

Plaintiff’s current claim of negligence—stemming from a failure to provide methadone for three 

days—is insufficient to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at

1060-61.

Second, even if it did, Plaintiff has not provided the Court with the sufficient information 

necessary to determine whether an Eighth Amendment claim for relief has been stated against any

particular Defendant. A complaint that fails to state the specific acts of the defendant which 

violated the plaintiff’s rights fails to meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Hutchinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff 

Case 4:15-cv-01908-YGR Document 12 Filed 10/07/15 Page 3 of 6
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

claims that Defendant Yau, who was aware that Plaintiff’s medication was expiring on July 15, 

2014, falsely “signed for [Plaintiff’s] medication.” Dkt. 1 at 3. However, Plaintiff does not 

specify whether Defendant Yau made such a false report on just one day or on all three days that 

Plaintiff allegedly did not receive his medication. Even so, again, such a claim of an isolated 

incident of denial of Plaintiff’s medication amounts at most to negligence, which does not violate 

a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060-61; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1130. 

Next, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Neal examined Plaintiff during the three days he was without 

his medication and “tri[ed] to refill” it. Dkt. 1 at 3. Therefore, this action indicates that even 

though Defendant Yau filled out a false report that Plaintiff had taken his medication during those 

three days, Defendant Neal ignored such a report and still attempted to refill the expired 

prescription. Defendant Neal’s actions do not amount to deliberate indifference because they

show that he was helping Plaintiff by attempting to refill the prescription. Finally, Defendant 

Aguilar’s helpful actions—i.e., contacting a doctor to prescribe Plaintiff’s medication and giving

Plaintiff access to his medication on the night of July 18, 2014—are far from amounting to a claim 

for deliberate indifference to his medical needs.

“While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the ‘grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . 

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-56, (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint should 

be dismissed if it does not proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Id. at 570. However, district courts must afford pro se prisoner litigants an opportunity to 

amend to correct any deficiency in their complaints. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

As explained above, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable deliberate indifference claim 

against any of the named Defendants. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend to correct the 

aforementioned deficiencies, if he can do so in good faith. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff 

must establish legal liability of each person for the claimed violation of his rights. Plaintiff must 

Case 4:15-cv-01908-YGR Document 12 Filed 10/07/15 Page 4 of 6
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

write out a complete statement of his claim. The Court notes that Plaintiff has attached several 

grievances to his complaint apparently as a way to explain his problem. However, the Court will 

not read through exhibits to piece together a claim for a Plaintiff who has not pled one. It is 

Plaintiff’s obligation to write out a complete statement of his claim in his amended complaint. 

The Court reminds Plaintiff that liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 

section 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a 

federally protected right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City of 

Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives another of a constitutional 

right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 

affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes the 

deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633; see, e.g., Robins v. 

Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995) (prison official’s failure to intervene to prevent 

Eighth Amendment violation may be basis for liability). Sweeping conclusory allegations will not 

suffice. Plaintiff must instead “set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s”

deprivation of protected rights. Leer, 844 F.2d at 634. 

Lastly, the Court stresses to Plaintiff that negligence by any Defendant in responding to 

Plaintiff’s medical condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment 

rights. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060-61; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1130. 

Accordingly, the complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff will be 

provided with twenty-eight days in which to amend to correct the deficiencies in his complaint if 

he can do so in good faith, as directed below.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in order to give him the 

opportunity to amend to correct the aforementioned deficiencies of his deliberate indifference 

claim against Defendants, as indicated above. Plaintiff shall not allege only negligence by any 

Defendant in responding to his medical condition because such a claim does not violate a 

prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060-61; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1130. 

Case 4:15-cv-01908-YGR Document 12 Filed 10/07/15 Page 5 of 6
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

2. Within twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall file his 

Amended Complaint as set forth above. Plaintiff must use the attached civil rights form, write the 

case number for this action—Case No. C 15-1908 YGR (PR)—on the form, clearly label the 

complaint “Amended Complaint,” and complete all sections of the form. Because the Amended 

Complaint completely replaces the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he 

wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 

915 (1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. 

Plaintiff’s failure to file his Amended Complaint by the twenty-eight-day deadline or to 

correct the aforementioned deficiencies outlined above will result in the dismissal of this 

action without prejudice.

3. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 

while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 

address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 

directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and 

(2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 

se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

October 7, 2015

Case 4:15-cv-01908-YGR Document 12 Filed 10/07/15 Page 6 of 6