Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-05024/USCOURTS-ca10-16-05024-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Manuel Bonilla
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

MANUEL BONILLA, 

a/k/a Carlos Contreras, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-5024 

(D.C. Nos. 4:11-CV-00572-CVE-TLW & 

4:08-CR-00051-CVE-1) 

(N.D. Okla.)

 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

 

Before LUCERO, EBEL, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Manuel Bonilla, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate 

of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s decision construing his 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as an unauthorized second or successive 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 motion and dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction. We deny a COA and 

dismiss this matter. 

 In 2010, Mr. Bonilla pleaded guilty to two counts from a thirteen-count third 

superseding indictment: one count of participating in a continuing criminal 

 

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 22, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 16-5024 Document: 01019661099 Date Filed: 07/22/2016 Page: 1 
- 2 - 

enterprise and one count of participating in a conspiracy to possess and distribute 

cocaine, marijuana and methamphetamine. He also pleaded guilty to a charge of 

money laundering from a separate information. He was sentenced to 293 months’ 

imprisonment. 

 Mr. Bonilla filed a direct appeal, but the government moved to enforce the 

appeal waiver in his plea agreement. Mr. Bonilla sought to raise a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel in the negotiation of his plea agreement. We 

granted the motion to enforce and dismissed the appeal, noting that the dismissal was 

without prejudice to Mr. Bonilla raising his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in 

a collateral proceeding. See United States v. Bonilla, 394 F. App’x 500, 502 

(10th Cir. 2010). 

 In 2011, Mr. Bonilla filed a § 2255 motion. The district court denied the 

motion and Mr. Bonilla did not seek a certificate of appealability. 

 In 2016, Mr. Bonilla filed a motion seeking relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b)(6). The district court concluded that the 60(b) motion constituted an attempt to 

file second or successive § 2255 motion without prior authorization and dismissed 

the motion for lack of jurisdiction. 

 Mr. Bonilla now seeks a COA to appeal from that decision. To obtain a COA, 

he must show that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court 

was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Appellate Case: 16-5024 Document: 01019661099 Date Filed: 07/22/2016 Page: 2 
- 3 - 

 A prisoner may not file a second or successive § 2255 motion unless he first 

obtains an order from the circuit court authorizing the district court to consider the 

motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); id. § 2255(h). Absent such authorization, a 

district court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of a second or successive § 2255 

motion. In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 

 A 60(b) motion should be treated as a second or successive § 2255 motion “if 

it in substance or effect asserts or reasserts a federal basis for relief from the 

petitioner’s underlying conviction.” Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1215 

(10th Cir. 2006). A 60(b) motion may not be treated as a successive § 2255 motion if 

it “challenges a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding,” as long as 

“such a challenge does not itself lead inextricably to a merits-based attack on the 

disposition of a prior habeas petition.” Id. at 1216. 

 In his initial § 2255 motion, Mr. Bonilla raised claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel and claims challenging the validity of his plea agreement. He also 

requested that the district court hold an evidentiary hearing on his claims. In his 

60(b) motion, Mr. Bonilla argued that the district court’s order denying his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea and its order denying his § 2255 motion should be vacated. 

He again challenged the validity of his guilty plea and asserted that the district court 

erred in not granting him an evidentiary hearing. 

 In his COA application, Mr. Bonilla asserts that the district court erred by 

failing to grant him an evidentiary hearing on the government’s alleged breach of the 

Appellate Case: 16-5024 Document: 01019661099 Date Filed: 07/22/2016 Page: 3 
- 4 - 

plea agreement and he argues that this is a procedural defect that was properly raised 

in his 60(b) motion. We are not persuaded by Mr. Bonilla’s argument. 

 In our decision in In re Lindsey, 582 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2009), we addressed 

a similar argument. In Lindsey, the movant filed a 60(b) motion in which he argued 

that the district court erred in deciding his § 2255 motion without granting him an 

evidentiary hearing. The district court transferred his 60(b) motion to this court after 

concluding that it constituted an unauthorized second or successive motion. The 

movant filed a motion for remand, arguing that he was challenging the integrity of 

the federal proceedings and therefore his motion did not require authorization. We 

disagreed. 

 As we explained, the movant’s motion fell into neither of the categories of 

Rule 60(b) arguments that would not require authorization. “The first type of Rule 

60(b) assertion that does not require authorization is one challenging a procedural 

ruling . . . which precluded a merits determination.” Lindsey, 582 F.3d at 1175 

(internal quotation marks omitted). We then explained that “the district court’s 

decision not to hold an evidentiary did not preclude a merits determination on 

[movant’s] § 2255 motion; it was the result of a merits determination.” Id. 

 That same reasoning holds true here because the district court denied the 

request for a hearing after deciding that Mr. Bonilla had not raised any meritorious 

claims. As the district court explained: “Defendant requests an evidentiary hearing 

on his § 2255 motion, but he has not asserted a colorable claim for relief. Thus, the 

Appellate Case: 16-5024 Document: 01019661099 Date Filed: 07/22/2016 Page: 4 
- 5 - 

record conclusively shows that defendant is entitled to no relief and the Court is not 

required to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying defendant’s § 2255 motion.” 

Supp. R., Vol. I at 98. 

 “The second type of Rule 60(b) argument that does not require authorization is 

a challenge to a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding, provided that 

such a challenge does not itself lead inextricably to a merits-based attack on the 

disposition of a prior habeas petition.” Lindsey, 582 F.3d at 1175 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). But, as was the case in Lindsey, Mr. Bonilla’s 60(b) motion “does 

lead inextricably to a merits-based attack” because “[t]here could be no error in 

denying an evidentiary hearing unless the district court made an incorrect merits 

determination.” Id. at 1176. “It follows that to argue that the court erred in denying 

an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion, the prisoner generally has to be attacking 

the district court’s analysis of the merits.” Id. 

 Mr. Bonilla’s 60(b) motion “in substance or effect asserts or reasserts a federal 

basis for relief from [his] underlying conviction.” Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1215. 

Reasonable jurists could therefore not debate that the district court was correct in its 

procedural ruling to treat Mr. Bonilla’s 60(b) motion as an unauthorized second or 

successive § 2255 motion and dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we 

deny a COA and dismiss this matter. 

 We have addressed Mr. Bonilla’s Motion for a COA without requiring the 

ordinary prepayment of costs and fees. Thus, we have granted his motion to proceed 

Appellate Case: 16-5024 Document: 01019661099 Date Filed: 07/22/2016 Page: 5 
- 6 - 

without prepayment of costs and fees. Granting that motion, however, does not 

excuse Mr. Bonilla’s obligation ultimately to pay all filing and docketing fees 

associated with this appeal. It only postponed his obligation to pay those appellate 

costs and fees until after the Tenth Circuit has ruled on the merits of his motion, 

which we have now done. The purpose of this deferral of time for payment of costs 

and fees is to ensure that indigent defendants can have the merits of their appeal 

considered. It is not the purpose of the deferral, however, to relieve an indigent 

appellant of the ultimate obligation to pay appellate fees and costs as is required of 

all appellants. 

 Thus, even though we have now decided on the merits that Mr. Bonilla is not 

entitled to a COA, which means he cannot continue with this appeal, he remains 

obligated ultimately to pay the required filing and docketing fees connected with his 

appeal. The amount due is $505.00. Payment shall be made to the Clerk of the 

District Court at 333 W. 4th St. #411, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 74103. Mr. Bonilla has the 

option to contact the Clerk of the District Court to arrange for a payment schedule 

Entered for the Court 

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk 

Appellate Case: 16-5024 Document: 01019661099 Date Filed: 07/22/2016 Page: 6