Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02090/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02090-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert C. Schulte
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2090

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri. 

Robert C. Schulte, *

*

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: December 15, 2005

Filed: February 2, 2006

___________

Before MELLOY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Robert Schulte pled guilty to one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1343, arising from a transaction for the purchase of real estate. At sentencing, the

district court imposed a sentence of 19 months’ imprisonment, and ordered Schulte

to pay restitution in the amount of $1,176,098.80, based on the loss caused by the

specific transaction involved in the offense of conviction, together with harm caused

by other real estate transactions that were part of the “scheme” that was an element of

the wire fraud offense to which Schulte pled guilty. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2).

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Schulte appeals only the district court’s restitution order, arguing that the

government failed to prove that the losses asserted were directly and proximately

caused by Schulte’s conduct as charged in the count to which he pled guilty. He

contends that the restitution order thus violates the Mandatory Victims Restitution

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, and the Sixth Amendment as construed in United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). The government moves to dismiss the appeal on the

ground that Schulte waived his right to appeal, and argues alternatively that the

restitution order was supported by sufficient evidence and consistent with the statute

and the Constitution. See United States v. Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2005).

We conclude that Schulte knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal

the restitution order, and that enforcement of the waiver would not result in a

miscarriage of justice that could make the agreement of the parties unenforceable. See

United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The plea

agreement signed by Schulte and the government provides in pertinent part that:

[B]oth the defendant and the government hereby waive all

rights to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues including, but

not limited to: any issues relating to pre-trial motions,

hearings and discovery; any issues relating to the

negotiation, taking or acceptance of the guilty plea or the

factual basis for the plea; and, whatever sentence is

imposed, any issues relating to the establishment of the

Total Offense Level or Criminal History Category

determined by the Court, except that the parties reserve the

right to appeal from any Chapter 5 upward or downward

departure from the Guidelines range if such departure is not

agreed to in this document.

(R. at 60-61) (emphasis added).

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This appeal waiver clearly extends to “all non-jurisdictional issues,” not merely

to certain matters relating to “whatever sentence is imposed,” as Schulte asserts. An

appeal of issues relating to the Total Offense Level or Criminal History Category are

matters “includ[ed]” within the scope of the waiver, but to which the waiver is “not

limited.” This meaning was reinforced during the change-of-plea hearing, at which

time the district court confirmed Schulte’s understanding that he “reserve[d] the right

to appeal based on claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of

counsel,” but “[o]ther than those reserved rights, all of your other appellate rights are

waived.” (Tr. at 35). A waiver limited to “whatever sentence is imposed” does not

foreclose an appeal of a restitution order under our precedent, United States v.

Sistrunk, 432 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir. 2006), but a waiver, like this one, that includes

all issues except jurisdiction does encompass restitution. United States v. Greger, 98

F.3d 1080, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 1996); accord United States v. Glynn, 149 Fed. Appx.

322, 323 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (unpublished). Accordingly, we conclude that

Schulte knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal the district court’s

restitution order.

To the extent Greger does not already answer the question, we also hold that

enforcement of the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. See Andis, 333

F.3d at 891-92. While we did say in Andis that an “illegal sentence” could be a

“miscarriage of justice,” we emphasized that the exception to general enforceability

of appeal waivers was “extremely narrow” and that “[a]ny sentence imposed within

the statutory range is not subject to appeal.” Id. at 892. We established in this circuit

that not every action that is contrary to law or in excess of the district court’s statutory

authority constitutes an “illegal sentence” that avoids an appeal waiver. An improper

application of the mandatory guidelines, for example, was not a sufficient basis to

invalidate a knowing and voluntary appeal waiver, id., even though the district court

in that scenario would have imposed an “illegal” sentence unauthorized by the

Sentencing Reform Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2004).

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The concept of an “illegal sentence” may not apply neatly to restitution orders,

as “they are not in the nature of a criminal penalty,” Carruth, 418 F.3d at 904 (internal

quotation omitted), but the focus of Andis on a statutory range nonetheless informs our

consideration of what constitutes a “miscarriage of justice” for these purposes.

Restitution orders “are not subject to any prescribed statutory maximum,” id., so a

challenge to a restitution order based on sufficiency of the evidence does not implicate

the sort of “illegality” that we said in Andis might justify voiding a voluntary

agreement between the parties. See also United States v. Reynolds, 432 F.3d 821,

823-24 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Enforcing the waiver [of a Booker claim] will not result in

a miscarriage of justice as Reynolds’s sentence is within the statutory range authorized

for the offense of conviction.”); but cf. United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1076

(9th Cir. 1999);United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1147 (4th Cir. 1995).

If a defendant sentenced erroneously to a lengthy term of imprisonment that was

within the statutory range but well beyond that authorized by the former mandatory

guidelines could not establish a miscarriage of justice, then we think it would be

anomalous to hold that a defendant challenging an order to pay a monetary sum could

on that basis avoid an appeal waiver to which he knowingly and voluntarily agreed.

If we refused to enforce this appeal waiver, moreover, we would render meaningless

the holding in Greger, which enforced the waiver of an appeal asserting that

restitution was imposed in violation of statute. 98 F.3d at 1081.

For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

 ______________________________

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