Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01216/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01216-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
C.A. Associates
Appellant
Dow Chemical Company
Appellee

Document Text:

P U B L I S H 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

C. A. ASSOCIATES, d/b/a 

EXECUTIVE TOWER INN, a Colorado 

Limited Partnership, 

Plaintiff, Appellant, 

NOV 16 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk ) 

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No. 89-1216 

v. / 

DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, a Delaware 

Corporation, 

Defendant, Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D. c •. No. 86-M-2566) 

Michael v. Ciresi (William E. Dorigan, E. Anne McKinsey, Kristin 

N. Lockhart, Julie D. Hagen of Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, 

Minneapolis, Minnesota, on.the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

David M. Bernick on the brief, Kenneth W. Brothers of Kirkland & 

Ellis, Denver, Colorado for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before MOORE and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BRA'rl'ON, Senior 

District Judge.* 

BRA'rl'ON, District Judge 

*The Honorable Howard C. Bratton, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1216 Document: 01019953174 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 1 
The plaintiff-appellant, C.A. Associates ("Associates"), is 

the owner of the Executive Tower, a 30-story building constructed 

in downtown Denver and completed in January, 197 4. Associates 

claims that Sarabond, a product developed and marketed by Dow 

Chemical Company ("Dow") as a masonry mortar additive, has caused 

the masonry on its building to begin cracking and falling off. It 

further claims that Dow knew or should have known of Sarabond's 

defective properties at the time the Executive Tower was built but 

that Dow fraudulently concealed this knowledge. At the conclusion 

of a seven-week trial in the district court, the jury returned a 

special verdict in favor of Dow finding that mortar mixed with 

Sarabond caused no more masonry cracking than conventional mortar, 

that Sarabond was not defective, and that Dow had made no 

misrepresentations to Associates concerning Sarabond. Associates 

now challenges the final judgment entered below, avering, inter 

alia, 1 that the trial court abused its discretion at trial in 

excluding evidence of· Sarabond-related failures 

structures. 

I. 

in other 

Before withdrawing Sarabond from the market, Dow manufactured 

and marketed this saran latex product as an additive for mortar to 

increase the mortar's bonding or adhesive strength. Beginning in 

1

In addition, Associates asserts that the trial court erred: 

1) by excluding evidence of fraudulent conduct by Dow employees 

arising after the completion of Associate's building, 2) in certain 

instructions to the jury, and 3) in its direction of a verdict in 

favor of Dow on Associates' breach of warranty claim. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-1216 Document: 01019953174 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 2 
the mid 1960s Dow worked closely with Denver masonry contractor 

Gage Behunin, who, under Dow's tutelage, became one of the pioneers 

in the use of Sarabond in prefabricated brick panels. Behunin 

ultimately became the masonry contractor for the Executive Tower 

and utilized these prefabricated brick panels on Associates' 

building. Associates asserts that the brick and mortar panels are 

now beginning to crack and fall off due to the defective properties 

of Sarabond. 

The crux of Associates' theory is that Sarabond, when mixed 

with portland cement mortar, induces the corrosion of steel 

embedded in the mortar. According to Associates, this corrosion 

occurs despite the climate or the configuration of the structure 

upon which Sarabond is used. 2 

Associates' expert chemist, William Hime, testified at trial 

that steel embedded in ordinary portland cement mortar is generally 

resistant to corrosion. Normally, the high alkalinity of cement 

causes the steel to form a thin oxidized layer that resists 

significant corrosion. Sarabond, by contrast, releases inorganic 

chloride ions when mixed with portland cement mortar. These 

chloride ions act as a catalyst, eating away the resistant layer 

2

Associates asserted below that Sarabond would induce 

corrosion in every circumstance in which Dow's saran latex products 

are mixed in port land cement mortar containing embedded steel. 

According to Associates, it does not matter whether Sarabond is 

used in prefabricated masonry or "laid in place" masonry, single 

story or multi-story buildings, tunnels or bridges, cold climate, 

warm climate, wet climate, or dry climate; in any circumstance 

involving metal embedded in a Sarabond-mortar mix, corrosion will 

occur. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-1216 Document: 01019953174 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 3 
of the steel. The result of this corrosive process is the buildup 

of a rust product which occupies between two and ten times more 

space than the original metal. The corrosion of the steel embedded 

in walls will continue until it exerts sufficient pressure to cause 

the brick and mortar to crack, separate from the building frame, 

and ultimately fall off the building. 

Associates further claims that Dow became aware of this 

problem years before construction of Associates' building but, 

nonetheless, actively promoted Sarabond's utility to architects, 

engineers, and masonry contractors. In particular, Dow encouraged 

Gage Behunin to use Sarabond. Associates seeks recovery alleging 

that Dow made misrepresentations and concealed certain facts 

concerning Sarabond, and that Gage Behunin on behalf of Associates 

relied thereon, resulting in the ultimate injury to Associates. 

Associates' action was tried below under the theories of 

strict liability, negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, and 

violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 6-1-101 et seq. (1963). It was originally consolidated for trial 

with the claims of four other entities, each owning separate 

buildings constructed with Sarabond and located in the Denver, 

Colorado area. At a pre-trial conference held approximately one 

month prior to trial, the district court decided to proceed to 

trial on only two of the five actions originally consolidated for 

trial. Thus, only two buildings were ultimately the subject of the 

trial below. One of these actions has since been settled. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-1216 Document: 01019953174 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 4 
II. 

Associates' first assertion of error arises out of a ruling 

on an evidentiary issue regarding the admissibility of evidence 

relating to buildings other than the buildings which were the 

original subjects of trial. This issue was thoroughly explored by 

the district judge in a series of pre-trial conferences. 

At the first pre-trial conference, held some six months prior 

to the date set for trial, the court requested that the parties 

submit a list of buildings on which they intended to offer 

evidence, excluding the five buildings which were at that time the 

subjects of the consolidated trial. 

supporting briefs. 

The court also requested 

Thereafter, the plaintiffs submitted a list of sixteen 

additional buildings. They informed the court that the evidence 

concerning other Sarabond structures was necessary because, with 

the relatively young age of the Denver-area buildings and Denver's 

dry climate, the five buildings at issue were at the "beginning 

stages of the corrosion cycle." The plaintiffs claimed that their 

experts needed evidence of other buildings to demonstrate the longterm corrosive effect of Sarabond and to rebut certain anticipated 

defenses of Dow. 3 

3

The plaintiffs pointed to the pre-trial order in which Dow 

stated inter alia that the buildings at issue suffered structural 

distress as a result of design and construction flaws, and that 

Sarabond was no more corrosive than ordinary mortar if metals are 

properly embedded. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-1216 Document: 01019953174 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 5 
Dow opposed the reference by the plaintiffs at trial to any 

other structures beyond those five which were to be the subjects 

of the consolidated trial. Dow argued that discussion of other 

structures in the course of trial would involve a series of "minitrials" concerning each separate structure referenced, causing 

confusion to the jury, delay and prejudice. Dow also claimed it 

had not conducted complete discovery on the buildings the 

plaintiffs wished to introduce. 

The court refused to allow introduction of evidence concerning 

all of the sixteen other buildings proposed by the plaintiffs on 

Fed. R. Evid. 403 grounds. The court expressed concern that an 

unfair inference favoring the plaintiffs would arise simply by 

virtue of the number of buildings referred to if the plaintiffs 

were allowed to name and discuss the five Denver buildings and 

sixteen other Sarabond buildings indicating distress. 4 The court 

also sought to avoid jury confusion and undue delay of the trial. 

At a second pre-trial conference held three months before 

trial, the court adopted the compromise proposal of Dow. Dow 

proposed that if the court allowed other building evidence beyond 

the five Denver buildings, the court limit this additional evidence 

to the nine "Sarabond buildings" located on the Dow campus in 

Midland, Michigan. The plaintiffs had included in their original 

4

The plaintiffs' counsel described to the court how 

plaintiffs' experts would utilize each building in testimony. The 

court responded, "The difficulty with that,· of course, is that it 

generates this momentum that would be unfair, that with so many 

buildings having this, it must be at fault, and that I'm not going 

to permit." 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-1216 Document: 01019953174 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 6 
list of sixteen additional buildings two of the buildings at Dow's 

Midland headquarters, but not the other seven. 

Dow claimed that the proposal would allow its experts 

immediate access to the other structures, as opposed to the 

situation if the court allowed in evidence of some other structures 

upon which Dow's experts had had limited or no discovery. Further, 

it would accommodate the plaintiffs' corrosion theory in that some 

of the Dow buildings were older than the Denver buildings and were 

situated in a wetter climate than Denver. 

The crux of Associates' complaint is not that it was denied 

the opportunity to introduce a sufficient quantity of other 

building evidence; indeed, the court allowed the plaintiffs' 

experts to discuss at trial some fifteen separate structures in 

addition to the Executive Tower. 5 Instead, Associates claims it 

was arbitrarily limited in its choice of the identity of the other 

building evidence to be offered. Associates complains that the 

trial judge's ruling severely limited its ability to effectively 

support and authenticate the testimony of its experts and to rebut 

the defense testimony of Dow's experts. 

It is apparent from our review of the record that the trial 

judge invested a great deal of time prior to trial acquainting 

5

Associates was allowed to discuss all five of the Denver-area 

buildings despite the fact the trial court had ordered that only 

two of these cases would be tried. The court also allowed evidence 

to be admitted regarding the nine buildings constructed with 

Sarabond at Dow's headquarters in Midland, Michigan, and two other 

structures: the Plymouth Swimming Pool (constructed in 1963) and 

the Fort Collins Picnic Shelters (constructed in 1966). 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-1216 Document: 01019953174 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 7 
himself with the theories of all parties and giving due 

consideration to evidentiary issues. Thus, it is entirely 

appropriate that we accord deference to the trial judge who is most 

familiar with the circumstances surrounding the issues in question. 

Higgins v. Martin Marietta Corp., 752 F.2d 492, 498 (10th Cir. 

1985). Such deference is particularly fitting in lengthy trials 

involving this magnitude of highly technical expert testimony. 

Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court's conduct of trial 

proceedings unless it affirmatively appears from the record that 

the trial court abused its discretion. Id. 

In the context of rulings under Fed. R. Evid. 403, the task 

of the trial judge is one of "balancing the probative value of and 

need for the evidence against the harm likely to result from its 

admission." McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 

1257 (10th Cir. 1988). This is a task to which the trial judge is 

particularly suited because of his familiarity with the full array 

of the evidence. Id. Thus, we will not reverse absent a clear 

abuse of discretion. See also Marsee v. United States· Tobacco Co. , 

866 F.2d 319, 321 (10th Cir. 1989); Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 865 

F.2d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1988); Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 

F.2d 1404, 1410 (10th Cir. 1988) ("if judicial self-restraint is 

ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is 

reviewed by an appellate tribunal 11 ) citing United States v. Glover, 

846 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1988). 

The threshold inquiry in any argument asserting erroneous 

exclusion of evidence is, of course, whether the evidence is 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-1216 Document: 01019953174 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 8 
relevant. Both federal and state courts routinely permit 

introduction of substantially similar acts or occurrences in 

product liability actions to demonstrate the existence of a defect, 

to prove notice, or to refute testimony given by defense witnesses. 

Ponder v. Warren Tool Corp., 834 F.2d 1553, 1560 (10th Cir. 1987); 

Rexrode v. American Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826, 829 n.9 (10th 

Cir.), cert. den., 459 U.S. 862 (1982); Jacobs v. Commonwealth 

Highland Theaters, Inc. , 73 8 P. 2d 6 (Colo. App. 1986). In a 

product liability action, the occurrence of similar accidents or 

failures involving the same product holds great relevance, since 

evidence of such failures tends to make the existence of a defect 

more probable than it would be without the evidence. See Fed. R. 

Evid. 401; Rhodes v. Michelin Tire Corp., 542 F.Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. 

Ky. 1982). 

However, the relevance of the evidence concerning the 

additional buildings which the plaintiff proffered is not seriously 

contested. Of crucial concern to the judge was the relevance of 

that evidence in juxtaposition to its tendency to confuse the jury, 

unduly prolong the trial, and unfairly prejudice the defendant with 

inflammatory and cumulative evidence. 6 

6

As evid~nce of this concern, the trial judge excluded any 

evidence concerning the Eisenhower Tunnel. The court refused 

admission of this evidence without equivocation stating, "[B]ecause 

of Colorado and what the Eisenhower Tunnel means to the people in 

this state, we would have a very prejudicial effect, and I don't 

want to voir dire a jury about how many times they drive through 

the Eisenhower Tunnel and did they ever worry about it falling in 

on them. So we're going to keep the Eisenhower Tunnel out, Rule 

403 if nothing else." At one point the court further admonished 

plaintiffs, "What you want is every bit of perjorative (sic) 

evidence you could find to inflame the jury, that's what you want. 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-1216 Document: 01019953174 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 9 
The standard for exclusion under Fed. R. Evid. 403 is somewhat 

exacting. "Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice." Fed. R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). See also Wheeler 

v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1410 (10th Cir. 1988) ("We have 

stated on numerous occasions that 'the exclusion of relevant 

evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy to be used 

sparingly'") citing Romine v. Parman, 831 F.2d 944, 945 (10th Cir. 

1987) citing K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 

1155 (10th Cir. 1985). 

Notwithstanding that standard, we are unable to state that the 

ruling of the trial judge constitutes an abuse of discretion. At 

the outset, the record shows that Associates was permitted in its 

case-in-chief and rebuttal to introduce a substantial amount of 

evidence regarding other structures in support of its various 

theories. 7 The judge allowed Associates to introduce evidence of 

at least six buildings older than the Executive Tower and nine 

buildings situated in a climate significantly wetter than that in 

Denver. Two of the buildings used to illustrate the age and 

I don't blame you, but that isn't what you're going to get." 

7

As indicated above, under plaintiffs' age and climate 

theories, the plaintiffs suggested that evidence of other buildings 

was necessary to illustrate the future effect of corrosion on the 

Denver-area buildings because, with the relatively young age of 

these buildings and the dry Denver climate, the corrosion of these 

buildings was in the initial stages. However, the court also 

clearly held plaintiffs to their broader theory regarding Sarabond 

that in any configuration of building or climate corrosion would 

occur. 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-1216 Document: 01019953174 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 10 
climate theories were on the plaintiffs' original list of sixteen 

buildings. Moreover, our review of the record indicates that the 

plaintiffs' experts were able to offer extensive "other building" 

evidence to rebut the defenses raised by Dow without going outside 

the parameters of the trial court's ruling. This lessened the 

relevance of and need for the extensive evidence of other 

structures. 

The court sought with its order to avoid significant delay, 

confusion and prejudice. At one point, the parties had 

contemplated introducing evidence concerning, potentially, well 

over the 21 separate structures indicated by the plaintiffs. 8 

Given the complexity of the subject matter, we agree that the 

potential for delay and confusion could multiply with each 

additional building offered into evidence. 

Moreover, Dow's defense rested upon an analysis of the 

structural forces that can cause cracking unrelated to Sarabond. 

Thus, each building added to the list would bring with it a whole 

history of design, construction, and performance and a whole 

8

The plaintiffs were not alone in their request to introduce 

other building evidence. Counsel for Dow informed the court that 

if the plaintiffs were allowed to discuss what they believed to be 

"bad" Sarabond buildings, Dow would "fight fire with fire" and seek 

introduction of evidence from its "data bases of 40 or 50 

buildings." The court's ruling limited the defendant's access to 

"other building" evidence as well as the plaintiffs'. Otherwise, 

the court would have faced the possible introduction of evidence 

from the five Denver buildings, the sixteen buildings proposed by 

the plaintiffs, and any other buildings introduced by Dow. 

Further, the plaintiffs' offer of proof concerning proffered 

rebuttal testimony included eight additional buildings not before 

proffered. 

11 

Appellate Case: 89-1216 Document: 01019953174 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 11 
metallurgical, chemical, and structural analysis. The court's 

ruling set an appropriate limit on the scope of evidence which 

either party could discuss at trial. In confining the number of 

buildings admissible at trial, the lower court prevented the jury 

from inferring that Sarabond was defective simply because many 

buildings had been investigated. 

Similarly, we disagree with Associates' contention that the 

trial court unduly restricted the scope of the plaintiffs' experts' 

testimony and improperly limited the plaintiffs' rebuttal evidence. 

As discussed above, the trial court's considered limitation on 

reference to evidence taken from other structures was in accordance 

with his discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 403. See also Quinones v. 

Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co .. , 804 F.2d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 

1986)(trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on admissibility 

of expert testimony); Fed. R. Evid. 702. Cf. Marsee v. United 

States Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 319, 323-24 (10th Cir. 1989)(admission 

of rebuttal testimony subject to discretion of the trial judge); 

Brownlee v. Gay and Taylor, Inc., 861 F.2d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 

1988)(trial judge has broad discretion in determining competency 

of expert witness). 

Accordingly, we find that the trial court acted within its 

discretion in limiting the evidence as it did in this case. Upon 

the basis of the admitted evidence, the jury found specially that 

Sarabond did not cause more cracking during the lifetime of a 

building than did conventional mortar. This finding, Associates 

conceded below, .was dispositive as to all Associates' affirmative 

12 

Appellate Case: 89-1216 Document: 01019953174 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 12 
claims. Associates cites additional error; 9 however, we note the 

concession of Associates, and, having reviewed all of the remaining 

claims, find no issue of merit necessitating further discussion. 

AFFIRMED. 

9

one error raised involves the court's instruction number 77 

which, in substance, instructed that the jury should not consider 

evidence of scientific advancements discovered subsequent to the 

time Sarabond was sold by Dow to Associates. Neither party 

disputes that under Col. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-404, which served as 

the basis for the instruction, the jury may not consider subsequent 

scientific advancements, but may inquire into alternative concepts 

implemented later and known to be possible at the time of 

manufacture. Associates argues that since the court admitted into 

evidence tests and reports post-dating the sale of Sarabond to 

Associates, the court must have determined that these subsequent 

tests reflected ''alternative concepts"; therefore, these tests and 

reports should have been expressly exempted from the challenged 

instruction or the instruction should have been omitted. We reject 

that contention. Under our reading of the instructions as a whole, 

see Furr v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d 1537, 1549 (10th Cir. 

1987), it is. apparent that the court did direct the jury to 

consider the subsequent tests and reports for their scientific 

value in aiding jury understanding, but not for holding Dow 

responsible for post-construction industry advancements. See 

Instruction No. 78. Further, the admitted tests and reports do not 

fall within the purview of the instruction. These tests involved 

saran latex, rather than some "alternative concept." Associates 

made no attempt to present any evidence regarding "alternative 

concepts" which were "known to be possible at the time of 

manufacture." Thus, the post-construction tests and reports were 

not even addressed by the challenged instruction. 

13 

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