Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-22-13428/USCOURTS-ca11-22-13428-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elvis Eghosa Ogiekpolor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13428

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ELVIS EGHOSA OGIEKPOLOR, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00016-WMR-RDC-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13428

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and BRASHER, 

Circuit Judges.

JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

Elvis Eghosa Ogiekpolor appeals his convictions for conspiring to commit money laundering and 15 counts of money laundering. On appeal, he challenges his convictions based on Sixth 

Amendment and Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)–(c), violations. After careful consideration, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Fraudulent Scheme

The charges in this case arose from business email compromise schemes and online romance scams to defraud victims into 

sending the perpetrators money. A business email compromise 

scheme involves a “computer intrusion that occurs when an employee of a company is tricked into interacting with an [illegitimate] email.” Doc. 56 at 2.1 After the employee clicks on an attachment or link, “malware . . . infects the employee’s email account 

and/or computer.” Id. The malware allows scammers to access 

sensitive company information, including login credentials and 

email correspondence, “which can then be used to defraud the victim company.” Id. In a common form of such a scheme, “[a]fter an 

initial transfer or wiring instruction is conveyed between legitimate 

1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

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parties to [a financial] transaction, the intruder sends a fraudulent 

follow-up email that appears to be coming from the original legitimate sender.” Id. The intruder’s email instructs the victim company to wire funds into a different account—one controlled by the 

intruder or an accomplice.

A romance scam occurs when “an imposter posing as a potential paramour” targets vulnerable individuals on dating websites 

to get them to send money under false pretenses. Id. at 2–3. “Once 

an online relationship is formed with the victim, the scammer 

tricks the dating website victim into sending money”—wire transfers, checks, or cash—to the scammer or associated individuals. Id.

at 3.

In this case, the government alleged that Ogiekpolor ran an 

operation to launder money obtained from business email compromise schemes and romance scams. He and co-conspirators working at his direction registered sham corporations and then opened

bank accounts in the corporations’ names. They deposited money 

obtained from the victims of the scams into these bank accounts. 

From there, Ogiekpolor withdrew the funds and dispersed them to 

other, presumably non-fraudulent, bank accounts. According to 

the government, he laundered approximately six million dollars in 

fraud proceeds.

B. The District Court Proceedings

In this subsection, we describe the government’s prosecution of Ogiekpolor for his role in the fraudulent scheme. Because 

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he raises speedy trial issues on appeal, we must discuss in some detail the history of the various criminal proceedings against him.

On August 20, 2020, the government charged Ogiekpolor,

via criminal complaint, with conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and money laundering, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. The complaint alleged that he engaged in criminal activity beginning in October 2019 and continuing through the filing of the complaint. According to the complaint, 

he directed a person he met online to register a new Georgia business entity with Georgia’s Secretary of State and then open bank 

accounts for that entity at five different banking institutions. Later, 

he deposited into those bank accounts the proceeds from fraudulent transactions. He was arrested on the same day the criminal 

complaint was filed. The next day, he made his initial appearance 

in court.

Shortly after the initial appearance, the magistrate judge 

held a detention hearing and ordered that Ogiekpolor be detained 

pending trial. The magistrate judge determined that pretrial detention was necessary because there was a serious risk that otherwise 

Ogiekpolor would not appear at trial. The magistrate judge found 

that he had weak ties to the United States, had substantial ties to 

Nigeria, and had overstayed his immigration visa.

The magistrate judge promptly scheduled a preliminary 

hearing, but the hearing was delayed several times while the government and Ogiekpolor discussed a pre-indictment resolution and 

government cooperation. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic also 

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made it difficult for Ogiekpolor and his attorney to communicate. 

The parties submitted three consecutive motions to continue the 

preliminary hearing. Each motion was granted. The magistrate 

judge specified that the time covered by the continuances—September 2 through November 17, 2020—would be excluded for 

Speedy Trial Act purposes.

On November 18, 2020, the government filed an information charging Ogiekpolor with conspiracy to commit money 

laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, arising from conduct alleged in the August 2020 complaint. He waived indictment and was 

arraigned the same day.

Shortly after the information was filed, Ogiekpolor indicated 

that he planned to plead guilty. But at the change of plea hearing,

he denied that he committed the fraud, so the court did not proceed with the change of plea. Now proceeding pro se, after the district court found good cause for his appointed counsel to withdraw,

he filed a motion to dismiss the information based on the Speedy 

Trial Act.

On January 13, 2021, while the motion to dismiss was pending, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Ogiekpolor with 

conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 371. The indictment covered the same period as the initial complaint and the information. For the indictment’s single conspiracy 

charge, Ogiekpolor faced a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 371. When the indictment was 

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returned, the district court opened a new criminal case and, on the 

government’s motion, dismissed the information.

In the new criminal case, the magistrate judge appointed 

Ogiekpolor new counsel. The magistrate judge rescheduled a pretrial conference and directed the clerk to exclude for speedy trial 

purposes the period from February 5 through March 3, 2021. 

Through counsel, Ogiekpolor then filed two unopposed motions

to continue pretrial deadlines. The magistrate judge granted these 

motions and excluded the period from March 3 through April 21, 

2021 from the speedy trial clock.

Ogiekpolor moved in April 2021 to dismiss the indictment 

based on the amount of time that had passed between his initial 

arrest on August 20, 2020 and the filing of the information on November 18, 2020. He argued that the government violated the 

Speedy Trial Act’s § 3161(b), which requires an information or indictment to be filed within 30 days of a person’s arrest.

While the motion to dismiss was pending, Ogiekpolor informed the court that he wished to proceed pro se. The district 

court allowed him to proceed pro se with the assistance of standby 

counsel.

In November 2021, the district court denied Ogiekpolor’s 

motion to dismiss. The court acknowledged that an information or 

indictment generally had to be filed within 30 days of a defendant’s 

arrest. But it concluded that “only eleven ‘non-excludable’ days 

elapsed between Defendant’s arrest (August 20, 202[0]) and the . . .

filing o[f] the Information (November 18, 202[0]).” Doc. 38 at 7. In 

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concluding that the time between the filing of the information and 

the indictment did not make the indictment untimely, the court

reasoned that Ogiekpolor had “formal notice of the charge against 

him upon the filing of the Information . . . , and the Indictment was 

obtained only as a result of [Ogiekpolor’s] aborted guilty plea on 

the Information.” Id. at 8. Thus, “certain periods between November 18, 2020 and January 13, 2021, [were] excludable” such that the 

30-day clock had not run. Id. at 8–9.

After denying the motion to dismiss, the court set a trial date 

for November 30, 2021. On November 13, 2021, the government 

moved to continue the trial, indicating that it would seek a superseding indictment. The court granted the continuance, moving the 

trial to January 31, 2022. The court found that the ends of justice 

were served by allowing the government time to seek a superseding indictment and prepare supplemental discovery.

After the continuance was granted, Ogiekpolor made several new filings, including (1) an objection to the government’s request for the continuance, (2) a motion to reconsider the court’s 

denial of his motion to dismiss the information, (3) a motion to dismiss the indictment on statutory and constitutional speedy trial 

grounds, and (4) an objection to any further continuances. Responding to the motions, the government explained that it had not 

yet filed a superseding indictment because “Ogiekpolor’s pending

motions/objections relate to the resolution of his original motion 

to dismiss or attendant speedy trial issues.” Doc. 49 at 5–7.

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On January 11, 2022, the government sought a second continuance, indicating that the earliest possible trial date was April 26, 

2022. It cited several reasons for the continuance, including Ogiekpolor’s pending motions, the need to obtain a superseding indictment, and the complexity of the case. Ogiekpolor again objected.

The district court held a hearing on the government’s continuance request and the pending motions. The court granted the 

continuance at the hearing. In an order entered after the hearing, 

the district court made an ends-of-justice finding to exclude the 

time from January 31 through May 17, 2022 for speedy trial purposes. The court set a trial date for May 17, 2022.

On February 15, 2022, the grand jury returned a superseding 

indictment charging Ogiekpolor with one count of money laundering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) and 16 substantive counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. 

The superseding indictment differed in material respects from the 

complaint, information, and initial indictment. Among other 

things, it alleged that the conspiracy began on an earlier date (February 2019) than had been alleged in the initial complaint, information, and indictment (October 2019). The superseding indictment also identified six additional sham companies Ogiekpolor and 

co-conspirators working at his direction registered in Georgia. 

Based on the new charges in the superseding indictment, he faced 

a new statutory penalty of ten years imprisonment per charge instead of five years total. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1957(b)(1), with 18 

U.S.C. § 371.

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Before the scheduled trial date, Ogiekpolor moved to dismiss the superseding indictment, citing due process, constitutional 

speedy trial, Speedy Trial Act, and criminal procedure violations. 

The court denied the motion to dismiss.

Ogiekpolor’s trial began on May 17, 2022. At the start of the 

trial, the government moved to dismiss one of the money laundering counts, and the district court granted that motion. The parties 

introduced hundreds of exhibits and called dozens of witnesses during the eight-day trial. The jury convicted him on all counts. The 

district court sentenced him to a total of 25 years’ imprisonment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 

trial has been violated is a mixed question of law and fact. United 

States v. Villarreal, 613 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2010). We review 

the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings 

for clear error. Id.

We likewise review de novo the district court’s denial of a 

motion to dismiss based on a violation of the Speedy Trial Act and 

for clear error its factual determinations as to excludable time. 

United States v. Dunn, 83 F.4th 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2023). A district 

court’s grant or denial of an ends-of-justice continuance under the 

Speedy Trial Act is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.

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We liberally construe pro se filings. See Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 

1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2022). “Pro se litigants, however, are required 

to conform to procedural rules.” Id.2

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Ogiekpolor argues that his constitutional and 

statutory rights were violated because of delays in his criminal case.

We first address Ogiekpolor’s constitutional issue and then turn to 

his statutory challenges.

A. The Delayed Trial Date Did Not Violate the Sixth 

Amendment.

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees a defendant “the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. 

VI. If a trial is unreasonably delayed, “a court must set aside any 

judgment of conviction, vacate any sentence imposed, and dismiss 

the indictment.” Villarreal, 613 F.3d at 1349. To determine whether 

a defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to a 

speedy trial, courts weigh four factors: (1) the length of the delay, 

(2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his 

right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 

407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). “In this circuit, a defendant generally must 

show actual prejudice unless the first three factors in Barker all 

weigh heavily against the government.” United States v. Davenport, 

935 F.2d 1223, 1239 (11th Cir. 1991).

2 Ogiekpolor represented himself at times during the district court proceedings. He is represented by counsel on appeal.

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Ogiekpolor asserts that he was denied the right to a speedy 

trial under the Sixth Amendment because of the delay between his 

arrest and trial. The district court rejected his constitutional speedy 

trial challenge because the first three Barker factors did not all 

weigh heavily in favor of dismissal and he did not show actual prejudice. We conclude that the district court did not err in weighing 

the factors and denying Ogiekpolor’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds.

1. Length of Delay

We begin by considering the first factor, the length of the 

delay. As we have explained, this factor “serves a triggering function: it must first be satisfied for the court to analyze the other factors.” United States v. Oliva, 909 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Villarreal, 613 F.3d at 1350). A delay exceeding one year is “presumptively prejudicial.” United States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1336 

(11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 

n.1 (1992)).

Here, the government concedes that the delay in bringing

Ogiekpolor to trial exceeded one year, as the district court found.

Because the delay exceeded one year,3 the triggering factor is 

3 Ogiekpolor argues that the relevant period for analyzing his Sixth Amendment challenge is between his arrest and the criminal complaint’s filing in August 2020 and his trial in May 2022, a total of 21 months. The government 

maintained, and the district court agreed, that the delay is calculated post-indictment. The district court calculated the delay as approximately 16

months—from January 13, 2021 (first indictment) to May 17, 2022 (trial). 

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satisfied, and we proceed to the remaining Barker factors. See Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1336–37.

We have explained that even when the length of delay is

presumptively prejudicial, it does not weigh heavily against the 

government unless the second factor, the reason for the delay, also 

weighs against the government. See, e.g., United States v. Vargas, 

97 F.4th 1277, 1290 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[I]t is particularly necessary 

to examine the length of the delay alongside the reasons behind it 

because there were different forces at work for different parts of 

the delay.”); United States v. Stapleton, 39 F.4th 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 

2022) (“[T]he length of delay doesn’t weigh heavily against the Government unless the reason for the delay also weighs against the 

Government.” (emphasis in original)), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2693 

(2023). We turn to factor two.

2. Reason for Delay

“The government bears the burden of establishing valid reasons for the delay.” Villarreal, 613 F.3d at 1351. When evaluating 

the government’s reasons, we allocate different weight to different 

reasons for delay:

(1) a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to 

hamper the defense is weighted heavily against the 

government; (2) a more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts is weighted less heavily 

against the government but nevertheless is 

Because the trial delay exceeded one year either way, we need not decide 

which calculation is correct.

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considered since the ultimate responsibility for such 

circumstances must rest with the government rather 

than the defendant; and (3) a valid reason, such as a 

missing witness, serves to justify appropriate delay. 

Id. (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The record supports the district court’s finding that the reason for the delay does not weigh against the government. The district court considered Ogiekpolor’s requests for extensions and pretrial motions. The court recounted that after the government issued the first indictment in January 2021, Ogiekpolor filed two unopposed motions to extend the time for pretrial filings and continue a scheduled pretrial conference. According to the court, 

“[t]hese two motions had the cumulative effect of extending the 

filing date for pretrial motions from March 1, 2021, to April 19, 

2021.” Doc. 88 at 5. Then, “between April 19, 2021, and August 17, 

2021, the parties litigated [Ogiekpolor’s] initial motion to dismiss 

. . . which included [his] requesting two extensions of time to file 

responses.” Id.

After the district court denied the motion to dismiss in November 2021, Ogiekpolor filed additional motions that the district

court said “required additional delay” to address. Id. at 5–6. The 

court also observed that “the COVID-19 pandemic prevented any 

trials from being conducted in the Northern District of Georgia 

during part of” the relevant period, and “it was unlikely that 

[Ogiekpolor’s] trial could have commenced sooner.” Id. at 5 n.1.

Thus, the district court found that the “delay [was] not attributable 

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to any negligence, dilatory conduct, or inaction on the part of the 

government.” Id. at 6.

The district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous. Given these findings, the court did not err in concluding that 

“the second Barker factor does not weigh against the government.”

See id. When “there is no indication that the prosecution was any 

more responsible than the defense for the delay,” and “matters outside the control of the parties [contribute to] the delay,” the second 

Barker factor does not weigh against the government. United States 

v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003); accord United States v. 

Register, 182 F.3d 820, 827 (11th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that when 

the defendant and “the government [both] bear some responsibility for putting off the trial,” then the second Barker factor does not 

weigh in the defendant’s favor). Moreover, where the litigation of 

pretrial motions and requests for continuances initiated by the defendant contribute to the delay, we cannot say that the reason for 

the delay weighs against the government. Register, 182 F.3d at 827.

Because the second Barker factor does not weigh against the 

government, the first Barker factor, the length of the delay, does not 

weigh heavily against the government. See Vargas, 97 F.4th at 1294. 

Next, factor three.

3. Assertion of Speedy Trial Right

For the third factor, we ask whether Ogiekpolor affirmatively asserted his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. The government agrees with him (and conceded below) that he did. The 

government did not concede that this factor weighs heavily against 

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it, however. We agree with the district court that this factor does

not weigh heavily against the government.

Under our precedent, whether a defendant’s assertion of his 

speedy trial right weighs heavily against the government depends

on the facts relevant to Barker factor two. Compare Ingram, 446 F.3d 

at 1335, 1338–40 (holding that the third factor weighed heavily 

against the government where the government was responsible for 

the delay and the defendant had asserted his right to a speedy trial 

soon after learning of the indictment and arrest warrant), with Register, 182 F.3d at 828 (concluding that the third Barker factor did not 

weigh heavily against the government where the defendant had asserted his right to a speedy trial but also moved for four continuances before trial). The district court concluded that Register was 

more applicable to this case than Ingram because Ogiekpolor was 

largely responsible for the delay in proceedings. Because the district 

court did not clearly err in finding that he caused a substantial part 

of the delay, we agree with the district court that this factor does 

not weigh heavily against the government.

Having concluded that the first three factors do not weigh 

heavily against the government, we move to factor four.

4. Actual Prejudice

The fourth factor we examine is whether Ogiekpolor suffered actual prejudice from the delay. “To show actual prejudice, 

[he] must show (1) oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) his own 

anxiety and concern, or (3) the possibility that his defense was 

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impaired because of the delay.” United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 

1070, 1081–82 (11th Cir. 2018).

On appeal, Ogiekpolor asserts three reasons why he suffered 

actual prejudice: (1) he “was subjected to oppressive pretrial incarceration for 21 months before his case came to trial”; (2) he “suffered anxiety and concern based on his displeasure with prior counsel for failing to make the government try him in a timely fashion 

and his multiple motions to dismiss and objections to requests for 

continuance that were made by the Government”; and (3) his defense was impaired because “the continued delay provided the government the time that [it] needed to file a superseding indictment, 

which increased [his] incarceration exposure from a maximum of 

five (5) years to a maximum of one-hundred and fifty (150) years.” 

Appellant’s Br. 25.4

We begin with his third reason, that his defense was impaired by the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. We start with this 

one “because the inability of a defendant [to] adequately . . . prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id.

We are unconvinced that Ogiekpolor’s description of the 

way in which his defense was impaired amounts to actual prejudice. First, his enhanced-criminal-exposure point is misplaced. The 

impairment inquiry does not focus on the result or potential result 

4 Although Ogiekpolor argues on appeal that he suffered prejudice, it does not 

appear that he argued prejudice below. We assume, without deciding, that his 

prejudice argument is properly before us.

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of the proceedings; it focuses instead on the likelihood that the defendant’s ability to mount a defense to the charges against him will 

diminish over time due to risks such as “dimming memories and 

loss of exculpatory evidence.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654. Second, he 

does not identify any witnesses, evidence, or legal defenses that he 

was unable to present because of the delay. Nor does he assert that 

the filing of the superseding indictment allowed the government to 

bring additional charges that he was unprepared to defend.

Turning back to Ogiekpolor’s first reason, we find it lacking

because pretrial incarceration alone does not amount to prejudice 

unless the defendant demonstrates that “the conditions under 

which he was held or the length of his confinement rendered the 

delay a constitutional violation.” Dunn, 345 F.3d at 1297. After his

initial arrest, the magistrate judge determined that he should be detained pending trial because he was a flight risk. As a result, he remained in detention for 21 months before trial, a significant 

amount of time. But he has identified no cases holding that this 

length of detention alone is unconstitutional. Other circuits have 

suggested that to show actual prejudice a defendant must demonstrate that the delay in trial resulted in substandard conditions of 

confinement or other consequences of the detention such as loss of 

employment, disruption of family life, or excessive mental anguish. 

See Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 761–62 (3d Cir. 1993); see also

United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390, 400 (4th Cir. 2022). Ogiekpolor does not point us to any such evidence.

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Lastly, we turn to his second reason, that he suffered prejudice based on his anxiety and concern. “Anxiety and concern of the 

accused are undoubtedly present to some degree in every case.” 

Morris v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 1387, 1391 (8th Cir. 1975). But “this alone 

does not demonstrate prejudice.” United States v. McGhee, 532 F.3d 

733, 740 (8th Cir. 2008). The Third Circuit has required a defendant 

to “produce evidence of psychic injury” to show actual prejudice 

based on anxiety and concern. Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 762. That court 

has also acknowledged that a showing of disrupted employment 

could contribute to establishing prejudice. Kennedy v. Superintendent 

Dallas SCI, 50 F.4th 377, 384–85 (3d Cir. 2022) (concluding that the

“second category of prejudice militate[d] slightly in favor of” the 

defendant when he “complain[ed] that the looming indictment interfered with his employment by limiting his opportunities in the 

Marine Corps and ultimately prevent[ed] him from reenlisting”). 

But we have not found, and Ogiekpolor does not cite, any case finding displeasure with counsel and length of proceedings sufficient to 

demonstrate anxiety and concern. Thus, we conclude that he has 

failed to show actual prejudice based on his second reason.

To sum up Ogiekpolor’s Sixth Amendment challenge, because the district court did not clearly err in finding that both he 

and the government were responsible under Barker for the delay in 

this case, factors one, two, and three do not weigh heavily against 

the government. Therefore, Ogiekpolor is not excused from showing actual prejudice. And because he has not done so, we agree 

with the district court that his constitutional speedy trial challenge 

is meritless.

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B. There Was No Speedy Trial Act Violation Based on the 

Delay in Returning the Indictment or Beginning the

Trial.

In addition to the Sixth Amendment’s protections, the 

Speedy Trial Act establishes time limits for a defendant’s criminal 

case. The Act requires the government to file an information or 

indictment charging a defendant with the commission of a crime 

within 30 days from the defendant’s arrest or receipt of a summons 

in connection with the charge(s). 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). The Act also 

sets a time limit for trial: “In any case in which a plea of not guilty 

is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence 

within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the 

information or indictment.” Id. § 3161(c)(1).

In computing the 30- and 70-day time limits, the Speedy 

Trial Act directs that certain periods are not counted. Id. § 3161(h). 

The Act lists circumstances when time is excluded. One circumstance relevant here is when a district court orders a continuance 

based on a finding that “the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A).

When deciding whether to grant a continuance based on the 

ends of justice, the court must consider the following factors: 

(i) whether the failure to grant the continuance “would be likely to 

make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a 

miscarriage of justice”; (ii) whether the case is so complex “that it 

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is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by” 

the Speedy Trial Act; (iii) whether, “in a case in which arrest precedes indictment, delay in the filing of the indictment is caused because the arrest occurs at a time such that it is unreasonable to expect return and filing of the indictment” within the Speedy Trial 

Act’s 30-day time limit; and (iv) whether the denial of a continuance “would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, 

would unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the 

attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.” Id. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)–(iv). The district court must set out, 

orally or in writing, “its reasons for finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A).

The Speedy Trial Act addresses what happens when the 30-

day time limit for filing an indictment or information after an arrest 

or the 70-day time limit for trial after indictment or information is 

not met. If the government exceeds the 30-day time limit to file an 

indictment or information, the Act directs that any charge against 

the defendant “shall be dismiss[ed] or otherwise dropped.” Id.

§ 3162(a)(1). If the 70-day time limit for holding the trial is not met, 

the defendant is entitled to dismissal of the indictment or information upon his motion. Id. § 3162(a)(2).

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Ogiekpolor argues that two distinct Speedy Trial Act violations occurred based on the delay in (1) the government securing 

an indictment and (2) the district court starting his trial. We reject 

both.

1. Ogiekpolor Waived Any Speedy Trial Act Violation Based 

on the Government’s Delay in Securing an Indictment.

Regarding the first Speedy Trial Act challenge, Ogiekpolor 

argues that the government failed to comply with the Act’s speedy 

indictment provision. The government responds that we should 

not reach the merits of this issue because Ogiekpolor waived any 

challenge under the Speedy Trial Act to the presentment of the indictment.

Determining whether Ogiekpolor waived his speedy indictment challenge involves two inquiries: First, whether the Speedy 

Trial Act’s waiver clause applies to a speedy indictment challenge,

and second, whether Ogiekpolor sufficiently raised a speedy indictment issue as to the superseding indictment. After considering both

questions, we conclude that he waived any speedy indictment challenge.

As we noted above, § 3162(a) provides sanctions for failing 

to adhere to its prescribed time limits. Subsection (a)(1) mandates 

dismissal of any charge not filed in an indictment or information 

within 30 days from a defendant’s arrest or service of a summons. 

Subsection (a)(2) requires dismissal of the indictment or information upon the defendant’s motion if the defendant is not 

brought to trial within 70 days. This subsection concludes: “Failure 

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of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a 

plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver of the 

right to dismissal under this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (emphasis added).

Ogiekpolor’s speedy indictment issue turns on the meaning 

of “this section.” He contends that because this waiver language 

appears in § 3162(a)(2), it applies only to dismissals based on failure 

to timely bring a case to trial. The government contends that “this 

section” refers to § 3162, which governs both the speedy trial right 

and the speedy indictment right. We agree with the government.

“Congress ordinarily adheres to a hierarchical scheme in 

subdividing statutory sections.” Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. 

Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60 (2004). When Congress drafts new legislation, 

it divides that legislation into sections, subsections, paragraphs, 

subparagraphs, clauses, subclauses, and items. See id. at 60–61. Congress refers to each level of that hierarchy by a unique word. See 

House Legislative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style, HLC No. 

117-2, 15–16 (2022); Senate Office of the Legislative Counsel, Legislative Drafting Manual 10 (1997).5 “[A] section is a unit below the 

subpart but above the subsection.” Section, Black’s Law Dictionary

(12th ed. 2024). Generally speaking, a subsection starts with “(a),” 

5 Although Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act before the congressional 

drafting manuals were published, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174), the Supreme Court has explained 

that these manuals are consistent with earlier guides. See Koons Buick Pontiac 

GMC, Inc., 543 U.S. at 61 n.4 (citing “standard interpretive guides” dating as 

early as 1961).

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whereas a paragraph starts with “(1),” a subparagraph begins with 

“(A),” and a clause commences with “(i).” Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 

Inc., 543 U.S. at 60–61.

By its plain language, the waiver clause of § 3162(a)(2)—a 

subsection—applies to “this section.” Thus, following the Code’s 

hierarchical scheme, the waiver language refers to § 3162, in which 

both the speedy indictment right and the speedy trial right appear.

If Congress intended to limit the waiver provision to dismissals for 

untimely trials, we would expect the statute to have used the 

phrase “under this paragraph” or “under this subsection.” Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Congress used this customary 

language elsewhere in the Speedy Trial Act. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(d)(2) (“The sanctions of section 3162 apply to this subsection.”

(emphasis added)); Id. § 3161(h)(3)(B) (“For purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph . . . .” (emphasis added)); Id.

§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) (specifying “clause (ii)” (emphasis added)).

We therefore join the numerous other circuits that have interpreted the plain language of § 3162(a)(2) to mean that a defendant waives a speedy indictment challenge if he does not move in 

the district court for dismissal on Speedy Trial Act grounds before 

trial. See, e.g., United States v. Satterwhite, 893 F.3d 352, 355–59 (6th 

Cir. 2018); United States v. Cherry, 720 F.3d 161, 165–66 (4th Cir. 

2013); United States v. Hines, 694 F.3d 112, 117–20 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 

United States v. Spagnuolo, 469 F.3d 39, 42–46 (1st Cir. 2006); United 

States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 803–04 (8th Cir. 2006); United States 

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v. Lewis, 980 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds 

by Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010).

Having concluded that a speedy indictment issue is waived 

if not timely raised, we turn to whether Ogiekpolor made a timely

challenge. Ogiekpolor argues that he adequately raised a speedy indictment challenge in his pro se motion to dismiss filed a few weeks 

before trial. He asserts that his motion to dismiss the superseding 

indictment sufficed to raise the issue because the motion “set forth 

the facts that constitute the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).” Reply 

Br. 5. Those facts, he says, include his acknowledgement that the 

superseding indictment charged a crime based on the same conduct as the initial complaint in the case, which was filed in August 

2020 and triggered the speedy trial clock. He adds that he referenced the Speedy Trial Act, “18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.,” in his motion 

to dismiss. He asserts that his failure to identify the specific speedy 

indictment provision in § 3161(b) should not be fatal to preserving 

his challenge. But after carefully reviewing the motion to dismiss—

even liberally construing this pro se filing—we disagree.

Ogiekpolor’s motion to dismiss reveals that the “facts” he 

now identifies as supporting a speedy indictment issue were presented in support of his Fifth Amendment due process challenge.

There, he asserted that “pre-indictment delay . . . [was] the product 

of a deliberative act by the government designed to gain a tactical 

advantage,” which caused him substantial prejudice. Doc. 76 at 1–

2. In context, he argued that the superseding indictment’s belated 

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addition of more charges based on the same offense conduct was 

evidence of the government’s unfair tactics.

What is more, a review of Ogiekpolor’s motion reveals that 

his failure to cite 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) was a knowing omission. He

cited specific provisions of the Speedy Trial Act in relation to other 

issues. For example, he unambiguously asserted a 70-day appearance-to-trial violation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (the correct provision). He argued that the elapsed days between his February 24 appearance on the superseding indictment and his scheduled trial date of May 17 violated the Speedy Trial Act. And he asserted a 90-day detention-to-trial violation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3164(b) (also the correct provision), arguing that the government’s failure to bring him to trial within 90 days of his arrest on 

August 20, 2020 violated the Speedy Trial Act. Ogiekpolor’s assertions of these specific violations with reference to the specific statutory provisions belies his position that a more-than-30-day speedy 

indictment violation is hidden in his motion.

Ogiekpolor does not contend that he raised a speedy indictment violation other than in his motion to dismiss. Thus, under 

§ 3162(a)(2), he waived it, and we cannot consider it on appeal.

2. There Was No Speedy Trial Act Violation Based on the Delay in Beginning the Trial.

We now turn to Ogiekpolor’s Speedy Trial Act challenge 

based on the delay between his indictment and trial. As we explained above, the Speedy Trial Act generally imposes a requirement that a trial begin “within seventy days from the filing date 

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(and making public) of the information or indictment.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(c)(1); see Davenport, 935 F.2d at 1229 (“Computation of the 

[70]-day limit under the Speedy Trial Act generally begins when the 

defendant is indicted or when the defendant first appears before the 

court . . . .”). But the Speedy Trial Act “permits a district court to 

grant a continuance and to exclude the resulting delay if the court, 

after considering certain factors, makes on-the-record findings that 

the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh 

the public’s and defendant’s interests in a speedy trial.” Dunn, 

83 F.4th at 1314 (quoting Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 498–

99 (2006)); accord 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).

Ogiekpolor argues that the Speedy Trial Act was violated because there were more than 70 days of non-excludable time between his indictment and trial. As an initial matter, both Ogiekpolor and the government agree that the 57 days from September 

16 through November 12, 2021 were non-excludable.6 At that 

point, 13 days remained on the speedy trial clock.

6 This period represents the time from when the district court had all the necessary information to rule on Ogiekpolor’s motion to dismiss the charges 

against him on speedy trial grounds through the district court’s denial of the 

motion. See Davenport, 935 F.2d at 1228 (“For pretrial motions that do not require hearings, § 3161(H)(1)(F) excludes the time required for ‘prompt disposition’ of the motion. . . . If the court has all the information necessary to rule 

on the motion at the time the motion is filed, the court immediately has the 

motion under advisement under § 3161(h)(1)(J) and thirty days may be excluded from the speedy trial clock due to the motion.”).

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The district court found that periods of delay from November 13, 2021 through the trial date were in the interests of justice 

and therefore excluded under the Speedy Trial Act. Ogiekpolor argues that the speedy trial clock continued to run after November 

12 because this period of delay was “due solely to the Government’s lack of diligent preparation.” Appellant’s Br. 30. In effect, he 

challenges the district court’s determination that this period should 

be excluded from the speedy trial clock based on the “ends of justice.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).

We begin by explaining why the district court did not clearly 

err in finding that the period from November 13, 2021 through January 11, 2022 was excludable. Notably, on November 13, 2021, the 

government filed a motion to continue the trial, which the district 

court granted. In that motion, the government recounted that the 

district court informed the parties on November 9, 2021 that the 

new trial date would be November 30, three weeks away. The government anticipated that it needed several weeks to provide discovery, file a superseding indictment, and prepare for trial.

The district court granted the motion and found that the 

ends of justice would be served by granting a continuance. In its 

order, the district court recited the government’s reasons for requesting the continuance and found that a denial of the request 

would result in a “miscarriage of justice.” Doc. 41 at 2–3 (citing 18 

U.S.C. § 3167(h)(7)(B)). After considering the government’s need 

for additional time to seek a superseding indictment, prepare supplemental discovery, and secure witnesses, the court found that “[a] 

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sixty day continuance of the trial date [was] appropriate to allow 

both parties adequate time to prepare for trial.” Id. at 3. In deciding 

whether to grant an ends-of-justice continuance, a district court 

must consider “a multiplicity of factors, i.e., adequate time for defense counsel [and the government] to prepare, number of [witnesses], pending motions, anticipated trial time, . . . conflicts in 

schedules of judges and trial counsel, etc.” United States v. Henry, 

698 F.2d 1172, 1174 (11th Cir. 1983). Here, the district court did just 

that. Given the “broad discretion” a district court has when “attempting to comply with the mandates of the Speedy Trial Act and 

the exclusions thereto,” the district court did not abuse that discretion in granting the government’s motion to continue trial. Id. And 

because none of the district court’s underlying findings was clearly 

erroneous, the court did not err in finding that the period between 

November 13, 2021 and January 11, 2022 was excludable time under § 3161(h)(7)(A)–(B). See id.

We now turn to whether the district court clearly erred in 

finding that the period from January 11, 2022 through the start of 

the trial on May 17, 2022 was properly treated as excludable time.

On January 11, 2022, the government filed another motion to continue trial, this time until April 26, 2022. The government explained 

that Ogiekpolor had filed several pretrial motions that were still 

pending before the district court and required the government to 

respond. Also, standby counsel would not be available for many 

dates between February and July. Standby counsel’s presence was 

mandatory because the district court previously conditioned its 

permission for Ogiekpolor to represent himself on having standby 

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counsel to aid him during trial. Moreover, the government had yet 

to seek a superseding indictment, the case was complex, supplemental discovery was required, and both parties needed additional 

time to prepare for trial.

The district court again found that the ends of justice were 

served by granting a continuance. After reviewing the government’s motion, the court found that denying a continuance would 

result in a “miscarriage of justice” and “deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.” Doc. 55 at 1 (citing 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(i), (iv)). The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the continuance, and again we cannot say that 

the district court clearly erred in finding that the continuance 

served the ends of justice. Cf. Henry, 698 F.2d at 1174.

Because the district court’s reasons for granting the two 

challenged continuances fell within the bounds of its considerable 

discretion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting 

the government’s motion to continue trial, nor did it err in rejecting Ogiekpolor’s Speedy Trial Act challenge.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we reject Ogiekpolor’s challenges on 

appeal and thus affirm the district court.

AFFIRMED.

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