Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-12-01170/USCOURTS-ca13-12-01170-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cross Match Technologies, Inc.
Intervenor
International Trade Commission
Appellee
Mentalix Incorporated
Appellant
Suprema, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SUPREMA, INC.,

MENTALIX INCORPORATED,

Appellants

v.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee

CROSS MATCH TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2012-1170

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States International Trade 

Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-720.

______________________ 

Decided: August 10, 2015

______________________ 

DARRYL MICHAEL WOO, Vinson & Elkins LLP, San 

Francisco, CA, argued for appellants. Also represented by 

ILANA RUBEL, BRYAN ALEXANDER KOHM, DAVID MICHAEL 

LACY KUSTERS, HEATHER N. MEWES, ERIN SIMON, Fenwick 

& West, LLP, San Francisco, CA; JAE WON SONG, Mountain View, CA; BRADLEY THOMAS MEISSNER, Seattle, WA.

CLARK S. CHENEY, Office of the General Counsel, 

United States International Trade Commission, WashingCase: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 1 Filed: 08/10/2015
2 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

ton, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by DOMINIC 

L. BIANCHI, ANDREA C. CASSON, CLINT A. GERDINE, WAYNE 

W. HERRINGTON. 

MAXIMILIAN A. GRANT, Latham & Watkins LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for intervenor. Also represented 

by CLEMENT J. NAPLES, New York, NY; GABRIEL BELL,

BERT C. REISER, JENNIFER HALBLEIB, Washington, DC. 

MARK R. FREEMAN, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, 

argued for amicus curiae United States. Also represented 

by JOYCE R. BRANDA, SCOTT R. MCINTOSH. 

JAMES ALTMAN, Foster, Murphy, Altman & Nickel, 

PC, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association. Also represented by F.

DAVID FOSTER. 

J. MICHAEL JAKES, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, 

Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington DC, for amicus 

curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association. Also 

represented by HERBERT CLARE WAMSLEY, JR., Intellectual Property Owners Association, Washington, DC; PHILIP 

STATON JOHNSON, Johnson & Johnson, New Brunswick, 

NJ; KEVIN H. RHODES, 3M Innovative Properties Company, St. Paul, MN.

CONSTANTINE L. TRELA, JR., Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL, for amicus curiae Microsoft Corporation. Also 

represented by RICHARD ALAN CEDEROTH, DAVID T.

PRITIKIN, Chicago, IL; BRIAN R. NESTER, RYAN C. MORRIS, 

Washington, DC; THOMAS ANDREW CULBERT, DAVID E.

KILLOUGH, Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA.

JOHN THORNE, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans 

& Figel, PLLC, Washington, DC, for amici curiae Dell 

Inc., Adobe Systems, Inc., Ford Motor Co., HewlettCase: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 2 Filed: 08/10/2015
SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 3

Packard Co., LG Display Co., Ltd., LG Electronics, Inc., 

Netflix, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., SAP America, Inc. Also represented by AARON M. PANNER, MELANIE 

L. BOSTWICK. 

DARYL JOSEFFER, King & Spalding LLP, Washington, 

DC, for amicus curiae Google Inc. Also represented by 

ADAM CONRAD, Charlotte, NC; SUZANNE MICHEL, Google 

Inc., Washington, DC.

ERIC JAY FUES, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae 

International Trade Commission Trial Lawyers Association. Also represented by T. CY WALKER, Kenyon & Kenyon LLP, Washington, DC.

JOHN D. HAYNES, Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, GA, for

amici curiae Nokia Corporation, Nokia USA, Inc. Also 

represented by ADAM DAVID SWAIN, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, LOURIE, DYK,

O’MALLEY, REYNA, WALLACH, TARANTO, CHEN, and 

HUGHES, Circuit Judges.∗

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge REYNA. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge O’MALLEY, with 

whom PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and DYK, Circuit

Judges, join. 

∗ Circuit Judges Moore and Stoll did not participate.

 

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REYNA, Circuit Judge. 

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, codified at 19 

U.S.C. § 1337 (“Section 337”), declares certain acts unlawful. Among them is importing “articles that . . . infringe a 

valid and enforceable United States patent.” 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). The International Trade Commission 

(“Commission”) interpreted this provision to cover importation of goods that, after importation, are used by the 

importer to directly infringe at the inducement of the 

goods’ seller. A majority panel of this court disagreed, 

reasoning that there are no “articles that infringe” at the 

time of importation when direct infringement does not 

occur until after importation. Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 742 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In doing 

so, the panel effectively eliminated trade relief under 

Section 337 for induced infringement and potentially for 

all types of infringement of method claims.

We granted en banc rehearing and vacated the panel 

decision, 2014 WL 3036241, and we now uphold the 

Commission’s position. We conclude that because Section 

337 does not answer the question before us, the Commission’s interpretation of Section 337 is entitled to Chevron

deference. We hold that the Commission’s interpretation 

is reasonable because it is consistent with Section 337 and 

Congress’ mandate to the Commission to safeguard United States commercial interests at the border. Accordingly, we return the case to the panel for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. 

I. BACKGROUND

This case comes before us on appeal from a final determination by the Commission, finding a violation of 

Section 337 by Suprema, Inc., and Mentalix, Inc., in 

Certain Biometric Scanning Devices, Components Thereof, 

Associated Software, and Products Containing the Same, 

Inv. No. 337-TA-720. Section 337 authorizes the Commission to investigate allegations of unfair trade acts in the 

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importation of articles that infringe a valid United States 

patent. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1). If a violation of the statute is found, the Commission issues an exclusion order 

that bars the importation of some or all of the infringing 

products and may issue a related cease and desist order

unless the Commission finds that certain public interest 

factors militate against such remedy. Id. § 1337(d).

In May 2010, Cross Match Technologies, Inc. (“Cross 

Match”) filed a complaint with the Commission, alleging 

infringement of four patents owned by Cross Match 

involving certain fingerprint scanning devices. The 

Commission found the scanners to be manufactured by 

Suprema abroad, and imported into the United States by 

both Suprema and Mentalix. Mentalix subsequently 

combined the scanners with software, and used and sold 

the scanners in the United States. 

Cross Match is the assignee of several patents covering technology used in biometric imaging scanners including U.S. Patent Nos. 7,203,344 (“the ’344 patent”), the 

only patent relevant to this appeal. The claims of the ’344 

patent are drawn to fingerprint scanning systems and 

methods that generate a fingerprint image, process that 

image to identify key regions, and determine image 

quality. Claim 19, the sole claim remaining in this appeal, recites:

19. A method for capturing and processing a fingerprint image, the method comprising:

(a) scanning one or more fingers;

(b) capturing data representing a corresponding fingerprint image;

(c) filtering the fingerprint image;

(d) binarizing the filtered fingerprint image; 

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(e) detecting a fingerprint area based on a 

concentration of black pixels in the binarized fingerprint image;

(f) detecting a fingerprint shape based on 

an arrangement of the concentrated black 

pixels in an oval-like shape in the binarized fingerprint image; and

(g) determining whether the detected fingerprint area and shape are of an acceptable quality.

’344 patent col. 19 ll. 24–37.

Suprema, Inc., is a Korean company that makes 

hardware for scanning fingerprints, including its RealScan line of fingerprint scanners. Suprema sells the 

scanners to Mentalix, Inc.1 The scanners are not standalone products. To function, they must be connected to a 

computer, and that computer must have customdeveloped software installed and running. Suprema does 

not make or sell this software. Instead, it ships each 

scanner with a “software development kit” (“SDK”) that is 

used for developing custom programs that control the 

functions of its scanners. The SDK comes with an instruction manual that explains how programs can be 

written to take advantage of scanner functionality.

Mentalix, Inc., is an American company that purchases Suprema’s scanners and imports those scanners into 

1 Suprema separately imports scanners into the 

United States. Suprema displays these scanners at trade 

shows and uses them to obtain a certification under the 

United States Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Integrated Fingerprint Identification standard. Suprema Answer 

at 13. Those importations are not relevant to the issue 

before us. 

 

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the United States. It writes custom software, called 

FedSubmit, which uses Suprema’s SDK to control and 

operate the scanners. Mentalix then bundles its software 

with the scanners and resells the bundle within the 

United States.

The Commission instituted an investigation of Suprema’s accused scanners in June 2010 pursuant to 19 

U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). 75 Fed. Reg. 34482–83 (June 17, 

2010). Section 337(a)(1)(B)(i) declares unlawful the 

importation, sale for importation, or sale within the 

United States after importation of articles that infringe a 

valid and enforceable United States patent. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) construed certain terms of claim 

19 of the ’344 patent and then conducted a thorough 

infringement analysis, expressly finding that each of the 

limitations of claim 19 was practiced by the accused 

products. See J.A. 123–32. On the basis of that finding, 

the ALJ determined that several Suprema scanners, the 

RealScan-10, RealScan-D, RealScan-10F, and RealScanDF, directly infringe claim 19 of the ’344 patent when 

used with the SDK kits and Mentalix’s FedSubmit software. J.A. 133. 

Based on the finding that the ’344 patent was infringed, the ALJ issued a Final Initial Determination that 

there had been “a violation of section 337 in the importation into the United States, sale for importation, and sale 

within the United States after importation of certain 

biometric scanning devices” and “associated software.” 

J.A. 205. The ALJ recommended that a limited exclusion 

order issue that would bar Suprema’s infringing scanners 

from entering the United States.2 Id. The ALJ further 

recommended that a cease-and-desist order issue to 

2 A limited exclusion order is directed solely to Suprema imports and does not affect importations of scanning products manufactured by other foreign entities.

 

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prevent Mentalix from distributing the infringing scanners. Id.

In June 2011, the Commission determined to review 

the ALJ’s Final Initial Determination of infringement of 

claim 19 of the ’344 patent. J.A. 209. The Commission 

requested briefing on the issues under review, and “requested written submissions on the issues of remedy, the 

public interest, and bonding from the parties and interested non-parties.” J.A. 210 (citing 76 Fed. Reg. 52970–71 

(Aug. 24, 2011)). In addition to considering the issue of 

direct infringement, the Commission also considered 

whether Suprema induced infringement of claim 19. The 

Commission’s comprehensive analysis included a survey 

of the relevant law, a summary the ALJ’s decision, and an 

extensive discussion of the parties’ arguments. 

Regarding direct infringement, the Commission found 

that record evidence demonstrated that Mentalix had 

already directly infringed claim 19 within the United 

States prior to the initiation of the investigation. Mentalix’s direct infringement arose from its integration of 

FedSubmit software with Suprema scanners and SDK 

kits, and subsequent use of the combination within the 

United States. J.A. 220. 

Turning to the issue of indirect infringement, the 

Commission examined the elements required to support 

an inducement finding, in addition to underlying direct 

infringement. In particular, the Commission considered 

the inducer’s knowledge regarding patent infringement. 

The Commission explained that the knowledge prong is 

met by a showing of willful blindness. J.A. 221 (citing 

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 

2070–71 (2011)). The Commission laid out the requirements for willful blindness: (1) the defendant’s subjective 

belief in the high probability that a fact exists; and (2) the 

defendant’s taking of deliberate steps to avoid learning of 

that fact. Id. (citing Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070). 

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The Commission found that Suprema “‘willfully 

blinded’ itself to the infringing nature of Mentalix’s activities,” which Suprema “had actively encouraged.” J.A. 221. 

Though much of the relevant evidence is confidential and 

cannot be repeated here, the Commission found that

Suprema believed in high probability that its scanners 

would infringe the ’344 patent. For instance, the Commission found that Suprema was successful in its attempts to develop various functions covered by the ’344 

patent into its products. J.A. 222. Based on these factual 

findings, the Commission found that Suprema subjectively believed in the high probability that Cross Match’s 

scanner technology was patented and, therefore, that it 

was likely that Suprema’s scanner products would be 

covered by Cross Match’s patents. J.A. 224.

The Commission also found that Suprema deliberately avoided acquiring knowledge of the ’344 patent.3 

Among other things, the Commission found that Suprema

failed to obtain opinion of counsel, through which the ’344 

patent would have been uncovered since it was owned by 

Cross Match, and the search would have included an 

analysis of whether Suprema infringed Cross Match 

patents. J.A. 224. Accordingly, the Commission found 

that Suprema had willfully blinded itself to the existence 

of the ’344 patent and “deliberately shielded itself from 

the nature of the infringing activities it actively encouraged and facilitated Mentalix to make.” J.A. 225. 

As to the active encouragement and facilitation requirement, the Commission listed numerous confidential 

examples of the collaborative efforts of Suprema and 

Mentalix, noting the list was not exhaustive. J.A. 225. 

Based on this extensive evidence, the Commission found 

that Suprema aided and abetted Mentalix’s infringement 

3 The finding was based on confidential evidence 

that we do not publicly discuss.

 

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by collaborating “with Mentalix to import the scanners 

and to help adapt Mentalix’s FedSubmit software to work 

with Suprema’s imported scanners and SDK to practice 

claim 19 of the ’344 patent.” J.A. 225. Thus, the Commission found that all the elements of induced infringement had been met. The Commission modified the ALJ’s 

initial determination such that Mentalix was found to 

directly infringe claim 19 of the ’344 patent, establishing 

the underlying direct infringement, and Suprema was 

found to induce infringement of claim 19. J.A. 233.

Upon determining Section 337 was violated, the 

Commission considered the appropriate enforcement 

action. It agreed with the ALJ that the appropriate relief 

included a limited exclusion order covering infringing 

scanners, associated software, and products containing 

the same that were manufactured overseas by or imported by or on behalf of Suprema or Mentalix, or any entity 

affiliated with either company. J.A. 235. Thereupon, the 

Commission issued the limited exclusion order and terminated the investigation.

Suprema and Mentalix appealed several of the Commission’s findings to this court, including the findings of 

direct and indirect infringement of claim 19 of the ’344 

patent. They further requested that the Commission’s 

limited exclusion order be vacated.

A divided panel of this court vacated the Commission’s findings that Mentalix directly infringed the ’344 

patent and that Suprema induced infringement of the 

’344 patent. Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 742 

F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The majority reasoned that 

Section 337’s language, “articles that infringe,” is a temporal requirement and that infringement must be measured at the time of importation. Id. at 1363. It concluded 

that the Commission lacks authority under Section 337 to 

issue an exclusion order predicated on induced infringement because such imports are not in an infringing state 

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upon importation. Id. at 1357. Thus, the majority vacated all of the Commission’s infringement findings as to the 

’344 patent and the limited exclusion order based on those 

findings. Id.

Cross Match and the Commission petitioned for rehearing en banc. We granted the petition to consider

whether the Commission correctly concluded that unfair 

trade acts covered by Section 337 include the importation

of articles used to infringe by the importer at the inducement of the articles’ seller. The United States Department of Justice and numerous Amici filed briefs. Oral 

arguments were heard on February 5, 2015. 

II. Discussion

United States trade laws have long afforded trade relief to domestic industries from a range of unfair trade 

practices. The commercial effect of international trade 

acts and practices has been a major congressional concern 

since the founding of our nation. In the second Act passed 

by the first United States Congress, the Tariff Act of 

1789, Congress found that the imposition of duties on 

imports was “necessary for . . . the encouragement and 

protection of manufactures.” Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 

§ 1, 1 Stat. 24, 24. Since 1789, Congress has been vigilant 

both to encourage and protect U.S. domestic interests in 

connection with unfair commercial activity involving 

foreign imports, a vigilance that in 1922 led to the passage of Section 316, the predecessor of Section 337. See

Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 316(a), Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42 

Stat. 858 (1922). Section 316 declared unlawful “unfair 

methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation 

of articles into the United States.” Id. at 943.

Section 337, the modern statutory section, is codified 

at 19 U.S.C. § 1337. As a trade statute, the purpose of 

Section 337 is to regulate international commerce. Id. at

858 (explaining purpose of Act enacting precursor to 

Section 337 was “to regulate commerce with foreign 

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countries”); Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590, 590 (1930) 

(same). Section 337 necessarily focuses on commercial 

activity related to cross-border movement of goods. See, 

e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(a)(1)(B) (imported goods infringing 

patents or copyrights), (a)(1)(C) (imported goods infringing a trademark), (a)(1)(D) (imported goods infringing a 

mask work), (a)(1)(E) (imported goods infringing design 

rights). While Congress has addressed domestic commercial practices under various statutory regimes, such as 

antitrust (15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38), patent (35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390), 

and copyright (17 U.S.C. §§ 1–1332), it has established a 

distinct legal regime in Section 337 aimed at curbing 

unfair trade practices that involve the entry of goods into 

the U.S. market via importation. In sum, Section 337 is 

an enforcement statute enacted by Congress to stop at the 

border the entry of goods, i.e., articles, that are involved 

in unfair trade practices.

Section 337 declares certain activities related to importation to be unlawful trade acts and directs the Commission generally to grant prospective relief if it has 

found an unlawful trade act to have occurred. Subsection 

(a) identifies several types of acts as unlawful, one of 

which relates to infringement of a U.S. patent. Specifically, the statute provides:

(a)(1) . . . [T]he following are unlawful, and when 

found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt 

with . . . as provided in this section:

 . . . . 

(B) The importation into the United 

States, the sale for importation, or the sale 

within the United States after importation 

by the owner, importer, or consignee, of 

articles that— 

(i) infringe a valid and enforceable 

United States patent or a valid 

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and enforceable United States 

copyright registered under title 17 

. . . . 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (emphases added). Section 337 directs 

the Commission to “investigate any alleged violation of 

this section on complaint,” including allegations of importing articles that infringe. Id. § 1337(b)(1). After concluding the investigation, the Commission is required to 

“determine . . . whether or not there is a violation of this 

section.” Id. § 1337(c). If it finds a violation under subsection (a), subsection (d) obligates the Commission to 

fashion prospective relief, typically involving the Commission directing that certain articles be excluded from entry 

into the U.S, “unless, after considering the effect of such 

exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive 

conditions in the United States economy, the production 

of like or directly competitive articles in the United 

States, and United States consumers, it finds that such 

articles should not be excluded from entry.” Id.

§ 1337(d)(1). Under the statutory provisions at issue, 

proof of quantifiable harm is not an element of liability, 

and monetary damages are not available as relief. 

We are asked to decide whether goods qualify as “articles that infringe” when the Commission has found that 

such goods were used, after importation, to directly infringe by the importer at the inducement of the goods’ 

seller. In other words, does the importation of such goods 

qualify as an unfair trade act under Section 337? If the 

answer is yes, the Commission has authority under 

§ 1337(d)(1) to issue an exclusion order to prevent this act 

from occurring in the future.

We begin with our standard of review, and what deference, if any, is owed to the Commission’s interpretation 

of Section 337. There is no dispute that Congress has 

delegated authority to the Commission to resolve ambiguity in Section 337 if the Commission does so through 

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formal adjudicative procedures. See United States v. 

Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); Kinik Co. v. Int’l 

Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“To 

the extent that there is any uncertainty or ambiguity in 

the interpretation of . . . § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii), deference 

must be given to the view of the agency that is charged 

with its administration.”); Enercon GmbH v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 151 F.3d 1376, 1381–83 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The 

Commission’s investigations under Section 337 require 

“adequate notice, cross-examination, presentation of 

evidence, objection, motion, argument, and all other 

rights essential to a fair hearing,” 19 C.F.R. § 210.36(d),

thus satisfying Mead’s formality requirement. Accordingly, we review the Commission’s interpretation pursuant to 

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

The Chevron framework is well-established. City of 

Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) 

(explaining Chevron’s “now-canonical formulation”). 

Chevron requires a court reviewing an agency’s construction of a statute which it administers to answer two 

questions. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. The first is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 

issue.” Id. If the answer is yes, then the inquiry ends, 

and we must give effect to Congress’ unambiguous intent. 

Id. at 842–43. If the answer is no, the second question is 

“whether the agency’s answer [to the precise question at 

issue] is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. The agency’s “interpretation governs in 

the absence of unambiguous statutory language to the 

contrary or unreasonable resolution of language that is 

ambiguous.” United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 

316 (2009) (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–30). 

A. Chevron Step One

Chevron’s framework begins with the language of the 

statute. DIRECTV Grp., Inc. v. United States, 670 F.3d 

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1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012). As explained below, the 

shorthand phrase “articles that infringe” does not unambiguously exclude inducement of post-importation infringement. 

By using the word “infringe,” Section 337 refers to 35 

U.S.C. § 271, the statutory provision defining patent 

infringement. The word “infringe” does not narrow Section 337’s scope to any particular subsections of § 271. As 

reflected in § 271 and the case law from before and after 

1952, “infringement” is a term that encompasses both 

direct and indirect infringement, including infringement 

by importation that induces direct infringement of a 

method claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (remedy for infringement); Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

Section 337 refers not just to infringement, but to “articles that infringe.” That phrase does not narrow the 

provision to exclude inducement of post-importation 

infringement. Rather, the phrase introduces textual 

uncertainty. Simply put, the phrase “articles that infringe” does not map onto the Patent Act’s definition of 

infringement. In its amicus brief to us, the United States 

describes the disparity as one arising from the in rem 

language of Section 337 and the in personam language of 

§ 271. See U.S. Amicus Br. 10–14.

The relevant portions of § 271 define persons’ actions 

as infringement. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever 

without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 

patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”); § 271(b) 

(“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall 

be liable as an infringer.”); § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to 

sell or sells . . . a component of a patented machine . . . shall be liable as an infringer.”). An “article” 

cannot infringe under any subsection of § 271. The disparity between the language of Section 337 and the 

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tainty requiring resolution by the agency charged with 

Section 337’s enforcement. Congress has not provided an

unambiguous resolution, much less one that excludes the 

inducement at issue here. 

Suprema argues that, because Section 337 refers to 

articles, the only bases for infringement under Section 

337 come from 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a) and (c), which refer to 

“any patented invention” and “a component” of a patented 

machine, respectively. Appellant’s Br. at 30–31. Suprema’s argument fails to recognize that inducement, like 

contributory infringement, is commonly based on the 

provision of articles. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 

Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015); Global Tech Appliances, Inc. 

v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). Still, we need not 

decide whether Suprema’s interpretation might be a 

reasonable resolution of the textual dilemma presented by 

mapping Section 337 onto § 271. We cannot find that 

Congress prescribed Suprema’s view, and hence we cannot adopt such an interpretation at Chevron Step One. 

Under §§ 271(a) and (c), it is not articles that infringe, but 

actions that infringe. 

Moreover, Suprema has not shown that the phrase

“articles that infringe” has a clearly established usage 

limited to product claims or to direct or contributory 

infringement, much less a usage that excludes induced 

infringement of a method claim. To the contrary, various 

forms of shorthand references to devices that infringe 

have often been used without such narrowed meaning.4 

4 See, e.g., Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., 746 F.3d 

1045, 1049, 1050–51, 1057, 1058, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 

Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, 

Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013); LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 65, 71, 

78–79, 81 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 

620 F.3d 1321, 1327–30 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Lucent Technol-

 

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We therefore cannot conclude that Congress, in using the

Section 337 phrase, did so with an unambiguous meaning 

for how it applies to § 271. 

Citing the present-tense use of the verb “infringe” in 

the phrase “articles that infringe,” the panel suggested 

that Section 337 must exclude inducement of postimportation infringement because the acts that complete 

infringement have not all taken place at the time of 

importation. Suprema, 742 F.3d at 1358. It is true that 

the direct infringement required for inducement, see 

Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 

2111, 2117 & n.3 (2014), will typically not have taken 

place at the time of the importation that induces it. Yet 

we cannot conclude that Congress unambiguously excluded such induced infringement on the basis of the panel’s 

reasoning. 

For contributory infringement, as for inducement, direct infringement is necessary and will typically take 

place later than the accused indirect infringer’s act. See 

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 

336, 341 (1961). The panel recognized that Section 337 

could fairly reach contributory infringement. See, e.g., 

Suprema, 742 F.3d at 1361, n.4. As that recognition 

confirms, Section 337’s present-tense language is readily 

ogies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1309, 1320–23, 

1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1337–42 (Fed. Cir. 2008); DSU 

Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1308–10 (Fed. Cir. 

2006); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 

1348, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2003); RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pac. 

Keystone Technologies, Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1268 (Fed. 

Cir. 2003); Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 

1336, 1342 n.2, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Water Techs. 

Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 666–68 (Fed. Cir. 

1988).

 

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18 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

susceptible to being read as satisfied by the indirect 

infringer’s own acts, including importation that is part of 

inducement or contribution. See National Presto Indus., 

Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1194–96 (Fed. Cir. 

1996) (inducing act must occur after patent issues to 

support inducement liability; not enough that induced act 

occurs after issuance); Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co., Ltd., 754 F.2d 345, 348 (Fed. 

Cir. 1985) (“[L]iability [arises] as of the time the [inducing] acts were committed, not at some future date determined by the acts of others.”) (emphasis omitted). 

Reading the statute unambiguously to require that infringement occur at the time of importation would have 

produced absurd results under the pre-1994 version of 

§ 271(a). Such a reading would mean that Congress, 

when it enacted the language at issue in 1988, excluded 

even the ordinary case of direct infringement. At that 

time (before 1994), § 271(a) did not define importing a 

patented invention (or the offer to sell a patented invention) an infringing act. Section 271(a) only covered making, using, and selling, and those actions had to occur in 

the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988). At least for 

ordinary importations involving goods that enter the 

United States for a later use or sale, none of the activities

encompassed by the former § 271(a) would have occurred 

in the United States at the time of importation. If Congress meant to forbid the Commission from looking past 

the time of importation in defining Section 337’s reach, 

Section 337 would not have reached even garden-variety 

direct infringement. Even if Section 337(a)(1)(B)’s clause 

covering post-importation sales allowed assessment of 

infringement after importation, Section 337 would not 

have covered the ordinary case of post-importation use 

without post-importation sales. We cannot attribute that 

result to Congress.

The panel also reasoned that Section 337’s remedial 

provision allowing for an exclusion order demonstrates 

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SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 19

that Section 337’s “focus is on the infringing nature of the 

articles at the time of importation.” Suprema, 742 F.3d at 

1358–59 (emphasis added). Section 337 refers to the 

Commission’s authority to issue an exclusion order 

against “the articles concerned.” Id. at 1359 (quoting 

Section 337(d)(1)). The panel asserted that the “articles 

concerned” “would be, of course, the aforementioned 

‘articles that . . . infringe a valid and enforceable United 

States patent.” Id. (quoting Section 337(a)(1)(B)(i)). The 

panel thus interpreted Section 337 subsections (d)(1) and 

(a)(1)(B)(i) as referring to the same “articles.”

The panel’s reasoning evidences a misunderstanding 

of enforcement statutes like Section 337. The “articles” of 

subsections (a) and (d)(1) are not the same. Subsection (a) 

defines unfair trade acts. When the Commission determines that one of these unfair trade acts has occurred, it 

provides injunctive relief to prevent future unfair trade 

acts according to subsection (d)(1). An exclusion order 

issued under subsection (d)(1) does not affect the articles 

that gave rise to the unfair trade act, e.g., the “articles 

that infringe.” Those articles have already been imported, 

and thus cannot be excluded from entry into the U.S. 

Rather, like all forms of injunctive relief, an exclusion 

order prevents future illegal acts from occurring by, for 

example, preventing similar articles from entering the 

U.S. 

Accordingly, we hold that Congress has not directly 

answered whether goods qualify as “articles that infringe” 

when the Commission has found that an importer used

such goods, after importation, to directly infringe at the 

inducement of the goods’ seller. 

B. Chevron Step Two

Because Section 337 does not answer the precise 

question before us, we consider whether the Commission’s 

interpretation of Section 337 is reasonable. The Commission’s interpretation “prevails if it is a reasonable conCase: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 19 Filed: 08/10/2015
20 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

struction of the statute, whether or not it is the only 

possible interpretation or even the one a court might 

think best.” Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 

2011, 2017 (2012). For the reasons explained below, we 

find the Commission’s interpretation consistent with the 

statutory text, policy, and legislative history of Section 

337. We thus find the Commission’s interpretation reasonable. 

1. Statutory Text

The Commission’s interpretation is consistent with 

the statutory text, for reasons we have already suggested. 

Induced infringement is one kind of infringement, and 

when it is accomplished by supplying an article, the 

article supplied can be an “article that infringes” if the 

other requirements of inducement are met. Liability for 

inducement must be predicated on a finding of direct 

infringement. Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2117. Yet direct 

infringement commonly occurs after inducement. Liability for inducement nevertheless attaches as of the time of 

the inducing activity, provided that direct infringement 

eventually occurs. Standard Oil, 754 F.2d at 348. The 

Commission’s interpretation recognizes that the acts 

necessary for induced infringement, including acts of 

direct infringement, may not occur simultaneously at the 

time of importation. In many cases, such acts cannot 

occur at the time of importation. In that context, the 

Commission’s interpretation that Section 337 grants it 

authority to prevent importation of articles that have 

been part of inducement as an unfair trade act is consistent with the statutory phrase “articles that infringe.” 

The Commission’s interpretation is also consistent 

with the text of Section 337 as a whole. See Holder, 132 

S. Ct. at 2017 (finding an agency’s interpretation consistent with statute’s text, and thus reasonable). Section 

337 contemplates that infringement may occur after

importation. The statute defines as unlawful “the sale 

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SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 21

within the United States after importation . . . of articles 

that—(i) infringe . . . .” § 337(a)(1)(B)(i). The statute thus 

distinguishes the unfair trade act of importation from 

infringement by defining as unfair the importation of an 

article that will infringe, i.e., be sold, “after importation.” 

Id. Section 337(a)(1)(B)’s “sale . . . after importation” 

language confirms that the Commission is permitted to 

focus on post-importation activity to identify the completion of infringement.

2. Legislative History and Statutory Policy

Nothing in nearly a century of U.S. trade law enactments is inconsistent with the Commission’s interpretation. The legislative history consistently evidences 

Congressional intent to vest the Commission with broad 

enforcement authority to remedy unfair trade acts. The 

United States Tariff Commission (“Tariff Commission”), 

the predecessor to the Commission, was established in 

1916. Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 795 (1916). From its 

creation, a fundamental purpose of the Tariff Commission 

was to prevent a diverse array of unfair methods of competition in the importation of goods.5 Recognizing the 

challenges posed by the wide array of unfair methods of 

competition, Congress emphasized the broad scope of the 

enforcement powers granted to the Tariff Commission

when it passed the 1922 Tariff Act. With respect to 

Section 316 of the 1922 Tariff Act, the precursor to Section 337, Congress explained that the “provision relating 

to unfair methods of competition in the importation of 

goods,” was “broad enough to prevent every type and form

5 Unfair methods of competition have included 

dumping, subsidies, safeguards, anticompetitive practices, 

and violations of intellectual property rights, all involving 

the cross-border movement of goods, i.e., articles. See, 

e.g., 42 Stat. 935-36, 943 (1922).

 

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22 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

of unfair practice . . . .” S. Rep. No. 67-595, at 3 (1922)

(emphasis added). 

In the Tariff Act of 1930, Congress superseded Section 

316 with Section 337, but did not alter the Tariff Commission’s broad authority to address every type and form of 

unfair trade practice. See Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 

(1930). Section 337 “provides broadly for action by the 

Tariff Commission in cases involving ‘unfair methods of 

competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles’ 

but does not define those terms nor set up a definite 

standard.” In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 443 (C.C.P.A. 

1955). When Congress used the words “unfair methods of 

competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles,” 

that language is “broad and inclusive and should not be 

limited to, or by, technical definitions of those types of 

acts.” Id. at 444 (emphasis added).

For nearly 35 years, the Commission has embraced its 

Congressional grant as bestowing authority to investigate 

and take action under Section 337 based on induced 

infringement. At least as early as 1980, the Commission 

was making determinations that inducement to infringe a 

valid U.S. patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) constituted an 

unfair trade act under Section 337 that could be remedied 

by an exclusion order. E.g., Certain Surveying Devices, 

Inv. No. 337-TA-68, USITC Pub. 1085 (July 1980) (Commission Determination). The Commission has persisted 

in its interpretation of Section 337 to the present day.6 

6 See, e.g., Certain Inkjet Ink Cartridges with Printheads and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-723, 

USITC Pub. 4373 (Feb. 2013), 2011 WL 3489151, at *49 

(June 10, 2011) (Initial Determination); Certain Semiconductor Chips Having Synchronous Dynamic Random 

Access Memory Controllers and Prods. Containing Same, 

Inv. No. 337-TA-661, USITC Pub. 4266 (Oct. 2011), Initial 

Determination at 42, 2011 WL 6017982, at *85 (Jan. 22, 

 

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SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 23

The Commission’s consistency supports the reasonableness of its interpretation. See, e.g., Astrue v. Capato ex 

rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012) (noting that 

agency’s reasonable interpretation was “adhered to without deviation for many decades”).

Congress has not upset the Commission’s consistent

interpretation of Section 337. Indeed, Congress introduced the current statutory language in 1988, after the 

Commission had adopted this interpretation. See note 6, 

supra. Congress acted against a backdrop of consistent 

agency and judicial interpretation emphasizing the 

breadth of the Commission’s authority. See, e.g., Von 

Clemm, 229 F.2d at 443–44 (the Commission’s power to 

remedy acts of unfair competition is “broad and inclusive”); In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458, 467 (C.C.P.A. 1934) 

(Section 337’s prohibition on “unfair methods of competi2010); Certain Automated Mechanical Transmission Sys. 

for Medium–Duty and Heavy-Duty Trucks and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-503, USITC Pub. 3934 

(Aug. 2007), Initial Determination at 154, 2007 WL 

4473082, at *101 (Jan. 7, 2005); Certain Hardware Logic 

Emulation Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 

337-TA-383, USITC Pub. 3154 (Jan. 1999), Comm’n 

Notice at 2 (Mar. 6, 1998), Initial Determination at 179, 

1997 WL 665006, at *101 (July 31, 1997); Certain MoldedIn Sandwich Panel Inserts and Methods for Their Installation, Inv. No. 337-TA-99, USITC Pub. 1246 (May 1982), 

Comm’n Op. at 8 (Apr. 9, 1982), aff’d sub nom., Young 

Eng’rs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d 1305 (Fed. 

Cir. 1983). We note that we provide, here, only a small 

portion of the Commission’s induced infringement determinations to show that they were made throughout the 

past 35 years. A more comprehensive list of the Commission’s induced infringement determinations under Section 

337 can be found at Suprema, 742 F.3d at 1372 n.2.

 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 23 Filed: 08/10/2015
24 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

tion in the importation of goods is broad enough to prevent every type and form of unfair practice”) (quoting S. 

Rep. No. 67-595, at 3 (1922)). There is no indication that 

Congress, in 1988, meant to contract the Commission’s 

authority regarding patent infringement. To the contrary, Congress said it was expanding Commission authority.

Congress amended Section 337 in 1988, removing the 

requirement that a complainant must show injury to 

domestic industry before a violation is found. Omnibus 

Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-

418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified at Section 337(a)(2)-

(3)). As a part of this effort, the 1988 Act inserted the 

phrase “articles that infringe.” Id. Congress declared its 

purpose to enhance Commission authority.7 The “fundamental purpose” of the 1988 amendment was to 

“strengthen the effectiveness of section 337” against the 

“importation of articles which infringe U.S. intellectual 

property rights.” H.R. Rep. No. 100-40, pt. 1, at 155

(1987); see also H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 112 (1988)

(Congressional finding that the amendments to Section 

337 “make it a more effective remedy for the protection of 

United States intellectual property rights”). The Com7 “(a) FINDINGS. — The Congress finds that — (1) 

United States persons that rely on protection of intellectual property rights are among the most advanced and 

competitive in the world; and (2) the existing protection 

under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 against unfair 

trade practices is cumbersome and costly and has not 

provided United States owners of intellectual property 

rights with adequate protection against foreign companies 

violating such rights.

(b) PURPOSE. — The purpose of this part is to amend 

section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to make it a more 

effective remedy for the protection of United States intellectual property rights.” § 1341, 102 Stat. 1211-1212.

 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 24 Filed: 08/10/2015
SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 25

mission’s interpretation is consistent with Congress’ 

longstanding, broad policy, and with its broadening 

purpose in 1988. 

This court has consistently affirmed the Commission’s 

determination that a violation of Section 337 may arise 

from an act of induced infringement. See, e.g., Young 

Eng’rs Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d 1305 (Fed. 

Cir. 1983) (affirming Section 337 violation based on 

contributory and induced infringement of process patents); Vizio, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 605 F.3d 1330 

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming Section 337 violation based on 

induced infringement of method claim); Emcore Corp. v. 

Int’l Trade Comm’n, 449 F. App’x 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 

(affirming without opinion Section 337 violation based on 

induced infringement of apparatus claim). Prior to this 

case, none of our reviews of the Commission’s determinations have questioned the Commission’s authority to 

investigate and find a violation of Section 337 predicated 

on an act of induced infringement.

The technical interpretation adopted by the panel 

weakens the Commission’s overall ability to prevent 

unfair trade acts involving infringement of a U.S. patent. 

The panel’s interpretation of Section 337 would eliminate 

relief for a distinct unfair trade act and induced infringement. There is no basis for curtailing the Commission’s 

gap-filling authority in that way. Indeed, the practical 

consequence would be an open invitation to foreign entities (which might for various reasons not be subject to a 

district court injunction) to circumvent Section 337 by 

importing articles in a state requiring post-importation 

combination or modification before direct infringement 

could be shown.

The Commission reasonably determined that its interpretation would further the purpose of the statute. See

Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 

562 U.S. 44, 59 (2011) (purpose of a statute is relevant to 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 25 Filed: 08/10/2015
26 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

Chevron Step Two). Congress enacted a legal regime for 

enforcement against unfair trade acts by directing the 

Commission to base Section 337 relief on goods and the 

issuance of exclusion orders to bar their importation. 

Absent unconstitutionality, we must defer to that regime. 

See, e.g., Beck v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 

924 F.2d 1029, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Our duty is limited 

to interpreting the statute as it was enacted . . . .”). The 

Commission adopted a reasonable interpretation under it.

We note that our deference to the Commission’s statutory interpretation in this case is hardly momentous. The

court has consistently deferred to the Commission, recognizing the Commission’s technical expertise in deciding 

issues arising under Section 337, a statute Congress has 

entrusted the agency to administer. E.g., Farrel Corp. v. 

Int’l Trade Comm’n, 949 F.2d 1147, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1991), 

superseded by statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c); Enercon, 151 

F.3d at 1381–83. We have concluded on several occasions 

that the court may not substitute its own interpretation of 

the statute for the agency’s reasonable interpretation. 

See, e.g., Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 495 F.3d 

1355, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Corning Glass Works v. 

Int’l Trade Comm’n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 

We have routinely deferred to the agency’s reasonable 

interpretation of Section 337. See, e.g., Enercon, 151 F.3d 

at 1383 (affirming the Commission’s interpretation of the 

term “sale for importation” in Section 337 as reasonable); 

Kinik, 362 F.3d at 1363 (deferring to Commission’s interpretation of the interplay between Section 337 and 35 

U.S.C. 271(g)); San Huan New Materials High Tech, Inc. 

v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 

1998) (affirming Commission’s reasonable interpretation 

of § 337(f)(2)).

CONCLUSION

We hold that the Commission’s interpretation that the 

phrase “articles that infringe” covers goods that were used 

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SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 27

by an importer to directly infringe post-importation as a 

result of the seller’s inducement is reasonable. We remand the appeal to the original panel for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Case: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 27 Filed: 08/10/2015
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SUPREMA, INC.,

MENTALIX INCORPORATED,

Appellants

v.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee

CROSS MATCH TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2012-1170

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States International Trade 

Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-720.

______________________ 

DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

While I fully join Judge O’Malley’s dissent, I write 

separately to emphasize the difference between this case 

and prior Section 337 cases at the International Trade 

Commission (“Commission”), and how starkly the Commission’s theory of induced infringement differs from its 

own past practice. 

Suprema, Inc. (“Suprema”) imports fingerprint scanners to several customers in the United States, including 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 28 Filed: 08/10/2015
2 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

Mentalix, Inc. (“Mentalix”). Cross Match Technologies, 

Inc. does not dispute the Commission’s finding that 

Suprema’s “scanners and [software development kit, or 

“SDK”] are capable of substantial non-infringing use.” 

J.A. 229. At the time of importation, the scanners neither 

directly infringe nor induce infringement of method claim 

19 of U.S. Patent No. 7,203,344, the sole remaining claim 

in this appeal. Instead, these staple articles may or may 

not ultimately be used to infringe claim 19, depending 

upon whether and how they are combined with domestically developed software after importation into the United 

States. 

The Commission’s Limited Exclusion Order here excluded all fingerprint scanners imported by Suprema or 

Mentalix “that infringe . . . claim 19,” interpreted to mean 

all scanners imported by Suprema or Mentalix, regardless 

of how those scanners were later used. Supp. App. 

400502. The Commission’s theory was that Suprema 

induced Mentalix’s post-importation direct infringement 

of claim 19. The Commission concedes that “Customs 

might not be able to determine whether future shipments 

of Supreme scanners presented for entry infringe claim 19 

under § 271(b),” but relies on a finding that some of the 

imported scanners will ultimately be used by Mentalix to 

directly infringe to enter an order excluding all scanners 

imported by Suprema or Mentalix. ITC Br. 59. 

The government contends that in prior commission 

decisions it has relied on an inducement theory, and that 

this case plows no new ground. But as the government 

conceded at oral argument, in prior cases, the Commission banned staple articles for importation on an inducement theory only in circumstances where inducing 

instructions were imported alongside an article that was 

ultimately used to directly infringe in the United States. 

The Commission’s theory was that all of the imported 

articles infringed because inducing instructions were 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 29 Filed: 08/10/2015
SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 3

included in the importation. Judge O’Malley’s dissent 

correctly points out that the vast majority of these prior 

Commission cases are distinguishable. But even taking 

the government’s description of those prior cases at face 

value, there was no such finding of instructions imported 

alongside the scanners here.1 Instead, the Commission 

relied solely on Suprema’s alleged intent to induce, citing 

evidence that Suprema collaborated with Mentalix to 

integrate Mentalix’s software with Suprema’s scanners 

after the articles were imported into the United States.

It is a far different matter where, as here, any inducement is separate from the importation, and the 

articles as imported may or may not ultimately be used to 

directly infringe a method claim when combined with 

software post-importation. 

The Commission’s notion that it can nevertheless exclude all of the scanners imported by Suprema because 

the Exclusion Order allows the importer to certify that 

certain of the staple articles will not ultimately be used to 

infringe reads the statute exactly backwards. The statute 

covers only “articles that—infringe,” 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B), and does not allow the Commission to 

1 The majority notes that the scanners ship “with 

an instruction manual that explains how programs can be 

written to take advantage of scanner functionality.” Maj. 

Op. at 6. But that is not the same as instructions directed 

to infringement of method claim 19, and neither the

administrative law judge nor the Commission found that 

these manuals contained instructions that induced infringement of claim 19, nor even mentioned the instructions in the inducement analysis. See J.A. 212 (“The 

SDKs include manuals as well as dynamic link libraries 

(‘dlls’) that include functions that operate various features 

of the accused fingerprint scanners.”).

 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 30 Filed: 08/10/2015
4 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

enter an exclusion order directed to all of the subject 

articles, even those that ultimately may never be used to 

infringe, on the theory that some of the articles may be 

used in an infringing manner after importation. 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 31 Filed: 08/10/2015
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SUPREMA, INC.,

MENTALIX INCORPORATED,

Appellants

v.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee

CROSS MATCH TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2012-1170

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States International Trade 

Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-720.

______________________ 

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom PROST, 

Chief Judge, LOURIE and DYK, Circuit Judges, join.

The majority today authorizes the International 

Trade Commission (“Commission”) to bar the importation 

of articles of commerce that may or may not be later used 

by third parties to infringe a method patent, based only 

on the putative intent of the importer. And, it does so in 

circumstances in which it is undisputed that the patented 

method cannot be practiced unless the imported article is 

used in combination with software neither embedded in 

the imported article nor sold by the importer. Because 19 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 32 Filed: 08/10/2015
2 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

U.S.C. § 1337 unambiguously fails to provide the Commission with the authority the majority endows on it, I 

respectfully dissent.

The majority justifies its decision on two grounds: (1) 

policy concerns regarding the desire to protect United 

States patent holders from unfair competition; and (2) 

deference to the Executive agency’s view of how best to 

fulfill its role in regulating “international commerce”. But 

we are not the appropriate audience for policy concerns 

except to the extent we are charged with enforcing the 

policy articulated in the statutory scheme Congress 

actually adopted. When Congress provides us with clear 

instructions, we are to follow those instructions regardless 

of our own policy preferences. Deference under Chevron 

U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 

467 U.S. 837 (1984), is not to be used as a substitute for 

statutory interpretation. This is especially true when, as 

here, the interpretation proffered by the agency “makes 

scant sense.” Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1989 

(2015).

Like us, the Executive may not expand the limited 

powers afforded to it by Congress under the guise of 

“deference”. At the Executive’s invitation, the majority 

strains to find an ambiguity in the statute where there is 

none, just so it may resort to the protective umbrella of 

Chevron. Although the majority says it is concerned 

about importers taking advantage of an apparent gap in 

the statute, any gaps should be filled by Congress, not by

us or the Commission. The patent holder here is well 

protected under the patent laws—having the ability to 

stop the only entity practicing its patented method from 

doing so in an action in district court under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 271(a), and the ability to seek damages from any importer acting with an intent to induce that entity to so act. 

We should not rewrite the trade laws out of a desire to 

enhance that remedy.

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SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 3

I. THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE

Our analysis of the scope of § 1337 must begin with 

the language of the statute. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (“As in any case of statutory 

construction, our analysis begins with the language of the 

statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)) The Commission is itself a creature of statute, and its authority to 

issue an exclusion order must emanate from a statutory 

grant of power. See Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under the 

familiar framework of Chevron, as the majority correctly 

notes, we only defer to the agency’s construction of the 

statute if the statute in question is ambiguous. If “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” 

our “inquiry is at an end”; we are to “give effect to the 

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 

467 U.S. at 842–43. Here, Congress—not the panel 

decision in this case—explicitly chose to exclude liability 

under § 1337 for induced infringement of a method claim 

that is not directly infringed, if at all, until after importation. We therefore do not afford the Commission’s construction any deference. 

Section 1337(a), in relevant part, states that:

(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the following are unlawful, and when found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other 

provision of law, as provided in this section: 

(A) Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles . . . 

into the United States . . .

(B) The importation into the United 

States, the sale for importation, or the sale 

within the United States after importation 

by the owner, importer, or consignee, of 

articles that— 

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4 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

(i) infringe a valid and enforceable 

United States patent . . .

(ii) are made, produced, processed, 

or mined under, or by means of, a 

process covered by the claims of a 

valid and enforceable United 

States patent. 

The key language is “articles that—infringe.” Because 

the majority finds this language to be ambiguous, it 

concludes that we must defer to the Commission’s interpretation. Maj. Op. at 15–18. The majority fails, however, to identify an actual ambiguity in the statute. The 

word “articles” is not ambiguous—it has a well-defined 

legal definition. See Black’s Law Dictionary 160 (7th ed. 

1990) (defining “article” as “[g]enerally, a particular item 

or thing”); see, e.g., also Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 

132 S. Ct. 2034, 2041–42 (2012) (looking to dictionary 

definitions to define the “normal usage” of a statutory 

term). The word connotes a physical object. And, Congress itself has defined “infringe” in 35 U.S.C. § 271. See, 

e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority 

makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 

within the United States or imports into the United 

States any patented invention during the term of the 

patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 

We thus turn to the surrounding statutory text to determine what forms of infringement outlined in § 271 

support liability under § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i).1 See, e.g., Yates 

1 The majority asserts that Suprema failed to 

demonstrate a “clearly established usage” of “articles that 

—infringe” “limited to product claims or to direct or 

contributory infringement.” Maj. Op. at 16–17. The plain 

language of the statute is all that is necessary to deter-

 

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SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 5

v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081–82 (“Whether a 

statutory term is unambiguous, however, does not turn 

solely on dictionary definitions of its component words. 

Rather, ‘[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the specific context in which

that language is used, and the broader context of the 

statute as a whole.’” Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil 

Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))). Congress specifically 

limits § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) to the “importation into the 

United States, the sale for importation, or the sale within 

the United States after importation . . . .” It is objects 

which are imported or sold, not methods. As the Commission correctly ascertained in Certain Electronic Devices 

with Image Processing Systems, Components Thereof, and 

Associated Software, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-724, 2012 

WL 3246515, at *12–13 (Dec. 21, 2011) (Final), moreover, 

its focus under the statute must be on the point of importation, and patented methods generally are not directly 

infringed until their use in the United States after importation. Both “importation into the United States” and 

“sale for importation” identify the point of importation as 

the cornerstone of liability. Indeed, the use of present 

tense verbs in the statutory language, i.e. “importation” 

mine its meaning. Indeed, the Commission itself has 

limited the scope of “articles that—infringe” with regard

to direct infringement of method claims, relying on the 

statute and common parlance, without reference to “clearly established usage” of “articles that—infringe.” See 

Certain Electronic Devices with Image Processing Systems, 

Components Thereof, and Associated Software, USITC 

Inv. No. 337-TA-724, 2012 WL 3246515, at *12–13 (Dec. 

21, 2011). Loose phraseology in our prior opinions does 

not change the words Congress explicitly chose in 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i).

 

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and “sale”, supports a natural reading of the statute—

that infringement is tied, not just to a physical object, but

to the date of importation. Cf. Carr v. United States, 560 

U.S. 438, 462 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Congress’s 

use of the present tense is unambiguous, and the statutory language accordingly should be the end of the matter.”). 

The exceptions to this importation-centric rule are 

specified in § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) and § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii). 

“[T]he sale within the United States after importation” in 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) raises considerations of post-importation 

conduct, but Congress specifically limited this to “sale”, 

which does not apply to methods. We have long held that 

“use” in § 271(a) covers infringement of method claims. 

NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 

1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Congress has consistently expressed the view that it understands infringement of 

method claims under section 271(a) to be limited to use.”). 

But “use” appears nowhere in § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). We 

expect that Congress speaks in precise terms when defining liability, and the absence of “use” in § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) 

is highly conspicuous. Section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) expressly 

covers importation of products made using infringing 

processes prior to importation. The need to include 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) demonstrates that Congress did not 

intend for § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) to extend beyond tangible 

“articles” to intangible methods, particularly where future 

infringement of such methods is uncertain at the time of 

importation. Congress identified the situations where our 

focus should leave the point of importation, and the 

majority errs in grafting “use” into the language of the 

statute where it does not appear. 

This makes practical sense; there is no actual harm to 

a patentee until an infringing use, and that harm only

occurs after importation for method claims such as the 

ones at issue in this appeal. This is especially true for 

staple goods like Suprema’s scanners, where a broad 

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assertion of the Commission’s power could prevent noninfringing goods from entering the country on the basis of 

what a customer may do with that item once it enters 

U.S. territory. Such considerations are the purview of the 

district courts, and fall outside the limited statutory 

jurisdiction of the Commission.

The Commission and the majority instead rely on an 

inducement theory under § 271(b). But as the Supreme 

Court recently reminded us, “our case law leaves no doubt 

that inducement liability may arise ‘if, but only if, [there 

is] . . . direct infringement.’” Limelight Networks, Inc. v. 

Akamai Techs, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014) (quoting 

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 

336 (1961)). Evidence of direct infringement—that all 

claimed steps of the method have been performed—is a 

predicate for a finding of inducement liability under 

§ 271(b). When the Commission attempts to enforce an 

exclusion order under § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) on grounds that

an importer or customer may later complete steps of a 

method claim post-importation, a necessary predicate of 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) is missing—there are no “articles that—

infringe” because there is no infringement. Although the 

importer’s specific intent to cause infringement may exist 

at the time of importation (a point Suprema contests 

here), the “articles that—infringe” do not. The Commission would have the power to institute an exclusion order 

under § 271(b) if, at the time of importation, there was 

evidence of both specific intent and the existence of an 

article that itself directly infringed. See, e.g., Kyocera, 545 

F.3d at 1346. But in that situation, the Commission could 

also justify the exclusion order on the basis of § 271(a). 

As we have described, however, the opposite is not true—

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) does not permit the Commission to 

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institute an exclusion order solely on § 271(b) when there 

is no direct infringement at the time of importation.2

Congress did not, in either § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) or § 271,

grant the Commission the power to issue an exclusion 

order on the basis of the importer’s intent to induce 

possible infringement after importation. If Congress had 

sought to grant the Commission the power to issue an 

exclusion order based on an importer’s intent to cause 

direct infringement at a later time, it would have said so. 

Congress could have used language similar to the “unfair 

methods of competition and unfair acts” language of 

§ 1337(a)(1)(A), broadly sweeping in such an intent to 

induce infringement. Instead, in 1988, Congress defined 

prohibited acts related to patent infringement in 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) through a categorical approach that does 

not include the possibility of post-importation infringement of method claims. Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–418, tit. I, 102 Stat. 

1211–12. We are not at liberty to impute power to the 

Commission that Congress did not grant. 

By permitting indirect infringement liability at the 

point of importation when there has been no direct infringement, the majority crafts patent policy where it 

believes there is a loophole ripe for abuse. See Maj. Op. at 

25–26. As the Supreme Court recently reminded us, 

however, “[t]he courts should not create liability for 

inducement of non-infringing conduct where Congress has 

2 Thus, even though this court has used the term 

“infringement” to generically describe any acts under 

§ 271, Maj. Op. at 15 (citing Crystal Semiconductor Corp. 

v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001)), that usage does not somehow alter how we 

should interpret “infringe” within the context of the statutory scheme of § 1337.

 

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elected not to extend that concept.” Limelight, 134 S. Ct. 

at 2118. As discussed later, moreover, the majority 

creates the possibility for an alternative type of abuse—or 

at least unnecessary confusion. As the Commission 

concedes, its exclusion orders are enforced at the border 

by Customs agents. Thus, Customs agents are charged 

with deciding which scanners may later be used by some 

Suprema customers in an infringing manner and, as to 

those, for which customers Suprema has acted with an 

improper intent to induce that infringement. Thus, 

although the majority states in its first footnote that 

scanners going to customers other than Mentalix are not 

relevant to the issue before us, Maj. Op. at 6 n.1, that is 

not the case.

The language of the statute is unambiguous—the 

Commission lacks the power under § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) to 

enter an exclusion order on the basis of infringement of a 

method claim when the underlying direct infringement 

occurs post-importation.

II. THE MAJORITY’S CONSTRUCTION

The majority, the appellees, and the government read 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) differently. They argue that the in rem

nature of the Tariff Act and the in personam nature of the

Patent Act are inherently incompatible. Maj. Op. at 15–

18. Because, they say, only a person, and not an article, 

can infringe, the majority reasons that the combination of 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) and § 271 is necessarily ambiguous, and 

we must therefore defer to the Commission’s reasoned 

interpretation of the Tariff Act under Chevron.3 Maj. Op. 

3 The majority does not argue that the use of “articles” in § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) is so fundamentally incorrect or 

creates such unanticipated results as to trigger the absurdity doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 

 

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at 15. The majority also focuses on the history of the 

Tariff Act and statements made in the legislative record, 

arguing that a 1988 amendment to the Tariff Act ratified 

a consistent pre-amendment application of § 271(b) to 

method claims under § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). Neither of these 

justifications is compelling.

A. The Lack of Ambiguity

The majority’s presumed ambiguity in the combination of § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) and § 271(b) seems to be merely a 

means to the end to which it arrives—resort to Chevron

step 2. We should not read statutes to create an ambiguity in light of clear congressional statements, even if that 

result may lead to what some parties consider a normatively more fair result. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 524 (1992) (White, J., 

dissenting) (“To conclude otherwise is to resort to ‘ingenuity to create ambiguity’ that simply does not exist in this 

statute.” (quoting Rothschild v. United States, 179 U.S. 

463, 465 (1900))); cf. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 

Reading Law § 27 (2012) (“Hence there can be no justification for needlessly rendering provisions in conflict if 

482, 486–87 (1868). The majority instead appears to be 

arguing that § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) is ambiguous in this particular situation because the application of § 271(b) to 

post-importation conduct does not provide for a clean 

analogue under § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). Maj. Op. at 15 (“Simply 

put, the phrase ‘articles that infringe’ does not map onto 

the Patent Act’s definition of infringement.”). This purported inconsistency does not prove that Congress intended to leave the interpretative decision to the Commission, 

it merely demonstrates congressional intent not to include 

such conduct under the scope of § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). FDA v. 

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 U.S. 120, 159 

(2000).

 

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they can be interpreted harmoniously.”) (hereinafter 

Scalia & Garner). 

Section 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) speaks in terms of “articles 

that—infringe.” The majority says that this is not how we 

naturally refer to infringement under § 271—that we 

normally think in terms of a person or entity doing the 

infringing. The majority claims that this “disparity” 

requires that the Commission, and not our court, resolve 

the “uncertainty.” Maj. Op. at 15–16. This argument—

newly asserted by the government in this en banc proceeding—lacks logical grounding. Although it is people 

who are liable for infringement under the law, it is the 

underlying article or methods that are the focus of an 

infringement analysis. It is to the aspects of articles that 

are manufactured, sold, or offered for sale or methods that 

are “used” that an element-by-element comparison with 

the patent claims is made. Multiple subsections of § 271 

tie conduct directly to an article. For example, § 271(a) 

defines infringement as conduct involving the “mak[ing], 

us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing] any patented invention.” The “patented invention” of § 271(a) is the equivalent to the “article” in § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). In the one 

situation where this analogy breaks down—method 

claims—the Commission has not said that the statute is 

inexorably ambiguous, it has instead concluded that 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) does not apply to post-importation 

conduct that infringes method claims. Certain Electronic 

Devices, 2012 WL 3246515, at *12. And, § 271(c) ties 

contributory infringement to conduct involving “a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or 

composition.” Similar to § 271(a), this “component” is the 

equivalent to the “article” in § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). 

Section 271(b) has no similar analogue. Induced infringement focuses on conduct tied to another infringer, 

not to an “article,” “patented invention,” or “component.” 

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”). 

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We have clarified that, in an induced infringement analysis, we focus on the conduct of the inducer and not the 

article itself. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 

1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“[I]nducement 

requires evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another's infringement, not merely that the inducer 

had knowledge of the direct infringer's activities.”); Warner–Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed.

Cir. 2003) (“To succeed [on a theory of induced infringement], a plaintiff must prove that the defendants’ actions 

induced infringing acts and that they knew or should 

have known their actions would induce actual infringement.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Any consideration of the “article” in an inducement 

analysis comes only as part of the requisite direct infringement under § 271(a). As discussed above, the 

Commission has already concluded that § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) 

does not premise liability on post-importation conduct 

found to infringe a method claim. 

The fact that Congress spoke in terms of “articles” instead of “infringers” in § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) is not evidence 

that Congress was confused or sought to implicitly delegate the decision of what an “article—that infringes” is to 

the Commission. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–

89 (2015) (explaining that we should not nonchalantly 

defer to an agency’s interpretation for questions of “deep 

economic and political significance” (internal citation 

omitted)). It, instead, indicates Congress’s determination 

that Customs’s decision-making at the border should be 

tied to a tangible object—i.e., an “article”—not an intangible consideration—i.e., the importer’s intent. Although 

the Commission may be required to consider the importer’s intent in its analysis, it will only be as a corollary to a 

finding of direct infringement at the point of importation. 

Under § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i), intent cannot be divorced from 

the direct infringement. See Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2118 

(explaining that separating § 271(b) from § 271(a) “would 

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require the courts to develop two parallel bodies of infringement law: one for liability for direct infringement, 

and one for liability for inducement.”). The majority 

continues to “fundamentally misunderstand[] what it 

means to infringe a method patent.” Id. at 2117. 

The majority counters that an unambiguous construction of the statute “to require that infringement occur at 

the time of importation” would produce “absurd results 

under the pre-1994 version of § 271(a),” because, pre1994, § 271(a) did not define importing a patented invention as an infringing act. Maj. Op. at 18. The majority, 

however, ignores that § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) explicitly considers the “sale within the United States after importation,” 

which means that Section 337 would “have reached even 

garden-variety direct infringement” that occurs through 

infringing sales within the United States. Maj. Op. at 18. 

Congress also amended § 271 in 1988 by adding § 271(g) 

to cover the importation of an article made by a patented 

process as an act of infringement. Omnibus Foreign 

Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–

418, § 9003, 102 Stat. 1107. And, the domestic industry 

was not without recourse, as it could still seek to invoke 

§ 1337(a)(1)(A) as it had done before the 1988 Amendments because, under the majority’s interpretation, those 

articles would not have been “articles that—infringe” 

under § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). The 1994 Amendments to § 271, 

as part of the legislation necessary to effectuate the 

Uruguay Round Agreements, Uruguay Round Agreements Act, P.L. No. 103–465, 108 Stat 4809 (1994), 

demonstrate that Congress recognized the importance of 

clearly tying infringement to the point of importation, 

strengthening both the power of the district courts and 

the Commission explicitly. Even if the majority’s “absurd 

result” theory were true, moreover, we would still be 

required to give effect to the language Congress chose in 

1988 to describe the Commission’s current power to 

control imports at the point of importation. See, e.g., 

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14 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (“When Congress 

acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its 

amendment to have real and substantial effect.”); Bausch 

& Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. 

Cir. 1998) (“A change in the language of a statute is 

generally construed to import a change in meaning . . . .”).

“It is . . . our task to determine the correct reading” of 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) in light of § 271, and we cannot pass this 

task to the Executive Branch where Congress is unambiguous. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. Congress provided 

the Commission with clear instructions: the Commission 

may bar the importation of any articles that could be 

found to be infringing under the Patent Act at the time of 

importation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). Claims of 

induced infringement predicated on the potential completion of all steps of a method claim after importing the 

article do not meet this requirement under the plain 

language of the statute. There is no need to rely on the 

Commission’s interpretation in light of the clear statutory 

language in § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). 

B. Legislative History

Failing to find a clear statement in the language of 

the statute that would support their interpretation of 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i), the majority relies on its own reading of 

the legislative history. Maj. Op. at 21–25. Putting aside 

the extent to which reliance on statements in legislative 

history have limited value when engaging in statutory 

interpretation, the history of the Tariff Act does not 

support the majority’s expansive interpretation of 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i).

From its inception in 1916, the Commission administered a predecessor to modern § 1337. Section 316 of the 

1922 Tariff Act declared that “unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the 

United States . . . the effect or tendency of which is to 

destroy or substantially injure an industry . . .” were 

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unlawful. Ch. 386, 42 Stat. 858, 943 (1922). This presumably included patent infringement as an “unfair 

method of competition” or an “unfair act.” See, e.g., 

Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 257 

(C.C.P.A. 1930). Congress reenacted § 316 as § 337 in the 

Tariff Act of 1930. Pub. L. No. 71–361, § 337, 46 Stat. 

590, 703–04 (1930). Similar to § 316, § 337 stated that 

“[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the 

importation of articles into the United States . . . the 

effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially 

injure an industry . . .” were unlawful. Id.; see also In re 

Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458, 463 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (explaining 

that § 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922 “was the prototype of 

section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, and is, in substance, 

the same”). Unsurprisingly, our predecessor court held 

that the prohibition on “unfair method[s] of competition” 

or “unfair act[s]” in § 337 also applied to patent infringement. Orion, 71 F.2d at 464–65. 

Section 337 remained largely unchanged until 1988, 

when Congress substantively amended the Tariff Act to 

its present form. Omnibus Foreign Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–418, 102 Stat. 1107. In 

§ 1342 of the Act, Congress amended § 337 to split the 

analysis of “unfair methods of competition and unfair 

acts.” Under § 1337(a)(1)(A), an exclusion order based on 

general unfair methods of competition and unfair acts

required a finding of substantial injury to the industry, as 

in the 1922 and 1930 Acts, but under § 1337(a)(1)(B), an 

exclusion order predicated on the importation of “articles 

that—infringe” no longer required a showing of substantial injury to the industry. Id. § 1342, 102 Stat. at 1212. 

Thus, in 1988 Congress explicitly created a limited exception for imports that violated patent rights by removing 

the requirement of proving a substantial injury to the 

domestic industry. But it did not remove the focus on 

“articles” that was present in the 1922 and 1930 Acts; it 

reinforced it. 

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The majority and the government rely too heavily on 

very general statements in the legislative history of the 

1988 Act when they claim that Congress somehow meant 

in that Act to authorize the Commission to base exclusion 

orders on any possible injury to domestic industry. In 

particular, the majority fails to explain why, if there had 

been a consistent Commission practice regarding exclusion orders predicated solely on an intent to induce infringement as they claim, and the only substantive 

change to § 1337(a)(1)(B) was removing the domestic 

injury requirement, Maj. Op. at 24, Congress adopted the 

“articles that—infringe” moniker. Reiter v. Sonotone 

Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (“In construing a statute 

we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word 

Congress used.”).

 The majority and the government point to a portion of 

the 1988 Amendments discussing congressional factfindings in support of their argument that Congress 

intended that § 1337(a)(1)(B) maintain a broad scope. 

Maj. Op. at 24–25 & n.7 (referring to this language as 

“consistent with Congress’ longstanding broad policy, with 

its broadening purpose”). Section 1341 of the 1988 Act, 

titled “Findings”, states that “the existing protection 

under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 . . . is cumbersome and costly and has not provided United States 

owners of intellectual property rights with adequate 

protection . . . .” 102 Stat. at 1211–12. And, the majority 

references statements in the House Reports explaining 

that the purpose of the 1988 amendments was to 

strengthen the Tariff Act and make it more effective. 

Maj. Op. at 24–25 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 100–40, at 155 

(1987) and H.R. Rep. No. 100–576, at 112 (1988)). Similarly, the government cites language from the Senate 

Report, to support the argument that the 1988 Amendments were intended to “strengthen” the enforcement of 

patent rights. Br. of Int’l Trade Comm’n at 13 (citing S. 

Rep. No. 100–71, at 128 (1987)). These statements, 

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however, do not imply that Congress intended for 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B) to cover claims of induced infringement at 

the time of importation when the requisite direct infringement would not occur until after importation and 

might never occur at all. 

Rather, by removing the domestic injury requirement 

for exclusion orders based on patent infringement, Congress eliminated one of the most “cumbersome and costly” 

aspects of seeking an exclusion order—proof of substantial injury to the domestic industry. 102 Stat. at 1211–12. 

Thus, all the statements to which the majority and government point regarding the need to strengthen protection of domestic patent rights point to the elimination of 

the substantial injury to domestic industry requirement; 

they do not justify the conclusion that Congress intended 

to imbue the Commission with the authority to do whatever it thinks will provide the broadest protections to 

patentees, regardless of its statutory charge. Statements 

in the legislative history should not be used to create 

ambiguity in an already clear statute, especially not 

legislative history that is as vague as that relied on by the 

majority here. See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 

572 (2011) (“We will not take the opposite tack of allowing 

ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory 

language.”). Congress strengthened the power of patent 

holders to assert their rights, not by expanding § 271, but 

by removing a procedural hurdle under § 1337(a). 

C. Historical Commission Practice

The majority and the government also assert that the 

statutory and legislative history supports its interpretation by demonstrating Congress’s intent to continue an 

unbroken practice by the Commission of predicating 

exclusion orders on acts of induced infringement. Maj. 

Op. at 21–23. Specifically, it states that “Congress has 

not upset the Commission’s consistent interpretation of 

Section 337.” Maj. Op. at 23. There has been no interpreCase: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 48 Filed: 08/10/2015
18 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

tation of § 337 that mirrors that adopted by the majority 

today, however, and certainly nothing so clear that Congress should be charged with jumping in to stop it. The

cases the majority cites to support the sweeping statements it makes about the Commission’s unbroken practices do not bear the weight placed on them. Indeed, the 

government conceded as much at oral argument. See Oral 

Argument at 1:12–1:13, Suprema, Inc. v. International 

Trade Comm’n, No. 12-1170 (en banc), available at

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

12-1170_252015.mp3. 

The majority cites a single pre-1988 case in support of 

its “consistency theory”: Young Engineers, Inc. v. U.S. 

International Trade Commission, 721 F.2d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 

1983).4 Young Engineers did not involve an exclusion 

4 The government relies heavily on Frischer & Co. 

v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A. 1930), to establish 

that the Commission had previously based exclusion 

orders on induced infringement. See, e.g., Br. of Int’l 

Trade Comm’n at 28–30, 32. Bakelite does not stand for 

what the government claims, however. The exclusion 

order in Bakelite was predicated on a finding that the 

imported articles were “prepared and manufactured in 

conformity” with the patented methods before being 

imported, which is consistent with the later-enacted 

prohibition on goods produced using patented methods 

prior to importation in § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii). Id. at 507; see 

also In re Orion, 71 F.2d at 466–67 (finding that the 

import of products produced using infringing methods 

abroad could be considered an unfair method of competition or unfair act under the Tariff Act of 1930). Bakelite

simply does not stand for the proposition that an exclusion order can be issued on the basis of induced infringement where the underlying direct infringement of a 

 

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order predicated exclusively on a finding of induced 

infringement. The Commission issued an exclusion order 

both because of a finding of direct infringement due to the 

importation of an infringing product, and induced infringement on the basis of the importer providing “training and assistance to [ ] customers in the use of the 

inserts in accordance with the patented methods.” In re 

Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts and Methods 

for Their Installation, USITC Inv. No. 337–TA–99, 218 

U.S.P.Q. 832, at *5 (April 9, 1982), aff’d, Young Eng’rs, 

721 F.2d at 1317. The Commission also concluded that 

the inserts at issue were not staple goods, and justified 

the exclusion order on a finding of contributory infringement. Id. We affirmed those findings without analysis of 

the Commission’s power to justify exclusion orders solely 

on a finding of induced infringement. Young Eng’rs, 721 

F.2d at 1317. Young Engineers does not evidence that we 

have “consistently affirmed the Commission’s determination that a violation of Section 337 may arise from an act 

of induced infringement.” Maj. Op. at 25. At best, Young

Engineers and Bakelite, see supra note 4, stand for the 

uncontroversial premise that the Commission can exclude 

either: (1) articles made using a patented method overseas pre-importation; or (2) non-staple goods imported 

into the United States on the basis of a finding of direct 

and induced infringement. In either situation, a Customs 

agent is not required to divine the importer’s intent to 

determine if there would be a potential downstream direct 

infringement. The direct infringement either already 

occurred prior to importation (and is statutorily covered 

under § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii)) or the good itself could not be 

used in a non-infringing manner. This is a far cry from 

method claim occurs after importation, and might not 

occur at all. Unsurprisingly, the majority does not even 

attempt to rely on Bakelite. 

 

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establishing a consistent agency practice of which Congress necessarily would have been aware in 1988, as the 

majority proclaims. Maj. Op. at 21–23. 

Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo 

Co., 754 F.2d 345 (Fed. Cir. 1985) does not alter this 

analysis. In Standard Oil, we analyzed when the period 

for laches would begin to run for claims of induced infringement: at the time of the direct infringement or at 

the time of the inducing act. Id. at 348–49. We concluded 

that laches barred recovery because the specific intent to 

induce existed prior to the six-year period for laches, even 

though the subsequent direct infringement occurred 

during the laches period. Id. Standard Oil does not 

annunciate a rule that induced infringement occurs at the 

time of the inducing act, see Maj. Op. at 20—we held 

instead that, once the direct infringement occurs, the 

liability for induced infringement is traced back to the 

inducing act. Id.; see also Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc. v. W. 

Bend. Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1196 (merely holding that there 

must be a direct infringement for liability under § 271(b) 

to exist). Nothing in Standard Oil alters the fact or 

requirement that there must be an underlying direct 

infringement for there to be induced infringement. Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2117. 

There is simply no evidence of any pre-1988 Commission practice equivalent to the Commission’s actions here. 

Even if reliance on congressional silence were ever a 

strong reed upon which to premise statutory interpretation,5 the majority cannot rely on Congress’s purported 

5 The Supreme Court has recognized that, absent 

circumstances not present here, congressional silence is, 

at best, a tenuous ground upon which to justify a particular statutory construction. See Cmty. for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989) (“Ordinarily, 

 

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desire to continue a consistent past agency practice to 

bolster its statutory construction when the only consistent 

agency practice was the agency’s failure to assert § 337 

against importers of staple goods based solely on the 

intent to induce infringement of method claims postimportation. 

D. Modern Commission Practice

Our post-1988 case law provides no better support for 

the majority’s interpretation. Although it is unclear 

which cases the majority believes supports its view, as it 

cites only two in passing, the government points to two 

cases that they argue demonstrate the Commission’s 

reliance on § 271(b) in an exclusion order: Alloc, Inc. v. 

International Trade Commission, 342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 

2003), and Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International Trade 

Commission, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Br. of Int’l 

Trade Comm’n at 33 n.8. But neither case required us to 

determine if an exclusion order could be predicated solely 

on an intent to induce infringement.

In Alloc, the Commission found no infringement, either direct or indirect, in imported flooring products, and 

we affirmed that determination. 342 F.3d at 1366–68, 

1375. After construing the claims at issue, we agreed 

with the Commission that there was no evidence of direct 

infringement. Id. at 1373. As for induced infringement, 

we noted that the basis for the allegation of inducement 

was installation instructions included in the packaging at 

the time of importation. Id. at 1373–74. In a short discussion of induced infringement, we found “no reason to 

‘Congress’ silence is just that — silence.”) (quoting Alaska 

Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987)); Johnson 

v. Trans. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., 

dissenting). 

 

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disturb the administrative judge’s conclusion on inducement” specifically because “the administrative judge 

found no evidence of direct infringement.” Id. at 1374. 

Alloc does not demonstrate our approval of the Commission’s use of induced infringement to justify the exclusion 

order in the circumstances here, however; our silence 

there was not nearly as deafening as the government 

believes. That case did not involve uncertainty as to 

future infringement, and there was no challenge to the 

Commission’s authority regarding inducement claims. At 

best, we merely overlooked this issue in our analysis, and 

“I see no reason why [we] should be consciously wrong 

today because [we were] unconsciously wrong yesterday.” 

Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 639–40 

(1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting); cf. Vizio, 605 F.3d at 1343 

(declining to analyze the Commission’s authority to base 

an exclusion order on induced infringement because 

“[a]ppellants do not challenge the Commission’s finding of 

infringement”); see also Maj. Op. at 25 (“Prior to this case, 

none of our reviews of the Commission’s determinations 

have questioned the Commission’s authority to investigate and find a violation of Section 337 predicated on an 

act of induced infringement.”). 

Kyocera also fails to provide any support for an interpretation of § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) that would include induced 

infringement of method claims for potential postimportation direct infringement. Similar to Alloc, there 

was no challenge to the Commission’s authority regarding 

induced infringement allegations; we assumed without 

deciding that an exclusion order could be predicated on a 

finding of induced infringement under § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). 

Kyocera, 742 F.3d at 1353–54; see also ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Int’l Trade Comm., 566 F.3d 1028, 

1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming Commission’s determination of no direct infringement, and therefore concluding 

there was “no basis for finding induced or contributory 

infringement,” without analyzing the Commission’s 

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authority under § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) to enter an exclusion 

order due to induced infringement). Our only discussion 

of induced infringement involved a short statement remanding the case to the Commission to perform the

correct analysis under § 271 after we had altered the 

specific intent analysis in DSU. Kyocera, 742 F.3d at 

1354. Importantly, our appellate review in Kyocera did 

not involve allegations of inducement predicated on 

potential post-importation direct infringement. See In the 

Matter of Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, 

Transmitter & Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control 

Chips, & Products Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-

TA-543, 2006 WL 3920334, at *74 (Oct. 10, 2006) (finding 

that Qualcomm “induces infringement of the apparatus 

claims” of U.S. Patent No. 6,714,983, but that “Broadcom

has not proved that Qualcomm induced infringement of 

the method claims of the ’983 patent”). 

To the contrary, Kyocera involved the importation of 

wireless devices that were programmed to operate in an 

infringing manner prior to being imported. Id. at 1346 

(noting that the Commission only excluded devices from 

manufacturers who “purchase[d] and incorporate[d] 

Qualcomm chips into their mobile wireless devices outside 

the United States, and then imported them into the 

United States for sale”). Although the Commission relied 

on an induced infringement theory for infringement of 

apparatus claims, the imported articles directly infringed 

at the time of importation. They were the quintessential 

“articles that—infringe.”

Judge Reyna, in his dissent to the panel opinion, highlighted a series of Commission decisions allegedly involving exclusion orders based on an intent to induce direct 

infringement after importation. Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l 

Trade Comm., 742 F.3d 1350, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

The majority, as well, appears to rely on those cases 

through incorporation by reference. Maj. Op. at 22 n.6 

(listing examples and referencing footnote 2 of the dissent 

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24 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

to the panel decision). But like Kyocera and Alloc, none of 

these cases involved a determination by this court that 

the Commission had the authority to base an exclusion 

order solely on a finding of an intent to induce possible

later infringement. In fact, in each of these cases, the 

Commission also found direct or contributory infringement at the time of importation.6 None demonstrate a 

Commission practice consistent with the majority’s interpretation. The government, the Commission, and the 

majority remain unable to point to any example of the 

Commission excluding staple goods on the basis of a 

theory of inducement of direct infringement of method 

claims post-importation prior to this appeal. 

Congress did not intend for Customs agents to need to 

decipher an importer’s intent to induce infringement at 

some later date. It, instead, avoided such an unworkable 

construct by requiring the Commission to issue exclusion 

orders based on the infringing nature of the article itself. 

Prior Commission practice, either pre- or post-1988, lends 

6 See, e.g., Certain Semiconductor Chips Having 

Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory Controllers and Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-661, 

USITC Pub. 4266, 2011 WL 6017982, at *80–84 (Jan. 22, 

2010) (also finding direct and contributory infringement 

at point of importation); Certain Automated Mechanical 

Transmission Sys. for Medium–Duty and Heavy-Duty 

Trucks and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-503,

USITC Pub. 3758, 2007 WL 4473082, at *98–101 (Aug. 1, 

2007) (also finding direct infringement at point of importation); Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Systems and 

Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-383, 1997 

WL 665006, at *63–88, 92–99 (July 31, 1997) (also finding 

direct and contributory infringement at point of importation).

 

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no support to a contrary view. Though we need not reach 

the legislative history or past Commission practice to 

perform our duty of saying what the law is for unambiguous statutory language, I am unconvinced that any of the 

“evidence” upon which the majority relies alters a fair 

reading of the language that a majority of both houses of 

Congress agreed to: “articles that—infringe.” Indeed, I 

believe it supports the unambiguous reading that the 

panel majority found in that statutory language.

E. Equitable Considerations

 The crux of the majority’s holding is equity, and the 

industry’s concern that the plain language of the statute 

might leave a porous border hospitable to infringers. See, 

e.g. Maj. Op. at 11, 25. But that concern is best addressed 

to Congress, who chose the words we are interpreting 

today. The majority minimizes—or ignores—both the 

power already available to the Commission and the 

importance of the other source of relief for the domestic 

industry: district courts. 

Behind the majority’s strained statutory interpretation is a belief that any construction of § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) 

that reduces the Commission’s authority to institute 

exclusion orders would negate the flexibility built into the 

Tariff Act for remediating harms against the domestic 

industry. See Maj. Op. at 25 (“There is no basis for curtailing the Commission’s gap-filling authority in that 

way.”). The majority claims that, under the broad language of the Tariff Act, the Commission must have the 

necessary authority to halt importation of all even potentially infringing goods in order to effectuate Congress’s 

intent in enacting § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). Id. The amici also 

highlight that, in combination with the Commission’s 

decision not to entertain complaints of direct infringement 

of method claims under § 271(a), Certain Electronic 

Devices, 2012 WL 3246515, at *12–13, the dissent’s construction would render the Commission largely toothless 

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to stop infringement of method patents. See, e.g., Amicus 

Br. of Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n at 4. 

These concerns are overstated. There is little evidence that the Commission would be impotent to stop 

such importers. The plain language of the statute would 

not prevent the Commission from predicating an exclusion order on, for example, a non-staple item. This construction also would not prevent the Commission from 

excluding goods that directly infringe at the point of 

importation. The Commission has a rich historical practice of excluding such goods, and the “articles that—

infringe” language does not diminish the Commission’s 

power. The language of the statute only denies the Commission the power to issue an exclusion order solely on 

the very limited factual scenario envisioned here—

allegations of induced infringement of a method claim 

based on potential post-importation direct infringement. 

This interpretation would not open a porous border for all 

kinds of nefarious actors. At worst, it would limit the 

Commission’s ability to address a situation that has never 

arisen prior to the present appeal. Our recency bias 

should not force us to depart from our traditional role in 

statutory interpretation due to concerns that may or may 

not ever present themselves again. It certainly should not 

serve as a justification to abdicate to the Executive all 

authority over interpretation of § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i).

This desire to give the Commission free rein to prevent potential abuses highlights a more fundamental 

concern with the majority’s approach. The Commission is 

a creature of statute, with its powers narrowly defined by 

Congress. Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1355. The Commission is 

also entirely at the whim of the President (through the 

United States Trade Representative), who can choose to 

set aside an exclusion order before it is enforced. 19 

U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2). The Commission is therefore subject 

to the control of the Executive Branch, even though the 

Commission is nominally an independent agency with 

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three commissioners from each political party that are 

appointed by the President upon the advice and consent of 

the Senate. Congress strictly defines the powers of the 

Commission, but the President has veto powers over the 

Commission’s assertions of power under § 1337. It is 

within this framework that we must ardently guard

Congress’s power to establish the law and our own power 

to “say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 

Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 

The majority, however, too easily defers to the Commission’s interpretation. By concluding that the statute 

is ambiguous, the majority emboldens the Executive at 

the expense of both Congress and this court. As long as 

we defer to the Commission’s interpretation of § 1337, 

that interpretation may change when the Administration 

changes. The value and importance of stare decisis in 

statutory interpretation is weakened by undue resort to

Chevron. Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 

402, 417 (1993) (“[T]he consistency of an agency’s position 

is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due.”). 

The Commission no longer becomes a “creature of statute,” but instead a creature of its own making, an everexpanding hydra that can sprout new areas of authority 

with each new interpretation. 

The majority nominally defers to the Commission because it finds that the statute is ambiguous due to the 

interplay of § 1337 and § 271(b), even though the language of § 1337 is clear on its face. Maj. Op. at 14–18. 

But the majority agrees with the Commission in part 

because it believes the Commission’s interpretation will 

prevent the narrow set of abuses described above. Maj. 

Op. at 24–26. The industry should address its concerns 

with potential holes in the statute to Congress, not the

Commission or the courts. By choosing to fix the purported mistake made by Congress in using “articles that—

infringe”, the majority oversteps its role, and at the same 

time weakens that of Congress.

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Finally, we must not forget that there is a forum that 

can provide an appropriate remedy for allegations of 

induced infringement of method claims based on postimportation direct infringement: district courts. District 

courts can enter injunctions preventing downstream 

customers from using the article in an infringing manner. 

35 U.S.C. § 283 (“The several courts having jurisdiction of 

cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance 

with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of 

any right secured by patent . . . .”). And, unlike the 

Commission, a district court could award damages for 

such acts of inducement. Id. § 284. 

The Commission is an alternative to district courts 

that acts to supplement the powers of district courts, not 

a substitute for district courts when the district court is 

not as convenient a forum or the remedy sought is more 

difficult to obtain. Indeed, as noted previously, the Commission itself has determined that it does not have power 

over allegations of direct infringement of method claims 

at the point of importation. Certain Electronic Devices, 

2012 WL 3246515, at *12–13. This does not mean those 

allegations can never be heard, they just must be addressed before a district court. Similarly here, 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) does not grant the Commission power to 

address assertions of induced infringement of method 

claims based on post-importation direct infringement. 

Those claims are not lost forever, they just must be asserted in district court. 

Finally, the majority’s interpretation of 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) is not the catholicon it purports to be. 

Although it will permit the Commission to premise exclusion orders on claims of induced infringement based on 

threats of post-importation direct infringement, it will 

also grant the Commission the power to hold up staple

goods. By premising Customs’s power to exclude goods on 

the importer’s alleged intent for how the goods may be 

used, goods that can be used in both infringing and nonCase: 12-1170 Document: 221-2 Page: 59 Filed: 08/10/2015
SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 29

infringing ways likely will be denied entry based on the 

perception that they could be used to infringe a method 

claim, especially considering the broad deference given to 

Customs agent’s decision-making at the border. See, e.g., 

Amicus Br. of Dell at 22 (citing the deference generally 

given to Customs agents in enforcing an exclusion order, 

such as the one issued in the present case, at the border). 

If those goods are not ultimately used in an infringing 

manner, the Commission would be acting beyond its 

powers under the Tariff Act. But that determination 

cannot be made until the goods have been imported, 

absent evidence that the goods are non-staple items or 

that the goods are intended to be used only in an infringing manner. A certification statement by the importer 

will not solve this problem because any evidence that a 

customer uses the goods in an infringing manner later, 

even if unexpected, would trigger concerns that could 

justify an exclusion order or subject the importer to the 

threat of severe sanctions. The weighing of competing 

concerns created by the majority’s construction demonstrates why it is Congress, and not our court and certainly 

not the Commission, which is in the best position to 

determine the Commission’s powers. Congress has made 

that determination, limiting those powers to “articles 

that—infringe.” That decision may make the domestic 

industry, and some members of this court, uncomfortable, 

but that is a debate best left for the branch of our government that should be most amicable to the concerns of 

industry: Congress. 

III. CONCLUSION

 The plain language of § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) reveals that

Congress did not grant the Commission the power to issue 

an exclusion order based solely on a finding of induced 

infringement of a method claim and potential postimportation direct infringement. Neither ambiguous 

statements from the legislative history nor vague and 

non-determinative prior Commission statements detract 

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from this analysis. The majority’s attempt to shoehorn 

the language of § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) into a strained interpretation of the statute under the guise of deferring to the 

Commission’s interpretation may prevent some rare

potential abuses of our patent system, but the majority 

also opens Pandora’s Box. The majority refers to the 

original panel interpretation as a “technical interpretation,” Maj. Op. at 25, but it should more appropriately be 

coined “the interpretation mandated by Congress.” Our 

system of separation of powers guarantees that Congress 

enacts the laws and we interpret those laws. The majority here harms both of these aims: it diminishes Congress’s power to define the scope of the Commission’s 

authority, and it permits the Executive Branch to say 

what the law is. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent 

from the majority’s interpretation of § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i).

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