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Parties Involved:
Felton Nelson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 10, 2024 

Decided December 11, 2024 

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge 

DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge

No. 24-1568 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

FELTON NELSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Illinois. 

No. 3:09-CR-30154-SMY-1 

Staci M. Yandle, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Felton Nelson appeals the sentence imposed upon the revocation of his 

supervised release. But his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and 

moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). A defendant who 

appeals a revocation order does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel, 

so the Anders safeguards need not govern our review. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 

788–90 (1973). Even so, our practice is to apply them. See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 

392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1568 Page 2 

issues that an appeal of this kind would be expected to involve. Because counsel’s brief 

appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects discussed in the brief and in

Nelson’s response under Circuit Rule 51(b).† See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 

(7th Cir. 2014). 

In 2023, Nelson violated the conditions of his supervised release after serving 

time in prison for possessing a firearm as a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He admitted 

to three instances of providing false statements and one instance of resisting or 

obstructing a peace officer (thereby committing other federal, state, or local crimes); 

nine instances of unlawfully possessing marijuana and one instance of unlawfully

possessing amphetamine and methamphetamine; ten instances of failing to submit a 

monthly written report to his probation officer and seven instances of doing so 

belatedly; three instances of failing to follow a probation officer’s instructions; one 

instance of failing to timely notify a probation officer after being arrested; five instances 

of failing to participate in counseling sessions as part of his substance abuse program; 

two instances of consuming alcohol; three instances of failing to report for mental health 

treatment; and one instance of failing to participate in the location monitoring program.

Based on the admissions, the district judge revoked Nelson’s supervised release and 

sentenced him to 36 months in prison with 24 months of supervised release to follow.

Counsel represents that he had the required consultation with Nelson and 

confirmed that he does not wish to challenge the basis of the revocation. Counsel thus 

properly refrains from discussing whether Nelson’s admissions were knowing and 

voluntary. See United States v. Wheaton, 610 F.3d 389, 390 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Counsel next considers whether Nelson could raise any non-frivolous procedural 

challenge to the sentence and rightly concludes that he could not. The judge correctly 

determined that Nelson’s most serious violations—providing false statements and 

unlawfully possessing marijuana, methamphetamine, and amphetamine—were 

Grade B violations under the Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2), which 

mandates revocation of supervised release, see § 7B1.3(a)(1). For a defendant with a 

Grade B violation and criminal history category of VI, the guidelines range is 21 to 27 

months of reimprisonment. See § 7B1.4(a). Because Nelson’s original offense was a 

Class A felony, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(1), 3559(a)(1), the statutory maximum term of 

† We received Nelson’s response to counsel’s Anders brief on October 3, 2024, 

after the deadline of September 16. We construe the filing as a motion for leave to file 

the response instanter, grant the motion, and consider the substance of the filing. 

Case: 24-1568 Document: 16 Filed: 12/11/2024 Pages: 3
No. 24-1568 Page 3 

imprisonment for his revocation was five years, see id. § 3583(e)(3). Nelson’s sentence

does not exceed this maximum because his cumulative prison and supervision 

sentences do not exceed the maximum term of supervised release allowed under his 

original offense, which was five years. See id. § 3583(h). 

In his Rule 51(b) response, Nelson proposes arguing that the judge procedurally 

erred by not crediting him for the 23 months he spent on supervised release before it 

was revoked. But that argument would be frivolous because the judge properly 

sentenced Nelson “without credit for time previously served on postrelease 

supervision.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 

Counsel next evaluates whether Nelson could advance a non-frivolous argument 

regarding the substantive unreasonableness of his sentence. We review a revocation 

sentence under a “highly deferential” standard, overturning the sentence only if it was 

“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Childs, 39 F.4th 941, 944–45 (7th Cir. 2022). We 

agree with counsel that the judge adequately considered the relevant sentencing factors 

in § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The judge assessed Nelsons’s “defiance of [his]

obligation to comply with supervised release”; his extensive criminal history; the need 

to protect the public; the fact that he effectively “absconded”; and Nelson’s failure to 

follow through with court-ordered mental health and substance abuse treatment. The 

district judge also noted that Nelson had received a below-guidelines sentence for the 

offense of the conviction and therefore warranted an “upward departure” for the 

revocation sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. n.4. Based on this explanation, the judge

did not abuse her discretion in imposing an above-guidelines sentence. 

Nelson next proposes arguing that his sentence was generally unfair because the 

judge imposed a longer prison term than the government had requested and because 

the judge considered past convictions for which Nelson already served time. But a 

party’s sentencing recommendation does not bind a district judge. United States v. 

Dawson, 980 F.3d 1156, 1166 (7th Cir. 2020). And the judge not only was allowed to 

consider Nelson’s background but was required to do so, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e), 

3553(a)(1), and she appropriately identified a trend of “violent and problematic and 

troubling offenses.” 

Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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