Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00184/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00184-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott Frauenheim
Respondent
Enrique Madrigal Lopez
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ENRIQUE MADRIGAL LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT FRAUENHEIM, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00184 LJO MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION ON

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 10]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is represented in this action by 

Charity S. Whitney, of the Office of the Attorney General for the State of California.

I. Background

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus, upon 

being convicted by a jury on April 19, 2011 of first degree murder, felon in possession of 

a firearm, and various sentencing enhancements. (See Lodged Doc. 1.) On May 16, 

2011, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate state prison term of fifty (50) years 

to life and a consecutive determinate two year term. (Id.) 

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On October 11, 2013, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 

affirmed the judgment. (Lodged Doc. 2.) Review was denied by the California Supreme 

Court on January 15, 2014. (Lodged Docs. 3-4.)

Petitioner proceeded to file six petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

state courts as follows:

1. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: June 5, 20121; 

Granted as a belated appeal: August 9, 2012;

2. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: September 28, 20122;

Denied: November 1, 2012;

3. Stanislaus County Superior Court

Filed: March 20, 20143; 

Denied: April 15, 2014;

4. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: April 14, 20144; 

Denied: May 1, 2014;

5. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: May 8, 20145;

Denied: May 22, 2014;

6. California Supreme Court

Filed: July 14, 20146; 

 

1 Under the mailbox rule, the Court deems petitions filed on the date Petitioner handed a petition 

to prison authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 

1056 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner was 

represented by counsel at the time of filing this petition, and is not entitled to the benefit of the mailbox 

rule.

2

Petitioner was represented by counsel at the time of filing this petition, and is not entitled to the 

benefit of the mailbox rule.

3

Although the petition was filed on April 10, 2014, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on March 20, 2014, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

4

Although the petition was filed on April 14, 2014, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on April 21, 2014, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

5

Although the petition was filed on May 12, 2014, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers 

the petition filed on May 8, 2014, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

6

Although the petition was filed on July 17, 2014, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers 

the petition filed on July 14, 2014, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

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Denied: September 24, 2014.

(Mot. to Dismiss, Exs. 5-16.)

Petitioner also filed a prior federal petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging 

the conviction. The petition was filed on January 14, 2015, and was denied without 

prejudice for failure to exhaust on May 14, 2015. (Lodged Docs. 17-20.) 

On February 1, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus in this Court.7 On April 8, 2016, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition 

as being filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), 

and for failure to exhaust state remedies. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 10.) Petitioner filed 

an opposition on July 22, 2016, and Respondent filed a reply on August 25, 2016. (ECF 

Nos. 16, 19. The matter stands ready for adjudication.

II. Discussion

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to 

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an 

answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being 

in violation of the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 

420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using 

Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); 

Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a 

respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court 

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & 

 

7

Although the petition was filed on February 10, 2016, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on February 1, 2016, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

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n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of the oneyear limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Respondent's motion to dismiss 

is similar in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state 

remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal 

answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority 

under Rule 4.

B. Commencement of Limitations Period Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). AEDPA imposes various requirements on all 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 

521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on February 1, 2016 and is subject to the 

provisions of AEDPA. AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners 

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As 

amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing 

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

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(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 

under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period begins running on the date that the 

petitioner’s direct review became final or the date of the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review. In this case, the California Supreme Court denied review on January 15, 

2014. The state appeal process became final ninety days later, on April 15, 2014, when 

the time for seeking certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. U.S. 

Supreme Court rule 13; Bowen v. Rowe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999). The AEDPA 

statute of limitations began to run the following day, on April 16, 2014. Patterson v. 

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner had one year from April 16, 2014, absent applicable tolling, in which to 

file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed in filing the 

instant petition until February 1, 2016, nine months after the statute of limitations period 

expired. Absent the later commencement of the statute of limitations or any applicable 

tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(b)

Petitioner contends that several alleged impediments purportedly prevented him 

from filing a timely federal petition. To warrant delayed accrual based on an "impediment 

to filing . . . created by State action," a petitioner must show a causal connection 

between the unlawful state impediment and his or her failure to file a timely petition. 

Bryant v. Arizona Atty. General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations 

omitted). A petitioner "must satisfy a far higher bar than that for equitable tolling." 

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009). A petitioner is entitled to delayed 

accrual under subsection (d)(1)(B) only if the impediment "altogether prevented him from 

presenting his claims in any form, to any court." Id. at 1001 (emphasis and citation 

omitted).

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Petitioner argues that an alleged lack of access to the law library, Spanish 

language legal materials, and inmate assistance for Spanish speaking inmates during 

Petitioner's incarceration constituted a state-created impediment warranting delayed 

accrual. 

State prison officials' conduct that interferes with an inmate's ability to prepare 

and file a habeas petition by denying access to legal materials sometimes may amount 

to a "state-created impediment" under subsection B. See Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 

1083, 1087-89 (9th Cir. 2005). However, Petitioner was able to file his state habeas 

petitions prior to and notwithstanding those alleged impediments. Petitioner's ability to 

file his state habeas petitions notwithstanding the alleged impediments undermines his

argument that a state-created impediment prevented him from filing a federal habeas 

petition. See Felix v. Baker, 589 Fed. App'x 382, 383 (9th Cir. 2015) (petitioner's ability 

to file a state habeas petition while the alleged state impediment of a lack of Spanishlanguage legal materials or translation assistance was in place undermined his argument 

that the impediment prevented him from filing a timely federal habeas petition); Alvarado 

v. Beard, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70636, 2015 WL 3466273, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 

2015), adopted, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70627, 2015 WL 3469235 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 

2015) (same). Petitioner has failed to show any entitlement to delayed accrual under 

section 2244(d)(1)(B).

D. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year 

limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held 

the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction 

relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one state court's disposition of 

a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the state court 

system. 536 U.S. 214, 216 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 

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Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year statute of limitations 

under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction petition was 

timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or 

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the 

requirements for statutory tolling. Id.

According to the state court records provided by Respondent, Petitioner’s first 

through third petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed and denied by the state courts 

on or before April 15, 2014. The petitions were therefore filed and denied prior to the 

commencement of the limitations period. A collateral action filed prior to the effective 

date of the statute of limitations has no tolling consequence. Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 

729, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) (Although the filing of a state habeas petition "would otherwise 

have tolled the running of the federal limitations period, since it was denied before that 

period had started to run, it had no effect on the timeliness of the ultimate federal filing."). 

Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for his first through third state petitions.

Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner is entitled to tolling during the 

pendency of Petitioner’s fourth through sixth state court petitions. Petitioner’s fourth 

petition was filed on April 14, 2014 – one day prior to the commencement of the 

limitations period. While Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the one day prior to the 

limitations period, he is entitled to tolling from April 15, 2014, until the denial of his sixth 

state petition on September 24, 2014. 

Petitioner had the entire year limitations period remaining as of September 24, 

2015. The limitations period therefore expired one year later on September 24, 2015, 

and the present petition was not filed until February 1, 2016, over four months later. 

While Petitioner filed a prior federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, federal 

petitions do not qualify for tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See Duncan v. Walker, 

533 U.S. 167, 181, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 150 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2001); King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 

1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the limitations period commenced on April 15, 

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2014, and expired on September 24, 2015. Petitioner filed the instant petition over four 

months later on February 1, 2016. Accordingly, the petition is untimely.

E. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-62 (2010); 

quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo. Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would 

give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th 

Cir. 1993). In his opposition, Petitioner presents three separate arguments why he is 

entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period: (1) his inability to write or speak 

English, (2) ignorance in the law, and (3) actual innocence. 

1. Limited Knowledge of the English Language

Petitioner contends he should be granted equitable tolling because he was not 

provided adequate legal assistance for a non-English speaker. (Opp'n, ECF No. 16 at 2-

4.) In Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069-71 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit held 

that a non-English speaking petitioner may be entitled to equitable tolling if he can 

demonstrate that he was unable, despite diligent efforts, to procure legal materials in his 

language or to obtain translation assistance. However, in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, the 

Supreme Court made clear the requirement that equitable tolling is only available if the 

petitioner demonstrates that he acted diligently. 544 U.S. at 418. In order to show 

diligence, he must provide details of any specific actions he took toward the filing of the 

petition. Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006). Additionally, he "bears a 

strong burden to show specific facts to support his claim of extraordinary circumstances 

and due diligence." Brown v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008). In this case, 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he acted diligently. His only assertion is a statement 

that he does not speak English and that the law library lacked sufficient Spanish 

language material and Spanish speaking clerks. Petitioner fails to state with specificity 

any actions he took to mitigate his language deficiency. He fails to provide a record of 

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requests for Spanish language materials from the library, and the denial of any such 

requests. The only request that he does provide is from April 25, 2016, after the instant 

motion to dismiss was filed in this action. (Opp’n at 12.) His conclusory claim is 

insufficient to satisfy his burden of demonstrating he acted diligently. Petitioner is not 

entitled to equitable tolling on this ground.

2. Ignorance of the Law

Petitioner also claims he should be entitled to equitable tolling because he is 

uneducated and does not have knowledge of the law. This claim for equitable tolling 

must also fail. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (lack of legal 

sophistication is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling); Turner 

v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1999) (inmate's lack of legal training, a poor 

education, or illiteracy does not give a court reason to toll the limitations period); 

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 

1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Petitioner's circumstances and lack of knowledge of the law are 

no different than the majority of incarcerated prisoners attempting to file petitions for writ 

of habeas corpus. Accordingly, his ignorance of the law is not an extraordinary 

circumstance entitling Petitioner to equitable tolling.

3. Actual Innocence

Finally, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to the equitable exception to the 

limitations period based on his actual innocence.

On May 28, 2013, the Supreme Court held that a federal court may entertain an 

untimely claim if a petitioner makes a showing of actual innocence. McQuiggin v. 

Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013). To qualify for the equitable exception to the timeliness 

bar based on actual innocence, a petitioner "'must show that it is more likely than not 

that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.'" 133 

S. Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). "[T]he emphasis on 

'actual innocence' allows the reviewing tribunal also to consider the probative force of 

relevant evidence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

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327. "The gateway should open only when a petition presents 'evidence of innocence so 

strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is 

also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.'" McQuiggin, 133 

S. Ct. 1924, 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316.) "Unexplained delay in presenting 

new evidence bears on the determination whether the petitioner has made the requisite 

showing." 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1935, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1019.

Petitioner asserts that he is actually innocent, but presents no evidence in support 

of the claim. Without further explanation, his claim does not undermine his guilt and is 

not sufficient to support a finding of actual innocence. Petitioner's claim, if presented to a 

reasonable juror, would not convince the juror of his innocence. Petitioner's actual 

innocence claim is without merit and the petition for writ of habeas corpus must be 

dismissed as untimely.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of equitable tolling and his 

petition remains untimely.

F. Exhaustion

Respondent, in his motion to dismiss, asserts an alternative ground for dismissal 

based on failure to exhaust state remedies. (See Mot. to Dismiss at 10.) As the petition 

is untimely and subject to dismissal, in an exercise of judicial efficiency, the Court will not 

address Respondent's claims regarding failure to exhaust judicial remedies.

III. Conclusion

As explained above, Petitioner failed to file the instant petition for habeas corpus 

within the one year limitation period required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner is not 

entitled to the benefit of statutory tolling, but not equitable tolling. Regardless, the 

petition remains untimely even with the benefit of statutory tolling. Based on the 

foregoing, this Court recommends that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED.

IV. Recommendation

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss for 

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period be 

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GRANTED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States 

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and 

Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this Findings and 

Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy 

on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen (14) days after service of the Objections. The Finding and 

Recommendation will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate 

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c). Petitioner is advised that failure to 

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's 

order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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