Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-14-04194/USCOURTS-ca4-14-04194-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Damon Keyon Jones
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4194

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff – Appellee, 

v. 

DAMON KEYON JONES, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:97-cr-00178-NCT-1) 

Submitted: January 20, 2015 Decided: February 5, 2015

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. 

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

William S. Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC,

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United 

States Attorney, Harry L. Hobgood, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

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PER CURIAM: 

Damon Keyon Jones appeals the district court’s 

judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 

fifty-four months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Jones argues that 

his sentence is plainly unreasonable. We vacate Jones’ sentence 

and remand for resentencing. 

This court will affirm a sentence imposed after 

revocation of supervised release “if it is within the statutory 

maximum and is not ‘plainly unreasonable.’” United States v. 

Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United 

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006)). When 

reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, 

we first assess the sentence for unreasonableness, “follow[ing] 

generally the procedural and substantive considerations that we 

employ in our review of original sentences.” Crudup, 461 F.3d 

at 438. A supervised release revocation sentence is 

procedurally reasonable if the district court considers the 

Chapter Seven advisory policy statement range and the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2012) factors applicable to supervised release 

revocation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 

439. 

Here, although the district court considered 

applicable § 3553(a) factors, it failed to calculate and 

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indicate consideration of the applicable policy statement range.1 

We therefore conclude that Jones’ sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable. 

Having found the sentence unreasonable, we assess next 

whether it is plainly unreasonable. “To determine whether a 

sentence is plainly unreasonable, this Court looks to the 

definition of ‘plain’ used in plain-error analysis.” United 

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547-48 (4th Cir. 2010). “For 

a sentence to be plainly unreasonable, . . . it must run afoul 

of clearly settled law.” Id. at 548. 

Because Jones did not preserve this claim for 

appellate review, our review is for plain error. See Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 52(b). To establish plain error, Jones must 

demonstrate that (1) the district court committed an error; 

(2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his 

substantial rights. Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 

1121, 1126 (2013). Even if these requirements are met, however, 

this court will “exercise [its] discretion to correct the error 

only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. 

 1 We reject as unsupported by the record the Government’s 

argument to the contrary. 

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Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 381 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

As stated, we recognize a sentencing error and find it 

to be plainly unreasonable because it runs afoul of clearly 

established law. See United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 

656 (4th Cir. 2007); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Additionally, 

because the sentence imposed by the district court was well 

above the advisory policy statement range calculated by the 

probation officer, Jones’ substantial rights were affected by 

the error; had the district court calculated and considered the 

policy statement range, it might have given Jones a lower prison 

term. See Thompson, 595 F.3d at 548. Further, we choose to 

exercise our discretion to notice the error because the district 

court’s failure to calculate and consider the policy statement 

range affected the fairness of the proceeding. 

Accordingly, we vacate Jones’ revocation sentence for 

a procedural sentencing error and remand for resentencing.2

 We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

 2 By this disposition, we indicate no view as to the 

appropriate sentence to be imposed by the district court on 

remand. We emphasize in this regard that we have not evaluated 

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed by the 

district court; we have concluded only that the sentencing 

procedure followed by the district court was in error based on 

its failure to calculate and consider the policy statement 

range. 

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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

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