Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01302/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01302-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arnold James Pemberton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-1302

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Minnesota.

Arnold James Pemberton, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 18, 2004

Filed: April 22, 2005

___________

Before BYE, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Arnold James Pemberton appeals his convictions and sentences following a

plea of guilty to three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(3), 1151, 1153(a), and 2. We affirm.

I

On April 18, 2002, Pemberton and his cousin Randy Garrigan got into a fight

with Robert "Whitey" Anderson and Leland Lussier at a bar in Bemidji, Minnesota.

Following the altercation, Pemberton and Garrigan obtained a rifle and a handgun and

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drove around until they found Anderson, Leland Lussier and Melissa Lussier on a

country road on the Red Lake Indian Reservation. A second confrontation ensued in

which Garrigan shot and seriously wounded both Anderson and Leland Lussier.

Pemberton shot at the trio but it is undisputed the bullets fired from his weapon did

not strike anyone. Melissa Lussier was uninjured in the shootout. 

Pemberton and Garrigan were charged in a seventeen-count superceding

indictment with assault with intent to commit murder, assault resulting in serious

bodily injury, assault with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to use a firearm in

furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting. The indictment alleged

Pemberton and Garrigan were non-Indians under 18 U.S.C. § 1152, and alternatively,

that Pemberton and Garrigan were Indians under 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). 

Pemberton entered into a plea agreement with the government and pleaded

guilty to Counts 6, 7 and 8, which, inter alia, alleged Pemberton was an Indian under

§ 1153(a). In return for Pemberton's plea of guilty, the government dismissed the

remaining counts. 

The plea agreement Pemberton signed states he is an Indian and fired at

Anderson, Leland Lussier and Melissa Lussier without justification and with the

intent to do them bodily harm. The agreement further states Pemberton was unaware

of any facts justifying his actions or the actions of Garrigan. The plea agreement also

states Anderson sustained permanent or life-threatening injuries and Lussier sustained

serious bodily injury. Finally, Pemberton stipulated to a four-level enhancement

under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2A2.2(b)(3)(A), because permanent,

life-threatening or serious bodily injuries resulted from the assault.

At the change of plea hearing, Pemberton testified he was not an enrolled

member of any tribe but considered himself an Indian. Pemberton further testified his

parents were both Indians and his mother was an enrolled tribal member. Change of

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The Honorable Joan E. Lancaster, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

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Plea Tr. 19-20. Pemberton also admitted the facts surrounding the assault, as outlined

above, and conceded the applicability of the four-level enhancement for permanent,

life-threatening or serious bodily injury. Change of Plea Tr. 20-22. The district

court1

 accepted the guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation. 

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) identified Pemberton as an Indian

who was born on the Red Lake Reservation and lived there with his mother, father

and later his girlfriend's family. The PSR indicated Pemberton has a three-year-old

daughter who lives with his girlfriend on the reservation. Finally, the PSR stated he

attended grade school and high school on the Red Lake Reservation. Pemberton

offered no objection to any of the factual information contained in the PSR. 

At sentencing, the district court imposed a fifty-seven month sentence – the low

end of the applicable guideline range. Once again, Pemberton offered no objection

to any of the factual information developed at the change of plea hearing, or

contained in the plea agreement and the PSR. On appeal, however, he argues the

district court lacked jurisdiction over him because there was insufficient factual basis

to conclude he was an Indian under § 1153(a). He further contends the four-level

enhancement was inapplicable because the injuries were solely attributable to the

actions of Garrigan who was acquitted at trial of any wrongdoing. 

II

Pemberton first argues the district court lacked jurisdiction because there was

insufficient evidence to establish his status as an Indian under § 1153(a). A dispute

over his status as an Indian or non-Indian, while relevant to the matter of proof at

trial, did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction. See United States v. White

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Horse, 316 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 2003). "As the Supreme Court has recently made

clear, the matter of jurisdiction has to do only with 'the court's statutory or

constitutional power to adjudicate the case.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Cotton,

535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)). "Subject-matter

jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution comes from 18 U.S.C. § 3231 . . . .

That's the beginning and the end of the 'jurisdictional' inquiry." Id. (quoting Hugi v.

United States, 164 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Beck, 250

F.3d 1163, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he nexus with interstate commerce, which

courts frequently call the 'jurisdictional element,' is simply one of the essential

elements of § 844(i) . . . . It is not jurisdictional in the sense that it affects a court's

subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., a court's constitutional or statutory power to

adjudicate a case.") (quoting United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir.

1998)). Thus, we hold the alleged dispute over Pemberton's Indian status did not

deprive the district court of jurisdiction. 

Even if Pemberton's characterization of § 1153(a) as jurisdictional is correct,

it is well settled "[i]n order for a defendant who has pleaded guilty to sustain a

challenge to the district court's jurisdiction, he must establish that the face of the

indictment failed to charge a federal offense." Mack v. United States, 853 F.2d 585,

586 (8th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Here, he does not challenge the sufficiency of

the indictment, and it is apparent the indictment charged all the necessary elements,

including his Indian status under § 1153(a). While a guilty plea does not confer

jurisdiction, United States v. Mathews, 833 F.2d 161, 164 (9th Cir. 1987), "[a] guilty

plea admits factual allegations in the indictment that form the basis for federal

jurisdiction," Mack, 853 F.2d at 586 (citing Mathews, 833 F.2d at 164). We conclude

his guilty plea was sufficient to establish the factual predicate necessary for the

district court to find he was an Indian under § 1153(a).

We also reject Pemberton's claim that the admitted facts were insufficient to

establish he was an Indian. Relying on United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152

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Pemberton does not dispute he has Indian blood.

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(8th Cir. 1995), he contends the only way to establish a defendant's Indian status is

to show he has some Indian blood2

 and is recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the

federal government. We disagree. "Enrollment is the common evidentiary means of

establishing Indian status, but it is not the only means nor is it necessarily

determinative." United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979)

(citations omitted). In United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976), this

court held defendants who hold themselves out to be Indians and who are of Indian

blood are Indians under § 1153. Here, the facts establish Pemberton identified

himself as an Indian. His parents were both Indians and his mother was an enrolled

member of the tribe. Additionally, he lived for long periods of time on the

reservation and attended grade school and high school on the reservation. He also has

a child and lived together with mother and child on the reservation. We conclude

these admitted facts are sufficient to establish his status as an Indian under § 1153(a).

Finally, Pemberton was charged under § 1153(a) as an Indian, as well as

§ 1152 which alleged he was a non-Indian. As part of the negotiated plea agreement,

Pemberton chose to plead guilty under § 1153(a) and admit he was an Indian. 

[R]egardless of which statute applied (one of them certainly did)

[Defendant] was guilty of a federal crime because he, like

everyone else, is either an Indian or he is not. Between them, the

statutes apply to all defendants whatever their race or ethnicity.

In other words, we believe that the situation here is the same as it

would be if we were dealing not with two statutes but with a

single one that provided that it applied whether or not the

defendant was an Indian . . . . 

White Horse, 316 F.3d at 773.

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Pemberton next argues the four-level enhancement under § 2A2.2(b)(3)(A) was

inappropriate because there was insufficient evidence to establish the factual

predicate for the enhancement. He, however, admitted the underlying facts and

stipulated in the plea agreement to the applicability of the enhancement. Further, he

failed to object to application of the enhancement in the PSR or at the sentencing

hearing. 

 Because Pemberton raised no objection in the district court to the sufficiency

of this evidence, we review his claim for plain error and accord relief only if the

alleged error "affect[s] substantial rights [and] seriously affect[s] the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." White Horse, 316 F.3d at 772

(quoting Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632-33 (2002). Here, the facts admitted by him are

more than sufficient to withstand plain error review. Accordingly, we reject his

contentions and conclude he is bound by the agreement and his admissions. See

United States v. Wicker, 80 F.3d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding defendant's

admissions at plea hearing provided abundant evidence in support of guilty plea);

United States v. Peebles, 80 F.3d 278, 279 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding

defendant's claims of innocence are unavailing given admissions to the contrary in

plea agreement, stipulation, and at change-of-plea hearing); see also United States v.

Stuttley, 103 F.3d 684, 686 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding post-plea regrets are not a fair

and just reason to warrant withdrawal of guilty plea). 

III

The order and judgment of the district court are affirmed. 

______________________________

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