Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01023/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roman Marczak
Appellee
Donald H. Russell
Appellant

Document Text:

FIL~D 

u~ ~ ewrt« A~ T~ u,:,evrit • 

PUBLISH 

rJUL 2 3 1992 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

ROMAN MARCZAK and RYSZARD 

KOWALCZYK, 

Petitioners-Appellees, 

v. 

JOSEPH R. GREENE, District 

Director of U.S. Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, 

Respondent--Appellant. 

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Nos. 90-1023 

90-1024 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D. Ct. Nos. 89-Z-1794 and 89-Z-1768) 

Emily E. Radford, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Stuart M. 

Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; and Lauri 

Steven Filppu, Deputy Director, Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C., James W. Winchester, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Denver, Colorado, with her on the briefs), for RespondentAppellant. 

Daniel M. Kowalski of Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee 

Marczak. 

Thomas R. Orr of Holland & Hart, Colorado Springs, Colorado 

(Timothy c.· Kingston and Daniel w. Patterson of Holland & Hart, 

Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief), for Petitioner-Appellee 

Kowalczyk. 

Before SEYMOUR, HOLLOWAY, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-1023 Document: 010110270468 Date Filed: 07/23/1992 Page: 1
Donald H. Russell, District Director of the United States 

Immigration and Naturalization Service, appeals the district 

court's order granting Roman Marczak's and Ryszard Kowalczyk's 

(petitioners) petitions for writ of habeas corpus and ordering 

that they be paroled pending final disposition of the exclusion 

proceedings. We reverse. 

I . 

On August 15, 1989, a Danish air charter landed in Anchorage, 

Alaska, carrying a number of Polish seaman who were en route from 

Poland to a fishing vessel owned and operated by the Polish 

national government. Sometime before arriving in the United 

States, several of the crewmembers decided to seek asylum in this 

country, and they reported to INS officials in Anchorage to 

request entry. Among the nine sailors who appeared before 

immigration officials at that time were appellees Kowalczyk and 

Marczak. 1 

When he filed this appeal, Mr. Kowalczyk was thirty-two years 

old, with a wife and two children still in Poland. Mr. Marczak, 

who was twenty-five years old and unmarried when he arrived, has 

since married an American woman. Both men are members of Fighting 

1 We granted the motion of a third appellee, Jacek Kisielewski, 

to dismiss his case when he received asylum in Canada. Order, 

April 20, 1992. 

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Solidarity, a radical political opposition group that resists any 

cooperation with the former communists in Poland, and that is 

distinct from the now legal Solidarity Party. They claim that as 

a result of their political activities, they have been repeatedly 

jailed, beaten, and interrogated, and that their own and their 

families' safety is in continuing jeopardy in Poland. 

Consolidated Answer Brief at 6 n.5; Rec., vol. I, doc. 15 at ex. 

L. If they were to return to Poland, they claim, they would be 

subject to similar levels of persecution and physical abuse. 

Mr. Kowalczyk and Mr. Marczak were not the first of the nine 

sailors to speak to immigration officials when they arrived in 

Anchorage. Four others presented travel documents for inspection 

and were formally "admitted" into the United States. Once 

admitted, they were immediately invested with the constitutional 

and legal rights attaching to those who have already "entered" the 

country. Accordingly, when the admitted sailors requested asylum, 

they were detained and placed in deportation proceedings pursuant 

to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1988). 2 

The immigration authorities apparently guessed that the next 

five men would also request asylum, and they refused to stamp 

their travel documents. Thus, although Mr. Kowalczyk and Mr. 

2 The merits of these cases were in part decided in Kapcia v. 

INS, 944 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1991). 

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Marczak had obtained in Poland valid C-1 "in-transit" visas 

permitting them to travel "in immediate and continuous transit 

through the United States" for the purpose of boarding their 

ships, id. at§ 1101(a)(l5)(C), they were detained along with the 

remaining three men, and placed in exclusion proceedings pursuant 

to 8 u.s.c. §§ 1225-1226. 3 All nine were taken to Wackenhut 

detention center in Aurora, Colorado. 

Through retained counsel (presumably paid for by the local 

Polish community), petitioners subsequently requested parole 

pending the determination of their immigration status. See 8 

U.S.C. S 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. S 212.5. The district director, 

Donald Russell, denied parole in both cases. In a letter dated 

3 An alien excluded from the United States, unlike one who has 

been admitted, possesses extremely limited constitutional rights, 

and the procedures for exclusion and expulsion are correspondingly 

less thorough than those for deportation. See Landon v. 

Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-27 (1982). "Once an alien gains 

admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go 

with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes 

accordingly." Id. at 32. When the aliens are detained 

immediately upon arrival, any such distinction between admitted 

and excluded aliens is wholly fictional. This irony, however, is 

irrelevant to the statutory distinction. See Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 

766 F.2d 1478, 1484 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1022 

(1986); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 977 (S.D. Fla. 1982) 

("The irony of this distinction is that deportable aliens, many of 

whom entered the country surreptitiously, are given more rights 

under the law than excludable aliens who present themselves to 

immigration."). 

Aliens who are finally adjudged excluded are then subject to 

expulsion, or "deportation." Used in this context, deportation 

is a synonym for expulsion, rather than a term referring only to 

the procedures undergone by aliens who have entered the country. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1023 Document: 010110270468 Date Filed: 07/23/1992 Page: 4
September 8, the same day as Mr. Marczak's request for parole, 

Mr. Russell responded simply, "Your request to parole Mr. Marczak 

is denied." Addendum to Consolidated Answer Brief for Petitioners 

Jacek Kisielewski and Ryszard Kowalczyk (hereinafter Addendum), 

doc. 6. On October 2, Mr. Russell responded in more detail to Mr. 

Kowalczyk's September 20 request, and denied parole on the grounds 

that "[p]arole is meant to be the exception and not the rule in 

exclusion cases," and that "there is a possibility that [he] will 

abscond to avoid being returned to [his] home country of Poland." 

Addendum, doc. 8. Mr. Russell also noted Mr. Kowalczyk's lack of 

family ties in this country and Russell's own belief that the 

asylum claim would not prove meritorious, and stated that "the 

continued detention ••. is in the public interest." Id. An 

identical letter was sent the same day to Roman Marczak's 

attorney. Rec., vol. I, doc. 15 at ex. C. 

Petitioners filed writs of habeas corpus in district court 

contesting the denial of parole and alleging that Mr. Russell 

unlawfully discriminated against them. Following an evidentiary 

hearing, the district court granted the writs and ordered 

appellees released on $3,500 bond. The court held that the 

District Director abused his discretion because he failed to make 

an individualized determination in each case before denying 

parole. Although the court found no evidence of discrimination, 

it concluded that appellees did not pose a risk of flight, and 

that the public interest favored parole over further 

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incarceration. Rec., vol. II, at 81. On appeal, the government 

contends the court acted outside its authority in holding an 

evidentiary hearing, applied an incorrect legal standard, and 

improperly overrode the INS's parole decision. 4 

II. 

Congress has exercised its power over immigration in the 

Immigration and Naturalization Act, codified at 8 u.s.c. §§ 1101 

et seq. Its authority in this area is exceptionally broad: "over 

no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more 

complete." Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst 

v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1972). This power is in turn 

entrusted to the Attorney General, 8 u.s.c. S 1103, whose 

decisions are accorded a high degree of judicial deference. Palma 

v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1982). 

An alien arriving in this country is subject to immediate 

assessment by the INS. "Every alien ..• who may not appear to 

the examining immigration officer at the port of arrival to be 

clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for 

further inquiry." 8 u.s.c. § 1225(b). Excludable aliens applying 

4 The merits of appellees' asylum petitions are not before us; 

indeed, resolution of the immigration matters would moot the issue 

here. We are informed that Mr. Marczak's appeal on the merits is 

currently before this court, and Mr. Kowalczyk's is still on 

appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 

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for asylum appear before an immigration judge who initially 

determines whether exclusion is appropriate. That decision may be 

appealed, first to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 8 

U.S.C. S 1226(b); 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.3, 236.7, and then to the Court 

of Appeals for the circuit in which the administrative proceedings 

were held, 8 U.S.C. § 110Sa(a)(2). Pending a final decision on 

the merits of the asylum claim, an alien either remains in 

detention or, in the District Director's discretion, is paroled 

into the community. Id. at S 1182(d)(S)(A); 8 C.F.R. 212.S. 

Appellees Marczak and Kowalczyk went through precisely this 

process. Once they were found by the Port Director in Anchorage 

to be apparently excludable under what was then 8 u.s.c. 

§ 1182(a)(20) 5 for failure to possess adequate documentation, they 

were detained under section 1225(b) and placed in exclusion 

proceedings. They applied for parole pending the resolution of 

those proceedings. 

A. 

The government contends Congress has always intended that 

parole be the exception in exclusion cases, and that a recent INS 

policy directive finally gives effect to that purpose. 

Consolidated Brief for Appellant at 27, 30. On its face, however, 

5 This provision is now found at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A) 

(i)(I). 

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the statute displays no preference for either detention or parole, 

leaving the matter instead to the discretion of the Attorney 

General. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 6 Normally, our inquiry into 

the meaning of a statute would end with its language. See United 

States v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1495, 1496 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

111 S. Ct. 2803 (1991) (if statute is unambiguous and result not 

irrational, plain language controls). 

The government nonetheless cites the House Report that 

accompanied the original act in 1952. 

The Committee believes that the broader discretionary 

authority is necessary to permit the Attorney General to 

parole inadmissible aliens into the United States in 

emergency cases, such as the case of an alien who 

requires immediate medical attention before there has 

been an opportunity for an immigration officer to 

inspect him, and in cases where it is strictly in the 

public interest to have an inadmissible alien present in 

the United States, such as, for instance, a witness or 

for purposes of prosecution. 

H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 

u.s.c.C.A.N. 1653, 1706~ see also Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 

6 (1st Cir. 1987). Despite the apparent clarity of the quoted 

language, the Supreme Court observed only six years later that 

"[p]hysical detention of aliens is now the exception, not the 

6 Section 1182(d)(5)(A) states: 

The Attorney General may .•. in his discretion 

parole into the United States temporarily under such 

conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or 

for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any 

alien applying for admission to the United States 

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rule, and is generally employed only as to security risks or those 

likely to abscond." Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 

(1958) (emphasis added). It is true, as the government argues and 

as we discuss below, that the parole regulations have been rewritten since Leng May Ma. The relevant provisions of the 

statute, however, remain intact, and a change in agency policy can 

obviously not affect statutory intent. At the very least, the 

government must concede that the policy was once different than it 

is now, and that the Supreme Court, given the opportunity to 

comment, did not disapprove of the practices then employed by the 

INS to effect Congressional intent. 

The agency presumption in favor of parole continued until 

1981. Faced with large numbers of asylum applicants in the early 

1980s (particularly Haitians and Cuban nationals arriving with the 

"Mariel boatlifts"), and wishing to prevent the "de facto" entry 

of tens of thousands of immigrants, the INS instituted a new 

policy of detention without parole for any immigrant who could not 

present a prima facie case for admission. A class of undocumented 

and unadmitted Haitians successfully challenged the new policy as 

void for failure to observe the notice-and-comment procedures for 

rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and a 

district court enjoined the policy's enforcement. Louis v. 

Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982); see Jean v. Nelson, 472 

U.S. 846, 850-51 (1985). The policy was thus invalidated, and the 

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INS immediately promulgated its new policy in compliance with the 

APA and codified it at 8 C.F.R. § 212.5. Id. 

As we read the Supreme Court's discussion of immigration 

parole in Jean, the whole of the INS's new policy is contained in 

the regulation actually enacted after the district court required 

formal rule~making procedures. See 472 U.S. at 851. The 

government concedes as much when it says that "the INS regulations 

governing parole were in fact changed and made more restrictive in 

1982," Consolidated Brief for Appellant at 28 (emphasis added), 

and that the new regulations "more nearly reflect the intent of 

Congress," id. at 30. Thus, not unless the terms of the 

regulation itself presume detention over parole is such a 

presumption in effect. Cf. Webb v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1252, 1255 

(10th Cir. 1989) ("court is required to give substantial weight to 

the interpretation made by the agency which is charged with the 

statute's administration"). But see, Amanullah, 811 F.2d at 6-7 

(parole is exception to general rule of detention). 7 

7 Petitioners rely heavily on Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 

654 F.2d 1382, 1389 (10th Cir. 1981), which noted that physical 

detention should be the exception. Since that case was decided 

under the old regulation, however, it does not serve as useful 

precedent in this case. 

Similarly, Rodriguez-Fernandez's conclusion that aliens may 

only be kept in detention for a limited time is inapplicable here. 

That case dealt with Cuban refugees who were both excludable from 

the United States and not permitted to return to Cuba. Unlike 

petitioners, who may end their imprisonment at any time by 

returning to Poland, the detainees in Rodriguez-Fernandez were 

threatened with indefinite imprisonment. 

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The regulations set forth the agency's understanding of the 

statutory conditions for parole, namely "for emergent reasons or 

for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." 8 u.s.c. § 

1182(d) (5) (A). "Emergent reasons" are defined to include "serious 

medical conditions in which continued detention would not be 

appropriate," 8 C.F.R. § 212.S(a)(l). Moreover, 

[t]he parole of aliens within the following groups would 

generally come within the category of aliens for whom 

the granting of the parole exception would be "strictly 

in the public interest," provided that the aliens 

present neither a security risk nor a risk of 

absconding: 

(i) Women who have been medically certified as pregnant; 

(ii) Aliens who are defined as juveniles ...• 

(iii) Aliens who have close family relatives in the 

United States ..• ; 

(iv) Aliens who will be witnesses in proceedings .•. 

in the United States; 

(v) Aliens whose continued detention is not in the 

public interest as determined by the district director. 

Id. at§ 212.S(a)(2) (emphasis added). Nowhere does the 

regulation purport to offer an exhaustive list of the 

circumstances in which parole should be granted, nor does it imply 

in any way that the listed factors are the only ones that ought to 

be considered. To the contrary, section (a)(2)(v) requires the 

district director to make a comprehensive determination of whether 

detention would serve the public interest, apart from the 

enumerated considerations. The only language that arguably 

supports the government's asserted presumption in favor of 

detention is the reference to "the parole exception," id. at 

§ 212.S(a)(2). Given the lack of any corresponding statement that 

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detention is the "rule, 118 the failure of Congress to state any 

preference at all, and the general "public interest" clause in the 

regulation, we conclude that there is no intended presumption 

sufficient by itself to justify the denial of parole. District 

Director Russell's duty under both the statute and regulation was 

to consider whether parole or detention served the public 

interest. If he did so properly, we must affirm his decision; if 

he did not, he may not invoke a presumption to justify his 

actions. 

Moreover, as a logical matter, we do not see how an 

immigration official could base his decision on a general rule, 

given the Supreme Court's requirement that the district director 

"make individualized determinations of parole." Jean, 472 U.S. at 

857 (emphasis added). This requirement gives meaning to the 

regulation and prevents wholesale by-passing of its terms. If the 

district director could decide, for example, that all aliens whose 

asylum claims are unlikely to succeed must be detained in the 

public interest, or that all aliens without family in this country 

are likely to abscond, he could avoid his obligation to decide the 

merits of each parole application. Put differently, a district 

director who decides parole applications on the basis of broad, 

8 Note, for example, that in the next section of the statute, 

parole is the exception t~ the general rule of admission for 

refugees. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(S)(B). 

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non-individualized policies engages in the same type of extraprocedural rule-making that was found illegal by the district 

court in Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 993-97. As we have already 

discussed, Congress has extremely broad power over immigration; 

the INS, while more limited in its powers than Congress, see 

Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 212 n.12 (2d Cir. 1982), may also 

exercise wide latitude in fulfilling Congressional intent and 

might create definitive parole rules, rather than the current 

guidelines. So long as the agency has not thought it wise to 

enact such sweeping rules, however, no single immigration official 

may take it upon him or herself to set personal policies for 

groups of parole applicants. Rather, in each case a district 

director must determine whether a particular person is likely to 

flee, and whether that person's continued detention would be in 

the public interest. 

B. 

The District Director's decision, while invested with 

considerable discretion, is not entirely immune from judicial 

review. Bertrand, 684 F.2d at 210. The parties have argued 

extensively over the proper standard of review, both in the 

district court and on appeal. 9 As a preliminary matter, we reject 

9 The standard of review of agency action is the same for the 

reviewing district court as it is for this court. Our review of 

agency action is deferential to the agency, and lacks the 

customary deference to the district court. Webb v. Hodel, 878 

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petitioners' argument that under 28 u.s.c. S 2241, they are 

entitled to the full scope of review available to habeas 

petitioners seeking to vindicate constitutional rights. The 

deference due an administrative determination hinges not simply on 

the petitioners' ability to proceed under the habeas statutes, but 

rather on the realm of the agency's authority and the nature of 

the petitioners' dispute. Excluded aliens have no constitutional 

right to be paroled into this country, and the scope of our review 

of the INS's parole decision is therefore unrelated to the review 

we would undertake were a convicted criminal claiming a violation 

of constitutional rights. "In immigration matters, the scope of 

judicial review on a petition for habeas corpus is more truncated 

than in the criminal context." Amanullah, 811 F.2d at 16. 

We cannot so easily dismiss Mr. Marczak's and Mr. Kowalczyk's 

contention that the denial of their immigration parole should be 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. The government vociferously 

argues that we should instead affirm as long as the district 

director acted for "facially legitimate and bona fide reasons." 

Apparently, both parties believe that "abuse of discretion" would 

afford more sweeping review than "facially legitimate and bona 

fide." 

F.2d 1252, 1254 (10th Cir. 1989); Mason v. Brooks, 862 F.2d 190, 

192 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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Judicial language abounds with phrases designed to express 

exquisite subtlety, precision, and accuracy in the inverse 

proportions of deference and scrutiny we apply in different legal 

contexts. We examine, for example, whether district court action 

was plain error or harmless error, whether a ruling was clearly 

erroneous or supported by substantial evidence, or whether a law 

needs to serve a compelling, significant, or important 

governmental interest. In many cases, the incantation of one of 

these mantras dictates the result. It is as if by multiplying the 

standards of review and selectively attaching them, we have turned 

the law into an objective and knowable science. In this case, as 

in many, our choice between two proffered standards of review 

matters only to the extent that they are meaningfully and 

practically different from each other. 

We often review district court action for an abuse of 

discretion. This standard is fairly deferential to the 

decisionmaker, and assures that the exercise of good judgment will 

generally be upheld. In a slightly different context, this court 

has described review for abuse of discretion as a determination 

"whether the information relied on by the 

[decisionmaker) is sufficient to provide a factual basis 

for its reasons. The inquiry is not whether the 

[decisionmaker]'s decision is supported by the 

preponderance of the evidence, or even by substantial 

evidence; the inquiry is only whether there is a 

rational basis in the record for the (decisionmaker)'s 

conclusions embodied in its statement of reasons." 

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Misasi v. United States Parole Comm'n, 835 F.2d 754, 758 (10th 

Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (reviewing U.S. Parole Commission's 

decision on eligible-for-parole date) (quoting Solomon v. Elesa, 

676 F.2d 282, 290 (7th Cir. 1982)); see Moret v. Karn, 746 F.2d 

989, 991 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying abuse of discretion standard to 

review of immigration parole). 

The "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard, by 

contrast, is used only in the context of immigration. The Supreme 

Court first articulated the standard in Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 

769-770, when it refused to reverse the Attorney General's denial 

of a waiver of exclusion to a prominent Belgian journalist. The 

Attorney General told Mr. Mandel it had denied the waiver because 

of previous abuses of other exclusion waivers. The Supreme Court 

held in response that "when the Executive exercises this power [to 

make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens] negatively on the 

basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts 

will [not] look behind the exercise of that discretion." Id. at 

770. Several circuits have invoked this standard in decisions 

regarding immigration parole under the provisions involved in this 

case. See Mason v. Brooks, 862 F.2d 190, 194 (9th Cir. 1988); 

Amanullah, 811 F.2d at 9-10; Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 

1485 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1022 (1986); 

Bertrand, 684 F.2d at 212. 

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Because the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard is 

used relatively infrequently, its meaning is elusive. The Second 

Circuit has held there was no difference intended by Kleindienst 

between "facially legitimate and bona fide" reasons, and a 

"rational basis" for statutory classifications. Azizi v. 

Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1133 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990). It is 

tempting to conclude from the broad language of the test that a 

court applying the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard 

would not even look to the record to determine whether the 

agency's statement of reasons was in any way supported by the 

facts. On this interpretation, merely asserting a legally 

permissible justification would support a denial of parole (or 

other discretionary immigration decision), regardless of whether 

the justification factually applied to the individual in question. 

This has not, however, been the practice of any of the courts that 

have adopted the standard in immigration matters. In Kleindienst 

itself, for example, the Supreme Court ascertained that Mr. Mandel 

had in fact violated the terms of his earlier waivers of exclusion 

where the Attorney General cited the violations as justification 

for denying Mr. Mandel entry into the country. 408 U.S. 756-58 

and n.5. Similarly, the First Circuit in Amanullah first decided 

that the district director had advanced facially legitimate 

reasons for denying parole, and then concluded after further 

examination that "[t]hese findings [were] not without record 

support." 811 F.2d at 11. When the Ninth Circuit denied parole 

because of an applicant's prior convictions in this country, it 

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both verified the fact of conviction and satisfied itself that any 

factual errors cited in the district director's statement of 

reasons (number of months spent on active military duty, 

mislabelling of offense as narcotics trafficking rather than 

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute) were not 

factors in the denial of parole. Mason, 862 F.2d at 194; see also 

Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1990) (where facts found by 

consular officer in issuing visas were not subject to judicial 

review, facially legitimate and bona fide standard meant review 

for whether evidence existed to form reasonable grounds for 

belief); Garcia-Mir, 766 F.2d at 1485 (Cuba's agreement to take 

back Mariel immigrants formed factual basis for conclusion of 

increased chance of flight); Bertrand, 684 F . 2d at 213-18 

(extensive review of evidentiary record). It thus appears that 

even under the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard of 

review, the district director's decision must be at least 

reasonably supported by the record. 

In sum, we see no meaningful difference between the two 

standards urged here. Both require considerable deference to the 

decision of the district director; both nevertheless require a 

summary examination of the record. The Supreme Court's opinion in 

Jean may be read as saying as much. The Court said of the lower 

court opinion, 

[t)he court held that [the INS's power to parole or 

refuse parole] was subject to review on a deferential 

abuse-of-discretion standard. According to the court 

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"immigration officials clearly have the authority to 

deny parole to unadmitted aliens if they can advance a 

"facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for doing so. 

4 72 U.S. at 853. The Court thus confl·ated the two standards by 

referring to them together, as if they were identical. See also 

Moret, 746 F.2d at 993 n.3 (alternate holding under facially 

legitimate and bona fide standard has same result as abuse of 

discretion review). In concluding that there is no practical 

difference between applying one standard or the other, we do not 

take license, nor could we, to re-weigh the facts underlying the 

district director's decision. See Bertrand, 684 F.2d at 214 

(district court improperly substituted its judgment for that of 

district director as to likelihood of parole). We merely require 

the district director to have articulated~ individualized 

facially legitimate and bona fide reason for denying parole, and 

some factual basis for that decision in each individual case. 

c. 

There remains one matter to be decided before we can properly 

evaluate the appeals at hand. According to the government, the 

district court overstepped its authority in granting an 

evidentiary hearing when it ought to have relied only on the 

administrative record. If this is true, then the record must be 

similarly limited on appeal. As support for this position, the 

government points to both the narrow review appropriate to parole 

decisions, and the statutory requirement that judicial review of 

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exclusion and deportation decisions on the merits be "determined 

solely upon the administrative record upon which the deportation 

order is based." 8 u.s.c. § 1105a(a)(4). 

The regulations do not set out any specific procedures for 

making parole decisions. Excluded aliens have no right to be 

paroled into this country, see Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 

956, 963 (9th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. 

__ (U.S. May 27, 1992) (No. 91-8424); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. 

Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1386 (10th Cir. 1981), and the decision 

to grant parole rests almost entirely in the hands of the district 

director. If a district court reviewing the denial of parole 

finds sufficient evidence in the administrative record to provide 

a basis for review, it need not hear evidence, nor may an alien 

claim a right to a hearing. Cf. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 

537, 544 (1950) ("[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress 

is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 

concerned"). In affirming a district court's decision not to 

grant a full hearing, the First Circuit reached the same 

conclusion on the ground that if deportation must be reviewed on 

the administrative record, then proceedings related to exclusion 

may not be subjected to greater scrutiny. Amanullah, 811 F.2d at 

16-17. But cf. Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1203-04 

(9th Cir. 1975) (district court may require INS to develop certain 

facts in habeas action). 

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This case, however, poses the different question whether a 

district court that does grant an evidentiary hearing on denial of 

immigration parole has overstepped its authority. Despite the 

evident agreement among the circuits that aliens may not demand 

one as a matter of right, no circuit has ever held a district 

court's conduct of such a hearing to be error. "While a petition 

for habeas corpus directed at the INS is usually reviewed by 

reference only to the administrative record, the District Court 

may, if necessary, conduct a hearing to take evidence concerning 

illegal action that is not reflected in the record." Johns v. 

Dep't of Justice, 653 F.2d 884, 896 (5th Cir. 1981). In Bertrand, 

although the Second Circuit held that the lower court improperly 

"substituted its judgment for that of the INS District Director" 

in a parole decision, it accepted without criticism the 

evidentiary hearing that formed the basis of the lower court's 

review, and it relied heavily on the facts presented there. 

Bertrand, 684 F.2d at 213-18. See also id. at 219-20 (Kearse, J., 

concurring) ("To the extent that the district court was making 

credibility assessments, its review was consistent with the 

strictures of Kleindienst['s]" facially legitimate and bona fide 

standard.) 

We will not forbid a district court from conducting an 

evidentiary hearing, nor will we disregard the evidence adduced 

from it. Unlike the "copious" administrative record relied on in 

Amanullah, 811 F.2d at 17, the administrative record before the 

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district court here consisted of nine pages, including the letters 

requesting and denying parole. 10 The district court could not, 

under the applicable standard, re-evaluate the evidence presented 

at the hearing and decide on its own whether the agency's decision 

was wise. It could, however, grant a hearing for the limited 

purposes of ascertaining the grounds asserted by the district 

director for denial, and ensuring that each decision was given 

individualized consideration. 

III. 

The district court conducted the hearing primarily as an 

offer of proof by both parties. Attorneys for petitioners and the 

government addressed their respective understandings of the 

relevant law, and summarized for the court the evidence they 

10 There is a similar problem with analogizing, as the 

government would, the permissible record on review in this 

situation to that mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4). The 

administrative record which must serve as the sole basis for 

judicial review of exclusion and deportation orders includes the 

transcript of the full evidentiary hearing had before the 

immigration judge, the procedures for which are carefully laid out 

in 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.2, 242.15. There are no standard procedures 

for a decision to grant or deny parole, however, and the 

administrative record of a parole decision may therefore consist 

(as it did here) of only a few pages. Indeed, as Mr. Marczak 

points out, District Director Russell's initial denial of parole 

contained no reasons or evidence at all. A district court that 

could not order an evidentiary hearing would be bound in similar 

cases to reverse the administrative decision, because there would 

be no evidence in the administrative record whatsoever to support 

it. To restrict judicial review of parole decisions to the same 

record as deportation decisions is simply to ignore the important 

differences between those two records. 

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intended to prove. In addition, the court allowed abridged 

testimony from two witnesses, Tamara Proch (a spokesperson from 

the Denver Polish community) and District Director Russell, as 

well as from petitioners. 

Mr. Russell stated that he denied parole on the basis of the 

petitioners' crewman books, "the INS documentation as to what had 

happened," and the initial interviews by an immigration officer. 

Rec., vol. II, at 72. He did not read petitioners' asylum 

applications until after he denied their parole requests. In Mr. 

Kowalczyk's case, the evidence revealed "that he had no relatives, 

no ties here in the United States. He came to the United States 

with a Cl transit visa to join a fishing vessel, which he did not 

do. He was taken into custody in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15. 

He was transferred down to Denver on August 16." Id. at 73. 11 

Because petitioners did not fit any of the specific 

categories of parolable aliens, Mr. Russell initially evaluated 

them under the general public interest prong. Under the 

regulation, "a denial of parole should be based on an affirmative 

determination that the public interest warrants continued 

11 Mr. Russell did not similarly detail the information he 

gleaned from Mr. Marczak's application. Since the petitioners 

underwent identical procedures upon arriving in Alaska, however, 

and since no one has suggested otherwise, we have no reason to 

believe that Mr. Russell possessed any more information about Mr. 

Marczak than he did about Mr. Kowalczyk. 

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detention." Liv. Greene, 767 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (D. Colo. 

1991). Mr. Russell's denial letters, however, contained only the 

terse conclusory statement, devoid of all factual or even 

hypothetical support, that parole was not in the public interest. 

Addendum, doc. 6; rec., vol. I, doc. 15 at ex. C. Under any 

reasonable interpretation of the standard, Mr. Russell was 

required to give facially legitimate and bona fide reasons, 

factually supportable, for finding detention to be in the public 

interest. There is no evidence that he considered in any 

meaningful or reviewable way whether or why the public interest 

required that Mr. Marczak and Mr. Kowalczyk be held in custody. 

Thus, he failed to satisfy even the minimal requirements imposed 

on him. See Li, 767 F. Supp. at 1090. 

At the hearing, however, Mr. Russell seems to have abandoned 

the public interest justification entirely. According to the 

terms of the statute and the regulation, then, the only remaining 

possible rationale for denying parole would be a legitimate 

finding that petitioners posed a flight or security risk. In 

direct response to the government attorney's question, Mr. Russell 

"[told] the Court why [he] denied parole" based on the evidence he 

had: 

We looked to see if the people were ill, that they were 

minors. They were all adult males. We considered the 

fact if or not they had any relatives or close ties to 

the United States, which they did not, the fact that 

they were single with no ties to the United States. 

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There was a good possibility over my 33 years of 

experience that they could abscond at some--and they 

don't always know this initially. Many times when they 

get involved in a community or with other individuals, 

they'll make that decision subsequent to their release. 

Rec., vol. II, at 66 (emphasis added); see also Consolidated Brief 

for Appellant at 9-10. Further questioning demonstrated Mr. 

Russell's understanding of the INS regulations on parole and his 

apparent belief that the factors set out in 8 C.F.R. 212.5 were 

the exclusive grounds for granting parole. 

Q: What is the basis for a determination whether parole 

is granted or denied in the discretion of the INS? 

A: ..• (I]t's been my understanding in cases like 

this with refugee cases that parole is an exception 

rather than the rule, and this is the interpretation of 

the INs.[12] 

12 The government argued below, unsuccessfully, that the 

petitioners were "refugees" and thus fell under the parole 

provisions of The Refugee Act of 1980, that "the Attorney General 

may not parole into the United States an alien who is a refugee 

unless the Attorney General determines that compelling reasons in 

the public interest with respect to that particular alien require 

that the alien be paroled into the United States rather than be 

admitted as a refugee." 8 u.s.c. S 1182(d)(5)(B). This provision 

limits the use of parole (which by statute does not constitute 

"entry" into the country) instead of formal admission for asylumseekers who have been found to be refugees. Under that section, 

parole is indeed the "exception" for refugees, but the "rule" is 

not detention, but admission. See supra at n.5. Moreover, the 

provision made no change at all, nor was it intended to, to the 

terms of the parole provisions for non-refugees. Amanullah v. 

Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1987) (Congress had 

"unambiguous wish ... that the parole authority stay exactly as 

it was vis-a-vis nonrefugee aliens"). 

Petitioners did not, to our knowledge, apply for refugee 

status at any time, and the district court therefore correctly 

held that petitioners were not refugees within the scope of the 

Refugee Act. 

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Q: Has the INS issued certain criteria for when parole 

will be granted? 

A: Yes they have. The commissioner published a 

directive back in 1983, and I have gone by that 

directive. 

Q: Is it also in CFR? 

A: Yes, it is. The basis of that ·policy memorandum is 

now the 8 CFR. 

Rec., vol. II, at 67. 

Mr. Russell's testimony, the bulk of which we have just 

reproduced, indicates his intention at the hearing to show that 

the denial of parole was based on his conclusion that Mr. Marczak 

and Mr. Kowalczyk were likely to flee. Taken together, Mr. 

Russell's written denials and his oral testimony provide three 

bases for that conclusion: (1) petitioners' lack of family ties in 

this country; (2) the low probability that they would succeed on 

the merits of their asylum claims; and (3) Russell's statement 

that "over [his] thirty-three years of experience .•• many times 

•.. they'll make that decision," rec., vol. II, at 66. 

We cannot say that Mr. Russell abused his discretion in 

reaching his initial decision to deny parole. Nonetheless, his 

reasons provide only a frail foundation for the conclusion they 

are asked to support. While Mr. Russell claimed to have extensive 

experience of aliens with no family ties and improbable asylum 

claims, he offered no specific example of such an alien fleeing 

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the jurisdiction, nor did he say anything specific about his 

experiences. 

Mr. Russell also neglected to say why and how his 

determination either was or was not affected by the evidence of 

significant local support for petitioners. Tamara Proch testified 

that the Polish community had volunteered homes, appropriate jobs, 

and individual sponsors for petitioners. Rec., vol. II, at 43-53. 

See Bertrand, 684 F.2d at 214-17 & n.15 (considering aliens' 

ability to support themselves on parole and availability of nonorganizational sponsors); Li, 767 F. Supp . at 1091 (district 

director must explain why support of community is not functional 

equivalent of family support). The Polish community had raised 

money for bond and other expenses, see Bertrand, 684 F.2d at 214-

15 & n.15, and had flown an expert from Washington to Denver to 

testify on behalf of the nine asylum seekers. Rec., vol. II, at 

48. 

Neither we, nor the district court, can evaluate this 

information for Mr. Russell. In reversing the district director 

and granting parole, the district court impermissibly substituted 

its own judgment for that of the District Director. Nevertheless, 

we understand the district court's frustration with Mr. Russell's 

cursory oral justifications for denying parole. While Mr. Russell 

offered a permissible reason for denying parole, namely the risk 

of flight, we hope district directors will in the future 

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articulate the evidence supporting their parole decisions so that 

we may easily determine whether the underlying rationale is 

facially legitimate and bona fide, and supported by facts 

particular to each petitioner. 

IV. 

Because the district court improperly re-weighed the evidence 

and made its own findings of fact, we must reverse its decision to 

grant the writ. In so doing, however, we cannot ignore the 

shifting factual backdrop to this case. Mr. Marczak and Mr. 

Kowalczyk have now been living in the Denver area for more than 

two and a half years, since December 1989. During this time, Mr. 

Marczak has married an American citizen and has asked the INS to 

reopen his case on that account. Both men may have developed 

further networks of personal and professional relationships. To 

our knowledge, they are still present in the jurisdiction and 

reporting to parole authorities. Rather than simply ordering the 

district director's decision reinstated, we think "it is 

appropriate that the INS district director be given the 

opportunity to reexercise [his] discretion" in light of all the 

current circumstances. Bertrand, 684 F.2d at 219. 

We expect that on remand, the district director will take 

account of all the information now available to him which bears on 

the appropriateness of parole. His consideration of the public 

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interest and the likelihood of flight should at least include an 

assessment of the Polish community's support of petitioners and 

its effectiveness, the petitioners' conduct on parole to date, 

their compliance with immigration and parole rules, their current 

ability and demonstrated willingness to support themselves 

financially, Mr. Marczak's marriage, and any other changed 

circumstances. 

Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

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