Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02221/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02221-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert L. McIntosh
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

·PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STA~S CO'lffl:T OP .APPEALS .· ,, '· 

FOR~ TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 

v. 

ROBERT NALL, 

Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 

and 

ROBERT MCINTOSH, 

Defendant/Appellee. 

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FILED 'ted States Court oi Appealll Um Tenth Circuit 

·' 

NOV 12 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECK,.ER Clerk 

Nos. 90-2220 

90-2221 

90-2271 

APPEALS PROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OP NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR 90-124) 

Paula G. Burnett, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Albuquerque~ New Mexico 

(William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), 

for Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 

James B. Foy, Silver City, New Mexico, for Defendant/Appellee/ 

Cross-Appellant Nall. 

Joseph A. Calamia, El Paso, 

El Paso, Texas, with him on the 

McIntosh. 

Texas (Joseph 'Sib' Abraham, Jr., 

brief), for·. Defendant/Appellee 

Before HOLLOWAY, LOGAN and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 1 
I 

On March 14, 1990, a five count indictment was returned by a 

New Mexico federal grand jury, with Count I charging Robert H. 

Nall, Jr. and Robert L. McIntosh with conspiracy to evade the 

reporting requirements of 31 u.s.c. § 5324(3) by avoiding a bank's 

filing of a Currency Transaction Report (CTR) as required by 31 

u.s.c. § 5313(a), in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 371. Counts II 

through V were substantive counts charging only Nall and they were 

based on specific transactions, each of which was charged as a 

structuring of a transaction to evade the reporting requirements, 

31 u.s.c. § 5324(3). 1 

At jury trial, counsel for both Nall and McIntosh made oral 

motions for judgment of acquittal, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a), 

following the government's completion of its case in chief. I R. 

190-94. Both motions were denied. After all the evidence was 

presented, both defendants again made oral motions for judgment of 

acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a), which were denied by the 

1 

The indictment reads in part: 

COUNT II 

On or about the 9th day of June, 1989, at Las 

Cruces, in the State and District of New Mexico, the 

Defendant, ROBERT H. NALL, JR., did knowingly and 

willfully, and for the purpose of evading the reporting 

requirements of Title 31, United States Code, Section 

5313(A), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 

structured or attempted to structure a transaction with 

the Sunwest Bank of Las Cruces, New Mexico. 

In violation of 31 U.S.C. 5324(3). 

I Pl. R. Doc. 1 at 3. Counts III, IV and V were similar except 

for the date of the alleged acts which were respectively listed as 

the 12th, the 15th, and the 28th day of June 1989. Id. at 3-4. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 2 
court. Id. at 243-44. On August 29, 1990, the jury returned a 

verdict of guilty against both defendants. 

Defendant McIntosh filed a motion for judgment of acquittal 

pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c) as to Count I, the only count 

on which he had been indicted and convicted. Nall filed a similar 

motion regarding all five counts. On September 11, 1990, the 

trial judge issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing Count 

I, charging conspiracy, as to both Nall and McIntosh, but denying 

Nall's motion for acquittal as to Counts II through V. I Pl. R. 

Doc. 37. The dismissal of Count I was due to the fact that "the 

Government's proof did not establish a conspiracy beyond 

reasonable doubt." Id. at 5. Since McIntosh was only charged 

with and convicted on Count I, the dismissal of this count 

released him from any conviction. 

The government filed a notice of appeal of the dismissal of 

Count I as to both Nall and McIntosh on October 9, 1990, pursuant 

to 18 u.s.c. § 3731. I Pl. R. Doc. 38. Judgment and sentence for 

Counts II through V was entered against Nall on November 21, 1990, 

and he was sentenced to five months on each count, all to be 

served concurrently with an additional two years of supervised 

release, provided that five months of the release was to be spent 

as a resident at the Alternative House of El Paso, Texas. 2 This 

sentence was the result of the trial court's departure downward 

2 

Additionally, Nall was fined $3,000 on Count II, payable in 

installments of $125 per month during the two years of supervised 

release. Nall was also directed to immediately pay the special 

assessment of $50 for each count on which he was convicted, for a 

total of $200. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 3 
one offense level, pursuant to § 5K2.0 of the Sentencing 

Guidelines. 3 Nall filed a notice of appeal regarding Counts II 

through Von December 3, 1990. The appeal of the United States as 

to Count I of the indictment and the appeal of Nall as to Counts 

II through V have been consolidated and will be considered by this 

opinion. 

II 

There was evidence at trial tending to show the following: 

In April 1989, Robert McIntosh, identifying himself as Tony 

DeSantio, 4 agreed to purchase Nall's business in Las Cruces, New 

Mexico, The Hitching Post, along with a residence on the same 

property for $185,000. An earnest money payment of $9,000 was to 

be made and followed up by several installment payments for a 

total down payment of $85,000. Gregg Floyd (Floyd), vicepresident of Las Cruces Abstract and Title, handled the paperwork 

on the sale for Nall. 

Floyd, a government witness, testified that on April 3, 1989, 

McIntosh and Nall met with Floyd at his office to begin the 

3 

The offense level of thirteen was reduced by the trial judge 

to twelve, pursuant to§ 5K2.0 of the Sentencing Guidelines. See 

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 5K2.0 

(Nov. 1990) [hereinafter u.s.s.G.]. Offense level twelve combines 

with a criminal history category of I to produce a sentencing 

range of ten to sixteen months. u.s.s.G. § SA. Under u.s.S.G. 

§ 5Cl.l(d)(2) such a sentence can be satisfied by a sentence of 

imprisonment for at least half of the minimum term in the 

guideline range in combination with the remainder of the sentence 

being met by a substitute punishment, such as home detention, as 

mandated by u.s.s.G. § SCl.l(e). 

4 

Counsel for McIntosh acknowledged that McIntosh used this 

pseudonym throughout the transactions involved in this case. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 4 
purchasing process. I R. 66. At this meeting, $9,000 was 

deposited with Las Cruces Abstract and Title Company as earnest 

money. Floyd said that in the future he would prefer a cashier's 

check. Floyd also told Nall and McIntosh at that April 3 meeting 

that if currency were brought in, there would have to be an IRS 

reporting form filled out by the title company for the currency 

reporting. IR. 63, 67. A receipt was made out showing that the 

title company had received $9,000 in earnest money. IR. 69. 

After this first payment was made, Nall asked McIntosh for 

additional money on the 

$26,000 in one lump sum. 

down payment and 

5 IR. 53-54. Floyd 

McIntosh paid Nall 

testified that on 

June 28 in a meeting with Nall and McIntosh, Floyd was told that 

$26,000 had already been paid by McIntosh to Nall before the 

closing. I R. 74. Executive vice-president Morrow of Sunwest 

Bank testified for the government that cash-in tickets indicated 

that three cash payments totaling $24,000 were made by the 

customer on Nall's note: one on June 9, 1989 of $9,000; a second 

on June 12, 1989 of $9,000; and a third payment on June 15, 1989 

of $6,000. IR. 163-65. 

Floyd testified further that on June 28, 1989, Nall, McIntosh 

and Floyd met to close the sale. McIntosh brought $50,000 in 

currency. A receipt was prepared by Floyd showing $50,000 had 

been paid by McIntosh to Nall. IR. 73-74. Floyd said that the 

preparation of the paperwork would take several hours. McIntosh 

5 

Although no evidence was presented which indicates the number 

or form of payments which made up this $26,000, counsel for Nall 

and for McIntosh both state that the payment was made in one lump 

sum. IR. 49-50, 53-54. 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 5 
1 - asked Floyd if he could leave the money with him and Floyd said 

that if the money were left with him he would have the IRS forms 

filled out. IR. 70. McIntosh did not want any forms filled out. 

IR. 71. Nall said he would pay the mortgage off; he would go 

directly down and take care of that. IR. 72. Floyd testified: 

"What I recall is [McIntosh] did not want Mr. Nall to put all the 

money directly down, to put it in amounts less than ten thousand 

at a time to pay on the mortgage." I R. 72. McIntosh said the 

reason for this was so there would be no report made for any 

transaction of ten thousand. IR. 72. Nall said he thought there 

would be no problem with putting it in amounts less than $10,000 

at a time. IR. 73. After the $50,000 was turned over to Nall, 

McIntosh and Nall left the Las Cruces Abstract and Title Company 

office together. IR. 74. 

On cross-examination, government witness Floyd said that when 

McIntosh and Nall left the title company office, it was Floyd's 

firm understanding that the money was going to the Sunwest Bank to 

pay off the note, which was in excess of $50,000 pertaining to the 

property. IR. 96-97. On redirect examination, Floyd was asked 

to reconcile his statements about what was to happen to the 

$50,000 and Floyd said that his "best recollection I have at that 

time there wasn't a definite agreement to pay the money in one 

lump sum." I R. 100. 

On Government Exhibit 7, there was a credit of $8,000 shown 

to Nall's account on June 28. IR. 167. 

Morrow testified further that on June 28 he and Anderson, 

another bank officer, told Nall's wife Kathy that they would not 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 6 
accept any more cash payments unless all the balance of the cash 

was applied to the note and a currency transaction report was 

filled out. IR. 168. The next morning Kathy brought the $42,000 

in and the bank applied it to the note on June 29, 1989, and "we 

filled out the proper paperwork." IR. 169. Government Exhibit 9 

was identified by Morrow as the currency transaction report, 

filled out on June 29, that the $42,000 in cash had been received. 

IR. 170. 

Defendant Nall presented testimony by several witnesses 

explaining why his payments to the bank were made in the amounts 

he paid and why other funds were retained by him. He had an 

antique car business and the witnesses' testimony was introduced 

to show that he withheld funds to make favorable purchases of cars 

for his antique car inventory. 

As noted, the trial judge granted the defendants' motions for 

judgments of acquittal as to Count I on the conspiracy charge, but 

entered judgments of convictions and sentences as to Nall on 

Counts II, III, IV and v. We turn to the arguments pressed on 

appeal. 

III 

Count I - Conspiracy 

The district court dismissed the Count I charge against 

McIntosh and Nall after the jury returned a verdict of guilty as 

to both defendants. The court found there to be insufficient 

evidence as a matter of law for the jury to make its finding of 

guilt. The government argues that the district court erred in its 

dismissal of Count I because there was sufficient evidence to 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 7 
prove the existence of a conspiracy between Nall and McIntosh to 

evade the CTR requirements. 6 

We review the district court's determination de IlQYQ. A 

conviction by jury verdict is to be reviewed with the evidence, 

both direct and circumstantial, along with the reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom, taken in the light most 

favorable to the verdict. United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 

1531 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986). In this 

light, the court determines whether a reasonable jury could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United 

States v. Bowie~ 892 F.2d 1494, 1497 (10th Cir. 1990); Hooks, 780 

F.2d at 1531. 

There are five elements which must be present to establish a 

conspiracy under 18 u.s.c. § 371: there must be an agreement; 

the purpose of that agreement must be to break the law; there 

must be an overt act; the purpose of the act must be to further 

the conspiracy; and the defendant on trial must have entered the 

conspiracy willfully. United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994, 999 

(10th Cir. 1991), The nature of a conspiracy, with its attendant 

aspects of secrecy, often requires that elements of the crime be 

established by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Pilling, 

6 

This issue is the only issue raised by the government in its 

brief as appellant. The remaining issues are all raised by Nall 

in his "Cross-Appellant's Brief in Chief and Appellee Nall's Reply 

Brief". Defendant McIntosh's Brief of Appellee in No. 90-2221 

addresses only McIntosh's argument that the trial court's ruling 

in granting the judgment of acquittal was correct because there 

was no proof of a conspiratorial agreement to evade the reporting 

requirement. 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 8 
721 F.2d 286, 293 (10th Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, the "evidence 

of conspiracy - even if circumstantial must be such as to 

establish beyond reasonable doubt defendant's agreement to or 

participation in a plan to violate the law." United States v. 

Webb, 359 F.2d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 1966). 

In this case in addition to the circumstantial evidence, such 

as the acts performed by the defendants, there is some direct 

evidence pertaining to the existence or nonexistence of the 

alleged conspiracy. Floyd was present at the June 28 meeting 

between Nall and McIntosh prior to Nall's depositing of $8,000 of 

the $50,000 cash at Sunwest. We note that Floyd, a government 

witness, testified that at the conclusion of the meeting it was 

his "firm understanding" that Nall and McIntosh had agreed to take 

the money to the bank and deposit the entire amount with Sunwest, 

filling out the necessary currency reporting form. I R. 96-97. 

Despite his redirect testimony that there wasn't a definite 

agreement to pay the money in one lump sum, the government's proof 

failed to establish a conspiratorial agreement, as the trial judge 

held. 

"[M]ere knowledge or approval of 

object and purpose of a conspiracy 

or acquiescence in the 

without an agreement to 

cooperate in achieving such object or purpose does not make one a 

party to a conspiracy ... ", United States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 

1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 1974); Jones v. United States, 365 F.2d 87, 

89 (10th Cir. 1966), nor establish the existence of a conspiracy. 

A conspiracy cannot be thrust upon a member, but instead must be 

purposely and voluntarily joined; there "must at some point be a 

9 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 9 
meeting of the minds in the common design, purpose, or objects of 

the conspiracy." 

district court that 

Butler, 494 F.2d at 1249. We agree with the 

There is absolutely no evidence to support [a finding] 

that there was an agreement between Defendants to make 

deposits at Sunwest Bank to avoid IRS reporting 

requirements. At best, the evidence shows that 

Defendant McIntosh delivered the $50,000 to Defendant 

Nall pursuant to the purchase agreement. While 

Defendant McIntosh may have stated a preference in the 

manner in which the payment of the Sunwest loan was to 

have been accomplished, there is no evidence that he 

participated in or directed the manner in which 

Defendant Nall ultimately deposited the $50,000. There 

is absolutely no evidence of any agreement as to how the 

deposit was to be made. 

I Pl. R. Doc. 37 at 4. Since no agreement was shown to have 

existed, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Count I for 

conspiracy as to both Nall and McIntosh. 

IV 

Nall's first argument on his appeal is that there was 

insufficient evidence to enable the jury to find him guilty on 

Counts II, III, IV and V. In reviewing such a ruling, the 

evidence is deemed sufficient if it is such that when considered 

in the light most favorable to the verdict, "any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) 

(emphasis in original); United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 

1470 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 60 u.s.L.W. 3260 (U.S. 1991); see 

United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 553 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, U.S. __ , 111 s.ct. 395 (1990). The evidence 

supporting a conviction must be substantial; that is, it must do 

10 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 10 
more than raise a mere suspicion of guilt, Sanders, at 1470. 

A. Counts II, III and IV 

Nall challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

his convictions on Counts II, III and IV. These substantive 

counts charge Nall with violating the prohibition against 

structuring transactions to avoid reporting by financial 

institutions, inter alia, required by 31 u.s.c. § 5313(a). Title 

31 u.s.c. § 5324 provides that "(n]o person shall for the purpose 

of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a) with 

respect to such transaction - .... (3) structure or assist in 

structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any 

transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions." 

The reporting requirement of§ 5313(a) essentially is that 

when a domestic financial institution is involved in a transaction 

for payment, receipt or transfer of United States coins or 

currency in an amount, denomination or amount and denomination, or 

under circumstances which the Secretary prescribes by regulation, 

the institution or any other participant in the transaction shall 

file a report as the Secretary prescribes. At the times involved 

here, such currency transaction reports were required of financial 

institutions by regulation for currency transactions involving 

more than $10,000. 31 CFR § 103.22(a)(l) (1989). The regulations 

parallel the provisions of 31 u.s.c. § 5324 in prohibiting 

structuring to evade the reporting requirements, 31 CFR 

11 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 11 
§ 103.53(c), and the regulations also give a regulatory definition 

of structuring. 7 

We have noted earlier, see note 5, supra, that counsel for 

Nall and for McIntosh stated that McIntosh made one lump sum 

payment of $26,000 to Nall. This followed McIntosh's first $9,000 

payment to Nall of earnest money on April 3, 1989, when the 

Hitching Post transaction was being set up with Floyd at the 

Las Cruces Abstract and Title Company. This $26,000 payment of 

course preceded the June 28, 1989, meeting to close the sale. 

During this period, from April 3 to June 28, as also detailed 

earlier, the government's evidence showed three cash payments were 

made by the customer on Nall's note: $9,000 on June 9; $9,000 on 

June 12; and $6,000 on June 15, all in June 1989. The record is 

not clear as to the discrepancy of $2,000 between these payments 

totaling $24,000 and the $26,000 lump sum payment by McIntosh to 

Nall. 

Nevertheless, the three payments to the bank by Nall within 

that period of June 9 to June 15, all in amounts below the $10,000 

7 

31 CFR § 103.ll(n) provides in pertinent part: 

For purposes of section 103.53, a person structures 

a transaction if that person, acting alone, or in 

conjunction with, or on behalf of, other persons, 

conducts or attempts to conduct one or more transactions 

in currency, in any amount, at one or more financial 

institutions, on one or more days, in any manner, for 

the purpose of evading the reporting requirements under 

section 103.22 of this Part. 'In any manner' includes, 

but is not limited to, the breaking down of a single sum 

of currency exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums, 

including sums at or below $10,000, or the conduct of a 

transaction, or series of currency transactions, 

including transactions at or below $10,000. 

12 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 12 
level that 

CTRs, is 

substantial 

would have 

undisputed. 

triggered 

We feel 

the reporting requirement for 

also that the evidence is 

which supports the inference that Nall was aware of 

the existence of the CTR requirements. There was evidence that 

Floyd had told Nall and McIntosh at the April 3 meeting that if 

they brought in more currency there would have to be an IRS 

reporting form filled out for the currency reports, which the 

title company would fill out. IR. 67, 101. 

We held in United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 

1991), petition for cert. by defendant pending, that for 

conviction under 31 u.s.c. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3), the government 

is not required to establish that the defendant had knowledge of 

the prohibition against structuring transactions. 937 F.2d at 

537-38. From the legislative history, we concluded that "the 

intent required is merely to avoid the currency transaction 

reporting requirements, and not• specific knowledge of the 

antistructuring law itself." Of course, a very critical element 

is the stipulation in the regulations that currency transactions 

"of more than $10,000" trigger the reporting requirement. Here, 

as to knowledge of that part of the regulatory scheme, the 

government's case on Counts II, III and IV is not strong. 

Nevertheless, there was evidence that as of April 3, 1989, Nall 

had notice of a requirement of an IRS reporting form being 

required if Nall and McIntosh brought in currency after the $9,000 

earnest money payment made that day. IR. 67. Then there is the 

evidence that a lump sum amount of $26,000 was thereafter paid by 

McIntosh to Nall. Although this amount was available, Nall made 

13 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 13 
the payments in three a.mounts under the $10,000 critical level, 

and in a fairly close time frame ($9,000 on June 9; $9,000 on 

June 12; and $6,000 on June 15). The jury apparently rejected 

the defense testimony on the theory that Nall held funds back to 

make antique car purchases. 

Considering the evidence on Counts II, III and IV in the 

light most favorable to the guilty verdict, while not strong we 

hold the evidence sufficient to sustain the findings of guilt on 

those offenses under the test of Dashney. Upholding the 

sufficiency of the proof on those offenses will, however, support 

only one conviction for structuring, as we now explain. 

We requested the parties to address a further question 

concerning Counts II, III and IV, first decided in United States 

v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1991), and later treated in 

our recent opinion in Dashney, 937 F.2d 532. We noticed the 

issue, sua sponte, because it goes directly to the validity of 

Nall's multiple criminal convictions. See Menna v. New York, 423 

U.S. 61 (1975) (per curia.m). 

In Davenport, the defendants were charged with twelve counts 

related to the structuring of an $81,500 transaction. One count 

was for conspiracy to violate§ 5324(3). Another count charged 

the entire $81,500 transaction as a "structuring", while each of 

ten other counts charged unlawful structuring through individual 

deposits which had been made from the $81,500. The Seventh 

Circuit held that the statute "does not forbid the making of 

deposits. It forbids the structuring of a transaction .... 

There was one structuring, one violation." Davenport, 929 F.2d at 

14 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 14 
1171. The court pointed out that "the structuring itself, and not 

the individual deposit, is the unit of crime." Id. at 1172. As a 

result, the additional ten individual structuring convictions 

related to the individual deposits were vacated, and only the 

conspiracy conviction and the one substantive structuring 

conviction were upheld. 

In Dashney* we agreed with the rationale of Davenport. Count 

1 in Dashney charged that the defendant structured or attempted to 

structure a transaction with the purchase on the same day of 

$99,999.93 in cashier's checks at ten banks. The purchases were 

accomplished at those ten banks. Count 2 alleged that Dashney 

attempted to structure a transaction or transactions with the 

purchase of cashier's checks totaling approximately $100,000, 

alleging transactions at two banks. These efforts alleged in 

Count 2 to purchase the checks, made with the same funds amounting 

to approximately $100,000 were unsuccessful, the government here 

arguing an attempt theory. It was clear from the record that the 

same $100,000 fund was involved in the conduct alleged in both 

counts. 937 F.2d at 541. We were persuaded by Davenport that 

there was a multiplicity of structuring charges, splitting up one 

unit of prosecution contemplated by the statute, into two 

substantive counts and we reversed one conviction. 

In the instant case, Nall made three deposits at the same 

bank, Sunwest, over the course of nine days. The source of each 

deposit was the same lump sum of some $24,000 (or $26,000) which 

McIntosh had paid to Nall. Each of these three deposits was 

charged in a separate count, identical except for the date of the 

15 

Appellate Case: 90-2221 Document: 010110096860 Date Filed: 11/12/1991 Page: 15 
deposit. that the 

charged 

We are convinced 

one structuring violation 

government has 

of 31 u.s.c. 

improperly 

§ 5324(3) by 

multiplicitous 

committed one 

counts. As 

structuring 

in Dashney and Davenport, Nall 

violation respecting the $26,000 lump 

sum payment, comprised of these three individual deposits, and 

there should have been only one structuring count addressing the 

1989 cash deposits made on June 9, June 12, and June 15, 1989 for, 

respectively, $9,000, $9,000, and $6,000. Therefore, we uphold 

the conviction on Count II but vacate the convictions on Counts 

III and IV. See Dashney, 927 F.2d at 542. 

B. Count V 

Nall argues again that there was insufficient evidence to 

sustain his structuring conviction on Count V. This count 

concerned the transactions at the time of the closing on June 28 

and 29, 1989, when some $50,000 was brought by McIntosh to the 

closing for Nall. 

We are not persuaded by Nall's contentions. The critical 

government testimony came first from Floyd, the vice-president of 

the title company. He said that on June 28, Nall and McIntosh met 

with him for the closing. Floyd prepared a receipt showing 

$50,000 had been paid by McIntosh to Nall. IR. 73-74. Floyd 

told them the paperwork would take several hours. McIntosh asked 

if he could leave the money with Floyd, who said if the money was 

left with him he would have the IRS forms filled out. I R. 70. 

McIntosh did not want them filled out and he did not want Nall to 

put all the money directly down, but to do so in amounts less than 

$10,000; that the reason was so that there would be no report for 

16 

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any transaction of $10,000. IR. 72. Nall said he thought there 

would be no problem with this. IR. 73. 8 

We are persuaded that the evidence is sufficient to sustain 

the Count V structuring conviction. The jury could reasonably 

infer that Nall made the $8,000 payment on June 28 with knowledge 

of the $10,000 CTR reporting requirement, and with the intent to 

avoid such a report. While all the remaining $42,000 was brought 

in the next day, this was after the bank officer's comments caused 

Kathy Nall to do so. The structuring attempt by Robert Nall was 

adequately proven to support the Count V conviction. 

Nall also makes the argument that Floyd was improperly 

permitted to testify about a hearsay statement made by the alleged 

co-conspirator McIntosh, although the conspiracy theory was 

rejected by the trial judge as not proven. The specific statement 

at issue is Floyd's testimony that McIntosh told Floyd that he did 

not want a CTR filled out on June 28,. 1989 for the $50,000. 

Nall concedes that there was no objection to the introduction 

of this statement. When reviewing the admission of claimed 

hearsay evidence to which no objection was made we cannot reverse 

absent a finding of plain error. United States v. Bowser, 941 

8 

We note also that there was evidence that the Sunwest Bank 

vice-president, Mr. Foddrill, saw Nall on June 28 in the office of 

Kathy Nall, who worked for the bank. Robert Nall had $50,000 

which Foddrill suggested putting in a safety deposit box. IR. 

140-41. The bank's executive vice-president, Mr. Morrow, 

testified about the bank's cash-in ticket showing $8,000 credited 

to Nall's account on June 28. 

Two bank officers told Kathy Nall they would accept no more 

cash unless all the remainder was applied to the note and a CTR 

was filled out. IR. 168. The remaining $42,000 was brought in 

by Kathy Nall the next day, and this was applied to the note and 

the CTR was made out. IR. 168-70. 

17 

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F.2d 1019, 1021 (10th Cir. 1991); see Pilling, 721 F.2d at 295-

96; Fed.R.Crim.P 52(b). Plain errors are those which are obvious 

and substantial, United States v. Granville, 716 F.2d 819, 821 

(11th Cir. 1983), and which when viewed in light of the entire 

record seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Young, 470 

U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984). Plain error is found "solely in those 

circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise 

result." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982). 

Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant 

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 

prove the truth of the matter asserted." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). 

In arguing that admission of the statement was plain error, Nall 

says the statement "indicated to the jury that at the time before 

Mr. Nall went to the Sunwest Bank to make a deposit, he knew a 

[CTR] had to be filled out." Cross-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 

17. We feel that as to Nall, the statement bearing on his 

knowledge of the reporting requirement is not hearsay. See United 

States v. Lambinus, 747 F.2d 592, 597 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. 

denied,, 471 U.S. 1067 (1985). We find no reversible or plain 

error on this ground. 

In sum, the dismissal of Count I as to both McIntosh and Nall 

is AFFIRMED. The convictions of Nall on Counts II and V are also 

AFFIRMED. The convictions of Nall on Counts III and IV are 

VACATED as multiplicitous. The case is remanded to the district 

court with directions to vacate the sentences of Nall and to 

18 

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( 

resentence him on the remaining convictions on Counts II and Vin 

light of this opinion. 

19 

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