Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05015/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05015-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Albemarle Corporation & Subsidiaries
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ALBEMARLE CORPORATION & SUBSIDIARIES,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5015

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:12-cv-00184-MBH, Judge Marian Blank 

Horn.

______________________ 

Decided: August 13, 2015 

______________________ 

JEROME LIBIN, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

DEBORAH K. SNYDER, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by TERESA E.

MCLAUGHLIN, GILBERT STEVEN ROTHENBERG, CAROLINE D.

CIRAOLO, DIANA L. ERBSEN.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, BRYSON, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

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2 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

BRYSON, Circuit Judge. 

Albemarle Corporation and Subsidiaries (“Albemarle”) 

appeals from a final judgment of the Court of Federal 

Claims dismissing its complaint for a refund of certain 

taxes paid in the 1997 and 1998 tax years. The court held 

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Albemarle’s 

claims because Albemarle had not filed its refund claims 

within the 10-year limitations period prescribed in 26 

U.S.C. § 6511(d)(3)(A). We affirm. 

I

In 1996, a Belgian subsidiary of Albemarle issued 20-

year debentures to Albemarle and certain of its U.S. 

subsidiaries. Interest payments were made on the debentures from 1997 through October 2001. The Belgian 

subsidiary, however, did not pay Belgian withholding 

taxes on the interest payments, because it believed the 

payments to be tax-exempt. 

In 2001, Belgian tax authorities issued a notice of adjustment to Albemarle for the tax years 1996 through 

1998. The notice provided, in part, that the debenture 

interest payments made between 1997 and 2001 were 

subject to Belgian withholding tax at the statutory rate of 

25%. Albemarle submitted a written protest to the tax 

authorities objecting to the assessment of withholding tax 

on the payments.

In January 2002, Albemarle and the Belgian tax authorities reached an agreement regarding the dispute. 

Albemarle agreed to pay withholding tax at the rate of 

15% on all interest paid from 1997 through 2001. It then 

made two payments to the Belgian authorities in January 

2002 and August 2002 that satisfied the total amount of 

the taxes due.

On May 15, 2009, Albemarle filed an amended consolidated U.S. income tax return for the 2002 tax year, in 

which it claimed refunds of $1,416,740 in foreign tax 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 3

credits attributable to the withholding taxes it had paid 

pursuant to the agreement with the Belgian tax authorities. 

The Internal Revenue Service allowed Albemarle’s refund claims for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001, but it 

disallowed Albemarle’s claims for 1997 and 1998. The 

IRS found that the 1997 and 1998 refund claims had not 

been filed within the 10-year limitations period provided 

in section 6511(d)(3)(A). According to the IRS, Albemarle 

should have filed its 1997 refund claim on or before March 

15, 2008, and its 1998 refund claim on or before March 15, 

2009, in order for those claims to be timely. 

Albemarle filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, 

seeking to recover a total refund of $825,846 attributable 

to the foreign tax credits for its 1997 and 1998 Belgian 

withholding taxes. The court agreed with the government, finding Albemarle’s claims for the 1997 and 1998 

tax years untimely. This appeal followed.

II

Whether Albemarle’s refund claims were timely filed 

depends on the interpretation of section 6511(d)(3)(A) of 

the Internal Revenue Code. That section was amended in 

a material way in 1997. Both the pre-1997 and the post1997 versions of the statute are at issue in this case. 

Because Albemarle’s refund claim for 1997 is governed by 

the pre-1997 version of the statute and the refund claim 

for 1998 is governed by the post-1997 version, we address 

the two claims separately. 

A

Section 6511(d)(3)(A) provides a 10-year “special period of limitation” for filing refund claims for foreign tax 

credits. The post-1997 version of the statute, which 

governs Albemarle’s refund claim for the 1998 tax year, 

provides as follows: 

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4 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

If the claim for credit or refund relates to an overpayment attributable to any taxes paid or accrued 

to any foreign country or to any possession of the 

United States for which credit is allowed against 

the tax imposed by subtitle A in accordance with 

the provisions of section 901 or the provisions of 

any treaty to which the United States is a party, 

in lieu of the 3-year period of limitation prescribed 

in subsection (a), the period shall be 10 years from 

the date prescribed by law for filing the return for 

the year in which such taxes were actually paid or 

accrued.

26 U.S.C. § 6511(d)(3)(A). 

The parties’ dispute over the 1998 tax year claim centers on the statutory language “from the date prescribed 

by law for filing the return for the year in which such 

taxes were actually paid or accrued.” Albemarle contends 

that “the year in which such taxes were actually paid or 

accrued” refers to the year in which its contested foreign 

tax liability was finalized and established. In this case, 

that would be 2002. The government, on the other hand, 

argues that the critical year is the year in which Albemarle’s foreign taxes originated, i.e., 1998. 

If Albemarle is correct, the 10-year limitations period 

for filing refund claims for foreign tax credits for 1998 

started to run on March 15, 2003—“the date prescribed by 

law for filing the return for” the 2002 tax year—rendering 

Albemarle’s May 15, 2009, filing timely. If the government is correct, the limitations period started to run on 

March 15, 1999, making Albemarle’s May 15, 2009, 

refund claim untimely. 

1

For an accrual-based taxpayer such as Albemarle, the 

10-year limitations period for filing a claim for foreign tax 

credits under the current version of section 6511(d)(3)(A)

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 5

runs “from the date prescribed by law for filing the return 

for the year in which such taxes were actually . . . accrued.”1

The word “accrue” is used in several provisions of the 

Tax Code pertaining to foreign tax credits. Section 901 of 

the Code allows a taxpayer to claim foreign tax credits in 

the amount of “any income, war profits, and excess profits 

taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any 

foreign country.” 26 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1). Section 905 

similarly provides that foreign tax credits may be taken 

“in the year in which the taxes of the foreign country . . . 

accrued[.]” 26 U.S.C. § 905(a).

It is undisputed that for purposes of sections 901 and 

905, Albemarle’s contested foreign taxes “accrued” in 

1998, the year of origin of the tax liability. That is evident from the fact that Albemarle claimed foreign tax 

credits in an amount equal to its 1998 Belgian tax liability, see 26 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1), and that it intends to use 

those credits to offset its U.S. tax liability for the 1998 tax 

year. See 26 U.S.C. § 905(a). 

Albemarle argues that the use of the term “actually” 

in section 6311(d)(3)(A) requires that the year of accrual 

for limitations purposes be determined differently from 

the way it is determined for purposes of sections 901 and 

905. Albemarle’s argument is that the word “actually” 

must be given its ordinary meaning of “in fact” or “in 

reality,” and that a contested foreign tax cannot “in fact” 

accrue until the tax liability is finally established, which 

1 The term “actually” in the statutory phrase “actually paid or accrued” could be read to modify only “paid” 

(but not “accrued”) or it could be read to modify both 

“paid” and “accrued.” Both parties have adopted the 

latter reading, and we agree that is the most natural 

reading of the statute.

 

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in this case would be 2002. The government, on the other 

hand, argues that in light of the IRS’s longstanding 

position that contested foreign taxes “relate back” to the 

year of origin for purposes of the foreign tax credit statute, foreign taxes “actually accrue” in the year of origin, 

i.e., the year in which the foreign tax liability arose.2 

The “plain meaning” interpretation of the word “actually” does not resolve the parties’ dispute. In the case of a 

contested foreign tax, either of two years could be regarded as the year that the tax “actually accrued”—the year of 

origin for the tax or the year in which the contested

liability is finalized. Simply interpreting “the year in 

which such taxes were actually . . . accrued” to mean the 

year in which the taxes “in fact” accrued provides no

guidance as to which of those two years was intended to 

be the starting point for the 10-year limitations period

under section 6511(d)(3)(A). 

Other provisions of the Tax Code likewise supply little 

help in determining the meaning of the word “actually” in 

the phrase “actually . . . accrued.” Other than section 

6511(d)(3)(A), no provision of the foreign tax credit statute 

uses the phrase “actually paid or accrued.” We therefore 

look to the context in which the 1997 statutory language 

was enacted in order to determine the meaning of that 

phrase. 

2

Prior to the 1997 amendment to section 6511(d)(3)(A), 

the 10-year limitations period ran from the date “prescribed by law for filing the return for the year with 

2 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-55, 1958-1 C.B. 266 (contested foreign tax “is accruable for the taxable year to 

which it relates even though the taxpayer contests the 

liability therefor and such tax is not paid until a later 

year”). 

 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 7

respect to which the claim is made.” 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6511(d)(3)(A) (1994). The 1997 amendment was enacted 

in response to a 1980 decision of the Court of Claims 

involving “carryover” foreign tax credits under section 904 

of the Tax Code. In order to understand the effect of the 

amendment, some background is necessary.

Section 904(a) limits the amount of foreign tax credit 

that a taxpayer may take in a given year. As a result, a

taxpayer may end up with “excess” foreign taxes for which 

credits may not be taken in the tax year of origin. Section 

904(c) allows such excess taxes to be “carried back” to 

certain preceding tax years and “carried over” to certain 

succeeding tax years. The statute provides that those 

excess taxes “shall be deemed paid or accrued” in the 

carryover or carryback years and may be taken as credits

in those years. See 26 U.S.C. § 904(c). 

Treasury Regulation section 1.904-2 governs the “carryback and carryover of unused foreign tax” under section 

904(c) of the Tax Code. For an accrual-based taxpayer, 

the regulation explains that a foreign tax “actually accrues” in the year of origin, and a portion of that tax—if 

unused in the initial year—may be “deemed accrued” in 

the year to which the excess tax is carried. See 26 C.F.R. 

§ 1.904-2(g) (example 5). 

When there has been a carryover of excess foreign 

taxes, an issue has arisen as to how the limitations period 

under section 6511(d)(3)(A) should be calculated regarding claims for credit for the excess taxes. In Ampex Corp. 

v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl. 428 (1980), the Court of 

Claims concluded that the limitations period should be 

determined by reference to the year to which the excess 

taxes are carried. The IRS disagreed with that decision, 

and in 1984 it issued a revenue ruling in which it took the 

position that the limitations period should be determined 

by reference to the year of origin for the excess taxes. 

Rev. Rul. 84-125, 1984-2 C.B. 125. 

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Congress amended section 6511(d)(3)(A) in 1997 to 

resolve the conflict between the decision in Ampex and the 

position taken by the IRS in the 1984 revenue ruling. The

prior version of the statute provided that the statute of 

limitations for foreign tax credit claims was 10 years 

“from the date prescribed by law for filing the return for 

the year with respect to which the claim is made.” The 

1997 amendment changed that language to read 10 years

“from the date prescribed by law for filing the return for 

the year in which such taxes were actually paid or accrued.” The committee reports on the legislation explained that the change was meant to clarify that, 

consistent with the IRS’s position, the limitations period 

of section 6511(d)(3)(A) would be determined by reference

to the year “in which the foreign taxes were paid or accrued (and not the year to which the foreign tax credits 

are carried).” H.R. Rep. No. 105-148, at 553 (1997); S. 

Rep. No. 105-33, at 180 (1997); H.R. Rep. No. 105-220, at 

576-77 (1997) (Conf. Rep.). 

The 10-year limitations period for a contested foreign 

tax had been determined with reference to the year of 

origin since long before the 1997 amendment, because the 

year of origin is “the year with respect to which the [refund] claim is made,” 26 U.S.C. § 6511(d)(3)(A) (1994), 

including in the case of contested taxes. See Rev. Rul. 84-

125, 1984-2 C.B. 125; Rev. Rul. 58-55, 1958-1 C.B. 266. 

Nothing in the background of the 1997 amendment suggests that Congress intended for that amendment, which 

was directed solely at correcting a court decision governing carryover foreign taxes, to change the longstanding 

rule under which the special limitations period had been 

calculated for contested taxes. 

3

Further guidance as to the meaning of the statutory 

phrase “actually paid or accrued” can be garnered from 

the Treasury Regulation that governs carryover of foreign 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 9

taxes, Treas. Reg. § 1.904. Section 1.904-2(c) of the regulation addresses whether a taxpayer is in an “excess 

limitation” position for a tax year, i.e., whether the taxpayer may absorb excess taxes carried from another year. 

The regulation uses the same language—“actually paid or 

accrued”—that is used in the 1997 amendment to section 

6511(d)(3)(A). See 26 C.F.R. § 1.904-2(c)(1)-(2). The 

regulation provides, for example, that when a “percountry limitation” is imposed on tax credits for a given 

tax year, the sum of the taxes “actually paid or accrued” 

and those “deemed paid or accrued” in that year must be 

smaller than the per-country limitation in order to yield 

an “excess limitation,” which can then be used to absorb 

unused foreign taxes carried from another year. 26 C.F.R. 

§ 1.904-2(c)(1); id. § 1.904-2(g) (example 5). 

Applying the parties’ respective interpretations of the 

phrase “actually . . . accrued” to section 1.904-2(c) would 

yield quite different results in the context of a contested 

foreign tax liability. Pursuant to that subsection, foreign 

taxes “actually paid or accrued” in a tax year are counted 

toward the credit limitation for the same year. Thus, if 

we adopted Albemarle’s interpretation and held that a 

contested foreign tax “actually accrues” in the contest 

resolution year, the foreign tax would be counted toward 

the credit limitation for the contest resolution year. 

Under the government’s interpretation, by contrast, a 

contested foreign tax “actually accrues” in its year of 

origin and would be counted instead toward the credit 

limitation for the year of origin of the tax. 

The government’s interpretation is correct. It is well 

established that a contested foreign tax is counted toward 

the credit limitation of its year of origin, because that tax 

is used to offset the U.S. tax liability for the year of origin. 

See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 351 F.2d 336, 338 (2d 

Cir. 1965); United States v. Cruz, 698 F.2d 1148, 1150 

(11th Cir. 1983); Rev. Rul. 58-55, 1958-1 C.B. 266. Applying Albemarle’s interpretation of the phrase “actually . . . 

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10 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

accrued” would lead to the anomalous result that a taxpayer could take a tax credit for a contested foreign tax in

one year (the year of origin), but the credit would be 

counted toward the limitation applicable to another year 

(the contest resolution year), which is contrary to the 

clear intent of the regulation. 

The phrase “actually . . . accrued” in the 1997 amendment to section 6511(d)(3)(A) appears to have been taken 

directly from Treasury Regulation section 1.904. Where 

identical language is used in statutes or regulations, we 

assume that the language is intended to have the same 

meaning. See Butterbaugh v. Dep’t of Justice, 336 F.3d 

1332, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2003), citing Dep’t of Revenue of 

Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994). Congress’s decision to use the same phrase in the 1997 statute suggests that Congress meant for that phrase to have 

the same meaning in the statute that it did in the regulation, i.e., to refer to the year of origin of the tax liability in 

question. 

4 

Albemarle argues that contested foreign taxes cannot 

“actually accrue” for purposes of section 6511(d)(3)(A), 

until the contest is over and liability is established. It 

relies principally on Dixie Pine Products v. C.I.R., 320 

U.S. 516 (1944), where the Supreme Court established 

what is known as the “contested tax doctrine.” 

In Dixie Pine, the Supreme Court affirmed the IRS’s 

disallowance of a deduction under section 23(c) of the 

Revenue Act of 1936, which permitted deductions from 

gross income of taxes “paid or accrued within the taxable 

year.” The Court held that a taxpayer may deduct from 

gross income only “a liability which really accrues in the 

taxable year.” 320 U.S. at 519. For an accrual-based 

taxpayer, the Court held that tax liability cannot accrue 

where “the liability is contingent and is contested by the 

taxpayer”; instead, the taxpayer must wait for the contest 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 11

proceeding to run its course and may claim a deduction 

“only for the taxable year in which its liability for the tax 

was finally adjudicated.” Id. 

Albemarle also invokes section 461 of the Tax Code 

and related regulations, which apply an “all events test” 

to determine when a federal tax liability is deemed to 

have been incurred for taxpayers who use an accrual 

method of accounting. The pertinent regulation implements the statute by providing: 

Under [an accrual] method, a liability is incurred, 

and generally is taken into account for Federal income tax purposes, in the taxable year in which 

all the events have occurred that establish the 

fact of the liability, the amount of the liability can 

be determined with reasonable accuracy, and economic performance has occurred with respect to 

the liability. 

26 C.F.R. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii); see 26 U.S.C. § 461(h)(4).3 

According to Albemarle, because the “all events test” 

for a contested foreign tax cannot be satisfied until the 

taxpayer’s liability is finally established, the year in 

which the tax “actually accrued” for purposes of section 

6511(d)(3)(A) must be the year in which the taxpayer

resolved its dispute with the foreign government.

Neither the “contested tax doctrine” of Dixie Pine nor 

the “all events test” of section 461 dictates when a contested foreign tax liability “actually . . . accrued” in the 

3 Treasury Regulation section 1.461-4(g)(6)(iii)(B)

provides that, for foreign tax liability that is creditable 

under section 901, “economic performance occurs when 

the requirements of the all events test (as described in 

§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)) other than economic performance are 

met.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.461-4(g)(6)(iii)(B). 

 

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12 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

different context of section 6511(d)(3)(A). It has long been 

recognized that the contested tax doctrine, which is 

derived from the law regarding deductions, is not strictly 

applicable to claims of foreign tax credits. See Cuba R. 

Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) 

(contested tax doctrine held inapplicable to cases involving foreign tax credits because the unambiguous language 

of section 131(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939—

now section 905 of the Code—dictates that foreign tax 

credits may be taken in the year “in which the taxes of the 

foreign country accrued,” even if those taxes were contested and paid in a later year); Rev. Rul. 58-55, 1958-1 C.B. 

266 (contested tax doctrine applied to accrual of foreign 

taxes for deduction purposes but not for credit purposes). 

Instead, the mechanism by which a taxpayer may 

claim credits for a contested foreign tax is governed by the 

so-called “relation back” doctrine. As explained above, a 

contested foreign tax “is accruable for the taxable year to 

which it relates even though the taxpayer contests the 

liability therefor and such tax is not paid until a later 

year.” Rev. Rul. 58-55, 1958-1 C.B. 266. 

In United States v. Campbell, the Second Circuit illustrated the operation of the relation back doctrine with the 

following example:

[I]f the taxpayer contests his liability for a foreign 

tax imposed on income in 1960, and this liability 

is finally adjudicated in the foreign country in 

1965, the credit may not be claimed until 1965, 

but the foreign tax imposed on 1960 income will 

be offset against the United States 1960 tax just 

as if it had accrued in 1960. 

351 F.2d at 338 (citation omitted).

Employing the same analysis, a leading commentator 

has observed that under the relation back doctrine, contested taxes effectively “accrue at two different times for 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 13

two different purposes.” Elisabeth A. Owens, The Foreign 

Tax Credit 328 (1961). That is, for the purpose of determining in what year the right to claim the credit arises, 

the contested tax doctrine and section 461 apply. For the 

purpose of determining against which U.S. tax the foreign 

tax is to be credited, the contested tax doctrine does not 

apply, and the tax is held to have accrued in the taxable 

year “to which the tax relates.” 

Therefore, in the context of the statutes governing eligibility for foreign tax credits, including section 

6511(d)(3)(A), we reject Albemarle’s argument that the 

year that the foreign tax “actually . . . accrued” is controlled by Dixie Pine and section 461 of the Tax Code.

5 

Albemarle’s interpretation of section 6511(d)(3)(A) is 

also inconsistent with the purpose underlying the statute. 

Congress provided a special 10-year limitations period for 

filing a refund claim for foreign taxes—as opposed to 

three years for filing a claim for domestic taxes—out of 

concern that a taxpayer may be barred from asserting a 

claim if foreign governments adjust the foreign tax liabilities after the initial three-year period. See Hart v. United 

States, 585 F.2d 1025, 1029 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (“The impetus 

for [the 10-year limitations period] proposal was concern 

over inequities arising from the ability of the Service to 

assess additional income taxes whenever a taxpayer 

received a refund of foreign taxes, no matter when that 

refund was received, while the taxpayer was barred from 

asserting a claim for refund of United States income taxes 

when foreign taxes were assessed or increased after the 

three year period from the date of filing.”), citing Bank of 

America v. United States, 377 F.2d 575, 579 (Ct. Cl. 1967); 

26 U.S.C. § 6511(a). 

Under Albemarle’s interpretation, however, the 10-

year limitations period would start to run only after the 

tax liability has been finalized; in other words, no more 

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14 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

adjustments would be made and all that would be left for 

the taxpayer to do in the 10-year period would be to file a 

refund claim. 

It is highly unlikely that Congress intended to provide 

the prolonged 10-year limitations period simply to enable 

a taxpayer to complete the filing process following the 

resolution of its foreign tax liability. In light of the fact 

that a domestic taxpayer is given only three years to file a 

refund claim, it is evident that the much longer period for 

filing foreign tax claims was intended to take account of 

the time needed to resolve foreign tax liability. Thus, we 

reject Albemarle’s contention that the special limitations 

period under section 6511(d)(3)(A) starts to run only after 

contested liabilities have been finalized. We agree with 

the government that the limitations period should be 

measured with reference to the year of origin for such 

taxes.4 

In sum, we hold that the 10-year limitations period 

for filing a refund claim for Albemarle’s 1998 Belgian 

withholding taxes started to run on March 15, 1999, “the 

date prescribed by law for filing the return for” the 1998

tax year. 26 U.S.C. § 6311(d)(3)(A). For that reason, 

4 In the event that a taxpayer’s foreign tax dispute 

lasts longer than 10 years, the taxpayer may either seek 

the IRS’s approval for an extension of the 10-year limitations period or file a “protective refund claim” with the 

IRS to guard against the running of the limitations period. The absence of other cases addressing the issue 

presented here indicates that the limitations period of 10 

years from the year of origin has proved sufficient to 

resolve foreign tax liability contests. Even this case is not 

evidence that the 10-year rule has created difficulties;

Albemarle admits that its failure to file a refund claim 

shortly after the 2002 resolution of its tax dispute was the 

result of an oversight on its part.

 

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Albemarle’s May 15, 2009, claim for credits for its 1998 

Belgian taxes is time-barred. 

B

Unlike Albemarle’s refund claim for the 1998 Belgian 

taxes, its claim for the 1997 Belgian taxes is governed by 

the pre-1997 version of section 6511(d)(3)(A). 

The provision amending section 6511(d)(3)(A) in 1997

was part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 

105-34. 111 Stat. 788. Section 1056(b) of that Act provided that “The amendment made by subsection (a) [i.e., the 

amendment to section 6511(d)(3)(A)] shall apply to taxes 

paid or accrued in the taxable years beginning after the 

date of the enactment of this Act.” Pub. L. No. 105-34, 

§ 1056(b), 111 Stat. 945. The Act was enacted on August 

5, 1997. Albemarle’s 1997 Belgian taxes accrued in the 

1997 taxable year, which began on January 1, 1997, and 

before the enactment of the Act. The 1997 amendment to 

section 6511(d)(3)(A) therefore does not apply to those 

taxes. 

Under the pre-1997 version of section 6511(d)(3)(A), 

the 10-year limitations period started to run on the date 

“prescribed by law for filing the return for the year with 

respect to which the [refund] claim is made.” 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6511(d)(3)(A) (1994). Albemarle claimed credits for its 

1997 Belgian withholding taxes, and it intended to use 

those credits to offset its U.S. tax liability for the 1997 tax 

year. Thus, “the year with respect to which [Albemarle’s 

refund] claim is made” was the year 1997. See Rev. Rul. 

84-125, 1984-2 C.B. 125 (under the pre-1997 version of 

section 6511(d)(3)(A), the limitations period is measured 

with reference to the year of origin for the contested 

foreign tax).

Accordingly, the 10-year limitations period for Albemarle’s 1997 refund claim started to run on March 15, 

1998, i.e., the due date for filing the return for the year 

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16 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

1997. Albemarle’s May 15, 2009, claim for a refund of 

1997 taxes is therefore untimely.

AFFIRMED

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