Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-01439/USCOURTS-caDC-96-01439-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Communications Commission
Appellee
Northeast Cellular Telephone Company, L.P.
Appellant
Portland Cellular Partnership
Intervenor
Saco River Cellular, Inc.
Intervenor for Petitioner

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 30, 1997 Decided January 16, 1998 

No. 91-1248

SACO RIVER CELLULAR, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

NORTHEAST CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY, L.P. AND 

PORTLAND CELLULAR PARTNERSHIP,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

Nos. 93-1423, 96-1439

________

Appeals from Orders of the 

Federal Communications Commission

Alan Y. Naftalin argued the cause for appellant Northeast 

Cellular Telephone Company, L.P., with whom Peter M. 

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 1 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Connolly, Carter G. Phillips and Stephen F. Smith were on 

the briefs.

Theresa Fenelon argued the cause for appellant Saco River 

Cellular, Inc., with whom Harold J. Carroll was on the briefs.

Laurence H. Schecker, Counsel, Federal Communications 

Commission, argued the cause for appellee, with whom William E. Kennard, General Counsel, Daniel M. Armstrong,

Associate General Counsel, and Roberta L. Cook, Counsel, 

were on the brief. John E. Ingle, Deputy Associate General 

Counsel, and Renee Licht, Counsel, entered appearances.

Anne M. Lobell, Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for amicus curiae United States of America, 

with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, 

U.S. Department of Justice, Mary Lou Leary, U.S. Attorney, 

Marleigh D. Dover, Special Counsel, U.S. Department of 

Justice, and Richard A. Olderman, Attorney, were on the 

brief.

Alan Y. Naftalin, Peter M. Connolly, Mark D. Schneider

and Michael A. Nemeroff were on the brief for intervenor 

Northeast Cellular Telephone Company, L.P. Herbert D. 

Miller, Jr. entered an appearance.

Theresa Fenelon and Harold J. Carroll were on the brief 

for intervenor Saco River Cellular, Inc.

L. Andrew Tollin and Michael Duele Sullivan were on the 

brief for intervenor Portland Cellular Partnership. Charles 

D. Ossola and Michael B. Barr entered appearances.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, and GINSBURG and TATEL, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Appellants Saco River Cellular, 

Inc. and Northeast Cellular Telephone Co., L.P., applicants 

for a license to provide cellular telephone service in the 

Portland, Maine area, challenge a series of decisions by the 

Federal Communications Commission culminating in the 

award of the license to Portland Cellular Partnership (PortCell). In the most recent decision under review, the Commission concluded that the 1995 amendments to the Paperwork 

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 2 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq., required it to reinstate PortCell's application, which it had previously dismissed, 

and consequently to award the license to PortCell. We agree 

that the 1995 amendments to the PRA obligated the Commission to reconsider its dismissal of PortCell's application. Accordingly, we affirm the agency order awarding the license to 

PortCell and dismiss as moot Saco River's challenge to the 

Commission's handling of its application.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1986 the Commission held a lottery for a license to offer 

cellular phone service in the Portland area. Seacoast Cellular, Inc. placed first among five applicants, followed by Saco 

River, Community Services Telephone Co., Northeast, and 

NYNEX Mobile Communications Co. Shortly thereafter Seacoast amended its application to substitute PortCell, a general 

partnership the original partners of which were Seacoast, 

NYNEX Mobile, and Community, as the winning applicant. 

(The current partners are Seacoast, NYNEX Mobile, and 

Lewiston-Auburn Cellular.)

Saco River and Northeast, the remaining two applicants, 

objected that PortCell was ineligible for a license because it 

had failed to "obtain a firm financial commitment for the 

financing necessary to construct and operate for one year its 

proposed cellular system and amend its application to so 

demonstrate," as required by 47 C.F.R. § 22.917(b)(1) (1986). 

The regulation then in force provided that:

The firm financial commitment ... shall be from a 

recognized bank or other financial institution and shall 

evidence the lender's determination that it has assessed 

the creditworthiness of the loan applicant and that it is 

committed to providing the necessary financing, including any actions required of the applicant to continue the 

commitment in force. Applicants obtaining financing 

from other than a recognized lending institution must 

submit proof that the financing entity has such funds 

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 3 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

available and uncommitted to another cellular application.

47 C.F.R. § 22.917(b)(1)(i) (1986). As evidence of the financial commitment it had obtained, PortCell submitted a letter 

of credit from NYNEX Credit Corp.

In 1989 the Commission agreed with Saco River and Northeast that PortCell's application was defective to the extent 

that the letter of credit did not include the terms of the 

proposed loan and failed to indicate that NYNEX Credit had 

assessed PortCell's creditworthiness. Nonetheless, the Commission waived the firm-financial-commitment requirement 

and granted the license to PortCell on the basis of the 

Commission's "lengthly [sic] experience in dealing with 

NYNEX Corporation and its various subsidiaries and affiliates." Portland Cellular Partnership, 4 FCC Rcd 2050, 2051 

(1989).

In 1990 this court vacated that decision as arbitrary and 

capricious because the waiver of the firm-financialcommitment requirement "was not based on any rational 

waiver policy." Northeast Cellular Telephone Co., L.P. v. 

FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1167. Upon remand the Commission, 

finding that it could not justify the waiver, dismissed PortCell's application as defective. Portland Cellular Partnership, 6 FCC Rcd 2283 (1991).

The Commission also dismissed Saco River's application as 

defective because Saco River's proposed service contour extended beyond the Portland service area. The Commission 

determined that, because the proposed extension involved 

more than de minimis encroachments into adjacent service 

areas, Saco River would not be permitted to amend its filing 

to bring it into compliance with the applicable rules. Id. at 

2284.

With PortCell and Saco River no longer in the running, the 

Commission designated Northeast as the tentative selectee. 

Id. Community filed a timely motion to reconsider. Nearly 

a year later PortCell filed its own petition to reconsider, 

arguing for the first time that the Commission had erred in 

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 4 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

dismissing its application because the firm-financialcommitment reporting requirement had not been approved by 

the Office of Management and Budget. The Paperwork 

Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq., provides that "[a]n 

agency shall not conduct or sponsor the collection of information unless in advance of the adoption or revision of the 

collection of information ... the Director [of the OMB] has 

approved the proposed collection of information." 44 U.S.C. 

§ 3507(a). The Commission responded that it had no authority to consider PortCell's petition because the petition was 

filed too late. Portland Cellular Partnership, 8 FCC Rcd 

4146, 4146 n.4 (1993).

In 1993 the Commission denied Community's petition for 

reconsideration, id. at 4149-50, and granted Northeast's application over the objections of Saco River and PortCell, id. at 

4150-52. PortCell filed a timely petition for reconsideration 

of the grant of Northeast's application. In addition, PortCell 

and Community filed petitions for further reconsideration of 

the dismissal of PortCell's application, with PortCell again 

raising its PRA objection.

In 1994 the Commission denied PortCell's and Community's petitions for further reconsideration of the order dismissing PortCell's application. In a somewhat different analysis 

than it had offered when it first denied PortCell's petition for 

reconsideration, the Commission explained that, because 

Community's original rehearing petition had been timely, the 

agency was free upon reconsideration thereof to entertain any 

relevant argument, including the PRA argument in PortCell's 

untimely petition. The Commission then declined to exercise 

its discretion to consider PortCell's "grossly untimely" PRA 

objection because

Port Cell's failure to avail itself of this argument when its 

compliance with [the Commission's] financial qualifications rule was first called into question imposed a particularly heavy burden on the resources of the court, the 

Commission and the other parties ... litigating the issue 

of Port Cell's compliance.

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 5 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Portland Cellular Partnership, 9 FCC Rcd 3291, 3292 (1994). 

Meanwhile, the Commission deferred reconsideration of its 

grant of Northeast's application, id. at 3291 n.2, and Northeast constructed a cellular system that has been operating in 

the Portland market since November 1994.

In 1995 the Congress added subsection (b) to the "public 

protection" provision of the PRA. The amended version 

provides:

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 

person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to 

comply with a collection of information that is subject to 

this chapter if

(1) the collection of information does not display a 

valid control number assigned by the Director [of the 

OMB] in accordance with this chapter;....

(b) The protection provided by this section may be 

raised in the form of a complete defense, bar, or otherwise at any time during the agency administrative process or judicial action applicable thereto.

44 U.S.C. § 3512. PortCell then filed yet another petition for 

reconsideration, this time asserting that § 3512(b) requires 

the Commission to consider its PRA argument.

In 1996 the Commission agreed that because the administrative proceedings were still ongoing, the amended statute 

required it to consider PortCell's PRA defense. The Commission then determined that it had violated the PRA by 

dismissing PortCell's application on the basis of an unapproved request for information about financial commitments. 

Portland Cellular Partnership, 11 FCC Rcd 19997, 20001-06 

(1996). Accordingly, the Commission allowed PortCell to 

amend its application to satisfy the firm-financial-commitment 

requirement, and PortCell submitted a 1995 letter of credit 

from Fleet Bank of Maine. Although this financial showing 

did not illuminate what commitment, if any, PortCell had 

obtained as of the time of its selection in 1986, the Commission accepted PortCell's amendment in satisfaction of the 

firm-financial-commitment requirement. The Commission 

thereupon rescinded its grant of the license to Northeast and 

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 6 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

awarded the license to PortCell. Id. at 20013. Upon the 

motion of Northeast, this court stayed the Commission's 1996 

order pending judicial review.

Both Northeast and Saco River appealed. Because Saco 

River placed second behind PortCell in the lottery for the 

Portland license, however, we need consider Saco River's 

challenge to the dismissal of its application only if we determine that the Commission erred in awarding the license to 

PortCell.

II. ANALYSIS

Northeast presents six arguments why the Commission 

erred when it revoked Northeast's license to serve the Portland market: (1) the Communications Act prevents the Commission from considering PortCell's belated argument invoking the PRA; the Commission's application of § 3512(b) of 

the PRA to this case (2) is an impermissible retroactive 

application of the new statute, and (3) reverses this court's 

1990 decision in Northeast v. FCC, in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine; (4) the lack of an OMB control 

number does not excuse PortCell's failure to comply with the 

statutory requirement to submit information to the Commission; (5) the OMB approved the firm-financial-commitment 

rule before it was "enforced" against PortCell; and (6) the 

firm-financial-commitment requirement is a substantive requirement for a license, not merely a collection of information. 

For the reasons detailed below, we reject all these arguments 

and affirm the Commission's 1996 order.

A. Did § 3512 Require the Commission to Consider PortCell's PRA Defense?

In the order under review the Commission acknowledged 

that "strong policy reasons" counseled against considering 

PortCell's PRA defense. 11 FCC Rcd at 20001. The Commission believed that it was required to do so, however, 

because it understood the 1995 amendments to the PRA as 

allowing any adversely affected person "to raise PRA violaUSCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 7 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

tions without limitation, so long as the administrative or 

judicial process in connection with a particular license or with 

a particular application continues." Id. at 20003. We agree 

with that reading of the Act as amended.

1. The Communications Act

According to Northeast, the Commission violated §§ 402(h) 

and 405(a) of the Communications Act when it considered 

PortCell's PRA defense. Section 402(h) requires the Commission, after a case has been remanded by this court, to give 

effect to our judgment "upon the basis of the proceedings 

already had and the record upon which [the] appeal was 

heard and determined." 47 U.S.C. § 402(h). Section 405(a) 

establishes a 30-day deadline for filing petitions for reconsideration. 47 U.S.C. § 405(a). The Commission responded to 

Northeast's argument as follows:

We are not waiving the financial qualification requirements for licensees in contravention of the court's mandate. Instead, we are considering whether the financial 

qualification requirement regulation is valid and enforceable under the PRA. Section 402(h) does not restrict us 

from doing so. In any event, Section 3512 of the PRA 

... overrides any restriction 402(h) might place on our 

consideration of PRA issues in a proceeding on remand 

from a court.

11 FCC Rcd at 20005.

We need not address today what restrictions §§ 402(h) and 

405(a) of the Communications Act impose when § 3512 of the 

PRA is not invoked. Because § 3512 of the PRA applies by 

its terms "notwithstanding any other provision of law," we 

agree with the Commission that § 3512 "simply trumps Section 405(a) and, to the extent it might be relevant, Section 

402(h)." Id. at 20003; see Liberty Maritime Corp. v. United 

States, 928 F.2d 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (similar "notwithstanding" clause "supercede[s] all other laws").

2. Retroactivity

Northeast argues that applying the PRA amendments to 

this case contravenes the principle that retroactivity is not 

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 8 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

favored in the law. As we recently noted, however, in 

determining whether a statute has retroactive effect it is 

necessary "to examine the temporal relationship between the 

statute and the activity the statute is meant to govern." 

Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State, 104 F.3d 1349, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Section 

3512(b) requires that, from October 1, 1995 onward, agencies 

and courts entertain arguments that would otherwise have 

been barred either by a statute of limitations or by the 

proponent's failure to have made the argument at an earlier 

stage in the administrative or judicial process. In this case, 

the Commission had dismissed PortCell's PRA defense as 

untimely without ruling upon the merits of it; the PRA 

amendments merely required the Commission, when the issue 

was raised anew, to make that ruling. Because § 3512(b) 

governs only the conduct of litigation after the effective date 

of the statute and does nothing to reopen matters litigated 

before that date, it does not offend any norm against retroactive lawmaking.

Nor is a statute retroactive "merely because it is applied in 

a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment or upsets expectations based in prior law." Landgraf v. 

USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994). By permitting 

parties to raise the PRA issue at any time in ongoing 

proceedings, the statute does not "impair rights a party 

possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past 

conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions 

already completed." Id. at 280. Rather, it simply prevents 

an agency or court from refusing to consider a PRA argument on the ground that it is untimely.

We conclude that the Commission correctly interpreted the 

amended statute as requiring it to consider PortCell's PRA 

defense when that defense was raised in the ongoing proceedings upon remand.

3. Separation of powers

Northeast argues that even if § 3512(b) can be applied to 

ongoing proceedings in other circumstances, its application in 

this case would effectively reverse our decision in Northeast 

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 9 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

v. FCC, in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine as 

the Supreme Court interpreted it in Plaut v. Spendthrift 

Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). Plaut was a sequel to 

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 

U.S. 350 (1991), in which the Court had announced a new 

statute-of-limitations rule for certain securities fraud suits. 

The Congress had responded to the Lampf, Pleva decision by 

passing a law purporting to revive suits that had been dismissed in the wake of Lampf, Pleva, but the Court held in 

Plaut that, as an attempt by the Congress to reopen a final 

judgment, the new law was unconstitutional. 514 U.S. at 225. 

According to Northeast, application of § 3512(b) in this case 

would likewise nullify this court's determination in Northeast,

which became final when PortCell failed to seek review in the 

Supreme Court, that the Commission "must disqualify" PortCell's application if the agency could adduce no rational 

waiver policy to support it. 897 F.2d at 1167.

Plaut is no bar to the application of § 3512 to the present 

case, however, because no party in Northeast raised, and we 

did not purport to resolve, the PRA issue. Nor did we 

render a final judgment terminating the case; rather we 

remanded it to the Commission for further proceedings. For 

the Commission and the court to apply § 3512 to this case 

after October 1, 1995, therefore, is merely to follow the rule, 

which the Supreme Court acknowledged in Plaut itself, that 

"each court, at every level, must 'decide according to existing 

laws.' " 514 U.S. at 226 (quoting United States v. The 

Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801)).

B. Did the Commission Violate the PRA?

The public protection provision of the PRA provides that 

"no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to 

comply with a collection of information" that lacks a currently 

valid OMB control number. 44 U.S.C. § 3512(a). When 

PortCell filed its application, the Commission had not obtained OMB approval for the firm-financial-commitment filing 

requirement then codified at 47 C.F.R. § 22.917(b) (1986). 

Therefore, to the extent that § 22.917(b) mandated a collecUSCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 10 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

tion of information, the Commission could not lawfully penalize PortCell for failing to comply with it.

Northeast makes three arguments for the proposition that 

§ 3512 of the PRA does not prevent the Commission from 

punishing PortCell for failing to comply with § 22.917(b): 

First, the mandate to demonstrate a firm financial commitment originated with the Congress (as opposed to the Commission); therefore PortCell was obligated to comply with the 

filing requirement regardless of the Commission's failure to 

comply with the PRA. Second, the Commission's failure to 

comply with the PRA was at most harmless error because the 

Commission had obtained an OMB control number for 

§ 22.917(b) by the time it penalized PortCell. Third, 

§ 22.917(b) is a substantive legal requirement rather than a 

"collection of information" requirement. For the reasons set 

out below, we reject these three arguments and conclude that 

the Commission was obliged, as it held, to permit PortCell to 

amend its application in order to demonstrate that it had 

complied with § 22.917(b).

1. Statutory obligation

Northeast contends that the requirement that an applicant 

demonstrate a firm financial commitment is a statutory obligation and therefore not subject to the PRA. The OMB's 

regulations clearly state that § 3512 "does not preclude the 

imposition of a penalty on a person for failing to comply with 

a collection of information that is imposed ... by statute," 5 

C.F.R. 1320.6(e), and we shall assume that is a reasonable 

interpretation of the law.

As the OMB has explained, however, that principle "does 

not extend to situations in which a statute authorizes, or 

directs, an agency to impose a collection of information on 

persons, and the agency does so." Controlling Paperwork 

Burdens on the Public; Regulatory Changes Reflecting Recodification of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 

30438, 30441 (1995). That is all that has happened here. 

Section 308(b) of the Communications Act provides that "[a]ll 

applications for station licenses ... shall set forth such facts 

as the Commission by regulation may prescribe as to the ... 

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 11 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

financial ... qualifications of the applicant to operate the 

station." 47 U.S.C. § 308(b). The Commission duly required 

that each applicant submit information showing that it had a 

firm financial commitment. There is no collection of information imposed by statute, much less a specific congressional 

command to provide information showing a firm financial 

commitment. The Congress merely authorized, it did not 

require, the Commission to collect information regarding the 

financial qualifications of applicants for a license. Accordingly, the Commission must itself have complied with the PRA 

before it may enforce that information collection requirement 

under § 308 of the Communications Act.

2. Harmless error

Northeast argues that the Commission's temporary failure 

to adhere to the PRA was harmless as far as PortCell is 

concerned. The OMB issued a control number for the firmfinancial-commitment regulation in 1990, which was after the 

information was collected from PortCell but before the Commission dismissed PortCell's application (in 1991) for failure 

to comply with the regulation. Northeast reminds us that the 

PRA "does not prevent the promulgation of a rule, only its 

enforcement." Dithiocarbamate Task Force v. EPA, 98 F.3d 

1394, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Northeast's argument loses sight of the Congress's purpose 

in enacting the PRAto "minimize the paperwork burden for 

individuals, small businesses, educational and nonprofit institutions, Federal contractors, State, local and tribal governments, and other persons." 44 U.S.C. § 3501(1). In order to 

fulfill that purpose, the PRA must protect a member of the 

public when the agency imposes the paperwork burden upon 

it, not merely when the agency relies upon the paperwork in 

making a decision, which (as this case illustrates) can be 

years later. Therefore, an agency may not, having belatedly 

gotten OMB approval of an information collection requirement, punish a respondent for its faulty compliance while the 

collection was still unauthorized. Because § 22.917(b) lacked 

a control number when the Commission required that PortCell submit information about its financial commitment, the 

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 12 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Commission could not punish PortCell for failing to submit 

the information it required.

3. Not a collection of information

The regulation in force at the time PortCell became the 

tentative selectee required that a cellular applicant "obtain a 

firm financial commitment for the financing necessary to 

construct and operate for one year its proposed cellular 

system and amend its application to so demonstrate." 47 

C.F.R. § 22.917(b)(1)(1986). Northeast submits that this regulation is not a "collection of information" within the meaning 

of the PRA because it requires the tentative selectee not 

merely to provide information about but actually to obtain a 

firm financial commitment. The Commission, on the other 

hand, considers the regulation to be a collection of information because the selectee must provide the Commission with 

evidence of the commitment.

Clearly enough the regulation imposes both a substantive 

and a reporting requirement. The selectee must obtain a 

firm financial commitment as a precondition to receiving a 

license, and it must amend its application to demonstrate that 

it has obtained the commitment. The latter requirement is a 

collection of information; therefore, the Commission may not 

punish a selectee for failing to provide the information unless 

it has first obtained a valid OMB control number.

In the present case the letter of credit from NYNEX 

Credit that PortCell submitted in 1986 was "incomplete because it failed to provide all of the evidence required by the 

regulation" and thus " 'failed to comply' with the requirement 

of the information collection." 11 FCC Rcd at 20007. The 

1986 letter of credit did not, however, demonstrate that 

PortCell had failed to obtain the required firm financial 

commitment, and the Commission did not fault PortCell on 

that substantive ground. Therefore, this case involves PortCell's failure to comply with a collection of information that 

lacks an OMB control number and not, as Northeast would 

have it, PortCell's failure to fulfill an underlying substantive 

requirement. Accordingly, we have no occasion to decide 

whether the PRA prevents an agency from punishing a party 

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 13 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

for a failure to fulfill a substantive legal requirement that is 

brought to light only because that substantive requirement is 

also the subject of an information collection requirement.

C. Did the Commission Rely upon Inapposite Information in 

Granting the License to PortCell?

The OMB regulations implementing the PRA require that 

where, as here,

an agency has imposed a collection of information as a 

means for proving or satisfying a condition for the receipt of a benefit or the avoidance of a penalty, and the 

collection of information does not display a currently 

valid OMB control number ... [the agency must] permit 

respondents to prove or satisfy the legal conditions in 

any other reasonable manner.

5 C.F.R. § 1320.6(c). Hence, the Commission appropriately 

allowed PortCell to amend its application in order to demonstrate that it had obtained the firm financial commitment that 

is a prerequisite to receiving a license to provide cellular 

service.

We note that the Commission disqualified PortCell for want 

of evidence that PortCell had obtained a firm financial commitment as of 1986, while PortCell's amended application 

demonstrates only that it had obtained a firm financial commitment as of 1995; the amendment sheds no light upon what 

commitment, if any, PortCell had obtained in 1986. Cf., e.g., 

Pontchartrain Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 15 F.3d 183, 184 

(D.C. Cir. 1994) ("In cases involving amendment of an applicant's initial financial certification, the Commission generally 

requires that the applicant also demonstrate that it had a 

reasonable assurance of financing at the time that it made its 

initial certification." (citing Aspen FM, Inc., 6 FCC Rcd 1602, 

1603-04 (1991))). At oral argument Northeast responded to 

an inquiry from the court by arguing for the first time that 

the Commission erred in accepting PortCell's amendment 

because it failed to demonstrate that it had a firm financial 

commitment as of 1986. As the Commission correctly noted 

in its 1996 order, however, before the agency "Northeast [did] 

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 14 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

not oppose the amendment or argue that it is insufficient." 

11 FCC Rcd at 20008. Because no one challenged the 

amendment as anachronous before the Commission, the agency did not have an opportunity to consider that charge. 

Therefore, the issue was neither preserved nor presented for 

our review, and we do not pass upon it. Cf. United States v. 

Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952) ("Simple fairness 

to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and 

to litigants, requires as a general rule that court should not 

topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative 

body not only has erred but has erred against objection made 

at the time appropriate under its practice"); Center for Auto 

Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Such an 

ambush at this late stage cannot be allowed").

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons we affirm the Commission's 

order rescinding the grant of the Portland, Maine Block B 

cellular license to Northeast, reinstating PortCell's application, and granting the license to PortCell. Accordingly, we 

vacate our order of March 10, 1997 staying the Commission's 

order, and we dismiss as moot Saco River's challenges to the 

Commission's handling of its application for a cellular license.

It is so ordered.

USCA Case #96-1439 Document #324115 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 15 of 15