Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01301/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01301-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC
Appellant
Garmin International, Inc.
Appellee
Garmin USA, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, 

Appellant 

______________________ 

2014-1301

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2012-

00001.

______________________ 

Decided: July 8, 2015

______________________ 

TIMOTHY M. SALMON, Basking Ridge, NJ, argued for 

appellant. Also represented by JOHN ROBERT KASHA, 

Kasha Law LLC, North Potomac, MD.

NATHAN K. KELLEY, Office of the Solicitor, United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, 

argued for intervenor Michelle K. Lee. Also represented 

by SCOTT WEIDENFELLER, ROBERT J. MCMANUS. 

_____________________ 

Before NEWMAN, CLEVENGER, and DYK, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN. 

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2 IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

DYK, Circuit Judge.

Cuozzo Speed Technologies (“Cuozzo”) owns U.S. Patent No. 6,778,074 (the “’074 patent”). Garmin International, Inc. and Garmin USA, Inc. (collectively, “Garmin”) 

petitioned the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office (“PTO”) for inter partes review (“IPR”) of claims 10, 

14, and 17 of the ’074 patent. The PTO granted Garmin’s 

petition and instituted IPR. The Patent Trial and Appeal

Board (the “Board”) timely issued a final decision finding

claims 10, 14, and 17 obvious. The Board additionally 

denied Cuozzo’s motion to amend the ’074 patent by 

substituting new claims 21, 22, and 23 for claims 10, 14, 

and 17. 

Contrary to Cuozzo’s contention, we hold that we lack 

jurisdiction to review the PTO’s decision to institute IPR. 

We affirm the Board’s final determination, finding no 

error in the Board’s claim construction under the broadest 

reasonable interpretation standard, the Board’s obviousness determination, and the Board’s denial of Cuozzo’s

motion to amend.

BACKGROUND

Cuozzo is the assignee of the ’074 patent, entitled 

“Speed Limit Indicator and Method for Displaying Speed 

and the Relevant Speed Limit,” which issued on August 

17, 2004. The ’074 patent discloses an interface which 

displays a vehicle’s current speed as well as the speed 

limit. In one embodiment, a red filter is superimposed on 

a white speedometer so that “speeds above the legal speed 

limit are displayed in red . . . while the legal speeds are 

displayed in white . . . .” Id. col. 5 ll. 35–37. A global 

positioning system (“GPS”) unit tracks the vehicle’s 

location and identifies the speed limit at that location. 

The red filter automatically rotates when the speed limit 

changes, so that the speeds above the speed limit at that 

location are displayed in red. The patent also states that 

the speed limit indicator may take the form of a colored 

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liquid crystal display (“LCD”). Id. col. 3 ll. 4–6, col. 6 ll. 

11–14. In claim 10, the independent claim at issue here, a 

colored display shows the current speed limit, and the 

colored display is “integrally attached” to the speedometer. Id. col. 7 l. 10.

Claim 10 recites: 

A speed limit indicator comprising:

a global positioning system receiver;

a display controller connected to said global positioning system receiver, wherein said display 

controller adjusts a colored display in response to signals from said global positioning 

system receiver to continuously update the delineation of which speed readings are in violation of the speed limit at a vehicle’s present 

location; and

a speedometer integrally attached to said colored 

display.

Id. col. 7 ll. 1–10. Claim 14 is addressed to “[t]he speed 

limit indicator as defined in claim 10, wherein said colored display is a colored filter.” Id. col. 7 ll. 23–24. Claim 

17 recites: “[t]he speed limit indicator as defined in claim 

14, wherein said display controller rotates said colored 

filter independently of said speedometer to continuously 

update the delineation of which speed readings are in 

violation of the speed limit at a vehicle's present location.” 

Id. col. 8 ll. 5–9.

On September 16, 2012, Garmin filed a petition with 

the PTO to institute IPR of, inter alia, claims 10, 14, and 

17 the ’074 patent. Garmin contended that claim 10 was 

invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) or as 

obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) and that claims 14 and 

17 were obvious under § 103(a). The PTO instituted IPR, 

determining that there was a reasonable likelihood that 

claims 10, 14, and 17 were obvious under § 103 over (1) 

U.S. Patent Nos. 6,633,811 (“Aumayer”), 3,980,041 (“EvCase: 14-1301 Document: 82-2 Page: 3 Filed: 07/08/2015
4 IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

ans”), and 2,711,153 (“Wendt”); and/or (2) German Patent 

No. 197 55 470 (“Tegethoff”), U.S. Patent No. 6,515,596 

(“Awada”), Evans, and Wendt. Although Garmin’s petition 

with respect to claim 17 included the grounds on which 

the PTO instituted review, the petition did not list Evans 

or Wendt for claim 10 or Wendt for claim 14. 

In its subsequent final decision, the Board explained 

that “[a]n appropriate construction of the term ‘integrally 

attached’ in independent claim 10 is central to the patentability analysis of claims 10, 14, and 17.” J.A. 7. The 

Board applied a broadest reasonable interpretation 

standard and construed the term “integrally attached” as 

meaning “discrete parts physically joined together as a 

unit without each part losing its own separate identity.” 

J.A. 9. The Board found that claims 10, 14, and 17 were 

unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1) over 

Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt; and, alternatively, (2) over 

Tegethoff, Awada, Evans, and Wendt. 

The Board also denied Cuozzo’s motion to amend the 

patent by replacing claims 10, 14, and 17 with substitute 

claims 21, 22, and 23. The Board’s denial of the motion to 

amend centered on proposed claim 21.1 Claim 21 would 

have amended the patent to claim “a speedometer integrally attached to [a] colored display, wherein the speedometer comprises a liquid crystal display, and wherein 

the colored display is the liquid crystal display.” J.A. 357–

58. The Board rejected the amendment because (1) substitute claim 21 lacked written description support as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, and (2) the substitute claims 

1 The parties do not separately address claims 22 

and 23 and apparently agree that the motion for leave to 

amend on those claims presents the same issues as claim 

21. 

 

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would improperly enlarge the scope of the claims as 

construed by the Board. 

Cuozzo appealed. The PTO intervened, and we granted Garmin’s motion to withdraw as appellee.2 We have 

jurisdiction to review the Board’s final decision under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

DISCUSSION

I 

IPRs proceed in two phases. St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 1375–76

(Fed. Cir. 2014). In the first phase, the PTO determines 

whether to institute IPR. In the second phase, the Board 

conducts the IPR proceeding and issues a final decision. 

Id. 

Cuozzo argues that the PTO improperly instituted 

IPR on claims 10 and 14 because the PTO relied on prior 

art that Garmin did not identify in its petition as grounds 

for IPR as to those two claims (though the prior art in 

question was identified with respect to claim 17). Under 

the statute, any petition for IPR must “identif[y] . . . with 

particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to 

each claim is based . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). Cuozzo

argues that the PTO may only institute IPR based on 

grounds identified in the petition because “[t]he Director 

may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted 

unless the Director determines that the information 

presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows 

that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner 

would prevail . . . .” Id. § 314(a). 

2 Garmin filed a motion to withdraw because it 

agreed not to participate in any appeal of the IPR written 

decision as part of a settlement agreement with Cuozzo. 

 

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Section 314(d) is entitled “No appeal” and provides 

that “[t]he determination by the Director whether to 

institute an inter partes review under this section shall be 

final and nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). The PTO 

argues that § 314(d) precludes review of a determination 

to institute IPR. Cuozzo argues that § 314(d) does not 

completely preclude review of the decision to institute 

IPR, but instead merely postpones review of the PTO’s 

authority until after the issuance of a final decision by the 

Board. 

We have previously addressed § 314(d) and have held 

that it precludes interlocutory review of decisions whether 

to institute IPR. In St. Jude, we characterized § 314(d) as 

a “broadly worded bar on appeal” and held that § 314(d) 

“certainly bars” interlocutory review of the PTO’s denial 

of a petition for IPR. 749 F.3d at 1375–76. This result was 

supported by § 319, which “authorizes appeals to this 

court only from ‘the final written decision of the 

[Board] . . . .’” Id. at 1375 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 319) (alteration in original). Similarly, the bar to interlocutory 

review is supported by 35 U.S.C. § 141(c), which “authorizes appeal only by ‘a party to an inter partes review . . . who is dissatisfied with the final written decision 

of the [Board] under section 318(a).’” Id. (quoting 35 

U.S.C. § 141(c)) (alterations in original). But while we 

stated that § 314 “may well preclude all review by any 

route,” we did not decide the issue. Id. at 1376.

We conclude that § 314(d) prohibits review of the decision to institute IPR even after a final decision. On its 

face, the provision is not directed to precluding review 

only before a final decision. It is written to exclude all 

review of the decision whether to institute review. Section 

314(d) provides that the decision is both “nonappealable” 

and “final,” i.e., not subject to further review. 35 U.S.C. 

§ 314(d). A declaration that the decision to institute is 

“final” cannot reasonably be interpreted as postponing 

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IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 7

bility. Moreover, given that § 319 and § 141(c) already 

limit appeals to appeals from final decisions, § 314(d) 

would have been unnecessary to preclude non-final review 

of institution decisions. Because § 314(d) is unnecessary

to limit interlocutory appeals, it must be read to bar 

review of all institution decisions, even after the Board 

issues a final decision. Nor does the IPR statute expressly 

limit the Board’s authority at the final decision stage to 

the grounds alleged in the IPR petition. It simply authorizes the Board to issue “a final written decision with 

respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged 

by the petitioner and any new claim added under section 

316(d).” 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). 

Our decision in In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1367 

(Fed. Cir. 1998), confirms the correctness of the PTO’s 

position here. There, even absent a provision comparable 

to § 314(d),3 we held that a flawed decision to institute 

reexamination under 35 U.S.C. § 303 was not a basis for 

setting aside a final decision. Hiniker, 150 F.3d at 1367. 

Under the statute at issue in Hiniker, reexamination 

could only be instituted if the Commissioner determined 

that there was “a substantial new question of patentability,” i.e., new prior art not considered by the examiner. 35 

U.S.C. § 303(a) (1994). In Hiniker, the PTO instituted 

reexamination based on prior art considered in the original examination (Howard). Hiniker, 150 F.3d at 1365. But 

the PTO’s final decision relied on East (which had not 

been before the examiner in the initial examination) in 

finding the claims invalid. Id. at 1366. We held that our 

3 Unlike § 314, the reexamination statute only provides that “[a] determination by the Commissioner . . . that no substantial new question of patentability 

has been raised will be final and nonappealable.” 35 

U.S.C. § 303(c) (1994) (emphasis added).

 

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jurisdiction was only “over Hiniker’s appeal from the

[final] decision of the Board.” Id. at 1367. While the final 

decision would have been subject to reversal if it had 

improperly relied only on prior art presented to the examiner,4 any error in instituting reexamination based on the 

Howard reference was “washed clean during the reexamination proceeding,” which relied on new art. Id. The fact 

that the petition was defective is irrelevant because a 

proper petition could have been drafted. The same is even 

clearer here, where § 314(d) explicitly provides that there 

is no appeal available of a decision to institute. There was

no bar here to finding claims 10 and 14 unpatentable 

based on the Evans and/or Wendt references. The failure 

to cite those references in the petition provides no ground 

for setting aside the final decision.

Cuozzo argues that Congress would not have intended 

to allow the PTO to institute IPR in direct contravention 

of the statute, for example, on grounds of prior public use 

where the IPR statute permits petitions only on the basis 

of “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 

35 U.S.C. § 311. The answer is that mandamus may be 

available to challenge the PTO’s decision to grant a petition to institute IPR after the Board’s final decision in 

situations where the PTO has clearly and indisputably 

exceeded its authority. 

The PTO argues that our previous decisions preclude 

mandamus. In In re Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC, 749 

F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014), we held that mandamus 

4 See In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 

789, superseded by statute as recognized by In re NTP, 

Inc., 654 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Recreative 

Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Congress 

subsequently amended the statute to provide for consideration of prior art before the examiner. 35 U.S.C. § 303. 

 

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relief was not available to challenge the denial of a petition for IPR. Given the statutory scheme, there was no 

“‘clear and indisputable right’ to challenge a noninstitution decision directly in this court,” as required for 

mandamus. Id. And in In re Procter & Gamble Co., 749 

F.3d 1376, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2014), we held that mandamus was not available to provide immediate review of a 

decision to institute IPR. There was no “clear and indisputable right to this court’s immediate review of a decision to institute an inter partes review, as would be 

needed for mandamus relief.” Id. at 1379. Furthermore, 

that “[wa]s not one of the rare situations in which irremediable interim harm c[ould] justify mandamus, which is 

unavailable simply to relieve [the patentee] of the burden 

of going through the inter partes review.” Id. (citation 

omitted). However, we did not decide the question of 

whether the decision to institute review is reviewable by 

mandamus after the Board issues a final decision or 

whether such review is precluded by § 314(d). Id. Nor do 

we do so now.

Even if § 314 does not bar mandamus after a final decision, at least “three conditions must be satisfied before 

[a writ of mandamus] may issue.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. 

Court for the D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). “First, ‘the 

party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other 

adequate means to attain the relief he desires.’” Id. (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 426 

U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (alteration in original)). That condition appears to be satisfied since review by appeal is 

unavailable. “Second, the petitioner must satisfy ‘the 

burden of showing that his right to issuance of the writ is 

clear and indisputable.’” Id. at 381 (internal quotations, 

citation, and alterations omitted). “Third, the issuing 

court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied 

that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id.

(citation omitted).

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Here, Cuozzo has not filed a mandamus petition, but 

even if we were to treat its appeal as a request for mandamus,5 the situation here is far from satisfying the clearand-indisputable requirement for mandamus. It is not 

clear that IPR is strictly limited to the grounds asserted 

in the petition. The PTO urges that instituting IPR of 

claims 10 and 14 based on the grounds for claim 17 was 

proper because claim 17 depends from claim 14, which 

depends from claim 10. Any grounds which would invalidate claim 17 would by necessary implication also invalidate claims 10 and 14. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet 

Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A broader 

independent claim cannot be nonobvious where a dependent claim stemming from that independent claim is 

invalid for obviousness.”). The PTO argues that Garmin 

implicitly asserted that claims 10 and 14 were unpatentable when it asserted that claim 17 was unpatentable. 

Whether or not the PTO is correct in these aspects, it is at 

least beyond dispute there is no clear and indisputable 

right that precludes institution of the IPR proceeding. We 

need not decide whether mandamus to review institution 

of IPR after a final decision is available in other circumstances. 

II

Cuozzo contends in addition that the Board erred in 

finding the claims obvious, arguing initially that the

5 See 16 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3932.1 

(3d ed. 2012) (“Many cases illustrate the seemingly converse proposition that . . . an appeal can substitute for a 

writ in the sense that an attempted appeal from an order 

that is nonappealable can be treated as a petition for a 

writ.” (citations omitted)). 

 

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Board should not have applied the broadest reasonable 

interpretation standard in claim construction. 

A 

The America Invents Act (“AIA”) created IPR, but the 

statute on its face does not resolve the issue of whether 

the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is appropriate in IPRs; it is silent on that issue. However, the 

statute conveys rulemaking authority to the PTO. It 

provides that “[t]he Director shall prescribe regulations,” 

inter alia, “setting forth the standards for the showing of 

sufficient grounds to institute . . . review,” and “establishing and governing inter partes review . . . and the relationship of such review to other proceedings . . . .” 35 

U.S.C. § 316(a)(2), (a)(4). Pursuant to this authority, the 

PTO has promulgated 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), which provides that “[a] claim in an unexpired patent shall be given 

its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.100(b). Cuozzo argues that the PTO lacked authority 

to promulgate § 42.100(b) and that the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is inappropriate in an adjudicatory IPR proceeding. The PTO argues that 35 U.S.C. 

§ 316 provides the necessary authority to the PTO to 

promulgate § 42.100(b) and that the broadest reasonable 

interpretation is appropriately applied in the IPR context. 

1 

Before addressing the scope of the PTO’s rulemaking 

authority, we consider the history of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard and the bearing of that 

history on the interpretation of the IPR statute. No section of the patent statute explicitly provides that the 

broadest reasonable interpretation standard shall or shall 

not be used in any PTO proceedings.

Nonetheless, the broadest reasonable interpretation 

standard has been applied by the PTO and its predecessor 

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for more than 100 years in various types of PTO proceedings. A 1906 PTO decision explained, “[n]o better method 

of construing claims is perceived than to give them in 

each case the broadest interpretation which they will 

support without straining the language in which they are 

couched.” Podlesak v. McInnerney, 1906 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 

265, 258. For more than a century, courts have approved 

that standard. See, e.g., Miel v. Young, 29 App. D.C. 481, 

484 (D.C. Cir. 1907) (“This claim should be given the 

broadest interpretation which it will support . . . .”); In re 

Rambus, Inc., 753 F.3d 1253, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(“Claims are generally given their ‘broadest reasonable 

interpretation’ consistent with the specification during 

reexamination.” (citation omitted)); In re Am. Acad. of Sci. 

Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Giving 

claims their broadest reasonable construction ‘serves the 

public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, 

finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified.’” (quoting In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. 

Cir. 1984))); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 

1997) (“[W]e reject appellants’ invitation to construe 

either of the cases cited by appellants so as to overrule, 

sub silentio, decades old case law. . . . It would be inconsistent with the role assigned to the PTO in issuing a 

patent to require it to interpret claims in the same manner as judges who, post-issuance, operate under the 

assumption the patent is valid. The process of patent 

prosecution is an interactive one.”); In re Carr, 297 F. 542, 

544 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (“For this reason we have uniformly 

ruled that claims will be given the broadest interpretation 

of which they reasonably are susceptible. This rule is a 

reasonable one, and tends not only to protect the real 

invention, but to prevent needless litigation after the 

patent has issued.”); In re Kebrich, 201 F.2d 951, 954 

(CCPA 1953) (“[I]t is . . . well settled that . . . the tribunals 

[of the PTO] and the reviewing courts in the initial consideration of patentability will give claims the broadest 

interpretation which, within reason, may be applied.”).

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This court has approved of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in a variety of proceedings, including initial examinations, interferences, and post-grant 

proceedings such as reissues and reexaminations. Indeed, 

that standard has been applied in every PTO proceeding 

involving unexpired patents.6 In doing so, we have cited 

the long history of the PTO’s giving claims their broadest 

reasonable construction. See, e.g., Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 

1571–72 (reexaminations); In re Reuter, 670 F.2d 1015, 

1019 (CCPA 1981) (reissues); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 

1404–05 (1969) (examinations); cf. Reese v. Hurst, 661 

F.2d 1222, 1236 (CCPA 1981) (interferences). Applying 

the broadest reasonable interpretation standard “reduce[s] the possibility that, after the patent is granted, 

the claims may be interpreted as giving broader coverage 

than is justified.” Reuter, 670 F.2d at 1015 (quoting Prater, 415 F.2d at 1404–05).

There is no indication that the AIA was designed to 

change the claim construction standard that the PTO has 

applied for more than 100 years. Congress is presumed to 

legislate against the background of the kind of longstanding, consistent existing law that is present here. Astoria 

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110 

(1991); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, 549 

F.3d 842, 848–49 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (improper to presume 

6 The claims of an expired patent are the one exception where the broadest reasonable interpretation is not 

used because the patentee is unable to amend the claims. 

Rambus, 753 F.3d at 1256 (“If, as is the case here, a 

reexamination involves claims of an expired patent, a 

patentee is unable to make claim amendments and the 

PTO applies the claim construction principles outlined by 

this court in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005).” (citations omitted)). 

 

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that congress would alter the backdrop of existing law sub 

silentio).

Moreover, Congress in enacting the AIA was well 

aware that the broadest reasonable interpretation standard was the prevailing rule. See 157 Cong. Rec. S1375 

(daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (allowing 

written statements to be considered in inter partes review 

“should . . . allow the Office to identify inconsistent 

statements made about claim scope—for example, cases 

where a patent owner successfully advocated a claim 

scope in district court that is broader than the ‘broadest 

reasonable construction’ that he now urges in an inter 

partes review”). It can therefore be inferred that Congress 

impliedly approved the existing rule of adopting the 

broadest reasonable construction.

Cuozzo argues that judicial or congressional approval 

of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard for

other proceedings is irrelevant here because the earlier 

judicial decisions relied on the availability of amendment, 

and the AIA limits amendments in IPR proceedings.7 

7 See, e.g., Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571–72 (“An 

applicant’s ability to amend his claims to avoid cited prior 

art distinguishes proceedings before the PTO from proceedings in federal district courts on issued patents.”

(emphasis added)); Reuter, 670 F.2d at 1019 (“It is well 

settled that claims before the PTO are to be given their 

broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the 

specification during the examination of a patent application since the applicant may then amend his claims . . . .”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Prater, 415 F.2d at 

1404–05 (“[T]his court has consistently taken the tack 

that claims yet unpatented are to be given the broadest 

reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification 

 

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But this case does not involve any restriction on 

amendment opportunities that materially distinguishes 

IPR proceedings from their predecessors in the patent 

statute. Section 316(d)(1) provides that a patentee may 

file one motion to amend in order to “[c]ancel any challenged patent claim” or “[f]or each challenged claim, 

propose a reasonable number of substitute claims,” 35 

U.S.C. § 316(d)(1), though “[a]n amendment . . . may not 

enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce 

new matter,” id. § 316(d)(3). The PTO regulations provide 

that “[a] patent owner may file one motion to amend a 

patent, but only after conferring with the Board.” 37 

C.F.R. § 42.221(a). “The presumption is that only one 

substitute claim would be needed to replace each challenged claim, and it may be rebutted by a demonstration 

of need.” Id. § 42.221(a)(3). The statute also provides that 

“[a]dditional motions to amend may be permitted upon 

the joint request of the petitioner and the patent owner . . . or as permitted by regulations prescribed by the 

Director.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(2). “A motion to amend may 

be denied where” the amendment either “does not respond 

to a ground of unpatentability involved in the [IPR] trial” 

or “seeks to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent 

or introduce new subject matter.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a)(2). 

Although the opportunity to amend is cabined in the 

IPR setting, it is thus nonetheless available. Here, the 

only procedural ground for rejecting the amendment that 

during the examination of a patent application since the 

applicant may then amend his claims . . . .”); see also, e.g., 

In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“As 

explained in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 

(MPEP) . . . , Applicant always has the opportunity to 

amend the claims during prosecution . . . .” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

 

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Cuozzo proposed was that it enlarged the scope of the 

claims, in violation of § 316(d)(3). A bar on post-issuance 

broadening has long been part of pre-IPR processes for 

which precedent approved use of the broadest reasonable 

construction. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251 (reissue beyond two 

years), id. § 305 (reexamination). Thus, the only amendment restriction at issue in this case does not distinguish 

pre-IPR processes or undermine the inferred congressional authorization of the broadest reasonable interpretation 

standard in IPRs. If there are challenges to be brought 

against other restrictions on amendment opportunities as 

incompatible with using the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, they must await another case.

The inference of congressional approval of the 

longstanding PTO construction standard also is not 

undermined by the fact that IPR may be said to be adjudicatory rather than an examination. The repeatedly 

stated rationale for using the broadest reasonable interpretation standard—that claim language can be modified 

when problems are identified in the PTO, see supra note 

7—does not turn on whether the PTO identifies the 

problems by adjudication or by examination. Indeed, 

interference proceedings are also in some sense adjudicatory, see Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 867–68 (Fed. Cir.

2007) (characterizing interference proceedings as adjudicatory and holding that the Board’s decision be reviewed 

on the record), yet interference proceedings use a variant 

of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, see 

Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 500 (Fed.

Cir. 1997) (“In the absence of ambiguity, it is fundamental 

that the language of a count should be given the broadest 

reasonable interpretation it will support . . . .” (quoting In 

re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 686 (CCPA 1981))). We conclude 

that Congress implicitly approved the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in enacting the AIA.

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2 

Even if we were to conclude that Congress did not itself approve the broadest reasonable interpretation 

standard in enacting the AIA, § 316 provides authority to 

the PTO to adopt the standard in a regulation. Section 

316(a)(2) provides that the PTO shall establish regulations “setting forth the standards for the showing of 

sufficient grounds to institute a review . . . .” 35 U.S.C. 

§ 316(a)(2). Section 316(a)(4) further provides the PTO 

with authority for “establishing and governing inter 

partes review under this chapter and the relationship of 

such review to other proceedings under this title.” Id.

§ 316(a)(4). The broadest reasonable interpretation 

standard affects both the PTO’s determination of whether 

to institute IPR proceedings and the proceedings after 

institution and is within the PTO’s authority under the 

statute.

Because Congress authorized the PTO to prescribe 

regulations, the validity of the regulation is analyzed 

according to the familiar Chevron framework. See United 

States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Wilder 

v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 675 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir.

2012). Under Chevron, the first question is “whether 

Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 

issue.” Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); accord Cooper Techs. Co. v. 

Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Hawkins v. United States, 469 F.3d 993, 1000 (Fed. Cir.

2006)). If the statute is ambiguous, the second question is 

“whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statutory language at issue.” 

Cooper, 536 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Hawkins, 469 F.3d at 

1000).

In the text of the IPR statute, Congress directed the 

PTO in IPR proceedings to determine the “patentability” 

of any “claim” put in issue. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a); see also id. 

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18 IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

§§ 311(b), 314(a). Congress was silent on the subject of 

how the PTO should construe the “claim,” and, if we 

assume arguendo that Congress did not itself approve (or 

reject) the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, 

step one of Chevron is satisfied. We proceed to step two of 

the Chevron analysis. The regulation here presents a 

reasonable interpretation of the statute. 

We do not draw that conclusion from any finding that 

Congress has newly granted the PTO power to interpret 

substantive statutory “patentability” standards. Such a 

power would represent a radical change in the authority 

historically conferred on the PTO by Congress, and we

could not find such a transformation effected by the 

regulation-authorizing language of § 316 any more than 

we could infer a dramatic change in PTO claim interpretation standards through the general language of the IPR 

provisions. Nevertheless, the language of § 316 readily 

covers the specific action the PTO has taken here, which 

is the opposite of a sharp departure from historical practice. The PTO has merely embodied in a regulation the 

approach it has uniformly applied, even without rulemaking, when it is interpreting “claims” to assess patentability. In so doing, the PTO has provided a uniform approach 

to be followed by the numerous possible three-member 

combinations of administrative patent judges that decide 

IPR proceedings. 

The adopted standard is reasonable not just because 

of its pedigree but for context-specific reasons. As discussed above, the policy rationales for the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in pre-IPR examination 

proceedings apply as well in the IPR context. The statute 

also provides for the PTO to exercise discretion to consolidate an IPR with another proceeding before the PTO. See

35 U.S.C. § 315(d). The possibility of consolidating multiple types of proceedings suggests a single claim construction standard across proceedings is appropriate. 37 

C.F.R. § 42.221(a) reflects a permissible construction of 

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the statutory language in § 316(a). Even if approval of the 

broadest reasonable interpretation standard were not 

incorporated into the IPR provisions of the statute, the 

standard was properly adopted by PTO regulation.

B 

The second issue is whether the Board here properly 

construed the claims under the broadest reasonable 

interpretation standard. We review the Board’s claim 

construction according to the Supreme Court's decision in 

Teva Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. 

Ct. 831, 841 (2015). We review underlying factual determinations concerning extrinsic evidence for substantial 

evidence and the ultimate construction of the claim de 

novo. See id. Because there is no issue here as to extrinsic 

evidence, we review the claim construction de novo.

Claim 10 includes the following limitation: “a speedometer integrally attached to said colored display.” ’074 

patent col. 7 l. 10. Cuozzo argues that the board improperly construed the phrase “integrally attached.” The Board 

construed “integrally attached” as meaning “discrete 

parts physically joined together as a unit without each 

part losing its own separate identity.” J.A. 9. Cuozzo 

contends that the correct construction of “integrally 

attached” should be broader—“joined or combined to work 

as a complete unit.” Appellant’s Br. 33. Before the Board, 

Cuozzo stated that its construction would cover “a display 

that both functionally and structurally integrates the 

speedometer and the colored display, such that there only 

is a single display.” J.A. 10. Cuozzo argues that the 

Board’s claim construction improperly excludes a singleLCD embodiment of the invention wherein the speedometer and the speed limit indicator are on the same LCD.

The phrase “integrally attached” was not included in 

either the specification or the claims as originally filed. 

The phrase was introduced by an amendment to claim 10

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20 IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

to overcome a rejection that the claim was anticipated 

under § 102(e) by Awada.8 

We see no error in the Board’s interpretation. The 

word “attached” must be given some meaning. As the 

Board explained, it would “be illogical to regard one unit 

as being ‘attached’ to itself.” J.A. 9. The specification 

further supports the Board’s construction that the speedometer and the speed limit are independent—it repeatedly refers to a speed limit indicator independent of any 

speedometer and states that “the present invention essentially comprises a speed limit indicator comprising a 

speed limit display and an attached speedometer.” ’074 

8 Claim 10 of the ’074 patent corresponds to the 

claim numbered as claim 11 during patent prosecution. 

Prior to amendment, claim 10 included the limitation: 

“a speedometer attached to said speed limit display.” J.A. 

100. Cuozzo’s proposed amendment to that limitation 

recited “a speedometer integrally attached to said colored 

display.” Id. In proposing the amendment, Cuozzo argued 

that the amendment overcame Awada because

“[t]he cited Awada (6,515,596) lacks a speedometer integrally attached to the speed limit display . . . . The vehicle’s driver is forced to look in 

two separate locations and then mentally compare 

the speed limit with his vehicle’s speed to determine how close he is to speeding if he is not already doing so sufficiently to activate the light 

and/or tone. . . . In contrast, the present invention 

provides an integrated display allowing the driver 

to immediately ascertain both his speed and its 

relation to the prevailing speed limit.” 

J.A. 104–05.

 

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IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 21

patent col. 2 ll. 52–54. The Board did not err in its claim 

construction.

C 

The third question is whether claims 10, 14, and 17 

were obvious. We review the Board’s factual findings for 

substantial evidence and review its legal conclusions de 

novo. In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012). The ultimate determination of obviousness 

under § 103 is a question of law based on underlying 

factual findings. Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 

U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)). What a reference teaches and the 

differences between the claimed invention and the prior 

art are questions of fact which we review for substantial 

evidence. Id. (citations omitted). Cuozzo states that, “[f]or 

the purposes of this appeal, claims 10, 14, and 17 rise and 

fall together.” Appellant Br. 17 n.1. Therefore, we analyze 

only claim 10.

Even under its own claim construction, Cuozzo agrees 

that the disclosed mechanical embodiment with a red 

colored filter is within the claim scope. In the analog

embodiment disclosed in the specification, a red filter is 

superimposed on a white speedometer so that “speeds 

above the legal speed limit are displayed in red . . . while 

the legal speeds are displayed in white . . . .” ’074 patent 

col. 5 ll. 35–37. A GPS unit tracks the vehicle’s location, 

and the speed limit at that location is determined. The 

red filter automatically rotates in response so that speeds 

over the legal speed limit are displayed in red. 

It is a “long-established rule that ‘claims which are 

broad enough to read on obvious subject matter are unpatentable even though they also read on nonobvious 

subject matter.’” Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 

F.3d 1318, 1328 n.4 (quoting In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 

1015 (CCPA 1972)) (internal alterations omitted). Thus if 

the mechanical embodiment is obvious, claim 10 is obvious. The Board determined that the mechanical embodiCase: 14-1301 Document: 82-2 Page: 21 Filed: 07/08/2015
22 IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

ment was obvious over Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt. We 

see no error in that determination. 

Aumayer discloses a display which shows a vehicle’s 

speed and indicates the current speed limit by highlighting the appropriate mark on a speed scale or by producing 

a scale mark of a different length or color. Aumayer col. 1 

l. 12, col. 5 ll. 19–31. Aumayer further teaches obtaining 

the current location of a vehicle from an on-board GPS, id. 

Abstract, col. 4 ll. 41–45, and “updating the speed limit 

data stored in the vehicle by means of a radio connection . . . by means of a data carrier,” id. col. 2 ll. 54–57. 

Figure 2a provides an illustration: 

Element 105 displays a maximum speed limit, and element 107 highlights this same speed limit on the speed 

scale. The pointer designated by element 102 displays the

vehicle’s current speed.

Evans discloses a transparent plate that “bears warning indicia, for example, a special color and/or a plurality 

of marks, spaces, ridges, etc. so that when the speedometer dial is viewed through it, a portion of the dial representing speeds in excess of a predetermined limit are 

demarked by the warning indicia.” Evans col. 2 ll. 3–8. 

The plate is generally fixed but can be removed and recut 

and/or repositioned in order to extend over a different 

range of numbers on the dial. Figure 3 is illustrative:

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Wendt discloses a speed limit indicator which is attachable by a suction cup to the cover of a speedometer. 

The indicator has a pointer which is rotatable to indicate 

the current speed limit. 

Cuozzo argues that Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt do 

not disclose “continuously updat[ing] the delineation of 

which speed readings are in violation of the speed limit at 

a vehicle's present location,” as required by claim 10. ’074 

patent col. 7 ll. 6–9. In particular, Cuozzo contends that 

Aumayer discloses updating speed limits associated with 

a region and not with a geographic position determined by 

the GPS locating device. The Board found that “it is 

indisputable that Aumayer displays the speed limit for 

the current location of a vehicle as determined by a GPS 

receiver, and not merely the speed limit for a certain class 

of road in a given region without any connection to the 

vehicle’s current location.” J.A. 34. The Board’s finding is 

supported by substantial evidence. 

Cuozzo also argues that there is no motivation to 

combine Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt because Aumayer is 

an automatic device while Evans and Wendt are manual 

devices. However, “[a]pplying modern electronics to older 

mechanical devices has been commonplace in recent 

years.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 

F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007). It would have been 

obvious to combine Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt to arrive 

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24 IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

at the analog embodiment. Cuozzo does not contend that 

any secondary considerations argue against a finding of 

obviousness. 

Claim 10 would have been obvious over Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt because it encompasses the analog embodiment of the invention discussed in the specification. 

We need not address whether claim 10 is also obvious 

over Tegethoff, Awada, Evans, and Wendt, as the Board 

also concluded.

D 

Finally, we consider whether the Board properly denied Cuozzo’s motion for leave to amend, finding that 

Cuozzo’s substitute claims would enlarge the scope of the 

patent. Cuozzo moved to substitute claim 10 with the 

following substitute claim 21: 

A speed limit indicator comprising: 

a global positioning system receiver determining a 

vehicle’s present location, a vehicle’s present 

speed and a speed limit at the vehicle’s present location; 

a display controller connected to said global positioning system receiver, wherein said display 

controller adjusts a colored display in response to signals indicative of the speed limit 

at the vehicle’s present location from said 

global positioning system receiver to continuously update the delineation of which speed 

readings determined by the global positioning 

system receiver are in violation of the speed 

limit at the vehicle’s present location; and 

a speedometer integrally attached to said colored 

display,

wherein the speedometer comprises a liquid crystal display, and 

wherein the colored display is the liquid crystal 

display.

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IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 25

J.A. 357–58. 

The statute and PTO regulation bar amendments 

which would broaden the scope of the claims. 35 U.S.C. 

§ 316(d)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a)(2)(ii). In the past, we 

have construed this requirement in the context of reissues 

and reexaminations. In both contexts, we have applied 

the test that a claim “is broader in scope than the original 

claims if it contains within its scope any conceivable 

apparatus or process which would not have infringed the 

original patent.” Tillotson, Ltd. v. Walbro Corp., 831 F.2d 

1033, 1037 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in the reissue context); see 

In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Tillotson, 831 F.2d at 1037 n.2) (in the reexamination 

context). The same test applies in the context of IPRs. 

Therefore, we inquire whether Cuozzo’s proposed substitute claims would encompass any apparatus or process 

that would not have been covered by the original claims.9

The Board held that claim 21 was broadening because it 

would encompass a single-LCD embodiment wherein both 

the speedometer and the colored display are LCDs, which 

was not within the original claims. Cuozzo argues that 

the proposed claims were not broadening and instead 

copied limitations from two dependent claims in the 

patent. 

9 Cuozzo argues that its substitute claim is narrowing because it is limited to the single-LCD embodiment 

and no longer would encompass the mechanical embodiment. This argument misstates the test for broadening. 

“[A] claim is broadened if it is broader in any respect than 

the original claim, even though it may be narrowed in 

other respects.” In re Rogoff, 261 F.2d 601, 603 (CCPA

1958); see also Senju Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., 746 

F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

 

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26 IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

Based on the proper construction of the phrase “integrally attached,” we agree with the PTO that Cuozzo’s 

proposed amendment is broadening. Cuozzo itself argues 

that the motion to amend was denied solely because of the 

PTO’s interpretation of “integrally attached,” and argues 

only that a remand is necessary if we were to reverse the

Board’s claim construction (which we have not done).

Cuozzo admits that the Board’s construction of “integrally 

attached” “excludes the single LCD embodiment of the 

invention in which the speedometer includes an LCD that 

is the colored display.” Appellant Br. 33. Proposed claim 

21 recites “a speedometer integrally attached to said 

colored display, wherein the speedometer comprises a 

liquid crystal display, and wherein the colored display is 

the liquid crystal display.” J.A. 358 (emphasis added). The 

word “the,” emphasized in the quoted language above, 

requires a single-LCD embodiment that includes both the 

speedometer and the colored display in one LCD. Because 

proposed claim 21 would encompass an embodiment not 

encompassed by claim 10, it is broadening, and the motion 

to amend was properly denied.

AFFIRMED

Case: 14-1301 Document: 82-2 Page: 26 Filed: 07/08/2015
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,

Appellant 

______________________ 

2014-1301

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2012-

00001.

______________________ 

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent, for the panel majority’s rulings 

are contrary to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 

Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (effective September 16, 2012).

The America Invents Act established new postissuance patent review systems, for the purpose of 

“providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.” H.R. Rep. No. 112–98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011). This 

purpose is achieved by new forms of proceedings in the 

Patent and Trademark Office, whereby a new adjudicatory body, called the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

(PTAB), serves as a surrogate for district court litigation 

of patent validity. These adjudicative proceedings in the 

PTO are designed “to review the validity of a patent . . . in 

a court-like proceeding.” H.R. Rep. No. 112–98, pt. 1, at 8. 

The goal is improved service to technology-based innovation, and thus to the national interest in creative advance 

Case: 14-1301 Document: 82-2 Page: 27 Filed: 07/08/2015
2 IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

and industrial growth. The panel majority thwarts the 

statutory plan in several ways.

First, the panel majority holds that the PTAB, in conducting these adversarial post-grant proceedings, need

not and should not apply the same patent claim construction as is required to be applied in the courts. Instead, 

the panel majority ratifies treating the claims of an issued 

patent as if they are the proposed claims in the patent 

application examination stage, when proposed claims are 

subject to the “broadest reasonable interpretation” examination expedient. The panel majority thus precludes 

achieving PTAB adjudication of patent validity comparable to that of the district courts, where validity is determined on the legally correct claim construction, not an 

artificial temporary “broadest” construction. The “broadest” construction is designed to facilitate examination 

before grant, not to confound litigation after grant.

As a further departure from the legislative plan, the 

majority holds that the “final and nonappealable” statutory provision relating to whether to institute post-grant 

proceedings means that “§ 314(d) . . . must be read to bar 

review of all institution decisions, even after the Board 

issues a final decision.” Maj. op. at 7. This restraint 

could bar review of information material to the final 

PTAB judgment, and may in turn impede full judicial 

review of the PTAB’s decision. This further diminishes 

the role of the PTO as a reliable arbiter of patent validity.

Several other aspects of the America Invents Act are 

confusingly treated in the majority opinion. For example, 

as Cuozzo points out, here the PTAB decision relies on 

arguments and evidence that had not been raised in the 

Petition to Institute, although the statute requires that 

all arguments and evidence must be presented in the 

Petition. The panel majority states that “[t]he fact that 

the petition was defective is irrelevant because a proper 

petition could have been drafted.” Maj. op. at 8. Such 

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IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 3

casual disregard of this statutory provision cannot have 

been intended, by the legislation, and sets a dubious 

precedent for responsible proceedings. 

The post-grant proceedings established by the America Invents Act were intended as a far-reaching surrogate 

for district court validity determinations. The premise is 

that an adversarial evidentiary proceeding in the PTO 

can reliably resolve most issues of patent validity, without 

the expense and delay of district court litigation, and 

sometimes even before infringement has occurred. The 

court today moves these new proceedings in directions 

inimical to the content and provisions of the America 

Invents Act, impeding the statutory purpose. 

I 

PTO Post-Grant Proceedings as a Surrogate for District Court Litigation

During six years of discussion, hearings, negotiation, 

and collaboration among the communities of technologybased industry, inventors, legislators, scholars, bar associations, and the concerned public, solution was sought to 

a major problem confronting United States industrial 

advance: the burgeoning patent litigation and the accompanying cost, delay, and overall disincentive to investment in innovation. 

The fruit of these efforts, the America Invents Act, is 

a thoughtful, creative, and ambitious statute whose 

cornerstone is the shift of patent validity disputes from 

the courts to the expert agency that previously was concerned primarily with examination for patentability. 

Previously, disputes of validity of issued patents were the 

exclusive province of the courts. Now, the America Invents Act not only authorizes the PTO to conduct litigation-type adversarial proceedings to decide patent 

validity, but also authorizes such proceedings even when 

there is no “controversy” under Article III.

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4 IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

The premise of the America Invents Act is that these 

new PTO proceedings will provide a reliable early decision, by technology-trained patent-savvy adjudicators, 

with economies of time and cost. See 157 Cong. Rec.

S7413 (Nov. 14, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith) (“The 

new transitional program . . . creates an inexpensive and 

speedy alternative to litigation—allowing parties to 

resolve [disputes] rather than spending millions of dollars 

in litigation costs.”).

The goal is to improve the climate for investment and 

industrial activity, while facilitating the removal of patents that were improvidently granted. See Changes to 

Implement Transitional Program for Covered Business

Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 7080, 7081 (Feb. 10, 2012) 

(“The purpose . . . is to establish a more efficient and 

streamlined patent system that will improve patent 

quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive 

litigation costs.”). An obstacle to achieving this purpose is 

the refusal of the PTO to construe patent claims in accordance with the law of claim construction that is applied in the courts—an obstacle now endorsed by the 

Federal Circuit. 

Claim construction is the first step in determining the 

validity of patent claims. In an adjudicatory proceeding 

for issued patents, the claims must be construed in accordance with law. In establishing this new adjudicatory

system in the PTO, the record shows no debate about 

whether the PTO, in deciding the validity of issued patents, should apply a different law from the law applied in 

the courts. The America Invents Act plainly contemplated that the new PTO tribunal would determine validity of 

issued patents on the legally and factually correct claim 

construction, not on a hypothetical “broadest” expedient 

as is used in examination of proposed claims in pending 

applications.

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The America Invents Act, in authorizing the PTO to 

determine validity by conducting adversarial proceedings, 

including discovery, depositions, witnesses, experts, briefs 

and arguments, is designed to reach the correct result in 

the PTO, the same correct result as in the district courts. 

See H.R. Rep. No. 112–98, pt. 1, at 75 (describing these 

new post-grant proceedings as “adjudicative systems” 

comparable to district court validity determinations). 

This legislative purpose fails when the PTO tribunal uses 

a different standard of claim construction, a standard that 

does not require the correct claim construction.

The legislative record contains no support for the majority’s view that Congress intended that the new PTO 

tribunal need not construe the claims of issued patents 

correctly. The legislative record does not show a congressional intent that issued patents should be more readily 

invalidated in these PTO proceedings than in the courts, 

by broadening the claims into invalidity. This PTO 

procedure distorts, indeed defeats, the legislative purpose 

of providing an administrative surrogate for district court 

determination of patent validity. 

Patent claims must be correctly construed for validity as for infringement

The construction of patent claims, their meaning and 

their scope, is the foundation of patent law. As stated in 

Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Phillips Electronics North 

American Corp., “[l]egal doctrine in patent law starts with 

the construction of patent claims, for the claims measure 

the legal rights provided by the patent.” 744 F.3d 1272, 

1282 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (vacated on other grounds). These 

legal rights must be the “correct” rights, not some fuzzy 

“broadest” measure.

Patent claims are construed as a matter of law, as 

limited by the specification, the prosecution history, and 

the prior art. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005) (en banc). Because exclusive rights are deterCase: 14-1301 Document: 82-2 Page: 31 Filed: 07/08/2015
6 IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

mined thereby, claims are construed the same way for 

validity as for infringement. No statute, no precedent, 

authorizes or even tolerates broader construction for 

validity than for infringement. It cannot have been 

contemplated in the America Invents Act that instead of 

applying the correct claim construction for adjudication of 

validity, the PTAB would seek an undefined broadest

interpretation to the claims, and then decide the validity 

of broadest claims that were never granted to the applicant.

The question is not whether a “broadest” construction 

protocol has a place in the examination of pending applications, where proposed claims are readily amended in 

the give-and-take of patent prosecution. However, after 

the patent has issued, announcing a property right on 

which the patentee and the public rely, the claims must 

be construed correctly. Absent commitment to the correct 

construction, this new forum for adjudication fails its 

purpose of providing an effective determination of validity. This failure cannot be what the legislators and supporters of the America Invents Act intended when they 

authorized the PTO to establish an administrative tribunal to determine patent validity through adjudicatory 

process.

“Broadest reasonable interpretation” is an examination expedient, not the law of claim construction

The broadest reasonable interpretation is authorized 

for use in the examination of pending applications, as the 

applicant and the examiner interact to define the invention so as to distinguish or avoid overlap with prior art. 

See In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“an 

essential purpose of patent examination is to fashion 

claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous.”) 

Id. The purpose of construing claims broadly during 

examination is to restrict or clarify the applicant’s proposed claims, not to broaden them. See In re Yamamoto,

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740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (the PTO broadly interprets claims 

during examination since the applicant may “amend his 

claims to obtain protection commensurate with his actual 

contribution to the art”) (quoting In re Prater, 415 F.2d 

1393, 1404–05 (CCPA 1969)); see generally MPEP § 2111 

(requiring the application of the “broadest reasonable 

interpretation” to pending claims). 

Giving proposed claims their broadest reasonable interpretation “serves the public interest by reducing the 

possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given 

broader scope than is justified.” Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 

1571; see In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)

(the broadest interpretation “is not unfair to applicants, 

because ‘before a patent is granted the claims are readily 

amended as part of the examination process’”) (quoting

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581, 1583 

(Fed. Cir. 1987)).

The “broadest” protocol aids the applicant and the examiner in defining claim scope during prosecution. It is 

not a claim construction on which substantive legal rights 

of validity or infringement are based, or are intended to 

be based. In contrast, applying the broadest interpretation to issued claims in these PTO post-grant validity 

determinations does not serve to restrict or clarify claims. 

Instead, this activity now appears to be used by the PTAB 

to broaden issued claims inappropriately, for claims can 

be broadened until they read on prior art—the result 

about which Cuozzo complains.

These post-grant proceedings provide no right to 

amend the issued claims, and permission to amend 

is restricted

A critical difference between the standard procedure 

of examination of pending applications, and these postgrant proceedings, is the ready pre-grant availability of 

amendment of the claims. Patent prosecution is a fluid 

exchange between the examiner and the applicant, and

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the expedient of broadest reasonable interpretation 

during examination is based on, and depends on, the 

applicant’s right to amend the claims. In Yamamoto the 

court stressed this difference from judicial proceedings:

An applicant’s ability to amend his claims to avoid 

cited prior art distinguishes proceedings before 

the PTO from proceedings in federal district 

courts on issued patents. When an application is 

pending in the PTO, the applicant has the ability 

to correct errors in claim language and adjust the 

scope of claim protection as needed. This opportunity is not available in an infringement action 

in district court.

740 F.2d at 1572.

In routine examination and reexamination, the 

amendment of a claim is a back-and-forth process between an examiner and the applicant, who may present 

amendments and new claims. Reexamination is “conducted according to the procedures established for initial 

examination under the provisions of Sections 132 and 

133.” 35 U.S.C. § 305. The focus of reexamination proceedings “returns essentially to that present in an initial 

examination.” In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 

1985).

It is significant that when claims in reexamination 

are not eligible for amendment, as when the patent has 

expired, the PTO instructs examiners not to use the 

broadest reasonable interpretation. MPEP § 2258G 

states:

In a reexamination proceeding involving claims of 

an expired patent, claim construction pursuant to 

the principle set forth by the court in Phillips v. 

AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 

(words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a 

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IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 9

person of ordinary skill in the art in question at 

the time of the invention) should be applied since 

the expired claims are not subject to amendment.

The panel majority is incorrect in concluding that Inter 

Partes Review proceedings are not materially different 

with respect to the opportunity to amend. Amid the Inter 

Partes Review restrictions, patent owners are limited to 

“one motion to amend,” and are presumptively limited to 

substituting one issued claim for one amended claim. 37 

C.F.R. § 42.221(a)(3). There is no right of amendment in 

these new post-grant proceedings, and motions to amend 

are rarely granted.1 The majority trivializes this difference, curiously stating that these post grant proceedings 

do not “involve any restriction on amendment opportunities that materially distinguishes IPR proceedings from 

their predecessors in the patent statute.” Maj. op. at 15. 

That is incorrect. Amendment in post-grant validity 

proceedings is not of right, and thus far appears to be

almost entirely illusory.

It is beyond debate that Inter Partes Review does not 

allow the kind of iterative amendment process that is part 

of the “broadest reasonable interpretation” protocol in 

examination. The restricted role of amendment in the 

America Invents Act proceedings comports with the 

1 See Andrew Williams, PTAB Update – The Board 

Grants Its Second Motion to Amend (At Least in Part), 

PATENT DOCS (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.patentdocs.org/

2015/01/ptab-update-the-board-grants-its-second-motionto-amend-at-least-in-part.html; see also Jennifer E. 

Hoekel, PTAB Grants First Opposed Motion to Amend 

Claims-Patent Trial and Appeal Board, THE NATIONAL 

LAW REVIEW (January 14, 2015), 

http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ptab-grants-firstopposed-motion-to-amend-claims-patent-trial-and-appealboard. 

 

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intended and expected “correct” claim construction, not 

the broadest claim construction. It comports with district 

court practices in adjudication, not PTO practices in 

examination. 

The America Invents Act designed these post-grant 

review proceedings as an adjudicatory process

The majority discounts the adjudicatory purpose of 

these new PTO proceedings. The majority states that 

“[t]he inference of congressional approval of the 

longstanding PTO construction standard also is not 

undermined by the fact that IPR may be said to be adjudicatory rather than an examination.” Maj. op. at 16. To 

the contrary, these differences between adjudication and 

examination are the fruit of six years of planning, to 

produce a new adversarial system in the PTO. 

The extensive congressional criticism of the nowdiscarded inter partes reexamination belies the majority’s 

“inference” that Congress silently approved practices it 

was not explicitly adopting. These discarded practices 

resulted in lengthy delays as well as indecisive results. 

See Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data *1 (USPTO 

Nov. 22, 2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/

stats/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2013.pdf. 

(last visited June 16, 2015) (average pendency of inter 

partes reexamination was three years).

The America Invents Act was designed to remedy 

these flaws, and to provide an adjudicatory proceeding 

with the benefits of adversary participation. Thus the Act 

provides for discovery, witnesses, argument, and other 

litigation procedures. The House Report explained that 

Congress intended to “convert” inter partes reexamination 

“from an examinational proceeding to an adjudicative 

proceeding.” H.R. Rep. No. 112–98, pt. 1, at 46–48 (2011); 

id. at 75 (describing post-grant proceedings and Inter 

Partes Review as “adjudicative systems”). The House 

Report states:

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IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 11

Unlike reexamination proceedings, which provide 

only a limited basis on which to consider whether 

a patent should have issued, the post-grant review 

proceeding permits a challenge on any ground related to invalidity under section 282. The intent 

of the post-grant review process is to enable early 

challenges to patents . . . . The Committee believes that this new, early-stage process for challenging patent validity . . . will make the patent 

system more efficient and improve the quality of 

patents and the patent system.

Id. at 46.

Inter partes review under the America Invents Act is 

designed to achieve the benefits of validity proceedings in 

the district courts. In the PTAB’s words, “[a]n inter 

partes review is neither a patent examination nor a 

patent reexamination,” but is “a trial, adjudicatory in 

nature [which] constitutes litigation.” Google Inc. v. 

Jongerius Panoramic Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00191, Paper 

No. 50, at 4 (Feb. 13, 2014). The PTO’s insistence on 

applying the same artificial claim construction methodology as in pre-grant examination is curious, indeed a 

negation of the purpose and obligation of this new adjudicatory process.

To conduct this adjudicatory process as the intended

surrogate for court actions, the PTAB must apply the 

same law as is required of the district courts. By imposing the protocol of broadest reasonable interpretation, the 

PTO and the panel majority frustrate the legislative 

purpose. The PTO tribunal cannot serve as a surrogate 

for district court litigation if the PTAB does not apply the 

correct claim construction, but deliberately applies a 

“broadest” construction. The possibility of error, the 

unreliability of result, cannot be salvaged by the possibility that sometimes it may not matter to the result. These 

new procedures will become no more than a tactical 

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vehicle for delay, harassment, and expenditure, despite 

the Congressional warning:

While this amendment is intended to remove current disincentives to current administrative processes, the changes made by it are not to be used 

as tools for harassment or a means to prevent 

market entry through repeated litigation and administrative attacks on the validity of a patent. 

Doing so would frustrate the purpose of the section as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.

H.R. Rep. No. 112–98, pt. 1, at 47 (2011).

The “broadest reasonable interpretation” examination 

protocol has no role in adjudication of validity in the 

courts. Correct adjudication of validity requires correct 

claim construction, not the broadest construction. These 

new PTO proceedings have no place for this inapplicable

expedient.

The public notice function of claims is defeated by a 

“broadest” interpretation of claim scope

These new proceedings are intended to provide an efficient test of the notice to the public as to what is covered 

by the claims. The public interest is in the actual scope of 

the claims, correctly construed—not their broadest interpretation. Uniformity in claim construction is critical to 

avoid “a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement 

claims [that] would discourage invention only a little less 

than unequivocal foreclosure of the field.” Markman v. 

Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996).

Section 112(b) of Title 35 states: “The specification 

shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which 

the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.” 

As the Cuozzo situation illustrates, the broadest interpreCase: 14-1301 Document: 82-2 Page: 38 Filed: 07/08/2015
IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 13

tation is in tension with the role of the specification, as 

well as the prosecution history, which not only provides 

information to the public about the scope and meaning of 

the claims, but also is a long-recognized source of claim 

interpretation and limitation. Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 

see Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 

1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (the prosecution history “constitute[s] the public record of the patentee’s claim, a record 

on which the public is entitled to rely.”) Decades of precedent instruct how claims are construed and how validity 

is determined when litigating over issued patents. If 

these new post-grant proceedings are to serve the purposes intended by the America Invents Act, the claims of 

issued patents must be construed the same way in these 

PTO proceedings as in the courts.

The broadest interpretation is irreconcilable with the

traditional obligations of claim construction and public 

notice. In the public interest, it is unacceptable to create 

a situation whereby the tribunals charged with determination of patent validity as a matter of law, that is, the 

PTAB and the district court, could validly reach a different result on the same evidence. 

Agency rulemaking authority is to implement the 

statute, not to change the statute

The America Invents Act directs the PTO to promulgate regulations “establishing and governing” these 

proceedings “and the relationship of such review to other 

proceedings under this title.” 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(4), 

326(a)(4). This authority relates to the “Conduct of postgrant review” and “Conduct of inter partes review.” The 

word “conduct” connotes procedure. Section 316 identifies 

areas whose conduct is assigned to the PTO, including 

public access to proceedings, discovery rules, and the right 

to a hearing. I discern no authorization to the PTO to 

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change the law of how claims of issued patents are construed. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 112–98, pt. 1, at 76.

The panel majority states that it is merely deferring

to the PTO’s interpretation of its statutory authority. 

Deference is not unlimited; the Court advises that “although an agency’s interpretation of the statute under 

which it operates is entitled to some deference, ‘this 

deference is constrained by our obligation to honor the 

clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, 

purpose, and history.’” Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 

397 (1979) (quoting Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 

566 n. 20 (1979)); see Muwwakkil v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 

18 F.3d 921, 925 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“When an agency’s 

interpretation of a statute it is entrusted to administer is 

contrary to the intent of Congress, as divined from the 

statute and its legislative history, we owe it no deference.”). 

In promulgating 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b) to authorize 

and require the broadest reasonable interpretation for 

these new proceedings, the PTO departed from the purpose of the America Invents Act to create a surrogate for 

district court litigation. Regulations must serve the 

statute they seek to implement. See Ernst & Ernst v. 

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213–14 (1976) (“The rulemaking 

power granted to an administrative agency charged with 

the administration of a federal statute is not the power to 

make law. Rather, it is the power to adopt regulations to 

carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the 

statute.”). 

The America Invents Act refers to the “proper meaning of a patent claim,” see 35 U.S.C. § 301(d) (referring to 

“the proper meaning of a patent claim in a proceeding 

that is ordered or instituted pursuant to section 304, 314, 

or 324”). The “proper meaning” is the correct meaning, 

applying the law of claim construction. The new PTO 

regulation authorizing “broadest reasonable interpretaCase: 14-1301 Document: 82-2 Page: 40 Filed: 07/08/2015
IN RE: CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 15

tion” in these post-grant proceedings defeats “the will of 

Congress as expressed in the statute,” Ernst & Ernst, 425 

U.S. at 214, for it defeats the purpose of substituting 

administrative adjudication for district court adjudication. The curious result is that patentees are required in 

these new PTO proceedings to defend the validity of 

claims that are construed to be of broader scope than the 

claims granted upon PTO examination.

II

The decision to institute Inter Partes 

Review

The America Invents Act states that the PTO’s decision whether to institute review is “final and nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The majority states that “On its 

face, the provision is not directed to precluding review 

only before a final decision. It is written to exclude all 

review of the decision whether to institute review.” Maj. 

op. at 6. The statute does not mean that all information 

presented with the petition to institute is barred from 

consideration on appeal of the final decision.

The stated purpose of the “final and nonappealable” 

provision is to control interlocutory delay and harassing 

filings. However, review is not barred of material aspects 

that were decided in connection with the petition to 

institute. In Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family 

Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986), the Court explained 

that “[f]rom the beginning ‘our cases [have established] 

that judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of 

Congress’,” (alteration in original) (quoting Abbott Labs. 

v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)).

In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 

340 (1984), the Court summarized the principle of judicial 

review of agency determinations:

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Whether and to what extent a particular statute 

precludes judicial review is determined not only 

from its express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the 

administrative action involved.

Id. at 345. In this case, Cuozzo argues that the petition to 

institute was improperly granted. The statute does not 

preclude judicial review of whether the statute was applied in accordance with its legislated scope. 

Conclusion 

The America Invents Act was enacted to enable the 

PTO to resolve validity issues, at reduced cost and delay. 

This goal is defeated by the court’s preservation of the

PTO’s new regulatory discrepancy between validity 

determinations under the America Invents Act and in the 

district courts. The purpose of invigorating the incentive 

role of patents, by providing a faster, cheaper, and reliable determination of the validity of issued patents is thus 

undercut—to no benefit, and in derogation of this oncepromising legislative initiative.

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