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Parties Involved:
Ironworkers Local 386
Intervenor for Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Warshawsky & Company
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 8, 1999 Decided July 9, 1999

No. 98-1277

Warshawsky & Company,

Petitioner

v.

National Labor Relations Board,

Respondent

Ironworkers Local 386,

Intervenor

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Michael W. Duffee argued the cause for petitioner. With

him on the briefs was John N. Raudabaugh.

Steven B. Goldstein, Attorney, National Labor Relations

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

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brief were Linda Sher, Associate General Counsel, John D.

Burgoyne, Acting Deputy Associate General Counsel, and

David Habenstreit, Supervisory Attorney.

Terrance B. McGann argued the cause for intervenor.

With him on the brief was Travis J. Ketterman. Collins P.

Whitfield entered an appearance.

Before: Wald, Silberman, and Henderson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Silberman, Circuit Judge: Warshawsky & Company petitions for review of an order of the National Labor Relations

Board dismissing a secondary boycott complaint filed against

Ironworkers Local 386. We grant the petition.

I.

Warshawsky (the Company) sells automobile parts and

accessories and is currently constructing a warehouse and

mail order facility in LaSalle, Illinois. The Company retained

G.A. Johnson & Sons, Inc. as its general contractor for the

project. Johnson in turn subcontracted with various other

companies, all of whom maintained collective bargaining contracts with the building trade unions that represent their

employees. Throughout the period relevant to this case,

Johnson and the subcontractors worked at the LaSalle site

from approximately 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. every weekday, and

occasionally on Saturday. In March of 1997, Warshawsky

retained Automotion, Inc. to install rack and conveyor systems at the site. In response, Iron Workers Local 386, which

represents Automotion's employees and had no dispute with

Johnson or any of the subcontractors, engaged in "area

standards" picketing of Automotion at the construction site on

March 5. The union stopped later that day after being told

that Automotion was not yet working at the site. One week

later, Warshawsky's Vice President of Human Resources sent

the union's business agent a letter stating that a "reserve

gate" had been established at the site for Automotion, and

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that any subsequent picketing of Automotion should be conducted only when Automotion was working on the site: Monday through Friday from 4 p.m. to 6 a.m., and all day Sunday.

Automotion began work at the site according to this schedule

on the same day.

The next morning, at around 6:40 a.m., various union

agents stationed themselves in close proximity to the LaSalle

site on a road that was used primarily by persons going to

and from the site. The site itself was not open to members of

the general public. As employees of Johnson and its subcontractors approached the construction site in their automobiles,

the union agents distributed the following handbill:1

AUTOMOTION, INC.

IS DESTROYING

THE STANDARD OF

WAGES FOR

HARD-WORKING

UNION MEMBERS

AUTOMOTION, INC.

PAYS SUBSTANDARD

WAGES AND FRINGE BENEFITS.

IGNORING THE AREA STANDARDS

THREATENS THE EFFORTS AND SACRIFICES

OF ALL UNION MEMBERS.

___________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________

Iron Workers Local 386 is currently engaged in a labor dispute 

concerning the

failure of Automotion, Inc. to pay the area standard wages and 

fringe benefits.

We are appealing only to the general public. We are not seeking 

any person

to cease work or to stop making deliveries.

The union agents also spoke briefly with the employees to

whom they gave the handbill, although we have no direct

evidence of what was said.

This activity lasted for about four hours, and resulted in

the employees of Johnson and its subcontractors refusing to

enter the site and refusing to perform services for their

employers. The union agents engaged in the same conduct at

the same times on four of the next six days, resulting each

__________

1 The actual handbill is in an appendix to our opinion. As will be

apparent, the caveat at the bottom is in very small print indeed.

day in employees of Johnson and its subcontractors refusing

to work. None of that conduct occurred while Automotion, or

any of its employees, suppliers, or subcontractors, were working at the site.

The General Counsel, responding to an unfair labor practice charge filed by Warshawsky, issued a complaint alleging

that the union's conduct violated s 8(b)(4)(i)(B) and (ii)(B) of

the National Labor Relations Act.2 The union's answer admitted that its agents handbilled and spoke to employees of

Johnson and its subcontractors, but characterized that conduct as a "lawful informational picket." The parties subseUSCA Case #98-1277 Document #448342 Filed: 07/09/1999 Page 3 of 31
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quently stipulated to the facts as set forth above and agreed

that those facts would serve as the complete record of the

case to be submitted to the ALJ for his decision without a

hearing. The ALJ granted the union's motion to amend its

answer two days before briefs were to be filed, which Warshawsky but not the General Counsel opposed, to substitute

__________

2 Those sections provide that it is an unfair labor practice for a

labor organization or its agents

(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual

employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the

course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,

materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to

threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce

or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an

object thereof is--

....

(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,

handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of

any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease

doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring

any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor

organization as the representative of his employees unless such

labor organization has been certified as the representative of

such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title

...

29 U.S.C. s 158(b)(4)(i)(B), (ii)(B) (1994) (emphasis added).

the word "handbilling" for "picket."3

The ALJ determined that because there was no direct

testimony as to what was said by the union agents to the

neutral employees and nothing else in the record supported

an inference that the union "induced" or "encouraged" the

work stoppage, the General Counsel had not met his burden

of proof. The ALJ's decision appears to have been strongly

influenced by his conclusion that the handbilling engaged in

by the union--as opposed to picketing--was "pure expressive" activity and is therefore entitled to some measure of

First Amendment protection. Although he described the

handbill as strident in tone, according to him it did no more

than truthfully advise members of the "public" (i.e., the

neutral employees of Johnson and its subcontractors) of

Automotion's wages and benefits. He accordingly discounted

the suspicious timing of the handbilling--that it took place

when Automotion's employees were not present. And he also

concluded that the apparent connection between the handbilling and the work stoppage was insufficent as a matter of law

to prove inducement.

The Board affirmed the ALJ's findings and conclusions and

adopted the order dismissing the complaint. See Iron Workers Local 386 (Warshawsky & Co.), 325 N.L.R.B. No. 141

(May 14, 1998). Chairman Gould concurred separately. He

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thought that the case was a close one; the evidence arguably

could support an inference that the union "was indeed making

an appeal, through a careful wink and a nod, for the employees to engage in a work stoppage." He noted particularly the

timing of the handbilling when the only recipients would be

__________

3 Warshawsky argues that the ALJ erred in granting the

motion because the last-minute change from "picket" to "handbilling" prejudiced Warshawsky, and that even if the motion were

properly granted, the ALJ erroneously failed to consider the original answer as evidence that the union's conduct constituted picketing. Because we conclude that the union's conduct violated the

statute even accepting the amended answer, and without even

considering the original answer as evidence of picketing, we need

not address these contentions.

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neutral employees, the text of the handbill, and the resulting

work stoppage. But based on Board precedent limiting the

"nod, wink, and a smile" theory, see Building & Constr.

Trades Council of Tampa (Tampa Sand & Material Co.), 132

N.L.R.B. 1564, 1565-66 (1961), he concluded that the facts of

the instant case, involving a handbill with a disclaimer, together with an absence of evidence as to the content of the

conversations between the union and the employees, did not

satisfy the General Counsel's burden of proving unlawful

inducement or encouragement.

II.

As noted, the ALJ (whose opinion the Board adopted)

relied significantly on the First Amendment in concluding

that the union did not induce or encourage the employees of

the neutral employers to engage in a secondary strike. In

the ALJ's words, the looming constitutional issue meant that

"analysis must proceed with care." The ALJ's reasoning is

not all that clear to us; it is as if the First Amendment acts

as a deus ex machina directing his factfinding.4 He presumably thought that to prohibit a union from engaging in "area

standards" handbilling of neutral employees might violate the

union's First Amendment rights, and therefore the constitutional avoidance canon suggests that the words "induce or

encourage" in s 8(b)(4)(i) should be interpreted, and applied,

narrowly so as not to proscribe the handbilling involved in

this case. We think the First Amendment is not at all

implicated and once it is put aside, the Board's finding can be

judged in accordance with the standard substantial evidence

test.

__________

4 Our dissenting colleague is no more forthcoming as to just

how the First Amendment affects her analysis. It would appear

that she is of the view that circumstantial evidence should be

thought less probative than direct evidence in this setting, but she

does not explain why. Cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 818

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("[T]he distinction between direct and

circumstantial evidence has no direct correlation with the strength

of the plaintiff's case."), rev'd on other grounds, 118 S. Ct. 1584,

1595 (1998).

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The Supreme Court has emphatically said that "[t]he prohibition of inducement or encouragement of secondary pressure

by s 8(b)(4)[i] carries no unconstitutional abridgment of free

speech," International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local

501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951). And in Electrical

Workers, the Court also recognized that "[t]he words induce

or encourage are broad enough to include in them every form

of influence and persuasion." Id. at 701-02 (emphasis added). It follows that the First Amendment does not protect

communications directed at--and only at--the neutral employees merely because the form of communications is handbilling and conversations.5 Indeed, the Board's brief concedes that a violation of the Act would have been established

"if the handbilling had [explicitly] requested neutral employees to cease work, or if the record showed that the union had

orally induced or encouraged such a work stoppage...."

The Board (both the ALJ and the Board's brief) relies

heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction

Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), in which the Court did

pivot on the First Amendment--using the canon of constitutional avoidance--to construe the secondary boycott provisions of the Act not to reach peaceful handbilling directed to

consumers at a shopping mall. There the union's primary

dispute was with a construction company retained to build a

department store in the mall. See id. at 570. The handbill

asked customers not to shop at any stores in the mall until

the mall owner (DeBartolo) promised that all of its tenants

would use only contractors who pay fair wages, and made

clear that the union was seeking only a consumer boycott.

The Board found that the handbilling "coerced" the mall

tenants, in the words of s 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), by putting economic

pressure on them through the appeal to consumers. The

Supreme Court rejected the Board's interpretation of

s 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to reach such consumer directed handbilling in

__________

5 The dissent, post at 3, misconstrues this rather unexceptionable statement.

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part to avoid the serious constitutional question that would

arise.

We think DeBartolo, and the constitutional issue the

Board's statutory interpretation would have presented there,

is fundamentally different because, as the Supreme Court

observed, the mall's potential customers were being urged "to

follow a wholly legal course of action, namely, not to patronize the retailers doing business in the mall." Id. at 575

(emphasis added). The issue in the case was whether that

sort of appeal to the consumers--which obviously implicates

the First Amendment--could be thought to threaten, coerce,

or restrain the mall tenants to cease doing business with

another (DeBartolo) within the meaning of s 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).

By contrast, the conduct sought by a union that directly

induces or encourages a secondary strike is itself unlawful

under s 8(b)(4)(i). See 29 U.S.C. s 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (providing

that it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or

its agents "to engage in ... a strike ... [the object of which

is] forcing or requiring any person ... to cease doing business with any other person"). The obvious implication of

DeBartolo, consistent with the Court's prior precedent, is that

an appeal limited to employees of a neutral employer which

reasonably could be found to be an inducement to engage in a

secondary strike is quite another matter; it does not raise

any constitutional problems.

The ALJ, again drawing on DeBartolo, suggested a related

basis for his decision. DeBartolo involved the construction of

the so-called publicity proviso of 8(b)(4), which states that

nothing in s 8(b)(4)

shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public,

including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an

employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer,

as long as such publicity does not have an effect of

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inducing any individual employed by any person other

than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any

goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution.

29 U.S.C. s 158(b)(4) (1994). The Board in DeBartolo had

argued the proviso was an exception to the secondary boycott

provisions, and therefore if a union was engaging in public

handbilling, but handbilling that did not qualify under the

proviso because it was not calling attention to a "distributor"

of goods with whom a union has a labor dispute, it was

implicitly banned (as coercive). The Court rejected that

construction--in part, as we noted, for constitutional reasons--pointing out that the proviso was not an exception to a

broad handbilling ban, but rather a clarification as to the

meaning of the section's bar on coercion. See DeBartolo, 485

U.S. at 582.

The ALJ, keying on the Supreme Court's description of the

proviso as serving a clarification function, pointed to the

language "public, including consumers and members of a

labor organization," 29 U.S.C. s 158(b)(4) (emphasis added),

and reasoned that handbilling appeals to union members are

entitled to the same constitutional protection as those directed to consumers. They are, after all, as Congress recognized,

both parts of the public. Therefore the constitutional

grounds for construing the handbilling restriction narrowly as

it relates to consumer handbilling apply equally to handbilling

directed at union members.6 We think that reasoning is

flawed. It ignores the Supreme Court's cases which draw a

distinction between urging consumers to engage in a lawful

boycott and inducing union members to engage in an unlawful

secondary strike.

* * * *

We come then to the Board's finding that the union did not

"induce" the neutral employees to stop work. Petitioner

__________

6 The ALJ thought the same holds true (as in this case) for a

union's handbilling of members of a different labor organization.

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argues that the Board's finding is not supported by substantial evidence, which is another way of saying that no reasonable factfinder could have made such a finding. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818, 822 (1998).

This is not a credibility case; there was no testimony. Nor

did the Board employ any presumptions, so we need not

consider whether such would have been reasonable. See id.

at 828. The case turns only on the reasonableness of the

inferences the Board did, and did not draw, from the raw

stipulated facts. And "[w]hen the Board purports to be

engaged in simple factfinding, unconstrained by substantive

presumptions or evidentiary rules of exclusion, it is not free

to prescribe what inferences from the evidence it will accept

and reject, but must draw all those inferences that the

evidence fairly demands." Id. at 829.

We think that the evidence does "fairly demand" the inference that the union sought to induce the neutral employees to

walk off the job site. The handbills themselves, the time,

place, and manner of their distribution, the simultaneous

conversations between the union agents and the neutral employees, and the subsequent response of those employees all

combine to paint only one plausible picture. The ALJ unreasonably took each piece of evidence, analyzed it separately--

not even accurately in our view--and concluded that no one

piece sufficed, never asking whether the totality of facts

pointed in only one direction.

To start with the handbill, the union argued that it specifically stated that "we are appealing only to the general public.

We are not seeking any person to cease work or to stop

making deliveries." But that caveat is contained in only very

small print at the bottom of the handbill. The Board has not

in the past credited similar disclaimers in the face of circumstances suggesting that the disclaimer is merely a legal cover.

See National Ass'n of Broad. Employees, Local 31, 237

N.L.R.B. 1370, 1376 (1978) (concluding that purported disclaimer at bottom of handbill was a "self-serving disavowal"

given the manner in which the handbill was distributed),

enforced, 631 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Catalytic,

Inc. v. Monmouth & Ocean County Building Trades Council,

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829 F.2d 430, 432, 435 (3d Cir. 1987) (dismissing disclaimer on

handbill virtually identical to disclaimer at issue here as a

"carefully vague and legalistic statement" whose tone may

actually have sent a signal to the neutral employees to cease

work); cf. International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local

453 (Southern Sun Elec. Corp.), 252 N.L.R.B. 719, 723 (1980)

(stating that union's self-serving disclaimer of picketing for

recognitional purposes is not determinative of whether union

was engaged in lawful picket).

As the ALJ put it, the main language of the handbill

contained a strident attack on Automotion's substandard

wages and, most significantly, the lugubrious prediction that

"Ignoring the Area Standards Threatens the Efforts And

Sacrifices Of All Union Members" (emphasis added), which

clearly tells the recipients of the handbill that they should

regard this matter as one in which they as union members

have a stake. And being so informed there is only one

possible action they can take that will contribute to the cause.

Indeed, Congress itself indicated that this sort of handbill

would be at least evidence of inducement, if not necessarily

conclusive evidence. The publicity proviso assumes that

handbills, or like publicity, advising members of a labor

organization that a secondary employer is distributing products produced by an employer with whom the union has a

primary dispute can have the "effect of inducing" a secondary

employee not to perform services. 29 U.S.C. s 158(b)(4)

(emphasis added). That the proviso does not afford a defense

in this case7 has no bearing on whether this generic type of

handbilling is at least evidence of inducement.

Second, the handbilling was de facto directed only at the

neutral employees. It took place on an access road to the

construction site (the common situs) only at times when the

__________

7 The proviso cannot constitute a defense for the union in this

case most obviously because there was a work stoppage. The ALJ

thought that it did not apply also because the handbills did not

advise the public that Warshawsky was distributing Automotion's

"products" (or perhaps that Warshawsky could not even be thought

a "distributor").

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employees of Johnson and its subcontractors--the neutral

employees--were reporting for work and during which, as the

union knew, Automotion was not working. The ALJ himself

determined at one point in his opinion that "the stipulated

facts leave scant room for any conclusion that the handbills

had been intended for anyone other than persons reporting

for work at the LaSalle project" and that "[t]here is no basis

in the stipulation that would allow even an inference that

handbills had been actually distributed to anyone else." Warshawsky, 325 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 6 (emphasis added). Inexplicably, the ALJ later drew precisely that forbidden inference, remarking that nothing in the evidence ruled out the

possibility that the union handbilled non-employees who may

have tried to enter the construction site (a mystery food

vendor or some construction-site tourists?). See id. at 9.

Based on the ALJ's own initial finding, which seems unassailable, we do not see how his latter inference can possibly be

justified.

Then there are the conversations between the union agents

and the employees. The ALJ was apparently under the

impression that because there is no testimony as to the

content of those conversations, the fact that they took place is

of no moment or significance. But we think that conclusion

is, as an evidentiary matter, ridiculous. It may well be that

those conversations, standing alone, would be of little relevance--but they did not stand alone. A reasonable factfinder

would have evaluated the existence of the conversations in

light of the evidence already set forth: a handbill distributed

exclusively to the very employees who later ceased work and

which calls attention to the efforts and sacrifices of all union

members. In such a case, the mere fact of a conversation

between the alleged inducers and those allegedly being induced can speak volumes. See, e.g., International Ass'n of

Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local No.

433 v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 1154, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1979) (enforcing Board's order finding unlawful inducement in part based

on conversations at neutral employer's office gate between

union agent and neutral employees who failed to report for

work later that day, even though there was no testimony

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regarding the content of the conversations). We also think

the Board's and the union's reliance on precedent holding a

union not to have violated the Act based on conversations

between a union and neutral employees, see, e.g., Carpenters

Local 316 (E & E Dev. Co.), 247 N.L.R.B. 1247, 1248-49

(1980); Gould, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 618, 622 (1978), enforced,

638 F.2d 159, 163 n.2 (10th Cir. 1980); Tampa Sand, 132

N.L.R.B. at 1565-66, is misplaced. In each of those cases,

the Board focused on testimony that the union officials specifically told the neutral employees that each employee's decision whether or not to walk off the job was his or her own to

make. It is precisely the absence of such evidence here--

neutralizing, as it were, any inference of inducement--that

renders the fact of the conversations so telling.

Moreover, the union agents who talked to the neutral

unionized employees are particularly within the control of the

union, a fact which in similar circumstances has led the Board

to draw an adverse inference against the union for failing to

produce evidence about the content of conversations involving

union members. See Ironworkers Dist. Council of the Pacific

Northwest (Hoffman Constr. Co.), 292 N.L.R.B. 562, 578

(1989); Carpenters Local 316 (Thornhill Constr.), 283

N.L.R.B. 81, 84 (1987); Local 3, Int'l Brotherhood of Elec.

Workers (Hunts Point Elec. Wiring Serv., Inc.), 271 N.L.R.B.

1580, 1585 & n.6, 1586 (1984); see also International Union,

United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.

v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1335-1342 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The

Board and the union's protest that the General Counsel had

the burden of proof and is therefore to blame for failing to

produce this evidence strikes us as flatly inconsistent with

this principle. A reasonable factfinder must ask, as do we:

What save for inducing or encouraging words could the union

agents possibly have said to the recipients of the handbills?

"Have a nice day"? "How 'bout them Cubs?"? Any "noninducement" words would be inconsistent with the setting,

and to suppose the union agents uttered them would be sheer

speculation. By contrast, the inference that the union orally

induced the employees to cease work has, as we have shown,

a substantial evidentiary base.

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We come last to the actual work stoppage that occurred

after the handbilling and conversations. Here again, the ALJ

reasoned that, under Board precedent, a work stoppage alone

is not sufficient proof of inducement. See, e.g., Gould, 238

N.L.R.B. at 622-23; Teamsters, Local Union No. 688 (Levitz

Furniture Co.), 205 N.L.R.B. 1131, 1132-33 (1973); Tampa

Sand, 132 N.L.R.B. at 1568; cf. United Scenic Artists, Local

829 v. NLRB, 762 F.2d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (union's

intent, and not the effect of its actions, is the critical aspect of

finding an unlawful secondary "object"). Chairman Gould

made the same point in concluding, despite his misgivings,

that the union did not violate the Act. However correct this

proposition is, it certainly cannot be taken to mean, as the

ALJ implied, that the fact of a work stoppage has no evidentiary value in proving a case of inducement. To the contrary,

the Board has found that a union's handbilling constituted

unlawful inducement in part because of its effect in producing

a work stoppage, see International Ass'n of Bridge, Sructural

& Ornamental Iron Workers, Local No. 433 (R.F. Erection),

233 N.L.R.B. 283, 287 (1977), enforcement granted in part

and denied in part, 598 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1979); see also

Catalytic, 829 F.2d at 435 ("The simple cause-and-effect of

the appearance of the leafletters and work stoppages eloquently testified to the purpose of the enterprise."), and has

also relied on the absence of a work stoppage as evidence that

a union did not engage in unlawful inducement, see, e.g.,

United Scenic Artists, Local 829 (Theatre Techniques, Inc.),

243 N.L.R.B. 27, 28 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 655 F.2d

1267 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Levitz Furniture, 205 N.L.R.B. at 1133

(refusing to presume from "one isolated instance when a

delivery was not made" that the union's handbilling was in

effect a signal picket).8 We think the Board's approach in

__________

8 The Board has even suggested (though admittedly in dicta) in

distinguishing handbilling from picketing that handbilling is only

"lawful" when unaccompanied by a work stoppage. See Local 917,

International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Industry City Assocs.),

307 N.L.R.B. 1419, 1419 n.3 (1992) (citing Hospital & Serv. Employees Union, Local 399 (Delta Air Lines, Inc.), 293 N.L.R.B. 602, 603

(1989)).

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these prior cases is consistent with our view of what a

reasonable factfinder would have been obliged to do in this

case: to consider a work stoppage as probative evidence of

inducement, even if not sufficient evidence taken alone.

We suppose it is possible to infer that the neutral employees "spontaneously" walked off the job after receiving the

handbills and talking with the union agents. The real question is whether it is a reasonable inference to draw.9 We

think not. As we observed, the ALJ employed a kind of

"divide and conquer" evidentiary strategy, dissecting the

General Counsel's case into evidentiary fragments that standing alone would be insufficient to prove inducement, but

neglecting to consider what we think is the overpowering

evidentiary force of those parts put together. For the Board

to focus on evidentiary fragments and to ignore the aggregate

weight of the evidence is no more permissible than ignoring

evidence that contradicts its conclusion. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951).

* * * *

We have no difficulty, reviewing the whole record, in

concluding the Board's finding is defective; it lacks substantial evidence.

__________

9 We, unlike the dissent, do not think it matters that the

stipulated facts did not specify whether all or only some of the

employees stopped work or the exact length of the conversations

with the union agents. Nor, for that matter, did the ALJ.

A P P E N D I X

AUTOMOTION, INC.

IS DESTROYING

THE STANDARD OF

WAGES FOR

HARD-WORKING

UNION MEMBERS

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AUTOMOTION, INC.

PAYS SUBSTANDARD

WAGES AND FRINGE BENEFITS.

IGNORING THE AREA STANDARD

THREATENS THE EFFORTS AND SACRIFICES

OF ALL UNION MEMBERS.

___________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________

Iron Workers Local 386 is currently engaged in a labor dispute 

concerning the

failure of Automotion, Inc. to pay the area standard wages and 

fringe benefits.

We are appealing only to the general public. We are not seeking 

any person

to cease work or to stop making deliveries.

Wald, Circuit Judge, dissenting: In my view, the majority

goes too far afield from the record and established restraints

on our appellate review powers in order to overturn the

Board and find that the union committed a violation of section

8(b)(4). An opinion upholding the decision of the Board in

this case, which I support, on the other hand would have had

only a limited impact; at most, it would have sent a message

to future companies that they ought not agree to be bound by

too sparse factual records. Instead, the majority issues a

surprisingly broad-based opinion which reverses the Board,

finds a union in violation of federal labor law,1 and sets forth

new constitutional law restricting the reach and protection of

the First Amendment.

The relevant facts of this case are easily summarized.

Warshawsky & Company ("the Company") is engaged in the

warehousing and sale of auto parts and accessories. In 1997,

the Company decided to build a warehouse and mail order

facility in LaSalle, Illinois. The Company hired a general

contractor who, in turn, hired various subcontractors, each of

which maintained collective bargaining agreements with various unions representing employees working on the construction site ("construction employees"). These employees

worked at the construction site Monday through Friday, 7

a.m. to 3:30 p.m. and on occasional Saturdays as well.

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In March 1997, the Company directly retained Automotion

Inc. ("Automotion") to install certain rack and conveyor systems at the construction site. Shortly thereafter, Ironworkers Local 386 ("Union"), which had no labor dispute with

either the general contractor or any of the subcontractors,

__________

1 In so finding, the majority does not take seriously enough the

proposition that unions, as well as individuals, are innocent until

proven guilty, and that courts must therefore be cautious in concluding that a union has violated federal labor law. See NLRB v.

Ironworkers Local 433, 850 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1988) ("What is

at issue is a finding that [the union] violated federal law. This is a

serious conclusion, one we do not lightly reach.").

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engaged in area standards picketing against Automotion.

The Union discontinued this picketing after being informed

that Automotion was not yet working on the site. Subsequently, an agent of the Company sent the Union a letter

stating that Automotion employees would be scheduled to

work on the site Monday through Friday from 4 p.m. to 6

a.m. and all day Sunday. The letter requested that any

future picketing of Automotion be conducted only when Automotion employees were on site.

On March 13, 1997, at around 6:40 a.m., various agents of

the Union were stationed in close proximity to the entrance of

the construction site. During about a four hour period, the

Union agents distributed copies of a handbill to construction

employees as they approached the construction site. A copy

of the handbill appears as an appendix to the majority's

opinion. Union agents distributed the same handbill at the

same location and at approximately the same time on March

14, 17, 18, and 19. Employees of Automotion were not at the

site on any of these occasions. Certain construction employees (number unknown, see below) refused to enter the construction site on each of the days on which the Union

handbilled.

On March 13, 1997, the Company filed an unfair labor

practice charge alleging illegal secondary activity on the part

of the Union. On March 25, 1997, the Regional Director

issued a complaint charging that the Union had violated

section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations

Act, which, in relevant part, makes it unlawful for a union to

"induce or encourage" any individual employed by a neutral

employer (i.e., one with whom the union has no primary labor

dispute) to engage in a work stoppage, where the union's

object is to force the neutral to cease doing business with an

employer with whom the union does have a primary dispute.

Before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), the parties

presented a joint motion accepting a stipulation of facts and

agreeing to waive a hearing. The stipulation contained a

copy of the handbill distributed by the Union. The stipulation also provided that "various" agents of the Union were

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stationed on a road used primarily by individuals going to and

from the construction site. The stipulation provided that the

Union agents gave copies of the handbill to individuals entering the site and that the agents "briefly spoke" with these

individuals. Finally, the stipulation provided that "the individuals" on the first day, and then "various individuals" on

subsequent days refused to enter the construction site and

perform work for their respective employers. Based on the

stipulation of facts, which constituted the entire record, and

on the briefs, the ALJ dismissed the complaint against the

Union, concluding that "a preponderance of the ... evidence

fails to establish that the failure of some of [the construction]

employees to report for work ... had been other than a

spontaneous reaction by those employees to the [Union's]

lawful actions of publicizing, other than through picketing or

through conduct tantamount to picketing, undisputed facts

about Autom[o]tion's wages and benefits." Iron Workers

Local 386 (Warshawsky & Co.), 325 N.L.R.B. No. 141 (May

14, 1998) at 4-5. The Board subsequently adopted the opinion of the ALJ, with Chairman Gould writing a concurring

opinion. The majority opinion today reverses the Board and

insists that it lacked "substantial evidence" for its conclusion

that a violation of section 8(b)(4) had not been proven. I

dissent from that holding on two basic grounds.

First, in order to reach its result, the majority creates new

constitutional law restricting the scope and protection of the

First Amendment. In taking the ALJ to task for considering

the First Amendment in his analysis of whether the Union

violated section 8(b)(4), the majority opines that "the First

Amendment does not protect communications directed at--

and only at-- ... neutral employees...." Majority opinion

("Maj. op.") at 7. This novel proposition, I believe, is simply

wrong.

In his opinion, the ALJ correctly noted that in order to

establish a violation of section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) and (ii)(B), the

General Counsel had to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence both that the Union induced or encouraged individuals employed by the Company to engage in a work stoppage

and that the Union had the object thereby of forcing the

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Company to cease dealing with Automotion. The ALJ was

guided in his attempt to discern the intent and motive of the

Union by the Supreme Court's decision in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trades

Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (DeBartolo II).

DeBartolo II is a case where the Supreme Court, under the

canon of constitutional avoidance, construed section 8(b)(4) as

not prohibiting the distribution of handbills to consumers

"press[ing] the benefits of unionism to the community and the

dangers of inadequate wages to the economy and the standard of living of the populace."2 Id. at 576. In so holding,

the Supreme Court emphasized the difference, constitutionally speaking, between pickets and handbills, the former constituting a mixture of conduct and communication and the latter

constituting pure expressive speech:

[P]icketing is a "mixture of conduct and communication"

and the conduct element "often provides the most persuasive deterrent to third persons about to enter a

business establishment." Handbills containing the same

message ... are "much less effective than labor picketing" because they "depend entirely on the persuasive

force of the idea."

Id. at 580 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees (Safeco),

447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)). In reaching its decision in DeBartolo II, the Court defined the socalled "publicity proviso" to section 8(b)(4) as constituting a

clarification of section 8(b)(4). The publicity proviso provides,

inter alia, that section 8(b)(4) did not prohibit "publicity,

other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising

the public, including consumers and members of a labor

organization, that a product or products are produced by an

employer with whom the labor organization has a primary

dispute and are distributed by another employer." 29 U.S.C.

s 158(b)(4) (1994). The handbills in DeBartolo II did not fall

__________

2 The handbills in DeBartolo II were distributed to patrons of a

mall in order to protest the alleged substandard wages paid by a

company hired by the mall owner to construct a department store

there.

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specifically under the publicity proviso; however, the Supreme Court, in interpreting the proviso as a clarification of,

rather than an exception to, section 8(b)(4), found that other

forms of handbilling (i.e., in addition to those that fall within

the terms of the proviso) would not necessarily be prohibited

under section 8(b)(4).

Like the handbills in DeBartolo II, the handbills in the

instant case were not covered by the publicity proviso.3 And

while the handbills in DeBartolo II were distributed to consumers at a shopping mall, the ALJ nevertheless found the

reasoning of DeBartolo II to be "important to the resolution

of the instant case":

[T]he fact that the [Supreme Court found the publicity]

proviso [to be] an express "clarification," rather than an

exception, is some indication that Congress contemplated

other, unstated, clarifications which would inform resolution of issues arising under Section 8(b)(4) of the Act's

stated prohibitions. Second, such unstated clarifications

arise in the context of the publicity proviso's ... defini-

__________

3 The handbilling in this case did not fall under the publicity

proviso because, on its face, the proviso deals only with handbilling

that does not result in a work stoppage. Additionally, the ALJ

found that the handbilling here did not fall under the publicity

proviso because the handbills did not advise the public that the

Company was distributing Automotion's products. The full text of

the proviso is, as follows:

[Nothing in section 8(b)(4)] shall be construed to prohibit

publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully

advising the public, including consumers and members of a

labor organization, that a product or products are produced by

an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary

dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as

such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual

employed by any person other than the primary employer in

the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or

transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the

establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution.

29 U.S.C. s 158(b)(4) (1994).

tion of "the public" which embraces both "consumers and

members of a labor organization[.]" Inasmuch as the

proviso serves as a clarification, rather than an exception,

the reach of the prohibition which it interprets, explains,

and clarifies must, of necessity, take into account publicity of disputes which is directed to members of labor

organizations, without too readily concluding that such

publicity constitutes unlawful inducement or encouragement.

Warshawsky & Co., 325 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 6 (emphasis

added).

Of course, as the ALJ acknowledged, handbilling does not

enjoy unfettered exemption under section 8(b)(4), in that

"[e]specially in the context of common situs situations, labor

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organizations must make reasonable efforts to minimize the

impact of their messages on neutral employers and their

employees." Id. at 7. However, he continued, this does not

mean that "those labor organizations [in the context of a

common situs] are ... required to abandon altogether communication of their messages." Id. Citing again to DeBartolo II, the ALJ noted the following:

[T]he Supreme Court recognized the constitutional and

statutory protection extended to handbill messages protesting failures to satisfy area wage and fringe benefit

standards--those which "press[ ] the benefits of unionism

to the community and the dangers of inadequate wages

to the economy and the standard of living of the populace." [DeBartolo II,] 485 U.S. at 576. Therefore, when

evaluating the lawfulness of [handbill] messages, even

when disseminated to members of a labor organization at

a common situs, analysis must proceed with care.

Id. The ALJ's point was that the Supreme Court has

recognized the constitutional and statutory protection of

handbills, like those in the instant case, which press the

benefits of unionism and the dangers of inadequate wages to

the community. The Supreme Court also defined the publicity proviso as a clarification, an explanation, of section 8(b)(4).

The publicity proviso in turn defines the public as including

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members of labor organizations. Accordingly, the analysis of

whether a union has violated section 8(b)(4) as a result of

communicating via handbills with members of other labor

organizations must proceed with some care. In other words,

one ought not too easily assume that a union has an illegal

intent or motive when handbilling neutral employees; a union

has a First Amendment right, even if not an unfettered right,

to express its ideas to all members of the public.

Surprisingly, the majority seems to be saying that the First

Amendment is not implicated at all when a union communicates solely with neutral employees. There is no support for

this belief. The majority jumps from the Supreme Court's

holding that the prohibition under section 8(b)(4) of the

inducement or encouragement of a secondary work stoppage

does not constitute an unconstitutional abridgement of free

speech, see International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB,

341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951), to its conclusion that any kind of

union speech directed to neutral employees carries no First

Amendment protection. This, in my view, puts the cart

before the horse. It is of course true that if the General

Counsel had actually proven that a union induced and encouraged employees of a neutral employer to engage in a work

stoppage with the object of forcing a neutral employer to

cease dealing with the primary, then that union could not

complain that its First Amendment rights had been violated.

But it does not follow from this proposition that no communication to neutral employees is protected speech or, as the

majority implies, that the ALJ erred in interpreting "induce"

or "encourage" narrowly in order to avoid First Amendment

concerns. See Maj. op. at 6 ("[The ALJ] presumably thought

that ... the constitutional avoidance canon suggests that the

words 'induce or encourage' in s 8(b)(4) should be interpreted, and applied, narrowly so as not to proscribe the handbilling involved in this case. We think the First Amendment is

not at all implicated....").

The majority places great reliance, in this regard, on its

ability to distinguish the facts of DeBartolo II from those

here. Again, without any affirmative support that I can find,

the majority thinks it adequate to point out that DeBartolo II

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involved handbills directed to consumers as opposed to the

handbills here, directed to neutral employees. It reasons

that when a union handbills consumers and they subsequently

refuse to patronize a neutral employer, these consumers are

following a wholly legal course of action, namely, withholding

their buying power. In contrast, it argues, when a union

handbills neutral employees, the only course of action open to

these employees is illegal to them under section 8(b)(4); that

is, neutral employees, when informed through a handbill that

a primary employer pays substandard wages, can only respond sympathetically by engaging in an illegal work stoppage.4 This single-option assumption is, however, mistaken.

Members of labor organizations--even employees of neutrals--are people too. They also consume. They also may be

potential future joint venturers with or employees of the

offending company. They certainly are members of their

communities with an interest in knowing which employers in

the area pay substandard wages. The majority assumes that

any time a union expresses its ideas to neutral employees,

that union has an illegal intent under section 8(b)(4) and the

neutral employees can only "contribute to the cause" by

engaging in an illegal work stoppage under section 8(b)(4), an

assumption without support in this record or in ordinary

experience and without which, the distinction the majority

attempts to draw between DeBartolo II and the instant case

simply dissolves. In my view, the ALJ was completely

justified in construing section 8(b)(4) narrowly and in assessing the situation with appropriate concern for the First

Amendment rights of union members.

My second ground for dissenting is that I believe the

majority errs in concluding that the stipulated record reasonably compels the conclusion that the Union had an illegal

intent and motive under section 8(b)(4). It is settled law that

the burden of proof is on the General Counsel to prove each

and every element of a section 8(b)(4) violation, see Local

__________

4 Indeed, the majority says, being "informed [of the message on

the handbill] there is only one possible action [neutral employees]

can take that will contribute to the cause." Maj. op. at 11.

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Union No. 501, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 756

F.2d 888, 898 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("The general counsel and

the charging party bear the burden of proving a secondary

boycott violation ..."), and that courts owe substantial deference to the findings of the Board, see Laro Maintenance

Corp. v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 224, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("The

court's review of the Board's factual conclusions is highly

deferential ...").5 The majority nevertheless reverses the

Board for failing to draw all inferences from purely circumstantial evidence in favor of the party with the burden of

proof. This result is quite unprecedented; it is akin to

reversing a jury verdict in a civil case because the jury, based

on purely circumstantial evidence, declined to find in favor of

the plaintiff. In reality, this case is quite simple: the Company (and the General Counsel) made a fatal strategic error in

waiving a hearing before the ALJ and in agreeing to be

bound by a stipulated record that did not sufficiently support

(let alone compel) the conclusion that the Union violated

section 8(b)(4).

To begin with, the majority unfairly wrests more (negative)

substance from the stipulation of facts than is actually there.

In truth, the stipulation is quite spare. The stipulation

contains a copy of the handbill given to the construction

__________

5 The deference owed to the Board's findings is even greater

where, as here, the critical question involves the intent and motive

of the Union. As we have repeatedly warned:

The court's review of the Board's determination with respect to

motive is even more deferential [than the court's review of

Board findings more generally]. Motive is a question of fact

that may be inferred from direct or circumstantial evidence.

In most cases only circumstantial evidence of motive is likely to

be available. Drawing such inferences from the evidence to

assess an employer's [or union's] ... motive invokes the expertise of the Board, and consequently, the court gives "substantial deference to inferences the Board has drawn from the

facts," including inferences of impermissible motive.

Laro Maintenance Corp., 56 F.3d at 229 (quoting Gold Coast

Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 995 F.2d 257, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1993))

(citations omitted).

employees. The handbill mentions nothing about the neutral

employer (i.e., does not say that the Company had engaged in

any wrongdoing by hiring Automotion) and, instead, contains

a specific proviso stating that the Union was engaged in a

labor dispute with Automotion (again, not the neutral employer) and that the Union was "not seeking any person to cease

work or to stop making deliveries." Second, the stipulation

states that "various" agents of the Union "were stationed at

certain locations along Murphy Road ... a road used primarily by individuals going to and from the La Salle facility

construction project." From this stipulation, we know only

that Union agents (number unknown) were stationed along a

road used primarily (but not exclusively) by individuals entering the construction project. The stipulation also states that

the agents gave copies of the handbill to the individuals

entering the construction project and "briefly spoke with"

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these individuals. From this, we know only that the agents

spoke with the employees, but we have no evidence whatsoever of the content of the conversations, nor do we know how

long these conversations were; "briefly" could mean five

seconds, merely enough time to say, "We are members of the

Iron Workers Local 386, please read this handbill," or five

minutes, enough time to request that the employees not

engage in a work stoppage, to request that the employees

engage in a work stoppage, or, indeed, to talk about the Cubs.

Finally, the stipulation states only that "the individuals" (on

the first day) and then "various individuals" (on the subsequent days) refused to enter the construction project and

perform work for their respective employers. We know from

this only that more than one employee refused to work, but

we do not know whether the number amounted to 10 out of

50; 50 out of 100; or 200 out of 200. The exact number and

ratio of employees who refused to work would certainly shed

a great deal of light on what one ought infer from the other

facts of the case, but, alas, we have no access to that

information on this record.

The majority speaks about the need to draw "reasonable"

inferences, see Maj. op. at 10, but then proceeds to draw

every possible inference against the Union. For example,

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with respect to the handbill itself, the majority finds that the

legal disclaimer on the handbill is of no evidentiary moment

because "that caveat is contained in only very small print at

the bottom of the handbill." Maj. op. at 10. In contrast, the

ALJ found the disclaimer to constitute some "evidence that

'[the Union] effectively took steps to neutralize [any] implied

inducement or encouragement of employees' of other employers." Warshawsky & Co., 325 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 9 (quoting Service & Maintenance Employees Union No. 399 (The

William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency) 136 N.L.R.B. 431,

437 (1962)). The ALJ's inference with respect to the disclaimer is, at the very least, reasonable. The disclaimer is

perfectly readable and although all boilerplate language is

somewhat legalistic, that does not mean that it is without any

effect.6

__________

6 The cases which the majority cites for discounting the existence

of the disclaimer are clearly distinguishable. In National Ass'n of

Broad. Employees, Local 31, 237 N.L.R.B. 1370 (1978), the Board

simply found that the existence of a legal disclaimer on a handbill

did not override the otherwise clear indication that the handbilling

involved there was an integral part and extension of picketing being

conducted simultaneously by the same union. Catalytic, Inc. v.

Monmouth & Ocean County Building Trades Council, 829 F.2d 430

(3d Cir. 1987), is not even a Board case; it is a review of a district

court injunction against a labor union. Moreover, counsel for the

union in that case admitted at oral argument that the union

handbilling constituted a "signal." Finally, the court of appeals'

finding that the disclaimer on the flyer constituted a "signal" was

preceded immediately by the statement that the union's argument

against the findings of the district court "ignore[d] the wide latitude

open to triers of fact to make factual determinations on the basis of

rational inferences which arise from the nature, location, and effect

of picketing." Id. at 436 (quoting American Radio Ass'n, AFLCIO v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, Inc., 419 U.S. 215, 232 (1974)). Of

course, the trier of fact in the instant case made the opposite factual

determination, that the disclaimer constituted credible evidence

against an illegal intent under section 8(b)(4). Finally, in International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 453 (Southern Sun Elec. Corp.),

252 N.L.R.B. 719 (1980), the Board simply noted that a self-serving

disclaimer that picketing was for a recognitional purpose was not

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The majority also infers that because the Union handbilled

only neutral employees, it must have had an illegal intent

thereby. But the ALJ's inference from this same fact is

equally compelling, or, again, at least reasonable. The Company chose to segregate Automotion employees from the

construction employees; by scheduling Automotion employees at odd hours, the Company made it impossible for the

Union to communicate its message to both Automotion and

construction employees at the same time. The ALJ found

that because the Automotion employees were presumably

already aware that their wages were below area standards,

nothing was to be gained by the Union in reinforcing this

knowledge. On the other hand, the construction employees

were less likely to have been aware that Automotion's wages

were below area standards. The ALJ determined that the

Union had a legitimate (non-illegal) interest in informing the

construction employees of Automotion's substandard wages

and that it was not required to republish this fact to Automotion employees simply to avoid the appearance of an improper

motive under section 8(b)(4).

The majority's final inference of intent to induce is drawn

from the fact that a conversation between Union agents and

employees took place and that some kind of a work stoppage

ensued. But what the majority infers from that sequence

paints too bleak a picture for the Union. The majority

conveniently ducks the question of how many of the neutral

employees, in response to the handbill and the words spoken

by Union agents, turned around and went home on the days

that the Union handbilled. See Maj. op. at 3-4. If in fact we

knew that all, virtually all, or even a substantial number of

the employees spoken to refused to work each day, then,

perhaps, the majority's inference that the work stoppage was

due to the Union's words might be justified. However, we do

not know from the record how many employees in fact turned

__________

determinative of the union's object in picketing. This unremarkable

proposition does not mean that legal disclaimers have no evidentiary weight at all, it simply means that the mere existence of such a

disclaimer does not necessarily win the day for the union.

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around and went home. More specifically, we do not even

know the ratio of employees who went home to employees

who stayed and went to work. The stipulation tells us

nothing and the ALJ only found that a preponderance of the

evidence failed to "establish that the failure of some of those

employees to report for work ... had been other than a

spontaneous reaction by those employees to the [Union's]

lawful actions...." Warshawsky & Co., 325 N.L.R.B. No.

141, at 4-5 (emphasis added). The majority has to assume

something totally absent from the record, namely, that all,

virtually all, or at least a substantial number of the employees, refused to work, in order to infer from that that "any

'non-inducement' words would be inconsistent with the setting, and to suppose the union agents uttered them would be

sheer speculation."7 Maj. op. at 13. Absent this first assumption that the conversations and handbills affected more

employees than not, to guess at the contents of these brief

car-side conversations is sheer speculation. It is not unfathomable, for example, that the Union agents merely reconveyed orally the gist of the handbill they were distributing.

Clearly, had a hearing been held, testimony as to the content

of the conversations could have been elicited. Without such

__________

7 The majority cites again to Catalytic for the proposition that the

"simple cause-and-effect of the appearance of leafletters and work

stoppages eloquently testified to the purpose of the enterprise."

829 F.2d at 435. Again, Catalytic is not a Board case. It is a case

where the court affirmed the findings of the district court, after

trial, that a union had violated section 8(b)(4) and that an injunction

was proper. The court in Catalytic rejected the union's arguments

against the findings of the district court because they "ignore[d] the

wide latitude open to triers of fact to make factual determinations

on the basis of rational inferences which arise from the nature,

location, and effect of picketing." Id. at 436 (quoting American

Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, Inc., 419 U.S.

215, 232 (1974)). In any event, it is decidedly not the law that the

effect of a work stoppage requires the conclusion of a section 8(b)(4)

violation. To be sure, a work stoppage may constitute evidence of

inducement, and the ALJ never said otherwise, but a work stoppage

alone is not sufficient proof thereof. See Teamsters, Local Union

No. 688 (Levitz Furniture Co.), 205 N.L.R.B. 1131 (1973).

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testimony, it is the General Counsel's burden to prove the

Union's speech fell on the inducement side, not the Union's

burden to prove it did not.8

In the end, the majority's decision requires an acceptance

of the proposition that the evidence here, entirely circumstantial, is so overwhelming against the Union that it brooks of

only one conclusion, a conclusion that is at odds with the

judgment of both the ALJ and the unanimous Board and one

which must be reached in the face of accepted legal principles

that the General Counsel bears the burden of proof and that

courts owe substantial deference to the Board's findings.

Ultimately, Chairman Gould's concurrence said it right:

[T]he Respondent's conduct here, although arguably consistent with an attempt to induce a work stoppage,

ultimately lacks a sufficient basis to support such a

finding [of a section 8(b)(4) violation]. The "nod, wink,

and a smile" theory cannot prevail in these circumstances

where the handbill explicitly stated that the Respondent

was not seeking a work stoppage, and where the record

fails to show what the Respondent said to the employees

as they approached the jobsite and received the handbills. In the final analysis, a finding of a violation must

__________

8 The majority attempts to shift this burden to the Union by

citing a string of cases, see Maj. op. at 13, which stand for the

proposition that when a party who has relevant information in her

control fails to produce that evidence, that failure may give rise to

an inference that the evidence is unfavorable to her, see, e.g.,

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1335-42 (D.C.

Cir. 1972). It is true that had a hearing been held, and the Union

had refused to call its agents to testify (or its agents refused to

testify) as to the contents of the conversations, then the ALJ might

have been justified in drawing an inference that the missing testimony would have been damaging to the Union. Here, however,

there was no hearing and no such phantom testimony. The Union

did not fail to provide evidence in its control; it merely agreed,

jointly with the Company, to a stipulation of facts. There is

absolutely no justification for drawing an inference against the

Union merely because it agreed to a joint stipulation of facts.

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be based on something more than the mere fact that the

employees ceased work in response to the Respondent's

conduct.

Warshawsky & Co., 325 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 2.

I respectfully dissent.

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