Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-03074/USCOURTS-caDC-14-03074-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sylvan D. Abney
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 10, 2015 Decided February 5, 2016

No. 14-3074

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

SYLVAN D. ABNEY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cr-00191-1)

Rachel Murphy argued the cause for appellant. With her on

the briefs were Brent Gurney and Emily Stark. 

 Jay Apperson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. On the brief were Vincent H. Cohen Jr., Acting U.S.

Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Elizabeth H. Danello, and

David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: ROGERS, BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

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ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court identified the two-prong

objective test for determining whether a defendant’s

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel has

been violated. Today that question arises in the context of a

sentencing for possession of 68 grams of crack cocaine that

occurred five days after Congress passed the Fair Sentencing

Act (“FSA”), when Presidential approval was imminent and

virtually assured. Despite knowing that when the FSA was

signed by the President, the mandatory minimum sentence for

his client’s offense would be cut in half, from 10 years to five

years, Sylvan D. Abney’s then-counsel failed to seek a

continuance of sentencing. 

At the time of Abney’s scheduled sentencing it was an open

question whether the reductions in the FSA would apply to preFSA conduct where the defendant was sentenced after the FSA

took effect. Yet, as cases in this and other circuits indicate, the

defense Bar was seeking continuances of scheduled sentencings

until the FSA became law. That is because it was at least

reasonably probable — if not more likely still — that courts

would interpret the FSA’s new mandatory minimums to apply

to defendants sentenced after its effective date. In 1984, the

Sentencing Reform Act established that the applicable

Sentencing Guidelines are those in effect at the time of

sentencing, not those in effect at the time of the offense. The

FSA did not change this scheme. Rather, it amended the

Controlled Substances Act to reduce the disparity between the

amounts of crack cocaine and powder cocaine that trigger

mandatory minimum sentences. It also directed the United

States Sentencing Commission to issue new Sentencing

Guidelines consistent with the FSA as soon as practicable and

in no event later than 90 days after the FSA’s enactment. Any

competent criminal defense attorney familiar with federal

sentencing principles would have understood that courts were

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reasonably likely to read the FSA’s lower mandatory minimums

to apply to defendants sentenced after its enactment. The

contrary interpretation of the FSA would impute to Congress an

unusual intent: A defendant sentenced for a crack-trafficking

offense after the FSA became law would receive the benefit of

a lower Sentencing Guidelines range based on the reduced

crack-powder disparity, while at the same time that defendant

would be subject to mandatory minimums based on the broad

crack-powder disparity the FSA was meant to narrow.

A continuance would have placed Abney in a position to

benefit from the reduced mandatory minimum were the

interpretation of the FSA favorable to him to prevail. Moreover,

a continuance posed no risk to the public because Abney was

incarcerated pending sentencing. We hold that under

Strickland’s two-prong test counsel’s failure to seek a

continuance of Abney’s sentencing was, in the absence of any

informed strategic choice, objectively unreasonable, and it also

was prejudicial because, but for counsel’s failure, there was a

reasonable probability that a continuance would have been

granted by a “reasonabl[e], conscientious[], and impartial[]”

judge, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, thereby reducing Abney’s

mandatory minimum sentence by half.

Our dissenting colleague misapprehends our application of

Strickland’s performance prong and misapplies the prejudice

prong. Under Strickland’s objective standards, counsel was not

required under the performance prong to anticipate how the

Supreme Court would ultimately resolve the issue of

retroactivity. Nor under Strickland’s prejudice prong is the

subjective opinion of the sentencing judge about a continuance

dispositive, for Strickland focuses on what a reasonable judge

would do upon considering the relevant factors, which this court

had identified before Abney’s sentencing and which weigh in

his favor. Our colleague’s other objections lack merit. The

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court’s analysis adheres to Strickland’s two-prong approach and

does not collapse the two prongs into one. See Dis. Op. 1–4. 

Nor does the court’s analysis do violence to our republican form

of government. See id. at 13.

Accordingly, because Abney was denied his Sixth

Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, we 

remand the case for resentencing under the FSA.

I. 

On December 17, 2007, Abney pleaded guilty to one count

of possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of

cocaine base (commonly known as crack cocaine), in violation

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Under the plea

agreement, if the government determined Abney provided it

with “substantial assistance,” then the government would ask the

district court to depart from “either the Sentencing Guidelines or

any applicable mandatory minimum sentence established by

statute.” Otherwise the mandatory minimum sentence for

Abney’s offense under the Controlled Substances Act was 10

years’ imprisonment. Once the government determined Abney’s

cooperation had proved unsuccessful, the district court

scheduled a sentencing hearing for October 13, 2009. The

government twice moved to continue sentencing between

October 2009 and August 2, 2010, because of Abney’s arrest

and incarceration in Maryland.

Five days before Abney’s scheduled sentencing hearing, the

House of Representatives, on July 28, 2010, joined the Senate in

passing the FSA, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (Aug. 3,

2010), reducing the mandatory minimum for Abney’s offense by

half, from 10 to five years. The drug amounts triggering

mandatory minimums for crack-trafficking offenses in the

Controlled Substances Act were increased from 5 grams

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to 28 grams for the five-year minimum, and from 50 grams to

280 grams for the 10-year minimum. See FSA § 2(a), 124 Stat.

at 2372 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B)(iii)). 

Congress’s passage of this landmark sentencing reform was

widely publicized, and it was well known that the President

would promptly sign the legislation.1

 Pursuant to Article I,

Section 7 of the United States Constitution, the President had

only 10 days (excepting intervening Sundays) upon presentment

to sign the bill into law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. The President

signed it promptly on August 3, 2010.

Abney’s counsel was aware that the FSA had passed both

houses of Congress and believed that it “w[ould] soon be in

place.” Def.’s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 2 n.1 (July 28,

2010). In his sentencing memorandum, Abney’s counsel wrote:

As an indication of the unfairness in sentencing in

cases like Mr. Abney’s, counsel would note that new

penalties for cocaine base will soon be in place, as the

House and Senate have approved legislation reducing

1

 See, e.g., Jim Abrams, Congress Passes Bill to Reduce

Disparity in Crack, Powder Cocaine Sentencing, WASH. POST, July

29, 2010, at A09; Erik Eckholm, Congress Moves to Narrow Cocaine

Sentencing Disparities, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2010, at A16; Press

Release, The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy,

Congress Passes Monumental Fair Sentencing Act and Restores

Fairness to Cocaine Sentencing (July 28, 2010) (expressing

Administration support for the FSA bill after it passed both houses of

Congress); Press Release, Department of Justice, Statement of the

Attorney General on Passage of the Fair Sentencing Act (July 28,

2010) (congratulating House of Representatives on passing the FSA);

Press Release, Department of Justice, Statement of the Attorney

General on Senate Judiciary Committee’s Approval of the Fair

Sentencing Act (Mar. 11, 2010) (applauding Senate Judiciary

Committee’s approval of bill that would become the FSA).

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the powder/crack disparity to 18 to one. Under those

guidelines 28 grams of crack would trigger the 5 year

mandatory; it would take 280 grams to trigger the 10

year mandatory.

Id. Counsel also contemplated that the FSA might be applied to

benefit Abney. In the same memorandum, he wrote: “[W]e

would note that absent some retroactivity, Mr. Abney will be

much more harshly punished than those committing and

convicted of the same crime in the near future. He also will be

effectively deterred longer than others.” Id. at 2 (emphasis

added). Counsel failed to mention — and, it seems, failed to

consider — a core feature of the federal sentencing scheme

under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,

§ 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837, 1989–90: that the applicable

Sentencing Guidelines are those in effect at the time of

sentencing, not those in effect when the offense was committed. 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii). As a consequence, counsel

apparently overlooked an interpretation of the FSA courts were

reasonably likely to adopt and thought, erroneously, that

retroactivity would require “subsequent legislation,” Sentencing

Tr. at 6. So, counsel did not seek a continuance of Abney’s

sentencing date for any duration.

On August 2, 2010, the district court sentenced Abney to

the 10-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. The

court, however, lamented that outcome. At the sentencing

hearing, it observed that, “[i]f the Court had some discretion, I

probably would give you a sentence [of] . . . somewhere less

than 120 months. I mean I wouldn’t give you 60, but it would

be somewhere in between . . . .” Id. at 7. The prosecutor

acknowledged that the government “[wa]s aware of the new

legislation that recently passed that certainly defense may raise

if he were at a different time[, which] might change [Abney’s]

fate; but as of now that is not retroactive . . . .” Id. at 5

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(emphasis added). Abney’s counsel offered no response beyond

suggesting that perhaps Abney’s sentence “will be revisited with

retroactivity down the road.” Id. at 6. The district court noted,

however, that “Congress, for whatever reason . . . has also

decided that retroactivity is not out the door.” Id. at 7.

The next day — August 3, 2010 — the President signed the

FSA into law. As a result, the 100-to-1 crack-to-powder

sentencing disparity was lowered to 18-to-1, and the mandatory

minimum sentence for possession with intent to distribute 68

grams of crack cocaine — Abney’s offense — was reduced from

10 years to five years. The Sentencing Commission was

required to promulgate new Sentencing Guidelines “as soon as

practicable, and in any event not later than 90 days after the date

of enactment” of the FSA. FSA § 8, 124 Stat. at 2374 (codified

at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note). The Commission did so on a

temporary basis in Amendment 748, which became effective on

November 1, 2010. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

app. C (2015) (Amendment 748). On April 6, 2011, the

Commission made the amendment permanent. Id. app. C

(Amendment 750) (effective Nov. 1, 2011); see also id.

§ 2D1.1(c). Then, on June 30, the Commission made retroactive

the portions of Amendment 750 relevant to the crack-powder

disparity. Id. app. C (Amendment 759) (effective Nov. 1, 2011);

see also id. § 1B1.10(d). Subsequently, on June 21, 2012, the

Supreme Court held in Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321

(2012), that the FSA’s new mandatory minimums applied to

offenders who committed a crack cocaine offense before August

3, 2010 (when the FSA became law), but were not sentenced

until after that date. 

Once the Sentencing Commission made Amendment 750

retroactive, Abney, through new counsel, filed an Unopposed

Motion to Reduce Sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and 28

U.S.C. § 2255. Notably, the motion stated that the government

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did not object to a reduction because “although it was well

know[n] that the FSA was to become imminently effective, Mr.

Abney’s counsel should have asked, but did not, to continue Mr.

Abney’s sentencing in order to obtain the benefits of the

amended statute.” Unopposed Mot. to Reduce Sentence at 2–3

(Oct. 3, 2012) (emphasis added). At the motion hearing, the

prosecutor explained, presciently, that the government, after

consultation with the Criminal and Appellate Divisions of the

United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, did

not oppose the motion because otherwise “the defense could

come back with an argument that counsel was ineffective for

failing to move to delay the sentencing at least one day until the

Fair Sentencing Act was in effect” and there was “significant

litigation risk on that claim.” Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 4, 6 (Apr. 9,

2013) (emphasis added). The prosecutor further advised that in

the government’s view “there is the question of whether the

[district] [c]ourt . . . would have abused its discretion in not

continuing the sentencing date.” Id. at 6. The prosecutor noted

that “there had been fairly widespread attention within the

defense Bar . . . to the fact that the law was going to

change . . . .” Id. at 4. Abney’s new counsel — a federal public

defender — agreed, recounting being unable to “find any other

case like this because frankly most people were continuing the

sentences until after the date [the FSA became effective].” Id.

at 14. 

The district court denied Abney’s unopposed motion for

sentence reduction, stating this court’s precedent “made it clear

that the FSA’s lower mandatory minimum sentences do not

apply retroactively to offenders who were sentenced before the

Act became effective on August 3, 2010.” Mem. Order at 3

(Feb. 7, 2014) (citing United States v. Bigesby, 685 F.3d 1060,

1066 (D.C. Cir. 2012)) (emphasis in original). The court

declined to consider Abney’s ineffective assistance claim,

“constru[ing] [the] motion solely as a motion to reduce his

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sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2),” id. at 2 n.2, because

“Abney ha[d] not expressly raised and fully briefed an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,”

id. at 5 n.4. 

Abney’s present counsel filed an Unopposed Motion for

Reconsideration, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

59(e), on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 28

U.S.C. § 2255. Counsel argued that “[t]here is no conceivable

possible strategy that could cause an attorney to neglect to ask

for a continuance when a law reducing his client’s sentence by

half is immediately forthcoming.” Unopposed Mot. for Recons.

at 8 (Feb. 24, 2014); see also id. at 9–10. The district court

ruled Abney had not satisfied either of Strickland’s prongs: On

performance, counsel’s failure to seek a continuance was not

objectively unreasonable because “it was far from apparent on

the day of [Abney’s] sentencing . . . that the FSA, once enacted,

could apply retroactively to offenders, like Abney, whose

conduct occurred before the FSA’s effective date [for] the FSA

legislation itself contained no retroactivity provision.” Mem.

Order at 2 (Aug. 29, 2014) (emphasis in original). On prejudice,

“it is completely speculative — not ‘reasonably probable’ —

that this Court would have granted a defense motion to continue

the sentencing until some unspecified future date based on the

uncertain applicability of a future law,” id. at 3, especially given

that Abney’s sentencing had already been delayed as a result of

his arrest and incarceration in Maryland, id.

Abney appeals the denial of his Rule 59(e) motion for

reconsideration, and this court granted a certificate of

appealability on the issue of whether sentencing counsel’s

failure to move for a continuance of Abney’s sentencing

constituted ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution. Order, United States v. Abney, No. 14-

3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 2015).

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II.

Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to

succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient. This requires showing that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors

were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair

trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant

makes both showings, it cannot be said that the

conviction or . . . sentence resulted from a breakdown

in the adversary process that renders the result

unreliable.

Id. at 687. “The proper measure of attorney performance” is

“reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at

688. Counsel’s performance is “deficient” when his

representation falls below an objective standard of

reasonableness. United States v. Rodriguez, 676 F.3d 183, 189

(D.C. Cir. 2012). The prejudice prong requires a showing of a

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of [his sentencing] would have been different.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. We first address our standard of

review and then proceed to our analysis of Abney’s claim under

the Strickland test.

A.

Abney appeals the denial of his motion for reconsideration. 

Although this court may “normally review district court denials

of Rule 59(e) motions only for abuse of discretion,” Dyson v.

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District of Columbia, 710 F.3d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2013),

“[t]here are some situations . . . in which we review the District

Court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration de novo,” id.

“This case presents such a situation,” id., because the district

court first considered the merits of Abney’s ineffective

assistance of counsel argument in denying his motion for

reconsideration, see id. Where a district court denies a motion

for reconsideration on the merits, “we . . . review that decision

de novo.” Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron Corp., 683 F.3d 397,

402 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

When the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel has

come before this court in other procedural postures, the court

has purported to remain agnostic on whether the standard of

review of the denial of a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is de novo or for abuse of discretion. See

United States v. Toms, 396 F.3d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In

those cases, the court has held the appeal failed under either

standard. See, e.g., United States v. McDade, 699 F.3d 499, 506

(D.C. Cir. 2012); accord United States v. Newman, 805 F.3d

1143, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2015); United States v. Shabban, 782 F.3d

3, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Where this court has found merit to an

ineffective assistance of counsel argument, however, it has not

characterized what occurred in the district court as an abuse of

discretion but rather has based its conclusion upon review that

was, in fact, de novo. For instance, in Payne v. Stansberry, 760

F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014), the court stated that it was

“review[ing] the district court’s factual findings for clear error

and questions of law de novo,” id. at 13. Similarly, in 

Rodriguez, 676 F.3d at 189–92, the court stated only that it was

applying the two prongs of the Strickland test. In both cases, the

court determined for itself whether counsel was

unconstitutionally ineffective. We now make explicit what

these cases imply: we review de novo a denial of an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. 

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The court is on firm ground in applying a de novo standard. 

The Supreme Court’s analysis in Strickland and its subsequent

ineffective assistance decisions evinces a standard of review

consistent with de novo review. In these cases, the Supreme

Court examines the record independently, with no apparent

deference to the district or state court’s ineffective assistance

analysis. See, e.g., Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081,

1087–90 (2014); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408–10

(2012); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698–700. Virtually all of our

sister circuit courts of appeals apply a de novo standard of

review. See Pham v. United States, 317 F.3d 178, 182 (2d Cir.

2003); United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2002);

United States v. Roane, 378 F.3d 382, 395 (4th Cir. 2004);

United States v. Bass, 310 F.3d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 2002); Mallett

v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2003); United

States v. Fudge, 325 F.3d 910, 923 (7th Cir. 2003); United

States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 508 (8th Cir. 2005); United States

v. Chacon-Palomares, 208 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000);

United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 796 (10th Cir. 2006);

Osley v. United States, 751 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2014); cf.

United States v. Manon, 608 F.3d 126, 132 (1st Cir. 2010). 

B.

To establish deficient performance by counsel under

Strickland’s first prong, a “defendant must overcome the

[strong] presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because “the record does not explicitly disclose . . . counsel’s

actual strategy or lack thereof . . . , the presumption may only be

rebutted through a showing that no sound strategy posited by the

[opposing party, here the government] could have supported the

conduct.” Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491, 500 (3d Cir. 2005)

(citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)). The

government suggests on appeal that Abney’s “counsel might

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have been worried about the potential adverse ramifications of

new minimums for the bargain [Abney] had struck [in pleading

guilty pursuant to a plea agreement] three years before.” 

Appellee’s Br. 23; see also id. at 23–24. In United States v.

Douglas, 644 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2011), the First Circuit observed

that “it may well be arguable that — where the earlier and

higher penalty was part of the bargain — the government may

in certain circumstances be entitled to withdraw from the plea

agreement if the bargain is now frustrated by the change in

penalties.” Id. at 45. Further, the government notes, Abney’s

sentencing had twice been postponed because he was

incarcerated in Maryland, so “with the possibility of an upward

variance looming, counsel might have reasonably concluded that

it would be unwise to press the court for yet a third continuance,

believing this might unduly focus the court on the misconduct

which had necessitated the earlier postponements.” Appellee’s

Br. 25. 

These proffered strategic rationales are implausible. The

plea agreement on its face is not conditioned on Abney’s

receiving a 10-year prison sentence: the agreement repeatedly

disavows any certainty as to sentencing, and it does not grant the

government the authority unilaterally to withdraw from the plea

agreement should the sentence imposed be less than ten years. 

At sentencing the district court was already aware of the

Maryland state charge, which Abney’s counsel noted in his

sentencing memorandum had been dismissed. Further, the

government never indicated to the district court that it would

seek an upward variance. And the district court’s remarks prior

to imposing sentence expressed a preference, in the absence of

the 10-year mandatory minimum, for a Guidelines-range

sentence or a downward departure. On this record, we conclude

that there is no conceivable strategy that would justify the failure

of Abney’s counsel to seek a continuance of sentencing. Rather,

it appears that counsel’s failure stemmed from his unfamiliarity

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with the existence of more than one reasonably likely

interpretation of the FSA. Cf. Varner, 428 F.3d at 501.

“[A]bsent a strategic decision by counsel, the ineffectiveness

prong of Strickland turns on whether an objectively reasonable

attorney would have [sought a continuance] because the issue

had a reasonable likelihood of success. ‘In other words, this is

the rare case where both Strickland prongs turn on the same

question, whether there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome of [Abney’s sentencing] would have been different had

this issue been raised.’” Payne, 760 F.3d at 14 (quoting Roe v.

Delo, 160 F.3d 416, 419 (8th Cir. 1998)). Contrary to the

dissent, Dis. Op. 1–4, this observation does not collapse

Strickland’s two prongs into one. Under the performance prong,

the question hinges on the reasonable probability that courts

would adopt a given interpretation of a new statute, while under

the prejudice prong, the question is whether it was reasonably

probable that a continuance would have been granted. The

analysis under each prong remains distinct. 

Under the first prong of Strickland, counsel’s performance

is “deficient” when counsel’s representation is not objectively

reasonable, see Rodriguez, 676 F.3d at 189, as measured by the

“prevailing professional norms,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 

The failure of Abney’s counsel to seek a continuance of

sentencing was objectively unreasonable and therefore

unconstitutionally deficient. The FSA’s impending enactment

was so important and widely publicized — and the reasonable

likelihood of its retroactive effect so apparent — that objectively

reasonable counsel would have known about it and the open

retroactivity question, irrespective of what Abney’s counsel

subjectively knew. The FSA’s significant reduction in the

mandatory minimum faced by Abney provided sufficient

grounds to pursue the reasonably likely interpretation that the

reduction would apply to offenders sentenced after the date of

its enactment. Clues regarding retroactivity were present at the

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sentencing hearing itself. The district court noted that the

retroactive effect of the FSA was “not out the door” in Abney’s

circumstances, Sentencing Tr. at 7, suggesting there was no need

for additional legislation. The government acknowledged that

the timing of Abney’s sentencing might affect his sentence. 

And illustrative of the “prevailing professional norms,”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, the defense Bar was endeavoring to

preserve the chance that criminal defendants might benefit from

the FSA’s lower mandatory minimums by seeking continuances

until after its enactment, as shown in cases where defendants

were similarly situated to Abney. See, e.g., United States v.

Thompson, 721 F.3d 711, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v.

Fields, 699 F.3d 518, 521–23 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United States v.

McMahon, 422 F. App’x 523, 524–26 (6th Cir. 2011); United

States v. Spires, 628 F.3d 1049, 1055 (8th Cir. 2011); United

States v. McClendon, 379 F. App’x 898, 899–901 (11th Cir.

2010). Abney’s new counsel — a federal public defender — in

seeking a reduction of sentence “couldn’t find any other case

like [Abney’s] because frankly most people were continuing the

sentences until after [the FSA became effective].” Mot. Hr’g Tr.

at 14 (Apr. 9, 2013). The prosecutor’s comments regarding the

defense Bar were similar. Id. at 4. Yet, counsel for Abney

failed to seek a continuance of sentencing. In these

circumstances, that amounted to a failure to provide “reasonably

effective assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

On appeal, the government, like our dissenting colleague, 

has skewed the performance issue in arguing that Dorsey’s

holding was unforeseeable. See Dis. Op. 1, 7–9; Appellee’s Br.

15–20. The retroactive effect of the FSA, the Supreme Court

observed, was ambiguous because “relevant language in

different statutes argue[d] in opposite directions” and the courts

of appeals had reached “different conclusions” on the import of

those statutes. Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2330–31 (referencing

1 U.S.C. § 109 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii)). What is not

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ambiguous is the performance prong issue in Abney’s case. The

issue is not, did Abney receive unconstitutionally inadequate

representation because his counsel failed to seek a benefit for his

client based on an unforeseeable interpretation of the FSA’s

retroactivity? Instead, the performance prong issue is, did

Abney receive unconstitutionally inadequate representation

because counsel failed to seek a benefit for his client based on

one of two reasonably likely but uncertain interpretations of the

FSA’s retroactivity? The interpretation of the FSA adopted in

Dorsey was not a novel invention of the Supreme Court. Prior

to Dorsey, defense attorneys argued — and some courts agreed

— that the FSA’s mandatory minimums applied to pre-FSA

conduct, depending on the date of sentencing. See, e.g., United

States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 198–203 (3d Cir. 2011); Douglas,

644 F.3d at 42–44. Even prior to congressional passage of the

FSA, defense attorneys who sought sentencing continuances —

including counsel’s fellow federal public defenders — realized

that it was reasonably likely that the date of sentencing would

determine the applicability of the FSA’s lower mandatory

minimums. See, e.g., Thompson, 721 F.3d at 712, 714; Fields,

699 F.3d at 519, 521–23.

Where sentencing benefits are available under existing law,

this court has concluded that counsel is ineffective when he fails

to advocate on his client’s behalf at sentencing. See Rodriguez,

676 F.3d at 191; United States v. Soto, 132 F.3d 56, 59 (D.C.

Cir. 1997). Whether counsel’s representation is deficient due to

misinterpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines or failure to

invoke a salient Guidelines provision, “such drastic missteps

clearly satisfy Strickland’s first test: They amount to errors ‘so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’” Soto, 132

F.3d at 59 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “‘[F]amiliarity

with the structure and basic content of the Guidelines . . . has

become a necessity for counsel who seek to give effective

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17

representation.’” United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1512

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States

v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992)). 

In view of counsel’s “overarching duty to advocate the

defendant’s cause,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, Abney’s

counsel could not remain silent when there was a substantial

sentencing benefit — a five-year reduction in the mandatory

minimum — that was reasonably likely to apply to his client if

his sentencing were postponed. Counsel had an obligation to

examine the FSA with enough care to detect what other counsel 

already had, namely the reasonable likelihood that courts would

interpret the FSA’s mandatory minimums provision to apply to

defendants sentenced after its effective date. That was one of

two interpretations of the FSA available at the time of Abney’s

sentencing that courts were reasonably likely to adopt. Both

interpretations revolved around the General Saving Statute, 1

U.S.C. § 109, which establishes a presumption against

retroactivity for new criminal laws that reduce penalties in an

earlier statute. The presumption, however, is rebutted if the new

statute expressly or by “fair implication” indicates that Congress

intended it to have retroactive effect. See Warden, Lewisburg

Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 659 n.10 (1974). One of

the available interpretations was that the FSA does not clearly

evince congressional intent to give the FSA’s mandatory

minimums retroactive effect. See Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2339–44

(Scalia, J., dissenting). Counsel’s error here appears to have

been that he assumed this was the only available interpretation

of the FSA and that the FSA could not be fairly read to imply

that Congress intended its mandatory minimums to apply to all

defendants sentenced after its enactment. Hence, counsel

concluded “subsequent legislation” was necessary to render the

FSA’s minimums applicable to Abney. Sentencing Tr. at 6.

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18

The other available interpretation was that the FSA does

fairly imply that Congress wanted its mandatory minimums to

apply to defendants sentenced after its enactment. The FSA

reduced the mandatory minimum sentencing disparity from 100-

to-1 to 18-to-1 for crack and powder offenses, FSA § 2(a), 124

Stat. at 2372, and Congress directed the Sentencing Commission

to “promulgate the guidelines, policy statements, or amendments

provided for in this Act as soon as practicable, and in any event

not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act,”

and to “make such conforming amendments” to the Guidelines

as needed “to achieve consistency with other guideline

provisions and applicable law,” FSA § 8, 124 Stat. at 2374. A

core feature of federal sentencing under the Sentencing Reform

Act of 1984 is that the applicable Sentencing Guidelines are

those in force at the time of sentencing, not at the time of the

underlying offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii). Reasonably

competent counsel are expected to be familiar with such basic

precepts of the federal sentencing regime. Cf. Rodriguez, 676

F.3d at 191; Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1512. Familiarity here would

have alerted Abney’s counsel to the unusual result that flows

from interpreting the FSA’s lower mandatory minimums to

apply only to post-FSA conduct. Congress had mandated the

Sentencing Commission to establish new Guidelines based on

an 18-to-1 crack-to-powder ratio so as to promptly end the

sentencing unfairness it rejected in the FSA. Depending on the

Commission’s dispatch, new Guidelines could have gone into

effect any day within 90 days after enactment. Once in effect

the new Guidelines would apply immediately, so that a

defendant sentenced then and thereafter for a pre-FSA cracktrafficking offense would face a Guidelines range based on the

18-to-1 ratio. Yet, if the pre-FSA mandatory minimums still

applied to such offenders, a defendant subject to a Guidelines

range based on the 18-to-1 ratio would nevertheless face a

mandatory minimum sentence based on the 100-to-1 ratio. 

Congress passed the FSA in response to the Sentencing

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19

Commission’s repeated recommendations that the crack-topowder ratio be reduced, see Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2328–29, and

it was widely known that the purpose of the FSA was to

eliminate the 100-to-1 disparity, which Congress had declared

unfair, see, e.g., FSA pmbl., 124 Stat. at 2372. Why would

Congress insist on the near-immediate reduction of the 100-to-1

disparity in the Sentencing Guidelines for defendants sentenced

after the FSA’s enactment but leave in place for those same

defendants the old, unfair mandatory minimums? Counsel

would not have had any reason, where the question remained

open, to conclude courts would inevitably embrace an

interpretation of the FSA that preserved the mandatory

minimums when courts had long noted the unfairness of the

100-to-1 disparity. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552

U.S. 85, 109–11 (2007). 

Counsel was not required to predict which of these

interpretations would ultimately carry the day. He was merely

required to consider the FSA carefully enough to recognize there

was more than one available interpretation courts were

reasonably likely to adopt — one of which would benefit his

client — and to seek a continuance so that his client would

benefit if the favorable interpretation prevailed. “In these

circumstances, reasonably effective counsel would have raised

the issue, if for no other reason than to preserve” the possibility

that Abney could benefit from the FSA’s lower mandatory

minimum. See United States v. Marshall, 669 F.3d 288, 293

(D.C. Cir. 2011).

The government’s new response on appeal misses the mark. 

It maintains that Abney’s “counsel cannot be faulted for failing

to anticipate, and act upon, Dorsey’s complex and novel legal

ruling.” Appellee’s Br. 19; see also Dis. Op. 1, 7–9, 13–14. 

Such clairvoyance is not the test under Strickland. See

Maryland v. Kulbicki, 136 S. Ct. 2, 4–5 (2015); cf. Brown v.

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20

United States, 311 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 2002); Bullock v.

Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir. 2002). Instead, due

diligence required that counsel press available, reasonably likely

interpretations of the FSA in seeking a continuance of his

client’s sentencing. This is not a case where the ultimate

interpretation of the FSA in Dorsey was “unpredictab[le],” as

the government would have it. Appellee’s Br. 17; see also Dis.

Op. 1, 7–9, 13–14. Prior to Dorsey, lower courts reached the

same interpretive conclusion the Supreme Court reached. See

Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2330 (collecting cases). Indeed, according

to some jurists, application of the FSA’s new mandatory

minimums to any defendant sentenced after its enactment was

the “only implication that makes sense,” given the words

Congress chose, United States v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445, 456

(7th Cir. 2011) (Williams, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing

en banc), and a different reading would produce “absurd

results,” id. at 461 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of

rehearing en banc). As these jurists explained, to interpret the

FSA otherwise would be to impute to Congress the puzzling

intent that defendants be sentenced under Sentencing Guidelines

consistent with the new 18-to-1 ratio but under mandatory

minimums based on the old 100-to-1 disparity, which Congress

had deemed unfair. Nor is this a case where counsel had to

predict anything. Abney’s counsel had only to read the law

passed by Congress and consider it in light of an existing

sentencing principle — that the applicable Guidelines are those

in effect at the time of sentencing, not at the time of the

underlying offense — to recognize the reasonable likelihood that

courts would interpret the FSA’s mandatory minimums to apply

based on the date of sentencing. 

Of course, “Abney’s counsel could not have known that the

President would sign the FSA the [day after Abney’s scheduled

sentencing]. But this is a quibble, for the record shows that . . .

Abney’s counsel believed that as of July 28 [five days before

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21

Abney’s scheduled sentencing] the law would ‘soon be in

place,’” Appellant’s Br. 22 (citing Def.’s Mem. in Aid of

Sentencing at 2 n.1), and counsel “could have requested a

continuance for no longer than the mere ten days the President

had to sign the bill into law,” id. As Abney rightly notes,

“[w]hile retroactivity tied to the date of sentencing still

presented the question of whether August 3, 2010 (the date of

the FSA’s enactment) or November 1, 2010 (the latest date the

FSA-mandated amended guidelines could have come into 

effect) . . . was the significant date, that uncertainty does not

validate counsel’s failure.” Reply Br. 5 n.2 (internal citation

omitted). Objectively reasonable counsel would have sought a

continuance to ensure that Abney was sentenced after the FSA

became law. There was no strategic reason not to, and the

failure to do so was unjustifiable because “it cost the defense

nothing and the possible benefit . . . was undoubtedly

significant,” United States v. Hylton, 294 F.3d 130, 134 (D.C.

Cir. 2002). 

Our dissenting colleague’s primary disagreement with this

performance prong analysis is that it demands too much of

defense counsel. Dis. Op. 3–4, 8–9. Not so. As this court has

long acknowledged (see, e.g., Soto, Gaviria, supra), the Sixth

Amendment requires defense counsel to keep apprised of

changes to sentencing law that may affect his client and to

invoke them appropriately. Nothing in the court’s analysis today

would obligate counsel blindly “to pursue any action that might

reasonably benefit the client.” Dis. Op. 3. Instead, Abney’s case

concerns the imminent enactment of watershed sentencing

reform that cut in half the mandatory minimum sentence he was

facing, by five years. Counsel was not only obligated to be

aware of this fact, as Abney’s counsel was, but in the absence of

any strategic considerations, counsel was also obligated to

pursue sentencing benefits arising from available, reasonably

probable interpretations of new sentencing laws. This standard

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22

does not oblige counsel to take into account any and every

possible interpretation. Consistent with professional standards

and constitutional requirements, it reflects what defense counsel

should be doing already. See, e.g., Thompson, 721 F.3d at 714;

Fields, 699 F.3d at 521–23; McMahon, 422 F. App’x at 524–26;

Spires, 628 F.3d at 1055; McClendon, 379 F. App’x at 899–901;

see also Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 14 (Apr. 9, 2013). After all, basic

statutory interpretation is a regular feature of the work of any

reasonably competent defense counsel. And, as discussed, there

are no strategic considerations here to excuse Abney’s counsel’s

failure to act on a reasonably probable interpretation of a statute

that could benefit his client. See Dis. Op. 4, 9–10. Rather,

Abney’s counsel’s approach was guided by a misunderstanding

of the FSA, a failure that stemmed from legal error, not strategic

decisionmaking. To the extent our dissenting colleague does not

believe counsel misunderstood the FSA at all, that objection is

not grounded in Strickland or the facts of Abney’s case but

represents a criticism of the majority’s interpretation of the FSA

in Dorsey. Id. at 13–14. 

Congress’s actual passage of the FSA and the imminence of

the President’s signature — as well as the failure of Abney’s

counsel to seek a continuance — distinguish our decisions in

Thompson, 721 F.3d 711, and Fields, 699 F.3d 518. In

Thompson, 721 F.3d at 714–15, the court held that counsel did

not render ineffective assistance when he tried and failed to

secure a continuance of sentencing until after enactment of the

FSA, where passage of that statute was still seven months away

and entirely speculative. Similarly, in Fields, 699 F.3d at

521–23, there was no abuse of discretion when the district court

denied a continuance eight months before the FSA became law,

when its enactment was anything but guaranteed. The same

distinction applies to other cases the government cites. See

Becerra v. United States, Nos. 7:09-CR-79-D, 7:12-CV-265-D,

2013 WL 2285350, at *6 (E.D.N.C. May 23, 2013); Torres v.

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23

United States, Civ. A. No. 3:12-01167, Crim. A. No. 3:09-00110,

2013 WL 1349126, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 1, 2013); United

States v. Jeanpierre, No. 07CR439(6), 2012 WL 4898182, at *2

(D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2012); United States v. Richardson, Crim.

No. 08-397, Civ. No. 11-2321, 2011 WL 6003952, at *3 (D.

Minn. Nov. 30, 2011); United States v. Musallet, Nos. 07-20099,

11-2008, 2011 WL 1303305, at *2–3 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 2011).

C.

Under Strickland’s second, but-for prejudice prong, 466

U.S. at 694, the objective inquiry continues. Importantly, the

Supreme Court has instructed that the prejudice inquiry does

“not depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular

decisionmaker,” id. at 695, but rather requires an appellate court

to consider how a motion for a continuance would have been

evaluated by a hypothetical judge “reasonably, conscientiously,

and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision,”

id. 

In United States v. Gantt, 140 F.3d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1998),

this court identified the factors to be weighed by a district court

in considering a motion for a continuance to include: 

the length of the requested delay; whether other

continuances have been requested and granted; the

balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants,

witnesses, counsel, and the court; whether the requested

delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory,

purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant

contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the

request for a continuance; whether the defendant has

other competent counsel prepared to try the case,

including the consideration of whether the other

counsel was retained as lead or associate counsel; [and]

whether denying the continuance will result in

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24

identifiable prejudice to defendant’s case, and if so,

whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial

nature. 

Id. at 256 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490–91 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). These factors

weigh in Abney’s favor, and it is reasonably likely that, had a

continuance of sentencing been sought, Strickland’s reasonable,

conscientious, and impartial district court would have granted it,

see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 

By the time Abney was scheduled to be sentenced, the FSA

had been passed by both houses of Congress and was mere days

away from the President’s signature. The FSA’s text made it

reasonably likely, even if not a certainty, that courts would

interpret the FSA to apply to offenders like Abney who had yet

to be sentenced. To interpret the FSA otherwise would result in

the same defendant being subject to Guidelines reflecting the

FSA’s reduced crack-powder disparity while still subject to the

old statutory mandatory minimums that Congress had already

found unfair, a result some jurists concluded “would ‘undercut

the bill’s primary objective,’ ‘result in sentencing anomalies

Congress surely did not intend,’ benefit the ‘worst offenders,’

give ‘rise to . . . oddities,’ and ‘not necessarily promote more

equitable outcomes,’” Holcomb, 657 F.3d at 460 (Williams, J.,

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting Abbott v.

United States, 562 U.S. 8, 20–22 (2010)). See Dorsey, 132 S. Ct.

at 2331–35; Holcomb, 657 F.3d at 453–57 (Williams, J.,

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 461–63

(Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Dixon,

648 F.3d at 198–203; Douglas, 644 F.3d at 42–44. Under the

FSA, had his sentencing been continued, Abney would have been

subject to a mandatory minimum sentence half as long as the one

under which he was sentenced. Although the district court had

granted the government two previous continuances due to

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25

Abney’s incarceration in Maryland, delay for which Abney bears

responsibility, the other relevant Gantt factors, taken together,

indicate that it was reasonably probable an objectively

reasonable judge would have granted a request to postpone

Abney’s sentencing: the length of the requested delay would

have been finite; the inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses,

counsel, and the district court would have been minimal so far as

the record indicates; the requested delay would have been for

legitimate reasons; Abney would not have contributed to the

circumstances that gave rise to this particular request for a

continuance; and denying the continuance would have resulted

in his identifiable and substantial prejudice. See Gantt, 140 F.3d

at 256. 

Our dissenting colleague emphasizes delay in Abney’s

sentencing, Dis. Op. 9–10, but ignores both the balance of the

Gantt factors and that Abney was not at liberty pending

sentencing. Nor is any precedent offered for the novel

proposition, contrary to the Supreme Court’s instruction in

Strickland, that an appeals court should accept the subjective

“assessment,” id. at 12, of a particular district court judge. The

dissent’s approach would replace Strickland’s objective

prejudice analysis with a test that falls somewhere between a

subjective inquiry and a deference doctrine. Additionally, as

reported cases reversing district courts make obvious, the court’s

analysis requiring a remand for resentencing is neither

“discrediting” nor “abusing” the district court. Id. 

Finally, it was reasonably probable that if the FSA had

applied, Abney would have received a lower sentence. Prior to

the FSA, a 10-year mandatory minimum constrained the district

court’s sentencing discretion. The FSA halved the minimum,

reducing the mandatory minimum to five years. Given

Congress’s redetermination of the appropriate minimum and its

emphasis in the FSA on promptly lowering sentences for crack

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26

cocaine offenses under revised Guidelines, there is no reason to

conclude that an objective, “reasonabl[e], conscientious[], and

impartial[]” district judge, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695,

sentencing Abney after the FSA became effective would impose

a prison term of 10 years or more. “On this record, we believe

there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that [Abney] would have

received a lower sentence had his Guidelines range factored in

[the five-year mandatory minimum].” Rodriguez, 676 F.3d at

192 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

Accordingly, because Abney has shown that his counsel’s

performance at sentencing was objectively unreasonable and that

he suffered prejudice as a result, we reverse the denial of his

motion for reconsideration and remand the case to the district

court for resentencing under the FSA.

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BROWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: It is hard to say whether a 

medium or a fortune-teller would be best suited for this 

case. The Court’s opinion seems to be one part Back to the 

Future, requiring trial counsel to possess a DeLorean, a flux 

capacitor and the inventiveness of the fictional Doc Brown in 

order to render competent assistance to a client. But it is 

another part Zombie Apocalypse, intent on disinterring the 

grisly remains of the long defunct approach of purposive 

judicial interpretation. Because neither approach is consistent 

with precedent and our judicial responsibilities, I respectfully 

dissent.

It seems silly to recite again the familiar ineffectiveassistance standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984), but circumstances demand clarity. Under the 

Strickland framework, a defendant must first establish 

“counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. If so, the defendant must then 

demonstrate the deficient performance was prejudicial by 

showing “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)

(quoting Strickland, at 694).

Today, the Court replaces this familiar two-part test with 

a one-part test of its own making. Under this new version of 

Strickland, an attorney’s conduct is ineffective if the attorney 

failed to pursue an action that “had a reasonable likelihood of 

success.” Maj. Op. at 13. The Court is open about this 

elision, calling this “the rare case where both Strickland 

prongs turn on the same question, whether there is a 

reasonable probability that the outcome of [Abney’s 

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2

sentencing] would have been different had this issue been 

raised.” Maj. Op. at 13-14. 

Examination reveals this novel conception of the 

Strickland standard has a limited lineage and, in our circuit, a 

common progenitor. Only three circuit court opinions have 

ever stated that the two prongs of Strickland operate, in rare 

instances, as one. See Etherton v. Rivard, 800 F.3d 737 (6th 

Cir. 2015), petition for cert. pending, Docket No. 15-723; 

Payne v. Stansberry, 760 F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014); and Roe v. 

Delo, 160 F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 1998). The idea originated in 

dicta in Roe, a case in which counsel failed to raise a plainerror claim on appeal despite what the court found to be a

reasonable possibility that such a claim would succeed under 

the circumstances. See 160 F.3d at 420. Counsel could not 

recall why the claim had been omitted and stated that,

whatever the reason, it was not a strategic decision. Id. at 

418-19.

This Court picked up the idea sixteen years later, in an 

opinion authored by the same judge writing for the majority 

today. Payne, 760 F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Citing only 

Roe’s diktat for support, this Court professed to have found 

another “rare case” in which the two prongs of Strickland 

mean the same thing. Payne, 760 F.3d at 14. The Court 

recycles the same language today—raising the curious 

question of how the “rare” cases in which the Strickland 

standard conveniently reduces itself to a one-part efficacy test

has occurred twice in little more than a year. Is there now a 

reasonable possibility this rarity will soon become routine?

The single-prong Strickland test has a shallow 

provenance for good reason. It is an elision of an important 

constitutional test that results in substantively different 

outcomes. The Court imports the reasonable probability

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3

standard of Strickland’s second part into its first part. Under 

this novel formulation, a defendant who satisfies the second, 

prejudice prong of Strickland will always satisfy the first, 

objective-standard prong of Strickland, because whether an 

attorney’s conduct fell below a professional standard depends 

on whether the attorney took every step that had some 

reasonable possibility of success for the client. By collapsing 

Strickland into this single step, the Court transforms the 

objective standard of Strickland into a retroactive assessment 

of the “rightness” of a defendant’s outcome. Defendants who 

could have had better outcomes if their counsel had made 

different arguments will, by inference, have received 

ineffective assistance. Under the Court’s approach, a lawyer 

is obligated to pursue any action that might reasonably benefit 

the client. Failing to do so constitutes unreasonable attorney 

conduct, and hence, it amounts to constitutionally ineffective 

assistance. 

This is not the approach endorsed by Strickland. 

Strickland’s second prong is about whether a defendant was 

prejudiced by his counsel’s ineffective assistance. But a court 

may reach the second prong only if counsel’s performance is 

adjudged ineffective under an objective standard. That’s 

because the second prong of the Strickland test is remedial in 

natureit’s not about whether there was a constitutional 

violation but about what we do after we know there was a 

constitutional violation. If a defendant’s outcome would have 

been the same, we say the constitutional violation was 

harmless. If there is a “reasonable probability” the outcome 

would have been different, then we take some type of action 

to remedy the constitutional problem.

Today the Court says the existence of a “reasonable 

probability” of a different outcome actually answers the first 

prong of Strickland: whether there was a constitutional 

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4

violation in the first place. Never mind that prong one of 

Strickland has its own standards for determining whether a 

constitutional violation occurs—standards that focus entirely 

on the realm of reasonable legal strategies, not the range of 

preferable legal outcomes. Strickland has always been about 

acknowledging the strategic aspect of lawyering. It is a 

commonplace observation that a lawyer simply cannot predict 

what will and will not work. Defendants have no right to 

counsel with flawless judgment; rather, the purpose of the 

right to effective counsel “is simply to ensure that criminal 

defendants receive a fair trial.” Id. at 689. 

The worst part of the Court’s new, amalgamated

Strickland standard is that it doesn’t work. Trial counsel 

often face multiple strategic options, each presenting a 

reasonable possibility of benefitting the client’s interests, but 

also presenting a reasonable possibility of harming the client’s 

interests. For example, in most circumstances, when defense 

counsel considers whether to present a witness, there is a 

reasonable possibility the witness will benefit the client’s 

case, but also some possibility the witness will be a dud or 

even diminish the client in the jury’s eyes. If we secondguessed all of counsel’s decisions on the basis of whether they 

might have had a reasonable possibility of changing an 

outcome, then nearly any decision that doesn’t pan out would 

amount to ineffective assistance. And that is exactly what 

Strickland says we shouldn’t do: “Judicial scrutiny of 

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and 

“every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting 

effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 

from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689.

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5

So applying the Strickland standard in the right order, we 

should ask whether Abney’s counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance in the first place—whether it was objectively 

unreasonable for counsel not to seek a continuance of 

Abney’s sentencing on the basis of the pending Fair 

Sentencing Act. 

To start, we know Abney’s counsel was aware of the Fair 

Sentencing Act, which was then awaiting the President’s 

signing decision. Abney’s counsel noted at sentencing that 

“new penalties will soon be in place” that would leave Abney 

“much more harshly punished than those committing and 

convicted of the same crime in the near future.” J.A. 18. But 

Abney’s counsel did not think Abney could benefit from the 

new law’s more lenient penalties “absent subsequent 

legislation making [the Fair Sentencing Act] 

retroactive.” J.A. at 25. In other words, Abney’s counsel was 

aware of the developing legal changes, and he considered the 

law’s applicability to Abney. Cf. Torres v. United States, 

2013 WL 1349126, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Apr. 1, 2013) (finding 

counsel sufficient despite no evidence counsel actually knew 

of the Fair Sentencing Act’s impending enactment). Counsel 

concluded, however, that it would take some form of 

retroactivity to make Abney’s pre-Act crimes eligible for 

post-Act penalties, a view of the Act that both the government 

and the district court shared.

Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. 

L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, without any explicit provision 

addressing whether and how pre-Act offenders would be 

treated under the law. The language of the Act was forwardlooking. Even the Court acknowledges today that “[t]he 

retroactive effect of the [Fair Sentencing Act] was 

ambiguious” as enacted. Maj. Op. at 15.

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After President Obama signed the Act into law, courts 

confronted the question of the Act’s possible 

retroactivity. This Court agreed with every other circuit court 

to address the issue: “there [was] simply ‘no evidence that 

Congress intended the [Fair Sentencing Act] to apply to 

defendants who had been sentenced prior to the August 3, 

2010 date of the Act’s enactment.” United States v. Bigesby, 

685 F.3d 1060, 1066 (D.C. Cir 2012). For defendants who 

committed their crimes before that date but were 

sentenced after enactment, however, the results were more 

mixed. 

Three circuits concluded defendants who committed their 

crimes before the Act took effect could not take advantage of 

its lower sentences, even if they were sentenced after the Act 

was implemented. United States v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 

336, 339–340 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding Act does not apply to 

those who committed their crimes before August 3, 

2010); United States v. Sidney, 648 F.3d 904, 910 (8th Cir. 

2011) (same); United States v. Tickles, 661 F. 3d 212, 215 

(5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (same). In his statement 

respecting the denial of en banc rehearing, Judge Easterbrook 

eloquently explained the reasoning behind this view. United 

States v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2011). Prior to its 

decision in Dorsey, the Supreme Court “never held any 

change in a criminal penalty to be partially retroactive.” Id. at 

446. Retroactivity had historically been an all-or-nothing 

proposition. Criminal statutes with retroactive application 

applied to all individuals regardless of the date on which they 

committed their crimes, while prospective statutes applied 

only to individuals who committed their crimes after the 

effective date of the new legislation. See id. This 

understanding of retroactivity did not depend on the date of 

sentencing, “which reflects how long it took to catch a 

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criminal, and the state of the district judge’s calendar, rather 

than principles of deterrence or desert.” Id. at 447. 

Three other circuits concluded that pre-Act offenders 

could take advantage of the Act’s lower mandatory 

minimums. These circuits adopted a “partial retroactivity”

approach, in which the Act applied retroactively to those who 

committed their offenses before its enactment but were 

sentenced afterwards. These “partial retroactivity” circuits, 

however, could not agree on which date would make the 

critical difference for sentencing purposes. The First Circuit 

held the Act’s new mandatory minimums applied only to 

defendants sentenced after the new sentencing guidelines 

went into effect on November, 1, 2010. United States v. 

Douglas, 644 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011). But in the Third 

and Eleventh Circuits, defendants received the benefit of the 

Act’s new minimums if they were sentenced on or after 

August 3, 2010. United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 203 

(3d. Cir. 2011); United States v. Rojas, 645 F.3d 1234 (11th 

Cir. 2011). 

“In light of [this] disagreement” among the circuit courts 

of appeals, the Supreme Court took up the Act’s retroactivity 

question, and in a 5-4 decision, held “the Fair Sentencing 

Act’s new, lower mandatory minimums apply to the post-Act 

sentencing of pre-Act offenders.” Dorsey v. United States,

132 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012). The Court itself acknowledged 

the partial-retroactivity interpretation was not obvious. 

Rather, the “timing issue...is difficult in part because relevant 

language in different statutes argues in opposite directions.” 

132 S. Ct. at 2330. Five members of the Court resolved the 

statutory chaos through a matrix of “six considerations, 

[which] taken together, convince us that Congress intended 

the Fair Sentencing Act’s more lenient penalties to apply to 

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those offenders whose crimes preceded August 3, 2010, but 

who are sentenced after that date.” Id. at 2331. 

Given that background, it is impossible to say Abney’s 

counsel performed incompetently by not asking for a 

continuance of Abney’s sentencing. At the time Abney’s 

counsel decided whether to seek a continuance, no court had 

yet enunciated the theory of partial retroactivity. Even when 

that theory emerged, federal courts divided over whether it 

was a proper interpretation of the Act. Moreover, the 

Supreme Court was itself divided over the theory, by a 5-4 

vote. And even for those justices in the majority, the partialretroactivity interpretation was, at best, a means of sorting out 

a tangle of statutory language pulling in different directions.

In contrast to what the Court says, then, counsel here neither 

ignored established guidelines, United States v. Soto, 132 F.3d 

56, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding counsel was ineffective for 

ignoring a relevant Guideline provision), nor failed to 

demonstrate familiarity with settled legal principles, Thomas 

v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491, 501 (3rd. Cir. 2005) (stating courts 

routinely declare counsel ineffective when counsel fails to 

present a strong defense because of unfamiliarity with clearly 

settled legal principles), nor ignored established case 

precedent interpreting guidelines, United States v. Gaviria, 

116 F.3d 1498, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Here, counsel did not face “two reasonably likely but 

uncertain readings of the [Fair Sentencing Act],” as the Court 

insists. Maj. Op. at 15. Counsel had every reason to believe 

retroactivity would continue to be the all-or-nothing concept it 

had always been—retroactive or prospective, but nothing in 

between. See Holcomb, 657 F.3d at 446 (statement of 

Easterbrook, J.). It is irrelevant, as the Court states, that 

before Dorsey, some “defense attorneys argued—and some 

courts agreed” that the Fair Sentencing Act was susceptible to 

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a novel, partial-retroactivity interpretation. Maj. Op. at 15. 

Those arguments arose well after the time by which Abney’s 

counsel would have had to decide whether to seek a 

continuance. Counsel’s legal judgment cannot be impugned 

on the basis of creative arguments that were yet to be made. 

The Court asserts the outcome of Dorsey was 

“reasonably likely,” and therefore counsel should have taken 

steps to ensure that his client’s interests were protected if this 

“reasonably likely” interpretation ultimately carried the 

day. Yet the analysis offers no support for its view that 

the Dorsey result was “reasonably likely” aside from its own 

say-so. The best the court can muster is the fact that some 

other defense counsel were seeking continuances at this time. 

This assertion, however, only demonstrates 

that some attorneys thought the date of sentencing might be of 

subsequent importance, not that all competent attorneys 

would think so. A few motions hardly serve as the kind of 

professional norm contemplated in Strickland. See 466 U.S. 

at 688. Furthermore, we have no comparison of the facts of 

these other cases. We do not know if these other defendants 

had also been the source of long sentencing delays, as Abney 

had been, or whether they had also committed their crimes 

long before the Act was even out of committee. We cannot 

measure Abney’s counsel’s conduct against the standard of 

these other defense attorneys without knowing that those 

attorneys found themselves in substantively similar positions. 

 

Not only could Abney’s counsel not have reasonably 

predicted the Court’s partial-retroactivity approach in Dorsey, 

he was also laboring under the limitations of his client’s 

case—which gave him sound, strategic reasons for not 

seeking a continuance. Under ordinary circumstances, a short 

continuance might be a small ask, but Abney’s was no 

ordinary case: by the time of his scheduled sentencing 

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hearing, he had already been avoiding sentencing for nearly 

three years. After initially facing a ten-year mandatory 

minimum sentence, Abney had entered a plea agreement with 

the government in which he agreed to provide investigative 

assistance in exchange for his release with supervision. See 

Appellee Br. 3–4. Thus, he could, through his own initiative, 

dramatically reduce his sentence. But Abney could not bring 

himself to fulfill the conditions of his release: he tested 

positive for cocaine and marijuana; he “waterloaded” his 

urine samples in an effort to thwart his mandatory drug 

testing; he failed to appear for drug tests; and, ultimately, he 

lost contact altogether with supervising law 

enforcement. Above all of this, the government never 

received any cooperation from Abney. Realizing that they 

had been duped, the government obtained a sentencing date of 

October 13, 2009. Abney again managed to avoid sentencing, 

this time because Maryland authorities arrested and detained 

him on charges of attempted first-degree murder. J.A. 

11. Abney’s subsequent incarceration in Maryland forced the 

district court to postpone his sentencing twice. J.A. 14.

So it was that Abney arrived at his August 2, 2010,

sentencing hearing, having already spent nearly three years—

much of it as a free man—avoiding the imposition of his 

sentence. Indeed, it is a mere accident of history that Abney’s 

Fair Sentencing Act near-miss is a near-miss at all. Had he 

been sentenced according to a more conventional schedule, he 

would have needed a continuance of at least many months, 

and likely years. A continuance of that kind would certainly 

not have been granted. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 699 

F.3d 518, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying postponement while Act was pending 

because pending legislation was too far off to be compelled 

consideration at sentencing) (internal citation omitted).

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The problems with the Court’s approach do not stop 

there. Even if Abney’s counsel had suspected partial 

retroactivity would become the rule, on what date would 

retroactivity take effect? Would counsel have needed a 

continuance of ten days, enough time to allow the law to be 

signed? Or a few months, to allow time for new sentencing 

guidelines to be written and go into effect? See United States 

v. Thompson, 721 F.3d 711, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (affirming 

district court’s denial of a continuance and stay of sentencing 

several months prior to the Act’s passage); Fields, 699 F.3d at 

521 (same). Even the Court does not know how long the 

Constitution would require competent counsel to continue the 

proceedings. Maj. Op. at 20 (endorsing Abney’s 

acknowledgment that whether August 3 or November 1 would 

be the relevant date was unclear, and yet holding such 

confusion cannot “validate counsel’s failure” to seek a 

continuance of indeterminate length). 

 

Even were we to accept that Abney’s counsel performed 

ineffectively, Abney would still need to satisfy Strickland’s 

second prong by showing “a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694. Because the effect of Dorsey is to lessen the sentence 

of defendants sentenced on or after August 3, 2010, the 

prejudice question turns on whether Abney would have gotten 

a continuance had his lawyer sought one. 

Continuances fall within the discretion of the trial judge, 

United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1978),

and are reviewed “only to determine whether the judge clearly 

abused his discretion.” United States v. Gantt, 140 F.3d 249, 

256 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Review must assess “the circumstances 

in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial 

judge at the time the request is denied.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 

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376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) (emphasis added). The Court, 

relying on a hypothetical, dispassionate decision-maker—a 

“reasonable, conscientious, and impartial district court,” Maj. 

Op. at 23—speculates that Abney’s request would have been

granted. In fact, we do not need to speculate about what 

would have happened if Abney’s counsel had sought a 

continuance: the sentencing judge answered the question in 

his opinion below, saying he would have been unlikely to 

grant a continuance and further “delay reaching finality on a 

three-year-old plea.” J.A. 87. The district court “considered 

whether the Fair Sentencing Act could benefit Abney, but 

came to the reasonable estimation that “it was unclear that 

[the Fair Sentencing Act] would even apply retroactively to 

Abney.” Id. The district court concluded it was “completely 

speculative—not reasonably probable” that a motion for 

continuance to some “unspecified future date” would have 

been granted. Id. Given the broad authority district court 

judges have to manage their calendars and grant or deny 

continuances, the district court’s assessment amounts to a 

reasonable exercise of discretion. The Court disagrees. Even 

after upending the Strickland standard, the Court can only 

make a case for prejudice by discrediting the district court as 

“[un]reasonable, [un]conscientious, and [ ]partial.” See Maj. 

Op. at 23.

But abusing the district court is still not enough. Rather 

than defer to the sentencing judge’s reasonable assessment of 

the likelihood of his granting relief, the Court takes yet 

another unpredictable step, relying on de novo review. 

Whether de novo review applies in these circumstances is a 

question this Circuit has left unanswered for nearly thirty 

years. See, e.g., United States v. Askew, 88 F.3d 1065, 1071 

(D.C. Cir. 1996). Today, the Court decides that question, and 

applying de novo review, it concludes that granting a 

continuance would have been likely. 

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At the heart of the Court’s misreading of Strickland is a 

misapprehension about the realities of our republican form of 

government. The Court seems baffled that Congress would 

“insist on the near-immediate reduction of the 100-to-1 

disparity in the Sentencing Guidelines for defendants 

sentenced after the [Fair Sentencing Act’s] enactment but 

leave in place for those same defendants the old, unfair 

mandatory minimums.” Maj. Op. at 18. Congress did not 

address retroactivity in the Fair Sentencing Act, in all 

likelihood, because it could not do so; had the Act taken up 

that issue, it may well have never garnered the votes 

necessary for passage. In our form of government, legislative 

compromise often produces imperfect outcomes. Here, those 

imperfections are most evident in the line-drawing problems 

caused by the new minimums. But this should not surprise 

the Court. Dorsey, in fact, recognizes that there are linedrawing problems with the application of the new 

minimums: pre-Act offenders who were also sentenced preAct remain in prison, serving lengthy sentences premised on a 

now-rejected cocaine-to-powder ratio. See 132 S. Ct. at 

2335. The only solution for this disparity is a congressional 

act making the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive, even for preAct offenders; absent this, there is no way to even out the 

ratio-based sentences being served by all offenders. 

Instead, the Court attempts to smooth out some of the 

disparity on its own, by moving Abney from the old, 

discredited sentencing regime into the new one. And it’s not 

easy. First, the Court revises the Strickland test, from two 

prongs into one. Second, the Court decides to apply de novo 

review, forcing an answer to a question unsettled in this 

jurisdiction for more than thirty years. I do not doubt that in 

its determination to rescue Abney, the Court acts with good 

intentions. In Dorsey, the high court acted with similar 

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motives when it decided to pick and choose among opposing 

provisions to make the Fair Sentencing Act’s more lenient 

provisions available to a larger number of defendants. That 

result might be what Congress should have adopted or would 

have enacted had decades of study produced sufficient votes. 

Instead, the Supreme Court fashioned an ad hoc measure to 

implement its widely-favored policy and in doing so offered 

neither rule nor guidance for future cases. If separation of 

powers is to have any meaning, the result in Dorsey cannot be 

deemed ordinary—certainly not so ordinary that counsel 

should be trained to expect it.

Here, trial counsel and the district court discussed, openly 

and on the record, that in order to benefit from the Fair 

Sentencing Act, Abney would need a legislative fix. Abney

would need Congress to act in order to give him the benefit of 

the law. Today, the Court turns that healthy, constitutionallygrounded presumption on its head: not only did Abney not 

need to wait for Congress to make the Fair Sentencing Act 

retroactive, but his counsel was incompetent for thinking the 

legislature’s involvement would be required. It is no longer 

enough for counsel to ask whether the courts have acted to fix 

some perceived problem Congress has caused; instead, 

counsel must presume both that courts can act and that they 

will. The failure to anticipate the “reasonable possibility” of 

judicial policymaking is proof of both counsel’s 

incompetence and the district court’s lack of 

conscientiousness—a result that seems both perverse and 

pernicious. 

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