Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01590/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01590-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fischer Imaging Corporation
Appellant
Ann McLaughlin
Appellee

Document Text:

FlLE 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Stat~i (:Qi_nt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MA 12 1910 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

FISCHER IMAGING CORPORATION, a Clerk 

Minnesota corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ANN McLAUGHLIN, Secretary 

of Labor of the United States, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 88-1590 

(D.C. No. 87-F-1500) 

(Dist. of Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, BARRETT and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

Fischer Imaging Corporation (Fischer) appeals the district 

court's order granting the Secretary of Labor's (Secretary) motion 

for summary judgment and the denial of Fischer's cross-motion for 

summary judgment, the dismissal of its Complaint and cause of 

action, and the denial of its motion for reconsideration or to 

alter or amend judgment. Fischer asserts that the district court 

abused its discretion because there was insufficient supporting 

evidence in the administrative record to substantiate its opinion. 

We affirm. 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-1590 Document: 01019966099 Date Filed: 03/12/1990 Page: 1 
FACTS 

The facts are undisputed. On October 30, 1985, Fischer filed 

an Application for Alien Employment Certification with the 

Colorado Job Service on behalf of Pascal Perin (Perin). Fischer 

is in the business of developing and manufacturing medical 

diagnostic (x-ray) equipment. The position offered was for an 

electronics technician having the ability to design electronic 

subsystems and component parts for medical diagnostic equipment 

using computer control and operating elements, as well as to 

oversee assembly of such equipment and troubleshoot as necessary. 

Fischer did not require any minimum level of education or training 

of applicants for the position, but did require at least two years 

of experience as an electronics technician in the medical 

diagnostic equipment field. 

With respect to the qualifications of Perin, 

Certification Application reveals that he studied 

engineering in Paris, France, from 1967-1968, from 

the 

electronic 

which he 

received a one-year certificate or degree. Perin also studied 

electronics from 1968-1970 at the Conservatore National des Arts 

in Paris. Additionally, Perin was involved in the design and 

assembly of x-ray equipment in France for almost six years prior 

to the filing of the Application. The Application also states 

that Perin was seeking work as an electronics engineer. 

The Certifying Officer considered the Application, and on 

February 18, 1986, issued a Notice of Findings, stating that 

Fischer had not met the requirements of 20 C.F.R. Part 656 as the 

job opportunity offered was not for an electronics technician, as 

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specified by Fischer, but rather for an electronics engineer. The 

Certifying Officer reclassified the position as that of an 

electronics engineer based on her analysis of the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles, (4th ed. 1977) (DOT), Occupational Code§ 

003.061-034, and reliance on two independent authorities. 

Consequently, the Certifying Officer concluded that Fischer's 

recruitment efforts did not comply with 20 C.F.R. §§656.20(c)(2), 

and 656.21(9)(4) because the wage offered was below the prevailing 

rate of pay required to be offered to 

Further, the Certifying Officer 

an electronics 

required that 

engineer. 

Fischer's 

recruitment efforts be aimed solely at electronics engineers. 

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.25(c)(3), Fischer filed a 

Rebuttal to Notice of Findings on March 25, 1986. 

On April, 15, 1986, the Certifying Officer issued a Final 

Determination denying certification based on the reclassification 

of the job from electronics technician to that of electronics 

engineer. On May 7, 1986, Fischer requested administrative 

judicial review. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) affirmed the 

Certifying Officer's denial of certification on January 28, 1987. 

The ALJ compared the DOT definitions for an electronics engineer 

and an electronics technician and determined that the primary 

function of an engineer is to design systems and the primary 

function of a technician is to implement those designs. Because 

Fischer's job description included the "design" of systems and 

parts for x-ray equipment, the ALJ determined that the position 

was for an electronics engineer as defined by the DOT, 

Occupational Code§ 003.061-034. Therefore, the ALJ held that 

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Fischer incorrectly classified the position as an electronic 

technician and, accordingly, its recruiting efforts and its wage 

offer did not conform to the Regulations. 

On March 2, 1987, Fischer filed a Motion for Reconsideration 

of the ALJ's decision. This Motion was denied on August 25, 1987. 

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.27(0), the decision of the ALJ 

represents the final decision of the Secretary. 

On October 6, 1987, Fischer sought judicial review of the 

ALJ's final decision in the district court. The parties filed 

cross-motions for summary judgment and the Secretary's motion was 

granted on February 1, 1988. The district court held that the 

Secretary's findings on the job classification were not an abuse 

of discretion, and that there was ample evidence to support the 

Secretary's findings. Fischer now appeals the district court's 

decision. 

ISSUES 

Fischer raises two issues on appeal: 

I. Whether the district court incorrectly concluded that the 

Secretary did not abuse her discretion in denying Fischer an Alien 

Employment Certification on behalf of Perin. 

II. Whether the district court abused its discretion by 

granting the Secretary's motion for summary judgment and denying 

Fischer's cross-motion for summary judgment and motion for 

reconsideration or to alter or amend judgment because there was 

insufficient evidence in the record supporting such a 

determination. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1590 Document: 01019966099 Date Filed: 03/12/1990 Page: 4 
DISCUSSION 

While primary responsibility under the Immigration and 

Naturalization Act (INA) rests with the Attorney General and the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of Labor 

(DOL) is given a significant role under§ 212(a)(l4), 8 U.S.C. § 

1182(a)(l4) of the INA. That statute provides: 

Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the 

purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor, [shall 

not be admitted] unless the Secretary of Labor has 

determined and certified to the Secretary of State and 

the Attorney General that (a) there are not 

sufficient workers qualified (or equally qualified in 

the case of aliens who are members of the teaching 

profession or who have exceptional ability in the 

sciences or the arts), and available at the time of 

application for visa and admission to the United states 

and at the place where the alien is to perform such 

skilled or unskilled labor, and (b) the employment of 

such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and 

working conditions of the workers in the United States 

similarly employed .. 

In order to fulfill its obligations under the INA, the 

Secretary has adopted regulations creating a process to implement 

the above statute. These regulations, as amended, are codified at 

20 C.F.R. Part 656. 

Although the Part 656 procedures are reasonably detailed, the 

principle underlying the process can be stated as follows: An 

employer seeking labor certification must actively recruit 

domestic workers at the prevailing wage in the manner prescribed 

by the regulations so that the labor market can be fairly tested. 

If a domestic worker is not found, certification for the alien to 

work in the United States is granted. Failure to comply with 

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these regulations may result in a denial of the alien labor 

certification. Id. 

We must now determine whether the Secretary acted in 

accordance with the above statutes and regulations. Under 5 

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), the scope of review for agency action 

(including denial of an alien labor certification) is limited to a 

determination of whether the decision was "arbitrary, capricious, 

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 

See also Wilder v. Prokop, 846 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Furthermore, 

[o]n appeal from a district court's review of an 

agency's action, the appellate court '"must render an 

independent decision on the basis of the same 

administrative record as that before the district court, 

the identical standard of review is employed at both 

levels; and once appealed, the district court decision 

is accorded no particular deference."' (Citations 

omitted). 

Webb v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1252, 1254 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, the scope of 

review is a narrow one. Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. ArkansasBest Freight, 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974). 

A reviewing court must 'consider whether the decision 

was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and 

whether there has been a clear error of judgment .... 

Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching 

and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow 

one. The court is not empowered to substitute its 

judgment for that of the agency. Citizens to Preserve 

Overton Park v. Volpe, [401 U.S. 402,] at 416. The 

agency must articulate a 'rational connection between 

the facts found and the choice made.' (Citations 

omitted). 

Id. Furthermore, in determining whether the Secretary's actions 

in denying the labor certification were arbitrary, capricious, or 

an abuse of discretion, our review is confined solely to an 

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examination of the administrative record. 20 C.F.R. § 

656.26(b)(4). See also Pancho Villa Restaurant, Inc. v. United 

States Department of Labor, 796 F.2d 596, 597 (2nd Cir. 1986). 

"It is clear that § 212(a)(l4) [of the INA] vests the 

Secretary of Labor with substantial discretion to receive and 

grant or deny applications for [alien] labor certification." 

Production Tool Corporation v. Employment and Training 

Administration, 688 F.2d 1161, 1166 (7th Cir. 1982). Of critical 

importance, § 212(a)(l4) delegates to the Secretary the 

determination of whether the factual circumstances underlying a 

particular application for certification satisfies the two 

substantive requirements of unavailability of and lack of adverse 

effect on domestic workers. Production Tool Corporation. 

In applying the foregoing to the present case, we conclude 

that the district court was correct in determining that the 

Secretary did not abuse her discretion in denying Fischer an Alien 

Employment Certification on behalf of Perin. 

According to 20 C.F.R. § 656.2l(b)(2)(i)(B), the job 

opportunity's requirements shall be those defined for the job in 

the DOT. Thus, the Certifying Officer compared Fischer's job 

description in the Application for Alien Employment Certification 

with the definitions for electronics engineer and electronics 

technician located in the DOT. The job description as stated in 

the Certification Application is as follows: 

Design electronic subsystems and component parts for 

diagnostic medical imaging (X-Ray) equipment, both new 

and existing products. Systems will employ computer 

hardware and software control and operation elements. 

Will also oversee assembly of designed systems, 

troubleshooting as necessary concerning problems with 

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( R. , 

proto-type systems which may arise in transition from 

design to manufacture. (Emphasis added). 

Vol. I, Doc. 2, Application for Alien Employment 

Certification). 

The definition for an electronics engineer under the DOT, 

Occupational Code§ 003.061-034 is as follows: 

Designs and develops electronics equipment performing 

duties as described under DESIGN ENGINEER, PRODUCTS ... 

• (Emphasis added). 

The definition for a design engineer is: 

[c]onducts analytical studies on engineering proposals 

to develop design for products, such as engines, 

equipment, machines, associated and subsystems 

components, and aerospace structures, utilizing and 

applying engineering principles, research data, and 

proposed product specifications. Analyzes data to 

determine feasibility of product proposal. Confers with 

research personnel to clarify or resolve problems and 

develops design. Prepares or directs preparation of 

product or system layout and detailed drawings and 

schematics. Directs and coordinates manufacturing or 

building or prototype product or system. Plans and 

develops experimental test programs. Analyzes test data 

and reports to determine if design meets functional and 

performance specifications. Confers with research and 

other engineering personnel and prepares design 

modifications as required. Evaluates engineering test 

results for possible application to development of 

systems or other uses .... (Emphasis added). 

DOT, Occupational Code, Master. 

The following is the definition for electronics technician in 

the DOT: 

Applies electronic theory, principles of electrical 

circuits, electrical testing procedures, engineering 

mathematics, physics, and related knowledge to lay out, 

build, test, troubleshoot, repair, and modify 

developmental and production electronic equipment, such 

as computers, missile-control instrumentation, and 

machine tool numerical controls: Discusses layout and 

assembly problems with ELECTRONICS ENGINEER ... and 

draws sketches to clarify design details and functional 

criteria of electronic units. Assembles experimental 

circuitry (breadboard) or complete prototype model 

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according to engineering instructions, technical 

manuals, and knowledge of electronic systems and 

components and their functions. Recommends changes in 

circuitry or installation specifications to simplify 

assembly and maintenance. Sets up standard test 

apparatus or contrives test equipment and circuitry, and 

conduct functional, operation, environmental, and life 

tests to evaluate performance and reliability of prototype or production model. Analyzes and interprets test 

data. Adjusts, calibrates, alines, and modifies 

circuitry and components and records effects on unit 

performance. Writes technical reports and develops 

charts, graphs, and schematics to describe and 

illustrate systems operating characteristics, 

malfunctions, deviations from design specifications, and 

functional limitations for consideration by professional 

engineering personnel in broader determinations 

affecting systems design and laboratory procedures. May 

operate bench lathes, drills, and other machine tools to 

fabricate nonprocurable items, such as coils, terminal 

boards, and chassis. May check out newly installed 

equipment in airplanes, ships, and structures to 

evaluate system performance under actual operating 

conditions. May instruct and supervise lower grade 

technical personnel •..• (Emphasis added). 

DOT, Occupational Code§ 003.161-014. 

After concluding that Fischer had misclassified the job 

opportunity as an electronics technician, the Certifying Officer 

prescribed certain actions which Fischer could undertake to remedy 

the deficiencies. (R., Vol. I, Doc. 2, Notice of Findings). The 

Certifying Officer advised Fischer that it could amend its 

application by placing new advertisements containing the proper 

job title and prevailing wage. Furthermore, the Certifying 

Officer specifically informed Fischer that failure to conform the 

prevailing wage with the job description could result in a denial 

of the Certification Application. Id. 

Rather than attempt to comply with the Certifying Officer's 

advice, Fischer insisted that the duties described in the job 

description could be performed by an electronics technician and 

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that it was offering the appropriate salary for that position. 

Fischer, therefore, has refused to change the job description or 

its requirements. 

Fischer claims that the Certifying Officer erred in 

reclassifying the position from electronics technician to that of 

electronics engineer. Citing Montessori Children's House and 

School, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 443 F.Supp. 599 (N.D. Tex. 

1977), Fischer states that it is error for a Certifying Officer to 

reclassify a job opportunity as specified by the employer. Fischer 

contends that the employer is the most critically aware of the 

credentials required to fill a particular job for the best 

interest of his business as a whole. Therefore, a Certifying 

Officer should not be allowed to reclassify a job opportunity as 

specified by the employer. 

Although an employer is accorded some deference in 

determining the skills necessary to perform a particular job, See 

Ratnayake v. Mack, 499 F.2d 1207, 1212 (8th Cir. 1974), it is the 

Secretary who is responsible for ensuring that§ 212(a)(l4) of the 

INA is complied with. In order to do that, the Secretary must 

apply 20 C.F.R. Part 656 to the Application for Alien Employment 

Certification. If the application does not comply with 20 C.F.R. 

Part 656, the Secretary, through the Certifying Officer, has the 

right and the obligation to deny the application. Therefore, 

Fischer's argument concerning the reclassification of the job 

opportunity must fail. The Certifying Officer did not abuse her 

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discretion by reclassifying the job opportunity to that of an 

electronics engineer. 

Under the INA, 

initial determination 

the Secretary 

whether the 

is charged with making the 

alien labor certification 

application satisfies the two substantive requirements of 

unavailability and lack of adverse affect on the wages and working 

conditions of United States' workers. When comparing the job 

description as proposed by Fischer to the definitions in the DOT, 

it is obvious that the Certifying Officer did not abuse her 

discretion. The Certifying Officer found that the title 

"Electronics Engineer'' in the DOT, more accur a tely described the 

position for which certification was sought. 

The ALJ affirmed the Certifying Officer's denial of the 

certification. As stated before, he compared the DOT definitions 

for an electronics engineer and an electronics technician and 

determined that the primary function of an engineer is to design 

systems while the primary function of a technician is to implement 

those designs. The ALJ concluded that since Fischer's job 

opportunity required the capability to design systems and parts 

for x-ray equipment, the position was for an electronics engineer. 

This determination is in accordance with the DOT. We cannot hold 

that the Secretary abused her discretion in denying Fischer an 

Alien Employment Certification on behalf of Perin. Furthermore, 

in the application itself, there is language indicating that Perin 

is seeking work as an electronics engineer. 

Fischer further argues that it was error for the Certifying 

Officer and ALJ to consider the two independent authorities' 

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opinions in determining whether the job opportunity was for an 

electronics engineer or an electronics technician. Fischer claims 

that it is unlikely that a reasonable man would consider the two 

independent authorities' opinions to be supportive of the final 

determination, given the fact that the two independent 

authorities did not have a correct factual basis for their 

opinions, nor did they provide their qualifications. (Appellant's 

Brief, at p. 11). Furthermore, Fischer contends that the two 

independent authorities were unidentified and unqualified 

formally. Id. Fischer argues that "[i]f this Court were to allow 

Administrative Law Judges to rely on 

unknown credentials as the sole 

unidentified experts 

substantiation for 

with 

their 

decisions, their discretion would be unlimited." Id. at p. 12. 

Finally, Fischer argues that the record does not document any 

basis upon which the two independent authorities relied in giving 

their opinions. We agree. 

The Certifying Officer consulted a professor with the 

Colorado School of Mines, Mr. James K. Applegate, a Geophysical 

Engineer, for an opinion on whether the job opportunity offered by 

Fischer was for an electronics engineer or an electronics 

technician. The Certifying Officer also received information from 

Mr. Irwin Feerst from the Committee of Concerned Electronics 

Engineers, concerning the job opportunity offered by Fischer. 

However, neither of these authorities has been shown to have any 

unique or special skills qualifying them to verify the position 

requirements for a job located in the DOT. 

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Although the administrative record does include a resume of 

Mr. Applegate, the Secretary failed to qualify Mr. Applegate as an 

expert in job classifications or definitions. There is no 

information or evidence to indicate that Mr. Applegate is 

qualified to give an opinion on whether a certain job description 

is included under an electronics engineer or an electronics 

technician in the DOT. "There is no fixed or general rule that 

requires expert testimony. However, the rule does dictate that 

where the topic requires special experience only the testimony of 

a person of that special experience will be received." Randolph 

v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844, 848 (10th Cir. 1979). 

Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record indicating 

that Mr. Feerst from the Committee of Concerned Electronics 

Engineers is qualified to verify position requirements for an 

electronics engineer vs. electronics technician. In fact, the 

record is completely devoid of any mention of Mr. Feerst's 

educational background or qua lifications. Moreover, the record 

does not indicate whether Mr. Feerst is even an electrical or 

engineer. The 

Mr. Applegate 

record 

or Mr. 

does not contain a statement 

Feerst 

electronics 

from either 

knowledge of the electronics engineering 

of their personal 

and/or electronics 

technician fields. 

The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) provides 

for the admission of evidence by an agency. That statute requires 

that "the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the 

exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious 

evidence." We must hold that it was error for the Certifying 

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Officer to consider the opinions of Mr. Applegate and Mr. Feerst 

to determine whether the job offered by Fischer was for an 

electronics engineer or an electronics technician because those 

opinions were irrelevant and immaterial. However, that error does 

not require reversal of the Secretary's actions because the error 

was harmless. In McCulloch Interstate Gas Corp. v. Federal Power 

Commission, 536 F.2d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 1976), the court stated, 

''[a]gency action will not be upset because of harmless error." 

See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1036 

(7th Cir. 1984) (The doctrine of harmless error is applicable in 

reviewing administrative decisions). Furthermore, the strict 

rules of evidence do not apply to an administrative hearing. 

Morton v. Dow, 525 F.2d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 1975). See also 

People of the State of Illinois v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 

722 F.2d 1341, 1349 (7th Cir. 1984) (The rules of evidence do not 

bind administrative agencies). Therefore, since strict common law 

rules of evidence do not apply to an administrative hearing, "the 

admission of incompetent and irrelevant matter is not reversible 

error, if there is substantial evidence to sustain the decision of 

the agency." Yiannopoulos v. Robinson, 247 F.2d 655, 657 (7th 

Cir. 1957). See also Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 

676, 686 (9th Cir. 1949) ("The [Administrative Procedure] Act • 

authorizes the agency to receive any evidence, although as a 

matter of policy it should exclude irrelevant, immaterial or 

unduly repetitious matter. However, the presence of such matter 

in the record does not call for reversal of agency action where on 

the whole record the rule or order issued is supported by 

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reliable, 

original); 

Ill. 1970). 

probative and 

and Whitfield 

substantial evidence.") (Emphasis in 

v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp. 889, 895 (E.D. 

In applying the foregoing law to the present case, we observe 

that no independent authorities were necessary in this case to 

justify the Secretary's actions. According to§ 212(a)(l4) of the 

INA, the Secretary is given broad discretion to exclude aliens 

seeking to enter the United States to perform skilled or unskilled 

labor. If the Secretary determines that there are sufficient 

workers in the United States, or the employment of such aliens 

would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of 

domestic workers similarly employed, the Secretary must exclude 

the alien. Id. In order to enforce§ 212(a)(l4) of the INA, the 

Secretary has promulgated the Regulations found in 20 C.F.R. Part 

656. These Regulations prescribe the rules the Secretary must 

follow to grant or deny an Alien Employment Certification 

Application. 

According to 20 C.F.R. § 656.2l(b)(2)(i)(B), the job 

opportunity's requirements shall be those defined for the job in 

the DOT. In comparing Fischer's job description with the DOT, the 

Certifying Officer did not abuse her discretion in finding that 

the title "electronics engineer" more accurately described the 

position for which certification was sought. The primary function 

of the position offered by Fischer is to "design" systems and 

parts for x-ray equipment. A comparison of the DOT definitions 

for an electronics engineer and an electronics technician reveals 

that an engineer designs systems and a technician implements those 

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designs. See DOT, Occupational Code§ 003.061-034 and 003.161-

014. Therefore, because Fischer incorrectly classified the 

position offered, its recruiting efforts did not conform to the 

Regulations. Accordingly, the Secretary did not err in 

reclassifying the position. 

Fischer further argues that it was error for the ALJ to 

assert that Perin was an electronics engineer. Fischer claims, 

and we agree, that Perin is not an engineer, nor does he have the 

United States educational equivalency to classify him as such. 

(Appellant's Brief, at p. 13). This argument is in response to 

the ALJ's finding that "[s]trong support for this conclusion [that 

designing is primarily the function of the engineer] is found in 

the fact that the alien himself is an Electronics Engineer." (R., 

Vol. I, Administrative Law Judge Decision and Order dated January 

28, 1987). 

In the Order on Motion For Reconsideration, the ALJ clarified 

his position on this issue. The ALJ stated that the finding that 

the alien was an electronics engineer was merely cited as 

supporting evidence, while the finding that the job description 

was more closely corresponding to the DOT description of an 

electronics engineer was the primary reason for his decision. 

(R., Vol. I, Order On Motion For Reconsideration date August 25, 

1987). Moreover, based upon the Statement of Qualifications of 

Alien, a form completed by the alien, this finding was not 

unreasonable. Item 9 on that form states that the alien (Perin} 

is seeking work as an electronics engineer. We cannot conclude 

that the ALJ's error in finding that Perin was an electronics 

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engineer was such as to require reversal. See McCulloch 

Interstate Gas Corp., 536 F.2d at 913. 

Fischer further argues that the assertion that the job duties 

are those of an electronics engineer is undercut by the DOL's own 

publications. Fischer proffers the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 

U.S. Dept. of Labor Bulletin 2250, Occupational Outlook Handbook 

235 (April, 1986) (OOH) as support for this contention. Fischer 

claims that "[i]n an analysis of D.O.T. definitions, the 

Occupational Outlook Handbook states that Electronics Technicians 

'work in all phases of business and government .. [including] 

research and design.'" (Appellant's Brief, at p. 14). According 

to Fischer, the OOH states that technicians also make proto-type 

versions of newly designed equipment and frequently do routine 

design work. Id. Therefore, Fischer claims that in light of the 

OOH, it was an abuse of discretion for the Certifying Officer to 

assert that the job duties required an electronics engineer rather 

than an electronics technician. This argument has no merit. 

The OOH was not presented by Fischer as part of its case 

before the Certifying Officer, the ALJ, or the district court. 

Therefore, the OOH is not part of the administrative record. 

Fischer's argument concerning the OOH1 is being presented for the 

first time in this appeal. We refuse to consider arguments that 

were not presented to the administrative agency. It is a 

fundamental rule of judicial review of agency decisions that a 

1 It should be noted that it is not even clear whether the OOH 

was published at the time of the certifying officer's final 

determination since it was published in April, 1986 and the 

certifying officer issued her final determination on April 15, 

1986. 

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party to an agency proceeding must raise all the issues which it 

intends to contest on appeal at the appropriate time under the 

agency's administrative procedure. 

'A reviewing court usurps the agency's function when it 

sets aside the administrative determination on a ground 

not theretofore presented •... ' (Citations omitted). 

Thus, absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing 

court will not consider contentions which were not 

pressed upon the administrative agency. Hormel v. 

Helvering, 312 u.s. 552, 557, 61 s.ct. 719, 85 L.Ed. 

1037 (1940). 

Wilson v. Hodel, 758 F.2d 1369, 1373 (10th Cir. 1985). Thus, 

judicial review must be confined solely to an examination of the 

administrative record. Pancho Villa Restaurant, Inc., 796 F.2d at 

597. Furthermore, the ALJ was precluded from receiving 

information about the OOH. 20 C.F.R. 656.26(b)(4) provides that 

"[t]he request for [administrative-judicial] review, statements, 

briefs, and other submissions of the parties and amicus curiae 

shall contain only legal argument and only such evidence that was 

within the record upon which the denial of labor certification was 

based." 

Finally, Fischer argues that the Secretary's failure to 

consider the opinion provided by Mr. Forrest Fox, Fischer's 

expert, was "blatantly arbitrary". Mr. Fox's opinion was that the 

job opportunity described in the application was explicitly 

included in the DOT definition of electronics technician. This 

argument is without merit. The letter of Mr. Fox concerning the 

job opportunity in question is dated July 21, 1986, several months 

after the issuance of the final determination of the Certifying 

Officer. Consequently, it was no t possible for the Certifying 

Officer to consider this information in rendering her decision. 

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Furthermore, the ALJ was not required to consider this letter in 

connection with his decision, since it was not part of the record 

before the Certifying Officer. The Certifying Officer and the ALJ 

did not act "blatantly arbitrary'' by not considering the letter of 

Mr. Fox because they were not required to do so. See Wilson, 758 

F.2d at 1373 and 20 C.F.R. § 656.26(b)(4). 

Fischer also contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by granting the Secretary's motion for summary judgment 

and denying Fischer's cross-motion for summary judgment and motion 

for reconsideration to alter or amend judgment because there was 

insufficient evidence in the record supporting such a 

determination. "In reviewing a summary judgment order, the 

appellate court applies the same standard employed by the trial 

court under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 

Osgood v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 848 F.2d 

141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). 

When a motion for summary judgment is granted, it is the 

appellate court's duty to examine the record to 

determine if any genuine issue of material fact was in 

dispute; if not, the court must decide if the 

substantive law was correctly applied. [Citations 

omitted]. During this review, the court must examine 

the record in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing the motion. 

Id. "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere 

existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will 

not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary 

judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of 

material fact." (Emphasis in original). Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1590 Document: 01019966099 Date Filed: 03/12/1990 Page: 19 
"[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of 

summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 

that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of 

proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). An employer seeking an alien labor certification must 

specifically follow the procedures set out in 20 C.F.R. Part 656, 

and has the burden of proving compliance with the Regulations. 20 

C.F.R. § 656.2(b). The district court properly granted the 

Secretary's motion for summary judgment because Fischer failed to 

carry this burden. 

According to 20 C.F.R. § 656.2l(b)(2)(i)(B), the job 

opportunity's requirements 

the DOT. Fischer listed 

shall be those defined for the job in 

the job opportunity as "electronic 

technician." However, the duties described included "design" and 

assembly of electronic systems. The job requirements and duties, 

as described by Fischer, clearly fall under "Electronics Design 

Engineer" in the DOT, Occupational Code § 003.061-034, whose 

functions are "designs and develops electronics equipment." 

In rebuttal, Fischer has never argued that the job 

requirements described in the certification application do not 

fall under the definition of "Electronics Design Engineer" 

according to the DOT. Rather, Fischer contends that since Perin 

is completely capable of performing the job offered, the Secretary 

erred in reclassifying the position from electronics technician to 

electronics engineer. However, Fischer is attempting to persuade 

us to employ a subjective standard to evaluate the Secretary's 

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Appellate Case: 88-1590 Document: 01019966099 Date Filed: 03/12/1990 Page: 20 
actions rather than an objective standard as mandated by§ 

212(a)(l4) of the INA and 20 C.F.R. Part 656. We cannot 

substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary of Labor, who is 

the expert in these matters. 

Regardless of whether Perin has the ability to perform the 

job opportunity, Fischer's Application for Alien Certification did 

not comply with 20 C.F.R. Part 656. Compliance by Fischer with 

the Regulations was absent as a matter of law, and no material 

issues of fact were raised that brought Fischer's failure to 

comply into doubt. 

CONCLUSION 

We affirm the district court's order granting the Secretary's 

motion for summary judgment and denying Fischer's cross-motion for 

summary judgment. We further affirm the district court's 

dismissal of Fischer's Complaint and cause of action, and the 

denial of Fischer's motion for reconsideration or to alter or 

amend judgment. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-1590 Document: 01019966099 Date Filed: 03/12/1990 Page: 21