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Parties Involved:
Jose Bedolla-Zavala
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-3690

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSE BEDOLLA-ZAVALA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:09-cr-00051-RTR-2—Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 17, 2010—DECIDED JULY 2, 2010

Before RIPPLE, MANION and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Jose Bedolla-Zavala pleaded guilty

to one count of distribution of cocaine in excess of 500

grams, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).

The district court sentenced him to 78 months’ imprisonment. Mr. Bedolla-Zavala now appeals his sentence,

contending that the district court erred in applying a

sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. See

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 4(h). Because we conclude that the district court’s application of the obstrucCase: 09-3690 Document: 17 Filed: 07/02/2010 Pages: 9
2 No. 09-3690

tion enhancement was correct, we affirm Mr. BedollaZavala’s sentence.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

On February 7, 2009, law enforcement received information about a likely impending drug transaction involving Edwin Dejesus. In response, they set up surveillance outside of a home where a car registered to Dejesus

was parked. They observed a silver minivan, occupied by

two men, enter an alley behind the home and depart a

short time later. Minutes later, Dejesus himself exited the

home carrying a white bag and drove away. Police followed Dejesus’s car, conducted a traffic stop and, during

a search, recovered a white bag containing two kilograms

of cocaine. Dejesus then agreed to cooperate with the

authorities. He placed a recorded call to the man who

had delivered him the drugs. During the call, Dejesus

stated that he had “it”—the money for the drug transaction—and told the man on the other end of the line that

he should come and pick it up. R.30, Attach. A.

While police surveillance continued, the same silver

minivan seen earlier at the residence returned. In it, police

found three men, including Mr. Bedolla-Zavala, who

was carrying the cell phone to which Dejesus earlier

had placed the call. At the time of his arrest, Mr. BedollaZavala identified himself as Benino Jesus Arroyo-Arroyo

and also provided a false date of birth. Prior to his arraignment, Mr. Bedolla-Zavala (then known to law enforceCase: 09-3690 Document: 17 Filed: 07/02/2010 Pages: 9
No. 09-3690 3

ment as Arroyo-Arroyo) met with a pretrial services

officer who prepared a bail report for the court. He again

repeated his alias and false date of birth, gave false

names for his parents and also represented himself to be

a legal resident of the United States. These false facts

appear in the bail report prepared for the court.

Mr. Bedolla-Zavala’s time as Arroyo-Arroyo was shortlived; prior to his initial appearance, his fingerprints

readily revealed his true identity and the fact of his

previous deportation.

B.

Mr. Bedolla-Zavala was charged with a single count

of distribution of a controlled substance in violation of

8 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). He pleaded guilty, and

the Government agreed to recommend a two-level reduction to his offense level for acceptance of responsibility

if his conduct continued to be cooperative, as well as an

additional one-level reduction in consideration of his

timely notification of his intention to plead guilty. See

U.S.S.G. § 3G1.1(a) & (b). No representations were made

in the agreement by either party with respect to the

obstruction of justice enhancement in § 3C1.1.

The presentence report (“PSR”) recommended a twolevel enhancement for obstruction of justice. Mr. BedollaZavala objected that his conduct in providing a false

name was not properly classified as obstruction, and the

Government concurred, noting that the conduct did not

significantly hinder the prosecution, and the deception

was uncovered quickly and through normal processes.

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The district court denied the objection, finding that

Mr. Bedolla-Zavala’s conduct was expressly covered by

the relevant Application Note. Consequently, the court

accepted the recommendation of the PSR and applied

the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice.

Mr. Bedolla-Zavala now appeals. 

II

DISCUSSION

Mr. Bedolla-Zavala’s sole contention is that the

district court erred in applying the obstruction of justice

enhancement. He claims that there is no evidence that

his statements were made with an intent to deceive,

as he had been using the alias that he provided to the

authorities throughout his time in the United States. He

further claims that his false information was not “material[],” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 4(h), because

it had no effect on the outcome of any issue in the case

and did not cause any significant hindrance in the investigation or prosecution. Because his challenge concerns only the correct application of the Guidelines, our

review is de novo. United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d

645, 649 (7th Cir. 2010).

We begin with the language of the guideline. Section

3C1.1 provides:

If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant

offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive

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No. 09-3690 5

conduct related to (i) the defendant’s offense of

conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a

closely related offense, increase the offense level

by 2 levels.

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

The district court, accepting the recommendations of

the PSR, ruled that Application Note 4(h) instructed that

the enhancement applied under the circumstances. Application Note 4 provides a “non-exhaustive list of examples of the types of conduct” to which the obstruction

enhancement applies. Id., Application Note 4. Among

the other conduct listed, the note specifically references

“providing materially false information to a probation

officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation

for the court.” Id., Application Note 4(h).

Mr. Bedolla-Zavala contends that the district court

should not have applied the obstruction guideline

because, by its terms, it applies only to “willfully” obstructing conduct. Mr. Bedolla-Zavala maintains that

he had no purpose to deceive when he identified himself

as Arroyo-Arroyo because he had been living in the

United States under that alias for some time.

We see no merit in this argument. As we have held, “the

Guidelines provide that furnishing false information to

a probation officer during a presentence [or other] investigation is itself conduct which constitutes obstruction of

justice.” United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 1392, 1400 (7th

Cir. 1993). “Therefore, if the defendant willfully provided false information, then he willfully obstructed or

attempted to obstruct the administration of justice.” Id.

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Nor do we see any merit to the cursory argument Mr. Bedolla- 1

Zavala advances that it is “incredibly unjust” to hold him accountable for the misstatements since his English is non-fluent

and he was not provided with an interpreter during his

first meeting with pretrial services. Mr. Bedolla-Zavala apparently understood the questions sufficiently to provide

names and dates of birth—although they were not his own.

In United States v. Elliott, 467 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2006), the 2

offense itself included an escape, and, therefore, we noted that

deception was an inherent part of the criminal act, already

taken into account in the normal guidelines range; to consider

it again in determining whether to apply an obstruction enhancement generally would be double counting in such cases.

Id. at 691. The Guidelines themselves recognize as much. See

(continued...)

Contrary to his suggestion, the fact that Mr. BedollaZavala used the alias in his private life hardly evinces that

he was not being deceptive by employing it. It certainly

does not establish that his statements to the pretrial

services officer preparing the bail report were anything

other than willful. There is simply nothing in the record

to suggest that his provision of a false identity—including

family and immigration information—was made by

“mistake or negligence.” Cf. Thomas, 11 F.3d at 1400.

1

Mr. Bedolla-Zavala’s attempted comparison to United

States v. Elliott, 467 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2006), is unavailing.

Although we did reject the application of the obstruction enhancement in the case of a defendant who gave

an alias, we did so for reasons inapplicable to the

present case. In addition to offense-specific considerations relevant in Elliott, we noted that Application 2

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No. 09-3690 7

(...continued) 2

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 7 (noting that the enhancement shall not apply to various offenses involving deceit). The

district court in Elliott had applied the enhancement based on

the proviso that, even in escape cases, the enhancement is

appropriate where “significant further obstruction” has occurred. We held that providing an alias that law enforcement

immediately knew to be false was not within the scope of the

relevant note.

Note 5(a) instructs sentencing courts not to apply the

enhancement for “providing a false name or identification document at arrest, except where such conduct

actually resulted in a significant hindrance to the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense,” but this

note does not govern in the present case. Note 5(a) limits

the reach of the obstruction enhancement to cases in

which the investigation is significantly hindered, but

only when the conduct upon which the enhancement

is sought is the provision of false information at the time

of arrest. It does not limit the instruction of Application

Note 4(h) regarding the provision of false information

to a probation officer preparing an investigation for the

court. This distinction in the application note embodies

the Commission’s reasoned—and realistic—judgment

that a false statement to a court officer, in the preparation of a specific report to be used by the court for a

specific decision, is a far more serious matter than an

opportunistic lie made during the confrontation of an

arrest situation.

Finally, Mr. Bedolla-Zavala contends that his statement

was not “material,” and, therefore, Application Note 4(h)

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We have held that information concerning a date of birth and 3

even a date of high school graduation is “material” within the

meaning of the guideline, because such false information can

“thwart[] the probation officer from investigating the defendant’s personal and criminal history, which are major factors in

determining a defendant’s sentence.” United States v. Thomas,

11 F.3d 1392, 1400-01 (7th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Ojo,

916 F.2d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant’s

(continued...)

does not apply by its terms. Mr. Bedolla-Zavala’s argument relies on the fact that his “alias actually had no

effect” on the “case or its outcome.” Appellant’s Br. 14.

His true identity became known by the time the court

decided the bail issue.

We already have rejected this understanding of the

materiality inquiry. The application notes define “material”

in relevant part as “information that, if believed, would

tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.”

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 6 (emphasis added);

see United States v. Owolabi, 69 F.3d 156, 163 (7th Cir. 1995)

(noting that whether “the government was still able to

ascertain” the truth despite the defendant’s attempted

deception did not control whether false statements were

“material”). The relevant considerations are the kind

of information provided and its tendency to influence

the court, not the actual effect of a particular misstatement. Personal information is a highly relevant factor in

determining whether a defendant should remain in

custody or be granted bond, and thus is material not

only at sentencing, but at arraignment. Mr. Bedolla- 3

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No. 09-3690 9

(...continued) 3

false information to a pretrial services officer including “her

name, date of birth, length of residence in the United States,

current address, family history, financial status and arrest

record” supported the enhancement); United States v.

Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1259 n.11 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that

“[c]learly the identification of the defendant is a material fact,”

and upholding the enhancement although the authorities

were not foiled by the defendant’s deception).

7-2-10

Zavala’s concealment of his true identity, when coupled

with deception about his legal status in the United

States, certainly could have influenced the district court’s

decision about whether or not to detain him following

his arraignment. 

Under these circumstances, the false information

Mr. Bedolla-Zavala provided was material, and his

conduct “falls squarely within the application note.”

United States v. Ojo, 916 F.2d 388, 393 (7th Cir. 1990).

Conclusion

The district court did not err in applying the obstruction of justice enhancement of § 3C1.1 in sentencing

Mr. Bedolla-Zavala. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence

imposed by the district court.

AFFIRMED

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