Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00331/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00331-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant
Wenda Campbell
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WENDA CAMPBELL, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 06-0331-C

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, :

Commissioner of Social Security, 

:

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security denying her claims for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income. The parties have consented to the exercise of

jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for all

proceedings in this Court. (See Docs. 26 & 27 (“In accordance with the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this case

consent to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all

proceedings in this case . . . and order the entry of a final judgment, and

conduct all post-judgment proceedings.”)) Upon consideration of the

Case 1:06-cv-00331-C Document 28 Filed 07/13/07 Page 1 of 14
1 Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and judgment shall

be made to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (See Docs. 26 & 27 (“An appeal from a

judgment entered by a Magistrate Judge shall be taken directly to the United States Court of

Appeals for this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of this

district court.”))

2

administrative record, plaintiff's proposed report and recommendation, the

Commissioner's proposed report and recommendation, the parties' arguments

at the July 11, 2007 hearing before the Court, it is determined that the decision

to deny benefits should be reversed and this cause remanded to the

Commissioner of Social Security for further consideration not inconsistent

with this decision..1

Plaintiff alleges disability due to diabetes, diabetic neuropathy,

hypertension and obesity. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made the

following pertinent findings:

3. The claimant has “severe” impairments, including insulin

dependent diabetes mellitus, peripheral neuropathy,

hypertension, and obesity.

4. The claimant’s impairments, considered individually and

in combination, do not meet or equal in severity any impairment

set forth at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. The claimant’s allegations of pain and functional

limitations are not fully credible.

6. The claimant retains the residual functional capacity to

perform a full range of light work.

Case 1:06-cv-00331-C Document 28 Filed 07/13/07 Page 2 of 14
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7. The claimant can perform past relevant work.

8. The claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the

Social Security Act.

(Tr. 23) The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision (Tr. 4-6) and thus,

the hearing decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security.

DISCUSSION

In all Social Security cases, the claimant bears the burden of proving

that she is unable to perform her previous work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d

1001 (11th Cir. 1986). In evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden,

the examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective medical

facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence

of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education and work history. Id. at 1005.

Once the claimant meets this burden, it becomes the Commissioner's burden

to prove that the claimant is capable, given her age, education and work

history, of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment which

exists in the national economy. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th

Cir. 1985).

The task for the Magistrate Judge is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision to deny claimant benefits, on the basis that Campbell

Case 1:06-cv-00331-C Document 28 Filed 07/13/07 Page 3 of 14
2 This Court's review of the Commissioner's application of legal principles,

however, is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

4

can perform her past relevant work as a convenience store clerk, cook and

printing laborer, is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is

defined as more than a scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).

"In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we must view the record

as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to

the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th

Cir. 1986).2

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ (1) erred in failing to make a specific

finding of fact regarding the physical and mental demands of her past relevant

work as a convenience store clerk, cook and printing laborer; and (2) he erred

in finding that her diabetes was caused by her non-compliance with prescribed

treatment. During oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel added to his first argument

that the ALJ’s determination that Campbell can perform the full range of light

work is not supported by substantial evidence inasmuch as there is no physical

residual functional capacity assessment of record which establishes that she

can perform light work. Because the Court can discern no substantial evidence

Case 1:06-cv-00331-C Document 28 Filed 07/13/07 Page 4 of 14
3 As recognized in the ruling, use of this test is likely to be “fallacious and

insupportable” because “[w]hile ‘delivery jobs,’ ‘packaging jobs,’ etc., may have a common

characteristic, they often involve quite different functional demands and duties requiring varying

abilities and job knowledge.”

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in the record which supports the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff can perform

the full range of light work and, therefore, no support for the determination

that plaintiff can perform her past relevant light work as a convenience store

clerk, cook, and printing laborer, there is no need to address plaintiff’s other

assignments of error. See Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1562 (11th Cir.

1985) (“Because the ‘misuse of the expert’s testimony alone warrants

reversal,’ we do not consider the appellant’s other claims.”).

Although the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability

to return to her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has

an obligation to develop a full and fair record. Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d

578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). Social Security Ruling 82-61

recognizes three possible tests for determining whether or not a claimant

retains the capacity to perform his past relevant work. They are as follows:

1. Whether the claimant retains the capacity

to perform a past relevant job based on a broad

generic, occupational classification of that job,

e.g., "delivery job," "packaging job," etc.3

 

 

 2. Whether the claimant retains the capacity

to perform the particular functional demands and

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4 The Dictionary of Occupational Titles' descriptions can be relied upon to define

the job as it is usually performed in the national economy.

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job duties peculiar to an individual job as he or

she actually performed it. 

3. Whether the claimant retains the capacity

to perform the functional demands and job duties

of the job as ordinarily required by employers

throughout the national economy.4

Under § 404.1520(e) of the Commissioner's regulations, a claimant will be

found to be "not disabled" when it is determined that she retains the residual

functional capacity to perform the actual functional demands and job duties of

a particular past relevant job or the functional demands and job duties of the

occupation as generally required by employers throughout the national

economy. SSR 82-61.

In this case, the ALJ appears to have relied upon test three above to

determine that the claimant can perform her past relevant work as a

convenience store clerk, cook and printing laborer. (See Tr. 22-23 (“At the

hearing, I asked the vocational expert to identify work performed by the

claimant in the past fifteen years, indicating the title of the job, and the skill

and exertional level of each job. The vocational expert testified that the

claimant had worked as a: Convenience Store Clerk (semi-skilled, light);

Kitchen Helper (unskilled, medium); Cook (semiskilled, light) and Printing

Case 1:06-cv-00331-C Document 28 Filed 07/13/07 Page 6 of 14
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Laborer (unskilled, light). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) & 416.920(e) provide that

an individual will be found ‘not disabled’ when it is determined that a claimant

retains the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work. This

includes performance of the actual functional demands and duties of a

particular past relevant job or the functional demands and duties of the

occupation as generally required by employers throughout the national

economy. Because Convenience Store Clerk, Cook and Printing Laborer are

all performed at the light exertional level, I find that the claimant can perform

these jobs. Upon consideration of the record, including the vocational expert’s

testimony, I find that the claimant retains the residual functional capacity to

perform her past relevant work.”)) 

Section 404.1520(e) of the Commissioner's regulations requires a

review and consideration of a plaintiff's residual functional capacity and the

physical and mental demands of the past work before a determination can be

made that the plaintiff can perform his past relevant work. Social Security

Ruling 82-62 provides that evaluation under § 404.1520(e) "requires careful

consideration of the interaction of the limiting effects of the person's

impairment(s) and the physical and mental demands of his . . . PRW to

determine whether the individual can still do that work." See also Lucas v.

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Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567, 1574 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990) (to support a conclusion

that a claimant "is able to return to her past work, the ALJ must consider all

the duties of that work and evaluate her ability to perform them in spite of her

impairments").

The RFC to meet the physical and mental demands of jobs a

claimant has performed in the past (either the specific job a

claimant performed or the same kind of work as it is customarily

performed throughout the economy) is generally a sufficient

basis for a finding of "not disabled." 

 

...

The decision as to whether the claimant retains the functional

capacity to perform past work which has current relevance has

far-reaching implications and must be developed and explained

fully in the disability decision. Since this is an important and,

in some instances, a controlling issue, every effort must be made

to secure evidence that resolves the issue as clearly and

explicitly as circumstances permit. 

Sufficient documentation will be obtained to support the

decision. Any case requiring consideration of PRW will contain

enough information on past work to permit a decision as to the

individual's ability to return to such past work (or to do other

work). Adequate documentation of past work includes factual

information about those work demands which have a bearing on

the medically established limitations. Detailed information

about strength, endurance, manipulative ability, mental demands

and other job requirements must be obtained as appropriate.

This information will be derived from a detailed description of

the work obtained from the claimant, employer, or other

informed source. Information concerning job titles, dates work

was performed, rate of compensation, tools and machines used,

knowledge required, the extent of supervision and independent

Case 1:06-cv-00331-C Document 28 Filed 07/13/07 Page 8 of 14
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judgment required, and a description of tasks and

responsibilities will permit a judgment as to the skill level and

the current relevance of the individual's work experience.

SSR 82-62. In finding that a claimant has the capacity to perform a past

relevant job, the decision of the Commissioner must contain among the

findings, a finding of fact as to the claimant's residual functional capacity, a

finding of fact as to the physical and mental demands of the past

job/occupation, and a finding of fact that the claimant's residual functional

capacity would permit a return to the past job or occupation. Id.

It is clear that the ALJ not only need make the foregoing findings but

that such findings must be supported by substantial evidence in the record. In

this instance, the ALJ determined that Campbell can perform the full range of

light work. (See Tr. 22 (“On consideration of the record, I find that the

claimant retains the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a full range

of light work. This RFC takes into consideration, among other things,

claimant’s allegations of numbness and pain from peripheral neuropathy and

fatigue by reducing the amount of weight lifted and carried.”)) “Light work

involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or

carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted

may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of

Case 1:06-cv-00331-C Document 28 Filed 07/13/07 Page 9 of 14
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walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some

pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) &

416.967(b) (2006). Social Security Ruling 83-10 recognizes that “[r]elatively

few unskilled light jobs are performed in a seated position.”

“Frequent” means occurring from one-third to two-thirds

of the time. Since frequent lifting or carrying requires being on

one’s feet up to two-thirds of a workday, the full range of light

work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of

approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. Sitting may occur

intermittently during the remaining time. The lifting requirement

for the majority of light jobs can be accomplished with

occasional, rather than frequent, stooping. Many unskilled light

jobs are performed primarily in one location, with the ability to

stand being more critical than the ability to walk. They require

use of arms and hands to grasp and to hold and turn objects, and

they generally do not require use of the fingers for fine activities

to the extent required in much sedentary work.

Id. “To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light

work,” an individual must have the ability to perform substantially all of the

foregoing activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) & 416.967(b).

There is simply no evidence in the record which establishes that

plaintiff can perform the standing and walking requirements of a full range of

light work. To be sure, on January 3, 2004 plaintiff indicated on a physical

capacities questionnaire form that she could stand for one hour, walk for one

mile and sit for 30 minutes (Tr. 78); however, such admission, at best, suggests

Case 1:06-cv-00331-C Document 28 Filed 07/13/07 Page 10 of 14
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that plaintiff might possibly be able to perform work which allows for a

sit/stand option. This evidence decidedly does not establish that plaintiff can

perform the prolonged standing and walking required of either the full range

of light work or her past relevant work as a convenience store clerk, cook and

printing laborer. The only physical capacities evidence in the record from a

treating or examining source, evidence which was specifically rejected by the

ALJ, established that plaintiff cannot even perform sedentary work. (Compare

Tr. 140 (PCE completed by treating physician Dr. John MacLennan) with Tr.

166 (VE’s testimony that MacLennan’s PCE was “less than a sedentary PCE

in the number of hours a person could sit, stand or walk.”)) Having rejected the

only residual functional capacity evidence of record from an independent

source, this Court holds that it was incumbent upon the ALJ to obtain an RFC

assessment from another source establishing that plaintiff can perform the

physical requirements of the full range of light work particularly in light of the

consistent testimony from the plaintiff and the vocational expert regarding the

impact of diabetic neuropathy on the ability to perform work activities.

(Compare Tr. 159 & 163 (“I’m a diabetic and right now I have complication

with my sugar when I stay level and the diabetic complication now is going

into my legs and my feet[]. . . . Like I said I got sick [during the latter part of

Case 1:06-cv-00331-C Document 28 Filed 07/13/07 Page 11 of 14
5 This testimony and the evidence of record as a whole (see Tr. 78-83 & 99-142)

reflects the type of physical limitations experienced by individuals who have insulin-dependent

diabetes mellitus and peripheral (or diabetic) neuropathy. “[T]he term ‘diabetic neuropathy’ is

defined as ‘a generic term for any diabetes mellitus-related disorder of the peripheral nervous

system, autonomic nervous system, and some cranial nerves.’ . . . ‘This most common of the

chronic complications of diabetes can affect either the peripheral or the autonomic nervous

system, or both. Peripheral neuropathies can cause bilaterally symmetric hypethesia,

hyperesthesia, paresthesia, loss of temperature and vibratory sense, or causalgia. Involvement of

the autonomic nervous system may be manifested by postural hypotension, gastroparesis,

alternating diarrhea and constipation, and impotence. The pathogenesis of chronic diabetic

neuropathy is poorly understood. Symptoms tend to progress, and the response to treatment is

unpredictable.’” Barrientoz v. Massanari, 202 F.Supp.2d 577, 580 n.21 (W.D.Tex. 2002)

(emphasis in original), citing and quoting STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 1212 (27th

ed. 2000); see also The Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary, 376 (Diabetic

neuropathy is “a chronic, symmetrical sensory polyneuropathy affecting first the nerves of the

lower limbs and often affecting autonomic nerves; pathologically, there is segmental

demyelination of the peripheral nerves.”); see Mendoza v. Apfel, 88 F.Supp.2d 1108, 1109 n.1

(C.D. Cal. 2000) (“Peripheral neuropathy, or polyneuropathy, consists of ‘neuropathy of several

peripheral nerves simultaneously.’”).

12

2003] and my feet[] and stuff started bothering me. I couldn’t walk on them,

couldn’t stand up.”) with Tr. 167 (VE’s testimony that “[d]iabetes results in a

lot of different conditions from numbness or neuropathy in the extremities to

loss of vision as the disease progresses, and also the loss of the extremities if

the claimant has severe diabetes and is non-compliant. Limitations from me

would be sedentary to light jobs that allow more for the sit/stand option or

would allow mostly sitting.”))5

 Because the record in this case contains no

evidence, much less substantial evidence, which establishes that plaintiff can

perform the physical requirements of the full range of light work--in particular,

the six hours of walking and standing--the Court finds that the ALJ improperly

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6 Put differently, based upon the evidence contained in this record, this Court finds

that plaintiff has carried her burden of establishing her inability to return to her past relevant

work.

13

determined not only that Campbell retains the residual functional capacity to

perform the full range of light work but, as well, improperly determined that

plaintiff can perform the requirements of her past work as a convenience store

clerk, cook and printing laborer.6 Accordingly, this cause must be remanded

to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings not

inconsistent with this decision.

CONCLUSION

The Court ORDERS that the decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying plaintiff benefits be reversed and remanded pursuant to

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89,

111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), for further proceedings not

inconsistent with this decision. The remand pursuant to sentence four of §

405(g) makes the plaintiff a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access

to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct.

2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993), and terminates this Court’s jurisdiction over 

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this matter. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 12th day of July, 2007.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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