Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-12-03500/USCOURTS-ca3-12-03500-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Blaine R. Handerhan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 12-3500

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

BLAINE R. HANDERHAN,

 Appellant 

______________

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Cr. Action No. 10-cr-00298-1)

District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell

______________

Argued September 11, 2013

______________

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit 

Judges.

(Opinion Filed: January 7, 2014)

______________

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
2

James T. Clancy, Esq. [ARGUED]

Office of United States Attorney

228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754

220 Federal Building and Courthouse

Harrisburg, PA 17108

Counsel for Appellee The United States of America

Philip Gelso, Esq. [ARGUED]

Briechle & Gelso

63 Pierce Street

Kingston, PA 18704

Marissa A. McAndrew, Esq.

Briechle & Gelso

41 North Main Street

Suite 310

Carbondale, PA 18407

Matthew R. Gover, Esq.

Brian W. Perry, Esq.

Gover, Perry & Shore

2411 North Front Street

Harrisburg, PA 17110

Counsel for Appellant Blaine Handerhan

______________

OPINION

______________

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
3

Blaine Handerhan (“Appellant” or “Handerhan”) 

appeals the District Court’s August 21, 2012 judgment of 

sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment. Appellant argues that 

the sentence he received for possessing thousands of images 

of child pornography was both procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable. Specifically, Appellant contends that the 

District Court erred by failing to (a) explicitly address his 

request for a downward departure based on mental health 

issues and (b) meaningfully consider the factors enumerated 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including Appellant’s arguments 

regarding the unreasonable nature of the relevant Sentencing 

Guidelines provision, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. Although we affirm 

the District Court’s sentence, finding it both procedurally and 

substantively reasonable, we feel compelled to remind the 

District Court that motions seeking departure should be 

formally decided. A reviewing court must know from the 

record whether a district judge is indeed exercising his or her 

discretion. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In late 2005, an undercover investigation by the 

Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force–a joint 

organization of federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies–determined that a single computer was sharing over 

“1400 images and/or video files of child pornography” 

through a file-sharing program. (Presentence Investigation 

Report (“PSR”) ¶ 5.) The Pennsylvania State Police were

notified and conducted an investigation and learned that the 

computer in question was located in the residence of 

Handerhan, a retired Lieutenant, who served for 25 years in 

the Mount Carmel Police Department. Thereafter, a search 

warrant was executed on Handerhan’s residence and his 

computer was seized. An evaluation of the computer 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
4

revealed that it contained over 6,000 images and video files of 

child pornography, including images of pre-pubescent 

children and other images depicting sadomasochism and 

bondage. In addition, the forensic analysis of Handerhan’s 

computer revealed that he had configured Shareza, a file 

sharing program, in order to distribute some of the images.

Appellant was charged in a two-count indictment in 

October 2010 with distribution of child pornography, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256(8)(A) and 2252A(2)(a), and 

with possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A). Handerhan subsequently pled guilty to 

a single count of possession of child pornography, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). In the plea 

agreement, the Government agreed to dismiss the distribution 

charge and recommended that Appellant “receive a threelevel reduction in the defendant’s offense level for acceptance 

of responsibility.” (App. 71.) The Government otherwise 

reserved the right “to recommend a sentence up to and 

including the maximum sentence of imprisonment and fine 

allowable, together with the cost of prosecution.” (Id. at 72.)

Prior to Handerhan’s sentencing, both parties were

given copies of the PSR. The probation officer calculated 

Appellant’s guidelines range as being 151 to 188 months’

imprisonment based on an offense level of 34 and a criminal 

history category of 1.

1

 1 The offense level calculation reflected several additions 

to the base offense level, including the fact that some of the 

material involved pre-pubescent minors, that the offense 

involved portrayals of “sadistic or masochistic conduct or 

other depictions of violence,” that “the defendant used a 

computer for the possession” of the child pornography, and 

 “[H]owever, because the statutory 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
5

maximum penalty [was] 10 years, the guideline sentence” 

was set at 120 months. (PSR ¶ 63.) The PSR also stated that 

there were no identifiable “factors warranting a departure 

from the guideline range.” (Id. at ¶ 79.) Appellant filed a 

sealed Sentencing Memorandum in response, requesting that 

“the Court apply a downward departure” and arguing that a 

sentence of 60 months was more appropriate. (App. 28, 38.) 

Appellant requested the downward departure under U.S.S.G. 

§ 5H1.32 and argued that the proposed 120-month sentence 

was unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.3

 

that “the offense involved 600 or more images.” (PSR ¶¶ 18-

23.)

2 In relevant part, U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3 states: “Mental and 

emotional conditions may be relevant in determining whether 

a departure is warranted, if such conditions, individually or in 

combination with other offender characteristics, are present to 

an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical 

cases covered by the guidelines.”

3 In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) includes the 

following factors: “(1) [T]he nature and circumstances of the 

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; 

(2) the need for the sentence imposed [in light of the 

defendant’s and society’s interests]; (3) the kinds of sentences 

available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range 

established for [the applicable category of offenses]; (5) any 

pertinent policy statement [by the Sentencing Commission]; 

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 

of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to 

any victims of the offense.”

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
6

Appellant argued that a downward departure pursuant 

to U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3 was appropriate “in light of the fact that 

he suffers from a mental health condition and has taken 

extraordinary measures to rehabilitate himself.” (Id. at 28.) 

According to Appellant, and supported by various medical 

documents submitted to the District Court, he suffers from 

obsessive compulsive disorder coupled with an “internet 

addiction,” manifesting itself in an uncontrollable urge to 

download and catalogue pornographic images of all kinds. 

(Id. at 17-18.) Appellant’s mental illnesses resulted in 

Appellant giving into the urge to download thousands of child 

pornographic images and video, and to store and 

“meticulously catalogue[]” them on his home computer. (Id. 

at 18.) Shortly after the police searched his home, Appellant 

sought treatment from multiple psychiatrists, searching for 

the most effective treatment. According to all of his 

psychiatric evaluations, Appellant did not exhibit any sexual 

attraction to children, nor did he apparently seek out the 

images in question for purposes of gratifying his sexual urges. 

(See id.) 

Appellant also argued that the proposed Guidelines

sentence was inappropriate in light of the § 3553(a) factors. 

Specifically, Appellant argued that the sentence was 

inappropriate because: (a) he recognized that what he did was 

wrong; (b) he acted under compulsion of his mental disorder; 

(c) he sought treatment for his malady; (d) the Government’s 

proposed sentence was appropriate in the “ordinary” case, not 

in Appellant’s unique circumstances; and (e) Appellant’s 

status as a father and devoted son militated against his longterm incarceration. (See id. at 33-38.)

The District Court subsequently held a sentencing 

hearing in August 2012. At the hearing, both parties argued 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
7

the merits of Appellant’s request for a downward departure, 

as well as the evaluation of the § 3553(a) factors, with the 

Government suggesting that if the District Court were 

inclined to agree, that it should “exercise its discretion to 

deny the downward departure, but consider all of [Appellant’s 

arguments] in the context of the § 3553(a) factors for a 

variance.” (Id. at 120.) After both sides made their 

respective arguments, the District Court ruled as follows:

Well, needless to say, this is a very very 

unfortunate situation for you, Mr. Handerhan. 

You did the right thing at least, you 

acknowledged your participation in this ugly 

crime. And what I am concerned about in all of 

these child pornography cases is the fact that it 

is people who view this and download it and 

distribute it or just look at it, they’re the people 

who perpetuate the ongoing abuse of children 

who are the subjects of these pornography 

images.

. . . .

The Government is asking for a 10-year 

sentence, which is the statutory maximum and 

is less than the guidelines would provide for 

this offense. In considering [Appellant’s 

counsel’s] presentation, I am somewhat 

impressed under 3553(a) factors that a variance 

could be granted in this case based upon what 

we’ve discussed here this morning and those 

factors that have been mentioned.

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
8

Considering all of those factors, I will 

make a slight variance from the statutory 

maximum penalty in imposing a sentence this 

morning. I’m sorry that you have to endure 

imprisonment, and I hope that you will be able 

to do that and come back to the community and 

be a law-abiding citizen.

Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act, 

it is the judgment of the Court on Count 2 that 

the Defendant, Blaine R. Handerhan, is hereby 

committed to the custody of the Bureau of 

Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 96 

months.

(Id. at 125-27.)

Appellant subsequently appealed his sentence, arguing 

that it was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. 

Specifically, Appellant posits that the District Court’s failure 

to explicitly rule on his request for downward departure, and 

its allegedly inadequate treatment of the § 3553(a) factors,

renders his sentence procedurally unreasonable. According to 

the Appellant, this, in turn, renders his sentence substantively 

unreasonable as well. 

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 

and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 

We review both the procedural and the substantive 

reasonableness of a district court’s sentence for abuse of 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
9

discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); 

United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 

banc). “Appellate review is limited to determining whether 

the sentence is reasonable.” United States v. Friedman, 658 

F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Our review 

for reasonableness proceeds in two stages. First, we must 

“ensure that the [D]istrict [C]ourt committed no significant 

procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly 

calculating) the [U.S. Sentencing] Guidelines range, treating 

the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 

U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on 

clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the 

chosen sentence . . . .” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Second, if we 

find that the sentence is procedurally sound, we then consider 

if it is substantively reasonable given the “totality of the 

circumstances.” Id. If the sentence is within the applicable

Guidelines range, we may presume that the sentence is 

reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350-51 

(2007). “[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute 

its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the 

appropriateness of a particular sentence.” Solem v. Helm, 463 

U.S. 277, 290 (1983). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Procedural Unreasonableness

When imposing a sentence, a district court must follow 

a three-step process. First, “[c]ourts must determine to 

calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as they 

would have before [United States v. Booker, 453 U.S. 220 

(2005)].” United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 

2006) (citations omitted). Second, district courts “must 

formally rul[e] on the motions of both parties, and stat[e] on 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
10

the record whether they are granting a departure and how that 

departure affects the Guidelines calculation, and tak[e] into 

account our Circuit’s pre-Booker case law, which continues to 

have advisory force.” Id. (alterations in original) (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 

Third, districts courts must “exercise[] [their] discretion by 

considering the relevant [§ 3553(a)] factors in setting the 

sentence they impose regardless [of] whether it varies from 

the sentence calculated under the Guidelines.” Id. (alterations

in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “During the third step, district courts should engage 

in ‘a true, considered exercise of discretion, including a 

recognition of, and response to, the parties’ non-frivolous 

arguments.’” United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 359 

(3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 

834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006)). 

These steps ensure “that the District Court’s decisionmaking process is both logical and fair,” and we therefore 

recommend that the District Court “consider the steps 

separately and sequentially.” Id. at 361. Failure to adhere to 

this process may result in a procedurally unreasonable 

sentence, United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214-15 (3d 

Cir. 2010), and may even “risk the substantive reasonableness 

of any decision [the district court] reache[s],” United States v. 

Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 2007). 

Appellant contends that the District Court’s sentence 

was procedurally unreasonable because it failed to adhere to 

the second and third steps of the Gunter process.4

 4 Appellant does not challenge the District Court’s initial 

calculation of his Guidelines range pursuant to step one of the 

Gunter process. At the sentencing hearing, Appellant’s 

Appellant 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
11

also challenges his sentence as substantively unreasonable, 

arguing that the District Court’s alleged procedural errors 

render the substance of his sentence unreasonable or that, in 

the alternative, “no reasonable sentencing court would have 

imposed the same sentence on [Appellant] for the reasons the 

district court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (3d Cir. 

2009). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the 

District Court’s sentence and find it both procedurally and 

substantively reasonable. 

1. Gunter Step 2 - Failure to Formally Rule On 

Downward Departure Request

Appellant challenges his sentence by asserting that the 

District Court did not formally rule on his motion for a 

downward departure. As previously stated, step two of the 

Gunter process requires district courts to “formally rul[e] on 

the motions of both parties, and stat[e] on the record whether 

they are granting a departure . . . .”Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247

(internal quotation marks omitted). The need for a clear 

ruling is particularly acute regarding a motion for a 

downward departure from the Guidelines because “[o]ur 

Court’s jurisdiction to review the denial of such departures 

depend[s] on a district court’s reason for denial.” Jackson, 

467 F.3d at 838. That is, if the court denied the motion 

because it “believed [it] could not legally depart on the 

ground asserted, we [have] jurisdiction to review for legal 

error; if, instead, [the court] recognized [its] authority to 

depart but chose not to do so, we lack[] jurisdiction to review 

that decision.” Id. at 838. 

 

attorney conceded that they did not wish to “dispute a point 

addition on the guidelines calculation,” because “it is really 

not important for today’s purposes.” (App. 109.)

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
12

As a result, we generally require that district courts 

“state expressly whether [their] denial of [a] defendant’s 

departure request was based on legal or discretionary 

grounds.” Id. at 838-39 (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(noting that the rule is still applicable, even post-Booker). 

Thus, where the “district court’s stated reasons are 

ambiguous–so that the record does not reflect whether the 

court’s denial is based on legal or discretionary grounds–then 

the proper remedy is to vacate the sentence and remand for 

the district court to clarify the basis for its ruling.” Stevens, 

223 F.3d at 247 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

The admonition against ambiguous rulings on 

downward departure requests is not ironclad, however. Both 

before and after Booker, this Circuit has recognized its ability 

to “infer meaning from the District Court’s actions” in a case. 

Jackson, 467 F.3d at 840. Thus, even where the district court 

does not explicitly rule on a motion for downward departure, 

this Court has held that it will “not remand for re-sentencing 

when the Government’s arguments to the district court 

concede[d] the plausibility of the downward departure.” Id. 

at 839 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In Jackson, and in similar

circumstances, we found it “quite likely that the district 

court’s refusal to depart . . . was discretionary, and thus [this 

Court could] infer that the departure motion had been denied 

by the [district] court in recognition of its ability to depart had 

it chosen to do so.” Id. at 839 (citations omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). While we have applied this 

rationale several times since the 2006 opinion in Jackson, 

“having to infer the District Court’s thinking is not our 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
13

preferred course.” Id. at 840 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

In this case, Appellant argues that the District Court 

erred in failing to (1) acknowledge that it had discretion to 

depart; (2) consider the substance of Appellant’s downward 

departure request; and (3) formally rule on that request. 

(Appellant Br. 23.) “By failing to consider and formally rule 

upon Mr. Handerhan’s argument that the addiction itself was 

sufficiently contributory to his commission of the offense to 

entitle him to a downward departure, the District Court 

created no record to support a thorough consideration of [the] 

motion for downward departure.” (Id.) We agree with the 

Appellant that the District Court did not explicitly deny 

Appellant’s request for a downward departure. Nonetheless,

we are able to infer that the District Court used its discretion 

because it was fully informed on the issues prompting the 

request, and the Government requested that “the Court 

exercise its discretion to deny the downward departure . . . .”

(App. 120.) This demonstrates that the Government 

acknowledged that the District Court had discretion to grant a 

possible departure. As a result, we find that the District Court 

did use its discretion to deny the request for a downward 

departure, choosing instead to grant a slight variance. 

As previously noted, this Court’s jurisdiction to 

consider Appellant’s arguments depends on the basis for the 

District Court’s ruling. See Stevens, 223 F.3d at 247-48 (3d 

Cir. 2000). “If the ruling was based on the district court’s 

belief that a departure on the grounds proffered by the 

defendant was legally impermissible, we have jurisdiction to 

determine whether the district court’s understanding of the 

law was correct. By contrast, if the district court’s ruling was 

based on an exercise of discretion, we lack jurisdiction.” Id. 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
14

at 247 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Therefore, it is imperative that this Court understand the basis 

for the District Court’s ruling. In this case, because we find 

that the District Court utilized its discretion, “[w]e do not 

have jurisdiction to review [the] discretionary decision[] by 

[the] district court[] to not depart downward.” United States 

v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 103 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

2. Gunter Step 3 – Procedural Unreasonableness 

While we do not have jurisdiction to review the 

District Court’s resolution of Appellant’s downward 

departure request, “[o]ur lack of review on this issue . . . goes 

no further than step two of Gunter, as step three requires our 

review of the sentence against the several § 3553(a) factors, 

only one of which is the Guidelines range.” Jackson, 467 F.3d 

at 839 n.6. The District Court “need not ‘discuss and make 

findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors,’” Id. (quoting 

United States v. Kulick, 629 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2010)), 

but we do inquire as to whether the District Court gave 

“‘meaningful consideration to the relevant § 3553(a) 

factors.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 

216 (3d Cir. 2008)). See also United States v. Lofink, 564 

F.3d 232, 238 n.13 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Although district courts 

must consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, they need not 

explicitly comment on every factor if the record makes clear 

the court took the factors into account in sentencing.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Though we “can 

articulate no uniform threshold for sufficiency because of the 

fact-bound nature of each sentencing decision, we certainly 

always demand more than a rote recitation of the § 3553(a) 

factors . . . .” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
15

Here, Appellant argues that the District Court 

neglected to address his arguments “(1) that the Sentencing 

Commission did not employ its characteristic empirical 

approach in setting guideline ranges for crimes involving 

child pornography and (2) that the enhancements in the 

Sentencing Guidelines, which were applicable in this case, 

are inherent in almost all offenses involving child 

pornography.” (Appellant Br. 25.) The Government 

contends that while “the district court did not recite every 

sentencing factor verbatim, the record clearly demonstrates 

that the court took all of the factors into consideration.” 

(Appellee Br. 15.)

We find that the District Court did consider 

§ 3553(a)(1): “the nature and circumstances of the offense 

and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” The 

District Court took into account that Appellant had been a 

productive member of society having served as a police 

officer, as well as the fact that he made “a serious and sincere 

effort to overcome” his mental illnesses by seeking therapy. 

(See App. 126.) 

Likewise, the District Court also considered many 

aspects of § 3553(a)(2): “the need for the sentence imposed 

[in light of the defendant’s and society’s interests].” The 

District Court considered the broader societal ills flowing 

from the possession of child pornography, and in large 

measure the District Court focused its sentencing discussion 

on the need to “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), and to “deter others generally from 

engaging in this crime.” (See App. 125-26.) This suggests 

that the District Court also considered § 3553(a)(3) – “the 

kinds of sentences available.” 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
16

The Government also argues that the District Court 

adequately considered two other factors – § 3553(a)(4) and 

§ 3553(a)(6). The first, § 3553(a)(4), looks to the “kinds of 

sentence and the sentencing range established for [the 

applicable category of offenses].” The District Court 

observed that although Handerhan’s sentence was statutorily 

capped at ten years, the advisory guidelines range for his 

offense before the statutory cap was actually higher.” (Id.) 

The second, § 3553(a)(6), looks to “the need to avoid 

unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 

similar records who have been found guilty of similar 

conduct.” The Government posits that the following District 

Court statement suffices: “[E]ight years . . . is a long time

. . . . But in light of all the circumstances that I have learned 

in this case, in fairness to the other people that I sentence . . . 

a penalty that is significant is appropriate in this case.” (Id. at 

131.) We agree that this statement appears to consider 

§ 3553(a)(6) because of the reference to the appropriateness

of the sentence as it relates to similarly situated defendants 

sentenced by this District Court.

Appellant also argues that his sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable “because the District Court failed to consider 

and formally rule upon Mr. Handerhan’s motion for 

downward variances based on flaws in the sentencing 

guidelines.” Specifically, “the Sentencing Commission’s 

failure to enact guidelines based on empirical research, 

focusing instead on Congressional directives, as is not its 

institutional role.” (Appellant Br. 13.) Appellant argues that 

United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2008) should 

govern. In Sevilla, this Circuit found the sentencing 

procedure of the district court to be unreasonable because it 

failed to address the defendant’s arguments regarding his 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
17

childhood and the crack/powder disparity within the 

Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 232.

However, as Appellant acknowledges, the District 

Court did state, “I think that some of these penalties for this 

offense are more serious than they need to be.” (App. 131.) 

The District Court then went on to say, “But in light of all the 

circumstances that I have learned in this case . . . I think . . . 

that a penalty that is significant is appropriate in this case.” 

(Id.) This demonstrates, albeit not as formally as we would 

prefer, that the District Court did consider arguable problems

in the sentencing guidelines but found the sentence, when 

coupled with the variance ultimately granted, to be 

appropriate.

Here, the District Court’s consideration of the 

§ 3553(a) factors appears to be more comprehensive than in 

Jackson where we found sufficient the district court’s 

statement that it considered the defendant’s prior convictions 

for crimes of violence, circumstances of defendant’s 

upbringing, and financial circumstances was sufficient 

discussion of the § 3553(a) factors. Jackson, 467 F.3d at 841-

42. 

The District Court said, “I am somewhat impressed 

under the § 3553(a) factors that a variance could be granted in 

this case based upon what we’ve discussed here this morning 

and those factors that have been mentioned. Considering all 

of those factors, I will make a slight variance from the 

statutory maximum penalty . . . .” (App. 126.) The District 

Court granted Appellant a 24-month downward variance, in 

apparent recognition of Appellant’s mental health issues and 

his efforts at treatment, stating, “I think you have made an 

effort to overcome your addiction.” (Id. at 125-26.) We find 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
18

that the District Court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors 

was “more than a rote recitation of the § 3553(a) factors . . . .” 

Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. Accordingly, the District Court did 

not err in its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors applicable 

to Appellant. The totality of the record demonstrates that at 

Gunter step three, all of the factors were sufficiently 

considered by the District Court and reflected in the variance 

ultimately granted. We find that the District Court did not 

commit procedural error in its sentencing.

B. Substantive Unreasonableness

Having concluded that the District Court committed no 

procedural error, we now review the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence under an abuse of discretion 

standard. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. We will affirm a 

procedurally sound sentence as substantively reasonable 

“unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed 

the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons 

the district court provided.” Id. at 568. In reviewing the 

substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we look to “whether 

the final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible 

statutory range, was premised upon appropriate and judicious 

consideration of the relevant factors.” United States v. 

Young, 634 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2011). “We focus on the 

totality of the circumstances, and the party challenging the 

sentence bears the burden of proving the sentence’s 

unreasonableness.” Friedman, 658 F.3d at 360. 

Appellant argues that “based upon the totality of the 

circumstances in this case, no reasonable sentencing court 

would have imposed a sentence of 96 months considering all 

of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors as advocated by 

[Appellant] at sentencing.” (Appellant Br. 37.) In the instant 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 18 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
19

case, the correct procedure was employed and a reasonable 

conclusion reached given the evidence presented. The facts 

do not suggest that no other court would impose a similar 

sentence. Appellant is a former police officer who–by his 

own admission–was aware that the images he downloaded 

were illegal. (App. 18 (noting, in the Sentencing 

Memorandum, that Appellant “knew child pornography was 

wrong”).) Moreover, his avowed explanation–that his 

obsessive compulsive disorder, coupled with his “internet 

addiction” drove him to download thousands of images of 

child pornography–does not account for why some of those 

images were then subsequently shared online by Appellant

via the Shareza software. (Id. 17-18.) Finally, while it is true 

that Appellant sought treatment for his condition (a factor that 

the District Court considered in sentencing Appellant), he 

expended such efforts only after his arrest. (Id. 17-22.) Due

to these factors, we find that a reasonable sentencing court 

could have imposed the same sentence upon Appellant. 

Furthermore, reviewing courts are entitled to presume 

that a sentence within the advisory Guidelines is reasonable. 

Rita, 551 U.S. at 364. In this case, Appellant received a 

below Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment. 

Under the deferential standard of review, the challenge to the 

length of imprisonment fails. 

VI. CONCLUSION

Today we affirm the District Court’s ruling and find 

that Handerhan’s sentence was neither procedurally nor 

substantively unreasonable. Nonetheless, having to infer that 

the District Court used its discretion to deny a downward

departure on the basis that the Government addressed the 

downward departure is not our “preferred course.” Jackson, 

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 19 Date Filed: 01/07/2014
20

467 F.3d at 839-40. We should not have to venture down that 

path only to conclude that we have no jurisdiction to review 

the district court’s discretionary denial of a downward 

departure. We want to be certain of the reason a district court 

judge denied a downward departure. We have provided 

specific guidance in Gunter and its progeny and that 

precedent must be followed.

Case: 12-3500 Document: 003111499021 Page: 20 Date Filed: 01/07/2014