Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01018/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01018-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Respondent
Michael Mojica
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 1, 2014 Decided August 15, 2014

No. 12-1481

MINISINK RESIDENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION 

AND SAFETY, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,

RESPONDENT

MILLENNIUM PIPELINE COMPANY, L.L.C.,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 13-1018

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Carolyn Elefant argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

petitioners. 

Karin L. Larson, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With her on 

the brief were David L. Morenoff, Acting General Counsel, 

and Robert H. Solomon, Solicitor.

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Aaron M. Streett argued the cause for intervenor. On the 

brief were Joseph Koury and Ryan J. Collins.

Before: KAVANAUGH, MILLETT and WILKINS, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Given the choice, almost no one

would want natural gas infrastructure built on their block. 

“Build it elsewhere,” most would say. The sentiment is 

understandable. But given our nation’s increasing demand for 

natural gas (and other alternative energy sources), it is an 

inescapable fact that such facilities must be built somewhere. 

Decades ago, Congress decided to vest the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission with responsibility for overseeing the 

construction and expansion of interstate natural gas facilities. 

And in carrying out that charge, sometimes the Commission is 

faced with tough judgment calls as to where those facilities 

can and should be sited. These petitions present one such

example.

In July 2012, the Commission approved a proposal for 

the construction of a natural gas compressor station in the 

Town of Minisink, New York. Many local residents, hoping 

to thwart that result, banded together to fight the compressor

station’s development. They formed a group called “Minisink 

Residents for Environmental Preservation and Safety” 

(“MREPS”) and mounted a vigorous, but ultimately 

unsuccessful, campaign opposing the project. Undeterred, 

MREPS and several of its individual members now petition 

for our intervention. In doing so, they mainly argue that the 

Commission’s approval of the project was arbitrary and 

capricious, particularly given the existence of a nearby

alternative site they insist is better than the Minisink locale 

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green-lighted by FERC. They also assail some of the 

Commission’s procedural calls along the way. Though we

respect the concerns they raise, we conclude that, as a legal 

matter, the Commission’s decisions were both reasonable and 

reasonably explained. Consequently, we deny the petitions 

for review. 

I.

We begin with a quick overview of the regulatory 

framework, before turning to the particulars of these petitions. 

A.

Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 

821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z),

with the principal aim of “encourag[ing] the orderly 

development of plentiful supplies of . . . natural gas at 

reasonable prices,” NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 

662, 669-70 (1976), and “protect[ing] consumers against 

exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies,” Fed.

Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 

(1944). Along with those main objectives, there are also 

several “‘subsidiary purposes’” behind the NGA’s passage, 

“includ[ing] ‘conservation, environmental, and antitrust’ 

issues.” Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 900 F.2d 269, 

281 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting NAACP, 425 U.S. at 670 & 

n.6). 

The Act vests FERC with broad authority to regulate the 

transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce. 

15 U.S.C. §§ 717b, 717c; see also Schneidewind v. ANR 

Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 301 (1988) (“FERC exercises 

authority over the rates and facilities of natural gas companies 

used in [interstate] transportation and sale.”). To achieve this

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objective, Congress equipped the Commission with a variety 

of regulatory tools, one of which captures the focus of our

review today. 

Under Section 7(c) of the Act, before an applicant can 

construct or extend an interstate facility for the transportation 

of natural gas, it must obtain a “certificate of public 

convenience and necessity” from the Commission. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 717f(c)(1)(A); Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 

723 F.3d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The statute provides that 

a certificate “shall be issued to any qualified applicant” upon 

a finding that “the applicant is able and willing properly to do 

the acts and to perform the service proposed . . . and that the 

proposed service” and “construction . . . is or will be required 

by the present or future public convenience and necessity.” 

15 U.S.C. § 717f(e). FERC may, in issuing such a certificate, 

attach “such reasonable terms and conditions as the public 

convenience and necessity may require.” Id.; Murray Energy 

Corp. v. FERC, 629 F.3d 231, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

The Commission has issued a policy statement outlining 

the criteria it considers in reviewing such certificate 

applications. Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas 

Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227 (Sept. 15, 1999), 

clarified, 90 FERC ¶ 61,128 (Feb. 9, 2000), further clarified, 

92 FERC ¶ 61,094 (July 28, 2000) (“Certificate Policy 

Statement”). The Commission will first confirm “whether the 

project can proceed without subsidies from the[] existing 

[pipeline’s] customers.” Id., 88 FERC ¶ 61,227, at 61,745. 

Then, it will “balanc[e] the public benefits against the adverse 

effects of the project.” Id., 90 FERC ¶ 61,128, at 61,396.

FERC will approve a project only “where the public benefits 

of the project outweigh the project’s adverse impacts.” Id.; 

see also Fla. Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 604 F.3d 636, 

649 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring in part and 

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dissenting in part) (summarizing the factors examined under

FERC’s Certificate Policy Statement).1

 

In conjunction with the certificating process, the 

Commission must also complete an environmental review of 

the proposed project, as mandated by the National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h.

E.g., Midcoast Interstate Transmission, Inc. v. FERC, 198 

F.3d 960, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Simply stated, the 

Commission’s NEPA obligation requires that it “‘identify the 

reasonable alternatives to the contemplated action’ and ‘look 

hard at the environmental effects of [its] decision[].’” Id.

(quoting Corridor H Alternatives, Inc. v. Slater, 166 F.3d 368, 

374 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (alterations in original). 

B.

For years, Millennium Pipeline Company 

(“Millennium”) has owned and operated a natural gas pipeline

system extending across much of New York’s southern 

border. In July 2011, seeking to expand its service capacity, 

Millennium applied to the Commission for a certificate of 

public convenience and necessity that would allow for the 

 1

 The “public benefits” the Commission examines “could include, 

among other things, meeting unserved demand, eliminating 

bottlenecks, access to new supplies, lower costs to consumers, 

providing new interconnects that improve the interstate grid, 

providing competitive alternatives, increasing electric reliability, or 

advancing clean air objectives.” Certificate Policy Statement, 90 

FERC ¶ 61,128, at 61,396. On the other side of the scale, the 

potential “adverse effects” the Commission will consider are “the 

effects on existing customers of the applicant, the interests of 

existing pipelines and their captive customers, and the interests of 

landowners and the surrounding community, including 

environmental impacts.” Id. 

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construction and operation of a natural gas compressor station 

along its existing pipeline. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 304-19. 

The proposed site for the project was located in the Town of

Minisink, New York. 

As explained in its application to FERC, the aim of 

Millennium’s project was twofold. First, the new station 

would allow Millennium to increase natural gas deliveries to 

its eastern interconnection by about 225,000 additional 

dekatherms per day. Second, the compressor would enable 

bi-directional gas flow on an existing segment of 

Millennium’s pipeline. J.A. 305. The project’s footprint, as 

proposed by Millennium, would consist of: (a) two 6,130-

horsepower natural gas-fired compressor units, to be housed 

in a newly built structure; (b) an additional 1,090 feet of pipe 

connecting the compressor station to the existing pipeline; (c) 

and several ancillary facilities, including a new mainline 

valve, an access driveway, a station control/auxiliary building, 

intake and exhaust silencers, and a filter-separator with a

liquids tank. The compressor station was to be sited on a 

small part of a much larger, 73.4-acre parcel—a parcel 

acquired and owned by Millennium. See J.A. 305-07. We 

refer to Millennium’s proposal as the “Minisink Project.” 

Consistent with agency regulations, notice of the 

proposed Minisink Project was published in the Federal 

Register. See 76 Fed. Reg. 46,786 (Aug. 3, 2011). Around 

the same time, the Commission issued a “Notice of Intent to 

Prepare an Environmental Assessment,” which was sent to a 

range of interested stakeholders, including lawmakers, 

potentially affected landowners, and environmental and 

public-interest groups. In the months following, Millennium 

sponsored a community meeting at the Minisink Town Hall

so that those interested could learn more about the proposal

and voice their views. FERC also hosted its own meeting in 

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Minisink concerning the proposal. As might be expected, the 

Minisink Project sparked its fair share of local interest; during

the review process, the Commission received hundreds of 

verbal and written comments. See J.A. 8-9. 

Most significantly for our purposes, several residents 

urged Millennium and the Commission to pursue a nearby 

alternative site for the compressor station—what came to be 

known as the “Wagoner Alternative.” Under the Wagoner 

Alternative, Millennium would construct a smaller, 5,100-

horsepower compressor station directly adjacent to its existing

Wagoner Meter Station, a site located along the pipeline about

seven miles northwest of Minisink. J.A. 10-11. This 

alternative, its proponents insisted, was far better suited for 

the project, in large part because it was less residentially 

dense than the site proposed in Minisink. See, e.g., J.A. 347-

50. But it came with a catch: Its implementation would 

require the replacement of a 7-mile segment of pipe along the 

pipeline—a segment the parties call the “Neversink Segment”

due to its crossing of the Neversink River; according to 

Millennium, no such upgrade would be required by the 

Minisink Project. See J.A. 390-91. Reacting to commenters 

who were pushing the Wagoner Alternative, FERC sent 

notice to landowners within the vicinity of the Wagoner 

Meter Station site and along the Neversink Segment, inviting 

their input and comments on the concept. J.A. 372-74. The 

Commission incorporated the feedback it received into its 

review of Millennium’s proposal. 

FERC released its Environmental Assessment (“EA”) for 

the Minisink Project several months later. See J.A. 428-97. 

Along with its detailed evaluation of the project’s likely 

environmental impacts—on water resources, vegetation and 

wildlife, air quality and noise, and more—the EA also 

analyzed several alternatives to Millennium’s proposal, 

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including an in-depth comparison between the Minisink 

Project and the Wagoner Alternative. J.A. 474-89. The EA

did identify some positive environmental upshots associated 

with the Wagoner Alternative, see J.A. 484-89, but, on 

balance, the assessment found that the Minisink Project was 

environmentally preferable, due principally to the negative 

environmental consequences that would flow from an upgrade 

of the Neversink Segment, J.A. 489 (“[T]he greater 

environmental issues and landowner impacts of replacing the 

Neversink Segment cause us to conclude that the Wagoner 

Alternative does not provide a significant environmental 

advantage over the proposed project.”). Overall, the EA 

concluded that, so long as Millennium implemented certain 

mitigation measures, the Minisink Project was expected to 

have no significant environmental impact. J.A 490-94.

After receiving and reviewing a slew of comments 

concerning the EA, FERC ruled on Millennium’s application

in July 2012. By a 3-2 majority, the Commission voted to 

issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity to 

Millennium, allowing the Minisink Project to move forward. 

Millennium Pipeline Co., L.L.C., Order Issuing Certificate, 

140 FERC ¶ 61,045 (July 17, 2012) (“Certificate Order”)

(reprinted at J.A. 2-50). 

The Commission began its analysis by applying the 

criteria set forth in its Certificate Policy Statement, first 

finding the threshold factor satisfied—that the project would 

not require any subsidization from Millennium’s existing 

customers. Certificate Order, ¶¶ 11-12. From there, the 

Commission weighed the project’s benefits (increased 

capacity to customers in the high-demand northeast market, 

among others) against what FERC viewed as its “minimal 

adverse effect[s],” both market- and environmentally-focused. 

In the end, the Commission concluded that “the public 

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convenience and necessity require[d] approval of 

Millennium’s proposal,” subject to certain environmental 

conditions. Id. ¶¶ 13-15. 

The Commission undertook an extensive environmental

analysis in its order, leaning heavily on the results of the EA. 

With respect to the Wagoner Alternative, in particular, the 

Commission explained as follows:

The EA evaluated several system and aboveground

site alternatives, and thoroughly compared the 

Wagoner Alternative to Millennium’s proposed 

Minisink Compressor Station. . . . Ultimately, the EA 

concludes that although there are certain advantages to 

the Wagoner Alternative (primarily, its greater 

distance from the nearest noise-sensitive areas and the 

lack of residences within 0.5 mile of the compressor 

site), the greater environmental issues and landowner 

impacts of replacing the Neversink Segment outweigh 

those advantages, and as a whole result in the 

Wagoner Alternative not providing a significant

environmental advantage over the proposed project.

The Commission concurs with this assessment. 

Certificate Order, ¶¶ 26-27. More broadly, the Commission

also addressed a variety of other comments touching on

environmental and landowner-related issues. At the end of 

the day, FERC adopted the EA’s findings and concluded that, 

so long as Millennium adhered to the parameters outlined in 

its application and complied with certain environmental 

mitigation measures, the Minisink Project was expected to 

have no significant environmental impact. Id. ¶ 83.

The Commission’s order also resolved a few procedural 

matters that had been raised. First, the Commission denied a

request for a full-blown evidentiary hearing for the Minisink 

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Project, concluding that the issues at stake could be 

adequately addressed on the written record. The Commission 

also denied a request to stay the proceedings due to a 

resident’s pending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 

request for documents from the Commission (generally 

seeking certain hydraulic analyses and systems models that 

Millennium submitted to FERC during the application 

process). Id. ¶¶ 84-87. 

As noted, the Commission’s determination was not 

unanimous; the approval of Millennium’s application drew 

two dissenting votes. At bottom, both dissenters—Chairman 

Wellinghoff and Commissioner LaFleur—explained that, in 

their eyes, the Wagoner Alternative was a preferable 

alternative to the Minisink Project, and that the Commission 

was wrong to conclude otherwise. See J.A. 41-47. In 

addition, Commissioner Clark issued a separate concurrence, 

highlighting his view that, even if one truly thought the 

Wagoner Alternative wrought lesser environmental impacts 

than the Minisink Project, so long as Minisink was still 

considered “an acceptable site that produces minimal adverse 

impacts,” it should still be approved because FERC need not 

limit its approval to sites with “the minimum impact.” J.A. 48 

(second emphasis in original).

Following the Commission’s approval, MREPS and 

others sought rehearing, and the Commission denied those 

requests through another thorough order. Millennium 

Pipeline Co., L.L.C., Order Denying and Dismissing Requests 

for Rehearing, Denying Request to Reopen and Supplement 

the Record, and Denying Requests for Stay, 141 FERC ¶ 

61,198 (Dec. 7, 2012) (“Reh’g Order”) (reprinted at J.A. 52-

96). Therein, after considering and rejecting various 

challenges to its initial decision, FERC reaffirmed its 

certificate approval for the Minisink Project. Additionally, 

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the Commission denied a request to reopen and supplement 

the record to include a study prepared by Mr. Richard 

Kuprewicz, who we are told is an “industry expert on pipeline 

engineering and safety.” Pet’rs’ Br. at 22-23. The 

Commission reached that result after determining that “Mr. 

Kuprewicz’s study provide[d] no basis for reversing [its]

approval of the Minisink Project.” Reh’g Order, ¶¶ 75-80. 

Finally, FERC denied a request to stay construction on the

Minisink Project pending judicial review. Id. ¶¶ 81-83.

2

 

Chairman Wellinghoff and Commissioner LaFleur again 

dissented, jointly reiterating their view that the Wagoner 

Alternative still stood superior to the Minisink Project. See 

J.A. 95-96. 

In January 2013, Minisink resident Michael Mojica filed 

a separate request for rehearing with FERC, focusing on (1) 

the Commission’s refusal to reopen the record to consider Mr. 

Kuprewicz’s study, and (2) Mr. Mojica’s claimed inability to 

timely obtain information he believed necessary to oppose 

Millennium’s application (essentially the documents pursued

via the aforementioned FOIA request). The Commission, 

joined this time by Chairman Wellinghoff and Commissioner 

LaFleur, unanimously denied the rehearing request. 

Millennium Pipeline Co, L.L.C., Order Denying Rehearing, 

142 FERC ¶ 61,077 (Jan. 31, 2013) (“Second Reh’g Order”) 

(reprinted at J.A. 99-106). 

 2

 Before construction on the Minisink Project was complete, 

Petitioners twice sought emergency stays from this Court as well. 

On both occasions we denied their requests. In re Minisink 

Residents for Pres. of the Env’t and Safety, No. 12-1390 (D.C. Cir. 

Oct. 11, 2012) (denying motion for emergency relief); Minisink 

Residents for Envtl. Pres. and Safety v. FERC, No. 12-1481 (D.C. 

Cir. Mar. 5, 2013) (denying petition for stay during pendency of 

these proceedings). 

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Meanwhile, MREPS commenced proceedings before this 

Court. In December 2012, MREPS and some of its members

filed a petition seeking review of the Commission’s 

Certificate Order and Rehearing Order (Case No. 12-1481). 

Then, after his individual rehearing request was denied by 

FERC, Mr. Mojica separately petitioned for our review (Case 

No. 13-1018).

3

 Given the sweeping overlap of issues, we 

consolidated the two petitions. We refer to MREPS and the 

various individual petitioners, collectively, as “Petitioners.” 

While the briefing in these appeals unfolded, Millennium 

completed construction of the Minisink Project and placed the 

compressor station into use in June 2013. 

II.

Petitioners seek review of a final order of the 

Commission, which means we have jurisdiction under 15 

U.S.C. § 717r(b). E.g., Murray Energy Corp., 629 F.3d at

235; Fla. Gas Transmission Co., 604 F.3d at 639. 

We review the Commission’s orders, including those 

approving certificate applications, under the familiar arbitrary 

and capricious standard. B&J Oil & Gas v. FERC, 353 F.3d 

71, 75-76 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Midcoast Interstate Transmission, 

198 F.3d at 967. Our role is limited “to assuring that the 

Commission’s decisionmaking is reasoned, principled, and 

 3

 Originally, Mr. Mojica was also a party to the first-filed petition, 

but given the pendency of his rehearing request before FERC at that 

time, he withdrew from participation in the original case to avoid 

any problems under Tennessee Gas. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. 

FERC, 9 F.3d 980, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“It is well-established 

that a party may not simultaneously seek both agency 

reconsideration and judicial review of an agency’s order.”). 

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based upon the record.” Am. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 593 F.3d 

14, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Penn. Office of Consumer Advocate 

v. FERC, 131 F.3d 182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1997). We must

consider “whether the decision was based on a consideration 

of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error 

of judgment.” ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d 

1071, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In so doing, we “cannot 

substitute [our] judgment for that of the Commission.” Nat’l 

Comm. for the New River, Inc. v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1323, 1327 

(D.C. Cir. 2004). All the while, we remain mindful that “[t]he 

grant[] or denial of a certificate of public convenience and 

necessity is a matter peculiarly within the discretion of the 

Commission.” Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Power 

Comm’n, 257 F.2d 634, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1958); accord Cal. 

Gas Producers Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 383 F.2d 645, 

648 (9th Cir. 1967). 

* * *

As a threshold matter, and even though neither FERC nor 

Millennium contests our power to entertain these petitions, we 

have independently assured ourselves that we are presented 

with a justiciable controversy. While the Minisink Project is 

now finished and functional, the petitions under review are 

not moot because Petitioners, through their written 

submissions to this Court and to the Commission, assert that 

the compressor’s operation continues to harm their aesthetic, 

health, and property interests. See Moreau v. FERC, 982 F.2d 

556, 566 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For much the same reasons, 

we are satisfied that Petitioners have suffered injuries

sufficient for Article III standing. Id. at 565. With this much 

established, we turn to the merits of Petitioners’ arguments.4

 4

 Our analysis on these points does not rest in any way on the 

online video submission referenced in Petitioners’ brief. See Pet’rs’ 

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A.

In urging us to upend FERC’s approval of the Minisink 

Project, Petitioners mount several lines of attack. Chief 

among them is their argument that the Commission failed to 

afford due consideration to the Wagoner Alternative, which 

Petitioners insist was undeniably superior to the Minisink 

Project—in their eyes, “economically, environmentally, and 

operationally” superior. See Pet’rs’ Br. at 6. Specifically, 

Petitioners claim that this alleged failure both violated the 

Commission’s obligations under Section 7 of the NGA, and 

represented a misapplication of the Commission’s own 

Certificate Policy Statement. We disagree. 

We do agree with Petitioners that the Commission was 

obligated to consider, as part of its certificating process under 

the NGA, reasonable alternatives to the project proposed by 

 

Br. at 5, 27-28. A picture may be worth a thousand words in some 

contexts, but extra-record video clips cannot substitute for proper 

briefing. Where a party’s standing is not apparent from the agency 

record, our rules require that “the brief . . . include arguments and 

evidence establishing the claim of standing.” D.C. CIRCUIT RULE

28(a)(7) (emphasis added). Petitioners’ choice to use “Video 

Testimonials” skirts this requirement, and if adopted more broadly, 

could wreak havoc on the procedural controls governing appeals 

before this Court, such as word limits, briefing schedules, and the 

like. And this is without even considering the specific failings 

associated with Petitioners’ video account. For one, there is no 

indication that the individuals it portrays are under oath, so their 

remarks are not even evidence. Moreover, Petitioners do not direct 

us to any particular segment of the video they deem relevant, 

whether through a pinpoint citation or otherwise; instead, they 

expect us to review the entirety of the 18-minute recording—which, 

it bears noting, spans more time than their counsel was allotted at 

oral argument—to discern the elements of standing. 

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Millennium. See, e.g., N. Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Power 

Comm’n, 399 F.2d 953, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“[T]he duty 

imposed upon the Commission by Section 7 of the Natural 

Gas Act is not merely to determine which of the submitted 

applications is most in the public interest, but also to give 

proper consideration to logical alternatives which might serve 

the public interest better than any of the projects outlined in 

the applications.”); accord Citizens for Allegan Cnty., Inc. v. 

Fed. Power Comm’n, 414 F.2d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 

The trouble with Petitioners’ theory, though, is that the 

Commission satisfied this obligation here. Based on our 

assessment of the record, we are convinced that the 

Commission amply considered alternatives to the Minisink 

Project, devoting especially thorough attention to the 

Wagoner Alternative favored by Petitioners.

For one, FERC’s Certificate Order unmistakably outlines 

the Commission’s exploration of the Wagoner Alternative as 

an alternate possibility for Millennium’s compressor station. 

See Certificate Order, ¶ 26 (“Numerous comments received 

during scoping also requested that the Commission evaluate 

alternatives to the proposed action . . . . The EA evaluated 

several system and aboveground site alternatives, and 

thoroughly compared the Wagoner Alternative to 

Millennium’s proposed Minisink Compressor Station.”). In 

keeping with the recommendations set out in the EA, 

however, the Commission concluded that the more significant 

environmental impacts associated with the Wagoner 

Alternative—mostly due to improvement of the Neversink 

Segment—rendered that option less preferable than the 

proposed Minisink Project. Id. ¶ 27 (summarizing some of 

the perceived environmental downsides to the Wagoner 

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Alternative).

5 The same holds true with respect to the 

Rehearing Order, wherein the Commission again walked 

through its comparison of the Minisink Project and the 

Wagoner Alternative. Reh’g Order, ¶¶ 66-67. Based on that 

comparison, the Commission reiterated its view that “the 

selection of the Minisink [Project] as opposed to the Wagoner 

Alternative is eminently reasonable.” Id. ¶ 67. 

Furthermore, Petitioners seem to overlook the fact that, 

once the Wagoner Alternative surfaced, the Commission took 

the additional (and, from what we understand, relatively 

unusual) step of issuing a supplemental notice before 

completing its Environmental Assessment. Therein, the 

Commission specifically flagged its consideration of the 

Wagoner Alternative, inviting feedback and input from 

nearby residents and other potentially impacted parties. See 

J.A. 372-74; J.A. 373 (“The Commission wants to ensure that 

 5

 For instance, the Commission explained as follows:

• The Wagoner Alternative would impact ten times more 

land acreage (112.4) than the Minisink Project (10.6);

• The Wagoner Alternative would require the clearing of 

more trees and the conscription of more agricultural 

land than the Minisink Project;

• The Wagoner Alternative would necessitate the 

placement of pipeline across eleven wetlands and 

twelve waterbodies, raising complications not extant in 

the Minisink Project; and

• The Wagoner Alternative had the potential to impact 

five special status species, as opposed to one through 

the Minisink Project. 

Certificate Order, ¶¶ 26-27. FERC’s Certificate Order also 

incorporated the EA itself, which goes through its own relatively 

detailed comparison between the two proposals. See J.A. 484-89.

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all potentially affected landowners for the [Wagoner] 

alternative have the opportunity to participate in the 

environmental review process. . . . You are encouraged to 

become involved in this process and provide your specific 

comments or concerns about Millennium’s proposal and the 

[Wagoner] alternative described above.”) In view of all of 

this, it seems clear that FERC duly considered the Wagoner 

Alternative (and other alternatives), and cogently explained its 

rationale in finding the Minisink Project properly approved 

under the NGA. We would be hard-pressed to read the record 

otherwise. 

In arguing to the contrary, Petitioners marshal only one 

meaningful theory in their favor. They claim that the 

Commission’s analysis was flawed because Millennium either

planned or needed to upgrade the Neversink Segment all 

along. In other words, according to Petitioners, even if 

Millennium moved forward with the Minisink Project (and 

not the Wagoner Alternative), it still had plans to replace the 

Neversink Segment in the very near future. So the 

Commission’s decision to account for the environmental 

impacts of a Neversink upgrade only in connection with the 

Wagoner Alternative and not the Minisink Project, Petitioners 

tell us, was unreasonable and misguided. E.g., Pet’rs’ Br. at 

32 (“Had the Commission compared a Minisink/Neversink 

project to a Wagoner/Neversink upgrade, the Wagoner 

alternative would have emerged as the superior choice.”). We 

reject their premise. 

This argument effectively hinges on an ambiguous 

reference in one PowerPoint slide that Petitioners uncovered 

through an internet search in the midst of the agency

proceedings—a document Petitioners generously refer to as 

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 17 of 33
18

the “Currie Report.”6 This document, Petitioners surmise, 

proves that the construction of a new compressor station at 

Minisink was only Millennium’s first step in a multi-phase 

expansion project, part of which was destined to include a 

Neversink upgrade all along. Notably, Petitioners made this 

very same argument to the Commission, and the Commission 

found it unsubstantiated. Rather, the Commission read the 

“Currie Report” as “merely . . . a marketing document,” and 

found that, as a factual matter, it did not evince “an intent by 

Millennium to pursue an integrated, three-phase expansion of 

its system,” nor “any firm decision by Millennium as to future 

construction,” as had been suggested. Reh’g Order, ¶ 32 

n.41. As to this factual determination, FERC’s findings are 

“conclusive” if “supported by substantial evidence,” 15 

U.S.C. § 717r(b); Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. FERC, 599 F.3d

698, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2010)—a standard, we have stated, that 

“requires more than a scintilla, but can be satisfied by 

something less than a preponderance of the evidence,” FPL 

Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. FERC, 287 F.3d 1151, 1160 (D.C. 

Cir. 2002). On this record, the Commission’s finding falls

comfortably within that range. We thus accept FERC’s 

conclusion that the “Currie Report” does not establish any 

firm present or future plans by Millennium to upgrade the 

Neversink Segment.7

 

 6

 Although never clearly explained, Petitioners seem to call this the 

“Currie Report” because they believe the PowerPoint presentation 

was prepared by an individual named Sean Currie, who is identified 

in at least one FERC filing as Millennium’s Manager of Capacity 

Optimization. See J.A. 126 n.77.

7

 Petitioners say we should accord FERC’s factual findings no 

deference because it was “biased” in favor of Millennium’s 

application. See Pet’rs’ Br. at 7, 41. In support, Petitioners point

to an excerpted portion of FERC’s Rehearing Order stating, in part, 

that “there is no incentive for a project sponsor to present an 

application that cannot meet our standards for approval.” Pet’rs’ 

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 18 of 33
19

In making this argument, Petitioners lean heavily on our 

decision in City of Pittsburgh v. Federal Power Commission, 

237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956). But that decision cannot bear 

the weight Petitioners wish. In City of Pittsburgh, we 

reviewed the issuance of a certificate of public convenience 

and necessity allowing a natural gas supplier to abandon 

service on one pipeline and to transfer that load to another 

pipeline operating below capacity. In the course of contesting

the Commission’s order, a group of petitioners argued that the

abandonment would result in rate increases associated with

future expansions—increases that could be avoided, those 

petitioners said, if the supplier maintained service on the 

pipeline it sought to abandon. After review, this Court set 

aside the order, largely based on the Commission’s failure to 

consider the effects of abandonment on the pipeline’s future 

expansion. Id. at 750 (“[The Commission] persistently closed 

its eyes even to the existence of the problem of future 

expansion.”). Seizing on that holding, Petitioners insist it 

 

Br. at 7 (quoting Reh’g Order, at ¶ 45) (emphasis by Petitioners). 

We could see how these remarks might give Petitioners pause. 

After reading that applicants have “no incentive” to pursue 

proposals that cannot secure approval, it is conceivable that one 

might come away thinking the Commission has a thumb on the 

scale for industry applicants. This is hardly the image our federal 

regulators should be projecting to the American public. But as 

another recent decision from this Court explained in turning aside a 

similar argument, “[t]he fact that [applicants] generally succeed in 

choosing to expend their resources on applications that serve their 

own financial interests does not mean that an agency which 

recognizes merit in such applications is biased.” NO Gas Pipeline 

v. FERC, No. 12-1470, slip op. at 10 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 2014). This 

logic holds true here, too. Though FERC’s comments were 

arguably clumsy, it would require quite a leap on our part to equate 

its statements with prejudgment.

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 19 of 33
20

applies equally to the facts of their case because FERC 

glossed over and ignored the possibility of a future Neversink 

Segment replacement. For at least two reasons we can see, 

however, City of Pittsburgh finds no application here.

First, in City of Pittsburgh, it was clear and unmistakable 

that the pipeline intended to expand service in the future. See

id. at 751 (“That Texas Eastern would soon move to expand 

its gas deliveries was apparent throughout the [Commission’s] 

proceeding.”); id. at 752 (“The record amply shows Texas 

Eastern’s intention to apply for authority to expand its 

capacity and its sales.”). Here, on the other hand, the

Commission examined the record—including the so-called 

“Currie Report”—and found no concrete indication that 

Millennium intended, then or in the future, to upgrade the 

Neversink Segment. So the evidence of “future expansion” is 

a far cry from what we were presented with in City of 

Pittsburgh. Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the 

shortcoming we took issue with in City of Pittsburgh was the 

Commission’s refusal to examine the effects of future 

expansion altogether; the hearing examiner would not permit 

any questioning or inquiry into the supplier’s plans for 

expansion, nor would the examiner consider several company 

memoranda that supposedly revealed such plans. Id. at 750-

52. Here, in stark contrast, FERC unquestionably did 

consider Petitioners’ theory that Millennium planned (or 

needed) to upgrade the Neversink Segment. See Certificate 

Order, ¶¶ 65, 68; Reh’g Order, ¶¶ 25, 32-33, 47, 73 & n.41. 

It just disagreed with their position that the prospect of such a 

step was sufficiently certain to require its environmental 

effects be taken into account in connection with the Minisink 

Project. Given this, we cannot say that the Commission 

“closed its eyes” to the issue of “future expansion”—here, the 

possible replacement of the Neversink Segment—as was the 

case in City of Pittsburgh. 237 F.2d at 750-52. 

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 20 of 33
21

Given the foregoing, we have no basis to second-guess 

the Commission’s determination that Millennium had no firm

plans to upgrade the Neversink Segment in the wake of the 

Minisink Project. Petitioners also press this argument with a 

slightly different gloss, however. They argue that even if 

Millennium was not planning to replace the Neversink 

Segment, circumstances would soon require such a step 

nonetheless. Absent such an upgrade, Petitioners assert, a 

“bottleneck” caused by the smaller-diameter pipe on the 

Neversink Segment would preclude Millennium’s pipeline 

from safely handling the volume, pressure, and speed that 

would be generated by the Minisink Project. (For the most 

part, this theory relies on the aforementioned study prepared 

by Mr. Kuprewicz.) We remain unmoved. The Commission 

considered this argument, too, and based on its assessment of 

the evidence, it again disagreed with Petitioners on the facts. 

FERC found no evidence that the Minisink Project would 

necessitate, as a structural or safety matter, an upgrade of the 

Neversink Segment. See Certificate Order, ¶ 68 (“Staff 

independently evaluated the hydraulic feasibility of the 

Minisink Compressor Station and completed an engineering 

analysis of Millennium’s pipeline system . . . . [T]here is 

nothing in the record to suggest that the operation of the 

Minisink Compressor Station will compromise the safety of 

the Neversink Segment.”); see also Reh’g Order, ¶¶ 75-80

(summarizing “flaws” in Mr. Kuprewicz’s various 

suppositions, as viewed by FERC). As we explain shortly, 

the Commission’s decision not to reopen the record to 

consider Mr. Kuprewicz’s report was not an abuse of 

discretion, and Petitioners provide no other meaningful basis 

for concluding that FERC’s factual determinations regarding 

the pipeline’s structural integrity were unsupported by 

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 21 of 33
22

substantial evidence. We thus find no basis to upset the 

Commission’s finding on this point either.

8

In our view, then, FERC reasonably concluded that the 

Wagoner Alternative would require replacement of the 

Neversink Segment, while the same was not plainly true of 

the Minisink Project. And with that factual determination in 

hand, it comes as no great shock that the Commission did not 

believe the Wagoner Alternative a better fit for the proposed

project. On this point, some historical context is in order. 

More than a decade before the Minisink Project was 

proposed, Millennium had sought approval from FERC to 

construct a replacement pipeline for the original Neversink 

Segment. Initially, the Commission approved that proposal

subject to certain conditions. Millennium Pipeline Co., L.P., 

Interim Order, 97 FERC ¶ 61,292, at 62,356 (Dec. 19, 2001). 

But due to the extreme difficulty Millennium encountered 

trying to satisfy those conditions—including a host of 

environmental snags—it opted instead to rely on the existing 

7.1-mile-long segment of pipe acquired from a competitor

(Columbia Gas) for the Neversink River crossing, i.e., the 

“Neversink Segment” as it exists today. See J.A. 401-05

(describing this background). FERC authorized that

 8

 We also find it somewhat telling that neither of the dissenting 

commissioners expressed a belief that a Neversink upgrade was 

imminently inevitable. True, both thought a Neversink replacement 

would have yielded longer-term benefits that would have 

outweighed the positive environmental factors the majority 

associated with the Minisink Project (nearly all tied to avoiding, at 

least for the time being, a Neversink upgrade). And mostly for this 

reason, they believed the Wagoner Alternative preferable in the 

long run. But neither suggested that the record, as they saw it, 

showed that Millennium planned or needed to replace the 

Neversink Segment even if it did not pursue the Wagoner 

Alternative, as Petitioners maintain. See J.A. 41-47, 95-96, 106. 

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 22 of 33
23

alternative arrangement in 2006. See Millennium Pipeline 

Co., L.L.C., Order Issuing and Amending Certificates, 

Approving Abandonment, Vacating Certificate, and Granting 

and Denying Requests for Rehearing and Clarification, 117 

FERC ¶ 61,319, at 62,576 (Dec. 21, 2006). Given

Millennium’s past struggles navigating the environmental 

complications of a Neversink upgrade, the fact that the 

Commission did not think such a course preferable at this 

juncture seems to us an understandable result. 

In sum, as we have stated before, FERC “enjoys broad 

discretion to invoke its expertise in balancing competing 

interests and drawing administrative lines.” Am. Gas Ass’n, 

593 F.3d at 19 (citing ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co., 297 F.3d at 

1085); see also Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 

750 F.2d 105, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[A]s an expert agency, 

the Commission is vested with wide discretion to balance 

competing equities against the backdrop of the public 

interest[.]”). Notwithstanding Petitioners’ pleas to the 

contrary, we conclude that the Commission’s consideration of 

the Wagoner Alternative falls within the bounds of that 

discretion.9

 Under our narrow standard of review, then, we 

 9

 We hasten to add that FERC’s obligation to consider alternatives 

in Section 7 proceedings is not boundless. As we have previously 

explained, FERC need not “undertake exhausting inquiries, probing 

for every possible alternative, if no viable alternatives have been 

suggested by the parties, or suggest themselves to the agency.” 

Citizens for Allegan Cnty., 414 F.2d at 1133. We do not suggest 

otherwise today, nor must we venture beyond these general 

guideposts. Since the Wagoner Alternative was so fervently 

advocated for during the Minisink Project’s review process, all 

agree that the Commission was obligated to at least consider it. 

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 23 of 33
24

have no basis to upset the Commission’s application of its 

Section 7 authority on this point.10

B.

Along with their weighty reliance on the Wagoner 

Alternative, Petitioners make several other arguments against 

the reasonableness of the Commission’s analysis. We treat 

each argument in turn, finding none persuasive. 

1.

Petitioners claim that the Commission failed to give the 

environmental impacts of the Minisink Project the “hard 

look” NEPA requires. We conclude otherwise. 

NEPA’s “hard look” doctrine is designed “to ensure that 

the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the 

environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not 

arbitrary or capricious.” Nat’l Comm. for the New River, 373 

F.3d at 1327. NEPA is a procedural statute; it “‘does not 

mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary 

 10 On the other side of the “public benefits”/“adverse impacts” 

scale, Petitioners appear to separately argue that FERC violated its 

policy statement by relying on Millennium’s existing contracts with 

gas transporters to demonstrate the public benefits of the Minisink 

Project. Pet’rs’ Br. at 35. We reject that claim as well. Petitioners 

identify nothing in the policy statement or in any precedent 

construing it to suggest that it requires, rather than permits, the 

Commission to assess a project’s benefits by looking beyond the 

market need reflected by the applicant’s existing contracts with 

shippers. To the contrary, the policy statement specifically 

recognizes that such agreements “always will be important 

evidence of demand for a project.” Certificate Policy Statement, 88 

FERC ¶ 61,227, at 61,748.

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 24 of 33
25

process.’” Midcoast Interstate Transmission, 198 F.3d at 967 

(quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 

U.S. 332, 350 (1989)). In reviewing an agency’s compliance

with NEPA, the “rule of reason applies,” and we “consistently 

decline[] to ‘flyspeck’ an agency’s environmental analysis.” 

Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 

66, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 

Petitioners claim to eschew a flyspecking approach here, 

arguing instead that the Commission’s analysis is laden with 

“gaping holes.” Pet’rs’ Br. at 41. They point to three. In our 

view, though, all fall decidedly more into the “flyspecking” 

camp than anything more. 

First, Petitioners contend that the Commission erred in 

failing to undertake a more fulsome cost-benefit analysis of 

the Minisink Project as compared with the Wagoner 

Alternative. This argument essentially piggybacks off their 

overall Wagoner Alternative theory, and, in that sense, we 

reject it for the reasons already stated. In our view, the 

Commission reasonably assessed the Wagoner Alternative, 

particularly with respect to its environmental implications, as 

most concerns NEPA. See Found. on Econ. Trends v. 

Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“NEPA’s dual 

mission is . . . to generate federal attention to environmental 

concerns and to reveal that federal consideration for public 

scrutiny.”) (emphasis added). Otherwise, to the extent 

Petitioners contend that the Commission should have focused 

more generally on the monetary costs and benefits of the 

respective proposals, we disagree that NEPA requires such an 

approach, particularly where only an environmental 

assessment, rather than an environment impact statement, is 

involved. See Webster v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 685 F.3d 411, 

430 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The agency does not,” under NEPA, 

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 25 of 33
26

“need to display the weighing of the merits and drawbacks of 

the alternatives in a monetary cost-benefit analysis.”); 

Communities Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 

F.3d 678, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is undisputed that the 

FAA was not required to undertake a formal cost-benefit 

analysis as part of the [environmental impact statement].”). 

Second, Petitioners argue that the Commission failed to 

examine the Minisink Project’s impact on property values. 

But as the Commission rightly rejoins, the EA clearly 

addressed this issue. J.A. 457-58. It recognized there may be 

some adverse impacts on surrounding property values due to 

the compressor station. On balance, though, the EA 

concluded that “the recommended building design and 

landscaping plans would eventually minimize the visual 

impact from the station on the surrounding residential 

properties and would not significantly reduce property values 

or resale values.” J.A. 458. The Commission’s order echoes 

this general assessment. Certificate Order, ¶ 70 (“[W]e 

believe that the visual and noise mitigation measures 

recommended in the EA and included as conditions in this 

order, will mitigate the potential for decreases in property 

values.”). Though we can see how Petitioners may disagree 

with this takeaway, their disagreement does not mean that 

FERC failed to consider the issue altogether, as they suggest. 

Third, Petitioners claim that the Commission failed to 

assess cumulative and future impacts. They accuse FERC of 

ignoring two issues in particular: (1) Millennium’s planned

development of a second compressor station on the pipeline 

upstream from Minisink (what came to be the “Hancock 

Project”), and (2) the potential construction of a lateral 

pipeline from the Minisink compressor to a proposed power 

plant operated by CPV Valley LLC. The record belies this

argument on both scores. As for the Hancock Project, the 

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 26 of 33
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EA’s “Cumulative Impacts” discussion flags Millennium’s 

“intent to construct a second compressor station” and explains 

that, because no certificate application had been filed with 

FERC, little was known about the details of the project. 

Nevertheless, given the “typical distances between 

compressor stations (70 miles) and the difference in 

construction timing,” the EA stated that no significant 

cumulative impacts were expected, other than possibly with 

respect to air quality. J.A. 473. In view of the uncertainty 

surrounding the second compressor station, and the difference 

in timing between the two projects, this discussion suffices 

under NEPA.11 The same holds true with respect to the 

 11 We disagree with Petitioners that the EA’s treatment of the 

“Hancock Project” contravenes this Court’s decision in Delaware 

Riverkeeper, see Pet’rs’ 28(j) Letter (June 16, 2014), which held 

that FERC improperly segmented and failed to consider the 

cumulative impacts of four “connected, contemporaneous, closely 

related, and interdependent” projects. Del. Riverkeeper Network v. 

FERC, 753 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In faulting the 

Commission’s NEPA analysis of the cumulative impacts of the 

“Northeast Project” under review there, that decision took pains to 

emphasize that the other three projects were all “either under 

construction or were also pending before the Commission for 

environmental review and approval.” Id. at 1308; see also id. 

(“FERC’s NEPA review . . . did not consider any of the other 

upgrade projects, even though the first upgrade project was under 

construction during FERC’s review . . . and even though the 

applications for the second and fourth upgrade projects were 

pending before FERC[.]”); id. at 1318 (“The temporal nexus here is 

clear. Tennessee Gas proposed the Northeast Project while the 300 

Line Project was under construction . . . . [a]nd FERC’s 

consideration of the Northeast Project application overlapped with 

its consideration of the remaining two projects . . . . We emphasize 

here the importance we place on the timing of the four 

improvement projects.”). Those critical facts are worlds apart from 

this case. At the time of its application for the Minisink Project, 

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 27 of 33
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potential development of the CPV Valley power plant. The 

EA’s “Cumulative Impacts” section identifies this possible 

project, too, though it again signals the absence of any firm 

details surrounding project specifics. Even still, the EA 

concluded that because the Minisink Project itself was 

expected to have minimal impacts, no significant cumulative

impacts were expected to flow from the possible development 

of the CPV Valley power plant, particularly since the 

construction timelines for the two potential projects would be

quite distinct. J.A. 473-74. In sum, based on our review of 

the EA, we are satisfied that FERC properly considered the 

cumulative impacts of the Minisink Project. 

2.

Petitioners also assert that the Commission’s approval of 

the Minisink Project contravenes its own siting guidelines. 

We can quickly dispatch these arguments. 

Among its NEPA-implementing regulations, FERC has 

promulgated “[s]iting and maintenance requirements” for the 

construction and upkeep of facilities. 18 C.F.R. § 380.15. 

Petitioners think that the Minisink Project contravenes three 

separate provisions of that regulation. We think not. We first 

agree with the Commission that § 380.15(b) is inapplicable 

 

Millennium had not yet applied for approval of the Hancock 

Project, nor was construction on either project underway. 

Furthermore, once plans for the Hancock Project were cemented 

and presented to FERC for approval under Section 7, the 

Commission did examine that project alongside the Minisink 

Project (then in the midst of development), and the resulting EA 

found no significant cumulative impacts associated with the two 

projects. See Millennium Pipeline Co., L.L.C., Order Issuing 

Certificate, 145 FERC ¶ 61,007, at ¶ 52 (Oct. 1, 2013). For at least 

these reasons, Delaware Riverkeeper lends no help to Petitioners. 

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 28 of 33
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altogether because, by its terms, it is triggered only by 

facilities constructed on third-party landowners’ property; 

here, as FERC noted below, Reh’g Order, ¶ 3, the Minisink 

Project was built on a parcel owned entirely by Millennium. 

While the parties also disagree whether § 380.15(e) (formerly 

§ 380.15(d))12 applies to a project involving the construction 

of a compressor station, we need not decide that issue because 

FERC nevertheless complied with the regulation’s directive to 

consider the use or extension of existing rights-of-way. 

Indeed, the Commission explicitly recognized its policy of 

“encourag[ing] pipeline construction on existing right[s]-ofway as a means of minimizing environmental disturbance,” 

but it concluded that any such preference does not alone 

provide a basis for rejecting an application that otherwise 

yields limited environmental impacts. Reh’g Order, ¶ 37.

This leaves only § 380.15(g) (formerly § 380.15(f)), 

which applies to the “[c]onstruction of aboveground 

facilities.” On this point, Petitioners claim that the Minisink 

site is not “unobtrusive,” but, in fleshing out that contention, 

they argue simply that the Wagoner Alternative would have 

been less so. We remain unconvinced by that approach. And 

otherwise, we agree with the Commission that it implemented 

appropriate mitigation measures to reduce the site’s potential 

obtrusiveness. See Reh’g Order, ¶ 50 (summarizing 

Millennium’s vegetation plans and noise mitigation 

requirements to reduce obtrusiveness); id. at ¶¶ 57-59 

(outlining Commission’s approval of building design and 

 12 After the completion of briefing in these cases, FERC amended

this regulation, adding a new subsection (c) and reconfiguring the 

existing provisions. As a consequence, the parties’ briefs discuss

§§ 380.15(d) and (f), which have since been re-designated as §§ 

380.15(e) and (g), respectively. See 78 Fed. Reg. 72,794, 72,812-

13 (Dec. 4, 2013). For clarity’s sake, we refer to the regulation 

using its current numbering. 

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 29 of 33
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Millennium’s agreement with Town of Minisink concerning 

landscaping and screening plan for site). Particularly in view 

of the deference owed FERC’s interpretation of its own 

regulations, see City of Oconto Falls, Wis. v. FERC, 204 F.3d 

1154, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2000), we reject Petitioners’ argument 

that the Minisink Project violates the siting guidelines.

C.

As a final offensive, Petitioners attribute several 

procedural errors to the Commission’s handling of 

Millennium’s application for the Minisink Project. We take

these arguments in turn, accepting none. 

First, Petitioners declare that the Commission improperly

refused to hold an evidentiary hearing on Millennium’s 

application. “FERC’s choice whether to hold an evidentiary 

hearing is generally discretionary.” Blumenthal v. FERC, 613 

F.3d 1142, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2010). “In general, FERC must 

hold an evidentiary hearing only when a genuine issue of 

material fact exists, and even then, FERC need not conduct 

such a hearing if [the disputed issues] may be adequately

resolved on the written record.” Cajun Elec. Power Coop., 

Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

We review the Commission’s denial of a hearing request for 

abuse of discretion. Woolen Mill Assocs. v. FERC, 917 F.2d 

589, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Petitioners assert that a hearing 

would have resolved “several key factual disputes,” but when 

push comes to shove, they point to only one—“the question of 

Millennium’s intentions regarding the Neversink upgrade.” 

Pet’rs’ Br. at 53. Of course, the Commission did resolve that

issue, it just did so on the written record, declining to interpret 

the “Currie Report” as the smoking-gun evidence Petitioners 

portrayed it to be, Reh’g Order, ¶ 32 n.41, and otherwise 

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 30 of 33
31

finding that Millennium had no firm present or future 

intention to replace the Neversink Segment, id. ¶ 47. From 

FERC’s perspective, there was no need to convene an 

evidentiary hearing to resolve this narrow issue. We perceive 

no abuse of discretion in that determination.13 

Second, Petitioners complain that their due process rights 

were violated because the Commission failed to timely 

provide them with certain documentation during the 

proceedings—namely, particular hydraulic studies and 

engineering analyses that Millennium provided to FERC as 

part of its application. Petitioners concede, however, that 

MREPS and some of its individual members obtained these 

documents before the deadline to file for rehearing (indeed at 

least one petitioner who requested this information in March 

2012 received access to it at least two months before petitions

for rehearing were due). Oral Arg. Recording at 38:41-39:08; 

see also Reh’g Order, ¶¶ 70-71. There is no dispute, then, 

 13 We note that, during the agency proceedings, Millennium 

represented that it had “no intention to file an application to replace 

the Neversink Segment before 2014.” Reh’g Order, ¶ 47 (quoting 

“Millennium’s December 9, 2011 Data Response No. 1,” reprinted 

at J.A. 367-70). Given that we have since hit that 2014 marker, we 

asked Millennium’s counsel at oral argument whether the 

company’s intentions had changed. Counsel assured us they had 

not. We were told Millennium still had no present plans to replace 

the Neversink Segment. Although such an upgrade remains a 

possibility down the road if demand eventually dictates, counsel 

relayed, Millennium could and would look to other options as well. 

Oral Arg. Recording at 31:05-31:40, 34:30-34:39. Of course, our 

review is based on the record as it existed before the Commission at 

the time of its decision, see CNG Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 40 

F.3d 1289, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1994), but we would potentially be 

facing a more troublesome set of facts if Millennium now planned 

to pursue a Neversink upgrade after all. Because we take counsel at 

his word, we confront no such scenario here.

USCA Case #13-1018 Document #1507746 Filed: 08/15/2014 Page 31 of 33
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that Petitioners had the chance to make meaningful use of this 

information in connection with their petitions for rehearing. 

Under our precedent, this fact neutralizes any constitutional 

claim under the Due Process Clause. See Blumenthal, 613 

F.3d at 1145-46; see also Jepsen v. FERC, 420 F. App’x 1, 2

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Relatedly, to the extent 

Petitioners assert that other potentially relevant documents 

were improperly withheld as confidential, the contention that 

such documents “‘might’ support [their] position [is] far too 

speculative to provide a basis for setting aside FERC’s 

judgment,” B&J Oil, 353 F.3d at 78, much less for finding a 

due process violation.

Third, Petitioners fault the Commission for failing to 

reopen the record to consider the “Kuprewicz Report.” We 

review that decision “only for an abuse of discretion,” Cooley

v. FERC, 843 F.2d 1464, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and we find 

none here. Of course, FERC did consider the report, at least

in a sense. True, the Commission declined to reopen the 

record and revisit its prior findings based on Mr. Kuprewicz’s

findings. But in the course of so concluding, the Commission

undertook an analysis of his report and opinions. Reh’g 

Order, ¶¶ 75-80. In the end, the Commission believed his 

analysis “suffer[ed] from several flaws” and did not provide 

support for his position on many points, particularly where his 

assessment differed from that of FERC’s staff. Id. ¶¶ 76, 79; 

Second Reh’g Order, ¶ 9. The Commission thus found that 

“Mr. Kuprewicz’s study provides no basis for reversing [its]

approval of the Minisink Project.” Reh’g Order, ¶ 80. This 

decision strikes us as well within the bounds of FERC’s 

discretion, particularly given the highly technical nature of the 

issues raised in the report. See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. 

FERC, 718 F.3d 947, 962 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Consequently, 

we find no error in the Commission’s declining to reopen the 

record based on Mr. Kuprewicz’s report. 

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III.

In approving the Minisink Project, the Commission 

accorded the Wagoner Alternative the serious consideration it 

was due, in keeping with its statutory obligations under the 

NGA and NEPA. In its judgment, the Commission did not 

think the Wagoner Alternative preferable and concluded that 

the Minisink Project, as put forward by Millennium, would 

serve the public interest and necessity. We are simply not 

empowered to second-guess the Commission’s determination 

on this point or to substitute our judgment for the 

Commission’s. Our much more limited role is, instead, to 

confirm that FERC thoroughly and reasonably examined the 

issue, and on the record before us, we are assured that it did. 

For this and the other reasons we have explained, the 

petitions for review are denied. 

So ordered.

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