Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-17073/USCOURTS-ca9-13-17073-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Defense
Appellee
Marguerite Hiken
Appellant
The Military Law Task Force
Appellant
United States Central Command
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARGUERITE HIKEN; THE

MILITARY LAW TASK FORCE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;

UNITED STATES CENTRAL

COMMAND,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-17073

D.C. No.

4:06-cv-02812-YGR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 20, 2015

San Francisco, California

Filed September 6, 2016

Before: William A. Fletcher, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and Barrington D. Parker, Jr.*

Opinion by Judge Parker;

Dissent by Judge Rawlinson

* The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge for the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.

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2 HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

SUMMARY**

Attorneys’ Fees

The panel vacated the district court’s initial attorneys’ fee

award to plaintiffs under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) after

plaintiffs substantially prevailed in a Freedom of Information

Act action brought against the federal government, and

remanded for recalculation of attorneys’ fees.

The district court on initial review awarded plaintiffs

attorneys’ fees calculated at $200/hour, which was well

below the current billing rates for its attorneys. The district

court, upon a motion to reconsider, determined that the first

judge had not erred in awarding only $200 an hour. 

The panel held that notwithstanding plaintiffs’ failure to

designate for appeal the district court’s underlying fee order,

plaintiffs’ intent to appeal the underlying fee award was

apparent from both the factual circumstances and plaintiffs’

extensive briefing on the issue. The panel exercised its

discretion, and considered the merits of the underlying fee

award.

The panel held that consistent with its burden, plaintiffs

provided substantial evidence of the prevailing market rate

for the applicable periods, and this evidence was properly

submitted to the district court. The panel further held that in

determining that prevailing market rate, the district court

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 3

relied on authority that was not apposite, and failed to provide

a requisite clear explanation for the fee award.

Finally, the panel held that plaintiffs fell within the class

of litigants entitled to attorneys’ fees on appeal, and may

request attorneys’ fees on appeal in accordance with Ninth

Circuit Rule 39-1.6.

Judge Rawlinson dissented because she would hold that

plaintiffs did not timely appeal the underlying fee award, and

that the district court acted within its discretion in calculating

the fee award. She would affirm the district court.

COUNSEL

Colleen Flynn (argued), Los Angeles, California; W. Gordon

Kaupp, Arce Law Group PC, New York, New York; Chris

Ford, Law Office of Chris Ford, Phoenix, Arizona; for

Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Gerard Sinzdak (argued), H. Thomas Byron III, and Dara S.

Smith, Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

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4 HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

OPINION

PARKER, Senior Circuit Judge:

InFebruary2012, Plaintiffs-Appellants Marguerite Hiken

and the Military Law Task Force (together, “MLTF”)

substantially prevailed in a Freedom of Information Act

(“FOIA”) action brought against Defendants-Appellees the

Department of Defense and United States Central Command

(together, the “Government”). In June 2012, MLTF filed a

motion for attorney fees pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E),

requesting that the court award it fees consistent with the

current billing rates for its attorneys. MLTF submitted

evidence relating to the prevailing historical market rate for

the pertinent geographic locations and time period, but did

not argue for any fees except the current billing rates for its

attorneys. Among other things, the Government argued that

MLTF was only entitled to fees based on the prevailing

market rate, which the Government argued was $200 an hour. 

The district court (Ware, C.J.) granted the motion in part,

awarding MLTF attorney fees calculated at $200 an hour,

which was well below the current billing rates for its

attorneys.

MLTF moved to alter or amend the judgment. The

Magistrate Judge to whom the motion was assigned

determined that the district court had erred in failing to

consider MLTF’s evidence of the prevailing market rate, and

recommended an award higher than that ordered by the

district court.

The district court (Rogers, J.), upon the Government’s

motion to consider the issue de novo, determined that the first

judge had not erred in awarding only $200 an hour. The

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HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 5

district court pointed out that MLTF had not argued for any

rate except its attorneys’ current billing rate, and thus took the

risk that the court would reject the higher billing rate and

accept the Government’s proposed billing rate. The district

court held that MLTF was not entitled to raise a new

argument on its motion to amend the judgment. MLTF

appealed. For the reasons set forth, we VACATE the district

court’s initial fee award and REMAND the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

A. MLTF Successfully Sues the Government Under FOIA

Military Law Task Force is a subcommittee of the

National Lawyers Guild that addresses military law issues. 

Marguerite Hiken is the co-chairperson of MLTF. In March

2005, MLTF made a request pursuant to FOIA, seeking

information from the Government relating to an incident in

Iraq involving an Italian journalist, and other information

relating to the Rules of Engagement in effect during the U.S.

military’s involvement in Fallujah, Iraq. The Department of

Defense (“DOD”) referred MLTF to United States Central

Command (CENTCOM), which in turn acknowledged receipt

of MLTF’s request and subsequently denied the request in

August 2005. MLTF appealed the denial to DOD. After

DOD informed MLTF that it would not be able to complete

the appeal process within the time limit set by FOIA, MLTF

commenced this action seeking disclosure of the documents.

At the outset of the litigation, DOD contended that it had

diligently searched its records and uncovered responsive but

confidential documents. At MLTF’s urging, DOD conducted

further review and ultimately located an additional number of

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6 HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

responsive documents. Redacted versions of those

documents were produced to MLTF. In October 2007, the

parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and the district

court (Patel, J.) denied both motions, ordering certain

documents to be submitted to her for in camera review.

Following submission of the additional documents

requested by the court, the parties renewed their crossmotions for summary judgment, and in February 2012, the

district court granted each motion in part and ordered the

Government to turn over certain additional documents.1 After

the case was transferred to then-Chief Judge Ware, the

Government moved for clarification and partial

reconsideration. The district court granted the motion in part

and allowed the Government to withhold certain additional

documents.

B. MLTF Seeks Attorney Fees

In June 2012, MLTF moved for attorney fees and costs

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). MLTF argued, first, that

it had substantially prevailed in the litigation, making it

eligible for fees and costs under § 552(a)(4)(E). MLTF also

argued that it was entitled to attorney fees because the public

interest was benefitted by the disclosure of the documents,

MLTF’s interest in the documents was aligned with that

public interest, and there was no reasonable basis for the

Government’s withholding of the documents.

1 A partial impetus for the district court’s order was that certain

documents were no longer properly classified as confidential because the

U.S. government had declared an end to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

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HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 7

MLTF proposed the amount of fees pursuant to the

“lodestar” method, and argued that the district court should

defer to MLTF’s attorneys’ current billing rates and their

judgment about the number of reasonable hours expended. 

MLTF directed the district court to the declarations of its

attorneys describing fees awarded to them in similar

circumstances, but onlyrequested that the district court award

them fees based on its attorneys’ current billing rates. MLTF

requested a fee award of $381,633.99.

The Government opposed the motion, arguing that

although MLTF was eligible for fees, it was not entitled to

them because the Government had articulated a reasonable

basis for withholding the documents and because MLTF had

submitted an unreasonably high fee request. The

Government further argued that, even if MLTF was entitled

to fees, its award should be substantially lower than

requested. The Government argued that the hours billed

should be reduced because of MLTF’s limited success on

some issues and because the hours billed represented

duplicative work. Finally, the Government contended that

MLTF’s attorneys were not entitled to their current billing

rate, and that MLTF had failed to submit evidence of the

reasonableness of their fees. The Government suggested a

rate of $200 an hour instead.

C. The District Court Grants MLTF a Portion of the

Requested Fees

On August 21, 2012, Judge Ware granted MLTF’s motion

in part, awarding $180,520 in fees and $1,059.99 in costs. He

held that MLTF was both eligible for, and entitled to, fees

and costs, but rejected MLTF’s request for fees based on

current billing rates. He observed that “the bulk of the

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8 HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

litigation in this case took place between 2006 and 2008,” and

thus, he “[did] not look to the attorneys’ current rates, but

instead look[ed] to prevailing market rates between 2006 and

2008.” Hiken v. Dep’t of Def., No. C 06-02812 JW, 2012 WL

3686747, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012). He noted that

“Plaintiffs fail[ed] to provide evidence of prevailing market

rates in this forum during the time period at issue.” Id. He

then cited two cases from the Northern District of California,

Blackwell v. Foley, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2010),

and Pande v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. C 04-05107 JCS,

2008 WL 906507 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2008), and determined

that, consistent with those decisions, a reasonable rate for all

of MLTF’s attorneys was $200 an hour. Judge Ware

declined, however, to reduce the number of billable hours,

and granted a fee award of $180,520.

D. MLTF Moves to Amend the Judgment

In September 2012, MLTF moved pursuant to Rule 59(e)

to amend the judgment on the ground that the district court

had improperly calculated the fee award. MLTF argued that,

contrary to the district court’s opinion, it had submitted

evidence of the prevailing market rates from 2006 and 2008,

and that the court’s calculation had resulted in an

unreasonably low award. The Government argued that the

district court had properly considered historical rates in

arriving at the hourly rate, and that the total award was more

than reasonable because MLTF had been compensated for all

of its billed hours, despite being only partially successful in

the litigation.

The motion was referred to a magistrate judge

(Westmore, J.), who recommended that MLTF’s motion be

granted because MLTF had, in fact, submitted declarations

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HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 9

showing the prevailing market rates during the applicable

period, and thus the district court’s finding to the contrary

was clear error. Finding that MLTF had submitted adequate

evidence, Judge Westmore undertook her own examination

of the prevailing rates and determined that an appropriate fee

award would be $257,776.50. She supported her

recommendation by creating a chart showing the appropriate

billing rate for each attorney during the relevant periods.

The Government moved for the district court to consider

MLTF’s motion de novo. Judge Rogers, newly assigned to

the case, largely rejected the Magistrate’s recommendation

and held that Judge Ware had properly assigned a rate of

$200 an hour. Without passing on the sufficiency of MLTF’s

evidence, Judge Rogers noted that although MLTF had

submitted declarations attesting to the historical billing rates,

it “did not actually argue in the Fee Motion for any rates other

than their current billing rates, nor did [it] provide any

analysis on what reasonable historical rates would have been

for each of the attorneys during the time worked.” Hiken v.

Dep’t of Def., No. 06-cv-02812-YGR, 2013 WL 4496336, at

*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013). She went on to hold that Judge

Ware had not committed plain error in finding that “Plaintiffs

fail[ed] to provide evidence of the prevailing market rates,”

because such a statement “does not compel the conclusion

that he did not consider the scant evidence now highlighted

by Plaintiffs, especially in light of the parties’ arguments in

the Fee Motion briefing.” Id. at *6. Judge Rogers concluded

that Judge Ware’s fee award was not the result of manifest

injustice or clear error, and consequently denied MLTF’s

motion to amend the judgment.

MLTF filed this appeal, purporting to appeal:

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10 HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

Order Granting Defendants; Motion for De

Novo Determination of Dispositive Matter

Referred to Magistrate Judge; Adopting in

Part Report and Recommendations That

Plaintiffs; Motion to Alter or Amend the

Judgment be Granted; and Denying Plaintiffs’

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Per. Fed.

Rule of Civ. Pro. 59(e), Dkt. No. 145, entered

in this action on August 19, 2013.

ER 94. The Notice of Appeal did not mention the underlying

fee award.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court’s award of attorney fees under FOIA is

reviewed for abuse of discretion, with de novo review being

afforded to questions of law. Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Locke,

572 F.3d 610, 613–14 (9th Cir. 2009). A district court’s

denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to amend judgment is similarly

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Int’l Rehab. Scis. Inc. v.

Sebelius, 688 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012).

DISCUSSION

I. Review of the Underlying Fee Award

Before engaging the merits of this appeal, we must first

determine the precise issue which is being appealed. MLTF

has only noticed for appeal Judge Rogers’s denial of its

motion to amend judgment. This sets a high bar for MLTF. 

A motion to amend judgment may only be granted where:

“1) the motion is ‘necessary to correct manifest errors of law

or fact upon which the judgment is based;’ 2) the moving

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HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 11

party presents ‘newly discovered or previously unavailable

evidence,’ 3) the motion is necessary to ‘prevent manifest

injustice,’ or 4) there is an ‘intervening change in controlling

law.’” Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d

1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting McDowell v. Calderon,

197 F.3d 1253, 1254 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999)). By contrast, we

may reverse a district court’s underlying fee award upon a

finding that the court abused its discretion by committing an

error of law, whether manifest or not.

The import of MLTF’s deficient notice of appeal is

apparent to the parties. The Government points out that

MLTF failed to notice the underlying fee award, and argues

that there is no basis to review that earlier order. MLTF,

perhaps realizing its error only after it was pointed out by the

Government, argues in its reply brief that this Court has

discretion to review the underlying award, notwithstanding

MLTF’s procedural error.

MLTF’s notice of appeal is plainly deficient. But MLTF

is correct that our review is nonetheless properly directed at

Judge Ware’s underlying fee award, and not at the subsequent

order denying MLTF’s motion to amend judgment. We allow

a party to argue the merits of an order not appearing on the

face of an appeal after considering: “(1) whether the ‘intent

to appeal a specific judgment can be fairly inferred’ and

(2) whether ‘the appellee [was] prejudiced by the mistake.’” 

Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 2003)

(alteration in original) (quoting Montes v. United States,

37 F.3d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1994)). Intent to appeal the

underlying order may be inferred where only the denial of a

motion for reconsideration appears on the face of the appeal. 

Id. (citing United States v. Belgarde, 300 F.3d 1177, 1180

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12 HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

(9th Cir. 2002); McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310, 1313–14

(9th Cir. 1987)).

In Lolli, the notice of appeal only mentioned the denial of

the motion for reconsideration of an adverse summary

judgment order, and did not specify an intention to appeal the

summary judgment order itself. 351 F.3d at 414. We

nonetheless reviewed the summary judgment order directly

because the appellant’s “intent to appeal the summary

judgment order can be inferred, as we frequently have done

when a party appeals after its motion for reconsideration was

denied.” Id. We went on to hold there was no prejudice to

the defendants where the appellant had provided a “full

discussion” of the summary judgment order in its opening

brief, and the defendants had provided a “detailed response”

in their answering brief. Id. at 414–15.

This case fits comfortably within those principles. 

Notwithstanding MLTF’s failure to designate for appeal

Judge Ware’s underlying fee order, MLTF’s intent to appeal

the underlying fee award is apparent from both the factual

circumstances and MLTF’s extensive briefing on the issue. 

The Government also cannot demonstrate prejudice. It had,

and took advantage of, an opportunity to argue the merits of

the underlying award in its opposition brief. Although the

dissent is “not persuaded that the ‘fair inference’ of an intent

to appeal should be so facilely bestowed upon Appellants

who have failed to comply with the rules of appellate

procedure,” Dissenting Op. at 21, it does not contest that

MLTF meets both elements of the test we articulated in Lolli. 

Accordingly, we choose to exercise our discretion and

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HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 13

consider in this appeal the merits of Judge Ware’s underlying

fee award.2

II. The Underlying Fee Award

A. Applicable Law

A party seeking attorney fees in a FOIA action must show

that it is both eligible for, and entitled to, such fees. Church

of Scientology v. U.S. Postal Servs., 700 F.2d 486, 489 (9th

Cir. 1983). A party is eligible for attorney fees if it

“substantially prevailed” in the litigation. Id. (quoting

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)). If a party is eligible for attorney

fees, the determination of entitlement is within the sound

discretion of the trial court. Id. at 492. In exercising such

discretion, the district court must consider: “(1) the public

benefit from disclosure, (2) any commercial benefit to the

plaintiff resulting from disclosure, (3) the nature of the

plaintiff’s interest in the disclosed records, and (4) whether

the government’s withholding of the records had a reasonable

basis in law.” Long v. IRS, 932 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir.

1991).

The “customarymethod” for awarding fees is the lodestar

method, which is performed by multiplying the number of

hours reasonably expended by the prevailing party in the

litigation by a “reasonable hourly rate.” Morales v. City of

San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). There is a

“strong presumption” that the lodestar figure represents a

 

2

 MLTF’s appeal remains timely. While MLTF would ordinarily have

thirty days from entry of the fee award to appeal, if a motion to amend

judgment is filed, the thirty days does not begin to run until the motion is

decided. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).

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14 HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

reasonable award, and the figure should only be departed

from “if certain factors relating to the nature and difficulty of

the case overcome this strong presumption and indicate that

such an adjustment is necessary.” Long, 932 F.2d at 1314

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court must “provide a . . . detailed account of

how it arrives at appropriate figures for ‘the number of hours

reasonably expended’ and ‘a reasonable hourly rate.’” Hall

v. Bolger, 768 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Blum

v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 888 (1984)). Though the district court

generally possesses a “superior understanding of the

litigation,” “[i]t remains important . . . for the district court to

provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the

fee award.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). 

To determine a “reasonable hourly rate,” the district court

should consider: “experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorney; the outcome of the results of the proceedings; the

customary fees; and the novelty or the difficulty of the

question presented.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles,

796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Kerr v. Screen

Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975)). The

reasonable rate should generally be guided by “the rate

prevailing in the community for similar work performed by

attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” 

Id. at 1210–11 (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11 (1984)).

The burden is on the fee applicant to produce evidence

“that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in

the community.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d

973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11). In general,

“[a]ffidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys

regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate

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HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 15

determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate

for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the

prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v.

Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990).

The resulting lodestar figure is “presumed to be [a]

reasonable fee.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 897. The district court

may nonetheless consider other factors in determining

whether to adjust the fee award upward or downward. 

Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1212. However, the district court

should explain why the adjustment was appropriate. Hall,

768 F.2d at 1151.

B. Calculation of the Reasonable Rate

Consistent with its burden, MLTF provided substantial

evidence of the prevailing market rate for the applicable

periods. In addition to affidavits from each of the attorneys

attesting to the reasonableness of their rates, MLTF also

supported its application by reference to comparable fee

awards, including:

• A 2009 fee award for $350 an hour to Colleen Flynn;

• A 2011 fee award for $500 an hour to a 2001 law

graduate;

• A 2008 fee award for $695 an hour to a 1978 law

graduate;

• A 2010 fee award for $675 an hour to a 1995 law

graduate;

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16 HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

• A 2010 fee award for $440 an hour to a 2008 law

graduate.

Despite the evidence provided by MLTF, the court below

chose instead to rely on two district court opinions, Blackwell

v. Foley, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2010), and Pande

v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. C 04-05107 JCS, 2008 WL

906507 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2008), in determining the

prevailing market rate. This authority was not apposite. In

Blackwell, the court was considering the prevailing market

rate for a 2002 graduate performing legal work in 2007 and

2008. 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1082. And in Pande, the court was

considering the prevailing market rate for a 2004 graduate

performing legal work in 2007. 2008 WL 906507, at *5.3

In justification of the rates that it found reasonable, the

court below said that “Plaintiffs fail to provide evidence of

prevailing market rates in this forum during the time period

at issue.” Hiken, 2012 WL 3686747, at *5. In view of the

evidence in the record discussed above regarding MLTF’s

rates, we cannot agree with this conclusion. As our case law

makes clear, it is incumbent upon the district court to provide

a “concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee

award.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.

The Government argued below that the court had, in fact,

reviewed and considered the evidence of prevailing historical

rates in the community, but “simply concluded that [those]

3 Here, MLTF sought fees for attorneys graduating in 2002, 2004, 2005,

and 2006. The dissent faults our reasoning because “[n]ot one of the

referenced cases arose under the Freedom of Information Act, as does this

case.” Dissenting Op. at 23. The same is true, however, of each of the

cases relied upon by the district court.

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HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 17

declarations did not provide sufficient evidence of the

prevailing rates.” Defendants’ Motion for De Novo

Determination of Dispositive Matter Referred to Magistrate

Judge at 6, Hiken, 2013 WL 4496336 (No. 06-cv-02812-

YGR), ECF No. 140. The Government, however, appears to

have shifted its approach on appeal, arguing instead, as the

district court held, that MLTF forfeited its opportunity to

argue for historical rates by only advocating in its brief for

current rates. We cannot accept this argument.

We have articulated the burden for each side in a fee

application: “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce

satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line

with those prevailing in the community.” Camacho, 523 F.3d

at 980. Conversely, “[t]he party opposing the fee application

has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence

to the district court challenging the accuracy and

reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by

the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Gates v.

Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1992). The

Government asks us to impose an additional limitation on fee

applicants: namely, that they are foreclosed from pointing out

a misapplication of a historical rate calculation if they only

requested current rates in an initial application. We do not

believe that such an additional burden would be warranted. 

From time to time, fee applicants request awards higher than

that which the evidence may, upon close review by a neutral

judge, fairly permit. But a fee applicant’s decision to request

a higher rate does not permit a court to disregard different

rates if the evidence in the record supports them.

The cases cited by the Government only stand for the

obvious proposition that a court is not required to

“manufacture arguments” on behalf of litigants. See Indep.

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18 HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir.

2003); Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282, 290 (9th Cir. 1965); see

also United States v. Anekwu, 695 F.3d 967, 985 (9th Cir.

2012). Contrary to the dissent’s insistence, none of these

cases suggests that a district court reviewing a fee application

is relieved of its obligation to calculate a reasonable rate

based on record evidence of prevailing historical rates merely

because the applicant has argued for a current rate higher than

the district court chooses to allow.

To be sure, MLTF might have been more careful to alert

the district court of the substantial evidence of prevailing

historical rates in the declarations, but there is no question

here that the evidence was properly submitted to the district

court. Furthermore, the fact that MLTF cited to the relevant

declarations in its moving papers is not consistent with the

Government’s position that the pertinent evidence was buried

in an impenetrable record. Accordingly, we vacate the

district court’s fee award and remand for a recalculation of

the appropriate rate.4

Because we vacate and remand the district court’s initial

award of fees, MLTF’s appeal from the district court’s denial

of its motion to amend the judgment is now moot. See

Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.

2001).

4 We note that the Magistrate’s fee calculation, while not controlling on

remand, may serve as an appropriate roadmap for the district court. The

resulting fee award, upon full briefing by both parties, may be greater or

less than the recommended award from the Magistrate.

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HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 19

III. Fees for Services Rendered on Appeal

MLTF requests that we award it costs and attorney fees

expended in making this appeal. As a general rule, a party

entitled to attorney fees as a matter of statute is similarly

entitled to fees accumulated in “establishing and negotiating

his rightful claim to the fee.” Se. Legal Def. Grp. v. Adams,

657 F.2d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir.

1978)).

The Government argues that any request for fees related

to this appeal is premature because even if we vacate and

remand, the district court may still, after review of the

evidence and exercise of its discretion, award the same sum. 

We disagree. In United Steelworkers, we vacated and

remanded a fee award, instructing the district court to

recalculate the appropriate fee. 896 F.2d at 407–08. In doing

so, we noted that plaintiffs were nonetheless entitled to fees

for the time spent on the appeal. Id. at 408. The Government

has not challenged, on this appeal, MLTF’s eligibility for and

entitlement to attorney fees. Thus, there is no question that

MLTF falls within the class of litigants entitled to attorney

fees on appeal, and MLTF may request attorney fees on

appeal in accordance with Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6.5

5 MLTF has also requested fees related to its motion to amend judgment

below. We leave the award and calculation of those fees to the sound

discretion of the district court.

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20 HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

CONCLUSION

The fee award of the district court is VACATED, and the

matter is REMANDED for recalculation of attorney fees in

a manner consistent with this opinion.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent for two reasons: 1) Military Law

Task Force (Task Force) failed to appeal the district court’s

fee award; and 2) the district court acted within its discretion

in calculating the fee award.

1. Task Force failed to appeal the district court’s fee

award.

As the majority candidly acknowledges, the “notice of

appeal is plainly deficient.” Majority Opinion, p. 11.

Specifically, Task Force’s notice of appeal contained

absolutely no mention of the underlying fee award. Rather,

it referenced only the district court’s denial of the motion for

reconsideration.

The majority relies upon the case of Lolli v. County of

Orange, 351 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2003) and the cases cited in

Lolli. See Majority Opinion, p. 11–12. However, a closer

reading of the cases cited in Lolli reveals the existence of

factual circumstances that are not present in this case.

In United States v. Belgarde, 300 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th

Cir. 2002), we expressed our belief that “all parties

understood that the government was appealing the dismissal

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HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 21

of the Indictment following denial of a motion to reconsider.” 

No such understanding existed in this case.

In McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.

1987), we observed that “[i]n denying [the] post-judgment

motion, the district court incorporated the prior order . . .” No

similar incorporation of the prior order accompanied the

district court’s denial of Task Force’s motion for

reconsideration.

I am not persuaded that the “fair inference” of an intent to

appeal should be so facilely bestowed upon Appellants who

have failed to comply with the rules of appellate procedure. 

I would hold that Task Force failed to appeal the underlying

fee award.

As the majority acknowledges, Task Force argued only

for fees based on the current billing rates for its attorneys. 

Task Force made absolutely no argument for fees predicated

upon prevailing historic market rates for the pertinent

geographical area and time period. See Majority Opinion, p.

4. Yet, the majority essentially holds that it was incumbent

upon the district court judge to award fees based upon an

argument that was never made by Task Force. See id. at

17–18.

Until today, we had not required a district court to rule on

an argument that was never presented. Indeed, our precedent

is to the contrary. We have consistently ruled that a party

forfeits any argument not made to the district court. See

United States v. Anekwu, 695 F.3d 967, 985 (9th Cir. 2012)

(“[A]n appellant waives arguments by failing to raise them in

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22 HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE

the district court . . .”) (citation omitted); see also Li v. Kerry,

710 F.3d 995, 1000 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013).1

2. The district court acted within its discretion in

calculating the fee award.

Our review of the reasonableness of an attorney fee award

is for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. $28,000.00

in U.S. Currency, 802 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2015).

The majority points to the inclusion of a declaration of

Carol Sobel setting forth fee awards in various court cases in

the Los Angeles area. See Majority Opinion, p. 16–17. 

However, the majority’s reliance on these fee awards is

problematic for two reasons: 1) the data provided was

proffered for the purpose of supporting Task Force’s request

for an award of its current billing rates, and 2) the district

court was not required to accept the proffered rates as

controlling.

Notably, Task Force never argued that the rates set forth

in the Sobel declaration established prevailing market rates

for 2006 to 2008. Rather, Task Force relied on the rates in

the declaration as support for an award of its current rates,

particularly since the rates in the declaration encompassed

2008–2011, as opposed to the pertinent years of 2006–2008.

More importantly, the district court was not required to

accept these rates as prevailing market rates for 2006–2008,

not only because the rates were for different years, but also

1 The majority opinion completely ignores the holding of these cases and

permits Task Force to appeal on a basis that was never presented to the

district court.

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HIKEN V. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 23

for different types of cases. Not one of the referenced cases

arose under the Freedom of Information Act, as does this

case.2 Rather, the rates cited were awarded in “a recent large

class-action First Amendment case,” “a consumer class

action,” and civil rights litigation. Absent a showing that the

fees were earned in cases that were analogous to litigation

under the Freedom of Information Act, the district court was

not obligated to accept these rates as historical market rates. 

See Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 946

(9th Cir. 2007) (“[B]illing rates should be established by

reference to the fees that private attorneys of an ability and

reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel charge

their paying clients for legal work of similar complexity.”)

(citations omitted).

In summary, because Task Force did not appeal the

underlying fee award, and because the district court acted

within its discretion in determining the appropriate fee award,

I would affirm.

2 The majority seeks to minimize this discrepancy by pointing to the

cases relied on by the district court. See Majority Opinion, p. 16 n.3. 

However, if non-Freedom of Information Act cases do not support the

district court’s decision, they do not become magically more persuasive

because they are cited by the majority.

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