Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cr-00072/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cr-00072-39/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Samuel Stone
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO FIND 

FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL 

PAGE - 1 

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

SAMUEL STONE, 

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. CR12-0072-JCC-GSA 

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 

FIND FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL 

DEATH PENALTY CASE 

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motions to declare the federal death 

penalty unconstitutional based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), (Dkt. No. 114), and the 

Fifth and Eighth Amendments. (Dkt. No. 115.) Having thoroughly considered the parties’ 

briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary and hereby DENIES 

the motions for the reasons explained herein. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Defendant Samuel Stone was indicted for the murder of Michael Anita on March 22, 

2012. (Dkt. No. 1.) The indictment contains a “Notice of Special Findings,” alleging certain 

facts, such as Mr. Stone’s age, his mens rea during the alleged crime, his previous convictions, 

the heinousness of the crime, and the presence of premeditation, that render him eligible for the 

death penalty. (Dkt. No. 1, at 2–3.) The same day, the government filed a notice of intent to seek 

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ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO FIND 

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the death penalty, listing statutory aggravating factors that echo the facts listed in the 

indictment’s notice of special findings, (Dkt. No. 3, at 2–3), as well as non-statutory aggravating 

factors that were not listed in the indictment. (Id. at 3–4.) 

On September 9, 2013, Mr. Stone filed two motions to declare the federal death penalty 

unconstitutional. In one, he argues that the federal death penalty scheme violates the Constitution 

by failing to specify that statutory aggravating factors must be submitted to the grand jury, (Dkt. 

No. 114), or alternatively that the government violated the Constitution by actually submitting 

those factors to the grand jury. In the other, he argues that the federal death penalty scheme 

violates the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Dkt. No. 115.) The 

government filed a consolidated response to both motions, (Dkt. No. 125), Mr. Stone filed a 

consolidated reply, (Dkt. No. 146), and, after the Court granted leave, (Dkt. No. 159), the 

government filed a sur-reply. (Dkt. No. 170.) 

II. DISCUSSION 

 “A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount 

successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which 

the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). A party seeking to 

demonstrate that an act of Congress is facially unconstitutional must “shoulder [a] heavy 

burden,” as “[t]he fact that the . . . Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable 

set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid,” outside of certain First 

Amendment challenges. Id. 

In this case, Mr. Stone argues that the federal death penalty scheme is unconstitutional on 

a number of separate grounds, including: 1) the government’s practice of submitting statutory 

aggravating factors to the grand jury is unconstitutional; 2) the government’s failure to submit 

the non-statutory aggravating factors to the grand jury is unconstitutional; 3) the government 

should have informed the grand jury that the “notice of special findings” might result in the 

defendant being subjected to the death penalty; 4) the relaxed evidentiary rules during the 

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ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO FIND 

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UNCONSTITUTIONAL 

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penalty phase violate Defendant’s due process rights; 5) the FDPA results in an arbitrary and 

capricious application of the death penalty based on an analysis of past death penalty 

prosecutions; 6) the non-statutory aggravating factors do not sufficiently limit and guide the 

discretion of the jury; 7) the non-statutory aggravating factors are an unconstitutional delegation 

of legislative authority to the executive branch; 8) non-statutory aggravating factors, in general, 

violate the Ex Post Facto clause; 9) the use of non-statutory aggravating factors is foreclosed by 

statutory language in the FDPA; 10) the FDPA violates the Constitution, as there is no 

mechanism for proportionality review; 11) the death penalty under all circumstances is cruel and 

unusual punishment; and 12) lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 

 The Court will not address any arguments related to the government’s delay in 

prosecuting the case, (Dkt. No. 146, at 9–10), as the Court has already scheduled a hearing 

related to those issues. (See Dkt. No. 189, at 8–9.) Similarly, the Court will not address the 

parties’ arguments regarding the scope of the mitigation evidence that should be allowed during 

the penalty phase. A motion to find the death penalty unconstitutional is not the proper 

instrument to ask the Court to address that issue. 

A. Ring v. Arizona and the FDPA’s Constitutionality 

The enumerated aggravating factors in the Federal Death Penalty Act (“FDPA”) operate 

as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, and must be found by a jury, 

rather than a judge, as they allow the jury to impose the death penalty. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 

U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (“Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional 

equivalent of an element of a greater offense.’” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 

494 n.19 (2000)). Generally, all elements of a crime must be submitted to the grand jury for 

indictment. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-252 (1999) (each element of each crime 

“must be charged by indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for 

its verdict”). Accordingly, the government must submit at least one statutory aggravating factor 

to the grand jury if the government wishes to pursue the death penalty. See, e.g., United States v. 

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ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO FIND 

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Allen, 406 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth Amendment requires at least one statutory 

aggravating factor and the mens rea requirement to be found by the grand jury and charged in the 

indictment.”). Here, the government has submitted a “notice of special findings” containing 

every statutory aggravating factor to the grand jury for consideration. The issue is whether the 

government’s submission of the “notice of special findings” to the grand jury, in an attempt to 

comply with Ring and the Indictment Clause, is unconstitutional. 

While the Ninth Circuit has not specifically addressed each argument raised by 

Defendant1 in this case, it has nonetheless held that as long as the “indictment did charge 

statutory aggravating factors upon which the government proceeded,” the Constitution has not 

been violated. United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 979 (9th Cir. 2007). Moreover, every 

court that has addressed the argument raised by Defendant has found it wanting. See, e.g., United 

States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 290 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Although [the defendant] is correct to 

point out that nothing in the FDPA requires prosecutors to charge aggravating factors in an 

indictment, he fails to note that there is nothing in that law prohibiting such a charge.”); United 

States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 21–23 (1st Cir. 2007) (contention that “there is a conflict 

between the FDPA and Ring, and that curing the problem would require rewriting of the statute, 

which is a legislative function,” is unpersuasive); United States v. LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914, 921 

(11th Cir. 2006) (“[N]othing in the [FDPA] forbids, or is inconsistent with, prosecutors’ taking 

of the additional step of including the statutory aggravating factors in the indictment and 

submitting same to the grand jury.”); United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1367 (11th Cir. 

2006) (“The FDPA is not facially unconstitutional. Nothing prohibits the government from 

presenting aggravating factors to a grand jury and then . . . charging those aggravating factors in 

 

1

 In contesting the validity of the submission of the “notice of special findings” to the 

grand jury, Defendant argues that the government’s practice violates the separation of powers 

between the legislature and the executive branches, the non-delegation doctrine, the requirement 

that the judiciary not salvage unconstitutional statutes as laid out in United States v. Jackson, 390 

U.S. 570 (1968), and also that a grand jury does not have the authority to issue special findings. 

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ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO FIND 

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the indictment.”); United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940, 949 (8th Cir. 2005) (FDPA not 

unconstitutional after Ring even though it requires that the government submit the statutory 

aggravating factors in a notice of intent, as long as the government also submits the factors “to 

the grand jury for inclusion in the indictment”); United States v. Barnette, 390 F.3d 775, 789 (4th 

Cir. 2004) (nothing in the FDPA “restricts the government from submitting aggravating factors 

to the grand jury”), vacated on other grounds 546 U.S. 803 (2005). 

The Court finds that the government’s submission of statutory aggravating factors to the 

grand jury does not violate the Constitution, and follows the logic of the numerous opinions 

upholding the challenged practice. 

B. Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors in the Indictment 

Defendant argues that the non-statutory aggravating factors should have been submitted 

to the grand jury for consideration along with the statutory aggravating factors. However, this 

argument has also been directly foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit. “[T]here is nothing to suggest” 

that the government’s failure “to present and charge non-statutory aggravating factors” to the 

grand jury is constitutionally required. Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 979. Because “[a] non-statutory 

aggravating factor by itself cannot trigger death eligibility,” id., it need not be presented to the 

grand jury. 

C. Informing the Grand Jury that Special Findings Could Result in a Death 

Sentence

There are two criteria by which the sufficiency of an indictment is to be measured: 

first, whether the indictment ‘contains the elements of the offense intended to be 

charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to 

meet’ and, secondly, ‘in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a 

similar offense whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may 

plead a former acquittal or conviction.’ 

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763–64 (1962) (quoting Cochran v. United States, 157 

U.S. 286, 290 (1895)). The indictment in this case satisfies those two requirements. 

Defendant contends that the indictment should also inform the grand jury that their 

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ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO FIND 

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special findings will make the defendant eligible for the death penalty. However, he cites no 

authority demonstrating that there exists such an obligation, and the Court has not found any. 

“[I]t is clear that so long as the defendant is sufficiently notified of the charges against him, the 

indictment need not set forth the ultimate punishment sought for the offenses charged in the 

indictment.” United States v. Natson, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1305 (M.D. Ga. 2006). See also 

United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 970, 981 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (“The grand jury’s role is 

not to decide whether probable cause supports the imposition of a particular sentence against a 

charged individual; rather, the grand jury check on prosecutorial powers stems from its 

independent factual determination of the existence of probable cause for the essential elements 

of the charged offense.”); United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) 

(“Grand juries to not make findings or recommendations concerning punishment or sentencing 

and such considerations should not influence their decision. It is for the petit jury to make that 

determination.”). 

Similarly, to the extent Defendant argues that the grand jury was obligated to find that all 

aggravating factors outweighed all mitigating factors in order for the government to pursue a 

death sentence, he is incorrect. 

[I]t makes no sense to speak of the weighing process mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 

3593(e) as an elemental fact for which a grand jury must find probable cause. In 

the words of the statute, it is a ‘consideration.’ 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e),—that is, the 

lens through which the jury must focus the facts that it has found to produce an 

individualized determination 

regarding whether the Defendant should be sentenced to death. United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 

738, 750 (8th Cir. 2005). Moreover, Defendant points to no authority holding otherwise. 

Accordingly, the Constitution was not violated when the government did not inform the 

grand jury that the special findings might render Defendant eligible for the death penalty. Nor 

was it violated when the grand jury did not weigh all potential mitigating factors against the 

submitted aggravating factors. 

// 

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ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO FIND 

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D. Relaxed Evidentiary Rules During the Penalty Phase 

During the penalty phase of a death penalty prosecution, “information may be presented 

as to any matter relevant to the sentence,” and such information “is admissible regardless of its 

admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials,” unless the 

probative value of the information is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice. 18 

U.S.C. § 3593(c). Defendant, in both of his motions, argues that the fact that the FDPA allows 

for the admission of information during the penalty phase that would not be admissible under the 

Federal Rules of Evidence violates the Constitution, by diminishing the reliability of the penalty 

phase and violating the Confrontation clause. 

However, “[w]hile capital punishment demands increased reliability, ‘the Supreme Court 

has . . . made clear that in order to achieve such heightened reliability, more evidence, not less, 

should be admitted on the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors.” Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 

979–80 (quoting United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2004)). Accordingly, as the 

Ninth Circuit has noted, the fact that the FDPA allows the district judge to exclude evidence if its 

probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice “provides a 

constitutionally sufficient procedural safeguard for evidentiary reliability.” Id.

E. Whether the FDPA Results in the Arbitrary and Capricious Application of 

the Death Penalty 

“[T]o satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a capital sentencing scheme must 

‘suitably direct and limit’ the sentencer’s discretion ‘so as to minimize the risk of wholly 

arbitrary and capricious action.’” Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 470 (1993) (quoting Lewis v. 

Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990)). The Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence requires 

that a death penalty scheme “(1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants; and (2) 

permit a jury to render a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a deatheligible defendant’s record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime.” Kansas 

v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173–74 (2006). 

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ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO FIND 

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Defendant does not point to a specific portion of the FDPA that renders it arbitrary and 

capricious, but contends that, based on his analysis of past prosecutions under the FDPA, it is 

nonetheless. Defendant estimates that “25 percent of factual first-degree murders by people 18 

years of age or higher in California, or nationally could be prosecuted under federal law as deathauthorized cases.” (Dkt. No. 115, Ex. A, at 3.) He also submits evidence regarding the frequency 

of federal death penalty prosecutions since 1988, along with some selected facts behind the 

crimes in those prosecutions, including the defendant’s race, the race and gender of the victim, 

whether the death penalty authorization was withdrawn, the state in which the case was 

prosecuted, whether the defendant was convicted after a plea bargain or at trial, and the 

defendant’s sentence if convicted. (Dkt. No. 115, Ex. B.) Defendant argues that, despite the fact 

that each crime was terrible, “for indiscernible reasons, some defendants were sentenced to 

death, while [sic] overwhelming majority were not.” (Dkt. No. 115, at 38.) 

“That federal executions are rare, however, does not render the FDPA unconstitutional.” 

Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 983 (footnote omitted). “The relevant question—whether capital 

punishment in the abstract violates the Eighth Amendment—was answered in the negative by 

Gregg.” Id. Indeed, in the context of the death penalty, 

[t]he sentencing decision requires the individual jurors to focus their collective 

judgment on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal defendant. It is not 

surprising that such collective judgments often are difficult to explain. But the 

inherent lack of lack of predictability of jury decisions does not justify their 

condemnation. On the contrary, it is the jury’s function to make the difficult and 

uniquely human judgments that defy codification and that ‘buil[d] discretion, 

equity, and flexibility into a legal system.’ 

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) (quoting H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American 

Jury 498 (1966)). “The Constitution is not offended by inconsistency in results based on the 

objective circumstances of the crime.” Id. at 307 n.28. Defendant’s contention that McCleskey is, 

along with Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu, “one of the least defensible decisions in the 

history of the Republic,” (Dkt. No. 147, at 7 n.23), even if true, does not allow the Court to 

ignore McCleskey when, as Defendant concedes, it is “the law of the land.” (Id.) 

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 As Defendant notes, “the government offers no evidence that objective circumstances of 

the crimes played any role in determining the inconsistencies between the many thousands of 

death-eligible cases in which the United States” does not pursue a death sentence and the few in 

which it does. (Dkt. No. 147, at 16.) But in a facial attack on the constitutionality of the federal 

death penalty, the burden is on Defendant, not the government, and Defendant has not proved 

that “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 

745, in light of McCleskey.

F. Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors, Limiting and Guiding the Discretion of 

the Jury 

During the penalty phase, to determine whether the death penalty should be applied, the 

factfinder may consider not only whether any statutory aggravating factors exist, but also 

“whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3592(c). The factfinder then weighs all statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors against all 

mitigating factors found to exist, to determine whether the aggravating factors outweigh the 

mitigating factors to such a degree that a death sentence is justified. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e). The 

issue is whether the FDPA is unconstitutional because it “provides no guidance to prosecutors in 

determining how to define or select non-statutory aggravating factors in a particular case,” and 

those factors may accordingly not be sufficiently “clear and objective” to pass constitutional 

muster. (Dkt. No. 115, at 40.). 

 The submission of non-statutory aggravating factors to the jury is constrained in four 

ways. 

First, the statute limits the scope of aggravating factors to those for which prior 

notice has been given by the prosecution. . . . Second, the death penalty 

jurisprudence devised by the Supreme Court guides the prosecution in 

formulating non-statutory aggravating factors. For example, due process requires 

that information submitted as aggravating genuinely narrow the class of persons 

eligible for the death penalty. . . . Third, the district court functions as a 

gatekeeper to limit the admission of useless and impermissibly prejudicial 

information. . . . And fourth, the requirement that the jury find at least one 

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statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt before it may consider the 

non-statutory factors further limits the delegated authority. 

United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 239–40 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations and footnote omitted). 

Accordingly, because each non-statutory aggravating factor must “genuinely narrow” the class of 

persons eligible for the death penalty, Defendant is incorrect that the government’s ability to 

define and chose non-statutory aggravating factors exposes him to factors that do not sufficiently 

curtail the factfinder’s discretion. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (“To avoid 

[constitutional problems], an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of 

persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe 

sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.”). Indeed, Defendant’s 

argument would render unconstitutional the use of non-statutory aggravating factors in any death 

penalty scheme, despite the fact that the Supreme Court has upheld their use. Id. at 878 (while 

statutory aggravating factors are constitutionally necessary, “the Constitution does not require 

the jury to ignore other possible aggravating factors” during the penalty phase). 

G. Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors and the Non-Delegation Doctrine

“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” 

U.S. Const., Art. I § 1. “Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another 

Branch.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). “So long as Congress ‘shall lay 

down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to 

[exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a 

forbidden delegation of legislative power.’” Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United 

States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). Here, Defendant argues that allowing the prosecutor to 

determine which non-statutory aggravating factors to submit to the jury for consideration violates 

the non-delegation doctrine. (Dkt. No. 115, at 41). He states that “[d]efining what constitutes 

criminal conduct and setting appropriate sanctions for that conduct is a quintessential legislative 

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decision,” and that, accordingly, “the authorization to define non-statutory aggravating factors is 

clearly a delegation of power.”2 (Id.) 

“Assuming (without deciding) that [the government’s ability to pursue non-statutory 

aggravating factors under the FDPA] even constitutes a delegation of legislative power, it would 

be ‘permissible so long as there are intelligible principles by which to exercise the delegated 

authority.’” Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 978 (quoting United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 707 (9th 

Cir. 2005)). In Mitchell, the Ninth Circuit held that the constitutional limitations on the use of 

aggravating factors articulated by the Supreme Court constitute such an intelligible principle. Id.

at 979. 

H. Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors and Ex Post Facto Laws 

“The Constitution forbids the passage of ex post facto laws.” Peugh v. U.S., __ U.S. __, 

133 S. Ct. 2072, 2077 (2013). “The Supreme Court has generally classified laws that violate the 

Ex Post Facto Clause into four categories.” Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 908 (9th Cir. 2012). 

A law may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause by: 

mak[ing] an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent 

when done, criminal. . . . aggravat[ing] a crime, or mak[ing] it greater than it was, 

when committed. . . . chang[ing] the punishment, and inflict[ing] greater 

punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. . . . [or] 

alter[ing] the legal rules of evidence, and receiv[ing] less, or different, testimony, 

than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to 

convict the offender. 

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). However, because “non-statutory aggravating factors and 

mitigating factors are weighed by the jury to make the individualized determination to impose 

the death sentence upon a defendant who has already been found eligible. . . . [t]hey do not 

increase the possible punishment or alter the elements of the offense.” United States v. Higgs, 

 

2

 However, non-statutory aggravating factors do not necessarily constitute “criminal 

conduct.” For instance, victim impact evidence is admissible during the penalty phase of a death 

penalty prosecution. See, e.g., Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 996 (extensive victim impact evidence in 

death penalty prosecution “was quite properly before the jury”). 

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353 F.3d 281, 322 (4th Cir. 2003). Here, even if the government were unable to submit the nonstatutory aggravating factors to the jury, the jury could theoretically still find Defendant eligible 

for the death penalty and sentence him to death, with reference to the statutory aggravating 

factors alone. Accordingly, the government’s selection of non-statutory aggravating factors to 

submit to the jury does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause because it neither criminalizes new 

conduct nor exposes Defendant to the risk of a sentence higher than that to which he was already 

exposed. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293–94 (1977) (where new statute “simply 

altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed,” no 

violation of Ex Post Facto clause); Gentry, 705 F.3d at 909–10 (use of victim impact evidence 

during penalty phase of capital prosecution did not violate Ex Post Facto clause); United States 

v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 759 (8th Cir. 2001) (allowance of non-statutory aggravating factors did 

not violate the constitutional prohibition against Ex Post Facto laws), vacated on other grounds 

536 U.S. 953; United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525, 1538 (D. Kan. 1996) (“[T]he use of 

non-statutory aggravating factors does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause.”). 

I. Whether § 3591 is Inconsistent With § 3592, Preventing the Use of NonStatutory Aggravating Factors 

Under the FDPA, a defendant “shall be sentenced to death if, after consideration of the 

factors set forth in section 3592 . . . it is determined that imposition of a sentence of death is 

justified.” 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a). There are sixteen statutory aggravating factors set forth in § 

3592, and “[t]he jury, or if there is no jury, the court, may consider whether any other 

aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists.” 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). Defendant 

argues that the non-statutory aggravating factors are not “set forth” in § 3592, and accordingly 

may not be used.3

 

3

 While Defendant raised this argument in one of his motions to find the death penalty 

unconstitutional, this does not appear to be a constitutional argument. Accordingly, the Court 

will construe this argument as an addendum to his motion to strike the non-statutory aggravating 

factors. 

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“A statute should be construed, if possible, in such a way that all of its provisions can be 

given effect, and so that no part of the statute is rendered inoperative or superfluous.” Nguyen, 

928 F. Supp. at 1536. Defendant’s “strained and hyper-literal reading of § 3591(a) would render 

large portions of § 3592 inoperative,” including the “‘any other’ mitigating factors provision.” 

Id. (citing § 3592(a)(8)). Moreover, “[t]here is nothing internally contradictory or ambiguous 

about a statute referring to something ‘set forth’ in a ‘catch-all provision.’” Id. See also United 

States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 444, 459 (E.D. Penn. 2001) (“To construe § 3591(a) so 

narrowly as to nullify the catch-all sentence of §3592(c) authorizing the use of non-statutory 

aggravating factors would violate ‘the longstanding canon of statutory construction that terms in 

a statute should not be construed so as to render any provision . . . superfluous.’” (quoting Beck 

v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 506 (2000))); United States v. Le, 327 F. Supp. 2d 601, 614 (E.D. Va. 

2004) (“[A] better, more sensible reading of § 3592(c) is that any non-statutory aggravating 

factors for which notice has been given are considered to be effectively set forth in § 3591(a).”); 

United States v. Williams, Case No. CR08-0070-YK, 2013 WL 1335599, at *20 (M.D. Penn. 

Mar. 29, 2013) (rejecting argument for similar reasons). The Court finds the reasoning in those 

cases persuasive and hereby adopts it, refusing to find the use of non-statutory aggravating 

factors statutorily foreclosed.

J. Imposition of Death Penalty Without Proportionality Review 

“[P]roportionality review refers to the notion that imposition of the death penalty would 

be ‘unacceptable in a particular case because [it is] disproportionate to the punishment imposed 

on others convicted of the same crime.’” Mitchell 502 F.3d at 980 (quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 

U.S. 37, 43 (1984)). “Pulley squarely rejected the claim that the Constitution requires 

proportionality review in death sentences.” Id.

K. Death Penalty and Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

Defendant argues that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under 

all circumstances, and must be found unconstitutional. However, a contention that capital 

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punishment “is incompatible with society’s values or otherwise categorically violates the Eighth 

Amendment” is unavailing. Id. at 982. Similarly, Defendant’s argument that the death penalty 

has in the past, and will in the future, lead to the execution of an innocent person “is one the 

Supreme Court has long been aware of,” but it has nonetheless declined to find capital 

punishment unconstitutional. Id. at 983. Defendant’s other arguments, that the process by which 

individuals are selected for capital prosecution vests too much discretion in the prosecuting 

attorney, that the death penalty is an “intellectually dishonest congressional response to the 

public’s frustration with violent crime,” and that the error rate in capital cases is unacceptably 

high, (Dkt. No. 115, at 49), are similarly unavailing where the Supreme Court has repeatedly 

upheld the death penalty. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); Zant v. 

Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 891 (1983); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296–97 (1987); Kansas 

v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 181 (2006). 

L. Lethal Injection and Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

Defendant argues that lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 

However, the Supreme Court has held that lethal injection is not categorically barred by the 

Eighth Amendment. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008) (holding that Kentucky’s lethal 

injection protocol satisfies the Eighth Amendment). In any case, “challenges to the execution of 

a federal sentence are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,” and raising it in a motion 

during the underlying criminal prosecution is improper. United States v. Little, 392 F.3d 671, 679 

(4th Cir. 2004). Finally, as the government notes, Defendant has not been sentenced to death, or 

even convicted. Accordingly, this challenge is premature. See United States v. Green, Case No. 

CR06-0019-TBR, 2008 WL 4000873, at *2–*3 (W.D. Ken. Aug. 26, 2008) (Defendant’s motion 

to find lethal injection unconstitutional not appropriate at this time, where Defendant had not 

been convicted and sentenced to death); United States v. Caro, Case No. CR06-0001-JPJ, 2006 

WL 1594185, at *4 (W.D. Va. June 2, 2006) (challenge to constitutionality of lethal injection 

during pretrial proceedings not ripe, and accordingly not properly raised). 

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III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motions to find the death penalty unconstitutional 

(Dkt. Nos.114 & 115) are DENIED. 

DATED this 18th day of February 2014. 

A 

John C. Coughenour 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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