Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-01025/USCOURTS-caDC-96-01025-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent
Professional Pilots Federation
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 3, 1996 Decided July 15, 1997 

No. 95-1604

PROFESSIONAL PILOTS FEDERATION, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with

Nos. 96-1025, 96-1026

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the 

Federal Aviation Administration

Nicholas H. Cobbs argued the cause for petitioners, with 

whom Michael J. Pangia was on the briefs.

Christine N. Kohl, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for respondent, with whom Frank W. 

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Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert S. Greenspan, Attorney, were on the brief.

Edgar N. James and Marta Wagner were on the brief for 

amicus curiae Allied Pilots Association. Martha L. Walfoort

entered an appearance.

Aidan D. Jones was on the brief for amicus curiae Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association.

Before: WALD, GINSBURG, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge WALD.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: The Professional Pilots Federation and two individual pilots petition for review of two 

decisions of the Federal Aviation Administration: not to 

institute a rulemaking to relax the FAA Rule that requires 

commercial airline pilots to retire at age 60, and to extend 

application of the Rule to commuter airline operations. The 

Pilots contend, first, that the Rule unlawfully requires airlines 

to violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, see 29 

U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and, second, that the FAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of the Administrative 

Procedure Act, when it decided to retain and expand the 

scope of the Rule. Finding merit in neither contention, we 

deny the petitions for review.

I. Background

The FAA first promulgated the Age 60 Rule in 1959 

pursuant to its mandate under the Federal Aviation Act of 

1958 to ensure air safety. 24 Fed. Reg. 9767 (December 5, 

1959). See 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(4) (authorizing Administrator to promulgate "regulations in the interest of safety for the 

... periods of service of airmen"); 49 U.S.C. § 44701(c) 

(requiring Administrator to regulate "in a way that best tends 

to reduce or eliminate the possibility or recurrence of accidents in air transportation"); 49 U.S.C. § 44702(b)(1)(A) (requiring Administrator to consider "the duty of an air carrier 

to provide service with the highest possible degree of safety" 

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when issuing an airman, air carrier, or other certificate); Air 

Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 897-98 (2d 

Cir. 1960). The agency concluded that the Rule would promote air safety after finding "that available medical studies 

show that sudden incapacitation due to heart attacks or 

strokes becomes more frequent as men approach age sixty 

and present medical knowledge is such that it is impossible to 

predict with accuracy those individuals most likely to suffer 

attacks." Quesada, 276 F.2d at 898. The Second Circuit, 

reasoning that it was not for a court to substitute its own 

"untutored judgment for the expert knowledge" of the agency, accepted this conclusion and dismissed an early challenge 

to the Rule. Id.

The FAA has reconsidered the Rule on several occasions. 

In the early 1960s, the agency began, but never completed, a 

study to determine the feasibility of testing individual pilots 

over the age of 60 in order to determine whether they 

remained fit to fly. See Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946, 948 (7th 

Cir. 1988). In 1970 the Air Line Pilots Association called 

upon the FAA to replace the blanket prohibition of the Age 

60 Rule with a regime of individualized performance tests and 

medical evaluations, but the agency decided to retain the Rule 

because "an increase in the number of medical examinations 

administered to a given pilot ... would not be an effective 

deterrent to incapacitation inasmuch as the indices of such 

incapacitation are not now sufficiently developed." See 

O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

In 1979 the Congress directed the National Institutes of 

Health to determine whether the Rule was still medically 

warranted. See Pub. L. No. 96-171, 93 Stat. 1285; see also 

Pilots Rights Ass'n v. FAA, 86 F.R.D. 174, 176 (D.D.C. 1980). 

In its final report, the NIH concluded that there was "no 

special medical significance to age 60 as a mandatory age for 

retirement of airline pilots" but recommended that the age 60 

limit be retained nonetheless because there was still no 

"medical or performance appraisal system that can single out 

those pilots who would pose the greatest hazard because of 

early, or impending, deterioration in health or performance." 

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Report of the National Institute on Aging, Panel on the 

Experienced Pilots Study 1 (August 1981).

In 1982 the FAA considered relaxing the Rule in order to 

allow a small group of pilots to continue flying until age 62 in 

order to generate data on their performance under actual 

operating conditions. 47 Fed. Reg. 29,782 (July 8, 1982). 

The FAA ultimately determined, however, that "no medical or 

performance appraisal system can be identified that would 

single out pilots who would pose a hazard to safety." 49 Fed. 

Reg. 14,692, 14,695 (April 12, 1984). Unable "to distinguish 

those pilots who, as a consequence of aging, present a threat 

to air safety from those who do not," the agency decided not 

to experiment with changing the Rule. Id.

The present litigation was stimulated, at least in part, by a 

1993 study of the Age 60 Rule that was performed by Hilton 

Systems, Inc. for the FAA's Civil Aeromedical Institute. The 

Hilton Study correlated accident data for the period from 

1976 to 1988 with pilot age and flying time. This analysis 

revealed "no support for the hypothesis that pilots of scheduled air carriers had increased accident rates as they neared 

the age of 60." Hilton Study at 6-2. On the contrary, the 

study found a "slight downward trend" in accident rates as 

pilots neared the age of 60. The authors cautioned, however, 

that this decrease might have resulted from "the FAA's 

rigorous medical and operational performance standards 

screen[ing] out, over time, pilots more likely to be in accidents."

Shortly after publication of the Hilton Study the FAA 

announced that it was again considering whether to institute 

a rulemaking concerning the Age 60 Rule and invited comments from the public on various aspects of the Hilton Study. 

58 Fed. Reg. 21,336 (April 20, 1993). The agency held a 

public hearing in September 1993 at which 46 members of the 

public made presentations. The agency also received more 

than a thousand written comments.

In July 1993 the Professional Pilots Federation filed with 

the FAA a rulemaking petition to repeal the Rule. The Pilots 

maintained that "time and empirical evidence have shown that 

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the blanket elimination of the country's most experienced 

pilots is not justified in the interests of safety and, therefore, 

is arbitrary and capricious, and violates this country's policy 

of prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of age."

In early 1995 after a series of accidents involving commuter 

airlines, the FAA proposed in a separate rulemaking to bring 

certain commuter operations, previously conducted under 

Part 135, under Part 121. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,230 (March 29, 

1995). These operations would then become subject to the 

more stringent safety standards of Part 121, including the 

Age 60 Rule, relaxation of which the agency was still considering in the wake of the Hilton Study.

In December 1995 the FAA denied the Pilots' petitions to 

repeal the Age 60 Rule and decided not to institute a rulemaking in response to the Hilton Study. 60 Fed. Reg. 65,977 

(December 20, 1995). The agency determined that the "concerns regarding aging pilots and underlying the original rule 

have not been shown to be invalid or misplaced," and concluded that the Rule was still warranted as a safety measure. Id. 

at 65,980. The FAA therefore retained the Rule, which 

provides that:

No certificate holder may use the services of any person 

as a pilot on an airplane engaged in operations under 

[Part 121] if that person has reached his 60th birthday. 

No person may serve as a pilot on an airplane engaged in 

operations under [Part 121] if that person has reached 

his 60th birthday.

14 CFR § 121.383(c) (1996). In addition the FAA adopted its 

proposed rule bringing under Part 121 certain commuter 

operations previously conducted under Part 135. 60 Fed. 

Reg. 65,832 (December 20, 1995). As a result, these commuter operations became newly subject to the Age 60 Rule. The 

Pilots petitioned this court for review of both rulemaking 

decisions.

II. Analysis

The Pilots challenge the FAA's decision not to institute a 

rulemaking to repeal the Age 60 Rule and its decision to 

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apply the Rule to commuter airlines as violations of both the 

ADEA and the APA. First, the Pilots assert that by requiring the airlines to discriminate on the basis of age the Rule is 

in "direct conflict" with the ADEA. Second, they claim that 

the agency violated the APA by: (1) not affording adequate 

consideration to the reasonable alternatives proposed by various commenters; (2) reaching a decision that is against the 

weight of the evidence; and (3) failing to provide any reasoned basis for treating older pilots differently than other 

groups of pilots who create as great or greater a safety risk.

A. The ADEA

The Pilots argue that the Age 60 Rule violates the ADEA 

because it requires the airlines to discriminate against older 

pilots and because the FAA need not have relied upon an agebased Rule in order to achieve its objective of air safety. The 

agency, we are told, could instead have implemented a 

scheme of medical evaluations and individualized testing in 

order to determine whether each pilot remains fit to fly. In 

any event, in the ADEA the Congress spoke directly to the 

role that age may play in employment decisions and the FAA 

cannotas a matter of logic if not of statutory interpretationcountermand that clear statutory command through an 

exercise of its rulemaking authority.

The FAA responds that the ADEA speaks only to employersincluding federal agencies acting in their role as employersand therefore places no substantive limitation upon the 

agency's power to regulate airline safety pursuant to the 

mandate of the Federal Aviation Act. In the alternative, the 

FAA contends that if the ADEA does apply to the air safety 

rules it promulgates, then the Age 60 Rule comes within the 

exception in § 623(f)(1) of that statute for a bona fide occupational qualification. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).

The FAA bases its first point upon the central provision of 

the ADEA itself, which states that "it shall be unlawful for an 

employer" to discriminate in employment upon the basis of 

age. § 623(a). The FAA argues that it promulgated the Age 

60 Rule in its capacity not as an employer but as a regulator; 

in that capacity the agency is specifically authorized, inter 

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alia, to prescribe "regulations in the interest of safety for the 

maximum hours or period of service of airmen." 49 U.S.C. 

§ 44701(a)(4); see also id. at § 44702. Absent a provision in 

the ADEA comparably specific or otherwise capable of overriding the authorization of § 44701"not withstanding any 

other provision of law" comes to mindthe ADEA places no 

limitation upon the rulemaking authority of the FAA.

The FAA also contrasts the ADEA with the Rehabilitation 

Act, in which the Congress expressly subjected the programmatic activities of the Government to the stricture against 

discrimination. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (providing that no 

qualified person shall be discriminated against for a disability 

"under any program or activity conducted by any Executive 

agency"); see also Buck v. DOT, 56 F.3d 1406, 1408-09 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995). Absent a similarly plain and unequivocal expression of intent, the FAA urges that we ought not lightly infer 

that the Congress intended to compromise its single-minded 

pursuit of safety in the air.

We agree with the FAA that the ADEA places no substantive limitation upon the agency's authority to act as a regulator of the airline industry. The statute prohibits both an 

employer in the private sector and an agency of the federal 

government from discriminating upon the basis of age in 

making employment decisions. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 633(a). 

Nothing in the Act can plausibly be read to restrict the FAA 

from making age a criterion for employment when its acts in 

its capacity as the guarantor of public safety in the air. The 

general prohibition of the ADEA, addressed as it is to 

employers, should not be read by mere implication to override 

the specific grants of authority to the FAA in 49 U.S.C. 

§ 44701. If the Congress intends to limit the means available 

to the FAA in its pursuit of air safety, we trust it will say so 

rather than leave the matter to the courts to infer. Therefore, we conclude that the ADEA does not limit the authority 

of the FAA to prescribe a mandatory retirement age for 

pilots; as a result, we need not reach the question whether 

the Age 60 Rule constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification within the meaning of § 623(f)(1) of that Act.

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B. The APA Challenges

We will defer to the FAA's decisions to retain the Age 60 

Rule and to bring commuter airlines under the Rule unless 

those decisions are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983). More particularly, the 

agency must have offered a reasoned explanation for its 

chosen course of action, see FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1088 

(D.C. Cir. 1986), responded to "relevant" and "significant" 

public comments, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 

35 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1977), and demonstrated that it afforded 

adequate consideration to every reasonable alternative presented for its consideration. See Public Citizen v. Steed, 733 

F.2d 93, 103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

With respect to its decision not to convene a rulemaking in 

order to repeal or modify the Age 60 Rule, the FAA argues 

that the appropriate standard of review is the even more 

deferential standard we apply to an agency's decision not to 

institute a rulemaking proceeding. Cellnet Communication, 

Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1992). That 

more deferential standard of review is indicated, however, 

only when the agency has clearly shown that "pragmatic 

considerations" would render the usual and somewhat more 

searching inquiry problematic because "the agency has chosen not to regulate for reasons ill-suited to judicial resolution, 

e.g., because of internal management considerations as to 

budget and personnel or for reasons made after a weighing of 

competing policies." See Bargmann v. Helms, 715 F.2d 638, 

640 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (reviewing FAA decision not to institute 

rulemaking to require first-aid kits on commercial aircraft). 

In the case now before us the decision not to institute a 

rulemaking looking toward repeal of the Age 60 Rule was 

purportedly based upon the merits of the existing Rule. We 

see no need, therefore, to afford the agency more than the 

usualand considerabledeference we show an agency when 

it adopts a rule implementing a statute it is charged with 

administering. We shall therefore apply the arbitrary and 

capricious standard of the APA.

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1. Consideration of alternatives

Various parties filing comments before the FAA proposed 

two alternatives to the present Rule. First, they suggested 

periodic performance checks designed to determine, on an 

individual basis, whether a pilot remains fit to fly. Second, 

they proposed allowing a group of pilots over the age of 60 to 

continue flying commercial passenger aircraft in order to 

gather the data that the FAA would need to make a reasoned 

decision about whether the current retirement age of 60 could 

safely be moved up to perhaps age 62 or 63. The Pilots now 

press both alternatives upon us.

a. Periodic performance checks

The FAA rejected periodic performance checks on the 

ground that they only "verify the state of a pilot's performance at the time of the checks." They do not detect "early 

or subclinical cognitive defects that may subtly degrade performance" and "do not predict whether an individual pilot's 

performance will degrade at any time in the future as a result 

of age." The Pilots assert that rather than afford adequate 

consideration to this proposal the agency blindly relied upon 

its 1984 determination that there are no valid tests capable of 

screening out pilots likely to suffer from age-related impairment. The FAA, we are told, did not even acknowledge that 

a detailed testing protocol had been presented to the agency 

during a 1985 hearing before the House Select Committee on 

Aging. The FAA also purportedly failed adequately to respond to the EEOC's observation that several non-Part 121 

operators, most notably the Boeing Corporation, have 

adopted individualized testing in order to settle various suits 

brought against them under the ADEA. The Pilots fault the 

FAA for responding to the EEOC's detailed comment with 

the simple assertion that it had "not been apprised of the 

testing protocols or of the results of any such testing, ha[d] 

not seen them discussed in the medical literature, and ha[d] 

not been party to the agreements."

The FAA responds by pointing out that it did evaluate the 

specific testing regimens proposed by the commenters before 

finally concluding that testing individual pilots is an inadeUSCA Case #96-1025 Document #284527 Filed: 07/15/1997 Page 9 of 33
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quate substitute for the Age 60 Rule. In the final rule 

document the agency observed that available tests: (1) evaluate only a pilot's present performance and cannot be used to 

predict the sudden onset of an age-related impairment, such 

as early or subclinical cognitive defects; (2) cannot measure 

the subtle degradation of skills that may prove serious in the 

cockpit; and (3) do not evaluate how a pilot responds to 

stress and fatigue.

The FAA contends that its response to the comment submitted by the EEOC was entirely adequate in light of the 

purely anecdotal evidence that the EEOC offered in support 

of its assertion that individualized testing has proven to be a 

viable substitute for a bright-line rule based upon age. The 

EEOC's principal evidence is that it reached a settlement 

agreement with Boeing under which that company's pilots 

were for a time allowed to continue flying until the age of 63. 

The FAA acknowledges as much but is quick to point out 

that: (1) the EEOC lawyer who oversaw the Boeing litigation 

observed in a 1991 article published by the Flight Safety 

Foundation that the full impact of the agreement upon safety 

remained to be assessed; (2) no account of Boeing's experience has yet been published; (3) Boeing pilots are corporate 

pilots who do not fly under Part 121; and (4) a Boeing 

representative had testified before the agency that "neither 

the information uncovered as a result of this effort nor 

subsequent Boeing ... experience with our medical and 

neuropsychological protocols ... gives us confidence that 

means are currently available to detect or predict age-related 

problems which may have [an] adverse [effect] on safety."

The Pilots also claim that the agency's rejection of individualized testing for pilots over the age of 60 is inconsistent with 

its acceptance of monitoring and testing for younger pilots 

with certain known medical conditions. The FAA maintains 

that it did in fact offer an adequate explanation for the 

apparent inconsistency when it specifically found that, although a younger pilot with a diagnosed medical condition 

may be monitored,

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such is not the case in aging, since there are no generally 

applicable medical tests that can, at this time, adequately 

determine which individual pilots are subject to incapacitation secondary to either acute cardiovascular or neurological events or to more subtle adverse conditions related to decline of cognitive functioning.

60 Fed. Reg. at 65,984. For example, a pilot with a diagnosed heart condition can be tested and monitored in order to 

determine whether there is a significant risk that he will 

suffer a heart attack. The FAA allows this pilot to continue 

flying provided that his doctors have determined that the risk 

of his suffering a sudden unexpected impairment due to his 

heart condition is de minimis. There are no tests, however, 

that can accurately determine the risk of an apparently 

healthy but older pilot suddenly being stricken by any one of 

the many potentially disabling conditions that may accompany 

advancing age.

We conclude that the FAA afforded adequate consideration 

to the alternative of individualized testing. The FAA explained that even state-of-the-art testing cannot screen out 

potentially risky pilots. The EEOC did not offer any data in 

support of its assertion that allowing pilots to fly until the age 

of 63 would not compromise safety; the FAA simply cannot 

be faulted for failing to explain away data that are not part of 

the record.

Finally, we conclude that the FAA adequately explained 

the difference in treatment it affords to pilots over the age of 

60 who have no known medical condition and to younger 

pilots who do have a known medical condition. The risk of 

allowing the younger pilot to continue flying is negligible 

providedand it is this critical proviso that our colleague in 

dissent seems to ignorethat "the agency has been able to 

develop a means of assessment and surveillance specifically 

designed to demonstrate the individual's capabilities and to 

identify any adverse changes." Doctors are not only unable 

to determine whether an older but apparently healthy pilot 

will be afflicted with a dangerous condition; they are also 

unable to predict with which of the myriad conditions that 

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*Contrary to the impression created by the dissent, the FAA did 

not suggest "that it is more difficult to monitor known medical 

conditions in an older pilot than in a younger pilot." Dissent at 3-4, 

n.3. Rather, the agency's concern was that it is more difficult to 

detect an unknown medical condition than to monitor a known 

medical condition. 

accompany advancing age an individual pilot is likely to be 

afflicted.* The FAA cannot practically monitor for the onset, 

and thereby avoid the consequences, of all potential hazardous medical conditions in an older pilot. Therefore, it was not 

unreasonable for the FAA to allow younger pilots with particular medical conditions to continue flying while, at the same 

time, not allowing pilots over the age of 60 to do so.

b. Selecting a group of pilots over the age of 60.

The FAA also rejected the suggestion that a group of pilots 

over the age of 60 be permitted to continue flying under Part 

121 in order to generate the data needed for the FAA to 

make an empirical judgment about whether the Age 60 Rule 

is reasonable. The Pilots contend, without elaboration, that 

the FAA failed to offer adequate consideration to this alternative. The FAA responds that it rejected this proposal because it did not have confidence that it could identify a cohort 

of vintage pilots who would not be susceptible to subtle 

impairments or to sudden incapacitation:

The FAA withdrew [a similar plan] in 1984 because valid 

selection tests for the group did not exist. The FAA was 

concerned that, without valid selection tests, these pilots 

would create an unacceptable safety risk in part 121 

operations. The commenter does not suggest any data 

that indicates [sic] that a group described [sic] would be 

able to identify any such tests. The FAA has the same 

concerns today.

60 Fed. Reg. at 65,984.

As long as the FAA cannot identify good candidates for the 

experiment that the Pilots propose, we can hardly conclude 

that its refusal to run the experiment is arbitrary and capricious. On the contrary, it would be unreasonable for the 

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court to require that the FAA periodically suspend its safety 

regulations in order to determine anew, upon the basis of 

(potentially disastrous) experience, whether they are still 

needed. Nor have the Pilots shown that such experimentation with the safety of passengers is permitted by the Federal 

Aviation Act. Indeed, the Congress arguably forbade it by 

requiring the FAA to "consider the duty of an air carrier to 

provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in 

the public interest." 49 U.S.C. § 44701(d)(1)(A).

Nothing in the record suggests that the FAA has, but 

refuses to act upon, the "valid selection tests" it would need in 

order to identify a group of low-risk pilots over the age of 60 

who might safely continue to fly. Therefore we must conclude that the FAA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously

and was quite possibly acting as required by lawwhen it 

refused to waive the Rule in order to allow a selected group 

of pilots to fly commercial passenger aircraft after attaining 

the age of 60.

2. The rationality of age-based risk assessment

The Pilots assert that, in the course of defending the Age 

60 Rule, the FAA drew several distinctions that reveal a 

" 'basic inconsistency in its reasoning' by applying similar 

concepts differently in parallel situations." See Air Line 

Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, 3 F.3d 449, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In 

particular, the Pilots maintain that the FAA's treatment of 

younger pilots, of pilots who do not fly under Part 121, and of 

foreign pilots cannot be reconciled with its treatment of Part 

121 pilots over the age of 60.

a. Younger pilots

The Pilots claim that it is arbitrary and capricious for the 

FAA to ground older and more experienced pilots while 

allowing younger pilots to fly even though a younger pilot is 

more likely than an older pilot to cause an accident. To the 

commenters who argued that this is a contradiction, the FAA 

responded (in essence) that, however valuable experience may 

be, it is no match for a heart attack. Implicit in the FAA's 

decision is the view that a 40-year-old pilot with 15 years of 

experience is a safer bet than a 61-year-old pilot with 36 

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years of experience. The 61-year-old pilot's additional experience is outweighed, that is, by the heightened probability 

that he will lose his ability to fly safelywhether through 

gradual wear and tear or a sudden episodeand the disastrous consequences if he does. The FAA also maintains that 

the Pilots' argument is fundamentally flawed because it assumes that the FAA based its decision to retain the Age 60 

Rule solely upon accident data. Accident data are one consideration, among many, that influenced the FAA's decision 

to select age 60 as the cut off; other data, such as the 

percentage of pilots suffering sudden heart failure, or a 

significant loss of vision or hearing, were also considered, and 

those data provide ample grounds for drawing a distinction 

between younger and older pilots. Indeed, according to the 

agency, all studies of the subject come to the conclusion that 

some mandatory retirement age for pilots is appropriate. 

The studies diverge only with regard to the precise age at 

which retirement should be mandated.

Finally, the FAA questions the assumption, implicit in the 

Pilots' argument, that relatively inexperienced pilots are replacing more experienced pilots as a result of the Age 60 

Rule. Young pilots are rarely if ever given command of an 

aircraft before they have had significant experience. Older 

pilots, therefore, are typically "replaced by pilots who have 

substantial experience as pilots in the first officer position, 

and often as flight engineers before that."

We conclude that the FAA adequately justified its decision 

to distinguish between younger pilots and those over the age 

of 60. The agency reasonably concluded that the risk inherent in allowing an older pilot to fly outweighs the benefit of 

having a more experienced person in command. In contrast, 

the risk of allowing a younger pilot to serve in a noncommand role is negligible while the benefit of allowing him 

to gain experience is high.

b. Younger pilots with known medical conditions

The Pilots observe that the FAA sometimes will allow a 

younger pilot with a serious medical problem to continue 

flying even if his problem is characterized by a high rate of 

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recurrence. It is arbitrary and capricious, the Pilots assert, 

to forbid an apparently healthy pilot over the age of 60 to fly 

because of the risk that he might have a first heart attack 

while, at the same time, allowing a younger pilot to fly in 

spite of the dramatically higher statistical risk that he might 

suffer a second heart attack.

The FAA defends its policy of granting exemptions to pilots 

who have experienced a serious medical problem on the 

ground that it does so only when the risk of a recurrence can 

be assessed adequately. A known condition can not only be 

monitored but also, as in the case of alcoholism and some 

heart conditions, controlled:

When a special issuance medical certificate is granted, 

the condition in question has been clearly identified, and 

the agency has been able to develop a means of assessment and surveillance specially designed to demonstrate 

the individual's capabilities and to identify any adverse 

changes. If that is not possible, certification is not 

granted.

60 Fed. Reg. at 65,984. Meanwhile, the subtler forms of 

physical and mental decline that may accompany aging often 

cannot be detected, let alone monitored or controlled.

In sum, the FAA determined that there are techniques for 

monitoring the health of pilots with certain medical conditions 

but that there is not yet any way of predicting whether and 

when an older pilot is likely to develop a condition with a 

potentially serious impact upon his ability to fly an airplane 

safely. This difference between the two groups is fully 

adequate to warrant the distinction that the FAA has drawn 

between them.

c. Corporate aircraft and air taxis.

The Pilots next assert that the FAA has applied the Age 60 

Rule arbitrarily without regard for either the type of aircraft 

being flown or the type of service being provided. Thus, the 

Rule applies to cargo carriers, where no passengers are at 

risk, but not to corporate aircraft and air taxis, where passengers are at risk. The Pilots claim that this is utterly irrational.

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The FAA responds that the distinction between common 

carriers of passengers and cargo, which are subject to the 

Age 60 Rule, and private carriers of passengers and cargo, 

which are not, is found in the governing statute. The Congress directed the FAA to consider the differences between 

"air transportation," defined as the transportation of passengers or property by a common carrier, 49 U.S.C. 

§§ 40102(a)(5), (24), & (25), and "other air commerce." See

49 U.S.C. § 44701(d)(1)(B). The Congress also specifically 

required the FAA to consider the duty of air carriers, defined 

elsewhere as common carriers, 49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a)(2), (5), 

(24), & (25), "to provide service with the highest possible 

degree of safety in the public interest." See 49 U.S.C. 

§ 44701(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, the agency considers it appropriate to regulate common carriers more stringently than it 

regulates "other air commerce." Insofar as that leaves corporate aircraft and air taxis beyond the reach of the Rule, the 

distinction is not unreasonable, says the agency: corporate 

pilots do not serve the public as do common carriers; and 

while air taxis do serve the public, unlike commuter airlines 

their safety record has not been a source of concern for the 

FAA or the NTSB, perhaps because their operationstypically involving only a few short haul passengers and less 

sophisticated equipmentplace lesser demands upon their 

pilots.

We conclude that the FAA adequately explained its decision to apply the Age 60 Rule to pilots of commuter aircraft 

but not to pilots of corporate aircraft and air taxis. The 

Congress clearly left the FAA free to regulate corporate 

aircraft operations at less than the "highest possible degree 

of safety." See Quesada, 276 F.2d at 898 ("The Administrator did not act unreasonably in placing greater limitations on 

the certificates of pilots flying planes carrying large numbers 

of passengers who have no opportunity to select a pilot of 

their own choice. The Federal Aviation Act contemplates 

just such distinctions between the regulations governing 'air 

commerce' and those governing other air transportation").

As for excluding air taxi operations while extending the 

Rule to commuter operations, we accept the FAA's point that 

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the NTSB had asked the agency specifically to consider 

extending the Rule to commuter operations. 60 Fed. Reg at 

16,235. In responding to the NTSB's request, the FAA was 

not obligedcontrary to our colleague in dissent, see dissent 

at 6to consider whether the Rule might further improve 

safety if applied to still other operations. Nor, we note, could 

such an extension of the Rule in any way benefit the petitioners; indeed, as the Seventh Circuit has observed, it would 

foreclose them from a source of post-60 employment. See 

Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307, 313 (1978).

d. Foreign pilots

Finally, the Pilots claim that it is arbitrary and capricious 

for the FAA to allow a foreign carrier operating in U.S. 

airspace to employ pilots who are over the age of 60 while 

prohibiting a U.S. common carrier from employing even the 

healthiest of pilots beyond that age. The FAA responds that 

as a signatory of the Chicago Convention, see 61 Stat. 1180, 

T.I.A.S. 1591 (December 7, 1944) the United States is required to recognize as valid any license issued by any other 

signatory, provided that the requirements underlying such 

licenses are "equal to or above the minimum standards which 

may be established from time to time pursuant to this convention." See 61 Stat. at 1189; see also 49 U.S.C. 

§§ 40105(b)(1)(A) & (B) (FAA must "act consistently with 

obligations of the United States Government under an international agreement," and "shall consider applicable laws and 

requirements of a foreign country"). The standards that 

have been established under the Chicago Convention permit 

(but do not require) a country to allow commercial pilots to 

fly beyond the age of 60. For this reason, the FAA maintains, it must as a matter of law allow foreign pilots to fly 

notwithstanding the Age 60 Rule.

We agree with the FAA that the mandate of § 40105 

requires this inconsistency in the treatment of domestic and 

foreign carriers and their pilots. Perhaps, however, experience with foreign pilots over the age of 60 flying commercial 

aircraft in U.S. airspace will provide the FAA with the 

comparative data it needs in order to evaluate empirically the 

continuing need for the existing rule.

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3. The weight of the evidence

The Pilots assert that the FAA not only placed unwarranted emphasis upon evidence that supports retaining the Rule 

but also downplayed significant evidence tending to undercut 

that support. Thus, the FAA stressed that an NIH panel 

had found in 1981 that pilot performance deteriorates with 

age while ignoring the same panel's recommendation that 

selected pilots over the age of 60 be allowed to fly in order to 

generate data about the performance of older pilots.

The FAA responds that it did not give short shrift to the 

NIH's recommendation that a limited number of older pilots 

be allowed to fly in order to generate data. The FAA 

remains unwilling to act upon this proposal because it knows 

of no method for selecting a group of low-risk pilots over the 

age of 60.

We agree with the FAA that it did not ignore the recommendations contained in the 1981 report of the NIH. As we 

have seen, see § II.B.1 above, the FAA decided not to allow 

pilots to continue flying past the age of 60 because it did not 

know then, as it does not know now, of any way to identify a 

group of pilots over the age of 60 who are less likely than 

other equally venerable aviators to experience some loss of 

their faculties.

The Pilots also fault the FAA for failing to acknowledge 

that the NIH has withdrawn its support for the Rule. The 

Pilots here refer to the declaration of a former director of the 

National Institute on Aging, Dr. T. Franklin Williams, that he 

had testified in 1985 before the House Select Committee on 

Aging "that it was the official position of the NIA that testing 

of pilots after age 60 was feasible and desirable."

The FAA counters that it did not acknowledge that the 

Institute had withdrawn its support for the Rule because the 

record does not establish any such change of position. The 

only Institute report in the record is the one prepared in 

1981. Neither the NIH nor the NIA has conducted another 

similar study since that time. Only Dr. Williams' declaration, 

submitted in litigation to which the FAA was not a party and 

reproduced in the present rulemaking record, is offered in 

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support of the proposition that the NIA "formally abandoned" 

its earlier position. Moreover, that declaration is in some 

tension with Dr. Williams' statement before the House Committee on Aging that he did not intend "to speak for or 

against the retirement age rule," and with his somewhat 

hesitant assertion that "we can probably reliably test cardiac 

functioning and with reasonable reliability identify risk for 

coronary events in older as well as younger persons."

We conclude that the FAA was under no obligation to 

acknowledge Dr. Williams' post hoc characterization of testimony that was never submitted to the agency. In any event, 

Dr. Williams did not state in his testimony that the NIH had 

formally abandoned the earlier study, nor did he give any 

explanation as to why the NIH would do so. The declaration 

of Dr. Williams contained no new evidence bearing upon the 

validity of the Age 60 Rule.

The Pilots also criticize the FAA for rejecting the proposed 

alternative of screening older pilots through performance 

checks without acknowledging that the NIH advocates that 

approach. As discussed above, see § II.B.1, the FAA afforded adequate consideration to the merits of this alternative 

and concluded that medical science has not yet advanced to 

the point of being able to predict who will experience agerelated deterioration. We see no reason why the FAA should 

be faulted for failing to name the supporters of the proposal 

as long as the agency adequately considered the merits of the 

idea. See Brae Corp. v. United States, 740 F.2d 1023, 1067 

(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Although the Commission has an obligation 

to identify and ponder all relevant issues, it need not mention 

by name every commentator whose grievance it examines").

The Pilots also question the FAA's use of the Hilton Study. 

That study concluded that the available data reveal no increase in the accident rate of pilots nearing age 60, but 

cautioned that there are no data available with respect to 

pilots over the age of 60. Acknowledging that the question of 

when a pilot should be required to retire must be answered 

"very conservatively because of the possibility of catastrophic 

results," the study concluded that "one could cautiously increase the retirement age to age 63." The Pilots claim that 

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the FAA did not adequately explain its failure to adopt this 

recommendation.

The FAA maintains that it regarded the Hilton Study as an 

inadequate basis upon which to change its policy because the 

study considered only accident data; a change of policy would 

have to take account of "data on vision, reaction time, judgment, circadian rhythm and many other neurobehavioral and 

physiological measures." The FAA also questioned whether 

it was appropriate to draw an inference about pilots who fly 

commercial passenger aircraft from statistics pertaining to 

pilots who fly cargo transports, and therefore have a different 

flying pattern that may subject them to lesser levels of 

fatigue and stress; Hilton drew the inference because it 

lacked more relevant data pertaining to commercial passenger pilots over the age of 60 (a null set).

The FAA may seem to have created something of a Catch22 by announcing that it will not allow older pilots to fly until 

it has experiential data demonstrating the continued ability of 

such pilots to fly safely. On the other hand, it hardly seems 

reasonable to require that the Administrator periodically put 

his hand into the fire in order to ensure that he has precisely 

assessed the danger that it poses. If the FAA was justified 

in imposing the Rule in the first place then we cannot say 

that, simply because it is the Rule itself that blocks the 

generation of data necessary to reconsider the Rule, it was 

unreasonable for the FAA to find that it lacks those data. In 

sum, we hold that the FAA's decision not to convene a 

rulemaking to revise the Age 60 Rule was not arbitrary and 

capricious in violation of the APA.

III. Conclusion

We hold that the ADEA does not limit the authority of the 

FAA to regulate air carriers in the interest of safety. Because we also conclude that the FAA was not arbitrary and 

capricious, in violation of the APA, in deciding not to conduct 

a rulemaking for the purpose of amending the Age 60 Rule, 

the petitions for review are

Denied.

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1Up until 1995, part 121 governed common carrier operations 

involving aircraft with more than 30 seats or more than 7,500 

payload capacity. In 1995, the FAA extended part 121 to cover 

airlines in scheduled passenger carrying operations with 10 to 30 

seats and turbojets regardless of seating capacity. See Commuter 

Operations and General Certification and Operation Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,832 (1995). 

WALD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part: The FAA has determined that the progressive anatomic, physiological, and cognitive decline generally associated 

with aging means that all pilots over the age of 60 represent 

too great a threat to aviation safety to be allowed to fly in 

part 121 operations, which constitute by far the bulk of 

commercial common carrier operations.1 The FAA based this 

determination not on evidence demonstrating that pilots over 

60 perform less well than pilots under 60, but rather on the 

claim that there is no accurate means to identify which pilots 

are particularly at risk of suffering a sudden incapacitation or 

more subtle deterioration in their abilities and the age of 60 

was within the age range where the incidence of diseases 

associated with aging sharply increases. This argument is 

essentially the same as that which the FAA offered when it 

first adopted the Age 60 Rule in 1959. The agency continued 

to adhere to the position that the Age 60 Rule is necessary to 

ensure the highest level of aviation safety despite the medical 

and technological developments over the ensuing nearly four 

decades, despite a growing trend among foreign aviation 

authorities to allow pilots over 60 to fly, and despite a recent 

report commissioned by the FAA which concluded there was 

no evidence of an increase in accidents associated with older 

pilots at least up to age 63.

The majority concludes that this decision by the FAA does 

not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 

("ADEA") and satisfies the Administrative Procedure Act's 

("APA") prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency action. I agree that the ADEA does not directly govern the 

FAA in its role as a regulator, and thus the FAA need not 

prove that the Age 60 Rule is a bona-fide occupational 

qualification for pilots. But I believe that the FAA's justificaUSCA Case #96-1025 Document #284527 Filed: 07/15/1997 Page 21 of 33
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2Although I disagree with the majority's analysis of the FAA's 

decision under the APA, I concur with the assessment that our 

usual standard of APA arbitrary and capricious review applies here, 

even though refusals to initiate rulemaking ordinarily are accorded 

particular deference by a reviewing court, because the FAA based 

its refusal to initiate a rulemaking to rescind the Age 60 Rule not on 

pragmatic resource concerns but on the merits of the rule. See

Majority opinion ("Maj. op.") at 8. 

tion for the rule simply does not pass muster under the APA.2

It may be the case that our current medical knowledge and 

testing protocols are unable to identify those older pilots who 

are at risk of sudden incapacitation or subtle deterioration in 

functioning, so that an arbitrary across-the-board age limit 

remains the only reliable means of achieving the highest 

possible level of aviation safety. However, the FAA has not 

yet provided an adequate justification on this go-round for its 

conclusion that this situation still exists, nor for its determination that aviation safety requires all common carrier pilots, 

even those carrying cargo only, to be subject to the age limit 

but not corporate or air-taxi pilots. The FAA's decision also 

suffers from a reliance on flawed and inapplicable studies of 

accident rates. Perhaps hardest to swallow is the FAA's 

continued refusal to try to obtain medical or performance 

data on older pilots at the same time as it claims that such 

evidence is required before any change in the rule can be 

countenanced. The agency's complacent acceptance of this 

Catch-22 situation, particularly given that the result is the 

continuation of a government-imposed regime of age discrimination, seems to me the epitome of arbitrary action.

I. THE FAA'S FAILURE TO OFFER AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION 

OF THE NEED FOR THE AGE 60 RULE

The core of the APA's prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency action is the requirement that an agency must 

provide a reasoned explanation for what it does. While "[t]he 

scope of review under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard 

is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for 

that of the agency," neither may a court sanction agency 

action when the agency merely offers conclusory and unsupUSCA Case #96-1025 Document #284527 Filed: 07/15/1997 Page 22 of 33
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3

In Baker, the Seventh Circuit commented that it was not clear 

"[e]xactly how this distinction [between younger pilots with known 

conditions and older pilots at risk of the conditions] applies as a 

practical matter," but upheld the FAA because petitioners were 

seeking exemptions from the Age 60 Rule and thus bore the 

"burden [of] present[ing] persuasive evidence that granting exemptions would not impair safety." 917 F.2d at 322. Here, however, 

petitioners are challenging the rule itself under the APA, and the 

APA requires the FAA to provide a sufficient explanation demonstrating that its actions are reasonable. Cf. id. at 322 n.6.

Contrary to the majority's thesis, Maj. op. at 10-12, there is 

nothing in the record to support the idea that it is more difficult 

to monitor known medical conditions in an older pilot than in a 

younger pilot; nor is there anythingbeyond the FAA's bare 

assertion that "there are no generally applicable medical tests 

that can, at this time, adequately determine which individual 

pilots are subject to" medical conditions associated with aging, 

Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 76to support the notion that it is 

ported postulations in defense of its decisions or when it 

ignores contradictory evidence in the record and fails to 

justify seeming inconsistencies in its approach. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 

29, 41 (1983); accord Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F.3d 

1396, 1404-05 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The FAA's explanation of its 

decision to retain the Age 60 Rule suffers from all of these 

defects.

The FAA currently grants medical exemptions to pilots 

under 60 who are at risk of sudden incapacitation or subtle 

deterioration in functioning because of known medical conditions, but refuses to grant exemptions to pilots over the age 

of 60 who are at risk of these same effects because of aging. 

In its decision, the FAA argued that this differential treatment of younger pilots and older pilots is merely a reflection 

of the state of medical technology; according to the FAA, 

there are tests by which the status of a known cardiovascular 

or neurological condition can be reliably monitored, but there 

are no tests by which the presence of such a condition can be 

reliably determined. The majority accepts this claim as an 

established fact, but the FAA cites no evidence in its support 

and it certainly is not intuitively clear why the difference 

between being at risk of sudden incapacitation or subtle 

deterioration because of known medical conditions and being 

at risk of the same effects because of aging should produce 

radically different diagnostic capacities. Cf. Baker v. FAA,

917 F.2d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 1990); see also id. at 325 (Will, J., 

dissenting).3If the difficulty in the latter instance is the lack 

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harder to diagnose such conditions in the first place in an older 

than in a younger pilot. The only possible difference is that 

disabling conditionswhether detected or notmay be more 

likely to occur in older than in younger pilots. But see infra note 

4 (FAA's evidence is ambiguous on question of whether age 60 is 

the appropriate cut-off to guard against age-related decline). Yet 

without evidence that such conditions are more easily detected in 

younger pilots, this potential difference does not suffice to justify 

the FAA's Age 60 Rule. Indeed, common sense suggests that 

examining physicians would be more likely to suspect, check for, 

and thus discover disabling conditions in the older pilots. Even if 

that were not the case, however, the possibility that older pilots 

are more subject to disabling medical conditions than younger 

pilots could be readily addressed by more frequent and thorough 

medical testing. 

of certainty regarding the pilot's health, why not simply 

presume that the older pilot does in fact suffer from conditions that could cause these effects and then determine 

whether the pilot is safe to fly by means of the same tests 

that are used to monitor pilots with known conditions?

Nor can the FAA's differential treatment of older and 

younger pilots be explained on the grounds that the agerelated conditions that pose a concern in regard to older 

pilots are different from those found in younger pilots. The 

record makes clear that the FAA allows younger pilots to fly 

who have been diagnosed with cardiovascular disease, even 

though it also lists cardiovascular disease as one of the 

potential causes of sudden incapacitation and subtle deterioration in older pilots. Age 60 Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 65,983-84. 

In any event, it is the potential effects of the medical conditions associated with aging, and not the conditions per se, that 

pose a risk to aviation safety, and the FAA allows younger 

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4

In addition, if the possibility of an age-related cognitive decline 

is to be the linchpin of the FAA's defense of the Age 60 Rule, then 

the agency should provide a more in-depth discussion than it 

currently does of why 60 is an appropriate age cut-off to guard 

against this phenomenon. In its decision the FAA identifies the 

phenomenon of age-related cognitive decline, but provides no indication of when such decline impacts on an individual's ability to 

function. The decision also comments that "[o]ne in 10 persons 

over age 65 and nearly half of those over 85 have Alzheimer's 

disease alone, and increasingly it is found in people in their 40's and 

50's." J.A. at 72. Without any indication of whether the incidence 

of Alzheimer's increases with age before 65, this statement does not 

support an across-the-board age cutoff of 60. See also Institute of 

Medicine, Airline Pilot Age, Health and Performance: Scientific 

and Medical Considerations, J.A. at 215 (noting that the prevalence 

of dementia before 65 has been estimated at 1 percent, while the 

prevalence after 65 has been estimated at 5 percent); J.A. at 638-41 

(affidavit of former Director of National Institute on Aging arguing 

that evidence on neurological and neuropsychological health does 

not support an age cut-off of 60). 

pilots to fly with conditions that could produce the same 

effects. For example, while the FAA puts great emphasis on 

the subtle decline in cognitive functioning that accompanies 

aging, the FAA allows younger pilots to fly with various 

conditions, such as neurological and psychological disorders 

or alcoholism, that potentially could undermine a pilot's cognitive abilities. J.A. 206, 284, 611-12, 678. The FAA nowhere 

explains why the same tests that it employs to assess whether 

younger pilots with these conditions possess the level of 

cognitive functioning required to fly safely cannot be used to 

make the same determination regarding older pilots.4

The FAA's failure to explain adequately its different treatment of younger pilots and older pilots when both are at risk 

of sudden incapacitation or subtle deterioration in functioning 

is not simply a minor deficiency in its analysis. The heart of 

the FAA's defense of the Age 60 Rule is its claim that medical 

knowledge does not provide a means by which those pilots at 

risk of these effects can be accurately identified. If the tests 

that the FAA currently uses to monitor younger pilots with 

known conditions that might cause such effects could be used 

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to monitor older pilots at risk of these conditions, then there 

would be no need for the rule.

A similar lack of reasoned analysis characterizes the FAA's 

explanation of the scope of the Age 60 Rule. The rule 

currently applies to all part 121 pilots, including part 121 

pilots that work solely in cargo operations. It also applies 

only to part 121 pilots; other pilotssuch as corporate pilots, 

test pilots, inspectors, and air-taxi pilotsare not covered. 

The FAA, defending its application of the Age 60 Rule to all 

and only part 121 operations, noted simply that Congress 

required the FAA in promulgating safety regulations to consider the duty of air carriers, which transport passengers or 

property by aircraft as a common carrier, to perform their 

services with the highest possible degree of safety in the 

public interest and to take account of the differences between 

air carriers and other forms of air commerce. See Age 60 

Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 65,985. According to the majority, this 

statement suffices to explain the FAA's refusal to apply the 

Age 60 Rule to non-air carrier pilots, such as corporate pilots, 

because "Congress clearly left the FAA free to regulate 

corporate aircraft operations at less than the highest possible 

degree of safety." Maj. op. at 16. But even if Congress did 

not require the highest possible degree of safety for non-air 

carrier operations, it did authorize the FAA to prescribe 

regulations that the FAA "finds necessary for safety in air 

commerce operations." 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(5) (1994). 

Thus, what is needed before we can conclude that the FAA's 

exclusion of non-air carrier operations from the Age 60 Rule 

is reasonable is some explanation as to why the rule is not 

required to achieve the level of safety that the FAA believes 

is appropriate for non-air carrier operations. Such an explanation is not to be found anywhere in the FAA's decision.

Further, the FAA's citation of the duty of air carriers to 

operate with the highest possible degree of safety does not 

explain why the FAA applies the Age 60 Rule to some but not 

all air carriers. At the same time as it issued its decision 

refusing to rescind the Age 60 Rule, the FAA also promulgated a final regulation extending the rule to commuter operations as part of a shift of most commuter airlines to part 121. 

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However, as applied to commuter operations the Age 60 Rule 

will not be fully effective for four years. The FAA justified 

this four year delay in terms of the burden the rule would 

impose on commuter airlines and commuter pilots; it emphasized that commuter airlines have invested money in training 

pilots in the expectation they could fly past 60 and will be 

subject to numerous other new regulations in the immediate 

future as a result of the shift to part 121, while commuter 

pilots have not planned on leaving their positions at 60. 

These are all sensible reasons to delay enforcement of the 

Age 60 Rule, but they are difficult to reconcile with the FAA's 

citation of the duty of air carriers to perform with the highest 

degree of safety in defending the application of the rule to all 

part 121 operations. Why, if this duty does not allow the 

FAA room to consider the differences between cargo and 

passenger operations or the burden on pilots under part 121, 

does it allow the FAA to take economic and fairness concerns 

into account in regard to commuter operations?

The FAA also provides no explanation for why duty to 

perform with the highest degree of safety possible is consistent with the continued exclusion from the Age 60 Rule of airtaxis, which are air carriers but not regulated under part 121. 

The FAA's only reference to air-taxis comes not in its age 60 

decision but in its proposal to shift commuter operations to 

part 121, and consists merely of the statement that air-taxis 

"are unlike commuter or major air carrier operations," along 

with the comment that the FAA was only asked to put 

commuter operations under part 121. See Commuter Operations and General Certification and Operations Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,230, 16,235 (1995). The majority 

maintains that the exclusion of air-taxi operations from the 

Age 60 Rule is reasonable simply because the FAA was not 

asked to extend the rule to such operations. I find this 

argument wholly unpersuasive and wide of the mark. The 

question is not whether the rule should be extended to airtaxi operations, but rather whether the FAA's application of 

the rule to all air carrier operations coming under part 121 

was reasonable. Given that its defense of the application of 

the Age 60 Rule to all part 121 operations was simply a 

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5The majority also remarks that extension of the Age 60 Rule to 

air-taxi operations would not benefit petitioners, since it would only 

further restrict the opportunities available to pilots over the age of 

60. But again, the petitioners' challenge is to the FAA's claim that 

the duty of air carriers to perform with the highest degree of safety 

is a sufficient basis to justify application of the rule to all part 121 

operations, not to the FAA's exclusion of air-taxi and other non-part 

121 air carrier operations from the rule. If the FAA were to 

determine that the differences between different types of part 121 

operations allowed pilots over the age of 60 to fly in some instances, 

more opportunities for older pilots would be created. 

citation of the air carrier's heavy duty of safety, the FAA has 

an obligation to provide some explanation as to why this duty 

does not require non-part 121 air carrier operations to be 

subject to the Age 60 Rule as well.5

A third deficiency in the FAA's decision is its reliance on 

flawed and inapplicable studies of accident rates. As the 

majority details, one instigating factor behind petitioners' 

request for a rulemaking on the Age 60 Rule was the 1993 

Hilton report on the relationship between pilot age and 

accident rates. This report, commissioned by the FAA, determined that there was no evidence of increased accident 

rates for air carrier pilots as they neared 60, and if anything a 

slight downward trend. Based on its analysis of pilots over 

the age of 60 flying in operations not covered by the Age 60 

Rule, the report concluded that the age limit for part 121 

pilots could be extended from 60 to 63. The FAA concluded, 

however, that the Hilton report did not justify rescission of 

the Age 60 Rule or an increase in the age cutoff.

The FAA based its rejection of the Hilton report in large 

part on the fact that earlier studies had found an increase in 

accident rates. But the record indicates that many of these 

studies are seriously flawed. For example, the FAA described in great detail the conclusions of a 1983 report that 

found a substantially higher accident rate for pilots over 60 

than for younger pilots. While the FAA noted that several 

commentators disagreed with the methodology used in this 

report, it never explained why, despite these methodological 

problems, the 1983 report retained any evidentiary value. As 

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the Seventh Circuit commented, these problemssuch as 

including millions of nearly accident free air carrier miles in 

determining the accident rate for pilots under 60 even though 

as a result of the Age 60 Rule no air carrier miles are 

available in determining the accident rate for pilots over 60, 

and calculating a single accident rate for all pilots in a ten 

year cohortmean that the 1981 report is, at best, of "very 

limited usefulness." Baker, 917 F.2d at 320-21 & n.1; accord

J.A. at 100-01, 659; see also J.A. at 101-02, 500-01, 518-20 

(criticisms of the Office of Technology Assessment report and 

the second Golasewski report). The FAA also relies on a 

National Research Council report that found car accident 

rates increased for older drivers, arguing that the lack of part 

121 pilots flying past 60 necessitated the use of surrogate 

data to assess the performance of older pilots and that car 

accident data was a relevant comparison because both flying 

and driving a car require good reflexes and judgment. But, 

again as the Seventh Circuit has noted, "[t]he connection 

between automobile drivers and pilots itself seems tenuous 

given the pilots' training, demonstrated proficiency, medical 

fitness, etc." Baker, 917 F.2d at 321; see also J.A. at 504. 

The FAA does not acknowledge these differences or explain 

why, even so, car accident data is relevant.

II. THE NEED FOR EVIDENCE ON OLDER PILOT SAFETY 

AND THE FAA'S REFUSAL TO OBTAIN IT

These deficiencies in the FAA's justifications for the Age 60 

Rule lead me to conclude that the FAA's decision to retain 

the rule fails the reasoned decisionmaking requirements of 

the APA. Even without them, I believe that the FAA's 

refusal to try and obtain the evidence it claims is necessary to 

rescind the rule would require us to hold that its decision was 

arbitrary.

In its decision, the FAA emphasizes that what is required 

before a conclusive assessment of the contribution of the Age 

60 Rule to protect aviation safety can be reached is medical 

and performance data on pilots over 60 serving in air carrier 

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scored by the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") in its 

1981 report on the Age 60 Rule, and the need for such 

directly relevant data is hard to deny. But the FAA simultaneously refuses to allow any over-60 pilots whose performance and health could be studied to generate this data to fly 

in air carrier operations, even pilots who have been subjected 

to rigorous medical and performance screening. The FAA 

defended its refusal to allow such a study of older pilots on 

the basis of the same argument that it uses to justify retention of the Age 60 Rule in generalnamely that there is no 

reliable means for selecting pilots to participate in the study 

who were not at risk of sudden incapacitation or subtle 

deterioration in their abilities, and in the absence of such 

selection tests the study would represent too great a threat to 

aviation safety.

The flaws in the FAA's reasoning discussed above make it 

difficult to credit the FAA's conclusion that such a study 

would pose an unacceptable risk to aviation safety. If accommodating the reasonable expectation of commuter airlines 

and commuter pilots justifies delaying application of the Age 

60 Rule to commuter operations, then surely the pressing 

need for data on older pilot health and performance justifies 

allowing a carefully screened group of pilots to fly past 60 as 

part of a systematic study of older pilots. And the FAA's 

contention that there is no means by which to safely select 

participants for such a study is undercut by the agency's 

claim that it can safely monitor younger pilots with known 

conditions that could result in sudden incapacitation or subtle 

deterioration in functioning. In addition, many experts who 

study the Age 60 Rule have argued that a carefully screened 

group of over 60 pilots could safely be allowed to fly as part of 

a systematic study. For example, the NIH report, which the 

FAA itself describes as "the most comprehensive study yet 

performed of the issues involved in age-related retirement of 

airline pilots," Age 60 Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 65,982, recommended that the FAA undertake such a program and provided a general description of what would be required. Thus, 

clearly the authors of the NIH report, who were national 

experts on the medical conditions associated with aging, 

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believed that such a study could be safely undertaken. See

J.A. at 179-81; see also id. at 471-73 (testimony of Dr. James 

Hickman of the Mayo Clinic to the same effect); see generally Andreas E. Struck et al., Multidimensional Risk Assessment versus Age as Criterion for Retirement of Airline 

Pilots, 40 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y. 526, 530 (1992) (arguing that 

under an improved medical certification procedure conditions 

that might cause sudden incapacitation or subtle deterioration 

in functioning "would most likely be identified" and advocating an increase in the mandatory retirement age for pilots to 

70), reprinted in J.A. at 622; Charles E. Drebing et al., Early 

Detection of Cognitive Decline in Higher Cognitively Functioning Older Adults, 8 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY No. 1, 31, 35 (1994) 

(analyzing data on a battery of tests designed to screen for 

cognitive decline and concluding that the battery "exhibits a 

relatively high degree of accuracy").

In any event, recent developments make it possible for the 

FAA to obtain medical and performance data from pilots 

flying in part 121 operations. Europe's Joint Aviation Authority as well as several Asian countries now permit pilots to 

fly past age 60, and by treaty these pilots must be allowed to 

fly in U.S. airspace. As the majority notes, this fact creates a 

natural source of exactly the sort of information on older 

pilots that is needed. Another seemingly valuable source of 

data on pilot functioning are commuter pilots over 60 who will 

be allowed to fly for four years after commuter operations are 

shifted under part 121. A third potential source is non-part 

121 operators who have agreed to allow pilots to fly past 60 

pursuant to consent decrees with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission. At no point in its decision, however, does the FAA suggest that it will make any efforts to 

obtain data on older pilot functioning from any of these 

sources.

Ordinarily, an agency's failure to try and obtain data 

needed to initiate a rulemaking would not be arbitrary; 

agencies must be allowed to set their own agendas and 

allocate their resources as they see fit. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985). But circumstances surrounding the FAA's retention of the Age 60 Rule are not 

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6A rider to the 1996 appropriations bill prohibited the National 

Transportation Safety Board from expending any funds to study the 

performance of pilots over 60. See Department of Transportation 

ordinary. For nearly forty years, the FAA has argued that 

the Age 60 Rule is necessary to ensure the highest level of 

aviation safety but it has yet to supply the direct evidence of 

older pilot health and performance that is needed to support 

this proposition. See, e.g., Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946, 948 

(7th Cir. 1988) (commenting that "the agency's progress in 

developing an understanding of the relationship between aging and flight performance has been disappointing"). The 

Age 60 Rule also exacts substantial costs; pilots are forced to 

end their careers even though they are healthy and perfectly 

able to fly and the flying public is deprived of the valuable 

expertise that these pilots offer. These costs do not on their 

own make the Age 60 Rule unreasonable, since they may be 

unavoidable if aviation safety is to be assured only in this 

way, but their presence makes it incumbent on the FAA to 

try to obtain the evidence required to fully and accurately 

assess the need for the Age 60 Rule.

Most importantly, the Age 60 Rule stands as an instance of 

government-mandated age discrimination for a particular 

group of employees. The ADEA manifests our country's 

rejection of measures that discriminate against individuals 

solely because of their age; its stated purpose was to "promote employment of older persons based on their ability 

rather than age ... [and] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). As I indicated 

earlier, I do not believe that the ADEA directly governs the 

FAA in its role as a regulator of aviation such as to make it 

necessary for the FAA to demonstrate that the Age 60 Rule 

is a bona-fide occupational qualification and therefore acceptable under the Act. But this does not mean that the FAA 

can ignore the ADEA altogether. The congressional condemnation of age discrimination embodied in the ADEA imposes 

a duty on the FAA to try to obtain data that might allow it to 

do away with its current reliance on an arbitrary across-theboard age cutoff as a method of ensuring aviation safety.6

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III. CONCLUSION

Judges must be ever-vigilant to ensure that when enforcing 

the APA's requirement of reasoned decisionmaking they defer to agency expertise. The importance of such deference is 

most acute in regard to safety determinations, given the 

potential catastrophic effects of inadequate safety regulations, 

and it is difficult to imagine an agency decision which judges 

would be more disposed to accept than one that implicates 

aviation safety. However, deference to agency expertise 

cannot be allowed to become toleration of arbitrary agency 

actionor in this case inactioneven in an area as critical as 

aviation safety. Because I believe the FAA has failed to 

provide a reasoned explanation for its decision to retain the 

Age 60 Rule, I would remand to the agency for further 

proceedings.

_____________________ 

and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-

205, § 345, 110 Stat. 2951, 2976 (1996). But this rider was not in 

effect when the FAA rendered its decision, and thus is irrelevant to 

a determination of whether the FAA's failure to undertake measures to obtain data on older pilot functioning was reasonable. 

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