Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-02065/USCOURTS-ca13-15-02065-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hulu, LLC
Appellee
Intertainer, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

INTERTAINER, INC.,

Appellant

v.

HULU, LLC,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-2065

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. CBM2014-

00052.

______________________ 

Decided: September 26, 2016

______________________ 

DIRK D. THOMAS, McKool Smith, P.C., Washington, 

DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by JOEL 

LANCE THOLLANDER, Austin, TX. 

ELIOT DAMON WILLIAMS, Baker Botts LLP, Palo Alto, 

CA, argued for appellee. Also represented by HARPER 

BATTS. 

______________________ 

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 1 Filed: 09/26/2016
 2 INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC

Before PROST, Chief Judge, CHEN and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

PROST, Chief Judge. 

Intertainer, Inc. (“Intertainer”) appeals from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“Board”) Final Written 

Decision in a covered business method (“CBM”) review 

finding that U.S. Patent No. 8,479,246 (“’246 patent”) is 

anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102. For the reasons stated 

below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Intertainer owns the ’246 patent, which was filed on 

June 13, 2012 and is titled “System and Method for 

Interactive Video Content Programming.” The ’246 

patent relates to creating and distributing videos with 

clickable links. ’246 patent col. 1 l. 58–col. 2 l. 15. When 

a user clicks on a link, the video is paused and the user is 

directed to a web page with “ancillary content.” Id. at col. 

2 ll. 8–10, col. 6 l. 61–col. 7 l. 2, col. 8 ll. 4–10, col. 9 ll. 27–

30. After the user is done viewing the “ancillary content,” 

the user can click on a link to return to the original video 

and resume play. Id. at col. 7 ll. 22–26, col. 8 ll. 48–50. 

Figure 5 of the ’246 patent provides an example that 

illustrates this process: 

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 2 Filed: 09/26/2016
INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC 3

To make the videos clickable, links must be “programmed” such that they are coordinated with the video 

itself. Id. at col. 5 ll. 23–26 (explaining that “interface 

links are programmed according to the intended method 

of presentation and associated with a piece of video content”). For example, links may be embedded in the video 

such that the video and links are streamed over the 

internet as a whole. Id. at col. 5 ll. 27–30. Alternatively,

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 3 Filed: 09/26/2016
 4 INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC

links may be delivered as a separate stream and overlaid 

on top of the video. Id. at col. 5 l. 63–col. 6 l. 4. 

In addition, all of the asserted claims recite the use of 

a “link program” that helps manage the interplay between 

the video and the links. The specification provides no 

information about how the “link program” is programmed. 

It does, however, disclose that the “interface link program” can be delivered over a network, and that “delivery 

of the interface link program need not be simultaneously 

delivered with the video to the user since the interface 

link program would already be at the user’s visual display.” Id. at col. 6 ll. 24–27.

Independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 8, 

10, 11, and 13–15 (“the challenged claims”) are at issue.1 

Claim 1 is representative:

1. A method for creating an interactive video, the 

method comprising:

encoding and storing the video onto a remote storage medium at a first site;

creating a link program adapted to both:

(a) interrupt streaming of the video at the remote 

storage medium to prevent streaming of the video 

over an Internet Protocol (IP)-based network to a 

second site; and

(b) access ancillary content accessible over the network with a universal resource locator (URL) to a 

remote site where the ancillary content is stored, 

the link program linking the ancillary content and 

the video to a point in time when the streaming of 

 

1 These are the only remaining claims in the ’246 

patent. Intertainer has filed a statutory disclaimer under 

37 U.S.C. § 1.321(a) disclaiming all others. 

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 4 Filed: 09/26/2016
INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC 5

the video from the remote storage medium is interrupted;

associating the link program with the video;

streaming the video over the network for display;

providing the link program over the network;

receiving an indication of an interaction with the 

link program;

interrupting, at the first site, the streaming of the 

video in response to receiving the indication of the 

interaction with the link program; and

continuing the streaming of the video over the 

network from the point in time when the streaming of the video was interrupted.

Id. at col. 9 l. 45–col. 10 l. 3 (emphases added).

On December 20, 2013, Hulu filed a petition with the 

Board seeking CBM review of the ’246 patent. The Board 

instituted review of the ’246 patent, in part, on the ground 

of anticipation in view of EP 0 840 241 to Chen (“Chen”). 

In its Institution Decision, the Board construed the claim 

term “link program” as “a set of instructions that tells the 

computer what to do when a link is selected.” J.A. 122. 

In its Patent Owner Response, Intertainer did not explicitly challenge this construction, but instead argued directly that Chen did not disclose a “link program” because it 

did not disclose a single program that both (1) interrupted 

the streaming video and (2) accessed ancillary content. 

On June 12, 2015, the Board issued a Final Written 

Decision finding that the challenged claims of the ’246 

patent were anticipated by Chen. It reaffirmed its construction and clarified that, under its construction, the 

“link program” did not need to be limited to a single

program. It then concluded that Chen anticipated the 

’246 patent because, in relevant part, “Chen’s disclosure 

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 5 Filed: 09/26/2016
 6 INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC

of pausing the video and displaying the linked page on the 

computer, in response to clicking a hot-link” disclosed the 

“creating a link program adapted to both: (a) interrupt 

streaming of the video at the remote storage medium . . . 

and (b) access ancillary content . . .” limitation. J.A. 12. 

It also construed the terms “associating the link program 

with the video” and “providing the link program over the 

network” as not requiring that the entire link program be 

“provid[ed]” with the video or “associat[ed]” over the 

network and concluded that Chen disclosed these limitations. J.A. 9-10, 15-16. 

Intertainer appeals from the Board’s decision. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and 

its findings of fact for substantial evidence. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We review the 

Board’s claim construction under the standard set forth in 

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.

Ct. 831, 841 (2015).

In this appeal, Intertainer challenges the Board’s construction of three claim terms: (1) “link program,” 

(2) “associating the link program with the video,” and 

(3) “providing the link program over the network.” We 

address each in turn.

I 

First, Intertainer argues that the Board erred in construing “link program” because its construction does not 

require that a “single” “program” perform both functions 

of “interrupt[ing] streaming of the video at the remote 

storage medium . . .” and “access[ing] ancillary content 

accessible over the network . . . .” Hulu counters that 

Intertainer waived its ability to challenge the Board’s 

construction, and that in any event the Board’s construction is correct. 

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 6 Filed: 09/26/2016
INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC 7

A 

Waiver is a doctrine that is limited in application. Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 

1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In the context of claim construction, “the doctrine has been applied to preclude a party 

from adopting a new claim construction position on appeal.” Id. However, waiver “has not been invoked . . . to 

prevent a party from clarifying or defending the original 

scope of its claim construction, or from supporting its 

existing claim construction position with new citations to 

the specification.” Id. 

Hulu contends that Intertainer waived its ability to 

challenge the Board’s construction because its Patent 

Owner Response neither explicitly challenged the Board’s 

construction of “link program,” nor proposed an alternate 

construction. Intertainer does not disagree with these 

facts but argues that it preserved its challenge because it 

asserts the same position that it took in its Patent Owner 

Response. 

We agree with Intertainer. Although Intertainer did 

not explicitly challenge the Board’s construction of “link 

program” in its Patent Owner Response (indeed, it appears to cite to it approvingly, see J.A. 147), it took the 

same position that it raises on appeal: that the claims 

require that the “link program” is a single program that

performs both “interrupt[ing] . . .” and “access[ing] . . .” 

functions. See J.A. 150–52. The only difference is that, 

before the Board, Intertainer did not integrate this position into a proposed construction of “link program;” instead, it argued that the plain language of the claims 

required this interpretation, drawing a distinction from 

Chen. Id. In effect, the locus of the dispute has shifted, 

but the dispute itself has not. This shift is understandable, as it was not until the Final Written Decision that the 

Board clarified that its construction of “link program” (“a 

set of instructions that tells the computer what to do 

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 7 Filed: 09/26/2016
 8 INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC

when a link is selected,” J.A. 122) did not require the 

“interrupt[ing] . . .” and “access[ing] . . .” functions to be 

embodied in the same program. Accordingly, because its 

arguments are consistent with the original scope of Intertainer’s claim construction position, Intertainer has not 

waived its ability to challenge the Board’s construction. 

See Interactive Gift, 256 F.3d at 1346.

B 

Turning to the merits, in a CBM review claims are 

given their “broadest reasonable construction in light of 

the specification of the patent in which [they] appear[].” 

37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC 

v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–45 (2016). “The protocol of 

giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation . . .

does not include giving claims a legally incorrect interpretation.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 

1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 

1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, the Board’s 

construction “cannot be divorced from the specification 

and the record evidence and must be consistent with the 

one that those skilled in the art would reach.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, “[t]he [Board]

should also consult the patent’s prosecution history in 

proceedings in which the patent has been brought back to 

the agency for a second review.” Id. 

Intertainer argues that the Board’s construction of 

“link program,” as clarified in its Final Written Decision, 

is incorrect because it does not require that the “interrupt[ing] . . .” and “access[ing] . . .” functions be performed 

by a “single” “program.” Its primary argument rests on 

the language of the claims: according to Intertainer, the 

claims recite that the “link program” is “adapted to both” 

functions, so it should be construed to be a single program 

whose corpus of instructions fully executes both functions. 

In technical terms, Intertainer argues that the “link 

program” must be “a single compilation of instructions” 

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 8 Filed: 09/26/2016
INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC 9

such that the main program and all sub-routines accessible to it (i.e., present at compile-time) are sufficient to 

accomplish both “interrupt[ing] . . .” and “access[ing] . . .” 

functions. Opening Br. 30 & n.2; see also Oral Argument 

at 2:35–3:38, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.

uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-2065.mp3. 

Hulu counters that Intertainer reads the claims too 

narrowly. According to Hulu, the claims and the specification only describe “link program” in functional terms 

and are silent as to whether the “interrupt[ing] . . .” and 

“access[ing] . . .” functions must be structured as one “link 

program” or several. Hulu also argues that only this 

position is consistent with the prosecution history because 

arguments that Intertainer made to overcome written 

description and anticipation rejections require that “link 

program” be broad enough to cover any computer implementation (i.e., one program or several) of the claimed 

functions. 

The parties’ dispute here rests not with what a link 

program does, but what a link program is; specifically, 

whether the “interrupt[ing] . . .” and “access[ing] . . .” 

functions require a single “link program.” On this narrower question, we agree with Hulu that the claims, given 

their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the 

specification and prosecution history, impose no such 

requirement. 

First, the claim language is silent on this question. 

The claims require that “a link program” is “adapted to” 

“interrupt[ing] . . .” and “access[ing] . . .” functions, but 

impose no limits on how these two functions must be 

programmed. The step of “creating a link program” could 

involve creating two separate executables that are invoked serially, or a single executable that only need be 

called once. It could also involve creating a single executable with multiple parameters such that the executable 

can be invoked once with one set of arguments to perform 

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 9 Filed: 09/26/2016
 10 INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC

the “interrupt[ing] . . .” function and invoked a second 

time with another set of arguments to perform the “access[ing] . . .” function. Further, the claims only require 

that the “link program” be “adapted to” perform these 

functions, so it could also be programmed such that it only 

helps initiate these functions, as opposed to performing 

these functions itself.

The specification also imposes no restriction on how a 

“link program” must be structured, as it describes the 

“interrupt[ing] . . .” and “access[ing] . . .” operations in 

only functional terms. See, e.g., ’246 patent col. 2 ll. 32–

37, col. 7 ll. 1–12, col. 8 ll. 8–11, 37–50, col. 9 ll. 27–36. In 

fact, its sole discussion of the “interface link program” 

appears in a single paragraph and is primarily concerned 

with how the program can be delivered to a client computer. See id. at col. 6 ll. 21–32. There is no discussion of 

how a “link program” should be programmed.

Finally, the prosecution history confirms that the 

“link program” cannot be limited to certain programmatic 

implementations. During prosecution, the examiner 

rejected claims reciting “link program” for lack of written 

description under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, in part because 

she believed the specification only disclosed delivering a 

stream of links over a network, as opposed to an entire 

“link program.” J.A. 409. According to the examiner, this 

was insufficient written description support for the 

“providing the link program over the network” limitation. 

Id. To overcome this rejection, Intertainer argued that 

the specification did in fact disclose delivery of an entire 

“link program” because disclosure of “link program” 

functionality meant that an entire “link program” was 

necessarily present:

[T]he fact that the computer performs the disclosed functions when a user interacts with an interface link necessarily requires that there is a 

link program instructing the computer to perform 

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 10 Filed: 09/26/2016
INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC 11

those functions. As such, one having ordinary 

skill in the art would appreciate that the claimed 

‘link program’ is merely the list of instructions 

that perform the disclosed functions.

J.A. 339. 

In addition, the examiner also rejected the claims as 

anticipated under § 102 by U.S. Patent No. 7,139,813 to 

Wallenius (“Wallenius”). J.A. 408. Intertainer attempted

to swear behind Wallenius by claiming priority to a “GAP 

Demo” embodiment which it had previously released,2 but 

the examiner rejected this attempt because she believed 

that the “GAP Demo” also only delivered a stream of links 

over a network, not an entire “link program.” To overcome this rejection, Intertainer repeated this same rationale: 

[T]he fact that the computer performs the disclosed functions when a user interacts with an interface link necessarily requires that there is a 

link program instructing the computer to perform 

those functions. As such, one having ordinary 

skill in the art would appreciate that the claimed 

‘link program’ is merely the list of instructions 

that perform the disclosed functions.

J.A. 349–50. 

In both contexts, Intertainer’s argument to the examiner advances a conception of “link program” that is broad 

enough to cover any implementation (i.e., one program or 

 

2 The “GAP Demo” was an interactive video showing dancers wearing GAP clothing. J.A. 609. A user could 

click on certain clothing items, such as a pair of khaki 

pants that a dancer was wearing, and be directed to a web 

page with details and purchasing information. J.A. 609–

10.

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 11 Filed: 09/26/2016
 12 INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC

several). This is because it assumes that, as long as there 

is a computer performing the “link program” functions 

(i.e., “interrupt[ing] . . .” and “access[ing] . . .”), a “link 

program” exists. Indeed, had the examiner operated 

under a narrower construction of “link program” that 

required a certain programmatic structure (i.e., one 

executable program), it is unclear whether Intertainer 

would have been able to overcome the § 112 and § 102 

rejections because the specification does not disclose 

details about how the “link program” is structured and 

the § 1.131 declarations that Intertainer submitted on its 

“GAP Demo” do not identify a “link program” that is a 

single executable.3 Accordingly, prosecution proceeded 

based on a structure-independent interpretation of “link 

program” and the Board correctly concluded that its 

broadest reasonable interpretation must be at least as 

broad. 

For these reasons, the Board did not err in construing 

“link program” to not require that the “interrupt[ing] . . .” 

and “access[ing]. . .” functions be performed by a “single” 

“program.” 

II

Intertainer also challenges the Board’s construction of 

the terms “associating the link program with the video” 

and “providing the link program over the network.” The 

 

3 Instead, the GAP Demo relied on a library of remote methods to deliver compressed streams of hyperlinked video to devices running PersonalJava. J.A. 350, 

612–15, 643–48, 651–52, 692. Intertainer identified a 

remote method that initiated a command to interrupt 

streaming from Intertainer’s remote databases as performing the “interrupt[ing] . . .” step and a separate (but 

unspecified) command to access a URL as performing the 

“access[ing] . . .” step. J.A. 614–15. 

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 12 Filed: 09/26/2016
INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC 13

Board did not construe these terms in its Institution 

Decision, see J.A. 7–9, but clarified in its Final Written 

Decision that neither of these phrases requires that the 

entire link program be provided over the network or 

associated with the video, J.A. 9–10. Instead, in its view, 

providing and associating a stream of links was sufficient. 

J.A. 15–16.

On appeal, Intertainer argues that the Board’s constructions contradict the plain language of the claims, 

which require that “the link program” is “provid[ed]” and 

“associat[ed].” It also presses that the specification and 

the prosecution history are consistent with this position 

because the specification never discloses “providing” or 

“associating” only part of the “link program,” and that 

arguments that it made during prosecution are consistent 

with interpreting the “link program” as a single, multielement program. 

Hulu counters that Intertainer’s position runs afoul of 

the prosecution history because, in order to overcome 

written description and anticipation rejections, it relied 

on interpretations of these limitations that only 

“provid[ed]” and “associate[ed]” interface links, not an 

entire link program. 

We agree with Hulu. As discussed above, during 

prosecution, the examiner rejected Intertainer’s claims for 

lack of written description because she believed the 

specification did not disclose “providing the link program 

over the network.” J.A. 409. Intertainer disagreed and 

argued that, because the specification disclosed providing 

a stream of links over the network and associating the 

links with video content, it necessarily disclosed the 

“providing” and “associating” steps. J.A. 339 (“[I]t would 

be clear to a person of ordinary skill in the art that interface links are elements of the interface link program, that 

the interface link program is the same as the link program, and that the link program is delivered to client 

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 13 Filed: 09/26/2016
 14 INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC

software in the manner described by the ’884 application.”); see also Oral Argument at 9:14–33 (citing this 

passage and summarizing that “when you’re providing the 

interface links, you’re necessarily providing the link 

program”). Intertainer did not identify any portion of the 

specification that disclosed that the remaining aspects of 

the link program (such as “interrupt[ing] . . .” or “access[ing] . . .”) were provided over the network or associated with a video; instead, in its view, providing and 

associating “elements” of the link program was sufficient. 

Accordingly, Intertainer conceded during prosecution that 

the steps of “providing the link program over the network” 

and “associating the link program with the video” can be 

satisfied when only a portion (e.g., a stream of links) of a 

link program is “provid[ed]” and “associat[ed].”

Arguments that Intertainer made with respect to the 

examiner’s anticipation rejections also support the 

Board’s constructions. As discussed above, Intertainer 

used its “GAP Demo” embodiment to swear behind Wallenius, the examiner’s anticipation reference. J.A. 349–51. 

However, as the examiner found, the GAP Demo only 

transmitted “hypervideo streams” and “additional data 

streams” (e.g., supporting metadata) over the network. 

See J.A. 408, 648. Indeed, in mapping the “GAP Demo” 

onto the particular elements of the claim, Intertainer 

argued that the “providing” step was disclosed because 

“‘current prototypes use RMI to deliver compressed hypervideo streams’ over the network.” J.A. 615. The GAP 

Demo did not transmit or associate other aspects of the 

“link program,” such as code to “interrupt streaming of 

the video at the remote storage medium.” So here too 

Intertainer conceded that the claims do not require that 

an entire link program is “provid[ed]” or “associat[ed].”

In sum, the Board’s constructions correctly capture 

the positions that Intertainer took during prosecution to 

obtain allowance. It did not err in construing these terms.

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 14 Filed: 09/26/2016
INTERTAINER, INC. v. HULU, LLC 15

III

Intertainer does not dispute that, under the Board’s 

constructions, Chen anticipates the ’246 patent. Accordingly, because we affirm the Board’s constructions, we 

affirm the Board’s decision that the ’246 patent is invalid 

under § 102. We need not reach Hulu’s alternative 

grounds for affirmance. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 15-2065 Document: 33-2 Page: 15 Filed: 09/26/2016