Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50632/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50632-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Julio Cesar Arriaga Hernandez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JULIO CESAR ARRIAGA HERNANDEZ,

AKA Julio Cesar Arriaga, AKA

Julio Cesar Hernandez Arriaga,

AKA Jose Julio Hernandez, AKA

Julio Cesar Hernandez,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50632

D.C. No.

8:13-cr-00058-

JLS-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 10, 2014*

Pasadena, California

Filed October 20, 2014

Before: Harry Pregerson, Richard C. Tallman,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel reversed a sentence and remanded for

resentencing in an illegal-reentry case in which the district

court enhanced the sentence pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(2) after finding that the defendant’s prior

conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under

California Penal Code § 12021(a)(1) (2003) qualified as an

aggravated felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).

The panel held that the analysis applied in the

immigration context in United States v. Aguilera-Rios, No.

12-50597, 2014 WL 4800292 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2014)

(holding that California’s felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm

statute, which does not include an antique-firearm exception,

is not a categorical match for the federal firearms offense),

applies in the sentencing context. The panel observed that

California does prosecute cases involving antique firearms

under § 12021(a)(1), and held that the modified categorical

approach is inapplicable because the definition of a firearm

in the California Penal Code is not divisible. The panel

concluded that the district court therefore erred in applying

the enhancement.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 3

COUNSEL

Sean K. Kennedy, Federal Public Defender; James H.

Locklin, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles,

California, for Defendant-Appellant.

André Birotte Jr., United States Attorney; Robert E. Dugdale,

Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division;

Joshua M. Robbins, Assistant United States Attorney, Santa

Ana, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

JulioCesar Arriaga-Hernandez (“Hernandez”) appealsthe

33-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea

conviction for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)

(2012). The sentencing judge enhanced Hernandez’s

sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) after finding that

Hernandez’s prior California conviction for being a felon in

possession of a firearm qualified as an aggravated felony. 

We have jurisdiction over the district court’s final judgment

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). The district court did not

have the benefit of our recent decision in United States v.

Aguilera-Rios, ___ F.3d ___, No. 12-50597, 2014 WL

4800292 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2014). There we held, in the

immigration context, that California’s felon in possession of

a firearm statute is not a categorical match for the federal

firearms offense. Id. at *9. We now hold that the same

analysis applies in the sentencing context. As a result, we

reverse Hernandez’s sentence and remand the case for

re-sentencing.

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4 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

Hernandez came to the United States as an illegal alien in

1982, when he was two months old. He has lived in

California for most of his life, and he lived there with his

girlfriend and young daughter prior to his incarceration. In

the past twelve years, Hernandez has been deported six times. 

Following each deportation Hernandez has returned to the

United States. Hernandez has had several additional run-ins

with the law in his life. Most significantly, in 2003

Hernandez pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a

firearm in violation of California Penal Code § 12021(a)(1)

(2003).

Hernandez was again deported in December 2012, but by

January 2013 he had returned to the United States. Shortly

after his return he was arrested in Orange County and indicted

in federal court for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (for

being an illegal alien found in the United States following

deportation). Hernandez pleaded guilty to the charge, and the

case proceeded to sentencing.

At sentencing, the district court relied on Hernandez’s

2003 felon in possession of a firearm conviction as a

predicate for imposing an eight-levelsentencing enhancement

under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines (“If the defendant previously was deported, or

unlawfully remained in the United States, after . . . (C) a

conviction for an aggravated felony, increase by 8

levels. . . .”). Based on this and other factors, the court

sentenced Hernandez to 33months imprisonment. Hernandez

objected to the court’s imposition of the eight-level

enhancement, and he appeals application of that enhancement

here.

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 5

Hernandez argues that his prior conviction under

California Penal Code § 12021(a)(1) (2003) (California’s

then-felon in possession of a firearm statute) does not qualify

as an aggravated felony warranting an eight-level sentencing

enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) of the Sentencing

Guidelines. Although he concedes that he was convicted in

California as a felon in possession of a firearm, he argues that

because California’s statute does not exclude antique

firearms, the crime of felon in possession of a firearm under

state law is categorically overbroad when compared with the

crime of felon in possession of a firearm under federal law,

see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which does exclude antique

firearms, see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).

The federal sentencing guidelines permit courts to base

sentencing enhancements on state convictions as long as the

relevant state statute is a “categorical match” with the generic

federal definition. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,

110 S. Ct. 2143 (1998) (applying the categorical approach to

sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. IV)); United States v. AcostaChavez, 727 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying the

categorical analysis to section 2L1.2(b)(1)). A state statute is

a categorical match to the generic federal statute if it

proscribes the same amount of or less conduct than the

federal statute. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588–89; see also

Aguilera-Rios, 2014 WL4800292, at *6–7 (citing Moncrieffe

v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1686–87 (2013)). “If the statute

of conviction ‘sweeps more broadly than the generic crime,

a conviction under that law cannot [categorically] count as [a

qualifying] predicate, even if the defendant actually

committed the offense in its generic form.’” Acosta-Chavez,

727 F.3d at 907 (quoting Descamps v. United States, 133 S.

Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013)). There is one exception to this rule: 

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6 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

Even if a state statute sweeps more broadly than a federal

statute, the two can be a categorical match if there is no

“realistic probability . . . that the State would apply its statute

to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.” 

Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S. Ct.

815 (2007).

Hernandez is correct that the California felon in

possession statute sweeps more broadly than its federal

counterpart. Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) of the Sentencing

Guidelines directs the sentencing court to apply an eight-level

enhancement if the previously-deported defendant remained

in the United States after “a conviction for an aggravated

felony.” An aggravated felony includes being a felon in

possession of a “firearm.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) cmt.

3(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining “aggravated felony”);

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The federal government defines

“firearm” as “any weapon . . . which will or is designed to or

may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action

of an explosive . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). It excludes

from this definition antique firearms. Id. (“Such term does

not include an antique firearm.”). California’s definition of

a firearm does not exclude antique firearms. See Cal. Penal

Code § 12021(a)(1).

The district court noted this discrepancy during

sentencing, but concluded that it was irrelevant because the

federal antique firearm exception is an affirmative defense,

and affirmative defenses are inapplicable to the categorical

analysis. This conclusion is no longer valid in light of recent

Ninth Circuit case law. We recently concluded that the

Supreme Court’s decision in Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. 1678,

retroactively overruled the portion of Gil v. Holder, 651 F.3d

1000, 1005–06 (9th Cir. 2011), which held that the antique

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 7

firearms exception is an affirmative defense that need not be

considered in a categorical analysis. Aguilera-Rios, 2014 WL

4800292, at *6. Under Aguilera-Rios, California Penal Code

§ 12021(a)(1) is not a categorical match to 18 U.S.C. §§ 921,

922. Thus, a conviction under section 12021(a)(1) cannot

serve as a predicate for the section 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) eight-level

enhancement unless there is no “realistic probability” that

California would prosecute people for possession of an

antique firearm. See Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193.

Contrary to the government’s argument, California does

in fact prosecute cases involving antique firearms under

California Penal Code § 12021(a)(1). See People v. Charlton,

No. A122842, 2011 WL 1492529, at *1, *4 (Cal. Ct. App.

Apr. 19, 2011) (affirming conviction under California Penal

Code § 12021(a)(1) for possession of replica muzzle-loading

pistol); People v. Servin, No. E047394, 2010 WL 1619298,

at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2010) (affirming conviction

under California Penal Code § 12021(a)(1) for “family

heirloom” replica single-shot muzzle-loading rifle incapable

of using modern ammunition); People v. Cushman, No.

C044129, 2005 WL 300024, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 9,

2005) (affirming conviction under California Penal Code

§ 12021(a)(1) for possession of black powder,

muzzle-loading firearms); see also Aguilera-Rios, 2014 WL

4800292, at *7 (citing these cases among others to conclude

that California actually prosecutes people for possessing

antique firearms under California Penal Code § 12021(a)(1)). 

These prosecutions meet the “realistic probability” standard

of Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193. Aguilera-Rios, 2014

WL 4800292, at *7.

Finally, the definition of a firearm in the California Penal

Code is not divisible. Thus, as the Supreme Court made clear

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8 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

in Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276, the modified categorical

approach is inapplicable. Id. at 2283–86.

Because the state felon in possession of a firearm statute

under which Hernandez was convicted criminalizes more

conduct than the federal felon in possession of a firearm

statute, there is no categorical match. See Aguilera-Rios,

2014 WL 4800292, at *9. Without the benefit of our recent

precedent, the district court erred in applying the eight-level

enhancement, and we remand Hernandez’s case for

re-sentencing. Because Hernandez is entitled to relief, we do

not address his other arguments as to why his conviction does

not qualify as an aggravated felony.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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