Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02356/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02356-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel Cox
Petitioner
Ronald J. Rackley
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DANIEL COX, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

RONALD J. RACKLEY, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:13-cv-02356-JAM-GGH 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is serving a thirteen-year prison term based on a 2011 

plea agreement wherein petitioner pled guilty to transporting marijuana, transporting 

methamphetamine, being a felon in possession of ammunition, driving under the influence of 

alcohol or drugs, and the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle as well as admitting to 

sentencing enhancements which included being out on bail when he committed the offenses and 

that he had a prior strike for first-degree burglary in August 2004. Petitioner challenges his 

sentence on the grounds that the 2004 burglary conviction—which was the result of a plea 

agreement—was constitutionally invalid. In particular, petitioner contends: 1) he is actually 

innocent; 2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel refused to offer 

evidence of his innocence, failed to investigate potential defenses, and gave erroneous advice; 3) 

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his due process rights were violated when the court refused to dismiss petitioner’s prior strike, 

denying petitioner’s Romero motion in his 2011 case; and 4) he was denied a fair trial because the 

trial court judge and the prosecutor committed misconduct. 

Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will 

recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied. 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. 2004 Conviction 

Pursuant to a stipulation, petitioner and the State agreed that the police report would serve 

as the factual basis for the entry of the plea. ECF No. 29-12 at 26. That police report, prepared 

by Sheriff’s Deputy Dean, described the incident as follows: 

On 04-01-2004, at approximately 0041 hours, I was dispatched to a 

suspicious circumstance, which was occurring at 4448 Pensacola 

Street in Shasta Lake City. Dispatch also said an unknown female 

was heard screaming for help[.] 

Upon my arrival, I contacted the victim and she identified herself as 

Collette Cook[.] Collette had fresh blood on her face and an 

approximate one-inch vertical laceration to the center of her 

forehead[.] The laceration was still bleeding when I arrived[.] The 

area surrounding the laceration was black/blue in color, and 

swollen[.] Collette also had an approximate one-inch vertical 

laceration to her lower shin are of her left leg. The laceration had 

fresh blood coming from it and the area surrounding it appeared to 

be swollen[.] The area was black and blue in color. I had medical 

respond and treat Collette for her injuries. Collette was treated at 

the scene and was later taken to Redding Medical Center for further 

treatment. I later contacted Collette and she told me the laceration 

to her forehead required eight stitches and the one to her shin 

required four stitches. 

A friend, who was also at the scene, accompanied Collette and she 

identified him as Christopher Benson. Collette said Christopher 

was present and witnessed the incident. 

I asked Collette what happened and this is her statement in 

summary: 

Collette said at approximately 0030 hours, she and Christopher 

were seated in the living room of Collette’s residence[.] She said 

the front door was locked and the curtains to the only window in the 

living room were drawn[.] She heard loud banging on the front 

door of her residence. Then she heard a voice, she recognized as 

Daniel Cox, yelling from outside the door[.] 

Collette said Daniel is an ex-boyfriend of three years and they share 

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a one-year-old child together[.] Collette said Daniel started 

screaming, “I’m gonna fucking kill yah.” Daniel continued to yell 

he was going to kill Collette and started kicking and pounding on 

the door even harder[.] Collette was afraid the door would break 

open, so she placed her hands on it, to keep it from being forced 

open. Daniel continued to pound on the door and threaten Collette 

for at least thirty seconds. 

Afterwards, Collette said it was momentarily quiet and then she 

heard the glass of the living room window break[.] She saw the 

glass fly inward and afterwards, Daniel crawled through the broken 

window[.] When he entered, she and Christopher retreated to the 

kitchen, which is adjacent to the living room. 

As Daniel entered the house he was holding an axe handle in his 

right hand. The handle had no blade, was approximately three feet 

long, and made of wood[.] 

Daniel became more irate when he saw Christopher and said, “Is 

this your new old man.” Collette tried to protect Christopher by 

standing between Daniel and Christopher using herself as a human 

shield[.] She repeatedly told Daniel to leave but he refused[.] 

Collette was in fear of her life and attempted to grab the phone so 

she could call 911. Daniel grabbed the phone from her and ripped 

the wire out of the wall, preventing her from calling 911[.] 

Daniel then used both hands, with an overhead chopping motion, 

and swung the axe handle downward, and hit Collette in the 

forehead[.] Daniel hit Collette so hard that she “saw stars,” 

momentarily lost consciousness, and fell backwards onto the 

kitchen floor[.] While falling backwards, she also knocked 

Christopher to the kitchen floor[.] 

Daniel advanced towards their location until he was standing over 

them. He hit both Collette and Christopher eight or nine more 

times with the axe handle[.] They were hit in various portions of 

their bodies[.] Collette was unsure exactly where else they were hit 

other than one strike to her shin[.] 

While swinging the axe handle, Daniel continued to yell and 

threaten both Collette and Christopher[.] Daniel did not stop until 

his one-year-old child; Daniel Cox, Jr came into the living room 

and started crying. Daniel put down the axe handle and said he was 

gonna take his son[.] Collette told him no, and begged him to 

leave[.] 

Meanwhile, Christopher had snuck out of the house undetected and 

ran to a neighbor’s to get help. He contacted a neighbor and asked 

them [to] dial 911 because the phone at Collette’s residence was not 

working[.] 

While Christopher was getting help, Collette screamed as loud as 

she could for help and begged neighbors to call the police. Daniel 

exited the kitchen to the porch area of the residence through the 

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living room[.] 

Daniel saw Christopher walking back towards the residence and 

Christopher told him the police were on their way[.] Daniel ran to 

his truck and drove away[.] 

* * * 

Collette was in fear for her life because Daniel has a history of 

violence[.] Based on prior contacts, I knew Daniel was on 

probation for felony domestic violence. Collette believed Daniel 

would carry through with his threat to kill her. 

While interviewing Collette, Christopher was able to repair the 

damaged phone line. A short time later, the phone rang and 

Collette answered. She recognized the voice calling her as 

Daniel’s[.] She told me Daniel was on the phone and handed it to 

me. I asked the voice on the other end of the connection if he was 

in fact Daniel Cox[.] The voice said yes[.] I asked Daniel if he 

would like to speak with me[.] He said yes and told me to meet 

him at the “Burger King” on the corner of Cascade Blvd and Shasta 

Dam Blvd[.] I asked Daniel where he was at and he would not tell 

me. Daniel then hung the phone up[.] 

I advised Deputy Nelson Daniel would be meeting him at the 

Burger King. Deputy Nelson responded to the location but Daniel 

never showed up[.] I made several attempts to call Daniel back 

with negative results. 

I asked Christopher what happened and this is his statement in 

summary[.] 

Christopher said he and Collette were seated in the living room. He 

was going to apply a tattoo to Collette’s left arm. While sitting 

there, he heard a loud bang coming from outside the front door to 

the residence. The banging continued and he heard a voice, who he 

recognized as Daniel’s, scream that he was going to kill Collette[.] 

The banging on the door increased in intensity and Daniel 

continued to threaten Collette. 

Collette became afraid the door would not keep Daniel out, so she 

used her body and leaned against the door to keep from being 

forced open[.] After an unknown amount of time, the banging on 

the door stopped and it was momentarily quiet[.] Afterwards, the 

living room window shattered and glass flew inward towards the 

living room. Both Christopher and Collette ran into the kitchen 

from the living room[.] 

After the window broke, they saw Daniel crawl through the broken 

window. When he did so, Christopher saw an axe handle in 

Daniel’s right hand. Christopher speculated Daniel used the axe 

handle to break the window[.] 

After entering the residence, Daniel advanced towards Collette and 

Christopher. Collette stepped between Christopher and Daniel and 

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asked him to just leave. Daniel became more agitated and asked 

Collette if Christopher was a boyfriend[.] 

Afterwards, Daniel used both hands in an overhand chopping 

motion and struck Collette in the head with the axe handle[.] The 

force was sufficient to knock both Collette and Christopher to the 

floor of the kitchen[.] Afterwards, Daniel used the same overhand 

chopping motion and hit both Christopher and Collette 

approximately three to four more times. Christopher said the axe 

handle hit his back and left wrist during the altercation. 

I examined the area[]s where Christopher said he was hit. His 

lower back and left wrist had redness and minor swelling[.] 

Christopher declined medical attention, when I offered it. 

Daniel stopped the assault after Collette’s son walked into the 

living room and started crying[.] Christopher then grabbed the axe 

handle away from Daniel. Afterwards, Christopher exited the 

kitchen, through the back door to the residence, and ran for help at a 

neighbor’s[.] He asked a neighbor to call 911 because his phone 

was disabled. While at the neighbor’s, Christopher could hear 

Collette screaming for help[.] 

After a neighbor told Christopher they would call 911, he returned 

back to the residence to help Collette[.] As he walked back, he saw 

Daniel standing on the front porch of the residence. Christopher 

told Daniel the police were on their way[.] Daniel ran to his truck, 

“peeled out,” and left southbound on Black Canyon Road[.] 

* * * 

The living room window was broken completely and the glass was 

strewn about the interior of the residence[.] I knew the window to 

the residence had been recently broken because it wasn’t broken 

when I responded to a prior incident, earlier in the night (Refer to 

Log Report # 04-10890)[.] The window looked consistent with 

being broken from the outside[.] 

The axe handle was left at the scene and both Collette and 

Christopher positively identified as the handle used in the assault. I 

later booked it into evidence[.] 

I examined the door Daniel attempted to force open. There were no 

footprints on the exterior of the door[.] The area where the “Dead 

bolt” meets the doorframe looked like it had been damaged but still 

worked. There was slight splintering to the wood in that area. The 

damage looked consistent with an outside force attempting to push 

the door inward[.] 

ECF No. 29-12, at 6–10. 

 Petitioner reached a plea agreement with the prosecution whereby petitioner pled guilty to 

assault and first degree residential burglary and stipulated to a prison term of five years. ECF No. 

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29-12, at 17–20, 23. Petitioner subsequently filed a series of state habeas petitions challenging 

the burglary conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that he was in 

fact innocent of burglary because he lived at the residence he entered and that documents known 

to trial counsel would have proven it. The superior court rejected the petition on the merits noting 

petitioner “neglects to recall that upon his being booked into the Shasta County Jail, he gave 

authorities a different address than the one he was accused of burglarizing” and that he “also 

filled out an income qualification statement for the appointment of a Public Defender in which he 

listed a different address than the one he plead guilty to burglarizing.” ECF No. 29 at 3. This 

same ineffective assistance of counsel claim was denied by California Court of Appeal. ECF No. 

29-2, at 54. Petitioner served his sentence and was released on parole in January 2007. ECF No. 

29-6 at 47. 

B. 2010 Conviction 

First Case (Case No. 10F5058) 

On June 30, 2010, following a traffic stop, defendant was found in 

possession of 436.9 grams of marijuana in five separate baggies and 

a cell phone containing text messages related to drug sales. Officers 

also found a digital gram scale in the vehicle in which defendant 

was traveling. 

Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana for sale, 

transportation of marijuana, being a felon in possession of 

ammunition, operating a vehicle without a functioning interlock 

device, driving with a suspended license, and failing to wear a 

seatbelt. It was further alleged that defendant was twice previously 

convicted of a serious or violent felony, served a prior term in 

prison, and committed the current offenses while out on bail or on 

his own recognizance in other cases. 

Second Case (Case No. 10F5465) 

On August 3, 2010, defendant was again stopped while driving a 

vehicle. On this occasion, defendant was stopped because his 

license plate was obstructed and the registration sticker had expired. 

After the traffic stop, the officer observed defendant “reaching 

around within the vehicle,” then into a black backpack inside the 

vehicle. Defendant was asked to “stop digging around” and put his 

hands where the officer could see them. 

Defendant complied with the officer's direction. The officer then 

told defendant why he had been stopped; defendant told the officer 

the vehicle did not belong to him, but he was in the process of 

buying it. Defendant admitted he did not have his driver's license 

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with him and that it was, in fact, suspended or revoked. 

Defendant consented to a search of the vehicle, saying the backpack 

inside the vehicle was his. Inside the backpack, were a Ziploc 

baggie containing 14.4 grams of methamphetamine, a hypodermic 

needle, a digital scale, and three rounds of .25–caliber full-metaljacket ammunition. A further search of the vehicle uncovered a 

glass smoking pipe on the passenger's seat. Defendant's passenger 

admitted the pipe was his. 

Following a series of questions regarding the items found in the 

vehicle, a field sobriety test was performed on defendant and it was 

determined he was under the influence of a controlled substance. 

Defendant and his passenger were both arrested. 

Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of 

methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for sale, 

transportation of methamphetamine, being under the influence of a 

controlled substance, being a felon in possession of ammunition, 

driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, driving with a 

suspended license, carrying a loaded firearm on one's person in a 

city, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

It was further alleged that defendant was personally armed with a 

firearm during the commission of these crimes, was twice 

previously convicted of a serious or violent felony, was personally 

armed with a firearm during the commission of a crime related to 

controlled substances, was out on bail or his own recognizance 

when he committed the offenses, and previously served a term in 

prison. 

Third Case (Case No. 10F6764) 

On August 3, 2010, Billy Russell went to the Redding Police 

Department to report his 1988 Ford Bronco stolen. Russell did not, 

however, have the license plate or vehicle identification number for 

the vehicle. Russell told officers he was in the process of registering 

the vehicle in his name and did not have the paperwork. He was 

told to get the necessary information and return to the department. 

Russell returned to the police department two days later with the 

appropriate information for the vehicle. Russell explained that early 

in the morning on August 2, 2010, he parked the Bronco in front of 

a motel intending to return and pick it up with a trailer because the 

vehicle had not yet been “smogged” and was not yet registered. 

When he returned later that day, the Bronco was gone. 

Officers checked the registration for the Bronco and learned it was 

impounded on August 3, 2010, after defendant was arrested on 

numerous narcotics charges in the second case. Russell denied 

knowing defendant or the passenger with whom defendant was 

arrested, and he did not give either of them permission to drive his 

Bronco. 

Defendant was later charged with the unlawful driving or taking of 

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a vehicle. It was further alleged that defendant was twice previously 

convicted of a serious or violent felony, served a prior term in 

prison, and committed the offense while out on bail or his own 

recognizance. 

Plea 

On August 5, 2011, defendant agreed to resolve all pending cases. 

He pled guilty to transporting marijuana, transporting 

methamphetamine, being a felon in possession of ammunition, 

driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and the unlawful 

taking or driving of a vehicle. Defendant also admitted being 

previously convicted of a serious or violent felony, committing 

offenses while out on bail or his own recognizance, and previously 

serving a term in prison. 

In exchange for his plea, the People agreed to dismiss the remaining 

charges and allegations as well as five pending but unrelated 

criminal cases and terminating defendant's probation in Shasta 

County case No. 08CTR182. The agreement preserved defendant's 

right to file a Romero motion; provided he would not receive 

probation; and provided for a 15–year–8–month lid on defendant's 

sentence. 

Romero Motion 

After entering his plea, defendant filed a Romero motion asking the 

court to strike his prior conviction for burglary. In support of his 

motion, defendant offered numerous letters from family members 

and friends, as well as various educational and self-improvement 

certificates defendant earned while incarcerated in the county jail. 

At the hearing on defendant's motion, the court also heard from 

several witnesses speaking on defendant's behalf, including 

defendant's mother, his brother, his brother-in-law, and the chaplain 

from the county jail. Defendant's brother-in-law, Jim Baker, 

testified that defendant previously worked in construction and was a 

hard worker. He described the remodeling work defendant and his 

father were doing together when defendant's father died. He 

remembered that after his father died, defendant just “shut down.” 

Defendant's mother, Barbara Cox, described a similar breakdown 

after defendant's father died. Where once defendant engaged with 

his children, after his dad died, defendant “lost interest,” and he 

never finished their remodeling project. She said defendant and his 

father were “very close,” and his father's death left “a big hole in 

[defendant's] heart.” 

Cox also told the court that defendant's three children were 

currently in her custody. Seventy years old, Cox suffered from a 

“heart problem” and diabetes, and recently fractured her hip. If she 

were to pass away, she said, defendant's children would be put “into 

the system,” because their mother was “nowhere to be found.” 

The chaplain from the county jail, Henry Quenca, also testified 

defendant was “suffering significantly with the loss of his father.” 

In the time he had been meeting with defendant, he saw defendant 

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make a “dramatic transformation.” According to Quenca, defendant 

“has always been spiritual,” but after several meetings with Quenca, 

defendant was “more at peace.” He described the transformed 

defendant as “[l]ess defiant,” no more “chip on his shoulder,” and 

as a man with “character.” 

Defendant's brother, Dean Cox, testified that defendant changed 

dramatically when their father died; he also offered testimony 

regarding defendant's prior conviction for burglary. According to 

Cox, defendant was Cox's tenant in the home defendant was 

convicted of burglarizing in 2004. Defendant was named in the 

rental agreement; Collette Cook, defendant's girlfriend, was added 

to the agreement later. 

In support of his Romero motion, defendant argued his prior strike 

was the result of “poor lawyer work,” rather than actual guilt. He 

also argued that his recent convictions were solely the result of his 

father's death, and the resulting emotional turmoil. Now, having 

overcome those circumstances, defendant said he could be a 

productive member of society, rather than a drain on the taxpayers. 

The trial court was not persuaded. The court found defendant's 

crimes to be numerous and of increasing seriousness, with 

defendant's first conviction reaching all the way back to 1992. The 

court also found that defendant's prior strike was “not that old,” 

particularly given that after three years in prison and two years on 

parole, defendant was convicted in 2009 of driving under the 

influence. The court thus ruled as follows: “In evaluating all of 

those things, I actually don't see any factors that weigh [in] favor of 

striking the strike. So the request to exercise discretion to strike the 

strike is denied.” 

III. DISCUSSION 

 The statutory limitations of federal courts’ power to issue habeas corpus relief for persons 

in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The text of § 2254(d) states: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 The United States Supreme Court has held that, in general, habeas relief is not available to 

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petitioners who challenge a fully-expired conviction used to enhance a subsequent sentence in a 

petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254: 

[O]nce a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral 

attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those 

remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did 

so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively 

valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, 

the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence 

through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior 

conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. 

Lackawanna County Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403–04, 121 S.Ct. 1567, 149 L.Ed.2d 608 

(2001) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In Lackawanna, the Court recognized only two 

limited exceptions to this general rule: (1) when the alleged constitutional violation in the prior 

criminal proceeding concerns the failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment; 

and (2) when the defendant was not at fault for the delay in seeking relief from the prior 

conviction, either because the state court refused to rule on the constitutional issue, or the 

defendant has, after expiration of the time for direct or collateral review of the prior conviction, 

obtained compelling evidence of actual innocence that could not have been uncovered in a timely 

manner. Id. at 404–06. 

Petitioner challenges his current sentence on the grounds that his 2004 burglary 

conviction, which constituted a prior serious felony and added additional time to his current 

sentence, was constitutionally invalid. He contends he is actually innocent of his 2004 burglary 

conviction and thus falls within the second exception to Lackawanna. See id. at 405; West v. 

Ryan, 652 F.3d 1071, 1081 (9th Cir. 2011). In support, citing People v. Gauze, 15 Cal. 3d 709 

(1975), petitioner argues that, under California law, a person cannot burglarize his own home and 

attaches a copy of his monthly rental agreement dated July 1, 2002 and a 60-day termination 

notice dated May 6, 2004. However, petitioner has unsuccessfully raised this same innocence 

claim in several state habeas petitions challenging his 2004 conviction and in his petition for 

review in the California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 29 at 3; ECF No. 29-2 at 54; ECF No. 29-8, at 

19.) For example, in February 2005 petitioner filed a state habeas petition with the Shasta 

Superior Court asserting his factual innocence claim. The trial court denied that habeas petition, 

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explaining as follows: 

Petitioner alleges that he was not guilty of First Degree Residential 

Burglary because he was a resident of the home at the time of his 

alleged crime. He indicates that both his attorneys were aware of 

two documents, a Monthly Rental Agreement dated July 1, 2002 

and a 60-Day Termination Notice Dated May 6, 2004, which, if 

presented to the court, would have proven his residence at the time 

of the burglary. Petitioner neglects to recall that upon his being 

booked into the Shasta County Jail, he gave authorities a different 

address than the one he was accused of burglarizing. Petitioner also 

filled out an income qualification statement for the appointment of 

a Public Defender in which he listed a different residence address 

then [sic] the one he plead guilty to burglarizing. In light of the 

above, it is difficult to believe Petitioner would have received a 

more favorable outcome absent counsel’s alleged failure to present 

the above documents. 

ECF No. 1 at 94–95. 

 Petitioner’s contention of actual innocence fails for several reasons. First, the evidence is 

not new in the sense that he was unaware of his alleged status in the apartment when he invaded 

that apartment. In fact, he argues in this very petition that he told his attorney at the time of his 

burglary proceeding of his rental status. 

 More importantly, petitioner has misperceived the extent to which the (much 

distinguished) Gauze case applies to his situation. Petitioner must have had an absolute right of 

entry, not just an alleged possessory interest, in order for Gauze to apply. People v. Pendleton, 25 

Cal. 3d 371, 382 (1979); In re Andrew I, 230 Cal. App. 3d 572, 579 (1991); People v. Frye, 18 

Cal. 4th 894, 953–955 (1998), disapproved on other grounds, People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390, 

421 n.22 (2009) (Gauze did not displace previous case law that entering a residence, even with 

consent, with the intent to commit to commit a felony is guilty of burglary.) It is clear from the 

facts that petitioner’s right of entry was less than unconditional. Petitioner was not residing at the 

residence,1 and his ex-girlfriend was the tenant with that absolute right of entry. Petitioner does 

not dispute that he did not have permission to enter; indeed, most people with a permissive right 

to enter would use a key, and not pound on the door ad infinitum or finally bash the living room 

 

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 The state court’s factual findings are binding in the AEDPA context unless they are 

unreasonable. 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d). See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770 

(2011). 

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window to pieces with an ax handle. Moreover, petitioner’s surprise to find a new “old man” 

residing with his ex-girlfriend puts to rest any idea that petitioner was also residing in the 

apartment at the time he invaded it. 

 This case is identical in principle to that of People v. Ulloa, 180 Cal. App. 4th 601 (2009). 

In Ulloa the defendant who had been married to the victim, and whose name appeared on the 

lease, but was no longer residing at his wife’s apartment. 

Here, there was evidence defendant and Tracy were estranged and 

separated due to having serious marital problems; defendant had 

voluntarily moved out of the apartment; defendant had committed 

prior domestic violence against Tracy; and Tracy feared defendant. 

Also, because defendant yelled at Tracy from outside the apartment 

at 5:00 a.m. and broke in, a reasonable inference could be drawn 

that defendant no longer had a key to the apartment and entered 

without Tracy's consent, with intent to commit theft or some other 

crime. Under such circumstances there was sufficient evidence 

supporting a finding that defendant did not have an unconditional 

possessory interest in the apartment. We thus conclude the 

apartment lease did not constitute a complete defense to burglary 

and there was sufficient evidence supporting defendant's burglary 

conviction. 

Id. at 610; see also People v. Davenport, 219 Cal. App. 3d 885 (1990). 

As such, petitioner does not fall within the Lackawanna exception for actual innocence 

because petitioner has not produced new and compelling evidence that uncovered after the time to 

challenge his prior conviction had expired. Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 405. 

 One final reason exists why petitioner cannot attack his conviction with evidence that he 

was named in the lease—petitioner is barred from attacking his guilty plea for the 2004 burglary 

under Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). The law is clear that petitioner may not 

raise claims of deprivation of his constitutional rights that occurred prior to his plea. “When a 

criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with 

which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of 

constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Id.; see also McMann v. 

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770–71 (1970); Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(“As a general rule, one who voluntarily pleads guilty to a criminal charge may not subsequently 

seek federal habeas relief on the basis of pre-plea constitutional violations”), overruled on other 

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grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003); Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 

137 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Petitioner's nolo contendere plea precludes him from challenging alleged 

constitutional violations that occurred prior to the entry of that plea.”); Hudson v. Moran, 760 

F.2d 1027, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 1985) (voluntary and intelligent guilty plea precludes federal habeas 

relief based upon “independent claims” of pre-plea constitutional violations); United States v. 

DeVaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1153 (10th Cir. 2012) (“A guilty plea waives all defenses except those 

that go to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction and the narrow class of constitutional claims 

involving the right not to be haled into court.”). 

A claim of actual innocence is a direct contradiction to a guilty plea and is therefore 

barred by Tollett. Sullivan v. Benedetti, 2013 WL 4432399, *6 (D.Nev.2013); Lee v. Almager, 

2011 WL 2882148, *15 (C.D.Cal. Jun. 7, 2011) (barring consideration of actual innocence claim 

as barred by Tollett and citing Hernandez v. Mendoza-Powers, 2005 WL 2089807, at *5 

(E.D.Cal. Aug. 29, 2005)); Alvarez v. Blevins, 2012 WL 3133825, *3 n. 5 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 24, 

2012) (noting preclusive effect of Tollett on actual innocence claims). Petitioner asserts his trial 

counsel was aware that petitioner had been renting the 4448 Pensacola Street home for more than 

2 years. ECF No. 1, at 11. Petitioner had to have been aware of his actual residence when he 

pled guilty. Nonetheless, petitioner pled guilty to burglary. ECF No. 29-12, at 27–28. As such, 

Tollett precludes petitioner’s actual innocence claim. 

Even if such a claim could be considered, the standards required to prove actual innocence 

set a high hurdle for this petitioner. In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 

L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), a majority of the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that a 

freestanding claim of actual innocence is cognizable under federal law. In this regard, the court 

observed that “in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after 

trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief 

if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.” 506 U.S. at 417. A different 

majority of the Supreme Court explicitly held that a freestanding claim of actual innocence is 

cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. Compare 506 U.S. at 417 with 506 U.S. at 419, 430–

37; see also Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that a majority of 

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the Justices in Herrera would have found a freestanding claim of actual innocence). Although the 

Supreme Court did not specify the standard applicable to this type of “innocence” claim, it noted 

that the threshold would be “extraordinarily high” and that the showing would have to be “truly 

persuasive.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. More recently, the Supreme Court declined to resolve 

whether federal courts may entertain independent claims of actual innocence but concluded that 

the petitioner's showing of innocence in the case before it fell short of the threshold suggested in 

Herrera. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–551, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). Finally, 

the Supreme Court has recently once again assumed, without deciding, that a federal 

constitutional right to be released upon proof of “actual innocence” exists. District Attorney's 

Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 174 L.Ed.2d 38 (2009). 

In doing so, the Supreme Court noted that it is an “open question” whether a freestanding claim 

of actual innocence exists and that the court has “struggled with it over the years, in some cases 

assuming, arguendo, that it exists while also noting the difficult questions such a right would pose 

and the high standard any claimant would have to meet.” 557 U.S. at 71. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has likewise assumed that freestanding innocence 

claims are cognizable in both capital and non-capital cases and has also articulated a minimum 

standard of proof in order for a habeas petitioner to prevail on such a claim. Carriger v. Stewart, 

132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Under that standard “[a] habeas petitioner asserting 

a freestanding innocence claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt, and must 

affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent.” Id. at 476–77; see also Jackson, 211 F.3d at 

1165. The petitioner's burden in such a case is “extraordinarily high” and requires a showing that 

is “truly persuasive.” Carriger, 132 F.3d at 476 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417). 

Thus, at minimum, petitioner must show that the new evidence “would be sufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that . . . no reasonable factfinder would have found 

[him] guilty of the underlying offense.” West, 652 F.3d at 1081 (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). Petitioner cannot meet that burden. As the Shasta Superior Court noted, petitioner gave 

authorities residence addresses different from the one he pled guilty of burglarizing. ECF No. 1, 

at 95. A reasonable factfinder could have credited petitioner’s statements to authorities upon 

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being booked and in his application for a public defender which contradict his theory of actual 

innocence. The undersigned has already commented on the speciousness of petitioner’s ability to 

claim that he had an unconditional right to enter the apartment given the way he exercised that 

“right.” As such, petitioner’s claims should be denied. 

Petitioner has requested an evidentiary hearing. The holding of an evidentiary hearing in 

a federal habeas proceeding is futile unless the district court has first determined that the state 

court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law, and therefore not entitled to deference under § 2254(d)(1), or that 

the state court unreasonably determined the facts based upon the record before it, and therefore 

deference is not warranted pursuant to § 2254(d)(2). 

Here, the undersigned has already determined that the state court’s decision was not 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law based on the record 

before it. Nor was it an unreasonable determination of the facts. Moreover, petitioner’s insistence 

that his asserted name on the lease absolves him from burglary is misplaced under California law. 

Cullen v. Pinholster, __U.S.__, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011), precludes an evidentiary hearing in such 

circumstances. Therefore, petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing should be denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For all the foregoing reasons, the petition should be denied. Pursuant to Rule 11 of the 

Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A certificate of appealability 

may issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitution 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons set forth in these findings and recommendations, 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right has not been made in this case. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied; and 

2. The District Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a documents should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: February 7, 2014 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

GGH:076 

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