Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03102/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03102-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rex Hesse
Appellee
Elsancho Eugene Jackson
Appellant
The Boeing Company
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L l ;\ i) l 

United States ~ :rtof Appea, 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT '£enth Cn·,:uit 

ELSANCHO EUGENE JACKSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

THE BOEING COMPANY, a Delaware 

Corporation; REX HESSEE, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

DEC 10 1992 

) ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) Clerk 

) 

) 

) No. 92-3102 

) (D.C. No. 90-1448-K) 

) (D. Kan.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BALDOCK and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BABCOCK,** District 

Judge.*** 

**Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, District Judge, 

District Court for the District of Colorado, 

designation. 

United States 

sitting by 

Plaintiff-appellant Elsancho Eugene Jackson worked as a sheet 

metal assembler for the Boeing Company (Boeing) from March 1987, 

until he was discharged in May 1989. Jackson brought suit against 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

*** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-3102 Document: 010110151609 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 1 
defendants, Boeing and Rex Hessee, asserting claims under Title 

VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3) 

and 1986 . Jackson also asserted several state law claims. The 

district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on 

all claims. The only issues on appeal are whether the district 

court erred (1) in granting summary judgment on Jackson's claim 

that he was discharged on the basis of his race in violation of 

Title VII, and (2) in granting summary judgment on Jackson's claim 

that defendants refused to rehire him because of his race in 

violation of § 1981. 

§ 1291 and affirm. 

We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

Our review of summary judgment is de novo. We apply the same 

legal standard used by the district court, namely Rule 56(c) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola 

Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1992), petition for 

cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1992) (No. 92-581). 

Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party 

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." We view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary 

judgment. Deepwater Invs .• Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 

F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 

The district court found Jackson could not prevail on his 

discriminatory discharge claim because he showed no evidence that 

Boeing's stated reason for firing him was merely a pretext for 

discrimination. Defendants claimed they discharged Jackson for 

excessive absenteeism. Jackson makes no attempt to show that 

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Appellate Case: 92-3102 Document: 010110151609 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 2 
Boeing applied its attendance policy in a discriminatory fashion. 

Instead, as evidence of pretext, he points to instances of 

allegedly racial harassment by his supervisor, Rex Hessee. 

However, in support of their motion for summary judgment, 

defendants produced overwhelming evidence to support their claim 

that Jackson was discharged for excessive absenteeism. We find 

that Jackson has not produced sufficient evidence to create a 

genuine issue of fact over whether defendants' proffered reason 

for his discharge was "in fact a coverup for a racially 

discriminatory decision." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792, 805 (1973). Therefore, we affirm summary judgment on 

Jackson's Title VII claim of discriminatory discharge. 

Jackson also argues the district court erred in entering 

summary judgment on his § 1981 claim. He alleges that Boeing 

refused to rehire him because of his race. The district court 

found that "failure to rehire an employee in the same position 

from which he was vacated does not violate§ 1981 where a new and 

distinct employment relation is not .created." Jackson v. Boeing 

Co., No. 90-1448-K, slip op. at 14 (D. Kan. Feb. 10, 1992). The 

district court concluded that§ 1981 did not apply in this case 

because Jackson reapplied for the same position from which he had 

been terminated. On appeal, Jackson argues that even if he 

reapplied to the same position, his claim is actionable under the 

amendments to § 1981, enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 

Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-1100 (enacted on Nov. 21, 

1991). Jackson failed to advance this argument to the district 

court, even though Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 

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Appellate Case: 92-3102 Document: 010110151609 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 3 
before Jackson submitted his brief in opposition to s ummary 

judgment. We, therefore, will not address this argument on 

appeal. Jackson argues in the alternative that the district court 

erred in concluding that he reapplied for the same position. 

Although Jackson's affidavit indicates that he intended to apply 

for a new position with Boeing, Jackson has not designated any 

evidence which would show that a new position was available. See 

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989) (to 

establish prima facie case, petitioner must show "she applied for 

an available position"). As the district court recognized, 

"the evidence shows that Boeing did not hire any new employees in 

its sheet metal department after plaintiff's discharge, although 

it did recall certain employees previously laid off." Jackson, 

slip op. at 15. We, therefore, affirm summary judgment on the 

§ 1981 claim on the grounds that Banks "provides no factual 

support for his claim." Id. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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