Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-18-01773/USCOURTS-ca6-18-01773-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anton Maurice Fuller-Ragland
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 19a0146p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTON MAURICE FULLER-RAGLAND,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 18-1773

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.

No. 1:18-cr-00016-1—Paul Lewis Maloney, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: June 7, 2019*

Before: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and BUSH, Circuit Judges

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Paul L. Nelson, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Grand 

Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. Mark V. Courtade, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S 

OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Anton Fuller-Ragland appeals from a sentence of 120 months of 

imprisonment after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Fuller-Ragland argues that the district court erred when it concluded that 

 

*This decision was originally filed as an unpublished opinion on June 7, 2019. The court has now 

designated the opinion for publication.

>

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a violation of the Michigan offense of unarmed robbery, Mich. Comp. L. § 750.530, constituted a 

“crime of violence” within the meaning of USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3). Fuller-Ragland also disputes 

the applicability of a sentencing enhancement for an altered or obliterated serial number on a 

firearm. Because we hold that a violation of Mich. Comp. L. § 750.530 is a “crime of violence,” 

and because the district court did not commit plain error in applying the sentencing 

enhancement, we affirm the district court’s sentence. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 11, 2018, police officers in Portage, Michigan received a report of a 

suspicious vehicle without a license plate in a jewelry-store parking lot. Fuller-Ragland was 

sitting in the vehicle and admitted to officers that he was on probation, that he had a pistol on his 

person, and that he did not have a concealed-carry permit. The officers confiscated FullerRagland’s pistol, arrested him, and recovered a second pistol, ammunition, and controlled 

substances from the vehicle. The pistol Fuller-Ragland had been carrying was a 9mm pistol with 

the serial number 158536. Fuller-Ragland’s presentence report (“PSR”) described the serial 

number as “partially obliterated.”

1

 Fuller-Ragland was indicted and pleaded guilty to being a 

felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 

Applying the Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), the PSR calculated Fuller-Ragland’s 

base offense level under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) as 22, based in part on Fuller-Ragland’s prior 

conviction for unarmed robbery in Michigan, which the PSR identified as a crime of violence. 

The PSR also applied a four-level enhancement under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), because the 9mm 

pistol had an “altered or obliterated serial number.” The PSR established an advisory Guidelines 

range of 121 to 151 months of imprisonment, although the statutory maximum Fuller-Ragland 

could receive was 120 months. Fuller-Ragland did not object to the calculation of his base 

offense level or the imposition of the four-level enhancement for an altered or obliterated serial 

number. He did, however, object to the PSR’s recommendation that the district court should not 

grant him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 

 

1An eTrace on the 9mm pistol revealed that the weapon had been reported stolen. Further ATF 

investigations uncovered that the pistol had been used in two shootings, including a shooting the day before police 

seized the pistol from Fuller-Ragland.

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At sentencing, the district court sustained Fuller-Ragland’s objection and gave him a full 

acceptance-of-responsibility credit, reducing his Guidelines range to 87 to 108 months of 

imprisonment. The district court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and decided that an 

upward variance to the statutory maximum—120 months—was appropriate because the 

circumstances of Fuller-Ragland’s arrest and his prior record indicated that Fuller-Ragland was a 

“significant risk to the public and a significant risk to re-offend.” The district court focused on 

the protection of the public, deterrence, and Fuller-Ragland’s criminal history in its decision to 

vary upward and impose the statutory maximum. Fuller-Ragland did not object. This appeal 

followed. 

II. ANALYSIS

Fuller-Ragland alleges two errors in his sentence. First, he disputes that the Michigan 

offense of unarmed robbery, Mich. Comp. L. § 750.530, is a “crime of violence” under USSG 

§ 2K2.1(a)(3), and asserts that his Guidelines range was incorrectly calculated. Second, FullerRagland argues that because the serial number on the 9mm pistol was only “scratched through 

but still [was] clearly legible,” the four-level enhancement under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) is not 

applicable. He asks that this court vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. 

A. Standard of Review

A district court’s failure to properly calculate the advisory Guidelines range is a 

“significant procedural error.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Fuller-Ragland did 

not object to the PSR nor did he raise these issues in the district court. Therefore, we review his 

challenge to the procedural reasonableness2 of his sentence for plain error. See United States v. 

Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872–

73 (6th Cir. 2004). Fuller-Ragland must show an error that was “obvious or clear,” that affected 

his substantial rights and that this adverse impact seriously “affected the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386 (quoting United States v. 

 

2Fuller-Ragland also suggests that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because, as the Guidelines 

are subject to the same interpretive rules as other statutes, a mistake in applying the Guidelines constitutes an abuse 

of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), identifies a failure to calculate the Guidelines range 

correctly as a procedural, not a substantive error. Fuller-Ragland has not identified authority indicating that we 

should depart from this precedent, and acknowledges that the error is procedural.

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Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006)). Plain error warrants reversal “only in exceptional 

circumstances and only where the error is so plain that the trial judge . . . [was] derelict in 

countenancing it.” United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir. 1994). 

This court has not previously addressed whether a violation of the current version of 

Mich. Comp. L. § 750.530 constitutes a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the 

Guidelines. See USSG §§ 2K2.1(a)(3); 4B1.2(a). We have held that a violation of an earlier 

version of this statute3is a “violent felony” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act 

(“ACCA”). See Chaney v. United States, 917 F.3d 895, 897 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. 

Matthews, 689 F. App’x 840, 846 (6th Cir. 2017). Two of our sister circuits agree. See United 

States v. Lamb, 638 F. App’x 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2016), vacated on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 494 

(2016); United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 680 (7th Cir. 1997). We routinely use authority 

that interprets the elements clause in the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), to interpret the 

same phrase that appears in the Guidelines: “has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” See United States v. Maynard, 

894 F.3d 773, 774 (6th Cir. 2018). 

Before the 2004 amendment, Mich. Comp. L. § 750.530 provided that: 

Any person who shall, by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear, 

feloniously rob, steal and take from the person of another, or in his presence; any 

money or other property which may be the subject of larceny, such robber not 

being armed with a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by 

imprisonment in state prison not more than 15 years. 

Mich. Comp. L. § 750.530 (P.A. 1931, No. 328 § 530) (amended by P.A. 2004, No. 128). After 

the amendment, the statute now reads: 

(1) A person who, in the course of committing a larceny of any 

money or other property that may be the subject of larceny, 

uses force or violence against any person who is present, or 

 

3

See Chaney v. United States, 917 F.3d 895, 900 n.2 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Matthews, 689 F. 

App’x 840, 844 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 679–80 (7th Cir. 1997). In United States v. 

Lamb, 638 F. App’x 575, 576–77 (8th Cir. 2016), vacated on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 494 (2016), it is not clear 

whether Lamb was convicted under the original or amended version of Mich. Comp. L. § 750.530. Lamb, however, 

relied on Michigan cases that interpreted the pre-amendment version of the unarmed-robbery statute. See Lamb, 638 

F. App’x at 576 (citing People v. Randolph, 648 N.W.2d 164 (Mich. 2002), superseded by statute, P.A. 2004, No. 

128, as recognized in People v. March, 886 N.W.2d 396 (Mich. 2016)).

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who assaults or puts the person in fear, is guilty of a felony 

punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years.

(2) As used in this section, “in the course of committing a larceny” 

includes acts that occur in an attempt to commit the larceny, or 

during commission of the larceny, or in flight or attempted 

flight after the commission of the larceny, or in an attempt to 

retain possession of the property. 

Mich. Comp. L. § 570.530. Fuller-Ragland was convicted under the amended statute. It does 

not appear that this circuit, or any of our sister circuits, have examined the amended statute.4 

Our analysis of whether Michigan’s unarmed-robbery statute constitutes a “crime of violence” 

within the meaning of the Guidelines is confined to the statute under which Fuller-Ragland was 

sentenced. Chaney, 917 F.3d at 900 n.2. 

The term “crime of violence” in USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) has “the meaning given that term in 

§ 4B1.2(a) and Application Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” USSG § 2K2.1, comment. 

(n.1). USSG § 4B1.2(a) provides that: 

The term “crime of violence” means any offense under federal or 

state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year that—

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another, or 

(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated 

assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the 

use or unlawful possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. 

§ 5845(a) or explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 841(c).

Fuller-Ragland argues that Michigan’s unarmed-robbery statute is not a “crime of 

violence” within the meaning of USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1) because it does not have the use, attempted 

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another as an element. He also 

contends that, as amended, the Michigan offense is “broader” than generic robbery and therefore 

does not fall within the enumerated-offense clause. 

 

4Two district courts have concluded that a violation of Michigan’s unarmed-robbery statute, as amended, is 

not a crime of violence. See United States v. Harris, 323 F. Supp. 3d 944 (E.D. Mich. 2018); United States v. Lamb, 

No. 16-20077, 2017 WL 730426 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2017). 

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The United States, relying in large part on analyses of the statute before it was amended, 

argues that Michigan unarmed robbery is a crime of violence under both the “elements” and 

“enumerated” clauses. The United States maintains that Michigan courts construe the statute 

consistently with the degree of force required for “physical force” under Johnson v. United 

States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010). The United States also contends that, even if we agree with FullerRagland that Michigan unarmed robbery is not a crime of violence, the district court did not 

commit plain error. 

We begin with the “elements” clause of USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1). In this inquiry, we 

consider whether Michigan unarmed robbery has as an element “the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Ibid.; see also United States v. 

Yates, 866 F.3d 723, 727 (6th Cir. 2017). To make this assessment, we apply the “categorical” 

approach, “meaning that we look at the statutory definition of the crime of conviction, not the 

facts underlying that conviction, to determine the nature of the crime.” United States v. Ford, 

560 F.3d 420, 421–22 (6th Cir. 2009). We assume that Fuller-Ragland’s conviction was based 

on the least of the acts criminalized under the Michigan unarmed-robbery statute and then 

determine whether those acts would qualify as a crime of violence under the Guidelines. Yates, 

866 F.3d at 728. The Supreme Court has held that, in the context of the ACCA, “the phrase 

‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to 

another person.” Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140 (emphasis in original). In Stokeling v. United States, 

139 S. Ct. 544, 550 (2019), decided after the briefing in this case concluded, the Supreme Court 

elaborated that “force capable of causing . . . injury” includes any level of force, however, small, 

that is necessary to “overcome the victim’s resistance.” With these cases in mind, we look to 

state law to determine the minimum level of force criminalized under Mich. Comp. L. § 750.530 

and then determine if that conduct is the type of “violent force required by the [G]uidelines’ 

force clause.” Yates, 866 F.3d at 728. 

The elements of Michigan unarmed robbery are: (1) feloniously taking the property of 

another; (2) using force or violence or assault or putting in fear against any person present while 

attempting, committing, fleeing or attempting to flee, or in attempting to retain possession of the 

property; (3) doing so while unarmed. People v. Harverson, 804 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Mich. Ct. 

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App. 2010); Mich. Comp. L. § 750.530. Michigan’s unarmed-robbery statute uses the 

disjunctive “or” to separate “force,” “violence,” “assault,” and “putting in fear,” which indicates 

that the defendant can use any of these to commit unarmed robbery. See Mich. Comp. L. 

§ 750.530(1); People v. Kowalski, 803 N.W.2d 200, 208 (Mich. 2011) (explaining that use of the 

disjunctive “or” indicates there may be multiple ways to commit a crime); see also People v. 

Keller, Nos. 334123 & 335254, 2018 WL 559696, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2018) (“Thus, 

‘put[ting] the person in fear’ is just one type of conduct that can establish robbery when the actor 

engages in the conduct ‘in the course of committing a larceny.’” (quoting Mich. Comp. L. 

§ 750.530(1))). If there is a realistic probability that Michigan applies its unarmed-robbery 

statute in a way that “criminalizes a level of force lower than the type of violent force required 

by” the Supreme Court’s decisions, then a violation of that statute is not a “crime of violence.” 

Yates, 866 F.3d at 730. 

Both Fuller-Ragland’s and the United States’s arguments center on “force.” But we 

conclude that “putting in fear” represents the least of the acts criminalized under Mich. Comp. L. 

§ 750.530, and our analysis must proceed accordingly.5 See Yates, 866 F.3d at 728. In 

Matthews, we held that “[b]ecause Michigan law requires one to fear injury in order to be ‘put in 

fear,’ Michigan’s statute criminalizing unarmed robbery is a violent felony for the purposes of 

the ACCA.” 689 F. App’x at 845; see also Chaney, 917 F.3d at 900. In reaching this 

conclusion, we relied on Michigan precedent interpreting the pre-amendment statute as requiring 

that “the act causing the victim to be put in fear—however slight—must be ‘capable of causing 

physical pain or injury to another person.’” Matthews, 689 F. App’x at 845 (quoting Johnson, 

 

5

Stokeling v. United States analyzed only whether the force required for robbery by actual force under 

Florida law was consistent with Johnson. See 139 S. Ct. 544, 549 (2019). Because, however, Michigan courts have 

made it clear that actual force is not necessary to commit a robbery, we must determine whether Michigan unarmed 

robbery requires a “threatened use of physical force” consonant with Stokeling. USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1) (emphasis 

added). Harris, which Fuller-Ragland relies on, does not address whether “putting in fear” under the amended 

statute is sufficient under the elements clause. Instead, the district court held that the level of “force” required under 

the statute was not “linked to a potential for physical pain or injury,” and because Michigan courts have “affirmed 

unarmed robbery convictions involving force that lacked the meaningful potential to cause such pain or injury, the 

crime of unarmed robbery in Michigan is not a ‘crime of violence’ under the elements clause of § 4B1.2(a).” 323 F. 

Supp. 3d at 950. We note that Harris predates Stokeling, which clarified that any force necessary to overcome a 

victim’s resistance is sufficient. For that reason, we do not find Harris or the other district court case cited in note 4, 

supra, persuasive. 

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559 U.S. at 140). In People v. Kruper, 64 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Mich. 1954), the Michigan

Supreme Court explained: 

Whenever the elements of force or putting in fear enter into the taking, and that is 

the cause which induces the party to part with his property, such taking is robbery. 

This is true regardless of how slight the act of force or the cause creating fear may 

be, provided, in the light of the circumstances, the party robbed has a reasonable 

belief that he may suffer injury unless he complies with the demand. 

Because “putting in fear” requires a fear of physical injury, the pre-amendment version of 

Michigan unarmed robbery was a crime of violence. See Chaney, 917 F.3d at 900; Matthews,

689 F. App’x at 845; see also United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054, 1059 (6th Cir. 2014) 

(a violation of Tennessee’s robbery statute is a crime of violence because commission of robbery 

through fear requires fear of bodily injury from physical force); United States v. Lewis, 405 F.3d 

511, 514 (7th Cir. 2005) (violation of Indiana’s robbery statute accomplished by putting 

someone in fear is crime of violence because it must be a fear of physical injury). We therefore 

turn to Michigan precedent interpreting the amended statute to determine whether a violation of 

Michigan’s amended unarmed-robbery statute is a crime of violence. See Mitchell, 743 F.3d at 

1059. 

The amendments to the statute created a “broader change” to Michigan’s robbery 

statutes.6 People v. Williams, 814 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Mich. 2012) (emphasis in original). The 

pre-amendment statute required that the force, violence, assault, or putting in fear used to 

accomplish the underlying larceny had to be contemporaneous with the taking. Id. at 273 (citing 

People v. Randolph, 648 N.W.2d 164, 167 (Mich. 2002), superseded by statute, P.A. 2004, No. 

128, as recognized in People v. March, 886 N.W.2d 396 (Mich. 2016)). The amended statute 

adopted the transactional theory of robbery; therefore the force, violence, assault, or putting in 

fear did not have to be used to accomplish the taking—instead it could be used before or after the 

taking, in flight or attempted flight, or to retain the stolen property. Id. at 273–74. 

The amendment also extended the robbery statute to cover both a completed larceny and an 

 

6People v. Williams, 814 N.W.2d 270, 274 (Mich. 2012), considered whether the amendment to Mich. 

Comp. L. § 750.530 removed the element of a completed larceny from the Michigan offenses of armed or unarmed 

robbery. Williams affirmed a defendant’s conviction for armed robbery because he used the threat of force or 

violence against a clerk by “representing that he was armed with a dangerous weapon . . . .” Id. at 280. 

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attempt.7 Id. at 276–77. But Michigan Supreme Court precedent interpreting the amended 

unarmed-robbery statute has not examined what is sufficient to convict a defendant for unarmed 

robbery by putting in fear under the amended statute.8

Under the pre-amendment version of the statute, Michigan assessed whether an 

individual had been put in fear through the following inquiry: “[w]hen a person is induced to part 

with property out of fear, the test to determine whether a robbery has been committed is whether 

‘the party robbed has a reasonable belief that he may suffer injury unless he complies with the 

demand.’” People v. Hearn, 406 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Kruper, 64 

N.W.2d at 632). Michigan’s intermediate appellate court has continued applying this analysis in 

determining whether a victim was put in fear under the amended statute. 

In People v. Harris, No. 267333, 2007 WL 1989454, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 10, 

2007) (per curiam), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that there was insufficient evidence to 

support a conviction for an unarmed robbery under the amended statute. The defendant got into 

a taxi, but the driver refused to take him anywhere without payment up front because she had 

been recently stiffed by someone going to the same address. Id. at *1. The defendant and the 

driver got into an argument, and the defendant told the driver that the next time he saw her, “he 

was going to put a cap in [her].” Ibid. Then the defendant grabbed some money from the cab’s 

console and left. The driver testified at trial that she was not afraid and thought it was an empty 

threat. Ibid. The court found that there was no evidence that the defendant had committed the 

larceny by force, violence, or assault—he had not attempted to commit a battery against the 

 

7Williams noted that the amendment was consistent with the Model Penal Code’s definition of robbery. 

814 N.W.2d at 278 (citing 2 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code & Commentaries § 222.1, at 96 (1980)). 

The Model Penal Code provides that a person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, the robber 

“[t]hreatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury[.]” 2 American Law 

Institute, Model Penal Code & Commentaries § 222.1, at 96 (1980). This appears to be consistent with the level of 

force required by Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). Williams expressly stated that the Model 

Penal Code was not used as interpretive tool, but rather to put the amendments in context. Williams, 814 N.W.2d at 

278 n.42. The use of Model Penal Code language, the court explained, “complements our conclusion that the 

Legislature was not undertaking an effort to (re)codify the common law understanding with the 2004 revisions.” 

Ibid.

8Williams does address the threatened use of force in relation to armed robbery. Treating robbery as an 

offense against a person is “particularly appropriate” when the robber is armed because “the safety and security of 

the person is most severely threatened, and the larcenous taking is of secondary importance.” 814 N.W.2d at 280 

(quoting People v. Hendricks, 521 N.W.2d 546, 553 (Mich. 1994)). 

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driver or put her in “reasonable apprehension” of an immediate battery. Ibid. Nor was there any 

evidence that “the larceny was accomplished by fear.” Id. at *2. Relying on the test in Hearn

and Kruper, which interpreted the pre-amendment statute, the court explained that “[w]hether 

property is taken as a result of fear must be determined from the victim’s perspective.” Ibid. 

The driver’s testimony established that she had not been placed in fear, and the defendant had 

not used a threat of injury to demand money from the driver. Ibid.

Other decisions from the Michigan Court of Appeals track this analysis. In determining 

whether the evidence was sufficient for a conviction of unarmed robbery by putting in fear, the 

court has examined whether the victim had a reasonable belief that he or she will suffer physical 

injury if he or she does not comply with the robber’s demands. For example, in People v. 

Nelson, No. 316065, 2014 WL 4628765, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2014) (per curiam), the 

court affirmed a defendant’s conviction of two counts of unarmed robbery when the defendant 

accosted two victims, Jeffrey and Draper. The defendant punched Jeffrey, and took property that 

belonged to both victims. The defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support 

his conviction of unarmed robbery against Draper. Id. at *3. The court concluded that the 

defendant “accomplished the taking from Draper by placing Draper in fear” because Draper had 

testified that he was afraid of being hurt. Id. at *4; see also People v. Krok, No. 341288, 2019 

WL 1780634, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019) (per curiam) (evidence was sufficient to 

prove defendant robbed a store by putting the clerk in fear of being hurt when defendant, while 

wearing a ski mask, entered the store at 3:30 a.m., demanded money, and both of the defendant’s 

hands were not visible at times during the robbery); People v. Scott, No. 338046, 2018 WL 

2166047, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 10, 2018) (per curiam) (“By telling her that he was going to 

be arrested for beating a female and then walking toward her, defendant threatened to harm her. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is sufficient evidence 

to establish that defendant assaulted or put the victim in fear while taking her phone.”); People v. 

Houle, No. 289436, 2010 WL 2441041, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. June 17, 2010) (per curiam) 

(elements for conviction of unarmed robbery “alternatively satisfied” because defendant caused 

victim to feel “intense fear” when he shoved her); People v. Blount, Nos. 270875, 271062 & 

271292, 2007 WL 4548042, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2007) (per curiam) (sufficient 

evidence to convict defendant of unarmed robbery when defendant and his accomplice searched 

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the house, demanded money, threatened a “blood bath,” punched one victim, then went through 

the other victim’s pockets and took his money, allowing the jury to infer that the victim was “in 

reasonable fear of an immediate battery if he resisted”).

Michigan defines “putting in fear” as a fear of physical injury. See Harris, 2007 WL 

1989454, at *2. This is consistent with the pre-amendment statute. See Chaney, 917 F.3d at 

900; Matthews, 689 F. App’x at 845. Furthermore, because “putting in fear” of physical injury 

involves a “threatened use” of at least enough force to overcome a victim’s resistance, it is 

consistent with the Guidelines and with Stokeling. USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1); see Stokeling, 139 S. 

Ct. at 553. We therefore hold that a violation of Mich. Comp. L. § 750.530, as amended, is a 

“crime of violence” within the meaning of the elements clause of USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1) and 

USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3). Consequently, we will not address whether Michigan unarmed robbery fits 

within the enumerated-offense clause. The district court did not commit plain error in 

calculating Fuller-Ragland’s advisory Guidelines range. 

B. The Four-Level Enhancement for an “Altered or Obliterated” Serial Number

We next consider whether the district court committed plain error in applying the fourlevel enhancement for an altered or obliterated serial number under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). 

Fuller-Ragland argues that the enhancement is not applicable because the serial number was 

“sufficiently legible to be read” and to allow the 9mm pistol to be traced. Fuller-Ragland 

proposes that, as the serial number was legible and visible to the naked eye, any damage to it was 

not material. He attempts to distinguish precedent from other circuits by emphasizing that, in 

those cases, the serial numbers were illegible or there was more severe damage. Fuller-Ragland 

also contends that, because law enforcement could trace the firearm, applying the enhancement 

here is inconsistent with the policy behind the enhancement.

The United States asserts that the district court did not commit plain error in applying the 

enhancement because the cases from this and other jurisdictions have applied the enhancement 

even when the serial number has only been partially destroyed. The United States argues that 

Fuller-Ragland’s proposed “naked-eye test” is inconsistent with this precedent, and that the serial 

number on the 9mm pistol was “markedly obliterated, scratched through and the majority of the 

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numbers unreadable unless subjected to close scrutiny.” The United States maintains that 

applying the enhancement for serial numbers that have been rendered substantially less legible is 

in harmony with the policy goals behind the enhancement because punishing possession of 

weapons that appear more difficult to trace deters trafficking in untraceable weapons. 

The record does not contain a picture of the 9mm pistol with its “partially obliterated 

serial number.” The United States filed a motion in district court to supplement the record for 

appeal with a picture of the pistol. Fuller-Ragland opposed the motion, and the district court has 

not issued a ruling. This deficiency is inconvenient, but does not hamper our review in this 

particular case. Fuller-Ragland did not object to the PSR and is therefore deemed to have 

accepted all the factual allegations contained in it. See Vonner, 516 F.3d at 385.9 Absent an 

objection, the district court can accept any undisputed portions of the PSR as a finding of fact.10 

See United States v. Denson, 728 F.3d 603, 615 (6th Cir. 2013). We therefore proceed with the 

understanding that the serial number on the 9mm pistol was “partially obliterated,” even though 

law enforcement was eventually able to identify the number and trace the pistol. The record 

does not indicate the means by which law enforcement was able to recover the serial number and 

trace the gun.

Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)’s enhancement applies whether or not the defendant is aware of 

the alteration or obliteration. USSG § 2K2.1 comment. 8(B); United States v. Love, 364 F. 

App’x 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2010). The Guidelines do not define what constitutes an “altered or 

obliterated serial number.” See Love, 364 F. App’x at 959–60; United States v. Carter, 421 F.3d 

909, 911 (9th Cir. 2005). 

We have only briefly addressed this enhancement in Love. In that case, we relied on 

Carter, 421 F.3d at 916, which held that a serial number is “altered or obliterated” when it is 

“materially changed in a way that makes accurate information less accessible.” See Love, 364 F. 

App’x at 959–60 (discussing Carter). In Love, we held that the district court did not “clearly 

 

9For this reason, we also reject Fuller-Ragland’s argument that we should not accord any deference to the 

record’s description of the serial number as “partially obliterated.” 

10The district court did not refer to the status of the 9mm pistol’s serial number during Fuller-Ragland’s 

sentencing hearing.

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err” when it concluded that the firearm in question had an altered or obliterated serial number 

when “two of the serial numbers were markedly more difficult to ascertain,” and “the numbers 

were not immediately distinguishable to the investigators.” Id. at 960. 

Other courts that have interpreted “altered or obliterated” have followed Carter’s holding 

and analysis. See United States v. Serrano-Mercado, 784 F.3d 838, 850 (1st Cir. 2015); United 

States v. Harris, 720 F.3d 499, 503–04 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Justice, 679 F.3d 1251, 

1254 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Jones, 643 F.3d 257, 258 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. 

Perez, 585 F.3d 880, 884–85 (5th Cir. 2009). Analyzing the application of the enhancement 

when the gun in question had its serial number printed in two separate locations, the Eleventh 

Circuit has held that the enhancement applies “either when any serial number on a gun has been 

altered or obliterated or when just one serial number has been altered or obliterated.” United 

States v. Warren, 820 F.3d 406, 408 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (emphasis in original); see 

also United States v. Adams, 305 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that “any change that 

makes the serial number appreciably more difficult to discern” is sufficient for conviction under 

18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which criminalizes possession of a firearm with a serial number that has 

been “removed, obliterated, or altered”); United States v. Mixon, 166 F.3d 1216, at *3 (6th Cir. 

1998) (table) (affirming conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) because “a portion of the serial 

number had been obliterated” and “a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the serial number 

had been altered or obliterated”). 

Other jurisdictions have concluded that the enhancement applies even when a portion of 

the serial number had been removed, partially obliterated, or altered. See Warren, 820 F.3d at 

408 (enhancement applies when any serial number on a gun has been altered or obliterated);

Serrano-Mercado, 784 F.3d at 850 (concluding that enhancement applies when the gun’s serial 

number is printed in two locations and one of the serial numbers has been obliterated but the 

other has not); Harris, 720 F.3d at 504 (district court did not err in applying the enhancement 

when there were “gouges and scratches” on the serial number that precluded the court from 

reading the number correctly); Perez, 585 F.3d at 885 (affirming district court’s finding that the 

serial number was “altered or obliterated” when it appeared that someone had tried to scratch the 

numbers off). Similarly, courts have affirmed the application of the enhancement when the serial 

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number was initially unreadable, but eventually recovered. See Justice, 679 F.3d at 1254; 

Carter, 421 F.3d at 910. Courts have also concluded that the policy behind the enhancement—

deterrence and assisting law enforcement—is served even if law enforcement can ultimately 

identify the serial number and trace the firearm. See Harris, 720 F.3d at 502–03; Carter, 

421 F.3d at 915. 

In light of the record, the standard of review we are bound to apply, our opinion in Love, 

and the way other jurisdictions have interpreted and applied this enhancement, we conclude only 

that the district court did not commit plain error in applying the enhancement in USSG 

§ 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). The PSR described the serial number as “partially obliterated,” a description 

that indicates that at least some of the digits in the 9mm pistol’s serial number had been altered 

or obliterated. See Love, 364 F. App’x at 960. The fact that some of the digits may have been 

visible and law enforcement was eventually able to recover the serial number and trace the 

firearm does not, under the specific circumstances of this case, make the application of the 

enhancement an “error . . . so plain that the trial judge . . . [was] derelict in countenancing it.” 

Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1383. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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