Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02651/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02651-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andres Espinoza-Torres
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Andres Espinoza-Torres,

Defendant/Movant. 

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CR 99-734-PHX-RGS

CV 04-2651-PHX-RGS

ORDER

Movant Andres Espinoza-Torres, presently confined at the United States Penitentiary

in Tucson, Arizona, filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on November 22, 2004. [Doc. # 501] The Government filed a Response

on April 5, 2005 [Doc. # 531], and Movant filed a Reply on June 6, 2005 [Doc. # 552]. On

November 16, 2005, Magistrate Judge Morton Sitver issued a Report and Recommendation

recommending that the motion be denied. [Doc. # 566] Movant filed an Objection to the

Report and Recommendation on August 14, 2006. [Doc. # 594] The Court has reviewed the

entire record, including each of Movant’s objections. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation and deny Movant’s § 2255 motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

On June 15, 2001, the Court entered judgment and sentenced Movant to life

imprisonment, plus 235 years and terms of supervised release following jury convictions for

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thirty-nine felony offenses, including conspiracy, hostage-taking, transporting and harboring

illegal aliens, interstate communications, and possession or use of a firearm during a crime

of violence. [Doc. # 353] Movant filed a direct appeal which was consolidated with those

of his co-defendants. On November 24, 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its

mandate affirming Movant’s convictions and sentences. [Doc. # 491] On November 22,

2004, Movant filed the instant motion. Movant contends that (1) trial counsel was ineffective

by failing to present the defense of duress, failing to call Movant to testify regarding a duress

defense, and failing to sever his trial from co-defendant Carlos Garcia-Mesa; (2) appellate

counsel was ineffective by failing to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United

States Supreme Court; and (3) the denial of representation by the Mexican Consulate violated

international laws and treaties. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Movant’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Movant must establish

that (1) considering all of the circumstances, his counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that Movant was prejudiced by such

representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). If a movant

fails to meet either part of the test, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be

denied. Id. at 700. A movant establishes prejudice when “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. at 694. 

To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, Movant must identify the specific acts

or omissions of counsel that he alleges do not meet the reasonable professional judgment

standard. Id. at 688-90. The Court must then determine whether the acts or omissions

alleged fall outside a wide range of professionally competent decisions given the surrounding

circumstances. Id. Movant must overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s

conduct fell within this wide range of reasonable assistance and that counsel made all

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 Luis was Movant’s nephew.

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significant decisions exercising reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 689-90. The Court

determines the reasonableness of counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error based

on all the attendant circumstances. Id. at 689. 

a. Movant’s Claims That Trial Counsel was Ineffective by Failing to

Present a Duress Defense and Not Allowing Movant to Testify as to

this Defense

Movant contends that trial counsel should have presented evidence, including his own

testimony, that he was acting under duress from Luis Soto-Espinoza, the co-conspirator who

was killed in the shootout at Pep Boys. As discussed in the Report and Recommendation,

had trial counsel presented a duress defense, including allowing Movant to testify, counsel

would have opened the door to the prosecution to delve into every aspect of Movant’s

activities in relation to the crimes. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion

that the decision not to have Movant testify was reasonable in light of the fact that Movant’s

testimony would have operated as an admission that he indeed participated in the crimes. “A

tactical decision by counsel with which the defendant disagrees cannot form the basis of a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Guam v. Santos, 741 F.2d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir.

1984). As the Magistrate Judge explained, in light of evidence that Movant was related to

Luis,1

 that the two had participated in previous criminal activities together, and that Movant

carried his own weapon, it would have been reasonable for counsel to conclude that a duress

defense was not viable. 

Furthermore, with respect to Movant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for allegedly

failing to advise Movant of his right to testify, the record supports a finding that Movant

waived his right to testify on his own behalf at trial. 

A defendant is ‘presumed to assent to his attorney’s tactical decision not to

have him testify.’ The district court has no duty to affirmatively inform

defendants of their right to testify , or to inquire whether they wish to exercise

that right. ‘[W]aiver of the right to testify may be inferred from the

defendant’s conduct and is presumed from the defendant’s failure to testify or

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notify the court of his desire to do so. A defendant who wants to reject his

attorney’s advice and take the stand may do so ‘by insisting on testifying,

speaking to the court, or discharging his lawyer.” When a defendant remains

‘silent in the face of his attorney’s decision not to call him as a witness,’ he

waives the right to testify.

United States v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations

omitted). Here, Movant’s counsel rested without presenting any witness testimony. Movant

did not protest counsel’s decision. Accordingly, Movant waived his right to testify. Id. 

Because Movant has not established that his counsel was ineffective by failing to

present a duress defense and not allowing him to testify in this regard, the Court will adopt

the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and deny these two claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. Furthermore, because a review of the motion and record

conclusively shows that Movant is not entitled to relief on this claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255,

the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Movant’s request for an

evidentiary hearing, set forth in his Reply brief, be denied.

b. Movant’s Claim That Trial Counsel Should Have Pursued Another

Severance Motion

Movant claims that trial counsel should have pursued another severance motion when

co-defendant Carlos Garcia-Mesa’s statements to police were admitted as evidence. GarciaMesa did not testify at trial, so Movant could not cross-examine him as to these statements.

The record, however, shows that co-counsel filed a severance motion in which Movant’s

counsel joined. In denying Movant’s motion to sever, the Court required the government to

redact facially incriminating language from Garcia-Mesa’s post-arrest statements to avoid

Confrontation Clause issues. Further, the Court reviewed the redacted statements for any

remaining prejudice and allowed Movant to object to the redacted version. The statements

were admitted as evidence against Garcia-Mesa as non-hearsay admissions to the extent that

the statements did not mention Movant specifically.

Movant does not explain how counsel’s failure to raise another severance motion was

prejudicial. A review of the record demonstrates that the government abided by its

agreement with defense counsel regarding the introduction of these statements as evidence.

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When the interviewing agent referred to the co-defendants in the courtroom while elaborating

on one of Garcia-Mesa’s statements, counsel made a motion to sever, which the Court

denied. 

As aptly explained in the Report and Recommendation, substantial evidence that

Movant was involved in the alleged crimes, other than Garcia-Mesa’s statements, was

presented to the jury: many of the hostages testified regarding Movant’s participation in the

conspiracy; Luis Soto-Espinoza’s father testified about Movant’s activities with his son; a

police officer testified that Movant was arrested prior to the instant offenses for weapons

possession while in the company of co-defendant El Negro; and two letters authored by

Movant while he was incarcerated prior to trial containing incriminating statements were

admitted as evidence.

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36

(2004), cited by Movant in his Reply, does not support his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. Unlike the hearsay statements in Crawford, the statements here were not introduced

as evidence against Movant but were redacted to be admissible only against Garcia-Mesa.

Furthermore, the issues of severance and Confrontation Clause violation were

addressed on appeal and denied by the Ninth Circuit. Section 2255 was not designed to

provide criminal defendants repeated opportunities to overturn their convictions on grounds

that could have been or were raised on direct appeal. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,

168 (1982). “[W]hen a matter has been decided adversely on appeal from a conviction, it

cannot be relitigated again on a 2255 motion.” United States v. Scrivner, 189 F.3d 825, 828

(9th Cir. 1999). 

The Court agrees with the conclusion of the Magistrate Judge that trial counsel was

not unreasonable for failing to raise another severance motion, and that any alleged failure

to do so did not result in prejudice to Movant. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and deny said claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. 

c. Movant’s Claim that Appellate Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance

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 The Court will disregard Movant’s attempts to add claims for the first time in his Reply brief that

appellate counsel was ineffective “for failing to communicate” and for “failing to raise independent grounds

on appeal.” 

3

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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Movant claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to file a petition for

writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court to attempt to overturn the ruling of

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.2

 In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate

Judge recommends that Movant’s claim be denied because Movant provides no basis for his

argument that the Supreme Court would have been likely to grant certiorari on the issues

presented in Movant’s appeal. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Court agrees with the

Magistrate Judge and will adopt his recommendation with respect to Movant’s claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

B. Movant’s Claim That International Laws and Treaties Were Violated by

the Arresting Officers’ Failure to Notify the Mexican Consulate of

Movant’s Detention

Movant claims that his rights were violated because his requests to consult with the

Mexican Consulate after his arrest “were ignored.” First, the record refutes this contention.

Detective Frank Chavez of the Phoenix Police Department testified that during his August

14, 1999 interview of Movant, he advised Movant orally and in writing of his right to

consular notification under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Movant signed

the consular notification form, indicating he wanted the Mexican Consul notified of his

arrest. [Trial transcript (“Tr.”) 2/20/01, pp. 4, 10-16] Detective Chavez further testified that

he notified the Mexican Consulate of Movant’s arrest. [Tr. 2/21/01, pp. 51-53] 

Next, As explained in the Report and Recommendation, even assuming that the

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations compels U.S. Courts to conclude that all police

questioning must cease when consular notification is requested, and assuming that such a

claim is cognizable on habeas corpus review, Movant fails to demonstrate that he was

harmed by any alleged lack of notification. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 665 (2005).

Movant fails to address the fact that even though he was read his “Miranda”3

 rights, he

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 The Court will not address Movant’s claims, raised for the first time in his Reply brief, that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Movant’s statements and that appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.

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nevertheless chose to make statements to the police.4

 The Magistrate Judge found Movant’s

assertion that he did not understand the interrogating officer’s dialect not credible.

Furthermore, as previously discussed, ample evidence apart from Movant’s statements

existed that Movant was part of the conspiracy. 

Finally, Movant does not claim actual innocence. He has failed to established cause

for his failure to raise this issue on direct appeal and has failed to establish actual prejudice.

This claim, therefore, is procedurally defaulted. Frady, 456 U.S. at 168. According, the

Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Movant’s claim with respect

to consular notification be denied.

The Court has considered each of the objections raised by Movant in response to the

Report and Recommendation. Movant sets forth the same arguments that he advanced in his

§ 2255 Motion and Reply. The Court finds Movant’s arguments unpersuasive. Movant

contends that an evidentiary hearing is necessary on his claim with respect to consular

notification. Because the motion and record conclusively shows that Movant is not entitled

to relief on this claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the Court will deny said request.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

[Doc. # 566]

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or

Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Doc. # 501]

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Movant’s request for an evidentiary hearing

on his claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a duress defense and not

allowing Movant to testify as to this defense, and on his claim with respect to consular

notification.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment in

accordance with this Order.

DATED this 17th day of September, 2007.

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