Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07039/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07039-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
George Washington University
Appellee
Harriet Hunter-Boykin
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 1997 Decided January 9, 1998 

No. 96-7039

HARRIET HUNTER-BOYKIN,

APPELLANT

v.

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cv00039)

John P. Racin argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant.

Walter A. Smith, Jr. argued the cause for appellee. Robert 

B. Cave and Mark J. Larson were on the brief. Peter W. 

Tredick entered an appearance.

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Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and GARLAND, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

Concurring Opinion filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The summary judgment motion at 

issue in this case should have turned on the reasonable 

interpretation of the phrase "to toll the running of any statute 

of limitations period," as used in a letter agreement between 

the plaintiff and defendant. Rather than determine whether 

a reasonable juror could have read the phrase as the plaintiff 

did, however, the court below applied a set of legal rules that 

it thought required the phrase to be read as the defendant 

urged. Because we conclude that the wrong rules were 

applied, and because a reasonable juror could have read the 

phrase as the plaintiff read it, we reverse the grant of 

summary judgment against her.

I

The plaintiff in this case, Dr. Harriet Hunter-Boykin, is an 

African American woman whom the defendant, The George 

Washington University ("GW"), hired as an Assistant Professor of Secondary Education on August 2, 1990. On July 19, 

1993, Hunter-Boykin's attorney wrote to GW, advising the 

university that she was considering suing it for racial discrimination. The letter alleged that GW had discriminated 

against Hunter-Boykin in her original appointment by not 

offering her a tenure-track, higher-paid position that it offered a white applicant at the same time. Joint Appendix 

("J.A.") 73-75.

According to the parties' calculations, a three-year statute 

of limitations governed Hunter-Boykin's contemplated suit 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and that period would expire on 

August 2, 1993, three years from the date of her original 

appointment. In order to provide breathing room in which to 

conduct settlement negotiations, the parties entered into an 

agreement "to toll the running of any statute of limitations 

period." The agreement, drafted by counsel for GW, was in 

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the form of a letter from GW's counsel to Hunter-Boykin's 

counsel. Dated July 22, 1993, and signed by both attorneys, 

the letter stated: "This will confirm that we have agreed ... 

to toll the running of any statute of limitations period applicable to any purported claims ... beginning on the date of this 

letter through September 7, 1993." J.A. 76.

The parties agree that on the date of this letter agreement, 

July 22, 1993, Dr. Hunter-Boykin still had eleven days left 

before the statute of limitations would otherwise have run on 

her contemplated lawsuit. Thereafter, they entered into five 

additional and virtually identical letter agreements, changing 

only the beginning and ending dates of the time period during 

which the statute of limitations was "toll[ed]." The last letter 

was dated December 17, 1993, and continued the tolling 

"through January 7, 1994." J.A. 81.

On January 4, 1994, counsel for GW notified HunterBoykin that GW had rejected her discrimination claims. He 

warned that if she followed through on her threat of litigation, the University would defend its interests "with vigor." 

J.A. 137. Undeterred, Hunter-Boykin filed suit on January 

10, 1994, three days after the end of the tolling period 

mentioned in the letter.

True to its word, GW did defend, and with vigor. It moved 

for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff had filed 

her complaint three days too late. Hunter-Boykin disagreed, 

arguing that to "toll" the statute of limitations means to 

"suspend" it. Since she had eleven days left to sue on the 

date the statute was first suspended, Hunter-Boykin contended that she had eleven days left to file her complaint when 

the last period of suspension ended on January 7, 1994. She 

was not late, she said; she had eight days to spare.

Defendant GW replied that, under District of Columbia 

law, private parties cannot agree to "suspend" the statute of 

limitations. A defendant can, however, agree to "waive" its 

right to assert a limitations defense for a discrete period. 

That, GW asserted, is what it did: it agreed not to assert its 

limitations defense if a complaint were filed during successive 

periods ending with the period defined in the last letter. See

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GW Summ. J. Reply Br. at 1, 5 (J.A. 122, 126). Moreover, 

GW argued, the scope of a waiver must be "absolutely clear 

and unequivocal." Because "the mere use of the word 'toll' 

plainly does not show the University's clear and unequivocal

intent to waive its defense beyond January 7," GW asserted 

that Hunter-Boykin's complaint was time-barred. Id. at 5 

(J.A. 126) (emphasis in original).

GW's motion for summary judgment was referred to a 

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local 

Rule 504. The magistrate agreed with the parties' determination of the applicable limitations period and agreed that on 

July 22, 1993, when the parties entered into their first tolling 

agreement, Hunter-Boykin had eleven days left in which to 

sue. Magistrate's Opinion ("Mag. Op.") at 5-6 (J.A. 155-56). 

Accepting much of GW's argument, however, the magistrate 

concluded that Hunter-Boykin had filed three days too late, 

and recommended that the district court grant the university's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 10-11 (J.A. 160-

61). The court adopted the magistrate judge's report in its 

entirety and dismissed Hunter-Boykin's complaint with prejudice. J.A. 201-02.

II

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett 

& Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The question 

to be decided on a motion for summary judgment is "whether 

a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on 

the evidence presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). In a matter involving a contract, 

summary judgment is appropriate where the agreement "admits of only one reasonable interpretation." United Mine 

Workers of Am. 1974 Pension v. Pittston Co., 984 F.2d 469, 

473 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

In deciding this case, the magistrate judge did not ask 

whether Hunter-Boykin's interpretation of "toll" as meaning 

"suspend" was reasonable. Instead, he first applied a rule 

that, "[i]n the absence of a specific tolling statute, disputing 

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parties cannot by mutual agreement interrupt or suspend the 

running of a statute of limitations." Mag. Op. at 6 (J.A. 156). 

As there is no specific provision in the District of Columbia 

Code "that authorizes the parties to an action to suspend or 

defer the running of the statute of limitations," the magistrate held that "[s]uch an interpretation is contrary to the 

District of Columbia statute and should be rejected by this 

court." Id. at 7-8 (J.A. 157-58). However, although he 

determined that parties could not suspend the running of the 

statute of limitations, the magistrate agreed with GW that a 

defendant could "waive" its right to assert an affirmative 

defense. He therefore interpreted the agreement as a "waiver"the only interpretation he regarded as lawful. Id. at 8 

(J.A. 158).

Second, in interpreting the scope of the waiver, the magistrate again did not ask what a reasonable juror could find. 

Instead, he held that because the waiver stated a specific time 

period, he was "not prepared to enlarge that period absent 

persuasive evidence that defendant intended a date different 

from the date stated." Id. Finding such "persuasive evidence" lacking, the magistrate judge concluded that GW had 

waived its statute of limitations defense only until January 7, 

1994. Id.

Because the magistrate's view of what the letter agreement 

meant clearly was colored by the two legal lenses he thought 

he was bound to employ, we consider the validity of those 

legal rules first. We then turn to the reasonable meaning of 

the agreement itself.

III

The first legal rule applied belowthat in the absence of a 

specific authorizing statute, private parties cannot suspend 

the running of the statute of limitationsturns the usual rule 

of construction on its head. The usual rule is that "in the 

absence of a controlling statute to the contrary, the parties to 

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ry period of limitation." 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions

§ 25, at 56 (1987) (emphasis added).1 The usual rule is quite 

sensible, since a limitations defense is merely a "personal 

privilege," of which a party may choose not to avail itself. 

See Atchison & Keller, Inc. v. Taylor, 51 A.2d 297, 297 (D.C. 

1947); see also Feldman v. Gogos, 628 A.2d 103, 104 (D.C. 

1993). If individuals can give up considerably more important protectionsincluding their Fifth Amendment rights in a 

criminal casewhat reason could there be to deny them the 

ability to extend a civil statute of limitations? Indeed, this 

court asked itself just that question, and concluded that there 

was no satisfactory answer, in the course of deciding that a 

defendant can waive the protection of the statute of limitations in a criminal prosecution. See United States v. Wilson,

26 F.3d 142, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Neither the magistrate, nor GW, cite any precedent from 

the District of Columbia for the proposition that specific 

statutory authority is required to permit private parties to 

agree to suspend a statute of limitationsand we have found 

none. Instead, the magistrate cited five opinions decided 

under the laws of other states. Four of those five did not 

involve the validity of private tolling agreements,2and the 

__________

1

In the context of an agreement to shorten a limitations period, 

the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows: "[I]t is well established that, in the absence of a controlling statute to the contrary, a 

provision in a contract may validly limit, between the parties, the 

time for bringing an action on such contract to a period less than 

that prescribed in the general statute of limitations, provided that 

the shorter period itself shall be a reasonable period." Order of 

United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 (1947). 

Here, neither party contends that the length of the period proposed 

by its opponent is itself unreasonable.

2

Instead, they involved the applicability of judge-made doctrines like equitable estoppel. See City of Bedford v. James Leffel 

& Co., 558 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1977); Neal v. Laclede Gas Co., 517 

S.W. 2d 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Glenn v. Morelos, 555 A.2d 1064 

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Leonard v. Eskew, 731 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 

App. 1987).

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fifth is also readily distinguishable.3

This court, on the other hand, has interpreted an agreement between two parties as effectively extending the District 

of Columbia statute of limitations. In Noel v. Baskin, the 

limitations period on the payment of a note had been running 

for almost two years when the debtor entered into an agreement to waive the statute, "in consideration of the holders' 

agreeing to postpone action until after [September 2, 1935]." 

131 F.2d 231, 231-32 (D.C. Cir. 1942). The Noel court 

interpreted the agreement as meaning that the lender had 

agreed to refrain from suit until that date, and that after that 

date passed, the three-year "statute would begin to run 

[anew]." Id. at 232. GW asserts that Noel stands only for 

the narrow proposition that parties may agree on the date 

upon which an action will be deemed to accrue. But it is 

difficult to see the practical difference between this proposition and the "suspension" view argued by Hunter-Boykin

except that agreeing on a new accrual date gives the plaintiff 

even more time to sue than would agreeing on a "suspension," 

because it restarts the limitations clock from zero.

Numerous other courts also have applied the usual rule 

that, in the absence of a legislative indication to the contrary, 

agreements to extend the statute of limitations are permitted 

without specific statutory authorization. In Aiken v. Burnet,

for example, the Supreme Court upheld a waiver of the 

statute of limitations in a taxpayer suit against the Internal 

Revenue Service, rejecting the argument that, prior to the 

enactment of a specific authorizing statute, the IRS lacked 

authority to accept waivers: "While Section 250(d) first speci-

__________

3 Willow Tree Investments, Inc. v. Wilhelm, 465 N.W.2d 849 

(Iowa 1991), involved an agreement to extend the maturity date of a 

mortgage note, which the Iowa Supreme Court rejected solely on 

the ground that the agreement was not recorded as expressly 

required by an Iowa statute. A recent Maryland opinion, cited by 

GW, also does not hold that parties may not agree to suspend the 

statute of limitations; it merely holds that they did not do so in that 

case. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor 

Assocs., 674 A.2d 106, 123 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996), aff'd on other 

grounds, 695 A.2d 153 (Md. 1997).

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fied that a waiver be in writing and signed by the Commissioner, there was nothing in that section which invalidated 

waivers made prior to its enactment or limited the effect of 

such instruments on the limitations therein imposed." 282 

U.S. 277, 281 (1930). See also United States v. Curtiss 

Aeroplane Co., 147 F.2d 639, 640-41 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, 

J.).

The defendant purports to see an important distinction 

between a "suspension" and a "waiver" of a statute of limitations. We do not, at least as the parties use the words in this 

case. Even if we were to accept (as GW argues) that the 

word "waiver" refers only to an agreement not to assert a 

limitations defense during a fixed period, any agreement to 

"suspend" could readily be reworded as an agreement to 

"waive" for the fixed period of the suspension plus whatever 

time remained on the limitations clock. Here, for example, 

instead of agreeing to "suspend" the statute of limitations 

until January 7, 1994, the parties could simply have agreed to 

"waive" it through January 18 (January 7 plus eleven days). 

We see no reason for the law to prohibit the former while 

permitting the latter.

In support of the magistrate's opinion, GW makes a further 

argument that the magistrate did not make: the District of 

Columbia Code is not simply silent on the question of private 

agreements to extend the statute of limitations; it affirmatively prohibits them. The provision of the code in question 

states:

"Except as otherwise specifically provided for by law,

actions for the following purposes may not be brought 

after the expiration of the period specified below from 

the time the right to maintain the action accrues:

....

(8) for which a limitation is not otherwise specially 

provided

3 years...."

D.C. Code § 12-301 (West 1997) (emphasis added). GW 

argues that the italicized phrase "plainly prevents private 

parties from agreeing whenever they wish to literally suspend 

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or interrupt a limitations period set by statute." GW Br. at 

12.

One problem with this argument is that, if we were to read 

the statute as GW urges, its own position that waivers are 

permitted while suspensions are prohibited would be untenable. The statute mentions neither "suspensions" nor "waivers." It simply states that, except as otherwise provided by 

law, actions "may not be brought" after the expiration of the 

limitations period. Since a waiver also permits an "action to 

be brought" after the expiration of the limitations period, the 

statute provides no ground to distinguish between the two. 

Yet, GW insists that the waiver it says it agreed to in this 

case, which it concedes would permit a suit to be brought 

more than three years after the cause of action accrued, is 

lawful.4

But there is no reason to read the statute as GW urges, 

and every reason not to do so. The most straightforward 

reading of the italicized phrase is that it was not intended to 

refer to private tolling agreements at all, but rather was 

intended to refer to other provisions of the D.C. Code that 

contain limitations periods for causes of action not listed in 

§ 12-301so that it is clear those provisions take precedence 

over the three-year "catch-all" of § 12-301(8).5 This reading 

also has the virtue of being the one that Congress has 

indicated it intended. In reporting on the proposed addition 

__________

4

See GW Br. at 20 n.14. GW's only response is to argue that 

"except as otherwise specifically provided for by law" refers to case 

as well as statutory law, and that although this court permitted a 

"waiver" of the statute of limitations in Noel, no District of Columbia court "specifically" has permitted a "suspension" of a statute of 

limitations. As noted in the preceding text, this misconstrues our 

opinion in Noel.

5 Such provisions include: D.C. Code § 36-314 (one-year period 

for filing workers' compensation claims); D.C. Code § 20-903 (sixmonth period for filing claims against estate); D.C. Code § 12-309 

(six-month period for filing notice of claim for action seeking 

unliquidated damages against D.C. government); D.C. Code 

§ 1-1105 (one-year period for action to recover costs of labor and 

materials and ninety-day period for filing notice of claim).

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of the phrase in 1963, the Senate Judiciary Committee gave 

this reason for its insertion: "The exception at the beginning 

of this section is inserted to make it clear that a limitation for 

a particular type of action found in any other provision of law 

would take precedence over the general limitations of this 

section." S. REP. NO. 88-743, at 71-72 (1963). See also D.C.

CODE ENCYCL. § 12-301 (West 1966) (Revision Note). Hence, 

there is no reason to read the phrase as any kind of reference 

to private tolling agreements.

In United States v. Insurance Co. of N. Am. ("INA"), this 

circuit was called upon to decide a case under a federal 

statute of limitations quite similar to § 12-301. See 83 F.3d 

1507 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The federal statute stated that, "except as otherwise provided by Congress, every action for 

money damages brought by the United States ... founded 

upon any contract ... shall be barred unless the complaint is 

filed within six years after the right of action accrues...." 

28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). One day short of the six years, the 

parties had entered into an agreement to "toll" this statute of 

limitations. Giving effect to that agreement, this court permitted the United States to file suit almost six months after 

the statute of limitations would otherwise have run. See 83 

F.3d at 1509-11. We see no reason why similar effect may 

not be given, under § 12-301, to the agreement at issue in 

this case.

IV

Even if District of Columbia law does permit an agreement 

to suspend a statute of limitations, GW argues that another 

rule bars courts from giving effect to such an agreement, 

"unless it is demonstrated by unequivocal evidence." GW 

Br. at 20 (emphasis added). This argument appears to have 

swayed the magistrate judge, who said he was unprepared to 

read the letter agreement as Hunter-Boykin urged, "absent 

persuasive evidence." Mag. Op. at 8 (J.A. 158) (emphasis 

added).

These formulations, however, are similar to the one the 

Supreme Court rejected in Liberty Lobby as inappropriate 

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for deciding a summary judgment motion in the usual civil 

case. "The judge must ask himself," the Court said, "not 

whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side 

or the other, but whether a fair-minded jury could return a 

verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." 477 U.S. 

at 252 (emphasis added). Liberty Lobby did note that the 

inquiry on a motion for summary judgment necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would 

apply at the trial on the merits. Hence, although in the "runof-the-mill" civil case the judge should ask "whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict," the test is different 

where the substantive evidentiary burden is higher. Id. For 

example, in a libel case where the First Amendment mandates a "clear and convincing" standard, the judge must 

determine whether a reasonable juror could conclude that the 

plaintiff has shown actual malice "with convincing clarity." 

Id. GW's implicit argument, therefore, must be that this is 

not a run-of-the-mill case, but rather that District of Columbia law requires a heightened burden of proof to establish a 

waiver of the statute of limitations: a burden of demonstrating "unequivocal" evidence.

The authority GW relies on to establish such a heightened 

burden is this court's own opinion in Noel v. Baskin. But 

this misreads Noel. The Noel court said that it would not 

read an agreement between the parties as creating an "indefinite" waiver of the statute of limitations, unless that purpose 

were "expressed in unequivocal terms." 131 F.2d at 232. 

"[I]n the absence of specific language making [the waiver] 

perpetual," the court said, it should be held to operate only 

for a reasonable time." Id. See also Munter v. Lankford,

232 F.2d 373, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ("[I]n Noel v. Baskin ... 

this court ruled that unless a waiver of the statute ... is 

specifically stated to be perpetual, it should be held to operate 

only for a reasonable time."). Hunter-Boykin does not contend that the tolling agreement here should be construed as 

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an "indefinite" or "perpetual" waiver. Hence, Noel's standard of proof has no application to this case.6

V 

Because the magistrate judge employed two incorrect legal 

rules, he granted summary judgment against the plaintiff 

without determining that no reasonable juror could read the 

letter agreement as she did. Nor did GW explicitly argue for 

such a determination in the briefs it filed in this court or 

below. While asserting that the rules required the court to 

accept its reading as a matter of law, GW appeared to 

concede that Hunter-Boykin's reading was at least "one usual 

and customary meaning." GW Br. at 21. See also id. at 10, 

21, 23 & n.22, 24.

At oral argument, however, GW took a much harder line. 

It argued not only that its interpretation of the letter agreement was required legally, but that no reasonable person 

could interpret it as plaintiff did. We find this view surprising. We expect that justices of the Supreme Court, judges of 

this and other courts, and the heirs and assigns of Mr. Black 

and other law dictionary authors, also would regard it so, 

since all have used the word "toll" in the same manner as 

Hunter-Boykin. And it is particularly appropriate in this 

case to look to usage by judges and law dictionaries in order 

to divine the meaning of "toll," since it is a term of art among 

lawyers, and since it was used in a letter written from one 

lawyer to another.

__________

6 GW also cites the maxim that courts "will strictly enforce 

statutes of limitations and will narrowly construe any exceptions to 

the statute." GW Br. at 14 & n.5. Even if this were the law of the 

District, we would not regard GW's construction of the agreement 

as any "narrower" or "stricter" than Hunter-Boykin's construction. 

Moreover, as noted in the following section, Hunter-Boykin's construction is so much more reasonable than GW's that we would hold 

for her even if we applied the maxim against her. The one maxim 

that does seem appropriate here is that "ambiguity in a contract 

should be resolved against the drafter," Cole v. Burns, 105 F.3d 

1465, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In this case, the drafter was GW. 

Hunter-Boykin, however, does not need the benefit of this or any 

other maxim to prevail on this appeal.

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We begin with the Supreme Court. In Chardon v. Soto,

the Court noted that "[t]his opinion uses the word 'tolling' to 

mean that during the relevant period, the statute of limitations ceases to run." 462 U.S. 650, 652 n.1 (1983). It then 

went on to explain that " 'tolling effect' refers to the method 

of calculating the amount of time available to file suit after 

tolling has ended," and noted that there were several possible 

"tolling effects." One, the Court said, was that the "statute 

of limitations might merely be suspended; if so, the plaintiff 

must file within the amount of time left in the limitations 

period." Id. This, of course, is precisely the "tolling effect" 

for which Hunter-Boykin argues. Another, the Court said, 

was that the "limitations period is renewed [and] the plaintiff 

has the benefit of a new period as long as the original." Id.

As we have pointed out above, this was the impact of the 

agreement on a new accrual date in Noel. And finally, 

Chardon noted, "[i]t is also possible to establish a fixed period 

... during which the plaintiff may file suit, without regard to 

the length of the original limitations period or the amount of 

time left when tolling began." Id. This is the possibility for 

which GW argues. It was, however, the one possibility for 

which no one argued in Chardon. Compare id. at 661 (court 

of appeals correctly applied "Puerto Rican rule that, after 

tolling comes to an end, the statute of limitations begins to 

run anew"), with id. at 665-66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 

(court should have applied federal tolling rule for class actions, which provides that tolling "suspends the running of a 

statute of limitations").

We move next to this court. In Detweiler v. Pena, we 

described the "tolling" provision of the Soldiers' and Sailors' 

Civil Relief Act as "suspend[ing]" the statute of limitations 

during a service member's period of active service. See 38 

F.3d 591, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In United States v. Wilson,

we explained that the effect of a waiver that "tolled" the 

criminal statute of limitations for ninety days was to extend 

the statute by that amount. See 26 F.3d 142, 156 & n.10 

(D.C. Cir. 1994). And, as noted above, in INA we again 

effectively interpreted a tolling agreement in the manner 

Hunter-Boykin urges here. See 83 F.3d at 1510. Other 

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courts, too numerous to list, also have interpreted the word 

"toll" as meaning "suspend" or its equivalent. See, e.g., 

Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 

1978) ("Tolling, strictly speaking, is concerned ... with the 

circumstances in which the running of the limitations period 

may be suspended."); United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 

831, 833 (D.D.C. 1996) (request for foreign evidence "tolled" 

the statute of limitations by "suspend[ing]" it until the foreign 

country took action on the request); Clark v. Milan, 847 

F. Supp. 409, 421 & n.26 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (describing 

"tolling agreement" as "suspending" the statute of limitations).

Black's Law Dictionary defines "toll" the same way. Although it lists two definitions, the one specifically applicable 

to statutes of limitations parallels Hunter-Boykin's definition: 

"To suspend or stop temporarily as the statute of limitations 

is tolled during the defendant's absence from the jurisdiction 

and during the plaintiff's minority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1488 (6th ed. 1990).7 Ballentine's Law Dictionary is in accord. See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (3d ed. 1969) 

("to suspend or interrupt the running of the statute of 

limitations").

Notwithstanding the above, GW argues that its interpretation should triumph because the agreement between the 

parties was not simply to "toll" the statute of limitations, but 

to "toll the running of any statute of limitations." The sixth 

edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines this phrase as "a 

metaphorical expression, by which it is meant that the time 

specified in the statute of limitations is considered as having 

passed and hence the action is barred." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1333 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added) (citing United 

States v. Markowitz, 34 F. Supp. 827, 829 (N.D. Cal. 1940)). 

Arguing that this establishes that the "running of the statute 

of limitations" means that the time has "passed" or "ex-

__________

7 The other listed meaning is "to bar, defeat or take away," 

which GW asserts supports its view. GW Br. at 21. This is not the 

definition Black's specifically uses in connection with statutes of 

limitation, and in any event does not suggest that Black's other 

definition is an unreasonable one.

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pire[d]," and is not just "passing," GW contends that we must 

conclude that on January 7, 1994, the statute of limitations for 

Hunter-Boykin's suit also had passed or expired. GW Br. at 

22.

Even if we were to accept the use to which GW has put Mr. 

Black's definition of "running",8it surely is not the only 

reasonable definition of the term. In fact, the case cited by 

Black's as the source for its definition actually stands for the 

opposite proposition, and supports Hunter-Boykin. See 

United States v. Markowitz, 34 F. Supp. 827, 829-30 (N.D. 

Cal. 1940) (rejecting interpretation of "running" as meaning 

that "the statute of limitations is considered as having passed 

rather than as passing," and explaining that when the "suspension" of "the running of the statutory period of limitations" is over, "the statutory period ... commences to run 

again"). Other courts also have defined the term in a manner 

wholly consistent with the interpretation offered by HunterBoykin. See, e.g., United States v. Moyer, 308 

F. Supp. 754, 756 (W.D. Pa. 1968) ("The term 'running' is not 

synonymous with 'expiration,' and will be ascribed a meaning 

that connotes the passing of time during which a defense ... 

matures."), aff'd, 420 F.2d 375 (3d Cir. 1970). And at one 

time, Black's itself defined "running" as meaning that the 

time was "passing," not that it had "passed." See BLACK'S 

LAW DICTIONARY 1498 (4th ed. 1968). Once again, the weight 

of authoritative usage is on Hunter-Boykin's side.

VI

We conclude that a reasonable juror could readily interpret 

the parties' tolling agreement in the manner suggested by 

Hunter-Boykin. Because reasonableness is the appropriate 

__________

8 We think the better way to interpret Black's definition is not 

as describing the effect of tolling a statute of limitations while it is 

running, but as describing the state of play after the statute of 

limitations has run, as in this sentence: "After the running of the 

statute of limitations, the action is barred." This also would 

reconcile Black's definition of "running" with its definition of 

"toll[ing]."

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standard for summary judgment in this case, we reverse the 

grant of judgment against her and order reinstatement of the 

complaint. Since Dr. Hunter-Boykin did not herself move 

for summary judgment, we do not consider the question 

whether any reasonable juror could have interpreted the 

tolling agreement in the manner urged by GW, and hence do 

not determine whether Hunter-Boykin would be entitled to a 

grant of summary judgment in her own favor.9

__________

9 We also do not need to reach Hunter-Boykin's additional 

argument that, even if the letter agreement itself does not defeat 

the statute of limitations, GW should be equitably estopped from 

raising the statutory bar.

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EDWARDS, Chief Judge, concurring: I concur in the court's 

reasoning and judgment, save on one point. In my view, the 

disputed tolling agreement has only one reasonable interpretation: it suspended the running of the statute of limitations 

until the closing date named in the agreement, January 7, 

1994. Thus, if Hunter-Boykin moves for summary judgment 

on remand, it appears that she should prevail as a matter of 

law on this point.

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