Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-05009/USCOURTS-caDC-23-05009-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc.
Appellant
Food Safety and Inspection Service
Appellee
United States Department of Agriculture
Appellee
Thomas J. Vilsack
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 3, 2023 Decided August 9, 2024 

No. 23-5009 

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., 

APPELLANT

v. 

THOMAS J. VILSACK, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:21-cv-01539) 

Daniel H. Waltz argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. 

Graham W. White, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were 

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, and Gerard J. Sinzdak, Attorney. 

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, PILLARD and KATSAS, 

Circuit Judges. 

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Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SRINIVASAN. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS. 

SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge: The Poultry Products 

Inspection Act authorizes the Department of Agriculture to 

prohibit the use of false or misleading labels on poultry 

products. Certain product labels—including those bearing 

claims about the conditions in which animals are raised—must 

be approved by the Department before hitting grocery store 

shelves. 

This case concerns the Department’s approval of labels for 

Perdue’s “Fresh Line” chicken and turkey products. Although 

Fresh Line chickens and turkeys, according to allegations we 

accept as true, were raised strictly indoors, the approved 

product labels depict birds freely roaming outside a barn. The 

Animal Legal Defense Fund asked the Department to reject any 

Perdue labels containing that kind of imagery. ALDF claimed 

that the imagery misleads consumers into thinking the birds 

were raised in pastures, when they in fact spent the entirety of 

their lives in overcrowded warehouses. The Department 

declined ALDF’s request to disapprove the labels. 

ALDF then sued, claiming that the Department violated 

the Poultry Products Inspection Act and the Administrative 

Procedure Act by approving the Fresh Line labels and by 

purportedly adopting a policy of evaluating only the text—not 

any graphics—on poultry-product labels. The district court 

concluded that ALDF failed to establish standing to challenge 

the Department’s actions. We agree. 

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I. 

A. 

Congress enacted the Poultry Products Inspection Act 

(PPIA) to ensure that poultry products are “wholesome, not 

adulterated, and properly marked, labeled, and packaged.” 21 

U.S.C. § 451. The PPIA makes it unlawful to sell poultry 

products with “false or misleading” labeling, id. §§ 453(h)(1), 

457(c), 458(a)(2), and empowers the Department of 

Agriculture to prevent the “use” of “any marking or labeling” 

it “has reason to believe . . . is false or misleading in any 

particular,” id. § 457(d). The statute defines “labeling” to 

include any “written, printed, or graphic matter” on a product’s 

“container[] or wrapper[].” Id. § 453(s). 

The Department has delegated enforcement of the PPIA’s 

labeling requirements to the Food Safety and Inspection 

Service (FSIS). By regulation, FSIS must approve certain 

labels before a company can use them in the market. 9 C.F.R. 

§ 412.1(a). Among the labels requiring pre-market approval 

are those including “special statements and claims,” a category 

encompassing “claims regarding the raising of animals.” Id. 

§ 412.1(c)(3), (e)(1)(iii). To get such a label approved, a 

company must submit to FSIS an application that can include 

a “sketch” label—that is, a “concept of a label . . . that clearly 

reflect[s] and project[s] the final version of the label” that will 

appear on grocery shelves. Id. § 412.1(a), (d). 

B. 

Because the government “challenge[s] standing at the 

pleading stage without disputing the facts alleged in the 

complaint, ‘we accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as 

true and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations 

in the plaintiff’s favor.’” In re U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt. Data 

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Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per 

curiam) (quoting Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 

2015)). Those allegations are as follows. 

On several occasions in 2018 and 2019, Perdue 

submitted—and FSIS approved—sketch labels for Perdue’s 

Fresh Line chicken and turkey products. Each of those labels 

contained essentially identical graphics: a cartoon depiction of 

chickens or turkeys outside a barn, beneath a full yellow sun, 

surrounded by corn and other plants. On some labels—such as 

the one below, included in Perdue’s application for Fresh Line 

chicken breasts—the birds appear to be pecking away amid the 

leafy vegetation, and the label advertises the chickens as having 

been “raised cage free.” See Am. Compl. 14 (J.A. 66). FSIS 

approved all Fresh Line labels without mandating any changes 

to the graphics depicting birds roaming outside a barn. See id. 

¶¶ 71–72, 78, 97–98 (J.A. 67, 69, 73). 

In January 2020, after FSIS had approved Fresh Line 

labels for both chicken and turkey products, the Animal Legal 

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Defense Fund (ALDF) asked FSIS to “decline to approve any 

Perdue label applications that contain the same or similar 

imagery.” Id. ¶¶ 88–90 (J.A. 71). ALDF is a national animal 

advocacy organization, and its request to FSIS was part of its 

mission to combat the “animal cruelty” and “societal ills 

caused by factory farming.” Id. ¶¶ 15–16 (J.A. 56). ALDF 

contended that the imagery on Fresh Line labels depicting birds 

outside is fundamentally “misleading and contrary to how the 

animals were raised.” Id. ¶ 88 (J.A. 71). According to ALDF, 

the “bucolic scene” on the labels falsely suggests that the birds 

have “access to the outdoors,” when they in reality spend the 

entirety of their “short lives” inside what amounts to a 

“crowded warehouse.” Id. ¶¶ 63, 79 (J.A. 66, 69).

FSIS rejected ALDF’s request. In a March 2020 letter, 

FSIS explained that the labels’ imagery did not “violat[e]” 

FSIS’s “labeling requirements” because the “photos, colors, 

and graphics used on packaging are not considered labeling 

claims and do not make the product label false or misleading.” 

Id. ¶¶ 91–93 (J.A. 72). ALDF inferred from FSIS’s letter that 

FSIS does not evaluate imagery depicting birds’ living 

conditions on any label—from Perdue or any another 

company—as part of its pre-market review process. See id. 

¶ 94 (J.A. 72). Later that year, Perdue submitted, and FSIS 

again approved, labels for more Fresh Line products, each of 

which bore essentially identical graphics to those ALDF had 

urged FSIS to find misleading. 

C. 

In June 2021, ALDF sued the Secretary of Agriculture, the 

Department, and FSIS. ALDF asserts two claims. First, it 

alleges that FSIS’s approvals of Perdue’s Fresh Line labels 

violated the PPIA and the APA. Second, ALDF claims that 

FSIS has a “pattern and practice” of not reviewing the “graphic 

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matter or imagery” on poultry-product labels, including 

imagery that “show[s] animals in natural, outdoor settings,” 

thereby again ostensibly violating the PPIA and APA. Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 109–18 (J.A. 74–75). The complaint seeks 

declaratory and injunctive relief. 

The government moved to dismiss both claims on the 

ground that ALDF lacks standing to pursue them. Animal 

Legal Def. Fund v. Vilsack, 640 F. Supp. 3d 134, 144 (D.D.C. 

2022). The district court agreed, finding that ALDF lacks 

standing to sue on its own behalf (organizational standing) or 

on behalf of its members (associational standing). Id. at 144–

51. 

ALDF appeals only the district court’s decision on 

associational standing. The court held that ALDF failed to 

demonstrate associational standing because the member whom 

ALDF asserts was injured—whose name is Marie Mastracco—

does not herself have standing. Id. at 149–51. As the district 

court saw it, ALDF’s amended complaint fails to show that 

Mastracco suffers a sufficiently concrete injury resulting from 

FSIS’s alleged failure to review the graphics on Fresh Line (or 

any other) labels. See id. at 150–51. The court dismissed the 

complaint without prejudice. 

II. 

We review the district court’s decision on standing de 

novo. Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2014). A 

membership organization like ALDF has associational 

standing if “(1) at least one of its members would have 

standing to sue in [her] own right, (2) the interests the 

association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and (3) 

neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires that 

an individual member of the association participate in the 

lawsuit.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 

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2002). Here, ALDF’s allegations are plainly germane to its 

purpose: one of the group’s “signature focus areas” is 

“expos[ing] and reform[ing] factory farming” by “curbing the 

misleading labeling and advertising of animal products.” Am. 

Compl. ¶ 19 (J.A. 57). And neither ALDF’s claims nor the 

relief it seeks requires Mastracco’s personal participation. Our 

inquiry thus focuses on the first prong: individual-member 

standing. 

Mastracco would have standing to sue in her own right if 

she suffers (a) an injury-in-fact that is both (b) “fairly traceable 

to the challenged action of the defendant” and (c) “likely, as 

opposed to merely speculative,” to be “redressed by a favorable 

decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. 

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). The parties dispute 

whether ALDF can demonstrate an injury-in-fact. To do so, 

ALDF must show that the asserted injury to Mastracco is both 

“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 180. 

As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, ALDF bears the 

burden of establishing standing. Susan B. Anthony List v. 

Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014). And because “standing is 

not dispensed in gross,” ALDF “must demonstrate standing for 

each claim that [it] press[es] and for each form of relief that [it] 

seek[s].” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 

(2021). ALDF “may seek to make the requisite showing 

through affidavits from members,” Food & Water Watch v. 

FERC, 28 F.4th 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2022), but the group has 

not offered an affidavit from Mastracco. As a result, we rely 

on the facts asserted in ALDF’s complaint. 

A. 

We start by summarizing ALDF’s theory of standing and 

the facts alleged in support of it. ALDF contends that 

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Mastracco was injured after purchasing Fresh Line chicken 

breasts and will continue to suffer cognizable injuries as long 

as FSIS permits misleading imagery to appear on Fresh Line 

and other poultry-product labels. Mastracco purchased Fresh 

Line chicken breasts after “relying” on the labels’ “false and 

misleading . . . graphic imagery.” Am. Compl. ¶ 30 (J.A. 60). 

Before discovering that those labels were, in her view, 

misleading, Mastracco had “regularly purchased” Fresh Line 

chicken breasts for her “sick and elderly dog.” Id. ¶ 31 (J.A. 

60). In deciding which chicken breasts to purchase, Mastracco 

“considered factors such as whether the chickens raised for the 

meat were healthy, given any chemicals or hormones, and 

treated humanely.” Id. (J.A. 60). And she “relied on the 

products’ labels to provide information about these [three] 

factors.” Id. (J.A. 60). Mastracco “was influenced to 

purchase” Fresh Line products by the label’s “claims about 

[containing] no antibiotics.” Id. ¶ 32 (J.A. 60). And, “seeing 

the graphic imagery, coupled with Perdue’s use of the term 

‘cage free,’” she “interpreted the label to mean that the 

chickens raised for the products roamed freely on pasture, 

under a shining sun.” Id. (J.A. 60). When she “learn[ed]” that 

was not the case, she was “surprised and upset.” Id. (J.A. 60). 

“FSIS’s unlawful approvals” of the Fresh Line labels, claims 

ALDF, caused Mastracco to suffer “consumer harm.” Id. ¶ 33 

(J.A. 61). 

That consumer harm is allegedly ongoing and imminent 

because Mastracco “feels compelled to continue purchasing 

whole chicken breasts” for her dog; but as long as FSIS 

continues allowing Fresh Line labels to remain on grocery 

shelves (claim 1) and maintains its purported policy of not 

vetting the imagery on poultry-product labels in its pre-market 

approval process (claim 2), Mastracco allegedly “will continue 

to suffer a lack of confidence in whether any chicken labels 

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convey accurate descriptions of the product’s animal raising 

conditions.” Id. ¶ 34 (J.A. 61). 

The complaint contends that vacating FSIS’s approvals of 

the Fresh Line labels (claim 1) would remedy Mastracco’s 

“consumer injur[y]” because it “would remove” the labels from 

the grocery shelves, “eliminating the chance that” she “would 

continue to purchase chicken products [she] mistakenly 

believe[s] come from chickens raised in outdoor, bucolic 

conditions.” Id. ¶ 35 (J.A. 61). And requiring FSIS to review 

graphic imagery on all poultry-product labels (claim 2) would 

remedy Mastracco’s consumer injury by “allow[ing]” her “to 

purchase” chicken products “with greater confidence in 

knowing how the animals were raised.” Id. ¶ 36 (J.A. 61). 

B. 

We now turn to assessing whether ALDF has standing to 

pursue its first claim, challenging FSIS’s approval of Fresh 

Line labels. We hold that the harm Mastracco suffered when 

she purchased Fresh Line chicken breasts is sufficiently 

concrete and particularized, but ALDF fails to show that the 

harm is ongoing or substantially likely to recur. 

1. 

 “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the 

context of a statutory violation.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 

U.S. 330, 341 (2016). As a result, although ALDF alleges that 

FSIS has violated the PPIA, the group must still establish that 

the injury Mastracco suffers is sufficiently concrete to qualify 

as injury-in-fact. “A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’; that 

is, it must actually exist.” Id. at 340. And the “concrete, de 

facto” injury must be a “legally cognizable” one. See id. at 341 

(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). 

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ALDF “must demonstrate standing ‘with the manner and 

degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the 

litigation.’” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 431 (quoting Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 561). At this point in the proceedings, “[o]n review of 

a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, . . . [w]e assume the truth of all material 

factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint 

liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences 

that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. 

v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 

Applying that standard, we conclude that ALDF’s 

complaint sufficiently alleges facts showing that Mastracco 

suffered a concrete injury. We read the complaint to allege that 

Mastracco’s purchase of Fresh Line products was at least 

partially motivated by a desire to buy humanely raised chicken, 

and that the label’s graphic depiction of the birds roaming 

outside was one reason she chose Fresh Line. In its complaint, 

ALDF explains that when making purchasing decisions, 

Mastracco “considered . . . whether the chickens raised for the 

meat were healthy, given any chemicals or hormones, and 

treated humanely,” and she “relied on the products’ labels to 

provide information about” all those factors. See Am. Compl. 

¶ 31 (J.A. 60). The complaint then goes on to say: “Mastracco 

was influenced to purchase Perdue’s Fresh Line chicken 

products by label claims about no antibiotics. And seeing the 

graphic imagery, coupled with Perdue’s use of the term ‘cage 

free,’ [she] interpreted the label to mean that the chickens 

raised for the products roamed freely on pasture, under a 

shining sun.” Id. ¶ 32 (J.A. 60). 

We understand those sentences to describe Mastracco’s 

pre-purchase decisionmaking process. And we infer from the 

allegations that Mastracco made the decision to purchase Fresh 

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Line chicken at least in part because of the label’s graphic 

representation of the birds’ living conditions. As a result, 

ALDF adequately alleges that Mastracco sought to buy 

humanely raised chicken, that she chose Fresh Line in part 

because she thought the graphics represented that the chickens 

were humanely raised, and that the imagery on the package 

thus misled her into making a purchase. That monetary injury 

is sufficiently concrete and particularized for purposes of 

standing. See TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425. 

2. 

While ALDF therefore has established that Mastracco was 

once harmed in a concrete and particularized way by FSIS’s 

approval of Fresh Line labels, the complaint fails to show that 

the harm is ongoing or imminent. 

Because ALDF seeks declaratory and injunctive relief—

not damages—“past injuries alone are insufficient to establish 

standing.” Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 

2011). Rather, ALDF must show either that Mastracco is 

“suffering an ongoing injury” (actual) or that she “faces an 

immediate threat of injury” (imminent). Id. To show an 

imminent injury, she “must show a ‘substantial probability of 

injury’ or ‘a substantial risk that the harm will occur.’” Nat’l 

Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 789 F.3d 165, 181 (D.C. Cir. 

2015) (first quoting Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764 F.3d at 7; and 

then quoting Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 158); see 

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409–10, 414 n.5 

(2013). Importantly, the alleged future injury cannot be a “selfinflicted harm” or one “largely of [one’s] own making”—

neither of those “amount[s] to an ‘injury’ cognizable under 

Article III.” Nat’l Fam. Plan. & Reprod. Health Ass’n, Inc. v. 

Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

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ALDF fails to thread that needle. Our analysis of a 

plaintiff’s standing “ordinarily depends on the facts as they 

exist when the complaint is filed.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569 n.4 

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Newman-Green, Inc. v. AlfonzoLarrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989)). Here, the entire premise 

of the complaint is that Mastracco now knows that Fresh Line 

chicken, regardless of the imagery on the label, is raised 

indoors. And ALDF fails to explain why it is substantially 

likely that Mastracco will continue to purchase Fresh Line 

chicken—and rely on the label’s graphics when doing so—now 

that she knows that the chickens were raised in a way that “is 

anathema to her ethical views.” ALDF Br. 19. Nor does ALDF 

explain why Mastracco’s reliance on labels she knows to have 

been misleading could be something other than a self-inflicted 

injury. 

In arguing that it has established a sufficiently imminent, 

non-self-inflicted injury, ALDF relies on Davidson v. 

Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2018). In 

Davidson, the Ninth Circuit held that there are certain 

circumstances in which “a previously deceived consumer may 

have standing to seek an injunction” based on future purchases 

of the same product “even though the consumer now knows or 

suspects that the advertising was false at the time of the original 

purchase.” Id. at 969. The court reasoned in relevant part: “the 

threat of future harm may be the consumer’s plausible 

allegations that she might purchase the product in the future, 

despite the fact it was once marred by false advertising or 

labeling, as she may reasonably, but incorrectly, assume the 

product was improved.” Id. at 970. Here, ALDF contends that 

Mastracco will continue to purchase Fresh Line chicken even 

though, last she knew, the chickens were raised indoors and the 

labels’ graphics are misleading. See Am. Compl. ¶ 35 (J.A. 

61); accord ALDF Reply Br. 6. 

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Even if we assume for purposes of argument that a plaintiff 

could allege a cognizable injury in the way Davidson lays out, 

ALDF fails to do so. To fit within that theory, a previously 

deceived plaintiff would need to show that it is likely she will 

purchase the product in the future; that her purchase is once 

again motivated by the message conveyed by the product’s 

label; and that it would be reasonable to assume the labeling 

has been cured of its defects. See Davidson, 889 F.3d at 969–

70. But nowhere does ALDF explain why Mastracco would 

continue to rely on Fresh Line labels’ graphics to purchase that 

product, or why it could be reasonable for her to do so. Instead, 

ALDF asserts that, because Mastracco cannot trust any

chicken-product labels in the market, “there are other reasons

why Mastracco may want to purchase Perdue Fresh Line 

products again, such as price, convenience, or availability at 

her local grocery store.” ALDF Reply Br. 6 (emphasis added). 

It would not be enough for purposes of standing, though, if 

Mastracco were to purchase Fresh Line chicken for reasons 

other than that she reasonably interpreted the labels’ graphics 

to mean that the product contains humanely raised chickens: if 

she were to buy Fresh Line because it was inexpensive, not 

because she wanted humanely raised chicken and believed the 

labels’ imagery to so promise, she would not suffer the injury 

she complains of. 

In sum, ALDF has not shown any substantial likelihood 

that Mastracco will suffer non-self-imposed future harm due to 

FSIS’s approval of Fresh Line labels. Even if ALDF could do 

so pursuant to a different theory of injury, the group has not 

advanced one. ALDF thus fails to establish standing to pursue 

the first of its two claims. 

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C. 

We also conclude that ALDF lacks standing to pursue its 

second claim, challenging FSIS’s ostensible policy of 

declining to evaluate the graphics on any poultry-product 

labels. ALDF again stumbles on the actual-or-imminent prong 

of the injury-in-fact requirement. 

1. 

ALDF claims that Mastracco is injured by FSIS’s alleged 

policy of not reviewing the imagery on poultry-product labels. 

ALDF’s theory is that, while Mastracco is “compelled” to 

continue purchasing chicken breasts for her dog, she, as a result 

of FSIS’s alleged policy, “suffer[s] a lack of confidence in 

whether any chicken labels” are accurate. Am. Compl. ¶ 34 

(J.A. 61). That is, because of FSIS’s ostensible policy, 

Mastracco cannot purchase chicken and “know[]” with 

“confidence . . . how the animals were raised.” See id. ¶ 36 

(J.A. 61). 

The district court found that injury insufficiently concrete. 

Animal Legal Def. Fund, 640 F. Supp. 3d at 150–51. The court 

believed that the sole injury supported by the complaint’s 

allegations is a psychic harm from disagreement with FSIS’s 

alleged policy. See id. We, however, understand the complaint 

to allege more than just that narrow type of harm. 

ALDF contends that FSIS’s asserted failure to review 

graphics on poultry labels prevents her from acting in accord 

with her sincerely held ethical beliefs: Mastracco must 

continue buying chicken for her dog, but FSIS’s allegedly 

unlawful policy prevents her from confidently making 

purchasing decisions that she believes are ethical. See Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 34, 36 (J.A. 61). She thus desires information with 

which she can make an informed purchasing decision, and the 

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“information deficit” created by FSIS’s policy “hinder[s] [her] 

ability” to do so. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 442. That is the sort 

of “downstream consequence[]” that can establish Article III 

standing. See id. (quoting Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 

Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 1004 (11th Cir. 2020)). 

Nor would relying on the graphics of non-Fresh Line 

products result in a self-inflicted injury. True, a premise of 

ALDF’s complaint is that the graphics on all poultry-product 

labels are unreliable insofar as they are unreviewed by FSIS. 

But ALDF does not allege that Mastracco thus knows all such 

graphics are necessarily inaccurate, and there is no cause to so 

assume. For all she knows, companies other than Perdue might 

accurately portray birds’ living conditions in graphics on 

product labels. She accordingly may reasonably believe some 

non-Fresh Line graphics are accurate, but she cannot know for 

sure because, according to ALDF, FSIS fails to review them as 

required. So, while Mastracco’s future reliance on the Fresh 

Line labels she knows to be inaccurate would comprise a selfinflicted injury, see supra Section II.B.2, her reliance on other

unreviewed—but potentially accurate—graphics would not. 

The government, though, argues that Mastracco’s reliance 

on such graphics would amount to a self-inflicted injury 

because she can disregard graphics and instead consult a label’s 

written statements. We disagree. It might be reasonable in 

some circumstances to expect consumers to “grasp an easy 

means for alleviating [their] alleged uncertainty.” See 

Gonzales, 468 F.3d at 831. But see Williams v. Gerber Prods. 

Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2008); Spann v. Colonial 

Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 28–29 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Here, 

however, it is not evident that a label’s written representations 

constitute an “easy means” for Mastracco to gain the 

information she desires. We do not know the extent to which 

poultry-product labels will contain written claims that speak to 

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Mastracco’s ethical concerns (and potentially override any 

graphic-caused confusion) by addressing whether the birds 

were “humanely raised.” A seemingly relevant written claim, 

moreover, would not necessarily clarify things for her. Indeed, 

the complaint indicates that the words “cage free” on Fresh 

Line labels furthered her misperception that the birds “roamed 

freely on pasture.” Am. Compl. ¶ 32 (J.A. 60). So even 

assuming it might be reasonable to expect a consumer like 

Mastracco to turn away from graphic illustrations and look 

instead at written statements, we cannot say that her doing so 

would “alleviat[e] [her] alleged uncertainty” about the birds’ 

living conditions. Gonzales, 468 F.3d at 831. 

2. 

While ALDF alleges a concrete injury, it fails to show that 

the injury is ongoing or imminent. For Mastracco to be injured 

by FSIS’s failure to review the graphics on poultry-product 

labels, she must encounter labels that graphically represent 

birds’ living conditions. And because, as we have explained, 

ALDF has not shown how Mastracco could be harmed again 

by the labels for Fresh Line chicken, the labels causing her 

future injury must be ones for competing products. But the 

complaint contains no allegation that Perdue or any competitor 

currently markets or will market any chicken product bearing 

graphics depicting chickens’ living conditions. We then must 

accept the possibility that there are no such products. And 

because ALDF’s failure to allege the existence of even a single 

non-Fresh Line product capable of harming Mastracco means 

that any prospective injury is necessarily hypothetical, we need 

not decide just how prevalent such non-Fresh Line products 

would have to be for Mastracco to face an imminent—that is, 

a substantially probable—injury. See Sierra Club v. Jewell, 

764 F.3d at 7. 

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ALDF errs in contending that its complaint does allege the 

existence of non-Fresh Line products that graphically depict 

chickens’ living conditions. ALDF focuses on its allegation 

that Mastracco “will continue to suffer a lack of confidence in 

whether any chicken labels convey accurate descriptions of the 

product’s animal raising conditions.” Am. Compl. ¶ 34 (J.A. 

61). According to ALDF, “[t]he word ‘any’ includes both 

Perdue Fresh Line products and all other chicken products on 

the market.” ALDF Reply Br. 6. We are unconvinced. That 

sentence of the complaint asserts only that if there are nonFresh Line labels that graphically depict birds’ living 

conditions, Mastracco would distrust them, just as she distrusts 

Fresh Line labels. The sentence does not allege that such nonFresh Line labels actually exist in the first place.

ALDF also asserts that “a walk down the meat aisle at any 

grocery store shows that brands other than Perdue use imagery 

depicting chickens on their chicken breast labels.” Id. at 7. 

That may be the case, but to matter, the imagery would need to 

make a representation about the birds’ living conditions. And 

regardless, it is not enough for ALDF to contend as much in its 

briefing in our court: for purposes of establishing standing, we 

cannot “credit an assertion in a brief as if it were alleged in a 

pleading.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d at 21. 

Based on the facts ALDF has pleaded in the complaint, we 

do not doubt that Mastracco will find herself in the meat section 

of her grocer because she needs to purchase chicken breasts for 

her dog. Nor do we doubt that she will seek out a humanely 

raised product and, if presented with a non-Fresh Line label 

that graphically depicts birds’ living conditions, might rely on 

that imagery to inform her choice. But the complaint gives no 

reason to infer that such a label even exists. In that light, we 

cannot say it is possible—much less substantially likely—that 

USCA Case #23-5009 Document #2069158 Filed: 08/09/2024 Page 17 of 21
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Mastracco will be injured by FSIS’s ostensible policy. ALDF 

thus fails to demonstrate standing for its second claim. 

* * * * * 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal without prejudice of ALDF’s complaint. 

So ordered.

USCA Case #23-5009 Document #2069158 Filed: 08/09/2024 Page 18 of 21
KATSAS, Circuit Judge, concurring: The claims in this 

case target two different actions by the Department of 

Agriculture: (1) its approval of an allegedly misleading label 

for Perdue Fresh Line poultry products; and (2) its alleged 

policy of refusing to review graphics on the labels of all other 

poultry products. As the Court explains, the standing of the

Animal Legal Defense Fund to raise these claims depends on 

the standing of its member Marie Mastracco. As to the first 

claim, her alleged injury to support prospective relief is selfinflicted; she knows that Fresh Line birds are not raised 

outdoors so, going forward, she cannot rely on any contrary 

suggestion from the label. As to the second claim, Mastracco’s 

alleged injury is speculative; ALDF has not alleged that any 

poultry products besides Fresh Line contain graphic images 

making factual assertions about the birds’ living conditions. 

On these points, the Court’s analysis is spot-on.

I also agree that Mastracco’s alleged injury for the second 

claim is concrete enough to support her Article III standing, 

though that strikes me as a close question. In my view, a 

plaintiff suffers no concrete injury from receiving misleading 

information that fails to mislead her. See Trichell v. Midland 

Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 1005 (11th Cir. 2020). From 

that premise, it would be a small step to conclude that a plaintiff 

likewise suffers no concrete injury from receiving unreliable 

information on which she does not rely. Nonetheless, I am 

ultimately persuaded by the Court’s concreteness analysis. 

Mastracco alleges an entitlement to receive from the 

government certain information that it has failed to provide—

a stamp of approval for graphic images that the government 

deems to be not misleading. And Mastracco further alleges that 

this information, if provided, would assist her in deciding 

which poultry products to buy for her dog. This seems enough 

to establish a concrete informational injury under TransUnion 

LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 441–42 (2021), and Trichell, 

964 F.3d at 1004.

USCA Case #23-5009 Document #2069158 Filed: 08/09/2024 Page 19 of 21
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Nonetheless, I remain skeptical about the second claim 

even apart from Mastracco’s failure to show imminence. First, 

if her alleged injury is an “information deficit” about how birds 

are treated, see TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 442; ante at 14–15, 

establishing redressability would require an alleged affirmative 

entitlement to receive this information, as opposed to just an 

entitlement to be free from any misleading information, see 21 

U.S.C. § 457(c). And if there were no such affirmative 

entitlement, the claim would fail on the merits.

Second, it seems to me doubtful that cartoons like the one 

at issue, see ante at 4, make any representation about how birds 

are raised. But for standing purposes, what matters is how 

Mastracco reacts to these cartoons, and the complaint does 

allege that she understands them to make factual 

representations. In reviewing a jurisdictional dismissal based 

on asserted shortcomings in the complaint itself, we must 

assume the truth of that allegation. See Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. 

FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011). And we must 

assume that such cartoons are also misleading to reasonable 

viewers—a question that goes only to the merits.

Third, I think Mastracco’s injury would be self-inflicted if 

she credited a cartoon over specific factual information on the 

label about how birds are raised. See Nat’l Family Planning &

Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). But the governing statute does not require labels to 

include such information. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 453(h), 457. The 

complaint does not allege that sellers of poultry products 

routinely include it. Nor does the government seriously 

contend as much. For these reasons, I agree with the Court that 

we cannot, at this stage of the case, deem Mastracco’s alleged

injury to be self-inflicted. Ante at 15–16.

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Fourth, ALDF seeks to challenge USDA’s alleged pattern 

of not reviewing any graphic images on the packaging of any 

poultry products besides those sold under the Fresh Line brand. 

But the Administrative Procedure Act requires plaintiffs to 

focus their claims on “discrete” as opposed to “programmatic” 

agency actions. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 

55, 64 (2004); see Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 

891–94 (1990); Am. Forest Res. Council v. United States, 77 

F.4th 787, 804–05 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Here, ALDF’s pattern 

claim seems to fall on the programmatic side of that line. But 

the government did not raise this objection, which goes to the 

APA’s non-jurisdictional requirement of reviewable “agency 

action” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704.

Because I do not regard these observations as inconsistent 

with the Court’s opinion, I join it in full.

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