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Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 4, 1997 Decided December 19, 1997 

No. 97-3025

IN RE: SEALED CASE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cr00452-01)

Shawn Moore argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellant.

Barbara J. Valliere, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John 

R. Fisher and Michael D. Brittin, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

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SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: This is an interlocutory appeal 

by a juvenile defendant from an order of the district court 

denying his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and 

directing his transfer for prosecution as an adult. After 

examining the basis for the U.S. Attorney's certification of a 

"substantial federal interest" under the Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 5032 ¶ 1, the 

district court upheld the certification, finding that charges for 

murder of a United States Postal Service mail carrier did in 

fact implicate such an interest. Holding also that the defendant's prior adjudication for carnal knowledge of a female 

child under sixteen years of age constituted a conviction for a 

"crime of violence," the court ordered his transfer for adult 

prosecution under § 5032 ¶ 4. Because we hold that a prosecutor's certification of a "substantial federal interest" under 

18 U.S.C. § 5032 ¶ 1 is not subject to judicial review, and 

because the defendant's prior adjudications involved crimes 

implicating a "substantial risk of violence" under § 5032 ¶ 4, 

we affirm the district court's transfer order.

I

A nine-count information, charging the defendant with, 

inter alia, murder of a United States Postal Service mail 

carrier under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1114, alleged the following 

facts. The defendant, approximately four months before his 

eighteenth birthday, conspired with two others to commit 

armed robbery. During the afternoon of June 11, 1996, they 

observed a pedestrian walk up to a Postal Service truck to 

speak to the mail carrier, who was sitting inside eating lunch. 

Armed with a .38 caliber revolver, the defendant approached 

from the back of the mail truck, pointed the pistol at the mail 

carrier and the pedestrian, and told them to get down and 

give him their money. The pedestrian complied, but the 

driver was impeded by a chain from his belt linking him to 

the keys in the truck's ignition. When the defendant grabbed 

the driver and began to pull him from the truck, a nearby 

citizen yelled out, and the defendant without warning stepped 

back, aimed the gun at the driver and shot him in the head, 

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then fled on foot from the scene. The mail carrier died six 

days later.

II

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 

1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031 et seq. (the "Act"), states that a 

juvenile

shall not be proceeded against in any court of the United 

States unless the Attorney General, after investigation, 

certifies to the appropriate district court of the United 

States that ... (3) the offense charged is a crime of 

violence that is a felony ... and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant 

the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.

18 U.S.C. § 5032. Pursuant to this statute, the United States 

Attorney (under authority of the Attorney General, 28 C.F.R. 

§ 0.57) filed a Certification stating that the charges included 

a felony crime of violence and that the government's need to 

protect its employees and to ensure delivery of the mail 

constituted a "substantial federal interest" warranting the 

exercise of federal jurisdiction. The defendant moved to 

dismiss the information on the grounds that the federal court 

did not have jurisdiction, and that his prior record did not 

justify his transfer for adult prosecution. The district court 

ruled that the form of the certification was proper. It further 

undertook to examine the basis for the government's decision, 

and found that the allegations in the information indeed 

established a substantial federal interest. While the defendant argues that the district court erred in finding a substantial federal interest in this case, the government vigorously 

contests the district court's ruling that it "has the authority to 

analyze 'more than the mere form of the government's certification' to determine whether a substantial federal interest 

exists." United States v. A.W., No. 96-0452, 1997 WL 

118408, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 1997) (quoting United States v. 

Juvenile Male No. 1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1318 (4th Cir. 1996)).

A

Before considering the reviewability of a U.S. Attorney's 

certification of a substantial federal interest, we must address 

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a preliminary question, raised by the panel at oral argument: 

whether the ruling of the district court on the validity of 

certification is itself properly before this court. We have 

squarely held that the decision to transfer a juvenile for adult 

prosecution is a "collateral order" qualifying as a final decision subject to interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 

Therefore, the interlocutory appeal is proper; but does this 

subject to our review only that issue, or should we also 

consider the question of certification? Normally, interlocutory appeal is very restricted in criminal cases, and certification would not appear to be subject to interlocutory review on 

its own. See, e.g., United States v. Brizendine, 659 F.2d 215 

(D.C. Cir. 1981) (denying jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal on grounds related to plea bargaining process). However, not only is the question of certification inextricably related 

to the transfer order, which is properly before this court, but 

federal subject-matter jurisdiction depends upon certification 

in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 5032. See, e.g., Impounded,

120 F.3d 457, 460 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The courts of appeals that 

have considered this issue are in near unanimous agreement 

that the record certification requirement is a jurisdictional 

prerequisite in a transfer proceeding."). Because this court 

has the duty to inquire into our own jurisdiction, we hold that 

we must address the reviewability of certification when it is 

antecedent to another issue properly before us on interlocutory appeal.

Our partially dissenting colleague objects to our considering this threshold issue. However, the law requires a court 

to examine its own subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal 

cases as well as civil cases. "Subject-matter jurisdiction 

presents a threshold question in any federal prosecution." 

United States v. Baucum, 80 F.3d 539, 540 (D.C. Cir.) (per 

curiam), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 204 (1996). Otherwise put, in 

the criminal arena as in the civil, federal courts, being "courts 

of limited jurisdiction have only the power to hear those cases 

over which Congress has conferred subject-matter jurisdiction upon them." Id. Because of this basic principle, before 

we can legitimately decide any question, whether on interlocUSCA Case #97-3025 Document #317200 Filed: 12/19/1997 Page 4 of 22
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utory or final appeal, we, like all federal courts, "are under an 

independent obligation to examine [our] own jurisdiction...." 

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). If 

we are without subject-matter jurisdiction over the case 

ostensibly before us, then any pronouncement on any issue, 

even though that issue would itself be otherwise appealable, 

becomes a violation of our Article III limitations. There is no 

"distinction between civil and criminal cases" in this regard. 

Baucum, supra, is but one of many criminal cases examining 

subject-matter jurisdiction.

Our colleague's comparison of the certification with an 

indictment is not apt. It is not the case that "[i]ndictments 

are the functional equivalent of § 5032 certifications," simply 

because "both invoke the authority of the district court...." 

Dissent at 5. We do not suggest that § 5032 certification is 

jurisdictional because it invokes the authority, but rather 

because the statutory scheme makes it essential to the existence of that authority, as we explain hereafter. The indictment, like the complaint in a civil case, simply begins the 

application of an existing realm of subject-matter jurisdiction 

to the facts and parties of a specific case. In most criminal 

cases, that jurisdiction arises under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, though 

in the case of a transferred juvenile, it arises under chapter 

403 of Title 18, § 5031 et seq. The "functional equivalent" of 

the indictment in the case of a transferred juvenile is not the 

certification but the criminal information. The criminal information in this case displays on its face the jurisdictional basis: 

"(filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5031, et seq.)." 1 There are 

subject-matter thresholds to be crossed on the criminal side 

as on the civil. If the certification question is such a jurisdictional threshold, then we must determine if we have crossed 

it before we can address the interlocutory question lurking 

behind it. The certification is such a threshold.

__________

1 We agree with our colleague that the various other potential 

defects and affirmative defenses he discusses are not necessarily 

jurisdictional. Dissent at 5. We do not agree that they are in any 

way parallel to the certification in this case.

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Circuit courts addressing the validity of a prosecutor's 

certification of substantial federal interest have uniformly 

treated the certification requirement as jurisdictional. See, 

e.g., Impounded, 117 F.3d 730, 733 (3d Cir. 1997); United 

States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3355 (Nov. 17, 1997). Similarly, the 

circuits also have concluded that the closely related question 

of certification of the record under 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is 

jurisdictional. See Impounded, 120 F.3d 457, 460 (3d Cir.

1997); United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1369-70 (2d Cir. 

1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 190 (1995); United States v. 

Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 170 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. 

Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 222-23 (10th Cir. 1990). The Sixth 

Circuit, in United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 

1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1112 (1992), presented a straightforward and convincing analysis demonstrating the jurisdictional nature of the certification requirement under § 5032. 

As that circuit noted, under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency 

Act, Congress "revoked the district courts' preexisting, largely unrestricted subject-matter jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions against juveniles," by declaring that acts otherwise 

criminal, when committed by juveniles, become generally 

noncriminal and merely constitute the entry into a state of 

"juvenile delinquency." Id. at 1258. Thus, a juvenile who 

has committed what otherwise "would have been a crime if 

committed by an adult," 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (emphasis added), 

has not committed a criminal offense against the United 

States and is therefore not within the criminal jurisdiction of 

the federal courts. Then, as the Sixth Circuit went on to 

note, Congress "partially restored" the jurisdiction it had 

taken away from the courts by conferring authority to proceed against juveniles alleged to have committed "acts that 

would be federal crimes if committed by adults," id. at 1259, 

when, but only when, the certification requirement is met. 

Therefore, the Sixth Circuit reasoned cogently, this certification must be a jurisdictional requirement. As it does go to 

the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, we must answer

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that question before we can legitimately opine on anything 

else.2

After the federal district court has acquired jurisdiction 

under § 5032, the prosecution may proceed against the juvenile within that jurisdiction in two fashions. First, he may be 

proceeded against in a juvenile delinquency proceeding under 

chapter 403 of Title 18. This is specified in 18 U.S.C. § 5032, 

which states that "[a] juvenile who is alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency and who is not surrendered 

to State authorities shall be proceeded against under this 

chapter unless he has requested in writing upon advice of 

counsel to be proceeded against as an adult...." Or, if he 

has after his fifteenth birthday committed an act which meets 

the transfer requirements of § 5032, which we construe later 

in this opinion, he may be prosecuted as if he were in fact an 

adult. That he has the option under § 5032 of electing the 

adult proceeding does not, as the dissent suggests, establish 

that the certification procedure is not jurisdictional, nor does 

it amount to a decision by the parties to confer subject-matter 

jurisdiction. That option in the fourth paragraph of § 5032 

only comes into effect in the case of "[a] juvenile ... who is 

__________

2 This answers our dissenting colleague's contention that the 

federal courts have jurisdiction, without certification, over the acts 

of juvenile delinquency under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 "which confers upon 

those courts 'original jurisdiction ... of all offenses against the 

United States.' " Dissent at 4. As the Chambers opinion demonstrates, under § 5031, an act of delinquency is one which "would 

have been a crime" had it not been for the juvenile status of the 

perpetrator. Therefore, the federal court loses jurisdiction under 

§ 3231 and does not regain it unless it is conferred pursuant to 

§ 5032. Our colleague's further suggestion that Chambers, contrary to its express language, does not support the conclusion that 

the § 5032 certification is necessary to subject-matter jurisdiction is 

also wide of the mark. The portion of the opinion to which he 

refers, 944 F.2d at 1260, concerns the time of the filing of the 

certificate, not its necessity. Indeed, the Chambers court expressly 

states that it is not "endorsing the government's regrettable tardiness in tendering the delayed certification, a jurisdictional prerequisite." 944 F.2d at 1260 (emphasis added). In that case, as in 

this, the jurisdictional prerequisite was present in time for testing 

on appeal.

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not surrendered to State authorities." Under the second 

paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 5032, a juvenile subject to such 

allegations "shall be surrendered" whenever "the Attorney 

General does not so certify." The phrase "so certify" refers 

to the certification under § 5032 ¶ 1. That paragraph establishes the very certification we are holding jurisdictional. 

The juvenile's consent does not confer jurisdiction. It merely 

establishes whether the district court, which has already 

obtained jurisdiction via the certification, will then exercise 

that jurisdiction in a juvenile proceeding or in a transfer 

proceeding resulting in prosecution as an adult.

Our colleague asserts that he can find "[n]o significant 

difference" between this case and several others where courts 

denied interlocutory review of alleged jurisdictional defects. 

But none of the cases he cites present the situation posed 

here, where a legitimate question involving Article III 

subject-matter jurisdiction necessarily precedes another issue 

(transfer for adult prosecution) which we are required to 

review on an interlocutory basis. In United States v. Poindexter, 859 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1988), we held allegations of 

grand jury taint not subject to interlocutory review, but the 

case presented no proper interlocutory question, nor did the 

grand jury issue contest federal subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Similarly, United States v. Levy, 947 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1991), 

and United States v. Sorren, 605 F.2d 1211 (1st Cir. 1979), 

both denied interlocutory review over questions of personal 

jurisdiction, and no proper interlocutory issue was presented. 

Again, United States v. Layton, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981), held only that a purported 

challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction (a claim that a statute 

did not apply to acts outside the United States) did not, 

standing alone, justify interlocutory review. Abney v. United 

States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), is not to the contrary. In that 

case, the Court held that although a pretrial order denying a 

motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds 

was a "collateral order" subject to interlocutory appeal, a 

denial of a challenge to the sufficiency of the same indictment 

was not. Id. at 663. But although our dissenting colleague 

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rhetorically refers to such a challenge as one involving a 

court's "federal judicial power," a challenge to the sufficiency 

of an indictment is not a challenge to the jurisdiction of the 

court. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we do not consider the certification question here based on some theory of 

discretionary "pendent appellate jurisdiction." We consider 

that question because it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to 

considering another question which this circuit has held we 

must consider on an interlocutory basis.

B

The duty to address the validity of certification does not 

decide the issue of our authority to look behind the U.S. 

Attorney's decision. Although the Fourth Circuit claims to 

have identified a circuit split on the reviewability of a prosecutor's certification, Juvenile Male No. 1, 86 F.3d at 1317-18, 

a closer examination of the precedents reveals that only the 

Fourth Circuit itself has allowed judicial inquiry into the basis 

upon which a "substantial federal interest" certification has 

been made.

In rejecting judicial review of the substantive decision 

underlying certification under 18 U.S.C. § 5032, three circuits 

have noted that the section "does not explicitly provide for 

judicial review of a certification, nor does it provide articulable standards" that a court can use to evaluate the exercise of 

the prosecutor's discretion. Impounded, 117 F.3d 730, 733 

(3d Cir. 1997) (extensively discussing the precedents). The 

structure of § 5032 supports this argument: this section 

expressly provides for judicial review of orders transferring a 

juvenile for adult prosecution and outlines standards for 

courts to apply, yet it is silent regarding review of certification. See Judge Wilkinson's concurring opinion in Juvenile 

Male No. 1, 86 F.3d at 1324. On similar reasoning, most 

courts have held unreviewable the bases of certification, 

including whether there exists an "appropriate" state court 

with jurisdiction over the juvenile, United States v. Vancier,

515 F.2d 1378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975); 

United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1984); and 

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whether the case in fact implicates a "substantial federal 

interest," Impounded, 117 F.3d at 735-36; United States v. 

Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. 

I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 

305 (1997).

Other than the Fourth Circuit, those circuits that have 

reviewed certification at all have only tested the facial adequacy of the certification against the facial requirements of 

§ 5032. See United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859 (2d Cir. 1995) 

(allowing review of whether the juvenile was charged with a 

crime of violence or one specifically enumerated in § 5032); 

United States v. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1991) 

(same); United States v. Gonzalez-Cervantes, 668 F.2d 1073 

(9th Cir. 1981) (reviewing whether the certification was timely 

filed by an authorized person and stated the appropriate 

statutory factors). Courts have also suggested that it might 

be appropriate to conduct a closer examination to resolve 

allegations of bad faith, see, e.g., United States v. C.G., 736 

F.2d at 1478, but there are no such allegations in this case.

In holding certification subject to judicial scrutiny, the 

Fourth Circuit first relied on a recent decision of the Supreme Court under the Westfall Act that included the language, " 'executive determinations generally are subject to 

judicial review.' " Juvenile Male No. 1, 86 F.3d at 1319 

(quoting Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 

434 (1995)). Under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679, the 

Attorney General defends civil actions brought against employees of the United States and, under appropriate circumstances, certifies "that the defendant employee was acting 

within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the 

incident out of which the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2679(d)(1). Upon such certification, the United States is 

substituted for the employee as the defendant in the action 

and the case proceeds under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 

U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. ("FTCA"). If the Attorney General 

refuses to so certify, an employee can seek review, alleging 

wrongful failure to certify under § 2679(d)(3). Gutierrez de 

Martinez, 515 U.S. at 428. In most cases, plaintiffs have no 

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complaint about the substitution of the "financially reliable" 

United States for an individual defendant. Id. at 427. However, when the recharacterized case falls within an exception 

to the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA (such 

as for claims "arising in a foreign country," 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2680(k)), certification entirely disposes of the plaintiff's 

claims. That is, the substitution of the United States has 

ended the civil action against the individual employee, but the 

exception to the FTCA shields liability of the United States, 

leaving the plaintiff without remedy.

In the Gutierrez de Martinez case, a federal employee 

contended that the Attorney General's decision to certify an 

action under the Westfall Act was unreviewable. The Supreme Court disagreed, and held a certification subject to 

judicial review. In reaching this conclusion, the Court first 

noted that in the class of cases represented by the one before 

it (that is, in which the United States, if substituted, would be 

immune), certification is tantamount to a final judgment 

against the plaintiff. With that finality as a backdrop, the 

court went on to consider the complex of incentives weighing 

on the U.S. Attorney making "the impetus to certify ... 

overwhelming." Id. at 427. Shortly put, if the U.S. Attorney 

refuses to certify, the federal employee is left exposed, the 

plaintiff does not have available the deep pocket of the United 

States, but the immunity of the United States is still subject 

to assault by review of the refusal to certify under 

§ 2679(d)(3). On the other hand, if the U.S. Attorney does 

certify, the employee is immune, the United States has any 

immunities unwaived under exceptions to the Federal Tort 

Claims Act, and, prior to Gutierrez de Martinez, the decision 

was unreviewable. The Supreme Court denied that immunity, recalling that "[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own 

cause." 515 U.S. at 428 (quoting The Federalist No. 10, at 79 

(J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)). Also, the Court noted 

that the statutory predecessor to the Westfall Act expressly 

provided for judicial review of scope of employment determinations; therefore, Congress "legislated against a backdrop 

of judicial review," and most likely intended to continue to 

allow judicial scrutiny of the "executive determination" that 

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an employee was acting within the scope of his employment. 

Id. at 425.

This brings us to the most important distinction between 

§ 5032 certification and the "scope of employment" certification under the Westfall Act and its predecessor statutes. In 

the ordinary case, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, at 

the very core of the executive function, has long been held 

presumptively unreviewable. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996) (noting exception for 

selective prosecution and other constitutional claims); Wayte 

v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (same). We cannot 

agree with the Fourth Circuit that a "presumption of reviewability" applies to § 5032 certification. See also Town of 

Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 397 (1987) (describing the 

"background of discretion" applicable to prosecutive decisions). The decision to invoke the power of the federal 

government and the criminal jurisdiction of federal courts 

rests peculiarly within the province of the Executive. Congress has created many areas of substantial overlap between 

federal and state criminal law; given the limited resources 

and policy objectives of the federal government, not every 

violation of federal law is prosecuted in federal court. The 

decision to certify that a particular case involves a "substantial federal interest" implicates the core prosecutorial discretion vested in the Attorney General and her delegates.

In sum, the reasoning of Gutierrez de Martinez is completely inapplicable to certification under the Juvenile Justice 

and Delinquency Prevention Act. Unlike the Westfall Act's 

"scope of employment" certification, § 5032 certification is not 

influenced by similar incentives, nor does it conclusively 

resolve the underlying case against the defendant. The 

"scope of employment" determination itself is inherently different from the decision to commit government resources to 

the prosecution of an alleged violent felon in a criminal case. 

The "scope of employment" determination involves the application of one element of the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, historically a question of law within the provenance of courts. See, e.g., Fiocco v. Carver, 137 N.E. 309 

(N.Y.1922) (Cardozo, J.). On the other hand, a "substantial 

federal interest" may vary depending upon federal policy and 

upon factors "such as the general incidence of crime, the need 

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for deterrence, enforcement priorities, and the like." Impounded, 117 F.3d at 734. The Executive, not the courts of 

law, is best qualified to determine such matters. See Wayte, 

470 U.S. at 607 ("Such factors as the strength of the case, the 

prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to 

undertake.").

The Fourth Circuit also relied on an antecedent "clear 

preference" in federal law for "having juvenile criminal matters handled in the state courts." Juvenile Male No. 1, 86 

F.3d at 1320. Although recognizing that the more recent 

amendments to § 5032 reflect that "serious crimes committed 

by juveniles" are becoming "a national problem that Congress 

believes is best addressed on a federal level," that court said 

that "the focus of the juvenile statutes is still on rehabilitation 

within the state systems," and ruled that judicial review 

would further this congressional goal. Id. Essentially, the 

Fourth Circuit made this "focus" into a presumption, put this 

presumption on the same side of the scale as the "presumption in favor of judicial review," and with only slight mention 

of the prosecutive function, announced that the scales tipped 

in favor of reviewability. We disagree. We can discover no 

reason, either in the statutory language or in precedent, to 

conclude that Congress intended judges to intervene in prosecutorial decisions in order to protect a "focus" on state 

rehabilitation of juveniles.

The defendant, relying on United States v. Male Juvenile,

844 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Va. 1994), argues that federal courts 

should review the stated reasons underlying the government's 

decision to proceed in federal court in order "to make sure 

that 'the nature of the offense or [the] circumstances of the 

case give rise to special Federal concerns.' " Appellant's 

Brief at 6 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 389, reprinted in

1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529). In the Male Juvenile case 

relied upon by appellant, the district court worried that 

absent a review of the Attorney General's certification, the 

government could prosecute a juvenile in federal court "whenUSCA Case #97-3025 Document #317200 Filed: 12/19/1997 Page 13 of 22
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ever a juvenile has committed a violent felony for which there 

is concurrent jurisdiction." Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. at 

284. Actually, the government would prosecute in federal 

court only when the Attorney General or her designee had 

determined that the "substantial federal interest" requirement of § 5032 was met. With review, the government could 

do so only when a court had made the same determination.

To argue that this difference compels review by judges of 

the Executive decision is to assume that only judges can 

discern the meaning of statutes, a view that is at odds with 

our three-part constitutional structure. The Constitution requires that the Executive "take Care that the Laws be 

faithfully executed." U.S. Const. Art. II § 3. This duty of 

fidelity requires interpretation and application of Congress's 

enactments, often in situations where the limitations of Article III (e.g., the case or controversy requirement) prevent 

interpretive guidance from the courts. In prosecuting adults, 

the Executive constantly faces situations in which a potential 

defendant has violated both state and federal laws. The 

Executive has the duty and is presumed to have the expertise 

to make the decision to prosecute. Not only do we have no 

reason to assume the Executive less competent to make a 

similar decision, albeit with a higher threshold, with reference 

to juveniles, but there is every reason to assume that this 

policy-laden decision is properly entrusted to the same branch 

administering at the prosecutive stage the rest of the body of 

criminal law. There is nothing nugatory about congressional 

efforts to provide guidance to the Executive directly via 

statutory language. Not every such effort gives rise to a 

justiciable question. We hold that this one does not. Thus, 

we review the certification only to determine its presence and 

whether it facially supports our jurisdiction. This one does, 

and we can require no more.

III

Once federal jurisdiction has attached, as we hold it has, 

the same section of the Act requires the mandatory transfer 

for adult prosecution of

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a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an act after 

his sixteenth birthday which if committed by an adult 

would be a felony offense that has as an element thereof 

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person of another, or that, by its very 

nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 

against the person of another may be used in committing 

the offense, ... and who has previously been found 

guilty of an act which if committed by an adult would 

have been one of the offenses set forth in this subsection 

or an offense in violation of a State felony statute that 

would have been such an offense if a circumstance giving 

rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed....

18 U.S.C. § 5032. In this case, the government filed a 

"Notice of Prior Conviction for Purposes of Mandatory Transfer of Juvenile for Prosecution as an Adult." This Notice 

documented that in 1993, the defendant pled guilty to carnal 

knowledge of a child under sixteen, in violation of D.C. Code 

§ 22-2801, and in 1996, he pled guilty to second degree child 

sexual abuse, in violation of D.C. Code § 22-4109. The 

children involved were family members aged six and four, 

respectively, at the time of the offenses. The district court, 

ruling only on the basis of the 1993 adjudication, agreed with 

the prosecutor that this crime involved "a substantial risk 

that physical force against the person of another may be used 

in committing the offense," and held the defendant subject to 

mandatory transfer for prosecution as an adult.

The defendant argues that the court should not look beyond the elements of the carnal knowledge offense, and that 

these elements do not include the use of force. We need not 

reach the question of whether the court should look beyond 

the elements of the charged offense to the charging papers or 

even to the facts underlying the prior conviction, because we 

hold that sexual abuse of a minor inherently involves "a 

substantial risk that physical force against the person of 

another may be used in committing the offense." Further, 

we have held already that, in a carnal knowledge prosecution, 

"when a child under the age of consent is involved the law 

conclusively presumes force." United States v. Jones, 477 

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F.2d 1213, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (applying this presumption in 

the context of the sufficiency of corroboration evidence). 

Thus, the district court properly held the defendant subject to 

mandatory transfer for adult prosecution under the applicable 

standards of § 5032.

CONCLUSION

We hold that a federal prosecutor's § 5032 certification of a 

"substantial federal interest" implicates core prosecutorial 

judgment and discretion, and that thereforeabsent allegations of bad faith or facial inadequacy of the certificatethe 

basis for such certification is not subject to judicial review. 

We uphold the certification on these grounds. Because a 

prior offense for sexual abuse of a minor is a crime involving 

a "substantial risk" of physical force, we affirm the order 

under 18 U.S.C. § 5032 transferring the defendant for adult 

prosecution in this matter.

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RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the majority's opinion insofar as it 

upholds the district court's "transfer" of the defendant for 

prosecution as an adult. The balance of the opinion deals 

with the appeal from the district court's order regarding the 

United States Attorney's certification of a "substantial Federal interest," 18 U.S.C. § 5032. I cannot join this part because, in my view, we do not have appellate jurisdiction to 

decide the matter: the order is not a final decision; it does 

not fall within the collateral order doctrine; we do not have 

pendent jurisdiction over it; and certification is not a "jurisdictional" prerequisite to the transfer order. I will take up 

each of these points in sequence.

First, the "courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of 

appeals from all final decisions of the district courts," 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. A "final decision" is one that "ends the 

litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do 

but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 

229, 233 (1945). There is no such "final decision" here. The 

case has not even gone to trial. And so to sustain appellate 

jurisdiction, we must slip the appeal into an exception. This 

is easy enough for the transfer order. The law of the circuit 

dictates that "transfer" orders fit within the limited collateral 

order exception to § 1291's final judgment rule. See In re 

Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 366-68 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Cohen v. 

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949). 

Certification orders cannot be squeezed through that opening, 

which brings me to point two.

Appealable, final collateral orders share several characteristics, one of which is that "denial of immediate review would 

render impossible any review whatsoever," United States v. 

Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971). In criminal casesapart 

from those dealing with the constitutional right to bailthe 

collateral order exception has been invoked when an order 

deprives the defendant of some "right not to be tried." 

Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 800 

(1989). Transfer orders may be of that sort. District court 

orders passing on the validity of the Attorney General's 

certification are not. If defendants are entitled to judicial 

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review of such orders, the review may be had after conviction 

and sentencing. The certification requirement of § 5032 no 

more confers upon a defendant a "right not to be tried" than 

does the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial, or 

the due process prohibition against vindictive prosecution, or 

the requirement that grand juries not be influenced by government violations of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. While violation of those proscriptions 

ordinarily demands dismissal of the indictment, a district 

court's refusal to dismiss may not be raised in an interlocutory appeal. See Midland Asphalt Corp., 489 U.S. at 798-

802; United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 

264-70 (1982); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 

852-61 (1978).

My colleagues acknowledge that the certification order 

"would not appear to be subject to interlocutory review on its 

own." Maj. op. at 4. That eminently correct observation, 

shared by one other circuit (see United States v. Juvenile 

Female, 869 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1989)), should have put an 

end to the appeal from that order. If not the collateral order 

doctrine, what other basis is there for asserting appellate 

jurisdiction? Some federal appellate courts, ours included, 

have devised a doctrine of "pendent" appellate jurisdiction in 

civil cases. See, e.g., Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 

U.S. 35, 44-45 n.2 (1995); Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin 

Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

This enables a court of appeals to reach out and review 

orders over which it has no independent jurisdiction. But 

pendent appellate jurisdiction has no place in criminal cases, 

where the final judgment rule is "at its strongest." Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. at 265. The Supreme Court 

could not be clearer on the pointin criminal cases, would-be 

pendent claims "are appealable if, and only if, they too fall 

within Cohen's collateral-order exception to the finaljudgment rule." Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 663 

(1977); see also MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 857 n.6; United 

States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 

United States v. Crosby, 20 F.3d 480, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 

Juvenile Female, 869 F.2d at 460; Note, The Proper Scope of 

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Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction in the Collateral Order Context, 100 YALE L.J. 511, 520 (1990).

Now to point four. The majority's theory, as I understand 

it, flows from a line of cases such as Mansfield, Coldwater &

Lake Michigan Railway v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884), 

which holds that a federal appellate court must first satisfy 

itself of its jurisdiction and then must make sure that the 

lower court also had jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bender v. 

Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 & n.4 (1986). 

This leads the majority to think that given our appellate 

jurisdiction over the transfer order, we are obligated to 

examine the district court's certification order because the 

certification order was "jurisdictional." See maj. op. at 3-9. 

I part company on two grounds.

First, the majority's principal authorityUnited States v. 

Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1257-61 (6th Cir. 1991)does not 

support its conclusion. To be sure, Chambers held that a 

§ 5032 certificate from the Attorney General was essential to 

sustaining the district court's jurisdiction.1 But the Sixth 

Circuit also held that the certificate did not have to be filed 

before trial because it was not a prerequisite to "initiating 

federal proceedings" against the juvenile offender. 944 F.2d 

at 1260. (The government there did not file its certificate 

until the close of its case-in-chief, id. at 1257.) Other courts 

have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. 

Gonzalez-Cervantes, 668 F.2d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1981); 

United States v. Ramapuram, 432 F. Supp. 140, 143 (D. Md. 

1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1978) (unpublished). In 

short, Chambers undercuts rather than supports the majority's essential propositionthat without a valid and proper 

__________

1 The majority cites two other casesImpounded, 117 F.3d 

730, 733 (3d Cir. 1997), and United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 118 

F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1997)supposedly holding that the requirement that a prosecutor certify a substantial federal interest was 

jurisdictional. Impounded merely "assume[d] that the § 5032 certification is a prerequisite to the district court exercising jurisdiction 

over the transfer hearing." 117 F.3d at 733. Juvenile Male #1 

made the same assumption. 118 F.3d at 303-04.

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certificate, the district court would have no jurisdiction to 

review the transfer order.

My next and final ground for disagreement is thisthe 

Attorney General's certification is not, as the majority supposes, "jurisdictional." In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of 

federal district courts stems from 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which 

confers upon those courts "original jurisdiction ... of all 

offenses against the United States." The policy reflected in 

§ 5032 may be one of abstention, of permitting the federal 

criminal laws to be invoked against juvenile violators only in 

limited situations. See Chambers, 944 F.2d at 1258. Even 

so, the text of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act does not 

revoke the existing jurisdiction of the district courts over 

juvenile violators. If that had been the ideamy colleagues 

think it wasCongress used a very obscure method of expressing its desire, quite different than the clear language of 

jurisdiction found in so many other jurisdiction-affecting statutes. The Act, in § 5032, states that the juvenile "shall not 

be proceeded against in any court of the United States unless 

the Attorney General" certifies to one of the three exceptions, 

the last of which mentions "substantial Federal interest." 

The words "proceeded against" are not directed to the jurisdiction of the courts. Courts do not proceed against persons. 

Prosecutors do. And it is prosecutors, or more accurately the 

Attorney General, who are the addressees of this language. 

It is therefore scarcely surprising that the majority's mistreatment of certification as jurisdictional poses vexing problems, problems my colleagues do not bother to answer. 

There is, for instance, a provision in § 5032 allowing a 

juvenile to request in writing that he not be tried as a 

juvenile and that he be "proceeded against as an adult." 

Such a written waiver takes the juvenile out of the Act. If we 

now plug in the majority's jurisdictional theory, the consequence is that juvenile defendants may confer jurisdiction on 

district courts by consenting to be tried as adults. What 

happened to the time-honored principle that parties cannot, 

by consent, confer jurisdiction on the federal courts? Consider also the majority's suggestion that certification may be 

open to challenge for "bad faith." Maj. op. at 16. Is one to 

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suppose that jurisdiction now turns on the state of mind of 

one of the litigants? I cannot understand why we should be 

reaching so far, and in such an unorthodox manner, to bestow 

the label "jurisdictional." The Act sets up a system for 

dealing with juveniles already subject to federal jurisdiction 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 because of their alleged "violation of a 

law of the United States," 18 U.S.C. § 5031. The certification 

requirement in § 5032, as the majority itself appears to 

acknowledge, see maj. op. at 14, merely codifies Congress's 

judgment about when the Attorney General may invoke this 

jurisdiction.

It is not enough to answer that the exercise of federal 

judicial power depends on a § 5032 certificate. One could say 

the same about a grand jury indictment. Yet the Supreme 

Court in Abney, while sustaining its appellate jurisdiction to 

consider the defendant's double jeopardy claim, refused to 

reach his challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment. See

431 U.S. at 663. Indictments are the functional equivalent of 

§ 5032 certifications; both signify that there is a significant 

federal interest; both invoke the authority of the district 

court to proceed; both are subject to challenge. Yet indictments cannot be considered "jurisdictional" in any meaningful 

sense. Simply because some condition or requirement is a 

prerequisite to criminal proceedings does not make the condition or requirement jurisdictional. A case must be brought 

within the period of limitations. There must be a speedy 

trial. The grand jury must be properly constituted. Trial 

must occur in a specified venue. Some offenses must be tried 

by a jury. Defendants are entitled to counsel. None of these 

are considered "jurisdictional."

We would do well to remember that calling something 

"jurisdictional" will have lasting, important and perhaps unanticipated effects in future cases. If the Attorney General's 

certification is jurisdictional, as my colleagues hold, challenges to it may be raised initially in the middle of trial, or 

right before sentencing, or on appeal, or in a petition for 

rehearing, or at any other time. Also, if the certification is 

jurisdictional, the juvenile defendant may not waive the requirement, even I suppose by pleading guilty. Yet I see no 

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good reasonthe majority offers nonewhy a defendant 

should be permitted to attack a certificate for the first time 

on appeal, or why a juvenile cannot waive the requirement 

altogether, or why a § 5032 certificate ought to be considered 

any more important than the many constitutional and statutory requirements which must be raised at trial and which can 

be waived.

In short, I believe that rather than succumbing to the 

temptation to resolve the issue on its merits, the majority 

should have dismissed the appeal from the district court's 

certification order on the authority of Abney v. United States.

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