Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_03-cv-00615/USCOURTS-alsd-1_03-cv-00615-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Annie C. Holmes
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANNIE C. HOLMES, *

 *

Plaintiff, *

 *

vs. * CIVIL ACTION No.03-00615-P-B

 *

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, *

Commissioner of Social *

Security, *

 *

Defendant. *

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge

for a recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and

Rule 54(d)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on

Plaintiff's Application for Attorney Fees under the Equal Access

to Justice Act (Doc. 21). Upon careful review of all pertinent

pleadings, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that

Plaintiff's Application be GRANTED, and Plaintiff awarded a

reasonable attorney’s fee in the amount of $2,237.50. 

I. Findings Of Fact

1. On September 10, 2003, Plaintiff commenced this action

under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that her

disability ceased in March 2000 due to medical improvement.

After providing the parties an opportunity to file briefs, and

present oral argument to the Court, the undersigned issued a

Case 1:03-cv-00615-P-B Document 24 Filed 11/17/05 Page 1 of 10
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report recommending that the portion of the Commissioner's

decision denying benefits be reversed and remanded pursuant to

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for further proceedings

consistent with the report. (Doc. 17). On March 18, 2005, the

District Court adopted the report and entered a Rule 58

judgment. (Docs. 19-20). In the Judgment, the District Court

reversed and remanded this cause to the Commissioner of Social

Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and held that Plaintiff

is a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access To

Justice Act (hereinafter "EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Id.)

2. On June 13, 2005, Plaintiff filed an application for

attorney's fees under the EAJA. (Doc. 21). In the application,

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's position was not

substantially justified, and requests an attorneys' fees award

in the amount of $2,237.50 (Id.) The requested amount

represents a total of 17.90 hours, at an hourly rate of $125.00

per hour for attorney time spent representing Plaintiff in this

Court. (Id.)

3. On June 29, 2005, Defendant filed its objection to

Plaintiff's EAJA fee application and therein, argued that its

position in this litigation was substantially justified because

the Commissioner can lose on the merits of the disability

question and win on the application for attorneys' fees. (Doc.

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23). 

II. Conclusions Of Law

1. The EAJA requires a district court to “award to a

prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . incurred by

that party in any civil action . . . including proceedings for

judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the

United States . . . unless the court finds that the position of

the United States was substantially justified or that special

circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

2. The burden of proving substantial justification is the

Commissioner's, who must demonstrate the substantial

justification of her position as a whole. See, e.g., United

States v. Jones, 125 F.3d 1418, 1420, 1427-1431 (11th Cir.

1997); Mobley v. Apfel, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1359 (M.D. Fla.

2000). Thus, the requirement that the government's position not

be substantially justified will only impact eligibility for an

award of fees when the Commissioner comes forth and satisfies

this burden. Mobley, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1359. "To be

substantially justified, the Commissioner's position must have

'a reasonable basis in both law and fact.'" Id. (citations

omitted). However, the mere fact that the cause was remanded to

the Commissioner does not automatically establish the

Commissioner's position was not substantially justified. Reeves

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“[A] party who wins a sentence-four remand order is a prevailing

party.” Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 

2

In the case sub judice, Plaintiff filed her application for attorneys'

fees on June 13, 2005. (Doc. 21). The EAJA requires a prevailing party to

file an application for attorney’s fees within thirty (30) days of final

judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The thirty (30) day clock

did not begin to run in this action until this Court’s Order of Judgment dated

March 18, 2005 (Docs. 19-20) became final, which would have occurred at the

end of the sixty (60) days for appeal provided under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). 

See Shalala, 509 U.S. at 302. Because Plaintiff’s motion was filed on June

13, 2005 (Doc. 21), it is found to be timely filed.

4

v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 383, 385 (llth Cir. 1988) (per curiam).

3. In this case, the Commissioner does not dispute the

issues of prevailing party status1 or timeliness;2 but instead

argues that because the Court determined that the ALJ did not

err in finding that Plaintiff had obtained medical improvement

and possessed the residual functional capacity to perform light

work, the Commissioner's position was substantially justified.

The undersigned however disagrees with the Commissioner in this

regard. In the report and recommendation, which was adopted by

the District Court, the undersigned determined that "while

substantial evidence clearly reflects medical improvement in

Plaintiff's condition, the undersigned cannot conclude, based on

the record before the Court, that substantial evidence supports

the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff can perform light work. In

fact, all three doctors who have treated or at least examined

Plaintiff have reached contrary findings." (Doc. 17). Given

that the ALJ's finding, with respect to Plaintiff's residual

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On March 29, 1996, the EAJA was amended so as to increase the statutory

cap on EAJA fees from $75.00 per hour to $125.00 per hour. See, e.g, Ikner v.

Apfel, 2000 WL 1844704, *2 n.1 (S.D. Ala. Nov 9, 2000). These amendments

apply to civil actions commenced on or after the date of enactment; therefore,

the statutory cap of $125.00 per hour applies in this present action.

5

functional capacity, was inconsistent with the opinions

expressed by all three doctors who had either treated or

examined Plaintiff, the undersigned finds that no reasonable

person could think, based on the record before the ALJ and the

Court, that a reasonable basis existed in law or fact for

concluding that Plaintiff could perform light work. For this

reason, the undersigned recommends that the Court reject the

Commissioner's argument that her position was substantially

justified. Additionally, the undersigned notes that the

Commissioner has not identified any other special circumstances

that would make an EAJA award unjust.

4. Turning now to the reasonableness of the attorneys'

fees sought, the EAJA, as recently amended,3 provides, in

pertinent part, as follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall

be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and

quality of the services furnished, except that . . .

attorneys fees shall not be awarded in excess of

$125.00 per hour unless the court determines that an

increase in the cost of living or a special factor,

such as the limited availability of qualified

attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a

higher fee.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

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5. In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992),

the Court determined that the EAJA establishes a two-step

analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be

applied in calculating attorneys fees under the Act: 

The first step in the analysis, . . . is to determine

the market rate for “similar services [provided] by

lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience,

and reputation.” . . . The second step, which is

needed only if the market rate is greater than

[$125.00] per hour, is to determine whether the court

should adjust the hourly fee upward from [$125.00] to

take into account an increase in the cost of living,

or a special factor. 

Id. at 1033-34 (citations and footnote omitted).

6. The prevailing market rate in the Southern District of

Alabama has been previously determined to be $125.00 per hour.

Boggs v. Massanari, C.A. 00-0408-P-C (S.D. Ala. (Jun. 13,

2001)); Boone v. Apfel, C.A. 99-0965-CB-L (S.D. Ala. (Aug. 30,

2001)). Because the market rate is not greater than the

statutory rate of $125.00 per hour, this Court need not reach

the second step of the Meyer analysis.

7. With regard to the reasonableness of the hours claimed

by Plaintiff’s attorney, “[t]he fee applicant bears the burden

of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate

hours and hourly rates.” Norman v. Housing Auth. of City of

Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988). “[T]he

measure of reasonable hours is determined by the profession’s

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judgment of the time that may be conscionably billed and not the

least time in which it might theoretically have been done.” Id.

at 1306. 

8. In the case sub judice, attached to Plaintiff’s fee

application is a time sheet detailing the description of work

performed, the time expended and the date on which the work was

performed. (Doc. 21-2). Although the Commissioner has not

disputed the reasonableness of the fees requested, the

undersigned has carefully reviewed the time sheet, and finds

that 17.90 hours is reasonable given the work activity that is

detailed and the usual number of hours billed by attorneys in

similar actions. 9. In consideration of the foregoing, the

undersigned recommends that Plaintiff be awarded attorneys' fees

in the amount of $2,237.50 under the EAJA for the 17.90 hours

her attorney spent representing her before this Court.

III. Conclusion

Therefore, upon consideration of the pertinent pleadings,

the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

Application for Award of Attorney's Fees Under the Equal Access

to Justice Act be GRANTED, and that the award be limited to the

EAJA rate of $125.00 per hour, thereby resulting in an award of

$2,237.50 for 17.90 attorney hours spent representing Plaintiff

in connection with this action.

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The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to this Report and Recommendation.

DONE this 17th day of November, 2005.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk

of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by

the district judge of anything in the recommendation and will

bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the

magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Lewis v. Smith,

855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for

challenging the findings and recommendations of the magistrate

judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1,

1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by

a magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that

is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A), by filing a “Statement of Objection

to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation” within ten

days after being served with a copy of the

recommendation, unless a different time is

established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the

recommendation to which objection is made and the

basis for the objection. The objecting party

shall submit to the district judge, at the time

of filing the objection, a brief setting forth

the party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a

different disposition made. It is insufficient

to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a

copy of the original brief may be submitted or

referred to and incorporated into the brief in

support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed

an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to

a Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment

can be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing

party may submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10)

days of being served with a copy of the statement of objection.

Case 1:03-cv-00615-P-B Document 24 Filed 11/17/05 Page 9 of 10
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72; SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is 

advised that a judicial determination that transcription is

necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost

of the transcript.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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