Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00128/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00128-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terry Menafee
Defendant
Ana Maria Soares
Plaintiff
State of California, Department of Industrial Relations
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ANA MARIA SOARES,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL 

RELATIONS AND TERRY MENAFEE,

 Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:16-00128 WBS EFB 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Ana Maria Soares brought this action based on 

alleged gender harassment and discrimination and her ultimate 

termination. Defendants State of California Department of 

Industrial Relations (“CDIR”) and Presiding Administrative Law 

Judge Terry Menefee1 now move to dismiss plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) for failure to state a claim upon which 

 

1 Plaintiff erroneously misspells Judge Menefee’s last 

name as “Menafee.” The court will use the correct spelling. 

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relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff worked as an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 

for CDIR from August 2014 to July 29, 2015 and was the only 

female ALJ in the Fresno office. (SAC ¶ 3.) Judge Menefee 

served as plaintiff’s supervisor during that time and allegedly 

harassed her because of her gender. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) After 

plaintiff complained about the harassment in November 2014 to 

Associate Chief Administrative Law Judge Thomas Clarke, the 

harassment allegedly increased. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) On May 25, 2015, 

Judge Menefee allegedly informed Judge Clarke that he “intended 

to reject Plaintiff from probation” and “influenced and 

participated in the decision to terminate” her, which was 

effective July 29, 2015. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

After plaintiff amended her Complaint once as a matter 

of course, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss her 

cursory First Amended Complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff then 

filed a Second Amended Complaint, alleging the same claims for 

(1) gender harassment against CDIR in violation of Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et 

seq.; (2) gender harassment against both defendants in violation 

of subsection 12940(j) of California’s Fair Employment and 

Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940-12951; (3) gender 

discrimination against CDIR in violation of Title VII; (4) gender 

discrimination against CDIR in violation of subsection 12940(a) 

of FEHA; (5) retaliation against CDIR in violation of Title VII; 

and (6) retaliation against CDIR in violation of subsection 

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12940(h) of FEHA. Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s SAC 

in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

II. Analysis

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court 

must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 

319, 322 (1972). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff 

must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Under this 

standard, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it 

strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is 

improbable.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.2

A. Harassment / Hostile Work Environment

Title VII and FEHA prohibit employers from harassing 

employees because of their gender and are “violated if []

 

2 The court can consider documents attached to the 

complaint on a motion to dismiss, Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 

1212 (9th Cir. 2012), and thus the court will consider the 

exhibits plaintiff attached to her SAC. 

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harassment is so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile work 

environment.” Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1109 

(9th Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)); see also Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 12940(j) (making it unlawful for an employer 

“because of . . . gender . . . to harass an employee”). Because 

“Title VII and FEHA operate under the same guiding principles,” 

courts often analyze Title VII and FEHA claims together. Brooks 

v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000).

To establish a prima facie case for a hostile work 

environment claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendants 

subjected her to verbal or physical conduct based on her 

[gender]; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her 

employment and create an abusive working environment.” Surrell 

v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2008); see 

also Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 38 Cal. 4th 264, 278 

(2006) (“Because the workplace environment is one of the terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment, a plaintiff may 

establish a violation of Title VII by showing that discrimination 

because of sex has created a hostile or abusive work 

environment.”). 

“‘[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual 

desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of 

sex’” as “[t]he motivation can be a ‘general hostility to the 

presence of women in the workplace.’” Kortan, 217 F.3d at 1110 

(quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 

80 (1998)). “[A] workplace may give rise to liability when it 

‘is permeated with “discriminatory [sex-based] intimidation, 

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ridicule, and insult,” that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive 

to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an 

abusive working environment.”’” Lyle, 38 Cal. 4th at 279 

(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).

To arise to a hostile work environment, the environment 

“must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a 

reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the 

victim in fact did perceive to be so.” Faragher v. City of Boca 

Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998). “[W]hether an environment is 

sufficiently hostile or abusive” is determined by “‘looking at 

all the circumstances,’ including the ‘frequency of the 

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and 

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 

performance.’” Id. at 787-88 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 22). 

“[S]poradic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and 

occasional teasing” are insufficient because the conduct must be 

“extreme” enough to “amount to a change in the terms and 

conditions of employment.” Id. at 788 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “The[] standards for judging hostility are 

sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a 

‘general civility code.’” Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80). 

In Reno v. Baird, the California Supreme Court 

distinguished between the type of conduct that constitutes 

harassment for which an individual employee could be personally 

liable from the type of conduct that constitutes discrimination 

or retaliation for which only the employer could be liable. 18 

Cal. 4th 640 (1998); see also Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines 

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P’ship, 42 Cal. 4th 1158, 1173 (2008) (holding that only the 

employer can be liable for retaliation under FEHA). Harassment 

“consists of a type of conduct not necessary for performance of a 

supervisory job” and is “presumably engaged in for personal 

gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other 

personal motives.” Reno, 18 Cal. 4th at 645–46 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

On the other hand, “[m]aking a personnel decision is 

conduct of a type fundamentally different from the type of 

conduct that constitutes harassment” and may give rise to only a 

discrimination claim against the employer. Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Under this limitation, 

“commonly necessary personnel management actions such as hiring 

and firing, job or project assignments, office or work station 

assignments, promotion or demotion, performance evaluations, the 

provision of support, the assignment or nonassignment of 

supervisory functions, deciding who will and who will not attend 

meetings, deciding who will be laid off, and the like, do not 

come within the meaning of harassment.” Id. at 646-47 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Lawler v. Montblanc 

N. Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir. 2013); see also

Bennett v. Permanente, No. 14-CV-2676 YGR, 2015 WL 6952697, at *9 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2015) (applying Reno to a harassment claim 

under Title VII). Because making “personnel decisions is an 

inherent and unavoidable part of the supervisory function,” FEHA 

limits recourse to a discrimination claim against the employer, 

in part because a supervisor cannot perform his job and “refrain 

from engaging in the type of conduct which could later give rise 

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to a discrimination claim.” Reno, 18 Cal. 4th at 646-47

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).3 

In her FAC, plaintiff’s allegations were cursory and 

conclusory and consisted of only actions that appeared to be 

commonly necessary personnel management actions. (See June 28, 

2016 Order at 6:2-7:18 (Docket No. 20).) Plaintiff added 

significantly more factual allegations to her SAC and included 

alleged mistreatment outside the scope of her job duties or Judge 

Menefee’s supervisorial role. For example, plaintiff alleges 

 

3 Plaintiff argues that the California Supreme Court 

departed from Reno in Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686 

(2010), and thus a harassment claim can be based exclusively on 

personnel management actions. In Roby, the Court reversed the 

appellate court’s holding that evidence of personnel management 

actions could not be used “as evidence in support of a harassment 

claim” and thus had to be disregarded when determining whether 

sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict in favor of the 

plaintiff on her harassment claim. Roby, 47 Cal. 4th at 700, 

710. The Court rejected this limitation, explaining how 

discrimination and harassment claims “can overlap as an 

evidentiary matter” and that official employment actions may 

“contribute[] to the hostile message that [a supervisor] was 

expressing to [the employee] in other, more explicit ways.” Id.

at 709. The court also explained that “acts of discrimination 

can provide evidentiary support for a harassment claim by 

establishing discriminatory animus on the part of the manager 

responsible for the discrimination, thereby permitting the 

inference that rude comments or behavior by that same manager was 

similarly motivated by discriminatory animus.” Id.

The Roby Court did not, however, overrule Reno and 

described its analysis as “consistent” with Reno. Id. at 707, 

708. After Roby, the Ninth Circuit has relied on Reno’s holding 

that “harassment ‘consists of actions outside the scope of job 

duties which are not of a type necessary to business and 

personnel management.’” Lawler, 704 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Reno, 

18 Cal. 4th at 646).

Because plaintiff has sufficiently alleged conduct 

by Judge Menefee that was not necessary to his role as a 

supervisor, the court need not determine whether plaintiff’s 

harassment claim could stand under Roby based solely on personnel 

management actions. 

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that Judge Menefee was always “gruff, acted irritated, and 

appeared to disbelieve” her and “solicited negative comments from 

attorneys who had appeared before” her. (SAC ¶¶ 5.i, 15.) 

Instead of assessing her current performance at an evaluation, 

Judge Menefee allegedly “attacked Plaintiff’s prior work history 

from nine years before, constantly interrupted her, and made it 

clear that he disagreed with the HR determination that [she] was 

qualified” and “harangued [her] and refused to allow her to speak 

in response.” (Id. ¶ 5.e, Ex. 2 at 8.) Judge Menefee also 

allegedly, and unjustifiably, described plaintiff’s demeanor in 

court as “arbitrary, demeaning and degrading.” (Id. Ex. 2 at 3.)

He also allegedly sent plaintiff emails “questioning [her] every 

action” because he “did not see [her] as equal to the men.” (Id.

Ex. 2 at 9.) He allegedly did not believe anything plaintiff 

said, but accepted “what the male judges sa[id] without 

question.” (Id. Ex. 2 at 8.) 

Plaintiff’s SAC also explains the significance of the 

“tests” or “exams” he allegedly made her take on a weekly basis. 

(Id. Ex. 2 at 7.) Although Judge Menefee allegedly told 

plaintiff that he gave her the exams because he did not believe

she was knowledgeable about workers’ compensation law, she 

alleges that he started giving her exams before he had the 

opportunity to evaluate her knowledge. (Id. Ex. 2 at 11.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that Judge Menefee did not give these 

exams to other ALJs, including an ALJ hired after plaintiff who 

had no prior ALJ experience. (Id. Ex. 2 at 9, 11.) She also 

does not believe that any other presiding judges utilize such 

tests. (Id. Ex. 2 at 11.) Judge Menefee also allegedly made 

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plaintiff complete “a questionnaire for him every week” and

attend weekly meetings at which he was “very aggressive in asking 

[her] questions.” (Id. Ex. 2 at 7.) According to plaintiff, no 

other newly hired ALJs were subjected to such questionnaires or

meetings. (Id.) 

Plaintiff further alleges that Judge Menefee warned her 

when she began working with him “that the attorneys who would 

appear before her were wary of female Judges because of former 

female Judges.” (Id. ¶ 5.c.) He allegedly referred to a former 

female ALJ as a “freak” and led plaintiff “to believe that the 

prior female Judges had been fired.” (Id. ¶¶ 5.a, 5.d.) When 

plaintiff met with Judge Clarke to discuss her concerns about 

Judge Menefee’s treatment, he allegedly told plaintiff that the 

two prior female judges had been “let go/fired/forced out” and 

suggested that plaintiff apply for a transfer to Salinas because, 

“if [she] stayed in Fresno [her] PJ would made it difficult for 

[her].” (Id. Ex. 2 at 13.) Because of their interactions, 

plaintiff was “afraid” of Judge Menefee, “dreaded” meeting with 

him, and felt humiliated. (Id. Ex. 2 at 7, 14.) 

While the factual allegations may not make it probable 

that Judge Menefee harassed plaintiff because of her gender, she 

has at least plausibly alleged that he used non-routine 

questionnaires, exams, and monitoring as devices to demean and 

humiliate her and was generally hostile toward her because of her 

gender. Taking all inferences in favor of plaintiff, the SAC 

sufficiently alleges that Judge Menefee subjected her to a 

hostile work environment because of her gender and the court must 

therefore deny defendants’ motion to dismiss her hostile work 

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environment claims under Title VII and FEHA. 

B. Gender Discrimination 

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a 

plaintiff must show “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) 

he was qualified for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse 

employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside 

his protected class were treated more favorably, or other 

circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise 

to an inference of discrimination.” Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. 

of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004); see also 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a); Guz v. Bechtel 

Nat’l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000). 

Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff sufficiently

alleges she was a member of a protected class and was subject to 

an adverse employment action. While they argue plaintiff fails 

to allege she was qualified for her position, their arguments 

would require the court to go beyond its role in deciding a 

motion to dismiss. Human resources allegedly determined that 

plaintiff was qualified for the ALJ position and, according to 

the SAC, plaintiff “performed her work competently at all times.” 

(See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 5.e, 10.) The SAC also provides specific 

examples of cases in which Judge Menefee allegedly criticized 

plaintiff’s decisions without justification. (Id. Ex. 2 at 7.) 

That plaintiff alleges Judge Menefee claimed she was unqualified 

does not preclude the inference that she was qualified, 

especially when she alleges that Judge Menefee unjustifiably

attacked her qualifications because of her gender. 

Plaintiff’s SAC also at least plausibly alleges facts 

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giving rise to the inference of discrimination. As previously 

discussed, the SAC alleges that Judge Menefee was hostile toward 

her because of her gender. Judge Menefee also allegedly 

scrutinized plaintiff’s leave time and falsely accused her of 

leaving work early. (Id. ¶¶ 5.j, 9.a, Ex. 2 at 3.) In contrast, 

other ALJs allegedly took more leave time than plaintiff and 

Judge Menefee did not question their absences or monitor their 

attendance. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9.a.)

Accordingly, because plaintiff at least plausibly 

alleges gender discrimination claims under Title VII and FEHA, 

the court must deny defendants’ motion to dismiss those claims. 

C. Retaliation

Title VII and FEHA prohibit an employer from 

“retaliat[ing] against employees who have ‘opposed any practice 

made an unlawful employment practice’” by Title VII or FEHA, 

respectively. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3); Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 12940(h) (same). “To make out a prima facie case of 

retaliation under Title VII, [the plaintiff] must put forth 

evidence sufficient to show that (1) she engaged in a protected 

activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) 

there was a causal link between her activity and the employment 

decision.” Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 

F.3d 1185, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2003); see Strother v. S. Cal.

Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 868 (9th Cir. 1996) (same 

prima facie showing for FEHA). “[T]o constitute protected 

activity, a complaint must be based on an employee’s ‘reasonable 

belief’ that he is reporting conduct that violates Title VII.” 

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E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 967 (9th Cir. 

2009); see also Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 

1043 n.4 (2005) (same for FEHA).

Plaintiff alleges that on November 14, 2014, she 

complained to Judge Clarke about Judge Menefee’s alleged 

harassment and discrimination. (SAC ¶ 8.) Six months later, 

Judge Menefee informed Judge Clarke that he “intended to reject 

Plaintiff from probation” and, two month after that, Judge 

Menefee “influenced and participated in the decision to 

terminate” plaintiff effective July 29, 2015. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff’s complaint to Judge 

Clarke sufficiently alleges that she engaged in a protected 

activity. Nor do they dispute that plaintiff was subjected to an 

adverse employment action. According to defendants, plaintiff 

nonetheless fails to allege cognizable retaliation claims because 

the lapse of time between her complaint to Judge Clarke and the 

adverse employment action precludes the inference of a causal 

link between her protected activity and the adverse action. 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that “causation can be 

inferred from timing alone where an adverse employment action 

follows on the heels of protected activity,” but has repeatedly 

found that durations of four months and greater between the 

protected activity and termination are too remote to support a 

finding of causation based on temporal proximity. Villiarimo v. 

Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citing cases). However, all of the decisions concluding that 

the lapse of time was too long to infer a causal connection that 

defendants rely on, and that the Ninth Circuit cited in 

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Villiarimo, were testing the sufficiency of the evidence at 

summary judgment or after the jury reached a verdict, not the 

sufficiency of the allegations on a motion to dismiss. Courts 

have also recognized that the lapse of time between the protected 

activity and adverse action may not break the causal link if “the 

employer engages in a pattern of conduct consistent with a

retaliatory intent” between the protected activity and adverse 

action. Wysinger v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 157 Cal. App. 4th 

413, 421 (2d Dist. 2007); accord Green v. Laibco, LLC, 192 Cal. 

App. 4th 441, 455-56 (2d Dist. 2011). 

Taking all inferences in favor of plaintiff, only six 

months passed between plaintiff’s complaint to Judge Clarke and 

the first adverse employment action taken against her. The SAC 

also alleges that the harassment increased after plaintiff 

complained to Judge Clark. (SAC ¶ 9.) As Judge Clarke allegedly 

predicted, Judge Menefee continued to “make it difficult” for 

plaintiff during this time in what the SAC suggests was an 

attempt to make her transfer or resign. (Id. ¶ 10; see also id.

¶ 15 (“When Plaintiff complained and refused to voluntarily 

resign, Judge Menafee made false statements about Plaintiff’s 

work and solicited negative comments from attorneys who had 

appeared before Plaintiff . . . .”).) Taking all inferences in 

favor of plaintiff, she has sufficiently alleged a causal 

connection between her protected activity and the adverse 

employment action and the court must therefore deny defendants’ 

motion to dismiss her Title VII and FEHA retaliation claims. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s SAC be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

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Dated: August 23, 2016

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