Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cr-00649/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cr-00649-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Deandre Snead
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 v. 

DEANDRE SNEAD, 

 Defendant. 

________________________________/ 

No. CR 12-0649 CW 

 

ORDER DENYING 

§ 2255 MOTION 

Movant Deandre Snead, represented by counsel, moves under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. 

Respondent has filed an opposition to the motion and Movant has 

filed a reply.1 Having considered all of the papers filed by the 

parties and the record in this case, the Court DENIES the motion. 

BACKGROUND 

A. Procedural Background 

On December 10, 2012, Movant plead guilty, without a plea 

agreement, to one count of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Applying United 

States Sentencing Guideline (USSG) § 2K2.1(a)(4)(a), the 

Presentence Report (PSR) indicated that Movant’s base offense 

 1 The government has filed a motion to stay the proceedings 

related to this motion pending the resolution of Beckles v. United 

States, Supreme Court Case No. 15-8544, in which the Supreme Court 

will address the applicability of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. 

Ct. 2551 (2015) to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 

Movant opposes the motion to stay. As discussed herein, the Court 

denies the § 2255 motion regardless of whether Johnson applies 

retroactively to the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, the 

motion to stay is DENIED. Docket No. 36. 

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level was 20, because Movant had one prior conviction for a crime 

of violence, second degree burglary. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(a) 

relies on the Career Offender Guideline, USSG § 4B1.2, for the 

definition of crime of violence. The PSR applied a four-level 

enhancement because the offense involved a firearm with an 

obliterated serial number and a three-level downward adjustment 

for acceptance of responsibility, for a total offense level of 21. 

The PSR indicated that Movant should be classified in Criminal 

History Category V, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of 

seventy to eighty-seven months. If Movant’s sentence had not been 

enhanced based on the crime of violence, his total offense level 

would have been 15, with a resulting advisory Guidelines range of 

thirty-seven to forty-six months. 

At sentencing, the Court found that Movant’s advisory 

Guidelines range was seventy to eighty-seven months and sentenced 

him to sixty months of imprisonment. Movant did not file a direct 

appeal but, on May 31, 2016, after the Supreme Court issued its 

decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), he 

filed the instant § 2255 motion. 

B. Johnson v. United States 

In Johnson, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to the 

residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e), which provides that a defendant with three prior 

“violent felony” convictions faces a fifteen-year mandatoryminimum sentence if convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e). The ACCA residual clause definition of “violent 

felony,” which encompasses any crime that “involves conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 

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is identical to the residual clause of the Guidelines’ definition 

“crime of violence.” The Ninth Circuit makes “no distinction 

between the terms ‘violent felony’ as defined in the ACCA and 

‘crime of violence’ as defined in § 4B1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing 

Guidelines for purposes of interpreting the residual clauses.” 

United States v. Spencer, 724 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quoting United States v. Crews, 621 F.3d 849, 852 n.4 (9th Cir. 

2010) (internal alteration marks omitted). 

The Johnson Court held that the residual clause is so vague 

that it “both denies fair notice to defendants and invites 

arbitrary enforcement by judges.” 135 S. Ct. at 2557. 

Accordingly, the Johnson Court held that an increase to a 

defendant’s sentence under the clause “denies due process of law.” 

In Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1357 (2016), the Supreme 

Court held that Johnson is retroactive as applied to the ACCA. 

However, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has 

addressed whether Johnson is retroactive as to the identical 

language in the Sentencing Guidelines. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 A prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court, 

making a collateral attack against the validity of his or her 

conviction or sentence, must do so by way of a motion to vacate, 

set aside or correct the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in 

the court which imposed the sentence. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 

1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1988). Section 2255 was intended to 

alleviate the burden of habeas corpus petitions filed by federal 

prisoners in the district of confinement by providing an equally 

broad remedy in the more convenient jurisdiction of the sentencing 

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court. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal sentencing court may grant 

relief if it concludes that a prisoner in custody was sentenced in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 

DISCUSSION 

 The government agrees that Johnson applies to the Sentencing 

Guidelines. However, the government argues that Movant 

procedurally defaulted his claim under Johnson by failing to file 

a direct appeal and that Johnson’s application to the Sentencing 

Guidelines is not retroactive. Moreover, the government argues 

that Movant’s prior conviction for second-degree robbery is a 

crime of violence, as defined by the Guidelines, even without the 

residual clause. 

I. Procedural Default 

 As a general rule, “claims not raised on direct appeal may not 

be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause 

and prejudice.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 

(2003). In order to overcome this procedural default resulting 

from the failure to raise his claims on direct appeal, Movant must 

show cause for the default and actual prejudice, or actual 

innocence. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350-51 (2006). 

A movant shows cause by demonstrating “that the procedural default 

is due to an ‘objective factor’ that is ‘external’ to the 

petitioner and that ‘cannot be fairly attributed to him.’” 

Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991)). 

 The government argues that “a defendant who failed to raise a 

claim on direct appeal must show ineffective assistance of counsel 

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to establish cause.” Docket No. 35 at 4. This narrow 

interpretation of cause is not supported by case law. Although, 

in most cases, a failure to object or failure to file a direct 

appeal that is not attributable to ineffective assistance of 

counsel is a procedural default, there are circumstances in which 

cause may be found. See, e.g., Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13 

(1984) (“Underlying the concept of cause, however, is at least the 

[] notion that, absent exceptional circumstances, a defendant is 

bound by the tactical decisions of competent counsel.”) The 

Supreme Court has held that cause is found when “the factual or 

legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel” 

at the time a direct appeal was or could have been filed. Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Accordingly, the failure to 

file a direct appeal when the appeal “would have been futile, 

because a solid wall of circuit authority” precluded the appeal 

does not constitute procedural default. English v. United States, 

42 F.3d 473, 479 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted); see also Kimes v. United States, 939 F.2d 776, 

778 (1991) (“failure to object . . . is not fatal to [a § 2255] 

petition, since well settled law precluded [the] claim at the 

time”). 

 In Reed, the Supreme Court held that when one of its 

decisions explicitly overrules one of its prior decisions or 

overturns “a longstanding and widespread practice to which [the 

Supreme Court] has not spoken, but which a near unanimous body of 

lower court authority has expressly approved” and the new decision 

is given retroactive application, there will almost 

certainly have been no reasonable basis upon which an 

attorney previously could have urged a []court to adopt 

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the position that this Court had ultimately adopted. 

Consequently, the failure of a defendant’s attorney to 

have pressed such a claim . . . is sufficiently 

excusable to satisfy the cause requirement. 

Id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Johnson 

expressly overrules prior Supreme Court cases upholding the 

analogous residual clause in the ACCA and the Supreme Court has 

held that Johnson is retroactive with respect to ACCA claims. 

Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016). 

 Moreover, it is indisputable that, at the time Movant could 

have filed a direct appeal, a claim that the residual clause in 

the § 4B1.2 definition of crime of violence was void for vagueness 

would not have succeeded and that “the legal basis for the claim 

was not reasonably available to counsel” at that time. Murray, 

477 U.S. at 488. Vagueness challenges to the residual clauses in 

the ACCA and the Sentencing Guidelines were foreclosed by the 

Supreme Court decisions in James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 

(2007), and Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011). 

Accordingly, Movant has demonstrated cause for his procedural 

default. 

 As stated above, Movant must also demonstrate prejudice by 

showing that the alleged error “worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions.’” United States v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 

1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 

U.S. 152, 170 (1982)). The Supreme Court has not defined the 

level of prejudice necessary to overcome procedural default but it 

has held that the level is “significantly greater than that 

necessary under the more vague inquiry suggested by the words 

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‘plain error.’” Murray, 477 U.S. at 493-94 (quoting Engle v. 

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)). To show prejudice under the 

plain error standard, a defendant must “show her substantial 

rights were affected, and to do so, must establish that the 

probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” United States v. 

Bonilla-Guizar, 729 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 The government argues that Movant cannot demonstrate 

prejudice because the Sentencing Guidelines are only advisory. 

Accordingly, the government notes that this Court “had nearly 

unfettered discretion to impose any sentence that Congress made 

applicable to his offense.” Docket No. 35 at 6. However, even 

though the Guidelines are advisory, the Supreme Court has 

consistently held that sentencing courts “must treat the 

Guidelines as ‘the starting point and the initial benchmark.’” 

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007) (quoting Gall 

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); see also Peugh v. United 

States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013) (“federal sentencing scheme 

aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions 

are anchored by the Guidelines”); Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6 

(“district courts must begin their analysis with the Guidelines 

and remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process.”). 

The Supreme Court recently observed that “when a Guidelines range 

moves up or down, offenders’ sentences move with it.” Peugh, 133 

S. Ct. at 2084. An improperly calculated Guidelines range would 

“derail[] the sentencing proceeding before it even began.” United 

States v. Doe, 705 F.3d 1134, 1154 (9th Cir. 2013). 

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 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has long held that, on direct 

review, miscalculation of the Guidelines range constitutes plain 

error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights. See, e.g., 

id. at 1188 (“We have held that when a sentencing judge 

incorrectly calculates the Guidelines range, potentially resulting 

in the imposition of a greater sentence, the error affects the 

defendant’s substantial rights and the fairness of the judicial 

proceedings.”). Moreover, the Supreme Court recently held that, 

absent “unusual circumstances,” when a sentencing court improperly 

calculates the Guidelines range, the sentence constitutes plain 

error, even if the sentence imposed is within the correct 

Guidelines range. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 

1338, 1347 (2016). 

 Here, this Court considered the enhancement based on the 

definition of crime of violence in imposing its sentence. Even 

though the sentence of sixty months was a downward variance from 

the enhanced range of seventy to eighty-seven months, it was still 

well above the non-enhanced range of thirty-seven to forty-six 

months. The Court finds that the constitutional error in 

calculating Movant’s Guidelines range “worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 171 (emphasis in 

original). 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that Movant has shown cause and 

prejudice sufficient to overcome his failure to file a direct 

appeal challenging his sentence. 

II. Retroactivity 

 The government next argues that, under Teague v. Lane, 489 

U.S. 288 (1989), Johnson does not apply retroactively to cases in 

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which an enhancement based on the definition of crime of violence 

in the Career Offender Guideline was applied. In Teague, the 

Supreme Court held that newly announced constitutional rules apply 

to all criminal cases still on direct review but only apply 

retroactively on collateral review if the rule (1) “places certain 

kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of 

the criminal law-making authority to proscribe” or (2) is a 

“watershed rule[] of criminal procedure.” Id. at 304, 311 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

 As stated above, the Supreme Court has held that Johnson is a 

new substantive rule because it “changed the substantive reach of 

the Armed Career Criminal Act, altering ‘the range of conduct or 

the class of persons that the [Act] punishes.’” Welch, 136 S. Ct. 

at 1265 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004)). 

Movant argues that, because the decision in Johnson similarly 

limits the application of certain Guidelines provisions and 

because it has been found to be retroactive with respect to the 

ACCA, it should be retroactive as to those Guidelines provisions 

as well. Movant contends that the retroactivity analysis in Welch 

applies to the rule set out in Johnson, and does not depend on the 

type of case in which the rule is applied. 

 It is true that the rule announced in Johnson applies only by 

analogy to the definition of crime of violence in the Career 

Offender Guideline. Johnson found that the language in the ACCA 

is unconstitutionally vague. While courts, including the Supreme 

Court and the Ninth Circuit, routinely look to interpretation of 

language in the ACCA when considering nearly identical language in 

the Guidelines and vice versa, it cannot be assumed that a finding 

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that Johnson is retroactive as to the ACCA definitively means that 

it is retroactive as to the Guidelines. Indeed, the Supreme Court 

recently granted certiorari in Beckles v. United States, 2016 U.S. 

LEXIS 4142. Among the issues presented in Beckles is whether 

Johnson applies retroactively to collateral challenges to federal 

sentences enhanced based on the definition of crime of violence in 

the Career Offender Guideline. 

 As the government points out, those who meet the criteria of 

the ACCA are subject to a statutory mandatory minimum sentence. 

In contrast, those who are eligible for enhancements under the 

Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to language similar to that found 

unconstitutional in Johnson are subject to higher advisory 

Guidelines ranges. Therefore, the government argues that, as 

applied to defendants who are challenging Guidelines enhancements, 

the rule in Johnson is procedural because it “does not alter the 

statutory sentencing range or prevent reimposition of the same 

sentence without the career offender enhancement.” Docket No. 55 

at 10. In effect, the government argues that any new 

constitutional rules applicable to Guidelines calculations are 

neither substantive nor watershed procedural rules under Teague 

and thus cannot be applied retroactively.2 As a district court in 

the District of Oregon recently observed, there is no Ninth 

 2 The government also argues that any Guidelines calculation 

error is a “procedural error” rather than “substantive error.” 

However, the terms “procedural error” and “substantive error” are 

terms of art related to direct appellate review of sentences and 

are not applicable here. See Gall v. United States, 522 U.S. 38, 

51 (2007). 

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Circuit or Supreme Court authority to support this position. See 

United States v. Dean, 2016 WL 1060229, at *13 (D. Or.). 

 Indeed, in Reina-Rodriguez v. United States, the Ninth 

Circuit determined that an en banc decision which “altered the 

conduct that substantively qualifies as burglary under the 

categorical approach” for purposes of the ACCA was a substantive 

rule and therefore eligible for retroactive application under 

Teague. 655 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2011). Without addressing 

whether the retroactivity analysis should be different for cases 

under the Guidelines as opposed to under the ACCA, the Ninth 

Circuit applied the decision retroactively to a case challenging a 

Guidelines enhancement based on the § 4B1.2 definition of crime of 

violence. Id. at 1189-90. 

 Moreover, in Welch, the Supreme Court made clear that it 

“determine[s] whether a new rule is substantive or procedural by 

considering the function of the rule.” 136 S. Ct. at 1265. The 

Welch Court held that rule in Johnson was substantive because it 

“affected the reach of the underlying statute rather than the 

judicial procedures by which the statute is applied.” Id. 

Applying Johnson to the Guidelines likewise affects the reach of 

those Guidelines that rely on the definition of crime of violence 

in the Career Offender Guideline but “has nothing to do with the 

range of permissible methods a court might use to determine” 

whether those Guidelines apply. Id. As it does for the ACCA, 

“Johnson substantively changes the conduct by which federal courts 

may enhance the sentence of a defendant under the Guidelines.” 

Dean, 2016 WL 1060229, at *16. Accordingly, Johnson applies 

retroactively to Movant’s case. 

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III. Crime of Violence 

 Finally, the government argues that Movant’s conviction for 

second-degree robbery, in violation of California Penal Code 

section 211, qualifies as a crime of violence, as defined by the 

Career Offender Guideline, without relying on the residual clause. 

 Section 4B1.2 defines a crime of violence as 

any offense under federal or state law, punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that-- 

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person of 

another, or 

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, 

involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

physical injury to another. 

USSG § 4B1.2(a). The underlined portion of the definition is 

referred to as the residual clause. Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 

indicates that the term “crime of violence” “includes murder, 

manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex 

offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of 

credit, and burglary of a dwelling.” USSG § 4B1.2, comment. 

(n.1). 

 As the government points out, the Ninth Circuit has 

previously held that violations of California Penal Code section 

211 are crimes of violence for purposes of USSG § 2L1.2. See 

United States v. Flores-Mejia, 687 F.3d 1213, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 

2012); United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 541 F.3d 881, 892-93 (9th 

Cir. 2008). In those cases, the Ninth Circuit held, “CPC § 211 is 

categorically a ‘crime of violence’ under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, 

because, in all its applications, CPC § 211 always constitutes 

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either generic robbery or generic extortion, both of which are 

included in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2’s definition of ‘crime of violence.’” 

United States v. Dixon, 805 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2015). 

 Unlike § 4B1.2, § 2L1.2 does not contain a residual clause, 

nor does the Guideline itself include a definition of crime of 

violence. Instead, an application note to the Guideline defines 

crime of violence to be any of a list of enumerated generic 

offenses, including robbery and extortion, or any offense that 

“has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another.” USSG § 2L1.2, 

comment. (n.1(b)(iii)). 

 As noted above, the § 4B1.2 Guideline definition of crime of 

violence at issue in this case includes extortion, but not 

robbery, in its list of enumerated generic crimes. The commentary 

to § 4B1.2 includes robbery in an additional list of enumerated 

generic crimes. Citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 

(1993), the government argues that Guidelines commentary, 

including the list of enumerated generic crimes in the commentary 

to § 4B1.2, is binding on this Court. Movant counters that 

Guidelines commentary is not binding if “it violates the 

Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a 

plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Id. Movant 

further contends that, without the residual clause, generic 

robbery no longer constitutes a crime of violence under § 4B1.2. 

Therefore, according to Movant, the commentary including robbery 

either violates the Constitution because it relies on the residual 

clause or is inconsistent with the Guideline without the residual 

clause. However, in the Ninth Circuit, generic robbery is defined 

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as “aggravated larceny, containing at least the elements of 

misappropriation of property under circumstances involving 

immediate danger to the person.” United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 

541 F.3d 881, 891 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 3 W. LaFave, 

Substantive Criminal Law § 20.3(e) (2d ed. 2003)). This 

definition meets the “elements clause” of § 4B1.2(a), because it 

“has as an element the . . . threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another.” USSG § 4B1.2(a); see also, id. 

(noting that the generic definition of robbery requires that the 

taking be done by means of violence or the use of force or fear). 

Accordingly, the inclusion of robbery in the Guidelines commentary 

is binding on this Court.3 

 Because § 4B1.2’s definition of crime of violence encompasses 

both generic robbery and generic extortion and because the Ninth 

Circuit has held that California Penal Code section 211 always 

constitutes either generic robbery or generic extortion, Movant’s 

conviction under section 211 continues to qualify as a crime of 

violence following Johnson. 

IV. Request for a Certificate of Appealability 

 If the Court denies Movant’s § 2255 motion as it does here, 

Movant requests a certificate of appealability (COA) pursuant to 

 3 Movant’s citation to United States v. Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d 

53 (1st Cir. 2016), is unavailing. In Soto-Rivera, the First 

Circuit held that, after Johnson, the inclusion of possession of a 

machine gun as a crime of violence in the commentary to § 4B1.2(a) 

was improper because, “in the absence of the residual clause, 

there is nothing within § 4B1.2(a)’s text to serve as an anchor 

for Application Note 1’s inclusion of possession of a machinegun 

within the definition of crime of violence.” Id. at 60. In 

contrast, as discussed above, generic robbery qualifies as a crime 

of violence under the “elements clause.” 

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28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). A certificate of appealability should be 

granted “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).4 

The Court certifies in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2253 that, for 

the reasons set forth in the Order Denying § 2255 Motion, none of 

the issues raised in the motion involves a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. The certificate of 

appealability is denied. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Movant’s § 2255 

motion. Docket No. 27. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 2, 2016 

CLAUDIA WILKEN 

United States District Judge 

 4 Section 2253(c)(2) codified the standard announced by the 

United States Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 

892-93 (1983). In Barefoot, the Court explained that “a 

substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right” means that 

a petitioner “must demonstrate that the issues are debatable among 

jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a 

different manner], or that the questions are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Id. at 893 n.4. 

 

Case 4:12-cr-00649-CW Document 39 Filed 08/02/16 Page 15 of 15