Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01096/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01096-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeanne Dovenmuehler
Appellant
St. Cloud Hospital
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1096

___________

Jeanne Dovenmuehler, * 

* 

Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

St. Cloud Hospital, * 

* 

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: October 5, 2007

Filed: December 4, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, RILEY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Jeanne Dovenmuehler sued St. Cloud Hospital ("St. Cloud"), alleging that St.

Cloud violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Minnesota's Human

Rights Act (MHRA). Dovenmuehler contends that St. Cloud improperly terminated

her based on her chemical-dependency disability. The district court1

 granted St.

Cloud's motion for summary judgment, concluding that: (1) Dovenmuehler did not

have an impairment under either the ADA or MHRA; (2) she was not limited in a

major life activity; (3) St. Cloud did not regard her as disabled; (4) St. Cloud had no

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HPSP was created by Minnesota statute in 1994, and the Minnesota Board of

Nursing participates. Minn. Stat. §§ 214.31–.37. The program monitors health

professionals who have an illness or condition that may impair their ability to practice

safely. If an individual does not abide by the plan HPSP creates for them, they may

lose their professional license.

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duty to accommodate Dovenmuehler because she never disclosed her disability; and

(5) she was not qualified for the job because the accommodation she required was

unreasonable. The district court also found that St. Cloud had a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Dovenmuehler and that Dovenmuehler

failed to prove St. Cloud's reason was pretextual. We hold that Dovenmuehler has

failed to establish that she is disabled under the ADA or MHRA. Therefore, we affirm.

I. Background

We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Dovenmuehler, the nonmoving

party. In the early 1980s, Dovenmuehler was addicted to cocaine. She attended inpatient treatment and has not used cocaine since. Dovenmuehler has been a registered

nurse in Minnesota since 1993.

In July 2004, Dovenmuehler applied for a registered nurse position in St.

Cloud's Children's Center. Dovenmuehler's employment application listed her

previous nursing experience, but she did not disclose to St. Cloud why she left her

previous employer, St. Joseph's Hospital ("St. Joseph's"). St. Joseph's terminated

Dovenmuehler for stealing narcotics. That same month, Dovenmuehler voluntarily

reported herself to Minnesota's Health Professional Services Program (HPSP) seeking

help for chemical dependency.2

St. Cloud interviewed Dovenmuehler for a position in the Children's Center and

hired her on August 5, 2004.The Children's Center treats patients ranging from preterm babies through children age 17. Intensive care patients comprise about 65% of

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OHS is an internal St. Cloud department that deals with nurses when they are

sick or injured on the job.

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the unit's daily volume, and often 98% of those patients are under the age of two. In

caring for these patients, Dovenmuehler's duties would include administering routine

and emergency narcotics to patients who, due to age and illness, typically cannot

communicate their medication needs.

St. Cloud hired Dovenmuehler but made the hiring contingent upon her

completing a medical placement evaluation with St. Cloud's Occupational Health

Services (OHS).3

 During her evaluation with OHS, Dovenmuehler disclosed that she

had carpel tunnel syndrome, rare leg soreness, a previous back injury, and hepatitis

C. She did not disclose that she was chemically dependent or that she had reported

herself to HPSP. St Cloud placed Dovenmuehler's employment on hold due to her

hepatitis C pending notification of clearance by the Minnesota Department of Health.

Six weeks into her new job, Dovenmuehler told OHS that she had previously

reported herself to HPSP and that HPSP had issued a plan that she needed to follow

in order to practice nursing safely. Dovenmuehler also told OHS that she had been

terminated from St. Joseph's due to alleged theft of Vicodin, but she stated that she

was fighting the charges. Dovenmuehler did not tell OHS that she was chemically

dependent. St. Cloud's Human Resources Director called St. Joseph's, her previous

employer, and confirmed that Dovenmuehler had been involuntarily terminated. 

Dovenmuehler's HPSP plan, which was intended to address her chemical

dependency, contained "practice restrictions" that would require St. Cloud to

"maintain supervised access to controlled substances . . . for 2000 hours of

professional practice or one year of continuous abstinence from alcohol and drugs of

abuse and until HPSP authorizes in writing to lift or amend this restriction." The

Human Resources Director and Dovenmuehler's supervisor met with Dovenmuehler

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to discuss the HPSP plan. They discussed compliance options for the HPSP plan

including: limiting Dovenmuehler's duties so that she would not have access to

medications; putting a "buddy" system in effect with a nurse from another unit; hiring

an additional nurse to shadow Dovenmuehler during her shifts; visual oversight of

Dovenmuehler; and transferring Dovenmuehler to another position in the Children's

Center that would not involve medication.

St. Could, based upon prior experience with HPSP plans, construed "supervised

access" as requiring, in some cases, constant observation. In deciding how to

implement the HPSP plan, St. Cloud considered: what unit the employee worked in;

the essential functions of each specific position; the unit size and location; the patient

population being served; the staffing of the unit; and the budget for the unit. Looking

at these factors, St. Cloud determined it could not accommodate Dovenmuehler's

HPSP plan restriction because it would need to have a nurse shadow her at all times

due to the duties of Dovenmuehler's position, the young patient population, and the

private room layout of the unit where she would be working. 

St. Cloud terminated Dovenmuehler on October 27, 2004, informing her that

her position in the Children's Center would not permit the supervised narcotics access

required by her HPSP plan. Since being terminated by St. Cloud, Dovenmuehler has

been hired by University of Minnesota Fairview Hospital and St. Gabriel's Hospital.

Both hospitals have implemented Dovenmuehler's HPSP plan restrictions.

The district court granted summary judgement to St. Cloud concluding, among

other things, that "Plaintiff is not disabled under the ADA or MHRA. Defendant

terminated Plaintiff because Defendant was given an HPSP plan that it could not

fulfill with any reasonable accommodation." Thus, the district court granted the

motion.

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Dovenmuehler also bases her claims on the MHRA, but she does not

differentiate between the ADA and MHRA claims. Both are analyzed under

McDonnell Douglas and federal precedent may be used to construe the MHRA. See

Reiff v. Interim Personnel, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 1280, 1292 (D. Minn. 1995). It is

appropriate that we treat the claims together. See Larson v. Koch Refining Co., 920 F.

Supp. 1000, 1004 (D. Minn. 1996).

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II. Discussion

On appeal, Dovenmuehler argues that the district court erred in granting

summary judgment. She contends that the district court erred in finding that she did

not demonstrate she is disabled or perceived as disabled. Dovenmuehler claims she

met the burden of proving her prima facie case of discrimination.

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment to St. Cloud.

Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 568

(8th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

(quotations and citation omitted).

The ADA prohibits discrimination by an employer "against a qualified

individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual." 42 U.S.C. §

12112(a).4

 Drug addiction that substantially limits one or more major life activities is

a recognized disability under the ADA. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896 (9th

Cir. 2002). However, the ADA protects only individuals who are no longer using

illegal drugs. Campbell v. Minneapolis Public Housing Authority, 168 F.3d 1069,

1072 n.1 (8th Cir. 1999). 

ADA and MHRA disability discrimination claims are analyzed under the wellknown McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Burchett v. Target Corp., 340 F.3d 510, 516 (8th

Cir. 2003). The employee bears the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of

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discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. The employer then has

the burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse

employment action. Id. at 802–03. Finally, to prevail, plaintiff must show that the

defendant's proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804. 

Dovenmuehler's prima facie case of employment discrimination required that

she prove (1) she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA or MHRA; (2) she

is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable

accommodation; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her

disability. Burchett, 340 F.3d at 517 (citations and quotation omitted). The plaintiff

bears the burden to prove she is disabled. Id.

Dovenmuehler has not met her burden on step one of the prima facie case. More

specifically, she has not shown she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA or

the MHRA. To show that she qualifies as disabled under federal and state law,

Dovenmuehler must show that she: (1) has a physical, sensory, or mental impairment

which materially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an

impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. Minn. Stat. § 363A.03,

Subd. 12. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Major life activities include caring for

one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning, and

working. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 1999).

With respect to the prima facie case, Dovenmuehler makes three arguments on

appeal. First, Dovenmuehler asserts that she is disabled due to chemical dependency.

The record shows that in 2003 and 2004 various doctors concluded that

Dovenmuehler smoked cigarettes occasionally, only drank alcohol occasionally and

had probably shared needles with other drug users in the past. In September 2005, as

part of her chemical dependency evaluation with HPSP, the evaluator concluded that

Dovenmuehler's cocaine dependency was in remission, that she was an opiate abuser,

and that she was at a high risk for relapse. Dovenmuehler stated in her deposition for

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this case that she has been chemical free since 1988 and that she only relapsed once

when she drank alcohol in February 2006. However, Dovenmuehler admitted to HPSP

that in 2004 she resumed drinking, and she later diverted Vicodin from St. Joseph's

for her own use. 

Dovenmuehler's case is unique because her claimed disability has a peculiar

feature. Certain behavior, while consistent with her claimed disability, also happens

to be illegal. Such conduct is not protected by the ADA. Under the ADA "the term

'individual with a disability' does not include an individual who is currently engaging

in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use." 42

U.S.C. 12210(a). 

Dovenmuehler argues that she is disabled because although she is currently

sober, if she were to relapse, she would then be disabled. As the district court noted,

this argument is unpersuasive and contrary to the ADA. Under the ADA,

Dovenmuehler is not protected from the consequences of illicit conduct explainable

by her chemical dependence, such as diverting hospital drugs intended for patients to

personal use. Dovenmuehler admitted to the Board of Nursing that she diverted

Vicodin for her own use from St. Joseph's. Neither the ADA nor MHRA protects

appellant from the consequences of that conduct. In this case, the HPSP plan that St.

Cloud considered an unreasonable accommodation stemmed directly from her

unprotected, illegal conduct, not from her status as one chemically dependent. See

Larson v. Koch Refining Co., 920 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (D. Minn. 1996). 

Next, Dovenmuehler contends that because of her chemical dependency she is

precluded from the major life activity of working. An individual is substantially

limited in the major life activity of working if she is "significantly restricted in the

ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as

compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities."

Kellogg v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 233 F.3d 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 2000) (citations and

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quotations omitted). The inability to perform a single, particular job does not

constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Id. In

determining if Dovenmuehler's major life activity of work is materially impaired by

her chemical dependency, we must consider: 

(A) the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;

(B) the job from which the individual has been disqualified because of

the impairment and the class of similar jobs from which the individual

also is disqualified because of the impairment; and/or (C) the job from

which the individual has been disqualified and the broad range of jobs

in various classes from which the individual also is disqualified because

of the impairment. 

Id. 

Dovenmuehler argues that her chemical dependency is a lifelong illness and

when she is not in remission she is unable to perform a range of jobs that require

interpersonal skills and year-round work. However, the record belies this assertion.

Dovenmuehler testified that her life activities outside work are not limited by her

chemical dependency, and her medical records do not indicate her addictions have

limited her major life activities, including working. Dovenmuehler has been employed

steadily as a nurse since 1994, and she has been able to find nursing jobs at two

different hospitals since her termination from St. Cloud. The only job from which

Dovenmuehler has been precluded is the one at issue in the St. Cloud Children's

Center—a job with special patient concerns not present in nursing jobs generally.

Therefore, Dovenmuehler has not shown that she is limited in the major life activity

of working. 

Lastly, Dovenmuehler fails to adduce evidence that St. Cloud regarded her as

disabled. To show that she was regarded as disabled under the ADA, Dovenmuehler

must establish that St. Cloud "mistakenly believed that she had a physical impairment

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that substantially limited one or more major life activities," or that St. Cloud

"mistakenly believed that she had an actual, nonlimiting impairment which

substantially limited one or more major life activities." Brunko v. Mercy Hosp., 260

F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 2001). The record does not support her allegation that St.

Cloud knew she was substantially limited in some major life activity or that St. Cloud

regarded her as such. 

Dovenmuehler has not carried her burden of proving the first part of the prima

facie case for discrimination—she has not shown that she is disabled or perceived as

disabled. Therefore, we need not analyze St. Cloud's legitimate reasons for

terminating Dovenmuehler or Dovenmuehler's claims that those reasons are

pretextual. Dovenmuehler failed to establish that she is disabled under the ADA and

MHRA. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment. 

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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