Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00156/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00156-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loadholt
Defendant
Claudell Earl Martin
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLAUDELL EARL MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

LOADHOLT, 

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:10-cv-00156-LJO-MJS (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR DISMISSAL OF ACTION WITH

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM

(ECF NO. 19)

THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE

SCREENING ORDER

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 1, 2010, Plaintiff Claudell Earl Martin, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has declined Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Req. for

Reassignment, ECF No. 5.) 

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The Court previously screened Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismissed it for failure to

state a claim, but granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint (Order Dismissing,

ECF No. 15.) The First Amended Complaint (First Am. Compl., ECF No. 19) is now before

the Court for screening. 

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that ... the action or appeal ... fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia

Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not

itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal

rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989).

III. SUMMARY OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint includes as its sole claim a renewal of the First

Amendment retaliation claim asserted in his original Complaint. He repeats factual

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allegations that on or about May 6, 2008 he filed a prison grievance against Defendant

Loadholt, a medical doctor at Corcoran State Prison, (First Am. Compl. at 9) regarding a

change in his cholesterol medication (Id. at 15). “[S]omedays after that” Defendant 1

Loadholt summoned him, became irate that Plaintiff had filed a grievance against her (Id.

at 15) left the room and returned stating “I told you, you were being narrow-minded. We

can do this! So now you will pick your cholesterol medication up at the window everyday.”

(Id. at 9-10.) When Plaintiff asked why he would be no longer able to keep this medication

on his person, Defendant Loadholt replied “you don’t get it, we can do what we like with

your medication; now, you will come to the window and take your cholesterol medication.”

(Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges the pill window restriction was arbitrary and contrary to prison

regulations and an adverse action taken against him by Defendant Loadholt in retaliation 2

for his grievance violating his First Amendment rights. (Id. at 4, 9-10.) 

Plaintiff subsequently grieved this retaliatory requirement (Id. at 17, 24-25). His

appeal was granted in October 2008 and he was allowed to keep his cholesterol

medication on his person. (Id. at 29.)

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.

at 4.) 

///////

///////

Variously “some weeks later ....” (First. Am. Compl. at 32.) 1

Plaintiff cites to Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3004 (Rights and Respect of Others) and 3351 2

(Inmate Refusal of Treatment).

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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Pleading Requirements Generally

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245

(9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief ....“ Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff

must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible

on its face.’“ Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant

committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal

conclusions are not. Id. at 1949–50.

B. Retaliation

Plaintiff reiterates, but does not add to, the factual allegations of retaliation

contained in his original Complaint. He claims that Defendant retaliated for his May 6,

2008 grievance by dispensing his cholesterol medication at the pill window rather than

allowing him to keep this medication with him.

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

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inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th

Cir. 2005); accord Silva v. DiVittorio, 685 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011).

For the reasons noted in the Court’s previous screening order, Plaintiff has satisfied

the second, third and fifth elements of retaliation. He has shown through circumstantial

evidence that his May 6th grievance, protected conduct under the First Amendment, was

a “‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the defendant's alleged retaliatory conduct.” Id.

(quoting Sorrano's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)). He also

has alleged facts plausibly showing that “the prison authorities' retaliatory action did not

advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution or was not tailored narrowly enough

to achieve such goals.” Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532. In fact the pill window restriction was

eliminated approximately four months after being instituted.

However, Plaintiff has not successfully amended to allege facts plausibly showing

the first and fourth elements of his retaliation claim. He was advised in the Court’s previous

Order that the alleged retaliatory adverse action, the pill window restriction, reflected only

de minimis harm and not a sufficient basis for a cognizable retaliation claim . As noted, 3

the Court could not envision how the inconvenience of having to pick up medicine, even

if a result of a retaliatory motive, could be significant enough to create a constitutional

violation. (Order Dismissing at 10.)

The First Amended Complaint suffers from the same defect. There is nothing before

See Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 2006) (De minimis harm is not sufficient to

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show “adverse action”).

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the Court suggesting that the procedure constituted anything more than a mere

inconvenience lasting only a relatively brief period. The prison regulations cited in the First

Amended Complaint, dealing with “mutual respect” and “inmate refusal of medical

treatment” are not factually or legally relevant to Plaintiff’s claimed adverse action. Plaintiff

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again has failed to satisfy the first element of his retaliation claim. He also fails to plausibly

allege the fourth element of retaliation because the window restriction would not chill a

person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.

Based on the record in this case and the absence of any indication that Plaintiff can

successfully amend, further leave to amend is not warranted. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996)) (denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of

discretion where further amendment would be futile); see also Robinson v. California Bd.

of Prison Terms, 997 F.Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Since plaintiff has not, and

can not, state a claim containing an arguable basis in law, this action should be dismissed

without leave to amend; any amendment would be futile.”) (citing Newland v. Dalton, 81

F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1996)).

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Further leave to amend would be futile and is not warranted. Accordingly, it is

RECOMMENDED that this matter be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE by the District

Judge.

See supra note 2. A prison official’s mere violation of a prison regulation is not a constitutional 4

violation. Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 779 (5th Cir. 2000), (citing Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235,

1251-52 (5th Cir. 1989).

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These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any

party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10)

days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2012 /s/Michael J. Seng 

ci4d6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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