Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-02050/USCOURTS-ca13-15-02050-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Best Buy Stores
Appellee
James L. Driessen
Appellant
Marguerite A. Driessen
Appellant
FYE
Appellee
Sony Music Entertainment
Appellee
Target Corporation
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JAMES L. DRIESSEN, MARGUERITE A. 

DRIESSEN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, AKA SONY BMG 

MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, BEST BUY STORES, 

AKA BEST BUY COMPANY, FYE, AKA TRANS 

WORLD ENTERTAINMENT, TARGET 

CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-2050

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Utah in No. 2:09-cv-00140-CW-BCW, Judge 

Clark Waddoups.

______________________ 

Decided: February 10, 2016 

______________________ 

JAMES L. DRIESSEN, Lindon, UT, pro se. 

MARGUERITE A. DRIESSEN, Lindon, UT, pro se. 

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2 DRIESSEN v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT

JAMES CHARLES PISTORINO, Parrish Law Office, Menlo 

Park, CA, for defendants-appellees. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, MAYER, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

James L. Driessen is the named inventor on U.S. 

Patent Nos. 7,003,500 (“the ’500 patent”), 7,636,695 (“the 

’695 patent”), and 7,742,993 (“the ’993 patent”). Mr. 

Driessen and his wife, Marguerite A. Driessen,1 (collectively “the Driessens”) sued Sony Music Entertainment, 

Best Buy Stores, FYE, and Target (collectively “Sony”), 

alleging infringement of the ’500, ’695, and ’993 patents in 

the United States District Court for the District of Utah. 

The district court granted Sony’s motions for summary 

judgment, finding asserted claims 1–4 and 7 of the ’500 

patent invalid as indefinite, and asserted claims 10–15 of 

the ’500 patent, all claims of the ’695 patent, and all 

claims of the ’993 patent invalid for lack of written description. The Driessens appeal. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

The ’500, ’695, and ’993 patents all have virtually the 

same specification and relate to systems and methods of 

purchasing downloadable content from the Internet. 

Rather than purchasing the content directly through the 

Internet, the buyer goes to a retail store to pay for the 

item in person. At the retail store, the buyer obtains a 

ticket or other “physical medium” proof of sale containing 

a web address specific to the item sold and a unique 

password that will enable its download. Driessen v. Sony 

 

1 The basis for Marguerite Driessen’s standing is 

not clear in the record. 

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DRIESSEN v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 3

Music Entm't, No. 2:09-CV-0140-CW, 2015 WL 1057845, 

at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 10, 2015) (“D.C. Op.”). The buyer can 

then anonymously download the media content from any 

computer with Internet access by going to the web address and inputting the unique password provided. The 

district court held claims 1–4 and 7 of the ’500 patent 

invalid as indefinite, and claims 10–15 of the ’500 patent 

and all asserted claims of the ’695 and ’993 patents invalid for lack of written description. Id. at *14. The Driessens appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION

We begin with the issue of indefiniteness. Indefiniteness is a question of law that we review de novo. Teva 

Pharm. U.S.A., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1341 

(Fed. Cir. 2015). We review the ultimate construction of a 

claim and intrinsic evidence de novo. Teva Pharm. 

U.S.A., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. 

Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 1363, 1365

(Fed. Cir. 2000). 

Claim 1 of the ’500 patent, which contains several 

means-plus-function elements, provides, 

A payment system for itemized Internet merchandise or itemized downloadable media material objects, comprising:

a retail point of sale establishment;

a customer access point at said retail point of 

sale establishment; 

URL information that is an Internet transaction location of said itemized Internet merchandise or itemized downloadable media material 

objects; 

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4 DRIESSEN v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT

means for accepting payment through an in 

person transaction with a customer wherein said 

payment is designated for purchase of said itemized Internet merchandise or itemized downloadable media material objects;

means for storing and retrieving a record on 

or in a physical medium corresponding to said 

URL information that is an Internet transaction 

location of said itemized Internet merchandise or 

itemized downloadable media material objects;

means for transfer of said physical medium 

from said retail point of sale establishment to said 

customer; and 

means for Internet transaction authorization 

on, in, or actuated from said physical medium 

wherein ownership rights in said itemized Internet merchandise or itemized downloadable media 

material objects are preselected and transferred to 

said customer through said transfer of said physical medium. 

’500 patent col. 10 ll. 18–42 (emphasis added). 

Primarily at issue in the case is the “means for storing 

and retrieving a record on or in a physical medium” 

limitation. Id. at ll. 30–31. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112(f),2 the district court found that the function of that 

element is “storing and retrieving a record on or in a 

physical medium.” D.C. Op., at *6. The district court

construed “storing” to mean “both putting into storage 

and holding in storage,” “retrieving” to mean “taking out 

of storage for the purpose of presenting authentication to 

 

2 Before the America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) 

was contained in § 112 paragraph 6. 

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DRIESSEN v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 5

prove purchase,” “record” to mean a “unique URL corresponding to specific web merchandise or content,” and “on 

or in a physical medium” to mean the location where “the 

record is stored and from where it may be retrieved.” Id. 

A means-plus-function claim is indefinite unless 

structure to perform the function is identified in the 

specification. E.g., Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude 

Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1113–14. The district court

here rejected the Driessens’ contention that Figure 5—

which depicts an “Admit One” ticket and a floppy disk—

provides the necessary structure to correspond with the 

above function. D.C. Op., at *7. The court explained that

while Figure 5 perhaps discloses examples of “physical 

media,” it does not disclose a structure that “stor[es] and 

retriev[es] a record on or in a physical medium.” Id.

(emphasis added). Because the specification failed to 

disclose any such associated structure for “storing” and 

“receiving” the record in a physical medium, the district 

court held that claim 1 and dependent claims 2–4 and 7 

are invalid as indefinite. 

The Driessens argue that the district court erred in 

construing “storing” in claim 1 of the ’500 patent to require “both putting into storage and holding in storage,” 

D.C. Op., at *6, contending that “storing” should be understood to require only holding in storage, not the additional preliminary step of getting there. The word 

“storing” itself implies both putting into and holding in 

storage. See Store, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2015)

(“to put . . . in a place where it is available, where it can 

be kept safely, etc.”). The Driessens point to no language 

in the claims or specification that would support their

contrary construction. The Driessens’ argument by 

analogy, that “store rooms, filing cabinets, cans, bottles, 

and similar devices” are properly understood as “storage” 

devices despite their inability to “put things into themselves,” is inapposite. Claim terms must be construed in 

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light of the context in which they appear. See, e.g., 

Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 

1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In the context of storing “a 

record on or in a physical medium,” it is apparent that 

“store” implies not only maintaining the record in a 

physical medium, but also getting it there to begin with. 

Similarly, the Driessens’ contention that “retrieving” 

should be construed to mean only “presenting” or “delivering” divorces the claim from its context, in violation of 

basic claim construction principles. See id. We see no 

error in the district court’s claim construction.

The Driessens argue further that the necessary structures for performing a “means for storing and retrieving a 

record on or in physical medium,” ’500 patent col. 10 ll. 

30–31, were known in the art, and therefore the claims 

are not indefinite. The district court properly rejected 

this argument. We have explained that “[t]he inquiry is 

whether one of skill in the art would understand the 

specification itself to disclose a structure, not simply 

whether that person would be capable of implementing a 

structure. Accordingly, a bare statement that known 

techniques or methods can be used does not disclose 

structure.” Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Tech. Corp., 490 

F.3d 946, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Nothing in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 

2120 (2014), is to the contrary. There is no support in the 

specification that the Driessens’ proposed additional 

structures—ink, bar codes, magnetic strips and disks, 

scratch off materials, and silica memory—perform the 

storing function. Nor does a general purpose computer 

provide sufficient structure for “storing and retrieving a 

record on or in a physical medium.” See, e.g., Noah Sys., 

Inv. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

We see no error in the district court’s conclusion that 

claims 1–4 and 7 of the ’500 patent are invalid as indefinite. 

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DRIESSEN v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 7

We next consider the issue of written description. We 

review a district court’s grant of summary judgment of 

invalidity for lack of written description de novo. ICU 

Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1376 

(Fed. Cir. 2009). Claim 10 of the ’500 patent provides,

A method of merchandise transfer on a computer 

network comprising at least one buyer computer 

on a network for operation by a user desiring to 

buy at least one product and at least one selling 

computer on said network operating for a purpose 

to sell said product, the method comprising the 

steps of: . . . 

sending a payment message as a response to 

said in person transaction either directly or 

through other computers on said network to 

said selling computer on said network; 

causing an authorization message to be created on said selling computer in or as a result of 

said payment message that comprises at least 

said specification of said product and authentication based on cryptographic key(s), said 

selling computer being programmed to receive 

said authorization message for verification of 

said authentication; . . . . 

. . . . 

Id. col. 11 l. 60–col. 12 l. 18 (emphasis added). The three 

terms “selling computer,” “payment message,” and “authorization message,” which first appeared when Mr. 

Driessen added new claims by amendment more than four 

years after filing the original application that became the 

’500 patent, also appear in claims 11–15 of the ’500 patent 

and all asserted claims of the ’695 and ’993 patents. The 

district court construed “selling computer” to mean “the 

seller-side computer or computer network comprised of 

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8 DRIESSEN v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT

the computer/network of the web content dealer.” D.C. 

Op., at *12. It construed “payment message” in accordance with both parties’ proposed constructions to mean 

“an electronic message indicating that payment was 

received.” Id. It construed “authorization message” in 

accordance with the Driessens’ proposed construction to 

mean “an electronic message,” explaining that no further 

definition is required because the context of “authorization message” is clear. Id. The district court then found 

that no written description for “selling computer,” “payment message,” or “authorization message” is provided 

anywhere in the specification or original application. The 

court rejected the Driessens’ contention that the terms 

were implicitly present in the original application, finding 

that the discussion of “secure web transactions” and 

“public key infrastructure” did not necessarily provide for 

“payment messages” or “authorization messages,” let 

alone require such messages to be sent to or from “selling 

computers.” Id. at *13. The court thus held that claims 

10–15 of the ’500 patent and all asserted claims of the

’695 and ’993 patents are invalid for lack of written description. 

When, as here, a patent applicant adds new claims after the original filing date, “the new claims . . . must find 

support in the original specification.” TurboCare Div. of 

Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. GE, 264 F.3d 

1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The terms “selling computer,” “payment message,” and “authorization message” are 

not present anywhere in the specification or original

provisional application. The Driessens contend that 

because the words “payment,” “message,” “authorization,” 

and “computer” appear individually numerous times in 

the specification, adequate written description for the 

terms “selling computer,” “payment message,” and “authorization message” is provided. This argument misunderstands the written description requirement. The mere 

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DRIESSEN v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 9

presence of these words in isolation does not suffice to 

show that the “patentee had possession of” the “selling 

computer,” “payment message,” and “authorization message” elements of the claimed invention at the time of the 

application, as 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) requires.3 LizardTech, 

Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 

(Fed. Cir. 2005). Further, the district court properly 

concluded that “selling computer,” “payment message,” 

and “authorization message” are not implicitly present in 

the application’s references to the distinct concepts of

“secure web transactions” and “public key infrastructure.” 

D.C. Op., at *13. 

We see no error in the district court’s conclusion that 

claims 10–15 of the ’500 patent and all asserted claims of 

the ’695 and ’993 patents are invalid for lack of written 

description. 

We have considered the Driessens’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Costs to Appellees.

 

3 Before the America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) 

was contained in § 112 paragraph 1. 

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