Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-12038/USCOURTS-ca11-15-12038-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Union City, Georgia
Appellee
Jason Jordan
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-12038

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-02960-AT

JASON JORDAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF UNION CITY, GEORGIA, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(March 23, 2016)

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Jason Jordan appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of the City of Union City, Georgia, (“Union City”) in his employment 

USCA11 Case: 15-12038 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 1 of 12
2

discrimination lawsuit filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. Jordan, who has been diagnosed with 

generalized anxiety disorder, cyclothymic disorder (a mood disorder), and panic 

disorder, was a probationary police officer with the Union City Police Department. 

He was fired following a series of events on duty during which Jordan experienced

heightened levels of anxiety causing another officer to believe Jordan needed 

immediate medical attention. Following his termination, Jordan brought this 

action under the ADA, alleging he was wrongly fired on the basis of disability. 

The district court granted summary judgment to Union City, concluding that 

Jordan was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA because he failed to show 

that he could perform the essential functions of the police-officer position while 

attempting to mitigate the effects of an anxiety attack. On appeal, Jordan argues

that summary judgment was inappropriate because evidence of his qualifications 

and of the effects of his anxiety was in dispute. After careful review, we affirm the 

district court.

I.

After successfully completing the police academy, Jason Jordan joined 

Union City in early October 2012 as a probationary parole officer.1

 As part of a 

 1 In reviewing whether summary judgment was appropriate, we present the facts in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party, Jordan, construing all reasonable inferences in his 

favor. Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2013).

USCA11 Case: 15-12038 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 2 of 12
3

six-month probationary period, new officers must complete the Field Training 

Officer Program (“FTO Program”) by riding with a field training officer for at least 

sixty days. The FTO Program is designed to train officers on the City’s policies 

and procedures, the law, responding to 911 calls, and initiating activity in the field.

Jordan completed the first part of this training with two supervisory officers, 

Marquis Grant and Walker Heard, on “morning watch” (midnight to 8:00 a.m.). 

Grant and Heard evaluated Jordan’s performance through Daily Observation 

Reports (“DORs”), which were submitted to Captain Eugene Tate, who oversaw 

the training program. Of the 549 numeric scores Jordan received on the DORs, 

491 (88%) were a 3 or 4 (out of 5), indicating largely satisfactory or positive

performance reviews. Heard testified that Jordan did a “very good job” as a new 

police officer. While training with Grant and Heard, Jordan disarmed a man in 

possession of a firearm after a traffic stop, attempted to pursue fleeing suspects 

into a wooded area after a high speed chase, and took charge of a situation at an 

apartment complex, arresting three male suspects and taking them into custody. 

In mid-November 2012, Jordan began training with another supervisory 

officer, Travis Crawl, on “evening watch” (4:00 p.m. to midnight). A few days 

into the new assignment, Jordan and Crawl were dispatched to a call on Raymond 

USCA11 Case: 15-12038 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 3 of 12
4

Drive.2 When Jordan arrived at the call, he saw a large man standing on the front 

porch. The man was yelling and appeared to have a gun in his hand. Jordan ran to 

cover at an oak tree at some distance from the front of the house in order to 

investigate what was actually happening. Once Crawl ran past him, Jordan 

realized that the person on the porch was a police officer. Jordan then ran to the

porch and arrived there at nearly the same time as Crawl. When Jordan reached 

the porch, he assisted in detaining the individual they were there to detain—who 

was already on the ground but was resisting—by holding him down while other 

officers handcuffed him. 

After the call, Crawl told Jordan he was disappointed that Jordan did not run 

up and get right in the action. Crawl accused Jordan of hiding behind the tree and 

raised his voice while talking to Jordan about the situation. While talking with 

Crawl, Jordan’s anxiety became elevated and he “choked up.” Crawl asked Jordan 

if he was okay. Jordan replied that he was fine and that his feelings were 

consistent with anxiety “episodes” or “attacks”3 that he had had in the past. Crawl 

asked if Jordan needed an ambulance. Jordan responded that he did not, but Crawl 

told him that he was taking him to the fire station to get him evaluated. 

 2 The details of this event are heavily disputed by the parties. We credit Jordan’s version 

of events as derived from his deposition testimony. See Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 

(11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[W]hen conflicts arise between the facts evidenced by the parties, 

we credit the nonmoving party’s version.”) (emphasis omitted). 3 Jordan used the term “anxiety episode,” but he indicated in his deposition testimony that 

this term was synonymous with “anxiety attack” or “panic attack.”

USCA11 Case: 15-12038 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 4 of 12
5

Around this time, Crawl and Jordan were dispatched to a shots-fired call. 

Crawl diverted from the shots-fired call and took Jordan to the fire station for 

evaluation instead. After the EMS evaluated Jordan and informed him that he was 

“okay,” Crawl told Jordan to have someone to pick him up so that he could go 

home for the day and that Jordan would meet with Captain Tate the next morning. 

Crawl also took Jordan’s weapon, explaining that Tate had told him it was standard 

operating procedure to take a weapon if someone had a “mental condition or 

episode.” 

The following day, Jordan met with Captain Tate. After some discussion of 

the events the previous day, Captain Tate told Jordan that he would be fired that 

day unless he resigned. The captain told Jordan,

I think you have anxiety issues because I’ve done a little 

investigating of my own and it’s not the first time that 

that’s happened. You had a situation that happened at the 

Academy that supposedly a thunderstorm came through 

[and] they had to call an ambulance for you. You’ve got 

some anxiety issues that you need to deal with . . . . It’s 

not going to be here.

Jordan chose to resign under threat of firing. 

II.

After filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission, Jordan filed suit against Union City in federal district 

court under the ADA, alleging that he had been discriminated against on the basis 

USCA11 Case: 15-12038 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 5 of 12
6

of disability. Jordan claimed that he was fired because Captain Tate regarded him 

as disabled, not that he was in fact disabled. 

Despite ruling in his favor on several disputes, the district court ultimately 

concluded that Jordan had not shown he could perform the essential functions of 

the police-officer position, such as handling high-stress and emergency situations 

in a cool, calm, and collected manner. The court found that Jordan’s 

“unpredictable, unpreventable, uncontrollable” anxiety attacks could cause him to 

be temporarily unable to “handle high-stress situations while attempting to mitigate 

the effects of an anxiety attack.” Consequently, the district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Union City. Jordan now appeals. 

III.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, viewing the 

evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 

Brooks v. Cty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1161-62 (11th Cir. 

2006). Where there is a conflict in the evidence, we resolve all reasonable doubts 

about the facts in favor of Jordan, the non-moving party. See Feliciano v. City of 

Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2013). “The court shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine factual dispute exists if a reasonable jury could return a 

USCA11 Case: 15-12038 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 6 of 12
7

verdict for the non-moving party. Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 

1085 (11th Cir. 2004). 

IV.

Jordan contends that there are material issues of fact regarding his 

qualifications for the police-officer position that preclude entry of summary 

judgment. He contends that the court improperly relied on Captain Tate’s 

subjective evaluation of Jordan, which was based on disputed factual events, and 

that the court’s construction of the evidence regarding Jordan’s training was not 

the only reasonable one. Further, Jordan argues, while his anxiety issues affected

his ability to manage stress “to some unspecified degree,” that “does not equate to 

being physically incapable of reacting and responding appropriately under stressful

or dangerous circumstances.” 

The ADA prohibits discrimination by an employer “against a qualified 

individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . discharge of employees” and 

any of the “terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(a). To proceed under the ADA, “a plaintiff must show that, at the time of 

the adverse employment action, he had a disability, he was a qualified individual, 

and he was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of his disability.” 

Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014). 

“Disability” under the ADA can be shown in three ways: (a) having a physical or 

USCA11 Case: 15-12038 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 7 of 12
8

mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; (b) having a 

record of such an impairment; and (3) being regarded as having such an 

impairment.4

 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).

A “qualified individual” is someone with a disability, who “with or without 

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of the job.5 42 

U.S.C. § 12111(8). Essential functions, in turn, are “fundamental job duties of a 

position that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.” Earl 

v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000); see 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1630.2(n)(1). We evaluate whether a function is “essential” on a case-by-case 

basis, considering several factors. Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 

1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) (listing factors to 

consider). The ADA directs courts to consider “the employer’s judgment as to 

what functions of a job are essential,” such as the employer’s written description 

for the job. Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305; see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1630.2(n)(3) (listing sources of evidence). We also look to the testimony of the 

 4 Congress has directed that the ADA “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of 

individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). Construing the 

ADA broadly, we agree with the district court that a reasonable jury could conclude that Captain 

Tate regarded Jordan as having a disability based on Captain Tate’s deposition testimony and his 

comments to Jordan. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (a plaintiff is “regarded as” having a 

disability if he can establish that he “has been subjected to an action prohibited under [the ADA] 

because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment 

limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”). 

5 We note that Jordan did not request a reasonable accommodation from Union City, nor 

would a reasonable accommodation be available to him based solely on a “regarded as” theory of 

disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h). 

USCA11 Case: 15-12038 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 8 of 12
9

plaintiff’s supervisor, among other factors. Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 

F.3d 1247, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2007). 

The essential functions of the police-officer position are not in dispute. 

These functions, which are derived from Union City’s written description of the 

position and from Captain Tate’s testimony, include the ability to exercise sound,

independent judgment in emergency or stressful situations and to react quickly and 

calmly in emergencies. The job description further states that officers may be 

exposed to dangerous and life-threatening situations and that they must be mentally 

and physically capable of using deadly force, if justified. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jordan and resolving all 

factual disputes in his favor, we conclude that the district court properly granted 

summary judgment to Union City.

6

 Jordan’s deposition testimony regarding his 

condition establishes that Jordan’s condition affected his ability to process and 

manage stress. In addition, Jordan testified that his condition could and did impact 

his breathing, blood pressure, heart rate, and adrenal fatigue. 

 6 Our review of the district court’s decision indicates that the court carefully relied on 

only those facts as to which no dispute existed, such as Jordan’s deposition testimony regarding 

his condition. But even had the court relied on disputed facts or a certain construction of the 

evidence, we are not bound by the district court’s determination of the facts for summaryjudgment purposes and may determine those facts ourselves. Feliciano, 707 F.3d at 1252 n.5

(“[O]n de novo review of a summary judgment ruling, we may not only affirm on any ground 

supported by the record, but may also choose to disregard a district court’s determination of the 

facts for summary judgment purposes and determine those facts ourselves.”).

USCA11 Case: 15-12038 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 9 of 12
10

Jordan explained that his anxiety episodes were also unpredictable. He 

testified that about once a month, he would experience a couple of episodes 

together and then none for a while. The episodes were not necessarily triggered by 

events, but events could stimulate his anxiety. As Jordan related, his anxiety 

episodes were unpreventable and largely uncontrollable. Jordan testified that he 

had learned various techniques over the years to control the anxiety, such as 

various breathing techniques, pinching his thumbs, and reassuring himself that he 

was not dying. However, he also stated that it was an “ongoing process” and that 

the coping techniques did not prevent episodes from occurring. See Jordan Dep. at 

47, 80 (“I think when the episode is going to come, it’s going to come.”). Rather, 

the coping techniques kept the anxiety from getting worse. Id. at 47-48 (“Don’t 

get me wrong, I can’t control the feeling. I can’t control the anxiety. I can just 

keep it from getting worse.”). Moreover, coping with an anxiety episode affected 

his ability to concentrate. Jordan had sought medical treatment because of an 

episode on four occasions since his first episode in 2007. 

In light of this undisputed evidence, we conclude that district court properly 

found no genuine issue of material fact regarding Jordan’s ability to react quickly 

and calmly in high-stress and potentially life-threatening situations while 

experiencing and trying to mitigate the effects of an anxiety episode. “[B]eing 

prepared to respond to unexpected events is, in part, precisely what defines a police 

USCA11 Case: 15-12038 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 10 of 12
11

officer or detective,” Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522, 1258 

(11th Cir. 1997), and Jordan’s testimony reflects the possibility that he was likely 

to have unpredictable and unpreventable anxiety episodes while on duty that would 

affect his ability to process and manage stress and impact his breathing, blood 

pressure, heart rate, and adrenal fatigue. And even aside from the physiological 

effects of his condition, coping with an anxiety episode so as to prevent it from 

getting worse necessarily would require Jordan to divert some of his focus away 

from his external circumstances, clearly affecting his ability to respond quickly and 

calmly in dangerous and potentially life-threatening situations. While the record 

contains evidence that Jordan was fully capable of performing the duties of his 

position much of the time, even an infrequent inability to perform the essential 

functions of the position is enough to render a plaintiff not a “qualified individual” 

under the ADA. See id. at 1257. 

The events at Raymond Drive further support the district court’s 

determination. Jordan experienced “high levels of anxiety,” during which he 

“choked up,” his respirations were shallow, his heart was racing, and his blood 

pressure was elevated. Although Jordan contends that he was able to respond to 

the shots-fired call and that his anxiety on that occasion did not rise to the level of 

an episode or attack, Jordan still exhibited symptoms sufficiently serious in degree 

USCA11 Case: 15-12038 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 11 of 12
12

to give cause to another officer to believe that Jordan required immediate medical 

attention. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the district court properly found that 

Jordan failed to show that he was a qualified individual under the ADA. Because 

Jordan must show that he is a qualified individual to proceed under the ADA, we 

do not address his remaining arguments, such as the legitimacy of Union City’s 

reasons for his termination. Consequently, we affirm the grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Union City.

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 15-12038 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 12 of 12