Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03005/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03005-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Army
Respondent
Diane King
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DIANE KING,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3005

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-1221-12-0143-W-3.

______________________ 

Decided: March 4, 2015

______________________ 

DIANE KING, Prattville, AL, pro se.

EMMA BOND, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC for respondent. Also represented by JOYCE R. BRANDA,

ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., ALLISON KIDD-MILLER. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

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2 KING v. ARMY

PER CURIAM. 

Diane King appeals from a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”) denying King’s 

request for corrective action under the Whistleblower 

Protection Act (“WPA”). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In May 2011, Ms. King was terminated from her position as a Medical Technologist at the Winn Army Community Hospital. The termination, which occurred during 

King’s one-year probationary period, was for “Conduct 

Unbecoming a Federal Employee.” Appellee’s App. 42 

(hereinafter “App.”). 

Ms. King filed an individual right of action appeal to 

the Board, arguing that she was terminated in retaliation 

for making protected disclosures in violation of the WPA. 

Specifically, Ms. King argued that she disclosed (1) that 

another employee improperly put labels on test tubes that 

were supposed to be anonymous and (2) that instructions 

contained in the Blood Bank Procedure manual could lead 

to patient death. The administrative judge (“AJ”) held 

that Ms. King had established a prima facie case of whistleblowing reprisal. However, the AJ also determined that 

the agency had established by clear and convincing evidence that it would have terminated Ms. King even in the 

absence of her whistleblowing. The AJ denied Ms. King’s 

individual right of action appeal. 

The full Board denied review. The Board concluded 

that “ample evidence” supported Ms. King’s termination. 

Id. at 11. The full Board also concluded that Ms. King “did 

not identify any direct or circumstantial evidence of 

retaliatory animus, proffered no evidence of retaliatory 

motive, presented no evidence about any other probationers who behaved as she did and were not terminated, did 

not support her allegation that the agency’s witnesses

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KING v. ARMY 3

were untruthful, and offered no evidence of collusion.” Id. 

at 12.

Ms. King seeks review of the Board decision. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

Our review of the Board’s decision is limited in scope. 

We may only set aside an agency’s “action, findings, or 

conclusions” if they are “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) 

obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).

The question here is whether the agency properly established “by clear and convincing evidence that it would 

have taken the same personnel action in the absence of [a 

protected] disclosure.” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2). We have 

identified three factors relevant to this determination: (1) 

“the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its 

personnel action”; (2) “the existence and strength of any 

motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who

were involved in the decision”; and (3) “any evidence that 

the agency takes similar actions against employees who 

are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly 

situated.” Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318, 1323

(Fed. Cir. 1999). 

With respect to the first Carr factor, the AJ found “evidence of serious performance and behavior problems . . . .” App. 21. When removing Ms. King, the agency 

stated that she “ha[d] been discourteous to [her] coworkers and [she] ha[d] disrupted the work environment.” 

Id. at 42. Ms. King had failed a competency exam, had 

numerous conflicts with her trainers and other coworkers, and had refused to follow directions. At least 

three of her co-workers came to Ms. King’s supervisor to 

express concerns that Ms. King created a hostile work 

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4 KING v. ARMY

environment. Ms. King admitted that she had called a coworker a compulsive liar, rabid, and dysfunctional, and

accused that co-worker of suffering from delusions. The 

AJ concluded that 

no reasonable agency management official would 

tolerate a probationary employee who cannot get 

along with coworkers, who fails to effectively 

communicate, and who creates an unpleasant 

work environment for her coworkers, much less 

one who speaks disrespectfully of her supervisors 

and coworkers while seemingly unable or unwilling to learn the skills necessary to perform successfully in her new job.

Id. at 22. Ms. King challenges the AJ’s findings, including 

his credibility findings. The Board’s findings are amply 

supported by the evidence.

As to the second Carr factor, the AJ concluded that 

Ms. King “presented no evidence to show that either [her 

direct supervisor or the management official taking the 

personnel action] had any motive to take a reprisal action 

against her.” Id. at 21. Ms. King argues that her entire 

chain of command met and decided to terminate her 

employment. But this does not point to a motive by the 

decision-makers to retaliate under the second factor. The 

AJ noted that both Ms. King’s direct supervisor and the 

management official who took the personnel action had 

viewed Ms. King’s whistleblowing favorably. 1

1 King further argues that the Board ignored the 

“cat’s paw” issue, as described in cases like Staub v. 

Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190, 1192 (2011)—

whether the deciding official was improperly influenced 

by someone with animus. But there is no evidence that 

someone with animus against Ms. King had influence 

over the decision-makers.

 

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KING v. ARMY 5

With respect to the third Carr factor, the AJ stated

that Ms. King “[wa]s unable to point to any probationer 

who engaged in comparable misconduct who has not been 

terminated during her probationary period.” Id. Ms. King

argues that, while there were no other probationary 

employees, another non-whistleblower employee was 

insubordinate but was not disciplined. Ms. King acknowledges that there were no similarly situated probationary 

employees, and non-probationary employees are not 

situated similarly to King. The Board did not err in holding that the agency properly established “by clear and 

convincing evidence that it would have taken the same 

personnel action in the absence of [a protected] disclosure.” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2).

Ms. King also argues that she “was not made aware of 

[certain] statements [relied on by the agency in her termination] and therefore, could not respond [to the notice 

of proposed removal].” Appellant’s Br. 2. There is no claim

that Ms. King lacked access to the witness statements 

during the Board proceedings. If Ms. King had been an 

“employee” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7511(a)(1)(A), her argument concerning lack of notice at 

the agency level might have some relevance under our 

decision in Stone v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 179 F.3d 1368 

(Fed. Cir. 1999), but we have not held that Stone applies 

to probationary employees and, in any event, Ms. King 

did not raise this issue with the Board in her petition for 

review, and the full Board did not address this argument.

AFFIRMED

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