Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03528/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03528-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert S. Katz
Appellee
Susan Shott
Appellant

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐3528

SUSAN SHOTT,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

ROBERT S. KATZ,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 15 C 4863 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 26, 2016 — DECIDED JULY 11, 2016

____________________

Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Susan Shott, a tenured associate

professor of biostatistics at Rush University Medical Center,

brought this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 alleging that one

of her colleagues, Dr. Robert Katz, retaliated against her for

complaining about anti‐Jewish discrimination in the work‐

place. The district court dismissed her complaint for failure to

state a claim. We affirm.

Case: 15-3528 Document: 32 Filed: 07/11/2016 Pages: 6
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This case arises indirectly from two lawsuits Shott filed

against Rush years ago. She first sued Rush in 1994 claiming

that Rush administrators discriminated against her by refus‐

ing to make reasonable accommodations for her religion (Or‐

thodox Judaism) and disability (rheumatoid arthritis). A jury

rejected Shott’s claim of religious discrimination but awarded

her $60,000 for disability discrimination. See Shott v. Rush‐

Presbyterian‐St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 338 F.3d 736, 738–39 (7th Cir.

2003). She sued Rush again in 2011. This time she alleged,

among other things, that Rush administrators refused to in‐

crease her salary or promote her to full professor in retaliation

for her earlier lawsuit. The district court granted summary

judgment for Rush, and we affirmed. See Shott v. Rush Univ.

Med. Ctr., No. 15‐3767, 2016 WL 3316618 (7th Cir. June 15,

2016).

While her second lawsuit against Rush was pending, Shott

also sued Katz, whom she had occasionally helped with sta‐

tistical analysis. She alleged that, in retaliation for her ongoing

litigation against Rush, Katz impeded her career advance‐

ment by rebuffing her invitations to collaborate on research

articles. She explained that “[p]ublication of research articles

is very important for the career advancement of Rush Medical

School faculty members” and that “[b]y refusing to publish

research articles with Dr. Shott and refusing to do research

with her, Dr. Katz has caused significant damage to

Dr. Shott’s career.”  

Katz was also Shott’s treating rheumatologist. She also ac‐

cused him of retaliating against her by refusing to respond in

timely fashion to her requests for prescription refills. When

Katz did respond, he agreed to refill Shott’s medications but

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No. 15‐3528 3

only if she would come in for an examination every six

months, a requirement that she found inappropriate.

The district court dismissed Shott’s complaint for failure

to state a claim. The court explained that Katz’s alleged with‐

holding of medical treatment did not state a claim for retalia‐

tion under § 1981 because Shott had not alleged that Katz’s

medical care affected her employment. The court also con‐

cluded that she failed to allege a sufficient “nexus” between

Katz’s refusal to collaborate and her career advancement at

Rush. The court gave Shott fourteen days to file an amended

complaint, but she chose to appeal instead.

We begin with a jurisdictional matter. Because Shott filed

her notice of appeal four days before her deadline for filing

an amended complaint, Katz has moved to dismiss the appeal

for lack of jurisdiction. But as Katz now concedes, “[w]hen a

judge conditionally dismisses a suit, but gives the plaintiff

time to fix the problem that led to dismissal ... , the order be‐

comes an appealable ‘final decision’ once the time for correc‐

tion has expired, whether or not the court enters a final judg‐

ment.” See Davis v. Advocate Health Ctr. Patient Care Express,

523 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2008). There has been no activity in

the district court since Shott filed her notice of appeal, so the

district court’s order dismissing her complaint without preju‐

dice became a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. See id.; Borrero v. City of Chicago, 456 F.3d 698, 699–700

(7th Cir. 2006). We therefore have jurisdiction over this ap‐

peal.

Section 1981 “protects the right of all persons to make and

enforce contracts regardless of race.” Carter v. Chicago State

Univ., 778 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that Jews

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are among the “identifiable classes of persons” the statute

protects. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al–Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,

611–13 (1987); Lubavitch‐Chabad of Ill., Inc. v. Northwestern

Univ., 772 F.3d 443, 446–47 (7th Cir. 2014); Bachman v. St. Mon‐

icaʹs Congregation, 902 F.2d 1259, 1261 (7th Cir. 1990)); cf.

Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617–18 (1987)

(explaining that although “Jews today are not thought to be

members of a separate race,” they are nonetheless protected

under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 because at the time of the statute’s

adoption they “were among the peoples then considered to

be distinct races”).

To state a retaliation claim under § 1981 based on events

occurring in the workplace, an employee must show that she

suffered a materially adverse action because she engaged in

protected activity. See Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis.,

L.P., 651 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011); Silverman v. Board of Ed‐

ucation, 637 F.3d 729, 740–42 (7th Cir. 2011). “Individual em‐

ployees can be held liable under Section 1981 if they ‘partici‐

pated’ in the retaliatory conduct.” Carter, 778 F.3d at 657,

quoting Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 896–97 (7th Cir. 2012); see

also Sklyarsky v. Means‐Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 896

(7th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that third‐parties may be liable

underthe statute fortortiously interfering with an employee’s

relationship with her employer for racial reasons); Muhammad

v. Oliver, 547 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).

Shott contends that the district court construed § 1981 too

narrowly by requiring her to allege that Katz’s acts of retalia‐

tion were related to an adverse employment action. As a gen‐

eral matter, we agree with her that the court’s focus on em‐

ployment was unwarranted. The statute forbids any retalia‐

tory actions that are “harmful to the point that they could well

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No. 15‐3528 5

dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a

charge of discrimination,” and those retaliatory actions need

not be directly “related to employment or occur in the work‐

place” except that their harm must have been caused by con‐

tract‐ or employment‐related events. Burlington Northern and

Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006); see Pantoja v.

American NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., 495 F.3d 840, 848–49 (7th

Cir. 2007).  

That analytic error was harmless, though. A plaintiff can

plead herself out of court by alleging facts that show she has

no legal claim. Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th

Cir. 2011). The retaliatory acts Shott alleged cannot plausibly

be considered materially adverse. See Burlington Northern, 548

U.S. at 57. Shott did not, for example, allege that Katz was un‐

der any obligation to work with her or that he discouraged

anyone else from working with her. Even if Katz’s refusal to

collaborate with her was in some way motivated by disap‐

proval of herlitigation against Rush, that would not be action‐

able under § 1981. We held in Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 898–

900 (7th Cir. 2012), that an individual employee could be lia‐

ble under § 1981 for causing an employer (under a “cat’s

paw” theory) to take retaliatory action against an employee.

We have not gone so far, however, as to suggest that a plain‐

tiff’s fellow employees violate the implied retaliation prohibi‐

tion in § 1981 by not seeking out the plaintiff to collaborate on

professional projects.

Moreover, Katz’s decisions about what research projects

to pursue—and with whom—are protected by the First

Amendment and would not serve as a proper basis for hold‐

ing him liable for violating Shott’s civil rights. See Trejo v. Sho‐

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ben, 319 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 2003) (First Amendment pro‐

tects faculty member’s right to participate in “academic de‐

bates, pursuits, and inquiries”); Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672

F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that right to aca‐

demic freedom includes right to carry on research without in‐

terference from fellow faculty members); McElearney v. Uni‐

versity of Ill. at Chicago Circle Campus, 612 F.2d 285, 288 (7th

Cir. 1979) (“Academic freedom does not empower a professor

to dictate to the University what research will be done using

the school’s facilities.”); see also Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731,

736 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Let us not forget that academic

freedom includes the authority of the university to manage an

academic community and evaluate teaching and scholarship

free from interference by other units of government, includ‐

ing courts.”).

Nor is it plausible that Katz’s request to examine Shott

every six months as a condition of continuing her prescrip‐

tions amounted to a material adverse action. If she was not

willing to comply with that obviously reasonable condition,

she should have tried to find a new doctor, not filed a federal

civil rights lawsuit against Katz.

AFFIRMED.

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