Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05407/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05407-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael F. DiMario
Appellant
Monica M. Peyton
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 4, 2002 Decided April 23, 2002

No. 00-5407

Monica M. Peyton,

Appellee

v.

Michael F. DiMario,

The Public Printer of the United States,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv00491)

Michael C. Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Theodore S. Allison argued the cause for appellee. With

him on the brief was John W. Karr.

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Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Edwards and Sentelle,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Monica Peyton, a former employee of the Government Printing Office ("GPO"), brought this

action against Michael F. DiMario, in his official capacity as

Public Printer of the United States, alleging employment

discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. ss 2000e, et seq. Peyton's hostile work

environment claim and retaliation claim were tried to a jury,

which issued a verdict for Peyton and awarded her $482,000

in compensatory damages. The district court decreased the

compensatory damages award to the statutory cap of $300,000

in accordance with 42 U.S.C. s 1981a(b)(3)(D). The district

court further awarded Peyton $78,476.90 as back pay and

$377,615.72 as compensation for lost future earnings. The

Public Printer (hereinafter referred to as "GPO") appealed,

challenging only the damages and relief awarded. GPO

contends the district court abused its discretion by: (1)

awarding the statutory maximum in compensatory damages;

(2) awarding back pay for a period when Peyton was in

school; and (3) awarding future earnings that are unreasonably speculative. We affirm the district court as to its award

of compensatory damages and back pay. However we agree

with appellant that the future earnings awarded are unreasonably speculative and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

A. Peyton's Employment at GPO

Appellee Monica Peyton worked for GPO for 11 years

(from July 5, 1987 to August 14, 1998). She served in various

GS-5 and GS-6 positions, including supply clerk and supply

technician. In the fall of 1995 she was accepted into a 2-year

proofreader apprenticeship program. Successful completion

of the apprenticeship program leads to an appointment as a

journeyman proofreader. The apprenticeship program consisted of on-the-job training as well as some classroom inUSCA Case #00-5407 Document #673030 Filed: 04/23/2002 Page 2 of 15
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struction. Apprentices were evaluated during each 13-week

period of the 2-year training program. GPO set specific

proofreading standards (e.g., the number of keystrokes that

must be read within an hour) and then taught the apprentices

how to meet those standards. Throughout the training program GPO provides information to apprentices to allow them

to access their reading speed at any time and periodically

advises apprentices as to whether they are meeting expectations. Peyton's apprenticeship began in January 1996. Although she apparently failed to meet the number of key

strokes per hour during one of the periods in 1996, Peyton

continued successfully in the program. Then in 1997, she

failed to meet the number of required keystrokes per hour for

the July 6-October 4 period.

According to Peyton's evidence, a superior, Charlotte Massey, made lewd comments and gestures concerning Peyton's

breasts on more than one occasion. Peyton complained to

Massey directly and Massey ranted at her and intimidated

her. Thereafter, Peyton made an informal complaint to

GPO's Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") office on

July 1, 1997, and a formal complaint on August 15, 1997.

Upon learning that Peyton had filed the informal complaint,

Massey engaged in a pattern of harassment, including threats

communicated directly and through co-workers. There was

physical contact between Peyton and Massey, which Peyton

characterized as a bump, or an elbowing, by Massey. Peyton

complained to her superiors that her work was being adversely affected by the hostile environment of the proof room, but

to no avail. Peyton was even told that she should drop her

complaint. Ultimately, Peyton was distressed and fearful

about approaching the head desk when Massey was assigned

to work there.

According to GPO, Peyton's failure to meet the proofreading goal in 1997 resulted in her being given a 2-week delay,

then a 12-week probation to improve. Peyton in fact began

to improve. However, Peyton was misled as to when these

probationary periods actually began and was ultimately expelled from the apprenticeship program in what had been

represented to her as the fifth week of the scheduled 12-week

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probation. Peyton was released from the apprenticeship

program in January 1998, though not terminated by GPO at

that time. GPO placed her in the Library Programs Service,

and ultimately she was terminated on August 14, 1998.

B. Proceedings Below

Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Peyton

filed the action below in the district court. In her complaint

(filed before she was fired), Peyton alleged sex discrimination

in the forms of quid pro quo sexual harassment and a hostile

work environment, as well as retaliation for pursuing her

rights under Title VII. Subsequently she amended her complaint to allege that she was terminated from GPO as retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for GPO

on the quid pro quo claim but denied it with respect to the

hostile work environment and retaliation claims. Peyton's

hostile work environment and retaliation claims were tried to

a jury in November 1999. The jury returned a unanimous

verdict finding that Peyton proved, by a preponderance of the

evidence, each element of her claim of sex discrimination on

the basis of hostile or abusive work environment, and retaliation, against GPO. The jury awarded Peyton compensatory

damages in the amount of $482,000.

The jury also sat in an advisory capacity on the issues of

damages for past lost earnings and benefits, up to the time of

trial, and damages for future lost earnings. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 39(c). The jury returned an advisory verdict in which it

found that plaintiff had proved, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that she was entitled to damages for past lost

earnings and benefits, and to damages for future lost earnings. The advisory verdict recommended $50,000 for back

pay and $840,000 for future lost earnings.

On the issues of entitlement to back pay and future lost

earnings, the district court made findings of fact. The court

agreed with the jury that Peyton "presented convincing and

credible evidence proving that her co-workers' and supervisors' conduct had a material effect upon her ability to perUSCA Case #00-5407 Document #673030 Filed: 04/23/2002 Page 4 of 15
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form and upon her quality of life in the workplace." It found

no credible explanation for the discrepancy between the timeframe of the probationary training period represented by

GPO to Peyton, and the period actually treated as the probationary training period by GPO. The court found the evidence to establish that after being told of her probation on

December 2, 1997, until her removal from the program, "Ms.

Peyton performed above the required standards." The district court concluded as a matter of law that "[a]s a direct and

proximate result of the retaliatory adverse employment actions taken against Ms. Peyton by officials of the GPO, Ms.

Peyton failed to be promoted to journeyman proofreader, as

of January 2, 1998, and was terminated from her employment

with the GPO as of August 14, 1998. She has suffered

compensatory damages and a loss of earnings and benefits as

a direct and proximate result of these adverse employment

actions."

C. Damages and Relief

Based on its findings, the district court awarded compensatory damages and equitable relief. First, the court reduced

the amount of compensatory damages recoverable to

$300,000, the statutory maximum under Title VII for an

award against an employer with more than 500 employees.

See 42 U.S.C. s 1981a(b)(3)(D). The court "determine[d] on

the facts of this case" that $300,000 "represent[ed] a fair and

appropriate compensatory award pursuant to the statutory

cap at 42 U.S.C. s 1981a(b)(3)." In denying GPO's Rule 59(a)

and (e) motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, remittitur,

the district court rejected the argument that this award of

compensatory damages was "grossly excessive" because the

case did not present "the 'most egregious' instance of unlawful conduct meriting the 'maximum amount recoverable under

Title VII's statutory cap.' " Rather, the court determined

"that the jury could reasonably view this case as the type of

egregious, unlawful conduct that Title VII was designed to

remedy." It distinguished this case from Nyman v. FDIC,

967 F. Supp. 1562, 1572 (D.D.C. 1997), based on the physical

assault of Peyton and GPO's manipulation of "the apprentice

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training rules in order to expel the plaintiff from the training

program." It concluded that the "$300,000 award neither

'shocks the conscience' nor represents a 'miscarriage of justice.' "

The court awarded back pay and future lost earnings

("front pay") as equitable relief. It calculated back pay for

three periods: January 2-August 14, 1998 (while Peyton was

still at GPO); August 14-October 11, 1998 (from termination

at GPO until employment by Bowne, Inc.); and October 11,

1998 to Trial (Peyton employed at Bowne, Inc.). It determined Peyton was entitled to an award of back pay in the

amount of $78,476.90. The court rejected arguments by

appellant GPO that Peyton inadequately mitigated her losses

during the August-October period when she was unemployed.

Noting that it is "the defendant's burden to prove that the

plaintiff's efforts to secure employment constituted inadequate effort to mitigate damages," the court "conclude[d] that

the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff

inadequately mitigated her losses."

In determining that front pay was appropriate, the court

first found that it would be "futile, ill-advised, and inequitable

to order that Ms. Peyton be returned to her old position."

Relying on our decision in Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270,

1278 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996),

the district court calculated projected future lost earnings. It

found that at the time of trial, Peyton earned $549.90 less per

week ($28,594.80 less per year) working for Bowne, Inc., a

private printer, than she would as a journeyman proofreader

for GPO. Because the court found that "Ms. Peyton reasonably expected and intended to work as a proofreader for the

GPO until she retired," it awarded her "front pay which

reflects that the plaintiff will suffer a loss of future earnings

totaling $28,594.80 per year until her projected retirement,"

discounted to the net present value. As Peyton was 34 years

old, and her retirement was projected at age 60, the district

court ultimately awarded $377,615.72 in front pay.

GPO filed the instant appeal challenging the district court's

determination of compensatory damages, back pay, and front

pay.

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II. Analysis

This Court reviews a district court's denial of a Rule 59(a)

and (e) motion for abuse of discretion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a),

(e); see Langevine v. District of Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018,

1023 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Rule 59(a)); Anyantaku v. Moore, 151

F.3d 1053, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Rule 59(e)). This Court also

reviews equitable relief, the standard for calculating back pay

and front pay, under an abuse of discretion standard. See

Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1277-78. A "district court has wide

discretion to award equitable relief." Id. at 1278. "The

district court should fashion this relief so as to provide a

victim of employment discrimination the most complete makewhole relief possible." Id. In reviewing for an abuse of

discretion, the Court considers "whether the decision maker

failed to consider a relevant factor, whether [the decision

maker] relied on an improper factor, and whether the reasons

given reasonably support the conclusion." Id. (citation omitted). With this standard of review in mind, we consider each

of the challenged awards in turn: compensatory damages;

back pay; and future lost earnings or "front pay."

A. Compensatory Damages

GPO argues that the denial of the motion for new trial, or

remittitur, and the award of $300,000 in compensatory damages is an abuse of discretion in that a "$300,000 compensatory damages award is grossly excessive given the record in

this case." Appellant relies on Nyman v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp.

at 1570-73, for the standards that should govern remittitur in

a Title VII case. In Nyman, the district court held that the

"maximum amount recoverable under the applicable cap ...

should be reserved for the most egregious cases of unlawful

conduct." 967 F. Supp. at 1572. There the district court

ordered remittitur of a $350,000 compensatory damages verdict to $175,000. Id. at 1567. Appellant essentially argues

that the harm to Peyton was not serious enough to warrant

the maximum penalty under the law, particularly when compared to other Title VII cases. Further, according to GPO,

appellee's approach would have us consider the "quality of the

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'unlawful conduct' at issue," rather than the nature of the

harm suffered, conflating compensatory damages with punitive damages-damages which are foreclosed to the plaintiff as

the defendant is a government entity. See 42 U.S.C.

s 1981a(b)(1). As to the critical inquiry of harm to the

victim, appellant contends there "simply was no significant

evidence of any prolonged, serious, or substantial harm to

appellee stemming from GPO's actions."

At the outset, we address appellant's suggestion that Peyton failed to carry her burden in proving damages. Although

compensatory damages must be proven and cannot be presumed, see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-64 (1978),

there has been no such presumption here. The district court

found that the jury could reasonably view this case as the

type of egregious, unlawful conduct that Title VII was designed to remedy: Peyton had worked her way up the ladder

at GPO, won a desirable apprenticeship, was harassed by a

superior in the final months, was threatened, intimidated,

physically assaulted, suffered retaliation for attempting to

exercise her rights under Title VII, and was ultimately fired

for exercising her rights. The evidence supports the district

court's finding that she became depressed, angry, and suffered a loss of self-esteem. She was injured.

Thus, the only question remaining is whether it was an

abuse of discretion by the district court to award the statutory maximum, $300,000 in compensatory damages, when the

jury had awarded $482,000. Of course, the district court is in

the best position to determine damages, as it heard all of the

evidence and saw all of the witnesses. This Court will only

require remittitur when (1) the verdict is beyond all reason,

so as to shock the conscience, or (2) the verdict is so inordinately large as to obviously exceed the maximum limit of a

reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate.

See Jeffries v. Potomac Dev. Corp., 822 F.2d 87, 96 (D.C. Cir.

1987); Williams v. Steuart Motor Co., 494 F.2d 1074, 1085

(D.C. Cir. 1974). The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that neither test required remittitur here.

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Appellant does not contend that an award of $300,000

"shocks the conscience" in the abstract, but rather argues,

relying on the district court's opinion in Nyman, that 42

U.S.C. s 1981a(b) in essence requires a sliding scale. Thus,

only the "most egregious cases of unlawful conduct" are

entitled to the statutory maximum of $300,000, and this case

is not so egregious. First, we reject the argument that

s 1981a(b) itself ever requires a reduction below the $300,000

cap. By its plain language, 1981a(b)(3) does nothing other

than provide a cap. Nothing in the language of that section

evidences a congressional intent to specifically empower, let

alone require, a trial or appellate court to reduce a verdict in

excess of $300,000 to some lesser figure. Although appellant

offers a plethora of cases in which smaller damage figures

have been awarded, and in which remittiturs to amounts

below $300,000 have been ordered, appellant provides no

authority for the proposition that cases involving some perceived or even evident degree of injury less than the most

egregious must inherently be awarded some figure lower than

the cap. It may well be that in the most egregious conceivable case a jury might award, for example, $300,000,000, which

would be reduced to $300,000. The fact that some other

hypothetical case might be only half as egregious (assuming

such comparisons can be made) would not require either the

trial or appellate court to reduce the award in that hypothetical case from $150,000,000 to $150,000.

Rather, the proper approach is to determine whether the

judgment awarded, regardless of whether it is the statutory

maximum, is supported by evidence, and does not shock the

conscience, or is not inordinately large so as to be obviously

unreasonable. Cf. Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance,

Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1416 (10th Cir. 1997). The cases that

appellant offers for purposes of comparison in which lesser

damages were awarded or approved do not convince us to the

contrary. In rejecting that line of argument, we find useful

the reasoning of a state court considering a similar question

in a different context.

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The appellant argues that a comparison of this award to

other awards for similar injuries would show that this

award is excessive. We stated in Fitzsimonds v. Cogswell, ... that "We are sure counsel realizes that there is

no way of obtaining uniformity in the amount juries and

trial judges may award for damages in personal-injury

cases." Because of the unique circumstances of each

case as well as the adjustments which would necessarily

have to be made for inflation, it is awkward to discuss the

size of an award through comparison with past decisions.

Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 16 (Wyo. 1980). Just so

here.

All, then, that is left is to assess whether the district court

abused its discretion in granting a damage award of $300,000,

which is $182,000 less than the jury would have awarded. It

is rarely appropriate for an appellate court to reduce the trial

court's determination as to the proper amount of damages.

Thus, in reviewing a damage award, we consider whether it

would be "a denial of justice to permit it to stand." Grunenthal v. Long Island R. Co., 393 U.S. 156, 159 (1968) (quoting

Dagnello v. Long Island R. Co., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir.

1961)). Given the district court's findings of fact, which are

unchallenged, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion. The court found that "Ms. Peyton presented convincing

and credible evidence proving that her co-workers' and supervisors' conduct had a material effect upon her ability to

perform and upon her quality of life in the workplace."

(emphasis added). The plaintiff convinced the jury, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that she had been the victim

of retaliation, that she was distressed and that she was fearful

about her work environment. Indeed, appellant concedes

that Peyton reported "feelings of depression and sadness

typical of plaintiffs in Title VII cases." Moreover, to the

extent that the egregiousness of GPO's conduct was considered, it was merely as a proxy to assess the distress inflicted

upon Peyton. Although we might have decided this issue

differently were it before us de novo, because we cannot say

that the district court abused its discretion, we affirm the

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denial of the Rule 59(a) and (e) motion, and thus allow the

compensatory damage award to stand.

B. Back Pay

Appellant objects to the award of back pay for the AugustOctober 1998 period, during which, it contends, Peyton failed

to adequately mitigate her damages. It is not entirely clear

that GPO properly preserved this issue for appeal. However,

even assuming that appellant did, we find that the district

court did not abuse its discretion. The employer has the

burden of proving failure to mitigate. See, e.g., Fleming v.

County of Kane, 898 F.2d 553, 560 (7th Cir. 1990). GPO

claims that Peyton was enrolled in school during the AugustOctober 1998 period and did not demonstrate that she was

actively seeking work. Relying on Dailey v. Societe Generale, 108 F.3d 451, 455-58 (2d Cir. 1997), appellant contends

that Peyton's school attendance shows that she failed to

"demonstrate at least a modicum of due diligence in pursuing

full-time employment." Dailey, however, provides little support. There the Second Circuit rejected a per se rule that

full-time school attendance was incompatible with the duty to

mitigate, and rejected the defendant's claim that the plaintiff

had failed to mitigate. See id. In any event, here GPO has

failed to prove that Peyton was attending school full time,

much less that she made inadequate efforts to seek employment. As the appellant has not shown that Peyton withdrew

from the market and was not ready, willing, and able to

accept other employment, we cannot say that the district

court abused its discretion in granting back pay for the

August-October 1998 period.

C. Future Lost Earnings ("Front Pay")

Although appellee argues that the front pay issue was not

properly preserved for appeal, we agree with appellant that it

was. It is clear from the district court's Memorandum Opinion filed May 24, 2000, that appellant had raised the issue of

the amount of front pay to the district court: "[T]he defendant asserts ... that any front pay award in excess of a few

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years is unduly speculative." Thus, the question is whether

the award of $377,615.72 in future lost earnings was an abuse

of discretion. We determine that it was.

In Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert.

dismissed, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996), we articulated factors to be

considered in calculating front pay. Certain considerations

"including whether an award of front pay would be 'unduly

speculative,' may in some circumstances limit the court's

discretion." Id. at 1280. "The longer a proposed front pay

period, the more speculative the damages become."

McKnight v. GM, 973 F.2d 1366, 1372 (7th Cir. 1992). Here

the award of 26 years of front pay was unduly speculative and

therefore an abuse of discretion. Contrary to the district

court's understanding, Barbour does not hold that a plaintiff's

intention to remain at her employer until retirement, even if

that intention is entirely reasonable, automatically entitles

front pay for the remainder of her work life. Rather, Barbour includes a list of non-exhaustive factors to consider,

including age. See Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1280. Indeed, Barbour specifically suggests that the district court consider the

length of time employees in similar positions stay at the

defendant employer as well as at other employers, the time

required to secure similar employment, and other factors.

Id. Moreover, on remand, the district court in Barbour only

awarded one year of front pay, which was affirmed by this

Court. See Barbour v. Merrill, 132 F.3d 1480 (D.C. Cir.

1997) (Table). Neither the district court nor appellee cites

any case which suggests that an employee's subjective intent

to remain at a job until retirement, by itself, justifies an

award of front pay for the rest of her career.

While some speculation is necessary to determine front

pay, here the appellee produced no expert testimony concerning her earning potential, nor did the district court examine

what positions were available in the private sector comparable

to a journeyman proofreader position at GPO. "The plaintiff

bears the initial burden of providing the district court 'with

the essential data necessary to calculate a reasonably certain

front pay award.' " Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1279 (quoting

McKnight, 973 F.2d at 1372). However, here the district

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court simply calculated the difference between pay at Bowne

and GPO, and assumed that appellee would have stayed at

Bowne for the rest of her career. In fact, Peyton had only

been working at Bowne a little over a month when the trial

began. Further, the district court took "judicial notice that

Ms. Peyton can expect to receive regular and incremental

increases in compensation as an employee of Bowne, Inc., as

she would have as an employee of the GPO." But the

evidence does not reflect how such increases would compare

between the public and private sectors. Moreover, there is

no evidence in the record that salaries at Bowne represent a

"fair sample of the market" or the industry standard in the

private sector. Nor does evidence in the record support the

finding that the GPO proofreading job provided Peyton an

"optimum and unparalleled occasion to earn a handsome

living." Appellee's assertion that the GPO position "was an

unusually high paying job" is also without basis. Indeed,

none of the citations to the Joint Appendix in her brief

support appellee's claim that her witnesses "testified about

the uncommonly high compensation for the GPO position."

Finally, appellee does not substantiate her claim that she is

not generally able to "pursue jobs in the future that will be

essentially comparable to the job she lost." In sum, we

cannot uphold the determination of front pay.

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Gotthardt v. National RR

Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 1999), does not alter

our analysis. That case involved a 59 year-old employee

approaching retirement who had been truly incapacitated by

the employer's wrongful conduct and could not enter another

career. See id. at 1156. Given those circumstances, the

Ninth Circuit upheld a front pay award that compensated

future lost earnings through the mandatory retirement age of

70: "Although an eleven-year front pay award seems generous, the district court explicitly found that Gotthardt would be

unable to work in the future, taking into account her age (59),

her educational and vocational background, and, especially,

her health." Id. at 1157. The Gotthardt court noted that

these were unique circumstances, because "front pay is intended to be temporary in nature." Id. (quoting Cassino v.

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Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir.

1987)). Similarly, in Davis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.,

742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984), the Sixth Circuit upheld an

award of front pay to a 59 year-old plaintiff but noted that

front pay for a 41 year-old plaintiff until retirement age might

be unwarranted. Indeed, "[o]ther courts seem to agree that

plaintiffs in their forties are too young for lifetime front pay

awards." Stafford v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 749

F. Supp. 781, 789 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (citing Bailey v. Container Corporation of America, 660 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Ohio

1986); Foit v. Suburban Bancorp, 549 F. Supp. 264, 267 (D.

Md. 1982); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335

F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971)).

To award Peyton front pay based on the assumption that

she will continue in an allegedly low-paying job (compared to

a journeyman proofreader at GPO) for a full career, when she

is only 34 years old and not incapacitated, is to give her a

tremendous windfall rather than to make her whole. There

is no reason to assume that if she is, in fact, qualified for a

high-paying job at GPO, she will not be able to find a highpaying job in the future. Perhaps she will not. Perhaps

private printers systemically pay less for the work she was

training to do. However, the district court cannot make this

determination solely on the basis of appellee's one month of

experience at a private employer that may, or may not, be

representative of the private sector, doing work that may, or

may not, be comparable to the work of a journeyman proofreader at GPO. The record does not support such a speculative conclusion. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's

award of $377,615.72 in future lost earnings, and remand for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

III. Conclusion

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

the Rule 59(a) and (e) motion for a new trial, or in the

alternative, remittitur. Therefore we affirm the award of

$300,000 in compensatory damages. Nor did the district

court abuse its discretion in awarding $78,476.90 as back pay.

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However, because the award of $377,615.72 in future lost

earnings was based on undue speculation, it was an abuse of

discretion, requiring reversal. We vacate the district court's

award of front pay and remand for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

USCA Case #00-5407 Document #673030 Filed: 04/23/2002 Page 15 of 15