Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01747/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01747-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ryan L. Gibbs
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐1747

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

RYAN L. GIBBS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 4:15‐cr‐40037‐JPG‐1 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 13, 2016 — DECIDED JANUARY 6, 2017

____________________

Before POSNER, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. The defendant pleaded guilty to

possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Because of the quantity

of the cocaine that he possessed and his history of drug and

other criminal offenses, his guideline sentencing range was

151 to 188 months and his statutory maximum 240 months.

The government recommended a 216‐month sentence (i.e.,

18 years, compared to the 15 and two‐thirds years that

Case: 16-1747 Document: 30 Filed: 01/06/2017 Pages: 6
2 No. 16‐1747   

would be the length in years of a sentence of 188 months, the

top of the guideline range), and that was the sentence that

the district judge imposed and that the defendant’s appeal

challenges.

The judge explained that he was imposing a sentence

significantly higher than the top of the defendant’s guideline

range on the basis of the “[18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) [sentencing]

factors.” He called the defendant “a poster child for being a

career offender,” and told him “unfortunately you may be

one of those people that will never be able to conform to be a

law‐abiding person.” He quoted loosely from the section

3553(a) factors, saying none too clearly that  

When I look at the 3553(a) factors apart from the “nature

and circumstances of the offense,” your “history and char‐

acteristics” of you as a defendant does [sic] not indicate

that there should be any leniency at all; that they [anteced‐

ent unclear] “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “pro‐

mote respect for the law,” which your history and charac‐

teristics indicate that you have no respect for the law;

“provide just punishment.” Nothing—No previous sen‐

tence that this Court has imposed or other Courts have de‐

terred you from your criminal conduct.

Neither the government, in recommending a 216‐month

sentence, nor the district judge, in imposing it, attempted a

sophisticated analysis of the likely consequences for the de‐

fendant, his family, and society (primarily the persons to

whom he sold illegal drugs) of adding roughly two years to

the sentence he would have been given had the judge

stopped at the top of the guideline range. Judging from the

government’s brief and the judge’s sentencing statement,

both the prosecution and the judge based the 216‐month sen‐

tence (proposed by the government, imposed by the judge)

Case: 16-1747 Document: 30 Filed: 01/06/2017 Pages: 6
No. 16‐1747 3

on a hunch. As the prosecutors as well as the judge are high‐

ly experienced, their hunches are likely often to be reliable.

And because federal prosecutors are free to suggest any sen‐

tence within the statutory range, and a federal district judge

has broad latitude in picking the sentence to impose within

that range, and because the briefs and argument of defense

counsel in this case bordered on the perfunctory—the argu‐

ment being that the judge should have reiterated his reasons

for imposing the 216‐month sentence, though as far as ap‐

pears his prior explanation included all the considerations

(of which we’ve noted the main ones) that entered into his

decision—the sentence must be affirmed.

Some consideration, however, should be given to the

possibility of basing a prison sentence—at least a very long

one (and an 18‐year sentence is very long)—on something

other than a hunch. The work of the U.S. Sentencing Com‐

mission in formulating sentencing guidelines provides a clue

to a possible alternative. The sentencing judge, instead of

ranging at large, with little guidance, over the wide space

between the statutory minimum sentence for the defendant’s

crime or crimes and the statutory maximum, might consider

asking the Sentencing Commission to evaluate the appropri‐

ateness in particular cases of all the possible sentencing

points in the statutory sentencing range, including points

that fall outside the guideline sentencing range. In a case like

the present one the Sentencing Commission might advise the

prosecutors, defense counsel, and the judge why it had fixed

the guideline range where it did and how disapproving it

would be of sentences below or above that range. The Com‐

mission might for example take a close look at the govern‐

ment’s suggested 216‐month sentence in this case and the

arguments the government gives for it, and conclude that

Case: 16-1747 Document: 30 Filed: 01/06/2017 Pages: 6
4 No. 16‐1747   

maybe it’s a proper sentence given the particular facts of the

case even though it lies outside the guideline range. The de‐

fense proposed a sentence of only 10 years, which would be

about two and a half years below the sentencing guideline;

and again, the Commission might agree in the special cir‐

cumstances of this case that that was a plausible alternative

to a sentence in the guideline range—or might explain why

it was not. Judges wouldn’t have to ask the Commission for

its input, or follow its recommendations, but they might find

it a valuable resource.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

Case: 16-1747 Document: 30 Filed: 01/06/2017 Pages: 6
No. 16‐1747 5

SYKES, Circuit Judge, with whom KANNE, Circuit Judge,

joins, concurring in the judgment. The defendant’s only ar‐

gument is that the district judge failed to adequately explain

his reasons for imposing a prison term of 216 months. The

record shows otherwise. The judge addressed the main ar‐

guments in mitigation and then focused on the defendant’s

lengthy criminal record, which began as a juvenile, contin‐

ued unabated into adulthood, and includes many violent

crimes (including a shooting resulting in death). The judge

emphasized the serious risk of recidivism, noting that all

past efforts at deterrence had failed. That’s explanation

enough for the 216‐month sentence—28 months above the

top of the range recommended by the Sentencing Guide‐

lines.

The defendant acknowledges the point but challenges the

sequence of the judge’s remarks. He thinks a judge must an‐

nounce the sentence first and then give his reasons for it. Or

if the judge has already given his reasons earlier in the hear‐

ing, he must repeat them after pronouncing sentence. Only

then, the argument goes, can the parties know the link be‐

tween the judge’s rationale and the sentence. There’s no sup‐

port for this argument. Judges normally explain their reason‐

ing before pronouncing sentence. The judge followed that

norm here. No repetition was required.

Case: 16-1747 Document: 30 Filed: 01/06/2017 Pages: 6
6 No. 16‐1747

KANNE, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join Judge Sykes in

her concurrence. I write further to add that although Judge

Posner has envisioned an interesting method to arrive at an

appropriate sentence in individual cases, it is my view that

such a unique system would be fundamentally unworkable

in practice and contrary to the statutory provisions enacted

by Congress and approved by the Supreme Court.  

Judge Posner, of course, recognizes that in this case we

cannot command the alternative approach to sentencing he

suggests. Therefore, I join Judge Posner and Judge Sykes in

affirming the sentence that the district court imposed.

Case: 16-1747 Document: 30 Filed: 01/06/2017 Pages: 6