Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06078/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06078-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jimmy W. Edgmon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

---"ILED 

~ Court of Appeals United St:h Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 2 0 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

GARY A. EDGMON and 

JH.flvlY W. EDGMON, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 91-6077 

and 91-6078 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D. C. No. CR-90-186-T) 

John F. Arens, Arens & Alexander, Fayetteville, Arkansas, (Marjorie 

M. Kesl and Lee H. Linzay, Jr. also of Arens & Alexander, and Mack 

Martin, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the brief) for 

defendants-appellants. 

Vicki Zemp Behenna, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, (Timothy D. Leonard U.S. Attorney with her on the brief) 

for plaintiff-appellee. 

Before Baldock and Ebel, circuit Judges, and A. ANDERSON, Senior 

District Judge.* 

A. Anderson, District Judge. 

*Honorable Aldan J. Anderson, Senior United States District Judge 

for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 1 
On December 10, 1990, a jury convicted appellants/codefendants Gary A. Edgmon ("Edgmon") and Jimmy W. Edgmon ("Edgmon, 

Sr.") each of four counts of conversion of Farmers' Home 

Administration collateral in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 658 and one 

count of conspiracy to convert in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 371. 

Appellant Edgmon, Sr., was also found guilty of one count of money 

laundering in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1956(a) (1) (B)(i). 

Appellants now challenge their convictions arguing that 1) the 

evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding of intent 

to defraud; 2) the verdict was contrary to the great weight of the 

evidence; 3) appellants' due process rights were violated; 4) the 

prosecution failed to present substantial exculpatory evidence to 

the grand jury; and 5) the money laundering charge violated the 

Double Jeopardy Clause. 

I. 

Appellants are both farmers in Oklahoma as well as father and 

son. In October of 1987, Edgmon obtained a loan from the Farmers 

Home Administration (FmHA) for $200,000. Edgmon granted FmHA a 

security interest in his cattle and other items to secure the loan. 

Edgmon made payments on the loan that amounted to $12,800 paid on 

the principal amount. In August of 1988, Edgmon applied for a new 

loan of $12,800 which would return him to the $200,000 maximum 

credit limit. FmHA approved the new loan to Edgmon in October of 

1988. Edgmon and FmHA then entered a new loan agreement and Edgmon 

received the additional funds from FmHA. See App. at 137-143(d). 

- 2 

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 2 
During May, June, and July of 1989, Edgmon sold a substantial 

number of his cattle that served as security for his FmHA loans. 

Edgmon sold the cattle through his father, Edgmon, Sr., in four 

separate transactions. The cattle were sold in Edgmon, Sr.'s name 

and the purchasers paid for the cattle by issuing checks payable to 

Edgmon, Sr. Neither FmHA' s nor Edgmon's name appeared on the 

cattle sales in any form. See,~., Supp. App. at 41-42 (May 2nd 

sale) . 

Sometime before June 24, 1989, Edgmon met with FmHA to apply 

for a new loan and to update his Farm and Home Plan form kept by 

FmHA. Edgmon represented to FmHA that he had a total of 450 head 

of cattle. App. at 181. This number was incorrect in that it 

failed to account for the cattle already sold by Edgmon in the name 

of his father, Edgmon, Sr. As a result of Edgmon's request for a 

new loan, FmHA scheduled with Edgmon a collateral inspection of his 

farm for August 8, 1989. Edgmon failed to appear for the 

inspection. FmHA rescheduled the inspection for August 11, 1989. 

On August 11, 1989, Edgmon appeared at the FmHA office and informed 

an FmHA representative that he had sold his cattle securing his 

previous FmHA loans. Trans. Vol. I at 56. On August 11, 1991, 

FmHA sent a letter to Edgmon demanding restitution of the proceeds 

of the sale of the collateral, approximately $140,000, and warning 

that if he failed to resolve the problem, FmHA would refer the 

claim for criminal prosecution. App. at 182(a). The problem was 

not resolved and FmHA referred the matter to the United States 

Attorney's Office. After a trial, a jury returned criminal 

- 3 

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 3 
convictions against Edgmon and Edgmon, Sr., for selling chattel 

securing FmHA loans without authorization and conspiring to convert 

the chattel. The jury also convicted Edgmon, Sr., of money 

laundering. Both challenge their convictions. 

II. 

A. Motion For Judgment Of Acquittal. 

Appellants both assert that the trial court erred in denying 

their motions for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of 

the evidence presented. On appellate review of a denial of "a 

motion for acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a), the issue is 

whether, taken in the light most favorable to the government, there 

is substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury might properly 

find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United 

States v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1394, 1399 (lOth Cir. 1990) (citation 

omitted). Defendants argue that substantial evidence does not 

exist to support their convictions for conversion and conspiracy to 

convert. Defendant Edgmon, Sr., also alleges that his conviction 

for money laundering is not supported by substantial evidence. 

~- Conversion and Conspiracy to Convert. 

The jury convicted defendants of four counts each of 

conversion in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 658. Section 658 provides 

in pertinent part: 

Whoever, with intent to defraud, knowingly conceals, 

removes, disposes of, or converts to his own use or to 

that of another, any property mortgaged or pledged to, or 

held by, the Secretary of Agriculture acting 

through the Farmers' Home Administration, ... shall be 

fined . . . or imprisoned . or both. 

- 4 

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 4 
18 u.s.c. § 658. See United States v. Garth, 773 F.2d 1469, 1476 

(5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986). Defendants 

argue that the element of intent to defraud was not supported by 

substantial evidence. Specifically, defendants argue that the 

evidence demonstrated that Edgmon believed he had the authority to 

sell the cattle and, therefore, neither defendant had an intent to 

defraud. Defendants argue this failure of proof on the conversion 

charge also invalidates their convictions for conspiracy to 

convert. 

After reviewing the record on appeal, we find that substantial 

evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 

Edgmon acted with intent to defraud. The nature of the sales 

themselves support the jury findings. The sales of the FmHA 

collateral were made by Edgmon's father, Edgmon, Sr. The sales 

were made in the name of Edgmon, Sr., and the payment checks were 

payable to Edgmon, Sr., alone. The sales were structured in this 

manner even though the cattle sold were owned by Edgmon and not by 

Edgmon, Sr. 

Further, at trial, defendant Edgmon testified that he knew 

that any check for the sale of FmHA collateral had to be issued in 

his name and FmHA's name. Supp. App. at 141. Edgmon testified he 

had made sales in the past and so knew that FmHA's name had to be 

on the check but, nonetheless, sold his cattle under his father's 

name and received payment in his father's name. See id. Thus, 

Edgmon's own testimony is sufficient to support a reasonable 

- 5 

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 5 
inference that, at the very least, Edgmon knew the form of the 

cattle sales was improper yet proceeded with them anyway. 

Additionally, on June 23, 1989, Edgmon met with an FmHA 

representative to fill out an FmHA loan related form for an 

additional FmHA loan. On that day, Edgmon represented that he had 

450 head of cattle to use as collateral for a new loan. App. at 

181. Edgmon made no mention that he had already sold some of the 

cattle he had used for collateral for his previous FmHA loans. To 

process Edgmon's new loan application, FmHA had to conduct a 

collateral inspection. Such an inspection was scheduled for August 

8, 1989. Trans. Vol. I, at 52-54. Edgmon met with the FmHA 

representative but canceled the inspection and failed to inform 

FmHA that he had already sold much of the cattle he was offering as 

collateral. Id. Just before the second scheduled collateral 

inspection, Edgmon finally informed FmHA that he did not have the 

cattle he had claimed could serve as collateral because he had sold 

many of them. Id. at 56. From these facts, a reasonable jury 

could infer that Edgmon was attempting to conceal the ongoing sales 

of collateral from FmHA and actively misrepresenting the amount of 

cattle he had available to serve as collateral and further infer 

such actions indicated an intent to defraud. This, when taken with 

Edgmon's testimony that he knew the form of the cattle sales was 

improper, constitutes substantial evidence from which a reasonable 

jury could find that Edgmon acted with intent to deceive. 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 6 
~- Money Laundering. 

Defendant Edgmon, Sr., challenges the district court's refusal 

to enter a judgment of acquittal on the count of money laundering 

in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1956 based on insufficiency of the 

evidence. One of the elements the government must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt to convict under § 1956 money laundering is that 

the accused acted with intent to conceal or disguise the nature or 

source of proceeds of an illegal activity such as conversion of 

FmHA collateral. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i). Defendant Edgmon, 

Sr., argues that the jury finding that he acted with intent to 

conceal the source of the funds is not supported by substantial 

evidence. 

In asserting his position, Edgmon, Sr., relies on the case of 

United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1470-73 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

The Sanders case involved the proceeds of drug transactions. The 

drug dealers purchased automobiles with the proceeds of those drug 

transactions and were later convicted of money laundering based on 

the automobile purchases. In the Sanders opinion we interpreted § 

1956. We held that merely spending the proceeds of illegal 

activities does not violate the money laundering statute. Id. at 

1472. We noted that, 

the purpose of the money laundering statute is to reach 

commercial transactions intended (at least in part) to 

disguise the relationship of the item purchased with the 

person providing the proceeds and that the proceeds used 

to make the purchase were obtained from illegal 

activities. 

Id. In holding that the defendants in Sanders did not violate § 

- 7 

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 7 
1956, we emphasized that no third parties were involved and no 

effort was made to conceal the identity of the defendants as the 

purchasers. Id. 

The facts now before us are significantly different from those 

presented in Sanders and, unlike the Sanders facts, support a 

finding of a violation of the money laundering statute. In this 

case, a third party was used for the transaction. Defendant Gary 

Edgmon owned the cattle in his own name. The cattle served as 

collateral for a loan to Gary Edgmon in Gary Edgmon's name. The 

sales, however, were made by his father, Edgmon, Sr., in Edgmon, 

Sr.'s name. Payment for the cattle was made to Edgmon, Sr., not 

the true owner of the cattle, Gary Edgmon. After receiving the 

proceeds of the conversions in his name, Edgmon, Sr. , used a 

substantial portion of the proceeds to purchase a 144 acre tract of 

land and a new tractor. Supp. App. at 49, 52-53. Edgmon, Sr., 

then used all of his equity in the land and the tractor to obtain 

a loan from a local bank. App. at 176, 179. The net effect was to 

take the proceeds of the conversion, pass them through a seller and 

a bank, and wind up with a check for an amount essentially 

equivalent to the original proceeds of the conversions. Edgmon, 

Sr., then paid a large portion of the proceeds to his son, Edgmon, 

the true owner of the sold cattle. These involved transactions, 

unlike the simple automobile purchases in Sanders, certainly 

support a finding under the money laundering statute of intent to 

conceal the origin or nature of the proceeds of unlawful activity. 

- 8 

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 8 
B. Motion For A New Trial. 

Defendants next argue that the district court committed error 

by refusing to grant their motions for a new trial. On appeal, we 

review a district court's denial a motion for a new trial for an 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Mcintyre, 836 F.2d 467, 472 

(lOth Cir. 1987). In contending that the district court abused its 

discretion, defendants merely reassert the arguments they made 

under their challenge to the refusal to enter judgment of 

acquittal. For the reasons discussed in the preceding section, 

therefore, we also reject defendants' challenge to the district 

court's failure to grant a new trial. 

c. FmHA 1 s Failure To Follow FmHA Regulations. 

Next, defendants challenge their convictions on what is 

presumably some form of a denial of due process argument. 

Defendants assert that FmHA failed to follow its own regulations in 

referring their case to the United States Attorney's Office for 

criminal prosecution. From this allegation, defendants make the 

leap of logic that FmHA's departure from its regulations raises a 

defense for them to the criminal prosecution by the United States 

Attorney's Office. Defendants cite no authority in support of this 

position. 1 

1In the absence of any useful authority provided by the 

parties, we have attempted to identify other published cases in 

which defendants' theory has been presented to a court. We find 

four published opinions in which the deciding court was faced with 

an argument essentially the same as that offered by defendants. 

The argument did not prevail in any of the four cases. See United 

States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 644-46 (2nd Cir. 1978) (rejecting 

claim that informal criminal reference procedure of Securities and 

- 9 

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 9 
Under the facts and argument presented to us by counsel, we 

find no violation of due process. The regulations cited by 

defendants contemplate an orderly procedure for a local FmHA 

commissioner to refer a matter to the United States Attorney's 

Office for criminal investigation and possible prosecution. The 

regulations state that when a commissioner discovers an 

unauthorized sale of FmHA collateral, corrective action must be 

taken. 7 C.F.R. § 1962.18(a). The regulations then direct that 

the commissioner notify the borrower of the unauthorized sale and 

demand restitution of the proceeds from the borrower. 7 C.F.R. § 

1962.18 (b) 0 The notice should also inform the borrower that if 

Exchange Commission violated due process and statutes and should 

invalidate convictions); United States v. Hirt, 465 F.2d 177, 178-

79 (9th Cir. 1972) (rejecting argument that criminal reference by 

local draft board violated regulations and thus due process thereby 

invalidating convictions); United States v. Archer, 455 F.2d 193, 

195 (lOth Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 856 (1972) (rejecting 

claim that conviction should be overturned because local draft 

board referred case for criminal prosecution prematurely in 

violation of regulations and thereby denied due process) ; United 

States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 328-29 (E.D. Pa. 1978) 

(rejecting claim that Securities and Exchange Commission violated 

defendant's due process rights by informally referring case for 

criminal prosecution) . We do not presume to represent that these 

four opinions are the only published cases ruling on defendants' 

theory. The research of a dispassionate decision-maker, no matter 

how conscientious, can never replace the dedicated research efforts 

of a zealous advocate. 

These four cases do not decide for us, unfortunately, the 

issue now presented. Three of the cases are distinguishable on 

significant points and so offer little guidance. See Fields, 592 

F.2d at 644-46; Hirt, 465 F.2d at 178-79; Bloom, 450 F. Supp. at 

328-29. While the fourth appears to be directly on point, this 

court dismissed the due process argument out of hand without 

discussion or meaningful analysis. See Archer, 455 F.2d at 195 

("This argument is without merit"). These cases serve only to 

indicate a less than enthusiastic judicial attitude toward the 

novel theory propounded by defendants and the need for thorough 

argument and research to support such a novel theory. 

- 10 -

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 10 
restitution is not made, the matter will be referred for criminal 

prosecution. See Guide Letter 1962-A-5. The commissioner in this 

case sent just such a notice. App. at 182 (a). While the 

commissioner may or may not have fully complied with FmHA 

regulations regarding post disposition approval of the unauthorized 

sale, the reference of the case to the United States Attorney's 

Office followed an orderly pattern. We find no violation of due 

process based on the arguments made by defendants. Cf. United 

States v. Garth, 773 F.2d 1469, 1473-74 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding 

that FmHA regulations regarding procedures for civil remedy for 

conversaion violate due process offers no defense to prosecution 

for criminal conversion) . 

D. Grand Jury Evidence. 

Defendants also challenge their convictions on the grounds 

that the government failed to present substantial exculpatory 

evidence to the grand jury as required by United States v. 

Williams, 899 F.2d 898 (lOth Cir 1990). Defendants assert that a 

government witness presented testimony to the grand jury that was 

misleading and inaccurate with respect to a crucial element of the 

crimes alleged. Defendants argue this misleading testimony 

undermines the reliability of the grand jury indictment and, 

therefore, entitles them to have their convictions based on that 

indictment set aside. 

We are not persuaded by defendants' argument. In their 

analysis, defendants fail to account for United States v. Mechanik, 

- 11 -

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 11 
475 U.S. 66 (1986). In Mechanik, the Supreme Court was faced with 

a factual situation analogous to that now presented this court. 

The prosecution had violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

6(d) by having two law enforcement agents testify in tandem. The 

grand jury issued an indictment following this improper procedure 

and, after a trial, a petit jury convicted the defendants of the 

crimes charged in the indictment. After the jury verdict, the 

defendants challenged their convictions on the basis of the error 

in the grand jury process. The Court found that the petit jury's 

verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rendered the procedural 

error in the grand jury charging process harmless. Id. at 73. In 

reaching its decision, the Court understood that the grand jury's 

role is merely to determine whether probable cause exists and not 

to determine guilt. The court noted, "We believe that the petit 

jury's verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt demonstrates ~ 

fortiori that there was probable cause to charge the defendants 

with the offenses for which they were convicted. Therefore, the 

convictions must stand despite the rule violation." Id. at 67. 

Though the alleged error in the grand jury proceedings in this 

case was arguably more significant than that committed in Mechanik, 

we find the reasoning of the Supreme Court applicable. The petit 

jury reviewed the same allegedly misleading evidence and defendants' "substantial exculpatory 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

evidence" and found defendants 

That finding of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt after having heard the evidence defendants allege 

should also have been presented to the grand jury "means ... that 

- 12 -

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 12 
there was probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty 

as charged." See id. at 70. 

E. Double Jeopardy And Money Laundering. 

Finally, defendant Edgmon, Sr., challenges his conviction for 

money laundering on the grounds that the conviction violates the 

Double Jeopardy Clause. Edgmon, Sr., contends that his conviction 

for both conversion and money laundering constitutes multiple 

punishments for the same offense. Edgmon, Sr., argues that the 

applicable double jeopardy test is the different fact test 

enumerated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 

(1932). Under the Blockburger test the inquiry is whether each 

statutory provision defining the crimes requires proof of a fact 

that the other does not. The government does not dispute 

defendants' contention that, under this test, the crime of 

conversion does not require proof of a fact that money laundering 

does not because the crime of conversion is an element of money 

laundering. 2 We, therefore, assume that defendant Edgmon, Sr., is 

2 The money laundering statute provides in pertinent part: 

Laundering of monetary instruments 

(a) (1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a 

financial transaction represents the proceeds of some 

form of unlawful activity-

(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying 

on of specified unlawful activity; 

(B) knowing that the transaction is 

designed in whole or in part-

( i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the 

location, the source, the ownership, or the 

- 13 -

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 13 
correct in his assertion that conversion and money laundering 

"fail" the Blockburger test. 

We do not find, however, that the Blockburger test is decisive 

of defendant's challenge. In a more recent opinion from the 

Supreme Court, Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985}, the 

Court further explained the analysis under a Double Jeopardy Clause 

challenge and the role of Blockburger in that analysis. In 

Garrett, the Court elaborated that a double jeopardy challenge 

requires a two-step analysis. Id. at 779, 786. In the first step, 

the court must determine whether the Congress intended each statutory violation to be a separate offense and whether one violation 

was intended to be a lesser included offense of the other. Id. at 

779, 784. The Blockburger test is an aspect of this first step and 

is designed to help determine legislative intent. Id. at 779. If 

Congress did not intend the statutory violations to be separately 

punishable offenses, the analysis ends. If the Congress intended 

the statutory violations to be separate punishable offenses, the 

control of the proceeds of specified unlawful 

activity; 

shall be sentenced to a fine . . . or imprisonment . . . 

or both. 

(7) the term "specified unlawful activity" means-

(D) an offense under , section 658 

(relating to property mortgaged or pledged to 

farm credit agencies) [conversion]. 

28 U.S.C. 1956 (emphasis added). 

- 14 -

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 14 
court must move to the second step of the analysis. Id. at 786. 

In the second step, the court must determine whether separate 

prosecutions or punishments for the offenses violates the Due 

Process Clause. Id. 

~- Legislative Intent. 

The Court in Garrett applied the two-step analysis to a 

challenge to prosecutions for a continuing criminal enterprise 

under 21 u.s.c. § 848 and one of the underlying predicate offenses. 

As in the present case, the two offenses "failed" the Blockburger 

test because one served as an element of the other. See id. at 

779. The Court, however, noted that Blockburger is not decisive 

and is only one method of determining legislative intent. See id. 

at 778-79. The true test is whether the legislature intended the 

violations of the two different statutory provisions to be separately prosecutable offenses. See id. The Court determined that 

the legislative history and statutory framework of the continuing 

criminal enterprise statute clearly indicated that Congress 

intended it to be a separate and supplemental offense, in addition 

to, rather than instead of, the predicate offense. Id. at 784-86. 

Like the continuing criminal enterprise statute reviewed in 

Garrett, Congress appears to have intended the money laundering 

statute to be a separate crime distinct from the underlying offense 

that generated the money to be laundered. The senate report on § 

1956 expresses the need for a federal criminal offense aimed 

directly at the activity of laundering the money gained from 

- 15 -

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 15 
illegal activity. The Senate report on the money laundering bill 

makes plain that the bill was intended to create a "new Federal 

offense against money laundering." Sen. R. 99-433 at 4. The 

discussion throughout the report is of the gap in the criminal law 

with respect to the post-crime hiding of the illgotten gains. See 

id. at 1-9. The Senate report and the statute itself indicate that 

the Congress intended simply to add a new criminal offense to 

punish activity that was not previously punished criminally. 

Congress aimed the crime of money laundering at conduct that 

follows in time the underlying crime rather than to afford an 

alternative means of punishing the prior "specified unlawful 

activity." congress enacted the money laundering statute to 

provide a punishment in addition to other punishment rather than 

instead of other punishment. We find that Congress intended money 

laundering and the "specified unlawful activity" to be separate 

offenses separately punishable. 

£. Double Jeopardy Clause. 

Having determined that Congress intended money laundering to 

be a separate offense from the "specified illegal activity" that is 

its predicate offense, and that it intended to permit prosecutions 

for both offenses, we must now determine whether prosecution for 

both offenses violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double 

Jeopardy Clause states, "nor shall any person be subject for the 

same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. 

Const. amend. V. "The critical inquiry is whether [the broader 

offense] is considered the 'same offense' as one or more of its 

- 16 -

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 16 
predicate offenses within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy 

Clause." Garrett, 471 U.S. at 786. In pursuing this inquiry, the 

Garrett court looked to the general meaning of the term "same" and 

to the allegations of the actual crimes charged and asked if they 

were the "same offense." Id. 

Edgmon, Sr., was charged with conversion and money laundering. 

In the conversion charge, Edgmon, Sr., was alleged to have assisted 

his son in selling cattle that served as collateral for an FmHA 

loan with the intent to defraud. The mere assistance with the sale 

of the cattle, if accompanied by the intent to defraud, was a 

sufficient actus reus for conversion in the context of this case. 

The money laundering charge alleged that Edgmon, Sr., helped 

disguise the origin of the proceeds of those sales by receiving the 

money in his name rather than the son's, putting the proceeds in 

his own account, using the proceeds to obtain assets, then using 

those assets to obtain a new loan and once again hold the proceeds 

of the sales in an easily negotiable form. While some of the 

evidence presented on the two offenses may overlap, the actual 

conduct and the nature of the conduct constituting the two offenses 

are not the "same." One is simply a sale of cattle. The other is 

a line of financial transactions that result in the parties holding 

essentially the same amount of cash in the form of a check at the 

end of the transactions as they held at the beginning of the 

transactions. To convict of money laundering, the jury had to find 

that Edgmon, Sr., not only assisted in the conversion of FmHA 

collateral but that he then attempted to take the proceeds of that 

- 17 -

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 17 
conversion and enter financial transactions designed to conceal the 

origin of those proceeds. 

We find that the offenses of conversion and money laundering 

are analogous to the offense of a continuing criminal enterprise 

and its predicate offense considered by the Supreme Court in 

Garrett. Therefore, prosecution and punishment for both money 

laundering and conversion does not violate the Double Jeopardy 

Clause. 

III. 

Having examined the arguments propounded by defendants, we 

find no reason to overturn their convictions. We have reviewed the 

record and find that substantial evidence exists from which a 

reasonable jury could conclude that defendants possessed the 

requisite mens rea for conversion of FmHA collateral. Substantial 

evidence also existed to support a finding that defendant Edgmon, 

Sr., had the mens rea necessary to be guilty of money laundering. 

We do not find that the purported violation by FmHA of its 

regulations should act to bar defendants' prosecution or invalidate 

their convictions. Furthermore, the finding by the petit jury of 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt cured the alleged evidentiary 

errors that may have been committed in the grand jury charging 

process. Finally, we find that prosecution of both money 

laundering and its predicate offense, conversion of FmHA 

collateral, does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

AFFIRMED. 

- 18 -

Appellate Case: 91-6078 Document: 01019336211 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 18