Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-07180/USCOURTS-caDC-06-07180-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Bruce
Appellee
District of Columbia
Appellee
Juan Johnson
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 8, 2008 Decided June 20, 2008 

No. 06-7136 

JUAN JOHNSON, 

APPELLANT

v. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 

APPELLEE

______ 

CONSOLIDATED WITH 06-7180 

______ 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 02cv01452) 

Gregory L. Lattimer argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellant. 

William J. Earl, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, 

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were 

Linda J. Singer, Attorney General at the time the brief was 

filed, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General. Edward E. Schwab, 

Deputy Attorney General, entered an appearance. 

USCA Case #06-7180 Document #1122650 Filed: 06/20/2008 Page 1 of 17
2 

Before: GINSBURG and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Juan Johnson is a police officer 

whose off-duty act of kindness to a stranger in distress landed 

him in the middle of a drug bust in which he was repeatedly 

kicked in the groin by a police officer who mistook him for a 

criminal. Johnson claims he was a victim of police brutality 

and sues both the officer alleged to have kicked him and the 

District of Columbia. We consider whether the accused 

officer is entitled to qualified immunity, and whether a local 

statute displaces Johnson’s common law claims against the 

District. 

I. 

The following version of events, which we accept as true 

for purposes of this appeal, is based on Johnson’s account. On 

July 23, 2001, Johnson stepped outside his apartment building 

in southeast Washington, D.C. to check the mail. Except for a 

police identification badge worn around his neck, Johnson 

was dressed in civilian clothes that gave no indication he was 

an officer of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”). 

As Johnson was walking through the courtyard of his 

building, a stranger named Andre Clinton approached him 

and exclaimed that he was being chased by “stick-up boys.” 

Johnson helped Clinton get away from his pursuers by leading 

him through the locked back door of the apartment building. 

Once inside, Johnson told Clinton to wait downstairs while he 

went to his third-floor apartment to get him a glass of water. 

When Johnson came out of his apartment a moment later, he 

USCA Case #06-7180 Document #1122650 Filed: 06/20/2008 Page 2 of 17
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was surprised to see Clinton running up the stairs toward him 

with police officers giving chase. 

Clinton was not running from robbers but from the 

police, and Johnson had unwittingly aided his flight. Moments 

before, Clinton had sold drugs to an undercover officer and 

was now attempting to evade arrest. Officers monitoring 

Clinton’s escape mistook Johnson for an armed accomplice 

and broadcast a police radio report saying so. The officers 

rushing up the stairs had no idea that Johnson was an off-duty 

police officer not involved in the crime. To them, he was a 

potentially dangerous criminal. 

Leading the chase was Jeffrey Bruce, an MPD narcotics 

officer. Bruce and his colleagues entered the apartment 

building through the unlocked front door, charged up the 

stairs with guns drawn, and ordered Johnson and Clinton to 

put up their hands. Johnson, who was standing just outside his 

apartment, immediately complied and tried to signal to Bruce 

that he was a fellow police officer. When his signals failed, 

Johnson realized that he could not easily resolve this case of 

mistaken identity and feared that Bruce might shoot him in 

the face or chest. With his hands still raised, Johnson turned 

away from the gun and fell through the open doorway of his 

apartment, landing face-down on the floor. While Johnson 

was prone on the floor with his arms and legs spread, Bruce 

repeatedly kicked and stomped his groin and buttocks. 

Johnson protested, “What are you kicking me for? I’m the 

police. I’m the police. Why are you kicking me, why are you 

stomping me?” When the MPD identification badge around 

Johnson’s neck finally came into view, Bruce stopped kicking 

him. 

The next day, Johnson visited the Police and Fire Clinic 

complaining that Bruce’s kicking had caused him to pass 

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blood in his urine. Johnson was placed on “Performance of 

Duty” (“POD”) paid leave for his physical injuries under the 

Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act, D.C.

CODE § 5-701 et seq., from July 24, 2001 until the middle of 

August of that year.1 Johnson briefly returned to work but 

went back on paid leave when his psychological injuries from 

the kicking were also classified as POD. Johnson remained on 

paid leave until December 28, 2004, when MPD reclassified 

his psychological injuries as non-POD. He has since resumed 

working as an MPD officer. 

Johnson filed two complaints in the United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia, which were consolidated 

on July 20, 2005. In his complaint dated July 22, 2002, 

Johnson sued the District of Columbia for police brutality, 

assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (collectively, the “common law claims”). In his 

complaint dated June 8, 2004, Johnson sued Bruce in his 

individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a 

violation of his federal constitutional rights by use of 

excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the 

Fourth Amendment (“§ 1983 claim”).2 The district court had 

federal-question jurisdiction over Johnson’s § 1983 claim, 28 

U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over his 

common law claims, id. § 1367. 

In the course of discovery, Johnson and Bruce gave 

conflicting accounts of what happened. Bruce testified at his 

deposition that Johnson tried to escape by lunging into the 

 

1

 The parties agree that even though he was off-duty at the time of 

the incident, Johnson was eligible for POD leave because an officer 

is “always on duty, although periodically relieved from the routine 

performance of it.” D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 6A, § 200.4. 

2

 Johnson raised additional claims in his complaints, but we discuss 

only those before us on appeal. 

USCA Case #06-7180 Document #1122650 Filed: 06/20/2008 Page 4 of 17
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apartment and trying to crawl away, keeping his hands close 

to his body. Bruce claimed he then ran into the apartment 

after Johnson, holstered his weapon, and reached for 

Johnson’s arms, at which point Johnson produced his police 

badge and Bruce let him go. Bruce denied ever having kicked 

or stomped Johnson. 

Bruce and the District moved for summary judgment, 

which the district court granted as to all claims in a 

memorandum opinion and order of August 10, 2006. Johnson 

appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Arrington v. 

United States, 473 F.3d 329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

II. 

Johnson sued Bruce under § 1983 for seizing him with 

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.3 See 

U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure 

in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall 

not be violated . . . .”). Such a claim is “properly analyzed 

under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ 

standard,” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989), 

which tracks the constitutional text by asking “whether the 

force applied was reasonable,” Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 

1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Bruce responds that he is 

entitled to qualified immunity, a defense we evaluate under 

 

3

 “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

USCA Case #06-7180 Document #1122650 Filed: 06/20/2008 Page 5 of 17
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the two-step analysis set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 200–02 (2001). Under Saucier, we ask first whether the 

officer’s alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, the 

same question we ask to test the merits of Johnson’s § 1983 

claim. If the facts alleged do not establish a constitutional 

violation, we end the inquiry and rule for the officer. Int’l 

Action Ctr. v. United States, 365 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 

(Roberts, J.). If the facts alleged do establish that a 

constitutional right was violated, we go on to ask whether that 

right was “clearly established.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

The district court entered summary judgment against 

Johnson on his § 1983 claim after concluding that Bruce 

enjoyed qualified immunity. In the district court’s analysis, 

the seizure was objectively reasonable or, at worst, derogative 

of rights not yet “clearly established.” We will affirm a grant 

of summary judgment only if we are persuaded that “there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 

We look to the law that governs the claims asserted and the 

defenses interposed to determine which of the disputed facts 

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). We must view the alleged material facts in the 

light most favorable to the party resisting summary judgment, 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 

U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970), and we cannot make credibility 

determinations or weigh the evidence, Liberty Lobby, 477 

U.S. at 249, 255. 

Applying this standard, we reverse the judgment of the 

district court. Bruce was not entitled to qualified immunity 

against Johnson’s § 1983 claim at the summary judgment 

stage because their conflicting deposition testimony gives rise 

to genuine issues of fact material to both the § 1983 claim and 

USCA Case #06-7180 Document #1122650 Filed: 06/20/2008 Page 6 of 17
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the qualified immunity defense. We look to Saucier to 

determine the materiality of these factual issues. 

A. 

The first Saucier question asks, “Taken in the light most 

favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged 

show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” 

533 U.S. at 201. As noted above, we apply a standard of 

objective reasonableness to determine the constitutionality of 

Bruce’s alleged kicking under the Fourth Amendment. 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. To assess the reasonableness of a 

seizure, “[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the 

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 

against the importance of the governmental interests alleged 

to justify the intrusion.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 

703 (1983). In so doing, we must give “careful attention to the 

facts and circumstances of [the] particular case, including the 

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 

immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and 

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 

arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. As Judge Friendly 

famously wrote, “Not every push or shove, even if it may 

later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, 

violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Glick, 

481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). Although Judge Friendly 

was writing about the Due Process Clause, his reminder 

carries equal force in the Fourth Amendment context.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Judge Friendly’s Johnson 

v. Glick opinion in a Fourth Amendment excessive force 

case). We follow Judge Friendly’s lead in inquiring after 

“such factors as the need for the application of force, the 

relationship between the need and the amount of force that 

was used, [and] the extent of injury inflicted.” Johnson v. 

Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.

USCA Case #06-7180 Document #1122650 Filed: 06/20/2008 Page 7 of 17
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And so now we must, in Justice Scalia’s words, “slosh 

our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’ ” 

Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2007). Based on the 

police radio broadcast describing how Clinton and Johnson 

ran away from the police and into the apartment building, 

Bruce had reason to fear that Johnson was an armed 

accomplice to a fleeing drug dealer. Bruce gave chase, 

eventually cornering Clinton and Johnson on the third-floor 

landing of the apartment building. With gun drawn, Bruce 

ordered the suspects to put up their hands. Both complied. 

Johnson alleges that he raised his hands, turned toward the 

open door of his apartment, fell face-first to the floor, and 

spread his arms and legs in a manner announcing submission. 

Accepting Johnson’s allegation that he meant to surrender 

peacefully, we may assume for the purpose of deciding this 

appeal that Johnson acted in a submissive fashion. Such was 

the rapidly developing situation Bruce allegedly encountered: 

a potentially armed suspect surrenders to an officer who is 

pointing a gun at him, falls to the floor, and lies there on his 

belly with arms and legs spread. 

In this scenario, we are convinced that a reasonable 

officer would not have repeatedly kicked the surrendering 

suspect in the groin. We arrive at this conclusion by balancing 

the intrusion on Johnson’s Fourth Amendment interests 

against the governmental interests served by Bruce’s use of 

force. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 

703). We consider first the severity of the intrusion on 

Johnson’s “right . . . to be secure in [his] person[].” U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. Striking the groin is the classic example 

of fighting dirty. From the schoolyard scrapper to the 

champion prizefighter, no pugilist takes lightly the threat of a 

hit below the belt. What’s more, Bruce supposedly kicked a 

man while he was down, hard enough to produce bloody 

USCA Case #06-7180 Document #1122650 Filed: 06/20/2008 Page 8 of 17
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urine. Although the constable surely has authority to use 

physical force in effecting an arrest, there are gradations of 

appropriate violence. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–

12 (1985) (holding deadly force to be a disproportionate and 

unreasonable means of seizing a fleeing, non-dangerous 

felon); Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 331–33 

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding, in a case where suspect was 

punched, beaten with a baton, pistol-whipped, and attacked by 

a police dog, that such violence was “more force than was 

reasonably necessary” if the suspect had already been 

disarmed and handcuffed). A kick to the groin tends toward 

the vicious end of that scale. We have no trouble finding that 

Bruce’s repeated kicks to Johnson’s groin were a serious 

intrusion on his Fourth Amendment interests. 

Next, we consider the countervailing governmental 

interests. An officer in Bruce’s position has a legitimate and 

substantial interest in apprehending an armed suspect and 

protecting himself and the public from possible harm. 

Although these are weighty interests, it is not clear how 

kicking Johnson in the groin furthered either of them. The 

question is whether the specific police behavior at issue — 

here, repeatedly kicking a surrendering suspect in the groin — 

produces some law enforcement benefit that might outweigh 

the serious harm it causes. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 

648, 659 (1979) (“The question remains, however, whether in 

the service of these important ends the [method of seizure] is 

a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion 

upon Fourth Amendment interests which such [seizures] 

entail.”). At oral argument, counsel could not attest to the 

usefulness of kicking Johnson in the groin. Neither can we. 

This tips the balance toward illegality. Bruce’s alleged kick to 

the groin of a prone man, which caused great personal harm to 

Johnson without any corresponding public benefit, violated 

the Fourth Amendment. 

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B. 

“[I]f a violation could be made out on a favorable view of 

the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask 

whether the [constitutional] right was clearly established.” 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. An officer is “shielded from liability 

for civil damages insofar as [his] conduct does not violate 

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). We decide de novo whether 

Johnson’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from Bruce’s 

kicks to his groin was clearly established. Elder v. Holloway, 

510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). 

We begin by establishing the appropriate level of 

generality at which to analyze the right at issue. See, e.g., 

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999); Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987). It will not do to ask 

whether Johnson had a right to be secure in his person against 

unreasonable seizures. Instead, “[t]he relevant, dispositive 

inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is 

whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his 

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 

533 U.S. at 202. On the facts as we have them on appeal, the 

issue is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that 

kicking Johnson in the groin after he had surrendered and 

posed neither a risk of flight nor any danger was a lawful 

means of effecting a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. If 

Bruce’s use of force survives this test of “objective legal 

reasonableness,” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, then he is entitled 

to qualified immunity. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 

341 (1986) (noting that “if officers of reasonable competence 

could disagree on this issue, immunity should be 

recognized”); Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 760 

USCA Case #06-7180 Document #1122650 Filed: 06/20/2008 Page 10 of 17
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(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he proper inquiry here is whether the 

officers’ actions were so excessive that no reasonable officer 

on the scene could have believed that they were lawful.”). 

Coming as it does on the heels of our determination that 

the alleged kicking was unreasonable, our inquiry into legal

reasonableness may seem redundant. Cf. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 

209–17 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing 

“the duplication inherent in [Saucier’s] two-step scheme”). 

Despite the similarity of phrasing, the two Saucier

reasonableness questions are distinct though overlapping. 

Accordingly, Part II.A of this opinion asks whether it was 

reasonable for Bruce to kick Johnson’s groin, while Part II.B 

asks whether it was reasonable for Bruce not to know that it 

was unlawful to kick Johnson’s groin. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 

203–07 (majority opinion); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.

ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 

THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1129–30 & n.10 (5th ed. 2003) 

[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (explaining the distinction 

between the “reasonableness” inquiries). 

In determining whether officers strayed beyond clearly 

established bounds of lawfulness, we look to cases from the 

Supreme Court and this court, as well as to cases from other 

courts exhibiting a consensus view. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617. 

We need not identify cases with “materially similar” facts, but 

have only to show that “the state of the law [at the time of the 

incident] gave [the officer] fair warning that [his alleged 

misconduct] . . . was unconstitutional.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 

U.S. 730, 741 (2002). Bruce is not entitled to qualified 

immunity if the cases show that his kicking violated the 

Fourth Amendment, because “a reasonably competent public 

official should know the law governing his conduct.” Harlow, 

457 U.S. at 819. 

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Our review of the cases convinces us that Bruce’s alleged 

use of excessive force violated a clearly established rule: An 

officer’s act of violence violates the Fourth Amendment’s 

prohibition against unreasonable seizures if it furthers no 

governmental interest, such as apprehending a suspect or 

protecting an officer or the public. The cases show that 

officers will not prevail if their use of force cannot be justified 

under the circumstances. In Tennessee v. Garner, the 

Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the 

use of deadly force to seize a non-dangerous fleeing felon, 

noting that such force is not “a sufficiently productive means 

of accomplishing” law enforcement goals. 471 U.S. at 10. In 

DeGraff v. District of Columbia, we reversed a summary 

judgment grant for the police because it was unclear what 

legitimate interest could have been served by carrying a 

suspect horizontally through the air and handcuffing her to a 

mailbox. 120 F.3d 298, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

Even in cases where officers have prevailed, we have 

emphasized that the violence complained of was undertaken 

in pursuit of a legitimate end. In Scott v. District of Columbia, 

we found no Fourth Amendment violation where officers 

struck a suspect once and pinned him to the ground, because 

“[a]ll of the officers’ actions were reasonably calculated 

toward the goal of securing [the suspect] and placing him in 

handcuffs, while minimizing his opportunity to escape. 

Nothing in the record indicates that they used more force than 

reasonably appeared necessary to achieve that goal.” 101 F.3d 

748, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In Wardlaw v. Pickett, we ruled in 

favor of a U.S. Marshal who punched a suspect in the face 

and chest, because the Marshal had reason to fear an attack by 

the suspect and stopped punching “[o]nce [the suspect] sat 

down on the stairs and it became apparent that he was not 

going to attack.” 1 F.3d at 1304. In Martin v. Malhoyt, we 

ruled in favor of an officer who forced a driver to remain in 

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the driver’s seat and then closed the car door on the driver’s 

leg, because we concluded that this rough treatment protected 

the driver from oncoming traffic. 830 F.2d 237, 262 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.). 

The cases add up to the sensible proposition that a police 

officer must have some justification for the quantum of force 

he uses. This is not to say that the judicial role in determining 

what is “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment 

transforms every judge into a police chief. “The 

‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged 

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, 

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396, and we will “accord[] a measure of respect to the 

officer’s judgment about the quantum of force called for in a 

quickly developing situation,” Martin, 830 F.2d at 261. But as 

the cases clearly establish, the state may not perpetrate 

violence for its own sake. Force without reason is 

unreasonable.4

 

4

 That officers ought not to use more force than reasonably 

necessary to advance a governmental interest was also evident from 

local statutes and regulations. See D.C. CODE § 5-123.02 (“Any 

officer who uses unnecessary and wanton severity in arresting or 

imprisoning any person shall be deemed guilty of assault and 

battery, and, upon conviction, punished therefor.”); D.C. MUN.

REGS. tit. 6A, § 207.1 (“It is the policy of the Metropolitan Police 

Department that each member of the department shall in all cases 

use only the minimum amount of force which is consistent with the 

accomplishment of his or her mission . . . .”). While these materials 

support our conclusion that Bruce’s use of force violated clearly 

established law, we will not rely on them in light of conflicting 

Supreme Court decisions concerning the use of state law to 

determine what is clearly established law. See HART & WECHSLER, 

supra, at 1131 n.11 (noting conflict). Compare Davis v. Scherer, 

468 U.S. 183, 195–96 (1984) (rejecting suggestion that state 

regulation demarcated clearly established law), with Hope, 536 U.S. 

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* * * 

The district court erred in concluding that Bruce was 

entitled to qualified immunity. Summary judgment was 

premature because there exists a genuine issue of material 

fact, namely, whether Johnson’s prone position was 

threatening or suggested escape. That dispute can only be 

resolved by evaluating the conflicting testimony of Johnson 

and Bruce. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 209–17 (Ginsburg, J., 

concurring in the judgment) (“Of course, if an excessive force 

claim turns on which of two conflicting stories best captures 

what happened on the street, Graham will not permit 

summary judgment in favor of the defendant official.”); cf. 

Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L.

REV. 1897, 1907 n.57 (1998) (noting “the example that 

Professor Arthur Miller is reported to have used regularly in 

his 1-L Harvard Law School civil procedure class of an earlier 

time, that if a dozen Jesuit priests proffer identical testimony 

regarding a street fight they all observed, and one disreputable 

inebriate proffers contrary testimony, summary judgment is 

inappropriate”). We reverse the district court’s judgment as to 

Johnson’s § 1983 claim and remand the case for trial. 

Johnson is not home free. His victory on appeal comes 

from our having viewed the facts most favorably to him. Seen 

in that light, the facts are egregious. Once the finder of fact 

has established what really happened during the tense 

exchange between Bruce and Johnson, it will be possible to 

judge whether Bruce’s conduct was actually unlawful under 

the Fourth Amendment. If Johnson’s behavior was 

 

at 743–44 (treating state regulations as probative of clearly 

established law). The cases discussed in the text set forth a clear 

standard. We need look no further. 

USCA Case #06-7180 Document #1122650 Filed: 06/20/2008 Page 14 of 17
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threatening, then Bruce’s use of force may be regarded as a 

reasonable means of protecting himself against a possible 

attempt to retrieve a weapon. See Wardlaw, 1 F.3d at 1304. If 

Johnson appeared to flee, then Bruce’s use of force as a 

means of preventing escape may be regarded as reasonable in 

light of his suspicion that Johnson was an armed felon. See 

Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. These issues await resolution in the 

trial court. 

III. 

Johnson also presses various common law claims against 

the District of Columbia. The district court granted summary 

judgment for the District on these claims, concluding that the 

Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act 

(“PFRDA”) barred Johnson’s suit. On this point we affirm. 

The PFRDA is the exclusive remedy against the District 

for police officers injured while performing their duties. 

Feirson v. District of Columbia, 506 F.3d 1063, 1068 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007) (citing Lewis v. District of Columbia, 499 A.2d 

911, 915 (D.C. 1985)). This should end the inquiry. Johnson 

cannot pursue his common law claims against the District 

because his having been kicked is covered by the PFRDA. 

But Johnson makes two arguments for why the PFRDA does 

not apply. We reject them both. 

Johnson’s first argument proceeds in three steps. The 

PFRDA is similar to a workers’ compensation statute. In 

thirty-four states, the workers’ compensation statute is not the 

exclusive remedy for intentional torts committed by a coworker. See 6 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 

LAW § 111.03[1], at 111-8 (2002). Therefore, the PFRDA is 

not the exclusive remedy in this intentional tort case. 

Johnson’s argument breaks down once we look at the 

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District’s statutes. The Workers’ Compensation Act of 1979 

(“WCA”), D.C. CODE § 32-1501 et seq., covers only 

“accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of 

employment . . . and . . . injury caused by the willful act of 

third persons directed against an employee because of his 

employment.” Id. § 32-1501(12) (emphases added). Thus the 

statute excludes intentional torts of the employer, but the D.C. 

Court of Appeals has explained that the WCA does cover 

injuries intentionally caused by a co-worker: “From the 

perspective of the employer” such an “injury is still 

‘accidental’ and the employer is liable” under the WCA, but 

not in tort, “so long as the injury arose out of and occurred in 

the course of employment.” Grillo v. Nat’l Bank of Wash., 

540 A.2d 743, 748 (D.C. 1988); see also Tekle v. Foot Traffic, 

Inc., 699 A.2d 410, 414 (D.C. 1997). Because the PFRDA 

and the WCA are not identical, we doubt their coverage is. 

See Ray v. District of Columbia, 535 A.2d 868, 870 (D.C. 

1987) (noting that the PFRDA covers any injury incurred in 

the performance of duty); Mayberry v. Dukes, 742 A.2d 448, 

451 (D.C. 1999) (“[E]ven though the [PFRDA] and the WCA 

serve similar purposes, we cannot just ignore differences in 

the statutory language of the two acts.”). Even if their 

coverage were identical, however, in light of Grillo, Johnson 

could not sue the District for the intentional tort of one of its 

employees. Nor does Johnson’s brief allege any intentional 

wrongdoing by the District. Cf. Grillo, 540 A.2d at 748. 

Consequently Johnson’s argument fails surely at the first step, 

and almost surely at the second. 

Johnson’s next argument, which is somewhat confusing, 

tries to make much of a classification decision regarding 

psychological injuries he claims to have suffered from the 

kicking. MPD initially ruled these injuries POD and gave him 

paid leave. But a new Stress Protocol, which defines the sorts 

of psychological injuries covered under the PFRDA, led MPD 

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to reclassify the psychological injuries as non-POD. Johnson 

argues that the incident and the injury are so intertwined that 

reclassification of his psychological injuries as non-POD 

somehow removed the kicking altogether from the PFRDA’s 

coverage. 

MPD reclassified Johnson’s psychological injuries as 

non-POD under the Stress Protocol because they were not the 

direct result of a uniquely stressful event — the kicking — 

but were instead a consequence of stressors inherent to the 

law enforcement profession. Simply put, the kicking and the 

psychological injuries are not so intertwined as Johnson 

argues. Johnson suffered his kicking in the performance of 

duty and was compensated under the PFRDA for his resulting 

injuries regardless of whether he was also compensated under 

the PFRDA for job-related stress. Johnson cannot opt out of 

the PFRDA regime and head to court just because he is 

dissatisfied with the level of compensation provided. The 

PFRDA was Johnson’s exclusive source of remedies against 

the District, and the district court was correct to enter 

summary judgment against his common law claims. 

IV. 

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the 

district court’s judgment in favor of Bruce and remand for 

trial of Johnson’s § 1983 claim, and affirm the judgment in 

favor of the District as to Johnson’s common law claims. 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #06-7180 Document #1122650 Filed: 06/20/2008 Page 17 of 17