Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00153/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00153-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Lee Dickinson
Plaintiff
Callie V.S. Granade
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DAVID LEE DICKINSON, :

Plaintiff, :

 

vs. : CA 16-0153-KD-C

CALLIE V.S. GRANADE, :

Defendant

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This prisoner action has been referred to the undersigned, in accordance with 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and General Local Rule 72(a)(2)(R) & (S), for appropriate action. 

For the reasons stated herein, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action 

based upon Dickinson’s failure to prosecute this action by fully complying with the 

Court’s order entered April 21, 2016 (Doc. 2). As well, the undersigned has screened 

Dickinson’s “Bill in Equity” in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and now 

recommends that this action be dismissed, prior to service of process, for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and because it is patently frivolous. Finally, this 

Court has a duty sua sponte to ensure that it has jurisdiction to entertain this action and 

since subject-matter jurisdiction is not apparent from the face of plaintiff’s amended 

pleading—that is, his “Bill in Equity”—this action is due to be dismissed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 25, 2002, Dickinson was indicted (in this Court) on one count of 

carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and one count of possessing a firearm during 

a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See United States v. Dickinson, 

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Criminal Action No. 02-00078-CG, Doc. 1. By superseding indictment, returned on June 

27, 2002, Dickinson was charged again with the aforementioned carjacking and 

possessing a firearm during a crime of violence, and, as well, was charged with 

possessing an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). See id., Doc. 32.

Dickinson entered a counseled guilty plea to Counts 1 and 2 of the superseding 

indictment—that is, carjacking and possessing a firearm during a crime of violence—on 

July 26, 2002, see id., Doc. 45, and, on November 13, 2002, he was sentenced to a total 

term of imprisonment of 166 months, 46 months as to Count 1 and 120 months as to 

Count 2, the sentence in Count 2 to run consecutive to that in Count 1, see id., Doc. 51. 

Dickinson’s appeal was dismissed in October of 2003, see id., Doc. 57, and his collateral 

motion to vacate was denied on October 6, 2005, along with his motion to renounce his 

United States citizenship, see id., Doc. 73. 

All was quiet in Dickinson’s criminal case for some ten years, until January 29, 

2016, when he sent a letter addressed to the Clerk of Court and attached thereto the 

following: (1) Declaration of Private Citizen Status; (2) Notice of Acceptance and 

Conveyance; (3) Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit; (4) Notice of Release and 

Indemnification; and (5) Deed of Trust (legal title to court case). See id., Doc. 74. 

Through the attached documents, all addressed to the Clerk of Court, Charles R. Diard, 

Jr., Dickinson purports to: (1) “convert back” to his former status as a private citizen of 

the United States in accordance with § 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States 

Constitution—Declaration of Private Citizen Status; (2) declare he is the cestui que trust, 

as a private citizen, enforcing his equitable rights by claiming a beneficial interest in his 

criminal case—indeed, his criminal case has become his private property because he has 

accepted the “deed” to his criminal case—and conveying to the Clerk of Court legal title 

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of the criminal case, as trustee, and to administer the trust as instructed in the Notice of 

Appointment—Notice of Acceptance and Conveyance; (3) appoint the Clerk of Court as 

trustee of his criminal case and “requesting” the Clerk of Court “to perform an 

extinguishment and a full accounting” of his criminal case and grant him any additional 

equitable relief to which he is entitled—Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit1; (4) 

hold harmless and indemnify the Clerk of Court (as well as Judge DuBose) with respect 

to any costs, fines, charges, claims, etc., that might arise as a result of treating Dickinson 

as a private citizen—Notice of Release and Indemnification; and (5) convey to the Clerk 

of Court a copy of the Judgment in a Criminal Case entered against him on November 

13, 2002, the first page of which is covered in Dickinson’s handwriting that requests the 

Clerk to accept “this deed” to his criminal case—Deed of Trust. See id., at 2-12. 

Some thirty days following the filing of the above information, on February 29, 

2016, Dickinson sent another letter addressed simply to the Clerk of Court and 

attaching thereto the following “documents”: (1) Declaration of Private Citizen Status; 

(2) Notice of Interest; (3) Notice of Release and Rescission of Signature of Suretyship; (4) 

Notice of Acceptance and Conveyance; (5) Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit; 

(6) Notice of Release and Indemnification; and (7) JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE 

(Deed/Legal title to case). See United States v. Dickinson, Criminal Action No. 

02-00078-CG, Doc. 75, at 1. The attachments to this letter are this time all addressed to 

 1 This attached document contains the following “Note” addressed to the Clerk of 

Court: “Your failure to show cause by disclaimer why you are not the trustee over this case 

within thirty (30) days from your receipt of this notice, constitutes your tacit consent, 

acceptance, admission, and confession that you are the trustee over this case. Furthermore, your 

failure to perform your fiduciary duties as instructed above in consequence of your failure to 

show ca[u]se why you are not the trustee within the time period stated herein, shall result in a 

breach of trust, and a Bill in Equity will be filed against you.” See United States v. Dickinson, 

Criminal Action No. 02-00078-CG, Doc. 74, at 4, Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit 

(emphasis in original).

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Judge Callie V.S. Granade and purport to accomplish the following for Dickinson: (1) a 

“conversion back” to his former status as a private citizen of the United States, 

conferred on the date of his natural birth on March 5, 1980, in accordance with § 1 of the 

14th Amendment to the United States Constitution—Declaration of Private Citizen 

Status, id. at 2;

2 (2) a declaration that he is the “beneficiary of the Constitution of the 

United States, and the cestui que3 of the private business trust created by the State of 

California on the 5th day of March, 1980 under the name DAVID LEE DICKINSON” 

and that he currently holds 100% beneficial and equitable interest in his criminal case 

because it (the criminal case) is “trust res4 of the said private business trust,” that is, 

Dickinson himself—Notice of Interest, see United States v. Dickinson, Criminal Action 

No. 02-00078-CG, Doc. 75, at 3; (3) a notification that he is releasing “any and all 

personal property interest, legal and equitable, in the public United States citizen 

‘DAVID LEE DICKINSON,’”—as opposed to his private persona—and in his criminal 

case—Notice of Release and Rescission of Signature of Suretyship, id. at 4; see also id. (“I, 

David Lee Dickinson, intend no longer to be held as Surety5 for, and hereby Release 

myself and Rescind my Signature(s) to be held as Surety for the State-created[] public 

 2 The undersigned finds interesting Dickinson’s apparent belief that he needed to 

“convert back” to a status he never lost. Compare id. with Doc. 73 (“[P]etitioner’s motion to 

renounce United States Citizenship [] is DENIED.”). 

3 As utilized by Dickinson, cestui que is essentially another name for beneficiary. 

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 243 (8th ed. 2004) ( defining cestui que trust as “[o]ne who 

possesses equitable rights in property, usu. receiving the rents, issues, and profits from it; 

BENEFICIARY.”). 

4 On definition of res is “[t]he subject matter of a trust; CORPUS.” See BLACK’S 

LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 1332.

5 A surety is “[a] person who is primarily liable for the payment of another’s debt 

or the performance of another’s obligation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 1482.

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United States citizen ‘DAVID LEE DICKINSON,’ ‘DAVID L. DICKINSON,’ ‘David Lee 

Dickinson,’ or any variations or derivatives of the ‘nom de guerre’ thereof, and 

furthermore, I Release myself as Surety for any and all bonds that funds the case. 

Through this notice, I have permanently Released myself as Surety for the public U.S. 

citizen “DAVID LEE DICKINSON,” and am legally bound by this Release in 

accordance to law.”); (4) a notification of his acceptance of his criminal case—more 

specifically, the judgment—as a private citizen of the United States—and conveyance to 

Judge Granade of “legal title” to his criminal case “in trust, for the benefit of DAVID 

LEE DICKINSON, and to establish a private trustee relationship[]”—Notice of 

Acceptance and Conveyance, id. at 5; (5) a notification of appointment of Judge Granade 

as trustee of his criminal case and accompanying demand that Judge Granade “perform 

an extinguishment and a full accounting of the case immediately,” including that she do 

all in her power as trustee “to cause the immediate release of [his] physical body from 

imprisonment, and the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons[,]” and ordering that 

she “make the payment[]”6—Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit, id. at 6

(emphasis in original);

7 (6) a notification purporting to hold harmless and indemnify 

Judge Granade with respect to any costs, fines, charges, claims, etc., that might arise as a 

 6 The undersigned appreciates the “make the payment” order to be referencing the 

restitution portion of the Judgment, the restitution amount being $14,978.97. 

7 This attached document contains the following “Note” addressed to Judge 

Granade: “Your failure to show cause by disclaimer why you are not the trustee over this case 

within thirty (30) days from the date of your receipt of this notice, constitutes your tacit

acceptance, admission, and confession that you are the trustee over the case. Furthermore, your 

failure to perform the fiduciary duties as instructed above in consequence of your failure to 

show cause why you are not the trustee within the time period stated herein, shall result in a 

breach of trust, and a Bill in Equity will pursue.” See United States v. Dickinson, Criminal Action 

No. 02-00078-CG, Doc. 75, at 6, Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit (emphasis in 

original).

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result of treating Dickinson as a private citizen—Notice of Release and Indemnification; 

and (7) conveying to Judge Granade a copy of the Judgment in a Criminal Case entered 

against him on November 13, 2002, all pages of which are covered in Dickinson’s 

handwriting that calls Judge Granade’s attention to her acceptance of this “Deed” to his 

criminal case—JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE (Deed/Legal title to case), see id., at 

8-14. 

All of the foregoing is necessary background inasmuch as it appears that Judge 

Granade’s “failure” to disclaim her “trusteeship” was the impetus for Dickinson filing a 

self-styled “Complaint for Breach of Trust” in this Court on April 11, 2016. (Doc. 1, at 

1-4.) Because it was “unclear to the undersigned exactly what type of case Dickinson 

has or this Court’s jurisdiction to consider his complaint[,]” the undersigned entered an 

order on April 21, 2016, reading, in relevant part, as follows:

This lack of clarity derives, in part, from the fact that Dickinson 

filed in his underlying federal criminal case, that is, United States v. 

Dickinson, Criminal Action No. 02-00078-CG, the very “trust” documents 

upon which he seeks to base his complaint in this case. (See Doc. 1, at 2.) 

Another complicating factor is that the “relief” Dickinson is seeking in this 

case is the dismissal of his criminal case and his immediate release from 

prison. (See id. at 2 & 4.) And, finally, if Dickinson, in fact, is attempting to 

file a civil “breach of contract” action—as opposed to a motion to vacate in 

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2255—he is required to file a motion to 

proceed without prepayment of costs and fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) & 

(2) (“Subject to subsection (b), any court of the United States may 

authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or 

proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of 

fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that 

includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is 

unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state 

the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the 

person is entitled to redress. [] A prisoner seeking to bring a civil action or 

appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding without prepayment of 

fees or security therefor, in addition to filing the affidavit filed under 

paragraph (1), shall submit a certified copy of the trust fund account 

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month 

period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of 

appeal, obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the 

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prisoner is or was confined.”). 

In light of the foregoing, the Clerk’s Office is instructed to send to 

Dickinson a form civil complaint—not a § 1983 form complaint but a 

generic civil complaint; a form motion to vacate; and a form motion to 

proceed without prepayment of costs and fees. If Dickinson, in facts, 

means to file a motion to vacate in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2255, given 

that the relief he seeks is his release from custody, cf. Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477, 481, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2369, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (“[H]abeas 

corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact 

or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release.”), 

he need return only that completed form to this Court without the 

necessity of completing the form motion to proceed without prepayment 

of costs and fees. See Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 806 (11th Cir. 

1997) (“[F]or a section 2255 proceeding, no filing fee is required[.]”); Brown 

v. United States, 2012 WL 3544727, *1 n.1 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2012) (“There is 

no filing fee for § 2255 motions.”). However, if Dickinson stakes the 

position that his action is one for “breach of contract/trust,” he need 

complete the form generic civil complaint supplied by the Clerk’s Office 

and thereon identify the specific type of case he has (for example, breach 

of contract)8 and the source of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction to 

consider his complaint. The present complaint’s general citation to Article 

III § 2 of the United States Constitution is not sufficient, see Royal American 

Management, Inc. v. WCA Waste Corp., 2016 WL 47874, *3 (Jan. 4, 2016) 

(“[T]here must be a statute granting a federal court jurisdiction under one 

of the Article III grants of subject-matter jurisdiction. The commonly used 

statutory grants of federal jurisdiction are found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 

(federal question jurisdiction) and 1332 (diversity jurisdiction).”), and 

while Dickinson additionally cites to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) (Doc. 1, at 1), 

he does not fully embrace § 1343(a)(4) (see id. (“Congress has also given 

federal district courts jurisdiction of these types of disputes in the spirit of 

28 U.S.C. section 1343(a)(4)[.]” (some emphasis supplied))), nor does he 

identify “any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights,” 

upon which he relies, see 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) (“The district courts shall 

have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be 

commenced by any person . . . [t]o recover damages or to secure equitable 

or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of 

civil rights, including the right to vote.”). Moreover, as aforesaid, if 

Dickinson completes the generic civil complaint form provided by the 

 8 “In this regard, the undersigned simply seeks to ensure that Dickinson is not 

bringing this action against Judge Granade in accordance with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)

(recognizing a cause of action against federal officials for violations of federal constitutional 

rights).” (Doc. 2, at 3 n.1, citing Nalls v. Coleman Low Federal Institution, 307 Fed.Appx. 296, 297 

(11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2009) (“The availability of a cause of action against federal officials in their 

individual capacities for violations of federal constitutional rights was established in 

Bivens[.]”).) 

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Clerk’s Office he must also complete the form motion to proceed without 

prepayment of fees and costs.

Dickinson is advised that whatever form complaint he files with 

this Court must be filed not later than May 20, 2016. If Dickinson 

completes the motion to vacate form in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 

the Clerk’s Office is instructed to close the present civil action as being 

improperly opened and file his § 2255 motion to vacate in the underlying 

criminal case, Criminal Action No. 02-0078-CG. If Dickinson completes the 

generic civil complaint supplied by the Clerk’s Office, the undersigned 

will consider this amended pleading as the operative pleading in this case. 

Compare Rosa v. Florida Dep’t of Corrections, 522 Fed.Appx. 710, 714 (11th 

Cir. Jun. 26, 2013) (“Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ‘an 

amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and becomes the 

operative pleading in the case.’” (quoting Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 

654 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2011)) with DeSisto College, Inc. v. Line, 888 

F.2d 755, 757-758 (11th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging as proper the denial as 

moot of defendant’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint 

because the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint), cert. denied, 495 

U.S. 952, 110 S.Ct. 2219, 109 L.Ed.2d 544 (1990). Any generic civil 

complaint completed by Dickinson must, as aforesaid, be 

accompanied—not later than May 20, 2016—by a completed in forma 

pauperis form which complies with the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(1) & (2).

Dickinson’s failure to comply with this order within the prescribed 

time or to notify the Court of a change in address could require the 

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute and to obey the Court’s 

order. 

(Doc. 2, at 1-4.) 

On May 18, 2016, Dickinson filed a response to the undersigned’s order and 

therein indicated that he “may have mistakenly invoked the wrong court to hear [his] 

complaint[;]” that the action he commenced is a “’private suit in equity[]’” he expects 

to be heard by a “’Court of Chancery[;]’” and that his action is not a prisoner civil rights 

action, a motion to vacate, or a civil breach of contract action. (Doc. 3, at 1 (emphasis in 

original).) 

 To clear up any misunderstanding and/or lack of clarity on My end, I 

hereby amend My initial complaint titled “Complaint for Breach of Trust” 

in good faith to reflect a “Bill in Equity,” and invoke the power of the 

“Court of Chancery” at Mobile, Alabama, 113 St. Joseph Street, Mobile, 

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Ala. 36602 to hear My equitable claim. See the Bill in Equity enclosed with 

this notice, marked as “Bill No.: “DLD-050716-BIE.”

In regards to your concerns, whether I am bringing an action 

against the trustee, Callie V.S. Granade[,] in accordance with “Bivens v. 

Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 

91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) []” or not; I have yet to entertain any 

such action to bring suit “civilly” against Granade in the “public realm.” 

Even though some of My Constitutional protected rights were restrained 

without proper jurisdiction to do so, this is not the primary issue at hand. 

I simply seek the enforcement of the private trust established between Me 

and Granade, and for a decree to be issued by you against said Callie V.S. 

Granade, “in the private,” ordering her to perform IN FULL her fiduciary 

duties as specifically instructed in the private trust. See the copy of the 

Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit enclosed with this notice 

marked as Exhibit “D,” along with other trust documents marked as 

Exhibits “A through K.”

I hereby respectfully and humbly reject and do reject you[r] 

“ORDER,” simply because if I use any “statutory or administrative rules, 

civil procedures, forms, motions complaints, etc., outside of the rules[] 

and procedures provided by a “Court of Chancery” to obtain an equitable 

remedy in the public sector, I will risk compromising the private trustee 

relationship established between Me and Granade mentioned above. 

Therefore, the amendment of My initial complaint must be considered due 

to this cause, and the enclosed Bill in Equity . . . recognized as the 

operative pleading in the case, because[] Equity regards as done that 

which ought to have been done. See 27A American Jurisprudence § 89. 

The rule also states that, (“Where separate legal and equitable courts 

remain, if an equitable claim is raised in the law court, the case will be 

transferred to the equity or chancery court . . .”) See 27A American 

Jurisprudence § 175 pg. 714.

(Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).) Dickinson’s “rejection” of the undersigned’s order, 

entered on the docket on April 21, 2016, extends not only to the instruction to “plead” 

his case on the court-provided form civil complaint but, as well, to the instruction to file

concurrent therewith “a completed in forma pauperis form which complies with the 

statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) & (2).” (Compare id. with Doc. 2, at 1-3 & 

4.) In other words, by “rejecting” the undersigned’s order, Dickinson obviously did not 

comply with the instructions contained in that order. 

Reaching beyond Dickinson’s “thumbing of his nose” for the moment, the 

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undersigned sets forth the contents of Dickinson’s attached “Bill in Equity”—the 

document Dickinson has stated, in his own words, constitutes “the operative pleading” 

in this case (Doc. 3, at 2)—as follows:

Bill in Equity

For Breach of Trust

To the Honorable William E. Cassady, as Chancellor, holding the 

Chancery Court at, 113 St. Joseph Street, Mobile, Alabama 36606

Parties

1. Plaintiff, David Lee Dickinson, is a Sovereign, living, 

breathing, flesh-and-blood man, one of the “We the People,” as a private 

Citizen of the United States under section 1 of the 14th Amendment of the 

U.S. Constitution, and do hereby appear by Special Appearance, sui juris, 

and is currently imprisoned at the Federal Correctional Complex (Low), 

FCC, c/o Post Office Box 5000, Yazoo City, Mississippi [39194], but lives 

in the Alabama Republic, and

2. Defendant, Callie V.S. Granade, is a living, breathing,

flesh-and-blood woman who lives in the Alabama Republic.

Statement of Claim

3. On or around the 30th of March 2016, A.D., the plaintiff did enter 

into a private trustee relationship with the defendant, whom which the said 

plaintiff appointed as trustee, through a special deposit and conveyed legal title 

to the court case, under Case No. 1:02-CR-00078-001, titled as JUDGMENT IN A 

CRIMINAL CASE. See copy of the attached Notice of Appointment and Special 

Deposit, marked as Exhibit “D,” the Notice of Acceptance and Conveyance 

marked as Exhibit “C” and the JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE, marked as 

Exhibit “A,” and made a part of this bill. Among the aforementioned trust 

documents which were delivered to the defendant, included the following:

a. Declaration of Private Citizen Status. See copy attached 

hereto, marked as Exhibit “B,”

b. Notice of Interest. See copy attached hereto, marked as 

Exhibit “E,”

c. Notice of Release and Rescission of Signature of Suretyship. 

See copy attached hereto, marked as Exhibit “F,”

[d.] Notice of Release and Indemnification. See copy attached 

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hereto, marked as Exhibit “G,” and

[e.] Cover Letter. See copy attached hereto, marked as Exhibit 

“I.”

4. The trust documents stated above in parts (a), (b), (c), (d), 

[and] (e) . . . of paragraph (3) were all delivered to the defendant on or 

around the 29th day of March 2016[.] . . . All these trust documents, except 

the cover letter, required a response from the defendant. But from the time 

the trust documents were first delivered, up to this day, the plaintiff has 

not received a response.

5. In the Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit, . . ., the 

defendant was demanded by the plaintiff to perform the fiduciary duties 

as follows:

A. to perform an extinguishment and a full accounting of the 

Case No. 1:02-CR-00078-001, and to settle, satisfy and discharge all debts, 

liabilities, etc., held against DAVID LEE DICKINSON; and

B. to do everything in the defendant’s power as trustee to cause 

the immediate release of the plaintiff’s physical body from imprisonment, 

and the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

6. In the Declaration of Private Citizen Status . . ., the plaintiff 

notified the defendant of his private Citizen status, and demanded the 

said defendant to show cause why the said plaintiff was not a private 

Citizen. 

7. In the Notice of Interest . . ., the plaintiff notified the 

defendant that he was a beneficiary of the Constitution of the United 

States, and the cestui que of the private business trust, created by the State 

under the name, DAVID LEE DICKINSON. The said plaintiff further 

notified the defendant that he held one hundred [] percent beneficial and 

equitable interest in the case, under Case No. 1:02-CR-00078-001, and 

demanded the defendant to show cause why the said plaintiff did not 

hold one hundred [] percent beneficial and equitable interest in Case No. 

1:02-CR-00078-001. The plaintiff further demanded the defendant to show 

cause why everything else stated in the Notice was not true.

8. In the Notice of Release and Rescission of Signature of 

Suretyship . . ., the plaintiff notified the defendant that he intended to no 

longer be held as surety for the State-created U.S. public citizen, DAVID 

LEE DICKINSON a (Private U.S. Business Trust), and released himself 

and rescinded his signature(s) consenting to be held as surety for all 

bonds that funds Case No. 1:02-CR-00078-001, and further, the defendant 

demanded the defendant to show cause why the said plaintiff was not 

released as surety.

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9. In the Notice of Release and Indemnification . . ., the plaintiff 

notified the defendant that he held harmless and indemnified the said 

defendant from all debts, liabilities, penalties, etc., that may have arisen 

from the defendant’s treatment of the said defendant as a private Citizen.

10. In the Notice of Acceptance and Conveyance . . ., the plaintiff 

notified the defendant of his acceptance of Case No. 1:02-CR-00078-001, 

and affixed his hand[]written acceptance on the JUDGMENT IN A 

CRIMINAL CASE (the trust res), and then conveyed the same as the 

“legal title” to the case[] back to the said defendant in trust[] for the 

benefit of DAVID LEE DICKINSON. Lastly, the plaintiff demanded the 

said defendant to show cause why the plaintiff did not own equitable title 

to Case No. 1:02-CR-00078-001, and why legal title to this case has not 

been conveyed to her in trust[] for the benefit of DAVID LEE 

DICKINSON. 

11. In the Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit . . ., the 

plaintiff notified the defendant of her appointment as trustee over the 

court case, under Case No. 1:02-CR-00078-001, and was also granted the 

said plaintiff’s name on special deposit in trust, for the benefit of DAVID 

LEE DICKINSON for life, and for the purpose of extinguishing all debts, 

liabilities, bonds, etc., that was held against DAVID LEE DICKINSON. 

Lastly, the plaintiff demanded the said defendant to make the payment, 

and to show cause by disclaimer why she was not the trustee.

12. The defendant has violated her fiduciary duties allocated by 

the plaintiff as instructed in the aforementioned trust documents 

described above . . . by her nonresponse and nonperformance, wherein the 

said defendant was given thirty (30) days to carry out IN FULL, and has 

withheld from the plaintiff[] his just equitable rights in the premises, 

showing wherein, with clearness and particularity.

13. The plaintiff duly notified the defendant that her failure to 

either perform as instructed in the aforemention[ed] trust documents, . . ., 

or to show cause why everything stated in the said trust documents were 

not true within the thirty day period, not only constituted the defendant’s 

tacit acceptance, admission and confession that everything stated in the 

trust documents stood as the truth, but also constituted the said 

defendant’s breach of trust.

14. In the creation of the aforementioned private trustee 

relationship established between the plaintiff and the defendant, certain 

specified duties were imposed on the defendant; and certain specified 

rights accrued to the said plaintiff, setting forth these duties, and the 

rights claimed, with definiteness.

15. The defendant has failed to respond and to perform in 

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accordance with the fiduciary duties as instructed in the aforementioned 

trust documents . . . and has tacitly accepted, admitted and confessed that 

everything stated in the trust documents are true, and that the said 

defendant is knowingly, willfully and intentionally in breach of trust.

Prayer

16. From the date the above mentioned trust documents were 

delivered to the defendant, and every day afterward, the plaintiff has not 

received a response from her, and as a consequence of the proceeding 

facts and claims, the plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief; and therefore, 

demands a judgment against the said defendant as follows:

1st. That a subpoena to answer issues against the defendant requiring 

her[] to answer this bill;

2nd. That a decree issue[] against the defendant ordering her[] to 

perform IN FULL as follows:

a. to perform an extinguishment and a full accounting of the 

Case No. 1:02-CR-00078-001, and to settle, satisfy, setoff and discharge any 

and all[] debts, fines, assessments, court costs, liens, restitutions, expenses, 

interests, claims, fees, taxes, penal sums, charges, orders, judgments, 

warrants, indictments, encumbrances, bonds, etc., that is imposed on, or 

held against[,]DAVID LEE DICKINSON regarding Case No. 

1:02-CR-00078-001;

b. to provide the plaintiff with any and all accounting 

information, stating the exact[] total amount of equitable interest the said 

plaintiff owns in Case No. 1:02-CR-00078-001; and

c. to do everything in the defendant’s power as trustee to cause 

the immediate release of the plaintiff’s physical body from imprisonment, 

at the Federal Correctional Complex (Low), FCC, c/o Post Office Box

5000, Yazoo City, Mississippi [39194], and from the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons.

So it is said. So it is done.

(Doc. 3, Exhibit 2, Bill in Equity, at 1-6 (emphasis in original).)

DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Obey the Undersigned’s Order Entered on April 21, 2016. 

Dickinson, by his own admission, “rejected” the undersigned’s order dated April 

20, 2016, and entered on April 21, 2016. (See Doc. 3, at 2.) Plaintiff’s rejection of the 

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undersigned’s order—more specifically, the instructions to file his complaint on the 

generic civil complaint form supplied by the Clerk’s Office and to accompany any such 

pleading with a motion to proceed without prepayment of costs on the form supplied 

by the Clerk’s Office (compare id. with Doc. 2, at 1-3 & 4)—is premised on his faulty and 

conclusory assumption that if he was to utilize any “[]statutory or administrative rules, 

civil procedures, forms, motions, complaints, etc., outside of the rules[] and procedures 

provided by a ‘Court of Chancery’ to obtain an equitable remedy in the public sector,” 

he would “risk compromising the private trustee relationship established between 

[him] and Granade[.]” (Doc. 3, at 2.) It is clear, however, that since the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure became effective on September 16, 1938, “federal courts have 

recognized only one form of non-criminal action: the civil action[,]” Russo v. 

Hickenlooper, 2016 WL 67568, *3 (D.Colo. Jan. 6, 2016), citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 2, and those 

rules “govern procedures in all civil actions in the United States District Courts.” Id.,

citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. In other words, “it no longer matters whether the action would 

have been considered one in equity or in law prior to 1938[,]” as the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure apply to all actions filed in the United States District Courts, including 

plaintiff’s “Bill in Equity,” and Dickinson must satisfy the requirements of those rules, 

id., contrary to his beliefs (Doc. 3, at 2). In addition to complying with the rules of 

procedure, plaintiff necessarily must comply with the Court’s instructions with respect 

to how to gain access thereto, such as by filing his complaint on a form supplied by the 

Clerk or by filing this Court’s form motion to proceed without prepayment of fees and 

costs. See Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The right of access to the 

courts is neither absolute nor unconditional. Conditions and restrictions on each 

person’s access are necessary to preserve the judicial resource for all other persons.” 

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(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 

Inasmuch as it is clear that an action may be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to 

prosecute it or if he fails to comply with any court order, Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); see also Link 

v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-1389, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 

(1962) (holding district courts have the power to sua sponte dismiss a cause of action for 

failure to prosecute); World Thrust Films, Inc. v. International Family Entertainment, Inc., 41 

F.3d 1454, 1456 (11th Cir. 1995) (“‘A district court has authority under Federal Rule[] of 

Civil Procedure 41(b) to dismiss actions for failure to comply with local rules.’”), and 

Dickinson overtly refused to comply with the contents of the undersigned’s order 

entered on April 21, 2016 (compare Doc. 3, at 2 with Doc. 2), instead thumbing his nose at 

the contents of the order, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss his 

action WITH PREJUDICE.

B. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and Analysis.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a federal court is required to conduct an initial 

screening of a prisoner complaint against a governmental entity, employee, or officer to 

determine whether the action: (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). A claim is frivolous when it 

“’lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.’” Miller, supra, 541 F.3d at 1100, quoting 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); 

see also Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir.) (finding an action frivolous when 

the district court concludes that it has “little or no chance of success,” because, based on 

the face of the complaint, the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” or the factual 

allegations are “clearly baseless,”—that is, the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either 

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in law or in fact”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 893, 114 S.Ct. 254, 126 L.Ed.2d 206 (1993); see Bilal 

v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.) (a case is frivolous when it appears the plaintiff 

has little or no chance of success), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1044, 122 S.Ct. 624, 151 L.Ed.2d 

545 (2001); Clark v. State of Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 639 (11th Cir. 

1990) (“A lawsuit is frivolous if the ‘plaintiff's realistic chances of ultimate success are 

slight.’”) (quotation omitted)). 

A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include enough factual 

matter—taken as true—to “’give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests[.]’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 

S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 

99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, the allegations 

must show plausibility. Id. at 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1966. “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . [This standard] 

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). That is, “[f]actual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and 

must be a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1966 (second brackets 

in original). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In 

determining whether a claim is stated, the factual allegations are accepted as true, 

except for conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of action’s elements. Id.;

Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). In addition to the foregoing, it 

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need be noted that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short 

and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already 

has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand 

for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of 

relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1)-(3).

When considering a pro se litigant’s allegations, the court holds them to a more 

lenient standard than those of an attorney, Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 

1263 (11th Cir. 1998), but it does not have “license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient 

pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action.” GJR Investments, Inc. v. 

County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by

Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 791, 710 (11th Cir. 2010) (relying on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 

662 (2009)). Furthermore, a pro se litigant “is subject to the relevant law and rules of 

court including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 

837 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863, 110 S.Ct. 180, 107 L.Ed.2d 135 (1989).

Given that Dickinson seeks to sue Senior United States District Judge Callie V.S. 

Granade, a judicial employee, it is clearly proper for the undersigned to screen 

plaintiff’s “Bill in Equity” in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Cf. Yarbrough v. Poole, 

2008 WL 533544, *1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2008) (making no mention of an IFP motion or 

that the prisoner had paid the filing fee and, instead, simply referencing that the matter 

was before the court on the complaint for preliminary screening in accordance with 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A).9 In this instance, the plaintiff stumbles before he can get out of the gate 

 9 Moreover, it is clear to the undersigned that had Dickinson complied with the 

order entered on April 21, 2016, this Court would have granted any properly-filed IFP motion, 

particularly since it is clear that plaintiff has continuously been in prison since the filing of 

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with respect to stating a claim for relief inasmuch as his “Bill in Equity” is bereft of the 

required “short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction[.]” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1). Plaintiff’s “Bill in Equity” contains no jurisdictional statement (Doc. 

3, Exhibit 2, Bill in Equity, at 1-6), and any argument by plaintiff that his filing of a “Bill 

in Equity” and referring to the undersigned as a “Chancellor” in a “Chancery Court” 

suffices to establish jurisdiction is categorically incorrect. Compare, e.g., Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 

(1994) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power 

authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial 

decree[.]” (internal citations omitted)) with, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 

326 U.S. 99, 105, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 1468, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945) (“The suits in equity of which 

the federal courts have had cognizance ever since 1789 constituted the body of law 

which had been transplanted to this country from the English Court of Chancery. But 

this system of equity derived its doctrines, as well as its powers, from its mode of giving 

relief. In giving federal courts cognizance of equity suits in cases of diversity 

jurisdiction, Congress never gave, nor did the federal courts ever claim, the power to 

deny substantive rights created by State law or the create substantive rights denied by 

State law. This does not mean that whatever equitable remedy is available in a State 

court must be available in a diversity suit in a federal court, or conversely, that a federal 

court may not afford an equitable remedy not available in a State court. . . . State law 

cannot define the remedies which a federal court must give simply because a federal 

court in diversity jurisdiction is available as an alternative tribunal to the State’s 

courts.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis supplied)); Waterman 

 charges in this case.

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v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43, 30 S.Ct. 10, 12, 54 L.Ed. 80 (1909) 

(“[I]nasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is derived from the 

Federal Constitution and statutes, that, in so far as controversies between citizens of 

different states arise which are within the established equity jurisdiction of the federal 

courts, which is like unto the high court of chancery in England at the time of the 

adoption of the judiciary act of 1789 . . ., the jurisdiction may be exercised, and is not 

subject to limitations or restraint by state legislation establishing courts of probate, and 

giving them jurisdiction over similar matters. This court has uniformly maintained the 

right of Federal courts of chancery to exercise original jurisdiction (the proper diversity 

of citizenship existing) in favor [of] creditors, legatees, and heirs, to establish their 

claims and have a proper execution of the trust as to them.” (emphasis supplied)); and 

Russo, supra, at *4 (where plaintiff filed a Bill in Equity and argued that his action arose 

under Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, the court noted that this clause 

of the Constitution, similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), “only 

provides that the judicial power extends to cases arising under the Constitution, federal 

laws, and treaties.”). Because Dickinson did not plead a short plain statement of the 

grounds for the Court’s jurisdiction, in this his amended pleading filed after the 

undersigned specifically advised him that it was unclear about the basis for the Court’s 

jurisdiction, see Vaughn v. Postal Employees, 2014 WL 3540575, *3 (S.D. Ala. Jul. 17, 2014) 

(“Plaintiff was given an opportunity to correct these deficiencies and was specifically 

instructed to provide additional facts in his amended complaint regarding the basis for 

his claims and for the Court’s jurisdiction.”), it is RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s Bill 

in Equity be dismissed. See Russo, supra, at *5.

In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff’s Bill in Equity is due to be dismissed with 

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prejudice as frivolous. The idea that a federal prisoner who entered a counseled guilty 

plea to serious criminal charges—carjacking and possessing a firearm during a crime of 

violence—can unilaterally establish a trust which has as its “res” the criminal judgment 

setting forth his term of imprisonment (166 months) and other consequences of 

pleading guilty (that is, restitution ordered in the amount of $14,978.97), name as trustee 

of such trust (upon her failure to act) the very judge who sentenced him following entry 

of his guilty plea, and demand she perform certain “fiduciary duties” beneficial to the 

prisoner (that is, immediately free his “human body” from prison and somehow “take 

care” of the restitution he has been ordered to pay), to only thereafter sue the sentencing 

judge in “equity” for breach of trust when she—quite naturally—does nothing 

“demanded” by the prisoner, represents not only a “indisputably meritless” legal 

theory but, as well, quintessential hubris.10 It is a truism of equity that “’he who comes 

into equity must come with clean hands[.]’” Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Lauer, 445 

F.Supp.2d 1362, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2006), quoting Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. 

Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814, 65 S.Ct. 993, 89 L.Ed. 1381 

(1945). Indeed, “[t]he unclean hands doctrine proscribes equitable relief when . . . an 

individual’s misconduct has ‘immediate and necessary relation to the equity that he 

seeks.’” Henderson v. United States, U.S. , 135 S.Ct. 1780, 1783 n.1, 191 

L.Ed.2d 874 (2015), quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 

245, 54 S.Ct. 146, 78 L.Ed. 293 (1933). Dickinson’s misconduct—that is, carjacking and 

possessing a firearm during a crime of violence—is part and parcel of the trust “res” (see 

 10 To the extent plaintiff’s focus on his “status” as a sovereign private citizen seems 

to suggest that he may also adhere to a “sovereign citizen” theory, the undersigned simply 

notes that this theory, along with other theories like “redemption,” “have been ‘flatly rejected’ 

by numerous courts as ‘frivolous, irrational [and] unintelligible.” Alexio v. Obama, 2015 WL 

9216562, *4 (D. Haw. Dec. 16, 2015), quoting United States v. Alexio, 2015 WL 4069160, *2-4 (D. 

Haw. Jul. 2, 2015).

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Doc. 3, Exhibit 2, at 18-22), and, indeed, without these convictions plaintiff would not 

have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 166 months and ordered to pay 

restitution and, therefore, would have no need to seek “equity.” Stated somewhat 

differently, a criminal judgment cannot be the “res” of a trust intended to benefit the 

very person whose misconduct resulted in imposition of the criminal judgment. 

Because plaintiff’s theory of recovery is not cognizable, viable, clean, or, for that matter, 

particularly intelligible, his amended complaint (that is, his Bill in Equity for Breach of 

Trust) is due to be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.

11

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 

“’A necessary corollary to the concept that a federal court is powerless to act 

without jurisdiction is the equally unremarkable principle that a court should inquire 

into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the 

proceedings. Indeed, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into 

subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.’” Bochese v. Town of 

 11 Presumably, Dickinson is cognizant of this Court’s consistent rejection of 

Uniform Commercial Code arguments vis-à-vis criminal judgments, see, e.g., United States v. 

Morrison, 2013 WL 3974523, *1 & 2 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2013) (collecting cases, noting that 

Morrison’s filings were baseless, frivolous, irrational and unintelligible, and specifically finding 

that Morrison’s “criminal prosecution (and accompanying criminal judgment entered against 

[him]) is not and never has been a commercial transaction subject to the Uniform Commercial 

Code.”), and, therefore, has “latched on” to the instant equitable breach of trust theory in a 

patently obvious attempt to try to “skirt” the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255(h). 

This Court should uniformly REJECT Dickinson’s action in this case and require that he follow 

the procedures set forth in the foregoing statutory sections before entertaining any arguments 

that constitute a second or successive collateral attack on his convictions and sentences, see 

United States v. Holt, 417 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Without authorization, the district 

court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition.”), particularly where, as 

here, plaintiff seeks immediate release from his confinement. Compare, e.g., Abella v. Rubino, 63 

F.3d 1063, 1066 (11th Cir. 1995) (“’[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner 

who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier 

release.’”) with Pugh v. Smith, 333 Fed.Appx. 478, 480 (11th Cir. Jun. 24, 2009) (“If the district 

court treats a prisoner’s § 1983 claim as a writ for habeas corpus relief because he challenges the 

fact or duration of his confinement and seeks an immediate release, it is without jurisdiction to 

consider it if the prisoner has previously filed a habeas petition that was dismissed with 

prejudice and has not applied to this Court for permission to file a successive application.”).

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Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 975 (11th Cir.) (quoting University of South Alabama v. American 

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 872, 126 S.Ct. 377, 

163 L.Ed.2d 164 (2005); see also Brai v. Southern Regional Medical Center, 2013 WL 4718923, 

*1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 2013) (“[T]he Court has a duty sua sponte to ensure that it has 

jurisdiction to entertain a plaintiff’s claims.”). As previously indicated, federal courts 

are courts of limited jurisdiction; therefore, “[i]n a given case, a federal district court 

must have at least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction under 

a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 

or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Baltin v. Alaron Trading 

Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 841, 

119 S.Ct. 105, 142 L.Ed.2d 84 (1998). “It is the responsibility of the plaintiff to establish 

subject matter jurisdiction, and this he must do by ‘affirmatively alleg[ing] facts 

demonstrating the existence of jurisdiction and include[ing] “a short and plain 

statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends. Fed.R.Civ.P. 

8(a).”’” Smith v. Wood, 2013 WL 3367107, *2 (N.D. Ala. Jul. 5, 2013), quoting Taylor v. 

Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994).

As indicated above, plaintiff’s amended complaint—his Bill in Equity for Breach 

of Trust—contains no statement of the grounds upon which this Court’s jurisdiction 

depends. Certainly, Dickinson does not directly cite to any federal statute that confers 

jurisdiction,12 and the facts he alleges do not support the existence of diversity 

 12 In his prayer for relief, plaintiff seeks issuance of a decree ordering Judge 

Granade to perform specific acts, including action that would cause the immediate release of his 

“physical body” from imprisonment. At best, this prayer for relief can be liberally read as a 

request by Dickinson that this Court issue what amounts to a writ of mandamus to the 

defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action 

in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency 

thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”). “However, mandamus relief is ‘an 

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jurisdiction,13 nor do they present a federal question14. Accordingly, this action need be 

dismissed because plaintiff has failed to affirmatively allege facts demonstrating the 

existence of jurisdiction—whether federal question, diversity, or jurisdiction conferred 

by specific federal statute—over his Bill in Equity.

In addition to the foregoing, dismissal for want of jurisdiction is appropriate in 

this case because plaintiff’s theory of recovery is patently frivolous. See Davis v. Cluet, 

Peabody & Co., 667 F.2d 1371, 1373 n.7 (11th Cir. 1982) (“’Dismissal for want of 

jurisdiction is appropriate only if the federal claim is frivolous or a mere matter of 

form.’” (citation omitted)). As set forth above, plaintiff’s theory of recovery is not 

cognizable because it is readily apparent that a criminal judgment cannot be the “res” of 

a trust intended to benefit the very person (plaintiff) whose misconduct resulted in 

 extraordinary remedy which should be utilized only in the clearest and most compelling of 

cases.’ Cash v. Barnhart, 327 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, a writ of mandamus is only 

appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates that: (1) he has a clear right to the relief requested; (2) 

the respondent has a clear duty to act; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” 

Hankerson v. United States, 594 Fed.Appx. 608, 609 (11th Cir. Feb. 24, 2015), citing Cash, 327 F.3d 

at 1258. As previously discussed at no small length, plaintiff has no clear right to the relief 

requested; therefore, to the extent plaintiff’s complaint can be read as containing a request for 

issuance of a writ of mandamus such request is due to be dismissed because mandamus relief is 

not appropriate. 

13 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the 

matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is 

between . . . citizens of different States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). In his amended pleading, 

plaintiff’s allegations that both he and the defendant live in Alabama sufficiently destroys 

diversity jurisdiction in this Court. In addition, he nowhere pleads an amount in controversy 

exceeding $75,000.

14 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff’s Bill in 

Equity betrays no suggestion that this action arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of 

the United States. Cf. Russo, supra, at *4 (“Plaintiff’s Bill in Equity . . . lack[s] the basic facts 

necessary to support a conclusion that this case arises under any portion of the Constitution or 

under any specific federal statute.”).

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imposition of the criminal judgment;15 therefore, this Court lacks the power to entertain 

plaintiff’s claim set forth in his amended complaint, that is, his Bill in Equity. See Hagans 

v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1378-1379, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (“[T]he 

federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction 

if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly 

insubstantial, obviously frivolous, plainly unsubstantial, or no longer open to 

discussion.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss 

this action, prior to service, for the following reasons: (1) failure to obey the 

undersigned’s order entered on April 21, 2016; (2) failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and, alternatively, as frivolous in accordance with this same 

statutory subsection; and/or (3) failure to establish that this Court has subject-matter 

jurisdiction of this matter. The dismissal of this action should be with prejudice.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in 

it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D.ALA. L.R. 72.4. The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, 

“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 

 15 Plaintiff is attempting to “force” Judge Granade to absolve him of his own 

criminal behavior, which is simply not an allegation/claim that resembles a constitutional 

violation.

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based 

on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time 

period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence 

of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if 

necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection 

must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state 

the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not 

specific.

DONE this the 1st day of June, 2016.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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