Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00689/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00689-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Suzan L. Hubbard
Respondent
Ronald Kemoni Peterson
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD KEMONI PETERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

SUZAN L. HUBBARD,

Respondent.

No. 15-cv-0689 KJM KJN P

ORDER

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2009 conviction for robbery 

and related offenses. Respondent’s motion to dismiss is pending. Respondent claims that the 

petition must be dismissed because petitioner’s claims are barred by the one-year statute of 

limitations. (ECF No. 14.) Petitioner opposes the motion, contending that his petition should be 

considered timely because he is entitled to equitable tolling. After careful consideration of the 

record before the court, the undersigned finds that additional briefing is warranted in this case.

Equitable Tolling

The one year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition may be equitably 

tolled if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing 

on time. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling 

must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

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some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 

(2005). The diligence required is “reasonable diligence,” not “maximum feasible diligence.” See

Holland, 560 U.S. at 653; see also Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010).

In his opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss, petitioner contends that equitable 

tolling is warranted based on his lack of access to legal materials, his placement in administrative 

segregation, and his mental health status. 

Mental Impairment

The Ninth Circuit has articulated a specific, two-part test for an equitable tolling claim 

based on a petitioner’s mental impairment:

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an 

“extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control by demonstrating 

the impairment was so severe that either

 (a) petitioner was unable to rationally or factually to personally 

understand the need to timely file, or

 (b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable personally to 

prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the 

claims to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental 

impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the 

totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access 

to assistance.

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see also Orthel v. 

Yates, 795 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A petitioner seeking equitable tolling on the grounds 

of mental incompetence must show extraordinary circumstances, such as an inability to rationally 

or factually personally understand the need to timely file, or a mental state rendering an inability 

personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.”).

A petitioner alleging a severe mental impairment during the filing period is not entitled to 

an evidentiary hearing unless he or she makes “a good faith allegation that would, if true, entitle 

him to equitable tolling.” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding for 

consideration of whether the petitioner's delayed filing was “attributable to psychiatric medication 

which deprived Petitioner of any kind of consciousness” where the petitioner had demonstrated 

“evidence of serious mental illness” by attaching prison psychiatric and medical records); see

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Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-100 (remanding where the petitioner was in the lowest percentile for 

verbal IQ, verbal comprehension and working memory, and, according to clinical psychologists, 

was incapable of inferential thinking necessary to complete a federal habeas form); see also

Orthel, 795 F.3d at 939-40 (“Where the record is amply developed, and where it indicates that the 

petitioner’s mental incompetence was not so severe as to cause the untimely filing of his habeas

petition, a district court is not obligated to hold evidentiary hearings to further develop the factual 

record, notwithstanding a petitioner's allegations of mental incompetence.”) (quoting Roberts v. 

Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010).)

In the instant case, petitioner alleges that for the past two to three years, he has been 

taking Trilyptol for anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder, and Zoloft for 

depression. (See ECF No. 17 at 7.) Petitioner alleges that these medications “sometimes cause 

[petitioner] to lose [his] memory short term [sic] and have jumbled thoughts because of their side 

effects.” (Id.) However, petitioner has not submitted any medical records or other documentation 

in support of his apparent contention that his alleged mental impairment was so severe that it 

caused his untimely filing.

Petitioner is granted the opportunity to provide additional briefing on his equitable tolling 

claim. Specifically, petitioner is directed to file a supplemental brief, signed under penalty of 

perjury, addressing his allegations that his medications interfered with his short term memory and 

“jumbled” his thoughts. In his brief, petitioner should explain when he started taking each 

medication and for what periods of time he was unable to file his federal habeas petition, as a 

result of the side effects of the medications. Petitioner must demonstrate by competent evidence 

that he suffers from a serious mental illness. Thus, petitioner is encouraged to attach any medical 

records he may have in support of his claims, including copies of his prescriptions or progress 

notes prepared by medical staff. Specifically, petitioner should submit any documents that would 

support his claim that (1) he was actually taking these medications for the period of time alleged, 

and (2) that the medications and related side effects interfered with his thought process so 

severely that it caused the untimely filing of his federal habeas petition.

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Lack of Access to Legal Materials

In some instances, a petitioner’s lack of access to his or her legal files may warrant 

equitable tolling. See Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 

130 S. Ct. 244 (2009) (“[d]eprivation of legal materials is the type of external impediment for 

which we have granted equitable tolling”); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009)

(holding that “a complete lack of access to a legal file may constitute an extraordinary 

circumstance” and remanding for determination of whether petitioner’s lack of access to his legal 

file made timely filing impossible). However, the dispositive question is whether the denial of 

access to the files was the cause of the delay. United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1197-98 

(9th Cir. 2004).

In his opposition, petitioner contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling because, on or 

about March 11, 2014, he was placed in administrative segregation and thereafter involuntarily 

transferred to another prison. (See ECF No. 17 at 6.) Petitioner asserts that he had “several 

conflicting issues about obtaining his legal materials,” and was not released from administrative 

segregation until approximately January 2015. (See id. at 7.) If petitioner was completely 

deprived of access to his legal materials during this time, he may be entitled to equitable tolling. 

However, it is not clear from petitioner’s opposition if he was denied access to his legal materials 

during the entire period of March 11, 2014, through January 2015, or if he had access to his 

materials during part of this time. Therefore, in his supplemental brief, petitioner should explain 

to the court (1) for what periods of time he was without access to his legal materials, and (2) 

whether he had access to some of his legal materials during this time, or if he was completely 

denied access to all of his materials.

The court also notes that petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition includes as 

attachments several letters documenting petitioner’s efforts to obtain various legal materials in 

late 2012 and early 2013, before his first state habeas petition was filed. These letters suggest that 

petitioner may have been without access to his legal materials for some period of time before he 

filed his first state habeas petition in the Solano County Superior Court.

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Petitioner is advised that the federal statute of limitations was running during the time 

before he filed his first state habeas petition. If it is petitioner’s position that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling for any period of time between October 11, 2011, and the filing of his first state 

habeas petition, petitioner should explain this argument in his supplemental briefing.

Delay in Filing State Habeas Petition with the California Supreme Court

In general, the statute of limitations is statutorily tolled during the time after a state habeas 

petition has been filed, but before a decision has been rendered. Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 

777, 780 (9th Cir. 2012). However, “a California habeas petitioner who unreasonably delays in 

filing a state habeas petition is not entitled to the benefit of statutory tolling during the gap or 

interval preceding the filing.” Id. at 781 (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225-27 (2002)). 

Thus, “[t]he period between a California lower court's denial of review and the filing of an 

original petition in a higher court is tolled -- because it is part of a single round of habeas relief --

so long as the filing is timely under California law.” Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 

2010). Generally, a gap of 30 to 60 days between state petitions is considered a “reasonable 

time” during which the statute of limitations is tolled. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 210 (2006) 

(using 30 to 60 days as general measurement for reasonableness based on other states' rules 

governing time to appeal to the state supreme court); Carey, 536 U.S. at 219 (same).

Here, the court observes that after petitioner’s state habeas petition was denied by the 

California Court of Appeal on August 2, 2012, petitioner waited 81 days to file his habeas 

petition with the California Supreme Court. (See ECF No. 14-2 at 51, 52.) Petitioner is advised 

that this length of delay is generally considered unreasonable, unless petitioner provides some 

justification for the delay. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. at 210. If petitioner has an explanation 

as to why he delayed in filing his petition in the California Supreme Court, he should provide this 

explanation in his supplemental brief. Petitioner is advised that if he cannot adequately justify the 

delay, petitioner will not be entitled to tolling during the interval between the California Court of 

Appeal’s denial of his petition and the filing of his petition in the California Supreme Court.

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Diligence

Finally, petitioner is reminded that petitioner “bears the burden of showing his own 

diligence and that the hardship caused by lack of access to his materials was an extraordinary 

circumstance that caused him to file his petition . . . late.” Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013 

(emphasis added). In determining whether a habeas petitioner has been diligent, courts consider 

both whether he was diligent in pursuing his rights “at the time his efforts were being thwarted,” 

as well as during the “period of time before the external impediment.” Roy, 465 F.3d 964, 970-

72 (9th Cir. 2006); see id. (quoting LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2005)) (“This 

obligation [to act diligently] does not pertain solely to the filing of the federal habeas petition, 

rather it is an obligation that exists during the period appellant is exhausting state court remedies 

as well.”). “Equitable tolling may be available ‘[w]hen external forces, rather than a petitioner’s 

lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim.’” McMonagle v. Meyer, 802 F.3d 

1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). A 

petitioner must provide specific facts regarding what was done to pursue the petitioner’s claims to 

demonstrate that equitable tolling is warranted. Roy, 465 F.3d at 973; see also Stillman v. 

LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003) (petitioner must show that the external force 

caused the untimeliness); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013-14 (prisoner did not point to 

specific instances where he needed a particular document and could not procure it when needed 

and failed to meet his burden to show his own diligence and that the hardship created by the lack 

of access to his materials was an extraordinary circumstance that caused him to file an untimely 

petition).

Petitioner’s opposition does not make clear whether he was wholly deprived of his legal 

materials for periods of time, or whether his access to such materials was limited. For example, 

in his declaration, petitioner claims he went to ad seg on March 11, 2014, and “had several 

conflicting issues about obtaining [his] legal material.” (ECF No. 17 at 6.) However, petitioner 

must explain how he was diligent in seeking such legal materials, and whether he was completely 

deprived of pertinent legal materials, or whether he had access to some of his legal materials. In 

addition, petitioner must describe the legal materials sought as well as his efforts to obtain such 

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legal materials, how the deprivation of such legal materials prevented him from filing his federal 

petition, and the date he obtained access to such materials. Similarly, to the extent petitioner 

contends an involuntary transfer constituted an extraordinary circumstance, he must provide 

similar factual details as to his diligence and alleged impeded access to necessary legal materials. 

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that there must be a “causal link between the lateness [of 

the petition] and the extraordinary circumstances” cited for the tardiness. Hartley v. Hall, 335 

Fed. App’x 686, 687-88 (citing Bryant v. Schriro, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(“Petitioner has failed to establish the requisite causal connection.”)). 

Therefore, in his supplemental opposition, petitioner must explain, by providing specific 

dates and circumstances, his own diligence and how the hardship caused by his lack of access to 

specific legal materials constituted an impediment to his timely filing in federal court. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, petitioner shall file and serve 

a supplemental opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner shall address

each of the four areas specifically set forth above.

2. Respondent may file a reply within fourteen days after the filing date of petitioner’s 

supplemental opposition.

3. Petitioner’s failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation that his 

request for equitable tolling be denied. 

Dated: November 9, 2016

/pete0689.fb.EqT

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