Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00450/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00450-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
D. G. Adams
Respondent
William Henry Jackson
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM HENRY JACKSON,

Petitioner,

v.

D. G. ADAMS,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05- 0450 AWI WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION RE PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. Respondent opposes the petition.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 25, 1979, Petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles County Superior Court of

multiple counts of kidnaping, attempted robbery, forcible rape, and oral copulation. The trial court

sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate life sentence.

Petitioner challenges his continued retention in prison following hearings before the

California Board of Prison Terms finding him unsuitable for parole. Petitioner sought relief in the

California court system, filing petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles County

Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court. Each of these

Case 1:05-cv-00450-AWI-WMW Document 34 Filed 09/08/08 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

courts denied relief to Petitioner. The last reasoned opinion was issued by the Los Angeles County

Superior Court on February 24, 2004. However, that court addressed only the issue of whether

parole denial was supported by some evidence, and did not address Petitioner’s contention here that

he was entitled to a fixed term of less than life imprisonment.

LEGAL STANDARDS

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, Petitioner is incarcerated at the Corcoran Substance

Abuse Treatment Center, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

Case 1:05-cv-00450-AWI-WMW Document 34 Filed 09/08/08 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

Case 1:05-cv-00450-AWI-WMW Document 34 Filed 09/08/08 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. th

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner

must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For th

example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due process rights “he must

say so, not only in federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A

general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is insufficient to present the "substance" of such a

federal claim to a state court. See, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982)

(Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance that the "due process ramifications" of an

argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074

(1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal constitutional

guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

 Under the AEDPA, exhaustion can be waived by Respondent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(C). The

Court can also excuse exhaustion if “(I) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such a process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). In this case, Respondent has admitted that the claims in this petition

were exhausted in the state courts.

DISCUSSION

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Petitioner contends that the length of his incarceration is disproportionate to his crime, and

therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment. Petitioner claims that when his crime is compared to those of similar gravity and

magnitude, he has served well beyond a constitutional sentence under the law in effect at the time he

was sentenced. 

Case 1:05-cv-00450-AWI-WMW Document 34 Filed 09/08/08 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner also contends that at the time of his commitment offense in 1976, he was entitled

to prompt term fixing. He claims that he was and is entitled to a “separate parole release hearing,”

and states that he has never had the former indeterminate sentencing law applied to his case or at any

of his parole hearings. 

As Respondent explains, under California law, after being found suitable for parole an inmate

has the right to have his primary term fixed promptly at a number of years that is proportionate to his

individual culpability and his offense. See In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal.3d 639 (1975). In this case,

Petitioner has never had his term fixed. His case is thus governed by In re Bobby Williams, 53

Cal.App.3d 10, 17 (1975), in which the court addressed a similar complaint that an inmate had not

received a timely term-fixing hearing, stating:

In People v. Wingo, supra 14 Cal.3d at page 182, the Supreme Court made clear that a

prisoner serving an indeterminate term has a right to have his term fixed proportionately to

his offense. If within a “reasonable time” (id. At p. 182) the Adult Authority omits or

declines to fix an inmates’s term at less than the maximum, the maximum term will be

deemed to be the term fixed for purposes of measuring the proportionality of the term to the

circumstances of the offense and the offender. (People v. Wingo, supra, at p. 183; see also In

re Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 654, fn. 18.)

Under California law, Petitioner is entitled to have a base term set only after being found

suitable for parole. In re Stanworth, 33 Cal.3d 176, 183 (1982) (under both the 1976 and the current

rules, a life prisoner must first be found suitable for parole before a parole date is set). Because

Petitioner was found unsuitable for parole following his hearings before the California Board of

Prison Terms, Petitioner did not have a base term set. Therefore, Petitioner’s maximum term is

deemed to be life imprisonment.

A criminal sentence that is not proportionate to the crime for which a defendant is convicted

may violate the Eighth Amendment. In Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct.1166 (2003), the Supreme

Court discussed the state of Eighth Amendment proportionality review and held that the only clearly

established governing legal principle is that a “gross disproportionality” review applies to criminal

sentences for a term of years. Id. at 1173. Citing extensively to its past cases dealing with criminal

sentencing and proportionality under the Eighth Amendment, the Court acknowledged that it has

“not established a clear and consistent path for courts to follow.” Id. The Supreme Court held that

Case 1:05-cv-00450-AWI-WMW Document 34 Filed 09/08/08 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 As expressed in his concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)(citing Solem v. Helm, 1

463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983).

“the only relevant clearly established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application

of’ frame work is the gross disproportionality principle, the precise contours of which are unclear,

applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Id. 

In Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct.1179 (2003), the Supreme Court again reviewed the

Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and chose to adopt Justice Kennedy’s view 1

that:

[There are] four principles of proportionality review-- the primacy of the legislature;

the variety of legitimate penological schemes; the nature of our federal system; and,

the requirement that proportionality be guided by objective factors– that inform the

final one: The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between the

crime and the sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly

disproportionate’ to the crime. 

Ewing, at 1186-1187. 

The court must agree with Respondent that Petitioner has not demonstrated that his life

sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crimes. Petitioner forcibly abducted and raped and

sexually assaulted three women, including a fourteen year old girl. Imposition of consecutive life

sentences for kidnaping and use of a deadly weapon has been held not to be disproportionate and not

to violate the Eighth Amendment. See Eckert v. Tansy, 936 F.2d 444, 447-50 (9 Cir. 1991). th

Accordingly, this claim presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.

As set forth above, under Stanworth Petitioner is entitled to have a base term set only after

being found suitable for parole. Petitioner was found unsuitable for parole following his hearings

before the California Board of Prison Terms. Thus, Petitioner’s contention that he was entitled to

prompt term fixing or a “separate parole release hearing,” is without merit and provides no basis for

habeas corpus relief.

//

Case 1:05-cv-00450-AWI-WMW Document 34 Filed 09/08/08 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;

2) The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 7, 2008 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00450-AWI-WMW Document 34 Filed 09/08/08 Page 7 of 7