Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01221/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01221-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marcos Anthony Gonzalez
Plaintiff
State of California
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCOS ANTHONY GONZALEZ, 

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.

No. 1:15-cv-01221---BAM

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

(Doc. 7)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Marcos Anthony Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On October 27, 2015, the Court 

dismissed Plaintiff’s first amended complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff’s second amended 

complaint, filed on November 9, 2015, is currently before the Court for screening. 

A. Screening Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must dismiss a case if at any time the Court 

determines that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In 

determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court applies the same pleading 

standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 

Case 1:15-cv-01221-BAM Document 8 Filed 11/16/15 Page 1 of 5
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a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)).

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

“[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . 

‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as true all 

factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions 

as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges as follows:

On or about 8/25/2009 at 10:55 P.M. Marcos Anthony Gonzalez was taken out of 

his cell then took off all his clothes and gave him a smock to wear they kept him 

in a [safety] cell for about 4 days on the fourth day Sherriff [sic] Monica Walker 

and Deputy Elizaldi came to[] Marcos Anthony Gonzalez’s cell and ordered him 

to[] take a shower when Marcos Anthony Gonzalez told Monica Walker and 

Deputy Elizadi he didn’t want to[] the two sheriffs called for Back up after 

Deputy Elizaldi struck Marcos Anthony Gonzalez in the head with a expandble 

[sic] batton [sic] and Monica Walker taze him 3 three times on the Back then 

Deputy Hinojas Joel Puckett Silva Brian join in on the [assault] then prisoner 

Marcos Anthony Gonzalez was taken to[] [Kaweah] Delta Hospital. 

(Doc. 7 at 1-2.)

DISCUSSION

A. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See 

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Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] 

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to 

perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint 

is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “Deputy Hinojas Joel Puckett 

Silva Brian join in on the [assault].” This allegation is conclusory and fails to specifically allege 

what each individual defendant did or did not do that resulted in a violation of his constitutional 

rights. It is not clear from the allegations what Plaintiff means by joining in on the assault. In 

other words, Plaintiff does not specify how these defendants were involved in the alleged assault. 

Additionally, Plaintiff fails to clearly identify the defendants allegedly joining in on the 

assault. Specifically, the Court cannot determine whether “Deputy Hinojas Joel Puckett Silva 

Brian” refers to three, four or some other number of defendants. If Plaintiff amends his claims, 

he must clearly identify the defendants and allege what they did or did not do that violated his 

rights. 

B. Excessive Force

It is not clear from Plaintiff’s complaint if he was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner 

at the time of the alleged constitutional violations by employees of the Tulare County Sheriff’s 

Department. 

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

convicted prisoners. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). For 

Eighth Amendment claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the issue is “whether 

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (per 

curiam) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992)); 

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013). The objective component of an Eighth 

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Amendment claim is contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency, Hudson, 

503 U.S. at 8 (quotation marks and citation omitted), and although de minimis uses of force do 

not violate the Constitution, the malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates 

contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident, 

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-8, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10) (quotation marks 

omitted); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002).

By contrast, it is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that protects 

pretrial detainees from the use of excessive force which amounts to punishment, Gibson v. 

County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 395 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)), and the Fourth Amendment sets 

the applicable constitutional limitations for considering such claims, Lolli v. County of Orange, 

351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1198) (quotation marks omitted). 

In resolving claims of excessive force brought by pretrial detainees, the Fourth Amendment’s 

objective reasonableness standard applies. Lolli, 351 F.3d at 415. The inquiry is whether 

Defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances 

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Id. (citing Graham, 490 

U.S. at 397) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff may be able to state an excessive force claim against certain defendants, 

including Monica Walker and Deputy Elizaldi. However, Plaintiff does not specify whether or 

not he was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner at the time of the incident. Further, Plaintiff 

may be able to state an excessive force claim against “Deputy Hinojas Joel Puckett Silva Brian.” 

However, as discussed above, it is unclear whether this string of names refers to three, four or 

some other number of defendants. 

Plaintiff will be given a final opportunity to amend his claims. If Plaintiff elects to amend 

his complaint, he should recite the facts giving rise to this action and specify whether he was a 

pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner at the time of the alleged incident. He also should clearly 

identify each defendant and allege what they did or did not do that resulted in an asserted 

violation of his constitutional rights. 

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint 

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). However, it 

appears that Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to cure the identified deficiencies. 

Therefore, the Court will grant him an additional opportunity to amend his complaint. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted; 

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a 

third amended complaint; and 

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will dismiss this action 

for failure to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 13, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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