Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-03-02915/USCOURTS-ca7-03-02915-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1 In the case of Hankton, cocaine base, commonly known as

“crack” cocaine.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CLARENCE HANKTON and

GREGORY DAVIS,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 01 CR 1—Charles R. Norgle, Sr., Judge.

____________

SUBMITTED MAY 8, 2006—DECIDED AUGUST 18, 2006

____________

Before COFFEY, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

COFFEY, Circuit Judge. In November of 2002, Clarence

Hankton and Gregory Davis each pled guilty to possessing,

with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).1

 After conducting a sentencing hearing,

during which the government introduced a plethora of

evidence concerning the drug and gang activities of both

defendants, the district judge sentenced Hankton to a term

of 300 months and Davis to 210 months. Both men apCase: 03-2915 Document: 71 Filed: 08/18/2006 Pages: 7
2 Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915

pealed, see United States v. Hankton, 432 F.3d 799 (7th Cir.

2005), and while we affirmed each of their sentences, we

remanded their cases to the district court in accordance

with United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 481 (7th Cir.

2005). The district judge has replied stating that he would

have given Hankton and Davis the same sentences notwithstanding the now-advisory nature of the Guidelines. United

States v. Hankton and Davis, No. 01-CR-1 (April 21, 2006);

see United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 757 (2005). We

invited the parties to file arguments concerning the reasonableness of the sentences, however, only Davis and the

government responded. Nevertheless, we affirm both of the

defendants-appellants’ sentences as reasonable. See United

States v. Newsome, 428 F.3d 685, 686 (7th Cir. 2005);

Paladino, 401 F.3d 484.

Our review of a district judge’s sentencing determination is deferential, and we will not substitute our judgement

for that of the trial judge when dealing with the question of

what sentence should have been imposed on the defendant.

See United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478, 481 (7th Cir.

2005). In addition, a sentence that is within a properly

calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.

See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir.

2005) An appellant may rebut this presumption of reasonableness by demonstrating that his sentence would be

unreasonable when measured against the factors set forth

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), such as the “need for the sentence

imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to

promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment

for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal

conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed

educational or vocational training, medical care, or other

correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” Id.

(citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 766).

Case: 03-2915 Document: 71 Filed: 08/18/2006 Pages: 7
Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915 3

2 Specifically, the trial judge noted Hankton’s role as the “King of

Kings” in “a violent Chicago street gang heavily involved in the

purchase and sale of cocaine.” This, the judge reasoned, warranted

a 300 month sentence in order to “reflect the seriousness of

Hankton’s crimes, promote respect for the law, and protect the

public from future crimes [by] Hankton.”

I. REASONABLENESS OF HANKTON’S SENTENCE

As our earlier opinion in this case makes clear, the

sentencing judge properly applied the Guidelines when

calculating Hankton’s sentence, see Hankton, 432 F.3d at

790-97, and accordingly his sentence as imposed is considered presumptively reasonable. See Hankton, 432 F.3d at

789-97; Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 608. Hankton has declined

our invitation to explain why and how the district court’s

analysis should be considered insufficient to support his

sentence or why the sentence he received was unreasonable

when measured against the § 3553(a) factors. Further,

while informing us that he would have given Hankton the

same sentence had the Guidelines been advisory, the

district judge properly referenced a number of the factors

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as integral to his

decision not to sentence Hankton differently.2

Thus, because the sentencing judge has advised us that

he would have imposed the same sentence post-Booker, and

due to the fact that Hankton has failed to rebut the presumption that his sentence is reasonable, he has failed to

establish plain error. See id. (citing Johnson v. United

States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 137 L. Ed. 2d

718 (1997)).

II. REASONABLENESS OF DAVIS’S SENTENCE

Unlike Hankton, Davis did accept our invitation to inform

this court why he believes his sentence, as imposed, is

Case: 03-2915 Document: 71 Filed: 08/18/2006 Pages: 7
4 Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915

unreasonable. In his brief to this court, Davis claims that

his sentence is unreasonable for a number reasons, all of

which are easily dismissed.

Davis initially claims that the district court “misunderstood its authority under Booker.” He attempts to support

this bold assertion by citing the sentencing judge’s statement that he failed to “overcome the rebuttable presumption that his sentence is reasonable.” However, this court

specifically held in United States v. Mykytiuk, that “any

sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is

entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.” 415

F.3d at 608. Indeed, the sentencing judge cited Mykytiuk in

reaching its conclusion that Davis had neither established

that his sentence had been improperly calculated nor that

the presumption of reasonableness had been overcome. The

district court’s analysis was directly in line with our holding

in Mykytiuk. See id.

Davis attempts to bolster his argument by arguing that

Mykytiuk should not be considered binding on a sentencing court, stating that, in Mykytiuk “this court only decided

that a Guidelines sentence is presumed to meet the appellate standard for review for reasonableness.” However, the

presumption that a correctly calculated Guidelines sentence

is reasonable not only applies to the appellate standard of

reasonableness review, but also guides a district judge’s

consideration of an appropriate sentence. It is only when

the defendant provides cogent reasons under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) that a sentencing judge need consider a nonGuidelines sentence. See Dean, 414 F.3d 729-30.

Next, Davis argues that the district court “refused to

consider [his] argument that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553[(a)]

factors support a sentence outside the career offender

Guideline range.” We disagree. Even a cursory review of the

sentencing judge’s order on remand reveals that the court

thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors and, in fact, did

Case: 03-2915 Document: 71 Filed: 08/18/2006 Pages: 7
Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915 5

3 In a tag-along argument, Davis claims that the “district court

incorrectly held this court had determined that the statements in

(continued...)

more than was required of him under the circumstances.

See United States v. Hankton, No. 01-CR-1, at *8-9 (N.D.Ill.

Apr. 21, 2006); United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470,

472-73 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that: “Judges need not

rehearse on the record all of the considerations that 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists; it is enough to calculate the range

accurately and explain why (if the sentence lies outside it)

this defendant deserves more or less.”). What’s more, to the

extent that this argument is a collateral attack on Davis’s

sentence, it fails; for we affirmed the validity of his sentence

under the Guidelines in our previous decision. See Hankton,

432 F.3d at 789-96.

In an equally unavailing argument, Davis avers that the

district court “incorrectly found that it lacked the authority

to impose a non-Guidelines sentence on the basis of the disparity between sentences for crack and powder cocaine.”

This argument is foreclosed by this court’s recent decision

in United States v. Miller, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1541426,

*4-6 (7th Cir. 2006). In Miller we held a district judge is

required to abide by the 100-to-1 crack cocaine to cocaine

powder ratio when applying the sentencing Guidelines to a

defendant’s conduct. Id. at *4; (following United States v.

Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Eura, 440

F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2006)). Said differently, a sentencing

judge may not depart downward based merely on his opinion that the statutory and/or Guidelines disparity between

punishments for crack cocaine and powder cocaine is unjust

or unwarranted. See id. at *5. Accordingly, Davis’s argument fails, for Judge Norgle did exactly what he should

have done according to Miller, he categorically refused to

consider Davis’s argument in favor of a downward departure based solely on the disparity between crack cocaine

and cocaine powder in the Guidelines.3

Case: 03-2915 Document: 71 Filed: 08/18/2006 Pages: 7
6 Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915

3 (...continued)

the plea agreements of Mr. Davis’ co-defendants were reliable.”

What we actually held was that the plea agreements, along with

the plethora of other evidence adduced at sentencing was enough

to support the sentence the district court imposed on Davis. See

Hankton, 435 F.3d 792-93. The district judge was correct not to revisit this issue and we decline the invitation to do so here. 

4 As part of his argument, Davis advances the ridiculous notion

that the district judge, by applying the rebuttable presumption in

Mykytiuk, considered the Guidelines to be mandatory. Suffice to

say, the district court did no such thing. Also, while we see no

reason to re-visit or expound on our holding in Mykytiuk, we

dismiss out of hand Davis’ assertion in his brief that Mykytiuk

“sends the message that a sentence within the Guidelines

will never be reversed . . . .” Our holding in Mykytiuk implies no

such thing. A “rebuttable presumption” is just that, “rebuttable.”

Finally, Davis reaches his arguments as to why the

district court should have issued a non-Guidelines sentence

based on the factors enumerated in § 3553(a).4

 The main

thrust of Davis’ argument concerning § 3553(a) is that the

district court’s sentencing determination should be found

unreasonable due to the fact that his crimes were “the

result of his addiction to marijuana and alcohol.” The

problem is, evidence of pre-existing drug and alcohol

addiction, without more, is insufficient to render a sentence

within a properly calculated Guidelines range unreasonable. Were this not the case, every convicted criminal who

had used or abused drugs and drink at some time and was

not given a reduction under the Guidelines could challenge

his sentence as unreasonable on those grounds alone. This

is most assuredly not what Congress had in mind when

they passed 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The same can be said for

Davis’s other § 3553(a) arguments as well. He claims he

was, at times, “responsible, held legitimate employment, .

. . tried to help his friends and family . . . [and] was a good

father when he was able to be there for his children.” These

Case: 03-2915 Document: 71 Filed: 08/18/2006 Pages: 7
Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915 7

arguments likewise do nothing to overcome the fact that

Davis was convicted of a serious drug crime. As the sentencing judge noted “Davis attained the rank of ‘Sultan Supreme’ in the [Mickey Cobras gang], and participated

heavily in the purchase and sale of crack cocaine.” We agree

with the district court’s conclusion that Davis’s sentence

“reflects the seriousness of [his] offense, promotes respect

for the law, and protects the public from further crimes.”

III. CONCLUSION

Because the sentencing judge stated that he would have

imposed the same sentence post-Booker and due to the fact

that Hankton and Davis’ sentences are reasonable, they

have failed to establish plain error. See id. (citing Johnson

v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137

L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—8-18-06

Case: 03-2915 Document: 71 Filed: 08/18/2006 Pages: 7