Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04110/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04110-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry M. Jensen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG 12 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. ) No. 90-4110 

) 

LARRY M. JENSEN, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-192-S) 

(D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER, District 

Judge.** 

Defendant-appellant Larry M. Jensen (defendant) was charged 

on October 11, 1989 with conspiracy and attempt to manufacture 

methamphetamine and use of a firearm in the commission of a drug 

trafficking offense. Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** The Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-4110 Document: 010110131485 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 1 
manufacture methamphetamine, in exchange for the government's 

dismissal of the attempt to manufacture methamphetamine and gun 

charges. 

Defendant was sentenced on July 17, 1990, over defendant's 

objections to the pre sentence report of the Probation Off ice. 

Defendant appeals on the bases of asserted error in the district 

court's calculation of the base offense level, in the district 

court's refusal to depart downward from sentencing guidelines, and 

the district court's enhancement of sentence for obstruction of 

justice. After examining the record, we are satisfied that the 

fact findings of the district court are not clearly erroneous and 

that its application of the law was correct. 

Defendant first challenges the calculation of the base offense 

level, arguing that the evidence did not support the presentence 

report which concluded that 55 pounds of the precursor chemical 

ephedrine converts to 39.8 kilograms of cocaine equivalency, thus 

establishing a base offense level of 34. Defendant asserts that 

ephedrine is not mentioned in the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines (U.S.G.S.), nor convertible under the guidelines. 

In United States v. Havens, 910 F.2d 703, 705 (10th Cir. 

1990), we held "that the trial court, upon proper testimony, may 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-4110 Document: 010110131485 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 2 
estimate the ultimate quantity of producible drugs." In the 

instant case, the district court, relying on evidence gathered by 

the probation office supporting the base offense level calculation, 

determined that the precursor ephedrine, in the undisputed amount 

of 55 pounds, when combined with other necessary chemicals, will 

produce 19.9 kilograms of methamphetamine. The 19.9 kilograms of 

methamphetamine was then converted, pursuant to U.S.G.S. § 2D1.1 

(November 1, 1988), to 39.8 kilograms of cocaine for base offense 

level calculations. The 39.8 kilogram cocaine equivalency fell 

well within base offense level 34, which covers offenses involving 

15 to 49.4 kilograms of cocaine. Defendant here does not challenge 

to conversion to an equivalent amount of cocaine, but challenges 

the district court's failure to give any justification for the 

conversion from 55 pounds of ephedrine to 19. 9 kilograms of 

methamphetamine. 

At sentencing defendant offered no evidence to challenge the 

conversion from ephedrine to methamphetamine. However, at that 

time, the district court suspended the sentencing hearing and 

directed the Probation Office to make further inquiry relative to 

the conversion of ephedrine to methamphetamine. Upon this 

direction, the Probation Office secured from Frederick A. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-4110 Document: 010110131485 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 3 
Steinhauer, a forensic chemist with the United States Department 

of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration, an opinion that 55 

pounds of ephedrine could be used to manufacture 18.75 kilograms 

of methamphetamine, or the equivalent of 3 7. 5 kilograms of cocaine, 

still well within base offense level 34. Defendant has not 

challenged the conclusions of Steinhauer. 

As regards the district court's refusal to depart downward, 

this Court notes that it is well established "when a sentence is 

within the guideline range ... then the district court's refusal 

to exercise its discretion to depart downward from the guideline 

range is not appealable. 11 United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 

1530 (10th Cir. 1990). Defendant asserts that a refusal to depart 

downward in this case would amount to a violation of due process, 

based on the assertion that he attempted to withdraw from the 

conspiracy, but was prevented from doing so by threats on his life. 

Defendant has produced no authority to support his contention that 

a refusal to mitigate the sentence of an admitted member of a 

conspiracy is a violation of due process when the defendant 

suffered threats by a coconspirator of physical violence during the 

pendency of the conspiracy. 

Finally, defendant challenges the district court's enhancement 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-4110 Document: 010110131485 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 4 
,,, . 

of his sentence for obstruction of justice based on the court's 

finding that defendant testified untruthfully at the evidentiary 

hearing on his motion to dismiss. On March 14, 1990, defendant 

testified that codefendant James Johnson put a gun to defendant's 

head and accused defendant of being an agent of the United States 

Drug Enforcement Agency. The following day, defendant volunteered 

that Johnson struck him in the face because Johnson thought 

defendant had spread rumors regarding Johnson's personal life. 

When defendant was challenged as testifying falsely the previous 

day, defendant justified his failure to mention the second incident 

by offering that he did not want to embarrass Johnson. He does 

not, however, challenge the finding of the 'district court that he 

failed to testify truthfully on March 14, 1990. His belief that 

on March 15, 1990, he merely "supplemented" his March 14, 1990 

testimony, and that his assertion that his explanation for doing 

so was somehow "reasonable" has no effect on the district court's 

finding, fully supported by the record, that defendant did in fact 

obstruct justice by testifying falsely. 

AFFIRMED 

Entered for the Court 

Clarence A. Brimmer 

Chief District Judge 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-4110 Document: 010110131485 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 5