Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_94-cr-00243/USCOURTS-azd-3_94-cr-00243-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe Sayetsitty
Defendant
Larry Sayetsitty
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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SRM

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent

-vsLarry Sayetsitty,

Defendant/Movant

 CR-94-0243-PCT-RCB

 CV-05-1580-PCT-RCB (JI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or

Correct Sentence Pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Movant, following his conviction in the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255

on May 26, 2005 (#366). On July 22, 2005 Respondent filed its Response (#369). Movant

filed a Reply on August 17, 2005 (#373).

The Movant's Motion is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

10, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases , Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Because this matter may be resolved on the basis of a statute of limitations, the review

of the factual and procedural background will generally be limited to those matters relevant to

a timeliness determination.

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Movant’s direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit summarized the facts as

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1

 Co-Defendant Joe Sayetsitty’s appeal was granted, and he was subsequently retried and convicted of

involuntary manslaughter (#324).

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follows:

Larry and Joe Sayetsitty are brothers and members of the Navajo

Nation. They spent the night of June 24, 1996, drinking and socializing

in various locations. At approximately 4 a.m. on June 25, they drove in

Larry's truck to a party at Diversion Dam, a site within the Navajo Indian

reservation near Kayenta, Arizona. While at Diversion Dam, Larry

became involved in an argument with the decedent, Jerry Lee Stanley.

Joe joined the argument, and a brief fight ensued before it was broken up

by others.

* * *

At approximately 5:20 a.m., Stanley stopped at the residence of

a friend, Kent Parrish, who lived on the reservation. Larry pulled up

behind Stanley's truck and told Joe, "the guy parked in front of us, when

he comes by here, throw him down." As instructed, Joe grabbed Stanley

by the shoulders as he came by and threw him to the ground. Both Larry

and Joe then kicked Stanley. One witness saw Joe kick Stanley in the

head, and another saw Larry kick him in the head eight to ten times, with

the motion and strength one might use in kicking a football field goal.

Finally, Stanley's friend came outside and broke up the encounter. Joe

and Larry then left the Parrish residence in Larry's truck and drove to

Larry's residence. Stanley's friend drove Stanley to the hospital, where

he was pronounced dead. He was later determined to have died of head

injuries.

U.S. v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1407-1408 (9th Cir. 1997). 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Movant and his brother were indicted for the premeditated murder of Jerry Lee Stanley

(#16). The court granted their motion to sever (#81). Movant was then tried and convicted of

second-degree murder (#233). On October 25, 1995, Movant was sentenced to 225 months

in prison followed by 48 months of supervised release (#271).

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Movant and his brother both appealed (#275 & 281). Movant’s appeal was denied on

the merits on February 28, 1997 and the mandate issued April 25, 1997 (#291).1

 See U.S. v.

Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405 (9th Cir. 1997). 

/ /

/ /

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D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Requests for Documents - Movant wrote a letter dated September 23, 1999 to the

district court judge, Hon. Broomfield, requesting that Movant be provided with a full docket

sheet, judgment and commitment order, transcripts, and copies of motions. The Court treated

this letter as a motion to produce documents, and denied the motion by an Order filed October

13, 1999 (#351). That order noted that “inasmuch as the court has an extra copy of its docket

it will direct the clerk to send it and a copy of the judgment and commitment to defendant.” 

 The Court’s docket reflects that this was completed by the Clerk of the Court. 

On October 18, 1999, Movant responded with a letter (#352) indicating that he had

“received my docket sheet and judgment and commitment order,” and again requesting

transcripts. The Court construed this letter as a motion to produce, and again denied it. (Order

11/8/99, #353).

Movant filed a Notice of Appeal (#354) challenging those denials. That appeal was

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on May 18, 2000 (#356). 

Delayed Appeal - On November 3, 2003, Movant filed a Motion to Extend Time to File

Late Appeal (#357), arguing that counsel had failed to file an opening brief, that as a result

Movant had been denied his right to appeal, and thus requesting leave to file a late appeal.

Movant sent a letter to the Clerk of the Court, filed March 31, 2004 (#360), stating that:

... counsel claimed on several occasions that yes he had filed the appeal.

However, it was almost three years later that I learned in fact that the

appeal has been dismissed for failure to file a timely brief.

On April 14, 2004, Movant then filed a third request for delayed appeal, a Motion for

Extension of Time for Excusable Neglect (#361). Movant again reiterated his concerns about

counsel’s failure to pursue his appeal:

Defendant wrote to the attorney to find out what has happened to his

case. No response. After several letters, and NO RESPONSE, on April

26, 2000 defendant discovered his appeal was dismissed?

On May 3, 2004, Movant filed a fourth request, a Motion for Case Discovery (#352), citing

to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion on his appeal, and asking for copies of his case records. 

On May 7, 2004, the Government filed a single Response (#363) to all of these

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requests, arguing that defense counsel had indeed filed a brief in the appeal, and that the appeal

had been denied on the merits, not dismissed.

The Court denied Movant’s motion to file a delayed appeal, and denied the related

motions as moot. (Order 5/26/04, #364.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Movant instituted the present habeas proceeding by filing his Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on May 26, 2005 (#366). Movant’s

motion asserts six grounds for relief: (1) newly discovered alibi evidence; (2) evidence of

actual innocence in form of medical testimony that Movant was physically incapable of

kicking; (3) sentencing errors; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel in arguing sufficiency of

the evidence; (5) prosecutorial misconduct in presentation of perjured testimony; (6)

violations of Blakey, Booker, and Fantan. 

In addition, Movant argues that his motion is timely because he did not discover his

appeal had been denied until May 24, 2004 (#366 at 7). Movant further argues that he is

entitled to equitable tolling because: (1) his efforts to be provided discovery in the case were

denied; (2) he has contracted an illness (id. at 11). Movant further argues that he has newly

discovered evidence, which justifies a delayed motion to vacate (id. at 14). Movant also

argues that he is, in any event, actually innocent (id. at 9). 

Respondents filed their Response (#369), arguing that the Motion is: (1) untimely; (2)

procedurally defaulted; (3) without merit; and (4) and subject to a non-retroactivity analysis.

Movant filed a Reply (#373) on August 17, 2005. In addition to repeating arguments

from his Motion, Movant’s Reply asserts that he is mentally incompetent, and obligated to

know tribal laws.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

Respondent argues that the Motion must be dismissed as untimely.

Applicable Statute of Limitations - The statute governing motions to vacate provides:

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A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created

by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a

motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Ordinary Application of Statute - The one-year statute of limitations on motions to

vacate generally begins to run on "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final."

28 U.S.C. § 2255(1). "Finality attaches when [the Supreme] Court affirms a conviction on the

merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing

a certiorari petition expires." Clay v. United States,537 U.S. 522 (2003). "We hold that, for

federal criminal defendants who do not file a petition for certiorari with this Court on direct

review, §2255’s one-year limitation period starts to run when the time for seeking such review

expires." Id. at 532. 

 Movant did not seek certiorari, but had 90 days after entry of the judgment of the Court

of Appeals to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. Rule 13, Rules

of the Supreme Court of the United States. “The time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari

runs from the date of entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not from the

issuance date of the mandate.” Id. Accordingly, for purposes of the statute of limitations in

28 U.S.C. §2255, the movant’s judgment of conviction became final 90 days after the Ninth

Circuit's decision on February 27, 1997, i.e. on May 29, 1997. The statute of limitations

commenced running on that date, and expired one year later, on May 29, 1998.

Filing Date - Movant's motion was filed May 26, 2005. However, under the “prison

mailbox rule,” for purposes of calculating statutes of limitations in federal habeas proceedings,

a prisoner’s filings are deemed “filed” when they are delivered to prison officials for mailing.

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See Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Movant’s certificate of service

reflects that his documents were deposited in the prison mailbox on May 17, 2004. However,

this must be a typographical error, because Movant’s attached Application to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis is dated and certified as of May 17, 2005. Therefore, the undersigned

presumes for purposes of this Report and Recommendation that Movant’s motion was mailed

on May 17, 2005, and therefore treats it as having been filed on that date. Even so, Movant’s

motion would still be almost seven years delinquent.

Effect of Delay in Notice on Appeal - Movant argues that his motion should

nonetheless be considered timely because his appellate attorney was non-communicative and

the Court would not grant him discovery, and thus he did not receive notice of the dismissal

of his appeal, which he characterizes as a denial of due process and a violation of court rules.

If the lack of notice is construed as an "impediment to making a motion created by

governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States," then

Movant's one year would not commence until that impediment was removed. 28 U.S.C. §

2255(2). Here, that impediment would have been removed at least by October 18, 1999, when

Movant responded with a letter (#352) indicating that he had “received my docket sheet.” That

docket sheet reflected the filing of the mandate from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on

April 25, 1997 (#291), which affirmed Movant's convictions. If this later date, October 18,

1999, is used, Movant's one year would have expired on October 18, 2000, and his Motion

would still be over four years delinquent. 

Movant argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling as a result of the delay of notice

of the denial of his appeal. In U.S. v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit

held the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 may be equitably tolled. Movant bears

the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1065 (9th Cir.2002). To be entitled to such tolling, Movant must "demonstrate that

‘extraordinary circumstances beyond [his] control [made] it impossible to file a petition on

time and the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Battles, 362

F.3d at 1197 (quoting Laws v. LaMarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003)). A number of

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courts have held that equitable tolling is appropriate to preserve the claims of a petitioner, who

through no fault of his own, fails to receive notice of the disposition of an appeal or

post-conviction proceeding, and consequently delays his federal habeas filing. See, e.g.,

Brandon v. U.S., 89 F.Supp.2d 731 (E.D.Va. 2000), Plowden v. Romine, 78 F.Supp.2d 115

(E.D.N.Y. 1999); Vasquez v. Greiner, 68 F. Supp.2d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); and Baskin v.

United States, 998 F.Supp. 188 (D.Conn. 1998).

Movant argues that he received the order denying his appeal for the first time on May

24, 2004. (Reply, #373 at 1.) Here, given the extreme lapse of time, and Movant's receipt of

the court's docket showing the denial of his appeal, it is implausible that his failure to receive

an actual copy of the denial of his appeal was an "extraordinary circumstance" or that it made

it impossible for Movant to file until May 24, 2004. Movant offers no explanation for why he

did not seek a copy of the appellate court’s decision.

Assuming arguendo that Movant's lack of notice was an extraordinary circumstance

preventing him from filing for a time, equitable tolling will not apply if Movant did not

continue to diligently pursue filing afterwards. “If the person seeking equitable tolling has not

exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to file after the extraordinary circumstances

began, the link of causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is

broken, and the extraordinary circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing.” Valverde

v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 2000). Ordinarily, thirty days after elimination of a

roadblock should be sufficient. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018, n.1 (9th Cir.

2003). Here, Movant waited almost an entire year before filing. That delay precludes a finding

of reasonable diligence, and thus a finding of equitable tolling.

Effect of Physical Illness - In his Motion, Movant asserts that he has contracted a virus

in the prison, resulting in various symptoms. (Motion, # 366 at 11.) However, Movant does

not assert how these symptoms commenced, when they terminated, or how they kept him from

filing a timely motion. Movant fails to make out a claim for equitable tolling on this issue.

Effect of Mental Incompetency - Movant asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling

because his "[mental] incompetency is 'OBVIOUS'." (Reply, #373 at 7.) However, Movant

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offers nothing to support his claim of incompetency other than making generic argument such

as "American Indians are known to have 'this diminished capacity from drinking.'" (Id. at 8.)

However, Movant concedes "[n]ot all indians but enough to NOTICE." 

A habeas petitioner's mental incompetence is not a per se reason to toll the statute of

limitations for filing a federal habeas petition. Instead, the alleged mental incompetence must

somehow have affected the petitioner's ability to timely file a habeas petition. Nara v. Frank,

264 F.3d 310, 320 (3rd Cir.2001). Therefore, a habeas petitioner must allege more than the

“mere existence of physical or mental ailments” to invoke the equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations. Rhodes v. Senkowski, 82 F.Supp.2d 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y.2000). Instead, a habeas

petitioner has the burden of showing that mental health problems rendered him or her unable

to file a habeas petition during the one year limitations period. Id. A statute of limitations is

tolled by reason of mental illness “only if the illness in fact prevents the sufferer from

managing his affairs and thus from understanding his legal rights and acting upon them.” Miller

v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir.1996)(internal citations omitted).

Movant has shown himself, through his filings in this Court, that he is sufficiently

competent to understand the proceedings, and to marshal arguments and authorities in support

of his cause, leading the undersigned to conclude that Movant suffers no mental defect that

prevented him from making a timely filing. 

Moreover, Movant proffers nothing to show that he himself is incompetent, or that such

diminished capacity precluded him from making a timely filing. Movant does not draw a causal

connection between any incompetence and the extreme delay evident in this case. Mere

conclusory statements in a § 2255 motion are insufficient to require a hearing. United States

v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981). 

Effect of Newly Recognized Rights - Movant asserts claims arising under the recent

line of cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), proceeding

through Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and culminating with United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Booker was not decided until January 12, 2005. Arguably,

Movant should be entitled to rely on 28 U.S.C. § 2255(3) to count his one year "from the date

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on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court." However, this

delayed start is available only "if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(3). Here,

the Supreme Court has not made the decisions in the Apprendi, Blakely, Booker line of cases

retroactively applicable on collateral review. To date, the Ninth Circuit has held that none of

them are retroactive. See Reynolds v. Cambra, 290 F.3d 1029, 1030 (9th Cir.2002) (holding

that Apprendi does not apply retroactively); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir.2005)

(Blakely); United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, 1120-21 (9th Cir.2005) (Booker).

Consequently, Movant is not entitled to rely upon § 2255(3) to delay the commencement of

his one year limitations period.

Applicability of Tribal Laws - Movant argues that his situation is extraordinary

because, as an American Indian, he is subject to tribal laws, making it all the harder for him to

know applicable federal law. (Reply, #373 at 9.) At the outset, it must be noted that a

prisoner’s pro se status is not an extraordinary circumstance. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d

168 (5th Cir. 2000). And, "ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner,

generally does not excuse prompt filing." Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th

Cir.1999). But see Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005)(considering

whether lack of "access to legal materials or the prison law library" precluded timely filing).

Movant asserts nothing extraordinary about his experience as a Native American that would

have precluded him from timely filing. Presumably, Movant would have been subject to tribal

laws on various issues. However, defendants living outside a reservation are similarly held to

know applicable municipal and county laws, in addition to the more widely applicable state and

federal laws. There is nothing extraordinary about Movant’s subjection to tribal laws.

Reliance on Castro Opinion - Movant argues that he is entitled to protection under

the Supreme Court's decision in Castro v. U.S., 540 U.S. 375 (2003). (Reply, #373 at 9-10.)

However, Castro did not deal with the timeliness of a habeas petition, but whether a district

court could sua sponte construe a federal defendant's post-trial motion for new trial as a

motion to vacate, and then later bar a subsequent § 2255 motion as a second or successive

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motion. 

Effect of Newly Discovered Evidence - Movant also asserts claims that he has newly

discovered evidence. Section 2255(4) provides that the statute runs from "the date on which

the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence." In Ground 2, Movant argues that he has newly discovered alibi

evidence that the person who eyewitnesses observed Movant kicking was not the victim.

However, it is the "facts" which must be newly discovered, not the evidence to prove the

facts. For example, in Matus-Leyva v. U.S., 287 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit

noted that the timeliness of a § 2255 motion asserting that the movant was a juvenile at the

time of his conviction was not extended until movant located his birth certificate. The court

noted that the movant "knew of the claim and litigated the issue at the time of his original

conviction." Id. at 761, n.3. Accordingly, the Court noted the invalidity of the Movant's

argument that "the statute did not begin to run until he located his birth certificate." Id. 

While the evidence obtained by Movant since trial, in the nature of affidavits, may have

been new to Movant at the time this Motion was filed, the "facts" were not. In his Reply Movant

acknowledges that he "raised and told his attorney, twice, at trial" about his alibi evidence.

(Reply, #373 at 11.) Thus these “facts” were available to Movant since trial. Further, the

affidavits themselves are all dated in June and July, 2004. Movant offers no explanation for

the ten month delay between obtaining those affidavits and finally filing his motion.

Movant also argues his receipt of evidence of actual innocence in form of medical

testimony that Movant was physically incapable of kicking. (Reply, #373 at 14-15 However,

the records on which Movant bases this argument, showing the installation of a rod in his right

femur, date back as early as January 5, 1998, and at the latest April 4, 2003. Moreover, Movant

would have known at the time of the crimes what his physical capabilities and medical history

were. 

Actual Innocence - Movant argues that any untimeliness should be ignored because he

is actually innocent. (Motion, #366 at 9.) In Majoy v. Roe, while declining to decide the

issue, the Ninth Circuit noted that the statute of limitations for state habeas petitioners in 28

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U.S.C. § 2244 may be subject to avoidance upon a showing of actual innocence. 296 F.3d

770, 776-777 (9th Cir. 2002). To establish such actual innocence, Movant would be required

to meet the standard for actual innocence applied in cases of procedural default. See Lucidore

v. New York State Div. of Parole, 209 F.3d 107, 114 (2nd Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Montano, 398

F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2005). That standard was articulated in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477

U.S. 436 (1986) as follows: 

[T]he prisoner must “show a fair probability that, in light of all the

evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with

due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have

been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial,

the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his

guilt.”

Id., 477 U.S., at 455, n. 17, quoting Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on

Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970).

A habeas petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show

"it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new

evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not sufficient.

Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant

guilty. Id. at 329. Moreover, a finding of "actual innocence" is not to be based upon a finding

that insufficient evidence to support the charge was presented at trial, but rather upon

affirmative evidence of innocence. See U.S. v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (lack

of proof of FDIC insurance in a bank robbery case, without evidence that insurance did not

exist, not sufficient to establish actual innocence). 

Here, Movant offers scant evidence of his actual innocence, including: (1) the

declaration of his sister, Anna Lewis, that at the scene of the crime Movant fought with Harry

Stanley Jr., and not Jerry Stanley, the victim; (2) the declaration of Larleen Sayetsitty,

Movant’s daughter, that Harry Stanley Jr. had been arrested; (3) the declaration of Joanne

Sayetsitty, Movant’s mother, that the fight was with Harry Jr., and that a third party said the

victim was involved in a fight 100 miles away; (4) the declaration of Darlene Sayetsitty,

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Movant’s wife, that the fight was with Harry Jr., and that an un-identified witness said he was

threatened by an agent to lie. Movant submits two unsigned declarations by Gordon Tellis and

Mrs. Tellis, and his own unsigned Declaration. In addition, Movant submits medical records

that he had a rod in his right femur, and his speculation that medical testimony would say his

leg would have shattered. (Reply, #373 at 19-20.)

Movant also makes ado about the lack of blood at the scene, on his clothes, in the

vehicle used to transport the victim, etc. (Reply, #373 at 29.) However, the medical examiner,

Dr. Vorpahl, reported that the victim died from a brain hemorrhage, which he defined as an

internal injury. (R.T. 6/28/95, #247 at 171-172.) The only appreciable external injury, other

than bruising and abrasions, were small lacerations on the victim’s head (Id. at 182-184, 223).

Movant offers no evidence to support his claim that the victim’s heart had pumped all of his

blood out, or that blood splatters should have been present.

In contrast, the Government submitted, inter alia, testimony by four eyewitnesses,

including: (1) Etta Parrish’s testimony that she observed Movant kicking the victim repeatedly

(R.T. 6/27/95, #246 at 57-60); (2) Kent Parrish’s testimony that he observed Movant kicking

the victim repeatedly like one would kick a football, and that he (Kent Parish) drove the victim

to the hospital (id. at 132-137); (3) Edgar Parrish’s testimony that he saw Movant driving away

from the scene (id. at 235); and (4) the testimony of Joe Sayetsitty, Movant’s brother and codefendant, that he and Movant followed the victim to the Parrish house where Movant

instructed him to throw the victim down, and Movant then kicked the victim (R.T. 6/28/95,

#247 at 39-41.) This is substantial evidence, and reasonable jurors could easily grant it

credibility over the disjointed stories by Movant’s family members.

Movant has not established that if his additional evidence would have been presented

no reasonable juror could have found Defendant guilty. Thus, assuming actual innocence

would avoid the effect of the statute of limitations, Movant has failed to establish his actual

innocence.

Summary - Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Movant’s motion is

untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and must be dismissed.

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IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Movant's Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed May 26, 2005 (#366) be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 10, Rules Governing Section

2255 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: April 17, 2006 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\94-243-369r RR 04 06 12 re MVacate.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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