Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01570/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01570-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Meyer Corporation, U.S.
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

MEYER CORPORATION, U.S.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2023-1570

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in Nos. 1:13-cv-00154-TJA, 1:13-cv-00181-TJA, 1:13-

cv-00182-TJA, 1:13-cv-00226-TJA, 1:13-cv-00227-TJA, 

1:13-cv-00258-TJA, 1:13-cv-00259-TJA, 1:13-cv-00266-

TJA, 1:13-cv-00322-TJA, 1:13-cv-00323-TJA, 1:13-cv00405-TJA, 1:14-cv-00118-TJA, 1:14-cv-00277-TJA, 1:15-

cv-00018-TJA, 1:15-cv-00019-TJA, 1:15-cv-00091-TJA, 

1:15-cv-00092-TJA, 1:15-cv-00191-TJA, 1:15-cv-00332-

TJA, 1:16-cv-00112-TJA, 1:16-cv-00271-TJA, 1:17-cv00186-TJA, 1:20-cv-03835-TJA, 1:21-cv-00103-TJA, Senior 

Judge Thomas J. Aquilino, Jr.

______________________

Decided: December 13, 2024

______________________

JOHN M. PETERSON, Neville Peterson LLP, New York, 

NY, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

PATRICK KLEIN; JOHN DONOHUE, Philadelphia, PA; 

RICHARD F. O'NEILL, Seattle, WA.

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2 MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US

 BEVERLY A. FARRELL, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, New 

York, NY, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, AIMEE LEE, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY,

JUSTIN REINHART MILLER; PAULA S. SMITH, Office of the 

Assistant Chief Counsel, Bureau of Customs and Border 

Protection, United States Department of Homeland 

Security, New York, NY.

______________________

Before PROST, HUGHES, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.

HUGHES, Circuit Judge.

This case returns to us on appeal following a remand 

in Meyer Corp., U.S. v. United States, 43 F.4th 1325 

(Fed. Cir. 2022). In that case, we held that the United 

States Court of International Trade had misinterpreted our 

precedent by imposing requirements beyond what the

statute and regulations demand when determining that

Meyer Corporation, U.S. was not entitled to rely on a “firstsale” price for the dutiable value of its imported cookware.

On remand, the trial court again held that Meyer was not 

entitled to rely on its first-sale price, finding that Meyer’s 

failure to produce financial documents for its parent 

holding company was dispositive of the issue. Because the 

trial court improperly applied an evidentiary presumption 

against Meyer and failed to address record evidence, we 

once again vacate and remand for the trial court to 

reconsider whether Meyer may rely on its first-sale price.

I

We briefly discuss the parties and the history of this 

case before turning to the merits of the current appeal. This 

case concerns duties that U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection assessed on cookware imported by Meyer 

Corporation, U.S. (Meyer). Some cookware was 

manufactured in Thailand, and some was manufactured in 

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MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US 3

China. The manufacturers in Thailand and China sold 

finished cookware to distributors in Macau and Hong 

Kong, respectively, and then to the U.S. importer, Meyer. 

The manufacturers, distributors, and importer are all 

related, with common parent and shareholder Meyer 

International Holdings, Ltd. (Meyer Holdings).

Relevant here, Meyer requested that Customs value its 

cookware based on the first-sale price that its affiliated 

distributors paid to the manufacturers. See Meyer Corp., 

U.S. v. United States, No. 13-00154, 2021 WL 777788, at *3 

(Ct. Int’l Trade Mar. 1, 2021) (Meyer II).

1 Customs rejected 

Meyer’s request to use the first-sale price and instead 

assessed duties based on the second-sale price that Meyer 

paid to its distributors. Id. at *4. 

Meyer protested Customs’ decisions and then appealed 

to the Court of International Trade. Id. Following a bench 

trial, the trial court affirmed Customs’ decision “to deny 

‘first sale’ treatment.” J.A. 89. In doing so, the trial court 

held that, under our decision in Nissho Iwai Am. Corp. v. 

United States, 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992), an importer 

wishing to rely on the first-sale price bears the burden to 

show that the first sales were “(1) bona fide sales that are 

(2) clearly destined for the United States (3) transacted at 

arm’s length and (4) absent any distortive nonmarket 

influences.” Meyer II, 2021 WL 777788, at *1, *5 (citing 

Nissho Iwai, 982 F.2d 505. For both Meyer’s Chinesemanufactured products and its Thai-manufactured 

products that were made in part from Chinese inputs, the 

trial court found that Meyer had not provided adequate 

information to prove that its first sales met the last 

1 For clarity, we adopt the same short form 

references as the trial court. “Meyer I,” as used by the trial 

court, refers to its pre-trial opinion granting-in-part

summary judgment, Meyer Corp. v. United States, 255 F. 

Supp. 3d 1348 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2017). See J.A. 1–2.

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4 MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US

requirement: that they were free of “market-distortive 

influence, either with respect to the plaintiff directly or the 

provision of inputs generally.” Id. at *6, *51. The trial court 

thus concluded that Meyer could not rely on the first-sale 

prices. Id. at *50–51.

Meyer appealed to this court, and we held that “[t]he 

trial court misinterpreted our decision in Nissho Iwai to 

require any party to show the absence of all ‘distortive 

nonmarket influences.’” Meyer Corp., U.S. v. United States, 

43 F.4th 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (Meyer III). We 

explained that “[t]here is no basis in the statute for 

Customs or the court to consider the effects of a non-market 

economy on the transaction value” and that “[t]he statute 

requires only that ‘the relationship between [the] buyer 

and seller did not influence the price actually paid or 

payable.’” Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(2)(B)) (third 

alteration in original). Accordingly, we vacated and 

remanded “for the court to reconsider whether Meyer may 

rely on the first-sale price.” Id. at 1333.

On remand, the trial court repeated many of its 

previous findings—with references to non-market economy 

effects excised—and again held that Meyer was not 

entitled to first-sale valuation of its cookware and

subsequently “affirmed” its earlier judgment in Meyer II.

Meyer Corp., U.S. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 3d 1376, 

1381 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2023) (Meyer IV). Meyer timely 

appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

II

“We review the Court of International Trade’s 

conclusions of law de novo.” Ford Motor Co. v. United 

States, 286 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “Following a 

trial, we review the court’s findings of fact for clear error.” 

Id.

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MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US 5

III

On appeal, Meyer asserts that the trial court failed to 

comply with our remand order requiring reconsideration of

whether Meyer may rely on the first-sale price. In raising 

this argument, Meyer alleges that the trial court 

improperly relied on an adverse evidentiary inference and 

failed to give due consideration to other record evidence.

Meyer also argues that this case requires us to provide a

definitive interpretation of “the firm” as used in 19 C.F.R. 

§ 152.103(l)(1)(iii). We address each issue in turn.

A

1

Under Section 402(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 

amended, Customs is instructed to set the transaction 

value of imported merchandise as “the price actually paid 

or payable for the merchandise when sold for exportation 

to the United States” plus additional amounts for certain 

specified costs not relevant here. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(1). 

Where the transaction takes place between a related buyer 

and seller, the statute states that the transaction value is 

viable “if an examination of the circumstances of the sale 

of the imported merchandise indicates that the 

relationship between such buyer and seller did not 

influence the price actually paid or payable.” Id. 

§ 1401a(b)(2)(B). The transaction price between related 

parties is also acceptable “if the transaction value of the 

imported merchandise closely approximates . . . the 

transaction value of identical merchandise, or of similar 

merchandise, in sales to unrelated buyers in the United 

States.” Id. § 1401a(b)(2)(B)(i).

The statute’s corresponding regulation, 19 C.F.R. 

§ 152.103(l)(1), lists ways for Customs to find that the 

relationship between the buyer and seller did not influence 

the price. Two of the three tests are relevant here: the 

“normal pricing practices” test and the “all costs plus 

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6 MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US

profit” test. As the name suggests, Customs will find that 

the “normal pricing practices” test is satisfied “[i]f the price 

has been settled in a manner consistent with the normal 

pricing practices of the industry in question.” Id. 

§ 152.103(l)(1)(ii). Likewise, the “all costs plus profit test”

is met “[i]f it is shown that the price is adequate to ensure 

recovery of all costs plus a profit which is equivalent to the 

firm’s overall profit realized over a representative period of 

time . . . , in sales of merchandise of the same class or 

kind.” Id. § 152.103(l)(1)(iii).

In Nissho Iwai, we addressed which price Customs 

should use as the transaction value in a multi-tiered 

import scheme in which all the entities are related—the 

first-sale price the distributor paid to the manufacturer or 

the second-sale price the importer paid to the distributor. 

982 F.2d at 508–11. There, we explained that “once it is 

determined that both the first- and second-sale prices are 

statutorily viable transaction values, the rule is straightforward: the manufacturer’s first-sale price, rather than 

the distributor’s second-sale price, is used as the basis for 

determining transaction value.” Meyer III, 43 F.4th at 1332 

(quoting Nissho Iwai, 982 F.2d at 509) (cleaned up and 

alterations omitted). The Nissho Iwai decision also 

elaborated on the meaning of “statutorily viable,” stating

that “[t]he manufacturer’s price constitutes a viable 

transaction value when the goods are clearly destined for 

export to the United States and when the manufacturer 

and middleman deal with each other at arm’s length, in the 

absence of any non-market influences that affect the 

legitimacy of the sales price.” Id.

2

As explained above and in our Meyer III opinion, the 

trial court in Meyer II erroneously interpreted Nissho 

Iwai’s statement about “the absence of any non-market 

influences” to mean that, because China was a non-market 

economy, Meyer had “the burden of demonstrating that 

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MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US 7

inputs from [China], as well as with respect to the 

transactions from its producer/seller to its 

middleman/buyer, were procured at undistorted prices.” 

Meyer II, 2021 WL 777788, at *6. To that end, the trial 

court held that financial records pertaining to Meyer 

Holdings, the ultimate parent company of the Meyer group,

were “relevant to examining whether any non-market 

influences affect the legitimacy of the sales price.” Id. 

Meyer did not produce any Meyer Holdings financials, 

asserting that it did not possess such records and that they 

were not relevant to the issues posed by the case. 

Subsequently, the trial court’s rejection of Meyer’s first-sale 

price hinged almost entirely on the absence of Meyer 

Holdings financials. The trial court noted that for the “all 

costs plus profit” test, “costs are obviously critical to that 

determination, and the real costs of inputs from [China]

are suspect, given its status as a nonmarket economy 

country.” Id. at *50. The trial court went on to explain its 

concerns about interference by Meyer Holdings:

Even if “true” costs of such inputs could be 

determined, Meyer Holding presumptively has had 

the ability to influence the price paid or payable for 

them, for example by providing its subsidiaries 

access to credit and capital on terms that are not 

available to competitors without the same level of 

bargaining power with creditors, or even at “below 

market” rates. Without financial statements, the 

court has no concept of the extent to which the 

finances of the Meyer group units are truly 

independent “silos” of one another, or the extent to 

which there might have been state influence or 

assistance to some degree. Statutory assists do not 

encompass financial assistance, of course, but the 

broader concern here is over market-distortive 

influence, either with respect to the plaintiff 

directly or the provision of inputs generally.

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8 MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US

Id. at *51. The trial court also acknowledged that Meyer 

Holdings was not a party to the litigation and Meyer was 

entitled to assert its inability to obtain parent company 

information, but it nevertheless found the lack of 

documents meaningful, stating:

However, given that the parent has an interest in 

seeing these types of matters resolved favorably, it 

is therefore presumed to be forthcoming, even 

unprompted, to provide whatever [Customs] deems 

necessary to assist in their resolution, and the fact 

that in that regard there has apparently been 

considerable “resistance” throughout this case to 

that not-unreasonable discovery request and the 

“assistance” that the parent could have provided its

subsidiary to address necessary questions with 

respect to concerns over nonmarket influences, 

speaks volumes.

Id. In conclusion, the court held that “[a]ll of the foregoing 

leads the court to doubt that accurate ascertainment of the 

‘true’ value of the ‘price paid or payable’ at the first sale 

level in the customs duty sense has been demonstrated in 

this case.” Id.

Following our remand order, the trial court’s Meyer IV 

opinion once again held that the lack of Meyer Holdings 

documents was dispositive to Meyer’s case. The trial court 

concluded that “[e]ven ignoring the fact that the claimed 

transaction values involve inputs from a non-marketeconomy country in the merchandise at issue, this court 

still cannot ignore plaintiff’s non-responsiveness to 

defendant’s request for information during discovery.” 

Meyer IV, 614 F.Supp.3d at 1380. The court also stated that 

“[t]he fact that the government herein was not provided 

with the financial information pertinent to plaintiff’s 

parent company hampered its ability to discern whether or 

not the parent of the plaintiff provided any form of 

assistance to reduce costs.” Id. Next, the trial court quoted 

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MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US 9

nearly the entirety of its analysis from Meyer II but noted 

that it had “excis[ed] any inference of ‘nonmarket 

consideration’ in accordance with the CAFC opinion.” Id.

The trial court concluded this opinion by stating:

[T]he prior analysis shows that plaintiff’s failure to 

provide the financial information requested by it 

during discovery provided an independent reason 

as to why Meyer could not demonstrate a true firstsale value absent of influence—not from a 

nonmarket-economy country per se—but from the 

relationships of the related parties. And the 

plaintiff had been forewarned by the court’s Meyer 

I decision as to the importance of that financial 

information but chose not to supplement its 

discovery responses.

Id. at 1380–81.

3

We agree with Meyer that the trial court failed to 

comply with our remand order instructing it to “reconsider 

whether Meyer may rely on the first-sale price” by

disregarding the trial record and instead applying an 

improper evidentiary presumption. The trial court’s 

opinion makes clear that it suspected Meyer of being

dishonest in its reporting of “costs” for use in the “all costs 

plus profit” test. See id. at 1379 (trial court repeating its 

prior statement that, even ignoring non-market economy 

effects, “the costs of the inputs from [China] are suspect”); 

id. at 1380 (“[T]he foregoing leads the court to doubt that 

accurate ascertainment of the ‘true’ value of the ‘price paid 

or payable’ at the first sale level in the customs duty sense 

has been demonstrated in this case.”). In reaching this 

conclusion, the trial court cites no record evidence to 

support its belief that Meyer inaccurately reported costs.

Rather, the court relied entirely on speculation that, 

because Meyer did not produce the Meyer Holdings 

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10 MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US

financial documents, the documents might have shown 

underreported costs. 

During discovery, Meyer objected to the production of 

Meyer Holdings’ documents on the grounds that it did not 

have possession, custody, or control of such documents. 

J.A. 33. There is nothing in the record to show that the 

government ever objected to the lack of production or 

pursued a motion to compel or subpoena against Meyer or 

Meyer Holdings. See Appellant’s Br. 14 n.6. Further, other 

record evidence seems to support Meyer’s position that it 

did not possess Meyer Holdings’ documents. See, e.g., Meyer 

II, 2021 WL 777788, at *8 (noting that Mr. Johnston, 

Meyer’s former managing director, “averred that, despite 

being related companies within the Meyer [g]roup,” each 

separate company is “structured with different ‘silos’ of 

business that operate independently of and competitively 

with each other, and that” Meyer “was accountable for its 

own profitability, independent of any other Meyer group 

entity.”). Yet, without citing any of this record evidence, the 

trial court presumed ill intent. The trial court mused that 

“Meyer Holding[s] presumptively has had the ability to 

influence the price paid or payable” and that Meyer 

Holdings was “presumed to be forthcoming, even 

unprompted, to provide whatever [Customs] deems 

necessary to assist in their resolution.” Meyer IV, 

614 F.Supp. 3d at 1380. The trial court accordingly found 

that it “sp[oke] volumes” that Meyer exhibited 

“considerable ‘resistance’ throughout this case to that not 

unreasonable discovery request,” given “the ‘assistance’ 

that the parent could have provided its subsidiary to 

address necessary questions.” Id.

The trial court’s language here is tantamount to the

discovery sanction of an adverse inference. Rule 37(b)(2)(A) 

of the Court of International Trade states that if a party 

“fails to obey an order to provide or permit 

discovery, . . . the court . . . may issue further just orders” 

including “directing that the matters embraced in the order 

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MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US 11

or other designated facts be taken as established for 

purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims.” 

Given that there were no discovery orders with which 

Meyer failed to comply—a prerequisite for adverse 

inferences under Rule 37(b)(2)(A)—the trial court had no 

basis to speculate about what the Meyer Holdings 

documents might have revealed, had they been produced.

While some statutory provisions that fall within the 

purview of the Court of International Trade more freely 

authorize the imposition of adverse inferences, assessing 

transaction value for related parties under 19 U.S.C.

§ 1401a(b)(2)(B) is not one of them. C.f. Fine Furniture 

(Shanghai) Ltd. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1365, 1370

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that, in the context of 

countervailing and antidumping duties under 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677e, “the statute permits Commerce to apply an 

adverse inference in selecting from among the facts 

otherwise available when an interested party fails to 

cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply 

with a request for information”).

Further, the trial court’s finding that Meyer could not 

prove its case without Meyer Holdings financial documents 

is particularly inappropriate because, in doing so, the trial 

court ignored other record evidence produced by Meyer,

including sworn testimony from employees and an expert 

opinion that was based on examination of company records.

The trial court did not grapple with any of this evidence: it 

did not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the 

evidence that was before it, or explain why, as a matter of 

law, that record evidence was or was not sufficient for 

Meyer to meet its burden. Indeed, aside from the trial 

court’s wholesale adoption of the government’s proposed

findings of fact in Meyer II, the court’s analysis does not 

even acknowledge—in its original determination or on 

remand—that there was other record evidence besides the 

missing Meyer Holdings documents. See Meyer II, 2021 WL 

777788, at *50–51; Meyer IV, 614 F. Supp. 3d at 1379–81.

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12 MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US

In our previous decision, we instructed the trial court 

to “reconsider whether Meyer may rely on the first-sale 

price.” Meyer III, 43 F.4th at 1333. It did not do so in any 

meaningful way. Accordingly, we vacate and remand once 

more.2 The trial court should evaluate, on the extensive 

record before it, whether Meyer has met its burden to show 

that its first-sale price is a viable transaction value under 

19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(2)(B). As discussed above, there are 

two alternate ways that Meyer may prove its case: the “all 

costs plus profit” test and the “normal pricing practices” 

test. See 19 C.F.R. § 152.103(l)(1). Because Meyer raised 

both tests as possible bases for using first-sale price, see 

J.A. 106, 108, so too should the trial court consider both 

tests in its opinion. We note that this decision should not 

be read as putting a thumb on the scale regarding the 

outcome on remand. Rather, it is an acknowledgement that 

Meyer was entitled to have its case heard on the merits of 

the record it presented, not disposed of based on conclusory 

speculation.

2 By ordering a remand for further consideration, we 

reject Meyer’s argument that a new trial is necessarily 

required. See Appellant’s Br. 43–46. Meyer had the 

opportunity to present evidence during a weeklong trial, 

after which the trial court adopted the government’s

proposed findings of facts and stated that Meyer’s facts 

were “not inaccurate,” Meyer II, 2021 WL 777788 at *50,

but did not make extensive conclusions of law based on 

those facts. The “extensive record” developed before the 

trial court, that record is “more than sufficient for 

conducting reconsideration.” Meyer IV, 614 F. Supp. 3d at

1381. Allowing for additional evidentiary proceedings 

would only prolong this already protracted case. To the 

extent that Meyer continues to seek a new trial, that 

request is best directed to the trial court. 

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MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US 13

B

Meyer also argues on appeal that this case requires us 

to provide an interpretation of “the firm” as used in the “all 

costs plus profit” test. See 19 C.F.R. § 152.103(l)(1) (“If it is 

shown that the price is adequate to ensure recovery of all 

costs plus a profit which is equivalent to the firm’s overall 

profit realized over a representative period of time (e.g., on 

an annual basis), in sales of merchandise of the same class 

or kind, this would demonstrate that the price has not been 

influenced.” (emphasis added)). Meyer notes that “[i]n an 

uncodified policy statement interpreting this Regulation, 

Customs has stated that the term ‘firm’ is ‘normally’

interpreted to be the parent company.” Appellant’s Br. 26; 

see also id. at n.14 (citing Determining the Acceptability of 

Transaction Value for Related Party Transactions (an 

Informed Compliance Publication), U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (April 2007), at 9; J.A. 38–39). Meyer 

asserts that this interpretation is incorrect, and the correct 

interpretation is that “firm” refers to “the firm which 

charged the price in the related party sale.” Id. at 26. 

Accordingly, Meyer argues that “[s]ince the [Meyer 

Holdings] financials could not be used in an ‘all costs plus 

profits’ test, they lost their ‘consequence to the 

determination of the action’ and became irrelevant.” Id. at 

33.

We decline to address Meyer’s arguments about the 

correct interpretation of “the firm” because the trial court’s 

opinion was not based on any interpretation—correct or 

incorrect—of that phrase. The government’s brief explains:

the trial court’s relevancy determination regarding the 

Meyer Holdings financials “did not rest on [Customs’]

interpretation of the term ‘firm’ in 19 C.F.R. 

§ 152.103(l)(1)(iii) as meaning a parent company, but 

instead turned on whether the parent holding company 

provided support or guidance that caused a marketdistortive effect on the first sale prices.” Appellee’s Br. 15. 

We agree.

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14 MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US

In Meyer II, the trial court acknowledged Meyer’s 

arguments regarding “the appropriate ‘firm’ to analyze 

under the ‘all costs plus profit test,’” but noted that 

regardless of whether Meyer’s argument was correct, it

wanted the Meyer Holdings financial statements in order 

to assess whether Meyer had accurately reported the 

“costs” arm of the “all costs plus profit” test. Meyer II,

2021 WL 777788, at *50 (“[W]hether it is true that for the 

‘all costs plus profit’ test no [Customs] regulation requires 

that the ‘firm’ mentioned in 19 C.F.R § 152.103(l)(1)(iii) be 

the ‘parent’ of the importing party . . . , costs are obviously 

critical to that determination, and the real costs of inputs 

from [China] are suspect, given its status as a nonmarket 

economy country.”). The Meyer IV opinion also did not rely 

on any interpretation of “the firm” in its decisions, even 

though the trial court appears to have voiced agreement 

with Meyer on its proposed interpretation. Meyer IV, 614 F.

Supp. 3d at 1380 (trial court restating its own findings 

from Meyer II and noting that “[i]t also found that ‘no 

[Customs] regulation requires that the “firm” mentioned in 

19 C.F.R. § 152.103(l)(1)(iii) be the “parent” of the 

importing party.’”). However, because the trial court’s 

opinion was not based on the challenged statutory term, we 

reserve the question of proper interpretation of 19 C.F.R. 

§ 152.103(l)(1)(iii) for another day.

IV

Because the Court of International Trade failed to 

meaningfully evaluate whether Meyer was entitled to rely 

on first-sale price in accordance with our remand order, we 

again vacate and remand for the court to reconsider 

whether Meyer may rely on the first-sale price. We need 

not reach Meyer’s alternative argument that the trial court 

should have also rejected Meyer’s second-sale price if it 

found that the costs were inaccurate for first-sale price.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. v. US 15

COSTS

No costs.

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