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Parties Involved:
Dennis Ackerman
Appellant
Tonia Ackerman
Appellant
U-Park, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 19-1814

___________________________

Tonia Ackerman; Dennis Ackerman

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

U-Park, Inc.

 Defendant - Appellee

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

 ____________

 Submitted: November 13, 2019

Filed: March 3, 2020

____________

Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

____________

ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.

Tonia Ackerman (“Ackerman”) alleged that she suffered permanent injuries

from a fall caused by the negligent removal of ice and maintenance of an asphalt

parking lot operated by U-Park in Omaha, Nebraska. Her husband sought damages

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for loss of consortium. The district court1

 granted U-Park’s motion in limine to

exclude expert Philip Wayne’s opinions on causation and granted U-Park’s motion for

summary judgment. The Ackermans appeal both decisions. We affirm.

I. Background

U-Park operates several parking lots in Omaha, Nebraska, including an asphalt

lot located at 555 N. 13 Street (“Lot 13”). On February 13, 2016, Ackerman paid the

$5.00 fee to park her car in Lot 13 so she could attend her daughter’s volleyball

tournament being held at the adjacent CenturyLink Center. After parking, Ackerman

alleged that she “walked approximately one car length when she slipped and fell on

a patch of black ice that she was unable to see because it blended into the blacktop.” 

Compl. ¶ 9. Black ice is “thin hard ice which is transparent and often difficult to see,

esp. as deposited on a road in cold weather.” Oxford English Dictionary Online,

https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/19670?redirectedFrom=black+ice#eid19401002

(last visited January 29, 2020). 

Joseph Schmitt, a part-owner of U-Park, was collecting parking fees at the time

of Ackerman’s fall. Schmitt testified that he was unaware of the presence of ice in the

parking lot. Approximately 30 minutes after Ackerman fell, Schmitt took photographs

of the area and spread ice melt. In the photographs, the viewer can see asphalt, the

rear of a car, a yellow line marking the left side of the parking space, three large

yellow numbers identifying the stall number, and an irregular circular shape that is

plainly darker than the rest of the surrounding asphalt. No precipitation occurred in

Omaha in the six days before Ackerman fell. The approximate temperature when

Ackerman fell was 17 degrees. Since no one knew how or when the ice originated,

each side retained an expert to assist with answering those questions.

1

The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, District Judge for the District of Nebraska.

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The Ackermans retained Philip B. Wayne as their expert. Wayne has a

bachelor’s degree in business administration with a concentration in economics. He

has managed numerous properties for 50 years. In the report he prepared for this case,

Wayne opined that Ackerman slipped and fell on black ice that had formed in a

“birdbath.” Although neither Ackerman nor Schmitt noted the existence of a

“birdbath” at the time of accident, Wayne reached his conclusion that a “birdbath”

existed because, in his opinion, there had been “virtually a complete lack of

maintenance to the parking lot surface” and that the “condition has been in process for

many years, and any effort to make repairs for the most part are non-existent.” He

further concluded that “[f]rom the deplorable condition of the lot’s surface, it is no

stretch that other areas of maintenance functions were left undone that includes

effective ice control.”

Wayne based his opinions on three visits to the parking lot. The first took place

on March 8, 2018, over two years after Ackerman fell. On this visit, Wayne rolled a

volleyball across the lot to track the direction water flowed. He also looked for

staining on the asphalt where water had previously been. He observed several

indentations in the asphalt where water could pool in “birdbaths” near where

Ackerman fell. Wayne took three videos during his visit to the parking lot, but only

one showed a green ball rolling and the other two were obscured by Wayne’s hand. 

Shortly after this visit, Wayne returned to the lot after a rainstorm and drove through

to see where the water was flowing and where the asphalt was wetter. He did not take

any photographs or videos on this visit. On the last visit on May 17, 2018, Wayne

took 15–17 photographs of the parking lot. Other than providing a general overview

of the condition of the parking lot at that time and area near where Ackerman fell,

none of the photographs focus on the actual location where Ackerman fell.

The Ackermans brought claims for negligence and loss of consortium. U-Park

moved to exclude Wayne’s expert opinions on asphalt deterioration/causation and

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moved for summary judgment. The district court granted both motions. The

Ackermans appeal both issues. 

II. Discussion

We review the exclusion of expert opinions for an abuse of discretion. Lawrey

v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 751 F.3d 947, 951 (8th Cir. 2014). Because we review de

novo the evidence and testimony presented during summary judgment proceedings in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we cast the facts and reasonable

inferences of this case in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Hickerson v. Pride

Mobility Products Corp., 470 F.3d 1252, 1256 (8th Cir. 2006)).

A. Exclusion of Wayne’s Expert Opinion

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, an expert opinion is admissible if (1) “the

testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;” (2) “the testimony is the product of

reliable principles and methods;” and (3) “the expert has reliably applied the

principles and methods to the facts of the case.” When determining the reliability of

an expert’s opinion, a court examines the following four non-exclusive factors: (1)

whether the expert’s theory or technique “can be (and has been) tested;” (2) “whether

the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;” (3) “the

known or potential rate of error;” and (4) “general acceptance.” Daubert v. Merrill

Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). These factors are not exclusive or

exhaustive and the court may tailor its inquiry to fit the particular facts of a case. 

Presley v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 553 F.3d 638, 643 (8th Cir. 2009) (citations

omitted). As the gatekeeper, the district court’s role is to discern “expert opinion

evidence based on ‘good grounds’ from subjective speculation that masquerades as

scientific knowledge.” Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 989 (8th

Cir. 2001). 

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The district court excluded Wayne’s expert opinion that Ackerman’s fall was

caused by black ice that would not have existed but for the birdbath in the asphalt. 

The court found that Wayne’s opinion would not assist the trier of fact for the

following reasons: (1) Wayne was not qualified to offer an opinion on asphalt

deterioration or birdbath creation; (2) Wayne’s “testing” (observing asphalt stains;

rolling a volleyball; and driving through the lot after a rain shower) was not reliable

and his methodology failed to meet Daubert standards; and (3) Wayne’s theory that

he can tell how long a birdbath existed “by reading the stains of asphalt like the rings

of a tree” was unsupported. 

Wayne’s expert opinion regarding the existence of a birdbath that caused black

ice to form fails to comply with Daubert standards. It is indisputable that Wayne lacks

academic qualifications so his ability to offer an expert opinion turns on his

experience as a property manager as well as the bases for his opinion. While Wayne

has broad experience in managing commercial property, his opinion is based on vague

theorizing and amorphous general principles. Wayne’s first visit to the property

occurred over two years after Ackerman fell. Despite his ultimate conclusion that

Ackerman’s fall was caused by the presence of black ice forming in a birdbath, Wayne

failed to take any photographs on that visit or any subsequent visit that would

corroborate this theory. The photographs taken by Schmitt approximately 30 minutes

after the accident do not show the presence of a birdbath-type depression in the

asphalt. Neither Schmitt nor Ackerman noted any kind of depression, indentation, or

defect in the asphalt. Lacking any evidence that a birdbath existed either at the time

of the fall or when he visited the property over two years after the accident, Wayne

asked the court to accept his ipse dixit that a birdbath existed at the time of

Ackerman’s fall. In the absence of any record evidence that Wayne used reliable

principles and methods or applied them reasonably to the facts of this case to form his

opinion that Ackerman’s fall was caused by black ice forming in a birdbath, his

opinion does not satisfy the Rule 702 standards for admissibility. The district court

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did not abuse its considerable discretion in excluding Wayne’s expert opinion on

causation.

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any

basis supported by the record. Beckley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian Hosps.,

923 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 2019). Because this is a diversity action, we apply the

substantive law of the forum state, here Nebraska. 

With regard to the standard of care owed to business invitees under Nebraska

law, owners or occupiers of land are not insurers of their premises. Aguallo v. City

of Scottsbluff, 678 N.W.2d 82, 89 (Neb. 2004) (quoting Heins v. Webster County, 552

N.W.2d 51, 57 (Neb. 1996)). Decades ago the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a

business owner has no legal responsibility “to protect a customer against hazards

which are known to the customer and are so apparent that he may reasonably be

expected to discover them and be able to protect himself.” Crawford v. Soennichsen,

120 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Neb. 1963). For example, a store owner may not be held liable

for a customer’s injuries resulting from a natural accumulation of snow and ice

because the condition was as well known to the invitee as to the premises owner. Id.

Most recently, the Nebraska Supreme Court has articulated the elements for premises

liability as follows: an owner or occupier is subject to liability for injury to a lawful

visitor resulting from a condition on the owner or occupier’s premises if the visitor

proves the following:

(1) that the owner or occupier either created the condition, knew of the

condition, or by exercise of reasonable care would have discovered the

condition; (2) that the owner or occupier should have realized the

condition involved an unreasonable risk of harm to the lawful visitor; (3)

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that the owner or occupier should have expected that the visitor either

would not discover or realize the danger or would fail to protect himself

or herself against the danger; (4) that the owner or occupier failed to use

reasonable care to protect the visitor against the danger; and (5) that the

condition was a proximate cause of damage to the visitor. 

Edwards v. Hy–Vee, Inc., 883 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Neb. 2016) (citation omitted). 

This case is complicated by the allegations in the pleadings that contradict

photographic evidence and the parties’ testimony. Ackerman’s allegation that her fall

was caused by “black ice” is belied by the photographs in the record taken shortly

after her fall that show the ice was visible, i.e. open and obvious, and the testimony

of both Ackerman and Schmitt that they both immediately recognized the cause of

Ackerman’s fall to be ice. Under either scenario, whether Ackerman slipped on

“black ice” or the ice was visible and apparent, U-Park is entitled to summary

judgment.

“Negligence is not presumed and must be proved by evidence, direct or

circumstantial.” Pantano v. Am. Blue Ribbon Holdings, LLC, 927 N.W.2d 357, 365

(Neb. 2019). Ackerman has the burden of providing sufficient evidence to create a

material question of fact regarding whether U-Park had either actual or constructive

notice of the condition that caused her to fall. Cloonan v. Food-4-Less of 30th &

Weber, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Neb. 1995). Ackerman testified that she did not

see the isolated spot of “black ice” that existed on the otherwise bare asphalt before

falling, and, as noted by the dissent, U-Park argued that the ice was not “visible and

apparent.” Schmitt testified that he was unaware of the icy patch before Ackerman

fell. 

After Ackerman fell, Schmitt photographed what appears to be ice. A

reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that ice was present at the

location of Ackerman’s fall. But, under Nebraska law, “[i]n order for a defendant to

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have constructive notice of a condition, the condition must be visible and apparent and

it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to an accident to permit a defendant

or the defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it.” Cloonan, 529 N.W.2d at

763. If the ice was not visible and apparent, as alleged by Ackerman, U-Park is

entitled to summary judgment because, as noted by the district court and the dissent,

U-Park is not required to see what cannot be seen. Id.

If, on the other hand, the ice was visible and apparent as it appears in the

photographs and reported by Ackerman and Schmitt after the accident, the evidence

in the record fails to create a reasonable inference that the isolated patch of ice upon

which Ackerman slipped was present for an appreciable period of time such that a

reasonable business owner was on notice or should have been “on notice of the

possibility of the existence of such a condition so as to reasonably require inspection

of the premises.” Kozloski v. Modern Litho, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Neb. 1967)

(reversing jury verdict and dismissing plaintiff’s negligence case because business

owner had no duty to inspect premises and discover a thin layer of ice for which there

was no knowledge by the defendant or explanation for the appearance of ice); see

Crawford, 120 N.W.2d at 581 (a business owner does not have a legal responsibility

to protect against hazards which are known and so apparent that an invitee may

reasonably be expected to discover them and protect herself unless perhaps the injury

occurs at nighttime or as a result of an unlighted condition, or under circumstances

where the injured person was “reasonably unaware of the dangerous condition,” or

under circumstances constituting a trap).

Here, there had been no precipitation for six days. Ackerman fell during the

daytime, shortly after 2:15 p.m. Only varying speculative explanations, without any

time frame, exist in the record for the cause of the isolated icy patch. The record lacks

evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that U-Park should have

had notice of the dangerous condition. And, perhaps most importantly, there is no

evidence to suggest that U-Park should have anticipated that Ackerman would not see

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visible ice, realize the danger of the ice, or fail to protect herself against the danger. 

Williamson v. Bellevue Med. Ctr., LLC, 934 N.W.2d 186, 193 (Neb. 2019) (one of

the elements for a premises liability claims is evidence from which a reasonable juror

could find that an invitee either would not discover or realize the danger, or would fail

to protect himself or herself against the danger). 

Demonstrating that an accident occurred does not prove negligence. Under

Nebraska premises liability law, there is no issue of negligence to submit to a jury

when there is a lack of evidence establishing the defendant’s knowledge of the

dangerous condition or of a failure to exercise reasonable care to discover it, or if

there is a lack of evidence establishing the defendant should have expected the

plaintiff would not discover, realize the danger, or fail to protect herself against it. 

Syas v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp. Found., 307 N.W.2d 112, 115 (Neb. 1981). 

Without Wayne’s testimony, the Ackermans are unable to create a material fact

dispute regarding U-Park’s alleged failure to exercise reasonable care to discover and

remedy the ice. There is no evidence in the record from which we can draw a

reasonable inference that if the ice was visible and apparent that Ackerman would not

discover or realize the danger of the ice or fail to protect herself against it.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in excluding Wayne’s causation opinions. The Ackermans have failed to

present sufficient evidence creating a fact question under Nebraska law that would

permit the Ackermans to hold U-Park liable for the isolated, icy patch in its parking

lot on February 13, 2016. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

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KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

I agree that it was within the district court’s discretion to exclude Wayne’s

expert opinion that there was a “birdbath” where Ackerman slipped and fell in 2016. 

But I do not agree that, without that opinion, U-Park was entitled to summary

judgment. The court affirms the grant of summary judgment under two alternative

scenarios. Because there are genuine disputes of material fact under both scenarios,

I respectfully dissent.

The first scenario stems from Ackerman’s allegation that she “slipped and fell

on a patch of black ice that she was unable to see because it blended into the

blacktop.” U-Park seized on this description and argued that it could not be liable

because the ice was not “visible and apparent” and U-Park was “not required to see

what cannot be seen by other human beings.” See Cloonan, 529 N.W.2d at 763. The

district court agreed and granted summary judgment on this basis. However, there is

evidence in the record indicating that the ice could be seen by other human beings. 

Schmitt was able to locate the ice, photograph it, and remove it with ice melt. And,

as the court recognizes, “the photographs in the record taken shortly after

[Ackerman’s] fall . . . show the ice was visible.” Ante at 7. In my view, this presents

a triable issue as to whether the ice was “visible and apparent.”

U-Park contends that, even if the district court was wrong to grant summary

judgment on this basis, we may still affirm because Ackerman cannot show that the

ice was present for a “sufficient length of time” for U-Park to discover and remedy the

condition before Ackerman fell. I think this is a close question. But Nebraska courts

have recognized that, unlike other conditions, ice “cannot form in an instant.” Starks

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. A-17-801, 2018 WL 3456008, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. July

17, 2018). There had been no precipitation for six days and the temperature had been

below freezing for three days before Ackerman’s fall. Schmitt further testified that,

although his usual practice was to drive through the lot when he arrived in the

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morning to “make sure everything [wa]s okay” and to walk through the lot during the

day to “check the surroundings,” he was not sure whether he did so on the day of

Ackerman’s fall. At this stage of the litigation, we are required to construe the

evidence in the light most favorable to Ackerman and to draw all reasonable

inferences in her favor. Brand v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 934 F.3d

799, 802 (8th Cir. 2019). Viewing the evidence in this light, I believe there is a triable

issue as to whether U-Park failed to inspect the parking lot on the day of Ackerman’s

fall and would have discovered the ice in the exercise of reasonable care. 

That exhausts the arguments that have been raised by the parties and briefed on

appeal. But the court also offers an additional rationale for affirming the district court. 

It reasons that, if the icy condition was visible and apparent, then it must have been

known and apparent to Ackerman. And it concludes that, in that scenario, U-Park

cannot be liable because “a business owner does not have a legal responsibility to

protect against hazards which are known and so apparent that an invitee may

reasonably be expected to discover them and protect herself.” Ante at 8 (citing

Crawford, 120 N.W.2d at 581).

But there is no hard-and-fast rule in Nebraska that a land possessor cannot be

liable for known and apparent conditions. Over three decades ago, the Nebraska

Supreme Court modified the rule in Crawford and “expanded the potential for finding

a duty owed by possessors to invitees in the area of known or obvious dangers.” 

Carnes v. Weesner, 428 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Neb. 1988). The Nebraska Supreme Court

now embraces the “modern view” that land possessors may be liable for known and

obvious conditions in certain circumstances. Corbin v. Mann’s Int’l Meat Specialties,

Inc., 333 N.W.2d 668, 669–70 (Neb. 1983). A land possessor may be liable, for

example, where it “has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted”

or “has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or

obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing

so would outweigh the apparent risk.” Id. (citation omitted). 

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The court decides that these exceptions to the Crawford rule do not apply

because there is “no evidence to suggest that U-Park should have anticipated that

Ackerman would not see visible ice, realize the danger of the ice, or fail to protect

herself against the danger.” Ante at 9. As a procedural matter, the exceptions to the

Crawford rule turn on factual issues that should not be decided by an appellate court

in the first instance. See, e.g., Aguallo, 678 N.W.2d at 94 (“Given that the trial court

did not resolve whether the City should have anticipated that persons . . . would fail

to protect themselves despite the open and obvious nature of the risk, we will not do

so on appeal.”). And as a substantive matter, the Nebraska Supreme Court has

recognized that parking lot users are often distracted and fail to protect themselves

from open and obvious dangers. See id. (“A reasonable fact finder could conclude

that the City should have anticipated that the users of the parking lot would fail to

protect themselves from the erosion because they might have forgotten about it while

shopping or at work, or because they were distracted by the items they were

carrying.”); Burns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 438 N.W.2d 485, 492 (Neb. 1989) (a

reasonable jury could find that a parking-lot owner should have expected that a

parking-lot user “would fail to protect herself against the danger from the icy

surface”). I would not decide this unbriefed issue for the first time on appeal. And

if I did consider it, I would follow the binding Nebraska case law that militates against

granting summary judgment.

For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

______________________________ 

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