Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03009/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03009-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerome M. Carter
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 22, 2009 Decided January 15, 2010 

No. 08-3009 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

JEROME M. CARTER, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-cr-00215-RBW-1) 

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. 

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony W. Miles, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance. 

Ryan W. Bounds, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. On the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. 

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy W. McLeese 

III, Elizabeth Trosman, and Ann K. Simon, Assistant U.S. 

Attorneys. 

USCA Case #08-3009 Document #1225891 Filed: 01/15/2010 Page 1 of 12
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Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, GRIFFITH and 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Jerome Carter pled guilty to 

five counts of bank robbery and was sentenced to 150 months 

in prison. The length of his sentence was based, in part, on the 

district court’s finding that his criminal history included four 

theft convictions in Maryland. On appeal, Carter challenges 

that finding because it was based solely on state court 

computer records that are, he argues, insufficient to prove 

prior convictions. We disagree and affirm the sentence. 

I. 

 Over the span of six weeks in June and July 2007, Carter 

netted more than $17,000 in a string of bank robberies across 

Washington, D.C. The police arrested Carter on July 29, 

2007. On October 5, he pled guilty to five counts of bank 

robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006). In the 

Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), the United States 

Probation Office calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of 

120 to 150 months, based in part on Carter’s criminal history. 

Using the Guidelines point system, the PSR assigned Carter a 

criminal history score of 18. Six of his 18 points came from 

four Maryland theft convictions. The PSR did not report the 

source of its information about the Maryland convictions. 

 In a presentence memorandum filed with the court, Carter 

objected to the PSR’s calculation of his criminal history score, 

claiming there was insufficient evidence of the prior 

Maryland theft convictions. Carter argued the district court 

could not use a criminal history score that relied on these 

insufficiently substantiated prior convictions. Omitting the 

Maryland convictions, Carter maintained his criminal history 

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score was only 12, which, when combined with his total 

offense score, corresponds to a guideline range of 110 to 137 

months. 

 At the sentencing hearing, the government produced 

Maryland state court records of the disputed convictions. App. 

at 46–62. The records were printouts of entries from the 

District Court of Maryland Criminal System Inquiry 

Charge/Disposition Display database. The database entries for 

each conviction include Carter’s name, other identifying 

characteristics, the charge, the case number, the plea, the 

disposition, and the sentence. The Maryland court clerk’s 

office certified each printout.1

 

 In the face of these records, Carter continued his 

objection to the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the 

possibility of data-entry errors rendered the computer records 

inherently unreliable. He suggested the government needed to 

produce a copy of the “actual court jacket” for each 

proceeding to prove the prior convictions. Tr. 3. The district 

court offered to postpone the hearing to give Carter an 

opportunity to present contrary evidence. Carter declined. Id.

at 5–6. 

 The district court rejected Carter’s challenge, concluding 

the computer records were reliable evidence of the Maryland 

convictions. Id. at 6. The district court adopted the PSR’s 

calculation of a criminal history score of 18 and its 

 

1

 The government provided this documentation for not only the 

four theft convictions mentioned above, but also two other 

Maryland convictions against which Carter lodges the same 

sufficiency challenge. Because those two convictions were more 

than ten years old at the time of the instant offense, they did not 

count towards Carter’s criminal history score or impact his 

guideline range. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 4A1.2(e)(2) (2008) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. 

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recommended guideline range of 120 to 150 months. The 

court then sentenced Carter to 150 months’ imprisonment. 

Carter appeals that sentence. We have jurisdiction under 18 

U.S.C. § 3742. 

II.

 Carter’s appeal challenges the district court’s factual 

conclusion that Carter was convicted of the four Maryland 

theft offenses used to enhance his criminal history score. We 

review the district court’s factual findings at sentencing for 

clear error, see In re Sealed Case, 552 F.3d 841, 844 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007)), which means that “we affirm unless we are ‘left with 

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.’” United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 

738 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum 

Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 

 When seeking a sentence enhancement, the government 

must prove a prior conviction by a preponderance of the 

evidence. See In re Sealed Case, 552 F.3d at 846. Carter 

argues the certified computer records the government 

proffered were insufficient to meet this burden because they 

are unreliable. 

 Evidence is competent to support factual findings at 

sentencing if it bears “sufficient indicia of reliability to 

support its probable accuracy.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 

MANUAL § 6A1.3 (2008) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The certified 

records of a state court are presumptively reliable. See FED. R.

EVID. 803(8) advisory committee’s note (justifying the 

hearsay exception for public records on the basis of their 

inherent reliability). The presumed reliability of public 

records “is found in the declarant’s official duty and the high 

probability that the duty to make an accurate report has been 

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performed.” 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 295, at 328 (6th 

ed. 2006); see Chesapeake & Del. Canal Co. v. United States, 

250 U.S. 123, 128–29 (1919) (explaining why public records 

are “unusually trustworthy sources of evidence”). Other 

courts have found similar certified state court records 

sufficiently reliable to support a finding of a prior conviction 

at sentencing. See United States v. Zuniga-Chavez, 464 F.3d 

1199, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Thompson, 

274 F. App’x 453, 455 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States 

v. Felix, 561 F.3d 1036, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding an 

uncertified printout from a state court conviction database 

sufficiently reliable to support a finding of a prior conviction);

United States v. Cousin, 219 F. App’x 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2007) 

(same); United States v. Esparza-Varela, 106 F. App’x 1, 4 

(10th Cir. 2004) (same). Carter cites to no case holding 

certified records from a state court’s disposition database 

insufficient to support a finding of a prior conviction by a 

preponderance of the evidence, and we are unaware of any. 

Carter nevertheless argues these computer records cannot 

be reliable because there is no assurance that they conform to 

the official case files or signed judgments of conviction. 

Appellant’s Br. at 5–7. We recognize the possibility of human 

error in data entry. But the mere possibility of error—the 

lynchpin of Carter’s argument—does not warrant the 

conclusion that these records, maintained and certified by a 

state court, are inherently unreliable. See Thompson, 274 F. 

App’x at 455 (noting that the defendant’s “unsubstantiated 

aspersions” do not discredit certified database records of a 

state court). Absent evidence of inaccuracy or unreliability, 

the Maryland state courts’ certified computer records are 

sufficient to prove a prior conviction at sentencing. 

Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding 

that Carter’s criminal history included the prior Maryland 

convictions. This is not to say certified computer records of 

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conviction are irrefutable. A defendant must have the 

opportunity to contest their accuracy. See United States v. 

Booze, 108 F.3d 378, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Here, the district 

court afforded Carter this chance, but he declined. 

For the first time on appeal, Carter points to a 

discrepancy between the computer record corresponding to 

his 1998 theft conviction and the PSR’s description of the 

same offense. The computer record indicates a one-year 

sentence for this conviction, whereas the PSR lists a sentence 

of 60 days. Appellant’s Br. at 9. Carter alleges no other 

inaccuracies in the records but presents this discrepancy as 

demonstrative evidence of their general unreliability. We are 

unconvinced. This single alleged inaccuracy does not 

introduce clear error into the district court’s conclusion that 

these records were reliable evidence of prior convictions.2

 

Carter also attempts to discredit the certified computer 

records because they present certain information in a 

truncated format. In particular, the records do not cite the 

statute under which Carter was convicted. They state simply 

“Theft: Less $300 Value.” See, e.g., App. at 57. Carter 

suggests the omission of the statute of conviction renders 

these records inadequate for certain determinations under the 

Guidelines. Appellant’s Br. at 12–13. This may be true in 

some cases, such as when a sentencing court may need to 

 

2

 Nor does this discrepancy create reversible error in the district 

court’s calculation of Carter’s criminal history score. Both the 

computer record and the PSR’s account establish that Carter was 

convicted of theft in 1998 and received a sentence of at least 60 

days. That is sufficient to support the district court’s finding that 

Carter had a conviction resulting in a sentence of 60 days or more, 

see United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 737–38 (D.C. Cir. 

1998), which in turn supports assessing two criminal history points 

for this offense. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b). 

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consider the statute of conviction to determine if a prior 

offense is a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines. See 

United States v. Andrews, 479 F.3d 894, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(f) (enhancing a criminal history score for a 

conviction for a “crime of violence”). But when assessing 

criminal history points in general, a court need not know the 

precise statute of conviction. Identification of the offense, the 

length of the sentence, and the recency of the sentence are 

usually sufficient to assess criminal history points for a prior 

conviction. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1(a)–(c), 4A1.2(c), (e). The 

Maryland records provided this essential data. Indeed, Carter 

does not allege that the records omitted information necessary 

to the correct calculation of his criminal history score. That 

the Maryland records might lack necessary information for 

some other Guidelines calculation does not render them 

inadequate for the calculation accomplished here. 

 Finally, Carter argues our decision in United States v. 

Price, 409 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 2005), precludes the district 

court’s conclusion that the certified computer records of 

conviction were reliable. Like Carter, the defendant in Price 

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of his prior 

convictions. In Price, the Probation Office alluded to 

unspecified and unproduced state court documents in support 

of the PSR’s description of the defendant’s prior convictions. 

The Price court concluded that this unadorned reference was 

insufficient to “demonstrate that the description in the [PSR] 

is based on a sufficiently reliable source to establish [its] 

accuracy.” Id. at 444. In reaching this conclusion, the court 

suggested, “[t]his reference could be, for instance, to a docket 

listing, which would lack the necessary indicia of reliability 

for the Government to meet its burden . . . .” Id. at 445. From 

this one-sentence hypothetical, Carter creates the proposition 

that the certified records proffered here are unreliable. 

Appellant’s Br. at 10. 

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Carter reads too much into Price. The Price court did not 

have before it any specific documentation supporting the 

alleged convictions. The court did not describe what 

information its hypothesized docket listing contained or 

whether the docket listing was an officially certified court 

record. Here, the sentencing court had before it certified 

records with information sufficient to identify the defendant 

and make the necessary criminal history calculation. It did not 

rely simply on an unadorned PSR reference to state court 

records; it had the records themselves. We decline to conclude 

the Price court’s dictum concerning a hypothetical PSR 

reference to a hypothetical docket listing forecloses reliance 

on the certified Maryland court records proffered here. 

III. 

 Taking another tack in his challenge to the Maryland 

records, Carter argues they were insufficient to prove a prior 

conviction under Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 

(2005), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). He 

claims these cases require the government to prove a prior 

conviction with a “conclusive judicial record of conviction[]” 

or its equivalent. Reply Br. at 9. The government maintains 

Carter failed to preserve this argument below and therefore 

we should review only for plain error. “Under plain error 

review, we may reverse only if: (1) there is error (2) that is 

plain and (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) we find 

that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Mouling, 

557 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). Carter contends we should review this 

question of law de novo. We need not decide which standard 

of review applies, because even under the more exacting de 

novo standard, Carter’s argument fails. Neither Shepard nor 

Apprendi establishes a requirement that the government prove 

a prior conviction through only a conclusive judicial record of 

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conviction. Neither case involves the issue raised by the 

district court’s reliance on the Maryland court records: the 

type or quantity of evidence needed to establish the fact of a 

prior conviction. 

Shepard concerns how a sentencing court determines the 

“character” of an offense to which a defendant previously 

pled guilty. 544 U.S. at 16. Application of the Armed Career 

Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes sentence 

enhancements where a defendant has prior convictions for 

certain predicate offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), can require a 

sentencing court to find facts concerning the conduct that 

gave rise to a defendant’s prior conviction. For instance, 

burglary is an ACCA predicate offense with a particular 

definition. A state statute may define burglary more broadly 

than does the ACCA. In this scenario, a defendant’s state 

burglary conviction does not necessarily qualify as a burglary 

under the ACCA. To determine if it does, a sentencing court 

would need to ascertain whether the conduct giving rise to the 

defendant’s state conviction satisfied the elements of burglary 

as defined in the ACCA. Shepard limits the evidence a 

sentencing court may consider when making this factual 

inquiry. Specifically, “a later court determining the character 

of an admitted [offense] is generally limited to examining the 

statutory definition, charging document, written plea 

agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit 

factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant 

assented.” Shepard, 524 U.S. at 16. Carter argues that 

Shepard’s limits should apply more generally to any judicial 

determination involving a prior conviction. 

Shepard cannot be stretched so far. It “did not address 

what documents can be used to prove the fact of a prior 

conviction, but was concerned only with what documents can 

be used to prove the facts underlying a conviction.” ZunigaChavez, 464 F.3d at 1204. The concerns motivating the 

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evidentiary limitations in Shepard—“the unpleasant and 

potentially unfair specter of retrying past crimes as part of the 

sentencing of the instant offense,” United States v. Bridges, 

175 F.3d 1062, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (discussing Shepard’s 

progenitor Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990))—are 

not present here. “Establishing the fact of a prior crime is a 

more discrete inquiry that is not as susceptible to the lengthy 

and cumbersome collateral trials of the kind the Shepard . . . 

Court[] hoped to avoid.” United States v. Bryant, 571 F.3d 

147, 154 (1st Cir. 2009). We therefore join our sister circuits 

in concluding that “Shepard does not apply when determining 

whether the government has satisfied its burden of proof as to 

the existence of a prior conviction.” United States v. NeriHernandes, 504 F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 2007); see Bryant, 

571 F.3d at 154; Zuniga-Chavez, 464 F.3d at 1204; United 

States v. Warwick, 149 F. App’x 464, 468 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005). 

Carter’s attempt to find support in Apprendi fares no 

better. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than 

the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. The Court exempted proof of a prior 

conviction from the right to a jury trial and permitted judicial 

determination of this particular fact because of the 

“procedural safeguards” attendant to the prior proceeding 

from which the conviction resulted. Id. at 488. The Court 

explained, “there is a vast difference between accepting the 

validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a 

proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial 

and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find” facts never 

before admitted or proved in a comparable proceeding. Id. at 

496. Carter argues that reliance on computer records lacking 

the “procedural safeguard” of a “signature by the sentencing 

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court” or its equivalent “defeats the purpose of relying on 

procedural safeguards to justify exempting prior convictions 

from the right to [a] jury trial.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. 

Apprendi’s reliance on “procedural safeguards” concerns 

the proceeding in which a prior conviction was rendered, not 

the evidence used to prove the prior conviction in a 

subsequent sentencing. Utilizing a reliable computerized 

record of conviction—itself subject to adversarial testing at 

sentencing—to establish a prior conviction does not 

undermine the procedural safeguards attendant to the process 

by which the prior conviction was obtained. Apprendi is 

inapposite to the issue in this case. 

IV.

 Carter’s final argument challenging the length of his 

sentence is his claim that the district court erroneously 

imposed on him the burden of disproving his prior 

convictions. He contends that the district court’s offer to 

postpone his sentencing hearing so that he could seek 

evidence that might rebut the government’s proffer of the 

state court records improperly or unconstitutionally imposed 

on him the burden of disproving his prior convictions. 

Appellant’s Br. at 17–20. 

Carter’s argument would only be valid if the evidence 

that the government introduced had been insufficient to 

sustain its burden of proof. In that case it would have been 

improper to place a burden on Carter to prove he was not 

convicted of the thefts. But here, the district court explained 

that the government’s uncontradicted and reliable evidence 

was sufficient to sustain its burden of proof. This placed no 

improper or unconstitutional burden on Carter. A defendant at 

sentencing may argue that the government’s evidence is 

insufficient without putting forward any affirmative evidence. 

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See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328-29 (1999). 

But that does not mean the defendant prevails if the 

government’s evidence satisfies the applicable standard of 

proof, as it did here. 

V. 

Because the district court did not err in concluding the 

certified computer records of the Maryland courts were 

sufficient to prove his prior convictions, we affirm Carter’s 

sentence. 

So ordered. 

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