Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-02-03797/USCOURTS-ca8-02-03797-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bumble Bee Seafoods
Appellant
Louis E. Kemp
Appellee
Quality Finer Foods
Appellee
Superior Seafoods
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-3797

___________

Louis E. Kemp, Superior Seafoods, Inc., *

and Quality Finer Foods, Inc., *

*

Plaintiffs-Appellees. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District of

v. * Minnesota.

*

Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: October 24, 2003

 Filed: February 23, 2005 

___________

Before BYE, HANSEN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc. (“Bumble Bee”) appeals the

district court’s adverse rulings following a bench trial on the trademark issues of

likelihood of confusion and dilution. Because we find that confusion was likely, we

reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Bumble Bee.

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1

The district court noted that no party had contemplated, much less used, the

composite term “LOUIS KEMP” to market surimi-based seafood products or any

other food products prior to the proposed use that precipitated renegotiation of the

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I. Background

Plaintiff-Appellee Louis E. Kemp (“Mr. Kemp”) is from a family that had been

engaged in the wholesale and retail seafood business since 1930. In 1985, Mr. Kemp

started Kemp Foods, Inc., which made and sold artificial crab products containing

surimi, a low-fat, processed fish product. In 1987, Mr. Kemp sold the seafood

business to Oscar Mayer Foods Corporation for $4 million pursuant to a Stock

Acquisition Agreement. Under the Agreement, Mr. Kemp transferred all trademarks

used in his business, including KEMP, KEMP’S and KEMP’S & Design to Oscar

Mayer. He further agreed not to use these marks “or any variation thereof” on any

products, except as permitted under the Agreement. Under the Agreement, Mr. Kemp

retained the right to “market, sell or otherwise distribute [certain listed products]

bearing a composite trademark consisting of the word KEMP or KEMP’s and

preceded by one or more additional words, the selection of which shall be approved

in advance in writing by [Oscar Mayer].” 

About six months after signing the Agreement, an Oscar Mayer executive

asked Mr. Kemp for permission to use the name LOUIS KEMP to market surimi

products. Oscar Mayer previously had achieved success with two-word or full-name

marks (e.g. Oscar Mayer, Louis Rich). Mr. Kemp agreed and entered negotiations

with Oscar Mayer to amend the Agreement. Ultimately, the amended Agreement did

not contain all of Oscar Mayer’s desired terms, namely, express permission to use the

term LOUIS KEMP on all products and exclusion of Mr. Kemp from using the term

LOUIS KEMP on any food products. Similarly, the amended Agreement did not

contain Mr. Kemp’s desired term, namely, the express reservation of a broad right to

use the term LOUIS KEMP on products other than surimi.1

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Agreement. 

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Under the amended Agreement, Mr. Kemp granted Oscar Mayer the right to

use and register the marks LOUIS KEMP and LOUIS KEMP SEAFOOD CO (the

“LOUIS KEMP marks”) for surimi-based products and other seafood accessory

products within the natural zone of expansion. The amended Agreement also

included a revised reservation of rights for Mr. Kemp that provided:

It is agreed that [Mr. Kemp], or any entity in which [he] has an interest,

may utilize a composite trademark consisting of the word KEMP or

KEMP’s and preceded or followed by one or more additional words the

selection of which shall be approved in advance in writing by [Oscar

Mayer] in connection with the marketing, selling, or distribution of

[certain listed products].

In 1992, Oscar Mayer sold the surimi business to Tyson Foods, Inc., who in

turn sold the business to Bumble Bee. Con Agra Foods subsequently acquired

Bumble Bee. Before October 1995, Bumble Bee and its predecessors spent over $49

million to promote and advertise the LOUIS KEMP marks. By October 1995, the

LOUIS KEMP marks had achieved a brand awareness of 47%, Bumble Bee’s Louis

Kemp Seafood Company held a 77% share of the market for retail pre-packaged

seafood and LOUIS KEMP was the number one surimi seafood brand with a 55%

market share. It is undisputed that Bumble Bee owns numerous registered trademarks

for KEMP, including the term KEMP without restriction as to font, trade dress or

form, and more narrow registrations for the term KEMP along with certain design

elements. In addition, Bumble Bee owns registration numbers 1,859,815 and

1,859,816 (for the mark LOUIS KEMP) and 1,859,817 and 1,879,931 (for the mark

LOUIS KEMP SEAFOOD COMPANY). 

In April and May 1995, Mr. Kemp wrote to Jeno F. Paulucci of Luigino’s, Inc.,

a prospective business partner, to propose the formation of a new company “to

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Hereafter, we refer to the plaintiffs collectively as Mr. Kemp.

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develop and sell a line of precooked wild rice products.” Mr. Kemp noted his

intention to take advantage of the goodwill associated with the LOUIS KEMP marks

(goodwill that Bumble Bee, Tyson, and Oscar Mayer had invested $49 million to

develop) when he stated:

Non-fish products can use the ‘Louis Kemp’ brand name which has

national recognition with over $50 million spent on advertising, 20

million lbs of ‘Louis Kemp’ product sold annually with a 67% market

share of the prepackaged retail market in its category. [April 1995 letter]

We could use the “Louis Kemp” brand name where we can and want to,

to take advantage of the considerable equity it possesses and or any and

all other brands the company can utilize, now and in the future to

develop any other specialty food items that would meet the compan[y’]s

goal for growth and success. [May 1995 letter]

While Mr. Kemp expressly stated that he desired to “take advantage of the

considerable equity” that the “Louis Kemp” brand name possessed, and while he may

have believed that he was entitled to do so under the contract, he also recognized the

risk attendant to this appropriation of goodwill. He sought and obtained an opinion

letter from counsel in which counsel advised that he could use his name, “Louis

Kemp” for precooked wild rice products. In counsel’s opinion, these products were

sufficiently different from fish products to avoid confusion. Counsel did advise

against using the term “Louis Kemp Seafood Company,” using type font or script

similar to that used by [then] Tyson, and using the marks on products that contained

surimi.

Mr. Kemp and his newly formed company, Quality Finer Foods2

 entered a

“Custom Packing and Sales Agreement” with Luigino’s, Inc. Under the Sales

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Agreement, Mr. Kemp granted Luigino’s the right to cancel the agreement “if any

meaningful action (in the sole discretion of Luigino’s attorney) is threatened or

commenced against Quality Finer Foods or its owner, Louis Kemp, for trade mark

infringement, violation and the like.” Apparently, Mr. Paulucci, his attorney, or

others at Luigino’s also recognized the risk attendant to using the trademark LOUIS

KEMP.

In October 1995, Mr. Kemp began commercial use of the mark LOUIS KEMP

on wild rice, chicken and wild rice soup, and wild rice with stir fry vegetables. Mr.

Kemp did not seek Bumble Bee’s approval, as per the amended Agreement, for use

of the two-word mark on wild rice products. Mr. Kemp’s use was accompanied by

trade dress that differed from Bumble Bee’s trade dress and did not include the words

“Seafood Co.” In particular, Bumble Bee displayed its LOUIS KEMP SEAFOOD

CO. mark against a blue background and Mr. Kemp displayed the LOUIS KEMP

mark against a white and red striped background, using a different font. Mr. Kemp

juxtaposed the mark with a scene of lakes and wild rice while Bumble Bee’s mark

appeared on see-through packages that permitted potential consumers to view the

surimi product. Mr. Kemp sought registration of the trademark LOUIS KEMP as

applied to precooked wild rice products. The Patent and Trademark Office rejected

Mr. Kemp’s application based on a finding that Mr. Kemp’s mark was confusingly

similar to Bumble Bee’s mark.

On March 13, 1996, Tyson, then owner of the LOUIS KEMP marks, sent Mr.

Kemp a cease and desist letter. Tyson alleged infringement and likelihood of

confusion. On March 21, 1996, Mr. Kemp responded by explaining that he believed

the amended Agreement permitted his use of the trademark LOUIS KEMP on nonsurimi products. Mr. Kemp then filed this suit to seek a declaratory judgment

regarding a contractual right to use the trademark LOUIS KEMP. Mr. Kemp also

brought tortious interference and unfair competition claims against Tyson and

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3

The Order provided, inter alia:

4. The parties to this litigation have been involved in a number of

related litigations in the federal, state, and bankruptcy courts of

State of California, including Kemp v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp.,

No BC133535 (Super. Ct. Los. Angeles County); Kemp v. Oscar

Mayer Foods Corp., No. B105,876 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist.); In re

Kemp, No LA9649617 KM (C.D. Cal. Bankr.); Dye, United

States Trustee v. Kemp, No. 97-02974-KM (C.D. Cal. Bankr.);

Dye, United States Trustee v. Kemp, No. 98-2344-AHM (C.D.

Cal.); and Dye, United States Trustee v. Superior Seafoods, Inc.,

No. 97-01331-KM (C.D. Cal).

* * *

6. The California litigations have now been resolved by means of a

demurrer and grant of summary judgment in favor of Tyson in the

California state trial court (i.e., in No. BC133535 (Super. Ct. Los

Angeles County)) coupled with a settlement agreement signed by

all of the parties to those litigations and the [parties to] present

litigation [other than Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc.], which

settlement has been approved by the California bankruptcy court.

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Bumble Bee. Tyson and Bumble Bee filed trademark infringement and dilution

counterclaims against Mr.Kemp based on federal and Minnesota law. In 1998, Mr.

Kemp stopped selling wild rice products under the LOUIS KEMP mark.

Over the next few years, litigation proceeded on many fronts, including state

and bankruptcy courts in California, as well as the United States District Court in

Minnesota. On May 21, 2001, upon stipulation of the parties, the district court below

entered an Order Granting Consent Judgment which held that the only remaining

issues were the issues of trademark infringement and dilution as set forth in Tyson

and Bumble Bee’s counterclaims.3

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7. Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, the Court finds that Tyson

owns all right, title, and interest in and to the LOUIS KEMP

Marks, and Tyson owns U.S. Trademark Registration Nos.

1,859,815 and 1,859,816 (for the mark LOUIS KEMP) and U.S.

Trademark Registration Nos. 1,859,817 and 1,879,931 (for the

mark LOUIS KEMP SEAFOOD CO.). Accordingly, the Court

hereby grants judgment to Tyson on its claim for declaratory

judgment (Am. Ans., Aff. Def. & Ctrcls., Ctrcl. I ¶¶ 32-36).

8. Tyson’s LOUIS KEMP Marks are valid, enforceable, and in full

force and effect.

* * *

11. Accordingly, the only issues remaining in the present litigation

are whether the use by Kemp of the trademark LOUIS KEMP or

any formative of this mark in connection with rice products,

including without limitation “seasoned wild rice, chicken wild

rice soup, and wild rice with stir fried vegetables” as well as

“southwestern white and wild rice, cooked and seasoned white

and wild rice and wild and white rice stir fry” (all as identified by

Kemp in response to Tyson’s Interrogatory No. 1) infringes

and/or dilutes Tyson’s rights in the Louis Kemp Marks.

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The district court then held a bench trial to resolve the outstanding issues of

whether Mr. Kemp’s use of the LOUIS KEMP mark infringed or diluted Bumble

Bee’s trademark rights. The evidence included the trial testimony of Mr. Kemp’s

former salesman for the wild rice products, Patrick Melby. Mr. Melby claimed that

actual confusion existed among brokers. In fact, Mr. Melby testified that these

professional buyers “always” asked if there was a connection between the wild rice

and surimi companies and that they “always” had to have it explained to them that the

two products came from different companies. This evidence was undisputed. The

district court, however, discounted this evidence and stated, “The Court does not

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extract from his testimony the inference or conclusion that confusion among brokers

was rampant.”

Tyson and Bumble Bee submitted a customer survey that purported to show

confusion among relevant consumers. The district court discounted the survey as

infirm. The district court noted that the pool of survey participants did not accurately

reflect the target market and that problems with the format of the surveyor’s questions

called into doubt the validity of the survey’s results.

Mr. Kemp testified that during the many years that he sold seafood products

under the KEMP trademarks, another firm sold dairy products under an identical

KEMP trademark with no reports of actual consumer confusion. An executive from

Con Agra (the company that owned Bumble Bee) testified that he was not aware of

any reports of actual confusion between the LOUIS KEMP seafood products and the

third party’s dairy products. Also, the evidence showed that Mr. Kemp promoted the

sale of his wild rice products as side dishes for fish, and Bumble Bee promoted its

surimi products for use with rice.

Finally, during trial, Mr. Kemp again made clear his intention to take advantage

of the goodwill and brand equity that Bumble Bee and its predecessors had built in

the trademark LOUIS KEMP:

Q. Well, isn’t it a fact that you used the mark LOUIS KEMP on

you[r] wild rice products solely to take advantage of the huge

investment that Oscar Mayer and Tyson invested in the brand?

A. Absolutely true and that’s because the agreement I made with

them and they made with me.

The district court applied the six factor test from Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628

F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (listing the following as factors to consider in

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assessing the likelihood of confusion: (1) the strength of the owner’s mark; (2) the

similarity of the owner’s mark and the alleged infringer’s mark; (3) the degree to

which the products compete with each other; (4) the alleged infringer’s intent to “pass

off” its goods as those of the trademark owner; (5) incidents of actual confusion; and

(6) the type of product, its costs and conditions of purchase (the “Squirtco factors”)).

The district court noted Mr. Kemp’s concession that the first and sixth factors

weighed in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. The district court then

analyzed the remaining four factors. In doing so, the district court conducted a sideby-side comparison of the parties’ respective products’ trade dress; discounted

similarities in the marks due to differences in the trade dress; noted the absence of

competition between the products; found that Mr. Kemp did not intend consumers to

associate his products with Bumble Bee’s products; found no evidence of actual

confusion; and, ultimately, found that there was neither a likelihood of confusion nor

actual dilution. As a result, the district court granted judgment in favor of Mr. Kemp.

II. Analysis - Likelihood of Confusion

We review application of the Squirtco factors and the ultimate determination

of a likelihood of confusion for clear error. Children’s Factory, Inc. v. Benee’s Toys,

Inc., 160 F.3d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 1998); Conagra, Inc. v. George A. Hormel, & Co.,

990 F.2d 368, 370-71 (8th Cir. 1993). Reversal under the clear error standard is

appropriate in this case because, after reviewing the record, we are “left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City

of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. United States

Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 

Mr. Kemp argues that minor differences in trade dress, as previously described,

establish that the marks are dissimilar. He argues further that he did not have an

intent to misappropriate the goodwill consumers associate with Bumble Bee’s mark

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and that his receipt of advice from counsel proves this fact. He also argues that the

underlying products were not in competition with one another and that there was no

evidence of actual confusion. Although he concedes that the first factor (the strength

of the mark) and the sixth factor (the type of product, its costs, and conditions of

purchase) support a finding that confusion is likely, he argues that, on balance, the

Squirtco factors support the conclusion that no confusion is likely.

The factors from Squirtco guide our analysis, but the ultimate determination

of whether confusion is likely is not to be mechanically determined through rigid

application of the factors. Under Squirtco, no one factor controls, and because the

inquiry is inherently case-specific, different factors may be entitled to more weight

in different cases. Squirtco, 628 F.2d at 1091 (“[R]esolution of this issue does not

hinge on a single factor but requires a consideration of numerous factors to determine

whether under all the circumstances there is a likelihood of confusion.”). Further, the

factors are not entirely separable. For example, it is inappropriate to conduct a sideby-side comparison of the elements of two products’ trade dress, as urged by Mr.

Kemp, without reference to the senior mark’s strength or the market conditions under

which likely consumers would see the marks. See, e.g., Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas,

839 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1988) (“‘[I]t is axiomatic in trademark law that “sideby-side” comparison is not the test.’”) (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc.,

632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1980)). Rather, our comparison of the similarity between

marks and products must occur in a context that recognizes how consumers encounter

the products and how carefully consumers are likely to scrutinize the marks.

See Homeowner’s Group, Inc. v. Home Marketing Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100,

1109 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Instead, the marks must be viewed in their entirety and in

context. [A] court must determine, in the light of what occurs in the marketplace,

whether the mark will be confusing to the public when singly presented.”) (internal

quotations omitted).

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Applying the factors in this manner, Mr. Kemp’s concession that Bumble Bee’s

mark is strong means that there must be greater degree of dissimilarity between the

senior mark and the offending mark. Compare General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co.,

824 F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Determining that a mark is weak means that

consumer confusion has been found unlikely because the mark’s components are so

widely used that the public can easily distinguish slight differences in the marks, even

if the goods are related.”) with Squirtco, 628 F. 2d at 1091 (“A strong and distinctive

trademark is entitled to greater protection than a weak or commonplace one.”). Also,

a greater level of dissimilarity is required because the products in this case are not

priced or sold in a manner that suggests a high level of consumer sophistication or

deliberation in the identification of product source. See First National Bank, in Sioux

Falls v. First National Bank, South Dakota, 153 F.3d 885, 889-90 (8th Cir. 1998)

(“[C]onsumers tend to exercise a relatively high degree of care in selecting banking

services. As a result, customers are more likely to notice what, in other contexts, may

be relatively minor differences in names.”); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman

Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1206 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[T]here is always less

likelihood of confusion where goods are expensive and purchased after careful

consideration.”); Electronic Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d

713, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[P]urchaser[] . . . sophistication is important and often

dispositive because ‘[s]ophisticated consumers may be expected to exercise greater

care.’”) (third bracket in original) (quoting Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision

v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 489 (1st. Cir. 1981)); Squirtco, 628 F.2d at 1091

(“‘[T]he kind of product, its cost and the conditions of purchase are important factors

in considering whether the degree of care exercised by the purchaser can eliminate

the likelihood of confusion which would otherwise exist.’”) (quoting Grotrian,

Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342

(2d. Cir. 1975)).

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In the appropriate case, minor differences in trade dress may provide a valid

basis for finding otherwise identical marks to be distinguishable. In General Mills,

824 F.2d at 627, for example, the court found that the mark “OATMEAL RAISIN

CRISP” was not likely to be confused with the mark “APPLE RAISIN CRISP” when

both marks were used on similar products. There, the underlying cereal products

were closely related to the commonly used descriptive terms in their respective

composite trademarks, such that the marks were weak. Id. at 626 (recognizing that

the highly descriptive nature of the mark “APPLE RAISIN CRISP” made it a weak

mark). Further, both parties used their marks in combination with highly distinctive

trade dress, namely, prominently displayed, widely recognized house marks. Id.

(describing trade dress that featured prominent displays of the house marks

“KELLOGGS” and “GENERAL MILLS”). 

Similarly in Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 830 (8th Cir.

1999), the court found “LEAN ’N TASTY” not confusingly similar to “LEAN

CUISINE,” both as applied to pre-packaged meals marketed as healthy or diet meals.

In Luigino’s, the only common ground between the marks was the descriptive word

“LEAN.” It would have been inappropriate to extend trademark protection in the

term “LEAN CUISINE” so broadly as to prohibit a competitor from employing the

descriptive term “LEAN” in combination with other terms as part of a composite

mark. Further, the court in Luigino’s specifically noted that consumers of specialty

health-food or diet items were likely to exercise greater care at the point of purchase

such that the conditions of purchase mitigated against a likelihood of confusion. Id.

at 831. Finally, as in General Mills, both parties’ products used trade dress that

employed prominent displays of their respective, well known house marks. Id. at

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As to the second Squirtco factor, then, we reject Mr. Kemp’s argument that

slight differences in trade dress such as type font, text color, and package art make

confusion unlikely. Bumble Bee’s mark and Mr. Kemp’s mark share a dominant

feature—the phrase Louis Kemp. Viewed in reference to the facts that Bumble Bee’s

mark is strong and likely consumers are not expected to exercise great scrutiny in the

purchase of low-price, supermarket items, we must conclude that the second

Squirtco factor, similarity of the marks, does not strongly support Mr. Kemp’s

position.4

 

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829. Accordingly, in both of these prior cases, unlike the present case, it was

particularly appropriate to emphasize the distinctions in trade dress since the marks

were weak, the additional trade dress was distinctive rather than descriptive, and, at

least in the case of Luigino’s, the consumers were presumed to exercise a high degree

of care in their purchases. 

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Turning to the third factor, the degree of competition, we note that the two

products, wild rice products and surimi-based products, were not in direct

competition. A showing of direct competition, however, is not required, and the

factor, “degree of competition” requires a broader examination of the products’

relationship in the market. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (providing for protection

against confusion regarding “origin, sponsorship, or approval”); Mutual of Omaha

Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that “[i]t is error to

assume that trademark law protects against use of a mark only on directly competitive

products” and that where “there was little or no direct competition . . . infringement

still could be found . . . for confusion, not competition, is the touchstone of trademark

infringement.”); Squirtco, 628 F.2d at 1091 (“Competitive proximity is one factor to

be considered, even though infringement may be found in the absence of direct

competition.”). Where products are wholly unrelated, this factor weighs against a

finding that confusion is likely. Where products are related, however, it is reasonable

for consumers to think that the products come from the same source, and confusion,

therefore, is more likely. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774

(8th Cir. 1994) (noting that protection extends “‘against use of [plaintiff’s] mark on

any product or service which would reasonably be thought by the buying public to

come from the same source, or thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or

sponsored by, the trademark owner’”) (quoting J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and

Unfair Competition § 24.03 (3d. 1992)). 

Here, the record clearly reflects a connection between the two products. Mr.

Kemp advocated the marketing of his rice products with fish and Bumble Bee

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promoted its surimi product for use with rice. Mr. Kemp’s products were intended

as side dishes, likely to be served with meat, fish, or poultry. Because direct

competition is not the only aspect of this inquiry (although a showing of direct

competition may increase the likelihood of confusion), proper application of this

factor requires exploration of the likelihood that consumers would draw a connection

between the two products and be confused as to the identities of their respective

sources. Here, the products were similarly marketed, similarly priced, and intended

for use as compliments to one another. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of

a finding that confusion was likely.

Turning to the fourth factor, the alleged infringer’s intent to pass off his goods

as those of the trademark owner, we believe the evidence supports only one

permissible view of Mr. Kemp’s admission, namely, his desire to cause consumers

to associate his brand with that of Bumble Bee. The evidence of this clear intention

to appropriate for his own benefit the considerable equity, i.e., the trademark

goodwill, of the LOUIS KEMP brand name was undisputed. Further, this intention

did not change over time. Rather, Mr. Kemp noted his intent in his solicitation letters

to Mr. Paulucci and again testified at trial that his subsequent, actual use of the name

was designed to take advantage of the investment Oscar Mayer and Tyson had made

in the mark. 

Rarely will a junior user admit such an intention. Mr. Kemp apparently did so

in this case because he believed contract rights entitled him to use the trademark

LOUIS KEMP. His subjective opinions regarding his contract rights, however, in no

way diminish the effect of his statement. He openly admitted his intention to market

his products to take advantage of the considerable equity of the Oscar Mayer and

Tyson investments. The only way to take advantage of this brand equity is to cause

consumers to mistakenly believe there is, at a minimum, an association between the

sources of the products.

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No party contemplated, much less used, a composite term that contained the

words “LOUIS KEMP” to market surimi-based seafood products—or any other food

products—prior to Oscar Mayer’s request that precipitated renegotiation of the

Agreement. Accordingly, no party enjoyed trademark rights related to the phrase

“LOUIS KEMP” before Oscar Mayer invested and developed its mark in association

with its surimi business. There are no claims before the court related to state law

rights of publicity nor claims that Mr. Kemp enjoyed celebrity status that would merit

protection of his personal name under such laws. Accordingly, when Mr. Kemp

referred to “the considerable equity” of the LOUIS KEMP brand name, the only

equity to which he could have been referring was the equity built by Bumble Bee’s

predecessors.

We cannot discount this intent based on the fact that Mr. Kemp believed the

contract entitled him to play on the goodwill of Bumble Bee’s marks. As noted, the

contract conditioned Mr. Kemp’s right to use a related mark upon Oscar Mayer’s

prior approval, which Mr. Kemp did not seek. Further, we cannot discount this intent

based on the fact that Mr. Kemp received advice of counsel and slightly modified his

presentation of his LOUIS KEMP mark. Discounting a showing of intent based on

minor changes in presentation is inappropriate because:

[f]ew businesspeople are foolhardy enough to be so blatant in their

attempt to increase profits. To find trademark infringement only by

exact identity and not where the junior user makes some slight

modification would be in effect to reward the cunning infringer and

punish only the bumbling one. 

J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23.20 (4th ed. 2002)

(citations and internal quotations omitted). Clearly, Mr. Kemp attempted to minimize

his legal risk. His desire to minimize his legal risk, however, cannot be equated with

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5

As noted previously, the only issue before us is the issue of infringement.

Based on the stipulation of the parties and the related California litigation, there is no

contractual right to use an infringing mark.

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a diminution of his desire to “take advantage of the considerable equity” of Bumble

Bee’s trademark.

It is important to note that intent as a Squirtco factor is relevant not because

trademark infringement requires intent, bad faith, or any other mens rea. Instead, this

Squirtco factor is relevant because it demonstrates the junior user’s true opinion as

to the dispositive issue, namely, whether confusion is likely. Accordingly, it is

irrelevant that he may have believed contract rights excused his use.5

 He adopted the

mark LOUIS KEMP specifically to take advantage of the “considerable equity”

Bumble Bee and its predecessors had built in the mark. He admitted this regarding

his prospective intentions in his letter to solicit Mr. Paulucci as a partner, and he

admitted this under examination regarding his intentions surrounding his actual use.

We believe this evidence permits only one possible conclusion, namely, that Mr.

Kemp believed consumers would associate his products with those of the senior user.

Accordingly, this factor weighs very strongly in favor of finding that confusion was

likely.

Finally, turning to the fifth factor, incidents of actual confusion, we cannot say

that the district court committed clear error in discounting the survey. The district

court acted well within its broad fact finding authority when it chose to discount the

survey evidence. We believe, however, that the undisputed testimony of Mr. Kemp’s

salesman for the wild rice products, Patrick Melby, that actual confusion existed

among sophisticated professional buyers, supports a finding of actual confusion.

Such buyers are individuals who make their living purchasing food products like

those of Bumble Bee and Mr. Kemp, and they may be presumed to exercise a high

standard of care. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d

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277, 293 (3d. Cir. 1991) (“[P]rofessional buyers, or consumers of very expensive

goods, will be held to a higher standard of care.”); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys.,

Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that buyers for professional and

institutional purposes were likely to be informed, deliberative buyers not easily

confused as to product source). As such, when even professional buyers are

confused, it serves as strong evidence that the average consumer, who exercises less

scrutiny, is likely to be confused. See Checkpoint Sys. v. Check Point Software

Tech., 269 F.3d 270, 285 (3d. Cir. 2001) (“[P]rofessionals or commercial buyers

familiar with the field . . . are sophisticated enough not to be confused by trademarks

that are closely similar. That is, it is assumed that such professional buyers are less

likely to be confused than the ordinary consumer.”) (quoting J. Thomas McCarthy,

Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 23:101 (4th ed. 2000)); see also; Perini Corp.

v. Perinie Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 128 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[I]n a market with

extremely sophisticated buyers, the likelihood of consumer confusion cannot be

presumed on the basis of the similarity in trade name alone.”).

The district court, as the fact-finder in this case, was entitled to discount Mr.

Melby’s testimony. We do not believe, however, that the district court’s opinion

contains a finding that Mr. Melby was non-credible. The district court merely found

that Mr. Melby’s testimony failed to demonstrate that instances of confusion were

“rampant.” Accordingly, the record contains undisputed testimony that there were

instances of actual confusion, even if those instances were not “rampant.” When, as

here, it is shown by an alleged infringer’s own salesman that even sophisticated

professional buyers experienced actual confusion, such evidence supports a finding

that confusion is likely. 

In summary, a balancing of the Squirtco factors support a finding that

consumer confusion was likely and Mr. Kemp’s use was infringement. Having found

infringement due to a likelihood of confusion, and there being no remedies for

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dilution separate from the available remedies for infringement, we need not address

the issue of dilution. The judgment of the district court is reversed and this case is

remanded for determination of an appropriate remedy.

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