Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00174/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00174-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nickolas Graham
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

PHILLIP A. TALBERT

United States Attorney

LAUREL J. MONTOYA

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401 

Fresno, CA 93721 

Telephone: (559) 497-4000 

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099 

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. 

NICKOLAS GRAHAM, 

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:19-CR-00174-ADA-BAM

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

AND ORDER 

DATE: October 12, 2022 

TIME: 1:00 p.m. 

COURT: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

General Order 618 was entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19. Further, 

pursuant to General Order 614, 620, 624, 628, and 630 and the CARES Act, this Court’s declaration of 

judicial emergency under 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s Order of April 16, 

2020 continuing this Court’s judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district judges to continue all 

criminal matters to a date after May 1, 2020.1

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

1 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

Case 1:19-cr-00174-NODJ-BAM Document 50 Filed 10/05/22 Page 1 of 4
2 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, 618, and 620 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the 

case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address 

continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has 

discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a twoweek ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 

764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to 

exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated 

by the statutory rules.

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4).2

 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

2 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

Case 1:19-cr-00174-NODJ-BAM Document 50 Filed 10/05/22 Page 2 of 4
3 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 12, 2022. 

2. By this stipulation, the government and defendants now move to continue the status 

conference until December 14, 2022, and to exclude time between October 12, 2022, and December 14, 

2022, under Local Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes investigative reports and photographs. All of this discovery has been either produced 

directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.. Defense counsel has 

requested additional discovery that the government needs to look in to and additional time is 

needed.

b) Counsel for defendant was recently retained and is requesting additional time to 

review the discovery, conduct investigation that is deemed necessary, and engage in plea 

negotiations. 

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government agrees with the continuance request and does not object to the 

continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 12, 2022 to December 14, 

2022, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

Case 1:19-cr-00174-NODJ-BAM Document 50 Filed 10/05/22 Page 3 of 4
4 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: October 4, 2022 PHILLIP A. TALBERT

United States Attorney

/s/ LAUREL J. MONTOYA

LAUREL J. MONTOYA

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: October 4, 2022 /s/ KEVIN P. ROONEY

KEVIN P. ROONEY

Counsel for Defendant 

NICKOLAS GRAHAM

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED that the status conference is continued from October 12, 2022, to

December 14, 2022, at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Time is excluded 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 4, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:19-cr-00174-NODJ-BAM Document 50 Filed 10/05/22 Page 4 of 4