Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03083/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03083-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Angel Canava
Petitioner
Department of Homeland Security
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ANGEL CANAVA,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3083

______________________ 

Petition for review of an arbitrator’s decision by Samuel Vitaro.

______________________ 

Decided: April 5, 2016

______________________ 

JIM CALLE, Law Office of Jim E. Calle, P.C., Tucson, 

AZ, argued for petitioner. 

EMMA BOND, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by BENJMAIN 

C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., CLAUDIA BURKE; 

ERIC J. MCNEILUS, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, 

United States Department of Homeland Security, Tucson, 

AZ.

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, DYK, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

Case: 15-3083 Document: 51-2 Page: 1 Filed: 04/05/2016
2 CANAVA v. DHS 

HUGHES, Circuit Judge. 

Angel Canava was removed from his position as a 

U.S. Border Patrol Agent pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7371, 

which mandates the removal of any law enforcement 

officer who is convicted of a felony. He appeals the Arbitrator’s decision upholding his removal. Because the 

Arbitrator did not err in finding that Mr. Canava was 

convicted of a felony for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 7371, we 

affirm. 

I 

On April 3, 2013, Mr. Canava was indicted on two felony counts. On June 11, 2013, Mr. Canava entered into a 

plea agreement with the State of Arizona in which he 

pleaded guilty to “Amended Count One: Unlawful Imprisonment by Strangulation, Domestic Violence, a class six 

undesignated offense,” in violation of Arizona Revised

Statute (A.R.S.) § 13-1303(A) and (C). J.A. 168–73. On 

August 5, 2013, judgment was entered against 

Mr. Canava for the “undesignated offense” of unlawful 

imprisonment. Id. at 181. 

On August 15, 2013, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposed to remove Mr. Canava from federal 

service pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7371, which mandates 

removal of federal law enforcement officers if they are 

convicted of a felony. The removal notice stated that 

“[p]ursuant to Arizona Law, A.R.S. § 13-604, this conviction is a felony conviction for all purposes until the offense 

is affirmatively designated a misdemeanor by the Court.” 

Id. at 164. 

On August 16, 2013, Mr. Canava submitted a written 

reply to DHS arguing, among other things, that 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7371 did not apply and could not be the basis for his 

removal because he pleaded guilty to an “undesignated 

offense” and not a felony. According to Mr. Canava, until 

a judge designated his offense a felony, he had not been 

Case: 15-3083 Document: 51-2 Page: 2 Filed: 04/05/2016
CANAVA v. DHS 3

convicted of a felony. DHS disagreed and immediately 

removed Mr. Canava from federal service. 

On August 30, 2013, Mr. Canava timely invoked arbitration. He again argued that he was not convicted of a 

felony, but only an undesignated offense that is treated 

like a felony. On December 16, 2014, the Arbitrator found 

that Mr. Canava had been convicted of a felony and 

sustained his removal. 

Mr. Canava appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant 

to 5 U.S.C. §§ 7121(f) and 7703(b)(1).

II

“We review an arbitrator’s decision under the same 

standard of review that is applied to decisions from the 

Merit Systems Protection Board.” Appleberry v. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., 793 F.3d 1291, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Johnson v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 625 F.3d 

1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). “Thus, we must affirm the 

decision of the arbitrator unless it is: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required 

by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) 

unsupported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting 5 

U.S.C. § 7703(c) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Prior to the enactment of the current version of 5 

U.S.C. § 737l, law enforcement officers convicted of felonies could be removed by their employing agencies, but 

the agencies were not required to do so. See 146 Cong. 

Rec. S2617 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 2000) (statement of Sen. 

Grassley). As enacted, 5 U.S.C. § 7371 requires the 

mandatory and immediate removal of a law enforcement 

Case: 15-3083 Document: 51-2 Page: 3 Filed: 04/05/2016
4 CANAVA v. DHS 

officer who is convicted of a felony.1 “Any law enforcement officer who is convicted of a felony shall be removed 

from employment as a law enforcement officer on the last 

day of the first applicable pay period following the conviction notice date.” 5 U.S.C. § 7371(b). “Conviction notice 

date” is defined as the date on which the employing 

agency receives “notice that the officer has been convicted 

of a felony that is entered by a Federal or State 

court . . . .” Id. § 7371(a)(1). Moreover, the removal is 

mandatory even if the conviction is not yet final because it 

has been appealed. Id.2 

A 

Mr. Canava asserts that the Arbitrator erred in sustaining his removal because he was not convicted of a 

felony as required by 5 U.S.C. § 7371, but instead was 

convicted of an “undesignated offense.” Pet. Br. 9. Additionally, he contends that the undesignated offense he 

pleaded guilty to was not pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604(A), 

which sets forth procedures by which the state court can

designate certain class six felony convictions as misdemeanors or refrain from designation until a term of probation is completed. Although Mr. Canava’s plea 

agreement provided that the offense would remain “undesignated” and “open-ended,” we agree with the Arbitrator and conclude that Mr. Canava was convicted of a class 

six felony pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604(A). 

The Arizona Criminal Code defines “felony” as “an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in 

 

1 There is no dispute that pleading guilty to a felony offense constitutes a conviction for purposes of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7371. 

2 A separate provision provides for reinstatement 

and back pay if the conviction is overturned on appeal. 5 

U.S.C. § 7371(d). 

Case: 15-3083 Document: 51-2 Page: 4 Filed: 04/05/2016
CANAVA v. DHS 5

the custody of the state department of corrections is 

authorized by any law of this state.” A.R.S. § 13-105(18) 

(emphasis added). A class six felony carries a presumptive sentence of one year imprisonment, with a mitigated 

sentence of 0.33 years and an aggravated sentence of two 

years. Id. § 13-702(D). 

However, under A.R.S. § 13-604(A), a trial judge has 

three options when sentencing a defendant for a nonrepetitive, non-dangerous class six offense: (1) designate 

the offense a felony and sentence accordingly; (2) designate the offense a class one misdemeanor if a felony 

sentence is “unduly harsh,” and sentence accordingly; or 

(3) place the defendant on probation and leave the offense 

undesignated until the completion of probation. A.R.S. 

§ 13-604(A); see also State v. Diaz, 173 Ariz. 270, 272 

(1992) (interpreting A.R.S. § 13-702(H), the predecessor 

statute to A.R.S. § 13-604(A)). When a class six felony is 

left undesignated at sentencing, it is treated as a felony 

conviction until such time that the judge enters an order 

designating the offense a misdemeanor. A.R.S. § 13-

604(A). 

Thus, although the plea agreement provided that the 

offense would remain “undesignated” and “open-ended,” 

the language of the plea agreement compels the conclusion that Mr. Canava pleaded guilty to a felony for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 7371. Application of 5 U.S.C. § 7371

depends only on whether the conviction constitutes a 

felony at the time of conviction, regardless of whether it is 

ultimately downgraded to a misdemeanor. The statutory 

sentencing range outlined in Mr. Canava’s plea agreement matches the statutory sentencing range for class six

felonies under Arizona law. Compare J.A. 168 with A.R.S.

§ 13-702(D). The plea agreement also notes that the 

“available term of probation for a Class SIX Felony is 

THREE (3) years” and requires that Mr. Canava serve 

three years of supervised probation. Compare J.A. 168–

69 with A.R.S. § 13-902(A)(4) (“Unless terminated sooner, 

Case: 15-3083 Document: 51-2 Page: 5 Filed: 04/05/2016
6 CANAVA v. DHS 

probation may continue for the following periods: For a 

class 5 or 6 felony, three years.”). Therefore, the Arbitrator did not err in finding that Mr. Canava was convicted 

of a class six felony because Mr. Canava was convicted of 

an offense “for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment was . . . authorized” and the sentence imposed was 

commensurate with the sentence prescribed for a class six

felony. 

Moreover, we conclude that Mr. Canava’s plea agreement was entered into pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604(A), 

such that the undesignated offense may be treated as a 

felony for all purposes until it is designated as a misdemeanor. In State v. Arana, the Arizona Supreme Court 

stated that the benefit of A.R.S. § 13-604(A) and its predecessor statute “is the potential for designation of a felony 

as a misdemeanor at some future date, not immunity 

from felony sanctions at the time of sentencing.” 173 

Ariz. 370, 371 (1992). Thus, a defendant convicted of an 

undesignated offense pursuant to the procedures set forth 

in A.R.S. § 13-604(A) faces the same consequences as if he 

were convicted of a felony until such time that the offense 

is affirmatively designated as a misdemeanor. 

Although the plea agreement does not specifically rely 

on A.R.S. § 13-604(A), the procedures set forth in A.R.S. 

§ 13-604(A) are duplicated in the plea agreement. The 

plea agreement gave the judge the discretion to (1) designate the offense as a felony, (2) designate the offense as a 

misdemeanor, or (3) place Mr. Canava on probation and 

defer designation of the offense. Compare J.A. 169 with

A.R.S. § 13-604(A). Moreover, the plea agreement notes 

that if the judge were to place Mr. Canava on probation 

and leave the offense undesignated, the offense may not

be designated a misdemeanor until the probation period is 

terminated. J.A. 169. 

As the Arbitrator noted, A.R.S. § 13-604(A) is the only 

authority in which trial judges are granted the discretion 

Case: 15-3083 Document: 51-2 Page: 6 Filed: 04/05/2016
CANAVA v. DHS 7

to defer designation of an offense. While Mr. Canava is 

correct that parties to a plea agreement may negotiate the 

designation of a class six non-dangerous, non-repetitive

offense pursuant to the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, “the trial court is not bound by any sentencing 

provision in a plea agreement [that] it finds inappropriate.” State v. Corno, 179 Ariz. 151, 154–55 (App. 1994). 

For example, if the parties stipulated to a felony designation in the plea agreement but the trial court finds that it 

would be unduly harsh to designate the offense as a 

felony, the judge can reject the plea agreement. Id. at 

155. Thus, the ultimate determination as to whether a 

class six non-dangerous, non-repetitive offense may 

remain undesignated pending the successful completion of 

probation is within the province of the trial court pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604(A). 

Therefore, because Mr. Canava was convicted of an 

undesignated offense pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604(A), the 

offense may be treated as a felony for all purposes, including the basis for his removal under 5 U.S.C. § 7371. 

B 

Mr. Canava also argues that the Arbitrator’s decision 

violated the Supremacy Clause by expanding 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7371’s mandate that an individual be convicted of an 

actual felony and not simply an undesignated offense 

treated as a felony under Arizona law. Although presented as a Supremacy Clause argument, Mr. Canava is 

simply repeating his previous argument—that an undesignated offense cannot be considered a felony conviction for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 7371. If the Arbitrator had 

improperly expanded the definition of 5 U.S.C. § 7371, it 

would be an error in statutory interpretation. It would 

not, however, be a violation of the Supremacy Clause, 

which generally places limits on the States, not on the 

federal government applying a federal statute. 

Case: 15-3083 Document: 51-2 Page: 7 Filed: 04/05/2016
8 CANAVA v. DHS 

In any event, we see no conflict between Arizona law

and 5 U.S.C. § 7371. Mr. Canava was convicted of an 

undesignated offense that, under Arizona law, carried the 

same punishment as a class 6 felony—a presumptive 

sentence of one year imprisonment, with a mitigated 

sentence of 0.33 years and an aggravated sentence of two 

years. A.R.S. § 13-702(D). The Supreme Court has 

defined “felony” for purposes of federal law as a “serious 

crime usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment for more 

than one year or by death.” Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 

560 U.S. 563, 574 (2010) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 

(9th ed. 2009)). We need not decide whether the meaning 

of felony under 5 U.S.C. § 7371 is determined by federal 

or state law, because in this case Mr. Canava was convicted of an offense that qualifies as a felony under both. 

III

Because we find no error in the Arbitrator’s decision, 

we affirm. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 15-3083 Document: 51-2 Page: 8 Filed: 04/05/2016