Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01719/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01719-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Emeryville
Defendant
Woodfin Suite Hotels, LLC
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

WOODFIN SUITE HOTELS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF EMERYVILLE,

Defendant. 

No. C 07-1719 SBA

Related Case No. C 06-1254 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 37]

Before the Court is plaintiff Woodfin Suite Hotels, LLC’s (Woodfin) ex parte application for

an order shortening the time to hear its Rule 60(b) motion [Docket No. 37]. This motion is currently

scheduled to be heard March 4, 2008. Woodfin requests that this date be expedited to no more than 35

days after December 28, 2007. For the reasons that follow, Woodfin’s ex parte application is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On November 8, 2005, the residents of defendant City of Emeryville (Emeryville) passed an

ordinance known as “Measure C.” Measure C is an ordinance that applies to hotels with more than 50

guestrooms and provides for minimum compensation for hotel employees. 

On February 21, 2006, Woodfin filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of

Measure C (C 06-1254 SBA). In response to a pending summary judgment motion against it, Woodfin

requested it be allowed to voluntarily dismiss its complaint without prejudice. On January 8, 2007, the

Court granted this request.

On September 28, 2006, employees of plaintiff Woodfin filed a complaint in state court alleging

that Woodfin is in violation of Measure C. That proceeding is styled Martinez, et al. v. Woodfin Suite

Hotels, LLC, and is before the Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG06291309. As a defense

to that action, Woodfin is asserting that Measure C is unconstitutional and unenforceable. As a result

of the legal challenge to Measure C, Emeryville intervened in the state court proceedings to defend the

constitutionality of the ordinance. 

Case 4:07-cv-01719-SBA Document 49 Filed 01/14/08 Page 1 of 5
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On March 27, 2007, plaintiff Woodfin Suite Hotels, LLC filed a second action against defendant

Emeryville (C 07-1719 SBA) in this Court. On June 7, 2007, the Court granted defendant Emeryville’s

motion to dismiss Woodfin’s complaint based upon Younger abstention principles. See Docket No. 36.

The Court also granted Emeryville’s request to strike Woodfin’s opposition to the motion to dismiss

because the opposition was untimely. See id. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice. 

Woodfin’s Rule 60(b) motion posits that the “part of the order striking WOODFIN’s Opposition

from the records, should be vacated and the order amended to reflect the fact that the motion to dismiss

was granted solely on the Younger abstention doctrine.” Docket No. 38, at 3. Woodfin argues that the

“excusable neglect” of its counsel in filing the opposition six days late is grounds for granting its Rule

60(b) motion. “WOODFIN’s counsel admits the opposition was filed in an untimely fashion, [but] the

failure to file the opposition constitutes excusable neglect by counsel and should not result in an order

striking Woodfin’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.” Docket No. 38, at 3.

Woodfin states that Emeryville is relying on claim and issue preclusion as one of its defenses

to Woodfin’s position in the ongoing state court litigation. At an August 27, 2007 administrative

proceeding, Emeryville asserted these preclusion defenses. On November 1, 2007, the Honorable

Bonnie Sabraw of the Alameda Superior Court, set a hearing on Woodfin’s request for a writ of mandate

to set aside Emeryville’s administrative orders related to Measure C. On December 27, 2007,

“WOODFIN received an Answer from the CITY [Emeryville] to its Petition for Writ of Mandate which

alleges as affirmative defenses res judicata and collateral estoppel presumably based on this Court’s

June 7, 2007 Order dismissing WOODFIN’s amended complaint.” Docket No. 37, at 4 (emphasis in

original). Therefore, Woodfin requests that this Court modify the June 7, 2007, specifically that portion

of the order striking Woodfin’s opposition to the motion to dismiss as untimely. Woodfin makes this

request to clear up what it characterizes as the confusion in the state court action and administrative

action that the dismissal of Woodfin’s second complaint was based on anything other than Younger

abstention grounds. 

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LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order

for “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” or “(6) any other reason that justifies

relief.” “A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2),

and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 60(c).

ANALYSIS

Emeryville objects to Woodfin’s request to hear the Rule 60(b) motion on an expedited basis.

Emeryville argues that good cause for an expedited hearing is lacking because the Rule 60(b) motion

was not filed “within a reasonable time” as required. Emeryville is correct.

Although one year is the outer limit of time within which to bring such a Rule 60(b) motion, a

motion brought within one year is not necessarily “within a reasonable time.” Numerous courts have

found that a reasonable time for filing a Rule 60(b) motion should not exceed that time allowed for an

appeal. See, e.g., Townsend v. Terminal Packaging Co., 853 F.2d 623, 624 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)

(“when the alleged error could have been corrected by appeal, this court requires that the Rule 60(b) [(1)

or (6)] motion be made within the thirty-day time period for filing a notice of appeal, so as to prevent

its use as a substitute for timely appeal on the underlying merits”); Plotkin v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,

688 F.2d 1291, 1293 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982) (agreeing that Rule 60(b) motion did not comply with the

reasonable time requirement where the motion was filed 18 days after the expiration of the time for

appeal of the order); In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1100 (2d Cir. 1979); Gila River Ranch, Inc. v.

United States, 368 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1966); Morse-Starrett Prods. Co. v. Steccone, 205 F.2d 244,

249 (9th Cir. 1953) (the provisions of Rule 60(b)(6) were not intended to benefit the unsuccessful

litigant who long after the time during which an appeal from a final judgment court have been perfected

first seeks to express his dissatisfaction); Chandler v. Wilson, 2006 WL 133417, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2006);

CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 202 F.R.D. 275, 278 (D. Kan. 2001); Ferguson v. United States, 186 F.R.D.

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340, 341 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (“a reasonable time for filing a Rule 60(b) motion should not exceed that

allowed for an appeal”).

The time for Woodfin to appeal the Court’s order dismissing its complaint was within thirty days

after the entry of the order. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a), “Except as otherwise provided in this section,

no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature

before a court of appeals for review unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of

such judgment, order or decree.” The order was entered June 7, 2007. See Docket No. 36. Woodfin’s

Rule 60(b) motion was filed on December 31, 2007. See Docket No. 38. Thus, not only was Woodfin’s

Rule 60(b) motion not filed within the thirty day period for appeal, it was filed more than six and a half

months after the order complained of was entered. Thus, the Court finds that Woodfin has not filed its

Rule 60(b) motion “within a reasonable time.” By extension, hearing this untimely motion on an

expedited basis is not warranted. 

In addition, a preliminary review of the underlying motion itself suggests that expedited review

is not necessary. Woodfin’s main premise for its motion is “excusable neglect.” At this time, though,

this does not appear a convincing explanation for the late filed opposition. Emeryville filed its motion

to dismiss on April 30, 2007. See Docket No. 13. At that time, the motion was calendared for hearing

on June 12, 2007. Woodfin knew, on April 30th or very shortly thereafter, that its opposition was due

on May 23, 3007. It did not file an opposition until May 29th. 

Woodfin argues that its counsel filed a notice of unavailability on May 24, 2007. See Docket

No. 30. But this is still a day after the opposition was due. Woodfin’s notice of unavailability was thus

filed nearly a month after the motion to dismiss was calendared and after Woodfin was aware that an

opposition was due.

Moreover, much of Woodfin’s Rule 60(b) motion is premised on the notion that a late filed

opposition merely creates a rebuttable presumption of consent to a motion, and that presumption is

rebutted by the filing of an untimely opposition. Not so. Under this Court’s standing orders, “[t]he

failure of the opposing party to file a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to any motion

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shall constitute a consent to the granting of the motion.” Armstrong Standing Orders No. 8 (emphasis

added). And not filing an opposition until six days after it is due is a failure to file within the meaning

of Standing Order Number 8.

Other difficulties with Woofin’s motion includes its suggestion that it only recently learned of

Emeryville’s position on res judicata and collateral estoppel. This is belied by the fact that Emeryville

first made the res judicata argument on June 17, 2007. See Docket No. 46, Ex. B. This date is also

significant because this occurred within the time allowed for an appeal of this Court’s order. And in its

own motion, Woodfin recites that Emeryville again raised this issue at an August 27, 2007

administrative proceeding. Thus, Woodfin had notice that Emeryville might assert res judicata and

collateral estoppel well before the December date as it is now asserting. Woodfin’s claim of urgency

is therefore unconvincing.

Finally, Woodfin notes that the Judge Sabraw heard its motion for summary judgment on August

30, 2007, and “noted in her order that WOODFIN’s constitutional claims – both facial and substantive

– remain alive and well.” Docket No. 38. If this characterization is correct, it does not appear that the

state court considered Woodfin’s constitutional claims barred by the doctrines of res judicata or

collateral estoppel. It is therefore not apparent that Woodfin’s belief that the state court may apply res

judicata or collateral estoppel has any well-supported foundation.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Woodfin has not shown good cause to grant its ex parte application for an

expedited hearing on its Rule 60(b) motion. Plaintiff Woodfin Suite Hotels, LLC’s ex parte application

for an order shortening the time to hear its Rule 60 motion [Docket No. 37] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

January 14, 2008 _________________________________

Saundra Brown Armstrong 

United States District Judge

Case 4:07-cv-01719-SBA Document 49 Filed 01/14/08 Page 5 of 5