Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03017/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03017-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph P. Kolter
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 26, 1995 Decided December 12, 1995

No. 95-3009

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JOSEPH P. KOLTER,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

95-3017

-

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cr00404-01)

Jonathan S. Feld argued the cause for appellant, with whom Alan I. Baron was on the briefs.

Leslie A. Blackmon, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, withwhomEric

H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Larry R. Parkinson, Wendy L. Wysong, and

Randall D. Eliason, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: BUCKLEY, GINSBURG, and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG,Circuit Judge: Former Congressman Joseph P. Kolter was indicted on five counts

involving allegations that he used monies from his Official Expenses Allowance to purchase items at

the House Stationery Store for his personal use, embezzled public funds by misusing his account at

the House Post Office, and thereafter concealed material facts from the Congress by filing false

statements with the House Finance Office. He brings this pretrial appeal, arguing that (1) all counts

charging him with making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 should be dismissed in light of

Hubbard v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995); (2) the indictment should be

dismissed because his prosecution would violate the Speech or Debate Clause of Article I of the

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Constitution and with respect to one count would violate the Rulemaking Clause of Article I; (3) the

district court should have granted his motion for in camera review of grand jury materials so that he

could substantiate his speech or debate claim; and (4) he lacked the notice required by the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution that his conduct was unlawful.

For the reasons set forth below, we do not now rule upon Kolter's challenge to the § 1001

counts. We reject Kolter's other arguments and remand this matter to the district court for further

proceedings.

I. Background

As a Member of Congress, which he was for five terms from 1983 to 1993, Kolter was

entitled to use his Official Expenses Allowance for certain expenses he incurred in the conduct of his

official duties. As provided in rules promulgated by the Committee on House Administration,

reimbursable expenses principally include postage for official mailings and office supplies needed for

official purposes. The rules expressly prohibit reimbursement of expenditures for the purchase of

gifts or of items for personal or political use.

Three counts of the indictment brought against Kolter involve the House Post Office: One,

conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; Two, concealing a material fact from the Congress, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 & 2; and Three, embezzlement and conversion of public funds, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 & 2. Kolter allegedly conspired with the Postmaster of the House Post

Office to embezzle roughly $11,000 by exchanging postage stamps and vouchers for cash. Counts

Four and Five, again charging violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 & 2 and 641 & 2, involve the House

Stationery Store (formally the Office Supply Service). Kolter allegedly obtained merchandise valued

at more than $33,000 by certifying that the goods were for official use when in fact they were for his

personal use or that of his family or friends.

In November 1994 Kolter moved the district court to dismiss the indictment upon three

constitutional grounds. First, he argued that the indictment implicates the legislative functions of the

Congress and therefore violates the speech or debate clause ("for any Speech or Debate in either

House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place"). Second, he

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asserted that the indictment infringes upon the power of the House to make its own rules and

therefore violatesthe rulemaking clause ("Each House may determine the Rules ofits Proceedings").

Finally, Kolter argued that the due process clause bars his prosecution because the applicable House

Rules did not afford him adequate notice that the conduct alleged in the indictment was criminal. In

order to facilitate adjudication of his motion to dismiss, Kolter also filed a motion for in camera

review of grand jury materials.

The district court denied bothmotionsin January1995. The judge noted that she had rejected

virtually identical challenges under the speech or debate and rulemaking clauses in United States v.

Rostenkowski, Cr. No. 94-0226 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 1994), a case involving another congressman

charged with embezzling money from his expense accounts and making false financial reports to the

House Finance Office (formerly the House Disbursing Office) in connection therewith. As to the due

process question, the judge said, "Kolter provides no analysis of the allegedly vague House Rules in

his brief, and he gives absolutely no explanation as to why use of any particular rule as evidence in

this case would violate Due Process." Kolter then filed this interlocutory appeal.

In July 1995three weeks prior to the date upon which Kolter's opening brief was due in this

courtwe issued our opinion in the interlocutory appeal in United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d

1291. We held that none of the counts in the indictment in that case presented a problem under the

speech or debate clause, but that certain portions of the counts charging embezzlement and

conversion were non-justiciable under the doctrine of the separation of powers and the rulemaking

clause. We also affirmed the district court's denial of Rostenkowski's motion for in camera review

of grand jury materials.

The constitutional issues raised in Rostenkowski closely parallel the issues that Kolter raises

here. Moreover, the charges related to the House Post Office and the House Stationery Store in the

two cases are factually similar, as are the counts alleging that the Congressmen violated 18 U.S.C.

§ 1001, which prohibits making a false or misleading statement to a "department or agency of the

United States." In Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d at 1302, we left it to the district court in the first instance

to determine whether any of the § 1001 counts survives the decision in Hubbard, in which the

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Supreme Court suggested that the Congress itself is not an "agency of the United States" within the

meaning of § 1001, 115 S. Ct. at 1757, 1761, but reserved the question whether the House Finance

Office is such an "agency." Id. at 1759 n.5; see also, United States v. Rostenkowski, --- F.3d ----,

Nos. 94-3158 and 94-3160, slip op. at 2 (Oct. 17, 1995) (reh. denied). Notwithstanding our remand

of the § 1001 issue in Rostenkowski, Kolter has sought to expand the scope of this interlocutory

appeal by requesting in his brief that we instruct the district court to dismiss the § 1001 allegations

against him.

Meanwhile, upon the Government's petition for rehearing in Rostenkowski we issued a

supplementalopinion reaffirming our view that under Hubbard the status ofthe House Finance Office

as an agency of the United States for purposes of § 1001 remains an open question. Rostenkowski,

slip op. at 3. That opinion issued after the close of briefing but before oral argument in the present

case.

II. Analysis

We address each of Kolter's five challenges to some degree below. In view of our recent

decision in Rostenkowski, however, we find that only the appellant's argument based upon the

rulemaking clause warrants extended discussion. First we attend to a threshold question.

A. The § 1001 Counts

As the United States correctly points out, this court does not now have jurisdiction to order

the district court to dismiss the § 1001 counts, as the appellant belatedly requests, upon the basis of

the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation in Hubbard. Whether such a statutory challenge may

properly be the subject of a pretrial appealKolter points to no authority for that propositionwe

need not determine, for the challenge is surely out of place in the present case: Kolter never asked

the district court to dismiss the § 1001 counts.

At the same time, the Government asksthat we addressthe appellant's challenge to the § 1001

counts upon the basis of the speech or debate clause in order to conserve judicial resources and to

avoid further delay of the trial in this case. The Government made the same point in seeking

rehearing in Rostenkowski, and we reject it again for the same reasons. See slip op. at 3-4. We think

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it would be short-sighted to rule upon the constitutionality of § 1001 as applied to a Member of

Congress before the district court determines whether, in light of Hubbard, the statute applies to the

House Finance Office. See, e.g., Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105

(1944) ("we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is

unavoidable"). As we noted before, the statutory question may well turn upon facts that have not

been developed in the record before us. Rostenkowski, slip op. at 3. In any event, the status of the

House Finance Office has been fully briefed in the district court in the Rostenkowski case. Therefore,

as we said in denying rehearing in that case, it is unlikely that much in the way of either judicial

resources or trial delay could be saved by our resolving the constitutional issues before the district

court first passes upon the question, id. at 3-4, and we decline to do so.

B. In Camera Review of Grand Jury Materials

In his opening brief Kolter lists the district court's denial of his motion for in camera

examination of grand jury materials as one of the "rulings under review." He offers no argument,

however, for reversal of that ruling, noting only that he disagrees with our holding on the identical

motion in Rostenkowski.

Congressman Rostenkowski had argued that the court must look beyond the face of his

indictment in order to determine whether it was based in part upon materialsthat could not properly

be used against him under the speech or debate clause. We rejected that proposition and its inroad

upon grand jury secrecy because the appellant had not provided "any reason to think that prohibited

material was submitted to the grand jury." 59 F.3d at 1313. Neither has Kolter. Therefore, as the

appellant apparently realizes, what we said in Rostenkowski is equally applicable here.

C. Due Process

Kolter's due process claim is that the House Rules that he allegedly violated are so vague in

distinguishing between "official" and "personal" use that he did not have constitutionally adequate

notice that his conduct would expose him to criminal liability for converting government fundsto his

own purpose. In response the Government argues first that the court is without jurisdiction to review

this claim in an interlocutory appeal. We agree.

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the court of appealsmayreview only a "final decision" ofthe district

court; a decision is not ordinarily final until a judgment terminating the entire case has been entered.

A small class of so-called "collateral orders" issued prior to judgment are deemed final for the

purpose of this requirement, however. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,

546 (1949). For an order to qualify as collateral and therefore subject to interlocutory appeal under

§ 1291, (1) the order must fully dispose of the limited question at issue on appeal; (2) the issue must

be completely collateral to the cause of action, i.e. independent of the underlying merits; and (3)

there must be at stake an important right that would be lost to the appellant if he had to await final

judgment before he could get appellate review.

Thus, the district court's resolution of a congressman's claim that his impending trial would

violate his rights under the speech or debate clause is subject to immediate appeal lest that

constitutional right be lost merely by requiring him to stand trial, regardless of the outcome. That

same congressman's claim that the charges against him are brought in derogation of his right (in

common with us all) to due process of law will not ordinarily be subject to interlocutory appeal,

however; post-conviction review is deemed adequate to vindicate that right. See, e.g. United States

v. Brizendine, 659 F.2d 215, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (court can still "provide effective relief by ordering

the indictment dismissed ..., striking any additional chargesthat were improperly brought against the

accused, requiring correction ofthe sentence, or reversing and remanding for reindictment and a new

trial").

Kolter makes no direct reply to the Government's argument that his due process claim is not

presently appealable. He states only that it is grounded in the alleged vagueness of the House Rules

and therefore merges with his argument based upon the rulemaking clause, which we address fully

below. It is not clear whether Kolter believes that some portion of his due process claim is separable

fromhis claimunder the rulemaking clause; in any event we take the Government's point as conceded

with respect to any such portion and dismiss the due process claim for want of jurisdiction.

D. The Speech or Debate Clause

In Part II-A we declined to reach the merits of Kolter's claim that the speech or debate clause

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precludes his being tried for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001, as alleged in Counts Two and Four of the

indictment. Therefore, our discussion of the speech or debate clause here pertains only to Counts

Three and Five and to that portion of Count One relating to the conspiracy to commit the illegal acts

described in Count Three (as opposed to the conspiracy to commit the § 1001 violations alleged in

Count Two).

Kolter's claim under the speech or debate clause is totally devoid of legal argument. From

the listing in his brief of the "issues presented for review" we infer that he raises three grounds for

invoking the protection of that clause: the allegations of the indictment implicate legislative acts; his

prosecution would require him to offer proof of his legislative acts in order to defend himself; and

his prosecution would depend upon his "status as a long-time Member of the House of

Representatives" (presumably in order to prove his knowledge of House Rules). Kolter asks that we

repudiate our decision in Rostenkowski to the extent that we there rejected virtually identical

arguments upon facts that are indistinguishable for the purpose of the speech or debate clause. See

59 F.3d at 1302-04. This panel would be bound by that decision even if we did not agree with it.

If Kolter wants to pursue these arguments, therefore, he will have to do so with a higher authority

than is convened today.

E. The Rulemaking Clause

Kolter's appeal under the rulemaking clause pertains to the allegations of embezzlement and

conversion of public fundsin Count Five ofthe indictment. The theory of the indictment requires the

court to distinguish between "official" and "personal" purchases at the House Stationery Store for

which Kolter obtained reimbursement from congressional funds. As in Rostenkowski, we must be

vigilant to avoid the separation of powers problems that may arise when the court undertakes to fill

a gap or resolve an ambiguity in Rules promulgated under the authority of each House to govern its

own proceedings. Where "a court cannot be confident that its interpretation is correct, there is too

great a chance that it will interpret the Rule differently than would the Congress itself; in that

circumstance, the court would effectively be making the Rulesa power that the Rulemaking Clause

reserves to each House alone." 59 F.3d at 1306-07.

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Kolter relies heavily upon our holding in Rostenkowski that certain ofthe House Rules do not

provide a "judicially discoverable and manageable" standard for distinguishing between expenditures

for official and for personal purposes. 59 F.3d at 1311. The Government makes three

counter-arguments: First, Kolter's alleged use of the Official Expenses Allowance for personal

purposes is proscribed by the various annual appropriation acts, which the court can interpret, as it

does other statutes, without raising concerns about the doctrine of separation of powers or the

rulemaking clause. Second, insofar as any item is to be used as a gift, its purchase is of a type for

which reimbursement is specifically prohibited by the Rules. Finally, Kolter's actions are

impermissible under Rules not considered in Rostenkowski.

Applicable House Rules permit a Member of Congress to charge to his Official Expenses

Allowance items purchased at the House Stationery Store that are necessary in the conduct of the

Member's official business. The indictment charges that Kolter violated these Rules by using his

Allowance to obtain more than $33,000 worth ofitemsthat were intended for his personal use or that

of his family or friendsincluding 650 pieces of fine china, 30 pieces of luggage, approximately 40

timepieces, 30 Mont Blanc pens, 40 wooden boxes for playing cards, and two gold necklaces.

In Rostenkowski the Congressman was charged, in part, with using his expense allowance to

purchase "a variety of valuable consumer goods and gift merchandise ... to be paid for as supplies

necessary for the official use, when in fact the goods he obtained were for the personal use of himself,

his family, or his friends." 59 F.3d at 1311 (quoting indictment). We held that insofar as the

Government's case depended upon showing that Rostenkowski had purchased itemsfor his personal

use, it was non-justiciable, because "without explanation in the Rules that term is too ambiguous to

support the prosecution of a Member of Congress." Id. "[W]hile the House Rules certainly

contemplate a line between the "official' and the "personal,' they do little to indicate where that

boundary lies." Id.

The Government'sfirst argument, as we said, isthat thisis a straightforward case ofstatutory

interpretation, unassailable under the rulemaking clause: "The edict that a congressman may use the

Official Expenses Allowance only for "official' expenses is not merely a House regulation. It is a

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statutory limit that Congress has imposed upon itself through the enactment of the annual

appropriations acts." In addition, federal statutes authorize reimbursement of House Members only

for "official expense[s]," see 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 56 & 122a, notes on "Reimbursement of Expenses of

House Members," and provide that appropriated funds "shall be applied only to the objectsfor which

the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law." 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a).

The Government maintains that these limitations can be enforced against a Member of

Congress through the general prohibition upon embezzlement and conversion of Government

property, 18 U.S.C. § 641, without offending the rulemaking clause or separation of powers

principles. The Government refers us for authority to our own recent decisions in United States v.

Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239, 1245-46 (1995) (false claims statute under which Senator was

prosecuted is simply procedural vehicle to enforce provisions of reimbursement statute), and United

States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 189-90 (1994) (by codifying in statute the disclosure requirementsin the

House Rules, "Congress has empowered the executive and judicial branches to enforce them").

Contrary to the Government's contention, we did consider this argument in Rostenkowski.

See 59 F.3d at 1308-09. There the "Government contend[ed] that the Appropriations Acts and the

Handbook [of House Rules] provide a "judicially discoverable and manageable standard[ ]' for

resolving [the] question" whether we could find and apply the line between "personal" and "official"

expenses implicit in the statutes and Rules. 59 F.3d at 1309. We determined not merely that the

House Rules are ambiguous when applied to certain situations, but that the statutes themselves are

no source of clarification; they merely invoke the official versus personal distinction, they do not

provide the standard by which it isto be applied. Ordinarily, a court may supply the missing standard

based upon the common understanding that would presumably underlie the Congress's use of such

terms as "official" and "personal." As we explained in Rostenkowski, however, where a criminal

statute is to be enforced against a Member of Congress, the rulemaking clause is uniquely a

constraint. See 59 F.3d at 1306-07; United States v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

("In the absence of any discernible legalstandard or even of a congressional policy determination ...,

we are loathe to give the False Claims Act an interpretation that would require the judiciary to

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develop rules of behavior for the Legislative Branch"). The personal versus official distinction is no

less elusive, as applied to a Member of Congress, when it appears in a statute than it is in the House

Rules themselves; our interpreting the legislative appropriations statutes cited by the Government

therefore implicates the separation of powers no less than does our interpreting the House Rules.

The Government'ssecond argument isthat inRostenkowski we expresslydistinguished "gifts"

as a subset of "personal" items, with respect to which the House Rules "could hardly be clearer:

fundsfrom the Official Expenses Allowance may not be used to purchase gifts except under clear and

limited circumstances." 59 F.3d at 1311. Hence, the Government could prove its case by showing

that Rostenkowski used his Official Expenses Allowance to purchase gifts outside the narrow

exception provided in the Rules. Here the Government maintains that it should likewise be able to

proveCount Five byshowing that Kolter charged prohibited giftsto his OfficialExpenses Allowance.

Kolter protests that "Count Five does not mention the word "gift.' It clearly states that the

items "were for the personal use of himself, his family, or his friends.' " He contrasts the quoted

phrase with the corresponding phrase in Count Four, where it is alleged that Kolter kept the items

"for his personal use, or gave them as gifts to personal friends and associates." This syntactical feint

is not at all persuasive. First, as noted above, gifts are a subset of personal items, not a third category

that coexists with the "official" and "personal" categories. Therefore, a gift could well be included

among the items intended "for the personal use of ... [Kolter's] family, or his friends." Indeed, that

is an obvious meaning of the term "gift." Second, Count Five incorporates by reference paragraph

five of Count Four, which declares that "Kolter caused employees of the House Stationery Store to

complete SpecialOrder Request formsfor itemsthat he intended to use as personal gifts, or for other

personal purposes." Third, Count Five alleges specifically that Kolter carried out his embezzlement

and conversion by causing "a variety of valuable consumer goods and gift merchandise ... to be paid

for ... as supplies necessary for his official use, when in fact the goods he obtained were for the

personal use of himself, hisfamily, or hisfriends." This is in all material respects the same charge that

we upheld in Rostenkowski because it clearly alleges that the Congressman used or intended to use

the items purchased as gifts. Therefore, we conclude as we did in Rostenkowski that the indictment

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states a case that the Congressman converted Government fundsto his own use by violating the clear

House Rule against using the Official Expenses Allowance for the purchase of gifts (outside the

limited exception, to which Kolter lays no claim). Accordingly, we reject Kolter's arguments that

Count Five should be dismissed.

We now turn to the Government's final argument in order to determine whether Kolter can

be tried and convicted upon any ground other than his alleged reimbursement for the purchase of

gifts. The Government asserts that certain facts and House Rules not before the court in

Rostenkowski show that the items Kolter obtained from the House Stationery Store could not have

served any "official" purpose, and that the indictment must therefore be understood as alleging that

they were for his personal use. See Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d at 1310 ("unless we can determine that

the factsset out in a particular allegation could not be authorized under any reasonable interpretation

of the House Rules, we must find that allegation non-justiciable").

Contrary to an implication in the Government's brief, we do not require the Government to

disclose its case prior to trial. What we said in Rostenkowski concerning the appellant's challenge

based upon the speech or debate clause is equallyapplicable to a challenge based upon the rulemaking

clause: "[P]rior to trial, the Government need show only that the indictment is valid." Id. at 1300.

In particular, the Government must show that the indictment alleges that the Congressman obtained

reimbursement for expenditures to which he could not have been entitled under the House Rules.

The Government may satisfy this burden in either of two ways. First, it may present its

chargesin sufficient detail to negate the possibility that, if the allegations are proved, the expenditure

could still be squared with an "official" use. Second, it may allege conduct that self-evidently violates

the Rules under any reasonable interpretation.

As to the first possibility, the Government is well-advised to anticipate in its indictment any

vague or obscure terms or provisionsin the Rules. Insofar as the Rules are loosely drafted, that may

be an onerous and sometimes an impossible task. The remedy for that, of course, rests with the those

who draft the Rules and the House that adopts them. Still, pending greater precision in the Rules,

the Government may strengthen its hand by adding to the indictment the type of allegations that in

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this case it has made only in its brief. The Government there reveals, for example, that Kolter neither

kept the 650 pieces of fine china, nor used them in his office, nor used them for entertaining at his

home or elsewherethe Government's inference being that he gave at least some of the china away

as gifts. Nor, we are told, did he keep the 30 pieces of luggage, nor use them on any official

congressional trips during the two-year period over which he acquired them. If these allegations were

in the indictment, then the indictment would allege purchases that clearly fall outside the scope of

official expenditures under any reasonable interpretation of the House Rules. (We note that Kolter

has not even claimed that he used these goods in some way that is arguably consistent with the

Rules.) These allegations are not in the indictment, however, and they cannot make valid an

otherwise insufficient indictment.

Asto the second courseshowing that the conduct alleged in the indictment isself-evidently

inconsistent with the House Rules governing reimbursementsthe Government refers us to a long

list of additional, allegedly unambiguous regulations in the Congressional Handbook, of which fully

42 pages deal with the Official Expenses Allowance. Many of these regulations are simply not

relevant to our analysis. For example, the Government points to extensive regulations governing

expenditures for food and beverages as well as travel in order to document its point that the Rules

are imbued with a spirit of frugality utterly inconsistent with a Member's getting reimbursed for the

purchase of fine china and luggage. Undoubtedly, the food, beverage, and travel rules do reflect a

frugal if not a parsimoniousspirit; but (as Grover Cleveland pointed out): "A man has never yet been

hung for breaking the spirit of a law."

The Government also, however, refers usto three specific Rulesthat are highly relevant, and

were not invoked in Rostenkowski. The Government thereby makes it clear that Kolter's alleged

conduct could not be lawful under any rational interpretation of the House Rules.

First, "[n]o Member, relative of the Member, or anyone with whom the Member has a

professional or legal relationship may directly benefit monetarily from the expenditure of these

allowances." Handbook at 2.1. Even if reimbursement for personal items were not separately

banned, therefore, this Rule would preclude a Member of Congressfrom selling any merchandise for

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which he or she had received reimbursement. Nor could Kolter exchange the merchandise for goods

or services of monetary value.

Second, "[e]xpensesincurred in support ofthe purchase or presentationoftrophies or awards,

or other items to be given in recognition of personal distinction, are not reimbursable from the

Official Expenses Allowance." Handbook at 2.60 (emphasis in original). This regulation, when

combined with the prohibition against reimbursement for the purchase of gifts, suggests that Kolter

could not lawfully transfer to another person anything for which he wasreimbursed out of his Official

Expenses Allowance. He has run afoul of the House Rules, therefore, unless he can show that he

kept all of the items for his own use.

Third, theRules governing theHouseStationeryStore expresslyauthorize Membersto obtain

reimbursement for two types of items "to support the conduct of the Member's official and

representational duties." These types of items are "office supplies" and "stationery supplies."

Handbook at 2.30-2.31. Conspicuous by their omission are most of the "valuable consumer goods

and gift merchandise" enumerated in Count Five of Kolter's indictment. The Government takes the

position that the two types ofsuppliesidentified in the Rules are exhaustive ofthe categoryof official,

and therefore reimbursable, purchasesthat a Member maymake at the Store. While that is a plausible

reading of the House Rules, the matter is by no means clear. Suppose a Member did purchase

luggage exclusively for use on official travel, or china exclusively for serving tea to visitors at his

Washington and district offices. Those would be arguably official uses, and the Rule does not clearly

preclude reimbursement of those expenditures. That is why we were unable in Rostenkowski to say

that the "armchairs, luggage, sets of china, and crystal sculptures of the U.S. Capitol" were clearly

personal items.

In this case, on the other hand, we have no doubt (and Kolter does not even try to raise any)

that the purchases were for a personal rather than an official use. Consider the list in Count Five

(incorporated by reference to Count Four):

(a) Approximately forty timepieces, including 14 wristwatches, varying in

price from$118.50 to $124.89 each, and 13 Ashbyclocks, costing approximately$95

each....

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(b) Approximately thirty Mont Blanc pens, ranging in price from $79.50 to

$159.50 each....

(c) Approximately 650 pieces of fine china and glassware, costing the United

States a total of approximately $21,000 ... [and including] 48 five-piece place settings

of china with 50 matching serving pieces....

(d) Approximately thirty pieces of luggage, costing the United States a total

of approximately $2,000....

(e) Two 20-inch gold chain necklaces, costing the United States $220 each ...

[and]

(f) Approximatelyfortywooden card boxes with a scene ofthe Capitol on top,

costing the United States approximately $28 each....

While one or two clocks, pens, tea sets, suitcases, or perhaps even one or two wooden boxes for

cardsto be put in the reception area of a congressional office might be deemed a purchase for official

use under the House Rules, the quantities ofsuch itemsinvolved here are alone enough to show that

they were not purchased for official use. Moreover, even were there only one gold necklace or one

wristwatch involved, there could be no doubt that it was not bought for any official use.

The particularity of the indictment is critical. Here the Government has identified the type of

item purchased, as well as the quantity and price of each item. Having identified Rules that

specifically proscribe reimbursement for the purchase of gifts and awards, and the sale or barter of

a reimbursed purchase, we have no difficulty in determining that the enumerated purchases could not

all qualify for official use under any reasonable interpretation of the House Rules.

III. Conclusion

Kolter has not shown that his prosecution raises any problem under the speech or debate

clause or poses any significant risk, relevant to the rulemaking clause and the separation of powers,

that the courts will err in applying the distinction between official and personal uses, as those terms

are used in the House Rules, to the facts alleged in the case against him. The Government is clearly

entitled to prove, as in Rostenkowski, that the purchases in question were used as giftsa use

unmistakably forbidden by the House Rules. Furthermore, the Government has in this case, as it did

not in Rostenkowski, made allegations in the indictment that under any reasonable interpretation of

the House Rules, state a violation of the statutes involved. Kolter has not shown that there is any

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ambiguity in the Rules by which he could establish an arguably official use for the goods that he

acquiredthat is, a use consistent with the allegations of the indictment but plausibly reimbursable

under the Rules.

For the reasons stated above in Parts II-A, II-B, and II-C respectively, we decline to order

that the § 1001 counts against Kolter be dismissed; we uphold the district court's denial of his motion

for in camera review of grand jury materials; and we reject his due process claim. Accordingly, the

orders of the district court are in all respects

Affirmed.

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