Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-24-01932/USCOURTS-ca13-24-01932-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Denis McDonough
Appellee
Tameria R. Robinson
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

TAMERIA R. ROBINSON,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________

2024-1932

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 23-2827, Judge Grant Jaquith.

______________________

Decided: December 13, 2024

______________________

TAMERIA R. ROBINSON, Oak Leaf, TX, pro se. 

 MARIANA TERESA ACEVEDO, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also 

represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ERIC P. BRUSKIN,

PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY. 

 ______________________

Before REYNA, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

Case: 24-1932 Document: 14 Page: 1 Filed: 12/13/2024
2 ROBINSON v. MCDONOUGH

PER CURIAM

Tameria Robinson appeals the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) order denying her 

petition under the All Writs Act for a writ of mandamus. 

Robinson v. McDonough, No. 23-2827, 2023 WL 5621850 

(Vet. App. Aug. 31, 2023) (Order). Ms. Robinson sought a 

writ of mandamus to reopen her previously denied claims, 

arguing that the Sergeant First Class Heath Robinson 

Honoring our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics 

Act of 2022 (PACT Act) automatically reopens denied 

claims that are subsequently established as presumptively 

service connected. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Robinson, a Gulf War veteran, actively served in 

the U.S. Army from November 1987 to May 1988 and from 

November 1990 to June 1991. Supplemental Appendix 

(S.A.) 27.1 After Ms. Robinson left the service, a VA 

examiner diagnosed her with allergic rhinitis but 

concluded that it was “less likely than not” that her 

condition was service connected. Id.; see also S.A. 39–40. 

The Board of Veterans Appeals (Board) accordingly denied 

Ms. Robinson’s corresponding claim for disability benefits. 

S.A. 18. The Veterans Court affirmed. Robinson v. Wilkie, 

No. 18-2481, 2019 WL 2061974, at *5 (Vet. App. May 10, 

2019). 

On January 20, 2023, the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (Agency) sent Ms. Robinson a letter indicating that 

she may be eligible to receive benefits under the PACT Act. 

S.A. 65–68. Specifically, the letter stated that a “Covered 

Veteran” under the PACT Act includes Gulf War veterans 

who served on or after August 2, 1990, and chronic rhinitis 

1 Supplemental Appendix of S.A. refers to the 

supplemental appendix submitted with Appellee’s 

Informal Brief.

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ROBINSON v. MCDONOUGH 3

is presumptively a service connected condition. S.A. 66. 

The letter further stated that claimants whose prior claims 

for disability compensation were denied should complete 

VA Form 20-0995. S.A. 67. Ms. Robinson subsequently 

filed a different form, VA Form 21-4138, indicating that she 

wished to open a new claim for allergic rhinitis under the 

PACT Act and for the Agency to review her denied claim. 

S.A. 77. The Agency, in response, explained that

Ms. Robinson should file her request using the proper form 

and directed her to a chart, listing VA Form 20-0995 as the 

proper form for individuals with new and relevant evidence 

concerning their previously denied claim. S.A. 77–78. 

Ms. Robinson subsequently called the Agency hotline 

attempting to reopen her previously denied claim. See 

S.A. 89. The Agency explained, on April 17, 2023, that it

could not automatically reopen decided claims. See id.

On May 10, 2023, Ms. Robinson petitioned the 

Veterans Court for a writ of mandamus that would direct 

the Secretary to award her benefits. Order at *1. 

Specifically, she argued that she was entitled under the 

PACT Act to reopen her previously denied claims. S.A. 84. 

The Veterans Court reasoned that because the PACT Act 

does not itself automatically reopen claims but instead 

requires the filing of a supplemental claim, Ms. Robinson 

failed to demonstrate her indisputable right to a writ of 

mandamus. Order at *2. Ms. Robinson now appeals to this 

court, contending that the Veterans Court relied on an 

improper interpretation of the PACT Act. 

II. DISCUSSION

A.

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans 

Court is limited by statute. Guillory v. Shinseki, 603 F.3d 

981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We have jurisdiction over 

“relevant questions of law, including interpreting 

constitutional and statutory provisions.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(1). But we lack jurisdiction over “challenge[s] to 

Case: 24-1932 Document: 14 Page: 3 Filed: 12/13/2024
4 ROBINSON v. MCDONOUGH

a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular 

case” except where constitutional issues are present. 

38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). However, this limited jurisdiction 

does not insulate the Veterans Court’s rulings on 

mandamus petitions from judicial review. See Lamb v. 

Principi, 284 F.3d 1378, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Accordingly, “[w]e may not review the factual merits of the 

veteran’s claim, but we may determine whether the 

petitioner has satisfied the legal standard for issuing the 

writ.” Beasley v. Shinseki, 709 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 

2013).

For a writ of mandamus to issue, three criteria must be 

met: “(1) the petitioner must lack an adequate alternative 

means to attain relief; (2) the petitioner must demonstrate 

a clear and indisputable right to the writ; and (3) the court 

must be convinced, given the circumstances, that the 

issuance of the writ is warranted.” Hargrove v. Shinseki, 

629 F.3d 1377, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Cheney v. U.S. 

Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004)). The 

decision to grant the writ “is in large part a matter of 

discretion with the court to which the petition is 

addressed.” Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 

426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976). We must affirm the Veterans 

Court’s decision unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 

38 U.S.C. §7292(d)(1)(A). 

B.

We first consider our jurisdiction. The Secretary 

argues that we must dismiss this appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction because the Veterans Court merely applied, 

and did not interpret, the PACT Act. We disagree. 

Ms. Robinson contends that the Veterans Court erred by 

concluding that she lacked an indisputable right to the writ 

because the PACT Act does not automatically reopen 

veterans’ claims. Thus, her appeal turns on the meaning 

and scope of a statutory provision. 

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ROBINSON v. MCDONOUGH 5

C.

We conclude that Ms. Robinson has failed to show that 

she has “a clear and indisputable right to the writ.” See 

Hargrove, 629 F.3d at 1378. Ms. Robinson seeks a writ of 

mandamus to direct the regional office to reopen her 

previously denied claims. But the PACT Act places two 

obligations on the Secretary relevant here, neither of which 

requires the Secretary to automatically reopen previously 

adjudicated claims. First, whenever a law establishes or 

modifies a presumption of service connection, the PACT Act 

requires the Secretary to identify claimants whose claims 

were denied but might have been decided differently had 

the presumption of service connection been applied. 

38 U.S.C. § 1167(a). Second, the PACT Act requires the 

Secretary “to inform [such claimants] that they may 

submit a supplemental claim.” 38 U.S.C. § 1167(b). But a 

duty to inform claimants that they may file a supplemental 

claim does not imply an obligation to reopen a previously 

denied claim in the absence of such a filing. Moreover, 

since there would be little need to file a supplemental claim 

if the Secretary was already obligated to reopen the 

previously denied claims, Ms. Robinson’s interpretation of 

the PACT Act is both unsupported by and inconsistent with 

the statutory text. Because the PACT Act does not 

establish Ms. Robinson’s right to the relief she seeks, the 

Veterans Court did not err in concluding that Ms. Robinson 

failed to show her indisputable right to a writ. See Order

at *2.

III. CONCLUSION

We have considered Ms. Robinson’s remaining 

arguments but do not find them persuasive. For the 

foregoing reasons, we affirm. We note, however, that Ms. 

Robinson may still pursue her claim under the PACT Act 

by filing a supplemental claim using VA Form 20-0995. See 

Order at *2 (urging Ms. Robinson “to file her supplemental 

claim as quickly as possible so that she may receive any 

benefits she is entitled to”).

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6 ROBINSON v. MCDONOUGH

AFFIRMED.

COSTS 

No costs.

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