Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-05448/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-05448-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alonso
Defendant
Antonio Cortez Buckley
Plaintiff
Copeland
Defendant
County of San Mateo
Defendant
Criado
Defendant
Echano
Defendant
Justice
Defendant
Michael
Defendant
Moody
Defendant
Greg Munks
Defendant
Tapia
Defendant

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTONIO CORTEZ BUCKLEY,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, ET AL., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 14-cv-05448-YGR 

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND 

MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT;

SETTING INITIAL CASE MANAGEMENT 

CONFERENCE; REFERRING PARTIES TO 

MAGISTRATE FOR SETTLEMENT 

Re: Dkt. No. 30 

Plaintiff Antonio Cortez Buckley brings this civil action against defendants County of San 

Mateo, Sheriff Greg Munks, and Deputies Justice, Michael, Echano, Tapia, Moody, Alonso, 

Copeland, and Criado (collectively, “defendants”) for claims arising from incidents occurring at 

the Maguire Correctional Facility. Plaintiff in a pro se capacity alleges three claims under 42 

U.S.C. section 1983 against defendants, specifically for (1) retaliation, (2) excessive force, and (3) 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 

Defendants County of San Mateo, Sheriff Munks, and Deputy Criado filed a motion to 

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to 

state a claim against them. (Dkt. No. 30, “Mtn.”) Defendants also move under Rule 12(e) for a 

more definite statement with respect to plaintiff’s excessive force claim. (Id.) 

Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, and for 

the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART the motion to dismiss WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND, and DENIES the motion for a more definite statement.1 

 1

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court 

determined this motion suitable for decision without oral argument. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was in custody at the Maguire Correctional Facility in San Mateo County, 

California, from November 20, 2013, through March 12, 2014. (See Dkt. No. 30, “FAC.”) The 

Court recounts the salient allegations in the FAC as follows: 

Plaintiff was first taken into custody on November 20, 2013, when his bail was revoked in 

an underlying criminal assault case. (FAC at 6:7-8.) Deputies (non-parties to this action) took 

plaintiff into custody and would not allow him to retain religious clothing,2 confiscating the 

clothing from plaintiff and calling him religious slurs. (FAC at 6:15-22.) One of the non-party 

deputies was Sergeant Justice, brother of defendant Deputy Justice. Plaintiff filed an inmate 

grievance against the non-party deputies on December 3, 2013, recounting their allegedly 

discriminatory behavior. (FAC at 6:22-25, Exh. A at 20.) In response to that grievance, a 

supervisor and watch commander denied plaintiff’s allegations and concluded that plaintiff’s 

grievance had no merit. (FAC, Exh. A at 20.) Plaintiff then filed a grievance appeal letter on 

December 13, 2013. (Id. at 22.) Captain Mark Hanlon’s response to the grievance appeal again 

denied any wrongdoing by the non-party deputies. (Id. at 21.) 

On February 28, 2014, seven of the deputy defendants3 – all but Criado – allegedly 

retaliated against plaintiff for filing the grievance against defendant Deputy Justice’s brother. The 

incident began at 11:00 p.m. when Deputy Justice appeared at plaintiff’s cell door and advised 

plaintiff that he was being placed in administrative segregation. (FAC at 7:16-22.) Plaintiff 

alleges there was no valid reason for his placement in administrative segregation, and that he was 

moved in retaliation for the grievance filed against Sergeant Justice. (Id. at 10:7-12.) 

After being escorted to administrative segregation, plaintiff was ordered to remove his 

clothing to wear a suicide jacket. (Id. at 8:3-7.) While plaintiff attempted to put on the suicide 

jacket, the seven present deputy defendants ran into his cell and pulled him to the cell floor, 

 2

 Plaintiff is an Orthodox Jew and wears a kippah (a brimless cap) and tallit katan (a 

fringed garment). 

3

 For clarity, the defendant deputies whom plaintiff alleges were involved in the retaliation 

incident were deputies: Justice, Michael, Echano, Tapia, Moody, Alonso, and Copeland. 

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holding his arms, legs, and neck. (Id. at 8:8-18.) The seven deputy defendants then jumped on 

plaintiff’s arms and legs with their knees, and bent plaintiff’s fingers back until his left index and 

middle fingers broke. (Id. at 8:20-28.) Plaintiff did not resist, but at that point he yelled out from 

the pain of his fingers breaking. (Id. at 8:28-9:1.) 

As Deputy Justice sat on plaintiff’s back, he told plaintiff: “Here is what is going to 

happen. You are going to stop complaining and disrespecting staff.” (Id. at 9:2-5) (original 

punctuation omitted.) At that point, Deputy Justice told plaintiff that he was Sergeant Justice’s 

brother, and called plaintiff a religious and racial slur. (Id. at 9:5-7) The seven defendant deputies 

then ceased restraining plaintiff and walked out of his cell. (Id. at 9:8-12.) Before leaving, 

Deputy Justice instructed plaintiff to pretend as though the incident did not occur. (Id. at 9:12-14.) 

Late in the evening of February 28, 2014, plaintiff activated the emergency intercom in his 

cell and pleaded for medical assistance for his broken fingers and injured lower back. (Id. at 9:24-

28.) The seven deputy defendants did not respond to plaintiff’s pleas. (Id. at 10:1-4.) Plaintiff 

did not receive any medical care for his broken fingers or back pain that evening. (Id. at 10:20-

25.) Plaintiff then began a four-day hunger strike in an attempt to be seen by medical staff. (Id.) 

In the early morning hours of March 5, 2014, plaintiff advised defendant Deputy Criado 

that he was unable to get out of bed as a result of the injuries caused by the incident involving the 

seven other deputy defendants. (Id. at 12:1-9). Deputy Criado responded by admonishing 

plaintiff for disrespecting staff members, and also claimed that he did not believe plaintiff was in 

fact injured. (Id. at 12:13-16.) Deputy Criado also warned plaintiff that his hunger strike was 

futile. (Id. at 12:17-21.) Deputy Criado did not document plaintiff’s injuries or submit a request 

for plaintiff to see medical personnel. (Id. at 12:24-28.) Instead, Deputy Criado filed an allegedly 

unsubstantiated rule violation report against plaintiff. (Id. at 12:21-24.) 

Later in the afternoon of March 5, 2014, plaintiff was visited by his girlfriend Dena 

Balsley. (Id. at 13:1-3.) Plaintiff showed Ms. Balsley his injuries from the February 28, 2014 

incident and Ms. Balsley approached an unidentified female deputy in the jail lobby to demand 

that plaintiff receive medical treatment. (Id. at 13:9-12.) Again, no treatment was provided. (Id. 

at 13:12-15.) Plaintiff’s injuries went untreated until March 11, 2015. (Id. at 13:23-28.) 

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On March 10, 2014, a court in Redwood City, California, ordered the San Mateo Sheriff’s 

office to provide medical treatment to plaintiff. (Id. at 13:16-23.) The next day, plaintiff received 

two pain shots for his broken fingers and dislocated lumber spine. (Id. at 13:23-28.) One day 

later, on March 12, 2014, plaintiff was released from custody and sent by ambulance to Kaiser 

Permanente hospital in Redwood City. (Id. at 14:3-6.) The hospital x-rayed plaintiff’s left hand, 

confirming his middle and index fingers were broken, and an x-ray of his lower back confirmed 

his vertebrae were dislocated. (Id. at 14:8-13.) On March 19, 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint 

form with the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office against the seven deputy defendants for their 

respective roles in the February 28, 2014 incident. (FAC, Exh. A at 17-19.) On March 31, 2014, 

plaintiff filed a separate complaint form against Deputy Criado for his failure to take plaintiff to 

receive medical treatment for his injuries. (FAC, Exh. B at 24-27.) 

 Plaintiff instituted this action against defendants on December 15, 2014. (Dkt. No. 1.) 

Following defendants’ original motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 17) plaintiff sought and was granted 

leave to amend his complaint (Dkt. Nos. 23, 25). The operative FAC was filed on April 13, 2015, 

seeking monetary damages for defendants’ violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, alleging 

claims for: (1) retaliation; (2) excessive force; and (3) deliberate indifference to his serious 

medical needs. Defendants now move to dismiss the claims against defendants County of San 

Mateo, Sheriff Munks, and Deputy Criado for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and for 

a more definite statement regarding plaintiff’s excessive force claim under Rule 12(e). 

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in 

the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). “Dismissal can be 

based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. Johnson v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011). To survive a 

motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This “facial plausibility” standard requires 

the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of 

specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547, 555.

In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 

court must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences 

in the plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 

F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 

If the Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. 

The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Claims Against the County Defendant 

The County moves to dismiss the claims against it under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that it 

cannot be held vicariously liable for actions of its employees who caused constitutional violations. 

Under Section 1983, a defendant is only liable where it “does an affirmative act, participates in 

another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes

the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 

1988) (emphasis in original) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). A 

local government, therefore, “cannot be held liable [under Section 1983] solely because it employs 

a tortfeasor,” and can have liability under Section 1983 for its employees’ actions only where an 

“action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Monell 

v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original). 

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Plaintiff’s theory of liability against the County is that it “is responsible for all of the 

cowardly lawless defendants because the [deputy defendants] are employees of the San Mateo 

County Sheriff Department.” (FAC at 14:13-19.) The County contends that this theory of liability 

is not cognizable. The Court agrees. Plaintiff cannot recover against the County merely because it 

employed the individual defendants. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 

In his opposition papers, plaintiff includes additional theories under which he seeks to 

recover against the County, including new claims of First Amendment violations resulting from 

the County’s policy on religious clothing for inmates. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, the 

Court “may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers” to determine whether 

plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim. Schneider v. California Dept. of Corrections, 151 

F.3d 1194, 1197 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1988). Looking only to the FAC and its attendant exhibits, the 

Court finds that plaintiff has not yet stated a cognizable claim against the County itself. 

The County’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

C. Claims Against Defendant Sheriff Munks 

Sheriff Munks similarly moves for dismissal, contending he cannot be held vicariously 

liable for the acts of the deputy defendants merely because he is their supervisor. “A supervisor is 

only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or 

directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). In that regard, plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Munks failed to 

train the deputy defendants properly. (FAC at 14:19-22.) To state a claim for insufficient 

training, plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that Sheriff Munks “disregarded the known 

or obvious consequence that a particular omission in their training program would cause [the 

deputy defendants] to violate citizens’ constitutional rights.” Flores v. County of Los Angeles, 758 

F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014). 

The FAC does not allege any facts to support a claim that Sheriff Munks’ failure to train 

the deputy defendants properly would amount to a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Again, plaintiff’s opposition includes additional facts to support his claim for failure to train, as 

well as additional theories under which he seeks to recover against Sheriff Munks. Again, these 

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new allegations are not properly before the Court. Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197. The only 

relevant allegation against Sheriff Munks is the conclusory statement that he “fail[ed] to properly 

train and superv[ise] the defendants.” (FAC at 14:21-22.) This allegation, without more, is 

insufficient to state a claim for failure to train. See Flores, 758 F.3d at 1159. 

The Sheriff’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

D. Claims Against Defendant Deputy Criado 

Deputy Criado moves to dismiss the single claim against him for deliberate indifference to 

plaintiff’s serious medical needs. A claim for deliberate indifference arising out of inadequate 

medical care includes two elements: (1) that the defendant was deliberately indifferent (2) to 

plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To be deliberately 

indifferent, the defendant must have actually been “aware of the risk” to plaintiff’s health and 

safety. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Deputy Criado argues that the FAC does not allege any facts tending to show that he was 

aware of plaintiff’s injuries, or that he knew the injuries created a risk to plaintiff’s health. Even a 

cursory reading of the FAC belies defendant’s argument. The FAC alleges, in detail, plaintiff’s 

interaction with Deputy Criado. Indeed, plaintiff specifically states that Deputy Criado “attempted 

to cover-up plaintiff Buckley’s serious injuries by deliberately failing to document plaintiff 

Buckley’s urgent medical request.” (FAC at 12:24-28.) In light of the FAC as a whole, deputy 

Criado’s argument that the FAC admits he did not have the requisite knowledge because he said 

there was “nothing wrong” with plaintiff, is disingenuous at best. 

The Court finds that the FAC contains sufficient allegations of deliberate indifference to 

put Deputy Criado on notice of plaintiff’s basis for the claim. The motion to dismiss Deputy 

Criado is DENIED. 

III. MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Defendants move for a more definite statement on the claim for excessive force because, 

they claim, plaintiff has not made clear whether he was pre-conviction or post-conviction at the 

time of the alleged violation. Without this clarification, defendants argue they are left unable to 

respond properly to the allegations because “there are distinct legal theories that govern a claim of 

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excessive forced based on [plaintiff’s] status as a pre or post-conviction.” (Mtn. at 8:4-5.) 

Rule 12(e) allows a party to move for a more definite statement before filing a responsive 

pleading where the original pleading “is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be 

required to frame a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). “Rule 12(e) motions are 

disfavored and rarely granted.” Castaneda v. Burger King Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1045 

(N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Cellars v. Pac. Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 

1999)). “The rule is aimed at unintelligibility rather than lack of detail and is only appropriate 

when the defendants cannot understand the substance of the claim asserted.” Id. (citing Beery v. 

Hitachi Home Elecs., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 477, 480 (C.D. Cal. 1993)). “If the detail sought by a 

motion for a more definite statement is obtainable through discovery, the motion should be 

denied.” Griffin v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 817 F.Supp.2d 1152, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting 

Castaneda, 597 F.Supp.2d at 1045). 

An order requiring a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) is not appropriate here. The 

FAC is not so vague that defendants cannot ascertain the nature of the claim, especially given the 

pro se status of plaintiff. Indeed, defendants understand the complaint to allege excessive force 

while plaintiff was in custody. The more specific detail they seek is easily obtainable through 

discovery.4 Moreover, defendants appear to bring their motion under Rule 12(e) in anticipation of 

filing a motion to dismiss, but Rule 12(e) is designed to enable defendants to answer, not move for 

dismissal. Jones v. Kreminski, 404 F.Supp.667, 668 (D.Conn. 1975) (“[t]he majority of cases 

have held that it is improper to use a 12(e) motion to prepare for a motion to dismiss.”). 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND as to defendants County of San Mateo and Sheriff Munks, and DENIED as to defendant 

Deputy Criado. Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement on the excessive force claim is 

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 The Court also notes that defendants could likely obtain the clarification they seek even 

without discovery through their own records. Plaintiff has not only provided the nature of the 

incident at issue, but also the relevant date on which he alleges it occurred. 

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DENIED. 

Having previewed plaintiffs’ supplemental allegations, the Court finds that amendment as 

to the dismissed defendants would not be futile. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint – 

to supplement and clarify the allegations against defendants County of San Mateo and Sheriff 

Munks only – no later than October 19, 2015. Defendants shall respond within fourteen (14) days 

after the filing. 

The Court also SETS an initial case management conference for Monday December 7, 

2015 at 2:00 p.m, at the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 

Ronald V. Dellums Federal Building, Oakland in Courtroom 1. 

In light of the status of the pleadings, this matter is hereby REFERRED to Magistrate Judge 

Vadas pursuant to Local Rule 72-1 for an early settlement conference. The parties will be advised 

of the date, time, and place of the settlement conference from Judge Vadas. 

This Order terminates Docket Number 30. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 2, 2015 

_______________________________________ YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

cc: Magistrate Judge Vadas 

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