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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Eric Von Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 10, 1997 Decided May 20, 1997

No. 95-3173

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ERIC VON WILLIAMS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(94cr0408-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellant, with whom A.J. Kramer, Federal 

Public Defender, was on the briefs. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Marian L. Borum, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, 

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Jr., and Jennifer M. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief. John R. Fisher entered an 

appearance.

Before: SILBERMAN, WILLIAMS, and HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: Eric Von Williams was convicted of two counts of distribution of cocaine base and two 

counts of unlawful use of a communication facility. His 

appeal focuses on various alleged errors at trial, including the 

denial of a missing witness instruction, a reference to a prior 

arrest photograph, bad character remarks by the prosecutor, 

and improper questioning of Williams by the trial judge. We 

affirm.

I.

The government established that Williams sold crack cocaine on three different occasions in one month to undercover 

DEA agents. The first sale (with which Williams was not 

charged because it took place in Maryland) was arranged 

through an individual known as Maurice, who was cooperating 

with the DEA to reduce a sentence he was facing; Maurice 

was the initial link between the DEA and Williams. To set 

up the two sales with which Williams was ultimately charged, 

the DEA agent who had made the first purchase (Engram) 

contacted Williams directly through the pager number that 

Williams had given him at the close of the first sale. Maurice 

was not present at either of these two sales (in which 

Williams sold two and three ounces of crack to Engram for 

$1,800 and $2,500, respectively); indeed, Agent Engram testified that he never spoke to Maurice about these sales, and 

that he specifically avoided involving Maurice at all in order 

to make the case against Williams stronger and because of 

the physical dangers to undercover agents posed by the use 

of informants.

Williams did not contest that he sold drugs to Engram; 

instead, his defense from the outset was that he was induced 

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through threat of bodily harm to him and his family by 

Maurice, an agent of the government. According to Williams' 

testimony, the day before the first sale, Mauricewhom he 

had seen before but whose last name he did not knowasked 

Williams to deliver a package for him. When Williams 

balked, Maurice threatened him, and, afraid that Maurice 

would "probably shoot [him] or something," Williams agreed 

to deliver the package, which he suspected contained drugs. 

The next day, Williams delivered the package to Agent 

Engram, and gave another individual the money he received 

from the sale.

As to the second and third sales, Williams testified that 

although he was contacted for each by Engram directly, he 

engaged in discussions so that Maurice would believe he was 

continuing to cooperate. After Williams' initial conversations 

with Engram, Maurice would then call Williams, directing 

him to sell to Engram and instructing him as to location and 

price. According to Williams, he received only $50 for his 

participation in the three sales, and he did not go to the police 

out of fear that Maurice would harm him or his parents.

The government sought to rebut Williams' defense. It 

introduced transcripts of the various conversations between 

Williams and Engram, which, according to the government, 

demonstrated that Williams was speaking in a code typically 

used by drug dealers, thereby suggesting predisposition. On 

Williams' cross-examination, the government brought out that 

he made cash payments on three automobiles (a Mercedes, a 

Lexus ES 300, and a Lexus LS 400) and a motorcycle in the 

13-month period directly preceding the drug sales, and admitted to paying $2,800 cash on his cellular phone bill during 

the month of the sales, actions presumably typical of drug 

dealers. Williams claimed to have worked as a mover, making $1,200 a month after taxes, but admitted on crossexamination that he never filed taxes on this income. Neither party called Maurice as a witness.

II.

As Williams correctly asserts, because he admitted to having sold the drugs, the only real issue at trial was his defense 

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1

In 1978, we stated that "we do not think that the defendant 

should bear the burden of proving inducement by a preponderance 

of the evidence," and that the defendant's burden is "met by 

convincing the jury that there is some evidence of government 

inducement," United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 

1978) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979), but 

we more recently have said that "the jury ... decides whether the 

defendant has carried his burden of proving inducement, not just 

producing evidence of it." United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 

1483 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Layeni, 90 F.3d 

514, 516-17 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (jury decides whether the "defendant 

meets his burden of proving that the government persuaded him to 

commit a crime"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 783 (1997). 

of entrapment. This defense "requires a showing that a 

defendant was induced by the government to commit a crime 

for which he lacked any predisposition." United States v. 

Budd, 23 F.3d 442, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citation omitted), 

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 910 (1995). Once the defendant has 

come forward with evidence of inducement1government 

behavior that would cause "an unpredisposed person to commit a crime," United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691, 697 (D.C. 

Cir. 1984)the ultimate burden of persuasion shifts to the 

government to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant was predisposed to commit the crime." Budd, 23 

F.2d at 445. Since Williams testified that he was induced, 

even coerced, by Maurice, the government had reason to 

introduce evidence either to rebut appellant's claim of inducement or to prove predisposition.

Of course, the most obvious manner in which the government could challenge appellant's story was to call Maurice as 

a rebuttal witness, which it did not. Instead, the government 

sought unsuccessfully to introduce through Agent Engram's 

testimony Maurice's hearsay statements to the effect that 

Williams and Fats, another drug dealer, worked together. 

Appellant accordingly requested that the court give the jury 

what is called the missing witness instruction, allowing the 

jury to infer that Maurice's testimony would have been 

unfavorable to the government. We have held that a missing 

witness instruction is appropriate if (1) "a party has it pecuUSCA Case #95-3173 Document #273086 Filed: 05/20/1997 Page 4 of 11
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2 We have said that the special relationship between the government and an informant alleviates the need for the defense to 

seek a witness by subpoena. Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 

226, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (separate opinion of Fahy, J.); id. at 235-

36 (Robinson, J., concurring). 

liarly within his power to produce [a witness]"; and (2) the 

witness' "testimony would elucidate the transaction." United 

States v. Glenn, 64 F.3d 706, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). The district court 

denied appellant's request on the ground that the "government doesn't have to produce confidential informants unless 

they participate in the transaction in some way."

The government reiterates that position before us, arguing 

that Maurice could not have given testimony that would have 

elucidated the second and third transactions because he was 

not present. That argument is misdirected; it is even a bit 

disingenuous. The testimony that Maurice would be expected to give goes not to his observation (or lack thereof) of the 

drug sales, but rather to whether he had induced appellant to 

engage in those transactions. That was the only issue in the 

case, and the government, by seeking to elicit Maurice's 

hearsay statements, tacitly admitted that his testimony was 

relevant on that issue.

There remains the question, however, whether the government had it peculiarly within its power to produce Maurice. 

The government argues that Williams knew Maurice, or had 

friends who knew Maurice, and, in any event, appellant's 

counsel never asked the government for Maurice's last name 

or address. In United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 

1404 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867 (1988), we held 

that "no automatic inference of exclusive government control 

arises from the fact that witnesses are acting as government 

informants," but even if the facts here were enough to give 

rise to an inference of government controlthereby relieving 

appellant from an obligation to seek a subpoena2we think 

the district court is entitled to demand more than appellant 

did here to discover Maurice's whereabouts before agreeing 

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to a missing witness instruction. If defense counsel does not 

even make some effort to obtain information as to the identity 

or whereabouts of the "missing witness," it may well be that 

the defense is no more anxious to call the witness than the 

prosecution. That would appear to be the case here. Appellant claims only that defense counsel "thought" the government would not disclose Maurice's identity, but defense counsel never actually asked. Under these circumstances, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give 

the instruction. Cf. United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 

51 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (In determining whether an alleged 

error should be "disregarded," FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), we may 

rely on arguments supporting the district court's decision that 

it did not rely upon.).

Williams also contends that the district court abused its 

discretion in failing to grant a mistrial on the basis of a 

reference to a prior arrest photograph of Williams. On the 

first day of trial, Agent Engram testified that he obtained a 

photograph of Williams the day after the first drug transaction. When asked by the prosecutor how the photograph 

"related to" Williams, Engram responded:

This is a picture that was in the possession of the 

Metropolitan Police Department. This is, I guess, a 

prior arrest photo that was taken by them.

Williams immediately moved for a mistrial; at the bench, the 

prosecutor explained to the court that Engram had been 

instructed not to mention that the photograph was from the 

Metropolitan Police Department, or that it was from a prior 

arrest. Although the trial judge denied the motion for a 

mistrial, the judge did offer to tell the jury whatever Williams 

wanted it to hear, and, at Williams' request, the court immediately instructed the jury: "In view of the testimony of the 

officer, I want to advise you that Mr. Williams has never been 

convicted of a criminal offense." Williams argues nevertheless that because his predisposition to sell drugs was the issue 

in the case, the reference to a prior arrest photograph, from 

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3 Of course, evidence of a prior arrest, without more, would not 

have been admissible as it would not tend to prove predisposition, 

but at most general criminal propensity. 

which the jury might infer that he had been arrested for 

selling drugs, was particularly prejudicial.

The government, for its part, concedes that the testimony 

was "improper"as well it should, for we cannot discern, and 

the government has not offered, any justifiable reason for the 

question about the photograph, let alone the answer.3Identification was never an issue in the case (Williams having 

conceded that he sold drugs to Engram), and even if it were, 

while on the stand Engram had already identified Williams as 

the person who had sold him the drugs. The government 

instead argues that the prejudicial testimony did not substantially impact the jury's verdict, see United States v. Eccleston,

961 F.2d 955, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and notes several factors 

that demonstrate that Engram's remark did not have such an 

effect.

We agree, albeit somewhat reluctantly because we are 

troubled by the government's tactics. The officer never 

linked the prior arrest photo to any drug transaction, and 

that appellant may have been arrested for something at some 

time is unlikely to have much impact on a District of Columbia jury. The district court promptly gave a curative instruction in the language requested by appellant, and, of course, 

we presume that the jury followed the instruction. Cf. Greer 

v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987). To be sure, an 

instruction that appellant had never been convicted might 

imply that he had been arrested. Appellant could not very 

well have requested an instruction that appellant had never 

been arrested (because it was not true). Still, appellant 

asked for, and received, the instruction he got. The district 

judge has wide discretion in determining whether to grant a 

new trial, Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1413, and we cannot reverse 

merely because we might have decided otherwise.

Appellant also objects to the prosecutor's implicit accusation that appellant has a bad character. During the crossexamination of Williams, the prosecutor elicited an admission 

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4 Taken in context, the prosecutor's rebuttal remark appears to 

have been fair comment on appellant's credibility. The statement 

was made while the prosecutor was referencing Williams' credibility:

This is the same person that admits he doesn't pay taxes. He 

doesn't file his income tax returns. That all the money that he 

says was paid in cash under the table. But, then he's got some 

pay stubs. Yet, curiously, when I ask him, well, if we went to 

the state, would they have any record of this, he said, no, it's all 

under the table.

I mean, what kind of a person is this? This is the same person 

who says I don't drive my car to the [drug] deal because I 

didn't have tags. When I show him that he does have tags, oh, 

well, I didn't really mean that.

that Williams had never filed taxes and that he had always 

been paid (by a moving company) under the table. The 

prosecutor then asked Williams: "So you're willing to do 

things that are not quite on the up-and-up?" Defense counsel 

objected, but the court overruled the objection because "a 

violation of the internal revenue laws is a criminal offense, so 

she can say that." And again, during rebuttal argument, the 

prosecutor referenced Williams' income, failure to pay taxes, 

and his equivocation on various issues, then rhetorically asked 

the jury: "I mean, what kind of person is this?" Defense 

counsel did not, however, object to this statement. Williams 

argues that although evidence regarding his income and 

failure to pay taxes may have been admissible to impeach his 

testimony about the source of his income, the prosecutor 

moved beyond impeachment to questions and statements 

designed to attack his character generally.

The government insists that it was perfectly appropriate to 

ask Williams about his job and his failure to file taxes, but 

appears to concede that the ultimate question going to appellant's character was improper ("ill-advised"). It argues, however, that the error, if any, was again harmless because of the 

length of the cross-examination. As to the prosecutor's remark, the government points out that appellant did not object 

at the time, and therefore we can review only for plain error. 

In any event, the government justifies the comment as fair 

comment on the testimony.

Although the propriety of the question is dubious, we agree 

that permitting the comment was surely not plain error,4cf. 

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United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 

(prosecutor's statement that jury can "throw [defendant's 

testimony] out the window into a garbage pail" did not 

require new trial), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996), and the 

question by itself was not prejudicial. The district court 

instructed the jury that:

Counsel's arguments, both at the beginning of the trial 

and at the end of the trial, are not evidence. They just 

give their best shot, so to speak, for their particular 

clients, but what they say is not evidence. It is solely 

their effort at persuading you that the evidence shows 

what they think it should show.

The prosecutor's question occurred in the midst of a two-day 

cross-examination, while the remark during rebuttal was only 

one remark in a 199-line statement. Given the extensive 

testimony by Williams and the curative instruction, the two 

statements did not substantially prejudice appellant; the 

question and remark were at most "minor aberration[s]," 

United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1442 (D.C. Cir. 

1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085 (1985), in the trial.

Finally, Williams argues that the trial judge improperly 

questioned him during his testimony. As we noted earlier, 

the government introduced audiotapes of Williams' various 

conversations with Engram to demonstrate that Williams was 

speaking in a code used by drug dealers (purportedly to avoid 

wiretaps). After the government asked Williams why, if 

Maurice had coerced him into selling, he did not respond in 

detail to Engram's remarks, or ever use the words "drugs," 

"cocaine," or "crack," the trial judge questioned Williams:

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THE COURT: Why don't you ever use "drugs" or speak 

plainly? Why do you just use codes or words that 

somebody overhearing can't understand, like "okay" or 

whatever like that? Why do you do that?

WILLIAMS: Why don't I ever use the word "drugs"?

THE COURT: The actual amount and things like that. 

Since you aren't in the drug business, why don't you 

explain plainly what you're selling here.

WILLIAMS: I was just talking back to whatever

responding back to whatever question he was asking me, 

Your Honor. That's all.

Later, the judge stated that if defense counsel continued to 

take statements in the audiotapes out of context, the judge 

would let the prosecutor elicit "all the places where [Williams] 

was talking in code or talking about meeting again." Appellant contends that, although he did not object to the court's 

questioning, the court's error was plain because the judge 

expressed his opinion on an issue central to the question of 

predisposition: whether Williams was speaking in a code 

typical of drug dealers. This line of questioning, moreover, 

was part of "repeated and aggressive" questioning of him by 

the district court.

We have seen an increasing number of cases in which our 

trial judges have been overly pointed in questioning witnesses, particularly defendants, see, e.g., United States v. 

Donato, 99 F.3d 426, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and this case 

borders on that category. Still, the judge did not single out 

Williams for questioning; he extensively questioned Agent 

Engram as well. The specific "code" question, on the other 

hand, is quite troublesome for the reasons appellant argues. 

But there was not an objection, and we do not think any error 

could be characterized as plain. The disputed question in the 

context of the lengthy cross-examination may have appeared 

to the jury as only an effort to clarify appellant's testimony. 

Given the substantial evidence of predisposition (and the 

rather flimsy evidence of inducement), we cannot believe that 

the judge's questioning, though error, " "might likely have 

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substantially affected the outcome of the trial.' " United 

States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting 

United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 

1982)).

This is not an easy case; appellant's arguments are powerful. Even in combination, however, we think that the asserted errors were not sufficiently prejudicial, given the jury's 

obvious rejection of appellant's own testimony, to justify a 

new trial.

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