Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02755/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02755-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Otis R. Bowen
Appellee
Wilbur Hilst
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILBUR HILST, M.D., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAYO 41989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 87-2755 

OTIS R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of 

United States Department of Health 

and Human Services, Health Care 

Financing Administration, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 86-4367) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Stephen G. Mirakian and Keith E. Drill of Koenigsdorf, Wyrsch & 

Ramsey, Kansas City, Missouri, and William Stewart, Topeka, 

Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., United States Attorney, and Alleen s. 

Castellani, Assistant United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, BARRETT and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 87-2755 Document: 01019957825 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 1 
·-· _. _ _ ,...: ,,.,,,'..,.,,. ,~-, 

Wilbur Hilst, a physician, commenced this action pursuant to 

28 u.s.c. § 1331 (1982) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 

Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that 

his constitutional right to due process was violated by the mariner 

in which he was suspended from participation in the Medicare 

reimbursement program. He requested actual damages of over 

$10,000 from Defendant Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of the Department 

of Health and Human Services. The district court granted 

defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. We affirm. 1 

I 

subject matter 

Defendant initially raises the issue of our jurisdiction over 

this appeal. The dis·tr ict court granted defendant's motion to 

dismiss by its Memorandum and Order filed August 4, 1987. On 

August 18, Hilst filed a motion for reconsideration. On August 

24, the court entered a separate judgment dismissing the action in 

accordance with Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

On September 23, the court found Hilst's motion for 

reconsideration timely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and denied it. 

On November 23, Hilst filed his notice of appeal. Defendant 

questions whether a motion to reconsider filed before the entry of 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The caus~is therefore ordered 

·submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-2755 Document: 01019957825 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 2 
judgment is timely and· thereby sufficient to toll the time for 

filing the notice of appeal. 

The district court correctly construed Hilst's motion for 

reconsideration as one pursuant to Rule 59(e). See Autorama Corp. 

v. Stewart, 802 F.2d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir. 1986). Rule 4(a)(4) of 

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that if a timely 

Rule 59(e) motion is made, the time for appeal begins to run from 

the entry of the order disposing of the motion. In this case 

Hilst's notice of appeal was timely only if his Rule 59(e) motion 

was timely, thereby tolling the time for appeal pursuant to 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). 

Although Rule 59 motions are to be served not later than ten 

days after entry of judgment, courts and commentators generally 

agree that this ten-day limit sets only a maximum period and does 

not preclude a party from making a Rule 59 motion before a formal 

judgment has been entered. See,~, Greater Houston Chapter of 

the ACLU v. Eckels, 755 F.2d 426, 427-28 (5th Cir. 1985) (motion 

for new trial); Contempo Metal Furniture Co. v. East Texas Motor 

Freight Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 761, 764 n.l (9th Cir. 1981) (motion 

for new trial); Jetero Const. Co. v. South Memphis Lumber Co., 531 

F.2d 1348, 1351 (6th Cir. 1976) (motion to alter or amend 

judgment); 11 c. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure 

§ 2812 at 81-82 (1973) (motion for new trial); 9 J. Moore, B. Ward 

& J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 11 204 .12 [ 4] ___ at _4-95 ( 2d ed . 

. 1989) (Rule 59 motion "made after the court has indicated the 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-2755 Document: 01019957825 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 3 
( action that it will take,·but before the judgment embodying that 

action has been formally entered, is timely'')~ see also 

Calculators Hawaii, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 724 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th 

Cir. 1983) (Rule 52(b) motion to amend). This circuit expressed a 

similar view in a case in which a motion for reconsideration of an 

interlocutory order on lien priorities was pending when the 

district court entered a final judgment of foreclosure. See 

Director of Revenue v. United States, 392 F.2d 307, 308-10 (10th 

Cir. 1968). The notice of appeal in that case was not timely 

filed from the date of the final judgment, but was timely filed 

from the subsequent denial of the motion for reconsideration. We 

upheld jurisdiction over the appeal. 

We conclude that Hilst's Rule 59(e) motion was timely even 

though it was made before the separate judgment was entered. 2 

Accordingly, his notice of appeal was also timely as measured from 

the disposition of that motion. 

II 

Hilst submitted claims for reimbursement from Medicare in 

conjunction with his medical practice. He was suspended for a 

2 The case of Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 

808 (9th Cir. 1981), cited by defendant, is factually 

distinguishable. There the district court denied motions to 

reconsider grants of partial summary judgments without ever 

ordering entry of judgment in favor of the parties obtaining 

partial relief. ·That case raised peculiar issues of finality 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and 28 u.s.c. § 1291, which are not 

·present here. 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-2755 Document: 01019957825 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 4 
period of one year by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Kansas, the state 

provider, based on a finding that he had made false statements bn 

claims and had billed for services he was not entitled to perform. 

Following that determination, Hilst sought and received an 

evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The 

ALJ found. that Hilst had not submitted false statements and that 

the decision to exclude him from participation in the Medicare 

program for one year was unreasonable, improper, and unsupported 

by substantial evidence. 

The agency appealed the ALJ's decision. The Appeals Council 

affirmed over a year later, during which time Hilst's suspension 

continued. Because he was not reinstated in the Medicare program 

pending appeal, Hilst filed a petition in the district court for 

review and enforcement of the ALJ's order. Hilst v. Heckler, No. 

83-4389 (D. Kan.). The court preliminarily enjoined defendant 

from taking action contrary to the ALJ's decision pending the 

outcome of the appeal. Concluding that it had jurisdiction over 

Hilst's attack on the constitutionality of the pending 

administrative actions, the court · subsequently held that 

"plaintiff's due process rights were violated by the failure to 

reinstate plaintiff into the program following the ALJ decision 

pending appeal to the Appeals Council." Rec., supp. vol. I, at 9. 

Hilst thereafter subsequently commenced this action alleging 

that· he was entitled to damages based on the prior judicial 

determination that his constitutional right to due process had 

5 

Appellate Case: 87-2755 Document: 01019957825 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 5 
been violated. He alleged that the violation occurred because 

both the regulations themselves and the acts of defendants' 

employees denied him due process. Defendant moved to dismiss on 

the grounds that if the suit was against him in his official 

capacity it was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and 

if it was against him in his individual capacity it was barred 

because the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to 

Bivens actions and there was no allegation that he was personally 

involved in the commission of any constitutional violation. The 

district court granted defendant's motion. 3 We affirm, although 

on a basis different from that relied on below. 

After the district court issued its opinion, the Supreme 

Court decided Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988). As a 

general rule, an appellate court must apply the law in effect at 

the time it reaches its decision. See Thorpe v. Housing 

Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969); Boise City Farmers Co-op. v. 

Palmer, 780 F.2d 860, 866 (10th Cir. 1985)(citing Bradley v. 

Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 714 (1974)). In Chilicky, 

the plaintiffs were individuals whose social security disability 

benefits had been terminated but were later restored. ~hey sued 

the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Commissioner of 

the Social Security Administration for damages, alleging they had 

violated the plaintiff's due process rights by adopting illegal 

policies and procedures that led to the termination of benefits. 

3 The district court held that Hilst's cause 

_against defendant in his individual capacity. 

argue to the contrary on appeal. 

6 

of action was 

Hilst does not 

Appellate Case: 87-2755 Document: 01019957825 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 6 
Relying on Bush v. Lucas,· 462 U.S. 367 (1983), the Court held that 

when Congress has provided "meaningful safeguards or remedies for 

the rights of persons," 108 s. Ct. at 2468, a Bivens action for 

alleged due process violations is not available against government 

officials who administer the program even though the statutory 

relief may not wholly compensate a plaintiff for damages suffered, 

_s_e_e _i_d. at 2468-71. _s_e_e _a_l_s_o _H_o_o_k_e_r_v_. __ u_n_i_t_e_d __ s_t_a_t_e_s __ D_e~p~'_t __ o_f 

Health & Human Serv., 858 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying 

Chilicky); but see Ysasi v. Rivkind, 856 F.2d 1520, 1527-28 (Fed 

Cir. 1988) (Bivens remedy available despite Chilicky when 

utilization of statutory relief was "frustrated" by defendant). 

In this case, a comprehensive remedy is provided to 

physicians when their right to participate in the Medicare program 

is suspended. See 42 u.s.c.A. § 1320a-7 (West Supp. 1988); 42 

C.F.R. § 1001.l et seq. As in Chilicky, this remedy includes an 

elaborate administrative hearing, and administrative and judicial 

review. 

with 

Although this remedial framework does not provide Hilst 

consequential damages arising from defendant's 

unconstitutional conduct, the Court in Chilicky clearly indicated 

that this lack does not entitle a plaintiff to maintain a Bivens 

action so long as the remedy, although incomplete, is adequate and 

the safeguards are meaningful. See 108 s. Ct. at 2468. We 

believe that the reasoning of Chilicky is applicable here and 

precludes Hilst from pursuing· a Bivens action. 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-2755 Document: 01019957825 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 7 
The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

8 

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