Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-01731/USCOURTS-ca7-13-01731-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darryl Rollins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-1731

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DARRYL ROLLINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 10-CR-186 — Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 2, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 29, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER, FLAUM,

EASTERBROOK, KANNE, ROVNER, WILLIAMS, SYKES, and

HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Darryl Rollins pleaded guilty to selling crack cocaine and was sentenced to 84 months in prison. 

This is our second time hearing his appeal. He challenges the 

calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range—specifically, 

the district court’s application of the career-offender guideline, which assigns a higher offense level if the defendant 

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has two prior convictions for a “crime of violence.” See 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). The term “crime of violence” includes

“any offense ... that ... is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or 

extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2014) (emphasis added). The 

highlighted text is known as the residual clause.

The district judge classified Rollins as a career offender 

based in part on a prior conviction for possession of a 

sawed-off shotgun, a crime that qualifies (if at all) only 

under the residual clause of this definition. In United States v. 

Miller, we held that possession of a short-barreled shotgun is 

not a predicate “violent felony” under the identically 

phrased residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act 

(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 721 F.3d 435, 437 (7th Cir. 

2013). In the first go-round on this appeal, Rollins argued 

that because the two residual clauses are the same, Miller

controls, notwithstanding application note 1 to § 4B1.2, 

which specifically lists possession of a sawed-off shotgun as 

a predicate crime of violence. A panel of the court rejected 

this argument based on United States v. Raupp, which holds

that that the application note’s list of qualifying crimes is a 

valid interpretation of the guideline’s residual clause.

677 F.3d 756, 758–60 (7th Cir. 2012).

In the meantime, the government changed its position on 

two key questions lurking in the background: (1) Does the 

Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States, 

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), apply to the residual clause in the 

career-offender guideline; and (2) should United States v. 

Tichenor, 683 F.3d 358 (7th Cir. 2012), be overruled? Johnson 

invalidated the ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally 

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No. 13-1731 3

vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2563. Although Johnson logically applies 

to the mirror-image residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2), our 

decision in Tichenor categorically forecloses vagueness 

challenges to the Guidelines. 683 F.3d at 364–65. The government previously invoked Tichenor, and Rollins did not 

ask the court to revisit and overrule it.

After the panel issued its opinion, however, the government reversed course and now argues that Tichenor should 

be overruled and that Johnson’s constitutional holding 

applies to the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2). In light of the 

government’s concession, the panel vacated its opinion and 

granted rehearing.

In a separate decision also issued today, the en banc 

court overrules Tichenor and holds that under Johnson, the 

residual clause in the career-offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Hurlburt, Nos. 14-3611 & 

15-1686 (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 2016). That decision undermines

Raupp’s rationale and is decisive here. Application note 1 has 

no legal force independent of the guideline itself; the note’s

list of qualifying crimes is valid (or not) only as an interpretation of § 4B1.2. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 41–42

(1993). More to the point, when the Sentencing Commission 

says in application note 1 that possession of a sawed-off 

shotgun is a crime of violence, it is interpreting the residual

clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2); no other part of the crime-of-violence 

definition applies. That was the basic premise of Raupp, 

which addressed the inchoate crime of conspiracy, another

offense on the application note’s list. 677 F.3d at 757–60.

But the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is invalid, so 

Raupp’s premise no longer holds. The panel circulated a new

opinion to the full court proposing to overrule Raupp. See 

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7TH CIR. R. 40(e). An en banc vote followed, and the court 

approved, making this the opinion of the full court. See 

Buchmeier v. United States, 581 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 2009) (using 

the same procedure). Accordingly, we now vacate Rollins’s 

sentence and remand for resentencing.

I. Background

Rollins sold crack cocaine to confidential informants on 

four separate occasions in 2009 and 2010, and these sales led 

to his eventual indictment on four counts of drug distribution. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The government initially 

sought a statutory sentencing enhancement, see id. § 851, 

based on Rollins’s 2005 Wisconsin felony drug conviction. 

Pursuant to plea negotiations, Rollins pleaded guilty to two 

counts and agreed for purposes of sentencing that he was 

responsible for the drug quantities involved in the other two 

sales. In exchange the government dropped the two remaining counts and withdrew its request for the § 851 enhancement.

Rollins’s presentence report initially calculated a Guidelines sentencing range of 188–235 months based on an 

adjusted offense level of 31 and criminal history category VI. 

To reach this offense level, the probation officer classified 

Rollins as a career offender, which gave him a base offense 

level of 34, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(2), then deducted three 

points for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1. The 

career-offender guideline assigns higher base offense levels

if the defendant has “at least two prior felony convictions of 

either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.”

§ 4B1.1(a). A “crime of violence” is defined as:

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any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year, that—

(1) has as an element the use, attempted 

use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another, or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another.

§ 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). Subsection (1) is sometimes 

called the “elements” clause; the highlighted text in subsection (2) is the residual clause.

Rollins’s 2005 drug conviction supplied the first predicate for the career-offender designation. Rollins also has a

prior conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun, see

WIS. STAT. § 941.28, and application note 1 to § 4B1.2 lists this 

offense as a qualifying crime of violence: “For purposes of 

this guideline[,] ... [u]nlawfully possessing a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (e.g., a sawed-off shotgun or 

sawed-off rifle, silencer, bomb, or machine gun) is a ‘crime of 

violence.’” The judge accordingly accepted the probation 

officer’s recommendation and classified Rollins as a career 

offender.

Rollins initially faced a mandatory five years in prison 

and a maximum term of 40 years, but the Fair Sentencing 

Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, reduced the 

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statutory range to no minimum and a 20-year maximum.1

The Act also reduced the statutory minimum term of supervised release from four years to three; the government 

alerted the judge to this change.

By reducing the maximum prison term, the Fair Sentencing Act also affected the sentencing range under the Guidelines. Rollins’s adjusted offense level dropped from 31 to 29, 

which reduced the Guidelines range to 151–188 months. The 

parties agreed that this was the correct range. Without the 

career-offender designation, the Guidelines range drops to 

130–162 months.

Regarding the recommended term of supervised release, 

although the government had alerted the court to the Act’s 

reduction in the statutory minimum, no one told the judge 

that the recommended term of supervised release under the 

Guidelines was now three years rather than four to five 

years.

At sentencing the government recommended a belowGuidelines sentence of 87 months based on Rollins’s substantial assistance, see U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, and in recognition of 

the 18 months he had spent in state custody. Rollins argued 

for a 57-month sentence. The judge imposed a sentence of 

84 months in prison and four years of supervised release.

Rollins appealed, arguing that the judge improperly applied the career-offender guideline and misapprehended the 

effect of the Fair Sentencing Act on the recommended term 

of supervised release under the Guidelines. His first argu-

 1 Under Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012), the Fair Sentencing 

Act applies retroactively to Rollins.

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No. 13-1731 7

ment hinged on our decision in Miller, which held that 

possession of a sawed-off shotgun is not a predicate violent 

felony under the ACCA’s residual clause. 721 F.3d at 437. 

Because the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) mirrors the 

residual clause in the ACCA, Rollins urged us to apply 

Miller to the career-offender guideline, notwithstanding 

application note 1. That is, he asked us to disregard the 

application note because it contradicted the text of the 

residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2).

After the panel heard argument, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Johnson invalidating the ACCA’s residual 

clause on vagueness grounds. 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The panel

ordered supplemental briefing to address the effect of 

Johnson on this case. The government argued that Tichenor

blocked application of Johnson to the career-offender guideline. See Tichenor, 683 F.3d at 364 (holding that the Guidelines are not susceptible to vagueness challenges). Rollins 

did not ask the court to revisit Tichenor, so we set aside the 

question of Johnson’s effect on § 4B1.2(a)(2).

With Johnson out of the picture, the outcome of the appeal turned on Raupp. There we held that the Sentencing 

Commission is “free to go its own way” when classifying

offenses as crimes of violence under the career-offender 

guideline’s residual clause, and this was so even if the same 

crime doesn’t qualify as a predicate under the parallel 

residual clause in the ACCA. Raupp, 677 F.3d at 760–61. 

Applying Raupp, the panel rejected Rollins’s argument under 

Miller. However, because the parties agreed that the judge 

misunderstood the recommended term of supervised release, the panel remanded to permit the judge to reconsider 

that part of the sentence.

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Rollins quickly petitioned for rehearing, noting that in 

the meantime the government had changed its position on 

both Tichenor and Johnson’s effect on the career-offender 

guideline. The Assistant U.S. Attorney acknowledged the 

government’s about-face and agreed that he should have 

notified us of this development sooner. The parties now 

agree that Tichenor should be overruled and that Johnson’s 

holding applies to the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2). Accordingly, the panel vacated its decision and granted rehearing to address these questions and whether Raupp remains 

viable. As we’ve noted, an en banc vote followed, and this 

opinion has been adopted by the en banc court.2

II. Discussion

In a separate opinion issued today, the en banc court

overrules Tichenor and applies Johnson’s constitutional 

holding to the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2). United States v. 

Hurlburt, Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 2016).

That decision settles the lion’s share of this appeal. The 

residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, and Rollins’s 

conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun is not a 

crime of violence under any other part of the definition in 

§ 4B1.2(a). That is, it doesn’t qualify under the “elements” 

clause in subsection (1), and it’s not one of the specific 

crimes listed in subsection (2). The only question is whether 

this conviction counts as a predicate crime of violence based 

on the application note alone. On a proper understanding of 

 2 District Judge J. Phil Gilbert, of the Southern District of Illinois, served 

on the original panel, sitting by designation. We appreciate his willingness to assist the court.

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No. 13-1731 9

the role that application notes play, this question virtually 

answers itself. 

We begin with the Supreme Court’s decision in Stinson, 

which explained the “three varieties” of text in the Guidelines Sentencing Manual. 508 U.S. at 41. The first variety “is a 

guideline provision itself.” Id. These “are the equivalent of 

legislative rules adopted by federal agencies.” Id. at 45. The 

Guidelines (and any amendments) must be submitted to 

Congress “for a 6-month period of review, during which 

Congress can modify or disapprove them.” Id. at 41. 

The second variety of text in the Sentencing Manual consists of the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements, 

which have much the same effect as the Guidelines themselves. See id. at 41–42 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)). The third 

variety is the Commission’s commentary; these “application 

notes” interpret the Guidelines and explain how they are to 

be applied. Id. at 42. The application notes thus are the

agency’s interpretation of its own legislative rules and under 

Stinson get Auer deference. Id. at 44; Raupp, 677 F.3d at 758 

(citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997)). Under 

this form of deference, an application note has “controlling 

weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with” 

the text of the guideline it interprets. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 45 

(quotation marks omitted).

In short, the application notes are interpretations of, not

additions to, the Guidelines themselves; an application note

has no independent force. Accordingly, the list of qualifying 

crimes in application note 1 to § 4B1.2 is enforceable only as 

an interpretation of the definition of the term “crime of 

violence” in the guideline itself. More specifically, the Sentencing Commission has interpreted the residual clause in 

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§ 4B1.2(a)(2) to include the specific crimes listed in application note 1. That interpretation is entitled to Auer deference, 

as we recognized in Raupp. But the note has no legal force

standing alone. It follows, then, that because the residual 

clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutional, the application

note’s list of qualifying crimes is inoperable and cannot be 

the basis for applying the career-offender enhancement.

The government suggests that we can read the list as a

freestanding interpretation of the term “crime of violence.” 

That argument cannot be squared with Stinson. “Crime of 

violence” is a defined term in the career-offender guideline.

Under § 4B1.2(a), “crime of violence” means subpart 1 (the 

elements clause) and subpart 2 (the four specific crimes 

followed by the residual clause). If the application note’s list 

is not interpreting one of those two subparts—and it isn’t 

once the residual clause drops out—then it is in effect adding

to the definition. And that’s necessarily inconsistent with the 

text of the guideline itself.

Indeed, the First Circuit has recently rejected the government’s argument that the note independently supports 

application of the career-offender enhancement. See United 

States v. Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2016) (“There is 

simply no mechanism or textual hook in the [g]uideline that 

allows us to import offenses not specifically listed therein 

into § 4B1.2(a)’s definition of ‘crime of violence.’ With no 

such path available ... , doing so would be inconsistent with 

the text of the [g]uideline.”). We think that court has it 

exactly right.

Because the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague, our holding in Raupp has lost its tether to the 

text of the career-offender guideline. In Raupp we upheld the 

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defendant’s career-offender designation based on a prior 

conviction for a different crime on the application note’s list: 

the inchoate crime of conspiracy. 677 F.3d at 757–60. We held 

that the note’s list of qualifying crimes was a valid interpretation of § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause, which was otherwise 

silent on the subject. Id. at 759 (“There cannot be a conflict

[between the note and the guideline] because the text of 

§ 4B1.2(a) does not tell us, one way or another, whether 

inchoate offenses are included or excluded. The note says 

they are included.”).

But Raupp was decided before Johnson, and the prevailing 

understanding at the time was that the residual clauses in

both the statute and the guideline had some kernel of meaning despite the judiciary’s persistent struggle to settle on a 

coherent and consistent construction. That permitted us to 

defer to the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of the 

guideline’s residual clause in application note 1. The prevailing understanding has now changed. Because Raupp’s 

premise has been undone by intervening legal developments, it is overruled.

To sum up, application note 1 is enforceable only as an 

interpretation of the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2); it has no 

independent legal force. The residual clause is invalid, and 

the application note’s list of qualifying crimes cannot alone 

supply the basis for a career-offender designation. Rollins’s 

conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun doesn’t 

qualify as a crime of violence under any other part of the 

definition. He was wrongly classified as a career offender.

Our final question is one of remedy. The career-offender 

error produced a Guidelines range that was too high. The 

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case is before us on plain-error review; we may correct a 

forfeited error if it is (1) “plain”; (2) affects the defendant’s 

“substantial rights”; and (3) “seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.” 

Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126–27 (2013)

(quotation marks omitted). Rollins was sentenced before 

Johnson upended the controlling law, but it’s enough that the 

error is “plain” at the time of appellate review. Id. at 1130.

That leaves the question of prejudice. To establish that 

the error affected his substantial rights, Rollins must show 

“a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome 

of the proceeding would have been different.” MolinaMartinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). As in Hurlburt, the question of 

prejudice in this case is informed by the Supreme Court’s 

recent decision in Molina-Martinez. There the Court explained that “[w]hen a defendant is sentenced under an 

incorrect Guidelines range[,] ... the error itself can, and most 

often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a 

different outcome absent the error.” Id. at 1345 (emphasis 

added). Rollins’s 84-month sentence is well below the original Guidelines range because he received credit for his 

substantial assistance to the government, and it remains 

below the correctly calculated range once the career-offender 

error is removed. Still, “[w]hen a district court incorrectly 

calculates the [G]uideline[s] range, we normally presume the 

improperly calculated [G]uideline[s] range influenced the 

judge’s choice of sentence, unless he says otherwise.” United 

States v. Adams, 746 F.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2014). Nothing in 

the record suggests that the normal presumption should not 

apply here.

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Before concluding, we note that the Sentencing Commission has amended the Guidelines to delete § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s 

residual clause in light of Johnson. 81 Fed. Reg. 4741, 4742 

(2016). The amendment, which became effective on August 1, 2016, also moves specific crimes from the application 

note’s list to the text of the guideline itself. The amended 

guideline now reads, in relevant part: “The term ‘crime of 

violence’ means ... murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, 

arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of a firearm 

described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material as 

defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).” 81 Fed. Reg. 4741, 4742 (2016 

(emphasis added). (Recall that § 5845(a) covers possession of 

a sawed-off shotgun.) The amendment doesn’t resolve this 

case, but it substantially clarifies future applications of the 

career-offender guideline.

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE Rollins’s sentence 

and REMAND for resentencing.3

 3 On remand the district court will have the opportunity to correct the 

error regarding the recommended term of supervised release.

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