Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03384/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03384-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory Fulk
Appellant
Charles Murphy
Appellee
Robert Smith
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-3384

CHARLES MURPHY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT SMITH and GREGORY FULK,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois

No. 3:12-cv-00841-SCW — Stephen C. Williams, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 3, 2016 — DECIDED DECEMBER 21, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Charles Murphy was an 

inmate in the Vandalia Correctional Center in Illinois. On July 

25, 2011, correctional officers hit Murphy, fracturing part of 

his eye socket, and left him in a cell without medical attention. 

Murphy sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law theories. 

A jury awarded him damages on some of those claims, including some state-law claims, and the district court awarded attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Two of the defendants now 

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
2 No. 15-3384

appeal and challenge two aspects of the judgment. They argue 

that state-law sovereign immunity bars the state-law claims 

and that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that 25 percent of the damage award be used to pay the attorney fee 

award.

We affirm on the sovereign immunity defense. The Illinois 

doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply to state-law 

claims against a state official or employee who has violated 

statutory or constitutional law. See Leetaru v. Board of Trustees 

of University of Illinois, 32 N.E.3d 583 (Ill. 2015). Murphy alleged and ultimately proved such violations here. On the attorney fee issue, however, we reverse. Under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(d), the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from 

up to 25 percent of the damage award, and the district court 

does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage. 

We remand for entry of a modified judgment. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

We recount the facts in the light reasonably most favorable 

to the verdict, which defendants do not challenge on the merits. On July 25, 2011, plaintiff Charles Murphy was a prisoner 

at the Vandalia Correctional Center. His assigned seat at 

mealtime that day had food and water on it. When he reported the mess, Correctional Officer Robert Smith first told 

him to clean it up himself and later told Murphy to leave the 

dining area. A different officer handcuffed Murphy, and Officer Smith escorted him to a segregation building. When they 

got there, a third officer asked Murphy what unit he normally 

stayed in, but Murphy ignored him. Officer Smith began moving his finger in and out of Murphy’s ear, while asking Murphy if he was deaf and repeating the phrase “you can’t hear, 

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
No. 15-3384 3

you can’t hear.” While this was happening, Lieutenant Gregory Fulk entered the building and saw what was happening.

Now escorted by three officers, Murphy was taken further 

into the segregation unit. Murphy did not struggle with the 

officers as they walked, although he taunted Officer Smith, 

promising what would happen the next time he “ain’t got no 

handcuffs on.” Hearing that, Officer Smith hit Murphy in the 

eye and then applied a choke hold with his arm around Murphy’s throat. Murphy lost consciousness. When he came to, 

Lieutenant Fulk and Officer Smith were pushing him into a 

cell. With his hands still cuffed behind his back, Murphy fell 

face-first into the cell and hit his head on its metal toilet. The 

officers took off his clothes and handcuffs and left without 

having checked his condition.

Thirty or forty minutes later, a nurse came to see Murphy, 

who was ultimately sent to a hospital. His orbital rim—part 

of his eye socket—had been crushed and needed surgery. He 

had that surgery but did not recover completely. As of January 2015, his vision remained doubled and blurred.

In July 2012, Murphy filed suit in the Southern District of 

Illinois. After two rounds of complaint amendments and a 

partial grant of summary judgment for defendants, the case 

was tried to a jury. The jury found for plaintiff Murphy on 

four claims against two defendants—Lieutenant Fulk and Officer Smith, the appellants here. The jury found Officer Smith 

liable on two claims of state-law battery and one federal claim 

of unconstitutional use of force under the Eighth Amendment. The jury also found Lieutenant Fulk liable on a federal 

Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. All told, the jury awarded $241,001 in compensatory and punitive damages against Officer Smith and 

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
4 No. 15-3384

$168,750 against Lieutenant Fulk. The district court reduced 

the combined award to a total of $307,733.82. That reduction 

is not at issue in this appeal. The district court also awarded 

attorney fees and ordered that 10 percent of the damages 

awarded be put toward paying those fees. Officer Smith and 

Lieutenant Fulk have appealed.

II. Sovereign Immunity

The defendants argue first that state-law sovereign immunity bars Murphy’s state-law claims. The district court 

found, and Murphy contends on appeal, that defendants 

waived their state-law sovereign immunity defense. We find 

no waiver but find that state-law sovereign immunity does 

not shield these defendants from liability.

A. Sovereign Immunity in Illinois

Illinois is protected against civil suits in federal court by 

two relevant doctrines. First, the “Eleventh Amendment immunizes unconsenting states from suit in federal court.” Benning v. Board of Regents of Regency Universities, 928 F.2d 775, 777 

(7th Cir. 1991); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13 

(1999) (explaining broader concept of sovereign immunity for 

which “‘Eleventh Amendment immunity ... is convenient 

shorthand”). Second, an Illinois statute provides, with exceptions not relevant here, that “the State of Illinois shall not be 

made a defendant or party in any court.” 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 

5/1. Under the Erie Railroad doctrine, that statute governs 

claims in federal court arising under state law. Benning, 928 

F.2d at 777, citing Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 

While both doctrines are often referred to as “sovereign immunity,” they are not the same. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. Vermont, 

807 F.3d 478, 485–86 (2d Cir. 2015) (distinguishing between 

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
No. 15-3384 5

Eleventh Amendment immunity and broader state sovereign 

immunity under Vermont law). As we explain below, important differences between the federal and state doctrines 

are decisive in this case.

B. Waiver

Before addressing the merits of the state-law sovereign immunity defense, we first address plaintiff Murphy’s argument 

that defendants waived the defense. “[S]overeign immunity 

is a waivable affirmative defense.” Park v. Indiana University 

School of Dentistry, 692 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2012) (Eleventh 

Amendment), citing Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin 

System v. Phoenix International Software, Inc., 653 F.3d 448, 463 

(7th Cir. 2011); see also Lapides v. Board of Regents of University 

System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002) (state’s voluntary removal to federal court waived Eleventh Amendment immunity). If a state does not raise the immunity defense, “a court 

can ignore it.” Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 

381, 389 (1998). Because the defendants never relied and still 

do not rely on Eleventh Amendment immunity, they waived 

that defense. See Park, 692 F.3d at 830 (finding waiver where 

the state “never once raised the issue ... before the district 

court” and declined to raise the issue “even when prompted 

by this court at argument”).1

 1 Like the parties, we rely on Eleventh Amendment case law to address waiver. This is our usual approach under the Erie doctrine because 

procedural issues are governed by federal law in federal courts, and 

waiver is generally treated as procedural. See Herremans v. Carrera Designs, 

Inc., 157 F.3d 1118, 1122–23 (7th Cir. 1998). Even if Illinois law governed 

the waiver issue, there would be no waiver. Illinois appears to permit sovereign immunity waivers only by statute, not by litigation conduct. See 

Township of Jubilee v. State, 960 N.E.2d 550, 555 (Ill. 2011) (“[E]fforts by legal 

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
6 No. 15-3384

State-law sovereign immunity, however, is a defense the 

defendants raised at least five times: in their answer, in the 

final pre-trial conference, in the jury instruction conference, in 

the defendants’ post-trial motion, and on appeal. Those references were explicitly to state-law sovereign immunity. The answer, for example, claimed protection under “statutory sovereign immunity,” and in both the post-trial motion and the 

briefs before this court, the defendants relied on the Illinois 

State Lawsuit Immunity Act.

Plaintiff Murphy has not cited nor have we found any 

comparable case finding a waiver of a sovereign immunity 

defense. Cf. Board of Regents, 653 F.3d at 467 (finding waiver 

where state filed suit in federal district court); Hill v. Blind Industries & Services of Maryland, 179 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(finding waiver when defendant “participat[ed] in extensive 

pre-trial activities and wait[ed] until the first day of trial before objecting ... on Eleventh Amendment grounds”). Other 

circuits hold that equal or less robust efforts to raise the immunity defense do not waive it. See, e.g., Union Pacific Railroad 

Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm’n, 662 F.3d 336, 339–40 (5th 

Cir. 2011) (no waiver when defendant raised issue for first 

time on appeal, after prevailing on a motion for summary 

judgment on the merits); Ashker v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1997) (no waiver when defendants raised issue “in their answer and pretrial statement ... 

 

counsel for the State to defend itself ... will not result in a waiver or forfeiture of the State’s statutory immunity. That is so because only the legislature itself can determine where and when claims against the state will be 

allowed.”), citing People ex rel. Manning v. Nickerson, 702 N.E.2d 1278, 1280 

(Ill. 1998).

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
No. 15-3384 7

and ... in their briefs filed in this court”). We reach the same 

conclusion here.

Plaintiff Murphy relies on the defendants’ apparent willingness to defend this case on the merits. See Neinast v. Texas, 

217 F.3d 275, 279 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Courts have found waiver 

... where the state ... evidenced an intent to defend the suit 

against it on the merits.”). But in this case the significance of 

that willingness is at best equivocal. Both the defendants and 

the district court seemed at times to blend the state-law immunity question with the merits of plaintiff’s claims. For example, the district court said that sovereign immunity did not 

shield the defendants because the jury, in ruling on the battery 

claim, necessarily determined that they acted outside their authority. Murphy v. Smith, No. 3:12-cv-00841-SCW, slip op. at 

17–18 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2015).

That blending would be confusing under federal immunity law, whether under the Eleventh Amendment or doctrines 

of absolute immunity. As we explain below, though, the 

blending of state-law immunity and the merits under Illinois 

law accurately reflects state law. When a plaintiff sues a state 

official or employee, the Illinois case law links state-law immunity to the merits. If a plaintiff adequately alleges and ultimately proves that an Illinois official violated a statute or the 

Constitution, Illinois courts hold that the immunity statute 

does not apply to claims against the individual official. Because of that linkage of immunity to the merits, the defense of 

the case on the merits is quite consistent with defendants’ assertion of state-law sovereign immunity.

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
8 No. 15-3384

C. Illinois Sovereign Immunity for Individual Employees

The Illinois sovereign immunity statute protects the State 

against being “made a defendant or party in any court.” 745 

Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1. Murphy argues that he has not sued the 

State of Illinois but only Illinois state employees. Whether the 

statute covers such state-law claims is a matter of state law. 

Our role is to decide questions of state law as we predict the 

state supreme court would decide them. E.g., Rodas v. Seidlin, 

656 F.3d 610, 626 (7th Cir. 2011) (“When interpreting state law, 

a federal court’s task is to determine how the state’s highest 

court would rule.”); Barger v. State of Indiana, 991 F.2d 394, 396 

(7th Cir. 1993) (“State courts are the final arbiters of state 

law.”).

Naming state employees as defendants would be too simple an evasion of the statute, which “cannot be evaded by 

making an action nominally one against the servants or agents 

of the State when the real claim is against the State of Illinois 

itself and when the State of Illinois is the party vitally interested.” Sass v. Kramer, 381 N.E.2d 975, 977 (Ill. 1978). A substantial body of Illinois case law addresses when and under 

what circumstances the immunity statute applies to claims

against state employees. See Benning, 928 F.2d at 779–80.

A claim against a state official or employee is a claim 

against the state when

“there are (1) no allegations that an agent or employee of the State acted beyond the scope of his 

authority through wrongful acts; (2) the duty alleged to have been breached was not owed to 

the public generally independent of the fact of 

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
No. 15-3384 9

State employment; and (3) where the complained-of actions involve matters ordinarily 

within that employee’s normal and official functions of the State.”

Healy v. Vaupel, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1247 (Ill. 1990), quoting Robb 

v. Sutton, 498 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. App. 1986). That analysis 

can be a difficult one, and the state cases guiding it have “not 

always been consistent.” Leetaru v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 32 N.E.3d 583, 602 (Ill. 2015) (Burke, J., dissenting). Compare Healy, 549 N.E.2d at 313 (applying immunity 

in part because the “relationship between the plaintiff and the 

defendants would not have had a source outside the employment status of the defendants”), with Jinkins v. Lee, 807 N.E.2d 

411, 420 (Ill. 2004) (rejecting a “but-for” state employment immunity analysis).

This case is governed by an important exception to sovereign immunity in suits against state officials or employees. If 

the plaintiff alleges that state officials or employees violated 

“statutory or constitutional law,” “[s]overeign immunity affords no protection.” Healy, 549 N.E.2d at 1247. “This exception is premised on the principle that while legal official acts 

of state officers are regarded as acts of the State itself, illegal 

acts performed by the officers are not.” Leetaru, 32 N.E.3d at 

596. That exception distinguishes Illinois’s sovereign immunity rule from federal law immunity doctrines, which usually 

apply to bar claims regardless of their potential merit. See, 

e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
10 No. 15-3384

92–93, 120–21 (1984) (reversing on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds a judgment on the merits for plaintiffs).2

Fritz v. Johnston, 807 N.E.2d 461 (Ill. 2004), shows the Illinois exception in operation and shows how state-law immunity depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. In that case, 

the plaintiff alleged that state employees conspired to force 

him to retire from his own state job by falsely telling the police 

that he had been making threats. Plaintiff alleged civil conspiracy and intentional interference with employment. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed dismissal of the case, holding 

that sovereign immunity did not apply because the plaintiff’s 

factual allegations matched the criminal offense of disorderly 

conduct. Id. at 467, citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/26-l(a)(4) (West 

1998).

This court’s Illinois sovereign immunity cases have 

acknowledged this exception to sovereign immunity but most 

often have found that the exception did not apply. See, e.g., 

Turpin v. Koropchak, 567 F.3d 880, 884 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Nothing 

 

2 The Illinois exception for illegal acts by state officials resembles the 

federal rule under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), but has much 

broader effects. Ex parte Young allows federal suits for injunctive and declaratory relief to require state officials to comply with federal law. The 

Illinois exception also allows suits for damages against state employees in 

their individual capacities. Compare MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 222 F.3d 323, 337 (7th Cir. 2000) (“the Ex parte Young

doctrine allows private parties to sue individual state officials for prospective relief to enjoin ongoing violations of federal law”), with Fritz v. Johnston, 807 N.E.2d at 468 (“Whenever a state employee performs illegally 

[or] unconstitutionally ... a suit may still be maintained against the employee in his individual capacity[.]”), quoting Wozniak v. Conry, 679 

N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ill. App. 1997).

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
No. 15-3384 11

in Turpin’s complaint alleges a violation of the State constitution or a statute, so this exception is off the table.”). In particular, Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2001), cabined 

the exception. We noted that the plaintiff had alleged a constitutional violation, but we found that sovereign immunity 

applied nonetheless because the plaintiff’s state-law claims 

were “not dependent on the alleged constitutional violation.” 

Id. at 442. Richman, however, preceded Fritz, which permitted 

state-law claims that did not depend on constitutional or statutory violations. Fritz, 807 N.E.2d at 467.

Richman also preceded Leetaru, which just last year reaffirmed the exception in broad terms, over a dissent that would 

have narrowed it to a scope closer to the federal Ex parte Young 

doctrine. Leetaru, 32 N.E.3d at 611–12 (Burke, J., dissenting). 

Despite the force of the dissent, our role under Erie is to take 

the Leetaru majority opinion at its word: the exception applies 

whenever “agents of the State have acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law.” Id. at 597 (majority opinion).

In this case, Murphy alleged and then proved that the defendants’ actions violated the United States Constitution. He 

also alleged and proved the factual elements of the Illinois 

criminal offense of aggravated battery. That statute requires 

(1) “a battery, other than by the discharge of a firearm,” and 

(2) that the defendant “knowingly ... [c]auses great bodily 

harm.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-3.05(a)(l) (West Supp. 2016) 

(effective July 1, 2011). Murphy alleged and proved to the jury 

that Officer Smith punched his face and head and choked 

him, then threw him into a cell with such force that he hit his 

face on a metal toilet. Officer Smith did so “without justification.” Cf. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-3(a) (West 2002) (defining 

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
12 No. 15-3384

criminal battery as contact “without legal justification”). Murphy suffered “serious and permanent injury” and required reconstructive surgery. Since Murphy alleged and proved that 

Smith and Fulk acted “in violation of statutory or constitutional law,” sovereign immunity does not bar his state-law 

claims. Fritz, 807 N.E.2d at 467, quoting Healy, 549 N.E.2d at 

1247.3

III. Attorney Fee

The Prison Litigation Reform Act sets limits on attorney 

fees awarded to prisoners who prevail in civil rights cases. 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(d). Whenever such a prisoner receives a monetary judgment, “a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 

percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s 

fees awarded against the defendant.” § 1997e(d)(2).

The district court interpreted that language to permit it to 

exercise its discretion in choosing the percentage of the damage award that should go toward the attorney fee, so long as 

the choice was no greater than 25 percent. The court allocated 

10 percent of the damage award to satisfy the attorney fee 

award. That interpretation is consistent with decisions of 

 

3 We emphasize that Murphy both alleged and proved the violations in 

this case. Most Illinois cases dealing with this exception to sovereign immunity focus on the plaintiff’s allegations because the appeals have arisen 

from motions to dismiss on the pleadings. We believe Illinois also requires 

a plaintiff ultimately to prove the alleged violations. For example, Leetaru

explained that “sovereign immunity affords no protection when agents of 

the State have acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of their authority,” and in reversing dismissal on the pleadings, the 

court allowed defendants on remand to show their conduct was not “in 

fact” unauthorized, illegal, or in violation of plaintiff’s rights. See 32 

N.E.3d at 597 (emphasis added).

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
No. 15-3384 13

other circuits, which allow such discretion. See Boesing v. 

Spiess, 540 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 2008) (“plain language of 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) does not require the district court to automatically apply 25 percent of the judgment to pay attorney’s 

fees”); Parker v. Conway, 581 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2009) (agreeing with Boesing).

We have read the statute differently. In Johnson v. Daley, 

339 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), we explained that 

§ 1997e(d)(2) required that “attorneys’ compensation come[] 

first from the damages.” “[O]nly if 25% of the award is inadequate to compensate counsel fully” does the defendant contribute more to the fees. Id. We continue to believe that is the 

most natural reading of the statutory text. We do not think the 

statute contemplated a discretionary decision by the district 

court. The statute neither uses discretionary language nor 

provides any guidance for such discretion.

Accordingly, we REMAND the case to the district court to 

modify its judgment to require Murphy to pay from the judgment the sum of $76,933.46 toward satisfying the attorney fee 

the court awarded. In all other respects the judgment is 

AFFIRMED.

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
14 No. 15-3384

MANION, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join the court’s opinion. I write separately to address the scope of Illinois’ sovereign immunity defense for state employees sued in their individual capacities, which has been a difficult issue for the Illinois state courts. Because the plaintiff in this case prevailed 

on federal constitutional claims as well as state claims, only a 

small portion of the judgment is at stake in this appeal. Yet the 

case still presents an important issue of state law: to what extent Illinois’ State Lawsuit Immunity Act and the Court of 

Claims Act confines intentional tort claims against state employees to the Illinois Court of Claims.

The State Lawsuit Immunity Act prohibits the State of Illinois from being named as a defendant in any court, with limited exceptions. 745 ILCS 5/1. One of those exceptions is the 

Court of Claims Act, which created that court as the “exclusive forum for resolving lawsuits against the state.” People ex 

rel. Manning v. Nickerson, 702 N.E.2d 1278, 1280 (Ill. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). It provides in relevant part 

that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over “[a]ll 

claims against the State for damages sounding in tort.” 705 

ILCS 505/8(d). In effect, the State’s limited waiver of sovereign 

immunity gives it home-court advantage when it defends tort 

claims for damages. See Loman v. Freeman, 890 N.E.2d 446, 458 

(Ill. 2008) (no right to a jury trial in the Court of Claims); 

Reichert v. Court of Claims, 786 N.E.2d 174, 177 (Ill. 2003) (no 

right to appeal the merits of a Court of Claims decision).

The dispositive question here is whether state-law portions of this suit (the battery claims) against the defendant 

prison guards are really “against the State” for the purposes 

of these statutes. The most natural reading of the statute 

seems to preclude any court other than the Illinois Court of 

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15
No. 15-3384 15

Claims from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s intentional tort claim. Battery is a tort and the defendants here were 

acting in the scope of their state employment when they (according to the jury) battered the plaintiff. Had they not been

doing so, the Illinois Attorney General’s office would not have 

appeared on their behalf, as it did in the district court and in 

this court. 5 ILCS 350/2(a) & (e) (providing that the Illinois Attorney General will appear on behalf of a state employee sued 

for something “arising out of any act or omission occurring 

within the scope of the employee’s State employment” and indemnify upon judgment against the employee in such cases). 

In every practical sense, this is a judgment that “could operate 

to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability.” Currie v. Lao, 592 N.E.2d 977, 980 (Ill. 1992).

However, the Illinois Supreme Court has construed 

“against the State” more narrowly in suits against state employees. See, e.g., Leetaru v. Bd. of Trs., 32 N.E.3d 583, 596 (Ill. 

2015); Loman, 890 N.E.2d at 462.1 That court would hold that 

the defendants here acted outside their authority and therefore that immunity does not apply. We are bound to follow 

that court’s holdings and reasoning. Therefore, I join the opinion of the court in full.

 1 Several opinions of Illinois’ intermediate appellate court read the 

Court of Claims Act more broadly; their reasoning would bring the plaintiff’s battery claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of 

Claims. See, e.g., Grainger v. Harrah’s Casino, 18 N.E.3d 265, 273‒75 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 2014); Sellers v. Rudert, 918 N.E.2d 586, 591‒92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); 

Welch v. Illinois Supreme Court, 751 N.E.2d 1187, 1194 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); 

Campbell v. White, 566 N.E.2d 47, 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). However, we are 

bound only by the opinions of Illinois’ highest court.

Case: 15-3384 Document: 49 Filed: 12/21/2016 Pages: 15