Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00564/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00564-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Roberta L. Ford
Plaintiff

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28 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. On April 25, 2007, the 1

Honorable Lawrence J. O’Neill reassigned the case to the undersigned for all purposes. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERTA L. FORD, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner )

of Social Security, )

)

)

Defendant. )

 )

1:07cv0564 DLB

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Roberta L. Ford (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for supplemental

security income and disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title XVI and Title II of the Social

Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were

submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Dennis L. Beck, United States Magistrate

Judge.1

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28 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page 2

number.

2

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS2

Plaintiff filed her applications for supplemental security income and disability insurance

benefits on August 21, 2003, alleging disability since February 1, 1998, due to left knee arthritis

and constant pain. AR 70-73, 123-130, 557-571. After being denied both initially and upon

reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR

51-55, 57-61, 62. On March 28, 2005, ALJ Fenton H. Hughes held a hearing. AR 575-595. He

denied benefits on April 13, 2005. AR 15-24. On March 8, 2007, the Appeals Council denied

review. AR 5-7.

Hearing Testimony

ALJ Hughes held a hearing on March 28, 2005, via video conference. Plaintiff appeared

with her attorney, Robert Christenson. Her husband, Marvin Ford, and Vocational expert (“VE”)

James Grief also appeared and testified. AR 575.

Plaintiff was 38 years old at the time of the hearing. AR 580. She lives with her husband

and children, ages three and six. AR 585. Her six year old is in school. AR 585. 

She testified that she stopped working in 1998 because of a left knee injury, and has had

at least eight or nine surgeries on her left knee. AR 579. She has constant, severe pain and

arthritis in her left knee, which sometimes causes it to give out. AR 580. She sometimes has to

use a cane because it is hard for her to get around when she’s out of her house. She can walk and

stand without the cane, but not for long periods. At home, getting around is a little easier

because she can go at a slower pace and stop and rest. AR 581. 

Plaintiff also testified that she has neck pain that began last year, when she fell down the

stairs after her knee gave out and hit her mid-back and head. She also explained that she “hasn’t

been the same” since a car accident in 1998. AR 581. The pain in her neck depends on the day

and the amount she can lift and carry has deteriorated over the years. She can’t carry 10 pounds

for two to three hours over an eight hour day because of her back. AR 582. She can’t stand for

more than 30 minutes at a time without having difficulty. AR 582. She takes rest breaks during

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the day and uses the cart at the grocery store. AR 583. When she is at home with her children,

she has to take two breaks an hour, for about 10 minutes each. AR 583. She can’t sit for more

than one to one and a half hours at a time. AR 584. She tries to elevate her leg as much as

possible when she’s home and keep hot and cold packs on it. AR 584. She tries to elevate it

every hour to hour and a half, for 5 to 15 minutes, since she is “constantly going with the kids.” 

AR 584. Her pain affects her concentration. AR 585. 

On a typical day, she gets her son off to school and goes back to bed until her younger

child, Destiny, wakes up, usually between 9 and 10 am. AR 586. She has problems going up

and down stairs. AR 586. She can drive for about 10 to 15 minutes before her back starts

hurting, but her husband does most of the driving. AR 586. 

The ALJ asked the VE if Plaintiff could perform any of her past work with a light

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) with occasional postural limitations. VE Grier testified that

Plaintiff could perform her past work fast food work and clerical mail clerk. AR 589-590.

Plaintiff’s husband, Marvin Ford, testified that Plaintiff is in constant pain and always

tired. She takes seven to eight breaks a day, for about 15-20 minutes each. She has trouble

walking and standing and has trouble with her knee. AR 591-592. Plaintiff has been using a

cane for about a month. AR 592. Her pain makes her irritated, so he has to help out with

cooking and giving the children attention. AR 592. 

Medical Record

X-rays of Plaintiff’s left knee taken on March 13, 1998, revealed the medial tibial plateau

to be higher than the lateral, with possible narrowing of the joint space. AR 155. 

On March 16, 1998, James R. Guadagni, M.D., performed surgery on Plaintiff’s left knee

to repair a chronic anterior cruciate ligament (“ACL”) tear and probable medial meniscal tear. 

She had a previous tear that was surgically repaired 15 years ago. AR 134. 

On April 9, 1998, Plaintiff told Dr. Guadagni that her pain was worse than before the

surgery. AR 137. She walked without a limp and had full range of motion. She had some

degenerative arthritis and an ACL tear, but Dr. Guadagni did not know why she was having more

pain. AR 139. 

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On May 5, 1998, Plaintiff reported that she was still having some pain and episodes of

instability. Dr. Guadagni told Plaintiff that he had nothing else to offer her and explained that

although surgery would improve her instability, it may or may not help the pain. He noted it was

uncertain how much of her pain was related to the episodes of instability. AR 138. 

Plaintiff had reconstructive surgery scheduled for June, but it had to be cancelled when she

became pregnant. AR 137. 

X-rays of Plaintiff’s left knee taken on November 2, 2000, showed moderate degenerative

changes. AR 516. 

On November 3, 2000, Plaintiff began seeing J.R. Lee, M.D., for complaints of chronic

knee pain. There was some muscle atrophy in the calf, but range of motion was full and she was

not limping. He diagnosed traumatic arthritis of the left knee and prescribed Vioxx. AR 515. 

Plaintiff was seen in the emergency room on January 26, 2001, for complaints of back

pain. She denied a history of back problems and thought that stress might be part of the problem. 

AR 291. She had tenderness in her back and limited range of motion. Plaintiff was diagnosed

with musculoskeletal pain, muscle spasms and lumbosacral back pain. AR 292. She was given

Flexeril, Ibuprofen and Vicodin. AR 292. 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Lee on April 6, 2001. Examination of her left knee revealed a mild

grinding sensation. Plaintiff was not limping and had full range of motion. He assessed a mild

flare up of degenerative knee arthritis, with minimal symptoms, and prescribed ibuprofen. AR

514. 

X-rays of Plaintiff’s left knee taken on November 9, 2001, revealed moderate

degenerative changes and narrowing of the knee joint space as well as mild hypertrophic

spurring. AR 309. 

On March 30, 2002, Plaintiff went to the emergency room complaining of muscle cramps

in her back and chest. She had tenderness in the lumbosacral region on the left with palpation,

but no spasms and good range of motion. Her gait was normal. She was diagnosed with

lumbosacral back pain and discharged with Tylenol with codeine. AR 425-427. 

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In July 2002, Plaintiff was seen in the emergency room for back pain following lifting

and stooping over her child. AR 198. She was diagnosed with a chest wall strain and thoracic

back pain. AR 199. 

In August 2002, Plaintiff reported a history of degenerative joint disease in her knees but

reported that ibuprofen provided some improvement. She also reported improvement with her

arthritis. She had full range of motion in her knees. AR 474. 

August 27, 2002, x-rays of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine revealed spasm with irritability of

moderate to moderately severe degree, early degenerative changes, possible early disc disease at

the upper levels and some disc space narrowing. AR 484. 

Plaintiff was seen at Family Healthcare Network on September 3, 2002. She complained

of “slight to mild” back pain that started after the delivery of her baby in March 2002. AR 473. 

Lumbar x-rays were normal with possible very early degenerative joint disease and/or disc

narrowing in the lumbar spine. She was diagnosed with mid-back and low back pain with

myalgia and degenerative joint disease. 

On September 17, 2002, Plaintiff returned to Family Healthcare Network, complaining of

left-sided chest pain, with little-to-no back pain. She was diagnosed with probable myalgia of

the pectoral muscles and instructed on muscle stretching and breathing/relaxation techniques. 

AR 471. 

On August 17, 2003, Plaintiff was seen in the emergency room for a left knee strain. She

reported that she had chronic knee pain, but her pain became worse when she was mopping. She

was diagnosed with a knee strain and discharged with a knee immobilizer. AR 168-174. 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Lee on September 3, 2003. He noted that she had undergone 10 left

knee operations since she was 10 years old, with the last surgery in 1998. Her pain has worsened

over the last month. On examination, there was severe patellofemoral crepitus. The ligaments

were very stable, she was able to bear her full weight and did not have a limping gait. He noted

that the x-ray revealed posttraumatic arthritis. Although Plaintiff asked about total knee

arthroplasty, Dr. Lee explained that there were no indications for it. He also did not feel that

arthroscopy would help because her knee was not swollen. He ordered an MRI. AR 487. 

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Jonathan Gurdin, M.D., performed an orthopedic evaluation on Plaintiff on December 16,

2003. AR 490. She reported that she has had back pain since a car accident about five years ago. 

She has not had treatment for her back for about a year and was not currently taking medication.

On examination, she walked slowly but did not show a definite limp. There was no difficulty

getting on and off the examination table or lying down and sitting back up. Examination of her

low back revealed slight tenderness in the midline at the lumbosacral level. There was slight

generalized tenderness about the entire left knee joint, but no definite soft tissue swelling or joint

effusion, although Dr. Gurdin noted that subtle changes would be difficult to detect with her

obesity. Her ligaments were intact and there was no crepitus with motion. 

Dr. Gurdin diagnosed prior internal derangements of the left knee with multiple surgeries,

lumbar myofascitis with early degenerative changes and moderate obesity. He expected that her

complaints would improve with weight loss and ongoing therapy. Presently, she could be on her

feet for two hours at a time and for five to six hours out of an eight hour day. Sitting was not

restricted. She would have difficulty climbing stairs, kneeling and squatting because of her left

knee. Plaintiff appeared capable of lifting and carrying at least 20 pounds occasionally and 10

pounds frequently. AR 491. 

On January 20, 2004, Dr. Lee noted that the January 2004, MRI revealed an old ACL

rupture. He opined that her knee has arthritis but was very stable. He believed that most of her

pain was from the arthritis. He gave Plaintiff a sample of Bextra. AR 511-512. 

State Agency physician Sadda Reddy, M.D., completed a Physical Residual Functional

Capacity Assessment form on February 10, 2004. AR 498. Dr. Reddy opined that Plaintiff could

lift 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, could stand and/or walk for at least two hours

in an eight hour workday, and could sit for about six hours an in eight hour workday. He

recommended a sedentary RFC, opining that Plaintiff could never climb ladders, ropes and

scaffolds and could occasionally climb ramps and stairs. She could occasionally stoop, kneel,

crouch and crawl. This opinion was affirmed by State Agency physician James V. Glaser, M.D.,

on April 23, 2004. AR 505. 

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On April 6, 2004, Plaintiff was seen in the emergency room after falling down six steps. 

She did not report a history of prior back problems. Notes indicate that she “lost footing” and/or

“slipped and fell.” X-rays were normal. Plaintiff was diagnosed with musculoskeletal pain and

prescribed Vicodin. AR 541-543, 547. 

In May 2004, treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff fell down steps one month ago. On

examination, neck passive range of motion revealed voluntary guarding and limited range of

motion. Lindy Dugan, M.D., submitted a physical therapy referral and prescribed Darvocet. AR

538. Dr. Dugan discussed his concern about Plaintiff’s need for medication stronger than

Tylenol or Motrin and thought she may need other psychological interventions for dealing with

her pain. AR 538. 

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Lee on June 18, 2004, for evaluation of her left ACL rupture. 

Her knee was very stable and there was no ACL deficit. He noted that ACL reconstruction

would not help her and that the January 2004, MRI only showed a questionable ACL problem. It

was possible that her ACL may be torn from a previous injury but her knee is stable, so there

would be no ACL deficiency. Dr. Lee noted that Plaintiff would have a period of disability from

time to time and that her knee was moderately disabled so that she could not compete with the

general population in the labor market. AR 509. X-rays taken the same day showed no evidence

of fracture, dislocation, effusion or synovitis. Mild early degenerative changes were suspected. 

AR 510. 

An MRI of Plaintiff’s cervical spine performed on June 23, 2004, revealed mild disc

degenerative changes, without significant spinal canal stenosis or additional discrete abnormality

to account for her symptoms of left neck and arm pain. AR 529. 

On December 13, 2004, Plaintiff was seen at San Juan Health Center for persistent left

knee pain. Range of motion was within normal limits with mild discomfort over the medial

aspect of the left knee. Jose Corvera, M.D., diagnosed chronic left knee pain and referred

Plaintiff to an orthopedist for a second opinion. AR 523-524. 

X-rays of her left knee taken on January 28, 2005, revealed moderate degenerative

osteoarthritic changes. AR 520. 

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On March 14, 2005, Dr. Lee completed a Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire. 

He last examined Plaintiff on June 18, 2004, and saw her approximately five times between

November 3, 2000 and June 18, 2004. He diagnosed knee arthritis and stated that her prognosis

was guarded. Her symptoms included pain and swelling and he listed ACL rupture as the clinical

findings. Her impairments were expected to last longer than 12 months and he believed that

Plaintiff’s impairments were reasonably consistent with her symptoms and that she was not

malingering. AR 552-553.

 He expected her pain to frequently interfere with her ability to perform even simple

work tasks, although he believed her capable of a low stress job. Plaintiff could sit for more than

two hours at one time and could stand for two hours at one time. She could sit for a total of at

least six hours in an eight hour day, but could stand/walk for less than two hours in an eight hour

day. She did not need to elevate her legs with prolonged sitting and did not need a cane when

occasionally standing/walking. She could rarely lift 10 pounds or less and never lift anything

over 10 pounds. She could frequently look down, turn her head, look up and hold her head in a

static position. She could occasionally twist, stoop, crouch, and climb ladders and stairs. Dr.

Lee believed that Plaintiff would have good days and bad days. AR 552-556.

ALJ’s Findings

After reviewing the medical evidence and testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff

had the severe impairments of moderate degenerative osteoarthritis of the left knee, mild cervical

disc bulge, lumbar myofascitis and moderate obesity. AR 21. Despite these impairments, the

ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform a wide range of sedentary work

limited by occasional postural restrictions. She was therefore not disabled. AR 23. 

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision

to deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations,

the Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence. 42 U.S.C. 405 (g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v.

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28 All references are to the 2002 version of the Code of Federal Regulations unless otherwise noted. 3

9

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at

401. The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and

the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993,

995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must

apply the proper legal standards. E.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 

This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s determination that the claimant is not disabled if the

Secretary applied the proper legal standards, and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

 REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he is unable to engage in

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42

U.S.C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he has a physical or mental impairment of

such severity that he is not only unable to do her previous work, but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which

exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th

Cir. 1990).

In an effort to achieve uniformity of decisions, the Commissioner has promulgated

regulations which contain, inter alia, a five-step sequential disability evaluation process. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f), 416.920 (a)-(f) (1994). Applying this process in this case, the ALJ 3

found that Plaintiff: (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of

her disability; (2) has an impairment or a combination of impairments that is considered “severe”

(moderate degenerative osteoarthritis of the left knee, mild cervical disc bulge, lumbar

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myofascitis and moderate obesity) based on the requirements in the Regulations (20 CFR §§

416.920(b)); (3) does not have an impairment or combination of impairments which meets or

equals one of the impairments set forth in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4; (4) is

unable to perform her past relevant work; but (5) retains the RFC to perform a significant number

of jobs in the national economy. AR 23-24. 

Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ (1) erred in failing to adopt the limitations imposed by

Dr. Lee; (2) erred in finding her husband’s testimony not credible; and (3) erred in assessing

Plaintiff’s pain testimony. 

DISCUSSION

A. Dr. Lee’s Opinion

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in failing to adopt Dr. Lee’s standing limitations

set forth in his March 18, 2005, questionnaire. 

The opinions of treating doctors should be given more weight than the opinions of

doctors who do not treat the claimant. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir.1998);

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.1995). Where the treating doctor's opinion is not

contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Even if the treating

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may not reject this opinion without

providing “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id.

(quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.1983)). This can be done by setting out

a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his

interpretation thereof, and making findings. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th

Cir.1989). The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct. Embrey v. Bowen, 849

F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir.1988).

In Orn v. Astrue,495 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit reiterated and expounded

upon its position regarding the ALJ’s acceptance of the opinion an examining physician over that

of a treating physician. “When an examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a

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treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the examining

physician are not ‘“substantial evidence.”’ Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; Murray, 722 F.2d at 501-502. 

“By contrast, when an examining physician provides ‘independent clinical findings that differ

from the findings of the treating physician’ such findings are ‘substantial evidence.’” Orn, 496

F.3d at 632; Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir.1985). Independent clinical findings

can be either (1) diagnoses that differ from those offered by another physician and that are

supported by substantial evidence, see Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir.1985), or (2)

findings based on objective medical tests that the treating physician has not herself considered,

see Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041.

If a treating physician’s opinion is not giving controlling weight because it is not well

supported or because it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ is

instructed by Section 404.1527(d)(2) to consider the factors listed in Section 404.1527(d)(2)-(6)

in determining what weight to accord the opinion of the treating physician. Those factors include

the “[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination” by the treating

physician; and the “nature and extent of the treatment relationship” between the patient and the

treating physician. 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii). Other factors include the supportablility of

the opinion, consistency with the record as a whole, the specialization of the physician, and the

extent to which the physician is familiar with disability programs and evidentiary requirements. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)-(6). Even when contradicted by an opinion of an examining

physician that constitutes substantial evidence, the treating physician’s opinion is “still entitled to

deference.” SSR 96-2p; Orn, 495 F.3d at 632-633. “In many cases, a treating source’s medical

opinion will be entitled to the greatest weight and should be adopted, even if it does not meet the

test for controlling weight.” SSR 96-2p; Orn, 495 F.3d at 633. 

Here, the ALJ reviewed the medical evidence, including Dr. Lee’s treatment notes and his

opinions as to Plaintiff’s functional limitations. Dr. Lee believed that Plaintiff could perform a

low stress job and could lift up to 10 pounds and sit for at least six hours, but could stand for less

than two hours. AR 22. The ALJ also reviewed the contrasting opinion of Dr. Gurdin, who

examined Plaintiff and determined that she could be on her feet for two hours at a time, for five

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to six hours total in an eight hour day. AR 22. He explained that he accorded Dr. Lee’s opinion

greater weight because he was a treating source, but did not accept his opinion that Plaintiff was

unable to stand for two hours at a time. He reasoned that Plaintiff’s ability to care for two small

children would “preclude the ability to remain seated for this long during a typical day.” AR 22. 

Plaintiff contends, and the Court agrees, that this reason is not a valid reason for rejecting

Dr. Lee’s opinion. That Plaintiff cannot “remain seated for this long” does not necessarily mean

that she can stand for two hours at one time. However, any error is harmless based on the totality

of the medical evidence and the remainder of the ALJ’s decision. Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.,

359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding an error harmless where it did not negate the

validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion). Moreover, as Defendant points out, Dr. Lee’s opinion

was inherently ambiguous and somewhat inconsistent- he stated that she could stand for two

hours at one time, but also stated that she could stand/walk for less than two hours in an eight

hour day. The ALJ was entitled to resolve this ambiguity. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In rejecting Dr. Lee’s opinion that Plaintiff could not stand for two hours at a time, the

ALJ adopted the opinions of Dr. Gurdin and State Agency physician Reddy, who both thought

that Plaintiff could stand for two hours at a time. AR 22. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144,

1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (consultive examiner’s opinion is substantial evidence). 

The ALJ also explained that Dr. Lee consistently found that Plaintiff’s knee was very

stable and declined to perform an ACL reconstruction. AR 21. Dr. Lee’s treatment notes

indicated that Plaintiff routinely had no swelling, effusion or ligament laxity. AR 22. Dr. Lee

did not believe that Plaintiff needed a cane, nor did he believe that she needed to elevate her legs. 

AR 22. A lack of supporting clinical findings is a valid reason for rejecting a treating physician’s

opinion. Magallenes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989).

In discussing his rejection of Dr. Lee’s standing limitation, the ALJ also cited Plaintiff’s

daily activities. For example, she is able to care for her children, ages three and six. She is able

to drive and goes shopping with her husband’s assistance. She carries her laundry basket across

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the parking lot to the laundromat and performs general cleaning, sweeping, dusting, mopping,

scrubbing and organizing. AR 22.

The Court is mindful of the recent decision in Orn v. Astrue, discussed above and cited by

Plaintiff. However, where the treating physician’s opinion is not supported in the first instance,

as here, Orn v. Astrue is not instructive. Dr. Lee’s limitation of Plaintiff’s standing ability was

contradicted by the objective evidence, the remaining medical opinions, and Plaintiff’s activities. 

Therefore, given the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff retained a sedentary RFC with

occasional postural limitations, the Court finds that the ALJ properly relied on the opinions of

Dr. Gurdin and Dr. Reddy regarding Plaintiff’s ability to stand. While Plaintiff may disagree

with the RFC finding, it appears that the ALJ gave her the benefit of the doubt in finding her

limited to sedentary work. The RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence and free of

legal error.

B. Plaintiff’s Husband’s Testimony 

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding her husband’s testimony not credible. 

Lay witness testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms is competent evidence which the

Commissioner must take into account. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). The

ALJ may reject such testimony if he does so expressly, in which case “he must give reasons that

are germane to each witness.” Id.; see also Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (2001) (“Lay

testimony as to a claimant's symptoms is competent evidence that an ALJ must take into account,

unless he or she expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives reasons germane to

each witness for doing so.” (citations omitted)).

Plaintiff specifically points to her husband’s testimony that she needs to take seven to

eight breaks a day, for about 15-20 minutes each, and that she has been using a cane for about a

month. AR 592. In rejecting Mr. Ford’s testimony, the ALJ cited the contradictory medical

evidence, including Plaintiff’s report to Dr. Gurdin in December 2003, that she was not taking

any medication or receiving any therapy and Dr. Lee’s consistent lack of objective findings

relating to her knee. AR 21. The ALJ also cited Dr. Lee’s March 2005, statement that Plaintiff

did not need to use a cane or elevate her legs. AR 22, 555. Inconsistency with medical evidence

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is a valid reason for rejecting a lay witness’s testimony. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211,

1218 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Plaintiff attempts to show error by arguing that Dr. Lee based his March 2005, opinion on

his last examination of Plaintiff, which was over nine months earlier, and that she has

deteriorated since that date. As Mr. Ford testified that she started using the cane one month

before the hearing, she argues that his testimony is not necessarily inconsistent. While this may

be so, it certainly does not render his testimony supported by the record. 

Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is disabled. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

1114 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512. Since her relatively unremarkable June 2004, visit

with Dr. Lee, Plaintiff was seen twice for knee pain. On December 13, 2004, range of motion

was within normal limits with mild discomfort over the medial aspect of the left knee. AR 523-

524. X-rays of her left knee taken on January 28, 2005, revealed moderate degenerative

osteoarthritic changes. AR 520. While the evidence supports a knee impairment, a finding

reflected in the ALJ’s sedentary RFC finding, it simply doesn’t support Plaintiff’s suggestion that

she deteriorated to the point of needing a cane. 

The ALJ’s treatment of Mr. Ford’s testimony is supported by substantial evidence and

free of legal error.

C. Plaintiff’s Pain Testimony

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by not crediting her testimony that her pain

precludes even sedentary work. 

The ALJ is required to make specific findings assessing the credibility of plaintiff's

subjective complaints. Cequerra v. Secretary of HHS, 933 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1991). “An ALJ is

not ‘required to believe every allegation of disabling pain’ or other non-exertional impairment,”

Orn v. Astrue,495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In rejecting the

complainant’s testimony, “the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what

evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.

1996) (quoting Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir.

1988)). Pursuant to Ninth Circuit law, if the ALJ finds that the claimant’s testimony as to the

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severity of her pain and impairments is unreliable, the ALJ must make a credibility determination

with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily

discredit claimant’s testimony. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“The ALJ may consider at least the following factors when weighing the claimant’s

credibility: ‘[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s]

testimony or between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work

record, and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect

of the symptoms of which [claimant] complains.” Id. (citing Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d

789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). “If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in

the record, we may not engage in second-guessing.” Id.

In rejecting Plaintiff’s pain testimony, the ALJ first explained that Plaintiff’s ability to

care for her children conflicted with her testimony. AR 22. She is able to get her oldest child off

to school and cares for her three year old at home. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff drives, goes

shopping with the help of her husband, takes care of her personal needs and climbs 13 stairs to

her bedroom. She does her laundry at a laundromat and does general cleaning, dusting, mopping,

scrubbing and organizing. AR 22. The ALJ was entitled to contrast Plaintiff’s daily activities

with her testimony. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-347 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff has generally received conservative treatment, that she

has received little medical treatment for her mild lumbar degeneration, and that she reported

good relief of her symptoms with ibuprofen. AR 22. These, too, are proper considerations. Id. 

The Court finds that the ALJ’s credibility analysis was supported by substantial evidence

and free of legal error. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, this Court DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security. The clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in

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favor of Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff,

Roberta L. Ford.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 8, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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