Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-06-01235/USCOURTS-ca6-06-01235-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anitra Coomer
Appellant
Joan Yukins
Appellee

Document Text:

*

The Honorable Harold A. Ackerman, Senior United States District Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting

by designation.

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0263p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

ANITRA COOMER,

 Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

JOAN YUKINS, Warden,

 Respondent-Appellee.

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No. 06-1235

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

No. 04-72217—Nancy G. Edmunds, District Judge.

Argued: June 10, 2008

Decided and Filed: July 22, 2008 

Before: GIBBONS and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; ACKERMAN, Senior District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Mark A. Satawa, LAW OFFICES, Southfield, Michigan, for Appellant. Brad H.

Beaver, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF: Mark A. Satawa, Stuart G. Friedman, LAW OFFICES, Southfield, Michigan, for

Appellant. Brian O. Neill, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing,

Michigan, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION _________________

HAROLD A. ACKERMAN, Senior District Judge. Petitioner-Appellant Anitra Coomer,

a Michigan state prisoner, appeals the dismissal of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Coomer

challenges the District Court’s determination that two of her confessions to murder were not

obtained in violation of Miranda. For the following reasons, we affirm the District Court’s denial

of habeas relief.

1

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I.

A. Kidnaping, Murder, and Police Investigation

On May 16, 1996, Dr. Deborah Iverson, opthamologist and mother of two, was kidnapped

and murdered in her car after she left her psychiatrist’s office in Birmingham, Michigan. Iverson’s

vehicle was found the next day, parked in a rural area of Macomb County. Inside was Iverson’s

body. An autopsy revealed that she had been strangled to death, and further investigation revealed

that two of Iverson’s checks had been cashed at two banks on the morning of her disappearance.

Over seven months later, on December 30, 1996, police officers received a tip that Anitra Coomer

and McConnell Adams were behind the crime.

The evidence at trial established the following circumstances of the case. Coomer and

Adams lived together with their two-year-old son in an apartment in Clawson, Michigan. On

May 16, 1996, their rent was overdue and they owed $480 to their day-care provider. At 9:30 a.m.,

Coomer and Adams dropped their son off with their provider and proceeded to Birmingham, a town

about twenty miles outside of Detroit. Meanwhile, Iverson left her psychiatrist’s office at 9:45 a.m.,

but never returned home. Nearly thirty-six hours later, the police found Iverson’s Toyota Land

Cruiser on the side of a highway. 

Inside the car, the police found Iverson lying face down on the floor of the back seat. They

found blood on the right side of her face and a line mark on her neck. Her jacket was missing a large

square piece and some spots on it were faded. Iverson was clutching in her hand a picture of one

of her sons. The medical examiner performed an autopsy the next day and later testified that Iverson

had been dead for at least twenty-four hours at the time that her remains were discovered. The cause

of death was ligature strangulation, which involved the use of some kind of noose around her neck,

such as a belt. The medical examiner also testified that the ligature pattern indicated that there might

have been a struggle, that the strangulation was not quick, and that it might have been agonizing.

Police did not discover any new leads until December 30, 1996. The day prior, Coomer

telephoned her friend Mark Dawson, telling him that Adams had beaten her. At the time, Coomer

was at the home of another friend, Anita Krawczyk. Dawson went to Krawczyk’s home that

afternoon, and Coomer told him about the Iverson murder. Coomer told Dawson that she and

Adams had originally planned to rob Iverson, but after cashing two checks, Adams strangled Iverson

with Coomer’s belt. Coomer and Adams then sprayed Iverson’s body and the inside of the car with

bleach. Coomer told Dawson that she had not reported Adams’s assault because he was holding the

murder over her. Dawson later testified that Krawczyk later called the police to report the assault.

When the police arrived, Coomer told them that Adams had beaten her and left in a stolen truck.

As Coomer and Krawczyk were driving to the police station to report the domestic assault,

Coomer told her that she was worried about being arrested for the Iverson murder, and that she and

Adams had agreed that if they were ever caught, he would take all the blame so that she could

remain free to raise their son. Shortly thereafter, Adams was arrested for domestic assault.

On December 30, 1996, Dawson’s attorney contacted the sheriff’s department with

information that Coomer was involved in the Iverson murder. Dawson later met with two officers

from the sheriff’s department and told them what Coomer had told him. Police officers left for

Coomer’s apartment later that night.

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B. Police Arrive at Coomer’s Apartment

The facts surrounding Coomer’s confessions at her apartment were explored in considerable

detail during an evidentiary hearing conducted by the Michigan trial court. The court summarized

the testimony as follows:

The evidence here showed that approximately nine to eleven officers were at the

scene of Defendant Coomer’s apartment on December 30, 1996 at about 11:45 p.m.

Defendant Coomer testified that two marked cars were parked in a manner that she

could observe them blocking her vehicle, while all other witnesses testified that no

police vehicles were parked in a manner that Defendant Coomer could observe them

out any of her apartment windows.

Defendant Coomer [testified that] she had never had any prior experience with police

officers and had had a friend over one to one and a half hours earlier in the evening

with whom she used alcohol and marijuana. The evidence is not clear as to

w[h]ether she was told that she was under arrest. Sergeant Kucyk indicated that she

had been told that she was not. Defendant indicated that no one told her whether she

was or not. Defendant Coomer was 20 years of age, had graduated from high school

and had a 4.0 grade point average.

There was extensive testimony offered by the People to establish where each officer

stood, what role each officer played and where each officer parked. The testimony

given by numerous officers . . . was consistent as to overall locations and roles with

minor variations as to the exact location of a fellow officer’s vehicle or position.

Defendant testified that when she opened her door, she saw at least three uniformed

officers at her door, while two plain clothes officers stepped from behind a wall.

Defendant further testified that three officers entered her apartment while two

remained outside her door on Detective Kucyk’s instruction. The People elicited

consistent testimony from the officers that placed only three officers at her door with

only two plain officers – two plain clothes officers entering the apartment. Coomer

testified [that] one police officer came inside only momentarily and left within

minutes; thereafter leaving only Kucyk and [Sergeant] Sanborn inside the apartment

when [Coomer’s first confession] was made.

Defendant testified that an officer accompanied her through the apartment while she

searched for cigarettes during her confession. The officers testified this did not occur

and Defendant had had the opportunity to walk throughout her apartment freely at

all times. Finally, Defendant testified that she felt that she was in custody the

moment she saw Sergeant Kucyk at her door because she had seen him on the news

and knew him to be the lead detective in the Iverson homicide investigation.

The evidence further showed that Defendant Coomer invited the officers into her

apartment upon their request [by intercom] and shortly commenced telling them her

version of what she knew about Deborah Iverson. While she . . . was not advised of

her rights until about four hours later, . . . there was no physical or mental abuse of

any nature exercised by the police. While Defendant testified that she had used

alcohol and marijuana earlier, at least one to one and one-half hours had passed since

consumption and there was no apparent signs of intoxication[;] [n]or was Defendant

in ill health or deprived of sleep.

When asked by the Court if she felt coerced in any way, Defendant replied “no.” In

fact, she gave her verbal statements to officers while weeping, suggesting remorse

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but clearly without any signs of threats or coercion appearing from the testimony on

the record.

(JA at 177-78.) In addition, Patrolman Hannah of the Clawson Police Department, who first called

Coomer on her intercom before proceeding to her apartment, had previous contact with Coomer on

matters related to domestic assault. Kucyk testified that he told Coomer, when in her apartment, that

he and Sanborn were present to talk with her, that she was not under arrest, and importantly, that if

she asked them to leave, they would go. Kucyk also stated that he told Coomer several times during

their discussion that she was not under arrest. 

C. Coomer’s Confessions

Once the officers were in the apartment, Coomer asked them to be quiet because her twoyear old son was asleep and offered them refreshments. They all sat at the kitchen table, and Kucyk

indicated that he wanted to speak about Iverson. Kucyk testified that, at that point, Coomer became

shaken, concerned, and hysterical. Coomer asked if she could get her cigarettes from her bedroom,

which she did, and proceeded to tell the officers “the whole story.” (JA at 136.) Coomer then

confessed her involvement in the Iverson murder. Few questions were asked of her; most of her oral

statements were offered in a continuous narrative over the next thirty minutes. Coomer testified that

while she cried at various points during her statements, she had otherwise calmed down once she

began to speak. She also conceded at trial that the oral statement was voluntary, and not compelled

or coerced.

After giving this oral statement, Coomer prepared a written statement for the police. This

written statement was later excluded by the state trial court and is not the subject of this appeal.

After writing down her statement, Sergeant Kucyk asked if Coomer would accompany him to the

sheriff’s department. Coomer agreed and was allowed to arrange for a babysitter for her son.

Coomer was transported by Sergeants Sanborn and Roberts and was provided with cigarettes and

a soda on the way to the station, arriving at approximately 3:30 a.m. 

At the station, Coomer was escorted to an interview room, where Kucyk joined them. Kucyk

had last seen Coomer about an hour earlier in her apartment. Kucyk told Coomer that the

circumstances had changed, that she was now in custody, and that he was required to read her

Miranda rights. Coomer was given Miranda warnings at 3:40 a.m. and was offered a waiver of

rights form dated December 31, 1996. Coomer declined an offer of food. Kucyk then intimated that

he wished to question her some more. Coomer agreed and repeated her story, adding some minor

details of the crime. This statement lasted about thirty to forty-five minutes, and Coomer

acknowledged at the trial court hearing that she waived her rights and spoke freely with the officers.

D. Coomer’s Trial Testimony

Coomer testified at trial on her own behalf. She said that while she and Adams planned to

rob a woman, she did not expect anyone to get hurt and that Adams made all the decisions. She

stated that Adams noticed the Land Cruiser, checked its parking meter, looked inside, and saw

certain items likely to be in a woman’s possession. When Iverson approached her car, Adams placed

a BB gun to Iverson’s back and forced her into her car. According to Coomer, when Adams asked

for Coomer’s belt, he said that he was just going to tie up Iverson. After giving him the belt,

Coomer went into the Arbor drug store. When she returned, she resumed driving and did not look

in the back seat. When she stopped at a stop sign, Coomer looked in the rearview mirror and saw

that Adams was no longer kneeling over Iverson on the floor, but was sitting in the back seat.

“Anitra,” Adams said, “it’s done. It’s over.” Coomer testified that she then began to cry.

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1

While not relevant to our Opinion, we note that the Court of Appeals vacated Coomer’s kidnaping conviction

because “defendant’s convictions and sentences for both felony murder and the underlying felony of kidnaping violate

her right against double jeopardy.” (JA at 139.) 

2

The named appellee, Joan Yukins, was the warden of Coomer’s state correctional facility at the time that

Coomer filed suit, and is represented by the State of Michigan. 

According to Coomer, Adams told her to drive home, where Adams picked up another

vehicle. They then drove out to Macomb County and left Iverson’s lifeless body in her car on the

side of a highway. On December 31, 1996, police officers executed a search warrant at Coomer’s

apartment and found her black leather coat with belt loops, but no belt, and a spray bottle of bleach

under the sink.

E. Procedural Background

Coomer was tried jointly with Adams but before separate juries in Michigan’s Circuit Court

for the County of Oakland. The trial court excluded Coomer’s written confession made in her

apartment on the ground that it violated Miranda. However, the trial court permitted the admission

of her two oral confessions: the first at her apartment, the other at the police station. The jury found

Coomer guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, and one count of kidnaping. The trial court

sentenced Coomer to life imprisonment for the murder and fifteen to sixty years for the kidnaping.

The Michigan Court of Appeals vacated Coomer’s kidnaping conviction on double jeopardy grounds

and affirmed Coomer’s murder conviction.1

 Coomer appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court but

was denied leave to appeal. See People v. Coomer, 465 Mich. 894 (2001) (table). 

Coomer filed her federal habeas corpus petition in the Eastern District of Michigan on

June 15, 2004.2

 Among other arguments, Coomer contended that her first oral confession in her

apartment was taken in violation of Miranda, and that her confession at the police station was

insufficiently removed from the taint of the Miranda violation arising from her written confession

in her apartment. The District Court denied Coomer’s petition, finding that the state courts’

conclusions “were not entirely unreasonable” inasmuch as they held that Coomer’s oral confessions

were lawfully obtained. (JA at 83 (emphasis added).) The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and this Court exercises jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, placed

“a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Coomer’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be granted

only if she can show that the state court’s adjudication of her claims on the merits:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by th[e Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than th[e Supreme] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Conversely, “[u]nder the ‘unreasonable

application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from th[e Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. A state court need not cite Supreme Court

cases on point or even be aware of such cases, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam).

“Furthermore, state findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the defendant can rebut the

presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” Baze v. Parker, 371 F.3d 310, 318 (6th Cir. 2004)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). This review is conducted in light of the law as it existed at the time

of the final state court decision, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989), unless an intervening

decision of constitutional import announces a “watershed” rule of criminal law with implications

for the fundamental fairness of the trial proceeding, Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396 (1994).

This Court reviews the District Court’s legal conclusions de novo. Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663,

671 (6th Cir. 2001).

Coomer made three confessions to the police. While the state trial court excluded Coomer’s

written confession made at her apartment, the court admitted Coomer’s oral statements made at her

apartment and at the police station. We will thus examine only the admission of Coomer’s two oral

statements because the exclusion of her written confession in her apartment is not raised in this

appeal.

B. The Oral Confession at Coomer’s Apartment

1. State Court Decisions

The state trial court permitted Coomer’s oral confession at her apartment to be admitted at

trial. It reasoned that Coomer “was in her own apartment in the presence of another individual

known to her,” and that the “questioning was minimal and brief.” (JA at 179.) It concluded that a

reasonable person would not have felt like he or she was in custody, and thus, the police were not

required to issue a Miranda warning. The Michigan Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion:

The evidence showed that defendant permitted the police officers to enter her

apartment building and permitted [them] to enter her apartment. . . . The officers did

not display weapons, and Kucyk indicated that he informed defendant several times

that she was not under arrest. Kucyk also told defendant that if she wanted them to

leave, they would go. . . . Defendant proceeded to give a statement, largely in

narrative form, with little police questioning. She fully acknowledged that she was

not compelled or coerced to give a statement.

(JA at 137.) Thus, the court held that “the totality of the circumstances indicates that Coomer was

not in custody at her apartment.” (JA at 137.) 

2. Supreme Court Precedent

We begin by determining the relevant, clearly established law. We must ascertain, de novo, whether the state court decisions concerning Coomer’s first oral statement were contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

clearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States “refers to the

holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court

decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

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The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. In the seminal case of

Miranda v. Arizona, the Court held that pre-interrogation warnings are required in the context of

custodial interrogations given “the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.” 384 U.S. 436,

458 (1966). The Court defined “custodial interrogation” to include any circumstance where a

suspect “deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to

questioning[.]” Id. at 478. However, the Court did not have occasion to apply that test to a set of

facts. 

In succeeding cases, the Court has fleshed out the relevant law concerning the circumstances

under which a suspect may be considered in custody. In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court instructed

that “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have

understood his situation.” 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). “A policeman’s unarticulated plan has no

bearing on the question [of] whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular time[.]” Id. The

Court elaborated further in Stansbury v. California, which was cited and relied upon by the

Michigan Court of Appeals in this case. 511 U.S. 318 (1994). In Stansbury, the Supreme Court

explained that “the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the

interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person

being questioned.” Id. at 323.

Subsequent to Stansbury, the Supreme Court framed the proper inquiry as involving two

essential questions: “[F]irst, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second,

given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to

terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). The Court

directed that “[o]nce the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are reconstructed, the court

must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on

freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id.

The Sixth Circuit added further guidance on the custody determination in United States v.

Salvo, where this Court explained that courts should consider the following factors:

(1) the purpose of the questioning; (2) whether the place of the questioning was

hostile or coercive; (3) the length of the questioning; and (4) other indicia of custody

such as whether the suspect was informed at the time that the questioning was

voluntary or that the suspect was free to leave or to request the officers to do so;

whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during

questioning; and whether the suspect initiated contact with the police or voluntarily

admitted the officers to the residence and acquiesced to their requests to answer some

questions.

133 F.3d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1998). 

3. Analysis

For the following reasons, we conclude that the state court decisions were not unreasonable,

and that Coomer’s oral confession in her apartment was properly admitted. Examining the totality

of the circumstances, and mindful of the Salvo factors, the evidence at trial showed that a reasonable

person would not have ultimately felt that his or her freedom was restrained in a manner associated

with a formal arrest. At the outset, we recognize that some facts could support a custodial

determination. For instance, Coomer testified that the police arrived at a late hour; that police cars

blocked her vehicle on her driveway; that up to eleven officers, uniformed and plain-clothed, came

to Coomer’s building; and that the purpose of the police questioning was, as Coomer alleges, to

focus the investigation on Coomer herself. However, that the police did not already have probable

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3

At oral argument, Coomer’s counsel stressed the distinction between a suspect being told that she is “free to

leave,” and a suspect being told that the officers would leave if asked. Coomer’s novel distinction is one without a

difference. Of course, when the officers are present in a suspect’s home, the more appropriate inquiry is not whether

the suspect feels free to leave, per se, but rather, whether the police will terminate questioning if asked to leave, as the

Czichary court suggests. See 378 F.3d at 826 (“That a person is told repeatedly that he is free to terminate an interview

is powerful evidence that a reasonable person would have understood that he was free to terminate the interview.”)

(emphasis added); see also Salvo, 133 F.3d at 950 (impressing that one factor for a court to consider in the custody

inquiry is whether a suspect was “free to leave or to request the officers to do so”) (emphasis added); United States v.

Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 951 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[The Officer] repeatedly told the defendants that they were not under arrest

and that they were free to cut off his questioning at any point.”) (emphasis added). Similarly, that Coomer was told

repeatedly that the police would leave if asked is powerful evidence that a reasonable person would have understood that

she was free to ask the police to leave and terminate the questioning.

cause to arrest Coomer is immaterial to our analysis here, because “any inquiry into whether the

interrogating officers have focused their suspicions upon the individual being questioned (assuming

those suspicions remain undisclosed) is not relevant for purposes of Miranda.” Stansbury, 511 U.S.

at 326. More importantly, no one factor is “dispositive of the custody issue.” Id. at 325. 

Other material facts support the state courts’ decisions. First, Coomer voluntarily allowed

the police into her apartment building and was questioned in her own home. While an interrogation

in one’s home is not determinative alone of the custodial inquiry, it is usually indicative of the

absence of the isolation inherent in custodial interrogations. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.

341, 346 n.7, 347 (1976) (finding that the suspect, who was questioned in his home, “hardly found

himself in the custodial situation described by the Miranda Court as the basis for its holding[,]”

because Miranda concerned “the principal psychological factor” of “isolating the suspect in

unfamiliar surroundings ‘for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his

examiner’”) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457). 

Second, Coomer’s confession lasted only thirty minutes, taking the form primarily of a

narrative and prompted by little police questioning. This fact suggests that Coomer was relieved to

discuss her role in a murder after more than six months of avoiding the authorities. The trial court

also noted that Coomer’s teary demeanor reinforced the impression that Coomer exuded remorse,

and we add that the merely intermittent police questioning and Coomer’s narrative confession

suggest an act born of free will, not an act born of coercion. In other words, if Coomer was coerced,

it was not by the police, but by her conscience. 

Third, and perhaps most significantly, Kucyk testified that he told Coomer several times that

she was not under arrest and that the police would leave if asked. See Salvo, 133 F.3d at 951

(acknowledging that one of the most important factors in the custody inquiry is whether an officer

explicitly informs a suspect that he or she is not under arrest). The state court’s adjudication cannot

be unreasonable where “no governing precedent of the Supreme Court or . . . court of appeals

[decision] that can be located . . . holds that a person was in custody after being clearly advised of

his freedom to leave or terminate questioning.”3

 United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822, 826 (8th

Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A]dvising a

defendant that he is free to leave and is not in custody is a powerful factor in the mix, and generally

will lead to the conclusion that the defendant is not in custody[.]”) (emphasis in original); Salvo, 133

F.3d at 950 (recognizing that a statement by an officer to a suspect that he was “free to leave at any

time . . . is an important factor in finding that the suspect was not in custody.”). 

To be sure, Coomer testified that her subjective belief was that she was not free to leave, but

the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed courts to dismiss a suspect’s subjective thoughts. See,

e.g., Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323. At the same time, Coomer conceded at trial that her confession was

not coerced or compelled. (JA at 420.) Coomer moved freely around her apartment, offered the

officers refreshments, and told the officers to stay quiet out of respect for her sleeping son. These

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4

Harmless error analysis applies to coerced confessions. Ariz. v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991).

Because we affirm the District Court’s holding regarding Coomer’s first confession, we need not reach Coomer’s

argument that the admission of this confession had a substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury’s verdict.

Cf. Jordan v. Hurley, 397 F.3d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 2005) (engaging in harmless error analysis after finding confrontation

clause error).

facts imply that Coomer exercised control over her surroundings in her own home, not that she was

controlled by her interrogators, as was the concern in Miranda. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we find that the state courts’ decisions that a reasonable

person would not have felt in custody in Coomer’s situation were not unreasonable applications of

the relevant, clearly established law. 

Coomer argues that this Court should proceed directly to a harmless error analysis because

she presupposes that she was in custody prior to her first confession. She contends that the District

Court “held that Ms. Coomer was in custody at the time of the first half of her initial confession, and

therefore in violation of Miranda[,]” but that despite this violation, the court found the error

harmless because, in the District Court’s words, it did not have a “‘substantial and injurious’ effect”

on the jury’s verdict. (Appellant’s Br. at 44 (quoting JA at 85).) 

Coomer profoundly misconstrues the District Court’s holding. The District Court held that

“[t]he question of custody is a close one, and the state courts’ conclusions were not entirely

unreasonable.” (JA at 83.) However, Coomer appears to be relying on dicta set forth earlier in the

District Court’s ruling, where it wrote that “[t]he objective circumstances of the interrogation lead

the Court to conclude that Petitioner was in custody and should have been advised of her

constitutional rights before she made her first statement.” (Id.) To the extent that the District Court

opined that Coomer was in custody during her first statement, this Court does not share that

perspective for the purposes of our limited review under AEDPA. 

As the Supreme Court has explained, and the District Court below accurately echoed, “a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the state-court decision applied [the law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S.

19, 24-25 (2002) (per curiam); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (“It is not

enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a firm

conviction that the state court was erroneous.”) (internal quotations omitted). The standard of

review is limited to determining whether, “after the closest examination of the state-court judgment,

a federal court is firmly convinced that a federal constitutional right has been violated,” Williams,

529 U.S. at 389, by virtue of a state court’s “objectively unreasonable” application of Supreme Court

precedent, Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002).

The state courts’ decisions finding that Coomer’s first oral confession was not obtained in

violation of Miranda were not unreasonable applications of Supreme Court precedent. No

governing Supreme Court decision has held that a defendant in Coomer’s circumstances – where

she was told that she was not under arrest and that the police would leave if asked – was in custody

for purposes of Miranda. We affirm the District Court’s holding concerning Coomer’s first oral

confession.4

C. Coomer’s Oral Confession at the Police Station

While we conclude that Coomer’s first oral statement was admissible, we proceed to examine

whether Coomer’s confession at the police station was properly made insofar as it relates to

Coomer’s intervening second confession, which the state courts found was obtained in violation of

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5

The trial court found that Coomer’s written confession had immediately followed her verbal confession, and

thus, “a reasonable person who had just orally implicated herself in a crime of this nature who sits down to put that

implication in writing at the request of an officer would not reasonably think that they would be free to leave.” (JA at

180.) 

At oral argument, counsel for Coomer focused extensively on the seeming incongruity between the Michigan

trial court’s determination that Coomer’s first confession in her apartment was lawfully obtained, while her second,

written confession just moments later was not. We do not review the lawfulness of Coomer’s written confession here.

However, we note that the trial court’s reasoning to exclude Coomer’s written confession best encapsulates our view

of the operative distinction between the oral and written confessions in Coomer’s apartment.

Miranda.

5

 See United States v. Gale, 952 F.2d 1412, 1417 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (analyzing

admissibility of the defendant’s fourth statement “only as it relates to his second and third

statements” because there was no Miranda violation involved with the first statement).

1. State Court Decisions

Both state court decisions found that Coomer’s oral confession at the police station was

admissible. The trial court determined that Coomer was properly Mirandized prior to her

confession, and that no evidence suggested undue coercion by the police to obtain a waiver of her

rights. The Michigan Court of Appeals went further, agreeing that Coomer had been properly

Mirandized, and also holding that Coomer’s confession was sufficiently disconnected from the prior

unlawful written statement made by Coomer in her apartment:

Here, defendant was in custody at the police station, she was fully advised of her

Miranda rights, and she waived those rights. Defendant’s contention that a

reasonable person would not have felt at liberty to terminate the second oral

statement is simply not supported by the record. There is no indication that the

second oral statement given at the police station was obtained illegally or

involuntarily. 

Further, the second oral statement given at the police station was not fruit of the

poisonous tree based on the contention that the written statement given at

defendant’s apartment should have been preceded by Miranda warnings.

Suppression of the oral statement given by defendant at the police station would not

be appropriate absent a causal connection between that statement and the earlier,

improperly written statement. . . . 

[T]here was a time lapse of approximately three hours between the written statement

made at the apartment and the second oral statement at the police station. . . . At the

police station, defendant was properly advised of her Miranda rights before giving

her second oral statement. Under these circumstances, the statement given at the

police station is sufficiently disconnected from the prior written statement that the

later oral statement cannot be considered the fruit of the poisonous tree.

(JA at 138 (emphasis added).) Thus, the Michigan Court of Appeals found no error in the trial

court’s admission of Coomer’s second oral confession.

2. Supreme Court Precedent

Coomer maintains that her confession at the police station was tainted by her earlier,

improper written confession in her apartment. The Supreme Court spoke directly to this

circumstance in Oregon v. Elstad:

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It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer

the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances

calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will, so taints the

investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective

for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires that the unwarned

admission must be suppressed, the admissibilty of any subsequent statement should

turn . . . solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.

470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (emphasis added). 

Elstad involved a young suspect who was interrogated without being Mirandized by police

in his home, where he first confessed to a crime. After the suspect was taken to the police station

and given proper warnings, he again confessed. The suspect argued at trial that his second

confession should not be admitted because it was the fruit of the first tainted confession. The

Supreme Court refused to adopt the suspect’s “cat out of the bag” theory and held that “a careful and

thorough administration of Miranda warnings serves to cure the condition that rendered the

unwarned statement inadmissible.” Id. at 310-11. The Supreme Court reasoned that the change in

location and circumstances, and the lack of any evidence suggesting that the police exploited the

suspect’s unwarned admission to secure the second, supported its finding that the suspect’s waiver

of his rights was freely given. Thus, the Court held that the second confession was not tainted by

the first confession. 

In deciding whether a second confession has been tainted by the prior coerced statement, the

Supreme Court instructed courts to consider “the time that passes between confessions, the change

in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of interrogators[.]” Id. at 310. A plurality of

the Court recently elaborated on these factors, directing courts to examine “the completeness and

detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the

two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel,

and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the

first.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 622

(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that Elstad controls absent a deliberate evasion of Miranda by the

police). 

3. Analysis

We find that the state courts’ decisions that Coomer’s second confession was lawfully

obtained were not unreasonable applications of Supreme Court precedent. As the Michigan Court

of Appeals held, we conclude that there is “no indication that the second oral statement given at the

police station was obtained illegally or involuntarily.” (JA at 138.) At the police station, Coomer

was offered food, and she acknowledged at the trial court hearing that she waived her rights and

spoke freely with the officers. Her Miranda warnings were complete, and the record before us

supports the conclusion that Coomer’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.

 Coomer argues that her police station confession was tainted by her earlier, unlawfully

obtained written confession. The Michigan Court of Appeals addressed this question, and noted

several factors in finding that the second confession did not need to be suppressed: the time lapse

of approximately three hours between the written statement in Coomer’s apartment and her

confession at the police station; the absence of coercive police conduct; the change in location; the

voluntary nature of her first oral statement that immediately preceded the unlawful written

confession; and her waiver of rights at the police station. 

We agree with the Michigan court. Like the suspect in Elstad, Coomer was administered

complete Miranda warnings and offered her second oral confession in different circumstances than

those surrounding her written confession. Kucyk testified that, once they arrived at the police

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station, he told Coomer that the circumstances had changed, that she was now in custody, and that

he was required to read her Miranda rights. While Coomer offered much of the same story as she

discussed at her apartment, and the police personnel remained largely the same, several hours had

passed since her first oral confession, Coomer was confined in the police station, and, crucially,

Coomer had been Mirandized. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 (“A subsequent administration of

Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should

suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.”). Even under

the Seibert plurality’s test, a reasonable person in Coomer’s shoes “could have seen the station house

questioning as a new and distinct experience,” and “the Miranda warnings could have made sense

as presenting a genuine choice whether to follow up on the earlier admission.” 542 U.S. at 615-16.

Coomer relies on Seibert to argue that Coomer’s second oral confession was tainted by her

unlawfully obtained written confession to the extent that her police house confession must be found

involuntary. In Seibert, Miranda warnings given mid-interrogation, after the suspect gave an

unwarned confession, were found ineffective, 542 U.S. at 617 (plurality opinion), because the police

employed a “technique . . . designed to circumvent Miranda,” id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

In any event, the District Court here distinguished the facts of Seibert: “Unlike the coordinated and

continuing interrogation in Seibert where Miranda warnings were given midstream, [Coomer’s]

statement at the Sheriff’s Department was subject to independent evaluation.” (JA at 88.) We agree.

Coomer’s new circumstance at the sheriff’s department “placed [her] in a position where she could

make an informed choice about whether to waive her constitutional rights.” (Id.) Indeed, she was

in a new location (at the station instead of in her home), there had been a break in time between the

two statements (the written confession was made at approximately 12:30 a.m., the station confession

at about 3:40 a.m.), and Kucyk specifically informed her that she was in custody (in direct contrast

to being told that the officers would leave if asked). Thus, unlike the suspect’s latter statement in

Seibert, Coomer’s police station confession was “sufficiently disconnected from the prior written

statement[.]” (Id. at 138.) Furthermore, the substantial similarity between Coomer’s voluntary oral

confession in her home and the oral confession at the police station makes it questionable whether

the intervening, improper written confession could have had any causal effect on the voluntariness

of the subsequent police house statement. Cf. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1469 (10th Cir.

1993) (examining whether later confessions were the “involuntary products” of an earlier, improper

confession). That the state courts admitted Coomer’s police station confession thus was not

unreasonable.

Coomer argues that “the District Court clearly erred in applying the facts of this case to the

multi-factor test” set out in Elstad and Seibert. (Appellant’s Br. at 38.) However, we review not

whether the District Court erred, but whether the state court decisions constituted unreasonable or

contrary applications of Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. For the foregoing reasons, we cannot find that they were. It was not an unreasonable

determination of the facts to conclude that Coomer’s waiver was knowing and voluntary when made,

nor an unreasonable or contrary application of Supreme Court precedent to hold that her second

confession was sufficiently disconnected from the taint of Coomer’s excluded written confession.

III.

We AFFIRM the District Court’s denial of Coomer’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

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