Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-19-10332/USCOURTS-ca11-19-10332-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Curtis Bryant
Appellant
Jerimaine Bryant
Appellant
Levi Bryant
Appellant
Antonio Glass
Appellant
Reginald Graham
Appellant
Samuel Hayes
Appellant
Torivis Reginald Ingram
Appellant
Daniel Jones
Appellant
Mario Rodriguez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee
Michael Walker
Appellant

Document Text:

19-10332 Opinion of the Court 1

 [PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 19-10332

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

REGINALD GRAHAM, 

a.k.a. The Real Rico, 

a.k.a. To Cool Rico, 

a.k.a. G'Rico Longllive Kingsqueezer,

a.k.a. Reggie,

ANTONIO GLASS, 

a.k.a. ntn_1bloodgangsta@yahoo.com, 

a.k.a. Tone Bleedin Red (Tone Gone Bag'em), 

a.k.a. Money Man Future @ S16_Future, 

a.k.a. smackvilletone, 

a.k.a. Tone Glass, 

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2 Opinion of the Court 19-10332

a.k.a. (at)tone.glass, 

JERIMAINE BRYANT, 

a.k.a. RNS DSBF Capo, 

a.k.a. (at) d5bf_mc, 

a.k.a. Blood @_McMaine06, 

a.k.a. Maine, 

MARIO RODRIGUEZ, 

a.k.a. "Blood", 

a.k.a. "str8_crackk", 

a.k.a. "Tuti", 

TORIVIS REGINALD INGRAM, 

a.k.a. "DSBF Mullet'', 

MICHAEL WALKER,

a.k.a. Laid Back ManMan,

a.k.a. Baba, 

LEVI BRYANT, 

a.k.a. Fish, 

CURTIS BRYANT,

a.k.a. Snow Luther King Jr.,

a.k.a. Snow Bryant,

a.k.a. Big Momma, 

DANIEL JONES, 

a.k.a. Dodo, 

SAMUEL HAYES, 

a.k.a. DSBF Jit,

a.k.a. Nba Flame,

a.k.a. Looney Hoe,

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19-10332 Opinion of the Court 3

a.k.a. Sammy, 

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-20307-JEM-7

____________________

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

The Wire is said to be one of best television shows of all time. 

That is in large part because of its realistic depiction of gang violence in an American city. See Emma Jones, How the Wire Became 

the Greatest TV Show Ever Made, BBC (Apr. 13, 2018), 

https://perma.cc/2V3Q-GYVK; Rob Sheffield, 100 Greatest TV 

Shows of All Time, Rolling Stone (Sept. 21, 2016), 

https://perma.cc/D862-BGDU. This case is about what happens 

when that fiction becomes reality.

Reginald Graham, Antonio Glass, Jerimaine Bryant, Mario 

Rodriguez, Torivis Reginald Ingram, Michael Walker, Levi Bryant, 

Curtis Bryant, Daniel Jones, and Samuel Hayes appeal their convictions and sentences for committing numerous crimes in connection with their membership in a Miami-based gang—the Dub 

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Street Blood Family or DSBF. For nearly two decades, the gang

operated in and tyrannized a community through its drug operations. When narcotics did not prove fruitful enough, its members 

turned to armed robberies. And when membersstepped out of line 

or rivals encroached on the gang’s territory, its members did not 

hesitate to kill.1 

The FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the City of Miami Police Department, and the MiamiDade County Police Department invested considerable resources 

to investigate the DSBF and take it down. Their collective work 

culminated in a broad indictment charging the defendants with numerous offenses. Count 1 charged Mr. Graham, Mr. Glass, 

Jerimaine Bryant, Mr. Rodriguez, Mr. Ingram, Mr. Walker, Levi 

Bryant, Curtis Bryant, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Hayes with a racketeering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Count 2 charged 

the same defendants—along with Latitia Houser, Donzell Jones, 

and Vencess Toby—with a narcotics conspiracy (to possess 280 

grams or more of crack cocaine and marijuana with the intent to 

distribute) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The indictment also 

charged the defendants with numerous substantive offenses.2

1 Because three of the defendants share the last name of Bryant, we use their 

full names or first names where necessary.

2 Ms. Houser, Donzell Jones, and Mr. Toby were not defendants in the trial

we review in this appeal.

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After a 38-day trial, a jury found the defendants guilty of 

many of the charges. A summary of the convictions and the sentences imposed follows:

Defendant Counts Sentence of 

Imprisonment

Reginald Graham 1 – Racketeering Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))

2 – Narcotics Conspiracy 

(21 U.S.C. § 846)

11 – Attempted Possession 

of Narcotics with the Intent to Distribute (21 

U.S.C. § 846)

228 months

Antonio Glass 1 – Racketeering Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))

2 – Narcotics Conspiracy 

(21 U.S.C. § 846)

19 – Possession of Narcotics with the Intent to Distribute (21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1))

Life 

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Jerimaine Bryant 1 – Racketeering Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))

2 – Narcotics Conspiracy 

(21 U.S.C. § 846)

5 – Possession of Narcotics

with the Intent to Distribute (21 U.S.C § 841)

12 – Possession of Narcotics with the Intent to Distribute (21 U.S.C § 841)

21 – Possession of Narcotics with the Intent to Distribute (21 U.S.C § 841)

Life

Mario Rodriguez 2 – Narcotics Conspiracy 

(21 U.S.C. § 846)

10 – Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of 

Drug Trafficking (18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c))

22 – Possession of Narcotics with the Intent to Distribute (21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1))

260 months 

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Torivis Reginald Ingraham2 – Narcotics Conspiracy 

(21 U.S.C. § 846)

22 – Possession of Narcotics with the Intent to Distribute (21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1))

168 months

Michael Walker 1 – Racketeering Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))

2 – Narcotics Conspiracy 

(21 U.S.C. § 846)

20 – Possession of Narcotics with the Intent to Distribute (21 U.S.C § 841)

235 months

Levi Bryant 2 – Narcotics Conspiracy 

(21 U.S.C. § 846)

4 – Possession of Narcotics 

with the Intent to Distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1))

192 months

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Curtis Bryant 1 – Racketeering Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))

2 – Narcotics Conspiracy 

(21 U.S.C. § 846)

11 – Attempted Possession 

of Narcotics with the Intent to Distribute (21 

U.S.C. § 846)

Life

Daniel Jones 2 – Narcotics Conspiracy 

(21 U.S.C. § 846)

235 months

Samuel Hayes 1 – Racketeering Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))

15 – Hobbs Act Robbery 

(18 U.S.C. § 1951(a))

17 – Hobbs Act Robbery 

(18 U.S.C. § 1951(a))

18 – Brandishing a Firearm 

in Furtherance of a Crime 

of Violence (18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii))

334 months

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The defendants now appeal, raising a host of issues. We vacate the Count 1 RICO conspiracy convictions due to the district 

court’s erroneous and wholesale exclusion of the defendants’ gang 

expert and the government’s complete failure to brief harmless error, an issue on which it bears the burden. We also vacate the sentence of Mr. Jones due to the improper application of a use-of-violence enhancement. In all other respects, we affirm.3

I. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL

The government’s case was largely based on the testimony

of Special Agent Christopher Mayo of the FBI; Sergeant Surami 

Kelly of the City of Miami Police Department; Special Agent Rosniel Perez of the ATF; Larry Grimes and Vandel Coakley, former 

members of the DSBF; Ms. Houser, a drug supplier for the DSBF

and the ex-girlfriend of one of its members; and Donzell Jones, a 

local drug dealer who was close to the DSBF. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see United 

States v. Scott, 61 F.4th 855, 863 (11th Cir. 2023), this is generally the 

story they told. 

As early as the year 2000, law enforcement authorities became aware of a group operating out of the South Gwen Cherry 

housing complex in the Allapattah neighborhood of Miami, Florida. That group called itself the DSBF and its members frequently 

identified themselves by other monikers such as RNS (Real N**** 

Shit) and GMT (Get Money Team). Founded by Isaac “Ike” 

3 As to any issues not discussed, we summarily affirm.

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Thompson, the DSBF had no formal affiliation with the infamous 

Bloods street gang of Los Angeles but its members considered 

themselves to be “[E]ast coast” Bloods.4

The law enforcement investigation into the DSBF began in 

earnest in the early 2010s. The DSBF had a chain of command. At 

the top of the chain was a chief executive of sorts, a position held 

by men like Mr. Thompson (and then Mr. Glass around 2012). Below him were “Top Smackers” or “TopShottas,” high-ranking deputies who were in charge of the daily drug operations. Then came 

the “L.T.s.”—lieutenants who were second in command during

drug transactions and typically collected the money and held the 

drugs and firearms. Although this chain of command became

more fluid over time, there was always a designated leader.

The DSBF had an initiation ritual, rules, handshakes, and 

hand signs. The initiation involved a 31-second display of loyalty, 

usually consisting of fighting a member or committing an act of 

violence against outsiders. The 31-second initiation was co-opted 

from the “Blood code.” Once initiated, members had to follow at 

least two rules: no stealing from the DSBF and no talking to the 

police. If a rule was broken, an enforcer, like Mr. Rodriguez, would 

oversee a 31-second punishment.

Only members could perform the DSBF handshake; outsiders who tried using it “could get beat up.” The DSBF’s hand signs

4 Later in the opinion, we discuss in more detail the government’s evidence 

about the DSBF’s association or affiliation with the Bloods.

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were intended to symbolize a capital B, a lowercase B, and “East 

side,” for “[E]ast coast” Bloods.

The DSBF was not shy about demonstrating its presence to 

the outside world. The area around the South Gwen Cherry complex had graffiti tags of the DSBF. And the gang’s members tattooed DSBF on their bodies. As self-proclaimed “[E]ast coast” 

Bloods, the DSBF’s members preferred to wear red.

Members frequently boasted of the DSBF on Facebook and 

disparaged a rival gang, the “13th Avenue Gang.” In a message that 

proved prescient, a friend of the DSBF warned Mr. Graham:

“[D]on’t put that DGMT shit on you all [Facebook] status. Feds 

watching that shit yeah.”

Through 2017, the DSBF primarily sold crack cocaine and 

marijuana, but its members regularly worked together to commit 

other crimes such as armed robberies. The group’s members were 

no strangers to violence. Members touted firearms and used 

them—killing rival gang members and “outsiders” such as Pooh 

Johnson, Richard Hallman, and Terrell Washington. They sometimes even shot their own members for violating the DSBF’s rules.

The DSBF’s criminal activities fell under three broad categories: (1) drugs; (2) armed robberies; and (3) homicides. We briefly 

summarize each of them.

Drugs. The DSBF controlled the sale of drugs—primarily 

crack cocaine and marijuana—in the South Gwen Cherry complex. 

Narcotics were the group’s financial engine, and many of the decisions were driven by this reality. Only DSBF members could sell 

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at South Gwen Cherry, and they did so “[e]very day” in shifts. Outsiders like Donzell Jones had to obtain permission to sell drugs 

there. Ms. Houser testified that starting in 2015 she began supplying the DSBF—through Mr. Glass, Quincy Bryant, Mr. Graham, 

and Mr. Walker—with the drugs the gang sold at South Gwen 

Cherry. She also said that Jerimaine Bryant supplied drugs to the 

DSBF.

Mr. Coakley testified that when it came to selling drugs, 

“everyone had a position.” At the bottom of the rung were “watch 

outs,” members who would alert the group if they saw rivals or 

police in the area. Members could graduate from a “watch out” to 

a “bomb man,” a position which required them to hold the drugs. 

They also had a “gunman,” which, as one would expect, was a 

member who had a firearm to protect the group.

Mr. Grimes described how a typical narcotics transaction

would be conducted. The DSBF would have at least a watch out 

and a bomb man. The drugs would be in a nondescript bag (“the 

bomb”) like a trash bag or a chip bag. When a customer requested

drugs, the bomb man would take the cash and walk over to set “the 

bomb.” He would then go back to the customer to deliver the 

drugs. Sgt. Kelly similarly described the drug transactions from her 

team’s controlled purchases.

During Mr. Grimes’ time with the DSBF, sometime in late 

2010, Mr. Glass was the L.T. who ran the daily drug operations. 

Mr. Glass would collect the money, assign shifts, and provide the 

drugs and guns.

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In addition, Mr. Grimes gave the jury insight into the finances of the DSBF’s narcotics operations. A “rock” of crack cocaine sold for $5, and his commission was 20%. On a good day,

Mr. Grimes would pocket $500, and on a bad day $250. He estimated that, on average, the DSBF sold 21 grams of crack cocaine 

daily. Like all markets, however, the drug sales would sometimes 

be up and other times be down. Starting in 2016, sales were down. 

The DSBF’s drug operation dried up significantly; supply was unreliable, and the buyers stopped coming. So, like any other market 

actor, the DSBF decided to diversify its operations to tap other income streams. That meant turning to robberies.

Armed Robberies. The jury learned of the DSBF’s armed 

robberies mostly through Mr. Grimes, who in response to defense 

counsel’s questioning stated, “I’m a robber.” Mr. Grimes testified 

that he was arrested for four robberies, but had committed over 25

robberies; at some point he stopped counting. Mr. Grimes’ first 

robbery with the gang dated to his initiation into the DSBF in 2010, 

when he and Mr. Glass (and others who are not defendants here) 

attempted to rob a drug dealer. During that attempted robbery, 

Mr. Grimes fired a gun provided to him by Mr. Rodriguez to show 

that they “ain’t to be played with and we going to shoot.”

Following his first robbery in 2010, Mr. Grimes consistently

committed armed robberies with the DSBF (“[m]ainly every day”). 

He identified Mr. Hayes as one of the gang members who frequently joined him in those endeavors. The firearms for the robberies were provided by Messrs. Rodriguez and Glass.

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Mr. Coakley testified to his participation in four armed robberies in the fall of 2016 with other DSBF members—Mr. Hayes, 

Mr. Glass, Mr. Graham, and Curtis Bryant. The government introduced security footage from each of the victimized establishments 

and Mr. Coakley walked the jury through each robbery. 

On September 17, 2016, Mr. Coakley, Mr. Glass, Mr. Graham, and Curtis Bryant robbed a Metro PCS store near South 

Gwen Cherry at gun point. Less than a week later, Messrs. Coakley 

and Hayes robbed the same store. In October of 2016, Messrs. 

Coakley, Hayes, and Glass robbed a nearby convenience store. 

That same month, Messrs. Coakley and Hayes again robbed the 

Metro PCS store. In all four robberies, the members held up the 

store clerk at gun point. And sometimes they held customers hostage. After each robbery, the members involved would split the 

proceeds evenly.

Homicides. The jury heard testimony about the DSBF’s 

killing of Mr. Johnson, Mr. Hallman, and Mr. Washington. All 

three men were murdered for crossing the gang. Mr. Glass killed 

Mr. Johnson in 2010 for robbing from the DSBF; Mr. Grimes, Mr.

Coakley, and Ms. Houser all testified about that murder. Curtis 

Bryant killed Mr. Hallman in 2015 after he shot a younger DSBF 

member; Mr. Coakley and Ms. Houser testified about that murder. 

Several DSBF members, including Mr. Glass and Curtis Bryant, 

killed Mr. Washington in 2016; Mr. Coakley, Ms. Houser, and Detective Roderick Passmore testified about that murder.

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The DSBF’s violence did not stop with outsiders. For example, Mr. Glass shot Mr. Grimes in a drive-by shooting for violating

the DSBF’s rules; he had robbed a customer and that was bad for 

business.

The narcotics, the robberies, and the murders all shared one

thing in common—firearms. Guns were used to sell drugs, to rob, 

and to kill. The DSBF’s members frequently posted pictures on 

social media with their guns—sometimes pointing them directly at 

the camera. Mr. Coakley testified that he had seen Mr. Rodriguez 

and Mr. Glass supply weapons, including handguns and semi-automatic rifles, to DSBF members at South Gwen Cherry.

II. PRE-TRIAL ISSUES

The defendants raise various challenges to the district 

court’s pre-trial orders, voir dire findings, evidentiary rulings, jury 

instructions, and sentencing determinations. A number of defendants also take issue with the sufficiency of the evidence against 

them on some of the charges. We address the issues presented in 

rough chronological order.

A. COUNT 2 OF THE INDICTMENT

We begin with Levi Bryant. For the first time on appeal, he 

challenges the sufficiency of Count 2 of the indictment.5

5 Mr. Ingram, Mr. Walker, and Jerimaine Bryant adopted Levi Bryant’s challenge to Count 2. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(i). 

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Where a defendant did not raise an issue below, we conduct 

plain error review. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 

507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993). Plain error requires a defendant to 

show (1) that there was an error, (2) that the error is plain, and (3) 

that the error affected his substantial rights. See United States v. 

Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1324 (11th Cir. 2015). If these three conditions are satisfied, we have discretion to correct the error. We 

“should correct a forfeited plain error that affects substantial rights 

if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 

U.S. 129, 137 (2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

As relevant here, Count 2 of the indictment charged a number of defendants, including Levi Bryant, with conspiracy to possess 280 grams or more of crack cocaine (and marijuana) with the 

intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 846. Numerous other counts 

individually or jointly charged different defendants with substantive narcotics offenses, such as possession of a controlled substance

with the intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

According to Levi Bryant, the § 846 conspiracy charged in 

Count 2 required a “linked” substantive § 841 violation. In his 

view, because Count 2 in part alleged a conspiracy involving in part

280 grams or more of crack cocaine, the government was required 

to allege that at least one of the substantive § 841 violations involved 280 grams or more of crack cocaine. But a substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit that offense are separate and 

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distinct crimes. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 

(1961) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946)). 

They may therefore be separately and independently charged, and 

the government is not required to “link” them in the charging instrument. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11 (1994) (holding that § 846 does not require proof that “a coconspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy”).

As we explained decades ago, a conspiracy “is not confined 

to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise” because “the essence of the crime of conspiracy . . . is an 

agreement to commit an unlawful act.” United States v. Cowart, 595 

F.2d 1023, 1030 (5th Cir. 1979). As a result, Levi Bryant cannot establish a defect in the indictment. There was no error, plain or otherwise, in the drafting of Count 2. 

B. THE MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS 

The district court denied the motions to suppress filed by 

Messrs. Jones, Ingram, and Rodriguez. They challenge those denials on appeal. 

We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed 

standard. We review factual findings for clear error and the application of the law to those facts de novo. See United States v. Ford, 784 

F.3d 1386, 1391 (11th Cir. 2015). 

1. MR. JONES

We begin with Mr. Jones. He sought to suppress his cell

phone and all evidence associated with it on the grounds that (1)

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he was illegally detained during a traffic stop and (2) the phone was 

seized without probable cause.

A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing at which Sgt.

Kelly and Agent Perez testified. Following that hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that Mr. Jones’ motion be denied because the officers’ search was incident to a lawful arrest. The district court then adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation. 

We find no error in the district court’s factual findings or legal conclusions and affirm the denial of Mr. Jones’ motion to suppress.

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. Amend. IV. “[T]he 

ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). “Where a 

search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 

Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). “In the absence of a warrant, a 

search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the 

warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). 

One such exception—which the district court held applied here—

is when a warrantless search occurs incident to a lawful arrest. See 

id. 

We must first determine whether there was a lawful arrest. 

Mr. Jones contends that he was not under arrest, and that even if 

he was, no probable cause supported the arrest. 

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The detention here “was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest.” See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 

200, 212 (1979). The record shows that Mr. Jones was pulled over 

and asked to step out of his car, but was not “questioned briefly 

where he was found.” See id. Instead, he was put in handcuffs, 

placed in the back of a police car, transported to the police station, 

and taken to an interrogation room. Sgt. Kelly’s and Agent Perez’s 

subjective beliefs that Mr. Jones was not under arrest or that he 

went to the police station “voluntarily”—while handcuffed in the 

back of a police car—do not control. See id. See also United States v.

Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The character of a seizure as arrest or Terry stop depends on the nature and 

degree of intrusion, not on whether the officer pronounces the detainee ‘under arrest.’”). Mr. Jones was practically and legally under 

arrest when he was handcuffed and taken to the police station in a 

police car. 

Having determined that Mr. Jones was under arrest, we now

ask whether his arrest was supported by probable cause. Probable 

cause exists when “the facts and circumstances within the officer’s 

knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, 

or is about to commit an offense.” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 

1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). See also District of Columbia 

v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (explaining that probable cause “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, 

not an actual showing of such activity”) (citation omitted).

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The magistrate judge—whose report the district court 

adopted—identified two bases which established probable cause 

for the arrest. The first was that Mr. Jones was driving an unregistered vehicle in violation of Fla. Stat. § 320.02, a second-degree misdemeanor punishable by up to 60 days of imprisonment. See State 

v. Brooks, 295 So. 3d 348, 350, 352–53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (reversing 

the trial court’s suppression of a firearm because the officers seized 

it incident to a lawful arrest for driving an unregistered vehicle); 

Fla. Stat. § 320.57(1) (making a violation of § 320.02 a second-degree misdemeanor and referencing statutes setting the available 

punishments). Second, Mr. Jones was involved in the RICO and 

narcotics conspiracies. We agree with the first basis and therefore 

do not address the second.

Mr. Jones does not dispute that he could have been arrested 

for driving an unregistered vehicle. Indeed, he does not challenge 

the validity of the initial stop for that infraction. He instead argues 

that he was not arrested for doing so because he was given two 

traffic citations. But, as we have explained, Mr. Jones was in fact 

under arrest for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when he was 

handcuffed, placed in the back of a police car, and taken to the police station. Nor does it matter under the Fourth Amendment that 

the officers could have issued traffic citations rather than execute 

an arrest. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (“We conclude that warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence 

of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and 

that while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s 

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protections.”). Accordingly, the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Jones for driving an unregistered vehicle in violation of 

Florida law.

Having confirmed the existence of an arrest supported by 

probable cause, we turn to whether the search of Mr. Jones was

incident to a lawful arrest. Simply put, “a police officer who makes 

a lawful arrest may conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee’s 

person[.]” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011). This exception exists in part to prevent the concealment or destruction of 

evidence. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). 

And the Supreme Court has permitted the seizure of a cell phone 

for that purpose while a warrant is obtained for a search of its contents. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 388. 

An officer retrieved Mr. Jones’ cell phone during a pat down 

following his detention and arrest. According to Agent Perez, cell 

phones hold evidentiary value as the mediums of narcotics transactions because they contain communications with customers and 

suppliers and, as relevant here, photographs that are used for social 

media posts. Mr. Jones’ cell phone therefore had independent evidentiary value and was properly seized to prevent the concealment 

or destruction of evidence it may have contained. See United States 

v. Bragg, 44 F.4th 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2022) (“Bragg’s iPhone was 

seized incident to his lawful arrest. . . . Because a seizure is generally less intrusive than a search, the Supreme Court ‘has frequently 

approved warrantless seizures of property, on the basis of probable 

cause, for the time necessary to secure a warrant, where a 

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warrantless search . . . would have been held impermissible.’”) 

(quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984)); Andersen 

v. DelCore, 79 F.4th 1153, 1166 (10th Cir. 2023) (“So long as an officer has probable cause that a cell phone contains evidence of a 

crime, he may seize the phone without a warrant if a reasonable 

officer would conclude that the seizure is necessary to prevent the 

destruction of evidence.”). Consequently, the district court did not 

err in denying Mr. Jones’ motion to suppress the cellphone and the 

evidence associated with it.6

2. MESSRS. INGRAM AND RODRIGUEZ

We move on to Messrs. Ingram and Rodriguez. They 

sought to suppress (1) evidence seized during an initial warrantless 

search of a carport connected to their residence and (2) additional 

evidence subsequently seized from their residence pursuant to a 

search warrant, as fruits of the poisonous tree of the initial warrantless search. The district court denied the motions to suppress, ruling that the initial warrantless search and seizure did not violate the 

Fourth Amendment and so there was no basis to suppress the fruits 

of that initial search.

a. THE CARPORT

6 Mr. Jones also challenges Agent Perez’s delay in obtaining a warrant to search 

the phone. Mr. Jones raised this argument below, but the magistrate judge 

did not address it in his report. Mr. Jones, in turn, did not object to the magistrate judge’s failure to address this argument and therefore waived the right 

to challenge this aspect of the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal. See 

11th Cir. R. 3-1. 

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The home and its surrounding curtilage are constitutionally 

protected areas, and warrantless searches of them are “presumptively” unreasonable. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. But officers 

may “ent[er] upon private land to knock on a citizen’s door for legitimate police purposes unconnected with a search of the premises.” United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006). 

This so-called knock-and-talk exception is limited in two respects. 

First, when an officer’s behavior “objectively reveals a purpose to 

conduct a search,” the exception ceases. See United States v. Walker, 

799 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2015). Second, an officer is “geographically limited to the front door or a ‘minor departure’ from 

it.” Id.

Mr. Ingram and Mr. Rodriguez contend that Miami-Dade 

Police Detectives Terrence Andre White and Charles Woods exceeded the scope of the knock-and-talk exception when they approached the carport. We disagree.7

The behavior here did not objectively reveal a purpose to 

search. Detectives White and Woods went to the residence upon 

belief that Mr. Rodriguez, who was wanted for questioning in connection with a homicide, was present there. Upon arriving at the 

residence, the Detectives saw Messrs. Ingram and Rodriguez sitting 

under the carport. So the Detectives walked through the open gate 

7 The government concedes on appeal that the carport was part of the curtilage. 

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to talk to them. This conduct fell squarely within the knock-andtalk exception. 

Moreover, approaching the carport did not exceed the geographic limit of the knock-and-talk exception. As in Walker, the 

carport here was open-aired and attached to the side of the home. 

See Walker, 799 F.3d at 1363–64 (carport was a “minor departure” 

from the front door because it “was located right next to the 

house”). And in seeing the two men under the carport, the Detectives could forego the formality of knocking on the front door. See 

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013) (recognizing that the knockand-talk exception allows an officer to do “no more than any private citizen might do”). Accordingly, the Detectives acted within 

the scope of the exception. 

Additionally, because the Detectives’ presence at the carport 

was lawful, the arguments of Messrs. Ingram and Rodriguez concerning evidence seized from the carport fail. That evidence consisted of narcotics and a firearm that Mr. Ingram grabbed from a 

table and attempted to conceal. Because those items were in plain 

view, they were subject to seizure without a warrant. See United 

States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The ‘plain 

view’ doctrine permits a warrantless seizure where (1) an officer is 

lawfully located in the place from which the seized object could be 

plainly viewed and must have a lawful right of access to the object

itself; and (2) the incriminating character of the item is immediately 

apparent.”). 

b. THE STATEMENTS

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When Mr. Rodriguez saw Detective Woods approaching 

the carport, he attempted to flee and was apprehended by Detective White. He challenges the voluntary statements he made after 

his arrest as obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and 

argues that his subsequent waivers of his Miranda rights could not 

cure any such violation. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 

436 (1966).8

Mr. Rodriguez is correct that Miranda warnings cannot 

“alone and per se” break “the causal connection between [any] illegality and” his voluntary statements. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 

590, 603 (1975). But, as noted above, there was no Fourth Amendment violation by Detectives White and Woods. As a result, Mr. 

Rodriguez’s statements were not subject to exclusion as fruits of 

the poisonous tree. See United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 

1099, 1113 (11th Cir. 1990). 

In sum, we find no error in the district court’s denial of the

motions to suppress filed by Messrs. Ingram and Rodriguez. 

C. THE MOTION TO SEVER

Jerimaine Bryant contends that the district court erred in

denying his motion to sever. We disagree.9 

8 Mr. Rodriguez does not independently challenge the sufficiency of the Miranda warnings or his waiver of his rights.

9 Mr. Graham, Mr. Walker, Mr. Glass, Mr. Jones, and Levi Bryant adopted 

Jerimaine Bryant’s severance argument. Such an adoption, however, is inappropriate. Severance is a fact-specific and defendant-specific inquiry that requires independent briefing. See United States v. Hankton, 51 F.4th 578, 609 n.17

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We review a district court’s denial of a motion to sever for 

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1235–

36 (11th Cir. 2011). “The burden of establishing an abuse of discretion” on the issue of severance “rests with [the defendant].” United 

States v. De La Torre, 639 F.2d 245, 249 (5th Cir. 1981).

If joinder appears prejudicial, a defendant can move for a 

severance. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). The Supreme Court has explained that “a district court should grant a severance under Rule 

14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise 

a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury 

from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro 

v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). Considering that guidance, we have set out a general rule that “defendants who are indicted together are usually tried together.” Lopez, 649 F.3d at 1234 

(citing United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1268 (11th Cir. 2007)). 

The rule applies with some force in conspiracy cases: defendants in 

such cases “should be” tried together. See id. (citation omitted). 

A defendant seeking severance “must discharge the heavy 

burden of demonstrating compelling prejudice from the joinder.” 

Browne, 505 F.3d at 1268 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). To prove compelling prejudice, a defendant must show

(1) that actual prejudice would result from a joint trial and (2) that 

(5th Cir. 2022) (“‘[U]nder Rule 28(i), severance issues are fact-specific’ and thus 

cannot be adopted by co-defendants.”) (citation omitted). In any event, we 

reject Jerimaine Bryant’s severance argument. 

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severance is the only proper remedy to avoid that prejudice. See 

Lopez, 649 F.3d at 1234. 

The indictment charged Jerimaine Bryant with both conspiracies—the Count 1 RICO conspiracy and the Count 2 narcotics 

conspiracy. There was a strong presumption, therefore, in favor of 

jointly trying him with the other defendants who were similarly 

charged. See id. See also United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1510 

(11th Cir. 1990) (“A defendant does not suffer compelling prejudice, sufficient to mandate a severance, simply because much of the 

evidence at trial is applicable only to co-defendants.”). 

Jerimaine Bryant argues that because his conduct was limited to narcotics possession and distribution, severance was warranted due to prejudicial “spillover” evidence concerning homicides. To remedy that issue, however, the district court instructed 

the jury to consider the case of each defendant separately and individually. We have explained that such an instruction “significantly 

alleviat[es]” the “possible prejudicial effects” of joinder. See Smith, 

918 F.2d at 1510. Here that instruction apparently did its job; the

jury acquitted some defendants, such as Levi Bryant and Mr. Jones,

of several charges. By Jerimaine Bryant’s own admission, a jury 

instruction like the one given plus a discriminating verdict signals 

that the jury followed those instructions and was able to sift 

through the evidence without undue influence from any potentially inflammatory spillover. See United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 

944, 984 (11th Cir. 1997). 

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Moreover, the evidence Jerimaine Bryant complains of was 

not spillover evidence. For example, one of the racketeering acts 

charged in the RICO conspiracy was the murder of Mr. Johnson. 

And the government presented evidence that Jerimaine Bryant was 

a senior member of the DSBF who advised Mr. Glass to kill Mr.

Johnson. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

the severance motion.

III. JURY SELECTION

At jury selection, the district court denied the defendants’ 

Batson challenges, finding that the government had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for exercising six of its eight peremptory 

strikes on prospective Black jurors. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 

476 U.S. 79 (1986). Levi Bryant contends that the district court’s 

rulings were erroneous, but we are not persuaded.10

A. BATSON

The Supreme Court has established a three-part inquiry for 

evaluating a claim that a peremptory strike is racially discriminatory:

First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing 

that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on 

the basis of race. Second, if that showing has been 

made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis 

for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the 

10 Jerimaine Bryant, Curtis Bryant, Mr. Ingram, and Mr. Walker adopted Levi 

Bryant’s Batson arguments. 

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parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine 

whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328–29 (2003) (citing Batson, 476 

U.S. at 96–98).11

Only step three of that sequence is in dispute here. At step 

three, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court 

must . . . decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved 

purposeful racial discrimination.” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 

162, 168 (2005) (citation omitted). In other words, “[t]he ultimate 

inquiry is whether the [government] was ‘motivated in substantial 

part by discriminatory intent.’” Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 

303 (2019) (citing Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 513 (2016)).

At step three, “the district court’s determination concerning 

the actual motivation behind each challenged strike amounts to 

pure factfinding, and we will reverse only if the decision is clearly 

erroneous.” United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 

2007). The district court’s determination is understandably entitled 

to “great weight.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 285–86 (2015). And 

“[a] finding that is ‘plausible’ in light of the full record—even if another is equally or more so—must govern.” Cooper v. Harris, 581 

U.S. 285, 293 (2017) (citation omitted).

11 Batson also applies to discriminatory strikes based on gender, but such strikes 

are not at issue here. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).

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The district court’s perception of an attorney’s credibility 

can be critical at step three, and can be measured by, among other 

things, “how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; 

and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted 

trial strategy.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339. Other relevant factors at 

step three include (1) “statistical evidence about the prosecutor’s 

use of peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors as compared to white prospective jurors in the case;” (2) “evidence of a 

prosecutor’s disparate questioning and investigation of black and 

white prospective jurors in the case;” (3) “side-by-side comparisons 

of black prospective jurors who were struck and white prospective 

jurors who were not struck in the case;” (4) “a prosecutor’s misrepresentations of the record when defending the strikes during the 

Batson hearing;” and (5) “other relevant circumstances that bear 

upon the issue of racial discrimination.” Flowers, 588 U.S. at 302. 

B. PROSPECTIVE JURORS 15, 19, 84, AND 103

The government used six of its peremptory strikes on prospective Black jurors. But Levi Bryant challenges as racially motivated only the strikes against Jurors 15, 19, 84, and 103.12

To establish discriminatory intent, Levi Bryant relies on statistical evidence, the government’s alleged misrepresentations to 

12 During the Batson hearing, defense counsel conceded that the government 

appropriately struck Juror 44, a prospective Black juror. The government 

struck Juror 85, another prospective Black juror, because he was young, familiar with the South Gwen Cherry area, and self-reported that he was being investigated by his employer.

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the district court during the Batson hearing, and comparisons of

prospective Black jurors who were struck to non-Black jurors who

were not struck. We address each type of evidence in turn but ultimately consider the evidence cumulatively. See Flowers, 588 U.S. 

at 314 (stating that the evidence relevant to the issue of discriminatory intent “cannot be considered in isolation” and a court “must 

examine the whole picture”). 

1. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

Looking first at the numbers, the parties narrowed the pool 

to 36 prospective jurors, 13 of whom were Black (either AfricanAmerican, Jamaican, or Bahamian). After the parties exercised 

their peremptory strikes, four members of the 12-person petit jury 

were Black. To get there, the government used six of its eight peremptory strikes on prospective Black jurors. The government had 

additional preemptory strikes that it could have, but did not, use. 

The defense, in turn, used three preemptory strikes on prospective 

Black jurors. The government attempted to accommodate two 

other prospective Black jurors—Jurors 57 and 146—but the district 

court struck them for cause.13

On at least two occasions, we have found that a similar pattern of strikes did not indicate discrimination. See United States v. 

13 Juror 57 had started a new job and was concerned that she would not be 

paid during a lengthy trial. The government proposed having the district 

court inform her employer about of the prohibition on discriminating based 

on jury duty. Juror 146 had a real estate licensing exam scheduled during the 

trial. The government proposed taking a day off on the date of his exam.

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Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 1986) (no Batson violation 

where the jury included two Black jurors and the government used 

three of eight peremptory strikes on prospective Black jurors and 

an alternate but had four unused challenges); United States v. 

Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 998 (11th Cir. 2008) (no Batson violation 

where the government chose not to use two of its peremptory 

strikes and the jury included three Black jurors and an alternate 

Black juror). Under these cases, the statistical evidence here is not 

so suggestive of discriminatory strikes so as to render the district 

court’s findings clearly erroneous.

2. THE GOVERNMENT’S REASONS

We next examine the race-neutral reasons proffered by the 

government. The government took some liberties in describing 

some of the prospective Black jurors’ answers, but its descriptions

were not a “series of factually inaccurate explanations” that necessarily signaled discriminatory intent. See Flowers, 588 U.S. at 314. 

The district court’s findings that the government’s stated reasons

were race neutral and supported by the record, see D.E. 1201 at 32, 

were plausible and therefore not clearly erroneous.

Juror 15. Levi Bryant’s strongest argument concerns Juror 

15. As relevant here, Juror 15 was unsure whether she could 

properly judge the testimony and credibility of a cooperating witness, so she left blank the two corresponding questions on the jury 

questionnaire. The district court attempted to clarify her position,

but she essentially provided a nonanswer: she “[j]ust didn’t think of 

it at the time.” D.E. 1198 at 49–50. Upon further questioning, she 

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said that she was capable of being impartial to cooperating witnesses. The government struck her because it believed that her 

failure to answer only those two questions on the questionnaire 

indicated that “it was something she just didn’t want to commit 

to,” and when she answered the district court’s questions, she did 

so “equivocally.” By equivocal, it meant that her answers were

“‘maybe, I don’t know, I guess I could,’ they were not clear, unambiguous answers of 100% yes. . . . It was not patently clear for us 

that these cooperating witnesses . . . would not be a potential problem for her.” D.E. 1201 at 9–10.

Juror 15 did not say exactly what the government claimed. 

But as to her initial answers, it was not “patently clear” what her 

position was on cooperating witnesses—it took the district court 

several attempts to clarify her position. So, although the government’s explanation to the district court was not entirely accurate, 

“mistaken explanations should not be confused with racial discrimination.” Flowers, 588 U.S. at 314. The government was free to 

conclude that Juror 15’s initial reticence to answer the two questions reflected her true feelings and that, in turn, that she merited

a peremptory strike. Cf. Harper v. Lumpkin, 64 F.4th 684, 696–97 

(5th Cir. 2023) (rejecting a defendant’s Batson argument that a prospective juror was “not being untruthful or deceptive by failing to 

respond to one of the items on the questionnaire”: “[T]his argument does nothing to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s stated reason was pretextual. Both things can be true: [the juror] could have 

been fully truthful and forthcoming, and the prosecutor could have 

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34 Opinion of the Court 19-10332

been concerned that she failed to respond to one of the most important items on the questionnaire.”).

The government also struck Juror 15 due to her exposure to 

the criminal justice system. She had a nephew who had been arrested or convicted and she failed to clarify whether she believed 

he had been treated fairly.

At the end of the day, the district court’s finding as to Juror 

15—that the government exercised a race-neutral strike—was not 

clearly erroneous, even when taking into account the statistical evidence.

Juror 103. As to Juror 103, Levi Bryant claims that an admitted misstatement by the government—that Juror 103 (rather than 

her husband) was on hemodialysis—was an attempt to misrepresent the record. But the district court did not clearly err in viewing

the government’s misstatement as just a mistake. 

The bottom line is that Juror 103 was the primary caretaker 

for her son, who is disabled, and for her husband, who was on hemodialysis awaiting a kidney transplant. In the government’s view,

this was “an unpredictable family health situation that would have 

been a disruption for the trial.” D.E. 1201 at 25. The district court 

plausibly found that the government’s strike of Juror 103 was raceneutral, even when the statistical evidence is considered. 

Juror 84. Levi Bryant next argues that the government 

made material misrepresentations with respect to Juror 84. He 

challenges the government’s proffer of a quote from Juror 84 that 

she “didn’t trust the system.” L. Bryant Br. at 31. It is true that 

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Juror 84 did not utter those exact words. But in commenting on

her son’s reckless driving charge, she stated that it “took a lot out 

of our lives,” and she believed that the charges were excessive and 

likely financially motivated. See D.E. 1198 at 122–23. Those comments—particularly her belief that the severity of her son’s charges 

was “a money making thing”—could fairly be characterized as a 

distrust of the system. See id. The district court’s finding that the 

government’s strike of Juror 84 was not racially motivated, even 

considered in light of the statistical evidence, was plausible and

therefore not clearly erroneous. 

In addition, Levi Bryant challenges the government’s claim 

that Juror 84 had an “inability to judge [a] cooperating witness.” L.

Bryant Br. at 31 (quoting D.E. 1201 at 12). This too was not a material misrepresentation. Juror 84 believed that it was improper for 

cooperating witnesses to receive lesser sentences and did not know 

if she could trust their testimony. She would not automatically discredit such testimony, but the fact that a witness cooperated 

“might influence [her] decision.” D.E. 1198 at 124. Her perspective

clearly evinced some possible doubt about cooperating witnesses. 

Though her statements would not have merited being removed for 

cause, the district court was entitled to find that the government 

was justified in striking her. See United States v. Hill, 31 F.4th 1076, 

1082 (8th Cir. 2022) (explaining that a prospective juror’s inability 

to consider the testimony of a cooperating witness constitutes a 

“race-neutral reason” for a peremptory strike); United States v. 

Thomas, 315 F. App’x 828, 834 (11th Cir. 2009) (concern that prospective jurors “might question the veracity of a cooperating coUSCA11 Case: 19-10332 Document: 302-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2024 Page: 35 of 142
36 Opinion of the Court 19-10332

defendant’s testimony” constituted a race-neutral reason for use of 

peremptory strikes).14

3. COMPARATOR EVIDENCE

As the final piece of his Batson claim, Levi Bryant attempts 

to infer discriminatory intent by comparison. 

Starting with the government’s peremptory strike of Juror 

19, Levi Bryant’s argument is unpersuasive. The government 

struck Juror 19 because she had served on a hung jury, raising concerns of her indecisiveness. This was a race-neutral reason. See 

United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 44 F.4th 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 2022)

(“Ms. Del Rosario’s prior service on a hung jury was a legitimate 

reason [for the use of a peremptory strike.]”); United States v. Rudas, 

905 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Aponte’s service on a hung jury was 

a legitimate reason for striking him.”).

Levi Bryant counters that this reason was pretextual because 

the government did not strike two prospective non-Black jurors 

who also had prior jury service. But those two comparators served 

on juries which returned verdicts. Juror 19 was struck not because 

she served on a jury, but because of her jury’s inability to reach a 

verdict. The comparison therefore misses the mark. 

As another point of comparison, Levi Bryant identifies two 

prospective non-Black jurors who, like Juror 19, had negative 

14 Thomas is an unpublished decision, but we find it persuasive on this point.

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experiences with the legal system but whom the government did 

not strike. Those jurors, however, also did not sit on hung juries. 

In sum, none of the prospective non-Black jurors identified 

by Levi Bryant shared the totality of Juror 19’s circumstances. He

therefore cannot show, by way of comparison, that the district 

court clearly erred in finding that government’s use of a peremptory strike on Juror 19 was race-neutral. See United States v. Stewart, 

65 F.3d 918, 926 (11th Cir. 1995) (“We recognize that failing to 

strike a white juror who shares some traits with a black juror does 

not itself automatically prove the existence of discrimination.”).

4. FAMILIARITY WITH SOUTH GWEN CHERRY

Finally, Levi Bryant argues that the government’s consideration of any prospective juror’s familiarity with the South Gwen 

Cherry complex was inherently discriminatory towards prospective Black jurors because it is located in a predominantly Black 

neighborhood. But “[a]n argument relating to the impact of a classification does not alone show its purpose.” Hernandez v. New York, 

500 U.S. 352, 362 (1991). 

Familiarity with the South Gwen Cherry complex was just 

one factor considered by the government, as it did not seek to exclude any prospective Black juror solely on that basis. And a juror’s 

familiarity with—and thus potential bias for or against—the particular geographic setting of a case (and the defendants who hail from 

that area) can be a legitimate reason for the use of a peremptory 

strike. See Hollingsworth v. Burton, 30 F.3d 109, 113 (11th Cir. 1994) 

(“Studmire’s close connection to the area in which the crime was 

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38 Opinion of the Court 19-10332

committed is highly relevant. Living and carpooling in the area created both an increased risk of familiarity with the scene of the crime 

and a heightened likelihood of being subjected to conversations relating to the crime.”). 

The district court found that a “small town familiarity with 

a particular area is racially neutral.” D.E. 1201 at 18. Without definitive evidence that the government adopted this criterion with 

the intent of excluding Black jurors, the district court did not clearly 

err in finding that any disparate impact “[did] not violate the principle of race neutrality.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362. See also Flowers, 588 U.S. at 302–03. The district court could have viewed the 

record differently, but it was not compelled to do so. 

5. SUMMARY

The individual components of Levi Bryant’s Batson claim fall 

short. Taken collectively, they also do not show that the district 

court clearly erred in finding that the government was not “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent” in striking Jurors 

15, 19, 84, and 103. See Flowers, 588 U.S. at 303. 

IV. THE EVIDENTIARY RULINGS AT TRIAL

The defendants challenge a number of evidentiary rulings 

by the district court. Where an objection was properly preserved, 

we generally review such rulings for an abuse of discretion. See Fid. 

Interior Constr., Inc. v. S.E. Carpenters Reg’l Council, 675 F.3d 1250, 

1258 (11th Cir. 2012). This standard “recognizes the range of possible conclusions the [district court] may reach.” United States v. 

Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

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We will not disturb an evidentiary ruling unless there is a 

“clear error of judgment.” In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 

1994). Of course, the district court also “abuse[s] its discretion if it 

base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly 

erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 

Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). “So [if] we conclude that the district 

court erred, we mean to say that the district court abused its discretion in one of these ways.” Carrizosa v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 

47 F.4th 1278, 1296 (11th Cir. 2022). 

A. RULE 801(d)(2)(E)

Our first look at the evidentiary rulings starts with Mr. Rodriguez, whom the district court treated as a member of the two 

charged conspiracies. He claims that this was error, and that as a 

result the district court improperly admitted against him the statements of purported co-conspirators. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 

The statements at issue were made by Messrs. Walker and Graham, and also include those statements contained in Summary Exhibit 303, which was a compilation of thousands of social media 

posts by the purported co-conspirators.

Mr. Rodriguez sought to exclude the statements through a 

motion in limine. The district court denied the motion without 

prejudice and advised Mr. Rodriguez to reassert the objection at 

trial should the government seek to introduce the co-conspirators’ 

statements. There is no indication in the record, however, that Mr. 

Rodriguez argued inadmissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) at trial, 

and he does not cite to any such objection. Mr. Rodriguez thus 

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40 Opinion of the Court 19-10332

failed to preserve the issue, which means that our review is for

plain error. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(b) (“Once the court rules definitively on the record—either before or at trial—a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for 

appeal.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Feldman, 936 F.3d 1288, 

1300 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Because the magistrate judge did not make 

a definitive ruling on the extrapolation issue, Mrs. Feldman was required to object to Dr. Chaitoff’s statement to avoid plain error review.”). Accord United States v. Broussard, 87 F.4th 376, 379 (8th Cir. 

2023) (explaining that a denial of motion in limine accompanied by 

an invitation to reassert the objection at trial is not a “definitive” 

ruling that preserves an issue for appeal).15

We find no plain errorin the district court’s admission of the 

co-conspirators’ statements against Mr. Rodriguez. “For a co-conspirator statement to be admissible under [Rule 801(d)(2)(E)], the 

government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: 

(1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant and the declarant were 

members of the conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made during 

the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. 

Hough, 803 F.3d 1181, 1193 (11th Cir. 2015). Contrary to Mr. 

15 Mr. Ingram, in the table of contents and summary of the arguments of his 

brief, also appears to argue that the district court erred in admitting the hearsay statements of purported co-conspirators. But he does not cite any authority in support of this point. Nor does he devote a discrete section of his argument to this contention. His failure to adequately brief the issue constitutes 

abandonment. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th 

Cir. 2014). 

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Rodriguez’s contention, Rule 801(d)(2)(E) does not require “substantial independent evidence” of a conspiracy. See M. Rodriguez 

Br. at 44. When preliminary facts relevant to determining the admissibility of evidence—such as co-conspirator statements—are 

disputed, the relevant standard of proof is a preponderance of the 

evidence. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). A 

preponderance of the evidence “simply requires the trier of fact to 

believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Watkins, 10 F.4th 1179, 1184 (11th Cir. 

2021) (citation omitted). 

The testimony of Mr. Grimes, a former short-lived DSBF 

member and unindicted co-conspirator, was enough to establish 

Mr. Rodriguez’s participation in the RICO and narcotics conspiracies by a preponderance of the evidence. Mr. Grimes testified that, 

when he became a member of the DSBF around 2010, Mr. Rodriguez was one of the first people he met in the gang. Mr. Rodriguez 

was introduced to him as “Blood”—an awfully suspicious nickname considering the gang was called the Dub Street Blood Family. During his relatively short tenure with the DSBF, Mr. Grimes 

frequently hung out with Mr. Rodriguez, including at the latter’s 

home. He knew Mr. Rodriguez as the point man for all gang rules 

violations and initiations, and as someone who occasionally supplied the gang (and himself) with guns. Mr. Rodriguez also sold 

crack cocaine. He had his own clientele, but would step in when 

the DSBF ran out of inventory. As Mr. Grimes testified, if Mr. Rodriguez had not been a DSBF member, the gang would not have 

tolerated him selling drugs at the South Gwen Cherry complex.

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Had Mr. Rodriguez challenged at trial the admission of coconspirator statements against him, Mr. Grimes’ testimony would 

have satisfied the district court under Bourjaily. See, e.g., United 

States v. Amede, 977 F.3d 1086, 1094–95, 1098 (11th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, Mr. Rodriguez’s unpreserved, non-specific challenge to

the Rule 801(d)(2)(E) evidence fails. The district court did not 

plainly err. 

B. RULE 804(b)(3)

Levi Bryant argues that the district court should not have 

admitted Jerimaine Bryant’s social media post (which implicated 

Levi) under the hearsay exception for statements against interest. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). We are not persuaded.

Rule 804(b)(3) permits the admission of an out-of-court

statement when (1) it is against the penal interest of the declarant, 

(2) corroborating circumstances exist indicating the trustworthiness of the statement, and (3) the declarant is unavailable. See 

United States v. Harrell, 788 F.2d 1524, 1526 (11th Cir. 1986). The 

statement must be one that “a reasonable person in the declarant’s 

position would have made only if the person believed it to be true 

because, when made, it . . . had so great a tendency . . . to expose 

the declarant to civil or criminal liability.” Fed. R. Evid. 

804(b)(3)(A).16 

As we have explained, Rule 804(b)(3) encompasses more 

than “direct confessions of guilt,” and includes “remarks that a 

16 Levi Bryant concedes that Jerimaine Bryant was unavailable as a witness.

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reasonable person would have realized strongly implied [the declarant’s] personal participation in the relevant crime . . . [and] disserving statements by a declarant that would have probative value 

in a trial against the declarant.” Chiquita, 47 F.4th at 1308 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a “statement is 

self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing it in context [and] . . . in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603–04 (1994). And whether 

a statement is genuinely against a declarant’s penal interest is a 

question of law we review de novo. See United States v. Costa, 31 F.3d 

1073, 1077 (11th Cir. 1994).

Levi Bryant is the uncle of Jerimaine Bryant, who refers to 

Levi as “Fish.” On Facebook, Jerimaine posted the following: “My 

uncle fish gave me the game, my Aunte Danielle showed me the 

way, and ma n s got me this far.” Anticipating that the government would use this statement to suggest that he taught Jerimaine 

the “drug game,” Levi moved to exclude the statement as inadmissible hearsay. See D.E. 1202 at 103. In response, the government 

argued that the post was a statement against Jerimaine’s interest—

“that he’s been taught a drug game” by Levi. See id. at 104. 

The district court admitted the Facebook post, concluding

that Jerimaine was “admitting complicity.” Id. Though the depth 

of this analysis may not have been to Levi’s liking, the district court 

considered the parties’ arguments and made a ruling on a matter 

of law, that is, whether the statement was against Jerimaine’s penal 

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interest. See Costa, 31 F.3d at 1077. Under the circumstances, no 

exhaustive factual explanation was necessary.17

The focus of our inquiry is on whether the statement “when 

made . . . had so great a tendency to . . . expose the declarant to . . 

. criminal liability” that a reasonable person in his position would 

not have made the statement unless he believed it was true. See 

Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(A). We have described this as an “expansive 

test.” United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 700 (5th Cir. 1978).

It is true that there is nothing facially self-inculpatory about 

Jerimaine’s Facebook post. According to the post, Levi “gave” him 

“the game,” but we do not know from the post itself what that 

means. As defense counsel argued in closing, “the game” could 

refer to an activity like gambling. See D.E. 1229 at 201–02. See also

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 720 

(5th ed. 2011) (defining “game”). 

But a “facially neutral statement[ ] might actually be against 

a declarant’s interest.” United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332, 1337 

(11th Cir. 1995) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603). And a statement’s context elucidates its meaning. See, e.g., United States v. 

Hammers, 942 F.3d 1001, 1010–11 (10th Cir. 2019) (the “context and 

the circumstances” under which statement was made include the

declarant’s state of mind and other statements and actions 

17 During her testimony, Sgt. Kelly did exactly what Levi had predicted. She 

testified that “the game” likely meant “narcotics sales.” D.E. 1203 at 71–72. 

And in its closing argument, the government argued that “[t]he game is 

drugs.” D.E. 1231 at 47.

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accompanying the statement); United States v. Awer, 770 F.3d 83, 94 

(1st Cir. 2014) (analyzing a purportedly self-inculpatory statement 

in the context in which it was made, rather than in conjunction 

with other similar statements made by the defendant); United States 

v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2014) (looking to the declarant’s conduct when the statement was made). We turn, therefore, 

to context.

The first important piece of context is that Levi was a known 

drug dealer by the time of Jerimaine’s Facebook post in 2015. Between 2006 and 2012, Levi was arrested four times for selling drugs, 

and two of those arrests resulted in convictions. And Mr. Coakley 

identified Levi as being one of the DSBF’s earliest members, selling 

drugs as early as 2001. The post therefore had a tendency to implicate Jerimaine (the declarant) in Levi’s narcotics activities and the 

drug business. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603–04 (“‘Sam and I went 

to Joe’s house’ might be against the declarant’s interest if a reasonable person in the declarant’s shoes would realize that being linked 

to Joe and Sam would implicate the declarant in Joe and Sam’s conspiracy.”). Moreover, Ms. Houser and Mr. Coakley identified 

Jerimaine as a crack cocaine supplier for the DSBF. So both Levi 

and Jerimaine were involved in the narcotics trade at the time of 

Jerimaine’s Facebook post. A reasonable person in Jerimaine’s position would have made the statement only if he believed it to be 

true because it had a tendency to expose him to criminal liability. 

This is not one of those instances in which a declarant’s implication of a co-defendant is suspect because it might be an 

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attempt to shift blame or curry favor—the statement here does not 

accomplish those ends. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603–04; Costa, 

31 F.3d at 1078. Given that Levi was a known drug dealer and a

member of the DSBF, and that Jerimaine was known to supply 

drugs to the DSBF, the district court did not err in concluding that 

“the game” was drug dealing.

Jerimaine’s statement in the Facebook post was also supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicated its 

trustworthiness. There was plenty of evidence implicating

Jerimaine in the drug conspiracy. And there is no obvious reason 

why he would have fabricated his business relationship with Levi. 

See United States v. U.S. Infrastructure, Inc., 576 F.3d 1195, 1209 (11th 

Cir. 2009).

We therefore conclude that Jerimaine’s Facebook post was 

properly admitted against Levi under Rule 804(b)(3).18

C. RULE 801(d)(1)(B)

Mr. Graham argues that the district court erred in allowing 

the government to introduce, as a prior consistent statement,

18 We reject the argument made by Levi that admitting Jerimaine’s Facebook 

post violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). Simply put, 

Jerimaine could not have reasonably anticipated that a social media post, made 

years before his arrest, would be used in court. The statement is therefore 

nontestimonial and the Confrontation Clause does not apply. See United States 

v. Hano, 922 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “the threshold 

question in every case” raising a confrontation issue “is whether the challenged statement is testimonial”) (citation omitted). 

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portions of an audio recording in which Donzell Jones, a cooperating witness, implicated Mr. Graham in a robbery. We disagree. 

Under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), a prior consistent statement by a 

witness is not hearsay if (1) the declarant testifies and is subject to 

cross-examination on the statement; and (2) the statement is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered “to rebut an 

express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it 

or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying.” A district court may exclude those parts of a prior consistent 

statement that do not relate specifically to matters on which the 

declarant was impeached, but “it is not required to do so.” United 

v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429, 1438 (11th Cir. 1984). “A district court is 

granted broad discretion in determining the admissibility of a prior 

consistent statement under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) and will not 

be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” United 

States v. Prieto, 232 F.3d 816, 819 (11th Cir. 2000). 

When cross-examining Donzell Jones, defense counsel impeached him using an audio recording of his interrogation by two 

agents. On redirect, the government played other portions of that 

recording to rehabilitate him. Some portions of the interrogation 

played by the government apparently implicated Mr. Graham in a 

robbery. See D.E. 1114 at 51–56 (“[The government is] presenting 

evidence against Reginald Graham now by saying that [they] did 

robberies together.”). 

The record, however, is silent as to what the recording actually says. See, e.g., id. at 50 (“Audio playing.”). And because it was 

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impeachment evidence, neither party entered Donzell Jones’ interrogation transcript into evidence. Mr. Graham, moreover, did not 

provide us with a copy on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2) (“If 

the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion 

is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the 

appellant must include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.”); Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. 

Dist., 449 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he burden is on the 

appellant to ensure the record on appeal is complete, and where a 

failure to discharge that burden prevents us from reviewing the district court’s decision we ordinarily will affirm the judgment.”). 

Given the incomplete record before us, our review of this issue is 

constrained. 

There is no dispute that the recording satisfied the first requirement of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Defense counsel used a portion of 

it during Donzell Jones’ cross-examination. As to whether the government properly offered it to rebut defense counsel’s express or 

implied charge that Donzell Jones was not credible and/or had an 

improper motive in testifying as a cooperating witness, Mr. Graham argues that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) limits the scope of rehabilitation 

to the precise issues on which defense counsel impeached Donzell 

Jones. This broad legal assertion, however, is contrary to our precedent. See Brantley, 733 F.2d at 1438. The scope of the government’s use of the recording was within the discretion of the district 

court, and we are reticent to disturb its decision given the limited 

record before us. 

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In any event, the record indicates that the government did 

not exceed the scope of the impeachment of Donzell Jones. Defense counsel cross-examined him on his prior statements, including purported lies about his involvement with a group of individuals which included several alleged DSBF members, his knowledge 

of certain gang members, and his knowledge of robberies that gang

members had participated in. See D.E. 1113 at 17–20; D.E. 1114 at 

21–24. On redirect examination, the government offered as a prior 

consistent statement another segment of the recording where 

Donzell Jones apparently admitted to knowing of the gang’s robberies. This was an express rebuttal of defense counsel’s cross examination and, as far as we can tell, fell directly within the purview 

of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Accordingly, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to 

rehabilitate Donzell Jones with his prior consistent statements.

D. LIMITS ON THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF AGENT PEREZ

Mr. Walker argues that the district court denied him his 

Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses by improperly limiting his cross-examination of Agent Perez. This argument lacks 

merit.

A district court generally has discretion to limit the scope of 

cross-examination, subject of course to the requirements of the 

Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1468 

(11th Cir. 1994). The Sixth Amendment confers on a defendant the 

right to cross-examine a witness to expose motivation and bias, but 

the right is not unlimited. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 

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678–79 (1986). It “guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, 

and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam). Accordingly, once a party 

has had that opportunity, further questioning is generally within 

the district court’s discretion. See Garcia, 13 F.3d at 1468. The question is “whether a reasonable jury would have received a significantly different impression of the witness’ credibility had counsel 

pursued the proposed line of cross-examination.” Id. at 1469. 

Mr. Walker contends that the district court should not have 

precluded him from further cross-examining Agent Perez about a

undercover narcotics buy on May 3, 2017. According to Mr. 

Walker, this buy was a last-ditch effort by the authorities to obtain 

direct evidence of him selling crack cocaine mere days before the 

indictment was returned. 

The problem for Mr. Walker is that Agent Perez did not testify on direct examination about the buy on May 3, 2017. In fact, 

he explained—both on direct and cross-examination—that he participated as part of the surveillance team for undercover narcotics 

buys in the South Gwen Cherry complex only in 2016. See, e.g.,

D.E. 1222 at 160 (Agent Perez: “The May 3rd [drug buy] I was not 

involved in it.” Defense Counsel: “All right. [W]ere you involved 

in any of Detective Quintero’s attempts to purchase narcotics?” 

Agent Perez: “The ones in 2016, yes.”). The district court therefore 

did not abuse its discretion or violate Mr. Walker’s Sixth 

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Amendment rights by limiting Mr. Walker’s cross-examination of 

Agent Perez on a matter in which he was not involved. 

In any event, Mr. Walker did ask Agent Perez some questions about the May 3, 2017, buy and the indictment, and his general authority over the timing of the controlled buys. He even attempted, among other things, to undermine the circumstantial evidence of his participation in drug sales by questioning Agent Perez 

on the slang terms in certain Facebook posts. Accordingly, Mr. 

Walker had ample opportunity to—and did—thoroughly cross-examine Agent Perez, such that additional questioning on the buy on 

May 3, 2017, would not have impacted the latter’s credibility. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion, and did not 

violate Mr. Walker’s Sixth Amendment rights, in limiting the crossexamination of Agent Perez. 

E. RULE 801(d)(2)(B)

Curtis Bryant argues that the district court erred in admitting his “giggle and smirk” reaction to a co-conspirator’s statement 

as an adoptive admission of his participation in a murder under 

Rule 801(d)(2)(B). The issue is close, but the abuse of discretion 

standard calls for rejection of the argument.

Mr. Coakley, a cooperating and unindicted co-conspirator, 

testified that after the shooting of Mr. Hallman, a rival gang member, Jerimaine Bryant announced that “momma got his feet wet.” 

According to Mr. Coakley, “Momma” referred to “Big Momma,” 

Jerimaine’s nickname for his brother Curtis Bryant, and “got his 

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feet wet” meant “you shot somebody.” In response to Jerimaine’s 

statement, Curtis Bryant started “giggling.”

When a statement is offered as an adoptive admission under 

Rule 801(d)(2)(B), the district court generally must determine as a 

preliminary matter whether (1) “the statement was such that, under the circumstances, an innocent defendant would normally be 

induced to respond,” and (2) “there are sufficient foundational facts 

from which the jury could infer that the defendant heard, understood, and acquiesced in the statement.” United States v. Carter, 760 

F.2d 1568, 1579 (11th Cir. 1985). We review a district court’s rulings under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) for abuse of discretion. See United 

States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 1990).

We have affirmed the admission of non-verbal reactions like 

silence and a head-nod as adoptive admissions. See Carter, 760 F.2d

at 1579–80, 1580 n.5 (the defendants’ silence in the back seat of a 

vehicle while the front seat passenger made incriminating statements about their drug smuggling activities); Joshi, 896 F.2d at 

1311–12 (the defendant’s head nod in response to a statement introducing him and describing his role in a narcotics conspiracy). 

We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to 

admit Jerimaine Bryant’s giggle.

The first criterion for admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) is 

particularly important when dealing with adoptive admissions by 

silence. See United States v. Santos, 947 F.3d 711, 724 (11th Cir. 

2020). But if the defendant affirmatively responded to the statement—like by nodding, see Joshi, 896 F.2d at 1311–11, or by 

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giggling, as is the case here—the “focus is on the second criterion.” 

Santos, 947 F.3d at 724.

Under the second criterion, we conclude there is sufficient 

evidence in the record from which the jury could infer that Curtis 

heard and acquiesced in Jerimaine’s statement. Mr. Coakley testified that Jerimaine told him—in the presence of Curtis—that 

“momma got his feet wet.” He also explained that “momma” referred to Curtis and getting “his feet wet” meaning shooting someone. Curtis giggled in response. Laughter, as an affirmative act,

can be stronger evidence of adoption than silence. See Carter, 760 

F.2d at 1579–80. Given the stark contrast between the gravity of 

the misconduct—a murder—and the tenor of the response, the giggling here was at least as strong as, if not stronger than, the assent 

of a head nod. See Joshi, 896 F.2d at 1311–12.19

Concerning comprehension, Curtis points out that there is 

no direct evidence that he necessarily shared Mr. Coakley’s understanding of Jerimaine’s statement. To attempt to reconstruct that

understanding, we break down the statement into two constituent 

19 In response to Curtis’ hearsay objection at trial, the district court explained 

that the second criterion for admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) is “really an 

issue for the jury.” That was only half right. It is true that the “ultimate 

determination of foundational prerequisites for adoptive admissions is for 

[the] jury.” Joshi, 896 F.2d at 1312. But as an initial matter the district court

must make a preliminary finding that the “jury could reasonably find that the 

defendant comprehended and acquiesced in the statement.” Id. Doing otherwise “needlessly risks the possibility of reversal if the evidence is subsequently 

found to have been erroneously admitted.” Id. 

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parts: (1) the identity of “momma” and (2) the action of getting 

one’s “feet wet.” As to the former, Curtis would have known his 

brother’s nickname for him, and he does not dispute this fact. As 

to the latter, Curtis is correct that we only know for certain how 

Mr. Coakley understood the statement. But we are reviewing for 

abuse of discretion, and admissibility does not require absolute certainty. Given his reaction, the district court could find that Curtis 

understood a slang term used by a family member. Any ambiguity 

in the statement went to weight, not admissibility. And defense 

counsel had the opportunity to expose any ambiguity in Mr. Coakley’s cross-examination. 

This issue presents a close question, but given our precedent 

and the discretion afforded a district court on evidentiary matters, 

affirmance is in order. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1259 (the abuse of 

discretion standard “recognizes the range of possible conclusions 

the [district court] may reach”). The district court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting Curtis’ giggle in response to Jerimaine’s 

statement as an adoptive admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(B).

F. OTHER ACTS EVIDENCE

Messrs. Hayes and Ingram challenge the admission of certain “other acts” evidence under Rules 404(b) and 403. Their pretrial motion to exclude this evidence below was struck as untimely. 

At trial, the district court denied Mr. Hayes’ objection on the merits

because “[t]he subject activity [was] evidence of the racketeering 

activity.” D.E. 1201 at 29–30. 

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The problem for Messrs. Hayes and Ingram is that they have 

failed to properly and sufficiently brief this issue on appeal. Before 

trial, the government notified the defendants that it intended to introduce numerous “other acts” against them—at least nine against 

Mr. Hayes and eight against Mr. Ingram. See D.E. 444. But on appeal, Messrs. Hayes and Ingram do not tell us with sufficient specificity what “other acts” were actually and improperly introduced 

against them at trial; for what purpose those “other acts” were presented; and when during the trial those “other acts” were introduced. Mr. Hayes tells us only that the “other acts” introduced 

against him were acts of “mugging, auto theft, fleeing and eluding, 

possession of firearms, etc.” S. Hayes Br. at 40 (emphasis added). 

He argues that those acts were too far removed in time from the 

Hobbs Act robberies to be probative of intent. Mr. Ingram is even 

less helpful. He simply tells us that the district court erred in admitting his “co-appellants’ prior arrests” and an arrest or conviction 

of his (we don’t really know which) for “possession with intent to 

sell controlled substance.” T. Ingram Br. at 55, 57.20 

To properly present an issue on appeal—especially one arising from a multi-defendant trial lasting almost 40 days—it was incumbent on Messrs. Hayes and Ingram to identify exactly the evidence they now challenge. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. We 

20 Mr. Hayes describes the “other acts” evidence with more specificity in his 

reply brief, but that comes too late. See United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 

1242–43 (11th Cir. 2004).

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decline to sift through a transcript of nearly 8,000 pages to figure 

out and resolve their arguments. 

G. RULE 615(a)

Jerimaine Bryant and Mr. Glass argue that the district court 

erred by excluding the testimony of a defense witness for violating 

the rule of sequestration. See Fed. R. Evid. 615 (2018). We agree 

that the district court erred.

1. MS. BRYANT

The witness at issue was Tracy Bryant, the sister of 

Jerimaine, Quincy, and Curtis Bryant and a relative of several other 

defendants. She also happened to be the former girlfriend of a government witness, Mr. Coakley, with whom she has five children. 

At the start of the trial, defense counsel invoked the rule of 

sequestration. And following an evidentiary hearing, the district 

court excluded the proffered testimony of Ms. Bryant for her violation of the rule.

Outside of the jury’s presence, Ms. Bryant explained that, 

prior to trial, the defense did not ask her to testify and she apparently had no interest in doing so. She did, however, want to observe the trial. She showed up for voir dire but was placed in an 

overflow courtroom with a malfunctioning closed-circuit television, got bored, and left. She returned a second time, sat through 

some of Sgt. Kelly’s testimony, again got bored, and left. As relevant here, she heard no testimony about Mr. Johnson or his murder. But afterwards she received a call from a friend who told her 

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that Mr. Coakley had testified that Mr. Glass murdered Mr. Johnson. This prompted her third visit to the trial, this time to watch 

Mr. Coakley testify, and she again left without hearing anything 

about Mr. Johnson. She then changed her mind about testifying. 

She decided she would testify and contacted the defense because 

she believed that Mr. Coakley had lied about Mr. Johnson’s murder.

As she detailed in her proffered testimony, Ms. Bryant and 

Mr. Coakley had been in a relationship for about 11 years and had 

five children together. At the time of Mr. Johnson’s murder, she 

lived in the South Gwen Cherry complex with her grandmother, 

mother, two sisters, and of her two brothers, Jerimaine and Quincy 

Bryant. 

Ms. Bryant testified to where she and Mr. Coakley were on 

the night Mr. Johnson was killed. She explained that she and Mr. 

Coakley were together in bed watching a movie at her apartment

on the night of the murder. She heard two sets of shots, sitting up 

for the first set and slouching for the second set. Mr. Coakley remained asleep during both sets of shots. She then went to the balcony, where she saw people running towards a clothing line but 

could not see Mr. Johnson. She returned and woke Mr. Coakley, 

who was sick with a stomach virus, to tell him of the shooting.

Mr. Coakley ran out the front door wearing red shorts and 

socks, returning to put shoes on before going back out. Ms. Bryant 

followed him and went to the clothing line. She did not see Mr. 

Coakley, Mr. Glass, Curtis Bryant, or Quincy Bryant during the 10

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minutes she was there. When she returned home, Ms. Bryant 

found her brother Quincy on the couch. He did not appear to be 

out of breath, sweating, or to have exerted himself.

According to Ms. Bryant, this series of events lasted 15 

minutes. She did not testify, however, as to where Mr. Coakley 

went or when he returned. 

2. THE RULE OF SEQUESTRATION

District courts have broad discretion to sequester witnesses 

before, during, and after their testimony. See Geders v. United States, 

425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976). At the time of trial, Rule 615 provided that, 

at a party’s request, a district court “must order witnesses excluded 

from the courtroom so that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony.”21

The two purposes of excluding prospective witnesses from 

trial are to prevent them from tailoring their testimony to that of 

earlier witnesses and to facilitate the exposure of false testimony 

and other credibility problems. See Geders, 425 U.S. at 87; Warren, 

578 F.2d at 1076; 29 Victor J. Gold, Fed. Prac. & Pro. Evid. § 6242 

(2d. ed. & June 2024 update). When counsel or a witness violates 

the rule of sequestration, the district court may (1) cite the guilty 

party for contempt; (2) allow opposing counsel to cross-examine 

21 Rule 615 was amended in December of 2023. The new Rule 615(a) operates 

only to exclude witnesses from the courtroom, while the new Rule 615(b) allows district courts to enter orders prohibiting disclosure of trial testimony to 

witnesses and/or prohibiting excluded witness from accessing the trial testimony.

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the witness as to the nature of the violation; or (3) in the case of an 

intentional violation that results in actual prejudice, strike testimony already given or disallow further testimony. See United States 

v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 1983). 

A violation of the rule of sequestration does “not . . . require 

the automatic exclusion of testimony[.]” United States v. Warren, 

578 F.2d 1058, 1076 (5th Cir. 1978). Excluding a witness’ testimony 

is a “serious sanction.” Id. at 1327. In all but the most egregious 

cases, cross-examination ordinarily has the “curative aspect” of empowering the jury to evaluate the violating witness’ credibility. See 

United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1211 (11th Cir. 1991). See also 

Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91, 92 (1893) (“If a witness disobeys 

the order of withdrawal, while he may be proceeded against for 

contempt, and his testimony is open to comment to the jury by 

reason of his conduct, he is not thereby disqualified, and the weight 

of authority is that he cannot be excluded on that ground, merely, 

although the right to exclude under particular circumstances may 

be supported as within the discretion of the trial court.”); United 

States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 363 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Because exclusion 

of a defense witness impinges upon the right to present a defense, 

we are quite hesitant to endorse the use of such an extreme remedy.”); United States v. Walker, 613 F.2d 1349, 1355 n.11 (5th Cir. 

1980) (“failure of a witness to comply with the sequestration rule 

does not of itself render his testimony inadmissible”). A district 

court “ordinarily will not exclude witnesses without a demonstration of probable prejudice.” Warren, 578 F.2d at 1076 n.16.

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The district court called Ms. Bryant’s conduct “among the 

more egregious violations of the [r]ule of [s]equestration.” D.E. 

1227 at 32. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we do not disturb 

the district court’s finding of a violation. We have held that a witness violates a Rule 615 sequestration order by reading the testimony of other witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 780 F.2d 

975, 980 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Reading prior trial testimony violates 

[a Rule 615] sequestration order.”). Being told of another witness’ 

testimony is not too far removed from the reading of testimony.

Nevertheless, the district court erred in excluding Ms. Bryant as the remedy for the violation. As indicated earlier, ordinarily 

a district court will not exclude a witness absent a showing of probable prejudice to the other side. See Warren, 578 F.2d at 1076 n.16. 

The district court never made a finding that the government would 

likely suffer prejudice if Ms. Bryant were allowed to testify. Indeed, 

the government did not claim prejudice below and does not argue 

prejudice on appeal.

3. PREJUDICE

We now address whether Jerimaine Bryant and Mr. Glass 

were prejudiced by the district court’s error. As previously noted, 

Ms. Bryant would have testified as to where she and Mr. Coakley 

were on the night of Mr. Johnson’s murder—specifically that he 

was asleep wither her in bed when the shots rang out and that she 

woke Mr. Coakley to inform him. That testimony, if believed, 

would have undermined the testimony of Mr. Coakley that he witnessed Mr. Johnson’s murder.

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Jerimaine Bryant argues that he would have received some 

general benefit from Ms. Bryant weakening Mr. Coakley’s overall

credibility. But Jerimaine Bryant was not implicated in the murder 

of Mr. Johnson, and as a result his generalized allegations are insufficient to establish the requisite prejudice. See, e.g., Warren, 578 

F.2d at 1076. He therefore has not shown prejudice from the exclusion of Ms. Bryant. 

The person most affected by Ms. Bryant’s exclusion was Mr. 

Glass, whom Mr. Coakley explicitly incriminated in Mr. Johnson’s 

murder. But Mr. Coakley was not the only one to point the finger 

at Mr. Glass for the killing. Mr. Grimes testified that other DSBF 

members teased Mr. Glass about him murdering Mr. Johnson. Ms.

Houser, a crack cocaine supplier for the DSBF and a cooperating 

witness, testified that she saw Mr. Glass shooting over a wall at Mr.

Johnson. She also heard Quincy Bryant and Mr. Glass discussing 

the murder. Ms. Bryant’s testimony may have cast doubt on Mr. 

Coakley’s version of events, but it would not have impeached Mr. 

Grimes or Ms. Houser. Given this additional evidence about Mr. 

Glass killing Mr. Johnson, it is not apparent that the exclusion of 

Ms. Bryant’s testimony prejudiced Mr. Glass. See Untied State v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1209–10 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the district court’s error in excluding a defense witness due to a violation 

of the sequestration rule was not prejudicial in part because there 

was “substantial, independent evidence” on the disputed issue at 

trial). But because we vacate all of the Count 1 RICO conspiracy 

convictions on another ground, we need not make any definitive 

pronouncements on prejudice to Mr. Glass.

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H. SGT. KELLY & AGENT PEREZ: PART 1

The government tendered Sgt. Kelly and Agent Perez as lay 

witnesses who could provide certain opinions based upon their 

training and expertise. See, e.g., D.E. 1202 at 31. Messrs. Graham, 

Walker, and Hayes argue that the district court erred in permitting 

them to offer improper dual-capacity testimony as both lay and expert witnesses. 

1. RULES 701 AND 702

“The Federal Rules of Evidence distinguish between lay and

expert opinion testimony.” United States v. Gbenedio, 95 F.4th 1319, 

1332 (11th Cir. 2024). Rule 702 generally permits opinions by qualified experts based on “scientific technical, or other specialized 

knowledge.” Under Rule 701, lay opinion testimony must, among 

other things, be “rationally based on the witness’[ ] perception” and 

cannot be “based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”

“The distinction sometimes blurs when [the] testimony is 

based on professional work.” Gbenedio, 95 F.4th at 1332. For example, just “because an expert could provide the type of testimony 

at issue, [that does not mean] a lay witness cannot.” United States 

v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1008 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying pre-2000 

version of Rule 701). See Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. 

Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213, 1223 n.17 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that Novaton remains good law after the 2000 amendment 

to Rule 701). Nor does “the lay opinion of a law enforcement official automatically become [ ] an expert opinion simply because it 

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involves knowledge that preexisted the investigation in the present 

case.” United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1328, 1342 (11th Cir. 2017). 

We “examine the basis of an opinion to determine whether 

it is lay or expert.” Gbenedio, 95 F.4th at 1332. When a witness 

testifies in a dual capacity, i.e., as both a lay witness and an expert 

witness, the district court must ensure that the lay opinions satisfy 

Rule 701 and that the expert opinions satisfy Rule 702. “[P]roper 

lay testimony [can be] rendered improper by the indiscriminate 

merging of fact testimony with expert testimony” while the witness is “on the . . . stand.” United States v. Hawkins, 934 F.3d 1251, 

1266 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that it was plain error to allow a police officer to testify both as lay witness—on matters like his interpretation of drug codes and jargon—and as an expert witness—on 

matters like interpreting conversations and drawing inferences 

from them as a whole, describing how cocaine is “cooked,” and

providing an overview of the evidence—without demarcation). 

Together, Sgt. Kelly and Agent Perez constituted an important part of the government’s case. Sgt. Perez testified for three 

days and Agent Perez for nine. We discuss their testimony separately, starting with Sgt. Kelly.

2. SGT. KELLY

At the time of trial, Sgt. Kelly had been investigating gangs 

in Miami for five years. See D.E. 1032 at 25. She had attended three 

courses on gangs(basic, intermediate, and advanced) offered by the 

Florida Department of Law Enforcement and had taken classes on 

how to use social media for investigations. See D.E. 1203 at 42–43. 

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And in the course of her work she had met with and talked to over 

50 gang members. See D.E. 1204 at 31. With respect to her investigation of the DSBF, she conducted surveillance at the South 

Gwen Cherry complex, was involved in some controlled purchases 

of narcotics, used informants, reviewed surveillance videos from 

pole cameras, and engaged in a review of the defendants’ social media activity. See, e.g., D.E. 1202 at 26–33. 

During her direct examination, and without any objections, 

Sgt. Kelly testified about or opined on a number of subjects. These 

included the nicknames of some of the defendants (e.g., Mr. Graham’s username on a social media account was “G’Rico Long Live 

King Squeezer”); the meaning of terms like “4-20” (a marijuana special for $200 on April 20), “code red” (police in the area), “topshotta” (a leader or someone who is on top), “whip” (a car), “trap” 

(the place where narcotics are kept and sold), “opp” (rival gang), 

“jitt charges” (juvenile charges), and “broom” (a gun); and the interpretation or meaning of certain gang signs. See D.E. 1203 at 14; 

D.E. 1202 at 47, 51, 53–54, 73, 76, 93–94, 99, 109, 114.

The first defense objection under Rule 702 to Sgt. Kelly’s testimony was to a question about the meaning of the term “crabs.” 

See D.E. 1202 at 127–28. After the government went over Sgt. 

Kelly’s training and experience, the defense objected again on Rule 

702 grounds. See id. at 130. The district court overruled the objection, explaining that “it was up to the jury to decide” and that it was 

“not a gatekeeper in this area any longer. I think the rules have 

changed.” Id. at 130–31. The district court then explained, 

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however, that “[t]he question [was] whether [Sgt. Kelly’s] experience qualifie[d] her to explain what certain words mean in this context, and I think that goes to the weight of it.” Id. at 131. 

After this exchange, Sgt. Kelly testified that “crabs” “usually 

means Crips.” She also explained that “OTF” means “only the family.” Id. at 132, 134.22

With respect to Sgt. Kelly, we see no reversible dual-capacity 

error. 

First, aside from the two answers described above, Sgt. 

Kelly’s opinions on nicknames, the meaning of terms used by the 

defendants, and gang signs came in without any objections. That 

means we review the admission of those opinions for plain error, 

see United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011), 

and there is no error that is plain given our precedent permitting 

lay opinion testimony on similar subjects by law enforcement officers with sufficient experience. See, e.g., Novaton, 271 F.3d at 1009

(agents who monitored wiretaps testifying about code words); 

United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1102 (11th Cir. 2011) (FBI 

agent testifying about code words, nicknames, references, and interpretations of calls and communications). 

Second, as to the two opinions to which objections were preserved—that “crabs” “usually means ‘Crips’” and that “OTF” 

22 There was also a defense objection when Sgt. Kelly was asked to opine about 

the meaning of the term “jump.” The objection was overruled, but Sgt. Kelly 

ultimately did not give an opinion. See D.E. 1202 at 100.

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means “only the family”—we conclude that the district court initially erred in stating that it did not have the role of gatekeeper. As 

our cases explain, the district court must ensure that expert testimony under Rule 702 does not come in under the guise of lay opinion testimony under Rule 701. See Hawkins, 934 F.3d at 1265–66. 

And in order to carry out this task, the district court must indeed 

act as a gatekeeper. Otherwise, dual-capacity opinion testimony 

may prove problematic. See, e.g., United States v. Dulcio, 441 F.3d 

1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We agree that it is error to admit opinion testimony of lay witnesses based upon specialized knowledge, 

such as [testimony by an agent on the modus operandi of people 

involved in the drug business].”). 

Nevertheless, the district court also explained that the question was whether Sgt. Kelly, by virtue of her experience, could provide a lay opinion on a given subject. And given her experience in 

gang investigations, her work in this case, and her review of the 

defendants’ voluminous social media activity, allowing Sgt. Kelly 

to opine on the meaning of “crabs” and “OTF” was not an abuse of 

discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Wall, 116 F.4th 1285, 1308 (11th 

Cir. 2024) (case agents did not violate Hawkins by providing “permissible factual or lay opinion testimony tied to the specifics of 

their investigation”); Gbenedio, 95 F.4th at 1333 (DEA agent allowed 

to opine, based on his personal observations, that the defendant 

dispensed controlled substances without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the normal course of practice). And even if there 

was any error, we fail to see how the defendants suffered any prejudice from two opinions on relatively non-important matters.

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3. AGENT PEREZ

We now turn to Agent Perez. As with Sgt. Kelly, we will 

focus on the specific testimony that the defendants challenge on 

appeal.

At the time of trial, Agent Perez was a special agent in the

ATF’s Miami field office. He had served as an agent for eight years 

and focused on investigating violent crimes, such as robberies, 

gang activity, arsons, and explosives. He was the case agent, which 

meant that he coordinated the various local and federal investigatory resources. He also executed many of the search warrants used 

in this case. See D.E. 1114 at 132–34.

Much like Sgt. Kelly, the vast majority of Agent Perez’s testimony complained of by the defendants on appeal came in without objection. For instance, Mr. Graham argues on appeal that 

Agent Perez provided certain testimony based on his “training and 

experience” that amounted to improper expert testimony. See R. 

Graham Br. at 13 (providing a string cite to Agent Perez’s testimony). But based on our review of Mr. Graham’s record cites, and 

those provided by Messrs. Walker and Graham, we conclude that 

they failed to raise contemporaneous Rule 702 objections. In fact, 

in most instances the defendants did not object at all. See, e.g., D.E. 

1114 at 177 (“Q: Based on your training and experience and investigation in this case, what does the phrase ‘BLATT’ mean? A: It’s 

also associated with the Blood gang.”); id. at 201 (“Q: Are you familiar with the phrase ‘Blood in and Blood out’? Do you know 

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what that means? A: I do, yes. Q: And what does it mean? A: It 

means that you are a Blood from birth, always.”). 

Given the lack of contemporaneous objections on Rule 702 

grounds, we review for plain error. See Wetherald, 636 F.3d at 1320. 

As with Sgt. Kelly, we find no plain error in the district court allowing Agent Perez to testify about the meaning of terms, code words,

and other gang-related phrases and actions. That is because our 

precedent allows testimony very close to what Agent Perez provided. See, e.g., Wall, 116 F.4th at 1308; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102; 

Novaton, 271 F.3d at 1009.

The only preserved Rule 702 objection was to Agent Perez’s 

testimony explaining why the word “Crazy” was spelled with a “B”

instead of a “C.” See D.E. 1217 at 85–86 (“A: That’s Brazzy. Q: [I]n 

the course of this investigation, have you seen . . . the letter B substituted for the letter C? A: I have. Q: And why is that? A: It’s a 

reference to the Bloods and not wanting the use the word C because it refers to Crips. [Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor 

. . . it’s calling for his opinion that is not just a lay opinion, but a 

specialized opinion which he’s not qualified for at this point.”). 

But the district court in effect sustained that objection by requiring Agent Perez to clarify whether, in the course of his investigation, he had seen the defendants switch the letter “B” for “C.” 

See id. After confirming that he had, the government then asked 

him whether the defendants had a “common association.” Agent 

Perez responded, “[y]es . . . [t]hey all subscribe to the Blood gang.” 

Id. at 86. The defendants’ objection to the latter answer was that 

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Agent Perez improperly drew a “conclusion that is not . . . for him 

to make at this point.” Id. at 87. The district court overruled that 

objection and the testimony continued without further reference 

to the previously-objected-to “specialized” testimony. We conclude the testimony was permissible because it was based on Agent 

Perez’s investigation in this case. See, e.g., Novaton, 271 F.3d at 1009.

In sum, we find no reversible error in the district court’s decision to allow Sgt. Kelly and Agent Perez to testify about the defendants’ association with the Bloods and the meaning of certain 

terms and gang-related code words. 

I. SGT. KELLY & AGENT PEREZ: PART 2

Mr. Hayes raises another plain-error challenge to the testimony of Sgt. Kelly and Agent Perez. He argues that they offered 

impermissible expert conclusions on the ultimate issue of whether 

there was a RICO enterprise by referring to the defendants collectively as a “gang” or an “organization.” See S. Hayes Br. at 10–11.

This argument is misplaced. Even assuming that Sgt. Kelly 

and Agent Perez provided Rule 702 testimony, experts may testify

on ultimate issues so long as they do not opine on the defendants’ 

mental state or condition in a criminal case. See Fed. R. Evid. 

704(b). See also United States v. Gryzbowicz, 747 F.3d 1296, 1310 

(11th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n expert may testify as to his opinion on an 

ultimate issue of fact provided that he does not merely tell the jury 

what result to reach or testify to the legal implications of conduct.”) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the existence of an enterprise is not a matter involving scienter, see Boyle v. 

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United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944–45 (2009) (laying out the “broad” 

understanding of a RICO enterprise), there was no plain error. 

J. SGT. KELLY & AGENT PEREZ: PART 3

Curtis Bryant challenges some of the testimony of Sgt. Kelly 

and Agent Perez on separate and unrelated grounds. He argues 

that there was no evidence that the social media account attributed 

to him in fact belonged to him. But this is simply not correct. The 

account, belonging to “Snow Bryant,” shared his last name and included multiple photographs of him (several of which were selfies). 

In the comments to one of the account’s posts, another user addressed “Snow” as “Curt” and “Curtis.” See Gov’t Exh. 306 at 6972, 

6993–95, 7015, 7065. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence 

that the account more likely than not belonged to Curtis Bryant. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 104(b). 

In addition, Curtis Bryant contends that the district court 

should have excluded this social media evidence under Rule 403 as 

irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. “Rule 403 ‘is an extraordinary 

remedy which the district court should invoke sparingly, and the 

balance should be struck in favor of admissibility.’ . . . The balance 

to be struck is largely committed to the discretion of the district 

court[.]” United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1247 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(citation omitted). 

As the government correctly points out, the account in question contained a significant amount of relevant information. For 

example, on multiple occasions the owner used the hashtag 

“GMT,” an alternative acronym for the DSBF, and posted pictures 

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of Mr. Hallman, a rival gang member, including one of him in a 

casket at his funeral. This was significant because Mr. Coakley offered testimony from which the jury could find that Curtis Bryant 

killed Mr. Hallman. So did Ms. Houser.

The social media evidence therefore suggested gang affiliation and further tied Curtis Bryant to the homicide of a rival gang 

member. This evidence was certainly prejudicial to Curtis Bryant, 

but not in a legally unfair way. On this record, we cannot say that 

any such prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the “Snow Bryant” social media account. 

V. THE DEFENSE EXPERT

The district court excluded all of the testimony of a defense

gang expert, Dr. Jesse de la Cruz. The defendants challenge his exclusion on appeal.

We review rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony 

under the abuse of discretion standard. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. 

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). This deferential standard gives 

the district court “‘considerable leeway’” in making its evidentiary 

determinations. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Kumho Tire, 

526 U.S. at 152). We may affirm an evidentiary ruling on any 

ground supported by the record, even if that ground was not the 

basis for the district court’s ruling. See In re Int’l Management Assocs. 

LLC, 781 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2015). See also Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp., 670 F.3d 21, 31 n.4 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying this principle 

to the exclusion of expert testimony).

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Before summarizing Dr. de la Cruz’s proposed testimony, we 

describe the evidence presented by the government about the 

DSBF and its affiliation or connection with the Bloods. That evidence will explain the relevance of Dr. de la Cruz’s testimony.

A. THE GOVERNMENT’S GANG AND BLOODS EVIDENCE

Count 1 of the indictment charged the defendants with being members of a RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

1962(d). The defendants, according to the government, were part 

of the DSBF, a criminal gang (an enterprise) which trafficked in 

narcotics and committed other crimes (like robbery and murder) 

from 2000 through 2017 out of the South Gwen Cherry complex. 

See D.E. 193 at 2–8. 

In its case in chief, the government presented the expert testimony of FBI Special Agent Christopher Mayo. As relevant here, 

he testified that (1) “an open air drug market” is a place where drug 

transactions take place outdoors; (2) in South Florida most gangs 

are community-based, operate by themselves in a geographic area, 

and are made up of members who grew up in a certain area; (3) 

“typically” there aren’t “nationally-based gangs”; (4) drug organizations usually sell narcotics at retail from a location, or “trap;” (5) 

drug organizations have individuals performing different functions 

(e.g., suppliers, lieutenants, sellers, lookouts, etc.); (6) drug organizations also have workers who handle weapons (like firearms) and 

are in charge of security “in case they’re robbed by rival gang members or other drug traffickers;” (7) drug organizations utilize people 

who will conduct robberies (e.g., of other drug organizations) or 

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commit homicides; (8) cocaine is a powder and is trafficked from 

Ecuador through go-fast vessels in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean, into Mexico and/or the United States; (9) cocaine is cooked 

with baking soda and water to form cocaine base in a rock-like 

form; (10) marijuana is grown in South Florida in grow houses and 

is also imported from Mexico and places like Colorado; and (11) 

the slang term “dub” refers to 20, as in a “20 piece of cocaine or $20 

worth of marijuana.” See D.E. 1215 at 95–108. 

Agent Mayo was not asked about the Bloods, or about 

whether the defendants were in a gang that considered itself a

Bloods gang. Other government witnesses, however, testified extensively about how the DSBF identified itself and considered itself

as a Bloods gang. 

Sgt. Kelly provided testimony about the Bloods and its connection to the DSBF. She testified that “[t]his gang [the DSBF] identifies themselves asthe Bloods.” D.E. 1202 at 75. She also explained 

that a defendant wearing a red bandana was “an indication for 

Blood[s]” and showed gang members “identifying themselves as 

Blood[s] members.” Id. at 96–97. In her experience, the Bloods 

wear red “most of the time,” but “not all the time.” D.E. 1203 at 

37, 39. When asked about “Tone Bleedin Red,” the Facebook name 

of Mr. Glass, she responded that the name meant “[t]hat he’s a 

Blood, that he’s bleeding red for Blood.” D.E. 1202 at 99. Similarly, 

she reviewed a photograph of Jerimaine Bryant and told the jury 

that he was making a “Blood” sign. See D.E. 1203 at 52 (“Usually 

people that associate themselves with the Bloods . . . they throw 

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that gang sign.”). She said that the “Bloods” and “Crips” are “rivals.” D.E. 1202 at 132. 

In relatively lengthy exchange with the government, Sgt. 

Kelly also testified that (1) in South Florida the number one factor 

to determine gang membership are the “red bandanas;” (2) the two 

main gang criteria she looks for are “the colors, the red, [and] the 

hand signs they [are] throwing;” and (3) other criteria are “[h]ow 

they [the members] call themselves as a group,” and whether a person identifies as a member—“Q: What do you think about someone who claims that they’re a Blood? A: If they say that, it’s because 

they’re Bloods and we usually document it as Blood[s] members.” 

D.E. 1204 at 29–31. See also D.E. 1202 at 96–97 (“Q: [W]hat is the 

significance of the red bandana? A: That’s significance [sic] that 

they [are] actually Blood, that they [are] part of a gang, that they’re 

identifying themselves as Blood members.”). 

Significantly, Sgt. Kelly also testified about the “connection” 

between the DSBF and the national Bloods gang. In her opinion, 

the DSBF was “a subset” of the Bloods. See D.E. 1202 at 120. 

Like Sgt. Kelly, Agent Perez testified about the affiliation of 

the DSBF with the Bloods. He explained that the members of the 

defendants’ gang “all subscribe to the Blood gang.” D.E. 1217 at 

86. He also said that certain words and phrases used by the defendants (and their spellings) were references to the Bloods or their 

code. See, e.g., D.E. 1218 at 71–75. For example, he told the jury 

that “based on [his] training and experience” the use of the word 

“blatt” in some of the defendants’ social media posts was 

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“associated with the gang of the Bloods.” D.E. 1220 at 91. See also 

D.E. 1219 at 78 (identifying an exhibit as a “photograph of 

Jerimaine Bryant displaying the hand sign for Bloods”).

The government’s evidence about the Bloods gang and its 

connection to the DSBF was not limited to the testimony of law 

enforcement officials. Two cooperating witnesses—Messrs. 

Grimes and Coakley—also testified that the defendants’ gang was

affiliated with the Bloods. Mr. Grimes told the jury that the DSBF 

was a “Blood gang” which used an initiation ritual (a 31-second 

beatdown) that “came from Blood like Blood code,” and explained 

that the members considered themselves East-side Bloods because 

they were on the east coast. See D.E. 1204 at 160–61, 165, 168. Mr. 

Coakley confirmed the DSBF’s affiliation with the Bloods gang. See

D.E. 1205 at 45, 179, 193. In addition, there was testimony by other

government witnesses about the defendants’ social media posts, 

which frequently referenced the defendants’ Bloods membership. 

See D.E. 1219 at 39, 68, 75, 77–78, 83–84; D.E. 1221 at 3, 6, 8, 10–12, 

14. 

B. DR. DE LA CRUZ

Dr. de la Cruz holds a bachelor’s degree in Sociology with a 

minor in Deviant Behavior, as well as a master’s degree in Social 

Work. See D.E. 1221 at 85. He was a gang member in California in 

the 1970s and wrote his dissertation about gang members from 

Stockton who were aligned with the “Norteños.” See id. at 85–87. 

He also interacted with members of the Bloods during his own incarceration and during his stint as the director of a program dealing 

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with parolees who had a high-risk of recidivism. See id. at 99–102. 

He has been qualified to testify as an expert on gang-related matters 

over 60 times in state and federal courts, and he has served as an 

expert consultant in over 500 other cases. See id. at 102–04. The 

defendants wanted to call him as a gang expert to explain that the 

defendants were not members of the Bloods or of a gang and therefore did not constitute a criminal enterprise. See id. at 60–61, 67.

In his testimonial proffer outside of the jury’s presence, Dr. 

de la Cruz provided the following opinions after reviewing some of 

the trial testimony and exhibits: (1) gangs, including the Bloods and 

the Crips, generally have rules; (2) gangs have leaders and gang 

members commit crimes for the benefit of the organization; (3) 

profits are managed by a treasurer; (4) most gangs do not allow 

members to use drugs, and sometimes punish drug use with death; 

(5) gangs do not allow members to assault or kill other members 

without permission; and (6) the defendants were not a gang or 

criminal enterprise because (a) they were a “bunch of yahoos running around . . . breaking the law with no sense of direction, with 

no leadership direction,” (b) they used drugs, which was inconsistent with the behavior of those in criminal enterprises, (c) they 

did not get together for meetings to discuss the organization’s business, (d) they were “shooting each other indiscriminately,” and (e) 

they did not kill rivals. See id. at 90–98. He also opined that the 

defendants were “not Bloods” because they wore blue instead of 

red, they attacked each other, and they talked to the police. See id. 

at 102-08. In sum, the defendants did “not meet one of the elements of a criminal enterprise[.]” Id. at 108. 

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During cross-examination in the proffer session, Dr. de la 

Cruz acknowledged that he was talking about the Bloods in general. He maintained that all of the Bloods gangs were connected 

under the “People Nation” or “Folk Nation” umbrella, but he had 

not interviewed any members of the Bloods outside of California 

or New York/Pennsylvania. See id. at 118–19. 

C. DISCUSSION

The district court excluded all of Dr. de la Cruz’s testimony

on three grounds. First, it ruled that his testimony was not relevant 

because the government had not tried to connect the DSBF to the 

national Bloods gang. Second, it believed that one of Dr. de la 

Cruz’s opinions went to the ultimate issue in the case (i.e., whether 

the defendants formed a criminal enterprise) and thus was not 

properly “the subject of expert testimony.” Third, it concluded that 

Dr. de la Cruz was not an “expert in th[e] area” of criminal enterprises and was not offered as an expert in that area. See D.E. 1221 

at 1224–26.23 

All three grounds were mistaken on either the facts, the law, 

or both. We explain why below.

1. RELEVANCE

Starting with relevance, the district court seems to have 

simply overlooked or misunderstood the government’s Bloods23 The district court did not exclude Dr. de la Cruz under the qualification or 

reliability aspects of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), 

or its progeny.

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related evidence. As detailed above, the government presented 

considerable testimony from a number of witnesses—including

Sgt. Kelly, Agent Perez, and former DSBF members—about the 

DSBF being a Bloods gang or a Bloods-affiliated gang and the defendants using Bloods nicknames, terms, and signs. If the government thought that Bloods-related evidence was irrelevant, it would 

not have presented this evidence for the jury to consider. 

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make a fact 

more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and

the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 

401. We have explained that “[t]he standard for what constitutes relevant evidence is a low one,” United States v. Tinoco, 304 

F.3d 1088, 1120 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401), and 

given the government’s Bloods-related evidence Dr. de la Cruz’s 

testimony certainly met that bar. Accord Roger C. Park & Aviva 

Orenstein, Trial Objections Handbook 2d § 2:1 (2023) (“Rule 401 

adopts a very broad concept of relevance.”). 

“In the law, what’s sauce for the goose is normally sauce for 

the gander,” and we “have applied this commonsense principle of 

equal treatment in the context of expert witnesses.” United States 

v. Knowles, 889 F.3d 1251, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2018). It is therefore 

“an abuse of discretion to exclude the otherwise admissible opinion

of a party’s expert on a critical issue, while allowing the opinion of 

his adversary’s expert on the same issue.” United States v. Lankford, 

955 F.2d 1545, 1552 (11th Cir. 1993). 

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This principle, we think, also applies when the defense wants 

to present expert testimony to counter factual testimony and/or 

lay opinions offered by government witnesses. Where the government presents evidence to support a certain theory, a defendant is 

entitled to rebut that theory with evidence of his own. See, e.g., 

United States v. Word, 129 F.3d 1209, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 1997) (reversing conviction because the defendant “was not afforded the opportunity to present evidence to counter the government’s argument,” 

as the government’s “trial strategy made this defense evidence 

highly significant”). Moreover, expert testimony can be used to 

counter an opponent’s fact or lay opinion testimony. See, e.g., Panger 

v. Duluth, Winnipeg & Pac. Ry. Co., 490 F.2d 1112, 1117 (8th Cir. 1974)

(explaining that, where the plaintiff offered a lay opinion in his own 

testimony, “the defendant should have been accorded the right to 

counter that evidence with either factual evidence of its own or 

properly proffered expert testimony”).

The defendants were charged in Count 1 with participating 

in a RICO conspiracy in which their criminal gang (the DSBF) was 

the alleged enterprise. Dr. de la Cruz’s testimony about gangs (and 

the Bloods) would have been helpful to the jury in determining (a) 

whether the defendants were part of a criminal gang and (b) 

whether the gang constituted the enterprise alleged in the charged 

RICO conspiracy.

“Rule 702 . . . requires that the evidence or testimony ‘assist 

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 

in issue[,]’ [and] [t]his condition goes primarily to relevance.” 

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Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. The topics of gangs, gang membership, 

and gang affiliation are not matters within the “common 

knowledge of [lay] jurors.” Evans v. Mathis Funeral Homes, Inc., 996 

F.2d 266, 268 (11th Cir. 1993). Other circuits have allowed the sort 

of expert opinions that Dr. de la Cruz sought to offer, and we think 

their decisions are persuasive on this point. See, e.g., United States v. 

Portillo, 969 F.3d 144, 169 (5th Cir. 2020) (upholding district court’s 

decision to allow a government expert to testify about the Bandidos 

Outlaw gang, which was the charged enterprise in a RICO case: 

“Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Schuster’s testimony [about the Bandidos Outlaws] would 

be helpful to the jury.”); United States v. Kamahele, 748 F.3d 984, 999 

(10th Cir. 2014) (“The district court allowed Officer Merino’s testimony after finding that it helped the jury by providing insights into 

the distinctive traits of TCG [the alleged gang], a topic beyond the 

knowledge of most jurors. This ruling fell within the district 

court’s discretion[.]”). Moreover, that Dr. de la Cruz’s testimony 

focused in part on the national Bloods gang did not render his opinions about the defendants or the DSBF irrelevant or otherwise improper. See United States v. Ledbetter, 929 F.3d 338, 349 (6th Cir. 2019) 

(“Detective Caffey would not have been a reliable expert on the 

Short North Posse itself. But he did not purport to be. Detective 

Caffey opined about the national Crips gang, on which he was qualified, and the Government used other testimony to show that the 

Short North Posse fit the description of a Crip set. This exact approach—eliciting expert testimony on a national gang and 

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separately drawing a link to the local set—was approved of [by us 

in an earlier case].”). 

Dr. de la Cruz’s testimony also did not improperly go to an 

ultimate issue in the case. As we explained earlier, with the exception of testimony on the mental state or condition of a defendant 

in a criminal case, there is no categorical prohibition on expert testimony concerning an ultimate issue of fact: except as provided in 

subsection (b) of Rule 704, “[a]n opinion is not objectionable just 

because it embraces an ultimate issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(a). As a 

result, “the mere fact that an expert’s conclusion trenches upon a 

jury issue does not compel exclusion” because Rule 704 “abolishes 

the per se rule against testimony regarding ultimate issues of fact.” 

United States v. Milton, 555 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding 

that, in a criminal prosecution for conducting an illegal gambling 

business, a government expert’s testimony that certain transactions 

constituted “lay off bets” was admissible). 

In the government’s view, Dr. de la Cruz’s testimony was 

“akin to Pat Riley [the former head coach for the Lakers, Knicks, 

and Heat] asserting that a group from a YMCA recreational league 

did not constitute a ‘basketball team’ because, in his decades of 

NBA experience, a team required players drafted from top college 

programs, paid millions of dollars, and . . . practiced multiple days 

a week.” Appellee’s Br. at 56. But that hypothetical does not quite 

fit. 

The proper question is not, as the government suggests, 

whether Mr. Riley would have been allowed to testify that a YMCA 

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team playing a pickup game is a not team in the sense of the rules 

of basketball, but whether he would have been allowed to testify 

that such a team—which can change players every day or week and 

may not have any collective continuity or goal over a period of 

time—is not an enterprise with relationships among its members 

(the changing players) and a longevity sufficient to pursue a given 

common purpose. One of the instructions provided to the jury 

explained that a RICO enterprise, “in addition to having a common 

purpose, must have personnel who function as a continuing unit,” 

and that “an association of individuals may retain its status as an 

enterprise even though the membership of the association changes 

by adding or losing individuals during the course of its existence.” 

D.E. 725 at 19. 

2. THE EXISTENCE OF AN ENTERPRISE

In addition, Dr. de la Cruz’s testimony did not amount to an 

improper legal conclusion. One of the factual issues the jury was 

asked to decide was whether the defendants agreed (i.e., conspired) 

to participate in a racketeering enterprise. See D.E. 725 at 17–18. 

To that end, the district court gave the jury a definition of a RICO 

enterprise. See id. at 19. 

As a number of our sister circuits have explained, the “existence vel non of a RICO enterprise is a question of fact for the jury.” 

United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 1993). Accord United 

States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining that, 

in a RICO prosecution, “[t]he issues of ongoing organization, continuing membership and an enterprise existing apart from the 

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underlying pattern of racketeering are factual questions for the 

jury”); United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1310 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 

1997) (“To the extent that the government argues that whether the 

two unions constituted a single enterprise is a matter of law, it is 

mistaken.”). Dr. de la Cruz’s opinion that the defendants and their 

gang—the DSBF—were not a criminal enterprise therefore did not 

constitute an impermissible opinion on a legal issue. See also United 

States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1535–39 (11th Cir. 1985) (analyzing 

the existence of a RICO enterprise as a fact question for the jury).

Indeed, because the existence of an enterprise is an element 

of a substantive RICO offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), see United 

States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), it is the 

jury which must decide whether an enterprise has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 

583 (1981) (“In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government must prove both the existence of an ‘enterprise’ and the 

connected ‘pattern of racketeering activity.’ . . . The existence of an 

enterprise remains a separate element which must be proved by 

the Government.”); 11th Cir. Crim. Pattern Jury Instructions, Offense Instruction 75.1 for 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (to convict a defendant of a § 1962(c) offense the jury must find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that, among other things, the defendant “was associated 

with an enterprise” and that the “enterprise was involved in or affected interstate commerce”); 2B Kevin F. O’Malley et al., Federal 

Jury Practice & Instructions § 56:03 (6th ed. & Feb. 2024 update) 

(instruction for 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c): “In order to sustain its burden 

of proof for the crime of participating in the affairs of an interstate 

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enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity as charged in 

Count __ of the indictment, the Government must prove the following five (5) essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. One: 

An enterprise, as described in the indictment, existed on or about 

the time alleged in the indictment . . . .”). Dr. de la Cruz’s testimony was relevant.

In his partial dissent, Judge Brasher suggests that Dr. de la 

Cruz’s testimony regarding the typical characteristics of criminal 

enterprises impermissibly went to a question of law—the definition 

of the statutory term enterprise under RICO. We disagree. Just 

because an element of an offense has a legal definition (or prescribed legal parameters) does not mean that it is transformed into 

a question of law. For example, the terms actual and constructive 

possession have legal definitions, but in a narcotics prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) the jury must decide, as a factual matter, 

whether the defendant possessed a controlled substance. See, e.g., 

United States v. Woodward, 531 F.3d 1352, 1360–61 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Similarly, the term scheme to defraud has a legal definition, but in 

a prosecution for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 it is the jury 

which must determine, as a factual matter, whether the defendant 

engaged in a scheme to defraud. See, e.g., United States v. Giarratano,

622 F.2d 153, 155–56 (5th Cir. 1980). Indeed, as described above, 

courts around the country allow testimony regarding gangs in 

RICO cases. See, e.g., Portillo, 969 F.3d at 169; Kamahele, 748 F.3d at 

999; Ledbetter, 929 F.3d at 349. 

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Dr. de la Cruz was therefore entitled to testify regarding 

what he believed to be the typical characteristics of a gang or criminal enterprise. And even if the district court could have permissibly excluded some of Dr. de la Cruz’s opinions, wholesale exclusion of the testimony regarding gang characteristics was an abuse 

of discretion, especially given the government’s extensive testimony on this very issue.

3. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) AND ENTERPRISE EVIDENCE

We pause for a moment here to note that several circuits 

have held that the existence of an enterprise is not an element of a 

§ 1962(d) conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Rich, 14 F.4th 489, 492–

94 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing similar cases from the Second, Ninth, and 

Tenth Circuits). But others have come to a different conclusion. 

See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 450 F.3d 655, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Some of our decisions suggest the that the existence of an 

enterprise is not an element of a § 1962(d) offense. See, e.g., United 

States v. Starret, 55 F.3d 1525, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995) (“To establish a 

RICO conspiracy violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), the government must prove that the defendants ‘objectively manifested, 

through words or actions, an agreement to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through the commission of two 

or more predicate crimes.’”) (citation omitted). But one of our 

early cases points in a different direction. In Phillips, 664 F.2d at 

1011, the panel explained that a substantive RICO violation under 

§ 1962(c) has “the following elements: (1) the existence of an enterprise which affects interstate or foreign commerce; (2) that the 

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defendant ‘associated with’ the enterprise; (3) that the defendants 

participated in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs; and (4) that 

the participation was through a pattern of racketeering activity, 

i.e., by committing at least two of the racketeering activity designated in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).” Then the panel stated that “[p]roof 

of a RICO conspiracy charge requires that the government prove 

the additional element of an agreement.” Id. at 1012 (emphasis 

added). By using the word “additional,” the panel in Phillips suggested that the existence of an enterprise—an element of a substantive RICO violation—is also an element of a RICO conspiracy.24

Our reading of Phillips is supported by other Eleventh Circuit cases. In United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1546 (11th Cir. 

1991), we said that, “[i]n addition to predicate crimes, a RICO conspiracy charge requires proof of an enterprise, of the continuing 

racketeering activity, and of the defendant’s knowledge of, agreement to, and participation in the conspiracy.” See also United States 

v. Weismann, 899 F.2d 1111, 1115–16 (11th Cir. 1990) (reversing 

RICO conspiracy conviction under § 1962(d) because the district 

court improperly changed the enterprise charged in the indictment); United States v. Young, 906 F.2d 615, 618 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The 

issues are as follows: (1) whether the government presented 

24 As a Unit B decision of the Former Fifth Circuit, Phillips constitutes binding 

precedent under Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 

1982).

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sufficient evidence (a) to establish the existence of an enterprise for 

the purposes of a RICO conspiracy . . . .”).

We need not definitively decide today whether the existence 

of an enterprise is an element of a RICO conspiracy under 

§ 1962(d). First, the government does not raise the issue. Second, 

the district court instructed the jury that one of the elements for 

the Count 1 RICO conspiracy charge was that “the enterprise was 

engaged in, or that its activities affected, interstate or foreign commerce.” D.E. 725 at 17–18. As this case was tried, therefore,

whether the DSBF constituted an enterprise was a critical issue for 

the charged RICO conspiracy. Cf. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 202 

(1948) (“To conform to due process of law, petitioners were entitled to have the validity of their convictions appraised on consideration of the case as it was tried and as the issues were determined 

in the trial court.”).

4. THE DEFENDANTS’ PROPOSED USE OF DR. DE LA CRUZ

Again, even if it may not have been error for the district 

court to exclude some of Dr. de la Cruz’s opinions, it was error to 

exclude his testimony as to the Bloods gang and the non-existence 

of a criminal enterprise. See United States v. Cohen, 510 F.3d 1114, 

1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he best way for the district court to have 

insured the exclusion of the potentially inadmissible aspects of [the 

expert’s] testimony was not to bar him from testifying altogether, 

but to sustain the government’s objections to particular questions 

likely to elicit inadmissible evidence under the rule.”). The defendants made it known at all times that they intended to use Dr. de la 

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Cruz’s testimony to rebut the criminal enterprise element of the 

RICO conspiracy charge. Before trial, for example, Mr. Hayes explained in response to the government’s motion to exclude Dr. de 

la Cruz that his testimony would “help resolve the [g]overnment’s 

main theory as to how the [c]odefendants allegedly maintained a 

RICO ‘enterprise.’” D.E. 679 at 4. Mr. Hayes acknowledged that 

disproving the defendants’ association with the national Bloods 

gang would not “automatically disprove whether the [c]odefendants operated a RICO ‘enterprise[,]’” but maintained it would “disprove the [g]overnment’s theory as to what kind of RICO ‘enterprise’” they formed. See id. at 3 n.1. The defendants’ legal position 

was well founded. See United States v. Rios, 830 F.3d 403, 421 (6th 

Cir. 2016) (explaining, in a RICO case involving the Latin Kings 

gang, that “[g]ang-affiliation evidence may be highly probative of 

an individual’s membership in a particular gang, so it ‘has been held 

admissible, in cases where the interrelationship between people is 

a central issue’”) (citation omitted). During trial, the defendants 

again argued that “one of the critical issues in this case is whether 

or not this is . . . [a] criminal enterprise, which is what Dr. de la 

Cruz is going to testify about.” D.E. 1221 at 65–66. Finally—and 

most importantly—Dr. de la Cruz’s proffered testimony delivered 

as promised. See, e.g., id. at 108 (“This particular group does not 

meet one of the elements of a criminal enterprise, in my opinion.”).

The government defends the district court’s wholesale exclusion of Dr. de la Cruz on one additional ground—it maintains 

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that his testimony contravened Supreme Court precedent on what 

a RICO enterprise entails. That contention, we think, is mistaken. 

The Supreme Court has held that an enterprise must have 

“an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of 

racketeering activity in which it engages.” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 940–

41. “From the terms of RICO, it is apparent that an association-infact enterprise must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and 

longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id. at 946. 

As summarized earlier, Dr. de la Cruz opined in part that the 

defendants were not a gang because (1) they were a “bunch of yahoos running around . . . breaking the law with no sense of direction, with no leadership direction,” (2) they used drugs, which was 

inconsistent with the behavior of those in criminal enterprises, (3) 

they did not get together for meetings to discuss the organization’s 

business, (4) they were “shooting each other indiscriminately,” and 

(5) they did not kill rivals. This aspect of his testimony would have 

gone to the existence and purpose of the alleged enterprise and the 

relationships among those associated with it, two of the structural 

features identified by the Supreme Court in Boyle. See United States 

v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1388–89 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that, had 

an objection been made to a qualified expert’s testimony on “the 

existence of a RICO enterprise”—based on an “understanding of 

the existence of organized crime and the Gambino family”—it 

would not “have been sustain[ed] under Rules 702, 703, and 704”). 

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The government may think that Dr. de la Cruz’s testimony was not 

credible or persuasive, but ultimate acceptance by the jury is not 

the standard for admissibility under Rule 702. 

D. PREJUDICE

We now turn to whether the wholesale exclusion of Dr. de 

la Cruz’s expert testimony was prejudicial. In cases of non-constitutional error where, as here, a party has preserved an objection, 

the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the error 

is harmless. See United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 607 (2013); 

United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020). A “nonconstitutional error is harmless if, viewing the proceedings in their 

entirety, a court determines that the error did not affect the verdict, 

‘or had but very slight effect[.]’ If one can say ‘with fair assurance

. . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error,’

the judgment is due to be affirmed even though there was error.” 

United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2004)

(citations omitted).

The government has failed to argue that the exclusion of Dr. 

de la Cruz was harmless error. Because its brief does not address 

harmlessness, the government has failed to carry its burden. See 

Davila, 569 U.S. at 607. But under our precedent that is not necessarily the end of the matter. 

We have the discretion to sua sponte determine whether an 

error is harmless. See Horsley v. State of Alabama, 45 F.3d 1486, 1492 

n.10 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Giovannetti, 928 F.2d 

225, 227 (7th Cir. 1991)). “But that discretion is not an obligation.” 

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Harris v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 42 F.4th 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 

2022). We have chosen to exercise that discretion where, for example, the harmlessness was “patently obvious.” United States v. 

Adams, 1 F.3d 1566, 1576 (11th Cir. 1993). And we have recently 

held that issues not raised by a party can be considered sua sponte

by the court only in “extraordinary circumstances.” United States v. 

Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). 

The Seventh Circuit considers three factors, as set out in Giovannetti, when deciding whether to exercise its sua sponte discretion: (1) “the length and complexity of the record”; (2) “whether 

the harmlessness of the error or errors found is certain or debatable”; and (3) “whether a reversal will result in protracted, costly, 

and ultimately futile proceedings in the district court.” Giovannetti, 

928 F.2d at 227. The Giovannetti factors are relied on by other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 

1991). We too find the Giovannetti factors helpful, but do not confine ourselves to them. See Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873.

Nothing about this case—and this issue in particular—is 

amenable to a sua sponte review for harmlessness. 

First, the record is long and complex. This is an appeal by 

10 defendants from a 38-day trial on a 23-count indictment. The 

trial transcript is nearly 8,000 pages long, and the exhibit pages

number in the thousands. To determine the effect of the exclusion 

of Dr. de la Cruz on the six defendants convicted of the RICO conspiracy charge, we would have to sift through the voluminous record to contrast the strength of the government’s case with that of 

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the defendants had Dr. de la Cruz’s testimony been allowed—a 

task not generally befitting of an appellate court. See Pryce, 938 F.2d 

at 1348 (“[An appellate] court should normally conduct the harmless error inquiry on its own initiative only where the relevant portions of the record are reasonably short and straightforward.”). We 

have declined to scour the record to plug gaps in the defendants’ 

briefing, see Part IV.F, and do the same here.

Second, the harmlessness of the error is far from certain. In 

fact, we have serious doubts that the wholesale exclusion of Dr. de 

la Cruz was harmless. Time and again, courts(including ours) have 

held that when a defendant’s expert was wrongfully excluded, and 

that expert sought to rebut the government’s own expert on a central issue (e.g., an element of the offense), the error was prejudicial. 

See, e.g., Lankford, 955 F.2d at 1552–53 (“Although [Mr.] Lankford 

did state that he believed the $1500 check did not need to be reported [to the IRS], the district court did not allow him to present 

evidence to the jury to explain why that belief would have been 

reasonable. The government, however, was allowed to pose a hypothetical question to a tax preparer concerning whether the 

proper course of conduct should have been to report the $1500 as 

income. Given the possible construction of the facts by the jury 

and given the defense’s inability to present expert testimony to rebut the expert opinion elicited by the government, we simply cannot conclude that the trial court’s error was harmless.”); United 

States v. Diallo, 40 F.3d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is noteworthy that 

the government was permitted to call its own expert (a DEA agent) 

to establish an economic motive for [Mr.] Diallo to smuggle 

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heroin. [Mr.] Diallo’s expert (a commodities analyst), in turn, 

would have shown an economic motive to smuggle gold. Having 

allowed the government to call as an expert a DEA agent, who was 

surely no more qualified as an expert in heroin than [Mr. Diallo’s 

expert] was in gold, the district court should have accorded the defendant the same right. Turnabout is fair play, even in the federal 

courts.”); Cohen, 510 F.3d at 1127 (holding that it was prejudicial 

error to exclude the defendant’s expert, who was to explain that 

the defendant’s mental disorder may have affected “his ability to 

form the requisite mens rea”). 

Here the district court prohibited Dr. de la Cruz from testifying that the DSBF was not a criminal gang and that, as a result, 

there was no RICO enterprise. His testimony would have helped 

the defendants counter the testimony—including the lay opinions—presented by government witnesses like Agent Mayo, Sgt. 

Kelly, Agent Perez, Mr. Grimes, and Mr. Coakley. See Word, 129 

F.3d at 1212–13.

Third, we understand that reversal on this issue might lead 

to costly and lengthy proceedings if the government chooses to retry the six defendants on Count 1. But we cannot say with certainty 

that the result of a new trial would be a foregone conclusion. A 

jury, for example, may find some of Dr. de la Cruz’s opinions sufficiently persuasive to create reasonable doubt. 

We do not vacate convictions in cases like this one lightly. 

And we appreciate the immense undertaking required of all parties 

to bring this case to trial, and acknowledge that it would be equally 

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or even more burdensome to do it again years later. But paramount to our sensitivity for the government’s limited resources

and the district court’s docket is our duty to ensure that the defendants receive a fair trial. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988)

(“Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. Indeed, this right is an essential 

attribute of the adversary system itself.”) (citation omitted). 

Accordingly, we vacate the Count 1 convictions of Mr. Graham, Mr. Glass, Jerimaine Bryant, Mr. Walker, Curtis Bryant, and 

Mr. Hayes, as well as their sentences. If the government decides 

not to retry them on Count 1, these defendants will need to be resentenced. See United States v. Klopf, 423 F.3d 1228, 1245 (11th Cir. 

2005) (discussing the “sentencing package” doctrine and the need 

for resentencing when one of the components has been set aside).

VI. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

We now turn to the challenges to the jury instructions by 

Messrs. Jones, Rodriguez, and Glass. None of them objected to the 

jury instructions below and none contest that their claims are subject to plain error review.25 

25 The defendants objected to the instruction for Count 1 but not on the 

ground they now raise on appeal. See United States v. Sentovich, 677 F.2d 834, 

837 (11th Cir. 1982) (“A party not raising an argument below waives his right 

to raise it on appeal absent plain error.”). Accordingly, their present challenge 

to the instruction for Count 1 was not properly preserved. See United States v. 

Wheeler, 540 F.3d 683, 689 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Because Wheeler did not explain to 

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“Jury instructions will not be reversed for plain error unless 

the charge, considered as a whole, is so clearly erroneous as to result in a likelihood of a grave miscarriage of justice, or the error 

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 675 (11th Cir. 

1984) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If a defendant demonstrates plain error, we have the discretion to correct the 

error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Rosales-Mireles, 585 U.S. at 135. 

A. COUNT 1

Mr. Glass contests the district court’s instruction on Count 

1, the RICO conspiracy charge. He points out that the instruction 

required only that the jury agree on the type of racketeering activity that the defendants agreed to commit. As a result, it violated 

due process by permitting the jury to convict him without unanimously agreeing on which two specific acts of racketeering he committed.26 

Mr. Glass relies primarily on Richardson v. United States, 526 

U.S. 813, 818–20 (1999). In that case the Supreme Court held that, 

for a conviction for the offense of engaging in a continuing criminal 

enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848, “a jury has to agree 

the district court the objection he raises on appeal, he has not preserved it. 

Thus, we review his claim for plain error.”) (citations omitted).

26 Although we have set aside the Count 1 convictions, we address this issue 

in case there is a retrial.

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unanimously about which specific violations make up the ‘continuing series of violations’” of the charge. Id. at 815. We have not 

yet decided in a published opinion whether to extend the holding 

in Richardson to the RICO context. See United States v. Hein, 395 F. 

App’x 652, 655–56 (11th Cir. 2010) (declining to address the issue). 

As far as we can tell, however, every circuit to confront the issue

after Richardson “has concluded that for a RICO conspiracy charge 

the jury need only be unanimous as to the types of racketeering 

acts that the defendants agreed to commit.” United States v. Cornell, 

780 F.3d 616, 625 (4th Cir. 2015). See also Rios, 830 F.3d at 434 (concluding that a unanimity instruction was not required); United 

States v. Randall, 661 F.3d 1291, 1297 (10th Cir. 2011) (agreeing “that 

it is not necessary to prove the specific predicate acts that supported 

a RICO conspiracy charge in order to prove a defendant’s participation in a RICO conspiracy”); United States v. Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 

80–82 (2d Cir. 2011) (same). Cf. United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496, 

500 (7th Cir. 1991) (same but pre-Richardson). 

Assuming without deciding that the district court erred, we 

hold that Mr. Glass cannot show that the alleged error was “plain”

because there is no Eleventh Circuit precedent on point and because the weight of authority in other circuits is adverse to him. 

See Hesser, 800 F.3d at 1325 (“‘Plain’ error means that the legal rule 

is clearly established at the time the case is reviewed on direct appeal.”). Accordingly, his challenge to the instruction for Count 1 

fails. 

B. COUNT 2

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Mr. Jones takes issue with the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on Count 2—the narcotics conspiracy charge—that 

the government was required to prove his guilt with post-juvenile 

conspiracy activity or, alternatively, that he had to ratify his participation in the conspiracy after he turned 18.

Mr. Jones’ argument is foreclosed by our precedent. In 

United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1475–76 (11th Cir. 1986), we 

held that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. 

§ 5031 et seq., does not require a limiting instruction concerning 

juvenile conduct where a defendant’s participation in the charged 

conspiracy continues past his 18th birthday. See also United States v. 

Newton, 44 F.3d 913, 919 & n.8 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that the district court’s charge to the jury “that they could find [the defendant] 

guilty only for acts that he committed after his eighteenth birthday” appeared to be a “benefit . . . to which he was not entitled”). 

Accord United States v. Camez, 839 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2016) (favorably citing Cruz for the proposition that the FJDA does not require a special jury instruction); United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 

969 (7th Cir. 1989) (same). 

There was no error, plain or otherwise. As we explain later, 

Mr. Jones ratified his participation in the narcotics conspiracy after 

his 18th birthday by selling marijuana for Mr. Glass. See, e.g., D.E. 

1208 at 207. No jury instruction on juvenile conduct was required. 

C. COUNT 10

Mr. Rodriguez claims that the district court committed plain 

error when it instructed the jury on the offense of possession of a 

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firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (Count 10) and 

aiding and abetting possession of a firearm in furtherance of that 

crime. In his view, the juxtaposition of those instructions confused 

the jury and caused it to speculate as to what species of knowledge 

was required to convict him because of the respective crimes’ different knowledge elements; the substantive possession instruction 

required “knowledge of the firearm’s presence,” while the aiding 

and abetting instruction required “advance knowledge that another participant would possess a firearm.” See D.E. 725 at 40–41. 

There was no plain error.

Count 10 charged Mr. Rodriguez (and Mr. Ingram) with a 

substantive violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) on May 6, 2016, and included a citation to 18 U.S.C. § 2, the aiding and abetting statute. 

See D.E. 193 at 15–16. Mr. Rodriguez concedes that both instructions—the § 924(c) instruction and the aiding and abetting instruction—were independently “correct[ ].” See M. Rodriguez Br. at 47. 

And he is right. See, e.g., Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 78 (holding that 

aiding and abetting liability under § 924(c) requires “advance 

knowledge”). We do not see how the district court could have 

plainly erred by providing separate and independently correct instructions for the two distinct forms of liability charged in Count 

10. 

We note, as well, that Mr. Rodriguez’s jury confusion argument is not persuasive. Count 23, like Count 10, charged Mr. Rodriguez (and Mr. Ingram) with a separate § 924(c) violation on May 

9, 2017, and it too included a citation to § 2. See D.E. 193 at 25. 

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Though the jury instructions for Count 23 were the same as for 

Count 10, the jury acquitted Mr. Rodriguez and Mr. Ingram on 

Count 23.

VII. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Multiple defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on some of their convictions. “We review de novo the sufficiency of evidence.” United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1335 

(11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The relevant question is 

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Significantly, the evidence “need 

not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence for a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. 

Kincherlow, 88 F.4th 897, 904 (11th Cir. 2023). 

A. COUNT 1

Mr. Graham, Mr. Walker, and Jerimaine Bryant challenge 

the sufficiency of the evidence on Count 1, which charged them 

with a RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d). The 

indictment alleged an illegal enterprise (the DSBF) implemented 

through criminal activities like “drug trafficking, provision of firearms to prohibited persons, illegal gambling, fraud, money laundering, robbery, assault, and murder.” D.E. 193 at 5.27 

27 We address the Count 1 sufficiency issues because, if the defendants are correct, double jeopardy will bar their retrial on the RICO conspiracy charge. See 

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1. BACKGROUND

“A RICO conspiracy differs from an ordinary conspiracy in 

two respects: it need not embrace an overt act, and it is broader and 

may encompass a greater variety of conduct.” Pepe, 747 F.2d at 659 

(footnotes omitted). The “touchstone of liability” under § 1962(d) 

is an agreement to participate in a RICO conspiracy. See Browne, 

505 F.3d at 1264. The government may prove such an agreement 

by showing either (1) “an agreement on an overall objective of the 

conspiracy,” or (2) “that a defendant agreed to commit personally 

two predicate acts, thereby agreeing to participate in a ‘single objective.’” Id. “If the government can prove an agreement on an 

overall objective, it need not prove a defendant personally agreed 

to commit two predicate acts.” United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 

1286, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001). 

The government may establish an overall objective “by circumstantial evidence showing that each defendant must necessarily have known that others were also conspiring to participate 

in the same enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.” 

United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And under either theory described above, “the government does not have to establish 

that each conspirator explicitly agreed with every other conspirator 

to commit the substantive RICO crime described in the indictment, 

United States v. Blizzard, 674 F.2d 1382, 1386 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The double jeopardy clause does preclude a second trial once a reviewing court has determined 

that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to sustain the verdict.”).

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or knew his fellow conspirators, or was aware of all the details of 

the conspiracy.” Pepe, 747 F.2d at 659. “That each conspirator may 

have contemplated participating in different and unrelated crimes 

is irrelevant.” Id. at 659–60. 

2. THE EVIDENCE

There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could 

find that Mr. Graham. Mr. Walker, and Jerimaine Bryant agreed to 

participate in a criminal enterprise, the DSBF, through a pattern of 

racketeering activity. See Starrett, 55 F.3d at 1547. 

The indictment alleged that the DSBF’s overall objective 

“was to generate money for its members and associates.” See D.E. 

193 at 5. The defendants operated out of a defined territory, the 

South Gwen Cherry complex, and used violence to control their 

turf. Outsiders were not tolerated. Mr. Johnson was just one example of an unfortunate outsider who, after a perceived attempt to 

encroach on DSBF turf, was murdered (by Mr. Glass). The group 

also had a loose hierarchical structure, with Ike Johnson as its 

founder in the early 2000s and Mr. Glass succeeding him around 

2012. Members of the DSBF sold drugs or acted as lookouts or 

gunmen, while others supplied the organization with drugs and 

firearms. And some of the same members who worked the streets 

together regularly engaged in robberies to further enrich themselves; they stole cars and robbed random victims or rival dealers. 

For the organization, making money was the primary objective. 

Jerimaine Bryant challenges the existence of a criminal enterprise. Again, we need not decide whether the existence of an 

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enterprise is an element of a § 1962(d) conspiracy. See Part V.C. 

The evidence summarized above allowed the jury to find a RICO 

enterprise. An “enterprise” includes an association-in-fact, defined 

as having “a purpose, relationships among those associated with 

the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associations 

to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946. Our 

sister circuits have held that a criminal gang like the DSBF, whose 

purpose is to make money by selling drugs, perpetrating robberies, 

and/or committing murders, can and does constitute a RICO enterprise. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (racketeering activity includes murder, robbery, and controlled substance offenses prohibited by state law and punishable by imprisonment for more than 

one year). We find their decisions persuasive and follow them. See, 

e.g., Harris, 695 F.3d at 1136; United States v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 

621–23 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667, 682–83 

(7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 77–78 (2d Cir. 

2011); United States v. Jones, 873 F.3d 482, 489–91 (5th Cir. 2017); 

United States v. Rodríguez-Torres, 939 F.3d 16, 24–27 (1st Cir. 2019). 

Jerimaine Bryant’s only remaining sufficiency argument is 

that he had withdrawn from the DSBF following his release from 

prison in 2011. His elevated role in the gang before then is uncontested. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the jury could find that Jerimaine Bryant continued to 

operate in concert with the overall objective of the RICO conspiracy after his release from prison. For one, he was a prominent 

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supplier for Mr. Glass. See United States v. Russo, 796 F.2d 1443, 

1460–61 (11th Cir. 1986) (evidence that the defendant was a “main 

supplier of drugs” to the organization was “more than sufficient to 

support his RICO conspiracy conviction”). He also continued to 

endorse the DSBF on social media. In 2013, for instance, he identified himself as a “Smackville top smacker,” which meant a senior 

member of the DSBF. In 2014, he mourned the death of a fallen 

DSBF member. And in 2015, he posted a “shout out” to “[his] 

Blood, [his] gang . . . ya know what we Bleed #GMT.” Additionally, the jury returned guilty verdicts against him on three post2011 narcotics charges—possession of controlled substances with 

intent to distribute (Counts 5, 12, and 21)—that could serve as predicate acts. The government’s evidence therefore was sufficient to 

support Jerimaine Bryant’s conviction for the RICO conspiracy. 

See Browne, 505 F.3d at 1264.

As for Messrs. Graham and Walker, they were on the front 

lines generating money for the DSBF. Both were “servers” who 

sold crack cocaine and marijuana for Mr. Glass. Ms. Houser, Mr. 

Coakley, and Donzell Jones all testified to that effect. According to 

Mr. Coakley, Messrs. Graham and Walker also acted as lookouts, 

and Mr. Graham participated with him in robberies. Messrs. Graham and Walker even exchanged text messages about narcotics 

transactions.

In response to this evidence, Messrs. Graham and Walker 

posit that they were merely independent drug dealers with a fleeting association with the DSBF. See United States v. Achey, 943 F.3d 

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909, 917 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[A] simple buyer-seller controlled substance transaction does not, by itself, form a conspiracy.”); United 

States v. Mercer, 165 F.3d 1331, 1333–35 (11th Cir. 1999) (an agreement to the mere “exchange of drugs for money” is “not probative 

of an agreement to join together to accomplish a criminal objective 

beyond that already being accomplished by the transaction”). Mr. 

Graham, for example, refers to a series of social media posts where 

he repeated certain statements (“I don’t work for nobody. I do my 

own shit.”) as evidence of his independence from the organization. 

But the jury heard contrary testimony, as described above, and was 

free to disregard Mr. Graham’s statements of independence. See id. 

at 1335 (“[W]e have held that an agreement may be inferred when 

the evidence shows a continuing relationship that results in the repeated transfer of illegal drugs to the purchaser.”).

Messrs. Graham and Walker also point to a text message between them from 2016 as evincing their unease with continuing to 

sell drugs for Mr. Glass. See D.E. 1217 at 20 (“I’m about to just tell 

em bra. I’m even feel like dealing with this crack no more.”). Far 

from helping their cause, however, this message is an admission 

that they were in fact “servers” for the DSBF and does nothing to 

erase their prior conduct. See Achey, 943 F.3d at 917 (“[A] conspiracy can be found if the evidence allows an inference that the buyer 

and seller knew the drugs were for distribution instead of merely 

understanding their transactions to do no more than support the 

buyer’s personal drug habit.”) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Nor do they point to any evidence that, like 

Donzell Jones, they were allowed to sell drugs with the DSBF in 

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the South Gwen Cherry complex based on a longtime friendship 

with Mr. Glass, rather than as members of the organization. Accordingly, the government presented sufficient evidence to establish that Messrs. Graham and Walker agreed to advance the conspiracy’s overall objective of generating money for the DSBF and 

its members. 

B. COUNT 2

Jerimaine Bryant, along with Messrs. Rodriguez, Ingram, 

and Jones, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their 

convictions on Count 2, which charged them with conspiracy to 

possess 280 grams or more of crack cocaine and marijuana with the

intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. We find the 

evidence sufficient for all four defendants. 

1. SINGLE CONSPIRACY

To establish a narcotics conspiracy under § 846, the government must prove that (1) there was a conspiracy or agreement to 

possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute it, 

(2) the defendants knew the essential unlawful objects of the conspiracy, and (3) the defendants knowingly and voluntarily joined 

the conspiracy. See United States v. Duldulao, 87 F.4th 1239, 1253–

54 (11th Cir. 2023); Dixon, 901 F.3d at 1335. Proof of an overt act is 

not required. See Shabani, 513 U.S. at 11.

When the government seeks to prove a single overarching 

conspiracy, it may rely on evidence such as “whether a common 

goal existed [among the conspirators],” “the nature of the underlying scheme,” and “the overlap of participants.” Dixon, 901 F.3d at 

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1335 (citation omitted). Importantly, “separate transactions are 

not necessarily separate conspiracies, so long as the conspirators act 

in concert to further a common goal. If a defendant’s actions facilitated the endeavors of other co-conspirators, or facilitated the venture as a whole, a single conspiracy is established.” Id. (citation 

omitted). See also United States v. Russo, 717 F.2d 545, 549 (11th Cir. 

1983) (stating that circumstantial evidence may suffice to prove 

participation in a conspiracy). Whether a single conspiracy existed 

is generally a question of fact for the jury. See United States v. Alred, 

144 F.3d 1405, 1414 (11th Cir. 1998). 

The government presented sufficient evidence for the jury 

to find beyond a reasonable doubt that these four defendants were 

part of a single narcotics conspiracy with common goals. Those

common goals were simple: buying and selling crack cocaine and 

marijuana for profit in the South Gwen Cherry complex. See United 

States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining 

that “[c]ourts typically define the common goal element as broadly 

as possible,” including, for example, “a common goal of buying and 

selling cocaine for profit” in a set area, and compiling cases to that 

effect) (citation omitted). In furtherance of that goal, the defendants operated a “marketplace” of crack cocaine and marijuana, 

complete with sellers, lookouts, and enforcers. See United States v. 

Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1090 (11th Cir. 2009) (describing a “farmer’s 

market” and “marketplace” at the heart of the drug conspiracy);

United States v. Westry, 524 F.3d 1198, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the defendants were “engag[ed] in a consistent series 

of smaller transactions that furthered [the conspiracy’s] ultimate 

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object of supplying the consumer demand of the market,” and the 

conspiracy consisted of “various acts of distribution at these several 

locations performed by numerous interrelated individuals”). And 

the scheme was replete with common players, as observed by law 

enforcement and video surveillance and supported by the defendants’ social media posts and text messages. See United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1327 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting the conspiracy’s 

“extensive overlap of the participants”). 

2. COMMON GOAL

Jerimaine Bryant disputes his pursuit of a common goal following his 2008 arrest and 2011 release from prison, based largely 

on the same argument discussed above—that he had moved out of 

South Gwen Cherry to a nearby trailer park where he purported to 

sell drugs independently. We reject his argument.

By all accounts, Jerimaine Bryant continued to frequent the

DSBF’s area and mingle with his co-defendants. And he supplanted 

Ms. Houser as Mr. Glass’ primary drug supplier. See D.E. 1207 at 

22–23, 185; D.E. 1213 at 16, 50–51. This critical role in the DSBF’s 

supply chain cemented his inclusion in the conspiracy after his 2011 

release from prison. 

3. MR. GRIMES’ CREDIBILITY

The same four defendants also assail the credibility of a cooperating witness, Mr. Grimes, characterizing his testimony as incredible, untrustworthy, and uncorroborated. As a general matter, 

“[w]e will not disturb the jury’s verdict [with respect to credibility] 

unless the testimony is incredible as a matter of law.” United States 

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v. Green, 818 F.3d 1258, 1274 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). That means that even “the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to support a conviction in the federal courts if it is not on its face incredible or otherwise unsubstantial.” United States v. Iacovetti, 466 F.2d 1147, 1153 

(5th Cir. 1972). See also Green, 818 F.3d at 1274 (testimony is not 

“incredible as a matter of law unless it is unbelievable on its face, 

that is, testimony as to facts that the witness could not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws 

of nature”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The defendants fail to satisfy this high bar as to Mr. Grimes. 

Mr. Rodriguez is Mr. Grimes’ most ardent challenger, and 

understandably so. Without some of Mr. Grimes’ testimony, the 

evidence plausibly supported a theory of defense that, for the most 

part, Mr. Rodriguez was an independent drug dealer who occasionally mingled with and dealt with DSBF members. Mr. Rodriguez 

points out that he is older and that he sold his own drugs, out of his 

own home, away from the South Gwen Cherry complex. By one 

account he occasionally sold drugs at South Gwen Cherry; by another he never did. Compare D.E. 1205 at 25 (Mr. Grimes) with D.E. 

1208 at 161 (Mr. Coakley). The government’s voluminous social 

media evidence contained some posts from Mr. Rodriguez declaring his allegiance to the DSBF or associating with other alleged 

members, but those posts were relatively few in number. See, e.g., 

Gov’t Exh. 315 at 114–15.

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Mr. Grimes, however, testified that Mr. Rodriguez oversaw 

DSBF initiations, used the DSBF handshake, and provided other 

members of the gang with guns. Mr. Coakley corroborated this in 

part, testifying that he saw Mr. Rodriguez “[s]ell drugs, supply 

guns, and supply dope.” D.E. 1207 at 66–68. Although Mr. Grimes’ 

testimony was not fully corroborated and the government’s direct 

examination involved some leading questions, see, e.g., D.E. 1205 

at 25, those matters went to credibility and weight, which were for 

the jury to assess. And no one argues, for example, that Mr. Grimes 

could not have possibly seen what he testified to. See Green, 818 

F.3d at 1274. The jury was therefore entitled to credit his testimony.

As for Mr. Ingram, Mr. Grimes identified him as a “bomb 

man” who retrieved the money from buyers, as well as a seller for 

the DSBF, and that testimony was echoed by Donzell Jones and 

Mr. Coakley. See D.E. 1202 at 75; D.E. 1205 at 20, 23, 25; D.E. 1206 

at 166; D.E. 1208 at 209–10. The government also introduced text 

messages of others inquiring of Mr. Ingram about drugs, as well as 

his drug convictions from the relevant timeframe (which included 

one where he was the subject of an undercover drug buy). See D.E. 

1202 at 111; D.E. 1211 at 121–23; D.E. 1212 at 208–09; D.E. 1215 at 

71–72; D.E. 1221 at 23; D.E. 1223 at 138; D.E. 1224 at 63. With or 

without Mr. Grimes’ testimony, sufficient evidence supported Mr. 

Ingram’s conviction on Count 2. 

4. THE FJDA

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Mr. Jones raises a final, unique challenge to his conviction 

on Count 2. He claims that for a large portion of the alleged conspiracy he was a juvenile under the FJDA, 18 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq.,

such that his actions during that period of time were delinquencies 

rather than felonies. Absent that conduct, he argues, his post-juvenile conduct cannot alone sustain his Count 2 conviction. 

Mr. Jones’ argument fails. When, as is the case here, the 

government has proven that there was one continuous conspiracy 

and the defendant’s membership in that conspiracy straddled his 

18th birthday, his juvenile acts can be “the sole basis for guilt.” 

Newton, 44 F.3d at 919 (citing Cruz, 805 F.2d at 1464). Mr. Jones 

participated in the alleged narcotics conspiracy after his 18th birthday by continuing to sell marijuana for Mr. Glass. See D.E. 1208 at 

207. See also D.E. 1220 at 55 (“Let me get two bags from dodo”);

D.E. 1221 at 18 (“Me either, but I rather FW the zone cause Dodo 

and Mullet got the loud dimes doe for $5. Weed gone live.”). So 

the jury could properly consider his juvenile conduct. See Cruz, 805 

F.2d at 1475–76. Mr. Jones’ conviction for Count 2 stands.28 

We affirm the convictions of Jerimaine Bryant and Messrs. 

Rodriguez, Ingram, and Jones on Count 2. 

28 Mr. Ingram, Mr. Graham, and Mr. Walker sought to adopt this particular

argument by Mr. Jones. But whether a defendant’s individual post-juvenile 

conduct can sustain a conviction for Count 2 is a fact-specific inquiry that requires independent briefing. See, e.g., United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 963 

n.13 (11th Cir. 1990). We therefore need not address the FDJA argument for 

these defendants.

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C. COUNT 10

Mr. Rodriguez challenges the sufficiency of evidence for his 

conviction on Count 10, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a 

drug trafficking crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He attempts to rely 

on Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 77–78 (holding that, to aid and abet the 

offense of using a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, the defendant must know beforehand that one of his co-defendants will 

carry a gun), to argue that he lacked the requisite advance 

knowledge of Mr. Ingram’s firearm possession. But that argument 

is a nonstarter. As the government correctly points out, Mr. Rodriguez was convicted of a substantive § 924(c) offense, and not of aiding and abetting someone else’s § 924(c) offense.

In addition, Mr. Rodriguez challenges the evidence that he 

possessed a firearm at all. See United States v. Woodard, 531 F.3d 

1352, 1362 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that, to prove a § 924(c) offense, 

the government must establish the defendant knowingly possessed 

a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime). As to his own 

possession, however, there is no sufficiency problem. Mr. Rodriguez admitted that the firearm found at the residence belonged to 

him. See Gov. Exh. 110 at 41 (“[The gun is] just for protection, bro. 

I, if I need it, I, I use it, yeah, I use it.”); D.E. 833-16 at 9, 29 (“[The 

gun] was mine.”). Accordingly, Mr. Rodriguez’s challenge to the 

§ 924(c) conviction fails.

D. COUNT 11

Mr. Graham and Curtis Bryant challenge their convictions 

on Count 11 for attempted possession of a controlled substance on 

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June 1, 2016, with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846. The indictment alleged that, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 

841(b)(1)(C), “this violation involved a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of . . . ‘crack cocaine.’” D.E. 193 at 16. 

The defendants argue that, because the evidence at trial showed 

only that the controlled buy constituting the charged conduct involved marijuana and not crack cocaine, they were entitled to a 

judgment of acquittal.

The government argues that the defendants’ argument is 

flawed because a conviction for an inchoate offense under § 846

may rest on any controlled substance. We agree. In United States 

v. Achey, 943 F.3d 909, 913–14 (11th Cir. 2019), we explained the 

interplay between § 841 and § 846. While § 841(a)(1) makes it a 

crime to intentionally distribute a controlled substance, § 846 

makes it a crime to conspire or attempt to violate § 841(a)(1), and 

§ 841(b)(1) merely provides the penalties for such inchoate violations. See id. 

To establish a conspiracy offense under § 846, the government need only prove that a defendant agreed to possess and distribute what he knew was a controlled substance. See id. “The 

specific type of drug involved is not an element of [a conspiracy 

offense under] § 841(a) but is instead ‘relevant only for sentencing 

purposes.’” Id. (citing United States v. Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899, 906 

(11th Cir. 1999)). 

We conclude that the same holds true for an attempt under 

§ 846, which like conspiracy is an inchoate offense. First, 

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impossibility is not a defense to an attempt offense under § 846. See 

United States v. Everett, 700 F.2d 900, 904 (3d Cir. 1983). Indeed, we 

have upheld a § 846 attempt conviction which was based on a transaction involving only sham cocaine. See United States v. McDowell, 

705 F.2d 426, 427–28 (11th Cir. 1983). Second, for inchoate § 846 

offenses like attempt and conspiracy, “the government need only 

prove that the defendant had knowledge that he was dealing with 

a controlled substance, not that he had knowledge of the specific 

controlled substance.” United States v. Woods, 210 F.3d 70, 77 (1st 

Cir. 2000) (conspiracy and attempt). 

Absent some sentencing issues that the defendants do not 

raise here, see, e.g., Achey, 943 F.3d at 914 n.5, the government did 

not have to prove mens rea as to a specific controlled substance at 

trial for the § 846 attempt charge. Consequently, there was sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Graham and Curtis Bryant on Count 

11. 

E. COUNT 22

Messrs. Rodriguez and Ingram attack their convictions on

Count 22, which charged them with possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute on May 9, 2017, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The evidence, however, was sufficient. 

To establish a violation of § 841(a)(1), the government has

to prove that the defendant “(1) knowingly (2) possessed [a controlled substance] (3) with intent to distribute it.” United States v. 

Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 453 (11th Cir. 1994). Such possession may be 

actual or constructive, and constructive possession requires a 

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showing that “a defendant maintained dominion or control over 

the drugs or over the premises where the drugs are located.” Id. 

Mr. Rodriguez argues that, without the evidence illegally 

seized from the residence he shared with Mr. Ingram on May 9, 

2017, the government had insufficient evidence to establish his constructive possession of the drugs found in the home’s safe. But we 

have already concluded that this evidence was not subject to suppression. The government therefore properly introduced the evidence it found in his shared home, including a copy of his birth 

certificate, a scale, and a safe containing bulk and individually-packaged drugs (crack cocaine and marijuana) and cash. There was also

his admission during his post-arrest interrogation that the drugs 

were his. This evidence soundly established his dominion over the 

place where the safe with the drugs was found, as well as his intent 

to distribute the drugs inside. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support Mr. Rodriguez’s conviction on Count 22.

The sufficiency challenge by Mr. Ingram fails for the same 

reasons. He attempted, and failed, to suppress the evidence seized 

from the shared residence. And that search also yielded a copy of 

Mr. Ingram’s birth certificate and Social Security card. Although 

Mr. Ingram denies that the drugs found in the safe were his, officers 

found him in possession of narcotics, and there was evidence (in 

the form of testimony and text messages) linking him to the sale of 

drugs. See, e.g., D.E. 1208 at 209–10 (Mr. Coakley: “I seen [Mr. Ingram] serve from Ike era to the time he got arrested. . . . [He] been 

serving for a long period of time . . . with [Mr. Rodriguez].”); D.E. 

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1205 at 162 (Mr. Grimes: “I don’t remember the time and the date, 

but I seen [Mr. Ingram selling drugs].”); D.E. 1218 at 49 (Mr. Rodriguez to Mr. Ingram: “What’s up with the loud for [Mr. Hayes].”). 

Consequently, a rational juror could have found Mr. Ingram guilty 

of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute

based on the drugs found in the shared residence. 

VIII. CUMULATIVE ERROR

As a final matter relating to the convictions, Jerimaine Bryant, Curtis Bryant, and Messrs. Rodriguez, Graham, Walker, and

Hayes contend that they are entitled to reversal of their convictions

based on the doctrine of cumulative error. They are not.

“The cumulative error doctrine provides that an aggregation 

of non-reversible errors (i.e., plain errors failing to necessitate reversal and harmless errors) can yield a denial of the constitutional 

right to a fair trial, which calls for reversal.” United States v. Baker, 

432 F.3d 1189, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Davis v. Washington, 

547 U.S. 813 (2006). “The harmlessness of cumulative error is determined by conducting the same inquiry as for individual error—

courts look to see whether the defendant’s substantial rights were 

affected.” Id. (citing United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th 

Cir. 1990) (en banc)). “The cumulative prejudicial effect of many 

errors may be greater than the sum of the prejudice caused by each 

individual error,” and we consider factors such as: (1) “the nature 

and number of the errors committed;” (2) “their interrelationship, 

if any, and combined effect;” (3) “how the district court dealt with 

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the errors as they arose (including the efficacy—or lack of efficacy—of any remedial efforts);” (4) “the strength of the government’s case[;]” and (5) “the length of trial.” Id. (citations omitted).

There are not, however, any guilt-phase errors to aggregate 

unrelated to the Count 1 RICO conspiracy charge. The district 

court’s wrongful sequestration of Ms. Bryant could have only been 

prejudicial for purposes of the RICO conspiracy, as she was going 

to dispute Mr. Coakley’s testimony that Mr. Glass murdered Mr. 

Johnson. See D.E. 193 at 6, 8 (indictment charging that the racketeering activity included murder). And the exclusion of Dr. de la 

Cruz also went to the Count 1 convictions. We are already setting 

aside the convictions on Count 1 due to the erroneous exclusion of 

Dr. de la Cruz. As for the possible errors in allowing improper Rule 

702 opinions by Sgt. Kelly and Agent Perez on a couple of terms, 

those opinions were far too insignificant to have any serious effect 

on defendants’ convictions.

IX. SENTENCING

Having concluded our review of the errors alleged by the 

defendants before and during trial, we reach the sentencing phase 

of the case. As a general matter, we review the application or interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and findings of 

fact for clear error. See United States v. Grant, 397 F.3d 1330, 1332 

(11th Cir. 2005).29

 

29 Before beginning our analysis, we note that at times the district court did 

not explicitly make specific factual findings that underpin its sentencing 

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A. BASE OFFENSE LEVEL FOR THE RICO CONSPIRACY

We start with Curtis Bryant and Jerimaine Bryant, who challenge the district court’s calculation of their base offense levels for 

their Count 1 RICO convictions. The base offense level for a RICO 

violation is 19 or “the offense level applicable to the underlying 

racketeering activity,” whichever is greater. See U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(a). 

Here, one of the underlying racketeering offenses was premeditated murder, see D.E. 193 at 6, 8, and the government proved the 

murders of Mr. Hallman and Mr. Johnson at trial. See D.E. 1205 at 

27–30; D.E. 1206 at 174–77; D.E. 1207 at 30–33, 165–68; D.E. 1213 

at 18–22, 43–49. Accordingly, for each defendant the district court 

calculated a base offense level of 43 based on the underlying predicate offense of murder, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1.30

The base offense level for Curtis Bryant stemmed from the 

murder of Mr. Hallman. He first argues that he did not commit 

murder because he was acting in defense of his associate, Anthony 

Nixon. Under Florida law, a person is justified in using deadly force 

if he reasonably believes that using such force “is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to . . . another[.]” Fla. 

decisions. This lack of specific findings is not fatal where, as here, “it is clear 

from the record what evidence the court credited in making” its sentencing 

decisions. See United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1293 (11th Cir. 2011).

30 We address the challenges to the Count 1 base offense level in case the murders of Mr. Hallman and Mr. Johnson are relevant to the resentencing of Curtis Bryant and Jerimaine Bryant and the government chooses not to retry 

Count 1.

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Stat. § 776.012(2) (2021). The determination of whether the force 

is justified is an “objective evaluation” of the conduct of the person 

“based on the circumstances as they appeared to [him] at the time 

of the altercation[.]” Bouie v. State, 292 So. 3d 471, 481 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2020). 

The district court’s determination that Curtis Bryant murdered Mr. Hallman is a finding of fact subject to clear error review. 

See United States v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 1531, 1535–36 (11th Cir. 1990) 

(district court’s finding that the defendant attempted to commit 

murder constituted a factual finding reviewed for clear error). Curtis Bryant cannot show that the district court’s finding constituted

clear error. The parties agree that shortly before Curtis Bryant shot 

him, Mr. Hallman had shot (and struck) Mr. Nixon, who was 15

years old at the time. But according to Ms. Houser, Curtis Bryant 

did not emerge from his house with a gun in his hand until after 

Mr. Hallman had shot Mr. Nixon and fled the scene. Consistent 

with this testimony, the medical examiner concluded that Mr. Hallman had been shot in the back. Jerimaine Bryant lauded Curtis 

Bryant for the shooting, and the following day Curtis Bryant himself bragged that Mr. Hallman “didn’t even see it coming.” D.E. 

1229 at 145. Given this evidence, the district court did not clearly 

err in finding for purposes of sentencing that Curtis Bryant had 

committed murder under Florida law.

Curtis Bryant next argues that he lacked premeditation 

when he killed Mr. Hallman. Under Florida law, premeditation 

may form “a moment before the act” so long as there is “a sufficient 

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length of time to permit reflection as to the nature of the act[.]” 

Preston v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 785 F.3d 449, 464 (11th Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Kocaker v. State, 119 So. 3d 1214, 1226 (Fla. 2013)). 

“Whether [a] defendant committed or attempted a murder with 

premeditation is a question of fact.” United States v. Henry, 106 F.4th 

763, 769 (8th Cir. 2024) (citation and internal quotation marks committed). The district court did not clearly err in finding that Curtis 

Bryant committed premediated murder by emerging from the 

house with his gun and shooting Mr. Hallman in the back while he 

was fleeing.

Jerimaine Bryant contends that the district court plainly 

erred in using U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1(a) to calculate his base offense level 

because he did not participate in a murder. It is well established, 

however, that a RICO conspirator may be held accountable for his 

co-conspirator’s actions if they were reasonably foreseeable and in 

furtherance of the conspiracy, even if he did not personally participate in those actions. See United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 

1297 (11th Cir. 2011). See also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (stating that 

when an offense involves “jointly undertaken criminal activity,” relevant conduct includes “all acts and omissions of others that were 

. . . in furtherance that criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable 

in connection with that criminal activity”). 

There is no claim by Jerimaine Bryant that Mr. Johnson’s

murder was not reasonably foreseeable or not in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. Given Mr. Grimes’ testimony that Jerimaine Bryant 

urged Mr. Glass to murder Mr. Johnson, the district court did not 

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plainly err in calculating Jerimaine Bryant’s base offense level for 

Count 1 under § 2A1.1(a). 

B. DRUG QUANTITY

Curtis Bryant and Messrs. Walker and Graham challenge, on 

several grounds, the district court’s sentencing determination that 

they were responsible for between 2.8 and 8.4 kilograms of crack 

cocaine. As explained below, we find no clear error in the district 

court’s drug quantity attribution. See United States v. Reeves, 742 

F.3d 487, 506 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that drug quantity attribution 

is subject to clear error review).31

 

The defendants’ base offense level for Count 2 under the 

Sentencing Guidelines rested on drug type and quantity. See 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c). Where, as here, the amount of drugs

seized did not reflect the scale of the narcotics offense, the district 

court had to estimate the quantity that was attributable. See Dixon, 

901 F.3d at 1349; U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.5. 

“In estimating the quantity, the [district] court may rely on 

evidence demonstrating the average frequency and amount of a 

defendant’s drug sales over a given period of time.” Reeves, 742 

F.3d at 506. “This determination may be based on fair, accurate, 

and conservative estimates of the drug quantity attributable to a 

31 Numerous other defendants attempt to adopt the challenges of Mr. Walker, 

Curtis Bryant, and Mr. Graham to the district court’s drug quantity attribution. But this is a fact-specific, individualized issue that cannot be adopted 

without independent briefing. See, e.g., Khoury, 901 F.2d at 963 n.13.

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defendant, but it cannot be based on calculations of drug quantities 

that are merely speculative.” Id. (alteration adopted) (quoting 

United Statesv. Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2012)). The 

government bears the burden of proving drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. 

The district court’s overall drug quantity finding was not 

clearly erroneous. At trial, the government presented evidence 

that the Count 2 narcotics conspiracy, as alleged in the indictment,

spanned from 2000 until 2017. Based on the testimony of Mr. 

Grimes and Mr. Coakley, the former DSBF members, the gang’s 

estimated daily drug sales ranged from 14 to 28 grams of crack cocaine from 2000 until 2010. After 2010, daily drug sales peaked at 

42 grams until mid-2013. Eventually, drug sales dwindled to seven

grams per week by 2016.

Taking the lowest estimated figures for daily sales based on 

this testimony, the DSBF sold at least five kilograms of crack cocaine per year from 2000 through mid-2013, and 364 grams per year 

in the less successful period that followed. And it sold the drugs 

out of a common location, the South Gwen Cherry complex, rendering the group’s total sales foreseeable to Curtis Bryant and

Messrs. Walker and Graham, all of whom participated in and were 

members of the drug conspiracy. On this record, the district 

court’s overall finding of between 2.8 and 8.4 kilograms of crack 

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cocaine did not constitute clear error. See Almedina, 686 F.3d at

1315.32

The defendants next challenge the district court’s calculation by focusing on the timing of their affiliation with the DSBF. 

We discuss each one separately. 

Reasonable foreseeability is not enough to attribute a quantity of drugs to a defendant who was a member of a narcotics conspiracy. In “the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity,” a 

defendant is responsible for “all acts and omissions of others that 

were (i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and (iii) reasonably 

foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 

1B1.3(a)(1)(B). See United States v. Reese, 67 F.3d 902, 907 (11th Cir. 

1995) (“[D]efendants are only accountable for other conduct that 

was reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to undertake.”).

Mr. Walker argues that his “involvement began with his arrest on January 30, 2015, and concluded with the return of the indictment on May 5, 2017,” such that he was only accountable for 

824 grams of crack cocaine. See M. Walker Reply Br. at 25. The 

government, however, established by a preponderance of the 

32 At 14 grams per day over 365 days, the estimated per-year sum from 2000 

through mid-2013 was 5.1 kilograms, or over 60 kilograms in total for that 

period. At seven grams per week over 52 weeks, the estimated per-year total 

from mid-2013 to 2017 was 364 grams, or over one kilogram in total. The 

district court’s calculation was well below these numbers. 

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evidence that Mr. Walker joined the conspiracy as early as July of 

2012, when he began self-identifying with the DSBF on social media. He downplays this self-identification as “innocuous expressions,” seeid. at 24, but outsiders were subject to violence for falsely 

claiming membership. And he cannot fault the district court’s consideration of the testimony from Mr. Coakley and Mr. Grimes, as 

it “was entitled to rely on the cooperators’ testimony.” Dixon, 901 

F.3d at 1349. 

Holding Mr. Walker accountable for at least 2.8 kilograms 

of crack cocaine was not clearly erroneous. During the first several 

years that he was associated with DSBF, a conservative estimate of 

the group’s total sales was over five kilograms per year. 

Curtis Bryant asserts that he should not be held accountable 

for crack cocaine sold during the three years he spent in prison after 

joining the DSBF in 2010. The evidence, however, showed that he 

joined the narcotics conspiracy as early as 2010 and, other than his 

self-serving assertion to the contrary, he provided no evidence to 

establish that he withdrew from the conspiracy when he went to 

prison. 

For purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant generally has the burden of proving his affirmative withdrawal from a 

conspiracy. See United States v. Young, 39 F.3d 1561, 1570 (11th Cir. 

1994) (discussing a defendant’s contention of withdrawal before the 

Sentencing Guidelines went into effect). “Neither arrest nor incarceration automatically triggers withdrawal from a conspiracy,” 

Richardson, 532 F.3d at 1285 n.1 (citation omitted), and the district 

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court explained as much: “The fact that [Curtis Bryant was] in jail 

doesn’t mean he’s not part of the conspiracy.” D.E. 1252 at 18. See

also United States v. Dabbs, 134 F.3d 1071, 1083 (11th Cir. 1998) 

(holding that a defendant was accountable at sentencing for losses 

within the scope of the conspiracy because he did not establish his 

withdrawal). 

In response, Curtis Bryant counters that the district court 

“never made individualized findings.” C. Bryant Reply Br. at 18. 

But it expressly overruled his objection, which mirrored the present argument on appeal, and found that the amount attributable 

to him was “conservatively estimated.” D.E. 1252 at 19, 27. We 

see no clear error in its finding. See United States v. $242,484.00, 389 

F.3d 1149, 1154 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“[W]e and other federal 

appellate courts have inferred from a district court’s explicit factual 

findings and conclusion implied factual findings that are consistent 

with its judgment although unstated.”).

Mr. Graham contends that his involvement spanned from 

2012 until 2017, and therefore he was only theoretically responsible 

for 2.4 kilograms of crack cocaine. This timespan, he posits, 

equated to 29% of the conspiracy’s duration, such that he should 

only be held responsible for 29% of the total amount the court attributed to him. His argument misses the mark. 

For starters, the DSBF’s yearly sales from 2012 to 2017 were 

variable and not static, so a raw, percentage-based calculation 

((time involved in the conspiracy ÷ the total length of the conspiracy) x total drug quantity) does not accurately represent the 

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amount sold over a given timeframe. And for at least the first year 

and a half of Mr. Graham’s professed involvement, the government 

established by a preponderance of the evidence that the sales exceeded five kilograms per year, easily satisfying the amount the district court attributed to him. The district court did not clearly err 

in finding Mr. Graham responsible for between 2.8 and 8.4 kilograms of crack cocaine. 

C. POSSESSION OF A FIREARM

Messrs. Walker and Graham contend that the district court 

erred in applying a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with a narcotics offense. See U.S.S.G. § 

2D1.1(b)(1). They argue, in part, that the enhancement should not 

apply because the evidence was insufficient to show that they personally possessed a firearm.33

 

33 Messrs. Walker and Graham note that the jury acquitted them of their substantive charges of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime, but acknowledge that, under our precedent, a district court may consider acquitted conduct in calculating their sentences. See United States v.

Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006). They nevertheless raise the 

issue to preserve it for appeal. Because “[o]ne panel of this Circuit cannot 

overrule another panel’s decision,” United States v. Rushin, 844 F.3d 933, 942 

(11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted), we reject the defendants’ acquitted-conduct 

argument. 

In closing, we note that the Sentencing Commission has enacted an amendment to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 that limits the use of “acquitted conduct” at sentencing. See U.S. Sentencing Commission Adopted Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Apr. 17, 2024). The amendment will go into effect on November 1, 2024, unless Congress disapproves it.

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1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level sentence 

enhancement “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was 

possessed[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The commentary for 

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) provides that “[t]he enhancement should be applied 

if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the 

weapon was connected with the offense.” § 2D1.1(b)(1), cmt. 

n.11(A). “We review ‘the district court’s findings of fact under § 

2D1.1(b)(1) for clear error, and the application of the Sentencing 

Guidelines to those facts de novo.’” United States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 

1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Gallo, 195 F.3d 

1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999)).

The government bears the initial burden of showing by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a firearm was present at the 

site of the charged conduct or that the defendant possessed a firearm during conduct related to the offense of conviction. See United 

States v. Stallings, 463 F.3d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 2006). Proximity 

between guns and drugs alone is sufficient for the government to 

meet that initial burden. See United States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 

82, 91–92 (11th Cir. 2013). If the government meets its initial burden, “the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant, who must 

demonstrate that a connection between the weapon and the offense was ‘clearly improbable.’” Stallings, 463 F.3d at 1220 (quoting 

United States v. Audain, 254 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001)). 

A firearm enhancement may also apply to a defendant when 

the firearm is possessed by a co-conspirator. See Pham, 463 F.3d at

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1245. In that situation, the government must show that “(1) the 

possessor of the firearm was a co-conspirator, (2) the possession 

was in furtherance of the conspiracy, (3) the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time of possession, and (4) the co-conspirator possession was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.” 

Id. 

2. MESSRS. WALKER AND GRAHAM

As to Mr. Walker, the evidence was sufficient to support the 

application of the firearm enhancement. Specifically, Sgt. Kelly testified that she and another officer observed Mr. Walker during a 

controlled drug buy in January of 2015. When one officer noticed 

Mr. Walker with a gun, the authorities moved in and a chase ensued, leading into an apartment where Sgt. Kelly saw Mr. Walker 

toss the gun into the kitchen sink before he was apprehended. A 

search of the apartment revealed a second gun, small bags of marijuana, and money. This apartment belonged to Mr. Walker’s 

grandmother, but it was where he was “staying.” D.E. 1203 at 97–

98, 101. 

Mr. Walker argues that Sgt. Kelly’s testimony is insufficient 

to show either that he possessed the firearm during the transaction 

or that he was the person who sold the drugs. But it is enough that 

the firearms were present at the site of the charged conduct. See 

Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 90. And Mr. Walker cannot show that it 

was “clearly improbable” that the firearms were connected to the 

drugs, which were in close proximity to each other. See id. See also 

United States v. Hall, 46 F.3d 62, 63–64 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming 

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application of a firearm enhancement where a handgun was found 

in the same room with other drug paraphernalia and cash).34

 

Turning to Mr. Graham, the district court explained at sentencing that it was applying the enhancement because firearms 

were used during the DSBF’s drug transactions at the South Gwen 

Cherry complex and, therefore, it was reasonably foreseeable to

Mr. Graham that his co-conspirators would possess firearms during 

those transactions. Mr. Graham, however, abandoned on appeal

any challenge to the application of the firearm enhancement on 

that ground. We therefore affirm the application of the enhancement. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680. 

But even putting abandonment aside, the record shows that 

Messrs. Graham and Walker communicated about drug trafficking 

activities and exchanging guns. Mr. Graham also was present at the 

controlled buy in January of 2015. The record therefore supports 

a finding that Mr. Walker’s firearm possession was reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Graham and part of the jointly-undertaken criminal 

activity. We therefore conclude that the district court did not 

clearly err in applying the firearm enhancement to Mr. Graham. 

D. USE OF VIOLENCE

34 Curtis Bryant purports to adopt Mr. Walker’s argument on this issue. But 

he cannot do so because the application of the firearm enhancement is a factspecific inquiry for a defendant, and therefore requires independent briefing. 

See, e.g., Khoury, 901 F.2d at 963 n.13.

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Jerimaine Bryant and Messrs. Walker, Graham, and Jones 

challenge the district court’s application of a two-level enhancement based on its findings that each defendant “used violence, 

made a credible threat to use violence, or directed the use of violence[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2). The district court applied the enhancement to each defendant based on separate violent threats or 

incidents. 

We review the district court’s findings of fact under the useof-violence enhancement for clear error and its application of the 

Sentencing Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Yuk, 885 F.3d 57, 

82 (2d Cir. 2018); Pham, 463 F.3d at 1245. We discuss each defendant 

and his respective incident of violence.35

The district court applied the use-of-violence enhancement 

to Jerimaine Bryant because he struck a community member in the 

head with a boot for speaking with the police. Bryant does not 

contend that the district court clearly erred in basing the enhancement on this incident. Instead, he focuses on his lack of 

35 Curtis Bryant attempts to adopt Mr. Walker’s argument on this issue. But 

whether a defendant used violence is an individualized factual inquiry that depends on his conduct. Curtis Bryant therefore cannot simply adopt Mr. 

Walker’s argument on this point. See, e.g., Khoury, 901 F.2d at 963 n.13. Cf. 

United States v. Cooper, 203 F.3d 1279, 1285 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments are “too individualized to be generally 

adopted”). This is especially so where, as here, the district court applied the 

enhancements to each defendant based on separate violent incidents. Compare 

D.E. 1246 at 19 (applying the enhancement to Mr. Walker based on social media activity), with D.E. 1252 at 23–26 (applying the enhancement to Curtis Bryant based on his participation in a murder). 

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participation in other violent acts. This argument is insufficient to 

disturb the district court’s determination. A single incident of violence is enough. See United States v. Barronette, 46 F.4th 177, 209 (4th 

Cir. 2022) (affirming the application of the use-of-violence enhancement based on a threat to hit a person in the head). 

With respect to Mr. Walker, the district court applied the 

use-of-violence enhancement after considering social media evidence. Following an incident where some rivals “tr[ie]d to jump 

[another DSBF member],” Mr. Walker posted a request for a “[gun] 

we can use to spook them n** **s out with we know [where] they 

be at.” Gov’t Exh. 317 at BSN 7865; D.E. 1246 at 19–20. The district 

court determined that Mr. Walker’s request for a firearm to 

“spook” others was a credible threat of violence sufficient to satisfy 

§ 2D1.1(b)(2). This finding was not clearly erroneous. See United 

States v. Sykes, 854 F.3d 457, 460–61 (8th Cir. 2017) (upholding the 

application of the use-of-violence enhancement based on a defendant’s statement to a confidential source that he would find and kill 

the thief who stole drugs from him). 

For Mr. Graham, the district court applied the use-of-violence enhancement based on testimony from Mr. Coakley that he 

and Mr. Graham robbed a Metro PCS store together and that Mr. 

Graham was the one brandishing a firearm. See D.E. 1250 at 5–6. 

Mr. Graham argues that Mr. Coakley’s testimony regarding the 

robbery was unreliable because he initially told the authorities that 

they rode bikes to the Metro PCS store, whereas at trial he testified 

that they drove to the store in a car. According to Mr. Graham, this 

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inconsistency shows that the government failed to prove that he 

robbed the store by a preponderance of evidence.

We reject Mr. Graham’s argument. The district court could 

have disbelieved Mr. Coakley about Mr. Graham’s brandishing of 

the gun, but it was not required to. Moreover, Mr. Graham could 

have brought a gun to the robbery regardless of how he and Mr. 

Coakley traveled to get to the Metro PCS store. Because we defer 

to the district court’s credibility determinations, this inconsistency 

is not enough to render its finding clearly erroneous. See United 

States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 

fact finder personally observes the testimony and is thus in a better 

position than a reviewing court to assess the credibility of witnesses.”).

The district court applied the use-of-violence enhancement 

to Mr. Jones based on his involvement in the narcotics conspiracy;

it found that he was “on notice that this was a violent group” and 

worked together with others who robbed a rival drug dealer. See 

D.E. 1260 at 15–16, 25–26. The government concedes that Mr. 

Jones did not personally use violence or make threats but contends 

that the fact that the co-conspirators brought the spoils of the robbery to Mr. Jones supports an inference that he directed or encouraged their violence. We disagree with the government. 

The Sentencing Guidelines allow for the application of an 

enhancement based on the actions of a defendant’s co-conspirators

if those acts are reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of 

jointly-undertaken criminal activity, but only “in the absence of 

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more explicit instructions in the context of a specific guideline[.]” 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. background. The language of the use-of-violence enhancement provides the required explicit instructions 

here by framing the inquiry on whether “the defendant used violence, made a credible threat to use violence, or directed the use of 

violence[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2) (emphasis added). Unlike other 

guideline provisions, § 2D1.1(b)(2) does not ask whether “violence 

was used” or whether “the offense involved violence.”36 

Based on the language of § 2D1.1(b)(2), we must focus on 

Mr. Jones’ own conduct. Absent any use or threatened use of violence by Mr. Jones, or his directing the use of violence, the district 

court could not base this enhancement on the actions of co-conspirators. See United States v. Hernandez-Barajas, 71 F.4th 1104, 

1107–08 (8th Cir. 2023) (holding that directing the use of violence 

requires that the violence be a “reasonably foreseeable” consequence of the defendant’s affirmative acts, and compiling cases to 

that effect). 

The evidence was insufficient to sustain the use-of-violence

enhancement as to Mr. Jones. All we have is the government’s bare 

assertion that the delivery of the drugs to Mr. Jones, without more, 

evinced his direction of the violence. Although the presentence 

investigation report stated that Mr. Jones was known as “the weed 

man” and that he was involved in resale of the drugs after the 

36 A number of other enhancements in the Sentencing Guidelines focus on the 

offense and not the defendant’s own actions. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. §§ 2A3.2(c), 

2B1.1(b)(11), 2D1.1(b)(1), 2H2.1(a)(1).

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robbers delivered the marijuana, see D.E. 868 ¶¶ 67, 80 & D.E. 1213 

at 36, his role as a seller of stolen narcotics does not alone serve as 

an open invitation for others to bring him the proceeds of their violent conduct. Without some evidence of such an arrangement, 

this is an evidentiary bridge too far. That is to say, the use-of-violence by others was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 

Mr. Jones’ own acts. See Hernandez-Barajas, 71 F.4th at 1107–08. We 

therefore conclude that the district court clearly erred in its application of the two-level use-of-violence enhancement to Mr. Jones. 

We vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. 

E. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Jerimaine Bryant and Mr. Hayes challenge the district court’s 

imposition of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. 

“Whether the district court properly applied the obstruction of justice enhancement is a mixed question of law and fact.” United 

States v. Johnson, 980 F.3d 1364, 1374 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). 

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice if “(1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the 

obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense[.]” 

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The enhancement is appropriate when a defendant “threaten[s], intimidat[es], or otherwise unlawfully influenc[es] 

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a co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempt[s] 

to do so[.]” § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(A). 

1. JERIMAINE BRYANT

We begin with Jerimaine Bryant. According to the presentence investigation report, in November of 2010 he struck a witness, Shakita Frank, “in retaliation for her cooperation with the law 

enforcement investigation.” D.E. 915 ¶ 27.37 

Jerimaine Bryant argues that, looking to the four corners of 

the report, there was no evidence that his alleged conduct curtailed 

or frustrated Ms. Frank’s cooperation with the authorities. He further says that “[t]he cooperation had already occurred and there 

[was] no evidence that it hindered or was designed to hinder future 

cooperation since Ms. Frank did not testify at trial or at sentencing 

as to the veracity of this 2010 allegation.” J. Bryant’s Br. at 42. 

This argument fails. After all, § 3C1.1(1) includes an “attempt[ ]” to obstruct or impede. So the fact that the attack on Ms. 

Frank did not have its desired effect did not preclude application of 

the enhancement. See United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1330–

32 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding enhancement for attempted witness 

intimidation); United States v. Fleming, 667 F.3d 1098, 1110–11 (10th 

Cir. 2011) (“[H]is request that Michelle tell Ms. Scott ‘not to be 

37 During trial, Ms. Houser testified as follows: “Q: What did you talk to 

Quincy about? A: I asked him why Jerimaine beat [Ms. Frank] with a [Timberland] boot. He said she talk too fucking much, and she was trying to talk 

to the First 48. . . . Q: What is First 48, when you say that? A: The homicide

detectives.” D.E. 1213 at 51–52. 

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talking to anybody about this shit’ constituted an attempt to 

threaten or influence Ms. Scott and satisfied the substantial step requirement.”).

2. MR. HAYES

Next, we consider Mr. Hayes’ obstruction-of-justice enhancement. According to the presentence investigation report, in 

February of 2017 Mr. Hayes physically assaulted Donzell Jones at 

the Federal Detention Center in Miami because of the latter’s cooperation with the government. See D.E. 868 ¶ 81. Mr. Jones testified about this incident at trial, explaining that following the incident he did not cooperate any further. D.E. 1114 at 46. 

Mr. Hayes argues that Mr. Jones’ testimony was Rule 404(b) 

“other act” evidence that was never noticed by the government,

was not relevant to the issues raised in the indictment, and was 

therefore inadmissible. But “it’s well established that [i]n determining the relevant facts, sentencing [courts] are not restricted to information that would be admissible at trial.” United States v. Baptiste, 935 F.3d 1304, 1315 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We have explained in similar circumstances 

that otherwise inadmissible evidence “is fair game” as part of a district court’s sentencing calculus “provided that the information has 

sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Id. 

(quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3). 

Significantly, Mr. Hayes does not challenge the reliability of 

Mr. Jones’ testimony. The closest he comes is his assertion that the 

“tussle” was a “mere coincidence” when compared to the timing 

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of Mr. Jones’ cooperation. See S. Hayes Br. at 51. But this simply 

challenges the inferences that can be drawn from the evidence, and 

not the reliability of the testimony itself. Indeed, Mr. Hayes notes 

in his reply brief that “the present record . . . allows an inference 

based on the pure coincidence that [Mr.] Hayes and [Mr.] Jones 

fought at a time subsequent to [Mr.] Jones’[ ] decision to cooperate.” This does not bear on reliability. 

The district court did not err in applying the obstruction enhancement to Mr. Hayes based on his assault of Donzell Jones. 

F. DISPARATE SENTENCES

Mr. Graham argues that the district court acted unreasonably in sentencing him to imprisonment for 60 more months than 

Mr. Ingram for similar crimes. According to Mr. Graham, Mr. Ingram received a lighter sentence despite playing a larger role in the 

drug conspiracy, participating in the conspiracy for a longer time, 

and having a prior criminal record.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence (both procedurally and substantively) for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 56 (2007). At sentencing, district courts must 

consider, among other things, “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 

been found guilty of similar conduct[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (emphasis added). But “[d]isparity between the sentences imposed on 

codefendants is generally not an appropriate basis for relief on appeal.” United States v. Regueiro, 240 F.3d 1321, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 

2001). And defendants convicted of different offenses, or subject to 

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different advisory guideline ranges, are not “similarly situated” for 

the purpose of considering sentencing disparities. See United States 

v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1048 (11th Cir. 2015).

Messrs. Ingram and Graham were not “similarly situated” 

defendants for purposes of sentencing. Mr. Ingram was found 

guilty of two drug-related charges and acquitted of the RICO conspiracy charge, whereas Mr. Graham was found guilty of two drugrelated charges and the RICO conspiracy charge. See D.E. 735; D.E. 

732. Mr. Graham also received a use-of-violence enhancement that 

Mr. Ingram did not. As a result, Mr. Graham had an advisory guidelines range of 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment, compared to a 

range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment for Mr. Ingram. Both 

received below-guidelines sentences—228 months for Mr. Graham 

and 168 months for Mr. Ingram. 

In short, Mr. Graham was found guilty of a more serious 

crime, and received an additional enhancement, and as a result he 

received a longer sentence. See Azmat, 805 F.3d at 1048 (“Defendants convicted of more crimes or more serious offenses naturally 

receive longer prison sentences[.]”). Given their different convictions and circumstances, we cannot say that the district court 

abused its discretion in sentencing Mr. Graham to 60 more months 

than Mr. Ingram. 

G. THE LIFE IMPRISONMENT SENTENCES OF MR. GLASS AND 

JERIMAINE BRYANT

Mr. Glass and Jerimaine Bryant argue challenge their life imprisonment sentences on various grounds. Because both 

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defendants were convicted of the Count 1 RICO conspiracy 

charge, and because we have set aside the Count 1 convictions and 

sentences, we do not address the life imprisonment sentences.

X. CONCLUSION

We set aside the convictions and sentences of Jerimaine Bryant, Curtis Bryant, Mr. Graham, Mr. Walker, Mr. Hayes, and Mr. 

Glass on the Count 1 RICO conspiracy charge, and remand for a 

new trial if the government chooses to retry these six defendants. 

If the government does not wish to retry the defendants on Count 

1, the district court will need to resentence them. 

We also vacate Mr. Jones’ sentence due to the improper application of the use-of-violence enhancement and remand for resentencing. 

In all other respects, we affirm the defendants’ convictions 

and sentences. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

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19-10332 BRASHER, J., Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part 1

BRASHER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur with almost all the majority opinion, but I dissent 

from Part V and its necessary implications for other portions of the 

opinion. The majority concludes in Part V that the district court 

abused its discretion by excluding defense expert Dr. de la Cruz’s 

testimony. I disagree. 

The government charged the defendants with a conspiracy 

to commit racketeering through “any enterprise” engaged in or affecting interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Dr. de la Cruz 

proposed to testify that he had “studied a criminal enterprise, what 

it does, how it works, [and that the defendants’ conduct] does not 

equal this”; the defendants argued that “regardless of the labeling 

one way or another . . . that is the crux of the testimony which 

should go to the jury.” The district court explained that a problem 

with this proposed testimony was “his criteria” in making his assessment: “that [enterprises] don’t have rules, that they don’t do 

this, that real . . . criminal enterprises don’t shoot themselves.” 

Without citing any specific portion of Fed. R. Evid. 702, the district 

court surmised: “I certainly don’t think it is the subject of expert 

testimony[.]” 

I think the district court was right. Dr. de la Cruz didn’t take 

the legal definition of “enterprise” as a given and discuss how that 

definition applied to the facts of this case; he made up his own legal 

definition of enterprise and planned to tell the jury to apply that 

definition. The district court was correct in excluding Dr. de la 

Cruz’s testimony, because an expert “‘may not testify to the legal 

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2 BRASHER, J., Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part 19-10332

implications of conduct.’” Commodores Entm’t Corp. v. McClary, 879 

F.3d 1114, 1128 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. 

& Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990)). Instead, the court 

must be the jury’s only source of law. Montgomery, 898 F.2d at 1541. 

When an expert witness offers legal conclusions, he “invade[s] the 

court’s exclusive prerogative” and “risk[s] confusing” the jury. 

Commodores, 879 F.3d at 1129. So, a district court must take “adequate steps to protect against the danger that [an] expert’s opinion 

would be accepted as a legal conclusion.” Id. (quoting United States 

v. Herring, 955 F.2d 703, 709 (11th Cir. 1992)). 

Dr. de la Cruz’s proffered testimony was fraught with legal 

opinions about what makes an “enterprise.” The “crux” of his proposed testimony was his “criteria” for assessing whether a group is 

a criminal enterprise, which differ from the actual legal definition 

of the term. Specifically, he laid out “universal” characteristics of a 

“criminal enterprise” and then applied those idiosyncratic criteria 

to the question of whether the “people in this case constitute a 

criminal enterprise[.]” For instance, he testified that criminal enterprises “all have a leader,” “all commit crimes for the benefit of the 

organization,” “don’t allow [members] to use drugs” because “you 

can’t make money for the organization if you’re smoking it up,” 

and universally do not permit members to “assault or kill an individual from [their own] organization . . . without permission[.]”

When explaining why he thought no such enterprise existed “in 

this case,” he testified that the defendants had “no leadership direction,” and that criminal enterprises have “certain rules” including 

that “you don’t use the drugs that you sell for the organization[.]” 

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19-10332 BRASHER, J., Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part 3

A juror could reasonably construe Dr. de la Cruz’s testimony as 

providing definitional criteria for a RICO enterprise—indeed, there 

is no other way to understand it. 

The problem is that the definition of a RICO enterprise 

within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) is a question of law. See 

generally Ruiz v. United States AG, 73 F.4th 852, 855–56 (11th Cir. 

2023) (an argument “about the meaning of a statutory . . . provision 

[ ] presents a quintessential question of law.” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Chinchilla, 987 F.3d 

1303, 1306 (11th Cir. 2021) (“The interpretation of a criminal statute is a legal question we review de novo.”). And as the majority 

indicates, the Supreme Court has spoken on that legal question by 

setting out “structural features” of a RICO association-in-fact enterprise: “a purpose, relationships among those associated with the 

enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to 

pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 

946 (2009). By setting out his own “universal” structural features of 

an enterprise—e.g., leadership, crimes committed for the organization’s benefit, rules against using drugs meant to be sold—Dr. de la 

Cruz’s testimony would have risked confusing the jury over the 

meaning of a statutory term and invaded the district court’s exclusive prerogative to state the law. See Commodores, 879 F.3d at 1129. 

The majority says that Dr. de la Cruz’s testimony was not 

improper legal testimony by pointing to the Third Circuit’s proposition that the “existence vel non of a RICO enterprise is a question 

of fact for the jury.” United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 

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4 BRASHER, J., Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part 19-10332

1993). This proposition is true, the majority emphasizes, even 

though a RICO enterprise has a legal definition. I don’t disagree. 

But Dr. de la Cruz did not testify only as to whether a RICO enterprise existed. Nor was he asked whether the defendants exhibited 

the structural RICO enterprise features the Supreme Court set out 

in Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946. Instead, as explained above, he spent the 

bulk of his testimony providing his own legal definition of “enterprise” by presenting his own set of structural features that are supposedly “universal” to criminal enterprises. In other words, his testimony was improper legal opinion because its crux was to provide 

the jury his own idiosyncratic definition of a statutory term. 

In any event, I can’t say the district court abused its discretion in excluding this testimony. “The abuse of discretion standard 

allows for a range of choice, and that means that sometimes we 

will affirm even though we might have decided the matter differently in the first instance.” Doe v. Rollins Coll., 77 F.4th 1340, 1347 

(11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1056 (2024). Because Dr. de 

la Cruz’s testimony offered improper legal opinions on the standard to evaluate whether a RICO enterprise exists, the district court 

reasonably prevented him from testifying. See Commodores, 879 

F.3d at 1128–29. So I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part 

from the majority opinion. 

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