Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00258/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00258-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Martin D. Biter
Respondent
Anthony Burciaga
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 and 303. 

Pending before the Court is the first amended petition (FAP), which 

was filed on January 28, 2013. Respondent filed an answer on May 2, 

2013, and Petitioner filed a traverse on August 22, 2013.

I. Jurisdiction

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the 

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

ANTHONY BURCIAGA,

 Petitioner,

v.

MARTIN D. BITER, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:12-cv-00258-LJO-SKO-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DENY THE FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND TO ENTER 

JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT (DOC. 22)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DECLINE TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

OBJECTIONS DEADLINE:

THIRTY (30) DAYS

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of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The challenged judgment was rendered by the Superior Court of 

the State of California, County of Madera (MCSC), located within the 

territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 84(b), 2254(a), 2241(a), (d). Petitioner claims that in the 

course of the proceedings resulting in his conviction, he suffered 

violations of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court 

concludes it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a) and 2241(c)(3), which authorize a 

district court to entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court 

only on the ground that the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. -

, -, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam). 

An answer was filed on behalf of Respondent Martin D. Biter, 

who had custody of Petitioner at Petitioner’s institution of 

confinement at the time the FAP was filed. (Doc. 29.) Petitioner 

thus named as a respondent a person who has custody of Petitioner 

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and Rule 2(a) of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases in the District Courts (Habeas Rules). 

See Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 

1994). Accordingly, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction 

over the person of Respondent. 

II. Background

A jury convicted Petitioner of the first degree murder of 

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Theodore Betts. The jury also found that the murder was committed 

in the course of a robbery and that Petitioner personally and 

intentionally used a firearm. 

In a habeas proceeding brought by a person in custody pursuant 

to a judgment of a state court, a determination of a factual issue 

made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct; the 

petitioner has the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence 

to rebut the presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); 

Sanders v. Lamarque, 357 F.3d 943, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2004). This 

presumption applies to a statement of facts drawn from a state 

appellate court’s decision. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n.1 

(9th Cir. 2009). The following statement of facts is taken from 

the opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth 

Appellate District (CCA) in People v. Anthony Burciaga, case number 

F057834, filed on November 4, 2010.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Gabriel Martin and Theodore Betts lived together in a 

remote location in Madera County. Martin and Betts grew 

marijuana and stored a large amount of marijuana on their 

property. On the morning of March 21, 2005, Martin and 

Betts were at home when Martin heard a car driving up 

their driveway and heard their dogs barking.

Martin stepped outside the house and walked up the 

driveway. Martin saw a blue SUV stopped in the driveway. 

The driver of the SUV, Marissa Rubianes, asked if there 

were any properties in the area for sale or rent. Martin 

told Rubianes he did not know of any such properties and 

asked her to turn around and leave.

At that point, Burciaga and another man, Rudy Castillo, 

came out from around the back of the SUV. Burciaga had a 

shotgun; Castillo had a handgun. Burciaga told Martin to 

keep the dogs away from him; Burciaga then pointed the 

shotgun in Martin's direction and threatened to shoot the 

dogs. Burciaga ordered Martin to walk back toward the 

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house. Martin complied, with Burciaga following and 

pointing the shotgun at him. When Martin got to the stairs 

outside the house, he saw Betts in the doorway of the 

house pointing a shotgun. Betts yelled at Martin to get 

another gun; Martin stepped inside to comply. Betts 

stepped outside. As Martin was reaching for a rifle in the 

house, he heard a shotgun blast. The shotgun blast came 

from near the door where Betts was standing.

Martin went to exit the house just as Betts was coming in 

the door. Betts was bleeding and exclaimed, “He hit me. He 

hit me. They got me. They got my arm.” Martin went 

outside, did not see anyone, and fired his rifle at a 

nearby hill to let the intruders know he had a weapon.

Martin called 911. He told the 911 operator that Burciaga 

and his companions had tried to rob Betts. Martin tried to 

administer first aid. Although law enforcement and 

paramedics arrived, Betts died shortly after their 

arrival. Betts bled to death from shotgun wounds to his 

left shoulder and underarm area.

Deputy Roy Broomfield received a sheriff's radio broadcast 

about the shooting. He immediately started driving toward 

the Betts residence. About a half mile from the house he 

spotted Burciaga and Anthony Mendez. They matched the 

description of perpetrators issued over the radio. They 

seemed out of breath, in a hurry, and their pant legs were 

wet and muddy. Burciaga had cuts on his chin. Broomfield 

handcuffed the two men and placed them in the back of his 

patrol car.

A short distance from where Broomfield had encountered 

Burciaga and Mendez, Broomfield saw shoe prints on the 

side of a hill. Broomfield showed the shoe prints to 

Sergeant Charles Bump, who tracked the shoe prints back to 

Martin and Betts's property. There were two sets of 

prints-one had a herringbone pattern and the other a flame 

pattern.

Along the trail of shoe prints, law enforcement found a 

12-gauge shotgun with no stock; there were four shells in 

the shotgun. The shotgun was lying on top of fresh grass. 

They also found the handgun, a New England .32-caliber 

revolver.

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Near the southeast corner of Martin and Betts's house, law 

enforcement found a herringbone pattern shoe print and a 

12-gauge shotgun shell casing in close proximity to each 

other. The shell casing was about 10 feet from the 

southeast corner of the house; the shoe print was about a 

foot from the shell casing. The herringbone shoe print at 

the house was very similar to the shoe print that Bump had 

been tracking.

The herringbone shoe prints were similar in pattern and 

size to Burciaga's shoes; the flame print matched Mendez's 

shoes. Law enforcement concluded that Burciaga made the 

herringbone shoe print impressions. The shotgun shell 

casing found outside Betts's home was fired from the 

shotgun found along the shoe print trail.

Codefendant Rubianes testified that after the robbery 

attempt, she found masks and bullets in the SUV. She 

claimed she did not know Burciaga and Mendez were planning 

to rob the victims; she thought they were going to buy 

marijuana.

Interviews of Burciaga

Burciaga was interviewed by Detectives John Grayson and 

Jerry Saldivar at around 1:25 p.m. on March 21, 2005. A 

tape of the interview was played for the jury. Burciaga 

claimed he was set up. Burciaga admitted, however, there 

was a plan to take marijuana from Martin and Betts. 

Burciaga was told the victims had a lot of marijuana and 

to look for a cave where the marijuana was hidden. 

Burciaga stated he was not planning to hurt anyone.

According to Burciaga, the plan had been developed by 

“Juetto.” Burciaga owed money to Juetto; Burciaga was to 

take the marijuana in order to pay his debt to Juetto. 

Burciaga admitted that he and the others with him did not 

go to Martin and Betts's property to buy a small amount of 

marijuana. Burciaga and his cousin, Mendez, were both in 

on the plan.

When they got to Martin and Betts's property, one of the 

owners (Martin) met them and the other (Betts) came out of 

the house and started shooting. Burciaga shot back and, 

when his gun recoiled, it hit him and cut his chin. 

Burciaga ran from the property and met up with Mendez. 

Burciaga discarded his 12-gauge shotgun in the woods. He 

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and Mendez walked out to a dirt road, where they 

encountered an officer.

Grayson told Burciaga that Betts was dead and Burciaga

responded, “No way.” Burciaga stated he did not try to 

kill anyone. He was sorry about what had happened.

Burciaga was interviewed for a second time on March 21 

commencing around 5:25 p.m. by Detectives Grayson and 

Saldivar. The jury heard a tape of this interview. 

Burciaga reiterated that he was in debt to a man and he 

had agreed to the crime in order to pay his debt to the 

man. Burciaga also claimed he had told his coconspirators 

he did not want anyone to die.

Burciaga was told the marijuana would be at property 

occupied by two old men. Burciaga was told by a man named 

“Bob” the specific locations on the property where 

Burciaga could find the marijuana, an RV, the basement, 

and a cave. Burciaga had visited the property about nine 

months before the crime. On the day of the crime, Burciaga 

brought a taser and a handgun; someone else supplied the 

shotgun.

Burciaga denied shooting Betts, but claimed that Betts 

came out of the house “blasting.” Burciaga also claimed 

that he shot to scare to Betts, not to kill him. Later, 

Burciaga claimed that he had killed someone for nothing. 

Burciaga claimed that Bob was Betts's son-in-law and Bob 

wanted Betts killed so he could inherit. Law enforcement 

was not able to locate “Bob.”

Burciaga and codefendants Mendez, Rubianes, and Castillo 

were charged with one count of first degree murder. It 

also was alleged that the murder was committed in the 

course of a robbery. It also was alleged that Burciaga 

personally and intentionally discharged a firearm. On 

March 25, 2008, the trial of Burciaga and Rubianes was 

severed from the trial of Mendez and Castillo.

People v. Burciaga, no. F057834, 2010 WL 4355509, at 1-3 (Nov. 4, 

2010).

III. Suppression of the Fruits of Petitioner’s Arrest

Petitioner argues that the state court unreasonably applied 

federal law and made unreasonable determinations of fact when it 

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denied his claim that his arrest was made without probable cause, 

and thus the state court should have excluded as fruits of the 

unlawful arrest the shoe prints, Petitioner’s statements to the 

investigating officers, and officers’ conclusions regarding the 

evidence. (FAP, doc. 22, 9.) 

Where the state has provided the petitioner with an opportunity 

for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the 

petitioner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the 

ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and 

seizure was introduced at trial. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 

(1976). 

In Stone, the Court did not set forth a test for determining 

whether a state has provided an opportunity for full and fair 

litigation of a claim. However, in a footnote the Court cited 

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), which held that a federal 

court must grant a habeas petitioner an evidentiary hearing if 1) 

the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state 

hearing; 2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported 

by the record as a whole; 3) the fact-finding procedure employed by 

the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; 

4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; 

5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state

court hearing; or 6) for any reason it appears that the state trier 

of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact 

hearing. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 494 n.36 (citing Townsend v. 

Sain, 372 U.S. at 313). Other factors include the extent to which 

the claims were briefed before, and considered by, the state trial 

and appellate courts. Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1178-

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79 (9th Cir. 1990). Even though a petitioner may contend the state 

court's factual findings concerning a search are not supported by 

the evidence, a petitioner has nevertheless been provided a full and 

fair opportunity to litigate his search claim where the validity of 

the search was raised in a pre-trial motion, the trial court held a 

hearing on the issue at which the petitioner was permitted to 

present evidence and examine witnesses, the trial court made a 

factual finding, and there was judicial review of the trial court=s 

decision. Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, Petitioner filed a pretrial motion to suppress based on 

the preliminary hearing transcript. (LD1 1 at 14.) Petitioner argued 

there was no probable cause for his prolonged detention/arrest, and

that all evidence resulting from the arrest should be suppressed. 

(Id. at 14-15.) At an evidentiary hearing on the suppression 

motion, Petitioner’s counsel examined witnesses and presented 

argument. (LD 1 at 16-21; LD 2 at 5-6.) The trial court ruled 

there was probable cause for the arrest and detailed the reasons for 

that conclusion. (LD 2 at 6.) On direct appeal, Petitioner claimed

there was no probable cause for his arrest. (LD 1, Applt.’s Op. 

Brf., 14-48.) The CCA considered and rejected this claim. (LD 2, 

6-13.)

In summary, Petitioner fully briefed and presented his claim 

with the assistance of counsel. His claim was the subject of a 

hearing at which the facts were fully developed in the course of 

testimony and cross-examination. The trial court determined the 

claim on the merits, and the facts fairly support the denial of the 

motion to suppress. Petitioner appealed the judgment and had the 

 

1

“LD” refers to documents lodged by Respondent. 

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opportunity to raise before the CCA and the Supreme Court of 

California (CSC) the trial court=s denial of the motion to suppress 

and the introduction of the fruits of the search. (LD 4-9.) The 

circumstances of Petitioner=s opportunity to litigate his search 

claim are analogous to those of the petitioner in Moormann v. 

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044. 

The Court concludes that Petitioner was afforded a full and 

fair opportunity to litigate his claim concerning the Fourth 

Amendment. Therefore, he cannot receive habeas corpus relief in 

this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2254. It will, therefore,

be recommended that Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim concerning 

probable cause for his arrest be denied.

IV. Unreasonably Prolonged Detention

Petitioner alleges that his detention of three or four hours 

was unreasonably prolonged. This claim was raised and rejected in 

the state appeal (LD 1, Applt.’s Op. Brf., 33-38; LD 2, 6-13), and 

is also subject to the bar of Stone v. Powell. 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim in this 

proceeding. It will, therefore, be recommended that Petitioner’s 

Fourth Amendment claim concerning an unduly prolonged detention be 

denied.

V. Voluntariness of Petitioner’s Statement

Petitioner alleges that his statements to detectives were 

involuntary because the officer made a statement denigrating Miranda

rights and thus undermined Petitioner’s understanding of his rights, 

the detention was unduly prolonged because it lasted for three and 

one-half hours while Petitioner was handcuffed with hands behind his 

back in a patrol car without opportunity for food or sleep, the 

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detention included subjecting Petitioner to two in-field show-ups, 

the questioning was repeated and excessive, and Petitioner was upset 

and crying. (FAP, doc. 22, 14-16.)

A. Standard of Decision and Scope of Review

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides in pertinent part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

 judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

Clearly established federal law refers to the holdings, as 

distinct from the dicta, of the decisions of the Supreme Court as of 

the time of the relevant state court decision. Cullen v.

Pinholster, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1399 (2011); Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

412 (2000).

A state court’s decision contravenes clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent if it reaches a legal conclusion opposite 

to, or substantially different from, the Supreme Court's or 

concludes differently on a materially indistinguishable set of 

facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. The state court 

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need not have cited Supreme Court precedent or have been aware of it 

"so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court 

decision contradicts [it]." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

A state court unreasonably applies clearly established federal 

law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule but 

applies it to a new set of facts in an objectively unreasonable

manner, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal 

principle to a new context in an objectively unreasonable manner. 

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002); see

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. An application of clearly established 

federal law is unreasonable only if it is objectively unreasonable; 

an incorrect or inaccurate application is not necessarily 

unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 

relief as long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the 

correctness of the state court’s decision. Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Even a strong case for 

relief does not render the state court’s conclusions unreasonable. 

Id. To obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must show

that the state court’s ruling on a claim was “so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Id. at 786-87. 

///

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The standards set by § 2254(d) are “highly deferential 

standard[s] for evaluating state-court rulings” which require that 

state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt, and the 

Petitioner bear the burden of proof. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 

S.Ct. at 1398. Habeas relief is not appropriate unless each ground 

supporting the state court decision is examined and found 

unreasonable under the AEDPA. Wetzel v. Lambert, –U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 

1195, 1199 (2012).

In assessing under section 2254(d)(1) whether the state court’s 

legal conclusion was contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

federal law, “review... is limited to the record that was before the 

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Evidence introduced in federal court 

has no bearing on review pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 1400. 

Further, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that in a habeas proceeding 

brought by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state 

court, a determination of a factual issue made by a state court 

shall be presumed to be correct; the petitioner has the burden of 

producing clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of 

correctness. A state court decision on the merits based on a 

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless it was objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state proceedings. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 340 (2003).

Pursuant to § 2254(d)(2), a habeas petition may be granted only 

if the state court’s conclusion was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

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state court proceeding. For relief to be granted, a federal habeas 

court must find that the trial court’s factual determination was 

such that a reasonable fact finder could not have made the finding; 

that reasonable minds might disagree with the determination or have 

a basis to question the finding is not sufficient. Rice v. Collins, 

546 U.S. 333, 340-42 (2006).

The last reasoned decision must be identified to analyze the 

state court decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Barker v. 

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1092 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005); Bailey v. Rae, 339 

F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the CCA’s decision was 

the last reasoned decision in which the state court adjudicated 

Petitioner’s claims on the merits. Where there has been one 

reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained 

orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim are 

presumed to rest upon the same ground. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 803 (1991). This Court will thus “look through” the 

unexplained decision of the CSC to the CCA’s last reasoned decision 

as the relevant state-court determination. Id. at 803-04; Taylor v. 

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 998 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004).

The deferential standard of § 2254(d) applies only to claims 

the state court resolved on the merits; de novo review applies to 

claims that have not been adjudicated on the merits. Lambert v. 

Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 965 (9th Cir. 2004); Lewis v. Mayle, 391 

F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2004). 

B. The State Court’s Decision

The decision of the CCA regarding the voluntariness of the 

confession is as follows: 

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While at the crime scene and in the back of Broomfield's 

patrol vehicle, Burciaga told one of the deputies at the 

scene that he wished to speak to the lead detective, 

Grayson. Grayson walked to the patrol vehicle; Burciaga 

was crying and stated he wished to talk. Grayson read 

Burciaga his rights from a department-issued Miranda card. 

Grayson asked Burciaga if he understood his rights. 

Burciaga nodded in the affirmative and grunted a “yes.” 

Burciaga made a statement to Grayson. Grayson spoke with 

Burciaga again, less than an hour after advising Burciaga 

of his rights. After this conversation, Grayson directed 

that Burciaga be transported to jail or the detectives' 

office. Grayson spoke with Burciaga a third time at the 

detectives' office.

“An appellate court applies the independent or de novo

standard of review, which by its nature is nondeferential, 

to a trial court's granting or denial of a motion to 

suppress a statement under Miranda insofar as the trial 

court's underlying decision entails a measurement of the 

facts against the law. [Citations.]” (People v. Waidla

(2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 730.) In analyzing Burciaga's claim 

of involuntariness, we note that it was he who initiated 

the first conversation with Grayson, and Grayson advised 

Burciaga of his Miranda rights prior to beginning that 

first conversation.

Despite these facts, Burciaga contends that because (1) he 

was subject to an unduly prolonged detention, (2) he was 

emotional when he made his statement, (3) Grayson 

denigrated his Miranda rights, and (4) he did not 

expressly waive his rights, his statements were 

involuntary and should have been excluded.

We previously discussed Burciaga's claim of an unduly 

prolonged detention, determining the detention was not 

unduly prolonged under the circumstances. The length of 

Burciaga's detention was not such that his statement was 

rendered involuntary. Burciaga states that he was detained 

at around 9:25 a.m. and his initial statement to Grayson 

was made at around 12:45 p.m., slightly over three hours 

later. This amount of time was not of sufficient length to 

render his statement involuntary, under the circumstances. 

(People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 78, 81-82 [overnight 

custody without access to food, water, toilet facilities, 

or an attorney renders statement involuntary]; People v. 

Alfieri (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 533, 543, 545-546 [36 hours 

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of custody and 20 hours of interrogation renders statement 

involuntary].)

That Burciaga was crying or emotionally upset does not 

render his statement involuntary. (People v. Whitson

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 236, 240, 249-250.) Grayson's 

reference to Miranda warnings as “technical crap” clearly 

was inappropriate and the trial court so found. Grayson, 

however, did issue the standard Miranda warnings after 

Burciaga asked to speak with him and before allowing 

Burciaga to speak.

Burciaga also contends that he did not expressly waive his 

Miranda rights, although he acknowledges he implicitly 

waived his rights. Even if Burciaga's affirmative nod and 

a grunted “yes” constitute an implied waiver, an implied 

waiver is sufficient to waive Miranda rights. (People v. 

Rios (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 491, 499, 507.)

Burciaga also contends his subsequent statements should be 

excluded because he was not readvised of his Miranda

rights. If a defendant is subsequently interrogated, 

however, “readvisement is unnecessary where the subsequent 

interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous' with the 

prior knowing and intelligent waiver. [Citations.]” 

(People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 170, 171 (Mickle) 

[readvisement unnecessary where the defendant twice 

received and twice waived Miranda rights 36 hours 

before].)

The length of time between Burciaga's initial statement to 

Grayson and his subsequent statements was not so lengthy 

as to reduce the effectiveness of his initial waiver, 

particularly where Burciaga was mentally alert, initiated 

the conversation, understood what was going on in the 

subsequent interrogations, and was interrogated by the 

same law enforcement official each time. (Mickle, supra, 

54 Cal.3d at p. 170; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 

334, 386.)

People v. Burciaga, no. F057834, 2010 WL 4355509, at *8-*9.

C. Analysis

In determining whether a statement or confession was

involuntary and obtained in violation of the principles of due

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process of law protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, a 

court examines whether a defendant's will was overborne by the

circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement or confession. 

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000). A court 

considers the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, 

including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the 

interrogation. Id.

Here, the questioning itself was not prolonged, and there was 

no extended deprivation of food or sleep. Although Petitioner might 

have been emotional, there is no suggestion he lacked competence to 

waive his rights. Although the officer denigrated Petitioner’s 

Miranda rights, the Miranda advisement itself clearly informed 

Petitioner that anything he said could be used against him in court. 

Petitioner was not misled as to matters essential to understanding 

the significance of his rights or the consequences of giving a

statement. Cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1986).

The giving of Miranda warnings followed by a voluntary and 

knowing waiver of those rights tends to show that a post-advisement 

statement was voluntary. The prosecution bears the burden of 

demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 

validly waived his Miranda rights. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 

157, 168 (1986). A waiver must be 1) voluntary, or the product of a 

free and deliberate choice and not the result of intimidation, 

coercion, or deception, and 2) knowing, or “‘made with a full 

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awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the 

consequences of the decision to abandon it.’” Berghuis v. 

Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-83 (2010) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 

475 U.S. at 421). 

The trial court found Petitioner had voluntarily chosen to 

speak after having been informed of his rights and having indicated 

he understood his rights. It is undisputed that it was he who 

voluntarily approached the officer and expressed a desire to make a 

statement. It is clearly established that a waiver of Miranda

rights may be express and formal, or implied through all the 

circumstances, including the words and conduct of the person 

interrogated. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 383 (citing North 

Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)). Specifically, a 

waiver may be implied through “‘the defendant’s silence, coupled 

with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct 

indicating waiver.’” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 (quoting North 

Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373). “Where the prosecution shows 

that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the 

accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied 

waiver of the right to remain silent.” Id. at 384. Here, the state 

court reasonably determined that Petitioner had been informed of his 

rights and waived those rights by manifesting his choice to make a 

statement. 

///

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A valid waiver of Miranda rights generally results in a finding 

of voluntariness of a confession following the waiver. Missouri v. 

Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09 (2004); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.

420, 433 n.20 (1984); DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th 

Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 183 (2009). The finding that 

the government had not engaged in any coercive conduct in the course 

of the interview is supported by the facts in the record and has not 

been contradicted or rebutted. The state court's findings of fact 

underlying the issue of voluntariness are entitled to a presumption 

of correctness pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Cf. Rupe v. 

Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1444 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In light of the totality of the circumstances, including 

Petitioner’s conduct and the absence of coercive police activity, a 

finding that Petitioner’s statement was “voluntary” within the 

meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was 

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. See, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 

167 (1986). Accordingly, it will be recommended that Petitioner’s 

claim that his statements were involuntary be denied.

VI. Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offenses

Petitioner requested an instruction on voluntary manslaughter 

on a theory of imperfect self-defense, but he did not affirmatively 

ask the trial judge to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of 

second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter. (LD 1 at 50.) 

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Nevertheless, Petitioner alleges that he suffered a denial of his 

due process rights when the state court failed to instruct the jury 

on the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and 

involuntary manslaughter. (Doc. 22, 16-17.)

A. The State Court’s Decision

The decision of the CCA on this claim is as follows:

Burciaga contends the trial court erred prejudicially when 

it failed sua sponte to instruct the jury on lesser 

included offenses of second degree murder and involuntary 

manslaughter.

In a criminal case, the jury may convict the defendant of 

either the charged offense or a lesser offense that is 

necessarily included within the charged offense. 

(Pen.Code, § 1159.) “‘Under California law, a lesser 

offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if 

either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or 

the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, 

include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that 

the greater cannot be committed without also committing 

the lesser.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 

Cal.4th 142, 154, fn. 5.)

A court must instruct sua sponte on general principles of 

law that are closely and openly connected with the facts 

presented at trial. (People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 

307, 323, disapproved on another point in People v. Barton

(1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200-201.) This sua sponte 

obligation extends to lesser included offenses if the 

evidence raises a question as to whether all of the 

elements of the charged offense are present and there is 

evidence that would justify a conviction of such a lesser 

offense. (People v. Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346, 351.) 

A criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on a 

lesser included offense only if there is evidence that, if 

accepted by the trier of fact, would absolve the defendant 

from guilt of the greater offense but not the lesser. 

(People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871.)

Burciaga argues that because he and Rubianes claimed they 

went to Martin and Betts's home to purchase marijuana, not 

to rob the two men, the trial court should have instructed 

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the jury sua sponte on second degree murder and 

involuntary manslaughter. The People contend the evidence 

of attempted robbery was overwhelming and there was no 

substantial evidence supporting any theory other than 

felony murder. We agree with the People.

“The requirement that courts give sua sponte instructions 

on lesser included offenses ‘is based in the defendant's 

constitutional right to have the jury determine every 

material issue presented by the evidence. [Citations.]’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288.) 

Contrary to Burciaga's contention, the evidence did not 

present an issue of second degree murder or involuntary 

manslaughter.

At trial the People proceeded only on a theory of felony 

murder. In Burciaga's pretrial statements to law 

enforcement, he admitted (1) there was a plan to take 

large quantities of marijuana from Betts and Martin; (2) 

he planned and did research before heading out, including 

visiting the victims' property nine months before the 

crime; (3) he did not want anyone to die; (4) he brought a 

gun and taser with him; and (5) Rubianes was to act as a 

diversion to get the property owners to come out of their 

house. When Burciaga and the others arrived at the 

property, Rubianes asked about real property in the area 

for sale. No inquiry about purchasing marijuana was made. 

When the SUV stopped on the property, Burciaga jumped out, 

brandishing a shotgun. Rubianes admitted that she found 

masks and bullets in the SUV after the attempted robbery. 

Burciaga specifically admitted in his pretrial statements 

that he and the others had not gone to the Betts and 

Martin residence to purchase marijuana.

When the People establish that a defendant killed a victim 

while committing a felony enumerated in Penal Code section 

189, including robbery or attempted robbery, the killing 

is deemed to be first degree murder as a matter of law. 

(People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 908-909 

(Mendoza).) The evidence is overwhelming that Burciaga and 

his cohorts (1) planned to take marijuana by force, (2) 

came armed with weapons and prepared to use force, and 

actually used force, (3) had supplies with them to 

facilitate a robbery, such as masks, a taser, and the 

guns, and (4) made no effort whatsoever to purchase any 

marijuana, as opposed to taking marijuana forcibly. 

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Consequently, the evidence was overwhelming that the 

killing occurred during an attempted robbery.

Even if Burciaga and the others did not intend to kill 

anyone during the planned robbery, the killing is still 

felony murder. The jury was instructed, correctly, that a 

person may be guilty of felony murder, even if the killing 

was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.

The jury was instructed, however, on Burciaga's theory of 

defense-that he went to the property to purchase 

marijuana. The jury was instructed that if the jury 

believed Burciaga had gone to Martin and Betts's home to 

purchase marijuana, he did not have the mental state 

required for robbery. If the jury had a reasonable doubt 

as to whether Burciaga had the requisite mental state for 

robbery, the jury was instructed to find him not guilty of 

that crime.

Virtually the only evidence that Burciaga and the others 

may have gone to Martin and Betts's property to purchase 

marijuana was Rubianes's testimony at trial that she drove 

to the property in order to purchase marijuana. She did 

not know Burciaga and the others had planned a robbery. 

This evidence is slight in light of Rubianes's own conduct 

at the scene of the crime in failing to ask about a 

marijuana purchase and the overwhelming evidence that 

Burciaga and the others planned and were prepared to use 

force to rob Martin and Betts of the marijuana.

When the evidence “points indisputably to a killing 

committed in the perpetration of one of the felonies” 

enumerated in Penal Code section 189, a trial court need 

not instruct a jury on offenses other than first degree 

felony murder. (Mendoza, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 908-

909.) If Burciaga had the requisite mental state required 

for robbery, the killing was felony murder; if he did not, 

the killing was not felony murder and the jury was so 

instructed. Thus, if the jury found Burciaga lacked the 

requisite intent for robbery, he would not have been found 

guilty of felony murder.

We conclude the trial court did not err in failing to 

instruct the jury on second degree murder or involuntary 

manslaughter.

People v. Burciaga, no F057834, 2010 WL 4355509, at *10-*12.

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B. Analysis

When a conviction is challenged in a proceeding pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. ' 2254 based on jury instruction error, a district court=s 

review extends only to federal issues; a claim of jury instruction 

error that is based solely on state law does not state a claim 

cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). A claim that an instruction was 

deficient in comparison to a state model or that a trial judge 

incorrectly interpreted or applied state law governing jury 

instructions does not entitle one to relief under ' 2254, which 

requires violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. '' 2254(a), 2241(c)(3). 

This basic, limiting principle is applicable in the present 

case, where the target of Petitioner=s claim of unfairness is the 

state court=s decision upholding the trial court=s failure to 

instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense. Although the 

Supreme Court has held that the failure to instruct on lesser 

included offenses can constitute constitutional error in capital 

cases, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638-46 (1980), it has reserved 

decision on whether such an omission in non-capital cases

constitutes constitutional error, id. at 638 n.7.

Accordingly, there is no clearly established federal law within 

the meaning of ' 2254(d) concerning a state court=s rejection of a 

claim that Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in a non-capital 

case were violated by a failure to instruct on a lesser included 

offense. Thus, such a claim is not cognizable in a proceeding 

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2254, and it should be dismissed. Windham 

v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1998). 

However, a defendant=s right to adequate jury instructions on 

the theory of the defense case might present an exception to the 

general rule. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 

1984). Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 

the Compulsory Process Clause and Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment, criminal defendants must be afforded a meaningful 

opportunity to present a complete defense. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 

U.S. 683, 690 (1986); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 

(1984). The Supreme Court has characterized its cases as not 

recognizing a generalized constitutional right to have a jury 

instructed on a defense available under the evidence under state 

law. Gilmore v. Taylor, 108 U.S. 333, 343 (1993). However, when 

habeas is sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a failure to instruct on 

the defense theory of the case constitutes error if the theory is 

legally sound, evidence in the case makes it applicable, and it fits 

the defense theory of the case. Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 

(9th Cir. 2006); Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 928-29 (9th Cir.

2000), (per curiam), cert. den. 534 U.S. 839 (2001). Where the 

evidence does not support the giving of the instruction, there is no 

constitutional violation. See Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 

1028–30 (9th Cir. 2005) (no constitutional violation when the state 

trial court refused to instruct on imperfect self-defense that was 

not supported by sufficient evidence); Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d at 

929 (no constitutional error in refusing to give an instruction not 

supported by evidence). In addition, for a habeas corpus petitioner 

to be entitled to relief, any instructional error must have had a 

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substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622, 637 (9th 

Cir. 1993).

Here, the state court’s finding that the evidence was

insufficient to warrant an instruction is entitled to a presumption 

of correctness on federal habeas review. Menendez v. Terhune, 422 

F.3d at 1029. However, even if the claim is reviewed de novo, there 

was not sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably have 

concluded that Petitioner intended only to buy marijuana. Further, 

it does not appear that Petitioner suffered any prejudice. The jury 

was instructed that if Petitioner lacked the intent required for 

robbery, the killing was not felony murder. Thus, the jury was 

instructed on Petitioner’s theory of the defense. Cf. Beardslee v. 

Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 576 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the jury 

necessarily rejected the testimony of Rubianes that Petitioner’s 

purpose in being at the scene was to buy marijuana.

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court deny 

Petitioner’s claim concerning instructions on the lesser included 

offenses of second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter.

VII. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner alleges he suffered a violation of his right under 

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the effective assistance of 

counsel when his counsel conceded that Petitioner was the shooter of 

the fatal shot. Petitioner contends that there was evidence 

sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt because he had stated he had 

run after the first shot, there was evidence that the fatal shot was 

shot from a location different from the place Petitioner had stated 

he had been, and Martin had both a motive to shoot Betts (Martin was 

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the beneficiary under the victim’s will) and the opportunity (a 

large arsenal, much of which had not been examined by law 

enforcement). Petitioner relies on a letter from a co-perpetrator’s 

counsel to the effect that some jurors who had contacted him 

adverted to a possibility of a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was 

the shooter. (Doc. 22 at 18-22.)

A. The State Court Decision

The decision of the CCA on this issue is as follows:

Burciaga claims he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel because defense counsel (1) conceded Burciaga 

fired the fatal shot that killed Betts, and (2) relied 

upon an inapplicable defense, specifically, imperfect 

self-defense. We disagree.

“Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California 

Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to the 

assistance of counsel.” (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 

Cal.3d 171, 215.) To establish constitutionally 

ineffective assistance of counsel, “ ‘a defendant must 

show both that his counsel's performance was deficient 

when measured against the standard of a reasonably 

competent attorney and that counsel's deficient 

performance resulted in prejudice to defendant.’ “ (People 

v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 674.) The burden of 

proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the 

defendant. (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425.)

Defense counsel argued (1) the People had failed to prove 

an intent to rob, and (2) Burciaga and the others went to 

Martin and Betts's home to purchase marijuana. Defense 

counsel also argued that Burciaga shot Betts because Betts 

pointed a gun at him and there was gunfire. Defense 

counsel specifically stated Burciaga did not shoot Betts 

in order to steal marijuana and that Betts pursued 

Burciaga as he attempted to flee.

Defense counsel's argument was reasonable in light of the 

state of the evidence. Martin testified that Burciaga was 

the one holding the shotgun. In his first interview with 

Grayson, Burciaga stated that he shot back when one of the 

owners came out of the house and started shooting. In his 

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second interview with Grayson, Burciaga first denied 

shooting Betts and then stated that he shot to scare 

Betts, not to kill him. Burciaga also stated in the second 

interview that Betts shot first and that killing Betts was 

an accident.

The physical evidence established that Betts died from a 

shotgun wound. Shoe prints bearing a herringbone pattern, 

the same as found on the bottom of Burciaga's shoes when 

arrested, were found in the dirt near a spent shotgun 

casing where Betts was shot.

Defense counsel's argument to the jury that Betts was the 

shooter was wholly consistent with Burciaga's statements 

to law enforcement and the physical evidence in the case.

We additionally reject Burciaga's claim that defense 

counsel argued an inapplicable defense. Burciaga 

misconstrues defense counsel's argument. Defense counsel 

did not assert imperfect self-defense by one who was a 

felon or aggressor. Defense counsel argued that Burciaga 

was not at Martin and Betts's to rob them but to purchase 

marijuana and that Betts was the aggressor who first fired 

shots. Burciaga fired only in response to shots being 

fired at him.

Courts repeatedly have rejected claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel in other cases involving concessions 

made by defense counsel in closing argument where the 

incriminating evidence was strong and defense counsel 

offered some other choice in the defendant's favor. We do 

so here as well. (See, e.g., People v. Bolin (1998) 18 

Cal.4th. 297, 334-335 [rejecting a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel related to defense counsel's 

concession of some measure of culpability as a valid 

tactical choice given the overwhelming evidence of the 

defendant's guilt]; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 

1148, 1186-1187 [rejecting a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel related to defense counsel's 

concession in closing argument that the defendant had been 

present at the scene of the crime, repudiating the 

defendant's alibi testimony]; see also People v. Wade

(1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 988 [“In light of the overwhelming 

evidence of his client's guilt, trial counsel had little 

choice but to candidly acknowledge guilt, concede the 

heinous nature of the offense, and concentrate instead on 

convincing the jury of the legitimacy of defendant's 

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mental defenses”]; People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 

697 [“Counsel's tactical decision to argue a particular 

personal view of the evidence, indicating that his client 

may have committed only a lesser offense, is not akin to 

pleading guilty to that offense”]; People v. Jackson

(1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 293 [“‘[G]ood trial tactics demanded 

complete candor’ with the jury”].)

 

People v. Burciaga, 2010 WL 4355509, at *12-*13.

B. Analysis

The law governing claims concerning ineffective assistance of 

counsel is clearly established for the purposes of the AEDPA 

deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Premo v. 

Moore, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 733, 737-38 (2011); Canales v. Roe, 151 

F.3d 1226, 1229 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in violation 

of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a convicted defendant must 

show that 1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms in 

light of all the circumstances of the particular case; and 2) unless 

prejudice is presumed, it is reasonably probable that, but for 

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984); 

Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994).

With respect to this Court’s review of a state court’s decision 

concerning a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme 

Court has set forth the standard of decision as follows:

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To establish ineffective assistance of counsel “a 

defendant must show both deficient performance by counsel 

and prejudice.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. ––,––,129 

S.Ct. 1411, 1419, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009). In addressing 

this standard and its relationship to AEDPA, the Court 

today in Richter, –– U.S., at –– – ––, 131 S.Ct. 770, 

gives the following explanation:

“To establish deficient performance, a person 

challenging a conviction must show that 

‘counsel's representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness.’ 

[Strickland,] 466 U.S., at 688 [104 S.Ct. 2052]. 

A court considering a claim of ineffective 

assistance must apply a ‘strong presumption’ 

that counsel's representation was within the 

‘wide range’ of reasonable professional 

assistance. Id., at 689 [104 S.Ct. 2052]. The 

challenger's burden is to show ‘that counsel 

made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’ Id., at 687 

[104 S.Ct. 2052].

“With respect to prejudice, a challenger must 

demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.’ 

...

“ ‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an 

easy task.’ Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ––, ––

[130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284] (2010). 

An ineffective-assistance claim can function as 

a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture 

and raise issues not presented at trial [or in 

pretrial proceedings], and so the Strickland

standard must be applied with scrupulous care, 

lest ‘intrusive post-trial inquiry’ threaten the 

integrity of the very adversary process the 

right to counsel is meant to serve. Strickland, 

466 U.S., at 689–690 [104 S.Ct. 2052]. Even 

under de novo review, the standard for judging 

counsel's representation is a most deferential 

one. Unlike a later reviewing court, the 

attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew 

of materials outside the record, and interacted 

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with the client, with opposing counsel, and with 

the judge. It is ‘all too tempting’ to ‘secondguess counsel's assistance after conviction or 

adverse sentence.’ Id., at 689 [104 S.Ct. 2052]; 

see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 

S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Lockhart v. 

Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 

L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). The question is whether an 

attorney's representation amounted to 

incompetence under ‘prevailing professional 

norms,’ not whether it deviated from best 

practices or most common custom. Strickland, 466 

U.S., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

“Establishing that a state court's application 

of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) 

is all the more difficult. The standards created 

by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly 

deferential,’ id., at 689 [104 S.Ct. 2052]; 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7, 117 

S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), and when the 

two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so, 

Knowles, 556 U.S., at ––––, 129 S.Ct., at 1420. 

The Strickland standard is a general one, so the 

range of reasonable applications is substantial. 

556 U.S., at –––– [129 S.Ct., at 1420]. Federal 

habeas courts must guard against the danger of 

equating unreasonableness under Strickland with 

unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) 

applies, the question is not whether counsel's 

actions were reasonable. The question is whether 

there is any reasonable argument that counsel 

satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.”

Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. at 739-40 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 

131 S.Ct. 770 (2011)). 

Here, defense counsel’s argument was reasonable in light of the 

overwhelming evidence that Petitioner shot Betts, including Martin’s 

testimony that Petitioner had a shotgun, Petitioner followed Martin 

to the house and pointed the shotgun at him, and the shotgun blast 

came from the side of the house near the door near where Betts

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stood; Petitioner’s own admissions that he was the shooter;

2 physical 

evidence of a trail of shoeprints with patterns similar to the 

patterns of Petitioner’s and Mendez’s shoes heading from the scene 

to the point at which Sergeant Bump made contact with Petitioner, 

the location of the .12 gauge shotgun with no stock discovered along 

the way on top of fresh grass under a tree limb, discovery of a 

spent .12 gauge shotgun casing and a herringbone shoeprint within a 

foot of each other about ten feet from the southeast corner of the 

house, and Petitioner’s having cuts on his chin; law enforcement 

opinion testimony that a comparison of the herringbone shoeprints to 

Petitioner’s shoes showed similarity and/or demonstrated that 

Petitioner made the shoe impressions; and firearms expert opinion 

testimony that the shotgun casing found behind the victim’s home was 

fired from the shotgun found on the shoeprint trail. 

In light of the strong evidence from multiple sources that 

supported a conclusion that Petitioner was the shooter, a fairminded 

jurist could conclude that defense counsel’s actions were 

reasonable, and they did not undermine confidence in the outcome of 

the proceeding or cause prejudice to Petitioner. Accordingly, it 

will be recommended that Petitioner’s claim of the ineffective 

assistance of counsel be denied. 

///

///

 

2

 In the first interview, Petitioner stated that a property owner came out of the

house and started shooting; Petitioner returned a shot, and his shotgun recoiled, 

hitting him on his lip and cutting his chin; Petitioner discarded his twelve-gauge 

shotgun in the woods. (LD 2 at 4-5.)

 In the second interview, Petitioner denied shooting Betts and said that Betts 

came out “blasting”; however, Petitioner admitted that he shot to scare Betts, not 

to hit him. Later Petitioner said that he had killed someone for nothing, and 

that if he killed Betts, it was an accident. (Id.) 

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VIII. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. 

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 Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. Accordingly, it will be recommended that 

the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

IX. Recommendations

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is RECOMMENDED 

that:

1) The first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus be 

DENIED; 

2) Judgment be ENTERED for Respondent; and 

3) The Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealability.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United 

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served 

with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court 

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and 

Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if served by 

mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review 

the Magistrate Judge=s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(C).

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal.

///

///

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Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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