Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_11-cv-03915/USCOURTS-alnd-2_11-cv-03915-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melissa Kohser
Plaintiff
Protective Life Corporation
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MELISSA KOHSER,

Plaintiff,

v.

PROTECTIVE LIFE

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:11-CV-3915-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction and Procedural History

Plaintiff Melissa Kohser (“Ms. Kohser”) initiated this job discrimination case

against Protective Life Corporation (“Protective”) on November 15, 2015, relating

to her demotion and subsequent dismissal fromthe company. (Doc. 1). Her complaint

contains seven counts: Count One is for discrimination under the federal Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 35-48); Count Two is for

discrimination under the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(“AADEA”) (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 49-54); Count Three is for race discrimination, harassment,

and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 55-62); Count Four is for Title VII

gender discrimination (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 63-69);Count Five isfor violations of the Equal Pay

FILED

 2015 Mar-25 PM 03:44

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:11-cv-03915-VEH Document 63 Filed 03/25/15 Page 1 of 40
Act (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 70-77); Count Six is for negligent and wanton hiring, training,

supervision, and retention (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 78-85); and Count Seven is for conversion.

(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 86-98). 

This matter is before the court on the objections (Doc. 60) of Ms. Kohser to

Magistrate Judge John H. England, III’s report and recommendation (the “R&R”) 

(Doc. 59),1 which recommends that Protective’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 17) (the “Motion”) be granted and that Ms. Kohser’slawsuit be dismissed with

prejudice. (Doc. 59 at 54). Protective’s Motion, evidentiarymaterials, and supporting

brief were all filed on January 17, 2013. (Docs. 17-19). Protective made a

supplemental evidentiary submission on January 18, 2013. (Doc. 21). Ms. Kohser

filed her opposition to the Motion on September 5, 2013. (Doc. 44).2 Protective

followed with its reply (Doc. 48) on September 20, 2013. 

The R&R was entered on January 13, 2015.

3

(Doc. 59). Ms. Kohser’s

objections were filed on January 27, 2015. (Doc. 60). This case was randomly

1 The parties have not consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. Therefore, in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the magistrate judge entered a report and recommendation.

2

 All page references to Doc. 44 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

3 Prior to deciding the R&R, on January 7, 2015, the magistrate judge entered a

Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 58), addressing several evidentiary issues pertaining to the

record on summaryjudgment. Ms. Kohser does not object to any of those evidentiaryrulings decided

in that Memorandum Opinion and Order.

2

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reassigned to the undersigned judge on January 28, 2015. (Doc. 61). On February 6,

2015, Protective filed a response (Doc. 62) to Ms. Kohser’s objections. The matter,

therefore, is now under submission, and, for the reasons explained below, the court

SUSTAINS Ms. Kohser’s objections IN LIMITED PART, alternatively TERMS

them as MOOT IN PART, and otherwise OVERRULES them. Additionally, the

court ACCEPTS Magistrate Judge England’s R&R as modified herein. Further, the

Motion is due to be GRANTED, and this case is due to be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. 

II. Standards

A. Summary Judgment Generally

Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R . Civ. P.

56(c). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved

in favor of the nonmovant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th

Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). “Once the moving party

has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the

nonmoving party to ‘come forward with specific factsshowing that there is a genuine

3

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issue for trial.’” International Stamp Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270,

1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)).

Finally “[i]f the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, because, as a

defendant, it is asserting an affirmative defense, it must establish that there is no

genuine issue of material fact asto any element of that defense.” International Stamp,

456 F.3d at 1274 (citing Martin v. Alamo Community College Dist., 353 F.3d 409,

412 (5th Cir. 2003)). 

B. Employment Discrimination Generally

A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case maintainsthe ultimate burden

of proving that the adverse employment decision was made because of intentional

discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143,

120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000) (“Although intermediate evidentiary

burdens shift back and forth under this framework, ‘[t]he ultimate burden of

persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the

plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’” (quoting Texas Dept. of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207

(1981))); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Comms., 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1984)

(“A Title VII disparate treatment plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with

4

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discriminatory purpose.” (citing Clark v. Huntsville City Board of Education, 717

F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983))).

Although the Supreme Court has established the basic allocation of burdens

and order of proof in a disparate treatment case, see, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973); Burdine, supra;

Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 56 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2003), that

framework applies only in cases in which there is no direct evidence of

discrimination. See Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir.

1987) (“The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine patterns of proof were designed to ease the

evidentiary burdens on employment discrimin[a]tion plaintiffs, who rarely are

fortunate enough to have access to direct evidence of intentional

discrimination.”(citing Thornbrough v. Columbus and GreenvilleR.R., 760 F.2d 633,

638 (5th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by St. Mary’s Honor Center v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1993))).4

Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine scheme, a plaintiff first hasthe burden

of proving by a preponderance of evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.

4 As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could

be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of age, . . . constitute direct evidence of

discrimination.” Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Barnes v.

Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 610-11 (11th Cir. 1987)). Based upon this standard,

Ms. Kohser’s case is, at best, purely a circumstantial evidence one. 

5

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Second, once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts

to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

employment decision. Finally, if the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must

either prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered

by the defendant are merely a pretext for discrimination or present sufficient

evidence, of any type, for a reasonable jury to conclude that discrimination was a

“motivating factor” for the employment action, even though the defendant’s

legitimate reason may also be true or have played some role in the decision.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05, 93 S. Ct. at 1824-26; Burdine, 450 U.S. at

252-54, 101 S. Ct. at 1093-94; Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02, 123 S. Ct. at 2155.

C. Age Discrimination

1. ADEA

The ADEA provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or

refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any

individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In order to

fall under the ADEA’s protections, an employee must be “at least 40 years of age[,]”

29 U.S.C. § 631(a), and the plaintiff “retainsthe burden of persuasion to establish that

6

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age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.”

5 Gross v. FBL

Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351, 174 L. Ed. 2d 119

(2009) (emphasis added).

The EleventhCircuit “has adopted a variation” of the prima facie case standard

articulated by the Supreme Courtfor Title VII claimsin McDonnell Douglasfor cases

arising under the ADEA. Mitchell v. Worldwide UnderwritersIns.Co., 967 F.2d 565,

566 (11th Cir. 1992). “Under this variation of the McDonnell Douglas test for

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must show that he (1)

was a member of the protected group of persons between the ages of 40 and 70, (2)

was subject to adverse employment action, (3) was replaced with [or not selected for

a position over] a person outside the protected group, and (4) was qualified to do the

job.” Mitchell, 967 F.2d at 566 (citing Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881

F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1989)); see also Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161

F.3d 1318, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998) (“To establish his prima facie case of

discriminatory failure to promote, Standard must show that (1) he was in a protected

group; (2) he was not given the promotion; (3) he was qualified for the position and

(4) someone outside of the protected group was given the position.” (citing Coutu v.

5

 In contrast to the motivating factor standard that is applicable in some types of Title VII

lawsuits.

7

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Martin County Bd. of County Commissioners, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11th Cir. 1995))).

“If this is done, the defendant has the burden of going forward and articulating

a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for the [adverse employment action].”

Verbraeken, 881 F.2d at 1045. “Finally, if the defendant rebuts the presumption of

discrimination, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

employer’s asserted reason is merely a pretext for a discriminatory [action].” Id. 

2. AADEA

Ms. Kohser also asserts violations of the AADEA. Claims arising under the

AADEA are analyzed according to the same framework as the ADEA. See Robinson

v. Alabama Cent. Credit Union, 964 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Ala. 2007) (“[T]he federal

courts have applied to AADEA claims the same evidentiary framework applied to

federal age-discrimination claims.”); id. (citations omitted) (“We agree that this

framework . . . is the proper means by which to review an AADEA claim.”).

D. District Court Review of Report and Recommendation

After conducting a “careful and complete” review of the findings and

recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge’s

report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

by the magistrate judge.”); Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982)

8

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(quotingNettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1982),6

overruled on other

grounds by Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996),

superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized by ACS Recovery Servs., Inc.

v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012)). The district judge may also receive

further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This requires that the district judge “give fresh

consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made by a party.”

Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing H.R. Rep.

No. 94-1609, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News 6162, 6163). In contrast, those portions of the R&R to which no objection is

made need only be reviewed for clear error. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781,

784 (11th Cir. 2006).7

6 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued

before October 1, 1981, as well as all decisions issued after that date by a Unit B panel of the former

Fifth Circuit. Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982); see also United States

v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1361 n.4 (11th Cir. 2009) (discussing the continuing validity of Nettles).

7 Macort dealt only with the standard of review to be applied to a magistrate’s factual

findings, but the Supreme Court has held that there is no reason for the district court to apply a

different standard to a magistrate’s legal conclusions. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150, 106 S. Ct.

9

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“Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de

novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.”

United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.

2003)). It is incumbent upon the parties to timely raise any objections that they may

have regarding a magistrate judge’s findings contained in a report and

recommendation, as the failure to do so subsequently waives or abandons the issue,

even if such matter was presented at the magistrate judge level. See, e.g., United

States v. Pilati, 627 F.3d 1360 at 1365 (11th Cir. 2010) (“While Pilati raised the issue

of not being convicted of a qualifying offense before the magistrate judge, he did not

raise this issue in his appeal to the district court. Thus, this argument has been waived

or abandoned by his failure to raise it on appeal to the district court.”). However, the

district judge has discretion to consider or to decline to consider argumentsthat were

notraised before the magistrate judge. Stephens v. Tolbert, 471 F.3d 1173, 1176 (11th

Cir. 2006); see also Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009)

(“Thus, we answer the question left open in Stephens and hold that a district court has

466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985). Thus, district courts in this circuit have routinely applied a clear-error

standard to both. See Tauber v. Barnhart, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1373-74 (N.D. Ga. 2006)

(collecting cases). This is to be contrasted with the standard of review on appeal, which distinguishes

between the two. See Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 1991) (when amagistrate’s

findings of fact are adopted by the district court without objection, they are reviewed on appeal under

a plain-error standard, but questions of law remain subject to de novo review).

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discretion to decline to consider a party’s argument when that argument was not first

presented to the magistrate judge.”).

“Parties filing objections mustspecifically identify those findings objected to.

Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district

court.” Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410 n.8. “This rule facilitates the opportunity for district

judges to spend more time on matters actually contested and produces a result

compatible with the purposes of the Magistrates Act.” Id. at 410. Indeed, a contrary

rule “would effectively nullify the magistrate judge’s consideration of the matter and

would not help to relieve the workload of the district court.” Williams, 557 F.3d at

1292 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d

615, 622 (9th Cir. 2000)).

III. Analysis

A. Threshold Considerations

1. Ms. Kohser’s Introductory Section of Her Objections

The R&R recommends that summary judgment be granted in favor of

Protective on all counts of Ms. Kohser’s complaint. In the introductory section of her

objections, Ms. Kohser only plainly challengesthe dismissal of her claims for age and

sex discrimination:

While Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

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Recommendation in its entirety, she particularly objects to the

conclusion that she has not presented sufficient evidence to withstand

summary judgment as to her claims that she was demoted and later

terminated because of her age and/or her sex. Plaintiff contends that,

when the proper summary judgmentstandard is applied to the evidence,

she has established genuine issues of material fact as to each of her

claims, but particularly asto her claims of discrimination based upon her

age and/or her sex. 

(Doc. 60 at 2-3).

Further, the substance of Ms. Kohser’s specific objections are largely limited

to the magistrate judge’s disposition of her age and gender discrimination claims.

First, Ms. Kohser contends that the magistrate judge ignored Protective’s failure to

follow its established procedures before demoting her and terminating her

employment. (Doc. 60 at 11-16). Second, Ms. Kohser complains that the magistrate

judge ignored her own testimony when he found that there was no evidence to show

thatshe was unaware of any performance issues before Protective demoted her. (Doc.

60 at 17-18).

Third, Ms. Kohser maintains that the magistrate judge improperly used the socalled “same actor” and “same group” inferences when recommending thatsummary

judgment be granted on Ms. Kohser’s age discrimination claim. (Doc. 60 at 18-22).

Fourth, Ms. Kohser argues that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that

Protective’s decisionmaker had an honest and good faith belief for his employment12

Case 2:11-cv-03915-VEH Document 63 Filed 03/25/15 Page 12 of 40
related actions that adversely affected her. (Doc. 60 at 22-28). Fifth, Ms. Kohser

urges that the magistrate judge’s R&R is wrong as a convincing mosaic of facts

establish the existence of gender and/or age discrimination. (Doc. 60 at 28-29). 

Finally, Ms. Kohser resists the dismissal of her derivative common-law

negligent training count premised upon the AADEA and concludes her objections as

follows:

The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation should be

rejected in its entirety because it is based upon an erroneous application

of the law. The Magistrate Judge ignored relevant and admissible

evidence presented by the Plaintiff to prove her claims; made credibility

assessments; weighed the evidence; relied upon inferences favorable to

the Defendant and adverse to the Plaintiff; and imposed a heightened

burden of proof on Plaintiff which is not justified under the law.

Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment

on her claims that she was demoted and terminated because of her age

and/or her sex. Because Plaintiff can establish that she was demoted

and/or terminated because of her age, the Magistrate Judge erred in

recommending that her claim for Negligent/Wanton Hiring, Training,

Supervision, and Retention Claim be dismissed. See King v. CVS

Caremark Corp.,No. 1:12-CV-1715-VEH, 2014 WL 868079 (N.D.Ala.

Mar. 5, 2014) (AADEA claim can satisfy the underlying tort

requirement of a negligent/wanton hiring, training, supervision and

retention claim). 

For all of the reasons set forth above, and all of the reasons

articulated in Plaintiff’s Response Brief In Opposition To Defendant’s

Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 44), Plaintiff prays that the

Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge be rejected in its

entirety and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be denied.

(Doc. 60 at 29-30).

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The court hasstudied Ms. Kohser’s objections(Doc. 60) and nothing contained

in themspecifically contests or otherwise bringsinto question the analysis conducted

by the magistrate judge in recommending a dismissal of Counts Three, Five and

Seven. Instead, in contesting the R&R “in its entirety,” Ms. Kohser has, at best, raised

merely a generalized objection concerning these counts. As a result, this means that

the magistrate judge’s treatment of them issubject to only clear error scrutiny by this

court.

Further, the court agrees with the contents of the R&R as to these three counts

and concludes that a dismissal of them on summary judgment is appropriate.

Accordingly, Ms. Kohser’s general objection isOVERRULED, those portions of the

R&R dealing with Counts Three, Five, and Seven are ACCEPTED, and those claims

are HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from Ms. Kohser’s complaint.

2. Ms. Kohser’s Summary of Facts and Claims

After her introductory section, Ms. Kohser sets out a summary of facts and

claims which spans over ten pages. (Doc. 60 at 3-11). Ms. Kohser’s facts do not

correspond with the statement provided by the magistrate judge in his R&R, fail to

indicate where any of her facts deviate from the R&R, and lack specific citations to

the record. 

As for support for her version of the facts, in a footnote Ms. Kohser vaguely

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states:

This summary is drawn from the various statements of disputed

and undisputed facts contained in the partiessummary judgment papers.

Plaintiff refers the Court to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed

Relevant Material Facts (Doc. 19, pp. iii - xxi), Plaintiff’s response to

those facts(Doc. 44, pp. 9 - 39), Plaintiff’s additional facts(Doc. 44, pp.

39 - 44), and Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s facts (Doc. 48, pp. iv -

xxiii). 

Doc. 60 at 3 n.1.

To the extent that Ms. Kohser’s factual summary can be construed as an

attempted solitary or multifaceted objection to the R&R, it is OVERRULED,

consistent withNettles, supra, as an ineffective generalized objection underthe report

and recommendation process. Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410 n.8. Consequently, the factual

summary provided by the magistrate judge in his R&R is HEREBY ACCEPTED by

this court.

B. Dismissals Directly Disputed by Ms. Kohser

Ms. Kohser directly contests only the proposed dismissal of Counts One (age

discrimination under the ADEA), Two (age discrimination under the AADEA),8 Four

(gender discrimination under Title VII), and Six (negligent training under Alabama

8 Counts One and Two are subject to the same analytical framework, as the Supreme Court

of Alabama has clarified that age discrimination claims arising under the AADEA borrow from the

ADEA. See Robinson v. Alabama Cent. Credit Union, 964 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Ala. 2007) (“[T]he

federal courts have applied to AADEA claims the same evidentiary framework applied to federal

age-discrimination claims.”); id. (citations omitted) (“We agree that this framework . . . is the proper

means by which to review an AADEA claim.”). 

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law) in her objections. The court addresses the merits of Ms. Kohser’s objections in

the context of these counts in more detail below.

1. Ms. Kohser’s Specific Objection Based upon

Protective’s Policies and Procedures

In the first section of her specific objections, Ms. Kohser, citing to several

binding and non-binding authorities, contends that, in recommending summary

judgment in favor of Protective, the magistrate judge improperly failed to factor in

(i) Mr. Bell’s delay in explaining his reasons for demoting Ms. Kohser, and (ii)

Protective’s deviation from its progressive-discipline policy as evidence of age or

gender-related pretext in the decisions to demote and fire her. (Compare Doc. 60 at

12 (“It was only after this interaction with HR that Bell created his reasons to justify

the demotion of Kohser.”), with Doc. 59 at 31 (“[T]he fact the reasons were not

communicated to Kohser [in writing] is not indicative of discrimination.”)).9

In support of her contention that Mr. Bell’s delay in detailing why she was

being demoted isrelevant to the issue of pretext, Ms. Kohser cites to the unpublished

panel decision of Mock v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 196 F. App’x 773 (11th Cir.

2006) for the proposition that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit has held that delays in

9 Mike Bell (“Mr. Bell”) was hired in March 2008 as the Vice President to head Protective’s

Reinsurance Administration Department. As pointed out in the R&R, “[t]he parties do not discuss,

but appear to have mutually assumed Bell was the decisionmaker for purposes of [Ms.] Kohser’s

claims.” (Doc. 59 at 21). Ms. Kohser does not contest this factual finding in her objections.

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explaining the basis for an adverse employment action is [sic] relevant to the issue of

pretext.” (Doc. 60 at 12). The court rejects this part of Ms. Kohser’s objections for

several reasons. First, Mock is merely persuasive authority and, consequently, to the

extent the opinion arguably suggests that any delay in explaining an adverse

employment decision, by itself, is always adequate evidence of pretext, such a

holding is not binding on and is rejected by this court. 

Second, Mock involves a significantly distinguishable record. As the panel

explained its pretext analysis in Mock:

At the time Bell informed him [i.e., the plaintiff] that he was being fired,

he insisted that it give him the reason for its decision. Bell refused to do

that. It was not until later, in a letter, that it told him that he had been

terminated for unacceptable performance. In light of Bell’srefusal to tell

Mock-at the time it fired him-why his employment had come to an end,

a trier of fact reasonably could find that the letter constituted a pretext

for discrimination.

196 F. App’x at 774.

Ms. Kohser states in her objections that when she “tried to get further

explanation from Bell concerning her alleged deficiencies, Bell refused to provide

any supporting information.” (Doc. 60 at 11 (emphasis added)). In Mock, the plaintiff

reportedly got no information from his employer, while Ms. Kohser maintains that

she was denied a “further explanation” from Mr. Bell. Also, the pages from her

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deposition transcript that Ms. Kohser cites to (i.e., Doc. 18-1 at 54-55 at 213-14)

10

do

not substantiate any “refusal” on the part of Mr. Bell to provide further support for

his decision to demote her.

As the relevant portions of Ms. Kohser’s deposition transcript from those

pinpointed pages specifically read:

Q. Now do you remember Mr. Bell getting with you at the end of

October to discuss, I guess, the emails you had written him,

wanting to know what you were accused of and micromanaging

and things like that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. And you all met on – do you remember when you all met?

A. I don’t remember the day.

Q. And who was present? Was it you and Mr. Bell?

A. Me and Mr. Bell.

Q. Do you remember what he said to you during that meeting?

A. I don’t recall everything that we discussed, but he told me that I

needed to move on and let the past be the past and move on with

my new job duties.

Q. Okay. And did you tell him that you would?

A. I don’t think that I replied.

10 The first pinpoint references to Doc. 18-1 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering

system.

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Case 2:11-cv-03915-VEH Document 63 Filed 03/25/15 Page 18 of 40
Q. You didn’t reply at all?

A. I don’t recall if I did.

Q. You didn’t say anything in that meeting?

A. No, ma’am.

Q. So you walked out of the meeting without saying a word? Did

you go back to work?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. I’m sorry. You didn’t say anything during the meeting, did you?

A. Not that I recall.

(Doc. 18-1 at 54-55 at 213-15 (emphasis added)). Thus, Ms. Kohser’s deposition

testimony fails to establish that she asked Mr. Bell any questions during this October

2010 meeting, much less that he refused to provide her with any answers about her

work-related deficiencies.

11

 Consequently, Mock is simply inapplicable. 

Asfor Ms. Kohser’s pretext challenge premised upon Protective’s disciplinary

11 Ms. Kohser also lists several multipage exhibits (without any pinpoint citations or

explanations) which she similarly claims substantiate a “refusal” on the part of Mr. Bell to provide

her with supporting information about her performance deficiencies. However, because Ms. Kohser

fails to describe which portions of these records support her point, the court rejects her position as

underdeveloped. Further, at least one of these cited records includes talking points for the meeting

that Ms. Kohser and Mr. Bell had in October 2010 (Doc. 21-6 at 34 at P’s Ex. 39) and indicates that

Mr. Bell shared with Ms. Kohser “objectives of the restructure” and “a few of the other reasons that

influenced [his] thinking about where to position [Ms. Kohser]in the new structure.” (Id. at 35). This

evidence demonstrates a willingness on the part of Mr. Bell to meet and communicate with Ms.

Kohser, as opposed to an outright refusal to provide any information at the time of the adverse

decision, as stated in Mock. 

19

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policy, while the Eleventh Circuit has held that departing from established hiring

policies and procedures may serve as pretext, see, e.g., Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d

1366, 1374 11th Cir. 1985) (“Departures from normal procedures may be suggestive

of discrimination.”) (emphasis added), in this instance, the specific wording on the

sample Corrective Action Form relied upon by Ms. Kohser does not require that a

written document always be used.

12

(See Doc. 21-4 at 67 (“The ‘form’ format should

be used for non exempt and exempt employees below salary grade 116.”)).

Additionally, as a Rule 30(b)(6) designated witness for Protective, Human

Resources Director MelanieTaylor McNary (“Ms. McNary”) testified, the Corrective

Action Form is not always used for disciplining management level employees, like

Ms. Kohser. (Doc. 21-3 at 10 at 37-38; see id. at 37 (“It does not have to be a threestep process. Managers can skip levels, based on how egregious the performance

deficiencies are; and there may be cases where the form is not used at all.”)). In her

objections,Ms. Kohser makes no effort to factually refute thisRule 30(b)(6) evidence

relied upon by the magistrate judge. Further, in reviewing the record on a de novo

basis and in light of Ms. McNary’s unrebutted testimony about how deviations under

the non-mandatory progressive disciplinary policy were not uncommon for

12 Alternatively, Ms. Kohser contends that Protective’s disciplinarymemo form should have

been used in lieu of a Corrective Action Form before she was demoted and terminated. (See Doc.

21-4 at 72 (attaching sample “Memo” for “Performance and Conduct” issues)).

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managerial employees, Ms. Kohser has not adduced evidence from which a

reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Bell’s treatment of her was a suspicious

anomaly designed to cover up discrimination.

Additionally, while Ms. Kohser passingly assertsthat Rita Cook (“Ms. Cook”)

(who the record shows is African-American) is an appropriate comparator of hers

(Doc. 60 at 14 n.2), Ms. Kohser makes no effort to explain how Protective’s

progressive disciplinary treatment of Ms. Cook is probative of pretext asto either her

sex or age discrimination claim. Undoubtedly, Ms. Cook is not a valid comparator for

the purpose of Ms. Kohser’s sex discrimination claim, as she and Ms. Kohser share

the same gender. 

As for age, Ms. Kohser does not state in her objections how old Ms. Cook is

and, the mere favorable treatment of another employee, without more, does not

establish valid comparator status. Further, even if Ms. Cook’s age places her outside

of the ADEA’s protected category or establishes that she is “significantly younger”

than Ms. Kohser, Ms. Kohser’s position as a managerial employee means that her

reliance upon Protective’s treatment of a non-managerial employee, such as Ms.

Cook, is not an adequate comparison. As Ms. McNary’s uncontradicted testimony

illustrates, Ms. Kohser and her subordinate employee, Ms. Cook, are not similarly

situated when it comes to treatment under Protective’s progressive disciplinary

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policy–the three-step process is not always followed with Protective’s managerial

employees. Cf. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.

2011) (“Although Mitten pointed to certain preferentially treated black employeesin

non-supervisory positions, he failed to identify a more favorably treated black

supervisory employee.”).

Therefore, after having conducted a de novo review, for all the reasons stated

above, the first part of Ms. Kohser’s specific objections is OVERRULED.

2. Ms. Kohser’s Specific ObjectionsBased upon her

Own Testimony

In the second section of her specific objections, Ms. Kohser contends that the

magistrate judge improperly failed to factor in evidence, including her affidavit, that

she was never told of any performance issues before her demotion. (See Doc. 60 at

17 (citing to Doc. 59 at 29 n.44)). Ms. Kohser also points out that, in the related

evidentiary Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 58) entered by the magistrate

judge on January 7, 2015, he accepted much of Ms. Kohser’s affidavit, including her

lack of prior knowledge.

In footnote 44 of the R&R, the magistrate judge acknowledges that one

reasonable reading of the record substantiates that her supervisor, Mr. Bell, never

talked to Ms. Kohser about her deficiencies before he demoted her. (See Doc. 59 at

22

Case 2:11-cv-03915-VEH Document 63 Filed 03/25/15 Page 22 of 40
29 n.44 (“At best, this would show there is no evidence he talked with her . . . .”)).

Therefore, the court disagrees with Ms. Kohser’s position that the magistrate judge’s

R&R turns upon an erroneous factual finding that she had knowledge of Mr. Bell’s

concerns about her performance issues in advance of her demotion. 

Alternatively, even if the magistrate judge’s R&R disregards the evidence

contained in Ms. Kohser’s affidavit and findsthat Ms. Kohser had prior notice of Mr.

Bell’s dissatisfaction with her performance leading up to her demotion and discharge,

such finding is of no consequence because, as the court has already explained above,

Ms. Kohser is unable to substantiate that Mr. Bell treated her less favorably than

others outside of her protected age or gender status under its non-mandatory

progressive disciplinary policy, and whether Ms. Kohser ever actually received a

prior verbal warning or other notice from Mr. Bell about her inadequate performance

is simply a subset of that same analysis. 

Accordingly, after having conducted a de novo review, for all the reasons stated

above, the second part of Ms. Kohser’s specific objections is OVERRULED

Alternately, it is TERMED as MOOT, as any purported factual finding by the

magistrate judge about Ms. Kohser’s prior knowledge does not affect the overall

correctness of the magistrate judge’s legal conclusion that Ms. Kohser has not

demonstrated pretext in terms of purported comparator evidence, and the court

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ACCEPTS that portion of the R&R. 

3. Ms. Kohser’s Specific Objections Based upon

Improper Inferences

Concerning her age discrimination claim only,

13 Ms. Kohser also specifically

objects that the magistrate judge improperly allowed the same actor and same group

inferencesto influence hisrecommendation to grantsummary judgment. In the R&R,

the magistrate judge recites Protective’s position that “an age-discrimination plaintiff

has a higher burden when the alleged decisionmaker is older than the plaintiff.” (Doc.

59 at 49). The magistrate judge also states that “the decisonmaker, Bell, was not only

older than Kosher but was also the same person who promoted her into the position

from which she was demoted.” Id.

In Williams v. Vitro Services Corp., 144 F.3d 1438 (11th Cir. 1998), the

Eleventh Circuit explained the contours of the same actor inference:

The circuit courts have applied varying weights to the strength or

value of the inference that obtains when the hirer and firer are the same

actor. See, e.g., Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267,

270–71 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]here the same actor is responsible for both

the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions

occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises that there

was no discriminatory motive.”); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d

13 The remainder of Ms. Kohser’s specific objections focus mostly on the merits of her age

discrimination claim. Consequently, the court concludes that summary judgment is appropriate on

her gender discrimination claim based upon its analysis of Ms. Kohser’s fist and second objections,

and ACCEPTS the R&R in that regard. 

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651, 658 (5thCir. 1996) (“This‘same actor’inference has been accepted

by several other circuit courts, and we now express our approval.”);

Evans v. Technologies Applications & Service Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959

(4th Cir. 1996) (“[B]ecause Houseman is the same person who hired

Evans, there is a powerful inference that the failure to promote her was

not motivated by discriminatory animus.”) (internal quotation and

citation omitted); E.E.O.C. v. Our Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77

F.3d 145, 152 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If Boettcher wished to discriminate

against Braddy because of her race, she could have refused to hire her

in the first place, or she could have discharged her because of her

deficient qualifications. Boettcher did neither.... The same hirer/firer

inference has strong presumptive value.”). But see Waldron v. SL

Industries, Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3rd Cir. 1995) (“[W]here ... the

hirer and firer are the same and the discharge occurred soon after the

plaintiff was hired, the defendant may of course argue to the factfinder

that it should not find discrimination. But this is simply evidence like

any other and should not be accorded any presumptive value.”).

Although Vitro has pointed to evidence to show that the same

individual responsible for hiring Williams after he already was in the

protected age group was also responsible for promoting him, for

attempting to prolong his stay with Vitro, and, ultimately, for

terminating him, we decline to accord to this “same actor” factual

circumstance a presumption that discrimination necessarily was absent

from the decision to terminate Williams. We nonetheless believe that

these facts may give rise to a permissible inference that no

discriminatory animus motivated Vitro's actions. See Buhrmaster v.

Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995) (“An individual

who is willing to hire and promote a person of a certain class is unlikely

to fire them simply because they are a member of that class. This general

principle applies regardless of whether the class is age, race, sex, or

some other protected classification.”). But within the burden-shifting

framework that has long been established in this circuit with regard to

employment discrimination cases, it is important to reiterate that this

inference is a permissible—not a mandatory—inference that a jury may

make in deciding whether intentional discrimination motivated the

employer’s conduct. . . . .

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Based on our consistent precedent, as articulated inCombs, we conclude

that “same actor” evidence of the sort introduced in this instance

constitutes evidence that a jury may consider in deciding the ultimate

issue of intentional discrimination. Evidence that the same actor both

hired and fired the plaintiff, in some circumstances, may help to

convince a jury that the defendant’s proffered legitimate reasons for its

decision are worthy of belief; it isthe province of the jury rather than the

court, however, to determine whether the inference generated by “same

actor” evidence is strong enough to outweigh a plaintiff's evidence of

pretext.

144 F.3d at 1442-43 (emphasis added). Thus, in Williams, the Eleventh Circuit has

made it clear that, within this Circuit, while the same actor inference may be a proper

consideration for a jury, it is not for a court to use when deciding motions for

summary judgment. Consequently, the third portion of Ms. Kohser’s specific

objections to the R&R in this limited regard are SUSTAINED.

The Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of the same group inference is less clear, as

Williams only expressly deals with the same actor inference. The court is unaware of

any binding authority which firmly discusses whether a district court can properly

rely upon the same group inference in granting summary judgment, but several cases

at least persuasively suggest that using such an inference when granting summary

judgment is permissible. 

For example in Ehrhardt v. Haddad Restaurant Group, Inc., 443 F. App’x 452

(11th Cir. 2011), an unpublished panel reasoned on summary judgment:

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Further, Nabil Haddad and Karabaich, the individuals who made

the decision to demote and ultimately terminated Ehrhardt, were within

the class of people protected by the AADEA. See Elrod v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1471 (11th Cir.1991) (explaining the

plaintiff’s burden to show the discharge is motivated by age is more

difficult when the decisionmaker is also within the class protected by the

ADEA). Ehrhardt presented no evidence that either Nabil Haddad or

Karabaich exhibited any age bias.

Ehrhardt, 443 F. App’x at 456; see also Howard v. Steris Corp., 886 F. Supp. 2d

1279, 1300 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (“And because they were in the same protected [age]

class, it makes it unlikely they would discriminate against him on the basis of a

shared characteristic.” (citing Elrod)).

Similarly, in reversing the judgment entered on a jury verdict in Elrod, the

Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff failed to offer “any substantially probative

evidence that age more likely than not motivated his discharge” and further indicated

that the plaintiff “faces a difficult burden . . . because all of the primary players

behind his termination . . . were well over age forty and within the class of persons

protected by the ADEA.” 939 F.2d at 1471. However, Elrod was decided on a trial

record and does not directly address to what degree the same group inference can be

invoked by the court on summary judgment. 

However, despite any conceivable legal error committed by the magistrate

judge in relying upon the same actor and same group inferences, the court nonetheless

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concludes that summary judgment is still appropriate on Ms. Kohser’s age

discrimination claim due to the absence of sufficient pretext. In an effort to

demonstrate satisfaction of this prong in the context of her age discrimination claim,

Ms. Kohser relies upon what she claims to be examples of age-stereotyping made

about her in the factual portion of Protective’s brief filed in support of its Motion:

A theme which runs through Defendant’s motion is that Kohser was

resistant to change and unwilling to adapt. It starts with the claim that

she did not know the TAI process and did not have a working

knowledge of the TAI side (Doc. 19, ¶ 22) and proceeds from there: she

was resistant to the gorilla project (Doc. 19, ¶ 45); she was interfering

with communicationsin the department(Doc. 19,¶ 70);she wasresistant

to change (Doc. 19, ¶ 77); and she had the inability to learn (Doc. 19, ¶¶

98-99).

(Doc. 60 at 20 (citing to factual portion of Protective’s brief filed in support of its

Motion)). As her primary legal authority, Ms. Kohser citesto Bienkowski v. American

Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1988) as well as other two other later cases

arising in the Fifth Circuit, Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345 (5th Cir.

2005) and Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).14

(Doc. 44

14 Neither Machinchick nor Rachid helps Ms. Kohser on summary judgment, as they are both

significantly distinguishable due to the high caliber of age-related evidence adduced by each

respective plaintiff. Machinchick included evidence of a “plan to ‘strategically hire some younger

engineers and designers.’” 398 F.3d at 345. Likewise in Rachid, the Fifth Circuit observed:

In the case sub judice, Rachid presents far more evidence of age

discrimination than was presented in Bienkowski. Rachid testified that Powers made

numerous ageist comments-including one situation where Powers allegedly said:

“[A]nd don't forget it, [Rachid], you’re too old, too”-and Haidar supported Rachid's

28

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at 63 n.14).

In Bienkowski, the plaintiff’s “supervisors allegedly commented that

Bienkowski looked ‘sharp’ if he was going to look for another job. The supervisors

also commented on his inability or willingness to ‘adapt’ to new systems in the

department.” 851 F.2d 1503, 1507 n.4. In reversing the district court’s order granting

summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit held:

We conclude that Bienkowski’s evidence is barely sufficient to

create a jury issue of intentional age discrimination. Unlike the district

court, we are unwilling to assume that indirect comments about his age

and adaptability are not possiblyprobative of an unlawful discriminatory

intent, given the parties’sharp disagreements over the operative facts of

Bienkowski’s performance. Moreover, live testimony will assist the

necessary credibility choices in this case more effectively than printed

affidavits.

Our conclusion is carefully circumscribed and circumspect,

however. First, Bienkowski has lent his oath to evidence much more

specific than that in previous cases, which have held that a plaintiff's

conclusory testimony of adequate job performance, standing alone, is

insufficient to raise a jury issue of age discrimination. See, e.g., Reeves

v. General Goods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 1982); Simmons v.

McGuffy Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980); Aquamina

assertions that Powers continually made such comments. Rachid even spoke with

human resources prior to his termination to express his fear that Powers would try to

fire him because of his age. Despite JIB’s focus on Teal-Guess’s investigation and

company policy, it was Powers who terminated Rachid, and it was Powers who

repeatedly made ageist comments to and about Rachid. Such comments preclude

summary judgment because a rational finder of fact could conclude that age played

a role in Powers’s decision to terminate Rachid.

Rachid, 376 F.3d at 315-16 (emphasis added).

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v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 644 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1981); Dale v. Chicago

Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1986); Bohrer v. Hanes Corp., 715

F.2d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 1983). Questions of motivation are necessarily

raised by the affidavits of Bienkowski and his supervisors, whose

renditions of their conversations and meetings with each other differ

diametrically and very specifically.

Second, we do not hold that a verdict for Bienkowski would be

supportable only on evidence that American’sreasonsfor firing him are

not justified or supported by objective facts. . . .

We do not transgress these principles, because granting

Bienkowski the inferences that may be drawn from the affidavits, a jury

could conclude that his supervisors’ evaluation of his performance

lacked veracity and that their true motivation resided in their age-based

comments.

Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1507, 1508 (emphasis added).

As the magistrate judge correctly contrasted this record with that before the

Fifth Circuit in Bienkowski, the level of specific evidence presented by Ms. Kohser

concerning the caliber of her job performance is lacking. (Doc. 59 at 50). Thus, Ms.

Kohser simply has not met the Bienkowskistandard, regardless of any same actor and

same group inferences. While Ms. Kohser contends in this section of her specific

objections that she “presented at least as much evidence as the plaintiff in

Bienkowski” about her adequate job performance (Doc. 60 at 22), she offers nothing

to specifically substantiate this assertion, and “[s]tatements by counsel in briefs are

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not evidence.” Skyline Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 613 F.2d 1328, 1337 (5th Cir. 1980).15

 

Alternatively, to the extent that Ms. Kohser’s meager evidence is enough to

satisfy Bienkowski, the court is not persuaded to follow that authority. Bienkowski is

not binding on this court and, based upon this court’s own independent research, the

Eleventh Circuit has neither cited to Bienkowski favorably nor embraced its “barely

sufficient” formula in finding a triable claim under the ADEA. Cf. Rachid, 376 F.3d

at 315 (“Comments to look ‘sharp’ and comments concerning an employee’s

willingness to ‘adapt’ to new systems are rather nebulous, but they allowed

Bienkowski to avoid summary judgment.”) (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, after having conducted a de novo review, for all the reasonsstated

above, the third part of Ms. Kohser’s specific objections is SUSTAINED IN

LIMITED PART and otherwise is OVERRULED. Further, the court ACCEPTS

15

 A further problem with Ms. Kohser’s reliance on Bienkowski is that she fails to identify

adequate proof of age-related comments made about her that are attributable to the undisputed sole

decisionmaker, Mr. Bell. Indeed, even Ms. Kohser’s summary of facts contained in her objections

lacks any reference to examples of Mr. Bell’s age-based animus. (Doc. 60 at 3-11). The closest that

Ms. Kohser comes to potentially linking Mr. Bell to a purported ageist comment is her reference to

language contained in Protective’s EEOC position statement (see Doc. 44 at 62, 63; see also Doc.

21-7), which summarizes Mr. Bell’s findings about Ms. Kohser’s deficiencies to include “repeatedly

demonstrat[ing] an unwillingness or inability to adapt to change and to consider and adopt new and

better ways of performing the Red Team’s work.” (Doc. 21-7 at 6). Thus, at best, Ms. Kohser has

identified only one arguably age-based observation made about her by Ms. Bell. In contrast, the

record in Bienkowski included multiple indirect age-based comments made by the plaintiff’s

supervisors and, even there, the Fifth Circuit found such evidence, coupled with a specifically and

sharply contested record of the plaintiff’s job performance to be “barely sufficient to create a jury

issue of intentional age discrimination.” 851 F.2d at 1507.

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the R&R’s conclusion (as modified above) that the Motion is due to be GRANTED

on Ms. Kohser’s ADEA (and AADEA) count(s). 

4. Ms. Kohser’s Objection Based upon the Absence

of an Honest Good Faith Belief

The fourth part of Ms. Kohser’s specific objections suggests that summary

judgment is inappropriate because “Bell did not act on the basis of an honest good

faith belief that Kohser was unable to perform her duties when he demoted and later

terminated her.” (Doc. 60 at 27). Ms. Kohser further states that “the [m]agistrate

[j]udge’s conclusion that Defendant has established the good faith belief defense is

erroneous.” (Id. at 28). In asserting this objection, Ms. Kohser fails to reference any

specific pages of the R&R in which she contends the magistrate judge erred.

Consequently, the specific objection is OVERRULED as underdeveloped.

The objection is also OVERRULED substantively. In particular, Ms. Kohser

seems to be asking this court to disregard or discount the honest belief rule on

summary judgment. (See, e.g., Doc. 60 at 23 (“One fundamental flaw with the socalled ‘honest belief rule’ at the summary judgment stage is that, by definition, it

requires the Court to assess the credibility of witnesses.”)). 

However, as explained in Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 939 F.2d 1466

(11th Cir. 1991), the honest belief rule is a binding employment law principle within

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the Eleventh Circuit that deserves consideration on summary judgment.

Federal courts “do not sit as a super-personnel department that

reexamines an entity’s business decisions. No matter how medieval a

firm’s practices, no matter how high-handed its decisional process, no

matter how mistaken the firm’s managers, the ADEA does not interfere.

Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an honest

explanation of its behavior.” Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864

F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). “[F]or an employer

to prevail the jury need not determine that the employer was correct in

its assessment of the employee’s performance; it need only determine

that the defendant in good faith believed plaintiff’s performance to be

unsatisfactory....” Moore v. Sears, Roebuck &Co., 683 F.2d 1321, 1323

n. 4 (11th Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original). See also Jones, 874 F.2d at

1540; Smith v. Papp Clinic, P.A., 808 F.2d 1449, 1452–53 (11th Cir.

1987) (“[I]f the employer fired an employee because it honestly believed

that the employee had violated a company policy, even if it was

mistaken in such belief, the discharge is not ‘because of race’ and the

employer has not violated § 1981.”).

Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470. 

Further, the magistrate judge appropriately described and relied upon the

honest belief rule in his R&R. (See Doc. 59 at 51 (“Although Kohser has presented

her own testimony to support her contention Bell’s reasons for demoting and

terminating her were erroneous, she has been unable to present evidence leading to

a reasonable inference Bell, the decisionmaker, did not have a good faith belief in the

truth of his reasons, which is the question relevant to his intent.”)).

Accordingly, after having conducted a de novo review,for all the reasonsstated

above, the fourth part of Ms. Kohser’s objections is OVERRULED. Further, the

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court ACCEPTS the R&R’s conclusion that the Motion is due to be GRANTED on

Ms. Kohser’s age discrimination claim. 

5. Ms. Kohser’s Specific Objection Based upon a

Purported Mosaic of Convincing Evidence

Ms. Kohser alternatively contends that, regardless of her ability to satisfy the

more common comparator evidence model, a convincing mosaic of a facts establishes

a material factual dispute about Protective’s discriminatory intent in its treatment of

her. (Doc. 60 at 28); see also Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328 (“A triable issue of fact exists

if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents ‘a convincing

mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional

discrimination by the decisionmaker.’” (footnote omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting

Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2011))).16

However, in an attempt to validate her gender and age claims under this

convincing mosaic framework, Ms. Kohser merely points out that a male took over

16

In Smith, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting summary

judgment even though the panel confirmed that the plaintiff’s comparator evidence was lacking. 644

F.3d at 1327 (“In his brief to this court, he repeats the argument he presented to the district

court—that he does not need a black supervisor comparator because the record contains sufficient

circumstantial evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether Lockheed fired him because he

is white.”); see id. (“We agree and find that the district court erred in granting Lockheed summary

judgment.”); see also id. 1328 (“Here, Mitten did not need to rely on the McDonnell Douglas

presumption to establish a case for the jury.”); see also id. (“As the following discussion explains,

the record contained sufficient evidence to allow a jury to infer that Lockheed fired Mitten because

he is white.”).

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her duties and that Protective (incorrectly, according to Ms. Kohser) claims “that she

was unwilling to adapt to change.” (Doc. 60 at 29). As explained in more detail

below, these parts of the record do not reasonably create a triable inference of gender

or age discrimination. Cf. Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328 (“Yet, no matter its form, so long

as the circumstantial evidence raises a reasonable inference that the employer

discriminated against the plaintiff, summary judgment is improper.”) (emphasis

added).

For example, merely because a male employee subsequently assumed her job

duties, this fact, alone, does not create a reasonable inference that Mr. Bell demoted

and fired Ms. Kohser on the basis of her gender. Instead, given Mr. Bell’s

performance-related explanation for his treatment of Ms. Kohser and in the absence

of a suitable comparator, more circumstantial evidence of a gender bias on the part

of Mr. Bell or some other gender-driven proof would be needed for a reasonable jury

to infer the existence of gender discrimination under Smith’s mosaic model.

17 Ms.

17 The Eleventh Circuit summarized the pieces of race-related evidence in Smith to include:

The foregoing circumstantial facts preclude summary judgment in this case

as a jury reasonably could infer that Lockheed only fired Mitten because he is white.

The evidence yields this inference because it: (1) suggests that Lockheed's

justification for firing Mitten is a pretext for racial animus; (2) shows that Lockheed

had a substantial incentive to discipline white employees more harshly than black

employees in the summer of 2005; and (3) indicates clearly that Lockheed

consciously injected race considerations into its discipline decision making without

an adequate explanation for doing so.

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Kohser’s evidence falls short of creating such a triable gender claim. 

As for her age claim, Protective has taken the position in its brief as well as in

other parts of the record that Ms. Kohser was “resistant to changes.” (Doc. 19 at 15

¶ 77 (citing Doc. 18-1 at 49 at 166-69; Doc. 21-2 at 27-31 at Ex. 36)).18 While in

opposing Protective’s Motion Ms. Kohser disputes this fact as conclusory,

mischaracterizing of testimony, and lacking in foundation (Doc. 44 at 33 ¶ 77), she,

in turn, attempts to rely on this same description of Ms. Kohser’s deficient

performance as circumstantial evidence of Mr. Bell’s ageist attitude about her. (Doc.

60 at 29). 

However, the particular underlying evidence relied upon by Protective in an

effort to substantiate this factual contention has nothing to do with Mr. Bell or any

arguably age-driven comments that he (or any other employee) made about Ms.

Kohser. Instead, Protective references only Ms. Kohser’s own deposition testimony,

(which describes her dealings with Tonya Pettis (“Ms. Pettis”) over the preparation

of Protective’s Schedule S to be filed with regulatory agencies), and contendsthat this

evidence underscores Ms. Kohser’sresistance to change. (See Doc. 18-1 at 49 at 166-

69; see also Doc. 21-2 at 27-31 at Ex. 36 (attaching email communications between

644 F.3d at 1340. Ms. Kohser’s purported discriminatory proof is considerably less.

18 The first pinpoint references for Doc. 21-2 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF

numbering system.

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Ms. Kohser and Ms. Pettis about Schedule S)).

Relying upon Protective’s factual contention made in its brief to

circumstantially show Mr. Bell’s discriminatory age-based intent misses the mark in

several respects. First, this factual contention offered in a brief is not evidence, but

rather onlyProtective’slawyer’s characterization of the evidence. Second, the critical

inquiry in this circumstantial evidence case is whether Mr. Bell, the undisputed sole

decisionmaker, ever expressly made any discriminatory comments or otherwise

demonstrated a discriminatory animus from which a reasonable jury could infer the

existence of age discrimination. Cf., e.g., Steger v. General Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066,

1079 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A decision maker’s discriminatory comment which may not

qualify as direct evidence of discrimination may constitute circumstantial evidence

which could assist a jury in disbelieving the employer’s proffered reasons for the

adverse action.”). 

Here, Ms. Kohser has only linked one nebulous arguably age-related

assessment of her by Mr. Bell. See court’s discussion of Protective’s EEOC position

statement at 31 n.15, supra. Ms. Kohser has not developed a record from which a

reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Bell’s had an age-focused bias that infused

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the decisionmaking process.

19 Thus, in the absence of a reasonable inference that Mr.

Bell discriminated against her on the basis of her age, Ms. Kohser has not met Smith’s

mosaic standard on that claim either.

Instead, granting summary judgment on Ms. Kohser’s gender and age claims

is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves:

Thus, a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient

evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may

permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully

discriminated.

This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always

be adequate to sustain a jury’s finding of liability. Certainly there will

be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie

case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant’s

explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was

discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment

as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other,

nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff

created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason

was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent

evidence that no discrimination had occurred.

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S. Ct. at 2109 (emphasis by underlining added). 

Here, to the extent that Ms. Kohser has created an issue of fact about the

truthfulness of Mr. Bell’s decision to demote and fire her, she has, at best, only shown

19 The treatment of Ms. Cook under Protective’s disciplinary policy does not help Ms.

Kohser under the mosaic model either, as Ms. Kohser was the decisionmaker in that instance, not

Mr. Bell.

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a weak dispute or a weak mosaic of discriminatory evidence. Further, the record

otherwise confirms that Mr. Bell’s decision was free from any considerations of Ms.

Kohser’s age or gender.

Accordingly, after having conducted a de novo review,for all the reasonsstated

above, the fifth part of Ms. Kohser’s specific objections is OVERRULED. Further,

the court ACCEPTS the R&R’s conclusion that the Motion is due to be GRANTED

on Ms. Kohser’s age and gender discrimination claims.

6. Ms. Kohser’s Specific Objection Based upon

Negligent and Wanton Hiring, Training,

Supervision, and Retention

Finally, within the conclusion of her objections, Ms. Kohser states that

“[b]ecause [she] can establish thatshe was demoted and/or terminated because of her

age, the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending that her claim for

Negligent/Wanton Hiring,Training,Supervision, and RetentionClaimbe dismissed.”

(Doc. 60 at 29-30).

Because this court has concluded de novo that Ms. Kohser has no triable age

discrimination claim, it agrees with the magistrate judge that “her derivative claim

[premised upon the AADEA] for negligent/wanton hiring, training, supervision, and

retention is due to be DISMISSED.” (Doc. 59 at 53).

Accordingly, after having conducted a de novo review, for all the reasonsstated

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above, the sixth part of Ms. Kohser’s objectionsis OVERRULED. Further, the court

ACCEPTS the R&R’s conclusion that the Motion is due to be GRANTED on Ms.

Kohser’s claim for negligent/wanton hiring, training, supervision, and retention

arising under Alabama law.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set out above, the court SUSTAINS IN LIMITED PART,

alternatively TERMS as MOOT IN PART, and otherwise OVERRULES Ms.

Kohser’s objections. The court further ACCEPTS the R&R as modified herein.

Accordingly, Protective’s Motion (Doc. 17) is due to be GRANTED, and Ms.

Kohser’s case is due to be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The court will enter

a separate final judgment order consistent with this memorandum opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this the 25th day of March, 2015.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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