Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06371/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06371-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General
Appellee
Warren T. Diesslin
Appellee
Scott Michael Thornton
Appellant

Document Text:

.. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SCOTT MICHAEL THORNTON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FI LED 

Uoited Stares (oun of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

&OBERT L. .HOECKER 

Clerk 

v . No . 89-6371 

WARREN T. DIESSLIN; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, State of Oklahoma, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

(D.C. No. CIV-89-1255-W) 

(W. Dist. of Oklahoma) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, TACHA and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Scott M. Thornton appeals~ se from the dismissal of his 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2254. 

We affirm. 

Thornton pled guilty on February 23, 1987 to two charges of 

first degree burglary and three charges of robbery with firearms. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6371 Document: 010110037110 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 1 
He is currently serving two 20 year terms and three 25 year terms 

for those convictions, all of which terms run concurrently. He 

did not appeal those convictions. 

On January 5, 1989, Thornton filed an application for postconviction relief in the Oklahoma County district court, alleging 

(1) that his guilty plea was not voluntarily given; (2) that no 

factual basis existed for his guilty plea; (3) that he was not 

correctly advised of the possible range of punishment; and (4) 

that the State of Oklahoma had failed to abide by the plea agreement it entered with him. The district court denied his application, by order dated March 23, 1989, on the ground that Thornton 

"has not provided a sufficient reason to explain his failure to 

withdraw his guilty plea and seek an appeal," and should therefore 

be denied relief on that basis. The court additionally found that 

an affidavit Thornton executed in connection with his plea of 

guilty provided a sufficient factual basis for his plea; that 

Thornton was advised of the range of punishment; and that the 

state had complied with the plea agreement. The district court's 

post-conviction findings included the specific notice stating: 

"YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ORDER BY FILING A PETITION IN ERROR IN THE 

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM THIS DATE." 

Thornton thereafter filed a Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Application for Post-Conviction Relief dated April 3, which 

was denied at a hearing on April 14. Thornton filed a Notice of 

Intent to Appeal, dated April 25, followed by a "Petition in Error" to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which the Clerk of 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-6371 Document: 010110037110 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 2 
• 

the Appellate Courts acknowledged was received on May 12 . This 

latter petition was rejected as untimely filed. 

Finally, Thornton wrote a letter to the judge who had denied 

his motion to reconsider the denial of his post-conviction relief 

petition, asking for assistance in filing his post-conviction appeal "by verifying to the Appellate Court that the 'final' ORDER 

was, in fact, handed down on 4-14-89 [the date of the hearing on 

his motion to reconsider]" or seeking permission to file an appeal 

out of time. The judge ultimately responded that she had no power 

to do what Thornton asked her to do. 

Thornton filed this habeas petition in July, 1989, arguing 

that (1) he was coerced into pleading guilty; (2) there was no 

factual basis supporting his guilty plea; (3) he was never advised 

of the range of punishment; (4) his counsel was ineffective; and 

(5) the state failed to abide by the portion of the plea agreement 

relating to the location of Thornton's confinement. The district 

court dismissed the petition on the basis that "[Thornton's] 

submissions and the record clearly show [Thornton] made an 

informed choice not to appeal the denial of post-conviction 

relief. Hence, [Thornton] is precluded from obtaining federal 

habeas review of his claims due to his knowing and deliberate 

bypass of established state procedures." District Court Opinion 

and Order dated October 24, 1989 (citations omitted). 

This circuit applies the "deliberate by-pass" standard of Fay 

v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) to the failure to directly appeal a state conviction, as well as to the failure to appeal the 

denial of a state habeas petition. See Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-6371 Document: 010110037110 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 3 
F.2d 612, 624, 624 n.11 (10th Cir. 1988); Worthen v. Meachum, 842 

F.2d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 1988). Thornton failed both to 

directly appeal his conviction and to timely appeal the denial of 

his post-conviction relief petition. Accordingly, we must 

determine whether the district court correctly held that his 

failure was a "deliberate by-pass," defined as "'an intentional 

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" 

Fay, 372 U.S. at 439 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 

(1938)). We hold that it did. 

Thornton was informed of his right to appeal in both 

instances where he failed to do so. He was required to 

specifically indicate his understanding of his right to withdraw 

his guilty plea and to appeal his conviction in the Summary of 

Facts he filled out and signed at the time he entered his plea. 

Additionally, as indicated, the order denying his post-conviction 

relief petition specifically informed him of his right to appeal 

and the means by which to do it. While he vigorously argues that 

his failure to directly appeal his conviction was the result of 

his fear that the state would then refuse to honor the plea agreement reached with respect to the location of his confinement, 

thereby endangering his life, or that his family would be somehow 

"jeopardized" by an appeal, he offers no more than his vague and 

conclusory assertion that such was the case. Such an assertion 

does not vitiate the validity of his statements made at the time 

of his guilty plea, indicating his understanding of his right to 

appeal. See Watkins v. Crouse, 344 F.2d 927, 929 (10th Cir. 

1965)("The test for such 'deliberate bypass' of course includes an 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-6371 Document: 010110037110 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 4 
awareness of the availability of state remedy ••. . We do not 

r ead Fay v. Noia .• • to mean ..• that the petitioner has to 

have some improper motive in bypassing state procedure."}; see 

also Hammer v. Meachum, 691 F. 2d 958, 960 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. 

denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). 

Thornton explains his failure to timely appeal the denial of 

hi s post-conviction petition as resulting from his lack of access 

to materials relating to Oklahoma law. While perhaps unfortunate, 

such lack of access does not excuse Thornton's failure to timely 

appeal, the right to do which was specifically pointed out in the 

state court order. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court 

dismissing Thornton's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED. 

The Mandate shall issue forthwith. 

-5-

Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-6371 Document: 010110037110 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 5