Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-04011/USCOURTS-ca10-95-04011-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Luis Orrego-Fernandez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 95-4011 

LUIS ORREGO-FERNANDEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 93-CR-222) 

G. Fred Metos, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant. 

.. FILE!i 

1...Dited States Court ot Apperus 

Tenth Circuit 

MAR 19 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

("I .... ~ 

Bruce C. Lubeck, Assistant United States Attorney (Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States 

Attorney, with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

"-... 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BARRETT, Circuit Judge, and KERN, District 

Judge.* 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

*Honorable Terry C. Kern, United States District Judge for the Northern District of 

Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 95-4011 Document: 01019284180 Date Filed: 03/19/1996 Page: 1 
Mr. Luis Orrego-Femandez was convicted of possession of a controlled substance 

with intent to distribute in violation of21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) after the district court denied 

his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the stop, detention, and search of 

the pickup truck he was driving. He contends on appeal the district court erroneously ( 1) 

rejected the credibility findings of the magistrate, (2) found that Trooper Miller observed 

alterations to his truck, (3) held lawful the stop and his detention, and (4) found voluntary 

his consent to the search of the truck he was driving. We affirm. 

I. 

Mr. Orrego-Femandez was driving a 1987 Mazda pickup truck north on Interstate 

15 at approximately sixty miles per hour. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Douglas R. 

Miller was traveling south on Interstate 15 at approximately sixty to sixty-five miles per 

hour. As the trooper passed Mr. Orrego-Femandez, he noticed that the truck did not have 

a front license plate, was freshly painted, and appeared to have been altered. Trooper 

Miller turned his vehicle and foll~ed Mr. Orrego-Femandez. The trooper noted that the 

truck had a rear Pennsylvania license plate but did not know whether Pennsylvania 

required a front license plate. He confirmed the truck was altered as he followed and 

pulled into the lane next to it. Eventually he turned on his overhead lights and stopped 

the truck. 

Trooper Miller further confirmed the truck was altered as he approached the 

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driver's side. When he requested a driver's license and truck registration, Mr. OrregoFemandez produced a New Jersey driver's license bearing his name but was unable to 

produce a registration. Instead he offered an insurance card which indicated the truck 

was registered in Pennsylvania to Mr. Jose Caez. Trooper Miller asked Mr. OrregoFemandez if he had permission to use the truck. Mr. Orrego-Femandez replied that he 

did and stated that Mr. Caez was his cousin. The trooper then informed Mr. OrregoFemandez he had stopped him because of a possible registration violation. Trooper 

Miller testified, however, that he actually stopped the truck because he suspected it had a 

hidden compartment which probably contained drugs or guns. 

Trooper Miller went back to his car to verify Mr. Orrego-Femandez's license and 

the registration of the truck. The dispatcher stated that no information could be found 

with respect to Mr. Orrego-Femandez's license but verified that the owner of the truck 

was Mr. Caez. The trooper returned to the truck and, while holding Mr. OrregoF emandez' s license and the insurance card, asked if there were any guns or drugs in the 

truck. Mr. Orrego-Femandez resp.Qnded that there were no guns or drugs. Trooper Miller 

then asked if he could search the truck for guns and drugs, to which Mr. OrregoFemandez responded, "sure, if you want to." Rec., supp. vol. III, at 34. The trooper 

requested Mr. Orrego-Femandez to get out of the truck and stand on the shoulder. In the 

meantime, two additional troopers arrived on the scene. Trooper Miller searched the 

exterior of the truck for further signs of a hidden compartment and found that the gas tank 

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Appellate Case: 95-4011 Document: 01019284180 Date Filed: 03/19/1996 Page: 3 
intake hose had been altered and that there was a gap between the end gate and the bed of 

the truck. Both modifications indicated to him that the truck contained a hidden 

compartment. Trooper Miller testified he then arrested Mr. Orrego-Fernandez because he 

thought the alterations to the truck gave him probable cause to believe it contained a 

hidden compartment which held guns or drugs. Mr. Orrego-Fernandez and the truck were 

transported to the sheriffs office where Trooper Miller obtained a warrant for a further 

search. On further inspection, officers discovered 109 kilogram packages of cocaine in a 

hidden compartment. 

The district court designated a magistrate judge to conduct a hearing on Mr. 

Orrego-Fernandez's motion to suppress evidence. The magistrate recommended that the 

evidence be suppressed. The district court reviewed the magistrate's findings and the 

objections thereto, rejected some of the findings, and denied Mr. Orrego-Fernandez's 

motion to suppress. Mr. Orrego-Fernandez entered a conditional guilty plea and this 

appeal followed. 

II. 

As an initial matter, Mr. Orrego-Fernandez contends the district court erred under 

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(l) by rejecting the magistrate's credibility determination without 

rehearing the testimony. Mr. Orrego-Fernandez insists the case should be remanded with 

an order requiring the district court either to take testimony or adopt the magistrate's 

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Appellate Case: 95-4011 Document: 01019284180 Date Filed: 03/19/1996 Page: 4 
recommendations. 

Under section 636(b )(1 )(B), the district court may designate a magistrate judge to 

hear certain pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal case. 

With respect to such "dispositive" motions, the district court may "designate a magistrate 

to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court 

proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the 

court, of[the] motion." 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(l)(B). The statute further provides that the 

district court 

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or 

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection 

is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in 

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the 

magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence or 

recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions. 

28 U.S.C. §636(b )(1 ). "'De novo review is statutorily and constitutionally required .... 

Where circumstances indicate that the district court has not conducted such review 

following timely objection to the magistrate's report, the case must be remanded for 

"---.. 

compliance with the statute."' Bratcher v. Bray-Doyle Indep. Sch. Dist., 8 F .3d 722, 724 

(lOth Cir. 1993) (quoting Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (lOth Cir. 1991)). 

However, "the express references to de novo review in [the district court's] order must be 

taken to mean it properly considered the pertinent portions of the record, absent some 

clear indication otherwise." Id. In United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674 (1980), 

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Appellate Case: 95-4011 Document: 01019284180 Date Filed: 03/19/1996 Page: 5 
the Supreme Court held that section 636(b)(l) requires "a de novo determination, not a de 

novo hearing" where a district court adopts the recommendation of the magistrate. In a 

footnote, the Court said ''we assume it is unlikely that a district judge would reject a 

magistrate's proposed findings on credibility when those findings are dispositive and 

substitute the judge's own appraisal; to do so without seeing and hearing the witness or 

witnesses whose credibility is in question could well give rise to serious questions which 

we do not reach." 447 U.S. at 681 n.7. The Court's caveat, however, was directed only 

to findings that are dispositive. 

Thus, before we determine whether the district court is required to rehear 

testimony, we must decide whether the magistrate's credibility findings were dispositive 

or material to the district court's holding. The district court here stated it would make a 

de novo determination, and then held that the alterations to the truck observed by Trooper 

Miller, given his experience with similar alterations to similar trucks, constituted 

reasonable suspicion. The question is whether the magistrate made material, contrary 

credibility findings with respect t~Trooper Miller's testimony that he observed the 

truck's alterations. 

The magistrate first noted that Trooper Miller testified he made certain 

observations as he passed the truck going the opposite direction. The magistrate found 

that Trooper Miller could not have made the asserted observations because of the distance 

between, and speed of, the respective vehicles. This credibility finding is not material 

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Appellate Case: 95-4011 Document: 01019284180 Date Filed: 03/19/1996 Page: 6 
because Trooper Miller did not base his stop on that observation. The trooper also 

testified he confirmed his observations when he followed the truck prior to the stop. The 

magistrate did not find otherwise. 

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the magistrate did not 

make material credibility findings contrary to the district court's conclusion. The 

magistrate did not specifically discredit Trooper Miller's testimony regarding his closer 

observations of the alterations. Nor did the magistrate's credibility findings address 

Trooper Miller's demeanor or any other factor gleaned from live testimony. Instead, the 

magistrate personally observed the truck's alterations but concluded that they were 

consistent with innocent behavior. 1 The district court disagreed and held that the 

alterations constituted reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Whether the alterations 

were innocent in nature is not a credibility determination. Because the magistrate's 

credibility findings were not material to the district court's ultimate determination, we do 

not address whether a district court's rejection of such findings requires rehearing the 

testimony. 

1

Because the truck was actually altered, the fact that Trooper Miller failed to 

document the alterations in his report is not determinative of whether he observed them. 

Similarly, the fact that the altered truck on which Trooper Miller was trained to recognize 

a hidden compartment may not have actually contained drugs is not material to whether 

Trooper Miller observed similar alterations indicating a hidden compartment in the 

instant case. 

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III. 

We review the factual findings in support of a district court's denial of a motion to 

suppress evidence under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Betancur, 24 

F.3d 73, 76 (lOth Cir. 1994). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

district court's ruling. United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1551 (lOth Cir. 1993). We 

review the question of standing and the ultimate determination of reasonableness de novo. 

Betancur, 24 F.3d at 76; Soto, 988 F.2d at 1551. 

A. 

We tum first to the issue of standing. The district court relied on United States v. 

Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, and United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271 (lOth Cir. 1990), 

to hold that Mr. Orr~go-Femandez had standing to challenge the search of the truck. The 

government contends Mr. Orrego-Femandez lacked standing because he did not produce 

a registration. 

"The standing inquiry focu~s on reasonable expectations, hence, a defendant is 

not required 'to produce legal documentation showing a chain of lawful custody from the 

registered owner' to himself." Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d at 1275 (quoting United States v. 

Arango, 912 F.2d 441,446 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 924 (1991). In 

Rubio-Rivera, the "[ d]efendant satisfied the requirement that he 'must at least state that 

he gained possession from the owner or someone with the authority to grant possession"' 

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Appellate Case: 95-4011 Document: 01019284180 Date Filed: 03/19/1996 Page: 8 
when he testified the owner directed him to "papers" in the glove box indicating 

ownership. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d at 1275 (quoting Aran"o, 912 F.2d at 445). 

Here, Mr. Orrego-Femandez introduced evidence that he had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the vehicle when he stated he received permission from the 

owner to use the truck. In addition, he produced a Pennsylvania insurance card which 

identified the individual he named as the owner of the truck. Trooper Miller testified the 

dispatcher confirmed that the individual on the insurance card was the owner of the truck. 

"Where the defendant offers sufficient evidence indicating that he has permission of the 

owner to use the vehicle, the defendant plainly has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the vehicle .... " Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d at 1275 (citation omitted). We hold that Mr. 

Orrego-Femandez has standing to challenge the search of the truck. 

B. 

Mr. Orrego-Femandez first asserts the district court erred when it found that 

Trooper Miller observed alteratio~ to the truck. We are not persuaded. The government 

submitted exhibits demonstrating the alterations described by Trooper Miller were 

observable. The trooper certainly got close enough to the truck to observe it from behind 

and on the side before he stopped it. The district court relied upon the experience and 

testimony of Trooper Miller and the exhibits corroborating his testimony to conclude that 

he observed the alterations. Under these circumstances, we can not say the district court's 

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Appellate Case: 95-4011 Document: 01019284180 Date Filed: 03/19/1996 Page: 9 
finding that Trooper Miller observed the alterations to the truck is clearly erroneous. 

c. 

Mr. Orrego-Fernandez also asserts the alterations to the truck did not provide 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support the stop. The Fourth Amendment 

prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. The stopping of a vehicle constitutes a 

"seizure." United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 

U.S. 1093 (1992). A vehicle stop is usually a limited seizure, however, "and is more like 

an investigative detention than a custodial arrest." ld. We therefore analyze the stop and 

detention of a vehicle under the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See 

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) ("[T]he usual traffic stop is more 

analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' ... than to a formal arrest."); Betancur, 24 F.3d at 

78 ("A temporary detention [of a vehicle's driver] for questioning is justified when the 

officer has reasonable suspicion 'of illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious 

crime."') (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,499 (1983)). See also Soto, 988 F.2d 

at 1554; United States v. Horn, 970 F.2d 728,731 (lOth Cir. 1992); Walker, 933 F.2d at 

815. Under Th!n, we examine "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, 

and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 

interference in the first place." 392 U.S. at 20. "[I]njustifying the particular intrusion the 

police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together 

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Appellate Case: 95-4011 Document: 01019284180 Date Filed: 03/19/1996 Page: 10 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21. 

Whether alterations to a vehicle in the absence of other factors can constitute 

reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed is a question of first impression for 

us, although we have addressed altered vehicles in cases where other factors are present.2 

In Betancur, 24 F.3d at 78, for example, we held that an altered truck plus registration 

papers which did not establish the defendant as the owner constituted reasonable 

suspicion for detaining the vehicle. The defendant there was stopped for speeding. As 

the officer approached the stopped truck, he noticed that it was "high," that the truck's 

bottom appeared lower than normal, and that the rear wheel well area was bright with 

fresh undercoating. When questioned about the ownership of the truck, the defendant 

provided unsatisfactory answers. The officer then asked the defendant whether he had 

cocaine or marijuana. The defendant subsequently argued the continued detention 

unreasonably exceeded the scope of the reason for the initial stop. We upheld the 

temporary detention because the officer reasonably suspected the transportation of 

contraband based on evidence of a__hidden compartment under the bed of the truck and the 

inability of the defendant to prove lawful possession of the truck. 

2 Otherwise innocent behavior may sometimes constitute reasonable suspicion 

given the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 

1481, 1484 (lOth Cir. 1994) ("In making a determination of probable cause the relevant 

inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of 

suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.") (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 

462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983)). 

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In United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d at 447, we held that evidence of a hidden 

compartment plus an inadequate amount of luggage for a purported two-week vacation 

constituted probable cause. The defendant there was stopped for speeding. The officer 

gave the defendant a citation for speeding and then asked for and received consent to 

search the truck for alcohol, weapons, or drugs. In the meantime, a second officer arrived 

at the scene. As the second officer walked up to the truck from behind, he noticed that 

the bed of the truck was very shallow. After lifting a mat that covered the bed, he 

observed the bed had been modified. The section seams of the bed appeared as if they had 

been put in by hand, bolts on the side of the bed did not match the color ofthe truck, and 

several inches existed between the bed of the truck and its undercarriage. Both officers 

tapped on the side of the truck, but neither could feel the taps on the other side. The 

officers then requested the defendant to follow them to the sheriffs office. The defendant 

asserted his arrest was illegal. We held the de facto arrest legal on the ground that the 

alterations to the truck and the lack of luggage gave the officers probable cause to believe 

the defendant was transporting contraband. 

Two district courts in our circuit have addressed whether alterations to a vehicle 

constitute reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. In United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 893 

F. Supp. 963, 966 (D. Kan. 1995), the court held that a truck with a "homemade" bed 

constituted reasonable suspicion. Although the defendant was following another vehicle 

too closely, one of the two troopers in the patrol car admitted he was going to stop the 

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defendant regardless of any traffic violation. The troopers testified they stopped the 

defendant because they suspected the truck had a false compartment under the truck bed. 

They followed the truck and pulled into the left lane to get a closer look. Before stopping 

the defendant, the troopers observed a discrepancy of six to eight inches between where 

the bed should rest on the frame rails of the truck and the actual height of the bed. The 

troopers testified that the clues to a false bed included the visibility of the false floor from 

the wheel well or the appearance that a spare tire is too low when mounted under the 

truck where it belongs. The troopers said they were absolutely certain the truck contained 

a false bed based upon knowledge and expertise regarding hidden compartments in 

vehicles. Noting that the defendant did not proffer any legitimate purpose for such a 

hidden compartment, the court held that evidence of a false bed constituted reasonable 

susp1c10n. 

In United States v. Castillo, 864 F.Supp. 1090, 1096-1097 (D. Utah 1994), the 

court held that evidence of a "customized" truck, the smell of air freshener from the 

truck's cab, and the defendant's nervousness did not establish reasonable suspicion. The 

defendants were stopped because the driver's side window was darkly tinted in likely 

violation of state law. As the trooper approached the truck, he noticed there were caps on 

the tie down holes and fresh undercoating under the wheel wells. After the driver rolled 

down her window, the trooper noticed a strong smell of air freshener. The trooper asked 

a number of intrusive questions unrelated to the possible traffic violation. Defendants 

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asserted that their continued detention was unreasonable because it exceeded the scope of 

the reason for the initial stop. The court held that the evidence, including the customized 

truck, did not establish reasonable suspicion that defendants were committing a crime. 

In this case, Trooper Miller testified he stopped Mr. Orrego-Femandez because he 

observed alterations to the truck. Four factors led to his initial curiosity: (1) the truck was 

freshly painted and had a bright finish, (2) the truck frame was noticeably lower in the 

back than the front, (3) the leaf springs on the rear axle were only about five inches from 

the pavement and (4) the wheel well was solid black and no air space could be seen. In 

addition, Trooper Miller observed what he believed to be a gas tank hanging two to three 

inches below the frame of the truck, which increased his suspicion that the truck had been 

altered to transport contraband. Trooper Miller testified he had been trained on a similar 

truck which had a lowered gas tank and a hidden compartment. The truck in the instant 

case had been freshly painted over dents that could have been easily removed, raising the 

inference that the truck was painted to conceal the alterations. 

While Mr. Orrego-Femand~ was traveling in the outside or slow lane, Trooper 

Miller pulled into the inside lane so he could further observe the truck. He testified he 

confirmed that the leaf springs were approximately five inches from the ground. He also 

confirmed that the wheel well had been recently undercoated with black paint and that 

there was no air space between the frame and bed of the truck. Trooper Miller testified 

that an unaltered truck has metal slats that reinforce the bed of the truck and tie into the 

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frame of the vehicle. Because he could not view the slats from the wheel well, he 

concluded that the bed was sitting on the frame of the truck. It was at this point that 

Trooper Miller stopped Mr. Orrego-Femandez. 

Alterations to vehicles do not automatically create reasonable suspicion. The 

alterations to the vehicle must be such that a trooper may reasonably believe a crime is 

being committed. The trooper must go beyond the inarticulable hunch that all customized 

vehicles contain hidden compartments and point to specific factors which justify the 

objectively reasonable conclusion that particular alterations indicate a hidden 

compartment which may contain contraband. The truck in this case was not merely 

"customized." It contained several alterations which in the trooper's experience were 

consistent with the existence of a hidden compartment. On these facts, we hold that the 

sum of the particular alterations observed by Trooper Miller created reasonable suspicion 

of drug trafficking and satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment for an 

investigative detention. 

D. 

Our review does not end here because Trooper Miller requested consent to search 

the truck. We review a district court's finding of voluntary consent under the clearly 

erroneous standard. United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d at 1557. "The voluntariness of 

consent must be determined from the totality of the circumstances, and the government 

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bears the burden of proof on the issue." ld. In making the determination, we do not 

presume that the consent was either voluntary or involuntary. United States v. Price, 925 

F.2d 1268, 1271 (lOth Cir. 1991). To sustain its burden, "the government must show that 

there was no duress or coercion, express or implied, that the consent was unequivocal and 

specific, and that it was freely and intelligently given." Soto, 988 F.2d at 1557 (citing 

United States v. Price, 925 F.2d at 1270). 

Mr. Orrego-Femandez asserts that his consent was involuntary for several reasons: 

(1) the sequence of questions prior to his consent, (2) he was not free to leave, and (3) he 

was not informed that he did not have to consent to the search. We must assess whether 

taken as a whole, under the totality of the circumstances, the district court's finding of 

voluntary consent is clearly erroneous. 

Failure to inform a defendant that he was free to leave or that he could refuse 

consent are "important factors in our consideration." United States v. McSwain, 29 F.2d 

558, 563 (lOth Cir. 1994). In McSwain, the initial stop of the defendant violated the 

Fourth Amendment. In assessing tl!e totality of the circumstances, we held that the 

consent of the defendant did not purge the taint of his illegal detention. The 

circumstances of this case, however, are more analogous to Soto where we recognized 

that any detained individual will feel some degree of compulsion but held that detention 

does not automatically render consent involuntary. 988 F.2d at 1557-58. Here, as in 

Soto, Mr. Orrego-Femandez was not subjected to an illegal detention. In addition, the 

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district court found the following facts. Mr. Orrego-Fernandez was not physically 

harmed, and no other officers were present when he gave his consent. Trooper Miller did 

not threaten Mr. Orrego-Fernandez or use a threatening tone. The search was conducted 

on the shoulder of a public highway in daylight. Trooper Miller asked only once if he 

could search the truck for guns or drugs. Mr. Orrego-Fernandez got out of the truck after 

the request to allow Trooper Miller to conduct the search. Mr. Orrego-Fernandez's 

consent was unequivocal and specific. Under these circumstances, the district court's 

finding that Mr. Orrego-Fernandez' consent was voluntary is not clearly erroneous. 

Moreover, the search did not exceed the consent given. The standard for 

measuring the scope of Mr. Orrego-Fernandez' s consent is "what ... the typical 

reasonable person [would] have understood by the exchange between the [trooper] and 

the suspect." Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,251 (1991). "The scope of a search is 

generally defined by its expressed object." Id. Trooper Miller's search of the vehicle did 

not exceed the scope of consent. He informed Mr. Orrego-Fernandez that he wanted to 

search for guns and drugs. Mr. 0t.:!._ego-Fernandez did not place any explicit limitation on 

the scope of the search. ~ id. Trooper Miller's search consisted of an external 

examination and the lifting of the camper shell door to examine the bed of the truck. He 

did not search the visible luggage in the truck. He did not search any hidden 

compartments in the cab or under the bed of the truck. We hold that the search of the 

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truck prior to Mr. Orrego-Femandez's arrest was within the scope of the consent given. 3 

We AFFIRM the district court's denial of Mr. Orrego-Femandez's motion to 

suppress evidence and the judgment of conviction. 

3 Mr. Orrego-Femandez does not challenge the arrest on appeal, so we do not 

address whether probable cause existed at this point to make an arrest. 

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