Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00021/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00021-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sherman
Respondent
Randy Stoops
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RANDY STOOPS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

STUART SHERMAN, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:16-cv-0021 JAM GGH P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an amended 

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254. On February 25, 2016, petitioner 

was directed to inform the court whether he wished to proceed with the original or amended 

petition, and to file a motion for stay and abeyance if he wished to proceed with his completely 

unexhausted amended petition. Petitioner filed a motion for stay and abeyance on March 3, 2016, 

and respondent filed an opposition on May 4, 2016, to which petitioner filed a reply on May 16, 

2016. Having reviewed those filings, the undersigned now recommends that the petitioner’s 

motion be denied and this action be dismissed without prejudice. 

 Petitioner pled guilty in 2014 to various sexual crimes. His claims in the amended 

petition, none of which have been exhausted, are: (1) the District Attorney withheld evidence to 

prove petitioner’s innocence, including text records, video surveillance, and witness statements; 

(2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel through lies to petitioner, refusing to obtain witness 

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statements and surveillance videos, refusing to accept petitioner’s defense that he reasonably 

thought the victim to be the age of consent, and refusing to file an appeal; (3) excessive 

sentencing; and (4) malicious intent by District Attorney in arguing against bail reduction. 

 In the order filed February 25, 2016, the court directed petitioner to file a motion for stay 

and abeyance and outlined the procedures required, including setting forth good cause, that the 

claims are potentially meritorious, that petitioner has diligently pursued his unexhausted claims, 

and the status of any pending state court proceedings. Petitioner’s motion, filed March 3, 2016, 

states only that he moves for stay and abeyance and that he intends to proceed on the amended 

petition. Respondent opposes the motion, contending that petitioner has not met the Rhines 

standards.1 Although the undersigned has considered petitioner’s reply, filed May 16, 2016, 

which does add some information in support of his motion, the motion should be denied as failing 

to meet the stay and abeyance requirements. 

DISCUSSION 

 On February 17, 2016, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion for publication which 

significantly changes the manner in which wholly unexhausted federal habeas petitions are 

handled. The court held “that a district court has the discretion to stay and hold in abeyance fully 

unexhausted petitions under the circumstances set forth in Rhines.” Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907 

(9th Cir. 2016). Pursuant to that newly issued decision, petitioner was afforded the opportunity to 

move to stay and hold his completely unexhausted petition in abeyance while he completes the 

state court exhaustion process. 

A district court may properly stay a habeas petition and hold it in abeyance pursuant to 

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Under Rhines, a district court may stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present an 

unexhausted claim to the state courts. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. Such a stay “eliminates entirely 

 

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 Petitioner complains that respondent’s filings are untimely; however, petitioner is informed that 

he failed to serve respondent with his motion in violation of E.D.L.R. 135(b), and respondent 

thereafter received proper extensions of time in which to respond to the motion. The response 

was filed one day late; however, respondent has adequately explained and apologized for the 

failure. (ECF No. 21 n. 1.) 

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any limitations issue with regard to the originally unexhausted claims, as the claims remain 

pending in federal court[.]” King, 564 F.3d at 1140.2 However, to qualify for a stay under 

Rhines, a petitioner must: (1) show good cause for his failure to exhaust all his claims before 

filing this action; (2) explain and demonstrate how his unexhausted claim is potentially 

meritorious; (3) describe the status of any pending state court proceedings on his unexhausted 

claim; and (4) explain how he has diligently pursued his unexhausted claim. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 

277–78. 

What constitutes good cause has not been precisely defined except to indicate at the outer 

end that petitioner must not have engaged in purposeful dilatory tactics, Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-

78, and that “extraordinary circumstances” need not be found. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 

661–62 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Rhines, 544 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring) (the “good 

cause” requirement should not be read “to impose the sort of strict and inflexible requirement that 

would trap the unwary pro se prisoner”) (internal citation omitted); id. (Souter, J., concurring) 

(pro se habeas petitioners do not come well trained to address tricky exhaustion determinations). 

“But as the Jackson court recognized, we must interpret whether a petitioner has “good 

cause” for a failure to exhaust in light of the Supreme Court’s instruction in Rhines that the 

district court should only stay mixed petitions in ‘limited circumstances.’ We also must be 

mindful that AEDPA aims to encourage the finality of sentences and to encourage petitioners to 

exhaust their claims in state court before filing in federal court.” Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 

1019, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661) (internal citations omitted). 

Recently, the Ninth Circuit stated that “a reasonable excuse, supported by evidence to 

justify a petitioner’s failure to exhaust,” will demonstrate good cause under Rhines. Blake v. 

Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014). In Blake, the Ninth Circuit held that ineffective 

assistance of counsel by post-conviction counsel can be good cause for a Rhines stay, however, 

bare allegations of state post-conviction IAC do not suffice. Id. at 983. 

The Blake court concluded that petitioner satisfied the good cause standard where he 

 

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 This assumes, of course, that the unexhausted claims were either timely brought in their own 

right, or that they can relate back to timely claims in the original petition. 

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argued that his post-conviction counsel3 “failed to conduct any independent investigation or retain 

experts in order to discover the facts underlying his trial-counsel IAC claim; namely, evidence 

that Blake was” subject to severe abuse as a child and suffered from brain damage and 

psychological disorders. 745 F.3d at 982 (internal quotes omitted). The petitioner supported this 

argument with extensive evidence, including psychological evaluation reports, a declaration by 

the private investigator who worked briefly for his post-conviction attorney, and thirteen 

declarations from petitioner’s family and friends describing his “abhorrent” childhood conditions. 

Id. at 982-83. The Blake court concluded that the petitioner had met the Coleman/Martinez 

standard to show good cause under Rhines.” Id. at 983-84 & n.7. 

Based on Mena, the aforementioned requirements now apply equally to completely 

unexhausted petitions such as the amended petition here. 

It is not until his reply that petitioner attempts to set forth these requirements, but he has 

inadequately done so. First, in regard to good cause, petitioner makes only the following 

conclusory assertion: “I was under the impression my claim had already been submitted to the 

courts for my appeal by my defense lawyer only to find out as time went on – thus indicating he 

in fact never filed my appeal with the courts....” (ECF No. 24 at 3.) Petitioner does not represent 

that his attorney affirmatively indicated that he would file an appeal on petitioner’s behalf, and 

petitioner makes no attempt to submit evidence that his attorney promised he would file an 

appeal, or when he made such a promise. Nor does petitioner explain why he did not file an 

appeal himself through the California Supreme Court level. As set forth in Blake supra, 

petitioner’s bare allegations of good cause do not suffice. 

These minimal assertions also fail to demonstrate that petitioner diligently pursued his 

unexhausted claims. Petitioner had an entire year to file his exhaustion petition, and as pointed 

out by respondent, he concedes that although he requested his public defender file his appeal, 

 

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 In Blake’s case “post-conviction counsel” must refer to counsel on the state habeas petition for 

two reasons (1) Blake had been sentenced to death and appointment of counsel would have been 

likely; (2) appellate counsel on direct review would in all probability not be tasked with raising 

issues outside the record as most courts will not adjudicate IAC claims on direct review. 

Therefore, Blake is instructive, but not controlling. 

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“when it got closer to [his] time limit [he] realized [he] would have to file [his] own appeal....” 

(ECF No. 8 at 1.) Petitioner provides no further explanation or reason why he did nothing during 

this time period, or why it was reasonable for him to rely on his public defender, despite the lack 

of documented communication between them. Petitioner even admits that he only requested his 

public defender appeal “the sentencing part” of his case, not the majority of the claims raised 

here, and he learned approximately eleven months after his conviction that his public defender 

would not be appealing his conviction. (ECF No. 9 at 5.) 

Petitioner has additionally failed to show that his claims are potentially meritorious. 

Because petitioner entered a guilty plea, there are only certain claims which may be raised on 

collateral review. 

The law is clear that petitioner may not raise claims of deprivation of his constitutional 

rights that occurred prior to his plea. “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open 

court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise 

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the 

entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). See also McMann v. 

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970); Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 1994) 

("As a general rule, one who voluntarily pleads guilty to a criminal charge may not subsequently 

seek federal habeas relief on the basis of pre-plea constitutional violations"), overruled on other 

grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003); Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 

137 (9th Cir. 1992) (“petitioner’s nolo contendere plea precludes him from challenging alleged 

constitutional violations that occurred prior to the entry of that plea”); Hudson v. Moran, 760 F.2d 

1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1985) (voluntary and intelligent guilty plea precludes federal habeas 

relief based upon “independent claims” of pre-plea constitutional violations); United States v. 

DeVaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1153 (10th Cir. 2012) (“A guilty plea waives all defenses except those 

that go to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction and the narrow class of constitutional claims 

involving the right not to be haled into court.”). 

 Claims three and four, for excessive sentencing and prosecutor’s malicious intent in 

arguing against bail reduction, respectively, may not be raised after a guilty plea is entered 

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because they pertain to constitutional violations which are alleged to have occurred prior to the 

entry of the plea. 

With respect to claims of ineffective assistance during the plea process involving defense 

counsel's alleged failure to investigate, the Supreme Court has explained: 

In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely 

resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffectiveassistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For 

example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to 

investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the 

determination whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by 

causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the 

likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to 

change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, 

will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely 

would have changed the outcome of a trial. Similarly, where the 

alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a 

potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of 

the “prejudice” inquiry will depend largely on whether the 

affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial. 

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 36 (1985). See also Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 

978, 989 (9th Cir.2010). “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly 

deferential,” and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 

(citations omitted). Thus, in federal habeas proceedings involving “claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, ... AEDPA review must be ““‘doubly deferential’”” in order to afford “both 

the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Woods v. Donald, ––– U.S. –––

–, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ––––, ––––, 134 S.Ct. 10, 13 

(2013)). 

 Based on this very deferential standard, and petitioner’s lack of specificity and evidentiary 

support in regard to his ineffective assistance claim, the undersigned fails to find that it is 

potentially meritorious. 

 In regard to the prosecutor’s withholding of exculpatory evidence, there is the question of 

whether Brady disclosures are required outside the context of a trial. The Supreme Court has yet 

to address whether the Due Process Clause requires such disclosures prior to entry of a guilty 

plea. McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir.2003). In United States v. Ruiz, 536 

U.S. 622, 629, 122 S.Ct. 2450 (2002), the Supreme Court did hold that withholding of 

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impeachment material did not give rise to a cognizable Brady claim in the context of a guilty 

plea. Exculpatory material should be treated no differently for Brady purposes. In United States 

v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (1985), the Supreme Court specifically rejected any 

distinction between exculpatory and impeachment evidence, finding them both to fall within 

Brady as “evidence favorable to an accused.” Id. at 676, quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 

at 1196, and citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766 (1972). 

Although McCann interpreted Ruiz to suggest in dicta that withheld exculpatory, as opposed to 

impeachment evidence, could give rise to a due process violation, 337 F.3d at 787, this court 

draws no such inference and relies on the Supreme Court's express finding in Bagley. Cf. Torres 

v. Prosper, 2008 WL 6665286, * 8 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 12, 2008) (discussing potential distinction 

between exculpatory and impeachment evidence in regard to guilty plea). Therefore, in light of 

Ruiz and Bagley, even if petitioner could proffer evidence in support of his claim, and whether it 

would be viewed as exculpatory or impeachment material, his Brady claim would fail. It is 

clearly established that the constitution does not require disclosure of impeachment information 

prior to a guilty plea, and it is also clearly established that exculpatory information is to be treated 

in the same manner. Since Bagley, the Supreme Court has not determined that Brady requires 

disclosure of exculpatory evidence before entry of a guilty plea. Therefore, this claim is not 

potentially meritorious. 

In sum, petitioner has failed to make an adequate showing of good cause, that his 

unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and that he has diligently pursued the 

unexhausted claims. His motion for stay and abeyance under Rhines and Mena must therefore be 

denied. Because a completely unexhausted petition must be dismissed, Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 

478, 481 (9th Cir.2001), the undersigned will so recommend. 

CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Petitioner’s motions for stay and abeyance (ECF Nos. 14, 20), be denied; 

2. This action be dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 

(14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within seven (7) days after service of the objections. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: May 23, 2016 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

GGH:076/stoo0021.fr-sta

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