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Parties Involved:
Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
Appellee
Victor Javed
Appellant
F. Dale Lippert
Not Party

Document Text:

I 

• 

FILED 

URI'l'BD STATES COOR'l' OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

TBftH CIRCUIT 

VICTOR JAVED, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC., ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee, ) 

) 

F. DALE LIPPERT, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

APR 2 4 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1372 

(D.C. No. 89-F-2216) 

(D. Colorado) 

ORDER ARD JUDGKBN'l'* 

Before ARDBRSOR, TACIIA and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance .. in the. determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Mr. Javed's employment was terminated. He sued his former 

employer claiming his termination was a result of racial 

discrimination. Mr. Javed requested relief including $10,000,000 

in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. The 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1372 Document: 010110034354 Date Filed: 04/24/1991 Page: 1 
district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment. 

We affirm. 

Mr. Javed, who was born in Pakistan, is a naturalized citizen 

of the United States. Mr. Javed went to work for his employer in 

1983 and was discharged in 1987. 

The district court, in ruling upon Defendant's motion for 

summary judgment, found Mr. Javed had failed to offer evidence of 

discrimination sufficient to establish 

Specifically the district court ruled Mr. 

a prima facie case. 

Javed had failed to 

offer any evidence of intent or motive to discriminate by race or 

national origin. 

We review a decision of the district court granting summary 

judgment de novo. We apply the same standard used by the district 

court. Summary judgment should be granted only if there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gray v. Phillips 

Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1988); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). 

Mr. Javed's ultimate burden of proof under either 42 u.s.c. 

S 1981 or Title VII (both were alleged in his complaint) is to 

demonstrate his employer intentionally discriminated against him 

because of his race or national origin. Patterson v. McLean 

Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187 (1989); McAlester v. United Air 

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Appellate Case: 90-1372 Document: 010110034354 Date Filed: 04/24/1991 Page: 2 
Lines, 851 F.2d 1249, 1260 (10th Cir. 1988). 

The evidence before the court showed Mr. Javed was hired in 

April 1983 as an Assistant Administrative Manager of Defendant 

Anheuser-Busch, Inc.'s Wholesale Operations Division. Mr. Javed 

received normal satisfactory performance evaluations until 

February 1985 when they began showing a deterioration. In March 

1986 he received a performance evaluation showing substandard 

performance and was given ninety days to attain certain specified 

improvements and was placed on ninety days' probation. During 

this ninety-day period Mr. Javed filed a charge of employment 

discrimination with the EEOC. This was settled between the 

parties. As a part of this settlement Mr. Javed was placed on a 

second 90-days probation. Mr. Javed understood that if he did not 

satisfactorily complete this probation, he would be discharged. 

Javed was counselled 

thirty-days intervals. 

During this second probationary period Mr. 

and his performance was evaluated at 

During his first thirty-days review Mr. Javed was told he had 

completed some of his objectives, some needed more work and some 

were not being accomplished. Mr. Javed was told essentially the 

same at his sixty--days evaluation. Mr. Javed's deficiencies 

involved a failure to monitor and explain freight charge 

activities; continuing problems with certain reports; failure to 

adequately supervise and assist subordinates; a failure to 

reconcile bank disbursement vouchers; a failure to review credit 

material; and a failure to follow company policy concerning sales 

accounts. At his final review meeting in March 1987, Mr. Javed 

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Appellate Case: 90-1372 Document: 010110034354 Date Filed: 04/24/1991 Page: 3 
was advised of the specific failures, and Mr. Javed was terminated 

in April 1987. In short the evidence shows that Mr. Javed was 

terminated for his continuing failure to satisfactorily perform 

his job. 

On appeal Mr. Javed points to affidavits before the district 

court showing that Mr. Javed had been called a "camel jockey" and 

a "bro." These affidavits fail to show when or where they were 

made and in one case who made the remarks, how often they occurred 

and whether management was present when the remarks were uttered. 

Construing this evidence most favorably to Mr. Javed, as we must, 

establishes that at least one co-worker made such remarks. Mr. 

Javed never complained of such remarks to management. There is no 

evidence in the record either showing or tending to show that 

management was ever aware of such remarks or condoned such 

remarks. It is interesting to note these affidavits were 

submitted after the entry of summary judgment. 

It is 

permeated 

clear that 

established 

by racial 

casual 

that a work 

slurs violates 

comments, or 

environment 

Title VII. 

accidental 

dominated or 

It is likewise 

or sporadic 

conversations, will not alone trigger relief. Hicks v. Gates 

Rubber, 833 F.2d 1406, 1412 (10th Cir. 1987). The remarks cited 

to us by Mr. Javed, while crude, rude, boorish, bigoted, and 

insensitive, do not as a matter of law establish a racially 

hostile work environment. "Title VII is violated only where the 

work environment is so 'heavily polluted with discrimination as to 

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Appellate Case: 90-1372 Document: 010110034354 Date Filed: 04/24/1991 Page: 4 
1 destroy the emotional and psychological stability of the minority 

(employee].'" Id. at 1413 (quoting Rogers v. Equal Employment 

Opportunity Comm'n, 454 ·F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. 

denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)). 

Mr. Javed next contends evidence exists in the record showing 

satisfactory evaluations, at least by implication, of Mr. Javed 

during the years 1985-1986 under Employers Threshold to Greatness 

Program. These never mentioned Mr. Javed and do not involve the 

evaluation of any individual employee. This "evidence" fails to 

create an issue of fact. 

We have reviewed the brief of Mr. Javed, the record on appeal 

and the judgment of the district court and find no error. The 

thorough and well drawn order of the district court granting 

swmnary judgment is AFFIRMED for substantially the same reasons as 

therein stated. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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