Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00205/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00205-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Seventh Generation, Inc.
Defendant
Maggie Tsan
Plaintiff
Erica Wildstein
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAGGIE TSAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SEVENTH GENERATION, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-00205-JST 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART REQUEST FOR 

JUDICIAL NOTICE, GRANTING IN 

PART AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS,

AND DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE

ECF Nos., 36, 37, 38.

Before the Court is Defendant Seventh Generation, Inc.’s Motion to Strike, Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint, and Request for Judicial Notice. ECF Nos. 36, 37, 38. For the 

reasons stated below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s Request for Judicial 

Notice, grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and denies Defendant’s

Motion to Strike.

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual History 

For the purposes of deciding these motions, the Court accepts as true the following factual 

allegations from Plaintiffs’ Complaint. ECF No. 1. 

Defendant Seventh Generation, Inc. (“Seventh Generation”) manufactures, markets, and 

sells cleaning supplies, paper products, and personal care products that are labeled “natural.” Id. ¶ 

4-5. Seventh Generation also markets its products as “natural” on its website. Id. ¶ 30-31. 

Plaintiffs Maggie Tsan and Erica Wildstein purchased the products because they “believed 

they were natural products.” Id. ¶ 13-14. Plaintiffs would not have purchased the products if they 

had known they were not natural. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 50. During the class period, Plaintiffs purchased 

such items as Seventh Generation’s Natural 2X Concentrated Liquid Laundry Detergent and 

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 1 of 13
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Seventh Generation’s Natural Dish Liquid. Id. ¶ 13-14. These, and 21 other Seventh Generation 

products, contain the word “natural” on the label. Id. ¶¶ 19, Ex. 1-23. Although “natural” is on 

the label of the products, the products contain non-natural ingredients such as benzisothiazolinone, 

methylisothiazolinone, laureth-6, sodium lauryl sulfate, lauramine oxide, sodium citrate, glycerin, 

and sodium hydroxide. Id. ¶ 33. A reasonable consumer would not consider products with such 

ingredients to be “natural.” Id. ¶ 43. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant labeled the products as “natural” to persuade consumers 

that the products only contained natural ingredients and that Defendant “profited enormously from 

its false and misleading marketing.” Id. ¶¶ 45, 50. 

B. Procedural History 

Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a complaint on January 14, 2015. ECF No. 1. 

Defendant filed a Motion to Transfer Venue on February 27, 2015, ECF No. 18, and the motion 

was denied on June 17, 2015. ECF No. 33. Defendant filed its Motion to Strike, Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint, and Request for Judicial Notice on July 6, 2015. ECF. Nos. 36, 37, 

38. Plaintiffs assert the following claims for relief: (1) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 

Act; (2) violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750, et seq.; 

(3) deceptive advertising, pursuant to California Business & Professions Code § 17500, et seq.; 

(4) unfair business practices, pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et 

seq.; (5) deceptive advertising, pursuant to Florida Statute § 501.201, et seq.; (6) breach of express 

warranty. ECF No. 1. 

C. Jurisdiction 

Plaintiffs assert, and Defendant does not deny, that Plaintiffs are citizens of the States of 

California and Florida and Defendant is a citizen of the State of Vermont. Id. ¶ 1. The Court has

subject-matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because there are 100 or more Class Members, at least one Class Member is 

a citizen of a state diverse from Defendant’s citizenship, and the matter in controversy exceeds 

$5,000,000 exclusive of interest and costs.

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 2 of 13
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Although a court's review on a motion to dismiss is usually limited to the allegations in the 

pleadings, there are two exceptions to this general rule. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

688 (9th Cir. 2001). First, a court may consider documents on which a complaint “necessarily 

relies” even if those documents are not physically attached to the pleading document itself. Id.

(citation omitted). This is known as the “incorporation by reference” doctrine, which allows 

courts “to take into account documents ‘whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose 

authenticity no party questions.’” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 

In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir.1999)). Second, under Federal 

Rule of Evidence 201, courts may take into account matters of public record, as long as they are 

not subject to reasonable dispute. Lee, 250 F.3d at 689.

Seventh Generation requests that the Court take judicial notice of: (1) 7 C.F.R. § 3202.1; 

(2) 7 C.F.R. § 205.100; (3) the Natural Products Association (“NPA”) Standard and Certification 

for Personal Care Products (available online), for the fact of its existence and not the truth of what

it asserts; (4) the NPA Standard and Certification for Home Care Products (available online), for 

the fact of its existence and not the truth of what it asserts; and (5) the Declaration of Timothy

John Fowler authenticating and attaching Exhibits 1-23, which are copies of Seventh Generation’s

product image files that include the front and back labels corresponding to the exhibits in the 

complaint. ECF No. 38 at 2. 

Plaintiffs do not oppose the first four of Defendant’s requests. The Court finds 7 C.F.R. § 

3202.1 and § 205.100 appropriate for judicial notice as documents in the public record whose 

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. The Court also finds both NPA 

Standards and Certifications appropriate for judicial notice because Plaintiffs referred to the NPA 

for guidance as to what a reasonable consumer may consider “natural,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 9, and 

because the fact that they exist is not subject to reasonable dispute. See McMahon v. Take-Two 

Interactive Software, Inc., No. EDCV 13–02032–VAP (SPx), 2014 WL 324008, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 

Jan. 29, 2014) (noting that “Courts have found website . . . articles to be a proper subject for 

judicial notice where those materials are relied on by a plaintiff or concern facts at issue in a 

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 3 of 13
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

complaint”). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice as to 7 C.F.R. 

§ 3202.1, 7 C.F.R. § 205.100, the NPA Standard and Certification for Personal Care Products, and 

the NPA Standard and Certification for Home Care Products.

Plaintiffs oppose Seventh Generation’s request for judicial notice of Timothy John 

Fowler’s declaration and the accompanying image files of front and back labels. ECF No. 45 at 1. 

They question the accuracy of the labels, arguing it is unclear if the Defendant’s exhibits represent 

every label produced by Defendant and contend that there is no indication of the time periods the 

labels were used. Id. at 2. Additionally, Plaintiffs point out that the images Defendant submitted 

contain the term “proof” and a space for an individual to approve the proof, but that it is unclear 

whether the proofs were ever approved for use in the marketplace. Id. at 3. Finally, they contend 

that that “the date for the back labels does not correspond to the date on the front labels.” Id.

Defendant responds that the images are appropriate for judicial notice under the incorporation by 

reference doctrine and that they were sufficiently authenticated by the declaration of Seventh 

Generation Senior Vice President Timothy John Fowler. ECF No. 50 at 2-4.

The Ninth Circuit has “recognized consistently that the district court may, but is not 

required to incorporate documents by reference.” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 

1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012). The incorporation by reference doctrine “is a narrow exception aimed 

at cases interpreting, for example, a contract. It is not intended to grant litigants license to ignore 

the distinction between motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.” Levenstein v. 

Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998). It is true, as Seventh Generation points out, that 

other courts have sometimes incorporated by reference the backs of food package labels on 

judicial notice. See,e.g., Brazil v. Dole Food Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 947, 962 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2013)

(labels of fruit mixture products named in complaint); Bruton v. Gerber Products Co., 961 F. 

Supp. 2d 1062, 1074 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (more legible versions of baby food product labels 

referenced in complaint); Gustavson v. Wrigley Sales Co., 961 F.Supp. 2d 1100, 1113 n.1 (N.D. 

Cal. 2013) (labels for gum and mint products that complaint specifically referenced and quoted). 

However, a necessary part of the incorporation by reference doctrine is that “no party questions” 

the “authenticity” of the labels at hand. Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1076; see also Davis, 691 F.3d at

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 4 of 13
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1159-60.

Here, Plaintiffs strongly dispute the authenticity of the labels. ECF No. 45 at 2-3. 

Although there is a declaration accompanying the images, the Court nevertheless finds there is 

sufficient justification for Plaintiffs to dispute their authenticity. The images of the backs of the 

labels are proofs, contain dates that do not correspond to the front labels offered by Plaintiffs, and 

have approval boxes that are not checked. The Court therefore denies without prejudice 

Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the declaration of Timothy John Fowler and the 

accompanying images.

III. MOTION TO DISMISS 

Seventh Generation moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint on several grounds:

(1) Plaintiffs fail to allege a plausible theory of deception; (2) Plaintiffs’ Magnuson-Moss 

Warranty Act (“MMWA”) claim fails; (3) Plaintiffs fail to state their claims with specificity; and 

(4) Plaintiffs’ express warranty claim fails as a matter of law. ECF No. 37 at i. The Court 

considers these arguments in turn. 

A. Legal Standard 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court must “accept all factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1072. 

Fraud claims are subject to a heightened pleading standard. “In alleging fraud or mistake, 

a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 9(b). “Rule 9(b) demands that the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud ‘be specific 

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 5 of 13
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct . . . so that they can defend against 

the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 

F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 

2011)). To meet this standard, a “complaint must ‘identify the who, what, when, where, and how 

of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false or misleading about the purportedly fraudulent 

statement, and why it is false.’” Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quoting Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2011)). 

B. Plausibility of Plaintiffs’ Claims 

Claims of false or misleading advertising and unfair business practice are governed by the 

“reasonable consumer” test. See Williams v. Gerber, 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008); Freeman 

v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995). Under this test, Plaintiffs must show that 

“members of the public are likely to be deceived.”1 Freeman, 68 F.3d at 289. California courts 

have recognized that “whether a business practice is deceptive will usually be a question of fact 

not appropriate for decision on demurrer.” Williams, 552 F.3d at 938 (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted); see also Asis Internet Servs. v. Subscriberbase Inc., No. 09-3503 SC, 2010 

WL 1267763, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010) (whether a reasonable consumer is likely to be 

deceived “is clearly a question of fact, which is best left for a jury, unless ‘[n]o reasonable trier of 

fact could conclude otherwise.’”) (quoting Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 135 

Cal.App.4th 663, 682, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 36 (2006)). 

It is a “rare situation” when courts ought to grant a motion to dismiss. Williams, 552 F.3d 

at 939. In Freeman, for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of a claim that mailers 

misleadingly suggested the plaintiff had won a sweepstakes because the mailer explicitly stated 

 

1

 Seventh Generation suggests further defining the reasonable consumer standard as requiring a 

“probability ‘that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, 

acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.’” ECF No. 37 at 6 (quoting Lavie v. 

Procter & Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th 496, 508 (2003)). Plaintiffs dispute this definition. 

ECF No. 47 at 7. There is no need to resolve the dispute now, however, as the Court concludes 

that dismissal is not appropriate even under Seventh Generation’s definition of the reasonable 

consumer standard.

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 6 of 13
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

multiple times that he would win only if he had the winning grand prize number. Freeman, 68 

F.3d at 289-90. This “qualifying language appear[ed] immediately next to the representations it 

qualifie[d] and no reasonable reader could ignore it.” Id. at 289.

Seventh Generation argues that the present case is the “rare situation” in which the Court 

may conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable consumer would not be deceived. It first argues 

that its use of the word “natural” is not plausibly misleading when read in the context of the other 

representations on the labels. ECF No. 37 at 7. It contends that its product labels sufficiently 

provide a definition of “natural” because many of them use the USDA’s “Certified Biobased” 

label on the front, and further explain what it means to be “natural” and “Biobased” on the back. 

Id. at 9-10. As for the products that do not have a “Biobased” label, Seventh Generation argues 

that their labels disclose which ingredients are synthetic in their ingredient panels. Id. at 11.

As an initial matter, because the Court has denied Defendant’s motion for judicial notice 

regarding its images of back labels, it cannot consider much of the material on which Defendant’s 

argument depends. Even setting this problem aside, however, the argument is unpersuasive. It is 

certainly possible that using a “Biobased” label or an ingredient list sufficiently explains (or 

disclaims) the word “natural” to a reasonable consumer, but this is an issue that should ultimately 

be resolved by the factfinder. The mere presence of such additional information is not enough to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of law. See Williams, 552 F.3d at 939 (stating that 

manufacturers cannot “mislead consumers and then rely on the ingredient list to correct those 

misinterpretations and provide a shield for liability for the deception”).

Next, Seventh Generation argues that Plaintiffs’ proposed definition of “natural” as not 

containing any “synthetic, highly processed, and/or non-natural” ingredients is inherently 

implausible when applied to its products. ECF No. 37 at 12. It argues that “home cleaning and 

personal care products ... plainly ‘do not exist in nature’ — nor resemble any naturally occurring 

substances — but instead are self-evidently processed and manufactured.” Id. at 13 (emphasis 

removed). As support, Seventh Generation cites to Pelayo v. Nestle USA, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 

973, 980 (C.D. Cal. 2013) and Balser v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., No. CV 13-05604-R, 2013 WL 

6673617 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2013).

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 7 of 13
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The Court concludes that neither Balser nor Pelayo is persuasive here. In Balser, the 

plaintiffs alleged that the use of “natural” on cosmetics product labels was misleading, and defined 

natural as “existing in or produced by nature; not artificial.” Balser, 2013 WL 6673617 at *1. The 

court found that definition to be implausible given that “shampoos and lotions do not exist in 

nature, there are no shampoo trees.” Id. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs’ definition relies on the 

synthetic or processed nature of the ingredients in the products. A factfinder may ultimately find 

that a reasonable consumer would not define “natural” as Plaintiff does, but that is not for the 

Court to resolve on the pleadings alone.

In Pelayo, the district court rejected several definitions of “natural” offered by plaintiffs in 

part based on a report by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) that “declined to adopt a 

definition of ‘natural’” because the word “may be used in numerous contexts and may convey 

different meanings depending on that context.” Pelayo, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 979. Pelayo’s reasoning

has been heavily criticized by other courts. See, e.g., Garcia v. Kashi Co., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 

1384-85 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (noting that “no subsequent case has adopted Pelayo’s position” and 

declining to do so); Surzyn v. Diamond Foods, Inc., No. C 14-0136 SBA, 2014 WL 2212216 at *3 

(N.D. Cal. May 28, 2014) (stating the FTC’s analysis, “rather than justifying the Pelayo court’s 

dismissal . . . support[s] the conclusion that the question . . . must be resolved based on 

consideration of evidence—and not at the pleading stage”); Jou v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. C13-03075 JSC, 2013 WL 6491158 at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013) (stating the Pelayo holding “is 

at odds with basic logic, contradicts the FTC statement on which it relies, and appears in conflict 

with the holdings of many other courts, including the Ninth Circuit”). The Court agrees with these 

criticisms and declines to adopt the reasoning in Pelayo.

Last, Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ citation to the USDA and NPA definitions of “organic” 

and natural” are not helpful and may even be misleading because they apply to food products and 

not cleaning products. ECF No. 37 at 14. However, Plaintiffs look to USDA and NPA sources 

only for guidance as to what reasonable consumers would consider natural, ECF No. 1 ¶ 8-9, and

allege that a reasonable consumer would consider products labeled “natural” to be free of 

“synthetic, highly processed, and/or non-natural ingredients.” Id. ¶ 13-14. Furthermore, Plaintiffs 

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 8 of 13
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

need not allege that “every consumer shares the same definition of ‘natural,’” only that “a 

reasonable consumer — regardless of the precise definition of natural to which that consumer 

adheres — could . . . be misled” by the use of “natural” on Defendant’s labels. Garrison v. Whole 

Foods Market Grp., Inc., No. 13–cv–05222–VC, 2014 WL 2451290, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 

2014).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs allege with sufficient plausibility that a 

reasonable consumer is likely to be deceived by the term “natural,” and denies the motion to 

dismiss on these grounds.

C. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 

Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) claim, 

arguing that their products are not “defective” even if they are incorrectly labeled as “natural.” 

ECF No. 37 at 19. Plaintiffs do not oppose this claim and voluntarily agree to dismiss their 

MMWA claims without prejudice. ECF No. 47 at 4 n.2. Accordingly, the Court grants

Defendant’s motion to dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s MMWA claim and nationwide class 

allegations based upon that claim.

D. Specificity of the Pleadings 

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state their claims with the required 

specificity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), as well as the heightened particularity 

necessary for claims related to fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). ECF No. 37 at 

22. 

1. Rule 9(b)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that a party alleging fraud “must state with 

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); ECF No. 37 at 5. “Rule 

9(b) demands that the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud ‘be specific enough to give 

defendants notice of the particular misconduct . . . so that they can defend against the charge and 

not just deny that they have done anything wrong.’” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 

1124 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011)). To 

meet this standard, a “complaint must ‘identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the 

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 9 of 13
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

misconduct charged, as well as what is false or misleading about the purportedly fraudulent 

statement, and why it is false.’” Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quoting Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2011)). Plaintiffs do not dispute that Rule 9(b) governs their claims.

Here, Plaintiffs specify which of Seventh Generation’s product labels contained 

misrepresentations, attach photograph exhibits of the challenged labels to the complaint, and 

include links and quotes from Defendant’s website. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs also clearly 

describe how Seventh Generation’s use of the word “natural” was allegedly misleading. Id. at ¶ 5. 

Plaintiffs state that they each purchased Defendant’s products, in reliance on the truthfulness of 

the “natural” labels, during the class period.2 Id. at ¶ 13-14. Plaintiff Erica Wildstein specifies

that she purchased the products at two retailers and their locations. Id. at ¶ 14. These statements 

are sufficient to establish “the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged” so 

that Defendant has sufficient notice to defend against this suit. Salameh, 726 F.3d at 1133. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss on Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) grounds is denied.

2. Rule 8(a)(2)

Both parties agree Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint 

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in 

order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Because the Court has found that the 

higher pleading standard of 9(b) has been met, the more lenient 8(a)(2) standard is also met. 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss on Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) grounds is denied.

E. Breach of Warranty

“[T]o prevail on a breach of express warranty claim, the plaintiff must prove (1) the 

seller’s statements constitute an affirmation of fact or promise or a description of the goods; 

 

2 Defendant argues “during the class period” does not give an indication of when Plaintiffs first 

purchased the products. ECF No. 37 at 22. Therefore, Defendant argues, the statute of limitations 

for Plaintiffs’ CLRA and FAL claims may have already passed. Id. However, the Court finds 

Plaintiffs’ assertion is specific enough to survive a motion to dismiss. See Janney v. Mills, 944 

F.Supp. 2d 806, 817 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (denying dismissal when plaintiffs alleged they purchased 

defendant’s products “during the class period”). 

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 10 of 13
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(2) the statement was part of the basis of the bargain; and (3) the warranty was breached.” 

Weinstat v. Dentsply Int’l., Inc., 180 Cal. App. 4th 1213, 1227 (2010) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Relying on their arguments regarding Plaintiffs’ false advertising and unfair 

business practice claims, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not met the reasonable consumer 

standard and therefore have failed to “identify statements ‘amounting to an affirmation of fact or 

promise’ which could constitute an express warranty on which a reasonable consumer could 

rely.’” ECF No. 37 at 24 (quoting Long v. Graco Children’s Prods. Inc., No. 13–cv–01257–

WHO, 2013 WL 4655763, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013)). 

The Court has already rejected the contention that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not plausibly 

meet the reasonable consumer standard as a matter of law. Plaintiffs allege that the use of the 

word “natural” in Defendant’s labeling “constitute express warranties and became part of the basis 

of the bargain between Plaintiffs and the Multi-State Class members . . . and Defendant.” ECF 

No. 1 ¶ 93. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant breached its duty because the products were 

not “natural.” Id. ¶ 96. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for breach of express 

warranty. See Garrison v. Whole Foods Market Grp., Inc., No. 13–cv–05222–VC, 2014 WL 

2451290, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2014). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’

breach of warranty claim is denied.

F. Punitive Damages Under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act 

The parties agree that to sustain an action for punitive damages under the CLRA Plaintiffs 

must allege facts sufficient to show that the Defendant is guilty “of oppression, fraud, or malice.” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause 

injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and 

conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1). “‘Fraud’

means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the 

defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property 

or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).3 For punitive damages, 

 

3

Plaintiffs do not argue Defendants are guilty of oppression. ECF No. 49 at 7.

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 11 of 13
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiffs only need to allege one of the three elements. Allen v. Hyland’s Inc., No. CV 12–01150 

DMG (MANx), 2013 WL 1748408, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2013). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendant acted maliciously. ECF 

No. 37 at 23. However, Plaintiffs state in their complaint that “Defendant knew, or reasonably 

should have known, that its representations concerning the Products are untrue and misleading, 

since they [sic] know how the Products and their ingredients are manufactured.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 72. 

This is sufficient to allege malice. See Allen, 2013 WL 1748408, at *2 (“merely alleging that 

Defendants knew or should have known all along that their products do not work because they

contain no active ingredient serves to adequately plead malice.”). 

Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendant acted with the intent to 

deceive. ECF No. 37 at 23. It contends that its representations on its website that certain 

ingredients are synthetic undermine any claim of intent to defraud or injure. Id. at 23-24. 

However, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant had the “intent to create consumer belief that the 

Products are ‘natural.’” ECF No. 1 ¶ 32. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that they purchased 

Defendant’s products because of the “natural” label and that they paid premium prices for those 

products. Id. ¶ 50. Finally, Plaintiffs allege “Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, 

that its representations concerning the Products are untrue and misleading.” Id. ¶ 72. Therefore, 

Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded fraud. 

IV. MOTION TO STRIKE 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) authorizes the Court to “strike from a pleading . . . 

any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “The 

function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise 

from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . .” Whittlestone, Inc. 

v. Handi–Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Motions to strike are generally disfavored, and should typically be denied “unless it is 

clear that the matter sought to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of 

the litigation.” Rosales v. Citibank, Fed. Sav. Bank, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 

“Any doubt concerning the import of the allegations to be stricken weighs in favor of denying the 

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 12 of 13
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

motion to strike.” In re Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 609, 614 

(N.D. Cal. 2007).

Seventh Generation requests that the Court strike four elements from Plaintiffs’ complaint. 

First, it asks the Court to strike allegations concerning USDA regulations because the USDA 

regulations apply only to agricultural and meat products. ECF No. 36 at 4. Second, it requests 

that the Court strike information referring to standards from the Natural Products Association 

(“NPA”) because the NPA is a private industry group, not a regulatory body. Id. at 4-5. Third, it 

requests that the Court strike citations to the Environmental Digest published by the National 

Advertising Division (“NAD”) of the Advertising Self-Regulatory Council, arguing that the NAD 

did not sufficiently explain how it reached the findings cited by Plaintiffs. Id. at 5. Last, it asks 

the Court to strike the references to third-party websites and other documents because they have 

no “specific connection to Seventh Generation.” Id. at 6-7. 

The Court disagrees with Seventh Generation. These sources provide information as to 

what the word “natural” may mean to consumers as well as the ingredients that may be in 

Defendant’s products. This information is clearly at least material to the question of how a 

reasonable consumer would interpret the word “natural” on Defendant’s product labels. The 

motion to strike is therefore denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the request for judicial notice is granted in part and 

denied without prejudice in part. The motion to dismiss is granted in regards to Plaintiffs’ MMWA 

claims and denied in regards to all other claims. The motion to strike is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 3, 2015

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-00205-JST Document 54 Filed 11/03/15 Page 13 of 13