Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04214/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04214-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jessie L. Robinson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4214

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Jessie L. Robinson, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 19, 2006

Filed: August 1, 2006

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Jessie L. Robinson was convicted in the district court1

 of two counts of

distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and

one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841 (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). We affirm.

In October and November 2003, Jefferson City police officers observed two

separate drug transactions between Robinson and a confidential informant. In each

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transaction, Robinson sold fifty dollars worth of crack cocaine to the informant. On

November 26, 2003, Officer Shawn Hagerty stopped a vehicle driven by Robinson

that failed to stop at a stop sign. While Officer Hagerty checked Robinson’s license

and registration, Officer Curtis Finke, who was assisting with the traffic stop, watched

Robinson from the passenger side of the vehicle. Officer Finke watched as Robinson

sat staring straight ahead, holding the steering wheel with both hands. Robinson then

quickly reached into his coat pocket, pulled out an object, and placed it between his

seat and the center console. Officer Hagerty returned to the driver’s side of the

vehicle and issued Robinson a warning for the stop sign violation. Officer Finke then

asked Robinson about the object he had taken from his pocket. Initially, Robinson

denied taking anything out of his pocket, but after Officer Finke insisted that he had

seen Robinson place an object between the seat and center console, Robinson began

to pull objects from under the seat. The third object that Robinson produced was a

digital scale with a white powdery substance on it.

The officers then asked Robinson to step out of the vehicle, and Officer Hagerty

patted him down for weapons. When the officers directed Robinson to step to the rear

of the vehicle, Robinson began, on his own initiative, to remove items from his

pockets and place them on the bumper. Because Officer Hagerty did not see one large

object that he had felt during the patdown, he reached into the pocket of Robinson’s

coat, whereupon Robinson turned and ran from the scene. The officers caught

Robinson and found two bags of crack cocaine in his pocket. Two more bags of crack

cocaine and a roll of cash totaling $1938 were found on the ground, where they had

apparently fallen from Robinson’s pocket. The four bags contained a total of 63.32

grams of crack cocaine.

The district court denied Robinson’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained

during the search and arrest. Following a jury trial, Robinson was found guilty of two

counts of distribution of cocaine base and one count of possession with intent to

distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base. The district court sentenced

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Robinson asserts two other arguments, both of which are without merit in light

of our controlling precedent. First, his argument that the distinction in 21 U.S.C. §

841 between “cocaine” and “cocaine base” is ambiguous fails in light of our cases

holding that “cocaine base” in that statute is synonymous with “crack cocaine.”

United States v. Vesey, 330 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v.

Crawford, 83 F.3d 964, 965-66 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Jackson, 64 F.3d

1213, 1216-20 (8th Cir. 1995). At Robinson’s trial, two experts testified that the

substance he possessed and distributed was crack cocaine. Second, we have squarely

rejected Robinson’s argument that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment

jury rights by enhancing his statutory sentence based on a judicial determination that

his prior convictions constituted felony drug offenses. See United States v. Perry, 437

F.3d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 2006).

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Robinson to concurrent 210-month sentences on the distribution charges and imposed

a sentence of life imprisonment on the possession charge.

On appeal, Robinson argues that because the evidence against him resulted

from an unconstitutional search and seizure, the district court erred in admitting it.2

 Robinson concedes that the initial traffic stop was lawful, but he argues that it ended

when Officer Hagerty issued him a warning. Thus, Robinson argues, the officers

could lawfully continue to detain him only if they had a reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity. Robinson argues that no basis existed for such reasonable suspicion,

so the continued questioning by Officer Finke was an unreasonable detention that

violated Robinson’s Fourth Amendment rights.

 On appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, we review for clear error the

factual findings of the district court and we review de novo the legal determination

that the Fourth Amendment was not violated. United States v. Roberson, 439 F.3d

934, 939 (8th Cir. 2006). Once Officer Hagerty decided to allow Robinson to depart

with a warning, any subsequent detention or search was limited by the strictures of the

Fourth Amendment. United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643,

648 (8th Cir. 1999). This dividing line is artificial, however, and we do not find a

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constitutional violation if there was a de minimis intrusion beyond that point. Id. at

649.

We apply an objective standard to determine whether there was a seizure.

United States v. Morgan, 270 F.3d 625, 630 (8th Cir. 2001). If a reasonable person

in Robinson’s circumstances would have felt free to leave, the exchange he had with

Officer Finke was consensual and does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See id.

We need not determine whether the conversation initiated by Officer Finke was

consensual or coercive, however, and we need not decide whether reasonable

suspicion existed to justify a seizure. Even assuming that Robinson is correct that

Officer Finke’s questions amounted to a seizure without reasonable suspicion, we

have upheld seizures of less than ten minutes as de minimis intrusions that do not

amount to an unreasonable seizure. See United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014,

1017 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1000-02 (8th Cir. 2005);

Morgan, 270 F.3d at 631-32; $404,905.00, 182 F.3d at 647-49. Although the record

does not reflect the exact duration of the conversation between Robinson and Officer

Finke, it does indicate that it lasted only a few minutes before Robinson produced the

scale. Robinson does not contest the district court’s determination that the scale

provided probable cause for further investigation. We thus conclude that, even if a

suspicionless seizure occurred during the period from the conclusion of the lawful

traffic stop until the officers unquestionably had probable cause, it was a de minimis

intrusion that did not constitute an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment.

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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