Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50288/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50288-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Yijun Zhou
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

YIJUN ZHOU,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50288

D.C. No.

2:13-cr-00766-PSG-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 6, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed August 10, 2016

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Barry G. Silverman,

and Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber;

Dissent by Judge Tashima

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2 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s restitution order in

a case in which the defendant, who pled guilty to

unauthorized use of access devices, used fraudulent credit

cards at a Target store in Colorado and at Nordstrom stores in

California.

The defendant argued for the first time on appeal that

because the offense of conviction covered onlythe Nordstrom

charges, and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996

(MVRA) authorizes restitution only to victims of the offense,

the district court erred by awarding restitution to victims of

both the Nordstrom and Target purchases.

The panel held that plain error review applies. The panel

clarified that although this court in some older cases used the

“decline to consider” formulation where a newly-raised issue

hinged on a factual dispute, that formulation is best

understood as an application of the “plain error” standard.

The panel concluded that, for purposes of plain-error

review, the Target charges occurred within the indictment

period. The panel explained that the defendant did not plead

guilty only to the Nordstrom allegations, and that the

fraudulent Target charges fit within the scope of the count to

which he pled guilty. The panel wrote that because the

Nordstrom charges were sufficient to establish a factual basis

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 3

for the defendant’s crime, the government was not required

to mention the Target charges at the plea colloquy.

Because any error was not plain, the district court did not

decide definitively whether the district court erred.

Dissenting, Judge Tashima wrote that both the text of the

indictment and the record – including the plea colloquy and

the presentence investigation report – show that the Target

charges did not form the basis of the offense of conviction. 

COUNSEL

Jonathan D. Libby (argued), DeputyFederal Public Defender;

Hilary L. Potashner, Federal Public Defender; Federal Public

Defender’s Office, Los Angeles, California; for DefendantAppellant.

Jean-Claude Andre (argued), Assistant United States

Attorneys; Robert E. Dugdale, Chief, Criminal Division;

United States Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles, California; for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Yijun Zhou used fraudulent credit cards at a

Target store in Colorado and at Nordstrom stores in

California to buy items worth almost $150,000. The

government indicted him on one count of unauthorized use of

access devices. Defendant pleaded guilty to that count. At

the plea colloquy, the government stated that it would prove

the fraudulent Nordstrom charges at trial but did not mention

the Target charges. At sentencing, the district court imposed

restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of

1996 (“MVRA”), without objection, for both the Nordstrom

charges and the Target charges. Defendant timely appeals,

arguing for the first time on appeal that the district court

improperly ordered restitution with respect to the Target

charges. We hold that the district court did not plainly err in

imposing restitution and, therefore, affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was indicted on one count of unauthorized use

of access devices, and aiding and abetting others to do so, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(a) and 1029(a)(2). The

indictment charged:

Beginning . . . no earlier than on or about

March 13, 2011, and continuing through on or

about December 17, 2011, in Los Angeles and

Orange Counties, within the Central District

of California, and elsewhere, defendant Yijun

Zhou, together with others . . . , aiding and

abetting one another, . . . knowingly and with

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 5

intent to defraud used unauthorized access

devices, . . . specifically, credit cards, . . . and

by such conduct obtained things of value . . .

together totaling $1,000 or more.

After Defendant pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea

agreement, the government stated that it would prove at trial

that Defendant used fraudulent credit cards to make purchases

at Nordstrom stores in California. Defendant understood

those allegations and agreed that they were true. He also

answered “Yes” to the question: “Are you pleading guilty

because you did the things charged in Count [One] of the

indictment?” The court also advised Defendant that the

amount of restitution could be as high as $160,000.

The probation office prepared a presentence report and an

accompanying letter recommending a Guidelines range of 30

to 37 months, a sentence of 37 months’ imprisonment, and

restitution of $146,725.02, payable in varying amounts to 30

identified victims. The restitution amount, and the identified

victims, concerned two different sets of events. About half of

the restitution amount stemmed from Defendant’s fraudulent

credit card purchases at Nordstrom stores in California. The

remainder related to Defendant’s fraudulent credit card

purchases at a Target store in Colorado. Both in their written

memoranda and in their oral presentations at the sentencing

hearing, the parties disputed the calculation of the Guidelines

range and the appropriate term of imprisonment, but neither

party challenged the award of restitution.

At sentencing, the district court ruled in Defendant’s

favor on one of the disputed issues and ruled in the

government’s favor on the other disputed issue. The court

calculated the Guidelines range to be 24 to 30 months, and it

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6 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

imposed a sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment. The court

also ordered Defendant to pay $146,725.02 in restitution, in

accordance with the list created by the probation office,

which included the victims of both the Nordstrom and Target

purchases.

Defendant timelyappeals, challenging onlythe restitution

order. He argues that the district court erred by awarding

restitution to persons who were not victims of the offense of

conviction, because the offense of conviction covered only

the Nordstrom charges and the MVRA authorizes restitution

only to victims of the offense. Defendant acknowledges, as

he must, that he did not raise that argument (or any argument

concerning restitution) to the district court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The parties dispute the standard of review that we should

apply. Defendant asserts that we should review the

imposition of restitution de novo because the issue that he

raises is a legal question pertaining to the scope of the

MVRA. By contrast, the government asserts that we should

not review the issue at all because it hinges on unresolved

factual disputes or, in the alternative, that we should review

only for plain error because Defendant failed to raise the issue

in the district court. We are persuaded that plain error review

applies.

The ordinary rule in criminal cases—established by

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) and by Supreme

Court precedent—is that “plain error” review applies to

arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights

may be considered even though it was not brought to the

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 7

court’s attention.”); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725

(1993). Time and again, we have reviewed challenges to

restitution orders—made for the first time on appeal—for

plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Rizk, 660 F.3d 1125,

1136 (9th Cir. 2011) (reviewing for plain error a dispute

about the propriety of restitution); United States v. Fu Sheng

Kuo, 620 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e review only

for plain error when the defendant failed to object to the

[restitution order] in the district court.”). Indeed, in United

States v. Bright, 353 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), the

defendant raised the same argument that Defendant makes

here—that “the amount of restitution imposed was excessive

because the court was authorized to order restitution only for

the counts of conviction”—and we held that the defendant

“did not challenge the amount of the restitution order before

the district court, so we review [the] claim for plain error.” 

See also United States v. Weinstein, 834 F.2d 1454, 1456 (9th

Cir. 1988) (reviewing for “plain error” whether the restitution

amount “exceeds the actual damages or loss occasioned by

the offense of which [the defendant] was convicted”). The

cases cited by the parties are not to the contrary.

The government points to a subset of our cases where we

have “decline[d] to consider” an argument that hinged on an

unresolved factual issue. E.g., United States v. Napier,

463 F.3d 1040, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2006). The better reading

of those cases is not as an exception to the “plain error”

standard, but as an application of the “plain error” standard. 

At a minimum, an error that hinges on a factual dispute is not

“obvious” as required by the “plain error” standard. See, e.g.,

United States v. Scrivner, 114 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 1997)

(“[F]actual disputes do not rise to the level of plain error.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, bythe time

we determine that an issue hinges on a factual dispute, we

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8 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

have concluded that any error is not “plain.” Whether we

“decline[d] to consider” an argument that hinges on a factual

dispute or simply hold that any error is not plain, the

result—affirming the district court’s decision—is the same. 

We clarify that, if the government thinks that a newly raised

issue hinges on an unresolved factual dispute, the proper

heading for that argument is under the “plain error” standard. 

Although we occasionally used the “decline to consider”

formulation in some older cases, that formulation is best

understood as an application of the “plain error” standard.

Defendant points to cases that, he contends, applied “de

novo” review and rejected the application of “plain error”

review. Defendant’s argument fails at the outset. In no case

cited by Defendant—or that we have found in this

context—have we expressly rejected the application of “plain

error” review to a newly raised argument. In the two cases

cited by Defendant where we applied “de novo” review,

United States v. Yeung, 672 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 2012); United

States v. Reed, 80 F.3d 1419 (9th Cir. 1996),1the government

did not request that we apply “plain error” review, so we had

no occasion to consider the issue. Accordingly, those cases

do not—and as three-judge decisions could not—overrule the

earlier authority, such as Weinstein, requiring that we apply

“plain error” review to non-jurisdictional arguments raised

1 Defendant also cites United States v. May, 706 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir.

2013). That case is inapposite. We never stated the applicable standard

of review, and we concluded that “the district court plainly erred in

ordering restitution for [a company’s] expenses.” Id. at 1215 (emphasis

added). In short, if anything, May supports the conclusion that “plain

error” review applies here.

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 9

for the first time on appeal.2See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d

889, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

MERITS

“Plain error is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that

affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, we

may then exercise our discretion to notice a forfeited error,

but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

United States v. Myers, 804 F.3d 1246, 1257 (9th Cir. 2015)

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert.

denied, 136 S. Ct. 1393 (2016). Here, any error is not plain,

so the second criterion is not satisfied.

The MVRA provides that, in cases involving certain

crimes (including unauthorized use of access devices), “the

court shall order . . . that the defendant make restitution to the

victim of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1).3 The

statute defines the term “victim” as

2 As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, de novo review—and not

“plain error” review—applies to “a nonwaivable limit on federal courts’

subject-matter jurisdiction.” Musacchio v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 709,

716 (2016); see United States v. Pocklington, 792 F.3d 1036, 1039–40

(9th Cir. 2015) (applying the rule); United States v. Doe, 366 F.3d 1069,

1075–76 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (same). But that exception has no

application here because the district court clearly had subject matter

jurisdiction to sentence Defendant and to impose restitution; Defendant

challenges only the extent of restitution. See Doe, 366 F.3d at 1076–77

(describing the limited nature of this exception to plain-error review).

3 The statute also authorizes restitution to “persons other than the victim

of the offense,” if the parties so agree in a plea agreement. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3663A(a)(3). Because there was no plea agreement here, that provision

does not apply.

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10 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

a person directly and proximately harmed as

a result of the commission of an offense for

which restitution may be ordered including, in

the case of an offense that involves as an

element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of

criminal activity, any person directly harmed

by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the

course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.

Id. § 3663A(a)(2).

This is not a “case of an offense that involves as an

element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal

activity.” Id. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) provides that

whoever “knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics in or

uses one or more unauthorized access devices during any

one-year period, and by such conduct obtains anything of

value aggregating $1,000 or more during that period . . .shall,

if the offense affects interstate or foreign commerce, be

punished.” That statute does not have “as an element a

scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity.” Id.

§ 3663A(a)(2); see United States v. Gordon, 480 F.3d 1205,

1211 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that § 1029(a)(2) does not

contain as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of

criminal activity); accord United States v. Acosta, 303 F.3d

78, 87 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Blake, 81 F.3d 498,

506 (4th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the only issue is whether

the Target victims were persons “directly and proximately

harmed as a result of the commission of” Defendant’s crimes

of conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2).

We have interpreted that statutory text to mean that “a

court may award restitution under the MVRA only for loss

that flows directly from the specific conduct that is the basis

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 11

of the offense of conviction. Thus, a court is authorized to

order restitution for the offense of conviction and not for

other related offenses of which the defendant was not

convicted.” May, 706 F.3d at 1214 (citations, internal

quotation marks, and footnote omitted). In addition, the

statute requires the court to award restitution in full for each

victim of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). The parties

dispute whether it was plain error to order restitution to the

victims of the Target charges.4

Defendant correctly points out that, at the plea colloquy,

the government asserted that it would prove (and Defendant

admitted) factual allegations concerning Nordstrom only; the

Target transactions were not mentioned. Defendant cogently

contends that everyone implicitly understood that only the

Nordstrom charges constituted the offense of conviction. But

the government correctly points out that Defendant pleaded

guilty to Count One ofthe indictment and that its text is broad

enough to cover both the Nordstrom charges and the Target

charges.

The count charged Defendant with fraudulent credit card

use “in Los Angeles and Orange Counties, within the Central

District of California, and elsewhere,” (emphasis added),

which includes Colorado, the site of the Target charges. 

Similarly, the count charged Defendant with fraudulent credit

card use “no earlier than on or about March 13, 2011, and

continuing through on or about December 17, 2011.” 

4 Defendant does not argue—and cannot argue—that he was misled

during the plea colloquy as to the potential amount of restitution. As

previouslynoted, the district court advisedDefendant that restitution could

be as high as $160,000. Instead, Defendant argues that the restitution

exceeded the court’s statutory authority.

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12 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

Although there is some evidence to the contrary, much

evidence in the record would support a finding that the Target

charges occurred in July 2011. For example, the presentence

report itemized the Target charges and noted that they

occurred “in July 2011.” On plain-error review, the burden

is on Defendant to demonstrate error. To the extent that the

record is unclear as to the date of the transactions, the fault

rests with Defendant for failing to object before the district

court in order to make a more complete record. Accordingly,

we conclude that, for purposes of plain-error review, the

Target charges occurred in July 2011—within the indictment

period.

Defendant did not plead guilty only to the Nordstrom

allegations—he pleaded guilty to Count One of the

indictment. “A guilty plea conclusively admits all factual

allegations of the indictment . . . .” United States v. Kubick,

205 F.3d 1117, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The fraudulent Target charges fit within the

scope of that count, and Defendant does not contest that he

actually engaged in criminal conduct at the Target store in

Colorado that meets the terms of the indictment. Especially

given “the MVRA’s broad remedial purpose,” United States

v. Eyraud, 809 F.3d 462, 468 (9th Cir. 2015), Congress likely

intended restitution to all victims within the scope of an

admitted crime, even if the parties focused primarily on one

set of victims at the plea colloquy.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Bailey,

975 F.2d 1028, 1033–34 (4th Cir. 1992), supports that

conclusion. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to a

count in the indictment of defrauding investors of more than

$15 million. Id. at 1033. The court rejected his argument on

appeal that restitution was proper only with respect to

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 13

investors specifically named in the indictment. Id. The court

reasoned that his “offense was defined broadly in the

indictment,” he pleaded guilty to the broadly defined charge

and, accordingly, restitution was appropriate for all investors

within the indictment, not just those investors named

specifically. Id. The same reasoning applies here: 

Defendant pleaded guilty to Count One of the indictment, and

restitution is therefore appropriate for all victims of that

count. See also United States v. Jackson, 982 F.2d 1279,

1283–84 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that restitution is

appropriate for all victims of the count of conviction, even

though other counts, involving the same victims and the same

loss, were dismissed).

Moreover, the “factual basis” requirement for the plea

colloquy does not mandate that the government list all facts

constituting the crime; the government merely must

demonstrate that “there is sufficient evidence to support the

conclusion that the defendant is guilty.” United States v.

Covian-Sandoval, 462 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The purpose of the

“factual basis” requirement is simply “to ensure that the

defendant is not mistaken about whether the conduct he

admits to satisfies the elements of the offense charged.” 

United States v. Mancinas-Flores, 588 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir.

2009). Because the Nordstrom charges indisputably were

sufficient to establish a factual basis for Defendant’s crime,

the government was not required to mention the Target

charges at the plea colloquy.

But we need not and do not decide definitively whether

the district court erred, because any error was not plain. We

agree with the First Circuit’s treatment of this issue in Acosta. 

In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to a one-count

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14 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

indictment for credit-card fraud during a 10-month period, in

violation of § 1029(a)(2), the same statute at issue here. 

Acosta, 303 F.3d at 81. Before accepting the plea, the district

court had suppressed evidence of some of the fraudulent

transactions. Id. At sentencing, the district court ordered the

defendant to pay restitution to all victims, including victims

of the suppressed transactions. Id. at 82. The defendant did

not object. Id. On appeal, the First Circuit held that “there

was no plain error in the district court’s use of the suppressed

evidence to calculate restitution.” Id. at 90. For the same

reasons, we conclude that any error here was not plain.

AFFIRMED.

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The majority holds that the district court did not plainly

err in ordering restitution for the Colorado Target charges

because “the text [of Count One] is broad enough to cover

both the Nordstrom charges and the Target charges.” Maj.

Op. at 11. Because I disagree with the majority’s strained

reading of the indictment – especially in light of the rest of

the record – I respectfully dissent.

As the majority notes, the district court “may award

restitution . . . only for loss that flows directly from ‘the

specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of

conviction.’” United States v. May, 706 F.3d 1209, 1214 (9th

Cir. 2013) (quotingUnited States v. Gamma Tech Indus., Inc.,

265 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Thus, a court is

authorized to order restitution ‘for the offense of conviction

and not for other related offenses of which the defendant was

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 15

not convicted.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Batson,

608 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2010)).

The issue in this case is what “specific conduct” formed

“the basis of the offense of conviction.” To ascertain Zhou’s

offense of conviction, the Court must look to Count One of

the indictment, the charge to which Zhou pleaded guilty. See

United States v. Kubick, 205 F.3d 1117, 1129–30 (9th Cir.

1999).

An indictment must meet the following requirements:

An indictment must provide the defendant

with a description of the charges against him

sufficient to (1) enable him to prepare his

defense; (2) ensure him that he is being

prosecuted on the basis of facts presented to

the grand jury; (3) enable him to plead double

jeopardy against a later prosecution; and

(4) inform the court of the facts alleged so that

it can determine the sufficiency of the charge.

United States v. Livingston, 725 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.

2013) (quoting United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167,

1173 (9th Cir. 1980)).

To support its position that the indictment included the

Colorado Target charges, the majority relies entirely on only

one fact: that Count One of the indictment alleges that the

fraud occurred in the Central District of California “and

elsewhere” (emphasis added). This bare assertion cannot

bear the weight the majority asks it to carry. If “and

elsewhere” were a catch-all encompassing literally every

location where Zhou might have committed credit card fraud

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16 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

during the specified time period, it would be entirely unclear

what conduct was encompassed bythe charge. An indictment

that referred, not to specific fraudulent conduct, but to

fraudulent conduct anywhere in the United States, would not

meet Livingston’s requirements because it would not

sufficiently limit the facts the government could adduce at

trial to prove the charge. Cf. United States v. Doss, 630 F.3d

1181, 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the indictment

sufficiently identified the time and place of the conduct

underlying the offense of conviction to give the defendant

“notice of what evidence might be presented at trial”).

Further, as the majority acknowledges, the record shows

that both the government and the district court understood

that the offense of conviction included only the California

Nordstrom charges. For example, during the plea colloquy,

the government stated that it would be prepared to prove the

fraudulent Nordstrom charges at trial, but did not mention the

Target charges. The purpose of the government’s showing as

to the factual basis for the plea “is to ensure that the

defendant is not mistaken about whether the conduct he

admits to satisfies the elements of the offense charged.” 

United States v. Mancinas-Flores, 588 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir.

2009). This purpose cannot be satisfied if the court never

asks the defendant to confirm that the government’s

allegations regarding his conduct are correct. In this case, the

district court asked Zhou whether “everything” the

government said about his conduct and intent was true and

correct; but the government’s proffer referred only to the

Nordstrom charges. Because the court never asked Zhou

about his Colorado conduct, the Rule 11(b)(1) colloquy is not

susceptible to the reading necessary to support the majority’s

position that Zhou admitted to that conduct.

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 17

Additionally, the Presentence Investigation Report

explicitly differentiates between the Nordstrom charges and

the Target charges:1It refers to the Nordstrom charges as

“the transactions charged in the instant offense,” while it

characterizes the Target charges as conduct “relevant . . . to

the instant conviction” (emphasis added). The government

argued that Zhou should pay restitution for this “relevant”

conduct, in addition to the Nordstrom charges, and the district

court agreed.

Indeed, the district court understood that it was ordering

restitution not only for the offense of conviction, but for all

relevant conduct as well. The district court explicitly

acknowledged that “[t]he amount of restitution is not limited

to the amounts alleged in the count to which [Zhou pleaded]

guilty and will include losses arising from the count

dismissed as well as all relevant conduct in connection with

those counts” (emphasis added). The court accordingly

advised Zhou that the amount of restitution could be as high

as $160,000. The district court’s statement of the law, and

the corresponding restitution calculation, directly contravene

our case law, which holds that a district court is not

authorized to order restitution for conduct that is merely

related to the offense of conviction, but is not an element of

the offense. See May, 706 F.3d at 1215.

Both the text of the indictment and the record – including

the plea colloquy and the Presentence Investigation Report – 

show that the Colorado Target charges did not form the basis

 

1

 “To the extent that we refer here to facts contained exclusively in the

presentence report, we pro tanto lift the order sealing that document.” 

United States v. Pimentel-Lopez, 2016 WL 3874414, at *4 n. 3 (9th Cir.

July 15, 2016).

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18 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

of the offense of conviction. The district court thus plainly

erred in ordering restitution for the losses attributable to

relevant conduct, rather than the offense of conviction. See

id. I thus would vacate the restitution order and remand with

directions that the district court limit its restitution order to

only the Nordstrom California charges, i.e., the losses

attributable to the offense of conviction.

I respectfully dissent.

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