Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06013/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06013-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
T. C. Martin
Appellee
Edward Michael McConnell
Appellant
United States Parole Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

" 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

EDWARD MICHAEL McCONNELL, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED 

Uoited Scitet Court of Appea,Is 

Tenth Circuit 

JUL 17 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

T. C. MARTIN, Warden, and 

the UNITED STATES PAROLE 

COMMISSION, 

No. 89-6013 

(U.S.D.C. No. CIV-88-1209-W) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

Respondents-Appellees. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BRORBY, SETH and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner McConnell appeals from the district court's denial 

of his petition for habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2241. McConnell has sought a 10-month reduction in the 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6013 Document: 010110038693 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 1 
aggregate sentence he is currently serving for additional time he 

previously served in prison on a parole violator term; the 

additional time served was due to an untimely discovered error in 

the calculation of his salient factor score under the Federal 

Sentencing Guidelines. McConnell makes several claims of error in 

the proceedings before the United States Parole Commission 

(Commission), the Regional Commissioner, the National 

Commissioners, and the National Appeals Board (Board). For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment rendered in the 

proceedings below. 

In 1974, while on parole from a prior conviction for bank 

robbery, McConnell violated parole by committing the following 

offenses: conspiracy to distribute heroin; conspiracy to commit 

bank robbery; in 1975, McConnell unlawfully possessed a firearm, 

and committed the offense of escape--guilty pleas were entered on 

these offenses. In 1981, McConnell was paroled from the 

aggregated sentence of 17 years. In 1985, McConnell once again 

violated parole by being convicted on guilty pleas for possession 

by a felon of a firearm (UZI semi-automatic rifle) and ammunition, 

possession of cocaine, and possession of marijuana. By Notice of 

Action dated May 22, 1986, on a combined initial/dispositional 

parole revocation hearing, the Commission assigned a presumptive 

parole date of October 9, 1987. McConnell did not appeal that 

decision. 

On June 25, 1986, the Institution Discipline Committee (IDC) 

found McConnell guilty of prison misconduct; he was involved in a 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-6013 Document: 010110038693 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 2 
conspiracy to introduce narcotics of unknown weight and purity 

into the prison, and had made multiple bribes to a staff 

correctional officer to assist in the scheme. The record 

indicates that an investigation revealed other inmates also were 

participating in the distribution of the drugs over a period of 

time in 1985 and 1986, and that a female visitor of McConnell's 

was supplying the drugs to the correctional officer. Payments 

were made to a place outside the institution. On July 10, 1986, 

the IDC found McConnell guilty of a second disciplinary 

infraction--the unauthorized use of narcotics, based upon 

laboratory tests of a urine specimen which tested positive for 

cocaine metabolite and THC (marijuana). In light of this new 

adverse information, the Commission ordered reopening of 

McConnell's case and ordered that his presumptive parole date be 

retarded; there is no dispute that a rescission hearing was 

scheduled for the next appropriate docket. 

In September 1987 McConnell received a rescission hearing, 

and by Notice of Action dated October 26, 1987, the National 

Commissioners ordered rescission of the presumptive parole date of 

October 9, 1987, and continued petitioner to a presumptive parole 

date of February 1, 1994. This decision required McConnell to 

serve an additional 76 months. McConnell appealed the decision to 

the Board, and it affirmed. However, it modified some of the 

reasons in light of ,its finding that McConnell's salient factor 

score for the parole violation addressed in the May 22, 1986 

Not1ce of Action was in error and that a lower guideline range was 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-6013 Document: 010110038693 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 3 
applicable. However, the Board noted that immediate release was 

not warranted because of his commission of serious rescission 

behavior, i.e., new criminal conduct extending into the community 

(bribery of correctional officer/introduction of narcotics into 

prison), and the use of narcotics in prison. The Board also 

affirmed the decision to go above the rescission behavior 

guidelines, agreeing with the National Commissioners that 

McConnell was a poorer risk than indicated by his salient factor 

score, a score based on two prior parole violations and the fact 

that he committed serious crimes in the community, some of which 

were within 10 months following his first parole in 1974. 

McConnell then sought habeas corpus relief in the federal 

district court from the penalty imposed for the substantive 

offenses, his parole violations, the prison misconduct, and from 

the Board's refusal to 11 correct 11 the error in his initial salient 

factor score by giving him a 10-month reduction in the aggregate 

sentence imposed. The district court denied McConnell's petition, 

and this appeal followed. 

This court reviews the denial of a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus de novo. See Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885, 888 (10th 

Cir.). However, the decisions of the Parole Commission are 

reviewed only to determine whether there is a rational basis in 

the record f o r the Commission's conclusions embodied in the 

statement of reasons. See Misasi v. United States Parole Comm'n, 

835 F.2d 754 (10th Cir.). 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-6013 Document: 010110038693 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 4 
McConnell asserts that the district court erred in upholding 

the Commission's refusal to rectify an excessive initial 

assessment by crediting his current sentence with a 10-month 

reduction for time previously served as a result of error in the 

initial determination of his salient factor score. He submits 

that this is repeated punishment for the same conduct and, 

therefore, violative of due process. The district court concluded 

that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 

grant McConnell credit for the additional 10 months previously 

served; the error was not discovered until after the otherwise 

applicable guideline range and original presumptive parole date 

had passed, and McConnell had committed serious rescission 

behavior, some extending into the community. 

We find no basis for relief in McConnell's assertion that the 

failure to discover the error in a timely fashion was the failure 

of the Commission, nor have we been cited to any authority which 

would require reversal on that basis. To the contrary, the Second 

Circuit held in Bryant v. Warden, Metropolitan Correctional 

Center, 776 F.2d 394 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1023, that 

a prisoner who, due to error by the Parole Commission, served 

almost 10 months additional time on a parole violator term was not 

entitled to "bank" the extra months and then draw on the "banked" 

time to offset punishment imposed for subsequent parole violations 

and future crimes. 

To require credit be given for additional time previously 

served due to error would encourage violations of prison rules 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-6013 Document: 010110038693 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 5 
without fear of incurring additional time in confinement. See 

Bryant, 776 F.2d at 397. In Bowen v. Murphy, 693 F.2d 104, 105 

(10th Cir.), we held that a prisoner is not entitled to credit on 

sentence being served for time served on sentences imposed 

previously on convictions ultimately vacated. We noted that this 

request for credit on a future unrelated sentence for a crime not 

yet perpetrated at the time of the previous void sentence would 

result in allowing convicted individuals to establish a line of 

credit for future crimes, giving them a sense of immunity and an 

incentive to engage in criminal conduct. See also Johnson v. 

Riveland, 855 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir.). We believe this rationale is 

equally applicable to the case at bar. 

McConnell also asserts that "banking" time is not possible 

under the circumstances of this case. We have examined his "time" 

argument (or sequence of events) and his point that there was no 

release from confinement and find them without merit. Bryant, 776 

F.2d 394; Bowen, 693 F.2d 104. 

The time McConnell is currently serving was the result of the 

prison misconduct found by the IDC. The fact that the allegations 

of misconduct were not the subject of complaint or conviction is 

not a basis for relief because 28 C.F.R. § 2.34(c) provides that 

the Commission may rely upon IDC findings regarding prison 

misconduct as conclusive evidence of guilt. See also Arias v. 

United States Parole Comm'n, 648 F.2d 196 (3d Cir.) (Commission 

may consider information other than that underlying conviction). 

-6-

Appellate Case: 89-6013 Document: 010110038693 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 6 
Thus, McConnell's current incarceration is based on a 

separate and independent cause of confinement notwithstanding that 

there was no release in the interim, and no formal conviction on 

the misconduct found by the IDC. Banking time is not an 

inapplicable concept in this case, and McConnell's assertion that 

reliance on Bowen and Bryant is misplaced is without merit. 

And, despite McConnell's contrary assertion, Mcclanahan v. 

Mulcrome, 636 F.2d 11 90 (10th Cir.), does not hold that 

disciplinary infractions are not "new information" for purposes of 

reopening a case by the Commission to reconsider a presumptive 

parole date. In fact, in that case we affirmed the Commission's 

view that a case may be reopened on the basis of "new information" 

upon the discovery by the Commission of an error in the initial 

determination of the severity rating for the offense. 

McConnell also contends that the Commission erred in 

determining the penalty for the Bribery/Introduction of Narcotics 

misconduct. He argues that the guidelines at 28 C.F.R. 

§ 2.36(a)(2)(ii), "New Criminal Behavior in a Prison Facility," 

should have been used rather than§ 2.36(a)(3), "New Criminal 

Behavior in the Community." McConnell's argument is based in 

large part on the examples for use listed in§ 2.36(a)(3); 

however, McConnell has improperly viewed the examples as 

limitations on the use of that provision. Indeed, as McConnell 

notes in his brief, the impact of the prison misconduct on the 

community must be considered. We disagree with McConnell's view 

that his misconduct had no impact on the community, and no victim 

-7-

Appellate Case: 89-6013 Document: 010110038693 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 7 
outside the prison. In fact, his bribery of a correctional 

officer in order to introduce narcotics into the prison for 

distribution helped foster and perpetuate the illegal drug market 

in the community, and by its nature necessarily required illegal 

drug transactions to occur in the community. Surely there can be 

no doubt that bribing an officer to bring drugs into the prison 

from outside, together with the payment of monies to an address 

outside the prison, is conduct which goes beyond the prison 

boundaries. We find no abuse of discretion in the Commission's 

use of§ 2.36(a)(3) to determine the penalty for the misconduct. 

There was no due process violation in the imposition of a 

penalty for prison misconduct in the absence of complaint or 

indictment, trial, and sentencing. Although a prisoner has the 

right to an opportunity to respond to the charges against him, 

this does not equate with the right to a trial. McConnell's 

argument not only overlooks the fact that an inmate does not enjoy 

the full panoply of rights available to those who have not yet 

been adjudicated guilty of criminal behavior, but also ignores the 

provisions of 28 C.F.R. § 2.34(c) as noted above. McConnell 

received copies of the IDC findings and the misconduct report 

prior to the rescission hearing. Thus, he was apprised of the 

allegations and had an opportunity to respond. 

McConnell also claims that the district court erred in 

affirming the Commission's decision to impose a period of 

incarceration above the guideline range for the prison misconduct. 

He submits that the circumstances given as "good cause" for the 

-8-

Appellate Case: 89-6013 Document: 010110038693 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 8 
decision above the guidelines were first announced at the Regional 

Commissioner's review of the rescission hearing, and were not 

mentioned in the September 1987 rescission hearing. McConnell 

thus asserts that he was denied the opportunity to challenge the 

grounds given to justify the sanction imposed. McConnell also 

submits that the Commission improperly considered information that 

had been presented previously and was not then considered 

sufficient to warrant a penalty above the guidelines. 

McConnell refers to Nunez-Guardado v. Hadden, 722 F.2d 618 

(10th Cir.), for a statement of what will satisfy the "good cause" 

requirement for parole decisions above the guidelines. The record 

in this case supports the determination to impose a sentence above 

the guideline range. We have described above the drug 

distribution plan in the prison and the bribes. These facts 

demonstrate a substantial degree of planning in the continuing 

criminal enterprise operated by McConnell, sufficient to come 

within the language of the legislative history considered in 

Hadden. Moreover, the district court correctly noted that the 

salient factor score does not take into account multiple parole 

violations, which are present in this case, even though it does 

consider whether the current offense behavior was a violation to 

parole. 

McConnell argues that the Commission previously did not 

consider the 1974 offenses as warranting a sentence above the 

gu i delines, and therefore they cannot be used to justify the 

upward departure following the prison misconduct determinations. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 89-6013 Document: 010110038693 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 9 
The Commission has broad power to consider matters other than the 

conviction when making its parole decisions. Arias, 648 F.2d 196. 

The Commission has discretion to set a presumptive parole date 

"above the appropriate guideline, and it does not lose this 

authority simply because it previously chose not to exceed higher 

guidelines that had been incorrectly applied to the prisoner." 

Patterson v. Gunnell, 753 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.) (citations 

omitted). 

In light of McConnell's multiple parole violations, his 

consistent involvement with firearms and narcotics, and his 

demonstrated willingness to engage in criminal conduct whether on 

parole or in the prison, we cannot say the decision to impose a 

penalty above the guideline was unwarranted, or otherwise an abuse 

of discretion. McConnell's heavy reliance on Schiselman v. 

United States Parole Comm'n, 858 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir.), is 

misplaced. 

Also on the issue of an above-the-guidelines parole decision, 

we find no error in the consideration of the type of firearm in 

dec i d i ng to go above the guidelines, rather than the mere fact of 

possession of a firearm. Because McConnell's possession of a 

firearm was considered at the initial parole determination, 

McConnell was sufficiently apprised of the information which would 

be presented for review on appeal from the Commission's decision. 

In imposing a penalty above the guidelines, the National 

Commissioners did not err in considering the type of weapon 

involved as a related but distinct consideration from the mere 

-10-

Appellate Case: 89-6013 Document: 010110038693 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 10 
fact of possession of a firearm. In addition, the reasons for the 

decision were specified and McConnell had the opportunity to 

appeal; thus, he was not denied due process. 

McConnell acknowledges that four or more prior convictions 

warrant a "0" rating, and he had four prior convictions preceding 

the current offense. Thus, we find no merit to the argument 

advanced by McConnell which would warrant reversal of the result 

reached below. 

McConnell's final claim of error involves the penalty 

assessed for his unauthorized use of narcotics after his urine 

specimen tested positive for cocaine metabolite and THC. 

McConnell's claim that the infraction occurred and he was found 

guilty of it by the IDC at a time when the penalty was 0-4 months 

is undisputed. However, no penalty was imposed for the infraction 

until 14 months after the IDC had determined McConnell's guilt, 

during which time the penalty for the infraction had been 

increased to a range of 0-8 months. McConnell was ultimately 

given the eight-month maximum for this institutional rule 

infraction. 

We recognize that§ 2.34(a) states there should be a prompt 

report of prison misconduct to the Regional Commissioner for 

prisoners who have a set presumptive parole date. We also note 

that the district court found the "notification to the Regional 

Commissioner was markedly less than prompt." Nevertheless, we 

believe the district court correctly determined this was not a 

sufficient basis for granting habeas corpus relief. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 89-6013 Document: 010110038693 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 11 
The district court's memorandum opinion points out there is 

no dispute that the rescission hearing was scheduled for the next 

appropriate docket following the order to reopen McConnell's case, 

and that McConnell had notice and the opportunity to be heard, at 

which he denied all allegations underlying the misconduct reports. 

We agree with the district court's assessment that the 

notification of misconduct was "less than prompt," but the court 

correctly noted that the guidelines are not law for purposes of 

the prohibition against ex post facto application of the higher 

range which came into effect after McConnell was found guilty of 

misconduct but before he was sanctioned therefor. See Resnick v. 

United States Parole Comm'n, 835 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir.). 

As a final matter, there is a pending motion by McConnell to 

supplement the record on appeal to add the affidavit of James Beck 

in support of his claim that the rescission penalty for the prison 

misconduct should have been determined pursuant to 

§ 2.36(a)(2)(ii), rather than§ 2.36(a)(3). However, we 

determined above that there was no error in the use of 

§ 2.36(a)(3), and thus deny McConnell's motion to supplement the 

record. 

The judgment rendered in the proceedings below is AFFIRMED in 

its entirety. 

-12-

Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-6013 Document: 010110038693 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 12