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Parties Involved:
Antonio Maldonado-Campos
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit .. 

0£C .. 4 1990 

&OBERT L HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-2227 

ANTONIO MALDONADO-CAMPOS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 89-160-JB-01) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

James B. Foy, Silver City, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

William L. Lutz, u.s. Attorney & David N. Williams, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, LOGAN and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

* Although the defendant requested oral argument, defendant's 

counsel failed to appear when this case was called for oral 

argument November 9, 1990 during the 1990 November Term in Denver, 

Colorado. At that time, the government waived oral argument. In 

view of these events and because we now have determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not assist materially in the 

determination of this appeal, the cause is ordered submitted 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 

34 .1. 9. 

Appellate Case: 89-2227 Document: 01019654572 Date Filed: 12/04/1990 Page: 1 
Defendant-appellant, Antonio Maldonado Campos, appeals his 

conviction and sentence. A jury convicted defendant of possession 

with intent to distribute less than fifty kilograms of marijuana, 

contrary to 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l) and 21 u.s.c. § 841(b)(1)(d). 1 

Defendant was sentenced to thirty-three months imprisonment to be 

followed by a three-year period of supervised release. Defendant 

timely filed his notice of appeal and we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and 18 u.s.c. § 3742(a). 

Defendant raises three points for reversal: 1) sufficiency 

of the evidence, 2) failure to grant a two-level reduction based 

upon a mitigating role in the offense as a "minor participant," 

see United States Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual, § 3Bl.2(b) 

(Nov. 1990), and 3} failure to depart downward from a criminal 

history category of III under the Sentencing Guidelines, see 18 

u.s.c. § 3553(b); u.s.s.G. § 4A1.3. We affirm the conviction, 

vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. 

I. 

At approximately 11:30 p.m. on March 28, 1989, border patrol 

agent Michael Harrison was alerted that a car entering north on 

Highway 11 near Columbus, New Mexico might contain illegal aliens. 

Harrison drove eighteen miles northward, after first observing an 

1 Although the indictment did not reference 18 u.s.c. § 2 which 

provides for principal liability for those who aid and abet a 

crime, § 2 was incorporated. Section 2 applies to the entire 

criminal code for "[i]t is rather a statutory canon defining an 

ingredient of criminal responsibility generally, than the 

definition of law of any crime." Breeze v. United States, 398 

F.2d 178, 183 (lOth Cir. 1968). 

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Appellate Case: 89-2227 Document: 01019654572 Date Filed: 12/04/1990 Page: 2 
older Cadillac heading south. He turned around and headed toward 

Columbus, thinking that the Cadillac was the car he was after. As 

he was headed south toward Columbus, Harrison again saw the 

Cadillac; this time it was headed north. Harrison turned around 

to follow it. A few minutes later, he saw the Cadillac parked 

along the road with the passenger door open. No occupants were in 

the car, but three bags of clothing were. Harrison, assisted by 

other agents, used tracking methods to follow three sets of 

bootprints, two from common cowboy boots and one from 

Chihuahua-heel boots which have a smaller track. 

The bootprints led directly east to a fence parallel to the 

highway. Further down, an abandoned suitcase was found containing 

nine packages of marijuana. Continuing to track the footprints, 

Harrison discovered a mark by a fence post where "somebody had 

drug their heel and made a big mark." Rec. vol. II at 57. 

Harrison tagged the location and continued to follow the tracks 

which led to a boarded-up house eight miles away from the 

abandoned car. Harrison and his fellow agents yelled for the 

occupants to come out. Three men crawled out of a window and were 

identified as defendant and his codefendants Lucatero-Campos and 

Castillos-Granados. Defendant was wearing Chihuahua-heel boots; 

his two codefendants were wearing regular cowboy boots. When the 

agents returned to the spot which was marked, they discovered a 

second suitcase containing marijuana hidden under tumbleweeds 

several yards away. The weight of the marijuana from the two 

suitcases was in excess of fifty pounds. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2227 Document: 01019654572 Date Filed: 12/04/1990 Page: 3 
II. 

Defendant contends that the circumstantial evidence is 

legally insufficient to convict him because it is equally 

consistent with flight to avoid prosecution for immigration 

violations as it is with flight to avoid prosecution for 

possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. 

Appellant's Brief at 18. He also contends that because he had a 

brace on his arm, he could not have carried the suitcases full of 

marijuana and that no evidence even indicates that he was present 

where the suitcases of marijuana were found. According to the 

defendant, based on these contentions the district court should 

have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 29(a). 

Given the jury's verdict, we review the evidence and its 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 

government to determine whether "any rational trier of fact could 

have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 u.s. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis omitted). 

A criminal conviction based upon principal liability, including 

aiding and abetting, may rest upon circumstantial evidence. 

United States v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1394, 1399 (lOth Cir. 1990); 

United States v. Russell, 905 F.2d 1450, 1453 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct. 267 (1990). No requirement exists that the 

evidence negate all possibilities except guilt of the charged 

offense. United States v. Alonso, 790 F.2d 1489, 1493 (lOth Cir. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2227 Document: 01019654572 Date Filed: 12/04/1990 Page: 4 
1986). Defendant need not have carried the suitcases of marijuana 

for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he 

knowingly participated in the marijuana importation venture, 

particularly given a flight on foot across the great plains with 

suitcases laden with marijuana rather than clothing. The evidence 

is sufficient to link defendant with the abandoned suitcases of 

marijuana found on the trail, which was followed "step-for-step 

the whole way" by border patrol agents. See rec. vol. II at 86. 

Plainly, a jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

III. 

Defendant next contends that he was entitled to a two-level 

reduction based upon a mitigating role in the offense as a "minor 

participant." Section 3B1.2, u.s.s.G., allows for a four-level 

reduction upon a finding that a defendant was a "minimal 

participant in any criminal activity," and a two-level reduction 

for a "minor participant" finding. The four-level reduction for 

minimal participants is for those "who are plainly among the least 

culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group.'' u.s.s.G. 

§ 3B1.2, comment (n.l). A "defendant's lack of knowledge or 

understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise and of 

the activities of others is indicative of a role as a minimal 

participant." !d. On the other hand, a "minor participant" is 

one "who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose 

role could not be described as minimal. " Id. { n. 3) • Whether a 

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Appellate Case: 89-2227 Document: 01019654572 Date Filed: 12/04/1990 Page: 5 
defendant is a minor .or minimal participant is a fact question 

generally reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. United 

States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 213, 215 (lOt h Cir. 1990). The 

defendant has the burden of proof and must show his entitlement to 

a downwar d adjustment by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 

In a written motion reviewed by the judge prior to 

sentencing, defendant sought the four-leve l reduction based upon 

minimal participation, see id. § 3B1.2(a). Rec. vol. I, doc. 19 

at 1-2. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge denied the 

reque sts contained in the motion and then, upon request, allowed 

defendant to add to the oral record. Defendant contended that 

codefendant Castillano-Granados, having acknowl edged an interest 

in the marijuana, was more culpable and yet woul d receive a 

lighter sentence. Id. vol. II at 269. The tri al judge responded 

that defendant's criminal history was responsi ble for defendant's 

heavier sentence. Thereafter, the following troublesome exchange 

occurred: 

The Court: 

Mr. Foy: 

The Court: 

Mr . Foy: 

The Court: 

But furthermore, the Court is not 

persuaded that he [def endant] was a 

minimal participant. I think under the 

definition set forth in the sentencing 

guidelines, he was a minor participant, 

which is entirely dif ferent from minimal. 

So would the Court be willing to give him 

a two level reduction then? 

No sir. 

Okay. 

You're just making your record Mr. Foy, I 

said I've denied your motion. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2227 Document: 01019654572 Date Filed: 12/04/1990 Page: 6 
Rec. vol. II at 269. Defendant contends that, having made a 

finding that defendant was a "minor participant," the trial court 

misapplied the sentencing guidelines by failing to decrease the 

offense level by two as envisioned by§ 3B1.2(b). 

In providing effective representation, it is obvious that 

defense counsel seized the moment, recognizing that a two-level 

reduction for being a minor participant is better than no 

reduction at all. What is not obvious is whether the trial court 

actually made a finding of "minor participant" as that term is 

defined in the commentary to § 3B1.2 . See United States v. 

Rutter, 897 F . 2d 1558, 1561 (lOth Cir. ) (guidelines commentary is 

"essential in correctly interpreting and uniformly applying the 

guidelines on a national basis"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 88 

(1990) . This is not a situation which lends itself to easy or 

generic categorization of the defendant as a minor participant; 

our recent cases suggest that those who transport marijuana or 

other controlled substances often are not minimal or minor 

participants. See United States v . Donaldson, 915 F.2d 612, 615 

(lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. Calderon-Porras, 911 F.2d 421, 

423-24 (lOth Cir. 1990)~ United States v. Arredondo-Santos, 911 

F . 2d 424, 426 (lOth Cir. 1990); United States v . Pelayo-Munoz, 905 

F.2d 1429, 1430-31 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

As we explained in United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3252 (1990), a trial court 

must make specific findings and explain its reasoning only 

concerning departures under the guidelines. Id. at 1535-36. When 

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Appellate Case: 89-2227 Document: 01019654572 Date Filed: 12/04/1990 Page: 7 
adjustments under the guidelines are involved, a trial court is in 

no way required to make detailed findings, or explain why a 

particular adjustment is or is not appropriate. Id. Thus, a 

district court is not required to announce the reasons supporting 

a factual finding concerning a role-in-the-offense adjustment 

under § 3B1.2. Donaldson, 915 F.2d at 615. However, when it is 

apparent from the court's optional discussion that its factual 

finding may be based upon an incorrect legal standard, we must 

remand for reconsideration in light of the correct legal standard. 

Although the district court referenced an unspecified definition 

contained in the Guidelines, the court also claimed that "a minor 

participant ••. is entirely different from [a] minimal 

[participant]." Rec. vol. II at 269. This statement is not 

correct. Rather, the terms "minimal participant" and "minor 

participant" are not too distant points along a continuum of 

moderate criminal participation. Section 3Bl.l "provides a range 

of adjustments for a defendant who plays a part in committing the 

offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the 

average participant." u.s.s.G. § 3B1.2, comment (backg'd) 

(emphasis supplied); Pelayo-Munoz, 905 F.2d at 1431. Reduced 

culpability is common to "minimal participant" and "minor 

participant" status and the determination of whether a defendant 

is a minimal participant, a minor participant or somewhere in 

between (and thereby entitled to a three-level reduction}, "is 

heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case." 

u.s.s.G. § 3B1.2, comment (backg'd); Donaldson, 915 F.2d at 615. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2227 Document: 01019654572 Date Filed: 12/04/1990 Page: 8 
Here, the trial court's statement concerning minimal and minor 

participants is sufficiently doubtful that we remand for 

clarification and application of the correct legal standard as 

contained in § 3Bl.2 and the related commentary. 

IV. 

Defendant lastly contends that the district court 

misapprehended its authority to depart downward from the 

sentencing guidelines if it found that the defendant's criminal 

history category over-represented the seriousness of the 

defendant's criminal history. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s. 

Ordinarily, we lack the power to review a district court's 

discretionary decision not to depart downward. See, ~, United 

States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 712 (lOth Cir. 1990); United 

States v. Havens, 910 F.2d 703, 706-07 (lOth Cir. 1990); United 

States v. Richardson, 901 F.2d 867, 870 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

However, we do have the power to review such a decision when it is 

the result of a district court's misapprehension of its power to 

depart downward. See 18 u.s.c. § 3742(a)(2); United States v. 

Lowden, 905 F.2d 1448, 1449 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 

206 (1990); United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1530 n.7 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 155 (1990). The latter 

alternative applies in this case. 

Defendant argued that a criminal history category of III, see 

u.s.s.G. ch. 4, over-represented seriousness because the 

underlying sentences pertained to unlawful entry into the United 

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Appellate Case: 89-2227 Document: 01019654572 Date Filed: 12/04/1990 Page: 9 
States after deportation. See rec. vol. I, doc. 19 at 2; vol. II 

at 269-70. According to the defendant, his criminal history was 

significantly less serious than that of other defendants who would 

be placed in category III. Rec. vol. II at 270. Defendant sought 

a downward departure using a criminal history category of I, 

claiming it more suitable. The district court commented: 

Court: Well, I'm going to deny your motion, Mr. Foy. 

Perhaps the Court of Appeals can address that. 

That is of concern to me as well, that the 

illegal entry is treated as it would for a 

more serious crime, but I fought these 

Sentencing Commission guidelines long enough 

and I think its up to the Court of Appeals to 

give us some direction on it. 

But I will state for the record, that I find 

that particular part of the sentencing 

guidelines that requires a Category 3 is too 

harsh and inflexible, but I feel that I'm 

committed under the sentencing guidelines to 

impose that kind of sentence. 

Mr. Foy: Thank you, Your Honor. 

Id. at 270-71. 

Without expressing any opinion on the merits, we think that 

this potential problem is addressed, at least initially, in the 

Sentencing Guidelines. "[TJhe Sentencing Commission has expressly 

identified overstatement of a defendant's criminal history as a 

circumstance that may warrant departure." United States v. 

Summers, 893 F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1990); see also United States 

v. Brown, 903 F.2d 540, 544-45 (8th Cir. 1990). The guidelines 

provide: 

There may be cases where the court concludes that a 

defendant's criminal history category significantly 

over-represents the seriousness of a defendant's 

criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant 

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Appellate Case: 89-2227 Document: 01019654572 Date Filed: 12/04/1990 Page: 10 
will commit further crimes. An example might include 

the case of a defendant with two minor misdemeanor 

convictions close to ten years prior to the instant 

offense and no other evidence of prior criminal behavior 

in the intervening period. The court may then conclude 

that the defendant's criminal history was significantly 

less serious than that of most defendants in the same 

criminal history category (Category II), and therefore 

consider a downward departure from the guidelines. 

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s. (emphasis supplied) . In downward 

departures, the court ordinarily will look to the next-lower 

criminal history category for guidance, id.; Summers, 893 F.2d at 

67-68, however, a departure below criminal history category I is 

not appropriate. United States v. Jagmohan , 909 F.2d 61 , 65 (2d 

Cir. 1990 ) ; United States v. Studley, 907 F.2d 254 , 258 n.2. (1st 

Cir. 1990 ); United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 509 (6th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 127 (1990); United States v. 

Williams, 891 F.2d 962, 965-66 (1st Cir. 1989). Thus , this is 

what the guidelines term a "guided departure," one in which "the 

guidelines provide specific guidance for departure by analogy or 

by other numerical or non-numerical suggestions." u.s.s.G. ch. 

1, pt. A into. comment, § 4(b), p .s. (discussing two different 

types of departure under the guidelines: guided and unguided). 

Downward departures based upon criminal historY are made 

pursuant to 18 U.S . C. § 3553(b) 2 and are reviewed under the same 

2 We reject the notion that downward departures based on the 

authority of u.s.s.G. § 4Al.3 p.s. are beyond the purview of 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(b). In United States v. Evidente, 894 F.2d 1000, 

1004 (8th Cir . ), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1956 (1990), the Eighth 

Circuit interpreted its decision in United States v. Justice, 877 

F.2d 664, 670 (8th Cir. 1989), and concluded that because the 

Sentencing Commission provided a policy statement authorizing 

departures based upon criminal history, that § 3553(b) did not 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 89-2227 Document: 01019654572 Date Filed: 12/04/1990 Page: 11 
three-part test for evaluating upward departures contained in 

United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 278 {lOth Cir. 1990). 

Spedalieri, 910 F.2d at 712 n.5; Brewer, 899 F.2d at 506; 

Williams, 891 F.2d at 964; see also Studley, 907 F.2d at 257 

(downward departure). We first determine de novo whether the 

circumstances admit of a factor not adequately taken into account 

by the Sentencing Commission which would justify departure. 

White, 893 F.2d at 277-78. Next, we review the district court's 

factual determinations supporting departure under the clearly 

erroneous standard. Id. at 278. Finally, under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3642(e)(3) we determine whether the degree of departure was 

reasonable. Id. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

apply. Evidente, 894 F.2d at 1004 n.5. According to the court, 

§ 3553(b) only pertains to factors ''not adequately taken into 

consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 

guidelines" and, therefore, cannot apply to departures based upon 

§ 4A1.3, a policy statement indicating that criminal history may 

provide a basis for departure. Id. This conflicts with the 

guidelines policy statement discussing both guided and unguided 

departures under§ 3553(b). u.s.s.G. ch. 1, pt. A into. comment, 

§ 4(b), p.s. Our cases consistently have analyzed departure based 

upon criminal history category with actual or tacit reference to 

§ 3553(b). See White, 893 F.2d at 278; United States v. 

Fortenbury, No. 89-2291, slip op. at 2, 6 (lOth Cir. Oct. 26, 

1990) [1990 WL 161255]; United States v. Whitehead, 912 F.2d 448, 

452 (lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. Freitekh, 912 F.2d 421, 423 

{lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 1491, 1494 (lOth 

Cir. 1990); United States v. Harris, 907 F.2d 121, 123 (lOth Cir. 

1990); United States v. Russell, 905 F.2d 1450, 1454-56 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 267 (1990); United States v. 

Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432, 1434-35 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s. 

Ct. 202 (1990); United States v. Bernhardt, 905 F.2d 343, 344 

(lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1316 

(lOth Cir.), reh'g en bane granted, ___ F.2d ___ (lOth Cir. 1990); 

United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 989-90 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct. 160 (1990). 

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3 

We lack a sufficient record to determine whether the district 

court would have granted a downward departure had it thought 

itself empowered. The district court's comments concerning the 

harshness and inflexibility of the Sentencing Guidelines in the 

abstract plainly would not be a proper basis for departure. 

Studley, 907 F.2d at 259-60. 3 "[G]rounds for departure must be 

specific to the particular defendant's commission of a particular 

offense under a particular set of circumstances." United States 

v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 353 (1st Cir. 1989). We agree 

with the Eleventh Circuit that, in addition to the seriousness of 

a defendant's criminal history, recidivism should be considered 

in deciding whether to depart downward under § 4A1.3. United 

States v. Collins, 915 F.2d 618, 620-22 (11th Cir. 1990). 

Although reported downward departures pursuant to § 4Al.3 based 

on over-represented seriousness are scarce, see Collins, 915 F.2d 

at 620-21 (accepting basis for departure, but remanding for 

consideration of appropriate amount); Summers, 893 F.2d at 67-68 

(same)~ United States v. Nelson, 740 F. Supp. 1502, 1518 (D. Kan. 

1990) (departing downward)~ United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 

664, 670 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting no cases), we cannot speculate 

We agree with the following: 

Courts should not frustrate the Congressional goal 

of uniformity in sentencing by manipulating their 

definition of the "heartland." A court should not mold 

typical criminal conduct or defendant characteristics 

into atypicality merely to achieve a departure from the 

guidelines. 

Studley, 907 F.2d at 257. 

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as.to whether the district court will exercise its discretion to 

depart on remand, and if so, what its reasoning will be. See 18 

u.s.c. § 3553(c)(2). For as we said in United States v. Gardner, 

905 F.2d 1432 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 202 

(1990), "[t]he initial task of deciding when and by how much to 

deviate from the guidelines falls upon the trial court, and 

the trial court must articulate its analysis supporting the 

degree of departure." Id. at 1436 (citation omitted and emphasis 

in original). 

We AFFIRM the conviction, VACATE the sentence, and REMAND for 

resentencing. 

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