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Parties Involved:
Dan Moriarty
Appellee
Johnny Randle
Appellant

Document Text:

. FILED 

Urmed S_ratcs (01-uc r:;£ A.ppe~Ls 

r enth C!r:=uir 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

f;;,~y :J 1990 

JOHNNY RANDLE, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

DAN MORIARTY, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-2135 

(D.C. No. 87-1438JC) 

(D.N.M.) 

Before McKAY, ANDERSON, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Johnny Randle appeals from the denial of his petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus. Randle contends that the district court 

erred in determining that his right to a speedy trial was not 

violated and that his plea bargain agreement was entered into 

voluntarily. We affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-2135 Document: 01019969795 Date Filed: 05/03/1990 Page: 1 
A warrant for Randle's arrest for heroin trafficking was 

issued on May 9, 1985. Randle was arrested on May 10, 1985, and 

was later released on May 11th after posting a$ 10,000 bond. Due 

to heavy case loads in the district attorney's office, Randle was 

not indicted on the heroin charges until June 17, 1986, more than 

thirteen months after his arrest. Randle was then rearrested and 

on August 25, 1986 was ordered to obtain counsel. On September 8, 

1986, the public defender filed a motion to dismiss due to the 

thirteen month delay. This motion was heard by the state trial 

court on September 9th. The state court denied the motion, and 

Randle subsequently pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain 

agreement on ,September 10, 1986. 

A. 

The first issue presented is whether the thirteen month delay 

between Randle's first arrest and the indictment violated Randle's 

right to a speedy trial, U.S. Const. amend. VI. The ultimate 

question of whether a petitioner's right to a speedy trial has 

been violated is an issue of law we review de nova. See Glidewell 

~ Burden, 822 F.2d 1027, 1028-29 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), 

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1018 (1988). Underlying factual 

determinations made by the state courts are entitled to a 

presumption of correctness if a full and fair hearing occurred in 

the state court. See id. at 1028; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Initially, we note that the sixth amendment right to a speedy 

trial attaches at either arrest or indictment, whichever comes 

first. See United States~ Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1971); 

see also Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 (1975) 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2135 Document: 01019969795 Date Filed: 05/03/1990 Page: 2 
(per curiam). The federal district court thus erred in holding 

that this case is governed by the rule in pre-accusation 

situations, see,~, U.S.~ Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1974), 

rather than that for post-accusation situations, see,~, Barker 

v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 

We thus turn to Barker. The Barker rule requires us to 

evaluate four factors: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for 

the delay; (3) whether the right to a speedy trial was timely 

asserted; and (4) whether the defendant has suffered any prejudice 

as a result of the delay. Id. at 530-33. None of the factors is 

determinative or sufficient in itself; all are ·considered 

together. Id. at 533. 

First, we find that the thirteen month delay after Randle's 

arrest weighs against the government. In United States~ Butler, 

426 F.2d 1275, 1277 (1st Cir. 1970), the First Circuit held a nine 

month delay to be overly long where the government's case depended 

on eyewitness testimony. The Supreme Court has also stated in 

dicta that "the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street 

crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy 

charge." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Both of these circumstances 

are present in the case at bar. 

The second factor, the reason for the delay, also weighs 

somewhat against the government. The courts below found that the 

reason for the delay was a "snafu" and heavy case load in the 

district attorney's office. The Supreme Court has stated that 

delays due to court congestion are usually counted against t~e 

government. See id. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2135 Document: 01019969795 Date Filed: 05/03/1990 Page: 3 
The third factor, whether the petitioner asserted his speedy 

trial right, is less clear. Randle did not assert his speedy 

trial rights until after he was ordered to obtain an attorney by 

the court. While Randle contends that his intent to move the 

process along was shown by his contacts with the bail bondsman, we 

are not persuaded that communications with a third party 

constitutes notice to either the government or the court. The 

state trial court also found that Randle had exhibited a "certain 

nonchalance" about the case and showed little interest in pursuing 

the case until ordered to obtain counsel. Because Randle waited 

until fifteen months after his arrest and two months after 

indictment before raising his speedy trial claim, and because of 

the state trial court's finding that Randle did not pursue his 

case, we find that the third Barker factor weighs against Randle. 

The fourth factor, prejudice to the petitioner's case, was 

the subject of extensive hearings before both the state trial 

court and the district court. The trial court found that a maid 

might have been able to provide favorable evidence for Randle at 

trial. The court also found, however, that there was no evidence 

that the maid was missing due to the delay or that maid would have 

been available if the indictment had quickly followed the arrest. 

The trial court also noted that the maid's unavailability was not 

established. The state trial court thus held that Randle's 

ability to present a defense at trial was not prejudiced. With 

respect to the second prejudice aspect, personal prejudice, the 

state trial court held that Randle's testimony about anxiety was 

self-serving and not credible. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2135 Document: 01019969795 Date Filed: 05/03/1990 Page: 4 
• 

On appeal, Randle attacks these findings. With respect to 

the prejudice to his defense prong, Randle contends that the state 

trial court erred by considering prejudice at the time of the 

hearing rather than prejudice at the time when the trial should 

have taken place. Randle contends, in effect, that if the trial 

had been held promptly he would have had a better chance of 

finding the maid. Randle also argues that since the government's 

case relied upon eyewitness identifications, he was prejudiced by 

the passage of time and the dimming of their memories. We find 

neither contention persuasive. Unlike Moore~ Arizona, 414 U.S. 

25, 26 (1973) (per curiam), Randle did not undertake to secure a 

prompt trial. The state trial court found that Randle had made 

little effort to find the maid and that he was not prejudiced by 

the asserted fading of the witnesses' memories. See United States 

~ Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850, 857 (10th Cir. 1983), overruled on other 

grounds, Batson~ Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 n.16 (1986); cf. 

United States~ Martinez, 776 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1985). 

Because Randle has not contended that the state trial court's 

hearing was not full and fair, we treat its findings as 

conclusive. See 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d). In any event, Randle's 

allegations differ little from the "[v]ague and conclusory 

allegations of prejudice resulting from the passage of time and 

the absence of witnesses" that we held insufficient to constitute 

a showing of prejudice in Jenkins, 701 F.2d at 854. We thus 

decline to find prejudice to Randle's defense based on this 

record. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2135 Document: 01019969795 Date Filed: 05/03/1990 Page: 5 
We reach the same result under the "personal prejudice'' 

prong. Randle's allegations of anxiety were rejected by the state 

trial court after a hearing and their resurrection is foreclosed 

by section 2254(d). Randle's other two allegations, that he could 

not visit his father and turned down a job because of bail 

restrictions, were apparently not addressed by the state trial 

court. We do not doubt that Randle was inconvenienced by the bail 

conditions; on the other hand we note that he never contacted 

either the court or the district attorney's office about his 

concerns. Based on this record and the state trial court's 

finding of "nonchalance,'' we do not find that Randle was actually 

prejudiced by the delay. 

Weighing all the factors together and bearing in mind our 

reluctance to dismiss in the absence of prejudice, Jenkins, 701 

F.2d at 857, we find that Randle's sixth amendment right to a 

speedy trial has not been violated. See id. at 858 (no violation 

of sixth amendment speedy trial at 16 months delay under similar 

facts). 

B. 

The second issue on appeal is whether Randle voluntarily 

pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain agreement. Randle 

contends that the state violated the plea bargain agreement by 

including a probation/parole condition which could result in him 

serving more than six years. We disagree. 

The relevant sections of the plea bargain agreement read in 

part as follows: 

No more severe than the following disposition will be 

made of the charge, as prescribed by law. BUT, the 

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Appellate Case: 89-2135 Document: 01019969795 Date Filed: 05/03/1990 Page: 6 
State agrees that defendant will receive no more than 

six (6) years of incarceration from the basic sentence 

of nine (9) years. The State and the defendant 

understand that the applicable penalty for this charge 

is basic sentence of nine years but not less than six 

years nor more than twelve years imprisonment and not 

more than $10,000.00 fine. 

I fully understand that if, as a part of this agreement, 

I am granted probation, a suspended sentence, or a 

deferred sentence by the Court, the terms and conditions 

thereof are subject to modification in the event I 

violate any of the terms or conditions imposed. 

Randle was duly sentenced under this agreement to a term of nine 

years imprisonment, three years of which were suspended. In 

addition, Randle ·received three years probation to run 

concurrently with two years of parole. 

Randle contends that he understood the agreement to state he 

would receive a maximum of six years imprisonment and that the 

parole language meant that if he received fewer than six years of 

imprisonment and violated parole, he could then be imprisoned for 

up to six years. In support of his interpretation, he points to a 

parole department recommendation that he be imprisoned for one 

year and receive five years probation. We are not persuaded. 

The plea agreement stipulated that the sentence would be "as 

prescribed by law" which included the possibility of parole, 

probation and/or a suspended sentence, but the agreement also 

provided that "defendant will receive no more than six (6) years 

of incarceration." Randle received only six years of imprisonment 

out of his term of nine years, as agreed in the plea bargain 

agreement. Randle's contention that the probation/parole term 

violates the imprisonment condition is unpersuasive because the 

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Appellate Case: 89-2135 Document: 01019969795 Date Filed: 05/03/1990 Page: 7 
' 

agreement specifically states that Randle might receive probation 

or a suspended sentence and provides that "the terms and 

conditions thereof are subject to modification in the event I 

violate any of the terms or conditions imposed." 

This interpretation is further supported by provision 6 of 

the plea agreement, which states: 

In the event the defendant violates any municipal, 

county, state, or federal law of any jurisdiction after 

entry of this plea or in anyway violates any of the 

conditions of any probation or parole to which he may be 

or become subject after entry of this agreement, the 

State may and will file Habitual Offender Proceedings 

against the defendant and may and will use the 

defendant's admission of identity on the prior felony 

convictions in such Habitual Offender Proceedings, 

regardless of whether probation or parole is revoked as 

a result of such violation. 

In our view this provision clearly indicates that both Randle and 

the State bargained for the possibility of additional imprisonment 

should Randle violate any provisions of probation or parole. 

We find that retention of Randle's guilty plea will not 

result in a miscarriage of justice. See Evers v. United States, 

579 F.2d 71, 73 (10th Cir. 1978) {per curiam), ce~t. denied, 440 

U.LS. 924 (1979). The district court did not err in finding that 

Randle's plea was voluntary. 

c. 

The certificate of probable cause is GRANTED. The judgment 

of the district court is AFFIRMED. Mandate shall issue forthwith. 

8 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-2135 Document: 01019969795 Date Filed: 05/03/1990 Page: 8