Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03564/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03564-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Board of Prison Terms
Respondent
Shearwood Fleming
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SHEARWOOD FLEMING,

Petitioner,

 v

ANTHONY KANE, 

Respondent.

 

BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS,

Real party in interest.

 /

No C 05-3564 VRW

ORDER

Petitioner Shearwood Fleming, a prisoner at the

Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California, has filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254.

Petitioner challenges a September 18, 2002 decision by the Board of

Prison Terms (merged into the Board of Parole Hearings after the

petition was filed) (“Board”) denying him parole. Doc #1. 

Respondent Anthony Kane filed an answer on March 19, 2007 opposing

the issuance of a writ (Doc #21) and petitioner filed a traverse on

May 25, 2007 (Doc #28). 

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For the reasons stated herein, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.

I

A

On March 3, 1981, petitioner pled guilty to second degree

murder in superior court in Los Angeles. He was sentenced to

fifteen years to life imprisonment with a two-year enhancement for

the use of a firearm during the commission of the crime. Appx A-I,

Ex A at 110; Doc #21, Ex 1. Petitioner disputes the extent of his

responsibility for the homicide underlying his conviction, but he

acknowledges the “appropriateness of his conviction” for second

degree murder. See Doc #17 at 2; Doc #16 at 14, fn 11. Because

petitioner was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement, the

underlying facts of the crime were never adjudicated. These facts

play an important role in petitioner’s habeas corpus proceedings,

however, as the commitment offense played a large role in the

Board’s decision to deny petitioner parole. 

Petitioner’s version of the facts is as follows: On

August 10, 1980 at approximately 11 pm, petitioner, then twenty

years old, met sixteen-year-old Joey Sherrod at a beach in Santa

Monica. Appx A-I, Ex A at 175. During this encounter, petitioner

and Sherrod had a discussion about “how the Mexicans were killing a

lot of blacks; about how they shot ‘Boo’ and ‘AJ’, and [] about the

close encounter [petitioner] had with some Mexicans 4 weeks ago.” 

Id. According to petitioner, Sherrod mentioned that he wanted to

rob “some Mexicans, * * * the same ones that shot Boo and AJ,

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because if they don’t give up any money then I blow their heads

off.” Id.

The duo, in possession of a gun, left the beach and

passed through a vacant lot on Santa Monica Avenue, where they saw

the two victims, Nazario Garcia and Samuel Trujillo, walking home. 

Doc #16 at 13. Petitioner and Sherrod stepped out of the bushes

and asked the victims for money. Appx A-I, Ex A at 175. The

victims “started laughing, and [petitioner] couldn’t comprehend

what they were saying because they were speaking spanish.” Id. 

At his initial interview by police on August 13, 1980,

petitioner stated that once the victims left, Sherrod discharged

the gun at them. Id. The gun “suddenly clicked,” misfiring, and

petitioner started “running for it.” Id. At this point,

petitioner stated that he heard the gun fire, and he “started

running back to see what happened.” Id. He saw one victim, later

identified to be Garcia, lying on the ground. Petitioner stood

over Garcia, “feeling sorry,” and then heard another “set of

shots.” Id. He saw the second victim, Trujillo, “running for his

life.” Appx A-I, Ex A at 176.

In his subsequent testimonies before the parole board,

however, petitioner changed his story and stated that he was the

one who initially held and fired the weapon. See, e g, Appx A-II

at 406 (“when they started laughing, he asked me to shoot and so I

pointed the gun up in the air and I didn’t know it had a safety

mechanism * * * a safety catch on it”); see also id at 644. After

the gun failed to discharge, petitioner testified that: “Joey then

snatched the gun from me * * * and shot Mr Garcia in the side as he

was running” (Appx A-I, Ex E at 376); Garcia was shot twice in the

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stomach as he was running (Appx A-II at 408-09); Garcia then fell

to the ground, and petitioner approached him and stood over him to

see if he had been shot while Sherrod continued shooting at

Trujillo. Petitioner “has always consistently maintained” that it

was Sherrod, not he, who shot and killed Garcia. Doc #17 at 2.

Respondent presents a different version of the crime in

which the petitioner, not Sherrod, shot at the victims as they ran

away. Doc #21 at 2. Quoting the probation officer’s report,

respondent asserts that, according to Trujillo, after shooting and

injuring Garcia, petitioner walked up to him together with Sherrod,

shot him in the stomach while standing over him and then ran away

through the vacant lot. Id; Appx A-I, Ex A at 68. Police and

rescue personnel pronounced Garcia dead at the scene of the crime. 

Appx A-I, Ex A at 68. The following day, Trujillo identified

petitioner as the shooter and four other witnesses interviewed at

the crime scene saw petitioner and Sherrod at the location and

overheard them “state they had just shot and killed the Mexican.” 

Appx A-I, Ex A at 149. Petitioner and Sherrod were arrested

separately on August 13, 1980, and each accused the other of being

the shooter who killed Garcia. Id.

After pleading guilty and receiving his sentence, 

petitioner began serving fifteen years to life on April 7, 1981. 

Appx A-I, Ex C at 300. He received his initial parole

consideration hearing on August 14, 1990, approximately nine years

into his sentence, and was denied parole. Doc #17 at 4. 

Petitioner then sought and was denied parole in 1992, 1994, 1997,

1999 and 2002. Doc #17 at 5-9.

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B

On September 18, 2002, the Board found petitioner

unsuitable for parole for a sixth time and deferred reconsideration

for four years. Appx A-I, Ex C at 320-26. The Board’s decision,

which fills six pages of transcript, found that petitioner was “not

suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger

to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison,”

citing: petitioner’s commitment offense, petitioner’s previous

record, his institutional behavior, his inconclusive psychological

report, his lack of realistic plans if paroled and letters and

other evidence submitted in opposition to parole. Id.

Presiding commissioner Jones Moore stated that

petitioner’s commitment offense was carried out in an especially

cruel and callous manner because “[t]here were multiple victims

attacked, injured and killed in the same incident” and the offense

was “carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner. And the

offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human sufferings.” Appx A-I,

Ex C at 324. In support of this finding, Moore stated that after

Garcia had fallen to the ground, petitioner “stood up over the top

of the victim and shot and killed him.” Id.

Moore also noted petitioner’s “extensive history of

criminality and misconduct,” which include arrests for possession

of a revolver, attempted robbery, possession of alcohol as a minor

and battery, a “history of unstable and tumultuous relationships

with others” and the fact that he had dropped out of high school

and developed drug and alcohol problems. Id at 324-25.

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Moore found that while incarcerated, petitioner “has not

completed necessary programming which is essential to his

adjustment” and “has not developed a marketable skill or a vocation

at this time.” Id at 321. At the hearing, Deputy Commissioner

Dennis Smith questioned petitioner about his decision to

discontinue Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous in 1999. 

Id at 301. 

Moore further noted that petitioner had received two

write-ups for misconduct since his previous parole hearing, thus

failing to demonstrate “evidence of positive change,” id at 321-22,

and had a total of thirteen CDC 115s (which are given to inmates

for misconduct) and twelve CDC 128s (cautionary write-ups) over the

course of his term of incarceration. Appx A-I, Ex C at 323. 

According to CDC documents in the record, petitioner’s CDC 115s

include a stabbing assault on another inmate, conspiracy to assault

prison staff and disobeying direct orders. Appx A-I, Ex A at 22.

Moore expressed skepticism about a somewhat optimistic

1999 psychological report prepared by CDC staff psychologist Dr

Steven Terrini because it “misstates or misquotes the facts”

regarding petitioner’s disciplinary record by incorrectly stating

that petitioner had no CDC 115s. Appx A-I, Ex C at 322. Because

of this error, the commissioners did not give much weight to Dr

Terrini’s conclusion that “[i]f released to the community

[petitioner’s] violence potential at this time is estimated to be

no more than the average citizen in the community” and that

petitioner “is competent and responsible for his behavior.” Appx

A-I, Ex B at 220-23.

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The commissioners also found that petitioner “lacks

realistic parole plans” because he “does not have a viable

residential plan * * * nor does he have acceptable employment

plans.” Appx A-I, Ex C at 322. Petitioner had testified that his

plans for parole included “work with kids and do upholstery work,

and just the writing” —— two plays by petitioner are included in

the record (Appx A-I, Ex B at 250-86) —— and possible participation

in his friend’s film-making company. Id at 311. 

Moore also noted that the Los Angeles County District

Attorney’s office and the Los Angeles Police Department had

submitted written opposition to a finding of parole suitability, id

at 322, and that a August 2002 report by “the prisoner’s counselor

wrote on his August 2002 Board report that CCI M Morton said that

the prisoner poses a moderate degree of threat if released to the

public at this time.” Id at 323.

Petitioner properly exhausted his administrative remedies

and his habeas petitions through the state system. See order dated

February 16, 2007 (Doc # 20) at 6. 

On February 2, 2005, the superior court in Los Angeles

denied petitioner’s habeas petition, finding that there was “some

evidence” that: the crime involved multiple victims and was

carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner; petitioner

lacked realistic parole plans and failed to participate

sufficiently in self-help programming; petitioner had a number of

disciplinary write-ups while incarcerated and the psychological

evaluation was inconclusive because it was based on the erroneous

belief that petitioner had a minimal disciplinary history. Appx AI, Ex J at 701-03. The superior court rejected several of the

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Board’s findings as lacking evidentiary support in the record,

specifically that: the crime was performed with an “exceptionally

callous disregard for human suffering” within the meaning of

California Code of Regulations title 15 § 2402(c)(1)(D); petitioner

had a history of “unstable or tumultuous relationships”; and

petitioner had a prior record of violence. Id at 702.

The superior court rejected petitioner’s arguments based

on his plea agreement, reasoning that (1) petitioner signed a plea

agreement that provided for an indeterminate sentence with a

maximum possible term of life in prison; (2) the Board was not a

party to the plea agreement; and (3) the Board’s mandate is to

exercise the power to grant or deny parole with the safety of the

community as its foremost consideration. Id at 704. The superior

court also rejected without discussion petitioner’s arguments based

on Penal Code § 3041, proportionality and the Board’s “failure to

comply with the mandate that parole shall normally be given,”

citing In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal 4th 1061, 1095 (2005) Id. 

Both the California Court of Appeal, id, Ex 5, and the

California Supreme Court, id, Ex 6, summarily denied habeas relief. 

On September 2, 2005, petitioner timely filed his petition in

federal court. 

II

The court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas

corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 USC § 2254(a); Rose v Hodges, 423 US 19, 21 (1975). 

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A state court’s determination is reviewed for unreasonableness, not

error. Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362 (2000); Anderson v Alameida,

397 F3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir 2005). A federal court may grant

habeas relief if the state court decision was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the [United States] Supreme Court” or

“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 USC 

2254(d). 

To determine whether a state court’s decision is contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law, this court must look to the highest state court to address the

merits of petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v

Thompson, 217 F3d 663, 669 n7 (9th Cir 2000). If state appellate

courts summarily deny a petitioner’s claim, a federal court must

“look through” the summary disposition to the last reasoned

opinion. Shackleford v Hubbard, 234 F3d 1072, 1079 n2 (9th Cir

2000) (citing Ylst v Nunnemaker, 501 US 797, 803-4 (1991)). Here,

the opinion the court must examine through AEDPA’s lens is that of

the superior court. 

California prisoners have a cognizable liberty interest

in being granted parole, as noted in the court’s order to show

cause dated July 5, 2006. Doc #11. A habeas petition from a state

prisoner challenging the denial of parole is cognizable under §

2254(d). Sass v California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F3d 1123,

1126-28 (9th Cir 2006). The Ninth Circuit recently discussed

prisoners’ liberty interest in parole in Irons v Carey, 2007 WL

2027359, *3 (July 13, 2007, ptn for reh’g denied November 6, 2007): 

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“California Penal Code section 3041 vests Irons and all other

California prisoners whose sentence provides for a possibility of

parole with a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the

receipt of a parole release date, a liberty interest that is

protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause.” 

See also Board of Pardons v Allen, 482 US 369, 381 (1987)(Montana’s

parole statute confers on state prisoners a liberty interest in

parole release that is protected under Due Process Clause of

Fourteenth Amendment); accord, Greenholtz v Inmates of Nebraska

Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 (1979); Sass, 461 F3d

at 1128; McQuillion v Duncan, 306 F3d 895, 900 (9th Cir 2002). 

A parole board, in order to satisfy due process, must

rely on “some evidence in the record” when denying a prisoner

parole. See Irons, 2007 WL 2027359 at *3. “To determine whether

the some evidence standard is met ‘does not require examination of

the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of

witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.’” Sass,

461 F3d at 1128 (quoting Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional

Institution at Walpole v Hill, 472 US 445, 454 (1984)). The “some

evidence standard is minimal” and its purpose is to ensure that

“the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the

[parole board] were without support or arbitrary.” Id at 1129. 

The evidence relied upon by the board must have “some indicia of

reliability.” McQuillion, 306 F3d at 904; Jancsek v Oregon Board

of Parole, 833 F2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir 1987). 

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Respondent urges the court not to apply the “some

evidence” standard, arguing that while the Ninth Circuit in Sass

extended the Supreme Court’s “some evidence” test to the parole

context, the Supreme Court has never actually held that a state

parole hearing must be supported by some evidence, so this standard

cannot form the basis for federal habeas review under AEDPA. Doc #

21 at 9-10. While respondent’s argument possesses a certain

abstract logic, this district court has no practical alternative

but to apply Ninth Circuit rules in habeas cases unless and until

the Supreme Court establishes new and different ones. Irons,

meanwhile, is unequivocal in articulating the applicable Supreme

Court rule in such cases: “[a]t the time that Irons’s state habeas

petition was before the state courts, the Supreme Court had clearly

established that a parole board’s decision deprives a prisoner of

due process with respect to this interest if the board’s decision

is not supported by ‘some evidence in the record.’” 2007 WL

2027359, *3. 

When applying the some evidence standard, the court must

look to the California statute codifying the factors for parole

boards to use when granting or denying parole. Id. California

Penal Code § 3041(b) (West 2005) provides that the parole panel or

board: 

shall set a release date unless it determines that

the gravity of the current convicted offense or

offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or

past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual,

and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed

at this meeting.

The implementing regulations for section 3041(b) provide the Board

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with the factors to consider in determining whether an inmate

convicted of murder is suitable for parole. See 15 Cal Code Regs

§§ 2400-11. Section 2402(a), which sets forth the criteria for

determining suitability for parole, unequivocally states that

“[r]egardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall

be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the

panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to

society if released from prison.” 

Factors tending to show “unsuitability” for parole are as

follows: 

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the 

offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner. The factors to be considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or

killed in the same or separate incidents. 

(B) The offense was carried out in a

dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an

execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated

during or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner

which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering. 

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or

very trivial in relation to the offense. 

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on

previous occasions inflicted or attempted to inflict

serious injury on a victim, particularly if the

prisoner demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at

an early age. 

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a

history of unstable or tumultuous relationships with

others. 

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has

previously sexually assaulted another in a manner

calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the

victim. 

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(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a

lengthy history of severe mental problems related to

the offense. (6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has

engaged in serious misconduct in prison or jail.

15 Cal Code of Regulations § 2402(c) (2007). 

Factors favoring a finding of “suitability” include:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have

a record of assaulting others as a juvenile or

committing crimes with a potential of personal harm

to victims. 

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has

experienced reasonably stable relationships with

others. 

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts

which tend to indicate the presence of remorse, such

as attempting to repair the damage, seeking help for

or relieving suffering of the victim, or indicating

that he understands the nature and magnitude of the

offense. 

(4) Motivation for Crime. The prisoner committed

his crime as the result of significant stress in his

life, especially if the stress has built over a long

period of time. 

(5) Battered Women Syndrome. At the time of the

commission of the crime, the prisoner suffered from

Battered Women Syndrome, as defined in section

2000(b), and it appears the criminal behavior was

the result of that victimization. 

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks

any significant history of violent crime. 

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the

probability of recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The

prisoner has made realistic plans for release or has

developed marketable skills that can be put to use

upon release. 

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional

activities indicate an enhanced ability to function

within the law upon release. 

15 Cal Code of Regulations § 2402(d) (2007). 

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III

Petitioner’s primary claim is that the Board lacked

sufficient evidence upon which it could lawfully have relied in

denying him parole. See Doc #16 at 21-22; Doc #17 at 16-46. 

Petitioner, however, has failed to meet his burden under the abovecited authorities. 

Petitioner argues that the Board’s continued reliance on

his commitment offense violates his due process rights. Doc #17 at

26-41. In Irons v Carey, the court recognized that “indefinite

detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment offense,

regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point

violate due process * * *.” 2007 WL 2027359 at *6. Sass, 461 F3d

at 1129. Petitioner’s, however, is not such a case. 

California law provides specifically for the commitment

offense to be one factor considered by the Board. See Cal Penal

Code § 3041(b) (West 2005); 15 Cal Code of Regulations § 2402(c)(1)

(2007). The California Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the

permissibility of relying on the commitment offense. In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal 4th 1061, 1095 (2005). The Ninth Circuit held

in Irons that “[the] commitment offense, standing alone, is a

sufficient basis for deeming a petitioner unsuitable where, as

here, there is some evidence to support a finding that [the crime

fell within the ambit of the standards set forth in 15 California

Code of Regulations § 2402(c)]”. 2007 WL 2027359 at *5. 

The Board found that the crime involved multiple victims,

a factor properly considered under 15 California Code of

Regulations § 2402(c)(1)(A). Appx A-I, Ex C at 324. “Some

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evidence” supports this finding: victim Trujillo identified

petitioner as the shooter and four witnesses who were at the scene

identified petitioner as a participant in the crime. Appx A-I, Ex

A at 149. Furthermore, petitioner admitted that it was he who

asked the victims for money and fired the initial shot. Appx A-I,

Ex A at 175; Appx A-II at 406, 644. 

There is also some evidence that petitioner carried out

the crime in a dispassionate and calculated manner, namely,

eyewitness testimony that petitioner stood over Garcia and shot him

while he lay injured on the ground. Id. Petitioner argues,

erroneously, that as a matter of law the Board cannot find that a

homicide in the second degree was carried out in a dispassionate

and calculated manner. Doc #16 at 17-18; Doc #17 at 30-31. This

factor is to be considered pursuant to 15 California Code of

Regulations § 2402(c)(1)(B). Because this is a considered factor,

the parole board’s finding must be upheld if it is supported by

some evidence. Furthermore, in Dannenberg, 34 Cal 4th at 1095, the

California Supreme Court recognized that the Board could properly

consider factors beyond the minimum elements of second degree

murder. See also Irons, 2007 WL 2027359 at *4. The court in

Dannenberg upheld the Board’s denial of parole that “pointed to

circumstances of the inmate’s offense suggesting viciousness beyond

the minimum elements of second degree murder * * *.” Dannenberg,

34 Cal 4th at 1095. Unquestionably, “some evidence” supports the

Board’s finding that petitioner carried out the crime in a

dispassionate and calculated manner.

Petitioner’s primary contention —— that it is

impermissible to rely solely on the commitment offense to deny

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parole —— fails because the Board’s denial did not rely solely on

the commitment offense. Furthermore, the cases that petitioner

cites in support of his argument involve prisoners who have

exhibited exemplary institutional behavior and are not analogous to

petitioner’s case. Doc #17 at 34-40. For example, in Rosenkrantz

v Marshall, 444 F Supp 2d 1063, 1073 (ND Cal 2006), cited by

petitioner at Doc #17 at 35, petitioner Rosenkrantz had no

disciplinary record while in prison and was a stellar inmate in all

respects. The same is true of the habeas petitioner in In re

Scott, 133 Cal App 4th 573, 582 (2005), also cited by petitioner. 

Doc #17 at 37. Petitioner also relies upon Irons v Warden, 358 F

Supp 2d 936 (ED Cal 2005)(Doc #17 at 39), but this case was since

reversed by Irons v Carey, 2007 WL 2027359; moreover, Irons had

exhibited model behavior in prison, yet the court upheld the

Board’s denial of parole based solely on his commitment offense. 

2007 WL 2027359 *2, *5. Petitioner’s reliance on these authorities

is therefore unavailing. The superior court’s opinion upholding

the Board’s findings regarding petitioner’s commitment offense

therefore was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

In denying parole, the Board also relied, in part, on

petitioner’s disciplinary record while incarcerated. Appx A-I, Ex

C at 31-32. Petitioner asserts that he had a “transition” period

upon entering prison and that “he has had no disciplinaries

resulting from any physical altercation within the past eighteen

(18) years.” Doc #16 at 14; Doc #17 at 26. But the Board’s

reliance on the fact that petitioner received a total of thirteen

CDC 115s and twelve CDC 128s while incarcerated, while receiving

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only one “laudatory chrono” dated January 29, 1988 constitutes

“some evidence” supporting the denial. Appx A-I, Ex C at 323; Appx

A-I, Ex A at 23. Petitioner most recently received a CDC 128 in

January 2000 for being absent from assignment, as well as a CDC 115

in November 1999 for disobeying a direct order. Appx A-I, Ex C at

322. His CDC 115s also include a stabbing assault on another

inmate, conspiracy to assault prison staff and disobeying direct

orders. Appx A-I, Ex A at 20-22. The Board is required to

consider serious institutional misconduct when deciding whether a

prisoner is suitable for parole and properly did so here. See 15

Cal Code of Regulations § 2402(c)(6).

In addition, the record supports the Board’s finding,

discussed above, that CDC staff psychologist Dr Terrini’s

psychological evaluation of petitioner’s propensity for violence if

released was inconclusive because it was based on an erroneous

premise. Appx A-I, Ex C at 322. The Board’s rejection of Dr

Terrini’s projection of petitioner’s violence potential if released

is therefore supported by some evidence in the record. 

The superior court’s ruling upholding the Board’s

findings regarding petitioner’s disciplinary record and the Terrini

report therefore was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, federal law or based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts.

The Board’s finding that petitioner has not sufficiently

participated in self-help and therapy programming, see id, Ex C at

321, is supported by “some evidence.” Petitioner admits that he

has not participated in Narcotics Anonymous or Alcoholics Anonymous

since 1999, see id at 301, despite the comment in Terrini’s 1999

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evaluation that “[t]he most significant risk factor for this man

would be continued abuse of alcohol.” See id, Ex B at 223. 

Terrini further recommended that if parole were granted, petitioner

should abstain from all alcohol and drug use, submit to monitoring

and be required to attend self-help groups such as Alcoholics

Anonymous. Id. Accordingly, petitioner’s documented failure to

participate sufficiently in self-help programming constitutes some

evidence that the Board lawfully relied on in denying parole. The

superior court’s opinion upholding the Board’s findings regarding

petitioner’s failure to participate in sufficient self-help

programming therefore was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, federal law or based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts.

Given this body of evidence supporting the Board’s denial

of parole, it is unnecessary to delve into the other factors listed

by the Board, such as petitioner’s lack of realistic parole and

employment plans. See Biggs, 334 F3d at 916 (holding that “the

district court was correct in finding that in spite of the fact

that several of the Board’s findings were unsupported, there was

some evidence supporting the Board’s decision that Biggs is not

entitled to relief at this time”); Sass, 461 F3d at 1128 (“the

relevant question [in determining whether the some evidence

standard is met] is whether there is any evidence in the record

that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary

board”). The Board, while recognizing some of petitioner’s

laudable strides toward self-improvement, ultimately concluded that

the “positive aspects of [petitioner’s] behavior don’t outweigh the

factors of unsuitability at this time.” Id, Ex C at 323-24. The

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superior court upheld that decision and this court has no basis for

disturbing the state court’s determination that the Board’s

decision meets the “some evidence” standard. 

 

IV

Petitioner also makes several legal arguments in support

of his petition. The court will address each in turn.

A

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to parole pursuant

to his plea agreement. See Doc #16 at 19-20; Doc #17 at 47-53. 

Specifically, petitioner argues that the Board has turned his

negotiated plea of second degree murder into a first degree murder

charge by continuing to deny him parole. Id. This argument is

without merit. 

Under California law, plea agreements are subject to the

ordinary rules of contract interpretation. See Buckley v Terhune,

441 F3d 688, 694-95 (9th Cir 2006); Brown v Poole, 337 F3d 1155,

1159 (9th Cir 2003). California courts are to look first to the

plain meaning of the agreement. See Cal Civil Code §§ 1638, 1644. 

Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder and the plea

agreement he struck with the government set forth a term of

punishment of fifteen years to life, with a two-year enhancement

for the use of a firearm during the commission of a crime. See

Appx A-I, Ex A at 97. Petitioner has not identified any provision

in the plea agreement or any promises made by the government

entitling him to be released at a determinate time. 

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Petitioner voluntarily entered into a plea agreement with

the government with the understanding that he might spend the rest

of his life in prison. The superior court’s determination that the

Board’s decision to deny petitioner’s parole was consistent with

its primary mandate to protect the safety of the community was

consistent with Irons and Sass and will therefore not be disturbed

by this court. 

B 

Petitioner alleges that former Governor Gray Davis had an

informal “no parole” policy for “virtually all prisoners convicted

of murder” and that the Board, in contravention of California Penal

Code § 3041's mandate that the board “shall normally set” parole,

followed this policy in his case. See Doc #17 at 53-68; Doc #16 at

24-26. Petitioner further argues that this alleged policy is

arbitrary and capricious and, as a result, violates his due process

rights, equal protection rights and his right to be free from cruel

and unusual punishment. Id. While petitioner argues this point at

length and submits a voluminous record in support of his argument,

the court is unpersuaded. 

The California Supreme Court considered a similar

contention in In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal 4th 616, 685-86 (2002) and

held that Governor Davis’s reversal of most of the Board’s

decisions to grant parole did not constitute evidence of a blanket

no-parole policy warranting reversal in a specific case where

denial was supported by a written decision detailing the factors

and evidence supporting the decision. 

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Although the Rosenkrantz decision did not directly

address petitioner’s contention that the Board itself is carrying

out a policy of denying parole across the board, it implicitly

finds the point without merit because it recognizes that the Board

recommends parole in more cases than the governor approves:

Petitioner has not presented any evidence

establishing that the Governor’s actual decisions

reversing grants of parole by the Board failed to

engage in an individualized consideration of the

factors concerning parole suitability, or that the

decisions themselves reflected or relied upon any

blanket policy of denying parole to all murderers. 

The circumstance that the Governor has reversed most

of the Board’s decisions granting parole does not

establish that he follows a blanket policy of denying

parole or that his decision in the present case was

based upon such a policy, rather than upon a

consideration of the factors and evidence discussed

in the Governor’s lengthy written decision denying

petitioner parole. Such reversals simply may indicate

that the Governor is more stringent or cautious than

the Board in evaluating the circumstances of a

particular offense and the relative risk to public

safety that may be posed by the release of a

particular individual.

29 Cal 4th at 682.

Also of relevance here, the United States Supreme Court

held in California Department of Corrections v Morales, 514 US 499

(1995), that an amendment to California’s parole statute did not

violate the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to individuals

sentenced before the amendment because of California’s use of

“particularized findings” combined with the Board’s broad

discretion under the statute. 

Petitioner effectively asks the court to overrule In re

Rosenkrantz, asserting that “an unlawful policy does in fact exist”

under which “it routinely violates due process by summarily denying

parole without meaningful review of the facts.” Doc # 17 at 61,

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63. The court declines to delve into the matters of state-wide

policy that petitioner seeks to introduce in support of his

petition because the record demonstrates that the Board conducted a

particularized review of the facts in petitioner’s case and

rendered a decision that was supported by “some evidence” as the

Constitution requires.

In the instant case, the Board made an individualized

decision, supported by not merely “some,” but ample evidence in the

record, that petitioner would constitute an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if paroled. Accordingly, the superior court did

not unreasonably apply federal law or make an unreasonable

determination of the facts in ruling against petitioner on this

issue.

C

Petitioner also argues that the Board was required to

consider the proportionality of the term he has served in

comparison to other prisoners convicted of second-degree murder. 

The court notes that this issue was adjudicated by the California

Supreme Court in In re Dannenberg, which explicitly reversed In Re

Ramirez, 94 Cal App 4th 549 (2001), upon which petitioner relies

throughout much of his brief. In Dannenberg, the court explained: 

When the time comes to evaluate the individual life

inmate’s suitability for release on parole, the BPT

is authorized —— indeed, required —— to eschew term

uniformity, based simply on similar punishment for

similar crimes, in the interest of public safety in

the particular case. Under this “hybrid” sentencing

scheme * * *, an inmate whose offense was so serious

as to warrant, at the outset, a maximum term of life

in prison, may be denied parole during whatever time

the Board deems required for “this individual” by

“consideration of the public safety.” * * *

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So long as the Board’s finding of unsuitability flows

from pertinent criteria, and is supported by “some

evidence” in the record before the Board * * *, the

overriding statutory concern for public safety in the

individual case trumps any expectancy the

indeterminate life inmate may have in a term of

comparative equality with those served by other

similar offenders.

34 Cal 4th 1061, 1076. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Dannenberg in

Sass, 461 F3d at 1127-28. Therefore, it cannot be said that the

superior court unreasonably applied federal law in relying on

Dannenberg to rule against petitioner on this issue. 

V

For the reasons stated herein, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk is directed to close file

number C 05-3564 and terminate any pending motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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