Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-01370/USCOURTS-caDC-02-01370-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Metro Mobile Communications, Inc.
Appellant
Federal Communications Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 20, 2003 Decided April 23, 2004

No. 02-1370

CALIFORNIA METRO MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

Appeal of an Order of the

Federal Communications Commission

Christopher D. Imlay argued the cause for the appellant.

Pamela L. Smith, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued the cause for the appellee. John A. Rogovin,

General Counsel, and Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission were on

brief. Jane E. Mago, Assistant General Counsel, Federal

Communications Commission, entered an appearance.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 1 of 14
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Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: California Metro Mobile Communications, Inc. (CMMC) appeals the Federal

Communications Commission’s (Commission’s) order denying

review of the decision of its Public Safety and Private Wireless Division to modify CMMC’s trunked radio station by

removing one frequency. CMMC first contends that the

Commission lacks authority under the Communications Act of

1934 (Communications Act or Act), 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.,

and the implementing regulations to modify CMMC’s license.

Second, CMMC maintains that, even if the Commission has

authority to modify its license, the decision to do so violates

the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A). We reject CMMC’s claims as explained below

and, accordingly, affirm the Commission’s order.

I.

CMMC, a provider of mobile radio equipment and two-way

radio service, applied to the Commission for a license to

operate a trunked1

 radio station on Very High Frequency

(VHF) channels in the Industrial/Business radio pool of the

1 The process of ‘‘trunking’’ increases efficiency in spectrum use

by ‘‘giving a single transmitting station simultaneous access to

multiple channels so that it can systematically scan all lines until it

finds an open channel on which to place a waiting call. This pooling

enables expeditious handling of many more calls than is possible if

each call had to be completed, if at all, only through one preassigned channel.’’ Telocator Network of Am. v. FCC, 691 F.2d 525,

530 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Telocator Network we analogized

trunking to customer lines at a bank: ‘‘If there is a separate line for

each teller, the customer gets on what he thinks is a short line only

to find out that the customer in front of him has a lengthy

transaction. On the other hand, if there was only one line feeding

into all the tellers, the line would keep moving because only one

teller out of many would be slowed down by the lengthy transaction.’’ Id.

USCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 2 of 14
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Private Land Mobile Radio (PLMR) services in Twin Creeks,

California. The Personal Communications Industry Association (PCIA), an organization certified by the FCC to coordinate frequencies, submitted CMMC’s application to the Commission’s Licensing and Technical Analysis Branch (Branch)

of the Public Safety and Private Wireless Division (Division)

of the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau and recommended appropriate frequencies for operation of CMMC’s

proposed station. On September 8, 1999 the Branch granted

CMMC a license to operate a trunked radio station under the

call sign WPOY920 on five channels, including frequency

153.6125 MHz.

On September 19, 2000 Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)

petitioned2

 the Commission to revoke CMMC’s license because, it claimed, CMMC’s operation on frequency 153.6125

MHz potentially interfered with the operations of its earlierlicensed stations (KJX775, WNFM314 and WPPX407) on

frequency 153.6050 MHz. PG&E submitted an interference

study done by the Industrial Telecommunications Association

(ITA) which demonstrated that CMMC’s interference signal

contour overlapped PG&E’s service area signal contours. As

the stations’ signals overlapped, PG&E contended that the

Commission improperly granted CMMC’s application because

PG&E had a prior and exclusive right to operate on frequency 153.6050 MHz and CMMC had failed to comply with

Commission rules by obtaining PG&E’s consent to operate on

frequency 153.6125 MHz. In this regard, PG&E asserted

that, given the ‘‘critical nature of [its] operation,’’ ‘‘in no way’’

would it have consented to CMMC’s operation on frequency

153.6125 MHz. Joint Appendix (JA) 1.

Responding to PG&E’s petition, the Branch sent a letter to

the PCIA on February 15, 2001 asking it to demonstrate that

2 PG&E’s letter, which it styled a ‘‘Petition for Revocation,’’ was

filed under section 1.91 of the Commission rules, which, inter alia,

provides that, if it appears that a license should be revoked, ‘‘the

Commission will issue an order directing the person to show cause

why an order of revocation TTT should not be issued.’’ 47 C.F.R.

§ 1.91(a).

USCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 3 of 14
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the frequency coordination it performed for CMMC’s application complied with Commission rules and, if it in fact failed to

do so, to submit a proposal to remedy the defect. On March

12, 2001 the PCIA responded, stating that the frequency

coordination it did for CMMC’s application had in fact failed

to take into account licenses held by PG&E and proposing

that the Commission ‘‘correct’’ CMMC’s license ‘‘by removing

frequency 153.6125.’’ JA 9.

On August 14, 2001 the Division denied PG&E’s petition

but, on its own motion, initiated a proceeding to modify

CMMC’s license by deleting frequency 153.6125 MHz. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., Petition to Revoke Grant of License for

California Metro Mobile Communications for Industrial/Business Private Land Mobile Radio Station, WPOY920,

Twin Creeks, California & California Metro Mobile Communications, Licensee of Trunked Industrial/Business Pool Station WPOY920, Twin Creeks, California, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 16 FCC Rcd 15419 (released Aug. 17, 2001).

The Division first addressed CMMC’s contention that the

Commission lacked authority to entertain PG&E’s petition

because it was in effect an untimely petition for reconsideration under section 405 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.

§ 405.3

 The Commission rejected CMMC’s contention, explaining that PG&E’s request ‘‘is most properly characterized

as an informal request for Commission action under [s]ection

1.41 of the Commission’s [r]ules.’’4

 16 FCC Rcd at 15421.

3 Section 405 provides in part: ‘‘After an order, decision, report,

or action has been made or taken in any proceeding by the

Commission, or by any designated authority within the Commission

pursuant to a delegation under section 155(c)(1) of this title, any

party thereto, or any other person aggrieved or whose interests are

adversely affected thereby, may petition for reconsideration only to

the authority making or taking the order, decision, report, or

action.’’ 47 U.S.C. § 405(a). The petition must ‘‘be filed within

thirty days from the date upon which public notice is given of the

order, decision, report, or action complained of.’’ Id.

4 Section 1.41 provides: ‘‘Except where formal procedures are

required under the provisions of this chapter, requests for action

may be submitted informally.’’ 47 C.F.R. § 1.41.

USCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 4 of 14
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Turning to the merits of the request, the Division agreed with

PG&E that CMMC’s application was improperly coordinated

because it failed to provide PG&E’s operations with the

required level of interference protection. Id. The Division

explained, however, that revocation of CMMC’s license was

unnecessary under the circumstances because PCIA had

‘‘proposed changes to the CMMC license designed to eliminate interference to PG&E’s stations.’’ Id. at 15422. The

Division concluded instead that section 316 of the Communications Act,5

 47 U.S.C. § 316, which authorizes the Commission to modify a license in the public interest, convenience

and necessity, provided the ‘‘appropriate vehicle for resolving

this matter.’’ Id. And the Division found that section 316’s

requirements were met: ‘‘[T]he proposed modification would

serve the public interest by preserving the existing coverage

areas of affected parties and preventing harmful interference,

while not unduly disrupting CMMC’s operations.’’ Id. Thus,

the Division proposed to modify CMMC’s license by deleting

frequency 153.6125 MHz following notice to CMMC and an

opportunity for CMMC to protest it. Id.; see 47 U.S.C.

§ 316(a)(1) (modification order not final until licensee notified

of proposed action and given at least thirty days to protest);

47 C.F.R. § 1.87(a) (same). CMMC availed itself of this

opportunity.

On December 27, 2001 the Division denied CMMC’s petition for reconsideration and modified CMMC’s license by

deleting frequency 153.6125 MHz. California Metro Mobile

Communications, Inc., Modification of Industrial/Business

Pool Trunked Station WPOY920 Frequency 153.1625 MHz,

Memorandum Opinion & Order & Order of Modification, 17

FCC Rcd 112 (released Dec. 31, 2001). In its petition CMMC

had again challenged the Commission’s authority to modify its

5 Section 316 provides in part: ‘‘Any station license TTT may be

modified by the Commission either for a limited time or for the

duration of the term thereof, if in the judgment of the Commission

such action will promote the public interest, convenience, and

necessity, or the provisions of this chapter or of any treaty ratified

by the United States will be more fully complied with.’’ 47 U.S.C.

§ 316(a)(1).

USCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 5 of 14
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license. CMMC claimed that PG&E’s request constituted an

untimely petition for reconsideration under 47 C.F.R. § 1.1066

and that, because PG&E failed to file its petition within

section 405’s 30–day window, the Commission could not consider PG&E’s request as an informal petition under 47 C.F.R.

§ 1.41. CMMC also claimed that 47 C.F.R. § 1.113,7

 which

allows an action taken under delegated authority to be modified or set aside within 30 days of its public notice, prevented

the Division from modifying a license once the 30 days

expired.

Finding CMMC’s procedural arguments to be ‘‘without

merit,’’ the Division rejected them. 17 FCC Rcd at 113–14.

The Division first reasserted that, in proposing to modify

CMMC’s license, it did not purport to act under the authority

of 47 C.F.R. § 1.113 but instead pursuant to section 316 of

the Act and 47 C.F.R. § 1.87(a). Id. at 114. The Division

further explained that, while CMMC correctly noted that

section 405 of the Act requires petitions for reconsideration to

be filed within 30 days following public notice of the action

the Commission is asked to reconsider, the Division proposed

to modify CMMC’s license on its own motion. Id. Turning

to the proposed modification itself, the Division explained that

CMMC had waived its right to protest the modification by

failing to object to it on the merits within the prescribed 30–

day period. Id. Finding that the modification served the

public interest, the Division deleted frequency 153.6125 MHz

from CMMC’s license. Id. CMMC then filed an application

for review with the Commission.

On October 29, 2002 the Commission denied CMMC’s

application for review. License of California Metro Mobile

Communications, Inc., Modification of Industrial/Business

6 Section 1.106 requires that a petition for reconsideration ‘‘be

filed within 30 days from the date of public notice of the final

Commission action.’’ 47 C.F.R. § 1.106(f).

7 Section 1.113 provides that ‘‘[w]ithin 30 days after public notice

has been given of any action taken pursuant to delegated authority,

the person, panel, or board taking the action may modify or set it

aside on its own motion.’’ 47 C.F.R. § 1.113(a).

USCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 6 of 14
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Pool Trunked Station WPOY920; Frequency 153.6125, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 17 FCC Rcd 22974 (released Nov.

13, 2002) [hereinafter California Metro Mobile Order]. The

Commission rejected CMMC’s contention that section 316 did

not authorize the license modification, concluding that section

316 authorizes it to modify a license if, in its judgment, the

modification will serve the public interest, convenience and

necessity with ‘‘no limitation on the time frame within which

the Commission may act to modify a license.’’ Id. at 22975.

The Commission went on to explain that ‘‘[a]lthough [s]ection

405 of the Act explicitly requires that petitions for reconsideration be filed within thirty days after public notice of the

action is given, Commission action under section 316 of the

Act is not subject to the limitations on revocation, modification or reconsideration imposed by [s]ection 405 of the Act

and implemented by’’ Commission rules. Id. (footnote omitted). Indeed, according to the Commission, CMMC’s reading

of section 316 ‘‘would vitiate the Commission’s authority

under [s]ection 316.’’ Id. at 22976.

The Commission also distinguished an earlier FCC order

CMMC relied on. Id. The Commission explained that its

San Mateo8

 decision differed because it dealt with the

Branch’s authority to correct clerical errors after the period

for sua sponte action had run. Id. By contrast, the Commission explained, ‘‘[n]othing’’ in that decision touched on the

subject of CMMC’s case: the Commission’s ability to modify

a license post-grant under section 316. Id. The Commission

further stated that, ‘‘[a]lthough the Division relied on a faulty

coordination in granting the frequency at issue to CMMC, it

8 Applications of County of San Mateo, California, To Modify

Public Safety Land Mobile Radio Station WIG278, Memorandum

Opinion & Order, 16 FCC Rcd 16501 (released Sept. 11, 2001)

[hereinafter San Mateo II]; see also County of San Mateo, California, Applications to Modify Public Safety Land Mobile Radio

Station WIG278, Order on Review & Reconsideration, 16 FCC Rcd

4291 (released Jan. 8, 2001) [hereinafter San Mateo I].

USCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 7 of 14
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did intend at the time to grant that particular frequency, and,

thus, its grant was not a ministerial or clerical error.’’ Id.

In addition, the Commission rejected CMMC’s claim that

the Commission lacked authority to modify its license because

the sole basis for the modification was PG&E’s petition for

revocation. Id. The Commission explained that the Division

denied PG&E’s petition for revocation and acted on its own

motion to modify CMMC’s license under section 316. Id.

The Commission further noted that deleting a single frequency from CMMC’s trunked station ‘‘was not tantamount to a

revocation of [its] license.’’ Id.

Finally, the Commission addressed CMMC’s protest (which

the Division deemed waived because it never received the

protest). Id. at 22976–78. The Commission rejected

CMMC’s argument that the public interest would not be

served by modifying a license based on potential interference

only, observing that, under its rules, ‘‘ ‘objectionable interference will be considered to exist’ when the interference contour of a proposed trunked station would intersect the service

contour of an existing station.’’ Id. at 22977 (quoting 47

C.F.R. § 90.187(b)(2)(iii)). Thus, the Commission explained,

the overlap of the two contours alone ‘‘is sufficient to create a

violation’’ of the rule which required CMMC to obtain

PG&E’s consent. Id. The Commission pointed out that,

especially with trunked stations, stations with overlapping

contours ‘‘cannot effectively cooperate in sharing the frequency and minimizing and reducing interference as required’’ by

Commission rules. Id. (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 90.173, 90.403).

Accordingly, the Commission concluded that modifying

CMMC’s license served the public interest by curing an

‘‘ongoing violation TTT that can unavoidably and presumptively[ ] only lead to predictable interference difficulties in a

shared spectrum environment.’’9

 Id.

9 The Commission also rejected CMMC’s complaint that modifying its license would hamper its ability to provide adequate service,

calling it a ‘‘bare’’ assertion because CMMC failed to substantiate it.

Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (‘‘allegations of fact shall TTT be

supported by affidavit of a person or persons with personal knowlUSCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 8 of 14
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CMMC now appeals the Commission’s order pursuant to 47

U.S.C. § 402(b)(5) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1).

II.

Our review of the Commission’s action is guided by familiar

administrative law standards. We defer to the Commission’s

interpretation of the Communications Act so long as the

Congress has not unambiguously forbidden it and it is otherwise permissible. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); see also Barnhart

v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002). Under Chevron’s classic

formulation, if the Congress ‘‘has directly spoken to the

precise question at issue,’’ we ‘‘give effect to [its] unambiguously expressed intent’’; ‘‘if the statute is silent or ambiguous,’’ we defer to the Commission’s interpretation so long as

it is ‘‘based on a permissible construction of the statute.’’ 467

U.S. at 842–43. We will affirm the Commission’s action

unless it is ‘‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with lawTTTT’’ 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A); see City of Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822

F.2d 1153, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1987). We do not prefer our

judgment to that of the Commission and require only that it

‘‘examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between

the facts found and the choice made.’ ’’ Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371

U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). The Commission’s modification of

CMMC’s license easily survives the application of these standards of review.

edge thereof’’); 47 C.F.R. § 1.87(d) (protest must comply with

requirements of section 309). CMMC’s unsupported allegation, the

Commission noted, failed to ‘‘raise a substantial and material question of fact concerning the modification of CMMC’s license.’’ 17

FCC Rcd at 22978. Further, because CMMC is licensed to operate

on other frequencies, the modification of its license, according to the

Commission, ‘‘may have a minor effect on CMMC’s operations.’’ Id.

USCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 9 of 14
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CMMC initially claims, as it did below, that neither section

405 nor section 316 authorized the Commission to modify its

license. We need not be detained long by CMMC’s argument

that PG&E’s petition for revocation was an untimely petition

for reconsideration under section 405 of the Act (and sections

1.106 and 1.113 of the rules). PG&E’s petition was filed

approximately one year after the time for filing a petition for

reconsideration had expired and therefore it could not be

treated as a petition for reconsideration. See 47 U.S.C.

§ 405(a); 47 C.F.R. § 1.106(f). We see nothing impermissible, however, in the Commission’s treating it as an informal

request for action. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.41(a); see JPJ Elec.

Communications, Inc., For Reconsideration of Dismissal of

Informal Request to Modify Station KNNQ312, Licensed to

the Town of Clay, New York, Order on Reconsideration, 16

FCC Rcd 2902, 2904 (Div. 2001) (addressing petition for

modification filed outside time for petition for reconsideration

under section 1.41). Moreover, the Commission could not

have been clearer that, in modifying CMMC’s license, it acted

on its own motion and pursuant to section 316 of the Act and

section 1.87(a) of its rules. See California Metro Mobile

Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 22975.

CMMC argues, however, that the Commission’s decision in

San Mateo I, 16 FCC Rcd at 4291–94, prevented the Commission from proceeding as it did. It contends that San

Mateo I holds that a license issued pursuant to delegated

authority may not be modified for any reason more than 30

days after its grant. But the holding in San Mateo I is not so

broad. Id. at 4294. At issue in San Mateo I was the

Branch’s decision to rescind, more than five months after its

grant of San Mateo’s applications to add certain frequencies

to its license, upon learning that it had granted San Mateo’s

applications ahead of an earlier-filed application for the frequencies. Id. at 4292–94. The Commission reinstated the

grant of San Mateo’s applications, concluding that the Branch

was not authorized to set aside an action on its own motion

once section 1.113(a)’s 30–day period expired. Id. at 4294.

The Commission also observed that the earlier applicant had

failed to file a timely petition for reconsideration challenging

USCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 10 of 14
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the grant of San Mateo’s applications.10 Id. CMMC’s case,

however, involves the Commission’s ability to modify a license

under section 316. Thus, San Mateo I does not stand for the

broad proposition, as CMMC would have it, that a license

issued pursuant to delegated authority is generally immune to

modification; it holds only that the delegatee may not set its

own action aside once the time period for doing so has

expired. Id.

CMMC’s more substantial claim is that the Commission

lacked authority to modify its license under section 316 of the

Act and section 1.87 of its rules. The gravamen of CMMC’s

claim is that the Commission cannot bypass the time limit

established in section 405 by relying on section 316 because,

in its view, the latter section permits the Commission to

modify a license based only on changed circumstances following grant of the license. According to CMMC, because a

licensee is entitled to ‘‘administrative finality,’’ section 316

authorizes the Commission simply to address ‘‘changed circumstances following the initial license grant’’—not to ‘‘revisit

initial grants of licenses after the statutory [s]ection 405

period has elapsed.’’ Appellant’s Br. at 13. The Commission

rejected this contention and so do we.

Under step one of Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43, we use the

customary statutory interpretation tools of ‘‘text, structure,

purpose, and legislative history’’ to determine whether the

Congress has spoken directly ‘‘to the precise question at

issue’’—here the scope of section 316. Consumer Elecs.

Ass’n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation and citations omitted). CMMC points to nothing in

the text or structure of the Communications Act or in its

purpose or legislative history (other than the mere existence

of the two provisions) that remotely suggests section 316 is

limited by section 405. See id. Indeed CMMC offers nary

10 On reconsideration, the Commission further explained that ‘‘the

erroneous grant of an application can be corrected sua sponte more

than 30 days after it becomes final only where the grant was

premised upon or contains a ministerial error.’’ San Mateo II, 16

FCC Rcd at 16504.

USCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 11 of 14
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an authority to support its interpretation. See Appellant’s

Br. at 13. And the plain language of section 316 does not

disclose any such limitation either: The section vests the

Commission with the authority to modify a license ‘‘either for

a limited time or for the duration of the term thereof, if in the

judgment of the Commission such action will promote the

public interest, convenience, and necessity.’’ 47 U.S.C.

§ 316(a)(1). While the section does explicitly restrict the

Commission’s authority to modify a license—that is, the Commission must find the modification in the public interest,

convenience and necessity—it imposes no express limitation

on when the Commission may do so.11 See id. The significance of the Congress’s silence here gains additional meaning,

we believe, when section 316 is compared with section 312,

which latter section authorizes the Commission to revoke a

license or construction permit in certain circumstances. Id.

at § 312(a)(1)-(7). That the Congress took care to specify in

section 312 the circumstances following the grant of a license

that warrant its revocation tends to show that if the Congress

was focused on post-grant events, it mentioned them. Id.

The Congress did not do so in section 316, which fact tends to

bolster, if only slightly, the conclusion that section 316 is not

limited to circumstances occurring after the license grant.

We conclude, however, that section 316 is not unambiguous

and therefore consider the gloss the Commission has given it

under step two of Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

In its order the Commission asserted that section 316

‘‘contains no limitation on the time frame within which [it]

may act to modify a license’’ and that its action under the

section ‘‘is not subject to the limitations on revocation, modification or reconsideration imposed by [s]ection 405.’’ California Metro Mobile Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 22975. This interpretation reasonably comports with section 316’s language.

See 47 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1). Section 316 grants the Commis11 Similarly, section 1.87 of the rules does not impose any time

limit on the Commission’s modification of a license. 47 C.F.R.

§ 1.87(a) (‘‘[w]henever it appears that a station license TTT should

be modified’’ (emphasis added)).

USCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 12 of 14
13

sion broad power to modify licenses; the Commission need

only find that the proposed modification serves the public

interest, convenience and necessity. See id. No doubt licensees have a strong and legitimate interest in administrative

repose, see, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 405(a), but the Congress gave

the Commission the authority in section 316 to override that

interest if doing so serves the public interest, convenience and

necessity. See id. at § 316(a)(1); Greater Boston Television

Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (‘‘administrative finality is subject to certain powers conferred in the FCC

by the Act for appropriate cases’’ such as license modification

power conferred by section 316), cert. denied sub nom.

WHDH, Inc. v. FCC, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). CMMC’s interpretation would, as the Commission pointed out, see California

Metro Mobile Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 22976, significantly limit

the Commission’s ability to modify a license in the public

interest, convenience and necessity because it would confine

the Commission to furthering those interests based only on

circumstances following a license grant—a result not even

hinted at by the statute’s text. See 47 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1).

Accordingly, because the Commission’s interpretation of section 316 is reasonable, we defer to it. See Chevron, 467 U.S.

at 843.

In addition, CMMC maintains that, even if the Commission

is authorized to modify its license under section 316, the

Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in doing so.

CMMC contends that the Commission modified its license in

the absence of actual interference. Moreover, CMMC contends, the Commission failed to consider a less ‘‘draconian’’

remedy, its good faith reliance on the PCIA’s frequency

coordination, its interest in ‘‘administrative finality’’ and the

costs resulting from the modification, including lost customers, disruption of service and the station’s diminished capacity. Appellant’s Br. at 15–18.

We think that the Commission’s modification of CMMC’s

license serves the public interest. The Commission expressly

rejected CMMC’s claim that modification required actual

interference with PG&E’s operations, explaining that the

modification was needed to cure an ongoing violation. CaliUSCA Case #02-1370 Document #818044 Filed: 04/23/2004 Page 13 of 14
14

fornia Metro Mobile Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 22977. The

Commission also rejected as unsubstantiated CMMC’s claim

that the modification would hamper its service. Id. at 22977–

98. The Commission noted, moreover, that the modification

would leave CMMC’s other frequencies intact and that, to the

extent it caused a ‘‘minor’’ disruption in CMMC’s operations,

it was ‘‘nonetheless in the public interest, as required by

[s]ection 316.’’ Id. at 22978. Accordingly, the Commission

acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously in modifying

CMMC’s license. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at

43.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Commission’s

order modifying CMMC’s license by deleting frequency

153.6125 MHz therefrom.

So ordered.

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