Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03304/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03304-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City and County of San Francisco
Defendant
Damien Fahey
Defendant
Adrienne Macbeth
Plaintiff
Kevin Worrell
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADRIENNE MACBETH,

Plaintiff(s),

 vs.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

et al.,

Defendant(s). /

No. C 07-3304 MEJ

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND

THROUGH NINTH CAUSES OF

ACTION

ORDER VACATING OCTOBER 11, 2007

HEARING AND SCHEDULING CMC ON

NOVEMBER 15, 2007 AT 10:00 A.M.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendants City and County of San Francisco, Kevin Worrell, and

Damien Fahey's ("Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Second through Ninth Causes of Action for

failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court finds a hearing

unnecessary and VACATES the October 11, 2007 hearing. After consideration of the parties'

papers, relevant statutory and case law authority, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby

GRANTS Defendants' motion for the reasons set forth below.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following factual allegations are taken from the complaint. On March 31, 2006, Plaintiff

Adrienne MacBeth ("Plaintiff") and her friend, Jane Doe, were at a bar in North Beach having drinks

with a stranger when the bartender accused Plaintiff of having failed to pay a previous bill and,

ultimately, told her to heave the bar or the police would be called. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-12.) Humiliated

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and insulted at being confronted like this in public, Jane Doe agreed that the police should be called;

Plaintiff and Jane Doe then left the bar and waited outside for the police to arrive. (Compl. ¶ 12.)

Defendant Officers Kevin Worrell and Damien Fahey arrived by patrol car shortly thereafter. 

(Compl. ¶ 13.) The officers went into the bar, and Plaintiff "could hear the people inside the bar

with the two officers laughing and calling them derogatory names, such as 'slut.'" (Compl. ¶ 13.) 

Outraged, Plaintiff kicked the bar door to show her anger. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Within seconds, Officers

Worrell and Fahey rushed outside, grabbed Plaintiff, "handcuffed her wrists in an excessively tight

manner," dragged her behind their patrol car in a dark alley so passersby would be unable to see,

pushed her to the ground such that she landed on her face, and began kicking her while she was

handcuffed on the ground. (Compl. ¶ 14.). Plaintiff felt at least one extremely forceful kick to her

body and recalls one of the officers said "just do it." (Compl. ¶ 14.) 

Meanwhile, Jane Doe was yelling for passersby to come to Plaintiff's aid. (Compl. ¶ 15.) 

When Jane Doe flagged two witnesses and showed them what was happening, the officers stopped

kicking Plaintiff, ran the witnesses off, and arrested Jane Doe. (Compl. ¶ 15.) They then slammed

Plaintiff's head into the patrol car and asked her to sign a citation. (Compl. ¶ 16.) When Plaintiff

refused, they slammed her head against the patrol car even harder, causing blood to "gush down the

side of her head." (Compl. ¶ 16.)

Eventually an ambulance arrived at the scene to attend to Plaintiff, who was so seriously

injured that she was taken to the Trauma Center at San Francisco General Hospital. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-

17.) Officers Fahey and Worrell escorted Plaintiff to the hospital, but refused to loosen the

handcuffs until a doctor at the hospital advised the officers that they needed to be loosened because

they were injuring her. (Compl. ¶ 17.) After the hospital released Plaintiff, Officers Fahey and

Worrell took her to the police station where, upon learning that she would not be released until she

signed the citation, Plaintiff signed the citation and was released. (Compl. ¶ 18.) 

As a result of the incident, Plaintiff suffered injuries including bruises, serious back and hip

problems, and walking with a limp because of right hip and back pain. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff also

alleges severe emotional and mental distress, medical expenses, loss of past and future income, and

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attorney's fees and expenses. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-27.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant City and

County of San Francisco ("the City") had been given notice of a pattern of ongoing constitutional

violations and practices of excessive force and false arrests in the North Beach area, and that the

City failed to take adequate measures to prevent the practice. (Compl. ¶ 20.)

B. Procedural Background

On June 22, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiff

alleges causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Civil Code section 52.1, as well as

five torts - battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of

emotional distress, and negligence. 

On August 13, 2007, Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss, as well as the

Declaration of Matthew Rothschild in support thereof and a Request for Judicial Notice.

On August 31, 2007, Plaintiff filed an Opposition.

On September 27, 2007, Defendants filed a Reply.

III. DISCUSSION

In their motion, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's Second through Ninth Causes of

Action. Defendants argue the second cause of action, which seeks relief for alleged "violation of

Fourteenth Amendment," is barred because the specific actions complained of are covered by the

Fourth Amendment, which Plaintiff alleges in her first cause of action. Defendants also argue the

third cause of action, which seeks relief for the alleged "violation of Civil Right to Life and Liberty"

under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments should be dismissed for the same reason as the

second, and also because it fails to state facts to support its equal protection claim. Finally, as to the

fourth through ninth causes of action, Defendants argue that each claim fails because Plaintiff failed

to comply with the claims filing requirement found in the California Government Code. 

In her Opposition, Plaintiff states that she does not oppose Defendants' motion as it relates to

the third through ninth causes of action. Accordingly, those causes of action are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. Thus, only Plaintiff's second cause of action is at issue. As to that cause of

action, Plaintiff argues that her complaint states an independent violation of substantive due process

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rights against the City. Plaintiff further argues that she alleges excessive force independent from the

excessive force used to "seize" her.

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(6) "tests the

legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). FRCP 8(a),

which states that plaintiff's pleadings must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief," provides the standard for judging whether such a cognizable

claim exists. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). This standard is a

liberal one that does not require plaintiff to set forth all the factual details of his claim; rather, all that

the standard requires is that plaintiff give defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds for

making that claim. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intell & Coord Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168

(1993) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 

Under FRCP 12(b)(6), a complaint "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim

unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980) (citing Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)); see also Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. All material allegations in the

complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. In re Silicon

Graphics, Inc. Sec Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir. 1999). 

If the court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. 

The court "should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. Application to the Case at Bar

Plaintiff's first cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges that Defendants acted under

color of law to deprive her of "the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures, as

guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution." (Compl. ¶ 29.) Her

second cause of action pleads a distinct legal theory under § 1983: violations of her "constitutionally

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protected rights, including but not limited to substantive due process protections under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution." (Compl. ¶ 32.) Defendants argue that

this substantive due process claim must be dismissed.

In any action under § 1983, "the first step is to identify the exact contours of the underlying

right said to have been violated." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998)

(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)). The Fourteenth Amendment substantive due

process right is understood to protect individuals from "the arbitrary exercise of the powers of

government, unrestrained by the established principles of private right and distributive justice." Id.

at 846 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)). However, the Fourteenth

Amendment does not cover all aspects of alleged arbitrary government behavior. Instead, "where a

particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a

particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of

substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Id. at 842. Thus, the Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures governs the legality and

manner of seizures; that Amendment governs the action "to the exclusion of any possible application

of substantive due process." Id. at 841. Accordingly, Plaintiff's second cause of action should be

dismissed.

In her opposition, Plaintiff raises two arguments in support of her second cause of action. 

First, Plaintiff cites to County of Sacramento v. Lewis and argues that her excessive force claims

may be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment if the officers arbitrarily used excessive force

independent of their goal of performing a "seizure." This argument is without merit. In Lewis, the

Supreme Court found that the § 1983 claim at issue must be analyzed under the Fourteenth

Amendment's substantive due process clause because no search or seizure had occurred, so the

Fourth Amendment could not apply. 523 U.S. at 843. Here, Plaintiff alleges Fourth Amendment

violations and, as discussed above, the more generalized notion of substantive due process does not

apply where a particular Amendment provides constitutional protection. Id. at 842.

Plaintiff also argues that her second cause of action may proceed against the City because it

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is directly liable even if no individual officer violated her constitutional rights. Plaintiff's argument

is, again, without merit. If it is found that the individual officers did not deprive Plaintiff of her

constitutional rights, such finding would be dispositive of her municipal liability claim. See City of

Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) ("[N]either Monell [] nor any other of our cases

authorizes the award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its

officers when in fact . . . the officer inflicted no constitutional harm."). 

Plaintiff cites Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that

a government entity can be held liable for putting poorly trained officers on the street even where the

individual officers are exonerated. In Hopkins, the Ninth Circuit noted that even if officers were to

be individually exonerated, the government may still be held liable for improper training. Id.

However, given the rule of law set out in Heller, the Ninth Circuit has subsequently made clear that

Hopkins creates municipal liability only when a plaintiff proves a constitutional violation, but an

officer is exonerated due to qualified immunity. See Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353,

356 (9th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Hopkins and holding that where trier of fact found individual

officers did not deprive plaintiff of Fourth Amendment rights, trial court "correctly entered

judgment" for municipality on municipal liability claim); see also Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916

(9th Cir. 1994) ("unlike the situation in Hopkins [], there was no violation of the decedent's

constitutional rights, and thus no basis for finding the officers inadequately trained"); Wilkins v. City

of Oakland, 2006 WL 305972, *1 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ("Hopkins should not be read as standing for

the proposition that a municipality may be held liable in the absence of a constitutional violation by

the individual defendant."). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot proceed on both her first and second

causes of action, and her second cause of action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss

Plaintiff's Second through Ninth Causes of Action. As Plaintiff's First Cause of Action remains

pending, the Court shall conduct a Case Management Conference on November 15, 2007 at 10:00

a.m. in Courtroom B, 15th Floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California. The parties

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shall file a joint case management statement no later than November 8, 2007. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 5, 2007 

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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