Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-16-12102/USCOURTS-ca11-16-12102-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Roland Baker
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-12102

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cr-00197-TJC-JBT-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

WILLIAM ROLAND BAKER, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(February 24, 2017)

Before HULL, WILSON, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

William Baker appeals his convictions and sentence for two counts of 

possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and 

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(b)(2). Baker raises four issues on appeal. First, he argues the district court abused 

its discretion by admitting evidence of his earlier guilty plea to lewd and lascivious 

conduct of a child under 16 in which the state court withheld adjudication. 

Second, he argues the district court abused its discretion by not granting him a 

mistrial after the government elicited testimony that he was a registered sex 

offender. Third, he argues he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the 

government failed to prove he knowingly possessed child pornography. Last, he 

argues the district court erred in enhancing his sentence by counting his guilty plea 

with adjudication withheld to lewd and lascivious conduct on a minor as a 

conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). After careful review, we affirm the 

district court.

I.

In March 2013, law enforcement agents identified an IP address in 

Jacksonville, Florida, that was sharing files identified as child pornography by the 

National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Agents connected to the 

computer using that IP address and downloaded three images and one video of 

child pornography. Comcast, the owner of the IP address, was subpoenaed. 

Comcast provided the government with Baker’s name and home address as the 

subscriber using that IP address. A criminal background check showed that in 

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1995, Baker pleaded guilty to lewd and lascivious conduct involving a child under 

16 in Florida.

Based on that information, the agents secured a search warrant and executed 

it in May 2013. They found two laptops in Baker’s home, a Dell and an HP. The 

Dell laptop computer had 106 images of child pornography on it. The HP laptop 

computer had 232 images of child pornography in unallocated file space.1

 It had

also been used to search for terms suggestive of child pornography on a filesharing program. While the search occurred, two agents went to Baker’s 

workplace to interview him. Baker told them he was the only person who used his 

laptop; that it was password protected; and that only he knew the password. He 

also said he used the file-sharing program that had led investigators to his home. 

However, Baker said he had been set up for the child pornography on his 

computer.

Baker was charged and convicted of two counts of possession of child 

pornography—one count for each laptop. As relevant to this appeal, Baker 

objected to two uses of his Florida 1995 guilty plea with adjudication withheld to 

lewd and lascivious conduct involving a child under 16. Baker argued the plea did 

not constitute a conviction under Florida law. As a result, he first objected to the 

 1 This means the images were not currently accessible to the user, but had been on the 

laptop at some point. See United States v. Pruitt, 638 F.3d 763, 765 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam). Investigators used special forensic software to look at these parts of Baker’s HP laptop

computer to find files that were deleted or saved only temporarily.

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plea’s introduction as propensity evidence—that is, evidence that he acted in 

accordance with his previous conduct. See Fed. R. Evid. 404. The district court 

overruled this objection, but limited the introduction of this evidence to the fact of 

the plea itself instead of its underlying details. Second, Baker objected to the 

district court’s use of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)’s sentencing enhancement for anyone 

convicted of § 2252(a)(4) who “has a prior conviction . . . under the laws of any 

State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct 

involving a minor.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). The district court overruled this 

objection after reviewing this Court’s precedent.

II.

Baker argues the district court erred by admitting evidence of his 1995 guilty 

plea without adjudication to lewd and lascivious conduct of a child under 16. We 

review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Woods, 684 F.3d 1045, 1062 n.17, 1064–65 (11th Cir. 2012) (per 

curiam).

Baker says his 1995 guilty plea was not a conviction, and therefore should 

not have been admitted as propensity evidence. This argument is misplaced. 

Whether this plea was a conviction is relevant to Baker’s sentencing enhancement, 

discussed below, but not to the evidentiary issue here. Baker does not dispute that 

he committed an act of “child molestation” within the definition of Rule 414. The 

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district court properly relied on Rule 414 to except this evidence from Rule 404’s 

general prohibition against propensity evidence.

Baker then says that in any event, the district court wrongly weighed the 

prejudicial effect of this evidence against its probative value under Rule 403. The 

record shows, however, that the district court carefully weighed this evidence 

before admitting it. The court recognized the risk of prejudice to Baker, but 

because the government was allowed to introduce only the fact of the plea and not 

its underlying details, the court determined the plea did not create a risk of unfair 

prejudice that would substantially outweigh its probative value. See Fed. R. Evid. 

403. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion.

III.

Baker next argues the district court erred when it denied his motion for a 

mistrial. We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. 

United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2012). “A mistrial 

should be granted if the defendant’s substantial rights are prejudicially affected.” 

United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 

Prejudice occurs when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the objected-to 

error, the outcome of the trial would have been different. See id. And if the 

district court gives a curative instruction, the reviewing court may reverse only if 

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the evidence is so highly prejudicial that the instruction could not cure it. United 

States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002).

Baker says the government went beyond the district court’s ruling to

introduce just the fact of his 1995 guilty plea without its underlying details. He 

points to where the government elicited testimony that he was registered as a sex 

offender in Florida. After that testimony, Baker immediately moved for a mistrial. 

The district court denied Baker’s motion, later saying if it was error at all, it did 

“not rise to any level of a mistrial.” And in any event, the court immediately 

instructed the jury to disregard that testimony. This Court assumes that juries 

follow the district court’s instructions. United States v. Kennard, 472 F.3d 851, 

858 (11th Cir. 2006). Because Baker has not shown this testimony was so highly 

prejudicial that the instruction could not cure it, we conclude the district court did 

not abuse its discretion. See Bender, 290 F.3d at 1284.

IV.

Baker’s third claim is that the district court erred by not granting his motions 

for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the government’s case and at the end of 

the entire trial. We review de novo whether the evidence in the record is sufficient 

to support the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. 

Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir. 2015). “We examine the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the government and resolve all reasonable inferences and 

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credibility issues in favor of the guilty verdicts.” Id. (quotation omitted and 

alteration adopted). We will overturn the jury’s verdict only if no reasonable trier 

of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Baker says the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 

“knowingly” possessed child pornography as required by the statute he was 

convicted of, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). He says the Dell laptop was “effectively 

inoperable”; the HP laptop could be accessed by anyone without a password; and 

the government had to use special software to access the child pornography files he 

was charged with possessing on both computers. Because of all this, Baker asserts 

the government did not have sufficient evidence to show he had the required 

mental state to support his convictions.

The jury was free to accept Baker’s claim, but rejected it in favor of the 

government’s case when it arrived at its verdict. See United States v. Jiminez, 564 

F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009). Section 2252(a)(4)(B)’s knowledge element 

requires the government to prove Baker knew the images in his possession showed 

minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct. See United States v. AlfaroMoncada, 607 F.3d 720, 733 (11th Cir. 2010). This Court has held that the 

knowledge element may be proved by circumstantial evidence in the record of 

online search terms related to child pornography and images found in a computer’s 

unallocated space if other evidence also supports the conviction. United States v. 

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Pruitt, 638 F.3d 763, 765, 767 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). In Baker’s case, the 

government presented the same type of evidence, and also introduced the 1995 

guilty plea as propensity evidence; evidence that only Baker used the HP laptop 

computer; and that the Dell laptop contained child pornography files. Cf. id. We 

conclude this record presented a reasonable basis for the jury’s verdict. See

Chafin, 808 F.3d at 1268. The district court did not err in denying Baker’s motions

for judgment of acquittal.

V.

Last, Baker argues his 1995 guilty plea without adjudication does not 

constitute a “conviction” under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). “We review de novo

questions of statutory interpretation.” United States v. Maupin, 520 F.3d 1304, 

1306 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

Section 2252(b)(2) says:

Whoever violates . . . paragraph (4) of subsection (a) shall be fined 

under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but 

if . . . such person has a prior conviction . . . under the laws of any 

State relating to . . . abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or 

ward, . . . such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for 

not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years.

The district court found Baker’s 1995 guilty plea without adjudication constituted a 

“conviction” for the purposes of this statute. The court imposed the mandatory 

minimum of ten years as Baker’s sentence.

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Baker points to this Court’s decision in United States v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 

1131 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam), in which we certified a question to the Florida 

Supreme Court asking whether “a guilty plea for a felony for which adjudication 

was withheld” qualified as a conviction under Florida law. Id. at 1133. The 

Florida Supreme Court held that for the purposes of Fla. Stat. § 790.23 (felon in 

possession of a firearm), a guilty plea without adjudication did not constitute a 

“conviction” under Florida law. Clarke v. United States, 184 So.3d 1107, 1116 

(Fla. 2016). Baker says the reasoning from Clarke should apply to his case.

Baker acknowledges this Court’s decisions in Maupin and United States v. 

Mejias, 47 F.3d 401 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), have already addressed his 

claim. In Mejias, this Court held a nolo contendere plea where adjudication was 

withheld constituted a “conviction” for the purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). 

47 F.3d at 404. The Mejias panel said “[t]he meaning of the word ‘conviction’ in a 

federal statute is a question of federal law unless Congress provides otherwise.” 

Id. at 403. Applying Mejias, this Court held in Maupin that a nolo contendere plea 

with adjudication withheld constituted a “conviction” for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252A(b). 520 F.3d at 1308. The Maupin panel pointed out that what 

constituted a “conviction” for § 2252A(b) was a question of federal law instead of 

state law, distinguishing statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) that specifically rely on 

state law. See id. at 1307.

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In Clarke, this Court was interpreting what constituted a “conviction” under 

§ 922(g)(1), which Congress says “shall be determined in accordance with the law 

of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” 780 F.3d at 1132 (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)). Baker was not convicted under § 922(g)(1), but 

§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2). Like Maupin and Mejias, “the statute at issue here 

does not provide the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held should 

determine whether an offense constitutes a prior conviction.” See Maupin, 520 

F.3d at 1307. 

Baker also acknowledges that Maupin interpreted § 2252A, which has nearly 

identical language to the § 2252(a), and forecloses his claim. However, he says 

Clarke suggests Maupin was incorrectly decided and asks us to revisit the decision 

in light of what the Florida Supreme Court has recently said. But because Maupin

did not rely on state law in reaching its holding, we are bound by our prior panel 

precedent “unless and until [it is] overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.” 

United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). As a 

result, the district court correctly followed our precedent and we affirm Baker’s 

convictions and sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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