Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03182/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03182-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chauncey L. Coleman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the

Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the

bound volumes go to press. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 17, 2008 Decided January 16, 2009

No. 05-3182

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CHAUNCEY L. COLEMAN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cr00349-01)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Stratton C. Strand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the briefs were Jeffrey A.

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Mary B.

McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and GINSBURG and

ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Chauncey L. Coleman was

convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a prior felon,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal he assigns a

variety of errors to the district court in contending that he was

denied a fair trial. Of the two voir dire challenges, we need

address only one. Because the district court read the unredacted

indictment to the prospective juror pool, revealing appellant’s

prior felony convictions for crimes of violence including

robbery with a deadly weapon, we reverse and remand for a new

trial. Appellant had offered to stipulate to his prior felon status,

and although defense counsel did not object, the issue was not

waived and the error was plain and not harmless. 

I.

On the hot afternoon of July 10, 2004, Officer James

Boteler, a member of the Metropolitan Police Department for

four years, and Officer James Harris, a rookie in training,

entered a residential building in response to citizen complaints

about narcotics activity in vacant apartments. The officers were

in uniform. Boteler signaled to a woman on the front steps

whom he knew to be a drug user to remain quiet and proceeded

to the second floor where he heard voices. From the second

floor landing he looked through the open door of apartment 202

and saw five people: three in the living room; a woman standing

near a pass-through from the living room to the kitchen, who

appeared to be manipulating a crack pipe in her hands; and

appellant, who was standing in the kitchen facing Boteler and

holding to his mouth a clear glass smoking device with an

orange tip. 

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After ten to fifteen seconds, Officer Boteler, upon hearing

Officer Harris’s noisy footsteps behind him, stepped into the

apartment and announced “police.” The three people in the

living room stood still. Appellant looked startled and stepped

back from the countertop. According to Boteler, appellant

“grabbed, and, almost in a swatting motion, knocked . . . a

silver-colored handgun revolver with black grips from his

waistband,” out of the officer’s view. The gun made a “thud”

noise when it hit the floor. Boteler ordered appellant to put his

hands up and come out of the kitchen into the living room.

Appellant did so after putting his crack pipe on the counter.

Boteler claimed appellant was “sweating profusely” and looked

“very distressed.” Upon handcuffing appellant, Boteler told

Officer Harris to secure the others by having them put their

hands against the wall. At this point, Boteler mentioned a

“gun,” walked into the kitchen, and found a handgun less than

a foot from where appellant had been standing. Boteler called

the dispatcher for a crime scene technician. 

On cross-examination, Officer Boteler denied that his prior

sworn statements regarding the gun were contradictory. He had

variously testified on previous occasions that Coleman “threw,”

“grabbed,” and “dropped” the gun. On cross-examination

Boteler testified that appellant had “dropped [the gun], grabbed

it, and knocked it out of his pants,” “almost in that order.” Two

other police officers also testified, a forensic scientist who

processed the gun and a fingerprint specialist who testified that

no identifiable prints were found on it. At the close of the

government’s case, the prosecutor read to the jury the three

stipulations agreed to by the parties: (1) appellant had previously

been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of more than one

year in prison; (2) the .357 magnum revolver and ammunition

were, respectively, a firearm and ammunition for purposes of

section 922(g); and (3) the gun and ammunition were

manufactured outside the District of Columbia and traveled

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through interstate commerce.

In defense, appellant called Officers Boteler and Harris and

testified himself. Boteler admitted that in his initial call to the

dispatcher he had not informed the dispatcher of the gun but

claimed that at the time he did not need help with the gun

because it was secured. Harris admitted that he did not see a

gun on appellant and learned there was a gun only after

appellant was handcuffed, when Boteler mentioned a “gun.”

Harris testified that he only saw the gun on the kitchen floor and

the crack pipe on the countertop. 

Appellant denied the gun was his. He testified that he was

in the apartment smoking crack along with four other people and

was holding up his crack pipe when the officers entered the

apartment. According to appellant, the woman had just given

him some crack, he had put it in his pipe, which he was holding

in his right hand, and was raising his lighter to his pipe with his

left hand. Jumping back upon seeing Officer Boteler, appellant

put the lighter on the counter and came from behind the counter

holding the crack pipe. Boteler told him to drop what was in his

hand, and he dropped the pipe on the floor. Boteler then stepped

on the pipe and handcuffed appellant. At that point Boteler told

Officer Harris that appellant was being locked up for possession

of cocaine and drug paraphernalia, and Harris called the

dispatcher. Boteler then walked into the kitchen, looked around,

and came out and asked the woman if she had any more cocaine.

Boteler returned to the kitchen and a few seconds later bent

down and came up with a gun. When Boteler asked appellant if

this was his gun, appellant told him: “Man, that ain’t my gun.

I ain’t have no gun.” Boteler then told Harris “gun.” Appellant

also denied having anything in his waistband. 

On cross-examination, appellant admitted to prior

convictions for unauthorized use of a vehicle and destruction of

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property, escape, breaking and entering, and possession of stolen

property. The district court gave a cautionary instruction that

this evidence was relevant only to appellant’s credibility and not

to show that he has a propensity to commit crime. After defense

counsel’s redirect examination, the district court, over defense

objection, asked appellant how long he had been using crack,

and appellant answered: “About ten years.” 

In final instructions, the district court offered no further

instruction on the use of prior crimes evidence. At the

prosecutor’s request, “as a matter of caution,” the version of the

indictment sent into the jury room was redacted. The jury found

appellant guilty of gun possession as a prior felon, and the

district court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment and

three years’ supervised release, and ordered him to pay a special

assessment of $100. 

II.

 “The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial guarantees to the

criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent

jurors.” United States v. Edmund, 52 F.3d 1080, 1094 (D.C. Cir.

1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In

Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989), the Supreme

Court identified voir dire as “a critical stage of the criminal

proceeding” because “[j]ury selection is the primary means by

which a court may enforce a defendant’s right to be tried by a

jury free from ethnic, racial, or political prejudice, or

predisposition about the defendant’s culpability.” Id. at 873

(internal citations omitted); see also Rosales-Lopez v. United

States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).

Appellant contends that he was denied a fair trial in violation of

the Sixth Amendment for several reasons, including that the

district court plainly erred during voir dire first, by reading the

unredacted indictment to the jury when he had offered to

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stipulate his felon status and second, by failing to inquire as

requested whether jurors held possible biases with respect to

police testimony and cases involving guns, and that these errors

were not harmless. Because the reading of the unredacted

indictment to the prospective jurors was reversible error, we

need not decide whether the failure to pose the requested

questions about police testimony and gun bias was also

reversible error.

Prior to the voir dire questioning of a pool of potential

jurors, the prosecutor advised the district court that the parties

had agreed to three stipulations, which the prosecutor read to the

jury at the close of the government’s case: that appellant had

previously been convicted of a felony and that the gun and

ammunition both qualified as prohibited under section 922(g).

The parties also submitted agreed-to proposed voir dire

instructions and questions as well as proposed jury instructions.

The district court acknowledged the prosecutor’s statement

about the stipulations and proceeded to discuss only the one

instruction, on probable cause, on which the parties were not in

agreement. The parties then discussed with the district court the

extent to which the jury would learn of appellant’s criminal

history, and the district court ruled that the prosecutor would not

be allowed to refer to either of appellant’s prior convictions as

a felony. Earlier appellant had filed an opposition to the

government’s in-limine motion to admit evidence of his prior

conviction for armed robbery pursuant to Federal Rule of

Evidence 404(b); the district court had denied the motion

without prejudice to its renewal at trial on rebuttal.

A jury pool was subsequently brought into the courtroom,

sworn, and given preliminary instructions by the district court,

including the instruction to listen to everything the district court

judge said because alternate jurors might be needed at trial. The

district court told the prospective jurors that the case involved a

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1

 The two requested questions were:

Do you believe that law enforcement agents or officers are, or

are not, trustworthy as a general matter, and would any of you

tend to give either more or less weight to, or tend to believe

one-count indictment, explaining that an indictment was not

evidence, that the evidence would decide the case, and that it

was for the jury to determine whether the government had

sustained its burden of proof. The district court then read to the

jury the unredacted indictment, which stated in pertinent part:

On or about July 10, 2004, within the District of

Columbia, Chauncey L. Coleman, having been

convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year in Prince George’s County,

Maryland . . ., a crime of violence, that is, robbery with

a deadly weapon and in D.C. Superior Court . . . a

crime of violence, that is, escape, did unlawfully and

knowingly receive and possess a firearm, that is, a

Smith & Wesson .357 caliber revolver, and did

unlawfully and knowingly receive and possess

ammunition, that is, .357-caliber ammunition, which

had been . . . transported in . . . interstate commerce. 

(emphases added).

Although the district court judge, in conducting the voir dire

and eliciting responses to a written jury questionnaire, spoke

individually with some jurors when they volunteered

information about a law enforcement connection or a gun

incident and asked whether they could be fair and impartial, the

district court did not put to the pool of prospective jurors two

questions that the parties had jointly requested concerning police

testimony and gun charges.1

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or disbelieve, the testimony of a law enforcement agent or

officer simply because of his or her status as a law

enforcement agent or officer? 

Do you have an opinion or feeling about the possession of

firearms, or laws dealing with the possession of firearms, that

would make it difficult to render a fair and impartial verdict

based solely upon the evidence presented during the trial?

Defense counsel did not object in the district court to the

reading of the unredacted indictment. However, because

appellant stipulated to his prior felon status and even objected to

admission of Rule 404(b) evidence, appellant did not waive the

challenge he now makes. Although the failure to object forfeits

a claim, “[m]ere forfeiture, as opposed to waiver, does not

extinguish an ‘error’ under Rule 52(b).” United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); see also United States v. Tann, 532

F.3d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The government’s suggestion

that appellant invited the error by not objecting in the district

court and so cannot raise it on appeal, citing United States v.

Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 51(b), is not well taken. The parties

confirmed after their initial briefs were filed that joint proposed

voir dire and jury instructions were emailed to the district court

prior to trial, although never docketed. Further, nothing in the

record indicates that defense counsel requested the voir dire

error, as occurred in Sutton, United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d

56, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2003), and United States v. Larouche, 896

F.2d 815, 829 (4th Cir. 1990), on which the government relies.

In Sutton, counsel voiced agreement on three occasions with the

district court’s ruling, 801 F.2d at 1367, whereas here, appellant

simply did not object. In Yousef, the defendants, whose requests

for mid-trial voir dire had been granted on certain subjects,

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made a tactical decision not to request mid-trial voir dire on

other subjects, 327 F.3d at 119. Likewise, in Larouche, a

defense request failed to adequately probe the issue of juror bias

against the defendants, 896 F.2d at 829, whereas here, the offer

to stipulate was directed to that precise bias.

Although the challenge to the reading of the unredacted

indictment is not waived, because appellant failed to object at

trial he must show in order to prevail on appeal that there was

“an error that is plain and that affect[s] substantial rights,”

Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(alteration in original), by prejudicing the defense and “seriously

affect[ing] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings,” id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1,

15 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that

appellant has met this burden.

In United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1995),

this court addressed the attendant harm of informing the jury of

the defendant’s prior felony conviction in a prosecution for

violation of section 922(g) where the prior conviction is

essentially identical to the charges in the indictment. Id. at 324.

Jones was indicted for drug offenses and being a felon in

possession of a firearm. Prior to voir dire, defense counsel

offered to stipulate to the fact of Jones’ prior felony conviction

and moved to exclude evidence of the prior conviction pursuant

to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Id. at 321. Nonetheless, after

instructing the prosecutor not to refer to the nature of the prior

felony, the district court read to the jury the unredacted

indictment, which stated that Jones had previously been

convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, which

was a felony. Id. When the prosecutor called a witness to

describe the nature of the prior felony, the district court

overruled the defense objection, stating that “the cat is probably

out of the bag,” and gave a limiting instruction then and during

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the final instructions to the jury regarding other crimes evidence.

Id. 

On appeal, the government presciently conceded that it was

error to read the unredacted indictment in light of the defense

offer to stipulate felon status, id. at 322-23; see Old Chief v.

United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191-92 (1997), but argued that the

error was harmless, Jones, 67 F.3d at 322. This court held that

the district court had abused its discretion by denying the

defense motion to exclude evidence of the nature of the prior

felony conviction and that it had plainly erred by informing the

jury of the nature of the felony when reading the indictment and

giving final jury instructions. Id. at 324-25. Applying to

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 this court’s rationale regarding

severance motions, the court observed that “the danger of undue

prejudice by allowing the government to introduce evidence

regarding the nature of Jones’ prior felony conviction was

manifest in view of the virtually identical charges in the

indictment.” Id. at 324; cf. United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d

50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d

1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Further, even though the

government had no need to establish the nature of the prior

felony to meet its burden of proof, Jones, 67 F.3d at 324 (citing

United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 3-4 (lst Cir. 1994) (en

banc)), the jury was confronted on five separate occasions with

both the fact and nature of Jones’s prior felony conviction, id.

The court concluded that the error was not harmless because

once the jury learned of his prior offense, Jones’ casual user

defense was doomed. Id. at 325.

Confronted with the same issue in United States v. Myles,

96 F.3d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1996), where the prior-conviction

information had been presented to the jury on four occasions,

the court concluded that, in the absence of any defense

objection, there was no plain error, id. at 496-97. The court

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distinguished Jones on the ground that the defense had neither

offered to stipulate nor requested that the prosecution refrain

from revealing the nature of the prior conviction, id. at 496. The

court further concluded that the error was not prejudicial in light

of “the strong evidence” of drug distribution, id. at 497, namely

a controlled buy in which Myles was the only man matching the

undercover officer’s description of the seller, a prerecorded

twenty dollar bill found under the mattress where Myles was

lying when the arrest team entered the bedroom, and the loaded

gun found during a search of the apartment incident to Myles’

arrest, id. at 493-94.

Under this court’s precedents, then, where proof of the

defendant’s prior felon status is required, it is reversible error for

the district court to read to the jury the unredacted indictment

referring to the prior felony offense where the defense has

offered to stipulate felon status and either a defense is

compromised or the government’s evidence of guilt is not

“strong.” See Jones, 67 F.3d at 324-25; Myles, 96 F.3d at 496-

97. Here, appellant offered to stipulate his felon status. He also

sought to exclude Rule 404(b) evidence of and references to his

prior armed and violent convictions in the government’s case-inchief. Yet the prospective jurors were informed of appellant’s

prior offense involving gun possession from the reading of the

unredacted indictment. As this court has acknowledged,

manifest prejudice can result when the jury is informed of a

prior conviction that is similar to the charged offense. See, e.g.,

Jones, 67 F.3d at 314. One of the prior offenses listed in the

indictment, robbery with a deadly weapon, is substantially

similar to the charged offense of felon in possession of a

weapon. Moreover, the other government evidence was not

strong. As both the district court and the prosecutor

acknowledged during trial, the outcome of the case turned on

whether the jury believed Officer Boteler or appellant. The

district court’s reading of the unredacted indictment incurably

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compromised appellant’s defense denying gun possession.

Accordingly, the district court plainly erred in reading the

unredacted indictment to the jury. 

The government’s attempt to distinguish Jones on the

ground that appellant had not offered to stipulate his felon status

until after the unredacted indictment was read to the jury is

based on a misreading of the record. In its brief the government

relies on a transcript reference when the prosecutor moved for

admission of the stipulations, overlooking the transcript

reference indicating that the district court was informed of the

joint stipulations before a jury pool was brought into the

courtroom. The government’s reliance on United States v.

Moore, 104 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1997), is misplaced; unlike

appellant, the defendant in Moore sought no measures to

minimize the prejudice from joinder of the section 922(g)(1)

charge, id. at 382. 

The voir dire error was not harmless because its effect was

to bolster Officer Boteler’s testimony and discredit appellant’s

where “police officer credibility lies at the heart of the case,”

United States v. Littlejohn, 489 F.3d 1335, 1346 (D.C. Cir.

2007). In closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized that “the

only thing at issue . . . [was] where [the] gun came from, [and]

whose gun was it,” and that “this case is about credibility.”

Appellant challenged the officer’s testimony on crossexamination, and in his own case underscored the degree to

which the government’s case turned on Boteler’s credibility. As

in Jones, appellant’s defense denying gun possession was

doomed by the reading of the unredacted indictment stating he

had previously been convicted of armed robbery. Unlike the

government’s evidence in Myles, there was no independent

corroborating evidence; Officer Harris saw neither a gun on

appellant’s person nor where Boteler had found the gun.

Consequently, the government’s evidence was not “strong,”

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much less overwhelming. See United States v. Clay, 346 F.3d

173, 177-78 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Turner, 565 F.2d

539, 541 (8th Cir. 1977). 

Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand for a

new trial. We need not reach appellant’s other claims of error.

For example, any error arising from the district court’s

questioning of appellant about his crack cocaine habit is unlikely

to recur at retrial. However, in light of our remand, we caution

that appellant’s second claim of voir dire error is not without

force. In Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964),

the court held that the failure to inquire into prospective jurors’

possible biases regarding police testimony was reversible error,

id. at 545 (citing Sellers v. United States, 271 F.2d 475, 476-77

(D.C. Cir. 1959)), where “virtually the entire case for the

prosecution” consisted of the testimony of two military police

officers. Although the district court retains “ample discretion”

in conducting voir dire, Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451

U.S. 182, 189 (1981), and does not necessarily have to ask all of

the questions that the parties request, see United States v. West,

458 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006), this discretion is “subject to the

essential demands of fairness,” Aldridge v. United States, 283

U.S. 308, 310 (1931). There is every reason to view the two

requested voir dire questions, supra note 1, as important in order

to “probe a potential juror’s views of the credibility of certain

kinds of witnesses,” West, 458 F.3d at 8, as well as bias

regarding the charge against appellant. See Littlejohn, 489 F.3d

at 1343; United States v. Boney, 68 F.3d 497, 502 (D.C. Cir.

1995); United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 435 (D.C. Cir.

1974); cf. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 665 (1987). As in

Brown, “[r]esponses to the requested query might have supplied

defense counsel, or indeed the prosecutor, with relevant and

useful information for exercising peremptory challenges or

challenges for cause,” 338 F.2d at 545; see also Littlejohn, 489

F.3d at 1343-44. The significance of the inquiries is highlighted

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by the fact that officer credibility was the key issue, see United

States v. Aragnos, 853 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1988); Sellers v.

United States, 271 F.2d 475, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and

appellant was charged with a gun offense, see, e.g., United

States v. Shavers, 615 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1980). 

Finally, a remand is not required on appellant’s claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call the

woman in the apartment as a witness and to preserve errors for

appeal. That defense counsel was “functioning as the ‘counsel’

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), is demonstrated by the

fact that he hired an investigator and presented stipulations as

well as proposed voir dire questions and instructions in addition

to opposing the government’s in-limine motion to introduce

Rule 404(b) evidence in its case-in-chief.

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