Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01994/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01994-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melinda Yvette Barela
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELINDA YVETTE BARELA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1 Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant.

1:13-cv-001994 GSA

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Melinda Yvette Barela (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of 

the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her application

for supplemental security income payments under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The 

matter is pending before the Court on the parties‟ briefs, which were submitted, without oral 

argument, to the Honorable Gary S. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.2

 

1

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013. Pursuant to Rule 

25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for Michael J. Astrue as the 

defendant in this action.

Case 1:13-cv-01994-GSA Document 17 Filed 03/02/15 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine 

whether (1) it is supported by substantial evidence and (2) it applies the correct legal standards. 

See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

“Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). It is “relevant evidence which, 

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. In applying the substantial evidence test, courts review the record as a whole. 

Lamb v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1976). Where the evidence is susceptible to 

more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's 

conclusion must be upheld.” Id.

DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Visual Impairment

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly “rejected the presence of a visual impairment.” 

Doc. 14 at 8. Plaintiff further argues that the Commissioner should have obtained a consultative 

examination with regard to Plaintiff‟s visual impairment because “the extent of the visual field 

loss and the impact of [the] visual field loss on the ability to engage in work activity” are not 

resolved in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.919(a) (an ALJ may request a consultative 

examination when there are inconsistencies in the evidence or the evidence is insufficient to 

support a decision on a claim). The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly evaluated 

Plaintiff‟s visual impairment and was not required to obtain a consultative examination regarding 

the visual impairment because (1) the record reflects no functional limitations whatsoever on 

 

2 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. See Docs. 7 & 8.

Case 1:13-cv-01994-GSA Document 17 Filed 03/02/15 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

account of the visual impairment; (2) nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff suffered from a 

disabling visual impairment for a continuous period of at least twelve months or that she was

expected to do so; and (3) the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff‟s allegations regarding her visual 

limitations. Doc. 15 at 7-8.

(i) The ALJ Properly Found that Plaintiff did not have a Disabling Impairment 

that Satisfied the Applicable Durational Requirement 

The Court concludes that the ALJ‟s findings regarding Plaintiff‟s visual impairment are 

free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ noted that on September 29, 

2006, the Plaintiff “underwent a pars plana vitrectomy about the right eye due to proliferative 

diabetic retinopathy, a vitreous hemorrhage, and an epiretinal membrane.” AR 20; 308. The ALJ 

further noted that Plaintiff alleged at the administrative hearing that she was experiencing

“blurred vision” and “worsening peripheral vision on the right.” AR 20; 72; 444. However, the 

ALJ found that “there is little evidence that the claimant‟s impairment caused more than minimal 

functional limitations for more than 12 continuous months.” AR 20. 

The ALJ supported his findings with reference to the medical evidence. Specifically, he 

stated that although Plaintiff had eye surgery to treat a vitreous hemorrhage in the right eye in 

September 2006, “[b]y October 23, 200[6], retinal care progress notes state that the claimant was 

„[d]oing well‟ and that no retinal therapy was required post surgery.” AR 20; 308; 312. Next, he 

noted that on October 5, 2010, Plaintiff‟s optometrist confirmed that her eye condition was

“stable.” AR 20; 332. The ALJ also referenced “an August 29, 2011 opinion by treating retinal 

specialist Robert Equi, M.D.,” which “states that the claimant has a corrected visual acuity of 

20/30 OD and 20/20 OS.” 3 AR 20; 296. The ALJ noted that “Dr. Equi stated that he had not 

 

3 The treatment record referenced by the ALJ was prepared by Dr. Robert Equi on August 29, 2011, in response to a 

records request submitted by the state agency in connection with Plaintiff‟s disability application. AR 296. The 

treatment record states that Plaintiff had a corrected visual acuity of 20/30 OD and 20/20 OS, based on an 

examination conducted on August 27, 2007. Id. The record further states that Plaintiff failed to attend her follow-up 

Case 1:13-cv-01994-GSA Document 17 Filed 03/02/15 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

treated the claimant since 2007.” AR 20; 296. Finally, the ALJ observed that when Plaintiff 

presented with complaints of visual problems to her treating retinal specialists on May 7, 2012, 

“she was merely given education and advised to return to care if her symptoms increased.” AR 

20; 402-403. The ALJ also noted that the medical record did not reflect any functional limitations 

related to Plaintiff‟s visual impairment. As a result, in light of the medical record evidence, he 

found that the Plaintiff‟s visual impairment did not constitute a severe, disabling impairment that 

met the applicable durational requirement. AR 20 (“there is little evidence that the claimant‟s 

impairment satisfied the durational requirement necessary to establish a severe, disabling 

impairment”); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.909. 

The ALJ‟s findings regarding Plaintiff‟s visual impairment are not legally erroneous and 

are supported by substantial evidence. In August 2007, following her 2006 right-eye vitrectomy, 

Plaintiff had 20/30 vision in her right eye and 20/20 vision in her left eye, with correction. AR 

296. Dr. Odette Yang and/or Dr. Richard Yang, Plaintiff‟s treating optometrists at Gateway 

Optometric Center, examined Plaintiff in May 2009, October 2010, and November 2011 and, on 

all three occasions, found that she had 20/20 vision in both eyes, with correction. AR 456; 452; 

448. As the ALJ noted, Dr. Odette Yang found Plaintiff‟s eye condition to be “stable” in October 

2010, and recommended routine eye exams on a yearly or as needed basis. On May 7, 2012, 

Plaintiff went to her treating eye-specialist, Dr. Robert Equi, at Retinal Consultants Medical 

Group, Inc., for a self-referred consultation for mild symptoms. AR 401. Plaintiff underwent an 

eye exam and further testing. Plaintiff‟s eye exam yielded basically normal results. Plaintiff was 

found to have 20/25 vision in both eyes with correction and a normal visual field in both eyes. 

AR 402. Plaintiff‟s Fluorescein Angiography and Fundus Photography results revealed that her

proliferative diabetic retinopathy (PDR) was “regressed” instead of “active.” AR 407. 

 

appointment that was scheduled for six months after the August 27, 2007 examination, and had, in fact, not been seen 

by Dr. Equi since 2007. 

Case 1:13-cv-01994-GSA Document 17 Filed 03/02/15 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Consultative Examiner Frank Chen, M.D., conducted a physical examination of Plaintiff on 

March 16, 2011; he found that Plaintiff had 20/20 vision in both eyes with correction and did not 

detect any abnormalities. AR 353. Similarly, Plaintiff had normal findings as to her eyes 

(PERRLA, conjunctivae and sclerae clear; vision grossly normal; no abnormal findings) during a 

physical examination conducted on August 28, 2012 by her primary-care providers, Shobha 

Sekhon, M.D./Cynthia Berube, F.N.P.. AR 353; 417.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly assess records from a September 4, 2012 eye 

examination by her optometrist, Dr. Odette Yang, that took place 3 days before her September 7, 

2012 administrative hearing. On September 4, 2012, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Yang complaining

of blurry vision in her left eye that she believed stemmed from retinal bleeding. AR 444. 

Plaintiff reported that the symptoms had been present for two weeks. AR 444. Plaintiff also 

stated that her right eye was stable and that she had recently seen Dr. Equi for a “Dfe” or Dilated 

Fundus Examination of the inner surfaces of the eye.

4

 AR 444. Dr. Yang referred Plaintiff back 

to Dr. Equi, her retinal specialist, for a “possible vitreal heme os,” i.e., a possible vitreous

hemorrhage of the left eye. AR 447; 463. Dr. Yang noted that Plaintiff‟s symptoms were a “nonemergency” and that it was “okay to wait,” but that Plaintiff should be seen and should schedule 

an appointment with Dr. Equi. AR 447. Dr. Yang also noted that Plaintiff had 20/20 vision in 

her right eye, with correction, and 20/20 vision, with correction, when using both eyes. AR 447. 

At her administrative hearing a few days later, on September 7, 2012, Plaintiff testified that she 

had blurry vision in her left eye because of “jelly that‟s floating around in there,” which her 

doctor would “need to go in and do surgery and remove so the blurriness will clear up.” AR 72. 

The ALJ considered Plaintiff‟s allegations of blurred vision and worsening peripheral

vision that she reported at her administrative hearing. Plaintiff had also reported these symptoms 

 

44

Plaintiff appears to be referring to her examination by Dr. Equi on May 7, 2012. AR 401-408.

Case 1:13-cv-01994-GSA Document 17 Filed 03/02/15 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

to Dr. Yang just days before. Plaintiff told Dr. Yang that she had experienced these symptoms 

for two weeks. However, there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff‟s symptoms resulted in 

any functional limitations or that they were expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 

months. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(c) (“[a claimant] must provide evidence ... showing how [the

alleged] impairment(s) affects ... [his or her] functioning”). Plaintiff did not submit further 

records to the ALJ or to the Appeals Council regarding any follow-up diagnostic workup or 

treatment obtained from Dr. Equi regarding these symptoms. See Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 

639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1982) (the “existence” of an impairment is not “per se disabling;” “[i]n 

addition, there must be proof of the impairment‟s disabling severity”); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 

F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[t]he claimant carries the initial burden of proving a disability in 

steps one through four of the analysis”). The ALJ thus correctly found that “there is little 

evidence that the claimant‟s [visual] impairment caused more than minimal functional 

limitations” for at least “12 continuous months.” AR 20; 20 C.F.R. § 416.909.

(ii) The ALJ was not Required to Obtain a Consultative Examination 

for Plaintiff‟s Visual Impairment

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have obtained a consultative examination because “it 

is not clear whether [Plaintiff‟s visual field] losses meet or equal the losses required” by Listing 

2.03 (contraction of visual field). Doc. 14 at 9, citing 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, Appendix 1, 

Listing 2.03. At step three of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine whether 

a claimant‟s impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment set 

forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 

(9th Cir. 1999); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (an impairment meets a listing if it 

satisfies all of the specified medical criteria); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir.2001) 

(plaintiff must present a plausible theory as to how an impairment or combination of impairments 

equals a listed impairment). The claimant bears the burden of proving he has an impairment that 

Case 1:13-cv-01994-GSA Document 17 Filed 03/02/15 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

meets or equals a listed impairment. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Plaintiff‟s argument that the ALJ was required to obtain a consultative examination to 

determine whether Plaintiff‟s visual impairment met or equaled Listing 2.03 (contraction of visual 

field) is unavailing. First, Plaintiff does not explain what criteria are established by Listing 2.03

and whether Plaintiff‟s visual impairment meets any of these criteria. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Astrue, 

2013 WL 503389, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013). Next, Plaintiff does not present any theory as 

to how her visual impairment would equal the criteria set forth in Listing 2.03. See Lewis v. 

Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir.2001) (plaintiff must present a plausible theory as to how an 

impairment or combination of impairments equals a listed impairment). Furthermore, progress 

notes from an eye examination conducted on May 7, 2012 at Retinal Consultants Medical Group, 

Inc. notes that Plaintiff had a normal visual field in both eyes.5 AR 402. Finally, the criteria to be 

evaluated pursuant to Listing 2.03 are directed to a claimant‟s “better eye,” which in Plaintiff‟s 

case would be her right eye (based on Dr. Odette Yang‟s September 4, 2012 examination). 20 

C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 1 § 2.03; AR 444. In her report of Plaintiff‟s September 4, 2012 eye 

examination, Dr. Yang noted that Plaintiff‟s right eye was stable and had 20/20 vision with 

correction; Dr. Yang further noted that when using both eyes, Plaintiff had 20/20 vision with 

correction. AR 444. The medical record evidence, as a whole, is not inconsistent or insufficient 

for the ALJ to properly evaluate the disabling effects of Plaintiff‟s visual impairment. Therefore, 

the ALJ was not required to obtain a consultative examination for Plaintiff‟s visual impairment. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.919(a). 

In sum, the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff did not have a severe, disabling visual 

impairment for the required duration. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.909. Furthermore, because the 

 

5

Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff‟s progress notes from August 2007, AR 299, “record the presence of a visual field 

defect in the central and peripheral fields.” Doc. 14 at 8. However, the progress note cited does not appear to

indicate any visual field abnormalities. 

Case 1:13-cv-01994-GSA Document 17 Filed 03/02/15 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

evidence is clear and the record is sufficient to support the ALJ‟s resolution of Plaintiff‟s 

disability claim, the ALJ was not required to obtain a consultative examination regarding

Plaintiff‟s visual impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.919(a). 

B. In Light of the ALJ’s Step Five Determination, any Error at Step Four is Harmless

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in finding Plaintiff not disabled at 

step four of the sequential disability determination process. Specifically, Plaintiff challenges the 

ALJ‟s step-four finding that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a babysitter and a 

caregiver companion. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he ALJ lacked a substantial evidentiary basis for 

finding substantial gainful activity in 2006 through 2009,” because Plaintiff worked part-time 

during that period and “[t]he earnings records cited by the ALJ do not plausibly support the 

conclusion” that Plaintiff‟s past relevant constituted substantial gainful activity. Doc. 14 at 7-8. 

The Commissioner does not contest Plaintiff‟s contention that Plaintiff‟s work as a babysitter and 

caregiver did not constitute substantial gainful activity and, therefore, cannot be considered as 

past relevant work at step four of the disability analysis. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b)(1). Rather, 

the Commissioner argues that “[e]ven if one assumes that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff 

could perform her PRW, such an error was harmless because the ALJ properly determined at step 

five that she could perform other work in significant numbers in the national economy.” Doc. 15 

at 10-11. Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ‟s step five findings.

The Court finds that any error at step four is rendered harmless by the ALJ‟s step five 

findings, which are not challenged by Plaintiff. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1042 

(9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ‟s erroneous step-four finding that claimant could return to past relevant 

work was harmless in light of the ALJ's alternative finding at step five that claimant could still 

perform other work in the national and local economies); Reynolds v. Astrue, 252 Fed. Appx. 161, 

165 (9th Cir. 2007) (ALJ's step four errors were harmless in light of ALJ's RFC assessment and 

Case 1:13-cv-01994-GSA Document 17 Filed 03/02/15 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

step-five determination); Baines v. Astrue, 781 F. Supp.2d 228, 237-38 (D. Del. 2011)

(“[e]rroneous step four findings can be rendered harmless by the identification of other work 

consistent with a plaintiff's RFC at step five”).

Here, the ALJ drew on the VE‟s testimony to determine at step five that Plaintiff could 

perform work as an office helper, toy assembler, and food and beverage order clerk. AR 26, 82-

83. Plaintiff does not argue that the ALJ‟s step five findings are inconsistent with Plaintiff‟s 

assessed RFC or otherwise improper. Therefore, in light of the ALJ‟s step five finding, the Court 

will not disturb the Commissioner‟s determination that Plaintiff is not disabled. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ‟s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court 

DENIES Plaintiff‟s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Carolyn 

W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Melinda Yvette Barela.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-01994-GSA Document 17 Filed 03/02/15 Page 9 of 9