Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00041/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00041-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General of California
Respondent
Victor Maciel Garcia
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR MACIEL GARCIA,

Petitioner,

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

 /

1: 06 CV 0041 OWW WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 21]

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to

dismiss.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 9, 2002, in Stanislaus County Superior Court, a jury found Petitioner guilty of

the following: attempted murder by intentionally and personally using a firearm (Cal. Penal Code §§

664/187 & 12022.53(d), count one); assault with a firearm (Penal Code §§ 245(a)(2) &

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12022.5(a)(1), count three); assault with a firearm (Penal Code §§ 245(a)(2) & 12022.5(a)(1), count

four); assault with a firearm (Penal Code §§ 245(a)(2) & 12022.5(a)(1), count six); and participation

in a criminal street gang (Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)). Additionally, as to count six, the jury found

true the allegation that Petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury (Penal Code § 12022.7(a)).

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total term of forty-five years to life in state prison on count

one, and stayed the sentences imposed on all other counts.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. 

On May 20, 2004, in an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, but

remanded the matter to the Superior Court to modify the judgment. The Court of Appeal directed

the trial court to modify the judgment “by striking not only the 15-to-life term for attempted, willful,

deliberate, and premeditated murder but also the consecutive 10-year criminal street gang

enhancement and by substituting a term of life with possibility of parole and a 15-year minimum

eligible parole date.” Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. The

court denied the petition on September 15, 2004.

Petitioner did not file a state habeas corpus petition. 

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Stanislaus

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

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F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

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grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

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convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that it is a mixed petition containing

both exhausted and unexhausted claim. Specifically, Respondent claims that while Petitioner’s first

and second claims were exhausted by being presented to the California Supreme Court in his petition

for review, his third claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is unexhausted. Respondent further

contends that it would be improper for this court to stay the action to allow Petitioner to exhaust his

third claim. Respondent argues that Petitioner has made no attempt to exhaust his state remedies as

to claim three before filing in this court

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. th

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner

must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). th

In response to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner concedes that his third claim is

unexhausted, but asks the court to stay this case while he exhausts the claim in state court.

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Following the enactment of the AEDPA, the district courts retain their authority to issue stays

that are a proper exercise of their discretion. The AEDPA does, however, does circumscribe that

discretion. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005). Because staying a federal habeas petition

frustrates AEDPA's objective of encouraging finality of state court judgments, the Supreme Court

has held that stay and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances. Id. Recognizing

that “granting a stay effectively excuses a petitioner's failure to present his claims first to the state

courts,” the Supreme Court has held that stay and abeyance is only appropriate when the district

court determines there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims. Id. at 277.

The Court summarized the analysis as follows: 

it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a stay and dismiss a

mixed petition if the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted

claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that he engaged in intentionally

dilatory litigation tactics. Such a petitioner's interest in obtaining federal review of his claims

outweighs the competing interests in finality and speedy resolution of federal petitions.

Id. at 278.

In this case, the court does not find good cause for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his third

claim before filing it in this court. Petitioner explains in his declaration that he did not receive the

transcripts of his trial until the second or third month of 2005, and filed the present petition in

December 2005. Petitioner states that in the intervening time he was relocated and was without his

property, and that lockdowns prevented him from going to the library to learn the relevant law. 

Although this may constitute good cause for Petitioner’s delay in pursuing a habeas corpus remedy in

general, it does not explain why Petitioner filed his petition in this court rather than in state court. . 

See generally, Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9 Cir.1986) (pro se th

prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge of law unfortunate but insufficient to establish cause). 

Although the statute of limitations was close to expiring at the time that Petitioner filed the present

petition on December 13, 2005, filing a proper petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court would

have tolled the running of the statute. Accordingly, the court does not find a basis for granting

Petitioner’s request for a stay.

RECOMMENDATION

As the court must dismiss a habeas petition that contains any unexhausted claims, Rose v.

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Lundy, 455 U.S. 510, 522 (1982), the court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion be

GRANTED and the petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED.

Petitioner may, at his option, move to withdraw the unexhausted claim within thirty (30) days

of the date of service of this Recommendation and proceed with only the exhausted claims. Guizar v.

Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9 Cir. 1988). However, Petitioner is forewarned that should he choose

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to go forward with only his currently exhausted claims, any subsequent filings may be barred by the

abuse of the writ doctrine. See McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991); see also, Rule 9(b), Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (failure to allege all available grounds for relief in

a single petition may be abuse of the writ). If Petitioner fails to withdraw the unexhausted claims

within the thirty (30) day time frame, the entire petition will be dismissed.. This dismissal will not

bar Petitioner from returning to federal court after exhausting available state remedies. See Trimble

v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9 Cir.1995). However, this does not mean that Petitioner th

will not be subject to the one year statute of limitations imposed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In

most cases, the one year period starts to run on the date the California Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s direct review. See id. Although the limitations period tolls while a properly filed request

for collateral review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), is does not toll for the time an

application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within

ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

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District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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