Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01468/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01468-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles B. Jones
Plaintiff
P. W.
Defendant
Melanie Williams
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES B. JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

P. W., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-01468-SI 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Re: Dkt. No. 1

Charles B. Jones, an inmate at Kern Valley State Prison has filed this civil rights action 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to complain about the refusal of two clerks at the Alameda County 

Superior Court to file several documents he submitted for filing. His complaint is now before the 

court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

BACKGROUND

The complaint alleges the following:

On three different occasions, Jones tried to file three “civil petitions” in the Alameda 

County Superior Court. Docket No. 1 at 8. Jones identifies these “civil petitions” as a 

“[p]reliminary notice & demand offer to compromise;” a “notice of application to be released from 

liability on a surety bond;” and a “request, or transfer (or) extension of superior court records.” Id.

at 10-11, 21. 

The first rejection occurred after Jones mailed his three petitions on or about January 16, 

2015 to the civil division of the superior court. Id. at 9. On January 30, 2015, the petitions were 

returned to him by deputy clerk P.W., with a form letter stating the following as the reason for 

rejection: “All attached motions are dismissed for fail[u]re to state a legally cognizable claim.” 

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Id.; Docket No. 1-1 at 15. Jones’ petitions were not assigned case numbers nor presented to a 

judicial officer. Docket No. 1 at 10. He believes it wrongful that “a non-licensed court clerk 

acting as a state bar licensed judicial officer of the court” ruled on his petitions. Docket No. 1 at 9. 

The next rejection occurred after February 23, 2015, when Jones mailed “duplicate 

cop[ies]” of his petitions to the superior court. Id. at 10. This time, the civil cover sheet he 

prepared was removed, and his criminal case number was written on the petitions, which were 

then processed by the criminal division of the superior court. Id. The petitions went to a judge 

who denied them in two brief orders. Jones’ “‘application for release from liability on a surety 

bond pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, § 996.110-150; and Civil Code sec. § 2794(3); Pen. 

Code Sec. §§ 4410’” was denied “as nonsensical.” Docket No. 1-1 at 19. Jones’ “‘preliminary 

notice and demands pursuant to Civil Code sections §§ 1782(a) and PC § 14150’” also were 

denied “as nonsensical.” Docket No. 1-1 at 20. The judge further wrote that Jones could not file a 

civil action against the Alameda County Superior Court under his criminal docket number and 

would have to mail any civil complaint or petition to the civil division. Docket No. 1-1 at 19-20. 

Jones’ third attempt to file his petitions occurred on or about June 8, 2015, when he sent 

his petitions to the Alameda County Superior Court again. Docket No. 1 at 10-11. On or about 

June 16, 2015, Alameda County Superior Court deputy clerk Melanie Williams rejected the 

petitions using a form rejection letter with this statement on it: “Please submit a civil complaint or 

petition so we may open up a new case. You may then proceed with the filing of documents for 

your case.” Docket No. 1-1 at 17; see also Docket No. 1 at 11. Jones believes this was wrongful 

because the clerk “would have had to read & screen the self drafted pleadings with the legal 

knowledge & comprehension of a licensed certified lawyer who can make a determination” about 

the code sections cited in his petitions. Docket No. 1 at 11. 

Dissatisfied with the results in superior court, Jones then filed a petition for writ of 

mandate in the California Court of Appeal and a petition for review in the California Supreme 

Court to complain about the allegedly improper action by the superior court clerks. Docket No. 1 

at 8. His petition for writ of mandate was summarily denied by the California Court of Appeal. 

See Docket No. 1-2 at 21. His petition for review was returned unfiled by the California Supreme 

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Court because he had missed the jurisdictional deadline for seeking review of the California Court 

of Appeal’s decision. See Docket No. 1-2 at 22. 

Having been rejected by three California courts, Jones now turns to the federal court. 

Here, he contends that the superior court clerks violated his First Amendment and Fourteenth 

Amendment right of access to the courts. 

His complaint discusses at length the claims that he wanted to pursue in the state court. 

Jones stirs together concepts from a variety of legal fields – including secured transactions, surety 

law, criminal law, civil judgments, contracts, habeas and California Penal Code provisions 

mentioning a County Jail Capital Expenditure bond measure – to create his theory of relief. In a 

nutshell, his theory is that persons convicted of crimes “automatically incur[] a liability to pay a 

debt of imprisonment to society,” and “California is selling that debt of imprisonment for 

cash/credi[t], secondary paper, promissory notes to bankers/investors/credit collectors for advance 

pay.” Docket No. 1-1 at 3. This supports relief for him, he asserts, because California has 

“materially altered” prisoners’ obligations to pay their debt to society by changing those 

obligations to “obligations to be detained as sureties (collateral) to back the bonds that were 

loaned/sold to third parties.” Id. at 5; see also Docket No. 1 at 20 (his claim “provides a remedy to 

be released legally from the liability of an (obligation of confinement) as a surety used as 

collateral to back a (surety bond) that was sold to third parties, i.e., ‘bankers/investors/credit 

collectors’ for secondary paper, promissory notes, credit/cash. California[’]s white collar 

corporate crime of ‘fraud’ for financial gain has placed an illegal restraint, upon this plaintiffs life 

& liberty” (errors in source)).

In his prayer for relief, Jones requests: (1) a declaratory judgment that the defendants 

violated his rights by interfering with his efforts to file his “contemplated litigation;” (2) an 

injunction compelling the defendants not to place obstacles to Jones filing his “‘preliminary notice 

and demands,’ notice of application to be released from liability of a surety bond,’ ‘request for 

superior court records pertaining to this plaintiffs bond information,’” or any other litigation 

relating to these claims; (3) appointment of counsel; (4) prevailing party fees; and (5) any other 

relief this court deems proper. Docket No. 1-1 at 6. 

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DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 

claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). 

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 350 (1996).1 The Ninth Circuit has “traditionally differentiated between two types of access 

to court claims: those involving prisoners’ right[s] to affirmative assistance and those involving 

prisoners’ rights to litigate without active interference.” Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 

(9th Cir.2011) (emphasis in original). Jones’ claim is one for active interference with his right to 

litigate. The constitutional right to litigate without interference encompasses the First Amendment 

right to petition the government and Fourteenth Amendment due process right to pursue legal 

redress by filing civil actions that have a reasonable basis in law or fact. See Silva, 658 F.3d at 

 

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The constitutional source of the right of access to the courts is not settled. See 

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-14 & 415 n.12 (2002); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 

366-67 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). Supreme Court decisions have grounded the right in the 

Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment Petition Clause, the Fifth 

Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due 

Process Clauses. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415 n.12 (citing cases). The Ninth Circuit also has 

found various constitutional sources for the right. See, e.g., Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 897 

(9th Cir. 1995) (right grounded in due process and equal protection clauses). As this court 

understands the complaint, Jones’ citations to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 

and Equal Protection Clause as well as to the First Amendment are for the purpose of identifying 

the constitutional bases of his claim for denial of access to the courts. See, e.g., Docket No. 1 at 5, 

13-14. His complaint does not allege any facts suggesting any claim for relief other than for a 

denial of access to the courts.

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1102. To state a claim for a violation of the right to litigate without active interference, the 

plaintiff must allege that he has suffered an actual injury, such as the dismissal of his pending 

action. See id. at 1103–04. Additionally, the “underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or 

lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must 

describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415. The 

underlying cause of action must be described by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair 

notice to a defendant, id. at 416, and to the court in a prisoner action that must be screened under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

Jones alleges that clerks at the Alameda County Superior Court interfered with his right of 

access to the court by rejecting his petitions without assigning a case number to those petitions and

without forwarding them to a judicial officer for action. His claim fails for several reasons. 

First, assuming for purposes of argument that the clerks did interfere with the right of

access, that interference has ended and prospective relief is no longer available. A judge did

review the petitions after they were resubmitted following the first rejection by a clerk. Alameda 

County Superior Court Judge Larry Goodman reviewed the petitions – which Jones alleges were

duplicate copies of the petitions earlier rejected by a clerk -- and rejected them as “nonsensical.” 

Jones has not been shut out of state court. His petitions were heard by a superior court judge, who 

found them to be legally meritless. Jones has received that which he complains the defendantcourt clerks deprived him of: judicial consideration of his petitions. Not only did he receive that 

ruling from the superior court, he also received a ruling from the California Court of Appeal when 

he petitioned the latter court about the superior court clerks’ actions. No prospective relief is 

warranted on the facts alleged.

Second, even if the superior court judge’s ruling did not suffice to give Jones access to the 

courts, Jones is not entitled to the injunctive relief he requests for a separate reason. Ordering the 

state court to accept his filings would be in the nature of a writ of mandamus, yet the federal court 

has no authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a state court. The federal mandamus statute 

provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of 

mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform 

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a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The mandamus statute only reaches federal

officers and employees. “The federal courts are without power to issue writs of mandamus to 

direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their duties.” Clark v. State of 

Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966). A petition for a writ of mandamus to compel a 

state court or official to take or refrain from some action is frivolous as a matter of law. See 

Demos v. U.S. District Court, 925 F.2d 1160, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1991); see also In re Campbell,

264 F.3d 730, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2001) (denying petition for writ of mandamus that would order 

state trial court to give petitioner access to certain trial transcripts which he sought in preparation 

for filing state post-conviction petition).

2

 

Third, the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Jones’ petition for writ of mandate 

strongly suggests that the clerks’ actions were permissible under state law. See Docket No. 1-1 at 

22 (petition for review describing the allegations of the petition for writ of mandate/prohibition 

sought in the lower court). That is, if the superior court clerks had no authority to reject Jones’ 

filings without forwarding them to a judicial officer, one would expect the California Court of 

Appeal to have said so by issuing a writ of mandate. The California Court of Appeal’s denial of 

Jones’ petition indicates that the superior court clerks acted permissibly, and were not required to 

file and assign a civil case number to these odd documents received from the prisoner. 

Fourth, as Jones recognizes, an access to the courts claim requires an underlying claim that 

is “nonfrivolous” or “arguable.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415. Yet the more he describes his 

 

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Eleventh Amendment immunity also would pose a problem for Jones’ official-capacity 

claim against the defendants. See Docket No. 1 at 7 (defendants sued in individual and official 

capacities). The action against the defendants in their official capacity as Clerks of the Alameda 

County Superior Court is considered an action against the State of California, and must be 

dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 

bars from the federal courts suits against a state by its own citizens, citizens of another state, or 

citizens or subjects of any foreign state, absent consent to the filing of such suit. Atascadero State 

Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1985). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to 

suits against an arm of the state, such as a California superior court. Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. 

Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (11th Amendment bars suit against state superior 

court and its employees). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state officials sued in 

their official capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985). 

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claim, the further into frivolity he plunges. His contentions that he is collateral for a bond that has 

been lent or sold to a third party, and that the abstract of judgment showing his criminal 

convictions and sentence therefor is part of a secured transaction, are legally frivolous. The other 

allegations in the complaint further describing his claims do not show the claims to have any merit 

whatsoever. Jones disclaims any interest in obtaining his release via his petitions to the state 

court, yet doesn’t explain what he ultimately was attempting to gain by filing those petitions nor 

does any legitimate purpose appear to exist. To the extent he was trying to free himself from 

being collateral on a bond, his claim is legal nonsense. The underlying action he allegedly was 

stymied in presenting was not nonfrivolous. 

The claim for denial of access to the courts is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. Leave to amend will not be granted because it would be futile. The 

claim that allegedly was interfered with was not a nonfrivolous claim, and that problem cannot be 

cured by amendment. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. Having determined that the complaint fails to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that the plaintiff might wish to plead. The 

clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2016

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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