Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01851/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01851-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Belinda Anaya
Defendant
Vivian Centeno
Plaintiff
City Of Fresno
Defendant
Jerry Dyer
Defendant
Alfred Hernandez
Plaintiff
Michael Manfredi
Defendant
John Nunez, Jr.
Plaintiff
Claudia Rendon
Plaintiff
George Rendon
Plaintiff
Lawrence Rendon
Plaintiff
Priscilla Rendon
Plaintiff
Ricardo Rendon
Plaintiff
Marcus K. Tafoya
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLAUDIA RENDON, GEORGE RENDON,

PRISCILLA RENDON, LAWRENCE

RENDON, RICARDO RENDON, JOHN

NUNEZ, JR., ALFRED HERNANDEZ,

AND VIVIAN CENTENO,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, JERRY DYER,

individually and in his

official capacity, MICHAEL

MANFREDI, individually and in

his official capacity, MARCUS

K. TAFOYA, individually and in

his official capacity, and

DOES 1 through 50 inclusive.

Defendants.

1:06-CV-01851 OWW SMS 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

GRANTING IN PART DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS AND MOTION FOR A MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs’ Claudia Rendon (“C. Rendon”), George Rendon (“G.

Rendon), Priscilla Rendon (“P. Rendon”), Lawrence Rendon (“L.

Rendon”), Ricardo Rendon (“R. Rendon”), John Nunez Jr. (“Nunez”),

Alfred Hernandez (“Hernandez”) and Vivian Centeno (“Centeno”)

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this lawsuit against 

the City of Fresno, Jerry Dyer its police chief, and officers

Michael Manfredi and Marcus Tafoya, individually and in their 

official capacity, as well as Officer Belinda Anaya, in her

individual and official capacities (collectively “Defendants”).

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Plaintiffs first claim is for a violation of civil rights under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the second and third claims are brought under

California Civil Code §§ 52 and 52.1, and the fourth claim is

Malicious Prosecution. Chief Dyer, Manfredi, Tafoya, and Anaya

were at all times allegedly employed as police officers for the

City of Fresno Police Department, and acted in the course and

scope of their official employment. Plaintiffs seek damages for

the acts allegedly committed under color of law and in

deprivation of the Plaintiffs’ rights secured by the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution to be free from

unreasonable seizure and excessive force. 

Defendants move to dismiss the entire complaint pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Defendants

alternatively move for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(e). 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their complaint May 11, 2007, for

violations of California Civil Code §§52 and 52.1, Malicious

Prosecution, and violation of the Plaintiffs’ Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Civil Rights Act. (Doc. 24,

First Amended Complaint). 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss June 4, 2007, for

failure to state a claim or in the alternative for a more

definite statement. (Doc. 27, Motion to Dismiss). On June 21,

2007, Plaintiffs filed Opposition to Defendants’ motions. (Doc.

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28, Memorandum/Response in Opposition re Motion to Dismiss). On

July 2, 2007, Defendants filed a response to Plaintiffs’

Opposition to Defendants’ motions. (Doc. 29, Reply to Response to

Motion re Motion to Dismiss). 

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 5, 2005, Plaintiffs were at a welcome home from

Iraq party for G. Rendon. During the party two men were involved

in a confrontation, but members of the party separated the two

men. After the men were restrained by the people at the party,

approximately twelve to fifteen Fresno police officers arrived at

the party. 

Plaintiffs allege the Officers entered the party and began

using excessive force by hitting people with batons and throwing

them on the floor. Plaintiffs allege that there were no fights or

physical confrontations that could be viewed by the officers to

justify excessive force to control the situation. 

In the complaint Plaintiffs set forth specific allegations

against each officer that Plaintiffs Hernandez, Centeno, Nunez, 

L. Rendon and C. Rendon were inside the house when the Officers

arrived. They observed Officer Tafoya enter the residence and

begin striking people at the party with his expandable baton.

Hernandez was later arrested by Officer Tafoya and charged with

numerous misdemeanor violations. Centeno was violently and

aggressively shoved and pushed by various officers. Officer

Tafoya also arrested Centeno and allegedly made sexually

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inappropriate comments to her. Centeno was charged with numerous

misdemeanor violations. While inside the house, Officer Tafoya

entered the room where Plaintiff Nunez was sitting and swung his

expandable baton at Nunez’s head. Nunez was able to block some of

the swings with his arms, but Officer Tafoya struck Nunez on the

legs causing him to fall to the ground. At that point, Officer

Tafoya stomped on Nunez’s back with his boot. It is also alleged

that Tafoya arrested Nunez, and charged him with numerous

felonies. L. Rendon was attacked and struck by Officer Tafoya.

L. Rendon was arrested and charged with various felonies. C.

Rendon was allegedly struck on her left thigh by Officer Tafoya.

Another Plaintiff, R. Rendon, was inside a bedroom when he heard

a commotion in the hallway. When he got into the hallway he

attempted to give assistance to Gabriel and Rebecca Gonzalez who

had been assaulted by Officer Tafoya. R. Rendon was ordered

outside by an officer, and violently thrown off of the porch and

on the ground by Officer Tafoya. R. Rendon was allegedly knocked

unconscious and then woke up. Tafoya allegedly arrested R.

Rendon and later charged him with numerous felonies. 

Officer Manfredi was also among the officers who began

hitting people at the party with batons and throwing them to the

floor. Hernandez observed Officer Manfredi taunt various

Plaintiffs. At the party Centeno and her mother had a gun pointed

at their head by Officer Manfredi as they pleaded with him to

stop assaulting their relative. When L. Rendon retreated from

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Officer Tafoya’s attack, Officer Manfredi caught him and threw

him to the ground. 

Officer Anaya is the last identified officer who entered the

house and began hitting people at the party with batons and

throwing them to the floor. When the officers entered the home,

P. Rendon was upstairs sleeping with her baby. She heard the

commotion and got up to see what was going on. When she saw the

officers, she went outside to find her husband, G. Rendon. She

found her husband and sat next to him on the curb. At that time,

it is alleged that Officer Anaya violently grabbed P. Rendon by

the hair and pulled her to her feet. Officer Anaya arrested P.

Rendon at the direction of Officers Tafoya and Manfredi. 

Plaintiffs and several other people were taken to the local

hospital for treatment of the injuries that they sustained from

the incident.

Chief of Police, Jerry Dyer, and the City of Fresno are sued

because they allegedly knew of Officer Manfredi’s and Officer

Tafoya’s history of excessive force and illegal police conduct,

and despite this knowledge, allowed these Officers to stay on the

force. 

All three Officers are alleged to have prepared false police

reports, which contained false and misleading information to show

probable cause for all Plaintiffs’ arrests. 

On August 14, 2006, the felony charges against Nunez, G.

Rendon, L. Rendon and R. Rendon were dismissed. On August 28,

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2006, the various misdemeanor charges against Hernandez and

Centeno were dismissed. P. Rendon was ordered to appear in court

regarding potential misdemeanor charges, but when she did the

court advised her that charges were never filed against her.

IV. MOTION TO DISMISS

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for a motion to dismiss if

a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” However, motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. The question before

the court is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail;

rather, it is whether the plaintiff could prove any set of facts

in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Ohel

Rachel Synagogue v. United States, 482 F.3d 1058, 1060 (9 Cir. th

2007) (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). 

“A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond

doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v.

CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999); See also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

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allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

A. Rule 8 Pleading Standard

A complaint must “contain a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The “short and plain” statement must give the

defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res.,

471 F.3d 1033, 1036 (9 Cir. 2006) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

th

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a]

party need not plead specific legal theories in the complaint, so

long as the other side receives notice as to what is at issue in

the case.” Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 737 (9 Cir. 2004) th

(quoting Am. Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 690 F.2d

781, 786 (9 Cir. 1982)). th Courts have a “duty...to construe pro

se pleadings liberally.” Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020

(9th Cir. 2001); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). The

pleadings of pro se litigants are “held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Castro v.

United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (quoting Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). “However, ‘a liberal

interpretation of a [pro se] complaint may not supply essential

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elements of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Peterson v.

Cal. Dep’t. Of Corr. & Rehab., 451 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1099 (D. Cal.

2006) (quoting Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir.

1992)). 

B. Legal Background

i. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 In order to sue a local government entity or its employees

in a federal court for civil rights violations, a plaintiff must

rely on statutory provisions that permit individuals to seek

relief in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which Plaintiff

brings this suit, provides in pertinent part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or

the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States...to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured

by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “creates a cause of action against

a person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another

of rights guaranteed under the Constitution.” Henderson v. City

of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002). “In order to

allege a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983, a

plaintiff must show that he or she has been deprived of a ‘right

secured by the Constitution and ... law of the United States’ and

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that the deprivation was ‘under color’ of state law.” Broam v.

Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9 Cir. 2003) (citing Flagg Bros., th

Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §

1983)). Here, Plaintiffs allege several Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment violations. Plaintiffs charge both local government

entities and individual police officers in this suit. Section

1983 extends liability differently to local governments than to

individuals. 

ii Monell

 Local government entities can be directly liable under §

1983 for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief, but only

if the allegedly unconstitutional actions were taken pursuant to

a “policy statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted

and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Neveau v. City of

Fresno, 392 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1171 (D. Cal. 2005) (quoting Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 659, 690 (1978)).

Alternatively, local government entities can be liable for

adopting an unconstitutional custom, even if such custom has not

received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels. Id. quoting Monell at 690-691. A local

government entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 simply

because it employs someone who has acted unlawfully. Instead, it

is when “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its law-makers or by those whose edicts or acts may

fairly be said to represent official policy,” inflicts the injury

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that the government as an entity is responsible. Ulrich v. City &

County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9 Cir. 2002) th

(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694)). “A single decision by a

municipal policymaker may be sufficient to trigger section 1983

liability under Monell, even though the decision is not intended

to govern future situations.” Haughn v. Brosseau, 351 F.3d 372

(9 Cir. 2003)(quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 th

(9 Cir. 1992)) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. th

469, 480-81 (1986)). The local government will be found

responsible if it can be established that “the individual who

committed the constitutional tort was an official with final

policymaking authority and that the challenged action itself was

an act of official governmental policy.” Sepatis v. City & County

of San Francisco, 217 F.Supp.2d 992, 1005 (D. Cal. 2002). 

iii. Officer Liability

 Individual local government officers can be named as

defendants either in their personal or official capacities. A

suit against an individual officer in his or her official

capacity is “only another way of pleading an action against an

entity of which an officer is an agent.” Wolfe v. Strankman, 392

F.3d 358, 365 (9 Cir. 2004) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 th

U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). As such, to state a claim against an

individual officer in his official capacity, a plaintiff must

allege an unconstitutional “policy statement, ordinance, or

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decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s

officers.” Neveau v. City of Fresno, 392 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1171 (D.

Cal. 2005) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 659, 690)). In contrast,

a claim against an individual local government officer acting in

his or her personal capacity is quite different from a Monell

claim against a local government entity. A plaintiff suing an

individual officer in his or her personal capacity is not

required to establish any connection between the alleged unlawful

act and a governmental “policy or custom.” “[R]egardless of

whether the constitutional violation occurred, the [official]

should prevail if the right asserted by the plaintiff was not

‘clearly established’ or the [official] could have reasonably

believed that his particular conduct was lawful.” Sepatis at 996

(quoting Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9 Cir. th

1991)). 

V. DISCUSSION

A. California Tort Claims Act

Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs failed to bring their

claims against the City of Fresno as required by the California

Tort Claims Act, Cal. Gov. Code Section 911.2. A plaintiff

seeking to bring tort claims against a government entity must

present those claims to the government entity within the

limitations period, either six months or one year, depending on

the nature of the tort alleged:

A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for

injury to person or to personal property or growing

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crops shall be presented as provided in Article 2

(commencing with Section 915) not later than six months

after the accrual of the cause of action. A claim

relating to any other cause of action shall be

presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with

Section 915) not later than one year after the accrual

of the cause of action.

Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2(a). 

Here, Plaintiffs’ tort claims arose on March 5, 2005. 

Plaintiffs did not present their claims to the City of Fresno

until they filed this complaint on September 22, 2006, more than

a year after the causes of action arose. 

The City’s motion to dismiss state law claims under Cal.

Gov. Code Section 911.2(a) is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, AS

AT ARGUMENT ON THESE MOTION, PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL STATED THERE WAS

NO BASIS FOR TOLLING THE CLAIMS. 

B. Official Capacity Claims Against Defendants are Redundant

Defendants assert that the official capacity claims against

Defendants Dyer, Manfredi, Tafoya, and Anaya (“Defendant

Officers”) should be dismissed as redundant because the City of

Fresno is a named defendant.

In Luke v. Abbott, 954 F.Supp. 202 (C.D. Cal. 1997),

plaintiffs Fredrick Luke and The Luke Family Trust brought a

claim against the County of Orange and the County’s District

Attorney Michael Capizzi, in his official capacity. The Luke

Court held that “[there] is no longer a need to bring officialcapacity actions against local government officials, for under

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Monell, ..., local government units can be sued directly for

damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.” Luke v. Abbott,

954 F.Supp. 202, 203 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985)). In its analysis of the facts of the

case with respect to the question of official capacity suits, the

Luke court referred to the Supreme Court’s discussion in Monell

v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Luke

court stated, 

“After the Monell holding, it is no longer necessary

or proper to name as a defendant a particular local

government officer acting in official capacity. To

do so only leads to a duplication of documents and

pleadings, as well as wasted public resources for

increased attorneys fees. A plaintiff cannot elect

which of the defendant formats to use. If both are

named, it is proper upon request for the Court to

dismiss the official-capacity officer, leaving the

local government entity as the correct defendant. If

only the official-capacity officer is named, it would

be proper for the Court upon request to dismiss the

officer and substitute instead the local government

entity as the correct defendant.” Id. at 204

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants refer to the Luke

case to provide support for their argument that official

capacity claims against the Defendant officers should be

dismissed. (Doc. 27, Motion to Dismiss, June 4, 2007). 

Defendants claim that according to Monell, and later Luke, it

is redundant to bring official capacity claims against a

government officer and the government entity. (Id.) In their

response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs state that

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“Defendants’ reliance on the Luke case is flawed when viewed in

context of the present lawsuit.” (Doc. 28, Memorandum/Response

in Opposition re Motion to Dismiss, June 21, 2007). Plaintiffs

state that official capacity claims against an officer are

redundant and should be dismissed when the officer is named in

his/her official capacity only.(Id.) Plaintiffs allege that

because the Defendants in the present case are sued in both

their official and individual capacities, Defendants’ request

to dismiss the official capacity claims should be denied. (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that because of the “dual nature in which the

police officer Defendants have been named, the concerns of the

Luke court in regard to the duplication of documents and

pleadings, as well as wasted public resources for increased

attorneys fees, is not applicable.” (Id. at 4). 

The distinctions between the Luke case and the present

case which were made by Plaintiffs are minimal and have no

legal bearing on the outcome of the decision. Plaintiffs’

attempt to distinguish between the present case and the Luke

case has no influence on the law . The Luke court which relied

on Monell held that the official capacity claims against an

officer of the government must be dismissed when the local

government entity is also named as a defendant. Luke v. Abbott

at 203. Here, Plaintiffs bring official capacity claims

against the Defendant officers as well as the City of Fresno

and therefore the official capacity claims against the officers

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are redundant. The claims against the officers under §1983 in

their official capacities must be dismissed. 

 Motion to dismiss the civil rights claims against 

Defendant Officers in their official capacities is GRANTED. 

C. Plaintiffs Allege Sufficient Facts to Support a Cause

of Action Against Police Chief Jerry Dyer in his

individual Capacity 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim against Chief Dyer

in his individual capacity. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs

cannot state a claim against Dyer, because Plaintiffs do not

allege that Dyer was physically present on March 5, 2005. “A

supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his

subordinates ‘if the supervisor participated in or directed the

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs.,

479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9 Cir. 2007) (quoting Taylor v. List, 880 th

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9 Cir. 1989)). In a 1983 civil rights th

action, “there is no respondeat superior liability.” Wilkins v.

Ramirez, 455 F.Supp.2d 1080, 1108 (D. Cal. 2006) (citing Ybarra

v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81

(9 Cir. 1984)). However, an official can be found liable in th

his individual capacity if it is alleged that, 1. there was an

actual “involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or 2. a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful

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conduct and the constitutional violation.” Wesley v. Davis, 333

F.Supp.2d 888, 892 (D. Cal. 2004) (citing Hansen v. Black, 885

F.2d 646 (9 Cir. 1989)). Furthermore, a supervisory official th

can be found liable if it is alleged that the official

“‘implemented a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights...’” Id. 

In Larez v. Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9 Cir. 1991), th the

district court reasoned that Defendant Chief of Police Gates

would be liable in his individual capacity if he "sets in

motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused to

terminate a series of acts by others, which he knew or

reasonably should [have] known, would cause others to inflict

the constitutional injury." Larez v. Los Angeles, 946 F.2d

630, 646 (9 Cir. 1991). It was alleged that although th

Defendant Gates was not at the site of the incident that gave

rise to this claim he was allegedly involved in the

“perpetuation of unconstitutional policies or customs of

excessive force, illegal searches including official tolerance

for the destruction of property during such searches, and

inadequate citizen complaint procedures which have the effect

of encouraging the excessive use of force.” Id. at 635.

Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant Dyer was present

on the night of March 5, 2005. Plaintiffs instead claim that

“Defendant Dyer [was] well aware of Defendant Manfredi, and

Defendant Tafoya’s history of excessive force and illegal

police conduct.” (Doc. 24, First Amended Complaint, May 11,

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2007, at ¶39). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Dyer not only

tolerated said conduct, but he actively participated in

retaining these officers, covering up said illegal activity,

and encouraging the conduct.” (Id.) 

Plaintiffs further allege “Defendant City of Fresno and

Defendant Dyer knew...or should have known of the illegal and

improper searches and seizures, and excessive force being

conducted by Defendant Officers.” According to Plaintiffs, in

spite of his knowledge, Defendant Dyer “failed to take

appropriate measures in reckless disregard of Plaintiffs’

constitutional and statutory rights.” (Id. at ¶40). These

allegations are sufficient to state a claim against Dyer in his

individual capacity for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against Dyer in

his individual capacity is DENIED. 

VI. MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

“Under the liberal pleading standards, ‘pleadings in

federal courts are only required to fairly notify the opposing

party of the nature of the claim.’” Castillo v. Norton, 219

F.R.D. 155, 163 (D. Ariz. 2003) (citing Resolution Trust Corp.

v. Dean, 854 F.Supp. 626, 624 (D. Ariz. 1994)) (quoting A.G.

Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Smith, 736 F.Supp. 1030, 1032 (D. Ariz.

1989)). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(e) provides:

If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is

permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot

reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the

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party may move for a more definite statement before

interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point

out the defects complained of and the details desired. If

the motion is granted and the order of the court is not

obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within

such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike

the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such

order as it deems just.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). However, a Rule 12(e) motion for a

more definite statement must be considered in light of Rule 8’s

liberal pleading standards in federal court. Neveau v. City of

Fresno, 392 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1169 (D. Cal. 2005). 

A rule 12(e) motion is “proper ‘only where the complaint

is so indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain the nature

of the claim being asserted.’” Neveau v. City of Fresno, 392

F.Supp.2d 1159, 1169 (D. Cal. 2005) (quoting Famolare, Inc. v.

Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F.Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal.

1981)). The court must deny the motion if “the complaint is

specific enough to apprise the defendant of the substance of

the claim being asserted.” Neveau v. City of Fresno, 392

F.Supp.2d 1159, 1169 (citing Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F.Supp.

1450, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).

The Court may also deny the motion if the detail sought by

a motion for more definite statement is obtainable through

discovery. See Id.; See also Davidson v. Santa Barbara High

Sch. Dist., 48 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1227 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing

Beery v. Hitachi Home Elecs. (Am.), Inc., 157 F.R.D. 477, 480

(C.D. Cal. 1993)) (citing Famolare, Inc., 525 F.Supp. at 949)). 

“Thus, the class of pleadings that are appropriate subjects for

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a motion under Rule 12(e) is quite small—the pleading must be

sufficiently intelligible for the court to be able to make out

one or more potentially viable legal theories on which the

claimant might proceed, but it must not be so vague or

ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a

simple denial, in good faith or without prejudice to himself.” 

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure (2d ed.) §1376.

Whether to grant a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite

statement lies within the wide discretion of the district

court. See Id. §1377. However, “[m]otions for more definite

statement are viewed with disfavor, and are rarely granted.” 

William W. Schwarzer, A. Wallace Tashima, and James M.

Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial §9:351 (2000)

(citing In re American Int'l Airways, Inc., 66 B.R. 642, 645

(E.D. Pa. 1986)).

A. Plaintiffs’ Illegal Search and Seizure Claim 

Defendants move for a more definite statement on the First

claim and state that it is indefinite as to whether false

arrest is claimed. 

In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the force used

by Defendants and several other police officers was excessive

and did not warrant the actions taken by Defendants. (Doc. 24,

First Amended Complaint, May 11, 2007, at ¶24). Plaintiffs

allege that Defendants, “used excessive force in seizing and

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arresting Plaintiffs and others resulting in various injuries

being sustained.” (Id. at ¶26). 

Plaintiffs make the following allegations in their

complaint against Defendant Tafoya: 

1. Plaintiff V. Centeno alleges that she was shoved

aggressively by various unknown officers and arrested

at Defendant Tafoya’s orders. (Id. at ¶29).

2. Plaintiff J. Nunez, Jr. alleges that he was hit by

Defendant Tafoya in the legs and was stomped on by

Defendant Tafoya. As a result, Plaintiff John Nunez

claims that these attacks by Defendant Tafoya were

without just cause. Plaintiff John Nunez, Jr.

alleges that he was arrested under felony violations

which were later dismissed. (Id. at ¶30).

3. Plaintiff C. Rendon alleges that Defendant Tafoya

hit her on her left thigh with his baton without

provocation. (Id. at ¶31).

4. Plaintiff G. Rendon alleges that Defendant Tafoya

ordered that he be arrested without probable cause. 

Plaintiff George Rendon claims that the charges

against him were later dismissed. (Id. at ¶32).

5. Plaintiff R. Rendon alleges that he was thrown off

of a porch at the house in a violent manner by

Defendant Tafoya, which left him unconscious.

Plaintiff Ricardo Rendon claims that when he became

alert, he was arrested without probable cause. 

Plaintiff Ricardo Rendon claims that the charges

against him were later dismissed. (Id. at ¶35). 

6. Plaintiff L. Rendon asserts that he was hit by

Defendant Tafoya with a baton without provocation.

(Id. at ¶34).

Plaintiffs also make the following claims against Manfredi.

1. Plaintiff V. Centeno alleges that she had a gun

pointed at her head and her mother’s head by

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Defendant Manfredi and later charged with various

misdemeanors which were dismissed. (Id. at ¶29). 

2. Plaintiff L. Rendon claims that he was violently

thrown on to the floor by Defendant Manfredi, then

handcuffed and dragged across the lawn. Plaintiff

Lawrence Rendon claims that he was arrested and then

the charges against him were dismissed. (Id. at ¶34).

Plaintiffs also bring a claim against Defendant Anaya. 

According to Plaintiff P. Rendon, Anaya grabbed her hair and

pulled her to her feet then arrested her without probable

cause. (Id. at ¶33). 

The allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint assert that the

actions taken by Defendants Tafoya, Manfredi, and Anaya towards

Plaintiffs, were objectively unreasonable under the

circumstances. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants did not have a

warrant to arrest Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further assert that

Defendants’ actions of violence and arresting Plaintiffs

restrained Plaintiffs’ freedom of movement. Plaintiffs claim

that their detention was unnecessarily painful and degrading

and was an undue invasion of their privacy.

When considered in light of Rule 8's liberal pleading

standards, Plaintiffs’ allegations are not vague or ambiguous

and a responsive pleading can be framed by Defendants. 

Defendants fail to point out the defects or the details desired

in their motion for a more definite statement. If the detail

sought by Defendants can be determined through discovery, the

court must deny their motion for a more definite statement. 

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Here were no allegations stating that Defendant Dyer was 1

present during the night of the incident. There are no

allegations that Defendant Dyer engaged in any illegal search and

seizure. As a result, Defendants’ motion for a more definite

statement against Defendant Dyer in his official capacity should

be GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

22

However, based on the liberal pleading standards of Rule 8, the

information provided by Plaintiffs is specific enough to give

notice to Defendants that they have been sued for unreasonable

seizure and false arrest. Motion for a more definite

statement is DENIED. 

1

B. Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim of Malicious Prosecution is 

 Specific Enough to Notify Defendants’ of the Substance 

 of the Claim Being Asserted

Plaintiffs’ fourth claim alleges a violation of their

Fourteenth Amendment rights through malicious prosecution. 

Defendants move for a more definite statement claiming that

“[i]t is unclear as to whether plaintiff is making a claim for

an unlawful arrest and therefore, in this regard, plaintiffs’

Amended Complaint is so vague and ambiguous that defendants

cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.”

(Doc. 27, Motion to Dismiss, June 4, 2007). 

In the Ninth Circuit, the general rule is that a claim for

malicious prosecution is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

if process is available within the state judicial system to

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provide a remedy. Ayala v. KC Envtl. Health, 426 F.Supp.2d

1070, 1083 (D. Cal. 2006) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 562 773 F.2d

1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985)) (en banc); Cline v. Brusett, 661

F.2d 108, 112 (9th Cir. 1981). However, "an exception exists

to the general rule when a malicious prosecution is conducted

with the intent to deprive a person of equal protection of the

laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person to a denial

of constitutional rights." Id.; Cline, 661 F.2d at 112. In

order to state a cognizable claim for malicious prosecution

under § 1983 Plaintiff must demonstrate not only a deprivation

of a constitutionally protected right, but also all of the

elements of the tort under state law. See Haupt v. Dillard, 17

F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1994).

When a plaintiff brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging

malicious prosecution, the plaintiff “must show that the

defendants prosecuted him with malice and without probable

cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying him

equal protection or another specific constitutional right.”

Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9 Cir. 2004) th

(quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th

Cir. 1995)). In the state of California, a plaintiff alleging

malicious prosecutions must prove that “(1) the prosecution was

commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was

terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, (2) that the prosecutor

lacked probable cause to bring the charges against the

plaintiff, and (3) that the prosecutor initiated and pursued

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the prosecution with actual malice. Maleki v. L.A. Unified

Sch. Dist., 160 Fed. Appx. 586, 590 (9 Cir. 2005) (citing th

Sheldon Appel Co. V. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863 (Cal.

1989)).

i. Plaintiffs allege that the prosecution was 

 commenced by or at the direction of Defendants

Plaintiffs must prove that “the prosecution was commenced

by or at the direction of the defendant and was terminated in

the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. In determining what constitutes

prosecution, the courts have established that “An individual

seeking to bring a malicious prosecution claim must generally

establish that the prior proceedings terminated in such a

manner as to indicate his innocence.” Awabdy v. City of

Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9 Cir. 2004). “Similar to other th

terminations short of a complete trial on the merits, a

dismissal in the interest of justice satisfies this requirement

if it reflects the opinion of the prosecuting party or the

court that the action lacked merit or would result in a

decision in favor of the defendant. Id. at 1068 (citing

Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal. App. 3d 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)).

“When such a dismissal is procured as the result of a motion by

the prosecutor and there are allegations that the prior

proceedings were instituted as the result of fraudulent

conduct, a malicious prosecution plaintiff is not precluded

from maintaining his action unless the defendants can establish

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that the charges were withdrawn on the basis of a compromise

among the parties or for a cause that was not inconsistent with

his guilt.” Id. at 1068. 

a. Plaintiffs P. Rendon and C. Rendon 

Plaintiff P. Rendon claims that Defendant Anaya arrested

her without probable cause at the direction of Defendant Tafoya

and Defendant Manfredi. She claims that she was ordered to

appear in court and only then was informed that charges were

never filed against her. Plaintiff P. Rendon was ordered to

appear in court regarding potential misdemeanor charges. 

Plaintiff P. Rendon appeared in court and was advised that

charges were never filed against her. (Doc. 24, First Amended

Complaint, May 11, 2007, at ¶33). Plaintiff C. Rendon admits

she was not prosecuted.

Since neither C. Rendon or P. Rendon allege that formal

charges were filed against them, Defendants’ motion for a more

definite statement as to the malicious prosecution claims on

behalf of these plaintiffs is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

b. Plaintiffs A. Hernandez, V. Centeno, J. Nunez, 

 G. Rendon, L. Rendon, and R. Rendon 

Plaintiff A. Hernandez claims that despite obeying all of

the officers’ commands on March 25, 2005 he was arrested

without probable cause at the direction of Defendant Tafoya. 

Plaintiff A. Hernandez also claims that he was charged with

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various misdemeanor violations which were subsequently

dismissed. (Id. at ¶28). 

Plaintiff V. Centeno alleges that she was violently and

aggressively shoved and pushed by various officers and arrested

at the direction of Defendant Tafoya. She claims that she was

charged with various misdemeanor violations which were

subsequently dismissed. (Id. at ¶29).

Plaintiff J. Nunez Jr. claims that Defendant Tafoya

violently assaulted him without provocation. He also claims

that he was arrested and charged with various felony violations

which were subsequently dismissed. (Id. at ¶30). 

Plaintiff G. Rendon claims that he too was arrested

without probable cause at the direction of Officer Tafoya, and

charged with various felony counts that were subsequently

dismissed. (Id. at ¶32). 

Plaintiff L. Rendon claims that he was handcuffed and

dragged across the lawn and arrested without probable cause and 

charged with various felony offenses that were subsequently

dismissed. (Id. at ¶34).

Plaintiff R. Rendon claims that he was knocked

unconscious, violently arrested without probable cause by

several Fresno Police Officers, and charged with various felony

violations that were subsequently dismissed. (Id. at ¶35).

The grounds for the dismissal of the charges against each

Plaintiff are unclear. It is also unclear whether the charges

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were dropped as a result of a motion by the prosecutor. 

However, the complaint sufficiently alleges a favorable

termination and constitutional deprivations of liberty and the

right to be free from excessive force at the hands of Defendant

Officers. The complaint also sufficiently alleges that

Plaintiffs’ prosecutions were commenced at the direction of the

Fresno Police Department and were dismissed in Plaintiff’s

favor. These allegations are sufficient to establish the first

element of Maleki.

ii. Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the charges 

 and the prosecution that was filed against them 

 was brought without probable cause

Plaintiffs also allege that the prosecutor lacked probable

cause to bring the charges against them. According to

Plaintiffs’ complaint “the [police] reports purposefully

contained false and misleading information which was designed

to provide probable cause for the arrests of the Plaintiffs,

and to cover up the illegal and unlawful conduct of the

Defendants.” (Id. at ¶41). Fabricated charges to wrongfully

initiate criminal prosecution against an innocent civilian

adequately satisfies the absence of the probable cause

requirement.

iii. Plaintiffs allege that their prosecution was 

 initiated with actual malice

Lastly, Plaintiffs’ allege that Defendant Officers knew

that their false police reports would be relied on by the

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Fresno County District Attorney’s office to institute criminal

proceedings against Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also claim that the

District Attorney’s office did, in fact, bring charges against

defendants in reliance on the false reports. 

Under Rule 8 these allegations are sufficient to place the

Defendants on notice that a malicious prosecution claim is

brought against them. The complaint specifically alleges

actual malice on behalf of Defendant Officers in writing their

police report. Whether there is any merit to these allegations

is a matter of proof. These allegations are sufficient to

state a claim for malicious prosecution. 

Defendant’s motion for a more definite statement regarding

the malicious prosecution claim as to Plaintiffs A. Hernandez,

V. Centeno, J. Nunez, G. Rendon, L. Rendon, and R. Rendon are

DENIED.

 

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss state law claims under Cal.

Gov. Code Section 911.2(a) is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND, AS AT ARGUMENT ON THESE MOTIONS, PLAINTIFFS’

COUNSEL STATED THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR TOLLING THE CLAIMS.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the civil rights claims

against Defendant Officers in their official capacities is

GRANTED.

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against Dyer in

his individual capacity is DENIED.

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4. Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is

DENIED. Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement

against Defendant Dyer in his official capacity is GRANTED

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

5. Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement as to the

malicious prosecution claims on behalf of Plaintiffs C.

Rendon and P. Rendon is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

6. Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement regarding

the malicious prosecution claim as to Plaintiffs A.

Hernandez, V. Centeno, J. Nunez, G. Rendon, L. Rendon, and

R. Rendon are DENIED.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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