Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01501/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01501-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fandango, LLC
Appellee
Robert Mankes
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROBERT MANKES,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

VIVID SEATS LTD., FANDANGO, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1500, 2015-1501

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of North Carolina in Nos. 5:13-cv-00717-

FL, 5:13-cv-00716-FL, Judge Louise Wood Flanagan.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

ROBERT MANKES,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

VIVID SEATS LTD.,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1909

______________________ 

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2 MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of North Carolina in No. 5:13-cv-00717-

FL, Judge Louise Wood Flanagan.

______________________ 

Decided: April 22, 2016

______________________ 

ANTHONY J. BILLER, Coats & Bennett, PLLC, Cary, 

NC, argued for plaintiff-appellant and plaintiff-appellee 

Robert Mankes. Also represented by DAVID E. BENNETT. 

RICHARD THOMAS MATTHEWS, Williams Mullen, PC,

Raleigh, NC, argued for defendant-appellee and defendant-appellant Vivid Seats Ltd. Also represented by 

ANDREW ROBERT SHORES; JOSEPH RAY POPE, Richmond, 

VA. 

SHARON DAVIS, Rothwell, Figg, Ernst & Manbeck, 

P.C., Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee 

Fandango, LLC. Also represented by STEVEN M.

LIEBERMAN. 

KEVIN J. CULLIGAN, Goodwin Procter LLP, New York, 

NY, for amicus curiae Askeladden, L.L.C. Also represented by JOHN P. HANISH; BRIAN TIMOTHY BURGESS, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

Before TARANTO, SCHALL, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

TARANTO, Circuit Judge.

 Robert Mankes owns U.S. Patent No. 6,477,503, 

which describes and claims methods for managing a

reservation system that divides inventory between a local 

server and a remote Internet server. In October 2013, Mr. 

Mankes sued Vivid Seats Ltd. and Fandango, LLC in the 

Eastern District of North Carolina, alleging that their 

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MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 3

operation of Internet-based reservation systems, in conjunction with the operation of local reservation systems by 

movie theaters and other entertainment venues, infringes 

the ’503 patent. Because it is undisputed that no one 

person performs all of the steps of the method claims, Mr. 

Mankes’s case depends on establishing what has been 

called “divided infringement.” 

When Mr. Mankes filed his complaints, the law relating to divided infringement was in the midst of a multiyear process of active judicial reconsideration, including 

by this court sitting en banc and by the Supreme Court. 

This court had granted en banc review to address the 

standards for direct-infringement liability for divided 

infringement but, in its decision, had left existing directinfringement standards in place without reconsidering 

them, while providing an independent inducement basis 

for divided-infringement liability. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. 

Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 

(en banc) (Akamai II). By mid-2014, however, the Supreme Court had reversed Akamai II, held that dividedinfringement liability of the sort at issue here requires 

some person to be liable for direct infringement under 35 

U.S.C. § 271(a), and remanded for possible reconsideration of direct-infringement standards by this court. 

Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 

2111, 2120 (2014) (Limelight). 

In early 2015, the district court in the present cases, 

applying the law on direct-infringement liability as it 

then stood, concluded that Mr. Mankes’s allegations are

insufficient to establish direct infringement under 

§ 271(a), and on that basis the court granted judgments 

on the pleadings for Vivid Seats and Fandango. When 

Vivid Seats thereafter sought attorney’s fees against Mr. 

Mankes under 35 U.S.C. § 285, the court denied the 

request, finding the case not to be exceptional, a prerequisite to a fee award under § 285. Mr. Mankes has appealed 

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4 MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 

the merits judgments against him, and Vivid Seats has 

appealed the denial of fees. 

During the briefing on the merits appeal here, the legal standards applied by the district court were first 

reinforced, then revised, by further decisions of this court 

in the Akamai-Limelight case. In Akamai Technologies, 

Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899 (Fed. Cir. 

2015) (Akamai III), a panel of this court, on remand from 

the Supreme Court, rejected direct-infringement liability 

for Limelight—as had the initial panel in the case in 

2010, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 

F.3d 1311, 1318–22 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Akamai I), and the 

en banc court in 2012, Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1307, 1318–

19. The Akamai III panel reasoned that Limelight did not 

direct or control its customers’ performance of claim steps, 

that its customers were not agents for Limelight, and that 

Limelight and its customers did not together constitute a 

joint enterprise (whose members can be charged with 

each other’s acts in the enterprise). 786 F.3d at 914–15. 

Three months later, however, the en banc court vacated Akamai III and decided Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. 

Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 

(en banc) (Akamai IV), cert. denied, 2016 WL 442440 (U.S.

Apr. 18, 2016). The en banc court changed the result in 

the Akamai-Limelight case, now ruling against Limelight

and for Akamai. Id. at 1025. The court did so by broadening the circumstances in which others’ acts may be 

attributed to an accused infringer to support directinfringement liability for divided infringement, relaxing 

the tighter constraints on such attribution reflected in our 

earlier precedents and in the three previous rulings for 

Limelight on direct infringement. See Aristocrat Techs. 

Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 709 F.3d 1348, 1362–

63 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 

532 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC Res., Inc. v. 

Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380–82 (Fed. Cir. 

2007). The en banc court concluded that attribution is 

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MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 5

proper in a joint-enterprise setting, and it also articulated 

a standard that permits liability “when an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or receipt of 

a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented method and establishes the manner or timing of that 

performance.” Akamai IV, 797 F.3d at 1023. The court 

added: “In the future, other factual scenarios may arise 

which warrant attributing others’ performance of method 

steps to a single actor. Going forward, principles of attribution are to be considered in the context of the particular facts presented.” Id. And the court stated: “To the 

extent our prior cases formed the predicate for [Akamai 

III], those decisions are also overruled.” Id. at 1023 n.3.

We need not say how much broadening occurred in 

Akamai IV. In the present cases, the district court’s 

rulings and the arguments of Fandango and Vivid Seats 

to the district court were squarely based on the earlier, 

narrower standard. We vacate the judgments on the 

pleadings against Mr. Mankes and remand for further 

proceedings in light of Akamai IV. 

We affirm the denial of attorney’s fees to Vivid Seats. 

Not only is Vivid Seats no longer a prevailing party (given 

our vacatur of the judgment in its favor), but we readily 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming the case not to be exceptional even under 

the state of the law before Akamai IV. Mr. Mankes rested 

his case on reasonable arguments for adjustment of legal 

standards that this court had already granted en banc 

review to consider in Akamai II and that remained in 

play, as indicated by Akamai II’s postponing reconsideration of those standards, by Limelight’s remand, and, 

ultimately, by Akamai IV’s adoption of broadened standards. In these circumstances, the district court did not err 

in refusing to deem unreasonable Mr. Mankes’s pursuit of 

this case to date.

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6 MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 

BACKGROUND

The ’503 patent, entitled “Active Reservation System,” 

recognizes that, to serve a national market, vendors have 

begun selling their goods and services both through the

Internet and at their physical locations. ’503 patent, col. 

1, lines 31–37.1 To do so, the patent says, vendors have 

typically divided their inventory, allocating a portion to 

the physical site and ceding control of the remaining 

inventory to the remote Internet site. Id., col. 1, lines 38–

47. But when the inventory is split, “neither [site] ha[s] 

contemporaneous information on the overall state of the 

local inventory,” which may result in underselling when 

one site has exhausted its allocation but the other still 

has available inventory, or may require the vendor to 

undertake the costly task of reallocating its inventory

between the sites. Id., col. 1, lines 43–67.

The specification describes means of controlling the 

entire inventory from a local site. The local site maintains the total inventory of available goods and services 

and designates pricing. Id., col. 3, lines 24–27. It communicates what portion of the inventory is available to an 

Internet server, which makes that inventory accessible for 

purchase by consumers online. Id., col. 3, lines 27–32. 

When a sale is requested over the Internet, the Internet 

site contacts the local site, which confirms the sale and 

updates the total inventory. Id., col. 3, lines 32–38. The 

adjusted inventory is then transmitted to the Internet 

site, along with a confirmation of the sale, which is forwarded to the consumer. Id., col. 3, lines 38–42. In this 

way, any time a sale is made, whether at the local or 

Internet site, the local site can keep an up-to-date account 

 

1 The patent also refers to telephone reservation 

systems, but the claims all involve the Internet, and we 

limit our discussion to Internet systems. 

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MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 7

of its total inventory and communicate that information 

to both sites. Id., col. 3, lines 16–19.

Claim 1 is illustrative, stating: 

1. A method for operating an Internet based 

active reservation system for the purchase of 

goods and services, comprising:

(a) providing an owner event server located at 

and operated by a local event owner having 

an available inventory of goods and services 

at a local site;

(b) providing an active reservation server located at and operated by user remote from said 

local site, said active reservation server accepting only data from said owner event server and formatting said data for viewing by an 

Internet-based consumer;

(c) allocating said available inventory by only 

said owner event server at all times between 

local inventory and Internet inventory;

(d) adjusting said available inventory by only 

said event owner at said owner event server 

at all times based on purchases of goods and 

services at said local event site;

(e) communicating said allocated Internet inventory only to said active reservation server;

(f) receiving purchase requests for goods and 

services in said Internet inventory at said active reservation server from said Internetbased consumer;

(g) communicating said purchase requests from 

said active reservation server to said owner 

event server;

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8 MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 

(h) accepting said purchase requests solely at 

said local event server and adjusting said Internet inventory only by said owner event 

server at all times to establish an adjusted Internet inventory;

(i) communicating said accepting and said adjusted Internet inventory from said owner 

event server to said active reservation server; 

and

(j) communicating said accepting and confirmation indicia relative thereto from said active 

reservation system to said Internet consumer.

Id., col. 8, lines 33–67.

In these cases, filed in October 2013, Mr. Mankes has

alleged that Vivid Seats and Fandango infringe the ’503 

patent by operating Internet-based reservation systems 

for reserving, buying, and selling tickets to movies, sporting events, and concerts. He has admitted that Vivid 

Seats and Fandango do not themselves perform every step 

of the claims. He has urged a finding of divided infringement, however, on the asserted ground that local entertainment venues perform the remaining steps.

When these suits began, divided-infringement law 

was in flux, as reflected in the developments in the case 

brought by Akamai against Limelight. In 2010, a panel of 

this court had held that Limelight could not be held liable 

for direct infringement, applying Muniauction and BMC. 

Akamai I, 629 F.3d at 1318–22. But in 2011, this court 

granted en banc review. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight 

Networks, Inc., 419 F. App’x 989 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In the 

2012 en banc decision, Akamai II, the court left the rejection of direct infringement in place without revisiting 

existing standards, 692 F.3d at 1307, 1318–19, but held

that inducement under § 271(b) might be established even 

if no person could be held liable for direct infringement, 

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MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 9

id. at 1308–18. That was the state of the law in 2013

when Mr. Mankes brought these suits. See Aristrocrat, 

709 F.3d at 1361–64. The Supreme Court, however, had 

already invited the Solicitor General to express the views 

of the United States on Limelight’s certiorari petition

seeking review of Akamai II. See Limelight Networks, 

Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2879 (2013). 

When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 895 

(2014), the parties in the present cases, recognizing that 

the Court might alter the legal landscape, asked the 

district court for a stay of proceedings, and the court 

obliged. Then, in June 2014, the Supreme Court decided 

Limelight, eliminating the independent inducement 

option and remanding with the observation that “the 

Federal Circuit will have the opportunity to revisit the 

§ 271(a) question if it so chooses.” Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at

2120. After that decision, the district court in the present 

cases put off deciding whether to lift the stays until this 

court, on remand from the Supreme Court in the AkamaiLimelight case, decided whether once again to hear the 

matter en banc (a process necessary to change preexisting direct-infringement law) or to refer the matter 

back to a panel. Once this court chose the panel-decision 

route, the district court in the present cases lifted the 

stays and allowed Vivid Seats and Fandango to file substantive motions on infringement. 

Vivid Seats and Fandango moved for judgment on the 

pleadings, arguing that they could not be liable for direct 

infringement because, based on the prevailing standard, 

Mr. Mankes had not alleged enough to attribute the ticket 

sellers’ actions to them. In his responses, Mr. Mankes 

noted the various changes in the state of the law, and he 

continued to argue for changing the law on divided infringement. In February 2015, in two materially similar 

opinions, the district court granted the defendants’ motions—addressing the merits of both direct infringement 

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10 MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 

and inducement. The court relied on the prevailing 

divided-infringement law and found that Mr. Mankes had 

not “allege[d] facts permitting the inference that defendant[s] direct[ ] or control[ ] the theaters in their actions.” 

15-1500 J.A. 8, 18. The court entered final judgment for 

Vivid Seats and, after Fandango dismissed its counterclaims without prejudice, entered final judgment for 

Fandango. 

After the district court granted judgment on the 

pleadings, Vivid Seats filed a motion requesting attorney’s

fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. On June 30, 2015, the district 

court, considering all of the circumstances, found the case 

not exceptional and therefore denied Vivid Seats’ motion.

Meanwhile, on May 13, 2015, before Mr. Mankes filed 

his opening brief in his (consolidated) appeals from the

merits judgments, a panel of this court decided Akamai 

III, applying a divided-infringement standard sufficiently 

limiting that, as in Akamai I and Akamai II, the court 

held Limelight to be entitled to judgment of no direct 

infringement as a matter of law. Akamai III, 786 F.3d at 

899–915. In August 2015, however, before briefing was 

completed, the en banc court vacated that opinion, see 

Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 612 F. 

App’x 617 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and decided the case anew in 

Akamai IV. In that decision, the court ruled against 

Limelight, reversing the district court judgment in its 

favor and holding it liable for direct infringement based 

on the articulation of the broadened liability standards 

quoted above. 797 F.3d at 1022–23. Those standards now 

apply on this appeal. See Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of City of 

Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 282 (1969). 

We have jurisdiction to review the merits and fees

judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

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MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 11

DISCUSSION

A 

We review the district court’s judgments on the pleadings de novo. buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 

1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 

741 F.3d 470, 474 (4th Cir. 2014). The district court here 

concluded that Mr. Mankes’s operative complaints 

(amended complaints filed in February and March of 

2014) do not plead facts sufficient to support liability for 

divided infringement. But the district court reached that 

conclusion based on legal standards that are now too 

narrow in light of the intervening decision in Akamai IV, 

which sufficiently broadened the standard governing 

direct-infringement liability for divided infringement that 

a three-time loss on the issue for Akamai (in Akamai I, II, 

and III) turned into a win. We conclude that the district 

court’s judgment in this case should be vacated and the 

case remanded for further proceedings in light of the new 

articulation of divided-infringement standards. 

1 

We first reject Vivid Seats’ argument (not joined by 

Fandango) that Mr. Mankes waived a claim of direct 

infringement. The district court did not find any such 

waiver; it did not even discuss waiver. The court addressed direct infringement on the merits. We see no 

error in its having done so. 

A sufficient reason, reflected in the district court’s silence about waiver, is that Vivid Seats did not expressly 

argue waiver to the district court. In opposing Vivid 

Seats’ motion for judgment on the pleadings in November 

2014, after the June 2014 Limelight decision, Mr. Mankes 

relied on direct infringement—despite having told Vivid 

Seats by email in March 2014, before Limelight rejected 

the independent inducement theory of Akamai II, that he 

was not pressing direct infringement in his amended 

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12 MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 

complaint, 15-1500 J.A. 125–26. But Vivid Seats responded to Mr. Mankes’s shift in emphasis to direct 

infringement only by stating that it was “surprising”; 

Vivid Seats did not argue that Mr. Mankes must be held 

to have waived a direct-infringement claim. Reply Br. in 

Support of Def. Vivid Seats Ltd.’s Mot. for Judgment on 

the Pleadings at 1, Mankes v. Vivid Seats Ltd., No. 5:13-

cv-00717 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2014), ECF No. 40. Without 

a waiver argument having been directly made by Vivid 

Seats, we cannot fault the district court for deciding the 

merits of the direct-infringement contention rather than 

considering it waived.

Vivid Seats’ waiver argument amounts to a new argument on appeal, but it makes no showing of the plain 

error or miscarriage of justice required to justify reversal 

based on a new argument. See Karpel v. Inova Health 

Sys. Servs., 134 F.3d 1222, 1227 (4th Cir. 1998). Indeed, 

it makes no persuasive showing of error at all. Mr. 

Mankes’s February 2014 amended complaint is not by its 

terms limited to indirect infringement, and Vivid Seats 

cites no authority treating such a complaint as not encompassing direct infringement. (The amended complaint 

against Fandango is similar, yet Fandango does not argue 

that it excludes a direct-infringement contention.) Vivid 

Seats points to the March 2014 email statement by Mr. 

Mankes’s counsel, but it cites no authority requiring

treatment of that email as a forfeiture, at least when, 

several months later, the Supreme Court in Limelight 

altered the law by eliminating the independent inducement principle of Akamai II. And Vivid Seats has identified no way in which it was prejudiced by the district 

court’s considering direct infringement to be in the case, 

especially in light of the liberal availability of the opportunity to amend pleadings so early in the case. See Laber 

v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426–27 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 

In these circumstances, we find no basis for deeming Mr. 

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MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 13

Mankes to have waived his direct-infringement contention 

against Vivid Seats. 

2 

On the merits, we conclude that Mr. Mankes’s cases 

warrant reinstatement and a remand for further proceedings in light of the broadened divided-infringement 

standard articulated by the en banc court in Akamai IV. 

Mr. Mankes has alleged that each step of claim 1 is performed by some entity. Some steps, i.e., (b), (e)–(g), (j), 

involve operating an online system for selling tickets and 

communicating sales to the inventory holder; Mr. Mankes 

has alleged that Vivid Seats and Fandango perform those 

steps. The remaining steps, i.e., (a), (c)–(d), (h)–(i), involve maintaining an inventory of tickets and updating 

the amounts in response to local and Internet sales; Mr. 

Mankes has alleged that local venues perform those steps. 

In the district court, there was no serious dispute that Mr. 

Mankes has sufficiently alleged in each case that the 

identified entities—the defendant Internet entity and the 

associated local venues—together perform all steps and 

deal with each other in making the reservation systems 

work. The dispute was over whether Mr. Mankes has 

alleged sufficient facts to justify attributing the local 

venues’ actions to Vivid Seats and Fandango under the 

then-governing standards for such attribution. And the 

district court held, in agreement with Vivid Seats and 

Fandango, that Mr. Mankes has not done so because he 

has not alleged that the local venues either are the defendants’ agents or are required by the defendants to take 

the particular actions that constitute performance of steps 

(a), (c)–(d), (h)–(i). 15-1500 J.A. 5–8, 15–18.

Although Mr. Mankes noted at oral argument that his 

claim could not survive under the direct-infringement 

standards pre-dating Akamai IV (as Akamai’s directinfringement claim did not survive under those standards), 15-1500 Oral Arg. at 1:16–2:02, those are no longer 

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14 MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 

the governing standards. Under Akamai IV, the district 

court’s analysis is now insufficient to support rejection of 

direct-infringement liability here. This court in Akamai 

IV articulated circumstances warranting attribution not 

previously enumerated in such terms, and it changed an 

Akamai loss into a Limelight loss on direct infringement 

on that basis. 797 F.3d at 1023 (“an alleged infringer 

conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a 

benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented 

method and establishes the manner or timing of that 

performance”). Akamai IV also is explicit that “other 

factual scenarios may arise which warrant attributing 

others’ performance of method steps to a single actor,” to 

be assessed “in the context of the particular facts presented.” Id. In at least those ways, Akamai IV makes clear 

that it does not suffice to reject direct-infringement liability here to conclude that local venues are not agents of the 

defendants and are not required by the defendants to take 

the claim steps that they perform.

When the governing legal standards have changed 

during an appeal, it may be appropriate, in the exercise of 

our authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106, to vacate a determination made under superseded standards and to remand for consideration under the new standards and for 

any proceedings made necessary and appropriate by the 

new standards. See, e.g., Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 

600, 607 (1935) (“We may recognize [an intervening legal] 

change, which may affect the result, by setting aside the 

judgment and remanding the case so that the . . . court 

may be free to act.”); Oplus Techs., Ltd. v. Vizio, Inc., 782 

F.3d 1371, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (vacating and remanding attorney’s fees case in light of Supreme Court 

decision changing the legal standard); Meadaa v. K.A.P. 

Enters., L.L.C., 756 F.3d 875, 885 (5th Cir. 2014); GDG 

Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov’t of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024, 1029 

(11th Cir. 2014); McCravy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 

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MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 15

176, 180–82 (4th Cir. 2012). In the present case, such a 

disposition is appropriate. 

We do not ourselves rule on whether the allegations 

Mr. Mankes has already made might be interpreted to 

justify attribution under Akamai IV, or what additional 

factual allegations might do so. Nor are we prepared to 

find that the record here makes clear that the judgments 

under review are correct under the newly articulated 

standards regardless of what facts might now be forthcoming with those standards in mind. Mr. Mankes has 

already alleged that Vivid Seats and Fandango market 

their reservation systems to local venues and offer them 

financial incentives “to perform . . . the other steps of the 

claimed invention by having the Sellers use the Vivid 

Seats [and Fandango] reservation system[s],” 15-1500 

J.A. 64 ¶¶ 21–22, 87 ¶¶ 18–19, and that local venues’ 

decisions to use the Vivid Seats or Fandango systems 

initiate commercial arrangements involving continuing 

communications about sales of tickets to permit the 

sellers to update their inventories, 15-1500 J.A. 63 ¶ 14, 

86 ¶ 14. For such an ongoing interactive commercial 

relationship, it is plausible that Vivid Seats and Fandango establish rules governing the needed coordination. 

Given what he already has alleged, Mr. Mankes should 

have the opportunity to allege facts that allow for a more 

informed evaluation than is possible on the present 

record, which was not developed with Akamai IV in mind, 

of whether the defendants’ accused activities come within

the ambit of the Akamai IV “conditions participation” 

standard or might otherwise justify finding directinfringement liability for divided infringement.

We do not think it appropriate to rule out at this stage 

any particular theory of direct infringement, including the

joint-enterprise theory and the possibility of other bases 

of attribution recognized in Akamai IV. Nor do we prescribe the course of proceedings required on remand

beyond ruling that, given the early stage of this litigation, 

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16 MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 

Mr. Mankes must at least have the chance to amend his

complaints, if he believes such amendment might be 

useful or the district court determines it is necessary, 

based on this court’s new articulation of dividedinfringement standards. See Laber, 438 F.3d at 426.2 

With that exception, we leave it to the district court in the 

first instance to apply Akamai IV to the current complaints, or to newly amended complaints, under the 

standards that govern whether a complaint suffices to 

allow litigation to continue past the stage of the opening 

pleadings. We also note that it is up to the district court 

to apply the usual standards for following any rulings 

that alter the governing law while the case is on remand. 

We vacate the district court’s judgments on the pleadings 

and remand.

 

2 See also Ladapo v. Target Stores, Inc., 615 F. 

App’x 842, 843 (5th Cir. 2015); Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 

625 F.2d 499, 512 (5th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. White Metal 

Rolling & Stamping Corp., 249 F.2d 262, 264 (2d Cir. 

1957) (vacatur and amendment warranted when “the 

controlling law has been altered or clarified during the 

time the appeal has been pending”); 6 Charles Alan 

Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Richard L. 

Marcus & Adam M. Steinman, Federal Practice and 

Procedure § 1473 (3d ed. 2015) (courts broadly permit 

amendment to “enable a party to assert matters that were 

overlooked or were unknown at the time the party interposed the original complaint”); id. § 1474 (“Courts also 

have allowed a party to amend in order to change the 

nature or theory of the party’s claim . . . .”); cf. Hartis v. 

Chicago Title Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 935, 948 (8th Cir. 2012) 

(change in law may warrant amendment even after 

scheduling-order deadline). 

Case: 15-1501 Document: 19-2 Page: 16 Filed: 04/22/2016
MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 17

B 

We affirm the denial of Vivid Seats’ motion for attorney’s fees. We review for abuse of discretion the district 

court’s determination that attorney’s fees were not warranted under § 285 because the case is not exceptional. 

Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. 

Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014). Section 285 permits a court, in an 

“exceptional” case, to “award reasonable attorney fees to 

the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. Because we 

vacate and remand judgment on the pleadings and no 

other relief runs in Vivid Seats’ favor, Vivid Seats is no 

longer the “prevailing party” under § 285. Inland Steel 

Co. v. LTV Steel Co., 364 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 

see Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992). Vivid 

Seats agreed at oral argument. 15-1909 Oral Arg. at 

1:14–1:45. At this point, § 285 does not authorize the 

district court to award attorney’s fees to Vivid Seats. 

In any event, independently of whether legal standards undergo further changes or whether Mr. Mankes 

eventually loses, we think it clear and worth ruling that 

the district court committed no error in rejecting an 

exceptional-case contention even under the law before 

Akamai IV. As the Supreme Court has explained, an 

“exceptional” case is “one that stands out from others with 

respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating 

position (considering both the governing law and the facts 

of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case 

was litigated.” Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & 

Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014). Here, the 

district court could readily view Mr. Mankes as having 

reasonably, openly, and in good faith pressed arguments 

for plausibly result-altering changes in governing legal

standards that were demonstrably under active judicial 

reconsideration in this court and the Supreme Court at 

the time. While Mr. Mankes’s case was pending before 

the district court, the law on divided infringement remained uncertain, with both our court and the Supreme 

Case: 15-1501 Document: 19-2 Page: 17 Filed: 04/22/2016
18 MANKES v. VIVID SEATS LTD. 

Court weighing in on possible changes, and Mr. Mankes’s 

litigation conduct appropriately reflected that shifting 

legal landscape. Without addressing other situations, we 

conclude that, in these circumstances, the district court 

properly determined that this case, to date, has not been 

exceptional in a way that would justify an award of fees 

against Mr. Mankes. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district 

court’s judgments dismissing the cases and remand for 

further proceedings, and we affirm the denial of Vivid 

Seats’ motion for attorney’s fees.

No costs. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED

Case: 15-1501 Document: 19-2 Page: 18 Filed: 04/22/2016