Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02066/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02066-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shawn Tyrone Percy
Petitioner
USA
Respondent

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

v. 

Shawn Tyrone Percy, 

Defendant/Movant.

No. CV 16-02066-PHX-DGC (DMF)

 CR 98-00873-PHX-DGC 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Shawn Tyler Percy, an inmate currently incarcerated in the Federal 

Bureau of Prisons, through counsel has filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 

Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. §2255 (hereinafter “2255 motion”) (Doc. 1). On September 6, 

2016, Respondent United States of America filed a Motion to Stay, and, on September 7, 

2016, filed a Motion to Extend the Time to File a Response/Opposition to Petitioner’s 

motion (Docs. 5, 6). On September 8, 2016, this Court granted Respondent’s requested 

extension, permitting Respondent to file its response/opposition “(i) no later than two 

weeks after the Court’s decision on the government’s Motion to Stay Further Proceedings 

on the Motion to Vacate Sentence (Doc. 5), if that Motion to Stay is denied; or (ii) no 

later than two weeks after the Supreme Court issues its decision in Dimaya and the Ninth 

Circuit issues its decision in Begay, whichever comes later, if the government’s Motion 

to Stay is granted” (Doc. 8). Petitioner filed a Response to the Motion to Stay on 

Case 2:16-cv-02066-DGC Document 13 Filed 11/04/16 Page 1 of 6
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

October 21, 2016 (Doc. 10), and on October 27, 2016, filed a notice of erratum (Doc. 11) 

correcting Movant’s sentence expiration date as being July 7, 2016, if the Court were to 

set aside Movant’s 924(c) conviction. On October 28, 2016, Respondent filed a Reply 

(Doc. 12). 

As explained below, the Court recommends that the Motion to Stay (Doc. 5) 

pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 (cert. granted 

Sept. 29, 2016), and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Begay, No. 14-

10080, be granted. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioner raises one claim in his 2255 motion, that, in light of the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), his 

sentence is unconstitutional. In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the so-called 

“residual clause” in the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal 

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (“ACCA”), is unconstitutionally vague. Petitioner asserts 

that his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) for discharging a firearm during and 

in relation to a crime of violence, second-degree murder, is unconstitutional. 

United States v. Begay, No. 14-10080, has been fully briefed, argued, and was 

submitted to the Ninth Circuit for decision on May 26, 2016. Begay will address whether 

second degree murder is a crime of violence for purposes of a § 924(c) conviction, and 

how Johnson impacts the analysis—the exact questions posed by this petition. The 

Supreme Court has granted certiori n Lynch v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498. In that case, the 

Supreme Court will decide whether the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which is 

identical to the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B) that Petitioner necessarily challenges 

here, is unconstitutional for the same reasons as the residual clause in Johnson. 

Following a three day jury trial, Movant was convicted of one count of seconddegree murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1111, and one count of discharging a firearm 

during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) 

(Doc. 1 at p.1). Movant was sentenced to 280 months in prison, consisting of 160 

Case 2:16-cv-02066-DGC Document 13 Filed 11/04/16 Page 2 of 6
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

months on the murder count followed by 120 months on the § 924(c) count (Id.). Movant 

asserts that his sentence expiration date on the second degree murder charge alone (not 

considering the §924(c) sentence) was July 7, 2016 (Doc. 11). 

Respondent requests a stay of these proceedings pending the U.S. Supreme 

Court’s pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 (cert. 

granted Sept. 29, 2016), and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Begay, No. 

14-10080 (Doc. 5). 

II. ANALYSIS 

A court’s power to stay proceedings pending the resolution of another case is 

“incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on 

its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” 

Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). “A trial court may, with 

propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket, and the fairest course for the parties to 

enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which 

bear upon the case.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th 

Cir. 1979). In determining whether a stay is appropriate, the court must weigh “the 

competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay.” 

Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 

300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). The “proponent of a stay bears the burden of 

establishing its need.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 709 (1997) (citing Landis, 299 

U.S. at 255). If there is “even a fair possibility” of harm to the opposing party, the 

moving party “must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go 

forward.” Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112 (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254). In habeas cases, 

“special considerations” are implicated “that place unique limits on a district court’s 

authority to stay a case in the interests of judicial economy.” See Yong v. INS, 208 F.3d 

1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000). If a stay is especially long or its term is indefinite,” the Court 

“require[s] a greater showing to justify it.” Id. at 1119. 

Because neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has decided the main 

Case 2:16-cv-02066-DGC Document 13 Filed 11/04/16 Page 3 of 6
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

issues raised by Movant, and that both are scheduled to do so in the upcoming months, 

the Court agrees with the government that controlling decisions by the Supreme Court 

and the Ninth Circuit in Dimaya and Begay, respectively, would narrow the issues and 

promote judicial economy. An inordinate amount of effort and time could be expended 

needlessly in the litigation of Petitioner’s 2255 motion and similar motions if the stay is 

not granted. On October 28, 2016, Respondent asserted that approximately forty (40) 

petitions have been filed in the Phoenix Division of this Court alleging 924(c) challenges 

(Doc. 12 at 4). Further, it is in the public interest that similarly situated defendants be 

treated alike for sentencing. However, efficiency and public interest are not the only 

inquiries in deciding whether or not to grant a stay. 

One of the factors the court may weigh in considering a stay of proceedings is the 

likelihood of success on the merits. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). 

Respondent describes a number of issues that need to be decided in Movant’s favor to be 

entitled to relief: 

Johnson did not consider the residual clause of any statute besides the 

ACCA, so the instant petition can only be successful if several issues are 

decided in Petitioner’s favor, including: (1) whether the Johnson holding, 

despite the express language of the opinion, applies equally to statutes other 

than the ACCA; (2) whether § 924(c)(3)(B) specifically is invalid in light 

of Johnson; (3) whether a challenge based primarily on Leocal v. Ashcroft, 

543 U.S. 1 (2004), may nonetheless be timely due to Johnson; and (4) 

whether second degree murder qualifies under the elements clause— and 

not the residual clause—of § 924(c)(3) in light of Leocal and its progeny. 

Begay will definitively answer questions (2) and (4) for courts within the 

Ninth Circuit and, if the Supreme Court grants certiorari, Dimaya will 

answer question (1) and inform the answer as to question (2). Begay should 

be decided any day now... A stay of proceedings in this case until after 

Begay and Dimaya are decided will promote judicial efficiency, ensure 

uniformity of law, and last only a matter of months – or possibly a mere 

matter of days or weeks, in the case of Begay. 

(Doc. 5 at 4). 

Another factor for the court to consider is whether issuance of the stay will 

substantially injure the parties interested in the proceeding. Hinton, 481 U.S. at 776. 

Case 2:16-cv-02066-DGC Document 13 Filed 11/04/16 Page 4 of 6
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Respondent’s argument that the stay should not be granted for the limited duration 

requested by the Government assumes that this case and subsequent appeal would be 

resolved before the Begay and Dimaya opinions issue, which seems unrealistic at best. 

Thus, Movant is not substantially injured by the short, limited stay Respondent requests. 

Movant cites Yong v. INS, 208 F.3d at 1116, in opposition to a stay in this case 

(Doc. 10 at 2). In Yong, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion 

by staying a habeas corpus petition pending resolution of another matter pending before 

the court, Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000). See Yong, 208 F.3d at 1121. The 

court noted that because Ma was merely before the Ninth Circuit, it was uncertain when it 

would be resolved. Id. at 1119. The court asserted that the resolution of Ma could take 

years if the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 

Id. Because decisions in Begay and Dimaya are not years but are very likely months 

away, a stay of this matter, unlike the stay in Yong, would be short and would not be 

indefinite. 

The stay Respondent requests is short and finite; it is also within the public 

interest. Thus, this Court will recommend that this matter be stayed pending the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Lynch v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 (cert. granted Sept. 29, 2016), and the 

Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Begay, No. 14-10080. Accordingly, 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Government’s Motion to Stay 

(Doc. 5) pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 (cert. 

granted Sept. 29, 2016), and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Begay, No. 

14-10080, be granted. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Government’s opposition/answer 

be filed no later than two weeks after the later of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch 

v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Begay, No. 

14-10080 be granted. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Case 2:16-cv-02066-DGC Document 13 Filed 11/04/16 Page 5 of 6
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 4th day of November, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:16-cv-02066-DGC Document 13 Filed 11/04/16 Page 6 of 6