Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02849/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02849-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jane K. Bevans
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2849

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Arkansas. 

Jane K. Bevans, * 

* [PUBLISHED]

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: September 28, 2007

 Filed: November 13, 2007

___________

Before COLLOTON, ARNOLD, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

This case arises from a writ of entry issued on April 17, 2006, by a United

States Magistrate Judge1

 to revenue officer Robert Brown of the Internal Revenue

Service. The writ authorized Brown to enter the residence of Jane K. Bevans to seize

property in satisfaction of unpaid federal taxes. Based on that writ, revenue agents

entered the Bevans home and seized numerous pieces of property. 

Appellate Case: 06-2849 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Entry ID: 3372167
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The application for the writ of entry, the writ, and the revenue officer’s report

of property that was seized were filed in the district court as a “miscellaneous case.”

Shortly after the seizure of the property, Bevans filed a motion in that same

miscellaneous case, seeking copies of the relevant tax assessments and requesting an

opportunity to pay the amount due in order to gain release of the seized property. See

26 U.S.C. § 6337 (“Any person whose property has been levied upon shall have the

right to pay the amount due . . . at any time prior to the sale thereof, and upon such

payment the Secretary shall restore such property to him . . . .”). The magistrate judge

entered an order on June 14, 2006, stating that the miscellaneous case was opened

“solely for the purpose of considering whether probable cause existed for issuing a

warrant of execution,” and declaring that it was not the “appropriate forum” for

raising the issues discussed by Bevans in her motion. The magistrate judge also

concluded that Bevans sought injunctive relief, and that a magistrate judge did not

have jurisdiction to grant that type of relief. The IRS then sold Bevans’s property at

a public auction on June 18. 

Bevans responded to the magistrate judge’s order by filing a document

captioned, “Motion For Determination of the Basis for Jurisdiction of this Matter by

the Magistrate, For a Determination of the Forum, and the Basis for Declaring that the

Relief Sought Cannot Be Had in a Miscellaneous Action.” This motion essentially

asked the magistrate judge to provide an explanation of the jurisdictional basis for

granting the writ of execution and for declining to assert jurisdiction to grant Bevans’s

request for injunctive relief. The magistrate judge entered another order, dated July

12, 2006, explaining that the government’s application for the writ of entry set forth

the court’s authority to grant the writ, that the responsibility of the magistrate judge

was to determine whether probable cause exists such that a writ should issue, and that

the relevant statutes and rules do not grant a magistrate judge authority to enter

injunctive relief of the sort requested by Bevans without the consent of the parties.

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Bevans sought no further relief in the district court, and she now seeks to appeal

the magistrate judge’s order of July 12, 2006, and also to challenge the authority of

the magistrate judge to grant the writ of entry on April 17, 2006. Our appellate

jurisdiction is limited by statute, and the courts of appeals have jurisdiction of appeals

from “final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Except where the parties have consented to entry of judgment by a magistrate judge

in a civil case, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), an order of a magistrate judge is not a final

decision of a district court that may be appealed to this court. United States v. Haley,

541 F.2d 678, 678 (8th Cir. 1974); accord United States v. Cline, 566 F.2d 1220, 1221

(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Reeds, 552 F.2d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 1977) (per

curiam). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and the case is

dismissed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-2849 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Entry ID: 3372167