Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02409/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02409-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lear Siegler Inc.
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

LEAR SIEGLER INC., doing 

business as Safelite Glass, 

Petitioner, 

FI LED 

U!lited States Court of Appeals 

Temb Cir,:uit 

DEC 111989 

~OBERT L. HOECKER 

Cletk . 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 87-2409 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 

BOARD, 

Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM THE NATIONAL·LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 

(Case No. 32-CA-6566) 

William G. Haynes, Eidson, Lewis, Porter & Haynes, Topeka, Kansas, 

Attorneys for Petitioner. 

John D. Burgoyne, Assistant General Counsel (Rosemary M. Collyer, 

General Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, 

Robert E. Allen, Associate General Counsel, and Aileen A. 

Armstrong, Deputy Associate General Counsel, with him on the 

brief), National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C., 

Attorneys for Respondent. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-2409 Document: 010110282910 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 1
sion 

Lear Siegler, Inc. ("Lear") petitions for review of a deciof the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board"), 

essentially adopting findings of an Administrative Law Judge that 

Lear violated Sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(S) of the Labor Management 

Relations Act. 29 u.s.c. § 158(a). The Board seeks enforcement 

of its order. 

The issues arise from certain events surrounding wage 

negotiations pursuant to reopener provisions in two separate 

collective bargaining agreements. 1 The Board found that Lear 

violated the Act by unilaterally modifying the terms of employment 

under those two agreements. It also found violations by Lear's 

threats to replace employees if they participated in an unfair 

labor practices strike, by its refusal to provide information to 

the unions, and by its threats aimed at an employee regarding his 

union activities. Lear Siegler, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 136 (1987). 

We grant enforcement of the Board's order as to all of its· findings with one exception. For reasons explained below, we conclude 

that the record does not sufficiently support the Board's finding 

that Lear improperly insisted to impasse on modifications which 

were beyond the scope of the reopener clause in one of the two 

contracts involved. Therefore, as concerns· that one contract 

reopener, Lear was entitled to take some of the actions to which 

the Board objects. 

1 Reopener clauses are contractual agreements to renegotiate certain items at a later date. "Reopener clauses in collective 

bargaining agreements allow both parties an opportunity to modify 

their existing agreement in order to meet changing economic 

conditions. As such, they serve to minimize economic uncertainty 

at the time of bargaining." NLRB v. Pratt & Whitney Air Craft 

Div., United Tech. Corp., 789 F.2d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 1986). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2409 Document: 010110282910 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 2
BACKGROUND· · 

Lear sells and installs automobile glass in nine shops 

located in the San Francisco, California area. It employs 17 

installers who are represented by Local Unions Nos. 169, 1621, and 

718 of the Glaziers, Architectural Metal & Glass Workers Union, 

International Brotherhood of Painters & Allied Trades, AFL-CIO. 

In 1982, Lear negotiated a contract with Local 718 covering two of 

its locations and another contract with Locals 169 and 1621 covering its remaining seven locations. Both contracts covered three· 

years from July 1, 1982 to June 30, 1985, and both contained 

reopener provisions for further negotiations relating to employee 

compensation during the final two years of the contract term. 

In June 1983, Lear negotiated a wage increase with its unions 

under each of the contract reopeners for "one year only," beginning· July 1, 1983. Both Lear and the unions agreed to meet again 

the following year to discuss the reopeners for the final contract 

year. Accordingly, in June 1984, the parties to these contracts 

met to negotiate jointly the reopeners under both contracts for 

the upcoming year. 

These joint nego~iations involved several meetings which took 

place during June and July of 1984. Proposals were made by both 

parties to the contract, but no agreement could be reached. 

Ultimatel'y, the parties were at impasse. The exact cause of this 

impasse is a question which we will address more fully below. 

Nevertheless, upon reaching this impasse, Lear unilaterally 

modified several terms of its employees' compensation benefits 

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Appellate Case: 87-2409 Document: 010110282910 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 3
according to one .of its early proposals which the unions had 

rejected. 

Based on these changes, and other changes affecting vacation 

and holiday eligibility, the ALJ concluded, and the Board agreed, 

that Lear had unilaterally decreased its employees' hourly wage 

rate and abrogated the health and welfare, pension, and holiday 

and vacation provisions of the existing contracts in violation of 

Sections .8(a)(l) and 8(a)(S) of the Nati6nal Labor Relations Act .• 

Because the two contracts contain significantly different reopener 

provisions, we address each of the contracts, and the issues 

pertaining to each one of them, separately. 

Our standard of review in cases arising under the National 

Labor Relations Act is mandated by statute. "The findings of the 

Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by 

substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be 

c;:onclusive." 29 u.s.c. S 160(e). Even where the reviewing court 

might have reached a different conclusion were it to consider the 

case de novo, the Board's decision may not be set' aside unless 

there does not appear to be sufficient evidence in the record supporting the Board's factual determination. See NLRB v. Automotive 

Controls Corp., 406 F.2d 221, 226 (10th Cir. 1969). 

Substantial evidence, however, is more than a mere scintilla 

of proof. "It· means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might_ accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated 

Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); see NLRB v. 

Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939); NLRB 

v. Pratt & Whitney Air Craft Div., United Tech. Corp., 789 F.2d at 

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Appellate Case: 87-2409 Document: 010110282910 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 4
126 ("Congress has directed the courts to 'assume more 

responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board_ 

decisions •••• '") (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 

U.S. 474, 490 (1951)). 

I•· 

CONTRACT REOPENER NEGOTIATIONS 

It is undisputed that a contract reopener provision permits 

midterm modification of a contract. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 

U.S. 282, 286 (1957). Nevertheless, an employer cannot insist on 

modifications beyond the scope of the terms addressed by the 

specific reopener provisioa. An impasse caused by the employer's 

insistence on negotiating over terms outside the reopener does not 

justify unilaterally modifying the contract terms. See,~, 

NLRB v. Pratt & Whitney Air Craft Div., United Tech. Corp., 789 

F.2d 136; -cf. Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. Office of Personnel 

Management, 778 F.2d 844, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Under Title VII of 

the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, "the FLRA recently has held 

that unions may not negotiate over new subjects during the term of 

an agreement absent a specific contract reopener." (emphasis in 

original)i (citing Internal Revenue Service, 19 F.L.R.A. 401 

(1985)). Absent a reopener clause specifically authorizing a 

modification, unilateral changes in the terms of employment during 

the course of an agreement constitute an unfair labor practice. 

Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. 

Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 159 (1971) ("[A]n 

employer's mid-term unilateral modification of [a mandatory 

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subject of bargaining contained in a contract] constitutes an 

unfair labor practice •• . . II ) . Such changes are only permissible 

where both parties negotiate in good faith but reach an impasse 

over some item within the scope of the midterm reopener. See NLRB 

v. United Nuclear Corp., 381 F.2d 972, 976 (10th Cir. 1967) (where 

parties "negotiate the proposed change to the point of impasse, 

••• the employer may lawfully take the proposed action") (citing 

NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949)). 

A. The Contract With Locals 169 and 1621. 

The contract with Locals 169 and 1621 specified a total 

compensation package, set at an initial level of $19.34, which 

includes a basic hourly wage rate and contributions to the union 

health and welfare fund, industry trust fund, and pension fund. 

The contract states that the "total package" would be increased by 

$.SO per hour effective October 1982. A reopener provision then 

provides that "[E]ffective May 1, 1983 it is agreed that the Union 

and [the Company] shall meet to determine the wage increase for 

the remaining two (2) years of this Agreement." R. Vol. II, 

Exhibit 2, at p. 12 (emphasis added). 

Notwithstanding the agreed limitation to an increase. in wages 

it is undisputed that in 1984 Lear insisted on negotiating a 

decrease in the total compensation package. 2 The unions refused 

2 As part of its unilateral modifications to the employees' 

compensation package, Lear discontinued its contributions to the 

Union Health and Welfare, and Pension Funds. Lear also altered 

the wage rate and vacation/holiday pay so that the entire 

compensation package after these changes was $16.95 as opposed to 

the initial contract level of $19.30, computed before the 

[footnote continued ••• ] 

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to discuss anything but an "increase" in the package as delineated 

in the reopener. Ultimately~ as noted above, the parties reached 

an impasse in negotiating the reopener in 1984. 

Lear acknowledges that, upon reaching impasse in the reopener 

negotiations, it unilaterally decreased its employees' wages, thus 

implementing changes in the terms of employment during the term of 

an existing collective bargaining agreement. It now contends that 

the reference to a wage increase in the reopener provision permitted any modification to the compensation package, whether in the 

form of an increase or a decrease. The Board's findings do not 

explicitly address the point. However, implicit in the Board's 

determination that Lear violated the Act is the Board's finding 

that any discussion of a decrease in the compensation package was 

outside the scope of the reopener. This conclusion is amply sup~ 

ported by the unambiguous language of the reopener itself. 

Furthermore, as demonstrated by the reopener provisi9n in the 

second contract before us, discussed below, Lear knew very well 

how to provide for an open-ended wage reopener. 

Lear was not entitled to insist to impasse on a decrease in 

the total wage package as a prerequisite to negotiating the 

midterm increase encompassed by the reopener. The record amply 

supports the conclusion that it did so, and thereafter unilaterally decreased wa__ges. Thus, the Board correctly concluded that 

Lear's unilateral modification of its contract with Locals 169 and 

[ ••• footnote continued) 

negotiated wage increases which came into effect in June 1982 and 

1983. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2409 Document: 010110282910 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 7
1621 by decreasing the employees' wage package in 1984 was unlawful. 

B. The Contract with Local 718. 

The wage schedule in Lear's contract with Local 718 contained 

the language "wages to be negotiated" beside each of the contract 

years 1983 and 1984. There is no dispute that such contract 

reopener language permitted negotiations over either wage 

decreases or increases. The problem stems from Lear's inclusion 

of proposed changes in holiday and vacation benefits as a subject 

for negotiation during the 1984 reopener, along with attempts to 

negotiate wage decreases. Specifically, Lear proposed to (a) 

shift holidays so that Washington's Birthday, one of the seven 

paid holidays listed in the contract, would be replaced by the 

employment anniversary date, (b) implement new eligibility 

requirements for holiday pay which would require that each 

employee work the day before and the day after a holiday in order 

to be paid for it, and (c) make changes in the amount of and 

eligibility for vacation pay. 3 

As previously indicated, negotiations broke down. Thereafter, Lear unilaterally implemented both the wage decreases and 

3 The contracts provide that each employee who works 40 weeks 

per year is entitled to three weeks paid vacation. Under the 

proposed scheme, employees would be entitled to two weeks paid 

vacation after one year of employment and three weeks after ten 

years. To be eligible, an employee must work 1800 hours during the 12 months prior to the employee's anniversary date. The 

proposal also entailed discontinuing Lear's contribution to the 

union's holiday and vacation fund, and the union pension plan, 

medical plan, and industry fund. Instead, the vacation and 

holiday costs would be paid directly to employees; the pension and 

medical plans would be replaced by Lear's own plans. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2409 Document: 010110282910 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 8
changes in vacation and holiday benefits. The Board determined 

that these unilatera1.changes. were unlawful .. on the ground that 

provisions relating to holidays and vacations were "noneconomic" 

subjects outside the reopener clause relating to wages; and, that 

Lear caused an impasse which was not a bona fide impasse because 

it partially resulted from the proposed improper modifications. 4 

Although Lear suggests that the economic consequences of its . . ,, 

proposed changes in vacation and holiday eligibility requirements. 

fairly incltide those subjects within the term "wages" as used in 

the contract reopener, we agree with the Board that such is not 

the case. 

However,. even assuming Lear attempted to bargain on an 

improper subject, that in itself is not unlawful. An employer can 

legitimately make a proposal outside the terms of a reopener 

clause provided it does not insist to impasse upon inclusion of 

that proposal in the contract. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of BorgWarner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958); NLRB v. Pratt & Whitney 

Air Craft Div., United Tech. Corp., 789 F.2d at 136. 

4 The Board found that the impasse resulted, at least 

partially, from Lear's proposals relating to eligibility requirements and other items in the contracts' holiday and vacation 

provisions: 

"[E]ven if [Lear] genuinely believed that it could 

modify the agreement after reaching a bona fide impasse, 

no such impasse was possible because [Lear] additionally 

insisted on changing noneconomic terms of the holiday 

and vacation provisions •••• [T]he noneconomic items 

were so integral to the remaining economic proposals as 

to make one contingent on the acceptance of the other." 

Lear Siegler, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. at 137 n.3. 

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The crucial question is whether the impasse between Lear and 

- Local 718 resulted at least partially because of Lear's proposed 

changes in holiday and vacation benefits. It is on this point 

which we disagree with the Board, and find that the Board's decision adverse to Lear is not supported by the record. 

are as follows. 

The facts 

In June 1984, the parties met to negotiate wages for the 

final contract year pursuant to the reopener clause. At a meeting 

on June 13, 1984, representatives for all the unions involved 

proposed a wage increase which Lear rejected. Lear then requested 

that the unions consider negotiating changes to the vacation and 

holiday provisions of the contracts. The unions refused to 

di~cuss anything other than "wages," and ·insisted that Lear tende~ 

its proposal on the reopener provisions. 

The June 13 meeting adjourned, and the parties agreed to meet 

again later that month. On June 26, 1984, the parties met a 

second time. Lear asked for the union response to its June 13 

proposal. The unions refused to discuss the earlier proposal, 

apparently objecting to any negotiations relating to noneconomic 

items such as the eligibility requirements for holiday and vacation pay. The union representative stated: "we're here to talk 

money only •• " R. Vol. III at Tab 3, p. 10. 

After a brief caucus, Lear presented an alternative proposal 

which included a decrease in the total wage package from $20.34 to 

$16.95, 5 and a reduction in the total paid vacation from three 

5 In June 1984, the total compensation package was $20.34. The 

$19.34 package for the first contract year had been increased by 

[footnote continued ••• ] 

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weeks per year to two weeks per year for employees of less than 

ten years. ·=.::-"Tne unions thereafter presented a counterproposal, a 

basic 5% increase in the total wage package. 

Lear then offered that if the unions would accep.t its total 

wage package of $16.95, it would agree to discuss with the unions 

·the distribution of the package. The unione rejected this latest 

proposal, indicating that such a signjficant decrease was unacceptable. The meeting ended with both parties expressing 

willingness to hear further proposals from the other side, but 

wit~ a clear understanding that unless agreement could be reached, 

the current contract provisions would expire July 1, 1984. 

On July s, 1984, after an exchange of telegrams between the 

parties, Lear dispatched a representative to meet with the unions 

in order to "accept any written counter proposal which [the 

unions] intended to make a~ailable." R. Vol. III, at Tab 3, p. 

12. The unions informed Lear's representative that they had no 

further proposal, but that they wished to review Lear's financial 

records to verify its claims that the San Francisco area 

operations were experiencing financial difficulties. The unions 

indicated that their membership might accept a freeze or a 

reduction if Lear was truly experiencing financial losses. The 

financial statements were delivered to the unions sometime before 

July 8, 1984; the sta~ements showed a pre-tax lo~s of $385,837. 

The final meeting between the parties occurred on July 16, 

1984. The unions acknowledged receipt of the financial 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

two negotiated raises of $.50 each, effective July 1, 1982 and 

1983. 

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statements, and the existence of operating losses, but indicated 

that their auditors . required some ... snpporting information to 

identify the exact character of the losses. The unions 

nevertheless advanced a proposal consisting of a $.75 per hour 

increase in the total wage package, contrasted with the unions 

last previous proposal of $1.02 increase. Lear informed the 

unions that it was financially unable to discuss any wage 

increase~ that unless the unions were willing to negotiate a 

decrease in the total wage package then the parties had nothing 

further to negotiate. The unions replied that they were unwilling 

to negotiate a decrease in the wage package. A final proposal by 

Lear of $16.50 per hour total package was rejected because, as the 

unions noted, it was less than the $16.95 which Lear had 

previously prop_osed. Lear. in.dicated that it could wait no longer 

due to the pressing financial situation, and informed the unions 

that effective the next pay period, it would institute the lower 

wage rate and Lear's own insurance package previously offered to 

the unions. 

In assessing the relative importance of Lear's proposals during the lengthy negotiations, the Board ignored the evidence 

directly relating to the actual cause of the impasse itself. 

Although Lear never explicitly withdrew its firs~ proposal, with 

its noneconomic changes to vacation and holiday benefits, neither 

the unions nor Lear did anything to imply that those relatively 

minor terms were the cause of the impasse which eventually 

occurred more than a month after Lear made that proposal. 

The impasse between the parties became evident at the final 

meeting on July 16, 1984. The relevant facts surrounding that 

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meeting are undisputed. The meeting commenced with the unions 

advancing a proposal consisting of a $. 75 per hour increase in·.:::the=.::· 

total wage package. Lear informed the unions that it was 

financially unable to discuss any w~ge increase: that unless the 

unions were willing to negotiate a decrease in the total wage 

package then the parties were at impasse. The unions replied that 

they were unwilling to neg~tiate a decrease in the wage package. 

Thus, the issue was clearly framed~-t~e noneconomic proposals had 

become inconsequential to the major thrust of the discussion. 

Indeed, according to the findings of the ALJ, no mention was made 

of these noneconomic items during the final meeting. See R. Vol. 

III, at Tab 3, p. 13-14. These facts are inconsistent with a 

conclusion that the impasse was in any way due to the noneconomic 

modifications included in Lear's first proposal. The facts show 

conclusively that the subject of the impasse was Lear's insistence 

on a net decrease in the total wage package, and the unions' 

insistence on a net increase. 6 

In arriving at its conclusion that Lear's noneconomic provisions were inextricably bound to the economic portions of its 

proposals, the Board placed significant reliance on the fact that 

6 We further reject the Board's conclusion that Lear had 

effectively linked any negotiations under the reopener to its 

initial request to discuss noneconomic items. As the ALJ's 

description of the final _meeting demonstrates, the eligibility requirements of the vacation and holiday provisions under the 

contracts were no longer a matter of serious consideration between 

the parties at the time the impasse was reached. Furthermore, 

nothing in the record indicates that Lear refused to negotiate a 

wage package which did not incorporate the noneconomic provisions of Lear's first proposal. The Board itself found that the company "did not expressly condition acceptance of its June 13 offer on a 

change in actual holidays •••• " Lear Siegler, Inc., 283 

N.L.R.B. at 137. 

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Lear proposed noneconomic modifications, that those proposals were 

never expressly revoked, and that the changes eventually enacted 

unilaterally by Lear incorporate some of these noneconomic 

modifications. The Board's reliance on these facts as evidence 

that Lear 

misplaced. 

insisted on those noneconomic provisions to impasse is 

The critical determination is what caused the impasse; 

not what resulted from the impasse. Simply because Lear proposed 

the noneconomic changes early in the negotiations, and later 

revived its first proposal at a time after impasse had been 

reached does not imply that those relatively minor provisions 

formed the essence of the impasse. The testimony elicited from 

both parties indicates that the impasse resulted from one single 

issue: a wage increase versus a wage decrease. When considered in 

light of the evidence directly related to the circumstances 

surrounding the impasse itself, the inference that the impasse 

involved anything more than this single issue is not supported by 

the evidence. 

We conclude, therefore, that the impasse which the Board 

found to have occurred between the parties was entirely due to 

Lear's insistence on negotiating a decrease in the total wage 

package. 

Upon reaching impasse over the proposed wage decrease, Lear 

informed its employees that it would unilaterally change its terms 

of employment by discontinuing its contributions to union plans, 

by decreasing the hourly wage rate, and by making various changes 

to employees' holiday and vacation privileges. These changes effectively incorporated Lear's earlier proposal of $16.95 total 

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compensation package and changes in noneconomic vacation and 

holiday terms. 

Having bargained in good faith to imp~sse with the unions 

over its proposed wage decrease, Lear was entitled unilaterally to 

adopt the proposed provision over which the impasse arose. See 

Newspaper Printing Corp. v. NLRB, 625 F.2d 956, 966 (10th Cir. 

1980). Nev,ertheless, it could not unilaterally modify those terms 

of the contract with Local 718 which were outside the scope of the 

reopener clause. NLRB v. Northeast Okla. City Mfg. Co., 631 F.2d 

669, 675 (10th Cir. 1980). Lear therefore violated the Act by 

unilaterally altering the noneconomic provisions relating to 

holiday and vacation benefits. We accordingly grant enforcement 

of the Board's order insofar as it relates to these impermissible 

changes to contract terms outside the scope of the reopener 

clause; however, we deny enforcement of that portion of the 

Board's order relating to Lear's modifications to the wage package 

under this contract. 

II-. 

LEAR'S WARNINGS TO POTENTIAL STRIKERS 

Lear challenges the Board's finding that Lear.violated section 8(a)(l) of the Act by threatening its employees with 

permanent replacement should they go out on strike. The Board 

based its conclusion on two factual determinations: that statements made by Lear management were coercive threats rather than 

mere statements of law; and that the threats were made to discourage Lear employees from participating in an anticipated lawful 

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strike which the employees contemplated, at least in part, to 

protest portions of Lear's proposals which clearly fell outside ·· 

the scope of the reopener. Lear contests these factual determinations. Under the appropriate standard of review, we conclude that 

the Board's factual determinations are supported by substantial 

evidence in the record considered as a whole. 

The Act makes it "an unfair labor practice for an employer 

• 0 • to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 

exercise of the rights guaranteed" by the Act. 29 u.s.c. 

S 158(a)(l). Those guaranteed rights include the right to "engage 

in concerted activities for the purpose of collective 

bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 u.s.c. § 157. 

In testimony before the ALJ, two employees, each covered by one of 

the two contracts with Lear, indicated that in response to 

employees' questions concerning an anticipated strike, Lear 

representatives had clearly told them they would be permanently 

replaced if they participated in a strike. These statements were 

made at a meeting during which Lear informed its employees that 

the unions were unwilling to accept its first proposal, and that 

the company did not intend to give in to union demands. 7 Under 

7 The ADJ found· that during the me'etings between Lear and its 

employees, Lear's Vice President of Industrial Relations: 

"explained the 13 June offer to the employee~ and 

compared the bene·f its which the employees were receiving 

under the terms of the current contracts with those they 

would receive under [its] proposal •••. He told the 

employees that because of [Lear's] severe financial 

losses incurred due to high labor costs that [Lear] in 

order to remain in business would have to cut its labor 

costs and that in order to do this [Lear] had made its 

13 June offer to the Unions and that the Unions had the ~ 

[footnote continued •• ~] 

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these circumstances, the Board correctly found the statements to 

be nothing but threats of reprisals against workers who backed a 

union strike in the event of a~ impasse in negotiations. 

The Board also concluded that the "strike" referred to by 

Lear's employees would have been caused in part by their concerns 

over noneconomic terms contained in Lear's first proposal. This 

is also substantially supported by the record. Lear described its 

initial proposal, which contained numerous items clearly beyond 

the scope of either reopener clause, to all of its employees; this 

immediately prompted the questions concerning the strike. These 

noneconomic modifications would severely limit some employees' 

eligibility for vacation and holiday privileges. To assume that 

the employees cared nothing about such a potentially deleterious 

result would be illogical absent some evidence to the contrary. 

No evidence appears in the record to contradict the Board's 

factual determination in this regard. The employees did not 

indicate that they were concerned only about the economic provisions of the proposal. 

At the time of Lear's threatening remarks, no bargaining 

impasse had been reached on any issue, and the ultimate issue 

which was to become the subject of the impasse had not yet become 

apparent. The employees were given no reason to believe that Lear 

would alter its proposal. Under these circumstances, sufficient 

evidence exists to support the Board's determination that the 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

option of accepting [the] 13 June offer or rejecting it 

and showing their displeasure by striking." 

Decision of A.L.J., R. Vol. III, at Tab 3, p. 29. 

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employees were considering a strike in the event that Lear refused 

to move off this initial bargaining position... The . employees 

clearly had the right to consider such a strike, and could have 

lawfully participated in it had Lear refused to alter its 

proposal. That Lear eventually did move off its position, and 

that no strike ever occurred is irrelevant. "The test for a 

violation of section 8(a)(l) 'is not whether an attempt at 

coercion has succeeded or failed but whether "the employer engaged 

in conduct which reasonably tends to interfere with, restrain or 

coerce employees in the free exercise of their rights under Section 7."'" Medallion Kitchens, Inc. v. NLRB, 806 f.2d 185, 191 

(8th Cir. 1986) (quoting NLRB v. Intertherm, Inc., 596 F.2d 267, 

271 (8th Cir. 1979) (quoting in turn Russell Stover Candies, Inc. 

v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 204, 208 (8th Cir. 1977))); NLRB v. Albion 

Corp., 593 F.2d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 1979). 

On June 27, 1984,. before it enacted any of the unilateral 

modifications to the employee's wages or benefits, Lear 

distributed a bulletin to its employees stating that "An 

[e]mployer has the right to permanently replace [e]conomic 

strikers to continue its business oper~tion in the event of a 

strike." R. Vol. III, Tab 3 at 27 (emphasis added). Lear now 

contends that this legally correct statement, sent before any 

impasse had been reached, and devoid of any specific information 

relating to the situation in each of its own shops, sterilizes the 

verbal communications between 

employees regarding permanent 

participated in a strike. This 

Lear representatives and its 

replacement of anyone who 

contention i$ wholly without 

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merit. See Furr's, Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 562, 567 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 ·(1967); NLRB· v. Dover Corp.,. Norri's 

Div., 535 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 

978 (1976). The record clearly supports the Board's findings. 

Under our limited scope of review, we conclude that the Board's 

determination is factually and legally correct. 

III. 

LEAR'S REFUSAL TO PROVIDE EMPLOYEE INFORMATION 

The Board also found that Lear violated the Act by refusing 

to furnish the unions with the names, addresses, and other 

relevant information concerning its employees. See Safeway 

Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 691 F.2d 953, 956 (10th Cir. 1982) (employer 

must disclose information relevant to unions' duties). Lear 

acknowledges its refusal to disclose the information to the 

unions. Lear contends, however, that it was justified in refusing 

the request because of the settled rule that an employer may 

refuse to disclose relevant information if there is a "likelihood 

of a clear and present danger to the employees involved." United 

Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198, 1207 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. 

denied, 401 U.S. 993 (1971); Sign and Pictorial Union Local 1175 

v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (employer justified in 

refusing information where non-striking employees had been 

"harassed, threatened and assaulted" by strikers and union ignored 

requests for assurances that information would not be used to 

further such harassment). 

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Here, the ALJ and the Board concluded that no likelihood of 

danger or union abuse existed. The record - supports this .. 

conclusion. No testimony was offered that any employee had been 

threatened, harassed, or otherwise intimidated by the.unions. 

Lear offered no testimony demonstrating union misconduct. The 

only evidence introduced in support of Lear's assertion that the 

information would be misused is an informal settlement agreement 

between Lear and the unions to dispose of an unfair labor practice 

charge relating to alleged misconduct in discriminating against 

nonunion employees which Lear had previously brought against. the 

unions. Even in this document, the unions expressly stated that 

they did not admit any violations on their part. Applying the 

"substantial evidence" standard to the Board's conclusion, we cannot set aside its finding. 

IV. 

INTERROGATING EMPLOYEES CONCERNING UNION ACTIVITIES 

Finally, Lear contends that the Board erroneously concluded 

Lear violated the Act by contacting an employee and threatening to 

discharge that employee after he informed the union of a grievance 

with Lear's management. Lear contends that this "isolated 

incident" does not warrant a finding of any violation. 

In June 1984, one of Lear'f!_employees filed a complaint with 

the union concerning an unexplained delay in receiving a pay 

increase due him under the collective bargaining agreement. When 

the union informed Lear that it intended to file a grievance on 

behalf of the employee, Lear _personnel contacted the employee, 

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demand_ing: "What's this union stuff? • • • This is not a threat, 

this is a promise. I' 11 ·be watching• you;· and you·--make one--mistake .. 

. and you're gone." R. Vol III, at Tab 3, p. 43. This court has 

stated: "[I]nterrogating employees concerning their union 

activities ••• is prohibited ••• if accompanied by coercion, 

threat, or restraint." Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. 

NLRB, 723 F.2d 1468, 1475 (10th Cir. 1983). Clearly, threatening 

to discharge an employee as a result of a grievance filed by the 

union on that employee's behalf constitutes such a prohibited 

activity. We accordingly affirm the Board's conclusion that the 

statements of Lear personnel to the employee in question violated 

the Act. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, we grant the Board's petition 

for enforcement of its order in all respects with the exception 

that Lear is permitted unilaterally to decrease the wage rates and 

other economic benefits within the total compensation package for 

employees covered by the contract between itself and Local 718 in 

accordance with its proposal which specified a total package of 

$16.95, effective as of the date of the impasse between the parties to that contract. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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