Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00685/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00685-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gordon Andrew Douglas
Petitioner
Greg Lewis
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GORDON ANDREW DOUGLAS, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

CLARK E. DUCART, 

Respondent.1

No. 2:13-cv-685-KJM-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He claims that his right to due process was violated 

by the state courts’ implementation of a federal court order issued in a previous federal habeas 

action filed by petitioner. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, it is 

recommended that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied. 

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 Greg Lewis was previously named as the respondent. The court now substitutes in the 

correct respondent, Clark E. Ducart, Warden of Pelican Bay State Prison, where petitioner is 

presently incarcerated. See Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 

1994) (“A petitioner for habeas corpus relief must name the state officer having custody of him or 

her as the respondent to the petition.”) (citing Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254); see also Smith v. 

Idaho, 392 F.3d 350, 355-56 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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I. Background

 On April 28, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court. 

Douglas v. Cambra, No. 2:97-cv-775 KJM JFM P.2

 Therein, petitioner raised several claims 

challenging his 1993 conviction on charges of first degree murder in violation of Cal. Penal Code 

§ 187, and arson of an inhabited dwelling in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 451(b), and his 

sentence of thirty-three years to life in prison imposed thereon. On November 1, 2007, the 

assigned magistrate judge recommended that habeas relief be granted on one of petitioner’s 

claims: that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for arson of an inhabited 

dwelling, in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 451(b). Case No. 2:97-cv-775 KJM JFM P, ECF No. 

60. On February 25, 2008, the assigned district judge adopted the November 1, 2007 findings 

and recommendations, vacated petitioner’s conviction for a violation of Cal. Penal Code § 451(b), 

and remanded the matter to the state court with directions that the portion of petitioner’s sentence 

imposed for his conviction on the arson charge be stricken and that petitioner be re-sentenced on 

the lesser included offense of arson of a structure, in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 451(c).3

 Id., 

ECF No. 67. Petitioner appealed that order, challenging the remedy ordered by the district court. 

Id., ECF No. 69. 

On November 24, 2010, in a published opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit held that the district court exceeded its habeas jurisdiction when it instructed the 

 

2

 See Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2012) (court may take 

judicial notice of matters of public record); Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 

n. l (N.D. Cal. 1978) (judicial notice may be taken of court records), aff’d, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 

1981). 

3

 The evidence introduced at petitioner’s trial established that: 

Douglas and his brother broke into Jack Clark's home to commit a 

robbery. During the course of the robbery, Douglas stabbed Clark 

to death. Several hours later after Clark was killed, Douglas and his 

brother returned to the scene of their crime and set fire to Clark's 

house to destroy any fingerprints they might have left behind. 

Douglas was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison on the 

murder count, with a consecutive sentence of eight years on the 

arson count. 

Douglas v. Jacquez, 626 F.3d 501, 503 (9th Cir. 2010). 

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state court to revise its judgment to enter a sentence for petitioner’s conviction of the lesser 

included offense of arson of a structure. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court opinion, and 

remanded the matter to the district court with instructions to issue a conditional writ of habeas 

corpus if the state court did not resentence petitioner within ninety days. Douglas v. Jacquez, 626 

F.3d 501 (9th Cir. 2010).4

 

 On remand the District Court issued the following order: 

Petitioner’s fifth claim for relief is granted to the extent that 

petitioner’s conviction for violation of California Penal Code 

section 451(b) is vacated if the state court, after ninety (90) days of 

the entry of this order, declines to re-sentence petitioner under 

section 451(c). 

Douglas v. Jacquez, No. 2:97-cv-775 KJM JFM P, ECF No. 89. 

 Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States 

Supreme Court. Id., ECF No. 92 at 20. By order dated January 9, 2012, that petition was 

summarily denied. Id.

 Meanwhile, in state court, the California Attorney General sent the Sacramento Superior 

Court a letter describing the matters set forth above, and the prosecutor filed a request in Superior 

Court that petitioner be sentenced on the lesser included offense of violating Cal. Penal Code 

§ 451(c), arson of a structure. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 2. In response, on September 2, 2011, the 

Superior Court issued a tentative ruling in which it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to 

re-sentence petitioner for a violation of Cal. Penal Code § 451(c). Id. Instead, the Superior Court 

ordered that petitioner’s conviction for a violation of § 451(b) would be stricken from the record 

90 days after the June 29, 2011 order signed by the federal district court, with no further action 

taken. Id. Specifically, the Superior Court opined as follows: 

 

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 The Ninth Circuit instructed as follows: 

The district court’s order is vacated. We remand Douglas’s habeas 

petition to the district court, and instruct the district court to issue a 

conditional writ of habeas corpus if the state court does not resentence Douglas within 90 days. The California state court may, 

in its discretion, enter a conviction for Douglas under § 451(c). 

Id. at 507. 

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Thus, this court must await 90 days from June 29, 2011, for the 

Penal Code § 451(b) conviction to be deemed stricken, and after 

that time will have jurisdiction only to correct the unlawful 

sentence that currently includes punishment for the Penal Code § 

451(b) offense. This court will not have jurisdiction to substitute a 

Penal Code §451(c) conviction for the stricken Penal Code § 451(b) 

conviction at that time. 

Id. at consecutive p. 5. 

 Petitioner subsequently filed in the Superior Court a motion “for an order correcting an 

unauthorized sentence in this matter” and to “strike a victim restitution award to the Sacramento 

Fire Department in the amount of $2,663.81.” Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 3 at consecutive p. 1. In 

response, the Sacramento County Superior Court issued an order stating: 

As of September 26, 2011, the Penal Code § 451(b) conviction has 

been deemed to have been stricken, pursuant to this court’s order 

issued on September 2, 2011. The clerk of the court, however, still 

needs to prepare a blue sheet minute order to memorialize this, and 

to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the sentence 

for the murder conviction and that the Penal Code § 451(b) 

conviction was stricken per court order on September 2, 2011. 

Id.

 That court denied petitioner’s request that the restitution award be stricken, explaining 

that: 

Defense counsel, however, is mistaken in arguing that the victim 

restitution awarded to the Sacramento Fire Department must be 

vacated now that the Penal Code § 451(b) conviction has been 

stricken. The evidence remains that defendant set fire to the 

victim’s residence in an attempt to cover up the murder that he had 

just committed. It was a mere technicality that has ended in the 

striking of the Penal Code §451(b) conviction, due to the fact that 

the victim was already dead when the residence was set on fire, 

thereby rendering the residence one that was no longer inhabited. If 

the trial court had realized the error at the time of trial, instruction 

on a Penal Code § 451(c) offense would have been given and would 

have resulted in a guilty verdict on that offense. As the evidence at 

trial clearly showed arson of the victim and the victim’s residence 

as an act intended to cover up the murder, and thus was a part of the 

continuing course of conduct of the defendant, victim restitution 

based on the arson was properly awarded for the murder itself. As 

defense counsel makes no other challenge to the award of victim 

restitution, and as this court has no jurisdiction to entertain any 

other challenge to the award in a postjudgment motion, there is no 

need to disturb the award of victim restitution imposed in this case. 

Id. at consecutive p. 2. The Superior Court directed the Clerk of Court to: (1) prepare a minute 

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order, nunc pro tunc to September 26, 2011, indicating that petitioner’s conviction for a violation 

of Cal. Penal Code § 451(b) was stricken from the state court record pursuant to Douglas v. 

Jacquez, 626 F.3d 501 (9th Cir. 2010) and the Superior Court order issued on September 2, 2011; 

and (2) prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting petitioner’s murder conviction but 

noting that petitioner’s conviction pursuant to § 451(b) was stricken pursuant to the Superior 

Court’s order of September 2, 2011. Id. at consecutive p. 3. The Clerk of Court subsequently 

carried out this order. Id. at consecutive p. 10. 

 On April 24, 2012, based upon the stipulation of the parties, the federal district court 

dismissed Douglas v. Cambra, No. 2:97-cv-775 KJM JFM P in its entirety and that case was 

closed. Case No. 2:97-cv-775 KJM JFM P, ECF No. 95. 

 Thereafter, on August 28, 2012, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 

the California Superior Court, Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 4, claiming that the Superior Court’s 

December 7, 2011 order did not comply with the Ninth Circuit decision in Douglas v. Jacquez, 

626 F.3d 501 (9th Cir. 2010). He argued, in essence, that the state court should have ordered that 

he was “acquitted” on the charge of arson of an occupied dwelling rather than simply striking that 

conviction from the record. Id. He explained that because the Superior Court struck his arson 

conviction instead of issuing an order of acquittal, it “continued to use and hold arson evidence 

against petitioner, even though it has no jurisdiction and no power to hear and determine it.” Id. 

The Superior Court construed these allegations as a claim that “[petitioner] should be deemed 

acquitted of the arson rather than merely having the arson conviction ‘stricken.’” Resp’t’s Lodg. 

Doc. 5, at 1. The court noted that there may have been a technical error in utilizing the word 

“stricken” instead of “vacated” in its December 7, 2011 order, but the semantical distinction is 

one without any substantive difference. Id. at 1-4. The court ruled as follows: 

Petitioner has filed the instant habeas petition, as Sacramento 

County Superior Court Case No. 12HC00420, to challenge this 

court’s December 7, 2011 order in Sacramento County Superior 

Court Case No. CR113481. Specifically, he claims that this court 

“imposed and carried out an unlawful Ninth Circuit order, Douglas 

v. Jacquez (9th Cir. 2010) 626 F.3d 501.” He claims that “[a]bsent 

an acquittal of his arson conviction, there is simply nothing in the 

record supporting an order by the state court compelling petitioner’s 

strickened arson order.” Rather, []he claims “there was one 

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appropriate course of action and one course only: the issuance of a 

conditional writ ordering petitioner’s acquittal on the arson charge.” 

He claims that the federal district court’s “finding of insufficient 

evidence” was the “legal equivalent of an entry of a judgment of 

acquittal at trial.” He appears to take issue with this court’s use of 

the terminology in the December 7, 2011 order that the arson 

conviction is “stricken” rather than that he has essentially been 

“acquitted” of the charge. 

Petitioner also mentions his defense counsel’s post-Douglas v. 

Jacquez motion to strike the victim restitution awarded to the 

Sacramento Fire Department, but does not appear to raise any 

actual claim with regard to the motion and this court’s order 

regarding the motion. Rather, he incorporates it into a continued 

attack on the court’s use of the word “stricken.” He attempts to 

allege the same attack as three separate grounds, but the attack 

appears to be virtually the same claim, that he should be deemed 

acquitted of the arson rather than merely having the arson 

conviction “stricken.” 

The matter is one of semantics. When a defendant claims 

insufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal of a conviction, and 

the appellate court agrees and finds the evidence insufficient, the 

appellate court will typically “reverse” the conviction. “‘A reversal 

based on the insufficiency of the evidence has the same effect [as a 

judgment of acquittal] because it means that no rational factfinder 

could have voted to convict the defendant.’” (People v. Seel (2004) 

34 Cal.4th 535, 544). The appellate courts have also directed that a 

conviction be “stricken” for insufficiency of the evidence, on direct 

appeal (see People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1324). 

In this case, however, it was the federal court on collateral review 

that invalidated the conviction due to insufficiency of the evidence. 

Upon re-examination of the June 29, 2011 order from the United 

States District Court, Eastern District of California, in Douglas v. 

Jacquez, Docket No. CIV S-07-0775 KJM JFM (HC), it now 

appears to this court that the exact language of the federal district 

court was as follows: “Petitioner’s fifth claim for relief is granted to 

the extent that petitioner’s conviction for violation of California 

Penal Code section 451(b) is vacated if the state court, after ninety 

(90) days of the entry of this order, declines to re-sentence 

petitioner under section 451(c)” [emphasis added]. As such, it 

appears that this court may have made a technical error in semantics 

in utilizing the word “stricken” instead of “vacated” in its 

December 7, 2011 order, a distinction without any substantive 

difference. 

Although the vacating of the conviction for arson may be viewed as 

having the same effect as a judgment of acquittal, petitioner does 

not demonstrate that he is entitled to a court order specifically 

proclaiming that he has been “acquitted” of violating Penal Code § 

451(b). Rather, all he is entitled to is an order correcting the 

December 7, 2011 order to reflect the exact wording of the federal 

court order in Douglas v. Jacquez, that the conviction is “vacated” 

rather than “stricken.” 

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In the interest of judicial economy, correcting the use of “stricken” 

to instead be “vacated” is more easily achieved by the court, on its 

own motion, modifying its ruling on December 7, 2011, to instead 

require the clerk of the court to forthwith: (1) prepare a blue sheet 

minute order, nunc pro tunc to September 26, 2011, indicating that 

“The PC 451(b) conviction is deemed vacated, pursuant to Douglas 

v. Jacquez (9th Cir. 2010) and this court’s orders issued on 9/2/11 

and [date of issuance of the instant order],” (2) prepare an amended 

abstract of judgment reflect the murder conviction and reflecting, in 

an asterisk at the bottom of the page, that “The PC 451(b) 

conviction was vacated per court’s orders of 9/2/11 and [date of 

issuance of the instant minute order],” and (3) give notice of the 

new order, the blue sheet minute order, and the amended abstract of 

judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the 

California Attorney General, the Sacramento County District 

Attorney, defense counsel Joseph B. de Illy, and defendant Gordon 

Douglas. 

Id. The Clerk of the Sacramento County Superior Court subsequently issued an amended abstract 

of judgment on October 17, 2012, reflecting that petitioner had been convicted of murder; that he 

had received a sentence of twenty-five years to life on that charge; that petitioner’s conviction 

pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 451(b) had been “vacated per court’s order of 9/2/11 and October 

17, 2012;” and that petitioner had been assessed fines payable to a victim and to the Sacramento 

Fire Dept. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 1. 

 On December 21, 2012, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court, in which he raised the same claims that he had raised in his habeas 

petition filed in the Superior Court. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 6. The California Supreme Court 

summarily denied that petition on March 13, 2013. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 7. 

 Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on April 8, 2013. ECF No. 1. 

Respondent filed an answer on April 7, 2014, and petitioner filed a traverse on May 15, 2014. 

ECF Nos. 19, 21. 

II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 

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(2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 

(9th Cir. 2000). 

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim - 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. 

___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining 

what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 

633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit 

precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall 

v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 

(2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so 

widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, 

be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of 

an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

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precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 5 Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S.__, __,131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter,131 

S. Ct. at 786-87. 

 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of 

§ 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by 

considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

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 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If 

the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When 

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. This 

presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for 

the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims 

but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 

___, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

 A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. This court “must determine what arguments or theories ... 

could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 

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fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 786. The petitioner bears “the burden 

to demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784). 

 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Description of Claims

 The petition before this court raises three grounds for relief. The first claim is stated, in 

full, as follows: 

I was denied due process and the correct re-sentence when the state 

court imposed and carried out an unlawful Ninth Circuit order. 

When petitioner filed his moving papers with the district court, it 

was the judgment of conviction of inhabited/arson that he attacked 

on insufficiency of evidence grounds, not the sentence imposed. 

Absent an acquittal of his arson conviction, there is simply nothing 

in the record supporting an order by the Ninth Circuit compelling 

the state court to impose order [stricken] or vacating petitioner’s 

arson conviction. Once the district court determined that 

petitioner’s conviction of inhabited/arson was not supported by 

sufficient evidence, there was one appropriate course of action and 

one course only: the issuance of a unconditional writ ordering 

petitioner’s acquittal on the arson charge. A district court’s finding 

of insufficient evidence in habeas proceedings is the legal 

equivalent of an entry of a judgment of acquittal at trial. 

ECF No. 1 at 9.6

 Petitioner’s second claim for relief is stated, in full, as follows: 

I was denied due process under the 5th and 14th Amendment when 

the state court ordered arson charge stricken/vacated then continued 

to use and hold arson evidence against petitioner. 

 

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CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 

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Petitioner filed a motion asking state court to strike restitution 

awarded to the Sacramento Fire Dept. in the amount of $2,663.81. 

Because state court imposed the unlawful order by the Ninth 

Circuit. The state court uncharacteristically misstated [it was a 

mere technicality that has ended in the stricking [sic]/vacating arson 

conviction, due to the fact that the victim was already dead when 

the residence was set on fire, thereby rendering the residence one 

that was no longer inhabited. If the trial court had realized the error 

at the time of trial, instruction on a P.C. 451(c) offense would have 

been given and would have resulted in a guilty verdict on that 

offense.] Petitioner was originally charged with a P.C. 451(a), the 

trial rested and knew petitioner would not be found guilty on that 

charge so they changed it to P.C. 457(b) over objection, petitioner 

should have been found not guilty and acquitted, as district court 

found. 

Id.

 Petitioner’s third claim for relief is stated, in full, as follows: 

I was denied due process under the 5th and 14th Amendment to the 

U.S.C. when state court imposed the unlawful Ninth Circuit order. 

Petitioner was denied the lawful relief appropriate for insufficient 

evidence. 

On November 14, 2011 petitioner filed an ex parte motion for 

retrial on remaining charge of 187 because petitioner was denied 

the correct and proper relief as a result of district court granting 

relief based on insufficiency of evidence and the state court 

carrying out the unlawful order pursuant to the Ninth Circuit, which 

resulted in state court striking-vacating arson charge. Petitioner 

was in effect hindered by the striken [sic]/vacated arson, whereas 

the petitioner should of received the correct and proper lawful relief 

which is equivalent to acquittal of the arson charge thereby 

allowing petitioner to exercise and file for his proper remedies, 

striken [sic]-vacate is not same as acquittal. 

Id. at 10. 

 In his traverse, petitioner continues to argue that because the California Superior Court 

ordered his arson charge “stricken” or “vacated” instead of issuing an order acquitting him of that 

charge, the state courts continue to “hold and use the arson evidence against petitioner.” ECF No. 

21 at 11. He argues that the Superior Court order vacating the arson conviction has prevented 

him from “exercise[ing] and fil[ing] his proper remedies.” Id. at 12. More specifically, petitioner 

argues that the state courts “continued [to] hold the arson evidence against petition[er] when it did 

not strike a restitution award of $2,663.82 to the Sacramento Fire Department in connection with 

the striken [sic] arson charge.” Id. at 14. Petitioner also contends that if he had received a 

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judgment of acquittal, he would have “absolute immunity” under the Double Jeopardy Clause 

from “further prosecution for the same offense.” Id. at 16. He explains that “because the district 

court erred in granting petitioner the correct judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the 

evidence, prosecution of the arson charge is still being suffered by the petitioner.” Id. at 17. 

 Petitioner also argues that the Sacramento County Superior Court did not have jurisdiction 

to issue an order striking or vacating his arson conviction from the record. Id. at 11. He argues 

that “the Ninth Circuit’s order violated due process of law because it, in effect, ordered the 

California Superior Court to modify a judgment of conviction that under state law it no longer 

had jurisdiction to modify.” Id. at 19. 

 Petitioner further argues that the Ninth Circuit’s remand order itself “was unlawful when 

it did not direct the District Court to enter a judgment of acquittal.” Id. at 13. He contends that “a 

state prisoner who has been granted habeas relief based on a claim of insufficient evidence [is] 

entitled to a judgment of acquittal.” Id. at 15. Put another way, petitioner argues that “the Ninth 

Circuit order violates due process because it ordered a state court to exceed its jurisdiction under 

state law by modifying petitioner’s sentence.” Id. at 22. 

 Finally, citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1978) and United States v. 

Bodey, 607 F.2d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1979), petitioner argues that “a district court’s finding of 

insufficient evidence in habeas proceedings is the legal equivalent of an entry of a judgment of 

acquittal at trial.” Id. Citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 431 (1963), petitioner argues that “a 

federal court cannot directly compel a state court to amend its judgment through a conditional 

writ.” Id. 

B. Exhaustion

 Respondent argues that none of petitioner’s claims has been exhausted in state court 

because he did not raise a federal constitutional challenge to the state courts’ failure to issue an 

order acquitting him of the arson charge. ECF No. 19 at 8-10. 

 Generally, a state prisoner must exhaust all available state court remedies either on direct 

appeal or through collateral proceedings before a federal court may consider granting habeas 

corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A state prisoner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by 

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fairly presenting his claim to the appropriate state courts at all appellate stages afforded under 

state law. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th 

Cir. 2004). However, an application for a writ of habeas corpus “may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the 

State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (a 

federal court considering a habeas petition may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits when it 

is perfectly clear that the claim is not “colorable”). 

For the reasons set forth below, whether or not petitioner’s due process claim was 

properly exhausted in state court, it lacks merit and federal habeas relief on that claim must be 

denied. 

C. Analysis 

 1. Violation of State Law

 To the extent petitioner is arguing that the state court decision on his due process claims 

violated state law, these claims are not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus action. As 

explained above, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court 

determinations on state law questions.” Wilson, 131 S. Ct. at 16 (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67). 

Thus, whether or not the California Superior Court violated state law in failing to issue an order 

acquitting petitioner of the arson charge, or whether the California Superior Court lacked 

jurisdiction under state law to issue its order(s), is not properly before this court. 

 2. Judgment of Acquittal

 The gravamen of petitioner’s complaints is that the California Superior Court’s failure to 

issue an order acquitting him of the charge of arson of an inhabited structure violated his due 

process rights. Petitioner contends that he has been harmed by his failure to obtain a court order 

“acquitting” him of this charge because: (1) he is now deprived of his right under the Double 

Jeopardy Clause not to be tried again on the arson charge; (2) he is still required to pay a 

restitution fine to the Sacramento Fire Department based on that charge; and (3) he cannot obtain 

a retrial on his murder charge based on an acquittal of the arson charge. Petitioner also argues 

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that the Ninth Circuit improperly ordered the state court to do something it lacked jurisdiction to 

do. 

 The court notes first that in order to prevail on his due process claims in federal court, 

petitioner must demonstrate that the state court decision on those claims is contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court authority, or is based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts of this case. As set forth above, petitioner must show that 

the state court decision is objectively unreasonable, or “so lacking in justification that there was 

an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. Petitioner has failed to make this showing. 

 Petitioner has not cited any United States Supreme Court case, and this court has found 

none, holding that a state prisoner who has been granted habeas relief in federal court based on a 

claim that one of the charges against him was not supported by sufficient evidence is entitled to 

an order by the federal court directing the state court to issue an order specifying that he was 

acquitted of that charge. In fact, as respondent points out, a federal habeas court does not have 

the authority to revise a state court judgment. As explained by the United States Supreme Court 

in Fay v. Noia: 

Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal liberty; when that right 

is denied and a person confined, the federal court has the power to 

release him. Indeed, it has no other power; it cannot revise the state 

court judgment; it can act only on the body of the petitioner. 

372 U.S. at 430-31, overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85 (1977) and 

superseded as recognized by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 724 (1991). Under the 

circumstances presented by this case, the state court did not unreasonably apply federal law in 

concluding that petitioner was not entitled to relief with respect to his claim that his right to due 

process was violated by the Ninth Circuit’s failure to order, and the California Superior Court’s 

failure to impose, a judgment of acquittal on the arson charge. See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 

754 (9th Cir. 2009) (“we conclude that when a Supreme Court decision does not ‘squarely 

address[ ] the issue in th[e] case . . . it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is ‘clearly established’ 

Supreme Court precedent addressing the issue before us, and so we must defer to the state court's 

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decision”). In the absence of an on point decision by the United States Supreme Court, the state 

court’s decision with respect to this due process claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court authority. 

 In part, petitioner appears to be arguing that the final resolution by the state courts of his 

successful federal habeas petition denied him his right to due process because, absent a specific 

order of acquittal, he does not have protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause from further 

prosecution on the arson charge. Petitioner is mistaken. “The Double Jeopardy Clause bars 

retrial where insufficient evidence supported a conviction.” United States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232, 

1250 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, the government may not retry a defendant when the prosecution 

introduces insufficient evidence to support his initial conviction. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 

1, 18 (1978). See also Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 39 (1988) (“Burks held that when a 

defendant’s conviction is reversed by an appellate court on the sole ground that the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial on the same 

charge); Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 327 (1984) (the “holding in Burks established 

. . . that an appellate court’s finding of insufficient evidence to convict on appeal from a judgment 

of conviction is [,] for double jeopardy purposes, the equivalent of an acquittal.”). Because the 

federal court in this case found that petitioner’s conviction for arson of an inhabited structure was 

not supported by sufficient evidence, petitioner cannot be retried on that charge. Burks, 437 U.S. 

at 18; Richardson, 468 U.S. at 327. Put another way, jeopardy was terminated when the federal 

court determined that petitioner’s arson conviction lacked sufficient evidence. Richardson, 468 

U.S. at 326. For purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, petitioner has been acquitted of the 

crime of arson of an inhabited structure, notwithstanding the Superior Court’s failure to issue an 

order specifically using the word “acquitted.” Id. 

 Petitioner may be arguing that the state court’s failure to specifically order his acquittal on 

the charge of arson of an inhabited structure leaves him open to prosecution on the lesser included 

charge of arson of a structure, in violation of § 451(c). Assuming arguendo that this argument is 

properly before the court, it is unavailing. In Douglas v. Jacquez, the Ninth Circuit quoted the 

opinion in United States v. Gooday, 714 F.2d 80, 82 (9th Cir. 1983) for the following proposition: 

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if no instructions are given on lesser included offenses . . . an 

acquittal on [a greater] charge necessarily implies an acquittal on 

all lesser offenses included within that charge. An acquittal on the 

explicit charge therefore bars subsequent indictment on the implicit 

lesser included offenses. 

626 F.3d at 506. As explained above, “an appellate court's finding of insufficient evidence to 

convict on appeal from a judgment of conviction is [,] for double jeopardy purposes, the 

equivalent of an acquittal.” Richardson, 468 U.S. at 327. Because petitioner was acquitted on the 

charge of violating Cal. Penal Code § 451(b), he appears to also enjoy protection under the 

Double Jeopardy Clause from prosecution for a violation of Cal. Penal Code § 451(c), which is a 

lesser included offense to the charge of which he was acquitted. Douglas, 626 F.3d at 506. 

Petitioner cites language in several cases which appears to suggest that a defendant who 

successfully challenges a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence is entitled not only to a 

reversal of his conviction but also to an order to the trial court to enter a judgment of acquittal 

with respect to that conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 828-29 (9th Cir. 

1992), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1171 n.10 

(9th Cir. 2005) (“the defendant who successfully challenges a conviction for insufficiency of the 

evidence is entitled not only to a reversal of his conviction but also to an order directing the 

district court to enter a judgment of acquittal with respect to that conviction”); United States v. 

Bodey, 607 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1979) (because defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal at 

his first trial, the double jeopardy clause barred the Government from bringing him to trial a 

second time on the same charge); Sumpter v. DeGroote, 552 F.2d 1206, 1211 -1212 (7th Cir. 

1977) (“reversals based on the failure of the prosecution’s proof represent the judgment of an 

appellate court that the defendant was entitled to a directed acquittal at trial”). However, in 

Bishop and Bodey, the defendants had moved for a judgment of acquittal in the trial court on 

sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The appellate court simply concluded that those motions for 

acquittal should have been granted. Petitioner has presented no evidence that he moved for 

acquittal on the arson charge in the trial court. In Sumpter, the Seventh Circuit held that where 

the petitioner’s conviction of prostitution was affirmed in part and a remand granted solely to 

permit the state to submit proof of an essential element of the crime charged lacking at trial, 

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rather than being reversed outright and a new trial granted to put the prosecution and the 

petitioner on an equal footing on remand, the limited remand violated the petitioner’s right not to 

be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Those facts are not present in the instant case. 

Because of the factual differences between this case and the cases cited by petitioner, Biship, 

Bodey, and Sumpter do not dictate the result here. 

 Petitioner also appears to be arguing that the state court’s failure to issue a judgment of 

acquittal on the charge of arson of an occupied structure has prevented him from obtaining a 

retrial of his murder charge. This argument is too speculative to warrant federal habeas relief. 

There is no evidence that petitioner’s murder conviction would be reversed if the Superior Court 

issued an order specifically acquitting him of the arson charge. Similarly, petitioner’s claim that 

his restitution fine would be withdrawn if he were to receive an order acquitting him of the arson 

charge is too speculative to warrant relief in this court. On the contrary, the California Superior 

Court explained that petitioner’s restitution award was supported by the facts of his crimes and by 

his murder conviction, and not simply by his conviction on the arson charge. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 

3 at consecutive p. 2. 

 For the foregoing reasons, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his due 

process claims. 

 3. Restitution Fine

 To the extent petitioner’s allegations could be construed to constitute a general challenge 

to the imposition of the restitution award to the Sacramento Fire Department, his claim is not 

cognizable in this action. 

 The federal writ of habeas corpus is only available to persons “in custody” at the time the 

petition is filed. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2254(a); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). 

This requirement is jurisdictional. Id. The Ninth Circuit has explicitly held that “an attack on a 

restitution order is not an attack on the execution of a custodial sentence . . . [Thus,] § 2254(a) 

does not confer jurisdiction over a challenge to a restitution order.” Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 

983 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Kramer, 195 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 1999)). With regard 

to petitioner’s challenge to the restitution portion of his sentence, the “custody” requirement of 

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Section 2254(a) is not satisfied and the court does not have jurisdiction to entertain this claim. In 

addition, to the extent petitioner’s claim challenging his restitution order concern violations of 

state law, petitioner has failed to state a cognizable federal habeas claim. As set forth above, 

federal habeas relief does not lie for violations of state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67; Jammal v. 

Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (“the issue for us, always, is whether the state 

proceedings satisfied due process; the presence or absence of a state law violation is largely 

beside the point”). 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s 

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: August 9, 2016. 

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