Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01702/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01702-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dominic Esquibel
Plaintiff
National Park Service
Defendant
Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks
Defendant
United States Department of the Interior
Defendant
United States of America
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Dominic Esquibel brings this action in response to his arrest outside of Sequoia 

National Park in December 2012. Defendants collectively move to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff 

concedes most of Defendants‟ arguments and requests leave to file a proposed amended 

complaint, attached to his opposition. For the following reasons, Defendants‟ motion will be 

granted with leave to amend, but not as proposed. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint and proposed amended complaint that he was unlawfully 

and violently arrested near the entrance of Sequoia National Park on December 22, 2012. Plaintiff 

alleges that an entrance gate kiosk employee yelled at him to move his car from a handicapped 

parking space. Plaintiff alleges that the kiosk employee called the park rangers and lied to them in 

order for them to arrest Plaintiff and move him from the parking space, which the kiosk employee 

wished to reserve. Plaintiff alleges two park rangers arrived and also yelled at Plaintiff, questioned 

him, threatened him, and eventually one park ranger, identified as Ranger Parker, stated that 

DOMINIC ESQUIBEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 

INTERIOR; NATIONAL PARK SERVICE; 

SEQUOIA AND KINGS CANYON 

NATIONAL PARKS; AND DOES 1 to 50,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-1702 SMS 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS‟ 

MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND

(Doc. 11)

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Plaintiff was under arrest and placed him in handcuffs. Ranger Parker told Plaintiff‟s wife that 

Plaintiff was being taken to jail in Fresno and the car was being impounded. Ranger Parker kicked 

Plaintiff‟s feet apart and frisked him. Ranger Parker placed Plaintiff in the back of the rangers‟ 

vehicle for about fifteen minutes, while the Ranger Parker discussed with the kiosk employee what 

had occurred. Ranger Parker told the other ranger that the kiosk employee had lied in order to 

move Plaintiff from the parking space. Plaintiff was released and issued a citation for failure to 

follow a lawful order. This arrest was particularly difficult and painful for Plaintiff because he 

wore an exoskeleton on his right leg and had surgery on his right arm, as a result of injuries 

sustained in combat in Afghanistan. Plaintiff had a handicapped parking permit and was lawfully 

parked in the parking space. He acted respectfully and cooperatively during and before the arrest 

although Plaintiff was hard of hearing and could not easily place his hands behind his back. 

On October 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this Court alleging physical injury 

and emotional distress against the United States, the U.S. Department of the Interior, the U.S. 

National Park Service, and Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks. He also seeks damages 

against certain federal employees, but is unaware of their names. Plaintiff brought two claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“1983”) and six tort claims pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act 

(“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2674 et seq. 

Defendants moved to dismiss the 1983 claims because the statute does not provide a right 

of action against the federal government, its agencies, or its officers. Defendants also moved to 

dismiss the FTCA claims as to all defendants other than the United States, the only proper party 

for money damages for actions of federal employees while acting with the scope of their 

employment. Plaintiff conceded these points and requested leave to file an attached amended 

complaint, which removes the 1983 claims, but haphazardly adds Bivens language, without 

specifically alleging a Bivens claim. Defendants argue that the proposed amendment is futile. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply 

give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff‟s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 

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Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Court may dismiss a complaint for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a „probability requirement,‟ 

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are 

not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Although accepted as true, “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). A plaintiff must 

set forth “the grounds of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 555-56 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

To the extent that the pleadings can be cured by the allegation of additional facts, the 

plaintiff should be granted leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California 

Collection Service Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). However, a court 

may deny leave to amend due to futility or legal insufficiency if the amendment would fail a 

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 

1988).

III. DISCUSSION

A. 1983 Claims

Section 1983 provides a right of action against individuals acting under color of state law. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. It does not provide a right of action against federal actors. Plaintiff has only 

alleged actions by federal actors; therefore, his 1983 claims will be dismissed. It seems from 

Plaintiff‟s proposed amendment that he seeks to convert his 1983 claims to Bivens claims. Bivens

provides a private right of action for civil rights violations by federal actors, and is considered a 

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counterpart to 1983 actions. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392-97 (1971); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). 

Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts which, if accepted as true, state a plausible claim that 

federal officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleges that a federal park ranger 

arrested him without basis to do so. However, as proposed, Plaintiff‟s Bivens claim or claims are 

unclear, fragmented, and insufficiently specific to pass Rule 8‟s pleading requirements. See FRCP 

8; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In particular, it is not clear from Plaintiff‟s 

proposed amendment which federal actors Plaintiff believes violated his constitutional rights in 

their individual capacities. Plaintiff also alleges that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated, but 

does not plead facts to support a Fifth Amendment violation. It is not entirely clear that Plaintiff

even wishes to proceed against any federal actor in his or her individual capacity with a Bivens

claim. Plaintiff has removed the civil rights cause of action from the caption page and indicates in 

his opposition that he does not object to the dismissal of all defendants other than the United 

States; yet, the proposed amendment makes several references to Bivens and argues that he is 

entitled to damages against individual federal employees. Hence, Plaintiff will not be permitted to 

file his proposed amended complaint, but Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his 1983 claims 

in order to properly plead a Bivens claim. If he wishes to plead a Bivens claim, Plaintiff is advised 

to research the proper parties and elements to the cause of action in order to avoid further 

dismissal. Plaintiff is not required to add a Bivens claim.

B. Tort Claims

Pursuant to the FTCA, the United States is the only proper party to suits for “injury [...] 

resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government 

while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2674, 2679(a)-(b). 

Hence, Defendants‟ motion to dismiss Plaintiff‟s third through eighth causes of action as to all 

defendants other than the United States will be granted without leave to amend. Plaintiff is not 

permitted to seek attorney‟s fees against the government for these claims. “[A] waiver of 

sovereign immunity in the FTCA „is to be construed narrowly so that the government is never held 

liable for a plaintiff‟s attorney fees.‟” Anderson v. United States, 127 F.3d 1190, 1191-1192 (9th 

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Cir. 1997) (quoting Jackson v. United States, 881 F.2d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1989)).

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants‟ motion to dismiss the complaint is GRANTED 

with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint in accordance with this order within 

thirty (30) days of entry of this order. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within thirty 

(30) days of entry of this order, this case will proceed on Plaintiff‟s third through eighth causes of 

action only, and only as against the United States. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1, 2015 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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