Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05014/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05014-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
M. C. Kramer
Respondent
Steven Ross Madsen
Petitioner

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1

This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the exhibits attached to the petition,

Respondent’s answer to the petition, the exhibits lodged with the answer, and Petitioner’s traverse. 

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 STEVEN ROSS MADSEN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

M. C. KRAMER, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

CV F 03 5014 LJO HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. #1]

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The parties having voluntarily consented to exercise of Magistrate

Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), by order dated May 23, 2003, this case was

assigned to the Magistrate Judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. Due to the

death of Magistrate Judge Hollis G. Best and the appointment of Magistrate Judge William M.

Wunderlich, on May 2, 2004, the matter was reassigned to the undersigned for all further

proceedings.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

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28 2All further references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

U.S . District Court

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a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, entered on April 23, 1998,

following his conviction by jury trial of the following counts: (1) Forcible oral copulation in

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 288a(c)2; (2) Robbery in violation of §§ 211, 212.5(c); (3) Assault

with a deadly weapon, to wit, a knife, with force likely to commit great bodily injury in violation of

§ 245(a)(1); (4) Sexual battery in violation of § 243.4(a); (5) Robbery in violation of §§ 211,

212.5(c); (6) Making a terrorist threat in violation of § 422; (7) Forcible oral copulation in violation

of § 288a(c); (8) Robbery in violation of §§ 211, 212.5(c). See Exhibit C, Answer to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter “Answer”). The allegations that Petitioner had personally used a

knife within the meaning of §§ 12022.3(a) and 667.61(e)(4), and that there was more than one victim

within the meaning of § 667.61(e)(5) were found to be true. Id. As to the three counts of robbery and

the count of making a terrorist threat, the jury found true the allegations that Petitioner had

personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon within the meaning of § 12022(b). Id. On May 21,

1998, Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate term of eight (8) years in state prison plus an

indeterminate term of 25 years to life. Id.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District (hereinafter “5th DCA”). On June 8, 2000, the 5th DCA issued an unpublished

opinion reversing Petitioner’s conviction for making a terrorist threat as well as the special allegation

that Petitioner had personally used a knife with respect to the first count of forcible oral copulation.

Id. The judgments of conviction on all other counts were affirmed; however, the sentences on all

such other counts were vacated, and the case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to

resentence Petitioner consistent with the opinion. Id.

On July 10, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court.

See Exhibit I, Answer. On September 20, 2000, the petition was summarily denied without comment

or citation to authority. See Exhibit J, Answer. 

On November 20, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States

Supreme Court. See Exhibit M, Answer. On February 26, 2001, the petition was denied. See Exhibit

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N, Answer.

On January 7, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno County

Superior Court. See Exhibit D, Answer. On January 14, 2002, the petition was denied. See Exhibit

E, Answer.

On February 4, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 5th DCA. See

Exhibits F, Answer. On April 22, 2002, Petitioner filed a supplemental habeas petition in the 5th

DCA. See Exhibit G, Answer. On May 10, 2002, both petitions were denied. See Exhibit H,

Answer.

On May 20, 2002, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court alleging

the same claims he raises in the instant petition. See Exhibit K, Answer. On November 26, 2002, the

petition was summarily denied. See Exhibit L, Answer.

On September 3, 2002, Petitioner filed his first federal habeas petition in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of California, Fresno Division. See Madsen v. Kramer, Case

No. CV F 02 6060 DLB HC. On November 18, 2002, Respondent filed a motion to stay the petition

pending exhaustion of Petitioner’s state remedies. On December 6, 2002, the Court denied

Respondent’s motion to stay and dismissed the petition because none of the grounds raised in the

petition were exhausted.

On January 6, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner

raises three purported grounds for relief: (1) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) Prosecutorial

misconduct; and (3) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

On June 24, 2003, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. 

On July 16, 2003, Petitioner filed a traverse to Respondent’s answer. 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court hereby adopts the facts as summarized by the 5th DCA in its opinion dated July 6,

2000:

Pam F.

On January 14, 1996, between 8:00 and 10:00 a.m., Pam F. was walking with her son

and a friend from McDonalds towards her home on Motel Drive in Fresno. Pam was eight

and one-half months pregnant. Appellant drove by in a silver blue Toyota pickup truck. He

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3

Twila testified she originally thought the truck was beige, but later realized when she saw the truck again that it was

silver in color. She thought the truck was a Mitsubishi. A defense witness, Larry Johnson, testified appellant owned a beige

camper shell.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 4

stopped and asked Pam if she wanted a ride. Because she was not feeling well, Pam accepted

the ride after making arrangements for her friend to walk her son home. Pam soon realized

she had made a mistake because appellant drove in a direction opposite from her home and

took her to an empty field. He stopped the truck and began touching her breasts. He was

rough and said he wanted her milk. Pam was frightened and told him she was pregnant. She

did not know whether she would come out of the encounter alive. He was very rough and

proceeded to suck her breasts. He then forced her to orally copulate him.

After Pam F. completed the act, appellant unsuccessfully tried to start his truck. Pam

got out and helped him push start the truck because she hoped appellant would take her back

to town. Once the truck was started, however, appellant reached behind her and locked the

passenger side door. He asked Pam for her money. Pam resisted saying she had a child and

was going to have another.

When Pam refused to give him the money, appellant pulled out a knife from behind

the seat. He threatened to kill the unborn baby, pointing to the bull's eye on the front of Pam's

T-shirt. He poked her in the breast with the knife and ordered her out of the truck. The

pressure of the knife resulted in a small pinhole puncture wound. Pam was very frightened at

this point and gave appellant $50 or $60. Pam asked if appellant was going to leave her there

and appellant again ordered her out of the truck. Pam exited the truck and walked home.

Pam went to the hospital that night and gave birth the next day. She did not report the attack

because she was humiliated. She was not working as a prostitute and had not seen appellant

before. Pam identified appellant as the man who attacked her both at trial and in a pretrial

photo lineup. She also identified a picture of appellant's truck as the truck he was driving the

morning of the attack.

Twila S.

On a night in August of 1996, Twila S. was working as a prostitute on Motel Drive

between 11:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. She approached a little silver pickup truck with a primered

front panel and a camper shell3 driven by appellant. She asked if he wanted a "date" ("date" is

the common euphemism for the act of prostitution). Appellant said he did. Twila said she

usually "dated" in a nearby cul-de-sac, but appellant said this was too close to the city and

proceeded to drive Twila to the pet cemetery on the outskirts of town. The area was once

known as one frequented by prostitutes and their customers and, although this is no longer

true, the area remains isolated, especially at night.

The two had agreed that Twila would give appellant a "blow job" for $20. When they

arrived at the pet cemetery, appellant gave her the $20, which she put in her shoe. Twila then

orally copulated appellant. Appellant asked if he could "tit fuck" Twila. She agreed. To

perform this act, appellant exited the truck and came to the passenger side. Appellant

ejaculated on her breasts. Both acts were consensual. Twila wiped herself off with a towel

she found on the seat of the truck.

When the acts were completed, appellant returned to the truck and reached over and

locked the door on Twila's side. He pulled out a knife from under the seat, held it in his hand

and demanded that Twila give him back his money. Twila gave him the money, got out of the

truck and walked home.

Twila initially reported the attack while at the hospital two weeks later seeking

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U.S . District Court

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treatment for a beating received by her then boyfriend, now her husband. Police were called

and she told the officer appellant had attacked her and hit her in the jaw. She later admitted

lying and said she was using the attack by appellant to protect her boyfriend. When she was

served with a subpoena to appear at trial, she told the serving officer, CHP Officer Skidmore,

that she had lied to police at the hospital about the extent of the attack. At trial, she testified

appellant had not beaten her as she had claimed at the hospital, but that he had robbed and

threatened her after the two had engaged in consensual sex. Twila identified appellant as her

attacker at trial and in a pretrial lineup, and she also identified a picture of appellant's truck as

the one she was attacked in.

Darlene B.

Sometime in January 1997, Darlene B. was working as a prostitute when appellant

pulled up in a silver-blue pickup truck and asked her if she needed a ride. Appellant then

asked Darlene if she would give him a "blow job" for $20. After assuring herself that

appellant was not working with the police, Darlene agreed and got into appellant's truck and

the two drove to her apartment complex. Darlene told appellant he would have to deposit the

money "in [her] account," meaning he would have to pay first. Appellant gave her the $20.

Appellant was nervous at the apartment complex and wanted to leave. As they talked,

Darlene told him about a man she had been warned about who drove a blue colored truck

with a primered hood, had a pock-marked face and was attacking prostitutes in the area. As

she told appellant about the warning, she realized appellant was the man who was the subject

of the warning. At that point, appellant, smiling, leaned over and locked the door of the truck.

He said he would not hurt Darlene. He drove to a residential dead end street. It was night and

the area was dark.

After they parked, appellant ordered Darlene to orally copulate him. When she

hesitated, appellant reached down underneath his seat and pulled out a knife. He told her to

do what she had been paid to do. He also ordered her to take off her clothes. Darlene asked if

she could use a condom and appellant agreed. At that point, Darlene was scared and crying.

Appellant told her to stop crying, he was not going to hurt her. He held the knife to Darlene's

throat.

Darlene was unable to orally copulate appellant. Appellant then placed his penis

between Darlene's breasts until he ejaculated. Appellant gave Darlene a towel to wipe herself

off and took $70 from her purse. He then ordered her out of the car before she could dress.

He refused her request to take her to a main street. Darlene testified the knife was brown

handled and folded.

Investigation

On January 22, 1997, Officer Skidmore and another officer stopped a silver blue

Toyota pickup because of an inoperative taillight. Appellant was driving the truck. Although

the officers knew the truck fit the general description of the one used in the assaults on

women in the area, they did not have sufficient evidence to hold appellant for these crimes

and he was released.

Thereafter, Skidmore became involved in the investigation of the assaults. He

obtained a photograph of appellant from the Department of Motor Vehicles. He then

presented several of the victims with a photo lineup which included appellant's picture. In

each case, they identified appellant as the person who had assaulted them.

While working with the Sexual Predator Team from the Department of Justice,

Skidmore was able to determine the location of appellant's residence (and his truck) at an

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Skidmore referred to this individual as "Watkins" and Ekern referred to her as "Mosely." No explanation appears

in the record for the different last names.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 6

address on Dakota Avenue in Fresno. The residence was placed under surveillance.

Search (from transcript of section 1538.5 hearing)

On March 13, 1997, Officer Skidmore, Fresno Police Officer Nella and two agents

from the Department of Justice arrived at the Dakota address to impound appellant's truck.

They did not have a warrant. The officers contacted the person living in the house on the

property, a Bridget Watkins or Bridget Mosely4 and told her the officers were going to

impound the vehicle. The officers were able to see appellant's car in the back area of the

property, behind a locked gate. Watkins was unwilling to open the gate, but did so when told

by officers a tow truck was en route and that appellant's truck would be impounded.

While on the property, the officers searched the truck, opening the unlocked door and

the glove compartment. Pictures were taken. The officers found a kitchen-type knife on the

left side of the truck, close to the driver's side door and tucked under a speaker box located

underneath the driver's seat. The officers also checked the trailer in which appellant lived to

see if he was home; he was not.

The property owner, Rory Ekern, was present during most of the search. He testified 

appellant lived in the trailer under a recreational vehicle garage. He said the police had been

"hanging out" near his property for about one week. He stated one of the officers showed him

a kitchen steak knife which the officer said was found beneath the seat of the truck. Then

Ekern said he heard one officer telling other officers that they had to put the knife back in the

car to have the pictures taken.

The truck was impounded and moved from the property. On March 14, 1997, a

warrant was obtained and a further search of the truck was done by the Fresno Police

Department Bureau of Investigation.

Defense

Appellant took the stand in his own behalf. He admitted engaging in acts of

prostitution with Darlene B. and Pam F. His testimony concerning the circumstances of his

initial encounters with the women was essentially the same as that of the victims, except that

he said Pam was working as a prostitute and approached him for work. Appellant said he

entered into an agreement with the women to perform a "blow job" for $20. He also said it is

his practice not to give prostitutes money until they perform the act agreed upon.

Appellant said he refused to pay the women because they did not perform as agreed.

With Darlene, he said she could not orally copulate him and she said she was going to vomit.

He lost interest and told her to leave the truck. With Pam, he testified that, after agreeing to

do a "blow job," she just wanted to do "a hand job," which appellant said he could do

himself. He ordered her to get out and refused to pay. He also claimed he did not know Pam

was pregnant, and thought she was just "fat."

Appellant denied any contact with Twila S. He also said he never threatened Darlene

B. or Pam F. and did not use a knife. He denied robbing either woman and denied ejaculating

on either woman's breasts. He admitted the presence of the steak knife in his truck at the time

of the search, but said he never had it in the truck while "driving around."

See pp. 4-9, Exhibit C, Answer.

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U.S . District Court

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DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Fresno County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly,

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert.

denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70

(2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

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As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly

established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

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court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claim

A. Ground One

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner claims trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of

counsel in the following manner: (1) By failing to investigate the corrosion defense and the search

and seizure before the preliminary hearing; (2) By failing to file the suppression motion (Cal. Code

of Civ. Proc. § 1538.5) within sixty (60) days; (3) By failing to take photographs of the area where

the search and seizure took place; (4) By failing to subpoena witness Bridget Mosely at the

suppression hearing; (5) By failing to subpoena Mike Gary; (6) By failing to persuade witness John

Pheifer to testify; (7) By failing to put on a “corrosion defense”; (8) By failing to object to the

allegedly illegal first amended information; (9) By failing to object or move for a mistrial following

the prosecutor’s allegedly improper closing argument; and (10) By failing to cooperate with appellate

counsel. Respondent contends the claims are without merit.

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe, 151

F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1998). In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that

counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he

or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of

reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v.

Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is

highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Sanders v. Ratelle, 21

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F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.1994).

Second, the petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive

defendant of a fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must

also evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356,

1461 (9th Cir. 1994). To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have

been different but for counsel’s error, may grant the petitioner a windfall to which the law does not

entitle him. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993). Thus, if the court finds that

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, the court must then ask

whether despite the errors and prejudice the trial was fundamentally fair and reliable. Id. 

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining

the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697. Since it is necessary to prove prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must

necessarily fail. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable

application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d 1058,

1062 (2000). 

1. Failure to investigate the “corrosion” defense and the search and seizure

Petitioner first claims defense counsel was ineffective in failing “to investigate the corrosion

defense and the search and seizure before the [p]reliminary [e]xamination.” Petition at 1. Petitioner

claims he informed defense counsel that the alleged victims were conspiring with officers of the

Fresno Police Department and that officers had taken Petitioner’s vehicle off of private property

without a valid search warrant. Id. In support of his claim, Petitioner points to defense counsel’s

questioning of Fresno Police Officer Xiong at the preliminary hearing. Petitioner argues the line of

questioning demonstrates “counsel ha[d] knowledge of corrosion between the victims and officers.”

Id. Petitioner also points to the testimony of a victim in which the victim states that several officers

had questioned several women. (CT 10.) In addition, Petitioner claims counsel would have been able

to prove the vehicle impoundment was not pursuant to a valid search warrant had he done the

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appropriate investigations and filed a discovery motion. Id. 

Petitioner’s allegations of collusion are pure speculation. There is no credible evidence

demonstrating a conspiracy existed between prostitutes and police officers to convict Petitioner. The

testimony of the victim shows only that officers were investigating the instant offenses involving

prostitutes by questioning several prostitutes. There is nothing to indicate collusion. Certainly, there

is nothing in Officer Xiong’s testimony showing such. Petitioner’s theories are pure conjecture, and

there is no reason to believe that further investigation by defense counsel prior to the preliminary

hearing would have revealed evidence of collusion or a conspiracy. Therefore, Petitioner has not

shown any error on the part of counsel. In addition, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice. 

Likewise, Petitioner’s claim that counsel failed to prepare for the preliminary hearing on the

issue of search and seizure and thereby challenge the vehicle impoundment is without merit. As

Respondent correctly notes, the 5th DCA, after considering federal and state law, found the search

and seizure lawful. See p. 18, Exhibit C, Answer. Specifically, the 5th DCA “concluded that the

officers acted lawfully in seizing the truck . . . .” Id. As the search and seizure was deemed lawful,

additional research by defense counsel would not have aided Petitioner or had any effect on the

outcome of the preliminary hearing. Thus, Petitioner cannot show any prejudice resulting from

counsel’s alleged errors.

2. Timeliness of suppression motion

Petitioner also faults counsel for failing to file the suppression motion (Cal. Code of Civ.

Proc. § 1538.5) within sixty (60) days of arraignment in order to preserve Petitioner’s right to seek

pretrial writ review. 

As Respondent correctly notes, Petitioner fails to set forth in his petition the grounds counsel

would have raised in pretrial writ review. In his traverse, Petitioner argues counsel should have

raised the trial court’s misapplication of United States Supreme Court cases which resulted in a

denial of his suppression motion. 

Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice because he cannot show that he would have

prevailed had it not been for counsel’s alleged failure. The 5th DCA found the search and seizure

lawful. Therefore, any pretrial writ raising this issue would also have been denied.

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3. Failure to take photographs

Petitioner next claims counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain photographs of the area

involving the impound of the truck. Petitioner argues that had counsel obtained photographs, he

could have demonstrated that the search and seizure was unlawful.

While it is true that photographs of the area may have offered further assistance to the trial

court in determining whether the vantage point of the officers viewing was lawful, the trial court had

sufficient evidence in the form of testimony from the investigating officer to make a proper

determination. When Officer Skidmore was asked how he observed the vehicle, he stated: “You

could see it over the fence and through a fence.” (RT 412-13.) The 5th DCA found the viewing

lawful: “[The investigating officers] were able to see the vehicle from a vantage point open to the

public, the driveway – a point at which they were legally entitled to be.” See p. 15, Exhibit C,

Answer. Therefore, no prejudice resulted from counsel’s alleged failure since photographs would

have been cumulative and would not have altered the outcome. 

4. Failure to subpoena Bridget Mosely at suppression hearing

Petitioner claims counsel also failed to subpoena witness Bridget Mosely to the hearing on

the suppression motion. Petitioner alleges Mosely was the only witness to the police officers’ initial

entry onto the property. Petitioner contends Mosely’s testimony would have altered the outcome of

the hearing.

The record demonstrates that Mosely was not the only one who witnessed the search and

seizure. Petitioner’s neighbor, Rory Ekern, lived “directly next door” to Petitioner. (RT 430.) The

defense called Mr. Ekern, and he testified at the hearing to having witnessed the search and seizure.

(RT 429.) Ekern stated that he owned the property located at 4566 E. Dakota on which Petitioner

maintained his residence. (RT 430.) Petitioner rented the property from Mosely who also lived at

4566 E. Dakota and rented from Ekern. (RT 430.) Ekern testified that he had seen officers outside

Petitioner’s residence on several occasions. (RT 431.) Ekern stated that on the day of the search and

seizure, he received a phone call from Mosely that the officers were at the property and they intended

to remove Petitioner’s truck. (RT 433.) When Ekern arrived, the officers were conducting a search of

the vehicle. (RT 435.) Ekern testified that Mosely was in the house and didn’t want to come outside.

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(RT 437.) 

Therefore, Petitioner has not demonstrated counsel’s failure to call Mosely to be error.

Ekern’s testimony was clearly preferable and more relevant since he was the one who witnessed the

search of the vehicle and its removal from his property. In addition, Petitioner cannot demonstrate

prejudice. Mosely could not have offered anything that would have altered the outcome of the

hearing since she was inside her house during the search.

5. Failure to subpoena Mike Gary

Petitioner claims defense counsel failed to subpoena Mike Gary, who at one time shared a

holding cell with Petitioner. Petitioner states that Mike Gary had informed him that he had been “set

up” by Officer Skidmore. Petition at 9. Mike Gary also allegedly told Petitioner he had other details

regarding Petitioner’s case. Id. Petitioner contends Mike Gary would have testified that all of the

victims knew each other. Id. 

Nevertheless, Petitioner states and the exhibits show that defense counsel chose not to call 

Gary because he believed Gary would make an unfavorable impression on the jury and that his

testimony would do more harm than good. Petition at 9; Exhibit L. According to the exhibits

submitted by Petitioner, Gary was the pimp of two individuals: Melody Bowlan and Joni Price. See

Exhibit K. In his traverse, Petitioner contends that defense counsel could have prevented Gary from

appearing unfavorable by limiting his questions to certain topics. However, this would not have

prevented the prosecutor from delving into Gary’s credibility and bias on cross-examination. The

prosecutor easily could have undermined Gary’s credibility by inquiring into the manner in which

Gary and Petitioner met (they were both in jail) or the source of Gary’s information (Gary was a

pimp). By calling Gary, defense counsel risked not only that the jury would disregard his testimony

because of his poor credibility, but that Petitioner’s own credibility would be diminished as a result

of his association with an avowed criminal. Counsel’s decision not to call Gary was a reasonable

decision, and Petitioner has not demonstrated ineffectiveness. See Denham v. Deeds, 954 F.2d

1501, 1505 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that counsel's decision not to call alibi witnesses because of

inconsistencies in the proposed testimony "reflect[ed] the skill and judgment one would expect of a

reasonably competent attorney"). 

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6. Failure to persuade Witness John Pheifer to testify

Next, Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective in failing to persuade John Pheifer to testify.

Counsel had intended to call Pheifer and did secure his appearance at trial. (RT 672, 775, 828.)

Petitioner states Pheifer had information regarding prostitutes receiving money from Officer

Skidmore in exchange for information. (RT 775.) 

From the record, it is apparent that counsel did secure Pheifer’s presence at trial. (RT 828.)

However, Pheifer refused to testify. When the Court took up the issue, defense counsel stated: “He’s

not going to testify. Apparently, he’s in the back refusing to testify . . . .” (RT 828.) A bailiff

confirmed that Pheifer was refusing to testify. (RT 828.) And so, defense counsel told the bailiff to

“send him back.” (RT 828.) Because Pheifer refused to testify, counsel’s decision not to force him to

the stand was not unreasonable. Denham, 954 F.2d at 1505; United States v. Opplinger, 150 F.3d

1061, 1072 (9th Cir.1998). 

7. Failure to present “corrosion defense”

Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective in failing to present a “corrosion defense.”

Petitioner contends counsel persisted in putting on an alibi defense despite weak evidence supporting

such a defense.

The Court is unclear as to what Petitioner means by a “corrosion defense.” Petitioner does

not clarify or expound on the claim anywhere in his petition. Petitioner does imply that there was

collusion among the police officers and the prostitutes. Nevertheless, if this is what Petitioner means,

there is simply no evidence supporting collusion or a conspiracy among the police and prostitutes.

The record only shows that police officers interviewed several prostitutes, and for the most part,

prostitutes were the victims of the offenses charged against Petitioner, but there is no evidence of a

secret agreement between the prostitutes and the police to falsely convict Petitioner.

Therefore, Petitioner has not demonstrated that counsel’s failure to put on a “corrosion

defense” constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, Petitioner cannot show prejudice,

because there is nothing in the record which would have supported such a defense.

8. Failure to object to the allegedly illegal first amended information

Petitioner next contends defense counsel failed to object to the 21-count information.

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Petitioner claims the amended information was illegal because it contained a charge which the court

had previously discharged for lack of sufficient credible evidence. Petition at 16. Petitioner also

complains defense counsel failed to challenge the amended information as it contained charges of

making criminal threats, and where these charges were not included in the original information. Id.

Further, Petitioner claims trial counsel failed to object and move for a new jury panel or a mistrial

when the prosecutor dismissed two of the thirteen charges read to the jury panel. Petition at 17.

In the first information, Count 19, the district attorney charged Petitioner with committing the

robbery of an individual, Twila, with the use of a knife. (CT 127.) At the preliminary hearing,

evidence was introduced that Petitioner had forcefully taken forty dollars from Twila. (CT 82.)

According to Officer Mart’s testimony, Twila had told him that the suspect struck her several times

on the right side of her head which his fist, brandished a knife, and took forty dollars from her. (CT

82.) However, in a prior statement to police, Twila did not report that the suspect took forty dollars

from her, only that the suspect had struck her on the right side of the head. (CT 86-87.) Following

the introduction of the evidence, defense counsel argued that the robbery charge as to Twila should

be dismissed because the evidence was insufficient and inconsistent. (CT 112-113.) The trial court

then discharged Count 19, stating: “The court finds insufficient credible evidence to support a

holding order on the robbery offense set forth in Count 19 and orders the defendant discharged on

that violation.” (CT 115.) Nevertheless, in the first amended information defense counsel re-charged

Petitioner in Count 8 with robbery of Twila with the use of a knife. (CT 214-215.) 

Cal. Penal Code § 739 provides, in relevant part:

[I]t shall be the duty of the district attorney of the county in which the offense is triable to file

in the superior court of that county within 15 days after the commitment, an information

against the defendant which may charge the defendant with either the offense or offenses

named in the order of commitment or any offense or offenses shown by the evidence taken

before the magistrate to have been committed.

(Emphasis added.)

Under California law, “a magistrate's legal conclusion that ‘the evidence failed to show

probable cause that the offense had been committed’ can be challenged by the district attorney by

means of including additional charges in the information so long as that challenge is made ‘within

the context of the magistrate's findings on the evidence.’” People v. Farley, 19 Cal.App.3d 215, 221

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(1971), quoting Jones v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 660, 665-666 (1971), superceded by constitutional

amendment on other grounds, Montez v. Superior Court, 285 Cal.Rptr. 279 (Cal.App.2d.1991). A

district attorney may not recharge an offense where the magistrate has made factual findings which

are fatal to the asserted conclusion that a particular offense was committed. Farley, 19 Cal.App.3d at

221. “A clear example of this would be where the magistrate expresses disbelief of a witness whose

testimony is essential to the establishment of some element of the corpus delicti.” Id. “Where,

however, the magistrate either expressly or impliedly accepts the evidence and simply reaches an

ultimate legal conclusion therefrom - i.e., whether or not such evidence adds up to reasonable cause

that the offense had been committed - such conclusion is open to challenge by inclusion in the

information.” Id. 

In this case, the magistrate did not make factual findings. Rather, he concluded generally that

the evidence was insufficient “to support a holding order on the robbery offense.” (CT 114.) In

Farley, the magistrate concluded generally that the evidence was insufficient to support the charge.

19 Cal.App.3d at 221. However, the California Supreme Court found the district attorney could

charge the defendant despite the magistrate’s ruling because the magistrate had made a legal

conclusion, not a specific factual finding contrary to an element of the offense. Id. Likewise, in this

case it was not improper for the district attorney to charge Petitioner with robbery of Twila despite

the magistrate’s legal conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge, because 

evidence was introduced which could test the magistrate’s conclusion at trial. The magistrate did not

make a specific factual determination as Petitioner argues, only a legal conclusion based on the

evidence. Farley, 19 Cal.App.3d at 221; Jones, 4 Cal.3d at 665-666. Accordingly, it was not error for

defense counsel to fail to challenge the first amended information, because the district attorney’s

reinstatement of the charge was not improper. In addition, Petitioner cannot show prejudice resulting

from counsel’s alleged failure because the first amended information was not in violation of

California law.

Petitioner also claims defense counsel failed to challenge the additional charges in the

amended information because they were not included in the original complaint. As discussed above,

the district attorney may charge the defendant with “any offense or offenses shown by the evidence

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taken before the magistrate to have been committed,” provided the magistrate has not made a factual

finding fatal to the asserted conclusion that a particular offense was committed. Cal. Penal Code

§ 739; Farley, 19 Cal.App.3d at 221. Further, under California law the rule is that an information

which charges the commission of an offense not named in the commitment order will not be upheld

unless (1) the evidence before the magistrate shows that such offense was committed, and (2) that

the offense ‘arose out of the transaction which was the basis for the commitment’ on a related

offense. Jones, 4 Cal.3d at 664-665; Parks v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 609, 614 (1952); People v.

Chimel, 68 Cal.2d 436, 443 (1968) , revd. on other grounds, 395 U.S. 752; People v. Downer, 57

Cal.2d 800, 809-810 (1962); People v. Evans, 39 Cal.2d 242, 249 (1952).

In Count 6 of the First Amended Information, Petitioner was charged with threatening to

commit a crime which would result in death or great bodily injury to victim Dana. (CT 214.) At the

preliminary hearing, Dana testified that Petitioner held a knife and pepper spray to her while

demanding money, saying, “[B]itch, gimme your money.” (CT 8-9.) In Count 9, Petitioner was

charged with making a criminal threat to victim Twila. (CT 215.) However, the 5th DCA reversed

Petitioner’s conviction on this count. See p. 31, Exhibit C, Answer. In Count 11, Petitioner was

charged with threatening to commit a crime which would result in death or great bodily injury to

victim Joni. (CT 216.) At the preliminary hearing, evidence was introduced that Petitioner, while

holding a knife, told Joni that “she was going to give him a blow job or . . . he was going to cut her

throat.” (CT 47.) Petitioner then held the knife to Joni’s neck and told her that she “better . . . give

him some good head or he would fuck her in the ass and stab her.” (CT 48.) 

There was evidence which showed Petitioner committed Counts 6 and 11, and the magistrate

did not make a factual determination to the contrary. In addition, the charges arose from the same

transactions for which Petitioner was ordered held. Therefore, the district attorney did not err in

including the charges in the First Amended Information. Consequently, defense counsel did not err

in failing to object to the inclusion of Counts 6 and 11, and Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice

resulting therefrom.

Petitioner also claims trial counsel failed to object and move for a new jury panel or a

mistrial when the prosecutor dismissed two of the thirteen charges read to the jury panel and when

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the court granted defense counsel’s motion to dismiss Counts 5, 6 and 7. Petitioner contends that the

removal of the five charges from the jury’s consideration so inflamed the jury that no jury instruction

could remove the thought that Petitioner had eluded punishment on five charges. Petition at 18.

Of the fifteen counts alleged in the First Amended Petition, the prosecutor orally requested 

the court strike two counts. (RT 506.) The court struck the two counts, stating:

Counsel, as I mentioned to you a few moments ago before we took our recess, I do

intend to advise the jurors that they will have the Information read to them, and since I have

previously paraphrased the Information that included two counts that are no longer before the

jury, I intend to instruct them at this time under CALJIC 17.46 as I will modify it, telling

them that the charges that I had paraphrased that were originally listed as Counts 10 and 11,

the forced oral copulation and terrorist threats to an alleged victim named Joni, that those

counts are no longer before the jury and that they should not consider this fact for any

purpose. 

(RT 506, 528-529.) 

The court then instructed the jury that “there have been some modifications” and the “[i]ssue

of guilt of the defendant as paraphrased to you as Count 10 and 11 of the defendant, a forced

copulation charge and alleged terrorist charge to a victim named Joni, those, counts are no longer

before you. Do not consider this fact for any purpose. It is not relevant to whether the defendant is

guilty or not guilty of any remaining count.” (RT 529-530.) 

Defense counsel orally requested that Counts 5, 6, and 7 be dismissed for insufficient

evidence. (RT 833). The court granted the request and dismissed the counts. (RT 833-834.) 

Petitioner’s claim is completely speculative. There is no evidence from which to conclude 

the jury became incensed over the dismissal of these charges. In addition, jurors are presumed to

follow their instructions. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). Petitioner submits nothing

which would overcome this presumption. On these facts, Petitioner has failed to show any prejudice

resulting from counsel’s failure to bring a motion for a new jury panel or a mistrial. 

9. Mistrial based on prosecutor’s closing argument

Petitioner claims defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object or move for a mistrial

following the prosecutor’s allegedly improper closing argument. Petitioner claims the prosecutor

improperly commented that Petitioner had tailored his testimony. Petitioner contends defense

counsel’s failure to object waived his right to raise the issue on direct appeal.

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The record shows the prosecutor argued that Petitioner tailored his testimony to match the

testimony of the victims. (RT 1170-1173, 1181, 1184, 1191.) In addition, the prosecutor argued that

Petitioner had the opportunity to tailor his testimony by listening to the witnesses testify and reading

the various police reports. (RT 1176.) 

Petitioner’s claim is without merit. He cites to one federal case in support of his contention

that the prosecutor’s arguments were unconstitutional: Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696 (2d.

Cir.1997), rev’d, Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000). As noted, however, the Supreme Court

reversed the Second Circuit, specifically holding that a prosecutor's comments during summation,

calling the jury's attention to fact that the petitioner had the opportunity to hear other witnesses

testify and to tailor his testimony, did not unlawfully burden his right to be present at trial, to be

confronted with witnesses, or to testify on his own behalf, and did not violate his right to due

process. Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 1120.

Because the prosecutor’s comments were not improper, defense counsel’s failure to object

was not error and Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice. 

10. Failure to cooperate with appellate counsel

Last, Petitioner claims defense counsel was ineffective in failing to cooperate with appellate

counsel. Specifically, he alleges defense counsel failed to timely turn over Petitioner’s file to

appellate counsel.

Petitioner submits no federal authority demonstrating counsel’s actions to constitute

ineffective assistance. In addition, he has failed to show prejudice. Appellate counsel timely filed an

opening brief on appeal, and the 5th DCA subsequently reversed Petitioner’s conviction on Count 9

and the true finding on Cal. Penal Code § 12022.3(a). See Exhibit C, Answer. Petitioner fails to

show how, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688.

11. Conclusion

In sum, Petitioner has not shown constitutional error as a result of any of defense counsel’s

alleged failures. Even if constitutional error can be shown, Petitioner has not shown the state court

rejection of the claim to be an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as

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determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or a decision based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The claim

must be denied. 

B. Ground Two

In his second ground for relief, Petitioner contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by

filing an amended information charging new and different offenses and recharging Petitioner with an

offense which was discharged at the preliminary examination. Petitioner further argues the

prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing in his closing that Petitioner had tailored his testimony.

A habeas petition will be granted for prosecutorial misconduct only when the misconduct “so

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 171 (1986), quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,

643 (1974); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 843 (9th Cir. 1995). To constitute a due process

violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be “of sufficient significance to result in the denial of

the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Greer v. Miller, 485 U.S. 756, 765 (1987), quoting United

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial - i.e., that absent

the alleged impropriety, the verdict probably would have been different.

As previously discussed, it was not improper in this case for the district attorney to charge

Petitioner with robbery of Twila (Count 8) despite the magistrate’s legal conclusion that there was

insufficient evidence to support the charge, because evidence was introduced which could test the

magistrate’s conclusion at trial. Under California law, “a magistrate's legal conclusion that ‘the

evidence failed to show probable cause that the offense had been committed’ can be challenged by

the district attorney by means of including additional charges in the information so long as that

challenge is made ‘within the context of the magistrate's findings on the evidence.’” People v.

Farley, 19 Cal.App.3d 215, 221 (1971), quoting Jones v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 660, 665-666

(1971), superceded by constitutional amendment on other grounds, Montez v. Superior Court, 285

Cal.Rptr. 279 (Cal.App.2d.1991). The magistrate did not make a specific factual determination as

Petitioner argues, only a legal conclusion based on the evidence. Farley, 19 Cal.App.3d at 221;

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Jones, 4 Cal.3d at 665-666.

With respect to the additional charges included in the amended information that were not

included in the original complaint, the prosecutor committed no misconduct. There was evidence

which showed Petitioner committed Counts 6 and 11, and the magistrate did not make a factual

determination to the contrary. In addition, the charges arose from the same transactions for which

Petitioner was ordered held. Therefore, the district attorney properly included the charges in the

First Amended Information.

Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing Petitioner tailored

his testimony during closing argument is also without merit. As previously discussed, the Supreme

Court held in Portuondo that a prosecutor's comments during summation, calling the jury's attention

to the fact that the petitioner had the opportunity to hear other witnesses testify and to tailor his

testimony, did not unlawfully burden his right to be present at trial, to be confronted with witnesses,

or to testify on his own behalf, and did not violate his right to due process. Portuondo, 529 U.S. at

1120.

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct which “so

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 171 (1986), quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,

643 (1974). The state court rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, nor did

the state court resolution result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The claim must be denied. 

C. Ground Three

In his last ground for relief, Petitioner contends his appellate counsel was ineffective in

failing to raise certain issues on appeal. In his traverse, Petitioner complains appellate counsel should

have raised “two Dead-Bang winning issues on appeal,” including: 1) the issue of the First Amended

Information; and 2) the issue of the prosecutor’s allegedly improper closing argument. Traverse at

21.

Effective assistance of appellate counsel is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the

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Fourteenth Amendment. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to Strickland 's two-pronged test. See, e.g.

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 

847 (9th Cir.1986). A defendant must therefore show that counsel's advice fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, defendant would have prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 & n. 9

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694; Birtle, 792 F.2d at 849). However, appellate counsel does

not have a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by defendant. Jones v.

Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983); Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 n. 10. The weeding out of weaker

issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. Id. at 1434

(footnote and citations omitted). As a result, appellate counsel will frequently remain above an

objective standard of competence and have caused her client no prejudice for the same

reason--because she declined to raise a weak issue. Id. 

Here, Petitioner complains appellate counsel failed to raise claims regarding the additional

charges in the amended information as well as the charge was dismissed by the magistrate from the

original complaint. As previously discussed, these claims are without merit. The district attorney did

not err in charging Petitioner in the First Amended Information, and defense counsel did not err in

failing to challenge the First Amended Information. Accordingly, appellate counsel did not err in

raising these same issues on appeal, and Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice.

Likewise, appellate counsel did not err in failing to challenge the prosecutor’s closing

argument. The prosecutor’s argument that Petitioner had tailored his testimony was not improper

under Supreme Court case law. In addition, Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice.

The state court rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, nor did the

state court resolution result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The claim must be denied. 

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 23

ORDER

Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. The Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent. All pending motions are DISMISSED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 21, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-05014-NEW Document 22 Filed 04/21/05 Page 23 of 23