Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06244/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06244-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bobby Lee Dean
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

JHnitl'lt l§tah·s Qilntrt nf (-~Jlpl'als 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE Of' THE CLERK 

C404 UNITEO STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER. COLORADO 80294 

ROBERT 1.. HOECKER 

<:LC:IUt July 31, 1990 

TO All RECIPIENTS OF THE CA..DTIONED OPINION 

RE: 89-6244 USA v. Dean 

(Lower docket: CR-89-60-R) 

Filed July 17, 1990, by Judge McKay 

Enclosed is Judge Barrett's 3Illended dissent ~.;hich should be 

substituted for the dissent contained in the opinion filed July 17, 

1990. 

Enclosure 

Rlll:oac 

Sincerely 

a111~~ By atrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

TELEPHONE 

1303J 644·3157 

!FTSI 564·3157 

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 1 
No. 89-6244, United States of America v. Bobby Lee Dean 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I respectfully dissent. 

The majority opinion improperly discredits the district 

court's understanding, interpretation, and application o f the 

Sentencing Guidelines. I would affirm the district court's upward 

departure in its entirety. 

An upward departure i s appropriate under U.S.S.G. § 4Al.3, 

p.s. "when the criminal history category significantl y underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or 

the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes.'' In 

United States v. Keys, 893 F.2d 983 (lOth Cir. 1990), we held that 

a prison disciplinary record may, in appropriate situations, be a 

proper basis for an upward departure under § 4A1.3. See also 

United States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300, 1306 (5th Cir. 1990) 

("Moreover, this court has repeatedly held that an upward 

departure . . . because a criminal history category does not 

adequately reflect a defendant's past criminal history is not 

improper. . Indeed, the gui delines themselves contemplate 

that a departure may be warranted for precise l y that reason. See 

u.s.s.G. s 4Al.J.")· 

Departure is also permissible when "[t]he court finds that 

there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, 

or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 

Sentencing Commission in . formulating the guidelines. . . " 18 

u.s.c. § 3553(b). "Circumstances that may warrant departure from 

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 2 
the guidelines pursuant to this provision cannot, by their very 

nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance. The 

controlling decision as to whether and to what extent departure is 

warranted can only be made by the court at the time of sentencing." 

U.S.S.G. § SK2.0, p.s. (emphasis supplied). 

Although the guidelines were enacted to eliminate the 

uncertainties and disparities in the former sentencing system in 

which judges had great discretion, Congress still envisioned that 

the guidelines would leave considerable discretion in the hands of 

the sentencing judge. United States v. White, 893 F.2d 277, 278 

(lOth Ci r. 1990). Furthermore, "(w]hen a defendant is a l ready in 

the highest Criminal History Category of VI. . . , there is no 

Guideline procedure a judge can reference to help determine a 

proper degree of departure . . • I [and] the question of degree of 

departure is solely one of reasonableness." United States v. 

Schmude, ( 7th Cir. 1990) (1990 WESTLAW, 39474 at pp. 24-25 ) . A 

decision based on reasonableness is afforded a deferential standard 

of review recogni zing that sentencing judges should be given 

considerable leeway in determining the degree of departure. Id. a t 

25. Furthermore, "at this early stage in the development of the 

Guidelines, we should not lightly overturn determinations o f the 

appropriate degree of departure." United States v. White, supra, at 

p. 270. 

The majority reverses the district court's upward departure, 

holding that the district court erred in (a) double counting the 

current offense of unlawful possession of a weapon as a basis for 

its upward departure, and (b) failing to explain the reasons for 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 3 
the magnitude of the deviation from the guidelines. The majority 

finally holds that the district court's upward departure from 18-

24 months to 48 months was unreasonable. 

In sentencing Dean the court observed, inter alia: 

I don't need to go over the fact that you have a 

horrendous record. And the thing that concerns me the 

most is the fact that much of this record involves a 

record of violence. 

Assault with intent to kill, first degree rape, 

robbery with a dangerous weapon, possession of a 

firearm, robbery with a firearm. And then, now, you're 

found again in possession of a weapon. 

I just don't think that the 

consider the facts of your record 

weapons and the fact that in spite 

you had a weapon, a stolen weapon. 

guidelines adequately 

of violence and use of 

of that, once again , 

So, I think this is grounds for departure. And I 

will depart on that basis, that the sentencing history 

just doesn't adequately reflect the serious of what you 

are presently involved with. And that is possession of 

a weapon. 

(R., Vol. I, Transcript, p. 6.) 

Based on this language, the majority holds that the district 

court engaged in double counting of the current offense o f unlawful 

possession of a weapon as a basis for departing upward. I strongly 

disagree. The district court's observations relative to Dean's 

possession of a weapon, were exactly that--merely observations --

part of the district court's narrative detailing Dean's horrendous 

record of violence. The Presentence Report reflected an adjustment 

in Dean's offense level based on his possession of a stolen weapon. 

That calculation was before the district court at the time of 

sentencing. It is uncalled for to assume, as the majority does, 

that the district court double counted Dean's offense of 

possession of a weapon. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 4 
Unlike the majority, I interpret the district court's 

observations as an expression of concern that inasmuch as the 

guidelines failed to take into consideration Dean's record of 

violence, specifically the related cases of assault with intent to 

kill and robbery with a dangerous weapon (both of which involved 

stabbings of the victims resulting in hospitalization) that an 

upward departure was appropriate. Furthermore, although 18 u.s.c. 

§3553(c) requires that the court set forth "the specific reasons 

for the imposition of a sentence different from that prescribed [in 

the guidelines]" there is no "magic language" mandated under§ 

3553(c). A district court complies with§ 3553(c) by simply giving 

"the specific reasons" for its departure. I believe that the 

district court fully complied by pinpointing to Dean's record of 

violence in departing upward from the guidelines. The key word in 

the district court's narrative is the word "violence." 

The majority's holding that the district court engaged in 

double counting, based on the determination that "we have to assume 

it (current offense] played some role" in the departure because the 

district court mentioned it, is a serious misinterpretation of the 

district court's sentencing language. There is no reason to assume 

that the current offense played any role in the district court's 

determination to depart upward. 

I also disagree with the majority's holdings that the 

district court failed to explain the magnitude of the upward 

departure and that the degree of departure was unreasonable. 

Under the guidelines, Dean was to be sentenced to 18-24 

months. After observing that the guidelines did not adequately 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 5 
consider the facts of Dean's horrendous record of violence, the 

district court sentenced Dean to 48 months. I believe that the 

district court adequately explained the reasons for departure, 

i.e., Dean's record of and propensity for violence which had not 

been adequately considered by the guidelines. Furthermore, "when a 

defendant is already in the highest Criminal Category of VI ... , 

there is no Guideline procedure a judge can reference to help 

determine a proper degree of departure ... , [and] the question of 

degree of departure is solely one of reasonableness." United States 

v. Schmude, (7th Cir. 1990) (1990 WESTLAW, 39474 at pp. 24-25). 

I would hold that the departure was not unreasonable based on 

Dean's history of violence and the fact that the two particularly 

violent crimes had not been considered under the guidelines. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 6 
PUBLISH 

FILED 

Uflited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cir~it 

JUL 17 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 89-6244 

BOBBY LEE DEAN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-89-60-R) 

Robert Mydans, Assistant United States Attorney (Leslie M. 

Kaestner, Assistant United States Attorney, and Timothy D. 

Leonard, United States Attorney, on the brief), attorney for 

plaintiff-appellee. 

June E. Tyhurst, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Rand C. Eddy, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the 

brief), attorney for defendant-appellant. 

Before McKAY, Circuit Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 7 
Bobby Lee Dean (Dean) appeals from a sentence imposed in 

excess of the guideline range of imprisonment calculated pursuant 

to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 994(a). 

Dean was charged in a two-count indictment with possession of 

a firearm after having been convicted of a felony in violation of 

18 u.s.c. § 922(g)(1). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Count I 

(possession of a revolver) was dismissed and Dean pled guilty to 

Count II (possession of a 12-gauge semi-automatic shotgun). 

Although the sentencing guideline range for Dean was 18-24 months, 

the district court departed upward after reviewing the Presentence 

Report and considering statements made during the sentencing 

hearing. Dean was sentenced to four years, to run consecutive to 

the sentence he was then serving. 

At the time of his sentencing, Dean was 36 years old and had 

been either in prison, on parole, or subject to an active arrest 

warrant for sixteen of the last twenty-one years. In determining 

defendant's criminal history category for sentencing purposes the 

following convictions were considered: 

8-17-69 (age 17): unauthorized use of motor 

vehicle; pled guilty; 5 years suspended, revoked; 

10-2-70 (age 18): first degree rape (abducted a 

woman from a park, threatened to stab her with a 

brandished knife if she did not comply, raped the 

victim, stole the victim's car); pled guilty; 15 years 

imprisonment to run concurrently with imprisonment for 

assault with intent to kill; 

2-1-75 (age 22): possession of a firearm after 

felony conviction (offense occurred while Dean was an 

escapee from state prison); pled guilty; 18 months 

imprisonment to run concurrently with former 

convictions; 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 8 
4-4-81 (age 28): robbery with firearm and burglary 

(Dean attacked and subdued the victim during the course 

of a burglary and threatened the victim with a large 

caliber handgun); pled guilty to both counts; 23 years 

imprisonment; paroled December 9, 1983; 

9-28-88 (age 36): burglary of private residence; 

pled guilty; 20 years imprisonment. 

Dean was given three criminal history points for each of those 

convictions. Dean received an additional two criminal history 

points because there was an active warrant for his arrest at the 

time of the instant offense. Therefore, Dean had a total of 

seventeen criminal history points, resulting in a criminal history 

category of VI. 

No criminal history points were added under the guidelines 

for Dean's convictions of assault with intent to kill (12-22-69) 

or robbery with a dangerous weapon (10-02-70). Those convictions 

"d d b 1 d 1 

were cons1. ere to e "re ate cases" to Dean's conv1.c . t• 1.on f or 

first-degree rape because Dean was sentenced on all three charges 

at the same time. Accordingly, these "related cases" convictions 

were not included in determining Dean's criminal history. See 

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) ("Prior sentences imposed in related cases 

are to be treated as one sentence for purposes of the criminal 

history."). 

Dean's base offense level was nine. One offense point was 

added because the guns in question were stolen and two points were 

subtracted for acceptance of responsibility. Therefore, Dean's 

total offense level was eight. The applicable guideline range for 

a defendant with a criminal history category of VI and offense 

1 Cases are considered related if they were consolidated for 

trial or sentencing. See u.s.s.G. § 4A1.2, comment 1. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 9 
level of eight was 18-24 months. The Presentence Report indicated 

that the guideline manual contained several provisions justifying 

an upward departure for Dean, including, but not limited to (1) 

the fact that the firearms described in the indictment were the 

products of two residential burglaries, and (2) Dean's extensive 

criminal conviction history. Dean had no objections to the 

Presentence Report. 

Appellate Contentions 

On appeal, Dean contends that the court erred in imposing a 

sentence above the sentencing guideline range of 18-24 months. 

Dean argues that the court erroneously concluded that his criminal 

history included aggravating circumstances not adequately 

considered by the Sentencing Commission. He points out that he 

received 17 points for his prior criminal record and that the 17 

points resulted in a criminal history category of VI, which is the 

highest possible criminal category. Dean contends that the 

seriousness of his criminal history was adequately represented by 

his criminal history category of VI, and that it is reasonable to 

assume that the Sentencing Commission contemplated that a 

defendant's criminal history would include convictions for violent 

crimes and possession of a stolen firearm. 

Dean cites to United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 787 (3rd 

Cir. 1989) for the proposition that the guidelines limit court 

discretion and that the guidelines, commentaries, and policy 

statements, clearly indicate that departure should be rare. In 

Uca, the defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit federal 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 10 
firearms offenses. The district court departed upward in 

sentencing Uca after determining that the sentencing guidelines 

did not adequately address the number of guns involved, the 

untraceability of the guns, and the potential for their use in 

unlawful activity. In reversing, the court held that upward 

departure was inappropriate because the circumstances relied upon 

by the district court, i.e., the number of guns, the 

untraceability of the guns, and their potential for use in 

unlawful activity, had been specifically considered by the 

Sentencing Commission in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.3 (~, under 

§ 2K2.3(b)(l), the sentencing judge is required to increase the 

offense levels proportionately to the number of guns involved in 

the violation). 2 

The government responds that Uca is distinguishable. The 

government contends that the upward departure in Uca was reversed 

because the factors upon which the district court based its upward 

departure had already been adequately considered by the Sentencing 

Commission as specific offense characteristics. The government 

argues that in the case at bar, unlike Uca, the factors relied 

upon by the court in support of its upward departure, i.e., the 

extent of Dean's criminal record, the violent nature thereof, and 

the fact that once again Dean was in possession of a weapon, were 

not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission as specific 

offense characteristics. 

2 Uca was decided February 9, 1989 and applied the guidelines as 

they existed prior to the November 1989 amendments. See United 

States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Appendix C at 

C.lOS-06. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 11 
The government cites to United States v. DeLuna-Trujillo, 868 

F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1989) for the proposition that "[t]he 

sentencing table, therefore, takes little account of either the 

nature and magnitude of the past offense, or its relationship to 

the current crime." The government refers to u.s.s.G. § 4A1.3, 

p.s.,

3 under which a district court may depart from the guidelines 

when the criminal history category significantly under-represents 

the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history. The 

government argues that the violent nature of Dean's criminal acts, 

and the period of time during which he committed them, demonstrate 

that his criminal history, even at criminal history category VI, 

significantly under-represents the seriousness of his criminal 

history and the likelihood that he would commit future crimes. 

Discussion 

An upward departure from the sentencing guidelines is 

permissible when "the court finds that there exists an aggravating 

3 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s. provides in part: 

If reliable information indicates that the criminal 

history category does not adequately reflect the 

seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or 

the likelihood that the defendant will commit other 

crimes, the court may consider imposing a sentence 

departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range. 

A departure under this provision is warranted when the 

criminal history category significantly under-represents 

the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or 

the likelihood that the defendant will commit further 

crimes •••• The court may, after a review of all the 

relevant information, conclude that the defendant's 

criminal history was significantly more serious than 

that of most defendants in the same criminal category, 

and therefore consider an upward departure from the 

guidelines. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 12 
or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 

adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission 

in formulating the guidelines ••• "18 u.s.c. § 3553(b). In 

determining "whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, 

the court may consider, without limitation, any information 

concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, 

unless otherwise prohibited by law. " U.S. S . G. § lBl. 4 • 

In United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276 (lOth Cir. 1990), the 

court set forth a three-step review of upward departures. 

In the first step, we determine whether the 

circumstances cited by the district court justify a 

departure from the Guidelines. The sentencing court may 

depart from the Guidelines only if it 'finds that there 

exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 

kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 

consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 

formulating the guidelines that should result in a 

sentence different from that described.' 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3553(b) •••• Our standard of review in the first 

step is plenary. 

In step two, we ascertain whether the circumstances 

cited by the district court to justify departure 

actually exist in the instant case. We search only for 

a sufficient factual basis to justify departure. 

The third and final step in our inquiry is a review 

of the district court's degree of departure from the 

Guidelines. To determine the applicable standard of 

review, we look to section 3742(e)(3), which mandates 

that we vacate a sentence outside the Guidelines if it 

is unreasonable. 

Id. at 277-78. Because the upward departure fails to satisfy the 

first and third prongs of White we reverse the sentence and remand 

for resentencing. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 13 
1. Whether the district court identified circumstances warranting 

departure. 

In order to comply with White, "the trial court must make 

adequate findings as mandated by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) and 18 

u.s.c. § 3553(c)". 4 United States v. Emrick, 895 F.2d 1297, 1297 

(lOth Cir. 1990). In Emrick, we held that the statement by the 

district court that "'[h]owever, the conviction does not 

adequately represent the criminal conduct, and upward departure is 

warranted in this matter'" was not an adequate finding in support 

of·an upward departure. Id. at 1298 (quoting from the record on 

appeal). Similarly, in United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720 (lOth 

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1786 (1990), we held that the 

statement that "'[t]he Court in arriving at an appropriate 

sentence takes judicial notice of the force and violence used by 

the defendant in committing the offense, which justifies an upward 

departure from the guidelines'" did not constitute an adequate 

finding in support of an upward departure. Id. at 722-24 (quoting 

from the record on appeal). 

Here the district court explained the reasons for departure 

in greater detail than that which was found to be inadequate in 

Emrick and Smith. However, the problem is that apparently two 

reasons were used and one of the reasons appears not to be 

4 18 u.s.c. § 3553(c) provides in part: 

The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state 

in open court the reasons for its imposition of the 

particular sentence, and, if the sentence ---

(2) is not of the kind, or is outside the range [of 

the guidelines] the specific reason for the imposition 

of a sentence different from that described. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 14 
justified. The district court explained its upward departure from 

the guidelines as follows: 

I don't need to go over the fact that you have a 

horrendous record. And the thing that concerns me the 

most is the fact that much of this record involves a 

record of violence. 

Assault with intent to kill, first degree rape, 

robbery with a dangerous weapon, possession of a 

firearm, robbery with a firearm. And then, now, you're 

found again in possession of a weapon. 

I just don't think that the guidelines adequately 

consider the facts of your record of violence and use of 

weapons and the fact that in spite of that, once again, 

you had a weapon, a stolen weapon. 

So, I think this is grounds for departure. And I 

will depart on that basis, that the sentencing history 

just doesn't adequately reflect the seriousness of what 

you were presently involved with. And that is, 

possession of a weapon. 

(R., Vol. I., Transcript, p. 6.) (emphasis added). Therefore, the 

two articulated grounds for departure were the defendant's record of 

violence, and the fact that defendant was being sentenced for the 

possession of a stolen firearm. 

A. Record of violence as grounds for departure. 

An upward departure is appropriate under u.s.s.G. § 4A1.3, 

p.s., "when the criminal history category significantly underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or 

the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes." Id.; 

~ also United States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300, 1306 (5th Cir. 

1990). Additionally, the application notes to u.s.s.G. § 4A1.2 

specifically authorize departures when the sentencing history does 

not adequately represent the seriousness of the defendant's criminal 

history because it does not count "related" cases. Comment 3 to 

§ 4A1.2 provides: 

-9-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 15 
The court should be aware that there may be instances in 

which this definition [related cases] is overly broad 

and will result in a criminal history score that 

underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's 

criminal history and the danger that he presents to the 

public .... In such circumstances, the court should 

consider whether departure is warranted. See § 4A1.3. 

u.s.s.G. § 4A1.2, comment 3. 

The record here demonstrates that Dean had a violent criminal 

past and it may even be that his criminal history category does not 

adequately reflect the seriousness of the violence involved. In 

particular, Dean's criminal history category did not reflect his 

"related" felony convictions of assault with intent to kill 

(stabbed the victim in the abdomen requiring hospitalization and 

surgery) and robbery with a dangerous weapon (stabbed the victim 

requiring hospitalization). Additionally, several of his 

convictions which were counted involved extreme violence or the 

threat of extreme violence. 

The district court noted the "related" convictions and the 

violent nature of the defendant's criminal history. However, the 

district court did not rely solely on Dean's violent criminal 

history but it also recited the nature of the present offense as 

grounds for departure. 

B. Improper double counting of the current offense of 

unlawful possession of a weapon. 

The nature of the sentencing offense was not a proper ground 

for departure. Defendant's sentencing offense was unlawful 

possession of a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l). 

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, which deals with "Receipt, Possession, 

or Transportation of Firearms and Other Weapons by Prohibited 

-10-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 16 
Persons," the base level of the offense was nine. 5 Defendant was a 

prohibited person because of his previous felony convictions, and 

therefore his base offense level under the guidelines took into 

consideration the fact that defendant was a convicted felon with a 

criminal history. Moreover, pursuant to§ 2K2.l(b)(1), defendant's 

offense level was increased by one because the firearm was stolen. 

Therefore, the fact that the firearm was stolen was also considered 

by the sentencing guidelines in establishing the offense level. 

The sentencing guidelines do permit a sentencing judge to 

depart for reasons already considered in the guidelines (i.e., 

adjustment for specific offense characteristics), "if the court 

determines that, in light of unusual circumstances, the guideline 

level attached to that factor is inadequate." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 

(emphasis added). However, the district court failed to state any 

unusual circumstances surrounding the facts of the sentencing 

offense which would have permitted the court to use the nature of 

the sentencing offense as grounds for departure. Therefore, because 

the guidelines adequately took into account that defendant was a 

convicted felon in possession of a stolen firearm, departure based 

on this ground was improper. See, ~' United States v. Colon, No. 

89-1249, slip op. at 4 (2d Cir. May 18, 1990) (available on Westlaw, 

1990 WL 67402) ("Because such quantities must be reflected in the 

base offense level, they may not serve as the basis for a 

5 The defendant was sentenced July 5, 1989, under the guidelines 

as they existed prior to the amendments which became effective 

November 1, 1989. See United States Sentencing Commission, 

Guidelines Manual, Appendix C at C.102-03. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 17 
discretionary upward departure."); United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 

503, 509 (6th Cir. 1990). 

Although we cannot be sure what role the current offense 

played in persuading the district court to deviate from the 

sentencing guidelines, we have to assume it played some role because 

he recited the facts of the current offense as one justification for 

the deviation. Any improper ground for deviation relied upon by the 

district court requires a remand for reconsideration of the sentence 

because the appellate court cannot determine whether departure would 

have occurred absent the improper ground for deviation. See, ~, 

United States v. Zamarripa, No. 89-2145, slip op. at 11 (lOth Cir. 

June 11, 1990) (available on Westlaw, 1990 WL 75715); United States 

v. Michael, 894 F.2d 1457, 1460 (5th Cir. 1990). 

2. Failure to explain the reasons for the magnitude of the 

deviation. 

Even assuming that the grounds articulated by the district 

court justified an upward departure, the district court failed to 

explain what criteria it considered in selecting the degree of 

departure. The defendant's challenge to the appropriateness of the 

departure implicitly raises questions as to the reasonableness of 

the extent of departure. The court in United States v. White, 893 

F.2d 276, 278 (lOth Cir. 1990), explained that when reviewing a 

sentencing court's upward departure we should determine whether the 

degree of departure was reasonable. 

For us to be able to review a departure sentence for 

reasonableness, we must have an explanation of why the district 

court chose the particular magnitude of departure. See United 

-12-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 18 
States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1990). The district court 

must supply the reasoning underlying the departure sentence because 

we will not speculate as to how a particular sentence was chosen. 

Cf. United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531, 1535 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

("If the trial court does not explicitly set forth the 

considerations that motivate its decision to depart from the 

Guidelines, we will not speculate as to what those considerations 

may have been.") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 

3817 (June 25, 1990). In United States v. Gardner, No. 89-6289, 

slip op. (lOth Cir. June 18, 1990) (available on Westlaw, 1990 WL 

80721), we explained that: 

We cannot evaluate the reasonableness of a 

particular departure from the guidelines without an 

adequate factual record, nor can we speculate as to 

reasoning that might have been employed by the 

sentencing court to arrive at a particular sentence. 

The initial task of deciding when and by how much to 

deviate from the guidelines falls upon the trial court, 

and the trial court must articulate its analysis 

supporting the degree of departure selected. Without 

such an articulation of the trial court's reasoning, we 

simply are not able effectively to supervise the 

sentencing process, nor to enforce the principles of 

uniformity and proportionality implicit in the concept 

of reasonableness. 

Gardner, slip op. at 10 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Although the district court explained the reasons for its 

threshold decision to depart, it gave no scintilla of reasoning as 

to how it determined the extent of the deviation. Therefore, an 

additional ground requiring remand to the district court for 

resentencing is the district court's failure to explain the reasons 

for the magnitude of the deviation. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 19 
3. The degree of departure appears to be unreasonable. 

The district court has considerable discretion in determining 

the degree of departure but such discretion is not unfettered, 

rather it is limited by the bounds of reasonableness. See 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3742(e) & (f). 6 "Reasonableness requires that the sentence regard 

the guideline factors set forth in § 3553, which include factors of 

uniformity and proportionality." Gardner, slip op. at 8. 

Proportionality is an important policy underlying the sentencing 

guidelines and it mandates a sentencing "system that imposes 

appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of different 

severity." See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines 

Manual, Ch. 1, Part A, Intra. 3. No particular formula or 

mathematical exactitude is required, but the degree of the departure 

must generally be compatible with the guideline principle of 

proportionality. 

It is not apparent from the facts presented why the doubling 

of defendant's sentence was reasonable. We are hampered in our 

analysis of the reasonableness of the departure because the reasons 

advanced must be those of the district court, not our own post hoc 

6 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) provides in part: 

Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall 

determine whether the sentence --

(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and 

is unreasonable, having regard for 

(A) the factors to be considered in imposing 

a sentence, as set forth in chapter 227 of 

this title [such factors include, 'the need to 

avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 

defendants with similar records who have been 

found guilty of similar conduct.' 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3553(a)(6).]. 

-14-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 20 
reasons. But, from the sparse record before us, no objective 

rationale appears evident to explain the degree of departure here. 

No extension of the criminal history categories, no analogy to other 

guideline provisions, no reference to guideline principles, nor any 

other rationale that we can glean from the record seems to provide 

support for a doubling of this defendant's sentence. Without more 

to explain the high degree of the departure here, we can only 

conclude that the degree of the departure appears "unreasonable." 

Conclusion 

We must set aside the departure sentence because the district 

court's articulated reasons for departure improperly included the 

nature of the sentencing offense which was adequately accounted for 

by the guidelines in determining the offense level. Moreover, the 

district court failed to offer any explanation for the magnitude of 

the departure, and without any such explanation, the magnitude of 

the departure seems unreasonably large. Therefore, we REVERSE the 

district court's departure sentence and REMAND for resentencing. 

-15-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 21 
No. 89-6244, United States of America v. Bobby Lee Dean 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I respectfully dissent. 

The majority opinion improperly discredits the district 

court's understanding, interpretation, and application of the 

Sentencing Guidelines. I would affirm the district court's upward 

departure in its entirety. 

An upward departure is appropriate under U.S.S.G. § 4Al.3, 

p.s. "when the criminal history category significantly underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or 

the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes." In 

United States v. Keys, 893 F.2d 983 (lOth Cir. 1990), we held that 

a prison disciplinary record may, in appropriate situations, be a 

proper basis for an upward departure under § 4A1.3. See also 

United States v. Harvey, 897 F . 2d 1300, 1306 (5th Cir. 1990) 

("Moreover, this court has repeatedly held that an upward 

departure •. • because a criminal history category does not 

adequately reflect a defendant 's past criminal history is not 

improper. • Indeed, the guidelines themselves contemplate 

that a departure may be warranted for precisely that reason. See 

U.S.S.G. § 4Al.3."). 

Departure is also permissible when "[t]he court finds that 

there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, 

or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 

Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines . •• . " 18 

u.s.c. § 3553(b) . "Circumstances that may warrant departure from 

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 22 
the guidelines pursuant to this provision cannot, by their very 

nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance. The 

controlling decision as to whether and to what extent departure is 

warranted can only be made by the court at the time of sentencing." 

u.s.s.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. (emphasis supplied}. 

Once an appellate court has determined that the district 

court's decision to depart was based upon the consideration of 

permissible factors, it must then ascertain whether the degree of 

departure was reasonable: 

It is true that a court departing from the guidelines 

because of the inadequacy of a defendant's criminal 

history category should 'use, as a reference, the 

guideline range for a defendant with a higher .•. 

criminal history category.' Sentencing Guideline § 

4Al.3 (Policy Statement} at 4.9: see also CervantesLucatero, 889 F.2d at 919. It is also true that the 

sentencing court in the instant case failed to 

explicitly do this. Nonetheless, we hold that a 

district court's departed sentence may reasonably he 

higher than any sentence authorized by an adjacent 

criminal history category without the court having to 

explain why a sentence within the adjacent category 

would not have sufficed. 

United States v. Montenegro-Rojo, (9th Cir. 1990) (1990 WESTLAW, 

4148 at p. 22}. 

Although the guidelines were enacted to eliminate the 

uncertainties and disparities in the former sentencing system in 

which judges had great discretion, Congress still envisioned that 

the guidelines would leave considerable discretion in the hands of 

the sentencing judge. United States v. White, 893 F.2d 277, 278 

(lOth Cir. 1990}. Furthermore, "[w]hen a defendant is already in 

the highest Criminal History Category of VI. . , there is no 

Guideline procedure a judge can reference to help determine a 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 23 
proper degree of departure . . ., [and] the question of degree of 

departure is solely one of reasonableness." United States v. 

Schmude, (7th Cir. 1990) (1990 WESTLAW, 39474 at pp. 24-25}. A 

decision based on reasonableness is afforded a deferential standard 

of review recognizing that sentencing judges should be given 

considerable leeway in determining the degree of departure. Id. at 

25o Furthermore, 11 at this early stage in the development of the 

Guidelines, we should not lightly overturn determinations of the 

appropriate degree of departure." United States v. White, supra, at 

p. 270. 

The majority reverses the district court's upward departure, 

holding that the district court erred in (a} double counting the 

current offense of unlawful possession of a weapon as a basis for 

its upward departure, and (b) failing to explain the reasons for 

the magnitude of the deviation from the guidelines. The majority 

finally holds t hat the district court's upward departure from 18-

24 months to 48 months was unreasonable. 

In sentencing Dean the court observed, inter alia: 

I don't need to go over the fact that you have a 

horrendous record. And the thing that concerns me the 

most is the fact that much of this record involves a 

record of violence. 

Assault with intent to kill , first degree rape, 

robbery with a dangerous weapon, possession of a 

firearm, robbery with a firearm. And then, now, you're 

found again in possession of a weapon. 

I just don•t think that the guidelines adequately 

consider the facts of your record of violence and use of 

weapons and the fact that in spite of that, once again, 

you had a weapon, a stolen weapon. 

So, I think this is grounds for departure. And I 

will depart on that basis, that the sentencing history 

just doesn't adequately reflect the serious of what you 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 24 
are presently involved with. And that is possession of 

a weapon. 

(R., Vol. I, Transcript, p. 6.) 

Based on this language, the majority holds that the district 

court engaged in double counting of the current offense of unlawful 

possession of a weapon as a basis for departing upward. I strongly 

disagree. The district court's observations relative to Dean's 

possession of a weapon, were exactly that--merely observations--

part of the district court's narrative detailing Dean's horrendous 

record of violence. The Presentence Report reflected an adjustment 

in Dean's offense level based on his possession of a stolen weapon. 

That calculation was before the district court at the time of 

sentencing. It is uncalled for to assume, as the majority does, 

that the district court double counted Dean's offense of 

possession of a weapon. 

Unlike the majority, I interpret the district court's 

observations as an expression of concern that inasmuch as the 

guidelines failed to take into consideration Dean's record of 

violence, specifically the related cases of assault with intent to 

kill and robbery with a dangerous weapon (both of which involved 

stabbings of the victims resulting in hospitalization) that an 

upward departure was appropriate. Furthermore, although 18 U.S.C. 

§3553(c) requires that the court set forth "the specific reasons 

for the imposition of a sentence different from that prescribed [in 

the guidelines] 11 there is no "magic language" mandated under § 

3553(c). A district court complies with§ 3553(c) by simply giving 

"the specific reasons" for its departure. I believe that the 

district court fully complied by pinpointing to Dean's record of 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 25 
violence in departing upward from the guidelines. The key word in 

the district court's narrative is the word "violence." 

The majority's holding that the district court engaged in 

double counting, based on the determination that "we have to assume 

it [current offense] played some role" in the departure because the 

district court mentioned it, is a serious misinterpretation of the 

district court's sentencing language. There is no reason to assume 

that the current offense played any role in the district court's 

determination to depart upward. 

I also disagree with the 

district court failed to explain 

majority's holdings that the 

the magnitude of the upward 

departure and that the degree of departure was unreasonable. 

Under the guidelines, Dean was to be sentenced to 18-24 

months. After observing that the guidelines did not adequately 

consider the facts of Dean's horrendous record of violence, the 

district court sentenced Dean to 48 months. A departed sentence 

may reasonably be higher than any sentence authorized by an 

adjacent history criminal category without any requirement that the 

district court explain why a sentence within the adjacent category 

would not have sufficed. United States v. Montenegro-Rojo, supra. 

Also, "when a defendant is already in the highest Criminal 

Category of VI ., there is no Guideline procedure a judge can 

reference to help determine a proper degree of departure ••• , 

[and] the question of degree of departure is solely one of 

reasonableness." United States v. Schmude, (7th Cir. 1990) (1990 

WESTLAW, 39474 at pp. 24-25). 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 26 
I believe that the district court adequately explained the 

reasons for departure, i.e., Dean's record of and propensity for 

violence which had not been adequately considered under the 

guidelines. I would hold that the departure was not unreasonable 

based on Dean's history of violence and the fact that the two 

particularly violent crimes had not been considered under the 

guidelines. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 89-6244 Document: 01019571147 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 27