Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_12-cv-00844/USCOURTS-almd-3_12-cv-00844-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eardine Ferrell
Plaintiff
Stephanie Forrester
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

EARDINE FERRELL, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 3:12-CV-844-WKW

 ) [WO]

STEPHANIE FORRESTER, )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant Stephanie Forrester removed this action from the Circuit Court of

Chambers County, Alabama, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441, and 1446(b).1

Before the court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. # 5), which Defendant opposes

(Doc. # 11). Based upon the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record

as a whole, Plaintiff’s motion is due to be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them

by Congress. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996). At the

same time, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Burns v. WindsorIns.

 Sections 1441 and 1446 were amended in 2011, and those amendments became 1

effective on January 6, 2012. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction & Venue Clarification Act of 2011

(“Act”), Pub.L. No. 112–63, 125 Stat. 758. Because this action was commenced prior to the

Act’s effective date, the Act does not apply to this action. See id.

Case 3:12-cv-00844-WKW-TFM Document 12 Filed 03/05/13 Page 1 of 11
Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Hence, in actionsremoved from state court

to federal court, federal courts strictly construe removal statutes, resolve all doubts

in favor of remand, and place the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction on the

defendant. Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328–30 (11th Cir. 2006). 

II. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a two-vehicle collision occurring between Plaintiff and

Defendant on December 29, 2008, in Chambers County, Alabama. Plaintiff’s vehicle

was totaled, and she suffered “permanent injuries” to her ribs, right knee, left arm,

and “body as a whole.” (Compl. 2.) Her injuries have required “extensive, painful

medical treatment,” and her pain and mental anguish have been “great.” (Compl. 2.) 

Plaintiff filed this action on December 7, 2010, in the Circuit Court of

Chambers County, Alabama. Seeking compensatory and punitive damages in

unspecified amounts, Plaintiff alleges state law claims for negligence and wantonness

against Defendant. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff and Defendant are Alabama

residents. 

For reasons not stated in the record, Plaintiff did not perfect service on

Defendant until August 30, 2012, approximately twenty-one months after the filing

of the Complaint. Defendant removed this action based upon diversity jurisdiction,

within thirty days of receiving service of the initial complaint. See § 1446(b). 

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In her Notice of Removal, Defendant assertsthat there is complete diversity of

parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and

costs. Defendant avers that Plaintiff is an Alabama citizen and that Defendant is a

Florida citizen. The record reveals that Defendant was an Alabama citizen when the

motor vehicle accident occurred and when thislawsuit wasfiled. By the time she was

served with process, however, Defendant had graduated froma university in Alabama

and had moved to Florida where she obtained employment. (Doc. # 11, at 2.)

III. DISCUSSION

“Complete diversity requiresthat no defendant in a diversity action be a citizen

of the same state as any plaintiff.” MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group, LLC, 420 F.3d

1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by HertzCorp.

v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1186 (2010); see also § 1332(a). The motion to remand

turns on whether Defendant has demonstrated complete diversity of citizenship. For

the reasons to follow, Defendant has not satisfied her burden of proof. The court

need not reach, therefore, the issue with respect to the amount in controversy.

There is well-established precedent that “[i]n order for a case to be removable

on the ground of diversity, diversity must exist at the time the state action is

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commenced.” Roecker v. United States, 379 F.2d 400, 407 (5th Cir. 1967) (citing 2

Jackson v. Allen, 132 U.S. 27 (1889)); see also MacGinnitie, 420 F.3d at 1239

(holding in a removal case that “[c]itizenship for diversity purposes is determined at

the time the suit isfiled”). A corollary to this general rule isthat if complete diversity

did not exist when the action originally was commenced, a party cannot create it later

by changing his or her domicile. See Goff v. Michelin Tire Corp., 837 F. Supp. 1143,

1144 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (finding that removal jurisdiction based on diversity of

citizenship was not destroyed by the plaintiff’s change of citizenship after the action

had been commenced in state court); Kilpatrick v. Arrow Co., 425 F. Supp. 1378,

1380 (W.D. La. 1977) (“[A] defendant cannot render a suit removable merely by

moving to another State after plaintiff files his original complaint in the State Court.”

(citing Porter v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 354 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1966)).

There also is a long line of authority that when diversity of citizenship is the

basis of removal, complete diversity also must exist “at the time the case is removed

to federal court.” (collecting cases)); see also Stevens v. Nichols, 130 U.S. 230, 231

(1889) (“The case was not removable from the state court, unless . . . at the

commencement of the action, as well as when the removal was asked, [the

 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the 2

Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down before October 1, 1981.

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defendants] were citizens ofsome other State than the one of which the plaintiff was,

at those respective dates, a citizen.”); Goff, 837 F. Supp. at 1144 (“In order for

defendants to be able to remove this case to federal court based on diversity, diversity

must have existed at both the time the complaint was originally filed and at the time

of removal.”). Here, it is undisputed that there was complete diversity between the

parties at the time of removal; thus, the focus is on whether complete diversity existed

at the commencement of the action in state court.

The parties’ argumentsfocus on Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s citizenship on two

separate dates: (1) the date the lawsuit wasfiled (December 7, 2010); and (2) the date

Defendant was served (August 30, 2012). The facts with respect to the parties’

citizenship on these dates are not in dispute. Plaintiff was an Alabama citizen on both

dates. Defendant was an Alabama citizen on the date of the Complaint’s filing in

state court but was a Florida citizen on the date of service. 

The dispute lies in the timing for determining complete diversity. Plaintiff

contends that complete diversity is lacking because on the date of the Complaint’s

filing in state court, both parties were citizens of the same state. 

Defendant argues that this is not the usual case where “the date of filing and

the date of service are . . . very close in time.” (Doc. # 11, at 2.) Rather, twenty-one

months separate the Complaint’s filing and service of process on Defendant. (Doc.

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# 11, at 2.) Defendant urges that where service is delayed and there is a change in a

defendant’s citizenship after the Complaint’s filing but prior to service, the date the

Complaint wasfiled is not determinative for assessing complete diversity. Defendant

argues that on this record complete diversity should be determined at the time

Defendant wasserved with process. BecauseDefendant changed her citizenship from

Alabama to Florida in the interim between the Complaint’s filing and service of

process, Defendant contends that there is complete diversity between the parties to

support removal. For the reasons to follow, the court finds that Defendant has not

met her burden of demonstrating complete diversity.

Defendant’s argument alludes to a potentially relevant principle of law, but

stops short of addressing it, namely, that timely service is a prerequisite to a lawsuit’s

commencement. Generally, a lawsuit’s commencement and its filing are one and the

same. Compare Roecker, 379 F.2d at 407 (“commenced”), with MacGinnitie, 420

F.3d at 1239 (“filed”). That is not always so, however, and whether an exception lies

to the general rule requires a threshold determination of the meaning of

“commenced.”

In other contexts sufficiently analogous, courts in this circuit have found that

state law determines when an action is commenced. See Tmesys, Inc. v. Eufaula

Drugs, Inc., 462 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[S]tate law determines when an

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action is commenced for purposes of CAFA.”); Hattaway v. Engelhard Corp., 998

F. Supp. 1479, 1480 (M.D. Ga. 1998) (To determine when the case commenced for

purposes of § 1446(b)’s one-year bar on removal of diversity actions, the district

court “look[s] to state law.”);see also Easley v. Pettibone Mich. Corp., 990 F.2d 905,

908 (6th Cir. 1993) (“State law determines when an action is commenced for removal

purposes.”). 

Under Alabama law, “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with

the court.” Ala. R. Civ. P. 3(a). Rule 3(a) anticipates that generally an action

commences upon filing, even though service is not made until later, but the Supreme

Court of Alabama has carved out an exception to that general rule. An action is not

commenced under Rule 3(a) if “it was not filed with the bona fide intention of having

it immediately served.” Ward v. Saben Appliance Co., 391 So. 2d 1030, 1035 (Ala.

1980); see also Freer v. Potter, 413 So. 2d 1079, 1081 (Ala. 1982) (Rule 3(a) “calls

for an implied demand for immediate service.”). For example, in three Alabama

cases, the plaintiffs did not have the requisite bona fide intention where upon filing

of the complaints, the plaintiffs’ counsel gave instructions for withholding service,

and, therefore, the actions did not commence on the dates the complaints were filed. 

See Ward, 391 So. 2d at 1035; Finkelstein v. Lovell, 449 So. 2d 1240, 1240 (Ala.

1984); Freer, 413 So. 2d at 1081.

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Based upon the foregoing authority, Defendant may be attempting to argue that

the action did not commence at the Complaint’s filing in state court because Plaintiff

did not intend immediate service. On its face, this argument is appealing based upon

the twenty-one-month gap between the Complaint’s filing and service of process. 

The record is barren, however, concerning Plaintiff’s intention with respect to service. 

Defendant asserts that the delay was “the complete fault of the Plaintiff” (Doc. # 11,

at 1), but that argument is conclusory and sheds no light on what efforts Plaintiff

made or did not make to serve Defendant. There is no evidence similar to that in

Ward, Freer, and Finkelstein that Plaintiff’s counsel directed the state court clerk not

to serve Defendant. There is insufficient evidence that Plaintiff did not have a bona

fide intention of having the Complaint immediately served. Defendant, as the party

seeking access to a federal forum, must bear the brunt of the evidentiary deficiency. 

See Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1328. Under Alabama law, therefore, this action

commenced upon the filing of the Complaint.

To argue otherwise, Defendant cites Hendry v. Masonite Corp., 455 F.2d 955

(5th Cir. 1972). That case was decided on appeal in 1972 from a decision of the

Southern District of Mississippi. As discussed above, state law determines when an

action commencesfor the purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction. It may have

been that actions commenced upon service, rather than upon filing, under Mississippi

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law in 1972 (the setting of the Hendry case), or it may have been that on Hendry’s

facts, the dates of filing coincided with the dates of service. Hendry does not say. 

But under Alabama law today, this action commenced when Plaintiff filed her

complaint in Chambers County, and nothing in the Hendry decision compels a

different conclusion.

The court declinesto adopt Defendant’s argument that the date ofservice isthe

date for determining her citizenship, to the extent her argument ignoresthe intentions

of Plaintiff regarding immediate service. To do so would provide an incentive for a

manipulative defendant sued in state court on state law claims, but desiring a federal

forum, to avoid service for the purpose of changing domicilesto create an avenue for

removal. While there is no indication of improper motives here, there is persuasive

authority that another court-made removal rule was designed to prevent similar

tactics. Cf. 14B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 3723 (4th ed. 2009) (“The purpose of requiring diversity to

exist at both times apparently is to prevent a non-diverse defendant from acquiring

a new domicile after commencement of the state court suit and then removing on the

basis of the newly created diversity of citizenship.”).

Defendant urges a rule treating service of process as the determining date for

assessing complete diversity when a defendant argues a change in his or her domicile

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prior to service, but after a complaint’s filing. Defendant seeks to use the date of

service of process to her removal advantage. But it is unclear what her position

would have been if complete diversity had existed at the time of the Complaint’s

filing in state court, but had dissolved prior to service based upon Defendant’s change

of domicile. Defendant offers no policy reason that equally applies to her situation

and the reverse situation, but asindicated above, there is a policy reason thatsupports

rejection of her theory. 

For the foregoing reasons, for purposes of determining whether complete

diversity exists, the citizenship of the parties at the time the action was commenced

in state court controls, and here Alabama law governs for ascertaining when the

action commenced. Absent evidence that Plaintiff lacked the requisite bona fide

intent to effect immediate service, as required under Alabama law, this action

commenced on the date of the Complaint’s filing in state court, not later. On that

date, both Plaintiff and Defendant were Alabama citizens; therefore, complete

diversity is lacking. These findings are within the heartland of Supreme Court

precedent, align with Alabama law’s defining when an action commences, and are

consistent with the EleventhCircuit’s “rule of construing removal statutesstrictly and

resolving doubts in favor of remand.” Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1328.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Defendantremoved this action on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, but she has

not established that there was complete diversity between the parties when the action

was commenced in state court. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion

to remand (Doc. # 9) is GRANTED, and this action is REMANDED to the Circuit

Court of Chambers County, Alabama, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Clerk of

the Court is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effectuate the remand.

DONE this 5th day of March, 2013.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

CHIEFUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTJUDGE

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