Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-02-03960/USCOURTS-ca8-02-03960-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jack C. Collinsworth
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-3960

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, * 

* 

v. * Appeal form the United States

* District Court for the Western

Jack C. Collinsworth, * District of Missouri.

* 

Defendant-Appellant. * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

*

___________

Submitted: December 16, 2003 

Filed: April 28, 2004

___________

Before MELLOY, BEAM, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. 

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Jack Collinsworth was charged with conspiring to manufacture and

distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On the day of trial,

after the district court1

 had heard preliminary motions and before the voir dire process

had started, defendant informed the court that he wished to plead guilty. Thereafter,

he and the district court engaged in the standard plea colloquy, as set forth in Rule 11

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of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Upon defendant’s request, the district

court then adopted the plea agreement. 

A few days before his sentencing hearing, defendant filed a pro se motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant claimed that he had not understood the

consequences of his plea due to the urgency of the plea negotiation on the day of trial,

that his attorney had not adequately explained the agreement to him, and that the

then-recent deaths of his child and grandfather placed him in a depressed mental state.

Defendant maintained that he believed he was pleading to simple possession rather

than conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. The district court

denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to 235 months of

imprisonment. Defendant now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to

withdraw his plea.

The government argues that defendant waived his right to appeal his

conviction. “When reviewing a purported waiver, we must confirm that the appeal

falls within the scope of the waiver and that both the wavier and plea agreement were

entered into knowingly and voluntarily.” United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-

890 (8th Cir. 2003). We also consider whether the enforcement of the waiver would

result in a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 890. 

Defendant’s plea agreement provides, in relevant part:

The parties expressly waive the right to appeal or collaterally

attack by post-conviction motion any sentencing issue, including the

applicability of certain U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provisions, which

have been addressed and agreed upon in this Plea Agreement, and which

are set forth in paragraph 12. Each party retains the right to appeal only

sentencing issues which have not been agreed-upon or which have not

been specifically addressed in the Plea Agreement. The defendant

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expressly waives the right to appeal or collaterally attack by postconviction motion all other issues. 

(Plea Agreement at ¶ 10) (emphasis added).

Defendant reserved the right to appeal sentencing issues which were not agreed

upon or addressed in the plea agreement. He expressly waived the right to appeal “all

other issues.” We find that the broad scope of defendant’s waiver encompasses his

right to appeal his conviction. Having reviewed the record, we also find that

defendant knowingly and voluntary waived this right. Defendant’s present contention

that he did not understand the plea agreement when he entered into it is undermined

by the thorough colloquy he had with the district court. Defendant has not argued and

we do not believe that a miscarriage of justice would result from the enforcement of

defendant’s waiver. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal. See United States v.

Morrison, 171 F.3d 567, 568 (8th Cir. 1999) (where defendant voluntarily entered

plea agreement waiving appellate rights, defendant not allowed to appeal the district

court’s denial of leave to withdraw plea and the appeal is subject to dismissal.). 

 ______________________________

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