Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-02960/USCOURTS-ca7-16-02960-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Moss
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 21, 2016

Decided December 21, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

No. 16-2960

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM MOSS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 00-CR-40101-JPG-2

J. Phil Gilbert,

Judge.

O R D E R

William Moss was found guilty by a jury in 2001 of conspiracy to possess with 

intent to distribute powder and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846, 841(a)(1), distribution of 

both, id. § 841(a)(1), and possession of a weapon during a drug trafficking offense, 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He was sentenced in 2001 to a total of 377 months’ imprisonment and 

8 years’ supervised release. In 2009 the prison sentence was reduced to 272 months after 

a pair of retroactive amendments to § 2D1.1 of the sentencing guidelines. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B.10(d) & App. C., amends. 706, 715. A further reduction to 204 months occurred in 

2014 after another retroactive amendment. See id. at § 1B1.10(d) & Supp. App. C., 

amend. 782.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 16-2960 Page 2

Moss was released from prison in 2015 and began serving his term of supervised 

release. Six months later, the government sought revocation, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), 

on the ground that Moss had violated the conditions of his release by driving above the 

speed limit, failing to tell his probation officer about the resulting ticket, committing

domestic battery, and possessing marijuana. After Moss admitted the drug possession, 

the district court revoked his supervised released and imposed a term of 

reimprisonment of 12 months and 1 day to be followed by another 60 months’ 

supervised release. 

Moss filed a notice of appeal after the revocation, but his appointed attorney 

asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and 

addresses the type of potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to 

involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the 

subjects that counsel discusses. United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); 

United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). We invited Moss to comment, 

but he has not responded. See CIR. R. 51(b). 

Moss has told counsel that he does not wish to challenge his admissions to the 

alleged violations of the conditions of release. Thus counsel properly refrains from 

discussing whether Moss’s admissions were knowing and voluntary. See United States v. 

Wheaton, 610 F.3d 389, 390 (7th Cir. 2010).

The attorney does consider whether Moss could argue that it was an abuse of 

discretion for the district court to revoke his supervised release. But Moss admitted 

possessing marijuana, a controlled substance, making revocation mandatory. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), (g)(1); United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014).

Counsel then rightly concludes that Moss could not argue that the district court 

imposed a plainly unreasonable term of reimprisonment. See United States v. Kizeart,

505 F.3d 672, 673 (7th Cir. 2007). Moss admitted possessing marijuana, an offense 

punishable by a term of imprisonment greater than one year because he had prior 

convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Moss thus committed a Grade B 

violation of his supervised release. See U.S.S.G. § 7B.1.1(a)(2). The district court correctly 

established a reimprisonment range of 18 to 24 months based on that violation and the 

Category V criminal history calculated at Moss’s original sentencing. See id. at § 7B1.4(a).

Twelve months and a day is substantially below this range, so we agree with counsel 

that it would be frivolous for Moss to argue that the term is plainly unreasonable.

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Lastly, counsel considers whether Moss could raise a claim that his lawyer 

rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. We note that a defendant facing 

revocation of supervised release does not have a constitutional right to counsel if he 

admits violating the conditions of his supervision and neither challenges the 

appropriateness of revocation nor asserts substantial and complex grounds in 

mitigation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973); United States v. Eskridge, 

445 F.3d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 2006). Yet we need not resolve whether or not Moss’s 

constitutional right attached. A claim of ineffective assistance generally should be

reserved for collateral review, where the defendant may develop a full record, and 

should not be addressed in a case like this one where counsel on appeal also represented 

the defendant in the district court. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003); 

United States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2003).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

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