Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01964/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01964-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Nowakowski
Appellant
People of the State of New York
Appellee

Document Text:

14‐1964

Nowakowski v. New York

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

______________                          

August Term 2015

(Argued: October 14, 2015          Decided: August 26, 2016)

Docket No. 14‐1964

                          

ROBERT NOWAKOWSKI,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

–v.–  

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

Respondent‐Appellee.

______________

Before:

STRAUB, WESLEY, and LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

Appeal from a May 30, 2014, order of the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of New York (Vitaliano, J.).  Petitioner‐Appellant Robert

Nowakowski filed a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from a

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conviction for second‐degree harassment.  Because Nowakowski completed his

sentence of conditional discharge, the District Court dismissed the petition as

moot, concluding there was no continuing collateral consequence sufficient to

confer standing.  We granted a certificate of appealability to address two

questions of first impression in our Circuit:  (1) whether Nowakowski was “in

custody” for the purposes of habeas review when he filed his petition during a

period of conditional discharge requiring one day of community service; and (2)

whether, despite the completion of that sentence, there are collateral

consequences to his conviction.  We conclude that Nowakowski was both “in

custody” at the time his petition was filed and that, because the presumption of

continuing collateral consequences applies to his conviction and is not rebutted,

his petition presents a live case or controversy.  We therefore VACATE the

district court’s dismissal of Nowakowski’s habeas petition and REMAND for

further proceedings.

Judge LIVINGSTON dissents in a separate opinion.

_________________

ROBERT NOWAKOWSKI, pro se, Brooklyn, NY.

VICTOR BARALL, Assistant District Attorney (Leonard Joblove,

Assistant District Attorney, on the brief), for Kenneth P.

Thomson, District Attorney for Kings County, Brooklyn, NY,

for Respondent‐Appellee.

_________________                        

WESLEY, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner‐Appellant Robert Nowakowski was convicted of harassment in

the second degree, an offense classified as a violation under state law, and

sentenced to one year’s conditional discharge, requiring one day of community

service.  Before completing this sentence, Nowakowski filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for

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the Eastern District of New York (Vitaliano, J.).  Because Nowakowski fulfilled

the requirements of his sentence during the pendency of the habeas proceeding,

the District Court concluded that Nowakowski’s case presented no live case or

controversy sufficient to establish Article III standing under Spencer v. Kemna, 523

U.S. 1 (1998).   

We granted a certificate of appealability with instructions to brief two

questions of first impression we now answer:  First, whether a sentence of

conditional discharge and one day’s community service, unfulfilled as of the

time of filing the habeas petition, satisfies the “in custody” requirement of § 2254.  

And second, whether a presumption of continuing collateral consequences

applies to Nowakowski’s conviction, thus presenting a live case or controversy

under Article III despite the expiration of his sentence.  Because we answer both

questions in the affirmative, we VACATE the District Court’s dismissal of

Nowakowski’s petition and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.1

 

1 We reject Nowakowski’s arguments that his case should be reassigned to a different

judge.  The principal basis upon which Nowakowski challenges Judge Vitaliano’s

impartiality is his judicial rulings, which “alone almost never constitute a valid basis for

a bias or partiality motion.”  Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).  Political

contributions received by Judge Vitaliano when he served in elected office—more than

five years prior to his confirmation as a federal judge and more than twelve years prior

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BACKGROUND2

Robert Nowakowski was arrested on October 31, 2006, on charges of

assault against another tenant in his building.  He contends that these charges

were fabricated by his landlord and his neighbors, including the now‐deceased

victim.  After a bench trial, he was convicted of harassment in the second

degree—which is classified as a violation under New York state law—in the

Criminal Court of the City of New York on September 18, 2008, and ordered to

pay a fine of $100.  The sentence was stayed for over four years during post‐

conviction appeals and collateral proceedings.  On May 14, 2013, the Criminal

Court vacated the fine and sentenced Nowakowski to a one‐year conditional

discharge, requiring him to complete one day of community service within that

time.  This change in sentence occurred at Nowakowski’s request because he

could not afford the fine and administrative charges, which totaled $195.

 

to Nowakowski’s petition—are not the “unusual circumstances where . . . an

assignment to a different judge is salutary and in the public interest.”  United States v.

Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

2 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from the parties’ briefing and are

undisputed.

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Pursuant to the amended sentence, the Kings County District Attorney’s

Office sent Nowakowski a “Notice of C.S. Obligation,” dated June 6, 2013.  This

notice informed Nowakowski that he had been referred for community service

on July 2, 2013, with the Parks Department.  It informed him that he was

required to appear on that date in a specific location, that the date would “NOT

be rescheduled,” and that if he failed to appear or complete the required service,

“a warrant may be issued for [his] arrest.”  Appellant App. 18.3

On July 1, 2013, Nowakowski filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for

habeas relief.  He then appeared and completed his community service before

appearing in the Criminal Court on July 9, 2015, with proof of completion.4  Prior

to filing his federal habeas petition, Nowakowski had filed a pro se civil

complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New

York, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by arrest and imprisonment without

probable cause, assault and excessive force, and the state tort of malicious abuse

of process.  See Second Am. Compl., Nowakowski v. City of New York et al., No.

 

3As Nowakowski’s appendix lacks global pagination, our citations use the PDF

pagination as available on this Court’s electronic docket (ECF No. 34).

4 Nowakowski states he completed the service as ordered on July 2.  See Appellant Br. 6.  

The People disclaim knowledge of the specific date but agree that, in any event, the

community service was completed after July 1 and before July 9.  See Appellee Br. 6.

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1:08‐cv‐00399‐RJD‐LB (E.D.N.Y. filed May 19, 2008), ECF No. 17.  His civil action

remains stayed pending resolution of his federal habeas proceeding.

On November 7, 2013, the District Court initially dismissed Nowakowski’s

petition without prejudice, because it contained an unexhausted claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  Nowakowski both moved to vacate

the dismissal, stating he wished to delete his unexhausted claim and proceed

only on his exhausted claims, and filed a motion in our Court for a certificate of

appealability.  We construed the motion as one for remand to the District Court

for consideration of his Rule 59(e) motion and granted it.  On April 2, 2014, the

District Court reopened Nowakowski’s case and granted Nowakowski’s motion

for reconsideration, allowing his exhausted claims to proceed.   

Following briefing, the District Court concluded that the expiration of

Nowakowski’s conditional discharge on May 14, 2014, rendered his petition

moot, unless Nowakowski could demonstrate a continuing collateral

consequence under Spencer, supra.  Nowakowski argued that his conviction

would preclude his § 1983 action from proceeding under Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994); the District Court held that Spencer rejected this argument against

mootness as an insufficient collateral consequence.  Thus, the District Court

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entered a Memorandum and Order on May 30, 2014, dismissing the petition as

moot and denying a certificate of appealability.  Nowakowski moved for a

certificate of appealability in this Court, which we granted.  See Order,

Nowakowski v. New York, No. 14‐1964 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2014), ECF No. 21.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition, including

whether a petitioner was in custody at the time of filing, see Carvajal v. Artus, 633

F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 2011), and whether his petition is moot, Marrero Pichardo v.

Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 46, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2004).  As Nowakowski briefed and argued

this case pro se, we construe his “appellate briefs and submissions liberally and

interpret them to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.”  Wright v. Comm’r,

381 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2004).

I.

The first question we must decide is whether Nowakowski was “in

custody” and thus able to seek federal habeas relief.5  In order for a federal court

to have jurisdiction over a habeas petition, the petitioner must be “in custody

 

5 Though the question of custody was not argued by the People below nor decided by

the District Court, the requirement of custody is jurisdictional, see Ogunwomoju v. United

States, 512 F.3d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 2008), and thus, we have an obligation to consider it nostra

sponte, see Soto v. United States, 185 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1999).

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pursuant to the judgment of a State court” at the time the petition is filed.  28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–91 (1989).  

Despite the “chief use of habeas” being “the release of persons held in

actual, physical custody in prison or jail,” the Supreme Court has affirmed “that,

besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man’s liberty,

restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient

in the English‐speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus.”  Jones v.

Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963); see also id. at 238.  The Jones Court found

jurisdiction where an individual was released from imprisonment on parole

subject to explicit conditions—for example, regular reporting to his parole

officer; remaining in a particular community, residence, and job; and refraining

from certain activities.  Id. at 242.  The Supreme Court has likewise found

jurisdiction where a petitioner was released on his own recognizance prior to

trial but had to appear in criminal court when ordered and where failure to do so

would result in issuance of an arrest warrant.  See Hensley v. Mun. Court, San Jose‐

Milpitas Judicial Dist., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973); see also Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v.

Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1984) (finding jurisdiction over petitioner released on

his own recognizance prior to trial “subject to the conditions that he would

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appear when ordered by the court, that he would waive extradition if he was

apprehended outside the State, and that a court could revoke the order of release

and require that he be returned to confinement or post bail”).   

The Courts of Appeals, including ours, have recognized that a variety of

nonconfinement restraints on liberty satisfy the custodial requirement.  See, e.g.,

Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2006) (post‐release supervision); Barry v.

Bergen Cty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 160–62 (3d Cir. 1997) (500 hours of

community service); Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 894–

95 (2d Cir. 1996) (banishment from tribal land); Dow v. Circuit Court of First

Circuit Through Huddy, 995 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (mandatory

fourteen‐hour alcohol rehabilitation program); Sammons v. Rodgers, 785 F.2d 1343,

1345 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (unexpired suspended sentence); United States ex

rel. B. v. Shelly, 430 F.2d 215, 217 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970) (probation).  Those cases

where courts have declined to find the petitioners sufficiently “in custody” have

typically involved the imposition of fines or civil disabilities, such as suspension

of licenses.  See, e.g., Barnickel v. United States, 113 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1997)

(restitution); United States v. Michaud, 901 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1990) (per curiam)

(monetary fine); Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1987) (suspension of

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medical license); Lillios v. New Hampshire, 788 F.2d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 1986) (per

curiam) (fine and temporary suspension of driver’s license); Ginsberg v. Abrams,

702 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (revocation of law, real estate, and

insurance licenses); see also Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 (collateral consequences of a

completed sentence do not constitute custody).

The custody inquiry therefore “requires a court to judge the ‘severity’ of an

actual or potential restraint on liberty.”  Poodry, 85 F.3d at 894.  Though the

language of habeas cases often refers to “severe restraints on individual liberty”

or “cases of special urgency,” Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351, these terms describe the

nature, rather than the duration, of the restraint.  It is evident that a single day of

incarceration would be sufficient custody for jurisdiction if the petitioner filed

while subject to such a sentence.  Similarly, courts have considered even

restraints on liberty that might appear short in duration or less burdensome than

probation or supervised release severe enough because they required petitioners

to appear in certain places at certain times, thus preventing them from exercising

the free movement and autonomy available to the unrestricted public, or

exposed them to future adverse consequences on discretion of the supervising

court.  See id. (custody satisfied where petitioner was required to appear in court

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when ordered and subject to revocation of release); Barry, 128 F.3d at 161 (despite

flexibility in scheduling, requirements “to be in a certain place—or in one of

several places—to attend meetings or to perform services” are clearly “restraints

on [petitioner’s] liberty not shared by the public generally”); Dow, 995 F.2d at 923

(mandatory class attendance and “physical presence at a particular place”

constituted custody, despite lasting only fourteen hours over three days);

Sammons, 785 F.2d at 1345 (potential of revocation of suspended sentence or

other adverse action during term sufficient for custody).

With these examples in mind, we turn to the facts before us, which are

uncontested.  Although the Criminal Court initially imposed a fine of $100, it

vacated this sentence and replaced it with a one‐year conditional discharge and

an order that Nowakowski perform one day of community service.  At the time

of the petition’s filing, therefore, the Criminal Court required Nowakowski (1) to

complete a day of community service (2) by a particular date and (3) to report to

the Criminal Court upon completion of that service.  Pursuant to these

requirements, Nowakowski received a “Notice of C.S. Obligation” from the

Kings County District Attorney.  The Notice commanded that Nowakowski

appear at a particular location at a particular time on a particular day, and

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informed him that he had no opportunity to reschedule the date and that failure

to appear could result in the issuance of a bench warrant.  In addition, during the

one‐year term of his sentence—which lasted for nine months after his petition

was filed—the Criminal Court retained jurisdiction to modify or enlarge the

conditions of, or to revoke entirely, the conditional discharge.  See N.Y. PENAL

LAW § 65.05[2].

Nowakowski’s sentence falls within the category of restraints that satisfy

the statutory requirement of custody.6  These restrictions are “not shared by the

public generally,” Jones, 371 U.S. at 240, require Nowakowski’s physical presence

at particular times and locations, both for community service and court

appearances, see Barry, 128 F.3d at 161; Dow, 995 F.2d at 923, and carry with them

the potential for future adverse consequences during the term of the sentence,

 

6 The People contend that Nowakowski should be estopped from claiming federal

habeas relief since his sentence was converted from a fine to conditional discharge at his

request.  They base this argument on two propositions:  that Nowakowski viewed

conditional discharge and community service as less onerous than the fine, and that his

request was a strategic attempt to qualify himself for federal habeas relief.  We find no

support for these conclusions in the record.  Nowakowski has put forth the reason for

his request—indigence, a rationale the Criminal Court accepted by entering a new

sentence.  Further, it stretches credulity that a convicted defendant would voluntarily

seek a sentence that subjects him to objectively increased restraint solely to gain mere

access to—not relief in—federal habeas proceedings.  The People have also presented

no law supporting a theory of estoppel applied to access to federal habeas, and we

decline to create any now.

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including arrest for noncompliance and modification or revocation of the

conditional discharge,7 see Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351; Sammons, 785 F.2d at 1345.  

They are wholly unlike the economic penalties suffered in fine‐only or license‐

revocation sentences, where the punishments “implicate only property, not

liberty.”  Barry, 128 F.3d at 161.  Consequently, we conclude that, at the time the

petition was filed, Nowakowski was “in custody” within the meaning of § 2254.

II.

The second question we must answer is whether Nowakowski’s case is

moot.  Unlike the “in custody” requirement, mootness is not fixed at the time of

filing but must be considered at every stage of the habeas proceeding.  See Carafas

v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968).  Once, as here, a petitioner’s sentence has

expired, “some concrete and continuing injury other than the now‐ended

incarceration or parole—some ‘collateral consequence’ of the conviction—must

exist if the suit is to be maintained.”  Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7.  In Spencer, the Court

conducted a two‐step analysis:  First, the Court determined whether a

 

7 That the Criminal Court could have revoked the conditional discharge if Nowakowski

committed “an additional offense,” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.05[2], was a particularly broad

vulnerability.  An “offense” under New York law, as we discuss more extensively infra

at Part II.A, is “conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine is

provided” by state or local law, ordinance, or regulation—everything from a traffic

infraction to a felony.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00[1]–[5].

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presumption of “continuing collateral consequences” should apply.  Id. at 8.  

And second, the Court determined whether, applying the presumption or not,

there was sufficient evidence that such consequences in fact existed.  Id. at 14;

accord United States v. Mercurris, 192 F.3d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1999).  We conduct

each inquiry in turn.

A.

Spencer traced more than forty years of Supreme Court precedent to

explain the development of the presumption of continuing collateral

consequences after its first articulation in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).  

The Court observed that it applied the presumption only to “criminal

convictions” and expressly declined to extend it outside of that context to parole

revocation.  Spencer, 523 U.S. at 9–13; see also Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632–33

(1982).  In so doing, it candidly acknowledged that such a presumption “sits

uncomfortably beside the long‐settled principle” that Article III standing cannot

be inferred and that the proponent of jurisdiction bears the burden of

demonstrating it.  Spencer, 523 U.S. at 10–11 (internal quotation marks omitted).  

It further considered “of particular relevance” that, with criminal convictions,

“the presumption of significant collateral consequences is likely to comport with

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reality,” calling this observation “‘an obvious fact of life.’”  Id. at 12 (quoting

Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55).  The Court’s clear reluctance to extend the Sibron

presumption outside of this narrow category has guided our Court in declining

to apply it when the defendant does not challenge a criminal conviction.  See

Mercurris, 192 F.3d at 293 (sentencing enhancement); United States v. Probber, 170

F.3d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 1999) (revocation of supervised release).

Spencer—as well as our opinions in Mercurris and Probber—may be fairly

characterized as declining to apply the presumption to cases in which something

ancillary to a conviction was challenged, even if of a criminal nature.8  Here, by

contrast, it is evident that Nowakowski challenges a conviction.  What is

disputed is whether this conviction is criminal, for reasons that will shortly

become clear.  Our Circuit’s precedent has never answered this question, nor has

the Supreme Court spoken on the subject in the context of the Sibron

presumption.  Therefore, we proceed cautiously, examining the nature of the

offense of which Nowakowski was convicted and drawing on principles in other

areas of law where the Supreme Court has addressed similar considerations.

 

8 But see infra note 15 (discussing a situation in which the Supreme Court arguably

applied the presumption outside of the context of a formal conviction).

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Before commencing our analysis, we think it necessary to explain briefly

the New York scheme of penal offenses.  The New York Penal Law defines an

“offense” as “conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine

is provided” by a state or local law, ordinance, or regulation.  N.Y. PENAL LAW

§ 10.00[1].  The Penal Law categorizes each offense as one of four types, listed

here in descending order of seriousness: a felony, a misdemeanor, a violation,

and a traffic infraction.  Id. § 10.00[2]–[5].  Of these four, only a felony and a

misdemeanor are labeled “[c]rime[s].”  Id. § 10.00[6].  Violations are offenses,

other than traffic infractions, “for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in

excess of fifteen days cannot be imposed.”  Id. § 10.00[3].  Misdemeanors permit

incarceratory sentences of up to one year, while felonies permit incarceratory

sentences over one year.  Id. § 10.00[4]–[5].  Traffic infractions are violations of

the Vehicle and Traffic Law, “which [are] not declared by this chapter or other

law of this state to be a misdemeanor or a felony.”  N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 155.   

In the case before us, Nowakowski was convicted of harassment in the

second degree, which New York classifies as a violation.  See N.Y. PENAL LAW

§ 240.26.  Thus, the critical question is whether, taking into account New York’s

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decision not to label violations as crimes, Nowakowski’s conviction is

nonetheless “criminal” for purposes of the Sibron presumption.   

We start from first principles.  The Sibron presumption is a judicial

doctrine concerning mootness under Article III.  See Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S.

301, 304 (1964).  Whether a case is moot is a question of federal, not state, law.  

See id.  As a result, we must determine whether Nowakowski’s conviction is civil

or criminal in nature by reference to federal principles—state law provides the

necessary facts underlying the question, but federal law provides the rule of

decision.  See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 (2011) (per

curiam) (analyzing a certified question of Montana law to determine whether the

doctrine of continuing collateral consequences was satisfied).  For several

reasons, we think the Supreme Court’s cases determining the applicability of

federal constitutional protections are the most relevant precedents upon which to

draw.  See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza‐Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165–68 (1963)

(concluding constitutional criminal protections apply where Congress applies a

punitive sanction); see also, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986)

(conducting same analysis with respect to sanctions imposed by state law).   

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First, the inquiries are identical in the question presented:  whether a

particular proceeding is civil or criminal in nature under federal law.  See Hicks ex

rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 (1988) (endorsing “the characterization of

this proceeding and the relief given as civil or criminal in nature, for purposes of

determining the proper applicability of federal constitutional protections” as

raising “a question of federal law rather than state law”).  And second, both the

civil‐criminal analysis and the Sibron presumption are judicially created

doctrines that give effect to constitutional requirements.  See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at

167–68; Sibron, 392 U.S. at 50.  Consequently, we see no reason why, if

Nowakowski’s conviction is “criminal” for purposes of federal constitutional

protections, it should not be criminal for purposes of the Sibron presumption,9

and so we apply the former analysis here.   

The Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he categorization of a particular

proceeding as civil or criminal is first of all a question of statutory construction.”  

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).  

In construing statutes, we endeavor to “determine the legislative objective”—i.e.,

to establish either a civil regulatory penalty or a criminal punishment.  Smith v.

 

9 In fact, application of a different test would create serious potential for absurd results,

such that a federal court applying federal doctrine could conclude that the same

conviction is simultaneously criminal and not.

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Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).  We start with the fact that New York does not

formally classify violations as  “crimes.”  See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00[6].  Where a

legislature has expressly designated a sanction as “civil,” that may in some cases

suffice to demonstrate evidence of intent.  See Allen, 478 U.S. at 368 (describing an

express label of a proceeding as “civil” as indicating the state’s intent “to proceed

in a nonpunitive, noncriminal manner”); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249

(1980) (observing Congress labeled a particular sanction as a “civil penalty”).  

Here, rather than identifying violations or their attendant sanctions as civil in

nature, New York has merely excluded them from the classification of “crime.”10  

In a case concerning the Ex Post Facto Clause, where Alaska’s sex offender

registration statute was neither explicitly denoted as civil nor criminal, the

Supreme Court looked to the purposes of the law as articulated in its text, as well

as “[o]ther formal attributes of a legislative enactment, such as the manner of its

codification or the enforcement procedures it establishes.”  Smith, 538 U.S. at 93–

94.

The reasons for applying a functional approach are clear.  States have

widely varying designations of offenses under their penal codes, and these

 

10 Although New York expressly states that punishment for a traffic infraction “shall not

be deemed for any purpose a penal or criminal punishment,” N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. § 155, it

makes no such declaration with respect to violations.

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designations subject defendants to different ranges of punishment.  For example,

elsewhere in our Circuit, Connecticut declines to designate “violations” as

crimes,11 while Vermont has no violations and instead labels all offenses in its

penal code as felonies or misdemeanors.  Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a‐24(a),

with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1.  While New York violations can result in fifteen‐

day imprisonment, Connecticut violations result only in fines.  Compare N.Y.

PENAL LAW § 10.00[3], with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a‐27(a).  The maximum

incarceratory sentence for misdemeanors is one year in New York and

Connecticut but two years in Vermont.  Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00[4], and

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a‐26(a), with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1.  Such variances

counsel against adopting a purely labels‐dependent approach to our analysis.  If

we were to do otherwise, federal jurisdiction over habeas petitions arising from

similar or identical conduct and punishment would be controlled by vagaries of

nomenclature, not substance.

Adopting the approach of the Smith Court, we examine New York’s penal

code and laws regarding Nowakowski’s conviction as a whole, giving due

weight to the State’s legislative judgments.  We conclude that New York

 

11 However, Connecticut excludes traffic infractions from its definition of “offense.”  See

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a‐24(a).

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21

punishes violations such as Nowakowski’s under its criminal, not civil,

authority.  An action to prosecute a violation is designated a “criminal action”

under New York law and may be commenced by filing an information or

prosecutor’s information, see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20[4], [6], [16], which are

instruments that “constitute[] an accusation on behalf of the state as plaintiff,”id.

§ 1.20[1].  Such actions are governed by the New York Criminal Procedure Law,

see id. § 1.10[1](a), which requires the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt, see id. § 70.20.  These are all customary indicia of the State’s exercise of

criminal jurisdiction.

Our understanding that Nowakowski’s conviction was secured pursuant

to New York’s criminal authority accords with traditional conceptions of the

distinction between criminal and civil jurisdiction:   

The distinction of public wrongs from private, of crimes

and misdemeanors from civil injuries, seems principally

to consist in this: that private wrongs, or civil injuries,

are an infringement or privation of the civil rights

which belong to individuals, considered merely as

individuals; public wrongs, or crimes and

misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of the public

rights and duties, due to the whole community,

considered as community, in its social aggregate

capacity.

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22

2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, bk. 4, ch. 1,

at 5 (1st ed. 1769).  Harassment in the second degree is conduct that New York

seems to view as a public wrong and wishes to punish in its social aggregate

capacity.  See N.Y PENAL LAW, art. 240 (designated “Offenses Against Public

Order” and including harassment in the second degree); cf. Smith, 538 U.S. at 94

(observing that codification in the criminal code may constitute some evidence of

punitive intent).  Thus, the New York statutory scheme evinces an intent to treat

a violation as criminally sanctionable conduct, notwithstanding the formal

designation of only misdemeanors and felonies as “crimes.”

In the context of federal constitutional protections, a conclusion that the

state legislature intended a criminal punishment ordinarily “ends the inquiry.”  

Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.  However, the Supreme Court has also developed a set of

factors that are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive, but are useful guideposts”

for determining whether a statutory penalty is criminal or civil in nature, even

where a legislature’s intent is to impose civil penalties.  Id. at 97 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).12  These factors, first announced in Kennedy v.

Mendoza‐Martinez, supra, are as follows:   

 

12 Where statutory intent to designate a sanction as civil is clear, “‘only the clearest

proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been

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23

[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative

disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically

been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes

into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its

operation will promote the traditional aims of

punishment—retribution and deterrence, [5] whether

the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,

[6] whether an alternative purpose to which it

may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7]

whether it appears excessive in relation to the

alternative purpose assigned.  

372 U.S. at 168–69 (footnotes omitted).  The Supreme Court has instructed that

“[a]bsent conclusive evidence of [legislative] intent as to the penal nature of a

statute, these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face.”  Id.

at 169.

However, here, as in Kennedy, “the objective manifestations of [legislative]

purpose indicate conclusively that the provisions in question can only be

interpreted as punitive,” and therefore, “a detailed examination along such lines

is unnecessary.”  Id.; see also Smith, 538 U.S. at 92–93.  Nonetheless, for the sake of

 

denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”  Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S.

93, 100 (1997) (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).   

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24

thoroughness and to assure ourselves of the soundness of our ultimate

conclusion, we briefly address these factors in the context before us.13

The first three factors easily weigh in favor of finding this violation

criminal in nature.  As discussed above, a conviction exposes a defendant to an

incarceratory sentence of up to fifteen days.  Of course, imprisonment is “the

paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint,” Smith, 538 U.S. at 100, and thus

incontrovertibly considered punishment.  In addition, conviction requires proof

of scienter beyond a reasonable doubt—namely, “intent to harass, annoy or

alarm another person.”  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW

§ 70.20.  The fourth factor similarly weighs in favor of considering the conviction

criminal: the statute clearly operates to deter bad conduct, and the possible

punishments serve retribution on offenders.  The fifth factor is not particularly

appropriate to this context—the criminality, or not, of Nowakowski’s conduct is

established by this statute in its own right.   

The final two factors—the existence of a rational alternative purpose and

whether the sanction is excessive in relation to it—do not appear to weigh in

favor of finding the sanction civil.  As the analysis of factors one, three, and four

 

13 In so doing, we are mindful of the Hudson Court’s admonition that consideration of

these factors should evaluate “the statute on its face” rather than “assess the character

of the actual sanctions imposed.”  522 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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25

show, the principal effect of the sanctions here is punitive—imprisonment,

monetary fines, or both—and do not appear to have an alternate purpose that

contributes to a regulatory or civil interest of the state.  For example, the

Supreme Court concluded in Smith that sex offender registration served a

nonpunitive civil purpose: “public safety, which is advanced by alerting the

public to the risk of sex offenders in their community.”  538 U.S. at 103 (alteration

and internal quotation marks omitted).  No analogous civil interest immediately

rises to mind on the law before us, but we need not conclusively decide the

question in light of the weight of the other factors.

In summary, we conclude that Nowakowski’s conviction is criminal in

nature for the purposes of invoking the Sibron presumption.14  We do so

primarily because New York has evinced a legislative intent to treat such

convictions as criminal, and such intent is supported by our consideration of the

Kennedy factors.

 

14 As our analysis here relies upon cases involving federal constitutional criminal

protections, such as the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause, a contrary

conclusion as to the criminal nature of violations in this case would call into question

the availability of those protections for such offenses.  Our conclusion avoids that result,

but we raise the issue to illustrate that Nowakowski’s conviction is best understood as a

criminal sanction as a matter of federal law.

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26

B.

Having concluded the presumption of continuing collateral consequences

should apply, we now turn to whether sufficient collateral consequences to

Nowakowski’s conviction have been demonstrated.  Because Nowakowski’s

conviction was based on one of the lowest level offenses under state law, we

think it is likely that he will suffer fewer collateral consequences than if convicted

of a felony or even a misdemeanor.  Thus, as his case may end up being on the

margins, we think it useful to examine how the presumption will functionally

affect our inquiry.   

First, Spencer defined the Supreme Court’s application of the principle as

being “willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing

collateral consequences (or, what is effectively the same, to count collateral

consequences that are remote and unlikely to occur).”  523 U.S. at 8.  This

approach has led the Court “to accept the most generalized and hypothetical of

consequences as sufficient to avoid mootness in challenges to conviction.”  Id. at

10.  Spencer used two hypothetical possibilities that a previous decision had

deemed sufficient to avoid mootness:  “the possibility that the conviction would

be used to impeach testimony [a defendant] might give in a future proceeding

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27

and the possibility that it would be used to subject him to persistent felony

offender prosecution if he should go to trial on any other felony charges in the

future.”  Id. (quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391 n.4 (1985)).  These two

possibilities span the progression of the Sibron presumption.  The Court has

consistently repeated the idea that a conviction subjects a criminal defendant to

the potential for an increased sentence for a subsequent conviction resulting from

a not‐yet‐extant criminal prosecution.  See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S.

366, 371 n.2 (1993)15; Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108 n.3 (1977); Benton v.

Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790–91 (1969); Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55–56.  In these cases, the

Court has also referred to the potential impeachment to which a defendant may

 

15 Though lacking express analysis of whether the presumption should apply, Dickerson

supports our earlier conclusion that the presumption applies to Nowakowski’s

conviction.  There, the Supreme Court dealt with a diversionary sentencing scheme for

possession of a controlled substance, pursuant to which “no judgment of conviction”

was entered and, following probation, “the original charges were dismissed.”  

Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 371 n.2.  Minnesota law further specified that the proceeding in

which Dickerson was found guilty “shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of

disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime or for any

other purpose.”  Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 152.18).  Nonetheless, the Court held that “a

nonpublic record of the charges dismissed,” which state law required the state

department of public safety to retain, “would carry collateral legal consequences”

because of hypothetical future sentencing.  Id.  Since Spencer cites Dickerson as an

example of the presumption, we see no evidence the Supreme Court has walked away

from this application.  See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 10.   If Dickerson qualified for the

presumption (1) without a judgment of conviction, (2) with eventual dismissal of the

original charges, and (3) with an express statement in law prohibiting treating him as a

criminal convict, we have difficulty concluding that Nowakowski’s formal conviction

and sentence falls outside of its scope.

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28

be subject in future proceedings.  See, e.g., Benton, 395 U.S. at 791; Sibron, 392 U.S.

at 55–56; see also Spencer, 523 U.S. at 10; Evitts, 469 U.S. at 391 n.4.  Notably, these

two consequences both require uncertain future proceedings, the first of which

would occur, if at all, by virtue of the defendant’s subsequent criminal conduct—

i.e., circumstances of his own making.16  Thus, the first effect of the presumption

is to accept a broader category of consequences as sufficient for purposes of

avoiding mootness.

Next, we turn to how the presumption affects the parties’ obligations to

present and prove the existence of collateral consequences.  Although Spencer

marked the Supreme Court’s most complete discussion of the presumption, the

Court never explicitly identified the nature or operation of the presumption.17  

 

16 It goes almost without saying that such speculative, partially self‐inflicted results

would not satisfy Article III outside of the context of the Sibron presumption.  E.g., Lane,

455 U.S. at 633 n.13 (“The parole violations that remain a part of respondents’ records

cannot affect a subsequent parole determination unless respondents again violate state

law, are returned to prison, and become eligible for parole.  Respondents themselves

are able—and indeed required by law—to prevent such a possibility from occurring.”);

accord Probber, 170 F.3d at 349.

17 Traditionally, presumptions have been divided into two categories: conclusive

presumptions (presumptio juris et de jure), which are essentially rules of law and cannot

be overcome no matter the strength of the contrary proof, and rebuttable presumptions

(presumptio juris tantum), which merely act as evidence which can be contradicted by

sufficient contrary evidence or determine the case when the evidence is in equipoise.  

See WILLIAM CALLYHAN ROBINSON, ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE § 375 (1900);

BEST ON PRESUMPTIONS § 17 (1845).  More recently, however, the Supreme Court has

loosely identified four categories of presumptions in the context of the burden of proof:

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29

Lower federal courts have nonetheless overwhelmingly treated the Sibron

presumption as rebuttable and placed the burden on the state to prove that no

collateral consequences will result.  See United States v. Quezada‐Enriquez, 567 F.3d

1228, 1232 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009); D.S.A. v. Circuit Court Branch 1, 942 F.2d 1143, 1146

n.3 (7th Cir. 1991); Malloy v. Purvis, 681 F.2d 736, 739 (11th Cir. 1982); Felton v.

Mazzuca, No. 98 Civ. 4567(RJS), 2012 WL 4462009, at *6 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,

2012); United States v. Hill, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037–38 (D.S.D. 2001).  But see

Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing conclusive

presumption).   

We think the majority approach is correct.  Sibron held “that a criminal

case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal

consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.”  392

U.S. at 57.  This language suggests that the presumption may be rebutted and

provides a standard of proof for that rebuttal—“no possibility” of collateral

consequences.  Further, Spencer’s observation that the presumption is an anomaly

 

(1) permissive inferences, which allow but do not require a conclusion, (2) shifting the

burden of production, such that a conclusion must be drawn only if no evidence has

been produced to the contrary, (3) shifting the burden of persuasion, such that the

adversely affected party bears the burden of overcoming the presumption with

sufficient evidence, or (4) conclusive presumptions, such that the result is determined

regardless of the evidence.  See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514–18 (1979).

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30

in Article III standing weighs against making its application conclusive even

where the proof shows no collateral consequences.  See 523 U.S. at 12.

Where the burden of proof rests is a more difficult question.  The burden

of proof is commonly understood to encompass both the obligation to produce

some evidence on an issue—i.e., the burden of production—and the obligation to

persuade the decision maker that the standard of proof has been met in one’s

favor—i.e., the burden of persuasion.  See Burden of Proof, BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Were we to conclude that the Sibron presumption

imposes both obligations on the state, we would be requiring the state both to

present potential collateral consequences to the reviewing court and then

disprove them.  There are numerous problems with such an approach, not the

least of which is the difficulty inherent in proving a universal statement18—that

no collateral consequences exist.  Further, it creates a situation in which—

through human error or otherwise—a state may fail to present an extant

collateral consequence to the court, which would have established that the

habeas petition was not moot.  Finally, forcing a state to argue against itself

would go even further afield from the traditional application of standing, in

 

18 See generally Kevin W. Saunders, The Mythic Difficulty in Proving a Negative, 15 SETON

HALL L. REV. 276 (1985) (noting that the proverbial difficulty in proving a negative is, in

reality, difficulty in proving a universal statement).

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31

which the proponent of jurisdiction bears the burden of “alleg[ing] facts

demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the

dispute.”  Spencer, 523 U.S. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).

By contrast, requiring habeas petitioners to identify at least some collateral

consequence that threatens them balances practical considerations and operation

of the presumption.  In the ordinary case, petitioners—and the court—may look

to the consequences regularly appearing in this context: e.g., future sentence

enhancement, impeachment, or civil disabilities.  Where those readily

identifiable consequences are not present, however, the state should not bear the

burden of both identifying and refuting every possible alleged consequence in its

laws.  Mindful of the Supreme Court’s caution in this area, we conclude that a

petitioner seeking habeas review must identify some continuing collateral

consequences that may flow from his criminal conviction—including those that,

as discussed above, are merely hypothetical and speculative.19  Once a petitioner

does so, however, the state bears the burden to prove by sufficient evidence that

 

19 Additionally, we note that even where a criminal conviction is the subject of the

inquiry, if the identified collateral consequences arise from separate and independent

grounds from that conviction, the conviction “can have no meaningful effect . . . and

hence cannot serve as a possible collateral consequence.”  Perez v. Greiner, 296 F.3d 123,

126 (2d Cir. 2002).  This principle does not mean, however, that all convictions after the

first (or most severe) do not have collateral consequences, if each marginally increases

some risk or consequence.  See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 56.

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32

there is “no possibility” such consequences will attach to his conviction.  See

Sibron, 392 U.S. at 57.

With our framework established, we apply the Sibron presumption to the

facts of this case.  Nowakowski has identified a sufficient collateral consequence

to avoid mootness in this case—namely, the potential for impeachment in a

future proceeding.20  Under New York law, the trial court in its discretion may

permit cross‐examination into a criminal defendant’s prior bad acts or crimes

upon balancing the probative value of the evidence with the risk of unfair

prejudice.  See generally People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371 (1974).  In these

instances, the defendant bears the burden “of demonstrating that the prejudicial

effect of the admission of evidence thereof for impeachment purposes would so

far outweigh the probative worth of such evidence on the issue of credibility as

to warrant its exclusion.”  Id. at 378.   

Additionally, where a criminal defendant presents evidence of his good

character, the prosecution may prove a conviction tending to negate such trait;

similarly, where conviction of an offense “constitutes an element of the offense

 

20 Nowakowski’s brief focuses on the threat of impeachment in his § 1983 suit.  

However, because of the prevalence of impeachment as a collateral consequence and

our obligation to construe pro se submissions liberally, we interpret Nowakowski’s

briefs and oral arguments to challenge the threat of impeachment through use of his

conviction generally.

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33

charged, or proof thereof is otherwise essential to the establishment of a legally

sufficient case,” the previous conviction may be proved.  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW

§ 60.40[2]–[3].21  In least one decision, the Appellate Division has held that a

conviction for harassment in the second degree can be the subject of proper

cross‐examination.  See People v. Hogencamp, 295 A.D.2d 643, 643–44 (N.Y. 3d

Dep’t 2002); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.40[1] (permitting independent

proof of conviction where it is a proper subject of cross‐examination and the

defendant denies or answers equivocally).  Consequently, we conclude that

Nowakowski’s conviction subjects him to the possibility of impeachment in a

future criminal proceeding and thus presents a sufficient continuing collateral

consequence to satisfy the requirements of a live case or controversy.  See Evitts,

469 U.S. at 391 n.4; Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55–56. 22

 

21 In fact, the Sibron Court cited the predecessor statute to § 60.40 as the basis for its

conclusion that the defendant could be subject to impeachment in a subsequent criminal

proceeding.  See 392 U.S. at 55–56.

22 Nowakowski has also argued that his conviction bars his § 1983 action under the

doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, supra, and that bar constitutes an additional collateral

consequence.  Though the People urge us to hold that Spencer squarely forecloses this

argument, we decline to do so for two reasons.  First, Spencer ultimately concluded no

presumption should apply to parole revocations and thus held that the Heck bar was

insufficient under the traditional rules of Article III standing, rather than the relaxed

standard applicable to convictions.  See 523 U.S. at 17.  Second, we think the discussion

in Spencer is less clear‐cut than the People maintain.  Although seven Justices joined

Justice Scalia in concluding that the Heck argument was “a great non sequitur,” id., half

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34

III.

We conclude by addressing our colleague’s thoughtful dissenting opinion.  

As we read it, the dissent’s principal thesis is that the Sibron presumption was

designed to apply—and therefore only applies—to convictions from which

significant collateral consequences are likely to result.23  See, e.g., Dissenting Op.,

post, at 2–3, 19.  We think the dissent’s approach is incompatible with the

Supreme Court’s practice and statements.  As an analytical matter, the dissent

conflates the separate steps undertaken in Sibron and Spencer into a single inquiry

 

the majority wrote in concurrence that if Heck did in fact bar the action, it “would

provide a reason, whether or not dispositive, to recognize continuing standing to

litigate his habeas claim,” id. at 19 (Souter, J., joined by O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer,

JJ., concurring).  The concurring Justices concluded, however, that “Spencer is free to

bring a § 1983 action, and his corresponding argument for continuing habeas standing

falls accordingly.”  Id.  We find unclear, therefore, Spencer’s discussion of the Heck bar as

a continuing collateral consequence where (1) a conviction, rather than a parole

revocation, is challenged and (2) where Heck would in fact bar the claim.  However,

because the possibility of impeachment constitutes a sufficient collateral consequence,

we need not decide Nowakowski’s Heck bar argument.

23 The dissent insists that its approach cabining the Sibron presumption to certain

“categories” of criminal convictions “is not [its] own.”  Post at 6–7 n.6.  Spencer, the

dissent claims, did the same by refusing to apply Sibron to a parole revocation.  Id.

(citing Spencer, 523 U.S. at 12).  The dissent misreads Spencer’s categorization of types of

adjudication as an invitation to subcategorize further.  Rather than debating whether

we should apply Sibron to a new “category of adjudication”—e.g., a criminal conviction,

a parole revocation, or a designation as an enemy combatant—the dissent proposes that

we split the category of criminal convictions into subcategories: criminal convictions

significant enough to warrant Sibron and those too insignificant to warrant Sibron.  That

new process of subcategorizing is novel and may someday be the law.  But today, it is

not.

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35

about whether collateral consequences do in fact flow from the defendant’s

conviction.  In other words, the dissent’s approach would require a court to find

that collateral consequences generally flow from the conviction before it applies a

presumption that assumes, as a first step subject to rebuttal, that collateral

consequences generally flow from the conviction.  Such an approach is, of course,

no presumption at all—and if it were the approach the Supreme Court intended,

Spencer could have been a great deal shorter and far less concerned with the

presumption’s anomalous place in Article III standing analysis.

The Spencer Court described its precedents as being “willing to presume

that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences (or,

what is effectively the same, to count collateral consequences that are remote and

unlikely to occur).”  Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added); see also id. at 10

(“[After Sibron], and in summary fashion, we proceeded to accept the most

generalized and hypothetical of consequences as sufficient to avoid mootness in

challenges to conviction.” (emphasis added)).  It also characterized its past

practice as “presuming collateral consequences (or of accepting the remote

possibility of collateral consequences as adequate to satisfy Article III).”  Id. at 10

(emphasis added); see also id. at 12 (describing it as “our presumption of collateral

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36

consequences (or our willingness to accept hypothetical consequences)”).  The

dissent appeals to the single instance in Spencer that uses the terms “significant”

and “likely”:  “In the context of criminal conviction, the presumption of

significant collateral consequences is likely to comport with reality.  As we said

in Sibron, it is ‘an obvious fact of life that most criminal convictions do in fact

entail adverse collateral legal consequences.’”  Id. at 12 (quoting Sibron, 382 U.S.

at 55).  But here is the language immediately following that line in Sibron: “The

mere ‘possibility’ that this will be the case is enough to preserve a criminal case

from ending ‘ignominiously in the limbo of mootness.’” 392 U.S. at 55 (quoting

Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 358 (1957), and Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574,

577 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).  The dissent’s attempt to convert the

presumption’s operation into an examination of the likelihood of collateral

consequences for the conviction at issue, see post, at 25, is inconsistent with the

Court’s actual practice, as well as Spencer’s description of that practice.24

 

24 We also note that the dissent’s reliance on a degree of “likelihood” will result in

practical chaos.  Automatic statutory disabilities—like disenfranchisement or

employment disqualification, see Dissenting Op., post, at 6–7, 7 n.7—do not require

operation of a presumption; they are actual, extant consequences from which the

defendant currently suffers.  Thus, the only function of the presumption is with respect

to hypothetical, future consequences.  But a court applying a “likelihood” approach

would have to determine whether hypothetical collateral consequences, e.g., denials of

handgun permits in New York City—authorized when an individual has been

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37

The dissent’s approach is also in significant tension with Minnesota v.

Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).  As we note above, see supra note 15, Dickerson

involved a case in which “no judgment of conviction was entered and, upon

respondent’s successful completion of probation, the original charges were

dismissed,” and in which a Minnesota law specifically prohibited the proceeding

from being “deemed a conviction for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities

imposed by law upon conviction of a crime or for any other purpose.”  508 U.S.

at 371 n.2 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 152.18).  It is hard to imagine a case—including

this one—that would meet the dissent’s proposed standard less than Dickerson—

and yet the Spencer Court cited it as an example of the presumption without a

hint of disavowal, see 523 U.S. at 10.

In short, we think the dissent’s approach begs the question by demanding

evidence of collateral consequences to invoke a rebuttable presumption that

assumes those consequences exist.  Accepting the dissent’s propositions would

also require us to conclude that what the Supreme Court has called a

“presumption,” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8, is not really a presumption at all; that

 

convicted of a violation, see Rules of the City of New York, tit. 38, § 5‐10(a), are more or

less likely than those the Supreme Court has identified, e.g., the potential for future

criminal prosecution.  Asking a court to make that determination seems to invite

judicial speculation or, worse, attempts at a Minority Report‐like predictive criminology.

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38

when the Court said the presumption “is applied to criminal convictions,” id., it

meant to say, but did not, that it is applied only to serious criminal convictions;

and that when the Court said “a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that

there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on

the basis of the challenged conviction,” Sibron, 392 U.S. at 57, it did not really

mean the words only, no, or any.  While the Supreme Court may choose to cabin

the presumption to specific offenses of a certain order of magnitude in the future,

the Court has not done so yet.  We therefore “leav[e] to [the Supreme Court] the

prerogative of overruling its own decisions,” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.

Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989), and take the Court at its word.25  Because

Nowakowski has identified the possibility of a collateral consequence stemming

from a criminal conviction—a consequence significant enough to have been

accepted by the Supreme Court in the past—his case is not moot.

 

25 We express no opinion about how we would approach this question from a “blank

slate.”  Dissenting Op., post, at 28.  When confronted with Supreme Court precedent, it

is not the job of this Court to ruminate on what it might do without that guidance.  Our

refusal to engage the dissent’s “blank slate” should not be confused for implicit

approval of the dissent’s novel approach.

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39

CONCLUSION

In sum, Nowakowski was in custody for the purposes of habeas review

while under a sentence of conditional discharge that obligated him to appear in

specific places at specific times and subjected him to the discretion of the court to

modify or revoke his discharge.  In addition, Nowakowski’s conviction is

criminal for the purposes of the Sibron presumption, and he has identified a

continuing collateral consequence under its application.  His petition thus

presents a live case or controversy sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction.  

Accordingly, the District Court’s order of May 30, 2014, is hereby VACATED,

and the case is REMANDED to the District Court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

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