Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07079/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07079-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kyle Edmond Franks
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

T":1 l . lJ,,. 

~ -- .L £.J 

United Sta.t~!l Court ot App:3b 

Tf!r..t.'h Cir~ui'; 

MAY 2 G i992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

v. ) No. 91-7079 

KYLE EDMOND FRANKS, 

Defendant-Appellant . 

) (D.C. No. CR-91-02-01-S) 

) ( E. D. Okla. ) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before TACHA, SNEED,** and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

This appeal arises out of appellant Kyle Frank's conviction 

after trial by jury for a number of violations of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 84l(a)(l), one violation of 18 u.s.c. § 922(g), and one 

violation of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c)(l). On appeal, Franks asserts 

that his convictions under 18 u.s.c. § 922(g) and 18 U. S.C . 

§ 924(c)(l) should be overturned because the government did not 

prove these offenses with sufficient evidence. Franks also argues 

that the district court erred in failing to suppress the evidence 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable Joseph T. Sneed, Circuit Judge for the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-7079 Document: 010110254286 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 1
seized as a result of the execution of a search warrant. We 

exercise jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and affirm. 

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government to 

ascertain if there is sufficient substantial proof, direct and 

circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom, from which a reasonable jury could find the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States Y..!... Wright, 826 

F.2d 938, 946 (10th Cir. 1987). Franks contends that the 

government failed to introduce sufficient evidence showing that he 

knowingly possessed the shotgun. Franks argues that the shotgun 

belonged to his wife and that he was never in possession of the 

weapon. 

The record reveals that Franks, at the very least, 

constructively possessed the shotgun. Constructive possession 

exists when a person does not have actual possession, but 

"knowingly holds the power to exercise dominion and control." 

United States~ Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir.) 

(quoting United States~ Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (10th Cir. 

1982)), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909 (1989). Because a weapon can 

be jointly possessed, the government need not prove the exercise 

of exclusive dominion and control . Uni ted States Y..!... Sullivan, 919 

F.2d 1403, 1430 (10th Cir. 1990). In this case, the government 

demonstrated that the shotgun was found lying on the bed in the 

master bedroom when the government entered Franks' residence. 

Thus, Franks clearly had access to the weapon and the jury could 

reasonably infer that he exercised dominion and control over it. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 91-7079 Document: 010110254286 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 2
Franks also claims that the government did not show that the 

shotgun increased the likelihood of the success of the underlying 

offenses. Section 924(c) requires that the government prove that 

the defendant intended to use the firearm "during and in relation 

to" a charged drug trafficking offense. Id. at 1432. "To prove 

this necessary relation, the Government's evidence must support a 

finding that the defendant intended the weapon to be available for 

use during the drug transaction." United States~ Matthews, 942 

F.2d 779, 783 (10th Cir. 1991). After reviewing the record, we 

conclude that the government introduced sufficient evidence to 

prove a violation of§ 924(c). First, the government showed that 

the shotgun was lying in plain view on the bed in the bedroom of 

the house where a drug transaction was to take place. Second, the 

government introduced evidence that Fr anks ran toward the bedroom 

when the search warrant was execute d. Based on this evidence and 

additional evidence in the recor d, a jury could reasonably infer 

that Franks intended to use the firearm to further a drug 

transaction. 

Franks finally contends that the district court erred when it 

refused to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the 

execution of the search warrant. The record indicates that the 

search warrant was to be executed during the daytime. Rule 41 of 

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure defines daytime "to mean 

the hours from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. according to local time. 111 

1 Oklahoma also uses this time frame to 

for execution of a daytime search warrant. 

§ 1230. Franks asks this court to declare 

unconstitutional as well. 

-3-

define the proper time 

Okla . Stat. tit. 22, 

this section 

Appellate Case: 91-7079 Document: 010110254286 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 3
Franks concedes that the government executed the search warrant at 

8:30 p.m., within the time prescribed by Rule 41. Franks, 

however, asks this court to find that Rule 41 authorizes 

unreasonable searches and seizures and is unconstitutional in 

light of the Fourth Amendment. 2 

We use a reasonableness standard to determine the legality of 

a state search in a federal prosecution. United States Y.!.. 

Mitchell, 783 F.2d 971, 974 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 

860 (1986). Franks essentially argues that because the search was 

conducted when it was dark outside, it was unreasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment. We disagree. Frank's argument would require 

the execution of daytime searches during daylight hours only. The 

reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment certainly does 

not require such a standard. Rule 41 properly defines the hours 

of a daytime search and protects an individual's reasonable 

expectation of privacy from unjustified governmental intrusions. 

Katz Y.!.. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., 

concurring). 

AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

2 We note that Franks argues in his brief that Rule 41 is 

unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment. Because Franks quotes 

the Fourth Amendment and incorrectly refers to it as the Sixth, we 

analyze this claim under the Fourth Amendment. 

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Appellate Case: 91-7079 Document: 010110254286 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 4