Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-06-02059/USCOURTS-ca10-06-02059-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hermilio Mancera-Perez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has *

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

October 1, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HERMILIO MANCERA-PEREZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-2059

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Mexico

(D.C. No. CR-05-2093 WPJ)

Submitted on the Briefs:*

Raymond P. Moore, Federal Public Defender, Vicki Mandell-King, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, and Lynn C. Hartfield, Research and Writing Attorney,

Office of the Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for DefendantAppellant.

David C. Iglesias, United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico and Terri J.

Abernathy, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States

Attorney, Las Cruces, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before BRISCOE, EBEL, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

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EBEL, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Hermilio Mancera-Perez pleaded guilty to illegal

reentry into the United States by an alien previously deported for an aggravated

felony and received a sentence of forty-six months’ imprisonment. ManceraPerez appeals, arguing that the length of his sentence is substantively

unreasonable. We conclude, however, that he has invited any error regarding the

length of his sentence (without concluding that the sentence was, in fact,

unreasonably long), and his claims now for the first time on appeal are waived. 

BACKGROUND

After being apprehended near the Mexican border in May 2005, ManceraPerez was charged with illegal reentry of a deported alien previously convicted of

an aggravated felony pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (a)(2) and (b)(2). 

Mancera-Perez entered into a plea agreement with the government in which he

agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a recommendation of a reduction in his

offense level for acceptance of responsibility and a sentence at the low end of the

recommended United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”)

range. After ascertaining that Mancera-Perez entered the agreement voluntarily,

the district court accepted it. 

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The presentence report (“PSR”) prepared by the probation office calculated

Mancera-Perez’s total offense level at twenty-one, including a base level of eight

under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a); a sixteen level increase for Mancera-Perez’s prior

conviction of a crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A); and a three level

reduction for his acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a) and (b). ManceraPerez’s criminal history was calculated to fall into category III, resulting in a

guideline range of forty-six to fifty-seven months’ imprisonment. 

The prior conviction for a “crime of violence” which led to ManceraPerez’s previous deportation, and for which the PSR applied a sixteen level

increase, was a state conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor under Indiana

law. The commentary to the Guidelines expressly specifies that a “crime of

violence” includes statutory rape. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, comment 1(B)(iii). 

According to the PSR, at age eighteen Mancera-Perez was charged with

“knowingly performing or submitting to sexual intercourse with a female child

who was over the age of 14, but had not yet attained the age of 16.” The PSR

states that Mancera-Perez was charged with battery in the same incident: “the

charging document also alleged the defendant knowingly touched, in a rude or

insolent manner, the same victim, which resulted in bodily injury, specifically a

swollen cheek.” However, the PSR also notes that the battery charge was

dismissed. No additional information regarding this prior conviction was

available to the district court. 

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Mancera-Perez’s criminal history score totaled five points; his criminal 1

history category, however, was actually level III. Mancera-Perez’s counsel

correctly stated that the low end of the Guidelines calculation was forty-six

months’ imprisonment. 

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Mancera-Perez did not file any objections to the PSR. At his sentencing

hearing, the court stated that, based on the PSR, a sentence “on the low end of the

guideline range” was appropriate, and invited counsel to comment. The

government agreed that the low end of the sentencing range was appropriate. 

Mancera-Perez’s counsel also agreed:

I agree with the Court and the government, Your Honor.

I have nothing further to present to the Court. One of the

reasons that Mr. Mancera-Perez is at the zone that he is or

at the guideline provisions that he is, is because of his

criminal history category, as the Court is well aware,

which is a five, and we have talked about that, and I think

the low end of the guideline provisions is 46 months.1

Mancera-Perez himself indicated, through an interpreter, that he had nothing to

add to this statement. 

The court then imposed a sentence of forty-six months. In so doing, the

court stated that it found “that the sentence is a reasonable sentence under the

sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), particularly taking into account the

defendant’s criminal history and the nature of that, some of the charges in that

past criminal history.” The court’s judgment was filed on January 19, 2006;

however, for reasons not revealed in the record, it was not entered into the district

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court docket until February 21, 2006. Mancera-Perez filed notice of appeal on

February 24, 2006. 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Although the government contends — and Mancera-Perez, inexplicably,

concedes — that his appeal was untimely, our review of the record confirms that

his appeal was, in fact, timely filed. Although the district court’s judgment was

filed on January 19, 2006, it was not entered onto the court’s docket until

February 21, 2006. “A judgment or order is entered for the purposes of [Fed. R.

App. P.] 4(b) when it is entered on the criminal docket.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(6);

Jenkins v. Burtzloff, 69 F.3d 460, 461-62 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The date of entry is

the beginning point for when the time period begins to run . . . .”). Since Rule

4(b)(1)(A) provides for a ten-day filing deadline, the period for a timely appeal

expired on March 7, 2006. Mancera-Perez filed his notice of appeal on February

24, 2006; thus, his appeal was timely. 

We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 

II. Substantive reasonableness

 Mancera-Perez argues that his sentence is unreasonably long in light of

two of the factors required to be taken into account in sentencing under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). First, he argues that his prior conviction for statutory rape, a “crime of

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We may consider an issue of waiver sua sponte, see United States v. Gimbel, 2

782 F.2d 89, 92 n.5 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that it is “beyond cavil” that an appellate

court may “raise [an] issue of waiver sua sponte”). Cf. Hines v. United States, 971 F.2d

506, 508 (10th Cir. 1992) (raising a Frady defense sua sponte because the defense “is

based upon concerns about finality, docket control, and judicial efficiency.”) However,

we are not required to do so. See United States. v. Heckenliable, 446 F.3d 1048, 1050

n.3 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 287 (2006). We do so in this case because

of the additional factor of invited error which would render it unjust and a perversion of

the integrity and proper administration of justice to allow a defendant affirmatively to

support the reasonableness of his sentence before the district court and then to

challenge the reasonableness of that sentence on appeal.

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violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), was not as serious as the Guidelines

suggest because it occurred when he was barely eighteen years old, and thus

merited a downward variance from the recommended Guidelines sentence. 

Second, he contends that, because the Indiana statutory rape law “criminalizes

conduct that would not be punishable in many states,” increasing his sentence

based on a conviction under that law would lead to an unwarranted sentencing

disparity under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). 

Because Mancera-Perez did not argue for a shorter sentence in front of the

district court, and indeed conceded the appropriateness of his forty-six month

sentence, we believe this argument seeks to assert invited error and is waived.2

Mancera-Perez acknowledges that the claims of error he raises on appeal

were not previously presented to the district court. However, he argues that,

because he only challenges the length of his sentence and not the method by

which the district court reached it, we may nevertheless review these claims for

reasonableness, rather than applying the plain error review generally provided for

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unpreserved claims of error. United States v. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1221

(10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3043 (2007). 

We review properly preserved sentencing challenges for reasonableness, 

United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), a

standard which the Supreme Court has recently equated with review for an abuse

of the sentencing court’s discretion, see Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456,

2465 (2007) (“[A]pellate ‘reasonableness’ review merely asks whether the trial

court abused its discretion.”). A sentence within the advisory Guidelines range is

afforded a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness during the process of

appellate review “that either the defendant or the government may rebut by

demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when viewed against the other

factors delineated in § 3553(a).” Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054.

When a defendant fails to preserve a sentencing challenge below, we

generally review only for plain error. See Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d at 1221. 

However, we have carved an exception to this rule allowing straight

reasonableness review for unpreserved objections to the length of a sentence: 

We have held that when the defendant fails to object to the method by

which the sentence was determined, such as a claim that the Guidelines

were misapplied or that the court did not adequately explain the

sentence with reference to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

we review only for plain error. See [Lopez-Florez, 444 F.3d at 1221].

But when the claim is merely that the sentence is unreasonably long, we

do not require the defendant to object in order to preserve the issue.

See id.; United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 433-34 (7th Cir.

2005).

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Here we do not conclude that the sentence was unreasonably long. Indeed, our 3

review of the record suggests to the contrary. It was within the guideline range and,

thus, on appellate review is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. Rita v. United

States, 127 S.Ct. 2456. Nothing we have seen rebuts that presumption. Nevertheless,

because here even if there was error in the length of the sentence it was never argued in

any manner and indeed was invited, we do not reach the merits of this issue.

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 United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2006), cert.

denied, 127 S. Ct. 3054 (2007). Mancera-Perez invokes the latter category of

claim, arguing that his appeal “challenges only the length, or substantive

reasonableness, of the sentence imposed” and therefore may be reviewed for

reasonableness without the requirement of an objection below. 

In Torres-Duenas, however, we did not contemplate a situation in which the

defendant not only failed to object after the district court pronounced his

sentence, but failed, even before sentencing, to offer any argument whatsoever for

a lower sentence and, indeed, agreed with the district court that the length of the

sentence imposed was reasonable. Under these circumstances, we conclude that

any error regarding the reasonableness of the length of the sentence was invited 3

and waived.

In contrast, the defendant in Torres-Duenas “requested a variance from the

Guidelines range, contending that his case was ‘unusual’ because his ‘felony

conviction is almost 20 years old. And that occurred when he was certainly much

younger . . . .’” Id. at 1180. In addition, he argued that he was “one of the less

culpable” of the codefendants in his case, and that no felony allegations had been

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brought against him since the original conviction. Id. Torres-Duenas therefore

raised arguments before the district court for a below-Guidelines sentence; he

failed only to raise a formal objection after the district court rejected his

arguments and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence. Id. at 1182. Thus, our

conclusion that he need not object to preserve his substantive reasonableness

argument for appeal addressed his lack of a formal objection to the court’s

conclusions, not a total lack of argument to the court. 

Lopez-Flores, which we relied upon in Torres-Duenas, presented a similar

factual scenario. In Lopez-Flores, we quoted extensively from the Seventh

Circuit in United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 433-34 (7th Cir. 2005), to

“explain[] why it is unnecessary to argue to the district court after imposition of

the sentence that the sentence is unreasonably long.” 444 F.3d at 1221 (emphasis

added). The Seventh Circuit explained that it did not require defendants to raise a

post-sentence

objection – probably formulaic – in every criminal case. Since the

district court will already have heard argument and allocution from the

parties and weighed the relevant § 3553(a) factors before pronouncing

sentence, we fail to see how requiring the defendant to then protest the

term handed down will further the sentencing process in any meaningful

way.

Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d at 1221 (quoting Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d at 433-34)

(emphasis added). 

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Lopez-Florez and Castro-Juarez thus addressed whether a defendant is

required to raise an objection to the reasonableness of a sentence after it has been

imposed by the district court, when the defendant’s argument for a lesser sentence

had already been presented to the court during pre-sentence arguments. However,

the scenario of a defendant who failed entirely to argue for a lower sentence

before the district court at any time, and then sought to make an argument for a

reduced sentence for the first time on appeal, was not addressed by either case. 

See also United States v. Swehla, 442 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding

that “a defendant only need argue for a different sentence before the sentence is

pronounced” to preserve appellate reasonableness review).

We therefore clarify Torres-Duenas’s exception allowing reasonableness

review of unpreserved substantive sentencing challenges to require that the

defendant have at least made the argument for a lower sentence before the district

court. When the appellate argument for a lower sentence was not raised at any

time before the district court, and when, to the contrary, the defendant

affirmatively endorses the appropriateness of the length of the sentence before the

district court, we conclude that if, there was error, it was invited and waived. 

Therefore we AFFIRM his sentence.

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06-2059, United States v. Mancera-Perez

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the result. I write separately, however, because the majority’s

proposed clarification of the exception announced in United States v. TorresDuenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2006) (allowing reasonableness

review of forfeited substantive sentencing challenges) is unnecessary and, thus,

dicta. The long and the short of the matter is that Mancera-Perez, by seeking and

agreeing to the sentence imposed by the district court, clearly waived the

challenges he now seeks to assert to that sentence. See United States v.

Carrasco-Salazar, — F.3d —, 2007 WL 2171359 at *2-3 (10th Cir. 2007)

(discussing waiver and forfeiture in the context of sentencing challenges). 

Necessarily, then, Mancera-Perez cannot benefit from any standards of review, or

exceptions therefrom, that we apply in cases where an error has been properly

preserved or merely forfeited.

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