Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01797/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01797-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Acolla
Defendant
Fernandez
Defendant
Garza
Defendant
Guzman
Defendant
Jerry McDowell
Plaintiff
H. Patel
Defendant
R. Rivera
Defendant
Sanchez
Defendant
A. Sandoval
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY MCDOWELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. RIVERA, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:13-cv-01797-MJS

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE 

AN AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY 

THE COURT OF HIS DESIRE TO 

PROCEED ONLY ON HIS COGNIZABLE 

CLAIMS

(ECF NO. 1)

PLAINTIFF‟S RESPONSE DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

SCREENING ORDER

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Jerry McDowell, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 6, 2013. 

(ECF No. 1.) His complaint is now before the Court for screening.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

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raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the „deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws‟ of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass‟n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The Complaint identifies the following officials at Wasco State Prison (Wasco) as 

Defendants: (1) R. Rivera; (2) Acolla; (3) Sanchez; (4) Fernandez; (5) Guzman; (6) A. 

Sandoval, (7) Garza; and (8) H. Patel.

Plaintiff alleges the following:

On September 13, 2012, Plaintiff was involved in a confrontation with Defedant 

Sandoval and afterwards was cuffed and escorted to a program office at Wasco. 

“Defendant Sandoval told Plaintiff, „you made me look bad out there in front of everyone, 

so now that you are cuffed-up, let‟s see how hard you really are.‟” (Compl. at 3.) 

Defendant Sandoval smashed Plaintiff‟s face against the wall and swung Plaintiff by his 

handcuffs onto the floor. Plaintiff called to Defendant Garza for help, but he lauged and 

walked away. Defendant Sandoval continued striking Plaintiff‟s legs and knees.

Plaintiff was put in a holding cage. Defendants Sandoval and Garza denied his 

requests for medical attention. Plaintiff eventually lost consciousness. He was left in the 

cage for more than ten hours. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff was then taken to Administrative 

Segregation (Ad-Seg) where he told Defendnats Fernandez, Guzman, Sanchez, and 

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Acolla that he had been attacked by Defendant Sandavol and was in need of medical 

care. These Defendants denied Plaintiff‟s request. Plaintiff complained that the attack 

had aggravated preexisting medical conditions in his legs and that his medical chronos 

required him to be housed on a lower bunk in a ground floor cell. Defendant Acolla 

instructed the other Defendants to place Plaintiff in an isolated upstairs cell. Defendant 

Fernandez threatened to deploy his entire pepper spray bottle on Plaintiff‟s face if he 

refused to cooperate. (Id. at 5.)

On September 24, 2012 Plaintiff lost his balance trying to walk down a set of 

stairs and fell. Plaintiff lost consciousness and suffered injury throughout his body. He 

was treated by medical staff and returned to his cell. On September 27, 2012 Plaintiff 

underwent a prescheduled surgery for his preexisting leg condition. Plaintiff was 

prescribed a cane and knee brace, but when he returned to Ad-Seg Defendants Acolla 

and Fernandez confiscated the cane. Plaintiff was then put in a standing cage and left 

for eight hours. Afterwards Defendants Guzman and Sanchez dragged Plaintiff to the 

Doctor‟s office where he received a wheelchair. (Id. at 6.) The attending physician tried 

to dress Plaintiff‟s wound with fresh bandages, but Defendants Guzman and Sanchez 

would not allow it. The Defendants then removed the leg rests on the wheelchair and 

pushed Plaintiff, who was yelling as his legs dragged underneath the chair, back to his 

cell. (Id. at 7.)

Defendant Patel was Plaintiff‟s primary care provider during this period and he 

refused to treat the injuries Plaintiff received from falling down the stairs despite 

numerous medical care requests. Nurses Boat and Hernandez both told Plaintiff that 

Patel had said Plaintiff complained too much and submitted too many requests for 

medical treatment. (Id.) Defendant Patel also denied Plaintiff rehabilitative therapy 

prescribed by the surgeon. The lack of therapy forced Plaintiff to endure months of 

unnecessary pain and untimately led to his body healing improperly. (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff filed inmate grievances requesting medical care and complaining of 

improper treatment. Defendants Acolla and Fernandez destroyed the greivances and 

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told Plaintiff they would not allow his grievances to be processed and that if he peristed 

“his time was going to go worst [sic] . . . .” (Id.)

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda 

Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 

1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.‟” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility 

that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 1949-50.

As discussed below, this Court finds that Plaintiff has asserted several claims 

which, when analzed separately and taken as true (as they must be at this stage of the 

proceedings), each contains sufficient facts and allegations that plausibly allege the 

elements of the constitutional wrong alleged. Accordingly, the Court intends to allow 

them to proceed. However, the Court notes that when each is read in light of the others, 

the overall plausibility diminishes with each successive claim: it is difficult to imagine 

that one inmate has been subjected without cause to such a succession of maliciously 

motivated constitutional violations by such a succession of prison authorities. Plaintiff

must realize that even a claim that survives screeningl must be supported and capable 

of being proven by admissible evidence and likely face many additional challenges after 

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screening. Thus, Plaintiff may be well advised to consider which claims he can support 

with competent independent evidence and proceed only on those he feels he can prove. 

Proceeding on all might jeopardize the credibility of all.

B. Linkage Requirement

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th 

Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a 

plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.

The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the 

plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a 

theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948. Since a government official 

cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability in § 1983 actions, Plaintiff must 

plead sufficient facts showing that the official has violated the Constitution through his 

own individual actions. Id. at 1948. In other words, to state a claim for relief under § 

1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission 

that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights.

The Complaint names R. Rivera as a Defendant but fails to provide any factual 

allegations linking him to the violations alleged. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Rivera is 

partly responsible for assigning him to an upper tier cell in violation of his Eighth 

Amendment rights. However, Plaintiff‟s factual allegations do not describe Defendant 

Rivera as a participant in that action.

Plaintiff can not state a cognizable claim against a defendants without setting 

forth specific facts as to the conduct of each that proximately caused a violation of his 

rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). The mere fact that a 

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defendant may have supervised the individuals responsible for a violation is not enough. 

The Defendants may only be held liable in a supervisory capacity if they “participated in 

or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff has failed to link Defendant Rivera to the violations alleged. The Court 

will provide an opportunity to amend. In order to state a cognizable claim, Plaintiff needs 

to demonstrate that the Defendant personally took some action that violated Plaintiff‟s 

constitutional rights.

C. Eighth Amendment

1. Excessive Force

The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment protects 

prisoners from the use of excessive physical force. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 130 

S.Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (per curiam); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). 

What is necessary to show sufficient harm under the Eighth Amendment depends upon 

the claim at issue, with “the objective component being contextual and responsive to 

„contemporary standards of decency.‟” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). For excessive force claims, the core judicial inquiry is whether 

the force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or 

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 34, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 

(quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (quotation marks omitted).

Not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of 

action. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 34, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) 

(quotation marks omitted). Necessarily excluded from constitutional recognition is the de 

minimis use of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to 

the conscience of mankind. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 34, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 (quoting Hudson, 

503 U.S. at 9-10) (quotations marks omitted). In determining whether the use of force 

was wanton and unnecessary, courts may evaluate the extent of the prisoner‟s injury, 

the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of 

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force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts 

made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (quotation 

marks and citations omitted).

While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, 

it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The malicious and sadistic use of force to 

cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 

34, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, 

it is the use of force rather than the resulting injury which ultimately counts. Id. at 1178.

Plaintiff alleges that he was involved in a confrontation with Defendant Sandoval 

and afterwards was handcuffed and taken to an office. Defendant Sandoval then told 

Plaintiff, “„you made me look bad out there in front of everyone, so now that you are 

cuffed-up, let‟s see how hard you really are.‟” (Compl. at 3.) He then smashed Plaintff‟s 

face against a wall, threw him to the floor, and beat his legs and knees, areas of 

Plaintiff‟s body where he suffered from a prexising medical condition.

Taking the circumstances alleged as true, Defendant Sandoval‟s use of force was 

wanton and unnecessary. Plaintiff had already been subdued and physically removed to 

another location. Under the circumstances alleged, Defendant Sandoval would be said 

to have acted maliciously to cause harm and not in a good-faith effort to maintain order 

or restore discipline. The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always 

violates contemporary standards of decency. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 34, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 

(quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) (quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff also alleges that during the attack he called out to Defendant Garza for 

help. Defendant Garza allegedly laughed at Plaintiff and walked away. The failure to 

intervene can support an excessive force claim where the bystander-officers had a 

realistic opportunity to intervene but failed to do so. Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 

410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003); Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995). Defendant Garza allegedly 

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had an opportunity to intervene but failed to do so. Under the circumstances that is all 

Plaintiff needs to allege to state a claim.

2. Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 

protects prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from 

inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) and Rhodes v. 

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted). While conditions of 

confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they must not involve the 

wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 

452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, conditions which are devoid of 

legitimate penological purpose or contrary to evolving standards of decency that mark 

the progress of a maturing society violate the Eighth Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 

1045 (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002); 

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.

Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate 

shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 

217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every 

injury that a prisoner sustains while in prison represents a constitutional violation, 

Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks omitted). To maintain an Eighth 

Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials were deliberately indifferent 

to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; 

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 

807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; Frost 

v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Sandoval, Garza, Fernandez, Guzman, Sanchez, 

and Acolla participated in numerous violations of his Eighth Amendment rights during the 

period beginning on September 13, 2012, when Sandoval beat Plaintiff in the program 

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office, through September 27, 2013, the day Plaintiff underwent surgery. The Complaint 

describes a pattern of behavior in which each Defendant participated in acts designed to 

torment and harm Plaintiff. In each case Plaintiff establishes the elements of an Eighth 

Amendment claim. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738 (Punitive treatment which amounts to 

gratuitous infliction of wanton and unnecessary pain is prohibited by the Eighth 

Amendment.).

Immediately after Defendant Sandoval‟s assault Plaintiff was placed in a holding 

cage. Defendants Sandoval and Garza denied mulitiple requests for medical aid and left 

Plaintiff, who eventually lost consciousness, for more than ten hours. Plaintiff was next 

taken to Ad-Seg where he told Defendants Fernandez, Guzman, Sanchez and Acolla 

what had happened and that he needed medical care. The Defendants refused to help 

Plaintiff.

These Defendants either personally inflicted the injury to Plaintiff, witnessed it, or 

was told about it after the fact. Plaintiff was entitled to medical care and personal safety. 

The Complaint adequately alleges that Defendants Sandoval, Garza, Fernandez, 

Guzman, Sanchez, and Acolla were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm 

to Plaintiff in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.

The Defendant officers in Ad-Seg - Fernandez, Guzman, Sanchez, and Acolla –

also forced Plaintiff into an upper tier cell. Plaintiff told these Defendants that Sandoval‟s 

attack aggravated a preexisting leg condition, that he could not walk, and that he had 

medical chronos limiting him to ground floor cells and lower bunks. These Defendants 

ignored the risk of harm and forced Plaintiff up the stairs, from which he later fell and 

suffered further injury, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.

Plaintiff underwent surgery and was prescribed a cane. When he returned to AdSeg Defendants Acolla and Fernandez confiscated the cane and confined Plaintiff in a 

standing cage for eight hours. Again, taking Plaintiff‟s allegations as true, Defendants 

Acolla and Fernandez knowingly disregarded Plaintiff‟s serious medical need in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment. Id.

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Defendants Guzman and Sanchez then dragged Plaintiff to the Doctor‟s office to 

replace the cane with a wheelchair. The Defendants refused to allow a doctor to redress 

Plaintiff‟s wound and then they removed the feet support on the wheelchair so that 

Plaintiff‟s legs would drag on the floor. The Defendants ignored Plaintiff yelling out in 

pain and acted intentionally to cause pain in violation of Plaintiff‟s Eighth Amendment 

rights. Id.

3. Inadequate Medical Care

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to 

medical care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with 

deliberate indifference to an inmate‟s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 

F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show [1] a serious 

medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat [his] condition could result in further 

significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the 

defendant‟s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 

1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). Deliberate indifference is shown 

by “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner‟s pain or possible medical 

need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 

439 F.3d at 1096).

The Complaint alleges that Defendant Patel, Plaintiff‟s primary care provider, 

ignored Plaintiff‟s numerous medical care requests. Two nurses allegedly told Plaintiff 

that Defendant Patel believed Plaintiff complained too much. However, Plaintiff does not 

allege facts supporting the suggestion Defendant Patel actually received the requests for 

medical care. As discussed below, Plaintiff also alleges that certain other Defendants 

refused to process those requests and his various grievances. Notwithstanding the 

nurses‟ comments, it is not clear from the allegations whether Defendant Patel was 

actually aware of Plaintiff‟s requests for medical care. Plaintiff also concludes that Patel 

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is responsible for denying rehabilitative therapy without supplying factual allegations 

demonstrating how he knows that to be true.

Plaintiff‟s conclusory allegations are not sufficient to state a congnizable claim 

against Defendant Patel. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. The Court will grant leave to 

amend. To state a claim Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that Defendant Patel 

knowingly disregarded a risk of harm to Plaintiff. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal 

standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this 

standard, the prison official must not only „be aware of the facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,‟ but that person „must also 

draw the inference.‟” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “„If a prison official 

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the 

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.‟” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of 

Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

D. First Amendment

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner‟s First Amendment rights to speech or 

to petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 

F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); 

see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 

65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First 

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor 

took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner‟s protected 

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his First Amendment 

rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 

668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva, 658 at 1104; Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 

1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff alleges that (1) Defendants Acolla and Fernandez destroyed his inmate 

grievances and threatended that if he peristed “his time was going to go worst [sic] . . .” 

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(2) because (3) Plaintiff attempted to access the inmate grievance process. Plaintiff 

further alleges that the Defendants‟ conduct (4) chilled the exercise of his Frist 

Amendment rights and (5) did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.

Plaintiff has satisfied the third element of his retaliation claim; filing a grievance is 

a First Amendment protected activity. Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1138. The 

Defendants allegedly destroyed Plaintiff‟s grievances and threatened him. “[T]he mere 

threat of harm can be an adverse action, regardless of whether it is carried out because 

the threat itself can have a chilling effect.” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1270. These 

allegations are sufficient to satisfy the first and fourth elements of Plaintiff‟s retaliation 

claim.

The second element of a prisoner retaliation claim focuses on causation and 

motive. See Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271. A plaintiff must show that his protected 

conduct was a “„substantial‟ or „motivating‟ factor behind the defendant‟s conduct.” Id.

(quoting Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)). The 

Complaint alleges that the Defendants acted for the purpose of discouraging Plaintiff‟s 

protected conduct. 

The fifth prong requires a prisoner to allege that “the prison authorities‟ retaliatory 

action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution or was not tailored 

narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532. This is not a high 

burden to reach. See id. (prisoner‟s allegations that search was arbitrary and capricious 

sufficient to satisfy this inquiry). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Acolla and Fernandez‟s 

conduct advanced no legitimate penological goal. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 

satisfied the fifth and final element of his retaliation claim against Defendants Acolla and 

Fernandez.

V. CONCLUSION

The Complaint states claims against Defendants Sandoval, Garza, Fernandez, 

Guzman, Sanchez, and Acolla for the violation of Plaintiff‟s Eighth Amendment rights 

and Defendants Acolla and Fernandez for the violation of Plaintiff‟s First Amendment 

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rights, but does not state a claim against the remaining Defendants. The Court will 

provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies 

identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 

1987).

If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to 

proceeding only on his cognizable claim, Plaintiff may so notify the Court in writing, and 

the Court will dismiss his other claims. Plaintiff will then be provided with a summons 

and USM-285 form for completion and return. Upon receipt of the forms, the Court will 

direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of process on Defendants Sandoval, 

Garza, Fernandez, Guzman, Sanchez, and Acolla.

If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a), but must state what each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of 

Plaintiff‟s constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Although 

accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Further, 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his 

amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” 

complaints). 

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. 

Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superceded pleading.” Local Rule 220.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the 

Court in this order, OR

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b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and is willing to proceed only on his cognizable claims; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for 

failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 30, 2013 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC _Signature- END:

ci4d6

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