Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05304/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05304-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mary E. Peters
Appellee
Public Citizen, Inc.
Appellee
Rubber Manufacturers Association
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 2007 Decided July 22, 2008

No. 06-5304

PUBLIC CITIZEN, INC.,

APPELLEE

v.

RUBBER MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION,

APPELLANT

MARY E. PETERS, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv00463)

Eugene Scalia argued the cause for the appellant. With him

on the briefs was Laurie T. Baulig.

Scott L. Nelson argued the cause for appellee Public Citizen,

Inc. With him on the brief was David Arkush.

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for the federal appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A.

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 1 of 19
2

Attorney, and Lloyd S. Guerci, Assistant Chief Counsel,

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Before: RANDOLPH and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND,Circuit Judge: A provision of the Transportation

Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation

(TREAD) Act limits the disclosure, “pursuant to section

30167(b)” of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,

of certain early warning reporting data. Appellant Rubber

Manufacturers Association contends that the limits imposed by

the TREAD Act apply not only to disclosures made “pursuant to

section 30167(b),” but also to disclosures made in response to

requests under the Freedom of Information Act. The Secretary

of Transportation, appellee Public Citizen, Inc., and the district

court all disagree with the Rubber Manufacturers Association.

We do as well. Concluding that the plain language of the

TREAD Act means what it says, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

I

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966

(the Safety Act) requires manufacturers of motor vehicles and

motor vehicle equipment to submit certain information to the

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in

order “to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries

resulting from traffic accidents.” 49 U.S.C. § 30101. In

November 2000, Congress enacted the TREAD Act, Pub. L. No.

106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000), which amended the Safety Act

and directed the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate a

regulation expanding the scope of the information that

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 2 of 19
3

manufacturers are required to submit to NHTSA. This

additional information, which the statute refers to as “early

warning reporting” (EWR) data, is information that may assist

the agency in identifying safety defects in motor vehicles or

motor vehicle equipment. See 49 U.S.C. § 30166(m)(3)(B).

NHTSA published the regulation called for by the TREAD Act

on July 10, 2002. Reporting of Information and Documents

About Potential Defects, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,822-01 (July 10, 2002)

(relevant provisions codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 579.5, 579.21-.26).

For tire manufacturers, the rule requires the reporting of, inter

alia, information regarding property damage claims, warranty

adjustments, and claims that a defect in the manufacturer’s tires

caused injury or death. 49 C.F.R. § 579.26. 

In addition to increasing the flow of industry information to

the agency, the TREAD Act contains a provision regarding

disclosure of EWR data. Section 30166(m)(4)(C), which is

entitled “Disclosure,” provides that “[n]one of the information

collected pursuant to the final [EWR rule] shall be disclosed

pursuant to section 30167(b) unless the Secretary determines”

that disclosure will assist in carrying out specified provisions of

the Safety Act. 49 U.S.C. § 30166(m)(4)(C) (emphasis added).

Section 30167(b), referenced in the quoted provision, is a

section of the Safety Act that requires the Secretary to “disclose

information obtained under this chapter related to a defect or

noncompliance that the Secretary decides will assist in carrying

out” the same provisions of the Safety Act specified in §

30166(m)(4)(c). Section 30167(b) expressly states that its

disclosure requirements are “in addition to the requirements of

section 552 of title 5,” which is the Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA). 49 U.S.C. § 30167(b). 

In April 2002, NHTSA initiated a rulemaking to address the

treatment of EWR data under the agency’s Confidential

Business Information (CBI) Rule, 49 C.F.R. pt. 512.

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 3 of 19
4

1

The protected categories include most information about

production numbers, warranty claims, field reports, and consumer

complaints. See Final CBI Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,221-25. 

Confidential Business Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 21,198 (Apr.

30, 2002). That rule sets forth the procedures and standards by

which NHTSA considers claims that information submitted to

the agency is entitled to confidential treatment under FOIA. See

49 C.F.R. § 512.1.

On July 28, 2003, NHTSA issued a Final CBI Rule, which

accepted the position of the Rubber Manufacturers Association

(RMA) that certain categories of EWR data, the disclosure of

which would cause substantial competitive harm, are protected

from public disclosure under FOIA Exemption 4. See

Confidential Business Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,209, 44,211

(July 28, 2003) (Final CBI Rule).1

 Exemption 4 provides that

FOIA’s disclosure requirements do not apply to matters that are

“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained

from a person and privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. §

552(b)(4). 

The Final CBI Rule rejected, however, RMA’s suggestion

that § 30166(m)(4)(C) is a withholding statute that renders all

EWR data protected from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 3

“unless the Secretary determines the disclosure of such

information will assist in carrying out” the specified provisions

of the Safety Act. Final CBI Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,217-18

(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 30166(m)(4)(C)). Exemption 3 provides

that FOIA’s disclosure requirements do not apply to matters that

are “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute[,] . . .

provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be

withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no

discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 4 of 19
5

withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be

withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 

Public Citizen and RMA each petitioned for

reconsideration. The former challenged the agency’s conclusion

that entire categories of EWR data are protected from disclosure

under Exemption 4; the latter challenged the decision not to treat

all EWR data as protected from disclosure pursuant to

Exemption 3. On April 21, 2004, NHTSA denied both petitions.

See Confidential Business Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 21,409-01,

21,410-11, 21,419-23 (Apr. 21, 2004). 

Public Citizen then filed suit in district court alleging that

NHTSA’s promulgation of the Final CBI Rule violated the

notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553, and challenging the

agency’s decision that FOIA Exemption 4 applies to entire

categories of EWR data. See Public Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, 427

F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2006). RMA intervened to defend the

Exemption 4 decision, and it filed a cross-claim against the

Secretary of Transportation challenging the decision that

§ 30166(m)(4)(C) is not an Exemption 3 withholding statute. 

On March 31, 2006, the district court held that NHTSA was

authorized to make categorical determinations regarding the

confidentiality of EWR data. Id. at 13-14. But it also found that

the agency had failed to provide adequate notice and opportunity

to comment as required by the APA. Id. at 16-17. The court

remanded the rule to the agency without reaching the parties’

other claims, including RMA’s cross-claim that

§ 30166(m)(4)(C) is a withholding statute for purposes of FOIA

Exemption 3. Id. at 17. RMA then filed a motion to alter or

amend the judgment, asking the court to address its Exemption

3 cross-claim. 

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 5 of 19
6

On July 31, 2006, the district court granted RMA’s motion

to alter or amend, but ruled against RMA on the merits. The

court upheld NHTSA’s decision that § 30166(m)(4)(C) is not an

Exemption 3 statute. It did so on the ground that the section

neither “‘establishes particular criteria for withholding’” nor

“‘refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.’” Public

Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, 444 F. Supp. 2d 12, 16-18 (D.D.C. 2006)

(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)). Determining that there was “no

just reason for delay,” the court entered a final judgment on

RMA’s cross-claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

54(b). RMA now appeals the district court’s holding that

§ 30166(m)(4)(C) is not an Exemption 3 withholding statute.

That is the only issue before this court.

II

With specific exceptions, the Freedom of Information Act

requires Executive Branch agencies to make their records

available “to any person” upon request. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(3)(A). FOIA was intended “to provide for open

disclosure of public information,” Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S.

345, 352 (1982), and it has long been understood to create a

“strong presumption in favor of disclosure,” United States Dep’t

of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991). “Although Congress

enumerated nine exemptions from the disclosure requirement,

‘these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that

disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.’”

National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 32

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose,

425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)). Accordingly, FOIA’s exemptions

are to be narrowly construed. Id. 

As noted in Part I, FOIA Exemption 3 permits the

government to withhold information “specifically exempted

from disclosure by statute[,] . . . provided that such statute (A)

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 6 of 19
7

requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a

manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes

particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of

matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). A statute need

only satisfy one of these disjunctive conditions to qualify as an

Exemption 3 statute. See Association of Retired R.R. Workers

v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd., 830 F.2d 331, 334 (D.C. Cir.

1987). Before a court inquires into whether any of the

conditions are met, however, it must first determine whether the

statute is a withholding statute at all by deciding whether it

satisfies “the threshold requirement that it specifically exempt

matters from disclosure.” Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the

Press v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 734 (D.C.

Cir. 1987) (emphasis added), rev’d on other grounds, 489 U.S.

749 (1989).

The question on appeal is whether § 30166(m)(4)(C) is a

withholding statute for purposes of FOIA Exemption 3.

According to the Secretary, “[j]udicial deference is neither

sought nor owed to the agency’s interpretation of the TREAD

Act’s disclosure provision as ineligible for treatment under

FOIA Exemption 3,” and this court should therefore make its

own determination de novo. Secretary Br. 12 (citing, inter alia,

Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 734). RMA and Public Citizen

concur. See RMA Br. 20; Public Citizen Br. 27. In Part III, we

explain our determination that § 30166(m)(4)(C) does not come

within the purview of Exemption 3. In Part IV, we consider

RMA’s arguments to the contrary.

III

Section 30166(m)(4)(C) states: 

None of the information collected pursuant to the final

[EWR rule] shall be disclosed pursuant to section

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 7 of 19
8

30167(b) unless the Secretary determines the

disclosure of such information will assist in carrying

out sections 30117(b) and 30118 through 30121.

49 U.S.C. § 30166(m)(4)(C). According to RMA, this means

that no EWR data may be disclosed -- under any statute,

including FOIA -- unless the Secretary makes the specified

determination with respect to §§ 30117(b) and 30118-21. Those

sections set forth rules relating to defect and noncompliance

notifications and remedies. RMA contends that, because “the

EWR data submitted pursuant to the TREAD Act is ‘not

necessarily indicative of any problem needing investigation[,]’

. . . . the Secretary could make the specified findings about only

a small subset of the EWR data in NHTSA’s possession.” RMA

Br. 22 (quoting Final CBI Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,218). Hence,

“the vast bulk of EWR data would not qualify for disclosure

because it is unrelated to a defect or noncompliance

investigation.” Id. 

If § 30166(m)(4)(C) actually said that no EWR data may be

disclosed without the specified determination, it might well be

an Exemption 3 withholding statute. See Consumer Prod. Safety

Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 121-22 (1980).

But § 30166(m)(4)(C) does not say that. Instead, it says that no

EWR data may be disclosed “pursuant to section 30167(b)”

without that determination. 49 U.S.C. § 30166(m)(4)(C). Thus,

in order to decide whether § 30166(m)(4)(C) is an Exemption 3

statute, it is necessary to examine § 30167(b).

Section 30167(b) states in full: 

Subject to subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary

shall disclose information obtained under this chapter

related to a defect or noncompliance that the Secretary

decides will assist in carrying out sections 30117(b)

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 8 of 19
9

2

“Subsection (a),” referenced in § 30167(b), limits the way in

which confidential information referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (the

Trade Secrets Act) may be disclosed. See 49 U.S.C. § 30167(a). The

parties do not argue that this subsection informs the meaning of

§ 30167(b) or § 30166(m)(4)(C) as relevant here. See Oral Arg.

Recording at 43:20-25; see also id. at 12:27-13:02, 26:08-55. 

and 30118-30121 of this title or that is required to be

disclosed under section 30118(a) of this title. A

requirement to disclose information under this

subsection is in addition to the requirements of section

552 of title 5 [FOIA].

Id. § 30167(b).2

 Section 30167(b) thus creates a mandatory

disclosure requirement: it obligates the Secretary to disclose

information obtained under the Safety Act when doing so will

assist in carrying out §§ 30117(b) and 30118-21, the same

sections cited in § 30166(m)(4)(C). It is a requirement that

applies whether or not any member of the public has requested

the information. And, as the section states, it is a “requirement

to disclose information [that is] in addition to the requirements

of” FOIA.

It is therefore plain that § 30166(m)(4)(C) does not mean

that no EWR data may be disclosed without the specified

Secretarial determination. Rather, it provides that EWR data is

not subject to the Secretary’s mandatory obligation to disclose

information pursuant to § 30167(b) -- whether requested or not

-- unless the Secretary makes that determination. Accordingly,

§ 30166(m)(4)(C) cannot be a FOIA Exemption 3 statute

because it does not “specifically exempt[]” certain matters

“from disclosure.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). At most, it

specifically exempts EWR data from disclosure under

§ 30167(b), a section that expressly states that its disclosure

requirement is “in addition to the requirements of” FOIA.

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 9 of 19
10

The fact that § 30166(m)(4)(C) simply limits disclosures

that § 30167(b) requires the Secretary to make sua sponte

distinguishes that section from the statute the Supreme Court

found to be an Exemption 3 withholding statute in GTE

Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102. In that case, the Court considered the

Consumer Product Safety Commission’s contention that the

disclosure prohibitions of § 6(b)(1) of the Consumer Product

Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1), are “limited to

disclosures initiated by the Commission” and do not apply to

disclosures requested under FOIA. Id. at 108. After examining

the language of the Act, the Court rejected that contention

because § 6(b)(1) “by its terms applies to the ‘public disclosure

of any information’ obtained by the Commission pursuant to its

authority under the CPSA, and to any information ‘to be

disclosed to the public in connection therewith.’” Id. (emphasis

in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1)). 

Unlike § 6(b)(1) of the CPSA, § 30166(m)(4)(C) does not

state that it applies to “public disclosure of any information,” but

instead states that it applies to “disclos[ure] pursuant to section

30167(b).” It therefore cannot be read to limit the agency’s

obligations to disclose EWR data under FOIA -- especially

given the FOIA savings provision at the end of the latter section.

Because § 30166(m)(4)(C) does not meet the threshold criterion

for qualification as an Exemption 3 statute -- i.e., that it

“specifically exempt[]” EWR data from disclosure -- we do not

need to consider whether the statute meets the additional

conditions of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A) or (B). 

IV

RMA offers three reasons why the reading of

§ 30166(m)(4)(C) set forth above -- that the section only applies

to disclosures pursuant to § 30167(b) -- cannot be correct. We

address those arguments below. 

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 10 of 19
11

A

RMA first contends that this reading of § 30166(m)(4)(C)

violates the canon of statutory construction that instructs courts

to give effect to all statutory language when it is reasonable to

do so. Before addressing this contention, we note the Supreme

Court’s frequent reminder that

canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb

that help courts determine the meaning of legislation,

and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn

first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have

stated time and again that courts must presume that a

legislature says in a statute what it means and means in

a statute what it says there. When the words of a

statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also

the last: judicial inquiry is complete. 

Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54

(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing, inter alia,

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42

(1989), and Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).

As we have noted, the words of § 30166(m)(4)(C) are

unambiguous: it applies, as it says it does, to disclosures made

“pursuant to section 30167(b).” Under these circumstances,

“‘we have no need to employ, nor any legitimate purpose in

employing, canons of construction designed to reconcile

confusing language.’” Atkinson v. Inter-American Dev. Bank,

156 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v.

Espy, 145 F.3d 1369, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). In any event, we

conclude that RMA’s canon-of-construction argument fails on

its own terms.

RMA argues that a change in statutory language must “‘be

read, if possible, to have some effect,’” RMA Br. 30 (emphasis

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 11 of 19
12

added by RMA) (quoting American Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505

U.S. 247, 263 (1992)), and that § 30166(m)(4)(C) would have

no independent effect if all it did were limit disclosures pursuant

to § 30167(b). Section 30167(b) itself requires disclosure of all

defect and noncompliance “information obtained under this

chapter” -- which after the TREAD Act amendment includes

EWR data -- that the Secretary determines will assist in carrying

out §§ 30117(b) and 30118-21. RMA contends that, because

§ 30166(m)(4)(C) states that EWR data may not be disclosed

pursuant to § 30167(b) unless the Secretary makes that same

determination, it limits only the same disclosures that

§ 30167(b) itself limits. Hence, if § 30166(m)(4)(C) only affects

disclosures under § 30167(b), it has no independent effect.

For § 30166(m)(4)(C) to have an independent effect, RMA

continues, it must limit disclosures made pursuant to any statute

-- including FOIA -- and not simply those made pursuant to

§ 30167(b). Thus, RMA maintains, § 30166(m)(4)(C) must be

read as requiring that “disclosure of EWR data is to be made

‘pursuant to’ § 30167(b), or not at all.” RMA Reply Br. 18

(emphasis added); see RMA Br. 36 (same). That is, “EWR data

may be released only pursuant to” § 30167(b). RMA Br. 35

(emphasis added). 

The principal problem with RMA’s reading is that the

italicized words do not appear in the statute. As the Supreme

Court has cautioned, “our preference for avoiding surplusage

constructions is not absolute.” Lamie v. United States Tr., 540

U.S. 526, 536 (2004). While a court should, “‘if possible,’ . . .

construe a statute so as to give effect to ‘every clause and word,’

. . . . [n]o canon of construction justifies construing the actual

statutory language beyond what the terms can reasonably bear.”

Amoco Prod. Co. v. Watson, 410 F.3d 722, 733-34 (D.C. Cir.

2005) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39

(1955)). RMA asks us to do just that, by adding words that are

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 12 of 19
13

3

See 49 U.S.C. § 30117(b)(1) (mandating that NHTSA’s

regulations “provide reasonable assurance that a customer list . . . will

be made available to a person . . . only when necessary to carry out

this subsection and [other listed sections]” (emphasis added)); see also

5 U.S.C. § 9101(d) (“Criminal history record information received

under this section shall be disclosed or used only for the purposes set

forth in paragraph (b)(1) or for national security or criminal justice

purposes authorized by law . . . .” (emphasis added)); 10 U.S.C.

§ 616(e) (“The recommendations of a selection board may be

disclosed only in accordance with regulations prescribed by the

Secretary of Defense.” (emphasis added)); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(h)(9)(B)

(“Financial records or information transferred by the Commission . .

. may be disclosed or used only in an administrative, civil or criminal

action or investigation . . . .” (emphasis added)).

not in the statute that the legislature enacted. See United States

v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611 (1989) (“[I]nterpretative

canon[s are] not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language

enacted by the legislature.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Congress knows well how to say that disclosures may be made

only under specified provisions or circumstances,3 but it did not

do so here. As then-Judge Roberts said with respect to a similar

argument in the Amoco case, any “inference to be drawn from

[the canon] does not dissuade us from the more natural reading

of the express language” of the statute. 410 F.3d at 733. 

Moreover, RMA’s construction runs afoul of its own canon.

As the Secretary correctly notes, “RMA’s argument reads the

pivotal clause ‘pursuant to section 30167(b)’ out of section

30166(m)(4)(C).” Secretary Br. 20. Indeed, deleting the clause

from § 30166(m)(4)(C) altogether would create precisely the

meaning upon which RMA insists -- i.e., that “[n]one of the

information collected pursuant to the final [EWR rule] shall be

disclosed pursuant to section 30167(b) unless the Secretary”

makes the specified determination. But such a deletion would

directly contradict a canon that counsels us to give effect to

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 13 of 19
14

“every clause and word.” Menasche, 348 U.S. at 538-39; see

TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).

We also doubt the premise of RMA’s argument -- that

reading § 30166(m)(4)(C) to apply only to disclosures pursuant

to § 30167(b) denies the section any purpose. Although we

cannot know for certain what purpose Congress had in mind, at

least two are possible.

First, the section may serve to fill a logical gap in

§ 30167(b). The latter states that the Secretary, acting on her

own and without a FOIA request, shall disclose information if

she determines that it will assist in carrying out the other

specified sections. But § 30167(b) does not necessarily compel

the inverse proposition: that the Secretary (again, acting on her

own and without a FOIA request) shall not disclose information

unless she makes such a determination. As we have noted,

“[t]he legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (‘the

mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another’) is not

always correct.” In re Sealed Case, 181 F.3d 128, 132 (D.C.

Cir. 1999). Because it is thus unclear from the language of

§ 30167(b) alone whether the Secretary may, in the absence of

a FOIA request, disclose information without making the

specified determination, § 30166(m)(4)(C) serves to fill that

lacuna for EWR data by making clear that such data may not be

disclosed unless the Secretary makes that determination. This

reconciles the affirmative language of § 30166(m)(4)(C) and the

negative language of § 30167(b), while giving effect to both.

Second, § 30166(m)(4)(C) may also serve to provide useful

clarification. Manufacturers did not have to report EWR data

under the Safety Act of 1966, which included § 30167(b). It

was not until 34 years later, with the passage of the TREAD Act,

that manufacturers were required to report EWR data to

NHTSA. It may well be, as RMA maintains, that “EWR data

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 14 of 19
15

would still have been subject to disclosure under § 30167(b)

pursuant to Secretarial findings” even “if § 30166(m)(4)(C) had

been omitted entirely from the TREAD Act.” RMA Reply Br.

14. But it is also true, as NHTSA suggests, that

§ 30166(m)(4)(C) makes clear that this is so. Oral Arg.

Recording at 39:21-49. In addition, as the district court found,

§ 30166(m)(4)(C) “reemphasizes, and clarifies, that if any of the

EWR data that relates to defects or noncompliance is going to be

released in accordance with Section 30167(b), the Secretary

must first determine that the disclosure of such information will

assist in carrying out other sections” of the statute. Public

Citizen, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 18. As the Supreme Court has

recognized, a provision that may at first glance appear to be

textual surplusage, may in fact “perform[] a significant function

simply by clarifying.” United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,

127 S. Ct. 2331, 2337 (2007). That a provision was intended to

serve such a function may be more likely when it was enacted

many years after the provision it is accused of duplicating. Cf.

Agredano v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 75 F.3d 541, 544 (9th Cir.

1996). It is certainly not unreasonable to believe that Congress

added § 30166(m)(4)(C) to clarify that § 30167(b) applies to the

new categories of reportable data that the TREAD Act created.

Given the explicitness of § 30166(m)(4)(C)’s language, the

“first canon” of statutory construction -- “that courts must

presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and

means in a statute what it says” -- is also the last canon that we

need to consult in this case. Connecticut Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S.

at 253-54 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even so,

consultation of the canon proffered by RMA does not yield a

different result.

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 15 of 19
16

4

We acknowledge RMA’s point that on occasion the Supreme

Court has considered a statute’s legislative history to support its

textual conclusion that Congress intended to protect certain

information from disclosure under FOIA. See Baldrige, 455 U.S. at

355-58; GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. at 111-16. But there is no text to

which such support may be attached in this case.

B

RMA also contends that the legislative history of the

TREAD Act requires us to interpret § 30166(m)(4)(C) as an

Exemption 3 withholding statute that limits disclosures under

FOIA. But as with canons of construction, when a statute’s

“language is plain on its face, courts do not ordinarily resort to

legislative history.” Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 57 (D.C.

Cir. 1997); see Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534; Davis v. Michigan Dep’t

of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808 n.3 (1989). And as we have

explained, § 30166(m)(4)(C)’s language is quite plain.

Moreover, legislative history is a particularly weak reed on

which to rest in this context, as this court has long disfavored the

use of legislative history to determine whether a statute qualifies

as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. See Norton, 309

F.3d at 38; Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 735.4

Even if we were inclined to look to legislative history for

guidance in this case, there is little that is useful here. The only

legislative history to which RMA points is a brief colloquy

between Representatives Markey and Tauzin during a House

debate on the TREAD Act, see RMA Br. 25-26 (citing 146

Cong. Rec. H9629 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2000)), and a request by

Senator McCain that the Representatives’ colloquy be included

in the Senate record, see Oral Arg. Recording at 14:53-15:17

(citing 146 Cong. Rec. S10,273 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000)). We

ordinarily do not give controlling weight to such colloquies. See

Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457 (2002) (“Floor

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 16 of 19
17

5 [Mr. MARKEY.] To protect the confidentiality of this new

early stage information, the bill provides in Section 2(b) in the

subsection titled ‘disclosure’ that such information shall be

treated as confidential unless the Secretary makes a finding

that its disclosure would assist in ensuring public safety, but

with respect to information that NHTSA currently requires be

disclosed to the public it is my understanding of the

committee’s intention that we not provide manufacturers with

the ability to hide from public disclosure information which

under current law must be disclosed. Would the gentleman

from Louisiana (Mr. TAUZIN) agree that this special

disclosure provision for new early stage information is not

intended to protect from disclosure that [which] is currently

disclosed under existing law such as information about actual

defects or recalls? 

. . . 

[Mr. TAUZIN.] Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is correct.

146 Cong. Rec. H9629.

statements from two Senators cannot amend the clear and

unambiguous language of a statute. We see no reason to give

greater weight to the views of two Senators than to the collective

votes of both Houses, which are memorialized in the

unambiguous statutory text.”); see also Grand Canyon Air Tour

Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Chemical

Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 919 F.2d 158, 164 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

Nor does this particular colloquy tell us much about these

three legislators’ views. The colloquy, which is set out in the

footnote, does not mention FOIA generally or Exemption 3

specifically.5

 Thus, although the two House members agree that

§ 30166(m)(4)(C) provides that EWR information “shall be

treated as confidential unless the Secretary makes a finding that

its disclosure would assist in ensuring public safety,” 146 Cong.

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 17 of 19
18

Rec. H9629, this does little more than repeat the statutory

language and does not resolve the question of whether such

confidential treatment is for the purpose of disclosure under

FOIA as well as § 30167(b). Moreover, the statement of

Senator McCain, to which RMA pointed during oral argument,

appears to undermine the reading RMA advocates. That

statement expresses the Senator’s “strong[] disagree[ment]” with

assertions “that the bill would inhibit the release of information

collected by Department of Transportation to the public,” and

asks that the Markey/Tauzin colloquy be included in the record

to “refute these assertions.” 146 Cong. Rec. S10,273.

C

Finally, RMA argues that failing to interpret

§ 30166(m)(4)(C) as a withholding statute will have negative

consequences. It states that, because the EWR data “includes

mere allegations of a design defect, even when a factfinder

would ultimately conclude that no defect existed,” the release of

such data “could cause the public to believe that fatalities were

caused by ‘defects’ in a particular manufacturer’s product at a

much higher rate than actually occurred.” RMA Br. 27. And it

avers that, “[i]n light of the very real probability that unfiltered

EWR data would cause public misunderstanding and confusion

with potentially adverse competitive effects for the

manufacturers providing the data,” it would be “sensible for

Congress to prevent the release of the data except in

circumstances where the Secretary uses her expertise to

determine that release of the data will further the goals of the

act.” Id. at 28-29 (emphasis omitted).

To the extent that this is an argument about legislative

intent, RMA points to neither legislative language nor history

indicating that § 30166(m)(4)(C) was meant to address such

concerns. To the extent that it is an argument about public

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 18 of 19
19

policy, it is addressed to the wrong audience. Although RMA’s

arguments are well and vigorously presented, only Congress has

the authority to provide the relief it seeks. 

V

In sum, § 30166(m)(4)(C) does not meet the threshold

criteria for a FOIA Exemption 3 statute, because it does not

“specifically exempt[]” EWR data from disclosure. Rather, the

plain language of § 30166(m)(4)(C) makes clear that it applies

to disclosures “pursuant to section 30167(b),” and the latter

provision makes clear that such disclosures are “in addition to”

disclosures required by FOIA. This does not, of course, end the

FOIA analysis, as the question of whether certain categories of

EWR information are protected from disclosure under FOIA

Exemption 4 remains pending and is not before us. It does,

however, dispose of the only matter at issue on this appeal. As

to that issue, the judgment of the district court is 

Affirmed.

USCA Case #06-5304 Document #1128839 Filed: 07/22/2008 Page 19 of 19