Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03140/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03140-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Oscar Armendariz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United Stet~ Cou,t cJ Appeals ienth Clrruit: ~ 

DEC 2 8 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.· 

OSCAR ARMENDARIZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

GABRIEL AGUIRRE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-3140 

Appeal from the United 

States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 89-40016-01) 

No. 90-3160 

Appeal from the United 

States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 89-40016-02) 

John J. Ambrosio, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant Oscar 

Armendariz. 

Joseph D. Johnson, Topeka, Kansas, (Richard A. Winterbottom of 

Michael L. Stout & Associates, Albuquerque, New Mexico, with him 

on the briefs) for Defendant-Appellant Gabriel Aguirre. 

Kurt J. Shernuk, Assistant United States Attorney (Lee Thompson, 

United States Attorney and Tanya J. Treadway, Assistant United 

States Attorney, with him on the brief), Kansas City, Kansas, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America. 

Before SEYMOUR, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 1 
In this consolidated appeal, codefendants Oscar Armendariz 

and Gabriel Aguirre assert they were denied the right to a fair 

trial and an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment when the 

district court refused to grant a 

improperly contacted by a third party. 

mistrial after a juror was 

Codefendants also urge 

error in the district court's failure to suppress the contents of 

conversations intercepted by state court wiretap authorization. 

In addition, Mr. Aguirre separately contends the district court 

abused its discretion in denying his motion for severance. We 

affirm. 

I. Background 

Codefendants were charged with conspiracy to 

marijuana and Mr. Aguirre with an additional count of 

distribute 

use of a 

telephone to facilitate the conspiracy based on evidence gathered 

from wiretaps placed on the telephone in Mr. Armendariz's 

residence, his place of business, and the home of a close 

associate. The information gathered from the taped conversations 

was utilized 

residences. 

to 

The 

obtain 

search of 

warrants to search codefendants' 

Mr. Armendariz's rural home in 

Manhattan, Kansas, produced eight one-pound bags of marijuana, 

$134,770 in cash, a Motorola pager, and drug paraphernalia; and 

that of Mr. Aguirre's residence in Deming, New Mexico, uncovered 

sixty pounds of marijuana in an abandoned car on the property and 

firearms which were taken from the house. In addition, the 

government negotiated a plea agreement with Randy Thomas, 

identified in the intercepted conversations as Mr. Armendariz's 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 2 
customer in California. Mr. Thomas agreed to tes.tify against Mr. 

Armendariz. 

During codefendants' second trial, 1 government witnesses 

testified on the procedure followed to intercept calls to the 

three telephone lines; the monitoring of the calls; the searches 

of the residences; and the results of laboratory testing of the 

substances found. The government's key witness, Randy Thomas, 

explained how he received thirty pounds of marijuana which he 

repackaged into one pound bags and then arranged to send payment 

of $25,000 in cash to Mr. Armendariz. In one taped conversation 

introduced into evidence, the jury heard Mr. Thomas tell Mr. 

Armendariz that some of the marijuana sent had molded while in his 

storage shed. In his defense, witnesses for Mr. Aguirre 

controverted testimony on the ownership of his residence in 

Deming. 2 

On the morning of the third day of trial at the conclusion of 

the presentation of this evidence, one of the jurors, Mr. Lonnie 

Funk, told the courtroom deputy that he had received a telephone 

call from a person identifying himself as Kenny Thomas, Randy's 

brother. The courtroom deputy relayed the story to the court. 

In chambers, the court assembled counsel and informed them 

that, in light of this unusual development, the court would 

question Mr. Funk to ascertain whether the conversation had any 

1The first trial ended in a mistrial when one of the government 1 S 

witnesses offered testimony prohibited by a motion in limine. 

2

The government produced Mr. Aguirre's New Mexico driver's license 

found in the Deming residence to establish his ownership of the 

property. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 3 
effect on his ability to serve as a juror. In the ensuing 

proceeding in chambers, Mr. Funk explained how he had first 

received a call from "Bill at radio station KMKF in Manhattan, 

Kansas." Bill told Mr. Funk his name had been entered as a prank 

in a drawing for $1,000 free work on a car, and he had won. After 

arranging to meet Bill, Mr. Funk asked his wife to call the radio 

station and verify Bill's story. Told that no Bill worked at the 

station, Mrs. Funk called her husband, who had stayed in Wichita 

during the trial, and told him what she had learned. Mr. Funk 

then called the number Bill left and told him he didn't appreciate 

this way of doing business and not to bother him again. Mr. Funk 

then testified that the following night, the same person called, 

apologizing for the charades and identifying himself as Kenny 

Thomas . "Does Kenny Thomas ring a bell for you?" the caller 

asked. When Mr. Funk said, no, the caller reminded him that his 

brother, Randy, was a witness in the trial. Mr. Funk continued: 

And right away that clammed me up. I didn't know 

what to say. And I-- he said, "I need to meet you." 

And I says, "Well, I can't, I'm a jury member, and I'm 

just not supposed to talk about this case to anybody." 

So he says, "Well, I will make it well worth your 

while." He says, "No matter what I do, you won't meet 

me? And I says, "No, I can't," and I hung up on him. 

And I went to bed last night thinking about it, and I 

dreamt about it and everything else. So I don't know. 

Mr. Funk told the court he had no further contact with the 

caller and had no idea what he wanted. 3 Counsel for Mr. 

3

rn response to the court's question, "[D]o you feel that this has 

any impact on any of your duties here in this case as far as has 

it pushed you in one direction or in another direction at all?" 

Mr. Funk answered, "No, not really ... you know, if it's for one 

side or the other side or what . . . . You know, I'm still the 

same. It's not going to influence." 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 4 
Armendariz asked Mr. Funk if he had mentioned the incident to 

oth•.,r members of the jury. Since four other jurors, Mr. Funk 

kn 9w, had overheard his conversation with the courtroom deputy, he 

then elaborated for them, offering that he couldn't "figure it out 

whether it's for one side or the other side. You know, it just 

doesn't make sense." When defense counsel again expressed his 

concern whether Mr. Funk still had an open mind, Mr. Funk answered 

that he felt he had the sense "to look at the evidence and the 

testimony and make our decision according to that." 

The court then called individually the four jurors to whom 

the incident was recounted. In the course of the subsequent 

questioning, counsel for the government and the defense agreed 

with the court that jurors should be asked what they specifically 

heard and what effect the conversation had on their ability to 

remain impartial. Although each juror stated the incident had no 

consequence, counsel for Mr. Armendariz moved for a mistrial, 

urging that the credibility of the government's key witness, Randy 

Thomas, was affected. 4 The court denied the motion but proceeded 

to summon each remaining juror to determine what influence the 

contact might have had. At the close of the questioning, counsel 

for both defendants again moved for a mistrial. 

overruled the motions. 5 

The court 

4nefense counsel stated, "This jury isn't thinking that the 

Government put him up to this. This jury isn't going to think 

that anybody else except the defendant or the defendants put them 

up to this." 

5The court was vexed, stating, 

I'm going to overrule and deny all motions for a 

(Continued to next page.) 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 5 
Upon reconvening the trial, the court instructed the jury: 

Members of the jury, a matter has been raised with 

each of you this morning regarding the possible 

prejudicial effect of an outside communication. Your 

deliberation should be upon the evidence in this case, 

ignoring any information which may have come to your 

attention from outside sources including discussions 

with other jurors. You are instructed not to speculate 

about any matter raised from any outside source. It 

must have no influence whatever in your deliberations. 

If you cannot follow this instruction or do not believe 

you can avoid all speculation and discussion concerning 

outside matters in your verdict on this matter, then you 

must tell the Court at this time. Does anyone want to 

tell me they cannot follow that instruction? 

Receiving no response, the court ordered final arguments and 

then instructed the jury. Subsequently, the jury found Mr. 

Armendariz guilty on Count I and Mr. Aguirre guilty on Counts I 

and II. Mr. Armendariz was sentenced to five years in prison on 

Count I and a five-year period of supervised release. Mr. Aguirre 

received a four-year sentence on both counts to run concurrently 

and a two-year period of supervised release. 

II. Improper Juror Contact 

Arguing the district court abused its discretion in denying 

their motion for a mistrial, codefendants urge that an outside 

contact with a juror coupled with the circumstances of the 

communication is per se ground for mistrial. This theory is 

predicated on the assertion that a juror's testimony about his 

(Continued from prior page.) 

mistrial. We're going to proceed with this case. I am 

very disappointed with this case. There is no way the 

attorneys can advise me that this will not happen again 

time after time, after time in a case like this .... 

I'm going to personally ask the FBI to investigate this 

situation. So that's going to be the Court's ruling. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 6 
ability to remain impartial is inherently suspect. No juror, 

codefendants assert, can resist the desire to please the court 

even in the face of certain misgivings. 6 

To overcome the presumptively prejudicial impact of any 

unauthorized private communication with a juror in a criminal 

case, under Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954), 

the trial court "should not decide and take final action ex parte 

but should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof 

upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a 

hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate." 

The government bears a heavy burden to establish that the 

communication was harmless. Id. at 229. The Court subsequently 

clarified the nature of that burden and rejected the notion that 

the law must impute bias to a juror's answers. Smith v. Phillips, 

455 U.S. 209 (1982). 7 See also United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 

92, 95 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Butler, 822 F.2d 1191, 

1197 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Once the government rebuts the presumption 

of prejudice in a Remmer hearing, the burden then shifts to 

defendant to show actual prejudice. See United States v. Day, 830 

F.2d 1099, 1105 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

6For example, in this case, codefendants underscore that Mr. Funk, 

later chosen foreman of the jury, stated his wife was frightened 

by the calls to their home, and he dreamed about Kenny Thomas's 

call the night before he told the court. Yet, codefendants 

emphasize, Mr. Funk said the contact didn't affect him one way or 

the other. 

7In Smith, the Court quoted its observation in Dennis v. United 

States, 339 U.S. 162, 171, n.7 (1950), "[o]ne may not know or 

altogether understand the imponderables which cause one to think 

what he thinks, but surely one who is trying as an honest man to 

live up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to say 

whether he has an unbiased mind in a certain matter." 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 7 
In this case, the district court's questioning of the 

individual members of the jury, supplemented by suggestions from 

counsel, fulfilled the Remmer hearing requirement. Nevertheless, 

codefendants argue the court's style of questioning intimidated 

jurors into answering what the court wanted to hear. 8 Although a 

form of questioning that would permit each juror the opportunity 

to offer evidence in his own words would have been preferable, we 

cannot say that the court's questioning in this case failed to 

elicit sufficient responses to allow the court to assess the harm 

8nespite suggestions from defense counsel, the court's questioning 

gave jurors little room to freely respond. For example: 

Court: Now, let me ask you, from what you heard 

there, anything about _that, arising from that entire 

thing, that would make it difficult for you to be 

completely fair and impartial in this case and decide 

thi s case based only on the evidence as you heard it 

from the witness stand and the instruction of the Court? 

Can you do that? 

Juror: Give a fair verdict? 

Court: Yes. 

Juror: Yes. 

Court: And give a fair verdict on that? 

Juror: Yes. 

Court: Now, I want you to do that without any use 

whatsoever or any thoughts whatsoever arising from these 

alleged phone calls. Can you do that? 

Juror: Yes. 

Court: That's outside and has nothing to do with 

this case. Is that clear to you? 

Juror: Right, yes. 

The court then admonished the juror to refrain from discussing the 

incident with anyone. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 8 
of the juror contact. Moreover, the court thoroughly and properly 

instructed the jurors after the hearing to assure their 

understanding of their responsibility. "[WJe will presume that 

jurors remain 'true to their oath and conscientiously 

observe the instructions and admonitions of the court' absent 

evidence to the contrary." United States v. Thompson, 908 F.2d 

648, 651 (1990) (quoting United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 

381 (lOth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 u.s. 908 (1987)). 

Consequently, defendants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice, 

Day, 830 F.2d at 1105, and the district court correctly denied the 

motion for mistrial. 9 

III. Legality of the Wiretap 

A. Probable Cause 

Codefendants contend the district court erred in denying 

their motions to suppress the contents of conversations 

intercepted under the authority of a state court wiretap order. 

They principally argue the affiant's generic assertion of the 

inadequacy of normal investigative techniques which necessitated 

the authorization for a wiretap failed to satisfy its burden to 

show probable cause.

1° Codefendants reference the affidavit of 

9codefendants have argued also that prejudice to them is inherent 

in the fact of contact alone. They maintain a reasonable juror 

would assume the contact was initiated by the defense and would 

thereby be motivated to react negatively towards either or both 

defendants. We do not agree that is the only plausible reaction 

of a juror in this case; therefore, we find this argument 

unpersuasive. 

10Mr. Armendariz raises a number of other alleged problems with 

the wiretap, such as, the failure to properly min~m~ze 

(Continued to next page.) 

-9-

Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 9 
Scott Crosby, a detective in the Riley County Police Department in 

Manhattan, Kansas, which enumerated the efforts made to utilize 

normal investigative techniques and the need to intercept calls to 

determine the nature and scope of the criminal activity. 

Codefendants insist Detective Crosby's assertions were unfounded 

and were controverted when he was questioned in a prior hearing on 

the motion to suppress. Normal investigative techniques were 

either never tried or were prematurely abandoned, codefendants 

maintain. 

We disagree. As the district court noted in its order 

denying the motion to suppress, the necessity requirement was 

fully satisfied in the thirty-three page affidavit supporting the 

application. The affidavit set forth a six-month effort which, 

using normal investigative techniques, including surveillance and 

the use of confidential informants, was frustrated by various 

problems local police were unable to overcome. 11 The district 

court also observed that the necessity requirement does not demand 

that every conceivable method of investigation has been tried and 

(Continued from prior page.) 

interceptions, to properly seal the record, to inform the court of 

the progress of the wiretap, and to designate a proper custodian 

of the records, in order to argue ultimately that the totality of 

the violations rendered the wiretap authorization constitutionally 

infirm. Nevertheless, it appears from the direction of his 

principle contention, Mr. Armendariz asserts the absence of 

probable cause to issue the authorization. 

11For example, the application for wiretap described the problems 

associated with surveillance of Mr. Armendariz's mobile home in an 

isolated rural setting and of his business in town, Oscar's Body 

Shop, which was fronted by a 2-lane state highway and afforded no 

appropriate position for observation. Threats of bodily harm and 

the reputation for violence of individuals under investigation 

caused several of the confidential informants to sever their 

contacts with the police. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 10 
has failed or that other steps could have been taken. United 

States v. Carneiro, 861 F.2d 1171, 1176 {9th Cir. 1988). 

Consequently 1 the district court concluded t:1ere was probable 

cause ·to believe the targets of the wiretaps were committing or 

were about to commit drug offenses a~d the intercepted 

conversations would relate to the offenses. We agree. 

Although application for the wiretap was made under the 

Kansas Electronic Surveillance Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2516, 

Kansas law conforms substantially 

III. United States v. Savaiano, 843 

to the requirements of Title 

F.2d 1280, 1291-92 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 836 (1988). The state procedure is 

incorporated under 18 u.s.c. § 2516(2). Like the district court, 

we apply federal standards to determine whether the evidence 

derived from the interceptions is admissible. Elkins v. United 

States, 364 u.s. 206 (1960). 

Under 18 u.s.c. § 2518{3)(a) of Title III of the Omnibus 

Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended by the 

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, the judge, 

reviewing an application for a wiretap, determines there is 

probable cause to believe a particular offense has been, is being, 

or is about to be committed, and that conversations related to the 

offense will be overheard. § 2518(3){b). The judge must also 

find that normal in'restigati ve procedures have been tried and 

failed, are unlikely to succeed, or are dangerous. § 2518(3)(c). 

While the necess;ty requirement assures that a wiretap intrusion 

does not supp:ant traditional investigative methods, it is not 

intended to pJace this tool off limits. "[T]he restriction must 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 11 
be interpreted 'in a practical and commonsense fashion.'" United 

States v. Brown, 761 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting 

United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237, 241 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. 

denied, 445 u.s. 934 (1980)). 

We believe the district court followed such an approach here. 

We review the district court's finding of probable cause for a 

wiretap under the same standard used for a search warrant, ~ 

United States v. Diltz, 622 F.2d 476, 481 (lOth Cir. 1980), to 

determine whether the facts and circumstances within the 

officer's knowledge based on reasonably trustworthy information 

are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to 

believe that an offense has or is being committed. "Although we 

examine de novo whether ~a full and complete statement' was 

submitted meeting section 2518(l)(c)'s requirements, we review the 

conclusion that the wiretap[] [was] necessary in each situation 

for an abuse of discretion." Brown, 761 F.2d at 1275 (citations 

omitted). 

We do not believe the district court abused its discretion in 

finding the wiretap placed on the three telephones was necessary. 

There was a substantial basis to find probable cause existed tied 

both to statements of confidential informants, the results of 

police surveillance, and the documentation from pen registers in 

the investigation. We, thus, defer to the district court's 

finding the wiretap was necessary for investigating authorities to 

determine the nature and scope of codefendants' criminal activity. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 12 
B. Failure to Identify Defendant Aguirre 

As an additional basis for suppression, Mr. Aguirre contends 

the failure to name him in the application for wiretap under 18 

u.s.c. § 2518(4)(a) and to provide him with inventory notice under 

18 u.s.c. § 2518(d) invalidated the wiretap authorization and 

requires suppression of his conversations introduced into 

evidence. 12 Mr. Aguirre relies on United States v. Donovan, 429 

u.s. 413 (1977), which held the government must name those 

individuals it has probable cause to believe are engaged in the 

criminal activity under investigation and whose conversations are 

expected to be intercepted. 

Albeit this holding, the Donovan Court, relying on Giordano, 

416 U.S. at 505, and ·united States v. Chavez, 416 u.s. 562 (1974), 

reiterated that "[not] every failure to comply fully with any 

requirement provided in Title III would render the interception of 

wire or oral communications 'unlawful.'" Donovan, 429 U.S. at 433 

(citation omitted). The remedy of suppression is required only 

for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that 

directly and substantially implement the congressional intention 

to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations 

clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary 

investigative device." Id. (citation omitted). The Court found 

that "[i]n no meaningful sense" did the failure to identify an 

12Although Mr. Aguirre's name is mentioned in the affidavit 

supporting the wiretap application, it is not included on the list 

of individuals whose conversations the government has probable 

cause to believe will be intercepted. Mr. Aguirre notes the state 

district court eventually directed inventory notice to him only 

when the prosecutor submitted the request after the grand jury 

handed down its indictment. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 13 
additional subject invalidate the authorization. Id. at 436. 

Surely, in this case, all of the requisite statutory factors 

necessary to support the authorization were present, and the 

failure to name Mr. Aguirre "in no way detracts from the 

sufficiency of those factors." Id. at 435. 

Similarly, failure to promptly provide inventory notice to 

Mr. Aguirre does not undermine the wiretap authorization or 

warrant suppression. Id. at 438; United States v. DeJesus, 887 

F.2d 114, 117 (6th Cir. 1989); Savaiano, 843 F.2d at 1280. Under 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2516(7)(d), inventory notice must be provided 

"[w]ithin a reasonable time but not later than 90 days after the 

termination of the period of an order or extensions thereof." The 

state district judge authorized the application on February 8, 

1989, and specified its termination on March 10, 1989. After the 

indictment was filed on May 3, 1989, within the ninety-day notice 

period, defendant concedes he received inventory notice. In 

addition, Mr. Aguirre has failed to show how he was prejudiced by 

the delay. Savaiano, 843 F.2d at 1291. 13 Indeed, the court 

granted defendant's motion for an extension of time to file 

pretrial motions. 

Although Mr. Aguirre raises important concerns immured into 

Title III to particularize the potential scope of any wiretap 

13Although defendant distinguishes Savaiano on the ground that 

inventory notice was received before the indictment was returned, 

the court relied only on the fact that the 90-day notice period 

was satisfied and defendant had failed to show prejudice because 

he received all the information "he would have obtained from the 

inventory, and considerably more, in timely fashion." Savaiano, 

843 F.2d at 1291. In this case, Mr. Aguirre fails to specify what 

information he was untimely denied. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 14 
authorization, these concerns remain predicated on the underlying 

legality of the wiretap itself. United States v. Cardall, 773 

F.2d 1128, 1134 (lOth Cir. 1985). Finding no error in that 

premise, we affirm the district court's denial of suppression on 

this ground. 

IV. Severance 

Mr. Aguirre contends the district court abused its discretion 

in failing to grant his motion for severance. Mr. Aguirre had 

argued the jury would be unable to compartmentalize evidence the 

government could only offer against his codefendant and the 

consequent spillover of guilt from Mr. Armendariz would be highly 

prejudicial. In particular, Mr. Aguirre complains that although 

he neither knew nor had ever spoken to the government's key 

witness, Randy Thomas, evidence offered by Mr. Thomas solely 

against Mr. Armendariz nevertheless swept him into that criminal 

activity. This prejudice was not cured, Mr. Aguirre states, by 

the court's instruction to the jury or single admonition during 

trial. Mr. Aguirre contends that this imputation of guilt coupled 

with the later jury contact incident necessitated the court's 

granting relief under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. 

Because the decision to grant a motion to sever is committed 

to the sound discretion of the district court, United States v. 

Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 667 (lOth Cir. 1989), to establish an abuse 

of discretion, defendant must show that "actual prejudice resulted 

from the denial." Id. at 668, citing United States v. Hack, 782 

F.2d 862, 870 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986). 

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Appellate Case: 90-3140 Document: 01019616463 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 15 
"Neither a mere allegation that defendant would have a better 

chance of acquittal in a separate trial, nor a complaint of the 

'spillover effect' from the evidence that was overwhelming or more 

damaging against the co-defendant than that against the moving 

party is sufficient to warrant severance." Hack, 782 F.2d at 870. 

Central to this prosecution was the common count of 

conspiracy to distribute marijuana. Although certain evidence 

applied only to Mr. Armendariz, other evidence, particularly 

recorded conversations between the two defendants, clearly links 

Mr. Aguirre to this "common thread." United States v. Rogers, 899 

F.2d 917, 926 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 113 (1990). 

"In conspiracy cases, the general rule is that persons indicted 

together should be tried together." Id. at 926 {C:itation 

omitted). Moreover, we must assume the jury can and did follow 

the court's instruction to consider the evidence separately 

against each defendant. Cardall, 885 F.2d at 668. Because 

defendant cannot particularize any actual prejudice to his case, 

we affirm. 

AFFIRMED. 

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