Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01394/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01394-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Blue Calypso, LLC.
Appellant
Groupon, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BLUE CALYPSO, LLC,

Appellant

v. 

GROUPON, INC.,

Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1391, 2015-1393, 2015-1394

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. 

CBM2013-00033, CBM2013-00034. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

GROUPON, INC.,

Appellant

v. 

BLUE CALYPSO, LLC,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1396

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. CBM2013-

00044. 

Case: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 1 Filed: 03/01/2016
2 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

BLUE CALYPSO, LLC,

Appellant

v. 

GROUPON, INC.,

Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1397, 2015-1398

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 

CBM2013-00046. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

BLUE CALYPSO, LLC,

Appellant

v. 

GROUPON, INC.,

Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1399, 2015-1401

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 

CBM2013-00035.

 ______________________ 

Decided: March 1, 2016 

______________________ 

Case: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 2 Filed: 03/01/2016
BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 3

 DAVID BRANDON CONRAD, Fish & Richardson P.C., 

Dallas, TX, argued for appellant. Also represented by 

CARL EDWARD BRUCE; JOHN C. PHILLIPS, San Diego, CA; 

JOHN A. DRAGSETH, Minneapolis, MN.

 JEANNE MARIE GILLS, Foley & Lardner LLP, Chicago, 

IL, argued for appellee and cross-appellant. Also represented by JASON JON KEENER, AARON JACOB WEINZIERL. 

 KAKOLI CAPRIHAN, Office of the Solicitor, United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, 

argued for intervenor Michelle K. Lee. Also represented 

by THOMAS W. KRAUSE, SCOTT WEIDENFELLER, BENJAMIN 

T. HICKMAN. 

______________________ 

Before REYNA, SCHALL, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge CHEN. 

Opinion dissenting-in-part filed by Circuit Judge SCHALL. 

CHEN, Circuit Judge. 

These related appeals arise from five Covered Business Method (CBM) reviews of five patents owned by Blue 

Calypso, LLC (Blue Calypso): U.S. Patent No. 7,664,516 

(the ’516 patent), U.S. Patent No. 8,155,679 (the ’679 

patent), U.S. Patent No. 8,457,670 (the ’670 patent), U.S. 

Patent No. 8,438,055 (the ’055 patent), and U.S. Patent 

No. 8,452,646 (the ’646 patent) (collectively, the Blue 

Calypso Patents). The United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) 

granted the petitions, filed by Groupon, Inc. (Groupon),

for review under the transitional program for covered 

business method patents. In its final written decisions, 

the Board found various claims of the Blue Calypso Patents unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102. The Board 

further found certain claims of the ’516 patent unpatentCase: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 3 Filed: 03/01/2016
4 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

able under § 112. In addition, the Board rejected 

Groupon’s remaining argument that additional claims

were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. 

Blue Calypso now appeals the Board’s decisions to review its patents, asserting that they are not “covered 

business method” patents. Blue Calypso also appeals the 

Board’s unpatentability determinations. In its crossappeal, Groupon contends that the Board erred in rejecting its obviousness arguments. For the reasons stated in 

this opinion, we affirm-in-part and reverse-in-part.

BACKGROUND

I 

The Blue Calypso Patents are all related and generally describe a peer-to-peer advertising system that uses 

mobile communication devices. The ’516 patent1 explains 

how advertising can be made to be more effective, compared to traditional broadcast advertising, when an 

advertiser enlists one of its customers to electronically 

forward advertisements to his like-minded peers. See ’516 

patent, 1:31–35. The ’516 patent further discloses the use 

of a “subsidy program” to induce customers (“subscribers”) 

to increase exposure of an advertisement. Id., Abstract. 

An advertiser using this system may customize its subsi-

 

1 The ’516 patent was the first filed. The ’679 patent 

issued as a continuation-in-part of the application that 

issued as the ’516 patent. The remaining three patents 

claim priority to the application that issued as the ’679 

patent: the ’670 patent (continuation), the ’055 patent 

(continuation-in-part); and the ’646 patent (continuationin-part). Unless stated otherwise, all citations to the 

record and the parties’ briefs refer to the documents filed 

in Blue Calypso’s appeal, and Groupon’s cross-appeal, of 

the Board’s decision relating to the ’516 patent, Case Nos. 

2015-1399 and 2015-1401.

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 5

dy program by specifying the nature of the subsidy or 

incentive—e.g., product discounts or rewards points—and 

by identifying necessary demographic criteria that a user 

must meet before being eligible for the advertiser’s subsidy program. Id. at 3:21–27; see also id. at 3:15–20. A

user of a mobile communication device can then subscribe 

to that program by creating a profile that contains demographic information. Id. at 4:11–16. After the subscribers create their profiles, the advertiser can then 

determine which subscribers satisfy the advertiser’s 

criteria and are therefore eligible for the subsidy program. 

Id. at 4:33–35. Each subscriber may then select from the 

subsidy programs for which it qualified. Id. at 4:40–46. 

Only after this mutual (“bidirectional”) selection does an 

advertiser transmit advertisements to that subscriber. 

Id. at 4:49–5:16. The advertisement includes a link, 

which, when executed, connects the subscriber to the 

advertiser’s website for additional information, offers, or 

coupons. Id. at 5:16–22. The subscriber, using a “source 

communication device” may then forward this advertisement to his peer’s “destination communication device.” 

Id. at 2:30–37. 

Neither party argues the challenged claims separately. We therefore use claim 2 of the ’516 patent as representative: 

2. A method for providing access to an advertisement from an advertiser to a source communication device possessed by a subscriber and 

distributing the access to the advertisement from 

the source communication device to a destination 

communication device possessed by a recipient, 

wherein the destination communication device is 

compatible with the source communication device, 

and the recipient having a relationship to the subscriber, the method comprising the steps of:

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6 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

comparing a desired demographic profile to a subscriber demographic profile to derive a match; 

establishing a bi-lateral endorsement between the 

subscriber and the advertiser; providing a subsidy 

program to the subscriber based on the match; 

sending a token related to the advertisement to the 

source communication device;

activating an endorsement manager in the source 

communication device; initiating a communication 

session between the source communication device 

and the destination communication device;

transmitting a message, including the token, from 

the source communication device to the destination communication device contemporaneously 

with the communication session; and

recognizing a subsidy, according to the subsidy 

program, for the subscriber after a termination of 

the communication session.

Id. at 7:45–8:3 (claim 2) (emphases added). 

II

Groupon petitioned the Board for CBM review of the 

Blue Calypso Patents under § 18(a) of the Leahy-Smith 

America Invents Act (AIA). Groupon asserted that the 

claims were unpatentable under either 35 U.S.C. § 102 or 

§ 103. In addition, Groupon asserted that a number of 

claims of the ’516 patent were unpatentable for failing to 

satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112. After examining the claims, the Board concluded 

that they met the statutory definition of a “covered business method patent,” granted the petition, and instituted 

review.

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 7

In its final written decisions, the Board found that 

claims 2–15, 20–23, and 29 of the ’516 patent; claims 7–16 

and 23–27 of the ’679 patent; claims 1–5 of the ’670 patent; and claims 1, 4–6, 10, and 14 of the ’055 patent were 

all anticipated by United States Patent Application 

Publication No. 2002/0169835 (Paul). In addition, the 

Board found that claims 1–19, 23–25, and 29 of the ’516 

patent were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112 as lacking adequate written description. The Board then rejected Groupon’s assertions that claims 4–9 of the ’646 

patent, as well as additional claims from the remaining 

four patents, were unpatentable as anticipated or obvious 

in light of a report published on a webpage by a graduate 

student at the University of Maryland Baltimore County 

Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering (Ratsimor). The Board found that Groupon failed to 

prove that Ratsimor was sufficiently publicly available to 

qualify as prior art.

Blue Calypso filed a timely appeal from the Board’s 

decision, Groupon filed a cross-appeal, and the Director 

intervened for the limited purpose of defending the 

Board’s determination that the challenged patent claims 

are “covered business methods.” We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s conclusions of law de novo and 

its findings of fact for substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(E); In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 

2007). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 217 (1938).

In this appeal, Blue Calypso raises three primary arguments. First, Blue Calypso argues that the Board 

should not have conducted CBM review of the patents at 

issue because, in Blue Calypso’s view, they do not claim 

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8 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

“covered business methods.” Second, Blue Calypso asserts that the Board incorrectly found that Paul anticipated many of Blue Calypso’s patent claims. Finally, 

Blue Calypso objects to the Board’s finding that the 

contested claims of the ’055 were unpatentable for lacking

written description support. In its cross-appeal, Groupon 

contends that the Board erred in concluding that Ratsimor was not prior art. 

I. Eligibility for CBM Review

Blue Calypso begins by arguing that the PTO and the 

Board exceeded their statutory authority by interpreting 

the statutory CBM definition in an overly broad way that 

improperly sweeps in Blue Calypso’s patents. In Blue 

Calypso’s view, the Board never should have instituted 

the CBM review of its patents. Although the Board’s 

decision to institute a CBM review is, per the AIA, “final 

and nonappealable,” see AIA § 18(a)(1); 35 U.S.C. § 324(e), 

we have held that the question of whether a challenged 

patent claim is a CBM relates to the Board’s authority to 

issue a final decision in a CBM review. Versata Dev. Grp., 

Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc. (Versata II), 793 F.3d 1306, 1318-23 

(Fed. Cir. 2015). Thus, because we have jurisdiction to 

review the Board’s final decisions in CBM reviews, see 

AIA § 18(a)(1); 35 U.S.C. § 329, the AIA does not preclude 

us from reviewing the Board’s conclusion that the challenged patent claims are “covered business methods” that 

lack any “technological invention,” Versata II, 793 F.3d at 

1323. 

A 

CBM review is limited to patents “that claim[] a 

method or corresponding apparatus for performing data 

processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or 

service, except that the term does not include patents for 

technological inventions.” AIA § 18(d)(1). Blue Calypso

asserts that its patents are not CBM patents because they 

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 9

relate to a method for managing and distributing advertising content, which is not “a financial product or service” 

that traditionally originated in the financial sector, e.g., 

banks, brokerages, holding companies and insurance 

firms. These arguments are foreclosed by our recent 

decisions in Versata II and in SightSound Techs., LLC v. 

Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

In Versata II, we examined the statutory definition of 

CBM patents, the relevant legislative history, and the 

PTO’s statements in its Notice of Final Rulemaking and 

concluded that the statute “on its face covers a wide range 

of finance-related activities” and “[t]he statutory definition makes no reference to financial institutions as such, 

and does not limit itself only to those institutions.” 793 

F.3d at 1325. In reaching this conclusion we referred to

the PTO’s Notice of Final Rulemaking, which observed 

that “the legislative history supported the proposition 

that the definition [of CBM] be broadly interpreted to 

‘encompass patents claiming activities that are financial 

in nature, incidental to a financial activity or complementary to a financial activity.’” Id. at 1324 (quoting Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents—

Definitions of Covered Business Method Patent and 

Technological Invention, 77 Fed. Reg. 48734, 48735 (Aug. 

14, 2012)). More recently, in SightSound, we agreed with 

the Board that “a ‘financial activity’ not directed to money 

management or banking can constitute a ‘financial product or service’ within the meaning of the statute.” 809 

F.3d at 1315. Here, the Board declined to limit the application of CBM review to patent claims tied to the financial sector. This determination is consistent with our 

recent case law. 

Blue Calypso alternatively contends that the challenged claims fall within the technological invention 

exception for CBM review because the claims are computer-based and contemplate hardware, software, a network, 

and communication devices. Versata II also addressed the 

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10 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

technological inventions exception. Congress created the 

technological inventions exception in § 18(d)(1), but 

expressly delegated authority to the PTO to provide a 

definition of “technological inventions” that would be 

excluded from CBM review. AIA § 18(d)(2) (“[T]he Director shall issue regulations for determining whether a 

patent is for a technological invention.”). In Versata II, 

we examined the resulting regulation, 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.301(b), which explains that a patent claims a technological invention if “the claimed subject matter as a whole 

recites a technological feature that is novel and unobvious 

over the prior art; and solves a technical problem using a 

technical solution.” 793 F.3d at 1326 (quoting 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.301(b)). We also turned to the PTO’s Office Patent 

Trial Practice Guide, which lists certain claim drafting 

techniques that are insufficient to render a patent a 

technological invention: “(1) mere ‘recitation of known 

technologies’; (2) ‘reciting the use of known prior art 

technology’; and (3) ‘combining prior art structures to 

achieve the normal, expected, or predictable results of 

that combination.’” Id. (quoting 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 

48764 (Aug. 14, 2012)). Ultimately, we rejected the 

argument that merely reciting the use of a computer 

would satisfy the technological invention exception, 

noting that “the presence of a general purpose computer 

to facilitate operations through uninventive steps does not 

change the fundamental character of an invention.” Id. at 

1327 (citing Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. 

Ct. 2347 (2014)); see also SightSound, 809 F.3d at 1315 

(holding that Versata II supports the conclusion that “a 

combination of known technologies does not amount to a 

‘technological invention’ within the meaning of the statute”). Accordingly, the Board correctly rejected Blue 

Calypso’s proposed interpretation of “technological invention.” 

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 11

B 

This leaves the question of whether the Board correctly applied the definitions of “covered business method” 

and “technological invention” to the Blue Calypso Patents. 

We review the Board’s reasoning under the arbitrary and 

capricious standard and its factual determinations under 

the substantial evidence standard. SightSound, 809 F.3d 

at 1315. 

1 

In determining that the Blue Calypso Patents are 

CBM patents, the Board reviewed the claims, noting, for 

example, claim 1’s recitation of “subsidizing the qualified 

subscriber according to the chosen subsidy program,” see 

’516 patent, 7:39–40 (claim 1). The Board construed the 

claim term “subsidy” as “financial assistance given by one 

to another.” Groupon, Inc. v. Blue Calypso, LLC, No. 

CBM2013-00035, 2013 WL 8538881, at *5 (PTAB Dec. 19, 

2013) (Institution Decision).2 The Board further observed 

 

2 The “subsidy” claim term is present in all challenged claims of the patents except the ’055 patent and 

the ’646 patent. Those claims instead refer to an incentive program. See ’055 patent, 15:9–10 (claim 1) (“incentivizing the first qualified subscriber according to the 

incentive program”); see also ’646 patent, 16:9–16 

(“transmitting an incentive program . . . for participation 

of the first qualified subscriber; and, incentivizing the 

first qualified subscriber . . . according to the incentive 

program”). Similar to “subsidy,” the Board construed 

“incentive” as “a reward provided to a subscriber based on 

an endorsement.” See Groupon, Inc. v. Blue Calypso, 

LLC, CBM 2013-00046, 2014 WL 7273565, at *5 (PTAB 

Dec. 17, 2014) (adopting the definition explicitly provided 

in the ’055 patent); see ’055 patent, 3:20–21 (“‘Incentive’: a 

reward provided to a subscriber based on an endorseCase: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 11 Filed: 03/01/2016
12 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

that the subsidy concept was “central to the claims” 

because “without the subsidy or subsidy program, there is 

no incentive for a subscriber to perform the other steps in 

the claims.” Id. at *7. Based on this understanding, the 

Board concluded that the challenged claims were financial 

in nature and therefore subject to CBM review under 

§ 18(d)(1). The Board reiterated this reasoning in its final 

written decision. 

We agree. Significantly, Blue Calypso has not challenged the Board’s interpretation of subsidy as “financial 

assistance given by one to another.” Thus, under this 

unchallenged interpretation, the claims of the Blue Calypso Patents are directed to methods in which advertisers financially induce “subscribers” to assist their 

advertising efforts. 

In its Reply Brief, Blue Calypso asserts that we 

should reverse because the claims of the Blue Calypso 

Patents are not as “blatantly money-related” as the patent at issue in Versata II. To support this argument, 

Blue Calypso points to the titles of the Blue Calypso

Patents and the title of the patent in Versata II. This 

argument fails, however, because § 18(d)(1) directs us to 

examine the claims when deciding whether a patent is a 

CBM patent. Blue Calypso also argues that, based on the 

Blue Calypso Patents’ specifications, the “subsidy” recited 

in the claims need not be financial in nature. This argument is also unsuccessful. To the extent that Blue Calypso is objecting to the Board’s interpretation of the 

“subsidy” claim term, Blue Calypso has waived that 

argument by failing to challenge the Board’s claim con-

 

ment.”). This does not alter our conclusion that the Board 

correctly concluded that the challenged claims are eligible 

for CBM review. As the Board acknowledged, “the ’055 

patent repeatedly, and almost exclusively discloses ‘incentive’ and ‘incentive program’ in a financial context.” Id. 

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 13

struction in its opening brief.3 See Becton Dickinson & 

Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 

(“[A]n issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief 

. . . is waived.”). 

We are also unpersuaded by Blue Calypso’s argument 

that the Board has acted in an arbitrary or capricious 

manner through an “unpredictable application” of the 

CBM definition. Appellant Reply Br. 3. For this argument, Blue Calypso relies on a handful of Board decisions 

declining to institute CBM review on patents unrelated to 

the Blue Calypso Patents. See FedEx Corp. v. Katz Tech. 

Licensing, L.P., CBM2015-00053 (PTAB June 29, 2015); 

Sega of Am., Inc. v. Uniloc USA, Inc., CBM2014-00183, 

2015 WL 1090176 (PTAB Mar. 10, 2015); Salesforce.com, 

Inc. v. Applications in Internet Time LLC, CBM2014-

00168 (PTAB Feb. 2, 2015); J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. v. 

Intellectual Ventures II LLC, CBM 2014-00160 (Jan. 29, 

2015). Contrary to Blue Calypso’s argument, each of 

these cases properly focuses on the claim language at 

issue and, finding nothing explicitly or inherently financial in the construed claim language, declines to institute 

CBM review. In contrast, the claims at issue in the 

instant case have an express financial component in the 

form of a subsidy, or financial inducement, that encourages consumers to participate in the distribution of advertisements. As the Board noted, the subsidy is central to 

the operation of the claimed invention.

 

3 Blue Calypso essentially argues that the specification recites “coupons” and “reward codes” as the potential 

subsidy in the subsidy program and that these types of 

subsidies are not financial. Even to the extent that we 

could consider Blue Calypso’s claim construction argument, we find no error in the Board’s conclusion that 

these also qualify as “financial assistance given by one to 

another.”

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14 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

Accordingly, none of Blue Calypso’s arguments persuades us that the Board’s reasoning is arbitrary or 

capricious or that its findings are not supported by substantial evidence. We therefore affirm the Board’s conclusion that the challenged claims of the Blue Calypso 

Patents meet the statutory definition of CBM patent.

2 

Blue Calypso next contends that the claims represent 

technological inventions because they are directed to a 

solution that remedies technological limitations of traditional broadcast advertising. We disagree. Claim 1 of the 

’516 patent, for example, recites “a system comprising a 

network, a source communication device, a destination 

communication device and an intermediary connected to 

the network.” ’516 patent, 7:8–10. These elements are 

nothing more than general computer system components 

used to carry out the claimed process of incentivizing 

consumers to forward advertisement campaigns to their 

peers’ “destination communication device[s].” Blue Calypso has not pointed to any technological aspect in the 

claims that rises above the general and conventional. 

Thus, just as in Versata II, conventional computer components cannot change the fundamental character of Blue 

Calypso’s claims. 

***** 

Because the Board’s decisions that the patents are 

CBM patents that do not claim a technological invention

are not arbitrary or capricious and are supported by 

substantial evidence, we conclude that the Board acted 

within its authority in conducting CBM review of the 

challenged claims of the Blue Calypso Patents.

II. Anticipation

Blue Calypso next argues that the Board erred in 

finding that Paul anticipates many of Blue Calypso’s 

claims. Anticipation is a question of fact that we review 

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 15

for substantial evidence. Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll 

Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b),4 a prior art reference will 

anticipate if it “disclose[s] each and every element of the 

claimed invention . . . arranged or combined in the same 

way as in the claim.” In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “However, a reference can anticipate a claim 

even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations 

arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill

in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ 

the claimed arrangement or combination.” Kennametal, 

780 F.3d at 1381 (quoting In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 

681 (C.C.P.A. 1962)). 

In finding that Paul anticipates several of Blue Calypso’s patent claims, the Board made numerous factual 

determinations. First, the Board found that Paul discloses “an Internet-based e-mail communications system that 

broadcasts communications to members.” Groupon, Inc. 

v. Blue Calypso, LLC, CBM 2013-00035, 2014 WL 

7273563, at *16 (PTAB Dec. 17, 2014) (Final Written 

Decision). The Board further explained that this communications system consisted of numerous “tools,” including 

one that “allows the users to develop and manage an email direct marketing campaign that sends personalized 

e-mail messages to members whose member records 

match parameters identified for the campaign,” and 

another tool that “provides a ‘refer a friend’ advertising 

campaign that provides a coupon to a member who is 

successful in referring a friend to the web site of the 

business.” Id. Both of these tools incorporated the use of 

 

4 Because the claims at issue in this case have effective filing dates prior to March 16, 2013, we apply the 

pre-AIA § 102(b).

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16 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

a hyperlink for viewers to click to access the advertising 

website. 

Blue Calypso does not dispute that Paul discloses 

both of these tools or that Paul teaches the other elements 

in the claims of the Blue Calypso Patents.5 Instead, Blue 

Calypso argues only that these two tools—the targetedmarketing “campaigns” tool and the refer-a-friend tool—

are separate and distinct and that the Board’s anticipation finding erroneously combined these distinct tools

when such a combination is not explicitly found in Paul. 

Blue Calypso points to Figure 5 of Paul, which illustrates 

that the “campaigns” tool 108, used to create targeted 

marketing campaigns, is a separate, independent tool 

from the “refer a friend campaign” tool 126. Blue Calypso 

contends that this separation precludes combination of 

the two tools to arrive at the claimed invention.

 

5 Blue Calypso also does not argue any distinction 

between the numerous claims that the Board found 

unpatentable in view of Paul. 

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 17

Paul Reference, Figure 5 (annotations added).

The Board read Paul differently. The Board first disagreed with Blue Calypso’s characterization of Paul as 

disclosing multiple, separately isolated methods. The 

Board noted Paul’s disclosure that a user “is enabled to 

conduct direct marketing campaigns using a computer 

program generally identified as a ‘campaign manager’ 

herein.” Paul, ¶ 51. In addition, the Board pointed to 

Paul’s explanation that its system empowers users to 

“have the ability to create numerous types of e-mail 

campaigns, such as ‘refer a friend’ campaign, through the 

campaign manager program.” Id. ¶ 50. Based on these 

disclosures, the Board concluded that “the campaign 

manager computer program is a single computer program 

that provides tools options for the user to develop the 

campaigns.” Final Written Decision, at *17.

The Board then recognized that although Paul did not 

explicitly disclose an example of a particular campaign 

that uses the “campaigns” and “refer a friend campaign” 

tools together, it did contemplate combining the disclosed 

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18 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

functionalities. In particular, the Board relied on Paul’s 

disclosure that the various disclosed features of Paul’s 

invention “may be produced in a single computer system 

having . . . elements or means combining the performance 

of any of the functions or steps disclosed or claimed . . . .” 

Paul, ¶ 29 (emphasis added). Thus, the Board concluded 

that 

as different tool options of the campaign manager 

in the e-mail communications system, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the direct e-mail campaign tool option was to be used in 

conjunction with the “refer-a-friend” campaign 

tool option to send “refer-a-friend” email message 

incentives to a subset of the members based on 

member demographic characteristics. To determine otherwise would require a finding that one 

of ordinary skill in the art, when reading Paul, 

would come to the conclusion that the only option 

would be to send a “refer-a-friend” email to all 

members. We do not find that one of ordinary skill 

in the art would have understood Paul to be so restrictive. 

Final Written Decision, at *18. The Board also observed 

that the declaration of Groupon’s expert, Dr. Joshi, also 

supported this conclusion. See Joint Appendix (J.A.) 

1643, ¶ 93 (opining that these disclosures in Paul established “that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand this to mean that a [user] can use the campaign 

manager . . . in order to send targeted referral emails”). 

On appeal, Blue Calypso asserts that the Board’s 

analysis runs contrary to our case law requiring that the 

purportedly anticipatory reference must not only disclose 

all elements of the claim, but must also disclose those 

elements “arranged as in the claim.” See, e.g., Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 

2008) (reversing a district court’s summary judgment of 

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 19

invalidity for anticipation because the defendant did not 

present any argument or evidence demonstrating that the 

reference contained any disclosure of the limitations 

arranged as in the claim). This case is distinguishable 

from Net MoneyIN because, in contrast to the reference in 

that case, Paul explicitly contemplates the combination of 

the disclosed functionalities. In addition, the Board 

reviewed expert testimony that supported its factual 

determination that one of skill in the art would read the 

reference as disclosing the ability to combine the tools to 

arrive at the invention recited in the Blue Calypso Patents. Both of these key factors were absent from Net 

MoneyIN. 

These distinctions demonstrate that the present case 

is more akin to our decision in Kennametal, where we 

recognized that “a reference can anticipate a claim even if 

it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in 

the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the 

claimed arrangement or combination.” 780 F.3d at 1381 

(quoting In re Petering, 301 F.2d at 681). The prior art 

reference in Kennametal disclosed a cutting tool assembled by combining different classes of materials with 

multiple options for each class. Id. at 1379–80. The 

disputed claims were directed to a specific combination of 

these materials disclosed in the reference. Id. at 1379. 

The specific combination recited in the claims of the 

disputed patent was not explicitly disclosed in the prior 

art reference. Id. The party challenging the claim’s 

patentability argued, and the Board accepted, that the 

reference anticipated each of the numerous possibilities 

that resulted from the permutations of the options disclosed in the reference. Id. at 1379–80. In affirming the 

Board’s anticipation finding, we noted that a reference 

need not always include an express discussion of the 

actual combination to anticipate. Id. at 1383. Instead, a 

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20 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

reference may still anticipate if that reference teaches 

that the disclosed components or functionalities may be 

combined and one of skill in the art would be able to 

implement the combination. Id.; see also Bristol-Myers 

Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1379 

(Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, in Kennametal, we found substantial evidence support for the Board’s finding that the 

reference anticipated the claims even without a particular

disclosure of the specific combination recited in the disputed claims. Id. 

Here, the Board found that Figure 5 of Paul, and the 

corresponding passages of the written description, disclose a limited number of tools. In addition, the Board 

found that, given Paul’s discussion of combining features 

disclosed therein, a skilled artisan would “at once envisage” the combination of two of the disclosed tools—refer-afriend and campaigns—to arrive at the system claimed in 

the Blue Calypso Patents. We agree. Just as in Kennametal, there is no suggestion here that one of skill in 

the art would not have the ability to use the direct e-mail 

campaign tool option in conjunction with the refer-afriend campaign tool to send refer-a-friend e-mail message 

incentives to a subset of the members based on member 

demographic characteristics. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, 

we affirm the Board’s determination that the disputed 

claims are anticipated by Paul.

III. Written Description

Blue Calypso also argues that the Board erred in finding claims 1–19, 23–25, and 29 of the ’516 patent unpatentable for failing to satisfy the written description 

Case: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 20 Filed: 03/01/2016
BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 21

requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.6 To adequately support 

the claims, the written description “must clearly allow 

persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the 

inventor invented what is claimed.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. 

Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 

banc) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

The written description requirement “plays a vital role in 

curtailing claims . . . that have not been invented, and 

thus cannot be described.” Id. at 1352. The Board’s 

determination that a patent claim is unpatentable for 

insufficient written description support is a question of 

fact that we review for substantial evidence. See id. at 

1355; In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 109 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 

(factual determinations by the Board are reviewed for 

substantial evidence).

Groupon argued that the term “endorsement tag” in 

independent claim 1 and the term “token” in independent 

claim 2 lack written description support. For example, 

claim 1 recites in relevant part 

providing an endorsement tag related to the at 

least one advertiser of the group of advertisers 

and linked with the advertising content; . . . 

receiving a signal from the recipient through execution of the endorsement tag to transmit the advertising content; and, 

transmitting the advertising content to the recipient.

’516 patent, 7:33–44 (emphases added). Similarly, claim 2 

recites in relevant part 

 

6 Because the claims at issue in this case have effective filing dates prior to March 16, 2013, we apply the 

pre-AIA § 112.

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22 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

sending a token related to the advertisement to 

the source communication device; . . . 

transmitting a message, including the token, from 

the source communication device to the destination communication device contemporaneously 

with the communication session . . . . 

Id. at 7:58–67 (emphases added). As noted by the Board, 

the parties agreed both terms should be construed as

“executable link, such as a hyperlink.”7

Before the Board, Groupon argued that these claim 

terms—“endorsement tag” and “token”—lacked written 

description support because the terms are absent from the 

written description of the ’516 patent. Blue Calypso, on 

the other hand, asserted that a skilled artisan would 

understand that these claim terms refer to an executable 

link and the written description specifically describes 

usage of an executable link in the same way that the 

claims recite using an “endorsement tag” or “token.” The 

 

7 Although the Board should have construed the 

terms at issue, see Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. 

Cardiac Sci. Operating Co., 590 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (explaining that a fact finder “must base its analysis of written description under § 112, ¶ 1 on proper claim 

construction” and remanding where the district court did 

not construe the terms at issue); In re Katz Interactive 

Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. 

Cir. 2011) (“claim construction is inherent in any written 

description analysis”), we need not determine if this was 

reversible error given that our resolution of this issue 

does not turn on construction. Moreover, the Board 

effectively acknowledged that the written description 

requirement would be met if the parties’ agreed-upon 

construction is accepted, and we do not readily discern 

any error in that construction.

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 23

Board responded to these arguments by first acknowledging that the specification need not explicitly “use the 

term[s] or otherwise describe exactly the subject matter 

claimed.” Final Written Description, at *21. Nevertheless, the Board ultimately rejected Blue Calypso’s argument and stated that

Patent Owner asserts further that the burden is 

on Petitioner to show lack of written description, 

and because Petitioner has only provided attorney 

argument, and no evidence, they cannot meet that 

burden. We are not persuaded, however, because 

Petitioner provided the most persuasive evidence of 

all; that the ’114 application[, the application that 

issued as the ’516 patent,] does not recite “endorsement tag” [or “token”]. 

Id. at *23 (emphasis added).

Blue Calypso now argues that the Board impermissibly elevated the fact that these terms are absent from the 

’516 patent’s written description. We agree.

The written description requirement is an important 

component of maintaining the integrity of our patent 

system. To accomplish this goal, § 112 mandates that the 

specification must contain a description of the claimed 

subject matter. Even so, when examining the written 

description for support for the claimed invention, we have 

held that the exact terms appearing in the claim “need 

not be used in haec verba.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, 

Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We are therefore troubled by the fact that the Board did not cite any 

evidence other than the fact that the terms were not 

present in the specification to support its finding. In fact, 

the only evidence that Groupon placed in the record to 

support unpatentability was Dr. Joshi’s declaration that 

“[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would not define the 

terms ‘endorsement tag,’ ‘token,’ and ‘link’ to necessarily 

have the same meaning” and that these terms have other 

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24 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

meanings in the art. J.A. 1658, ¶¶ 129–30. The Board 

did not cite this evidence in its final written decision. 

Moreover, even if the Board had relied on Dr. Joshi’s 

declaration, it would not provide substantial evidence 

support for the Board’s finding; Dr. Joshi’s opinion is 

abstract and untethered from the context provided by the 

’516 patent. Accordingly, we conclude that the Board 

placed undue weight on the absence of the terms in the 

specification.

Our conclusion that Groupon failed to carry its burden of demonstrating unpatentability under § 112 is 

further supported by the figures of the patent, the specification, and the claim language.8 See Lockwood, 107 F.3d 

at 1572 (explaining that the necessary support may be 

provided through the “words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set forth the claimed 

invention”). Figure 4 of the ’516 patent illustrates the 

process of formatting and transmitting an advertisement 

to a recipient. 

 

8 Neither the Board nor the parties provided any 

basis on which the outcome would be different for “endorsement tag” than for “token.” We therefore address 

the two terms together. 

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 25

’516 patent, Figure 4 (annotation added). Specifically, 

Figure 4, with its corresponding disclosure, explains that 

in step 66, “the recipient may click on the advertisement 

to link, via the Internet, to the advertiser’s or another 

designated website for additional information or further 

action.” Id. at 5:17–44. This disclosure corresponds to the 

steps in claim 1 where the system “provide[s] an endorsement tag related to the at least one advertiser . . . 

and linked with the advertising content” and then permits 

the “transmi[ssion of] the advertising content” after the 

recipient “execut[es] . . . the endorsement tag.” Id. at 

7:33–44. 

Despite this explanation in the written description, as 

well as the context provided in the claim itself (“links” 

“execut[es]”), Groupon argues that we can nevertheless 

affirm the Board’s finding. First, Groupon points to the 

term “link” in different claims (claims 25 and 27) and 

Case: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 25 Filed: 03/01/2016
26 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

contends that the doctrine of claim differentiation requires that “token” and “tag” must have a different definition. Claim 25 recites “[t]he method of claim 24 where the 

step of sending a text message to the destination communication device includes the additional step of sending an 

advertising link in the text message.” Id. at 10:47–50 

(emphasis added). Claim 27 recites “[t]he system of claim 

26 where the text message includes an active link.” Id. at 

10:53–54 (emphasis added). We recognize that, under our 

decision, the use of “link” in these claims would express 

the same concept as the use of “tag” and “token” in the 

challenged claims. But, as discussed above, the context in 

which “tag” and “token” are used demonstrates that the 

inventor intended these terms to refer to the same concept 

as “link” in claims 25 and 27: an executable link. As in 

Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., “this is simply a case where the patentee used 

different words to express similar concepts even though it 

may be confusing drafting practice.” 381 F.3d 1111, 1120 

(Fed. Cir. 2004).

Next, Groupon relies on the prosecution history of the 

’516 patent and notes that the terms “endorsement tag” 

and “token” were added after the examiner rejected the 

claims. The amendments to which Groupon points, 

however, consisted of much more than inserting the words 

“endorsement tag” and “token”; these words were inserted 

as part of an extensive re-write of all the claims in the 

application. As such, this observation has little bearing 

on our analysis. Finally, Groupon notes that shortly after 

these terms were added to the claims, the inventor filed a 

continuation-in-part application that included additional 

explanations related to tags and tokens. This too has 

little significance because it provides no insight into the 

relevant inquiry of whether the four corners of the ’516 

patent provide written description support for the claim 

terms at issue. We recognize that these arguments could 

be relevant if they were argued in the context of a claim 

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 27

construction dispute. However, Groupon agreed to a 

construction of these terms, and the Board effectively 

acknowledged that the written description is met under 

that construction. Groupon cannot now dispute a claim 

construction to which it previously agreed. See Abbott 

Labs. v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d 1343, 1352 

(Fed. Cir. 2003). When considered solely in the context of 

whether the claim terms are adequately supported by the 

written description, these arguments fail.

For these reasons, we conclude that the Board erred 

by giving improper weight to the mere fact that “tag” and 

“token” are absent from the text of the written description. In addition, none of Groupon’s arguments persuades 

us that the Board’s conclusion that the challenged claims 

are unpatentable under § 112 is nevertheless supported 

by substantial evidence. We therefore reverse the Board’s 

conclusion that these claims are unpatentable as lacking 

adequate written description support. 

IV. Public Availability of Ratsimor

In its cross-appeal, Groupon requests that we reverse

the Board’s decision that Ratsimor was not a printed 

publication and could not therefore be relied on to prove 

unpatentability. Ratsimor is a report co-authored by Dr. 

Olga Ratsimor who, at that time, was a graduate student 

in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering 

(Department) at the University of Maryland Baltimore 

County (UMBC). Dr. Ratsimor coauthored the report 

with other professors and students at UMBC, including 

Dr. Joshi, Groupon’s expert. In Ratsimor, the authors 

describe a program involving a software framework 

entitled “eNcentive,” which can be used to transmit 

advertising materials to users and allow those users to 

forward those advertisements to other users. The users 

who forward the advertisements are then rewarded with 

additional promotions and other compensation. Dr. 

Ratsimor made her report available via a hyperlink on the 

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28 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

personal webpage that she maintained while she was a 

student at UMBC.

Before the Board, Groupon argued that additional 

claims of the Blue Calypso Patents were unpatentable as 

anticipated or obvious in light of Ratsimor. Groupon 

asserted that Ratsimor was available via a hyperlink 

located on a personal webpage created by a graduate 

student before the critical date of the Blue Calypso Patents. According to Groupon, this reference was therefore 

a printed publication under § 102(b). The Board disagreed, concluding that even if Ratsimor was available on 

the internet, the evidence Groupon presented was insufficient to find that the report was publicly accessible.

Therefore the Board concluded that Ratsimor was not a 

printed publication and could not be used to prove unpatentability under either § 102 or § 103. 

A 

Section 102 provides that “A person shall be entitled 

to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention was . . . described 

in a printed publication . . . more than one year prior to 

the date of the application for patent . . . .” This rule is 

“grounded on the principle that once an invention is in the 

public domain, it is no longer patentable by anyone.” In 

re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In re 

Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1978)). To qualify 

as a printed publication, a reference “must have been 

sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.” 

In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 

“Because there are many ways in which a reference may 

be disseminated to the interested public, ‘public accessibility’ has been called the touchstone in determining 

whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ bar 

under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–

99 (Fed. Cir. 1986). A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was “disseminated or otherwise made 

available to the extent that persons interested and ordiCase: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 28 Filed: 03/01/2016
BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 29

narily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising 

reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Kyocera Wireless 

Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008). Whether a reference qualifies as a printed 

publication is a legal conclusion based on underlying 

factual determinations. In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1311 

(Fed. Cir. 2009).

B 

The issue of public accessibility has frequently arisen 

in the context of references stored in libraries. In these 

cases, we generally inquire whether the reference was 

sufficiently indexed or cataloged. See, e.g., Hall, 781 F.2d 

at 899–90. For example, in Hall, we found that a dissertation was publicly accessible because it was shelved and 

indexed in a card catalog at a German university. Id. In 

contrast, in Cronyn, we found that the references were not 

publicly accessible, despite the use of indexing, because 

the references were indexed only by title and author’s 

name, rather than by subject. 890 F.2d at 1161. Indexing 

only by title and author’s name did not amount to the 

references being “either cataloged or indexed in a meaningful way.” Id. Indexing by subject offers meaningful 

assurance that an ordinarily skilled artisan, exercising 

reasonable diligence, will be able to locate a particular 

reference among the many volumes stored in a library.9 

 

9 Indexing is, of course, not the only manner of 

proving public accessibility. See Lister, 583 F.3d at 1312 

(“While cataloging and indexing have played a significant 

role in our cases involving library references, we have 

explained that neither cataloging nor indexing is a necessary condition for a reference to be publicly accessible[;] 

. . . a variety of factors may be useful . . . .”). But, in the 

absence of other evidence, such as evidence that the 

reference was actively distributed to the public or actually 

Case: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 29 Filed: 03/01/2016
30 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

Only more recently have we addressed the question of 

how to determine public accessibility of a reference 

housed on a webpage in one corner of the vast world wide 

web. “[I]ndexing is no more or less important in evaluating the public accessibility of online references than for 

those fixed in more traditional, tangible media.” Voter 

Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Sols., Inc., 698 F.3d 

1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In Voter Verified, we found 

that a particular article that was available only through 

an on-line publication was publicly accessible. Id. We 

reached that conclusion based on “unrebutted testimony” 

in the record indicating that the particular on-line publication was well known to the community interested in the 

subject matter of the reference. Id. In addition, we noted 

that numerous related articles were also located within 

the same on-line publication. Id. These factors overcame 

the absence of evidence demonstrating that the website at 

which the article was located was indexed and thereby 

findable by an internet search engine. Id. at 1381. Thus, 

we concluded that “[w]hether or not the website itself had 

been indexed . . . (through search engines or otherwise), 

the uncontested evidence indicates that a person of ordinary skill interested in electronic voting would have been 

independently aware of the [the on-line publication] as a 

prominent forum for discussing such technologies.” Id. 

Just as indexing plays a significant role in evaluating 

whether a reference in a library is publicly accessible, 

Voter Verified underscores that indexing, “[w]hether . . . 

through search engines or otherwise,” id., is also an 

 

retrieved by members of the public, indexing is a useful 

inquiry to evaluate public accessibility. See, e.g., In re 

Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 536 F.3d 1361, 1381 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008) (concluding that two company brochures were 

not printed publications because there was no evidence 

“about the circulation and availability of the brochures”).

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 31

important question for determining if a reference stored 

on a given webpage in cyberspace is publicly accessible.

In the present case, the Board found that Groupon 

had failed to carry its burden of establishing that an 

interested party exercising reasonable diligence would 

have located Ratsimor. We agree. Groupon has provided 

no evidence that Ratsimor was disseminated to the interested public before the critical date other than testimony 

from Dr. Joshi that it was “publicly available around 

November 2003.” Even if we assume that Ratsimor was 

available online on Dr. Ratsimor’s personal page before 

the critical date, Groupon does not point to any evidence 

indicating that Ratsimor was viewed or downloaded. 

Further, in contrast to Voter Verified, the present case 

lacks any testimonial evidence that a person interested in 

e-commerce and peer-to-peer marketing would be independently aware of the web address for Dr. Ratsimor’s 

personal page. In other words, there was no evidence that 

the ordinarily skilled artisan would know of Dr. Ratsimor’s personal webpage or its web address. Instead, 

Groupon argues that an internet search engine would 

have been able to locate the report. But that argument 

does not allow us to automatically infer that Dr. Ratsimor’s webpage was “indexed . . . (through search engines 

or otherwise)” and thus locatable by a search engine. See 

Voter Verified, 698 F.3d at 1381. The record is devoid of 

any evidence that a query of a search engine before the 

critical date, using any combination of search words, 

would have led to Ratsimor appearing in the search 

results. 

C 

Alternatively, Groupon points to an article that Dr. 

Ratsimor and several of the same co-authors published 

and argues that it would have directed interested researchers to Ratsimor. We have previously recognized 

that the presence of a “research aid” can also establish 

Case: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 31 Filed: 03/01/2016
32 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

public accessibility. See Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, 

Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2006). For example, 

in Bruckelmyer, we concluded that the presence of an 

issued foreign patent put an interested researcher on 

notice of that patent’s application. Id. (“[I]t does not 

matter whether the ’119 application was catalogued or 

indexed in a meaningful way because the ’119 patent was 

indexed and could serve as a research aid.”). The Board 

acknowledged that the published article was publicly 

accessible and that it related to the same research presented in Ratsimor. The Board nevertheless found the 

article insufficient because it did not include any citation 

to Ratsimor. Moreover, even if the published article 

would have led a reader to the UMBC Department website, there is no evidence that it would have led a reader 

to Dr. Ratsimor’s personal website, which arguably 

housed the link to Ratsimor. For example, there is no 

evidence that UMBC Department’s website provided a 

link to Dr. Ratsimor’s webpage.

We agree with the Board. The published article does 

not provide a skilled artisan with a sufficiently definite 

roadmap leading to Ratsimor. An adequate roadmap 

need not give turn-by-turn directions, but should at least 

provide enough details from which we can determine that 

an interested party is reasonably certain to arrive at the 

destination: the potentially invalidating reference. The 

issued foreign patent in Bruckelmyer is such a roadmap; 

the existence of a patent assumes the existence of a 

corresponding patent application. Additionally, a published article with an express citation to the potentially 

invalidating reference would similarly provide the necessary guidance. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 

No. 01-cv-1974, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39343, at *20–21 

(N.D.N.Y. May 14, 2008) (finding that an article in a 

“seminal publication in the field of electrical engineering” 

with an explicit citation to the allegedly invalidating 

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 33

reference was a research aid that made the sought-after 

reference publicly accessible).

In this case, Groupon at no point asserts that the published article cited or mentioned Dr. Ratsimor’s personal 

page. Instead, Groupon asserts that the common subject 

matter would lead an interested party to do additional 

research on the UMBC Department’s website. However, 

even to the extent that is true, there is no evidence that 

an interested party could navigate from that website to 

Dr. Ratsimor’s personal page, whether through a direct 

link or a chain of links, to access the Ratsimor Reference. 

***** 

For these reasons, we agree with the Board that 

Groupon failed to carry its burden of proving public 

accessibility of the Ratsimor Reference.10 We therefore 

affirm the Board’s rejection of Groupon’s § 102 and § 103 

arguments that rely on the Ratsimor Reference.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s conclusions that Paul anticipates the challenged claims of the 

Blue Calypso Patents and that the Ratsimor Reference is 

not a printed publication within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 

§ 102(b). However, for the reasons discussed in the opinion, we reverse the Board’s conclusion that the claim 

 

10 Because we agree with the Board that the Ratsimor Reference is not a printed publication within the 

meaning of § 102(b), we also agree with the Board that 

Groupon cannot rely on this reference to establish the 

unpatentability of additional claims under § 102 or § 103. 

We therefore need not reach Groupon’s argument that the 

Ratsimor Reference anticipates or renders these claims 

obvious. 

Case: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 33 Filed: 03/01/2016
34 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

terms “endorsement tag” and “token,” as used in the ’516 

patent lack written description support.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 34 Filed: 03/01/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BLUE CALYPSO, LLC,

Appellant

v. 

GROUPON, INC.,

Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1391, 2015-1393, 2015-1394

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. 

CBM2013-00033, CBM2013-00034.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

GROUPON, INC.,

Appellant

v. 

BLUE CALYPSO, LLC,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1396

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. CBM2013-

00044. 

Case: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 35 Filed: 03/01/2016
2 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

BLUE CALYPSO, LLC,

Appellant

v. 

GROUPON, INC.,

Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1397, 2015-1398

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 

CBM2013-00046. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

BLUE CALYPSO, LLC,

Appellant

v. 

GROUPON, INC.,

Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1399, 2015-1401

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 

CBM2013-00035.

 ______________________ 

SCHALL, Circuit Judge, dissenting-in-part.

Case: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 36 Filed: 03/01/2016
BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 3

I am pleased to join Parts I, III, and IV of the court’s 

opinion. However, I respectfully dissent from Part II. For 

the reasons set forth below, I believe the Board erred in 

finding claims 2–15, 20–23, and 29 of U.S. Patent No. 

7,664,516 (the ’516 patent); claims 7–16 and 23–27 of U.S. 

Patent No. 8,155,679; claims 1–5 of U.S. Patent No. 

8,457,670; and claims 1, 4–6, 10, and 14 of U.S. Patent 

No. 8,438,055 anticipated by U.S. Patent Application 

Publication No. 2002/0169835 A1 by Paul, JR. et al. 

(“Paul”). 

I.

A.

Paul describes an internet-based communications system that allows organizations (e.g., Amazon.com) to 

broadcast emails to their members (e.g., individual consumers with Amazon.com accounts). See Paul at ¶¶ 10, 

21. The system includes an application program, or 

“campaign manager,” that provides organizations with 

various “routine” or “tool” options for communicating with 

their members. Paul at ¶¶ 34, 51, 100. One such tool 

option (the “direct-email tool”) enables organizations to 

develop and manage direct marketing campaigns through 

which “personalized . . . e-mails” may be sent to “selected

members” who are pulled from an organization’s membership database based upon selected demographic criteria. 

Paul at ¶¶ 51, 64, 66–67 (emphasis added). The personalized emails may include, for example, an advertisement 

for a business with a hyperlink to the business’s website. 

Paul at ¶ 95. Another tool option (the “refer-a-friend 

tool”) uses a referral campaign to attract new members. 

See Paul at ¶¶ 101–02. In this campaign “[a]ll the members” of an organization receive a “refer a friend e-mail” 

that includes a hyperlink to the organization’s “new 

member website.” Paul at ¶ 101 (emphasis added). If a 

current member forwards the email to one or more friends 

and a friend clicks on the link, the current member may 

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4 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

receive a reward. See Paul at ¶ 102. In this way, current 

members are motivated to increase the organization’s 

membership. Paul at ¶ 102. 

Although the relevant claims vary in scope, I agree 

with the majority that, for purposes of this appeal, claim 2 

of the ’516 patent is representative of the claimed subject 

matter. Relevant to the issue of anticipation, that claim 

provides as follows: 

2. A method for providing access to an advertisement from an advertiser to a source communication device possessed by a subscriber and 

distributing the access to the advertisement from 

the source communication device to a destination 

communication device possessed by a recipient, 

wherein the destination communication device is 

compatible with the source communication device, 

and the recipient having a relationship to the subscriber, the method comprising the steps of:

(1) comparing a desired demographic profile to a 

subscriber demographic profile to derive a match; 

(2) establishing a bi-lateral endorsement between 

the subscriber and the advertiser; 

(3) providing a subsidy program to the subscriber

based on the match; . . . 

(4) activating an endorsement manager in the 

source communication device; 

(5) initiating a communication session between 

the source communication device and the destination communication device; . . . and

(6) recognizing a subsidy, according to the subsidy 

program, for the subscriber after a termination of 

the communication session.

’516 patent at 7:45–8:3 (numerals and emphases added).

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 5

In finding claim 2 anticipated by Paul, the Board relied upon, inter alia, the direct-email and refer-a-friend 

tools. For example, and as relevant here, the Board found 

the first limitation met by Paul’s disclosure of the directemail tool. Regarding the third limitation, the Board 

found that Paul discloses “providing a subsidy program to 

the subscriber” through the description of the refer-afriend tool. The Board did not however find that the 

refer-a-friend tool provides a subsidy “based on the 

match,” a claim element linked to the first limitation. 

Only by finding that the direct-email and refer-a-friend 

tools would be used together did the Board conclude that 

Paul discloses providing a subsidy “based on the match.”

The Board, in making this finding, acknowledged that 

Paul “does not disclose expressly an example in which a 

direct e-mail campaign to send targeted advertisements 

based on demographics of members is used with a ‘refer-afriend’ campaign involving incentive-based referrals.” 

Nor does Paul, the Board recognized, “indicate expressly 

that any of the [tools] . . . can be used with any other one 

of the . . . [tools].” The Board nevertheless found that one 

of ordinary skill in the art “would understand” that the 

direct-email and refer-a-friend tools are “to be used in 

conjunction . . . to send ‘refer-a-friend’ e-mail message 

incentives to [selected] members based on member demographic characteristics.” In other words, the Board found 

that the refer-a-friend tool would be used to create a 

referral email, but instead of sending the referral email to 

all members using that tool (as described in Paul), one of 

skill in the art would know to use the direct-email tool to 

send the referral email to selected members based on a 

demographic match. 

From its findings and discussion of Paul, there is no 

question the Board did not rely upon an express disclosure of the claimed invention to support its ultimate 

anticipation finding. What the Board does not answer, 

however, is which alternative anticipation theory it 

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6 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

applied; namely, anticipation by inherency or anticipation 

because a person of skill in the art, reading Paul, would 

“at once envisage” the claimed arrangement. 

B.

In affirming the Board’s finding of anticipation, the 

majority views Paul, in particular paragraph 29, as 

“explicitly contemplat[ing] the combination of the disclosed functionalities” of the direct-email and refer-afriend tools. Maj. Op. 17–19. The majority also reads the 

Board’s decision as having “found that [Paul] . . . disclose[s] a limited number of tools” and also as having 

“found that . . . a skilled artisan would ‘at once envisage’ 

the combination of . . . the refer-a-friend and [direct-email 

tools] to arrive at the system claimed” by Blue Calypso. 

Maj. Op. 20 (emphasis added). Based on these apparent 

findings by the Board, the majority concludes that the 

facts of this case are akin to those in Kennametal, Inc. v. 

Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 

where we found that a prior art reference anticipated 

certain claims even without disclosing all the claimed 

limitations. 

II.

A.

An invention is unpatentable by reason of anticipation 

if it “was patented or described in a printed publication in 

this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this 

country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 

(2006).1 A prior art reference cannot anticipate “unless 

 

1 This provision has since been amended. See

Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 

112–29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011). However, because the pending claims have an effective filing date 

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BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 7

[it] discloses within the four corners of the document not 

only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the 

limitations arranged or combined in the same way as 

recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 

545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Prior art can, 

however, anticipate a claim even if it “d[oes] not expressly 

spell out” all the limitations arranged or combined as in 

the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would “at once envisage” the claimed arrangement 

or combination, In re Petering, 49 CCPA 993, 301 F.2d 

676, 681 (1962), or if the “missing descriptive matter is

necessarily present,” or inherent, in the reference, Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 

(Fed. Cir. 1991). “Under the principles of inherency, if the 

prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or 

includes, the claims limitations, it anticipates.” Perricone 

v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (quoting MEHL/Biophile Int'l Corp. v. Milgraum, 

192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).

B. 

I agree with the majority that the Board’s holding of 

unpatentability based on anticipation necessarily hinges 

on a finding distinct from an express disclosure of the 

invention of claim 2 of the ’516 patent. Given the majority’s reliance on Kennametal and its view of the Board’s 

purported findings, it seems to me the majority concludes 

that we should affirm because one skilled in the art would 

“at once envisage” the claimed invention when reading 

Paul. I part company with the majority on this point, for 

this case, I believe, is governed by Net MoneyIN. In my 

view, the Board erred in finding that Paul discloses the 

third limitation of claim 2, i.e., “providing a subsidy 

 

before March 16, 2013, the pre-AIA § 102(b) applies. See

AIA, 125 Stat. at 293; In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 1376 

n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

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8 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

program to the subscriber based on the match.” (Emphasis added.) The Board relied on a combination of the 

direct-email and refer-a-friend tools to meet this limitation; yet, the Board recognized that Paul fails to explicitly 

disclose any such combined use. As noted, the Board 

made up for this shortcoming in Paul by finding that one 

of ordinary skill in the art “would understand” that the 

two tools are “to be used in conjunction.”2

 

2 We have stated that filling in the gaps in a reference by using the understanding of one skilled in the art 

to find anticipation indicates reliance on a theory of 

inherency. See Finnigan Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 

180 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (concluding that the 

Administrative Law Judge relied on inherency in finding 

the claims anticipated because he “was able to close th[e] 

gap between the [prior art reference] and the claim” by 

relying on the understanding of one skilled in the art); 

Cont'l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 

(Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that “when [a] reference is 

silent about [an] asserted inherent characteristic, such 

gap in the reference may be filled with recourse to extrinsic evidence . . . [which] must make clear that the missing 

descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing 

described in the reference . . . .”). Although I do not read 

the majority opinion as adopting the view that the Board

relied on inherency in this case, to the extent the Board’s 

decision may be read that way, I believe the record evidence is insufficient to establish inherent anticipation. 

Groupon failed to show that the combination of the direct

e-mail and refer-a-friend tool options is “necessarily 

present” in Paul. Groupon’s expert, Dr. Joshi, in fact, 

acknowledged that using Paul’s system does not require 

either the direct-email or refer-a-friend tools to be used at 

all, let alone in conjunction. Moreover, the Board’s finding that the tools are “different tool options of the camCase: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 42 Filed: 03/01/2016
BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 9

Although anticipation typically cannot be found without an express or inherent disclosure, there is a line of 

cases where “the issue of anticipation turns on whether [a 

disclosed] genus was of such a defined and limited class 

that one of ordinary skill in the art could ‘at once envisage’ each member of the genus.” Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. 

Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 

2012). For example, in Kennametal, the case upon which 

the majority relies, the claimed invention was a cutting 

tool having a substrate comprising “hard particles and a 

binder” and a “physical vapor deposition coating on at 

least a portion of the substrate.” 780 F.3d at 1379. The 

prior art reference disclosed all the elements of the 

claimed cutting tool within the reference, but did not 

expressly disclose an example of the tool with the claimed 

coating. Id. at 1382. However, because the reference 

“expressly ‘contemplat[ed]’” the claimed coating as one of

three possible coatings, we found the claims anticipated 

because one of skill would “immediately envisage applying [the claimed] coating.” Id. at 1383. 

This case, in my view, is distinguishable from Kennametal for at least three reasons. First, the Board did 

not find or even suggest, nor did Groupon argue, that the 

claimed process at issue here is a species of some genus 

disclosed by Paul. Second, even if the “at once envisage” 

line of cases is applicable here, claim 2 is not a system 

claim requiring the mere presence of the right combination of tools (i.e., the direct e-mail and refer-a-friend tools) 

for anticipation. Rather, anticipation of method claim 2 

 

paign manager” reveals that they do not necessarily have 

to be used together because “options” are, by their very 

nature, not necessary. As for Dr. Joshi’s conclusion that 

the tools “can be used with one another,” it seems to me 

that, if he is correct, this testimony suggests only a possible use, not an inherent use.

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10 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

requires not only that both tools be used, but also that 

specific functions among the tools’ various functions be 

combined. And third, Paul does not contemplate—

expressly or otherwise—combining the direct-email and 

refer-a-friend tools to perform the step recited in the third 

limitation. Groupon’s expert conceded this point. Even 

putting these distinctions aside, Kennametal still, I think, 

does not support the majority’s conclusion because—

contrary to the majority’s apparent view of the Board’s 

decision—the Board did not find that one of skill in the 

art would “at once” or “immediately” envisage the combined use of the direct-email and refer-a-friend tools. 

Absent such a finding, Paul could only anticipate the 

third limitation by expressly or inherently disclosing the 

combination, and, as explained above, I see no such 

disclosure in Paul. 

I recognize the Board cited to various portions of Paul

that, in its view, would lead one of skill to conclude that 

the direct-email and refer-a-friend tools would be used 

together. However, in my view, nothing in those paragraphs supports the Board’s ultimate finding of anticipation, regardless of which anticipation theory the Board 

may have applied. For example, the Board quoted from 

paragraph 29 of Paul, which explains that the invention 

may be produced in a single computer system having 

(1) separate elements or means for performing the individual steps described or claimed or (2) one or more 

elements or means combining the performance of any 

of the functions or steps disclosed or claimed, or may 

be arranged in a distributed computer system, interconnected by any suitable means . . . as would be 

known to one of ordinary skill in the art. 

Paul at ¶ 29 (numerals added). This boiler-plate language merely describes the amount or type of structure 

(or number of algorithms) that may be used to implement 

the system. Put differently, while the quoted text enviCase: 15-1394 Document: 5-2 Page: 44 Filed: 03/01/2016
BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 11

sions that multiple steps may be carried out by a single 

element, it contains no suggestion to combine tools in 

order to perform steps not otherwise disclosed. And 

because paragraph 29 fails to mention either the direct email tool or the refer-a-friend tool, or any of the tools’ 

specific functions, I do not view the paragraph as an 

express contemplation to combine the two tools.3 The 

Board also quoted from paragraphs 50, 51, and 100 of 

Paul, but those paragraphs only state that the directemail and refer-a-friend tools are both part of the campaign manager. They do not suggest that the two tools 

would be—or could be—combined in any way.

I view the facts here as being similar to those in Net 

MoneyIN. There, the claimed “Internet payment system” 

comprised five links, and the district court found the 

invention anticipated by a reference disclosing all five 

links within the four corners of the reference. Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1368–69. We reversed, concluding that 

the district court “wrong[ly] combine[d] parts of [two] 

separate protocols,” each of which included some of the 

claimed links, to find anticipation. Id. at 1371. In reaching that conclusion, we explained that even though “there 

may be only slight differences between the protocols 

disclosed in the [prior art] reference and the [claimed] 

system,” such differences “invoke the question of obvious-

 

3 In sharp contrast to the generic language of paragraph 29, the portion of the prior art reference in Kennametal that we viewed as an express contemplation of 

the claimed coating stated that “applicants also contemplate that one or more layers of a coating scheme may be 

applied by physical vapor deposition.” 780 F.3d at 1380

(emphases added). Based on that explicit disclosure, we 

concluded that “a person of skill in the art . . . would 

immediately envisage applying a [physical vapor deposition] coating.” Id. at 1383. 

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12 BLUE CALYPSO, LLC v. GROUPON, INC. 

ness, not anticipation.” Id. Here, just as in Net MoneyIN, the combination of the direct-email and refer-afriend tools similarly invokes the question of obviousness 

because the Board combined specific functions of two 

separate tools to find anticipation. Thus, I conclude that, 

like the district court in Net MoneyIN, the Board erred 

here because “it is not enough that [Paul] discloses part of 

the claimed invention, which an ordinary artisan might 

supplement to make the whole, or that it includes multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow 

combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Id. 

In sum, I believe the record evidence does not contain 

an express or inherent disclosure (or even an express 

contemplation) of the combined use of the direct-email 

and refer-a-friend tools. The evidence, at most, it seems to 

me, reveals that Paul discloses a single system with 

multiple tools that are capable of functioning together. 

This is not enough for anticipation. The Board’s “analysis 

[therefore] goes astray because it assumes what [Paul] 

neither disclose[s] nor render[s] inherent.” Perricone, 432 

F.3d at 1379. 

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from 

the court’s affirmance of the Board’s finding that Paul 

anticipates claim 2 of the ’516 patent, as well as its affirmance of the Board’s finding that Paul anticipates claims 

of the other patents at issue in the case.

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