Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-13-04424/USCOURTS-ca3-13-04424-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia
Appellee
Angelina Tillman
Appellant

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 13-4424

____________

ANGELINA TILLMAN,

 Appellant

v.

REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-12-cv-01505)

District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly

____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 15, 2015

Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA and BARRY, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: January 23, 2015)

____________

OPINION*

____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Angelina Tillman appeals the District Court’s summary judgment denying her 

claim of unlawful age discrimination. We will affirm.

 

*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 

not constitute binding precedent.

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I

We review the facts in the light most favorable to Tillman, Hersh v. Allen Prods. 

Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1986), and we will affirm a summary judgment only if a 

rational juror could not find for her, Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 143 F.3d 

120, 129 (3d Cir. 1998).

A

In July 2007, Tillman, who was then 57 years old, was hired by the Philadelphia 

Redevelopment Authority as a real estate specialist. Tillman and the Authority’s other 

non-management employees were represented by Local 1971 of the American Federation 

of State, County and Municipal Employees and relations between the Authority and the 

Union were governed by a collective bargaining agreement. The CBA stated that, in the 

event of layoffs, junior employees would generally be terminated first. This rule did not 

apply, however, to the Union’s president, a set number of stewards, and three union 

officers, who were granted “superseniority” status. The CBA also specified that “the 

EMPLOYER shall have the right to rely on the last list of appointments of UNION 

officials submitted by the UNION.” App. 297.

In early 2010, Tillman was appointed to the Union’s executive board. The Union 

notified the Authority of this fact in February 2010 but did not provide a formal list of its 

officials until June 20, 2011. Shortly after, the Authority informed the Union that it would 

be laying off Tillman and several other employees. 

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In response, the Union president told the Authority’s deputy executive director of 

operations, David Thomas, that Tillman could not be fired because she was an executive 

board member with superseniority. Thomas countered that executive board members were 

not “officers” with superseniority and that, in any event, Tillman was not entitled to 

superseniority because the Union had failed to provide an updated list of its officers. 

Tillman, who was 61 years old at this point, was subsequently let go, while the 

Authority’s other real estate specialist, Irma Gonzalez-Bowie, was retained. GonzalezBowie was 50 years old and had worked at the Authority for 29 years, compared to 

Tillman’s four years.1 Gonzalez-Bowie did not have superseniority status.

B

In March 2012, Tillman sued the Authority, claiming unlawful age discrimination, 

in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), and unlawful employment practice, in violation of 

43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955(a). The Authority moved for summary judgment and the District 

Court granted the motion, finding that Tillman had failed to establish a prima facie case 

of age discrimination. Tillman now appeals.2

II

 

1 Tillman returned to the Authority in December 2012. She now works in its 

Residential Services Department as a property management coordinator. 

2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 

summary judgment. Callison v. City of Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005).

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Under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis, a plaintiff must first 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To do so, she must show that she (1) belongs to a protected class; 

(2) was qualified for the position held; (3) suffered adverse employment action; and (4) 

was replaced by someone “sufficiently younger,” raising the inference of age 

discrimination. Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 249 (3d Cir. 2002).

Tillman argues that there is sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact 

regarding whether the Authority’s retention of Gonzalez-Bowie raised the inference of 

age discrimination. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). She asserts that her executive board position 

gave her superseniority and that Gonzalez-Bowie was “significantly younger.” Tillman 

Br. 11–12 (emphasis added). In Tillman’s view, the Authority’s failure to recognize her 

superseniority status “was the result of Thomas’s animosity toward older individuals.” Id. 

at 12. Tillman seems to base this claim on David Thomas’s inquiry about her age during 

an exit interview, id. at 13, and allegations that Thomas said that another employee was 

“too old, he’s been here too long, his knowledge and stuff is, you know, out of date,” id. 

at 7 (quoting App. 384), 14–15. Tillman argues that, based on this evidence, a reasonable 

juror could infer age discrimination. She faults the District Court, moreover, for failing to 

draw justifiable inferences in her favor. 

We are unpersuaded. Tillman’s claim that she suffered age discrimination is 

unsubstantiated. The record shows that Thomas asked Tillman’s age after she had already 

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been laid off in order to determine when she could begin to receive Medicare benefits. 

Tillman leans heavily on Potence v. Hazleton Area School District, where we declined to 

overturn a jury’s verdict that an employer’s explicit instruction not to hire any more “old 

plumbers,” among other things, constituted age discrimination. 357 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 

2004). Here, however, we have merely a passing comment that another employee—in 

another context—was “too old” for a promotion. We also note that, at the time Tillman 

was let go, Gonzalez-Bowie was 50 years old and had worked at the Authority 25 years 

longer than Tillman.

Finally, Tillman argues that the Authority’s refusal to recognize her superseniority 

is a factual matter to be resolved by the jury. But even if a jury found that she had 

superseniority, Tillman has provided nothing more than speculation that the Authority’s 

failure to recognize that status was linked to ageist animus. And mere speculation does 

not suffice.

III

The record shows that Tillman failed to establish a prima facie case of age 

discrimination.3 Accordingly, the District Court’s summary judgment will be affirmed.

 

3 Because we agree with the District Court that Tillman has failed to establish a 

prima facie case of age discrimination, we need not say more. Nevertheless, we have 

reviewed the District Court’s alternative holding that Tillman could not establish pretext 

and find no error there either.

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