Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01025/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01025-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Bellipanni
Appellee
Boulder County District Court
Appellee
Boulder County Public Defender
Appellee
Peter Hofstrom
Appellee
Diane McDonald
Appellee
Gregory Stuart
Appellant

Document Text:

.. 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

GREGORY STUART, ) 

FILED 

U<1ired States Court of Appeals 

T.-.rtr.h r:,..~,tt 

SEP 2 2 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) 

Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 

) No. 89-1025 

V • ) 

) 

BOULDER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT; ) 

BOULDER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER; ) 

DIANE MCDONALD; PETER HOFSTROM; ) 

and JOSEPH BELLIPANNI, ) 

) 

Defendants/Appellees. ) 

(D. Colorado) 

(D.C. No. 88-C-1907) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Gregory Stuart appeals from an order of the district court 

dismissing an action which he filed prose asserting claims under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stuart contends that the district court erred 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1025 Document: 01019973985 Date Filed: 09/22/1989 Page: 1 
by applying the doctrine of absolute immunity to bar his complaint 

for relief from the acts of a Colorado state trial court, the 

state trial judge, and the state prosecutor who he claims violated 

his civil rights in denying his motion for a judicial recommendation against deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 125l(b)(2). 1 The 

district court dismissed the action as frivolous pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(d). 2 For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the 

district court's decision. 

I. FACTS 

Stuart is a British citizen with resident alien status. In 

August 1986 he pled guilty to first degree assault in Boulder 

County District Court in the State of Colorado. He was sentenced 

to a four year jail term. Within 30 days after he was sentenced, 

the state court considered Stuart's motion for a recommendation 

against deportation pursuant to 8 u.s.c. § 125l(b}(2}. The court 

declined to issue such a recommendation, citing the presentence 

1 Federal law classifies an alien as "deportable" if that alien 

is convicted of a crime involving "moral turpitude" within five 

years of entering the United States and is incarcerated for a 

minimum time as a result of the conviction. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 

(a}(4}. The statute provides, however, that the general 

classification as "deportable" will not apply: 

if the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall 

make, at the time of first imposing judgment or passing 

sentence, or within thirty days thereafter, a 

recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien 

not be deported . 

8 u.s.c. § 125l(b}(2}. 

2 Section 1915(d) provides: 

The court may ••• dismiss the case if ••. satisfied 

that the action is frivolous or malicious. 

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report, the contents of the court file, and the evidence produced 

at the hearing on the motion. In reaching its conclusion, the 

state court noted: 

The court has no indication that such a recommendation 

is appropriate. The court has considered the nature of 

the offense, the defendant's criminal and work history 

and his prior ties to the United States. 

R. Vol. I, Tab 2 at Ex. 6. Stuart subsequently filed several 

motions for reconsideration of the trial court's action in the 

state courts, including a petition for a writ of mandamus with the 

Colorado Supreme Court. The Colorado Supreme Court denied 

Stuart's petition in August 1988. 

Dissatisfied with the results in the state courts, Stuart 

filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district 

court essentially seeking review of the state court's ruling on 

the deportation issue, demanding that an evidentiary hearing be 

''remanded" to the state court for determination by a different 

state court judge. Stuart did not ask for money damages. 

Stuart's complaint lists two main concerns. First, he 

asserts that his own counsel inaccurately predicted success on the 

motion for recommendation against deportation thus motivating him 

to plead guilty, and that she discussed the motion with the state 

prosecutor outside of Stuart's presence. Second, Stuart complains 

that the procedure used by the state trial judge in considering 

the deportation issue was flawed in that the hearing on the motion 

did not take place prior to sentencing and was not heard by the 

judge who sentenced him on the underlying crime, but rather it was 

considered by a substitute judge shortly after sentencing. These 

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Appellate Case: 89-1025 Document: 01019973985 Date Filed: 09/22/1989 Page: 3 
are the exact same issues raised in the petition to the Colorado 

Supreme Court. 

The district court adopted the recommendation of the United 

States Magistrate that Stuart's federal claim be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d}. The magistrate's recommendation was 

based on a determination that the state court trial judge and the 

state prosecutor both enjoy absolute immunity in their respective 

capacities from suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The magistrate also 

found that defense counsel, while acting as deputy public defender, is not subject to a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 because she is not acting under color of state law. 

On appeal, Stuart contends that judicial and prosecutorial 

immunity only bar actions for money damages. He therefore argues 

that his requested relief is not precluded by the doctrine of 

absolute immunity. On appeal, Stuart does not object to, nor does 

he raise any issue relevant to the district court's dismissal of 

the claim against defense counsel, Diane McDonald, or the Boulder 

County Public Defender's Office; therefore, we do not address the 

district court's order concerning the claims against those 

parties. 

II. DISCUSSION 

In reviewing the lower court's decision, this court is "free 

to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there 

is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds 

not relied upon by the district court." Griess v. Colorado, 841 

F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir. 1988} (quoting Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1025 Document: 01019973985 Date Filed: 09/22/1989 Page: 4 
Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987)); see,~, Taylor v. 

Nichols, 558 F.2d 561, 565-67 (10th Cir. 1977) (affirming grant of 

summary judgment on alternative grounds of immunity). Upon careful examination of Stuart's complaint, we find that the district 

court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the 

claim; therefore, the district court's order dismissing this case 

must be affirmed. 

Stuart's federal complaint, couched in the same terms and 

raising the identical issues as his petition to the state supreme 

court, is nothing more than a thinly disguised attempt to seek 

judicial review of the state trial court's decision concerning the 

judicial recommendation against deportation. Stuart does not 

raise any general constitutional issues or challenges to the 

procedures applied by the Colorado courts. Rather, he simply 

claims that the court erred in this particular case. 

Although the district court did not address the issue of 

subject matter jurisdiction, federal district courts generally 

lack authority to review state court decisions in particular 

judicial proceedings; such review is reserved solely for the 

United States Supreme Court. Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 

1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1986) ("A federal district court does not 

have the authority to review judgments of a state court in 

judicial proceedings .... ") (citing District of Columbia Court 

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (federal district 

courts lack jurisdiction over "challenges to state-court decisions 

in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if 

those challenges allege that the state court's action was un-

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constitutional.")); see Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596, 597 (10th 

Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977) (federal district 

courts may review constitutional claims attacking states' power to 

license attorneys involving challenges to a state's authority or 

administration of the rules, but may not review the "state court's 

adjudication of a particular application."). 

Stuart asks that the state court be ordered to hold an 

evidentiary hearing before a new trial judge. We cannot grant 

such relief. Federal circuit courts "have no authority to ••. 

'direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance 

of their duties.'" Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d at 1436 n.5 

(quoting Haggard v. State of Tennessee, 421 F.2d 1384, 1386 (6th 

Cir. 1970)). The district court could not appropriately issue 

such an order either; federal district courts lack the power to 

review state court judgments where the relief sought is the 

equivalent of appellate review. Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d 

262, 263 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing,~, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 

Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)); Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d at 

1436 n.5; see In re Dalton, 733 F.2d 710, 716 (10th Cir. 1984), 

cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1185 (1985). 

Although Stuart may attempt to raise constitutional claims 

under the civil rights statute, those claims are identical to and 

"inextricably intertwined" with the issues raised before the 

Colorado Supreme Court in Stuart's petition for a writ of mandamus 

to require the state trial court to reconsider the judicial recommendation against deportation. The Colorado Supreme Court has 

considered and denied this petition. Just as in Van Sickle v. 

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Holloway, 791 F.2d at 1436-37, the civil rights claims raised here 

are in essence a request that the federal district court review a 

final decision of Colorado's highest court. The district court 

has no authority to review such a decision. As we noted in 

Anderson v. Colorado: 

Where a constitutional issue could have been reviewed on 

direct appeal by the state appellate courts, a litigant 

may not seek to reverse the state court judgment by 

bringing a constitutional claim under 42 u.s.c. § 1983. 

793 F.2d at 263 (citing,~, Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333 

(10th Cir. 1981); see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486 (Review of a final decision of the highest court of a jurisdiction in a particular case may be had only 

in the United States Supreme Court) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257). 

The district court should have dismissed Stuart's complaint for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the 

district court did not have jurisdiction to hear Stuart's claims. 

Because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint, we need not address Stuart's other issues 

raised on appeal. The judgment of the United States District 

Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall 

issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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