Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02914/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02914-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Belal Faruki
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 14-2914

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BELAL FARUKI,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:13-cr-00117 — Rubén Castillo, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 — DECIDED OCTOBER 13, 2015

____________________

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Belal Faruki was convicted of wire 

fraud in federal district court on January 17, 2014. The jury 

determined that, between January 2010 and January 2011, Faruki operated an investment scheme through which he defrauded one investor, Marc Tishfield, and attempted to defraud a second investor, Richard Schottenfeld. Following denials of Faruki’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and motion for a new trial, the district court sentenced Faruki to 

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forty-eight months in prison. Faruki now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions, as well as 

two evidentiary rulings by the district court. We affirm.

I. Background

Faruki met Tishfield in 2006 while Tishfield was working 

as a portfolio manager at SAC Capital, a Connecticut-based 

hedge fund. At the time, Faruki was a computer technology 

consultant retained by SAC Capital to help examine and improve its electronic trading systems. Faruki and Tishfield 

stayed in touch after Faruki completed his project at SAC 

Capital, periodically meeting in person and communicating 

by telephone, e-mail, and instant message.

In January 2010, Faruki informed Tishfield that he had 

launched his own investment fund, Neural Markets, using

mathematically-driven trading strategies. Faruki stated that 

he was currently investing his own money in the fund in an 

effort to establish a trading history he could pitch to prospective investors. He told Tishfield that in December 2009 his 

fund had achieved investment returns exceeding 12%, and 

that his investment return in January 2010 was 32%. Faruki 

also told Tishfield that he had hired RSM McGladrey, an accounting firm, to audit his fund’s investment performance.

On August 25, 2010, Faruki sent Tishfield an e-mail outlining the investment strategy and returns achieved by Neural 

Markets. Faruki’s e-mail indicated that the fund had been 

trading since March 2009 and had achieved investment returns exceeding 200%. Faruki also represented that Neural 

Markets employed “almost zero leverage.” According to a 

document attached to the e-mail, Neural Markets’ prime brokers were TradeStation and JPMorgan, and the fund’s profits 

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and losses were accounted for by Liccar CPA and audited by 

RSM McGladrey. Marketing materials attached to the e-mail 

stated: “Neural Markets currently manages only a simulated 

portfolio.”

Tishfield testified at trial that he and Faruki had several 

conversations in which they discussed the meaning of “simulated portfolio.” According to Tishfield, Faruki said that he 

was managing $5 million in assets for wealthy clients in Chicago. Faruki explained that his “simulated” investing accounts mirrored his trading for wealthy Chicago clients, but 

did not contain clients’ specific information in an effort to protect their identities.

On September 5, 2010, Faruki sent Tishfield a private 

placement memorandum (“PPM”) for the Neural Markets 

fund. A PPM is commonplace in the investment fund industry and governs all of the terms of an investment. The PPM 

stated that TradeStation and JPMorgan would be the prime 

brokers, Liccar CPA would be the fund administrator, RSM 

McGladrey would be the auditor, and Foley & Lardner LLP

would be the fund’s legal counsel. The PPM also provided

that Faruki would not use leverage when investing Tishfield’s 

funds, except in exceptional circumstances. Tishfield signed 

the PPM and committed to invest $1 million in the Neural 

Markets fund on September 8, 2010.

On September 16, 2010—after Tishfield signed the PPM 

but before he transferred funds to Faruki—Faruki met with 

Tishfield and Tishfield’s brother-in-law, Richard Schottenfeld, at Schottenfeld’s office in Manhattan. Schottenfeld is the 

chairman of a trading firm in New York City called Schottenfeld Capital. During this meeting, Faruki told both Tishfield 

and Schottenfeld that he was trading Neural Markets’ funds 

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in trading accounts at a broker-dealer called TradeStation,

and that the fund was using JPMorgan as a clearing broker. 

Tishfield also recalled Faruki saying that he had attended either Boston University or Boston College. Schottenfeld decided not to invest with Faruki following the meeting.

At trial, the government presented evidence that much of 

the information Faruki gave to Tishfield prior to Tishfield’s 

decision to invest in Neural Markets was false. For instance, 

an FBI agent analyzed Faruki’s bank and trading account records, as well as his hedge funds, and determined that Faruki 

never traded $5 million for other investors. In fact, Faruki and 

his hedge funds never traded any funds for any investors 

other than Tishfield. Additionally, a representative from Liccar CPA testified that Faruki had not hired the accounting 

firm in August 2010 and that the firm does not provide the 

type of reporting that Faruki represented it would provide in 

his August 2010 e-mail to Tishfield. Similarly, the managing 

director of RSM McGladrey testified that Faruki never retained RSM McGladrey to provide auditing services. The parties stipulated that Faruki never had any prime brokerage accounts at JPMorgan. The government also offered evidence 

showing that from January 27, 2010 through September 24, 

2010, Faruki was prohibited from selling securities in or from 

Illinois (the “Illinois Order of Prohibition”).1 Faruki did not 

dispute at trial—nor does he dispute on appeal—that he did 

not attend either Boston University or Boston College.

 

1 In January 2010, the State of Illinois Department of Securities issued 

an Order of Prohibition against Faruki for engaging in fraud in the sale of 

securities.

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Sometime in September 2010, Faruki opened his first account at TradeStation. The account he opened was an individual account, into which he deposited $150,000. Faruki subsequently applied for an institutional account on behalf of Neural Markets. In evaluating Faruki’s application for an institutional account, TradeStation discovered the Illinois Order of 

Prohibition and denied Faruki’s application. TradeStation

also closed Faruki’s personal account. TradeStation’s general 

counsel informed Faruki that TradeStation was no longer interested in doing business with him.

In the process of trying to open the personal and institutional TradeStation accounts, Faruki made a number of false 

representations to two TradeStation employees, Lance 

Baraker and Charles Runyon. These representations included 

some of the same representations that Faruki made to Tishfield and Schottenfeld, including that Faruki was managing 

$5 million in investor funds.

On September 28, 2010, Tishfield sent Faruki $1 million by 

wire transfer to a Neural Markets bank account to invest in 

the Neural Markets fund. Even though TradeStation had denied Faruki’s request for an institutional account and closed 

his personal account, Faruki told Tishfield that TradeStation

would open the account within a week. Faruki had previously 

represented to Tishfield that he would begin trading Tishfield’s investment on October 1, 2010.

The government alleges that following his encounter with 

TradeStation, Faruki had two of his friends open institutional 

accounts at TradeStation in the name of Evolution Quantitative 1X, LLC (“Evolution Quantitative”), accounts which Faruki secretly controlled. Faruki then transferred Tishfield’s $1 

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million into a newly opened bank account in the name of Evolution Quantitative. He subsequently transferred the money 

into the Evolution Quantitative accounts at TradeStation, 

where he traded Tishfield’s funds. 

In November 2010, TradeStation discovered that Faruki 

controlled the Evolution Quantitative accounts and terminated them. Faruki—again through friends—then set up another trading account at a different broker-dealer, Interactive 

Brokers, and transferred Tishfield’s money to that account. 

Faruki informed Tishfield that his money was being transferred to the Interactive Brokers account, but represented that

TradeStation had closed the initial account due to a “trading 

error.”

In December 2010, Tishfield received his first account 

statement from Liccar CPA, which reported significant losses 

associated with his $1 million investment. Tishfield asked Faruki to return what was left of his investment but Faruki refused, citing the PPM. Faruki also reminded Tishfield that under the terms of the PPM, he was permitted to use Tishfield’s 

investment funds to defend himself against any lawsuit initiated by Tishfield.

On February 6, 2013, a grand jury indicted Faruki on seven 

counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The indictment alleged that between January 2010 and January 2011, 

Faruki operated a fraudulent investment scheme in which he 

defrauded Marc Tishfield out of $1 million and attempted to 

defraud Richard Schottenfeld.

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Faruki was tried in January 2014, and the jury found him 

guilty on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7.2 After trial, Faruki filed a 

motion for a judgment of acquittal and a motion for a new 

trial. The district court denied both motions. On August 20, 

2014, the district court sentenced Faruki to forty-eight months 

in prison. Faruki appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence underlying his convictions as well as two evidentiary rulings by the district court.

II. Discussion

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Faruki

Faruki claims that the government failed to prove his guilt 

as to wire fraud (Counts 1, 2, and 3) and the transfer of funds 

in furtherance of a scheme to defraud (Counts 4, 5, and 7). According to Faruki, there is insufficient evidence he made 

“false or material statements” or that he “used wires in furtherance of fraud.” “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the government, and we will overturn a jury verdict only if 

no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States 

v. Garten, 777 F.3d 392, 400 (7th Cir. 2015).

1. Wire Fraud: Counts 1, 2, and 3

To sustain a conviction for wire fraud, the government 

must show that Faruki: “(1) was involved in a scheme to defraud; (2) had an intent to defraud; and (3) used the wires in 

furtherance of that scheme.” United States v. Durham, 766 F.3d 

 

2 Counts 1, 2, and 3 address Faruki’s culpability for wire fraud. Counts 

4, 5, and 7 pertain to specific fund transfers for the purpose of executing a 

scheme to defraud. The government dismissed Count 6.

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672, 678 (7th Cir. 2014). Faruki argues that the government’s 

evidence was insufficient to prove both that he participated 

in a scheme to defraud and that he had an intent to defraud.

“A scheme to defraud requires the making of a false statement or material misrepresentation, or the concealment of [a]

material fact.” United States v. Powell, 576 F.3d 482, 490 (7th 

Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Marc Tishfield testified that Faruki made 

a number of false statements to him, as well as his brother-inlaw, Richard Schottenfeld, in order to convince both men to 

invest in the Neural Markets fund. In reviewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the government, we must take

Tishfield’s testimony as true—that Faruki told Tishfield he 

was managing $5 million in real investor funds, had active accounts at TradeStation and JPMorgan, and had hired RSM 

McGladrey to audit his fund, among other misrepresentations—and accept that Faruki made these false statements. 

The government independently verified that many of the

statements alleged were false by obtaining records from 

TradeStation, JPMorgan, and RSM McGladrey, offering further proof that Faruki was untruthful regarding accounts and 

services obtained from these institutions. 

We are not convinced by Faruki’s argument as to Counts 

1, 2, and 3 that the government failed to sufficiently corroborate Tishfield’s testimony regarding what Faruki told Tishfield before he invested in the Neural Markets fund. Schottenfeld testified that Faruki told both Schottenfeld and Tishfield

that he was managing $5 million for real investors. Additionally, during a September 20, 2010 instant message conversation between Tishfield and Faruki that took place eight days 

before Tishfield wired his $1 million investment, Tishfield 

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asked Faruki whether it had been a good day or a bad day for 

his accounts. Faruki responded that all of his accounts, including “5m simulation, 5m real, 150k everything,” had suffered 

losses. The government reasonably construed this statement 

as a representation by Faruki that he had a simulated account 

containing $5 million, an account containing $5 million from 

real investors, as well as a personal account containing

$150,000. A rational juror could conclude that the instant message, as well as Schottenfeld’s testimony, sufficiently corroborated testimony from Tishfield.

With respect to the intent requirement, a rational trier of 

fact could find that the government established Faruki’s intent to defraud beyond a reasonable doubt. “[I]ntent to defraud requires a wilful [sic] act by the defendant with the specific intent to deceive or cheat, usually for the purpose of getting financial gain for one’s self or causing financial loss to 

another.” United States v. Howard, 619 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 

2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). There 

is ample evidence that Faruki made false statements in order

to induce Tishfield into investing in the Neural Markets fund

for Faruki’s own financial gain.

The government offered sufficient evidence such that a rational juror could conclude that Faruki participated in a 

scheme to defraud and that he had an intent to defraud. Accordingly, his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as 

to his convictions on Counts 1, 2, and 3 fails.

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2. Wire Transfers in Furtherance of Fraud: Counts 4, 5, and 7

With regard to Counts 4, 5, and 7,3 Faruki argues that the 

evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for two reasons. First, he claims that the wire transfers at issue occurred 

after the alleged scheme to defraud was complete. Second, he

claims that the government presented insufficient evidence 

that he controlled these wire transfers. All of the relevant

transfers occurred after Tishfield wired his $1 million investment to Faruki.

Despite the fact that Faruki executed these wire transfers 

after Tishfield had handed over his money, we can properly 

consider the transfers as part of Faruki’s scheme to defraud. 

In United States v. Sampson, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may be charged with the commission of fraudulent 

activities carried out both before and after money is obtained 

from the victims. 371 U.S. 75, 80 (1962). In that case, defendants were charged with mail fraud and the district court dismissed thirty-four counts on the grounds that the mails were 

not used for the purpose of executing the alleged scheme, as 

required by the statute. Id. at 76. Defendants were accused of 

fraudulently inducing victims to pay for services defendants 

never had any intention of performing. Id. at 77. The Supreme

Court rejected the argument that actions by defendants that

occurred after the victims paid defendants money were not 

part of the fraudulent scheme: “[T]he indictment alleged that 

 

3 Count 4 concerns the transfer of money from the Neural Markets 

bank account to the Evolution Quantitative bank account. Count 5 concerns the transfer of money from the Evolution Quantitative bank account 

to the Evolution Quantitative TradeStation accounts. Count 7 concerns the 

transfer of funds from the Evolution Quantitative bank account to the lawyer for Neural Markets.

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the scheme ... included fraudulent activities both before and 

after the victims had actually given over their money to the 

defendants.” Id. at 78. The Court held that the district court 

erred in dismissing the thirty-four counts. Id. at 81.

The logic of Sampson applies in this case. It is clear that as 

part of his scheme, Faruki planned to invest Tishfield’s money 

in a trading account, which required several transfers of 

funds. This is evidenced by Faruki’s numerous efforts to open 

accounts at TradeStation and Interactive Brokers. Faruki

made false representations in soliciting Tishfield’s investment

as well as in transferring Tishfield’s money to various accounts. The evidence therefore demonstrates that wire transfers executed after Tishfield delivered his $1 million investment to Faruki were part of an overall scheme to obtain and 

trade Tishfield’s funds.

Faruki also argues that we should reverse his convictions 

on Counts 4, 5, and 7 on the grounds that there is insufficient 

evidence to suggest that Faruki actually controlled the wire 

transfers identified in these counts. Faruki claims that because 

his name was not on the wire transfers, no reasonable jury 

could conclude that he caused the transfers to occur in furtherance of his fraudulent scheme. Yet, the federal wire fraud 

statute states:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise 

any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or 

fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by 

means of wire ... any writings, signs, signals, 

pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing 

such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this 

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title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or 

both.

18 U.S.C. § 1343 (emphasis added). Under the terms of the 

statute, it is enough that Faruki “caused” the funds to be 

transmitted. 

The record offers ample evidence that Faruki caused the

wire transfers, even if the transfers were not in his name or 

the name of his fund, Neural Markets. For instance, Faruki 

had friends open TradeStation accounts in the name of “Evolution Quantitative” after he failed to open an institutional account himself. TradeStation ultimately terminated the Evolution Quantitative trading accounts when it discovered that 

Faruki controlled these accounts. Faruki does not challenge

the veracity of this evidence. 

In sum, a rational juror could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the wire transfers executed after Tishfield delivered the money were part of Faruki’s overall scheme, and 

that Faruki caused the funds to be transmitted. Faruki’s convictions on these counts must stand.

B. Evidentiary Rulings

Faruki challenges two of the district court’s evidentiary 

rulings at trial. He argues that the district court erred in allowing the TradeStation audiotapes to be introduced. He also 

claims that the court’s limitation of his cross-examination of 

Lance Baraker, a TradeStation employee, violated Federal 

Rule of Evidence 106 and his Sixth Amendment rights. 

“The evidentiary rulings of the district court are given special deference[.]” Young v. James Green Mgmt., Inc., 327 F.3d 

616, 621 (7th Cir. 2003). We review such decisions for an abuse 

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of discretion. United States v. Wilburn, 581 F.3d 618, 622 (7th 

Cir. 2009).

1. TradeStation Tapes

Faruki argues that the district court abused its discretion 

by allowing the government to play portions of TradeStation 

audiotapes for the jury. These tapes recorded Faruki making 

numerous false statements to TradeStation employees in the 

process of trying to obtain individual and institutional trading accounts with TradeStation. Faruki argued before the district court, and argues on appeal, that playing certain portions 

of the tapes for the jury was unduly prejudicial, in violation 

of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. A “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice ....” Fed. R. Evid. 

403. “Evidence is unduly prejudicial if it creates a genuine risk 

that the emotions of the jury will be excited to irrational behavior, and the risk is disproportionate to the probative value 

of the offered evidence.” United States v. Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 

974 (7th Cir. 2011).

At trial, the district court heard arguments from the government about why the tapes should be played and ultimately 

concluded:

The tapes were admitted yesterday. I do think 

they are part of the back end of the scheme in 

setting up this account. I have taken a look at the 

transcripts of these tape recordings. There is 

some information that might not be accurate 

representations made by the defendant, and I 

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think they are prejudicial, but given the allegations in this case, I don’t find them unduly prejudicial.

Faruki challenges the district court’s determination. He argues that playing portions of the TradeStation tapes for the 

jury—particularly, the portions in which he makes numerous 

misrepresentations to TradeStation employees in an attempt 

to open trading accounts—was unduly prejudicial because 

the tapes implicate propensity evidence concerns, as outlined 

in Federal Rule of Evidence 404.4 We note, however, that Faruki does not make an explicit Rule 404 argument; rather, he 

argues that the playing of the portions of the tapes was unduly prejudicial within the framework of Rule 403. We therefore limit our analysis to consideration of Faruki’s Rule 403 

objection.

We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in concluding that the presentation of the portions of the tapes 

to the jury was not unduly prejudicial. There is no evidence 

that the district court either failed to consider Faruki’s arguments or applied an incorrect standard in adjudicating the

Rule 403 objection. The district court appropriately balanced 

the probative value of the evidence against the danger of prejudice, as it was required to do. Although the district court 

stated that it believed the playing of the tapes would be “prejudicial,” it determined that it would not be “unduly” so, 

 

4 Faruki claims that the playing of the tapes for the jury was prejudicial because the tapes tended to suggest that if Faruki made false statements to TradeStation, he likely made false statements to Tishfield as well. 

Per Rule 404, “[e]vidence of a person’s character or character trait is not 

admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” Fed. R. Evid. 404.

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given all of the other evidence in the case. This analysis tracks 

the balancing test district courts are obligated to perform 

when considering Rule 403 objections. See United States v. 

Khan, 508 F.3d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 403 instructs the 

court to balance the probative value of the evidence against 

‘the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 

misleading the jury, or ... considerations of undue delay, 

waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’”). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the tapes to be played.

2. Limitation of Faruki’s Cross-Examination

Faruki also argues that the district court violated the doctrine of completeness, codified by Federal Rule of Evidence 

106, and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 

by limiting his cross-examination of TradeStation employee 

Lance Baraker. We review a district court’s limitation on the 

scope of cross-examination for an abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Sasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995). But if the restriction directly implicates the Sixth Amendment right to 

confrontation, we review de novo. Id. (citing United States v. 

Jackson, 51 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 1995)). 

At trial, Faruki sought to cross-examine Baraker about 

portions of a conversation with Faruki that were not part of 

the transcript or audiotapes already introduced by the government. When Faruki’s counsel began to question Baraker 

about these portions of the conversation, the government objected, contending that Faruki’s attempt to introduce his own 

statements violated the hearsay rule because the statements 

were not subject to the party-opponent exception used by the 

government to place Faruki’s other statements into evidence. 

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Faruki’s counsel argued that, under the doctrine of completeness, other portions of Faruki’s conversation with Baraker

should be admitted and played to provide context for the portions that had already been admitted and played for the jury. 

Following a sidebar and an examination of the transcript portions Faruki’s counsel sought to introduce, the district court 

determined that Faruki’s counsel could question Baraker 

about Baraker’s own statements, but that he could not use the

questioning as an opportunity to put statements by Faruki 

into the record:

I think under the rule of completeness, [Faruki’s 

counsel] is going to be allowed to cross-examine 

Mr. Baraker on anything Mr. Baraker said in this

transcript, that he said, not get into what Mr. Faruki is saying, not to put in false exculpatories, 

because that, I think, would be a violation of the 

hearsay rule, but I think he’s allowed to impeach Mr. Baraker on any portion of the conversation.

The government notes that while Faruki properly raised 

an objection to the limitation of the cross-examination under 

Rule 106, Faruki raises the Confrontation Clause issue for the 

first time in his post-trial briefing. Faruki does not dispute 

that he failed to raise an objection to the district court’s ruling 

on Confrontation Clause grounds at trial. Although the question of whether a court’s limitation of a defendant’s cross-examination offends the Confrontation Clause is generally reviewed de novo, we agree with the government that Faruki 

forfeited this argument and review only for plain error. United 

States v. Wing, 104 F.3d 986, 988–89 (7th Cir. 1997). For these 

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reasons, we review the Rule 106 issue for abuse of discretion 

and the Confrontation Clause issue for plain error.

First, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Faruki’s cross-examination such that the

transcript portions could only be used for impeachment purposes, rather than to place Faruki’s statements into the record. 

We are not convinced by Faruki’s argument that admission of 

his additional statements was necessary merely to place “in 

context” the admitted portion of his conversation with 

Baraker. The district court properly advised defense counsel 

that it would exclude any prior out-of-court statements by Faruki offered to prove that Faruki had been truthful in speaking with Baraker. Allowing Faruki to introduce such statements would have violated the hearsay rule. 

Moreover, the district court carefully examined the specific portions of the transcript prior to its evidentiary ruling. 

Rule 106 states: “If a party introduces all or part of a writing 

or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” Fed. R. Evid. 106. The district court 

reviewed the proffered statements and evaluated whether 

those statements contradicted other statements already 

placed into the record. The record shows that the court was 

within its discretion when it determined that the appropriate 

course of action was to allow Faruki’s counsel to cross-examine Baraker about specific statements Baraker made in the 

taped conversations with Faruki, but only to the extent that 

the statements impeached Baraker’s testimony. 

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Faruki was not entitled to introduce his own hearsay statements through Baraker to “impeach” earlier statements Faruki had made that were already in evidence. The district 

court properly found that the appropriate vehicle for the introduction of such evidence would have been for Faruki himself to have taken the stand. Thus, the district court’s limitation on cross-examination was not an abuse of discretion and 

did not violate the standard of “fairness” contemplated by 

Rule 106.

Second, the district court did not commit plain error by 

limiting Faruki’s cross-examination of Baraker in the manner 

described. Faruki argues that his Confrontation Clause rights 

were violated because he was unable to engage in a “rigorous” cross-examination of Baraker without introducing the 

other statements by Faruki. He also claims that his rights were 

violated because the government did not put Charles Runyon, another TradeStation employee, on the stand so that Faruki could “clear up his statements through cross-examination” of Runyon. Faruki claims that it was improper of the 

government to rely solely on Baraker’s testimony. 

This argument is unconvincing. The district court’s decision to limit cross-examination of Baraker did not violate Faruki’s right to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment. 

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause does guarantee a defendant a right to effective cross-examination. United 

States v. Jackson, 540 F.3d 578, 591 (7th Cir. 2008). But the district court has wide discretion to impose reasonable restrictions on cross-examination. Id. The restriction in this case 

was narrow—it only prevented Faruki from introducing his 

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own out-of-court statements on the recordings. It was also justified on reasonable grounds, namely an effort to adhere to 

the hearsay rule.

Moreover, the statements by Runyon and Baraker were 

non-testimonial and placed into evidence solely to provide 

context for Faruki’s statements on the recordings. Non-testimonial statements do not require confrontation. See United 

States v. York, 572 F.3d 415, 427 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[P]laying the 

tapes of those conversations for the jury does not violate the 

Confrontation Clause so long as those tapes are offered to provide context for the defendant’s own admissions.”). In short, 

this restriction did not violate Faruki’s Sixth Amendment 

rights and the district court did not commit plain error in limiting Faruki’s cross-examination of Baraker.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

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