Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02189/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02189-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Artemio Gomez-Cuevas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

PILED 

United Sttne& Court of Appeals 

'Tenth Circuit 

NOV 7 1990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPE~OBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ARTEMIO GOMEZ-CUEVAS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 89-2189 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 89-159-JB) 

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, and Susan L. Foreman, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, on the brief for the DefendantAppellant. 

William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, arid Stephen R. Kotz, 

Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief for the PlaintiffAppellee. 

Before MOORE,. SETH, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-2189 Document: 01019946628 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 1 
On April 13, 1989, defendant-appellant Artemio Gomez-Cuevas 

(Gomez) was charged by a grand jury on two counts. Count I 

charged possession with intent to distribute more than fifty 

kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(l) and 

84l(b)(l)(C) and 18 u.s.c. § 2. Count II charged importation of 

more than fifty kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 u.s.c. 

§§ 952(a) and 960(b)(3) and 18 u.s.c. § 2. Gomez entered a plea 

of guilty to Count I, which the district court accepted. Under 

the plea agreement, Count II was dropped, as were charges against 

Gomez' co-defendant. 

Gomez alleges on appeal he should be allowed to enter a new 

plea because he did not enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily. 

He contends the district court erred in failing to advise him: (1) 

of the nature of the charge; (2) of the rights included in his 

right to a jury trial; (3) that his responses could be used 

against him in a perjury prosecution; and (4) that the Sentencing 

Guidelines would apply, all in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 

u.s.c. § 1291 and affirm. 1 

Before accepting Gomez' plea, the district court placed 

Gomez under oath and, through an interpreter, established his 

ability to comprehend the proceedings. The district judge asked 

Gomez whether he fully understood the charges and had had 

sufficient time to discuss them with his attorney. Gomez 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2189 Document: 01019946628 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 2 
responded affirmatively to both questions. The judge explained 

Gomez was presumed innocent and the government would have to prove 

its case to a twelve-member jury, which would have to agree 

unanimously, before he could be found guilty of the charge. The 

court ascertained that Gomez understood he would forfeit his right 

to a jury trial by entering a plea of guilty. 

The judge further advised Gomez that if he entered a plea of 

guilty and the court accepted the plea, then the court could 

impose the statutory maximum penalty, including a sentence of 

twenty years in prison, a fine of up to $1,000,000, and a 

supervised release period of at least three years. Gomez stated 

he understood the possible penalties. 

The court also informed Gomez he had a right not to 

incriminate himself. The court explained he would lose this right 

if he entered a plea of guilty because the court must ask 

questions about the charge to make certain the plea was proper. 

Gomez indicated he understood. The court then questioned Gomez as 

to the factual basis for the plea. Gomez stated he knew he had 

the marijuana and he was going to distribute it. Following this 

discussion, Gomez pleaded guilty to Count I of the indictment. 

The parties filed the executed plea agreement with the court. 

The court asked Gomez whether his attorney had obtained his 

consent and authority to negotiate the plea agreement on his 

behalf. Gomez responded "yes." Gomez also told the court that 

neither the government nor anyone else had made any promises in 

exchange for his plea of guilty beyond the terms of the plea 

agreement. He further stated no one had threatened him or coerced 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-2189 Document: 01019946628 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 3 
him to plead guilty. Finally, Gomez testified he entered the 

guilty plea voluntarily and willingly. 

Gomez now asserts the court failed to comply with the 

requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 

during the plea hearing. The issue of whether a district court 

has complied with Rule 11 before accepting a guilty plea is 

primarily a question of law subject to de novo review. See United 

States Y....!._ Rhodes, No. 89-3241, slip op. at 6 (10th Cir. Sept. 6, 

1990) (to be reported at 913 F.2d 839); United States Y....!.. 

Jamarillo-Suarez, 857 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A defendant's guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary. 

McCarthy Y....!.. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). 2 Rule 11 

2 In McCarthy, the Supreme Court required strict adherence to 

the then-current version of Rule 11 to ensure the validity of a 

guilty plea. 394 U.S. at 463-64; see also Boykin Y....!.. Alabama, 395 

U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969) (''strict adherence unqueitionably enhances 

the reliability of the voluntariness determination"); Halliday Y....!.. 

United States, 394 U.S. 831, 832 (1969) (McCarthy rule adopted to 

ensure every criminal defendant who pleads guilty is protected by 

Rule ll's procedural safeguards, which are "designed to facilitate 

the determination of voluntariness of his plea"). As the Fifth 

Circuit has remarked, however, "[a]t the-time of McCarthy, Rule 11 

was a relatively short and general pronouncement of little more 

than 100 words." United States Y....!.. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 936 (5th 

Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 and cert. denied 

sub nom. Flanagan Y....!.. United States, 445 U.S. 971 (1980). The Rule 

has since undergone a more than tenfold increase in size and now 

bears only a slight resemblance to its form at the time the 

Supreme Court decided McCarthy. See United States Y....!.. Williamson, 

806 F.2d 216, 220 (10th Cir. 1986); Dayton, 604 F.2d at 936. 

Thus, our determination of whether a defendant's guilty plea is 

knowing and voluntary no longer consists of simply checking the 

trial court's incantation of the formula of Rule 11. See Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983 amendment, Rule ll(h)) 

("Rule 11 should not be given such a crabbed interpretation that 

ceremony [is] exalted over substance"); Dayton, 604 F.2d at 939-40 

("One who has pled guilty and done so voluntarily, 

understandingly, and with knowledge of the consequences of his 

plea ... has evinced a desire to waive technicalities, to come 

to terms with the legal system, and to admit his fault."). As 

(Footnote Continued on Following Page) 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-2189 Document: 01019946628 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 4 
prescribes procedures designed to ensure that pleas are entered 

knowingly and voluntarily. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that 

"the values lying at the heart of the rule's concerns [are] 

absence of coercion, understanding of the accusation, and 

knowledge of the direct consequences of the plea." United States 

Y.!.. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 939 (5th Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. 

denied, 445 U.S. 904 and cert. denied sub nom. Flanagan Y.!.. United 

States, 445 U.S. 971 (1980). These three concerns guide us as we 

review Gomez' allegations of error in light of the harmless error 

analysis required by Rule ll(h). See,~, United States Y.!.. 

Barry, 895 F.2d 702, 704 (10th Cir.) (court need not vacate 

appellant's conviction and sentence unless substantial rights 

affected), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3222 (1990); United States Y.!.. 

Vance, 868 F.2d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir. 1989) (when record does not 

show that court's failure to inform defendant of possible 

restitution affected his decision to plead guilty, error is 

harmless). 

First, Gomez argues that the district court failed to advise 

him fully of the nature of the charge, as Rule ll(c)(l) requires. 

In Stinson Y.!.. Turner, 473 F.2d 913, 916 (10th Cir. 1973), this 

court held a district court may satisfy Rule 11 and Constitution 

by explaining the nature of the charge in plain terms. The 

advisory committee's notes to the 1974 amendment further explain 

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

noted in United States Y.!.. Barry, 895 F.2d 702, 705 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3222 (1990), we now review all alleged 

Rule 11 violations in accord with the mandate of of Rule ll(h): 

"Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does 

not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Fed. R. 

Crim. P. ll(h). 

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Appellate Case: 89-2189 Document: 01019946628 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 5 
that "[t]he method by which the defendant's understanding of the 

nature of the charge is determined may vary from case to case, 

depending on the complexity of the circumstances and the 

particular defendant." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee's 

notes. 

Based on these standards, we are certain that Gomez 

understood the nature of the charge. In his colloquoy with the 

district court, Gomez admitted he had discussed the charges with 

his attorney and understood them. He stated he knew he had the 

marijuana and that he was going to distribute it. The written 

plea agreement Gomez signed also stated that he desired to plead 

guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than fifty 

kilograms of marijuana. There is no more about the charge that 

Gomez need understand. Any error, which we fail to perceive, 

would be harmless under Rule ll(h). 

Second, Gomez complains the court did not explain his right 

to a jury trial as Rule ll(c)(3) requires. Gomez insists that 

Rule 11 requires the judge to inform him that his fifth amendment 

rights include the right to assistance of counsel, to confront and 

cross-examine witnesses, and to be free from compelled selfincrimination. However, in United States Y-!.. Williamson, 806 F.2d 

216, 222 (10th Cir. 1986), we held a district court's failure to 

explicate the components of a jury trial does not violate the 

requirements of Rule 11. 3 Accord United States Y-!.. Stead, 746 F.2d 

3 Ideally, of course, the sentencing court will enumerate these 

rights to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding. As we 

recently noted in United States Y-!.. Barry, "it is ... true ... 

that thoughtful and careful compliance with Rule 11 best serves 

(Footnote Continued on Following Page) 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-2189 Document: 01019946628 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 6 
355, 357 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1030 (1985). The. 

inquiry is not whether the rights inherent in a jury trial were 

enumerated, but rather whether the record affirmatively shows "a 

voluntary and intelligent plea.'' Stinson, 473 F.2d at 915-16. 

The failure to advise a criminal defendant of his right to 

confront and cross-examine witnesses is harmless error when the 

guilty plea is voluntary and the defendant understands the nature 

of the charges against him. Stead, 746 F.2d at 357. 

We are convinced Gomez entered the plea voluntarily and 

knowingly. Gomez responded affirmatively when the court asked him 

whether his attorney had obtained his consent and authority to 

negotiate the plea agreement on his behalf. He also stated no one 

had threatened him or coerced him to plead guilty. Gomez further 

testified he entered the plea of guilty voluntarily and willingly. 

There is no evidence in the record, nor does Gomez allege, that 

the defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at any 

stage of the guilty plea. We hold that Gomez entered his plea 

voluntarily and knowingly. Thus, the district court's failure to 

inform Gomez of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 

is harmless error. Also, there was no prejudice in the court's 

failure to advise Gomez he had a right to counsel because Gomez 

already was represented by counsel. Finally, because Gomez 

voluntarily waived his right to be free from compelled self-

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

the fair and efficient administration of criminal justice." 895 

F.2d 702 at 705 (quoting advisory committee's notes to 1983 

amendment to Rule 11). 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-2189 Document: 01019946628 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 7 
incrimination before responding at the pleading hearing, the court. 

need not further advise him of this right. 

Third, Gomez contends he was not advised his responses in 

court could be used against him in a prosecution for perjury, as 

Rule ll(c)(S) requires. We find no merit in this contention. In 

United States Y.!.. Pinto, 838 F.2d 1566, 1569 (11th Cir. 1988), the 

Eleventh Circuit held a court's failure to so advise is an 

insufficient basis to attack a plea absent a threat of prosecution 

for perjury or some other showing of prejudice. See also United 

States Y.!.. Law, 633 F.2d 1156, 1157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 

U.S. 992 (1981). Here, Gomez does not face a threat of 

prosecution for perjury, and he demonstrates no other prejudice 

that might result. Based on Rule ll(h), we hold the court's 

failure to advise Gomez his responses could be used against him in 

a prosecution for perjury is harmless error. 

Fourth, Gomez attaches the greatest significance to the 

court's failure to tell him the Sentencing Guidelines would 

"determine" the range of his sentence and this range is related 

directly to the quantity of marijuana involved. We cannot accept 

Gomez' argument that the district court's failure to inform him 

the Sentencing Guidelines would apply to his case violated Rule 

ll(c)(l). At the time Gomez entered his plea, Rule ll(c)(l) 

required the sentencing court to inform a defendant of "the 

mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum 

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Appellate Case: 89-2189 Document: 01019946628 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 8 
possible penalty provided by law." It did not require the court 

to discuss the Guidelines with defendants. 4 

Gomez contends that the court's failure to inform him the 

Guidelines would apply is the "functional equivalent" of a failure 

to inform him of a statutory minimum sentence in violation of Rule 

ll(c)(l). However, we recently have held that Rule ll(c)(l) 

requires a court to inform the defendant of "the mandatory minimum 

penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty 

provided by law," not the applicable Guidelines range. United 

States Y..!.. Rhodes, No. 89-3241, slip op. at 7-9 (10th Cir. Sept. 6, 

1990) (to be reported at 913 F.2d 839) (citing United States Y..!.. 

Fernandez, 877 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1989)). In Fernandez, the 

Second Circuit held Rule 11 is satisfied when a court informs the 

defendant of the maximum and minimum statutory sentences. Id. at 

1143 (citing advisory committee's notes to 1974 amendment); accord 

United States Y..!.. Salva, 902 F.2d 483, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1990); 

United States Y..!.. Thomas, 894 F.2d 996, 997 (8th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 110 S. Ct. 1935 (1990); United States Y..!.. Henry, 893 F.2d 

46, 48 (3d Cir. 1990); United States Y..!.. Turner, 881 F.2d 684, 686 

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 199 (1989) .

5 

4 The Rule was amended effective December 1, 1989 to require 

the sentencing court to advise the defendant of "the fact that the 

court is required to consider any applicable sentencing guidelines 

but may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances." 

Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(c)(l). 

5 The offense to which Gomez pled guilty had no statutory 

minimum sentence. See 21 u.s.c. § 841(b)(l)(C) (mandating 

sentence of "not more than 20 years"). Therefore, Rule 11 did not 

require the court to advise Gomez of a statutory minimum sentence 

or its functional equivalent. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2189 Document: 01019946628 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 9 
In United States Y..!.. Henry, the Third Circuit further 

explained the rationale behind this requirement. The court 

reasoned that the bottom of a Guideline range does not necessarily 

equate with the "mandatory minimum penalty provided by law" 

because downward departures from the Guidelines are permitted 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). 893 F.2d at 48. Because Rule ll(c)(l) 

is predicated on statutory minimum and maximum sentences readily 

ascertainable from the face of the applicable statute, it is 

possible for a court to tell a defendant what statutory sentence 

range he faces. In contrast, the Guideline range can be affected 

by a variety of factors that a sentencing court cannot know before 

a presentence report is available. Therefore, any estimate of the 

Guideline range a court would provide before the presentence 

report is available would likely be incorrect. Id. at 49. As the 

court in Henry pointed out, an incorrect estimate could itself 

form the basis for an allegation that the guilty plea should be 

invalidated. Id. at 48-49. 

We are persuaded by this reasoning and reject Gomez' 

argument. The court's failure to advise a defendant that the 

Guidelines apply is not the functional equivalent of a failure to 

inform him of a statutory minimum sentence. 6 Moreover, even if 

6 We reiterate our view, however, that sentencing courts should 

exercise the greatest care practical to ensure the three core 

concerns of Rule 11 are met. Specifically, we note that the 

Sentencing Commission's policy statement on accepting plea 

agreements recommends that: 

The court shall defer its decision to accept or reject 

any nonbinding recommendation pursuant to Rule 

ll(e)(l)(B), and the court's decision to accept or 

reject any plea agreement pursuant to Rules ll(e)(l)(A) 

and ll(e)(l)(C) until there has been an opportunity to 

(Footnote Continued on Following Page) 

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Appellate Case: 89-2189 Document: 01019946628 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 10 
Rule 11 supported Gomez' "functional equivalent" argument, we hold. 

the court's failure to advise Gomez the Guidelines apply would be 

harmless error under Rule ll(h). In United States Y.!... Barry, 895 

F.2d 702, 704 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 3222 (1990), 

we held that the court's failure to apprise the defendant of a 

mandatory period of supervised release did not prejudice his 

decision to plead guilty because he did not show it had a 

significant impact on his decision. Similarly, Gomez has not 

shown that knowledge of the Guidelines' application would have 

changed his decision to plead guilty. 

Gomez contends he was prejudiced because the written plea 

agreement implies the court had the option of imposing probation 

or minimal imprisonment. The agreement stated that "the matter of 

sentencing is left entirely in the discretion of the court." 

Gomez asserts he should have been informed that under the 

Guidelines the court did not have the option of imposing probation 

or minimal imprisonment. 

We fail to understand the significance of this argument based 

on the requirements of Rule 11. First, we find it highly unlikely 

a boilerplate disclaimer made by the prosecution about the 

responsibility of the court in sentencing could reasonably lead 

Gomez to expect a sentence of probation from the court. See 

United States Y.!... Salva, 902 F.2d 483, 487-88 n.6 (7th Cir. 1990). 

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

consider the presentence report, unless a report is not 

required under section 6Al.1. 

United States Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual § 

p.s. The recent amendment to Rule ll(c)(l), instructing 

inform defendants that the Guidelines apply should also 

this potential problem in the future. See supra note 4. 

11 

6Bl. 1 (c), 

courts to 

mitigate 

Appellate Case: 89-2189 Document: 01019946628 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 11 
Second, the statement in the plea agreement is not inaccurate. 

The Guidelines grant a sentencing court substantial discretion to 

depart downward. See,~, United States Y..!.. Henry, 893 F.2d 46, 

48 (3d Cir. 1990) {court may depart downward from Guidelines in 

certain circumstances). Finally, because Rule 11 does not require 

a district court to advise a defendant what sentence he is likely 

to receive under the Guidelines, we find no legal basis for Gomez' 

view the court should have corrected his unsubstantiated belief 

about the likelihood of a probation sentence. 7 

Finally, we find no merit in the distinction Gomez draws 

between his position and the other cases· addressing a court's 

failure to advise a defendant of the application of the 

Guidelines. The defendants -in the cases we have cited contended 

Rule 11 was violated because they were not informed how the 

Guidelines would affect their sentences. Rhodes, No. 89-3241, 

slip op. at 7; Salva, 902 F.2d at 487-88; Thomas, 894 F.2d at 997; 

Henry, 893 F.2d at 48; Turner, 881 F.2d at 687; Fernandez, 877 

F.2d at 1143. Gomez contends Rule 11 required the court to advise 

him that the Guidelines applied. We hold there is no significance 

in this distinction. As we explained above, Rule ll{c){l) only 

required the court to advise Gomez of the maximum statutory 

sentence, which it did. The Rule did not require the court to 

inform Gomez that or how the Guidelines apply. Further, we find 

Gomez has 

7 Gomez also contends the court's failure to advise him about 

the likelihood of probation violates fundamental fairness. We 

reject this contention based on the reasoning of the Seventh 

Circuit in Salva. 902 F.2d at 487-88. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2189 Document: 01019946628 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 12 
( 

demonstrated no prejudice from the court's failure to inform him 

that the Guidelines would apply. 

We hold that Gomez entered his guilty plea knowingly and 

voluntarily. He fully understood the nature of the charges to 

which he pleaded guilty. He entered his plea freely. Gomez knew 

he was avoiding potential penalties through his plea agreement. 

He knew the penalties he was facing in pleading guilty to Count I. 

Because Gomez' substantial rights were not affected, we must 

disregard any variance from the procedures Rules 11 prescribes. 

We find no reason Gomez should be permitted to enter a new plea 

and we AFFIRM. 

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