Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-70486/USCOURTS-ca9-14-70486-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bank of America, NA
Real Party in Interest
Paul J. Malikowski
Real Party in Interest
United States District Court for the District of Nevada, Reno
Respondent
United States of America

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA,

RENO,

Respondent,

PAUL J. MALIKOWSKI; BANK OF

AMERICA, NA,

Real Parties in Interest.

No. 14-70486

D.C. No.

3:13-cv-00470-

RCJ-VPC

OPINION

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

to the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued January 16, 2015

Submitted June 29, 2015

San Francisco, California

Filed June 29, 2015

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2 IN RE UNITED STATES

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.;

Concurrence by Judge Wallace

SUMMARY*

Mandamus 

The panel denied without prejudice a petition for a writ of

mandamus brought by the United States challenging District

Judge Robert C. Jones’s policy of denying the applications

for pro hac vice admission of U.S. Department of Justice

attorneys who are not admitted to the Nevada Bar.

After the United States filed its petition for a writ of

mandamus, Judge Jones reversed his previous order denying

the United States attorney permission to appear. The panel

held that this did not render the controversymoot because the

challenged conduct can reasonably be expected to recur. The

panel held that the controversy remains live, and the court

had jurisdiction to consider the petition.

The panel held that while the reversal of the challenged

order did not render the controversy moot, it rendered a

formal writ of mandamus a superfluous or ineffective

remedy. The panel further held that the court was not

categorically precluded from opining on the merits of the

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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IN RE UNITED STATES 3

mandamus petition when issuance of the writ would no

longer be effective.

The panel considered whether mandamus relief would

have been appropriate at the time the petition was filed, and

applied the five factors enumerated in Bauman v. U.S.

District Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977). The

panel held that at a minimum, a court’s decision to deny pro

hac vice admission must be based on criteria reasonably

related to promoting the orderly administration of justice, or

some other legitimate policy of the courts. The panel

concluded that Judge Jones acted outside his discretion by

failing to provide a valid reason to deny the United States

attorney’s application for pro hac vice admission, and held

that the requirement of clear error was satisfied. The panel

further held that the United States had no other means to

obtain relief, and the United States was harmed when the

United States attorney was denied pro hac vice admission.

The panel also held that the fact that Judge Jones’ order was

not an isolated occurrence weighed in favor of granting

mandamus relief when the petition was filed. Finally, the

panel held that the district court order raised important issues. 

After weighing the Bauman factors, the panel concluded that

it was appropriate to offer guidance to the district court.

Judge Wallace concurred only in the judgment to deny the

writ of mandamus because Judge Jones’s reversal of his prior

order denying admission to United States attorneys rendered

unnecessary the government’s petition for a writ of

mandamus. Judge Wallace stated that the proper, and more

effective, place from which the government may obtain

assurances that Judge Jones would discontinue his practice of

routinely denying admission to the government’s out-of-state

attorneys, and then reversing course when such denials

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4 IN RE UNITED STATES

became subject to appellate review, was the Judicial Council

of the Circuit.

COUNSEL

Kathryn Keneally, Assistant Attorney General; Tamara W.

Ashford, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General;

Gilbert S. Rothenberg (argued), Michael J. Haungs, and Ivan

C. Dale, Attorneys, Tax Division, United States Department

of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

No appearance for Real Parties in Interest.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

The United States has filed a petition for a writ of

mandamus challenging a district judge’s policy restricting the

pro hac vice admission of government attorneys. After the

petition was filed, the district judge reversed his previous

order denying an attorney in this case pro hac vice admission. 

The United States contends that the district judge’s reversal

of his previous order did not render this controversy moot,

and requests that we exercise our supervisory and advisory

mandamus power to issue guidance to the district court. We

agree that the controversy remains live, conclude that the

district court erred, and find that guidance to the district court

is appropriate. We decline to issue a formal writ of

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IN RE UNITED STATES 5

mandamus because it would not be an effective remedy in

this case, and accordinglydeny the petition without prejudice.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is one of at least two cases in which the United

States has filed petitions for writs of mandamus to the district

court challenging District Judge Robert C. Jones’s policy of

denying the applications for pro hac vice admission of

attorneys for the Department of Justice (DOJ) who are not

admitted to the Nevada bar.

I. Proceedings Before The District Court

The underlying litigation in United States v. Malikowski,

No. 13-cv-470-RCJ-VPC (D. Nev.), involves an action

brought by the United States to collect income taxes from an

individual. The DOJ Tax Division designated attorney

Virginia Cronan Lowe, a member of the Massachusetts bar,

to litigate the case, and the local U.S. Attorney’s Office filed

a motion to permit Lowe to appear. Judge Jones denied the

motion. The order cited District of Nevada Local Rule IA 10-

3

1

and stated “[b]efore the Court will permit Ms. Lowe to

practice before this Court, the Court requires a showing that

the Nevada admitted Assistant United States Attorneys in our

judicial district are incapable of handling this matter.”

It appears that Judge Jones has a policy of denying out-ofstate government attorneys pro hac vice admission. Judge

Jones described this policy to attorneys in United States v.

1 Local Rule IA 10-3 provides that government attorneys shall, on

motion of the U.S. Attorney of the District, be permitted to practice,

“[u]nless otherwise ordered by the Court . . . .”

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6 IN RE UNITED STATES

Walker River Irrigation District (Walker River), No. 3:73-cv00127-RCJ-VPC (D. Nev.), a case involving claims of the

United States and the Walker River Paiute Tribe (the Tribe)

to water rights in the Walker River basin. Andrew Guarino

and David Negri, DOJ Environment and Natural Resources

Division attorneys based in Denver, Colorado and Boise,

Idaho, respectively, appeared by telephone at one of the first

status conferences in Walker River held before Judge Jones. 

Both had previously filed notices of appearance in the case. 

After Guarino and Negri introduced themselves at the status

conference, Judge Jones stated: “You folks will see in other

cases . . . that I am entering orders disapproving Washington,

D.C., counsel appearance, in particular in tax cases and in

some environmental cases, and insisting upon appearance

only by the local U.S. Attorney or adjacent districts of the

U.S. Attorney.” Judge Jones assured Guarino and Negri that

“those orders will not apply to this case[,] at least to the

appearances so far.”

Approximately two months later, Guarino and Negri

appeared in person before Judge Jones. Judge Jones asked

whether Guarino and Negri had been granted pro hac vice

status, and cited Local Rule IA 10-3. Judge Jones again

stated that he was “developing a policy” of “disallowing” or

“debarring” U.S. Attorneys from Washington, D.C. because

of concerns about their adherence to “ethical standards,” but

once again assured Guarino and Negri that he would allow

them to appear in this case.

Soon thereafter, the lead counsel for the United States,

who had handled Walker River for over a decade, filed a

notice of withdrawal stating that Guarino would replace her

as lead counsel. The local U.S. Attorney’s Office filed a

motion to allow Guarino and Negri to practice before the

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IN RE UNITED STATES 7

court. While the motion was pending, Guarino and Negri

appeared before Judge Jones and the magistrate judge to

whom the case was assigned.

Several months later, Judge Jones issued an order denying

Guarino and Negri permission to practice before the district

court. Like the order in Malikowski, the Walker River order

cited Local Rule IA 10-3 and stated “[b]efore the Court will

permit Mr. Negri and Mr. Guarino to practice before this

Court, the Court requires a showing that the Nevada admitted

Assistant United States Attorneys in our judicial district are

incapable of handling this matter.”

The orders in Malikowski and Walker River were not

isolated occurrences. In at least four other cases, Judge Jones

has refused to allow appearances by attorneys for the federal

government who were not admitted to the Nevada bar.2

II. Mandamus Proceedings

The United States filed petitions for writs of mandamus

in Malikowski and Walker River. The petitions sought an

2 For instance, he refused to allow attorneys for the Office of the United

States Trustee, each of whom lived and worked in Nevada, to appear in In

re Hofsaess, No. 2:13-cv-01161-RCJ (D. Nev.), because they were not

members of the Nevada bar. He issued an order denying DOJ attorneys

from Alaska and Washington D.C. permission to appear in Great Basin

Resource Watch v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management,No. 3:13-cv-00078-

RCJ-VPC (D. Nev.), absent a showing that the local U.S. Attorney’s

Office “are incapable of handling the matter.” He issued similar orders in

Nevada Association Services, Inc. v. Yanke, No. 2:13-cv-01386-RCJCWH (D. Nev.), and EEOC v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 3:13-cv-00528-

RCJ-WCG (D. Nev.).

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8 IN RE UNITED STATES

order directing Judge Jones to grant the motions for pro hac

vice admission he had denied.

The Ninth Circuit panels to which the petitions were

initially assigned issued orders requesting Judge Jones to

respond to the petitions if he so desired. In response, Judge

Jones granted the United States’ motions in Malikowski and

Walker River, allowing Lowe, Guarino, and Negri to appear.3

Because the specific relief the United States requested in

its petitions had been provided, the United States was ordered

to file supplemental briefing regarding whether the petitions

were moot. In its supplemental briefing, the United States

argues that the petitions are not moot, and requests that we

exercise our “supervisory mandamus authority to correct the

district judge’s improper interference with the government’s

choice of counsel and the judge’s usurpation of

responsibilities for conducting and supervising litigation that

Congress has expressly delegated to the Attorney General.”

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus pursuant

to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. We assess whether a

writ of mandamus is warranted by weighing five factors

enumerated in Bauman v. U.S. District Court, 557 F.2d 650

(9th Cir. 1977).

3

Judge Jones dismissed the claims of the United States and entered

judgment in Walker River on May 28, 2015.

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IN RE UNITED STATES 9

DISCUSSION

The United States contends that the district court

exceeded its authority “[b]y imposing its own standard as to

when and under what circumstances Justice Department

officers may litigate a case in the District of Nevada . . . .”

Before we may reach the merits of the United States’

arguments, we must first resolve whether this controversy

was rendered moot when the district court reversed the orders

from which the original mandamus petitions sought relief. If

the controversy remains live, we must also decide whether it

is appropriate to offer guidance to the district court when

there are no longer any orders we may reverse or vacate by

issuing a writ of mandamus.

We find that the controversy remains live. We conclude

that the district court committed clear error and that guidance

is necessary. However, because we expect that the district

court will follow this guidance without our issuing a formal

writ, and because the district court has already done the act

the petition asks us to compel it to do, we deny the petition

without prejudice.

I. Mootness

After the United States filed its petition for a writ of

mandamus, Judge Jones reversed his previous order denying

Lowe permission to appear. We conclude that this did not

render this controversy moot.

“A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a ‘Case’

or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—‘when the issues

presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally

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10 IN RE UNITED STATES

cognizable interest in the outcome.’” Already, LLC v. Nike,

Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt,

455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam)). “A case might

become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear

that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be

expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw

Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United

States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S.

199, 203 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is true

that a petition for a writ of mandamus directed to a district

judge will ordinarily be rendered moot when the judge

performs the act the petitioner seeks to compel through the

writ. Compare Penn-Central Merger and N&W Inclusion

Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 503 (1968), and Williams v. Simons,

355 U.S. 49, 57 (1957) (per curiam), with Armster v. U.S.

Dist. Court, 806 F.2d 1347, 1360–61 (1986) (observing that

“[a] finding of mootness would be particularly inappropriate”

in an advisory mandamus proceeding, the purpose of which

“is to provide guidance to all district court judges . . . .”). 

However, the traditional exceptions to mootness also apply to

mandamus proceedings. See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v.

U.S. Dist. Court, 156 F.3d 940, 945–46 (9th Cir. 1998)

(finding that a petition for mandamus was not moot where

issue was capable of repetition, yet evading review). “It is

well settled that ‘a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a

challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its

power to determine the legality of the practice.’” Friends of

the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 (quoting City of Mesquite v.

Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982)). A case is

not moot if the challenged conduct can “reasonably be

expected to recur.” Id.

We find it is reasonably likely that Judge Jones will again

deny the pro hac vice applications of attorneys for the United

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IN RE UNITED STATES 11

States because he has done so at least once after he reversed

his order denying pro hac vice admission in this case. In

Great Basin Resource Watch v. U.S. Bureau of Land

Management, No. 13-cv-00078-RCJ-VPC (D. Nev.), Judge

Jones denied a motion requesting that a DOJ attorney who

was a member of the North Dakota Bar be allowed to appear.

The United States filed a motion for reconsideration, which

Judge Jones denied on July 23, 2014, after he allowed Lowe

to appear in this case.

Judge Jones’s reasoning in the Great Basin order leads us

to conclude that his decision to reverse course in the present

case was not an acknowledgment that his previous orders

were wrongly decided. See Knox v. Serv. Employees Intern.

Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) (holding that a union’s

voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct did not render

the case moot, in part because the union continued to defend

the practice’s legality); Armster, 806 F.2d at 1359 (“It has

long been recognized that the likelihood of recurrence of

challenged activity is more substantial when the cessation is

not based upon a recognition of the initial illegality of that

conduct.”). The Great Basin order asserted that a district

court has “inherent authorityto determine that an out-of-state,

unadmitted lawyer may not properly appear before it.” It also

stated that Judge Jones was willing to admit out-of-state

government lawyers only if the local United States Attorney

“affirmatively represents, at oral argument, that he is unable

to effectively litigate this case without the assistance of outof-state counsel . . . .” This order leaves us with little doubt

that Judge Jones may continue to deny the pro hac vice

applications of attorneys for the United States. For this

reason, this controversy remains live, and we have

jurisdiction to consider the petition.

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12 IN RE UNITED STATES

II. Whether We May Review Issues Raised in the Petition

if the Writ Is No Longer An Effective Remedy

While the reversal of the challenged order did not render

this controversymoot, it rendered a formal writ of mandamus

a superfluous or ineffective remedy here. Historically, a writ

of mandamus was an order compelling a court or officer to

act. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803) (“[A]

writ of mandamus is ‘a command . . . directed to any person,

corporation or inferior court, requiring them to do some

particular thing therein specified, which appertains to their

office and duty . . . .’” (emphases omitted) (quoting 3

WILLIAMBLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *110)). There is no

specific act the United States would have us compel the

district court to do, either in this case or another case, nor is

there any order we may vacate. The challenged order has

already been reversed. We recognize the United States has a

continuing interest in receiving assurances that Judge Jones

will not deny its attorneys pro hac vice admission in the

future. But we do not believe we can craft a formal writ of

mandamus that would provide such assurances. Cf. United

States v. Hall, 145 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1944) (“[W]e have

no power to consider the petition in the broad and general

nature of the prayer but . . . we have such power to the extent

that the petition applies to the specific case out of which [the

judge’s] rulings arose.”4). Therefore, while there may be a

continuing need to decide this case, “issuance of a writ would

4 The petition in Hall requested “that Judge Hall be directed to recognize

the authority of the Attorney General to assign condemnation matters to

Irl D. Brett and staff, to recognize the authority of Mr. Brett and his

assistants to represent the United States in such proceedings, and to

assume jurisdiction over all pleadings and motions filed by Mr. Brett and

his staff on behalf of the United States in condemnation proceedings.” 

145 F.2d at 783.

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IN RE UNITED STATES 13

be an empty gesture.” United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d

1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 1982). But see In re Washington Post

Co., 807 F.2d 383, 393 (4th Cir. 1986) (issuing a writ of

mandamus to vacate a district court’s orders closing hearings

even though the hearings had already been held).

To provide the assurances the United States seeks, we

must opine on the merits of the issues raised in the petition,

with confidence that the district court will follow our

guidance in future cases even if no writ issues. In cases

where intervening events have rendered the writ an

ineffective or superfluous remedy, but where the controversy

nonetheless remains live, we have occasionally reviewed the

district court’s decision for error while withholding a formal

writ. See Phoenix Newspapers, 156 F.3d at 952; Brooklier,

685 F.2d at 1173. In United States v. Brooklier, we

considered a petition for a writ of mandamus brought by a

newspaper company and a reporter challenging a number of

orders by a district court closing criminal proceedings to the

press and refusing to release transcripts.5685 F.2d at 1165. 

We reviewed the challenged orders in a mandamus

proceeding after the trial had concluded and the transcripts

had been released, id. at 1165, 1173, and concluded that the

district court erred in a number of respects. Id. at 1165–73. 

We found, however, that these errors were “far from clear” at

the time the district court ruled, and determined that

mandamus should not issue. Id. at 1173. We observed that

“although the controversy is not moot under controlling

authority, in view of the completion of the trial and the

release of the transcripts, issuance of a writ would be an

empty gesture.” Id.

5 The petitioners also filed an appeal, which we dismissed for lack of

standing. Brooklier, 685 F.2d at 1165–66.

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14 IN RE UNITED STATES

We confronted similar issues in Phoenix Newspapers,Inc.

v. U.S. District Court. There we reviewed, on a petition for

a writ of mandamus, whether a district court erred by sealing

a hearing transcript. 156 F.3d at 943. At the time of our

review, the transcripts had been released. Id. at 945. We

nonetheless concluded that the controversywas not moot, id.,

proceeded to address the issues raised in the petition, and

found that the district court erred. Id. at 951. We did not,

however, issue a writ of mandamus because we were not

“persuaded that mandamus [was] the appropriate remedy,” in

part because the transcripts had already been released. Id. at

952.

Brooklier and Phoenix Newspapers establish that we are

not categorically precluded from opining on the merits of a

mandamus petition when issuance of the writ would no

longer be effective.

6 Our cases do not offer guidance about

when it is appropriate to reach the merits if no formal writ

may issue. But we think it clear that we should only offer

guidance to the district court if the writ would have been an

appropriate remedy at the time the petition was filed. This

insures that mandamus proceedings do not supplant the

normal appeals process. In addition, we should be satisfied

6 Brooklier and Phoenix Newspapers do not authorize the uncabined use

of mandamus proceedings to review district court decisions for error

where the prerequisites for the issuance of mandamus are not satisfied. In

the typical mandamus proceeding, we should avoid identifying errors of

law in a district court’s order if it is clear that the writ is not an appropriate

remedy. See In re Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO, 837 F.2d

503, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (denying petition for writ of mandamus and

observing that “[w]here there’s no remedy, there’s no need to decide if

there was a wrong”). Such a practice insures that mandamus proceedings

are not used as a substitute for the normal appeals process. See Ex parte

Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947).

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IN RE UNITED STATES 15

that there is a compelling reason to review the district court’s

decision for error when the specific relief sought has already

been granted. Cf. Armster, 806 F.2d at 1361 (declining to

withdraw prior mandamus opinion where “a strong public

interest in having the legality of the challenged procedure

determined remains” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

This allows for review of important issues that would

otherwise escape review, while insuring that such review is

limited to truly extraordinary circumstances.

III. Whether Mandamus Was Available When the

Petition Was Filed

We now consider whether mandamus relief would have

been appropriate at the time the petition was filed. 

Mandamus “is a ‘drastic and extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved

for really extraordinary causes.’” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court,

542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S.

258. 259–60 (1947)). “As the writ is one of ‘the most potent

weapons in the judicial arsenal,’ [Will v. United States,

389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967)], three conditions must be satisfied

before it may issue.” Id. “First, ‘the party seeking issuance

of the writ [must] have no other adequate means to attain the

relief he desires . . . .’” Id. (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court,

426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)). Second, the petitioner’s right to

issuance of the writ must be “clear and indisputable.” Id. at

381 (quoting Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403) (internal quotations

marks omitted). “Third, even if the first two prerequisites

have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its

discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under

the circumstances.” Id.

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16 IN RE UNITED STATES

To determine whether mandamus relief is appropriate, we

weigh five factors enumerated in Bauman v. U.S. District

Court,

7

 557 F.2d 650, 654–55 (9th Cir. 1977):

(1) The party seeking the writ has no other

adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to

attain the relief he or she desires. (2) The

petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a

waynot correctable on appeal. (This guideline

is closely related to the first.) (3) The district

court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter

of law. (4) The district court’s order is an

oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent

disregard of the federal rules. (5) The district

court’s order raises new and important

problems, or issues of law of first impression.

Id. (citations omitted). The Bauman factors are not

exhaustive, see In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297,

1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (listing additional considerations), and

“should not be mechanically applied,” Cole v. U.S. Dist.

Court, 366 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004). While all the

factors need not be present to issue the writ, id., “the absence

of factor three–clear error as a matter of law–will always

defeat a petition for mandamus . . . .” DeGeorge v. U.S. Dist.

Court, 219 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

7 The Bauman factors are consistent with the Supreme Court’s most

recent discussion of mandamus in Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S.

367 (2004), and incorporate the “conditions” announced therein. We have

therefore continued to apply the Bauman factors without separately

considering the three conditions described in Cheney. See, e.g., Perry v.

Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1126, 1136–38 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Cheney

and applying the Bauman factors).

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IN RE UNITED STATES 17

A. Clear Error

We begin with the third Bauman factor, whether “[t]he

district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law,”

Bauman, 557 F.2d at 654–55, since “failure to show clear

error may be dispositive of the petition.” Cohen v. U.S. Dist.

Court, 586 F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 2009). “The clear error

standard is significantly deferential and is not met unless the

reviewing court is left with a ‘definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.’” Id. (quoting Concrete

Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S.

602, 623 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We

normally review a denial of a motion to appear pro hac vice

for abuse of discretion,” United States v. Walters, 309 F.3d

589, 591 (9th Cir. 2002), and therefore our review of a

decision to deny pro hac vice admission is especially

deferential in a mandamus proceeding. See Munoz v. Hauk,

439 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). 

Notwithstanding the high degree of deference appropriate

here, it is clear to us that the district court acted outside its

discretion in denying Lowe’s application for pro hac vice

admission.

We begin by determining whether the district court

properly interpreted the District of Nevada’s standards

governing the pro hac vice admission of government

attorneys. The court denied the motion to admit Lowe

pursuant to Nevada Local Rule IA 10-3. The rule provides:

[u]nless otherwise ordered by the Court, any

nonresident attorneywho is a member in good

standing of the highest court of any state,

commonwealth, territory or the District of

Columbia, who is employed by the United

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18 IN RE UNITED STATES

States as an attorney and, while being so

employed, has occasion to appear in this

Court on behalf of the United States, shall,

upon motion of the United States Attorney or

the Federal Public Defender for this District

or one of the assistants, be permitted to

practice before this Court during the period of

such employment.

(emphasis added). The court interpreted the first clause of the

rule to confer discretion to deny pro hac vice admission to

attorneys for the United States who are not members of the

Nevada bar. We generally defer to a district court’s

interpretation of its local rules, Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d

1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007), and agree that the rule appears to

give district judges discretion to deny attorneys for the United

States permission to appear pro hac vice.

However, that discretion is not unbounded. Local Rule

IA 10-3 does not empower a district court to refuse pro hac

vice admission arbitrarily. See Zambrano v. City of Tustin,

885 F.2d 1473, 1483 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Admission to a state

bar creates a presumption of good moral character that cannot

be overcome at the whims of the District Court.” (quoting In

re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1975) (internal

quotations marks omitted))); cf. Munoz, 439 F.2d at 1179

(expressing confidence that the district judge “will not

exercise his discretionary power arbitrarily” and therefore

declining to “fix precise guidelines” governing pro hac vice

admission under a district’s local rules). Therefore, a district

court must articulate a valid reason for its exercise of

discretion. See Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566,

577 (1st Cir. 1996); cf. United States v. Ries, 100 F.3d 1469,

1472 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding, in a criminal case, that “[i]n

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IN RE UNITED STATES 19

denying a pro hac vice application, the judge must articulate

his reasons, for the benefit of the defendant and the reviewing

court”).

We have offered little guidance about what constitutes a

valid reason for denying pro hac vice admission in a civil

case. Some of our sister circuits permit district courts to deny

an application for pro hac vice admission only in rare

circumstances. For instance, the Fifth Circuit has held that

[a]n applicant for admission pro hac vice who

is a member in good standing of a state bar

may not be denied the privilege to appear

except “on a showing that in any legal matter,

whether before the particular district court or

in another jurisdiction, he has been guilty of

unethical conduct of such a nature as to justify

disbarment of a lawyer admitted generally to

the bar of the court.”

In re Evans, 524 F.2d at 1007 (quoting Sanders v. Russell,

401 F.2d 241, 247–48 (5th Cir. 1968)). The Eleventh Circuit

has continued to apply this stringent standard following its

split from the Fifth Circuit. See Schlumburger Techs., Inc. v.

Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Absent a

showing of unethical conduct rising to a level that would

justify disbarment, the court must admit the attorney.”). In

other circuits, district courts have broader discretion to refuse

pro hac vice admission. For instance, the Sixth Circuit has

held that an attorney’s pro hac vice admission may be

revoked where conflicts of interest exist, or where “some

evidence of ethical violations was present.” D.H. Overmeyer

Co., Inc. v. Robson, 750 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1984). And the

Fourth Circuit has held that a district court may deny an

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attorney permission to appear pro hac vice based on the

attorney’s “unlawyerlike conduct in connection with the case

in which he wished to appear.” Thomas v. Cassidy, 249 F.2d

91, 92 (4th Cir. 1957) (per curiam).

We need not announce specific factors that should inform

a district court’s exercise of its discretion to deny pro hac vice

admission. To resolve this case, we need only define the

outer limits of that discretion. At minimum, a court’s

decision to deny pro hac vice admission must be based on

criteria reasonably related to promoting the orderly

administration of justice, see Ries, 100 F.3d at 1471, or some

other legitimate policy of the courts, see Roma Constr. Co.,

96 F.3d at 577 (concluding that a district court abused its

discretion where its decision to deny pro hac vice admission

was “based on criteria that are not set forth in writing, that do

not reasonably support its action, and that do not appear to

respond to any general policy of the District . . . .”).

We recognize that “counsel from other jurisdictions may

be significantlymore difficult to reach or discipline than local

counsel.” Ries, 100 F.3d at 1471. However, “[a]dmission to

the state bar is the essential determinant of professional ethics

and legal competence,” and, in practice, “the application

process for admission before the federal district courts is

generally perfunctory and pro forma.” Zambrano, 885 F.2d

at 1483. Therefore, if a court has ethical doubts about an

attorney who is in good standing with a state bar, it must

articulate some reasonable basis for those doubts before

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denying the attorney’s application for pro hac vice

admission.8

We conclude that the district court’s decision to deny pro

hac vice admission to Lowe was arbitrary, and therefore lay

outside the district court’s discretion. In the order denying

Lowe’s motion, the district court found that she was an active

member in good standing of the Massachusetts bar. The

district court nonetheless denied themotion, stating: “[b]efore

the Court will permit Ms. Lowe to practice before this Court,

the Court requires a showing that the Nevada admitted

Assistant United States Attorneys in our judicial district are

incapable of handling this matter.” The district court cited no

reason, except its own policy, for refusing to admit Lowe. 

We note that Judge Jones has explained in other cases that he

adopted his policy of refusing to admit government attorneys

pro hac vice based on doubts about “the ethical

commitments” of government attorneys. Generalized doubts

about all government attorneys’ ethical commitments are not

valid grounds for denying an individual attorney’s application

for pro hac vice admission. We therefore conclude that Judge

Jones acted outside his discretion by failing to provide a valid

reason to denyLowe’s application for pro hac vice admission.

It is particularly important that a district court provide a

valid reason for denying pro hac vice admission where, as

here, the attorney seeking admission represents the United

States. The Attorney General has clear statutory authority to

choose which attorneys will represent the United States in

8 A district court would clearly act within its discretion in denying pro

hac vice admission if, for example, an attorney’s actions led the court to

conclude the attorney would not “abide by the court’s rules and practices”

or “be readily answerable to the court.” Ries, 100 F.3d at 1471.

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litigation. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 515(a), 517; Hall, 145 F.2d at

783–84. That authority does not mandate that district courts

automatically grant government attorneys’ applications for

pro hac vice admission. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court,

694 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2012) (“When the United

States stands as a party before the court, the authority of the

Attorney General is no greater than that of any other party. 

The Attorney General is not independent of the court’s

authority, including its authority over a settlement

conference.”). But “the federal government, though not

independent of the court’s authority, is also not like any other

litigant,” id., and a district court should “consider the unique

position of the government as a litigant in determining

whether to exercise its discretion,” In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898,

903 (5th Cir. 1993). For example, “[i]t is not open to serious

dispute that the Government is a party to a far greater number

of cases on a nationwide basis than even the most litigious

private entity . . . .” United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154,

159 (1984). Given the volume of litigation in which the

government is a party, arbitrary interference with the

government’s choice of counsel risks burdening the executive

branch in the discharge of its duties.

Such interference also risks creating the impression that

the courts are intruding upon the traditional prerogatives of

the political branches. “[C]ourts should not risk becoming

‘monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive

action.’” In re Stone, 986 F.2d at 904 (quoting Laird v.

Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). That risk is particularly acute

where, as here, a court adopts a policy that singles out

attorneys from specific departments and offices for greater

scrutiny. Moreover, some of Judge Jones’s comments risked

giving the impression that his admission policy was

motivated byhis disagreement with the enforcement priorities

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IN RE UNITED STATES 23

of specific federal agencies. For instance, during a

proceeding in In re Hofsaess, No. 2:13-cv-01161-RCJ (D.

Nev.), Judge Jones stated:

My experience has been, in a number of cases,

that when I admit out-of-state licensed

attorneys for the U.S. Government, that they

feel no obligation to me under the ethical

standards of the Nevada Bar. . . . And some of

the directions taken by the Internal Revenue

Service and attorneys out of and licensed out

of Washington with respect to that is just

abhorrent to me.

(emphasis added). Similarly, an order denying a motion for

reconsideration in Great Basin Resource Watch v. U.S.

Bureau of Land Management, No. 13-cv-00078-RCJ-VPC

(D. Nev.), stated: “[t]he local United States Attorney, Mr.

Daniel G. Bogden, serves under an Attorney General who,

under the guise of prosecutorial discretion, selectively

enforces laws to further political objectives that ought to be

left to the legislature. There is simply no presumption that

his subordinates are above ethical reproach.” (emphasis

added). Because Judge Jones did not articulate a valid reason

for his pro hac vice admission policy, comments like these

created a real risk that the policy would, rightly or wrongly,

be viewed as an encroachment on the domain of the political

branches.

Because the requirement of clear error is satisfied here,

we turn to the other four Bauman factors.

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B. Whether the United States Has No Other Means to

Obtain Relief And Whether the United States Will

Be Harmed in a Way Not Correctable on Appeal

“The first Bauman factor highlights the need for

mandamus to be used only when no other realistic alternative

is (or was) available to a petitioner.” Cole, 366 F.3d at 817;

see also Cheney, 542 U.S. at 367 (describing absence of

“adequate means to attain . . . relief” as a “prerequisite” to

issuance of the writ). The United States could not have

obtained relief through an appeal in this case because “the

denial of a petition for admission to a district court bar is

neither a final order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . .

nor an interlocutory order appealable under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292.” Gallo v. U.S. Dist. Court, 349 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th

Cir. 2003); see also Cohen, 586 F.3d at 710 (“lost choice of

counsel cannot be adequately remedied through means other

than mandamus . . . .”). We are therefore satisfied that the

writ is not being “used as a substitute for the regular appeals

process.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81.

It is true that the United States could have filed a formal

complaint against Judge Jones with the Judicial Council of

the Ninth Circuit before seeking a writ of mandamus. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 351–53. But the United States could not have

obtained the relief it seeks by filing a misconduct complaint. 

As Judge Wallace’s concurrence in the judgment notes, the

Judicial Council’s procedures “are not intended to provide an

alternative avenue for appealing a judge’s rulings in a

particular case . . . .” In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct,

613 F.2d 768, 769 (9th Cir. 1980). The United States could

have complained that Judge Jones’s “pattern and practice of

arbitrarily and deliberately disregarding prevailing legal

standards” amounted to “misconduct.” See In re Judicial

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IN RE UNITED STATES 25

Conduct & Disability, 517 F.3d 558, 562 (U.S. Jud. Conf.

2008). However, the Judicial Conference of the United States

has cautioned that “the characterization of such behavior as

misconduct is fraught with dangers to judicial independence.” 

Id. For this reason,

a cognizable misconduct complaint based on

allegations of a judge not following prevailing

law or the directions of a court of appeals in

particular cases must identify clear and

convincing evidence of willfulness, that is,

clear and convincing evidence of a judge’s

arbitrary and intentional departure from

prevailing law based on his or her

disagreement with, or willful indifference to,

that law.

Id. Indeed, because “[t]he Judicial Council is not a court and

thus cannot determine whether a judge’s rulings are

erroneous,” “a complainant must at a minimum allege that the

rulings in question have been reversed on appeal.” In re

Judicial Misconduct, 631 F.3d 961, 962 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Because the government’s requested relief relates to the

merits of Judge Jones’s rulings, and those rulings have not

been reversed on appeal, it appears that the Judicial Council

could not provide the relief that the government seeks in its

mandamus petition. Judge Wallace’s point is well taken that

Judge Jones’s practice of reversing himself after the

government has filed a petition for a writ, thereby insulating

his rulings from review, may itself qualify as the type of

conduct properly addressed by the Judicial Council. 

However, by its terms, the government’s mandamus petition

challenges a particular order denying a particular motion, not

a pattern and practice of routinely reversing his orders to

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insulate them from appellate review. We do not see why the

government should be forced to recharacterize the relief it

seeks in order to seek relief from the Judicial Council. 

Indeed, the prospect that the government would be forced to

request different relief from the Judicial Council strongly

suggests that pursuing a misconduct complaint was not an

adequate alternative means to obtain relief.

With respect to the related second Bauman factor, we

have recognized that a lost choice of counsel produces “harm

[that] is not correctable on appeal.” Cohen, 586 F.3d at 710

(citing cases). The United States was harmed when Lowe

was denied pro hac vice admission. This immediate harm

was remedied when Judge Jones granted Lowe’s application

for pro hac vice admission after the petition was filed. 

However, we recognize that the United States also has

interests in avoiding uncertainty and delayin securing pro hac

vice admission of government attorneys in the future. It

cannot adequately protect these interests by filing successive

petitions for writs of mandamus, even if the petitions again

cause Judge Jones to admit the attorneys. The United States

will still be inconvenienced by the delay.

The first and second Bauman factors weighed in favor of

issuing mandamus when the petition was filed, and weigh in

favor of offering guidance to the district court.

C. Whether the District Court’s Order Is An OftRepeated Error

There are several other cases in which Judge Jones has

issued similar orders. The fact that Judge Jones’s order in

this case was not an isolated occurrence weighed in favor of

granting mandamus relief when the petition was filed. We

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IN RE UNITED STATES 27

place significant weight on this factor in this case because it

demonstrates that the United States has a continuing need for

relief, and that guidance is therefore warranted, even though

Lowe has been admitted.

D. Whether the District Court’s Order Raises

Important Problems or Issues of First Impression

The order at issue here raises important problems. We

find it highly relevant that the conduct complained of could,

if allowed to continue, burden the Executive in the

performance of its duties. See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 382

(“Accepted mandamus standards are broad enough to allow

a court of appeals to prevent a lower court from interfering

with a coequal branch’s ability to discharge its constitutional

responsibilities.”). We also note that this dispute resembles

a handful of other cases in which we have issued mandamus

to clarify the authority of the district courts in litigation

overseen by the Attorney General. See United States v. U.S.

Dist. Court, 694 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2012); Hall, 145 F.2d

781. This factor weighed in favor of mandamus relief when

the petition was filed and weighs in favor of offering

guidance to the district court even though a formal writ is no

longer necessary.

E. Mandamus ReliefWould Have Been Appropriate,

But a Formal Writ Is No Longer Necessary

After weighing the Bauman factors, we are convinced that

it is appropriate to offer guidance to the district court. Issuing

a formal writ would have been an appropriate remedy but for

Judge Jones’s voluntary cessation, and there is a continuing

need to decide the issues the petition raises. It is true, as

Judge Wallace notes in his concurrence in the judgment, that

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it will often be possible to resolve disputes about judicial

administration informally through, for instance, the

involvement of chief district judges. Informal efforts have

been undertaken in this case. The record does not disclose

whether those efforts have caused Judge Jones to modify or

abandon his pro hac vice policy. However, it is clear to us

that, by one important measure, the informal efforts

undertaken here have not proven effective, because they have

not produced a public record upon which the government

may rely if the challenged conduct recurs. Absent a record

memorializing the resolution of the issues presented by the

petition, the government will continue to face considerable

uncertainty about whether its attorneys will be admitted pro

hac vice.

For reasons discussed supra, it is not necessary to issue a

formal writ in this case. We are confident that the district

court will conform its decisions to the principles we announce

here. See Phoenix Newspapers, 156 F.3d at 952; Armster v.

U.S. Dist. Court, 792 F.2d 1423, 1431 (9th Cir. 1986)

(Armster I); Brooklier, 685 F.2d at 1173. We accordingly

deny the petition without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we DENY the petition without

prejudice.

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IN RE UNITED STATES 29

WALLACE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

I concur only in the judgment to deny the writ of

mandamus. Judge Jones’s reversal of his prior order denying

admission to government attorneys renders unnecessary the

government’s petition for a writ of mandamus. This is where

our analysis should end. See In re Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps.,

AFL-CIO, 837 F.2d 503, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (denying

petition for writ of mandamus and observing that “[w]here

there’s no remedy, there’s no need to decide if there was a

wrong”). In my view, our statutory writ authority is an

improper vehicle for providing hopeful but non-binding

assurances that Judge Jones will discontinue his practice of

routinely denying admission to the government’s out-of-state

attorneys, and then reversing course when such denials

become subject to appellate review. The proper, and frankly

more effective, place from which the government may obtain

such assurances is the Judicial Council of the Circuit (Circuit

Council).

I.

In 1939, Congress passed legislation instituting a

comprehensive plan of decentralized judicial administration.

The Administrative Office Act of 1939 (Act) created the

Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and

thereby effectively transferred responsibility for supervising

court administration from the Department of Justice to the

courts themselves. The primary purpose of the Act was “to

furnish to the Federal courts the administrative machinery for

self-improvement, through which those courts will be able to

scrutinize their own work and develop efficiency and

promptness in their administration of justice.” H.R. Rep. No.

76-702, at 2 (1939).

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Integral to this goal was the creation of a Circuit Council

in each circuit to act as a local “board of directors” for the

circuit. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit

of the United States, 398 U.S. 74, 86 n.7 (1970). Presently,

the Circuit Council consists of the chief judge of the circuit,

who presides, and an equal number of circuit and district

judges of the circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1). Unlike the

Judicial Conference of the Circuit, whose “purely advisory”

function is “to provide an opportunityfor friendlyinterchange

among judges and between bench and bar, out of which might

grow increased understanding of problems of judicial

administration and enhanced cooperation toward their

solution,” the Circuit Council is “designed as an actual

participant in the management of the judicial work of the

circuit.” Chandler, 398 U.S. at 98 (Harlan, J., concurring).

Indeed, the Circuit Council is presently vested with broad

authority to “make all necessary and appropriate orders for

the effective and expeditious administration of justice within

its circuit.” 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1). In aid of this authority, the

Circuit Council may hold hearings, take sworn testimony, and

issue subpoenas. Id. The Circuit Council also possesses

review authority over district courts’ local rules to ensure

their consistency with the Supreme Court’s general rules of

practice, procedure, and evidence. Id. § 332(d)(4).

Importantly, these powers come with teeth:

All judicial officers . . . of the circuit shall

promptly carry into effect all orders of the

judicial council. In the case of failure to

comply with an order made under this

subsection, . . . a judicial council or a special

committee . . . may institute a contempt

proceeding in any district court in which the

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IN RE UNITED STATES 31

judicial officer . . . who fails to comply with

the order . . . shall be ordered to show cause

before the court why he or she should not be

held in contempt of court.

Id. § 332(d)(2).

In 1980, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act built

upon the Administrative Office Act, and augmented the role

of the judicial council in investigating judges whose conduct

is prejudicial the “effective and expeditious administration of

justice.” Id. The Circuit Council has power to conduct

investigations of such alleged conduct so long as the conduct

is not “directly related to the merits of a decision or

procedural ruling,” id. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii), and does not rise to

the level of an impeachable offense. See J. Clifford Wallace,

Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving Judicial

Independence: Comparative Perspectives, 28 Cal. W. Int’l

L.J. 341, 348–49 (1998).

Since its institution, the Circuit Council has been the

primary administrator of discipline within the federal

judiciary. Most of the Circuit Council’s work in this regard is

performed informally and inconspicuously, and with great

effectiveness. See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal

Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 243

(1993). As one former chief judge has said: “[W]e believe

[the Circuit Council’s] success may be measured by its lack

of visibility. We suspect that some who have criticized

councils for inactivity are unmindful of the saw that still

waters run deep, and that the most effective actions are often

the most inconspicuous.” In re Imperial “400” Nat’l, Inc.,

481 F.2d 41, 47 (3d Cir. 1973). Indeed, our own Circuit

Council has long been successful in dealing with judicial

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32 IN RE UNITED STATES

misconduct “through an informal mechanism, backed up by

[its] power to enter orders if necessary under . . . § 332.” U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Report on the

Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of

1980 in the Ninth Judicial Circuit(1987). My own experience

as former chief judge and as a current member of the Circuit

Council bears this out. Typically, even the most serious

judicial problems are resolved successfully without the filing

of a formal complaint.

Occasionally, however, it may become necessary to

initiate a formal complaint against a judge who (1) has

“engaged in conduct,” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a); (2) that is not

“directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural

ruling,” id. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii); (3) but is “prejudicial to the

effective and expeditious administration of the business of the

courts,” id. § 351(a). The Judicial Code provides that “[a]ny

person alleging that a judge has engaged in [such] conduct

. . . may file . . . a written complaint containing a brief

statement of the facts.” Id. Alternatively, the chief judge may,

on the basis of information available to him or her, “identify”

a complaint through a written order “and thereby dispense

with the filing of a written complaint.” Id. § 351(b).

Once a complaint has been filed or identified, the chief

judge must expeditiously review it to determine “whether

appropriate corrective action has been or can be taken without

the necessity for a formal investigation,” or whether the facts

stated in the complaint are “plainly untrue” or “incapable of

being established through investigation.” Id. § 352(a). During

this process, the chief judge may request that the judge whose

conduct is the subject of complaint file a written response. Id.

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The chief judge may then issue a final written order

(1) dismissing the complaint for various enumerated reasons,

see id. § 352(b)(1); or (2) concluding that appropriate

corrective action has been taken or that intervening events

have rendered the complaint unnecessary, id. § 351(b)(2).

Failing those, however, the chief judge must appoint a special

committee to investigate the allegations in the complaint. Id.

§ 353(a). The committee then conducts an investigation and

files a comprehensive written report with the entire Circuit

Council, with recommendations for appropriate action. Id.

§ 353(c).

The Circuit Council mayconduct additional investigation,

dismiss the complaint, or take action against the judge whose

conduct is the subject of complaint, including issuance of a

private or public reprimand. Id. § 354(a)(1)–(2).

II.

Instead of a non-binding advisory opinion, the statutory

procedures outlined above provide the proper vehicle by

which the United States may potentially obtain the assurances

it seeks in this case. The government could, for example, seek

a specific order from the Circuit Council under section 332

correcting Judge Jones’s alleged pattern and practice of

denying, as a matter of course, admission to out-of-state

government attorneys, coupled with his subsequent reversal

whenever such denial becomes the subject of a petition for a

writ of mandamus. See J. Clifford Wallace, Must We Have

the Nunn Bill?, 51 Ind. L.J. 297, 322 (1976) (observing that

the Circuit Council’s power to issue orders likely includes the

“issuance of ‘specific orders, directed to individual judges,

and limited to the correction of a specific situation for which

that judge can be held directly responsible,’” quoting

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34 IN RE UNITED STATES

Comment, The Authority of the Circuit Judicial Councils:

Separation of Powers in the Courts of Appeal, 5 Seton Hall

L. Rev. 815, 860 (1974)). Indeed, “[a]n order by the Council

to a district judge . . . involve[s] supervision of a subordinate

judicial officer,” and “in this regard, [is] not unlike the

extraordinary writ of mandamus.” Chandler, 398 U.S. at 106

(Harlan, J., concurring). Such an order may be especially

appropriate given the Circuit Council’s authority to review

the local rules of district courts, including the local rule upon

which Judge Jones relied to deny routinely admission to outof-state government attorneys. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4).

Alternatively, the government could file a complaint with

the Circuit Council against Judge Jones. Indeed, the House

Report on the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act

contemplated use of the formal complaint procedure in this

very circumstance: “If a clear impediment to the

administration of justice is shown . . . the circuit council

could hear a case brought against a judge who is a litigant in

a legal proceeding.” H.R. Rep. No. 96-1313, at 8 (1980).

Of course, it bears emphasizing that the Circuit Council

is not an alternative appellate forum in which to address the

merits of a judge’s order. In re Charge of Judicial

Misconduct, 613 F.2d 768, 769 (1980) (the Circuit Council’s

procedures “are not intended to provide an alternate avenue

for appealing a judge’s rulings in a particular case”). Indeed,

the Circuit Council does not review “objections to substantive

or procedural error” because “in such cases the gravamen of

the complaint is not the fitness of the judge, but the merit of

his decision.” In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 685 F.2d

1226, 1227 (9th Cir. 1982). Here, however, the gravamen of

the government’s complaint is not the merits of Judge Jones’s

decision to deny government attorneys admission in the

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IN RE UNITED STATES 35

present case—otherwise the government would not still be

pressing for a writ after Judge Jones reversed course, granting

them the particular relief they asked us compel through a

writ. Rather, the government seeks an assurance that Judge

Jones’s pattern and practice of routinely denying out-of-state

government attorneys admission—and subsequentlyreversing

himself to insulate such orders from appellate review—will

not happen in the future. Such forward-looking relief is not

within our statutory mandamus power as a three-judge panel,

but it falls well within the statutory purview of the Circuit

Council.

Indeed, the Committee on Judicial Conduct and

Disability, a sub-part of the Judicial Conference of the United

States, recently recognized that “a judge’s pattern and

practice of arbitrarilyand deliberatelydisregarding prevailing

legal standards and thereby causing expense and delay to

litigants may be misconduct.” In re Judicial Conduct and

Disability, 517 F.3d 558, 562 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2008). 

Subsequently, however, Judge Kozinski, during his tenure as

chief judge, issued an order clarifying that to avoid the

merits-related bar on judicial misconduct complaints by

alleging a “pattern or practice,” “a complainant must at a

minimum allege that the rulings in question have been

reversed on appeal,” because the Circuit Council “cannot

determine whether a judge’s rulings are erroneous.” In re

Judicial Misconduct, 631 F.3d 961, 962 (9th Cir. 2011). But

here, Judge Jones has insulated himself from appellate review

by reversing course whenever a petition has been filed, thus

rendering ineffective any petition for a writ of mandamus.

The Supreme Court clarified decades ago, quoting our

circuit’s precedent, that “[a]lthough it is well established that

Judicial Councils do not exist to review claims that a

particular trial judge’s rulings were erroneous, In re Charge

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of Judicial Misconduct, 613 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1980), they do

exist ‘to provide an administrative remedy for misconduct of

a judge for which no judicial remedy is available.’ In re

Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 595 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.

1979).” Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 435

n.2 (1985). See also Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc.

§ 3939 (“Judicial council action is most obviously proper

even with respect to isolated conduct if there is no apparent

remedy by appeal or writ . . . .”). Judge Jones’s pattern of

denying admission and then reversing himself only after the

government files a petition for a writ—which insulates his

rulings from “remedy by appeal or writ”—likely qualifies,

therefore, as the type of conduct that is most properly

addressed by the Circuit Council. Even if the Circuit Council

could not opine on the merits of Judge Jones’s denial,

moreover, it surely could prevent him from engaging in a

practice of insulating his denials from appellate review.

The majority concludes that their advisory opinion is

necessary because at the time the petition was filed, i.e.,

before Judge Jones reversed himself, the Bauman factors

weighed in favor of issuing a writ. But Bauman’s first

factor—whether the “party seeking the writ has no other

adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he

or she desires”— is a prerequisite, the Supreme Court has

held, to issuance of the writ. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381. The

purpose of the first Bauman factor is to assess only the

“availability” of an adequate alternative means, not to

consider whether the petitioner is likely to be successful in

employing it. Bauman, 557 F.2d 650 at 656. Indeed, Bauman

states,“the availability of a direct appeal would weigh

strongly against a grant of mandamus. . . . [E]ven if the grant

of an interlocutory appeal from the order is not a foregone

conclusion, the possibility remains . . . that a[n] appeal may

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be available. That possibility, or uncertainty, regarding

appealability militates against issuance of a writ here.” Id.

(emphasis added).

The majority is content to assume that “pursuing a

misconduct complaint was not an adequate alternative means

to obtain relief.” However, in this case, as in Bauman, even

though it was “not a foregone conclusion” that the United

States would obtain the relief it seeks through the filing of a

formal complaint, it is clear that the “availability” of an

adequate alternative means—even if “uncertain[]”—militates

against issuance of a writ in this case. I would therefore hold

that this “prerequisite” for issuance of mandamus, Cheney,

542 U.S. at 381, was not satisfied here, at the time the petition

was filed or after. Consequently, even under the majority’s

own rubric, it should not be issuing an advisory opinion in

this case.

In sum, we properly denied the government’s petition for

a writ of mandamus because Judge Jones’s voluntary reversal

rendered it unnecessary. However, our denial does not leave

the government without an avenue for the relief it seeks.

Particularly in the present case, which involves a district

judge’s pattern and practice across many cases, followed by

his voluntary self-reversal in those cases that become subject

to appellate review, the government could, if necessary, seek

relief from the Circuit Council. If the government deems it

necessary to file a future misconduct complaint to address

Judge Jones’s alleged pattern and practice, the chief judge

may determine that further investigation is warranted. In that

event, if the Circuit Council’s investigation supports the

government’s allegations, the Circuit Council may, in its

discretion, issue a public reprimand providing the assurances

that the government seeks.

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III.

In light of the role Congress established for the Circuit

Council in resolving the issues the government raises here,

our court should abstain from using the blunt instrument of

our section 1651 writ authority to offer nonbinding guidance

to district courts, especially when subsequent events render

issuing the writ unnecessary. See Richardson-Merrell,

472 U.S. at 435 n.2 (observing that action by the Circuit

Council is appropriate where judicial remedies are

unavailable).

Our court has strayed in recent years from the traditional

understanding that our mandamus authority is sharply limited

to truly extraordinary circumstances in which no alternative

remedy—judicial or administrative—is available. As the

majority points out, our court has sometimes offered “advice”

to district judges on legal issues for which there was no

judicial writ remedy when it has concluded that the alleged

wrongs were capable of repetition but evaded review. See,

e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the

Dist. of Ariz., 156 F.3d 940, 948–49 (9th Cir. 1998). This

practice appears to be an extension of several earlier cases in

which our court invoked a so-called “supervisorymandamus”

authority to “provide necessary guidance to the district

courts” regarding “questions of law of major importance to

the administration of the district courts.” In re Cement

Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982); see also

Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Ariz.,

881 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that “exercise of

supervisorymandamus authority” was warranted because the

case involved an “important question of first impression” that

would “elude review”). This in spite of there being no case or

controversy before the court.

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The term “supervisory mandamus” owes its existence to

a blip in Supreme Court jurisprudence from the 1957 case of

La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). In La

Buy, over a blistering dissent by Justice Brennan joined by

Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Harlan, the Court stated its

belief that “supervisory control of the District Courts by the

Courts of Appeals is necessary to the proper judicial

administration in the federal system. The All Writs Act

confers on the Courts of Appeals the discretionary power to

issue writs of mandamus in . . . exceptional circumstances.”

Id. at 259–60.

Two decades later, we observed in Bauman v. U.S. Dist.

Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977), that “[s]ince the advent

of the concept of ‘supervisory mandamus’ in La Buy . . . the

challenge to the federal appellate courts has been to formulate

objective principles to guide the exercise of their section 1651

power.” Id. at 653. We cautioned against the “obvious”

“dangers of unprincipled use of that power,” which “could

readily subvert the policies underlying the finality rule” or the

“congressional scheme governing interlocutoryappeals,” and

which could “undermine the mutual respect . . . between

federal trial and appellate courts.” Id. We pointed out that

“without articulable and practically applicable guidelines to

govern the issuance of extra-ordinary writs, appellate judges

would continually be subject to the temptation to grant such

relief merely because they are sympathetic with the purposes

of the petitioners’ underlying actions, or because they

question the trial court’s ability to direct the litigation

efficiently or impartially.” Id. at 653–54. In light of those

dangers, we instituted a five-factor test to bring principled

guidance to the exercise of section 1651 power, recognizing

that its “continuing effectiveness . . . depends on its reasoned

and principled exercise.” Id. at 654.

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Despite the potentially broad interpretations that Courts

of Appeals might be tempted to derive from La Buy, they

would do well to observe that the Court has since retreated

considerably from this expanded use of mandamus that it

seemed to sanction in 1957. Indeed, in its most recent

articulation of our statutory mandamus authority, the Court

reiterated that the “traditional use of the writ in aid of

appellate jurisdiction . . . has been to confine [the court

against which mandamus is sought] to a lawful exercise of its

prescribed jurisdiction.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the

Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently,

“only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial

usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion will justify

the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). This is a far cry from

offering advice on administrative issues, i.e., so-called

“supervisory mandamus.”

The foremost “prerequisite[]” to invoking statutory

mandamus authority is that the party seeking issuance of the

writ “have no other adequate means to attain the relief he

desires.” Id., quoting Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for the

N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976); see also Bauman,

557 F.2d at 654. The purpose of this threshold hurdle is to

“ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the

regular appeals process.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81. In

accordance with this principle, our mandamus authority,

whether phrased as “supervisory” or not, must not be invoked

as a substitute for any “other adequate means” by which the

petitioner may “attain the relief he or she desires.” Bauman,

557 F.2d at 654.

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Our court should therefore avoid invoking “supervisory

mandamus” authority for anything it deems to implicate

questions of “major importance” whose “resolution would

add importantly to the efficient and orderly administration of

the district courts.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d at

1305. Congress has established extra-judicial mechanismsfor

dealing with certain issues, and we must defer to Congress,

lest our so-called “supervisory” authority become a tool for

scattershot resolution of important issues of court

administration that Congress directed to be handled outside

the normal judicial process, through the judicial

administrative organization of the Circuit Council.

For example, we declined a petitioner’s invitation to

exercise a so-called “inherent supervisory authority” over

rules implemented under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 to review certain

plans issued by the district court pursuant to the Criminal

Justice Act (CJA). Russell v. Hug, 275 F.3d 812, 820–21 (9th

Cir. 2002). We refused to exercise any so-called supervisory

authority over such plans because in the CJA “Congress

granted to the Judicial Council a continuing authority to

supervise such plans.” Id. at 821. Because the statutory

“provisions ma[d]e clear that the district court’s adoption and

modification of a plan under the [CJA] is an administrative

matter, subject to the governance of the Judicial Council,” we

held that our appellate review authority under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 “does not authorize us to engage in supervisory

oversight of administrative actions of the district courts.” Id.

The same should be said about our mandamus authority

in light of the statutory provisions delegating responsibility

over the administrative issues presented in this appeal to the

Circuit Council. The Circuit Council has statutory review

authority over the local rule invoked by Judge Jones in

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denying admission to non-local government attorneys.

Moreover, as set forth above, the Circuit Council has

statutory authority to issue orders to correct judicial conduct

that is prejudicial to the “effective and expeditious

administration of justice within its circuit.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 332(d)(1). Because this authority was given by Congress to

the Circuit Council, I cannot join the majority opinion. We

should not use our opinion denying the government’s petition

for a writ of mandamus to offer the guidance of two judges on

these administrative matters.

I therefore concur only in the judgment denying the writ

of mandamus.

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