Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03135/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03135-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Talib D. Watson
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 5, 2005 Decided June 3, 2005

No. 04-3135

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

TALIB D. WATSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00314-01)

Robert J. Kovacev argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Stacy D. Belf.

Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's

Office, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief

were Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher

and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and ROBERTS, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

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SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: This case comes before us on

appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia. Appellant-Defendant Talib Watson challenges his

criminal conviction on two grounds: First, he submits that the

trial court abused its discretion by limiting cross-examination of

a police officer and of a cooperating witness. Second, he

submits that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting

evidence regarding Defendant’s prior bad acts when Defendant

was notified of the nature of the evidence only shortly before the

court commenced voir dire examination of the jury. For the

reasons set forth below, this Court affirms Watson’s conviction

and remands the record to the District Court for re-sentencing in

light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v.

Booker.

I. Background

A. The Stop, the Search, the Arrest, and the Questions

On June 23, 2003, Watson was driving in Northwest

Washington when he was pulled over by Officer John Cox of the

U.S. Park Police. Cox testified that he pulled Watson over

because the windows of Watson’s Cadillac Escalade were tinted

excessively, in violation of District of Columbia law. Cox

determined that Watson was subject to an outstanding

misdemeanor warrant and arrested him. Watson had $7,675 on

his person. After arresting Watson, Cox searched the Escalade,

finding $1,650 in the center console. The Escalade was moved

to another site, where Cox continued the search. In a side door

panel, he found two firearms: a loaded KelTec 40-caliber semiautomatic handgun and a loaded Beretta 9-mm pistol. In other

doors he found socks containing more KelTec and Beretta

ammunition. In the back seat and map pocket he found

“hideaway” (i.e., disguised) cans, one of which contained

marijuana and had Watson’s fingerprints on it.

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Hours later, Cox took Watson out of the jail cell,

whereupon, according to Cox, he allegedly gave him a “rights

card” and read him his Miranda rights, to which Watson replied

“yes” to all questions. No one was present at the time, and the

waiver card allegedly signed by Watson was not produced at

trial. According to Cox’s testimony, Watson admitted to Cox

that the “stuff” in the car was his. Cox did not write down

Watson’s statement.

Police determined that the KelTec handgun had been sold

lawfully to a Russell Lane (“Lane”) by a Christopher Bannock.

The government interviewed Lane in August 2003. In

December 2003, Lane was arrested for unlawful possession of

a firearm and possession of crack cocaine; in early 2004 he

entered a plea agreement in which he was obligated to testify

truthfully for the government in the Watson matter.

Watson was indicted for felonious possession of firearms –

i.e., the KelTec and the Beretta – and ammunition, and for

simple possession of marijuana.

B. Testimony of Cox

At trial, Cox testified to his observations and to his account

of Watson’s alleged admission of ownership of the weapons.

Watson sought to suppress the fruits of Cox’s search, including

Watson’s alleged statements, on the theory that Officer Cox

lacked probable cause to stop Watson’s car and that the stop was

pretextual. At the suppression hearing, Watson, who is black,

attempted to introduce evidence purporting to show that Cox

had a propensity for stopping black drivers on window-tint

charges. In 18 months, Cox allegedly stopped at least 27 black

drivers for window-tint violations that culminated in drug

charges. The District Court refused to allow Watson to crossexamine Cox on this particular issue, for reasons discussed

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further below.

At trial, Watson sought to cross-examine Cox regarding 33

cases in which he alleged that Cox had “stopped young black

males for tinted windows and many of those cases also had the

marijuana component to it.” This, he said, suggested Cox’s

“bias” so as to impeach his credibility. The court expressed

skepticism as to the relevance of this line of questioning.

Following arguments, the court precluded that line of crossexamination, for reasons discussed further below.

In closing arguments, the prosecutor extolled Cox’s

impartiality.

C. Testimony of Lane & Evidence of Prior Bad Acts

At trial, Lane testified that he sold the recovered KelTec

handgun to an individual known as “Q,” whom Lane watched

passing the firearm to Watson. Lane also testified, over

Watson’s objection, that he had previously sold another firearm

to Watson. This second firearm was not a part of the Watson

indictment and was never actually recovered from Watson.

At a status conference one week before the trial began, the

Government warned that it would offer such a “cooperating

witness,” but would not disclose either the witness’s identity or

the “facts and circumstances” surrounding his testimony. The

government did not give notice that the witness would be

offering Rule 404(b) (“prior bad acts”) evidence. Watson notes

that the Government had stated during discovery that it had no

404(b) evidence “at this time,” and never amended that

response. That response was dated August 2, 2003, before the

Government contacted Lane and months before Lane’s

December 2003 arrest and subsequent plea bargain.

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1 The same prosecutor represented the government in both

Lane’s and Watson’s cases.

On the day the trial began, before jury voir dire, the

Government revealed Lane’s identity and the fact that Lane

would testify to the two KelTec handguns he sold Watson (only

one of which Cox recovered). Watson objected to the late

notice.

Following voir dire, the prosecutor turned over to Watson’s

counsel a large amount of information about Lane, and

suggested that after arguments the court break for the day so that

Watson’s counsel could have an opportunity to go over the

material. But Watson’s counsel disagreed, suggesting that the

government begin direct examination of its first witness, saying,

“I would be ready to go in the morning.” After lunch, defense

counsel changed course and raised the Rule 404(b) notice

requirement, arguing he wasn’t sure he had “ample notice to do

a thorough investigation and a meaningful cross-examination.”

The court ruled that it would permit introduction of the 404(b)

evidence.

Lane testified less than 48 hours after the prosecutor

revealed Lane’s identity. While Lane was on the stand, defense

counsel cross-examined him regarding his plea agreement. The

defense sought to challenge Lane’s credibility by questioning

him about an exchange between the prosecutor1and the judge in

Lane’s case regarding the prosecutor’s recommendation that

Lane be released pending sentencing. The exchange was as

follows:

The Court: All right, when do you want to come back?

Prosecutor: Your honor, the government is actually

particularly optimistic about Mr. Lane’s ability to complete

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his cooperation within the next three or four months. It’s a

scheduling matter.

See Tr. of June 4, 2004 at 142 (from the Watson proceeding,

reading back the exchange from the Lane proceeding). On

cross-examination, Watson’s counsel sought to introduce this

statement as to the prosecutor’s “optimis[m],” arguing at the

ensuing bench conference that this was evidence of bias on

Lane’s part, in that it showed that Lane had committed to

“cooperate” by supplying prosecution-favored testimony –

whether truthful or not. The prosecutor argued, and the court

agreed, that the statement went to a scheduling matter, not to the

substance of Lane’s Watson-case testimony. “Cooperation”

meant nothing more than testifying per se, not testifying

favorably. The judge did not preclude cross-examination, but

instructed defense counsel that cross-examination would have to

focus on “the whole context of [the statement].” Defense

counsel did not challenge this ruling; instead, he said, “I’ll move

on. I’ll move on.” The Court sustained the prosecutor’s

objection.

In closing arguments, the prosecutor extolled Lane’s

credibility.

D. Conviction and Sentencing

On June 8, 2004, the jury found Watson guilty of firearms

and drug offenses, and not guilty of an ammunition offense. On

September 9, 2004, the court sentenced Watson to 108 months’

imprisonment on the firearms offense and 12 months’

imprisonment on the marijuana offense, to be served

concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release.

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II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609,

616 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116,

122 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Despite the guarantees of the Sixth

Amendment’s Confrontation clause,

[t]he district court nonetheless has considerable discretion

to place reasonable limits on a criminal defendant’s

presentation of evidence and cross-examination of

government witnesses. It must be cautious, however,

particularly where a party is seeking to impeach a witness

whose credibility could have an important influence on the

outcome of the trial.

Whitmore, 359 F.3d at 615-16 (citations and quotation marks

omitted). Because “[w]e . . . recognize that the district court is

in the best position to conduct the balancing test,” we “review

a FED. R. EVID. 403 ruling ‘only for grave abuse.’” Id. at 619

(quoting United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 795 (D.C. Cir.

2003)).

B. Cross-Examinations of Cox & Lane

1. Officer Cox

Watson argues that, by precluding defense counsel from

questioning Officer Cox about approximately thirty cases where

he allegedly stopped black men on window-tint violations but

eventually arrested them on drug charges, the court

inappropriately “foreclosed all examination” into Cox’s

credibility in violation of Watson’s Sixth Amendment right to

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confront witnesses brought against him. Br. for Appellant at 16.

This issue, Watson urges, “is key to the Government’s case.”

Id.

In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986),

which similarly dealt with potential witness bias, the Supreme

Court held that “the exposure of a witness’[s] motivation in

testifying is a proper and important function of the

constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Watson

argues that under Van Arsdall, therefore, a trial court may not

“prohibit[] all inquiry” into the bias of a witness. Br. for

Appellant at 16 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at

679 (emphasis in original)). But Van Arsdall reminds in terms

equally strong that the Constitution does not give a defendant

limitless discretion in presenting evidence for purposes of

witness impeachment:

It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause

of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from

imposing any limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the

potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the contrary,

trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation

Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such

cross-examination based on concerns about, among other

things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the

witness’[s] safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only

marginally relevant. And as we observed earlier this Term,

“the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for

effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is

effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the

defense might wish.”

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer,

474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis in original)). 

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A trial court may prevent the introduction of evidence “if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,

or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403. In

this case, evidence that Cox may have arrested (or stopped)

various persons of a common demographic on common charges

could not logically be probative of bias absent evidence (1) that

Cox knew of the driver’s race before stopping him, and, more

importantly, (2) that the officer’s record of like arrests is

composed disproportionately of arrests of members of that

demographic group. At the motion hearing, Cox testified

without contradiction that he could not see the driver of

Watson’s vehicle. Tr. of Jan. 16, 2004, at 43. Moreover,

defense counsel failed to offer any showing of disparate

treatment sufficient to justify further inquiry into alleged racial

bias or profiling on Cox’s part. As the trial judge noted, the

proposed cross-examination “would in essence be multiple steps

removed from actually being able to demonstrate that there was

in any way a racial bias on the part of the police officer in this

particular case such that his credibility . . . would be placed into

question.” Tr. of June 3, 2004. 

In sum, the relevance of the evidence was not readily

apparent given the lack of information regarding Cox’s arrests

of members of other demographic groups, and its probative

value was substantially outweighed by the threat of undue delay

or confusion of issues inherent in a drawn-out inquiry into the

details of Cox’s history of arrests. This Court holds that the trial

court acted well within its discretion by limiting this line of

questioning. A court may not limit “all inquiry” into bias, 475

U.S. at 679 (emphasis in original), but it may preclude inquiry

that would be more protracted and prejudicial than probative.

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2. Russell Lane

Watson also argues that the trial court erred in precluding

cross-examination of cooperating witness Lane that would have

attempted to raise doubts regarding the veracity and motivation

of Lane’s testimony. At issue was the prosecutor’s statement in

Lane’s criminal proceedings that, in the words of Watson,

“suggested that the Government was ‘optimistic’ about Lane’s

testimony.” Br. for Appellant at 16.

As noted above, when the court in Lane’s proceeding asked

the prosecutor for advice regarding the scheduling of Lane’s

case, the prosecutor stated that “the government is actually

particularly optimistic about Mr. Lane’s ability to complete his

cooperation within the next three or four months. It’s a

scheduling matter.” Tr. of June 4, 2004, at 142.

The trial court prohibited defense counsel from raising the

issue in a manner that would have obscured the full context of

the prosecutor’s statement. The court did not preclude all

questioning on this matter in cross-examination of Lane.

Rather, it instructed defense counsel that “if you’re going to go

into a statement in open court that relates to the time frame that

this will occur, you’re going to have to give the whole context

of it. It raises the question of how is it relevant to crossexamination.” Id. at 143.

The trial court would have allowed this line of questioning

to go forward so long as defense counsel included the entire

statement in its question in order to prevent flagrant distortion

of the exchange, and the jury was provided with extensive

direct- and cross-examination regarding the nature of Lane’s

plea agreement. This Court, therefore, concludes that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination

– certainly not in such a way as to prejudice Watson. As with

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the foreclosed cross-examination of Cox, the probative value of

this evidence (assuming its relevance) was deemed to have been

outweighed by the threat that the presentation would mislead the

jury. FED. R. EVID. 403. We see no abuse of discretion on the

record before us.

C. Evidence of Prior Bad Acts

Watson argues that the trial court erred in allowing the

prosecution to introduce evidence of prior bad acts, under Rule

404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, despite the

prosecution’s failure to apprise the defense of the nature of the

identity of the witness until the morning of voir dire, only 48

hours before witness Lane was called to testify.

The courts must not treat lightly the “surprise” introduction

of evidence that leaves a criminal defendant without opportunity

to prepare an effective response. Rule 404(b) mandates that

where the government seeks to introduce evidence of prior bad

acts against the defendant, it must “provide reasonable notice in

advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial

notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such

evidence it intends to introduce at trial.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b).

For that reason, this Court has held that “Rule 404(b) does not

empower a district judge to excuse the government from

providing any notice that it intends to use bad acts evidence.”

United States v. Spinner, 152 F.3d 950, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(emphasis in original).

In this case, however, the Court need not answer the

question of whether failure to provide notice prior to voir dire is

sufficiently close to failure to provide “any notice” to make this

case analogous to Spinner. Even assuming arguendo that the

prosecution failed to bear its Rule 404(b) notice obligation, this

Court holds that Watson failed to show prejudice from the error.

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To warrant reversal, an error of the trial court must “affect

substantial rights” – i.e., it must be prejudicial, having an effect

on the outcome of district court proceedings. United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P.

52(b)); see also Spinner, 152 F.3d at 961. In this case Watson

has not demonstrated that he suffered any prejudice. His own

counsel initially rejected the prosecutor’s suggestion that the

court recess until the next day in order to give the defense time

to respond to the prosecutor’s late disclosure of the general

nature of the 404(b) evidence. The prosecutor’s suggestion

could not have been more emphatic:

Here is our concern, Your Honor, in deference to [defense

counsel] Mr. Daum. We are now turning over at the lunch

break here a great deal of information to Mr. Daum about

the cooperating witness. There is going to be a long

transcript of information about things that this cooperating

witness told the government. Frankly, I don’t see Mr.

Daum digesting enough of it to be prepared to go forward.

Tr. of June 2, 2004, at 94-95. Watson’s counsel responded, “I

would be ready to go in the morning.” Id. at 95. We recognize

that an argument could be made, although Watson has not

clearly done so, that the language of counsel was directed

toward the timeliness of the Jencks material, and that his

“waiver” of any additional time did not contemplate the

objection to the Rule 404(b) evidence at all. However, it is not

incumbent upon the Court to construct a record, but rather upon

the defense. 

Insofar as Watson’s objections to the notice of the Rule

404(b) evidence address the adequacy of the timeliness of the

notice, again, his argument fails on this record. The trial

prosecutor identified the “general nature” of the evidence when

he stated before the commencement of voir dire that 

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What we have here, Your Honor, is a cooperating witness

who is expected to testify that he sold one of the weapons

in this case to the defendant. We intend to prove that by

virtue of that person’s testimony and on top of that a

representative from the legal gun shop where this witness

purchased that weapon offering documentary proof that that

same weapon was purchased by this cooperating witness

and that that same weapon was recovered in the defendant’s

car, a pretty strong evidentiary link.

Tr. of June 2, 2004, at 5. The Government explained further at

7-8:

Now, the other evidentiary matter, Your Honor, deals with

the fact that the cooperating witness actually sold the

defendant two weapons, two Keltec 40-caliber

semiautomatic handguns that are one serial number apart.

The government, because of security concerns, was not

willing to make anything known about this cooperating

witness until the day of trial and we can represent to the

court that two virtually identical weapons were sold by this

cooperating witness to the defendant between the dates of

May 3, 2003 and June 23, 2003 and we ask that the

cooperating witness be permitted to testify as to both of

those instances because they go to identification. The

second cell [sic] of the weapon would go to identification.

It would go to knowledge, it would go to absence of

mistake, plan – scheme or plan to own 40-caliber Keltecs.

(Emphasis added.)

Notice of “general nature” is all that Rule 404(b) requires. We

have located no precedent of this circuit defining “general

nature,” nor has appellant supplied any definitive source. One

academic source has noted that “the concept of ‘general nature’

has been liberally construed.” See 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM ,

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HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.5 at 363-64 & n.45

(5th ed. 2001) (citing United States v. Robinson, 110 F.3d 1320,

1325-26 (8thCir. 1997)). See also United States v. Watt, 911 F.

Supp. 538, 556-57 (D.D.C. 1995) (“Moreover, courts have

routinely denied requests by defendants for greater particularity

in 404(b) notice.”) (collecting cases).

Given that appellant’s argument does not spell out any

flaws in the timeliness of the notice, specificity as to the date,

time, and other details of the 404(b) evidence, the notice was

adequate under the Rules. In sum, Watson’s counsel

specifically declared at trial that introduction of the evidence at

such a late time did not impede the defense, and Watson has

offered no reason for this Court to second-guess that decision or

the judgment of the Court.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the conviction

of the District Court. We further instruct, and the parties agree,

that we will retain jurisdiction over this case but remand the

record to the District Court for re-sentencing in light of the

Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Booker, 125

S.Ct.738 (2005). See United States v. Coles,403F.3d 764,769-

71 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

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