Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-50338/USCOURTS-ca9-11-50338-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Osinger
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER OSINGER,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-50338

D.C. No.

2:10-cr-00758-ODW-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Otis D. Wright, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 10, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed June 4, 2014

Before: Susan P. Graber, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson;

Concurrence by Judge Watford

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2 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction and sentence for stalking

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A.

The panel held that because § 2261A proscribes harassing

and intimidating conduct, it is not facially invalid under the

First Amendment. The panel rejected the defendant’s

argument that the statute’s failure to define “harass” or

“substantial emotional distress” renders it unconstitutionally

vague.

The panel also rejected the defendant’s contention that

§ 2261A was unconstitutionally applied to his protected

speech, where the defendant engaged in a course of conduct,

unmistakably proscribed by the statute, with the intent to

harass and intimidate the victim and to cause her substantial

emotional distress, and where any related speech was integral

to the defendant’s criminal conduct and involved sexually

explicit publications concerning a private individual.

The panel held that the defendant was not entitled to a

downward adjustment premised on acceptance of

responsibility, and rejected a contention that a disparity with

the sentence imposed on a defendant who pled guilty in a

different stalking case rendered the sentence in this case

unreasonable.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 3

Concurring, Judge Watford wrote separately to add

thoughts on why the as-applied challenge fails, including that

the “speech integral to criminal conduct” exception to First

Amendment protection surely applies when the defendant

commits an offense by engaging in both speech and nonspeech conduct, and the sole objective of the speech is to

facilitate the defendant’s criminal behavior.

COUNSEL

Michael K. Cernyar, Long Beach, California, for DefendantAppellant.

André Birotte Jr., United States Attorney, Robert E. Dugdale,

Chief Criminal Division, Ryan White (argued), Assistant

United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Christopher Osinger (Osinger) challenges his

conviction for stalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. 

Osinger asserts a facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2261A as

unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to his

conduct.

Osinger also maintains that the district court’s sentence of

46 months’ imprisonment was unreasonable because his

acceptance of responsibility and a sentencing disparity

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4 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

warranted a more lenient sentence. We affirm Osinger’s

conviction and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Osinger was indicted for engaging in a course of

harassing and intimidating conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2261A(2)(A) and 2261(b)(5). The indictment alleged that

Osinger sent several threatening and sexually explicit text

messages, emails, and photographs of V.B., a former

girlfriend, to V.B., as well as to her co-workers and friends. 

The indictment also alleged that Osinger “used the Internet to

create a Facebook page in a name close to V.B.’s name” to

post “suggestive and explicit photos of V.B.” and “demeaning

statements, purportedly made by V.B. . . .”

Prior to trial, Osinger sought dismissal of the indictment,

asserting that 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A) was

unconstitutionally vague. The district court ruled that

18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A) was not unconstitutionally vague

and denied Osinger’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

At trial, V.B. testified that she was introduced to Osinger

through a mutual friend. Osinger subsequently became

V.B.’s roommate and they became romantically involved. 

During their nine-month relationship, V.B. allowed Osinger

to take nude photographs of her.

Osinger told V.B. that he had divorced his wife in 2005. 

V.B. eventually moved out of the apartment she shared with

Osinger and ended their relationship when she discovered that

Osinger was still married. V.B. did not provide Osinger with

her new address because she “didn’t want him to contact

[her].” Osinger contacted V.B.’s sister-in-law and told her

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 5

that he knew where V.B. lived and that “he wanted to be with

[V.B.].” According to V.B., Osinger “repossessed cars” and

“could easily find addresses . . .” After Osinger spoke with

V.B.’s sister-in-law, V.B. telephoned Osinger because she

“wanted him to stop looking for [her] family or friends, and

[she] wanted to hear what he had to say.”

Osinger later came to V.B.’s new residence in an attempt

at reconciliation. Osinger arrived in the “early hours of the

morning, like 1, 2 in the morning.” V.B. did not answer

when he knocked on her window or door because she “didn’t

want to speak to him.” Osinger also “came to [her] work a

few times.”

When V.B. eventually agreed to meet with Osinger, he

told her that he was getting a divorce. Osinger left copies of

divorce papers in V.B.’s mailbox, but V.B. doubted their

authenticity because they lacked the signature of Osinger’s

wife or “any court stamps.” V.B. informed Osinger that she

was not interested in continuing their relationship and moved

in with her sister. V.B. did not tell Osinger that she was

living with her sister and did not provide him with the

address. Nevertheless, Osinger called and texted V.B. and

eventually came to her sister’s home. V.B. informed him that

she was not interested in reviving their relationship.

After V.B. received an offer for a new position in

California, she informed Osinger that she was leaving Illinois. 

Osinger told her that “he would do anything for [them] to be

back together,” and was upset that V.B. left without saying

goodbye. V.B. did not provide her California address to

Osinger.

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6 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

Following her relocation to California, V.B. continued to

receive text messages from Osinger, including messages that

he wanted “one last chance.” V.B. contacted Osinger when

he stated that he would move to California. V.B. told Osinger

“to stop texting [her], to stop calling . . .”

V.B. continued to receive text messages from Osinger

despite her remonstrations. Considering the content of the

messages, V.B. inferred that Osinger had sexually explicit

videos of her. V.B. construed the text messages as “a threat.” 

She subsequently received a telephone call from an exboyfriend who informed her that “someone had posted a

Facebook page with nude pictures of [V.B.] and horrible

content . . .” When V.B. viewed the Facebook page, she

recognized the photographs as ones that Osinger had taken of

her. V.B. feared that her family might see the photographs,

as one of her cousins had already accepted the Facebook

posting.

V.B. contacted Carlos Enriquez, her supervisor, to assist

her in removing the Facebook page. V.B. was “crying

hysterically” and “could not believe what [Osinger] had done,

and [she] was just shocked.” Enriquez removed the Facebook

page and informed V.B. that he had been contacted by

another employee who had received “an e-mail through his

[company] web e-mail with nude pictures of [V.B.].” V.B.

received a telephone call from a former co-worker in Chicago

that “he had also received an e-mail with nude pictures.”

V.B. eventually reported the incidents to the Torrance

Police Department because she “was scared. [She] did not

know what else [Osinger] was going to try to do.” V.B.

ultimately obtained a restraining order against Osinger.

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 7

Enriquez corroborated V.B.’s testimony regarding her

emotional state and his assistance in removing the Facebook

page. Enriquez stayed with V.B. because she “was really

bad, still shaking and kind of . . . desperate.” Enriquez also

received an email at work “with some pictures and with really

bad content . . .” Enriquez contacted company headquarters

to have the email blocked. When Enriquez informed V.B.

about the email, she started to cry and shake.

Jason Roberts, V.B.’s former co-worker in Chicago,

testified that he “received some pretty disturbing e-mails” on

his corporate account. Roberts informed V.B., who “was

very, very disturbed, very upset. . . .”

Darek Pawelek, V.B.’s ex-boyfriend, testified that he

received a Facebook invite that he thought was from V.B.,

although the name was spelled differently. When Pawelek

informed V.B. of the Facebook page’s content, “[s]he got

really upset. She started crying, saying things like [she

didn’t] know why he is doing this. Why won’t he leave [her]

alone. . . .”

The jury found Osinger guilty of stalking in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(2)(A) and 2261(b)(5) as alleged in count

one of the indictment.

At sentencing, Osinger objected to the recommendation

from the probation officer that a downward departure for

acceptance of responsibility was unwarranted. Osinger also

asserted that a more lenient sentence was supported by the

27-month sentence of another defendant convicted of

violating 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. Osinger requested a six-month

prison sentence and twelve months in a halfway house.

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8 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

The district court calculated a base offense level of 18, an

adjusted offense level of 22, and a guidelines range of 46 to

57 months’ imprisonment. The district court rejected

Osinger’s request for a downward adjustment premised on

acceptance of responsibility. After considering the requisite

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court sentenced

Osinger to 46 months’ imprisonment, at the low end of the

guidelines range, and three years of supervised release.

Osinger filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is

reviewed de novo.” United States v. Berry, 683 F.3d 1015,

1020 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “We also review de

novo when a criminal statute is challenged for vagueness.” 

Id. (citation omitted).

“We review a sentence for both procedural error and

substantive reasonableness. . . .” United States v. Joseph,

716 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “We

review for clear error the district court’s finding that

[Osinger] did not accept responsibility for his crime.” United

States v. Ramos-Medina, 706 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir.), as

amended, cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 64 (2013) (citation omitted).

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 9

III. DISCUSSION

A. Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A1,2

1. Facial Challenge

Osinger contends that 18 U.S.C. § 2261A is facially

unconstitutional because it prohibits speech protected by the

 

1

 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A) provides:

Whoever . . . (2) with the intent — (A) to kill, injure,

harass, or place under surveillance with intent to kill,

injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial

emotional distress to a person in another State or tribal

jurisdiction or within the special maritime and

territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall be

punished as provided in section 2261(b) of this title.

 

2

 18 U.S.C. § 2261(b) provides:

A person who violates this section or section 2261A

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned — (1) for life

or any term of years, if death of the victim results;

(2) for not more than 20 years if permanent

disfigurement or life threatening bodily injury to the

victim results; (3) for not more than 10 years, if serious

bodily injury to the victim results or if the offender uses

a dangerous weapon during the offense; (4) as provided

for the applicable conduct under chapter 109A if the

offense would constitute an offense under chapter 109A

(without regard to whether the offense was committed

in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the

United States or in a Federal prison); and (5) for not

more than 5 years, in any other case, (6) Whoever

commits the crime of stalking in violation of a

temporary or permanent civil or criminal injunction,

restraining order, no-contact order, or other order

described in section 2266 of title 18, United States

Code, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less

than 1 year.

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10 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

First Amendment. Osinger also argues that 18 U.S.C.

§ 2261A(2)(A) is overly broad because it does not define

“substantial emotional distress” or “harassment.”3

“In a facial challenge, a statute is unconstitutionally vague

if it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair

notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it

authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory

enforcement. . . .” United States v. Harris, 705 F.3d 929, 932

(9th Cir.), as amended, cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1510 (2013)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although we

have not extensively addressed the First Amendment

implications of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A), other circuits have

rejected similar facial challenges.

For example, in United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849

(8th Cir. 2012), the Eighth Circuit observed that “[a]n

overbreadth challenge . . . will rarely succeed against a law or

regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or to

conduct necessarilyassociated with speech (such as picketing

or demonstrating).” Id. at 856 (citation, alterations, and

3

In conclusory fashion, Osinger also asserts that “the Indictment filed

in this case must be dismissed because it fails to state an offense.” 

However, Osinger has waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the

indictment as he provided no argument in support of this issue in his

opening brief. See Autotel v. Nev. Bell Tel. Co., 697 F.3d 846, 857 n.9

(9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1250 (2013) (“[T]he conclusory

statement in [the defendant’s] opening brief, unaccompanied by argument

or citation to the record, is insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal, and

we do not address it.”) (citations omitted). In any event, the indictment

sufficiently alleged the requisite elements to charge a violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2261A. See United States v. Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d 1253,

1261 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Generally, an indictment is sufficient so long as it

sets forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense. . . .”)

(citation omitted).

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 11

internal quotation marks omitted). “Section 2261A(2)(A) is

directed toward courses of conduct, not speech, and the

conduct it proscribes is not necessarily associated with

speech. . . .” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks

omitted). “Most, if not all, of the statute’s legal applications

are to conduct that is not protected by the First Amendment.” 

Id. (citation and alteration omitted). Additionally, “[t]he rare

application of the statute that offends the First Amendment

can still be remedied through as-applied litigation.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Because a

substantial number of the statute’s applications will not be

unconstitutional, [the Eighth Circuit] decline[d] to use the

strong medicine of overbreadth to invalidate the entire

statute.” Id. (citations, alteration, and internal quotation

marks omitted).

We agree with the Eighth Circuit’s rationale that, because

18 U.S.C. § 2261A proscribes harassing and intimidating

conduct, the statute is not facially invalid under the First

Amendment. In particular, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A specifically

criminalizes “a course of conduct that . . . causes . . .

substantial emotional distress to [the harassee].” 18 U.S.C.

§ 2261A(2)(B) (emphasis added). Additionally, 18 U.S.C.

§ 2266(2) provides that “[t]he term ‘course of conduct’ means

a pattern of conduct composed of 2 or more acts, evidencing

a continuity of purpose.” Thus, the proscribed acts are

tethered to the underlying criminal conduct and not to speech. 

Moreover, we concur in the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that,

“[b]ecause the statute requires both malicious intent on the

part of the defendant and substantial harm to the victim, it

is difficult to imagine what constitutionally-protected

speech would fall under these statutory prohibitions.” 

Petrovic, 701 F.3d at 856 (alterations and internal quotation

marks omitted); see also United States v. Sayer, No. 12-2489,

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12 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

– F.3d –, 2014 WL 1758453, at *7–*8 (1st Cir. May 2, 2014)

(rejecting facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A) on

similar grounds).4

Osinger’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A) is

unconstitutionally vague because it does not define “harass”

or “substantial emotional distress” is equally unavailing. 

“Vague statutes are invalidated for three reasons: (1) to avoid

punishing people for behavior that they could not have known

was illegal; (2) to avoid subjective enforcement of laws based

on arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by government

officers; and (3) to avoid any chilling effect on the exercise

of First Amendment freedoms. . . .” United States v.

Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1256 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). None of these reasons

applies here.

Contraryto Osinger’s argument, “harass” and “substantial

emotional distress” are not esoteric or complicated terms

devoid of common understanding. See, e.g., Adams v. Ford

Motor Co., 653 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Black’s

Dictionary[784 (9th ed. 2009)] defines harassment as ‘words,

conduct, or action (usu. repeated or persistent) that, being

4 Our decision in United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir.

2011), is not to the contrary. In that case, we held that, “[i]n order to

affirm a conviction under any threat statute that criminalizes pure speech,

we must find sufficient evidence that the speech at issue constitutes a true

threat . . .” Id. at 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Eighth

Circuit properly concluded in Petrovic, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A is targeted at

a course of conduct, not speech. See Petrovic, 701 F.3d at 856 (“Section

2261A(2)(A) is directed toward courses of conduct, not speech, and the

conduct it proscribes is not necessarily associated with speech. . . .”)

(alteration and internal quotationmarks omitted). Bagdasarian, therefore,

is inapplicable to our analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A.

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 13

directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes

substantial emotional distress in that person and serves no

legitimate purpose. . . .’”); see also Veile v. Martinson,

258 F.3d 1180, 1189 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing “substantial

emotional distress” to be “understood by persons of common

intelligence” to mean “mental distress, mental suffering, or

mental anguish, and includes depression, dejection, shame,

humiliation, mortification, shock, indignity, embarrassment,

grief, anxiety, worry, fright, disappointment, nausea, and

nervousness, as well as physical pain” in the context of a state

stalking statute) (citations omitted). As the Fourth Circuit

observed in United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300 (4th Cir.),

cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 757 (2012), “[w]hatever other

definitions one might hypothesize for the meaning of harass

or intimidate, there can be little doubt that [the defendant’s]

stalking falls within the conduct the statute is intended to

proscribe. [The defendant’s] own words evince his intent to

cause substantial emotional distress. . . . In short, we reject

[the defendant’s] contention that his stalking convictions

must be overturned on vagueness grounds.” Id. at 312

(citation, alteration, footnote reference, and internal quotation

marks omitted).

Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A requires that the defendant

act with the intent to harass, intimidate, or cause substantial

emotional distress. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A). This

scienter requirement, which the jury found had been proven

beyond a reasonable doubt, thoroughly undermines Osinger’s

contention that he was unable to discern that his harassment

of V.B. was proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. See United

States v. Jae Gab Kim, 449 F.3d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 2006), as

amended (“[A] scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s

vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice

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14 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed. . . .”)

(citation omitted).

Osinger’s threats, creation of a false Facebook page with

sexually explicit photographs of V.B., and emails to V.B.’s

co-workers and friends containing explicit photographs

evinced Osinger’s “intent to . . . cause substantial emotional

distress . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2). Thus, Osinger’s

unrelenting harassment and intimidation of V.B. was not

based on conduct that he “could not have known was illegal.” 

Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1256.5

5 Osinger contends that pending legislation to amend 18 U.S.C.

§ 2261A(2)(A) bolsters his vagueness challenge. Osinger relies on a

proposed bill entitled “Simplifying The Ambiguous Law, Keeping

Everyone Reliably Safe Act of 2011.” H.R. 196, 112th Cong. (2011). 

Notably, even if the proposed amendments were otherwise relevant to our

analysis, which we doubt, those proposals would not eliminate the terms

that Osinger challenges as vague. Indeed, if any implication can be

drawn, it is that the drafters did not consider the challenged terms “harass”

and “emotional distress” to be ambiguous. The proposed bill provides:

(a) Whoever, with intent to kill, physically injure,

harass, or intimidate a person, or place under

surveillance with the intent to kill, physically injure,

harass, or intimidate a person, travels in interstate or

foreign commerce or within the special maritime and

territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or enters or

leaves Indian country, and in the course of, or as a

result of, such travel- (1) causes or attempts to cause

bodily injury or serious emotional distress to a person

other than the person engaging in the conduct; or

(2) engages in conduct that would be reasonably

expected to cause the other person serious emotional

distress; shall be punished as provided in subsection

(c).

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 15

2. As-Applied Challenge

Osinger next contends that 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A) was

unconstitutionally applied to his protected speech.

“In an as-applied challenge, a statute is unconstitutionally

vague if it fails to put a defendant on notice that his conduct

was criminal. For statutes involving criminal sanctions the

requirement for clarity is enhanced.” Harris, 705 F.3d at 932

(citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Osinger’s as-applied challenge is unpersuasive given the

nature of the implicated speech. “The First Amendment

prohibits any law abridging the freedom of speech. However,

the Supreme Court has carved out some limited categories of

unprotected speech, including obscenity, defamation, fraud,

incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct.” United

States v. Meredith, 685 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

133 S.Ct. 536 (2012) sub. nom. Giordano v. United States

(citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“At issue here is the First Amendment exception that allows

the government to regulate speech that is integral to criminal

conduct. . . .” Id. at 819–20.

In Meredith, we considered whether the defendants’

convictions for advocacy of tax evasion violated the First

Amendment. See id. at 817. In addition to selling books

explaining how to avoid taxes, the defendants sold a

Id. (emphases added). Although the bill utilizes the term “serious

emotional distress” in lieu of “substantial emotional distress,” the

proposed legislation does not support Osinger’s vagueness challenge

given that Osinger’s proscribed course of conduct in threatening and

intimidating V.B. caused both serious and substantial emotional distress.

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16 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

particular type of financial trust “which they claimed was

exempt from taxes. . . .” Id. at 818. The defendants were

charged “with conspiring to defraud the United States by

impeding, impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful

functions of the IRS in the ascertainment, computation,

assessment, and collection of federal taxes, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 371. . . .” Id. In rejecting the defendants’ First

Amendment argument, we observed that “in those instances,

where speech becomes an integral part of the crime, a First

Amendment defense is foreclosed even if the prosecution

rests on words alone.” Id. at 820 (citation, alteration, and

footnote reference omitted). Because the defendants’ conduct

“involved far more than mere advocacy of tax evasion,” the

First Amendment was not implicated by the defendants’

“speech integral to criminal conduct.” Id. at 819, 823

(citation omitted).

Although Meredith implicitly undermines Osinger’s

argument that he engaged in protected speech, other circuits

have explicitly rejected as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C.

§ 2261A(2)(A). In Petrovic, the defendant sent the victim

text messages stating that he had sexually explicit images of

her, which the defendant subsequently mailed as postcards to

the victim’s family and workplace. See Petrovic, 701 F.3d at

852–53. The defendant also designed a website containing

links to the images. See id. at 853. In rejecting the

defendant’s as-applied challenge, the Eighth Circuit reasoned

that the defendant’s “communications fall outside the First

Amendment’s protection” because “[t]he communicationsfor

which [the defendant] was convicted under § 2261A(2)(A)

were integral to this criminal conduct as they constituted the

means of carrying out his extortionate threats. . . .” Id. at

854–55 (citation omitted).

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 17

In Shrader, the Fourth Circuit similarly rejected the

defendant’s as-applied challenge. In that case, the defendant

made a series of harassing phone calls to the victim and her

family. See Shrader, 675 F.3d at 304. The Fourth Circuit

observed that “[t]he statute contains three important elements. 

First, the defendant must possess either the intent to kill,

injure, harass, or place under surveillance with intent to kill,

injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial emotional

distress to a person in another State . . .” Id. at 309–10

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Second, the

defendant must pursue that intention through a course of

conduct, defined as a pattern of conduct composed of 2 or

more acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose, that makes use

of a facility of interstate commerce[.]” Id. at 310 (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted). “Finally, the

defendant’s conduct must in fact cause substantial emotional

distress to the intended victim or place that person in

reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury . . .” 

Id. (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks

omitted). Based on the defendant’s harassing and

intimidating conduct, the Fourth Circuit held that “the statute

clearly proscribed [the defendant’s] particular conduct in this

case. There can be little doubt that [the defendant’s] conduct

was harassing and intimidating . . .” Id. at 312. As a result,

the defendant’s “own words evince his intent to cause

substantial emotional distress . . .” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

We reach a similar conclusion in this case. Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A), Osinger engaged in a course of

conduct “with the intent . . . to . . . harass, or intimidate, or

cause substantial emotional distress to” V.B. V.B. told

Osinger repeatedly that she no longer wanted to be contacted

by him. Nonetheless, Osinger was unrelenting in his pursuit

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18 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

and harassment of her, including threatening text messages. 

Osinger designed a false Facebook page and sent emails to

V.B.’s co-workers containing nude photographs of V.B. Any

expressive aspects of Osinger’s speech were not protected

under the First Amendment because they were “integral to

criminal conduct” in intentionally harassing, intimidating or

causing substantial emotional distress to V.B. Meredith,

685 F.3d at 819–20. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A),

Osinger was on notice that his harassing and intimidating

conduct “was criminal.” Harris, 705 F.3d at 932.6

In the limited context of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, Osinger’s

speech is not afforded First Amendment protection for the

6

In United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 588 (D. Md. 2011),

the district court granted a motion to dismiss the indictment because

18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A) was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. 

However, Cassidy is entirely distinguishable from the present appeal. In

that case, the district court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2261A contravened the

First Amendment as applied because the victim was “a well-known

religious figure” and the defendant’s “Tweets and Blog posts about [the

victim] challenge[d] her character and qualifications as a religious leader.” 

Id. at 583 (citation omitted). “And, while [the defendant’s] speech may

have inflicted substantial emotional distress, the Government’s Indictment

. . . [was] directed squarely at protected speech: anonymous,

uncomfortable Internet speech addressing religious matters. . . .” Id.

Other district courts have distinguished Cassidy in rejecting similar

constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. See, e.g., United States

v. Sayer, Nos. 2:11-CR-113-DBH, 2:11-CR-47-DBH, 2012 WL1714746,

at *2–*3 (D. Me. May 15, 2012) (distinguishing Cassidy and concluding

that the defendants’ online posting of sexually explicit material and

harassment of the victim was not protected speech); United States v.

Shepard, No. CR 10-1032-TUC-CKJ, 2012 WL 1580609, at *5, (D. Ariz.

May 4, 2012) (holding that Cassidy was inapposite because the

defendant’s use of the internet to stalk the victim was not protected

speech).

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 19

additional reason that it involved sexually explicit

publications concerning a private individual. In Petrovic, the

Eighth Circuit observed that the victim was “a private

individual” and that the defendant’s “communications

revealed intensely private information about [the victim].” 

701 F.3d at 855 (citation omitted). The Eighth Circuit opined

that “the interstate stalking statute is viewpoint neutral. It

proscribes stalking and harassing conduct without making the

further content discrimination of proscribing only certain

forms of that conduct.” Id. at 855–56 (citation omitted). 

“[T]he intimately private facts and photographs revealed by

[the defendant] were never in the public domain before [the

defendant] began his campaign to humiliate [the victim].” Id.

at 856. Additionally, “the public has no legitimate interest in

the private sexual activities of [the victim] or in the

embarrassing facts revealed about her life,” and “the

information [the defendant] publicized to the communitywas

highly offensive.” Id. (citations omitted). “The

communications for which [the defendant] was convicted

under § 2261A(2)(A) may be proscribed consistent with the

First Amendment. The statute is not unconstitutional as

applied to [the defendant].” Id.

Osinger’s as-applied challenge is similarly unavailing

given his intent to harass and intimidate a private individual

by circulating sexually explicit publications that were never

in the public domain. Applying the logic of Petrovic and

Shrader, we reject Osinger’s as-applied challenge to

18 U.S.C. § 2261A.

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20 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

B. Osinger’s Sentence

1. Acceptance of Responsibility

Osinger asserts that the district court erred in denying his

request for a downward departure premised on acceptance of

responsibility. According to Osinger, he intended to plead

guilty and proceeded to trial only to preserve his

constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2261A.

“The Sentencing Guidelines allow district courts to grant

a two-level downward adjustment to a defendant who clearly

demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” 

Ramos-Medina, 706 F.3d at 940 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “The defendant bears the burden

of showing that he has accepted responsibility for his

actions.” Id. (citation omitted).

At trial, Osinger did not simply pursue his First

Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. Instead,

Osinger asserted that his actions were the legal equivalent of

“being prosecuted for ripping the label off a mattress. . . .” 

His counsel argued that Osinger was “charged with stalking

in the absence of evidence to prove it. There is no history of

any violence. There is no history of any threat of violence. 

There is no history that he ever waited outside her house. 

There is no history that he ever visited her in Los Angeles.” 

His counsel maintained that “[w]hat the government is asking

in this case is that the conviction rest solely on the fact that

somebody hurt somebody else’s feelings really,really badly.” 

Osinger also challenged the jurisdictional basis for the

charges by arguing that he thought that he was

communicating only with individuals in Chicago where

Osinger resided. Osinger asserted that there was no evidence

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 21

of any threats and that he did not direct the e-mails to V.B.,

as he sent them only to her co-workers. Osinger argued that

there was “[n]o evidence of repetitious conduct and no

evidence of malice. A love obsession is not malice. . . .” 

Finally, Osinger maintained that he was not guilty of stalking

because he did not contact V.B. after sending the pictures. 

“On this record, the district court did not clearly err in finding

that [Osinger’s] actions were inconsistent with acceptance of

responsibility. . . .” Ramos-Medina, 706 F.3d at 942.

In addition to challenging his guilt at trial, Osinger failed

to demonstrate the requisite contrition to warrant a downward

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. See United

States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557, 568 (9th Cir. 2004), as

amended (holding that the defendant “did not meet his burden

of demonstrating ‘genuine contrition for his acts’”) (citation

omitted). Osinger expressed that he “deeply regret[ted] his

conduct.” However, he conveyed his regrets in the context

that “as in many breakups things were said and done that

people regret. Here, Mr. Osinger said and did things out of

anger. . . .” Rather than directly accepting responsibility for

his conduct, Osinger intimated that his actions stemmed from

V.B.’s refusal to reconcile. Such equivocal expressions of

contrition “did not meet [the defendant’s] burden of

demonstrating genuine contrition for his acts,” and “it was not

clearly erroneous for the district court to deny downward

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.” Dhingra,

371 F.3d at 568 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

2. Sentencing Disparity

Finally, Osinger contends that his sentence was

unreasonable because another defendant received a more

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22 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

lenient sentence despite engaging in more extensive and

intrusive stalking. However, Osinger was not similarly

situated to the defendant who received a more lenient

sentence after pleading guilty in a different case. See United

States v. Espinoza-Baza, 647 F.3d 1182, 1195 (9th Cir. 2011)

(“It does not matter for the purposes of § 3553(a) that [the

defendant] can point to other criminal defendants who may

have received lighter sentences under materially different

circumstances. . . .”) (citation, alterations, and internal

quotation marks omitted). Osinger’s sentencing disparity

argument is undermined by his more extensive criminal

history. See id. (observing that the defendant was not

similarly situated to other defendants because “[t]here is

nothing in the record suggesting that these other defendants

had comparable criminal histories”) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, Osinger’s sentence was at the low end of the

guidelines range. See United States v. Green, 592 F.3d 1057,

1072 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We have trouble imagining why a

sentence within the Guidelines range would create a disparity,

since it represents the sentence that most similarly situated

defendants are likely to receive.”) (citation and alteration

omitted). We hold that Osinger’s sentence was procedurally

and substantively reasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

We adopt the reasoning articulated by the Eighth and

Fourth Circuits in Petrovic and Shrader and hold that

Osinger’s facial and as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C.

§ 2261A are unavailing. Osinger’s threatening messages to

V.B. and his sending of sexually explicit photographs to

V.B.’s co-workers and friends unquestionably evinced

Osinger’s intent to harass and intimidate V.B. and to cause

substantial emotional distress. Osinger’s course of conduct

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 23

was unmistakably proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, and any

related speech was not afforded First Amendment protection,

as it was integral to Osinger’s criminal conduct and involved

sexuallyexplicit publications concerning a private individual.

The district court’s sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment,

at the low end of the guidelines range, was reasonable

because Osinger was not entitled to any downward

adjustment premised on acceptance of responsibility or on

sentencing disparity.

AFFIRMED.

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree with my colleagues that Christopher Osinger’s

conviction and sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2261A

should be affirmed, notwithstanding his First Amendment

objections. I write separately to add a few additional

thoughts on why Osinger’s as-applied challenge fails.

I

I agree with the court that Osinger’s speech isn’t entitled

to First Amendment protection because it was “speech

integral to criminal conduct.” See United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice

Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). This exception to the First

Amendment has been and remains controversial; its

boundaries and underlying rationale have not been clearly

defined, leaving the precise scope of the exception unsettled. 

See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally

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24 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “SituationAltering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 Cornell

L. Rev. 1277, 1311–26 (2005). But whatever difficulties may

arise from application of the exception in other contexts, it

surely applies when the defendant commits an offense by

engaging in both speech and non-speech conduct, and the sole

objective of the speech is to facilitate the defendant’s criminal

behavior. In those circumstances, the defendant’s speech

loses whatever First Amendment protection it might

otherwise have enjoyed, even if the speech, considered in

isolation, would be fully protected.

That, in my view, is the proper reading of Giboney. 

There, a labor union engaged in non-speech conduct that

amounted to, as the Court later put it, “a secondary boycott

which a State had validly outlawed.” New York v. Ferber,

458 U.S. 747, 762 n.14 (1982). Specifically, the union

orchestrated a series of agreements among Kansas City ice

distributors under which they pledged not to sell ice to nonunion peddlers, conduct that violated Missouri’s anti-traderestraint law. Giboney, 336 U.S. at 492. When the lone

holdout distributor (Empire) refused to join the boycott, the

union “informed Empire that it would use other means at its

disposal to force Empire to come around to the union view.” 

Id. Union members began picketing Empire with placards

protesting its willingness to deal with non-union peddlers.

The “avowed immediate purpose of the picketing was to

compel Empire to agree to stop selling ice to nonunion

peddlers”—an agreement that would have been punishable as

a felony under Missouri law. Id. Empire sought an

injunction prohibiting the picketing.

Although the union was engaged in peaceful picketing

that “publicize[d] truthful facts about a labor dispute”—

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 25

speech which, standing on its own, would have been fully

protected under the First Amendment—the Court held that

the union’s speech could not be “treated in isolation.” Id. at

498. The union’s speech lost whatever First Amendment

protection it might otherwise have enjoyed, the Court

concluded, because it was “used as an integral part of conduct

in violation of a valid criminal statute,” and its “sole

immediate object” was to facilitate the union’s commission

of that offense. Id. That the union’s unlawful course of

conduct “was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by

means of language” mattered not for First Amendment

purposes. Id. at 502.

Osinger’s case fits comfortablywithin this formulation of

the exception for speech integral to criminal conduct. As in

Giboney, we’re dealing with a valid criminal statute: No one

disputes that, as a general matter, Congress has the power to

punish those who engage in interstate stalking. And the court

properly rejects Osinger’s facial challenge to the particular

variant of that crime at issue here—engaging in a course of

conduct intending to harass or inflict substantial emotional

distress on a person in another State. 18 U.S.C.

§ 2261A(2)(A). As I’ll sketch out below, Osinger committed

the crime of interstate stalking by engaging in a course of

conduct that consisted of both speech and non-speech

conduct. True, Osinger engaged in some speech that,

considered in isolation, might have been entitled to First

Amendment protection. But as the court correctly holds, that

speech lost whatever protection it might have enjoyed

because its “sole immediate object” was to facilitate his

commission of the stalking offense. Giboney, 336 U.S. at

498.

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26 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

II

Like many stalking offenses, this one began with a failed

relationship. The victim in this case, V.B., broke up with

Osinger when she discovered that he was married to another

woman. A few months after V.B. ended their relationship,

Osinger began showing up uninvited at V.B.’s home. On

multiple occasions, he arrived around 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. and

telephoned her or knocked at her window or door. V.B.

refused to speak with him, but Osinger continued to make

unwanted visits to her home anyway. He also appeared

several times at the restaurant where V.B. worked. After

these encounters, V.B. moved to another neighborhood,

hoping that Osinger’s unwanted visits to her home, at least,

would stop.

They didn’t. As a repossession agent, Osinger could

easily get addresses for people he wanted to find, and he

successfully tracked V.B. down at her new home. The two

briefly reconciled, but that ended when V.B. concluded that

Osinger had given her fraudulent divorce papers and was

seeing other women. After ending their relationship for the

final time, V.B. moved in with her sister, hoping Osinger

wouldn’t be able to find her there. But despite V.B.’s

decision to conceal her new address from Osinger, he

surprised her by showing up at her sister’s apartment. He

also called her and sent her text messages. V.B. responded by

telling Osinger their relationship was over.

After a year of dealing with Osinger’s harassing behavior,

V.B. moved from Illinois to California, in part to get away

from him. She didn’t tell Osinger where she was moving,

and she didn’t give him her new address. For months, she

had no direct contact with him. V.B. appeared to have made

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 27

a clean break: She had a new job, a new home, and what she

believed was a fresh start with Osinger out of her life.

Then, out of the blue, Osinger started contacting V.B.

again. Over the course of two days, she received

approximately 40 text messages from him. The messages

started out with declarations of love, but they quickly turned

nasty—e.g., “You truly are the Devil.. I hate you I HATE

U.”—when V.B. made it clear that she would not give him

another chance. From there, Osinger’s messages took on a

threatening tone:

• Trust me after this weeknd ur going to feel like I ass

FUKD U.

• Am going to make sure u fucking hate me. After this

weeknd.

• So buckle up. This ride isn’t over just yet!!! . . .

• If I was you I get a big bottle. To drink. Ur going to

need it.

• So enjoy... What’s to come.

• [A]m about to pull the rug from rite under ur sexxy lil

feet!!!

That weekend, Osinger made good on his threats. V.B.

got a call from an ex-boyfriend who told her that he had

received a “friend” request from what appeared to be a fake

Facebook account set up under her name (with a minor

spelling error). When V.B. accessed the Facebook page, she

was horrified by what she saw. Someone—Osinger, it turned

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28 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

out—had posted over 30 photos of V.B., many of them

sexuallyexplicit, organized into two albumstitled “WHORE”

and “WHORE2.” Some of the photos showed V.B. topless or

bottomless. Others showed her partially or fully nude and

masturbating. Still others showed her performing oral sex. 

The statements posted on the page, purportedly made by

V.B., included: “I like to go out and be the whore I am I uslly

get a job and fuck my bosses rite now I work for [company

name redacted] look me up pass my pix around . . . I just

move to [city redacted],” and “if you want video,, just send

me ur email.” Osinger sent “friend” requests to V.B.’s family

members and friends to encourage them to view the Facebook

page.

V.B. immediately called her boss to enlist his help in

taking the Facebook page down before any more of her

friends or family members saw it. During that call, V.B.’s

boss told her that one of her co-workers, who also happened

to be V.B.’s roommate, had just received a disturbing email

sent to his company account. The email, sent by Osinger,

stated that he knew the recipient was working with V.B.,

offered supposed “tips” on what to do if the recipient wanted

to sleep with V.B., and ended by saying, “if you want video

send a mesg back I got tons.” The email attached some of the

photos Osinger had posted on the Facebook page, depicting

V.B. partially or fully nude and performing oral sex. Osinger

later sent the same email, lewd photos included, to V.B.’s

boss and one of V.B.’s former co-workers in Chicago, before

the company’s IT department blocked Osinger’s email

address.

After learning about the fake Facebook page and the

disturbing emails Osinger had sent to her co-workers, V.B.

was understandably distraught. As she testified at trial, “I

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 29

was scared. I did not know what else he was going to try to

do.” V.B. quickly sought and received a restraining order

against Osinger.

III

As these facts show, Osinger engaged in a course of

conduct that amounted to interstate stalking. It began in

Illinois when he harassed V.B. by repeatedly showing up at

her home and workplace, despite her efforts to avoid him. It

continued after she moved to California, initially through a

string of unwelcome and implicitly threatening text messages,

and then through a fake Facebook page and emails sent to

V.B.’s co-workers.

The text messages, emails, and Facebook page constitute

speech that, considered in isolation, might have been entitled

to First Amendment protection. I say “might” because the

notion that any of Osinger’s speech should receive full First

Amendment protection is certainly debatable. The text

messages quoted above were sent only to V.B., an unwilling

listener, with no apparent purpose other than to harass or

frighten her. See Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs.

One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and

“Cyberstalking,” 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 731, 742–43 (2013). 

They formed part of the basis for Osinger’s prosecution not

because of any expressive idea they communicated, see Saxe

v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 208 (3d Cir.

2001), but rather because of the “implicit threat of conduct”

they contained. Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll.

Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 2010). Still, there is no

categorical exception to the First Amendment for harassing

or offensive speech, id. at 708, and it’s hard to say that the

text messages rise to the level of “true threats” under Virginia

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30 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003), the closest recognized

exception, given their content and the absence of any history

of violence between Osinger and V.B. With respect to the

emails and Facebook page, they don’t fall within any

currently recognized exception either; the Supreme Court has

left unresolved whether the First Amendment protects

unauthorized disclosure of intensely private facts about a

purely private figure. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,

383 n.7 (1967); cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217

(2011) (suggesting that highly offensive speech on matters of

purely private concern might not be insulated from civil

liability). All of this is simply a long way of saying that we

have to assume Osinger engaged in at least some speech that

could be constitutionally protected.

None of that speech is entitled to constitutional protection

here, however, because all of it falls within the exception for

speech integral to criminal conduct. Osinger used the text

messages, emails, and Facebook page “as an integral part of

conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute,” Giboney,

336 U.S. at 498—namely, his ongoing campaign to harass

V.B. through repeated unwanted contacts. Unable to harass

her in person after she left Illinois, he used speech to continue

the campaign. See John B. Major, Note, Cyberstalking,

Twitter, and the Captive Audience: A First Amendment

Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 117, 126

(2012). Because the “sole immediate object” of Osinger’s

speech was to facilitate his commission of the interstate

stalking offense, that speech isn’t entitled to constitutional

protection. Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498.

What makes this a straightforward case is the fact that

Osinger committed the offense by engaging in both speech

and unprotected non-speech conduct. For the speech-

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UNITED STATES V. OSINGER 31

integral-to-criminal-conduct exception to apply, the conduct

need not have been criminal on its own; it’s enough if the

conduct and speech together “constituted a single and

integrated course of conduct, which was in violation of [a]

valid law.” Id. Here, the non-speech conduct consisted of inperson harassment, which, together with the text messages,

emails, and Facebook page, violated § 2261A(2). In other

cases the non-speech conduct might consist of categorically

unprotected speech, like the extortionate threats in United

States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 847, 855 (8th Cir. 2012), or noncommunicative aspects of speech, like repeated unwanted

telephone calls that are harassing due to their sheer number

and frequency. See Gormley v. Dir., Conn. State Dep’t of

Probation, 632 F.2d 938, 941–42 (2d Cir. 1980).

Cases in which the defendant’s harassing “course of

conduct” consists entirely of speech that would otherwise be

entitled to First Amendment protection are less

straightforward. The Court in Giboney made clear that the

union’s picketing lost its First Amendment protection only

because the union was “doing more than exercising a right of

free speech or press.” 336 U.S. at 503. If a defendant is

doing nothing but exercising a right of free speech, without

engaging in any non-speech conduct, the exception for speech

integral to criminal conduct shouldn’t apply. Instead, when

pure speech is involved, the Court has suggested that the

government’s ability “to shut off discourse solely to protect

others from hearing it” depends on “a showing that

substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an

essentially intolerable manner.” Cohen v. California,

403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). It’s unclear whether this standard

would apply in a § 2261A prosecution in which the defendant

caused someone substantial emotional distress by engaging

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32 UNITED STATES V. OSINGER

only in otherwise protected speech. That is a question whose

resolution we wisely leave for another day.

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