Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-05661/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-05661-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Boutte
Plaintiff
The San Francisco SPCA Animal Hospital
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN BOUTTE,

Plaintiff, No. C 07-5661 PJH

v. ORDER OF DISMISSAL

THE SAN FRANCISCO SPCA 

ANIMAL HOSPITAL,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Plaintiff John Boutte filed this action on November 7, 2007, and also requested leave

to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court finds that the complaint must be dismissed

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e) for failure to state a claim. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action against defendant San Francisco SPCA Animal Hospital

(“SF-SPCA”). Plaintiff alleges that he owed money to SF-SPCA for his dog’s surgery; that

the agreed-upon charge was $2,000.00; that SF-SPCA later gave him a bill for $4,000.00;

and that SF-SPCA “then proceeded to take money out of” his bank account without his

authorization. Plaintiff alleges a claim of deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, and a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard 

The court may authorize a plaintiff to file an action in federal court without

prepayment of fees or security if the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he or she is

unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). When a complaint

Case 4:07-cv-05661-PJH Document 10 Filed 01/23/08 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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is filed in forma pauperis, it must be dismissed prior to service of process if it is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary damages from defendants who are

immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,

1226-27 (9th Cir. 1984). A complaint is frivolous for purposes of § 1915(e) if it lacks any

arguable basis in fact or in law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328- 30 (1989). A

complaint lacks an arguable basis in law only if controlling authority requires a finding that

the facts alleged fail to establish an arguable legal claim. Guti v. INS, 908 F.2d 495, 496

(9th Cir. 1990). 

When a complaint is dismissed under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave

to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from

the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato

v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal of complaint as frivolous). 

B. Analysis

The court finds that the complaint must be dismissed because neither cause of

action asserted by plaintiff states a claim. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "provides a cause of

action for the 'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498,

508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff

must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person

acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v.

Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). 

While plaintiff’s claim could arguably be construed as one alleging deprivation of

property without due process, it nonetheless fails because plaintiff does not bring the claim

against a state actor. A person acts under color of state law if he "exercise[s] power

possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed

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with the authority of state law." West, 487 U.S. at 49 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Generally, a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his

official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law. Johnson v.

Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1997); Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944

F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1991). 

However, a private individual generally does not act under color of state law. 

Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Purely private conduct, no matter how

wrongful, is not covered under § 1983. See Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547,

559 (9th Cir. 1974). Put another way, there is no right to be free from the infliction of

constitutional deprivations by private individuals. Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d

831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). Actions taken by private individuals or organizations may be

under color of state law 

if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the

challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as

that of the State itself. What is fairly attributable is a matter of normative

judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity. . . . [N]o one fact can function

as a necessary condition across the board for finding state action; nor is any

set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may be some

countervailing reason against attributing activity to the government. 

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-96

(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, plaintiff alleges his claims against SPCA-SF, a private actor. He does not

allege facts showing any close nexus between a state actor and SPCA-SF. In particular,

he does not allege that the action about which he complains resulted from the exercise of

coercive power by the City and County of San Francisco; that the City and County provided

significant encouragement for the activity; or that SPCA-SF operated as a willful participant

in joint activity with the City and County. See id. at 296. Accordingly, the § 1983 claim

must be dismissed.

The dismissal of the § 1983 claim is with leave to amend. In order to survive

dismissal of the action, plaintiff must amend the complaint to allege facts showing a close

nexus between SPCA-SF and the City and County of San Francisco or another state actor.

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With regard to the second cause of action, the court finds that plaintiff also fails to

state a claim under the Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq.

(“RICO”). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a), “[t]he district courts of the United States shall have

jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing

appropriate orders.” Section 1962, in turn, lists activities that are prohibited under RICO. 

Plaintiff, however, fails to specify which provision of § 1962 was violated by SPCA-SF. 

In general, RICO makes it criminal to conduct an enterprise's affairs or obtain

benefits through a pattern of “racketeering activity,” which is defined as behavior that

violates specific federal statutes or state laws that address specified topics and bear

specified penalties. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 552 (2000). Section 1961 sets forth

the specific “predicate acts” that may constitute “racketeering activity” for a RICO violation. 

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 

A "pattern" of racketeering activity requires "at least two acts of racketeering

activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and

threatening no future criminal activity do not demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity. 

River City Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Foods West, Inc., 960 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir.1992)

(citing H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242 (1989)). 

The Act includes a private right of action “by which ‘[a]ny person injured in his

business or property’ by a RICO violation” may seek damages and the cost of the suit. 

Rotella, 528 U.S. at 552 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). Thus, in order to state a claim

under RICO, a plaintiff must allege facts that establish a pattern of racketeering activity

based on a minimum of two predicate acts, a criminal enterprise in which the defendants

participated, and a causal relationship between the predicate acts and the harm suffered by

the plaintiff. See 18 U .S.C. §§ 1961-68, 2314, 2315; Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473

U.S. 479, 496-97 (1985). The compensable harm that must be alleged is “the harm caused

by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497. The

plaintiff must allege injury to his property or injury to a business or property interest of legal

value to plaintiff under state law. Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 899 (9th Cir.2005).

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United States District Court

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In the present case, the plaintiff pleads facts which, if true, establish a single act by

one defendant (the alleged unauthorized removal of money from plaintiff’s bank account). 

Plaintiff alleges no act that qualifies as a predicate act under 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Moreover,

plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that multiple defendants participated in a

criminal enterprise, that two or more predicate acts occurred, or that he suffered harm

compensable under RICO. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff's RICO claim fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and finds further that the claim suffers from

multiple defects that cannot be cured by amendment.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the complaint is DISMISSED. The request for

leave to proceed IFP is DENIED.

The RICO claim is dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. The § 1983 claim is dismissed

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Any amended complaint must be filed no later than February

15, 2008. 

The court cautions plaintiff that if he fails to state a claim as to the § 1983 cause of

action, the court will dismiss the action, regardless of the inclusion of any purely state-law

claims in the amended complaint. In addition, if plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint

by the February 15th deadline, the action will be dismissed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2008 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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