Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04865/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04865-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Pleasant Hill
Defendant
Steve Dexheimer
Defendant
Sam Morgan
Plaintiff
Drew Sanchez
Defendant

Document Text:

U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAM MORGAN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF PLEASANT HILL, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-04865 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This section 1983 action arises out of the defendant police officers’ 10 minute

detention of plaintiff Sam Morgan, a California Highway Patrol Officer. Plaintiff alleges

that there was no probable cause to detain him; the officers used excessive force; the

detention was racially motivated; and the City of Pleasant Hill had a policy that led to these

constitutional violations. Now pending before the Court is defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on all claims. After carefully considering the evidence and argument submitted by

the parties, and having had the benefit of oral argument, defendants’ motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part.

FACTUAL HISTORY

At approximately 8:30 p.m. on December 19, 2003, a man called the Pleasant Hill

police dispatcher. The caller reported that he had been in Einstein Entertainment in Pleasant

Hill when two gentlemen came into the store. He reported further that the store employees 

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 1 of 13
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

then suddenly announced that the store was closing and that all the customers should leave,

as there was an emergency. The caller left the store and a few minutes later drove by the

store. He reported that when he drove by he saw the guys who had entered the store behind

the register, and they had a phone up to their ear. The caller explained that the store was

supposed to be open until 10:00 p.m. He told the dispatcher: “I don’t know it just felt funny,

and I wasn’t really sure if I should call, I mean, but it just was really weird.” The caller then

described the two men: a 6’3” African-American man, and a shorter, dark-skinned Asian

man. He reported that the men had a big case with them, “like one of those large suitcases.” 

The dispatcher called Pleasant Hill police officer defendant Drew Sanchez and his

partner. The dispatcher ordered the officers to respond to the store and stated that a caller

reported that “two subjects came into the store, spoke to the employees, the employees then

told all the customers they needed to leave that they had an emergency, and locked the doors

behind them.” Defendant police officer Steve Dexheimer also responded to the call. The

dispatcher described the subjects as a tall black male and a shorter Asian male carrying a

large suitcase. 

The responding officers asked the dispatcher to call the video store. She did, and a

person identifying himself as “Joseph” answered the phone. The dispatcher relayed to

Joseph what the caller had reported and said, “he was a little concerned for your guys’ safety.

. . . So we wanted to call and make sure.” Joseph responded, “the subjects are still here.”

He explained further that the two men had police identification, but no uniforms, that they

came with state papers, and that it looks like official business. The dispatcher then asked

Joseph to send someone outside to talk with the officers. The dispatcher reported to the

defendant officers that the store employee had said “that the subjects that are there, still there. 

And that they are not uniforms, but have badges, and state papers, and say that they’re police

officers.” 

Joseph came out of the store and talked to the defendant officers. He reported that the

men were taking money out of the register. Officer Dexheimer then reported to the

dispatcher about the money being taken from the register, and explained that the officers still

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 2 of 13
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

did not know what was going on. Officer Dexheimer asked the dispatcher to place another

call to the store. He also asked the dispatcher to send another officer to cover the rear of the

store. A store employee, “Bill,” answered the dispatcher’s call to the store. The dispatcher

told Bill to meet the officers outside and to bring the phone with him. He did so. Neither

Joseph nor Bill could tell the officers anything more about why the men were taking money

out of the register.

According to the defendant officers, they believed a night-time robbery was in

progress so they entered the store with their weapons drawn. Before they did so, they

radioed the dispatcher that they were “code 4.” Code 4 means no further assistance required. 

At that time there were two other officers on the scene. The defendant officers then entered

the store with their weapons targeted at the two “suspects.” According to plaintiff, he and his

partner identified themselves as police officers, but defendants ordered them to the ground

and handcuffed them. Officer Dexheimer saw a badge around plaintiff’s neck.

The two men identified themselves as plainclothes California Highway Patrol

(“CHP”) investigators who were in the process of serving a tax warrant at the business. The

defendant officers searched plaintiff and his partner and removed their weapons and

identification, while they were still handcuffed and on the ground. Officer Dexheimer then

asked his partner to search plaintiff again, “to make sure I didn’t miss anything.” The two

“suspects” provided law enforcement identification, badges and other corroborating

identification showing that they were CHP Officers Sam Morgan and Edward Dela Cruz. 

The defendant officers then removed the handcuffs, released them, and apologized.

Plaintiff asked the defendant officers why they responded as they had. Officer

Dexheimer responded something to the effect that “this is Pleasant Hill, this town is lily

white . . . you guys are two minorities . . . what do you expect us to do?”

According to plaintiff, the detention lasted approximately 10 minutes. The evidence

also demonstrates that the CHP has a policy that requires tax warrants to be served by

uniformed officers, although plaintiff claims that he was given permission to serve this

particular warrant in plainclothes.

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 3 of 13
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

CHP Officer Morgan filed this section 1983 suit seeking damages and injunctive

relief. He claims he was detained without probable cause; defendants used excessive force;

they detained him because of his race; and a City of Pleasant Hill policy led to the violations

(Monell claim). Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims on the ground that no

reasonable trier of fact could find any constitutional violations. In the alternative, they argue

that at a minimum they are entitled to qualified immunity.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary judgment

A principle purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to isolate and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A

party moving for summary judgment that does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial (usually the defendant) has the initial burden of producing evidence negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claims or showing that the non-moving party

does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102

(9th Cir. 2000). 

If the moving party does not satisfy its initial burden, the non-moving party has no

obligation to produce anything and summary judgment must be denied. If, on the other hand,

the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production, then the non-moving party

may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s evidence, but instead

must produce admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for

trial. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1102. A genuine issue of fact is one

that could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is “material” only if it

could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). 

//

//

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 4 of 13
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

B. Qualified immunity

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity “provides ample

protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law;”

defendants can have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the law

requires in any given situation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). A ruling on the issue of qualified immunity should be made

early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense

is dispositive. See id. at 200. 

A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the

plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right, then proceed to

determine if the right was “clearly established.” See Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290

(1999). The threshold question must be: Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional

right? See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If no constitutional right would have been violated

were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning

qualified immunity. See id. On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on the

allegations, the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. See

id. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is

whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted. Id. If the law is determined to be clearly established, the next

question is whether, under that law, a reasonable official could have believed his conduct

was lawful. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1993). 

//

//

//

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 5 of 13
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

DISCUSSION

A. Probable cause

Defendants’ detention of Officer Morgan did not violate his Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights if defendants had probable cause to believe plaintiff was committing a

crime, here, a night-time robbery. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-24

(1976). “The test for whether probable cause exists is whether ‘at the moment of arrest the

facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officers and of which they had

reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing the

[plaintiff] had committed or was committing an offense.’” United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d

698, 704 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). “A determination whether probable

cause exists requires a ‘practical, common-sense’ decision based on the totality of the

circumstances, including the veracity, basis of knowledge and reliability of the information

provided by informants.” Id.

Defendants had probable cause to believe plaintiff was committing a robbery. They

were told that “two subjects came into the store, spoke to the employees, the employees then

told all the customers they needed to leave that they had an emergency, and locked the doors

behind them.” That description itself gave the officers cause to believe a robbery was

occurring.

After the dispatcher spoke to the store employee, the officers learned that the

“subjects” had badges and “state papers,” but were not wearing uniforms. The officers also

observed that there were not any police cars parked near the store. A store employee then

told the defendant officers that the two men had badges, were not uniformed, and were

taking money out of the register, but the employee did not explain why the men were taking

money. The other employee, Bill, came out as well and said the same thing. Again, he did

not explain why the men were taking the money.

If the two men did not have badges or other government identification there is no

question that the officers would have had probable cause to believe they were robbing the

store. The question, then, is whether the officers’ assertion that they were CHP officers and

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 6 of 13
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

the employees’ report that the men had badges and “state papers” sufficiently undermined

probable cause. Because the CHP officers were not uniformed, did not have a marked police

car, and had not notified the Pleasant Hill Police Station in advance that they were serving

the tax warrant, the officers had probable cause to believe a robbery was being committed by

two men claiming to be police. Plaintiff does not cite any case that suggests that an officer

has to accept that anyone who has an official looking badge is in fact an officer on official

police business.

At a minimum, the officer defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Under the

facts as alleged by plaintiff, a reasonable officer in defendants’ position could have believed

he had probable cause. 

B. Excessive force

Plaintiff also claims that the force defendants used, namely, storming the store with

guns targeted at plaintiff and his partner, making them get to the ground, handcuffing them,

searching them (twice), and the length of the detention (10 minutes) was constitutionally

excessive and that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2000), the first prong of the qualified-immunity

inquiry is “whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged.” 533

U.S. at 200. “[I]f a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’

submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id.

at 201. 

This two-step inquiry is intended to respect the subtle but important difference

between the reasonableness inquiry that is central to excessive-force claims and the role that

reasonableness plays in the qualified-immunity analysis. See Robinson v. Solano County,

278 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). As the Supreme Court explained in Saucier,

whether an officer used excessive force turns on “the reasonableness of the officer’s belief as

to the appropriate level of force.” Id. at 205. Even when the officer’s belief in this regard is

mistaken, however, the officer may still be entitled to qualified immunity if his mistake was a

reasonable one. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 7 of 13
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

collapse the excessive-force and qualified-immunity determinations into a single

reasonableness inquiry for consideration by a jury; instead, the Supreme Court held that the

issue of qualified immunity must remain a legal determination for the court, where that

determination turns on “what the officer reasonably understood his powers and

responsibilities to be, when he acted, under clearly established [legal] standards.” Id. at 208. 

1. First step: could a jury find excessive force?

“In considering the first step of Saucier’s two-step qualified immunity inquiry, [a

court] must determine whether [the plaintiff’s] constitutional right to be free from excessive

force was violated.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001). This

prong is satisfied when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, a reasonable juror could conclude that the officer’s conduct constituted

excessive force. See Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125,

1129-30 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The question of whether police officers used excessive force “requires careful

attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the

crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 

Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1013-14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

“calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often

forced to make split-second judgments–in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly

evolving–about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).

No reasonable jury could find that the officers’ actions here were excessive. First, the

crime the officers believed was being committed–a night time robbery–is a serious felony. 

Second, the “suspects” posed an immediate threat to the officers because the officers

believed they were engaging in a night time robbery–common sense (and defendants’ expert)

suggest that persons who commit such crimes are dangerous and may in fact have a weapon

even if they have not brandished it thus far. It would be unreasonable to expect police

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 8 of 13
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

officers to enter a store they believe is being robbed without having their guns out, and then

handcuffing and searching the suspects. It is thus unsurprising that plaintiff does not cite any

case which suggests that the officers’ conduct in these circumstances was unreasonable.

Plaintiff’s reliance on Robinson is unpersuasive. In that case the plaintiff shot two

dogs that had killed his livestock. A police dispatcher told the defendant officers that “a man

carrying a shot gun who had just shot two dogs is ‘in the middle of the street yelling at this

time.’” 278 F.3d at 1010. When the police arrived, Robinson was in his home wearing an

unbuttoned shirt and jeans. He walked from his home toward the police, and the police were

able to see that he was calm. While he approached the police, the officers kept their guns

holstered. Id. Robinson then told the police his name and that he was involved with the

dogs. The defendant officers responded by pointing their guns at Robinson’s head. Id.

The Ninth Circuit held that the pointing of the guns could be considered excessive

force. It noted that none of the factors justifying the use of force, including the seriousness

of the crime and danger to the officers, was present. The crime police were investigating was

at most a misdemeanor and the plaintiff appeared unarmed and was approaching the officers

in a peaceful way. Id. at 1014. The court also noted that the police never even searched the

plaintiff for a weapon. Finally, it concluded that the plaintiff’s “use of a weapon, that he

clearly no longer carried, is insufficient to justify the intrusion on Robinson’s personal

security.” Id. at 1014.

Here, in stark contrast, the defendant officers believed the plaintiff was in the midst of

committing a serious felony–a night-time robbery. While no one had told the officers that

plaintiff was armed, a reasonable officer would believe that one committing a night-time

robbery by pretending to be a police officer could very well be armed. As soon as the

officers secured plaintiff they searched him, and then searched him again, corroborating the

officers’ assertion that they believed plaintiff might be armed. Under these circumstances,

no reasonable jury could find the officers’ conduct was unreasonable.

//

//

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 9 of 13
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

2. Second step: was the right clearly established

Even assuming, however, that a jury could find excessive force, qualified immunity

applies if the right to be free of having guns pointed at you and being handcuffed under these

circumstances was not clearly established. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining

whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that

his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. Qualified immunity

protects defendants’ conduct unless there was “a clearly established rule prohibiting [him]

from acting as he did.” Id. at 209.

As the above discussion demonstrates, the law was not clearly established that the

defendants’ conduct here was unconstitutional. Plaintiff does not cite a single case that

suggests officers cannot handcuff, search, and draw guns when they reasonably believe a

suspect is committing a night-time robbery. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

plaintiffs’ excessive force claim.

C. Racial profiling

Plaintiff also makes an Equal Protection claim. The Equal Protection clause prohibits

selective enforcement of law based on a person’s race. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.

806, 813 (1996). The Sixth Circuit has held that Whren confirmed that “an officer’s

discriminatory motivations for pursuing a course of action can give rise to an Equal

Protection claim, even where there are sufficient objective indicia of suspicion to justify the

officer’s actions under the Fourth Amendment.” Farm Labor Organizing Comm. v. Ohio,

308 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff relies on Officer Dexheimer’s statement–“this is

Pleasant Hill, this town is lily white . . . you guys are two minorities . . . what do you expect

us to do?” –as evidence sufficient to support a finding that plaintiff’s race was a motivating

factor in how the officers responded to the call.

Defendants do not dispute the above legal standard; instead, they claim the remark

was off-hand and that Officer Dexheimer merely meant that “the City of Pleasant Hill is a

very low crime area and he used the term ‘lily white’ in the literary fashion to mean

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 10 of 13
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

‘innocent.’” Defendants also claim that because they immediately apologized to plaintiff and

his partner that is “proof positive about their lack of any racial intent.” 

Defendants’ argument is just that: argument. Officer Dexheimer’s statement gives

rise to an inference that the reason the officers responded as they did is because of plaintiff’s 

race. The Court cannot grant summary judgment on this claim.

D. Monell claim

A city can be sued directly for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief under section

1983 where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that

body's officers.” Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U. S. 658, 690

(1978). To establish such municipal liability, a plaintiff must satisfy four conditions: “(1)

that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the

municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the

plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the

constitutional violation.’” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted)). A

municipality, however, cannot be held liable strictly on a respondeat superior theory. See

Kreutzer v. County of San Diego, 153 Cal.App.3d 62, 70 (1984). 

As there was no probable cause or excessive force violation, plaintiff’s Monell claim

is necessarily limited to plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim. The question, then, is whether

plaintiff has come forward with evidence sufficient to support a finding that defendants’

alleged Equal Protection violation was caused by, at least in some respects, a Pleasant Hill

policy that amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Plaintiff has not come forward with sufficient evidence. The evidence is undisputed

that in May 2003 both individual defendants received five hours of training in a course

entitled “racial profiling.” The course was certified by the State of California Commission

on Peace Officer Standards and Training. In light of such undisputed evidence no

reasonable trier of fact could find that the City of Pleasant Hill had a police policy that was

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 11 of 13
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

G:\CRBALL\2004\4865\orderresj.wpd 12

deliberately indifferent to the equal protection rights of minorities and led to the alleged

violation here. 

Plaintiff responds that at the time of the incident the Pleasant Hill Police Department

did not have a written racial profiling policy, and he complains that the training was done

several years after it was required by law. Neither of these facts supports an inference that at

the time of the incident the City was deliberately indifferent to racial profiling. The very

officer who made the racial statement received five hours of racial profile training several

months before the incident. 

 Plaintiff also contends that the training was inadequate because at his deposition

defendant Sanchez did not recall having attended the training. After Officer Sanchez’s

memory was refreshed, however, he did recall the training. He also testified that one of the

principles taught in the class was that “race should not influence your police work.”

In sum, no reasonable trier of fact could find a municipal policy that was the “moving

force” behind defendants’ alleged Equal Protection violation.

E. State law claims

Plaintiff also makes claims pursuant to California Civil Code sections 51.7 and 52.1. 

Defendants allege that these claims “relate to the racial profiling” issue. As there is a

genuine dispute as to whether the officers’ responded differently because of plaintiff’s race,

summary judgment on this claim must be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s

probable cause, excessive force, and Monell claims is GRANTED. In all other respects the

motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 16, 2005

 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 12 of 13
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

G:\CRBALL\2004\4865\orderresj.wpd 13

Case 3:04-cv-04865-CRB Document 34 Filed 12/16/05 Page 13 of 13