Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-16-30112/USCOURTS-ca5-16-30112-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brad Dawson
Appellant
Charlene Dawson
Appellant
RockTenn CP, L.L.C.
Appellee
RockTenn Company
Appellee
RockTenn Services, Incorporated
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-30112

BRAD DAWSON; CHARLENE DAWSON, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants 

v. 

ROCKTENN SERVICES, INCORPORATED; ROCKTENN CP, L.L.C.; 

ROCKTENN COMPANY, 

 Defendants - Appellees 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana 

USDC No. 5:13-CV-3299

Before KING, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff–Appellant Brad Dawson worked as a delivery truck driver and 

was injured while making a sulfuric acid delivery to a paper mill owned and 

operated by Defendants–Appellees. Dawson and his wife, Plaintiff–Appellant 

Charlene Dawson, sued Defendants–Appellees, asserting negligence. The 

magistrate judge, to whom this matter was referred by consent, granted 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 27, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2 

summary judgment in favor of Defendants–Appellees. For the following 

reasons, we AFFIRM. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Defendants–Appellees Rock-Tenn Services, Inc., Rock-Tenn CP, L.L.C., 

and Rock-Tenn Co. (collectively, Rock-Tenn) own and operate a paper mill in 

Hodge, Louisiana. The mill requires large amounts of sulfuric acid, and RockTenn contracted with Martin Transport to deliver sulfuric acid to the mill twice 

a day from a third-party. Plaintiff–Appellant Brad Dawson has many years of 

experience delivering hazardous cargo and was hired by Martin Transport as 

a truck driver around February 2013. In the months following his hire, 

Dawson delivered sulfuric acid to the mill at least daily, sometimes twice daily, 

without incident. 

Under Rock-Tenn’s operating procedures, the first step in the sulfuric 

acid delivery process entails the driver donning safety gear, including a hard 

hat, face shield, goggles, rubber gloves, rubber boots, and a full rubber suit. 

The driver next ensures that all hoses are “free from defects and void of other 

material.” If the hoses pass the driver’s inspection, the driver connects one of 

the hoses—an air hose—to his tanker-trailer to build up pressure in the tank. 

The driver then connects another hose—the delivery hose—to the tankertrailer. Once the driver opens the valves on the tanker and the mill’s vessel, 

the acid flows from the tanker into the mill’s vessel through the delivery hose. 

Each offloading (involving roughly 2,800 to 3,000 gallons of acid) takes about 

an hour. 

When the tanker-trailer is empty, a pressure gauge on the tanker reads 

zero, and the delivery hose begins to shake, indicating the offload is complete. 

The valves on the tanker and the mill’s vessel are then closed, and a valve on 

a pressure-release line is opened to release any pressurized sulfuric acid 

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remaining in the delivery hose.1 Any remaining pressure in the delivery line 

is then bled into an underground, plant-wide drainage system roughly 30 to 40 

feet from the tanker-trailer. The process usually takes about 10 to 15 seconds. 

The drainage system is covered by a grate, which impedes the driver’s ability 

to see whether any pressurized sulfuric acid has actually been bled from the 

delivery hose. 

On June 5, 2013, Jerry Brown, a trainee employed by Martin Transport, 

accompanied Dawson on his sulfuric acid delivery to Rock-Tenn’s mill. Dawson 

and Brown made their first delivery to Rock-Tenn’s mill without incident. On 

their second delivery to the mill, after the tanker was empty and the valves on 

the tanker and the mill’s vessel were closed, Dawson instructed Brown to open 

the valve on the pressure-release line. Brown opened the valve and gave 

Dawson a thumbs up after the valve had been turned. Dawson then waited 30 

seconds before releasing one of the locks connecting the delivery hose to the 

tanker-trailer. As he did so, his safety shield was blown off, and he was 

sprayed with pressurized sulfuric acid on his face and head. Brown ran to his 

assistance and used a nearby hose to wash Dawson.2 Dawson was rendered 

disabled as a result of his injuries. 

Two days after the accident, Joe Williams, a Martin Transport employee, 

inspected the tanker-trailer involved in the accident and found glass in the 

tanker, possibly from a bottle used to sample the acid after loading, and a 

broken spring in an internal valve of the tanker. After the inspection, Williams 

requested that a pressure gauge used to measure pressure inside the tank be 

replaced, probably because it “had a blurred sight glass,” which made it 

 

1 The pressure-release line (and the delivery hose to which it connects) is owned and 

supplied by Rock-Tenn.

2 Brown was apparently unable to get Dawson to the safety shower because Dawson 

and the shower were separated by a four or five foot tall construction fence. 

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difficult to see the internal needle’s operation. In his deposition, Williams 

testified that the faulty spring in the internal valve would have had “[v]ery 

little” effect on the functionality of the internal valve, and a malfunctioning 

PSI gauge would only affect the driver’s ability to tell when the tanker was 

void of pressure “some, [but] not a whole lot.” He also testified that he did not 

believe that the glass or broken spring had anything to do with the accident. 

Based largely, if not wholly, on Williams’s inspection, Steven Nattin, a 

Martin Transport supervisor, prepared an incident investigation report dated 

June 10, 2013, and an on-the-job injury investigation report dated June 11, 

2013. These reports concluded essentially the same thing as Williams’s 

inspection: The “[t]railer internal valve had a broken spring & the trailer had 

a sample bottle in it. This resulted in the internal & external valve not being 

able to seal off completely, allowing pressure to build in hose after initial bleed 

off.” Similarly to Williams, Nattin testified in his deposition that the internal 

valve would have operated even with the broken spring, but that he 

nonetheless identified the spring and bottle as the cause of the accident 

because “all [he] had to go on was [Martin Transport’s] findings of the tank 

inspection.” 

Rock-Tenn also conducted an investigation of the accident, which 

consisted of “[b]asically going to the site and talking through [with the Martin 

Transport personnel present] what they had learned by talking to Mr. Dawson 

at the emergency room and [to Brown].” The investigation lasted a couple of 

hours and determined that the accident was caused by “a timing issue as far 

as opening or closing the vent whenever Mr. Dawson removed the hose from 

the truck.” Rock-Tenn did not inspect the pressure-release line as part of its 

investigation. 

In the weeks following the accident, Martin Transport continued to make 

daily sulfuric acid deliveries to the mill without incident. However, on June 

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27, 2013, Thomas Kelly, another Martin Transport driver, was involved in a 

similar accident. An investigation concluded that Kelly’s accident was caused 

by a plugged pressure-release line, and the same day as Kelly’s accident, RockTenn issued a work order instructing that the pressure-release line be 

“unchoke[d] or change[d] out.” The pressure-release line was subsequently 

replaced and discarded. At his deposition, Nattin testified that, in light of 

Kelly’s accident, he believed Dawson’s accident “had nothing to do on our 

[Martin Transport’s] end.” 

On December 30, 2013, Dawson and his wife, Charlene (together, 

Plaintiffs), filed the instant suit, alleging Rock-Tenn’s negligence caused their 

damages. The parties consented to trial before a magistrate judge. On May 

13, 2015, Rock-Tenn filed a motion for complete summary judgment, which the 

magistrate judge granted.3 The magistrate judge found that Plaintiffs had 

failed to show that Rock-Tenn “knew or should have known of any problem 

(assuming there was one) with the pressure release hose or valve,” as required 

for liability by section 2317.1 of the Louisiana Civil Code.4 The magistrate 

judge concluded that, in light of the fact that the deliveries occurred daily, 

sometimes twice daily, without incident for years before Dawson’s June 5th 

accident, “[t]here is simply no evidence of any problems or warning signs prior 

to Dawson’s accident” that would have provided Rock-Tenn with the requisite

actual or constructive knowledge. The magistrate judge also found that the 

 

3 In that same order, the magistrate judge denied Plaintiffs’ March 18, 2015, motion 

for partial summary judgment. This denial is not directly at issue in this appeal. 

4 Article 2317.1 provides as follows: 

The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage occasioned by its 

ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of 

reasonable care, should have known of the ruin, vice, or defect which caused 

the damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of 

reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nothing 

in this Article shall preclude the court from the application of the doctrine of 

res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case.

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doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the case because “Rock-Tenn did 

not have exclusive control over the offload system,” as delivery drivers, such as 

Dawson, “had access to and used the offload system . . . multiple times per 

day,” and “Rock-Tenn’s negligence [wa]s not the only reasonable conclusion as 

to the cause of the accident.” Following the denial of their motion for 

reconsideration, Plaintiffs timely appealed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

When, as here, the parties consent to a magistrate judge’s disposition of 

a motion for summary judgment, we “review the [magistrate judge’s] grant of 

summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the magistrate 

judge.” Henley v. Edlemon, 297 F.3d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 2002). Summary 

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists ‘if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.’” Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347, 350 

(5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986)). We “construe[] ‘all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.’” McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010)). 

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER

 Plaintiffs assert that the magistrate judge committed several reversible 

errors in granting Rock-Tenn’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, 

they assert the magistrate judge erred in (1) concluding that Plaintiffs had not 

shown Rock–Tenn’s constructive knowledge of a clog in the pressure-release 

line, as required by article 2317.1 of the Louisiana Civil Code; (2) declining to 

apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; (3) refusing to allow them to supplement 

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their opposition to Rock-Tenn’s motion; and (4) failing to address their “faulty 

design and procedure claim.” We address each assertion in turn. 

A. Constructive Knowledge 

Plaintiffs assert that Dawson’s June 5th accident was caused by a clog 

in the pressure-release line. According to Plaintiffs, this clog constituted a 

defect within the meaning of article 2317.1 of the Louisiana Civil Code, and 

Rock-Tenn had constructive knowledge of that defect (i.e., they should have 

known of its existence in the exercise of reasonable care). Specifically, 

Plaintiffs assert that, if Rock-Tenn had conducted reasonable inspection and 

maintenance of the pressure-release line, it would have discovered the alleged 

clog in the line. The magistrate judge, assuming the alleged clog in the 

pressure-release line constituted a defect, concluded that Plaintiffs failed to 

present any evidence that Rock-Tenn had constructive knowledge of that 

alleged defect. We agree with the magistrate judge. 

The parties accept that article 2317.1 of the Louisiana Civil Code governs 

liability in this case. Accordingly, we begin our analysis with the text of article 

2317.1, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he owner or custodian of a 

thing is answerable for damage occasioned by its . . . defect, only upon a 

showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known 

of the . . . defect which caused the damage.” La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2317.1. 

As the plain text of article 2317.1 makes clear, the question of whether a 

custodian or owner of a thing has constructive knowledge of a defect in that

thing is inextricably linked with the exercise of reasonable care. See Walters 

v. City of West Monroe, 162 So. 3d 419, 424 (La. Ct. App. 2015). 

Louisiana courts have traditionally analyzed the exercise of reasonable 

care as consisting of two separate components. See Myers v. Dronet, 801 So. 2d 

1097, 1108 (La. Ct. App. 2001); see also, e.g., Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 

So. 2d 493, 497 (La. 1982). The first component requires the owner or 

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custodian to take reasonable steps to discover defects in the thing that create 

an unreasonable risk of harm. See Myers, 801 So.2d at 1108; see also, e.g., 

Kent, 418 So. 2d at 497. The second component requires the owner or custodian

to take reasonable steps to protect against injurious consequences resulting 

from defects in the thing that create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Myers, 

801 So. 2d at 1108; see also, e.g., Kent, 418 So.2d at 497. 

When an owner or custodian of a thing fails to exercise reasonable care 

to discover a defect in that thing, Louisiana law imputes the owner or 

custodian with knowledge of the defect if the defect is of such a character or 

has existed for such a period of time that a reasonable custodian or owner 

would have discovered it. See, e.g., Dufrene v. Gautreau Family, LLC, 980 So. 

2d 68, 80 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing constructive knowledge requires 

party to discover “apparent” defects and those that have been shown to exist 

for “a long period of time”). The obligation that arises from this constructive 

knowledge is the same as that which arises from actual knowledge—the owner 

or custodian must take reasonable steps to protect against the injurious 

consequences resulting from the defect. See Myers, 801 So.2d at 1108; see also, 

e.g., Kent, 418 So.2d at 497. Thus, an owner or custodian of a thing cannot 

avoid liability under article 2317.1 by merely claiming ignorance of the 

existence of a defect in that thing if, in the exercise of reasonable care, the 

defect should have been discovered. See, e.g., Crooks v. Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n, 97 

So. 3d 671, 678–79 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (rendering judgment for plaintiff who 

demonstrated that, had the defendant “exercised reasonable care, i.e. 

inspect[ed] the sofa beds in use in its facility, it would have discovered the 

defect”). Conversely, an owner or custodian of a thing is not liable under article 

2317.1 if the type of inspection that a reasonable owner or custodian would 

have undertaken under the circumstances would not have revealed the alleged 

defect in that thing. See, e.g., Bush v. XYZ Ins. Co., 880 So. 2d 953, 956 (La. 

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Ct. App. 2004) (finding defendant was not liable under article 2317.1 where 

defendant would have been required to hire a metallurgist to discover defect). 

Here, Plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence that Rock-Tenn 

failed to exercise reasonable care in its inspection and maintenance of the 

pressure-release line. Rock-Tenn was not the insurer of the pressure-release 

line, and its obligation to undertake further inspection and maintenance of the 

line depended on the existence of sufficient facts which would have caused a 

reasonable person to do so. See, e.g., Monson v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 

955 So. 2d 758, 761 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing article 2317.1 does not 

make an owner of a thing “the insurer of [its] safety”). Plaintiffs have not

pointed this court (or the magistrate judge) to any facts which would have 

caused a reasonable person in Rock-Tenn’s position to conduct further 

inspection or maintenance of the pressure-release line. Under Rock-Tenn’s 

operating procedures, Martin Transport’s drivers were required to, and 

apparently did, check that the pressure-release line was “free from defects and 

void of other materials” prior to each delivery.5 Martin Transport’s drivers 

delivered acid to the mill at least daily, often twice daily, without ever

apparently notifying Rock-Tenn of any defect in the pressure-release line. In 

the absence of any countervailing evidence to suggest that a reasonable person 

in Rock-Tenn’s position would have undertaken further inspection or 

maintenance of the pressure-release line, there is no basis for imputing RockTenn with constructive knowledge of an alleged defect in that line.6 

 

5 Plaintiffs do not argue, much less cite any authority for the proposition, that RockTenn’s duty to maintain or inspect the pressure-release line was non-delegable. 6 In apparent recognition of the absence of countervailing evidence, Plaintiffs argue 

that it would violate their due process rights to affirm the magistrate judge’s grant of 

summary judgment on the basis that they have not produced sufficient summary judgment 

evidence on the issue of reasonable care because they were not provided any notice that issue 

was before the magistrate judge. This argument, however, is relegated to a single footnote 

and consequently has been waived. See Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of Tex., Inc. v. Chesapeake 

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Even assuming Plaintiffs had presented countervailing evidence to 

suggest that the exercise of reasonable care required Rock-Tenn to conduct

further inspection and maintenance of the pressure-release line, Plaintiffs 

have failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that the alleged clog was of 

such a character or existed for such a period of time that it would have been 

detected by reasonable inspection and maintenance. The pressure-release line 

was apparently unclogged hours prior to Dawson’s June 5th accident and 

apparently unclogged hours after that accident, when deliveries were made to 

the mill without incident. Moreover, Dawson was required to, and apparently 

did, check that the pressure-release line was “free from defects and void of 

other materials” immediately prior to his June 5th accident. These facts 

suggest that, if a clog did, in fact, cause Dawson’s accident, the clog developed 

in the course of mere minutes or hours. Plaintiffs do not dispute this conclusion 

and offer no explanation—much less evidence—for how a reasonable 

inspection or maintenance routine would have detected such a transitory clog. 

Indeed, Plaintiffs did not offer any evidence as to what a reasonable inspection 

or maintenance routine would have entailed. 

After this matter was raised at oral argument, Plaintiffs filed a letter 

brief citing the deposition testimony of Rock-Tenn’s expert, John Z. Wlascinski, 

as evidence that, had Rock-Tenn performed reasonable inspection and

maintenance of the pressure-release line, Rock-Tenn would have discovered 

the alleged clog in the pressure-release line. Yet that testimony was not cited 

 

Energy Corp., 810 F.3d 335, 339 n.4 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Arguments subordinated in a footnote 

are ‘insufficiently addressed in the body of the brief,’ and thus are waived.” (quoting Bridas 

S.A.P.I.C. v. Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 356 n.7 (5th Cir. 2003))). Regardless, Plaintiffs’ argument 

is meritless. As demonstrated supra, the issue of reasonable care and constructive knowledge 

are inextricably intertwined, and Rock-Tenn’s motion for summary judgment put Plaintiffs 

on sufficient notice of the need to address the issue of reasonable care by expressly pointing 

out the absence of evidence that Rock-Tenn breached its duty to exercise reasonable care and 

by discussing article 2317.1’s requirement of constructive knowledge. 

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in Plaintiffs’ opposition to Rock-Tenn’s motion for summary judgment. In fact, 

that testimony appears in the record as an appendix to an opposition to a 

motion in limine filed more than two months after Plaintiffs filed their

opposition to Rock-Tenn’s motion for summary judgment. Thus, it cannot 

furnish a basis for reversing the magistrate judge’s grant of summary 

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring a party who asserts that a 

fact is genuinely disputed to support the assertion by “citing to particular parts 

of materials in the record”); see also, e.g., Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 

405 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that evidence that was not referred to in nonmovant’s opposition to summary judgment was not properly before the district 

court on summary judgment and would not be considered on appeal).7 

In their brief, Plaintiffs discuss at length several cases which they assert 

illustrate the magistrate judge’s error in granting summary judgment.8 But 

 

7 Plaintiffs did cite Wlascinski’s deposition testimony in their motion for 

reconsideration, and the magistrate judge appears to have considered his testimony before 

denying that motion. However, Plaintiffs do not separately address the denial of their motion 

for reconsideration in their brief. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have waived any argument that the

denial of that motion was improper in light of Wlascinski’s deposition testimony. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); see also, e.g., Nat’l Bus. Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 671 

F.3d 526, 533 (5th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that a party waives an issue by failing “to 

meaningfully address it in its briefing”). Regardless, the outcome would be the same if 

Wlascinski’s deposition testimony were considered. In his deposition, Wlascinski testified 

that Dawson’s June 5th accident would not have been prevented by routine inspection and 

maintenance, but conceded that, if the accident was, in fact, caused by a clog in the pressurerelease line, it may have been prevented by such inspection and maintenance. Because 

Wlascinski’s deposition testimony was admittedly not based on “any studies, literature, 

learned treatises, [or] anything of that nature” and, in any event, did not take the possibility 

of detection of the alleged clog in the pressure-release line out of the realm of mere 

speculation, it could not defeat Rock-Tenn’s motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Brown 

v. City of Hous., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable 

inferences, and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary 

judgment.”) 8 See Matthews v. Red River Entm’t of Shreveport, LLC, No. 12-1188, 2013 WL 

1932847 (W.D. La. May 8, 2013); Robert v. Turner Specialty Servs., LLC, 182 So. 3d 1069 (La. 

Ct. App. 2015); Powell v. Chabanais Concrete Pumping, Inc., 82 So. 3d 548 (La. Ct. App. 

2011). 

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those cases do not support Plaintiffs’ position. Instead, they demonstrate the 

type of evidence Plaintiffs could have presented, but failed to present, to avoid 

summary judgment.9 

B. Res Ipsa Loquitur 

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine “is a rule of circumstantial evidence that 

infers negligence on the part of defendants.” Lawson v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales 

of Am., Inc., 938 So. 2d 35, 44 (La. 2006) (quoting Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the 

Lake Reg’l Med. Ctr., 564 So. 2d 654, 660 (La. 1989)). Three criteria must be 

satisfied to invoke the doctrine: “(1) the injury is of the kind which does not 

ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence on someone’s part; (2) the evidence 

sufficiently eliminates other more probable causes of the injury, such as the 

conduct of the plaintiff or of a third person; and (3) the alleged negligence of 

the defendant must be within the scope of the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.” 

 

9 Specifically, in Powell, the plaintiff demonstrated the defendant’s constructive 

knowledge by presenting expert testimony that the defect in the thing at issue was a known 

wear item that would fail if not replaced and that the item’s wear could have been confirmed 

by mere visual inspection. 82 So. 3d at 557–58. Here, Plaintiffs have not pointed this court 

(or the magistrate judge) to any evidence demonstrating that the alleged clog in the pressurerelease line was caused by wear in the pressure-release line or that the alleged clog could 

have been detected by mere visual inspection. In fact, the record is devoid of any evidence 

regarding the age or lifespan of the pressure-release line at issue. Therefore, unlike Powell,

there is no evidentiary basis to conclude that the pressure-release line warranted inspection 

and maintenance beyond that conducted by Martin Transport’s drivers prior to delivery. In 

Robert, the plaintiffs demonstrated the defendant’s constructive knowledge by presenting 

evidence that the defendant was requested to check its equipment (and apparently evidence 

that the defect in its equipment should have been found on inspection). 182 So. 3d at 1071, 

1074–75. Here, Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence of complaints or issues with the 

pressure-release line prior to Dawson’s June 5th accident (or, as demonstrated supra, that 

the alleged clog in the pressure-release line could have been found on inspection). Finally, in 

Matthews, the plaintiff demonstrated the defendant’s constructive knowledge by introducing 

evidence that the defendant failed to conduct an inspection for the specific defect at issue in

compliance with the manufacturer’s recommendation. 2013 WL 1932847, at *2–5. Plaintiffs 

have offered no evidence that the manufacturer of the pressure-release line in this case (or, 

for that matter, any manufacturer of any pressure-release line) recommended inspection or 

maintenance, let alone inspection or maintenance beyond that provided by Martin 

Transport’s drivers before delivery. 

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Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 966 So. 2d 36, 44 (La. 

2007); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D (Am. Law Inst. 1965) 

(recognizing the same three criteria for the application of the doctrine of res 

ipsa loquitur). 

A plaintiff usually satisfies the res ipsa loquitur criteria by showing that 

the instrumentality that caused the plaintiff’s injury, or all reasonably 

probable causes of the plaintiff’s injury, were under the exclusive control of the 

defendant. See Cangelosi, 564 So. 2d at 666; see also Restatement (Second) of 

Torts § 328D cmt. g. However, such a showing is not necessary for the 

application of res ipsa loquitur. See Cangelosi, 564 So. 2d at 666; see also 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D cmt. g. Instead, the essential question 

is “whether the probable cause [of the accident] is one which the defendant was 

under a duty to the plaintiff to anticipate or guard against.” Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 328D cmt. g; see also Spott v. Otis Elevator Co., 601 So. 2d 

1355, 1362 (La. 1992) (recognizing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies 

when “the circumstances are such that the only reasonable and fair conclusion 

is that the accident was due to a breach of duty on defendant’s part”). In the 

context of article 2317.1, this means that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 

cannot be used to infer negligence on the part of an owner or custodian of a 

thing where it is at least equally probable that the defect in that thing was not 

of such a character or had not existed for such a period of time to allow the 

owner or custodian to discover it in the exercise of reasonable care (i.e., where 

the owner or custodian lacks constructive knowledge of the defect). See, e.g., 

Broussard v. Voorhies, 970 So. 2d 1038, 1045 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding 

that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “did not apply to establish the required proof 

of constructive knowledge”); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D cmt. 

g, illus. 7. 

Here, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that all reasonably probable 

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causes of Dawson’s June 5th accident were under Rock-Tenn’s exclusive 

control. Specifically, the evidence does not sufficiently eliminate either 

Dawson’s or Brown’s conduct as a cause of the June 5th accident. Moreover, 

even if we agreed with Plaintiffs that the most probable cause of Dawson’s 

June 5th accident was a clog in the pressure-release line, it is at least equally 

probable that the clog developed in so short a period of time before Dawson’s 

accident that Rock-Tenn had no reasonable opportunity to discover and correct

it. As the magistrate judge appropriately recognized, “[t]here was evidence 

from which a reasonable person could find that there was miscommunication 

between Dawson and Brown, or that Brown did not properly open the valve, or 

that the line did become clogged but with no signs or advance warning that 

would render Rock-Tenn at fault.” The magistrate judge, therefore, correctly

concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not be used to infer 

negligence on Rock-Tenn’s part. 

C. Leave to Supplement 

Plaintiffs assert that the magistrate judge abused its discretion in 

denying them leave to supplement their opposition to Rock-Tenn’s motion for 

summary judgment with the deposition of Rock-Tenn’s expert, Wlascinski. 

Plaintiffs, however, never sought leave to supplement their opposition. 

Rather, they sought leave to supplement their own motion for partial summary 

judgment, and as discussed supra, filed Wlascinski’s deposition transcript in 

connection with their opposition to a subsequent motion in limine. Because 

Plaintiffs never sought leave to supplement their opposition (as they contend), 

the magistrate judge clearly acted within his discretion in not granting them 

leave.10 

 

10 Plaintiffs do not address whether the court can or should treat their request for 

leave to supplement their own motion for partial summary judgment as a request for leave 

to supplement their opposition to Rock-Tenn’s motion for summary judgment. Consequently, 

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D. Faulty Design and Procedure Claim 

Plaintiffs assert that, even if the magistrate judge’s rulings on Plaintiffs’ 

“[a]rticle 2317.1 claims and [their] res ipsa loquitur claims” were correct, the 

magistrate judge erred in failing to address Plaintiffs’ “faulty design and 

procedure claim.” That was a “freestanding claim,” Plaintiffs assert, to which 

“the notice requirements of [a]rticle 2317.1 are not applicable.” While 

conceding that their opposition to Rock-Tenn’s motion for summary judgment 

did not address the “faulty design and procedure claim,” Plaintiffs assert that 

they cannot be faulted for not doing so because Rock-Tenn did not seek 

summary judgment on that specific claim, as required by Federal Rule of Civil 

P. 56(a). 

Rock-Tenn moved for complete summary judgment. Thus, contrary to 

Plaintiffs’ argument, Rock-Tenn adequately identified “each claim” upon which 

it was seeking summary judgment (i.e., the entire case). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment (recognizing that the 

“each claim” language upon which Plaintiffs rely was added to make clear that 

partial summary judgment could be sought “as to a claim . . . or part of a 

claim”). Moreover, Plaintiffs’ argument ignores the fact that their complaint 

asserted a single claim of negligence, and Rock-Tenn’s motion for summary 

judgment addressed each of the alleged acts of negligence asserted in Plaintiffs’ 

amended complaint. Consequently, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any 

 

the issue has been waived. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); see also, e.g., Nat’l Bus. Forms & 

Printing, 671 F.3d at 533. Regardless, any error in the magistrate judge’s handling of

Wlascinski’s deposition was harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; see also Ayers v. Peterson, 130 

F. App’x 666, 669–70 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding that any error in denying leave to 

supplement appendixes to opposition to motion for summary judgment was harmless). As 

discussed supra, Wlascinski’s deposition testimony would not have precluded summary 

judgment, and therefore Plaintiffs’ substantial rights were not affected by the magistrate 

judge’s handling of that testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; Ayers, 130 F. App’x at 669–70. 

 Case: 16-30112 Document: 00513812886 Page: 15 Date Filed: 12/27/2016
No. 16-30112

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reason why their opposition did not articulate, as they were required to do, the 

manner in which their faulty design and procedure evidence supported their 

sole negligence claim. See, e.g., Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th 

Cir. 2014) (recognizing non-movant’s duty to articulate the manner in which 

evidence supports their claim). The magistrate judge, therefore, did not err in 

failing to address Plaintiffs’ “faulty design and procedure claim.”11 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the magistrate judge’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Rock-Tenn. 

 

11 Although Plaintiffs do make reference in reply to the fact that they briefed their 

“faulty design and procedure claim” in their motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs 

do not specifically address whether the argument and evidence provided in support of their 

motion for partial summary judgment can substitute for their opposition to Rock-Tenn’s 

subsequent motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the issue has been waived. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); see also, e.g., Nat’l Bus. Forms & Printing, 671 F.3d at 533. 

 Case: 16-30112 Document: 00513812886 Page: 16 Date Filed: 12/27/2016