Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-05020/USCOURTS-ca10-16-05020-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patsy Marie Bates
Appellant
Board of County Commissioners of Mayes County
Appellee
Aaron Peters
Not Party

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

PATSY MARIE BATES, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

BOARD OF COUNTY 

COMMISSIONERS OF MAYES 

COUNTY, 

 Defendant - Appellee, 

and 

AARON PETERS, 

 Defendant. 

No. 16-5020 

(D.C. No. 4:13-CV-00805-CVE-FHM) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Patsy Marie Bates sued Aaron Peters and the Board of County Commissioners 

of Mayes County (“the Board”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of her 

constitutional rights when Mr. Peters sexually assaulted her while she was in the 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

January 5, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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custody of the Mayes County Sheriff’s Office. Mr. Peters was a detention officer for 

the Mayes County Jail at the time of the sexual assault. The district court granted 

summary judgment for the Board.1

 Ms. Bates challenges that decision on appeal. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I. Background 

 In September 2013, Mr. Peters applied to work at the Mayes County Sheriff’s 

Office. As part of the application process, the sheriff’s office obtained a Triple I 

background check on Mr. Peters, which identified no known criminal background. 

After learning this, Assistant Jail Administrator Mitchell Goodman and Sergeant 

Keisha Oberg interviewed Mr. Peters for a detention-officer position. During the 

interview, the two interviewers—as was routine—specifically advised Mr. Peters that 

female inmates sometimes use their sexuality to try to solicit favors from jailers. To 

illustrate this point, Administrator Goodman asked Mr. Peters what he would do if a 

female inmate showed him her breasts. Mr. Peters responded that he would tell 

someone. Administrator Goodman then informed Mr. Peters that the proper response 

would be to tell the female inmate to lower her shirt, and then immediately to write a 

report documenting the incident. 

After the interview, Mr. Goodman recommended that he and Sheriff Mike 

Reed interview Mr. Peters a second time. After that second interview, the Sheriff 

hired Mr. Peters as a detention officer. 

 1

 The district court denied Mr. Peters’s motion for summary judgment. He and 

Ms. Bates later settled her claim against him, and the district court dismissed him 

from the lawsuit. 

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3 

In November 2013, Ms. Bates was arrested and booked into the Mayes County 

Jail. During her stay at the jail, Ms. Bates suffered a seizure and was taken to the 

Mayes County Medical Center. During Ms. Bates’s hospital stay, Mayes County Jail 

detention officers were assigned to guard her. 

In separate shifts, detention officers Tabitha Smith and Jerrod Salyers first 

guarded Ms. Bates at the hospital. Later, Mr. Peters relieved Mr. Salyers for a 

twelve-hour shift. After Mr. Peters completed this shift, Ms. Bates did not tell the 

next detention officer on duty, Jennifer Eastwood, or any hospital staff, that 

Mr. Peters had acted inappropriately while guarding her. 

Two days later, a female charge nurse requested a meeting with Jail 

Administrator Kyle Murry to discuss some unusual behavior involving the security 

that had been provided at the hospital for Ms. Bates. The nurse told Administrator 

Murry that when Mr. Peters had been guarding Ms. Bates, the hospital-room door had 

always stayed shut and that Mr. Peters didn’t sit by the door like the other officers 

did. After speaking with the nurse, Administrator Murry asked the Mayes County 

Sheriff’s Office to investigate. 

As part of the investigation, sheriff’s investigators interviewed Ms. Bates and 

learned that during her hospitalization Mr. Peters had inserted his fingers into her 

vagina, had watched her take a shower, and had asked her to touch herself in front of 

him. During his later interview with the police, Mr. Peters wrote and signed a 

Voluntary Statement, saying that “Ms. Bates was flirting with me at the hospital on 

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Friday when I come on shift. I had a moment of weakness and she kiss me which 

lead to fringering [sic]. She grab me and was touching me.” Aplt. App. at 162. 

Mr. Peters was arrested on a charge of rape by instrumentation. He was also 

terminated immediately as a sheriff’s office employee. Mr. Peters later pleaded 

no-contest to assault with intent to commit a felony. Until learning that Mr. Peters 

had assaulted Ms. Bates, Sheriff Reed had known of no cases where a female inmate 

alleged assault by a detention officer. 

During his deposition, Mr. Peters testified that he was given no training in 

working at a correctional facility, in supervising female inmates, or in supervising 

inmates in a medical facility. He admitted that he needed no training to know that he 

should not inappropriately touch female inmates, calling that “common sense.” Id. at 

86. 

In her complaint, Ms. Bates alleges, under a municipal-liability theory, that the 

Board’s policies or customs were the moving force behind her constitutional injuries. 

Ms. Bates also brought a claim under Article 2, § 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution, 

alleging that the Board was liable under respondeat-superior for Mr. Peters’s 

misconduct. 

The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not a proper 

party for Ms. Bates’s § 1983 claim. Alternatively, the Board argued that even if it 

were a proper party, Ms. Bates could not establish that a policy or custom at the 

Mayes County Jail “was the moving force behind any alleged constitutional violation 

by Defendant Peters.” Aplt. App. at 54. Finally, the Board asserted that Mr. Peters 

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had not acted within the scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted 

Ms. Bates, meaning that the Board could not be held liable for violating the 

Oklahoma Constitution. 

The district court determined that it did not need to resolve whether the Board 

was a proper party because the Board’s motion for summary judgment could be 

granted on other grounds. The district court concluded that the Board was entitled to 

summary judgment on the § 1983 claim because it found “no causal link between any 

official policy or custom of the Sheriff or the Board and the harm alleged by 

[Ms. Bates].” Id. at 573. The court further concluded that the Board was entitled to 

judgment on the state-law claim because Mr. Peters’s sexual assaults on Ms. Bates 

“could have no legitimate purpose in maintaining discipline and were wholly outside 

of the scope of Peters’ employment.” Id. at 575. Ms. Bates now appeals. 

II. Discussion 

We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in 

favor of the Board, applying the same legal standard as applies in the district court. 

Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 787 (10th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment 

is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A. Municipal liability under § 1983 

“[A] municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it 

employs a tortfeasor.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). 

Instead, “a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 [must] 

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identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. “The 

plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality 

was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Id. at 404. In other words, “a 

plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of 

culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action 

and the deprivation of federal rights.”2

 Id. 

Ms. Bates argues that Mr. Peters’s inadequate training caused her to suffer a 

constitutional injury. “A municipal policy or custom may take the form of . . . the 

failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from 

‘deliberate indifference’ to the injuries that may be caused.” Bryson, 627 F.3d at 788 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 

389 (1989) (“Only where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant 

respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants can such a 

shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable 

under § 1983.”). “It is not enough . . . for [Ms. Bates] to show that there were 

general deficiencies in the county’s training program for jailers.” Lopez v. LeMaster, 

 2

 Ms. Bates alleges that the sexual assault deprived her of constitutional rights. 

The district court acknowledged that a prison guard’s sexual assault of an inmate can 

violate the Eighth Amendment. But the district court also cited our cases holding 

that consent can defeat an Eighth Amendment claim. The district court found 

undisputed evidence that sexual activity happened in Ms. Bates’s hospital room, but 

also found a genuine issue of material fact whether the sexual activity was 

consensual. In denying summary judgment for Mr. Peters, however, the court 

concluded that Ms. Bates had presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable 

trier of fact could conclude that a constitutional violation occurred. In this appeal, 

the Board does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that Ms. Bates presented 

sufficient evidence to show that her constitutional rights were violated. 

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172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th Cir. 1999). “Rather, [Ms. Bates] must identify a specific 

deficiency in the county’s training program closely related to [her] ultimate injury, 

and must prove that the deficiency in training actually caused [her] jailer to act with 

deliberate indifference to [her] safety.” Id. 

Ms. Bates asserts that Mr. Peters should not have been permitted to guard her 

by himself, because he was new to the job and he had not been adequately trained in 

supervising female inmates. But she has failed to identify a specific training 

deficiency that was closely related to her sexual assault. As we have previously 

explained in a similar context, “we are not persuaded that a plainly obvious 

consequence of a deficient training program would be the sexual assault of inmates. 

Specific or extensive training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that 

sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior.” Barney v. Pulsipher, 

143 F.3d 1299, 1308 (10th Cir. 1998). Although Mr. Peters did not receive formal 

training on supervising female inmates, he testified that he did not need any training 

to know that he was not supposed to inappropriately touch female inmates because 

that was “common sense.” Aplt. App. at 86. Under these circumstances, Ms. Bates 

has failed to present evidence creating a material factual dispute on the question of 

whether deficiencies in Mr. Peters’s training caused her constitutional injury. 

Ms. Bates also relies on Sheriff Reed’s admission that female inmates are at a 

higher risk of being sexually assaulted by male guards than by female guards. She 

argues that this contradicts the district court’s finding that Sheriff Reed had no reason 

to think Mr. Peters would sexually assault a female inmate based on Mr. Peters’s lack 

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of any known sexual misconduct. She contends that “[u]nder [the district court’s] 

reasoning, we have to wait for a sexual assault to occur, even where the policymaker 

acknowledges an admittedly higher risk of harm to female inmates.” Aplt. Br. at 11. 

She argues that “[a] prison official may be considered deliberately indifferent if he 

has knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm and fails to take reasonable steps 

to alleviate that risk.” Id. 

Sheriff Reed’s admission that female inmates are more at risk of harm does not 

support a finding of municipal liability. Mr. Peters had no criminal history, and 

Ms. Bates has failed to produce any evidence that the Sheriff or Board should have 

known that Mr. Peters posed a risk to female inmates. Absent knowing that 

Mr. Peters might be a safety risk toward female inmates, “[a]ny known harm could 

stem only from the mere fact of [Mr. Peters’s] gender.” Barney, 143 F.3d at 1311 

(internal quotation marks omitted). We have previously rejected the argument that a 

sheriff and county commissioners “disregarded an obvious risk to the safety of 

female inmates by allowing a single male guard to have custody of a female inmate 

absent any indication that the guard would assault her.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

For the reasons stated above and for the reasons more fully addressed by the 

district court in its Opinion and Order, we agree with the district court’s conclusion 

that that there was no causal link between any official policy or custom and the harm 

to Ms. Bates. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of the Board 

on Ms. Bates’s § 1983 claim. 

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B. State-law Claim 

In her complaint, Ms. Bates also alleges that the Board violated her rights 

under the Oklahoma Constitution. She asserts she is entitled to bring a claim against 

the Board under Bosh v. Cherokee County Building Authority, 305 P.3d 994 (Okla. 

2013). In Bosh, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized a private right of action for 

excessive-force claims by inmates under the Oklahoma Constitution. Id. at 1001. 

The Oklahoma Supreme Court also concluded that inmates could sue the employer 

for an excessive-force claim if the acts occurred within the scope of the detention 

officer’s employment. Id. at 1003-04. 

Here, the district court determined that Mr. Peters was not acting within the 

scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted Ms. Bates. The district court 

noted that Oklahoma courts have consistently found that sexual assaults committed 

by employees are not actions taken in furtherance of an employee’s duties, citing 

Schovanec v. Archdiocese of Oklahoma City, 188 P.3d 158, 161 (Okla. 2008) and 

N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (USA), 998 P.2d 592, 599-600 (Okla. 1999). 

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has explained the rule as follows: 

Generally, an assault upon a third person is not within the scope of 

employment. Exceptions to the general rule exist if: 1) the act is fairly and 

naturally incident to the employer’s business; 2) the act occurs while the 

employee is engaged in an act for the employer; or 3) the assault arises 

from a natural impulse growing out of or incident to the attempt to 

complete the master’s business. Nevertheless, an assertion that an act is 

accomplished during an employment activity is insufficient to assess 

liability against the employer unless the act was done to accomplish the 

assigned work. 

N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (USA), 998 P.2d at 598-99 (internal citations omitted). 

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In the N.H. case, the plaintiffs sought to hold the national church organization 

liable for its minister having sexually molested them as minor children. Id. at 597. 

Addressing the employer’s liability, the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited a case where 

it had held that a nursing home employee acted within his scope of employment when 

he struck an Alzheimer patient while bathing him. Id. at 599. The court explained 

that “the aide had to control a combative patient” and that “[t]he assault was an 

impulsive response to attempt to complete the patient’s bath” “naturally arising from 

the situation he had been placed in by the employer.” Id. In contrast, the court said 

that “[m]inisters should not molest children. When they do, it is not a part of the 

minister’s duty nor customary within the business of the congregation.” Id. The 

court further observed that “[the minister] acted for his own personal gratification 

rather than for any religious purpose” as “[i]t is inconceivable that [the minister’s] 

acts were of the nature of those which he was hired to perform.” Id. 

Given this guidance from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, we agree with the 

district court that Mr. Peters acted outside of the scope of his employment by 

sexually assaulting Ms. Bates. His conduct was not a misguided attempt to complete 

a task for his employer comparable to the situation with the nursing home employee. 

Obviously, sexually assaulting an inmate furthers no legitimate correctional purpose. 

Instead, like the minister who molested the children, Mr. Peters “had stepped aside 

from [his] employment at the time of the offending tortious act(s) on some mission or 

conduct to serve [his] own personal needs, motivations or purposes,” Baker v. St. 

Francis Hosp., 126 P.3d 602, 607 (Okla. 2005). Under these circumstances, we 

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agree with the district court that the Board cannot be held liable for Mr. Peters’s 

conduct and we affirm summary judgment on this claim. 

III. Conclusion 

We affirm the district court’s judgment.3 

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge 

 3

 Given our disposition, we need not reach the question of whether the Board 

was the proper party for Ms. Bates’s § 1983 claim. 

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