Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-07023/USCOURTS-ca10-89-07023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Louis W. Sullivan
Appellee
Wanda Talley
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Uflited Scares Court o{ Ap~ 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

JUL 11 1990 

~OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WANDA TALLEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of 

Health and Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 89-7023 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 88-113-C) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Paul F. McTighe, Jr., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Roger Hilfiger, United States Attorney, Donald A. Gonya, Chief 

Counsel for Social Security, Randolph w. Gaines, Deputy Chief 

Counsel for Social Security, A. George Lowe, Chief, Disability 

Litigation Branch, Donald H. Romano, Office of the General 

Counsel, Social Security Division, Department of Health and Human 

Services, Baltimore, Maryland, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

After examining the briefs and appellate r8cord, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument woul.d not materially 

Appellate Case: 89-7023 Document: 01019434693 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 1 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a}; lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff, Wanda Talley, appeals from an order of the 

district court affirming the final decision of the Secretary 

denying her application for disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 416(i} and 423 and for Supplemental Security Income benefits 

under 42 U.S.C. § 138la. 

Plaintiff applied for benefits in 1983. Her claim was 

denied. She did not request a hearing and the decision became 

final January 13, 1984. Plaintiff then refiled. This application 

was also denied. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an 

administrative law judge (ALJ) who denied benefits. The ALJ held 

that while plaintiff could not return to her prior work, she could 

perform light work. The Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's 

decision and remanded for the purpose of receiving expert 

vocational testimony regarding the transferability of plaintiff's 

work skills. After a hearing, benefits were again denied and the 

Appeals Council denied review. 

On appeal plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision was not 

supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, he erred in 

basing his decision on the grids1 , in not following the vocational 

expert's testimony, and in finding plaintiff's complaints of pain 

not credible. 

"Our review of social security administration cases is 

usually quite limited. 'The Secretary's decision must be 

l Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P, App 2. 

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Appellate Case: 89-7023 Document: 01019434693 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 2 
sustained if supported 

court does not we igh the 

by substantial evidence. 

evidence and may not 

The reviewing 

substitute its 

discretion for tha t of the agency.'" So~enson v. Bowen, 888 F. 2d 

706 , 710-11 {lOth Cir. l989)(quoting Cagle v. Califano , 638 F . 2d 

219 , 220 (lOth Cir . 198l)(citations omitted) . Substantial 

evidence is "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (l97l)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. 

v. NLRB, 305 U. S . 197 , 229 (1938)). 

The evidence showed that plaintiff had a discectomy and 

l ami nectomy of the lumbar spine in 1970. She returned to work and 

later became a licensed practical nurse . In April 1983 , plaintiff 

fell and broke her left knee. She claims disability dating from 

this injury. 

plaintiff was 

complained of 

In the months i mmediately following her fall, 

able to walk without difficu lty although she 

pain. In November 1983 , plaintiff underwen t an 

arthroscopic examination and was rehospitalized in December for 

debridement of a hematoma and lysis of adhesions in her knee. At 

that time, he r treati ng physician estimated plaintiff would have a 

recovery period of three to four months. In April 1984 , 

plaintiff's physician determined she had a permanent partial 

impairment of six percent of her knee . 

Plaintiff was also seen by Dr . Rao Sureddi for treatment of 

hype~tension and diabetes. In August 1986, Dr. Sureddi opined 

that plaintiff was totally disabl ed due to hype rtensive 

cardiovascular disease , uncontrolled diabetes mellitus, severe 

osteoarthritis, recurrent urinary 

3 

tract infections, angina 

Appellate Case: 89-7023 Document: 01019434693 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 3 
pectoris, migraine headaches, chronic depression and anx ie ty 

reaction, and asthenia and vertigo secondary to poor circulation , 

obesity, and hypothryroidism. 

In 1986, plaintiff was seen at a mental health facility for 

depression. She was diagnosed as having an adjustment disorder 

with withdrawal due to unresolved grief over her husband's d e ath 

which had occurred in earl y 1983. She was noted as having some 

difficulty with anxiety attacks at that time. 

At the hearing, plaintiff a lleged that she was totally 

disabled due to a combination of her physical and men tal 

impairmen ts and disabling pain. She testified that s he was in 

constant pain , apparently caused by arthritis, espec ially in her 

left knee. Plaintiff also alleged that her ability to leave her 

house was hampered by panic attacks. 

Only one of plaintiff's treating physicians, Dr. Sureddi , 

opined tha t plaintiff was totally disab led based on her med ical 

and mental impairments . Howev er, his brief, conclusory opini on is 

not support ed by medical evidence. Further, plaintiff does not 

argue that she is totally disabled because of any on e or any 

combination of these impairments alone. Plaintiff argues that her 

nonexertional impairment, pain, combined with her other 

impairments , renders her totally disabled. 

"'To be disabling, pai n must be so severe, by itself or in 

conjunction with other impa irmen ts, as to preclude any substantial 

gainful employment.'" Brown v. Bowen, 801 F . 2d 361, 36 2-63 (lOt h 

Cir. 1986)(quoting Dumas v . Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1552 (2d 

Cir. 1983)). To determine whether a claimant's pain is disabling, 

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Appellate Case: 89-7023 Document: 01019434693 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 4 
"the Secretary is entitled to examine the medical record and 

evaluate a 

subjecti ve 

claimant's credibility. Moreover, 

complaint of pain is by itself 

a claimant's 

insufficient to 

establish disability." Brown, 801 F.2d at 363, citing to Dumas. 

However, a claimant's subjective complaints of pain must be 

considered in evaluating a claim based on pain. See Luna v. 

Bowen , 834 F.2d 161, 163 (lOth Cir. 1987)(setting forth the 

framework to be used in evaluat ing su ch a claim). 

The medical records must be consistent with the nonmedical 

testimony as to the severi ty of t he pain. "To establish disabl ing 

pa in without the expli cit confirmation of treating physicians may 

be difficult. Nonetheless, the claimant is en titled to have his 

nonmedical objective and subjective testimony of pain evaluated by 

the ALJ and weighed a longside the medical evidence." Huston v. 

Bowen, 8 38 F.2d 1125, 1131 (lOth Cir . 1988). 

The record shows that none of plaintiff's treating physicians 

repo rted that plaintiff' s pa in wa s dis abl ing. The consulting 

physicians did not verify her claim. One, Dr. Reid Park ison, 

noted that although plaintiff s tated she was unable to walk more 

than ten f eet without a cane, she did not b ring it to his office 

even though she had to walk at least 100 feet from the parking lot 

to his office. She appeared to walk without difficulty. 

The ALJ considered p laintiff's complaints, medical records, 

rec i tation of her da i ly activities , and her a ppearance and actions 

at the hearing. He found that plaintiff's pain was not "of such 

intensity, frequency, and duration as to be disabling within the 

meaning of such term as used in the Act." ROA Vol. II at 33. He 

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Appellate Case: 89-7023 Document: 01019434693 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 5 
held that plaintiff's complaints of pain were not credible , but 

rather, " con tain[ed] some hyperbole, judged as an attempt to 

bolster her symptoms to a level tha t she can obtain benefits." 

Id. at 34. 

''Because '[e]xaggerating symptoms or falsifying information 

for purposes of obtaining government benefits is not a matter 

taken lightly by this Court,' we generall y treat credibility 

determinations made by an ALJ as bindi ng upon review." Gosset t v. 

Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 807 (lOth Cir. 1988)(quoting Broadbent v. 

Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 413 {lOth Cir. 1983). Here, plaintiff 

complained of disabling pain. However, none of her trea t i ng 

physicians considered her pain disabling. Further, objective 

observation of plaintiff did not support her subjective complaint. 

The record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's 

findi ng that plaintiff's complaints of pain contained 

hyperbole. 

some 

The ALJ proper l y based his determination of disability on t he 

grids after finding that plaintiff' s complaints of pain were not 

credible. See Frey v. Bowen , 816 F.2d 508, 513 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

After finding that plaintiff was not disabled, although she could 

not return to he r prior work activity, the Secretary had the 

burden of showing that plaintiff could find other work in t he 

economy. Diaz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 898 F.2d 

774, 776 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Vocational testimony was received on this issue. Plaintiff 

argues tha t the ALJ did not fo llow the vocational expe rt 's opinion 

that she could not do the jobs for which she had transferable 

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Appellate Case: 89-7023 Document: 01019434693 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 6 
skills. However, the hypothetical posed to the vocational expe rt 

did not set forth only impairments which had been accepted as true 

by the ALJ. Therefore, his opinion was not binding on the ALJ. 

See Ekela nd v. Bowen, 899 F.2d 719, 721-22 (8th Ci r . 1990); cf. 

Wingert v . Bowen, 894 F.2d 29 6 , 29 8 (8th Cir. 1990). 

We cannot say the Secretary's dec ision is not supported by 

substantial evidence. 

The judgment of t he Un ited States Distri ct Court f or the 

Eastern Distri ct o f Oklahoma is AFFIRMED . 

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