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Parties Involved:
Charles Shark
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 21, 1995 Decided April 18, 1995

No. 93-3213

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CHARLES SHARK,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(92cr0405)

Ralph D. Martin, appointed by the court, argued the cause for appellant.

Timothy J. Heaphy, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on

the briefs were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher and Roy W. McLeese,

III, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam : Appellant Charles Shark was charged and convicted by a jury of drug

distribution and conspiracy charges in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (1988 & Supp. V 1993),

as well as criminal forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 835(a)(1) (1988), and was sentenced to 360 months

for each drug offense. He appeals his convictions on the ground that his counsel did not provide him

with effective assistance, depriving him of his rights under the Sixth Amendment. Shark also claims

that he is entitled to resentencing because the district court mistakenly thought that it lacked

discretion not to sentence him as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. We

uphold the convictions and affirm the sentence.

I.

In pressing his Sixth Amendment claim, appellant sets forth several alleged errors by trial

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1Appellant also claims that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing defense

counsel to act under a conflict of interest and by not telling the jury to disallow statements made

by the prosecutor in closing argument. On neither occasion did defense counsel objectthese

incidents are among those cited by Shark as indicia of her fecklessnessand we conclude quite

readily that neither amounts to plain error. 

counsel, only one of which warrants discussion.1 This is Shark's contention that defense counsel

abandoned a pre-trial victory which, by the prosecutor's own admission, would have made it

impossible for the government to present its case. According to appellant, counsel retreated from her

position in order to mollify the court, which was ostensibly upset by defense counsel's timing in

raising the issue. On the first day of trial, after jury selection, defense counsel challenged the

government's intention to provide the jury with transcripts of three audiotapes of conversations

recorded by an undercover officer while purchasing drugs from Shark's co-conspirators. Defense

counsel made a "general" and a "specific" objection. The general objection was that the occasionally

poor quality of the recordings did not allow for a fair transcription of the tapes. The specific

objection contested the transcripts' attribution at one point of the word "Charles"the defendant's

first nameto one of the co-conspirators. Defense counsel maintained that despite listening to the

tape "[a]t least a hundred times," she was unable to make out the word "Charles."

Shark's ineffective assistance claim hinges on his assertion that although the district court

sustained the objections, defense counsel abandoned her position (inexplicably). Both propositions

are debatable. First of all, the district court never definitively ruled on defense counsel's motion; to

the contrary, the judge'sstatements on the matter were inconsistent and apparently inconclusive. He

initially responded to the objections by stating, "Well, until they are ironed out, I'll let [the

government] use the transcripts. If there's any doubt, we can play the tapes." He noted that defense

counsel had been ordered to lodge any objections long ago, but then the judge appeared to change

course, telling the prosecutor, "Look, I can't allow themto be used over defense counsel's objection."

After thisremark, however, the judge seemed to revert to his initial position. "I don't know whether

[the objections] are valid or not," he said. "These are things that I ordered to be worked out before

trial. She's a little bit late." Finally, the judge simply closed discussion on the matter, stating, "Let's

move on."

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When defense counsel reiterated her objections the next day, the court asked the prosecutor

if the government would be hindered by not using the transcripts. Before getting an answer,

however, the court went on to express its frustration with the timing of the objection, and his

exchange with defense counsel (Ms. Roberts), particularly his expression of pique, figures

prominently in Shark's appeal.

THE COURT: Now this is the very thing I told you all about, lectured her partner

about, but he didn't pay any attention to me. He doesn't pay any attention to me,

anyhow, and next time I'm going to get his attention and put him in the cell block.

MS. ROBERTS: Judge, please.

THE COURT: I am, because he constantly ignores this court. He's always got an

application for a continuance because he's got to be in another court. He doesn't obey

the orders of this court. This is a good example.

The prosecutor sought to address defense counsel's specific objection to the third tape, but

the district court stated, "I'm not going to allow any of them in if she's going to object, and I'll deal

with this matter of her and her law firm's dereliction in duty after the trial." He told the prosecutor,

"You may be right," but said, "I can't do anything about it." The prosecutor replied, "Your Honor,

... I just strongly urge you, we cannot do this case without transcripts. That's all there is to it. We

cannot do the case." Although the judge seemed to have made up his mind to sustain the objection,

he apparently still had not reached a firm decision on whether to prohibit use of the transcripts (or

to examine them himself, as he had previously suggested was possible), for he then asked the

prosecutor (Mr. Kohl), "Do you have any recommendations as to what I should do with them?"

A somewhat confusing exchange then took place, which ultimately obviated any need for the

judge to make a final ruling on defense counsel's objection.

MR. KOHL: Here's my recommendation, and this is that I think even Ms. Roberts

would agree that she

THE COURT: Talk to her if you've got something you can work out with her.

MR. KOHL: I can address her specific objection to tape three.... And that is, if she

wants, I can take the word "Charles" out, if that's something that she definitely

disagrees with.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. KOHL: But my request is that with respect to that, in general, the argument that

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she's making is one for closing argument ... and I think that she'd be, frankly, if I

discern her objection, she'd be comfortable with that.

THE COURT: I don't know, Mr. Kohl. It's not your fault.

MS. ROBERTS: If counsel is willing to omit the name "Charles" from the transcript,

coupled with the court's instruction and an addendum I ask the court to consider

giving, and that is that the jury be advised that if their (pause)and I'm losing my

mind.

THE COURT: Well, talk to him so he can tell me with precision what it is you want.

After a discussion off the record, defense counsel told the court that she had reached an

agreement with the prosecutor.

MS. ROBERTS: If counsel will omit the word "Charles" from the transcript and the

court will, together with its other instruction, advise the jurorsthat if their, what they

hear on the tape does not coincide with the transcript, it's what they hear that controls

and not the transcript.

THE COURT: Well, that's the law.

MS. ROBERTS: And that's the only other request I'd make finally, and I think that

will resolve it and Mr. Shark would be happy.

THE COURT: Then you've withdrawn all your objections?

MS. ROBERTS: I've withdrawn all my objections, given what counsel is willing to

do and the court's instruction to the jury.

In light of these statements by defense counsel, even if we were to view the judge's

declarations, "I'm not going to allow any of them in ifshe's going to object" and "I can't do anything

about it," as a final ruling on the transcriptswhich we think is by no means clear given his

subsequent invitation ofsuggestionsfrom the prosecutorwe do not think that defense counsel can

be said to have abandoned her position. She withdrew her objections, to be sure, but only after she

had extracted a concession from the prosecutor and an assurance from the judge about the nature of

his instruction to the jury.

As Shark's appellate counsel acknowledged, we normally would not look twice at trial

counsel's withdrawal of her objection in considering Shark'sineffective assistance claim. As set forth

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), such a claim has two

components; the defendant must show that "counsel's performance was deficient" and that "the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Shark's claim falters at the first step. The prosecutor's

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concession, coupled with the court's assurance asto itsinstruction, at least arguably satisfied defense

counsel's stated concerns, since the transcripts no longer contained the word "Charles" and the jury

was to be told that the tapes were to predominate over the transcripts in the event of any

inconsistencyincluding, perforce, the inclusion of words that a listener could not discern. In light

of this, we would not be able to say that defense counsel's withdrawal of her objections "fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness," the benchmark for deficiency under Strickland. 466 U.S.

at 688.

This case raises an additional issue, however, because Shark claimsthat counselwas coerced

into abandoning her position by the judge's threatened reprimand of her and her partner. Shark

maintainsthat the court created a conflict between the defense counsel's personal interest (to mollify

the judge) and that of her client (to insist upon the objection to the transcripts). We must decide,

then, whether the reason that Shark attributes to defense counsel's otherwise unassailable

decisionfear of sanctions stemming from her tardiness in raising the objectionshould affect our

appraisal of his claim of ineffective assistance.

Shark's effort to have us view this case as one falling into the conflict of interest subset of

ineffective assistance claims is rather ingenious. A defendant who can establish that "an actual

conflict ofinterest adverselyaffected hislawyer's performance" isrelieved fromthe stringent showing

required under Strickland. Id. at 692 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)

(footnote omitted)). Recognizing that "it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of

representation corrupted by conflicting interests," id., the Strickland Court reaffirmed Cuyler v.

Sullivan, which held that a defendant who can demonstrate that hislawyer acted under a conflict need

only show that the conflict had some negative effect upon his defense (defined as "an actual lapse in

representation"). Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50.

We need not determine, however, whether in this case defense counsel's conduct, although

not "objectively unreasonable" under Strickland, nevertheless amountsto a "lapse in representation"

within the meaning of Cuyler, for we think that Shark's ground for claiming a conflict of

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2Consequently, we have no occasion to consider the approach adopted by several circuits for

assessing whether a conflict of interest has led to a "an actual lapse in representation" that would

justify reversing a conviction. See, e.g., Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 770-71 (7th Cir.

1994); Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1407 (1994); 

United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906

(1989); United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 836 (1st Cir. 1985). 

interestfriction between trial counsel and the courtis insufficient as a matter of law.2 We very

much doubt that mere fear of rebuke from the court could ever give rise to a conflict of interest

sufficient to establish a predicate for ineffective assistance. Were that the case, any provocation of

the court, even on the smallest matter, could be maneuvered into an excuse for invalidating a

conviction. Usually, when a defendant claims that a judge's hostility impaired defense counsel's

zealous advocacy, the right that defendant seeks to redeem on appeal is the right to a fair trial. See,

e.g., United States v. Logan, 998 F.2d 1025, 1028-30 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Robinson

v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 569 (1993). When no objection is made at trial to the circumstances

allegedly constraining defense counsel's freedom to act in her client's best interests, we review only

for plain error, in keeping with FED. R. CIV. P. 52(b). See United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770,

1777-79 (1993). Under the standard set forth by that Rule, the defendant must show that the court's

error was "particularly egregious," United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982), and we are to

correct only those errors that "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings." United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297

U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). That, obviously, is a far more difficult standard than the "lapse in

representation" test that Shark would have us apply to this case.

We think it fair to say that any rebuke sufficient to create a cognizable conflict of interest

would, virtually by hypothesis, so hamper counsel's zealousrepresentation asto violate a defendant's

right to a fair trialand would be independently remediable on those grounds. Of course, if judicial

expressions of dissatisfaction were severe enough to lead defense counsel to make decisions that are

both objectively deficient and prejudicial, the Strickland requirements for showing ineffective

assistance would be satisfied. But a defendant cannot avoid those requirements by seeking to make

out a claimofineffective assistance under the more lenient Cuylerstandard when the asserted conflict

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of interest issaid to arise from ordinary friction between a judge and defense counsel at trial. We see

no need further to complicate this already confusing province of the law by embracing an additional

framework for assessing whether judicial discipline of counsel has disrupted a defendant's

representation.

II.

Shark'sresentencing argument, although less complex, fares no better. Shark was sentenced

under the Sentencing Guidelines' career offender provision, § 4B1.1. A defendant qualifies as a

career offender if he has two prior felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled

substance offense and the crime for which he is currentlybeing sentenced fallsinto either ofthose two

categories. Shark met those criteria, as he had been convicted of robbery in 1974 and of attempted

robbery in 1981. Shark claimed, however, that consideration of his prior convictions resulted in

assignment of a "criminal history category [that] significantly overrepresent[ed] the seriousness of

his past conduct and future threat to society," United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 55 (D.C. Cir.

1992), as his prior convictions had occurred 13 and 19 years before his current offense. He asked

the judge to consider the intervening years as a reason for departing downward from the range

applicable to career offenders in computing his sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.

Shark maintains that the district judge wrongly thought himself to lack any discretion to

depart downward. Shark's claim is not that the judge abused his discretion by refusing to depart

downwardsuch decisions, we have said, are not reviewable. United States v. Spencer, 25 F.3d

1105, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Beckham, 968 F.2d at 53. Rather, Shark bases his appeal on our

promise to "remand a case for resentencing when the district court indicates erroneously that "his

discretion was constrained in a way that it actually was not.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Hazel,

928 F.2d 420, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).

The sentencing judge was quite evidently aware of his discretion. Not only did Shark's

counsel request a downward departure, but the prosecutor in arguing that such a departure was not

warranted volunteered that "the court has some latitude" in sentencing "where the defendant can

show the court [that] for eight or nine years he has been a law-abiding citizen." The judge, moreover,

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expressly asked defense counsel ifshe wanted to present evidence supporting downward departure,

inviting "anything that you want to put on that would mitigate toward the defendant." There would,

of course, be no point in such a statement if the judge thought himself constrained to reject the

request for downward departure as a matter of law. Finally, midway through the proceedings, the

judge told defense counsel, "I don't see any basis on what I've heard so far that gives me any

leeway"a statement that, we think, indicates that the judge appreciated his discretion but thought

that he had not been presented with any reason to exercise it.

Shark clingsto statements by the judge that he felt "constrained" to sentence Shark as a career

offender, requiring imposition of a prison term that the judge thought to be "a long one and one ...

which I probably would not give if we didn't have the Sentencing Guidelines." But these comments

and others, such as the recognition that "there's not a whole lot of leeway that a judge has in these

cases," do not indicate a misunderstanding of the discretion afforded a judge in assigning a defendant

a criminal history category under the Guidelines. This sort of remark is often made by a sentencing

judge who has been asked to depart fromthe Guidelinessentence but concludesthat the groundsthat

would permit discretionary departure have not been established. We have no doubt this is what

happened in this case, especially as the judge made the statements in question after he expressly

concluded that Shark's argumentfor departurethe long period oftime separating his present offense

fromhis prior convictionswas unpersuasive. "I understand that counsel has taken the position that

these are old violations; but the fact is that a good part of the time [in between the convictions] the

defendant wasincarcerated." The judge's response to the arguments put before him indicates that he

plainly understood them to be within his discretion to consider.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the convictions and sentences are hereby affirmed.

So ordered.

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