Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01077/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Orient Express Railway Company, LLC
Petitioner
V. M. Speakman
Intervenor
Surface Transportation Board
Respondent
United States of America
Respondent
United Transportation Union
Intervenor

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 26, 2007 Decided April 20, 2007

No. 06-1077

AMERICAN ORIENT EXPRESS RAILWAY COMPANY, LLC,

PETITIONER

v.

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENTS

UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION AND

V. M. SPEAKMAN,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

06-1080

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Surface Transportation Board

Robert Bergen argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner American Orient Express Railway Company, LLC.

Lawrence R. Liebesman and Paul J. Kiernan entered

appearances.

USCA Case #06-1077 Document #1035650 Filed: 04/20/2007 Page 1 of 8
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Gordon P. MacDougall argued the cause and filed the briefs

for petitioner United Transportation Union-General Committee

of Adjustment.

Craig M. Keats, Deputy General Counsel, Surface

Transportation Board, argued the cause for respondent. With

him on the brief were Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney

General, U.S. Department of Justice, and Robert B. Nicholson

and John P. Fonte, Attorneys, Ellen D. Hanson, General

Counsel, Surface Transportation Board, and Jamie Palter

Rennert and Jamellah Ellis, Attorneys.

Daniel R. Elliott III was on the brief for intervenor United

Transportation Union.

No. 06-1203

AMERICAN ORIENT EXPRESS RAILWAY COMPANY, LLC,

PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of a decision of the

Railroad Retirement Board

Robert Bergen argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner. Paul J. Kiernan entered an appearance.

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 Although the Orient Express sold its assets, the case is not

moot because the company’s liability for contributions remains at

issue.

Rachel L. Simmons, General Attorney, Railroad Retirement

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief

was Steven A. Bartholow, Deputy General Counsel.

Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: The American Orient Express

Railway Company markets and sells vacations aboard vintage

railcars. The issue in these petitions for judicial review is

whether the Orient Express is a “rail carrier,” and thus a covered

employer liable for contributions under the Railroad Retirement

Act, 45 U.S.C. § 231 et seq., and the Railroad Unemployment

Insurance Act, id. § 351 et seq.1

Vacations on the Orient Express feature luxury train

accommodations, fine dining, and activities such as excursions

at intermediate stops, lectures, and live music. The Orient

Express company owns the railcars and employs onboard

service workers, including chefs, waiters, bartenders, tour

leaders, and cabin attendants. To move its railcars, the company

contracts with Amtrak, which provides locomotives and engine

crews and makes arrangements with third parties who own and

operate railroad tracks. 

The Railroad Retirement Board initiated proceedings to

determine whether the Orient Express was liable for

contributions under the Railroad Retirement Act and the

Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. Under those statutes,

a covered employer includes, essentially, any carrier by railroad

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subject to the jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board.

See 45 U.S.C. §§ 231(a)(1), 351(a)-(b). At the request of the

Orient Express, the Retirement Board stayed its proceedings to

allow the company to obtain a declaratory order from the

Surface Transportation Board. The Transportation Board issued

a declaratory order stating the company was subject to its

jurisdiction. STB Finance Docket No. 34502 (Dec. 27, 2005)

(STB Order). The Retirement Board then issued an order

agreeing with the Transportation Board and holding the

company liable for contributions. B.C.D. 06-15 (Apr. 18, 2006)

(RRB Order). 

The Orient Express claims it is not subject to the

jurisdiction of the Transportation Board because it neither owns

nor operates a railroad. Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the

Transportation Board has jurisdiction over “transportation by

rail carrier that is . . . by railroad.” 49 U.S.C. § 10501(a)(1). A

rail carrier is “a person providing common carrier railroad

transportation for compensation.” Id. § 10102(5).

The Transportation Board ruled that the Orient Express

provides “transportation.” The company does not dispute that

ruling. But the company denies that it provides “railroad

transportation,” arguing that it is not a “railroad” because it does

not own tracks, see 49 U.S.C. § 10102(6), and therefore cannot

provide “railroad transportation.” The argument not only defies

common sense – if the Orient Express is not providing railroad

transportation, what kind of transportation is it providing? – but

also confuses the use of “railroad” as a noun with its use as an

adjective in § 10102(5). A “rail carrier” may own tracks and

transport passengers along its tracks, but that is not the only way

to provide “railroad transportation.” A rail carrier may instead

use tracks owned by another entity and “operated under an

agreement,” 49 U.S.C. § 10102(6)(B), which is how the

Transportation Board viewed the Orient Express. STB Order at

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 That the Orient Express does not operate its own

locomotives and relies on Amtrak for motive power is of no

consequence. Nothing in the definition of railroad “transportation”

suggests the carrier must use its own locomotives. The Interstate

Commerce Act defines “transportation” to include either “a

locomotive” or a “car . . . related to the movement of passengers.” 49

U.S.C. § 10102(9)(A).

4. Given our respect for the Transportation Board’s judgment

in these matters, see Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Surface Transp. Bd.,

162 F.3d 101, 104, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1998), we see no basis for

upsetting its determination of what constitutes tracks “operated

under an agreement.”2

The Transportation Board next determined that the Orient

Express was a common carrier because it “holds itself out to the

general public as engaged in the business of transporting

persons.” STB Order at 4. The Orient Express argues that a

common carrier is instead one who provides a service meeting

“a specific and provable public need” that “cannot . . . be met on

a commercially reasonable basis” without “a virtual monopoly

or . . . franchise,” in return for which the carrier accepts

additional duties. Although the Interstate Commerce Act does

not define “common carrier,” the Transportation Board’s

definition is the standard one. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v.

FERC, 660 F.2d 668, 674 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Under common law,

a common carrier is one who holds himself out as engaged in the

business of providing a particular service to the public.”);

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (8th ed. 2004). The Orient

Express makes the mistake of treating the description of some

common carriers as a definition of all common carriers. The law

imposes upon some common carriers duties such as

nondiscrimination and the use of utmost care, and it requires

some providers, especially monopolies, to behave as common

carriers if their services are essential. Nevertheless, the term

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“common carrier” describes not the legal obligations of a

company but how the company does business. To be a common

carrier, a company need only, in practice, serve the public

indiscriminately and not “make individualized decisions, in

particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal.” Nat’l

Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641

(D.C. Cir. 1975) (NARUC); see also Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy,

457 F.3d 78, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

The Orient Express operates as a common carrier. It

distributes to the public brochures advertising specific prices for

its vacation packages. Its 2004 brochure, for instance, offered

an eight-day trip exploring the Pacific Coast at a per-person rate

of $ 3,190 for “Vintage Pullman” cabin accommodations and

$ 5,290 for “Presidential Suite” accommodations. There is no

indication the Orient Express makes customer-by-customer

decisions about whether it will deal. True enough, the company

excludes children under the age of eight and has not made its

cars accessible to the mobility-impaired. The company also

notes that not every member of the public can afford its

vacations. But to hold oneself out to the public “does not mean

a given carrier’s services must practically be available to the

entire public.” NARUC, 525 F.2d at 641. “One may be a

common carrier though the nature of the service rendered is

sufficiently specialized as to be of possible use to only a fraction

of the total population. And business may be turned away either

because it is not of the type normally accepted or because the

carrier’s capacity has been exhausted.” Id.

The Surface Transportation Board reasonably concluded it

had jurisdiction over the Orient Express, see Ass’n of Am. R.Rs.,

162 F.3d at 104, and we therefore deny the company’s petition

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 In a consolidated case (No. 06-1080), petitioner General

Committee of Adjustment 386 of the United Transportation Union

contends the Transportation Board lacked power to issue the

declaratory order. This court only has jurisdiction over petitions filed

by a “party aggrieved” by a final order. 28 U.S.C. § 2344. A party

challenging an agency’s authority to act is not “aggrieved” if the

agency disposition was in its favor. See City of Cleveland v. U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 68 F.3d 1361, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

The Committee does not claim this particular order harmed it or its

members in any way. We therefore dismiss the Committee’s petition

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

for review in No. 06-1077.3

This brings us to the petition for review of the Railroad

Retirement Board’s order (No. 06-1203). The Retirement Board

summarized and agreed with the Transportation Board’s

determination that the Orient Express was subject to the

Transportation Board’s jurisdiction. The company contends the

Retirement Board evaded its responsibility when it deferred to

the Transportation Board’s decision without analysis. The

company’s description of what occurred is not accurate. The

Retirement Board noted that it “should carefully weigh a

decision by the [Transportation Board]” and “accept the

[Transportation Board’s] conclusion for purposes of

coverage . . . if it accords with the evidence before us as well.”

RRB Order at 3-4. After stating this, the Retirement Board

provided a detailed summary of the Transportation Board’s

decision and correctly found that “the conclusion . . . is clearly

supported on each issue by the evidence before the Board itself

as well.” RRB Order at 5. That the Retirement Board reached

the same conclusion about the Orient Express as the

Transportation Board shows only that the company’s arguments

were not well-conceived.

The Railroad Retirement Board reasonably determined the

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Surface Transportation Board had jurisdiction over the Orient

Express. See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 749

F.2d 856, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The company’s petition in

No. 06-1203 is therefore denied.

So ordered.

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