Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00257/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00257-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Henry A. Jones
Plaintiff
David Macher
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY A. JONES, et al., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

DAVID MACHER, et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:05-CV-0257-OWW-SMS 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT (DOC. 15) WITHOUT LEAVE

AMEND AND TO DISMISS ACTION WITH

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se who filed a

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 23,

2005. By order filed on March 25, 2005, the Court dismissed

Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. Pending before the

Court is Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed on April 22, 2005.

I. Screening the Complaint

The Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners

seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion

thereof if the Court determines that an allegation of poverty is

untrue or that the action is 1) frivolous or malicious, 2) fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 3) seeks

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2).

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

Review of the complaint filed by Plaintiff on April 22,

2005, reveals that Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief

based on alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff

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claims that in connection with criminal charges he faced in the

Superior Court for Riverside County, Defendant David Macher, who

was Plaintiff’s counsel, violated Plaintiff’s rights to due

process, a fair trial, and the effective assistance of counsel by

providing ineffective assistance of counsel, including removing

jurors based on their race and thereby depriving Plaintiff of his

right to an impartial jury, failing to raise Plaintiff’s mental

history, allowing perjured testimony, failing to call alibi

witnesses, failing to cross-examine witnesses, failing to raise

Miranda issues, failing to challenge a search warranted to call

witnesses, and failing to withdraw as counsel because of a

conflict of interest. It appears that Plaintiff is also

complaining of the conduct of Detectives Gill and Silva, who

appear to be law enforcement investigators, who allegedly used

Plaintiff’s mental illness to obtain a confession. 

Although Plaintiff states in the complaint that no criminal

charges are pending against him, in another location he states

that he has not obtained transcripts that he needs to prosecute

an effective appeal. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff’s criminal

case is still pending.

A. Civil Rights Violation

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] 

 . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States. . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution. . .

shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

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To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must plead that

defendants acted under color of state law at the time the act

complained of was committed and that the defendants deprived the

plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v. United

States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).

Further, the statute plainly requires that there be an

actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants

and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by a plaintiff. 

See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit

has held that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation

of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if

he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

B. Color of State Law

In order to recover under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege and

prove that Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive

Plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or federal

statute. Karim-Panahi v.Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621,

623 (9th Cir. 1988). It is established that a public defender

does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s

traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal

proceeding. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317, 325 (1981);

Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1985). Thus, it

does not appear that the present allegations of the complaint

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state a claim against Defendant Macher, whose conduct relates to

representation of Plaintiff in a criminal action. 

C. Attack on Criminal Conviction

When a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his

custody, or raises a constitutional challenge which could entitle

him to an earlier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of

habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Young

v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 11 S.Ct.

1090 (1991). Moreover, when seeking damages for an allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, “a § 1983 plaintiff

must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88

(1994). “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 488.

Here, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking damages for a

past conviction, Plaintiff has not shown that his conviction has

been reversed or expunged; thus, no claim pursuant to § 1983 is

stated with respect to that conviction. To the extent that

Plaintiff is attacking his conviction, his claim would generally

be more appropriately brought in a habeas corpus proceeding. A

federal court may only grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus

if the petitioner can show that "he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A habeas corpus

petition is the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the

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 The Court takes judicial notice of its docket in action number 1:05-cv-00265-OWW-LJO, Jones v. United

States, which reveals that Plaintiff has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, the Court is not certain if

that petition relates to the conviction of which Plaintiff complains in the complaint filed in the instant action.

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“legality or duration” of his confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d

573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991), quoting, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 485, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1833 (1973); Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. In contrast, a

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper

method for a prisoner to challenge the conditions of that

confinement and obtain injunctive relief. See McCarthy v.

Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141-42, 111 S.Ct. 1737, 1741-42 (1991);

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499, 93 S.Ct. at 1841; Badea, 931 F.2d at

574; Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases. Plaintiff may address his attack on his

criminal conviction by way of a petition for writ of habeas

corpus.1

If Plaintiff is seeking this Court to intervene in the state

court criminal proceedings, Plaintiff is informed that generally

the federal writ of habeas corpus will not extend to one awaiting

trial unless special circumstances exist such that there is an

absence of state processes effective to protect a federal right.

See Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 245-254 (1886); Fay v. Noia,

372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v.

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) and Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722

(1991). Further, it is established that federal courts will not

interfere with pending state criminal proceedings unless the

petitioner has exhausted all state court remedies with respect to

the claim raised. See Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F.2d 1310, 1311-

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1312 (9th Cir. 1992).

D. Judicial Immunity

Judges and officers whose functions bear a close association

to the judicial process are entitled to absolute judicial

immunity from damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for judicial 

acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts. Demoran v.

Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 156 (9th Cir. 1986). A judge loses judicial

immunity for judicial acts only when the judge acts in the clear

absence of all jurisdiction or performs an act that is not

judicial in nature. Shucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th

Cir. 1988). The factors relevant in determining whether an act is

judicial “relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether

it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the

expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the

judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

356-357, 362 (1978). Judicial immunity is not lost by allegations

that a judge conspired with a third party. As long as the judge’s

ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, immunity applies. Ashelman v. Pope,

793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986).

The allegations of the complaint before the Court are

somewhat unclear and do not unequivocally assert a claim against

a judge of the pertinent Superior Court. However, to the extent

that Plaintiff is complaining of the conduct of a judge in

ordering a psychological examination, making rulings in his case,

or failing to release transcripts, it appears that Plaintiff is

complaining of actions or rulings made by a judge in a case

before the respective court. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts

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 The complaint is not successively paginated; the reference is to an attachment with the number “31" at the

bottom.

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that would show that the actions or rulings made by the judge in

connection with Plaintiff’s case to which the judge was assigned 

were not within their jurisdiction. Thus, to the extent that

Plaintiff is attempting to state a claim against the judge or

judges involved in the rulings in his case, Plaintiff fails to

state a claim.

E. Prosecutorial Immunity

Plaintiff may be alleging that an unnamed prosecutor or

prosecutors are liable for actions undertaken in their

prosecutorial roles by presenting known false evidence. (Cmplt.

at 31.)2 Plaintiff does not identify the actors or state any

specific facts regarding the evidence or any other circumstances 

supporting this conclusion. State prosecutors are absolutely

immune from civil liability for acts taken in their official

capacity that are closely associated with the judicial process,

such as initiating prosecution and presenting the state’s case.

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 430-431 (1976); Milstein

v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001). The actions of

the prosecutor referred to by Plaintiff in the complaint appear

to be actions closely associated with the judicial process, such

as presenting the state’s case; Plaintiff does not state facts

warranting a conclusion that the prosecutors named as defendants

were acting outside their prosecutorial roles. 

II. Amendment of the Complaint

In summary, the Court finds it necessary to dismiss the

complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff has failed to state a

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cognizable claim against the defendants based on the facts as

alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff has already been given an

opportunity to file an amended complaint, and Plaintiff’s amended

complaint suffers from the same defects noted in the Court’s

order that dismissed the initial complaint with leave to amend.

The facts alleged in the amended complaint are essentially the

same as those stated in the initial complaint. It does not appear

that Plaintiff can allege a set of facts, consistent with the

allegations, in support of the claim or claims that would entitle

him to relief. It is concluded that any further opportunity to

amend would be futile.

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that

1. The complaint BE DISMISSED without leave to amend and

with prejudice for failure to state a claim; and

2. The Clerk of Court BE DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Defendant because the dismissal would terminate the action in its

entirety.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

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by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 26, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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