Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00786/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00786-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Horel
Respondent
Leslie James Jones
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESLIE JAMES JONES,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT HOREL, WARDEN,

Respondent.

 /

1: 06 CV 00786 WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 15]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. Pending before the court is Respondent’s

motion to dismiss.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 11, 1996, Petitioner was convicted in Stanislaus County Superior Court of

assault with a deadly weapon and three counts of robbery. A number of sentencing enhancements

were found true. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a determinate state prison term of twenty-one

years. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.

On May 22, 1998, in response to Petitioner’s request to clarify custody credits, the abstract of

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judgment was amended to reflect credit entitlements. Again, Petitioner did not appeal.

Petitioner subsequently filed seven pro se post-conviction collateral challenges to his

conviction. The first of these was filed in the California Court of Appeal on March 24, 2000.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Stanislaus 

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

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involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that it is barred by the applicable

statute of limitations. Petitioner opposes the motion. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition

and any exhibits annexed to it that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases state that “an alleged

failure to exhaust state remedies may be raised by the Attorney General, thus avoiding the necessity

of a formal answer as to that ground.” The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to

dismiss as a request for the court to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. See,

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e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. th

1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases and case law, the court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss

pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244, subdivision

(d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In this case, an amended abstract of judgment was issued May 22, 1998. As Respondent

contends, the state appeal process became “final” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(A), when the

time for filing an appeal expired sixty days later, on July 21, 1998. Cal. Rules of Court, rule

8.104(a). The statute of limitations therefore began running the following day, July 22, 1998. See

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9 Cir. 2001)(citing Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 6(a)). Thus, absent th

any time for tolling, the statute of limitations expired one year later on July 21, 1999.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the statute of limitations would be tolled during the

pendency of a properly filed application for State post-conviction relief. However, in this case,

Petitioner did not file a state petition for post-conviction relief until March 24, 2002, after the statute

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of limitations expired on July 21, 1999. Because the limitations period had already expired, the

collateral challenge had no tolling consequence. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th

Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also

Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354

(N.D.Cal.2002). Thus, absent equitable tolling, this petition is untimely. 

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 th

F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60, 139 (1997); Calderon v. th

United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1288 (9 Cir.), overruled in part on other grounds th

by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9 Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that th

"[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if

'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir.1999), citing Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541; Beeler, 128 F.3d at th

1288-1289.

In this case, the court’s review of the petition reveals no basis for equitable tolling and

Petitioner does not make an argument for equitable tolling in his opposition to the motion to dismiss.

The court therefore finds no basis for equitable tolling in this case.

In his opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner contends that the decisions in

Cunningham v. California, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007); Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S.Ct. 2546 (2006);

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); and

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), entitle him to a watershed rule. This contention lacks

merit. Neither Apprendi nor its progeny Blakely apply retroactively. See United States v. Cruz, 423

F.3d 1119 (9 Cir. 2005). The court agrees with Respondent that Crawford did not announce a new th

“watershed rule” of criminal procedure that could be applied retroactively on collateral review to

cases already final on direct review, and that neither Cunningham nor Washington v. Recuenco

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changed this result. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to by-pass the statute of limitations to

bring a claim based on this line of cases. 

In light of the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows;

1) pursuant to Respondent’s request, the Clerk of the Court is directed to substitute D. K. Sisto

as the Respondent in this action;

2) Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED:

3) this petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED as barred by the statute of limitations;

4) the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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