Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-03003/USCOURTS-ca8-07-03003-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jorobor Gumaneh
Petitioner
Michael B. Mukasey
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 07-3003

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Jorobor Gumaneh,

Petitioner,

v.

Michael B. Mukasey,

Attorney General of the

United States of America,

Respondent.

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Petition for Review of an

Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

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Submitted: June 9, 2008

 Filed: August 1, 2008

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Before SMITH, BOWMAN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Jorobor Gumaneh, a citizen of the Republic of The Gambia, petitions for review

of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the immigration

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The IJ and BIA also rejected Gumaneh’s claim for protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). She has not set forth an argument on appeal

regarding the CAT ruling. Therefore, Gumaneh waives this claim. See ChayVelasquez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2004).

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judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal.1

 For

the reasons discussed below, we deny Gumaneh’s petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Gumaneh entered the United States on December 29, 1999, as a visitor with

authorization to remain until March 28, 2000. She overstayed her visa and, while

residing in the United States, gave birth to two daughters and one son between 2000

and 2002.

Gumaneh had been subjected to female genital mutilation (“FGM”) while living

in The Gambia. During a telephone call in February 2003, Gumaneh’s parents

informed her that she needed to return to The Gambia with her two daughters so that

they could be subjected to FGM. After this phone call, Gumaneh feared returning to

The Gambia with her children. In a September 2003 letter and in a November 2003

letter, her family continued to request that Gumaneh bring her daughters to The

Gambia for FGM.

Gumaneh filed an asylum application with the Department of Homeland

Security on April 1, 2004, which was referred for a hearing before an IJ. On

December 5, 2005, the IJ denied her application for asylum and withholding of

removal but granted her request for voluntary departure. The IJ concluded that her

asylum application was untimely because she failed to file within one year of her

arrival. While the IJ accepted that Gumaneh experienced changed circumstances that

would excuse a late filing, the IJ concluded that Gumaneh failed to file within a

reasonable period after the changed circumstances. First, the birth of her two

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daughters in 2000 and 2001 put Gumaneh on notice, in light of her past experience,

that they could be subjected to FGM when she returned to The Gambia, and her

failure to file within a reasonable period of time—filing more than three years

later—rendered her petition untimely. Second, assuming that the births of her

daughters were insufficient to put her on notice of changed circumstances, the

telephone call in February 2003 requesting that her daughters undergo FGM put

Gumaneh on notice, and she failed to apply within a reasonable period, given that

more than one year elapsed between the phone call and Gumaneh’s filing for asylum.

Finally, even assuming that the phone call was insufficient to put her on notice,

Gumaneh still waited seven months to file for asylum after receiving the September

2003 letter from her family.

The IJ also determined that Gumaneh was not entitled to withholding of

removal based upon the fact that her daughters would be subjected to FGM because

the statutory provisions regarding withholding of removal did not permit an applicant

to assert a claim derived from a child’s fear of future persecution. The IJ also rejected

Gumaneh’s derivative claim because her daughters were United States citizens and

were not compelled to go to The Gambia.

On July 31, 2007, the BIA concurred in the IJ’s conclusions and adopted the

IJ’s opinion. Gumaneh filed a motion to reconsider on September 10, 2007, relying

upon our decision in Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 2007), for the

proposition that an applicant for withholding of removal may make a derivative claim

based upon the claim that the applicant’s daughters would be subjected to FGM if the

applicant were to be removed. The BIA rejected the proposition that Hassan

recognized such a derivative claim and denied the motion to reconsider. Gumaneh

now petitions for review.

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II. DISCUSSION

“When the BIA adopts and affirms the IJ’s decision, but also adds reasoning of

its own, we will review both decisions together.” Chen v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 797, 800

(8th Cir. 2007). We affirm the decisions if they are supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Singh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 2007). We review

questions of law de novo, and we reverse findings of fact only if the evidence is “so

compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find in favor of the petitioner.”

Turay v. Ashcroft, 405 F.3d 663, 666–67 (8th Cir. 2005).

A. Asylum

An applicant must file for asylum within one year of arrival, which Gumaneh

failed to do. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). There are two exceptions to this rule: an

applicant may demonstrate “either the existence of changed circumstances which

materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances

relating to the delay in filing an application within the [one-year] period.” Id. §

1158(a)(2)(D). If an applicant contends that changed circumstances affect her

eligibility, the applicant must file an application “within a reasonable period given

those ‘changed circumstances.’” 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii).

“Congress has expressly precluded judicial review of the Attorney General’s

determination that an asylum application is untimely.” Somakoko v. Gonzales, 399

F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005); see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (“No court shall have

jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph

(2).”). This preclusion extends to the IJ’s determination that an applicant has not filed

within a reasonable period given the changed circumstances. See Fang Huang v.

Mukasey, 523 F.3d 640, 651 (6th Cir. 2008) (determining that the court lacked

jurisdiction to determine whether the application had been filed within a “reasonable

period” given changed circumstances); Haddad v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 515, 519 n.7

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(6th Cir. 2006) (same); see also Awad v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 73, 76 (1st Cir. 2006)

(finding no jurisdiction to review conclusion that asylum application was not filed

within a “reasonable period” of the onset of extraordinary circumstances). Therefore,

we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that Gumaneh’s asylum

application was untimely.

B. Withholding of Removal

“An alien may not be removed if the alien shows there is a clear probability

[her] ‘life or freedom would be threatened in [the alien’s] country because of the

alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion.’” Guled v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 872, 881 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §

1231(b)(3)(A)) (second alteration in original). To establish withholding of removal,

Gumaneh must show that “it is more likely than not that [she] would be subject to

persecution.” See Abrha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 1072, 1076 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation

omitted).

Relying on our opinion in Hassan, Gumaneh argues that she has a claim that

derives from the likelihood that her daughters would be subjected to FGM if she takes

them with her to The Gambia. Gumaneh asserts that this derivative claim is sufficient

to establish a clear probability of persecution and makes her eligible for withholding

of removal.

In Hassan, we concluded that an asylum applicant who suffered FGM has

satisfied her burden of showing that she suffered past persecution entitling her to a

presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution. 484 F.3d at 518.

The IJ refused to address Hassan’s derivative claim after determining that her United

States citizen daughters could remain in the United States with their father. Id. at 519.

After the hearing, the father was removed from the United States. We did not address

whether an asylum applicant may establish a derivative claim of persecution based

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upon the fact that her daughters would experience FGM, choosing instead to remand

the case for reconsideration in light of the IJ’s inaccurate assumption that the children

could remain with their father. Id. We now consider, for the first time, whether a

parent may bring a derivative claim for withholding of removal based upon the fact

that her children would be subjected to future persecution.

Other circuits that have considered this question agree that a parent cannot

assert a derivative claim based upon a child’s possible future persecution. See Niang

v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2007); Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609 (7th Cir.

2003). In Niang, the Fourth Circuit considered the petition of an applicant who

claimed that her United States citizen daughter would be subjected to FGM if she were

taken to Senegal. 492 F.3d at 512–13. The applicant sought withholding of removal

based upon her daughter’s future persecution. In order to be eligible for withholding

of removal under the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, an application must show that “the

alien’s life or freedom would be threatened.” Id. at 513 (emphasis in original)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)). “Thus, the statute permitting withholding of

removal does not encompass derivative withholding claims, that is, claims for

withholding of removal based on persecution to another person . . . .” Id. The Fourth

Circuit acknowledged that if an applicant has resided in the United States for ten

years, she might meet the exception in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b that examines “exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s . . . child,” which would permit a court

to consider a child’s future FGM in its hardship analysis. See 8 U.S.C. §

1229b(b)(1)(D). The applicant in Niang, however, did not meet the statutory

requirements for the exception. See Niang, 492 F.3d at 513. Therefore, the Fourth

Circuit concluded, “[T]here is simply no statutory or regulatory authority for her to

claim withholding of removal based on threatened hardship to her U.S. citizen minor

daughter. As Congress has not provided for such a derivative withholding claim, we

will not judicially amend the statute to create one.” Id.; accord In re A-K-, 24 I. & N.

Dec. 275 (B.I.A. 2007) (relying on Niang).

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Unlike withholding of removal claims, the asylum statutes do provide for some

limited derivative claims. A spouse or a child of an applicant may also be granted

asylum by a derivative claim based upon a spouse’s or a parent’s claim. 8 U.S.C. §

1158(b)(3). A parent of an applicant, however, cannot maintain a derivative asylum

claim based upon a child’s claim. 8 C.F.R. § 207.7(b). The derivative claims

recognized in the asylum statute are not included in the withholding of removal

statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Even if they were, the statutory derivative claims do not

extend to parents. See Niang, 492 F.3d at 512 n.11.

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The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Oforji. There, an applicant

sought to assert a derivative claim for withholding of removal under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”). Oforji, 354 F.3d at 614–15. The regulations at issue

required that in “an application for withholding of removal under [the CAT], the

immigration judge shall first determine whether the alien is more likely than not to be

tortured . . . .” Id. at 615 (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4)).

The regulations did not provide for a derivative claim based upon the fact that the

applicant’s two daughters would be subjected to FGM. In particular, the court in

Oforji noted that the two daughters who would be subjected to FGM if taken to

Nigeria were United States citizens. Id. at 616. The Seventh Circuit concluded, “[A]n

alien parent who has no legal standing to remain in the United States may not establish

a derivative claim [under the CAT] by pointing to potential hardship to the alien’s

United States citizen child in the event of the alien’s deportation.” Id. at 618.

We conclude that an applicant may not establish a derivative claim for

withholding of removal based upon the applicant’s child’s fear of persecution. The

withholding of removal statute simply does not allow an applicant to maintain such

a derivative claim.2

 We agree with the thorough analysis of the Fourth Circuit that

withholding of removal is specifically limited to instances in which “the alien’s life

or freedom would be threatened.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added). In

addition, Gumaneh does not contend that she qualifies for any exception under §

1229b, perhaps because she cannot establish the required ten years of residency in the

United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).

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The Sixth Circuit has concluded that an applicant may be eligible “in her own

right,” not derivatively, based on psychological harm on account of her own fear that

her non-citizen daughter would be subject to FGM. Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634,

641 (6th Cir. 2004). But see Niang, 492 F.3d at 512 (criticizing Abay). Gumaneh,

however, does not argue that she is eligible for withholding of removal based upon

any psychological harm to herself, and we decline to address this issue. See Alyas v.

Gonzales, 419 F.3d 756, 760 (8th Cir. 2005).

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We recognize that Gumaneh is faced with an extremely difficult decision: leave

her U.S. citizen minor daughters in the United States to reside with friends or

relatives, or take her daughters to The Gambia and risk the possibility that they will

be subjected to FGM. The IJ also recognized that her daughters could live with their

father, who now resides in Sierra Leone, presuming that the daughters would be free

from FGM there. Despite this difficult choice, under the statutes as presently enacted,

Gumaneh is not eligible for withholding of removal based upon a derivative claim that

her daughters will be subjected to FGM.3

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Gumaneh’s petition for review.

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