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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Fredrick Worrills
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-12248

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 4:15-cr-00001-CDL-MSH-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

FREDRICK WORRILLS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

________________________

(April 19, 2016)

Before MARTIN, JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Fredrick Worrills appeals his 78-month prison sentence, which was imposed 

after he pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2113(a). Worrills argues that the district court erred by applying a two-level 

enhancement for making a “threat of death” during the robbery. United States 

Sentencing Guidelines § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). First, Worrills asserts that his statement 

that he had a gun would not instill a fear of death in a reasonable person on these

facts. Second, Worrills contends that this enhancement amounted to impermissible 

double counting because a “threat of death,” as we have construed that term, is 

inherent in every bank robbery. After careful consideration, we affirm Worrills’s 

sentence.

I.

Worrills robbed a bank after he discovered that his account there was 

overdrawn. Around midday on December 17, 2014, Worrills visited a Bank of 

America branch and tried to make a withdrawal. The teller informed Worrills that 

his account had a negative balance and that he would need to deposit $381 to have 

it reactivated. Worrills declined to do so and left.

Two hours later, Worrills returned to the bank. He approached the same 

teller with a deposit slip in one hand and his other hand out of sight, possibly in the 

pocket of his hoodie. Worrills said to the teller, “I’ve got a gun, just give me the 

money.” The teller later reported that she could tell from Worrills’s demeanor that 

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he wasn’t joking. Worrills then handed over the deposit slip, on which he had 

written, “Give me all your money, I’ve got a gun.” In these circumstances, the 

teller was “placed [] in fear” and surrendered $3,764 to Worrills. Worrills left the 

bank. On December 26, 2014, he turned himself in. During questioning, he denied 

that he had a gun during the robbery.

II.

We review a district court’s application and interpretation of the Guidelines 

de novo. United States v. Murphy, 306 F.3d 1087, 1089 (11th Cir. 2002) (per 

curiam). We also review de novo whether an enhancement constitutes double 

counting. United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1315 (11th Cir. 2009). 

A two-level sentencing enhancement applies when a “threat of death” was 

made during a robbery. USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). The defendant need not 

expressly threaten to kill the victim; engaging in any conduct “that would instill in 

a reasonable person . . . a fear of death” is sufficient. Id. § 2B3.1, cmt. n.6. This 

Court has held that statements to the effect of “I have a gun” support a threat-ofdeath enhancement. See Murphy, 306 F.3d at 1089. This is because “[a] 

reasonable bank teller given [such a note] would reasonably have this reaction: ‘If I 

do not give this robber money . . . , I will be shot; and people who are shot often 

die.’” Id.

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Double counting occurs “when one part of the Guidelines is applied to 

increase a defendant’s punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already 

been fully accounted for by application of another part of the Guidelines.” United 

States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). 

However, double counting is permitted if the Sentencing Commission intended the 

result and each section is conceptually separate. Id. at 1227. “Absent a specific 

direction to the contrary, we presume that the Sentencing Commission intended to 

apply separate sections cumulatively.” Kapordelis, 569 F.3d at 1315.

III.

The district court did not err by applying the threat-of-death enhancement. 

The test is whether Worrills’s conduct would instill a fear of death in a reasonable 

person in the teller’s circumstances. See Murphy, 306 F.3d at 1089. Verbally and 

in a demand note, Worrills ordered the teller to give him money and stated that he 

had a gun. The teller could not see one of Worrills’s hands because he kept it 

below the counter. She reported that this conduct “placed her in fear . . . , which 

caused her to then provide the money.” Under this Court’s precedent, such 

conduct was sufficient to support a threat-of-death enhancement. See id.

Worrills argues that mitigating circumstances made it unreasonable for the 

teller to fear death—namely, she recognized him as a customer from his earlier 

visit. Worrills bases this “mitigating circumstances” theory on two out-of-circuit 

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cases. In these cases, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits recognized a “rare,” 

“unusual” exception to the general rule that statements to the effect of “I have a 

gun” support a threat-of-death enhancement. United States v. Wooten, 689 F.3d 

570, 576 n.3 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Gibson, 155 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 

1998). When “unique factual circumstances . . . prevent[] the case from fitting the 

standard [threat-of-death] mold,” this exception may apply. Wooten, 689 F.3d at 

576 n.3. 

In Wooten, the exception applied because: (1) the defendant was calm, 

placed both hands on the bank counter, and seemed to be joking; (2) the robbery 

did not include “hallmarks of experienced bank robbers” like a demand note or a 

mask; and (3) the teller reported that he never felt threatened or afraid. Id. at 572–

73, 578–79. Even if we were to adopt this exception, it would not apply here 

because no mitigating circumstances are present: Worrills kept one hand out of 

sight, had a serious demeanor, used a demand note, and frightened the teller. The 

fact that Worrills was a customer with an overdrawn, inactivated account does not 

mitigate his threat. If anything, it amplifies his threat because it shows he was 

desperate for money.

Nor did the district court err by rejecting Worrills’s claim of double 

counting. Bank robbery is defined as taking from a bank, credit union, or savings 

and loan association “by force and violence, or by intimidation.” 18 U.S.C. 

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§ 2113(a). Making a “threat of death” is not included as an element of the offense. 

See id. Bank robbery triggers a base offense level of 20, to which the threat-ofdeath enhancement is separately added. USSG § 2B3.1(a), (b)(2)(F). Worrills 

argues that his method of intimidating the teller (saying he had a gun) was “the 

least dangerous or consequential way” to get the money—nothing less serious 

would have worked. Thus, Worrills claims, his intimidating conduct was an 

inherent part of bank robbery, and using it to enhance his sentence is impermissible 

double counting.

We reject Worrills’s contention that making a threat of death, as we have 

construed that term, is inherent in every bank robbery. Worrills minimizes the 

effect of his words when he argues that threatening the teller with a gun was “the 

only way that [] Worrills could reasonably expect the teller to comply with his 

demand.” There are surely less dangerous or consequential ways to get the money 

from tellers, who are typically trained not to offer resistance. Because threatening 

victims with death goes beyond mere intimidation, “[t]he harm at which the 

[threat-of-death] enhancement is aimed is conceptually distinct from the harm that 

[Worrills’s robbery] caused.” Dudley, 463 F.3d at 1227. This conclusion is 

bolstered by the presumption that the Sentencing Commission intends to apply 

separate sections cumulatively. See Kapordelis, 569 F.3d at 1315.

For these reasons, we affirm Worrills’s sentence. 

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AFFIRMED.

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