Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01403/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01403-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Armel Richardson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1403

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ARMEL RICHARDSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 CR 109-1— Gary S. Feinerman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 26, 2016— DECIDED FEBRUARY 9, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and POSNER, Circuit 

Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. The defendant pleaded guilty to 

conspiracy to distribute an illegal drug, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a), and was sentenced to 114 months in 

prison. His appeal challenges only the length of his sentence, 

which he contends was based on unreliable evidence consisting of police reports of previous crimes that he’d committed.

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Because he was a career offender his guidelines range 

was 151 to 188 months. Thus he received a below-guidelines

sentence. (Had he not been a career offender, his guidelines 

range would have been only 77 to 96 months.) But it is apparent from remarks made by the district judge at the sentencing hearing that the judge would have imposed an even 

lower sentence had it not been for the description in the 

presentence report of two convictions of the defendant, unrelated to the convictions that resulted in the career offender 

determination that increased his guidelines range, for possession of illegal drugs. It was those two convictions that 

persuaded the judge that (in his words) the defendant “is a 

career offender, not just technically but actually.”

The two offenses that made the defendant technically a 

career offender had been committed in 1997, some 18 years 

before the sentencing hearing, when he was only 19 years 

old, and the offenses had involved only small amounts of 

(crack) cocaine (7.2 grams and .2 grams, respectively). The 

two convictions that caught the judge’s eye were for possession of at least 3, and of at least 25, grams of cocaine, in 2001 

and 2005 respectively, when the defendant had been 23 and 

26 years old. The judge said that those two offenses could 

“very easily” have been charged as distribution offenses, 

which are punished more heavily than charges of simple 

possession and would have made the defendant a career offender even if he hadn’t attained that status by virtue of the 

1997 convictions.

It is apparent that had the judge not considered the 2001 

and 2005 offenses, he would have given the defendant an 

even shorter sentence than 114 months. The defendant complains, however, that the only descriptions of those offenses 

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No. 15-1403 3

in the presentence report were based on police reports, and 

that such reports often are unreliable and therefore should 

not have been the basis of a heavier sentence than the judge

would otherwise have imposed. Indeed he argues that information in uncorroborated police reports should never be 

allowed to influence a sentencing judge, because such reports are hearsay.

What is true is that “a sentencing court may not consider 

police reports to determine whether a prior conviction meets 

the definition of a crime of violence or a controlled substance 

offense for purposes of classifying a defendant as a career 

offender.” United States v. Durham, 645 F.3d 883, 896 (7th Cir. 

2011), summarizing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 

(2005). But that was not what the district judge did. The classification of the defendant as a career offender is not contested. The only issue is whether a sentencing judge can allow 

his exercise of sentencing discretion to be influenced by a 

summary of police reports in the presentence report prepared by the Probation Service. He can. Judges routinely rely 

on information found in such reports, even though much of 

that information is hearsay. The rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing, and so the sentencing judge is free to consider hearsay found in presentence reports provided that “it 

is well supported and appears reliable.” United States v. 

Heckel, 570 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2009). The only hearsay in 

the presentence report relating to the defendant’s 2001 and 

2005 offenses was the amount of drugs plus a statement that 

he’d been found with a digital scale containing crack cocaine 

residue, along with $7,515 in cash, when he was arrested in 

2005—his convictions and sentences were matters of public 

record, and the sentences of 27 months for the 3-gram offense and 98 months for the 25-gram offense were consistent 

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4 No. 15-1403

with the drug amounts; and as the defendant presented no 

evidence that the police reports were inaccurate in any respect relevant to this case, the judge was not required to disregard those amounts.

AFFIRMED

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