Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02305/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02305-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Manuel Hernandez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

UNITCD STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States C.ourt of Appeals 

Tl'!f'lth CirctJit 

NOV 8 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, · Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MANUEL HERNANDEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

No. 89-2305 

(D.C. No. 89-84JC-01) 

(D.N .M.) 

Before TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN, 

District Judge.** 

Defendant Manuel Hernandez appeals his conviction in federal 

district court of possession with intent to distribute less than 

fifty kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 u.s.c. 

SS 84l(a)(l) and 841(b)(l)(D). Hernandez argues on appeal that 

the district court erred: (1) in finding there was sufficient 

evidence to give the jury a deliberate ignorance instruction; (2) 

by not including sufficient detail in the balancing instruction to 

the jury: (3) in finding trial counsel's decision not to subpoena 

a witness did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel; 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, District Judge of the 

United States District Court for the District of Utah, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-2305 Document: 010110047865 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 1 
' 

and (4) in miscalculating his sentence from the Sentencing 

Guidelines by finding he was not a minimal or minor participant. 

We affirm. 

Hernandez contends the the district court erred in 

instructing the jury on deliberate ignorance because there was 

insufficient evidence that he knew or deliberately avoided 

knowledge of the marijuana in the vehicle he was driving. We 

disagree. In Glick Y.!.. United States, 710 F.2d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 

1983), we held that a deliberate ignorance instruction is 

appropriate when the evidence is sufficient to enable a jury to 

find beyond a reasonable doubt the fact at issue and either the 

defendant knew it or deliberately avoided acquiring positive 

knowledge of it. 

Here, there was evidence that Hernandez knew of the 

marijuana: the border patrol agent at Truth or Consequences, New 

Mexico testified he could smell marijuana when Hernandez first 

opened the window to speak with him; there were two large garbage 

bags of marijuana in the trunk; the spare tire was out of 

position, unusually heavy, and smelled like it was filled with 

marijuana; Hernandez was hired for two hundred dollars by a 

stranger to drive a car from El Paso to the Albuquerque airport; 

and Hernandez lied about his citizenship and the ownership of the 

vehicle to get through the checkpoint without revealing further 

information. 

There also was evidence that if Hernandez did not know the 

vehicle was transporting marijuana, then he deliberately avoided 

knowledge of it: the strong smell of marijuana was not masked by 

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Appellate Case: 89-2305 Document: 010110047865 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 2 
air freshener, but Hernandez made no attempt to investigate the 

stench he claimed not to have recognized or even detected --

indeed, any attempt to explain his failure to do so by his 

position in the driver's seat and his testimony the owner of the 

car had instructed him not to look into the trunk would be at odds 

with his denial that he smelled anything unusual when he himself 

had opened the trunk at the agent's request; Hernandez was hired 

for a price disproportionate to the apparent task of driving the 

vehicle -- a clear sign some illegality was involved; Hernandez 

testified he considered it "peculiar" that a stranger would offer 

him two hundred dollars to drive to Albuquerque; and there was 

nothing else in the vehicle to transport illegally besides 

marijuana. We hold there is sufficient evidence that Hernandez 

either knew or deliberately avoided knowledge the vehicle was 

transporting marijuana. 

The defendant also contends the district court failed to give 

the requisite balancing instruction to the jury. We disagree. In 

Glick, 710 F.2d at 643, we held that the failure to add the 

balancing language at issue was not grounds for reversal because 

its ommission does not constitute plain error. The balancing 

instruction we recommended in Glick, 710 F.2d at 644, states: 

"the required knowledge is established if the defendant is aware 

of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question 

unless he actually believes it does not exist." Here, the 

deliberate ignorance instructions include that exact language even 

though the law in this circuit clearly does not require it. 

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The defendant further contends that the language we commended 

in Glick, id., and United States~ Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d 

244, 249 (10th Cir. 1987), is inadequate because it is not 

tailored specifically to the marijuana offense. In evaluating the 

instructions, we apply the plain error rule of Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 52(b) because defense counsel objected at trial 

to the propriety of a deliberate ignorance instruction in any 

form, not to the specific instruction the court gave. See,~, 

Glick, 710 F.2d at 643. Reviewing the deliberate ignorance 

instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole, we do 

not find plain error. We cannot say that the lack of specificity 

in a part of the instructions we have never required misled the . 

jury or prejudiced the defendant. 

We also find the defendant's argument that there was 

insufficient evidence to support a conviction for knowing 

possession of marijuana to _be without merit. As we noted in 

Arbizo, 833 F.2d at 248, the purpose of a deliberate ignorance 

instruction is to "alert the jury that the act of avoidance of 

knowledge of particular fact may itself circumstantially show that 

the avoidance was motivated by sufficient guilty knowledge to 

satisfy the statute." Thus, as long as the instruction is 

properly phrased and based on sufficient evidence that the 

defendant knew or deliberately avoided knowledge of the 

marijuana two requirements we have already found -- the 

instructions may permit a jury to find a defendant guilty of 

knowing possession of marijuana based on circumstantial evidence. 

See,~, United States~ Ashby, 864 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2305 Document: 010110047865 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 4 
1988); Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1987). As we stated above, 

we find that the defendant's conviction for knowing possession of 

marijuana was based on sufficient evidence even if the jury relied 

on the deliberate ignorance theory. 

Hernandez contends that his trial counsel's failure to 

subpoena a critical witness constituted ineffective assistance of 

counsel. We disagree. A claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel requires that the defendant show: (1) counsel's 

performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defendant. Strickland Y..!.. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984); Denton Y..!.. Ricketts, 791 F.2d 824, 826 (10th Cir. 

1986). Defense counsel's decision not to have border patrol agent 

Garcia testify at trial may have been trial strategy and was of 

little consequence, possibly could have been counterproductive in 

light of the whole record. Although Garcia initially testified at 

the suppression hearing that he did not smell marijuana when 

Hernandez opened the car window, he admitted on cross-examination 

he was standing no closer than eight to ten feet from the vehicle. 

Further, we are not convinced defense counsel's decision not to 

call that witness in any way prejudiced the defendant. We hold 

that the district court's finding that the decision about Garcia 

did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel was not 

clearly erroneous. 

Finally, Hernandez contends that the district court did not 

apply the Sentencing Guidelines correctly in deciding not to 

reduce his offense level based on his role as a minor or minimal 

participant. We disagree. Because Hernandez failed to object to 

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Appellate Case: 89-2305 Document: 010110047865 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 5 
the presentence report on which the district court relied, we will 

not reverse the sentence unless there is plain error under Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure 52(b). We find no plain error in the 

district court's determination. First, the Guidelines do not 

require a sentencing court to reduce the offense level based on 

the defendant's role as a courier. United States L.. Pelayo-Munoz, 

905 F.2d 1429, 1430 (10th Cir. 1990). Second, it is not clear 

from the record that the district court even "found" Hernandez was 

a courier, as the defendant claims, simply because he called him a 

"mule." However, it is clear the district court found Hernandez 

was not a minor or minimal participant--a finding of fact reveiwed 

under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 1431. After 

reviewing the record, we cannot conclude the trial court's 

determination that Hernandez was not a minor or minimal 

participant is clearly erroneous. Therefore, we hold there was no 

plain error in the calculation of Hernandez' sentence. We AFFIRM. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

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