Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00187/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00187-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Jimenez
Petitioner
Tampkins
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD JIMENEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

TAMPKINS,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:19-cv-00187-NONE-JDP

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS 

PETITION AND GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

(Doc. Nos. 11 & 20)

Petitioner Richard Jimenez, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, brought this

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the sentence imposed upon 

him by the Fresno County Superior Court on July 29, 2014, in his underlying criminal case. 

Therein, petitioner asserts that he was subjected to an “illegal enhancement” and received 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. No. 1 at 1, 3.) This matter was referred to a United 

States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 

Contending that the pending petition is time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and that petitioner failed to exhaust his claims before 

seeking federal habeas relief, respondent moved to dismiss the petition on July 12, 2019. (Doc. 

No. 11.) Petitioner filed his opposition to that motion on September 20, 2019, arguing the merits 

of his petition without addressing either the timeliness or exhaustion arguments presented by 

respondent in moving to dismiss the petition. (Doc. No. 16.) Respondent replied on September 

27, 2019. (Doc. No. 17.)

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On February 18, 2020, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and 

recommendations recommending that this court grant respondent’s motion to dismiss on the 

ground of untimeliness and without addressing exhaustion of the claims in state court. (Doc. No. 

20.) The findings and recommendations were served on petitioner and contained notice that 

objections were due within fourteen (14) days. (Id.) The time for filing objections has passed 

and petitioner has failed to do so.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 304, this 

court has conducted a de novo review of this case.1 The issue now before the undersigned is 

whether this petition was timely brought under AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)-(2). Having 

carefully reviewed the entire record, the court finds the pending petition for federal habeas relief 

to be untimely filed and will adopt the findings and recommendations. 

Under the § 2244(d)(1), “a state prisoner must file his federal habeas corpus petition 

within one year of the date his state conviction became final.” White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 

923 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), plaintiff’s 

conviction became final on June 11, 2016, and one year after that was June 11, 2017. (Doc. No. 

20 at 3.) But ascertaining the running of the one-year statute of limitations does not end the 

inquiry. “[T]he question of when a conviction becomes final, so as to start the running of the 

statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(1)(A), is fundamentally different from the question of how 

long the statute of limitations is tolled under § 2244(d)(2).” White, 281 F.3d at 924 (citations 

omitted). Thus, the next inquiry is whether the applicable one-year time limitation was tolled so 

as to make petitioner’s filing of his petition in this case on February 11, 2019, timely. In this 

 

1

 Having reviewed the records, the court notes that petitioner had litigated and appealed the two 

issues in this case—“illegal enhancement” and ineffective assistance of counsel—in seven 

different actions he has filed in state court before bringing this federal habeas action. The state 

court had found the two issues raised by petitioner to be meritless. (Doc. Nos. 12-2 at 5 

(affirming the trial court’s denial of a Marsden motion because “the record overwhelmingly 

supports the trial court’s conclusion”); 12-6 at 2 (finding that petitioner had executed “a valid 

change of plead form”); 12-16 at 1 (denying petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus because it “will 

not entertain habeas corpus claims that could have been, but not raised, on appeal”); see also 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (holding that “[f]actual determinations by state 

courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary”) (citing 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 

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regard, petitioner filed his application for federal habeas relief with this federal court 976 days

after June 11, 2016. Pursuant to AEDPA, the one-year time limitation is tolled “while a properly 

filed state habeas petition is pending in state court”; a petition “is ‘pending’ as long as the 

ordinary state collateral review process continues.” Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 690 

(9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Here, the pending findings and recommendations painstakingly 

and correctly detailed the tolling calculation stemming from each of petitioner’s seven state 

habeas actions, beginning with the first postconviction application in state court on March 16, 

2015 to the last, the November 21, 2017 denial of a petition for review by the California Supreme 

Court. (Doc. No. 20 at 3-5.) The undersigned need not repeat that review here. Ultimately, 

however, even if petitioner’s one-year time limitation for the filing of his application for federal 

habeas relief was tolled until November 21, 2017, the instant petition was still untimely filed 

because it was not submitted until February 11, 2019—or 447 days after the statute of limitations

had expired. (Id. at 5.)

The magistrate judge also considered whether petitioner might be entitled to equitable 

tolling of the statute of limitations. To be entitled to equitable tolling, a petitioner must show “(1) 

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood 

in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citation omitted). The court agrees 

with the conclusion reached in the pending findings and recommendations that petitioner “has not 

identified any extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from filing his action within the statute 

of limitations.” (Doc. No. 20 at 5.) Without equitable tolling, the pending petition is time-barred 

under § 2244(d)(1) despite application of statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).

Having found petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief, the court now turns to whether a 

certificate of appealability should be issued. A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no 

absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, as an appeal is only allowed 

under certain circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-336 

(2003). In addition, Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires that a district 

court issue or deny a certificate of appealability when entering a final order adverse to a 

petitioner. See also Ninth Circuit Rule 22-1(a).

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If, as here, a court grants a motion to dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the 

court may only issue a certificate of appealability when “the applicant has made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make a substantial 

showing, the petitioner must establish that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that 

matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues 

presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).

In the present case, the court concludes that petitioner has not made the required 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right to justify the issuance of a certificate of 

appealability. Reasonable jurists would not find the court’s determination that petitioner is not 

entitled to federal habeas corpus relief wrong or debatable, and they would not conclude that 

petitioner is deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 

126–27 (1982) (recognizing that a writ of habeas corpus “entails significant costs” and 

“[c]ollateral review of a conviction extends the ordeal of trial for both society and the accused”).

The court therefore declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

Accordingly:

1. The findings and recommendations issued on February 18, 2020 (Doc. No. 20) are 

adopted in full;

2. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. 

11) is granted; 

3. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. 1) is dismissed; 

4. The court declines to issue a certificate of appealability; and

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge to this case for the 

purposes of closure and to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2020 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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