Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03075/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03075-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Susan Viola Klat
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 2, 1998 Decided September 22, 1998

No. 97-3075

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Susan Viola Klat,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cr00385-01)

Mary Manning Petras, appointed by the Court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

David B. Goodhand, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for appellee, with whom Wilma A. Lewis,

United States Attorney, John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

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Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Wald, Williams and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Wald, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Susan Viola Klat of

threatening to assault the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, William Suter, and the Chief Justice of the

United States Supreme Court, William Rehnquist. On appeal, appellant challenges her conviction and sentence based

on a number of alleged errors made by the district court,

including (1) allowing her to appear pro se at a hearing to

determine her competency to stand trial; (2) failing adequately to warn her of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation; (3) failing to dismiss the indictment as duplicitous; (4) failing to give the jury a special unanimity instruction; and (5) failing to depart downward in sentencing on the

basis of diminished capacity.

We reject all of the defendant's claims except for the

district court's failure to provide appellant with counsel at a

hearing to determine her competency to stand trial. We hold

that the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel

at this hearing and that the district court therefore erred in

allowing appellant to appear pro se. As a remedy for this

error, we remand the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the competency hearing

could have come out differently if, as the Sixth Amendment

requires, the defendant had been represented at the hearing.

If it is determined that counsel could have altered the outcome of the competency hearing, appellant's conviction must

be vacated and appellant afforded a new trial.

I. Background

On October 25, 1996, appellant was indicted on two counts

of threatening to assault Mr. Suter (Count 1) and Chief

Justice Rehnquist (Count 2) with the intent to retaliate

against them on account of their performance of official

duties. The government's evidence against appellant included letters and voice mail sent to a California government

official as well as statements made to co-workers, friends,

Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and employees at the

United States Supreme Court, spanning a six-month period

from February 29, 1996 through August 25, 1996.1 The

government claimed that these various statements, letters

and messages constituted threats to assault Mr. Suter and

Chief Justice Rehnquist in violation of 18 U.S.C. ss 115 and

1114.

__________

1 Prior to August, 1996, appellant was living and working as a

nurse in San Diego, California. In September of 1995, appellant

filed a civil rights suit against the State of California, which was

dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See Trial Tr. at 156,

159. Subsequently, appellant petitioned the United States Supreme

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Court (1) for a stay, which was denied in February, 1996 and (2) for

a writ of certiorari, which was denied in June 1996. See id. at 272,

275. After her petition for a writ of certiorari was denied, appellant

began announcing her intention to move to Washington, D.C. in

order, as she told several people, to ensure that the Supreme Court

heard her case. See id. at 187. Appellant did in fact move to the

Washington, D.C. area, where she was ultimately arrested by the

FBI. Appellant's allegedly threatening acts included several statements made to co-workers to the effect that she was going to go to

the Supreme Court and "blow away anybody" who stood in her way,

see id. at 219, and a letter addressed "[t]o the clerk and Justices of

the Supreme Court" which stated, among other things, the following:

Denying me or anyone else the Constitution's protection while

disregarding federal law only demonstrates that this Court

lacks the interest and ability to protect all individuals' rights or

administer justice in any form. One shouldn't have to resort to

creating casualties, such as the Oklahoma bombing, to get your

attention. Unfortunately, experience shows that this is the

only method that creates change and actually works. The

Declaration of Independence distinctly states that whenever

any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it

is the right of the people to alter or abolish it. Nowhere in this

declaration does it state that corruption is to be tolerated. An

eye for an eye may well be the only solution left to justice in

this country. The writ will still be written and the story told

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Prior to her indictment, on August 27, 1996, appellant was

brought before a magistrate for a probable cause hearing.

Appellant was represented at this hearing by appointed counsel. The magistrate found probable cause and remanded

appellant back to jail for a forensic screening to ascertain

whether appellant was competent to stand trial. Dr. Bruce

Cambosos performed this screening and concluded that appellant was competent to stand trial. A bail hearing was held on

September 3, 1996, where the magistrate granted appellant's

request through counsel that she be released on her own

recognizance.

On September 24, 1996, appellant filed a motion requesting

that her attorney be removed and that she be named counsel

of record. Attached to this motion was a signed "Waiver of

Right to Assigned Counsel." In these two documents, appellant stated, inter alia, that she was "aware of the implications and responsibilities involved that accompany being represented in propria persona and waive[d] the right to have

supportive counsel present or involved at this time"; that she

"hereby relinquishe[d] the right to retain the federal public

defender as counsel and w[ould] proceed with all procedures

and proceedings connected with this case in propria persona

hereinafter"; and that she was "aware that both the Sixth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and

Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc., rule [sic] 44(a) provide for the

right to assignment of counsel and elect[ed] to waive this

right." J.A., Ex. 3. Appellant requested in her motion an

order naming her counsel of record "officially" as of September 17, 1996, at 4:30 p.m. Id.

Appellant was arraigned on November 1, 1996. At her

arraignment hearing, she followed up on her motion to remove appointed counsel. Appointed counsel also moved to

withdraw because appellant had filed a civil suit against him.

The district court granted counsel's motion to withdraw, and,

based on appellant's behavior at the hearing--which the court

described as "bizarre"--ruled that there was "reasonable

cause" to believe that appellant was suffering from a mental

__________

with the ultimate outcome explained by whoever survives this

madness and is left standing. Id. at 177.

disease or defect that rendered her unable to understand the

nature of the proceedings against her. The district court

then ordered appellant into custody to be examined pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. s 4241(b). Although the district court had

granted appointed counsel's motion to withdraw, the court did

not appoint new counsel for appellant.

Appellant spent nearly a month at Carswell Federal Medical Center in Forth Worth, Texas. There, she was examined

by Dr. James Shadduck, a forensic psychologist. Appellant

allowed herself to be interviewed by Dr. Shadduck but refused to participate in formal psychological testing. Based on

his observations of appellant, Dr. Shadduck concluded that

she was competent to stand trial. See Appellant Br., Attach.

C. Dr. Shadduck did note "strong evidence of a narcissistic

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personality disorder, and the possibility of a diagnosis of a

bipolar disorder," id. at 6, and that appellant "occasionally

evidenced excessive suspiciousness that verged on paranoia."

Id. at 5. However, Dr. Shadduck also found that appellant

displayed "at least average intellectual abilities, and no notable cognitive impairments." Id at 7. Ultimately, Dr. Shadduck concluded that appellant was "not presently suffering

from a mental disease or defect which would render her

unable to understand the nature and consequences of the

proceedings against her or to assist properly in her own

defense." Id. Dr. Shadduck's forensic report was submitted

to the district court on December 16, 1996.

On January 16, 1997, the district court held a hearing to

determine whether appellant was competent to stand trial

and whether she could represent herself at trial. Appellant

appeared at this hearing pro se. Based on Dr. Shadduck's

report and its own observation of appellant's behavior at this

hearing, the district court found that appellant was in fact

competent and, further, that she could represent herself at

trial. Appellant agreed at this hearing to the appointment of

standby counsel; standby counsel was appointed on January

28, 1997, and appeared with appellant at all subsequent

proceedings.

The jury trial commenced on February 24, 1997. Appellant

gave the opening statement and cross-examined the first two

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government witnesses. However, after cross-examining the

second witness, appellant informed the court that she could

not continue to "confront" her friends because it was "too

emotional" for her. Trial Tr. at 213. Accordingly, standby

counsel took over the rest of the trial and sentencing. On

February 26, 1997, the jury found appellant guilty on both

counts of the indictment. On May 27, 1997, appellant was

sentenced to a term of 57 months imprisonment for each

count, to run concurrently, to a year of supervised release for

each count, to run concurrently, and to a $100 special assessment for each count.

II. Discussion

A.Right to Counsel at the Competency Hearing

On November 1, 1996, appellant was arraigned before the

district court. Appellant was represented by appointed counsel at her arraignment hearing; however, by the close of the

hearing, the district court had both (1) granted appointed

counsel's motion to withdraw from the case and (2) ordered

appellant into custody, finding "reasonable cause" to believe

that appellant was incompetent to stand trial. The district

court did not subsequently appoint new counsel. Accordingly, appellant was without counsel from the close of her

November 1, 1996 arraignment hearing until the district court

found her competent to stand trial and to waive her right to

counsel at the January 16, 1997 hearing.

A defendant has a right to counsel at every critical stage of

a criminal prosecution. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,

469-71 (1981); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972).

A competency hearing is one such critical stage. See, e.g.,

United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1984)

(in banc) (noting that stage is critical where defendant is

"confronted 'by the legal system,' in that he ha[s] a lawrelated choice before him, and could ... profit from the

expert advice of counsel ...." (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451

U.S. at 471)).2 Of course, a defendant may waive her right to

__________

2 See also 18 U.S.C. s 4247(d) ("At a hearing ordered pursuant to

this chapter the person whose mental condition is the subject of the

hearing shall be represented by counsel....").

counsel and, indeed, the Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), has held that a defendant has a Sixth

Amendment right to represent herself. However, the Supreme Court noted that while a defendant has a right to

represent herself, this defendant must "knowingly and intelligently" forgo the benefits traditionally associated with the

right to counsel in order to be allowed to proceed pro se. Id.

at 835.

In the instant case, appellant had clearly indicated her

desire to waive her right to counsel and to proceed pro se.

However, at the November 1, 1996 arraignment hearing the

district court made an explicit finding that there was "reasonable cause" to believe that appellant was mentally incompetent to stand trial. Under these circumstances, we find that

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the district court erred in allowing appellant's appointed

counsel to withdraw without appointing new counsel to represent appellant until the issue of her competency to stand trial

had been resolved. This finding is based on our conclusion

that, where a defendant's competence to stand trial is reasonably in question,3 a court may not allow that defendant to

waive her right to counsel and proceed pro se until the issue

of competency has been resolved.4

The Supreme Court has not explicitly considered this issue;

however, we find support for our conclusion from the Court's

decision in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), where it

__________

3 "Where a defendant's competence to stand trial is reasonably in

question" means where, as in this case, the trial court has found

"reasonable cause" under 18 U.S.C. s 4241(b); or, of course, where

the trial court's failure to do so would be reversible as an abuse of

discretion.

4 We note that the district court did not find, prior to the

competency hearing, that appellant had waived her right to counsel.

However, from the standpoint of the Sixth Amendment, it is irrelevant whether the district court erroneously found a waiver of

counsel or simply neglected to appoint counsel for appellant: absent

a valid waiver of counsel, it is constitutional error for a court to

allow a defendant to proceed pro se once the right to counsel has

attached.

found that a defendant could not waive his right to a competency hearing when there was a question as to his competency to stand trial: "[I]t is contradictory to argue that a

defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his right to have the court determine his

capacity to stand trial." Id. at 384. Likewise, we find it

contradictory to conclude that a defendant whose competency

is reasonably in question could nevertheless knowingly and

intelligently waive her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.5

Such a defendant may not proceed pro se until the question of

her competency to stand trial has been resolved.6

Accordingly, we find that appellant was erroneously denied

her Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the district

court found reasonable cause to doubt appellant's competency

to stand trial and yet failed to appoint counsel to represent

her through the resolution of the competency issue. This

finding does not end our inquiry, however, for we must also

determine the proper remedy for this erroneous denial of

counsel. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1966), the

Supreme Court noted that there are "some constitutional

rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be

treated as harmless error ...."; the Court listed the right to

counsel as one such right. Id. at 23 & n.8. The Supreme

Court has not, however, held that all non-trial denials of

counsel require automatic reversal of a defendant's conviction.

For example, in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), the

__________

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5 See also United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1990)

("Logically, the trial court cannot simultaneously question a defendant's mental competence to stand trial and at one and the same

time be convinced that the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.)"

6 In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), the Supreme Court

held that the standard for determining competency to stand trial is

the same as the standard for determining competency to waive

counsel. See id. at 399-400. Pursuant to the Court's decision in

Godinez, therefore, a court cannot logically question a defendant's

competence to stand trial while at the same time finding the

defendant competent to waive counsel--the standard is the same for

both determinations.

Court held that a preliminary hearing constituted a critical

stage in the criminal process and that the defendants were

thus entitled to counsel at the hearing. However, the Court

did not automatically reverse the defendants' convictions but

instead remanded the case to the state court to determine

"whether the denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing was

harmless error under Chapman v. California ...." Id. at

11.

In Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), the Supreme

Court explained that the determination of whether a Sixth

Amendment violation requires automatic reversal turns on

the extent to which the violation pervades the entire criminal

proceeding. As the Court noted: "Some constitutional violations ... by their very nature cast so much doubt on the

fairness of the trial process that, as a matter of law, they can

never be considered harmless. Sixth Amendment violations

that pervade the entire proceeding fall within this category."

Id. at 256. The Court further noted that in previous cases

requiring automatic reversal, "the deprivation of the right to

counsel affected--and contaminated--the entire criminal proceeding." Id. at 257.

In order to determine whether the Sixth Amendment violation here affected and contaminated the entire criminal proceeding--thus requiring automatic reversal under Satterwhite--we remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to

determine whether the competency hearing could have come

out differently if appellant had been represented by counsel.

The Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to permit retrospective hearings on questions of mental competency, see

Pate, 383 U.S. at 387; however, the purpose of the hearing

here is not to determine, retrospectively, whether appellant

was or was not in fact incompetent to stand trial. Rather, the

purpose of the hearing is to determine whether counsel might

have made certain decisions or arguments which could have

changed the result of the competency hearing. The Seventh

Circuit utilized a similar standard in attempting to determine

whether a constitutional error in a defendant's competency

hearing required reversal, stating that the "question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that [absent the constituUSCA Case #97-3075 Document #383803 Filed: 09/22/1998 Page 8 of 14
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tional error] the trial judge would have found [the defendant]

unfit." United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen, 686 F.2d

1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 1982). Similarly, the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that

the defendant there did not need to demonstrate that "he was

in fact incompetent to succeed on [his ineffective assistance of

counsel] theory. He need only show that counsel's failure to

pursue what should have been reasonable doubts as to his

competency was prejudicial to him." McLaughlin v. Royster,

346 F. Supp. 297, 310 (E.D. Va. 1972).

If the district court determines on remand that counsel

could not have changed the outcome of the competency

hearing, reversal is not required because the effects of the

violation would be effectively confined to the competency

hearing--that is, they would not serve to contaminate the

entire criminal proceeding. If, however, the district court

determines that the competency hearing could have come out

differently absent the Sixth Amendment violation, reversal is

required because the violation under this determination would

serve to contaminate the entire criminal proceeding, including

appellant's subsequent waiver of her right to counsel at trial

and the trial itself.

In making this determination, the district court should

inquire into whether counsel could have made certain tactical

decisions (such as retaining a second forensic expert to evaluate appellant) or made certain arguments (such as questioning Dr. Shadduck's report on grounds that it was based solely

on his observations of appellant rather than on formal testing)

which could have changed the outcome of the competency

hearing. The district court should also keep in mind that

appellant had a right to counsel at her competency hearing

but that she also had a right to counsel for the period

between her arraignment hearing and her competency hearing. Although a defendant does not have the right to have

counsel present during a psychiatric examination, see Byers,

740 F.2d. at 1119, a defendant does have a right to counsel

when faced with law-related choices with respect to this

examination. Id. A defendant thus has a right to counsel

before a psychiatric exam; for example, when making the

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"significant decision of whether to submit to the examination

and to what end the psychiatrist's findings could be employed." Estelle, 451 U.S. at 471. Accordingly, the district

court should include in its inquiry what impact counsel could

have had on appellant's decision not to submit to formal

psychological testing, considering, for example, the fact that

Dr. Shadduck noted that he could not definitively conclude

that appellant was not suffering from a bipolar disorder

because appellant had refused to participate in formal testing.

B.Validity of Appellant's Waiver of Right to Counsel at

Trial

Appellant argues that the district court failed to advise her

of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and

thus, apart from any question of her competency to stand

trial, that her waiver of counsel was invalid and she was

denied her Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial. The

government concedes that the district court did not engage in

the ideal colloquy with appellant; however, the government

argues that appellant's waiver was nevertheless valid because

the record as a whole indicates that appellant's waiver of

counsel was knowing and intelligent.

The Supreme Court in Faretta held that a defendant has a

constitutional right to self-representation but that, in order to

represent himself, a defendant must "knowingly and intelligently" forgo the benefits traditionally associated with the

right to counsel:

Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and

experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made

aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that "he

knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes

open."

422 U.S. at 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel.

McCann, 317 U.S. at 279). In United States v. Bailey, 675

F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1982), this court enjoined trial judges in

future cases involving defendants' invocations of their right to

self-representation to "mak[e] clear on the record the awareness by defendants of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation as to which the Supreme Court in Faretta has

voiced its concern." Id. at 1300. However, the Bailey Court

did not find that a failure to make such a finding clear on the

record required reversal where the record as a whole indicated that the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was

knowing and voluntary.7 In finding that the record as a

whole indicated a knowing and voluntary waiver, the Bailey

Court took note of the fact that the defendant "consciously

and emphatically wanted to represent himself"; that there

was no possibility that the defendant "was misled or coerced

into waiving his right to counsel"; that the defendant had

studied law at Leavenworth for three years; and that the

defendant "had previously been convicted of a felony, a factor

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which necessarily indicates that he had some knowledge and

understanding of the relevant law and courtroom procedure."

Id. at 1301-02.

Under the facts of this case, we agree with the government

that the record as a whole establishes that appellant's waiver

of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary (except of

course insofar as she may have been lacking competency).8

__________

7 In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), the Supreme Court

added the word "voluntary" to the inquiry of whether a waiver is

"knowing" and "intelligent." Id. at 400, 402.

8 We agree with appellant that the district court failed to engage

appellant in a sustained colloquy concerning the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The district court did state at

appellant's arraignment hearing that, "If I were charged with a

serious crime like this, as you are, I would not represent myself. I

would want independent advice to assist me." 11/ 1/96 Tr. at 4.

However, at the January 16, 1997 competency hearing--where the

district court actually found that appellant could represent herself

at trial--the district court did not re-enter this conversation with

appellant and did not make clear on the record that appellant was

aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.

Nevertheless, we find that the district court's failure to do so does

not require reversal here because the record otherwise establishes a

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.

First, appellant consistently and emphatically expressed her

desire to represent herself at trial. Her pretrial motion

requesting removal of appointed counsel clearly demonstrated

that she was aware that she had a Sixth Amendment right to

counsel and that she wished to waive this right. For example, appellant noted in her motion that she was "aware of the

implications and responsibilities involved that accompany being represented in propria persona and waive[d] the right to

have supportive counsel present or involved at this time."

J.A., Ex. 3.

Furthermore, as the district court was aware, at the time of

the January 16, 1997 hearing, appellant was a 39-year old

nurse who had previously worked in complex areas of nursing

such as neonatal intensive care, acute care, and psychiatric

care. Indeed, appellant argued this very point at her arraignment hearing: "I'm an ICU nurse, competent. I take

care of people on a [sic] every day basis ... I have to perform

competently each and every minute that I work." 11/1/96 Tr.

at 21.

Moreover, appellant was relatively well-versed in the law.

First, appellant had litigated her civil suit in California pro se.

Additionally, appellant did a great deal of self-study on

criminal law subsequent to her arrest, as appellant explained

to the district court at her competency hearing: "But I did

spend every free moment that I was allowed off the unit in

Carswell in the law library. I did go through the entire two

volumes of criminal trial manual that is in D.C. I did go

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entirely through the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."

1/16/97 Tr. at 9. Dr. Shadduck confirmed as well that

appellant "spent a significant portion of her stay at [Carswell]

doing research in the law library" and that she "clearly

demonstrate[d] an in depth understanding of the legal process...." Appellant Br., Attach. C at 4, 6.

Finally, there is absolutely no evidence in the record to

suggest that appellant was in any way coerced or misled into

waiving her right to counsel. In sum, we conclude, as did the

court in Bailey, that "[o]n the record before us in this case,

[appellant's] claim on appeal of the invalidity of the trial

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judge's grant of [her] request is not persuasive as to any

necessity to reverse [her] conviction." 675 F.2d at 1302.

C.Duplicity of Charges

Appellant argues that both counts of the indictment are

duplicitous and that the district court therefore erred in

failing to dismiss the indictment as was requested by appellant through pretrial motion. The government argues that

the indictment is not duplicitous because it properly charged

a series of events as a single count because the events

constitute a common scheme to threaten. We agree with the

government that the acts charged constitute a common

scheme to threaten and therefore that the district court did

not err in failing to dismiss the indictment as duplicitous.

"Duplicity" is the joining in a single count of two or more

distinct and separate offenses. See United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Appellant is correct

in noting that the two counts in the indictment charged

numerous allegedly threatening acts (i.e., different statements, letters, voicemail messages). However, several acts

may be charged in a single count if the acts "represent a

single, continuing scheme that occurred within a short period

of time and that involved the same defendant." United

States v. Alsobrook, 620 F.2d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1980).

Appellant argues that the acts charged did not occur within

a short period of time because the acts spanned the period

from February to August of 1996. We do not believe, however, that six months is too long a period for acts charged in an

indictment to constitute a single, continuing scheme. The

various acts charged all involved appellant and all related to

appellant's apparent frustration with the Supreme Court's

denial of her appeals. Appellant's argument with respect to

the duplicity rule would require the government to file a

separate count for each allegedly threatening statement, letter, and voicemail message, "thereby producing the danger of

inappropriate multiple punishments for a single criminal episode." Mangieri, 694 F.2d at 1282. We do not find the

indictment in this case to be duplicitous.

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D.Unanimity Instruction

Appellant argues that the district court erred in failing to

instruct the jury that it had unanimously to find that at least

one of the acts charged in each of the counts constituted a

threat to assault. Specifically, appellant argues the district

court erred in failing to give a special jury instruction to the

effect that the jurors must be unanimous as to which act(s)

they find the defendant guilty. We have previously urged

trial courts to employ a special unanimity instruction when an

indictment charges more than one act. See Mangieri, 694

F.2d at 1281; United States v. Hubbard, 889 F.2d 277, 278

(D.C. Cir. 1989). However, appellant failed to request a

special unanimity instruction; consequently, we review the

district court's failure to do so, sua sponte, for plain error.

See Hubbard, 889 F.2d at 278. We cannot conclude that it

was plain error not to give a special unanimity instruction in

this case. In the context of the entire indictment and the

trial, we conclude that the general unanimity instruction

given by the district court sufficed to instruct the conscientious juror that she must agree with the other jurors on what

act(s) constituted a threat to assault. See Mangieri, 694 F.2d

at 1281.

E.Downward Departure for Diminished Capacity

Appellant argues that the district court erred because it

failed to depart downward from the applicable sentencing

range under U.S.S.G. s 5K2.13 ("[A court may depart downward] to reflect the extent to which reduced

mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense."). However, appellant failed to request a downward

departure under section 5K2.13. Accordingly, we review the

district court's failure, sua sponte, to depart downward on the

basis of appellant's diminished capacity under plain error.

See United States v. Studevent, 116 F.3d 1559, 1564 (D.C. Cir.

1997). Appellate review in the context of downward departures is limited to a determination of "whether the sentencing

judge misunderstood the scope of its authority to depart."

United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1015 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 446 (1997). There is no indication that

the district court misunderstood its authority to depart under

section 5K2.13. The court was not asked to depart under

section 5K2.13 and its failure, sua sponte, to do so is not plain

error.

For the foregoing reasons, we remand the case for an

evidentiary hearing to determine whether counsel could have

made a difference in the outcome of appellant's competency

hearing. If the district court determines that counsel could

have made a difference, appellant's conviction and sentence

are vacated. Otherwise, they are affirmed.

So 

ordered.

USCA Case #97-3075 Document #383803 Filed: 09/22/1998 Page 14 of 14