Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03074/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03074-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maureen Biggane
Appellee
City of Chicago
Appellee
Laura Kubiak
Appellant
Melissa Stratton
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐3074

LAURA KUBIAK,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

    Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14‐CV‐1159 — Samuel Der‐Yeghiayan, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 7, 2015 — DECIDED JANUARY 11, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM, WILLIAMS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Officer Laura Kubiak was working

in the Chicago Police Department’s Office of News Affairs

(“ONA”) when she was verbally assaulted by her colleague,

Officer Veeja Zala. Kubiak reported Zala to (1) ONA Director

Melissa Stratton, (2) Kubiak’s supervising Lieutenant,

Maureen Biggane, and (3) the Internal Affairs Division

(“IAD”). Three months later, Biggane ordered Kubiak to

leave ONA and return to her prior position as a beat patrol

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2 No. 14‐3074

officer. Kubiak filed a complaint against the City of Chicago,

Stratton, and Biggane, alleging retaliation in violation of the

First Amendment and conspiracy to deprive her of her con‐

stitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district

court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim on which relief can be granted. Kubiak appeals.

We affirm.  

I. Background

Because we are reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a

claim, we must take as true the facts alleged in Kubiak’s

complaint. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1078 (7th Cir.

2008).

Kubiak worked as a beat patrol officer with the Chicago

Police Department for fourteen years. Her primary duties

were to patrol assigned areas, issue citations, make arrests,

and conduct investigations. In 2000, Kubiak was detailed to

the Office of News Affairs. Kubiak alleges that this was a

“highly coveted detail” to a “prestigious desk job.” At the

ONA, Kubiak served as a liaison to the news media. Her re‐

sponsibilities included “keeping members of the news media

apprised of police activity by providing information on top‐

ics such as crimes committed, arrests made, and providing

information with regard to community safety alerts.”

On November 8, 2012, Officer Zala, another news media

liaison at the ONA, allegedly verbally assaulted Kubiak as

she was exiting the office at the end of her shift. Zala ran to‐

ward her, enraged by a work‐related report Kubiak had

drafted. He screamed, “Who the fuck do you think you are,

you stupid bitch?” He shook his finger in Kubiak’s face and

swung his hand back as if to strike her. Kubiak quickly

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No. 14‐3074 3

backed away in fear. Officer Robert Perez was with Kubiak

at the time of the incident and tried to calm Zala, telling him

to “stop it.” Zala continued to yell at Kubiak, saying, “You

are nothing, you are a stupid bitch, you don’t know how to

be the police, I am the police, I am the real police.”

Kubiak returned to her desk and called ONA Director

Stratton. She told Stratton about the incident and said she

feared Zala was going to strike her. Kubiak informed Strat‐

ton that Zala had previously directed similar outbursts to‐

ward her. During this phone call, Zala stood by Kubiak’s

desk and continued to berate and intimidate her. An ONA

employee who witnessed Zala’s conduct later spoke with

Kubiak and expressed fear that Zala was going to shoot Ku‐

biak.  

Kubiak alleges that Zala has a history of violence. Ac‐

cording to her complaint, around 2009, a jury returned a

verdict in favor of the plaintiff in a suit against Zala for bat‐

tery and excessive force. The City defended Zala at trial. Ku‐

biak alleges that the City failed to correct Zala’s behavior but

rather gave him a prestigious news media liaison position in

the ONA. Throughout his detail at the ONA, Zala often lost

his temper and directed his outbursts toward his colleagues,

including Kubiak.

The next day, Kubiak again spoke with Stratton. Stratton

told Kubiak that she had already spoken with Zala and that

she did not have time to discuss the incident further. On No‐

vember 12, Kubiak requested a meeting with Biggane, her

supervising Lieutenant, to discuss the incident. Biggane re‐

sponded that she was too busy. Kubiak alleges that she con‐

tinued to request meetings, but each time, Biggane respond‐

ed that she was too busy. On November 27, Kubiak went to

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Biggane’s office to discuss the incident, but Biggane refused

to discuss it.

On December 3, Kubiak submitted a memorandum to

Biggane complaining about Zala, which initiated an Internal

Affairs Division investigation. Kubiak subsequently gave a

statement to the IAD investigators. Perez also provided a

statement corroborating Kubiak’s complaint. Kubiak alleges

that after she gave her statement to the IAD, Officer Jose Es‐

trada, who had been found guilty of excessive force and also

worked at the ONA, told her that she “better be careful be‐

cause [she] might be the one to get suspended or fired.”  

In mid‐February, Kubiak learned that her IAD complaint

against Officer Zala had been “sustained.” Within days, Big‐

gane cancelled Kubiak’s detail to the ONA and reassigned

Kubiak to a position as beat officer on a midnight shift in

what Kubiak alleges is one of the most dangerous neighbor‐

hoods in Chicago. The same day, Perez was also removed

from the ONA and reassigned as a beat officer. Kubiak and

Perez were the only two officers who had their ONA details

cancelled even though other members of the ONA had pre‐

viously requested to transfer out of the ONA. At the time of

her removal, Kubiak was the most senior member of the

ONA and had not requested a transfer.  

Stratton and Biggane made the decision to remove Kubi‐

ak and Perez from the ONA. Stratton and Biggane had the

final authority to make these personnel decisions, which

were not subject to further review. Kubiak alleges that Zala

was never reprimanded and remains detailed to the ONA.

On February 18, 2014, Kubiak filed a complaint against

the City of Chicago, Stratton, and Biggane. Kubiak asserted a

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No. 14‐3074 5

claim against all defendants alleging retaliation in violation

of the First Amendment pursuant to § 1983, and a claim

against Stratton and Biggane alleging conspiracy in depriva‐

tion of constitutional rights pursuant to § 1983.1 Kubiak ar‐

gued that by cancelling her detail to the ONA and assigning

her to work as a beat patrol officer, defendants retaliated

against her for engaging in protected speech. According to

Kubiak, defendants engaged in a pattern of protecting and

rewarding officers accused of violent misconduct while re‐

taliating against those who exposed and reported the mis‐

conduct.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim on which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted

the motion and dismissed the claims with prejudice, con‐

cluding that Kubiak’s speech was not constitutionally pro‐

tected since Kubiak did not speak as a private citizen and

did not speak on a matter of public concern. Kubiak appeals.

II. Discussion

We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss based

on Rule 12(b)(6). Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081. Rule 12(b)(6) per‐

mits a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To properly state a claim, a plaintiff’s complaint

must contain allegations that “plausibly suggest that the

                                                  1 Kubiak also brought a state law claim of retaliation in violation of

the Illinois Whistleblower Act, 740 ILCS § 174/1, but the district court

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim and dis‐

missed it without prejudice. Kubiak does not appeal the dismissal of her

state law claim.

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6 No. 14‐3074

plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a

speculative level[.]” EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496

F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omit‐

ted). We accept as true all of the well‐pleaded facts in the

complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081.  

A. First Amendment Retaliation Claim  

To establish a claim for retaliation in violation of the First

Amendment, a public employee first must prove that her

speech is constitutionally protected. Swetlik v. Crawford, 738

F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013). For a public employee’s speech

to be protected under the First Amendment, the employee

must establish that she spoke as a citizen on a matter of pub‐

lic concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). The

determination of whether speech is constitutionally protect‐

ed is a question of law. Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 489

(7th Cir. 2008).

1. Kubiak Did Not Speak as a Private Citizen

The district court held that Kubiak failed to allege facts

that plausibly suggest that she spoke as a citizen. We agree.

The Supreme Court has held that “when public employees

make statements pursuant to their official duties, the em‐

ployees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment

purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their com‐

munications from employer discipline.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at

421. “Determining the official duties of a public employee

requires a practical inquiry into what duties the employee is

expected to perform, and is not limited to the formal job de‐

scription.” Houskins, 549 F.3d at 490 (citation omitted); see

also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25 (“Formal job descriptions of‐

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No. 14‐3074 7

ten bear little resemblance to the duties an employee actually

is expected to perform ....”).  

First, Kubiak contends that she made her complaints

about Zala not as part of her routine job duties, but rather as

a citizen who was subjected to an assault by a violent Chica‐

go police officer. She argues that she sufficiently pled that

her speech was made as a citizen because her complaint

identifies her primary job responsibility as being a liaison to

the news media. Kubiak’s complaint lists her ordinary and

daily job duties as including: keeping members of the news

media apprised of police activity, responding to inquiries

from the news media, and monitoring the News Affairs

email account.2 Kubiak argues that as the public relations

face of the Chicago Police Department, her professional du‐

ties did not include reporting misconduct of her coworkers,

and as such, her complaints about Zala were made as a pri‐

vate citizen. We disagree.  

Kubiak’s concept of “official duties” is overly narrow. As

we explained in Houskins, an employee’s official duties are

not limited to the formal job description. 549 F.3d at 490. We

must make a practical inquiry into what Kubiak was ex‐

pected to do as an employee. See id.; Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d

961, 965–67 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a correctional officer

spoke as an employee and not as a citizen when reporting

supervisor’s breach of prison security even though the of‐

                                                  2 Kubiak notes that her duties also included researching print, televi‐

sion, and online media; creating files of the Chicago Police coverage in

the news; receiving and recording notifications from the field on poten‐

tially newsworthy events; preparing daily news clips and monthly safety

related reports; maintaining files on high profile cases; and preparing

media advisors and press releases.

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8 No. 14‐3074

ficer’s primary responsibility was to monitor vehicle and

foot traffic through the main gate). Generally, an employee

who is verbally assaulted by a colleague would be expected

to report the inappropriate behavior to a supervisor. Addi‐

tionally, as the district court pointed out, in the context of a

police department, it makes even more sense to expect offic‐

ers to report that a fellow officer acted violently. Kubiak is a

police officer, and as part of that job, she is responsible for

protecting the public from harm, even though she was de‐

tailed to the ONA at the time of the complaints.3

Our conclusion that Kubiak spoke as an employee is fur‐

ther supported by the fact that her speech was intimately

connected with her job. In Davis v. Cook Cnty., the plaintiff

nurse argued that her memorandum to the Employee Assis‐

tance Counselor, which contained complaints about being

harassed by other employees when working in the hospital’s

                                                  3 Kubiak also argues that reporting Zala’s actions was not “ordinari‐

ly” within the scope of her duties, relying on Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct.

2369, 2379 (2014) (“The critical question under Garcetti is whether the

speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s du‐

ties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”). However, Kubiak’s

reliance on Lane is misplaced. Employee grievances, such as Kubiak’s

complaints about Zala, are very different than the speech at issue in

Lane—subpoenaed testimony at a former employee’s corruption trials.

See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377. The Lane Court explained that testimony un‐

der oath by a public employee is outside the scope of his ordinary job

duties and is thus citizen speech for purposes of the First Amendment.

Id. at 2378. The Court reasoned that when a public employee testifies,

any obligation he may have as an employee is “distinct and independent

from the obligation, as a citizen, to speak the truth.” Id. at 2379. In con‐

trast, Kubiak’s obligation to report Zala’s verbal assault stemmed from

her position as an ONA employee, and there was no independent obliga‐

tion as a citizen to report Zala’s conduct to her ONA supervisors.

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No. 14‐3074 9

emergency room, was citizen speech. 534 F.3d 650, 652 (7th

Cir. 2008). We disagreed and held that the memorandum

was employee speech. Id. at 653–54. We noted that “[w]hile

drafting letters of complaint may not be a core job function

of a nurse, a focus on core job functions is too narrow after

Garcetti ....” and that the plaintiff’s speech was “intimately

connected with her job.” Id. at 653 (citation and internal quo‐

tation marks omitted).  

Similarly, Kubiak’s speech was intimately connected with

her professional duties. She complained that her co‐worker

treated her inappropriately at work and yelled at her over a

work‐related report. Moreover, her speech was directed to

her supervisor, the director of her office, and the IAD. Just as

the plaintiff’s memorandum in Davis “reflect[ed] the concern

of a conscientious nurse to ensure and contribute to the

smooth functioning of the ER,” Kubiak’s complaints about

Zala reflected an employee’s attempt to improve her work

environment so that she would not be harassed again. Id. As

a result, the district court correctly concluded that Kubiak’s

speech was made as a public employee and not as a private

citizen.  

2. Kubiak’s Speech Did Not Address a Matter of Public

Concern

The district court held that Kubiak failed to allege facts

that plausibly suggest that she spoke on matter of public

concern. The court noted that the facts alleged suggest that

Kubiak’s speech was focused on her personal interest in pro‐

tecting herself from harassment by Zala. We agree.  

The Supreme Court has defined “public concern” to

mean “legitimate news interest,” or “’a subject of general in‐

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10 No. 14‐3074

terest and of value and concern to the public at the time of

publication.’” Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll., 770 F.3d

680, 684 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543

U.S. 77, 83–84) (2004) (per curiam)). “Whether an employee’s

speech addresses a matter of public concern must be deter‐

mined by the content, form, and context of a given statement

....” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983). The Con‐

nick test requires us to look at the overall objective or point

of the speech, as ascertained by those three factors. Kristofek

v. Vill. of Orland Hills, 712 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2013). Of the

three factors, content is the most important, but the subject

matter of the speech is not determinative. Bivens v. Trent, 591

F.3d 555, 560–61 (7th Cir. 2010); Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d

895, 907 (7th Cir. 2002). Rather, we must focus on the “par‐

ticular content (as opposed to the subject matter) of the

speech ....” Bivens, 591 F.3d at 561. The motive of the speaker

is relevant as part of the context in which the speech was

made but is not dispositive. Kristofek, 712 F.3d at 985. In sum,

we ask whether the objective of the speech—as determined

by content, form, and context—was to “bring wrongdoing to

light” or to “further some purely private interest.” Id.  

Kubiak argues that she made her complaints to her su‐

pervisors and to the IAD out of fear for her own safety as

well as for the safety of others. According to Kubiak, we

should infer that she was motivated to help the public by no‐

tifying her superiors of the fact that Zala posed a threat of

violence, and thus conclude that she spoke on a matter of

public concern. However, the content, form, and context of

Kubiak’s speech convince us that the objective of Kubiak’s

complaints was to further her personal interest in remedying

an employee grievance and that her speech did not address a

matter of public concern.  

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No. 14‐3074 11

First, as to the content of Kubiak’s speech, Kubiak argues

that speech involving police departments and misconduct of

officers is always a matter of public concern. However, when

analyzing the content of the speech, the broad subject matter

is not determinative, and we must instead focus on the par‐

ticular content of the speech. Bivens, 591 F.3d at 560–61. The

precise content of Kubiak’s speech focused on the work‐

related incident with Zala and on Kubiak’s concerns about

her own safety. Kubiak’s complaint states that she informed

Stratton “of what had occurred,” “that she was afraid that

Officer Zala was going to physically strike her,” and that

“Zala had similar outbursts in the past towards her” (empha‐

sis added). The complaint also states that Kubiak requested a

meeting with Biggane to “discuss the incident” and that Ku‐

biak’s memorandum to Biggane, which initiated the IAD in‐

vestigation, “complain[ed] of Officer Zala’s assault.” Thus,

the particular content of Kubiak’s speech was focused on

Zala’s actions toward Kubiak personally. See Houskins, 549

F.3d at 491–92 (holding that a social worker’s police report

stating that a correctional officer had hit her did not address

a matter of public concern because the report was “nothing

more than [a] personal grievance against [the officer] in or‐

der to have him arrested for striking her”).  

Second, the form of Kubiak’s speech also indicates that

the objective of her speech was to air a personal grievance.

Kubiak reported the incident to her superiors, Stratton and

Biggane, and to the IAD. The fact that Kubiak’s complaints

about Zala were directed up the chain of command suggests

that Kubiak’s speech did not address a matter of public con‐

cern. See Bivens, 591 F.3d at 560 (holding that complaints the

plaintiff made directly up the chain of command to his su‐

pervisors were not protected by the First Amendment).

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12 No. 14‐3074

Third, regarding the context of Kubiak’s speech, the

grievance arose from Kubiak’s personal confrontation with

Zala while at work. This fact indicates that the speech con‐

cerned a private issue and did not address a matter of public

concern. See id. at 561–62 (noting that an officer’s complaint

about the safety of his working conditions “arose as a result

of [the officer’s] own illness and detailed his own exposure

to environmental lead [at work]” and concluding that the

speech was an “internal grievance [ ] on a matter of purely

private interest”).  

Additionally, we consider the motive of the speaker as

part of the context in which the speech was made. Kristofek,

712 F.3d at 985. Kubiak alleges that she was motivated by a

concern for public safety, especially since a jury had previ‐

ously returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in a suit

against Zala for battery and excessive force. But the fact that

Kubiak’s complaints were all made internally suggests that

she was primarily motivated by personal concerns. Cf. id. at

984–85 (noting that the plaintiff’s “rather aggressive reac‐

tion” of going to the FBI with his suspicions, in addition to

making internal complaints, suggested that he was not solely

concerned with his personal interest but was also motivated

by a desire to help the public); see also Bivens, 591 F.3d at 561

(“Although the fact that the speech was entirely internal does

not itself render the speech unprotected, this fact does sug‐

gest that the grievance was personal in nature.” (internal ci‐

tation omitted)). In any event, motive is not dispositive. Kris‐

tofek, 712 F.3d at 985. Even accepting Kubiak’s allegations as

true and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, as

we are required to do in reviewing a dismissal based on Rule

12(b)(6), Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081, Kubiak’s mixed motives

are not enough to show that the objective of her speech was

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No. 14‐3074 13

to bring wrongdoing to light, especially given the personal

nature of her complaints.

In sum, the content, form, and context of Kubiak’s speech

show that her speech did not address a matter of public con‐

cern. Because Kubiak did not sufficiently allege facts that

plausibly suggest that she spoke as a private citizen on a

matter of public concern, the district court correctly deter‐

mined that her speech was not entitled to First Amendment

protection. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. Therefore, the district

court properly dismissed Kubiak’s complaint for failure to

state a claim on which relief can be granted.  

B. Conspiracy Claim  

Kubiak also claims that Stratton and Biggane entered into

a conspiracy to deprive her of her constitutional rights. Since

Kubiak’s speech was not constitutionally protected, the dis‐

trict court properly dismissed Kubiak’s conspiracy claim.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court.

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