Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-24-01392/USCOURTS-ca13-24-01392-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Owen M. Cunningham
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

OWEN M. CUNNINGHAM,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2024-1392

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:22-cv-01826-PSH, Judge Philip S. Hadji.

______________________

Decided: January 6, 2025

______________________

OWEN M. CUNNINGHAM, Lemon Grove, CA, pro se. 

 SONIA W. MURPHY, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, DOUGLAS K.

MICKLE.

 ______________________

Before LOURIE, STOLL, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.

Case: 24-1392 Document: 18 Page: 1 Filed: 01/06/2025
2 CUNNINGHAM v. US

PER CURIAM.

Owen M. Cunningham filed a complaint before the 

Court of Federal Claims seeking relief for his involuntary 

discharge from the United States Army. The Court of Federal Claims granted the government’s motion for judgment 

on the administrative record, denied Mr. Cunningham’s 

cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record, 

and denied the government’s motion to dismiss as moot. 

Cunningham v. United States, No. 22-1826, 2023 WL 

8852607, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 21, 2023) (“Decision”). For the 

reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Cunningham first enlisted in the Army in 2005 as 

a helicopter mechanic. Decision at *1; App’x 2.1 By June 

2017, he served as a reserve warrant officer, but received a 

new active-duty appointment as a chief warrant officer two 

in June 2019. Decision at *1. In September 2020, Mr. Cunningham took a urinalysis test that detected cocaine at a 

value of 675 nanograms per milliliter, which exceeded the 

100 nanograms per milliliter cutoff to pass a test for cocaine metabolites. Decision at *1; App’x 3. After Mr. Cunningham’s failed test, the Army flagged Mr. Cunningham 

and suspended him from flying duties. Decision at *1;

App’x 3–4, 115; see Department of the Army, Army Regulation (“AR”) 600-8-2, Suspension of Favorable Personnel 

Actions (Flag) (2016); App’x 43–44.

Mr. Cunningham’s case was subsequently referred to 

the Flying Evaluation Board. Decision at *1; App’x 4. On 

March 23, 2021, the Flying Evaluation Board found by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Cunningham “displayed undesirable habits in that he tested positive 

1 We refer to the supplemental appendix filed with 

the government’s informal response brief, ECF No. 8, as 

“App’x” throughout this opinion.

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CUNNINGHAM v. US 3

for . . . cocaine” and recommended terminating his aviation 

service. App’x 109; Decision at *1. Mr. Cunningham subsequently asked the Appointing Authority to set aside the 

Flying Evaluation Board’s findings and recommendations. 

Decision at *1; App’x 287–89. To support this request, 

Mr. Cunningham submitted an opinion from Dr. Jeff Walterscheid, chief toxicologist for the Armed Forces Medical 

Examiner System, providing new evidence. Decision at *1; 

App’x 290–91. On September 7, 2021, the Appointing Authority denied Mr. Cunningham’s request to set aside the 

Flying Evaluation Board’s findings and recommendations.

Decision at *1; App’x 108, 326.

In parallel to Mr. Cunningham’s Flying Evaluation 

Board referral, in February 2021, the Army initiated disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Cunningham under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) 

after Mr. Cunningham waived his right to challenge the 

drug allegations at a court martial. Decision at *1; App’x

106; see 10 U.S.C. § 815. After a hearing, the Army found 

Mr. Cunningham guilty of using cocaine in violation of 

UCMJ Article 112a and issued him a written reprimand as 

punishment. Decision at *1; App’x 142, 144. Mr. Cunningham did not appeal this decision, but his counsel submitted

a request to set aside the Article 15 findings because of the 

new evidence from Dr. Walterscheid. Decision at *1; App’x 

146–48. On September 7, 2021, Mr. Cunningham’s request 

to set aside the Article 15 findings was also denied. Decision at *1; App’x 6, 326.

In April 2021, the General Officer Show Cause Authority began elimination proceedings against Mr. Cunningham for use of cocaine pursuant to AR 600-8-24. Decision

at *2; App’x 6; see Department of the Army, AR 600-8-24,

Officer Transfers and Discharges (2020); App’x 45–83. The 

General Officer Show Cause Authority recommended that 

Mr. Cunningham receive a general discharge from the 

Army with an honorable characterization of his service. 

Decision at *2; App’x 10. Consistent with this 

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4 CUNNINGHAM v. US

recommendation, Mr. Cunningham’s separation from the 

Army was approved on June 6, 2022. Decision at *2; App’x 

100. On June 30, 2022, the Army issued Mr. Cunningham’s certificate of discharge from active duty. Decision at 

*2; App’x 324.

On December 15, 2022, Mr. Cunningham filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging procedural 

violations occurred during his elimination proceedings. 

Decision at *2; App’x 1–15. The Court of Federal Claims 

concluded that the Army acted in compliance with AR 600-

8-24 by denying Mr. Cunningham a board of inquiry because he had not served for three years as a probationary 

officer. Decision at *3. Next, the Court of Federal Claims

found that any alleged procedural errors in the processing 

of Mr. Cunningham’s case were rendered harmless by the 

Army’s reevaluation of Mr. Cunningham’s case and the unchanged recommendation to still discharge him. Id. at *4. 

Lastly, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that there 

was substantial evidence to support the Army’s determination that Mr. Cunningham knowingly used cocaine in violation of UCMJ Article 112a. Id. The Court of Federal 

Claims further concluded that the Army’s determination of 

Mr. Cunningham’s guilt complied with AR 27-10. Id.; see 

Department of the Army, AR 27-10, Military Justice (2020); 

App’x 20–42. Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims

granted the government’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, denied Mr. Cunningham’s cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record, and denied 

the government’s motion to dismiss as moot. Decision at 

*5.

Mr. Cunningham appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 1295(a)(3).

II. DISCUSSION

“We review a decision of the [Court of Federal Claims]

‘granting or denying a motion for judgment on the administrative record without deference.’” Bader v. United 

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CUNNINGHAM v. US 5

States, 97 F.4th 904, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Barnick 

v. United States, 591 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). We

will not disturb the Army’s decision unless “it is arbitrary, 

capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial 

evidence.” Barnick, 591 F.3d at 1377.

This appeal presents the following issues regarding 

whether the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded 

that: (1) Mr. Cunningham was a probationary employee 

under AR 600-8-24; (2) any procedural errors that occurred 

in Mr. Cunningham’s elimination proceedings from the 

Army were rendered harmless when Mr. Cunningham’s 

case was reevaluated; and (3) the Army complied with

AR 27-10 and UCMJ Article 112a. We will address each 

issue in turn.

A.

Mr. Cunningham argues that the Court of Federal 

Claims did not adequately review the documentation related to his appointment date and incorrectly interpreted 

and applied AR 600-8-24 in concluding that he was a probationary officer. Appellant’s Br. 1–2. Specifically, 

Mr. Cunningham alleges that the operative date for determining probationary status was when he was appointed as 

a reserve warrant officer on June 21, 2017, rather than 

when he was appointed to the Regular Army on June 21, 

2019. Id.; see App’x 322–23 (identifying Reserve and Regular Army appointment dates). Mr. Cunningham further 

alleges that as a nonprobationary officer he would be entitled to a board of inquiry.2 Appellant’s Br. 2–3; see AR

2 By contrast to probationary officers, nonprobationary officers are entitled to a board of inquiry. “A board of 

inquiry is a formal hearing procedure wherein the service 

member may be represented by counsel and present 

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6 CUNNINGHAM v. US

600-8-24 ¶ 4-18; App’x 56–58. We disagree that Mr. Cunningham is entitled to nonprobationary status.

The Court of Federal Claims correctly held that 

Mr. Cunningham was a probationary officer not entitled to 

a hearing by a board of inquiry. The date of Mr. Cunningham’s appointment to the Regular Army in the grade of 

chief warrant officer two was June 21, 2019. Decision at 

*1; App’x 323 (“The existing warrant officer Reserve appointment is vacated upon acceptance of this appointment”

to “the grade of Chief Warrant Two.”). The Court of Federal Claims also correctly concluded that the relevant end 

date for determining probationary status is the date that 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army issued a final 

decision regarding Mr. Cunningham’s case, rather than the 

date when Mr. Cunningham received his certificate of discharge from active duty.3 Decision at *3. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army “determined 

[Mr. Cunningham] will be involuntarily eliminated from 

the United States Army with an Honorable characterization of service” on June 6, 2022, the date of the final decision in Mr. Cunningham’s case. App’x 100; see AR 600-8-24 

¶ 4-19(j) (“Action by the [Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Army] acting for [the Secretary of the Army] is final.”); 

App’x 60. In sum, it was less than three years between 

Mr. Cunningham’s appointment to the Regular Army and 

the final decision by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Army.

witnesses.” Holley v. United States, 124 F.3d 1462, 1464 

n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also AR 600-8-24 ¶ 4-6; App’x 50.

3 Cf. AR 600-8-24 ¶ 4-19(c) (“[i]f at any time during 

the processing of the recommendation (before a final decision in the case) the officer no longer meets the probationary criteria,” the officer will be processed as a 

nonprobationary officer) (emphasis added); App’x 60.

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CUNNINGHAM v. US 7

Mr. Cunningham’s appointment could be terminated 

without going through a board of inquiry first. The Secretary of the Army “may terminate the regular appointment 

of any permanent regular warrant officer at any time 

within three years after the date when the officer accepted 

his original permanent appointment as a warrant officer in 

that component.” 10 U.S.C. § 1165; see also AR 600-8-24

¶ 4-19(b)(1)–(2) (“A probationary officer is—(1) Any commissioned officer on the [active-duty list] with less than 6

years active commissioned service or a commissioned Reserve officer with less than 6 years commissioned service

(see 10 U.S.C. [§] 630). (2) Warrant officers who have less 

than 3 years’ service since original appointment in their 

present component (see 10 U.S.C. [§] 1165).”); App’x 60. 

Because “[Mr.] Cunningham’s appointment to his most recent component on June 21, 2019, was less than three years 

before June 6, 2022, when the final decision was issued by 

the [Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army] to eliminate 

him,” Decision at *3, the Court of Federal Claims did not 

err in finding that Mr. Cunningham was a probationary officer who is not entitled to a hearing by a board of inquiry.

B.

Mr. Cunningham argues that the Court of Federal 

Claims erred and acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when processing Mr. Cunningham’s elimination paperwork under AR 600-8-24 because his original 165-page

rebuttal document was lost. Appellant’s Br. 3–6, 9.

Mr. Cunningham contends that the Army failed to “appropriately” review his documents, Appellant’s Br. 4, because

the Army “made a decision on over a year[’]s worth of legal 

proceedings in three working days.” Appellant’s Br. 5. In 

response, the government argues that this characterization 

is inaccurate because the Army remedied any errors in the 

processing of Mr. Cunningham’s claim before the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of the Army made a final decision. Appellee’s Br. 17. We agree with the government.

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8 CUNNINGHAM v. US

The Army did not act in an arbitrary and capricious 

manner and did not commit any prejudicial error in processing Mr. Cunningham’s elimination paperwork under 

AR 600-8-24. “Table 4-2, Steps 3 and 9 [of AR 600-8-24] 

mandate that upon the initiation of elimination proceedings for a probationary officer, the initiating official must 

advise ‘the officer that he or she has [thirty] calendar 

days . . . to prepare a written statement or rebuttal’ and 

that the initiating official may take action upon receipt of 

the statement.” Decision at *3 (quoting AR 600-8-24 

¶ 4-19, Table 4-2); App’x 60–61. There is no dispute that 

the General Officer Show Cause Authority failed to consider Mr. Cunningham’s original written rebuttal statement documents before the initial recommendation of his 

elimination. Decision at *3; Appellee’s Br. 16. The Court 

of Federal Claims found that “the administrative record indicates that this error was later discovered and remedied 

by the Army.” Decision at *3. After Mr. Cunningham 

acknowledged that the pertinent written rebuttal statements responding to the elimination action were submitted, App’x 102, the Army acknowledged that 

Mr. Cunningham’s rebuttal documents were received on 

March 23, 2022, App’x 101, and still reached the same conclusion. Decision at *2; App’x 100. Because the Army came 

to the same conclusion as its initial recommendation after 

reviewing Mr. Cunningham’s rebuttal statements, any alleged errors in processing Mr. Cunningham’s elimination 

paperwork were harmless.

Mr. Cunningham also argues that the Army committed 

prejudicial error because it did not properly consider Enclosure 4 of Mr. Cunningham’s rebuttal, titled “Article 15 

Set Aside Request with Enclosures.” Appellant’s Br. 6. 

Mr. Cunningham contends that “[t]his proves” the government “cannot properly classify which documentation was

submitted” in his appeal. Id. In response, the government 

argues that “[a]lthough Mr. Cunningham resubmitted the 

evidence from Dr. Walterscheid in his rebuttal materials, 

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CUNNINGHAM v. US 9

the record shows that [the Army] had already considered 

the evidence from Dr. Walterscheid in the Article 15 setaside request.” Appellee’s Br. 18–19 (emphasis in original)

(citing App’x 326).

We agree with the government. AR 27-10 authorizes 

an Article 15 finding to be “set aside” if punishment has 

resulted in a “clear injustice”—for example, the “discovery 

of new evidence unquestionably exculpating the Soldier.” 

AR 27-10 ¶ 3-28(a); App’x 36. However, Mr. Cunningham’s 

set aside request was denied on September 7, 2021, 

App’x 326, which occurred over five months before 

Mr. Cunningham resubmitted his materials and the Army 

received his materials. App’x 102–05; Decision at *3. 

There is substantial evidence showing the Army fully complied with the requirements of AR 600-8-24 before the General Officer Show Cause Authority made its final 

recommendation regarding Mr. Cunningham’s elimination.

C.

Mr. Cunningham also argues that his removal from the 

Army violated AR 27-10. Appellant’s Br. 7–8 (discussing 

Decision at *4). He urges that he was unlawfully removed 

under UCMJ Article 112a because he did not knowingly

and willingly consume a controlled substance. Appellant’s

Br. 8. We disagree.

Under AR 27-10, imposition of punishment under Article 15 requires a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. AR 27-10 ¶ 3-18(l); App’x 30. UCMJ Article 

112a mandates that “[a]ny person subject to this chapter 

who wrongfully uses” cocaine “shall be punished as a courtmartial may direct.” 10 U.S.C. § 912a(a). The Manual for 

Courts-Martial (“MCM”), which interprets the UCMJ, explains that “wrongful use” in Article 112a has two elements: “(a) That the accused used a controlled substance; 

and (b) That the use by the accused was wrongful.” MCM

Part IV ¶ 50.b(2) (2019); App’x 87–88. “Knowledge of the 

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10 CUNNINGHAM v. US

presence of the controlled substance is a required component of use.” MCM Part IV ¶ 50.c(10); App’x 90. However, 

“[k]nowledge of the presence of the controlled substance 

may be inferred from the presence of the controlled substance in the accused’s body or from other circumstantial 

evidence.” MCM Part IV ¶ 50.c(10); App’x 90.

The Court of Federal Claims found that Mr. Cunningham’s urinalysis test detected cocaine at a value above the 

cutoff for cocaine metabolites. Decision at *1; App’x 310. 

There is substantial evidence supporting the conclusion 

that Mr. Cunningham knowingly ingested cocaine, including the evidence from the urinalysis test. Drawing reasonable inferences from the urinalysis test, the Army’s 

determination that Mr. Cunningham’s guilt satisfied the 

burden of proof was also supported by substantial evidence. 

Regardless of the new evidence from Dr. Walterscheid, Decision at *1, “courts cannot substitute their judgment for 

that of the military departments when reasonable minds 

could reach differing conclusions on the same evidence.”

Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 

1983). Therefore, although Mr. Cunningham can identify 

other evidence in the record that could support a contrary 

conclusion, he has not shown that the Army’s decision was 

unsupported by substantial evidence.

III. CONCLUSION

We have considered Mr. Cunningham’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing 

reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Federal 

Claims.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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