Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01077/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Capital One Bank (USA), National Association
Appellee
Capital One Financial Corporation
Appellee
Capital One, National Association
Appellee
Intellectual Ventures I LLC
Appellant
Intellectual Ventures II LLC
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC, 

INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 

CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, CAPITAL ONE, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2016-1077

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Maryland in No. 8:14-cv-00111-PWG, Judge 

Paul W. Grimm.

______________________ 

Decided: March 7, 2017

______________________ 

IAN NEVILLE FEINBERG, Feinberg Day Alberti & 

Thompson LLP, Menlo Park, CA, argued for plaintiffsappellants. Also represented by MARC BELLOLI,

ELIZABETH DAY, CLAYTON W. THOMPSON, II; ERIC F.

CITRON, Goldstein & Russell, P.C., Bethesda, MD.

MATTHEW J. MOORE, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees. Also repreCase: 16-1077 Document: 72-2 Page: 1 Filed: 03/07/2017
2 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE

sented by GABRIEL BELL, ADAM MICHAEL GREENFIELD;

JEFFREY G. HOMRIG, Menlo Park, CA; ROBERT A. ANGLE,

DABNEY JEFFERSON CARR, IV, Troutman Sanders LLP, 

Richmond, VA; KENNETH R. ADAMO, DAVID WILLIAM 

HIGER, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago, IL.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, WALLACH and CHEN, Circuit 

Judges.

PROST, Chief Judge. 

Intellectual Ventures I LLC and Intellectual Ventures 

II LLC (collectively, “IV”) appeal from a final decision of 

the United States District Court for the District of Maryland finding all claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,984,081 (“’081 

patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 6,546,002 (“’002 patent”)

ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and barring IV from 

pursuing its infringement claims of U.S. Patent No. 

6,715,084 (“’084 patent”) under a collateral estoppel (issue 

preclusion) theory.1 For the reasons discussed below, we 

affirm.

I 

IV sued Capital One Financial Corporation, Capital 

One Bank (USA), National Association, Capital One, and 

National Association (collectively, “Capital One”), alleging 

infringement of the ’084 patent, the ’081 patent, and the 

’002 patent (collectively, “patents-in-suit”) in the United 

States District Court for the District of Maryland. In 

response, Capital One asserted antitrust counterclaims 

against IV under the Sherman Act and moved for sum-

 

1 IV additionally appealed the district court’s finding of patent ineligibility of U.S. Patent No. 6,314,409. IV, 

however, withdrew this patent from appeal. IV’s Mot. to 

Withdraw U.S. Patent No. 6,314,409 as an Appellate 

Issue at 2. 

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INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE 3

mary judgment on IV’s infringement claims, arguing that 

the ’081 and ’002 patents are invalid under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 101. 

In a related proceeding, the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of New York entered a 

partial summary judgment order of ineligibility under 

§ 101 for the ’084 patent. See Intellectual Ventures II, 

LLC v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 13-cv-3777-AKH, 

2015 WL 1941331, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2015) 

(“JPMC”); J.A. 1343–74. Relying on the JPMC court’s 

partial summary judgment order, Capital One moved for 

summary judgment in the District of Maryland under a 

collateral estoppel theory to bar IV’s infringement action 

on those patents. 

In response to Capital One’s summary judgment motions, the district court invalidated the ’081 and ’002 

patents under § 101 and barred IV from proceeding on its 

infringement claims as to the ’084 patent under a collateral estoppel theory based on the JPMC court’s findings. 

Having granted Capital One’s summary judgment motion 

on collateral estoppel grounds, the District of Maryland

elected not to independently reach the merits of the ’084 

patent’s eligibility under § 101. After disposing of the 

patents-in-suit, and over IV’s objection, the district court 

certified its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) so that this appeal could proceed concurrently 

with Capital One’s antitrust counterclaims in the District 

of Maryland.2 IV filed its appeal. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

 

2 In the related JPMC matter, although the Southern District of New York rendered a finding of invalidity 

at summary judgment as to the ’084 patent under § 101, it 

denied IV’s request for Rule 54 certification and immediCase: 16-1077 Document: 72-2 Page: 3 Filed: 03/07/2017
4 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE

II 

On appeal, IV raises a number of issues regarding the 

proceedings below: (1) IV argues that the district court 

abused its discretion by certifying this appeal under Rule 

54; (2) IV appeals the district court’s determination that it 

is collaterally estopped from pursuing its patent infringement claims as to the ’084 patent; and (3) IV appeals the district court’s determination that the ’081 and 

’002 patents are invalid under § 101. We take each issue 

in turn.

A 

We review the district court’s decision to certify a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) for an abuse of 

discretion. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 

427, 437 (1956). On appeal, IV argues that the district 

court erred by merely providing a two-sentence Rule 54(b) 

certification statement without any specific findings or 

reasoning to support its conclusion. IV also asserts that 

because the district court did not make any findings or 

provide a rationale, any deference we owe to the district 

court “is nullified” under Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. 

Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1335–36 (4th Cir. 1993). 

Aside from attacking the sufficiency of the district court’s 

reasoning, IV argues that the close interrelationship 

between its infringement claims and Capital One’s antitrust counterclaims weighs against certification. IV 

therefore maintains that we should vacate the certification and remand the appeal. 

Capital One responds that the district court’s express 

finding of “no just reason for delay” supports its decision 

to certify. It also cites the district court’s additional 

certification reasoning in response to IV’s motion to 

 

ate appeal. Thus, IV has not to date appealed the merits 

of that court’s § 101 findings. 

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INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE 5

vacate the Rule 54(b) judgment. See J.A. 1728 (explaining 

why Rule 54(b) certification would create a more efficient 

use of judicial resources under this case’s facts and procedural posture). Regarding its counterclaims, Capital One 

argues that the antitrust issues are not sufficiently interrelated to IV’s infringement claims because its counterclaims implicate IV’s patent portfolio, which encompasses

roughly 3,500 patents. 

We agree with Capital One that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in certifying the appeal under 

Rule 54(b). Under that rule, “[w]hen an action presents 

more than one claim for relief . . . the court may direct 

entry of final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than 

all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 54(b). 

First, regarding the sufficiency of the district court’s 

findings, we observe that the district court set forth its 

reasoning for certification in two separate, independent

orders. See J.A. 55 (concluding that “there is no just 

reason for delay[ing]” entry of judgment with the antitrust claims still pending in the initial motion); J.A. 1727–

28 (weighing the potential benefits of reserving final 

judgment under a Rule 60 motion and concluding that 

judicial economy supports certification). Although the 

district court’s initial ruling did not set forth a lengthy 

analysis in support of certification, it expressly determined that there was no just reason for delay. J.A. 55. 

Beyond this, the district court subsequently explained 

why judicial economy supports its initial determination.3 

 

3 In its reply brief, IV argues—without support—

that a district court cannot use a subsequent order to 

“cure [the] defect” in its initial analysis. Reply Br. 24–25. 

Not so. The Fourth Circuit merely requires that the 

district court state its findings on the record or in its 

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6 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE

J.A. 1728. Regarding the sufficiency of its analysis, 

therefore, we conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion because it met the standard set forth 

by the rule.

Second, we review the extent to which the existence of 

Capital One’s counterclaims affect the analysis. To do so, 

we may consider—among other factors—“the relationship 

between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims.” 

Braswell Shipyards, 2 F.3d at 1335–36. Here, Capital 

One’s antitrust counterclaims implicate IV’s patent portfolio of roughly 3,500 patents. J.A. 3026–27. Yet IV

asserts only a narrow subset (the patents-in-suit) of that 

broader portfolio. Id. Further, the scope of Capital One’s 

antitrust counterclaims transcends issues of mere infringement. See id. (alleging, among other things, wrongful conduct, concealing the scope of its portfolio, and 

demanding excessive licensing rates). Indeed, the mere 

existence of some factual overlap between the parties’ 

claims and counterclaims does not necessarily lead to the 

conclusion that the district court abused its discretion. 

See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Int’l Med. Prosthetics 

Research Assocs., 975 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 

(recognizing that the factual overlap on one aspect of a 

counterclaim is not adequate to show an abuse of discretion). Under these facts, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion given the tenuous relationship between the claims on appeal and counterclaims

that remain. We have considered IV’s remaining arguments, but find them unpersuasive. As a result, we 

affirm the district court and entertain the remaining 

issues on appeal. 

 

order. Braswell Shipyards, 2 F.3d at 1336. This is precisely what it did. J.A. 55, 1728.

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INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE 7

B 

We review issues of preclusion de novo, applying the 

law of the regional circuit. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Zenni 

Optical Inc., 713 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Similarly, we review a district court’s summary judgment 

ruling under the law of the regional circuit, DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1252 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014). The Fourth Circuit reviews the entry of summary judgment de novo. Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert 

Cnty. Md., 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth 

Circuit has established five requirements for collateral 

estoppel. See Ramsay v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 14 F.3d 206, 210 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring that 

the issue in the prior proceeding be identical, actually 

determined, necessary, final, and that the affected party 

was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 

issue). Here, the parties only dispute the finality requirement, for which the Fourth Circuit requires a “final 

and valid” judgment. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust 

Litig., 355 F.3d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 2004). 

On appeal, IV challenges the district court’s grant of

partial summary judgment in which the court determined

that IV was collaterally estopped from pursuing its patent 

infringement claims as to the ’084 patent. It argues that 

the district court erred because it based its collateral 

estoppel findings on a partial summary judgment order by 

the JPMC court, rather than a final judgment. In support 

of its position, IV cites Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Manufacturing Corp., 294 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In that 

case—applying Seventh Circuit law—we held a partial 

summary judgment order does not meet the finality 

requirement of collateral estoppel. See id. at 1333 (basing 

collateral estoppel necessarily on a decision that is “immune . . . to reversal or amendment”) (citation omitted). 

We conclude that under Fourth Circuit law, collateral 

estoppel attaches in light of the JPMC court’s partial 

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8 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE

summary judgment order. At the outset, we observe that 

IV’s reliance on Vardon is misplaced because in that case, 

we applied the law of the Seventh Circuit. See Vardon, 

294 F.3d at 1333 (applying an “immune . . . to reversal or 

amendment” standard for collateral estoppel to attach). 

The Fourth Circuit, however, applies a less rigid test of 

finality. See Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th 

Cir. 1987) (abrogated on other grounds). Under Swentek, 

finality neither demands final judgment, nor requires a 

party’s appeal. Id. at 561. Rather, “[f]inality for purposes 

of collateral estoppel is a flexible concept and ‘may mean 

little more than that the litigation of a particular issue 

has reached such a stage that a court sees no really good 

reason for permitting it to be litigated again.’” Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, “[a]s long as the prior adjudication 

of the identical issue is conclusive, [the court does not] 

require the issue to be tried again because it lacked the 

formality of an express order and a ‘no just reason for 

delay’ determination.” See id. (noting that a trial judge 

need not enter judgment under Rule 54 and await appeal 

before ascribing a preclusive effect) (citation omitted). 

Applying the Fourth Circuit’s test, we conclude that

the JPMC court’s partial summary judgment order met 

the finality prong for the purposes of collateral estoppel. 

Here, the JPMC court granted Capital One’s partial 

summary judgment motion after considering the parties’ 

briefing and oral argument. 2015 WL 1941331, at *17. 

Indeed, in deciding JPMC, the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of New York “denied as 

moot” additional discovery motions related to the ’084 

patent. Id. Although the district court has not yet entered its judgment on IV’s claims, it has nothing left to 

resolve absent a reversal and remand on appeal. Because

this particular issue “has reached such a stage that [the 

district court would] see[] no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again,’” the JPMC court’s order 

meets the finality requirement under Fourth Circuit 

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INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE 9

precedent. Swentek, 830 F.2d at 561 (citation omitted). 

Thus, we conclude that collateral estoppel attaches as a 

result of the JPMC court’s partial summary judgment 

order invalidating the ’084 patent. 

C 

The Fourth Circuit reviews the grant or denial of 

summary judgment de novo. Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 

817. Patent eligibility under § 101 is an issue of law that 

we review without deference. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patent-eligible 

subject matter as follows: “Whoever invents or discovers 

any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 

composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to 

the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. 

§ 101. In interpreting this statutory provision, the Supreme Court has held that its broad language is subject to 

an implicit exception for “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,” which are not patentable. Alice 

Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).

To determine whether the exception applies, the Supreme Court has set forth a two-step inquiry. Specifically, a court must determine: (1) whether the claim is

directed to a patent-ineligible concept, i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea; and if so, 

(2) whether the elements of the claim, considered “both 

individually and ‘as an ordered combination,’” add enough 

to “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patenteligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative 

Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297–98 

(2012)). Applying this two-step inquiry to claims challenged under the abstract idea exception, we typically 

refer to step one as the “abstract idea” step and step two 

as the “inventive concept” step. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC 

v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 

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Under the “abstract idea” step we evaluate “the ‘focus 

of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if 

the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded 

subject matter.” Id. If the claim is directed to a patentineligible concept, we proceed to the “inventive concept” 

step. For that step we “look with more specificity at what 

the claim elements add, in order to determine ‘whether 

they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of 

the ineligible subject matter’ to which the claim is directed.” Id. at 1258 (quoting Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom 

S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 

On appeal, IV challenges the district court’s determinations that the ’081 and ’002 patents fail under step one 

and step two of Alice under § 101.

THE ’081 PATENT

The ’081 patent consists of twenty-nine claims relating to methods, systems, and apparatuses for dynamically 

managing eXtensible Markup Language (“XML”) data. 

XML is a specialized mark-up computer language developed in the mid-1990s that defines a set of rules for 

encoding documents in both a human- and machinereadable format. J.A. 663–64. Given this unique encoding, XML documents have specific format requirements 

for the data contained in the document, and tags that 

define what data the system stores at each position within 

an XML document. See J.A. 895 (discussing the use of 

nested structures to preserve the relationship of data 

within a given XML document). The ’081 patent explains 

that companies frequently use XML documents to publish 

various types of information that customers and partners

use, such as invoices, purchase orders, and price lists. 

Because XML users can create their own unique formats

using these XML rules, not all formats are compatible. 

Therefore, companies attempting to share these types of 

XML documents may find them incompatible with their 

own XML formats. Resolving this conflict, the ’081 patent 

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INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE 11

contends, was a difficult task that required specialized 

programming skills to manipulate and transfer XML 

documents into the desired format.

Thus, the ’081 patent identified what its inventor perceived as a need to “allow[] the user to view and update 

XML documents in different formats, and allow[] the user 

to manipulate the data and perform actions without 

programming skills.” ’081 patent col. 1 ll. 45–48. To 

fulfill this need, the patent describes presenting the user 

with a second document—the “dynamic document”—

which is based upon data extracted from the original XML 

document. According to the patent, the user can then 

make changes to the data displayed in the dynamic document and the changes will be dynamically propagated 

back into the original XML document (despite the 

acknowledged compatibility problems with such documents). Viewed within this framework, we turn to the 

specific language of the claims. For convenience, we 

reproduce claim 21 below.4 

21. An apparatus for manipulating XML documents, comprising:

a processor;

a component that organizes data components of 

one or more XML documents into data objects;

a component that identifies a plurality of primary 

record types for the XML documents;

 

4 Although IV did not expressly concede that claim 

21 is representative of the claimed invention, it acknowledged that the invention “is memorialized in [this claim].” 

Appellants’ Br. 11. Accordingly, we conclude that claim 

21 is representative. See also J.A. 12 (asserting that the 

parties agreed that claim 21 is representative). 

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a component that maps the data components of 

each data object to one of the plurality of primary 

record types;

a component that organizes the instances of the 

plurality of primary record types into a hierarchy 

to form a management record type;

a component that defines a dynamic document for 

display of an instance of a management record 

type through a user interface; and

a component that detects modification of the data 

in the dynamic document via the user interface, 

and in response thereto modifies a data component in an XML document.

’081 patent col. 20 ll. 43–61.

In short, the ’081 patent concerns a system and method for editing XML documents. Stripped of excess verbiage, the claim creates the dynamic document based upon 

“management record types” (“MRTs”) and “primary record 

types” (“PRTs”). The inventor coined these terms to 

describe the organizational structure of the data at issue. 

A PRT is a simple data structure that contains unspecified data extracted from XML documents and an MRT is 

merely a collection of PRTs. ’081 patent col. 2 ll. 5–12. A 

user interface then displays the dynamic document to the 

user to permit the user to make modifications to the 

document. In response to these changes made to the 

dynamic document, the system somehow modifies the

underlying XML document. 

1 

We find that, under step one, the claims of the ’081 

patent are abstract. We conclude that the patent claims 

are, at their core, directed to the abstract idea of collecting, displaying, and manipulating data. 

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We have held other patent claims ineligible under 

§ 101 for reciting similar data manipulation steps. For 

instance, in Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass’n, we held the concept of 

“1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the 

collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a 

memory” abstract. 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

In particular, the invention there involved extracting data 

from a document, entering the data into appropriate data 

fields, and storing the data in memory. Id. at 1345. In 

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 

we concluded that customizing information and presenting it to users based on particular characteristics is abstract as well. 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015)

(“Intellectual Ventures I”). And in Electric Power Group, 

we explained that an invention directed to collection, 

manipulation, and display of data was an abstract process. 830 F.3d at 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the ’081 

patent’s concept related to the collection, display, and 

manipulation of data is similarly abstract. 

According to IV, the ’081 patent provides a concrete 

solution to a problem in computer programming, i.e., how 

to “dynamically manage multiple sets of XML documents.” Appellants’ Br. 31 (citation omitted). IV maintains that because the invention relates to a specialized

computer language—XML—and renders otherwise incompatible documents compatible through a unique 

dynamic document based on MRTs and PRTs, it is neither

abstract, nor an age-old idea like Alice’s “intermediated 

settlement.” Appellants’ Br. 32 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. 

at 2359). 

IV’s characterization, however, does not change the 

result. Although IV correctly observes that the ’081 

patent applies to XML documents in particular (rather 

than any other type of document), at best, this limits the 

invention to a technological environment for which to 

apply the underlying abstract concept. But such limitaCase: 16-1077 Document: 72-2 Page: 13 Filed: 03/07/2017
14 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE

tions do not make an abstract concept any less abstract 

under step one. Intellectual Ventures I, 792 F.3d at 1366. 

As the specification recognizes, companies have frequently employed XML documents in routine business transactions. ’081 patent col. 1 ll. 28–36. Thus, the patent’s

recitation of XML documents specifically, does little more 

than restrict the invention’s field of use. Such limitations 

do not render an otherwise abstract concept any less 

abstract. Affinity, 838 F.3d at 1259. 

IV’s identification of the ’081 patent’s specific data 

structures and objects (PRTs and MRTs) also does not 

change our analysis under this step. In particular, IV 

argues that the ’081 patent creates these specific data 

structures to interrelate various XML documents in a 

particular way to ensure compatibility of otherwise incompatible documents. IV maintains that these structures provide a concrete solution through a component 

that detects modifications to the dynamic document and 

in response thereto, propagates those changes back to the 

underlying XML document. We disagree. 

Although these data structures add a degree of particularity to the claims, the underlying concept embodied 

by the limitations merely encompasses the abstract idea 

itself of organizing, displaying, and manipulating data of 

particular documents. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, 

LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]ny novelty in 

implementation of the idea is a factor to be considered 

only in the second step of the Alice analysis.”). The PRTs 

and MRTs are, at bottom, broadly defined labels for 

generic data types that transfer data from one type of 

electronic document to another—here, the so-called dynamic document. The resulting dynamic document, in 

turn, is nothing more than an interface for displaying and 

organizing this underlying data. These features, therefore, do not alter our conclusion that the claimed invention is directed to the abstract concept of collecting, 

displaying, and manipulating data of particular docuCase: 16-1077 Document: 72-2 Page: 14 Filed: 03/07/2017
INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE 15

ments. Having concluded that the invention is drawn to 

an abstract idea, we move to step two. 

2 

In applying step two of the Alice analysis, we “determine whether the claims do significantly more than 

simply describe [the] abstract method” and thus transform the abstract idea into patentable subject matter. 

Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715. We look to see whether 

there are any “additional features” in the claims that 

constitute an “inventive concept,” thereby rendering the 

claims eligible for patenting even if they are directed to 

an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. Those “additional features” must be more than “well-understood, 

routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298. 

With regard to the claims at issue, we perceive no “inventive concept” that transforms the abstract idea of 

collecting, displaying, and manipulating XML data into a 

patent-eligible application of that abstract idea. Rather, 

the claims recite both a generic computer element—a 

processor—and a series of generic computer “components” 

that merely restate their individual functions—i.e., organizing, mapping, identifying, defining, detecting, and 

modifying. That is to say, they merely describe the functions of the abstract idea itself, without particularity. 

This is simply not enough under step two. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715–16 (holding the claims insufficient to 

supply an inventive concept because they did not “do 

significantly more than simply describe [the] abstract 

method,” but rather are simply “conventional steps, 

specified at a high level of generality”) (quoting Alice, 134 

S. Ct. at 2357). 

IV argues that the ’081 patent claims, however, unconventionally improve a technological process. The 

claims, according to IV, specify how to manage and modify 

XML documents of varying formats and syntax in a way 

that departed from convention. It argues that the patent 

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accomplishes this by creating a “dynamic document” 

based upon the MRTs and PRTs, so the system can modify multiple sets of XML data components at once through 

a user interface. We conclude, however, that these data 

structures do not sufficiently transform the abstract 

concept into a patentable invention under step two. In 

particular, the MRTs and PRTs—although technical 

sounding—include generic data types for which the system can store the extracted data. See ’081 patent col. 2 

ll. 4–9 (“A PRT is similar to a relational database table; 

they contain most of the data. An MRT includes a grouping of PRTs; they contain pointers to individual PRT 

records and some calculated data.”). Indeed, as the district court observed, IV set forth particular definitions for 

these terms that describe them as generic data structures. 

See J.A. 29–30 (defining a PRT as “a data type that defines a data structure to contain data extracted from XML 

documents” and MRT as “a data type that defines a 

collection of primary records types”). The mere fact that 

the inventor applied coined labels to conventional structures does not make the underlying concept inventive. 

See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352 n.2, 2360 (finding the

claims abstract despite the recitation of technicalsounding names such as “shadow credit record[s]” and 

“shadow debit record[s]”). And the recited dynamic document provides little more than an unspecified set of rules 

for displaying and organizing MRTs in a user interface

akin to the generic interfaces we have elsewhere explained impart no inventive concept. See, e.g., Intellectual 

Ventures I, 792 F.3d at 1370 (finding that the recited 

“interactive interface” was not a “specific application of 

the abstract idea that provides an inventive concept”); 

Affinity, 838 F.3d at 1262 (characterizing a “graphical 

user interface” as a “generic feature” of the invention). 

IV next submits that the specific combination of 

PRTs, MRTs, and a dynamic document overcomes the 

previous problem of the “incompatibility of XML docuCase: 16-1077 Document: 72-2 Page: 16 Filed: 03/07/2017
INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE 17

ments with different ‘XML syntax[es]’ and different ‘XML 

formats, relational database schemes, and messages 

formats.’” Appellants’ Br. 40 (citing J.A. 168, 1388). In 

particular, IV argues that the claims set forth a unique 

solution to a problem with contemporary XML documents. 

Id. at 45. But the claims do not recite particular features 

to yield these advantages. Although the claims purport to 

modify the underlying XML document in response to 

modifications made in the dynamic document, this merely 

reiterates the patent’s stated goal itself. Nothing in the 

claims indicate what steps are undertaken to overcome 

the stated incompatibility problems with XML documents 

to propagate those modifications into the XML document. 

Indeed, the claim language here provides only a resultoriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it. Our law demands more. See Elec. 

Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356 (cautioning against claims 

“so result focused, so functional, as to effectively cover any 

solution to an identified problem”).

In sum, evaluating these claimed elements either individually or as an ordered combination, we conclude that 

they recite no more than routine steps of data collection 

and organization using generic computer components and 

conventional computer data processing activities. Although this patent purports to have met a need in the art 

to “allow[] the user to view and update XML documents in 

different formats, and . . . manipulate the data and perform actions without programming skills,” the claims 

recite nothing inventive or transformative to achieve this 

stated goal. ’081 patent col. 1 ll. 45–48. Thus, taken 

individually or in combination, the recited limitations 

neither improve the functions of the computer itself, nor 

provide specific programming, tailored software, or meaningful guidance for implementing the abstract concept. 

Alice, 134 S. Ct at 2359. Accordingly, they do not meaningfully limit the claims to provide the requisite inventive 

concept under step two. 

Case: 16-1077 Document: 72-2 Page: 17 Filed: 03/07/2017
18 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE

We conclude, therefore, that the asserted claims of the 

’081 patent do not meet the standard for eligibility under 

§ 101 and affirm the district court’s entry of summary 

judgment. 

THE ’002 PATENT

Turning to the ’002 patent, IV appeals the district 

court’s finding on summary judgment of ineligible subject 

matter under § 101. We provided a separate analysis of 

this patent in our opinion in the companion appeal. See

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., Nos. 

2015-1128, -1129, -1132, slip op. at 22–27 (Fed. Cir. 

March 7, 2017) (affirming the district court’s dismissal 

under Rule 12 for reciting patent-ineligible subject matter). Because nothing in the record before us here leads 

us to conclude otherwise, we affirm the district court’s 

entry of summary judgment of ineligibility of the asserted 

claims on the basis of our findings and conclusions in our 

opinion for that appeal. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 16-1077 Document: 72-2 Page: 18 Filed: 03/07/2017