Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03764/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03764-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fannie Mae
Appellee
Charmaine Hamer
Appellant
Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐3764

CHARMAINE HAMER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING SERVICES OF CHICAGO & FANNIE

MAE,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the  

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:12‐cv‐10150 — Rubén Castillo, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JUNE 2, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 31, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges and YANDLE, Dis‐

trict Judge.*

YANDLE, District Judge. Charmaine Hamer, a former Intake

Specialist for the Housing Services of Chicago (“NHS”) and

Fannie Mae’s Mortgage Help Center (“Fannie Mae”) (together

                                                 

* Of the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

Case: 15-3764 Document: 29 Filed: 08/31/2016 Pages: 5
2 No. 15‐3764

“Appellees”), filed suit against her former employers, alleging

violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29

U.S.C. § 621 et. seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended. The district court

granted summary judgment in favor of NHS and Fannie Mae

on September 14, 2015. As such, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a), the original deadline for

Hamer to file her Notice of Appeal was October 14, 2015.

On October 8, 2015, Hamer’s counsel filed a “Motion to

Withdraw and to Extend Deadline for Filing Notice of Ap‐

peal” in which she requested an extension to December 14,

2015 for Hamer to file her Notice of Appeal. The district court

granted the motion and extended the deadline to December

14, 2015.

Hamer filed her Notice of Appeal with this Court on De‐

cember 11, 2015; within the timeframe permitted by the dis‐

trict court’s Order, but exceeding the extension allowable un‐

der Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(C) which provides: “No extension

under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed 30 days after the pre‐

scribed time or 14 days after the date when the order granting

the motion is entered, whichever is later.”

On December 31, 2015, we, sua sponte, entered an Order

instructing the Appellees to file a brief addressing the timeli‐

ness of this appeal. They did so, arguing that Hamer’s Notice

of Appeal is untimely under Rule 4(a)(5)(C) and, therefore,

that this Court lacks jurisdiction over her appeal.  

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No. 15‐3764 3

Hamer asserts that the district court extended the time to

file her Notice of Appeal pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), which

states in relevant part: “[T]he district court may, upon motion

filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time oth‐

erwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal

upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause.” She con‐

tends that Rule 4(a)(5)(C) does not apply since the district

court did not consider it when granting the extension. Hamer

further argues that the Appellees waived their timeliness

challenge by not initially raising it.  

The Supreme Court has consistently held that the statu‐

tory requirement for filing a timely notice of appeal is “man‐

datory and jurisdictional.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 207,

209, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2362, 168 L. Ed. 2d 96 (2007). In Bowles, the

Court explained the relationship between the statutory filing

period set forth in § 2107(a) and the district court’s authority

to extend that period under § 2107(c) and Rule 4:

According to 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a), parties must

file notices of appeal within 30 days of the entry

of the judgment being appealed. District courts

have limited authority to grant an extension of

the 30‐day time period...Rule 4 of the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure carries § 2107 into

practice. In accord with  § 2107(c), Rule 4(a)(6)

describes the district court’s authority to reopen

and extend the time for filing a notice of appeal

after the lapse of the usual 30 days... Id. at 208.

Like the initial 30‐day period for filing a notice

of appeal, the limit on how long a district court

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4 No. 15‐3764

may reopen that period is set forth in a statute,

28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). Because Congress specifically

limited the amount of time by which district courts

can extend the notice‐of‐appeal period in § 2107(c),

that limitation is more than a simple ‘claim –pro‐

cessing rule.’(emphasis added). As we have long

held, when an ‘appeal has not been prosecuted

in the manner directed, within the time limited

by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for

want of jurisdiction.’ Id. at 213. (internal citation

omitted).

Like Rule 4(a)(6), Rule 4(a)(5)(C) is the vehicle by which §

2107(c) is employed and it limits a district court’s authority to

extend the notice of appeal filing deadline to no more than an

additional 30 days. Thus, the district court was in error when

it granted Ms. Hamer an extension that exceeded the Rule

4(a)(5)(C) time period by almost 30 days.  

Although we recognize that Ms. Hamer relied upon the

district court’s erroneous Order and was misled into believ‐

ing that she had until December 14, 2015 to file her Notice of

Appeal, this Court simply has no authority to excuse the late

filing or to create an equitable exception to jurisdictional re‐

quirements. See Bowles at 214. Therefore, Hamer’s Notice is

untimely.  

Finally, Hamer’s argument that the Appellees waived the

issue of the timeliness of her appeal also fails. When a filing

error is one of “jurisdictional magnitude”, forfeiture or

waiver cannot excuse the lack of compliance with the statute’s

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No. 15‐3764 5

time limitation.” See Bowles at 213. Had the Appellees never

challenged the timeliness of Hamer’s Notice, they could not

waive what this Court is bound by statute to uphold. Accord‐

ingly, because we have no jurisdiction to consider Hamer’s

appeal on the merits, it is dismissed.  

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