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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Tristan Wolff
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 1999 Decided November 2, 1999

No. 98-3152

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Tristan Wolff,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cr00098-01)

Jennifer Blunt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Stephen R. Martin, II, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Wilma A.

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Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Mary Patrice Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: Williams, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: This case is here for a second time

on claims of sentencing error. In United States v. Wolff, 127

F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Wolff I") the court remanded for

resentencing in view of the government's breaches of the plea

agreement. See id. at 86-87. On remand, the district court

sentenced Wolff to sixty-four months' incarceration and three

years' supervised release on each robbery count, the sentences to run concurrently. The district court reimposed a

special assessment of $100.00 under 18 U.S.C. s 3013, and

again ordered Wolff to pay restitution of $122.00 to Riggs

Bank and $1867.00 to Washington Federal Savings Bank.

Wolff contends the district court erred by applying a twolevel enhancement under s 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) of the United

States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1995) ("Guidelines"),

when the evidence failed to show an express threat of death,

and by failing to consider his ability to pay before ordering

restitution as required under the Victim Witness Protection

Act, 18 U.S.C. s 3664(a) (1995). As clarified at oral argument, Wolff also contends, in the event this court agrees with

his second claim of error, that the district court erred in

delegating part of its sentencing responsibility to the probation office. Because our decision in United States v. Robinson, 86 F.3d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1996), is dispositive of his

first claim of error, and we conclude that Wolff has failed to

show that the district court plainly erred with regard to its

statutory obligation to consider his ability to pay, we affirm

and do not reach his unlawful delegation claim.

I.

Wolff received a two-level sentence enhancement for making an express threat of death pursuant to s 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) of

the Guidelines on the basis of a note that he handed to a

bank teller stating: "give me all your big bills, $100s, $50s,

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and $20s, I have a gun. I will kill people." We see no merit

in Wolff's argument that this statement did not provide

sufficient basis for sentencing enhancement, as we fail to see

any material difference between the note used by Wolff in the

instant case and the demand note in Robinson that stated

"I'll shoot somebody in here now." Robinson, 86 F.3d at

1202. Each was an express threat of death within the

meaning of s 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) of the Guidelines.1

In Robinson, the court explained that to qualify for this

enhancement it is sufficient that a reasonable person in the

position of the immediate victim of the robbery would "(1)

very likely [have] believed that the robber made a threat and

that the threat was to kill and (2) likely thought that his or

her life was in peril thereby experiencing 'significantly greater fear' than the intimidation required to commit robbery."

86 F.3d at 1202. The court left open "the possibility that a

court may enhance a sentence even if an ordinary person

would be placed in fear for someone else's life." Id. at 1203.

Wolff contends that the statement at issue here could not

reasonably have put the teller in fear for her life because it

referred only to "people in general." Wolff maintains that

__________

1 Application note 6 to the commentary to s 2B3.1 of the Guidelines states:

An "express threat of death," as used in subsection (b)(2)(F),

may be in the form of an oral or written statement, act,

gesture, or combination thereof. For example, an oral or

written demand using words such as "Give me the money or I

will kill you", "Give me the money or I will shoot you", "Give

me your money or else (where the defendant draws his hand

across his throat in a slashing motion)", or "Give me the money

or you are dead" would constitute an express threat of death.

The court should consider that the intent of the underlying

provision is to provide an increased offense level for cases in

which the offender(s) engaged in conduct that would instill in a

reasonable person, who is a victim of the offense, significantly

greater fear than that necessary to constitute an element of the

offense of robbery.

Guidelines s 2B3.1 comment, n.6.

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Robinson is not dispositive as to such "general" statements.2

Yet, from the statement of what are sufficient elements for

enhancement in Robinson, it necessarily follows that the bank

teller in the instant case could reasonably believe she was

included among the "people" Wolff was threatening to kill.

See United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161, 1166-67 (4th Cir.

1995). The absence of the word "teller" in the note can

hardly be dispositive when the context of an ongoing robbery

is considered. This was not an innocent encounter; the

threat in the note enhanced the intimidation that robbery

alone would cause; the teller was in the immediate chain of

custody of the money that Wolff sought to take from the

bank. Moreover, the Guidelines would not appear to require

that the threat be specifically directed to a particular person

or specific target. In any event, under the circumstances, a

reasonable teller could easily infer from the context of the

note that the threat to kill "people" included her.

Much like the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Strandberg,

952 F.2d 1149, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 1991), we conclude that the

statement by Wolff was equivalent to the note in Robinson.

See also United States v. Figueroa, 105 F.3d 874, 879-80 (3d

Cir. 1997); United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 276-77

(7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bell, 12 F.3d 139, 139-40

(8th Cir. 1993).

Just as a reasonable teller receiving a note from a bank

robber would very likely infer that "shoot" means "kill,"

a reasonable teller would also probably infer that a

threat to kill "somebody in here" referred to him. Indeed, in the highly-charged circumstances of a robbery,

we think that the threat to "shoot somebody in here" is

practically indistinguishable from the threat to "shoot

you."

Robinson, 86 F.3d at 1202. Therefore, the district court did

not err in enhancing Wolff's sentence under s 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).

__________

2 Wolff suggests that Robinson left open, for example, the question of whether statements such as "I have a gun" and "I will shoot

somebody out here" are statements to which s 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) applies.

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II.

The Victim Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. ss 3663-3664

(1995), requires that, prior to ordering restitution, the district

court "shall consider the amount of loss sustained by any

victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the

defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the

defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other

factors as the court deems appropriate." 18 U.S.C. s 3664(a)

(1995).3 Wolff contends for the first time on appeal that the

district court failed to consider his ability to pay restitution.

Because our review is for plain error, Wolff must show not

only that the district court erred but that he suffered prejudice as a result. See United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320,

1327 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Thompson, 113 F.3d

13, 15 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

732-34, 736, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776-79, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

Even under our modified view of plain error in sentencing,

see United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287-88 (D.C. Cir.

1994), cert. denied, 591 U.S. 956 (1996), Wolff has not met his

burden.

At his original sentencing, the district court ordered Wolff

to pay restitution of $122.00 to Riggs Bank and $1,867.00 to

Washington Federal Savings Bank. At the sentencing hearing, the district court indicated that it had considered the

information in Wolff's presentence report. That report concluded that Wolff did not currently have the ability to pay a

fine, restitution, or the cost of supervision or incarceration.

But the report also stated that Wolff was 30 years old at the

__________

3 We apply the statute in effect at the time of the criminal

conduct, as both parties agree, in light of the court's decisions that

application of the later enacted Mandatory Victims Restitution Act

of 1996, Title II, Subtitle A of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214

(codified at 18 U.S.C. ss 3663-3664 (1996)), which eliminated the

requirement that the district court consider the defendant's ability

to pay before ordering restitution in a case like this, 18 U.S.C.

s 3664(f)(1)(A) (1996), would raise ex post facto concerns. See

United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1141 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1998);

Bapack, 129 F.3d at 1327 n.13.

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time of sentencing in 1996, had no dependents, was in good

mental and physical health, had a Bachelor of Science degree

from Dolgealflea Polytechnic in England, had previously been

employed at a local business for seven years earning approximately $500 weekly, and had produced award-winning movie

videos. Wolff does not dispute the accuracy of this information, nor does he dispute that the district court referenced the

original judgment at his resentencing.

Clearly, under the statutory mandate, the district court

could properly take into account the defendant's educational

level, employable skills, and financial status, including family

cost-of-living expenses upon release from prison and other

obligations. Consideration of the statutory factors is demonstrated when a district court indicates expressly at some

point prior to ordering a defendant to pay restitution that the

court has considered the defendant's financial situation and

has concluded, in light of identified evidence or uncontested

proffers, that the defendant has the ability to pay. A district

court's consideration of a defendant's ability to pay also may

be demonstrated implicitly by its adoption of the explained

conclusion in the presentence report, or through some other

statement by the court indicating in more than a perfunctory

manner that it has considered the defendant's financial situation. See Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1141; Bapack, 129 F.3d at 1328.

Looking at the record, see, e.g., Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1141, it

is sufficiently clear, albeit just barely, by cobbling together

statements at various points in Wolff's sentencing hearings,

that there was no plain error.4

__________

4 Although the district court did not make express findings as to

Wolff's ability to pay restitution, the statute does not require as

much. See Bapack, 129 F.3d at 1328. Accord United States v.

Davis, 117 F.3d 459, 463 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sanders,

95 F.3d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lavin, 27 F.3d 40,

42 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Rogat, 924 F.2d 983, 986 (10th

Cir. 1991); United States v. Ryan, 874 F.2d 1052, 1053 (5th Cir.

1989). Additionally, we note that while express findings are not

required, a clear indication on the record of the district court's

consideration of the statutory factors would facilitate appellate

review; in this regard, counsel on both sides could assist the district

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First, and foremost, the district court's remarks at sentencing indicate that it had reviewed the presentence report prior

to imposing sentence. This alone can suffice to show that the

district court considered the defendant's ability to pay. See

Bapak, 129 F.3d at 1327; Davis, 117 F.3d at 464; United

States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1278 (4th Cir. 1995); United

States v. Mizrachi, 48 F.3d 651, 657 (2d Cir. 1995); United

States v. Osborn, 58 F.3d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1995); United

States v. Nelson, 5 F.3d 254, 258-59 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 1098, 114 S. Ct. 937, 127 L.Ed.2d 228 (1994).

At the end of Wolff's first sentencing hearing, the district

court referenced the findings in the report with regard to the

amount of restitution due each victim bank, and at his resentencing hearing, the district court read from and paraphrased

its discussion of restitution at the first sentencing hearing.

Thus, in amending the restitution amount suggested in the

presentence report to reflect money already recovered by one

of the victim banks, the district court remarked "I can only

deal with the information that I have from the presentence

report...." Furthermore, in the judgment imposing the

restitution on Wolff, the district court indicated that it had

adopted the factual findings of the presentence report.

It might also be said that the district court did not accept

such evidence at face value, for it specifically stated that, as of

the time of sentencing, the amount of Wolff's prison pay

"probably is meager." Although a defendant could have

other financial resources, the district court's remark is some

indication that the court was considering Wolff's financial

status. In addition, at the conclusion of Wolff's first sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it had not "been

able to find that there has been any ability to pay." Although

this statement is unclear, it does suggest that the district

court recognized that it was obligated to consider Wolff's

ability to pay if it was going to impose financial conditions as

part of the sentence, or as the government suggests, the

__________

court. Cf. United States v. Dudley, 104 F.3d 442, 447 (D.C. Cir.

1997).

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statement may have referred to Wolff's inability to pay a fine,

cost of imprisonment, or supervision.

Considering the burden on Wolff to show error by the

district court in ordering restitution, see 18 U.S.C. s 3664(d),

we conclude that Wolff cannot show error that seriously

affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the

judicial proceedings. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S. Ct. at

1779. Although at oral argument he emphasized that he was

represented by court-appointed counsel, and the presentence

report noted a large debt, namely a loan of $8,000 from a

friend, and concluded, based in part on Wolff's statement that

he had no assets, that he was financially unable to pay

restitution, the district court was not required to reach the

same conclusion. The presentence report also included information about Wolff's somewhat remarkable educational and

working history that could reasonably cause the district court

to conclude that Wolff had the ability to earn a decent living

and then some. The court could reasonably view a personal

loan in a different light than a commercial loan with due dates

and clear legal consequences upon default. Wolff's contention at oral argument that the district court's reference at

sentencing to avoiding double recovery by a victim bank

indicates that it was applying the wrong statute, and therefore was unaware of the need to consider his ability to pay,

fails to demonstrate plain error; not only did the district

court refer to the need to find an ability of pay, neither the

government nor the 1995 Act or its successor, see supra n.3,

suggest the propriety of such recovery.

Accordingly, because Wolff's challenge to the enhancement

of this sentence under s 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) of the Guidelines is

meritless and he has failed to demonstrate that the district

court plainly erred by not considering his ability to pay

restitution, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

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