Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02975/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02975-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terry Brown
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 ___________

 No. 05-1745

 ___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Reginald Dinez Johnson, also known *

as Cedric Miller, *

*

Appellant. *

 ___________

Appeals from the United States

 No. 05-2056 District Court for the

 ___________ Eastern District of Missouri.

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Patricia Alexander-Butler, also known *

as Patricia Washington, *

*

Appellant. *

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
-2-

 ___________

 No. 05-2092

 ___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Carl Alexander, *

*

Appellant. *

 ___________

 No. 05-2975

 ___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Terry Brown, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 13, 2006

Filed: June 15, 2006

___________

Before WOLLMAN, FAGG, and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
1

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri. 

-3-

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal follows the convictions of Reginald Dinez Johnson, Patricia

Alexander-Butler, Carl Alexander, and Terry Brown. Johnson, Alexander, and Brown

were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and

phencyclidine (PCP) in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Alexander and

Alexander-Butler were convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 371. Alexander was also convicted of engaging in monetary transactions

in property derived from unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). 

The appellants raise overlapping issues. Johnson argues that the district court1

erred in admitting certain physical evidence and testimony. Alexander and Brown

argue that the evidence is insufficient to support their drug conspiracy convictions,

that a new trial is warranted based on newly discovered evidence, and that their

sentences violate their constitutional rights under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments.

Alexander-Butler and Alexander argue that the evidence is insufficient to support their

convictions. We affirm.

I. DRUG CONSPIRACY

We state the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. United States

v. Selwyn, 398 F.3d 1064, 1065 (8th Cir. 2005). In the 1990s, Edward Quentin

Anderson sold drugs in the St. Louis area. Around 1996, Anderson began buying

cocaine from Lester Diggs. When a cocaine drought hit St. Louis and prices

skyrocketed, Anderson and Diggs decided to buy drugs directly from suppliers in

California. At first, they bought marijuana and later, cocaine and PCP. 

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
-4-

In the beginning of this cross-country relationship, Diggs and Anderson tried

different methods of transporting the drugs from California to St. Louis. Eventually,

they purchased a truck with two gas tanks, one of which was outfitted with a false

tank. Diggs and Anderson hired a white driver and followed him in a second vehicle.

This chase vehicle served two purposes: it accompanied the vehicle that contained

money on the way to California and drugs on the return trip to St. Louis, and it served

as a decoy for law enforcement. Anderson testified that he did not trust the couriers

with the large quantities of drugs or sums of money and that it was more likely that

the police would stop the three or four black men in the chase vehicle than the white

driver. 

 Over the course of the next seven or eight years, Anderson purchased several

different vehicles with false tanks or hidden compartments and hired various white

men to transport the drugs. Anderson, Brown, Diggs, Johnson, and others drove the

chase vehicle, usually a van with tinted windows. Anderson testified that the group

made numerous trips to California and a few trips to Texas to purchase drugs and

transport them back to St. Louis.

On at least two occasions, Alexander traveled with his codefendants to purchase

drugs. In 1996 or 1997, Alexander, Anderson, and Erica Bass flew to Los Angeles

to purchase cocaine. Although most of the purchase money was concealed in the

transport truck’s false tank, Alexander carried $10,000 on the plane. After arriving

in California, the group purchased cocaine. Alexander purchased half of a kilogram

using his $10,000. A hired driver transported the cocaine, including Alexander’s

portion, to St. Louis. On another trip, Anderson, Johnson, Alexander, Diggs, and a

few others flew to Houston to buy cocaine. Although the group was unable to

purchase the drugs from the intended source, Alexander found a different source and

purchased half of a kilogram of cocaine. He returned to their shared hotel room,

packaged the cocaine, and returned to St. Louis on a commercial flight, carrying the

drugs with him.

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
-5-

The conspiracy experienced general success until a Kansas deputy sheriff

stopped Jason Miller, a drug courier, for speeding. Miller gave consent to search the

vehicle, and the deputy found six kilograms of cocaine. Miller advised the deputy that

he was en route to deliver the drugs. The deputy then contacted the FBI, which

arranged a controlled delivery of the cocaine to take place in a parking lot at the

DePaul Health Center in St. Louis. On December 11, 2001, Anderson, Johnson, and

two other men were arrested at the scene and taken to the Jennings Municipal Jail. At

the time of the arrest, Johnson identified himself as Cedric Miller.

Johnson was searched either at the scene or at the Jennings Municipal Jail, and

the items found on his person were placed in a plastic bag. FBI Agent Henry Vera

testified that the bag contained the following items: an Illinois identification card

bearing a picture of Johnson and the name of Cedric Miller, a cellular telephone, a

pager, and loose slips of paper containing incriminating information. The FBI

transferred the bag containing Johnson’s personal property to the Jennings Police

Department. After booking Johnson, the police returned the bag to the FBI. Agent

Vera testified that he participated in the investigation of Johnson’s personal property

on December 11 or 12, 2001, and that the accompanying report was transcribed on

December 16, 2001. 

Following the arrests at the hospital, the group did not sell cocaine for several

months. Because they experienced several financial losses, the group decided to sell

PCP, which could be purchased at a price less than cocaine and sold for a similar

profit. They bought the drugs in California and used the same method of transporting

PCP as they had cocaine. 

In February 2004, a Kansas trooper stopped one of their PCP couriers and

found $28,000 in a secret compartment. The driver told the trooper that three men,

including Diggs, were following him in the chase vehicle. When the chase vehicle

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
-6-

was stopped and its occupants arrested, Diggs provided an Illinois identification card

in the name of Stephen Boyd. 

On August 19, 2004, Johnson, Alexander, Brown, Anderson, Diggs, Bass, and

ten others were charged in a superseding indictment for their role in the drug

conspiracy. Only Johnson, Alexander, and Brown proceeded to trial on Count I,

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and PCP. 

A. Reginald Dinez Johnson

At trial, the government offered into evidence the identification card in the

name of Cedric Miller, the loose pieces of paper, the cellular phone, and the pager.

The district court admitted these items as having been lawfully obtained during a

search and inventory incident to a lawful arrest. Johnson does not contest the

lawfulness of his arrest, but argues that the warrantless search of his personal property

violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree. 

We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo. United States v. Adams,

401 F.3d 886, 893 (8th Cir. 2005). “‘[We] review the underlying factual

determinations for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences of the district court

and law enforcement officials.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d

1077, 1083 (8th Cir. 2003)). 

Had the FBI retained Johnson’s personal property throughout its investigation

or had the report been transcribed on the date of investigation, there is little question

that the evidence in question would have been admissible. The Supreme Court has

noted that:

[O]nce the accused is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in

his possession at the place of detention that were subject to search at the

time and place of his arrest may lawfully be searched and seized without

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
-7-

a warrant even though a substantial period of time has elapsed between

the arrest and subsequent administrative processing, on the one hand, and

the taking of property for use as evidence, on the other. This is true

where the clothing or effects are immediately seized upon arrival at the

jail, held under the defendant’s name in the “property room” of the jail,

and at a later time searched and taken for use at the subsequent criminal

trial. 

 

United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974). As stated above, Johnson’s

property was seized by the FBI, turned over to local authorities, returned to the FBI,

and then searched. Although Johnson relies heavily on the date of transcription,

December 16, Agent Vera testified that he investigated the items on December 11 or

12, 2001, after receiving them from the local authorities. Although a period of time

elapsed between the arrest and the subsequent search of Johnson’s property, we

conclude that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See United

States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869, 874-75 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that the local

authority’s seizure of items shortly after the defendant was arrested and the FBI’s

search of those items the following day was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).

See also United States v. Phillips, 607 F.2d 808, 809-10 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that

a delayed search was reasonable); United States v. Swofford, 529 F.2d 119, 122-23

(8th Cir. 1976) (same). 

Johnson further argues that the district court erred in admitting FBI Agent

George Roberts’s testimony regarding the issuance date of the Illinois identification

cards seized from Johnson and Diggs upon their arrests. Johnson carried an

identification card in the name of Cedric Miller, and Diggs carried one in the name of

Stephen Boyd. Agent Roberts testified that the Illinois Secretary of State’s records

reflected that the two cards had been issued on the same day. 

Johnson argues that Agent Roberts’s testimony was prejudicial and

impermissible hearsay and that the admission of such testimony violated his Sixth

Amendment right of confrontation. Because defense counsel did not object at trial,

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
2

Johnson argues that we should review for abuse of discretion because defense

counsel objected to the testimony at trial. A close review of the transcript shows that

counsel did not object to Agent Roberts’s comparison of the dates, but to the potential

hearsay testimony regarding the conversation between the investigator at the Illinois

Secretary of State’s Office and Agent Roberts. “We have repeatedly held that

objections must be specific and that otherwise we will review evidentiary rulings only

for plain error.” United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 1017, 1023 (8th Cir. 2005). In any

event, any error in admitting the testimony was harmless in light of the government’s

other evidence against Johnson. 

-8-

we review for plain error.2

 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Under

the plain error rule, an error may be corrected if it is plain, affects the substantial

rights of a defendant, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of judicial proceedings. Id. Johnson, Diggs, and Anderson testified that Johnson and

Diggs procured their false identification cards on the same day and with Anderson’s

help. Agent Roberts’s testimony was thus merely cumulative and did not substantially

affect Johnson’s rights. Accordingly, Johnson is not entitled to plain error relief. 

B. Carl Alexander and Terry Brown

Alexander and Brown assert that the evidence is insufficient to support their

convictions of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine

and PCP. We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v.

Alexander, 408 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 2005). We view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict, “‘resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the

government, and accepting all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that

support the jury’s verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788, 792

(8th Cir. 2003)). We reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found the

defendants guilty. Id.

To establish that Alexander and Brown conspired to distribute cocaine and PCP,

the government must prove: (1) that there was a conspiracy, an agreement to distribute

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
-9-

cocaine and PCP; (2) that the defendants knew of the conspiracy; and (3) that the

defendants intentionally joined the conspiracy. Id. (citing Espino, 317 F.3d at 792).

A conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence; it need not be proved by

direct evidence. Id. 

Alexander and Brown argue that they were merely present and that they neither

knew of the conspiracy nor took part in it. We conclude that the evidence supports

their convictions and that both Brown and Alexander contributed to the conspiracy’s

success.

For his part, Brown often drove or rode with his codefendants in the chase

vehicle. Anderson, Diggs, Bass, and the couriers testified that Brown served in that

capacity for the transport of cocaine and PCP. Miller also testified that, after his first

trip from California to St. Louis, he returned the vehicle and the drugs to Anderson’s

house. After the drugs were taken out of the false compartment, Brown drove Miller

home. From this evidence, we conclude that a jury could reasonably find that Brown

knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy. 

Similarly, the evidence is sufficient to support Alexander’s conviction.

According to the testimony of Anderson and Bass, Alexander accompanied them to

California and Texas to purchase drugs. Alexander argues that the testimony of his

codefendants was unreliable and that he was either merely present or an independent

actor. The jury, however, found Alexander’s codefendants’ testimony credible, and

“[w]e give significant weight to the jury’s credibility determination.” Alexander, 408

F.3d at 1008. From the evidence presented, a jury could reasonably deduce that

Alexander knew of, and intentionally joined, the conspiracy. 

Alexander and Brown next argue that the district court erred in denying their

motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We review the district

court’s denial of such motions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dittrich, 204

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
-10-

F.3d 819, 821 (8th Cir. 2000). A new trial will be granted only if the following five

elements are met: 

(1) the evidence must have been discovered after the trial; (2) the failure to

discover must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the

movant; (3) the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the

evidence must be material; and (5) the evidence must be likely to produce an

acquittal if a new trial is granted. 

Id. (quoting United States v. Ryan, 153 F.3d 708, 713 (8th Cir. 1998)).

Alexander and Brown based their motion on an alleged conversation that took

place between Brown and Donald Fults, a drug courier. At trial, Fults testified that

Brown and Alexander were members of the conspiracy. In their post trial motions for

a new trial, Brown and Alexander alleged that Fults apologized for testifying against

Brown and that Fults said that Anderson paid him to testify. Before denying their

motions, the district court heard arguments and the testimony of Fults and Corey

Williams, an inmate who testified that he had overheard the conversation. Fults

denied making the apology and the accompanying statement. 

At best, this evidence would serve only to impeach Fults’s testimony.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Alexander’s and Brown’s motions for a new trial.

Finally, Alexander and Brown raise two constitutional issues. First, they argue

that their Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the district court found that

they each had one prior felony drug conviction, triggering the mandatory minimum

sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Alexander

and Brown invite us to address the constitutionality of utilizing prior convictions to

enhance sentences. After the district court handed down their sentences, however, the

law in our Circuit became clear: The fact of a prior conviction is a sentencing factor

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
3

At the time of the transaction, Patricia Alexander-Butler’s name was Patricia

Washington. For consistency, we will use Alexander-Butler throughout this opinion.

-11-

for the court to decide, not a fact issue for the jury. E.g. United States v. Gamboa, 439

F.3d 796, 814-15 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that Almendarez-Torres v. United States,

523 U.S. 224 (1998), is still good law); United States v. Levering, 431 F.3d 289, 295

(8th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Carillo-Beltran, 424 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir.

2005) (same). Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the

defendants’ prior convictions triggered the statutory mandatory minimum sentence.

Alexander and Brown also argue that their sentences are so disproportionate to

the offense of conviction that they rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.

Lengthy the sentences may be, but “[w]e have held that mandatory minimum penalties

for drug offenses do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and

unusual punishment.” United States v. Baker, 415 F.3d 880, 882 (8th Cir. 2005)

(quoting United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 679 (8th Cir. 2003)). We thus reject

the appellants’ constitutional challenges. 

II. WIRE FRAUD CONSPIRACY AND MONEY LAUNDERING

Anderson operated a construction business in St. Louis. In 2001, Diggs told

Alexander about a house that Anderson was building and that Alexander could buy

the house without providing a down payment. Alexander wanted to buy it, but

because of his criminal history he could not secure a loan to pay for the $269,000

house. He persuaded his mother, Alexander-Butler,3

 to apply for a loan to finance the

house. To facilitate the sale, Anderson provided the down payment and closing costs,

and Alexander promised to give Anderson $10,000, a Mercedes-Benz, and a Hummer.

Alexander-Butler agreed to apply for the loan so that Alexander and his family

could live in the Anderson-built house. The signed loan application stated that

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
-12-

Alexander-Butler earned $7000 per month and had $80,000 in savings. According to

her tax returns, her business experienced a net loss in 1999 and 2000 and a small net

profit in 2001, and she received about $500 from a pension fund. Her bank statements

showed that she did not have more than a few hundred dollars in savings during the

relevant period. Because she applied for a stated loan, carrying a higher interest rate,

Alexander-Butler did not have to provide specific proof of income, and she was

approved for a $215,000 loan. In this process, several faxes were exchanged between

the real estate agent and the mortgage broker and the mortgage broker and the lender.

 

To show that he had received the down payment from the buyer, Anderson went

to his bank and purchased a $20,000 cashier’s check payable to Anderson from

Patricia Alexander-Butler. He redeposited that money into his account and gave the

receipt to his real estate agent who, in turn, presented it to the mortgage broker.

Because the down payment cost more than Anderson had available to him, he repeated

the process with a $15,000 cashier’s check. 

On the day of the closing, Anderson, Alexander, Alexander-Butler, the real

estate agent, and the escrow closing officer gathered at the Commonwealth Title

Company. Anderson testified that his real estate agent informed him that an

additional $18,000 would be needed, so Anderson and Alexander left the closing to

obtain a third cashier’s check from Anderson’s account. While they were gone,

Alexander-Butler changed her mind about signing the documents. To persuade her

to sign, Alexander had a private conversation with her, and Anderson offered her

$7500. Alexander-Butler eventually signed the documents and closed on the house.

Alexander gave Anderson the Mercedes-Benz and moved into the house with his

family. Anderson spent the proceeds from the sale to pay Alexander-Butler $7500,

to pay back loans, and to buy drugs. 

On August 19, 2004, Alexander-Butler and Alexander were charged with

conspiracy to commit wire fraud and engaging in monetary transactions in property

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
-13-

derived from unlawful activity. Alexander-Butler was convicted of the first offense,

and Alexander was convicted of both. 

A. Patricia Alexander-Butler and Carl Alexander

Alexander-Butler and Alexander challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to

convict them of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. As stated above, we review de novo

the sufficiency of the evidence and view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences. 

To prove conspiracy to commit wire fraud, the government must show (1) that

there was a conspiracy, an agreement to commit wire fraud, (2) that Alexander and

Alexander-Butler knew of the agreement, and (3) that they intentionally joined in the

conspiracy. See United States v. Wintermute, 443 F.3d 993, 1003 (8th Cir. 2006).

Alexander’s and Alexander-Butler’s wire fraud conviction required that the

government prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that they joined a scheme to defraud,

(2) that they intended to defraud, (3) that it was reasonably foreseeable that interstate

wire communications would be used, and (4) that the wires were, in fact, used. United

States v. Slaughter, 128 F.3d 623, 628 (8th Cir. 1997).

Upon review of the evidence, “resolving all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the

government,” United States v. Gomez, 165 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1999), we

conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Alexander and AlexanderButler of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Alexander-Butler applied for a loan to

purchase a house for Alexander because he could not obtain a loan. The evidence

showed that each of the alleged conspirators benefitted from this arrangement:

Alexander-Butler received $7500 from Anderson, Alexander moved into the house

with his family, and Anderson liquidated his assets. Although Alexander-Butler

testified that she never told the loan officer that she made $7000 per month or that she

had $80,000 in savings, the government presented signed loan documents listing this

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874
-14-

false information. Those documents were faxed to the lender, and the information

included therein caused the lender to loan Alexander-Butler the money. Alexander

persuaded his mother to sign the documents, attended the closing, promised to give

Anderson vehicles and cash for the down payment, and moved into the house. Based

on the foregoing evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude that Alexander-Butler

and Alexander joined in a conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

B. Carl Alexander

Alexander argues in his pro se supplemental brief that the evidence was

insufficient to convict him of engaging in monetary transactions derived from

specified unlawful activity. We disagree. A conviction under § 1957 requires a

showing (1) that the defendant knowingly engaged in a monetary transaction, (2) that

the defendant knew the property involved derived from specified unlawful activity,

and (3) that the property was of a value greater than $10,000. United States v. Pizano,

421 F.3d 707, 722 (8th Cir. 2005). The same evidence that supports his conspiracy

to commit wire fraud conviction supports this conviction. Accordingly, we affirm his

conviction.

Having reviewed the statute of limitations argument raised in Alexander’s pro

se supplemental brief, we conclude that it is without merit and warrants no further

discussion.

CONCLUSION

The convictions and challenged sentences are affirmed. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-2975 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/15/2006 Entry ID: 2056874