Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04884/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04884-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mohamed Adam Abdelshafi
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 08-4884

MOHAMED ADAM ABDELSHAFI,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

Henry E. Hudson, District Judge.

(3:07-cr-00428-HEH-1)

Argued: December 2, 2009

Decided: January 25, 2010

Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges,

and John Preston BAILEY, Chief United States

District Judge for the Northern District of West Virginia,

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Bailey joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: John Britton Russell, Jr., DURRETTEBRADSHAW, PLC, Midlothian, Virginia, for Appellant. Joseph

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Errington Atkinson, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Dana J. Boente, Acting United States Attorney,

Alexandria, Virginia, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

AGEE, Circuit Judge: 

Mohamed Adam Abdelshafi was convicted in a bench trial

in the Eastern District of Virginia on fifteen counts of health

care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347, and two counts

of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1028A, and sentenced to sixty-two months’ imprisonment.1

On appeal, Abdelshafi does not challenge his convictions for

health care fraud, but contends the district court erred on two

grounds. First, Abdelshafi contends the Government’s evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt of aggravated

identity theft, as a matter of law, because the Government

failed to prove that he used Medicaid patients’ identifying

information "without lawful authority." 18 U.S.C.

§ 1028A(a)(1). Second, Abdelshafi argues that his sentence

on the health-care-fraud counts should be vacated because he

should not have received a two-level, offense-level enhancement for abuse of trust. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

1The district court imposed concurrent, thirty-eight-month sentences on

the fifteen health-care-fraud counts. Separately, the court imposed twentyfour month sentences on the two aggravated-identity-theft counts, to run

concurrently with each other and consecutive to Abdelshafi’s sentence on

the health-care-fraud counts. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(b)(2) & (4). 

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I. Background

Although the parties vigorously contest how the law applies

to the essential facts of this case, those facts are not in dispute.

Virginia Premier Health Plan ("Virginia Premier"), a health

maintenance organization, contracts with the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services to provide medical services — including medical transportation services — to

Medicaid patients in Virginia.2 Some medical transportation

services are provided directly by Virginia Premier, while others are contracted to third-party vendors. Abdelshafi owned

and operated one such third-party vendor, Shafi Medical

Transportation ("SMT"). 

Virginia Premier contracted with SMT to provide medical

transportation to some of its members. Typically, Virginia

Premier would send SMT a daily trip log, which included

patients’ identifying information, contact information, and trip

details. Importantly, the patient’s identifying information

included that person’s Medicaid identification number. The

data in these trip logs served as SMT’s direction to transport

patients and to bill Virginia Premier. For example, each handwritten claim form Abdelshafi submitted on behalf of SMT

included the patient’s name, date of birth, Medicaid identification number, date of service, pick-up and drop-off locations, and number of miles traveled. Virginia Premier would

then pay SMT based on such factors as the mileage traveled,

driver’s wait time, whether wheelchair transportation was provided, and whether transportation was provided outside of

normal business hours, all as submitted by Abdelshafi. 

SMT’s billing practices came under suspicion after Virginia Premier discovered that several claim forms Abdelshafi

submitted contained substantially inflated mileage amounts.

2The Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services administers

Virginia’s Medicaid program. See HCMF Corp. v. Allen, 238 F.3d 273,

275 (4th Cir. 2001). 

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The ensuing investigation by state and federal authorities

revealed that Abdelshafi not only inflated mileage amounts,

but also submitted claim forms for trips that did not, in fact,

occur. Investigators concluded these billing practices allowed

Abdelshafi to collect at least $308,329.00 in fraudulent payments. 

At trial, Abdelshafi argued in a motion for acquittal that he

could not be guilty of aggravated identity theft because he did

not use Medicaid patients’ identifying information "without

lawful authority." 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Abdelshafi contended that since Virginia Premier specifically furnished him

with patients’ identifying information for use in SMT’s billing, he was in lawful possession of the Medicaid identification numbers and other identifying information. In

Abdelshafi’s view, "excessive use" of that legitimately

obtained identifying information "over and above" what was

authorized by Virginia Premier did not constitute a use "without lawful authority." Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 384. Abdelshafi argued that to be a use "without lawful authority" an

individual must "try[ ] to take someone else’s identity and

pretend to be that person or . . . pretend that they have been

providing services for that person." Id.

The district court considered the matter and ruled that the

aggravated-identity-theft statute "does not require that" another’s identifying information "be stolen" or misappropriated.

Id. at 394. Further, the court read 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) to

proscribe the use of another "person’s identity for any unlawful purpose[ ]." Id. at 395.

The Court is of the opinion that reading the statute

over, it indicates that it is unlawful to use a person’s

identity for any unlawful purposes, and that it’s the

use of it that is important. They may have the authority to have the identification for one purpose but yet

may not use it for another unlawful purpose.

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This situation is the latter. There was no authority

to use the identity of either of these two individuals

for the purpose of filing a false medical claim. 

Id. at 394-95.

At sentencing, Abdelshafi also objected to a proposed twolevel enhancement of his Guidelines offense level on the

health-care-fraud counts for abusing a position of trust. See

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. First, Abdelshafi maintained that his relationship with Virginia Premier consisted of a mere "ordinary

commercial contract" and thus did not involve a position of

trust. J.A. at 418. Second, focusing on the limited services

SMT provided, Abdelshafi argued that he did not possess the

"significant amount of discretion" necessary to support such

an enhancement. Id.

The district court determined that the appropriate inquiry

turned on "the total discretion" Abdelshafi possessed "with

respect to the victim." Id. at 424. Abdelshafi, in the district

court’s view, "exercise[d] discretion" in recording "how many

miles that he drove, the time of day, [and] the type of transportation" in what was "somewhat of a self-policing relationship" in regard to billing Virginia Premier. Id. at 427. In

addition, Abdelshafi’s discretion in this regard occurred in the

context "of providing Medicaid services" and clearly involved

"compensat[ion] from Medicaid funds." Id. at 426. The district court consequently overruled Abdelshafi’s objection and

increased his offense level by two levels for abusing a position of trust. 

II. Analysis

On appeal, Abdelshafi reasserts these arguments in contending that the district court erred in denying his motion for

acquittal on the aggravated identity theft counts and in imposing a Guidelines enhancement for abuse of trust. "We review

de novo a district court’s denial of a motion, made pursuant

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to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for

judgment of acquittal." United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d

150, 160 (4th Cir. 2006). Similarly, we "review de novo the

district court’s legal interpretation of what constitutes ‘a position of trust’ under [U.S.S.G.] § 3B.3," but our review of the

district court’s "factual findings" is only "for clear error."

United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 535-36 (4th Cir.

2005). We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.

A. Aggravated Identity Theft

The aggravated-identity-theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A,

in pertinent part reads as follows: "Whoever, during and in

relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c),

knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful

authority, a means of identification of another person shall, in

addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years." 18 U.S.C.

§ 1028A(a)(1). This mandatory two-year sentence must run

consecutive to "any other term of imprisonment imposed on

the person under any other provision of law." Id.

§ 1028A(b)(2). 

To establish a violation of § 1028A(a)(1), the Government

must prove the defendant (1) knowingly transferred, possessed, or used, (2) without lawful authority, (3) a means of

identification of another person, (4) during and in relation to

a predicate felony offense.3See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1); see

also United States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401, 404-405 (5th

Cir. 2009); United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 606-07

(11th Cir. 2007), abrogated in part on other grounds by

3For purposes of § 1028A(a)(1), a "means of identification" is defined

as "any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with

any other information, to identify a specific individual." 18 U.S.C.

§ 1028(d)(7); see also United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 230, 234-35 (4th

Cir. 2008). 

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Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009).

Abdelshafi’s convictions for health care fraud qualified as

predicate felony offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(1). 

The argument on appeal relates only to the second element

of a § 1028A(a)(1) offense, as Abdelshafi maintains that his

use of Medicaid patients’ identifying information was not

"without lawful authority." In order to use the identification

of another without lawful authority, Abdelshafi contends that

a defendant must "misappropriat[e] or "misrepresent[ ] . . .

someone’s identity or identifying information." Opening Brief

at 16. Because he "did not steal or otherwise unlawfully

obtain," id. at 20, Medicaid patients’ identifying information

or "misrepresent[ ] . . . his own or some other person’s identity," id. at 22, Abdelshafi argues he did not commit aggravated identity theft.

When engaging in statutory interpretation, we "first and

foremost strive to implement congressional intent by examining the plain language of the statute." United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 213 (4th Cir. 2009). "[A]bsent ambiguity

or a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary," we

thus give a statute its "plain meaning." United States v. Bell,

5 F.3d 64, 68 (4th Cir. 1993). A statute’s plain meaning is

determined by reference to its words’ "ordinary meaning at

the time of the statute’s enactment." United States v. Simmons, 247 F.3d 118, 122 (4th Cir. 2001). We remain mindful

that in "interpreting the plain language of a statute, we give

the terms their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,

absent an indication Congress intended" the statute’s language

"to bear some different import." Stephens ex rel. R.E. v.

Astrue, 565 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). 

As the Supreme Court noted in its discussion of

§ 1028A(a)(1) in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct.

1886 (2009), "[n]o special context is present here." 129 S. Ct.

at 1891. Our analysis accordingly focuses on the statute’s

plain text. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that "[n]othing

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in the plain language of the statute requires that the means of

identification" at issue "must have been stolen" — or as

Abdelshafi characterizes the point "misappropriated" — "for

a § 1028A(a)(1) violation to occur." Hurtado, 508 F.3d at

607. Consequently, "strong textual reasons" support our rejection of Abdelshafi’s version of the statute’s meaning. FloresFigueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1890. 

The Eleventh Circuit in Hurtado aptly stated the pertinent

point: "For sure, stealing and then using another person’s

identification would fall within the meaning of ‘without lawful authority.’ However, there are other ways someone could

possess or use another person’s identification, yet not have

‘lawful authority’ to do so." 508 F.3d at 607. For example, in

this case, Abdelshafi came into lawful possession, initially, of

Medicaid patients’ identifying information and had "lawful

authority" to use that information for proper billing purposes.

He did not have "lawful authority," however, to use Medicaid

patients’ identifying information to submit fraudulent billing

claims. We thus find no textual basis in the statute for Abdelshafi’s assertion that identifying information must be stolen or

"misappropriated" to be used "without lawful authority."4

Section § 1028A(a)(1)’s "broader context" further supports

our conclusion that a person need not "misappropriate" another’s identity to use it "without lawful authority." Passaro, 577

F.3d at 213. As noted in Hurtado, 18 U.S.C. § 1028 — the

4The only language in § 1028A that could support Abdelshafi’s argument is the statute’s title of "Aggravated identity theft." 18 U.S.C.

§ 1028A (emphasis added). Abdelshafi wisely does not press this point to

support his argument, as it is well established that "‘the title of a statute

cannot limit the plain meaning of [its] text.’" United States v. Buculei, 262

F.3d 322, 331 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524

U.S. 206, 212 (1998)). Neither does Abdelshafi argue that the plain language of § 1028(a)(1) is ambiguous. We therefore agree with the Hurtado

Court that "we need not consider the title of § 1028(A) (‘Aggravated Identity Theft’) because the phrase ‘without lawful authority’ in § 1028A(a)(1)

is plain and unambiguous." 508 F.3d at 608 n.6. 

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section preceding § 1028A — "enumerates eight identityfraud violations." 508 F.3d at 607-08. Two of these violations

specifically require that an identification document be "stolen

or produced without lawful authority." 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1028(a)(2) & (6) (emphasis added); see also Hurtado, 508

F.3d at 607. 

If Congress had wished to include a misappropriation element in the aggravated-identity-theft statute it stands to reason

that it would have included language in § 1028A(a)(1) similar

to that used in the immediately preceding section. As the

Hurtado Court explained:

If Congress intended to provide for an enhanced penalty only when an identification was stolen by a

defendant and then used in the commission of

another crime (such as passport fraud), it easily

could have used the words "stolen" or "theft" in

§ 1028A(a)(1). The fact that Congress used the word

"stolen" in § 1028, but chose the broader phrase

"without lawful authority" in § 1028A(a)(1) plainly

indicates that Congress intended to prohibit a wider

range of activities in § 1028A(a)(1) than just theft.

508 F.3d at 608. The fact that Congress did not include such

language in § 1028A(a)(1) supports our conclusion that the

aggravated-identity-theft statute does not contain a misappropriation element: "‘[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section

of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts

intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or

exclusion.’" Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1854

(2009) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23

(1983)) (alteration in original); see also Hurtado, 508 F.3d at

608. 

Contrary to Abdelshafi’s assertions, the aggravatedidentity-theft statute’s use of the phrase "without lawful

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authority" is "broad and unambiguous." United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 609 (1989); see also Hurtado, 508 F.3d

at 608 n.6. The statute prohibits an individual’s knowing use

of another person’s identifying information without a form of

authorization recognized by law. See United States v. Hines,

472 F.3d 1038, 1039-40 (8th Cir. 2007). While Abdelshafi

had authority to possess the Medicaid identification numbers,

he had no authority to use them unlawfully so as to perpetuate

a fraud. We, therefore, decline to narrow the application of

§ 1028A(a)(1) to cases in which an individual’s identity has

been misrepresented, as it would clearly be inappropriate for

us "to adopt an interpretation[ ] not supported by the plain text

of the statute." United States v. Pressley, 359 F.3d 347, 351

(4th Cir. 2004).5

Our conclusion in this regard is not altered by Abdelshafi’s

representation that "every single incident of health care fraud

by a provider would also constitute aggravated identity theft"

if his conduct is deemed to violate the statute.6 Opening Brief

5We similarly reject Abdelshafi’s contention that to use another person’s identifying information "‘without lawful authority’ there must be no

authority for the basic, underlying use to which it is put," i.e., the statute

"is not meant to apply to instances where the basic use is clearly authorized but the authorization is then abused or used excessively." Opening

Brief at 22. Section § 1028A(a)(1) does not distinguish between "basic

uses" and "excessive uses" of another person’s identifying information.

Rather, the statute applies to any knowing use of another’s identifying

information performed without a form of authorization recognized by law.

6During oral argument in this case, Abdelshafi’s counsel argued that

§ 1028A(a)(1)’s separate use and predicate felony elements necessitate

that the use without lawful authority for which a defendant is charged

under § 1028A(a)(1) be "different than the predicate act use." Counsel

contended that otherwise the statute’s use language would be "superfluous." Because this argument was not presented in Abdelshafi’s opening

brief, it has been waived. See United States v. Jones, 308 F.3d 425, 427

n.1 (4th Cir. 2002). Even if we were to consider this argument, we would

conclude that it lacked merit. Section § 1028A(a)(1) establishes an

enhanced penalty for those who knowingly transfer, possess, or use

another person’s identifying information "during and in relation to" a

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at 21. Section 1028A(a)(1) provides an enhanced penalty for

those who unlawfully use another’s identifying information

during and in relation to a broad array of predicate offenses,

including crimes related to the "theft of government property"

and "fraud," as well as offenses involving "unlawful activities

related to passports, visas, and immigration." FloresFigueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1888-89. That a single type of health

care fraud related to provider payments — a subset of crimes

involving fraud and theft — may fall within the statutory

ambit is not particularly noteworthy. 

"Even if we were more persuaded than we are by [this] policy argument[ ], the result in this case would be unchanged.

Resolution of the pros and cons of whether a statute should

sweep broadly or narrowly is for Congress." United States v.

Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984). We adhere to the principle that "[f]ederal crimes are defined by Congress, and so

long as Congress acts within its constitutional power in enacting a criminal statute, this Court must give effect to Congress’

expressed intention concerning the scope of conduct prohibited." United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 939 (1988).

Congress’ decision to impose additional punishment on those

who use another’s identifying information to submit fraudulent claims for payment for health-care related services "is not

so ‘absurd or glaringly unjust’ as to lead us to question

whether Congress actually intended what the plain language

of [§ 1028A(a)(1)] so clearly imports." Rodgers, 466 U.S. at

484 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 450

(1932)) (internal citation omitted). 

wide array of predicate offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (emphasis

added); see also id. § 1028A(c). Although the same underlying transfer,

possession, or use may occasionally support both a defendant’s predicate

felony and a § 1028A(a)(1) enhancement, on other occasions a different

predicate act will serve as the basis for the enhancement. No more need

be said to show that our interpretation does not render the statute’s "use"

language superfluous. See Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803,

809 (1989) (recognizing that "the words of a statute must be read in their

context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme").

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After all, the use of another person’s means of identification makes a fraudulent claim for payment much harder to

detect and, therefore, more likely to succeed. It also often

casts undue suspicion on the individuals whose identifying

information is misused and infringes their interest in keeping

personal information private and secure. These factors provide ample justification for the increased punishment of those

who use another’s identifying information in fraudulently billing for medical services. A literal reading of the unambiguous

terms of the statute, "in light of ordinary principles of statutory interpretation," therefore, will not produce "absurd

results" or "thwart the obvious purpose of the statute."7 United

States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1064 (4th Cir. 1988) (quotations omitted). Consequently, our "inquiry is complete" and

"there is no need to consult legislative history nor to look to

the ‘rule of lenity.’"8Id. (quotations omitted). We thus conclude that the district court did not err in ruling that Abdelshafi’s conduct was "without lawful authority" and violated

§ 1028A(a)(1).

B. Abuse of Trust Enhancement

We now turn to Abdelshafi’s claim that the district court

erred in imposing a two-level enhancement to his Guidelines’

7We note that Abdelshafi has failed to refer us to any portion of

§ 1028A(a)(1)’s legislative history that suggests our interpretation of the

statute is "‘demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’" Morison, 844 F.2d at 1064 (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 83, 93

(1985)). 

8At oral argument, Abdelshafi’s counsel pointed us to the rule of lenity

and the interpretative canon that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. We note that the rule of lenity does not apply in this case because

§ 1028A(a)(1)’s text is unambiguous. See United States v. Helem, 186

F.3d 449, 455 (4th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, "[t]he canon in favor of strict

construction [of criminal statutes] is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose. . . . [I]t is satisfied if

the [statute’s] words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers." United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145

(1975) (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1948)). 

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offense level for abuse of trust. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. On

appeal, Abdelshafi argues that he "had no relationship with

Medicaid and was given no discretion by Virginia Premier.

Therefore the position of trust enhancement is inapplicable."

Opening Brief at 26. For the following reasons, we disagree.

Section 3B1.3 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines

provides that a defendant’s offense level should be increased

by two levels "[i]f the defendant abused a position of public

or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the

offense." Accordingly, the enhancement applies if "the defendant abused a position of trust and that abuse significantly

contributed to the commission or concealment" of the underlying offense. United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 203

(4th Cir. 1999). Whether a defendant held a position of trust

must be assessed from the perspective of the victim. See

United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 415 (4th Cir. 2001). 

In evaluating application of the enhancement, we generally

weigh three factors to determine whether a particular defendant abused a position of trust, including (1) whether the

defendant had special duties or special access to information

not available to other employees, (2) the extent of the discretion the defendant possessed, and (3) whether the defendant’s

actions indicate that he is more culpable than others in similar

positions who engage in criminal acts. See Akinkoye, 185 F.3d

at 203. In this case, however, resort to the traditional balancing test proves unnecessary. Application note 2(B) to § 3B1.3

specifies that an abuse-of-trust enhancement applies,

"[n]otwithstanding Application Note 1, or any other provision

of this guideline," when the defendant "exceeds or abuses the

authority of his or her position in order to obtain, transfer, or

issue unlawfully, or use without authority, any means of identification."

The facts of this case fall plainly within the scope of application note 2(B). Abdelshafi abused the authority of his posiUNITED STATES v. ABDELSHAFI 13

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tion in using Medicaid patients’ identifying information,

without authority, to file fraudulent claims for payment.

Application note 2(B) cites as an example of an abuse of trust

under the guideline "a hospital orderly who exceeds or abuses

the authority of his or her position by obtaining or misusing

patient identification information from a patient chart."

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 application note 2(B)(ii). Abdelshafi, quite

similarly, abused the authority of his position in misusing the

patient identification information listed on trip logs he

received from Virginia Premier. 

Abdelshafi’s arguments in regard to his lack of discretion

and fiduciary relationship with Medicaid are beside the point

in the face of the plain reading of application note 2.9 We,

therefore, do not address Abdelshafi’s arguments in regard to

either application note 1 or our precedents regarding its scope.10

For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that Abdelshafi

enjoyed a position of trust in regard to patients’ identifying

information comparable to that of a hospital orderly in the

application note (2)(B) example. This conclusion remains

valid regardless of whether we consider the victim in this case

to be Medicaid, Virginia Premier, the patients whose identifying information Abdelshafi misused, or all of them. Furthermore, Abdelshafi’s abuse of trust significantly facilitated his

9The Guidelines’ "policy statements and commentary are generally entitled to treatment as authoritative guides with controlling weight, unless

[they are] inconsistent with a statute or the Sentencing Guidelines themselves." United States v. Wiley-Dunaway, 40 F.3d 67, 71 (4th Cir. 1994),

superseded on other grounds as recognized by United States v. Mosley,

200 F.3d 218, 223-24 (4th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we give controlling

weight to § 3B1.3’s application note 2. 

10We recognize that the parties have not approached the abuse-of-trust

enhancement from the perspective of application note 2(B), but "[w]hen

an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to

the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the

independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law." Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991).

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commission of aggravated identity theft, as it granted him

access to the patient identifying information necessary to file

fraudulent billing claims. We accordingly uphold the district

court’s decision to impose an abuse-of-trust enhancement. See

United States v. McHan, 386 F.3d 620, 623 (4th Cir. 2004)

(recognizing we are entitled to affirm on any ground supported by the record, including theories not relied upon by the

district court).

III. Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

AFFIRMED

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