Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02022/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02022-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Billie Ray Bradford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FI LED 

U!lic~ Scatfi O;Nrr of Appeals 

Tenth Cir::-ui~ 

MAR l 3 1Q90 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. No. 89-2022 

BILLIE RAY BRADFORD, also known 

as London York, also known as 

York D. London, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D. New Mexico) 

(D.C. No. CR-84-61) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Billie Ray Bradford pled guilty to, and was convicted of one 

count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1341. On appeal, 

Bradford challenges the district court's rulings concerning the 

admissibility of evidence gathered as a result of his arrest, and 

a voice identification linking Bradford to the crime. Bradford 

also claims that the dismissal of the original indictment against 

him for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. S 316l(b), 

should have been with prejudice. Finally, Bradford moves this 

court to summarily dismiss the case against him because the 

transcript of the first hearing in which the indictment was 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-2022 Document: 01019966126 Date Filed: 03/13/1990 Page: 1 
originally dismissed is not available on appeal. Because we find 

no reversible error in the proceedings below, and no prejudice to 

Bradford resulting from the missing transcripts, we deny the 

motion to summarily dismiss and affirm the conviction. 

BACKGROUND 

In August 1983 Bradford telephoned the Western Bank in 

Gallup, New Mexico, identified himself as York D. London, and 

asked to open a business checking account in the name of London 

Designs, Inc. Shortly thereafter a check drawn on a San Francisco 

bank for $50,300 payable to London Designs, Inc. arrived at the 

bank and was deposited in the newly opened account. 

During September 1983 Bradford called Kenneth Agge, the Vice 

President of Western Bank, again identified himself as York D. 

London, and instructed that the bank was to arrange a wire 

transfer of the bulk of the $50,000 to individuals at banks in San 

Diego, California and Natchez, Mississippi. Later that month the 

Gallup bank received a second check for $68,928 from York D. 

London and deposited it in the London Designs, Inc. account. 

Agee became suspicious that the checking account was being 

used for some sort of fraudulent transaction and contacted the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation in Gallup. The FBI began an 

investigation. On October 13, 1983 the FBI office in McComb, 

Mississippi learned that a woman using the name of Andrea Johnson 

had entered the First Natchez Bank in Fayette, Mississippi earlier 

that day and informed bank personnel that she expected a wire 

transfer of monies. She stated she would return the next day to 

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retrieve the funds. That same day Bradford called Agee at the 

Western Bank in Gallup to order two wire transfers: one to a woman 

named Andrea Johnson to be picked up at the First Natchez Bank in 

Fayette Mississippi, and the other to a person named Binar Haugen 

at a bank in San Diego. At the FBI's request, Agee recorded the 

October 13 telephone conversation between himself and Bradford. 

Also on that same day, Bradford called the First Natchez Bank in 

Fayette, again identifying himself as York D. London. He 

indicated that he was expecting some monies from the Western Bank 

in Gallup, and instructed the bank employees how to handle the 

money when it arrived. 

Knowing that a transfer was to occur on October 14 and that a 

woman would be at the Fayette bank at 9:00 a.m. to receive the 

transfer, several FBI agents positioned themselves in the vicinity 

of the bank and awaited the woman's arrival. Several minutes 

after the Fayette bank opened on October 14, the bank manager 

advised the FBI agents that a woman identifying herself as Andrea 

Johnson was in the bank in connection with the wire transfer from 

Gallup. Prior to this woman's entrance into the bank, the nearby 

FBI agents observed her getting out of an automobile which was 

later determined to be owned and driven by Bradford. Upon learning that the woman who had been in Bradford's car had entered the 

oank to receive the transfer, the agents proceeded to arrest 

Bradford in his car. 

Bradford was taken to the sheriff's office where he consented 

to a search of his vehicle which yielded several items of 

evidentiary value including the ownership registration naming 

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Bradford as the vehicle's owner. After he was advised of his 

rights, Bradford was asked to speak by telephone to an FBI agent 

in Gallup. Bradford was advised that the telephone conversation 

would be recorded, but was not told the specific purpose for the 

call. The true objective of the telephone conversation was to 

allow Agee to identify Bradford's voice as that of York D. London, 

the individual who had requested the wire transfers. While 

Bradford voluntarily spoke by phone to the Gallup FBI agent, Agee 

was present in the room with the agent, and Agee was asked to 

identify the voice. The agent in Gallup asked Bradford to repeat 

several key phrases and Agee identified Bradford's voice "within 

the first couple, three sentences." R. Vol. II, at p. 71. Agee 

again had the opportunity to hear Bradford's voice during a motion 

to reduce bond at which Bradford testified. 

Based largely on Agee's voice identification, Bradford was 

formally charged and transferred to New Mexico where he negotiated 

a plea of guilty to one count of mail fraud conditioned on his 

appeal of the issues now before us. 

I. Probable Cause for the Arrest 

Bradford claims that he was arrested without probable cause. 

He therefore contends that all of the evidence gathered as a 

result of the arrest is inadmissible "fruit of the poisonous 

tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). 

Bradford does not argue that the FBI lacked probable cause, based 

on the ongoing investigation, to believe that the person who 

identified himself to Gallup bank officials as York D. London was 

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involved in a criminally fraudulent transfer of money. The objective facts related to the FBI by bank officials and the other 

information gathered during the investigation were clearly sufficient grounds on which to base such a belief. Bradford's only 

argument against his arrest is that the FBI lacked sufficient 

basis to link him to the person identified as York D. London. 

At the time of Bradford's arrest, FBI officials knew that a 

woman would arrive at the bank in Fayette, identify herself as 

Andrea Johnson, and request assistance in connection with a wire 

funds transfer she was to receive. They had reason to believe 

that she was part of a criminal conspiracy and they knew that her 

male accomplice had requested the fraudulent transfer. The agents 

therefore knew they were looking for at least two people, a man 

and a woman. The agents witnessed the woman exit Bradford's car 

and a few minutes later they arrested Bradford who was waiting in 

his car outside the bank. Thus the agents knew that Bradford had 

transported a suspected criminal to a bank where the crime was to 

occur, that the crime involved at least one male accomplice who 

was aware of the place and time which the transfer was to occur, 

and that Bradford was waiting alone in the car nearby while the 

crime was actually occurring. Based on these facts, the FBI had 

ample probable cause to arrest Bradford. 

This is not a case where the agents relied solely on "[t]he 

argument that one who 'accompanies a criminal to a crime rendezvous' cannot be assumed to be a bystander • . " United States 

v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593 (1948). Rather, the agents had 

learned, over the course of their investigation, that the 

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" 

fraudulent transfer would be perpetrated by at least two people. 

They also knew that the man who had ordered these transfers had 

arranged for a woman to pick up the money. The reasonable and 

natural conclusion to be drawn from all the available facts was 

that Bradford, the person who drove her to the bank, knew of and 

was a participant in the criminal conduct in progress inside the 

bank. Compare United States v. Barber, 557 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 

1977} (no probable cause to arrest driver who remained in car 

outside liquor store while passenger attempted to pass a 

counterfeit bill to store manager), with United States v. Howard, 

758 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985} (arrest of car driver was justified 

based on postal inspector's knowledge that persons who attempt to 

cash altered money orders often send a woman into post office 

while others wait outside}. Cf. United States v. Di Re, ·332 U.S. 

at 594 (arrest of car's occupants was unwarranted where any inference that everyone on the scene was a party to the crime had been 

destroyed by conduct of government informer who pointed out only 

one guilty person in the car}. 

II. Motion to Suppress Voice Identification 

Bradford contends that Agee's identification of Bradford's 

voice, both the initial identification based on Bradford's telephone conversation with the Gallup FBI and the subsequent inperson identification at the bond hearing, is inadmissible because 

of the suggestive circumstances surrounding the identification. 

The suggestiveness of these procedures, he contends, violates his 

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• 

right to a fair trial and due process of law. See Manson v. 

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 

We determine the constitutionality of identification 

procedures, which entail mixed questions of law and fact, under a 

plenary standard of review. Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597 

(1982): Archuleta v. Kerby, 864 F.2d 709, 710-11 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2108 (1989). We therefore review the 

district court's legal conclusions de novo, giving its factual 

determinations a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d): 

Archuleta v. Kerby, 864 F.2d at 711. 

Bradford contends that the voice identification procedure was 

unnecessarily suggestive in that: (1) the initial identification 

took place at the FBI office, after the bank president had been 

told that the person or persons on the phone were being 1nterviewed in connection with the fraudulent transfers: (2) the bank 

president was exposed to the FBI agent's end of the phone 

conversation with Bradford, and therefore heard some of the 

agent's questions concerning Bradford's previous criminal record: 

and (3) the bank president was asked to identify Bradford's voice 

from a single voice tape recording. He also contends that the incourt identification, after Bradford had been indicted, is inherently suggestive. 

The district court made no specific finding as to the suggestiveness of the identification procedures. Even if it was the 

product of suggestive procedures, however, introduction of the 

identification evidence would not necessarily violate Bradford's 

due process rights. Archuleta v. Kerby, 864 F.2d at 711: United 

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• 

States v. Williams, 605 F.2d 495, 498 (10th Cir.), cert. • denied, 

444 U.S. 932 (1979). The essential question is "whether under the 

totality of the circumstances the identification was reliable." 

Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972); Manson v. Brathwaite, 

432 U.S. 98 (1977) ("reliability is the linchpin in determining 

the admissibility of identification testimony"). 

The Supreme Court has set forth the following five factors 

which are to be balanced against the "corruptive effect," Manson 

v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114, of the identification procedures: 

"l. The opportunity of the witness to [identify] the 

criminal at the time of the crime; 

2. The witness' degree of attention; 

3. The accuracy of the witness' prior description of 

the criminal; 

4. The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness 

at the confrontation; and 

5. The length of time between the crime and the 

confrontation." 

Archuleta v. Kerby, 864 F.2d at 711 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 

U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)). 

An analysis of the five factors convinces us that there was 

not a ''very substantial likelihood of ••• misidentification" in 

this case. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198 (quoting Simmons v. 

United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). Agee had ample opportunity to hear and identify Bradford's voice prior to the FBI 

identification. The transfers and other bank transactions which 

the two discussed were both important and unusual, so that Agee 

paid close attention. Indeed, these conversations were so unusual 

that Agee contacted the FBI, expressed his suspicion of criminal 

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activity, and recorded one of the conversations. He demonstrated 

a high degree of certainty concerning his identification of 

Bradford; he testified that he identified the voice within the 

"first couple, three sentences." The identification procedure in 

the FBI office took place on October 14, one day after the 

recorded conversation between Bradford and Agee. All these facts 

clearly demonstrate that the procedure yielded a reliable 

identification. 

Bradford contends that the bank president's description of 

the voice was "a general description [which] would fit thousands 

of people." Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 22. The inherent 

nature of voice identification is such that even the most 

distinguishable voice characteristics are not easily described to 

others. The best possible description is likely to consist of 

just a few vague adjectives, a determination of the speaker's 

gender, and any identifiable accent used. Nevertheless, reliable 

voice identification is clearly admissible evidence despite its 

limitations. See,~, United States v. Olson, 794 F.2d 561 

{10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986); United States v. 

Patton, 721 F.2d 159 {6th Cir. 1983}; United States v. Schultz, 

698 F.2d 365 {8th Cir. 1983}; United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 

353 {9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977). 

Bradford's due process rights were in no way violated by the 

district court's refusal to suppress the reliable voice 

identification evidence. 

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' 

III. The Speedy Trial Act 

After Bradford had been indicted, the district court granted 

a motion to dismiss the charges for a violation of the Speedy 

Trial Act. That Act provides that a defendant must be indicted 

within thirty days of the date of his arrest. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 316l(b). In granting the motion over the government's objection, the district court nevertheless dismissed the charges 

without prejudice. Bradford now claims that the dismissal should 

have been with prejudice, precluding any further prosecution. 

The decision whether to dismiss an indictment with or without 

prejudice for violation of the Speedy Trial Act is within the 

discretion of the district court. 18 U.S.C. S 3162(a)(l); United 

States v. Taylor, 108 s. Ct. 2413 (1988); United States v. Doran, 

882 F.2d 1511, 1518 (10th Cir. 1989) ("The trial court e~ercises 

considerable discretion in determining the form of dismissal."). 

We review the district court's decision for abuse of discretion, 

and specifically to determine "that the judgment is supported in 

terms of the factors identified in the statute." United States v. 

Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2420. The factors set out by the statute 

for the district court's consideration are "the seriousness of the 

offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the 

dismissal; and the impact of reprosecution upon the administration 

of [the Act] and on the administration of justice." 18 u.s.c. 

S 3162(a)(2). 

In dismissing the indictment, the district court made the 

following specific findings: 

"I consider the offense charged to be serious. The 

adverse impact of reprosecution on the administration of 

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justice and the Speedy Trial Act is slight. The defendants have claimed no prejudice due to the delay in filing the indictment. The government did not intentionally seek delay, and the unusual circumstances of this 

case are unlikely to recur. Finally, the filing of the 

indictment exceeded the time requirements by a mere 

three days. For these reasons, the indictment will be 

dismissed without prejudice." 

R. Vol. I, Tab 39, at p.2. The district court could not have more 

clearly noted its due consideration of the necessary factors set 

out in the statute. We can add nothing more to the court's 

accurate and comprehensive analysis of each factor. There was no 

abuse of discretion; this relatively minor violation of the Speedy 

Trial Act did not clearly require dismissal with prejudice. See 

United States v. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920, 926 (1st Cir.), cert. 

denied, 109 S. Ct. 308 (1988) (where charge involves serious 

crime, only equally serious delay in violation of the Act 

justifies dismissal with prejudice). 

IV. Record Omissions 

Finally, Bradford_ claims that he is entitled to summary 

reversal because the transcripts of the initial hearing on the 

Speedy Trial Act could not be located and are not available on 

appeal. He argues that the failure to provide such transcripts 

violates the Court Reporter's Act, 28 u.s.c. § 753(b), and denies 

him his right to a complete transcript on appeal. Hardy v. United 

States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964). 

The court Reporter Act, 28 U.S.C. § 753(b), requires that a 

reporter "record verbatim by shorthand or by mechanical means 

••• all proceedings in criminal cases held in open court." 

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• 

Although the requirements of the Act are mandatory, 1 failure to 

satisfy the recording mandate is not~~ error, and without 

more does not generally require reversal. Usually, the defendant 

is required to at least allege some error in the unrecorded 

proceeding which would require reversal. Thus, "when a defendant 

is represented on appeal by the same attorney who defended him at 

trial, the court may properly require counsel to articulate the 

prejudice that may have resulted from a failure to record a 

portion of the proceedings." United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 

1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1977). Bradford claims, however, that no 

showing of prejudice is possible in this case because his 

appellate counsel is different than his counsel below, and 

therefore counsel has no way of knowing what may or may not have 

occurred during the hearing. 

Of the circuits that have addressed the appropriate remedy 

for a violation of the Court Reporter's Act, only the Fifth 

Circuit has adopted~ rule whereby the mere absence of "a substantial and significant portion" of the record, without a 

specific showing of prejudice or error, is itself sufficient to 

mandate reversal if appellate counsel did not represent the 

defendant at trial. See United States v. Renton, 700 F.2d 154, 

157 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d at 

1305-06). The propriety of basing a decision to reverse or affirm 

a conviction depending on whether the defendant has a new lawyer 

1 See,~, United States v. Andiarena, 823 F.2d 673, 676 (1st 

Cir. 1987); United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1530 (6th Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1068 (1986); United States v. Selva, 

559 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1977). 

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on appeal has been seriously questioned. See United States v. 

Stefan, 784 F.2d 1093, 1102 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 

855 (1986); United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1531 n.40 (6th 

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1068 (1986). We need not 

decide whether a person who is represented by different counsel on 

appeal is entitled to a stricter view concerning a violation of 

the Court Reporter's Act than might otherwise apply. Even under 

the Fifth Circuit's dual standard the absence of the transcript 

from this initial hearing is not a "substantial and significant 

omission" in the record on appeal, and Bradford is not entitled to 

reversal based solely on this minor discrepancy. 

This circuit has previously held that an omission such as 

failure to transcribe the testimony of one defense witness was not 

"significant in light of the entire record •••• " United States 

v. Pilling, 721 F.2d 286, 296 (10th Cir. 1983). To warrant 

reversal, the defendant must make a showing that the missing 

portion of the record was "substantial and crucial." Id. (citing 

United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d at 1303). Other circuits have 

ordered new trials pursuant to the Court Reporter's Act where the 

missing transcripts involved much more crucial proceedings than 

the hearing at issue here. See United States v. Stefan, 784 F.2d 

at 1102 ("New trials have been ordered • where the record 

lacked voir dire, opening statements, voir dire at closing 

statements, the government's closing argument, or the entire 

trial.") (citations omitted). In contrast, this was a straight-

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forward, simple, and minor hearing with little possibility of 

serious error. 2 

Bradford "cannot prevail without a showing of specific 

prejudice." United States v. Anzalone, 886 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 

1989). To warrant a reversal based on the missing transcript, he 

must first allege a specific error and the court must find itself 

unable to ascertain whether the error was harmless without examining the unavailable portion of the record. See Parrott v. United 

States, 314 F.2d 46 (10th Cir. 1963) (alleged error in the trial 

judge's comments to prospective jurors could not be adjudicated on 

appeal because reporter neglected to record jury voir dire). 

Bradford has not alleged any error or any prejudice; his contention concerning the missing transcript therefore fails. 

2 It is almost inconceivable that any reversible error could 

have occurred during the course of this preliminary hearing 

without any indication of such error elsewhere in the record. We 

have available to us the district court's order containihg 

specific findings from which we have concluded that the decision · to dismiss without prejudice was well within the court's 

discretion. In addition, Bradford's court appointed trial counsel 

made a subsequent motion to dismiss the second indictment based 

primarily on the earlier dismissal. That subsequent motion 

contained no indication of prejudicial error during the course of 

the prior proceeding. The possibility that either the government's attorney or the district court said or did anything in the 

course of the hearing to seriously prejudice Bradford but which 

cannot be deduced from any of the briefs, documents, court orders, 

or recorded testimony presently before us is simply too remote to 

warrant reversal. 

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' C 

CONCLUSION 

Bradford raises no argument on appeal which merits reversal 

of his conviction. The conviction is therefore AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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