Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04990/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04990-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jennifer Barone
Plaintiff
InterContinental Hotels Group PLC
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER BARONE,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP 

PLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-04990-JCS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION 

FOR JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY

Re: Dkt. Nos. 14, 18

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises from an injury that Plaintiff Jennifer Barone suffered at a hotel in Dublin, 

Ireland. Defendant InterContinental Hotels Group PLC (“IHG PLC”) moves to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction, asserting that it is a foreign holding company with no direct activities in 

California. Barone argues that IHG PLC in fact actively manages several hotels in California and 

is therefore subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. In the alternative, Barone seeks jurisdictional 

discovery to further explore IHG PLC‟s role in managing California hotels. The Court held a 

hearing on May 20, 2016. For the reasons stated below, IHG PLC‟s Motion is GRANTED, and 

this action is DISMISSED without leave to amend but without prejudice to Barone bringing a 

separate action in a court with jurisdiction over IHG PLC. Barone‟s Motion for Jurisdictional 

Discovery is DENIED.1

II. BACKGROUND

A. Allegations of the Complaint

Barone is a citizen of Florida currently residing in Ontario, Canada. 1st Am. Compl. 

(“FAC,” dkt. 8) ¶ 1. At the time of the events at issue, Barone lived in Florida but was on vacation 

 

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The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all 

purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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in the Republic of Ireland, where she and her husband were staying in the InterContinental Hotel 

Dublin (the “Dublin Hotel”). Id. ¶¶ 1−3. Barone booked an appointment through the Dublin

Hotel for a May 28, 2015 session at a spa located on the Dublin Hotel‟s premises. Id. ¶¶ 3−4. 

During a steam treatment at the spa, an employee “splashed boiling or near-boiling water onto 

[Barone‟s] right shoulder from the device that was creating the steam for the treatment.” Id. ¶ 6. 

Barone suffered second-degree burns that required medical treatment and caused her intense pain 

and permanent disfigurement. Id. ¶¶ 11−13. According to Barone, the employee was negligent 

and/or the device was not appropriate for that use, and IHG PLC is liable under the doctrine of 

respondeat superior, among other theories. See id. ¶¶ 7−10. 

The Complaint does not specifically identify the claim or claims that Barone seeks to 

bring. Taking the allegations as a whole, she appears to base her claim on a theory of negligence, 

although it is not clear whether she would have this Court apply the law of Ireland (where the 

injury occurred), the United Kingdom (where IHG PLC is based), or some other jurisdiction.

As is relevant to the present Motion, Barone‟s Complaint asserts that IHG PLC, “a public 

limited company organized under the laws of England and Wales and registered at Companies 

House in the United Kingdom,” operates thousands of hotels around the world including several in 

the Northern District of California. Id. ¶ 2.

B. The Parties’ Arguments and Evidence

1. IHG PLC’s Motion and Declaration of George Turner

IHG PLC argues that it “does not have sufficient contacts with California to warrant the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over it by this Court,” relying primarily on a declaration by IHG 

PLC general counsel and company secretary George Turner. IHG Mot. (dkt. 14-1) at 2, 4−6; see 

generally Turner Decl. (dkt. 14-2). According to IHG PLC and Turner, IHG PLC is a British 

holding company that is not registered with the California Secretary of State, is not qualified to 

conduct business in California, does not solicit business in California or elsewhere in the United 

States, has neither contracted to supply goods or services in California nor derived substantial 

revenue therefrom, does not maintain an office or property in California, has no employees or 

officers in California, and does not maintain a presence or engage in a persistent course of conduct 

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in California. IHG Mot. at 4−5; Turner Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7−14. IHG PLC contends that its overall 

contacts with California are not sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction, and that 

Barone‟s allegations of an injury occurring in Dublin have no connection to California that would 

establish specific jurisdiction. See IHG Mot. at 4, 6−7. 

IHG PLC‟s Motion and Turner‟s declaration disclaim any direct relationship between IHG

PLC and the Dublin Hotel where Barone was injured. See id. at 5−6; Turner Decl. ¶¶ 15−33. 

Although that issue would likely play a central role in the merits of whether IHG PLC could be 

held liable for Barone‟s injury, it has little if any bearing on whether IHG PLC is subject to 

personal jurisdiction in California. This Order therefore does not address those arguments and 

statements in detail.2 

IHG PLC also argues, and Turner declares, that IHG PLC owns but is a distinct entity from 

IHG Hotels Limited (“IHGHL”). IHG Mot. at 4; Turner Decl. ¶¶ 4−6. It is not clear what role, if 

any, IHGHL played in the facts underlying this case. By inference from unsupported assertions in 

the introduction of IHG PLC‟s Motion, IHGHL may serve as a franchisor that played some role in 

the licensing and/or management of the Dublin Hotel. See IHG Mot. at 1−2 (asserting that IHG

PLC “is the ultimate indirect parent of the franchisor,” and the “franchisor entered into a license 

agreement with Ballsbridge Hotel Partnership of the Hotel” to allow “the Hotel to exist within the 

InterContinental® brand system”).

2. Barone’s Opposition, Declarations, and Cross-Motion for Discovery

Contrary to IHG PLC‟s characterization of itself as merely a holding company, Barone 

argues that IHG PLC is “an international operator of hotels” and “the „mother ship‟ of a global 

business enterprise consisting of thousands of hotel properties.” Pl.‟s Opp‟n (dkt. 17) at 1−2. 

Barone relies on IHG PLC‟s annual report, its website, and her own experience at the Dublin 

Hotel to assert that IHG PLC takes a hands-on role in managing many of the hotels associated 

 

2 One such assertion, that “IHG PLC is not an agent of the Hotel or any other Defendant, and 

no Defendant, including the Hotel, is an agent of IHG PLC,” seems out of place given that IHG 

PLC itself is the only defendant named in this action. See Mot. at 5−6; Turner Decl. ¶ 27. But 

whatever Turner and IHG PLC may have meant by that assertion, it is not relevant to the present 

Motion.

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with the InterContinental brand, see id. at 4−10, including several in California, id. at 10−12.3

Statements in the annual report from IHG PLC‟s officers, specifically its CEO and its chairman, 

describe IHG PLC‟s progress in imposing standards across all hotels in its system, its success in 

opening new hotels, and its efforts “to deliver a personalised experience for [its] members, before, 

during and after their stay.” Opp‟n at 4−6 (citing Barone Decl. (dkt. 17-1) Ex. C (IHG Annual 

Report) at 6−9). Barone also points to financial statements in the annual report showing that a 

portion of IHG PLC‟s profit comes from “revenue generated from the sale of room nights,” among 

other evidence that, Barone argues, shows IHG PLC‟s active role in managing InterContinentalbranded hotels. Id. at 8 (citing Barone Decl. Ex. C at 126). 

With respect to IHG PLC‟s purported activities in California, Barone primarily discusses

IHG PLC‟s recent acquisition of the Kimpton Hotels chain, including five existing and two 

forthcoming hotels in California. Id. at 10−11 (citing Barone Decl. ¶ 7 & Exs. B, C). Invoking 

the “representative services doctrine,” Barone contends that even if IHG PLC operates hotels in 

California through subsidiaries, the Court can assert jurisdiction over IHG PLC itself based on 

those contacts. Id. at 11. She also cites risk assessments in the annual report discussing the 

possibility of liability in the United States. Id. at 10 (citing Barone Decl. Ex. C at 158).

A declaration by Barone‟s counsel John McKay details his tribulations in attempting to 

serve IHG PLC. See generally McKay Decl. (dkt. 17-7). According to McKay, IHG PLC‟s 

website listed an attorney named Steve Smith as senior vice president and general counsel of the 

Americas division of “IHG (InterContinental Hotels Group) PLC,” in charge of a department 

based in the state of Georgia. Id. ¶ 2 & Ex. A. When Barone attempted to serve process on IHG 

PLC at the Georgia address, Smith refused service on the basis that his department was not part of 

IHG PLC. Id. ¶ 3. After Barone served IHG PLC in the United Kingdom via the Hague 

convention, McKay received an email from a paralegal at the Georgia address on behalf of IHG 

PLC, requesting that Barone dismiss her complaint voluntarily and instead sue the franchisee in 

 

3 As with IHG PLC‟s contentions on the subject, this Order does not dwell on Barone‟s 

arguments regarding IHG‟s purported role in managing the Dublin Hotel. While such a 

relationship might at the margin be relevant to IHG PLC‟s role in managing hotels generally, it 

reveals little as to IHG PLC‟s relationship with California.

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Ireland, or alternatively allow IHG PLC additional time to respond. Id. ¶ 4 & Ex. B. The IHG 

PLC website that previously listed Smith as an officer of IHG PLC has since been revised to omit 

“PLC” from his job title, “leaving only the more vague moniker „InterContinental Hotels Group.‟” 

Id. ¶ 5 & Ex. C. Barone argues that this course of dealing demonstrates IHG PLC‟s propensity “to 

haul out the corporate shell game when it is under fire.” Pl.‟s Opp‟n at 11.

In the alternative to her arguments why IHG PLC‟s Motion should be denied, Barone 

moves for jurisdictional discovery to explore IHG PLC‟s “relationship with the hotels in its 

„System‟ and particularly the one in Dublin and those here in California.” Id. at 12; see Pl.‟s Mot. 

(dkt. 18). According to Barone, this case falls within the Court‟s “broad discretion to permit 

jurisdictional discovery.” Pl.‟s Opp‟n at 12.

3. IHG PLC’s Reply in Support of Dismissal

IHG PLC continues to argue in its Reply that it “is a foreign holding company that does 

not maintain minimum contacts with California.” IHG Reply (dkt. 21) at 1. The Reply includes 

many references to “IHC [sic] PLC”—presumably a repeated typographical error intended to refer 

to IHG PLC—interspersed with correct references to “IHG PLC.” See id. at 1−4, 6. IHG PLC 

characterizes the annual report on which Barone relies as “an unverified 2015 report Plaintiff 

found online,” and asserts that it “does not even mention IHC [sic] PLC, let alone contain facts 

establishing that IHC [sic] PLC had any contacts with California.” Id. at 1−2; see also id. at 3 

(“[N]othing in the report even references IHG PLC, let alone demonstrates that IHG PLC has 

continuous and systematic contacts with California.”). According to IHG PLC, Barone‟s reading 

of the word “we” in the annual report as referring to IHG PLC “is not supported by fact or law.” 

Id. at 3. IHG PLC once again asserts that it is the ultimate parent of, but operationally distinct 

from, IHGHL, but again fails to explain what relevance, if any, IHGHL has to this case. Id. With 

respect to jurisdictional discovery—also addressed in IHG PLC‟s separate Opposition to Barone‟s 

Motion, discussed below—IHG PLC argues that Barone‟s request is based on a mere “hunch,” 

and that the Court should therefore deny her Motion. Id. at 4−7.

4. IHG PLC’s Opposition to Motion for Discovery

In its Opposition, IHG PLC asserts again that the “unverified 2015 report Plaintiff found 

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online . . . does not even mention IHC [sic] PLC, let alone contain facts establishing that IHC [sic] 

PLC has contacts in California.” IHG Opp‟n (dkt. 24) at 1−2. Like IHG PLC‟s Reply, portions of 

its Opposition appear to use the terms “IHC PLC” and “IHG PLC” interchangeably. See id. at 

1−2. IHG PLC argues that because Barone‟s arguments contradict Turner‟s sworn declaration and 

amount to nothing more than a hunch, her request for discovery should be denied. Id. at 3−5 

(citing, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2008); Teras Cargo Transp. (Am.), 

LLC v. Cal Dive Int’l (Australia) Pty Ltd., No. 15-cv-03566-JSC, 2015 WL 6089276 (N.D. Cal. 

Oct. 16, 2015)). According to IHG PLC, the cases on which Barone relies for her discovery 

arguments involved more substantial evidence of a connection to the forum than Barone has 

shown here, and are therefore distinguishable. Id. at 5−7.

5. Barone’s Reply in Support of Discovery

Barone‟s Reply takes umbrage at IHG PLC‟s characterization of the annual report, among 

other aspects of IHG PLC‟s responses:

Despite Plaintiff‟s Declaration testimony that the Annual Report 

was downloaded from Defendant‟s own website, see [Barone Decl.] 

at ¶ 10, and the fact that the Court can take judicial notice of 

documents posted on its website, see W. Marine, Inc. v. Watercraft 

Superstore, Inc., 2012 WL 479677, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2012) 

(compiling cases); see also O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 

499 F.3d 1218, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007), Defendant refers to its 

Annual Report as “an unverified 2015 report that Plaintiff found 

online,” [IHG Opp‟n] at 1, and makes the even more bizarre claim 

that “the report offered by Plaintiff does not even mention IHC PLC 

[sic], let alone contain facts establishing that IHC PLC [sic] has 

contacts in California.” Id. The mysterious “IHC PLC” appears ten 

times in Defendant‟s Opposition without being identified. It appears 

interspersed with references to “IHG PLC,” which Defendant uses 

to identify itself, see [IHG Opp‟n] at 1. Either Defendant is being 

too clever by half in its efforts to confuse the facts, or it made the 

same typographical error ten times in a seven-page brief while 

managing to get it right in thirteen other instances. If it wants the 

Court to believe that the Annual Report posted on its website is not 

its own publication to its shareholders, and/or that it is never 

mentioned in the document, that assertion is astoundingly 

disingenuous.

Pl.‟s Reply (dkt. 25) at 1−2 (additions of “[sic]” in original).

Barone argues that the report is, in fact, IHG PLC‟s report because it states that it is the 

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report of “InterContinental Hotels Group,” bears a service mark registered to IHG PLC,4includes 

a certification by “Company Secretary” George Turner (who represented himself as the company 

secretary of IHG PLC in his declaration in this action), states that it can be viewed (and can in fact 

be viewed) at www.ihgplc.com, and defines the terms “the Group,” “IHG,” and “the Company” 

(all of which are used extensively therein) to mean “InterContinental Hotels Group PLC”—i.e., 

IHG PLC. Id. at 2−4 (citing Barone Decl. Ex. C at 1, 2, 94). Barone contends that the report‟s 

descriptions of IHG PLC‟s conduct in California, as well as her counsel‟s experience with the 

Georgia-based legal department that may or may not be part of IHG PLC, contradict Turner‟s 

declaration that IHG PLC has no operations in the United States. Id. at 4−5. According to 

Barone, such conflicts should be resolved in her favor at the pleading stage, and should entitle her 

to at least jurisdictional discovery if not denial of IHG‟s Motion to Dismiss. See id. at 4−6. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(2) and Jurisdictional Discovery

A party may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006). “Where, as here, the motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary 

hearing, „the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.‟” Id. (quoting 

Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990)). “Although the plaintiff cannot simply rest 

on the bare allegations of its complaint, . . . uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be 

taken as true.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(internal quotations omitted). “Conflicts between parties over statements contained in affidavits 

must be resolved in the plaintiff‟s favor.” Id.

Alternatively, where “the jurisdictional facts are contested or more facts are needed,” a 

court may permit jurisdictional discovery. Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 

 

4 Barone also argues that the registration certificate for the mark demonstrates that IHG PLC 

represented itself as engaged in hotel operation and management, and that IHG PLC is therefore 

not merely a holding company. Pl.‟s Reply at 2−3 & Ex. A.

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(9th Cir. 2003). Courts may, however, dismiss without allowing jurisdictional discovery “when it 

is clear that further discovery would not demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis for 

jurisdiction.” Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Grp., Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 801 (9th Cir. 1989). A 

plaintiff must generally demonstrate “more than a hunch that [discovery] might yield 

jurisdictionally relevant facts.” See Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008).

Personal jurisdiction depends on both substantive law and constitutional due process 

considerations. “Where . . . there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, 

the district court applies the law of the state in which the district court sits.” Dole Food Co., Inc. 

v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002). As Barone‟s Complaint does not rely on any 

federal statute, the Court applies the law of California to determine whether personal jurisdiction 

exists. See generally FAC. “Because California‟s long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive 

with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due 

process are the same.” Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1110 (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10).

B. Overview of Personal Jurisdiction

“For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, that defendant 

must have at least „minimum contacts‟ with the relevant forum such that the exercise of 

jurisdiction „does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.‟” Id. at 

1110−11 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). “In judging minimum 

contacts, a court properly focuses on „the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 

litigation.‟” Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 781, 788 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 

204 (1977)). 

Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. 

Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 

S.A. v. Brown, the Supreme Court explained that “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over 

foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when 

their affiliations with the State are so „continuous and systematic‟ as to render them essentially at 

home in the forum State.” Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 

317). On the other hand, the Court continued, “[s]pecific jurisdiction . . . depends on an 

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„affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,‟ principally, activity or an 

occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State‟s regulation.” 

Id. (alteration in original; citation omitted). Thus, “[i]n contrast to general, all-purpose 

jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected 

with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

C. This Order Assumes That IHG PLC Manages InterContinental Hotels

The Court agrees with Barone that IHG PLC‟s attempt to distance itself from the annual 

report attached to Barone‟s declaration is bizarre. While much of the report is vague as to the 

exact identity of the corporate entity to which it pertains, IHG PLC‟s repeated assertion that the 

report does not mention IHG PLC is simply false. See, e.g., Barone Decl. Ex. C at 81 

(“Independent Auditor‟s Report to the members of InterContinental Hotels Group PLC”); id. at 86 

(“We have audited the accompanying Group statement of financial position of InterContinental 

Hotels Group PLC . . . .”); id. at 94 (referring to “InterContinental Hotels Group PLC (the Group 

or IHG)” and “InterContinental Hotels Group PLC (the Company)”). Moreover, even absent 

those explicit references, the fact that the report is available on the “Investors” section of 

IHGPLC.com, where it is presented as “our 2015 Annual Report and Form 20-F,” also suggests

that the report pertains to IHG PLC. See Barone Decl. ¶ 10; see also InterContinental Hotels 

Group, “Reporting centre,” http://www.ihgplc.com/index.asp?pageid=942 (accessed May 17, 

2016). The Court also agrees with Barone that the report tends to suggest that IHG PLC takes a 

more active role in managing at least some InterContinental-branded hotels than its present 

arguments let on.

The Court need not, however, untangle the precise nature of the report or even the nature 

of IHG PLC‟s activities in California. Even if IHG PLC in fact actively manages a number of 

hotels in California, that alone would not establish that this Court has either specific jurisdiction or 

general jurisdiction over IHG PLC for the purpose of the present action, as discussed in the 

following sections. This Order therefore assumes for the sake of argument that Barone is correct 

that IHG PLC “considers the [Dublin, Ireland] hotel where [Barone] was injured to be its „own‟ 

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and that it manages several hotels in California, including in the San Francisco area.” See Pl.‟s

Reply at 8.

D. This Court Lacks Specific Jurisdiction over IHG PLC for Claims Based on 

Barone’s Injury in Dublin

“The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident 

defendant „focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.‟” 

Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 

U.S. 770, 775 (1984)). The exercise of specific jurisdiction “is consistent with due process” only 

where “the defendant‟s suit-related conduct . . . create[s] a substantial connection with the forum 

state.” Id.; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (“the 

constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established „minimum 

contacts‟ in the forum state”). 

A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant where the 

following requirements are met:

(1) the non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities 

or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; 

or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 

privileges of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the 

benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 

defendant‟s forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1111. 

The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test for specific 

jurisdiction. Id. (citing Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.3d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990)). “If the plaintiff 

succeeds in satisfying both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to 

„present a compelling case‟ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (quoting

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476−78).

Here, the second prong of the test dooms any claim that Barone might have to specific 

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jurisdiction. Barone‟s claim—based an injury that occurred in Ireland—does not “arise[] out of or 

relate[] to” any alleged activities of IHG PLC that have any significant relation to California. See 

id. Barone argues that the injury occurred because of management decisions that affected IHG 

PLC‟s global system of hotels as a whole, and that she only visited the Dublin Hotel because of 

IHG PLC‟s “worldwide solicitation of guests, including here in California.” Pl.‟s Opp‟n at 11−12. 

Such an approach “elide[s] the essential difference between case-specific and general 

jurisdiction,” see Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 927, as well as the difference between the first and second 

prongs of the test for specific jurisdiction. Barone cites no authority supporting such a broad 

application of the specific jurisdiction doctrine.

How IHG PLC managed its hotels in California or marketed its foreign hotels to 

consumers in California had no bearing on Barone‟s injury, because Barone was injured at a hotel 

in Ireland and there is no indication that Barone, a Florida citizen, has even set foot in California. 

See FAC ¶¶ 1−3. Barone does not suggest that any relevant management or marketing decision by 

IHG PLC—a corporation based in the United Kingdom—was made in California. Barone‟s claim 

rests on whether some aspect of the equipment or service at the Dublin Hotel was deficient; IHG 

PLC‟s California hotels may or may not have exhibited the same deficiency, but Barone‟s 

experience in Ireland was not affected in any way by the condition of any hotel in California. The 

Court concludes that Barone has not met her burden to show that her claim “arises out of or relates 

to the defendant‟s forum-related activities.” See Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1111.

E. This Court Lacks General Jurisdiction over IHG PLC

In International Shoe, the Supreme Court observed that there are “instances in which . . .

continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify 

suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” 326 

U.S. at 318. The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is “fairly high.” Brand v. Menlove 

Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1986). “It is one thing to hold a corporation answerable for

operations in the forum State, quite another to expose it to suit on claims having no connection 

whatever to the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014) (citation 

omitted). 

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A corporate defendant may be subject to general jurisdiction when its contacts with the 

forum “approximate physical presence.” Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086. Whether this 

standard is met turns on the “economic reality of the defendants‟ activities rather than a 

mechanical checklist.” Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 

2006). “Factors to be taken into consideration are whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or 

engages in business in the state, serves the state‟s markets, designates an agent for service of 

process, holds a license, or is incorporated there.” Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086. 

“[E]ngaging in commerce with residents of the forum state is not in and of itself the kind of 

activity that approximates physical presence within the state‟s borders.” Id.

In recent years, the Supreme Court has cautioned against an overly expansive view of 

general jurisdiction, framing the question as whether the defendant corporation is “essentially at 

home” in the forum state. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting 

Goodyear). As summarized by the Ninth Circuit:

The Court in Daimler rejected the plaintiffs‟ argument, also pressed 

by plaintiffs here, that general jurisdiction is appropriate whenever a 

corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic 

course of business” in a state. [Daimler, 134 S. Ct.] at 761 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). It emphasized that the “paradigm” fora 

for general jurisdiction are a corporation‟s place of incorporation 

and principal place of business. Id. at 760 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Only in an “exceptional case” will general jurisdiction be 

available anywhere else. Id. at 761 n.19.

Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310

(2015).

“General jurisdiction . . . calls for an appraisal of a corporation‟s activities in their entirety, 

nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at 

home in all of them.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Daimler

as requiring a comparison between a corporation‟s ties to the forum state and its operations 

elsewhere, finding no general jurisdiction where a defendant corporation‟s “California contacts are 

minor compared to its other worldwide contacts.” See Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1070 (citing Daimler, 

134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20)). “[T]he reasonableness test articulated in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 

Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102 . . . (1987), is reserved for the specific 

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jurisdiction inquiry and plays no role in the general jurisdiction inquiry.” Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 

F.3d 1059, 1079 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20), cert. denied, 136 S. 

Ct. 915 (2016).

Barone‟s briefs fail to acknowledge or address the “essentially at home” standard set forth 

in Goodyear and Daimler. See generally Pl.‟s Opp‟n; Pl.‟s Reply.5 Barone bases her argument 

for jurisdiction on the theory that IHG PLC “manages several hotels in California, including the 

San Francisco area,” Pl.‟s Reply at 8, and that it directed marketing activities to California, Pl.‟s 

Opp‟n at 11−12. Even assuming Barone is correct that IHG PLC “is a hands-on manager of its 

hotels,” id. at 4, she does not argue that California is IHG PLC‟s place of incorporation or 

principal place of business, and does not explain why this is the sort of “exceptional case” where 

IHG PLC should be subject to general jurisdiction in a forum that does not meet one of those 

criteria. See Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1070 (discussing Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760−61 & n.19).

In Daimler, a Daimler subsidiary “ha[d] multiple California-based facilities, including a 

regional office,” and was “the largest supplier of luxury vehicles to the California market.” 

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752. The Supreme Court held that even if those contacts were imputed to 

Daimler, they would not be sufficient for California courts to exercise general jurisdiction over 

Daimler, because under such an approach “the same global reach would presumably be available 

in every other State in which [the subsidiary‟s] sales are sizable,” and “[s]uch exorbitant exercises 

of all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants „to structure their primary 

conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them 

liable to suit.‟” Id. at 760−62 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472).6

Barone argues that California is one of many markets in which IHG PLC operates hotels. 

See Pl.‟s Opp‟n at 8−9 (discussing IHG PLC operations in Europe); see also Barone Decl. Ex. C at 

35−46 (discussing IHG PLC performance in regions throughout the world). There is no indication 

 

5 Barone‟s counsel acknowledged at the hearing that Daimler represents a significant barrier to 

this Court asserting jurisdiction over IHG PLC for the purpose of this action, and presented no 

argument why Daimler should not apply here.

6 Although the Daimler case involved contact through a subsidiary, the decision does not turn 

on that fact because the Court assumed for the sake of argument that the subsidiary‟s contacts 

could be imputed to Daimler itself. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.

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that California holds any special significance to IHG PLC—to the contrary, the entire western 

hemisphere (IHG PLC‟s “Americas” region) accounted for only slightly more than half of IHG 

PLC‟s global revenue in 2015. See Barone Decl. Ex. C at 32. Accordingly, regardless of how 

active a role IHG PLC plays in managing its hotels, exercising general jurisdiction in this case 

would contradict the Supreme Court‟s admonishment that a “corporation that operates in many 

places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20. The 

Court holds that even if Barone‟s allegations and arguments are taken as true, she has not met her 

burden to show that IHG PLC is subject to general jurisdiction in California. 

F. Jurisdictional Discovery Is Not Warranted

“A district court is vested with broad discretion to permit or deny discovery” related to 

questions of jurisdiction. Laub, 342 F.3d at 1093. “„[D]iscovery should ordinarily be granted 

where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more 

satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.‟” Id. (quoting Butcher’s Union Local No. 498 v. 

SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1986)). On the other hand, “refusal to allow further 

discovery before dismissing on jurisdictional grounds is not an abuse of discretion when it is clear 

that further discovery would not demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis for jurisdiction.” 

Am. W. Airlines, 877 F.2d at 801(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nor must a court 

allow discovery “based on little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally relevant 

facts.” Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1020.

Here, Barone‟s theory of jurisdiction is that IHG PLC managed several hotels in California 

(among thousands of hotels throughout the world) and directed certain marketing activities toward 

California (as part of its “worldwide solicitation of guests”). See Pl.‟s Opp‟n at 11−12; Pl.‟s Reply 

at 7−8; FAC ¶ 2. As discussed above, the Court holds that such contacts are insufficient to 

establish general jurisdiction. She argues that aspects of IHG PLC‟s conduct related to California 

stemmed from the same high-level decision making that influenced her travel plans (presumably 

when she was in Florida) and led to her injury in Ireland. See Pl.‟s Opp‟n at 11−12. As discussed 

above, the Court holds that any such connection between Barone‟s claims and this forum is too 

tenuous to establish specific jurisdiction. Barone seeks jurisdictional discovery because she 

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believes it would “expose the true nature of [IHG PLC‟s] relationship with the hotels in its 

„System‟ and particularly the one in Dublin and those here in California,” Pl.‟s Reply at 12, but 

even if discovery were to confirm entirely Barone‟s theory of that relationship, IHG PLC would 

still fall outside of this Court‟s jurisdiction with respect to the claims raised in this action. The 

Court therefore finds it “clear that further discovery would not demonstrate facts sufficient to 

constitute a basis for jurisdiction.” See Am. W. Airlines, 877 F.2d at 801. Barone‟s Motion is 

DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, IHG PLC‟s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and 

Barone‟s Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery is DENIED. This case is DISMISSED without 

leave to amend but without prejudice to Barone bringing her claim in a court of competent 

jurisdiction. The Clerk is instructed to enter judgment consistent with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 20, 2016

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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