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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Rahim Zamanian
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2713

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Sedighe Honarvar, *

*

Appellant. *

*

___________

Appeals from the United States

No. 06-2720 District Court for the Southern

___________ District of Iowa.

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Rahim Zamanian, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 9, 2007

Filed: February 26, 2007

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Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

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BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Rahim Zamanian and Sedighe Honarvar, husband and wife, appeal from guilty

jury verdicts rendered on all counts on July 15, 2005. The couple was convicted of

conspiracy, bank fraud, and making false statements for their scheme of fraudulently

obtaining funds from various financing institutions. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

The following recitation of facts is stated in the light most favorable to the

jury's verdict. United States v. Stevens, 439 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2006). Honarvar

and Zamanian carried out a fraudulent scheme to obtain funds by completing

applications for credit card accounts with false information regarding the nature of

their income. For example, the couple would state income upwards of $80,000 on the

applications when, in fact, their tax returns listed total income ranging from $1,919

to $25,700. And, they represented to low income housing officials and food stamp

administrators on more than one occasion that they had little or no income. Once they

were issued the credit cards, they transferred funds from the newly-issued credit card

accounts to their pre-existing credit card accounts in order to make payments on those

pre-existing accounts. They would then accumulate additional debt and charges on

the cards. As a result of this scheme, the couple accumulated a large amount of credit

card debt and subsequently discharged approximately $189,000 of credit card debt in

bankruptcy court. The various counts for bank fraud and false statements for each

defendant related to specific applications submitted by each individual for various

cards, including applications for an AT&T Universal MasterCard, a Chase Manhattan

Platinum MasterCard, and a Discover Platinum Card. 

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The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa. 

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The jury convicted Zamanian and Honarvar on all counts. The district court1

sentenced Zamanian to twelve months and one day of imprisonment on counts one,

five, six, ten and eleven, to be served concurrently; and ordered restitution in the

amount of $45,501.47. Honarvar received a term of imprisonment of one day, with

credit for time served on counts two, three, four, seven, eight, nine, and eleven, along

with a program of home confinement for six months; and was ordered to pay

restitution in the amount of $45,501.47. 

On appeal, Honarvar contends that the questions regarding annual household

income on the disputed credit card applications were too ambiguous to form the basis

of prosecution for false statements, and that there was insufficient evidence to support

the convictions on all charges. Zamanian likewise claims there was insufficient

evidence supporting the convictions for bank fraud, false statements and conspiracy,

and further claims that the judgment and sentence on both the bank fraud and false

statement offenses violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Both parties challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on all counts. We review

de novo the sufficiency of the evidence and view that evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences. United

States v. Spears, 454 F.3d 830, 832 (8th Cir. 2006). "We reverse only if no reasonable

jury could find the defendant[s] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. We do not

weigh the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Rather "the jury has sole

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Honarvar did not testify.

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responsibility for resolving conflicts or contradictions in testimony, and we must

resolve credibility issues in favor of the verdict." Id. 

The crux of Zamanian's argument is that the government failed to prove that he

acted with the subjective state of mind that makes an objectively false statement

criminal, that is, that he knowingly stated his income at a much higher level than it

actually was with the intent to defraud or influence the financial institutions issuing

the credit cards. Honarvar advances a slightly different argument, claiming that the

government failed to prove the falsity of the statements she made regarding her

income on three credit card applications. She also claims, like Zamanian, that the

government failed to prove that the statements, even if false, were knowingly false.

Viewing the evidence as we must, and applying our strict standard of review, we

disagree.

One version of why Zamanian and Honarvar chose their stated income on the

credit card applications, and the reason advanced by Zamanian at trial,2

 was that when

they completed the applications they fully expected to make upwards of $82,000 in

the stock market and in an overseas Iranian investment. That, however, is not the

story the jury walked away with after the trial testimony. We cannot weigh the

credibility any differently today. The government presented sufficient evidence that,

in fact, Zamanian and Honarvar conspired and knowingly falsified income on the

credit card applications in an attempt to increase the amount of credit extended so that

they could continue the scheme of accumulating credit as alleged in the indictment.

And, the jury heard evidence that the amount of income stated on a credit card

application, although not determinative, definitely makes a difference in the amount

of credit extended to that particular applicant. 

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Honarvar further argues that even though the government demonstrated that

Honarvar indeed made inconsistent statements regarding income on credit card

applications and actual income reflected on income tax returns, it failed to prove that

one of those statements was true and the others false. Thus, according to Honarvar,

all the government proved was inconsistency, not falsity. Given our standard of

review, we do not follow this line of reasoning. The jury could decide for itself which

evidence it found more persuasive and make a sound determination regarding the

falsity of Honarvar's statements on the credit card applications at issue. 

B. Ambiguity of "Income"

Honarvar argues that the question posed on the credit card applications, seeking

"income" or "annual household income" is so excessively vague or fundamentally

ambiguous that it cannot form the basis for any charge based on a false statement in

response to that question. We disagree. Persons of ordinary intelligence would agree

that the term "income" is one with a common usage and understanding, especially

when used on a credit card application. Further, Zamanian and Honarvar objected to

the court's proposed inclusion of a definition of the term "income" in the jury

instructions. It is incongruous for Honarvar to now argue that the ambiguity of the

term led the jury astray when it was within her purview to instruct the jury

accordingly. 

C. Double Jeopardy

Even when not preserved below, as Zamanian concedes, we have reviewed

double jeopardy arguments for plain error. United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796,

809 (8th Cir.), 127 S. Ct. 605 (2006). Under this standard, the court will correct the

error "'if the error results in a miscarriage of justice or seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.'" United States v. Ihmoud,

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454 F.3d 887, 895 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 701 (2006) (quoting United

States v. Jackson, 155 F.3d 942, 947 (8th Cir. 1998)).

The Double Jeopardy Clause is violated in a single proceeding only

where multiple punishments are imposed for the same crime contrary to

the legislature's intent. In order to determine whether two crimes are the

same for double jeopardy purposes, we apply the test of Blockburger v.

United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Under Blockburger, if each

offense requires proof of an element not required by the other, the crimes

are not considered the same, and a double jeopardy challenge necessarily

fails. We have recognized that the Blockburger test focuses on the

statutory elements of the offenses, rather than the evidence presented at

trial. In addition, a proper analysis of a double jeopardy claim requires

us to examine not only the statutory provisions at issue, but also the

specific charges brought against the defendant in the indictment. 

Gamboa, 439 F.3d at 809 (citations and quotations omitted).

Zamanian acknowledges that on their statutory faces the crimes of bank fraud

under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 do not present

a double jeopardy problem, as each contains elements not included in the other.

United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that section 1344

bank fraud requires the distinguishing element of a scheme or artifice, while section

1014 false statement offense requires the distinguishing element of a false statement);

United States v. Dupre, 117 F.3d 810, 818 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). Notwithstanding

this concession, Zamanian encourages this court to examine the jury instructions in

this case, claiming that the instructions on the bank fraud offenses specifically charged

to the jury incorporated or subsumed the false statement offenses.

Looking at the statutory elements of the offenses in addition to the specific

charges brought against Zamanian in the indictment, as we must under Blockburger,

we have no double jeopardy concerns. While novel, Zamanian's argument that the

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jury instructions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause is unavailing. The jury

instructions adequately set forth the statutory elements of the offenses, along with

additional descriptions of the particular acts at issue on each count. The fact that both

charges were based on statements made by Zamanian on the credit card applications,

however, does not mean that the instructions on bank fraud and false statements

subsume each other in violation of Blockburger. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

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