Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02686/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02686-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shontay Dessart
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2686

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SHONTAY DESSART,

Defendant-Appellant,

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 12-CR-85 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JUNE 2, 2015 — DECIDED MAY 17, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges. 

SYKES, Circuit Judge. From his home in tiny Reedsville, 

Wisconsin, Shontay Dessart manufactured and sold products containing the active chemical ingredients in numerous 

prescription drugs, offering them for sale online with the 

disclaimer “for research only” to evade the oversight of the 

U.S. Food and Drug Administration. He was convicted of 

violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331, 

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2 No. 14-2686

with the intent to defraud or mislead the agency, which 

converted his violations from strict-liability misdemeanors 

into specific-intent felonies, id. § 333(a)(2). On appeal Dessart 

contends that (1) the FDA’s investigator lied in procuring a

search warrant and the warrant otherwise lacked probable 

cause; (2) the government’s evidence was insufficient to 

prove that he acted with deceptive intent; and (3) the district 

court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of “prescription drug.” Long story short: Dessart lied, the investigator didn’t, the warrant was backed by ample probable-cause, 

and there was no instructional error. We affirm.

I. Background

A. The Investigation

In September 2008 U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

officers in Chicago seized a package addressed to Shontay 

Dessart in rural Reedsville, Wisconsin. The package contained 100 injectable vials of white powder, which the 

officers suspected was human growth hormone (“HGH”). 

Customs agents contacted the FDA, and Special Agent Loris 

Cagnoni was assigned to lead the investigation.

Once on board Agent Cagnoni learned that a local narcotics task force in Wisconsin had received an anonymous 

tip in July that Dessart was operating an illegal online 

“pharmacy” from his home in Reedsville, selling prescription drugs on the website www.EDS-Research.com and also 

selling steroids in bars around Appleton, Wisconsin. Agent 

Cagnoni visited the website, which listed numerous bodybuilding and performance-enhancing drugs for sale, including one called “HGH Frag,” as well as the chemicals sildenafil, tadalafil, and vardenafil, the active ingredients in the 

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No. 14-2686 3

prescription drugs Viagra, Cialis, and Levitra. The products 

advertised on the website carried a disclaimer saying the 

drugs were “for research only.”

On October 23 Customs officers intercepted a second 

package addressed to Dessart at the same address. This one

contained 250 vials of white powder nearly identical to those 

in the first. Five days later a U.S. Postal Service inspector 

contacted Agent Cagnoni to inform him that someone by the 

name of Erica Lynn Gabrielsen had inquired about the 

delivery status of the second package via the Postal Service’s

package-tracking website. That same day Customs seized a 

third package nearly identical to the other two. This one was 

addressed to Gabrielsen at an apartment in Appleton.

With the third package in their custody, the agents decided to move on what they suspected was an HGHtrafficking operation. Agent Cagnoni submitted an affidavit 

to a magistrate judge describing the packages and their 

contents, the anonymous tip, and the information he had 

gleaned from browsing the EDS-Research website. Agent 

Cagnoni averred that there wasn’t time to test the intercepted substances because chemical testing would “take approximately six weeks” and thus compromise the controlled 

delivery the agents were planning to undertake with one of 

the packages. The magistrate judge found probable cause 

and issued a search warrant for Dessart’s Reedsville residence.

On October 29, after making a controlled delivery of one 

of the packages, state and federal agents executed the warrant. Both Dessart and Gabrielsen were home. (Gabrielsen 

was Dessart’s girlfriend and is now his wife.) Inside the 

residence the agents discovered extensive evidence of a 

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pharmaceutical manufacturing operation: raw chemicals in 

powder and liquid form, materials for making chewable 

tablets, flavorings, colorings, glass vials and bottles, packaging materials and labels, a digital scale and measuring 

instruments, and various other pieces of equipment associated with the manufacture, packaging, and distribution of 

pharmaceutical drugs. They also found a black duffle bag 

containing roughly 20 ready-to-ship U.S. Postal Service

packages, each of which held one or more blue bottles of

tablets or liquids. Labels affixed to the bottles listed “EDS 

Research Supplies Inc.” as their originator, along with the 

disclaimer “for research only.” Dessart gave the agents 

access to his business records—including databases listing 

his customers, products, and orders—and told them that 

computers in Gabrielsen’s Appleton apartment also were 

used to operate the business.

While the search was ongoing, Agent Cagnoni spoke 

with Gabrielsen in a separate room and obtained her consent 

to search the Appleton apartment. The details of this conversation are disputed, specifically (1) whether Gabrielsen, who 

was eight months pregnant at the time, was handcuffed 

when she signed a consent-to-search form; (2) whether 

Agent Cagnoni kicked her; and (3) whether she was induced 

to sign by a promise that she could use her phone to arrange 

child care for her stepson. It’s undisputed, however, that 

Gabrielsen signed a written consent to search her Appleton 

apartment, to which the third intercepted package had been 

addressed. There the agents seized two computers and 

additional evidence of the prescription-drug-trafficking

operation.

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No. 14-2686 5

The agents sent samples of the substances recovered 

from the Reedsville residence and the intercepted packages

to the crime laboratory for chemical testing. The results came 

back three weeks later; the powder was not HGH after all. 

Rather, the raw chemicals and finished products contained

the active ingredients for a variety of prescription drugs, 

including Viagra, Cialis, Levitra, and Propecia.

B. Indictment and Trial

Dessart was indicted on 23 counts of violating the Food, 

Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331. Count 1 charged 

him with operating an unregistered pharmaceutical manufacturing business. Id. § 331(p). Counts 2 through 12 alleged 

that he sold misbranded drugs in interstate commerce. Id.

§ 331(a). Counts 13 through 23 alleged that he misbranded 

drugs held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce. Id. 

§ 331(k). Violations of § 331 ordinarily are strict-liability 

misdemeanors, but the government alleged that Dessart 

committed the violations with intent to defraud or mislead

the FDA, which subjected him to felony penalties. See id.

§ 333(a)(2).

Dessart moved to suppress the evidence seized from his

Reedsville residence and the Appleton apartment. He argued that the warrant affidavit did not establish probable 

cause and Gabrielsen’s consent was involuntary. He also 

requested a Franks hearing, see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 

154 (1978), to challenge what he claimed was a material 

intentional falsehood in the warrant affidavit. Specifically, 

he accused Agent Cagnoni of falsely stating that chemical 

testing would take “approximately six weeks.”

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A magistrate judge concluded that the warrant was supported by probable cause and any mischaracterization of the 

testing time was inadvertent and immaterial. The district 

judge agreed and declined to suppress the evidence seized 

in the Reedsville search. But the judge granted the motion in 

part, excluding the evidence recovered from the Appleton 

apartment because the government hadn’t established that 

Gabrielsen’s consent was voluntary. Later, in light of our

decision in United States v. Pelletier, 700 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 

2012), the judge revisited and reversed this ruling, concluding that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applied. Finally, 

the judge denied Dessart’s request for a Franks hearing.

Dessart then pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor violations of the Act, avoiding the felony designation and enhanced penalties under § 333(a)(2). Before sentencing, 

however, he fired his lawyer, asked to proceed pro se, and 

moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The judge obliged.

That move proved inadvisable. The judge declined to reconsider the Franks ruling and rejected Dessart’s second 

suppression motion, which was largely repetitive of the first.

The case proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted Dessart on 

all counts.

II. Discussion

We can group Dessart’s appellate arguments into three 

baskets: (1) challenges to the search warrant (both the probable-cause determination and the denial of his request for a 

Franks hearing); (2) arguments about the sufficiency of the 

government’s evidence; and (3) a challenge to the jury 

instruction defining the term “prescription drug.”

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No. 14-2686 7

A. The Search Warrant

1. Probable Cause

Dessart’s first argument is that the district judge should 

have granted his suppression motion because Agent 

Cagnoni’s warrant affidavit didn’t establish probable cause

to search his home. The proper focus of an appellate claim of 

this sort “is whether the judge who issued the warrant (rarely 

the same as the judge who ruled on the motion to suppress) 

acted on the basis of probable cause. On that issue we must 

afford ‘great deference’ to the issuing judge’s conclusion.”

United States v. McIntire, 516 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir. 2008)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (first emphasis added).

The issuing magistrate judge’s decision easily survives 

this deferential review. Three aspects of Agent Cagnoni’s

affidavit are particularly salient. First, the affidavit provided

a detailed description of the hundreds of vials of white 

powder that were found in the packages intercepted by 

Customs and explained why this evidence pointed to an 

illicit HGH-trafficking business operating from Dessart’s

Reedsville residence. Agent Cagnoni also described his prior

experience purchasing HGH in an undercover capacity and 

his involvement in other investigations in which similar 

packages originating from China were seized and later 

determined to contain illicit HGH. He explained that the 

white powder contained in the intercepted packages was

identical in size, weight, color, and packaging as the HGH 

purchased or seized in these earlier investigations.

An experienced police officer’s direct personal observation of suspected contraband provides probable cause for a 

search warrant “[a]bsent some reason to doubt the veracity 

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8 No. 14-2686

of the [officer’s] affidavit.” United States v. Burge, 683 F.3d 

829, 832 (7th Cir. 2012). In Burge the contraband was marijuana plants. We accept for present purposes that identifying 

HGH is a more complex undertaking, but Dessart has given

us no reason to doubt Agent Cagnoni’s experience or veracity. It makes no difference that the agent was in fact mistaken

about the contents of the vials (they contained other prescription drugs, not HGH). What matters is that his suspicions were grounded in his personal observation of the 

suspected contraband and his professional training and 

experience.

Second, the anonymous tip corroborated Agent 

Cagnoni’s suspicions. When the police rely on a tip as 

support for a warrant application, the issuing magistrate 

engages in a “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis,” taking

account of the informant’s “[r]eliability, veracity, and basis 

of knowledge.” United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 816 (7th 

Cir. 2014). Granted, this analysis is more difficult when the 

tipster is anonymous. Dessart argues as well that the gap in 

time—nearly three months between the tip and the warrant 

application—made the tip stale. But considered in context

and through the lens of our deferential standard of review, 

the anonymous tip reliably corroborated the other evidence 

gathered in the investigation. The tipster reported that 

Dessart was operating an online “pharmacy” from his 

Reedsville home and peddling steroids in Appleton bars. 

The tip contained important details that bolstered its credibility. For example, the tipster provided specific information 

about Dessart’s website and knew that Dessart had a girlfriend who lived in Appleton. The tip, though anonymous, 

strengthened the probable-cause determination.

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No. 14-2686 9

Third, and relatedly, the anonymous tip led Agent 

Cagnoni to log on to Dessart’s website, EDS-Research.com. 

There he found substantial evidence that Dessart was engaged in the illegal distribution of HGH and prescription 

drugs. Among other bodybuilding and performanceenhancing products offered for sale, the website listed

something called “HGH Frag” and chemicals containing the 

active ingredients in Viagra and Cialis—all carrying the 

disclaimer “for research only.”

In short, Agent Cagnoni’s affidavit gave the magistrate 

judge a robust factual foundation to authorize a search of 

Dessart’s Reedsville residence. The district judge was right 

to reject the suppression motion.1

2. Franks Hearing

Dessart also challenges the district judge’s denial of his 

request for a Franks hearing. “[D]etermining the likelihood 

that [an investigator] lied in his warrant affidavit ... involve[s] essentially the same process as fact-finding,” so our 

review of this issue, too, is deferential, for clear error only. 

United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1227 (7th Cir. 1990).

To win a Franks hearing, the defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing that the officer who swore out 

the warrant affidavit “made a false statement knowingly and 

intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.” 

United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). This preliminary show-

 1 Dessart also argues that the judge should have suppressed the evidence 

seized in the search of the Appleton apartment, but only as the fruit of an 

unlawful search of the Reedsville residence. Because the Reedsville 

search was not unlawful, this argument necessarily fails.

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ing encompasses three elements: “(1) the affidavit contained 

a material false statement; (2) the affiant made the false 

statement intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the 

truth; and (3) the false statement was necessary to support 

the finding of probable cause.” United States v. Maro, 

272 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2001). Franks hearings are “rarely 

held” because “[t]hese elements are hard to prove.” United 

States v. Swanson, 210 F.3d 788, 790 (7th Cir. 2000). Dessart 

has not come close to carrying his burden.

Dessart focuses on Agent Cagnoni’s statement that chemical testing of the suspected HGH in the intercepted packages would take “approximately six weeks.” Because the test 

results actually came back in three weeks, not six, Dessart 

argues that the agent’s estimate was either an intentional

falsehood or, at a minimum, a reckless misrepresentation 

made “to quickly ... obtain a search warrant.”

There are several flaws in this argument, not least of 

which is a fairly obvious materiality problem. The length of 

time required for chemical testing was informative but not 

necessary to the probable-cause determination; a laboratory’s speed in returning test results has no bearing on the 

likelihood that a seized substance is illegal contraband. The 

district judge found the six-week estimate immaterial to the 

probable-cause calculus, and we agree. That alone is enough 

to sink Dessart’s Franks argument.

For completeness, however, we’ll briefly touch on 

Dessart’s contention that the agent’s six-week estimate was 

either intentionally false or reckless. As best we can tell, 

Dessart appears to be arguing that Agent Cagnoni didn’t

want the substances tested at all, either because he didn’t 

actually believe the powder was HGH or because he didn’t 

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No. 14-2686 11

care whether it was HGH but just wanted to obtain access to 

Dessart’s residence. As evidence of this supposed nefarious 

intent, Dessart points to the fact that the agent didn’t submit 

the first intercepted package for testing immediately after it 

was seized in September, but instead waited until after the 

second and third packages were intercepted and the search 

warrant was issued.

The failure to request immediate testing after the interception of the first package isn’t particularly probative of 

Agent Cagnoni’s intent in applying for the search warrant

the following month. The record reflects that Cagnoni was 

actively pursuing other aspects of the investigation after the 

seizure of the first package in September, and the interception of two nearly identical packages in October no doubt 

strengthened the agent’s suspicions. That he didn’t send

samples to the lab right away doesn’t show that he intentionally falsified his estimate of the testing time.

That brings us to our final point: An essential element of 

a preliminary Franks showing is a false statement. The problem for Dessart is that Agent Cagnoni’s approximation of the 

testing time wasn’t false. We know that when the samples 

were tested in January 2009, the lab returned the results in 

three weeks rather than six. But an FDA chemist testified at 

trial that “the typical turnaround time for obtaining test 

results is 30 to 60 days.” Agent Cagnoni’s six-week estimate 

was well within the “typical” four-to-seven-week window.2

 2 In his reply brief, Dessart identifies a few other statements that he 

claims were reckless and misleading. This argument comes far too late

and is waived. See Darif v. Holder, 739 F.3d 329, 336–37 (7th Cir. 2014)

(“[A]rguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived.”).

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B. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Specific Intent

Dessart next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

underlying his convictions. He argues that the government 

failed to present sufficient evidence that he acted with 

deceptive intent, a necessary factual predicate for felony 

penalties. As we’ve noted, violations of § 331 are ordinarily 

strict-liability misdemeanors, but if the defendant “commits

such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead,” the 

offense converts to a felony and harsher penalties apply.

§ 333(a)(2).

The statute is silent as to the object of the deception, but 

the consensus among the circuits is that § 333(a)(2) applies if 

the defendant intended to deceive either consumers or the 

FDA or both. See United States v. Andersen, 45 F.3d 217, 219 

(7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting in the context of Food, Drug, and 

Cosmetic Act violations committed with the intent to defraud the FDA the defendant’s argument “that fraud on a 

regulatory agency does not support the use of § 2F1.1,” the 

sentencing enhancement for “offense[s] involv[ing] fraud”);

United States v. Ellis, 326 F.3d 550, 554 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The 

inquiry, therefore, is whether the defendant designed his 

conduct to avoid the regulatory scrutiny of the FDA.”);

United States v. Bradshaw, 840 F.2d 871, 874 (11th Cir. 1988) 

(“[T]he structure of the statutory scheme, the purpose of the 

statute, and the case law persuade us that Congress meant to 

encompass conduct intended to defraud government enforcement agencies.”).

Any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence comes 

with “a heavy, indeed, nearly insurmountable, burden.” 

United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2010). To 

prevail, Dessart “must convince us that even after viewing 

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No. 14-2686 13

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

no rational trier of fact could have found him guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

To recap the charges, in Count 1 Dessart was accused of 

operating an unregistered drug-manufacturing business in 

violation of § 331(p).3 In Counts 2 through 12, he was accused of introducing misbranded drugs into interstate 

commerce in violation of § 331(a). In Counts 13 through 23,

he was accused of misbranding drugs held for sale after

shipment in interstate commerce in violation of § 331(k). 

Each count carried the § 333(a)(2) “with intent to defraud or 

mislead” enhancer.

The evidence of Dessart’s intent to mislead the FDA was 

ample and easily sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The 

government adduced substantial evidence that Dessart was 

fully aware of the requirements of the Act and took affirmative steps to evade compliance. As we’ve explained, the 

government introduced extensive evidence establishing that 

Dessart was operating an online “pharmacy” out of his 

home by manufacturing and selling various prescription 

drugs to weight lifters, bodybuilders, and others seeking to 

enhance their physical appearance or performance. The 

government presented evidence of the items seized in 

Dessart’s home—e.g., raw drug ingredients from overseas, 

flavorings, colorings, manufacturing equipment, packaging

materials and labels, ready-to-use postal shipping packages—and also testimony from Dessart’s customers. The drugs 

were, in fact, human prescription drugs and were specifically marketed and intended for that use, but Dessart affixed 

 3 The registration duty is found in 21 U.S.C. § 360.

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the label “for research only,” both on his website and on the 

drug packaging itself. And EDS-Research.com carried a 

lengthy and detailed disclaimer explicitly discussing the Act

and its prohibitions on introducing unapproved new drugs 

into interstate commerce. Among other things, the disclaimer stated that the products offered for sale were not to be 

used as “drugs ... for humans or animals or for commercial 

purposes” and should not “be considered to be food, drugs, 

medical devices, or cosmetics.”

This factual foundation is easily sufficient to support a 

reasonable inference that Dessart was aware of his obligations under the Act and was intentionally trying to evade the 

regulatory authority of the FDA. Indeed, it would have been 

surprising had the jury not drawn that inference. There is no 

other explanation for affixing a “for research only” disclaimer on drugs sold for human consumption.

C. Jury Instructions

Finally, Dessart challenges the jury instruction defining 

the term “prescription drug.” We review claims of instructional error for abuse of discretion, “approving on appeal 

instructions that ‘fairly and accurately’ summarize the law 

and have support in the record.” United States v. Jefferson, 

334 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 2003). Material errors of law 

automatically qualify as an abuse of discretion, so we review

de novo the extent to which “the instruction completely and 

correctly states the law.” Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 

934 (7th Cir. 1999).

It would be hard to conclude that the challenged instruction misstated the law given that the judge lifted the definition of “prescription drug” essentially verbatim from the 

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No. 14-2686 15

statutory text. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines a 

prescription drug as:

(1) A drug intended for use by man which—

(A) because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the method of its 

use, or the collateral measures necessary to 

its use, is not safe for use except under the 

supervision of a practitioner licensed by 

law to administer such drug; or

(B) is limited by an approved application 

under section 355 of this title to use under 

the professional supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such 

drug ... . 

21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1).

Over Dessart’s objection the judge limited the jury instruction to the definition in subsection (A), which covers 

drugs that possess certain characteristics—e.g., toxicity or 

potential for harmful effects—that make them safe to use 

only under the supervision of a licensed practitioner. Under 

subsection (B) a drug is a “prescription drug” if approved as 

such by the FDA. Because Dessart’s products were not 

approved by the FDA, the judge omitted that part of the 

statutory definition.

Dessart raises two complaints. First, he argues that the 

instruction should have included the definition in subsection (B). We don’t see why. The evidence did not show—and 

the government never argued—that Dessart’s products 

qualified as “prescription drugs” because they were approved as such by the FDA. Second, Dessart argues that the 

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16 No. 14-2686

instruction should have included the definition of “prescription drug product” found in 21 U.S.C. § 379g. Again, we 

don’t see why. Section 379g is part of the Prescription Drug 

User Fee Act of 1992, a discrete statutory scheme that collects 

user fees to help fund the FDA’s review and approval of new 

drug applications. By its terms § 379g provides that its 

definition of “prescription drug product” applies “[f]or 

purposes of this subpart” only. There was no instructional 

error.

AFFIRMED.

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No. 14‐2686 17

POSNER, Circuit Judge, concurring. I agree with the deci‐

sion but have reservations about some of the verbal formulas

in the majority opinion. I do not criticize the majority for re‐

citing them, because they are common, orthodox, even ca‐

nonical. But they are also inessential and in some respects

erroneous, and on both grounds ripe for reexamination.

First is the proposition that when a judge issues a war‐

rant, whether to search or to arrest, the appellate court

“must afford ‘great deference’ to the issuing judge’s conclu‐

sion” that there was probable cause. United States v. McIntire,

516 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir. 2008). This proposition derives

from Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983), where we are

told that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly said that after‐

the‐fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit

should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate’s

‘determination of probable cause should be paid great defer‐

ence by reviewing courts.’” Why great deference? Because,

we’re told in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698–99

(1996), “the Fourth Amendment demonstrates a ‘strong

preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant,’

Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 236, and the police are more

likely to use the warrant process if the scrutiny applied to a

magistrate’s probable‐cause determination to issue a warrant

is less than that for warrantless searches. Were we to elimi‐

nate this distinction, we would eliminate the incentive.”

This is a curious passage in three respects. First, why

should a reviewing court accord “great” deference to a mag‐

istrate’s determination of probable cause? The term “magis‐

trate,” often used in place of “judge” to designate the judicial

officer who issues warrants, is an acknowledgment that war‐

rants usually are issued by the most junior judicial officers—

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18 No. 14‐2686

and often police or prosecutors can shop among magistrates

for one who is certain or almost certain to respond affirma‐

tively to a request to issue a warrant. Second, the Fourth

Amendment does not express a preference for searches con‐

ducted pursuant to warrants. Warrants are mentioned only

in the amendment’s second clause, which forbids general

warrants and warrants not supported by both probable

cause and an oath or affirmation. Nothing in the amendment

requires warrants—ever.

And third, the proposition, whether or not correct, that

police are more likely to resort to warrants if more deference

is given to a magistrate’s finding of probable cause than to

an after‐the‐fact assertion by police or prosecutors that a

search without a warrant is supported by probable cause

implies confidence by the police that the magistrates from

whom they seek warrants can be depended upon to find

probable cause to issue the warrants. Otherwise warrants

would be abjured. In short, the more warrants, the more

searches because searches pursuant to warrants are less like‐

ly to be challenged than warrantless searches.

The passages from judicial opinions that I’ve quoted thus

far invite judicial haste and carelessness. But wait a mi‐

nute—I am objecting to propositions enunciated by the Su‐

preme Court. That may seem impertinence on my part, forc‐

ing me to invoke the old proverb that “a cat may look at a

king,” one meaning of which is that an inferior is or should

be allowed to criticize a superior.

Another reservation I have concerning the majority opin‐

ion in this case relates to the defendant’s request that the dis‐

trict judge conduct a hearing (called a Franks hearing, see

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)) to determine the like‐

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No. 14‐2686 19

lihood that an agent had lied in the affidavit submitted to

the magistrate in support of the agent’s request for a war‐

rant. The district court refused to hold a hearing, and in af‐

firming the refusal our majority opinion says that “’deter‐

mining the likelihood that [an investigator] lied in his war‐

rant affidavit ... involve[s] essentially the same process as

fact‐finding,’ so our review of this issue, too, is deferential,

for clear error only,” quoting United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d

1218, 1227 (7th Cir. 1990). Doubtless the majority would also

agree with the statement in Pace that “where the district

court has reasonably and conscientiously reviewed the de‐

fendant’s [claim for a hearing], and has properly applied the

law, its decision should stand even if we, as an original mat‐

ter, would have ordered the hearing.” Id. This is a conven‐

tional appellate‐court statement, but it’s puzzling. What

could it mean to say that the district court’s decision “should

stand even if we, as an original matter, would have ordered

the hearing”? It could just mean that we haven’t been given

all the facts, and the district court was given all the facts, so

its decision is more likely to be correct than ours would be.

Or it could mean that the case is a toss‐up and—rightly—a

tie goes to the district court. Which is it? I’d like to know.

I am puzzled too by the remark in Pace that “even if de

novo review is more likely to catch and correct more ‘mis‐

takes’ by the district courts in denying Franks hearings, those

mistakes do not go to a defendant’s actual guilt or inno‐

cence. ... [W]here mistakes do not go to guilt or innocence,

de novo review imposes too great a cost for the benefits it

might obtain.” Id. There is first the question, which I’ll leave

for another day, what the terms “actual guilt” and “actual

innocence” mean that “guilt” and “innocence” without the

adjective “actual” do not mean. The next question is, when

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20 No. 14‐2686

there are mistakes that do not relate to the defendant’s guilt

or innocence, what reason could there be for paying any at‐

tention to them? A partial answer is that while a warrant

procured by a lie is unlawful (it may violate a statute, or a

judicial gloss that has been placed on the Fourth Amend‐

ment), it need not signal that the defendant is innocent of the

crime with which he’s charged—the crime that led to the

application for a warrant. Yet one would have expected a

dishonest application, being a serious procedural violation,

to invite as close (or almost as close) judicial scrutiny as an

erroneous conviction. Otherwise there are bound to be false

convictions. Police who procure a search warrant by lying to

the magistrate may also have no scruples against planting

contraband in the house they are searching, or against pre‐

tending that the person they arrested had resisted arrest vio‐

lently. It makes sense to exclude the fruits of such warrants

even if in many cases the error doesn’t imply that the de‐

fendant is innocent.

Three‐fourths of the way through the majority opinion

we read that “any challenge to the sufficiency of the evi‐

dence [that the defendant acted with ‘deceptive intent’]

comes with ‘a heavy, indeed, nearly insurmountable bur‐

den,’” quoting United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d 540, 546 (7th

Cir. 2010). To prevail, the defendant “must convince us that

even after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. I have trouble

understanding why an appellant should have to overcome

“a heavy,” a “nearly insurmountable,” burden of proof. Crit‐

icizing such hyperbole we said in United States v. Curescu,

674 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2012), that “to say that a jury ver‐

dict can be set aside only if ‘wholly irrational’ (which would

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No. 14‐2686 21

indeed be a ‘nearly insurmountable’ proposition to establish)

is the kind of hyperbole that sometimes creeps into opinions.

... A jury verdict of guilt can be set aside—must be set

aside—if, even though the verdict is not ‘wholly irrational,’

the evidence would not have justified a reasonable juror in

finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

And why is evidence in a criminal trial to be viewed “in

the light most favorable to the prosecution“? It’s been said

that when an appellant “challenges the sufficiency of the ev‐

idence to convict him ... by expressing his disagreement

with the state trial judge’s [or the jury’s] decision to believe

one of the eyewitnesses against him,” we cannot reverse the

conviction unless given some “basis to suppose that the trial

judge was irrational to credit this witness’s testimony.” John‐

son v. Gramley, 929 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir. 1991). Yet often the

study of a trial transcript reveals not that the judge was irra‐

tional but that there was no basis for believing or disbeliev‐

ing the witness—the judge was guessing, and while the

guess was rational it can’t realistically be thought to have

determined guilt or innocence.

And why must a conviction be affirmed even if it is ap‐

parent that the trier of fact (judge or jury), while not irra‐

tional, was mistaken? Why in short are the dice so heavily

loaded against defendants? And finally can the extraordi‐

nary burden placed on defendants be squared with the re‐

quirement (unchallenged) that a defendant must be proved

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in order to be convicted?

I also question the statement near the end of the majority

opinion that “claims of [jury‐]instructional error” are to be

“review[ed] ... for abuse of discretion,” the term “abuse of

discretion” being defined a few lines further along as includ‐

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22 No. 14‐2686

ing, among other missteps, “material errors of law.” Of

course material errors of law are potentially very serious, but

what has that to do with discretion or its abuse? Common as

the term “abuse of discretion” is in opinions dealing with

appeals from district court decisions, I find it opaque. If the

appellate court is persuaded that the trial court erred in a

way that makes the trial court’s decision unacceptable, it re‐

verses. What has discretion to do with it? And “abuse”

seems altogether too strong a term to describe what may be

no more than a disagreement between equally competent

judges—the trial judge and the appellate judges—that the

appellate judges happen to be empowered to resolve as they

see fit.

To repeat what I said at the outset, I don’t disagree with

the decision to affirm the district court. I disagree merely

with the rhetorical envelope in which so many judicial deci‐

sions are delivered to the reader. Judicial opinions are lit‐

tered with stale, opaque, confusing jargon. There is no need

for jargon, stale or fresh. Everything judges do can be ex‐

plained in straightforward language—and should be.

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