Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-19-01326/USCOURTS-ca3-19-01326-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerry Fruit
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 19-1038

___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

TYKEI GARNER,

Appellant

___________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1-16-cr-00341-002)

District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III

___________

No. 19-1326

___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JERRY FRUIT,

Appellant

___________

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On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1-16-cr-00341-001)

District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III

___________

Argued January 14, 2020

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS, Circuit 

Judges.

(Filed:May 29, 2020)

John F. Yaninek [Argued]

Thomas Thomas & Hafer

305 North Front Street

6th Floor

Harrisburg, PA 17101

Attorney for Appellant Tykei Garner

Keith M. Donoghue [Argued]

Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District 

of Pennsylvania

601 Walnut Street

The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Attorney for Appellant Jerry Fruit

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David J. Freed

Scott R. Ford [Argued]

Office of United States Attorney

Middle District of Pennsylvania

228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754

220 Federal Building and Courthouse

Harrisburg, PA 17108

Attorney for Appellee United States of America

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

These consolidated appeals require us to determine 

whether a Pennsylvania state trooper unlawfully prolonged a 

traffic stop. Appellants Jerry Fruit and Tykei Garner challenge 

the District Court’s denial of their joint motion to suppress 

evidence, claiming the traffic stop violated their Fourth 

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. 

Garner also claims the District Court erred when it allowed the 

Government to use his prior drug conviction as Rule 404(b) 

evidence. Finally, Garner contends the evidence was 

insufficient to convict him of a conspiracy to distribute heroin 

and cocaine. We will affirm.

I

On July 5, 2016, Pennsylvania State Trooper Kent 

Ramirez stopped a car with a New York license plate for 

speeding on Interstate 81 near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Prior 

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to the stop, Trooper Ramirez ran the license plate and learned

the car was owned by Enterprise Rent-A-Car, though it lacked 

the typical bar code rental stickers. 

The entire traffic stop was recorded on Trooper 

Ramirez’s dashcam. When Ramirez approached the passenger 

side of the vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of air freshener 

and noticed that each vent had an air freshener clipped to it. 

Ramirez identified himself, asked for the driver’s license, and 

explained that the driver was going 75 miles per hour in an area 

with a posted speed limit of 55. Because traffic was noisy, 

Ramirez asked the driver to exit the vehicle so they could talk 

on the side of the road.

The driver identified himself as Jerry Fruit and gave 

Ramirez his driver’s license and rental car agreement. In 

response to an inquiry from Ramirez, Fruit said he was 

traveling from Manhattan to Hagerstown, Maryland to visit his 

cousin for about two days. He also identified his passenger, 

Tykei Garner, as his cousin. The rental agreement listed Fruit 

as the authorized driver of the vehicle, but limited to the state 

of New York. And the agreement stated that it covered a rental 

period of June 11–15, so it appeared to have expired twenty 

days before the traffic stop. When Ramirez asked about that 

discrepancy, Fruit explained that he was in a car accident, his 

car had been in the shop for a month, and the rental agreement 

was through his insurance company.

Before he returned to his cruiser to run Fruit’s license 

and contact Enterprise about the status of Fruit’s rental 

contract, Trooper Ramirez asked Fruit a series of questions 

about his employment, prior traffic tickets, and criminal 

history. Fruit asked Ramirez what these questions had to do 

with his speeding violation, and Ramirez responded that the 

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questions were “part of [his] traffic stop, okay?” App. III, 

Traffic Stop Video at 7:26–7:28.

About six minutes after he stopped the car, Trooper 

Ramirez asked the passenger (Garner) to get out of the car so 

he could question him. Garner responded that Fruit was 

dropping him off in Greencastle, Pennsylvania to visit his 

girlfriend, but said he would return to New York the next day 

to attend a court hearing.

1 He also admitted he had a suspended 

license for failure to pay child support. When Ramirez

continued to ask him about his criminal history, Garner added 

that he had been arrested for fighting. Garner also clarified that 

Fruit was not his biological relative, though he considered him

family. As with Fruit, Ramirez asked Garner questions 

unrelated to the traffic stop, including about his criminal 

history. 

Twelve minutes into the traffic stop, Trooper Ramirez

returned to his vehicle to check with Enterprise on the status of 

the rental agreement and to verify Fruit’s and Garner’s driving 

records and criminal histories. Ramirez later explained at the 

suppression hearing that he had to input their information into 

his computer manually, which could take between twelve to 

fifteen minutes for two people. Ramirez learned from the 

computer search that neither Fruit nor Garner had any 

outstanding warrants, although Fruit was on supervised release

1 The District Court found that Garner said they would 

be returning for court the next day while Fruit said he was 

going to Maryland for about two days. That finding is clearly 

erroneous. When Ramirez asked Garner if they were coming 

back together, Garner said: “Actually, I have to go to court” for

“child support. . . . Headed back tomorrow, hopefully.” Traffic 

Stop Video at 9:37–9:46 (emphasis added).

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for a federal crime. He also learned that both men had extensive 

criminal records, including drug and weapons crimes. Ramirez

then called the Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center, 

which reported that both men had been subjects of high 

intensity drug trafficking area investigations. Finally, 

Enterprise confirmed that Fruit had extended the rental 

agreement beyond the listed expiration date. 

After learning all these things, Trooper Ramirez

resolved to ask permission to search the vehicle but waited for 

backup before doing so. The backup officer, Trooper Severin 

Thierwechter, arrived 37 minutes into the stop, at about 9:29 

pm. Trooper Ramirez then asked Fruit if he could search the 

car, but Fruit declined. Ramirez responded that he had “enough 

to believe that there may be criminal activity going on.” Traffic 

Stop Video at 37:55–37:59. Ramirez then advised Fruit that he 

was calling for a K-9 unit and Fruit was not free to leave. At 

9:31 p.m., Ramirez called for a K-9 unit, and Trooper John 

Mearkle arrived with dog Zigi 17 minutes later—56 minutes 

into the stop. Ramirez told Mearkle that he suspected criminal 

conduct because Fruit and Garner gave “conflicting stories,” 

had “long criminal histories,” and were “very nervous.” Traffic 

Stop Video at 58:33–58:45. When Mearkle brought Zigi to the 

car, Zigi alerted twice at the passenger side door. Zigi then

entered the vehicle and alerted in the back seat and trunk. The 

troopers searched the car themselves and found bags 

containing 300 grams of cocaine and 261 grams of heroin in 

the trunk. So they arrested Fruit and Garner. 

Fruit and Garner were indicted for conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine and possession with 

intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. They moved to suppress 

the evidence seized during the traffic stop, arguing that they 

were seized in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights 

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because Trooper Ramirez extended the traffic stop longer than 

was necessary to issue the speeding ticket and lacked 

reasonable suspicion to engage in the ensuing criminal 

investigation. The District Court denied their motion, ruling 

that Trooper Ramirez had “an escalating degree of reasonable 

suspicion” that justified extending the stop. Fruit App. 26.

In 2018, Fruit pleaded guilty to both counts under a plea 

agreement preserving his right to appeal the denial of his 

motion to suppress. Garner was convicted of both counts by a 

jury. Garner moved for judgment of acquittal and a new trial, 

which the District Court denied. The Court sentenced Fruit and 

Garner each to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’ 

imprisonment with both counts to run concurrently. They 

appealed and we consolidated their cases for argument and 

disposition.

II

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 

3231 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 

U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review the District Court’s factual 

findings in support of its order denying the motion to suppress

for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. United 

States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2012). Because 

the District Court denied the suppression motion, we view the 

facts in the light most favorable to the Government. United 

States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002).

III

We begin by addressing Fruit and Garner’s argument 

that the District Court erred when it denied their motion to 

suppress evidence. Trooper Ramirez paced Fruit driving 75 

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miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, so there is no dispute 

that the initial traffic stop was lawful. The question here is 

whether it became unlawful because it was “prolonged beyond 

the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission.” 

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). 

The Supreme Court has stated that the Fourth 

Amendment allows an officer to conduct unrelated 

investigations that do not lengthen a roadside detention. 

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). But if these 

investigations “measurably extend the duration of the stop,” 

the seizure becomes unlawful unless otherwise supported by 

reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Id. at 333 (internal 

citation omitted). The lawful seizure “ends when tasks tied to 

the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—

completed.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354

(2015) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 

(1985)).

Rodriguez is the precedent most relevant to this appeal. 

There, K-9 officer Morgan Struble stopped Rodriguez for 

driving erratically. 575 U.S. at 351. After Struble checked 

Rodriguez’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, he

returned to the car, asked for the passenger’s license, and 

questioned the occupants about their travel plans. Id. Struble

ran the passenger’s license, found no outstanding warrants or 

other problems, and called for backup. He returned the 

documents to Rodriguez and the passenger and completed the 

traffic stop by issuing Rodriguez a written warning. But instead 

of sending Rodriguez on his way, Struble asked permission to 

walk his dog around the vehicle. Id. at 352. When Rodriguez

refused, Struble ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle while 

he waited for backup. After the second officer arrived, Struble

then searched the car and the dog alerted to the presence of 

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drugs some seven or eight minutes after he issued the written 

warning to Rodriguez. Id.

The Supreme Court held that an officer may not extend 

the stop to conduct a dog sniff unless there is reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity beyond the traffic violation. Id. 

at 357–58. It observed that an officer’s mission when making 

a traffic stop includes determining “whether to issue a traffic 

ticket” and making “‘ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic 

stop.’” Id. at 355 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408). A dog 

sniff aimed at “detecting evidence of ordinary criminal 

wrongdoing” unrelated to the stop “is not fairly characterized 

as part of the officer’s traffic mission.” Id. at 355–56 (internal 

citation, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). 

A

This Court has issued two opinions in the wake of 

Rodriguez: United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2018), 

and United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2018). In 

Clark, we held a lawful traffic stop was unlawfully extended

when an officer began unreasonably questioning a driver about 

his criminal history after tasks tied to the mission of the traffic 

stop “reasonably should have been[] completed.” 902 F.3d at 

410 (internal citation omitted). Although the officer questioned 

the driver for just 20 seconds, we noted that the brevity of the

questioning did not bear on whether the questions were offmission. Id. at 410 n.4.

In Green, we recognized the difficulty in pinpointing

the moment when tasks tied to the traffic stop are completed or 

reasonably should have been completed (what we called the 

“Rodriguez moment”). We also recognized the possibility that 

the Rodriguez moment occurs when an officer no longer 

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pursues the tasks tied to the traffic stop even though he 

reasonably could have continued with those tasks. 897 F.3d at

182 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355) (explaining that an 

officer waiting for backup due to danger inherent in traffic 

stops ordinarily does not measurably prolong the traffic stop

but complexity is added to the analysis when the officer calls

for backup and then does not wait for backup to arrive). Thus, 

we determined in Green that the Rodriguez moment occurred 

no later than when the officer issued the traffic citation, but 

“instructed Green to wait in his car indefinitely.” 897 F.3d at 

181. We also determined that the Rodriguez moment occurred 

at the earliest when the officer pursued an off-mission task by 

making a phone call related to drug trafficking and was “no 

longer concerned with the moving violation.” Id. at 182. Even 

assuming the earlier Rodriguez moment in Green, we still held

the seizure was constitutional because the officer already had 

reasonable suspicion at that point. Id. 

So what tasks ordinarily are tied to the mission of a 

traffic stop? They include: “checking the driver’s license, 

determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the 

driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof 

of insurance.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 (internal citation 

omitted). We have also held that some questions relating to a 

driver’s travel plans ordinarily fall within the scope of the 

traffic stop, as do delays caused by safety concerns related to 

the stop. United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir. 

2003); Clark, 902 F.3d at 410.

To lawfully extend a stop beyond when tasks tied to its 

initial mission are completed or reasonably should have been 

completed, an officer must have an objectively reasonable and 

articulable suspicion that illegal activity had occurred or was 

occurring. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355; Clark, 902 F.3d at 410. 

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In determining whether the officer had reasonable suspicion, 

we consider “the totality of the circumstances—the whole 

picture.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 

This standard requires “considerably less than proof of 

wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” United 

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), but requires more than 

a “hunch.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Reasonable 

suspicion depends on both the “information possessed by 

police and its degree of reliability.” Alabama v. White, 496 

U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

B

The District Court denied the motion to suppress in 

2017, before we decided Green and Clark, so it did not 

determine when the “Rodriguez moment” occurred. Instead, it 

found that Trooper Ramirez’s observations throughout the 

traffic stop created an “amalgam of information . . . that

triggered [his] suspicion that a crime was afoot beyond a 

moving violation.” App. 25. 

Our review of the video and audio record leads us to 

conclude that the earliest the Rodriguez moment occurred was 

when Trooper Ramirez began asking Fruit about his 

employment, family, criminal history, and other conduct 

unrelated to the traffic stop. After informing Fruit that he was 

speeding, Ramirez collected Fruit’s driver’s license and rental 

agreement. He noted the rental agreement had expired, but 

Fruit assured him he had extended the rental term. Before he 

returned to his cruiser to investigate the status of Fruit’s rental 

agreement, Ramirez questioned Fruit for five minutes about his 

criminal history. This questioning was not tied to the traffic 

stop’s mission—the speeding violation—because it was 

“aimed at detecting criminal activity more generally.” Green, 

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897 F.3d at 179. But if Trooper Ramirez had reasonable 

suspicion when he began questioning Fruit about his criminal 

history, even if such questioning at that moment measurably 

extended the traffic stop, there is no Fourth Amendment 

violation. 

We hold Trooper Ramirez had reasonable suspicion to 

extend the stop based on information he obtained during the 

first few minutes of the traffic stop and before he engaged in 

any unrelated investigation. So no unlawful extension of the 

traffic stop ever occurred. When Ramirez first spotted the car, 

he noticed it had a New York license plate and appeared to be

a rental car. After learning the vehicle belonged to Enterprise, 

he noticed it did not have the typical bar code stickers on the 

driver’s window or the rear windshield. These observations

aroused his suspicion because, in Ramirez’s experience, rental 

vehicles usually had these stickers unless someone peeled them 

off in violation of a rental agreement.

As Trooper Ramirez approached the vehicle, he smelled 

a strong odor of air freshener and saw air fresheners clipped on 

every vent, which was abnormal in his experience. Ramirez’s 

questions related to the traffic stop revealed that Fruit was 

traveling along I-81 between New York City and Hagerstown, 

which Ramirez knew to be a drug trafficking corridor. Ramirez

also saw that the rental agreement had expired two weeks 

earlier and Fruit seemed extremely nervous throughout the 

stop. In their totality, these factors are sufficient to show that 

Trooper Ramirez’s suspicion of illegal activity was objectively 

reasonable. So he could extend the traffic stop and Fruit and 

Garner were not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

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IV

Fruit also argues that Trooper Ramirez exercised a lack 

of diligence in his stop, rendering it tantamount to an arrest 

requiring probable cause. Fruit contends that Ramirez should 

not have waited for another trooper to arrive before seeking 

consent or calling for a K-9 unit. Instead, Fruit claims Ramirez 

should have called the K-9 unit before he asked Fruit for

permission to search the vehicle. We are unpersuaded.

Fruit correctly notes that a stop must be “sufficiently 

limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an 

investigative seizure.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 

(1983) (plurality opinion). But Trooper Ramirez had 

reasonable suspicion to justify further investigation before he 

even questioned Fruit. And Ramirez explained he called for 

backup before asking to search the vehicle because it was 

starting to get dark, Fruit had a previous firearms offense, and 

he is smaller than Fruit and Garner. He called for backup for 

officer safety, which is consistent with the mission of any 

traffic stop. See Clark, 902 F.3d at 410. As the Supreme Court 

has instructed, “[t]raffic stops are ‘especially fraught with 

danger to police officers,’ . . . so an officer may need to take 

certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete 

his mission safely.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356 (internal 

citations omitted).

In the 25 minutes between Trooper Ramirez’s return to 

his vehicle and Trooper Thierwechter’s arrival, Ramirez not 

only ran Fruit and Garner’s records—which he said could take 

15 minutes or more since the two lived out of state—but also 

made the phone calls to Enterprise and the Pennsylvania 

Criminal Intelligence Center. Ramirez called for backup only

after running Fruit and Garner’s records and making those

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calls. Thierwechter arrived within ten or fifteen minutes, so this 

brief delay burdened Fruit only negligibly. 

Fruit also argues that Trooper Ramirez should have 

called for the K-9 unit before asking for consent to search. But 

this argument fails because we have observed no lack of 

diligence by officers in waiting to call for K-9 units until after 

the suspect has denied consent. See United States v. Frost, 999 

F.2d 737, 742 (3d Cir. 1993). Trooper Ramirez thus acted 

diligently and needed only reasonable suspicion to conduct the 

dog sniff, which he had. See Green, 897 F.3d at 179–80.

V

In addition to adopting Fruit’s unsuccessful arguments, 

Garner raises two additional issues particular to his appeal. The 

first involves the admission of evidence and the second relates 

to his motion for judgment of acquittal. We consider each in 

turn. 

A

At trial, the Government sought to introduce evidence 

of Garner’s 2005 conviction for possession of cocaine, his 

2007 conviction for sale of cocaine, and a pending charge from 

2016 for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. The 

District Court admitted Garner’s 2007 New York City cocaine

trafficking conviction as evidence of knowledge of the cocaine 

in the car and his intent to distribute it. But it did not admit 

Garner’s drug possession charges from 2005 and 2016, 

because they were not relevant to this distribution charge. 

Garner urges us to overturn our precedent that a 

conviction makes “the defendant’s knowledge of the presence 

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of heroin more probable than it would have been without the 

evidence as it indicates that he had knowledge of [the drug 

trade], thus making it less likely that he was in the wrong place 

at the wrong time.” Garner Br. at 20–21 (citing Givan, 320 F.3d

at 461 (admitting a previous cocaine conviction to prove 

knowledge and intent to distribute heroin)). This is a nonstarter 

because only the Court sitting en banc can overturn a prior 

precedent. Joyce v. Maersk Line Ltd., 876 F.3d 502, 508 (3d 

Cir. 2017). 

Garner also argues the District Court’s admission of his 

2007 drug trafficking conviction was error under Rules 403 

and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We review this

decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Butch, 256 

F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001).

Rule 404(b) provides “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or 

other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in 

order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 

accordance with the character.” But that evidence “may be 

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” FED. R. EVID.

404(b)(1)–(2). 

According to Garner, his 2007 drug trafficking 

conviction dealt with different facts than those present in this 

appeal and occurred too long ago to be admissible. He notes 

that his first conviction involved distributing cocaine on a 

street corner while this case involves distributing cocaine and 

heroin in a car. He also argues that a cocaine conviction does 

not prove that he knew what heroin looks like or how it is sold. 

He also contends the District Court failed under Federal Rule 

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of Evidence 403 to properly balance the probative value of the 

evidence against its prejudicial effect. 

We apply a four-part test to determine whether prioracts evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b). United States v. 

Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Huddleston 

v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1988) (discussing the 

four sources protecting against undue prejudice of admitting 

Rule 404(b) evidence). Such evidence is admissible if it is: (1) 

offered for a non-propensity purpose; (2) relevant to that 

identified purpose; (3) sufficiently probative under Rule 403 so 

its probative value is not outweighed by any inherent danger of 

unfair prejudice; and (4) “accompanied by a limiting 

instruction, if requested.” Davis, 726 F.3d at 441. 

Garner’s 2007 conviction showed that he had personal 

knowledge about how to identify cocaine, how to traffic it, and 

how to package, price, and purchase it in New York. If Garner 

had that knowledge, he could purchase and package drugs in 

New York, before transporting them to Hagerstown for sale. 

So his prior conviction showed that Garner had the intent and 

knowledge to sell packaged cocaine in his possession. 

After finding the 2007 cocaine distribution charge

relevant, the District Court then balanced its probative value 

with its prejudicial impact. The Court determined that the

conviction’s probative value outweighed the danger of unfair 

prejudice because intent and knowledge are critical to proving 

a conspiracy. Finally, the Court agreed that it would issue a 

limiting instruction when requested. As a result, the Court 

admitted the 2007 conviction into evidence. 

The Court admitted the 2007 cocaine trafficking 

conviction to prove knowledge of cocaine and how to sell it, 

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not to prove intent and knowledge of packaging heroin. 

Because the Court admitted the evidence only to prove cocaine 

distribution, the difference between the charges on which 

Garner was being tried and his prior conviction would be that 

one took place in a car and the other took place on a street 

corner. This difference would not affect Garner’s knowledge 

of how to identify, package, and sell cocaine. So Garner’s 

argument about the cases’ dissimilarity fails. The District 

Court correctly applied Huddleston and did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting Garner’s cocaine distribution 

conviction with a limiting instruction.

B

Finally, Garner claims the District Court erred when it 

denied his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. He notes 

that “[t]here was no evidence presented at trial that [he and 

Fruit] ever had any communications regarding distribution of 

heroin or cocaine.” Garner Br. 30. That’s true, but immaterial. 

Here, the Government relied on circumstantial evidence to 

prove its case. See, e.g., United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 

132, 160 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 

238 (3d Cir. 2007). Viewing the record, as we must, in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, United States v. Smith, 294 

F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 2002), ample evidence supported 

Garner’s conspiracy conviction.

That evidence included that: (1) Fruit and Garner were 

travelling together from New York City (a known drug hub) to 

Hagerstown (a known drug destination); (2) the rental bar code 

had been removed from the vehicle; (3) air fresheners were 

attached to each air vent; and (4) Trooper Ramirez pulled the 

car over just before 9:00 p.m., with an hour left to reach 

Greencastle, yet Garner said he planned to travel the next day 

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the four hours back to New York for a court hearing. The 

Government also elicited testimony that, despite statements by 

Garner to Trooper Ramirez regarding a court hearing involving 

child support, there was no record of any such hearing 

scheduled in the state of New York involving Garner. Evidence 

at trial also revealed that Garner minimized his criminal history 

when he told Trooper Ramirez that he had been arrested for

fighting while neglecting to mention his extensive history of 

drug possession and trafficking. A rational trier of fact could 

find that Garner lied about his drug history because he knew 

the car contained narcotics. Finally, the two defendants 

traveled with cocaine and heroin worth over $20,000 in their 

car and Garner knew about the cocaine trade.

Viewing this evidence as a whole, a rational juror could 

conclude that Garner agreed with Fruit to possess and 

distribute the heroin and cocaine in the vehicle. So the District 

Court did not err in denying the Rule 29 motion.

* * *

The District Court did not err when it denied Fruit and 

Garner’s joint motion to suppress the evidence of drug 

trafficking seized during the traffic stop. Nor did the Court err 

when it allowed the Government to use Garner’s 2007 drug 

conviction as Rule 404(b) evidence or when it found that the 

Government adduced sufficient evidence to convict Garner of 

conspiring with Fruit to distribute heroin and cocaine. We will 

therefore affirm the judgments of conviction and sentences.

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