Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01937/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01937-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CDCR Mental Health
Defendant
R. Coffin
Defendant
C. Cryer
Defendant
G. Ugwueze
Defendant
Rechell Williams
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RECHELL WILIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CDCR MENTAL HEALTH, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-01937-MJS

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH 

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

CLAIM 

 (ECF No. 13)

DISMISSAL COUNTS AS A STRIKE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

 CLERK TO TERMINATE ALL PENDING 

MOTIONS AND CLOSE CASE

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Rechell Williams, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 17, 

2014. (ECF No. 1.) The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and dismissed it for failure 

to state a claim but gave leave to amend. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint (ECF No. 13.) is now before the Court for screening. 

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

Case 1:14-cv-01937-MJS Document 14 Filed 04/29/15 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail “to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted,” or that “seek monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, 

or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff identifies Clinician Jane/John Doe, Chief Psychologist R. Coffin, Chief 

Psychiatrist John/Jane Doe1, Correctional Counselor I John/Jane Doe, Chief Medical 

Executive G. Ugwueze, and Chief Executive Officer C. Cryer as Defendants. Plaintiff 

alleges essentially the following:

On September 12, 2013, Plaintiff was attacked by fellow inmate Garcia. Garcia 

was designated as an “Enhance Out Patient” (“EOP”) inmate and had been on suicide 

watch. Defendants are members of the committee that determines the placement of 

mental health inmates in the prison. On the date of the attack, Defendants approved 

Garcia’s release from the EOP population to the general population despite knowing that 

he needed regular monitoring. Garcia also informed Defendants that he needed help or 

he would hurt himself or someone else. Defendants violated California Code of 

Regulations and prison policies by failing to properly diagnose, monitor, and treat inmate 

Garcia.

Upon his release to the general population, Garcia was pacing around and acting 

in an aggressive manner. Two witnesses observed Garcia and informed staff of his 

behavior. Garcia then attacked Plaintiff by attempting to throw him over the second floor 

tier to the first floor. 

 

1 Plaintiff alleges that this position was vacant during the relevant time period. As discussed 

below, Plaintiff cannot state a claim against a non-existent person.

Case 1:14-cv-01937-MJS Document 14 Filed 04/29/15 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Plaintiff seeks damages for Defendants’ failure to protect him in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method 

for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979)).

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States was 

violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Ketchum v. 

Cnty. of Alameda, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility 

that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

B. Linkage 

Under Section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each Defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 

Case 1:14-cv-01937-MJS Document 14 Filed 04/29/15 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

(9th Cir. 2002). In other words, there must be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the Defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. 

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 (1978). 

While Plaintiff alleges that Chief Psychiatrist John/Jane Doe was on the panel that 

decided to release Garcia into the general population, he states that the position was 

vacant at the time. Plaintiff cannot state a claim against a position not occupied by an 

actual person. Leave to amend is denied as futile.

C. California Code of Regulations

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated Title 15 of the CCR or 

other prison policies, he does not state a cause of action. The existence of the CCR 

does not necessarily entitle an inmate to sue civilly. The Court has found no authority to 

support a finding of an implied private right of action under Title 15, and Plaintiff has 

provided none. Several district court decisions hold that there is no such right. See e.g., 

Vasquez v. Tate, No. 1:10-cv-1876-JLT (PC), 2012 WL 6738167, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 

28, 2012); Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1211 (S.D. Cal. 2012). Because 

Plaintiff may not bring an independent claim solely for violation of prison regulations set 

out in Title 15, leave to amend such a claim is futile and is denied on that basis. 

D. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment “protects prisoners . . . from inhumane methods of 

punishment . . . [and] inhumane conditions of confinement.” Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 

F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and 

severe, prison officials must provide prisoners with adequate food, clothing, shelter, 

sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 

(1994). They also have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical 

harm by other inmates. Id. at 833.

To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison 

officials were “deliberately indifferent” to serious threats to the inmate's health or safety. 

Case 1:14-cv-01937-MJS Document 14 Filed 04/29/15 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Id. at 834. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 

F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “‘If a [prison official] should have been aware of the 

risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter 

how severe the risk.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 

1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). The prisoner must show that “the official [knew] of and 

disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety; the official must both be aware of 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and [the official] must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. Cnty. of 

Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). To prove knowledge of the risk, the prisoner 

may rely on circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk may be 

sufficient to establish knowledge. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.

Plaintiff’s factual allegations do not state an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff 

alleges that Garcia informed Defendants that he would harm himself or someone else if 

he was taken off of suicide watch and placed back into the general population. A failure 

to respond and protect Plaintiff from such a broad, generalized risk will not support a 

claim that any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk of harm to 

Plaintiff. See Hollis v. Laird, No. 1:11-cv-00748-AWI-SKO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

118289, at *43 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2014) (placement in a cell with inmate known to be 

mentally unstable insufficient to establish subjective mental state of deliberate 

indifference); See also Johnson v. Hicks, No. 1:11-cv-02162-GSA-PC, 2014 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 54239, at *12-13 (E.D. Cal. April 17, 2014) (concerns regarding placement with 

an inmate known for in-cell violence fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim). Plaintiff 

fails to allege any specific threats that Garcia made to him, that he told any Defendant

he was the target of any such threats, or that any of the named Defendants had reason 

to believe that Garcia was exhibiting aggressive behavior toward Plaintiff.

Plaintiff was advised of these deficiencies in his claim in the Court’s prior 

screening order. (ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff’s failure to cure these deficiencies is reasonably 

Case 1:14-cv-01937-MJS Document 14 Filed 04/29/15 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

construed as reflecting his inability to correct them. Further leave to amend would be 

futile and is denied.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted. Plaintiff was advised in the prior screening order of deficiencies in his claims 

and was given the opportunity to correct them. Plaintiff has failed to do so, and no 

useful purpose would be served in allowing yet another opportunity to amend.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk of Court shall send Plaintiff a copy of his First Amended 

Complaint (ECF No. 13.), filed April 6, 2015;

2. The action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim;

3. Dismissal shall count as a strike pursuant to the “three strikes” provision 

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

4. The Clerk of Court shall terminate all pending motions and CLOSE this 

case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-01937-MJS Document 14 Filed 04/29/15 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Case 1:14-cv-01937-MJS Document 14 Filed 04/29/15 Page 7 of 7