Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01302/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01302-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
AT&T Corp.
Not party
AT&T Operations, Inc.
Appellant
AT&T Services, Inc.
Appellant
AT&T, Inc.
Not party
SBC Internet Services, Inc.
Appellant
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
Appellant
Two-Way Media LLC
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

AT&T, INC., AT&T CORP.,

Defendants

AT&T OPERATIONS, INC., AT&T SERVICES, INC., 

SBC INTERNET SERVICES, INC., 

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2014-1302

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Texas in No. 5:09-cv-00476-OLG, 

Judge Orlando L. Garcia.

______________________ 

Decided: March 19, 2015

______________________ 

LESLIE V. PAYNE, Heim, Payne & Chorush, LLP, Houston, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented 

by MICHAEL F. HEIM, MICAH JOHN HOWE, NATHAN J.

DAVIS; MAX LALON TRIBBLE, JR., Susman Godfrey L.L.P., 

Houston, TX, RACHEL S. BLACK, IAN B. CROSBY, PARKER 

C. FOLSE, III, Seattle, WA.

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2 TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 

CARTER GLASGOW PHILLIPS, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellants. Also 

represented by CONSTANTINE L. TRELA, JR., RICHARD ALAN 

CEDEROTH, ROBERT N. HOCHMAN, NATHANIEL C. LOVE, 

Chicago, IL. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, O’MALLEY, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge O’MALLEY. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge. 

Two-Way Media LLC (“TWM”) brought this patent infringement suit against AT&T, Inc.; AT&T Corp.; AT&T 

Operations, Inc.; AT&T Services, Inc.; SBC Internet 

Services, Inc.; and Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 

(collectively, “AT&T”). The case proceeded to a jury trial 

in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, where the jury found that AT&T infringed 

the asserted claims of the patents at issue and awarded

damages. The district court entered final judgment 

consistent with the jury’s verdict on October 7, 2013. The 

district court thereafter denied all of AT&T’s post-trial 

motions for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”). Upon 

docketing those rulings, the time for AT&T to file an 

appeal began to run. AT&T, however, failed to file a 

timely notice of appeal. Because we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in 

refusing to extend or reopen the appeal period, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

TWM filed suit in the United States District Court for 

the Southern District of Texas on April 11, 2008, alleging, 

inter alia, infringement of certain claims of U.S. Patent 

Nos. 5,778,187 and 5,983,005. In June 2009, the Southern District of Texas transferred the case to the United 

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TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 3

States District Court for the Western District of Texas. 

The case proceeded to a jury trial, resulting in a verdict of 

infringement and a damages award to TWM. Final 

judgment reflecting the jury’s verdict was entered on 

October 7, 2013.

On October 4, 2013, AT&T timely filed four motions 

for renewed JMOL or a new trial, regarding noninfringement, invalidity, and damages. These filings 

stayed the running of the time within which AT&T was 

required to file any notice of appeal from the final judgment. Because three of the four JMOL motions were 

confidential, AT&T moved to file those under seal. On 

November 22, 2013, the court denied all of AT&T’s JMOL 

motions and granted TWM’s request for costs, entering 

judgment against AT&T on all pending claims. When the 

court initially docketed the denials of AT&T’s motions, it 

labeled the three orders addressing the confidential 

motions as orders granting the motions to seal, not indicating that the same orders denied the relief sought in the 

underlying motions. The parties (through counsel) received notice of electronic filings (“NEFs”) for each of

those orders labeled “ORDER GRANTING [] Motion For 

Leave to File Sealed Document.” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 

13804. The underlying orders, which could be accessed by 

clicking on the hyperlink in the NEFs, clearly denied the 

merits of AT&T’s JMOL motions, however. At the same 

time, the court docketed its order denying the fourth, nonconfidential JMOL. And, the court docketed its order on 

TWM’s Bill of Costs. Both of these were included and 

properly identified in the November 22 NEFs to the 

parties. On November 25, the court updated the description of the orders on the docket, but did not send new 

NEFs to the parties. 

On January 15, 2014, after the appeal period had expired, AT&T asserts that it first discovered that the 

November orders actually denied all of its post-trial 

motions. The next day, AT&T filed a motion to extend or 

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4 TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 

reopen the appeal period pursuant to Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) and (6). On February 6, 2014, 

the district court denied AT&T’s motion. 

A denial of a motion under Rule 4(a) is a final appealable order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also Eltayib v. 

United States, 294 F.3d 397, 399 (2d Cir. 2002). Because 

this is a patent infringement case, we have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

Since a ruling on a motion for relief under Rule 4(a) is 

an issue not unique to patent law, we apply the law of the 

regional circuit—here, the Fifth Circuit. See Amgen Inc. 

v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 25 F. App’x 923, 924 

(Fed. Cir. 2001).1 Under Fifth Circuit law, we review the 

district court’s ruling on a motion for relief under Rule

4(a)(5) and (6) for abuse of discretion. Stotter v. Univ. of 

Tex., 508 F.3d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 2007) (reviewing a motion for relief under Rule 4(a)(5) for abuse of discretion); 

In re Jones, 970 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir. 1992) (reviewing a 

motion for relief under Rule 4(a)(6) for abuse of discretion). 

Rule 4(a) states in relevant part:

(5) Motion for Extension of Time.

(A) The district court may extend the time to file a 

notice of appeal if:

1 Although the dissent argues that we apply our 

own law when determining our jurisdiction, there is no 

dispute over our jurisdiction in this case. We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of AT&T’s Rule 

4(a) motion. Indeed, the dissent does not discuss this 

court’s jurisdiction, and instead addresses the merits of 

AT&T’s motion. 

 

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TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 5

(i) a party so moves no later than 30 days after the 

time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires; and

(ii) regardless of whether its motion is filed before 

or during the 30 days after the time prescribed by 

this Rule 4(a) expires, that party shows excusable 

neglect or good cause.

. . . .

(6) Reopening the Time to File an Appeal. The 

district court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of 14 days after the date when its 

order to reopen is entered, but only if all the following conditions are satisfied:

(A) the court finds that the moving party did not 

receive notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry of judgment or order 

sought to be appealed within 21 days after entry;

(B) the motion is filed within 180 days after the 

judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry, 

whichever is earlier; and

(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

In sum, to qualify for an extension of the appeal period, the moving party must show “excusable neglect or 

good cause.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). A court may reopen

the appeal period, on the other hand, if, inter alia, “the 

court finds that the moving part did not receive notice” of 

the entry of the judgment or order at issue. Fed. R. App. 

P. 4(a)(6) (emphasis added). Both decisions are committed to the trial court’s discretion. The question, accordingly, is not whether any panel member—or even all of 

them—would have granted AT&T’s motion under either 

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6 TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 

Rule 4(a)(5) or (6) if acting as district court judges, but 

whether, under the circumstances, this district court 

abused its discretion when it chose not to do so.

a. Extension of the Appeal Period Pursuant to 

Rule 4(a)(5)

In considering AT&T’s motion under Rule 4(a)(5), the 

court found that the AT&T had failed to show good cause 

or excusable neglect. Although the NEFs communicated 

an arguably incomplete description of the orders, the 

district court noted that even a total lack of notice would

not be enough, standing alone, to justify extending the 

time for filing an appeal. The court concluded that it is 

the responsibility of every attorney to read the substance 

of each order received from the court and that it is not 

sufficient to rely on the email notifications received from 

the electronic filing system. The court explained that the 

NEFs were sent to 18 attorneys at the two firms representing AT&T. The court further noted that assistants at 

those firms actually downloaded copies of all of the orders 

onto the firms’ internal systems. Finally, the court pointed to the fact that, on that same day, the court also issued 

orders denying the unsealed JMOL motion and entering a 

bill of costs—both of which produced accurately labeled 

NEFs. The district court therefore refused to extend the 

appeal period under Rule 4(a)(5).

AT&T argues that its delay should be excused because 

it received incomplete NEFs and the district court did not 

reissue new NEFs when it corrected the docket entries. 

In other words, AT&T argues that, because the initial 

NEF did not fully describe what the order entailed, the 

court should have found that the “excusable neglect or 

good cause” required under Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii) had been 

established. We disagree. 

As the district court correctly noted, even a complete 

lack of notice would not qualify as excusable neglect 

under Rule 4(a)(5), without some additional showing. To 

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TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 7

allow Rule 4(a)(5) to be triggered so easily would render 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d)(2) a nullity. 

Rule 77(d)(2) expressly provides that “[l]ack of notice of 

the entry does not affect the time for appeal or relieve—or 

authorize the court to relieve—a party for failing to appeal 

within the time allowed, except as allowed by Federal 

Rule of Appellate Procedure (4)(a).” (emphasis added). 

Because AT&T would not be entitled to relief even if it 

had received no NEFs notifying it of the court’s order, the 

district court was correct to require some additional 

evidence of excusable neglect or good cause. See Wilson v. 

Atwood Grp., 725 F.2d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)

(“The rule is strict, but its meaning and purpose are plain. 

We have consistently held that the simple failure of the 

clerk to mail notice of entry of judgment, without more, 

does not permit relief to a party who has failed to appeal 

within the prescribed time.”); see also Avolio v. Cnty. of 

Suffolk, 29 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Plaintiffs could not 

qualify for this kind of extension [under Rule 4(a)(5)] 

because the mere failure to discover that the judgment 

had been entered, even when the clerk had failed to mail 

a notice of judgment as directed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d), 

does not constitute excusable neglect.”); Case v. BASF

Wyandotte, 737 F.2d 1034, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The 

fact that the appellant did not receive the opinion and 

order upon issuance did not excuse his failure to file a 

timely notice of appeal.”); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 

458 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Generally a finding of excusable 

neglect requires lack of notice plus additional equitable 

factors such as attempts to learn the anticipated date of 

the decision.”).

AT&T first responds by arguing that this is not just a 

lack of notice case; it is a case involving an affirmatively 

misleading notice. And, it argues that, because the district court’s NEFs violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79, the notice it received violated the legal 

requirements governing the same. Turning to AT&T’s 

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8 TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 

second argument first, AT&T is wrong when it contends 

that the court or its clerk violated Rule 79. Rule 79 

applies to the civil docket, not to electronic email notices. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 79(a)(1)–(3). Rule 79 provides that 

each docket entry is to briefly state “the substance and 

date of entry of each order and judgment.” Although the 

court did not send updated NEFs, the district court 

promptly corrected the docket entries to state that the 

orders denied the underlying JMOL motions. The civil 

docket, therefore, had a complete description of those 

orders had AT&T bothered to check the docket, as it 

should have done. Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 987 

F.2d 1199, 1201 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Rule 77(d) clearly states 

that a party must make a timely appeal whether or not he 

receives notice of the entry of an order. Implicit in this 

rule is the notion that parties have a duty to inquire 

periodically into the status of their litigation.”); In re 

Morrow, 502 F.2d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 1974) (“Notification 

by the clerk is merely for the convenience of the litigants.”). AT&T’s resort to Rule 79 is, thus, unhelpful to 

its appeal under Rule 4(a)(5). 

AT&T’s claim that its failure to read the court’s order 

was excusable because it was misled into doing so by the 

court itself does not fare much better on these facts. We 

recognize that excusable neglect “is not limited strictly to 

omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of 

the movant.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. 

Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 392 (1993). It is true, moreover, that a 

court’s own conduct—including misleading entries or 

statements to counsel—is relevant to whether neglect not 

predicated only on a failure to receive notice of an entry of 

judgment can, or should, be deemed excusable. See 

Chipser v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 600 F.2d 1061, 1063 (5th Cir. 

1979) (affirming trial court’s finding of excusable neglect 

because an extension of time was not “unwarranted” 

when counsel was misled by good faith reliance on statements by the district court, some of which occurred after 

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TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 9

counsel sought clarification of the court’s orders). The 

fact that the incomplete NEFs are relevant to the court’s 

inquiry does not mean they are determinative of it, however. 

The district court not only may, but should, consider 

“‘all relevant circumstances’” in determining whether a 

party’s failure to file a timely appeal was excusable. See 

Stotter v. Univ. of Tex., 508 F.3d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Pioneer Inv., 507 U.S. at 395). At bottom, Rule 

4(a)(5) assumes some neglect on behalf of the non-filer 

and directs the district court to exercise its equitable 

discretion to determine whether that neglect should be 

excused. The trial court examined the circumstances 

surrounding the admitted neglect by AT&T’s counsel and 

concluded it should not be forgiven. The trial court found 

that it was not excusable for AT&T’s attorneys to rely on 

the email notifications and neglect to read the orders in 

light of the circumstances surrounding the November 22, 

2013 NEFs. As the trial court noted, AT&T received an 

order denying its unsealed JMOL motion and an order 

assigning costs—both of which triggered properly labeled 

NEFs—at the same time it received the allegedly misleading NEFs. Pointedly, costs are only to be awarded to a 

prevailing party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (“[C]osts—

other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the 

prevailing party.” (emphasis added)). An order assessing 

costs was a clear indication that all matters relevant to 

the question of whether TWM was a prevailing party had 

been resolved. The district court noted, moreover, that 

the orders and NEFs had been sent to 18 different counsel 

and legal assistants representing AT&T and that at least 

some of those recipients downloaded the full text of the 

orders. Given these circumstances, the district court 

concluded that it was inexcusable for AT&T’s multiple 

counsel to fail to read all of the underlying orders they 

received, or—at minimum—to monitor the docket for any 

corrections or additional rulings, which might explain 

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10 TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 

why costs had been awarded to TWM. Again, the question is not whether we, if acting as trial court judges, 

might have excused counsel’s neglect in these circumstances, but whether the trial court abused its discretion 

when it refused to do so. We see no such abuse of discretion.2

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion when it found that AT&T did not satisfy its 

burden to show excusable neglect for its failure to read 

the underlying orders and check the docket for more than 

a month after the court issued the final orders. 

b. Reopening the Appeal Period Pursuant Rule 4(a)(6)

After concluding that AT&T’s neglect was not excusable, the court turned to AT&T’s request for relief under 

Rule 4(a)(6). As noted, Rule 4(a)(6) requires, as a predicate, findings by the trial court that: (1) the movant did 

not receive notice of the entry of judgment; (2) the movant 

filed the motion in a timely fashion; and (3) no party 

would be prejudiced by a reopening of the time to appeal. 

Even when all of these predicates are satisfied, moreover, 

2 Cases which have found excusable neglect based 

on misleading information from the court are readily 

distinguishable. See, e.g., Mennen Co. v. Gillette Co., 719 

F.2d 568, 570–71 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding excusable neglect 

where the clerk entered judgment contrary to the judge’s 

express instructions telling counsel to submit proposed 

entries and the trial court did not clarify that it intended 

earlier judgment entry to be a final entry until two days 

before the time to appeal expired); Rodgers, 722 F.2d at

461 (affirming a finding of excusable neglect where the 

clerk failed to send any notice and did not enter the 

judgment as the most recent docket entry, making repeated docket checks by counsel ineffective). 

 

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the court retains the discretion to either grant or deny the 

motion. 

Here, the district court found that AT&T did receive 

notice of the entry of judgment when it received and 

downloaded those judgments from the electronic docket 

and that TWM would be prejudiced by the reopening of 

the appeal period, rendering Rule 4(a)(6) inapplicable. 

After making these factual findings, moreover, the court 

rejected AT&T’s claim that, even if it admittedly received 

the actual text of the judgments and of the other orders 

entered at the same time, the court should reopen the 

appeal because AT&T never received email notifications 

that the docket was corrected shortly after the initial 

entries to more accurately reflect the substance of the 

orders entered. On this point, the trial court expressly 

declined “to give ‘an interpretation of Rule 4(a)(6) that 

allows parties to ignore entirely the electronic information 

at their fingertips,’ as it would ‘severely undermine the 

benefits for both courts and litigants fostered by the 

CM/ECF system, including the ease and speed of access to 

all the filings in a case.’” Two-Way Media LLC v. AT&T 

Operations Inc., No. 5:09-cv-476, slip op. at 8 (W.D. Tex. 

Feb. 6, 2014), ECF No. 663 (quoting Kuhn v. Sulzer 

Orthopedics, Inc., 498 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 2007)). 

We see no clear error in the trial court’s factual finding that AT&T failed to establish that it did not receive 

the notice contemplated in Rule 4(a)(6)(A) and no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s refusal to grant AT&T’s 

motion solely because AT&T did not receive an NEF of 

the corrected docket entry.3

3 Given these conclusions, we do not address the 

district court’s conclusion that TWM would be prejudiced 

by a reopening of the appeal period.

 

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12 TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 

Like the district court before us, we decline to hold

that the actual receipt of the text of a judgment or order, 

which a party knows the court directed to be entered on 

the docket, does not constitute notice of the entry of that 

judgment within the meaning of Rule 4(a)(6)(A). 

Rule 4(a)(6) does not apply when a party simply shows it 

did not read a court order—justifiably or not. It only 

applies when a party received no notice of that order. For 

example, Rule 4(a)(6) does not apply when an attorney 

receives the notice in the mail, but does not open it. See 

Khor Chin Lim v. Courtcall Inc., 683 F.3d 378, 381 (7th 

Cir. 2012) (“The judiciary is not entitled to add time just 

because a litigant fails to open or read his mail—or any 

other extra-statutory reason.”). AT&T’s argument that it 

never read the underlying orders because it was confused 

by the NEFs it received, is, therefore, irrelevant; the only 

question for purposes of Rule 4(a)(6) is whether it received

notice of the order. When an attorney admittedly receives 

any order from the court, as here, and he is expressly 

informed that the order was to be entered on the docket 

(see, e.g., J.A. 13804, which states “[t]he following transaction was entered on 11/25/2013 . . .”), the district court 

does not clearly err by finding that he also has received 

notice of the entry of that order under Rule 77(d), whether 

or not he examines its contents. Where an order is actually received, but ignored, Rule 4(a)(5) is the procedural 

vehicle counsel must pursue to seek relief from its failure 

to read or digest the order.

AT&T’s argument that it never received the type of 

notice contemplated by Rule 4(a)(6)(A) because it never 

received an NEF that described the type of docket entry 

required by Rule 79 (i.e., one setting forth a short description of the order or judgment) is unpersuasive. While the 

NEF was admittedly inaccurate, AT&T was notified both 

that the orders had been entered on the docket and that 

the order contained final judgments. See Sanofi-Aventis 

Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., 748 F.3d 

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1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“No ‘magic words’ are needed 

to confer final judgment.”). We decline to hold, as a 

matter of law, that those circumstances always constitute 

an absence of notice for purposes of Rule 4(a)(6)(A).

While AT&T neither cites nor relies upon them, the 

dissent contends that a series of cases decided in the 

1950s requires us to find an absence of notice under 

Rule 4(a)(6)(A). In those cases, the question presented 

was whether a docket entry which failed to unambiguously set forth a final judgment within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 was sufficient to trigger the 

running of the time for appeal or whether a later docket 

entry was the triggering entry. In those cases, the question was not whether the first entry accurately described 

the underlying order, but whether the underlying order 

summarized in the entry unequivocally evidenced the 

intent to enter a final judgment. Thus, in United States v. 

F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227 (1958)—the 

primary authority on which the dissent relies, Dissenting 

Op. 6—the Supreme Court found the earlier docket entry 

inadequate to trigger an appeal because the underlying 

order it described failed to contain the type of findings 

necessary to constitute a final judgment.4 356 U.S. at 234 

(“[R]espondent argues . . . that inasmuch as the clerk’s 

4 The dissent’s reliance on O’Brien v. Harrington, 

233 F.2d 17, 18–20 (D.C. Cir. 1956) is also misplaced. In 

O’Brien, the district court entered judgment addressing

only one of the two pending claims and did not expressly 

direct entry of judgment as to fewer than all pending 

claims under Rule 54(b). As such, the appellate court 

concluded that the entry of judgment of one claim did not 

terminate the action and the whole case was still before 

the district court. Id. In this case, on the other hand, 

there is no dispute that the district court’s orders addressed all pending claims.

 

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entry incorporated the opinion by reference, it, too, adequately stated the amount of the judgment. This contention might well be accepted were it not for the fact that the 

action also sought recovery of interest on the amount paid

. . . .” (emphasis added)). The other cases cited by the 

dissent are to the same effect. See Cedar Creek Oil & Gas 

Co. v. Fidelity Gas Co., 238 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir. 1956) 

(finding that neither the court’s order of June 12 nor the 

docket entry describing that order “evince[d] clearly an 

intent to make a judgment on those days”); Healy v. Pa. 

R.R. Co., 181 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1950) (finding the trial 

court order at issue insufficient to trigger the time for 

appeal because motions for a new trial and judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict remained pending and unresolved for six months thereafter). Because the docket 

entries at issue addressed themselves to underlying 

orders which were not sufficient to constitute final judgments, the courts refused to treat them as the docket 

entries which triggered the time for an appeal. The facts 

at issue in those cases are not relevant to the question we 

address here.

Pointedly, neither Rule 4(a)(6) nor the meaning of notice thereunder were at issue in the cases to which the 

dissent points us. AT&T does not dispute that the underlying order it received evinced an unequivocal intention to 

enter final judgment and award costs consistent therewith. Nor is there any debate over which docket entry—

the initial one or the corrected one—triggered AT&T’s 

time for appeal. In either case, AT&T’s appeal was untimely by a large margin.5 The only question here is 

5 The dissent mischaracterizes our holding. We do 

not hold that the order was entered for purposes of triggering AT&T’s time to appeal on November 22, 2013. 

That question is neither in dispute, nor presented to us. 

Under the various authorities on which the dissent relies, 

 

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whether AT&T was entitled to an NEF of the corrected 

docket entry before it can be said to have received notice of 

the entry of the admittedly complete and unequivocal 

judgments. While we respect the dissent’s contrary view, 

we find no legal error in the trial court’s conclusion that it 

was not. Again, whatever its faults, the NEFs AT&T did 

receive stated clearly that all the cited orders were “entered” on the docket and links to all the orders were 

provided. See, e.g., J.A. 13804.

Even if AT&T and the dissent were correct that a second NEF from the court was required before it can be said 

to have received “notice of the entry of judgment” against 

it, moreover, we would still find no abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s refusal to reopen the appeal under Rule 

4(a)(6). The district court refused to trigger the relief 

contemplated in Rule 4(a)(6) in circumstances where a 

party actually has received a final judgment (regardless of 

whether the entry of that judgment is accurately described), but fails to monitor the electronic docket for a 

compliant entry of the judgment. In this era of electronic 

filing—post-dating by some 60 years the era in which the 

cases cited by the dissent were issued—we find no abuse 

of discretion in a district court’s decision to impose an 

obligation to monitor an electronic docket for entry of an 

order which a party and its counsel already have in their 

possession and know that the clerk at least attempted to 

enter.6 Thus, putting aside the question of whether the 

prerequisites to application of Rule 4(a)(6) were satisfied, 

it is clear that AT&T’s time to appeal was triggered no 

later than correction of the docket entry. The only question we address is what constitutes adequate notice under 

Rule 4(a)(6).

6 Again, the question before us is not which docket 

entry triggered the running of the time for appeal. 

 

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16 TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 

we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of AT&T’s 

motion under that Rule.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of relief under both Rules 4(a)(5) and (6).

AFFIRMED

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

AT&T, INC., AT&T CORP.,

Defendants

AT&T OPERATIONS, INC., AT&T SERVICES, INC., 

SBC INTERNET SERVICES, INC., 

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2014-1302

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Texas in No. 5:09-cv-00476-OLG, 

Judge Orlando L. Garcia.

______________________ 

DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that

the district court did not have discretion to reopen the 

appeal period under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

(“FRAP”) 4(a)(6).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 77(d) provides that “[i]mmediately after entering an order or 

judgment, the clerk must serve notice of the entry, as 

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2 TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 

provided in Rule 5(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d)(1). FRAP

4(a)(6) provides that a district court may reopen the time 

to file an appeal where “the court finds that the moving 

party did not receive notice under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 77(d) of the entry of the judgment or order 

sought to be appealed within 21 days after entry.” Fed. R. 

App. P. 4(a)(6). Contrary to the majority, I think that the 

substantive orders were not entered on the docket at the 

time that AT&T arguably received notice of the orders, 

and the required notice of the entry was not provided. 

Under the circumstances, FRAP 4(a)(6) applies. 

I 

The majority incorrectly holds that the interpretation 

of FRAP 4(a)(6) is governed by the regional circuit’s law. 

The interpretation of FRAP 4(a)(6) is governed by Federal 

Circuit law since the issue is jurisdictional. State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Florida, 258 F.3d 1329, 1334 

(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“We have established that in matters of 

our own jurisdiction, regional circuit law is not binding, 

and we are obligated to make an independent determination of our jurisdiction.”); see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 

205, 215 (2007) (“[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal 

in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.”). However, 

in relevant respects, regional circuit law and Federal 

Circuit law are the same. 

II

Under FRAP 4(a), the 30-day time limit for appeal 

runs from the “entry of the order disposing of the last” 

judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) and/or new trial 

motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), 4(a)(4)(A). Here, 

two JMOL motions and one new trial motion (the “substantive motions”) were filed with the district court as 

attachments to motions for leave to file under seal (the 

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TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 3

“sealing motions”).1 The sealing motions were listed on 

the docket as numbers 594, 595, and 596. On November 

22, 2013, the district court judge signed orders which 1) 

granted the sealing motions and 2) denied the substantive

motions. On November 25, the district court clerk for the 

first time entered the substantive motions on the docket 

as entries 617, 620, and 623.2 The clerk then made entries 

613, 615, and 616 on the docket, which stated that the 

sealing motions had been granted. For example, docket 

number 613 included the following docket text: 

ORDER GRANTING [594] Motion for Leave to 

File Sealed Document; GRANTING [599] Motion 

for Leave to File Sealed Document; GRANTING 

[605] Motion for Leave to File Sealed Document; 

GRANTING [608] Motion for Leave to File Sealed 

Document Signed by Judge Orlando L. Garcia. 

(rf).

J.A. 13804. I refer to these entries as the “sealing order 

docket entries” or “sealing entries.” A notice of electronic 

filing was generated for each of the sealing order docket 

entries, notifying the parties that the sealing motions had 

been granted. 

Later that day, the clerk modified docket entries 613, 

615, and 616 to state that the substantive JMOL and/or 

new trial motions had been denied. For example, docket 

number 613 was amended to add: 

1 AT&T also filed one motion for JMOL or, in the 

alternative, new trial that was not under seal. That 

motion and its subsequent denial did not form the basis of 

AT&T’s FRAP 4(a) motion. 2 Until November 25, the substantive motions did 

not have docket numbers assigned because they were 

submitted as attachments to motions for leave to file 

under seal. 

 

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4 TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 

DENYING 617 SEALED MOTION Signed by 

Judge Orlando L. Garcia. (rf) Modified on 

11/25/2013, to link to doc #617 (rf). (Entered:11/25/2013). 

J.A. 74. I refer to these entries as the “substantive order 

docket entries.” Notice of the substantive order docket 

entries was not provided to the parties. 

The district court and the panel majority conclude

that the parties received notice of the entry of the substantive orders when, at the earlier time when they 

received the notices of the sealing order docket entries, 

they downloaded the substantive orders. The majority 

holds that the substantive orders were entered on the 

docket as of the time of the sealing entries and not when 

the substantive order docket entries for the first time 

stated that the substantive motions had been denied. 

With respect, that is simply not correct. 

III 

FRAP 4(a)(7) establishes that, in these circumstances,

an order or judgment is not “entered” (does not become 

effective) until it “is entered in the civil docket under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).” Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(7)(i). The mere fact that an order is issued does not 

start the time for appeal; a docket entry is required. 

Wheat v. Pfizer, Inc., 31 F.3d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1994)

(“[F]or purposes of determining whether a notice of appeal 

was timely, the relevant date is the date the post-trial 

motion was entered on the docket, not the date it was 

filed.”); United States v. Ronne, 414 F.2d 1340, 1342 n.1

(9th Cir. 1969) (“While [the] judgment was filed on November 22, 1968, it was not entered in the criminal docket 

until November 25, 1968. The notice of appeal was filed 

within ten days of that date and is therefore timely.”); see 

Wimberly v. Rogers, 557 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1977) 

(“An appeal as of right in a civil suit must be filed within 

30 days of the date of entry on the civil docket of the 

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judgment or order appealed from.”); Cedar Creek Oil & 

Gas Co. v. Fidelity Gas Co., 238 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 

1956) (“It is settled that there is no judgment until the 

clerk makes his docket entry.”); O’Brien v. Harrington, 

233 F.2d 17, 18–19 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (“Rule 58 provides 

that . . . notation in the civil docket constitutes entry of 

the judgment; and the judgment is not effective before 

such entry. Until the order or judgment is entered in the 

civil docket, the case is still in the District Court, there is 

no finality, and there can be no appeal.”).3 Our own court 

has frequently applied a similar rule holding that the 

time for a rehearing petition under Rule 40 does not begin 

to run until the judgment is entered in the docket, even 

though the opinion was publicly released days or even 

weeks earlier. Thus, even if an order or judgment has 

been publicly released and a party is aware of the order or 

judgment, if it has not been entered on the docket, the 

time for appeal does not begin to run until the clerk 

makes a docket entry. 

IV

Contrary to the majority, it is equally clear that the 

three docket entries concerning the sealing orders here 

did not constitute the required “entry” with respect to the 

substantive motion orders. FRAP 4(a)(7) states that a 

judgment or order is entered “when the judgment or order 

is entered in the civil docket under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 79(a).” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(i). 

FRCP 79(a) provides that “[t]he clerk must keep a 

record known as the ‘civil docket.’” Fed. R. Civ. P. 79(a)(1). 

“Each entry must briefly show the nature of the paper 

3 Some of these cases relate to FRCP 58 rather than 

to FRAP 4(a). But FRCP 58 has the same rule that judgment is entered only when it is entered on the docket 

pursuant to FRCP 79(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(1). 

 

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6 TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 

filed or writ issued, the substance of each proof of service 

or other return, and the substance and date of entry of 

each order and judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 79(a)(3). Here, 

the sealing entries did not show “the substance . . . of [the 

substantive] order[s],” Fed. R. Civ. P. 79(a)(2), since they 

merely stated that the sealing orders had been granted 

and did not mention that the substantive orders were 

denied. As shown by United States v. F. & M. Schaefer 

Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227 (1958), and numerous Court of 

Appeals cases, a docket entry that does not comply with 

FRCP 79(a) does not trigger the time for appeal.4

4 See Danzig v. Virgin Isle Hotel, Inc., 278 F.2d 580, 

582 (3d Cir. 1960) (docket entries of jury verdict along 

with amount of verdict were insufficient to start time for 

appeal because “the entry of judgment . . . should be 

unambiguous on its face so that counsel or a party consulting the docket will have no reasonable basis for doubt 

as to the nature and effect of what has been done or as to 

the timeliness of further proceedings”); Cedar Creek, 238 

F.2d at 300–01 (noting that “[i]t is settled that there is no 

judgment until the clerk makes his docket entry,” and 

holding that judgment and docket entry did not “evince 

clearly an intent to make a judgment” and therefore time 

for appeal did not run from those entries); Reynolds v. 

Wade, 241 F.2d 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1957) (docket entry that 

judgment filed and entered was insufficient to show 

substance of entry under FRCP 79(a)); O’Brien, 233 F.2d 

at 19–20 (holding that “the court’s judgment with respect 

to [one claim] ha[d] never been entered and ha[d] never 

become effective” where the docket entry was directly 

contrary to the district court’s opinion); Healy v. Pa. R.R.

Co., 181 F.2d 934, 935–37 (3d Cir. 1950) (holding that 

appeal was not yet available where opinion and docket 

entry were insufficient to constitute entry of order disposing of post-trial motions, and noting that an order must 

 

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The majority attempts to distinguish these cases because “[i]n those cases, the question was not whether the 

first entry accurately described the underlying order, but 

whether the underlying order summarized in the entry 

unequivocally evidenced the intent to enter a final judgment.” Maj. Op. at 13. Even if some of these cases involved both insufficient orders and insufficient docket 

entries, the cases make clear that a docket entry complying with FRCP 79(a) is required for an order to be entered. Cases like O’Brien, 233 F.2d at 19–20, cannot be 

distinguished on the ground that the underlying order 

was insufficient.5

both be “made and entered in the docket in due form” and 

that both “an order and its entry in the docket” are required by the rules (emphases added)); see also Funk v. 

Franklin Life Ins. Co., 392 F.2d 913, 914–15 (7th Cir. 

1968) (docket entry that did not show monetary sum 

awarded did not start time for appeal because it was 

incomplete). 

Although there were amendments to FRCP 79 in 

1963, after some of these cases were decided, these 

amendments were stylistic only. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 79

advisory committee’s note to 1963 amendment. References in some of these cases to FRCP 73(a) correspond to 

current standards under FRAP 4(a), which was “derived 

from FRCP 73(a) without any change of substance.” Fed. 

R. App. P. 4 advisory committee’s note to 1967 adoption. 5 In O’Brien, an employee had sought a declaration 

(1) that he was improperly removed from his position and 

(2) an order directing the commissioner to reinstate him. 

233 F.2d at 18. The district court judge issued an opinion 

finding that (1) the employee had been wrongfully terminated but holding that (2) the court could not order reinstatement and later signed an order to that effect. Id. On 

the same day the order was signed, the clerk made the 

 

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8 TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 

Here, the three sealing entries clearly did not reflect 

the “substance and date of entry of each order” with 

respect to the substantive orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 79(a)(3).

Rather, they merely stated that the sealing motions had 

been granted. Therefore, at the time the notices of electronic filing were sent to the parties, the substantive 

orders had not even been entered. The orders were only 

entered once the clerk made entries reflecting the substantive orders pursuant to FRCP 79(a)(3). The majority’s 

holding to the contrary, that the orders were entered on 

the docket at the time of the sealing entries on the docket, 

is incorrect. 

Notices of electronic filing were never sent concerning 

the substantive order docket entries. Thus, the clerk 

never served, “[i]mmediately after entering an order or 

judgment, . . . notice of the entry” of the order. Fed. R. 

Civ. P 77(d)(1). While defendants may have had notice of 

the underlying order, as the majority holds, and of the 

following entry on the docket: “March 26, 1954. Order 

granting summary judgment in favor of Def[endant] . . . .” 

Id. The D.C. Circuit held that the docket entry was not 

effective to enter judgment because “the clerk did not 

make a notation of the substance of the court’s judgment, 

but distorted it by indicating a ruling directly contrary to 

that which had actually been made on the claim for 

declaratory relief [for improper removal].” Id. at 19. 

“[W]hen [the clerk] fails accurately to note in the civil 

docket the substance of a judgment which he has before 

him, he is guilty of a clerical misprision.” Id. at 20. Because judgment had never been entered on the claim for 

declaratory relief (due to the clerk’s “clerical misprision”), 

judgment had only been entered on the reinstatement 

claim. Id. “[T]he court’s judgment with respect to the 

claim for declaratory relief [for improper removal] ha[d] 

never been entered and ha[d] never become effective.” Id. 

 

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sealing orders, defendants never had notice of the entry of 

the substantive orders on the docket.6 In other words, the 

only notice AT&T arguably received of a docket entry was

of the sealing docket entries. That cannot be notice of an 

event (the entry on the docket of the denial of the substantive orders) that has not yet occurred. As a result, 

AT&T “did not receive notice under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 77(d) of the entry of the judgment . . . within 21 

days after entry.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(A). In my view, 

since notice of entry of the orders was never provided—

the only event that triggers the time for appeal—both the 

district court and the majority err in holding that the 

requirements of FRAP 4(a)(6) were not satisfied.

V 

The majority suggests that, even if the dissent is correct as to the scope of FRAP 4(a)(6), the district court 

should be sustained because it had discretion to deny

relief under FRAP 4(a)(6). But the district court here did 

not exercise discretion. Rather it held that it was without 

authority “[b]ecause Defendants received notice of the 

denial of their post-trial motions” and therefore would

“not reopen the time to file a notice of appeal under Rule 

4(a)(6), which requires a lack of notice.” J.A. 7. The district court’s holding was thus premised on an error of law 

6 The majority relies on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Lim v. Courtcall Inc., 683 F.3d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 

2012) for the proposition that receipt of the underlying 

judgment or order satisfies FRAP 4(a)(6), but that case 

did not address whether receipt of the order without 

receipt of the docket entry satisfies the rule, and the 

plaintiff there may well have received notice of the docket 

entry together with the order. In any event, as discussed 

above, the rule is clear—there must be receipt of notice of 

the entry of the order, not just the order itself. Only the 

entry starts the time for appeal.

 

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10 TWO-WAY MEDIA LLC v. AT&T, INC. 

and not an exercise of discretion. “A district court by 

definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of 

law.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996); Am. 

Signature, Inc. v. United States, 598 F.3d 816, 823 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010) (“An abuse of discretion may be established 

under Federal Circuit law by showing that the court made 

a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors 

or exercised its discretion based on an error of law or 

clearly erroneous fact finding.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

VI 

I would find that FRAP 4(a)(6) applies here.7 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary conclusion. 

7 FRAP 4(a)(6) also requires that “the court find[] 

that no party would be prejudiced.” Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(6)(C). The district court found that “Plaintiff would 

be prejudiced if Defendants are permitted to file its notice 

of appeal after missing the deadline. This prejudice also 

prevents the Court from granting Defendants an extension of time to file its notice of appeal under Rule 4(a)(6).” 

J.A. 7. The majority correctly does not rely on this statement by the district court. Plaintiff argued at the district 

court that it was prejudiced because it paid a debt in cash 

after the deadline had passed for AT&T to appeal. Plaintiff stated that “[b]y foregoing the alternative [non-cash] 

option due to plaintiff’s reliance on the missed deadline, 

plaintiff was prejudiced because it was prevented from 

using those funds to pursue other opportunities separate 

and apart from this litigation.” J.A. 13871. It is unclear 

how this could establish that re-opening the time for 

appeal would prejudice plaintiff. Furthermore, defendants 

offered in response to reimburse plaintiff for costs it 

incurred as a result of paying in cash. Prejudice requires

“some adverse consequence other than the cost of having 

 

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to oppose the appeal and encounter the risk of reversal, 

consequences that are present in every appeal.” Fed. R. 

App. P. 4 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment. 

 

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