Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00212/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00212-17/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vincente Salvador Arenas-Garcia
Defendant
Miguel Zuniga Arteaga
Defendant
Armando Martinez
Defendant
Miguel Angel Sanchez-Meza
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Juan Vizuett-Resendiz
Defendant
Terry Whited
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

JESSICA A. MASSEY

ANGELA L. SCOTT

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

MIGUEL ZUNIGA ARTEAGA,

ARMANDO MARTINEZ,

TERRY WHITED,

MIGUEL ANGEL SANCHEZ-MEZA,

JUAN VIZUETT-RESENDIZ, and

VINCENTE SALVADOR ARENAS-GARCIA,

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00212-DAD-BAM

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER

CURRENT DATE: November 10, 2021

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

This case is set for status conference on November 10, 2021. On May 13, 2020, this Court 

issued General Order 618, which suspended all jury trials in the Eastern District of California until 

further notice, and allows district judges to continue all criminal matters. Under General Order 618, a 

judge “may exercise his or her authority to continue matters, excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act 

with reference to the court’s prior General Order 611 issued on March 17, 2020 . . . with additional 

findings to support the exclusion in the Judge’s discretion.” General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 

2020). In addition, any judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions 

“at the discretion of that Judge or upon the request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the 

Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 

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618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). This and other General Orders were entered to address public health 

concerns related to COVID-19 (for example, General Order 614—recently extended by General Order 

635).

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice 

continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that 

the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless 

“the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the 

ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

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In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 1

 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant MIGUEL 

ZUNIGA ARTEAGA, by and through defendant’s counsel of record, Nicholas Reyes, defendant 

ARMANDO MARTINEZ, by and through defendant’s counsel of record, Caroline McCreary, defendant 

MIGUEL ANGEL SANCHEZ-MEZA, by and through defendant’s counsel of record, Richard A. 

Beshwate, JUAN VIZUETT-RESENDIZ, by and through defendant’s counsel of record, Monica 

Bermudez, and VINCENTE SALVADOR ARENAS-GARCIA, by and through defendant’s counsel of 

record, Harry M. Drandell, seek a continuance of the current status conference to March 23, 2022 and 

hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 10, 2021. 

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until March 

23, 2022, and to exclude time between November 10, 2021, and March 23, 2022, under Local Codes T2 

and T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case

includes over 15,000 pages of Bates stamped discovery and several months of wiretap 

recordings. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made 

available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to 

review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review 

and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare 

1 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Additionally, given the voluminous discovery and the fact that this case involved 

a wiretap investigation, it is so complex that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for 

pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself prior to March 23, 2022.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 10, 2021 to March 23, 

2022, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] and 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(ii) [Local Code T2], because it results from a continuance 

granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: November 3, 2021 PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

/s/ JESSICA A. MASSEY

JESSICA A. MASSEY

Assistant United States Attorney

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Dated: November 3, 2021 /s/ per email authorization

NICHOLAS REYES

Counsel for Defendant

MIGUEL ZUNIGA ARTEAGA

Dated: November 3, 2021

Dated: November 3, 2021

 Dated: November 3, 2021

Dated: November 3, 2021

/s/ per email authorization

CAROLINE MCCREARY

Counsel for Defendant

ARMANDO MARTINEZ

/s/ per email authorization

RICHARD A. BESHWATE

Counsel for Defendant

MIGUEL ANGEL SANCHEZMEZA

/s/ per email authorization

MONICA BERMUDEZ

Counsel for Defendant

JUAN VIZUETT-RESENDIZ

/s/ per email authorization

HARRY DRANDELL

Counsel for Defendant

VINCENTE SALVADOR 

ARENAS-GARCIA

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ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED that the status conference is continued from November 10, 2021, to March 

23, 2022, at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Time is excluded pursuant to 

18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 4, 2021 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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