Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03696/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03696-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bettye Battle-Turner
Appellant
David Bonenberger
Appellee
Michael L. Gerdine
Appellant
Richard Gray
Appellant
Reggie L. Harris
Appellant
Thomas Irwin
Appellant
Daniel W. Isom
Appellant
Jerry Lee
Appellant
Michael Muxo
Appellant
Francis G. Slay
Appellant
St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department
Appellant
The Board of Police Commissioners of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3696

___________________________

David Bonenberger

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department; The Board of Police Commissioners of

the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department; Bettye Battle-Turner, in her official

and individual capacities as a member of the Board of Police Commissioners;

Richard Gray, in his official and individual capacities as a member of the Board of

Police Commissioners; Francis G. Slay, in his official and individual capacities as

a member of the Board of Police Commissioners; Michael L. Gerdine, in his

official and individual capacities as a former member of the Board of Police

Commissioners; Jerry Lee, in his official and individual capacities as a former

member of the Board of Police Commissioners; Thomas Irwin, in his official and

individual capacities as a current member of the Board of Police Commissioners;

Chief Daniel W. Isom, in his official and individual capacities; Lt. Col. Reggie L.

Harris, in his official and individual capacities; Lt. Michael Muxo, in his official

and individual capacities

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: September 24, 2015

 Filed: January 19, 2016

____________

Appellate Case: 14-3696 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/19/2016 Entry ID: 4357042 
Before RILEY, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

Sergeant DavidBonenberger, a whiteman, applied for the position of Assistant

Academy Director of the St. Louis, Missouri Police Academy. Sergeant Angela

Taylor, an African-American woman, was chosen. Sergeant Bonenberger sued a

number of officials in the St. Louis Police Department, alleging race discrimination

and conspiracy to discriminate. A jury found in Sergeant Bonenberger’s favor on his

claims against three of his superiors: Academy Director Lieutenant Michael Muxo,

Lieutenant Colonel Reggie Harris, and then-Police Chief Daniel Isom. They appeal 1

the district court’s denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law. Having

2

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND3

Sergeant Bonenberger was a long-time employee of the St. Louis Metropolitan

Police Department. In September 2010, the Department posted a job opening for

Assistant Academy Director of the city’s police academy. Upon learning of the

opening, Sergeant Bonenberger contacted Lieutenant Muxo, “to get a feel for”

whether he might be eligible for the position, despite not meeting the minimum

qualifications of three years of supervisory experience and two years of teaching

experience. Lieutenant Muxo told Sergeant Bonenberger “not to bother applying

Chief Isom is now retired. 1

The HonorableCatherine D. Perry, United States DistrictJudge for theEastern 2

District of Missouri.

We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. See 3

Southland Metals, Inc. v. Am. Castings, LLC, 800 F.3d 452, 458 (8th Cir. 2015).

-2-

Appellate Case: 14-3696 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/19/2016 Entry ID: 4357042 
. . . because the job was going to a black female. . . . [I]t was out of his hands . . . and

[his superior Lieutenant] Colonel Harris would make the decision.” 

The outgoing Assistant Academy Director, Sergeant Deborah Boelling, also

discussed the position with Lieutenant Muxo. When they discussed who might be

selected for the position, Lieutenant Muxo declared, “there no way [sic] they were

going to put a white male in that position.” Sergeant Boelling suggested Lieutenant

Muxo consider Sergeant Bonenberger for the position. She inquired who Lieutenant

Muxo was “interested in” and why, and he replied Sergeant Taylor was being

considered because “Harris wanted a black female in that position.”

Sergeant Bonenberger applied for the job anyway, “hop[ing] that maybe

something would fall through with the person they had picked out for it.” Despite

Sergeant Bonenberger’s interest and Sergeant Boelling’s recommendation, Lieutenant

Muxo recommended Sergeant Taylor to Lieutenant Colonel Harris, who in turn

recommended her to Chief Isom.

Like Sergeant Bonenberger, Sergeant Taylor did not meet the minimum

qualificationsfor the position. She had lesssupervisory and teaching experience than

Sergeant Bonenberger, and scored lower than Sergeant Bonenberger on her

performance evaluations. Lieutenant Muxo wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Harris that

he recommended Sergeant Taylor because “her management style [is] conducive to

the vision I have for the Academy” and she is “a quick learner and can meet my

expectations.” Neither Sergeant Bonenberger nor Sergeant Taylor were interviewed.

The day Sergeant Taylor’s selection was announced, Sergeant Bonenberger

filed a grievance alleging he was improperly denied an interview for the position.

Sergeant Bonenberger proposed the department should, among other things: 

“Rescind the transfer of [Sergeant Taylor; and] [g]rant me an interview for the

position with a member ofthe [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] present

-3-

Appellate Case: 14-3696 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/19/2016 Entry ID: 4357042 
during the interview.” Sergeant Bonenberger did not mention his conversation with

Lieutenant Muxo in the grievance because Lieutenant Muxo had been “truthful and

honest” with him and he did not want to “throw him under the bus.” 

Lieutenant Muxo contacted Sergeant Bonenberger the day after Sergeant

Taylor was selected and Lieutenant Muxo told him “he had no choice” and “he had

to bring color down to the academy.” A few days later, Chief Isom tacitly denied

Sergeant Bonenberger’s grievance, writing to a Department of Human Resources

representative that he chose Sergeant Taylor for the position because she “had the

most time in rank and a clean disciplinary background” and “the responsibility for the

transfer of personnel rests with the Chief of Police and he/she retains the right to

assign personnel as the needs of the Department dictate.” Chief Isom’s

correspondence did not mention Sergeant Bonenberger’s greater supervising and

teaching experience, his greater number of certifications, or his superior performance

evaluations. 

In fact, Sergeant Bonenberger and Sergeant Taylor were promoted fromPolice

Officer to Sergeant on the same day, and both had a disciplinary history. Sergeant

Bonenberger had received multiple written reprimands and short-term suspensions

for infractions such as careless driving, “[d]ischarging a [f]irearm at a [m]oving

[v]ehicle,” “failure to remain on assigned beat until relief is called,” “unprofessional

demeanor,” and “fail[ing] to notify his superior of information concerning police

matters” and “knowingly ma[king] false statementsto . . . Internal Affairs” about that

incident. Sergeant Taylor appears to have had fewerindividual disciplinary incidents. 

However, she was suspended for 30 days in connection with eight disciplinary

infractions after she “failed to secure medical attention for [a gunshot] victim,” failed

to investigate the crime or report it to a supervisor, and “made false statementsto [the

Internal Affairs Division]” in connection with the investigation of the incident.

-4-

Appellate Case: 14-3696 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/19/2016 Entry ID: 4357042 
Sergeant Bonenberger sued a number of officials in the Department in their

official and individual capacitiesfor racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1981, and the Missouri Human Rights

Act (MHRA), alleging he was not hired for the Assistant Academy Director position

due to his race. This appeal pertains only to Lieutenant Muxo, Lieutenant Colonel

Harris, and Chief Isom. Sergeant Bonenberger alleges they discriminated against him

based on his race and Lieutenant Muxo and Lieutenant Colonel Harris conspired to

discriminate against him based on his race. 

The jury found for Sergeant Bonenberger on his discrimination claims against

all three defendants and his conspiracy claimagainst Lieutenant Muxo and Lieutenant

Colonel Harris. Sergeant Bonenberger was awarded actual damages of $200,000 and

punitive damages of $100,000 against Lieutenant Muxo, $300,000 against Lieutenant

Colonel Harris, and $20,000 against Chief Isom. The district court granted additional

equitable relief, including an injunction against future discrimination.

Lieutenant Muxo, Lieutenant Colonel Harris, and Chief Isom (appellants)

moved for judgment as a matter of law, to amend the judgment, or for a new trial. 

The district court denied the motion. They appeal the denial of their motion for

judgment as a matter of law.4

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“We review the denial of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law de novo,

and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” Southland

Metals, 800 F.3d at 458. We “will reverse only if ‘there is a complete absence of

Appellants mention their motion for a new trial only in their reply brief, so we 4

do not consider it. See, e.g., Neb. State Legislative Bd., United Transp. Union v.

Slater, 245 F.3d 656, 658 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2001). 

-5-

Appellate Case: 14-3696 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/19/2016 Entry ID: 4357042 
probative facts to support the verdict.’” Am. Bank of St. Paul v. TD Bank, N.A., 713

F.3d 455, 462 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sanders v. Lee Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 669 F.3d

888, 894 (8th Cir. 2012)). 

B. Adverse Employment Action and Discrimination Claims

“A prima facie case of discrimination [under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 and the MHRA] requires the employee to present evidence of an adverse

employment action brought on by the employer’s discriminatory motive.” 

MacGregor v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 373 F.3d 923, 927-28 (8th Cir. 2004); see also

McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 510 (8th Cir. 1995). “An

adverse employment action is a tangible change in working conditions that produces

a material employment disadvantage.” Sallis v. Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 476

(8th Cir. 2005).

Appellants assert they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because

Sergeant “Bonenberger’s speculative testimony did not provide sufficient evidence

of an adverse employment action in order for his discrimination claim to get to the

jury.” Because the Assistant Academy Director position was not a promotion and

5

carried no increase in pay, benefits, orrank, appellants contend Sergeant Bonenberger

experienced “purely subjective injuries and disappointment” not rising to the level of

an adverse employment action. See id.

This question of whether Sergeant Bonenberger suffered an adverse

5

employment action was not submitted to the jury. Because Appellants do not raise

any issue related to that fact on appeal, that issue is forfeited, and we do not address

it. See, e.g., Neb. State Legislative Bd., United Transp. Union, 245 F.3d at 658 & n.3. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 14-3696 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/19/2016 Entry ID: 4357042 
Denial of a sought-after transfer may constitute an adverse employment action

if the transfer would result in a change in pay, rank, or material working conditions.

6

Cf. LePique v. Hove, 217 F.3d 1012, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding the denial of

a requested transfer to the same position in a different city was not an adverse

employment action because the transfer would have involved no material change in

working conditions). Although appellants correctly assert Sergeant Bonenberger

would not have experienced a change in pay or rank if he had been selected for the

Assistant Academy Director position, we must also determine whether the position

offered materially different working conditions. As the district court reasoned,

Sergeant Bonenberger introduced evidence the Assistant Academy Director position

was “a high-profile” job; involved significant supervisory duties; offered more

“contact with command rank officers”; and provided regular daytime hours and

holidays off. Historically sergeants who held the position of Assistant Academy

Director were “significantly” more likely to be promoted to Lieutenant. 

Because we have had little occasion to elaborate on “material working

conditions” in the context of the denial of a requested transfer—the question

presented here—we find a useful analogy in our cases holding that a compulsory,

unwanted “transfer constitutes an adverse employment action when the transfer

resultsin a significant change inworking conditions or a diminution in the transferred

employee’s title, salary, or benefits.” See Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d

915, 919-20 (8th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (concluding an adverse employment

action occurred where an employee wastransferred to “an admittedly less prestigious

Although the parties characterize the employment action at issue as a transfer, 6

we note it may more closely resemble a hiring action. Sergeant Bonenberger was

applying for a different job, not, for example, a transfer to the same job in another

precinct. We conclude Sergeant Bonenberger suffered an adverse employment action

regardless of whether Sergeant Bonenberger’s pursuit of the Assistant Academy

Director position is characterized as an application for a new job or a request for a

transfer to a different job assignment.

-7-

Appellate Case: 14-3696 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/19/2016 Entry ID: 4357042 
unit,” which involved “less lucrative clients and . . . a smaller sales territory”). We

have held changes in supervisory duties, prestige, and promotion potential, if

significant, can produce materially different working conditions. Cf., e.g., id. 

For example, we determined a transfer froma supervisory to a non-supervisory

position constituted an adverse employment action due to the significant difference

in job functions. See Tadlock v. Powell, 291 F.3d 541, 546-47 (8th Cir. 2002)

(explaining reassignment to a “less prestigious,” non-supervisory position was an

adverse employment action even though the employee retained “the same grade,

salary, and benefits”). The potential of a transfer leading to future promotions or

salary increases is also relevant, at least when combined with other material

differences in working conditions. See Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365,

1369 (8th Cir. 1997) (declining to disturb a jury award in favor of a plaintiff who was

transferred to another position with a higher salary but without supervisory status or

comparable opportunities for salary increases and advancement).

Based on these previous interpretations, we conclude the Assistant Academy

Director position’s supervisory duties, regular schedule and hours, greater prestige,

and potential increased opportunity for promotion, in combination, offered a material

change in working conditionsfor Sergeant Bonenberger. These materially different

7

working conditions provide sufficient evidence to support the conclusion Sergeant

Bonenberger suffered an adverse employment action. Because there were “probative

facts to support the verdict,” the district court did not err by denying appellants’

motion for judgment as a matter of law on Sergeant Bonenberger’s discrimination

claims. See Am. Bank of St. Paul, 713 F.3d at 462. 

We express no opinion whether any one of these factors, standing alone, 7

would constitute a material change in working conditions.

-8-

Appellate Case: 14-3696 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/19/2016 Entry ID: 4357042 
C. Conspiracy Claim

With regard to Sergeant Bonenberger’s conspiracy claim, Lieutenant Muxo and

Lieutenant Colonel Harris argue Sergeant Bonenberger failed to proffer sufficient

evidence to prove they reached an agreement to deprive him of his constitutional

rights. To prove a § 1983 conspiracy claim, Sergeant Bonenberger must prove: 

“(1) that the defendant[s] conspired with others to deprive him of constitutional

rights; (2) that at least one of the alleged co-conspirators engaged in an overt act in

furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) that the overt act injured [him].” White v.

McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 814 (8th Cir. 2008). “[T]he plaintiff must allege with

particularity and specifically demonstrate with material facts that the defendants

reached an agreement. [The plaintiff] can satisfy this burden by ‘pointing to at least

some facts which would suggest [the defendants] “reached an understanding” to

violate [his] rights.’” City of Omaha Emps. Betterment Ass’n v. City of Omaha, 883

F.2d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 1989) (alterations omitted) (quoting Nelson v. City of

McGehee, 876 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1989)). 

Appellants argue a reasonable jury could not have found evidence of an

agreement becauseSergeant Bonenberger’s and Sergeant Boelling’s testimonies were

that Lieutenant Colonel Harris told Lieutenant Muxo he had decided to hire a black

woman, not that the two agreed. See City of Omaha Emps. Betterment Ass’n, 883

F.2d at 653 (“Mere knowledge of another’s wrongdoing isinsufficient to hold a party

liable as a conspirator.”). Although this is one reasonable interpretation of their

testimony, it is not the only reasonable interpretation. Sergeant Boelling’s testimony

could also be interpreted to support an inference that Lieutenant Muxo and Lieutenant

Colonel Harris reached an agreement. Sergeant Boelling testified: “[Lieutenant

Muxo] told me that [Lieutenant Colonel] Harris wanted a black female in the

position, and that there no way [sic] they were going to put a white male in that

position.” (Emphasis added). A reasonable jury could interpret Sergeant Boelling’s

use of “they” to mean Lieutenant Muxo was referring to himself, Lieutenant Colonel

Harris, and possibly Chief Isom. This interpretation properly was left to the jury. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 14-3696 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/19/2016 Entry ID: 4357042 
Lieutenant Muxo’s related statement to Sergeant Boelling that he was interested in

Sergeant Taylor for the position because Lieutenant Colonel Harris wanted to hire a

black woman could also support the inference that Lieutenant Muxo and Lieutenant

Colonel Harris reached an understanding to discriminate against Sergeant

Bonenberger based on his race.

We have held “‘[t]he question of the existence of a conspiracy to deprive the

plaintiff[] of [his] constitutional rights should not be taken from the jury if there is a

possibility the jury could infer from the circumstances a “meeting of the minds” or

understanding among the conspirators to achieve the conspiracy’s aims.’” White, 519

F.3d at 816 (quoting Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1458 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). 

Because Sergeant Bonenberger put forth “‘at least some facts which would suggest

that [Lieutenant Muxo and Lieutenant Colonel Harris] “reached an understanding”

to violate [his] rights,’” this question wasreserved for the jury. City of Omaha Emps.

Betterment Ass’n, 883 F.2d at 652 (quoting Nelson, 876 F.2d at 59). We affirm the

district court’s denial of appellants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

-10-

Appellate Case: 14-3696 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/19/2016 Entry ID: 4357042