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Parties Involved:
Noel Taylor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-11641

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-20835-FAM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

NOEL TAYLOR, 

a.k.a. Juicy, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(February 25, 2020)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, WILSON, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Noel Taylor sold drugs to an individual cooperating with law enforcement. 

He was pulled over immediately after the transaction and police found $1,000 

cash, a gun, and 129 baggies of crack cocaine in his car. He pleaded guilty to 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, possession of a firearm and 

ammunition by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a 

drug trafficking crime. At his plea hearing there was some confusion because the 

plea agreement had the wrong counts written in it. The court twice suggested 

delaying the hearing, but Taylor’s attorney said that Taylor was “ready to proceed 

now if the Court would permit.”

The court went through the plea colloquy, but it did not tell Taylor that the 

government could use any false statements made under oath against him in a 

perjury or false statement prosecution. It did not advise him that he had a right to 

plead not guilty or to change his plea. It did not advise him that he had a right to a 

jury trial, or that at trial he would be able to confront and cross-examine adverse 

witnesses, be protected from compelled self-incrimination, be able to testify and 

present evidence, and be able to compel witnesses to attend. Nor did it advise him 

that he was giving up all of those rights by pleading guilty.

Before sentencing Taylor moved for a downward variance. He also 

indicated that he wanted to withdraw his plea and have new counsel appointed. 

But at his sentencing hearing he said that he did not want to withdraw his plea. 

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The judge granted Taylor’s motion for a downward variance and sentenced him to 

240 months in prison, the mandatory minimum.

This is Taylor’s appeal. He contends that the district court’s plea colloquy 

was deficient because the court failed to ensure that Taylor knowingly and 

voluntarily waived all his rights as required under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 11.1

Because Taylor did not object to the Rule 11 colloquy in district court, we 

review only for plain error. United States v. Mosley, 173 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th 

Cir. 1999). To prevail under plain error review, a criminal defendant must show 

the following: (1) the district court erred; (2) that error was “plain”; (3) the error 

affected his substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Madden, 

733 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2013). To establish that the error affected his 

substantial rights, Taylor must show “a reasonable probability that, but for the 

error, he would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 

542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004). “A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the 

reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different 

1 Taylor also filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing 

that the crimes he pleaded guilty to were unconstitutionally vague and his counsel was 

ineffective. He did not claim that his plea was deficient under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. The district court dismissed that motion without prejudice because the 

pending direct appeal divested it of jurisdiction.

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result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted).

The government concedes, and we agree, that by failing to inform Taylor of 

“several important trial rights,” the court erred, and the error was plain. But Taylor 

is not entitled to relief because he fails to show that the error affected his 

substantial rights. In fact, Taylor admits on appeal that “[i]t is impossible to 

definitively contend that Taylor would have aborted his plea and decided to go to 

trial” if the court had completely advised him of his rights under Rule 11. 

Taylor does say in his brief that “a proper Rule 11 colloquy would have 

altered his decision.” But a bare assertion that a proper Rule 11 colloquy would 

have “altered his decision” is not enough to show that the error affected his 

substantial rights. See United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1239 n.3 (11th 

Cir. 2018) (“Presendieu has not made this showing because he has not cited any 

evidence showing that he otherwise would not have pled guilty.”). Looking at the 

entire record, Taylor has not pointed to any evidence that he would not have 

pleaded guilty if given the proper Rule 11 colloquy. Indeed, all the evidence in the 

record indicates that he likely would still have pleaded guilty. Taylor was caught 

with the drugs and gun, and he has pointed to no defense he might assert at trial. 

The court asked several times during Taylor’s sentencing whether he wanted to 

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withdraw his plea, and each time Taylor said no. His substantial rights were not 

affected.

AFFIRMED.

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