Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-16-55977/USCOURTS-ca9-16-55977-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Conference of Chief Justices
Amicus Curiae
Courthouse News Service
Appellee
Michael D. Planet
Appellant
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
Amicus Curiae

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE,

Plaintiff-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL D. PLANET, in his official 

capacity as Court Executive 

Officer/Clerk of the Ventura 

County Superior Court,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 16-55977

16-56714

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-08083-

SJO-FFM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 28, 2018

Pasadena, California

Filed January 17, 2020

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, N. Randy Smith,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw;

Concurrence by Judge N.R. Smith

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2 COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the 

district court’s summary judgment in favor of the 

Courthouse News Service in its action seeking immediate 

access to newly filed civil complaints from Ventura County 

Superior Court.

Prior to 2014, Ventura County had a “no-access-beforeprocess” policy pertaining to new civil complaints which 

often resulted in significant delays between the filing of a 

complaint and its availability to Courthouse News Service. 

After this suit was filed, the County dropped the no-accessbefore-process policy and instituted a “scanning policy,”

which requires court staff to scan new civil complaints 

before reviewing or processing them. After scanning, the 

complaints are available on public computer terminals in the 

Ventura County clerk’s office. Prior to July 2016, 

complaints filed after 3:00 PM were scanned and made 

publicly available the next day. The district court concluded 

that both Ventura County’s no-access-before-process policy 

and its scanning policy unconstitutionally infringed 

Courthouse News Service’s right to timely access the 

complaints. 

Applying Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court

(Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986), the panel held that 

the press has a qualified right of timely access to newly filed 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET 3

civil nonconfidential complaints that attaches when the 

complaint is filed. However, this right does not entitle the 

press to immediate access to those complaints. Some 

reasonable restrictions resembling time, place, and manner 

regulations that result in incidental delays in access are 

constitutionally permitted where they are content-neutral, 

narrowly tailored and necessary to preserve the court’s 

important interest in the fair and orderly administration of 

justice. 

The panel held that although Ventura County has a 

substantial interest in the orderly administration and 

processing of new complaints, its former no-access-beforeprocess policy failed, under a rigorous but not strict scrutiny 

analysis, both prongs of the balancing test set forth in PressEnterprise II. Thus, Ventura County had not shown a 

“substantial probability” that more contemporaneous access 

to the newly filed complaints would impair its interest in 

orderly administration. In fact, the record demonstrated that 

the lengthy delays under the no-access-before-process 

policy were entirely unrelated to Ventura County’s asserted 

governmental interests. Moreover, the policy caused far 

greater delays than were necessary to adequately protect 

Ventura County’s administrative interests given the 

reasonable alternatives available. The panel affirmed the 

district court’s summary judgment as to the no-access-before 

process policy. 

The panel held that Ventura County’s scanning policy 

passed constitutional scrutiny. The panel determined that 

there was a substantial probability that Ventura County’s 

interest in the fair and orderly administration of new judicial 

filings would be impaired if the scanning policy was not in 

place. Moreover, unlike with the no-access-before-process 

policy, there was nothing in the record to indicate that 

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4 COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET

Ventura County considered but rejected reasonable 

alternatives to the scanning policy. Additionally, the panel 

noted that prior to 2014, Ventura County was undergoing 

severe budget constraints, and it had demonstrated that the 

overnight delay in access to complaints filed during the last 

ninety minutes of the court’s public hours was no greater 

than essential to manage necessary court operations under 

the circumstances existing at the time. The panel therefore 

reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as 

to the scanning policy, vacated the district court’s injunction 

and award of fees, and remanded for further consideration 

consistent with the panel’s opinion. 

Concurring as to part III of the opinion, Judge N.R. 

Smith stated that the majority correctly determined that 

Ventura County’s access policies resembled time, place, and 

manner restrictions—they were content-neutral and affected 

only the timing of access to the newly filed complaints. 

However, Judge N.R. Smith stated that rather than adopt the 

time, place, and manner test, the majority applied a strict 

scrutiny analysis which Supreme Court precedent does not 

require. 

COUNSEL

Robert A. Naeve (argued), Craig E. Stewart, Erica L. 

Reilley, and Jaclyn B. Stahl, Jones Day, Irvine, California; 

Frederick B. Hayes, Hayes Law Office, Hermosa Beach, 

California; for Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Rachel Matteo-Boehm (argued), Roger Myers, Jonathan 

Fetterly, and Leila Knox, Bryan Cave LLP, San Francisco, 

California, for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

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COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET 5

Caitlin Vogus (argued), Bruce D. Brown, and Selina 

MacLaren, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 

Press, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae The Reporters 

Committee for Freedom of the Press.

John C. Eastman, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, 

Chapman University Fowler School of Law, Orange, 

California; Keith R. Fisher, National Center for State Courts, 

Arlington, Virginia; for Amicus Curiae Conference of Chief 

Justices.

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

“The peculiar value of news is in the spreading of it while 

it is fresh.” Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 

215, 235 (1918), abrogated on other grounds by Erie R.R. 

Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This case pits the 

urgency of reporting on, and the public interest in obtaining, 

contemporaneous news about filings in our courts against 

administrative interests in the fair and orderly processing of 

those filings. During Courthouse News Service’s decadelong battle to obtain immediate access to newly filed 

complaints from Ventura County Superior Court, the drive 

for “fresh” news has only become more intense. In this 

digital age, newsfeeds and media platforms update the news 

by the minute or even by the second, and even traditional 

media deliver an endless stream of “breaking” news. Yet 

courts undeniably have an important administrative function 

that requires orderly processing of new filings, and this 

results in incidental delays to access by the press and public. 

We are asked to resolve these competing interests.

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6 COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET

Applying Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court

(Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986), we conclude that 

the press has a qualified right of timely access to newly filed 

civil nonconfidential complaints that attaches when the 

complaint is filed. However, this right does not entitle the 

press to immediate access to those complaints. Some 

reasonable restrictions resembling time, place, and manner 

regulations that result in incidental delays in access are 

constitutionally permitted where they are content-neutral, 

narrowly tailored and necessary to preserve the court’s 

important interest in the fair and orderly administration of 

justice.

I.

A.

Courthouse News Service (CNS) “is a national news 

organization that publishes daily reports for its subscribers 

about civil litigation, including the filing of new lawsuits.” 

Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet (Planet I), 750 F.3d 776, 

779 (9th Cir. 2014). CNS has more than 2,700 subscribers 

nationwide, including lawyers, law firms, news 

organizations, other media outlets, and entertainment and 

watchdog groups. In addition to sending proprietary 

litigation reports to law firms, CNS counts twenty-nine 

media entities among its subscribers, including the Los 

Angeles Times and Boston Globe. Id. at 780. CNS describes 

itself as a “pool reporter” for national media, which 

disseminate CNS’s litigation news to the broader public.

To collect information on newly filed complaints, CNS 

dispatches its reporters to some 2,600 courthouses across the 

country, including the Ventura County Superior Court 

(Ventura County). Over 250 CNS reporters review newly 

filed complaints and decide which are newsworthy. In 

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COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET 7

California state courts, CNS reports only on unlimited civil 

complaints, which either seek injunctive relief or have an 

amount in controversy greater than $25,000.1 See id. at 779 

n.1; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 85(a), 88. Approximately sixtyfive entities subscribe to CNS’s “Central Coast Reports,” the 

CNS publication that reports on Ventura County lawsuits.

Defendant Michael Planet serves as the Ventura County 

Court Executive Officer and Clerk. Planet is responsible for 

the administration of court records, which includes 

responding to media and other public requests for access to 

court records. His deputy, Cheryl Kanatzar, is responsible 

for processing civil court complaints and supervising the 

Civil Department court processing assistants.

Ventura County neither requires nor allows electronic 

filing; thus, all pleadings and other documents at the court 

are filed in paper format and maintained in hard copy in a 

physical case file in the clerk’s office. Between November 

2010 and June 2014, the court maintained a “media bin” in 

which it placed newly filed complaints after processing 

them. During that time, Ventura County processed newly 

filed complaints at the filing counters or desks in the Civil 

Department using the Court Case Management System 

(CCMS), which allows the court to maintain its docket of 

court filings. Ventura County required a seven-step 

procedure to process a new civil complaint using CCMS. As 

the district court described:

1 CNS does not argue that it is entitled to access documents that are

statutorily or judicially deemed confidential. Accordingly, our decision 

here concerns only publicly available civil complaints, i.e., those deemed 

non-confidential by state law or judicial determination, or those that were 

not otherwise properly filed under seal.

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First, a [court processing assistant] reviews 

the documents to determine that the 

complaint is being filed in the correct court 

and the documents necessary to initiate the 

case are presented with the correct filing fee 

or fee waiver. Second, the [court processing 

assistant] enters all the required case 

information to “create” a new case in CCMS. 

Third, all accompanying instruments, for 

example checks, are entered and the receipt is 

generated. Fourth, any summons required 

are issued. Fifth, the documents are stamped 

as “Filed.” Sixth, the labels generated from 

CCMS are placed on the physical case file, 

along with the filing date, courtroom 

assignment, and case destruction stamp. 

Finally, the documents are placed in a 

physical case file.

After court processing assistants completed these steps, 

supervisors performed an additional layer of quality control 

review, a process which took several additional days to 

complete. Only after both processes were completed would 

the clerk designate newly filed civil complaints as “located 

to the media bin” for public access. However, sometimes 

the complaints never even made it to the bin, and the court 

kept no record of the complaints actually delivered to the 

media bin.

Ventura County also excepted certain complaints from 

the media bin. After processing, the court routed directly to 

judges complaints requiring “immediate judicial review,” 

such as California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) cases 

or complaints filed simultaneously with ex parte applications 

for temporary restraining orders. Staff then delivered copies 

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COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET 9

of only the face pages of these complaints to the media bin. 

To view the entirety of the complaint, CNS had to request a 

copy directly from the chambers of the assigned judge.

This “no-access-before-process” policy often resulted in 

significant delays between the filing of a complaint and its 

availability to CNS; in many documented periods, over half 

of the filed complaints took two or more court days to 

become publicly available. Although Planet acknowledges 

the delay resulting from the no-access-before-process 

policy, he justified the policy by asserting concerns about 

privacy and confidentiality, accounting protocols and check 

payments attached to complaints, quality control, efficiency, 

and the integrity of court records.

After this suit was filed, however, Planet dropped the noaccess-before-process policy. In June 2014, Ventura County 

instituted its “scanning policy,” which requires court staff to 

scan new civil complaints before reviewing or processing 

them. After scanning, the complaints are available on public 

computer terminals in the Ventura County clerk’s office. 

When Planet originally adopted the scanning policy, the 

public, including CNS reporters, could view the scanned 

filings from 8:00 AM until 3:00 PM, even though the 

courthouse remained open and court staff accepted new 

filings until 4:30 PM. Complaints filed after 3:00 PM were 

scanned and made publicly available the next day.

The parties dispute what percentage of new complaints 

Ventura County made available on the same day as filing 

under the scanning policy, a dispute that arises from the 

3:00 PM public closing time of the clerk’s office. Planet 

maintains that Ventura County provided same-day access to 

approximately 97% of filings. CNS counters that Ventura 

County scanned between “one-third and more than one-half” 

of complaints after 3:00 PM. Ventura County does not 

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10 COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET

automatically scan and make available any exhibits 

submitted with the complaints; nor did CNS reporters ask for 

the exhibits from the court until this litigation.

B.

CNS filed its original lawsuit seeking same-day access 

to newly filed civil complaints on September 29, 2011. The 

district court dismissed the suit under the Pullman and 

O’Shea abstention doctrines. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. 

Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); O’Shea v. Littleton, 

414 U.S. 488 (1974). We reversed the district court’s 

decision to abstain.

Citing Press-Enterprise II, we rejected Planet’s 

argument that this is not a free expression case, holding that 

CNS was asserting its First Amendment right of timely 

access to judicial and other public proceedings and 

documents. Planet I, 750 F.3d at 784–85. We further held 

that “Pullman abstention ‘is generally inappropriate when 

First Amendment rights are at stake.’” Id. at 784 (quoting 

Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

We noted that the first requirement for Pullman abstention—

that “the case touches on a sensitive area of social policy 

upon which the federal courts ought not to enter”—“is 

‘almost never’ satisfied in First Amendment cases ‘because 

the guarantee of free expression is always an area of 

particular federal concern.’” Id. at 783–84 (first quoting 

Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 492 (9th Cir. 2003); then 

quoting Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 

1989)). “Abstaining in this case portends particularly 

egregious damage to First Amendment rights because it 

stifles the ‘free discussion of governmental affairs’ that the 

First Amendment exists to protect.” Id. at 787 (quoting 

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 

(1982)). Moreover, “[t]he purpose of CNS’s effort to timely 

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COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET 11

access filed unlimited civil complaints is to report on 

whatever newsworthy content they contain, and CNS cannot 

report on complaints the Ventura County Superior Court 

withholds.” Id. at 787–88.

We also rejected the district court’s dismissal on O’Shea

grounds because we disagreed that remedying Ventura 

County’s denial of the First Amendment right to timely 

access newly filed complaints would necessarily require “an 

ongoing federal audit.” Id. at 791 (quoting E.T. v. CantilSakauye, 682 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)). 

We remanded to the district court to determine the merits of 

CNS’s claims, including whether “the right of access may be 

overcome by an ‘overriding [governmental] interest based 

on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values 

and is narrowly tailored to preserve that interest.’” Id. at 793 

n.9 (alteration in original) (quoting Leigh v. Salazar, 

677 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting PressEnterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9)). We also suggested that the 

“delay in making the complaints available may also be 

analogous to a permissible ‘reasonable restriction [ ] on the 

time, place, or manner of protected speech.’” Id. (alteration 

in original) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 

781, 791 (1989)).

Upon remand, the district court dismissed CNS’s (bythen-filed) first amended complaint for failure to state a 

claim. Erroneously interpreting Press-Enterprise II and our 

mandate, the court ruled on a different issue entirely—

whether “filed civil complaints which have not yet been the 

subject of a hearing are outside the scope of the First 

Amendment right of access.” Courthouse News Serv. v. 

Planet (Planet II), 614 F. App’x 912, 915 (9th Cir. 2015). 

We again reversed and remanded the case for reassignment 

to a different district court judge. Id.

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12 COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET

Upon remand from Planet II, on cross-motions for 

summary judgment, the new district court judge granted 

CNS’s motion in part, denied Planet’s motion, and entered 

declaratory relief and a permanent injunction against 

Ventura County. Although the district court recognized that 

CNS had a First Amendment right of timely access to newly 

filed civil complaints, it rejected CNS’s claim that Ventura 

County’s failure to provide same-day access infringed that 

right. The district court held, however, that the right of 

access would be impaired if Ventura County failed to 

provide timely access. The district court further held that the 

right to timely access attaches at the moment of filing, i.e., 

when the complaint is received by the court. The district 

court concluded that both Ventura County’s no-accessbefore-process policy and its scanning policy 

unconstitutionally infringed CNS’s right to timely access the 

complaints.

Accordingly, the district court permanently enjoined 

Planet and Ventura County “from refusing to make newly 

filed unlimited civil complaints and their associated exhibits 

available to the public and the press until after such 

complaints and associated exhibits are ‘processed,’” and it 

“further directed [Planet and Ventura County] to make such 

complaints and exhibits accessible to the public and press in 

a timely manner from the moment they are received by the 

court . . . except in those instances where the filing party has 

properly moved to place the complaint under seal.” As a 

result, Planet changed the court’s scanning policy. Under 

the post-injunction scanning policy, Ventura County now 

keeps its clerk’s office open to the public until 4:00 PM and 

has moved up its filing deadline to 4:00 PM.

These cross-appeals followed.

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COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET 13

C.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In 

First Amendment cases, we review de novo the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment and independently 

review factual findings. Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 

789, 796 (9th Cir. 2012).

II.

We have long presumed a First Amendment “right of 

access to court proceedings and documents.” Oregonian 

Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 920 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 

1990) (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (PressEnterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)); accord United 

States v. Index Newspapers LLC, 766 F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th 

Cir. 2014). Concurring in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 

Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), Justice Stevens described the 

Court’s holding: “Today . . . the Court unequivocally holds 

that an arbitrary interference with access to important 

information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and 

of the press protected by the First Amendment.”2 Id. at 583 

(Stevens, J., concurring). From there, a full majority of the 

Court affirmed this presumptive right of access in Globe 

Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. See 457 U.S. at 603–04.

The presumption of access to judicial proceedings flows 

from an “unbroken, uncontradicted history” rooted in the 

common law notion that “justice must satisfy the appearance 

2 Justice Stevens’s concurrence chided the Court for not recognizing

earlier that “the First Amendment protects the public and the press from 

abridgment of their rights of access to information about the operation 

of their government, including the Judicial Branch.” Id. at 584; see also 

Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30–38 (1978) (Stevens, J., 

dissenting).

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14 COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET

of justice.” Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573–74 

(plurality opinion) (quoting Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 

610, 616 (1960)); see also Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., 912 F.3d 1147, 1184 n.38 (9th Cir. 2019) 

(en banc) cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 424, 425 (2019) (mem.)). 

Openness in judicial proceedings “enhances both the basic 

fairness of the [proceeding] and the appearance of fairness 

so essential to public confidence in the system,” PressEnterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508, and forms “an indispensable 

predicate to free expression about the workings of 

government,” Planet I, 750 F.3d at 785. “The right of access 

is thus an essential part of the First Amendment’s purpose to 

‘ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate 

in and contribute to our republican system of selfgovernment.’” Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 

at 604).

The First Amendment right of access exists, moreover, 

to enable free and informed discussion about important 

issues of the day and governmental affairs. Thus, “[t]he 

news media’s right of access to judicial proceedings is 

essential not only to its own free expression, but also to the 

public’s.” Id. at 786. “With respect to judicial proceedings 

in particular, the function of the press serves . . . to bring to 

bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the 

administration of justice.” Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 

420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). “The free press is the guardian of 

the public interest, and the independent judiciary is the 

guardian of the free press.” Leigh, 677 F.3d at 900. These 

values hold especially true where, as here, the impetus for 

CNS’s efforts to obtain newly filed complaints is its interest 

in timely reporting on their contents. See Planet I, 750 F.3d 

at 787–89; cf. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 592 

(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[A] special 

solicitude for the public character of judicial proceedings is 

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COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET 15

evident in the Court’s rulings upholding the right to report 

about the administration of justice.”).

A.

We must determine whether the qualified First 

Amendment right of access applies to the type of judicial 

record at issue here—newly filed nonconfidential civil 

complaints—and, relatedly, at what point in time that right 

attaches. To determine whether a First Amendment right of 

access attaches to a type of judicial proceeding or record, we 

consider (1) whether that proceeding or record “ha[s] 

historically been open to the press and general public” and 

(2) “whether public access plays a significant positive role 

in the functioning of the particular [governmental] process 

in question.” Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8; see also 

Index Newspapers, 766 F.3d at 1084. This “experience and 

logic” test evaluates the institutional value of public access 

to judicial proceedings and records to determine whether the 

First Amendment provides a presumption of access. See 

Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605. A presumptive First 

Amendment right of access arises if a proceeding or record 

satisfies both requirements of the two-part test.

The Supreme Court has yet to explicitly rule on whether 

the First Amendment right of access to information reaches 

civil judicial proceedings and records, but the federal courts 

of appeals widely agree that it does. Planet I, 750 F.3d 

at 786 (collecting cases); see also Courthouse News Serv. v. 

Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 

140 S. Ct. 384 (2019) (mem.). Indeed, every circuit to 

consider the issue has uniformly concluded that the right 

applies to both civil and criminal proceedings. See Dhiab v. 

Trump, 852 F.3d 1087, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Rogers, J., 

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 

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(collecting cases).3 This nationwide consensus accords with 

the broad understanding of First Amendment rights—and 

the rejection of “any ‘narrow, literal conception’ of the 

Amendment’s terms,”—that the Supreme Court has long 

espoused:

[T]he Framers were concerned with broad 

principles, and wrote against a background of 

shared values and practices. The First 

Amendment is thus broad enough to 

encompass those rights that, while not 

unambiguously enumerated in the very terms 

of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary 

to the enjoyment of other First Amendment 

rights.

Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604 (quoting NAACP v. 

Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963)).

3 See Planet I, 750 F.3d at 786; N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. 

Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 298 (2d Cir. 2012) (administrative civil 

infraction hearings); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 

249, 253–54 (4th Cir. 1988) (documents filed in connection with 

summary judgment motion in civil case); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 

733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (“A presumption of openness inheres 

in civil trials as in criminal trials.”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 

1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) (litigation committee reports in shareholder 

derivative suits); In re Iowa Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 

(8th Cir. 1983) (contempt proceedings, which are “a hybrid containing 

both civil and criminal characteristics”); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 

796, 801 (11th Cir. 1983) (civil trial and enforcement proceedings 

concerning “the release or incarceration of prisoners and the conditions 

of their confinement”); see also Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 268 

(4th Cir. 2014) (docket sheets for civil proceedings). The California 

Supreme Court has also so concluded. NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. 

v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 361 (Cal. 1999).

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We agree with the Seventh Circuit that although “the 

First Amendment does not explicitly mention a right of 

access to court proceedings and documents, ‘the courts of 

this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy 

public records and documents, including judicial records and 

documents,’” and that this right extends to civil complaints.4 

Brown, 908 F.3d at 1068–70 (quoting Nixon v. Warner 

Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)). As we held in 

Planet I, and as the district court correctly concluded, a 

qualified First Amendment right of access extends to timely 

access to newly filed civil complaints. Id. at 788; see also 

Planet II, 614 F. App’x at 915. Though we did not expressly 

apply the “experience and logic” test in Planet I, both our 

common experience and the logical extension of First 

Amendment principles lead to the conclusion that “[t]he 

press’s right of access to civil proceedings and documents 

fits squarely within the First Amendment’s protections.” 

Brown, 908 F.3d at 1069. Both sides before us agree that 

experience and logic support a public right of access to 

newly filed civil complaints. Indeed, Planet represents that 

Ventura County has a “long-standing policy of providing 

timely access to court records,” and agrees that the First 

Amendment protects a right of access to new civil 

4 We disagree, however, with the Seventh Circuit’s decision to 

abstain from resolving the dispute about when the right attaches and 

when delays are so long as to be tantamount to a denial of the right. See 

Brown, 908 F.3d at 1070–75; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 

378–79 (1976); O’Shea, 414 U.S. 488. In Planet I, we concluded that 

the injunctive relief CNS then sought neither presented a risk of an 

“ongoing federal audit” of a state’s judicial system nor amounted to “a 

major continuing intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts 

into the daily conduct of state . . . proceedings.” 750 F.3d at 790–92 

(quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 500, 502). We pointed out that Ventura 

County would have “available a variety of simple measures” that it could 

take to comply with an injunction requiring it to provide CNS timely 

access to newly filed complaints. Id. at 791.

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complaints. But he now argues that the right does not arise 

until judicial action of some sort. CNS urges us to affirm the 

district court’s conclusion that the First Amendment creates 

a right of access that arises upon the court’s receipt of the 

complaint. In CNS’s view, anything short of immediate 

access violates its First Amendment rights.

B.

We reject Planet’s contention that the right of access to 

civil complaints attaches only at the moment “they become 

the subject of some type of judicial action.” Our decision in 

Planet II remains the law of this case. See Planet II, 614 F. 

App’x at 915; see also Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 

389 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“Under the law of the case 

doctrine, a court will generally refuse to reconsider an issue 

that has already been decided by the same court or a higher 

court in the same case.” (citing Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 

1483, 1488–89 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). Even if Planet II 

had not foreclosed this argument, no court has held or even 

suggested that the public character of judicial records 

depends on whether the proceedings have progressed to a 

stage requiring a judge to act on the papers.

A complaint is a judicial document or record: an item 

filed with a court that is “relevant to the judicial function and 

useful in the judicial process.” Judicial Document, Black’s 

Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); accord Bernstein v. 

Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 

139 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of 

Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006)). Absent a 

showing that there is a substantial interest in retaining the 

private nature of a judicial record, once documents have 

been filed in judicial proceedings, a presumption arises that 

the public has the right to know the information they contain. 

See Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 

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24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994). CNS has submitted 

specific evidence that numerous jurisdictions around the 

country make newly filed complaints publicly available. 

The declarations of CNS reporters demonstrate a widespread 

practice of making complaints available before they are 

subjected to judicial review. The same is true of the long list 

of state statutes providing access to judicial records that CNS 

and Planet each marshal.5 Even Planet concedes that “[a]t 

least 34 states obligate records custodians to respond to 

access requests within a reasonable period of time or a fixed 

number of days.” None of these statutes conditions access 

on judicial action.

Moreover, public access to civil complaints before 

judicial action upon them “plays a particularly significant 

role” in the public’s ability to ably scrutinize “the judicial 

process and the government as a whole.” Globe Newspaper, 

457 U.S. at 606. Citizens could hardly evaluate and 

participate in robust public discussions about the 

performance of their court systems if complaints—and, by 

extension, the very existence of lawsuits—became available 

only after a judicial decision had been made. As one district 

court has elaborated:

[T]he public has a right to know how its 

resources are being used—courts are funded 

by the public, judges are evaluated by the 

public, officials who appoint and approve 

judges are voted on by the public, and the 

laws under which parties sue may be refined, 

rescinded, or strengthened based on the 

5 See e.g., Ariz. S. Ct. R. 123(f)(2); Cal. Gov’t Code § 68150(l); Fla. 

Jud. Admin. R. 2.420(m); Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 32(j); Miss. Code. Ann. 

§ 25-61-5; Ohio R. Superintendence 45(b).

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public’s views of the ways in which they play 

out in court.

Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP,

No. 14-CV-6867 (VEC), 2016 WL 1071107, at *9 

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2016), aff’d, 814 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 

2016); see also United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 

(2d Cir. 1995) (“[Monitoring of the courts] is not possible 

without access to . . . documents that are used in the 

performance of Article III functions.”).

Public access to civil complaints before judicial action 

also buttresses the institutional integrity of the judiciary. See 

Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 266 (4th Cir. 2014); see 

also Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 682 (3d Cir. 1988) 

(“Public access serves to promote trustworthiness of the 

judicial process, to curb judicial abuses, and to provide the 

public with a more complete understanding of the judicial 

system, including a better perception of its fairness.”). Some 

civil complaints may never come up for judicial evaluation 

because they may prompt the parties to settle. The public 

still has a right to know that the filing of the complaint in our 

courts influenced the settlement of the dispute: “When a 

complaint is filed, and the authority of the people of the 

United States is thereby invoked, even if only as a threat to 

induce settlement, the American people have a right to know 

that the plaintiff has invoked their power to achieve his 

personal ends.” Bernstein, 2016 WL 1071107, at *9; see 

also Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 140.

In support of his argument that the public right of access 

arises only post-judicial action, Planet points to cases that 

merely conclude that various civil litigation documents fall 

outside of the First Amendment right of access altogether. 

See, e.g., In re Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 176 (1st 

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COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET 21

Cir. 2003) (documents “submitted by a criminal defendant 

to show financial eligibility for [Criminal Justice Act]

funds”); Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 680 & n.14 (evidentiary 

document that was “never specifically referred to at trial or 

admitted into evidence”). These cases address documents 

that are not in fact part of the record of judicial proceedings, 

unlike the complaint, “which initiates judicial proceedings, 

is the cornerstone of every case, the very architecture of the 

lawsuit,” and access to which “is almost always necessary if 

the public is to understand a court’s decision.” Bernstein, 

814 F.3d at 140 (quoting FTC v. Abbvie Prods. LLC, 

713 F.3d 54, 62 (11th Cir. 2013)).

Planet also argues that then-Judge Scalia’s opinion in In 

re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 

1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985), supports his position that the tradition 

of access to judicial records does not include “pre-judgment 

access.” See id. at 1333. That decision is inapposite, 

however. Reporters Committee concerned the district 

court’s entry of a protective order on discovery materials 

obtained from third party Mobil Oil Corporation “on the 

ground that much of it was sensitive and confidential.” Id.

at 1326. The application for the protective order was 

supported by a declaration “describing in general terms the 

negative effect release of the materials as a whole would 

have on Mobil’s business in Saudi Arabia and its 

competitive position in shipping.” Id. Much of the 

discovery designated as confidential was filed under seal in 

pre-trial motions for summary judgment. Id. The district 

court ultimately released all the documents to the group of 

reporters seeking them following the trial and judgment. Id.

at 1328. In contrast, the civil complaints at issue here by 

stipulation are not confidential, subject to a protective order 

or filed under seal.

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And as Judge J. Skelly Wright pointed out, then-Judge 

Scalia’s “unnecessary constitutional ruminations” drawing 

on late-nineteenth century cases supporting a historical rule 

of no access to pre-judgment civil records were pure dicta 

and also not quite an accurate historical portrayal. Id.

at 1342, 1348 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting 

in part); see also id. at 1333–36 (citing Ex parte Drawbaugh, 

2 App. D.C. 404 (1894); Schmedding v. May, 85 Mich. 1 

(1891); and Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884)). 

Indeed, the late-nineteenth century cases unearthed in 

Reporters Committee do not foreclose finding a tradition of 

access here.6 And a 1953 nationwide study of court practices 

regarding access to government information concluded 

otherwise:

In the preponderant majority of states judicial 

records are in fact and law open to inspection 

by citizens and newspapermen as and when 

the papers become judicial records through 

being filed or through other procedure. 

Inspection does not wait upon proceedings in 

open court or indeed any judicial action, that 

is, action upon them by a judge.

Harold L. Cross, The People’s Right to Know 151 (1953) 

(emphasis added).

6 As early as 1927, New York courts rejected the reasoning of the 

1884 case Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884), relied upon by thenJudge Scalia with respect to privilege from libel for reporting on court 

documents. See Campbell v. N.Y. Evening Post, 245 N.Y. 320, 327–28 

(1927).

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C.

Though we conclude, as did the district court, that the 

qualified right of access to nonconfidential civil complaints 

arises when they are filed with the court, we do not view that 

conclusion as demanding immediate, pre-processing access 

to newly filed complaints. At the same time, however, we 

recognize, like the district court, that a necessary corollary 

of the right to access is a right to timely access. CNS’s 

reporting on complaints must be timely to be newsworthy 

and to allow for ample and meaningful public discussion 

regarding the functioning of our nation’s court systems. See 

Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604–05; Grove Fresh, 

24 F.3d at 897–98 (7th Cir. 1994). As the Court reasoned in 

Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), a ban on 

reporting news “just at the time [the] audience would be 

most receptive” would be effectively equivalent to “a 

deliberate statutory scheme of censorship.” Id. at 269. In 

other words, the public interest in obtaining news is an 

interest in obtaining contemporaneous news. In re Reporters 

Comm., 773 F.2d at 1352–53 (Wright, J., concurring in part 

and dissenting in part). As the Seventh Circuit explained in 

Grove Fresh: “The newsworthiness of a particular story is 

often fleeting. To delay or postpone disclosure undermines 

the benefit of public scrutiny and may have the same result 

as complete suppression.” 24 F.3d at 897. Before us, amici 

the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 

twenty-seven media organizations7 press the point that 

7 The media organizations include: American Society of News 

Editors, The Associated Press, Association of Alternative Newsmedia, 

The Center for Investigative Reporting, Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 

The E.W. Scripps Company, First Amendment Coalition, Gannett Co., 

Inc., Hearst Corporation, International Documentary Association, 

Investigative Reporting Workshop at American University, Los Angeles 

Times Communications LLC, The McClatchy Company, MediaNews 

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“news” is not even “news” if it is not timely, that is, 

immediate and contemporaneous. See Janet Kolodzy, 

Convergence Journalism 59 (2006) (“It is, after all, called 

the ‘news’ business and not the ‘olds’ business.”); Fred 

Fedler et al., Reporting for the Media 123 (8th ed. 2005) 

(identifying timeliness as a central characteristic of news). 

Thus, that “old” news is not worthy of, and does not receive, 

much public attention has been widely recognized. 

Moreover, as amici argue, the need for immediacy of 

reporting news “is even more vital in the digital age,” where 

timeliness is measured in terms of minutes or seconds. We 

thus arrive at the question that lies at the core of this dispute: 

what amount of delay in making newly filed complaints 

publicly available is constitutionally justified?

III.

A.

Once we have determined that a qualified First 

Amendment right of access to newly filed nonconfidential 

civil complaints exists, a presumption of access arises under 

Press-Enterprise II that may be restricted only if “closure is 

essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored 

to serve those interests.” 478 U.S. at 13–14 (quoting PressEnterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510); see also Globe Newspaper 

Co., 457 U.S. at 606–07.

Group, Inc., Meredith Corporation, National Press Photographers 

Association, New England First Amendment Coalition, New England 

Newspaper and Press Association, Inc., The New York Times Company, 

News Media Alliance, Online News Association, Radio Television 

Digital News Association, Reporters Without Borders, Society of 

Professional Journalists, Student Press Law Center, Tully Center for Free 

Speech, and The Washington Post.

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In Globe Newspaper, the Court reiterated that strict 

scrutiny applies to the denial of a qualified First Amendment 

right of access but noted that, “[o]f course, limitations on the 

right of access that resemble ‘time, place, and manner’ 

restrictions on protected speech, would not be subjected to 

such strict scrutiny.” 457 U.S. at 607 n.17 (emphasis added) 

(internal citation omitted). The Globe Newspaper Court 

then cited to footnote 18 of Richmond Newspapers, where 

the Court, explaining that the First Amendment right of 

access is not absolute, analogized restrictions on access to 

judicial proceedings to the regulation of expression in the 

public square, reasoning that, “[j]ust as a government may 

impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon 

the use of its streets in the interest of such objectives as the 

free flow of traffic, so may a trial judge, in the interest of the 

fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations 

on access to a trial.” 448 U.S. at 581 n.18. The Court, 

however, evinced greater solicitude for the courtroom setting 

that would countenance greater restrictions on access than 

those allowed in public forums, stating: “It is far more 

important that trials be conducted in a quiet and orderly 

setting than it is to preserve that atmosphere on city streets.” 

Id. (comparing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), with 

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), and Estes v. Texas, 

381 U.S. 532, 85 (1965)). The Court offered a final ground 

supporting reasonable restrictions in the courtroom setting—

that courtrooms have limited capacity means that “there may 

be occasions when not every person . . . can be 

accommodated.” Id. So too here.

Ventura County’s access policies resemble time, place, 

and manner restrictions—they are content-neutral and affect 

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only the timing of access to the newly filed complaints.8 

They should “not be subjected to such strict scrutiny,” Globe

Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607 n.17, but to the more relaxed 

scrutiny the Supreme Court has stated applies to these types 

of cases. An incidental delay of the right of access does “not 

pose such inherent dangers to free expression, or present 

such potential for censorship or manipulations, as to justify 

application of the most exacting level of First Amendment 

scrutiny.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 

661 (1994). Thus, in Leigh v. Salazar, a case concerning 

restrictions on the press’s right to observe a government 

activity, we explained that the Press-Enterprise II 

“balancing test” is “rigorous,” but not strict, scrutiny. 

677 F.3d at 900. That is the level of scrutiny we apply to the 

limitation on access to newly filed complaints here.9

8 We also note that there is no allegation that Ventura County’s 

access policies discriminate among media outlets in granting access to 

newly filed complaints. Favoring one media organization over another 

would “present serious First Amendment concerns.” Turner Broad. Sys., 

512 U.S. at 659. And although there is some suggestion in Ventura 

County’s briefs that because CNS commercially profits from its access 

to the complaints its First Amendment right is somehow diminished, to 

be clear: profit motive is entirely irrelevant to the determination of a 

news organization’s First Amendment rights. “If a profit motive could 

somehow strip communications of the otherwise available constitutional 

protection, our cases from New York Times to Hustler Magazine would 

be little more than empty vessels.” Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. 

Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989).

9 Our concurring colleague misapprehends the level of scrutiny we 

apply here, which is drawn directly from the Court’s access to judicial 

proceedings cases, Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 607, n.17, and 

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581, n.18. The concurrence would 

instead have us scrutinize the limitation on access here under the 

standard applicable to speech in public forums, places that have been 

used “time out of mind” for public assembly, communication, and 

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The interest Ventura County asserts to justify the delay 

in access is core to its functioning as a court: the fair and 

orderly administration of justice. See Seattle Times Co. v. 

Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 n.20, 35 (1984) (acknowledging 

both “the government’s substantial interest in protecting the 

integrity of the discovery process” and the “privacy interests 

of litigants and third parties” in civil litigation); cf. Sorrell v. 

IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 596 (2011) (affirming “the 

importance of maintaining ‘privacy’ as an important public 

policy goal”); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 

493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990) (recognizing that “administrative 

efficiency interests . . . are unusually compelling” in the 

antitrust regulation context). Even in this era of electronic 

filing systems, instantaneous public access to court filings, 

especially complaints, could impair the orderly filing and 

processing of cases with which clerk’s offices are charged. 

After all, litigants are not uploading their complaints to the 

internet; they are filing them with a court, making them 

subject to judicial administration. The First Amendment 

does not require courts, public entities with limited 

resources, to set aside their judicial operational needs to 

satisfy the immediate demands of the press.

expression, Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 

37, 45 (1983) (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 

515 (1939)), or that the government has designated as such, see Ark. 

Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998). But the 

courthouse is decidedly not a traditional or designated public forum for 

expression; rather it is “dedicated to the unique societal function of 

conducting the administration of justice.” 1 Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla 

and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 8:32.50 (2016). And the third 

prong of the time, place and manner test, whether the regulations “leave 

open ample alternative channels for communication of the information,” 

is inapplicable in this context—there is only one way CNS can access 

the new complaints: the court clerk’s office.

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To survive Press-Enterprise II’s two-prong balancing 

test, Ventura County must demonstrate first that there is a 

“substantial probability” that its interest in the fair and 

orderly administration of justice would be impaired by 

immediate access, and second, that no reasonable 

alternatives exist to “adequately protect” that government 

interest. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14.

B.

Although Ventura County has a substantial interest in the 

orderly administration and processing of new complaints, its 

former no-access-before-process policy nevertheless fails 

both prongs of Press-Enterprise II.

As to the first prong of Press-Enterprise II, Ventura 

County has not shown a “substantial probability” that more 

contemporaneous access to the newly filed complaints 

would impair its interest in orderly administration. The 

record shows that Ventura County’s no-access-beforeprocess policy bears no real relationship to the County’s 

legitimate administrative concerns about privacy and 

confidentiality, accounting protocols, quality control and 

accuracy, efficient court administration, or the “integrity” of 

court records. The record shows that the no-access-beforeprocess policy resulted in significant delays before the newly 

filed complaints found their way into the media bins and that 

these delays were unrelated to Ventura County’s asserted 

administrative interests. The policy did not protect the 

privacy interest: it was stipulated that the complaints did not 

contain private or confidential information; rather, Planet’s 

Deputy, Kanatzar, testified that private information is 

instead listed in fee waiver applications. And, as the district 

court noted, California Rule of Court 1.201(b) requires the 

filer—not the court—to exclude or redact private 

information from publicly filed judicial documents. Nor did 

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the policy protect the asserted accounting interest. Planet 

could point to no instances of accounting issues that related 

to providing access before processing. The policy also failed 

to protect Ventura County’s interest in orderly 

administration: Planet failed to cite a single example of a 

situation in which providing pre-process access to a newly 

filed complaint compromised the quality and accuracy of 

information logged into the Court Case Management System 

(CCMS). As for efficiency, Planet again could not point to 

any situation in which providing pre-process access created 

efficiency problems. Finally, concerning the “integrity” of 

court records, which appears to encompass properly 

handling litigants’ documents by attaching the correct fees 

to filings and removing private information, neither Planet 

nor Kanatzar testified that providing reporters pre-process 

access to complaints resulted in loss, destruction, or 

mutilation of, or otherwise compromised the “integrity” of, 

case files.

In fact, the record demonstrates that the lengthy delays 

under the no-access-before-process policy were entirely 

unrelated to Ventura County’s asserted governmental 

interests. Although the policy’s labyrinthine seven-step preaccess procedures purported to protect the orderly 

administration of court filings, a staff supervisor testified 

that there was “no way” she could confirm whether 

complaints designated “located to the media bin” in CCMS 

in fact made it to the physical media bin that day—a result 

that cuts against Ventura County’s assertion that its policies 

were designed for proper court recordkeeping. Given that 

the no-access-before-process policy in some cases harmed 

the very interests Ventura County claimed to be trying to 

protect, we find that this policy fails the first prong of PressEnterprise II scrutiny.

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This policy also fails the second prong of PressEnterprise II because it caused far greater delays than were 

necessary to adequately protect Ventura County’s 

administrative interests given the reasonable alternatives 

available. It is undisputed that the policy resulted in 

substantial and meaningful delays in access to complaints, at 

times delaying access for up to two weeks. These delays 

compromised the newsworthiness of reporting on 

complaints and deprived the public of information without 

any administrative justification. During several documented 

periods between 2012 and 2014, it took two or more court 

days for CNS to access one-fifth to two-thirds of newly filed 

complaints:

Time Period Same Day 

(%)

Next Day 

(%)

2+ Day 

(%)

June 11–22, 2012 0 55 45

Dec. 10–21, 2012 2 46 52

Aug. 12–23, 2013 0 67 33

Mar. 24–Apr. 4, 2014 3 32 65

Apr. 14–25, 2014 14 66 20

Record evidence also demonstrates that Ventura County 

could effectively address its administrative concerns through 

methods that did not cause such extensive and arbitrary 

delays in access. Ventura County’s decision to adopt the 

scanning policy, which measurably decreased the delay in 

public and press access to complaints, demonstrated that it 

could achieve its administrative interests with substantially 

less restrictive means. The record additionally shows that 

Planet and his staff considered but rejected potential 

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alternatives providing timelier public access to complaints. 

For example, Ventura County considered making copies of 

newly filed complaints or requiring parties to submit an extra 

copy upon filing for more immediate public access. 

Although it is unclear why Ventura County ultimately 

declined to adopt these alternative procedures, Planet 

articulates no reasons why creating or requiring additional 

copies would unduly burden court resources or otherwise 

present administrative difficulties, declaring only that 

Ventura County “made the commonsense decision” not to 

require litigants to submit an extra copy of filed complaints. 

See Valley Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 798 F.2d 1289, 

1295 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that courts “must carefully 

state the articulable facts demonstrating an administrative 

burden sufficient to deny access” to judicial records). The 

ready availability of alternative “simple measures” to 

improve access to newly filed complaints, Planet I, 750 F.3d 

at 791, further strengthens our conclusion that the no-accessbefore-process policy fails the second prong of PressEnterprise II.

C.

Ventura County’s scanning policy, which requires court 

staff to scan new civil complaints and make the electronic 

scans available on public computer terminals, survives 

Press-Enterprise II scrutiny.10 This policy easily passes the 

10 Planet argues that Ventura County’s adoption of its scanning 

policy moots CNS’s challenge to its now-discontinued no-access-beforeprocess policy. We agree with the district court that CNS’s challenge to 

Ventura County’s no-access-before-process policy is not moot. “The 

voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a 

case moot because a dismissal for mootness would permit a resumption 

of the challenged conduct as soon as the case is dismissed.” Am. 

Diabetes Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 938 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 

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first prong of the test given that it is directly related to 

Ventura County’s asserted interests. In fact, Planet testified 

that adopting a scanning policy addressed his concerns about 

privacy, potential accounting protocol problems, and quality 

control review in Ventura County’s complaint processing 

procedures. Thus, there is a substantial probability that 

Ventura County’s interest in the fair and orderly 

administration of new judicial filings would be impaired if 

the scanning policy was not in place.

We must now turn to the second prong of the PressEnterprise II test: whether there were no reasonable 

alternatives available for adequately protecting the Ventura 

County’s interest in fair and orderly administration at the 

time it adopted the scanning policy. When examining the 

availability of reasonable alternatives, we cannot ignore the 

modified, post-injunction scanning policy that Ventura 

County instituted in July 2016. Under this policy, the court 

2019) (quoting Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2014)). 

In the case of a government defendant, “[w]e presume that a government 

entity is acting in good faith when it changes its policy, but when the 

Government asserts mootness based on such a change it still must bear 

the heavy burden of showing that the challenged conduct cannot 

reasonably be expected to start up again.” Rosebrock, 745 F.3d at 971 

(internal citation omitted).

In Rosebrock, we set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider 

in determining whether a government defendant’s voluntary cessation of 

challenged conduct moots a controversy, where, as here, the cessation is 

not enshrined in legislation or regulation. See id. at 972. Because Planet 

maintains that the public has no right of access until judicial action upon 

a complaint, and nothing other than the injunction in this litigation 

prevents Ventura County from returning to its pre-2014 policy, the 

district court correctly found that, unlike the defendant in American 

Diabetes Association, Planet has likely not met “the heavy burden of 

showing that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to 

start up again.” Id. at 971.

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extended the hours it keeps its clerk’s office and filing 

counters open to the public from 3:00 PM to 4:00 PM, but 

also moved the filing deadline back from 4:30 PM to 

4:00 PM. The changes extended the time during which the 

public has access to newly filed complaints but reduced the 

time within which the public may file complaints. It has also 

resulted in CNS reporting “near perfect” same-day access 

under the post-injunction scanning policy.

However, we are satisfied that the post-injunction 

scanning policy was not a reasonable alternative available to 

Ventura County when it implemented its scanning policy in 

2014. Prior to 2014, a statewide budget crisis severely 

curtailed Ventura County’s resources, cutting the court’s 

budget by more than $13 million over three fiscal years. To 

mitigate the impact of the resulting multimillion-dollar 

shortfall, Ventura County reduced staff, increased 

mandatory staff furlough days, and twice reduced the 

courthouse closing time: from 5:00 PM, its “traditional” 

closing time, to 4:00 PM and then to 3:00 PM. Under the 

court’s necessary budget control measures, administrative 

vacancies more than doubled, leaving fewer staff to scan all 

relevant complaints, serve members of the public seeking to 

file and view documents, and prepare court calendars. As 

Planet explained, Ventura County’s earlier public closing 

time thus “allow[ed] a reduced number of clerks to catch up 

on the new filings before leaving work at 4:30.”

Unlike with the no-access-before-process policy, there is 

nothing in the record to indicate that Ventura County 

considered but rejected reasonable alternatives to the 

scanning policy. Furthermore, Ventura County was 

undergoing severe budget constraints at the time, and it has 

demonstrated that the overnight delay in access to 

complaints filed during the last ninety minutes of the court’s 

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public hours was no greater than essential to manage 

necessary court operations under the circumstances existing 

at the time. The First Amendment does not require us to 

second guess the careful deliberations the state court 

undertook in deciding how to manage scarce resources. We 

decline do so here.

We therefore conclude that Ventura County’s scanning 

policy passes constitutional scrutiny.

IV.

The First Amendment secures a right of timely access to 

publicly available civil complaints that arises before any 

judicial action upon them. Our decision reflects the First 

Amendment’s “role . . . in securing and fostering our 

republican system of self-government” through informed 

and robust public debate. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 

at 587 (Brennan J., concurring in the judgment). “The 

guarding of the freedom of public discussion is a preliminary 

step in the unending attempt of our nation to be intelligent 

about its own purposes.” Alexander Meiklejohn, Free 

Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 106 (1948). 

While the incidental delays resulting from Ventura County’s 

former no-access-before-process policy cannot survive 

Press-Enterprise II scrutiny, its scanning policy passes 

constitutional muster.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment as to the no-access-before-process 

policy, but reverse the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment as to the scanning policy. We vacate the district 

court’s injunction and award of fees, and remand for further 

consideration consistent with this opinion.

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Each side shall bear its own costs.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring as to Part III:

Applying strict scrutiny to determine whether a state 

court system may regulate the public’s access to 

nonconfidential civil complaints does not comply with 

Supreme Court precedent. Instead, reasonable time, place 

and manner restrictions should be applied. Let me explain.

A.

Once it is determined that a qualified First Amendment 

right of access attaches to a government proceeding or 

activity, a court must then determine the proper level of 

scrutiny, “because not every interference with speech 

triggers the same degree of scrutiny under the First 

Amendment.” See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 

622, 637 (1994). When “the State attempts to deny the right 

of access . . . , it must be shown that the denial is necessitated 

by a compelling governmental interest.” Globe Newspaper

Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606–07 (1982). 

However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that 

“limitations on the right of access that resemble ‘time, place, 

and manner’ restrictions on protected speech [sh]ould not be 

subjected to such strict scrutiny.” Id. at 607 n.17 (citations 

omitted); see also Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 

448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“Just as a

government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner 

restrictions . . . so may a trial judge . . . impose reasonable 

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limitations on access to a trial.” (citation omitted)).1 Thus, a 

limitation on a First Amendment right of access is not 

subject to the same strict scrutiny applied to a denial of 

access. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07.

The time, place, and manner standard permits 

government regulation “provided the restrictions ‘are 

justified without reference to the content of the regulated 

speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 

governmental interest, and that they leave open ample 

alternative channels for communication of the 

information.’” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 

791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). This framework strikes 

the proper “balance[] [between] the vital public interest in 

preserving the media’s ability to monitor government 

1 Multiple circuit courts have reached the same conclusion. See Flynt 

v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (recognizing that a 

restriction on media’s right of access is permitted if it is a reasonable 

time, place, and manner restriction); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 

868 F.2d 497, 505 (1st Cir. 1989) (recognizing that time, place, and 

manner restrictions “need only be reasonable to survive First 

Amendment scrutiny”); United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 620–21 

(7th Cir. 1985) (holding “[a] limitation on the public access to a trial is 

not subject to the same ‘strict scrutiny’ given a denial of access. . . . The 

limitation can withstand constitutional scrutiny so long as it is reasonable 

and neutral, as with time, place, and manner restrictions generally”); 

United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 747 F.2d 111, 114 (2d. Cir. 1984) 

(holding a limitation that “is simply a ‘time, place, and manner’ 

restriction, which should not be subjected to strict scrutiny, but should 

be upheld if reasonable”); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 

1282 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a time, place, and manner regulation 

that restricts access in the courtroom is constitutional “if it is reasonable, 

if it promotes significant governmental interests, and if the restriction 

does not unwarrantedly abridge . . . . the opportunities for the 

communication of thought” (alterations in original) (quotations marks 

and footnotes omitted)).

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activities against the government’s need to impose 

restrictions if necessary for safety or other legitimate 

reasons.” Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 

2012).

Under the time, place and manner framework, the first 

step is to determine if the policy is content-neutral. To be 

content-neutral, the policy cannot “target speech based on its 

communicative content,” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 

2218, 2226 (2015), or “draw[] distinctions based on the 

message a speaker conveys,” id. at 2227. “A regulation that 

serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is 

deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some 

speakers or messages but not others.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; 

see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (“Press-Enter. 

I”), 464 U.S. 501, 519 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) 

(explaining that, while it is sometimes necessary to identify 

limitations “by reference to the subject matter of certain 

questions” but this would not amount to an improper 

content-based regulation, because in this context, the 

government is not violating the principle of neutrality).

Once it is determined that the policy is content-neutral, 

the regulation must be “narrowly tailored to serve a 

significant governmental interest.” McCullen v. Coakley, 

573 U.S. 464, 477, 486 (2014). To be narrowly tailored, the 

restriction need not employ “the least restrictive or least 

intrusive means.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 798. Rather, this court 

must ensure “the regulation promotes a substantial 

government interest that would be achieved less effectively 

absent the regulation.” Id. at 799 (alteration omitted) 

(quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 

(1989)). For example, in Clark, the Court explained how the 

prohibition on camping on the National Mall served 

purposes that “[p]erhaps . . . would be more effectively and 

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not so clumsily achieved by preventing tents and 24-hour 

vigils entirely in the core areas.” 468 U.S. at 297. But 

because “the Government has a legitimate interest in 

ensuring that the National Parks are adequately protected . . .

[and] the parks would be more exposed to harm without the 

sleeping prohibition than with it, the ban [wa]s safe from 

invalidation under the First Amendment as a reasonable 

regulation of the manner in which a demonstration may be 

carried out.” Id.

However, an access policy may fail the requirement for 

“narrow tailoring” if the burdens imposed serve no purpose. 

See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799–800. In other words, the 

regulation must actually advance the government’s interest. 

See id.; see also McCullen, 573 U.S. at 486 (“[T]he 

government still may not regulate expression in such a 

manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech 

does not serve to advance its goals.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)).

Finally, the policy must leave open ample alternative 

channels of communication.2 McCullen,573 U.S. at 477. 

Access policies that merely delay (rather than outright deny) 

access to nonconfidential civil complaints will generally 

satisfy this requirement. See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 

758 F.2d 350, 359 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (finding 

unconstitutional a state statute that outright denied media 

organizations’ ability to conduct exit polling). But see 

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (explaining that 

courts may outright deny access when, due to “limited 

capacity . . . not every person who wishes to attend can be 

2 The Majority argues that this prong of the time, place, and manner 

test is “inapplicable in this context.” Maj. Op. at 26 n.9. However, as 

detailed in this section, this prong is applicable in access cases.

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accommodated”). In such cases of delayed access, the 

question boils down to whether the delay “den[ies] or 

unwarrantedly abridge[s] the opportunities for the 

communication of thought and the discussion of public 

questions immemorially associated with resort to public 

places.” Id. (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 

574 (1980)); see also Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 

750 F.3d 776, 787 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Planet I”) (explaining 

how limiting access can deter “informed public discussion 

of ongoing judicial proceedings”); cf. Cox Broad. Corp. v. 

Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (recognizing one of the 

functions of the press is to “bear the beneficial effects of 

public scrutiny”).

The parties argue that reporting on complaints must be 

timely to be newsworthy and to allow for ample and 

meaningful public discussion regarding the functioning of 

our nation’s court systems. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 

at 604–05; Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice 

Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897–98 (7th Cir. 1994), superseded by rule 

on other grounds. As the Seventh Circuit explained in Grove 

Fresh: “The newsworthiness of a particular story is often 

fleeting. To delay or postpone disclosure undermines the 

benefit of public scrutiny and may have the same result as 

complete suppression.” 24 F.3d at 897.

However, timeliness and newsworthiness are not the 

focus of the First Amendment analysis. Rather, the First 

Amendment analysis focuses on the significant government

interest and whether the restriction is narrowly tailored to 

meet that interest. Absent either an unreasonable burden on 

the right of access or access restrictions that also operate as 

limitations on publishing information previously obtained, 

ample alternatives for communication are left open. 

Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1978) 

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(distinguishing a right of access from a right to publish 

information that has been obtained); Globe Newspaper, 

457 U.S. at 621 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[S]tatutes that 

bear on th[e] right of access do not deter protected activity 

in the way that other laws sometimes interfere with the right 

of expression . . . .”).

The majority correctly determines that “Ventura 

County’s access policies resemble time, place, and manner 

restrictions—they are content-neutral and affect only the 

timing of access to the newly filed complaints.” Maj. Op. 

25–26. However, rather than adopt the time, place, and 

manner test, the majority ignores Supreme Court precedent 

by analyzing the access policies under strict scrutiny.3

Again, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 

“limitations on the right of access that resemble ‘time, place, 

and manner’ restrictions on protected speech [sh]ould not be 

subjected to . . . strict scrutiny.” Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 

at 607 n.17; see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 

n.18 (“Just as a government may impose reasonable time, 

place, and manner restrictions . . . , so may a trial judge . . .

impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial.”).

3 The majority mistakenly claims that its level of scrutiny is drawn 

directly from Globe Newspapers and Richmond Newspapers. Maj Op. 

at 26 n.9. This cannot be the case. These two Supreme Court cases direct 

us not to use strict scrutiny when an access policy resembles a reasonable 

time, place, and manner restriction. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 

607 n.17; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18.

The majority further mistakenly argues that the time, place, and 

manner standard is only applicable to speech in public forums. Maj Op. 

at 26 n.9. However, the Supreme Court explicitly stated time, place, and 

manner restrictions may be used in courtroom access cases. See 

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18.

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As an alternative to a time, place, and manner analysis, 

the majority instead suggests that a straightforward 

application of the Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court

(Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986) test should be used; 

suggesting that it is not the most exacting level of First 

Amendment scrutiny, but is instead akin to a “‘balancing 

test’ that provides ‘rigorous,’ but not strict, scrutiny.” Maj.

Op. 26 (citing Leigh, 677 F.3d at 900).4 However, to comply 

with the scrutiny required by Press-Enterprise II, the policy 

must be “narrowly tailored and necessary to preserve the 

court’s important interest in the fair and orderly 

administration of justice.” Maj. Op. 6. In other words, “no 

reasonable alternatives exist to ‘adequately’ protect that 

government interest.” Maj. Op. 28. Thus, this “no reasonable 

alternative” requirement mirrors the same strict scrutiny 

analysis Supreme Court precedent does not require. See

Daily Herald Co., 758 F.2d at 359 (holding that to meet the 

heavy burden of “exacting scrutiny” the State must prove 

that “no reasonable alternatives” are available to serve the 

State’s legitimate interest).

Because the majority’s strict scrutiny analysis does not 

comply with Supreme Court precedent, I part company with 

them.

B.

Because the Ventura county access policies resemble 

time, place, and manner restrictions, such access policies 

4 The majority cannot rely on Leigh, because Leigh’s use of the word 

rigorous was merely dicta. Leigh was not holding that Press-Enterprise 

II’s test is anything less than strict scrutiny. See Leigh, 677 F.3d at 900. 

Further, to the extent that Leigh dictates applying Press-Enterprise II’s 

strict scrutiny test here, we should call this case en banc to determine 

whether our circuit’s precedent follows Supreme Court precedent.

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should be reviewed under the time, place, and manner test as 

the Supreme Court would do. Scrutinizing Ventura County’s 

access policies as time, place, and manner regulations, the 

Ventura County’s pre-2014 no-access-before-process policy 

unconstitutionally deprived Courthouse News Service 

(“CNS”) of its right to timely access newly filed complaints. 

However, Ventura County’s original scanning policy 

(closing the clerk’s office with the complaint-viewing 

computer terminals at 3:00 PM) survives scrutiny.

1.

Applying the time, place, and manner test, Ventura 

County’s pre-2014 no-access-before-process policy does not 

reasonably regulate public access to civil complaints.

On one hand, the policy is content neutral. The 

regulation does not “target speech based on its 

communicative content,” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226, or draw 

distinctions “based on the message a speaker conveys,” id.

at 2227. The reasons Planet asserts for limiting access to 

civil complaints until after processing are significant

governmental interests. Planet asserts an interest in the fair 

and orderly administration of justice through maintaining 

(1) privacy and confidentiality, (2) accounting protocols, 

(3) quality control and accuracy, and (4) the integrity of 

court records. These interests are sufficiently important to 

justify some delay in access resulting from its policies. See 

Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511–12; Grove Fresh, 

24 F.3d at 897–98; see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 

467 U.S. 20, 34 n.20, 35 (1984) (acknowledging both “the 

government’s substantial interest in protecting the integrity 

of the discovery process” and the “privacy interests of 

litigants and third parties” in civil litigation); cf. Sorrell v. 

IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 596 (2011) (affirming “the 

importance of maintaining ‘privacy’ as an important public 

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COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET 43

policy goal”); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 

493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990) (recognizing “administrative 

efficiency interests” as compelling in the antitrust regulation 

context).

However, Planet must also demonstrate that the access 

policy actually advanced Ventura County’s important 

governmental interests. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799–800. 

Here, Planet fails the analysis. He cannot explain how 

“processing” the complaints before making them available 

to the press furthered his stated reasons for the policy. In 

other words, Planet offered no connection between the 

means he chose and the ends he pursued. For example, the 

policy did not advance the privacy interest: it was stipulated 

that the complaints already did not contain private or 

confidential information; rather, Kanatzar testified that 

private information is instead listed in fee waiver 

applications. And, as the district court noted, California Rule 

of Court 1.201(b) requires the filer—not the court—to 

exclude or redact private information from publicly filed 

judicial documents.

Nor did the policy advance the asserted accounting 

interest. Planet could point to no instances of accounting 

issues that related to providing access before processing. Nor 

did the policy further Ventura County’s interest in orderly 

administration: Planet failed to cite a single example of a 

situation in which providing pre-process access to a newly 

filed complaint compromised the quality and accuracy of 

information logged into the Court Case Management System 

(“CCMS”). As for efficiency, Planet again could not point to 

any situation in which providing pre-process access created 

efficiency problems.

Finally, concerning the “integrity” of court records, 

which appears to encompass properly handling litigants’ 

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44 COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET

documents by attaching the correct fees to filings and 

removing private information, neither Planet nor Kanatzar 

testified that providing reporters access to complaints before 

processing resulted in loss, destruction, or mutilation of, or 

otherwise compromised the “integrity” of case files. Indeed, 

even the interest in proper court record keeping remains 

unserved by the pre-access process; a staff supervisor 

testified that there was “no way” she could confirm whether 

complaints recorded as “located to the media bin” in CCMS 

were physically “located to the media bin.”

Accordingly, the no-access-before-process policy 

infringed upon CNS’s right of access by institutionalizing 

delay that extended wait periods for a large portion of 

complaints that stretched over days, even weeks. Because 

the delays in access under the no-access-before-process 

policy failed to further Ventura County’s important 

governmental interests, the no-access-before-process policy 

is not a reasonable regulation of the right of timely access to 

newly filed complaints.5

2.

Turning to Ventura County’s post-2014 scanning policy, 

this policy is a reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and 

manner restriction.6 This policy requires court staff to scan 

5 Because I find that Planet’s no-access-before-process policy was 

not narrowly tailored, I do not analyze whether it left open ample 

alternative channels for communication and information.

6 The concerning consequences of the district court’s conclusion that 

the 2014 scanning policy violated the First Amendment illustrate why a 

federal court reviewing a state court access policy must tread carefully. 

In 2016, responding to the district court, Ventura County shortened the 

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COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET 45

complaints into PDF-formatted documents prior to 

processing the complaint. The scanned PDFs are then made 

available to the public for 10 days through public computer 

terminals, and paper copies are available for a per-page 

charge.

As with the no-access-before-process policy, this policy 

is facially content-neutral. The policy is also narrowly 

tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. Planet 

asserts the same significant interests with this policy as with 

the no-access-before-process policy—the policy was 

necessary for the fair and orderly administration of justice. 

But, unlike the no-access-before-process policy, Planet 

testified that this policy satisfied the administrative concerns 

about privacy, accounting protocol issues, and quality 

control. Thus, the policy advanced the substantial interest of 

fair and orderly administration of justice, and that interest 

would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. See 

Ward, 491 U.S. at 798–99.

Finally, the policy also left open ample alternative 

channels for communication and information. The policy did 

nothing to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the opportunities 

for the communication of thought. The reporters were still 

able to get the complaints in a timely enough manner to 

report on newsworthy issues. These minor delays did

nothing to deter the “informed public discussion of ongoing 

judicial proceedings.” Planet I, 750 F.3d at 787.

window for litigants—the primary stakeholders of the civil court 

system—to file complaints.

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