Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02256/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02256-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Peter Swehla
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Theodore McMillian died on January 18, 2006. This opinion

is being filed by the remaining judges of the panel pursuant to 8th Cir. Rule 47E.

2

 The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2256

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa.

Paul Peter Swehla, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: January 12, 2006 

 Filed: March 31, 2006 

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, MCMILLIAN1

 and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Paul Peter Swehla appeals the district court’s2

 sentence of 262 months

imprisonment for distributing morphine within 1,000 feet of a school. Swehla argues

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that his sentence is unreasonable because his criminal record was overstated and the

presentence report was inflammatory and not objective. We affirm.

I.

In November 1998, Swehla’s father, Gerald Swehla, was diagnosed with colon

cancer. A doctor prescribed large quantities of morphine to allow Swehla’s father to

cope with the pain associated with his cancer. Swehla’s sister, Paulette Heying, who

was a nurse, cared for her father until he died on June 7, 1999. At that time, Heying

stored the remaining morphine in her home. Over the next two-and-one-half years,

Swehla stole more than one hundred 15 mg, 30 mg, and 100 mg morphine pills from

Heying’s home. 

On January 21, 2002, Swehla provided some of the morphine pills to his friend,

Ryan Monson. Because Monson had been drinking heavily with Swehla, the

morphine had a dangerous interaction with the alcohol in Monson’s system. Monson

died the next morning. Under the plea agreement, the parties stipulated that the

morphine pills were a contributing factor in Monson’s death. 

After Monson’s death, another friend of Swehla, Craig Witt, confronted Swehla

about the morphine pills. Swehla gave a baggie containing over forty pills to Witt

along with some loose change. Witt took the pills and loose change to a nearby creek

to dump them. Witt later told police the location of where he had dumped the pills

and loose change. The police recovered the loose change, but the pills had been

washed away by the creek. Later that day, Fawn Benson, another friend of Swehla,

found an additional sixty morphine pills inside Swehla’s bandana in Swehla’s

bedroom. Benson turned over the sixty pills to police.

After learning that he was wanted for questioning in relation to Monson’s

death, Swehla made plans to leave the country. On February 9, 2002, Swehla left the

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United States for Mexico. On October 11, 2002, Swehla was charged in a one-count

indictment with distributing morphine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. A warrant for

Swehla’s arrest was subsequently issued..

Swehla was captured by authorities on February 11, 2004 when he attempted

to reenter the United States in Brownsville, Texas. On March 3, 2004, Swehla made

an initial appearance and pled not guilty. On November 17, 2004, the government

filed a superceding indictment charging Swehla with distributing morphine within

1,000 feet of a school, possession with intent to distribute morphine within 1,000 feet

of a school, and distribution of morphine causing the death of Monson. The

government and Swehla entered into a plea agreement. Swehla agreed to a career

offender classification, with a resulting guideline range of 210 to 262 months

imprisonment. It was the understanding of both parties that the district court would

sentence Swehla within that range. The government agreed to dismiss the remaining

counts of the indictment. On December 22, 2004, Swehla entered a guilty plea to

distributing morphine within 1,000 feet of a school.

The district court sentenced Swehla on April 29, 2005, after the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In the

presentence report, the probation officer concurred with the parties’ career offender

calculation, including a total adjusted offense level of thirty-two and a criminal

history category VI, which yielded a total advisory Guidelines range of 210 to 262

months imprisonment. The district court sentenced Swehla to 262 months

imprisonment, six years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment. Swehla

appeals his sentence.

II.

Swehla contends that his sentence of 262 months imprisonment was

unreasonable in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The government

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argues that we should review Swehla’s sentence for plain error because Swehla did

not properly preserve error on reasonableness by objecting when the sentence was

pronounced. Swehla contends that such an objection is unnecessary because a

defendant only need argue for a different sentence before the sentence is pronounced.

Consequently, Swehla argues that we should review the sentence for reasonableness.

See United States v. Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2005). A review for

reasonableness is equivalent to abuse of discretion review. United States v. Hadash,

408 F.3d 1080, 1083 (8th Cir. 2005). We find the government’s argument

unpersuasive. Once a defendant has argued for a sentence different than the one

given by the district court, we see no reason to require the defendant to object to the

reasonableness of the sentence after the court has pronounced its sentence.

Accordingly, we review Swehla’s sentence for reasonableness.

A sentence within the advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.

United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005). Generally, a sentence

is presumed reasonable when the district court properly considers the defendant’s

circumstances, the factors listed in § 3553(a), and the advisory sentencing guidelines

range when determining the sentence. United States v. Vasquez, 433 F.3d 666, 670

(8th Cir. 2006). In the present matter, the district court considered the defendant’s

circumstances, the § 3553(a) factors, and the advisory guidelines range. We do not

find any error in the district court’s handling of those issues.

Swehla contends that his career offender status overstated his criminal history.

Consequently, he contends that his sentence should have been at the bottom of the

sentencing range. Specifically, Swehla argues that all of his prior criminal history

occurred in the early 1990s when he was a juvenile offender. The crimes that formed

the basis for the career offender finding were committed when Swehla was seventeen

and eighteen years old. Swehla cites United States v. Hutman, 339 F.3d 773 (8th Cir.

2003), and similar cases to support the contention that we have recognized downward

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departures as appropriate when a criminal history is composed of youthful offenses

during a limited period of time. 

The present matter is different than those cases cited by Swehla. Swehla

committed many crimes from the age of fifteen to eighteen. Even though the crimes

that formed the basis for a career criminal offender finding were during a more

limited period, Swehla’s criminal record is more extensive than just the predicate

offenses. Further, Swehla stipulated to his status as a career offender in his plea

agreement with the government, with the clear understanding he would be sentenced

within that range. We do not find the district court’s sentence based upon that

stipulation and Swehla’s overall record to be in error.

Swehla further contends that the presentence report was unduly inflammatory

and not objective. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d) sets forth the duties of

the presentence reporter. The reporter is not limited to mere fact-gathering, but is

required to draw conclusions and make judgments that inform a sentence. Swehla

contends that the presentence reporter in this case exceeded these duties. Instead,

Swehla contends that the reporter engaged in bias that goes beyond the duties

prescribed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Johnson, 935

F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that the presentence reporter is an “agent of the

court, not an agent of the prosecution”). 

Specifically, Swehla cites four parts of the presentence report that he claims

were not objective. First, Swehla argues that the report included an overly aggressive

argument for denying an acceptance of responsibility reduction despite the parties’

agreement that the defendant was entitled to that reduction. Both the defendant and

the government objected to the report’s analysis on this issue. 

Second, Swehla contends that the report included an unjustified disparagement

of the plea agreement. The report further contended that an upward departure to

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negate the benefits to the defendant might be appropriate. Both the defendant and

government filed tempering remarks to this part of the report.

Third, Swehla argues that the report contained embarrassing and inflammatory

details of crimes Swehla committed at the age of fifteen. Swehla believes that these

details were unnecessary for the district court to reach a fair and just sentence in the

present matter. 

Fourth, Swehla cites the report’s dismissal of corrections, clarifications, and

explanations to the report. Swehla believes that the presentence reporter should have

at least discussed the comments when relevant in the report. 

As an agent for the court in the sentencing process, the presentence report

writer is neither an advocate for either party nor, necessarily, an advocate for the plea

agreement. It was certainly well within the probation officer’s responsibility to point

out that the flight to Mexico would likely result in an obstruction enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 if the defendant was not a career offender. A person who engages

in conduct that results in § 3C1.1 enhancement does not normally qualify for

acceptance of responsibility credit. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, app. note 3. Likewise, pointing

out the possibility of an upward departure because a death resulted is within the

statutory responsibility of the probation officer. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

32(d)(1)(E). In short, our review of the presentence report does not show a report that

is unduly inflammatory but rather very thorough in its discussion of the offense,

offender, and applicable sentencing guidelines.

Moreover, as Swehla acknowledges, it is the district court, not the presentence

reporter, that ultimately determines the sentence. In this case, the district court

neither adopted the recommendation of the reporter for denying acceptance of

responsibility credit nor the suggestion that the plea agreement be abrogated.

Further, since the government objected to both of these portions of the presentence

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report, it is unclear what harm was done by them. In fact, Swehla is unable to cite

anything in the record to suggest that the arguably objectionable portions of the

presentence report affected the district court’s sentencing of Swehla.

As to the contention that the description of Swehla’s juvenile crimes was

unduly inflammatory, we find no error. A presentence reporter should “provide the

trial judge with as much information as possible in order to enable the judge to make

an informed decision.” United States v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir.

1990). Having reviewed the presentence report, we find nothing unusual to suggest

that the reporter went beyond that role. It is notable that Swehla does not contend

that anything contained in the allegedly inflammatory sections of the presentence

report is inaccurate.

While the presumptions in favor of a Guidelines sentence and a properly

determined sentence are rebuttable, there is nothing in the record that causes us to

question the judgment of the district court in this matter. Swehla’s sentence was

within a range agreed upon by the defendant and the government. The district court

properly applied the § 3553(a) factors. Even if the presentence report was prejudicial

against Swehla, a conclusion with which we do not agree, there is nothing in the

record to indicate that it factored into the district court’s sentence. Therefore, we do

not find that Swehla’s sentence was unreasonable.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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