Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00415/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00415-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
ABC10
Plaintiff
Omar Abdulsattar Ameen
Intervenor
KXTV, LLC
Plaintiff
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KXTV, LLC dba ABC10,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND 

IMMIGRATION SERVICES,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00415-JAM-CKD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On March 7, 2019, KXTV, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed suit 

against United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(“Defendant”) after it withheld agency records on intervenor, 

Omar Abdulsattar Ameen (“Ameen”). Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff 

alleges Defendant violated the Freedom of Information Act 

(“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, in doing so. Id. Defendant filed a 

Motion for Summary Judgment asserting Plaintiff is not entitled 

to the records because they are subject to FOIA exemptions that 

prohibit their release. Mot. Summ. J. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 21. 

Plaintiff opposed the motion with Ameen’s support. Opp’n, ECF 

No. 22; Mem. in Supp. of Opp’n, ECF No. 27.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s claim arises from Defendant’s denial of a FOIA 

request for “all immigration files, photos, annotations, and 

investigations compiled” on Ameen, who is the subject of an 

extradition matter brought by the United States. Am. Compl.

¶ 14, ECF No. 6. In effect, Plaintiff requested the entirety of 

Ameen’s Alien File (“A-File”). The A-File is an official record 

that contains information obtained by the Government on an 

individual as they pass through the United States immigration 

and inspection process. Mot. at 6. After an administrative 

appeal of the denial, Defendant maintained its position and 

continued to withhold the requested records. Mot. at 2. 

Plaintiff subsequently filed suit. Id. Upon the commencement 

of the suit, the parties agreed to narrow the amount of 

information at issue. Mot. at 2. As part of this effort, 

Defendant produced a Vaughn index describing what information 

was withheld and why. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 

(D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[A] Vaughn index [] provides the court with a 

method to analyze the propriety of the withholding in sufficient 

detail to show the applicability of the exemption.”). With the 

Vaughn index, Defendant released a large portion of Ameen’s AFile. Mot. at 2. Defendant claimed the non-released

information was exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C § 552(b)(3), (b)(6), 

(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C), and (b)(7)(E). Id. Around this time, 

Ameen intervened in the case based on his privacy interests in 

his A-File. See Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 15. After reviewing 

the file, Ameen provided a list of documents he would waive his 

interests in and consent to Defendant producing. Mot. at 3.

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Approximately one month later, Ameen changed his position on 

waiving his privacy interest through FOIA and decided to provide 

many of the documents directly to Plaintiff himself. Id. Ameen 

shared 187 pages of documents from his A-File with Plaintiff and 

subsequently waived his privacy interest in the remaining 

documents. Id. Following Ameen’s disclosure of the documents, 

Defendant revised the Vaughn index, provided Plaintiff with an 

updated response letter, and released more of Ameen’s A-File. 

Id. Then, in response to Plaintiff’s opposition to the instant 

motion, Defendant released some additional information. Suppl. 

Decl. of Kelli Taylor (“Taylor Suppl. Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 30-3.

Soon thereafter, in Ameen’s extradition proceedings, 

Defendant released partially redacted portions of three 

memoranda still withheld in full in this action (Doc. Nos. 119, 

124–25, and 131). See Exs. 16, 17, 18, 19 to Sur-Reply, ECF No. 

32. Defendant continues to withhold in full three pages from

those memoranda in both proceedings (Doc. Nos. 126, 130, and 

132). See Ex. 17 to Sur-Reply. The Court will treat the 

documents that were released in part in the extradition 

proceedings as released in part in this action. Thus, only 

three pages of the memoranda remain withheld in full.

On February 25, 2020, the Court held a hearing on the 

motion during which it requested in camera review of several of 

the documents withheld in full (Doc. Nos. 114–16, 117, 127–29, 

159–66, 198, 200). ECF No. 38. Upon review, the Court found 

those documents had been properly withheld by Defendant and that 

the FOIA exemptions identified were correctly applied. Min. 

Order, ECF No. 39. As to those documents, the Court GRANTED 

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Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement. Id.

Accordingly, the information that remains in dispute 

consists of twenty-six (26) partially redacted pages and three

(3) pages withheld in full. See Ex. M to Reply, ECF No. 30-4; 

Ex. N to Reply, ECF No. 30–5; Ex. 17 to Sur-Reply; Min. Order,

ECF No. 39. Defendant applied FOIA exemptions (b)(6) and 

(b)(7)(A), (C), (E), and (F) to prevent the release of all or 

part of the remaining documents. Mot. at 7.

II. OPINION

A. Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff raises several evidentiary objections in its 

responses to Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts. See

Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed 

Facts (“SUF”) ¶¶ 21, 22, 26, 27, ECF No. 22-1; Objs. at ECF No. 

25. The Court has reviewed these evidentiary objections but

declines to rule on them as courts self-police evidentiary 

issues on motions for summary judgment and a formal ruling is 

unnecessary to the determination of this motion. See Burch v. 

Regents of the University of California, 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 

1118–1122 (E.D. Cal. 2006).

B. Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of 

fourteen exhibits. See Req. for Jud. Notice, ECF No. 23.; 

Suppl. Req. for Jud. Notice, ECF No. 33. Several of those 

exhibits originate from Ameen’s extradition matter, USA v. 

Ameen, Case No. 2:18-MJ-00152-EFB (E.D. Cal.), including: 

(1) the docket itself; (2) the Complaint; (3) the Memorandum of 

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Extradition Law and Request for Detention Pending Extradition 

Proceedings; (4) Exhibit 6 to the Extradition Hearing Brief; (5) 

the Updated Exhibit List; (6) Ameen’s Passport filed at Exhibit 

11-B; and (7) Reply to Defense Second Supplemental Extradition 

Hearing Brief. Plaintiff also requests judicial notice of the 

docket in Muchnick v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Case No. 3:15-cv03060-CRB (N.D. Cal.).

In addition to court filings, Plaintiff requests the Court

take judicial notice of the following public records: (1) United 

States Department of Homeland Security’s “DHS/USCIS/PIA-068 

Refugee Case Processing and Security Vetting” Document; (2) The 

Sacramento Bee article, “Is this Iraqi Sacramento resident an 

ISIS killer, or victim of a mentally ill witness?”; (3) CBS 

Sacramento article, “Sacramento Man Linked to Iraqi ISIS Murder 

Denied Bail”; (4) The New York Times article, “ISIS Member 

Arrested in Sacramento, U.S. Says”; (5) The New Yorker article, 

“The Fight to Save an Innocent Refugee from Almost Certain 

Death”; and (6) The New Yorker article, “The Evidence That Could 

Save Omar Ameen’s Life.”

“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 

reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known 

within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or 

(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. 

R. Evid. 201(b). Accordingly, a court may take judicial notice 

of “undisputed matters of public record . . . including 

documents on file in federal or state courts.” Harris v. County 

of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). A court may 

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not, however, judicially notice a disputed fact stated within 

those records. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689–90 

(9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, a court should not take judicial 

notice of adjudicative facts that are irrelevant to the case at 

issue. Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 

692 F.3d 983, 991 n.8 (9th Cir. 2012).

All the exhibits Plaintiff requests that the Court 

judicially notice are undisputed matters of public record. 

Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of their existence. 

However, the Court declines to take judicial notice of their 

substance, including any disputed or irrelevant facts within 

them.

C. Applicable Legal Standards

1. The Freedom of Information Act

“FOIA was enacted to facilitate public access to Government 

documents.” Llahr v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 

973 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Nonetheless, “FOIA contemplates that some information 

may legitimately be kept from the public.” Id. To this end, 

the statute contains nine enumerated exemptions allowing the 

Government to withhold documents or portions of documents. Id.

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9)). FOIA’s presumption in favor 

of disclosure means that an agency invoking one of the 

exemptions bears the burden of demonstrating that the exemption 

properly applies to the documents. Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

This presumption also means that the exemptions are to be 

interpreted narrowly. Id. (internal quotation marks and 

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citation omitted). But they are nonetheless “intended to have 

meaningful reach and application.” John Doe Agency v. John Doe 

Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989). Thus, if an agency refuses to 

disclose records that correctly fall within one of the 

exemptions, courts lack the statutory authority to order 

disclosure. Spurlock v. F.B.I., 68 F.3d 1010, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 

1995) (citations omitted). With FOIA’s exemptions, “Congress [] 

created a scheme of categorial exclusion; it did not invite a 

judicial weighing of the benefits and evils of disclosure on a 

case-by-case basis.” F.B.I. v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 631 

(1982).

When an agency is tasked with establishing that its records 

search was adequate and that any withheld documents fall within 

an exemption, it “must provide tailored reasons in response to a 

FOIA request.” Shannahan v. I.R.S., 672 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th 

Cir. 2012). It may not respond with boilerplate or conclusory 

statements. Id. (citation omitted). But when an agency 

provides sufficiently detailed declarations, courts are to 

“accord [those declarations] substantial weight.” Id.

Further, courts may rely solely on agency declarations or 

affidavits so long as “the affiants are knowledgeable about the 

information sought and the affidavits are detailed enough to 

allow the court to make an independent assessment of the 

[agency’s] claim. Lane v. Dep’t of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 

1135–36 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Upon receiving detailed descriptions of the documents 

and facts sufficient to establish an exemption, the “court need 

look no further”. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 

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omitted).

2. Summary Judgment in FOIA Cases

“Summary judgment is the procedural vehicle by which nearly 

all FOIA cases are resolved.” Brown v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., WL 

1237274 at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citations omitted). However, 

the typical summary judgment standard is insufficient in a FOIA 

proceeding. Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 388 

F.Supp.2d 1086, 1095–97 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Because the facts are 

rarely in dispute in a FOIA case, the Court need not ask whether 

there is a genuine issue of material fact. Minier v. Cent.

Intelligence Agency, 88 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1996). Instead, 

the summary judgment standard in a FOIA case requires a twostage inquiry. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 388 F.Supp.2d at 1095–

97.

First, the Court must determine whether the agency has met 

its burden of proving that it fully discharged its obligations 

under FOIA. Zemansky v. EPA, 767 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(citation omitted). To do so, the agency must demonstrate that 

it conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all 

relevant documents. Id. The question is not whether any other 

relevant documents could possibly exist, but whether the 

agency’s search for the documents was adequate, as measured by a 

reasonableness standard. Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 705 

F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983). If this initial burden is 

met, the next stage of the inquiry examines whether the agency 

has proven that the withheld information falls within one of the 

nine FOIA exemptions. U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 

173 (1991).

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Thus, to prevail on summary judgment, “the agency must 

prove it has fully discharged these burdens under FOIA, after 

the underlying facts and inferences to be drawn from them are 

construed in the light most favorable to the FOIA requester.” 

Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 388 F.Supp.2d at 1095.

D. Analysis

1. Adequacy of Search

As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Defendant 

searched for responsive records in accordance with its standard 

procedures for processing FOIA requests. See Am. Compl. 

Plaintiff does not challenge Defendant’s search for responsive 

documents. Id. Further, Defendant provides a declaration from 

the Associate Director of the FOIA Unit within the Department of 

Homeland Security (“DHS”) that details Defendant’s search for 

responsive records and establishes it as sufficiently thorough. 

Decl. of Jill Eggleston (“Eggleston Decl.”) ¶¶ 16–18, ECF No. 

21–3. See Zemansky, 767 F.2d at 571 (“In demonstrating the 

adequacy of the search, the agency may rely upon reasonably 

detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good faith.”).

Accordingly, Defendant has satisfied the initial burden of

the summary judgment inquiry.

2. Claimed Exemptions

Next, Defendant must prove that the withheld information 

falls within each of the FOIA exemptions applied. Ray, 502 U.S. 

at 173. Defendant has applied several exemptions to the 

following documents that were either partially redacted or 

withheld in full:

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Partially Redacted Documents FOIA Exemptions Applied

118 6, 7(C), 7(E)

120 6, 7(C), 7(E)

121–23 6, 7(C), 7(E)

138 6, 7(C)

153 6, 7(C), 7(E)

154–55 6, 7(C), 7(E)

157–58 6, 7(C), 7(E)

167 6, 7(C), 7(E)

171 6, 7(C)

192–97 6, 7(C), 7(E)

199 6, 7(C), 7(E)

259–60 6, 7(C)

Documents Withheld in Full FOIA Exemptions Applied

126 6, 7(A), 7(C), 7(E), 7(F)

130 6, 7(A), 7(C), 7(E), 7(F)

132 6, 7(A), 7(C), 7(E), 7(F)

Taylor Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 2–3; Ex. M to Reply; Ex. N to Reply; Ex. 

17 to Sur-Reply.

a. Exemption 7

FOIA’s seventh exemption applies to certain “records or 

information compiled for law enforcement purposes.” 5 U.S.C 

§ 552(b)(7). Judicial review of Exemption 7 requires another

two-stage inquiry. Abramson, 456 U.S. at 622. “First, a 

requested document must be shown to have been an investigatory

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record compiled for law enforcement purposes.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Then the agency must 

demonstrate that release of the document would have one of the 

six results specified within that exemption. Id.; see 5 U.S.C 

§ 552(b)(7)(A)-(F).

The first part of the inquiry is easily resolved. “An 

agency with a clear law enforcement mandate need only establish 

a rational nexus between enforcement of a federal law and the 

document for which an exemption is claimed.” Los Angeles Times 

Comm’cs, LLC v. Dep’t of Army, 442 F. Supp. 2d 880, 895 (C.D. 

Cal. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). DHS 

and its components are law enforcement agencies. Eggleston 

Decl. ¶ 32. Of those components, Defendant and ICE are 

responsible for the administration and enforcement of federal 

laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens 

and identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities at the nation’s 

borders. Eggleston Decl. ¶ 32; Decl. of Toni Fuentes (“Fuentes 

Decl.”) ¶¶ 9–11, ECF No. 21–9. Ameen’s A-File was put together 

by these law enforcement agencies and A-Files have routinely 

been found to “meet [the Exemption 7] test because they are 

‘compiled for adjudicative and enforcement purposes’ within 

DHS’s statutory authority.” Muchnick v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

225 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2016).

Thus, the documents at issue are investigatory records 

compiled for law enforcement purposes.

(i) Exemption 7(A)

Defendant invokes Exemption 7(A) to withhold portions of 

three memoranda that “could reasonably be expected to interfere 

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with enforcement proceedings.” Mot. at 9. Under Exemption 

7(A), the agency “need only make a general showing” that 

disclosure would frustrate ongoing proceedings. Lewis v. 

I.R.S., 823 F.2d 375, 380 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). 

It “is not required to make a specific factual showing with 

respect to each withheld document that disclosure would actually 

interfere with a particular enforcement proceeding.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This exemption 

is meant to allow courts to determine that the release of 

certain types of investigatory records would generally hamper a 

pending case. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

The three memoranda in question (Doc. Nos. 119, 124–26, and 

130–32) were produced by United States Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (“ICE”) during a joint terrorism task force 

investigation of Ameen. Fuentes Decl. ¶ 13. As of the filing 

of the instant motion, ICE’s investigation into Ameen is 

considered ongoing. Id. According to Officer Fuentes, the 

Deputy Officer of ICE’s FOIA Office, the release of these 

documents would interfere with the ongoing investigation by 

“reveal[ing] law enforcement techniques, and guidelines and 

tools used by ICE in investigating targets.” Suppl. Decl. of 

Toni Fuentes (“Fuentes Suppl. Decl.”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 30-1. Their 

disclosure “would reveal the status of specific actions being 

taken by [ICE],” and if “the subject(s) of the investigation was 

to discover the contents of these memos, they may change their 

behaviors, activities, or start destroying critical evidence.” 

Fuentes Suppl. Decl. ¶ 6.

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But Officer Fuentes does not reveal much more than that. 

Under Exemption 7(A), Defendant need only make a general showing 

that disclosure would frustrate ongoing proceedings. Lewis, 823 

F.2d at 380. Nonetheless, the Court must receive enough detail 

to make an independent assessment of Defendant’s claim. Lane, 

523 F.3d at 1135–36. The names of the documents, without much 

more, do not give the Court any insight as to why the release of 

these types of investigatory records would interfere with the 

ongoing case. See Fuentes Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7. That their disclosure 

would reveal law enforcement techniques and the status of 

specific actions being taken is vague and veers into the 

territory of “boilerplate or conclusory statements.” Shannahan, 

672 F.3d at 1148.

In cases where Exemption 7(A) was validly applied to 

prevent the release of certain types of investigatory documents, 

the declarations or affidavits were more insightful. For 

instance, in Lewis, the affidavits described “in sufficient 

detail” the undisclosed materials and more specifically 

“addressed why disclosure would impair the IRS’s investigation.” 

823 F.2d at 378. One of the affidavits explained that 

disclosure would: reveal the evidence developed against the 

plaintiff; the reliance placed by the Government on that 

evidence; the names of witnesses and potential witnesses; the 

scope and limits of the investigation; the identities of third 

parties contacted; the specific transactions being investigated; 

the strengths and weaknesses of the government’s case; and 

potential impeachment material. Id. at 378 n. 5.

Without more information as to why the types of 

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investigatory records listed in Officer Fuentes’ declarations 

would interfere with the ongoing investigation, the Court cannot 

independently assess whether Exemption 7(A) was justifiably 

asserted. Furthermore, Defendant did not apply Exemption 7(A)

to these memoranda in Ameen’s extradition proceedings. Ex. 17 

to Sur-Reply. This suggests to the Court that Exemption 7(A) 

was superfluously applied, running afoul of the principle that 

the exemptions be narrowly interpreted. Llahr, 569 F.3d at 973

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Accordingly, Defendant invalidly claimed FOIA Exemption 

7(A) to prevent the release of this information.

(ii) Exemption 7(C)

Defendant invokes Exemption 7(C) to withhold personal 

information belonging to third-party individuals who, unlike 

Ameen, did not consent to the release of their information. 

Mot. at 10. Defendant applies Exemption 7(C) to portions of all 

the documents at issue. Id. Exemption 7(C) can be asserted to 

prevent the release of documents that “could reasonably be 

expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 

privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). In analyzing whether 

Exemption 7(C) applies, the third-parties’ privacy interests in 

the documents must be balanced against the public interest in 

their release. U.S. Dep’t. of Just. v. Comm. for Freedom of the 

Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989).

To trigger this balancing, the requester must first “show 

that the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant 

one, an interest more specific than having the information for 

its own sake.” Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 

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U.S. 157, 172 (2004). Next, the requester “must show the 

information is likely to advance that interest.” Id. If the 

requester fails to make both showings, “the invasion of privacy 

is unwarranted.” Id.

Defendant has refused to release the personal information 

of third parties that appears throughout all the documents. 

Decl. of Jill Eggleston (“Eggleston Decl.”) ¶¶ 30–31, ECF No. 

21–3; Fuentes Decl. ¶¶ 16–20. Some of these individuals are 

private citizens. See Eggleston Decl. ¶ 30. Others are 

government employees involved in Ameen’s case. Id. 

Investigatory records generated by law enforcement agencies 

often contain information about private citizens whose link to 

the official inquiry is tenuous. Favish, 541 U.S. at 166. 

“There is special reason, therefore, to give protection to this 

intimate personal data, to which the public does not have a 

general right of access in the ordinary course.” Id. (internal 

citation omitted). In these instances, “the privacy interest is 

at its apex.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Likewise, “[l]aw enforcement personnel involved in a 

criminal investigation have a [] privacy interest under 

Exemption 7(C) in not having their identities disclosed.” Brown 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., WL 1237274 at *9 (E.D. Cal. 2015) 

(internal citations omitted). Thus, these third parties have a 

privacy interest in any personal information contained in these 

documents.

Plaintiff argues the public has an interest in knowing 

whether Defendant is “adequately performing its job and properly 

vetting refugee applicants such that murderers and terrorists 

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are not allowed into the country.” Opp’n at 15. When “the 

public interest is being asserted to show that responsible 

officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the 

performance of their duties, the requester must establish more 

than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure.” Favish, 

541 U.S. at 176. Instead, “the requester must produce evidence 

that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the 

alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” Id. 

Further, there is a presumption of legitimacy accorded to the 

Government’s official conduct. Id. (internal citation omitted). 

And where that presumption is applicable, “clear evidence is 

usually required to displace it.” Id. (internal citation 

omitted).

Plaintiff is only able to point to allegations against 

Ameen from the Government’s extradition memorandum as evidence 

that Defendant acted negligently or improperly in executing its 

duties. See Opp’n at 15–16; Ex. 3 to Req. for Jud. Notice, ECF 

No. 23. The Court declines to treat mere allegations against 

Ameen as clear evidence of governmental misconduct. Meanwhile, 

Plaintiff fails to explain how the information at issue is 

likely to advance that interest. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to 

make the requisite showings and the invasion of privacy that 

would result from releasing the third-party information is 

unwarranted. Favish, 541 U.S. at 172.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED as to the 

information withheld under FOIA Exemption 7(C).

(iii) Exemption 7(E)

Defendant invokes Exemption 7(E) to withhold information 

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relating to law enforcement techniques and procedures. Mot. at 

14. Exemption 7(E) protects records compiled for law 

enforcement purposes from disclosure if those records would 

reveal techniques, procedures, or guidelines for investigations 

or prosecutions that could reasonably be expected to risk 

circumvention of the law. Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t. of Just., 797 

F.3d 759, 777 (9th Cir. 2015). However, a showing that 

disclosure would lead to a danger of future lawbreaking is not 

necessary. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Exemption 7(E) applies even when the identity of the 

techniques has been disclosed or are generally known, but the 

manner and circumstances of the techniques are not generally 

known, or the disclosure of additional details could reduce 

their effectiveness. See Bowen v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 925 

F.2d 1225, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding application of 

Exemption 7(E) to withhold publicly-known investigative 

techniques and procedures when disclosure would reveal 

additional details that would hamper future agency 

investigations).

Here, Exemption 7(E) is used to withhold law enforcement 

techniques and procedures used to investigate Ameen. Mot. at 

15. Defendant alleges this information was withheld because it

could reveal the law enforcement procedures used when 

adjudicating certain types of applications. Eggleston Decl. ¶

32; Fuentes Decl. ¶ 21. According to Defendant, their 

disclosure “could assist people seeking to violate or circumvent 

the law by taking proactive steps to counter operational and 

investigative actions taken by ICE and USCIS during enforcement 

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operations.” Eggleston Decl. ¶ 32; Fuentes Decl. ¶ 21.

Exemption 7(E) “sets a relatively low bar for the agency to 

justify withholding.” Blackwell v. F.B.I., 646 F.3d 37, 42 

(D.C. Cir. 2010). It “only requires that the agency demonstrate 

logically how the release of the requested information might 

create a risk of circumvention of the law.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). For instance, in Hamdan, 

Exemption 7(E) was appropriately applied to documents described 

as revealing “techniques and procedures related to surveillance 

and credit searches.” 797 F.3d at 777. It was of no 

consequence that credit searches and surveillance are publicly 

known law enforcement techniques. Id. at 777–78. The 

affidavits claimed the records revealed techniques that, if 

known, could enable criminals to educate themselves about 

methods used to locate and apprehend persons. Id. at 777. This 

implied specific means of conducting surveillance and credit 

searches would be released, rather than merely application of 

the techniques. Id. at 777–78. And “affidavits which state 

that further detail would compromise the very techniques the 

government is trying to keep secret, are sufficient to meet the 

[agency’s] burden.” Id. at 778.

Thus, Defendant has met its burden. These documents are 

withheld to prevent potential violators from evading and 

exploiting United States immigration laws. Eggleston Decl. 

¶ 30. This is sufficient justification for their continued 

withholding under Exemption 7(E). Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 777. 

Plaintiff’s argument that these documents fall under the 

“routine-technique exception” has no teeth. See Opp’n at 19–20. 

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As long as the manner and circumstances of the techniques are 

not generally known, or the disclosure of additional details 

could reduce their effectiveness, Exemption 7(E) applies even 

where the identity of the techniques has been disclosed.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED as to the 

information withheld under FOIA Exemption 7(E).

(iv) Exemption 7(F)

Defendant invokes Exemption 7(F) to withhold information 

that could reasonably be expected to result in harm if released. 

Mot. at 17. Exemption 7(F) permits withholding records or 

information that, if disclosed, “could reasonably be expected to 

endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F). Defendant invokes Exemption 7(F) to 

prevent the release of the names of federal employees and third 

parties involved in investigating Ameen. Mot. at 17.

Because the Court finds Exemption 7(C) applies to that 

information, it need not make a finding on Exemption 7(F). See

Center for Nat. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 331 F.3d 

918, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reserving judgment on whether 7(F) 

would support withholding the names of detainees and lawyers 

when 7(A) was properly invoked).

b. Exemption 6

Defendant invokes Exemption 6 to withhold personal 

information belonging to third-party individuals who, unlike 

Ameen, did not consent to release of their information. Mot. at 

18. This exemption is applied to portions of all the documents 

at issue. Mot. at 10. Exemption 6 provides that “personnel and 

medical files and similar files” may be withheld if their 

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disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 

personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).

As with Exception 7(C), the Exemption 6 analysis involves a 

balancing of the privacy interest protected by withholding the 

documents against the public interest in their release. Forest 

Serv. Employees for Envt’l Ethics v. U.S. Forest Service, 524 

F.3d 1021, 1024 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2008). The only distinction 

between the two tests is the magnitude of the public interest 

required to override the privacy interests protected by the 

exemptions. Id. Under Exemption 6, the invasion of privacy 

must be “clearly unwarranted.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).

But, where the documents at issue are compiled for law 

enforcement purposes, only the lower requirement of Exemption 

7(C) must be met. See Lane, 523 F.3d at 1137 (where Exemption 

7(C) applies, the court need not reach whether the information 

might also be protected under Exemption 6). Because the thirdparty information was properly withheld under Exemption 7(C), 

the Court need not make a finding on Exemption 6.

3. The Segregability Requirement

Even where records fall within one of the exemptions, FOIA 

further requires disclosure of “any reasonably segregable 

portion of a record . . . after deletion of the portions which 

are exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). It is reversible error for a 

district court “to simply approve the withholding of an entire 

document without entering a finding on segregability, or the 

lack thereof.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Army, 611 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1979). Non-exempt portions of 

a document must be disclosed unless they are “inextricably 

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intertwined with exempt portions” to such a degree that 

separating the two would “impose significant costs on the agency 

and produce an edited document with little informational value.” 

Willamette Indus., Inc. v. United States, 689 F.2d 865, 867–68 

(9th Cir. 1982).

The burden of proof is on the agency to show that all 

reasonably segregable portions of a document have been 

segregated and disclosed. Pac. Fisheries Inc. v. United States, 

539 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2008). The agency must provide a 

detailed justification for its claim on non-segregability, but 

it is not obligated to provide so much detail that the exempt 

information would effectively be disclosed. Johnson v. Exec. 

Office for U.S. Attorneys, 310 F.3d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

The burden can be met with an affidavit containing reasonably 

detailed descriptions of the withheld portions of the documents 

and alleging facts sufficient to establish an exemption. Pac. 

Fisheries, 539 F.3d at 1148.

The Court finds that, between the Vaughn Index and the four 

declarations, Defendant has justified not disclosing the few 

documents withheld in full under Exemptions 7(C) and 7(E). See

Vaughn Index, Ex. A to Mot.; Fuentes Decl., ECF No. 21-9; 

Fuentes Suppl. Decl., ECF No. 30-1; Eggleston Decl.; ECF No. 21–

3; Suppl. Decl. of Jill Eggleston (“Eggleston Suppl. Decl.”), 

ECF No. 30-2. Those exemptions were validly applied. Defendant 

withheld those documents in their entirety only where it 

“determined that no further segregation . . . was possible 

without disclosing information that warrants protection under 

the law.” Eggleston Decl. ¶ 33.

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In sum, the Court finds Defendant failed to meet its burden 

with regard to Exemption 7(A) but has established the 

applicability of Exemptions 7(C) and 7(E) to these documents. 

Meanwhile, the Court need not make a finding on Exemptions 6 and 

7(F). Thus, because Exemptions 7(C) and 7(E) apply to all or 

portions of the documents that remain withheld, Defendant is not 

required to disclose the information protected by either of 

those exemptions.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 6, 2020

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