Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03013/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03013-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maurice T. Lee
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 14, 2000 Decided June 30, 2000

No. 99-3012

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Eddie J. Mathis,

Appellant

No. 99-3013

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Maurice T. Lee,

Appellant

---------

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 1 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

No. 99-3014

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Walter Mathis,

Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cr00334-01)

(No. 97cr00334-02)

(No. 97cr00334-04)

David Schertler argued the cause for appellant Eddie J.

Mathis. Barry Coburn, appointed by the court, was on brief.

Adam H. Kurland, appointed by the court, argued the

cause for appellant Maurice T. Lee.

Mary M. Petras, appointed by the court, argued the cause

for appellant Walter Mathis.

Barbara J. Valliere, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Wilma A. Lewis, United

States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, William M. Blier and

Valinda Jones, Assistant United States Attorneys were on

brief.

Before: Ginsburg, Henderson and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Appellants

Eddie Mathis, Walter Mathis and Maurice Lee were convicted on a single count of conspiracy to distribute and possess

with the intent to distribute heroin and cocaine in violation of

21 U.S.C. s 846. The appellants challenge their convictions,

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 2 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

claiming that the government's evidence at trial proved multiple conspiracies and that the variance between the single

conspiracy charge on which they were indicted and the evidence against them substantially prejudiced them. Additionally, Walter Mathis claims that the district court erroneously

admitted other crimes evidence at trial and committed two

sentencing errors. Appellants Eddie Mathis and Lee also

challenge the district court's application of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) in sentencing them. Finally, Lee claims that the district court erroneously admitted

his handgun and certain legal documents into evidence. We

conclude that while the government's conspiracy evidence

varied from the conspiracy charged, the variance did not

substantially prejudice the appellants. We affirm the district

court in all other respects except for its application of section

4A1.1(d) of the Guidelines in sentencing Walter Mathis. Accordingly, we affirm all three appellants' convictions and

Eddie Mathis's and Lee's sentences but vacate Walter Mathis's sentence and remand to the district court to resentence

him in accordance with this opinion.

I.

Viewed most favorably to the government, see United

States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the

evidence showed that in about May 1996 Eddie Mathis, with

his nephew Lee's assistance, reestablished a preexisting drug

distribution network. Eddie Mathis obtained cocaine and

heroin from different suppliers and sold it to Eugene Matthews, who then resold it on the streets of the District of

Columbia (District). On September 18, 1996 Eddie Mathis's

brother, Walter Mathis, finished his parole term and "between September and October" of 1996 joined the conspiracy

by delivering an ounce of heroin to Matthews. Trial Tr.

4/30/98 at 128. During this time, agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) were investigating another cocaine dealer, Robert Andrews (Eddie Mathis's father-in-law).

By wiretapping Andrews's telephones, DEA agents learned

that Andrews and Eddie Mathis shared the same New York

drug supplier, Miguel Franklin Castro. Andrews had introUSCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 3 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

duced Eddie Mathis to Castro's initial courier, Elias Rodriguez, to whom Eddie Mathis expressed an interest "in dealing

with heroin." Trial Tr. 5/6/98 (a.m.) at 56. Andrews and

Eddie Mathis pooled their money to buy enough cocaine and

heroin from Castro (through Rodriguez) to make it "worth it

for [Rodriguez] to come" to the District. Trial Tr. 5/6/98

(p.m.) at 12. Castro's new courier, Vladimir Perez, at first

delivered the drugs to Andrews's house and also delivered

cocaine and heroin to Harold Corbett, another drug dealer

operating in the District. Soon Eddie Mathis himself ordered

heroin from Castro.

On March 8, 1997 DEA agents, acting undercover, ordered

250 grams of heroin from Andrews. After Perez delivered

the heroin, the police arrested both Andrews and Perez.

They pleaded guilty and Perez identified Castro, Rodriguez

and Eddie Mathis as coconspirators. On July 9, 1997 DEA

agents arrested Castro as he was preparing to sell Eddie

Mathis 300 grams of heroin. Castro pleaded guilty to drug

trafficking charges and cooperated with the DEA by making

several monitored telephone calls to Eddie Mathis to arrange

a drug deal. Castro arranged a heroin sale to Eddie Mathis.

Eddie Mathis dispatched Lee to purchase the heroin and a

DEA agent arrested Lee on August 20, 1997. DEA agents

were unable to arrest Eddie Mathis before he went into

hiding but they subsequently filed a complaint against him

and obtained a warrant for his arrest.

Meanwhile, in July 1997 Eddie Mathis contacted Rodney

Patterson and Terry Kelton, who were then inmates at the

United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, about

arranging a drug transaction. Patterson and Kelton introduced Eddie Mathis to Peter Coley, a fellow inmate. Unbeknownst to Eddie Mathis, Coley had agreed to assist DEA

agents in setting up a drug sale to Eddie Mathis. Through

monitored telephone calls, Coley spoke to Eddie and Walter

Mathis several times. With the help of DEA agent Samuel

Bates, Coley arranged a drug transaction at the Landover

Mall in Landover, Maryland. On November 5, 1997 Bates

and an undercover Baltimore City Police detective, carrying a

five kilogram package of sham cocaine, met Walter Mathis

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 4 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

and Dee Smith at the Landover Mall. Walter Mathis then

dispatched Smith, who drove a gold and tan Geo vehicle, to

pick up Eddie Mathis. Eddie Mathis arrived at the Mall

fifteen minutes later. Smith then left the Mall in his Geo.

Bates showed Eddie Mathis the cocaine, who replied "Okay,"

and DEA agents then arrested both Eddie and Walter Mathis. Trial Tr. 5/12/98 at 148. Less than an hour later DEA

agents spotted Smith's gold and tan Geo parked in front of

the Glenarden Apartments adjacent to the Landover Mall.

Inside an apartment the officers found and searched Smith,

recovering a semiautomatic handgun magazine. In the glove

compartment of the Geo the officers recovered Smith's loaded

semiautomatic handgun. A search of Smith's apartment uncovered copies of court documents related to Lee which Lee

had mailed to a Maryland post office box and letters from

Kelton to Smith regarding Lee's court proceedings.

The government secured a six-count indictment against

Eddie Mathis, Walter Mathis, Lee and Rodriguez, charging

each of them with one count of conspiracy to distribute and

possess with the intent to distribute heroin and cocaine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. s 846. Additionally, Eddie Mathis was

charged individually with two counts of possession of heroin

with intent to distribute and one count of possession of

cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.

s 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(i); he and Lee were jointly charged

with one count of possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(i). Eddie

Mathis was also charged with one count of conspiracy to

launder money in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) &

(b)(1)(B)(ii). On May 22, 1998 a jury found Eddie and Walter

Mathis and Lee guilty of conspiracy.1 After the district court

sentenced the appellants, they filed their timely appeals.

__________

1 Eddie Mathis was convicted on two counts and Lee on one count

of possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21

U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(i). Eddie Mathis was also convicted

of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).

The jury acquitted him on the two remaining counts against him

and also acquitted Rodriguez of conspiracy.

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 5 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

II.

The indictment charged Eddie and Walter Mathis and Lee

with participating in a single conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and heroin from "at least in or about May

1996 to on or about November 5, 1997." Indictment at 1.

The appellants concede that the evidence establishes a conspiracy among themselves, Castro, Rodriguez, Perez and

Matthews (the Mathis-Castro conspiracy) but contend it ended with Lee's arrest on August 20, 1997,2 after which date all

participants except Eddie and Walter Mathis were under

arrest. They contend that evidence of the transaction culminating in the November 5 reverse sting involving Coley and

the Mathises constituted a separate conspiracy (the MathisColey conspiracy) which materially varied from the conspiracy on which they were indicted. In addition, Eddie Mathis

contends that evidence of Castro's drug deliveries to Andrews

involved a separate conspiracy (the Andrews-Castro conspiracy) from the Mathis-Castro conspiracy.

A. Variance

In order to establish that a variance between the indictment and the evidence requires a reversal of their convictions, the appellants must demonstrate

(1) that the evidence at trial established the existence of

multiple conspiracies, rather than the one conspiracy

alleged in the indictment, and

(2) that because of the multiplicity of defendants and

conspiracies, the jury was substantially likely to transfer

evidence from one conspiracy to a defendant involved in

another.

United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(quotation omitted). To determine whether the evidence

supports a single conspiracy as opposed to multiple conspiracies, the court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see Thomas, 114 F.3d at 244, looks at

"whether the defendants shared a common goal, any interdependence among the participants, and any overlap among the

__________

2 All dates occurred in 1997 unless otherwise noted.

participants in the allegedly separate conspiracies." Gaviria,

116 F.3d at 1533 (citation omitted). The participants shared

a common goal to distribute drugs for profit in the District.

Furthermore, Eddie and Walter Mathis's involvement with

participants Castro, Andrews and Coley established coconspirator overlap. See id. at 1533 (overlap satisfied when main

conspirator works with all participants); United States v.

Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (overlap satisfied

when "main figures" are involved in all alleged schemes).

The government, however, did not show the participants'

interdependence in a single conspiracy. It established a

"hub" conspiracy consisting of appellants Eddie and Walter

Mathis and Lee.3 To further their conspiracy the appellants

obtained drugs from different suppliers including Castro,

Andrews and Coley. Each supplier became a separate

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 6 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

"spoke" of the hub.4 But "[w]ithout a rim to enclose the

spokes, ... the evidence ma[kes] out multiple conspiracies,

not the single one alleged." United States v. Tarantino, 846

F.2d 1384, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 755 (1946)). At oral argument the

government described the rim enclosing the supplier spokes

as the common goal to sell illegal drugs in the District.

According to the government, it needed to show interdependence only among the hub sellers, not among the spoke

suppliers. See Appellee's Br. 24. Our caselaw, however,

teaches that competing spoke suppliers in a hub conspiracy

must not only have a connection to the hub sellers5 but must

also have interdependence among each other in order to form

__________

3 The "hub" is "the focal, key or central member[s] of a wheel

conspiracy." United States v. Flood, 965 F.2d 505, 509 (7th Cir.

1992).

4 The "spokes" are the hub's "associates" who are involved in

individual transactions and "know that they are working for the

hub." United States v. Payne, 99 F.3d 1273, 1279 n.5 (5th Cir.

1996).

5 The government does not dispute that interdependence must

exist between the spoke suppliers and the hub conspiracy. See

Appellee's Br. 24.

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 7 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

a rim and constitute a single conspiracy. In United States v.

Graham, 83 F.3d 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the government

established the operation of the "Newton Street Crew," a

cocaine trafficking organization consisting of three different

"cliques" or groups of people selling drugs together. The

three defendants charged with conspiracy were members of

the same clique but the government used evidence of the

entire drug operation, including all three cliques, to establish

the conspiracy. The court analyzed the connections among

the three drug cliques in concluding that the evidence "was

sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that ... the

cliques were dependent on each other." Graham, 83 F.3d at

1472; see also United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 347

(D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd in part en banc, 59 F.3d 1323 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) (core hub conspiracy with various unrelated suppliers "likely ... varied from the indictment's conspiracy

count") (citing United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385,

1395-1402 (7th Cir. 1991) (conspiracy requires interdependency among competing suppliers)). Although "fairly minimal"

evidence may establish interdependency, Gatling, 96 F.3d at

1522, some connection among competing spoke suppliers in a

hub conspiracy must exist in order to constitute one conspiracy. With the foregoing in mind, we must determine whether

spoke suppliers Andrews, Castro and Coley were interdependent.

The evidence supports Andrews's involvement not solely

with Eddie Mathis but also with Castro. Andrews introduced

Eddie Mathis to Castro and DEA surveillance of Andrews

uncovered Eddie Mathis's subsequent connection with Castro.

Furthermore, according to Castro, Eddie Mathis relied on

Andrews as an initial critical link to order heroin from Castro.

Finally, Castro delivered drugs to both Andrews and Eddie

Mathis at Andrews's house. This evidence is more than

sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Andrews had

the requisite connection to competing supplier Castro and

thus participated in the Mathis-Castro conspiracy. See Graham, 83 F.3d at 1471 (finding interdependency among cliques

that purchased and distributed drugs together).

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 8 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The evidence does not, however, manifest a connection

between Coley and either Castro or Andrews. The government does not point us to evidence of such a connection,

apparently assuming that interdependency among suppliers is

not required. With no connection between Coley and either

Castro or Andrews, however, we conclude that the Mathis

brothers' transaction with Coley constituted a separate conspiracy, the Mathis-Coley conspiracy. Accordingly, the government's evidence regarding Coley and the November 5

reverse sting varied from the Mathis-Castro conspiracy

charged in the indictment.

In order to reverse their convictions, however, the appellants must show that the variance "substantially prejudiced"

them through "spillover prejudice." Gaviria, 116 F.3d at

1533. Substantial prejudice occurs when multiple defendants

are charged with a large and complex conspiracy and spillover prejudice confuses the jurors. See United States v.

Stewart, 104 F.3d 1377, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (trial of multiple

defendants increases "danger that, due to 'spillover' effects,

appellant might be found guilty based on evidence properly

admitted only against someone else"). The record here does

not suggest such spillover prejudice or jury confusion. First,

the risk of "spillover prejudice ... is less likely the fewer the

defendants." Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1533 (no risk of prejudice

with four charged defendants); see also Anderson, 39 F.3d at

348 (no risk of prejudice with ten charged defendants). Here,

as in Gaviria, the government indicted only four defendants.

Second, the government introduced tape recordings of conversations among Eddie Mathis, Castro and Andrews and

among Eddie and Walter Mathis and Coley. The government also used a videotape of Lee selling drugs. The jury,

therefore, had " 'no need to look beyond each defendant's own

words in order to convict.' " Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1533

(quoting Anderson, 39 F.3d at 348). Third, Eddie and Walter

Mathis played roles in both the Mathis-Castro and the Mathis-Coley conspiracies. See id. Finally, the district court

instructed the jury that it could convict only if the evidence

supported one conspiracy instead of two. See Trial Tr.

5/20/98 at 32. Neither the Mathis brothers nor Lee objected

to the jury charge, see id., and they therefore bear a "heavy

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 9 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

burden of showing substantial prejudice" because the "jury is

presumed to follow a trial court's instructions." United

States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1980)

(citations omitted). In sum, although we find a variance

between the indictment charging a single conspiracy and the

trial evidence indicating more than one conspiracy, we conclude the variance did not substantially prejudice the appellants.6

B. Walter Mathis

The indictment charged only one conspiracy (the MathisCastro conspiracy); the government's evidence of the MathisColey conspiracy therefore constituted "other crimes" evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and, Walter

Mathis claims, was improperly admitted.7 We review the

district court's admission of "other crimes" evidence for abuse

of discretion. Graham, 83 F.3d at 1472. Evidence of an

uncharged crime or bad act is admissible if it is relevant,8

__________

6 Eddie Mathis also argues that evidence of Castro's drug sales to

another dealer, Corbett, established a separate conspiracy. Corbett

obtained drugs initially from Andrews and later from Castro, see

Trial Tr. 5/5/98 (a.m.) at 37, thus showing interdependency among

the Mathis-Castro conspiracy participants. See Graham, 83 F.3d

at 1472. There is no evidence, however, linking Corbett (as a spoke

or otherwise) in the Mathis-Castro hub conspiracy including Eddie

and Walter Mathis and Lee. Assuming without deciding that

Corbett's involvement with Andrews and Castro indicates a separate conspiracy, we conclude that the evidence of that conspiracy

was not substantially prejudicial to Eddie Mathis. See Anderson,

39 F.3d at 348.

7 Walter Mathis contends for the first time on appeal that,

because of the variance, the government's indictment joined two

conspiracies and was therefore duplicative. This argument is

waived, however, because defenses based on " 'defects in the indictment' ... are waived under [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure]

12(f) if not raised prior to trial." United States v. Weathers, 186

F.3d 948, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)).

8 "Relevant evidence" is "evidence having any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination

probative of a material issue (such as intent) other than the

defendant's character9 and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.10 See Gaviria, 116

F.3d at 1532. In a conspiracy prosecution, the government is

usually allowed considerable leeway in offering evidence of

other offenses "to inform the jury of the background of the

conspiracy charged, to complete the story of the crimes

charged, and to help explain to the jury how the illegal

relationship between the participants in the crime developed."11 United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 33-34 (2d

Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and quotation omitted).

Evidence of the Mathis-Coley conspiracy was relevant to

show Walter Mathis's intent to act in concert with his brother

Eddie Mathis to possess drugs with the intent to distribute

them. Furthermore, the probative value of the Mathis-Coley

conspiracy is not "substantially outweighed" by its prejudicial

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 10 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

effect. Evidence tending to demonstrate "intent, plan, preparation, and motive ... is particularly probative where the

government has alleged conspiracy," United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 659 & n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citations

omitted), and as discussed supra, evidence of the Mathis-

__________

of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401.

9 In pertinent part, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to

prove the character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for

other purposes, such as proof of ... intent, ... plan....

10 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.

11 We note that "the principles governing what is commonly

referred to as other crimes evidence are the same whether the

conduct occurs before or after the offense charged." United States

v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Coley conspiracy did not substantially prejudice Walter Mathis. In light of the government's recognized latitude in using

other crimes evidence in a conspiracy prosecution and the

probative value of the Mathis-Coley conspiracy to show intent, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting evidence of the Mathis-Coley conspiracy.

Walter Mathis also raises two challenges under the Guidelines. First, he claims that the district court erroneously

failed to apply section 3B1.2(b) which provides a two-level

reduction for a "minor participant," defined as "any participant who is less culpable than most other participants."

U.S.S.G. s 3B1.2, Application Note 3. A minor participant's

relevant conduct must involve more than one participant and

" 'culpability for such conduct [must be] relatively minor

compared to that of the other participant(s).' " United States

v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting

United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir.

1991)). Walter Mathis contends that his role in the MathisCastro conspiracy was similar to Lee's (who did receive the

minor participant reduction) and therefore the district court

erroneously found that his was not a "relatively minor" role

compared to the other participants' roles. Because "[t]he

application of section 3B1.2 is inherently fact-bound" it is

"largely committed to the discretion of the trial judge."

Caballero, 936 F.2d at 1299. Ultimately, we uphold the

district court's findings of fact unless "clearly erroneous."

United States v. Bridges, 175 F.3d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir.

1999).

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 11 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The district court decided Lee was a minor participant

because he "was used only as a messenger" or a "gopher" in

small deals. Sentencing Tr. 1/6/99 at 72. Lee did not play "a

role in the planning of the criminal enterprise." Id. at 73.

Walter Mathis, on the other hand, participated in a series of

telephone calls in which he, Eddie Mathis and others

"planned, discussed and arranged for the delivery of 5 kilograms of cocaine," which was "the largest single delivery of

drugs in the whole case." Id. at 47-48. Although we have

concluded that the November 5 reverse sting was not part of

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 12 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the offense of conviction, the district court may nonetheless

consider it at sentencing as relevant conduct. See United

States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing

United States v. Nichols, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994)). The

district court correctly considered Walter Mathis's relevant

conduct in the November 5 reverse sting and, accordingly, it

did not clearly err in failing to apply section 3B1.2(b)'s minor

participant reduction to him notwithstanding its treatment of

Lee to the contrary.

Finally, Walter Mathis contends that the district court

erroneously applied section 4A1.1(d)'s two-point increase to

his offense level because the government did not prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that he was on parole at the

time of his offense.12 In view of the government's concession,13 we conclude that the district court clearly erred in this

factual determination and we remand for resentencing because of the incorrect addition of a two-level adjustment

under section 4A1.1(d). See Drew, 200 F.3d at 874.

C. Eddie Mathis

Eddie Mathis also challenges the district court's application

of section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines providing a two-level

increase "[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was

possessed" during a drug offense. The weapon need not be

used, but merely "present, unless it is clearly improbable that

the weapon was connected with the offense." U.S.S.G.

s 2D1.1, Application Note 3; see United States v. Burke, 888

F.2d 862, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (section 2D1.1(b)(1) does not

require that defendant "used or would have used the firearm"). Within one hour of arresting Eddie and Walter

Mathis during the November 5 reverse sting, DEA agents

arrested Smith carrying ammunition and discovered his load-

__________

12 Section 4A1.1(d) provides a two point increase "if the defendant

committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice

sentence, including ... parole."

13 "[W]e concede that the record does not show by a preponderance that appellant committed the offense while on parole." Appellee's Br. 48.

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 13 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ed handgun in the glove compartment of the Geo he had

driven from the crime scene. Furthermore, it was foreseeable to Eddie Mathis that his coconspirator Smith would be

carrying a firearm in view of the fact that Eddie and Walter

Mathis were purchasing five kilograms of cocaine for $75,000

from a stranger. See Childress, 58 F.3d at 725 (coconspirator's possession of handgun reasonably foreseeable when

conspirators "handled a substantial quantity of drugs and

money"). Because the district court's finding that Smith

possessed the firearm at the shopping mall where the reverse

sting took place, see Sentencing Tr. 1/6/99 at 37-38, is supported by a preponderance of the evidence and because

Smith's possession was reasonably foreseeable, we conclude

that the district court did not clearly err in applying section

2D1.1(b)(2)'s two-level increase to Eddie Mathis's sentence

calculation.

D. Lee

Lee challenges his conviction, claiming that the district

court improperly admitted evidence at trial.14 We review the

district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

See United States v. Williams, 2000 WL 665562, at *3 (D.C.

Cir. 2000). The improper admission of evidence is harmless

unless the reviewing court determines that the defendant was

substantially prejudiced thereby. See United States v. Small,

74 F.3d 1276, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1996). First, Lee contends that

the district court improperly admitted into evidence the handgun he possessed on July 17, 1996 because it later determined

at sentencing that there was "no evidence this gun was

carried by Lee for the purpose of furthering the ends of the

drug conspiracy." Sentencing Tr. 1/6/99 at 72. The district

court's determination at sentencing, however, does not automatically equate to inadmissibility at trial because the two

__________

14 In passing, Lee asserts that the prosecutor improperly argued

during closing that the goal of the conspiracy was "selling drugs for

profit in the District of Columbia." Trial Tr. 5/19/98 at 3. We need

not address this " 'asserted but unanalyzed' argument." SEC v.

Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d 602, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting

Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 14 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

rulings apply different standards. The court admitted Lee's

handgun at trial under the "relevant evidence" standard of

Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See supra n.8. "Relevant

evidence" need only tend to make the existence of a fact "of

consequence" more or less probable. The standard applicable to the court's ruling at sentencing, however, is preponderance of the evidence, that is, "evidence which as a whole

shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than

not.... '[P]reponderance' means something more than

'weight'; it denotes a superiority of weight, or outweighing."

United States v. Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1255 & n.2 (D.C.

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and quotation omitted).

Lee's possession of the handgun, although not directly furthering the Mathis-Castro conspiracy, may have nonetheless

constituted relevant evidence. See In re Sealed Case, 105

F.3d 1460, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (guns are common "tools of

the trade" for drug dealers) (quotation omitted). In United

States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the court held

that the defendant's gun seized at the time and place of a

drug transaction was admissible as drug paraphernalia. See

Payne, 805 F.2d at 1066 n.5. Although Lee's gun was not

found at the time drugs were bought or sold, it was found

during the existence of the Mathis-Castro conspiracy. In

addition, the government did not mention Lee's handgun in

closing, thus mitigating any negative effect. Furthermore,

the government introduced a videotape of Lee selling drugs

as part of the Mathis-Castro conspiracy. In view of this

uncontroverted evidence of Lee's involvement in the conspiracy, we conclude that the district court's admission of Lee's

handgun, if error, was nevertheless harmless. See United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993) (non-prejudicial

harmless error not grounds for reversal).

Lee's contention that the district court improperly admitted

into evidence certain legal documents related to his case

similarly lacks merit. The documents, which included redacted copies of the criminal complaints filed against Lee, see

Government Exhibits 610R, 611R, 612R & 613R, bore Lee's

name, were found in Smith's apartment and showed that Lee

maintained a "continuing connection" with Eddie Mathis even

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 15 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

after his (Lee's) arrest. Trial Tr. 5/13/98 (p.m.) at 14. Although at sentencing the court found that Lee's participation

"ended with his arrest on August 20, 1997," Sentencing Tr.

1/6/99 at 72, it did not abuse its discretion in admitting these

documents at trial because they were relevant to show Lee's

continued connection with Eddie Mathis. Even if the court

did err in admitting the redacted documents, the documents

contained no substantially prejudicial information and therefore any error was harmless.

Finally, Lee challenges the district court's application of

the Guidelines, claiming that it erroneously failed to apply

section 5C1.2's safety valve provision.15 Lee bears the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he is

entitled to safety valve relief. See United States v. White, 1

F.3d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("defendant properly bears the

burden of proof under those sections of the Guidelines that

define mitigating factors") (internal quotation marks and

quotation omitted). Only the last of section 5C1.2's five

criteria is pertinent here, requiring that:

(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the

defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all

information and evidence the defendant has concerning

the offense or offenses that were part of the same course

of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact

that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already

aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with

this requirement.

See also 18 U.S.C. s 3553(f)(5). Lee argued below that he

satisfied section 5C1.2(5) notwithstanding he had no useful

information to provide the government. Lee, however, did

not proffer any information, useful or not. On appeal, Lee

__________

15 Section 5C1.2 provides that if five criteria set out in 18 U.S.C.

s 3553(f)(1)-(5) are met, "[i]n the case of an offense under 21 U.S.C.

s 841, ... [or] s 846 ..., the court shall impose a sentence in

accordance with the applicable guidelines without regard to any

statutory minimum sentence."

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 16 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

claims that a proffer would have been futile because the

government stated at sentencing that "at this point, post trial,

it certainly wouldn't be a productive debriefing." Sentencing

Tr. 1/6/99 at 68. Nevertheless, Lee cannot avoid his affirmative disclosure obligation merely because the government

suggests a debriefing would be unproductive. See United

States v. Ivester, 75 F.3d 182, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[D]efendants seeking to avail themselves of downward departures

under s 3553(f) bear the burden of affirmatively acting.").

Because Lee failed to proffer information of any kind to the

government, we conclude that the district court did not

clearly err by not applying section 5C1.2.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions of

Eddie Mathis, Walter Mathis and Maurice Lee. In addition

we affirm the sentences imposed on Eddie Mathis and Maurice Lee but remand to the district court to resentence

Walter Mathis in accordance with this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #99-3013 Document #526918 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 17 of 17