Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00788/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00788-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CCI
Defendant
Aaron Augustine Heredia
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON AUGUSTINE HEREDIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CCI,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00788-JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(Doc. 1) 

30-DAY DEADLINE 

Plaintiff alleges he was attacked by another inmate while he was on the phone. Because 

he fails to state a cognizable claim, the Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If an action is dismissed on one of these three basis, a strike is imposed 

per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed 

as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and has 

not alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed in forma 

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pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015).

B. Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint

Plaintiff complains of incidents that occurred at California Correctional Institute (“CCI”) 

in Tehachapi, California. CCI is the only defendant Plaintiff identified. Plaintiff alleges that, on 

January 21, 2015, he was using the phone at his assigned time when he was attacked by a “drunk 

level 4 inmate.” Plaintiff ended up being shot twice by the tower officer and sprayed with 3 cans 

of pepper-spray during the incident. Plaintiff alleges that the level 4 inmate is a trouble-maker 

and has been in two more fights since. Plaintiff is a level 2 inmate who complies with the 

requirements of his program, and has never had any write-ups during his entire term of 

incarceration. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and requests the “115 write up” and everything 

about this incident be removed from his C-File. 

Plaintiff has not stated any cognizable claims but may be able to correct the deficiencies in 

his pleading so as to state a cognizable claim. Thus, he is being given the pleading requirements, 

the legal standards for claims he may be attempting to state (though none are identified), and 

leave to file a first amended complaint. 

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

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allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit 

Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and

“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

If he chooses to file a first amended complaint, Plaintiff should endeavor to make it as 

concise as possible and under twenty-five pages. He should merely state which of his 

constitutional rights he feels were violated by each Defendant and its factual basis. 

2. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of 

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 

other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 

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in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named 

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff=s 

federal rights. 

Plaintiff fails to link any individual persons to any of his allegations. Plaintiff must 

clearly state which individuals he feels are responsible for each violation of his constitutional 

rights and their factual basis as his complaint must put them on notice of Plaintiff=s claims against 

him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).

D. Legal Standards

1. Eighth Amendment -- Failure to Protect 

"The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined 

are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 

114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Prison officials 

have a duty "to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates, which has been 

interpreted to include a duty to protect prisoners." Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714 

F.3d 1155, 1160 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 

(9th Cir. 2005)).

To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must "show that the officials acted with 

deliberate indifference to threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate." Labatad, at 1160 (citing 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). This involves both objective 

and subjective components.

First, objectively, the alleged deprivation must be "sufficiently serious" and where a 

failure to prevent harm is alleged, "the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions 

posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. at 834, quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 

349, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). Second, subjectively, the prison official must "know of and 

disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 

45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). A prison official must "be aware of facts from which the 

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inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must also draw the 

inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Liability may follow only if a prison 

official "knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by 

failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Id. at 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

2. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff is informed that supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 

for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a 

named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed 

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th 

Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 

(1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, 

Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: 

personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations 

and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the 

policy 'itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional 

violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may not be 

imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat 

superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not 

answer for the torts of their servants - the term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. 

Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; 

each government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id. 

A>[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a Aformulaic recitation of the

elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of ruling on a motion to 

dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch 

allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather 

because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the 

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form of a factual allegation.@ Id. Thus, any allegations that supervisory personnel such as a 

Warden is somehow liable because of the acts of those under his or her supervision does not state 

a cognizable claim.

3. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff names CCI as the only defendant in this action. Plaintiff may not sustain an 

action against a state prison. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing 

suits brought against an un-consenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 

F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 

(1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); 

Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars 

suits against state agencies as well as those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See

Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dep=t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 

1996); Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991); Taylor v. 

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was a 

state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community 

College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). AThough its language might suggest otherwise, 

the Eleventh Amendment has long been construed to extend to suits brought against a state by its 

own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states.@ Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053 (citations omitted). 

AThe Eleventh Amendment=s jurisdictional bar covers suits naming state agencies and 

departments as defendants, and applies whether the relief is legal or equitable in nature.@ Id.

(citation omitted). Because CCI is a part of the California Department of Corrections, which is a 

state agency, it is entitled to dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment.

4. Heck/Edwards Bar

The United States Supreme Court has determined that an inmate may not bring an action 

under § 1983 if its success would release the claimant from confinement or shorten its duration, 

Preiser v, Ridrugyez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827 (1973), or would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of the conviction or sentence, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Where the 

plaintiff’s success on a § 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his underlying 

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conviction or sentence, he must first "prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on 

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas 

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254." Heck at 487-88. "A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a 

conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983." Id. at 

488. This "favorable termination" requirement has been extended to actions under § 1983 that, if 

successful, would imply the invalidity of prison administrative decisions which result in a 

forfeiture of good-time credits. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643–647 (1997). 

Thus, if removal of the “115 write-up” from Plaintiff’s file would result in resurrection of 

any good-time credits, Plaintiff must show that the guilty finding they were based on has been 

invalidated before he may pursue claims under § 1983. Plaintiff has not shown that any finding 

against him under the 115 has been favorably terminated and thus cannot pursue any claims under 

§ 1983 on the underlying events at this time. 

E. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with leave to file a first

amended complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiff needs an extension of time to comply with this 

order, Plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later than thirty days from the 

date of service of this order.

Plaintiff must demonstrate in any first amended complaint how the conditions complained 

of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The first amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named 

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some 

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff's first amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and 

plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

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Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. 

The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies identified 

by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff 

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his first amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints).

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a first

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order, or 

a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 22, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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