Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01761/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01761-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Teri Blair
Plaintiff
Viking Recovery Services
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Teri Blair,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Viking Recovery Services,

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 09-1761-PHX-DKD

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Plaintiff Teri Blair filed a complaint against Defendant Viking Recovery Services on

August 24, 2009, asserting violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”)

(Doc. 1). Defendant was served regarding this matter on October 30, 2009 (Doc. 7) but has

never appeared. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment. No

response has been filed, and the time for doing so has expired. See LRCiv 7.2(c). Because

defendant has never appeared it may be fairly assumed that Defendant has not filed a consent

to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. Accordingly, the undersigned submits this recommendation

to the presiding District Judge for the purpose of entering a case dispositive order. For the

reasons that follow, the Court will recommend that the Motion for Default Judgment be granted

in part and denied in part.

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The Clerk entered default on January 22, 2010 (Doc. 9), but the Motion for Default

Judgment was filed only after the Court’s February 24, 2010 Order (Doc. 10) directing Plaintiff

to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute or move for

judgment.

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Because Defendant’s default has been entered under Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure (see Doc. 9),1

 the Court has discretion to grant default judgment against

Defendant pursuant to Rule 55(b). See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980);

Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986). Factors the Court should consider in

deciding whether to grant default judgment include (1) the possibility of prejudice to Plaintiff,

(2) the merits of the claims, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the amount of money at

stake, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether default was due to

excusable neglect, and (7) the policy favoring a decision on the merits. See Eitel v. McCool,

782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Having considered Plaintiff’s motion and supporting

affidavit, which address each of the Eitel factors (see Doc. 11), and having reviewed the wellpled factual allegations of the complaint (see Doc. 1), the Court concludes that default judgment

is appropriate on the FDCPA claim. See Nero v. Law Office of Sam Streeter, P.L.L.C., 655 F.

Supp.2d 200 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting default judgment on FDCPA claims); Gilmore v.

Account Mgmt., Inc., 357 Fed.Appx. 218, 2009 WL 4826953 (C.A.11 (Ga.) (same). The Court

recommends granting Plaintiff’s motion to the extent she seeks $1,000 in statutory damages

under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) and $5,275.00 in attorney fees and $425.30 in costs under

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (see Doc. 11). In its discretion, and upon review of the Blair affidavit,

the Court will decline to award actual damages. The affidavit does not justify an award of

damages beyond the statutory damages. The affidavit does not sufficiently demonstrate that

Plaintiff suffered any out-of-pocket losses such as medical expenses, missed purchase

opportunities, or lost wages attributable to Defendant’s conduct.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment (Doc.

11), be granted in part and denied in part.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that default judgment be in the total amount of

$6,700.30.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The parties shall have

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have seven days within which to file

a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 10th day of August, 2010.

cc: SRB

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