Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02638/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02638-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Linda Ray Gardner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The HONORABLE WILLIAM R. WILSON, Jr., United States District Judge

for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2638

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Linda Ray Gardner, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 9, 2006

Filed: May 3, 2006 

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, HANSEN and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

A jury convicted Linda Ray Gardner of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or

more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court granted

Gardner’s motion for a new trial. The government appealed, and we reversed. United

States v. Gardner, 396 F.3d 987 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 153 (2005). On

remand, the district court1

 sentenced Gardner to 120 months in prison. She appeals,

raising three evidentiary issues. We affirm. 

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I.

Ruby Eastep was the first of the government’s twenty-three witnesses at trial.

Eastep testified that she was a high school classmate of Gardner who began using

methamphetamine in 1994 while residing in Merced, California. Eastep purchased the

drugs from Mexican suppliers introduced by a friend, Chris Smith. Eastep moved

back to Arkansas in 1994 and began supplying local distributors, including Gardner.

Eastep testified that she made twenty-four trips between California and Arkansas in

the next two or three years, each time delivering Gardner between a quarter-pound and

two pounds of methamphetamine. 

Early in her direct examination Eastep testified that she brought Chris Smith to

Arkansas during this period and that Gardner’s sister, Tina Spears, introduced Smith

to Gardner. Defense counsel objected to this testimony as inadmissible hearsay. See

Fed. R. Evid. 802. The government argued it was testimony excluded from the

definition of hearsay and admissible as “a statement by a coconspirator of a party

during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).

Following the procedure approved by this court, the district court conditionally

admitted the testimony as a coconspirator statement and then found at the end of the

trial that the government had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence “(1)

that a conspiracy existed; (2) that the defendant and the declarant were members of

the conspiracy; and (3) that the declaration was made during the course and in

furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir.

1978). On appeal, Gardner argues that the district court abused its discretion in

admitting this testimony because Smith’s introduction to Gardner was not “in

furtherance of” the conspiracy. She argues that the testimony was prejudicial hearsay

because it linked her to a methamphetamine broker from California.

Later in her direct examination, Eastep testified that she went to California in

1996 to buy five pounds of methamphetamine for Gardner and another Arkansas

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distributor. While there, Eastep had a falling out with Smith and his Mexican

supplier, and they refused to supply Eastep with methamphetamine. Later, Eastep

telephoned Gardner, who said that Smith had already called and would directly supply

her. Thereafter, Eastep was “cut out of the middle,” and Gardner purchased directly

from Smith and his Mexican suppliers. Gardner’s statement to Eastep was not

hearsay; it was an admission by a party admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) of the

Federal Rules of Evidence. It was also far more prejudicial to Gardner’s defense than

the earlier statement by Spears that she introduced Smith to Gardner two years

previously. The introduction provided relevant background because it explained how

Smith knew to call Gardner and offer to supply her directly. But Gardner’s 1996

statement that Smith would be supplying her directly was admissible without the

background statement by Spears. 

In general, statements by coconspirators concerning their distribution of drugs

or their efforts to recruit other conspirators are admissible as in furtherance of the

conspiracy. See United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 74-75 (1st Cir. 2005),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1105 (2006); United States v. Mickelson, 378 F.3d 810, 820

(8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, 1 F.3d 662, 674 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 936 (1993). Here, even if Spears’s statement that she introduced

Smith to Gardner, standing alone, was only marginally “in furtherance of” the

conspiracy, any error was harmless because other admissible testimony established

that Smith directly supplied Gardner with methamphetamine. See United States v.

Lopez, 384 F.3d 937, 942 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1078 (2006); United

States v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 1994). 

Gardner further argues that this testimony violated her Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause rights because the government failed to demonstrate that the

declarant, Tina Spears, was unavailable. This argument is based upon outdated Eighth

Circuit decisions. See United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 909-10 (8th Cir. 1985);

United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 638-39 (8th Cir. 1984). Those decisions were

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overruled in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 391 (1986), where the Supreme

Court held that the Confrontation Clause does not require “a showing of unavailability

as a condition to admission of the out-of-court statements of a nontestifying coconspirator, when those statements otherwise satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule

of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).” See also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83

(1987); United States v. Reyes, 362 F.3d 536, 540-41 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 542 U.S.

945 (2004). 

II.

Government witness Mazda Rasasy testified that he began delivering

methamphetamine from California to Gardner in Arkansas after Smith became

Gardner’s supplier. Rasasy testified that he initially drove the shipments to Arkansas,

but his superior told him to fly the drugs to Arkansas after an encounter with law

enforcement. Rasasy then transported the drugs on Southwest Airlines flights

between Sacramento and Little Rock. Toward the end of its case in chief, the

government introduced a Southwest Airlines document showing that numerous flight

reservations were made in Rasasy’s name in the year 2000, including flights

originating or ending in California and Little Rock. The document was authenticated

by the testimony of Lisa Stewart, a Southwest Airlines records custodian. The district

court overruled Gardner’s relevancy objection to this evidence. 

On appeal, Gardner argues the evidence was irrelevant because it failed to show

“who made the reservations, whether any of the reservations were actually used,

whether they were for round-trip or one-way travel, or whether Little Rock was ever

a final destination.” But the evidence was relevant as that concept is defined in Rule

401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The numerous airline reservations in Rasasy’s

name were some support for his testimony that he was serving as a drug courier by air

that year. The uncertainties noted by Gardner -- which defense counsel effectively

established on cross-examination -- went to the weight of the evidence, not its

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admissibility. See Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918,

927 (2d Cir. 1977). The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this

relevant evidence. 

III.

The government presented evidence connecting Gardner with “Ace,” a debt

collector the Mexican suppliers sent to Arkansas from time to time. The first witness

to establish the connection was Eastep, who testified:

Q: Now, you’ve testified about someone that you knew as Ace.

 Where did you see Ace?

A: At Linda’s, Linda Gardner’s house.

Q: How many times have you seen Ace at Linda Gardner’s house?

A: Several times. He stayed there for a few weeks when he was there.

Q: Do you remember approximately when that was?

A: 2001, I believe. 

Gardner objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that testimony to events in 2001

was improper because it was outside the period charged in the indictment, which

alleged a conspiracy “in or about 1994 through in or about 2000.” The district court

observed that it was “discretionary with the Court” to allow evidence beyond the dates

of the alleged conspiracy. The court then denied the motion for a mistrial, struck

Eastep’s testimony as to 2001, and said it would instruct the jury to disregard the

testimony if Gardner requested that instruction. Gardner declined. Following

Eastep’s unexpected reference to 2001, the government made no further inquiry into

events after 2000 with any witness. 

On appeal, Gardner argues that the court abused its discretion in denying her

motion for a mistrial. See United States v. Hollins, 432 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 2005)

(standard of review). Gardner cites no authority establishing that the testimony was

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improper, much less grounds for a mistrial. As a general matter, the government

ventures into dangerous territory when it offers evidence of similar wrongdoing

outside the alleged conspiracy period. Such evidence may be excludable under

Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. It is reversible error if it constructively

amends the indictment by creating a substantial likelihood the defendant will be

convicted of an uncharged offense. Or it may be a material variance, changing the

evidence but not the charge, in which case its admission is reversible error if the

defendant is prejudiced. See United States v. Johnston, 353 F.3d 617, 623 (8th Cir.

2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1068 (2004). 

In this case, Eastep did not testify to wrongdoing by Gardner in 2001. To be

sure, the innocuous reference to an event in 2001, if pursued by the government in

greater detail, would have raised an inference that the conspiracy lasted beyond the

period alleged in the indictment. At some point, that variance could become material.

But the district court avoided the danger by striking Eastep’s first unanticipated

reference to 2001 and by offering the defense a curative instruction. There was no

further reference to events in 2001, and substantial testimony by later witnesses linked

Gardner and Ace during the period alleged in the indictment. Accordingly, even if

Eastep’s vague reference to an event in 2001 was improper, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Gardner’s motion for a mistrial. Compare United

States v. Cole, 380 F.3d 422, 427 (8th Cir. 2004). 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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