Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02019/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02019-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shirley Burton
Appellant
Sharon Johnson
Appellee

Document Text:

-FILED 

Unitoo States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

l~OV t 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

SHIRLEY BURTON, 

v. 

Petitioner-Appel lee, 

Cross-Appellant, 

SHARON JOHNSON, 

Respondent-Appellant, 

Cross-Appellee. 

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) __________________ ) 

Nos. 90-2016 

90-2019 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 87-0557) 

Charles H. Rennick, Assistant Attorney General (Hal Stratton, 

Attorney General, with him on the brief), Santa Fe, New Mexico, for 

Respondent-Appellant. 

Tova Indritz, Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for 

Petitioner-Appellee and Cross Appellant. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge,- and BROWN, 

Senior District Judge. 

BROWN, Senior District Judge.• 

* Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United states Senior District Judge, 

District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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Appellant Sharon Johnson, Warden for the State of New Mexico, 

appeals the order of the United states District court for the 

District of New Mexico, granting Shirley Burton's petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus. Mrs. Burton cross-appeals from the order 

insofar as it denied some of the claims for relief contained in her 

federal petition. 

Shirley Burton admitted that in the early hours of August 14, 

1983, she shot and killed her husband, Robert Burton, in Roswell, 

New Mexico. She claimed that she did so because she believed from 

his past actions that she and her children were in immediate danger 

of great bodily harm, sexual abuse and death at the hands of her 

husband. She presented evidence of Robert's repeated physical, 

sexual and verbal assaults upon her and her two children, together 

with evidence that she suffered from "battered woman's syndrome," 

which contributed to her belief that she had to kill her husband in 

order to protect her children and herself from continued abuse. 

The state introduced evidence that Robert did not abuse his family, 

and that Mrs. Burton, having carefully planned the murder in 

advance, did not act in defense of herself and children. The jury 

convicted Mrs. Burton of murder in the first degree, and she was 

sentenced to life imprisonment. 1 

1 Prior to trial, Mrs. Burton was offered a 7 year sentence 

in return for a plea of murder in the second degree. She declined 

this offer and proceeded to trial. See Exhibits to Item 49, Volume 

II Record, U.S. District Court. 

On this appeal, there are two volumes of records from the 

District Court of Chaves County, New Mexico and the New Mexico 

Supreme Court, and 121 audiotapes of trial proceedings in Chaves 

County. In addition, there are two volumes of records arising from 

the federal habeas corpus proceedings in the District Court for the 

District of New Mexico. 

These records will be referred to hereafter as "state records" 

or "federal records". 

2 

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The issues presented in this appeal concern the manner in 

which the state trial court conducted the voir dire of the jury 

panel, and the discovery after trial that one of the jurors who 

served on the case was the victim of mental and physical abuse by 

her husband, and that this juror's children had also been abused by 

their father. Other issues involve the propriety of instructions 

and the claim that alleged cumulative error denied Mrs. Burton's 

right to fair trial. 

The federal district court adopted the findings of the magistrate and found that Mrs. Burton's right to an impartial jury had 

been denied because a woman who served on the jury had suffered 

abuse in her own family. In addition, the court found that 

inadequate voir dire proceedings denied Mrs. Burton's right to an 

impartial jury and fair trial. The state elected not to retry Mrs. 

Burton within the 90 days allotted by the federal district court, 

she was released from custody, and is free pending this appeal. 

The circumstances of the voir dire and other state court 

proceedings relating to Mrs. Burton's trial and conviction may be 

described as follows: 

Because of the nature of her defense, Mrs. Burton's counsel 

filed a pretrial motion for individual, sequestered questioning of 

the jury panel on subjects pertaining to physical, emotional and 

sexual abuse of wives and children. 2 Attached to this motion was 

an affidavit of an expert in group dynamics and the jury selection 

2 This motion requested that the court order individual voir 

dire on issues of publicity, child abuse and battered wives; that 

voir dire on other subjects be conducted in groups of 6 prospective 

jurors; and that the voir dire process be sequestered so that no 

other prospective jurors would be present except those being 

questioned. 

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process which related to the hesitancy of people to speak about 

sensitive subjects when others are present. It was the opinion of 

this expert that "(i)n a trial with inflammatory issues and one in 

which potentially many of the members of the venire have attitudes 

or prejudices that could be hidden during the voir dire, the only 

possibility of obtaining a fair trial would be through extensive, 

open-ended, attorney-conducted, sequestered voir dire." Vol I, 

state Record, Page 100, Affidavit of Bennett. 

At a hearing on this motion, the defense presented expert 

testimony to the effect that in the area of sensitive topics, 

members of the venire tend to make socially acceptable statements, 

and that in order to inquire into such topics as sexual abuse and 

wife beating, each prospective juror should be questioned 

separately, outside the hearing of other prospective jurors. This 

expert testified that over 20% of the American adult population has 

personally encountered a sex abuse or wife-battering situation, and 

that such people are not able to evaluate evidence of similar 

situations in an objective manner because an abused person tends to 

blame herself, and thus would judge the defendant in this case more 

harshly than would a juror without such personal experience or 

exposure to an abusive situation. Tape 2, 7/19/84, State 

Record. 

The trial judge denied the defense motion to sequester and 

question each juror privately on sensitive matters. Instead, the 

court divided the jury panel into two groups, each to be voir dired 

as a whole, with a statement by the court advising that any juror 

could answer questions in private. Each party's voir dire was to 

be limited to one hour, with a possible extension if the attorney 

4 

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used his time "diligently." The defense request that the panel be 

required to complete a jury questionnaire was denied. 3 

The panel was divided into two groups with 29 prospective 

jurors in each. The court informed the first group that they could 

answer questions in private, but that he preferred answers in open 

court because inquiries in chambers were difficult. Tapes 1 and 2, 

7/24/84, state Record. Any juror who had discussed the case was 

questioned in chambers. Defense counsel questioned this panel 

about their attitudes concerning child abuse and neglect, and asked 

the entire panel if any of them had seen the effects of child 

abuse. Four answered affirmatively and discussed their 

experiences. Wife abuse was also discussed and counsel sought 

juror's opinions on self defense, etc. Defense counsel was stopped 

after one hour, and his request for more time to examine the panel 

about their knowledge of Robert Burton, potential witnesses and 

exposure to publicity was denied upon the ground that counsel had 

not been "diligent." Tape 5, and Chambers Tapes C & D, 7/24/84. 

One of the jurors in this panel, Lisa Zoeller, told the court 

in chambers that she could not be an impartial juror because her 

father had abused her mother and the children, but her mother had 

not killed her father. Chambers Tape c. The juror Zoeller was 

excused by the court for "Cause." Vol. II, state Record, p. 191. 

There was a similar voir dire of the second group, except that 

this time, the court asked more specific questions about publicity 

3 Vol. I, State Record, Motion for Supplemental Jury 

Questionnaire, filed 7/23/84. This questionnaire was designed to 

elicit general background information on each juror, so that during 

voir dire the defense counsel could concentrate his questions on 

wife and child abuse, and jurors' attitudes towards justifiable 

homicide, etc. 

5 

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and their knowledge of prospective witnesses. Defense counsel told 

the members of this panel that any questions on sensitive subjects 

could be answered privately in chambers, and he then discussed 

child abuse, rape, wife beating, the reporting of violent acts 

against women and the subject of self-defense. Defense counsel 

specifically asked which jurors had personally seen the effects of 

child abuse. Carolyn Green answered that she had worked for a 

school where most of the staff and children had been abused in some 

way, describing the effects of child abuse which she had observed. 

Counsel then asked whether anyone else had "seen those kinds of, 

(sic), or had contact with child abuse or sexual abuse?". There 

was no answer. Tape a, State Record. Counsel again asked at a 

later time if there were "anybody else who has anything that they'd 

like to share either with the court individually or with me at this 

time in terms of the things we've talked about? ••• We've talked 

about child abuse. We've talked about battered wives and other 

things. 11 There was no response. No member of this panel discussed 

abuse in chambers. The defense challenged juror Green for cause 

upon the ground that she had experienced violence in her home, 

rape, and contact with abused children. The challenge for cause 

was granted, and Green was removed from the panel. Another juror 

in this panel, Mrs. Russell, was excused by the Court for cause 

because of her opinions about child abuse after having read an El 

Paso Times article. state Record Vol II, pp. 190 and 329. 

6 

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\' 

At trial Shirley Burton and other witnesses testified about 

the violent and abusive nature of Robert Burton. 4 The jury heard 

evidence that during prior marriages, Burton had beaten two other 

wives and raped one of them, and had sexually molested a stepdaughter. Defendant Shirley Burton testified that during her 

marriage to Robert Burton she was beaten, raped and sodomized by 

her husband, and that he frequently beat their son, Gene, and her 

daughter, Elizabeth whom he had legally adopted. The children were 

beaten with fists, whips, rope, halter, belts, or whatever was 

handy. Mrs. Burton testified that she had tried to leave Robert 

several times, but had returned because of threats to her children, 

and that she had not contacted the police for protection because of 

his threats of retaliation if she did so. In January, 1983, Mrs. 

Burton learned that Robert had been sexually molesting Elizabeth 

and his son Gene for the past ten years. At trial, Elizabeth 

testified that her father had raped her twice and attempted to rape 

her on other occasions. Mrs. Burton obtained a gun and hid it 

under the mattress on her side of the bed, but Robert found it. 

The abuse continued. In May, 1983, Mrs. Burton returned home and 

found Robert attempting to rape Elizabeth. Mrs. Burton was then 

badly beaten and sodomized. In June, 1983, Robert cut Mrs. Burton 

with a knife and stitches were required. On August 12, 1983, 

4 As noted, there was a conflict in the evidence concerning 

Mrs. Burton's motive in shooting her husband, and the state 

presented evidence that Robert Burton was a law-abiding, esteemed 

member of the community, without a reputation for violence. It 

should be noted that Mrs. Burton's testimony regarding physical 

abuse of herself and her children was corroborated by several 

witnesses. The Court has summarized the evidence presented by the 

defense for the purpose of evaluating the claim of juror bias and 

lack of impartiality. 

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Robert again attacked Elizabeth, and knocked her to the ground. on 

August 13, Mrs. Burton traveled 70 miles to Ruidoso and obtained a 

gun. She testified that her purpose was to stop Robert from 

hurting or killing her children and herself. She stopped on her 

way back home to Roswell and test-fired the gun. When she arrived 

in Roswell she parked three blocks from home, walked through the 

back gate, entered the patio door, and walked into the bedroom. 

She testified that Robert looked at her, said "If you're going to 

use that thing, use it," and rolled toward her. She fired several 

times, Robert jumped up and then fell, shouting obscenities. Mrs. 

Burton then ran out and drove back to her friends in Ruidoso. When 

police arrived at 3:00 a.m. on August 14, Robert was standing at 

the doorway. He told the police that it was too dark for him to 

see who shot him. He died later from three bullet wounds. 

The defense presented expert testimony concerning "battered 

woman's syndrome" and the effects of long-term domestic violence. 

It was the experts' opinions that Shirley Burton lived in constant 

fear for herself and children and that she believed her only 

recourse was to kill her husband. 5 

The jury returned its verdict of first-degree murder on August 

9, 1984. On August 29, the defense filed a motion for new trial, 

complaining, among other grounds, of inadequate voir dire of the 

jury, which was conducted in groups too large for meaningful 

discussion, and of the failure to give the defense adequate time to 

inquire into serious issues. The affidavit of Michael L. Stout, 

5 Dr. Jeffrey Collins, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Rappaport, a 

clinical psychologist testified concerning Mrs. Burton's state of 

mind at the time she killed her husband. 

8 

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attorney for Shirley Burton, which accompanied the motion for new 

trial, informed the court in this manner: (Vol. II State Record, 

pp. 298-299) 

"I have contacted several jurors who sat during the trial 

of this cause and have discovered the following information: 

A. At least three of the jurors have been close to 

situations concerning abuse of some sort which was not discussed 

during jury selection, including Mr. Smoot and Ms. Gonzales, as 

shown by their affidavits. 

B. One juror, Ms. Townsend, stated that she had 

knowledge of abuse in a very "close relationship" to her. She 

stated that the person, though battered, is still alive and hasn't 

killed anyone. As a result of her knowledge she believes that 

battered people can cope with the situation without resorting to 

violence. She believes that this knowledge served as a springboard 

to her opinion that Shirley Burton 'could have handled' her 

situation without killing. 

c. One juror stated that she has been the subject 

of long-standing abuse and is still married to the abuser, that the 

relationship is not as abusive as it once was, and that she did not 

wish to share the information in public for fear of harming her 

relationship or her family. Also her youngest child is presently 

seeing a counselor for emotional problems connected to the child's 

observation of the abuse of the juror and her other children. I 

would prefer to give the juror's name privately so as to not 

endanger her or her family." 

The motion for new trial was denied on September 4, 1984. 6 

(State Record, Vol. II, p. 306). 

On September 5, 1984, the defense filed a second motion for 

new trial, reiterating that "Persons who have had experiences 

relevant to the issues in this case and which affect their 

impartiality in a case of this nature served as jurors in this 

case," in violation of Mrs. Burton's right to trial by impartial 

jurors. Vol. II State Record, pp. 308-309. 

6 There is no audiotape in the record for the hearing held 

September 4, 1984. 

9 

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In connection with this motion for new trial, the defense 

presented an affidavit filed October 1, 1984, from one juror, 

identified as "S.G.G. 11 or "Mrs. G," who stated that she had "been 

the subject of wife abuse in the past and (is) presently subject to 

abuse to a lesser degree." This juror stated that her husband had 

a violent temper and verbally and physically abused the family, at 

one time hitting his son across the back with a golf club, which 

resulted in the need for medical attention. One of her children 

was seeing a counselor for emotional difficulties related to the 

abuse. This juror requested that her name and testimony be kept 

secret because she feared her husband might abuse her and her 

children if he found out that she was making this statement. 7 

At this hearing in chambers "Mrs. G" testified that when the 

panel was asked about child abuse during voir dire, that she did 

not "connect" her own experiences with the discussion and that she 

tried not to think about her own situation. (Tape 1, 10/1/84). 

It is significant that in October, two months after the trial, Mrs. 

G still feared that her husband would find out about her testimony 

and would harm her or her family. 

7 Tapes relating to Mrs. G's testimony in chambers have been 

sealed to protect her anonymity. 

The trial court ordered that the following affidavits should 

be sealed and not opened unless by order of the District or Supreme 

Court of New Mexico: (Vol. II state Record, p. 396) 

Four Jurors, filed 9-7-84 

Michael L. Stout, filed 9-7-84 

Beth Owens, filed 9-7-84 

"One Juror", filed 10-1-84 

Michael L. Stout, filed 10-3-84 

The affidavits of Beth Owens, and the "Four Jurors" are not 

included in the state record filed in this appeal. 

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The audiotape of this testimony in chambers reveals that even 

in that in camera setting the juror was struggling with fear and 

great emotional distress because of her own abusive situation. 

On October 9, the trial court denied the motion for new trial, 

finding that: (State Record, Vol. II, p. 337) 

11 1. None of the jurors was incapable of performing his 

or her duties as a juror. 

11 2. No juror, after being asked, withheld relevant 

information during voir dire." 

Mrs. Burton's conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of 

New Mexico. That court found that defendant was not denied the 

opportunity to ask all relevant questions of the jury panel and 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 

permit extensive questioning by defense counsel. That court 

further found that defendant had failed to establish partiality on 

the part of the juror, Mrs. G., that "no evidence is presented to 

demonstrate any prejudice" to defendant, and that there was no 

error in denying a new trial. 

Mrs. Burton's federal application for a writ of habeas corpus 

was reviewed by William H. Deaton, United States Magistrate for the 

District of New Mexico, and his findings were adopted by the 

district court. The magistrate found that under the evidence, the 

situation of the juror, Mrs. G. , was such that it made her 

impliedly biased, no matter how impartial she professed to be, and 

that Mrs. Burton had been deprived of her right to an impartial 

jury. In addition, the magistrate found that the one-hour 

restriction on voir dire and the refusal to allow sequestered voir 

11 

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dire, deprived the petitioner of her right to due process and an 

impartial jury. 

The right to trial by an impartial jury is a fundamental 

concept of due process. That right, and the duty of strict inquiry 

into its application, were discussed in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 

717, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961), where it was found that pretrial 

publicity had tainted the jury panel: 

England, from whom the Western World has 

largely taken its concepts of individual 

liberty and of the dignity and worth of every 

man, has bequeathed to us safeguards for their 

preservation, the most priceless of which is 

that of trial by jury •..• In essence, the 

right to jury trial guarantees to the 

criminally ac- -~sed a fair trial by a panel of 

impartial, 11 inuifferent jurors. • • • "A fair 

trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 

requirement of due process." .•.. In the 

ultimate analysis, only the jury can strip a 

man of his liberty or his life. In the 

language of Lord Coke, a juror must be as 

"indifferent as he stands unsworn" ...• His 

verdict must be based upon the evidence 

developed at the trial." (6 L. Ed. 2d 755). 

(citations omitted) 

While jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts and 

issues involved, that fact does not foreclose inquiry into whether 

there has been a deprivation of due process of law. Irvin v. Dowd, 

supra, 6 L. Ed. 2d 756. 

In a civil case tried in a federal district court, a juror's 

son had sustained injury in an accident. The juror did not respond 

to a voir dire inquiry concerning "previous injuries . . • that 

resulted in any disability or prolonged pain or suffering" to a 

juror's immediate family. The court of appeals found that the 

failure to respond had prejudiced plaintiffs' right of peremptory 

challenge. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the fact that 

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a juror might have been peremptorily challenged was not alone 

sufficient to reverse a conviction, and that in order to be 

entitled to a new trial in such a situation, "a party must first 

demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material 

question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct 

response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for 

cause." McDonough Power Equipment v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 78 

L. Ed 2d 663, 671 (1984) (emphasis supplied). 

In Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F. 2d 1480, (10th Circuit 1987) the 

McDonough rule was applied in ruling on a habeas corpus petition 

filed by a state defendant who complained that a juror's incorrect 

answers on a jury questionnaire and his failure to answer an oral 

question during voir dire, so prejudiced his right to exercise 

peremptory challenges that he was denied a fair trial. The jury 

questionnaire asked if any member of the juror's family at present 

or in the past was or had been a member or employee of any law 

enforcement agency. Juror Beserra, who served as jury foreman, 

answered "no, " al though his brother had recently retired after 

working more than 30 years as a police officer. on voir dire the 

panel was asked "Are there any persons on this panel who have 

either a relative or a close friend who might work for a police 

department either in Albuquerque or some other city?". Eight 

people responded, but the juror Beserra remained silent, even 

though another juror mentioned that his brother was a retired 

military police chief. 

In Baca, a panel of this court found that defendant had 

"failed to demonstrate that Beserra was partial or that defendant 

was denied his constitutional right to be tried by an impartial 

13 

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jury." 821 F. 2d at 1483. In so doing, the court reviewed the 

state of the law in this manner: 

Al though a prima facie showing of impairment of a 

party's peremptory challenges may entitle that party to 

an evidentiary hearing .... "(t)he fact that (the) juror 

might have been peremptorily challenged by 

defendant is not alone sufficient to reverse defendant's 

conviction," Williams v. United States, 418 F. 2d 372, 

377 (10th Cir. 1969). In McDonough Power Equip .• Inc. v. 

Greenwood, ... the Supreme Court stated that "it ill 

serves the important end of finality to wipe the slate 

clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process 

because counsel lacked an item of information which 

objectively he should have obtained from a juror on voir 

dire examination." -- "A party who seeks a new trial because of 

non-disclosure by a juror during voir dire 

must show actual bias." United States v. 

Perkins. 748 F. 2d 1519, 1532 (11th Cir. 

1984) , either "by express admission or by 

proof of specific facts showing such a close 

connection to the circumstances at hand that 

bias must be presumed." id. ( quoting United 

states v. Nell, 526 F. 2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir. 

1976) • "(T) he remedy for allegations of juror 

partiality is a hearing in which the defendant 

has the opportunity to prove actual bias. " 

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 .... 

At such a hearing, evidence of dishonesty and 

the subject matter of . the nondisclosed 

information are relevant to the inquiry into 

alleged partiality." 821 F. 2d at 1483. 

In finding that there had been no denial of a fair trial, 

since the defendant failed to demonstrate that Beserra was partial, 

the Baca court noted that defendant did not contend that he was not 

given a full, fair and adequate evidentiary hearing, that the trial 

court found that juror Beserra was not partial, a finding entitled 

to the presumption of correctness, and that this finding was in 

fact supported by the record. In this respect, the court observed 

that the oral question at voir dire was presented in the present 

tense, so that Beserra had no objective duty to respond since his 

brother was no longer in law enforcement. 

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In the very recent case of United States v. Gillis F. 2d ---

(No. 90-8064, 10th Circuit, 8/12/91), a federal defendant 

alleged that he had been denied a fair trial because members of the 

venire panel also sat on a panel in an earlier case in which he was 

tried on another narcotic charge, involving different 

conspirators. 8 The defendant's challenge of the entire panel for 

cause was denied and during voir dire, the trial judge did not 

inquire about knowledge gained from the first charge--instead, the 

jurors were asked generally if they knew "of any reason whatsoever" 

which could impair their impartiality. This court found that the 

"risk of a biased jury was significant," that the trial court had 

failed to conduct an adequate examination "to negate the risk of 

prejudice," and that a new trial was required. 

State court findings relating to juror bias "are factual 

determinations to which the presumption of correctness under 28 

u.s.c.A. Section 2254(d) apply, although the constitutional 

standard of jury impartiality is a question of law. Patton v. 

Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n. 12, 81 L. Ed. 2d 847, 857, note 12 

(1984); Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F. 2d 805, 815-816, (9th Cir. 1987). 

In Lincoln, supra, the state prisoner alleged that he was denied a 

fair trial because of excessive pretrial publicity. While noting 

that a "preconceived notion as to the defendant's guilt or 

innocence, without more, does not rebut a juror's presumed 

impartiality, as long as the juror can lay aside his or her 

8 Of 32 prospective jurors on the panel at the second trial, 

at least 15 were present at the selection of the other jury one 

month previously. Three persons present on both panels served as 

trial jurors in the second trial. They had been excused during the 

voir dire examination at the first trial. 

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impression and render a verdict on the evidence, " the court 

observed that "a juror's assertion of impartiality is not 

dispositive, if the defendant can demonstrate 'the actual existence 

of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the 

presumption of partiality.'" 807 F. 2d at 815. In Lincoln, the 

circuit held that the district court had an independent duty to 

ascertain whether the presumption of correctness should attach to 

the state court factual findings, and remanded the case for this 

purpose. 

The state court finding that "No juror, after being asked, 

withheld relevant information during voir dire," and that "None of 

the jurors was incapable of performing his or her duties as 

jurors," is presumed to be correct unless "the Federal court on a 

consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that 

such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record." 

28 u.s.c.A. Section 2254 (d) (8). Braley v. Shillinger, 902 F. 2d 

20 (10th Cir. 1990), Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 71 L.Ed. 2d 

78 (1982). In Smith, a juror who sat on the state jury which 

convicted Phillips of murder applied for a job as an investigator 

in the prosecutor's off ice during the trial. The prosecutor 

withheld the information from the trial court and defense counsel 

until after the trial. Following a hearing, the trial judge found 

that the juror's application was an "indiscretion," but that it did 

not reflect a premature conclusion of guilt or prejudice against 

the defendant, "or an inability to consider the guilt or innocence" 

of the defendant based solely upon the evidence. 

In finding no merit to Phillips 1 

Supreme Court found the state trial 

16 

due process claim, the 

court's findings to be 

Appellate Case: 90-2019 Document: 010110096831 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 16 
"presumptively correct" under 28 u.s.c.A. Section 2254(d), and not 

to be disturbed "unless the federal habeas court articulates some 

basis for disarming such findings of the statutory presumption that 

they are correct and may be overcome only by convincing evidence." 

As to Phillips' claim, the Supreme Court noted that neither the 

federal district court, nor the court of appeals took any issue 

with the findings of the state court. 

During the murder trial in the Braley case, supra, 902 F. 2d 

20, defense counsel received anonymous calls reporting that two 

jurors knew the victim's father, and that the father had two of the 

jurors "in his pocket." Affidavits were filed after trial 

indicating that the two jurors initially refused to vote for 

anything less than first-degree murder, and that these jurors 

eventually swayed the jury to a verdict of second-degree murder 

instead of manslaughter. At a hearing, the father and the two 

jurors testified and denied any contact or improper influence and 

the trial court denied the motion for new trial. The denial of 

habeas corpus relief was affirmed by a panel of this court upon a 

finding that the case was governed by the Smith decision, and that 

the petitioner had failed to establish any exception to the 

presumption provided by Section 2254 (d). 

In Mrs. Burton's case, the federal district court determined 

that the record did not support the conclusions of the state trial 

court. Our review of the record is in accord, and we here quote 

those findings in some detail, since they fairly summarize the 

state court proceedings: (Vol. II, Federal record, Item 45, 

Magistrate's Amended Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, 

pp. 7-9): 

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13. In this case, the juror testified that when 

asked about child abuse she did not connect her abusive 

experiences with the voir dire discussion and that she 

tried not to think of her own situation by pushing her 

thoughts of her abusive experiences to the edge of her 

consciousness. Tape 1 (Chambers Oct. 1, 1984). The 

trial court found that the juror had honestly (not 

consciously) failed to mention her family's history of 

abuse during voir dire. The record, however, does not 

fairly support that finding of honesty. The voir dire 

centered around the topics of child and wife abuse. If 

so requested by a juror, the trial court permitted 

individual questioning on these sensitive topics. Yet 

the juror did not speak up at that time. Nonetheless, 

the juror was conscious of the fact that her family 

situation was abusive when she submitted an affidavit 

after the trial describing her situation. Affidavit of 

S.G.G. (filed Oct. 1, 1984). Under these circumstances, 

it is hard to believe that the juror honestly answered 

the abuse voir dire questions. 9 Had the juror spoken 

up, she would have been dismissed for cause as two other 

jurors had been who had revealed substantial exposure to 

family abuse. Since the record does not fairly support 

a presumption of correctness of the trial court's finding 

that the juror was honest, that presumption is overcome. 

Thus McDonough applies and petitioner is entitled to a 

new trial. 10 

Assuming that the juror had answered the voir dire 

question honestly, the record still would not have fairly 

supported the presumption of correctness of the trial 

court's finding of juror impartiality under Baca. 

Although the juror did not admit to bias, the facts in 

her case show such a close connection to the petitioner's 

that bias must be presumed. First, the juror's affidavit 

stated that she has "been the subject of wife abuse in 

the past and (is) presently subject to abuse to a lesser 

degree." ... She also stated in her affidavit that her 

"youngest child is presently seeing a counselor for 

emotional difficulties which are related to the abuse 

9 Mrs. G was a member of the second group of jurors which was 

voir dired. 

10 As previously noted, the McDonough test for obtaining new 

trial because of the absence of an impartial jury requires that 

during voir dire a juror failed to honestly answer a material 

question, and secondly, that a correct response to voir dire 

questions would have formed a valid basis for a challenge for 

cause. 

Actual bias may be found either by an express admission, or by 

proof of specific facts which show such a close connection to the 

facts at trial that bias is presumed. Baca v. Sullivan, supra, 821 

F. 2d 1480, 1483. 

18 

Appellate Case: 90-2019 Document: 010110096831 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 18 
that my other children and I have received and which he 

has witnessed." .•. Moreover, the juror testified that 

her husband has a violent temper that results in his 

hitting and verbally abusing the family • For 

example, her husband at one time hit her son across the 

back with a golf club ..• The juror also indicated that 

she wanted her affidavit and testimony kept secret, 

because she feared her husband might do something bad to 

her and her children should he find out. 

Furthermore, a forensic psychologist testified that 

people exposed to abuse would almost always unfairly 

judge a case involving abuse. 

Whether a juror's bias may be implied from the circumstances 

is a question of law for this court. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 

209, 222, n* (1982) (J. O'Connor, concurring); Cummings v. Dugger. 

862 F. 2d 1504, 1509 (11th Cir. 1989). Doubts regarding bias must 

be resolved against the juror. United States v. Nell, 526 F. 2d 

1223, 1230 (5th cir. 1976), where the rule was so aptly expressed 

in this manner: 

We have no psychic calibers with which to measure the 

purity of the prospective juror; rather, our mundane 

experience must guide us to the impartial jury promised 

by the Sixth Amendment. Doubts about the existence of 

actual bias should be resolved against permitting the 

juror to serve, unless the prospective panelist's 

protestation of a purge of preconception is positive, not 

pallid. 

We will not discuss at length the similarities of the experiences 

of Mrs. Burton and the juror, Mrs. G. It is sufficient to note 

that the abuse, both mental and physical, continued over a long 

period of time and that the juror, at the time of trial, was living 

in an abusive situation, fearing her husband's violent temper even 

at the time she was testifying in chambers. Petitioner has 

presented a number of cases involving implied bias in situations 

which are similar to those we have here. In United States v. 

Eubanks, 591 F. 2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979), the court found that 

the fact that a juror's sons used heroin barred any inference that 

19 

Appellate Case: 90-2019 Document: 010110096831 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 19 
juror could be impartial in a case in which defendants were charged 

with distributing heroin; in Jackson v. United States. 395 F. 2d 

615 (D.C. Cir. 1968), a juror was presumed to be biased because he 

had been a lover in a love triangle similar to the one involved in 

the case at issue; in United States v. Allsup. 566 F. 2d 68, 71-71 

(9th Cir. 1977) and United States v. Mccorkle, 248 F. 2d 1 (3rd 

Cir. 1957), cert. den. 2 L. Ed. 2d 77, rehearing denied, 2 L. Ed. 

2d 263, jurors were found to be biased because of their banking 

ties and robbery experience in cases involving bank robberies; and 

in State v. LaRue, 722 P. 2d 1039, 1042 (Hawaii 1986), it was found 

that a victim of child abuse could not be impartial in a case 

involving sexual abuse of a minor. 

Here, the record is clear that Mrs. G was dishonest in her 

response to questions on voir dire--this is true whether or not she 

simply did not, or could not respond properly because of her own 

emotional distress. This dishonesty, of itself, is evidence of 

bias. See U.S. v. Colombo, 869 F. 2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1989); 

Consolidated Gas & Equipment Co. of America v. Carver, 257 F. 2d 

111, 115 (10th Cir. 1958); U. s. v. Scott, 

( 5th Cir • 19 8 8 ) • 11 

854 F. 2d 697, 699 

11 The state relies upon Brown v. United States. 356 F. 2d 

230 (10th Cir. 1966), where the brother of a juror had been 

murdered some years before trial. The court found no violation of 

the right to impartial trial where there was no evidence in the 

voir dire proceeding of the juror's relation to his brother and no 

information about how the brother's murder had affected the juror. 

The voir dire question concerned attacks upon the jurors II immediate 

family" and defense counsel did not explain what he meant by 

11 immediate family". In finding there was no abuse of discretion in 

denying a new trial, the court noted that "(t)he record here does 

not disclose that the juror either failed to give a truthful answer 

to the question propounded, or conceal a known disqualification." 

356 F. 2d at 233. 

20 

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We likewise find that Mrs. G's failure to respond on voir dire 

denied Mrs. Burton a fair trial under the McDonough test, for it is 

clear that the juror did fail to answer a material question, and 

that a correct response would have provided a basis for a challenge 

for cause. Had Mrs. G responded honestly, she would have been 

excused for cause. That is exactly what happened to jurors Green 

and Zoeller who revealed their exposures to family and child abuse. 

We find that the record establishes that Mrs. G's silence and 

the inherently prejudicial nature of her own family situation 

deprived Mrs. Burton of her right to a fair trial by an impartial 

jury, and that she is entitled to a new trial. Because of our 

finding on this issue, we need not and do not reach any other 

issues in the case. 

The judgment of the district court requiring a new trial is 

AFFIRMED. 

In the case now before us, the record is clear concerning 

abuse which directly affected the juror and her children, and the 

juror's refusal to give a truthful answer. 

21 

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90.2016 and 90-2019, Burton v. Johnson 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting 

I respectfully dissent because I think the majority opinion 

is not based upon proper constitutional analysis, and creates an 

erroneous rule of constitutional law. 

We examine habeas challenges to state court proceedings, 

including voir dire of jurors, only for constitutional error, not 

for infractions of rules imposed on federal courts through the 

exercise of supervisory authority. Mu'min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct. 

1899 (1991). The Constitution permits state trial courts great 

latitude in conducting voir dire, including inquiry into subjects 

which might tend to show juror bias. See id. at 1904, 1906. "To 

be constitutionally compelled, however, it is not enough that such 

questions might be helpful. Rather, the trial court's failure to 

ask these questions must render the defendant's trial 

fundamentally unfair." Id. at 1905. (~iting Murphy v. Florida, 

421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975)). 

Contrary to arguments advanced in this case, the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require state court 

judges to question jurors individually, or to question jurors in 

private, or to ask detailed, content based questions of jurors, or 

to question jurors or permit the questioning of jurors for any 

particular length of time, or even to permit peremptory challenges 

of jurors. Id. 

Thus, it is clear at the outset that the voir dire 

examination conducted in this case did not violate the Fourteenth 

Amendment. There was extensive inquiry of the prospective jurors, 

Appellate Case: 90-2019 Document: 010110096831 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 22 
and the general subject of abuse was raised, although inartfully. 

The jurors were all given an opportunity to express reservations 

either openly, or in a private meeting with the judge. That 

process was constitutionally sufficient. 

The court below and the majority opinion both base their 

conclusions on a presumption of a bias, reasoning first that 

anyone who has experienced some sort of abuse personally or in 

their family is constitutionally disqualified from sitting on a 

case where some sort of abuse is raised as a defense. Second, the 

court below and the majority reasoned that the juror in question 

here, a "Mrs. G", "was dishonest in her response to questions on 

voir dire, Maj. Op. at 20 (emphasis added); therefore, she was 

constitutionally disqualified because of bias, and the dishonesty 

resulted in her not being stricken for cause. These arguments 

intertwine Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment considerations. I have 

no problem with that since the constitutional analysis as to bias 

is the same for each. In each instance, however, the court below 

and the majority have failed to address directly the right 

threshold question. Mu'min is instructive on the point. 

The petitioner in Mu'min claimed that the trial court's 

failure to examine jurors individually regarding their exposure to 

pretrial publicity violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights. He contended that the harm from possible pretrial 

knowledge of incriminating facts not admissible in evidence was 

even greater than the possible existence of racial or ethnic 

prejudice from the standpoint of necessary voir dire. In support, 

the petitioner cited the American Bar Association Standards for 

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Criminal Justice. The Supreme Court rejected the premise of 

prejudice and disqualification underlying the Standards, pointing 

out that the wrong question was being asked. The court stated: 

But, more importantly, the standards relating to voir 

dire are based on a substantive rule that renders_a_ 

potential juror subject to challenge for cause, without 

regard to his state of mind, if he has been exposed to 

and remembers 'highly significant information' or 'other 

incriminating matters that may be inadmissible in 

evidence.' That is a stricter standard of juror 

eligibility than that which we have held the 

Constitution to require. Under the ABA standard, 

answers to questions about content, without more, could 

disqualify the juror from sitting. Under the 

constitutional standard, on the other hand, [t]he 

relevant question is not whether the community 

remembered the case, but whether the jurors . had 

such fixed opinions that they could not jud~ 

impartially the guilt of the defendant.' 

Id. at 1907-08, (quoting Patton v. Yount, 476 U.S. 1025, 1035 

(1984) (emphasis added)). 

Under this analysis, then, the majority opinion is clearly 

wrong to begin with when it states that "[h]ad Mrs. G responded 

honestly [that there had been some abuse in her family], she would 

have been excused for cause". Maj. Op. at 21. She should only 

have been disqualified on constitutional grounds if questioning 

disclosed that "she had such fixed opinions that she could not 

judge impartially the guilt of the defendant." Id. 

The same is true of implied bias. The court below and the 

majority presume disqualification without at least asking and 

directly analyzing the relevant question: Did Mrs.Gin fact have 

such fixed opinions that she could not judge impartially? She 

indicated she could. The state courts found she could, and, 

neither the court below nor the majority even begin to demonstrate 

convincing proof of actual bias. 

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Of course, "[i]n those extraordinary situations involving 

implied bias, state-court proceedings resulting in a finding of 

'no bias' are by definition inadequate to uncover the bias that 

the law conclusively presumes." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 

223 n* (O'Connor, J., concurring), But, if the majority is 

fashioning a conclusive presumption of bias on constitutional 

grounds in abuse cases, it does so without support, and I believe 

it to be bad constitutional law. Justice O'Connor described 

constitutional presumptions correctly, I believe, as follows: 

[t]here are some extreme situations that would justify a 

finding of implied bias. Some examples might include a 

revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the 

prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close relative 

of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal 

transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow 

involved in the criminal transaction. 

Id. at 222 (O'Connor, J., concurring}. A case like the one before 

us hardly falls in the categories described, any more than a 

situation similar to Mu'min where a juror has been exposed to 

incriminating information about the defendant. People are capable 

of judging fairly on the evidence in these situations. 

Cases cited by the majority such as Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 

717 (1961} and United States v. Gillis, 942 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 

1991} have either been distinguished in Mu'min, or have failed, as 

does the majority opinion here, to take Mu'min into account in 

their analysis. Other cases cited by the majority, including 

Gillis, are intertwined with federal supervisory standards and do 

not present a pure constitutional analysis. 1 In short, there is 

1 In Gillis, moreover, the pertinent subject was not even 

addressed on voir dire. Here, it was. 

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no convincing authority which supports a constitutional 

presumption of bias in abuse cases. 

Finally, I strongly disagree with the majority's "finding" 

that Mrs. G was dishonest, and its use of that finding to support 

an inference of actual bias. Honesty is a pure credibility 

finding which the state trial court which examined Mrs. G on the 

subject, had the right to make. It is not enough for the majority 

to recognize the rule that state court findings are entitled to a 

presumption of correctness, 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d); Sumner v. Mata, 

449 U.S. 539, 551 (1981); Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388 (10th 

Cir. 1989), and then to override that presumption because the 

majority thinks it can read the record better than the state 

courts can determine credibility first hand. The statutory 

presumption of correctness accorded to state court findings "may 

be overcome only by convincing evidence." Smith v. Phillips, 455 

U.S. 209, 218 (1982) (emphasis added). And, issues of witness 

credibility, and findings based upon the court's opportunity to 

observe and evaluate the demeanor of the witness, are particularly 

subject to the presumption of correctness. See Case v. Mondragon, 

887 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1989). "Demeanor plays a fundamental 

role not only in determining juror credibility, but also in simply 

understanding what a potential juror is saying." Patton v. Yount, 

467 U.S. 1025, 1038 n.14 (1984). 

An examination of the voir dire conducted in this case 

discloses that at best it was ambiguous with respect to the 

subject of physical abuse, as opposed to sexual abuse, or sexual 

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abuse coupled with other physical abuse. Mrs. G testified at the 

post-trial hearing that her situation did not involve sexual abuse 

As the majority opinion acknowledges, at the hearing Mrs. G 

testified that when the panel of prospective jurors was asked 

about child abuse she did not connect her own experiences with the 

discussion. She denied deliberately withholding any requested 

information and, in fact, did not recall ever being asked on voir 

dire whether she had been a victim of wife abuse. She stated that 

she just did not connect her situation with the questions asked. 

She stated further that she never felt she had been asked a 

question on voir dire that called for an answer o~ the subject of 

abuse in her own family. She also said that she believed she 

would have responded had she thought that a response was called 

for. 

In short, the most that can be said about the voir dire 

inquiry is that it was ambiguous with respect to putting Mrs.Gin 

a position of a required response on the subject of abuse in her 

own family. She certainly gave no dishonest answer, since she 

remained silent. And, her silence, as found by the trial court 

which had an opportunity to observe her demeanor, and had first 

hand knowledge of the voir dire inquiry, was not dishonest. See 

Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480 (10th Cir. 1987); Brown v. United 

States, 356 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1966). 

Following the hearing, as the majority opinion notes, the 

state trial court specifically found that "no juror, after being 

asked, withheld relevant information during voir dire." The court 

further found that "none of the jurors was incapable of performing 

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his or her duties as a juror." On direct appeal, the New Mexico 

Supreme Court upheld those determinations, and further found that 

their was no evidence demonstrating prejudice. 

I believe it to be indefensible, on these facts, for the 

federal courts to make a finding on the honesty of this juror, 

directly at odds with the state court findings, and then to draw 

conclusions from that finding. Certainly there is no "convincing 

evidence" to support the majority's finding, as required by Smith 

v. Phillips. See 455 U.S. at 218. 

Stripped of extraneous trappings, the majority opinion in 

this case stands only for the proposition, as a matter of 

constitutional law, that prospective jurors who have been abused 

in any way or who have had abuse in their families in some way at 

some time are automatically disqualified from sitting on cases in 

which abuse might arise as a defense, on the presumption that such 

prospective jurors are incapable of being impartial within the 

meaning of the Sixth Amendment. I disagree with such a rule, and 

with this supervisory/evidentiary resort to presumptions. 11 ['I'] he 

remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which 

the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias." Smith v. 

Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215 (emphasis added). "[P]reservation of 

the opportunity to prove actual bias is a guarantee of a 

defendant's right to an impartial jury." Id. at 216 (quoting 

Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950) (emphasis 

added)). 2 Except in the most egregious circumstances, federal 

2 Decisions to hold hearings, of course, and the conduct of 

such hearings, must be consistent with the rules of evidence 

[footnote continued .. 

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. ] 

Appellate Case: 90-2019 Document: 010110096831 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 28 
habeas courts ought to stay out of the business of speculating and 

presuming as to the state of mind of state court jurors, and 

overriding the first hand judgment of state courts on the actual 

facts of the subject. 

[ ... footnote continued] 

applicable to post-verdict inquiry of jurors. See.,~' Tanner 

v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 at (1987). 

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