Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02566/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02566-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Todd Bracken
Plaintiff
David DeCosta
Plaintiff
Department of Fish and Game
Defendant
Robert Haiduck
Plaintiff
Gerald E. Hobbs
Plaintiff
Mike Holt
Plaintiff
Patrick Keene
Plaintiff
Keene Engineering Co., Inc.
Plaintiff
Donald Koch
Defendant
James Gregory Lee
Plaintiff
Shannon Poe
Plaintiff
Public Lands for the People, Inc.
Plaintiff
David Richard
Plaintiff
Arnold Schwarzenegger
Defendant
Dee Stapp
Plaintiff
Terry Stapp
Plaintiff
State of California
Defendant

Document Text:

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PUBLIC LANDS FOR THE PEOPLE, No. 2:09-cv-02566-MCE-EFB

INC., a California 501 C-3 

non-profit corporation;

GERALD E. HOBBS; PATRICK

KEENE; KEENE ENGINEERING 

CO, INC., a California

corporation; ROBERT HAIDUCK;

TERRY STAPP; DEE STAPP; DAVID 

DECOSTA; JAMES GREGORY LEE;

MIKE HOLT; TODD BRACKEN;

SHANNON POE; and DAVID

RICHARD,

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; ARNOLD

SCHWARZENEGGER, in his official

capacity as Governor of the 

State of California; CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME; 

DONALD KOCH, in his official

capacity as Director, California

Department of Fish & Game; and

Does 1-20,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

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2

Through the present action, Plaintiff Public Lands for the

People, Inc. (“PLP” or “Plaintiffs”) a nationwide miners’

association, along with a number of individual miners, seek to

invalidate a California statute, SB 670, signed into law by

Governor Schwarzenegger on August 5, 2009 and codified as

California Fish and Game Code § 5653.1. SB 670 imposes a

temporary moratorium on instream suction mining in California

until the Department of Fish and Game (“DFG”) completes a full

environmental review of that mining process. In suction mining,

silt, sand and small gravels are vacuumed from streambeds and a

dredge machine is used to filter out gold before screened

material is passed back into the waterway.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint includes numerous causes of action

which allege, inter alia, violations of equal protection, due

process, unlawful takings, violations of interstate and foreign

commerce provisions, and improper preemption of federal statutes

and regulations. Now before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, also brought on numerous grounds, including contentions

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) that the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction because most of Plaintiffs’

claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States

Constitution, and because Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this

action. Defendants also move to dismiss on abstention grounds,

arguing that the Court should refrain from hearing this matter in

any event under the principles set forth by the United States

Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). As set

forth below, Defendants’ Motion will be granted.

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 See Karuk Tribe of California, et al., v. California 1

Department of Fish and Game, No. RG 052211597 (Alameda Sup. Ct.);

Pls.’ Compl., ¶ 13. Defendants have filed a Request for Judicial

Notice asking the Court to take judicial notice, under Federal

Rule of Evidence 201, of documents filed in that action. That

request was unopposed and is granted. 

 Defendants have similarly requested that the Court take 2

judicial notice of filings from the Hillman action; that request

was also unopposed and is granted.

3

BACKGROUND

In 2005 the Karuk Tribe of California sued the DFG in

Alameda County in an effort to enjoy suction dredge mining in the

Klamath, Scott and Salmon Rivers of Northwest California, where

the Karuk Tribe has its homeland. The Tribe argued that suction 1

mining practices posed environmental dangers and violated various

provisions of the California Fish and Game Code. Ultimately, the

2005 litigation was concluded pursuant to an Order and Consent

Judgment whereby the DFG agreed to conduct an updated

environmental review pursuant to the California Environmental

Quality Act (“CEQA”), California Resources Code § 21000, et seq.

When the required CEQA review did not take place within 18

months as the Karuk Plaintiffs anticipated, three tribe members

filed a new taxpayer action, entitled Hillman et al. v.

California Department of Fish and Game, No. RG 09434444 (Alameda

Sup. Ct.); Pls.’ Compl., ¶ 32. That lawsuit, filed in February 2

2009, sought to stop public funding of the suction mining

permitting process and, like its predecessor, was filed in

Alameda County Superior Court. 

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4

The Hillman court ultimately issued a preliminary injunction on

July 10, 2009, which prohibited the DFG from spending any monies

from the State’s General fund for the issuance of suction dredge

permits until after DFG completed the CEQA review previously

ordered in the 2005 lawsuit. (See Defs.’ Request for Judicial

Notice, Ex. E). Plaintiff PLP, which intervened in the action,

has appealed the trial court’s injunction. That appeal remains

pending.

In the meantime, on August 5, 2009, less than a month after

the Alameda County injunction was issued, Governor Schwarzenegger

signed SB 670 into law, a statute which like the injunction

establishes a temporary ban on suction mining until after DFG’s

environmental review of the practice. That prompted PPL to sue

the State of California, as well as the Governor and the DFG’s

former director, Donald Koch, in their official capacities. As

indicated above, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit contains a plethora of some

eleven different counts which seek, among other relief, a

declaration that SB 670 is invalid, an injunction against the

statute’s enforcement, and damages. As indicated above,

Defendants now challenge that lawsuit through concurrently filed

motions seeking either dismissal, the striking of certain

portions of the Complaint, or a more definite statement of the

allegations Plaintiffs do attempt to levy.

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5

STANDARD

In moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(1), the challenging party may either make

a “facial attack” on the allegations of jurisdiction contained in

the complaint or can instead take issue with subject matter

jurisdiction on a factual basis (“factual attack”). Thornhill

Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733

(9th Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549

F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). If the motion constitutes a facial

attack, the court must consider the factual allegations of the

complaint to be true. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412

(5th Cir. 1981); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. If the motion

constitutes a factual attack, however, “no presumptive

truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the

existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial

court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional

claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733 (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d

at 891).

If the Court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. Generally, leave to

amend should be denied only if it is clear that the deficiencies

of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Broughton v.

Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980).

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6

ANALYSIS

A. Eleventh Amendment Claims

The Eleventh Amendment bars all suits in federal court,

whether in law or equity, against states, state agencies, and

state officials sued in their official capacities. See Seven Up

Pete Venture v. Schweitzer, 523 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2008) (as

to states); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425,

429 (1997) (as to state agencies); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d

816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (as to state officials). As the Ninth

Circuit explained in In re Jackson, 184 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir.

1999), “Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity limits the

jurisdiction of the federal courts and can be raised at any time

during judicial proceedings or by the court sua sponte.” Id. at

1048.

The only exception to the immunity afforded under the

Eleventh Amendment is with respect to state officials sued to

prevent an ongoing violation of federal law, which under the socalled Ex Parte Young doctrine may be sued in federal court in

their official capacities. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908);

Idaho v Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269-71 (1997).

Defendants argue that all Defendants except Director Koch

are immunized by Ex Parte Young. Although Governor

Schwarzenegger is also individually named, he too is immunized

from liability because he, unlike the Director of the Department

of Fish and Game, is not tasked with enforcing SB 670 and

consequently cannot be enjoined from so doing. See Nat’l Audubon

Soc’y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

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 That portion of the Act relied on by Plaintiffs states in 3

pertinent part as follows: The “State of California is admitted

into the Union upon the express condition that the people of said

State, through their legislature or otherwise, shall never

interfere with the primary disposal of the public lands within

its limits, and shall pass no law and do no act whereby the title

of the United States to, and right to dispose of, the same shall

be impaired or questioned.”

7

In arguing against the application of Eleventh Amendment

immunity, Plaintiffs rely on the 1850 Act of Congress under which

California was granted statehood. See 31 Cong. Ch. 50 § 3, 9

Stat. 452 (Sept. 9, 1850) (attached as Ex. D to Pls.’ Mot).3

That statute generally provided that California must not

interfere with the disposition of public lands under the title of

the United States.

No case law since 1850 has adopted the reasoning Plaintiffs

urge this Court to adopt in finding that California waived its

immunity to suit in federal court as a precondition to joining

the Union. Moreover, as defendants point out, however, nothing

in the Congressional Act of Admission itself refers to

California’s amenability to suit in federal court. That omission

is dispositive given clear case law that if Congress intends to

subject the states to federal jurisdiction, it must do so

specifically. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473

U.S. 234, 246 (1985); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.

62, 73-74 (2000) (“Congress may abrogate the States’

constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only

by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the

statute”).

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8

 This proposition is underscored by the provisions of

various federal statutory schemes. The Americans with

Disabilities Act, for example, specifically abrogated the states’

Eleventh Amendment immunity by stating as follows: “A State shall

not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of

the United States from an action in Federal or State court of

competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.” 

42 U.S.C. § 12202. Similarly, too, the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act also abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity given

its provision allowing suit “against any employer (including a

public agency) in any Federal or State Court of competent

jurisdiction.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73-74.

In this case, the 1850 Act provides no such unequivocal

language allowing California to be sued in federal court. 

This Court consequently finds that the Eleventh Amendment bars

all of Plaintiffs’ claims in the present matter except for those

alleging prospective relief against the Director of the

California Department of Fish and Game.

B. PLP Lacks Standing if its Alleged Injuries Cannot be

Redressed through a Favorable Outcome of this

Litigation

Standing is a critically important jurisdictional

limitation. Federal courts can only determine such matters as

arise in the context of a general “case” or “controversy” under

Article III of the United States Constitution. Sec. and Exch.

Comm’n v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972).

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9

A party’s standing to sue is “an essential and unchanging part of

the case-or-controversy requirement in Article III.” Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).

Standing depends upon showing, at an “irreducible minimum”,

that a plaintiff’s injury can be likely be redressed through a

favorable decision. See id. at 560-61. Speculation as to

whether an injury can be redressed through such favorable

decision is not sufficient. Id. Here, Defendants argue that the

Alameda County Superior Court has already enjoined DFG’s issuance

of dredge mining permits in order to compel DFG to comply with

requirements of CEQA that are not at issue here. Consequently,

according to Defendants, even if a favorable decision was

rendered in this case, that decision would have no practical

effect given that the ongoing state court injunction would remain

in effect. Defendants therefore argue that an essential

component of standing is absent. See, e.g., Nuclear Info. and

Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 457 F.3d 941, 955 (9th

Cir. 2006) (plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a regulation

of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission because even were the

regulation found invalid, it would still be barred by an

independent Department of Transportation regulation).

In response, all Plaintiffs appear to argue is that the

Court’s decision here may cause the state court to terminate its

injunction, since Judge Roesch stayed further proceedings in the

Alameda County action, but not Plaintiffs’ appeal of the

preliminary injunction, given the passage of SB 670 and the

challenge to it brought here. 

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10

Plaintiffs therefore argue that “[i]t is quite obvious that Judge

Roesch is seeking guidance from this Court.” Opp., 5:1-3. That

reasoning, however, largely amounts to speculation as to what

effect this Court’s findings could have on the state court, and

such speculation is not enough to satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden of

showing the likelihood of redressability. Lujan, 504 U.S. at

561.

Significantly, in Renee v. Duncan, 573 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.

2009), the Ninth Circuit found that where the criteria for rating

teachers under the No Child Left Behind Act was subject to

independent state law, a declaration of federal law could not be

deemed to have any significant “coercive effect” on California’s

independent action. Id. at 911.

Consequently, with respect to that portion of this lawsuit

which survives the bar of Eleventh Amendment immunity, there is

no redressable injury which can confer the standing that

Plaintiffs must possess in order to maintain this lawsuit.

C. Younger Abstention.

Plaintiffs’ lawsuit fares no better even if a redressable

injury were to be identified. That is because, to the extent

that this Court is empowered to act, it should refrain from doing

so given the abstention doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court

in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

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11

Pursuant to so-called Younger abstention, federal courts are

cautioned to exercise “restraint in the fact of ongoing state

judicial proceedings.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 975

(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Under Younger, a federal court must

abstain, and dismiss a federal action, where four criteria are

satisfied: 1) there must be ongoing state proceedings; 2) that

implicate important state interests; 3) where the federal

plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal constitutional

issues in those state proceedings and 4) where the federal action

would interfere with the state action “in a way that Younger

disapproves.” Id. at 978. Each element must be satisfied in

order to justify abstention. AmeriscourceBergen Corp. v. Roden,

495 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007).

Younger abstention is a doctrine of equitable restraint

rather than a purely jurisdictional limitation. Ohio Civil

Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619,

626 (1986) (Younger abstention “does not rise from lack of

jurisdiction of the District Court, but from strong policies

counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction where

particular kinds of state proceedings have already been

commenced”).

The Younger criteria appear to be met in this matter. 

First, the Alameda County Hillman action remains ongoing and on

appeal. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608-09 (1975)

(state proceedings are still pending when a case is on appeal);

Beltran v. State of Cal., 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1988) (as

long as state proceedings were pending at the time federal action

was initiated, Younger applies). 

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12

Second, the enforcement of California’s environmental laws has

been deemed by other courts to be an important state interest for

purposes of applying Younger. See, e.g., Carter v. City of

Richmond, 1997 WL 397761 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1997). Third, because

PLP is already a Plaintiff-Intervenor in the Hillman action,

because PLP asserted in that case many of the same claims raised

here, and because PLP appealed the state court’s preliminary

injunction in Hillman, Plaintiffs clearly have not been barred

from raising the federal issues they now assert in this action. 

Finally, with regard to interference with the state court

proceeding, it seems clear that the practical result of this

action would amount to an injunction against the state court

injunction, a result clearly at odds with the state court

process.

Plaintiffs cite the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Walnut

Properties Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1988) for the proposition that Younger abstention should not

apply where the state court has stayed its own proceedings

pending resolution of the case in a federal forum, and argue that

Judge Roesch’s stay of proceedings mentioned above accordingly

qualifies for exemption. In Walnut Properties, however, the

Ninth Circuit found that there were no ongoing state proceedings

given the stay, making Younger abstention unwarranted on that

ground alone. Id. at 1106-07. 

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 Because the Court finds dismissal to be warranted on these 4

grounds alone, it need not consider the additional arguments

advanced by Defendants for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) and declines to do so. Additionally,

given the dismissal of this matter in its entirety, Defendants’

alternative requests that certain portions of Plaintiffs’

Complaint be stricken under Rule 12(f), and that Plaintiffs be

ordered to file a more definite statement of their claims under

Rule 12(e), are denied as moot.

13

Here, on the other hand, the state court stay order specifically

does not apply to ongoing appellate proceedings and thus, under

the authority cited above this case, the state court Hillman

action remains ongoing. Moreover, the efficacy of the continuing

preliminary injunction itself remains unaffected despite the stay

of any additional activity in this case.

CONCLUSION

As set forth above, the majority of Plaintiffs’ claims in

this lawsuit are clearly precluded by the immunity provided by

the Eleventh Amendment. Further, any claims that remain viable

against the Director of the California Department of Fish and

Game, are barred because the necessary standing to bring such

claims is absent. 

Alternatively, the Court should refrain under the principles

of so-called Younger abstention from hearing the claims asserted

here in any event. 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 7) is therefore

GRANTED. 

4

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14

Because the Court does not believe that the deficiencies of

Plaintiffs’ claims can be remedied through amendment of their

pleadings, no leave to amend will be afforded. The Clerk of

Court is hereby directed to close this file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 15, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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