Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-06327/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-06327-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City College of San Francisco
Defendant
Shalamon Duke
Plaintiff
Mark William Rocha
Defendant
San Francisco Community College District
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHALAMON DUKE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY COLLEGE OF SAN FRANCISCO, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-06327-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 21

Defendants San Francisco Community College District (“the District” or “CCSF”) 

and Chancellor Mark William Rocha’s motion to dismiss came on for hearing before this 

court on January 15, 2020. Plaintiff Dr. Shalamon Duke appeared through his counsel, 

Don Lancaster. Defendants appeared through their counsel, Damon Thurston. Having 

read the papers filed by the parties and carefully considered their arguments and the 

relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby rules as follows, for 

the reasons stated at the hearing and for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

On August 26, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants CCSF, Rocha, 

and Does 1–10 in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Francisco. 

Compl., Dkt. 1, Ex. A. That complaint asserted 14 causes of action. On October 3, 2019, 

defendants removed this action to this court. Dkt. 1. On October 31, 2019, Duke filed a

Motion to Remand. Dkt. 15. On November 14, 2019, defendants filed an opposition to 

that motion. Dkt. 18. On November 22, 2019, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC,” Dkt. 19), asserting the same 14 causes of action: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) 

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(alleged against CCSF, Rocha, and Does); (2) 29 U.S.C. § 206 (“Equal Pay Act”) (alleged 

against CCSF and Does); (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”) (alleged against CCSF, Rocha, 

and Does); (4) 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (“ADEA”) (alleged against CCSF and Does); (5) 42 

U.S.C. § 2000 (“Title VII”) (alleged against CCSF, Rocha, and Does); (6) 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2615 (“FMLA”) (alleged against CCSF, Rocha, and Does); (7) Cal. Govt. Code 

§ 12940(a) (“FEHA Discrimination”) (alleged against CCSF, Rocha, and Does); (8) Cal. 

Govt. Code § 12940(h) (“FEHA Retaliation”) (alleged against CCSF, Rocha, and Does); 

(9) Cal. Govt. Code § 12940(h) (“FEHA Retaliation”) (alleged against CCSF, Rocha, and 

Does); (10) breach of contract (alleged against CCSF and Does); (11) negligent infliction 

of emotional distress (“NIED”) (alleged against CCSF, Rocha, and Does); (12) Cal. Govt. 

Code § 54957 (alleged against CCSF and Does); (13) Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (“Unruh Act”)

(alleged against CCSF and Does); and (14) intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”) (alleged against CCSF, Rocha, and Does).

Duke is an African American educator who served as Associate Vice Chancellor of 

Student Development at CCSF beginning in July 2018.1 FAC ¶¶ 4, 14. He was paid 

$172,184.67, and a “Latina counterpart” hired around the same time earned $193,152.18. 

Id. ¶ 14. 

On December 6, 2018, a civil complaint was filed against Duke alleging that he 

sexually harassed someone while working at a former employer—a school within Los 

Angeles Community College District. Id. ¶ 15. On December 8, 2018, CCSF placed 

Duke on administrative leave. Id. ¶ 20. On December 10, 2019, CCSF asked for Duke's 

resignation, and he was told that Rocha would move to terminate him. Id.

On December 11, 2018, CCSF sent a notice to Duke that he was formally placed 

on Administrative Leave, and on the same date Rocha sent an email to the CCSF 

community stating that Duke had been "separated" from CCSF and would "not return to 

his duties." Id. ¶ 21. On December 14, 2018, CCSF provided notice to Duke that it 

 

1 The well-pled allegations of the complaint are recounted and taken as true for the 

purposes of this motion to dismiss.

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intended to terminate Duke's employment because Duke lacked judgment and good 

sense by failing to notify CCSF that a complaint was pending. Id. ¶ 23. However, no 

complaint was pending when Duke assumed his position at CCSF. Id.

At plaintiff’s request, a pre-disciplinary “Skelly hearing” was held on January 9, 

2019.2 Id. ¶¶ 25–26. Duke alleges that the hearing was deficient. Id. ¶ 27. A CCSF 

board meeting was held on January 24th, 2019, and the Board of Trustees unanimously 

voted to terminate Duke's employment. Id. ¶ 28. On January 25, 2019, Rocha sent 

plaintiff notice of his termination. Id. ¶ 29.

Prior to CCSF's termination of Duke, he had requested leave for the birth of his 

daughter, which had been granted. Id. ¶ 30. However, he was terminated shortly before 

he was scheduled to take his leave. Id. On June 14, 2019, Duke sent a California 

Government Tort Claim to CCSF, to which CCSF did not respond. Id. ¶ 31. On July 2, 

2019, Duke filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and 

Housing. Id. ¶ 32. Duke subsequently received right-to-sue letters. Id.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims 

alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that a complaint include a “short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2), a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff fails to state a 

cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 

 

2 The parties and materials submitted with the FAC interchangeably refer to a pretermination meeting attended by plaintiff and a representative of the Board (along with 

plaintiff’s counsel, telephonically, and a facilitator) as the “Skelly hearing” and the “Skelly 

meeting.” Although the nomenclature is certainly not determinative, a potential for 

confusion arises given that various of the parties’ arguments depend upon whether 

plaintiff was afforded a “hearing,” and the characteristics of any such hearing. This court 

refers to that January 9 meeting as the “Skelly hearing” simply because that is a familiar 

turn of phrase following Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975); but the 

court’s adoption of that descriptor should not be confused with any substantive evaluation 

of the characteristics of the particular meeting at issue.

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theory. Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013).

While the court is to accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, 

legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be 

accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). The complaint must proffer 

sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 558–59 (2007). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court 

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it 

has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2)). If dismissal is warranted, it is generally without prejudice, “unless it is clear

. . . that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 

F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). “Leave to amend may also be denied for repeated 

failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendment.” Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 

545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008).

Review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint, although the court can 

also consider documents “whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose 

authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the plaintiff's 

pleading.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Silicon 

Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also Sanders v. Brown, 

504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007) (“a court can consider a document on which the 

complaint relies if the document is central to the plaintiff’s claim, and no party questions 

the authenticity of the document”). The court may also consider matters that are properly 

the subject of judicial notice (Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001)), 

exhibits attached to the complaint (Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 

896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989)), and documents referenced extensively in the 

complaint and documents that form the basis of the plaintiff’s claims (No. 84 Emp’rCase 4:19-cv-06327-PJH Document 32 Filed 01/31/20 Page 4 of 26
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Teamster Jt. Counsel Pension Tr. Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 925 n.2 

(9th Cir. 2003)).

B. Analysis

First, defendants argue that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the 

action because plaintiff was required to file a writ of mandamus, rather than bring this 

action. Second, defendants move to dismiss each of plaintiff’s fourteen causes of action

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Third, defendants move to 

strike portions of the FAC.

1. Subject-matter Jurisdiction

Defendants argue that Duke was required to file a writ of mandamus3to challenge 

his termination, rather than file this civil action. Plaintiff argues that the decision to 

terminate him did not satisfy the procedural elements that would compel him to seek a 

writ. At the hearing, defendants declined to spend any of their time addressing the 

argument.

Defendants present this as a jurisdictional issue, but the underlying preclusive 

mechanism that their argument invokes would be that the state actor’s decision “trigger[s] 

res judicata and collateral estoppel effect”—not a challenge to this court’s jurisdiction 

over the action. Ahmadi-Kashani v. Regents of Univ. of California, 159 Cal. App. 4th 449, 

457 (2008); accord Tan v. Univ. of CA San Francisco, Case No. 06-cv-04697-TEH, 2007 

WL 963222, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2007) (“In essence, this doctrine is a ‘species of res 

judicata’ and collateral estoppel.”) (quoting Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton, 199 Cal.

App. 3d 235, 243–44 (1988)). 

Turning to that inquiry, the court beings by noting that because plaintiff’s “claim is 

governed by the FEHA, []he was not obligated to exhaust any available ‘administrative 

remedy,’ and could have proceeded directly with a claim to the Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing, and then to the courts.” Ahmadi-Kashani, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 

 

3

“Writ of mandamus,” “writ of mandate,” and “administrate mandate” all carry the same 

meaning in the context of defendants’ motion and are used interchangeably.

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456; accord McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 113 (2008) 

(“initiation and completion of internal administrative proceedings like the one here is not a 

condition precedent to the filing of a FEHA claim”). However, defendants’ argument rests 

on the principle that when one participates in “a full adversarial hearing” satisfying the 

procedures required to make it a quasi-judicial process under California law, such a 

hearing “trigger[s] res judicata and collateral estoppel effect[.]” Ahmadi-Kashani, 159 Cal. 

App. 4th at 457. In short, a plaintiff must make his choice of forum, and he might not be 

permitted to abandon his chosen route of adjudication in favor of another midway through 

the proceedings.

This either/or principle is “founded on the rationale that a plaintiff is entitled to only 

one opportunity to try her claim. If she takes that opportunity in the context of an 

administrative process, she cannot merely ignore an adverse result and ask for a ‘doover’ in court.” Id. at 458. Accordingly, “[j]udicial exhaustion . . . . may arise when a party 

initiates and takes to decision an administrative process—whether or not the party was 

required, as a matter of administrative exhaustion, to even begin the administrative 

process in the first place. Once a decision has been issued, provided that decision is of a 

sufficiently judicial character to support collateral estoppel, respect for the administrative 

decisionmaking process requires that the prospective plaintiff continue that process to 

completion, including exhausting any available judicial avenues for reversal of adverse 

findings. Failure to do so will result in any quasi-judicial administrative findings achieving 

binding, preclusive effect and may bar further relief on the same claims.” McDonald, 45 

Cal. 4th at 113 (citation omitted).

The court therefore inquires whether plaintiff’s termination must have been 

challenged with an administrative mandate, rather than though this action. 

“[A]dministrative mandate is available only if the decision resulted from a proceeding in 

which by law: 1) a hearing is required to be given, 2) evidence is required to be taken, 

and 3) discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the agency.’” McGill v. 

Regents of Univ. of California, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1776, 1785 (1996) (internal quotation 

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marks omitted).

The first prong raises the question as to what constitutes a “hearing.” A 

satisfactory hearing must be “intended to afford [plaintiff] an opportunity to prove her 

case,” rather than merely as “an opportunity for the parties to discuss information and 

contentions relative to the grievance.” Ahmadi-Kashani, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 458 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Certain “judicial characteristics” are “essential to 

according administrative findings collateral estoppel effect, including but not limited to 

testimony under oath, the opportunity to call witnesses and introduce evidence, and a 

formal record of the hearing.” McDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 113. Even when the plaintiff is 

“entitled to be accompanied by a representative, the meeting” is not satisfactory where it 

includes “no provisions for sworn testimony; no opportunity for cross-examination, for the 

questioning of third-party witnesses, or for the admission or consideration of other 

evidence” including the questioning of primary witnesses. Ahmadi-Kashani, 159 Cal. 

App. 4th at 458.

Here, there is no indication that a hearing was required to be given by law. The 

District’s own statements confirm that the pre-termination Skelly hearing was “a matter of 

courtesy and not of legal right” (FAC, Ex. 17), and they explicitly noted that it was “not 

clear whether” the Board of Directors meeting at which the decision to terminate plaintiff 

would be a “hearing” at all (FAC, Ex. 16). Accordingly, plaintiff was not required to seek 

an administrative mandate, and defendants’ argument—whether framed in terms of this 

court’s jurisdiction or plaintiff’s duty to exhaust administrative remedies—fails.4

2. Whether Plaintiff’s FAC Adequately Pleads Each Claim

a. First Claim: § 1983

 

4 The argument also fails under the second prong outlined in McGill, which assesses the 

evidentiary features of the hearing. Here, there is no indication that evidence was 

required to be taken by law. In fact, there is not even any indication that evidence 

outside of plaintiff’s own (unsworn) statements was permitted, much less required. See, 

e.g., FAC, Ex. 15 (Skelly hearing report); FAC, Ex. 7 (notice advising plaintiff that a 

“Skelly hearing” would at some point ensue, and that the hearing would allow him 

(without mention of other witnesses) to “address management concerns”).

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Plaintiff appears to assert two theories of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, he 

argues that defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Second, 

he argues that defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 

With respect to the alleged equal protection violation, although plaintiff uses the 

words “Equal Protection” occasionally, his briefing and FAC are entirely bereft of any 

content explaining or supporting such a theory. Instead, the discussion of plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claim in the FAC and briefing all concern the Due Process Clause, as does

plaintiff’s cited authority. Accordingly, plaintiff’s first cause of action, to the extent it is 

based on a theory that defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Constitution, is DISMISSED AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Plaintiff articulates his allegations and arguments regarding due process violations 

more clearly. Plaintiff argues that both defendants denied him due process by 

terminating him without an investigation and for reasons not permitted under California 

Education Code § 87732. Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot argue that any 

constitutionally-protected right was violated, given that the FAC confirms plaintiff was 

provided a notice of intent to dismiss, a Skelly hearing, and a notice of dismissal. See

FAC ¶¶ 23, 25, 26, 29.

“To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that an individual acting under 

the color of state law deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity protected by the 

United States Constitution or federal law. To establish a due process violation, a plaintiff 

must show that he has a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause and 

that he was deprived of the property without receiving the process that he was 

constitutionally due.” Levine v. City of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citation omitted). 

A plaintiff can assert a claim under § 1983 for a due process violation if he was 

denied “property interests in [his] employment without due process of law.” Clements v. 

Airport Auth. of Washoe Cty., 69 F.3d 321, 331 (9th Cir. 1995). “This Due Process 

analysis involves a two-step process. First, we must determine whether the [plaintiff] had 

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a protected property interest in [his] continued employment. Second, we must determine 

whether, in being deprived of this interest, [he] received all the process that was due.” Id. 

“[O]nce it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies [at the first step], the 

question remains what process is due [at the second step]. The answer to that question 

is not to be found in the [state] statute,” but in the Due Process Clause of the 

Constitution. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Regarding the first step, plaintiff “must show that [he] had a protected property 

interest in [his] job[]. We look to state law to determine whether a protected property 

interest exists.” Clements, 69 F.3d at 331; accord Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 

538 (“Property interests are not created by the Constitution, they are created and their 

dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 

independent source such as state law”) (internal quotation marks omitted). If he had 

such an interest, “the State could not deprive them of this property without due process.” 

Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 538. A public employee entitled to retain his position 

during good behavior and who could not be dismissed except under enumerated 

circumstances has “property rights in continued employment.” Id. at 539.

Here, plaintiff alleges that his employment was governed by California Education 

Code § 87732. Defendants do not dispute this; rather, they argue that plaintiff was 

terminated in accordance with that section. That section provides that “No regular 

employee or academic employee shall be dismissed except for one or more of the 

following causes:” and provides an enumerated list of causes. See Cal. Educ. Code 

§ 87732. Accordingly, the statute creates a property interest in plaintiff’s continued 

employment. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 538–40 (finding that a similar Ohio 

statute created a property interest in continued employment).

Regarding the second step, the court “must determine whether, in being deprived 

of this interest, [plaintiff] received all the process that was due.” Clements, 69 F.3d at 

331. The court looks to the Constitution to assess what process was due. “It is well 

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settled that the root requirement of the Due Process Clause is that an individual be given 

an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.

Although the pre-termination hearing need not be elaborate, ‘some kind of hearing’ must 

be afforded the employee prior to termination. The essential requirements of this pretermination process are notice and an opportunity to respond.” Clements, 69 F.3d at 

331–32 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he pretermination ‘hearing,’ 

though necessary, need not be elaborate. . . . [T]he formality and procedural requisites 

for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the 

nature of the subsequent proceedings. In general, ‘something less’ than a full evidentiary 

hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 

U.S. at 545 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For example, “constitutional 

minima [are] satisfied where the employee had access to the material upon which the 

charge was based and could respond orally and in writing and present rebuttal affidavits.” 

Id. at 542. 

“[T]he pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve the propriety of the 

discharge. It should be an initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially, a 

determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges 

against the employee are true and support the proposed action. The essential 

requirements of due process, and all that respondents seek or the Court of Appeals 

required, are notice and an opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, 

either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental 

due process requirement. The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written 

notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an 

opportunity to present his side of the story. To require more than this prior to termination 

would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing 

an unsatisfactory employee.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 545–46 (citations 

omitted).

Plaintiff argues that he was not afforded due process prior to being terminated. He 

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alleges that he was placed on administrative leave on December 8, 2018. FAC ¶¶ 20–

21. On December 12, he was given notice of a December 13 board meeting concerning 

his employment. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. The day after the board meeting, he was notified of 

CCSF’s intent to terminate his employment, and its justification for doing so. Id. ¶ 23. On 

December 19, Duke requested a pre-disciplinary hearing. Id. ¶ 25. That Skelly hearing

was held on January 9, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. Plaintiff attended in person, and his attorney 

attended telephonically. FAC, Ex. 15 at 1. Duke was afforded the opportunity to present 

reasons why he should not be terminated at the hearing. Id.; see also FAC ¶ 26. On 

January 23, Duke received notice of a board meeting held on January 24, at which the 

Board of Trustees unanimously voted to terminate his employment. FAC ¶ 28.

The allegations in plaintiff’s pleading make clear that the Skelly hearing satisfied 

defendants’ pre-termination obligations under the Due Process Clause. Plaintiff was 

given written notice of the complaints against him, and he was given the opportunity to 

attend (and did attend) a meeting during which he was permitted to respond to those 

complaints.

5

Given that plaintiff’s due process claim challenges the process he was afforded 

prior to his termination, that claim must be DISMISSED for the reasons explained above. 

Rather than alleging a due process violation, plaintiff’s pleadings have instead alleged 

facts demonstrating that the process he was afforded prior to his termination satisfied the 

Due Process Clause’s requirements. Accordingly, his § 1983 claim based on the Due 

Process Clause is DISMISSED AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS WITH PREJUDICE.

b. Second Claim: Equal Pay Act

Duke alleges that defendants violated the Equal Pay Act because the District 

allegedly paid one other employee (a “Latina counterpart”)—holding a position with 

similar responsibilities that was “comparable in scope of work”—more than plaintiff, 

 

5 Plaintiff alleges that “Duke had no opportunity to present evidence favorable to him” at 

the Skelly hearing (FAC ¶ 39), but that allegation does not comport with most other 

allegations in the complaint. See, e.g., FAC ¶ 26 & Exs. 7 (Skelly hearing would allow 

Duke to “address management concerns”), 15.

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despite his having “more direct experience.” See FAC ¶¶ 53, 54, 56.

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s complaint compares himself only to a single other 

employee, which as a matter of law fails to state a claim. Plaintiff responds that alleging 

a single comparison employee is sufficient to state a claim.

“To make out a case under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must prove that an 

employer is paying different wages to employees of the opposite sex for equal work. The 

jobs held by employees of opposite sexes need not be identical, but they must be 

‘substantially equal.’” Hein v. Oregon Coll. of Educ., 718 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1983)

(citation omitted). “[T]he proper test for establishing a prima facie case in a professional 

setting such as that of a college is whether the plaintiff is receiving lower wages than the 

average of wages paid to all employees of the opposite sex performing substantially 

equal work and similarly situated with respect to any other factors, such as seniority, that 

affect the wage scale.” Id. at 916. So, when evaluating the merits of the claim, the 

average of all similar employees of the opposite gender is necessary to determine 

liability. When there is only a single opposite-gender employee performing similar work, 

it is appropriate to compare the plaintiff’s pay against that single employee. Id. at 918

(noting, however, that the Ninth Circuit looks “critically upon the use of a single 

comparator to make out a prima facie case”).

Thus, contrary to defendants’ position, comparing oneself to a single other 

employee is appropriate when there is only a single comparable employee of the 

opposite gender. Although the FAC does not include such allegations, at the hearing 

plaintiff’s counsel argued that the District in fact employs only a single female employee 

who performs substantially equal work and is similarly situated to plaintiff. Given 

plaintiff’s counsel’s representation at the hearing, plaintiff’s Equal Pay Act claim is 

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, for the limited purpose of alleging (if possible 

consistent with Rule 11), that the District employs only a single female employee who 

performs substantially equal work and is similarly situated with respect to other factors

that affect the wage scale.

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c. Third Claim: § 1981

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to bring a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 

based on defendants breaching his employment contract, because his employment was 

formed by a contract pursuant to California Education Code Sections 72411 and 87470. 

He argues that a contract, in combination with those statutes, guaranteed him 

employment until June 30, 2020, unless he was terminated for reasons permitted by the 

statute. By terminating him for reasons not specified in California Education Code 

§ 87732, plaintiff alleges that defendants breached a contract. 

As discussed above with respect to plaintiff’s due process claim, plaintiff had a 

property interest in his employment that was created by statute—not a contractual right. 

California law is clear on this point. E.g., Kim v. Regents of Univ. of California, 80 Cal. 

App. 4th 160, 164 (2000) (“In California public employment is held not by contract, but by 

statute. . . . [O]ur Supreme Court has made it clear that civil service employees cannot 

state a cause of action for breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing.”); Miller v. State of California, 18 Cal. 3d 808, 813 (1977) (“[I]t is 

well settled in California that public employment is not held by contract but by statute and 

that, insofar as the duration of such employment is concerned, no employee has a vested 

contractual right to continue in employment beyond the time or contrary to the terms and 

conditions fixed by law.”).

Plaintiff claims that defendants terminated his employment improperly, not that 

they breached any provision requiring back-pay or other remuneration for work already 

performed.6 As such, plaintiff’s claim is not based on a breach of contract under 

controlling California law. This conclusion was clarified by the fact that, when asked at 

the hearing what allegation supports the existence of the contract underlying this claim, 

plaintiff referred the court only to the first exhibit to the FAC, which is a letter explaining 

 

6

“Pension rights, unlike tenure of civil service employment, are deferred compensation 

earned immediately upon the performance of services for a public employer and cannot 

be destroyed without impairing a contractual obligation.” Miller, 18 Cal. 3d at 814.

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that plaintiff was appointed to his position pursuant to statute. See FAC, Ex. 1. Because 

plaintiff does not have any contractual interest to enforce, his claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981 is DISMISSED AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS WITH PREJUDICE.

d. Fourth Claim: Age Discrimination

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. (“ADEA”), 

provides:

It shall be unlawful for an employer--

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 

otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 

because of such individual's age;

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way 

which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 

employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 

status as an employee, because of such individual's age;  or

(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply 

with this chapter.

29 U.S.C. § 623.

“The ADEA prohibits an employer from, among other things, ‘discharging’ an 

employee who is over forty years of age ‘because of’ the employee’s age.” Sheppard v. 

David Evans & Assoc., 694 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 29 U.S.C. 

§§ 623(a)(1), 631(a)). “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must 

allege in her complaint that: (1) she was at least forty years old; (2) she was performing 

her job satisfactorily; (3) discharged; and (4) ‘either replaced by a substantially younger 

employee with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances 

otherwise giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.’” Id.

“[A]n age difference of less than ten years, without more evidence, is insufficient to 

make a prima facie case of age discrimination. . . . [A]n age difference of less than ten 

years creates a rebuttable presumption that the age difference is insubstantial. . . . A 

plaintiff who is not ten years or more older than his or her replacements can rebut the 

presumption by producing additional evidence to show that the employer considered his 

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or her age to be significant. The plaintiff can produce either direct or circumstantial 

evidence to show that the employer considered age to be a significant factor.” France v. 

Johnson, 795 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to adequately allege that defendants replaced 

plaintiff’s position with someone younger, much less someone 10 years younger. Plaintiff 

argues that it is defendants’ burden to show that the person who replaced Duke was not 

10 years younger, and that his burden at the pleading stage is merely to “give notice of 

his claims.” See Opp., Dkt. 26 at 15.

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that the District “discharged Dr. Duke and replaced him with 

a younger person to assume his responsibility. Dr. Duke is informed, believes and 

thereon alleges that the individual who has assumed his duties is at least 10 years 

younger than him.” FAC ¶ 77. Plaintiff makes no other allegation indicating that 

defendants considered his age to be significant. Plaintiff’s claim therefore relies entirely 

on a presumption of discrimination based on the age of his replacement. Yet, the 

allegations in plaintiff’s FAC regarding his replacement are too conclusory to adequately 

allege that presumption. Accordingly, plaintiff’s fourth claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND, in order to allege facts supporting the allegation regarding plaintiff’s 

replacement’s age.

e. Fifth and Seventh Claims: Discrimination

Duke alleges that he was discriminated against due to his race in violation of 

Title VII and FEHA.

To state a claim for race discrimination, plaintiff must establish four prima facie 

elements: “(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the 

position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered 

an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available 

job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” Guz v. Bechtel 

Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000); see Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Arizona, 

Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining elements of prima facie case of 

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discrimination under Title VII); Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 941 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(“California courts apply the Title VII framework to claims brought under FEHA.”),

abrogated on other grounds by Nat'l Assoc. of African Am.-Owned Media v. Charter 

Commc'ns, Inc., 915 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Adetuyi v. City & Cty. of San 

Francisco, 63 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (collecting cases).

Defendants argue that these claims fail because the complaint alleges no facts 

supporting any plausible nexus between Duke’s termination and his sex, gender, color, or 

race. Cf. FAC ¶¶ 86–87, 102, 105. Duke’s only plausible allegation regarding his 

termination is that defendants acted on the revelation of pending allegations against 

Duke—which is not cognizable under Title VII or FEHA. Regarding Rocha, defendants 

argue that supervisory employees are not subject to personal liability for allegedly 

discriminatory management decisions as a matter of law. Plaintiff argues that he 

expressly alleged that CCSF and Rocha discriminated against him based on race.

Here, there are no plausible, well-pled allegations that defendants acted because 

of plaintiff’s sex, gender, color, or race—other than bare conclusory allegations from 

plaintiff. Plaintiff cites only to FAC ¶¶ 86–87 & 103–05, which are bare, conclusory 

allegations. The allegations’ conclusory nature is even more pronounced in light of the 

fact that the parties agree on certain core facts surrounding defendants’ articulated 

justification for terminating plaintiff—that he failed to disclose an investigation of 

misconduct with students undertaken by his previous employer prior to December 7, 

2018. See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 39, 86 (discrimination claim based on fact that defendants 

terminated Duke “based on allegations that were neither investigated nor within its 

jurisdiction”). Accordingly, plaintiff’s fifth and seventh causes of action as alleged CCSF 

are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff may amend his complaint to include 

well-pled allegations of discriminatory motive.

Regarding Roca, plaintiff’s claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. “In Reno v. 

Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 663 (1998), the California Supreme Court held that supervisors 

could not be held liable under FEHA's general anti-discrimination provision.” Scott v. 

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Solano Cty. Health & Soc. Servs. Dep't, 459 F. Supp. 2d 959, 965–66 (E.D. Cal. 2006)

(“Based on the unambiguous language in Reno, the court must dismiss plaintiff's FEHA 

discrimination claims against” individuals); Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 643 (1998) 

(unlike harassment claims, “FEHA, like similar federal statutes, allows persons to sue and 

hold liable their employers, but not individuals” for discrimination); accord Janken v. GM 

Hughes Elecs., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 65 (1996) (liability for discrimination “is limited to the 

‘employer’ only”).

f. Sixth Claim: FMLA

“To make out a prima facie case of FMLA interference, an employee must 

establish that (1) he was eligible for the FMLA's protections, (2) his employer was 

covered by the FMLA, (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) he provided 

sufficient notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) his employer denied him FMLA 

benefits to which he was entitled.” Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 

1243 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants argue that plaintiff was not eligible for FMLA leave because he had not 

been employed for 12 months and for at least 1,250 hours of service during the previous 

12-month period. Plaintiff argues that defendants are liable under the statute—

regardless of his eligibility for FMLA’s protections—because the District approved his 

request for leave.

Regarding the first element, “[t]he FMLA entitles ‘an eligible employee’ to take 

family or medical leave for several enumerated reasons, including to care for a close 

relative. The term ‘eligible employee’ means an employee who has been employed (i) for 

at least 12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested. That is, an 

employee is not eligible for family or medical leave until he or she has worked for an 

employer for 12 months.” Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770, 780 (9th Cir. 

2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (“The term 

‘eligible employee’ means an employee who has been employed—(i) for at least 12 

months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested under section 2612 of 

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this title; and (ii) for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the 

previous 12-month period.”).

Duke alleges he was “appointed” by the District in July 2018 and was terminated in 

January 2019. FAC ¶¶ 14, 29. Because he alleges that he was not employed for at least 

12 months, plaintiff was not eligible for FMLA leave, and his claim must fail. Accordingly, 

plaintiff’s sixth claim is DISMISSED AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS WITH PREJUDICE.

h. Eighth Claim: FEHA Retaliation Based on Complaint for Equal 

Pay

“[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff 

must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the 

employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the 

protected activity and the employer’s action.” Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 

1028, 1042 (2005).

Plaintiff argues that he complained about his pay and asked for an increase

commensurate with comparable female employees. He argues that asking for pay equal 

to his female counterparts is a protected activity, and that he was terminated after doing 

so. Defendants argue that the temporal proximity between Duke’s request for a raise and 

his firing is not sufficient to allege a causal link where, as here, there is an alternate 

explanation—he was the subject of a sensitive complaint at a community college where 

he used to work, and he failed to disclose that matter to CCSF until it became a formal 

lawsuit. See FAC ¶¶ 19, 27; see also RJN, Dkt. 21-1, Ex. A.

Evidence that plaintiff’s termination followed soon after his alleged complaint about 

the legality of his pay is sufficient to allege a causal link supporting his intentional 

retaliation claim. See, e.g., Flait v. N. Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal. App. 4th 467, 478 (1992) 

(“sufficient circumstantial evidence . . . that there is a causal link” where plaintiff “was 

terminated only a few months after” the protected activity); Santillan v. USA Waste of 

California, Inc., 853 F.3d 1035, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017) (plaintiff “established a nexus 

between his termination in July 2012, and his protected activity because USA Waste fired 

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him roughly two months after” the activity); Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 

812 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The causal link between a protected activity and the alleged 

retaliatory action ‘can be inferred from timing alone’ when there is a close proximity 

between the two.”). 

As such, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s eighth cause of action as alleged 

against CCSF is DENIED.

The claim as alleged against Rocha is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. “[T]he 

same rule applies to actions for retaliation that applies to actions for discrimination: The 

employer, but not nonemployer individuals, may be held liable.” Jones v. Lodge at Torrey 

Pines P'ship, 42 Cal. 4th 1158, 1164 (2008) (“Reno's rationale for not holding individuals 

personally liable for discrimination applies equally to retaliation.”). 

i. Ninth Claim: FEHA Retaliation Based on Assertion of Right to 

Due Process

For this claim, Duke alleges an additional theory of liability based on the same 

substantive law as the eighth cause of action. He asserts that he engaged in the 

protected activity of asserting his right to due process in being terminated. FAC ¶ 117.

Plaintiff fails to adequately plead the first and fourth elements required to establish 

a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA—that plaintiff show he or she engaged 

in a ‘protected activity,’ and that that plaintiff show a causal link between the protected 

activity and the employer’s action. Plaintiff’s FAC fails to provide any factual allegations 

that he “asserted his right to obtain due process in being terminated” prior to his 

termination, such that the protected activity could have plausibly led to his termination. 

No such allegations are pled under the cause of action. See FAC ¶¶ 115–120; cf. FAC 

¶ 118 (alleging that he was terminated “[a]fter complaining about his pay,” which would 

relate to the eighth cause of action). The ninth cause of action also incorporates 

paragraphs 1–32 of the FAC, (see FAC ¶ 114). Those paragraphs do not contain any 

allegations that Duke complained about any due process violations prior to his 

termination. Of course, plaintiff has alleged due process violations through this action, 

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but a retaliation claim requires such complaints to proceed the allegedly-retaliatory 

action. 

Because the court is not convinced that amendment would necessarily be futile, 

the ninth cause of action as alleged against CCSF is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND.

The claim as alleged against Rocha is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. “[T]he 

same rule applies to actions for retaliation that applies to actions for discrimination: The 

employer, but not nonemployer individuals, may be held liable.” Jones, 42 Cal. 4th at 

1164 (“Reno’s rationale for not holding individuals personally liable for discrimination 

applies equally to retaliation.”).

j. Tenth Claim: Breach of Contract

“In California public employment is held not by contract, but by statute. . . . [O]ur

Supreme Court has made it clear that civil service employees cannot state a cause of 

action for breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing. This same general principle of law applies to civil service and noncivil service 

public employees alike.” Kim, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 164 (citations omitted); accord Miller, 

18 Cal. 3d at 813–14 (“[I]t is well settled in California that public employment is not held 

by contract but by statute and that, insofar as the duration of such employment is 

concerned, no employee has a vested contractual right to continue in employment 

beyond the time or contrary to the terms and conditions fixed by law. Nor is any vested 

contractual right conferred on the public employee because he occupies a civil service 

position since it is equally well settled that the terms and conditions of civil service 

employment are fixed by statute and not by contract. Indeed, the statutory provisions 

controlling the terms and conditions of civil service employment cannot be circumvented 

by purported contracts in conflict therewith.’”) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

7

 

7 There is an exception irrelevant to the present action for “pension rights” which, “unlike 

tenure of civil service employment . . . are deferred compensation earned immediately 

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Although Duke’s employment was held by statute—not contract—he now asserts 

a cause of action for breach of contract because defendants terminated his employment 

for reasons not permitted by statute. See FAC ¶¶ 121–128. But plaintiff cannot prevail 

on such a claim under California law, as he does not have a contractual right to continue 

in an employment relationship with CCSF. Moreover, defendants sought clarification as 

to whether the alleged contract is written, oral, or implied, under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 430.10. Plaintiff responded by identifying Exhibit 1 to the FAC as the alleged contract. 

That exhibit only reinforces the correctness the above analysis—plaintiff was appointed 

pursuant to statute, not contract.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s tenth claim is DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

k. Eleventh Claim & Fourteenth Claims: NIED and IIED

The eleventh and fourteenths claims allege that defendants negligently and 

intentionally, respectively, caused plaintiff severe emotional distress by terminating him. 

See FAC ¶¶ 133, 152. 

Defendants raise three primary arguments.

First, they argue that because the alleged conduct occurred at the worksite and in 

the “normal course of the employer-employee relationship . . . workers’ compensation is 

plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy for any injury that may have resulted.” Miklosy v. Regents of 

University of California, 44 Cal. 4th 876, 902 (2008).

In California, “[s]o long as the basic conditions of compensation are otherwise 

satisfied, and the employer's conduct neither contravenes fundamental public policy nor 

exceeds the risks inherent in the employment relationship, an employee's emotional 

distress injuries are subsumed under the exclusive remedy provisions of workers' 

compensation.” Id. at 902 (citations omitted). Accordingly, when “alleged wrongful 

conduct . . . occurred at the worksite, in the normal course of the employer-employee 

 

upon the performance of services for a public employer[.]” Miller, 18 Cal. 3d at 814.

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relationship, . . . workers' compensation is plaintiffs' exclusive remedy for any injury that 

may have resulted.” Id. “The kinds of conduct at issue (e.g., discipline or criticism) are a 

normal part of the employment relationship.” Id. (quoting Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal. 

3d 1, 25 (1990)). That includes “termination of a whistleblower employee.” Id. “Even if 

such conduct may be characterized as intentional, unfair or outrageous, it is nevertheless 

covered by the workers' compensation exclusivity provisions.” Id.; accord Shoemaker, 52 

Cal. 3d at 25.

However, the doctrine “does not prohibit all emotional distress causes of action 

against an employer, but only those based on conduct that is a normal risk of the 

employment relationship.” Fretland v. Cty. of Humboldt, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1478, 1492 

(1999). “[W]ork-related injury discrimination is not a normal risk of the compensation 

bargain” and therefore can support IIED and NIED claims. Id. That is because adverse 

employment actions based on FEHA violations contravene public policy, and thus are not 

subject to a workers’ compensation remedy as the exclusive remedy. See Sheppard v. 

Freeman, 67 Cal. App. 4th 339, 344 (1998) (“an employee has an actionable claim only 

where the employer's conduct violates public policy”).

Second, defendants argue that the Tort Claims Act abolished all common law or 

judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability that arises 

from statutory or constitutional authority. See Cal. Gov. Code § 815(a). Defendants 

argue that Duke has not identified any statutory exception to the general rule of 

governmental immunity permitting Duke to proceed with either claim. 

However, Duke has pled violations of duties contained in state statutes, including 

California Education Code § 87732. That statute allegedly sets out a duty specifying that 

CCSF can only fire plaintiff based on an enumerated list of reasons. FAC ¶¶ 133, 151.

Third, defendants argue that the NIED cause of action does not state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted because in California, “there is no independent tort of 

negligent infliction of emotional distress[.]” Potter v. Firestone, 6 Cal. 4th 965, 984 

(1993). But that out-of-context quote does not stand for the proposition that any claim 

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titled “Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress” must be dismissed as a matter of 

California law. Rather, plaintiff’s NIED claim is best considered as a more specificallyexplained claim for negligence. See id. (“The tort is negligence, a cause of action in 

which a duty to the plaintiff is an essential element.”).

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s eleventh and fourteenth 

causes of action as to CCSF is DENIED.

With respect to plaintiff’s eleventh and fourteenth causes of action as alleged 

against Rocha, “except where a statutory exception applies . . . . an employee or former 

employee cannot sue individual employees based on their conduct, including acts or 

words, relating to personnel actions.” Sheppard, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 342, 347. That 

holding applies “for all employees, whether or not they are supervisors. Personnel 

actions are made for the benefit of the enterprise-the employer, and it is the employer, 

not the individual employees, that must bear the risks and responsibilities attendant to 

these actions.” Id. at 346; see generally Barrera v. Fed. Exp. Corp., Case No. 08-cv2668-JF-RS, 2008 WL 4414723, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2008) (quoting Sheppard, 67 

Cal. App. 4th at 349); Lomax v. Sellenthin, Case No. 98-cv-2588-TEH, 1999 WL 281120, 

at *5 & n.3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1999) (“It is also well settled that, as an individual 

supervisor, Sellenthin is not a proper defendant to most of plaintiff's claims.”) (citing 

Sheppard, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 339); but see May v. Semblant, Inc., Case No. 13-cv01576-EJD, 2013 WL 5423614, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013) (questioning reasoning in 

Sheppard, and declining to apply its holding to coworkers acting “in a supervisory and 

decision-making role”); Stripling v. Regents of the Univ. of California, Case No. 14-cv02606-YGR, 2015 WL 5117900, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) (declining to follow 

Sheppard); Graw v. Los Angeles Cty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1160 

(C.D. Cal. 1999) (declining to follow Sheppard).

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s eleventh and fourteenth 

causes of action as to Rocha is GRANTED and the claims are DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

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l. Twelfth Claim: Cal. Govt. Code § 54957

California Government Code § 54957(b)(2) provides: “As a condition to holding a 

closed session on specific complaints or charges brought against an employee by 

another person or employee, the employee shall be given written notice of his or her right 

to have the complaints or charges heard in an open session rather than a closed session, 

which notice shall be delivered to the employee personally or by mail at least 24 hours 

before the time for holding the session. If notice is not given, any disciplinary or other 

action taken by the legislative body against the employee based on the specific 

complaints or charges in the closed session shall be null and void.”

Plaintiff alleges that the District failed to give notice as required under the statute 

because the only notice delivered at least 24 hours before the session was emailed, 

rather than delivered personally or by physical mail. See FAC ¶ 139. Defendants argue 

that Duke, as a factual matter, received notice in some form at least 24 hours before the 

session, so there was no harm caused by any statutory deficiency. Rather than argue 

that they complied with the statute, defendants argue, without citation to any authority,

that “[t]he Court should not entertain this exacting reading of the Education Code in this 

situation[.]” Mot., Dkt. 21 at 19. 

Contrary to defendants’ argument, the statute does not appear to require any 

demonstration of harm or prejudice on its face. Rather, its plain language appears to 

provide for a non-discretionary remedy—voiding any action taken in an improperlynoticed, closed session. Given the arguments presented to the court on this motion, 

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s twelfth claim is DENIED. 

However, the court notes that this claim was not thoroughly briefed on this motion. 

The parties are encouraged to revisit this claim with more thorough briefing in the future, 

including with respect to whether the statute’s language requiring notice “by mail” 

requires physical mail rather than electronic mail; whether the complained-of session was 

an “open” or “closed” session, and whether the remedy plaintiff seeks applies to an 

“open” session at all; and whether the statutory remedy requires a demonstration of harm 

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or prejudice.

m. Thirteenth Claim: Unruh Act

Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss this claim as to both defendants. It is therefore 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to both defendants.

3. Motion to Strike 

a. Punitive Damages

As an initial matter, plaintiff has clarified that he is only seeking punitive damages 

against Rocha individually, not the District as a public entity. Accordingly, plaintiff’s 

requests for punitive damages based on claims asserted against the District are 

STRICKEN from the complaint. E.g., FAC, pp. 32:9 & 36:1.

Because there are no claims pending against Rocha following this order, 

defendants’ motion with respect to Rocha is moot.

b. Strict Liability

Defendants seek to strike language from FAC ¶ 13 alleging that the District is 

strictly liable for act of its agents. Regardless of the allegation’s merits as a matter of 

legal principle, the court declines to strike that paragraph from the complaint.

4. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of a complaint filed in the Superior 

Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. Plaintiff does not oppose 

the request. Defendants do not ask the court to take notice of the truth of any facts 

contained in that document—merely its existence. RJN, Dkt. 21-1. The request is 

GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s first cause of action based on a theory that 

defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution is DISMISSED AS 

TO BOTH DEFENDANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; plaintiff’s first cause of action 

based on a theory that defendants violated the Due Process Clause is DISMISSED AS 

TO BOTH DEFENDANTS WITH PREJUDICE; plaintiff’s second cause of action under 

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the Equal Pay Act is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; plaintiff’s third cause of 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is DISMISSED AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS WITH 

PREJUDICE; plaintiff’s fourth cause of action under the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; plaintiff’s fifth and seventh 

causes of action under FEHA and Title VII as alleged CCSF are DISMISSED WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND, and as alleged against Rocha are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; 

plaintiff’s sixth cause of action under the FMLA is DISMISSED AS TO BOTH 

DEFENDANTS WITH PREJUDICE; defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s eighth cause 

of action under FEHA as alleged CCSF is DENIED, and the claim as alleged against 

Rocha is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; plaintiff’s ninth cause of action under FEHA as 

alleged against CCSF is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, and as alleged against 

Rocha is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; plaintiff’s tenth cause of action for breach of 

contract is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

eleventh and fourteenth causes of action for NIED and IIED as alleged CCSF is DENIED, 

and the claims as alleged against Rocha are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; 

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s twelfth cause of action under Cal. Govt. Code 

§ 54957 is DENIED; plaintiff’s thirteenth cause of action under the Unruh Act is 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART 

AND DENIED IN PART, in accordance with this order.

Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint within 21 days of the date of this order.

No new parties or causes of action may be pleaded without leave of court or the 

agreement of all defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2020

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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