Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01537/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01537-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clifton Hutchins, Jr.
Plaintiff
A. Johal
Defendant
J. Katavich
Defendant
A. Klang
Defendant
J. Lewis
Defendant
Bill Lockyer
Defendant
Patel
Defendant
Ramos
Defendant
Sheheta
Defendant
A. Youssef
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLIFTON HUTCHINS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

BILL LOCKYER, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01537-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S EX 

PARTE APPLICATION AS MOOT 

(ECF Nos. 1 & 12)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Clifton Hutchins, Jr., a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on September 28, 2015.

Plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for screening. Plaintiff has consented to 

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this case. (ECF No. 7).

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner 

has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

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immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, 

or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

II. PLEADING STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “are 

not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 

677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible 

claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to 

have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), but nevertheless, 

the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Wasco State Prison in Wasco, California. 

Plaintiff brings this action against several Defendants: Bill Lockyer, Director of 

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Corrections; J. Lewis, Deputy Director, Policy and Risk Management Services1; Dr. A. 

Youssef, Chief Medical Executive; J. Katavich, Warden; Drs. A. Johal, A. Klang, Ramos, 

Sheheta, and Patel; and Dr(s). John Doe numbers 1 through 10. Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants violated his right to adequate medical care. He seeks damages in the 

amount of three million dollars. 

Plaintiff’s substantive allegations may be summarized as follows:

Plaintiff suffers from rheumatoid arthritis in his knee and shoulder and advanced 

degenerative joint disease of the patellofemoral joint line. He may require extensive 

surgery in the future, including a regional partial resurfacing of the patellofemoral joint 

line.2

On or about October 7, 2014, Defendant Dr. Johal cut off Plaintiff’s opioid pain 

medication without properly tapering Plaintiff, as per the procedures set out in the Pain 

Management Guideline Manual.

3 After Dr. Johal discontinued Plaintiff’s opioid 

medication, she placed him on another medication that Dr. Johal knew caused extreme 

nausea and dizziness. 

Plaintiff filed a health care request form to challenge the unexplained changing of 

his medication. He also filed a CDCR 602 HC Inmate Appeal Form requesting Dr. Johal 

reinstate his opioid therapy and physical therapy for six months in order to increase 

Plaintiff’s physical mobility and reduce pain on walking, getting dressed, and showering, 

and enable Plaintiff to sleep without pain.

Plaintiff’s appeal was partially granted at the first level of review. Though he 

received physical therapy and a knee brace, he was denied opioid medications. Plaintiff 

 

1 Defendant J. Lewis is not named in the caption of the complaint; however it appears that Plaintiff intends

to state a claim against Defendant Lewis.

2

Plaintiff refers the Court to Exhibit A, his Medical Progress Report, but there is no Exhibit A attached to 

the Complaint for the Court to consider.

3

Plaintiff refers the Court to Exhibit B, a Pain Management Guideline Manual, but there is no Exhibit B 

attached to the Complaint for the Court to consider.

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then submitted his Inmate Appeal to the second level, again requesting the reinstatement 

of his opioid medications. At this level, Defendant Dr. Klang denied Plaintiff’s appeal 

after creating a false record stating that there was no documentation of objective 

evidence of severe disease. 

In response to Dr. Klang’s false representation, Plaintiff submitted an appeal 

seeking a proper medical assessment of his injuries and a continuation of his opioid 

therapy. On review, Defendant Dr. Youssef also denied Plaintiff’s request for opioid 

therapy. Finally, Plaintiff appealed to the highest level, the “Directors’ Level,” and his 

request for opioid therapy was denied by Defendant J. Lewis on consideration of 

Plaintiff’s course of treatment only and not his specific need for opioid therapy. 

Plaintiff alleges that he has continuously suffered from extreme pain as a result of 

Defendants’ failure to provide appropriate, adequate medical care, namely opioid 

treatment.

IV. DISCUSSION

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional 

or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 

580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 

(9th Cir. 2006); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. “Section 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a 

link, or causal connection, between each defendant’s actions or omissions and a violation 

of his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 

1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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For Eighth Amendment claims arising out of medical care in prison, Plaintiff “must 

show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat [his] condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” 

and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm 

v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure 

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite 

state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of 

due care. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on 

other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. 

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from chronic pain due to rheumatoid arthritis and 

advanced degenerative joint disease. Such symptoms from such impairments reflect an 

objectively serious medical need. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 

2014) (existence of chronic or substantial pain indicates a serious medical need) (citation 

omitted); accord Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The second element of an Eighth Amendment claim is subjective deliberate 

indifference, which involves two parts. Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1078. Plaintiff must 

demonstrate first that the risk was obvious or provide other circumstantial evidence to 

indicate that Defendants were aware of the substantial risk to his health, and second that 

there was no reasonable justification for exposing him to that risk. Id. (citing Thomas v. 

Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010)) (quotation marks omitted). There must be 

some causal connection between the actions or omissions of each named defendant and 

the violation at issue; liability may not be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior. 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 

F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th 

Cir. 2011). 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to provide facts to support any claims with 

regards to Defendants Lockyer, Katavich, Ramos, Sheheta, Patel, and John Doe(s) 1 

through 10. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff only asserts in a conclusory fashion that 

they denied him medical attention. Therefore, all claims against these Defendants are 

dismissed. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Ingram v. 

Brewer, No. 1:07-cv-00176-OWW-DLB, 2009 WL 89189 (E.D. Cal. January 12, 2009) (“In 

order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named 

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff’s 

federal rights.”).

With regards to Defendants Johal, Klang, Youssef, and Lewis, Plaintiff fails to

provide sufficient facts to show that these Defendants knew of or should have known of a 

substantial risk to Plaintiff’s health and deliberately ignored that risk. Plaintiff pleads only 

conclusions, alleging that Defendants were “deliberately indifferent” to his “serious 

medical needs” by denying him opioid medications. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. He must 

include facts which, if proven, would support a finding that these Defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to a known medical risk. It is not enough that Plaintiff, or even 

another physician, might prefer another course of treatment. Mere disagreement with a

course of treatment does not suffice to support a claim under section 1983. Snow, 

681F.3d at 987-88; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122-23.

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Johal did not follow procedure when she abruptly 

discontinued Plaintiff’s opioid medications and prescribed a different medication that she 

knew caused extreme nausea and dizziness. Dr. Johal did prescribe an alternative 

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medication as well as a knee brace and physical therapy. It cannot be said that she 

disregarded his medical needs; just that she chose to follow a different course of 

treatment. Though the medication was known to cause dizziness and nausea in some

patients, Plaintiff does not allege that it caused these effects in him and that Defendant, 

knowing of the side effects, continued the medications without sound medical 

justification. The mere denial of Plaintiff’s choice of treatment does not give rise to a 

viable claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment, particularly when doctors prescribed 

Plaintiff alternative treatments. Snow, 681 F.3d at 987-88; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122-23.

Plaintiff fails to set forth any facts linking the denial of adequate medical care to 

Defendants Klang, Youssef, and Lewis. It appears that each of these Defendants simply 

confirmed the medical determination made by Dr. Johal. Since this Court does not 

believe that Dr. Johal’s actions rose to the level of a constitutional violation, Defendants 

Klang, Youssef, and Lewis may not be held liable for Dr. Johal’s actions. Lemire, 726 

F.3d at 1074-75 (“A prison official in a supervisory position may be held liable under § 

1983 . . . ‘if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or a 

sufficient causal connection exists between the supervisor’s unlawful conduct and the 

constitutional violation.’”) (quoting Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 

2003)); Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-08. Moreover, Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the appeals 

process and the responses to his appeals does not suffice to demonstrate that 

Defendants Klang, Youssef, and Lewis knew of and disregarded Plaintiff’s serious 

medical needs. Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1086-87 (prison official who signed off inmate’s 

second-level appeal after relying on the medical opinions of staff dentists who had 

already signed off on inmate’s treatment plan found not liable under § 1983); see also

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (actions in reviewing inmate appeal 

do not support viable claim because there is no separate constitutional entitlement to 

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appeals process). 

V. PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE APPLICATION

On February 1, 2016, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application with the Court 

inquiring as to the screening status of his complaint with the Court. (ECF NO. 12) As 

the Court has now issued its screening order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915A(a), the 

Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s ex parte application as moot.

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendants Johal, 

Klang, Youssef, Lewis, Lockyer, Ramos, Sheheta, Patel, Katavich, and John Doe(s) 1 

through 10 for violation of the Eighth Amendment arising out of their treatment of his 

chronic pain without opioid medication. Plaintiff has not previously been provided with 

notice of the deficiencies in his claims and the Court will provide Plaintiff with the 

opportunity to file an amended complaint, if he believes, in good faith, he can cure the 

identified deficiencies. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez, 

203 F.3d at 1130-31; Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff 

amends, he may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his 

amended complaint. George, 507 F.3d at 607.

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but 

under section 1983, it must state what each named defendant did that led to the 

deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and liability may not be imposed on 

supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; 

Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-07. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

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555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be 

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

2. Plaintiff’s ex parte application to the Court (ECF No. 12) inquiring as to the 

screening status of his complaint is DISMISSED as moot;

3. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank complaint form along with a 

copy of the complaint filed September 28, 2015;

4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in 

this order or a notice of voluntary dismissal;

5. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed, 

without prejudice, for failure to state a claim and failure to obey a court 

order, subject to the “three strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 25, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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