Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01221/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01221-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
D. L. Runnels
Respondent
Tio Dinero Sessoms
Petitioner

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 Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Firestone’s apologies for his oversight were later 1

conveyed through the courtroom deputy.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIO DINERO SESSOMS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S 05-1221 DFL GGH P

vs.

D. L. RUNNELS, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. ORDER

 /

Petitioner, proceeding with counsel, has filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§2254. Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing came on for hearing before the

undersigned on September 28, 2006. Eric Weaver appeared for petitioner. Respondent’s counsel

made no appearance. 

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Petitioner was convicted in Sacramento County Superior Court, after a jury trial,

of one count of murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)); one count of robbery (Cal. Penal Code §

211); and of burglary (Cal. Penal Code §§ 459 and 462(a)). Two special circumstances were

found true as to the murder count, count one: 1) that petitioner was engaged in the commission or

attempted commission of the crime of robbery, in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 211 (Cal. Penal

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Code § 190.2(a) (17)); and (2) petitioner was engaged in the commission or attempted

commission of the crime of burglary, in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 459 (Cal. Penal Code §

190.2(a) (17)). Amended Petition (AP), pp. 1-2. Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term

of life without the possibility of parole and additional determinate terms in the amount of 15

years. AP, p. 2.

Petitioner has raised the following claims in his amended petition: 1) petitioner

received ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) when his trial counsel did not contact and

interview the officers who took petitioner into custody in Oklahoma, failing to learn that

petitioner had invoked his Miranda rights to the Oklahoma officers prior to being interviewed by

the California police officers; 2) the state court of appeal unreasonably concluded that

petitioner’s request for counsel to the California police officers, Woods and Keller, was

equivocal. AP (Memorandum), pp. 10, 28.

Petitioner has moved for an evidentiary hearing as to claim one of the amended

petition. Generally:

To obtain an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, a habeas petitioner must establish that (1) his

allegations, if proven, would constitute a colorable claim, thereby

entitling him to relief and (2) the state court trier of fact has not,

after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts. 

Correll v Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1998). If, of course, petitioner’s facts cannot

stand as the basis for a federal claim, e.g., the alleged error is not prejudicial as a matter of law,

no evidentiary hearing is required.

Since the passage of AEDPA, a petitioner who has “failed to develop” a claim,

i.e., had an opportunity to develop a claim, but did not do so, is not entitled to an evidentiary

hearing unless that petitioner demonstrates diligence to discover the factual predicate for his

claim despite his “failure,” and that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was

convicted. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, __U.S.__, 120 S. Ct. 1479

(2000). “A petitioner has not neglected his or her rights in state court if diligent in efforts to

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26 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). 2

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search for evidence.” Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1490. “Diligence ... depends upon whether the

prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to

investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Id. “Diligence require[s] in the usual case that the

prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by

state law.” Id.; Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended 252 F.3d 1150

(9th Cir. 2001).

 Moreover, federal habeas law affords a presumption of correctness to facts found

after a full and fair hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may overcome the

presumption with clear and convincing evidence, id., but it only makes sense to read the previous

general law on the granting of an evidentiary hearing in harmony with the presumption – unless

the petitioner alleges facts that would clearly warrant an overcoming of the presumption, there is

no need to hold an evidentiary hearing. 

In arguing for an evidentiary hearing on claim one, petitioner asserts that most of

the facts supporting this IAC claim are outside the trial record (motion, p. 3), observing that: 

• petitioner invoked his right to silence under the Fifth Amendment after

having been given his Miranda rights by two Oklahoma police officers,

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Hinds and Bufford, when taken into custody in Langston, Oklahoma; see

Declarations, filed on 5/5/06, of Officer David Hinds at ¶¶ 9-10, & of

former Police Chief Greg Bufford, ¶ 5.

• petitioner informed Investigator Cerrito prior to his (petitioner’s) superior

court trial that he had invoked his right to silence to the Oklahoma police;

see petitioner’s Dec., ¶¶ 4, 8, filed on 5/5/06; Declaration of Roseann

Cerrito, ¶ 5, filed on 5/5/06.

• Cerrito informed petitioner’s trial counsel at least three times that the

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petitioner had invoked his right to silence to the Oklahoma police; Cerrito

Dec., ¶ 7.

• petitioner also independently told his trial counsel on at least three

occasions that he had invoked his right to silence to the Oklahoma police;

petitioner’s Dec., § 7.

• petitioner’s trial counsel never contacted the Oklahoma police or

otherwise investigated the claim; Declaration of Howard McEwan, filed

on 5/5/06, ¶5; Cerrito Dec., ¶ 8.

• his trial counsel told Investigator Cerrito that it did not matter that

petitioner had invoked his right to silence to the Oklahoma officers

because it was the Sacramento officers who took petitioner’s statement

which was introduced at trial; Cerrito Dec., ¶ 8.

• trial counsel did not object to the introduction of petitioner’s statement on

the ground that the Sacramento police did not “scrupulously honor”

petitioner’s invocation of his right to silence within the meaning of

Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-06, 96 S. Ct. 321, 326-27 (1975).

Motion, pp. 3-4, noting respondent’s Answer, wherein respondent does not dispute the preceding

facts established by petitioner’s supporting documents (Answer, pp. 20-21). Petitioner seeks an

evidentiary hearing to establish the veracity of trial counsel’s concession in a declaration that he

did not have a tactical reason for not investigating petitioner’s allegations that he (petitioner) had

invoked his right to silence after Oklahoma police officers had read him his Miranda rights. 

Motion, pp. 4, 6; Declaration of Howard McEwan, filed on 5/5/06, ¶5. Petitioner evidently

believes this needs to be established because in the Answer (and in the filed Opposition to the

motion), respondent argued, inter alia, that trial defense counsel did have a tactical reason for not

investigating whether petitioner had invoked his right to silence with the police officers from

Oklahoma “presumably because [petitioner’s] invocation of his right to silence did not preclude

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 The court uses the electronic pagination in the CM-ECF system at the top of each 3

electronically filed page, not the page numbering inserted by a party or counsel.

 “I have no current recollection of being informed by Mr. Sessoms or Ms. Cerrito that 4

Mr. Sessoms invoked his Miranda rights to the officers who took Mr. Sessoms into custody in

Oklahoma. I know that I did not call anyone in Oklahoma to inquire about Mr. Sessoms’ claim

but I did not have a tactical reason for not doing so.” McEwan Dec., ¶ 5.

 The record of this case contains a videotape of the interview by Sacramento Officers 5

Woods and Keller, dated November 20, 1999. The record also otherwise indicates that that is the

date of the interview/interrogation. See, e.g., Reporter’s Transcript (RT), pp. 17-18.

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the subsequent re-initiation of questioning four to five days later in a different locale with

different officers from a different jurisdiction who gave a fresh set of Miranda warnings.”

Motion, p. 4, quoting Answer, p. 29; Opp., p.4. The court notes that respondent also contends 3

that the lack of recall with respect to his having been informed that petitioner had invoked his

right to silence, evidenced in trial counsel McEwan’s declaration, renders his claim that he

lacked a tactical reason for failing to contact the officers from Oklahoma “suspect.” Answer, p. 4

29. 

At oral argument, the undersigned indicated that there was no need for an

evidentiary hearing to verify the facts of this claim because the issues are legal. The declarations

adequately establish that petitioner invoked with the Oklahoma police his right to remain silent

on November 15, 1999, which no party contends that the Oklahoma police did not honor. 

Petitioner contends that under Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-06, 96 S. Ct. 326-27, the

Sacramento police officers did not scrupulously honor petitioner’s invocation of his right to

remain silent, when, days later, on November 20, 1999, they arrived and took a statement from 5

petitioner about the same crime for which petitioner had chosen not to give a statement to the

Oklahoma police. In Mosley, at 105-106, 96 S. Ct. at 327, the Supreme Court found that

petitioner’s right to cut off questioning had been honored where police “immediately ceased the

interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the

provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had

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not been a subject of the earlier interrogation.”

However, as the court pointed out at the hearing on this motion, under U.S. v.

Hsu, 852 F.2d 407 (9 Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit has found that an interrogation that resumed th

within thirty minutes after a suspect had invoked his right to silence as to a particular crime did

not violate the petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights, even though it involved the same crime. The

court noted that:

Our reading of Mosley is not so wooden. Far from laying down

inflexible constraints on police questioning and individual choice,

Mosley envisioned an inquiry into all of the relevant facts to

determine whether the suspect’s rights have been respected. 

Among the factors to which the Court looked in that case were the

amount of time that elapsed between interrogations, the provision

of fresh warnings, the scope of the second interrogation, and the

zealousness of officers in pursuing questioning after the suspect

has asserted the right to silence. [Citation omitted.]

......................................................................................................

Our post-Mosley decisions have adhered to this flexible approach that takes 

account of all relevant circumstances. For example, we have noted

on several occasions that an identity of subject matter in the first

and second interrogations is not sufficient, in and of itself, to

render the second interrogations unconstitutional. Grooms v.

Keeney, 826 F2d 883, 886 (9 Cir. 1987); United States v. Heldt,

th

745 F.2d 1275, 1278 n. 5 (9 Cir. 1984)(discussing United States th

v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246, 1278 (9th Cir. 1979).

U.S. v. Hsu, 852 F.2d at 410.

What weighs most heavily is the question of whether a fresh set of Miranda

warnings are given and a valid waiver is obtained. Id., at 411-12. The substantive question as to

the Mosley claim, claim one, is whether or not the Sacramento police properly re-Mirandized

petitioner (and obtained a waiver) before talking with him some five days later, on November 20,

1999, which includes an inquiry into the manner of the re-issuance to petitioner of the Miranda

warnings by Sacramento Police Officers Keller and/or Woods before they talked to him several

days after he had cut off questioning from the Oklahoma police about the same crime. As to

claim two, the issue is whether or not the petitioner made an adequate request for counsel which

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Sacramento police failed to honor. While whether or not the interrogation by the Sacramento

police involved a waiver of Miranda rights as a result of overbearing or coercive tactics would

apply to both the right to silence and the right to counsel, the stricture upon the police is much

more onerous in the right-to-counsel context. It is the suspect (or interviewee) alone who must

re-initiate any interrogation once his right to counsel has been invoked because once the subject

of a custodial interrogation has asserted the right to counsel, “‘the interrogation must cease until

an attorney is present.’” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1885 (1981),

quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S. Ct. at 1627. Edwards noted that Mosley

distinguished the “procedural safeguards triggered” by invoking the right to silence from a

request for counsel, only the latter of which required that all interrogation cease until an attorney

was present. Id. 

In oral argument, counsel for petitioner conceded that the claim at issue in the

motion for an evidentiary hearing is not one arising as a straight claim under Edwards, but that

Mosley and its progeny must be applied to determine if any violation occurred at all. Counsel

then went on to argue that, if however, a violation did occur under Mosley, only then does the

question arise as to whether there was a reasonable tactical decision in trial counsel’s failure to

pursue and investigate the claim, etc., for which petitioner’s counsel has submitted a declaration

by trial counsel that he had no tactical reason for not doing so. Because respondent has raised

some question as to trial counsel’s sincerity, or at least as to his recall, on this point, petitioner

believes the evidentiary hearing is necessary.

Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). First, a petitioner must show

that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. To this end, the petitioner must

identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

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professional judgment. Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. The federal court must then determine

whether in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide

range of professional competent assistance. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2066. “We strongly presume that

counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he exercised 

acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d

695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland at 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

In extraordinary cases, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated

based on a fundamental fairness standard. Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 391-93, 120 S. Ct.

1495, 1512-13 (2000), (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 506 U.S. 364 (1993)).

The Supreme Court has recently emphasized the importance of giving deference

to trial counsel’s decisions, especially in the AEDPA context:

In Strickland we said that “[j]udicial scrutiny of a counsel’s

performance must be highly deferential” and that “every effort

[must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and

to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”

466 U.S., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, even when a court is

presented with an ineffective-assistance claim not subject to §

2254(d)(1) deference, a [petitioner] must overcome the

“presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Ibid. (quoting Michel

v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)).

For [petitioner] to succeed, however, he must do more than show

that he would have satisfied Strickland’s test if his claim were

being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 2254(d)(1), it

is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its

independent judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland 

incorrectly. See Williams, supra, at 411, 65 S. Ct. 363. Rather, he

must show that the [ ]Court of Appeals applied Strickland to the

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 “Unreasonable application” of established law applies to mixed questions of law and 6

fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually on point Supreme Court

cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. Williams (Terry), 529

U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the AEDPA standard of

review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the deference is not

blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is

different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at 1522

(emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002). The state decision cannot

be rejected unless the decision itself is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established

Supreme Court authority. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S. Ct. 362 (2002). An unreasonable

error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has occurred. 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). 

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facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-699, 122 S. Ct. 1843,1852 (2002).

As this court pointed out at the hearing, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing

because, applying the Strickland prejudice prong, this court must find that “confidence in the

verdict is completely undermined” by trial counsel’s failure to proceed down the path of the

Mosley claim. After finding prejudice following that analysis, this court must then process the

claim through the AEDPA filter, requiring the undersigned to find the state court decision 6

denying petitioner’s IAC claim re: Mosley objectively unreasonable, having made a ruling that is

worse than clear error. As the court observed at the hearing, should the claim survive these

levels of analysis, there can be no finding on the first Strickland prong that trial counsel made a

reasonable tactical decision in failing to investigate the claim. That is, trial counsel cannot have

had a reasonable basis for ignoring a suppression basis that was clear from the record and so

“winable” for petitioner. On the other hand, if there is no Mosley violation, counsel’s state of

mind is equally irrelevant – no harm, no foul. In any event, notwithstanding respondent’s

questions as to the sincerity or effectiveness of trial counsel’s declaration that he had no tactical

basis or reason for not following through with the investigation of this claim, given his own

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representation of the vagaries of his memory regarding this issue, it is unlikely an evidentiary

hearing would uncover any facts not adequately set forth in the supporting declarations to the

amended petition. Indeed, once petitioner has expanded the record with the declaration of trial

counsel, it is respondent who requires the evidentiary hearing if respondent desires to dispute

those facts initially outside the record. Otherwise, the declaration stands as uncontroverted. 

Respondent has not requested, and has opposed, the evidentiary hearing. Trial counsel’s facts

outside the record as set forth in the declaration are the facts of this case.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that petitioner’s August 24, 2006, motion 

for an evidentiary hearing is denied.

DATED: 12/15/06 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

sess1221.evi

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