Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03132/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03132-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dannie Jones
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 20, 2010 Decided June 28, 2011

No. 09-3132

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DANNIE JONES, ALSO KNOWN AS SMILEY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cr-00118)

Gregory Stuart Smith, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Stephanie C. Brenowitz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Elizabeth

Trosman, Darlene M. Soltys, John K. Han, and B. Patrick

Costello, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: TATEL, GARLAND, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Dannie Jones pled guilty to

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 100

grams or more of heroin. Although Jones faced a mandatory life

sentence if he went to trial and lost, his plea agreement provided

for a sentence of sixty months. Before he was sentenced,

however, Jones moved to withdraw his guilty plea, maintaining

that he had not understood that he was pleading guilty to

conspiracy. The district court denied the motion and sentenced

Jones to the agreed-upon term. On appeal, Jones contends that

the district court abused its discretion both in denying his motion

and in failing to order a competency hearing before doing so. 

We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment of the

district court. 

I

On October 23, 2008, a grand jury charged Jones and seven

co-defendants with a variety of drug trafficking offenses. Jones

was included in two counts of the 39-count indictment: Count

One, which charged each defendant with conspiracy to distribute

and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of

heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A)(i); and Count 38, which charged Jones with

distributing heroin on a specific date (February 15, 2008), in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). If convicted,

Jones faced a mandatory statutory sentence of life in prison in

light of his prior drug trafficking convictions. Initial Sentencing

Hr’g Tr. 6-7 (Mar. 18, 2009).

The government’s theory was that Jones was a street-level

dealer in a drug operation run by Rex Pelote and Edward Farley,

who conspired with Jones and numerous others to distribute

heroin in the area of Langston Terrace in the District of

Columbia. According to the government’s proffers to the

district court: Pelote would purchase the heroin wholesale; a coUSCA Case #09-3132 Document #1315516 Filed: 06/28/2011 Page 2 of 17
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conspirator named Shannon would divide it into $10 ziplock

bags; Pelote, Shannon, and Farley would allocate it to street

dealers; the street dealers, including Jones, would distribute it;

and Shannon would then collect the proceeds from the dealers

for delivery to Pelote. See Plea Hr’g Tr. 14, 33-34, 61-62 (Jan.

6, 2009). As part of the government’s investigation: an

undercover officer bought heroin from Jones in Langston

Terrace on February 15, 2008; officers videotaped Jones

conducting other drug transactions in the area with several of the

co-conspirators; government wiretaps intercepted telephone

conversations in which Farley discussed how many ziplocks to

give Jones and how much Jones still owed for prior sales;

additional wiretaps captured Jones calling Farley to advise him

that customers were out seeking drugs; and still other wiretaps

captured Jones warning Farley that police were in the area. See

id. at 61-62; Initial Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 8-10 (Mar. 18, 2009);

Status Hr’g Tr. 5-6 (Aug. 10, 2009).

On January 6, 2009, the day the trial was set to begin, Jones

and two co-defendants entered guilty pleas. Jones, represented

by appointed counsel, pled guilty to a lesser-included offense of

Count One of the indictment -- conspiracy to distribute and

possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(i) --

with an agreed-upon sentence of sixty months’ imprisonment

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).1

 Prior to

entering the plea, Jones had signed the government’s factual

proffer, acknowledging that it was true. App. 32-36. Referring

to the proffer, the court confirmed with Jones that: he “worked

1

Rule 11(c)(1)(C) provides that a plea agreement may specify that

the government will “agree that a specific sentence . . . is the

appropriate disposition of the case.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 

“[S]uch a recommendation . . . binds the court once the court accepts

the plea agreement.” Id.

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with Rex Pelote and Edward Farley and others to sell heroin in

Langston Terrace”; he was “doing hand-to-hand heroin sales on

the street”; although he was “getting the heroin that [he was]

selling from someone named Shannon, [he] knew that Shannon

was getting it from Rex Pelote”; and, he “would get the money

from the sales[,] would give the money back to Shannon,

and . . . knew that Shannon would get the money back to

Pelote.” Plea Hr’g Tr. 33-34 (Jan. 6, 2009). 

On March 18, 2009, at what was to have been his

sentencing hearing, Jones moved to withdraw his plea. He told

the judge that he had thought he “was taking a plea to possession

of -- distributing heroin, not conspiracy.” Initial Sentencing

Hr’g Tr. 10 (Mar. 18, 2009). “What I have here is one sale,” he

said. “I admit to selling that, but it was less than 100

grams . . . less than . . . half a gram of heroin.” Id. at 9-10 He

did not, he said, want “to take a cop to 100 grams.” Id. at 10. 

Jones’ counsel advised the court that Jones had “refused to

discuss the situation” the last three times counsel had gone to

see him, and for that reason counsel had filed a motion to

withdraw from the representation. Id. The court then granted

counsel’s motion, continued the defendant’s sentencing, and

subsequently appointed new counsel.

Jones’ new counsel appeared with him for a status hearing

on May 8, 2009. Counsel reported that Jones had refused to talk

to her as well. In response to a question from the court

regarding the status of the guilty plea, Jones again said that he

“thought [he] was pleading guilty to my sales that they said I

had made, not to no conspiracy, not to no 100 grams.” Status

Hr’g Tr. 2 (May 8, 2009). He told the court that he did not want

his new attorney, and that he would seek to retain a lawyer or

possibly represent himself. The court noted that Jones was

refusing to cooperate with a psychologist the court had asked to

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screen him, and postponed the sentencing to allow Jones to

obtain counsel. 

The court held two more status hearings before conducting

Jones’ sentencing. At the first hearing, the court explained that

Jones had requested another appointed counsel because he had

been unable to retain one on his own. Jones told the court that

he still wanted to withdraw his plea, and the court appointed a

third lawyer for him. Status Hr’g Tr. 2-4 (Aug. 10, 2009). At

the second and final status hearing, Jones’ newly appointed

counsel reported that Jones had refused to see him when he

twice visited Jones at the jail. The court told Jones that it was

not inclined to grant his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and

that sentencing would proceed the next day. The court observed

that there was “nothing incompetent” about Jones; he was just

being “obstinate.” Status Hr’g Tr. 7 (Nov. 23, 2009).

Jones’ sentencing hearing took place on November 24,

2009. The court stated for the record that Jones was going to

represent himself, but that the last attorney the court had

appointed was present to serve as stand-by counsel if Jones

chose to consult him.

The court first addressed the question of Jones’

competency. It noted that Jones’ second attorney had suggested

that Jones was incompetent and had asked the court to order a

psychological screening. The court had just received the report

from the psychologist, who advised that Jones had refused to

cooperate, telling her: “I won’t take the exam. I know what I’m

doing. I’ll see the judge in court.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 4 (Nov.

24, 2009). Although the psychologist recommended that Jones

be sent to an inpatient facility for a competency examination, the

judge declined, saying: “I’ve been observing you in court on the

several occasions you’ve been here . . . . I don’t think there’s

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anything wrong with your head. I think you’re perfectly

competent.” Id. at 5. 

The court then proceeded to consider Jones’ motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. Jones again said that he had not

understood he was pleading to a conspiracy, and that he just

wanted to plead to the “10 ziplocks that I supposedly sold to the

undercover police officer.” Id. at 6-8. Jones admitted that he

“bought them from Shannon” and that he knew Shannon got the

bags from Farley. Id. at 8. Then, for the first time, he asserted

that he bought the ziplocks for his own personal use, and that he

“didn’t sell no drugs to nobody.” Id.

Applying the factors that this circuit has held relevant to

motions to withdraw guilty pleas, the district court concluded

that Jones did not proffer a “fair and just reason” to justify

withdrawal of the guilty plea. Id. at 17. The court found that

Jones did not present “a viable claim of innocence,” that the

government would be “considerably” -- although “maybe not

horrendously” -- prejudiced by withdrawal, and that there was

“no taint” in the colloquy the court had conducted when it took

Jones’ plea on January 6. Id. at 17-18.

Finally, the court proceeded to sentencing. Jones was given

an opportunity to consult with stand-by counsel, which Jones

agreed to do. After the consultation, counsel asked the court to

impose the agreed-upon 60 months’ incarceration. The court

imposed the 60-month sentence, notwithstanding that the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines range for the offense to which Jones pled

was 188-235 months.2

 This appeal followed. 

2

See Presentence Investigation Report ¶ 104; supra note 1.

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II

Jones asserts that the district court committed two errors. 

First, he contends that the court erred in denying his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea because he presented a “fair and just

reason” for withdrawal. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B). 

Second, he argues that, even if he did not present a fair and just

reason, the court erred in denying the motion without first

holding a competency hearing. We address these contentions

below.3

A

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets

forth the requirements for judicial consideration and acceptance

of guilty pleas, as well as for the withdrawal of such pleas. Rule

11(d) provides that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea prior

to sentencing if he “can show a fair and just reason for

requesting the withdrawal.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B). 

“Although [w]ithdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing is to

be liberally granted, we review a district court’s refusal to

permit withdrawal only for abuse of discretion.” United States

v. Curry, 494 F.3d 1124, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted); see United States v.

3

Jones further contends that his sentencing counsel was

ineffective in not asking the district court to recommend that he be

placed in the Bureau of Prisons’ Residential Drug Abuse Program. 

This claim is raised for the first time on appeal, and it is “‘this court’s

general practice . . . to remand [such a] claim for an evidentiary

hearing unless the trial record alone conclusively shows that the

defendant either is or is not entitled to relief.’” United States v.

Shabban, 612 F.3d 693, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting United

States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 909-10 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). As the trial

record does not resolve the issue, we remand so that the district court

may address it in the first instance.

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Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Reversal is

“uncommon.” United States v. Shah, 453 F.3d 520, 522 (D.C.

Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014,

1017 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 

In reviewing a district court’s refusal to permit withdrawal,

this court considers three factors: “‘(1) whether the defendant

has asserted a viable claim of innocence; (2) whether the delay

between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw has

substantially prejudiced the government’s ability to prosecute

the case; and (3) whether the guilty plea was somehow tainted.’” 

Curry, 494 F.3d at 1128 (quoting, inter alia, United States v.

McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The third factor --

taint -- is the “most important,” United States v. Ford, 993 F.2d

249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1993), while the second -- prejudice -- “has

never been dispositive in our cases,” Hanson, 339 F.3d at 988. 

We will therefore re-order the factors and consider them in the

order of their importance. See United States v. Robinson, 587

F.3d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d

1203, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

1. The gravamen of Jones’ claim of taint is that he thought

he was merely pleading guilty to a single sale of 10 ziplocks of

heroin to an undercover officer, and that he did not understand

that he was actually pleading guilty to a conspiracy involving

100 or more grams of the drug. It is hard to see how this could

have been so.

The district court’s first question to Jones at the plea

hearing was whether he wanted to enter a plea of guilty to

“conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute

100 grams or more” of heroin. Plea Hr’g Tr. 22 (Jan. 6, 2009). 

Jones said: “Yes, I do.” Id; see also id. at 32 (statement by the

court that the guilty plea is to “conspiracy”). The court also

asked whether Jones had read and understood his plea

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agreement; Jones confirmed that he had, and that he had gone

over it with his attorney. Id. at 23. The first line of that

agreement, which Jones signed, states that Jones agreed to

“enter a plea of guilty to Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess

with Intent to Distribute 100 grams or more” of heroin. App.

37 (bolding in original). See id. at 38 (acknowledging that the

defendant “is accountable for at least 100 grams but less than

400 grams of heroin” (bolding in original)). Finally, the court

confirmed with Jones that he had “signed a piece of paper called

a factual proffer in support of guilty plea.” Plea Hr’g Tr. 32

(Jan. 6, 2009). The first line of that proffer likewise stated that

Jones had agreed to enter a plea of guilty to “Conspiracy to

Distribute and Possess with the Intent to Distribute 100 grams

or more” of heroin. App. 32. 

Nor is there room for an argument that the district court

failed to sufficiently explain the meaning of the offense to which

Jones was pleading. As Jones concedes, “the district judge did

separately state that ‘a conspiracy is an agreement between two

or more people to violate the law,’ and that ‘the basic charge

here . . . is that you were working together with other people in

the heroin distribution business.’” Appellant’s Reply Br. 4

(referencing Plea Hr’g Tr. 32 (Jan. 6, 2009)). Indeed, the court

did more. Referring to the factual proffer, the court confirmed

with Jones that: he “worked with Rex Pelote and Edward Farley

and others to sell heroin in Langston Terrace”; he was “doing

hand-to-hand heroin sales on the street”; although he was

“getting the heroin that [he was] selling from someone named

Shannon, [he] knew that Shannon was getting it from Rex

Pelote”; and, he “would get the money from the sales[,] would

give the money back to Shannon, and . . . knew that Shannon

would get the money back to Pelote.” Plea Hr’g Tr. 33-34 (Jan.

6, 2009). The factual proffer further advised Jones that “the

essential elements” of the conspiracy offense to which he was

pleading were: “1. That an agreement existed between two or

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more persons to commit the crimes of distribution and

possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance;

and 2. That the defendant intentionally joined in that

agreement.” App. 32 (citing United States v. Lam Kwong Wah,

924 F.2d 298, 302-03 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v.

Pumphrey, 831 F.2d 307, 308-09 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). We detect

no error in any of this, and no basis for believing that Jones

failed to understand he was pleading guilty to a conspiracy

involving 100 or more grams of heroin. 

As this court has previously explained, “[i]f we determine

that there was no error in the taking of the defendant’s plea, we

will be extremely reluctant to reverse the district court, even if

the defendant makes out a legally cognizable defense to the

charges against him.” Cray, 47 F.3d at 1208; accord Robinson,

587 F.3d at 1131. “That is, a defendant who fails to show some

error under Rule 11 has to shoulder an extremely heavy burden

if he is ultimately to prevail.” Cray, 47 F.3d at 1208; accord

Robinson, 587 F.3d at 1131. Jones has shown no error, and we

now turn to the remaining factors to determine whether he has

met that burden.

2. Jones maintains that he asserted a viable claim of

innocence in the district court. “To satisfy this standard, an

appellant ‘must do more than make a general denial in order to

put the Government to its proof; he must affirmatively advance

an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent, for he

has waived his right simply to try his luck before a jury.’” 

Robinson, 587 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Curry, 494 F.3d at 1129

(quoting Cray, 47 F.3d at 1209)).

The district court found that Jones did not advance a viable

claim, given his previous admissions that he sold drugs he

bought from Shannon and that he knew the drugs had come from

the alleged co-conspirators. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 8 (Nov. 24,

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2009). The court indicated that Jones had thus admitted an

“ongoing business relationship” that constituted a conspiracy. 

Id. Indeed, the proffer and admissions we described in the

previous section were more than sufficient to establish Jones’

on-going participation in the conspiracy. His “‘general denial’”

of the offense without a denial of the behavior constituting the

offense was “insufficient to satisfy the [second] factor.” Curry,

494 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Cray, 47 F.3d at 1209); see

Robinson, 587 F.3d at 1131-32.

On appeal, Jones does not dispute that such an ongoing

relationship would vitiate a claim of innocence. Appellant’s Br.

22. Nor does he dispute that he sold drugs to the undercover

agent on February 15, 2008. Id. Rather, he claims “that his

ongoing business relationship involved his buying of drugs from

Shannon for his own use, not selling.” Id. And he denies that

he sold to anyone “else beyond this one February 15, 2008 sale

to an undercover officer.” Appellant’s Br. 22-23.

But this is not quite what Jones told the district court, and

we cannot regard that court as having abused its discretion in

rejecting a claim not made to it. On March 18, the first time

Jones suggested that he wanted to withdraw his plea, he

“admit[ted] to selling” heroin to the undercover officer, but said

that was just “one sale.” Initial Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 9-10 (Mar.

18, 2009). He did not say anything about his buying from

Shannon only for personal use until the November 24 hearing. 

And contrary to his contention on appeal, Jones’ claim there was

not that the 10-ziplocks sale to the undercover police officer was

the only sale he had ever made. Rather, he claimed that even the

10 ziplocks seized on February 15, 2008 contained drugs for his

own personal use, and that he “didn’t sell no drugs to nobody”

at that or any other time. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 8 (Nov. 24,

2009); see id. at 9. Far from acknowledging the sale, as he does

on appeal and as he had previously done on March 18, he said

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only that he would plead to the “10 ziplocks that I supposedly

sold to the undercover police officer.” Id. at 8 (emphasis

added).

Accordingly, the innocence claim that Jones ultimately put

to the district court was that he had never sold drugs to anyone. 

This claim was belied, of course, by the government’s evidence. 

More important, it flatly contradicted Jones’ prior admissions,

made during both the January 6 plea colloquy and the March 18

hearing. A “motion that can succeed only if the defendant

committed perjury at the plea proceedings may be rejected out

of hand unless the defendant has a compelling explanation for

the contradiction.” Shah, 453 F.3d at 523 (quoting United States

v. Peterson, 414 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005)). As Jones

offered no explanation for the contradiction (and still offers

none), the district court’s conclusion that he failed to assert a

viable claim of innocence was hardly an abuse of discretion. 

See Curry, 494 F.3d at 1129; Hanson, 339 F.3d at 988. 

3. Finally, we consider whether the delay between Jones’

guilty plea and his motion to withdraw substantially prejudiced

the government’s ability to prosecute the case. At the

sentencing hearing, the government argued that it was

prejudiced because by then it had “been about 10, 11 months,”

the cooperating witnesses had already been sentenced, and it

would at that point be more difficult for the government to

prosecute its case. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 15 (Nov. 24, 2009). 

Although the court did not specify its rationale, it agreed that the

government would be “considerably” -- although “maybe not

horrendously” -- prejudiced by withdrawal. Id. at 17.

 Jones notes that he first moved to withdraw his plea on

March 18, 2009, only two-and-a-half months after he entered his

plea, not ten or eleven. He argues, correctly, that the proper

time frame for evaluating prejudice is generally the period

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“between the plea ‘and the motion to withdraw,’” Appellant’s

Br. 23 (quoting Robinson, 587 F.3d at 1126), rather than

between the plea and the court’s ruling on that motion. Here,

however, the issue is clouded somewhat by the fact that Jones

sought to discharge his first counsel at the same time he moved

to withdraw his plea -- and then followed up by rejecting two

more attorneys in succession -- thus rendering a swift ruling on

his motion next to impossible. In addition, we have the

government’s representation that, even by the March 18 date,

most of the co-defendants and cooperators had already been

sentenced. Appellee’s Br. 26-27 n.11.

Although it may nonetheless be true that we should

downgrade the district court’s perception of the prejudice the

government suffered from “considerable” to “slight,” we need

not belabor the point because the degree of prejudice to the

government has to date “never been dispositive in our cases.” 

Curry, 494 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Hanson, 339 F.3d at 988); see

also Cray, 47 F.3d at 1208; United States v. Abreu, 964 F.2d 16,

20 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Here, because we find no taint in the taking

of Jones’ plea, nor any unreasonableness in the district court’s

determination that Jones failed to assert a viable claim of

innocence, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial

of Jones’ motion to withdraw his plea.

B

Jones’ second contention is that, “[e]ven if [he] did not

demonstrate a ‘fair and just reason’ sufficient to justify the

withdrawal of his guilty plea . . . , the district court erred in

denying his motion to withdraw his plea prior to” conducting a

competency hearing. Appellant’s Br. 26. A defendant has a

right to a competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to

believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a

mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to

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the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and

consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist

properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); see United States

v. Perez, 603 F.3d 44, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Prior to the date of

the hearing, “the court may order that a psychiatric or

psychological examination of the defendant be conducted.” 18

U.S.C. § 4241(b) (emphasis added). This court “review[s] the

district court’s failure to hold a competency hearing under §

4241 for abuse of discretion.” Perez, 603 F.3d at 47. 

Jones argues that the district court should have held a

competency hearing because both his former counsel and the

court-appointed psychologist recommended that the court order

a competency evaluation. As set forth in Part I above, at Jones’

sentencing hearing the district court noted that Jones’ second

counsel had suggested that Jones was incompetent and had

asked the court to order a psychological screening. The court

stated that it had done so, and that it had received back from the

psychologist a report advising that Jones refused to cooperate,

saying only: “I won’t take the exam. I know what I’m doing. 

I’ll see the judge in court.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 4 (Nov. 24,

2009). The psychologist recommended that Jones be sent to an

inpatient facility for a competency evaluation, but the court

declined, concluding from its own observations that Jones was

“perfectly competent.” Id. at 5. 

Although not dispositive, a defense attorney’s view about

the competence of her client or the need for a psychological

evaluation is “unquestionably a factor which should be

considered” by the district court. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.

162, 178 n.13 (1975); see United States v. Klat, 213 F.3d 697,

703 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In this case, the court gave defense

counsel’s view due consideration and sent a clinical

psychologist to the jail to conduct a psychological screening. 

But the court also knew that counsel had no basis for making a

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competency evaluation of her own, because she reported to the

court that Jones “had refused to talk to her.” Sentencing Hr’g

Tr. 4 (Nov. 24, 2009).

Needless to say, a court must also consider the professional

evaluation of a psychologist the court itself sends to screen a

defendant. But that psychologist reported that Jones “wouldn’t

talk to [her],” either. Id. at 5. In context, then, it is clear that

this psychologist likewise had no basis for a professional

evaluation of her own. She recommended that Jones be sent for

an inpatient examination not because she thought him

incompetent, but because his refusal to speak to her prevented

her from making an evaluation.

Beyond relying on the attorney’s and psychologist’s

recommendations, Jones does not point to anything in his

behavior, demeanor, or prior medical history as indicating that

a competency examination or hearing was necessary. See

Drope, 420 U.S. at 180 (holding that these factors are “relevant

in determining whether further inquiry” regarding a defendant’s

competency “is required”).4

 Jones does not, for example, point

to his refusal to cooperate with the psychologist and his

appointed attorneys. The court attributed that refusal to his

“obstinancy,” not to a lack of “mental competency,” repeating

that “I think you’re perfectly competent and intelligent and

know what you’re about.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 5 (Nov. 24,

2009). Under the circumstances, that was a reasonable

conclusion. “The relevant legal question is not whether

appellant will ‘assist properly in his defense,’ but whether ‘he is

4

In this regard, Jones’ case is considerably different from United

States v. Williams, 113 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1997), a case he cites on

appeal. In Williams, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the trial court should

have held a competency hearing in light of the defendant’s “irrational

behavior” at trial, including her “outbursts and hysteria.” Id. at 1160.

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able to do’ so.” United States v. Battle, 613 F.3d 258, 263 (D.C.

Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Vachon, 869 F.2d 653, 655

(1st Cir. 1989)) (first emphasis added). As we have previously

noted, “uncooperativeness with one’s counsel does not alone

prove an inability to communicate.” United States v. Caldwell,

543 F.2d 1333, 1349 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1975); accord Battle, 613

F.3d at 263.

Finally, although Jones does not expressly contend that his

persistence in trying to withdraw from a favorable plea

agreement was itself sufficient reason to believe that he was

suffering from a mental disease or defect, he does hint that

“some observers believed” he was acting “irrationally” in doing

so. Appellant’s Br. 29. The district court rejected that

suggestion, concluding that Jones’ problem was not “mental

capacity” but “obstinancy” -- he “just decided [he] didn’t like

the deal [he] cut.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 5 (Nov. 24, 2009). We

have no ground for overturning that conclusion. Cf. Perez, 603

F.3d at 48 (concluding that, although the defendant “held

dubious legal views and pursued an inadvisable strategy, none

of this provided reasonable cause for the district court to

question his competence to stand trial”).

By contrast to the attorney and psychologist, the district

judge did have an opportunity -- over the course of six hearings

-- to speak with Jones and observe his demeanor. On that basis,

the judge told Jones: “I’ve been observing you in court on the

several occasions you’ve been here . . . . I don’t think there’s

anything wrong with your head. I think you’re perfectly

competent.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 5 (Nov. 24, 2009). As we held

in Battle, “[b]ecause ‘evidence of a defendant’s . . . demeanor at

trial . . . [is] relevant’ in determining competency,” a district

“court [i]s justified in relying on its own observations” as part of

determining whether a competency examination or hearing is

required. 613 F.3d at 263 (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 180). 

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And because there was nothing in the record before the court to

give it “reasonable cause” to believe that Jones might be

suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him

mentally incompetent, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), the court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Jones’ motion to withdraw his

plea without first holding a competency hearing or ordering

another examination.

III

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

denial of Jones’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In keeping

with this court’s general practice, we remand Jones’ ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, raised for the first time on appeal,

for an evidentiary hearing before the district court. See supra

note 3.

So ordered.

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