Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02947/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02947-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sugeyli Mishelle Alvarez-Salazar
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Evelin Salazar-Ortega
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2947

___________________________

Evelin Salazar-Ortega; Sugeyli Mishelle Alvarez-Salazar

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioners

v.

Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General of the United States

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

 Board of Immigration Appeals

____________

 Submitted: May 17, 2016

 Filed: July 8, 2016

[Unpublished] 

____________

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Evelin Salazar-Ortega and her minor daughter, both natives and citizens of

Guatemala, entered the United States illegally in July 2014 and were placed in

removal proceedings. They sought relief from removal by filing applications for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture (CAT). Following a hearing, the immigration judge (IJ) denied relief, and the

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Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed. Salazar-Ortega now petitions this

court for review. We deny the petition. 

In her application for relief, Salazar-Ortega stated that she feared being

persecuted in Guatemala on account of her membership in the particular social group

of “Guatemalan women who lack a male protective figure,” her membership in her

“family,” and her “political opinion supporting women’s rights.” Salazar-Ortega

testified before the IJ that she was married but was separated from her husband; that

in 1995, when she was four years old, her father was murdered in Guatemala after

receiving demands for money and death threats; that she graduated from the

Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala in July 2014; and that she worked as a

teacher and as an independent sales representative for several fashion and beauty

companies. In February 2014, Salazar-Ortega began receiving phone calls and text

messages from two men who demanded 50,000 quetezales (about $6,500), and

threatened to harm her and her daughter if she did not pay. She testified that the men

knew who her father was; where she was a student; and when she went to work,

attended classes, and came home. She further testified that she believed the men

knew she was working as a sales representative and that they had asked her for money

because “they thought that I did have money because I also sold products.” SalazarOrtega reported the threats to the police several times, but the police did not identify

or apprehend the men.

Salazar-Ortega also testified that on July 10, 2014, two masked men grabbed

her as she was leaving the university, held down her arms, tore her blouse and

touched her breast, put a gun to her back, and attempted to rape her. They fled when

security officers happened upon the area. Officers gave chase, but the men escaped. 

Salazar-Ortega testified that the two men who attacked her were the same two men

who had been threatening her over the phone because “they told [her]” they were the

“same people” and “mentioned the money,” again demanding 50,000 quetezales. She

stated that the men “said the same things that they said . . . when they would call” and

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that warned her that they had not been “jok[ing]” about paying them the money. She

also testified that the men told her that she had one month to pay or they would kill

her and her daughter. Salazar-Ortega reported the incident to the police the next day

but, as far as she knew, the police neither investigated the incident nor apprehended

the two men. Ten days later, she left Guatemala, explaining that she felt compelled

to leave because the two men “were going to . . . murder me and [my] daughter, and

they gave me a month . . . to get that money. I wasn’t going to be able to get that

money.” When asked at the hearing why she believed these men had targeted her,

Salazar-Ortega stated, “[A]t one time, you know, they did mention that a woman has

to be dependent of a man [and not] just move forward and . . . be independent and

move ahead by herself.”

The IJ denied relief, concluding first that Salazar-Ortega had presented

insufficient evidence to support her claims that she had suffered persecution on

account of her political opinion or her membership in her family. The IJ also declined

to determine whether “Guatemalan women who lack a male protective figure”

constituted a particular social group because, in any event, Salazar-Ortega had failed

to establish that the harm she suffered was in any way related to her membership in

that particular social group. Instead, the IJ found it “clear from [her] testimony as a

whole thatshe wassubject to extortion by criminals and threats, and, finally, an attack

for the simple reason that they wanted money.” 

Salazar-Ortega filed a motion to reconsider, proposing a different particular

social group and arguing that the IJ “plainly erred in finding no nexus between the

past persecution [she] suffered and her political opinion supporting women’s rights

or her membership in the particular social group of single Guatemalan women who

are working professionals.” She argued that the IJ erroneously focused on a motive

of criminal extortion and failed to consider that a protected ground was at least “one

central reason” for the harm she suffered. The IJ denied the motion. 

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On appeal to the Board, Salazar-Ortega argued that the IJ erred by rejecting 1

her claims that she was persecuted on account of her political opinion supporting

women’s rights, her membership in her “family,” and her membership in the newly

proposed particular social group of “single Guatemalan women who are working

professionals.” The Board dismissed Salazar-Ortega’s appeal, concluding that her

testimony established that the two men had threatened and attempted to rape her

because of their criminal motivation to extort money. The Board noted that “persons

perceived as being wealthy do not constitute a particular social group,” nor do

“conditions of civil strife affecting the populace as a whole . . . constitute

persecution.” The Board acknowledged Salazar-Ortega’s testimony suggesting that

she was targeted because a woman cannot be “independent and move ahead by

herself,” but concluded that her testimony as a whole clearly established that she was

targeted “because of her perceived wealth” and her ability to complywith extortionate

demands, not because of her membership in the particular social group of “single

Guatemalan women who are working professionals.” The Board further concluded

that Salazar-Ortega had not presented sufficient evidence to show that the men

targeted her because she supported women’s rights or because of her membership in

her family. The Board determined that because Salazar-Ortega had not shown that

she suffered persecution on account of a statutorily protected basis, it need not

address her argument that the IJ erred by finding that she failed to show that the

Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control the perpetrators. The

Board also concluded that because Salazar-Ortega did not satisfy the less demanding

The IJ denied Salazar-Ortega’s motion to reconsider on March 9, 2015, the

1

same date on which the Board received her notice of appeal of the IJ’s original

decision. Because the notice of appeal was dated March 4, 2015, however, it did not

indicate that Salazar-Ortega was also appealing the IJ’s denial of her motion to

reconsider. Although the Board did not specifically refer to the IJ’s denial of the

motion to reconsider, it considered and rejected the arguments she raised in that

motion.

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requirements to qualify for asylum, her claims for withholding of removal and relief

under the CAT also failed.

We review the Board’s decision for substantial evidence on the record as a

whole, see Kanagu v. Holder, 781 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 2015), and will not disturb

its findings of fact “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502

U.S. 478, 481 & n.1, 483-84 (1992). We review questions of law de novo, but give

substantial deference to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of the statutes and

regulations that it administers. See Matul-Hernandez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 707, 712

(8th Cir. 2012). When the Board adopts the reasoning of the IJ, we consider the two

decisions together. Kanagu, 781 F.3d at 916. 

Substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the Board’s denial of

Salazar-Ortega’s claims for relief. No reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

disagree with the Board’s finding that the persecution Salazar Ortega suffered was on

account of her persecutors’ criminal motive to extort money and their perception that

she had the means to pay, rather than her political opinion or her membership in any

of the particular social groups she proposed. As set forth above, Salazar-Ortega

repeatedly testified that the two men had threatened, harassed, and attacked her

because they wanted money and believed that she had it. Although Salazar-Ortega

urges a different interpretation of the record, there is no indication that the Board or

the IJ ignored or mischaracterized the evidence. See Quinteros v. Holder, 707 F.3d

1006, 1011 (8th Cir. 2013). 

The fact that the two men attacked and attempted to rape Salazar-Ortega,

although appalling, does not alone establish that such persecution was on account of

a protected ground. “To reverse the finding that the alleged persecution was not

based on a protected ground, it is necessary that the record compel the finding that a

protected ground motivated the [perpetrators’] actions.” Kanagu, 781 F.3d at 918

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(quoting Gomez v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 2005)). The record in this

case does not compel reversal of the finding that Salazar-Ortega was not persecuted

on account of her political opinion or her membership in any of the particular social

groups she proposed. To the extent the two men referred to Salazar-Ortega’s

employment as a sales representative, it is evident that those references were intended

to put Salazar-Ortega on notice that the men were aware of her potential sources of

income and to further intimidate her into paying them money. Likewise, to the extent

that the men commented on a woman being dependent on a man, used demeaning

language in one threat, or briefly remarked on Salazar-Ortega’s separation from her

husband, the record does not compel a reversal of the Board’s finding that these

isolated incidents were insufficient to establish that the two men had any motive

beyond criminal extortion of money. 

Salazar-Ortega argues that the Board erred by declining to determine whether

her proposed particular social group of “single Guatemalan women who are working

professionals” was cognizable. We disagree. The Board declined to reach this issue

because it agreed with the IJ that, even if such a group were cognizable,

Salazar-Ortega failed to demonstrate that she had been or would be persecuted on

account of her membership in that group. See Aguinada-Lopez v. Lynch, No. 15-

1095, 2016 WL 3176422, at *2 (8th Cir. June 7, 2016) (assuming that proposed

particular social group was cognizable but affirming denial ofrelief because applicant

failed to establish a nexus between that group and the persecution).

Salazar-Ortega contends that the Board failed to specifically discuss whether

her political opinion or her membership in one of her proposed particular social

groups was “at least one central reason” for the persecution she suffered. See 8

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 344-46 (BIA Sept.

14, 2010) (noting that after enactment of the REAL ID Act of 2005, the “at least one

central reason” standard applies in mixed-motive asylum cases). It istrue that the “at

least one central reason” standard applies in so-called “mixed-motive” cases, but the

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Board found that Salazar-Ortega had presented insufficient evidence to establish that

her political opinion or her membership in any proposed particular social group were

even secondary motives of the two men, much less that either protected ground was

“at least one central reason” for the alleged persecution. While a motive of extortion

does not “preclude a finding of additional motives that may concern a protected

ground,” Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 2009), SalazarOrtega has failed to establish that the persecution she suffered was in any way on

account of a protected ground. 

Salazar-Ortega argues that the Board improperly substituted a different

particular social group for the group of “single Guatemalan women who are working

professionals” thatshe actually proposed, and she cites Crespin-Valladares v. Holder,

632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011), in support of her claim that this error requires that we

remand the case. Unlike the circumstances in Crespin-Valladares, however, the

Board acknowledged Salazar-Ortega’s proposed particular social group, but declined

to specifically determine whether the group was cognizable because, even assuming

that it was, Salazar-Ortega failed to establish that she was persecuted on account of

her membership in that group. Likewise, the IJ acknowledged Salazar-Ortega’s

proposed particular social group of “Guatemalan women who lack a male protective

figure” and concluded that she had not established that the persecution she suffered

was in any way related to her membership in that group. Neither the IJ nor the Board

misstated, overlooked, or otherwise failed to consider the proposed particular social

groups alleged by Salazar-Ortega. Rather, the IJ and Board each concluded that, even

assuming the cognizability of Salazar-Ortega’s various proposed particular social

groups, she had not established that her membership in the relevant group was a

reason for the persecution she suffered. 

After considering the record as a whole, we conclude that no reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to reject the IJ’s and the Board’s conclusion that the

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two men targeted Salazar-Ortega because they intended to extort money from her and

they perceived that she was wealthy. 

Because Salazar-Ortega failed to carry the relatively lower burden of proof on

her asylum claim, and because her other claims for relief are based upon the same

arguments, her claims for withholding of removal and relief under the CAT also fail. 

See Makatengkeng v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 876, 885 (8th Cir. 2007). 

The petition for review is denied. 

______________________________

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