Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-13-14142/USCOURTS-ca11-13-14142-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Adrian Velazquez
Appellant

Document Text:

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 13-14141

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20231-UU-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

YOLANDA SOSA, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

No. 13-14142

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20231-UU-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 1 of 17
2

versus

ADRIAN VELAZQUEZ, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(April 3, 2015)

Before HULL, BLACK, and MELLOY,

∗ Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Pursuant to written plea agreements, Yolanda Sosa and Adrian Velazquez

(collectively, “Defendants”) pled guilty to conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud. 

Defendants appeal two forfeiture orders entered by the district court after it 

imposed joint-and-several restitution against Defendants in the amount of 

$753,430. These consolidated appeals involve the restitution amount and the 

forfeiture of two cars. After careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, 

and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm. 

 ∗

Honorable Michael J. Melloy, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting 

by designation.

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 2 of 17
3

I. BACKGROUND

A. 2011 Medicare Fraud

The factual proffers accompanying Defendants’ plea agreements set forth 

the offense conduct as follows. Between June 15, 2011, and October 7, 2011, 

Defendants met with a “cooperating doctor” and paid the doctor for prescriptions 

that Defendants could use to fraudulently bill Medicare. Specifically, Defendants 

provided the cooperating doctor with Medicare beneficiary information and paid 

the doctor thousands of dollars to write prescriptions for expensive medications 

that were not actually given to any patients. The doctor never saw or evaluated the 

patients, and instead wrote the prescriptions for whatever medications Defendants 

requested. Defendants gave the fraudulent prescriptions to various pharmacies, 

which submitted false claims to Medicare based on the prescriptions.

As a result, Medicare paid the pharmacies approximately $753,430 based on 

the false claims. The pharmacies paid Defendants over $60,000 for obtaining the 

fraudulent prescriptions. Thus, Defendants’ conduct resulted in a total fraud loss 

amount of $753,430. 

B. Plea Agreements 

On April 9, 2013, Defendants were charged in an 18-count indictment with 

various offenses arising out of the Medicare fraud scheme. On June 26, 2013, 

Defendants executed substantially identical plea agreements, in which they agreed 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 3 of 17
4

to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. In return, the government agreed to dismiss the remaining 

counts. 

Under the express terms of their plea agreements, Defendants “agree[d] to 

entry of a personal money judgment in favor of the United States in the amount of 

$753,430, which represents the gross proceeds of the offense of conviction, 

pursuant to [18 U.S.C. § 982].” To this end, Defendants “voluntarily agree[d] to 

forfeit all of [their] right, title, and interest in [two real properties located at 8550 

N.W. 30th Avenue and 2500 N.W. 99th Street in Miami, Florida,] to the United 

States as substitute assets to satisfy the personal money judgment.” 

In the plea agreements, Defendants agreed knowingly and voluntarily to

waive the following: any claim or defense under the Eighth Amendment—

including any claim of excessive fine or penalty—with respect to the forfeiture;

any right to a jury trial on the forfeiture; any statute of limitations with respect to 

the forfeiture; any notice of forfeiture proceedings; and “any right to appeal any 

order of forfeiture entered by the Court pursuant to the plea agreement.” The plea 

agreements also stated that Defendants were “aware that [their] sentence[s] had not 

yet been determined by the Court.” 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 4 of 17
5

C. Plea Hearing

During the joint plea hearing, Defendants confirmed that they had reviewed 

their plea agreements with counsel and understood each and every term of the 

agreements. The district court reviewed the plea agreements’ restitution and 

forfeiture provisions in detail. With regard to the forfeiture provisions, the 

government stated that defense counsel had suggested paying the money judgment 

with a “substantial cash payment or some other payment plan” instead of forfeiting 

the two houses, and that the government, while not promising to agree to that 

proposal, would at least consider it going forward. 

The district court confirmed Defendants’ understanding that they were liable 

for repaying $753,430 to the government, and that they could not object to “any 

source to forfeiture” or otherwise challenge any forfeiture ordered against them. In 

response to the district court’s inquiry, Defendants stated that no one forced or 

coerced them to plead guilty or to agree to the forfeiture or the money judgment. 

Defendants affirmed that they signed the factual proffer and agreed with 

each and every fact contained in the proffer. Finding that Defendants were aware 

of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the pleas, the district court 

accepted Defendants’ guilty pleas as knowing and voluntary and adjudicated them 

guilty of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud. 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 5 of 17
6

D. Presentence Investigation Reports

The presentence investigation reports (“PSIs”) outlined Defendants’ assets, 

including: two houses, six cars (a 2000 Chevrolet Silverado, a 2001 Kia Sportage, 

a 2002 Chevrolet Corvette, a 2007 Cadillac Escalade, a 2012 Dodge Challenger, 

and a 2013 BMW 740i), and seven bank accounts. Defendants held approximately 

$3000 in domestic bank accounts, and Sosa reported an additional $22,000 in an 

individual bank account at Banco Popular in the Dominican Republic. 

In June 2005 (before the 2011 fraud), Sosa obtained a $180,000 mortgage 

loan on property located at 8550 NW 30th Avenue in Miami, Florida, which was 

worth approximately $124,033. In April 2012 (shortly after the 2011 fraud), Sosa 

paid off the loan in full. In July 2011 (during the fraud period), Defendants paid 

$40,000 to purchase property located at 2500 NW 99th Street in Miami, Florida, 

which was worth approximately $69,472. 

In 2012, Defendants reported an adjusted gross income of $395,616—listed 

as “gambling proceeds”—on their joint federal tax return, and claimed a tax refund 

of $32,169. The PSIs ultimately determined that Sosa’s net worth was $204,213, 

and Velazquez’s net worth was $42,256. 

Neither defendant objected to the PSIs. 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 6 of 17
7

E. Sentencing 

On August 23, 2013, the district court held the sentencing hearing. In 

explaining the circumstances of the offense, the government stated that Defendants 

“met with the cooperating doctor on a number of occasions” until the government 

“shut it down” and “pulled the [doctor’s] proactive cooperation.” The government 

confirmed that the total loss amount of $753,430 was attributable to Defendants’ 

transactions with the cooperating doctor, and that the four pharmacies involved 

received $13 or $14 million dollars from Medicare. When the district court asked 

why the government would pay millions of dollars in claims that it knew to be 

fraudulent, the government responded that the Department of Health and Human 

Services was authorized to pay the claims as part of an undercover operation. 

As to the money judgment, the government stated that it had recommended a 

sentence at the low end of the guidelines range, in part because Defendants had 

agreed to the money judgment of $753,430 and had indicated they intended to 

plead guilty early on in the process. Defense counsel contended that Defendants 

did not actually receive most of the money fraudulently obtained from Medicare. 

The government pointed out that Sosa and Velazquez—despite claiming to be a 

housekeeper and a mechanic, respectively—owned two houses and six cars. The 

houses were purchased or paid off during or shortly after the 2011 conspiracy. 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 7 of 17
8

One of the cars, a 2013 BMW 740i, was purchased right before Defendants’ arrest 

on April 18, 2013. 

The district court sentenced each defendant to 24 months’ imprisonment, at 

the low end of the advisory guidelines range. The district court also imposed jointand-several restitution in the amount of $753,430 and forfeiture of certain property 

consistent with Defendants’ plea agreements. Neither defendant objected to the 

sentence. 

F. Preliminary Forfeiture Order

The government moved for a preliminary order of forfeiture for the two 

houses specified in the plea agreements as substitute assets to satisfy the personal 

money judgment of $753,430. On August 28, 2013, the district court entered a 

preliminary order of forfeiture for the two houses, which were valued circa 

$220,000. 

G. Amended Forfeiture Order

On September 4, 2013, the government moved to amend the preliminary 

forfeiture order as to the money judgment of $753,430, pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32.2(e) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p).1

 The government sought 

 1

Section 853(p) mandates forfeiture of substitute property when, as a result of any act or 

omission of the defendant, any property subject to forfeiture: “(A) cannot be located upon the 

exercise of due diligence; (B) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; (C) 

has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; (D) has been substantially diminished in 

value; or (E) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 8 of 17
9

forfeiture of additional substitute assets, namely, three cars registered in the name 

of defendant Sosa: a 2007 Cadillac Escalade, a 2012 Dodge Challenger, and a 2013 

BMW 740i. The district court granted the government’s motion, and, on 

September 6, 2013, entered an order amending the August 28 forfeiture order to 

add Defendants’ interests in the three cars. 

On September 6, 2013, Defendants filed objections to the government’s 

motion to amend the forfeiture order, objecting only to the amount of the money 

judgment being $753,430. Defendants argued that the government knew of their 

fraudulent conduct from an early stage but let the fraud continue and the loss 

accumulate to the current amount of $753,430. According to Defendants, the 

government could have, but failed to, locate the money during its active 

investigation of the fraud. 

In the district court, Defendants made no objection to the car-aspect of the 

forfeiture.

On September 10, 2013, Defendants timely appealed the August 28, 2013 

preliminary forfeiture order and the September 6, 2013 amended forfeiture order. 

On September 20, 2013, the district court overruled Defendants’ objections and 

denied their motion to stay the forfeiture pending appeal. 

 

difficulty.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(1). In such cases, “the court shall order the forfeiture of any 

other property of the defendant, up to the value” of the unavailable property. Id. § 853(p)(2). 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 9 of 17
10

On March 12, 2014, the government moved to dismiss the appeals based on 

the appeal waivers contained in Defendants’ plea agreements. On May 1, 2014, 

this Court denied the government’s motion to dismiss because (1) the district court 

did not specifically question Defendants about the appeal waivers during the plea 

colloquy; and (2) the appeal waivers, even if enforceable, did not govern 

Defendants’ claims that their guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary because 

they were not informed of certain facts relevant to the forfeiture provisions in their 

plea agreements. 

II. DISCUSSION

As to the forfeiture orders, Defendants raise two claims of error, which we 

address in turn. 

A. Plea Agreements Were Knowing and Voluntary

Defendants argue that they did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to the 

forfeiture provisions in their plea agreements because the government did not 

disclose until sentencing that Defendants had perpetrated their months-long fraud 

through a government cooperator. According to Defendants, the government could 

have stopped the fraud (and thus, the payments by Medicare) earlier, but instead 

allowed the loss amount to grow over four months. Defendants contend that, had 

they known of the government’s inaction, they would have contested the amount of 

forfeiture. 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 10 of 17
11

Because Defendants did not move to withdraw their pleas prior to 

sentencing, we review only for plain error.2

 See United States v. Chubbuck, 252 

F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001). In fact, while before the district court, 

Defendants never moved to withdraw their pleas.

Under plain-error review, the defendant has the burden to show that there is 

(1) an error (2) that is plain and (3) that has affected the defendant’s substantial 

rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). 

If the first three prongs are met, then an appellate court may exercise its discretion 

to correct the error, but only if (4) the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

To be valid, a guilty plea must be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent act 

done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 

consequences. United States v. French, 719 F.2d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1983). If a 

defendant is fully aware of a plea’s consequences, it must stand unless it was 

induced by threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises. Id. We have 

previously suggested that, where there is no evidence of misrepresentation, a lack 

of information on an issue secondary to guilt does not render a plea involuntary. 

 2

Defendants’ post-sentencing filings did not timely preserve this argument. See Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(e) (“After the court imposes sentence . . . the plea may be set aside only on direct 

appeal or collateral attack.”). 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 11 of 17
12

See id. at 390 n.6 (defendant was unaware of the possibility of entering into a 

binding plea).

Here, the record amply demonstrates that Defendants were fully aware of the 

consequences of their guilty pleas, and Defendants do not suggest that their pleas 

were induced by government misrepresentation. At the time they signed their plea 

agreements and the corresponding factual proffers, Defendants knew that the 

doctor involved in their four-month-long conspiracy was a government cooperator. 

Defendants contend that they did not become aware of the full extent of the 

cooperator’s involvement in their fraud until sentencing. While the information 

provided at the sentencing hearing concerning the government’s use of the doctor

was more explicit than previously contained in the record, Defendants cannot show 

any misrepresentation that would render their plea agreements involuntary or 

unknowing. See id. at 390 & n.6. We therefore find no error, plain or otherwise. 

B. Second Prong: Forfeiture of Cars Was Not Plain Error

As their second claim, Defendants argue that the government breached the

plea agreements by seeking and obtaining forfeiture of any additional assets such 

as the cars.

3

 Specifically, Defendants contend that the plea agreements provided 

that forfeiture of the two houses, whatever their value, would fully satisfy and 

 3

On March 17, 2014, this Court granted the parties’ joint motion to dismiss the appeal in 

part as to the 2012 Dodge Challenger—one of the three cars in the amended forfeiture order. 

The parties sought to have this car released to a third-party lienholder. 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 12 of 17
13

extinguish the personal money judgment of $753,430 against them, and that they 

did not agree to forfeit the cars as well. 

In the district court, Defendants did not object to forfeiture of the cars and 

never argued that the government breached the plea agreements. Thus, our review 

of this issue is also only for plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 

129, 133-34, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1428 (2009). As noted above, the first three prongs, 

Defendants must establish, are that there is (1) error (2) that is plain and (3) that 

has affected Defendants’ substantial rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S. Ct. at 

1776. 

We ultimately need not decide whether there was error here, because any 

error was not plain for several reasons. For an error to be considered plain, the 

“error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” 

Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135, 129 S. Ct. at 1429. In the context of plea agreement 

breaches, the Supreme Court has advised that “[n]ot all breaches will be clear or 

obvious,” such as when the drafting of an agreement leaves the scope of the 

government’s commitments open to doubt. Id. at 143, 129 S. Ct. at 1433. 

“At a minimum, court[s] of appeals cannot correct an error . . . unless the 

error is clear under current law.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S. Ct at 1777 

(emphasis added). Furthermore, it is well-established in this circuit that, “at least 

where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 13 of 17
14

issue, there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme 

Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 

1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003). 

To evaluate whether the government breached a plea agreement, we

“determine the scope of the government’s promises” and ask “whether the 

government’s actions [were] inconsistent with what the defendant reasonably 

understood when he entered his guilty plea.” United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 

1101, 1105 (11th Cir. 2004). “The government is bound by any material promises 

it makes to a defendant as part of a plea agreement that induces the defendant to 

plead guilty.” United States v. Horsfall, 552 F.3d 1275, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008). 

First, we review what Defendants’ plea agreements said. The agreements 

did not provide that the government would seek to forfeit only the two houses 

specified therein. The agreements also did not state that forfeiture of the two 

houses would “fully satisfy” or extinguish the money judgment. Instead, the plea 

agreements were clear that, while Defendants specifically agreed to forfeit without 

issue their interest in the two houses, they also agreed not to contest any forfeiture 

orders issued against them, which certainly indicated that the forfeiture was not 

limited to the two houses and that additional property could be forfeited to satisfy 

the agreed money judgment. 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 14 of 17
15

The plea agreements also provided that Defendants waived any claim or 

defense or statute of limitations to the forfeiture, any right to trial on forfeiture, any 

notice of forfeiture proceedings, and any right to appeal any forfeiture order. At 

the time the plea agreements were entered, those provisions would be superfluous 

and without any relevance if Defendants were only required to forfeit the two 

houses to extinguish their forfeiture obligations, because they had already agreed 

to voluntarily forfeit those houses under the terms of their plea agreements. 

The plea hearing made clear that Defendants were liable for repaying the 

agreed $753,430 money judgment to the government, that they could not object to 

“any source to forfeiture” or otherwise challenge any forfeiture ordered against 

them, and that the forfeiture order had not yet been finalized. 

The use of the term “satisfy” in the house-forfeiture provision of the 

agreements does not compel a different conclusion. Defendants attempt to read 

“satisfy” in isolation without placing it in the context of the other sentences in the 

agreements. And as noted earlier, the agreements did not state that the houseforfeiture would fully satisfy or extinguish the money judgment. 

In addition, the words “satisfy” or “satisfaction” do not appear in the 

applicable forfeiture statutes or rules: 18 U.S.C. § 982 (requiring criminal 

forfeiture in certain cases), 21 U.S.C. § 853 (governing forfeiture under § 982, 

including the forfeiture of substitute property), or Federal Rule of Criminal 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 15 of 17
16

Procedure 32.2 (the procedural rules on criminal forfeiture). There is no precedent

from the Supreme Court or this Court interpreting the meaning of “satisfy” in the 

forfeiture context or otherwise resolving this issue. Defendants have not identified 

any controlling authority in support of their interpretation. 

Given all of the factual circumstances of this case, it was not “clear under 

current law” that the government patently breached the plea agreements by seeking 

forfeiture of the cars or that any such breach should have been “obvious” to the 

district court. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S. Ct at 1777.

C. Fourth Prong: Discretion to Correct Forfeited Error

Under the fourth prong of the plain-error test, we have discretion to correct a 

plain error only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S. Ct at 1776. Not every 

breach of a plea agreement seriously affects the integrity of judicial proceedings—

courts must consider countervailing factors on a case-by-case basis. Puckett, 556 

U.S. at 142-43, 129 S. Ct. at 1433 (characterizing as “ludicrous” the defendant’s 

receipt of a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility, as called for in 

the plea agreement, when the defendant continued his criminal conduct after

entering into the agreement).

Even assuming arguendo that any error was plain, the fourth prong of the 

plain-error test weighs against its correction. There is a disparity of over $500,000 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 16 of 17
17

between the agreed money judgment of $753,430 and the value of the two houses

specified in the plea agreements. A review of Defendants’ assets in the undisputed 

PSIs suggests that Defendants were not forthright in disclosing the location of their 

criminal proceeds. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that allowing 

forfeiture of Defendants’ interests in two of their six cars seriously affected “the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” See Olano, 507 

U.S. at 732, 113 S. Ct at 1776. Accordingly, we conclude that Defendants have 

not demonstrated plain error as to this issue. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s orders of forfeiture. 

AFFIRMED. 

USCA11 Case: 13-14142 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 17 of 17