Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-1_18-cv-00046/USCOURTS-ared-1_18-cv-00046-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Lanon Ford
Plaintiff
Levi Langston
Defendant
Wallace
Defendant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

NORTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL LANON FORD PLAINTIFF 

ADC #103053 

V. No. 1:18CV00046-KGB-JTR 

LEVI LANGSTON, Corporal, 

North Central Unit, ADC, et al. DEFENDANTS 

 RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

 The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent 

to United States District Judge Kristine G. Baker. You may file written objections 

to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) 

specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be 

received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of this 

Recommendation. If you do not file objections, Judge Baker can adopt this 

Recommendation without independently reviewing all of the evidence in the record. 

By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of fact. 

I. Introduction 

 Plaintiff Michael Lanon Ford (“Ford”) is a prisoner in the North Central Unit 

of the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”). He has filed a pro se § 1983 

Complaint and three Amended Complaints alleging that Defendants violated his 

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constitutional rights. Docs. 1, 7, 11 & 13.1 Before Ford may proceed with this case, 

the Court must screen his allegations.2

 

II. Discussion 

 Ford alleges that, on June 13, 2018, he was in the cafeteria when Defendant 

Corporal Levi Langston insulted him. Ford responded by “[sticking] up [his] middle 

finger” then saying, “Eat one that long,” holding his arms about two feet apart. 

Langston then handcuffed Ford, which he characterized as being “further degraded,” 

and escorted him out of the cafeteria before he could finish eating. Doc. 7 at 4; Doc. 

13 at 4. 

 Ford was taken to restrictive housing. Later that day, Langston wrote a major 

disciplinary against Ford, charging him with “insolence to a staff member,” in 

violation of prison rules. Doc. 13 at 7. On June 21, 2018, a disciplinary hearing was 

 1

The Court has construed Ford’s pro se Complaint and Amended Complaints, together, as 

constituting his claims. See Kiir v. N.D. Pub. Health, 651 Fed. Appx. 567, 568 (8th Cir. 2016) 

(amendment “intended to supplement, rather than to supplant, the original complaint,” should be 

read together with original complaint); Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (pro 

se pleadings must be liberally construed). 

2

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints 

seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or a portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are 

legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b). When 

making this determination, a court must accept the truth of the factual allegations contained in the 

complaint, and it may consider documents attached to the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009); Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011). 

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conducted, at which Ford declined to make a statement. The disciplinary hearing 

officer convicted Ford of the disciplinary charge and imposed punishment of fortyfive days of restricted commissary, phone and visitation privileges, and a reduction 

in his classification level. Id. at 8-9. 

 In this § 1983 action, Ford alleges that: (1) Langston “lied” in the disciplinary 

report because Ford did not say the exact words Langston accused him of saying; 

(2) Langston wrote the disciplinary charge in retaliation for Ford’s exercising his 

right to free speech and to file grievances; (3) Langston bullied and verbally harassed 

Ford; (4) Langston discriminated against Ford based on his race; (5) Langston 

violated ADC policy prohibiting employees from discriminating against or harassing 

inmates; and (6) Ford complained to Defendant Sergeant Wallace (“Wallace”) about 

Langston’s conduct, but Wallace failed to take corrective action. Ford alleges 

violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeks compensatory 

and punitive damages. Docs. 7, 11 & 13. 

 A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim 

 The major disciplinary charge Langston brought against Ford is not itself 

actionable under § 1983. It is well settled that an officer’s mere filing of a 

disciplinary charge -- even an inaccurate or incomplete charge -- does not give rise 

to a § 1983 cause of action. Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); 

Glick v. Sargent, 696 F.2d 413, 414 (8th Cir. 1983). 

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 To the extent that Ford challenges the subsequent disciplinary conviction and 

the punishment imposed, this due process claim also fails. A prisoner may only 

maintain a due process challenge to a disciplinary conviction or proceeding if he is 

deemed to have a liberty interest at stake. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 

(1995); Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846-47 (8th Cir. 2003). A prisoner does not

have a liberty interest in avoiding temporary disciplinary segregation and the 

suspension of privileges, because such punishment does not create an “atypical and 

significant hardship on an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”3

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482-86 (thirty days in disciplinary segregation); Phillips, 320 

F.3d at 847 (thirty-seven days in isolation and loss of privileges of contact visitation, 

exercise and chapel); Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 (8th Cir. 2002) 

(thirty days in punitive); Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3 640, 642-43 & n.2 (8th 

Cir. 1996) (thirty days in punitive segregation, which included the suspension of 

mail, telephone, visitation and commissary privileges). 

 Similarly, a prisoner does not have a liberty interest in maintaining his 

classification level. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Sanders v. Norris, 

153 Fed. Appx. 403, 404 (8th Cir. 2005); Hartsfield v. Dept. of Correction, 107 Fed. 

 3

The record makes it clear that Ford was in segregation no more than 45 days (the length 

of time his privileges were restricted) and most likely less than that. His disciplinary documents 

state that, after the incident in the cafeteria, he was “escorted to Restrictive Housing” and was 

“later released back to General Population.” Doc. 13 at 7. 

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Appx. 695, 696 (8th Cir. 2003); Carney v. Houston, 33 F.3d 893, 894 (8th Cir. 1994); 

Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir. 1990). 

 Because Ford’s disciplinary conviction did not implicate a liberty interest, he 

has failed to state a viable due process claim. 

 Ford’s allegation that Langston’s conduct violated ADC policy also fails. As 

a matter of law, the violation of prison policy, standing alone, does not rise to the 

level of a constitutional violation actionable under § 1983. Moore v. Rowley, 126 

Fed. Appx. 759, 760 (8th Cir. 2005); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th 

Cir. 1997). In addition, it is well settled that prisoners do not have a due process right 

to enforce compliance with internal prison rules or regulations. Phillips, 320 F.3d at 

847; Gardner, 109 F.3d at 430. 

 Accordingly, Ford has not pled a viable § 1983 due process claim. 

 B. First Amendment Retaliation Claim 

 Ford alleges that Langston wrote the disciplinary in retaliation for Ford’s 

exercise of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Doc. 13 at 4. He also 

alleges, generally, that Langston “uses the unit disciplinary [process] as a way of 

retaliation if you write a grievance on him.” Doc. 7 at 4. 

 The Eighth Circuit has recognized that the filing of a disciplinary charge – 

which is otherwise not actionable under § 1983 -- may be actionable if the charge 

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was written in retaliation for the inmate’s exercising a constitutional right. See Dixon 

v. Brown, 38 F.3d 379, 379–80 (8th Cir. 1994); Sprouse, 870 F.2d at 451. 

 Although Ford’s disrespectful comment and gesture to Langston is not 

constitutionally protected, 4 the filing of prison grievances is protected First 

Amendment activity capable of supporting a viable retaliation claim. Lewis v. Jacks, 

486 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007). However, a retaliatory disciplinary claim fails, 

as a matter of law, if there was “some evidence” to support the underlying 

disciplinary conviction. See Cowans, 150 F.3d at 912 (holding that inmate failed to 

state claim for retaliatory disciplinary where he was found guilty of violating prison 

rules against using abusive and insulting language); Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 

464, 469 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that a finding that a disciplinary was based on some 

evidence “essentially checkmates” a retaliation claim); Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 

738 (8th Cir.1993) (same). In this respect, “a report from a correctional officer, even 

 4

Due to his status as a prisoner, Ford retains only “those First Amendment rights that are 

not inconsistent with” such status, “or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections 

system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). A prisoner does not have a First Amendment 

right to use vulgar, insolent or other inappropriate language in violation of prison rules. Kervin v. 

Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir 2015) (“[B]acktalk by prison inmates to guards, like other 

speech that violates prison discipline, is not constitutionally protected.”); Turner v. Falk, 632 Fed. 

Appx. 457, 460 (10th Cir. 2015) (prisoner does not “have a First Amendment right to make violent, 

explicit, or harassing statements, at least when he has been warned not to”); Huff v. Mahon, 312 

Fed. Appx. 530, 531-32 (4th Cir. 2009) (“An inmate does not have a First Amendment right to 

direct disrespectful comments to a prison official, whether verbally or in writing[.]”); Cowans v. 

Warren, 150 F.3d 910, 912 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding no freedom of speech violation when prison 

officials punished an inmate for using abusive language in his grievances). 

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if disputed by the inmate and supported by no other evidence, legally suffices as 

‘some evidence’ upon which to base a prison disciplinary violation, if the violation 

is found by an impartial decisionmaker.” Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 

(8th Cir. 2008); see also Henderson, 29 F.3d at 469. Importantly, this rule applies 

even if the report is written by the officer who is alleged to have engaged in the 

retaliatory conduct. Id.

 Ford does not dispute that he directed a profane and insolent comment and 

gesture toward Langston. This admission, coupled with Langston’s account of the 

incident, clearly constitutes “some evidence” to support Ford’s disciplinary 

conviction for “insolence to a staff member.” Accordingly, Ford has not stated a 

viable First Amendment retaliation claim. 

 C. Fourteenth Amendment Racial Discrimination Claim 

 Ford asserts, in a conclusory manner, that Langston “is known” for racially 

discriminating against inmates and picked him out for harassment on that basis. Doc. 

7 at 7; Doc. 13 at 4. Although provided the opportunity to explain “the reason he 

believes Langston discriminated against him based on his race,” Ford has not 

presented any facts suggesting that Langston intentionally treated him differently 

from other inmates on that basis. See Docs. 8, 11 & 13. Thus, Ford has failed to 

allege sufficient “factual content to ‘nudge’ his claim of purposeful discrimination 

‘across the line from conceivable to plausible,’” as is required to state a § 1983 claim. 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 683 (a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’” and 

“naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” is insufficient “to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face”; dismissing complaint that “does not 

contain any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ 

discriminatory state of mind”); Doering v. Tate, No. 5:13cv00147-JLH-JTR, 2013 

WL 3874294, at *2 (E.D. Ark. July 26, 2013) (dismissing, for failure to state a viable 

claim, a prisoner’s “vague and conclusory” allegations that he was discriminated 

against due to his race). 

 Accordingly, Ford has not pled a viable racial discrimination claim. 

D. Verbal Harassment Claim 

It is well settled that verbal abuse, name-calling and harassment by a prison 

official do not amount to a § 1983 claim. See McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 

(8th Cir. 1993) (holding that verbal harassment, threats, and name calling are not 

actionable under § 1983); Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 

1992) (holding that “mere verbal threats made by a state actor do not constitute a § 

1983 claim”); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that 

verbal threats and name-calling are not actionable under § 1983); see also Blades v. 

Schuetzle, 302 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2002) (no constitutional violation due to two 

incidents of “thoroughly offensive” and “racially derogatory language”). 

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Accordingly, Ford’s allegations that Langston “bullied” and “harassed” him 

fail to state a viable § 1983 claim. 

E. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim

Ford alleges that Langston subjected him to “cruel and unusual punishment” 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, he contends that: (1) Langston’s 

handcuffing and removal of him from the cafeteria “degraded” him and prevented 

him from finishing his meal and engaging in activities such as mailing a letter, 

playing dominoes and other games, talking on the phone, going to the gym, going to 

yard call, and going to the library; (2) Langston refused to loosen the handcuffs, 

which were hurting his wrists, and forced him to walk to isolation, which hurt his 

legs; (3) Langston’s actions “upset” Ford, giving him a headache, blurred vision and 

shortness of breath; (4) as a result of the reduction in his classification level, he 

cannot get weekly visits, go up for parole, be on inmate counsel, be in hobbycraft, 

go on meritorious furlough, go on work release, or earn extra good-time credits; and 

(5) because the disciplinary conviction was posted online, his character has been 

“defamed.” Doc. 13 at 4-5. 

To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show “unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain,” as well as a deprivation “denying the minimal 

civilized measure of life's necessities.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). 

In this case, the temporary and minor deprivations that Ford alleges fall far short of 

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meeting this standard. See, e.g., Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 2008) 

(Eighth Amendment claims “require a compensable injury to be greater than de 

minimis”); Phillips, 320 F.3d at 848 (holding that an allegedly false disciplinary

conviction that resulted in an inmate being required to spend thirty-seven days in 

punitive isolation -- where he was not allowed contact visitation, exercise privileges, 

or chapel rights -- did not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation); Eugene v. 

Klecker, 636 F.2d 250, 251 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that the loss of good time credits 

was not an Eighth Amendment violation); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02 

(1976) (defamation claims are not actionable under § 1983). 

Accordingly, Ford has failed to state a viable Eighth Amendment claim. 

 F. Corrective Inaction Claim 

 Finally, because Ford has failed to demonstrate an underlying constitutional 

violation, his corrective inaction claim against Wallace fails, as a matter of law. See 

Mendoza v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 849 F.3d 408, 420 

(8th Cir. 2017) (supervisory liability claims “automatically fail for lack of an 

underlying constitutional violation”); Schoettle v. Jefferson County, 788 F.3d 855, 

861-62 (8th Cir. 2015) (“We have long held that neither municipal nor supervisory 

liability may attach in section 1983 actions unless individual liability is first found 

on an underlying substantive claim.”); Williams v. Davis, 200 F.3d 538, 539 (8th 

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Cir. 2000) (“Absent a constitutional violation, there [is] no basis for section 1983 

liability on the part of [supervisors].”). 

III. Conclusion 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 

 1. Ford’s Complaint and Amended Complaints (Docs. 1, 7, 11 & 13) be 

DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted. 

 2. This dismissal constitute a “strike” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

 3. The Court CERTIFY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in 

forma pauperis appeal from any Order adopting this Recommendation would not be

taken in good faith. 

 DATED this 23rd day of May, 2019. 

 ___________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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