Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cr-02235/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cr-02235-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Matthew Allen Hawkes
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MATTHEW ALLEN HAWKES, 

Defendant. 

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No. CR 09-2235-TUC-RCC-CRP

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 ON MOTION TO 

 SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. (Doc 28). In

this motion, Defendant contends the border patrol agent did not have the requisite reasonable

suspicion to stop his vehicle. The Government contests the motion arguing the border patrol

agent did have reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. For the reasons discussed

infra., the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge, after his independent review,

DENY the Motion to Suppress based on an illegal stop of Defendant’s vehicle. (Doc 28).

I. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing on this motion on March 18, 2010.

(Doc 36). At the evidentiary hearing, the Government produced the following witness to

support its position:

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• Gabriel Class, Senior Border Patrol Agent and K-9 officer employed by the

Border Patrol for the last 5.5 years, who was working at the checkpoint on

Highway 191, South of Willcox, Arizona for five months before the incident. 

The following are the factual findings of the case from the evidentiary hearing. The

facts are not contested by the parties. 

II. FACTUAL FINDINGS

A. Checkpoint on Highway 191

At the evidentiary hearing Agent Class testified that since approximately March-April

2009, he was working at the Border Patrol checkpoint on Highway 191, south of Willcox,

Arizona. This checkpoint was established in this area to stop illegal traffic. The checkpoint

covers the northbound portion of the road and is equipped with a stop sign, speed limit signs,

large traffic cones, flood lights, and a “speed bump” (a plastic cover crossing the road that

contains the power cords for the trailer and the flood lights). While this was continually

referred to by the Prosecution as to “speed bump”, it was clearly there for electrical conduit.

 There was no testimony that this bump was striped or signed as a speed bump. Agent Class

testified that the checkpoint operates at all times except when it is raining, in which case the

stop and speed signs are removed, while the speed bump across the road is left in place as

its removal is impossible. Agent Class testified that when the checkpoint is closed, the risk

of alien or narcotics smuggling increases requiring border patrol agents to be more attentive

than usual. 

Because of the establishment of Highway 191 Checkpoint, as a matter of course, drug

and alien smugglers try to avoid the checkpoint. On direct examination, Agent Class testified

that illegal aliens and drug smugglers common attempt to circumvent the checkpoint area by

using Kansas Settlement Road (or other small streets around the Highway 191 Checkpoint),

continuing on Birch Road, exiting on Highway 191, then turning on Dragoon Road which

provides direct access to I-10. 

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B. Previous encounters

At the evidentiary hearing Agent Class testified that approximately a week before the

incident at issue, he encountered Defendant Hawkes, where the latter was stopped and his

vehicle, a Ford Escort, was searched following the alert of Agent Class’s narcotics detecting

canine. No drugs were found, but the trunk smelled like fresh marijuana and cologne, and

the agents found burlap strands in the trunk. Agent Class testified that this kind of burlap is

commonly used to carry marijuana, and drug smugglers often use strong cologne to conceal

the odor of marijuana. Since no drugs were found, the agents let Defendant Hawkes pass the

checkpoint.

Shortly before the incident at issue, the green Lexus in which Defendant Hawkes was

stopped was also allegedly involved in criminal activity. A few days before the incident,

other Border Patrol Agents stopped the same green Lexus in an area north of Checkpoint on

Highway 191, an area commonly used to load narcotics. This vehicle was suspected in

distracting the agents from the actual load site. Agent Class testified that he received an email alert about this encounter from his colleagues. 

C. The stop on September 7, 2009

On September 7, 2009 the Highway 191 checkpoint was closed due to weather

conditions, and Agent Class was patrolling the fixed location a few miles north of the

checkpoint on Highway 191. He was driving his marked Border Patrol vehicle and was

accompanied by his assigned narcotics-detecting canine. At approximately 7:10 a.m. Agent

Class received a dispatch about the speeding green Lexus and the dispatch named Defendant

Hawkes as the owner of the Lexus. Agent Class testified he recognized the name of

Defendant Hawkes from his previous encounter which was the first factor to make Agent

Class suspicious of criminal activity. Agent Class started following the green Lexus. The

pursuit lasted over eight miles at speed approaching 90 mph. Agent Class testified that

Defendant made a sharp left turn from Highway 191 to Dragoon Road in such a sudden

manner that the rear end of the vehicle fish-tailed. Agent Class testified he wanted to wait

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for the back up, but when the vehicle made such an abrupt turn, he considered this as an

attempt to flee and turned on his emergency lights and executed the stop of Defendant

Hawkes’ vehicle. 

Once Defendant pulled over and Agent Class approached the vehicle, Agent Class

testified he noticed the smell of fresh marijuana. Agent Class requested consent for a canine

inspection. Defendant consented and Agent Class’s canine alerted on the trunk. In the trunk,

agents discovered six bundles of marijuana, after which Defendant was arrested.

III. ANALYSIS

Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer cannot stop a vehicle without a

reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct at the time of the stop. United States v. Rodriguez,

976 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir.1992). Reasonable suspicion is established when specific,

articulable facts, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for

suspecting that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. United States v.

Salinas, 940 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir.1991). To establish that a reasonable suspicion exists,

the courts look into “totality of circumstances-the whole picture” where the following factors,

not to the exclusion of others, may be considered: 

(1) characteristics of the area; (2) proximity to the border; (3)

usual patterns of traffic and time of day; (4) previous alien or

drug smuggling in the area; (5) behavior of the drive including

obvious attempts to evade officers; (6) appearance or behavior

of the passengers; (7) model and appearance of the vehicle; and

(8) officer experience. 

United States v. Garcia-Barron, 116 F.3d 1305, 1307 (9th Cir.1997) (citing United

States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)).

Government officers can refer to their past experience and training to articulate how their

factual observations triggered their good-faith belief that criminal activity was afoot. United

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.411, 417-418 (1981). The burden of citing the “specific and

articulable facts” is borne by the Government, while the burden of proof on the motion to

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suppress evidence lies with the Defendant. United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 715 n. 5

(9th Cir.2005).

In the case in question, the Government cited the following factors to support

reasonable suspicion: (1) the area where the incident took place is very close to the border

and is notorious for alien and narcotic smuggling; and Agent Class, being an experienced

border patrol officer, is familiar with previous alien and narcotic smuggling in the area

and ways of circumventing of the Highway 191 checkpoint; (2) both the Defendant and

his vehicle have been reported in previous encounters that were related to drug smuggling

suspicion and failure to yield to law enforcement officers; (3) that the car was speeding

and failed to slow down in a speed bump area; and (4) once Agent Class started following

the Defendant’s vehicle, the Defendant made an abrupt turn with a side slip (“fishtailing”).

A. Area of the stop

At the evidentiary hearing Agent Class testified that the area where the incident

occurred is known for drug and alien smuggling because of its proximity to the border. The

drugs and alien smuggling was the reason for establishing the Highway 191 checkpoint in

this area. Further, Agent Class testified that based on his experience of working at the

Highway 191 checkpoint, he was aware of potential ways of circumventing the checkpoint

by illegal narcotics and alien smugglers. In the opinion of Agent Class, Defendant’s route

was consistent with these common circumvention ways. This Court finds Agent Class’s

testimony as to his experience in this area reasonable and credible. The factor of a known

area for criminal activities standing alone cannot be considered as creating reasonable

suspicion, but together with other factors may cumulatively lead the court to conclusion that

such reasonable suspicion existed at the time of the stop. U.S. v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1426

(9th Cir.1986). 

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B. Prior encounters

At the evidentiary hearing Agent Class testified that when he received the report on

a green Lexus driving at a high rate of speed on the day of the incident he recognized the

name of Defendant Hawkes indicated as the owner of the vehicle. The previous encounter

stood out for Agent Class because Defendant Hawkes was suspected in drug smuggling and

during that encounter he was nervous and acted in a bizarre way. The Government argues

this formed a ground for reasonable suspicion for exercising a stop of Defendant’s vehicle.

Again, this alone cannot establish reasonable suspicion to support a stop, but “it is

permissible to consider such a fact as part of the total calculus of information in these

determinations.” Burrell v. McIlroy, 464 F.3d 853, 858 (9th Cir.2006). Based on the agents’

previous encounters with both Defendant Hawkes and his vehicle related to drug smuggling

or distracting the agents from actual drug smugglers, this Court believes that Agent Class had

a reasonable suspicion of drug smuggling at the time of the stop.

C. Speeding and failure to slow down at the speed bump

Agent Class testified that on the day of the incident the Checkpoint on Highway 191

was closed due to weather conditions. While speed and stop signs are removed during the

downtime of the checkpoint, the speed bump cannot be removed as its serves as a cover for

the power cords for the flood lights. The Government contends that the Defendant did not

slow down at the speed bump located near the Highway 191 checkpoint which was an

additional articulable fact creating reasonable suspicion. This Court disagrees. Where the

speed limit and stop signs are removed, the drivers do not necessarily know that there is a

speed bump in the area, and a speed bump becomes nothing more than a natural unevenness

of the road. Therefore, this Court does not consider this “speed bump” as a factor adding to

creation of reasonable suspicion. Similarly, driving above the speed limit is common

behavior not peculiar to people transporting illegal drugs. Officers claim suspicious behavior

for cars speeding, driving the speed limit, and driving below the speed limit. Speed is not

a factor supporting reasonable suspicion. 

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D. Abrupt turn

Agent Class testified that after receiving a report on a green Lexus driving at a high

speed rate, and the information on the vehicle registration, he started following Defendant’s

car. It took Agent Class a while to get behind the Defendant’s vehicle. Agent Class’s

contention that Defendant Hawkes probably noticed the marked border patrol vehicle is

reasonable. Thus, a sharp turn made by Defendant Hawkes at a high speed so that the rear

of the vehicle fish-tailed, makes it reasonable to suspect that Defendant Hawkes was trying

to flee by making such an abrupt turn.

The driver's behavior is one of the factors in the totality of circumstances. “[E]rratic

driving or obvious attempts to evade officers can support a reasonable suspicion.” United

States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 (citing United States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d

941 (CA9 1974); Duprez v. United States, 435 F.2d 1276 (CA9 1970)). In Illinois v.

Wardlow, the Supreme Court held that:

[I]t was not merely respondent's presence in an area of heavy

narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers' suspicion, but his

unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Our cases have also

recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor

in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flight-wherever

it occurs-is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily

indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (internal citations omitted). It is

significant in this case that Agent Class did not testify to the usual litany of suspicious

driving behavior: hands gripping steering wheel tightly at 11 and 20 o’clock, constant

looking in rear view mirror, refusal to look over at officer, etc. Rather he testified to specific

information legitimately gathered through law enforcement activity and logically considered

with his law enforcement training. This is the type of law enforcement judgment the case

law clearly seems to support. 

Here, taken in totality, the abrupt turn of the Defendant by making a “fish-tail”

together with the information on previous encounters with the Defendant and Defendant’s

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vehicle, as well as the area of the stop being known for alien and narcotic smuggling and

circumvention of the border patrol checkpoint, are facts sufficiently specific and articulable

for Agent Class to form reasonable suspicion. Based on the above, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Judge find that the border patrol agent had the requisite

reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge, after his independent

review, DENY Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence based on presence of reasonable

suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle. (Doc 28).

Pursuant to FederalRule ofCriminal Procedure 59(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The

parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the following case

number: CR-09-2235-RCC. 

DATED this 1st day of April, 2010.

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