Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04428/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04428-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
JoAnne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Marlo T. Garnes
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARLO T GARNES,

Plaintiff,

 v

JO ANNE B BARNHARDT, Commissioner

of Social Security

Defendant.

 /

No C 02-4428 VRW

 ORDER

Plaintiff Marlo T Garnes, having prevailed in her appeal

from the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) decision to

terminate her benefits, now moves for an award of $46,172.48 in

attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act

(EAJA), 28 USC § 2412(d). Doc #30 (Pl Mot); Doc #33 (Pl Reply) at

8. Defendant Joanne B Barnhart opposes the motion. Doc #31 (Def

Opp). For the reasons stated herein, the court GRANTS plaintiff an

award of $38,796.75.

 I

Plaintiff’s appeal to this court turned on the issue of

the manner in which the Social Security Administration applied 20

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 1 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

CFR 416.1339, the implementing regulation for 42 USC §

1382(e)(4)(A). 20 CFR 416.1339(b) authorized the suspension of

benefits in the month in which

a warrant or order for the individual's arrest

or apprehension, an order requiring the

individual's appearance before a court or other

appropriate tribunal * * * or similar order is

issued by a court or other duly authorized

tribunal on the basis of an appropriate finding

that the individual — (A) Is fleeing, or has

fled, to avoid prosecution as described in

paragraph (a)(1) of this section * * *

or (ii) “The first month during which the individual fled to avoid

such prosecution * * * if indicated in such warrant or order, or in

a decision by a court or other appropriate tribunal.” 

That regulation in turn was designed to implement a 1996

law codified at 42 USC § 1382(e)(4):

No person shall be considered an eligible individual

or eligible spouse for purposes of this subchapter

with respect to any month during such month the

person is –

(A) fleeing to avoid persecution, or custody or

confinement after conviction, under the laws of the

place from which the person flees, for a crime, or

an attempt to commit a crime, which is a felony

under the laws of the place from which the person

flees * * *; or

(B) violating a condition of probation or parole

imposed under Federal or State law.

On November 5, 2004, this court granted plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment on the basis that the SSA’s Appeals

Council failed to employ correct legal principles when applying 42

USC § 1382(e)(4) to the facts of plaintiff’s case and that

substantial evidence did not support the SSA’s conclusions because: 

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 2 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

(1) the plain language of the regulation compelled closer scrutiny

of the factual basis for terminating an individual’s SSI benefits

under 42 USC § 1382(e)(4) because a warrant must contain a finding,

as the regulation’s language requires, that “plaintiff was fleeing

to avoid prosecution,” not merely that she failed to appear; (2)

the SSA’s contention that there was no intent requirement for an

individual to be “fleeing” was unsupportable, in that the SSA was

obligated to determine that actions by an individual that are used

as the basis for terminating that individual’s SSI benefits are, at

least in part, motivated by an intent to avoid prosecution; and (3)

the SSA’s factual determination that plaintiff was “fleeing” was

not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Doc # 27. 

The court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against

defendant. 

II

Plaintiff bases her motion for attorney fees and costs on

the EAJA, which provides:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by

statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party

other than the United States fees and other

expenses * * * incurred by that party in any civil

action * * * including proceedings for judicial

review of agency action, brought by or against the

United States * * * unless the court finds that the

position of the United States was substantially

justified or that special circumstances make an

award unjust.

28 USC § 2412(d). “Fees” includes “reasonable attorney fees,”

which are defined to include “prevailing market rates for the kind

and quality of the services furnished, except that * * * attorney

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 3 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the

court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a

special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified

attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” 

“Party” includes, as relevant here, “an individual whose net worth

did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.” 

Plaintiff qualifies as a “prevailing party” for EAJA

purposes. Her net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the

civil action was filed, and her success in appealing the SSA’s

action meets the statutory standard. See Gutierrez v Barnhart, 274

F3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir 2001) (“An applicant for disability

benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the EAJA if

the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of

whether disability benefits ultimately are awarded”). 

Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of fees, however,

if the court determines that the position of the United States was

“substantially justified” or that “special circumstances make an

award unjust.” 28 USC § 2412(d)(1)(A). In Pierce v Underwood, 487

US 552, 565 (1988), the United States Supreme Court defined

“substantially justified” as “justified in substance or in the main

— that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable

person.” This definition is “no different from the ‘reasonable

basis both in law and fact’ formulation adopted by the Ninth

Circuit and the vast majority of other Courts of Appeals that have

addressed this issue.” Id. 

Under the law of this circuit, the burden is on the

government to demonstrate that its position was substantially

justified or that special circumstances exist to make an award

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 4 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

unjust. Gutierrez, 274 F3d at 1258, citing Love v Reilly, 924 F2d

1492, 1495 (9th Cir 1991). The EAJA states that the “‘position of

the Unites States’ means, in addition to the position taken by the

United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by

the agency upon which the civil action is based[.]” 28 USC § 2412

(d)(2)(D). Accordingly, the court must determine whether the

government was substantially justified in (1) “taking its original

action” and (2) “defending the validity of the action in court.” 

Gutierrez, 274 F3d at 1259. 

Upon careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda and

the applicable law, the court concludes that neither the final

decision of the SSA in plaintiff’s case nor the agency’s litigation

position in defense of that decision was “substantially justified”

and that there are no “special circumstances” present that would

make an award unjust. 

In the present case, the legal and factual errors in the

Appeals Council’s reasoning, as outlined above, were so significant

as to necessitate the conclusion that the SSA’s position was not

“substantially justified.” Moreover, while the SSA litigated

Garnes, it was litigating two other cases involving the

interpretation of the “fleeing felon” provision in 42 USC § 1382

(e)(4)(A): Blakely v Commissioner, 330 F Supp 2d 910 (WD Mich

2004) and Hull v Barnhart, 336 F Supp 2d 1113 (D Or 2004). 

Although the commencement of litigation in Garnes in September 2002

and the filing of defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment in

March 2003 predated the decisions in Blakely and Hull, the absence

of adverse court judgments arising from the SSA’s enforcement of

\\

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 5 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

the “fleeing felon” provision did not render the government’s

litigation stance “substantially justified.” It was not. 

The Ninth Circuit does not recognize a “free pass” under

the EAJA for issues not previously litigated: “there is no per se

rule that EAJA fees cannot be awarded where the government’s

litigation position contains an issue of first impression” and that

the government’s plea for “an automatic ‘first impression’ free

pass * * * contravene[d] the purpose of the EAJA[.]” Gutierrez,

274 F3d at 1259. Moreover, whether a litigated issue is one of

first impression may be considered as one factor in determining

whether the government’s litigation position is substantially

justified, but does not constitute a “special circumstance.” Id. 

In Gutierrez, the Ninth Circuit held that the district

court abused its discretion by denying fees to a prevailing

plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s argument

that 20 CFR § 1520a was “unclear”: “[t]he regulation in force

before and during litigation stated that a [particular form] ‘must

be completed’ and ‘will be appended to the decision.’ There was

nothing ambiguous about this requirement.” Id at 1259. The court

also rejected the government’s argument that its litigation

position was substantially justified by the lack of Ninth Circuit

precedent where three other circuits had announced decisions

contrary to the view advocated by the government. Id at 1261.

In Pirus v Bowen, 869 F2d 536, 537-38 (9th Cir 1989), the

Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that neither

the agency’s adoption of a regulation establishing age-based

criteria for withholding benefits from divorced spouses of deceased

wage-earners under 42 USC § 402(e)(1)-(3)(A) and its enforcement of

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 6 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

that regulation against plaintiff nor its litigation stance in

defense of that regulation were “substantially justified.” As

relevant here, the court gave little weight to the fact that the

dispute concerned the agency’s interpretation and implementation of

a new statute, id at 539, and held that both the decision denying

benefits and the defense of that position through litigation were

not “substantially justified.” 

In opposition to Garnes’s motion, the SSA relies on Kali

v Bowen, 854 F2d 329, 332 (9th Cir 1988), which it characterizes as

“remarkably similar” to the present case. Def Opp at 2. In Kali,

the plaintiffs sought fees under the EAJA after successfully

challenging federal and state regulations that changed conditions

of eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Kali,

854 F2d at 330. The district court held that the Secretary was

substantially justified because the case was “one of first

impression in this circuit. If the question of law is unresolved

and of unclear resolution, then the government’s litigation of the

issue is reasonable and substantially justified.” Id at 330-31

(citing Minor v United States, 797 F2d 738, 739 (9th Cir 1986);

Foster v Tourtellotte, 704 F2d 1109 (9th Cir 1983)). Reviewing the

district court’s decision under the “highly deferential” abuse-ofdiscretion standard, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that

“[t]he Secretary’s interpretation of the complex statutory scheme

was justifiable on the facial language of the relevant statutes and

did not clearly contravene congressional intent.” Id at 334. The

government argues that because the SSA’s position prevailed in Kali

“despite a string of losses in other courts,” Def Opp at 2, n 1, it

must prevail on the instant motion. 

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 7 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Kali, however, is distinguishable from the instant case. 

This court found the SSA’s interpretation of “fleeing”

unsupportable and the POMS policy not even a reasonable reading of

the SSA regulation. Accordingly, the SSA’s interpretation was not

a “facially correct reading of the statute” as in Kali. See Kali,

854 F2d at 334. 

In summary, the court concludes that the government’s

position in this case was not “substantially justified” and an

award of fees is therefore proper under the EAJA. 

 

 

III

Having determined that an award of fees is proper, the

court must now determine the amount of the award. In particular,

the court must determine whether an hourly rate in excess of the

statutory rate is appropriate. See 28 USC § 2412 (2)(A). The

specifics of plaintiff’s fee request are set forth below:

Yrs/practice Hours Rate Total/row

Attorney Gerald A 

McIntyre

 38 89.3 $500 $44650.00

Attorney Ralph

Murphy

 30 5.3 $152.78 $809.73

Paralegal E Madrigal 8.3 $75 $622.50

Costs $90.25

Total (with Costs) $46172.48

The 5.3 hours billed for work performed by attorney Ralph

Murphy of Bay Area Legal Aid in 2002 are billed at a rate stated to

be the EAJA statutory cap with a cost-of-living adjustment

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 8 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

authorized by statute. Pl Mot at 3, ¶ 10 and Ex C. According to

Thangaraja v Gonzales, 428 F3d 870, 876-77 (9th Cir 2005), however,

the EAJA rate for work performed in 2002 stands at $144.43; Mr

Murphy’s time will be compensated at that rate. Mr Murphy’s hours

constitute merely 5.6% of the total attorney hours expended.

Mr McIntyre’s hours represent 94.4% of the total attorney

hours. Only Mr McIntyre’s hourly rate is at issue on this motion. 

There are no specific EAJA provisions relating to paralegals, so an

appropriate rate for Ms Madrigal’s time must also be determined. 

An award in excess of the statutory rate is only

appropriate where “lawyers skilled and experienced enough to try

the case are [not only] in short supply,” but there is also limited

availability of “attorneys having some distinctive knowledge or

specialized skill needful for the litigation in question.” Pierce

v Underwood, 487 US 552, 573, 108 SCt 2541, 2553 (1988). The Ninth

Circuit has distilled the Supreme Court’s Pierce v Underwood

holding into a two-prong test: (1) the attorney must possess

“distinctive knowledge and skills” and (2) the qualifications must

be “in some way needed in the litigation and cannot be obtained

elsewhere at the statutory rate.” Pirus, 869 F2d at 542. 

The prevailing attorneys in Pirus included the National

Senior Citizens Law Center in Los Angeles, one of the law offices

seeking a fee award on the instant motion. About the plaintiff’s

attorneys, the court held that their expertise was of a kind

warranting above-cap fee rates: 

In the instant case, Pirus’s attorneys had

developed a practice specialty in social security

law. Having litigated various class actions

challenging provisions of the Act, they had

extensive knowledge of the Act, its legislative

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 9 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

history, and the development of the Social

Security Administration’s regulations. The

expertise and skills that they developed are in

many ways akin to those developed by a patent

lawyer: expertise with a complex statutory

scheme; familiarity and credibility with a

particular agency; and understanding of the needs

of a particular class of clients – in this case,

the elderly – and of how those needs could best be

met under the existing statute and regulations. 

Id.

On this motion, plaintiff’s attorney Gerald A McIntyre

argues that, like the attorneys in Pirus, he possesses distinctive

knowledge and skills that were necessary to litigating Garnes. A

1967 graduate of Yale Law School and an attorney with the National

Senior Citizens Law Center in Los Angeles since 1993, McIntyre

specializes in Social Security and SSI non-disability issues. Pl

Mot, McIntyre Decl at ¶¶ 3-4. In particular, McIntyre has

developed “an even more specialized expertise” in the “fleeing

felon” provision in 42 USC § 1382(e)(4)(A) and issues thereunder. 

Id at ¶ 5. McIntyre submits considerable evidence demonstrating

this expertise in social security law and specifically detailing

his experience with cases involving the “fleeing felon” provision

and recognizing McIntyre as a national expert on this provision.

See generally Pl Mot; Pl Reply. 

McIntyre argues further that the second prong of the

Pirus “special factor” test – that his special services were

necessary to the litigation – was satisfied. McIntyre asserts that

without his expertise in interpreting the “fleeing felon” provision

this action could not have been brought. Pl Reply at 5. There had

been no challenges to the Commissioner’s interpretation of the

statute before McIntyre began litigating the issue: “[i]n general,

attorneys did not question the Commissioner’s interpretation.” Id. 

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 10 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Furthermore, McIntyre states that if he had not agreed to represent

plaintiff, plaintiff would likely not have been able to find

another attorney in California willing to take her case at the

statutory EAJA rate. Pl Mot at 2-3. 

In opposition, the government argues that because there

was no body of law under the “fleeing felon” statutes in existence

at the time the case was filed and because the court relied on

dictionary definitions of “fleeing” in making its ruling, the case

did not require the distinctive knowledge and skill that would,

under Pirus, warrant an award of fees in excess of the EAJA cap.

Def Opp at 4. 

In addition, the government challenges ten of the hours

expended by paralegal Eleanor Madrigal on efforts to resolve

plaintiff’s Virginia arrest warrant and 1.8 hours spent by attorney

McIntyre on the same matter, contending that these hours did not

help the litigation, but rather helped plaintiff obtain benefits. 

In reply, plaintiff disputes that the hours in question were not

expended on the litigation, but nonetheless reduces her demand to

delete half of the disputed hours (5.0 hours of McIntyre’s time,

and 0.9 hours of Madrigal’s time). 

The court concludes that a typical social security

disability practitioner would be unlikely to bring a case that

involved challenging SSA’s implementation of its own regulations as

too complicated, difficult and risky. McIntyre possessed

distinctive knowledge of the whole statutory scheme and,

specifically, the 1996 revisions to the Act and the new regulations

issued thereunder, as well as of the SSA’s policies and practices

implementing those regulations; he employed this expertise directly

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 11 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

in his representation of plaintiff in this matter and his hours

expended on the case are reasonable. He is entitled to fees at a

rate in excess of the EAJA statutory cap. 

IV

It remains for the court to determine appropriate rates

for the work of Mr McIntyre and Ms Madrigal.

The United States Supreme Court has stated ”once a

private litigant has met the multiple conditions for eligibility

for EAJA fees, the district court’s task of determining what fee is

reasonable is essentially the same as that described in Hensley [v

Eckerhart, 461 US 424 (1983)]” — that is, “to allow the district

court discretion to determine the amount of a fee award * * *.” 

Commissioner, INS v Jean, 496 US 154, 161 (1989). 

The blended rate for a reasonable attorney fee at

prevailing market rates that this court has awarded under feeshifting statutes such as 28 USC § 1447(c) would not be apposite

here, because such rates are designed to remunerate the work of

“reasonably competent counsel, not counsel of unusual skill and

experience,” e g, Albion Pacific Property Resources, LLC v

Seligman, 329 F Supp 2d 1163, 1169 (ND Cal 2004). Yet entitlement

to above-cap rates under the EAJA is synonymous with distinctive

knowledge and skills especially relevant to the litigation at

issue. 

Relying on Jean, another judge of this court awarded fees

under the EAJA at rates up to $320 per hour in 1994, finding these

to represent, in the words of EAJA, “prevailing market rates for

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 12 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

the kind and quality of services furnished”. Sneede v Coye, 856 F

Supp 526, 534 (ND Cal 1994)(Henderson, J). The statutory scheme at

issue was the Medicaid program, “recognized as one of the most

complex, arcane, and difficult areas of practice [in which] very

few attorneys are competent to practice.” Id at 535. Lead counsel

in the case had submitted evidence that she was “one of the, if not

the, most knowledgeable and outstanding attorney [sic] litigating

complex health care/Medicaid issues in California, and perhaps the

country.” Id. In this regard, Sneede is apposite. 

It is the practice of the undersigned judge, however, to

rely on official data to determine appropriate hourly rates, not on

an attorney’s self-proclaimed rates or declarations regarding

hourly rates charged by law firms. One reliable official source

for rates that vary by experience levels is the Laffey matrix used

in the District of Columbia. See

http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/dc/Divisions/Civil_Division/Laffey_Matrix

_4.html (citing Laffey v Northwest Airlines, Inc, 572 F Supp 354 (D

DC 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 746 F2d 4

(DC Cir 1984), cert denied, 472 US 1021 (1985)). See, e g, In re

HPL Technologies, Inc Securities Litigation, 366 F Supp 2d 912, 921

(ND Cal 2005)(Laffey matrix used to determine fee rates where

senior attorney devoted much time to settlement discussions and

preparation). Under the 2005 Laffey matrix, attorneys with 20 or

more years of experience bill $390/hour and paralegals bill

$110/hour. These rates are tailored to the District of Columbia. 

McIntyre is based in Los Angeles. It is this court’s practice to

adjust fees drawn from the Laffey matrix in accordance with the

locality pay differentials applicable to the federal judiciary, an

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 13 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 (123.18 - 115.98)/115.98 = 0.06208, or about 6.2%

14

agency that employs legal professionals throughout the United

States. See http://www.opm.gov/oca/05tables/pdf/salhr.pdf. The

Washington-Baltimore area is subject to a +15.98% locality pay

differential, whereas the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Riverside area is

subject to a 23.18% locality pay differential. The discrepancy

between these two percentages – 6.2%1

 – amounts to the upward

adjustment from the Laffey rates to which Mr McIntyre and Madrigal

are entitled. 

 The court thus concludes that McIntyre’s time should be

compensated at $414 per hour and Madrigal’s time at $117 per hour. 

Combining these rates with the stated hours and rounding yields a

$36,970 fee for McIntyre and an $981 fee for Madrigal. Combining

these amounts with a $765.50 fee for Murphy, the total attorneys’

fee to which plaintiff is entitled comes to $38,706, plus $90.25 in

costs. 

V 

The court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees

and costs. Defendants must pay plaintiff’s counsel an award of 

$38,796.75. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:02-cv-04428-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/31/06 Page 14 of 14