Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01948/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01948-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jackson J. Blevins
Appellant
Jean C. Blevins
Appellant
Jewel Companies, Inc.
Appellee
Lewis Research Labs Co., Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

Unit.eel States Court of Appeals TP.nth Circuit 

JEAN C. BLEVINS and ) 

JACKSON J. BLEVINS, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

LEWIS RESEARCH LABS CO., INC., ) 

and JEWEL COMPANIES, INC., ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

JAN 2 G 1988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 86-1948 

(D.C. No. 86-C-374C) 

(N.D. Oklahoma) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before SEYMOUR, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.8. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

This is an appeal from a jury verdict denying plaintiffs Jean 

C. Blevins and Jackson Blevins recovery in a products liability 

acti on. Plaintiffs argue that the district court committed a 

clear abuse of discretion by improperly limiting cross-examination 

of Lewis Slavin, part-owner of defendant Lewis Research, and by 

admitting evidence of the ownership of Lewis Research which 

a llegedly prejudiced the jury's determinat i on of liability. We 

Appellate Case: 86-1948 Document: 010110025154 Date Filed: 01/26/1988 Page: 1 
disagree with these contentions and do not find clear error in the 

district court's handling of these issues. 

The facts are not in dispute. In April 1981, Jean Blevins 

felt a burning sensation in her chest and experienced respiratory 

problems while using defendants' rust remover chemical to remove 

rust from her sink. Ms. Blevins has since been hampered by 

continual respiratory difficulties. In April 1983, she and her 

husband filed this products liability action alleging that 

defendants Lewis Research Labs and Jewel Companies had 

manufactured and distributed an unreasonably dangerous product 

without adequate warning. After four days of trial, the jury 

returned a verdict for defendants. 

I. 

Plaintiffs first contend that the court should have allowed 

cross-examination of Lewis Slavin regarding the failure of his 

employees to use respiratory protection. During direct 

examination, Mr. Slavin testified that employees prepare the rust 

remover by blending ingredients, including phosphoric acid, from a 

platform at the top of a 6,000-gallon tank. These employees do 

not use a protective mask, even though they are in constant 

contact with fumes from the phosphoric acid. Upon the basis of 

this testimony, plaintiffs sought to impeach Mr. Slavin by 

introducing a document from Monsanto Company, the manufacturer of 

the phosphoric acid, which implores the use of respiratory 

equipment "when airborne exposure limits are exceeded." The trial 

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.. 

court sustained defendants' relevancy objection and refused to 

allow the introduction of the document. 

We hold the trial court's refusal to admit this document does 

not constitute an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. Rule 

401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence broadly defines relevant 

evidence as "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 

We have repeatedly held, however, that the question of relevancy 

is a matter of discretion for the trial court and will not disturb 

the decision on appeal absent a showing of clear abuse. ~, 

Averitt v. Southland Motor Inn of Okla., 720 F.2d 1178, 1181 (10th 

Cir. 1983); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Marine OfficeAppleton & Cox Corp., 579 F.2d 561, 566 (10th Cir. 1978). 

Furthermore, the extent of cross-examination allowed to a party is 

within the trial judge's discretion and will not be disturbed on 

appeal unless clearly prejudicial. 1 We have upheld limits placed 

upon the examination of a witness because the trial court felt the 

anticipated testimony would be immaterial and irrelevant or only 

probative of collateral issues. See, e.g., United States v. Polk, 

550 F.2d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 838 (1977) 

(cross-examination to impeach government witness properly limited 

1Plaintiffs miss the point when citing case law stating that the 

cross-examination of a witness is a matter of right. The cases 

and treatises mentioned by the plaintiffs only prohibit the 

arbitrary curtailment of inquiry about a subject on which the 

party should have been allowed reasonable cross-examination. None 

of the law mentioned by plaintiffs or found by this court 

precludes a trial judge from limiting cross-examination on 

collateral or irrelevant issues. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1948 Document: 010110025154 Date Filed: 01/26/1988 Page: 3 
on basis of materiality and relevancy); United States v. Coppola, 

526 F.2d 764, 777 (10th Cir. 1975) (no prejudice found regarding 

the limitation of appellant's cross-examination of two government 

witnesses on collateral matters). 

In accordance with this precedent, we hold the trial court 

properly refused to admit cautionary instructions provided by the 

supplier of the phosphoric acid. The only issue properly before 

the court below was whether a toxic vapor proximately causing Ms. 

Blevins' injuries resulted when she applied the product to a rusty 

surface. Yet plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. William Anderson, 

testified that the chemical reaction caused by applying the 

product to rusty surfaces would be different than if the product 

were inhaled in a relatively rust-free environment. Therefore, 

testimony regarding the effect of inhalation of vapor by Mr. 

Slavin's employees has little bearing on the effect the product 

had on the plaintiff. 2 

Even had the court erred in excluding the letter, plaintiffs 

cannot prevail here without showing the error prejudicially 

affected a substantial right. Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet 

Enters., 774 F.2d 380, 396 (10th Cir. 1985); Rasmussen Drilling v. 

Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978). A review of the record and the 

briefs indicates the exclusion of this evidence did not cause 

2we note in passing the potential for prejudice if the letter had 

been admitted into evidence. Even if evidence is found to be 

relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or 

confusion of the issues. ~, Texas Eastern Transmission 

Corp. v. Marine Office-Appleton & Cox Corp., 579 F.2d at 567. 

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> 

unfair prejudice to the plaintiffs. We find it particularly 

noteworthy that apparently none of Mr. Slavin's employees has ever 

reported or made a claim for an injury caused by inhalation of 

fumes. Ms. Blevins would have had a difficult task even if she 

had been able to use Monsanto's letter to insinuate the 

dangerousness of defendants' product during the manufacturing 

process. To link this evidence to defendants' liability, 

plaintiffs would have had to prove the airborne exposure limits 

mentioned in the letter were exceeded at Mr. Slavin's plant (there 

is no evidence of this in the record), while also explaining the 

apparent health of his employees. We therefore have no doubt that 

the court's refusal to admit this evidence, even if erroneous, 

would not warrant reversal. 

II. 

Plaintiffs also argue the trial court should not have allowed 

Mr. Slavin to testify that he and his wife owned Lewis Research. 

This evidence, according to the plaintiffs, informed the jury that 

Lewis Research was only a "mom and pop'' operation deserving of its 

sympathy and unable to pay a significant damage award. Plaintiffs 

believe this testimony improperly distracted the jury from the 

central issue of the company's liability. 

It is error to admit evidence of the financial condition of a 

party except to determine punitive damages. Whiteley v. OKC 

Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir. 1983). As we stated in 

Blankenship v. Rowntree, 219 F.2d 597, 598 (10th Cir. 1955), "such 

evidence tends to inject into the case a foreign, diverting, and 

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.. 

distracting issue which may effectuate prejudicial results." 

However, in this case no evidence was received about the financial 

worth of either Lewis Research or Jewel Companies. Also, we find 

it hard to understand how the jury could have inferred prejudicial 

financial information from the fact that Mr. Slavin and his wife 

owned Lewis Research. Indeed, the jury could have concluded the 

company possessed substantial value based upon Mr. Slavin's 

testimony that it had manufactured other products in addition to 

approximately 1,500,000 bottles of rust remover. We hold the 

plaintiffs have not shown the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting this testimony. 

accordingly AFFIRMED. 

The district court's judgment is 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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