Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-99008/USCOURTS-ca9-14-99008-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ron Credio
Appellee
Charles L. Ryan
Appellee
Joe Clarence Smith
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOE CLARENCE SMITH,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN; RON CREDIO,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 14-99008

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-00318-PGR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Paul G. Rosenblatt, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 8, 2015

San Francisco, California

Filed May 26, 2016

Before: Richard A. Paez, Richard R. Clifton,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez

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2 SMITH V. RYAN

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Arizona

state prisoner Joseph Clarence Smith’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254

habeas corpus petition challenging his death sentence,

imposed at 2004 resentencing proceedings, for the murders of

Sandy Spencer and Neva Lee.

The panel held that Smith’s contention that the trial

court’s admission of testimonial hearsay during the

aggravation phase of resentencing proceedings violated his

Sixth Amendment confrontation rights is foreclosed by

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), which held that

the Confrontation Clause does not bar courts from

considering unconfronted statements during sentencing

proceedings.

The panel held that in light of Smith’s reliance on his

sexual sadism diagnosis and the U.S. Supreme Court’s

pronouncement that the prosecution enjoys wide latitude in

admitting rebuttal evidence, it was reasonable for the Arizona

Supreme Court to conclude that the prosecution’s

introduction of substantial evidence of Smith’s prior crimes

during the penalty-phase hearings fell within the boundaries

of due process. The panel held that introduction of this

rebuttal evidence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The

panel held that any change between Arizona’s 1970’s and

2003 capital sentencing statutes was procedural rather than

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SMITH V. RYAN 3

substantive, and that the state trial court’s rejection of Smith’s

claim that admission of the rebuttal evidence during the 2004

penalty-phase hearings violated his rights under the Ex Post

Facto Clause was therefore not contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513

(2000).

The panel held that any vagueness challenge to the

application of the Arizona (E)(2) aggravator (for a previous

conviction for a felony involving the use or threat of violence

on another person) fails because both the trial court and the

Arizona Supreme Court applied the narrowed definition of

the aggravator. The panel held that application of the (E)(2)

aggravator to the facts of Smith’s case was not contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of clearlyestablished federal law.

The panel held that the Arizona Supreme Court’s

rejection of Smith’s argument that application of the Arizona

(E)(6) aggravator (for offenses committed in an especially

heinous, cruel, or depraved manner) violates the Eighth

Amendment was not an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.

The panel held that because Smith cannot establish

prejudice from counsel’s failure to obtain brain scans, his

claim of ineffective assistance at his 2004 resentencing

proceedings is not substantial, and his procedural default on

that claim cannot be excused under Martinez v. Ryan, 132

S. Ct. 1309 (2012).

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4 SMITH V. RYAN

COUNSEL

Michael L. Burke (argued) and Kelly L. Culshaw, Assistant

Federal Public Defenders, Jon M. Sands, Federal Public

Defender, Office of the Arizona Federal Public Defender,

Phoenix, Arizona, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Jon G. Anderson (argued), Assistant Attorney General,

Thomas C. Home, Attorney General, and Jeffrey A. Zick,

Chief Counsel, Office of the Arizona Attorney General,

Phoenix, Arizona, for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

In 1977, Joseph Clarence Smith, Jr. was convicted of two

murders and sentenced to death. This is the second time we

have reviewed Smith’s habeas challenge to his death

sentence. In Smith v. Stewart, 189 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 1999),

we reversed in part and ordered that a writ of habeas corpus

issue directing the State of Arizona to resentence Smith for

the murders of Sandy Spencer and Neva Lee. Smith was

resentenced to death in 2004 for each murder. After

exhausting his remedies in state court, Smith filed a new

petition in federal court. Applying the standards of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, the district

court again denied relief. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

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SMITH V. RYAN 5

I.

A.

In 1973, Smith was convicted of rapingAlice Archibeque. 

While on probation for the Archibeque rape, Smith raped

Dorothy Fortner and killed Sandy Spencer and Neva Lee. 

Smith was convicted of the Fortner rape and in subsequent

proceedings he was convicted of murdering Spencer and Lee

and sentenced to death.

In our 1999 opinion, we summarized the facts of the

underlying murders and trial court proceedings. For context,

we repeat that summary here:

On January 1, 1976, officials of the

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department found

the nude body of Sandy Spencer in the desert

outside Phoenix. One month later in a

different desert location, police discovered the

nude body of Neva Lee. Both teenage

hitchhikers had been suffocated by having dirt

forced into their mouths, which were taped

shut. The assailant stabbed both women

multiple times, punctured them with needles,

and bound their wrists with rope.

Smith, who was on probation from a rape

conviction, became the prime suspect. Police

put him under surveillance. When that failed

to produce probable cause for an arrest, police

had a female officer pose as a hitchhiker

to lure Smith into committing false

imprisonment or battery. He eventually

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6 SMITH V. RYAN

picked up the officer, took her to his father’s

machine shop, and grabbed her by both arms. 

After a prearranged signal, police entered and

arrested him for false imprisonment.

During Smith’s imprisonment, police

questioned him about the Lee and Spencer

murders. At first, he denied his involvement. 

But months later, at his own initiation, Smith

gave investigators a bizarre account of the Lee

slaying. He told police that he was present at

the crime because a friend, John Jameson,

forced him at gunpoint to drive the victim to

the desert. Once there, Jameson ordered Lee

to have sexual intercourse with Smith in order

to frame Smith for her rape. Smith said

Jameson then decided to kill Lee. His account

conflicted with some physical evidence found

at the scene. Smith later contended that he

told police no such story.

Smith went on trial for the Lee murder

first. Throughout the trial, he maintained his

innocence, contending that other people

committed the crime and that investigators

conspired to frame him. Jameson testified at

the trial. He denied being present at the

murder, but said that a man known as

“Squirrel” bragged about killing two women

and showed Jameson pictures of the dead

women. The jury returned a general verdict

finding Smith guilty of murder.

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SMITH V. RYAN 7

Smith then went on trial for the Spencer

slaying. The following day, he pleaded guilty

to the crime shortly after Di Anne

Jameson—Smith’s girlfriend, John Jameson’s

ex-wife, and a key prosecution witness—told

the court that she had been improperly

contacted by a defense investigator and by

Smith’s mother. During the plea colloquy, the

prosecutor expressed doubts about Smith’s

emotional stability to enter a voluntary plea. 

Nonetheless, the trial court accepted the plea. 

Three weeks later, Smith unsuccessfully

sought to withdraw the plea, explaining that

he had only pleaded guilty out of concern that

his parents and Ms. Jameson would be

arrested.

Smith, 189 F.3d at 1006–07. After the sentencing hearing for

both convictions, the trial judge found three aggravating

circumstances warranting the death penalty and no mitigating

circumstances. Id. at 1007. The judge sentenced Smith to

death for each of the murder convictions.

On direct appeal in 1979, the Arizona Supreme Court

affirmed Smith’s convictions but remanded his case for

resentencing because Arizona had revised its capital

sentencing scheme to permit defendants to present additional

mitigating evidence. Id. at 1007 & n.2; see also State v.

Watson, 586 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ariz. 1978) (invalidating as

unconstitutional the capital sentencing scheme’s limit on

defendants’ right to present mitigation evidence). 

Notwithstanding the opportunity to present additional

mitigating evidence at Smith’s resentencing, Smith’s counsel

simply resubmitted the same evidence he had presented in the

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8 SMITH V. RYAN

prior proceeding. Smith, 189 F.3d at 1007. The trial judge

again found no mitigating circumstances and sentenced Smith

to death for each of the murders of Lee and Spencer. Id. at

1008. On direct appeal for the second time, the Arizona

Supreme Court affirmed Smith’s death sentences. Id.

After unsuccessfully seeking post-conviction relief in

state court, Smith filed a federal habeas petition under

28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging both his convictions and death

sentences. Id. at 1008. In 1999, we concluded that Smith’s

counsel performed deficientlyat the resentencingproceeding. 

Id. at 1014. We reversed in part and ordered the district court

to issue the writ and direct that Smith be resentenced. Id.

B.

In 2002 the Arizona legislature responded to the U.S.

Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584

(2002), by shifting from judge to jury the role of finding facts

necessary to impose the death penalty. See 2002 Ariz. Legis.

Serv. 5th Sp. Sess. Ch. 1 § 3 (West); see also State v. Glassel,

116 P.3d 1193, 1202 (Ariz. 2005). This change, coupled with

the time necessaryfor counsel to gather evidence and prepare,

delayed resentencing until 2004, when the Arizona Superior

Court held separate proceedings to sentence Smith. State v.

Smith, 159 P.3d 531, 536 (Ariz. 2007).

Like the current framework, Arizona’s capital sentencing

scheme in 2004 began with an “aggravation phase” in which

the jury determined whether the prosecution had proved

beyond a reasonable doubt any alleged statutory aggravating

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SMITH V. RYAN 9

circumstances. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703.01(C), (E) (2003).1

If the jury found at least one of the aggravating

circumstances, the proceeding moved to a “penalty phase” in

which the jury heard mitigating evidence and determined

whether to impose death. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

703.01(D), (F)–(G) (2003); see also State v. McGill, 140 P.3d

930, 946 n.9 (Ariz. 2006) (Hurwitz, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) (describing Arizona’s capital sentencing

procedure). Although the Superior Court applied the thencurrent capital sentencing framework—including broad

mitigation evidence and jury factfinding—the state sought to

prove the statutory aggravators codified in the 1977 scheme. 

Smith, 159 P.3d at 536. In two separate proceedings, first for

1 When Smith was first sentenced, Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme

was codified in Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-454 (Supp. 1973). In

2004, the procedure for imposing a death sentence was set forth in

Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-703.01 (2003). The current

procedure is codified at Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-752 (2012). 

Two changes between the 1977 and 2004 iterations, both referenced

above, are noteworthy. First, unlike the scheme in place when Smith was

indicted, the framework in place when Smith was resentenced in 2004

allowed a defendant to present any relevant mitigation evidence. 

Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-454(D), (F) (Supp. 1973), with Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 13-701.01(G) (2003). Second, whereas the 1977 statute committed

factfinding to a judge, the 2004 statute committed it to a jury. Compare

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-454(C)–(D) (Supp. 1973), with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

703.01(S) (2003).

In Arizona and elsewhere, a capital sentencing proceeding consists of

an “aggravation phase,” which is sometimes referred to as the “eligibility

phase,” and a “penalty phase,” which is sometimes referred to as the

“selection phase.” See State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 946 n.9 (Ariz. 2006)

(Hurwitz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We use

“aggravation phase” to refer to the first phase of a capital sentencing

proceeding and “penalty phase” to refer to the second.

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10 SMITH V. RYAN

Spencer and second for Lee, the juries unanimously found

three aggravating factors.

First, the juries found that Smith had been convicted of

another offense exposing him to a life sentence or the death

penalty, Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-454(E)(1)

(1977).2 To establish the (E)(1) aggravator, the prosecution

introduced Smith’s prior 1973 and 1976 convictions for

raping Archibeque and Fortner.

Second, both juries found that Smith had been previously

convicted of a felony involving “the use or threat of

violence,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-454(E)(2) (1977). To

establish the (E)(2) aggravator, the prosecution first offered

the Lee murder at the Spencer sentencing and then offered the

Spencer murder at the Lee sentencing.

Third, the juries found that the Spencer and Lee murders

were especially cruel, heinous, or depraved within the

meaning of Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-454(E)(6)

(1977). To establish the (E)(6) aggravator, the prosecution

elicited testimony regarding the women’s injuries and the

cause of death for each. The prosecution offered evidence

that both women had been asphyxiated by dirt forced into

2

In 1977, these three aggravating factors were codified in Arizona

Revised Statutes section 13-454(E). By 2004, the aggravators appeared

at Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-703(F). Currently, the aggravators

are set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-751(F). The (E)(1)

and (E)(6) aggravators were the same in each version. Between 1977 and

2004, the (E)(2) factor was changed from prior felonies involving the

threat of violence to prior felonies for a “serious offense.” Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 13-703(F)(2). For ease of reference and continuity with the relevant

Arizona Supreme Court decision and the district court order, we refer to

the aggravating factors simply as (E)(1), (E)(2), and (E)(6).

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SMITH V. RYAN 11

their airways, that before death both had been bound at the

wrists and ankles with ligatures, and that each suffered

puncture and stab wounds. As the Arizona Supreme Court

recounted, Spencer “suffered nineteen stab wounds to the

pubic region and a vaginal tear that was caused by

penetration. She also had three stab wounds to her breasts

and a sewing needle was found embedded in her left breast.” 

Lee “also had puncture and stab wounds to her chest,

abdomen, and breasts and damage to her vulva.”

As mitigation evidence, Smith offered expert testimony

demonstrating mental impairment and psychological

problems, including signs of dissociative identity disorder.3

Smith’s expert also concurred with the prosecution expert’s

diagnosis that Smith suffered from sexual sadism. Smith’s

mother and sister testified to Smith’s personal history and

several prison employees and a prison expert testified to his

good behavior in prison.

Both juries returned a death verdict and the court entered

a sentence of death by lethal injection.

On his third direct appeal, Smith raised six primary

arguments. Among those arguments, and relevant to this

federal habeas proceeding, Smith challenged the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting the (E)(2) aggravator, the

prosecution’s use of autopsy-related hearsay evidence at the

Lee sentencing in violation of the Confrontation Clause, U.S.

Const., amend. VI, § 2, and the prosecution’s use of

prejudicial rebuttal evidence. Smith also asserted twelve oneparagraph claims which he conceded were foreclosed by state

3 The parties agree that for the purposes of this appeal, the Spencer and

Lee mitigation evidence was the same.

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12 SMITH V. RYAN

law. Among those truncated claims, Smith asserted that

Arizona’s capital sentence scheme provides no objective

standards to guide the jury in the penalty phase and thus

violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The

Arizona Supreme Court rejected each of Smith’s challenges

and affirmed both death sentences. Smith, 159 P.3d 531. The

U.S. Supreme Court denied Smith’s petition for certiorari. 

Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985 (2007); 128 S. Ct. 2997

(mem.).

Two years later, in November 2009, the Arizona Supreme

Court appointed counsel for Smith’s post-conviction

proceedings. In mid-2011, Smith filed his post-conviction

relief petition in state superior court, referred to in Arizona as

a Rule 32 petition. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1.4 The postconviction court rejected each of Smith’s arguments and

dismissed his Rule 32 petition. In February 2012, the

Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment.

4 Smith raised three issues in his Rule 32 petition. First, the

prosecution’s use of autopsy-related hearsay testimony at both sentencing

proceedings violated Smith’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights in

light of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). Second,

the prosecution erroneously and prejudicially suggested that Smith bore

the burden to prove that he should not receive the death penalty. Third,

newly discovered evidence of Smith’s organic brain damage would have

affected the jury’s determination of his sentence. Smith’s appellate

counsel failed to raise the Confrontation Clause claim in the Spencer case

and failed to raise the burden of proof issue in either case. Smith argued

that counsel’s omissions were the result of ineffective assistance of

counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

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SMITH V. RYAN 13

C.

In December 2012, Smith timely filed a new § 2254

habeas petition in federal court, in which he raised thirty-nine

claims challenging his death sentences and requested an

evidentiary hearing. Among those claims, Smith raised the

following seven arguments which he has pressed on appeal:

Claim 13—The admission of autopsy-related hearsay

evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right of

confrontation;

Claim 15—The use of Smith’s conviction for murdering

Spencer to satisfy the (E)(2) aggravator in the Lee sentencing,

and vice versa, violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights;

Claims 18, 19, and 20—The sentencing judge denied

Smith his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to

representation and due process when he responded to a jury

question in the Spencer case in the absence of Smith’s

counsel, and counsel’s failure to be available during jury

deliberations and to raise that failure on appeal constituted

ineffective assistance of counsel;

Claim 23—The prosecution presented irrelevant and

unfairly prejudicial rebuttal evidence in violation of Smith’s

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment and to due process;

Claim 29—Executing Smith after thirty-five years on

death row would be cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eighth Amendment;

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14 SMITH V. RYAN

Claim 30—Arizona’s (E)(6) aggravator for especially

heinous, cruel, or depraved murders fails to narrow the class

of death-eligible offenders as required by the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments; and

Claim 39—Smith’s counsel at sentencing rendered

ineffective assistance in derogation of the Sixth Amendment

by failing to develop and present mitigating evidence.

The district court denied the petition and request for an

evidentiary hearing and it subsequently denied Smith’s

motion to alter or amend the judgment. The district court

concluded that Smith’s claims alleging Sixth Amendment

confrontation and Fourteenth Amendment due process

violations arising from admission of autopsy-related hearsay

evidence and prejudicial rebuttal evidence—Claims 13 and

23—were “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further” or “debatable by reasonable jurists,” and issued a

certificate of appealability (“COA”). See Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The district court declined to

extend the COA to any of Smith’s other claims.

Smith timely appealed. In his opening brief, Smith

addressed the two certified claims and the seven other

uncertified claims described above. We ordered the Attorney

General to respond to Smith’s uncertified claims, and we

deferred ruling on whether to grant a COA on those issues. 

See 9th Cir. Rule 22-1(e). We construe Smith’s opening brief

as a motion to expand the COA pursuant to Circuit Rule 22-

1(e), and we grant a COA on three of his uncertified

claims—his challenges to Arizona’s (E)(2) and (E)(6)

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SMITH V. RYAN 15

aggravators, Claims 15 and 30, and his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, Claim 39.5

II.

We review de novo the district court’s denial of Smith’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus and review its factual

findings for clear error. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 777

(9th Cir. 2014). Because Smith filed his federal habeas

petition after 1996, AEDPA governs. Id. We may not grant

relief “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings” unless the state court

decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). Only

Supreme Court holdings clearly establish federal law for the

purposes of § 2254(d)(1), but circuit precedent is persuasive

authority in assessing what law is “clearly established” and

whether the state court applied the law reasonably. Murray

v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 997 (9th Cir. 2014).

A state court unreasonably applies federal law when it

“correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies that

rule unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.” 

White v. Woodall, —U.S.—, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014). 

5 We decline to expand the COA to encompass Smith’s claims regarding

jury deliberations and his claim that execution after a thirty-five-year

delay constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, which are identified as

Claims 18, 19, 20, and 29. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000).

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16 SMITH V. RYAN

“It is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its

independent review of the legal question, is left with a firm

conviction that the state court was erroneous.” Andrade,

538 U.S. at 75 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the

state court’s application of Supreme Court holdings “must be

‘objectively unreasonable,’ not merely wrong; even ‘clear

error’ will not suffice.” Woodall, —U.S.—, 134 S. Ct. at

1702 (quoting Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75–76). “A state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal

habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on

the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v.

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

III.

A.

Smith contends in Claim 13 that the state trial court’s

admission of testimonial hearsay during the aggravation

phase of the resentencing proceeding in the Lee case violated

his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. Smith

argues that the sentencing court impermissibly admitted the

out-of-court statements of the medical examiner who

conducted Lee’s autopsy through the testimony of the thencurrent chief medical examiner and a detective who was

present at the autopsy. Smith asserts that the Arizona

Supreme Court’s ruling that this testimony did not violate the

Confrontation Clause unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law and unreasonablydetermined the facts

in light of the record, and that the district court erred in

concluding to the contrary.

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SMITH V. RYAN 17

The U.S. Supreme Court has never established a right to

confront witnesses at sentencing. To the contrary, Smith’s

argument is foreclosed by Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.

241 (1949), “which held that the Confrontation Clause does

not bar courts from considering unconfronted statements

during sentencing proceedings.” Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d

898, 927 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a Confrontation Clause

challenge to the use of hearsay in a capital sentencing

proceeding under pre-AEDPA standards); see also United

States v. Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196, 1197 (9th Cir. 2006);

United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir.), amended by

992 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993). We therefore conclude that

the Arizona Supreme Court did not act unreasonably in

rejecting Smith’s Sixth Amendment confrontation claim.6

B.

In Claim 23, Smith argues that the district court erred in

finding that Smith suffered no constitutional violation when

the prosecution introduced substantial evidence of Smith’s

prior crimes during both the Lee and Spencer penalty-phase

hearings. Smith contends that the admission of that evidence

6 Smith also asserts that the Arizona Supreme Court’s confrontation

analysis “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This argument need

not detain us, however, because even if we found § 2254(d)(2) satisfied,

Williams, 337 U.S. 241, and Sivak, 658 F.3d at 927, foreclose Smith’s

Confrontation Clause challenge. Cf. Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735

(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[W]e may not grant habeas relief simply

because of § 2254(d)(1) error and . . . if there is such error, we must

decide the habeas petition by considering de novo the constitutional issues

raised.”); see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1008–16 (9th Cir.

2004) (holding that state courts made unreasonable factual determination

and then proceeding to evaluate constitutional claim).

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18 SMITH V. RYAN

was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and the Ex

Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const., art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.

1.

During both penalty phases of the Spencer and Lee

resentencing proceedings, Smith offered mitigation evidence

related to his mental health, his family background and

relationships, and his good behavior in prison. Particularly

relevant to this habeas claim, Smith’s mental health expert,

Dr. Parrish, agreed with the prosecution’s mental health

expert, Dr. Moran, that Smith suffered from “sexual sadism.” 

During the Lee proceeding, Dr. Parrish explained the

meaning of sexual sadism to the jury.

7 When questioned by

defense counsel, Dr. Parrish identified Smith as a sexual

sadist and agreed that sexual sadism could have caused Smith

to lose control during the commission of his crimes. Dr.

Parrish’s testimony at the Spencer proceedings was very

similar. Smith’s counsel previewed the sexual sadism

diagnosis in his opening statement during the Spencer penalty

phase, although the focus was on Smith’s asthma and anxiety

diagnoses.

During rebuttal at both the Lee and Spencer proceedings,

the prosecution called a number of witnesses to testify about

the facts of Smith’s two prior convictions and the facts of the

 

7 Dr. Parrish explained that the “essential features of a paraphilia,” the

type of mental disorder encompassing sexual sadism, are “recurrent,

intense, sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges or behaviors, generally

involving nonhuman objects: No. 1, nonhuman objects. No. 2, the

suffering or humiliation of one’s self or one’s partner. No. 3, children or

other nonconsenting persons that occur over a period of at least six

months.”

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SMITH V. RYAN 19

Lee and Spencer murders. The quantity and intensity of

evidence was extensive and powerful.

During the Spencer penalty phase, the prosecution

questioned at length five witnesses about the details of

Smith’s crimes. Dr. Moran described how the escalation of

violence in Smith’s crimes—from the Archibeque rape to the

two murders—was typical for individuals with sexual sadism

diagnoses. Dr. Moran related how, while raping Archibeque,

Smith “us[ed] handcuffs,” “state[d] it would be necessary to

kill the victim,” “related numerous things to the victim about

bodies being found in the desert,” and more. Dr. Moran

opined that Smith’s acts became more “degrading” during the

later Fortner rape, when Smith “obtained a Pepsi bottle from

somewhere within the car, placed it in her vagina, forced her

to commit an act of fellatio, [and] also committed sodomy

upon her.” Finally, Dr. Moran explained that the “amount of

violence was increasing” during the Lee and Spencer

murders, as evidenced by “sewing needles that were

embedded in [Spencer’s] breast,” the “cutting of [Lee’s]

vagina,” and the murder victims’ death by strangulation—“by

forcing dirt down their throat [and] covering their mouth with

duct tape.” Dr. Moran then repeated the facts of the four

crimes a second time in response to further questioning by the

prosecution.

The prosecution also called two law enforcement officers. 

First, the prosecution called Detective Charles Adams, who

had investigated the Archibeque case. At the prosecution’s

prompting, Adams “basically summarize[d his] report” for

the jury. Adams explained how Smith offered Archibeque a

ride, took her to his home, and raped her in the presence of

his wife using handcuffs. Smith then drove both women to

the desert, saying it “would be necessary to kill

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20 SMITH V. RYAN

[Archibeque],” raped her again outside the car while his wife

waited, and ultimately released Archibeque on the promise

that she would bring him $200 the next day. The prosecution

then called Detective Dominguez, who described the

elaborate story Smith told to police to explain his

involvement in the Lee and Spencer murders. Dominguez

also described arriving at the scene where Lee’s body was

found. Lee was “completely nude” with “visible trauma on

the body,” including “ligature markings around the ankles

and wrists” and “trauma into the chest area.” Dominguez

also testified about attending Lee’s autopsy. He recounted

the medical examiner pointing out “stab wounds to the

vaginal area,” a “puncture wound of the right breast by the

nipple area,” “five stab wounds to the chest area,” and that

her “deep throat area, was full of dirt.”

The prosecution also elicited the facts of Smith’s prior

crimes during its cross examination of James Aiken, a

corrections expert. Aiken had testified on direct examination

that a “toothbrush with [a] razor blade attached” found in

Smith’s prison locker was likely a “defensive weapon.” 

Smith had called Aiken to testify generally about Smith’s

good conduct in prison. Ignoring the scope of Aiken’s direct

examination testimony, the prosecution related, one by one,

the facts of the Archibeque, Fortner, Spencer, and Lee crimes,

and after each description, asked whether Aiken still believed

the toothbrush was a defensive weapon.

Dorothy Fortner, the victim in Smith’s second rape

conviction, provided the most damaging evidence against

Smith’s mitigation case. Fortner recounted how Smith

convinced her to accept a ride by claiming he was friends

with her boyfriend and then took her to an “unpaved portion

of the desert.” Fortner, who was four or five months pregnant

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SMITH V. RYAN 21

at the time, described how she “asked him a hundred times to

let [her] go.” Instead, Smith ran a knife “up and down [her]

torso” and asked her if she “would like to be killed fast or

slow.” Fortner testified that Smith raped her “repeatedly”

inside and outside the car, at one point using “a Coke bottle

or Pepsi bottle.” Smith “tried to strangle” her and made her

urinate in front of his car while he watched. Fortner ended

her testimony by relating how Smith said “he was going to

cut [her] open with his knife and take [her] infant out and lay

her on the desert floor and let her die, and let [Fortner] die

next to her on the desert floor, and that he was going to watch

this.”

The jury faced a similar wave of witnesses during the Lee

penalty-phase proceedings. Dr. Moran described how

Smith’s crimes fit the description of sexual sadism and

Detective Adams gave a similar description of the

Archibeque crime. In place of Detective Dominguez’s

testimony about Lee’s murder, Detective Jessie Locksa

testified about the similarly gruesome details of Spencer’s

murder. Unlike the Spencer proceeding, however, Fortner

did not testify.

2.

a.

Smith first argues that the prosecution’s introduction of

“extensive, inflammatory evidence” violated his Fourteenth

Amendment due process right to fundamental fairness

because it was “tantamount to the prosecution offering

nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.” The Arizona

Supreme Court rejected this argument on direct appeal. 

Smith, 159 P.3d at 543. The state supreme court concluded

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22 SMITH V. RYAN

that the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence was “relevant to the

diagnosis of sexual sadism,” and that it did not “render[] his

sentencing proceedings fundamentallyunfair.” Id. at 542–43. 

Smith did not raise this due process claim during his state

post-conviction proceedings, but he renewed it in his federal

habeas petition. The district court ruled that the Arizona

Supreme Court’s “decision was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”

b.

Under the state’s death penalty scheme, the Arizona

Supreme Court had little difficulty concluding that the

prosecution’s rebuttal evidence was relevant to Smith’s

mitigation case because the evidence “assisted the jury in its

evaluation of” the expert testimony regarding Smith’s mental

health at the time of the murders. Id. at 542.8 Arizona

Revised Statutes section 13-703.01(G) provides that both the

prosecution and the defense “may present any evidence that

is relevant to the determination of whether there is mitigation

that is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Once

Smith introduced evidence of his sexual sadism diagnosis in

support of his mitigation case, the prosecution was entitled to

present evidence related to that diagnosis.

As theArizona Supreme Court noted, both parties’ mental

health experts “relied on the underlying facts of” Smith’s

prior crimes to make their diagnoses. Id. Thus, the

8 Normally, “violations of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas

review.” Rhoades v. Henry, 611 F.3d 1133, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010). When

the state law error rises to the level of a due process violation, however,

federal habeas review is available. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781

(1990).

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SMITH V. RYAN 23

prosecution was entitled to present those underlying facts to

the jury, so jurors could assess Smith’s diagnosis and its

mitigating impact, if any. Smith also argued that his sexual

sadism was at least partially responsible for his inability to

control his actions. Again, that assertion opened the door for

the prosecution to rebut Smith’s claim by offering the facts of

Smith’s crimes as evidence that he acted deliberately or

purposefully. The state court’s relevancy finding is a

question of state law, which we must accept unless rebutted

by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(e)(1); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

330 (2003). Smith has failed to meet that high burden here.

Even if evidence is relevant, however, it may still violate

the Due Process Clause if it is “so unduly prejudicial that it

renders the trial fundamentally unfair.” Payne v. Tennessee,

501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991); see also Lisenba v. California,

314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (holding that in “a criminal trial,

denial of due process” occurs when the “absence of

[fundamental] fairness fatally infected the trial”). Here, the

Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion that the prosecution’s

rebuttal evidence did not render Smith’s sentencings

fundamentally unfair was not an “unreasonable application

of[] clearlyestablished Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

In Dawson v. Delaware, the U.S. Supreme Court held that

“just as the defendant has the right to introduce any sort of

relevant mitigating evidence, the State is entitled to rebut that

evidence with proof of its own.” 503 U.S. 159, 167 (1992). 

The Court endorsed the “principle of broad rebuttal asserted

by Delaware,” although it ultimately rejected the State’s

rebuttal evidence on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 168. 

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s instruction that both the

defense and prosecution should be given wide latitude when

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24 SMITH V. RYAN

introducing evidence in the penalty phase, it was reasonable

for the Arizona Supreme Court to conclude that the

prosecution’s rebuttal evidence, while powerful, did not

render Smith’s sentencing proceedings fundamentally unfair.

The fact that the trial court imposed some limits on the

prosecution’s rebuttal evidence bolsters the reasonableness of

the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion. In response to the

defense’s argument in both proceedings that allowing

evidence about all of Smith’s eleven other adjudicated and

unadjudicated crimes would be overbroad, the trial court

limited the scope of the prosecution’s evidence to crimes for

which Smith had been either charged or convicted.9

Further, to the extent that Smith’s ultimate due process

concern is that the jury considered the prosecution’s rebuttal

evidence as evidence of non-statutory aggravators, both the

trial court and the prosecution were careful to clarify that the

rebuttal evidence could not be used for that purpose. The

judge instructed the jury as follows:

Pursuant to law, the State has presented

evidence to rebut the defendant’s mitigation

evidence. This evidence is not a new

aggravating circumstance. It is presented

solely to give you a more complete picture of

the defendant’s character, propensities or

record, and to aid you in properly weighing

whether the mitigation is sufficiently

9 Smith states that the trial court’s limiting order only applied to the Lee

proceeding. Nonetheless, it appears that during the Spencer proceeding,

the prosecution also limited the rebuttal evidence to those crimes for

which Smith had been charged or convicted.

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SMITH V. RYAN 25

substantial to call for leniency and the

imposition of a life sentence.

The prosecution made similar remarks to the jury in both

cases. The trial court’s emphasis on the limited, permissible

role of the rebuttal evidence weighs against a finding that the

sentencing hearings were rendered fundamentally unfair. See

Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 12 (1994) (holding that a

limiting instruction by the trial court precluded a finding that

improperly admitted evidence “so infected the sentencing

proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury’s imposition

of the death penalty a denial of due process”).

There is little doubt that the prosecution’s powerful

rebuttal evidence was prejudicial to Smith. Witness after

witness testified in detail about the psychological and

physical violence that Smith inflicted on his victims, painting

a picture of exceptional violence. Nonetheless, in light of

Smith’s reliance, minimal as it may have been, on his sexual

sadism diagnosis and the U.S. Supreme Court’s

pronouncement that the prosecution enjoys wide latitude in

admitting rebuttal evidence, it was reasonable for the Arizona

Supreme Court to conclude that the evidence fell within the

boundaries of due process.

3.

a.

Smith also contends that the introduction of the

prosecution’s rebuttal evidence violated the Eighth

Amendment. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily

rejected that claim, citing its decision in State v. Hampton,

140 P.3d 950 (2006). Smith, 159 P.3d at 542 n.11. Although

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26 SMITH V. RYAN

Hampton is a state court decision, it cites U.S. Supreme Court

precedent for the proposition that the “Eighth Amendment

does not . . . limit the State to urging statutory aggravating

factors at the penalty stage.” Hampton, 140 P.3d at 961 n.10. 

Smith did not assert this claim during his state postconviction proceedings, but he renewed it in his federal

habeas petition. The district court did not conduct a separate

analysis of Smith’s Eighth Amendment claim. Referring to

Smith’s due process and Eighth Amendment claims together,

the district court ruled that the Arizona Supreme Court’s

“decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.”

b.

The district court correctly rejected Smith’s Eighth

Amendment claim. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that

“statutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally

necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they

circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death

penalty.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983). The

Court proceeded to conclude, however, that “the Constitution

does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating

factors in the process of selecting, from among that class,

those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death.” 

Id. That same year, relying on Zant, the U.S. Supreme Court

held that “nothing in the Eighth Amendment . . . prohibits the

admission of [the defendant’s] criminal record” even where

the trial judge’s consideration of the “criminal record as an

aggravating circumstance was improper as a matter of state

law.” Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 956 (1983).

Barclay and Zant support the Arizona Supreme Court’s

decision to reject Smith’s Eighth Amendment claim. In this

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SMITH V. RYAN 27

case, the prosecution introduced evidence to rebut Smith’s

contention that his mental health, including his sexual sadism

diagnosis, constituted a mitigating circumstance. Although

the evidence of Smith’s prior crimes would have been

improper non-statutory aggravating evidence during the

aggravation phase of the sentencing proceedings, under

Barclay, the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit its

introduction during the penalty phase. Therefore, the Arizona

Supreme Court’s determination was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.

4.

a.

Finally, Smith claims that admission of the prosecution’s

rebuttal evidence violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto

Clause. Smith argues that the Arizona sentencing law in

place at the time he committed the Lee and Spencer murders

limited evidence during the penalty phase to “1) evidence that

is mitigating, and 2) evidence that rebuts mitigation.” He

contends that the trial court violated the Ex Post Facto Clause

by applying the capital sentencing statute in place in 2004,

Ariz. Rev. State. § 13-703.01, when Smith was resentenced,

and interpreting it to allow the introduction of a greater range

of evidence. In a minute order rejecting Smith’s Ex Post

Facto argument, the trial court determined that “it always has

been and remains the law that both the defendant and state

may present all relevant evidence, whether directly or on

rebuttal, to aid the jury in determining whether there is

mitigation sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.”

Smith did not raise an Ex Post Facto Clause claim on

direct appeal or in his state post-conviction relief petition. In

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28 SMITH V. RYAN

fact, the district court is the only post-conviction court to

address this claim. In rejecting that claim, the district court

concluded that any change to Arizona’s sentencing scheme

was procedural rather than substantive, and therefore did not

implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Smith’s ex post facto

claim is procedurally defaulted, but because the State waived

this affirmative defense, we address it on the merits. See

McDaniels v. Kirkland, 813 F.3d 770, 775 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015)

(reaching merits of claim where state waived the defense of

procedural default).

b.

As an initial matter, it is questionable whether Arizona’s

2003 sentencing statute represented a change in the law when

compared to the 1970’s sentencing statute. Arizona Revised

Statutes section 13-454(B) (1977), which was in effect when

Smith committed the Lee and Spencer murders, provided that

during sentencing, “[t]he prosecution and the defendant shall

be permitted to rebut any information received at the

[sentencing] hearing.” The sentencing statute in effect in

2004 stated:

At the penalty phase, the defendant and the

state may present any evidence that is relevant

to the determination of whether there is

mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to

call for leniency. In order for the trier of fact

to make this determination, the state may

present any evidence that demonstrates that

the defendant should not be shown leniency.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703.01 (2003). Both versions of

Arizona’s statute use broad language to describe admissible

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SMITH V. RYAN 29

rebuttal evidence: one permits “any information” and the

other “any evidence.” While one could interpret the later

statute to permit the introduction of a wider scope of rebuttal

evidence, it is also fair to read it as largely restating the same

objectives of the earlier statute. Thus, the state trial court

reasonably concluded that the “new death penalty sentencing

scheme merely clarifies and does not change the standard for

admitting rebuttal evidence,” and the district court agreed

with that conclusion.

Even if Smith is correct that the later version of the statute

broadens the range of admissible rebuttal evidence, the trial

and district courts concluded that any change to that law was

“procedural.” Legal changes must be substantive, rather than

procedural, to give rise to an Ex Post Facto Clause violation. 

Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977).

U.S. Supreme Court precedent forecloses Smith’s

argument that any alleged change in the 2003 statute was

substantive. In Carmell v. Texas, the Supreme Court

distinguished between rule changes affecting the

“admissibility of evidence” and rules affecting “whether the

properly admitted evidence is sufficient to convict the

defendant.” 529 U.S. 513, 546 (2000). In Carmell, the

defendant challenged a statutory change that eliminated the

requirement of corroborating evidence in certain rape cases,

allowing a conviction to be obtained on the basis of the

victim’s testimony alone. Id. at 544–45. That change in law

violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it did “not merely

regulate the mode in which the facts constituting guilt may be

placed before the jury, . . . but govern[ed] the sufficiency of

those facts for meeting the burden of proof.” Id. at 545

(internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). The

Supreme Court contrasted the change regarding corroboration

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30 SMITH V. RYAN

evidence with changes related to rules governing witness

competency or “what kind of evidence may be introduced at

trial.” Id. at 545, 550.

As the district court properly concluded, in the context of

Smith’s case, any change to Arizona’s capital sentencing

statute falls squarely in the “admissibility of evidence”

categoryand constitutes a procedural change in law. Whether

the prosecution may present more or different rebuttal

evidence under the statute in place in 2004 does not change

the fact that Smith had already been found death-eligible. 

Smith challenges only the evidence ruled admissible by the

trial court in the penalty phases of the Spencer and Lee

sentencing proceedings, not evidence admitted at the

aggravation phases nor at the guilt phase of his trial in the Lee

case. Given this procedural context, Smith cannot argue that

the changes to the capital sentencing statute’s text resulted in

a substantive change triggering Ex Post Facto Clause

concerns because the rebuttal evidence was not used to

“convict” him. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 546. Carmell instructs

that “[t]he issue of the admissibility of evidence is simply

different from the question whether the properly admitted

evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant.” Id.

10

 Thus,

10 Although it does not qualify as clearly established law for AEDPA

purposes, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed a very similar Ex Post

Facto Clause challenge to the 2003 Arizona death sentencing scheme as

a whole and reached the same conclusion as the district court and superior

court here. In State v. Ring, the Arizona Supreme Court held generally

that the “framework of a state’s statutory capital sentencing scheme is

procedural in nature” and specifically held that the changes the Arizona

legislature made to the “capital sentencing procedures do not resemble the

type of after-the-fact legislative evil contemplated by contemporary

understandings of the ex post facto doctrine.” 65 P.3d 915, 928 (Ariz.

2003).

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SMITH V. RYAN 31

the state trial court’s rejection of Smith’s Ex Post Facto

argument was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application

of Carmell. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1).

In sum, none of Smith’s three arguments related to the

prosecution’s rebuttal evidence warrant habeas relief.

C.

Smith next contends (in Claim 15) that the application of

the (E)(2) aggravator to his case violated the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments, because it is impermissibly vague

as interpreted by the Arizona Supreme Court.11 Under the

state criminal code in effect at the time of the 2004

resentencing proceedings, the (E)(2) aggravator applied when

the “defendant was previously convicted of a felony in the

United States involving the use or threat of violence on

another person.”12 The prosecution used the Lee murder as an

aggravating factor during the Spencer sentencing and vice

versa.

11 The state is mistaken when it suggests that Smith “abandoned” his

vagueness challenge by failing to raise it in his habeas petition. Smith

alleged in Claim 15 that the application of (E)(2) to his case violated,

among other things, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also

argued in the district court that the Arizona Supreme Court’s definition of

murder as necessarily involving violence “failed to appropriately narrow

the aggravating circumstance.” Smith did not abandon this claim.

12 The Arizona Legislature subsequently amended Arizona Revised

Statutes section 13-703(F)(2) (formerly Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-454(E)(2)),

to require that a prior conviction be for a “serious offense.” First-degree

murder is expressly identified as such an offense. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 13-703(I)(1).

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32 SMITH V. RYAN

1.

On direct appeal, Smith argued that the trial court erred in

denying a judgment of acquittal with respect to the (E)(2)

aggravator because Arizona’s first-degree murder statute,

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-452 (Supp. 1957–1978) does not

necessarily require the use or threat of force. The Arizona

Supreme Court rejected that argument, and held that under

the text of section 13-452,13

first-degree murder could not be

committed without the use of force. Smith, 159 P.3d at 537.

The state supreme court separately held that Arizona had not

violated Smith’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by

failing to “sufficiently narrow” the application of (E)(2). Id.

at 546. Smith did not challenge the (E)(2) aggravator in state

post-conviction proceedings, but he renewed that claim in his

federal habeas petition. The district court denied the claim,

finding that the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of

Arizona’s murder statute was not arbitrary and capricious. 

Before this court, Smith argues that “by failing to sufficiently

narrow the (E)(2) aggravating circumstance, the [Arizona]

supreme court rendered it unconstitutionally vague” and that

in doing so it unreasonably applied clearly established

Supreme Court law.

2.

The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that states must

carefully define their death aggravators to avoid violating the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; undefined aggravators

are subject to vagueness challenges. Lewis v. Jeffers,

13 Section 13-452 defined first-degree murder as “murder . . . perpetrated

by means of poison or lying in wait, torture or by any other kind of wilful,

deliberate or premeditated killing.” See Smith, 159 P.3d at 537.

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SMITH V. RYAN 33

497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,

427–28 (1980). Those challenges “characteristically assert

that the . . . challenged provision fails adequately to inform

juries what they must find to impose the death penalty and as

a result leaves them and appellate courts with the kind of

open-ended discretion which was held invalid in Furman v.

Georgia.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361–62

(1988). Thus, a “narrowing construction” is required to

“channel the sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective

standards.” Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 774 (quotation marks

omitted). Without narrowly defined aggravators, the

sentencer cannot make “a principled distinction between

those who deserve the death penalty and those who do not.” 

Id. at 776.

The Arizona Supreme Court has provided a narrowing

construction for the (E)(2) aggravator. It has instructed, “[i]n

order to constitute an aggravating circumstance under

[(E)(2)], the prior conviction must be for a felonywhich by its

statutory definition involves violence or the threat of violence

on another person.” State v. Gillies, 662 P.2d 1007, 1018

(Ariz. 1983) (emphasis added); see also State v. Fierro,

804 P.2d 72, 82 (Ariz. 1990). In other words, the specific

facts of the defendant’s crime are irrelevant for triggering the

(E)(2) aggravator. Gillies, 662 P.2d at 1018. In Gilles, the

Arizona Supreme Court explained that its construction of the

(E)(2) aggravator “guarantees due process to a criminal

defendant.” Id. It remarked that “[e]vidence of a prior

conviction is reliable, the defendant having had his trial and

exercised his full panoply of rights which accompany his

conviction.” Id. Thus, focusing on the definition of the crime

of conviction and the conviction itself prevents “a second trial

on [the] defendant’s prior conviction to establish” the (E)(2)

aggravating circumstance. Id.

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In addition to focusing on “the statutory definition of the

prior crime, and not its specific factual basis,” the Arizona

Supreme Court has further narrowed the (E)(2) aggravator by

defining “violence” as the “exertion of any physical force so

as to injure or abuse.” State v. Henry, 863 P.2d 861, 879

(Ariz. 1993) (quoting State v. Arnett, 579 P.2d 542, 555

(Ariz. 1978)). The state supreme court additionally explained

that the physical force exerted must be “employed or

threatened with the intent to injure or abuse” for the (E)(2)

aggravator to apply. Fierro, 804 P.2d at 82.

Through this case law, Arizona has offered a narrowed

construction of the (E)(2) aggravator. The U.S. Supreme

Court, however, has yet to analyze any “prior crime of

violence” aggravator. This means there is no clearly

established federal law explaining how a state must narrow an

aggravator like (E)(2) in order to sufficiently “channel the

sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective standards.” 

Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 774. Without any guidance from the

Supreme Court, we cannot say that Arizona’s construction of

(E)(2) is unreasonable.

Even when a state properly adopts a narrowing

construction of an aggravator, a defendant may still have a

colorable vagueness claim if the state court fails to actually

apply the narrowing construction. For example, in Godfrey

v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that, although the

Georgia high court had properly created three factors to

consider when applying its “(b)(7)” aggravator,

14

the state

14 Georgia’s (b)(7) aggravator applied when an offense was

“outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved

torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.” Ga.

Code § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978).

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SMITH V. RYAN 35

supreme court had failed to assess those factors in Godfrey’s

case. 446 U.S. at 431–32. Thus, it is not enough to adopt a

narrowing construction; a state court also must use that

narrowed definition, or it risks violating the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments.

Here, any (E)(2) vagueness challenge fails because both

the trial court and Arizona Supreme Court applied the

narrowed definition of the (E)(2) aggravator to Smith’s case. 

After the close of evidence during the aggravation phase in

the Spencer proceeding but before the jury commenced

deliberations, the trial court rejected Smith’s motion for

acquittal on the (E)(2) aggravator, noting that by providing

the jury with the definition of first-degree murder and the

guilty verdict in the Lee case, the court had “sufficiently

narrow[ed]” the jury’s discretion.15It is clear that the trial

court properly instructed the jury using the narrowed

definition of the (E)(2) aggravator. Similarly, the Arizona

Supreme Court held that a “prior felonyconviction qualifie[s]

as an aggravator under [(E)(2)] only if the elements of the

offense—without regard to the underlying facts of the

 

15 The trial court instructed the jury as follows:

First, you must decide whether the defendant has been

convicted of the first-degree murder of Neva Lee.

Second, you must decide whether that first-degree

murder conviction was a felony that necessarily

involved the use or threat of violence on another

person.

The jury returned a verdict of “proven.” The trial court gave a similar

instruction in the Lee sentencing proceeding, except that “Neva Lee” was

changed to “Sandy Spencer” and a sentencing order was provided to the

jury to show Smith’s conviction for killing Spencer, rather than a guilty

verdict.

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36 SMITH V. RYAN

crime—required the use or threat of violence on another

person.” Smith, 159 P.3d at 537. In evaluating Smith’s case,

the Arizona Supreme Court described the (E)(2) inquiry as

“whether first-degree murder necessarily require[s] the use or

threat of violence.” Id. That the Arizona courts recognized

and applied the narrowed definition of (E)(2) forecloses

Smith’s constitutional vagueness claim.

Nor did Arizona Supreme Court act contrary to clearly

established federal law in its application of the narrowed

(E)(2) aggravator to the facts of Smith’s case. See Jeffers,

497 U.S. at 780 (explaining that even if a court utilizes a

constitutionally narrowed aggravator, it may still violate the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments if it “misapplie[s] its

own aggravating circumstance to the facts of [the] case”). At

the close of the aggravation phase in both cases, the jury was

instructed on Arizona’s statutory definition of first-degree

murder and provided with a copy of the Lee and Spencer

indictments, the Lee guilty verdict (for the Spencer jury), and

the Spencer sentencing order (for the Lee jury). The judge

instructed the jury in each case to ignore the “specific facts”

of Smith’s offenses and examine only the statute and verdicts. 

Using those sources, the jury considered whether Smith had

been convicted of a crime that necessarily involved violence

and concluded that he had. On direct review, the Arizona

Supreme Court agreed that first-degree murder is a crime that

necessarily involves violence, concluding that the jury’s

determination was correct as a matter of law. Smith, 159 P.3d

at 537.

The standard under which a habeas court reviews an asapplied challenge is very deferential. In Jeffers, the U.S.

Supreme Court held that “federal habeas review of a state

court’s application of a constitutionally narrowed aggravating

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SMITH V. RYAN 37

circumstance is limited, at most, to determining whether the

state court’s finding was so arbitrary or capricious as to

constitute an independent due process or Eighth Amendment

violation.” 497 U.S. at 780. The Supreme Court further held

that the appropriate standard of review for a vagueness

inquiry is the “rational factfinder” standard, which asks

whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact” could

have found the aggravating circumstance. Id. at 781.

TheArizonaSupremeCourt’s determination that applying

the (E)(2) aggravator to Smith’s case was not arbitrary or

capricious was not an unreasonable application of Jeffers. 

Citing a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, the Arizona Supreme Court held that “even

surreptitious poisoning involves the use of force” because a

defendant “who uses poison to kill another person

‘intentionally avails herself of the physical force exerted by

poison on a human body.’” Smith, 159 P.3d at 537 (quoting

Vargas-Sarmiento v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 448 F.3d 159,

174–75 (2d. Cir. 2006)). In a footnote, the state supreme

court also remarked that it previously upheld the use of firstdegree murder as an (E)(2) aggravator in a capital case. Id.

at 537 n.5; see State v. Gretzler, 659 P.2d 1, 16 (Ariz. 1983)

(holding that the “trial court correctly found” the (E)(2)

aggravator “based on the defendant’s nine prior convictions

for first degree murder”). In light of the state supreme court’s

reliance on this precedent, its decision cannot be described as

arbitrary and capricious.

Nor does the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision to allow

any first-degree murder to serve as an (E)(2) aggravator lead

to “standardless sentencing discretion” in contravention of

clearly established Supreme Court law as Smith claims. It is

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38 SMITH V. RYAN

true that the U.S. Supreme Court has required constitutionally

narrowed aggravators so that “capital punishment [cannot] be

imposed in any murder case.” Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 422–23. 

For example, in Godfrey a plurality of the Court rejected

Georgia’s “wantonly vile” aggravator, because a “person of

ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every

murder as ‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and

inhuman.’” Id. at 428–29. But (E)(2) is different because,

unlike the aggravator in Godfrey, it looks not to the crime for

which the defendant is being sentenced but to his past

offenses. There is nothing to suggest that the Supreme

Court’s warning not to make every murder eligible for the

death penalty would extend to every murderer who has

already committed murder in the past.

Because the application of the (E)(2) aggravator was in no

way contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law, we affirm the district court’s denial

of Smith’s challenge to the (E)(2) aggravator.

D.

In Claim 30, Smith similarly argues that the (E)(6)

aggravator for offenses committed in an especially heinous,

cruel, or depraved manner violates the Eighth Amendment,

and that the Arizona Supreme Court’s rejection of this

argument was an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.

1.

Prior to the resentencing proceedings, Smith moved to

dismiss the (E)(6) aggravator as unconstitutionally vague. 

Smith argued that the (E)(6) aggravator “provides no

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SMITH V. RYAN 39

meaningful guidance for identifying the most blameworthy

killings, and offers no protection from an arbitrary and

capricious application of the death penalty.” The trial court

denied Smith’s motion. The court briefly discussed the U.S.

Supreme Court’s decision in Maynard v. Cartwright,

486 U.S. 356 (1988), and cited to three U.S. Supreme Court

decisions upholding Arizona’s (E)(6) aggravator: Walton v.

Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled on other grounds by

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Lewis v. Jeffers,

497 U.S. 764 (1990); and Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40

(1992). The trial court concluded that “by giving detailed and

clear jury instructions concerning the definition and

application of the ([E])(6) aggravating factors, the jury will

be carefully focused and limited in its fact finding and

deliberative duties as to each factor so as to prevent any

arbitrary and capricious aggravation and sentencing findings

and decisions from being made.”

At the Spencer and Lee resentencings, the court instructed

the juries on the (E)(6) aggravator, and both juries found that

each of the three factors supporting the (E)(6) aggravator had

been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.16

16 At the Spencer resentencing, the trial judge instructed the jury as

follows:

Next aggravating circumstance alleged is the

especially cruel, heinous or depraved.

Concerning this aggravating circumstance, all first

degree murders are to some extent heinous, cruel or

depraved. However, this aggravating circumstance

cannot be found to exist unless the murder is especially

heinous, cruel or depraved, that is, where the

circumstances of the murder raise it above the norm of

other first degree murders.

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40 SMITH V. RYAN

The terms “cruel, heinous,” or “depraved” are to be

considered in the disjunctive; therefore, proof of any

one of these factors is sufficient to establish this

aggravating circumstance.

Cruelty involves the infliction of physical pain

and/or mental anguish on the victim before death. A

crime is committed in an especially cruel manner when

a defendant either knew or should have known that the

manner in which the crime was committed would cause

the victim to experience physical pain and/or mental

anguish before death. The victimmust be conscious for

at least some portion of the time when pain and/or

anguish was inflicted.

Terms heinous or depraved, the term“heinous” and

“depraved” focus on a defendant’s state of mind at the

time of the offense, as reflected by his words and acts.

A murder is especially heinous if it is hatefully or

shockingly evil; grossly bad. A murder is especially

depraved if it is marked by debasement, corruption,

perversion or deterioration. In order to find

heinousness or depravity, you must find that the

defendant had such a mental state as exhibited by

engaging in at least one of the following actions:

First, infliction of gratuitous violence on the

victim;

Second, needless mutilation of the victim’s body

after death.

In this context, “gratuitous violence” refers to

violence committed upon the victim beyond that

necessary to kill. In this context, “needless mutilation”

means that the defendant, in an act separate from the

killing itself, committed other acts with the intent to

mutilate the victim’s corpse.

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SMITH V. RYAN 41

The Arizona Supreme Court has interpreted Arizona’s

capital sentencing statute to provide that proving of any of the

three factors is sufficient to trigger the (E)(6) aggravator. See

State v. Cromwell, 119 P.3d 448, 456 (Ariz. 2005) (“As in

prior decisions, we note once again that the [(E)](6)

aggravator is stated in the disjunctive, indicating that

evidence of any one of the statutory prongs, ‘heinous,’

‘cruel,’ or ‘depraved’ will support a finding that the (F)(6)

To assist you in determining whether or not murder

is heinous or depraved, you may consider whether:

The murder was senseless; or

Second. Helplessness of the victim.

All murders are senseless because of the brutality

and finality. Yet not all are senseless as the term is

used to distinguish those first degree murders that

warrant a death sentence from those that do not. 

Rather, than senseless murder is one that is unnecessary

to achieve a defendant’s criminal purpose.

“Helplessness” is proven when the victimis unable

to resist.

Neither senselessness nor helplessness, standing

alone, are sufficient to prove that this murder was

heinous or depraved.

As previously stated, the terms especially cruel,

heinous or depraved are considered separately;

therefore, the presence of any one of these factors, or

combination of factors, is sufficient to establish the

aggravating circumstance.

The trial judge delivered a nearly identical instruction at Lee’s

resentencing.

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42 SMITH V. RYAN

aggravator is present.”). On direct review, the Arizona

Supreme Court independentlydetermined thatthe prosecution

proved the (E)(6) aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt,

concluding that “overwhelming evidence established that the

murders of Spencer and Lee were especially cruel.” Smith,

159 P.3d at 544.17

The state supreme court agreed with the trial court’s

definition of cruelty in its jury instructions, explaining, “The

‘cruelty’ prong of the (E)(6) aggravator focuses on the

victim’s mental anguish and physical suffering. A finding of

crueltyrequires proof that the victim consciously experienced

physical or mental pain prior to death, and the defendant

knew or should have known that suffering would occur.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). The Arizona Supreme Court

noted that both victims were bound and had their mouths

taped shut, which would have been unnecessary if they were

unconscious. Id. That court also observed that both victims

had their noses and mouths filled with dirt and died of

asphyxiation. Id. Because such treatment would cause

mental anguish and physical pain, and because “[a]t a

minimum, Smith should have known pain and anguish would

occur,” the Arizona Supreme Court independentlydetermined

that the prosecution had proved cruelty. Id. at 544–45. And

because proof of any of the three factors was sufficient, the

state supreme court did not consider the juries’ separate

findings of heinousness and depravity. Smith, 159 P.3d at

546.

17 At the time of the murders, state law required that the Arizona

Supreme Court “independently review[] the aggravation and mitigation

evidence to determine whether the death sentence was appropriate.” 

Smith, 159 P.3d at 544 n. 15 (citing State v. Richmond, 560 P.2d 41, 51

(Ariz. 1976)).

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SMITH V. RYAN 43

Smith challenged the (E)(6) aggravator in the district

court, arguing that it failed to narrow the class of deatheligible defendants. In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s

opinions in Walton, 497 U.S. at 652–56, and Jeffers, 497 U.S.

at 774–77, the district court denied habeas relief.

2.

a.

In Walton, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a vagueness

challenge to Arizona’s (E)(6) aggravator. 497 U.S. at

652–57. Like Smith, Walton argued that the “especially

heinous, cruel, or depraved aggravating circumstance as

interpreted by the Arizona courts fails to channel the

sentencer’s discretion as required by the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 652.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the aggravator

was facially vague as written. Id. at 654. Nonetheless, it

rejected the challenge and upheld the (E)(6) aggravator,

holding that the Arizona Supreme Court’s narrowing

construction satisfied constitutional requirements. Id. at 654. 

The U.S. Supreme Court distinguished its prior holdings in

Cartwright, in which it reversed a death sentence based on

Oklahoma’s similar “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”

aggravator, and in Godfrey, in which it reversed a death

sentence based on Georgia’s “outrageously or wanton or vile,

horrible or inhuman” aggravator. Unlike Walton, in both

Cartwright and Godfrey “the defendant[s] [were] sentenced

by a jury and the jury either was instructed only in the bare

terms of the relevant statute or in terms nearly as vague. 

Neither jury was given a constitutional limiting definition of

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44 SMITH V. RYAN

the challenged aggravating factor.” Walton, 497 U.S. at 653

(citations omitted).

In Walton, by contrast, the Arizona Supreme Court

explained that “‘a crime is committed in an especially cruel

manner when the perpetrator inflicts mental anguish or

physical abuse before the victim’s death,’ and that [m]ental

anguish includes a victim’s uncertainty as to his ultimate

fate.” Id. at 654 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.

Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1032 (Ariz. 1989). The U.S.

Supreme Court held that Arizona’s narrowing instruction

gave “meaningful guidance to the sentencer” and therefore

was constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 655. The Court also

said it would not “fault the state court’s statement that a crime

is committed in an especially ‘depraved’ manner when the

perpetrator ‘relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or

perversion,’ or ‘shows an indifference to the suffering of the

victim and evidences a sense of pleasure’ in the killing.” Id.

(quoting Walton, 769 P.2d at 1033).

In another opinion decided the same day, the Supreme

Court also reversed our holding that Arizona’s construction

of the (E)(6) aggravator contravened Cartwright and Godfrey. 

Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 774. Again, the Court distinguished both

cases. In Jeffers, the Arizona Supreme Court had applied a

narrowing construction with respect to the terms “heinous”

and “depraved,” looking to the “infliction of gratuitous

violence on the victim” and “the apparent relish with which

the defendant commit[ted] the murder.” Id. at 770. Those

narrowing constructions sufficiently channeled the

sentencer’s discretion. Id. at 776–77. The Court repeated its

prior holding, concluding that Walton “squarely foreclose[d]

any argument that Arizona’s subsection ([E])(6) aggravating

circumstances, as construed by the Arizona Supreme Court,

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SMITH V. RYAN 45

fails to channel the sentencer’s discretion by clear and

objective standards that provide specific and detailed

guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for

imposing a sentence of death.” Id. at 777–78 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court took up another

challenge involving Arizona’s (E)(6) aggravator. Richmond,

506 U.S. at 46. The Arizona Supreme Court had not crafted

the (E)(6) aggravator’s narrowing construction before the

defendant was sentenced, and thus the sentencing judge could

not have relied on the aggravator without violating the

defendant’s constitutional rights. Id. at 47.18 Nonetheless, as

in Walton and Jeffers, the U.S. Supreme Court again

approved of the narrowing construction adopted after the

defendant had been sentenced, id. at 48, as set forth by the

Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Gretzler, 659 P.2d at

10–11 (Ariz. 1983):

[T]he statutory concepts of heinous and

depraved involve a killer’s vile state of mind

at the time of the murder, as evidenced by the

killer’s actions. Our cases have suggested

specific factors which lead to a finding of

heinousness or depravity[:]

. . . .

[One such factor]is the infliction of gratuitous

violence on the victim.

18 The Court ultimately granted habeas relief because the Arizona

Supreme Court’s independent review had not cured the deficient

instruction. Richmond, 506 U.S. at 51–52.

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46 SMITH V. RYAN

. . . .

[Another] is the needless mutilation of the

victim.

Richmond, 506 U.S. at 50–51.

b.

Comparing the (E)(6) instruction given in Smith’s case

with the formulations approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in

Walton, Jeffers, and Richmond demonstrates that the Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Smith’s claim was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

Smith’s sentencing juries received instructions on cruelty

similar to those approved in Walton, requiring a finding that

the defendant knew or should have known that his actions

would cause physical pain or mental anguish before death and

that the victim was conscious to experience that pain or

anguish. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 654.

Similarly, Smith’s sentencing juries were instructed that

heinousness required a “hatefully or shockingly evil” murder,

that depravity was “marked by debasement, corruption,

perversion or deterioration,” and that finding either

heinousness or depravity required proof that the killing

involved the “infliction of gratuitous violence” or “needless

mutilation of the victim’s body after death.” See Richmond,

506 U.S. at 50–51; Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 770. Indeed, to

further guide the juries, the state trial court defined

“gratuitous violence” as “violence committed upon the victim

beyond that necessary to kill” and “needless mutilation” as

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SMITH V. RYAN 47

mutilation of the victim’s corpse “in an act separate from the

killing itself.”19

c.

In an effort to avoid the U.S. Supreme Court decisions

approving Arizona’s narrowing construction, Smith argues

that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), “implicitly

overruled” Walton on this point because it held that jurors

rather than judges must find aggravating factors, thereby

abrogating Walton’s contrary determination. Smith argues

that the U.S. Supreme Court “reluctant[ly]” accepted

Arizona’s narrowing construction in Walton only because

when Walton was decided, judges rather than juries found the

19 Smith challenges the “needless mutilation” instruction because it

failed to define “mutilation,” in contrast to the Nevada instruction that we

approved in Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1162 & n.1 (9th Cir.

1989) (approving the “mutilation” instruction given to the jury regarding

Nevada’s “torture, depravity, mutilation” aggravator), judgment vacated

sub nom. Angelone v. Deutscher, 500 U.S. 901 (1991). Deutscher’s

approval of Nevada’s mutilation instruction, however, does not render

Smith’s mutilation instruction an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.

In Deutscher, 884 F.2d at 1162–63, and then in Valerio v. Crawford,

306 F.3d 742, 755–56 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), we held Nevada’s

depravity instructions unconstitutionally vague and compared them to the

impermissible aggravators in Godfrey and Cartwright. Unlike the

instructions in Smith’s case, however, Nevada’s improper depravity

instruction did not require the jury to find any particular fact or look to any

identified factors. See Deutscher, 884 F.2d at 1162 n.1 (“[D]epravity of

mind is characterized by an inherent deficiency of moral sense and

rectitude. It consists of evil, corrupt and perverted intent which is devoid

of regard for human dignity and which is indifferent to human life. It is

a state of mind outrageously, wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.”);

Valerio, 306 F.3d at 752 (same).

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48 SMITH V. RYAN

(E)(6) factors or (E)(6) aggravator. According to Smith,

“[t]he change in Arizona’s law, from judge to jury

sentencing, renders Arizona’s heinous, cruel, or depraved

aggravating circumstances unconstitutional.”

Smith’s argument does not support granting habeas relief. 

Smith argues that Ring undermines the constitutionality of

Arizona’s (E)(6) aggravator jury instructions—as approved

by the U.S. Supreme Court in Walton, Jeffers, and

Richmond—despite the Court’s silence in Ring on the effect

of its holding on those prior cases.20 But “[s]ection

2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which a state

court unreasonably applies [Supreme Court] precedent; it

does not require state courts to extend that precedent or

license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error.” 

White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706. As the Court has explained, “if a

habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the

facts at hand, then by definition the rationale was not clearly

established at the time of the state-court decision.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has not

“squarely established” that the instruction approved of in its

prior decisions is insufficient when put to a jury. Id. 

Irrespective of whether invalidation of the jury instructions in

Walton, Jeffers, and Richmond is “the logical next step” after

Ring, the Court “ha[s] not yet taken that step, and there are

reasonable arguments on both sides—which is all [Arizona]

needs to prevail in this AEDPA case.” Id. at 1707.

20 In Ring, the Supreme Court had no reason to evaluate the (E)(6)

aggravator because on direct review the state supreme court had found

insufficient evidence to support its application, relying instead on a

different aggravator. 536 U.S. at 596.

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SMITH V. RYAN 49

In light of the Court’s decisions in Godfrey, Cartwright,

Walton, Jeffers, Richmond, and Ring, neither the state trial

court’s decision to give the (E)(6) narrowing instruction, nor

the Arizona Supreme Court’s (E)(6) analysis, was “so lacking

in justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Harringon, 562 U.S. at 103.

E.

Finally, in Claim 39 Smith argues that the district court

erred in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

at his 2004 resentencing proceedings. Specifically, Smith

points to a positron emission tomography (“PET”) scan and

diffusion tensor imaging (“DTI”) study that revealed

evidence of organic brain damage. Smith argues that his

counsel’s failure to obtain and present those scans at his

resentencings constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

1.

In Smith’s Rule 32 petition, he alleged that the PET scan

constituted newly discovered evidence that entitled him to

post-conviction relief. The petition did not allege ineffective

assistance of counsel. The superior court denied Smith’s

petition, ruling that the PET scan could have been obtained or

“discovered” prior to his resentencing, and that the scan was

cumulative of Dr. Parrish’s testimony. The Arizona Supreme

Court denied review.

In the district court, Smith argued for the first time that

his counsel’s failure to obtain the PET scan and DTI study

constituted ineffective assistance. The district court denied

relief on this claim on several grounds. The court found that

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50 SMITH V. RYAN

Smith’s sentencing counsel had not been ineffective, noting

that Smith had been examined by ten doctors and

psychiatrists prior to the resentencing proceedings, none of

whom had found any organic brain damage. The district

court also found that Dr. Parrish’s testimony, along with

testimony about Smith’s difficult childhood and history of

asthma, sufficiently addressed the concerns expressed by our

1999 opinion, see Smith, 189 F.3d 1004, and that the strength

of the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence foreclosed a finding of

prejudice. The district court further concluded that Smith had

procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim by failing to raise it before the Arizona state courts.

2.

Smith failed to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim in his state post-conviction proceedings, as required by

Arizona law. Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1319 (9th Cir.

2014). Thus, we agree with the district court that Smith’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally

defaulted.

Smith argues that his default is excused under Martinez

v. Ryan, —U.S.—, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316–17 (2012). We

have held that

[t]o establish ‘cause’ to overcome procedural

default under Martinez, a petitioner must

show: (1) the underlying ineffective assistance

of trial counsel claim is ‘substantial’; (2) the

petitioner was not represented or had

ineffective counsel during the PCR

proceeding; (3) the [Rule 32] proceeding was

the initial review proceeding; and (4) state law

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SMITH V. RYAN 51

required (or forced as a practical matter) the

petitioner to bring the claim in the initial

review collateral proceeding.

Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1319 (citing Trevino v. Thaler,

—U.S.—, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013)). Smith satisfies the

third and fourth prongs of the Dickens test because Arizona

law does not permit defendants to raise ineffective assistance

claims on direct appeal, and Smith failed to allege such a

claim in his Rule 32 petition. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at

1316–17; Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1319. The first prong of the

test, however, requires that the underlying ineffective

assistance of counsel claim be “substantial.” Under that

standard, an underlying claim is “insubstantial” if it “does not

have any merit or . . . is wholly without factual support.” 

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319. Thus, to assess whether Smith

has satisfied the first prong required to excuse his procedural

default under Dickens, we conduct a preliminary assessment

of his underlying claim.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Smith must

demonstrate (1) that counsel was ineffective and (2) that

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). To satisfy the

second prong, Smith “must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694.

Here, even if counsel’s failure to obtain the brain scans

constituted deficient performance, Smith cannot establish

prejudice. In a capital case, “the question is whether there is

a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer

. . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and

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52 SMITH V. RYAN

mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. at 695. 

The prosecution’s evidence in both the Spencer and Lee

sentencing hearings was extensive. The jurors were

presented with evidence of Smith’s prior rapes, including the

brutal rape of Dorothy Fortner while she was pregnant. They

also heard, in graphic detail, how Smith tortured and

suffocated Spencer and Lee. Moreover, the brain scans that

Smith obtained in the Rule 32 proceedings were largely

cumulative of the mitigating evidence presented by Dr.

Parrish. Dr. Parrish conducted a battery of

neuropsychological tests on Smith, and she testified that he

suffered mild to moderate brain impairment and that his

results fell in the “brain damaged range.” Given the strength

of the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence and the cumulative

nature of the brain scans, Smith cannot establish that any

deficient performance by counsel affected the sentences

imposed. Because Smith cannot establish prejudice, we need

not consider whether the performance of Smith’s sentencing

counsel fell below a reasonable standard of professional

competence.

Smith’s underlying claim is not substantial, therefore

Smith’s procedural default cannot be excused under Martinez. 

132 S. Ct. at 1317. We thus conclude that Smith’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted.

IV.

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

denial of Smith’s petition.

AFFIRMED.

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