Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02589/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02589-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Lawrence Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Charles A. Shaw, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2589

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff/Appellee * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Richard Lawrence Davis, *

*

Defendant/Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 12, 2005

Filed: August 8, 2005

___________

Before MURPHY, BRIGHT and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

After Richard Lawrence Davis was convicted by a jury of possessing more than

50 grams of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, his motion for a new trial was

granted and the government appealed. We reversed, reinstating the conviction and

remanding for sentencing. See United States v. Davis, 367 F.3d 787, 790 (8th Cir.

2004). On remand the district court1

 imposed a 20 year mandatory minimum

sentence. Davis appeals, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial because of the

prosecutor's improper closing argument, that he did not have a qualifying prior felony

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Appellant's posttrial motion for a new trial was granted on a ground he had not

raised, and it is not clear whether he had based it on the prosecutor's closing

argument. See Davis, 367 F.3d at 790. The government has not objected that Davis

should have raised the issue in a protective cross appeal, and we assume that was not

required since Davis had received the relief he sought. See Bethea v. Levi Strauss

and Co., 916 F.2d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 1990)

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conviction to support the mandatory minimum sentence, and that the sentencing facts

relating to his prior conviction should have been submitted to a jury. We affirm.

Davis first argues that the prosecutor's rebuttal argument at trial was improper

and that the court's curative measures were insufficient, entitling him to a new trial.2

The government contends on the other hand that the prosecutor was fairly responding

to arguments made by defense counsel. In his closing argument defense counsel had

suggested that the government deceived the jury about the experience and motivation

of the investigating officers, and he accused the prosecutor of having met with the

government witnesses before trial in order to influence their testimony. Counsel also

said the prosecutor had belittled the defendant on cross examination. In her rebuttal

argument the prosecutor responded to the allegations. She suggested that the charge

about fabricating witness testimony was nothing more than a litigation tactic. The

defense objected, and the court instructed the prosecutor to "refrain from

personalizing." The prosecutor argued that the government witnesses had been

aggressively cross examined by Davis' lawyer and that they would not have wanted

to come to testify had they known how they would be treated. Defense counsel

objected, and the court instructed the prosecutor to "move on." The prosecutor also

told the jury that it was necessary to meet with witnesses before trial to learn what

they had seen and to inform them about trial procedures, and suggested that the cross

examination done by defense counsel had lengthened the trial. The court sustained

the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the comment.

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The government argues that Davis failed to object to all of the challenged

statements at trial and as a result some of the prosecutor's comments are subject to

review only for plain error. Because Davis has not demonstrated that any of the

challenged statements were sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial under the

abuse of discretion standard, we do not need to determine whether any of the

statements require plain error review.

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Davis claims that the prosecutor engaged in an improper personal attack by

telling the jury that defense counsel had misstated facts, had distracted the jury, and

had been aggressive in cross examination. Davis also contends that the government

improperly vouched for its witnesses during rebuttal by stating that it is a crime to

fabricate testimony and that its meetings with witnesses were appropriate and not out

of the ordinary. Davis argues that these statements prejudicially affected his

substantial rights because the government lacked strong evidence of his guilt and the

district court failed to take sufficient curative action in sustaining only one of his

three objections. In reply, the government argues that the prosecution's remarks were

not improper because they were a justified response to the allegations made by the

defense in its closing. It also contends that Davis suffered no prejudice as a result of

the statements and points out that the defense made few objections, that it did not

seek a mistrial, and that the district court gave curative comments after each of the

defense objections.

Trial courts have broad discretion in controlling closing arguments, and they

will only be reversed if there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. United States

v. Wesley, 798 F.2d 1155, 1156 (8th Cir. 1986).3 A conviction will be overturned on

the basis of inappropriate prosecutorial comments only if they have affected the

overall fairness of the defendant's trial. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12

(1985). In determining whether reversal is merited, we consider whether the

prosecutor's comments were actually improper within the context of the trial and, if

so, whether they were so prejudicial that the defendant was deprived of his right to

a fair trial. United States v. Eldridge, 984 F.2d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 1993). Prejudice

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is determined in light the misconduct's cumulative effect, the strength of the evidence

of the defendant's guilt, and the curative actions of the trial court. Id. at 946-47. In

reviewing objections to the government's closing argument we must think about "the

probable effect the prosecutor's response would have on the jury's ability to judge the

evidence fairly." Young, 470 U.S. at 12.

The prosecutor's remarks in rebuttal must be viewed in their context. In his

closing argument defense counsel had accused the prosecutor of deceiving the jury

about the age and experience of testifying officers, of humiliating the defendant in

cross examination, and of fabricating the testimony of its witnesses. A prosecutor "is

entitled to make a fair response and rebuttal" if he or government agents or witnesses

are attacked. United States v. Williams, 97 F.3d 240, 246 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting

United States v. Lee, 743 F.2d 1240, 1253 (8th Cir. 1984)). The rebuttal comments

by the prosecution in this case were a responsive attempt to "right the scale" after the

"defense counsel's opening salvo." Young, 470 U.S. at 12-13; United States v.

Franklin, 250 F.3d 653, 660-61 (8th Cir. 2001). Unlike the remarks requiring reversal

in United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502 (8th Cir. 1996), the comments were

directed at defense counsel rather than the defendant. Moreover, the government

presented strong evidence of Davis' guilt, see United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d

456, 461 (8th Cir. 1985), and the district court took curative actions whenever there

was an objection. The court instructed the prosecutor both to "refrain from

personalizing" and to move on. It also sustained a defense objection and instructed

the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comment about the length of the defense cross

examinations. There was no motion for mistrial or other request for intervention by

the court. We conclude after studying the trial record that Davis has not shown that

he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's remarks or that the overall fairness of the trial

was impacted by the rebuttal argument. He is therefore not entitled to a new trial.

Davis also challenges on two grounds the mandatory minimum sentence

imposed by the district court and seeks resentencing. Before trial the government

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filed a criminal information alleging that Davis had a prior final conviction for a

felony drug offense, referencing September 24, 2001 state convictions for possession

of marijuana and second degree drug trafficking. Based on this, the information

alleged that Davis was subject to a twenty year mandatory minimum sentence

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), for violation of § 841(a) after a prior final

conviction of a felony drug offense. Davis filed a response denying that he had a

prior felony drug conviction because he had received a suspended imposition of

sentence and probation from a Missouri court for drug trafficking and under Missouri

law that did not count as a conviction. Davis also asserted that possession of

marijuana was a misdemeanor offense. The district court nevertheless applied §

841(b) in sentencing Davis to 240 months.

Davis argues first that the district court erred by imposing a mandatory

minimum sentence under § 841(b). He asserts that he did not have a prior felony

drug conviction since suspended sentences are not considered convictions under

Missouri state law. See Yale v. City of Independence, 846 S.W.2d 193, 194

(Mo.1993) (en banc). Davis acknowledges that in each case in which we have

considered the applicability of § 841(b) to Missouri suspended sentences, we have

applied federal law to determine that such sentences are final convictions requiring

application of a mandatory minimum sentence. See United States v. Slicer, 361 F.3d

1085 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Franklin, 250 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2001); United

States v. Ortega, 150 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 1998). He nevertheless argues that we should

follow United States v. Stallings, 301 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2002),where the

defendant was held not to have a judgment of conviction for purposes of § 841(b)

because his California sentence had been suspended. Davis argues we should give

full faith and credit to Missouri judgments by applying Missouri law to determine

whether he has a state conviction. 

The government argues that what constitutes a final prior conviction for a

felony offense under § 841(b) is a question of federal law and that suspended

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sentences for felony drug offenses have always been treated as final convictions by

this court, citing Slicer, Franklin, and Ortega. The government seeks to distinguish

these cases from Stallings by citing a case where the court observed in passing that

Stallings never decided whether the California conviction there was final. See United

States v. Maxon, 339 F.3d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding North Dakota conviction

final under federal law despite state probation provision). Finally, the government

argues that not only are the facts concerning Davis' prior suspended sentence identical

to those in Ortega and Franklin, but that Slicer, a case decided after Stallings,

reaffirmed that Missouri suspended sentences are final convictions under federal law.

See Slicer, 361 F.3d at 1086, 1087 n.1.

Reviewing the district court's application of § 841(b) de novo, we find the key

facts related to Davis's Missouri drug offense to be almost identical to those in

Ortega, Franklin, and Slicer and conclude that his suspended sentence is a final

felony conviction under federal law. See id. In each of those cases, the defendant

had previously received a suspended sentence and probation for a Missouri felony

drug offense. In each, we applied federal law and held that the defendant's suspended

sentence was a final prior conviction for a felony drug offense for purposes of §

841(b). Davis was convicted of a felony drug offense in Missouri court and given a

suspended sentence and term of supervised probation. Under federal law, this was

a conviction for which the government could seek an increased mandatory minimum

sentence. Ortega, 150 F.3d at 948; Franklin, 250 F.3d at 665; Slicer, 361 F.3d at

1087. 

Davis also challenges the district court's application of § 841(b) on Sixth

Amendment grounds, arguing that under Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct 2531

(2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the facts relating to his

prior conviction should have been submitted to the jury for determination beyond a

reasonable doubt. The fact of a prior conviction remains a sentencing factor that need

not be submitted to a jury, however. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.

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224, 226-27 (1998); see also United States v. Johnson, 408 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2005)

(Almendarez-Torres not overruled by subsequent cases). 

We conclude that appellant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by the

application of § 841(b) based on the court's finding that Davis had a prior felony drug

conviction and that the district court did not err in imposing a twenty year mandatory

minimum sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A). 

The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring separately.

I am bound to concur by precedent, but I do protest against a holding where the

court examines state judicial proceedings but refuses to credit the character of those

proceedings as determined by the state itself.

Davis had previously been prosecuted for drug trafficking in Missouri. The

Missouri court did not impose judgment and sentence, but placed Davis on probation

and suspended further judicial proceedings pending Davis’ successful completion of

probation. In other words, no judgment was entered against Davis. See generally

Yale v. City of Independence, 846 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Mo. 1993). The state court

could have imposed judgment and sentence but then suspended the execution of the

sentence to place Davis on probation. See id. In that case, a judgment would have

been entered against Davis.

The state court deliberately chose not to enter a judgment of conviction against

Davis. The federal courts should respect the character of state judicial proceedings,

as determined by the states themselves. Respect for the dignity of the states in our

federal system requires that we do so. See U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1 (the Full Faith

& Credit clause). We should not declare that state proceedings that did not, in the

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state’s eyes, result in a final conviction is nevertheless a final conviction under

federal law.

Davis is now twenty-three years old. He was convicted in this case, at the age

of twenty-one, of possessing one 78-gram rock of crack cocaine, with the intent to

distribute it. Davis is not a drug kingpin. He does not have a long criminal record.

Apart from the present case, he has one juvenile conviction (from when he was

thirteen years old), one adult conviction for driving with a revoked driver's license,

and the non-conviction-conviction at issue in this appeal (for possessing marijuana

and for second-degree drug trafficking).

A straight guidelines sentence would be approximately 121⁄2 years to 151⁄2 years

(151 to 188 months). The federal court's refusal to credit the Missouri court's

decision to suspend judicial proceedings rather than to convict Davis mandates an

additional 41⁄2 to 71⁄2 years in prison.

The straight guidelines sentence is itself very harsh. The additional prison

term, premised on a refusal to credit the Missouri court’s characterization of its own

judicial proceedings, is gratuitous and unjust. One need not take a sentimental view

of drug dealers to see that this twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence comes

disturbingly close to simply throwing away a young life.

This is a case well-suited for review by this court en banc, or by the United

States Supreme Court.

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