Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04813/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04813-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alan McIlvain Co
Appellee
Steven LeBoon
Appellant

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-4813

___________

STEVEN LEBOON,

 Appellant 

v.

ALAN MCILVAIN COMPANY

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-02574)

District Judge: Mary A. McLaughlin

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 1, 2015

Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 5, 2015)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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Steven LeBoon appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his case for failure to 

prosecute. He also appeals numerous interlocutory orders entered before his case was 

dismissed. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

We write solely for the parties and therefore only recite those facts that are 

necessary to our disposition. LeBoon represented himself at trial against his former 

employer on claims of employment discrimination and retaliation. However, on the 

second day of trial, LeBoon did not appear for court. He called the District Court and 

explained that he was having car trouble and thus could not get to court that day, and he 

was unsure whether he could make it to court the following day. The District Court 

declared a mistrial and ordered LeBoon to show cause why his case should not be 

dismissed for failure to prosecute. Specifically, the District Court ordered LeBoon to 

provide proof of his car troubles, including a report from the mechanic he retained to 

repair his car.

LeBoon filed a letter averring that he had been unable to start his car on the 

morning of trial, and he attached undated photographs showing a mechanic working on 

his car. He also averred that, on the morning of the second day of trial, he could not find 

a different way to travel to court—he was unable to afford to rent a car and lived far away 

from public transportation. After reviewing LeBoon’s submission, the District Court 

found that LeBoon’s claims of car trouble were unsubstantiated, noting that he failed to 

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submit any documentation from his mechanic corroborating his account. The Court also 

found that LeBoon could have taken public transportation to court. 

Ultimately, the District Court concluded that LeBoon’s case should be dismissed 

under the factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d 

Cir. 1984). The District Court determined that LeBoon was personally responsible for 

causing the mistrial, had acted willfully and in bad faith, and was unlikely to succeed on 

the merits. In addition, the court found that the defendant would be prejudiced if forced 

to continue to litigate this case. LeBoon moved for reconsideration, which the District 

Court denied. 

On appeal, LeBoon challenges numerous interlocutory orders entered before his 

case was dismissed. An order dismissing a case for failure to prosecute is an appealable 

final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Usually, interlocutory orders merge with the district

court’s final judgment and are also appealable. See Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. 

Ctr., 729 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013). This rule does not apply, however, when 

judgment is entered for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b). See Marshall v. Sielaff, 

492 F.2d 917, 919 (3d Cir. 1974). The purpose of this exception is to avoid the 

piecemeal litigation that would result if litigants who failed to prosecute could appeal 

immediately the district court’s interlocutory decisions. See id. Thus, we may review 

only the District Court’s exercise of discretion in dismissing LeBoon’s case for failure to 

prosecute.

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In determining whether the Court abused its discretion in dismissing the case for 

failure to prosecute, we are guided by the factors articulated in Poulis. These include “(1) 

the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused 

by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of 

dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad 

faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of 

alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.” Id. at 868 

(emphases removed). 

We perceive no abuse of discretion. We agree with the District Court that the first 

factor, the extent of LeBoon's responsibility, weighs against him. See Briscoe v. Klaus, 

538 F.3d 252, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2008) (pro se litigant is “solely responsible for the progress 

of his case.”). LeBoon claimed that he was unable to get to court, and that he was not 

personally responsible for his car troubles. However, the District Court concluded, with 

record support, that LeBoon willfully caused the mistrial. LeBoon failed to support his 

claims of car trouble with a dated letter from his mechanic, which caused the court “to 

doubt the veracity” of his claimed excuse. And the record supports the District Court’s 

conclusion that he could have taken public transportation to court, notwithstanding any 

car trouble. 

The second factor, which focuses on prejudice to the Defendants, also weighs 

against LeBoon as the Defendants were required to expend to expend time and expense to 

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prepare for trial, only to have the case mistried after the first day of testimony. 

Moreover, the third factor—LeBoon’s history of dilatoriness—weighs in favor of 

dismissal. The District Court’s dismissal order emphasized his dilatory tactics. For 

example, the District Court conducted a pre-trial conference to explain to LeBoon which 

witnesses he would be permitted to call, and why a particular witness could or could not 

testify. Nevertheless, on the eve of trail, he sent the court a proposed witness-list that 

included many witnesses that the District Court had already stricken, and he attempted to 

relitigate this issue with the District Court at trial. LeBoon also arrived for trial 

unprepared, and he ended the first day of trial early because he was not ready to question 

his witnesses. Moreover, this record also supports the District Court’s conclusion that 

LeBoon was causing delay willfully and in bad faith—the fourth consideration under 

Poulis. The last factor considers whether LeBoon was likely to succeed on his claims. 

The record supports the District Court’s conclusion that he was not. 

On appeal, LeBoon asserts that the District Court “compounded its abuse of 

discretion” by denying his motion to reconsider the dismissal, but he provides no legal 

authority or argument supporting this assertion. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the 

District Court’s order denying reconsideration, and we perceive no abuse of discretion. 

The District Court properly dismissed LeBoon’s case in light of the Poulis factors. 

Nothing in LeBoon’s motion for reconsideration casts doubt on that judgment. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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