Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00628/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00628-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lisa Scott Barnett
Plaintiff
Jill Harris
Defendant
Philip Harris
Defendant
Legacy Hospitality, LLC
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LISA SCOTT BARNETT, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00628-N

)

LEGACY HOSPITALITY, LLC, )

PHILIP HARRIS, & JILL HARRIS, )

Defendants. )

ORDER

The Complaint in this action alleges claims under the federal Fair Labor 

Standards Act and a state law claim for unjust enrichment against the Defendants. 

(Doc. 1). The Defendants have filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) as to the unjust enrichment claim, arguing that 

it is preempted by the FLSA. (Docs. 7 – 8). In her timely filed response (Doc. 19) 

in opposition to the motion, Plaintiff Lisa Scott Barnett “maintains her opposition to 

Defendants’ federal preemption argument and does not waive any arguments,” but 

provides no substantive argument in opposition. Instead, Barnett requests leave 

either to amend her complaint or to voluntarily dismiss her unjust enrichment claim 

without prejudice.1

 1 Barnett asserts that the Rule 12(c) motion is premature because she may still seek to 

amend her complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15; thus, she asserts, the 

pleadings are not “closed.” However, prior to filing their motion, the Defendants filed their 

answer (Doc. 5) to the complaint, without asserting counter- or cross-claims; thus, the 

pleadings are deemed “closed” for purposes of Rule 12(c). See Lillian B. ex rel. Brown v. 

Gwinnett Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 15-12159, 2015 WL 7295351, at *1 & n.1 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 

2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“By the plain language of Rule 12(c), a party may not 

move for judgment on the pleadings until ‘[a]fter the pleadings are closed.’ The pleadings are 

closed only when a complaint and answer have been filed[,]... [a]t least where ... neither 

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), governing the voluntary dismissal of 

“actions,” does not permit Barnett to solely dismiss her unjust enrichment claim. 

“Rule 41 allows a plaintiff to dismiss all of his claims against a particular defendant; 

its text does not permit plaintiffs to pick and choose, dismissing only particular 

claims within an action. A plaintiff wishing to eliminate particular claims or issues 

from the action should amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) rather than dismiss 

under Rule 41(a).” Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 

2004) (quotation omitted). Accord Campbell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 605 F.3d 839, 841 

n.1 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). As such, her motion for voluntary dismissal of 

her unjust enrichment claim, embedded in her response (Doc. 19), is DENIED.

Barnett has also requested, in the alternative, that she be permitted to 

“amend her complaint to provide a more definite statement or withdraw her unjust 

enrichment claim.”2 (Doc. 19 at 2). Under S.D. Ala. CivLR 15(b), a “motion to 

amend a pleading must state specifically what changes are sought by the proposed 

amendments[, and t]he proposed amended pleading must be filed as an attachment 

 

party counter- or cross-claims.”). As such, the motion is not premature. But see id. at *3 

(“The District hadn’t filed an answer when it moved for judgment on the pleadings, so the 

pleadings weren’t closed at that time. Because a party may not move for judgment on the 

pleadings until the pleadings are closed, the district court should have denied the District's 

Rule 12(c) motion as procedurally premature.”).

2 The Defendants filed and served their answer on January 15, 2016. (Doc. 5). Thus, 

Barnett could have amended her complaint once as a matter of course to drop her unjust 

enrichment claim or provide a more definite statement had she done so by February 5, 2016. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Because she did not, she may now amend her complaint 

“only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2).

Case 1:15-cv-00628-N Document 21 Filed 02/11/16 Page 2 of 3
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to the motion to amend.”3 Barnett’s perfunctory request to amend hedges on the 

specific changes she seeks, and she has not attached a proposed amended complaint 

to her response. Accordingly, Barnett’s motion for leave to amend her complaint,

embedded in her response (Doc. 19), is DENIED, without prejudice to her ability to 

request such relief in a separate motion that complies with CivLR 15(b).

The Court’s submission order (Doc. 10) on the Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion 

remains in effect.

DONE and ORDERED this the 11th day of February 2016.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 3 Moreover, “[a]ny amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a 

motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended and may not incorporate 

any prior pleading by reference.” S.D. Ala. CivLR 15(a).

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