Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02716/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02716-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marvin Alton McKay
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2716

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Marvin Alton McKay, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: August 28, 2007 

Filed: September 4, 2007

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In this direct criminal appeal of his 180-month prison sentence for being a felon

in possession of a firearm, Marvin McKay (McKay) argues (1) the district court1

 erred

in refusing to give him credit under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 for 212 days he served on a

state conviction for resisting arrest by fleeing, and (2) he was entitled under the Sixth

Amendment to a jury determination of his prior convictions before receiving a

sentence enhancement based on those convictions. 

Appellate Case: 06-2716 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/04/2007 Entry ID: 3347843
-2-

Upon de novo review, see United States v. Hurley, 439 F.3d 955, 957 (8th Cir.

2006) (stating the district court’s interpretation and application of § 5G1.3 is reviewed

de novo), we conclude the court did not err in sentencing McKay to the statutory

minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment. Although the district court had the authority

to sentence McKay below the statutory minimum, if McKay qualified for the credit

under § 5G1.3(b), see United States v. Kiefer, 20 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 1994)

(explaining, when applying § 5G1.3(b) to give credit for time served, a district court

has discretion to reduce the sentence below the statutory minimum), McKay did not

qualify for the credit because his state offense was not the basis for an increase in his

offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) (declaring, to qualify for credit, the state

offense must have been “relevant conduct to the instant offense” and “the basis for an

increase in the offense level for the instant offense”). McKay received no offenselevel increase on the basis he resisted arrest by fleeing. Cf. Hurley, 439 F.3d at 957

(“The mere fact the federal conspiracy charge encompassed a time period during

which the state offense occurred has no effect on [the defendant’s] offense level under

the guidelines, a prerequisite to triggering the credit-for-time-served provisions of

§ 5G1.3(b).”); United States v. Meyers, 401 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding

§ 5G1.3(b) did not apply where the defendant’s federal sentence was enhanced

because of his use of a stun gun during an abduction, because the state conviction he

served time for–unlawful use of a weapon–involved a different gun that he pulled on

the police officer who arrested him). 

As to the Sixth Amendment issue, McKay’s argument is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243-46 (1998) (holding that

recidivism, as a basis for increasing a sentence, need not be charged in an indictment

and may be subsequently decided by the court at sentencing), which is still good law.

See United States v. Strong, 415 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2005) (construing United

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), as reaffirming the holding in AlmendarezTorres). 

For these reasons, we affirm.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-2716 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/04/2007 Entry ID: 3347843