Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10637/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10637-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marco Hernandez-Lara
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARCO HERNANDEZ-LARA,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-10637

D.C. No.

5:11-cr-00900-

EJD-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 29, 2016*

Pasadena, California

Filed March 29, 2016

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Ferdinand F. Fernandez,

and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ-LARA

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a sentence for illegal reentry in a case

in which the government challenged the district court’s

conclusion that the defendant’s prior burglary conviction

under California Penal Code § 459 did not qualify as a “crime

of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).

Applying Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 110 (9th Cir. 2015),

the panel held that the definition of crime of violence

that appears in § 16(b), as incorporated in U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), is void for vagueness.

COUNSEL

Merry Jean Chan, Assistant United States Attorney; Brian

Stretch, Acting United States Attorney, and Barbara J.

Valliere, Chief, Appellate Division, Assistant United States

Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern

District of California, San Francisco, California, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Alfredo M. Morales, Law Offices of Morales & Leaños, San

Jose, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ-LARA 3

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant United States of America appeals the sentence

imposed on appellee Marco Hernandez-Lara following his

conviction for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

Specifically, the government contends that the district court

miscalculated the United States Sentencing Guidelines range

applicable to Hernandez because the district court concluded

that Hernandez’s 2009 burglary conviction under California

Penal Code § 459 did not qualify as a “crime of violence” as

defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). After the government filed its

appeal, however, we held in a different context that the

definition of a crime of violence that appears in § 16(b) is

unconstitutionally vague. See Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d

1110 (9th Cir. 2015). Because we are bound by Dimaya’s

holding, and because the government offers the same

arguments in favor of § 16(b)’s constitutionality that we

rejected in that decision, we hold that § 16(b), as incorporated

in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), is void for vagueness.

1. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) imposes an 8-level

enhancement on a defendant convicted of illegal reentry if

“the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully

remained in the United States, after . . . a conviction for an

aggravated felony.” Section 2L1.2 defines “aggravated

felony” by reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), which

includes numerous offenses. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. 3(A). 

One of these offenses is a “crime of violence (as defined in

section 16 of Title 18 . . . ).” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). 

Here, the government argued to the district court that

Hernandez’s burglary conviction qualified as a “crime of

violence” under § 16(b), which the statute defines as an

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4 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ-LARA

“offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a

substantial risk that physical force against the person or

property of another may be used in the course of committing

the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). The district court disagreed,

concluding that burglary under California Penal Code § 459

“is not a crime of violence under section 16(b).” It then

sentenced the defendant to 24 months of incarceration, and

the government appealed.

After the government appealed this decision, the United

States Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States,

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Johnson held that language similar

to § 16(b), the Armed Career Criminal Act’s so-called

“residual clause”1definition of a “violent felony,” is

unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2557; see also

Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1115. We deferred submission pending

this court’s decision in Dimaya (which addressed Johnson’s

impact on § 16(b)), and ordered supplemental briefing once

Dimaya became final.

2. In Dimaya, we relied on Johnson to hold that

§ 16(b)—the exact same definition of a “crime of violence”

at issue in this case—was void for vagueness. Dimaya,

803 F.3d at 1115. We stated that the “residual clause”

declared unconstitutional in Johnson and § 16(b), although

not identical, are both “subject to the same constitutional

defects.” Id. Here, the government seeks to distinguish

Johnson based on the insignificant differences between the

1 The “residual clause” defines a “violent felony” as “any crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . is

burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury

to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ-LARA 5

“residual clause” and § 16(b)—arguments that we explicitly

rejected in Dimaya, id. at 1117–19. Indeed the government

admits as much, and offers no basis upon which to distinguish

the application of § 16(b) in Dimaya and its application here. 

We, too, see no reason why Dimaya does not control this

case. We therefore hold that § 16(b), as incorporated in

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), is unconstitutionally vague, and

affirm the sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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