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Parties Involved:
AEI Income & Growth Fund 24
Appellee
AEI Income Management XXI
Appellee
Fruth, Jamison & Elsass
Not Party
PQ Enterprises
Not Party
George P. Parrish
Not Party
Michael E. Quigley
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3269

___________

AEI Income & Growth Fund 24, LLC; *

AEI Income Management XXI, Inc., *

its corporate managing member, *

*

Appellees, *

*

v. *

*

George P. Parrish; *

*

Defendant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Michael E. Quigley; * District of Minnesota.

*

Appellant, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

PQ Enterprises, LLC; *

*

Defendant, *

*

Fruth, Jamison & Elsass, P.A., *

*

Movant Below. *

___________

Submitted: October 6, 2006

Filed: October 18, 2006 

___________

Before SMITH, MAGILL, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

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PER CURIAM.

Michael Quigley appeals from the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary

judgment on a claim brought against him and others (defendants) by AEI Income &

Growth Fund 24, LLC, and AEI Income Management XXI, Inc. (plaintiffs), alleging

defendants breached a contract guaranteeing a third party’s performance under a lease.

Upon careful review, we affirm.

To begin, we note that we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review

the district court’s summary judgment decision notwithstanding another defendant’s

automatic stay in bankruptcy or the district court’s reservation of plaintiffs’ right to

request additional attorneys’ fees and costs. See Kocher v. Dow Chem. Co., 132 F.3d

1225, 1228-29 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1997) (notwithstanding automatic stay as to one

defendant, court had jurisdiction under § 1291 to review judgments in favor of other

defendants because district court’s judgments “unquestionably were intended to be

final for purposes of appeal”); Obin v. Dist. No. 9 of Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &

Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574, 584 (8th Cir. 1981) (motion for attorneys’ fees

raises claim that is collateral and independent of merits; thus, judgment on merits, if

otherwise final, is final for purposes of appeal despite possibility of remaining

attorneys’ fees claim).

Turning to the issues raised by Quigley, we first hold that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in declining to transfer venue to Texas. See Terra Int’l, Inc.

v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 119 F.3d 688, 696 (8th Cir. 1997) (court did not abuse its

discretion in weighing factors relevant to motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1404(a); factors include convenience of parties, convenience of witnesses, interests

of justice, and any other relevant factors when comparing alternative venues). We

also note that Quigley waived his choice-of-law argument, and, in any event, the

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district court properly applied Minnesota law to interpret and enforce the contract,

which expressly provided that it was executed and intended to be construed under

Minnesota law. See P&O Nedlloyd, Ltd. v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., No. 05-3766,

2006 WL 2483520, at *2 n.3 (8th Cir. Aug. 30, 2006) (“[b]ecause choice of law is

waived if not timely raised, we need not address the choice of law question for the

first time on appeal”); Allianz Ins. Co. v. Sanftleben, 454 F.3d 853, 855 (8th Cir.

2006) (in diversity case, district court sitting in Minnesota applies Minnesota choiceof-law rules, which permit contracting parties to agree upon law that will govern

contract).

Upon de novo review of the summary judgment decision, we agree with the

district court that, under the clear and unambiguous terms of the contract, plaintiffs

are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Winthrop Res. Corp. v. Eaton

Hydraulics, Inc., 361 F.3d 465, 468-69 (8th Cir. 2004) (grant of summary judgment

and determinations of state law are reviewed de novo); Lakeland Tool & Eng’g, Inc.

v. Thermo-Serv, Inc., 916 F.2d 476, 481 (8th Cir. 1990) (where language of contract

unambiguously expresses intent of parties, contract construction is question of law);

cf. Nat’l City Bank v. Lundgren, 435 N.W.2d 588, 591-93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)

(unconditional guarantee is separate obligation from principal obligation; where

guarantee stated that guarantor’s liability would be “absolute and unconditional”

irrespective of invalidity or unenforceability of principal debt or defenses available

to borrower, guarantor expressly waived his right to assert release of debtor as defense

to enforcement of guarantee). To the extent Quigley now contends that he was

induced by fraud into executing the contract, that issue was not raised in the district

court and need not be addressed on appeal. See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local

Union No. 545 v. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084, 1096 (8th Cir. 2004) (“We

ordinarily do not address issues that a party raises for the first time on appeal and

failed to raise in the district court.”).

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The judgment of the district court is affirmed, and additionally plaintiffs’

motion to strike is granted. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

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