Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07117/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07117-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rose Braz
Plaintiff
Center For Biological Diversity
Plaintiff
Peter Galvin
Plaintiff
Dale Hall
Defendant
Dirk Kempthorne
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 

a non-profit organization, PETER GALVIN, 

an individual, ROSE BRAZ, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Secretary of the

Interior, U.S. Department of the Interior,

and DALE HALL, Director, U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-07117 WHA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

The Center for Biological Diversity and individuals seek declaratory and injunctive

relief against Dirk Kempthorne, Secretary of the United States Department of Interior, and its

Fish and Wildlife Service to list certain foreign bird and butterfly species on the foreign

endangered species list pursuant to the Endangered Species Act. For the reasons stated below,

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and

defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgement is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

STATEMENT

The United States has taken on an active role in the conservation of endangered species

on an international level. As the Endangered Species Act declares, “the United States has

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pledged itself as a sovereign state in the international community to conserve to the extent

practicable the various species of fish or wildlife facing extinction . . . pursuant to the

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora” and other

international agreements. 16 U.S.C. 1531(a)(4)(F). The relevant petitions, received by the

Service in 1980, 1991, and 1994, involve the listing of 56 foreign bird and butterfly species. 

More specifically, in 1980, the International Council for Bird Preservation petitioned to list

58 foreign bird species as threatened or endangered under the ESA (AR 4–9). As a result of an

amendment by Congress to the ESA incorporating additional requirements to list species,

petitions pending at the time of the amendment were then treated as if resubmitted on the

effective date of the amendment, October 13, 1982. H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, at 19–20 (1982). 

On January 20, 1984, a finding of “warranted but precluded” was made for the 58 foreign bird

species petitioned for in 1980 (49 Fed. Reg. 2485).

The Service issued proposed and final rules listing six of the 58 birds as endangered in

1990 (55 Fed. Reg. 39848). In the following year, 1991, the Service received a second petition

from the ICBP to list an additional 53 foreign bird species under the ESA (AR 72–73). In 1994,

the Service issued a finding proposing to list thirty species (fifteen from the 1980 petition and

fifteen from the 1991 petition) and a finding of “warranted but precluded” for the remaining

foreign bird species petitioned for in 1980 and 1991 (59 Fed. Reg. 14496). The Service

finalized the listing for the thirty foreign bird species the following year (60 Fed. Reg. 2899). 

The Service received the third petition at issue to list seven foreign swallowtail

butterflies as threatened or endangered under the ESA in 1994 (59 Fed. Reg. 24117). 

On May 21, 2004, the Service issued a new finding on the “warranted but precluded” birds,

determining that of the remaining 73 foreign birds, 51 continued to warrant listing but were

precluded by higher-priority listing actions, eleven were removed because they were found to

be extinct, seven were removed because they did not meet the criteria for listing, and five were

found to warrant listing (69 Fed. Reg. 19354). In December 2004, the Service issued a

finding of “warranted but precluded” for the seven butterflies petitioned for in 1994 (69 Fed.

Reg. 70580).

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As of November 16, 2006, the Service had failed to issue: (a) proposed rules for the

five foreign bird species it had determined were warranted in 2004; (b) its annual findings

scheduled for May 2005 regarding the 51 “warranted but precluded” birds from May 2004;

and (c) its annual findings scheduled for December 2005 regarding the seven “warranted but

precluded” butterfly species from December 2004. This action followed. Subsequently, the

Service issued proposed listing rules for the five warranted birds from 2004, and pursuant to an

agreement between the parties entered as a case management order, the Service agreed to issue

the twelve-month filing for the “warranted but precluded” bird and butterfly species by

April 2007. The new finding, issued on April 23, 2007, found that six species warranted listing,

but continued to maintain that fifty species were “warranted but precluded” (72 Fed. Reg.

20184). The April 23 finding is summarized below (within “listing priority” numbers):

Warranted-But-Precluded Species from 1980 Petition

1. Cauca guan [Colombia] (LPN 2)

2. Cantabrian capercaillie [Spain] (LPN 3)

3. Gorgeted wood-quail [Colombia] (LPN 2)

4. Takahe [New Zealand] (LPN 8)

5. Chatham Island oystercatcher [Chatham Islands] (LPN 8)

6. Marquesan imperial-pigeon [Marquesas Islands] (LPN 2)

7. Orange-fronted parakeet [New Zealand] (LPN 4)

8. Uvea parakeet [New Caledonia] (LPN 8)

9. Southeastern rufous-vented ground cuckoo [Brazil] (LPN 3)

10. Chilean woodstar [Peru, Chile] (LPN 2)

11. Margaretta’s hermit [Brazil] (LPN 3)

12. Okinawa woodpecker [Okinawa] (LPN 7)

13. Black-hooded antwren [Brazil] (LPN 2)

14. Fringe-backed fire-eye [Brazil] (LPN 2)

15. St. Lucia forest thrush [St. Lucia] (LPN 3)

16. Eiao Polynesian warbler [Marquesas Islands] (LPN 3)

17. Codfish Island fernbird [New Zealand] (LPN 9)

18. Gizo white-eye [Solomon Islands] (LPN 8)

19. Cherry-throated tanager [Brazil] (LPN 2)

20. Lord Howe currawong [Lord Howe Island] (LPN 12)

Warranted-But-Precluded Species from 1991 Petition

21. Junin flightless grebe [Peru] (LPN 2)

22. Greater adjutant stork [S.E. Asia] (LPN 2)

23. Andean flamingo [South America] (LPN 2)

24. Brazilian merganser [South America] (LPN 2)

25. Southern helmeted curassow [Peru, Bolivia] (LPN 8)

26. Blue-billed curassow [Colombia] (LPN 2)

27. Bogota rail [Colombia] (LPN 8)

28. Junin rail [Peru] (LPN 2)

29. Jerdon’s courser [India] (LPN 2)

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30. Slender-billed curlew [Eurasia] (LPN 2)

31. Salmon-crested cockatoo [Indonesia] (LPN 2)

32. Blue-throated macaw [Bolivia] (LPN 8)

33. Black-breasted puffleg [Ecuador] (LPN 2)

34. Esmeraldas woodstar [Ecuador] (LPN 2)

35. Yellow-browed Toucanet [Peru] (LPN 11)

36. Helmeted woodpecker [South America] (LPN 8)

37. Royal cinclodes [Peru, Bolivia] (LPN 2)

38. White-browed tit-spinetail [Peru] (LPN 2)

39. Brown-banded antpitta [Colombia] (LPN 2)

40. Brasilia tapaculo [Brazil] (LPN 8)

41. Kaempfer’s tody-tyrant [Brazil] (LPN 2)

42. Ash-breasted tit-tyrant [Peru, Bolivia] (LPN 2)

43. Peruvian plantcutter [Peru] (LPN 2)

44. Medium tree-finch [Ecuador] (LPN 11)

45. Black-backed tanager [Brazil] (LPN 8)

Warranted-But-Precluded Species from 1994 Petition

46. Harris’ mimic swallowtail [Brazil, Paraguay] (LPN 12)

47. Jamaican kite swallowtail [Jamaica] (LPN 8)

48. Fluminese swallowtail [Brazil] (LPN 5)

49. Hahnel’s Amazonian swallowtail [Brazil] (LPN 11)

50. Kaiser-I-Hind swallowtail [East Asia] (LPN 8)

2007 Warranted Species

1. Fiji petrel

2. Chatham petrel

3. Cook’s petrel

4. Galapagos petrel

5. Magenta petrel

6. Heinroth’s shearwater

Plaintiffs now seek declaratory and injunctive relief to compel defendants to issue proposed

rules for each of the species it has determined is “warranted but precluded.” In addition, in their

motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs move to compel the Service to issue proposed listing

rules for the six species that were determined to warrant a listing in 2007. Since filing the

motion, however, the proposed and final rules for the six species have been issued by the

Service. Defendants cross-motion for summary judgment challenges the standing of plaintiffs.

ANALYSIS

1. THE ESA.

Congress passed the Endangered Species Act in 1973 to protect species of plants and

animals endangered or threatened with extinction. The purpose of the ESA is “to provide a

means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened species depend may be

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conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and

threatened species.” 16 U.S.C. 1531(b). Under Section 4 of the ESA, the Secretary of Interior

is generally responsible for determining which species, both domestic and foreign, should be

listed as endangered or threatened. 16 U.S.C. 1533(a)(1).

The ESA permits interested persons to petition the Secretary to add or remove species

from the threatened and endangered species lists. 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3). Within twelve months

after receiving a petition that presents substantial information indicating the petition action may

be warranted, the Service must make one of the following findings: (i) the petitioned action is

actually not warranted; (ii) the petitioned action is warranted in which case the Secretary shall

“promptly” published a proposed regulation; or (iii) the petitioned action is warranted but “the

immediate proposal and timely promulgation of a final regulation implementing the petitioned

action . . . is precluded by pending proposals to determine whether any species is an endangered

species or a threatened species,” and “expeditious progress is being made to add qualified

species” to the list “in which case the Service shall promptly publish such finding in the Federal

Register, together with a description and evaluation of the reasons and data on which such

finding is based.” 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3)(B).

The ESA provides that if the Service makes a “warranted but precluded” finding, the

petition must “be treated as a petition that is resubmitted to the [Service] on the date of such

finding,” meaning the Service must make a new determination within one year as to whether the

species should be listed, not listed, or continue to remain on the “warranted but precluded” list. 

16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3)(C)(ii). All “warranted but precluded” findings are subject to judicial

review. 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3)(C)(ii). The ESA further directs the Service to “implement a

system to monitor effectively the status of all species” subject to warranted-but-precluded

findings and to make prompt use of its emergency listing authority “to prevent a significant risk

to the well being of any such species.” 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3)(C)(iii). Each candidate species is

given a listing priority number according to: (a) the magnitude of threats they face; (b) the

immediacy of these threats, and (c) the taxonomic distinctiveness of the entity that may be listed 

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(48 Fed. Reg. 43,098). Listing priority numbers range from 1 (highest priority) to 12

(lowest priority). 

Section 11 of the ESA provides that “any person may commence a civil suit on his own

behalf . . . against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform any

act or duty under [Section 4] which is not discretionary with the Secretary.” 16 U.S.C.

1540(g)(1), referring to 16 U.S.C. 1533. The federal district courts have jurisdiction under such

suits to order the Secretary to perform any of the duties specified in Section 4. 16 U.S.C.

1540(g)(1). 

2. LEGAL STANDARD.

Under FRCP 56(c), summary judgment shall be rendered if “there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Summary judgment is not granted if the dispute about a material fact is “genuine” — that is,

if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Because the ESA does not contain its own internal standard of review, judicial review

of ESA citizen suits may only set aside the agency action, as set forth in Administrative

Procedure Act, if the action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.” “The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA

standard of review . . . to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the

reviewing court.” While the district court must make a detailed inquiry into whether the

administrative action was based on the relevant facts, it may not set aside agency action as

arbitrary or capricious unless there is no rational basis for the action. Friends of the Earth v.

Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).

3. STANDING.

Defendants contend that plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. Specifically,

defendants challenge whether plaintiffs have shown an “injury in fact” to warrant jurisdiction. 

As defendants maintain, in order for plaintiffs to meet the “injury in fact” requirement to

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 Unless otherwise stated, all internal quotes are omitted from quotations used in this order. 

7

standing they must show previous use or visitation of the area inhabited by each species and

concrete plans to return to those areas. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–64

(1992), the Supreme Court directly considered the standing requirements for a plaintiff to

challenge a rule promulgated under the ESA. In Lujan, when asked if she planned to return to

the habitat in question at her deposition, plaintiff responded “I intend to go back,” but confessed

that she did not know when, only maintaining that she would go “[i]n the future.” In finding

that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action, the Supreme Court held (id. at 562–64)*

 :

Of course, the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for

purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for

purpose of standing. But the “injury in fact” test requires more

than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party

seeking review be himself among the injured. To survive the

Secretary’s summary judgment motion, respondents had to submit

affidavits or other evidence showing, through specific facts, not

only that listed species were in fact being threatened by funded

activities abroad, but also that one or more of respondents’

members would thereby be “directly” affected apart from their

“special interest” in th[e] subject. . . Past exposure to illegal

conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy

regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any

continuing, present adverse effects. And the affiants’ profession of

an “inten[t]” to return to the places they had visited before —

where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the

opportunity to observe animals of the endangered species — is

simply not enough. Such “some day” intentions — without any

description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of

when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the “actual

or imminent” injury that our cases require. 

Contrary to defendants, nowhere in Lujan is there a requirement that a plaintiff allege past

visitation and concrete plans to return. Lujan does hold that an allegation of prior use, in and of

itself, is not enough to confer standing upon a plaintiff. Future or imminent harm, however, may

be enough to establish standing if such harm is concrete and cognizable. As the Ninth Circuit

has held, “potential injury may be sufficient to confer standing.” Regents of University of

California v. Shalala, 82 F.3d 291, 298 (9th Cir. 1996).

In the present action, the future or imminent harm must be evidenced by concrete plans

of an intention to visit the particular habitat for the species. Contrary to plaintiffs, Japan

Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986), does not support the

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idea that anyone who has an interest in a certain animal (no matter where that animal may be)

has standing. In Japan Whaling, the Supreme Court found that a whale-watching society had

standing because “whale watching and studying of the members [would] be adversely affected

by whale harvesting.” In Lujan, however, the Supreme Court made clear that standing only had

been established in Japan Whaling because “plaintiff was a citizens’ council for the area in

which the challenged construction was to occur, so that its members would obviously be

concretely affected.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8 (emphasis added). Here, all of the species at

issue are located in foreign, overseas areas where plaintiffs do not reside. Plaintiffs can thus not

qualify for standing on the grounds that they have an aesthetic interest in a foreign species

without “a factual showing of perceptible harm.” Id. at 565.

Applying the Lujan standing requirements to the present record, plaintiffs only meet the

standing requirements for six of the species involved in this action. Plaintiffs lack standing for

those species in which they have provided no description of a concrete plan evidencing a future

trip to the habitats in question. The high number of species involved in this action break down

into the following groups for standing purposes. 

First, for many of the species in question plaintiffs have alleged a mere hope to one day

observe the species in its foreign habitat. For instance, in the declaration of Rose Braz, she

stated:

I hope to be able to return to Okinawa and again see these birds in

their natural habitat . . . Many of the other birds I still hope to see

are likewise critically imperiled . . . I plan to continue to travel

around the world to observe rare and endangered birds, and I, like

many an obsessive birder, would like to see in my lifetime as many

birds as possible, including the birds that are the subject of this

case . . . I plan to travel to South America where I hope to observe

species . . . (Braz Decl. ¶¶ 7–10).

As cl held by Lujan, such some-day intentions unsupported by any concrete evidence are not

enough to confer standing. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not met the standing requirements for

the following species (for which similar vague statements of intention have been made):

• Cantabrian capercaillie

• Marquesan imperial-pigeon

• Uvea parakeet

• Eiao Polynesian warbler

• Gizo white-eye

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• Greater adjutant stork

• Jerdon’s courser

• Jamaican kite swallowtail

• Heinroth’s shearwater

• Blue-throated macaw

• Salmon-crested cockatoo

• Black-hooded antwren 

Second, for many of the species in question, some plaintiffs have made statements that

are not as vague as “I hope,” but are still not concrete enough. These statements indicate a desire

to visit the relevant species’ habitats and give general time frames (e.g., summer 2008 or July of

2009). For instance, in the declaration of Kassia Siegel he stated, “I plan to return to Lord Howe

Island in early 2009 to once again attempt to view the Lord Howe currawong and enjoy its very

special habitat” (Siegel Decl. ¶ 9). Defendants contend that such statements are not concrete

enough to establish the necessary requirements for standing and that something beyond a mere

speculation of a general time frame (e.g., hotel reservations or plane tickets) is needed to show

the necessary “injury in fact” requirement of standing. This order agrees.

Although it does not appear that the Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit has directly

addressed this issue, plaintiffs primarily rely on Lockyer v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,

459 F. Supp. 2d 874, 885 (N.D. Cal. 2006), where the district court held:

Plaintiffs have satisfied [the standing requirements] here. Both the

Environmental Plaintiffs and the State Plaintiffs have shown their

concrete interest by submitting numerous declarations from

organizational members and State officials regarding their

geographic proximity to areas that will be affected by changed

roadless area policies. See, e.g., Declaration of Jonathan

Oppenheimer ¶ 19 (“Specifically, during the summer of 2006, I

intend to visit the Mallard-Larkins Roadless Area . . .”;

Declaration of Erik Molvar ¶ 11 (“This coming summer I and my

children plan to visit the Snowy Ridge and Libby Flats Roadless

Areas as well as Roadless Areas in Colorado and Washington.”)

The facts in Lockyer, however, differ from those presented on the current record. In Lockyer, the

species and habitats involved were all domestic. Here, the species and habitats involved are all

foreign. In terms of concreteness, it is one thing for an American to plan to visit Colorado early

next year, but entirely different for an American to plan to visit Lord Howe Island. The sheer

distance and remoteness relative to the United States and the amount of effort required to

organize such a trip is significant. Given we are concerned with rare species, there is also

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uncertainty associated with possible animal restrictions and access provisions that may have

been put in place by foreign governments and agencies. While such restrictions and provisions

have not been detailed on the record, getting into a foreign country to see these foreign species

seems harder than plaintiffs assume. In such circumstances, this order finds it much more

prudent to require a plaintiff to go beyond vague time frames. It is not necessary to confirm a

specific itinerary, but more must be shown than generalized plans for the future, at least when it

comes to overseas remote locations, possibly restricted in access due to the rare status of the

birds and butterflies. Accordingly, plaintiffs have also not met the standing requirements for the

following species (for which similar statements of intention have been made):

• Fiji petrel

• Chatham Island petrel

• Okinawa woodpecker

• Magenta petrel

• Chatham Island oystercatcher

• Cook’s petrel

• Codfish Island fernbird 

• Takahe 

• Orange-fronted parakeet

• Peruvian plantcutter

• Junin flightless grebe

• Southern helmeted curassow 

• Junin rail 

• Yellow-browed toucanet

• Royal cinclodes 

• White-browed tit-spinetail

• Ash-breasted tit-tyrant

• Esmeraldas woodstar

• Cherry-throated tanager

• Brasilia tapaculo 

• Brazilian merganser

• Helmeted woodpecker

• Kaempfer’s tody-tyrant

• Slender-billed curlew

• Mimic swallowtail 

• Fringe-backed fire-eye 

• Margaretta’s hermit 

• Black-backed tanager 

• Fluminese swallowtail 

• Hahnel’s Amazonian swallowtail 

• Southeastern rufous-vented ground cuckoo

• Cauca guan 

• Brown-banded antpitta 

• Bogota rail 

• Blue-billed curassow 

• Gorgeted wood-quail

• Lord Howe currawong

• Kaiser-I-Hind swallowtail 

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Third, plaintiff Alvaro Jaramillo has established standing for the Chilean woodstar,

Andean flamingo, Galapagos petrel (which has already been listed), medium treefinch,

black-breasted puffleg, and St. Lucia forest thrush. In his declaration, Jaramillo provided

concrete plans to lead guided tours to the habitats for these species by way of a detailed itinerary

including specific dates of travel (Jaramillo Decl. Exh. 1). Contrary to defendants contention

that plaintiffs did not allege standing at the time the complaint was filed, plaintiffs have alleged

standing for every species involved since the filing of the action. Absent any evidence indicating

otherwise, plaintiffs have met their burden showing that Jaramillo had standing at the time the

complaint was filed. 

* * *

Plaintiffs contend that establishing standing for any given species confers standing for

not only that species but for all species with a higher listing priority number. Plaintiffs argue

that in order for a lower priority species to ultimately be listed, all species with a higher priority

must be listed first, and thus, standing for the lower priority species necessarily implies standing

for all those above it. This order refuses to adopt plaintiffs’ expansive of standing. Under

plaintiffs’ flawed reasoning, if a plaintiff were to establish standing for a species with the lowest

possible priority number (i.e., with the lowest threat of endangerment), he or she would

automatically have standing for all those species with higher priority numbers (i.e., with the

highest threat of endangerment).

4. “WARRANTED BUT PRECLUDED” SPECIES.

Plaintiffs argue that defendants have failed to make “expeditious progress” or

demonstrate that the listing of the “warranted but precluded” species are precluded by other

pending listing proposals. As the Ninth Circuit held in Center for Biological Diversity v.

Kempthorne, 466 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006):

[T]he circumstances under which the Secretary may invoke the

excuse of warranted but precluded are narrowly defined. 

Implementing the petitioned action . . . must be precluded by

pending proposals and expeditious progress must be being made to

list qualified species and delist those for whom ESA’s protections

are no longer necessary. . . [T]he Service must show that it is

actively working on other listings and delistings and must

determine and publish a finding that such work has resulted in

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pending proposals which actually preclude proposing the

petitioned action at that time, and must determine and present

evidence that [it] is, in fact, making, expeditious progress in the

process of listing and delisting other species.

Defendants contend that they have made expeditious progress to list qualified species and delist

others between 2004 to 2007 (the relevant years in question) as evidenced through the following

actions: (1) publication of a twelve-month finding on a petition to list seven butterfly species;

(2) publication of a twelve-month finding and proposed rule delisting the Mexican bobcat;

(3) a final rule listing the Tibetan antelope as endangered; (4) a ninety-day finding on a petition

to delist the Morelet’s crocodile; (5) a proposed listing rule for six species of foreign birds, for

which listing was found to be warranted in the 2004 notice; (6) a special rule regulating trade in

beluga sturgeon, listed as threatened, and its caviar; and (7) a management rule for captivebred

members of three African antelope species, all listed as endangered (Saito Decl. ¶ 27). 

This order disagrees.

First, defendants’ publication of the twelve-month finding on the petition to list seven

butterfly species was ultimately a “warranted but precluded” finding. If the Service could use

such findings to show expeditious progress towards listing qualified species, every species could

potentially be found to be precluded due to the backlog of petitions in the Service. Second,

while the relevant period of showing expeditious progress is between 2004 (the year the

“warranted but precluded” findings were made) to 2007, it is difficult to ignore the fact that

some of the species for which plaintiffs have standing for are related to petitions that date as far

back as 1980, over 25 years ago. If the Service were allowed to continue at its current rate, it is

hard to imagine anytime in the near or distant future when these species will be entitled to

listing. Such delay hardly qualifies as “expeditious progress” and conflicts with the purpose of

the ESA to provide “prompt action upon receipt of a petition to list species if the petition

presents substantial scientific evidence that the species is endangered or threatened.” H.R. Rep.

No. 97-567 at 12 (1982). Third, as admitted by defendants, listing action of any kind (including

“warranted but precluded” findings and delistings) has only occurred for a total of twenty species

in the past three years. The number of species that were actually listed in the foreign endangered

list in the past three years is four. In light of the Service’s own initiative to list 29 species in

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2008, it is difficult to see how such activity qualifies as “expeditious progress” by the Service. 

“[T]he legislative history of the ESA and its subsequent amendments demonstrate [that]

Congress from the outset recognized that timeliness in the listing process is essential.” 

Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 254 F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 2001). If defendants were

allowed to continue at such a pace, many of the species in question may very well be extinct by

the time they are found to warrant a listing.

Defendants further contend that the Service is making expeditious progress “despite its

limited staff and resources” (Reply Br. 7). The Ninth Circuit in Center for Biological

Diversity v. Norton, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 2003), however, has already

rejected similar arguments made by the Service:

As other district courts within this Circuit have noted, to the extent

the [Service] feels aggrieved by Congress’ failure to allocate

proper resources in which to comply with [its] statutory duty,

Congress, not the courts, is the proper governmental body to

provide relief. Put another way, [t]he solution of being

over-obligated and under-funded rests with Congress, and not with

the Court. . . [T]he mandatory language of the ESA does not

support [D]efendant[‘s] suggestion that the ESA allows the

Secretary to comply with statutory duties at his or her

convenience, or that a heavy workload of the agency may excuse

compliance.

The Service’s inability to meet the statutory requirements of the ESA as a result of the lack of

allocated resources is not a cognizable concern. Congress has directed that ESA protection be

given to endangered species. As such, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to the

“warranted but precluded” species for which it has standing must be GRANTED.

In the event that plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted, defendants have

submitted a proposed schedule to list the “warranted but precluded” species at issue. 

The proposal takes significant steps in actively listing the species in question within a reasonable

time and, with a few modifications, will be adopted. Defendants will undertake to list every

species with a listing priority of two or three by the end of 2008. Defendants schedule proposes

a listing of all the remaining species at issue between 2010 and 2012. Now that many of the

species at issue have been removed from this action, however, defendants will be under no

obligation to list the species for which the standing requirements have not been met. 

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Defendants should thus be able to issue proposed listing rules for all the species for which

standing has been established by the end of 2008 and are hereby ordered to do so.

5. PROMPT ISSUING FOR “WARRANTED” SPECIES.

In their opening brief, plaintiffs contended that defendants violated Section 4 of the ESA

by its failure to “promptly” issue proposed rules for the seven species that were found to warrant

a listing in April 2007. Since their opening brief, the proposed and final listing for the seven

species has been made (72 Fed. Reg. 71298). As such, defendants contend that plaintiffs’ claim

for failing to promptly issue the proposed rule is now moot because there is no longer a case or

controversy. Plaintiffs maintain that their claim is not moot because the “voluntary cessation”

exception applied. 

Mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case. In order for

the exception to apply, however, “the defendant’s voluntary cessation must have arisen because

of the litigation.” Public Utilities Com’n of State of Cal. v. F.E.R.C., 100 F.3d 1451, 1460

(9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs have offered no support in the record to show that the Service made

the proposed listing rules as a result of this litigation. In fact, the record shows that the Service

had been working on preparing initial drafts of the proposed rules in September 2006, a few

months before this suit was filed.

At the hearing, plaintiffs raised the “capable of repetition, but evading review” exception

to the mootness doctrine. It does not apply. “A case or controversy remains if the Service’s

allegedly wrongful delay is capable of repetition but evading.” The exception only applies

where (1) the duration of the challenged action is too short to allow full litigation before it

ceases, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs will be subjected to it again. 

Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2002). These requirements

are absent. By plaintiffs’ own admission, we have no pattern of the agency consistently issuing a

listing proposal to moot out litigation.

CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, defendants shall make a listing as outlined above for the

bird and butterfly species for which plaintiffs have standing. Proposed listing rules must be

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issued for the Chilean woodstar, Andean flamingo, medium treefinch, black-breasted puffleg,

and St. Lucia forest thrush by the end of 2008. In the Court’s view, this disposes of the matter

entirely, however, if the parties believe otherwise, they must file notice with the Court by

JANUARY 28, 2008, AT NOON.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2008. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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