Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00770/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00770-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J.W. Marriott Desert Ridge
Defendant
Marriott International Incorporated
Defendant
Mary Jan Moore
Plaintiff

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Mary Jan Moore, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Marriott International Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-00770-PHX-BSB

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Mary Jan Moore (Plaintiff or Moore) is a massage therapist at the 

Marriott’s Revive Spa (the Spa). Plaintiff alleges that, her employer, Defendants 

Marriott International, Inc. and J.W. Marriott Desert Ridge (Defendants or Marriott), 

discriminated against her based on disability, and refused to provide reasonable 

accommodations, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 

(Count 1). (Doc. 1 at 4-5.) She also alleges a state law claim of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (Count 2). (Id. at 5.) This matter is before the Court on the parties’ 

motions for summary judgment.1

 Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on her ADA discrimination claims. 

(Doc. 94.) Plaintiff argues that the Court should find that, as a matter of law, at all 

 

1

 The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636. 

This Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim. See Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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relevant times she was a qualified person with a disability, and that Defendants 

discriminated against her by (1) disciplining her because of her disability, (2) denying her 

equal opportunity for booking spa appointments, and (3) failing to assign her certain 

points in the spa appointment booking system. (Doc. 94.) Defendants move for 

summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s ADA claims and argue that, as a matter of law, 

Plaintiff is not disabled, that she received reasonable accommodations, and that the 

additional accommodations she requested were not reasonable. (Docs. 92.) Defendants 

also seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress and punitive damages. (Id.) 

 For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 

judgment, and grants Defendants summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants 

discriminated against her by disciplining her for her disability. The Court also grants 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. The Court denies Defendants’ request for summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation claims. The Court also denies Defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. 

I. Factual Background 

 A. Evidence of Plaintiff’s Seizures 

In 1995, before Plaintiff began working for Marriott, she started having seizures. 

(PSOF ¶ 4, corrected Ex. 2 at 15-25; DSOF ¶ 41, Ex. 6 at 9, 19.)2

 Plaintiff testified that 

she was diagnosed with epilepsy in 1995. (PSOF ¶ 31, corrected Ex. 2 at 16-17, Ex. 1 at 

5.) In 2002, Plaintiff began working for Marriott. (PSOF ¶ 38; DSOF ¶ 29.)3

 In June 

2006, Plaintiff had two grand mal seizures while participating in work-related training 

 

2

 Citations to “PSOF, Ex.” are to exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s originally filed Statement of Facts in Support of Her Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 95.) Citations to “PSOF, corrected Ex.” are to corrected exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s 

corrected Statement of Facts in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 118.) 

3

 Citations to PSOF are to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in Support of Her Motion for Summary Judgment, as corrected on July 15, 2014. (Doc. 118, Ex. 1.) 

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using a line of scented products. (PSOF ¶¶ 7, 11, Ex. 1.) Later that year, Plaintiff told 

her supervisor, Candy James, that she believed the scented oils she used during the 

training caused her seizures. (PSOF ¶ 124, Ex. 2 at 114-115.) 

 In February 2007, Plaintiff had another grand mal seizure and went to the 

emergency room at Scottsdale Healthcare Osborn Hospital. (PSOF, corrected Ex. 2 at 

101, 102.) The treating doctor noted that Plaintiff “may well have focal epilepsy.” 

(PSOF, corrected Ex. 2 at 311.) He opined that Plaintiff should take anti-seizure 

medication for the rest of her life, and Plaintiff continues to takes such medication. (Id.

at 313-14; PSOF ¶ 32, corrected Ex. 2 at 47, 118.) Two of Plaintiff’s medical providers 

have opined that scented oils could cause a seizure. (PSOF ¶ 11, corrected Ex. 2 at 56, 

98, Ex. 4 at 43.) 

B. 2006 Request for Accommodation 

 On November 10, 2006, Plaintiff gave her supervisor, Candy James, a note from 

Dr. Andrea Orlowski requesting that Plaintiff be excused “from working with any 

essential oils as they contribute[d] to health problems in her.” (PSOF ¶ 124-25, corrected 

Ex. 2 at 114-115.) James honored Plaintiff’s request to be removed from treatments that 

required the use of essential or scented oils. (PSOF ¶ 125, corrected Ex. 2 at 114, 117; 

DSOF ¶¶ 49, 52-53, Ex. H at 114-118, 112; 166, Ex. F at 336-37.) Plaintiff and her 

supervisor did not discuss the Revive Massage at that time. (DSOF ¶ 51, Ex. H at 146-

47, 156-57, 166, 170-71.) 

 Defendants assert that in 2006, according to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the 

only treatments that required the use of scented oils were the body treatments. (DSOF 

¶ 50; Ex. H 146, 233-34.) Although Plaintiff testified that body treatments required the 

use of scented oils in 2006, she did not testify that only the body treatments required 

scented oils. (DSOF, Ex. H at 146.) Instead, Plaintiff testified that, before 2007, the 

body treatments, the Desert Ridge Massage, and an aromatherapy massage all required 

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the use of scented oils. (PSOF 2 ¶ 128, Ex. 1; DSOF, Ex. H t 146.)4 The Revive 

Massage was performed with unscented oils until 2007. (PSOF 2 ¶ 125, Ex. 1.) 

C. Implementation of a New Booking System in 2010 

 In October 2010, Marriott implemented the Service Booking Enhancement System 

(the Enhanced System) for scheduling appointments and assigning guests to therapists on 

a rotation system. (DSOF ¶¶ 54-55; PSOF ¶ 56.) The Enhanced System assigns points to 

therapists based on several criteria, including years of service with Marriott, status as a 

full or part-time employee, flexibility in working certain schedules, and the ability to 

perform the body treatments and massage modalities offered by the Spa. (DSOF ¶ 57.) 

The therapists’ points and the percentage of appointments they receive for their hours 

worked determine their rank in getting appointments assigned to them by the Spa’s 

computer program, Spa Soft. (DSOF, ¶ 58.) Generally, a therapist with higher points 

and a lower percentage of appointments would receive an appointment before a therapist 

with fewer points and a higher percentage of appointments. (Id.) 

 Additionally, as part of its system for assigning appointments, Marriott adopted a 

Spa Balancing Policy, which provides, in part, “if a guest moves an appointment to a later 

time at the last moment, the supervisor will make every effort to swap an appointment if 

possible.” (PSOF ¶ 77, Ex. 22, section H; corrected Ex. 9 at 29, 35.) 

 After a meeting regarding the Enhanced System, Plaintiff expressed concern to 

Anna Smith, Marriott’s Director of Human Resources, regarding how the system would 

affect a therapist who could not perform certain treatments. (DSOF ¶59-60.) Plaintiff 

informed Smith that she had a “neurological seizure disorder” and that working with 

scented oils and lotions could cause her to have a seizure. (DSOF ¶ 60, Ex. H at 164-65, 

170.) Plaintiff told Smith that she could not perform the body treatments and 

 

4

 Citations to “PSOF 2” are to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in Support of Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 104.) Citations to exhibits to PSOF 2 are to exhibits attached to PSOF 2. Plaintiff explains that “PSOF 2” supports her Controverting Statement of Facts. (Doc. 105.) 

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aromatherapy. (DSOF ¶63, Ex. H at 171.) Smith and Plaintiff did not discuss the Revive 

Massage. (DSOF, Ex. H. at 170-71.) 

 Several weeks later, Plaintiff gave Smith a note from Bunnie Richie, D.O., dated 

October 5, 2010, stating that Plaintiff was “contraindicated from working with scented 

oils, lotions, and aromas due to her condition.” (DSOF ¶ 65; PSOF, Ex. 5.) Dr. Richie 

testified that by “her condition,” she was referring to Plaintiff’s “temporal lobe epilepsy” 

and she believed that scented oils could “trigger” or “exacerbate” Plaintiff’s condition. 

(PSOF, Ex. 4 at 43.) 

 Plaintiff later met with Smith and the Spa Director, Becky Barrett, and Smith told 

Plaintiff that Marriott would excuse her from performing the body treatments, but it 

would not grant Plaintiff’s request to continuously rebalance her appointments 

throughout each shift each time a same-day or last-minute appointment was made, 

moved, or cancelled. (DSOF ¶ 64, 66, Ex. H at 173, 180-81; PSOF 62.) Barrett 

explained that under the Enhanced System, the Spa supervisors would continue to 

balance the appointments among the therapists but would only do so twice a day, once in 

the morning and once in the afternoon, thirty to sixty minutes before each shift. (DSOF, 

Ex. H at 177-78; PSOF ¶ 65.) 

 Barrett stated that, rather than continuously rebalancing the appointments 

throughout a shift, if Plaintiff was next in rotation to receive the next same-day booking 

for a body treatment that she could not perform, the Spa would, nevertheless, pay 

Plaintiff her hourly rate, commission, and tip on the body treatment, even though she 

would not perform the treatment. (DSOF ¶ 67; Ex. H at 173-76.) Plaintiff agreed to try 

that procedure. (DSOF ¶ 68-70; Ex. H at 175.) Barrett also told Plaintiff that Marriott 

would assign her the full eighteen points in the Enhanced System for all eight of the body 

treatments, even though Plaintiff could not perform them. (DSOF ¶ 71, Ex. H at 173, 

187, 264; PSOF ¶ 142.) 

/// 

/// 

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D. The 2011 Discipline

 On June 29, 2011, Spa supervisor Danielle Morgan questioned Plaintiff about a 

Spa guest’s complaint that Plaintiff had used unscented oil during a Revive Massage 

instead of the Spa’s signature scented Revive herb garden oil, which is required by the 

Spa’s protocols for the Revive Massage. (DSOF ¶ 72, Ex. H at 191.) On July 1, 2011, 

Plaintiff had a meeting with Morgan regarding the incident. (DSOF, Ex. H at 191.) 

Plaintiff testified that before the July 1, 2011 meeting, she had discussed her seizure 

disorder with Morgan. (DSOF, Ex. H at 191.) During the July 1, 2011 meeting with 

Morgan, Plaintiff stated that Morgan, Barrett, and Smith should have known that she 

provided doctors’ notes excusing her from using scented oils and lotions and that she had 

been removed from “all body treatments and massages that were performed with these 

scented oils” in 2007 and again in 2010. (DSOF, Ex. H. at 192.) Morgan said she was 

not aware of that information. (Id.) Morgan gave Plaintiff a written warning for not 

following Spa protocol. (DSOF ¶ 73, Ex. H at 193; PSOF ¶ 174, 178.) Plaintiff refused 

to sign the written warning because she did not think she had done anything wrong. 

(DSOF, Ex. H at 193.) 

 Plaintiff then met with Morgan and Barrett. (DSOF, Ex. H at 193.) Plaintiff 

stated that she thought there was a misunderstanding because she had never been “taken 

off” the Revive Massage. She thought management knew she could not use scented oils 

and lotions and therefore she assumed that Spa management was “okay” with her 

performing the Revive Massage with unscented oils. (DSOF, Ex. H at 194-95, 230, 249-

50; PSOF corrected Ex. 2 at 341.) Plaintiff disputed the written warning on the ground 

that she had provided Smith with a doctor’s note on October 5, 2010 indicating that she 

could not use scented oils or lotions. (DSOF ¶ 74, H at 193-95, 249-50.) Plaintiff 

acknowledged that she did not discuss the Revive Massage with Barrett or anyone else in 

2010. (DSOF, Ex. H at 170-71, 195, 250.) Barrett reduced the discipline to a verbal 

warning. (DSOF ¶ 75, Ex. H at 198-99; PSOF, Ex. 23.) 

/ / / 

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E. 2011 Request for Accommodation 

 Plaintiff spoke to Smith and Barrett and re-urged her request that the Spa 

rebalance the appointment schedule continuously throughout the day. She also requested 

that she receive three points in the Enhanced System for the Revive Massage, and that the 

Spa add an unscented Swedish massage to its menu of services. (PSOF ¶¶ 164, 171, 

corrected Ex. 2 at 238-42, 341, 344, 345.) Smith and Barrett told Plaintiff that the Spa 

would not assign her three points in the Enhanced System for the Revive Massage, add an 

unscented massage to the Spa menu, or continuously rebalance her appointments. (PSOF 

¶¶ 44, 171, corrected Ex. 2 at 240, 342-43, 345.) However, it would permit Plaintiff to 

perform the Revive Massage with unscented oils when a guest requested it or when a 

guest agreed to the massage without scented oil if Plaintiff was the only therapist 

available at the particular time the guest requested. (DSOF ¶ 78; Ex. H at 208-11.) 

 Plaintiff testified that when she asked Marriott to accommodate her by assigning 

her three points for the Revive massage in the Enhanced System, Barrett told her that the 

Spa had done “enough” to accommodate her (PSOF ¶ 153), she had “exhausted her 

ADA,” and was a “burden of the Spa.” (PSOF ¶ 184, Ex. 1 at ¶ 28, corrected Ex. 2 at 

340-43; Ex. 29.) Plaintiff asserts that as a result, her number of bookings has declined 

and she has lost income. (PSOF ¶ 41, 149-50.) 

II. Summary Judgment Standard

 A party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only disputes over facts that might affect the 

outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed 

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evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

 The Ninth Circuit “has set a high standard for the granting of summary judgment 

in employment discrimination cases.” Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach. Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 

1410 (9th Cir. 1996). “[V]ery little evidence is required to survive summary judgment in 

a discrimination case because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved 

through a searching inquiry — one that is most appropriately conducted by the factfinder, 

upon a full record.” Id. 

III. Plaintiff’s ADA Discrimination Claims 

The ADA provides that no covered employer “shall discriminate against a 

qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard 

to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 

employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of 

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e, governs the analysis of claims under the ADA. See Budnick v. Town of 

Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, the plaintiff must prove three 

elements: (1) that she is disabled within the meaning of the statute; (2) she is a qualified 

individual able to perform the essential functions of the job, either with or without 

reasonable accommodations; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because 

of her disability. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(citation omitted); see also Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 

1237 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (requiring reasonable 

accommodation)). 

 A. “Disability” under the ADA 

 The ADA defines disability as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that 

substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of 

such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in 

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[42 U.S.C. § 12102](3)).” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Because the alleged discrimination 

occurred after the effective date of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), that 

statute applies to this case. The ADAAA expanded the scope of the term “disability” in 

the ADA. See Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 

850, 861 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 1. Physical Impairment 

 Plaintiff alleges that she has epilepsy and that epilepsy is an impairment under the 

ADA. (Doc. 94 at 7-8.) A “physical impairment” is “any physiological disorder or 

condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the 

following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, 

including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genitourinary; hemic 

and lymphatic, skin; and endocrine.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). 

 Plaintiff presented her deposition testimony and some medical evidence that she 

has suffered from seizures since 1995, has been diagnosed with epilepsy, and that she 

takes anti-seizure medication regularly. (PSOF ¶ 4, corrected Ex. 2 at 15-25; PSOF ¶ 31, 

corrected Ex. 2 at 16-17, Ex. 1 at 5; PSOF ¶ 32, corrected Ex. 2 at 47, 118.) She also 

presented deposition testimony from her treating physician, Dr. Richie, stating that 

Plaintiff’s epilepsy could be exacerbated by scented oils. (PSOF, Ex. 4 at 43.) 

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff suffers from seizures. (Doc. 92 at 8-9.) Rather 

they argue that, other than her own beliefs, Plaintiff has not provided evidence that 

exposure to scented oils causes Plaintiff’s seizures. (Doc. 92 at 8.) However, to satisfy 

the first element of the prima facie case, it is not necessary for Plaintiff to show that her 

alleged impairment is caused or exacerbated by aspects of her employment. See 29 

C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) and (h)(1) (defining physical or mental impairment without reference 

to an individual’s employment). Considering Plaintiff’s detailed deposition testimony 

regarding her history of seizures and diagnosis of epilepsy, the Court finds that Plaintiff 

has presented sufficient evidence to establish that her seizures are a physical impairment. 

See Lovejoy–Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 2001) (it is 

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“well established” that “epilepsy constitutes a disability under the ADA”); Franklin v. 

Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 1999 WL 796170, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999) 

(idiopathic seizure disorder, or epilepsy, is a physical impairment that affects the 

neurological and musculoskeletal systems). 

 2. Substantial Limitation of a Major Life Activity

 An impairment alone is insufficient to render an individual disabled under the 

ADA; a plaintiff must also show that her impairment substantially limits a major life 

activity. See Rohr, 555 F.3d at 858. The regulations in 20 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) provide a 

non-exhaustive list of major life activities, which include “caring for oneself, performing 

manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Substantially limited means that an impairment “limits the ability 

of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the 

general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). 

 The term “substantially limits” is “construed broadly in favor of expansive 

coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i); 

see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A-C). An impairment “need not prevent, or significantly 

or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be 

considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Although courts are to 

make “an individualized assessment,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv), the focus of the 

court’s attention should be primarily on “whether [employers] have complied with their 

obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not [on] whether an individual’s 

impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly, the threshold issue of 

whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand 

extensive analysis.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii). 

 At the summary judgment stage, the Ninth Circuit does not require comparative or 

medical evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the substantial 

limitation of a major life activity. See Head v. Glacier N.W. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1058 

(9th Cir. 2005). “[A] plaintiff’s testimony may suffice to establish a genuine issue of 

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material fact.” Id. Such testimony, however, must meet the generally required degree of 

personal knowledge and factual detail needed to withstand summary judgment. See 

Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos Polymers, Inc., 681 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012.) “To survive 

summary judgment, an affidavit supporting the existence of a disability must not be 

merely self-serving and must contain sufficient detail to convey the existence of an 

impairment.” Head, 413 F.3d at 1059. 

 Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff’s seizures are considered an impairment 

under the ADA, Plaintiff has not shown that her seizures substantially limit a major life 

activity because she has not shown that her seizures limit her ability to work. (Doc. 92 at 

9 n.3.) Defendants’ argument fails because it does not recognize that major life activities 

include more than work. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Plaintiff offers evidence that when 

she has a seizure she is unable to engage in several activities that are considered major 

life activities, including performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, speaking, eating, 

walking, standing, lifting, bending, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, 

communicating, and working. (PSOF ¶ 28-30; Ex. 3 at ¶ 3.) Defendants do not dispute 

Plaintiff’s assertion that she is unable to participate in these activities during a seizure. 

(Doc. 92 at 9 n.3 ) 

 Plaintiff takes seizure medication and has not had a seizure since 2007. (PSOF 

¶ 8, corrected Ex. 2 at 105.) Under the ADAAA, the fact that the periods during which 

an episodic impairment is active and substantially limits a major life activity may be brief 

or infrequent is not relevant to determining whether the impairment substantially limits a 

major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (“An impairment that is episodic or in 

remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”). 

 The record includes evidence that Plaintiff has a history of seizures and that she is 

substantially limited in several major life activities during a seizure. Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and construing that evidence in favor of 

expansive coverage as required by the ADAAA, Plaintiff has raised a genuine dispute 

regarding whether her seizures substantially limited several major life activities. “At the 

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summary judgment stage, the ‘requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima 

facie case . . . is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of 

the evidence.’” Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wallis v. 

J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

 Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the 

issue of disability. Plaintiff, however, has not established, beyond a dispute of material 

fact, that she is disabled under the ADAAA. See McGregor v. Nat’l. R.R. Passenger 

Corp., 187 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff must establish all prima facie 

elements of an ADA claim beyond dispute of material fact to prevail on summary 

judgment). Additionally, the issue of whether an individual is substantially limited in a 

major life activity is generally a question for the finder of fact. See Bristol v. Bd. of

County Comm’rs of Clear Creek, 281 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the 

Court also denies Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of 

disability. 

B. Qualified to Perform the Essential Functions of the Job 

 For the purpose of establishing the second prong of the prima facie case, the ADA 

defines “qualified individual” as one who “with or without reasonable accommodation, 

can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds 

or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is qualified to 

perform the essential functions of her job. (Doc. 92 at 8) (arguing that that Plaintiff 

cannot meet her burden of proof on the first and third prongs of her ADA claim); 

(Doc. 109 at 2) (for purposes of its response to Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 

judgment, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff met her burden of proof on the first 

two elements of her prima facie case). Accordingly, the Court does not further address 

this element of Plaintiff’s prima facie case and finds that Plaintiff has established that she 

is a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of her job. 

/// 

/// 

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C. Adverse Employment Action and Causation 

 In addition to establishing the first two elements of the prima facie case, to state a 

claim for discrimination under the ADA Plaintiff must also establish that she suffered an 

adverse employment action because of her disability. Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc. 91 

F.3d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff alleges three adverse employment actions. 

First, she asserts that Defendants disciplined her in 2011 with a written and verbal 

warning. Second, she asserts that Defendants refused to assign her three points for the 

Revive Massage in the Enhanced System. Third, she asserts that Defendants refused to 

rebalance her appointments throughout her shift. (Doc. 94 at 1, 12.) 

 1. The 2011 Discipline 

 In her motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that Defendants 

discriminated against her by disciplining for her using unscented oil during a Revive 

Massage and she asserts that the verbal warning she received, which was memorialized in 

writing, was an adverse employment action. (Doc. 94 at 6, 12.) Defendants argue that 

the warning was not an adverse employment action and, therefore, this claim of 

discrimination fails as a matter of law. (Doc. 109 at 3, 7.) 

 On July 1, 2011, Marriott issued Plaintiff a Disciplinary Action Form including a 

written warning disciplining Plaintiff for failing to follow Spa protocol by using 

unscented oil for a Revive Massage.5

 (PSOF ¶¶ 177-181, Ex. 18.) In a section labeled 

“Description of Corrective Action,” the written warning stated that Plaintiff would 

“follow protocols for all services as written, if her medical condition prohibits, she must 

notify management to determine what if any further accommodation can be made to her 

position as a massage therapist.” (PSOF, Ex. 18.) The written warning also stated that 

“additional infraction(s)/violations(s) of company policy or procedure may result in 

 

5

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further disciplinary action up to and including termination.” (PSOF, Ex. 18.) After 

discussing the incident with Plaintiff, on July 2, 2011, Marriott issued another 

Disciplinary Action Form changing the discipline type from a written warning to a verbal 

warning. (PSOF ¶ 209, Ex. 23.) Otherwise, the contents of the July 2, 2011 Disciplinary 

Action Form are the same as the July 1, 2011 Disciplinary Action Form. (Compare

PSOF, Ex. 18, with PSOF, Ex. 23.) Because the verbal warning was memorialized in 

writing and includes the same contents as the written warning that it replaced, the Court 

considers the verbal warning to be the same as the written warning.6

 

 For the purposes of a discrimination claim, an adverse employment action is one 

which “materially affects the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 

citations and modification omitted) (discussing adverse employment action in the context 

of the plaintiff’s claim of “disparate treatment discrimination” under Title VII); see also 

Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 818, 819 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff established a 

prima facie case of disparate treatment when the defendant subjected the plaintiff to 

adverse employment actions including verbal and physical abuse, discriminatory 

overtime, and termination, “that constituted a material change in the terms and conditions 

of [the plaintiff’s] employment”) (internal quotation omitted); Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. 

Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that “[t]he removal of or 

substantial interference with work facilities important to the performance of the job 

constituted a material change in the terms and conditions of a person’s employment” and 

qualified as an adverse employment action, and also finding that the employer’s failure to 

respond to grievances was not an adverse employment action because “it did not 

materially affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of the [plaintiffs’] 

employment”). 

 

6

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 To support her assertion that the warning constituted an adverse employment 

action, Plaintiff cites Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000), Fonseca v. Sysco 

Food Serv. of Ariz., 374 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir. 2004), and Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 

1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 2004). (Doc. 117 at 5.) As discussed below, these cases do not 

support Plaintiff’s position. 

 In Ray, a case involving a retaliation claim under Title VII,7

 the Ninth Circuit 

stated that it adopted an expansive definition of adverse employment action and held that 

“an action is cognizable as an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to 

deter employees from engaging in protected activity.” Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243 (adopting 

the EEOC’s interpretation of adverse employment action). Plaintiff cites Ray for the

proposition that the Ninth Circuit broadly defines adverse employment action. (Doc. 117 

at 5.) However, as Plaintiff herself notes, the definition of adverse employment action 

adopted in Ray does not apply in this case in which “there is no retaliation claim.” 

(Doc. 117 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges discrimination based on direct or circumstantial 

evidence (disparate treatment) under the ADA and does not allege retaliation. (Doc. 1.) 

Thus, Ray does not control the determination of whether the warning was an adverse 

employment action in this case. 

 For similar reasons, Fonseca and Yartzoff do not help resolve the adverse 

employment action issue. In Fonseca, the employee was initially suspended for a workrelated incident. Id. After the employee grieved his suspension, it was reduced to a 

warning letter placed in his file. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the “warning letter still 

constitutes an adverse employment action, particularly since Sysco publicizes all 

discipline to all its employees.” Id. (citing Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (In discussing plaintiff’s retaliation claims, the court stated that “[t]ransfers of 

job duties and undeserved performance ratings, if proven, would constitute ‘adverse 

employment decisions[.]’”)). 

 

7

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VII). 

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Fonseca and Yartzoff are distinguishable from this case. First, unlike Fonseca, 

there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s warning was publicized to other employees. Second, 

although Fonseca was not a retaliation case, it relied on Yartzoff, a Title VII retaliation 

case, for the proposition that a warning letter can be considered an adverse employment 

action. See Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1375-1376 (discussing prima facie case of Title VII 

retaliation claim). “The concept of ‘adverse employment action’ is more broadly 

construed in the retaliation context than in the substantive discrimination context in a 

disparate treatment claim.” Grimmett v. Knife River Corp., 2011 WL 841149, at *9 

(D. Or. Mar. 8, 2011) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Rwy Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 

60-63 and 68 (2006) (explaining that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, unlike the 

substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and 

conditions of employment, and defining adverse employment action for purposes of 

retaliation claims as an action that “a reasonable employee would have 

found . . . materially adverse,” which means that the action that “might have dissuaded a 

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination”) (internal 

quotation omitted)).8

 Thus, as the court stated in Grimmett, “Fonseca, the non-retaliation 

case, inappropriately cited to Yartzoff, the retaliation case, for the proposition that a 

warning letter with no material impact on the employee’s working conditions, constitutes 

an adverse employment action in a disparate treatment claim.” Grimmett, 2011 WL 

841149, at *9. For these reasons, Ray, Fonseca, and Yartzoff do not support Plaintiff’s 

claim that the warning was an adverse employment action. 

 To establish an adverse employment action in this non-retaliation case, Plaintiff 

must establish that the challenged action “materially affects the compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis, 520 F.3d at 1089. Plaintiff argues that 

the warning was an adverse employment action because it stated that “additional 

 

8

 Although Burlington involved Title VII, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the framework used to analyze Title VII claims applies to the ADA. Barnett v. U.S. Air, 

Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (adopting Title VII analysis for the ADA), overruled on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 

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infraction(s)/violation(s) of company policy or procedures may result in further 

disciplinary action up to and including termination,” and it remains in her file. (Doc. 117 

at 5.) Without any explanation or citation to the record, Plaintiff describes the warning as 

her “first bite of the discipline apple.” (Id.) 

 Defendants argue that the warning was not an adverse employment action because 

Plaintiff continues to work for Marriott “in the same capacity as before the verbal 

warning,” and “every aspect of Plaintiff’s employment remains entirely intact.” 

(Doc. 109 at 9.) To support their position, Defendants cite the declaration of Spa 

Director Barrett, which states that the “July 2011 verbal warning to [Plaintiff] did not 

have any effect on her compensation, benefits, or any other terms and conditions of her 

employment with Marriott.” (Doc. 109, Ex. A.) Plaintiff does not dispute Barrett’s 

declaration or cite any evidence indicating that the warning materially affected her 

compensation, terms, or any other condition of her employment. (Doc. 94 at 12-14, 

Doc. 117 at 5.) 

 Several courts within the Ninth Circuit have held that a warning letter is not an 

adverse employment action. See Hoang v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 724 F. Supp. 2d 

1094, 1104 (D. Or. 2010) (a warning letter which affected no materially adverse change 

in the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment was not an adverse employment 

action); Tudor Delcey v. A–Dec, Inc., 2008 WL 123855, at *4 and *9 (D. Or. Jan. 9, 

2008) (a written warning was not an adverse employment action because it had no impact 

on the employee’s status); Silva v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 1795786, at *7 (D. Ariz. Jun. 20, 

2007) (a letter of reprimand without any employment consequences was not an adverse 

employment action).9

 

 In Hoang, the plaintiff was issued a “First Written Warning” letter providing 

notice that: “This is the 1st written warning. If the behavior continues then a Final 

Written Warning will be issued. Should you receive a Final Written Warning, you will 

 

9

 Although the court in Silva also noted that the letter of reprimand did not remain in the employee’s file, its decision did not turn on that fact. Chertoff, 2007 WL 1795786, 

at *7. 

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not be eligible to receive any salary increase or incentive bonuses for the time you remain 

on Final Written Warning.” Hoang, 724 F. Supp. 2d. at 1098-99. The court found that 

the warning was not an adverse employment action because it stated that the plaintiff 

would become ineligible for a raise only if her behavior continued and she received a 

further warning. Id. at *1104. Thus, because the letter did not “implement any 

materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of [the plaintiff’s] employment, it 

was not itself adverse employment action.” Id. 

 Similar to the warning letter in Hoang, the warning Plaintiff received notified her 

that “additional infraction(s)/violation(s) of company policy may result in further 

disciplinary action up to and including termination.” (PSOF, Ex. 23.) The warning 

notified Plaintiff that she “may” be subject to further discipline only if she committed 

“additional” violations of company procedure or policy. (Id.) Thus, the warning itself 

did not implement any material adverse change in the terms or conditions of Plaintiff’s 

employment and was not an adverse employment action. See Tudor Delcey, 2008 WL 

123855, at *4 and *9 (a written warning notifying the employee that if he failed to 

comply with standard practices, the employer “would issue a probation notice,” was not 

an adverse employment action because it had no impact on the employee’s status). 

Because the warning was not an adverse employment action, Plaintiff cannot establish a 

prime facie case of discrimination based on the warning and Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants discriminated against her by the 

2011 discipline.10

/ / / 

/ / / 

 

10 Plaintiff contends that Defendants did not move for summary judgment on her “discrimination claims.” (Doc. 103 at 2.) Defendants, however, moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 92 at 1.) Although Defendants’ motion for summary judgment did not specifically address whether the warning was an adverse employment action (Doc. 92), the parties fully briefed the issue on Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment. (Doc. 94 at 12, Doc. 109 at 7-8, Doc. 117 at 4-5.) Thus, Plaintiff 

had notice and an opportunity to respond to Defendants’ request for summary judgment on this claim. 

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 2. Rebalancing and Swapping Appointments 

 Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on her disparate treatment claim that 

Defendants violated the ADA by administering their Spa Balancing Policy in a manner 

that had the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability and that gave male 

therapists preferential treatment. (Doc. 94 at 16 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A).)11 

Plaintiff concedes that the Spa Balancing Policy is facially neutral, but alleges that 

Defendants “appl[y] the policy to male therapists only.” (Doc. 94 at 16.) She asserts that 

Defendants give preferential treatment to male therapists by “rebalancing/swapping [their 

appointments] manually after the pre-shift balancing in order to try to balance the male 

therapists who lose bookings because a guest changes the appointment time.” (Doc. 94 at 

16 (citing PSOF ¶ 195-198).) Plaintiff’s claim appears to be based on Defendants’ 

practice of “swapping” appointments between male and female therapists when a guest 

who was booked for an appointment with a male therapist expresses a preference for a 

female therapist on short notice. (Doc. 117 at 9 n.2.) 

 The record reflects that under the Spa Balancing Policy, all massage therapists’ 

appointments are balanced twice a day, before the start of each shift. (PSOF ¶ 65. PSOF. 

Ex. 22 at H, corrected Ex. 7 at 87-88.) Before each shift, the Spa supervisors review the 

appointments that were booked the day before and allocate them among the therapists 

who can perform the requested treatments to ensure that each therapist receives about the 

same number of appointments. (PSOF ¶ 67, corrected Ex. 7 at 82, 152; DSOF, Ex. E at 

21-22, Ex. G at 233.) After the Spa supervisors balance the appointments before a shift, 

any newly booked appointments are assigned by the Spa Soft program to the therapist in 

the rotation with the lowest “percentage load” who can perform the booked treatment. 

 

11 To support her motion for summary judgment on this claim, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants denied her request for accommodation in which she asked to have her 

appointments rebalanced in the same manner as the male therapists’ appointments. (Doc. 94 at 16 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2(B).) Because “a claim of discrimination 

based on a failure reasonably to accommodate is distinct from a claim of discrimination 

based on disparate impact,” Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 276-77 (2d Cir. 

2003), this argument does not support Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim and will be 

addressed separately in Section IV. 

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(DSOF ¶ 98, Ex. B at 52, 149-50; Ex. G at 234.) If a therapist cannot perform a 

treatment, Spa Soft assigns the appointment to the next therapist in the rotation who can 

perform the treatment. (DSOF ¶ 105, Ex. F at 366-67; PSOF ¶ 60, 62.) In addition to 

balancing the appointments before each shift, the Spa Balancing Policy also provides that 

“if a guest moves an appointment to a later time at the last moment, the supervisor will 

make every effort to swap an appointment if possible.”12 (PSOF ¶ 77, Ex. 22.) 

 The record also reflects that that when a guest expresses a preference for a female 

therapist after an appointment has been booked with a male therapist, the supervisor tries 

to swap an appointment between a male therapist and a female therapist. (PSOF 2 ¶¶ 96, 

102-03; PSOF, Ex. 12 at 37-39.) When a guest who was booked with a male therapist 

requests a female therapist, the appointment is given to a female therapist. (PSOF ¶ 71, 

Ex. 12 at 37-38, Ex. 22 at H, Ex. 14 at 40.) If the female therapist has an appointment at 

the same time, she swaps her appointment with the male therapist (a same-time swap). 

(PSOF, Ex. 12 at 38-39.) When the schedule does not permit a same-time swap, the 

supervisor attempts to book an appointment for the male therapist at a later time. (PSOF 

¶ 79, Ex. 7 at 104, Ex. 14 at 39-42.) If “unable to trade a later appointment for the male 

therapist, [the supervisor] takes an appointment from a female therapist, who did not 

receive the male’s gender preference appointment, and give[s] it to the male to 

compensate him for the loss.” (PSOF ¶ 81, Ex. 14 at 42.) Defendants explain that they 

follow this practice because male therapists typically have fewer appointments booked. 

(PSOF, Ex. 7 at 102.) 

 Although Plaintiff’s allegations are unclear, she appears to allege that Defendants 

only applied the Spa Balancing Policy in the manner described above for male therapists 

and did not similarly swap appointments when Plaintiff lost an appointment because a 

guest changed an appointment time. (Doc. 94 at 16 (arguing that Defendants make “no 

similar adjustments” for Plaintiff); PSOF ¶ 195-98.) Plaintiff appears to argue that 

 

12 Swapping means moving an appointment from one therapist to another therapist. (PSOF, corrected Ex. 7 at 109.) 

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because she, similar to the male therapists, has fewer appointments booked at the start of 

each day because of her disability (PSOF, Ex. 1 ¶ 23), Defendants’ practice of only 

swapping appointments for male therapists discriminated against her on the basis of her 

disability. 

 In response, Defendants state that, in three specific situations, the Spa tries to swap 

appointments among the massage therapists within a shift, based on last minute guest 

requests. (Doc. 109 at 14.) These situations occur when a guest (1) changes the 

appointment time to a time the therapist cannot accept, (2) changes the service/treatment 

to a service/treatment the therapist cannot perform, and (3) changes their request for a 

therapist based on gender. (DSOF ¶ 107-09.) Defendants argue that, when these 

situations occur, they treat all therapists equally. (Doc. 109 at 14.) 

 Plaintiff disputes this assertion. In her declaration, Plaintiff states that since the 

Enhanced System and the Spa Balancing Policy were adopted, “at no time” has she had 

“a guest assigned to [her] for a treatment that [she] could perform request[] a treatment 

that she was unable to perform because of her epilepsy at check-in.” (PSOF, Ex. 1 ¶ 23.) 

However, she states that Defendants have told her that they would “not swap or balance 

appointments for [her] — even with knowledge of [her] disability.” (Id.) She argues that 

Marriott does not manually swap appointments for her after “pre-shift balancing” if she 

“loses a booking because a guest changes the appointment time,” as it does for male 

therapists. (Doc. 94 at 16; PSOF ¶ 196, Ex. 1 ¶ 23 (stating that Defendants said they 

would not swap appointments for Plaintiff), Ex. 7 at 147-48.) Plaintiff argues that 

Defendants’ implementation of its Spa Balancing Policy (specifically their alleged refusal 

to swap appointments for her) does not consider that she, like male therapists, often starts 

the day with fewer appointments booked because of her disability and, therefore, the 

policy discriminates against her on the basis of her disability. (Doc. 94 at 17-18, PSOF 

¶ 41.) Because there is a genuine dispute regarding how Defendants implement the Spa 

Balancing Policy, the Court denies the parties’ motions for summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim based on that policy. 

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 Additionally, the parties’ briefing on this claim often mixes discussions of 

disparate treatment and failure to accommodate. (See Doc. 94 at 16, 18 (discussing 

reasonable accommodation), Doc. 94 at 17 (referring to “disparate treatment”), Doc. 109 

at 13 (discussing discriminatory treatment), Doc. 117 at 8-10 (discussing Defendants’ 

obligation to accommodate Plaintiff by rebalancing her appointments).) However, as 

further explained in Section III.C.3, disparate treatment and failure to accommodate are 

distinct theories of liability under the ADA and are analyzed differently. Johnson v. The 

Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, 2005 WL 230834, at *7-*8 (D. Or. Aug. 

23, 2005) (discussing theories of liability under the ADA). 

 Considering the lack of clarity in the parties’ arguments regarding Plaintiff’s claim 

based on the Spa Balancing Policy, the Court denies summary judgment on this basis as 

well. See Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.2d 694, 703 (7th Cir. 1986) (“It is not the obligation 

of this court to research and construct the legal arguments open to parties, especially 

when they are represented by counsel.”); Marco Realini v. Contship Containerlines, Ltd., 

143 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (denying summary judgment when parties 

had failed to adequately brief the issues). 

3. Points Assigned in the Enhanced System 

 Plaintiff next moves for summary judgment on her claim that Defendants 

discriminated against her on the basis of her disability by failing to assign her three points 

for the Revive Massage in the Enhanced System. (Doc. 109 at 18.) Plaintiff argues that 

she suffered an adverse employment action when Defendants refused to assign her three 

additional points because her ranking in the Enhanced System was adversely affected. 

(Doc. 94 at 12, 19.) She also argues that Defendants cannot show that assigning her three 

additional points would result in an “undue hardship,” and she cites cases addressing 

failure to accommodate claims. (Doc. 94 at 20, 22 (citing Cripes v. City of San Jose, 261 

F.3d 877, 893 (9th Cir. 2001).) In her reply to support her motion for summary judgment 

on this claim, Plaintiff argues she does not need to establish an adverse employment to 

establish a failure to accommodate claim. (Doc. 117 at 12.) Additionally, Plaintiff’s 

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reply discusses the issue of the three points using the language of a failure to 

accommodate claim. (Doc. 117 at 11.) For example, Plaintiff argues that Defendants 

have failed to show that assigning Plaintiff the three points for performing the Revive 

Massage is an undue hardship. (Doc. 117 at 11); see Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 

F.3d 1080, 1989 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[u]nder the ADA, an employer is required 

to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees unless the employer can 

demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation 

of the business of the employer.”). 

 However, disparate treatment and failure to accommodate are distinct theories of 

liability under the ADA and are analyzed differently. See Johnson, 2005 WL 230834, at 

*7-*8. In a disparate treatment case, the employer allegedly treated the plaintiff “less 

favorably than others because of [her] race, color, religion, sex, or [other protected 

characteristic].” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335, n.15 (1977). An 

employer’s liability in a disparate-treatment case “‘depends on whether the protected 

trait . . . actually motivated the employer’s decision.’” Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 52 (quoting 

Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). The McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting analysis generally applies to disparate treatment claims. Raytheon, 540 

U.S. at 50 n.3 (stating that the McDonell Douglas analysis applies to disparate treatment 

claims under the ADA). 

 In a failure to accommodate claim, the issue is “whether sufficient evidence in the 

record supports the inference that [the employer] failed to accommodate [the employee’s] 

disability.” Johnson, 2005WL 2030834, at *8. The McDonnell Douglas analysis is 

inappropriate in failure to accommodate claims. Id. (quoting Weigel v. Target Stores, 

122 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1997)). “‘Accordingly, it is important for the plaintiff to be 

clear about the nature of the claim [she] is asserting.’” Johnson, 2005 WL 2030834, at 

*8 (quoting Weigel, 122 F.3d at 464.) 

 Considering Plaintiff’s interweaving of the law applicable to disparate treatment 

and failure to accommodate claims in her motion for summary judgment on her claim 

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related to her request for three additional points in the Enhanced System (Doc. 94 at 18-

23), and her almost complete reliance on a failure to accommodate theory to support that 

claim in her Reply (Doc. 117 at 11-14), Plaintiff has not clearly identified the nature of 

her claim in her motion for summary judgment. Based on the lack of clarity in Plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment and her Reply, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment on her claim that Defendants discriminated against her by failing to 

assign her three points for the Revive Massage. See Sanchez, 792 F.2d at 703; Marco 

Realini, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1343. Additionally, to the extent that Defendants move for 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim based on her request for three 

additional points in the Enhanced System, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for a 

similar lack of clarity. However, as set forth below, the Court considers Defendants’ 

request for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim, which the 

parties have fully briefed. 

IV. Plaintiff’s ADA Failure to Accommodate Claims 

 Plaintiff asserts that Defendants discriminated against her in violation of the ADA 

by refusing to grant her reasonable accommodations. (Doc. 1.) Defendants move for 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims that they failed to reasonably accommodate her 

by refusing to assign her three points in the Enhanced System for the Revive Massage, 

and by denying her request to have her appointments rebalanced throughout the day. 

(Doc. 92.) 

 The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees by “not 

making reasonable accommodations to the known [limitations of an employee].” 42 

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also 29 C.F.R § 1630.9. “[A plaintiff] bears the initial 

burden of showing that ‘the suggested accommodation would, more probably than not, 

have resulted in [her] ability to perform the essential functions of [her] job.’” Mustafa v.

Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Buckingham v.

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United States, 998 F.2d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 1993)).13 Once plaintiff satisfies her burden by 

demonstrating a viable accommodation the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate 

that “the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the 

business of the employer.” Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1089. 

 Assessing the potential accommodation of a disabled employee may require the 

employer to initiate “an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual.” 29 

C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). The interactive process is “a mandatory rather than a permissive 

obligation on the part of employers under the ADA . . . and is triggered by an employee 

or an employee’s representative giving notice of the employee’s disability and the desire 

for accommodation.” Barnett v. U.S. Air., Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). Appropriate 

reasonable accommodations may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work 

schedule, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or 

devices,” as well as “modifications or adjustments that enable [the disabled employee] to 

enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly 

situated employees without disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o); see also 42 

U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). 

A. Defendants’ Obligation to Offer Accommodations 

 In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff 

does not dispute that she is able to perform the essential functions of her job (performing 

massages) without accommodation, they were not obligated to provide any reasonable 

accommodations for her disability.14 (Doc. 92 at 13, 14); see Cripes, 261 F.3d at 889 

(reasonable accommodations include “mechanisms to remove barriers or provide 

assistance to disabled individuals so that they can perform the ‘essential functions’ of the 

 13 Although both cited cases are based on claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 

1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, “[i]nterpretations of the ADA are guided by Rehabilitation Act precedent.” Nunes, 164 F.3d at 1248 n.2. 

14 Plaintiff does not dispute that she can perform massages without accommodation. (PCSOF at 10 (Plaintiff does not dispute the portion of DSOF ¶ 30 which states that Plaintiff “has and continues to be able to perform the essential functions 

of her job without the need for accommodation.”) (citing DSOF, Ex. H at 119-120).) 

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employment position.”). In other words, Defendants argue that an employer is required 

to provide reasonable accommodations only if accommodations are required to enable an 

employee to perform the essential functions of her job. 

 Plaintiff asserts that the ADA requires accommodations to provide disabled 

employees equal access to opportunities. (Doc. 103 at 10.) Plaintiff asserts that because 

her disability precludes her from performing massages or treatments with scented oils, 

she is deprived of the opportunity to earn the maximum number of points under the 

Enhanced System and, in turn, of an equal opportunity to be assigned appointments. 

(Doc. 103 at 14.) Thus, she asserts that Defendants’ implementation of the Enhanced 

System is a barrier to the performance of her essential job functions. 

 The Supreme Court has held that the ADA requires reasonable accommodations 

for individuals “with disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that those 

without disabilities enjoy.”15 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added). In so holding, 

the Court in Barnett found that a reasonable accommodation may result in a preference 

for disabled individuals over otherwise similarly situated nondisabled individuals. Id. at 

405. “Barnett [also] indicates that accommodations may adjust for the practical impact 

of a disability, not only for the immediate manifestations of the physical or mental 

impairment giving rise to the disability.” Giebeler v. M & B Assoc., 343 F.3d 1143, 1150 

(9th Cir. 2003) (discussing Barnett). “Barnett recognized that the obligation to 

 15 The regulations provide for three categories of reasonable accommodations: “(1) accommodations that are required to ensure equal opportunity in the application process; (2) accommodations that enable employees with disabilities to perform the essential functions of the position held or desired; and (3) accommodations that enable employees with disabilities to enjoy benefits and privileges equivalent to those enjoyed by non-disabled employees.” EEOC v. MCI Tele. Corp., 993 F. Supp. 726, (D. Ariz. 1998) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630(o)). 

 The Court’s decision in Barnett turned on the second type of reasonable accommodation provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii), and did not consider whether workplace opportunities (such as opportunities to be assigned to a particular position) constituted a “benefit” or “privilege” under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii). Barnett, 535 

U.S. at 396-406. Therefore, the Court does not need to consider Defendants’ argument that “benefits and privileged of employment” under the regulations are limited to access to workplace facilities and services. (Doc. 116 at 4.) 

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‘accommodate’ a disability can include the obligation to alter policies that can be barriers 

to nondisabled persons as well.” Id. at 1151 (citing Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405). Therefore, 

the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that reasonable accommodations were not 

required because Plaintiff could perform the essential functions of her job without an 

accommodation. 

B. Good Faith Participation in the Interactive Process

 To support their summary judgment motion, Defendants alternatively argue that, 

even if they had a duty to accommodate Plaintiff, they engaged in the interactive process 

with Plaintiff and granted her reasonable accommodations and, thus, have satisfied their 

duty under the ADA.16 (Doc. 92 at 10.) Plaintiff disputes whether Defendants engaged 

in the interactive process. (Doc. 103 at 11.) 

 The ADA requires employers to engage in a good-faith interactive process with 

employees to identify and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations. 

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). The interactive process also requires employers to analyze job 

functions, establish essential and nonessential job functions, and cooperate with the 

employee to determine the types of accommodation that would be most effective. See

Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated on other 

grounds by 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (stating that neither side can delay or obstruct the 

interactive process). After the employer and employee “have identified and assessed the 

range of possible reasonable accommodations, . . .‘the expressed choice of the applicant 

shall be given primary consideration unless another effective accommodation exists that 

would provide a meaningful equal employment opportunity.’” Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1115 

(quoting ADA legislative history). The duty to accommodate “is a ‘continuing’ duty that 

 

16 Defendants argue that they were not obligated to engage in the interactive 

process because there is no evidence of a nexus between Plaintiff’s seizures and the use 

of scented oils. (Doc. 92 at 11.) Plaintiff has presented evidence that she had seizures 

after using scented oils during work-related training and that scented oils could cause 

seizures. (PSOF, Ex. 1, Ex. 4 at 43.) Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create 

a genuine dispute regarding whether there is a medical nexus between her disability and the need for an accommodation. Accordingly, the Court will not grant summary judgment based on Defendants’ nexus argument. 

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is ‘not exhausted by one effort.’” McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 

1237 (9th Cir. 1999). “The employer’s obligation to engage in the interactive process 

extends beyond the first attempt at accommodation or where the employer is aware that 

the initial accommodation is failing and further accommodation is needed.” Humphreys 

v. Mem. Hosp. Ass’n., 239 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). However, an “employer is 

not obligated to provide an employee the accommodation he requests or prefers, the 

employer need only provide some reasonable accommodation.” Zivkovic., 302 F.3d at 

1089. Whether an accommodation is reasonable turns on the facts of the case. 

McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1238. 

 The record reflects that in 2006, Defendants granted Plaintiff’s request to be 

excused from performing scented body treatments. (PSOF, corrected Ex. 2 at 14, 117; 

DSOF, Ex. H at 114-118, 166.) After the Spa implemented the Enhanced System in 

2010, Defendants and Plaintiff reevaluated Plaintiff’s accommodation. (DSOF ¶¶ 59-71, 

86-89.) Defendants assigned Plaintiff the full eighteen points in the Enhanced System for 

eight body treatments that she could not perform because they used scented oils. (DSOF 

¶ 71, Ex. H at 173, 187-88, 264; Ex. B at 36-37, 89.) Defendants also again excused 

Plaintiff from performing treatments using scented oils. (DSOF, Ex. H at 173.) 

 After Defendants disciplined Plaintiff in July 2011 for performing the Revive 

Massage with unscented oil in violation of Spa protocol, Plaintiff advised Barrett and 

Smith that she had previously been excused from performing treatments that used scented 

oils because of her disability. (PSOF ¶ 179, Ex. 1 at ¶ 45.) Defendants excused Plaintiff 

from performing the Revive Massage. (PSOF, Ex. 29.) Plaintiff requested additional 

accommodations from Barrett and Smith, including that the Spa assign her three points in 

the Enhanced System for the Revive Massage and rebalance her appointments throughout 

the day. (DSOF ¶77, Ex. H at 229-30, 234, 235, 238, Ex. F at 337-38, 344-46, 376-77.) 

Defendants denied Plaintiff’s requests. (PSOF, Ex. F at 345.) 

 Plaintiff disputes whether Marriott engaged in the interactive process after July 

2011 because Defendants allegedly rejected Plaintiff’s requests without considering 

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whether the requested accommodations were reasonable. (Doc. 103 at 12; PSOF ¶ 144.) 

Plaintiff argues that although Defendants acknowledged that she had an ADA 

accommodation to not use scented oils (PSOF, Ex. 23), Defendants did not consider 

Plaintiff’s request for accommodation to “be ADA” and thus summarily dismissed her 

request for accommodations after July 2011. (Doc. 103 at 12.) Plaintiff further argues 

that, rather than complying with their obligations under the ADA, Barrett and Smith did 

not assign Plaintiff the three points for the Revive Massage because it had “already 

giv[en] her 18 points for the body treatments” and “it was [not] fair [to the other 

therapists] to give her more.” (PSOF, corrected Ex. 7 at 59-60.) Plaintiff also argues that 

Barrett told her she had “exhausted the ADA” and was “a burden on the Spa.” (Doc. 103 

at 11; PSOF, corrected Ex. 2 at 340-43). Thus, Plaintiff argues that Defendants 

terminated the interactive process in July 2011 and she was not obligated to continue 

asking Defendants for accommodations when it was clear they were not going to consider 

her requests. (Doc. 103 at 11.) 

 Defendants counter that they sufficiently accommodated Plaintiff by excusing her 

from performing treatments that used scented oils and offering several other 

accommodations. (Doc. 92 at 9, 13.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff terminated the 

interactive process by failing to raise the accommodation issue after July 2011. (Doc. 92 

at 11.) In her Reply, Plaintiff asserts that the accommodations Defendants offered were 

ineffective because they did not necessarily provide employment opportunities equal to 

Plaintiff’s peers because none of the offered accommodations affected Plaintiff’s ranking 

for purposes of assigning massage appointments in the Enhanced System or affected her 

assignment of appointments during a particular shift. (Doc. 103 at 14, 20.) 

 In a failure to accommodate case, summary judgment is only available for an 

employer when there is no genuine dispute that the employer has engaged in the 

interactive process in good faith. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1116. Considering Plaintiff’s 

testimony that Barrett told her she had “exhausted the ADA,” that she was a “burden on 

the Spa,” and that “this was not ADA,” (Doc. 103 at 11, PSOF Ex. 20, PSOF corrected 

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Ex. 2 at 340-43), there is a genuine dispute whether Defendants engaged in good faith in 

the interactive process. Evidence that an employer failed to engage in the interactive 

process in good faith alleviates the plaintiff of the burden of providing evidence of the 

reasonableness of her proposed accommodations at the summary judgment stage. See 

Witt v. N.W. Aluminum, Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133 (D. Or. 2001) (denying 

summary judgment on ADA claim when there was evidence that the employer did not 

engage in the interactive process). Thus, the Court does not need to consider the 

reasonableness of Plaintiff’s proposed accommodations at this point in the proceedings. 

C. Plaintiff’s Request for Accommodation 

 Nevertheless, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the 

identified accommodations (the assignment of three additional points and rebalancing 

throughout the shift) are not inherently unreasonable. Barnett, 535U.S. at 42 (“[T]o 

defeat a motion for summary judgment, [the plaintiff] need only show that an 

‘accommodation’ seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily in in the run of cases.”). 

The record reflects that Defendants assign points in the Enhanced System to other 

therapists who are unable or unwilling to perform certain treatments or services. (PSOF 

2, Ex. 2 at 40, Ex. 27 at 7; PSOF, corrected Ex. 7 at 40, 211 (therapist Shawn Kelly is 

given three points each for two massages he does not perform for religious reasons); 

PSOF, Ex. 11 at 20, 47 (non-disabled therapist Lisa Hagan received three points for body 

treatments she was unable to perform). The record also reflects that Defendants 

rebalance appointments for male employees. (PSOF ¶ 76, corrected Ex. 7 at 102-04, 

Ex. 22 (rebalancing or swapping appointments for male employees).) These exceptions 

to Defendants’ policies regarding assigning points for modalities and balancing or 

swapping appointments cast doubt on Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s requested 

accommodations are unreasonable. 

 Defendants further argue that providing Plaintiff her requested accommodations 

would amount to preferential treatment. (Doc. 92 at 17.) This argument does not 

undercut Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim because even if Plaintiff’s requested 

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accommodations required Defendants to offer Plaintiff preferential treatment, “[b]y 

definition any special ‘accommodation’ requires the employer to treat an employee with a 

disability differently, i.e., preferentially.” Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397. 

 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s request to be accommodated by assigning 

her three points in the Enhanced System for the Revive Massage is unreasonable as a 

matter of law because it would override Defendants’ established seniority system. 

(Doc. 92 at 16.) “A ‘seniority system’ is a scheme that alone or in tandem with other 

non-‘seniority’ criteria allots to employees ever improving employee rights and benefits 

as their relative lengths of pertinent employment increase.” Cal. Brewers Ass’n v. 

Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605-06 (1980). The Supreme Court has held that a requested 

accommodation that conflicts with the rules of a seniority system is ordinarily 

unreasonable. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394. 

 The parties dispute whether the Enhanced System is a seniority system. There is 

evidence that Defendants adopted the Enhanced System to replace their prior seniority 

system, suggesting that the current system is not a seniority system. (PSOF 2 ¶ 78, 

Ex. 26; DSOF, Ex. A at ¶ 43) (stating that the “new system would eliminate the old 

seniority system and implement a ‘point system’ that would establish ranking system” 

based on several criteria). Additionally, the Enhanced System assigns a total of twentyfive points if an employee has been employed for over eight years, but apparently stops 

considering years of service once an employee has served over eight years. (Doc. 92 at 

19; DSOF ¶ 89, Ex. A at ¶ 33.). Thus, the Enhanced System does not appear to award 

“ever improving employee rights and benefits as their relative lengths of pertinent 

employment increase.” See Cal. Brewer’s Ass’n, 444 U.S. at 605-06. 

 On the existing record, there is a genuine dispute as to whether the Enhanced 

System is a seniority system. Additionally, even if the Enhanced System is a seniority 

system, there is evidence that, despite that seniority system, Plaintiff’s requested 

accommodations are reasonable. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405 (although the ADA may 

not trump a seniority system in the run of cases, an employee may show that the 

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requested accommodation is reasonable on the particular facts of the case). Plaintiff has 

offered evidence that Defendants make exceptions to their policies for assigning points 

under the Enhanced System (PSOF, corrected Ex. 7 at 40, 211, Ex. 11 at 20, 47), thus 

there is a genuine dispute that employee expectations that the system will be followed 

have been reduced such that “one more departure, needed to accommodate [Plaintiff], 

will not likely make a difference.” Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405. 

 Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a genuine 

dispute whether Defendants engaged in the interactive process in good faith and whether 

the accommodations Plaintiff requested are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court denies 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA failure to accommodate 

claims. 

V. State Law Claim for the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

 Defendants also move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claim of 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 92 at 21.) To establish a claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must prove that Defendants 

(1) engaged in “extreme” and “outrageous” conduct, (2) intended to cause emotional 

distress or “recklessly disregarded the near certainty that such distress will result,” and 

(3) actually caused her to suffer “severe emotional distress.” See Citizen Publ’g Co. v. 

Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 110 (Ariz. 2005) (quoting Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 

(Ariz. 1987)). 

 To be extreme and outrageous, the acts complained of must be “‘so outrageous in 

character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and 

to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Mintz v.

Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int’l, Inc., 905 P.2d 559, 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Cluff 

v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 460 P.2d 666, 668 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969)). Conduct in the 

employment context rarely rises to the required level of outrageousness. Mintz, 905 P.2d 

at 563 (citing Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988)). 

Furthermore, though a showing of physical injury or a disabling response is not required, 

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the resulting emotional “distress must be extreme” and severe to support this cause of 

action. Pankratz v. Willis, 744 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (the conduct must 

“be of such a nature at to be apt to cause” a “disabling result”). 

 Here, the Court concludes as a matter of law that the facts do not support a claim 

for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To support this claim, Plaintiff argues that 

Defendants disciplined her for her disability, refused her requests for accommodations, 

and treated her less fairly than other non-disabled therapists. (Doc. 103 at 23.) In sum, 

Plaintiff relies on her allegations of discrimination, without any additional allegations of 

outrageous or extreme conduct. The Court has already found that Plaintiff’s claim that 

she was disciplined for her disability fails as a matter of law, and has found that there are 

disputed issues of fact that preclude summary judgment on her other claims. Therefore, 

none of Defendants’ conduct, including that of its employees or former employees, which 

occurred entirely within the employment context, is sufficiently extreme and outrageous. 

See Mintz, 905 P.2d at 563-64 (holding that the employer’s conduct was not extreme and 

outrageous when the employer failed to promote the plaintiff, forced her to return to 

work, and hand-delivered her a letter while she was in the hospital informing her that her 

job duties had been reassigned); Spratt v. Northern Auto. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 456, 461 

(D. Ariz. 1996) (holding that the employer’s conduct was not extreme and outrageous 

when the employer placed the employee on corrective action, demoted her, reduced her 

salary, and fired her for theft and fraud while she was on maternity leave). 

 In addition, Plaintiff has not shown that she suffered severe emotional distress. 

Plaintiff has not sought medical treatment for her alleged emotional distress or sustained 

any damages for her alleged emotional distress. (DSOF, Ex. 118, Ex. H at 297-98 

(stating that her damages are based on the number of massages she missed).) Although 

Plaintiff’s lack of medical treatment does not preclude a claim for the intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff does not cite any evidence indicative of severe 

emotional distress in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

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(Doc. 103 at 23.) Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants 

on this claim. 

VI. Punitive Damages 

 Defendants also move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for punitive 

damages. (Doc. 92 at 23.) The ADA allows for punitive damages in cases in which the 

defendant has engaged in discriminatory acts “with malice or with reckless indifference” 

to the rights of the plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). In Kolstad v. Amer. Dental Ass’n., 

527 U.S. 526 (1999), the Supreme Court explained that in § 1981a “Congress plainly 

sought to impose two standards of liability — one for establishing a right to 

compensatory damages and another, higher standard that a plaintiff must satisfy to 

qualify for an award of punitive damages.” 527 U.S. at 534. Thus, to justify an award of 

punitive damages, an “employer must act with ‘malice or reckless indifference to the 

[plaintiff’s] federally protected rights.’” Id. at 535 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)) 

(alteration and emphasis in original). The Court further explained that the terms “malice” 

and “reckless indifference” pertain to “the employer’s knowledge that it may be acting in 

violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination.” Id. at 

535. Therefore, under this standard, “an employer must at least discriminate in the face 

of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive 

damages.” Id. at 536. 

 Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants acted with reckless disregard of her rights 

by denying her request for accommodations, disciplining her for disability, and by telling 

her that she had “exhausted her ADA” and was a “burden to the Spa.” (Doc. 103 at 23.) 

Because there are genuine disputes of fact related to Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate 

claims that could affect the resolution of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, the Court 

denies summary judgment on this claim. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 94) is DENIED. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 92) is DENIED, in part, on Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claims and her 

request for punitive damages, and is GRANTED, in part, on Plaintiff’s claim that 

Defendants discriminated against her in violation the ADA by disciplining her in 2011, 

and on Plaintiff’s state law claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

 Dated this 31st day of October, 2014. 

 

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