Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01479/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01479-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Honey Producers Association
Appellee
Dongtai Peak Honey Industry Co., Ltd.
Appellant
Sioux Honey Association
Appellee
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY CO., LTD.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

AMERICAN HONEY PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION, 

AND SIOUX HONEY ASSOCIATION,

Defendants-Appellees. 

______________________ 

2014-1479

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:12-cv-00411-NT, Senior Judge Nicholas 

Tsoucalas.

______________________ 

Decided: January 30, 2015

______________________ 

YINGCHAO XIAO, Lee & Xiao, of San Marino, California, for plaintiff-appellant. With her on the brief was 

DOUGLAS CAMPAU. 

JANE C. DEMPSEY, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee United 

States. With her on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, 

Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and REGINALD T. BLADES, JR., Assistant Director. 

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2 DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US

MICHAEL J. COURSEY, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, of 

Washington, DC, for defendants-appellees American 

Honey Producers Association and the Sioux Honey Association. With him on the brief were R. ALAN LUBERDA and 

BENJAMIN BLASE CARYL. 

______________________ 

Before WALLACH, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant Dongtai Peak Honey Industry Co., Ltd. 

(“Dongtai Peak”) appeals the decision of the United States 

Court of International Trade (“CIT”) denying its Motion 

for Judgment on the Agency Record. See Dongtai Peak 

Honey Indus. Co. v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 2d 1234 

(Ct. Int’l Trade 2014). Because the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) properly exercised 

its discretion in denying Dongtai Peak’s untimely filings, 

and because Commerce’s decisions to treat Dongtai Peak 

as part of the China-wide entity and to impose a dumping 

margin based on adverse facts available were supported 

by substantial evidence and were in accordance with law, 

this court affirms. 

BACKGROUND

I. Facts

In 2001, Commerce imposed an antidumping duty order on honey imported from the People’s Republic of 

China (“China”). Honey From the People’s Republic of 

China, 66 Fed. Reg. 63,670 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 10, 

2001) (notice of amended final determination of sales at 

less than fair value and antidumping duty order) (the 

“Order”). In January 2012, Commerce initiated the tenth 

administrative review of the Order for the period of 

review December 1, 2010, through November 30, 2011. 

Initiation of Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews & Requests for Revocation in Part, 77 

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DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US 3

Fed. Reg. 4759 (Dep’t of Commerce Jan. 31, 2012) (“Initiation”). Dongtai Peak was named a respondent in this 

review. Id. at 4761.

As part of the review, on March 2, 2012, Commerce issued a non-market economy questionnaire (the “Questionnaire”) to Dongtai Peak, which included Section A 

(General Information), with a deadline of March 23, 2012, 

and Sections C (Sales to the United States) and D (Factors of Production), with a deadline of April 8, 2012. 

Appellant timely filed a response to Section A of the 

Questionnaire, and filed its responses to Sections C and D 

after receiving a one-day extension of the deadline from 

Commerce. Because Appellant’s extension request was 

received less than six minutes before the submission 

deadline for Sections C and D, in granting the request 

Commerce stated: “To ensure that [Commerce] is fully 

able to consider requests of this nature, we advise Dongtai Peak to plan accordingly and file any future extension 

requests as soon as it suspects additional time may be 

necessary.” J.A. 157.

On April 3, 2012, Commerce issued a Supplemental 

Section A Questionnaire (the “Supplemental Questionnaire”) to address certain deficiencies in Dongtai Peak’s 

original Section A response. The deadline to respond to 

the Supplemental Questionnaire was “COB [Close of 

Business], April 17, 2012.” J.A. 158. However, Dongtai 

Peak failed to submit its response by this deadline. 

Instead, on April 19, 2012, Dongtai Peak filed an untimely request (the “April 19 Letter”) to extend the deadline to 

April 27, 2012, claiming good cause for an extension 

existed because of the overlap with the deadline to file its 

responses to Sections C and D, a national holiday, and 

various issues with its translator, its United States-based 

attorneys, and its computers. In response, the American 

Honey Producers Association and Sioux Honey Association (“Petitioners”) submitted an objection to the untimely 

extension request. On April 24, 2012, Appellant submitCase: 14-1479 Document: 50-2 Page: 3 Filed: 01/30/2015
4 DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US

ted a response to the objection, restating its claim that 

good cause existed for the extension. Then, on April 27, 

2012, Dongtai Peak submitted a second request for an 

additional one-day extension of the deadline (the “April 27 

Letter”). Following the close of business on April 27, 

2012, Appellant submitted its response to the Supplemental Questionnaire (the “Supplemental Response”) 

without Commerce having granted the extension requests 

in the April 19 or April 27 Letters. 

On May 22, 2012, Commerce denied Dongtai Peak’s 

extension requests because “good cause [did] not exist . . . 

to extend retroactively its deadline.” J.A. 190. Commerce 

noted although Appellant explained why it could not 

timely file its Supplemental Response, it “provided no 

explanation as to why it was unable to file its extension 

request in a timely manner prior to the deadline for its 

questionnaire response.” J.A. 190. It also noted Dongtai 

Peak had “previously been cautioned with respect to late 

extension requests when it requested an extension of the 

deadline to file its Section C and D questionnaire responses five minutes before the deadline for that questionnaire response.” J.A. 189. Commerce therefore 

removed Appellant’s extension requests and its Supplemental Response from the official record. 

Dongtai Peak requested reconsideration of this determination, but Commerce upheld its decision to deny 

the extension requests and to remove the requests and 

the Supplemental Response from the record in its Preliminary Results. Honey From the People’s Republic of China, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,699, 46,701–02 (Dep’t of Commerce 

Aug. 6, 2012) (“Preliminary Results”). In doing so, Commerce again noted the April 19 Letter did not address 

Dongtai Peak’s inability to file an extension request by 

the deadline, and stated the deadline was significant 

because Commerce had found Appellant’s United States 

sales to be non-bona fide in prior reviews, and therefore 

needed time for a full analysis of the information sought 

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DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US 5

in the Supplemental Questionnaire. Id. Accordingly, in 

the Preliminary Results, Commerce determined that 

without the Supplemental Response, the record lacked 

sufficient information to calculate a separate rate for 

Dongtai Peak, and therefore the company would be considered part of the China-wide entity. Id. at 46,702. In 

addition, Commerce determined the China-wide entity did 

not cooperate to the best of its ability during the review, 

and therefore Commerce relied entirely on adverse facts 

available (“AFA”) to determine the dumping margin for 

the China-wide entity. Id. Commerce selected a rate of 

$2.63 per kilogram based on the rate calculated for Anhui 

Native Produce Import & Export Corporation (“Anhui 

Native”) during the sixth administrative review, which 

had also been assigned to the China-wide entity in the 

sixth and seventh administrative reviews. Id. at 46,703.

On November 26, 2012, the Final Results of the review were issued, upholding the Preliminary Results in 

their entirety. Administrative Review of Honey From the 

People’s Republic of China, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,417 (Dep’t of 

Commerce Nov. 26, 2012) (final results of antidumping 

duty administrative review) (“Final Results”), and accompanying Issues & Decision Memorandum (Nov. 19, 2012) 

(J.A. 137–56) (“Issues & Dec. Mem.”).

II. Proceedings

In December 2012, Dongtai Peak filed an action in the 

CIT challenging several aspects of the Final Results, 

including: (1) the denial of its extension requests and the 

removal of those requests and the Supplemental Response 

from the record; (2) Commerce’s decision to consider 

Dongtai Peak part of the China-wide entity; (3) Commerce’s use of AFA to calculate the dumping margin for 

the China-wide rate; and (4) the $2.63 per kilogram AFA 

rate itself. Dongtai Peak moved for Judgment on the 

Agency Record, which the CIT denied on March 21, 2014.

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In response to Dongtai Peak’s argument that Commerce improperly rejected its extension requests and 

removed the filings from the record, the CIT found Commerce’s determinations were consistent with its regulations and within its discretion. In addition, the CIT found 

“Commerce reasonably determined that [Dongtai] Peak’s 

extension requests were unsupported by good cause” 

because Commerce found (1) Appellant “failed to comply 

with the regulations by filing its extension requests after 

the deadline expired”; (2) “the facts of the instant case did 

not warrant granting [Dongtai] Peak’s untimely requests”; and (3) Appellant “was aware of the deadline in 

question and its particular importance.” Dongtai Peak, 

971 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (citing Issues & Dec. Mem. at 5–

6). The CIT also found Commerce’s denial of the extension requests did not violate Appellant’s “statutory rights” 

because the company had notice of the deadline and an 

opportunity to comply, but simply failed to file a timely 

extension request. Id. at 1240–41.

As to Dongtai Peak’s argument that Commerce improperly denied it separate rate status, the CIT found 

Commerce reasonably concluded that without the Supplemental Response, “[t]he record lacked certain information regarding [Dongtai] Peak’s separate rate 

eligibility because [it] failed to timely file its extension 

requests and failed to show good cause to extend the 

deadline.” Id. at 1242. As to Appellant’s initial Section A 

response that remained on the record, the CIT found the 

company did not identify any evidence in that response 

demonstrating the lack of government control as required 

for separate rate status. Id. Although there were translations of Chinese law and information concerning Dongtai Peak’s ownership and corporate structure in the initial 

Section A response, the CIT found this did not render 

Commerce’s decisions unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. Thus, the CIT held Commerce reasonably 

included Dongtai Peak in the China-wide entity.

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DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US 7

Regarding Dongtai Peak’s challenge to Commerce’s 

use of AFA in calculating the China-wide rate, the CIT 

found Commerce’s determination was reasonable and 

consistent with law. Id. at 1244. In particular, the CIT 

observed “Commerce did not simply equate [Dongtai] 

Peak’s untimely submission with a failure to cooperate,” 

but “considered the circumstances of [Dongtai] Peak’s 

untimely submission.” Id. As to the actual rate calculated using AFA, the CIT noted Dongtai Peak provided no 

evidence of market fluctuations or other changes in the 

Chinese honey industry since the 2006–2007 review, and 

therefore its “bare assertion that such changes occurred is 

insufficient to undermine Commerce’s selection of [Anhui 

Native’s] rate to determine the margin for the [China]-

wide entity.” Id. at 1244. The CIT therefore concluded 

Commerce’s selection of the rate was supported by substantial evidence.

Dongtai Peak filed a timely appeal and this court has 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2012).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

This court reviews decisions of the CIT de novo, “apply[ing] anew the same standard used by the [CIT].” 

Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 548 F.3d 

1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under that standard, this 

court must uphold Commerce’s determinations unless 

they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the 

record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 

U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). “Although such review 

amounts to repeating the work of the [CIT], we have 

noted that ‘this court will not ignore the informed opinion 

of the [CIT].’” Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal. v. United 

States, 612 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United 

States, 44 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also Cleo 

Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1291, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 

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(“When performing a substantial evidence review, . . . we 

give great weight to the informed opinion of the [CIT]. 

Indeed, it is nearly always the starting point of our analysis.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a mere 

scintilla,” as well as evidence that a “reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 

This court’s review is limited to the record before Commerce in the particular review proceeding at issue and 

includes all evidence that supports and detracts from 

Commerce’s conclusion. Sango Int’l L.P. v. United States, 

567 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009). An agency finding 

may still be supported by substantial evidence even if two 

inconsistent conclusions can be drawn from the evidence. 

Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).

II. Legal Framework

The antidumping statute authorizes Commerce to impose duties on imported goods that are sold in the United 

States at less-than-fair value if it is determined that a 

domestic industry is “materially injured, or threated with 

material injury.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1673. Once an antidumping duty order covering certain goods is in place, 

“Commerce periodically reviews and reassesses antidumping duties” during administrative reviews. Gallant 

Ocean (Thai.) Co. v. United States, 602 F.3d 1319, 1321 

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1675(a)). 

In calculating antidumping margins, Commerce generally determines individual dumping margins (separate 

rates) for each known exporter or producer. 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677f-1(c)(1). If it is not practicable to calculate individual dumping margins for every exporter or producer, 

Commerce may examine a reasonable number of respondents (mandatory respondents), such as Dongtai Peak. See 

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id. § 1677f-1(c)(2). In antidumping duty proceedings 

involving merchandise from a non-market economy,1

however, Commerce presumes that all respondents are 

government-controlled and therefore subject to a single 

country-wide rate. See Sigma Corp. v. United States, 117 

F.3d 1401, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Respondents may rebut 

this presumption and become eligible for a separate rate 

by establishing the absence of both de jure and de facto 

government control. Id. If a respondent fails to establish 

its independence, Commerce relies upon the presumption 

of government control and applies the country-wide rate 

to that respondent. Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 182 

F.3d 876, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

III. Commerce Properly Exercised Its Discretion in Rejecting Appellant’s Extension Requests and Supplemental 

Response 

On appeal, Dongtai Peak repeats the arguments it 

raised before the CIT. First, Appellant argues Commerce’s rejection of and removal from the record of its 

extension requests and the Supplemental Response was 

improper and not in accordance with law because Dongtai 

Peak established good cause to extend the deadline. In 

1 A “nonmarket economy country” is “any foreign 

country that [Commerce] determines does not operate on 

market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that 

sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the 

fair value of the merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A). 

“Because it deems China to be a nonmarket economy 

country, Commerce generally considers information on 

sales in China and financial information obtained from 

Chinese producers to be unreliable for determining, under 

19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a), the normal value of the subject 

merchandise.” Shanghai Foreign Trade Enters. Co. v. 

United States, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1341 (Ct. Int’l Trade 

2004).

 

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10 DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US

particular, Appellant claims good cause was shown in the 

April 19 Letter which described Dongtai Peak’s 

1) difficulties encountered in overseas communication between rurally-located Appellant and its 

US-based counsel; 2) difficulties encountered in 

communication between Appellant and its translator; 3) difficulties encountered as a consequence 

of a 4-day-long Chinese national holiday; 4) debilitating computer system malfunctions and related 

time-consuming repair efforts; and 5) the unexpected burden to Appellant[’s] personnel of having 

to prepare responses to [the Supplemental Questionnaire] and its Section C and D questionnaires 

over an overlapping timeframe.

Appellant’s Br. 15. In addition, in contrast to Dongtai 

Peak’s purported showing of good cause, Appellant contends Commerce “articulated no basis for [its] conclusion, 

such as exactly how or why the explanation provided in 

the [April 19 Letter] does not constitute good cause,” and 

therefore its determination is “not supported by substantial evidence, and it remains vague as to exactly what 

Commerce means by good cause.” Id. 14–15.

Relying on other administrative proceedings, Dongtai

Peak argues “Commerce has a long practice of keeping 

[extension] requests on the case record, and approving 

them, even when they are submitted subsequent to the 

applicable time limit,” and “has articulated no legally 

valid reason for its departure from this practice in the 

underlying review proceeding.” Id. at 10–11. In addition, 

Appellant asserts that while Commerce claimed it needed 

time to fully consider extension requests, “there were no 

pressing deadlines in the present case that would have 

made acceptance and granting of the extension request at 

all rushed or difficult.” Id. at 6, 13. To Appellant, this

case “involve[s] a small amount of information (a mere 

supplemental questionnaire dealing with a single secCase: 14-1479 Document: 50-2 Page: 10 Filed: 01/30/2015
DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US 11

tion),” and when Appellant submitted its Supplemental 

Response, “there were many months yet before Commerce’s final results were due. That is, there was ample 

time for Commerce to complete a very thorough and 

comprehensive analysis.” Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 

Finally, Dongtai Peak argues “fairness and accuracy also 

require that Commerce accept the late submission” because “Commerce’s refusal to extend the deadline unfairly 

prejudiced Appellant’s right to receive its own calculated 

rate using its own information.” Id. at 6, 25–26.

Under 19 C.F.R. § 351.302(b) (2012),2 Commerce 

“may, for good cause, extend any time limit established by 

this part.” A party may request an extension “[b]efore the 

applicable time limit . . . expires,” and such a “request 

must be in writing, . . . and state the reasons for the 

request.” Id. § 351.302(c) (emphasis added). If Commerce 

refuses to extend the time limit, it “will not consider or 

retain in the official record of the proceeding . . . 

[u]ntimely filed factual information, written argument, or 

other material that the Secretary rejects.” Id.

§ 351.302(d)(1)(i). 

The United States Supreme Court has clarified that, 

“[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances[,] the administrative agencies should 

be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to 

pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to 

discharge their multitudinous duties.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 

519, 543 (1978) (internal quotation marks and citation 

2 In September 2013, Commerce amended 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.302, effective October 21, 2013. Extension of Time 

Limits, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,790 (Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 20, 

2013) (final rule). However, the language quoted herein 

reflects the regulations in effect during the underlying 

review. 

 

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omitted). “Accordingly, absent such constraints or circumstances, courts will defer to the judgment of an agency regarding the development of the agency record.” PSC 

VSMPO-Avisma Corp. v. United States, 688 F.3d 751, 760 

(Fed. Cir. 2012). In addition, “[i]n order for Commerce to 

fulfill its mandate to administer the antidumping duty 

law, including its obligation to calculate accurate dumping margins, it must be permitted to enforce the time 

frame provided in its regulations.” Yantai Timken Co. v. 

United States, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1371 (Ct. Int’l Trade 

2007).

Here, Commerce properly exercised its discretion in 

rejecting Dongtai Peak’s extension requests and Supplemental Responses because (1) the extension requests were 

submitted after the established deadline in violation of 19 

C.F.R. § 351.302(c), and (2) Appellant failed to show “good 

cause” for an extension as required by § 351.302(b). As to 

its good cause arguments, Commerce properly found 

Dongtai Peak’s April 19 Letter describing its difficulties 

in completing the Supplemental Response did not demonstrate why the company was unable to file timely its 

extension request. Indeed, all of the causes of delay noted 

in the April 19 Letter were known to Appellant prior to 

the April 17th deadline, and did not prevent the company 

from filing an extension request before that date. See 

Issues & Dec. Mem. at 6 (“[N]one of these reasons explained why [Dongtai Peak] was unable to file the extension request before the existing April 17, 2012, deadline 

and none of these reasons constitute ‘good cause’ to grant 

a late-filed extension request, especially in the context of 

an administrative review it requested itself.”). Indeed, 

the record shows the company was closed for the Chinese 

holiday from April 5 through 8; the computer difficulties 

occurred sometime between April 1 and 4; and the deadline for the Sections C and D responses was April 9. J.A. 

510, 288–92.

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Thus, Commerce reasonably determined Dongtai 

Peak was entirely capable of at least submitting an extension request on time, but simply failed to do so; therefore, 

good cause did not exist to retroactively extend the deadline. Issues & Dec. Mem. at 6; see 19 C.F.R. § 351.302(b), 

(c). Having properly denied the extension requests, 

Commerce also reasonably determined the Supplemental 

Response was untimely and removed it from the record 

pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.302(d).

As to Dongtai Peak’s claim that Commerce failed to 

identify why the April 19 Letter did not establish good 

cause, Appellant misunderstands its obligation to submit 

a written extension request before the time limit specified 

by Commerce and to “state the reasons for the request.” 

Id. § 351.302(c). That is, Commerce was not required to 

demonstrate good cause for rejecting Dongtai Peak’s 

untimely submissions. As the Government notes, “[i]t is 

not for Dongtai Peak to establish Commerce’s deadlines or 

to dictate to Commerce whether and when Commerce 

actually needs the requested information.” United States’ 

Br. 23; see PSC VSMPO, 688 F.3d at 760–61 (It is fully 

within Commerce’s discretion to “set and enforce deadlines” and this court “cannot set aside application of a 

proper administrative procedure because it believes that 

properly excluded evidence would yield a more accurate 

result if the evidence were considered.”).

Appellant’s argument regarding Commerce’s “long 

practice” of approving untimely extension requests is 

equally unpersuasive. As noted, Commerce may grant 

extension requests if it determines the extension request 

provides good cause for extending the deadline. 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.302(b). In the various administrative reviews cited 

by Appellant, Commerce found good cause was shown and 

therefore exercised its discretion in granting the untimely 

extension requests. Here, by contrast, Commerce did not 

find good cause. In addition, Dongtai Peak’s argument 

ignores the fact that Commerce also routinely rejects

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14 DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US

untimely-filed submissions. In this case, moreover, 

Commerce explicitly cautioned Dongtai Peak on several 

occasions against making untimely extension requests. 

See, e.g., J.A. 157 (“To ensure that [Commerce] is fully 

able to consider requests of this nature, we advise Dongtai Peak to plan accordingly and file any future extension 

requests as soon as it suspects additional time may be 

necessary.”).

As to Dongtai Peak’s presumption that Commerce had 

adequate time to process this review, Commerce should 

not be burdened by requiring acceptance of untimely 

filings closer to the final deadline for the administrative 

review. While Appellant claims this case involves “a mere 

supplemental questionnaire” that Commerce had “ample 

time” to review, Appellant’s Br. 24, the Supplemental 

Questionnaire is actually comprised of nine pages of 

questions regarding Dongtai Peak’s management, shareholders, accounting practices, affiliations, United States 

sales, domestic sales, and merchandise, and was due less 

than four months before the deadline for Commerce to 

issue the Preliminary Results, J.A. 158–77. Furthermore, 

as Commerce specifically noted, the deadlines in this case 

were important because in two prior reviews Commerce 

found Dongtai Peak’s United States sales to be not bona 

fide, a determination that requires careful consideration 

of the totality of circumstances. See Issues & Dec. Mem.

at 5. Thus, the Supplemental Questionnaire was intended to elicit information “regarding [Dongtai Peak’s] reported quantity and value, its separate rate status, 

structure and affiliations, sales process, accounting and 

financial practices; and merchandising,” information 

which “has proven vital to [Commerce’s] prior non-bona 

fide analyses.” Id. Commerce fully explained its need for 

a “significant amount of time and effort to gather the 

necessary information, consider the facts of the record, 

and provide interested parties with an appropriate period 

for comments and rebuttal comments.” Id. at 13.

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DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US 15

As to Dongtai Peak’s fairness and accuracy argument, 

this court has made clear Commerce’s rejection of untimely-filed factual information does not violate a respondent’s 

due process rights when the respondent had notice of the 

deadline and an opportunity to reply. See PSC VSMPO, 

688 F.3d at 761–62. Here, the record shows Dongtai Peak 

was afforded both notice and a meaningful opportunity to 

be heard. In particular, as Commerce noted, Appellant 

“was well aware of the established deadlines in this case”; 

Commerce “advised [Dongtai] Peak of the importance of 

submitting its documents in a timely manner”; and Dongtai Peak “was aware of the consequences of its not doing 

so.” Issues & Dec. Mem. at 11 (citations omitted).

Accordingly, because Dongtai Peak failed to establish 

good cause with respect to its failure to submit its extension requests in a timely manner, Commerce reasonably 

exercised its discretion in rejecting the requests and in 

enforcing the applicable deadline.

IV. Commerce’s Decision to Deny Appellant Separate 

Rate Status Was Supported by Substantial Evidence and 

Was in Accordance with Law

Next, Dongtai Peak argues Commerce erred in denying it separate rate status because “[t]he record contained 

substantial and compelling evidence indicating that 

[Appellant] is eligible for a separate rate.” Appellant’s Br. 

28. Specifically, Appellant claims the initial Section A 

Questionnaire “included no less than ten pages of questions, including extensive questions specifically addressing separate rate eligibility,” and Dongtai Peak “provided 

extensive narrative responses to these questions, as well 

as all required supporting documentation.” Id. at 29. In 

addition, Appellant claims, there was no record evidence 

that its export activities were subject to government 

control, so Commerce’s conclusion that Appellant was not 

entitled to separate rate status was not based on substantial evidence. Dongtai Peak also argues the Supplemental 

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Questionnaire “did not directly address government 

control at all, but merely included a handful of questions—in what Commerce labeled as the ‘Separate Rates’ 

section of its supplemental questionnaire—having to do 

with prior work experience and responsibilities of Appellant’s management and ownership.” Id. at 30.

As noted, in antidumping proceedings involving merchandise from a non-market economy, Commerce presumes all respondents are government-controlled and 

therefore subject to the country-wide rate. See Sigma, 

117 F.3d at 1405. Respondents may rebut this presumption and establish eligibility for a separate rate through 

evidence of the absence of both de jure and de facto government control. Id. If a respondent fails to do so, however, Commerce may rely upon the presumption of 

government control and apply the country-wide rate to 

that respondent. Transcom, 182 F.3d at 882.

Here, substantial evidence supports Commerce’s determination that Dongtai Peak failed to demonstrate the 

absence of de facto and de jure government control, as 

required for separate-rate status, and therefore that the 

company is part of the China-wide entity. Contrary to 

Dongtai Peak’s contention, the company’s initial Section A 

response was insufficient to establish its separate rate 

eligibility. Without a timely-filed Supplemental Response, Commerce did not have information regarding 

Dongtai Peak’s “shareholders, management, accounting 

practices, corporate structure, and affiliations,” and 

information addressing whether “several organizations to 

which [Dongtai] Peak belonged were state-sponsored, 

controlled [Dongtai] Peak’s business operations or coordinated [Dongtai] Peak’s export activities.” Issues & Dec. 

Mem. at 12. Furthermore, Dongtai Peak does not identify 

any evidence in its initial Section A response that demonstrates lack of government control. As the CIT properly 

found, while the initial Section A response provided “some 

evidence of its eligibility for a separate rate,” it was 

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DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US 17

“insufficient to render Commerce’s decision unsupported 

by substantial evidence.” Dongtai Peak, 971 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1242.

As to Dongtai Peak’s contention that there was no 

record evidence of government control, this argument 

ignores that under the law for non-market economy 

countries, all respondents are presumed to be subject to 

governmental control unless they meet the burden of 

proving otherwise. See Sigma, 117 F.3d at 1405. Further, while Appellant claims the Supplemental Questionnaire did not request any information that would have 

demonstrated Dongtai Peak’s eligibility for a separate 

rate, the record shows the Supplemental Questionnaire 

contains a “Separate Rates” section requesting specific 

information regarding Dongtai Peak’s shareholders, 

management, and affiliation with other entities within 

the Chinese honey industry, as well as information related to quantity and value, structure, sales process, accounting and financial practices, and merchandising. J.A. 

158–77. Accordingly, this court agrees with the CIT that 

“[b]ecause [Dongtai] Peak failed to file either its [Supplemental Response] with this information or an extension 

request before the deadline, Commerce reasonably concluded that Peak failed to demonstrate the absence of 

government control.” Dongtai Peak, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 

1243.

V. Commerce’s Application of AFA and Its Selection of an 

AFA Rate Were Supported by Substantial Evidence

Finally, Dongtai Peak argues Commerce’s application 

of AFA was improper because Commerce had no basis to 

apply AFA aside from the late filing of the Supplemental 

Response. Appellant’s Br. 32 (“[F]rom its observation that 

it rejected Appellant’s submission as untimely, Commerce 

jumped to the conclusion that Appellant ‘did not cooperate 

to the best of its ability.’” (citation omitted)). That is, to 

Appellant, “there is no meaningful evidence on the record 

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18 DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US

indicating that Appellant did not cooperate to the best of 

its ability.” Id. at 33. At center, Dongtai Peak contends

Commerce is throwing out the entire case record, 

terminating the entire review proceeding, and implementing maximum punitive and penalizing 

measures (via the application of full [AFA]) simply 

because Appellant was two days late requesting a 

deadline extension for a mere supplemental questionnaire dealing with a single section (section 

A)—a supplemental questionnaire that Appellant 

did ultimately complete and submit to the record. 

This is unfair and out of balance, in violation of 

fundamental fairness principles of antidumping 

law.

Id. at 27. 

As to the AFA rate Commerce selected for the Chinawide entity, as noted, Commerce used the calculated rate 

for Anhui Native from the 2006–2007 administrative 

review. Appellant argues, “[g]iven fluctuations in sales 

prices, production and transportation costs, [and] market 

conditions, . . . it was unreasonable for Commerce to rely 

upon such an old rate, and to assume, without the least 

investigation or corroboration, that such a rate was 

reliable, relevant, or at all accurate.” Id. at 36. Dongtai 

Peak further contends the AFA rate is not based on its 

own sales and production data for the current period of 

review, therefore violating the requirement that Commerce calculate the most accurate dumping rates possible. 

Id.

During its periodic administrative reviews, Commerce 

requests information from respondents and if a respondent “significantly impedes a proceeding,” Commerce is 

permitted to use “facts otherwise available” to determine 

an antidumping duty rate. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(C). If 

Commerce further finds a respondent has “failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with 

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DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US 19

a request for information,” then it “may use an inference 

that is adverse to the interests of that party in selecting 

from among the facts otherwise available” (i.e., it may 

apply AFA). Id. § 1677e(b). “[T]he statutory mandate 

that a respondent act to ‘the best of its ability’ requires 

the respondent to do the maximum it is able to do.” 

Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1382 

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

In selecting an AFA rate, Commerce may use information from the petition, investigation, prior administrative reviews, or “any other information placed on the 

record.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b); see Gallant Ocean, 602 F.3d 

at 1323 (“[I]n the case of uncooperative respondents,” 

Commerce has discretion to “select from a list of secondary sources as a basis for its adverse inferences.”); F.lli De 

Cecco di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 

216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000). However, when 

Commerce “relies on secondary information rather than 

on information obtained in the course of an investigation 

or review,” it “shall, to the extent practicable, corroborate 

that information from independent sources that are 

reasonably at [its] disposal.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). To 

corroborate secondary information, Commerce must find 

the information has “probative value,” KYD, Inc. v. United 

States, 607 F.3d 760, 765 (Fed. Cir. 2010), by demonstrating the rate is both reliable and relevant, Gallant Ocean, 

602 F.3d at 1323–24. 

Here, in the Supplemental Questionnaire, Commerce 

warned that “failure to properly request extensions for all 

or part of a questionnaire response may result in the 

application of partial or total facts available, . . . which 

may include adverse inferences [(i.e., AFA)].” J.A. 159. 

Therefore, Commerce found Dongtai Peak was “fully 

aware of the established deadlines in this case, advised of 

the importance of meeting deadlines and the possible 

consequences should it not meet those deadlines.” Issues 

& Dec. Mem. at 15. In contrast to Appellant’s argument, 

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20 DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US

Commerce did not simply base its “failure to cooperate” 

conclusion on the untimely filings; rather, the record 

indicates Commerce considered the circumstances of 

Dongtai Peak’s untimely submission and found the reasons provided (i.e., computer failure, communication 

problems, translation problems, overlapping deadlines, 

and a national holiday) did not prevent Dongtai Peak 

from timely filing an extension request. Id. at 15–16. 

Thus, based on the record, Commerce reasonably concluded Appellant “placed itself in a position in which it could 

not comply with the deadline.” Id. at 16.

As this court has noted, “[c]ompliance with the ‘best of 

its ability’ standard is determined by assessing whether 

respondent has put forth its maximum effort to provide 

Commerce with full and complete answers to all inquiries,” and “[w]hile the standard does not require perfection 

and recognizes that mistakes sometimes occur, it does not 

condone inattentiveness, carelessness, or inadequate 

record keeping.” Nippon Steel, 337 F.3d at 1382 (emphases added). Because Dongtai Peak was aware of the 

deadline and had the opportunity to file an extension 

request prior to its expiration, its failure to do so indicates 

an inattentiveness or carelessness with regard to its 

obligations. This warranted application of AFA.

As to the AFA rate selected by Commerce for the China-wide entity, Commerce properly corroborated the rate 

by demonstrating why it was reliable and relevant. 

Specifically, the selected rate was reliable because it was 

calculated using verified sales and cost data for Anhui 

Native from a prior administrative review, and therefore 

“reflect[ed] the commercial reality of another respondent 

in the same industry” as Dongtai Peak. Issues & Dec. 

Mem. at 18; see Gallant Ocean, 602 F.3d at 1324 (To be 

reliable, “Commerce must select secondary information 

that has some grounding in commercial reality.”). Furthermore, this court has clarified that when Commerce 

chooses a calculated dumping margin from a prior segCase: 14-1479 Document: 50-2 Page: 20 Filed: 01/30/2015
DONGTAI PEAK HONEY INDUSTRY v. US 21

ment of the proceeding as the AFA rate, that rate is 

reliable. See KYD, 607 F.3d at 766–77 (Commerce’s 

selection of the highest prior margin as the AFA rate 

reflects “a common sense inference that the highest prior 

margin is the most probative evidence of current margins 

because, if it were not so, the [responding party] knowing

of the rule, would have produced current information 

showing the margin to be less.”). Commerce further 

determined the rate was relevant because it was applied 

to the China-wide entity in the sixth and seventh administrative reviews. See Issues & Dec. Mem. at 18–19. 

In addition, Dongtai Peak has not identified any record evidence indicating this rate lacked probative value, 

including any evidence regarding fluctuations in sales 

prices, production and transportation costs, or market 

conditions. To the extent Appellant claims Commerce 

erred in choosing an AFA rate that was not based on 

Dongtai Peak’s own sales and production data for the 

current period of review, this argument is meritless. 

Because Appellant was part of the China-wide entity, 

Commerce was not required to calculate a separate AFA 

rate for Dongtai Peak and it was unnecessary for Commerce to corroborate the AFA rate for the China-wide 

entity using Dongtai Peak’s own data. Substantial evidence supports Commerce’s use of AFA in this case and

its selection of an AFA rate for the China-wide entity.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the United 

States Court of International Trade is

AFFIRMED

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