Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01079/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01079-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sean McEndree
Plaintiff
Rash Curtis & Associates
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN MCENDREE,

No. 2:10-cv-01079-MCE-JFM

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

RASH CURTIS & ASSOCIATES,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Sean McEndree

(“McEndree” or “Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Rash Curtis &

Associates (“Rash Curtis”), a debt collection agency, violated

state and federal law by its actions in attempting to collect a

$450.00 unpaid medical bill allegedly owed by Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff now moves to amend his Complaint to add new claims

stemming from a collection call allegedly made by Rash Curtis on

April 5, 2012, almost two years after the operative complaint in

this matter was filed on May 2, 2010. Plaintiff further requests

that the deadline for completing discovery in the instant case,

which expired on May 19, 2011, be extended so as to permit

discovery with respect to the events of April 5, 2012.

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According to Plaintiff, by placing its April 5, 2012

collection call, Rash Curtis violated both the Federal Debt

Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq., and

California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(Rosenthal Act), Cal. Civ Code §§ 1788, et seq. The FDCPA

prohibits a debt collector from communicating with a consumer

“if the debt collector knows the consumer is

represented by an attorney with respect to such debt

and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such

attorney’s name and address, unless the attorney fails

to respond within a reasonable period of time to a

communication from the debt collector, or unless the

attorney consents to direct communication with the

consumer.

15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). The Rosenthal Act similarly prohibits

communications with a represented debtor. Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1788.14(c). Because Plaintiff had clearly been represented by

his current counsel for nearly two years before Rash Curtis’

April 5, 2012 collection call was made, Plaintiff argues that the

call is actionable under both the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act and

requests permission to amend his complaint accordingly.

Although Plaintiff’s Motion cites to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(a) as constituting the standard upon which to

measure his request to amend, that reliance is incorrect. Once a

district court has filed a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to

Rule 16, as it has here on July 28, 2010, the standards set forth

by Rule 16 control. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,

975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992). Prior to the final

pretrial conference, a court may modify a status order upon a

showing of “good cause.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b).

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 “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which focuses

on the bad faith of the party seeking to interpose an amendment

and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s ‘good

cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party

seeking the amendment.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. In explaining

this standard, the Ninth Circuit has stated that:

[a] district court may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if

it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of

the party seeking the extension.’ Moreover,

carelessness is not compatible with a finding of

diligence and offers no reason for granting of relief. 

Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the

party opposing the modification might supply additional

reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is

upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking

modification. If that party was not diligent, the

inquiry should end.

Id. (citations omitted).

In the present case, Defendant does not appear to dispute

Plaintiff’s diligence in pursuing the requested amendment. The

allegedly offending telephone call occurred on April 5, 2012, and

Plaintiff filed his motion to amend less than a month later, on

May 1, 2012, after his effort to obtain a stipulation permitting

the amendment short of a motion failed. Consequently, the

requisite “due diligence” under a Rule 16(b) standard is met

despite Plaintiff’s failure to cite to that standard.

The only impediment to Plaintiff’s motion identified by the

defense rests with Rash Curtis’ claims that the proposed

amendment is futile and should be denied on that basis.

Rash Curtis correctly points out that leave to amend may be

denied on futility grounds where the amendment, if permitted,

would be subject to a motion to dismiss. Saul v. United States,

928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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A futility challenge to a proposed amended complaint is therefore

analyzed under a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

standard. Adorno v. Crowley Towing and Transp. Co., 443 F.3d

122, 126 (1st Cir. 2006). In order to survive a motion to

dismiss on that standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual material, when accepted as true, to state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Rash Curtis advances two arguments in support of its

futility argument. First, it argues that because Plaintiff did

not actually speak to a Rash Curtis representative on April 5,

2012 (instead, according to Plaintiff, he just saw Rash Curtis’

identifying information flash on the screen of his cell phone and

did not actually answer the call), there was no actionable

“communication” involving Rash Curtis and Plaintiff as required

for liability under either the FDCPA or the Rosenthal Act. The

Court finds that hypertechnical distinction utterly unpersuasive. 

Whether Plaintiff answered the call or not, under his version of

events a call was placed to him by Rash Curtis and he recognized

the caller as Rash Curtis when it registered on his cell phone. 

Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, as the Court must do here under the applicable

Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court cannot say as a matter of law

that no communication ensued. Consequently Rash Curtis’ futility

claim on that basis must fail.

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Rash Curtis’ second argument is no more compelling. Again,

Rash Curtis advances a technical distinction between Plaintiff’s

representation as to the debt itself, and Plaintiff’s

representation with regard to Rash Curtis’ allegedly wrongful

conduct in attempting to collect the debt. According to Rash

Curtis, the communication at issue pertained to the underlying

debt and therefore Plaintiff’s representation in this lawsuit

does not pertain to the debt, making the statutory proscriptions

against contacting a represented debtor inapplicable.

This is nonsensical. The FDCPA, for example, makes it clear

that the term “debt” includes both the consumer obligations to

pay “whether or not such obligation has been reduced to

judgment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Attempting to parse the

FDCPA’s scope between pre and post-judgment collection efforts

therefore is unavailing. Rash Curtis knew, or should have known,

that Plaintiff was represented long before it made its alleged

April 5, 2012 call. To the extent Rash Curtis placed that call,

as alleged by Plaintiff, at a point some two years after

Plaintiff’s counsel initiated this lawsuit, its conduct is

without question potentially actionable. Rash Curtis’ futility

argument therefore fails on that score as well.

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Leave to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 23) is GRANTED. 

1

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 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 1

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 230(g).

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Plaintiff may accordingly file a First Amended Complaint not 2

later than ten (10) days after the date this Order is

electronically filed. Plaintiff’s additional request for

additional discovery to explore the circumstances surrounding the

April 5, 2012, telephone call is, however, denied. Plaintiff has

made no attempt to demonstrate just what additional discovery in

that regard would be necessary, and given the very limited nature

of the offending call, that need is questionable at best.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2012

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 In filing a First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff is 2

cautioned not to include claims that were dismissed by way of the

Court’s previously filed May 9, 2012, Memorandum and Order which

granted, in part, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication.

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