Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03011/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03011-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rico McLaughlin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 4, 1998 Decided December 18, 1998

No. 97-3011

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Rico McLaughlin,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv00466)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Elizabeth C. Coombe, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were

Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, John R. Fisher,

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Mary Patrice Brown and Henry K. Kopel, Assistant United

States Attorneys.

Before: Wald, Sentelle and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Rico McLaughlin was convicted

of multiple federal and D.C. offenses, all related to the

shooting of a government informant. After trial, McLaughlin

filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that he was

denied the right to confer with counsel during a brief recess

between his cross-examination and redirect. That motion

was denied. On appeal, McLaughlin argues that the court's

denial of his request to confer with counsel during the recess

between his cross-examination and redirect violated the Sixth

Amendment. He also argues that he was convicted and

sentenced under multiple federal and D.C. provisions which

Congress did not intend to apply to the same underlying

conduct, and that his simultaneous convictions under these

statutes violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. We find that

there was no Sixth Amendment violation, and we reject

appellant's arguments that his federal and D.C. convictions

cannot stand simultaneously. However, we do find that

defendant's convictions under two D.C. assault provisions

merge. Accordingly, we reverse his conviction for aggravated assault and vacate the concurrent sentence imposed for

that offense.

I. Background

Rico McLaughlin was tried in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia in connection with the

shooting of Thomas White. White had been an informant in

an operation called Project Uptown which involved a joint

task force of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,

the U.S. Secret Service, the Department of Housing and

Urban Development, and the Metropolitan Police Department. On April 26, 1995, White received multiple gunshot

wounds while being chased down a neighborhood street in the

District of Columbia. At trial, White testified that McLaughlin was a drug dealer with whom he had transacted in the

past, and identified McLaughlin as the shooter. An eyewitness who saw the shooting from a distance confirmed some

aspects of the identification. The court also heard evidence

from neighborhood residents, who testified that there was a

rumor in the neighborhood that White was an informant, and

that McLaughlin might have known about that rumor.

Mr. McLaughlin took the stand in his own defense. After

the government finished its cross-examination, the court ordered a brief recess, noting that defense counsel could redirect after the recess, if desired. In response to a request

from the government, and over defense objections, the court

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directed counsel not to speak to defendant during the break

"about anything he said in his testimony today." The recess

lasted fifteen minutes. After the recess, defense counsel

stated that "given the Court's ruling," she had no redirect.

Defense counsel stated: "I should also stress for the record

that I did think to myself what other areas I might want to

explore with Mr. McLaughlin. I have identified other areas,

and I would be prepared to consult with him on that. But

given the Court's ruling, I am not permitted to do that, so I

have no further questions."

At the close of trial, McLaughlin was convicted of (1)

knowingly causing bodily injury with the intent to retaliate

for providing information to law enforcement, 18 U.S.C.

s 1513(b); (2) using or carrying a firearm in relation to a

crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. s 924(c); (3) assault with intent

to kill while armed, D.C. Code ss 22-501 and 22-3202; (4)

aggravated assault while armed, D.C. Code ss 22-504.1 and

22-3202; (5) possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, D.C. Code s 22-3204(b); and (6) carrying a pistol

without a license, D.C. Code s 22-3204(a).

On December 2, 1996, defendant filed a written motion for

new trial on the ground that the court's order denying him

the right to confer with counsel about his testimony during

the recess violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The court

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randum explaining the denial. United States v. McLaughlin, 955 F. Supp. 132 (D.D.C. 1997). Defendant was sentenced on all six counts on which he was convicted. He

received eighty-seven months imprisonment on count one,

including an upward departure of twenty-four months; sixty

months imprisonment on count two, counts one and two to

be served consecutively; five to fifteen years imprisonment

on count three; five to fifteen years imprisonment on count

four, counts three and four to be served concurrently but

consecutively to counts one and two; five to fifteen years imprisonment on count five; and forty months to ten years imprisonment on count six, counts five and six to be served

concurrently, but consecutively to counts one through four.

The defendant now appeals, contending that the court's

denial of his request to confer with counsel during the recess

denied him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Appellant

also argues that the district court erred in allowing defendant

to be convicted and sentenced under multiple provisions

which Congress did not intend to give rise to simultaneous

convictions, and whose simultaneous application offends the

Double Jeopardy Clause. In addition, appellant asserts that

the prosecutor made improper statements at trial which

substantially prejudiced the outcome and that the district

court made an improper upward departure from the sentencing guidelines on the s 1513(b) charge. While we have

carefully considered each of appellant's arguments, the prosecutorial misconduct and sentencing departure arguments do

not merit separate discussion.

II. The Right to Confer with Counsel

We first examine appellant's argument that the district

court's refusal to allow him to confer with defense counsel

during a brief recess between defendant's cross-examination

and redirect denied him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Asserting this alleged denial, McLaughlin requested a

new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. He now appeals

from the district court's denial of his request.

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Three cases frame the Sixth Amendment issue in this case:

Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Mudd v. United

States, 798 F.2d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1986); and Perry v. Leeke,

488 U.S. 272 (1989). Geders held that prohibiting discussions

with defense counsel during an overnight recess shortly before defendant's cross-examination violated the Sixth Amendment, apparently without a showing of prejudice to the defendant. 425 U.S. at 91. Mudd held that the Sixth Amendment

was violated by an order for a defendant not to speak to his

defense attorney over a weekend recess between his direct

and cross-examination, even where the order prohibited only

discussions regarding the defendant's testimony. 798 F.2d at

1512. Mudd squarely held that no showing of prejudice is

required once a Sixth Amendment violation is established, but

noted that restricting discussion during a very brief recess

might give rise to no Sixth Amendment violation at all. Id. at

1514. Both Geders and Mudd, while holding that prohibiting

consultation with counsel during the relatively lengthy recesses in those cases was a Sixth Amendment violation, explicitly

declined to decide whether the same would necessarily be

true if a shorter recess were involved. Geders, 425 U.S. at 89

n.2; Mudd, 798 F.2d at 1514 (suggesting that orders which do

not impose blanket prohibitions on discussions between counsel and defendant but prevent only discussion regarding a

defendant's testimony "only interfere with the right to counsel when they cover a substantial trial recess").

The question left open by Geders and Mudd was settled by

Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989), which held that, while no

prejudice need be shown once a Sixth Amendment violation is

established, the Sixth Amendment is not violated where no

discussions are allowed between a defendant and his attorney

during a fifteen-minute recess between the defendant's direct

and cross. The Perry Court distinguished Geders, noting

that during an overnight recess, a defendant may need access

to his attorney to discuss matters that "go beyond the content

of the defendant's own testimony." Id. at 284. While noting

that "[i]t is the defendant's right to unrestricted access to his

lawyer for advice on a variety of trial-related matters that is

controlling in the context of a long recess," id., the Court held

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that "in a short recess in which it is appropriate to presume

that nothing but the testimony will be discussed, the testifying defendant does not have a constitutional right to advice."

Id.

The lengths of the recesses in this case and in Perry are

similar. The order at issue in Perry barred all communication, while the order in this case was less restrictive, barring

only communication regarding defendant's testimony. Nonetheless, appellant argues that this case is distinguishable from

Perry because the recess here was after cross-examination

rather than before. We agree with the district court that this

distinction is not constitutionally significant. See McLaughlin, 955 F. Supp. at 135.

Appellant notes that the Perry Court emphasized the importance of maintaining the integrity of cross-examination, a

concern not applicable here since the cross had been completed. Portions of Perry did express concern about preserving

the quality of cross-examination. See Perry, 488 U.S. at 282

("[C]ross-examination is more likely to elicit truthful responses if it goes forward without allowing the witness an opportunity to consult with third parties, including his or her lawyer."); id. at 283 (" 'Once the defendant places himself at the

very heart of the trial process, it only comports with basic

fairness that the story presented on direct is measured for its

accuracy and completeness by uninfluenced testimony on

cross-examination.' ") (quoting United States v. DiLapi, 651

F.2d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mishler, J., concurring)). However, other portions of the Perry opinion make clear that the

decision did not turn on the fact that the recess was before

cross-examination rather than after. Indeed, the Court

phrased its holding in general terms: "We merely hold that

the Federal Constitution does not compel every trial judge to

allow the defendant to consult with his lawyer while his

testimony is in progress if the judge decides that there is a

good reason to interrupt the trial for a few minutes." Perry,

488 U.S. at 284-85 (emphasis added).

Concededly, the Perry Court was faced with a recess

before cross-examination, so that its conclusions may be

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considered dicta regarding recesses at other times during a

defendant's testimony. But even if the Perry holding is not

directly controlling, a decision that there was a Sixth Amendment violation in the present case would be inconsistent with

Perry's rationale. The Perry Court observed that "when a

defendant becomes a witness, he has no constitutional right to

consult with his lawyer while he is testifying." Id. at 281.1

The Court observed that courts commonly instruct witnesses

not to discuss their testimony during trial, and reasoned that

while the Confrontation Clause immunizes a defendant from

physical sequestration, it does not immunize him from limited

nondiscussion orders. As the Court noted, "when [a defendant] assumes the role of a witness, the rules that generally

apply to other witnesses--rules that serve the truth-seeking

function of the trial--are generally applicable to him as well."

Id. at 282.

Appellant argues that the need to confer with counsel after

cross-examination is unique in that it is at that time that a

decision is made regarding whether to redirect at all, and that

such a decision is best made after discussion with the defendant. However, appellant does not, and could not, argue that

a defendant is always entitled to a brief recess before redirect

to confer with counsel. As the Supreme Court stated in

Perry, "a trial judge has the unquestioned power to refuse to

declare a recess at the close of direct testimony--or at any

other point in the examination of a witness...." Id. at 283.

Accordingly, appellant argues only that if there happens to be

such a recess, the defendant must be allowed to confer with

counsel about his testimony. We cannot hold that Sixth

Amendment rights turn on such happenstance. It cannot be

the law that the right to counsel attaches on the fortuity of a

recess before defendant's redirect when there is no right to

such a recess.

__________

1 Our dissenting colleague, while recognizing the quoted language

from the Supreme Court, states that "nothing in Perry suggests

that the Court intended the word 'testifying' to apply to redirect

examination." Dissent at 5. The dissent suggests no definition of

"testifying" that would not include redirect examination.

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Our dissenting colleague asserts that in his view, "this case

has nothing to do with a defendant's right to a recess."

Dissent at 1. He then proceeds to set forth an analysis under

which the Sixth Amendment affords the defendant a right to

consultation with counsel at the end of cross-examination and

before announcing a decision as to whether or not to conduct

redirect examination. Indeed, in our colleague's view, "[d]efense counsel cannot responsibly assess the [ ] risks and

benefits" of conducting redirect "without first consulting the

client about what occurred during cross." Dissent at 2. If

such a right to consult exists, then this presupposes a right to

have some sort of recess, whether or not our colleague wishes

to announce this necessary conclusion. Appellant did not

argue that such a right to consult exists even where there is

no recess, and indeed, conceded the contrary at oral argument. Given the Supreme Court's recognition of the trial

judge's "unquestioned power" to refuse a recess in Perry, we

hold that the appellant is correct, and our colleague mistaken.

No such right to a recess exists.

Furthermore, we do not see the unique need to confer with

counsel before redirect that appellant asserts. While there

may be important matters which could be discussed prior to

redirect, there may also be important matters which counsel

might discuss with a defendant prior to cross-examination, or

for that matter during direct or cross. As the Mudd panel

noted, a defense attorney may want to advise the defendant

before cross-examination on demeanor or speaking style, or

to warn the defendant before cross-examination about questions that could raise self-incrimination concerns or questions

that could lead the defendant to mention excluded evidence.

798 F.2d at 1512. Perry does not rest on the premise that

there are no legitimate reasons for a defendant to confer with

counsel before cross-examination, and arguing that there are

legitimate reasons to confer with counsel before redirect

cannot distinguish this situation from Perry. The question

before us is not whether there are legitimate reasons for a

defendant to confer with counsel before redirect, but whether

there is a Sixth Amendment right to do so. Under the

reasoning of Perry, there is no such right.

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Our colleague sees this case as controlled by Geders rather

than Perry on the theory that the decision of whether to

conduct redirect is a "tactical decision." He cites from Geders the language that the overnight recess in that case

involved "tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be

reviewed." Thus, he reasons, since there was a tactical

decision to be made here, Geders, not Perry, must control.

Our colleague's conclusion does not follow from the Geders

language. The quoted language from Geders, as our colleague recognizes, reflects the Court's recognition that overnight "recesses are often times of intensive work, with tactical

decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed." True, a

tactical decision may be genuinely at issue at the time of the

submission to redirect. Indeed, many such decisions may be

circulating in the courtroom air. Many may be there between direct and cross also. Nonetheless, the Supreme

Court in Perry made it plain that the need to make decisions

does not change the fact that a defendant witness "has no

constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while he is

testifying." Perry at 281. As our colleague recognizes, the

Perry Court stated the proposition that " 'cross-examination

is more likely to elicit truthful responses if it goes forward

without allowing the witness an opportunity to consult with

third parties, including his or her lawyer.' " Dissent at 4

(quoting Perry at 282). As our colleague further recognizes,

the undertaking of redirect establishes the right of the prosecution to re-cross. No less than the original cross, re-crossexamination is more likely to elicit truthful response without

third-party consultation. The fifteen or twenty minute recess

is not like an overnight recess, a time of intensive work with

tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed.

Rather, it is like the recess between direct and cross considered in Perry: a time too short for broad-ranging strategic

discussions but a prime time for the discussion of the witness'

testimony. Just as the recess in Perry could have resulted in

the sort of coached answers on cross that the Supreme Court

feared but for the trial court's restriction, an open-ended

attorney-client session at the end of cross could allow for a

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reconstruction of the defendant's testimony on redirect subjected only to a freshly coached re-cross-examination.

Our colleague's assertion that "[w]hen tactical questions

arise, the Sixth Amendment requires defendants to be allowed to consult with their attorneys," cannot as a practical

matter state an acceptable proposition of Sixth Amendment

law. Tactical questions can arise at any point during the

defendant's testimony, and it is plain from Perry as well as

trial experience that a defendant has no unrestricted right to

interrupt the testimony for consultation. No more has he a

right to consultation during a fortuitous recess.2

III. Defendant's Multiple Convictions and Sentences

In the District of Columbia, the government may "simultaneously charg[e] in one indictment offenses under similar

federal and D.C. statutes arising from a single transaction."

United States v. Jones, 527 F.2d 817, 829 n.15 (D.C. Cir.

1975). Federal district courts in the District of Columbia

have jurisdiction over offenses "under any law applicable

exclusively to the District of Columbia which offense is joined

in the same information or indictment with any Federal

offense." D.C. Code s 11-502(3). Where an indictment contains both District of Columbia and federal charges, the

district court may adjudicate the entire case. United States

v. Wade, 152 F.3d 969, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In this instance,

the government charged defendant with six counts, including

two federal counts and four District of Columbia counts. A

grand jury returned an indictment on each of the six counts:

(1) knowingly causing bodily injury with the intent to retaliate

for providing information to law enforcement, 18 U.S.C.

s 1513(b); (2) using or carrying a firearm in relation to a

crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. s 924(c); (3) assault with intent

to kill while armed, D.C. Code ss 22-501 and 22-3202; (4)

__________

2 We find it significant that the ABA standards on criminal

defense do not list whether to redirect as one of the essential areas

where the client makes the choice. Criminal Justice Prosecution

Function and Defense Function Standards, 4-5.2, Control and

Direction of the Case.

aggravated assault while armed, D.C. Code ss 22-504.1 and

22-3202; (5) possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, D.C. Code s 22-3204(b); and (6) carrying a pistol

without a license, D.C. Code s 22-3204(a). Appellant does

not challenge the inclusion of these counts in the same

indictment, but argues that his conviction and sentencing on

all six counts is not in keeping with congressional intent

regarding the application of these provisions and is barred by

the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The parties agree that because appellant has first raised

this argument on appeal, we review for plain error. Cf.

United States v. Foster, 988 F.2d 206, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

This standard is set forth by Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), which

provides that "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial

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rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the

attention of the court." Under this standard, the Court of

Appeals should correct a plain error affecting substantial

rights if the error " 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity,

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " United States

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (quoting United States v.

Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).

A.Legislative Intent, Double Jeopardy, and the Blockburger Test

Appellant argues that several of his convictions were under

statutory provisions which should not be applied to the same

conduct, either because Congress did not so intend or because

the Double Jeopardy Clause does not so permit. In particular, appellant argues that his conviction under 18 U.S.C.

s 1513(b) cannot stand together with his convictions for assault with intent to kill while armed, D.C. Code ss 22-501

and 22-3202, and for aggravated assault while armed, D.C.

Code ss 22-504.1 and 22-3202; that the two "carrying" provisions, 18 U.S.C. s 924(c) and D.C. Code s 22-3204(b), cannot

both apply; and that his convictions under the two D.C.

assault provisions merge.

Whether conduct can give rise to multiple convictions in a

single trial is essentially a question of statutory construction,

but it is statutory construction with constitutional implicaUSCA Case #97-3011 Document #403839 Filed: 12/18/1998 Page 11 of 36
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tions. This is so because the question of Congress's intent

and the question of what the Double Jeopardy Clause permits

in such situations are closely intertwined. The Double Jeopardy Clause affords three basic protections: "It protects

against a second prosecution for the same offense after

acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the

same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v.

Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted). It is the

third strand of protection that is at issue in this case. The

Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against cumulative punishments is designed to ensure that the sentencing discretion

of courts is confined to the limits established by the legislature. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984). Thus in

determining whether convictions under multiple provisions

violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, our inquiry is directed at

legislative intent. United States v. Hoyle, 122 F.3d 48, 49

(D.C. Cir. 1997). When a defendant is charged under multiple provisions, the "Double Jeopardy Clause does no more

than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater

punishment than the legislature intended." Missouri v.

Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). Thus the Double Jeopardy

Clause serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors, not the legislature. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165

(1977). Accordingly, analysis of prosecutions under multiple

statutes under the Double Jeopardy Clause is limited to

considering whether the legislature intended to allow simultaneous convictions. United States v. Sumler, 136 F.3d 188,

189 (D.C. Cir. 1998). If the legislature intends to impose

multiple punishment, imposition of such sentences does not

violate Double Jeopardy. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S.

333, 344 (1981).

The test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.

299 (1932), is often used to determine whether the legislature

intended to allow punishment under multiple provisions.

United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993). Under this

test, we compare the elements of the offenses to see whether

"each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does

not." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. The application of the

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test focuses on the statutory elements of the offense, not on

the proof offered in a given case. Iannelli v. United States,

420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975). Hence if each provision

requires proof of an element that the other does not, the

Blockburger test is satisfied, indicating that simultaneous

application of the two provisions was intended. Conversely, if

the provisions do not each require an element that the other

does not, the Blockburger test is not satisfied, indicating that

simultaneous application of the two provisions was not intended.

The Blockburger test functions both as a rule of statutory

construction and a constitutional presumption. As a tool of

statutory construction, the Blockburger test is not absolutely

controlling. See, e.g., Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340. In particular, failing the Blockburger test does not necessarily imply

that two provisions may not be applied together, as the

ultimate question is one of legislative intent. If the legislature intends two criminal provisions to apply simultaneously,

applying them together does not offend the Double Jeopardy

Clause, even if the two provisions would otherwise be considered as defining the same offense under the Blockburger test.

It is here, however, that Blockburger functions as a constitutional presumption for the protection of defendants--under

the Double Jeopardy Clause, two provisions may apply to the

same conduct despite failing the Blockburger test, but only if

there are other clear indications that the provisions were

intended to be applied together. As the Court noted in

Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1980), "[t]he

assumption underlying the rule is that Congress ordinarily

does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes."

Several cases illustrate that where there is clear evidence

of legislative intent, multiple sentences are possible even

though a Blockburger analysis would indicate otherwise. In

Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983), the Court

considered whether a defendant was properly sentenced for

both robbery and armed criminal action under Missouri law.

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ble. The Court concluded that where the Missouri legislature

had made it clear that it intended cumulative punishment for

the violation of two statutes it was the intent of the legislature, not the Blockburger test, which controlled. In Garrett

v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985), the Court again

refused to treat the Blockburger rule as a conclusive determinant of legislative intent. The Court there concluded that

Congress clearly intended to allow conviction for both a

continuing criminal enterprise and the predicate offense, although application of the Blockburger test indicated the two

were the same offense. In United States v. White, 116 F.3d

903, 931-32 (D.C. Cir. 1997), this court held that convictions

for a RICO conspiracy and a drug conspiracy in the same

proceeding did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Although the two conspiracies were the same under Blockburger, we concluded that Congress intended to authorize cumulative punishments. Id. at 932. See also Iannelli, 420 U.S. at

779 (finding that Congress intended to allow punishment for

both conspiracy and underlying offense given longstanding

historical distinction).

Just as failing Blockburger does not preclude punishment

under multiple provisions, passing Blockburger does not mandate it. In this context, the Blockburger test functions as a

rule of statutory construction. We recognized this in United

States v. Canty, 469 F.2d 114, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1972), when we

noted that "even [where] two provisions require different

elements of proof, there must still be a determination that

Congress intended the provisions to bear separate punishments when applied to a single act or transaction." At one

level, this simply states the unremarkable fact that regardless

of the outcome of the Blockburger test, a court may not

impose punishment without ultimately concluding that the

legislature so intended. The contrary proposition would allow courts to exceed their authority and undermine the

separation of powers. See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689. But

noting that a court must limit punishments to those Congress

intended does not answer the question underlying our statement in Canty--How are we to determine Congress's intent?

Our statement in Canty makes clear that the Blockburger

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test is not always the whole of our analysis. Indeed, it could

not be, for two provisions could "pass" the Blockburger test

but contain plain indications in their text that they were not

intended to be applied together.

Nonetheless, the value of having a predictable and consistent rule for determining which provisions may apply together is great. Thus even where it functions only as a rule of

statutory construction, the Blockburger test cannot be disregarded. The question of what manifestations of congressional intent make resort to Blockburger unnecessary or trump

the outcome of the Blockburger test is a recurrent one, and is

encountered again today.

B.Appellant's Convictions under 18 U.S.C. s 1513(b) and

the D.C. Assault Provisions

18 U.S.C. s 1513 criminalizes retaliation against witnesses,

victims, and informants. Subsection (a) provides penalties for

"[w]hoever kills or attempts to kill another person with intent

to retaliate" for serving as a witness or providing information

to law enforcement. In the case of an attempt, the punishment provided is imprisonment for not more than twenty

years. Subsection (b), the provision charged here, provides

that "[w]hoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to another person or damages the

tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so,

with intent to retaliate against any person for [serving as a

witness or providing information to law enforcement,] or

attempts to do so," shall be fined, or imprisoned not more

than ten years.

Under D.C. Code s 22-501, assault with intent to kill

carries a sentence of two to fifteen years. Under s 22-504.1,

aggravated assault carries a maximum ten-year sentence. A

person commits aggravated assault if he "knowingly or purposely causes serious bodily injury to another person," or if

he causes serious bodily injury by intentionally or knowingly

creating a grave risk under "circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life." Both assault with intent

to kill and aggravated assault are subject to enhanced penalties if committed while armed. D.C. Code s 22-3202.

Examining the elements of s 1513(b) and each of the D.C.

assault provisions at issue reveals that under the Blockburger

test, s 1513(b) is distinct from both assault with intent to kill

while armed and aggravated assault while armed. Section

1513(b) requires proof of intent to retaliate, which is not

required under either D.C. assault provision. Assault with

intent to kill while armed under D.C. Code ss 22-501 and

22-3202 requires proof of intent to kill and proof that the

offender was armed, neither of which are required by

s 1513(b). Aggravated assault while armed under D.C. Code

s 22-504.1 requires "serious bodily injury," while s 1513(b)

requires only "bodily injury" or damage to "tangible property." Aggravated assault while armed also requires that the

offender was armed, which is not required by s 1513(b).

Thus under the Blockburger test, s 1513(b) is distinct from

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both the D.C. assault provisions at issue.

However, appellant argues that Blockburger is not dispositive in this instance. He cites a line of cases holding that

certain federal and D.C. statutes were not intended to be

applied to the same conduct, notwithstanding that the provisions did not define the same offense under the Blockburger

test. None of these cases addresses the precise issue in this

case. Two of the cases cited involved the federal bank

robbery statute. In United States v. Canty, 469 F.2d 114

(D.C. Cir. 1972), we held that a defendant's convictions for

both assault with a dangerous weapon under D.C. Code

s 22-502 and for taking money or property from a federal

bank by force, violence, or intimidation could not stand. We

noted that "[t]he federal bank robbery statute establishes a

comprehensive scheme for prosecuting and punishing persons

who rob federally-insured banks." Id. at 127. Instead of

prosecuting entirely within the bank robbery scheme, the

federal government charged the defendant with the lowest

tier of robbery in the federal scheme, and sought to punish

the aggravated portion of the offense via the D.C. assault

provision. By venturing outside the comprehensive scheme

created by Congress for dealing with such offenses, the

government had obtained a greater sentence than would

otherwise have been possible. Id. at 128. We encountered

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similar facts in United States v. Leek, 665 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir.

1981), where the defendant was convicted of entering a bank

with intent to commit robbery under the Federal Bank

Robbery Act, as well as assault with a dangerous weapon

under the D.C. Code. As in Canty, the government had

declined to prosecute on the highest possible federal charge,

instead charging a lower tier under the Federal Bank Robbery Act in combination with a D.C. assault charge. As in

Canty, we noted that "the Federal Bank Robbery Act is

carefully designed, matching maximum penalties with specific

offenses," and held that "fragmentation of a single course of

conduct to enable use of a local statute to multiply convictions

and enhance punishment is impermissible." Id. at 388.

Appellant argues that the present case is analogous to

these cases regarding the Federal Bank Robbery Act. In

particular, he argues that the government could have charged

s 1513(a), but instead charged the less serious offense,

s 1513(b), paired with the D.C. assault provisions, in order to

obtain a longer sentence. An attempt to kill in retaliation

under s 1513(a) would have been limited to a sentence of

twenty years. Appellant received a sentence of seven years

and three months under s 1513(b), and a sentence of five to

fifteen years under each of the D.C. assault provisions, with

the sentences under the two D.C. assault provisions to be

served concurrently. Hence his time served under these

provisions could potentially be over twenty-two years as

opposed to the twenty-year maximum provided by s 1513(a).

(Of course, if less time were actually served on the D.C.

assault charges, his time served under s 1513(b) and the D.C.

assault provisions could be much less than the federal maximum under s 1513(a).) Thus this scenario is in many respects similar to that decried in Canty and Leek. For

example, Canty could have been prosecuted under the federal

scheme for assault with a dangerous weapon in connection

with a bank robbery, carrying a maximum of twenty-five

years. He was instead charged under a less serious federal

provision, bank robbery by force and violence, (twenty-year

maximum), paired with assault with a dangerous weapon

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under the D.C. Code (ten-year maximum). Canty, 469 F.2d

at 127.

We nonetheless conclude that Canty and Leek are distinguishable from the case at hand. Canty was premised on the

existence of a comprehensive federal scheme which by its

nature made resort to local charges improper. United States

v. Jones, 527 F.2d 817, 828 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1975). As we

noted in Canty, the federal bank robbery statute "subdivides

the offense into a series of steps--a continuum running from

entry with intent to rob, to robbery by force and violence, to

robbery with the aid of a dangerous weapon, to robbery

resulting in death or kidnapping." 469 F.2d at 127. Section

1513, in contrast, is less comprehensive. Its provisions are

not narrowly tailored to reflect differences in behavior. In

particular, subsection (b) applies equally to retaliatory conduct causing bodily injury (however serious), damage to

tangible property, or mere threats to engage in such conduct.

Given this less comprehensive structure, there is no reason to

conclude that Congress intended s 1513 to be the exclusive

mechanism available for conduct falling within its purview.

Therefore, the U.S. Attorney was free to charge D.C. provisions as well, and free to charge the defendant with the

offenses which could yield the highest sentence. See Jones,

527 F.2d at 820-21. Cf. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.

114, 125 (1979) ("Just as a defendant has no constitutional

right to elect which of two applicable federal statutes shall be

the basis of his indictment and prosecution, neither is he

entitled to choose the penalty scheme under which he will be

sentenced.").

Appellant also cites two cases interpreting the federal mail

robbery statute, but again, we find the present case distinguishable. In United States v. Spears, 449 F.2d 946 (D.C.

Cir. 1971), we concluded that Congress did not intend to allow

the same conduct to give rise to convictions for robbery under

the District of Columbia statutes and for assault with intent

to rob under the federal mail robbery statute. We noted that

the federal provision proscribed only assaults which formed

"an integral part of an unsuccessful attempt to rob a mail

carrier." Id. at 954. In light of "conventional doctrines"

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barring conviction for both an attempt and the completed

offense, id., we concluded that Congress did not intend the

federal provision to apply where there was a conviction under

the D.C. Code for completed robbery. In contrast, no "conventional doctrines" counsel against allowing a traditional

assault conviction in combination with a conviction under a

special prohibition on retaliatory conduct. Cf. United States

v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that both

federal mail and wire fraud statutes and the D.C. false

pretenses statute could apply to the same conduct, given that

the special interest protected under the federal statutes was

clearly distinct from the general property interest safeguarded by the local statute).

In United States v. Knight, 509 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1974),

we considered whether convictions for armed robbery under

both the District of Columbia Code and simple robbery under

the federal mail robbery statute were permissible. We concluded that Congress had "deliberately addressed itself to the

distinction between simple mail robbery and the case where a

dangerous weapon is involved, and ha[d] provided an increase

of punishment only if the use of the dangerous weapon puts

the life of the mail custodian in jeopardy." Id. at 362. Since

the jury acquitted on the charge of putting the mail custodian

in jeopardy and convicted instead of simple mail robbery, we

held that it was impermissible for the government to nonetheless reach the weapon use by obtaining a conviction under the

D.C. armed robbery provision. Id. Our decision in Knight

rested on a belief that applying the District of Columbia

armed robbery statute to the armed mail robbery in that case

would have flouted Congress's intent. From the fact that

Congress had provided enhanced penalties for only a certain

type of armed conduct, we inferred a congressional intent

that other types of armed conduct should not be subject to

enhanced penalties. In contrast, appellant points to no congressional distinctions in the retaliation statute which would

be flouted by resort to the D.C. Code in this case.

In conclusion, we find no reason that the Blockburger test

should not be determinative in this instance. We do not claim

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ed them to apply together. Neither 18 U.S.C. s 1513 nor the

D.C. assault provisions mention the other or give any other

positive indication of whether or not the federal and D.C.

provisions are intended to apply simultaneously. However,

where a federal and District offense satisfy Blockburger, no

such positive indication of intent to apply together is required. See Sumler, 136 F.3d 188, 190-92 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(upholding convictions for both first degree murder while

armed under District of Columbia law and killing in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise under federal law

where Blockburger test satisfied and no contrary intent demonstrated). Cf. Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 341. Instead, it is only

necessary that whatever manifestations of congressional intent are present do not seriously call into doubt whether the

Blockburger result accurately captures legislative intent.

Where, as here, the text and structure of the provisions at

issue shed little light on whether Congress would intend them

to apply together, there is no reason to deviate from the

Blockburger test. The original version of s 1513 was passed

in 1982. See Pub. L. No. 97-291, s 4(a), 96 Stat. 1250 (1982).

We must presume that when Congress drafted this provision

it knew that behavior subject to this provision would sometimes fall within the assault provisions of the District of

Columbia. We must also presume that Congress was aware

of the Blockburger rule, and legislated with it in mind.

Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 342. Given this, the absence of other

significant indications of intent regarding whether the federal

provision is exclusive leads us to conclude that the Blockburger analysis controls.

C.Appellant's Convictions under 18 U.S.C. s 924(c) and

D.C. Code s 22-3204(b)

Defendant was sentenced for violating both 18 U.S.C.

s 924(c), using or carrying a firearm during or in relation to a

drug trafficking offense or crime of violence, and D.C. Code

s 22-3204(b), possession of a firearm during the commission

of a crime of violence. Section 924(c) requires proof that the

defendant (1) "use[d] or carrie[d]" (2) "a firearm" (3) "during

and in relation to" (4) "any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... for which he may be prosecuted in a court of

the United States." 18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1). A "crime of

violence" is defined as a federal offense that "is a felony and

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened

use of physical force against the person or property of

another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk

that physical force against the person or property of another

may be used in the course of committing the offense." 18

U.S.C. s 924(c)(3).

D.C. Code s 22-3204(b) requires proof that the defendant

(1) "possess" (2) within the District of Columbia (3) a "firearm

or imitation firearm" (4) "while committing a crime of violence

or dangerous crime as defined in s 22-3201." Section

22-3201 defines a crime of violence as one of twenty-three

specified offenses, all of which include actual, threatened, or

intended violence, or the likelihood of violence, directed

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against a person. D.C. Code s 22-3201(f). Both assault with

intent to kill and aggravated assault are among the offenses

specified. Dangerous crime is defined as "distribution of or

possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, if

the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than 1

year." D.C. Code s 22-3201(g).

Both the federal and D.C. statutes are silent regarding

whether they are intended to be applied simultaneously. Nor

is there any structural indication whether or not Congress

intended both provisions to apply to the same conduct. We

therefore rely on the Blockburger test. The government has

argued that these two provisions each require proof of an

element that the other does not. The government notes that

conviction under s 924(c) requires proof that the defendant

used or carried a firearm, while conviction under

s 22-3204(b) requires proof only of possession. Cf. United

States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (more

than possession required to trigger s 924(c)(1)), with Brown

v. United States, 691 A.2d 1167, 1169 (D.C. 1997) (mere

possession of proscribed weapon is sufficient to trigger

s 22-3204(b)). Conversely, conviction under s 22-3204(b) requires proof that the possession occurred during one of a

specified list of D.C. offenses. Conviction under s 924(c) can

be based on use of a firearm during offenses other than those

to which s 22-3204(b) applies. Thus the government claims

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that s 22-3204(b) requires proof of an element that s 924(c)

does not--that the underlying offense is one of the offenses

specified in s 22-3204-and the two offenses are not the same

under the Blockburger test.

While we agree that the Blockburger test is satisfied here,

the government's analysis oversimplifies the application of

Blockburger to these facts. The proper method of applying

the Blockburger test in this situation is suggested by the

Supreme Court's opinion in Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S.

684, 694 (1980). Whalen considered whether convictions for

both rape and felony murder based on rape were proper.

Conducting a traditional Blockburger analysis, the government in Whalen argued that the rape offense requires rape,

while felony murder could be based on five felonies other than

rape. Conversely, the government there argued that felony

murder requires a killing, which rape does not. However, the

Whalen Court did not accept the government's Blockburger

analysis. The Court reasoned that if instead of listing the six

felonies which can serve as a basis for felony murder in the

alternative, Congress had separately proscribed the six types

of felony murder (i.e., rape-felony murder, robbery-felony

murder, etc.), rape would clearly be a lesser included offense

of the rape version of felony murder. The Court refused to

ascribe significance to this difference in drafting, and found

that the dual convictions were improper. See also White, 116

F.3d at 931 (recognizing that Whalen analysis is required

where a statute lists several alternative sub-offenses).

Like the felony murder offense considered in Whalen, both

18 U.S.C. s 924(c) and D.C. Code s 22-3204 are compound

offenses, satisfied by possession during any one of a list of

underlying offenses. After Whalen, the fact that the lists of

offenses which can serve as the predicate offense for the two

provisions are not coextensive does not end the Blockburger

analysis. Instead, we treat this as if there is a separate

provision for each offense on the list. In this case, the

district court's instructions to the jury clearly linked the

s 924 charge to the federal retaliation count, and the

s 22-3204(b) charge to the D.C. assault counts. Thus we are

in effect considering whether the defendant was appropriately

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convicted of "possession under D.C. Code s 22-3204(b) during the commission of assault under D.C. Code ss 22-504.1

and 22-501" and "possession under 18 U.S.C. s 924(c) during

the commission of retaliation under 18 U.S.C. s 1513(b)."

Taking this view, the first conviction requires commission of

the D.C. assault offense, and the second requires commission

of the retaliation offense. Since we have already concluded

that the assault charges and the retaliation charge are not the

"same offense," defendant's s 22-3204(b) conviction and his

s 924(c) conviction each required an element that the other

did not. Therefore, the Blockburger test is satisfied.

D.Appellant's Convictions under D.C. Code s 22-501 and

s 22-504.1

Finally, we consider whether defendant was properly convicted for both assault with intent to kill while armed under

D.C. Code ss 22-501 and 22-3202 and aggravated assault

while armed under D.C. Code ss 22-504.1 and 22-3202.

The District of Columbia Code contains a series of assault

offenses. Section 22-501 prohibits assault with intent to kill,

to rob, to poison, or to commit sexual abuse, with a maximum

sentence of fifteen years. Section 22-502 prohibits assault

with intent to commit mayhem or assault with a dangerous

weapon, with a maximum sentence of ten years. Section

22-503 prohibits assault with intent to commit any other

offense, with a maximum sentence of five years. Section 22-

504 prohibits simple assault, threats, and stalking. The maximum sentence for simple assault is 180 days.

In 1994, an aggravated assault provision was added to the

existing assault provisions of the D.C. Code. See Omnibus

Criminal Justice Reform Amendment Act of 1994, D.C. Law

No. 10-151, s 202. At the same time, the penalty for simple

assault was decreased from twelve months to 180 days. Id.;

Burgess v. United States, 681 A.2d 1090, 1094 (D.C. 1996).

The new aggravated assault provision applies to conduct

which knowingly, purposely, or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another person, and carries a maximum sentence

of ten years. D.C. Code s 22-504.1.

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The government correctly points out that assault with

intent to kill requires intent to kill, which aggravated assault

does not, and that aggravated assault requires serious bodily

injury, which assault with intent to kill does not. Hence, the

government notes, the Blockburger test is satisfied. However, we do not believe that Blockburger is determinative in this

instance.

As we noted earlier in this opinion, the ultimate question is

one of legislative intent, and Blockburger is not always controlling. Just as we may conclude that a legislature intended

to allow punishment under multiple provisions when a Blockburger analysis taken alone would not support such a conclusion, see Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368; Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779, we

may conclude that a legislature intended not to allow punishment under multiple provisions although a Blockburger analysis would allow it. In the latter instance, as in the former, it

is the intent of the legislature that controls. In Prince v.

United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957), without undertaking a

Blockburger analysis, the Court held that Congress did not

intend unlawful entry of a bank and bank robbery to be

consecutively punishable under different provisions of the

Federal Bank Robbery Act. In Heflin v. United States, 358

U.S. 415 (1959), again without employing a Blockburger analysis, the Court interpreted the same act not to provide for

punishment for both taking property from a bank and receiving the same stolen property. See also Milanovich v. United

States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961) (interpreting federal statute regarding theft from government agencies as not permitting

punishment both for taking and for receiving stolen property

from a United States naval base); Jeffers v. United States,

432 U.S. 137, 155-56 (1977) (concluding that Congress did not

intend cumulative penalties under 18 U.S.C. ss 846 and 848

without undertaking a Blockburger analysis); United States

v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that I.R.S.

Code offenses of subscribing to a false tax return and aiding

preparation of a false tax return should merge even though

they would not be considered the same offense under Blockburger).

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It is not coincidental that each of the cited cases involved

prosecution under two provisions of a single statutory

scheme. Offenses defined by the same statutory scheme can

be viewed as somewhere between the usual Blockburger

situation involving two entirely distinct provisions and cases

involving multiple convictions under a single statutory provision. Cases in the latter category are often referred to as

"unit of prosecution" cases, as they consider whether the

conduct at issue was intended to give rise to more than one

offense under the same provision. See, e.g., Bell v. United

States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) (simultaneous transportation of

more than one woman constitutes a single violation of Mann

Act); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S.

218 (1952) (under the Fair Labor Standards Act, unit of

prosecution is a course of conduct, not each individual act).

In "unit of prosecution" cases, although the ultimate question

remains one of legislative intent, the Blockburger test is not

used. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70 n.24 (1978);

United States v. Evans, 854 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1988);

Morris v. United States, 622 A.2d 1116, 1130 (D.C. 1993).

Instead, courts will presume that a single violation is intended

unless Congress clearly expresses its intention to allow multiple offenses under the statute. See Bell, 349 U.S. at 84 ("[I]f

Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense

clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against

turning a single transaction into multiple offenses....").

"Unit of prosecution" cases are thus resolved in favor of

lenity. Id.

Cases like this one, which involve offenses within the same

statutory scheme but not the same provision, are not properly

"unit of prosecution" cases. Unlike in those cases, the Blockburger rule is applicable. Indeed, Blockburger itself involved

provisions within a single statutory scheme. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 305 (allowing convictions under multiple

provisions of the Harrison Narcotic Act). However, because

offenses defined by the same statutory scheme will often have

similar purposes and serve similar interests, it may be less

appropriate to assume from silence that the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments as long as Blockburger

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is satisfied. See United States v. Nichols, 401 F. Supp. 1377

(E.D. Mich. 1975) (concluding that the "Bell-Prince-HeflinMilanovich line establishes a principle of lenity in construing

closely related statutory provisions arguably violated by a

single act") (emphasis added). Cf. United States v. Alston,

609 F.2d 531, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting disparate interests

served by federal and D.C. statute in allowing application of

both); Irby v. United States, 390 F.2d 432, 433-34 (D.C. Cir.

1967) (noting that housebreaking and robbery involved distinct interests in allowing both to operate).

In cases involving application of more than one provision of

a single statutory scheme, the absence of positive indications

that the provisions were intended to apply simultaneously

becomes more troublesome. In such situations, the structure

of the scheme itself may provide an indication that the

scheme was intended as a hierarchy of offenses, with only one

of the offenses applying to conduct in a given instance. See

United States v. Makres, 598 F.2d 1072, 1075 (7th Cir. 1979)

(noting that when two provisions are in the same section of

the code, the structure of the statute and the apparent

relationship of the provisions may support the conclusion that

cumulative punishment was not intended, but that the structure and relationship of the provisions are less likely to be

helpful when two separate sections of the code are involved).

Thus resort to Blockburger in such cases may be unnecessary

(as in Prince, Heflin, Milanovich, and Jeffers) or nondeterminative (as in Dale).

Although there is by no means any special rule for handling

Blockburger situations involving provisions within a single

statutory scheme, courts in such situations are often more

hesitant to base punishment under both provisions on Blockburger alone than is the case with provisions from distinct

statutory schemes. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Romo,

989 F.2d 757, 759 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that although 18

U.S.C. s 922(g)(1) and s 922(g)(5) constitute distinct offenses

under Blockburger, "Congress, by rooting all the offenses in a

single legislative enactment and including all the offenses in

subsections of the same statute, signalled that it did not

intend multiple punishments for the possession of a single

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weapon"); United States v. Parr, 741 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1984)

(concluding that fact that two provisions of the Mann Act

were not the same under Blockburger was not controlling,

and proceeding to consider other indications of whether provisions were intended to apply together). See also Dale, 991

F.2d at 859 n.61 (noting that the analysis by which it concluded that two Internal Revenue Code offenses could not apply

simultaneously "does not spill over to embrace prosecutions

for Internal Revenue Code offenses plus offenses under other

statutes with discrete objectives").

Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1958), which

might be cited to the contrary, is in fact distinguishable. The

Court in that case did reject the argument that three sections

which were codified together and which shared the single

purpose of outlawing nonmedicinal sales of narcotics were not

intended to apply together. However, in doing so it noted

factors other than the Blockburger analysis which supported

its conclusion: the three provisions were enacted at three

different times, and Congress had manifested an attitude of

severity toward the narcotics laws.

In the present case, despite the outcome of a Blockburger

analysis, we are skeptical as to whether Congress intended a

single assault to lead to convictions for both assault with

intent to kill while armed and aggravated assault. We faced

a similar question regarding two D.C. assault provisions in

Ingram v. United States, 353 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

There, appellant was convicted of both assault with intent to

kill, in violation of D.C. Code s 22-501, and assault with a

dangerous weapon, in violation of D.C. Code s 22-502. Although the dissent pointed out that the offenses were distinct

under the Blockburger test, we held that consecutive sentences could not be imposed for the two offenses. We noted

that the hierarchical structure of the D.C. assault provisions

suggested that the two assault offenses at issue were "offenses on the same spectrum, the former being worse than

the latter." Id. at 875. We concluded that "[a]lthough the

various sections may define 'separate and distinct offenses,' it

is unlikely that Congress intended a single act to be punished

cumulatively as both a more and a less serious form of

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aggravated assault." Id. But see Bridgeford v. United

States, 411 A.2d 633 (D.C. 1980) (holding that assault with

intent to kill under s 22-501 and mayhem under s 22-506 do

not merge given the differences in elements and in the

interests protected); Robinson v. United States, 501 A.2d

1273 (D.C. 1985) (concluding that convictions for both assault

with intent to commit rape and assault with intent to commit

sodomy were proper in light of distinct elements and interests

served, but also noting that the first assault on the victim had

concluded before the second began).

Courts interpreting the assault provisions of other jurisdictions have been similarly reluctant to assume that a single act

of assault was intended to be punished under multiple assault

provisions. See State v. Jenkins, 515 A.2d 465, 474-75 (Md.

1986) (citing Ingram in holding that although the two offenses

pass Blockburger, Maryland's assault with intent to murder

and assault with intent to maim provisions were not intended

to apply to a single assault, as "an assault aggravated up to

the felonious level in two separate ways [does not] become

two assaults") (quoting Manigault v. State, 486 A.2d 240 (Md.

Ct. Spec. App. 1985)); State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 382

(Tenn. 1996) (concluding that although each required proof of

fact that other did not, convictions under both Tennessee's

aggravated assault and attempted manslaughter provisions

were inappropriate, given common purpose of both to deter

assaultive-type conduct); State v. Ritter, 714 A.2d 624, 626

(Vt. 1998) (holding that two aggravated domestic assault

provisions which pass Blockburger test were nonetheless intended merely to define alternative ways of committing aggravated assault, not to create two separate offenses).

While we recognized in Ingram the hierarchical structure

of the D.C. assault provisions, we did not reverse either the

assault with intent to kill or assault with a deadly weapon

convictions. Instead, we simply held that consecutive sentences were improper and remanded for resentencing on one

of the counts. Ingram, 353 F.2d at 873. However, in light of

subsequent case law, the relief afforded in Ingram is no

longer sufficient. Since Ingram, the Supreme Court has

made clear that the propriety of multiple convictions must be

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carefully considered even where the sentences are concurrent. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985);

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790 (1969). This is so

because a conviction, even one with a concurrent sentence,

carries significant collateral consequences. See Ball, 470 U.S.

at 864-65. After Ball, "punishment" in this context includes

not only the sentence, but the conviction itself. See id. at 861.

Hence, the reasoning which supported vacating one of the

sentences at issue in Ingram now also supports reversing one

of the assault convictions here.3 Accordingly, we reverse

appellant's conviction for aggravated assault.

IV. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, we affirm appellant's convictions

under 18 U.S.C. s 1513(b), 18 U.S.C. s 924(c), D.C. Code

s 22-501, D.C. Code s 22-3204(b), and D.C. Code

s 22-3204(a). However, we vacate the judgment of conviction under D.C. Code s 22-504.1.

__________

3 We do not decide what application D.C. Code s 23-112 might

have in this instance, as neither party has raised the issue.

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Tatel, Circuit Judge, dissenting: During a recess at the

end of McLaughlin's cross-examination, the district court

ordered him not to discuss with his lawyer anything "relating

to his testimony and potential redirect examination." United

States v. McLaughlin, 955 F. Supp. 132, 133 n.1 (D.D.C.

1997). Objecting both before and after the break, McLaughlin's lawyer informed the court that she wished to consult

with her client because she had "identified other areas" that

she "might want to explore" with him on redirect. This

court, reasoning that McLaughlin had no constitutional right

to the recess in the first place, now holds that he had no right

to consult with his lawyer because Sixth Amendment rights

cannot turn on "happenstance." Maj. Op. at 7. But this case

has nothing to do with a defendant's right to a recess. The

question before us is whether the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel required the court to allow McLaughlin's lawyer to

consult with him regarding the important tactical decision of

whether to conduct redirect. Because I believe it did, I

respectfully dissent.

It is a bedrock principle of our system of justice that "to

minimize the imbalance in the adversary system," United

States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973), a criminal defendant

has the fundamental right to "the guiding hand of counsel at

every step in the proceedings against him." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). Indeed, " '[o]f all the rights

that an accused person has, the right to be represented by

counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to

assert any other rights he may have.' " United States v.

Chronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.

Rev. 1, 8 (1956)).

In Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), the Supreme

Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment guarantees not

just the right to have counsel, but also the right to consult

with counsel about important tactical decisions. More than

merely allowing the defendant to participate in tactical decisions, consultation enables the lawyer to obtain factual information crucial to making them. Geders reversed the convicUSCA Case #97-3011 Document #403839 Filed: 12/18/1998 Page 30 of 36
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tion of a defendant ordered by the trial court not to discuss

his testimony with anyone, including his lawyer, during an

overnight recess between his direct and cross-examinations.

Acknowledging that trial courts ordinarily enjoy wide discretion to sequester witnesses in order to insulate them from

"improper attempts to influence the[ir] testimony," id. at 87,

the Court nonetheless found that an overnight sequestration

order unconstitutionally limits the right to counsel. "Such

recesses," the Court said, "are often times of intensive work,

with tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed." Id. at 88. Observing that "[t]he lawyer may need

to obtain from his client information" and "pursue inquiry

along lines not fully explored earlier," id., the Court held that

the conflict between a trial court's otherwise proper sequestration order and a defendant's right to consult with counsel

about tactical decisions must be resolved in favor of the Sixth

Amendment. See id. at 91.

The tactical decision involved in this case--whether to

conduct redirect examination--undoubtedly required the assistance of counsel, including the opportunity for defense

counsel to consult with the defendant in order to obtain

information. While redirect examination allows a defendant

to clarify testimony, it also presents serious risks, for it

subjects the defendant to further cross-examination. Given

the uncertainty surrounding recross, prudent defense counsel

must always consider whether the expected benefit of redirect outweighs its potential cost. See Mark A. Dombroff,

Dombroff on Direct and Cross-Examination s 11.2 (1985)

("The major question which you confront in conducting a

redirect examination is the extent to which that redirect

should be pursued."); Francis X. Busch, Law and Tactics in

Jury Trials s 353 (1949) ("[I]t is highly important for an

advocate ... to pause and consider carefully whether the

status of the witness' testimony, and the witness, after crossexamination, will be improved by a redirect examination.").

Defense counsel cannot responsibly assess these risks and

benefits without first consulting the client about what occurred during cross.

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Imagine a cross-examination that elicits ambiguous testimony not explored on direct examination that, left alone,

would harm the defense by confusing the jury. It cannot be

that instead of permitting defense counsel to consult with the

defendant to ascertain the facts underlying the ambiguous

testimony, the law requires counsel to rely on educated

guesswork in deciding whether to explore the ambiguity on

redirect. The district court's order forbidding McLaughlin's

attorney from consulting with him prior to redirect did exactly that: It forced her to choose between proceeding with

redirect on a hunch or foregoing the opportunity to clarify

her client's testimony. After the recess, the attorney told the

court:

I should ... stress for the record that [during the break]

I did think to myself what other areas I might want to

explore with Mr. McLaughlin. I have identified other

areas, and I would be prepared to consult with him on

that. But given the Court's ruling, I am not permitted to

do that, so I have no further questions.

The district court's order conflicts with Geders's holding that

the Sixth Amendment requires trial courts to allow defense

counsel to obtain information from their clients prior to

making important tactical decisions.

Nothing in Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989), displaces

Geders. Unlike the overnight recess in Geders, in Perry

there was "virtual certainty" that any conversation between

the defendant and his lawyer during a fifteen minute recess

between direct and cross would relate only to his ongoing

testimony and would not "encompass matters ... that the

defendant [has] a constitutional right to discuss with his

lawyer, such as ... trial tactics." Id. at 283-84. Citing

Geders with approval, Perry reaffirmed the principle that a

trial court's interest in thwarting external influences on testimony, while legitimate, cannot defeat a criminal defendant's

right to consult with counsel about tactical decisions. See id.

at 284 (stating that the fact that discussions between a

defendant and his attorney "will inevitably include some

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consideration of the defendant's ongoing testimony" does not

compromise the basic right to "unrestricted access" to counsel

regarding trial tactics). The difference between Geders and

Perry turns not on the length of their respective recesses (as

my colleagues suggest), but on the fact that during the precross-examination recess in Perry, no legitimate tactical decisions had to be made, nor did the defendant have any need to

provide information to his lawyer. The defendant's decision

to testify left him with no choice but to submit to crossexamination and to answer the prosecutor's questions truthfully. Indeed, Perry's analysis focused exclusively on the

importance of maintaining the integrity of cross-examination

and protecting the prosecution's ability to elicit uninfluenced

testimony from the defendant. See id. at 282 ("[C]rossexamination is more likely to elicit truthful responses if it

goes forward without allowing the witness an opportunity to

consult with third parties, including his or her lawyer."); id.

("Cross-examination often depends for its effectiveness on the

ability of counsel to punch holes in a witness' testimony at

just the right time, in just the right way."); id. ("[C]rossexamination of a witness who is uncounseled between direct

examination and cross-examination is more likely to lead to

the discovery of truth than is cross-examination of a witness

who is given time to pause and consult with his attorney.").

To be sure, Mudd v. United States, a pre-Perry decision,

identified several subjects that defendants might want to

discuss with counsel between direct and cross, such as demeanor, speaking style, and not mentioning excluded evidence. 798 F.2d 1509, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1986). But after

Perry, no right to counsel attaches to such considerations

because their discussion would interfere with the government's right to unencumbered cross-examination.

In contrast to Perry, this case presents no threat to the

government's right to cross-examination uninfluenced by defense counsel because the prosecution had completed

McLaughlin's cross. Also unlike in Perry, McLaughlin's lawyer faced a tactical decision--whether to conduct redirect--a

decision she believed she could not make without consulting

her client. It seems to me that this decision presented the

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defense with the same set of issues that it confronted when

deciding whether McLaughlin should take the stand in the

first place. McLaughlin was thus essentially in the same

position between cross and redirect as he was before deciding

whether to testify at all. Surely no one would argue that he

had no Sixth Amendment right to consult with his lawyer

regarding that tactical decision.

Although Perry also stated in broad language--language

that my colleagues agree is dicta, see Maj. Op. at 6-7--that "a

defendant ... has no constitutional right to consult with his

lawyer while he is testifying," id. at 281 (emphasis added),

nothing in Perry suggests that the Court intended the word

"testifying" to apply to redirect examination. Not only did

the Court never mention redirect examination, but Perry's

rationale cannot be extended to this case without running

afoul of the very rule that it reaffirmed: When tactical

questions arise, the Sixth Amendment requires defendants to

be allowed to consult with their attorneys. My colleagues

fault me for not offering a definition of the word "testifying"

that excludes redirect, see Maj. Op. at 7 n.1, but they themselves make no effort to define the word to exclude the

overnight recess between direct and cross in Geders. Indeed,

because the Geders recess came while the defendant was still

"testifying," and because Perry unquestionably reaffirmed

that the right to consult with counsel attached during the

Geders recess, the Perry Court could not have intended the

word "testifying" to be as broad as my colleagues read it.

A few final thoughts bear mentioning about my colleagues'

effort to recharacterize McLaughlin's Sixth Amendment claim

as a claim that he had a right to a recess. To begin with,

affording defense counsel a reasonable opportunity to confer

with the defendant prior to redirect would not necessarily

require a recess; depending upon the circumstances, allowing

the defendant and counsel to whisper to one another for a

minute or two might suffice. But if a recess is required, the

district court must order one not because the defendant has a

right to a recess, but because the defendant has a constitutional right to counsel. This case no more involves a constitutional right to a recess than a prisoner's right to visits from

his lawyer involves a constitutional right to visitation.

Second, McLaughlin's brief plainly argues that the right to

counsel does not depend on the court declaring a recess. See

Appellant's Br. at 34 ("[I]t was error ... for the court to deny

defendant the right to confer with counsel during the 25-

minute recess that took place, whether or not counsel would

have had such a right had no recess been ordered."). True,

counsel said the opposite at oral argument, but surely a

defendant's constitutional right cannot turn on counsel's hasty

answer to a judge's question, particularly where, as here, the

brief is to the contrary.

Finally, the language from Perry that my colleagues quote

out of context for the proposition that McLaughlin had no

right to a recess before redirect has no applicability to this

case because, once again, Perry focused solely on protecting

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the prosecution's right to a clean cross-examination. The full

passage reads:

"Once the defendant places himself at the very heart of

the trial process, it only comports with basic fairness that

the story presented on direct is measured for its accuracy and completeness by uninfluenced testimony on

cross-examination."

Thus, just as a trial judge has the unquestioned power

to refuse to declare a recess at the close of direct

testimony--or at any other point in the examination of a

witness--we think the judge must also have the power to

maintain the status quo during a brief recess in which

there is a virtual certainty that any conversation between

the witness and the lawyer would relate to that ongoing

testimony.

Perry, 488 U.S. at 283-84 (citation and footnote omitted)

(emphasis added). By using the word "thus," the Court

clearly linked its reference to a recess to the previous sentence's discussion of the importance of unencumbered crossexaminations, a discussion without relevance to the issue

before us.

The irony of this court's decision is that it not only impairs

the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but by inhibiting

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redirect examination it also hampers the truth-seeking process, the central concern of both Geders and Perry. While

cross-examination promotes the goal of truth-seeking, so does

redirect. Redirect allows counsel to help the defendant clarify testimonial inconsistencies and ambiguities elicited through

cross-examination that might otherwise leave the factfinder

confused or distracted. The importance of redirect to the

truth-seeking process cannot be overstated. "[O]ur adversarial system of justice ... is premised on the well-tested

principle that truth ... is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the equation." Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (internal quotation omitted). While the

possibility of improper coaching exists at any stage of any

witness's testimony, Geders pointed out that lawyers operate

under ethical standards that distinguish between "discussing

testimony and seeking improperly to influence it," and that

cross--in this case recross--allows the prosecutor to expose

any such influence. Geders, 425 U.S. at 89-90 & n.3. And as

Geders squarely held, any remaining conflict between the risk

of improper influence and an accused's fundamental right to

counsel must be resolved in favor of the Sixth Amendment.

See id. at 91.

I would reverse McLaughlin's conviction on the ground that

the district court's refusal to allow him to consult with his

lawyer before redirect violated the Sixth Amendment. See

Perry, 488 U.S. at 278-80 (holding that harmless error analysis does not apply to claims of "denial of access" to counsel).

Accordingly, I would not reach the double jeopardy issues.

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