Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03135/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03135-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rachel L. Breedlove
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 14, 1999 Decided March 7, 2000

No. 98-3135

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Rachel L. Breedlove,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00041-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Maria Jankowski and

Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, entered

appearances.

Anne Y. Park, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief was Wilma A. Lewis, U.S.

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Attorney, John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Harry R. Benner, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: Silberman, Ginsburg and Henderson, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: The appellant, Rachel Breedlove,

was convicted of bank fraud. At trial the Government introduced evidence of her involvement in two prior fraudulent

bank transactions, one of which involved a bank account held

by William Cloud. Mr. Cloud's role in the scheme was not

established, and the district court instructed the jury not to

speculate about his identity or his role in the transaction.

Ms. Breedlove claims the district court thereby prevented the

jury from considering a fact that may have raised a reasonable doubt about her intent to commit the crime of which she

was convicted. On this ground, Ms. Breedlove seeks a new

trial. Alternatively, Ms. Breedlove seeks a remand for resentencing on the ground that the district court, when computing

her sentence, should not have considered the transaction

involving Mr. Cloud. Finally, Ms. Breedlove asserts that she

was sentenced to a period of supervised release in excess of

the statutory maximum. We affirm Ms. Breedlove's conviction and remand this case solely so that the district court may

impose a term of supervised release within the statutory

maximum.

I. Background

As a former Marine, Ms. Breedlove received monthly educational benefit checks from the Department of Veterans

Affairs. Early in January 1998 she received in the mail a

U.S. Treasury check payable to her in the amount of $58.65.

At about the same time she opened a checking account at the

First Union National Bank in Washington, D.C. Several

days later she deposited into that account a U.S. Treasury

check seemingly for $998,688.65. The teller assisting Ms.

Breedlove suspected the check may have been altered, as did

his supervisor.

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In February 1998 Ms. Breedlove was indicted for aiding

and abetting bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. ss 1344 &

2, and for uttering a counterfeit obligation of the United

States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 472. At trial, in order to

establish Ms. Breedlove's specific intent to defraud First

Union, the Government presented evidence of two prior and

allegedly fraudulent bank transactions in which she had been

involved. The first transaction occurred in August 1997,

when Ms. Breedlove deposited to the account of Mr. William

Cloud at the Navy Federal Credit Union a check in the

amount of $1,206,000, drawn upon the Bank of America, and

made payable to Mr. Cloud. Mr. Cloud had endorsed the

check and an accompanying deposit slip was filled out before

Ms. Breedlove approached the teller. The Credit Union soon

determined the check had been altered and it reversed the

transfer of funds into Mr. Cloud's account.

Shortly thereafter a check in the amount of $850,000,

drawn upon Mr. Cloud's account at the Credit Union and

made payable to Ms. Breedlove, was endorsed and deposited

to Ms. Breedlove's checking account at Central Fidelity National Bank--to no avail, of course, as there were by then

insufficient funds in Mr. Cloud's account to cover the check.

In October 1997 an Internal Revenue Service search of Ms.

Breedlove's home turned up the checkbook of Mr. Cloud--

who did not live there--from which the $850,000 check had

been written, as well as receipts for the $1,206,000 check Ms.

Breedlove had deposited into Mr. Cloud's account.

The second transaction occurred in December 1997. Shortly after she had been sent an educational benefit check in the

amount of $425.19, Ms. Breedlove deposited into her checking

account at NationsBank a U.S. Treasury check made payable

to herself, seemingly in the amount of $4,251.19. The next

day, she withdrew $4,500.00 from her account.

At the close of Ms. Breedlove's trial, the district court

instructed the jury in part as follows:

[I]f you decide that the defendant was involved in the

prior transactions, you may consider the evidence relating to the two other transactions solely for the purpose of

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deciding whether the defendant acted with the specific

intent to defraud in committing the offenses charged in

the indictment.

...

And ... I remind you that you have heard evidence

relating to a bank account held by a person named

William Cloud. You may not speculate as to who this

person is or what role he may have had in the events that

have been described to you.

Ms. Breedlove's counsel had objected in advance to the

district court's mention of Mr. Cloud, on the ground that it

was a "reference to a specific fact."

The jury convicted Ms. Breedlove on both counts of the

indictment and the district court sentenced her on each count

to concurrent terms of 46 months of imprisonment, to be

followed by five years of supervised release. In computing

Ms. Breedlove's sentence, the district court considered her

previous involvement with fraudulent checks both as relevant

conduct and as evidence of more than minimal planning.

II. Analysis

Upon appeal Ms. Breedlove raises three issues. She argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury to

avoid speculation about Mr. Cloud and his role in the August

1997 transaction. She claims the district court improperly

considered the August 1997 transaction in calculating her

sentence. And she objects that the district court ordered her

to serve a period of supervised release in excess of the

statutory maximum.

A. The Jury Instruction

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52, we review a

properly raised objection to a jury instruction only for nonharmless error; an objection that was not raised in the

original proceeding we review only for plain error. See

United States v. Perkins, 161 F.3d 66, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

An objection is not properly raised if it is couched in terms

too general to have alerted the trial court to the substance of

the petitioner's point. See United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d

1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Counsel for Ms. Breedlove objected to the district court's

instruction that the jury refrain from speculating about Mr.

Cloud by stating that the instruction was a "reference to a

specific fact." Upon appeal Ms. Breedlove elaborates: The

instruction precluded the jury from considering the possibility

that in August 1997 she unwittingly had cashed a check

altered by Mr. Cloud. That fact would have supported Ms.

Breedlove's defense that she did not know the $998,688.65

check had been altered and therefore did not have the

requisite intent to commit the crimes of which she was

accused. Ms. Breedlove asserts that, in order to preserve

her objection to the instruction, her counsel was required to

point out to the district court only that the court should not

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make "reference to a specific fact"; that is, "trial counsel was

not required to point out to the district court the value to the

defense of the particular facts being foreclosed by the court's

instruction, just to object that the court was erring by

instructing on facts."

Read in context,* trial counsel's objection was not specific

enough to convey the meaning Ms. Breedlove now attributes

to it. The district court agreed that in her closing arguments

counsel for Ms. Breedlove could refer to Mr. Cloud and to the

evidence connecting him to the August 1997 transaction, but

it did not want the jury to speculate about Mr. Cloud's role in

that transaction. Counsel apparently sensed some disjunction between the district court's agreement that she could

refer to Mr. Cloud and the court's concern that the jury not

speculate "as to who he may be." She did not, however,

make the substance of this objection, as Ms. Breedlove has

now explained it, clear to the district court. See United

States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(finding appellants failed to preserve argument where objection before district court did not include key terms used in

appeal). Further, counsel's apparent acquiescence in closing

__________

* The relevant portions of the transcript are appended at the end

of this opinion.

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the matter ("Your Honor, if I hear you correctly....") gives

no indication that she remained dissatisfied with the result.

Counsel's twice-stated objection that the proposed jury

instruction "is a reference to a specific fact" barely resembles

her present argument, which is that the jury instruction

invaded the province of the jury as factfinder by removing

from the jury's consideration a fact that might have raised a

reasonable doubt about her guilt. Insofar as that is her

objection, we hold that Ms. Breedlove did not properly preserve it for appeal. We will therefore upset her conviction

only if the instruction rises to the level of plain error.

The Supreme Court defined plain error in United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). First, of course, the district court

must have made an error by "[d]eviati[ng] from a legal rule."

Id. at 732-33. Second, the error must be one that should

have been "obvious" to the district court. Id. at 734. Third,

the error must have "affect[ed] substantial rights," that is,

"been prejudicial", "affected the outcome of the district court

proceedings." Id. A court of appeals should correct even a

plain error affecting substantial rights only if there would

otherwise be a miscarriage of justice, as there would be if the

defendant is actually innocent of the offense, or if the error

" 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Id. at 736 (quoting United

States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).

The evidence concerning Mr. Cloud's role in the August

1997 transaction was sparse. It included testimony by a

Navy Federal Credit Union investigator who concluded that

Mr. Cloud had endorsed the $1,206,000 check. The investigator stated that he believed Mr. Cloud had been in "cahoots"

with Ms. Breedlove in executing the check scheme. Ms.

Breedlove did not submit any additional evidence linking Mr.

Cloud to the August 1997 transaction or to any other act

involving her. The district court prevented Ms. Breedlove

neither from introducing further evidence about Mr. Cloud

nor from arguing to the jury about such evidence as there

was linking Mr. Cloud to the August 1997 transaction. The

district court merely aimed to preclude the jury from specUSCA Case #98-3135 Document #501261 Filed: 03/07/2000 Page 6 of 12
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ulating about Mr. Cloud absent any substantial evidence, in

the words of trial counsel for Ms. Breedlove, "as to what Mr.

Cloud may or may not have done." We see no error in the

district court's exercise of caution; the instruction was not so

restrictive as to remove from the jury any of its factfinding

authority. See Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232

(D.C. Cir. 1947) ("functions of the jury include ... the

drawing of justifiable inferences of fact from proven facts....

The jury may not be permitted to conjecture merely, or to

conclude upon pure speculation").

Even had the district court erred as claimed, the overwhelming evidence that Ms. Breedlove is guilty of the crime

charged would have rendered the error harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. Ms. Breedlove's intent to commit the

crimes of which she stands convicted is apparent from the

evidence. She opened a checking account at the First Union

National Bank only days before she attempted to deposit the

check for $998,688.65. When she opened the account she

asked whether the bank offered tax-deferred or retirement

accounts into which she might be able to deposit a half million

or a million dollars, adding falsely that she was the owner of

several lucrative businesses. The teller who assisted Ms.

Breedlove when she made the deposit told her a "hold" would

be placed upon the check--that is, she could not draw upon

the credit to her account until the bank had collected good

funds for the check--because of its amount. Ms. Breedlove

claims that she did not know the check had been altered, but

it is difficult to conceive of a bank placing a hold on a check

for $58.65 due to its amount; at the very least, Ms. Breedlove's anticipation a few days earlier that she would be

depositing a large sum, together with her ready acquiescence

in the delayed availability of funds, suggests that she knew

the check she deposited was for a significant amount, not for

$58.65. A reasonable juror could hardly fail to conclude from

these facts that Ms. Breedlove intended to utter an altered

check.

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B. The Sentence

When it calculated Ms. Breedlove's base offense level, the

district court included not only the potential loss involved in

the offense for which she was convicted but also the potential

losses from the August 1997 and December 1997 transactions,

both of which the court found were part of the "same course

of conduct" as the January 1998 transaction. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual s 1B1.3(a)(2) & application note 9.

Upon appeal Ms. Breedlove argues that the August 1997

transaction was too remote in time and too different in

character from the offenses of December 1997 and January

1998 to be considered part of the same course of conduct.

We afford due deference to the district court's application of

the Guidelines to the facts of Ms. Breedlove's case. See

United States v. Jackson, 161 F.3d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

The Sentencing Guidelines list several factors for determining whether two or more offenses are part of the same course

of conduct, including the similarity of the offenses, the regularity of the offenses, and the time interval between the

offenses. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual s 1B1.3

application note 9(B). If in a particular case any one of these

factors is counter-indicative, then the offenses should not be

deemed a single course of conduct unless another of the

factors is particularly suggestive thereof. See id.

In United States v. Pinnick we upheld the district court's

determination that a defendant's repeated use of counterfeit

checks constituted a single course of conduct. The defendant

had used different aliases in presenting the checks, and had

used the checks to obtain different types of proceeds--cash in

two instances and an automobile in another. The instruments

and the methods used by the defendant were sufficiently

similar, however, to establish an " 'identifiable behavior pattern of specified criminal activity.' " 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Perdomo, 927 F.2d 111,

115 (2d Cir. 1991)).

In this case the August 1997, December 1997, and January

1998 transactions share a common modus operandi. In each

transaction, Ms. Breedlove presented an altered check for

deposit to a controlled account (either hers or Mr. Cloud's) at

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a financial institution. Ms. Breedlove then sought to reach

the proceeds of the fraud by drawing checks upon the accounts into which she had deposited the altered checks--

except that Ms. Breedlove was apprehended before she could

draw proceeds from the January 1998 transaction.

Ms. Breedlove points out that each offense involved a

different depository institution, but that suggests to us only

that Ms. Breedlove sought to reduce the risk of suspicion.

She also argues that the August 1997 transaction is not

similar to the December 1997 and January 1998 transactions

because only the latter two involved U.S. Treasury checks.

That distinction bears not at all upon whether she used the

checks in a single course of conduct. More important, each of

the checks was legitimately issued for a small amount, then

altered for the purpose of obtaining a larger amount from an

unwitting depository institution. As for the five months

between the two transactions, the interval hardly seems

significant in view of the similarity of the offenses. We

therefore defer to the district court's determination that the

August 1997 transaction was part of the same course of

conduct as the December 1997 and January 1998 transactions

for the purpose of calculating Ms. Breedlove's base offense

level.

The district court also considered the August 1997 transaction in enhancing Ms. Breedlove's sentence by two levels for

"more than minimal planning," see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual s 2F1.1(b)(2), defined as "more planning than is

typical for commission of the offense in a simple form." Id.

at s 1B1.1 application note 1(f). Such planning is deemed

present "in any case involving repeated acts over a period of

time, unless it is clear that each instance was purely opportune." Id. Three repeated (non-opportunistic) acts are generally sufficient to support a finding of more than minimal

planning. See United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 515 (D.C.

Cir. 1994).

Ms. Breedlove's argument that the district court improperly relied upon the August 1997 transaction as evidence of

more than minimal planning is but a corollary of her nowrejected argument that that transaction was not relevant

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conduct for sentencing purposes. ("Absent the $1,206,000

Cloud check, ... with only two acts of relevant conduct

rather than three, the two-point 'more than minimal planning'

enhancement for 'repeated acts' ... no longer applies.") The

corollary fails with the proposition from which it is derived.

We hold, therefore, that the district court properly enhanced

Ms. Breedlove's sentence for more than minimal planning.

C. Supervised Release Term

Ms. Breedlove argues, and the Government agrees, that the

district court improperly sentenced her to a term of five years

of supervised release on each of the two counts of which she

was convicted. The conviction for uttering carries with it a

statutory maximum imprisonment of 15 years, making it a

Class C felony. See 18 U.S.C. ss 472, 3559(a)(3). As Ms.

Breedlove points out, the maximum authorized term of supervised release for a Class C felony is three years. See 18

U.S.C. s 3583(b)(2). We therefore remand this case to the

district court for the limited purpose of correcting this error.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Ms. Breedlove's conviction. We remand this case, however, so that the district

court may impose a term of supervised release within the

statutory maximum.

So ordered.

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APPENDIX

Ms. Jankowski: Your Honor, I have one other objection

and, Your Honor, this may be my newness to this

jurisdiction, but there was no testimony at all concerning

motive. And there is an instruction that says that intent

and motive shouldn't be confused and something along

the lines of if she acted with a good motive, that is not

supposed to be taken into consideration.

I just don't see where that was an issue at all in this

case that would even warrant an instruction. This is not

a case where Ms. Breedlove testified that her children

were hungry and she desperately needed the money, or

anything like that....

The Court: I see your point. The instruction is included,

however, because I anticipate that there will be speculation on the part of the jury as to what motivated her to

do what she did, particularly in view of the fact that we

have this mysterious Mr. Cloud, whose presence in this

case has never been explained. So I want to dissuade

them from speculating about who Mr. Cloud was or what

his role may have been.

Ms. Jankowski: Your Honor, I can see your concern,

however, I think that the instruction--I don't believe

that the instruction really addresses the possibility that

they may speculate about Mr. Cloud. It kind of suggests

that personal advancement or financial gain are two wellrecognized motives. It kind of suggests a motive that

sometimes someone might attempt an act for advancement or financial gain, and that that is saying that is still

acceptable and that you can't confuse motive with intent.

It doesn't really say to the jury--

The Court: Would you like me to leave out that paragraph, "personal advancement and financial gain"? And

I think I may make some specific reference to Mr. Cloud

and that they are not to speculate on what part he may

have played, if any, in connection with these matters.

Ms. Jankowski: Your Honor, the only objection I have to

that is a reference to a specific fact.

The Court: That's what they are going to do. I beg

your pardon?

Ms. Jankowski: That is a reference to a specific fact.

The Court: Well, I am also, in part, anticipating your

argument. I expect that you will make reference to Mr.

Cloud, and I think maybe in the context, they ought to be

told that they are not to speculate on Mr. Cloud.

Ms. Jankowski: Certainly, Your Honor, if they are to

determine whether or not Ms. Breedlove committed the

prior bad act of--they are supposed to assume that she

committed that act and assume that she had knowledge

of the check's alteration. I can certainly argue to the

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jury that it was a check that was made out to him, a

check that was endorsed by him, and they can just as

likely assume that he--I don't think that is an improper

argument to make to the jury. Your Honor, she is being

accused of a prior bad act.

The Court: There is evidence in the case to implicate

your client in the presentation of these fraudulent documents. The bank photographs alone may provide sufficient evidence for the jury's purposes, even though the

witnesses themselves couldn't identify her.

Also, the fact that she was the one who apparently

endeavored to profit by the funds. There is circumstantial evidence to point to your client as the one who was, if

you will, the culpable party insofar as these instruments

were concerned.

There is no evidence one way or another as to Mr.

Cloud, other than the fact that his signature mysteriously

appears and his bank account mysteriously was used.

Now, I am not suggesting that you are not permitted

to argue, but I don't want the jury speculating, on the

basis of a total absence of evidence, as to who he may be.

Ms. Jankowski: Your Honor, if I hear you correctly, I

can certainly argue to the jury that Ms. Breedlove has

not been proven to have committed this offense, but you

are going to tell the jury that they cannot speculate as to

what Mr. Cloud may or may not have done?

The Court: That's correct. That's the way I am going to

leave it.

Ms. Jankowski: If we can then somehow--

The Court: But I will take out that middle paragraph of

instruction number 35 [regarding the distinction between

intent and motive] to which you had an objection.

Ms. Jankowski: Your Honor, the only--

The Court: That does not preclude [the prosecution]

from arguing it, however.

Ms. Jankowski: Certainly

The Court: You want me to take that out?

Ms. Jankowski: Yes, Your Honor.

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