Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01946/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01946-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ducart
Respondent
Sidney Maiden
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In 2011, a jury convicted Petitioner of carjacking, assault with a firearm participation in a 

criminal street gang and other charges. As a result, the court sentenced him to 25 years-to-life in 

prison. In this action, he claims there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, the 

prosecutor committed misconduct and that the California statute punishing participation in a criminal 

street gang is unconstitutionally vague. Because the Court finds none of the grounds for the petition 

may give rise to relief, the petition is DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2011, Petitioner was convicted of carjacking, assault with a firearm, attempted carjacking,

attempted first degree robbery, second degree robbery, possession of a firearm by a felon and active 

participation in a criminal street gang. (Doc. 20, Ex. A). True findings were also made regarding gangrelated enhancements and allegations supporting he used a firearm. (Id.). 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (the “5th

SIDNEY MAIDEN,

 Petitioner,

v.

DUCART,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-01946-JLT

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE FILE

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY

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DCA”), which affirmed the conviction. (Doc. 20, Ex. A). Next, he filed a petition for review in the 

California Supreme Court, which was denied. (Lodged Document (“LD”) 5). 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the Statement of Facts in the 5th DCA’s unpublished decision1:

Maiden's convictions arise from a series of events that occurred in Bakersfield on October 27, 

2010. At approximately 8:30 p.m., Fernando Roman was carjacked at gunpoint in the parking 

lot of Valley Plaza Mall. The perpetrator forced Mr. Roman out of his green minivan, took his 

cell phone, and drove off in the vehicle.

Shortly before 10:00 p.m., two men approached Goben and Veronica Vargas while they were 

using a drive-through automated teller machine located on Oswell Street. One of the men wore 

a mask. The masked individual pointed a gun at Veronica Vargas and demanded she lower the 

passenger side window of the Vargas' automobile. The second man tried to gain entry from the 

opposite side of the car. Goben Vargas quickly shifted into drive and “hit the gas,” allowing 

the couple to escape.

Within minutes of the encounter on Oswell Street, a similar incident occurred nearby on 

Auburn Street. Two men accosted Marilyn Aldana and Laura Sanchez in the parking lot of La 

Mina Restaurant and stole their purses at gunpoint. The men fled towards a green minivan 

occupied by a third individual. The person inside opened the door for the robbers and the car 

sped off after they jumped inside.

Fernando Roman's minivan was recovered by police around midnight. Officers searched the 

vehicle and found several items belonging to Marilyn Aldana and Laura Sanchez. The 

recovered items included credit cards, debit cards, and cosmetics.

Further investigation led police to the home of Maiden's cousin, Dayshnay Fountain. Two 

suspects, Stephan Cartwright and Michael Russell, were apprehended inside of Ms. Fountain's 

apartment. A search of the residence uncovered a semi-automatic handgun, a face mask, a 

digital camera and cell phone belonging to Laura Sanchez, and clothing matching the victims' 

descriptions of the robbers.

Ms. Fountain reportedly told police that Cartwright and Russell had been at her apartment

earlier in the evening, but left at some point with Maiden. She said Maiden arrived in a vehicle 

she did not believe was his, and all three men departed in that vehicle. Police began searching 

for Maiden based on the information provided by Ms. Fountain.

At a field show-up conducted outside of Ms. Fountain's apartment, victims Marilyn Aldana and 

Laura Sanchez identified Cartwright and Russell as the men who had robbed them. Mr. and 

Mrs. Vargas could not positively identify the suspects but told police both men matched the 

general appearance of their attackers in terms of height, weight, and build. Goben Vargas also 

said that the gun, mask, and a brown sweatshirt seized from Ms. Fountain's apartment were all 

the same as those worn and used by the perpetrators.

Meanwhile, Fernando Roman identified Maiden from a photographic lineup. Maiden was 

located and taken into custody in the early morning hours of October 28, 2010. He was found 

in possession of Mr. Roman's cell phone at the time of his arrest.

 

1

The 5th DCA’s summary of the facts in its unpublished opinion is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). 

Thus, the Court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the 5th DCA.

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On June 1, 2011, the Kern County District Attorney filed an amended criminal information 

charging Maiden with carjacking (Count 1), assault with a firearm (Counts 2, 6, 9 & 10), 

attempted carjacking (Count 3), attempted first degree robbery (Counts 4 & 5), second degree 

robbery (Counts 7 & 8), possession of a firearm by a felon (Count 11), and active participation 

in a criminal street gang (Count 12). The amended information contained enhancement 

allegations for gang association (Counts 1 through 11), personal use of a firearm (Counts 1, 2, 

3, 4, 5, 7, 8 & 12) and firearm use liability as a principal in the commission of a felony offense 

(Counts 3, 4, 5, 7 & 8). Further enhancements were alleged pursuant to sections 667 and 667.5 

but were subsequently dismissed at the request of the prosecutor.

The amended information charged Stephan Cartwright and Michael Russell with the same 

crimes alleged under Counts 3 through 12. Maiden was the only person accused of carjacking 

and assaulting Fernando Roman under Counts 1 and 2. The trial court later granted a motion to 

sever the trial of Russell from that of his co-defendants. Maiden and Cartwright were tried 

jointly in a two-week jury trial that began in August 2011.

All five victims testified as prosecution witnesses at Maiden's trial, as did several officers from 

the Bakersfield Police Department. Officer Matthew Gregory served as the prosecution's gang 

expert. Among other testimony, Officer Gregory provided background information regarding 

the criminal street gang known as the Bloods and opined that Maiden and Cartwright were 

active members of the gang.

Dayshnay Fountain was called as a prosecution witness, but she contradicted police testimony 

by denying Maiden had come to her home on the night in question. She also denied telling 

investigating officers that Cartwright and Russell were picked up by Maiden in a vehicle. 

According to Ms. Fountain, Cartwright left her apartment on foot at approximately 9:50 p.m. 

and Russell departed shortly after 10:00 p.m.

Maiden's sister, Shataree Scoggins, was called as a defense witness. She testified Maiden was 

at home with her and several family members on the evening of October 27, 2010 and had 

fallen asleep on a couch in the living room by 9:30 p.m. His sister also claimed that Russell, 

who is her cousin, gave her Fernando Roman's stolen cell phone earlier that day, “before it 

even became nighttime.” Ms. Scoggins left the phone on a coffee table next to Maiden before 

she went to bed, thus explaining why it was found in his immediate vicinity at the time of 

Maiden's arrest.

Maiden was acquitted of attempted carjacking with respect to Goben and Veronica Vargas as 

alleged in Count 3. He was convicted on all remaining counts. The jury returned true findings 

on the gang enhancement allegations for all convictions under Counts 1 through 11 and for 

personal use of a firearm under Counts 1, 2, and 12. Firearm enhancement allegations based 

on his participation as a principal in the offenses charged under Counts 4, 5, 7 and 8 were also 

found to be true.

(Doc. 20, Exh. A, pp. 24-26).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 

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7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States 

Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located 

within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(d). 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds 

by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute’s 

enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed 

by its provisions.

B. Legal Standard of Review

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) will not be granted unless the 

petitioner can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 412-413. 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if it applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, or “if it confronts a set of facts 

that is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision but reaches a different result.” 

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406 (2000). 

In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court 

explained that an “unreasonable application” of federal law is an objective test that turns on “whether 

it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree” that the state court decision meets the standards set 

forth in the AEDPA. The Supreme Court has “said time and again that ‘an unreasonable application of 

federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 

1388, 1410-1411 (2011). Thus, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court

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“must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-788. 

The second prong pertains to state court decisions based on factual findings. Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d at 637, citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Under § 2254(d)(2), a 

federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claims “resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d at 1500. A state court’s factual finding is unreasonable when it is “so clearly incorrect that it 

would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Id.; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 

(9th Cir. 2004), cert.denied, Maddox v. Taylor, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004).

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks to the 

last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court’s decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). “[A]lthough we 

independently review the record, we still defer to the state court’s ultimate decisions.” Pirtle v. 

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether the error had “a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-120 (2007)(holding that the Brecht

standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness).

IV. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner raises three grounds for relief. He claims: (1) there was insufficient evidence to 

support the convictions for first degree robbery, second degree robbery, and all three counts of assault 

with a firearm; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct; and (3) Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(a)—which 

criminalizes and punishes participation in a criminal street gang—is unconstitutionally void for 

vagueness.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner first contends that the convictions for first and second degree robbery and those for 

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assault with a firearm were not supported by sufficient evidence. 

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion

The 5th DCA rejected this claim as follows:

Maiden does not dispute the sufficiency of evidence in support of his convictions relating to 

the carjacking of Fernando Roman, his unlawful possession of a firearm, or active participation 

in a criminal street gang. He contends the requisite proof was lacking as to the charges under 

Counts 4 through 10, i.e., the crimes committed against Marilyn Aldana, Laura Sanchez, and 

the Vargas family. More specifically, Maiden asserts “[t]here was no evidence that [he] was 

present during any of those crimes, or that he actively encouraged, aided or abetted in their 

commission.” His position is untenable.

There are no missing links in the chain of circumstantial evidence connecting Maiden to the 

crimes for which he was convicted. While some links may have been weaker than others, the 

evidence was sufficient to support multiple theories of liability, including his role as the driver 

who transported Cartwright and Russell to and from the locations where the offenses occurred. 

Maiden's arguments to the contrary ignore pertinent trial testimony and the applicable standard 

of review.

“A substantial evidence inquiry examines the record in the light most favorable to the 

judgment and upholds it if the record contains reasonable, credible evidence of solid value 

upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied in reaching the conclusion in question.” 

(People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052, italics in original.) Reversal is not 

warranted unless the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict under any hypothesis. 

(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) This standard applies in cases, such as this one, 

where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 

43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)

“Although it is the jury's duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence 

susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other 

innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant's guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053–1054.) If the jury 

rejects the interpretation pointing to innocence, and there is competent evidence to support a 

finding of guilt as the more reasonable conclusion, we are bound by the jury's decision. 

(People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 118.) We cannot reweigh the evidence, reinterpret 

the evidence, or substitute our own judgment for that of the jury. (People v. Baker (2005) 126 

Cal.App.4th 463, 469.) 

Maiden emphasizes the enhancement allegations for personal use of a firearm under Counts 4 

through 10 were found to be untrue. He thus concludes “that the jury did not convict him as a 

perpetrator, but as an aider and abettor in those offenses.” His reasoning on this point is sound, 

but it does not support any arguments for reversal.

Aiding and abetting liability exists “when a person who does not directly commit a crime 

assists the direct perpetrator by aid or encouragement, with knowledge of the perpetrator's 

criminal intent and with the intent to help him carry out the offense.” (People v. Miranda

(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 407 (Miranda).) One who “promotes, encourages or instigates 

the commission of the crime” may be characterized as an aider and abettor. (People v. Cooper

(1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.) Likewise, any person who is “present for the purpose of 

diverting suspicion, or to serve as a lookout, or to give warning of anyone seeking to interfere, 

or to take charge of an automobile and to keep the engine running, or to drive the getaway car 

and to give direct aid to others in making their escape from the scene of the crime, is a 

principal in the crime committed.” (People v. Swanson–Birabent (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 733, 

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743–744, internal quotation marks omitted.)

The decision to aid and abet may occur in the spur of the moment, and the assistance provided 

need not be a substantial factor in the offense. (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 

532.) “[A]ny person concerned in the commission of a crime, however slight that concern may 

be, is liable as a principal in the crime.” (Ibid., citations omitted.) Companionship and 

conduct before and after the offense are relevant considerations in the liability analysis. 

(People v. Haynes (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1294.)

Based on the facts and circumstances recounted above, there was substantial evidence linking 

Cartwright and Russell to the crimes at issue. Maiden had close ties to both individuals. As to 

Cartwright, the prosecution established a common membership in the Bloods street gang. 

There was also evidence of Russell's membership in the Bloods, as well as a familial 

relationship between him and Maiden.

The prosecution's evidence indicated Cartwright and Russell were traveling in a vehicle with 

Maiden prior to committing the crimes alleged in Counts 4 through 10. The attempted 

robbery of Goben and Veronica Vargas, and the offenses involving Marilyn Aldana and Laura 

Sanchez, occurred in very close proximity of time and location. The robbers were seen fleeing 

in a green minivan occupied by a third individual. It was up to the jury to decide whether that 

third person was Maiden, or a nameless perpetrator who somehow managed to evade capture 

and suspicion.

The jury reasonably could have inferred a scenario in which Maiden carjacked the minivan and 

then met up with his fellow gang members, encouraging them to commit additional crimes 

with him and/or with his assistance. Jurors apparently believed Maiden used the stolen vehicle 

to drive Cartwright and Russell to and from the locations where the subsequent offenses 

occurred. Assuming the role of a getaway driver, Maiden logically would have served as a 

lookout while his cohorts engaged in their crime spree. This hypothesis is supported by the 

testimony of Laura Sanchez, who said the man in the green minivan was waiting for 

Cartwright and Russell and helped facilitate their escape. The cumulative impact of the 

evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude, without doubt, that Maiden aided and 

abetted the crimes charged under Counts 4 through 10.

(Doc. 20, Ex. A, pp. 26-28).

2. Federal Standard.

The law on sufficiency of the evidence is clearly established by the Supreme Court. Pursuant 

to the Court’s holding in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, the test on habeas review to determine 

whether a factual finding is fairly supported by the record is as follows: “[W]hether, after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Lewis 

v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 (1990). Thus, only if “no rational trier of fact” could have found proof of 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt will a petitioner be entitled to habeas relief. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. 

Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Id. at 324, n. 16. 

A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether it is 

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satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 

338 (9th Cir. 1992). The federal court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.’” See id., quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Only 

where no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may the writ 

be granted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338.

If confronted by a record that supports conflicting inferences, a federal habeas court “must 

presume–even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record–that the trier of fact resolved any such 

conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. A 

jury’s credibility determinations are therefore entitled to near-total deference. Bruce v. Terhune, 376 

F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004). Except in the most exceptional of circumstances, Jackson does not 

permit a federal court to revisit credibility determinations. See id. at 957-958. 

Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence may be sufficient to sustain a 

conviction. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). However, mere suspicion and 

speculation cannot support logical inferences. Id.; see, e.g., Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1278-

1279 (9th Cir. 2005)(only speculation supported conviction for first degree murder under theory of 

aiding and abetting).

After the enactment of the AEDPA, a federal habeas court must apply the standards of Jackson

with an additional layer of deference. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. Generally, a federal habeas court 

must ask whether the operative state court decision reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson

and Winship to the facts of the case. Id. at 1275. Moreover, in applying the AEDPA’s deferential 

standard of review, this Court must also presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). This presumption of 

correctness applies to state appellate determinations of fact as well as those of the state trial courts. 

Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir.1990). Although the presumption of correctness does not 

apply to state court determinations of legal questions or mixed questions of law and fact, the facts as 

found by the state court underlying those determinations are entitled to the presumption. Sumner v. 

Mata, 455 U.S. 539, 597 (1981). 

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In Cavazos, v. Smith, __U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2 (2011), the Supreme Court further explained the 

highly deferential standard of review in habeas proceedings, by noting that Jackson

“makes clear that it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions 

should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury's 

verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed 

with the jury. What is more, a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a 

sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state 

court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was “objectively 

unreasonable.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 

(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because rational people can sometimes disagree, the inevitable consequence of this settled law 

is that judges will sometimes encounter convictions that they believe to be mistaken, but that 

they must nonetheless uphold.

Cavazos, 132 S.Ct. at 3.

“Jackson says that evidence is sufficient to support a conviction so long as ‘after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 443 U.S., at 319, 99 

S.Ct. 2781. It also unambiguously instructs that a reviewing court “faced with a record of 

historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not 

affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of 

the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id., at 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781. 

Cavazos, 132 S.Ct. at 6. 2

3. Analysis

Petitioner argues that the evidence at trial “did not and nor would not logically permit any 

interpretation” that Petitioner was the carjacker, despite that fact that Roman identified Petitioner as 

such. (Doc. 26, p. 18). Petitioner characterizes the prosecution’s evidence as “speculation and 

suspicion.” (Id.). Petitioner points out various inconsistencies in the trial testimony, apparently to 

support his claim of insufficient evidence. (Id., p. 19). After claiming that Roman’s identification of 

Petitioner was based on “subjective” rather than “objective” factors, he concludes that it was merely a 

case of mistaken identification. (Id.). 

Petitioner’s arguments are unpersuasive and reveal his misunderstanding of the liberal standard 

 

2

To the extent that the 5th DCA’s opinion does not expressly cite the Jackson v. Virginia standard in analyzing the 

sufficiency claims herein, it must be noted that, long ago, the California Supreme Court expressly adopted the federal 

Jackson standard for sufficiency claims in state criminal proceedings. People v. Johnson, 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 (1980). 

Accordingly, the state court applied the correct legal standard, and this Court’s only task is to determine whether the state

court adjudication was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that standard.

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of review to be applied here. The Court’s function is not to re-weigh the evidence. Rather, the 

Court’s only function is to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The 5th DCA carefully 

set forth the evidence supporting the carjacking conviction and the Court will not repeat it again. The 

Court agrees with the state court that, “[w]hile some links may have been weaker than others, the 

evidence was sufficient to support multiple theories of liability.” After reviewing all relevant 

evidence, the state court noted:

The jury reasonably could have inferred a scenario in which Maiden carjacked the minivan and 

then met up with his fellow gang members, encouraging them to commit additional crimes 

with him and/or with his assistance. Jurors apparently believed Maiden used the stolen vehicle 

to drive Cartwright and Russell to and from the locations where the subsequent offenses 

occurred. Assuming the role of a getaway driver, Maiden logically would have served as a 

lookout while his cohorts engaged in their crime spree. This hypothesis is supported by the 

testimony of Laura Sanchez, who said the man in the green minivan was waiting for 

Cartwright and Russell and helped facilitate their escape. The cumulative impact of the 

evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude, without doubt, that Maiden aided and 

abetted the crimes charged under Counts 4 through 10.

(Doc. 20, Ex. A, p. 28).

The Court agrees with the state court. While some discrepancies and inconsistencies exist 

within the total body of evidence adduced at trial, the deferential standard under the AEDPA requires 

the Court to conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes 

in dispute here beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner next contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by comments made during 

closing argument and rebuttal.

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

The 5th DCA denied this claim as follows:

Maiden argues for complete reversal of the judgment on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. 

The misconduct allegedly occurred during closing argument and rebuttal. Maiden contends the 

prosecution argued facts not in evidence by stating that “Mr. Maiden's name came up” while 

police were at the home of Dayshnay Fountain. Maiden further claims his constitutional rights 

were violated when the prosecution highlighted the fact that certain individuals did not testify 

in his defense at trial.

The record disproves the first contention. Officer Nicole Shirer testified regarding her 

conversations with Dashnay Fountain on October 28, 2010 and Ms. Fountain's reaction to the 

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discovery of a mask, a gun, and stolen property inside of her apartment: “She became very 

upset. She began to shake and to cry ... She said at about 7 o'clock in the evening, Sidney—a 

subject she told me was Sidney Maiden arrived at her residence. And shortly thereafter, 

Cartwright—Mr. Cartwright, Mr. Russell and Mr. Maiden all left together.”

The prosecution did not resort to matters outside of the record by arguing Maiden's name 

“came up” and “somebody in that household mentioned him.” Moreover, according to the 

testimony of Officer Shirer, the statements were accurate.

The remaining arguments ultimately pertain to the testimony of Maiden's sister, Shataree 

Scoggins. As previously discussed, Ms. Scoggins testified regarding Maiden's whereabouts on 

the evening of October 27, 2010. Maiden had allegedly fallen asleep by 9:30 p.m. inside a 

home occupied by several family members, including his mother. Ms. Scoggins also claimed 

to have told their mother, at the time of Maiden's arrest, that the cell phone belonging to 

Fernando Roman was given to her by Michael Russell. Her mother allegedly asked why she 

did not explain this to the police officers, to which Ms. Scoggins replied, “They didn't ask me.”

The prosecution remarked upon the believability of Ms. Scoggins' story during closing 

argument and the fact that Maiden's mother did not testify in her son's defense. Advance 

notice was provided to the trial court and defense counsel that such comments would be made. 

When closing arguments were presented, the trial court reminded jurors the defense had no 

burden of proof and was thus under no obligation to produce witnesses. The prosecution 

acknowledged this as well, albeit in a less formal manner (“I have the burden folks....They 

don't have to prove a damn thing”).

We find no legal error in the prosecutor's remarks. “[A] prosecutor may comment on the 

absence of logical witnesses to rebut the People's or corroborate the defendant's case.” (People 

v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 210.) In light of his sister's testimony, Maiden's mother was 

a logical witness. “[I]t is neither unusual nor improper to comment on the failure to call logical 

witnesses.” (People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1275.) This principle vitiates 

Maiden's claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

The case of People v. Gaines (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 821 (Gaines), on which Maiden relies, is 

inapposite. In Gaines, the defendant took the stand and offered an alibi defense, identifying a 

particular witness in the courtroom who was expected to testify to facts corroborating his 

version of the events. (Gaines, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 823–824.) The witness did not end 

up testifying. (Id. at p. 824.)

During rebuttal, the prosecutor speculated as to what the absent witness would have said had 

he testified, asserting the testimony would have contradicted that of the defendant. The 

prosecutor also accused defense counsel of essentially hiding the witness and obstructing the 

prosecution's ability to call him for impeachment purposes. (Gaines, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 824–825.) The appellate court found these arguments went beyond the evidence in the 

record and rose to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. (Id. at pp. 825–826.)

The Gaines opinion holds “that a prosecutor commits misconduct when he purports to tell the 

jury why a defense witness did not testify and what the testimony of that witness would have 

been.” (Gaines, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 822.) Such behavior did not occur in this case. 

The prosecution limited its comments to evidence in the record and permissibly noted Maiden's 

decision not to call logical witnesses.

(Doc. 20, Ex. A, pp. 28-29).

///

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2. Federal Standard

Under clearly established federal law, a prosecutor's improper comments will be held to violate 

the Constitution only if they “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 

denial of due process.” Parker v. Matthews, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2153, 183 L.Ed.2d 

32 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting Darden v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 168, 181–183 (1986)); see Sassounian 

v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir.2000). Prosecutorial misconduct deprives the defendant of a fair 

trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause if it prejudicially affects the substantial rights of a 

defendant. United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1539 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 

455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982)).

To grant habeas relief, this Court must conclude that the state court's rejection of the 

prosecutorial misconduct claim “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Parker v. 

Matthews, 132 S.Ct. at 2155 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 767–87). The standard of 

Darden v. Wainwright is a very general one that provides courts with more leeway in reaching 

outcomes in case-by-case determinations. Parker, 132 S.Ct. at 2155 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 

541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

In determining whether the prosecutor's remarks rendered a trial fundamentally unfair, the 

remarks must be analyzed in the context of the entire proceeding. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 

385 (1990); Darden, 477 U.S. at 179-82. Furthermore, counsel are “given latitude in the presentation of 

their closing arguments, and courts must allow the prosecution to strike hard blows based on the 

evidence presented and all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1253–

1254 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1415 (9th Cir.1993)). A reviewing 

court should consider challenged remarks in light of the realistic nature of closing arguments at trial. 

“Because 'improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear,' 

'a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most 

damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the 

plethora of less damaging interpretations'.” Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 744 (9th Cir.) (quoting 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646–647 (1974)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 937 (1998). Finally, 

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even when prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of a due process violation, such misconduct 

provides grounds for habeas relief only if that misconduct is prejudicial under the harmless error test 

articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–638 (1993); Shaw v. Terhune, 380 F.3d 473, 

478 (9th Cir.2004). Thus, even where a prosecutor's argument, questions or behavior are found 

improper, relief is limited to cases in which a petitioner can establish that the misconduct resulted in 

actual, substantial prejudice.

3. Analysis.

Here, the 5th DCA considered the entire context of the trial, including comments by the 

prosecution in closing argument, before concluding that comments related to Dashnay Fountain were 

actually supported by the testimony of prosecution evidence, and that comments regarding the 

defense’s failure to present witnesses to confirm Shataree Scoggin’s testimony did not constitute 

misconduct. The Court agrees.

As the 5th DCA noted, Officer Shirer testified that, on the night of Petitioner’s arrest, Fountain 

told her about Petitioner’s movements and actions with Cartwright and Russell. Thus, the prosecutor’s 

comments were support by admitted evidence, and the prosecution did not resort to matters outside of 

the record by arguing Maiden's name “came up” and “somebody in that household mentioned him.” 

Regarding the defense’s failure to call a witness to verify Scoggins’ testimony about Petitioner’s 

whereabouts, contrary to Petitioner’s contentions, it is permissible for the prosecutor to comment about 

the failure of the defense to call witnesses to support an aspect of the defense as long as the comment is 

not directed to the accused’s right to avoid self-incrimination. United States v. Cabrera, 201 F.3d 1243, 

1250 (9th Cir. 2000). Such comments do not impermissible shift the burden of proof. Id. As 

Respondent correctly notes, the prosecutor did not in any way suggest what testimony Petitioner’s 

mother might give, only that his own mother would be a logical witness for the defense to call if indeed 

Ms. Scoggins’ testimony was accurate and credible. Under such circumstances, those comments did

not violate Petitioner’s constitutional rights. Moreover, the prosecutor reminded the jurors that 

Petitioner did not have “to prove a damn thing” and the court instructed the jury was instructed that 

comments of counsel were not evidence. (LD 16, pp. 1307-1308). Jurors are presumed to understand 

and follow the court’s instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000); see Waddington v. 

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Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 195 (2009)(“arguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than 

do instructions from the court.”), quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384, 110 S.Ct. 1190 

(1990). 

None of the Darden factors favor Petitioner. The record does not establish that the prosecutor 

manipulated or misstated the evidence or that his comments implicated other specific rights of the 

accused. As discussed, the comments themselves were not objectionable content, and, in any event, 

the jurors were properly instructed at the conclusion of the trial regarding the comments of counsel. 

Additionally, Petitioner's objections regarding the prosecutor's comments about Fountain’s 

statements to police and the failure of the defense to call Petitioner’s mother to confirm Scoggins’ 

account do not amount to a due process violation because “[c]riticism of defense theories and tactics is 

a proper subject of closing argument.” See United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th 

Cir.1997) (citation omitted). Prosecutors have taken far more egregious shots at defense counsel and 

have been found not to have committed misconduct. See e.g., U.S. v. Del Toro–Barboza, 673 F.3d 

1136, 1151 (9th Cir.2012) (characterizing defense strategy as “the Wizard of Oz trick”); United States 

v. Ruiz, 710 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir.2013) (characterizing defense case as “smoke and mirrors” 

directed to defense case and not counsel); Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 744– 45 (9th Cir.1998) 

(calling defendant's argument “trash” not misconduct; “He did not say the man was 'trash'; he said the 

argument was. A lawyer is entitled to characterize an argument with an epithet as well as a rebuttal.”); 

United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 487-88 (5th Cir.2002) (rejecting a challenge to a prosecutor's 

closing argument that accused the defense of trying “to get someone on this jury to...take a red 

herring”); but see, United States v. Sanchez, 659 F.3d 1252, 1224 (9th Cir.2011) (misconduct where the 

prosecutor argued: “the defense [counsel] in this case read the records and then told a story to match the 

records. And ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to ask you not to credit that scam that has been 

perpetrated on you here.”). For these reasons, the Court will deny this claim.3

 

3

In his Traverse, Petitioner makes much of the purported distinction between an “alibi” defense and a defense based upon 

“misidentification.” Petitioner contends that the prosecution’s emphasis upon an “alibi” defense and the lack of evidence 

supporting it was a “designed subterfuge” to “shift the burden of proof” to Petitioner. (Doc. 26, p. 6). In the Court’s view, 

the distinction between an “alibi” defense and a defense of “misidentification” is, in this instance, artificial. Although under 

other circumstances it is conceivable that the two defenses would be distinct, in this case they are intertwined: Petitioner 

argues that Roman misidentified him and that he was not the individual involved in the robberies along with Cartwright and 

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C. Unconstitutionality of Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(a)

Finally, Petitioner contends that Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(a) is unconstitutionally void for 

vagueness. 

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

The 5th DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

Section 186.22, subdivision (a), proscribes active participation in a criminal street gang. 

Maiden challenges the constitutionality of the statute, arguing it is void for vagueness because 

the term “gang” and the concept of active participation are ambiguous. In People v. Castenada

(2000) 23 Cal.4th 743 (Castenada), the California Supreme Court considered the meaning of 

the phrase “actively participates in any criminal street gang,” as used in section 186.22. The 

high court concluded that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague because “our Legislature 

has made it reasonably clear what conduct is prohibited” and because nothing in the statutory 

language would encourage “arbitrary or discriminatory law enforcement.” (Castenada, supra, 

23 Cal.4th at p. 752, citations omitted.)

Maiden acknowledges that we are bound by the holding in Castenada but submits he is raising 

the issue to preserve federal appellate review. We would note for his benefit that the Eastern 

District of California has rejected challenges to section 186.22 made on grounds of 

unconstitutional vagueness. (See, e.g., Williams v. Evans (E.D. Cal. 2009) 2009 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 47310, *85–89, 2009 WL 1460832, *30–31.) In any event, Maiden's argument is 

devoid of merit under controlling decisions of the California Supreme Court.

(Doc. 20, Ex. A, p. 29).

2. Federal Standard.

The test for vagueness is whether the sentencing provision fails “to give a person of ordinary 

intelligence fair notice that it would apply to the conduct contemplated.” United States v. Rearden, 349 

F.3d 608, 614 (9th Cir.2003); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). To

determine if a statute is vague, a court should look at the common understanding of the statute's terms. 

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973); United States v. Fitzgerald, 882 F.2d 397, 398 (9th 

Cir.1989). In addition, a statute must establish minimal guidelines for law enforcement and not grant 

law enforcement undue discretion. United States v. Sorenson, 914 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir.1990); United 

States v. Van Hawkins, 899 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir.1990). Unless First Amendment freedoms are 

implicated, “a vagueness challenge may not rest on arguments that the law is vague in its hypothetical 

 

Russell. Assuming Petitioner is truthful, then he was obviously at some other location at the time of the crimes, thus raising 

the question of whether the defense had any proof of an alibi. If Petitioner cannot present any credible evidence of an alibi, 

then his claim that he is actually innocent becomes nothing more than self-serving speculation. Nothing about the 

relationship between these two defenses supports a conclusion that the prosecution was engaging in a “subterfuge” or that 

the prosecutor’s comments “shifted” the burden of proof.

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applications, but must show that the law is vague as applied to the facts of the case at hand.” United 

States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 

467 (1991)).

3. Analysis.

The petition claims that sec. 186.22(a) is void for vagueness “since petitioner was deprived of 

adequate notice and the policy was impermissibly delegated...” (Doc. 1, p. 8). The Traverse does not 

address the issue at all. The Court presumes Petitioner means he was denied adequate notice of what 

constitutes “active participation” in a criminal street gang. However, the Court is not clear what he

means when he claims that the “policy was impermissibly delegated.” Thus, the Court will construe 

this argument as a claim that the statute’s vagueness results in arbitrary enforcement.

The requirements for a gang enhancement are clear: 

First, the prosecutor must demonstrate that the defendant committed a felony “for the benefit 

of, at the direction of, or in association with [a] criminal street gang.” Cal.Penal Code § 

186.22(b)(1). Second, the prosecutor must show that the defendant committed the crime “with 

the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.” Id. 

We have previously recognized the importance of keeping these two requirements separate, 

and have emphasized that the second step is not satisfied by evidence of mere membership in a 

criminal street gang alone. See Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2005).

Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009). A “criminal street gang” is defined as “any 

ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, 

having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more” enumerated criminal acts, 

“having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or 

collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.” Cal.Penal Code § 

186.22(f) (2002). 

A “pattern of criminal gang activity” is defined as “the commission of, attempted commission 

of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of two or 

more” enumerated criminal offenses, “provided ... the last of those offenses occurred within three years 

after a prior offense, and the offenses were committed on separate occasions, or by two or more 

persons.” Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(e) (2002). “Primary activities” is defined as “one of the group's 

‘chief’ or ‘principal’ occupations.... That definition would necessarily exclude the occasional 

commission of those crimes by the group's members.” Sengpadychith, 26 Cal.4th 316, 323 (2001).

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In Briceno, the court stated “that these ‘detailed requirements' were designed to ensure that the 

statute increased punishment only when a defendant ‘committed a felony to aid or abet criminal 

conduct of a group that has as a primary function the commission of specified criminal acts and whose 

members have actually committed specified crimes, and who acted with the specific intent to do so.’”

Id. at 1080 (quoting People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal.4th 605, 623–24 & n. 10 (1997)). The Briceno court 

stated that the California Supreme Court in “Gardeley suggest[ed] that merely being a gang member, or 

committing a crime in association with another gang member, is not enough to trigger the sentencing 

enhancements of § 186.22(b). Rather, the defendant must commit the crime with the specific intent to 

aid or abet the criminal conduct of the gang.” Id.

These requirements, as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, are not vague, nor do they encourage 

arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement, but, instead, provide “minimal guidelines for law 

enforcement” but do “not grant law enforcement undue discretion.” United States v. Sorenson, 914 

F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). California Penal Code § 186.22 specifically lists the conduct that makes 

a group a criminal street gang. The statute provides sufficient information to determine (1) if Petitioner 

was a member of a gang, (2) if Petitioner's gang's primary activity was the commission of crimes, (3) if 

the gang's members engaged in a pattern of criminal activity, and (4) if Petitioner's offenses were 

committed “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with 

the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.” Cal.Penal 

Code § 186.22(b), (e), (f). Petitioner does not challenge the findings as to these gang enhancements 

and the Court finds no basis on which to conclude that the evidence supporting those enhancements 

was insufficient. 

Moreover, numerous cases in this district have consistently held that this statute is not void for 

vagueness. E.g., Williams v. Evans, 2009 WL 1460832 (E.D.Cal.2009); Thae Lee v. Gipson, 2012 WL 

5349506 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2012); Brookfield v. Yates, 2013 WL 6512844 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2013); 

Lobretto v. Sisto, 2013 WL 509160 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013); Palos v. Sisto, 2007 WL 2695498 (E.D. 

Cal. Sept. 11, 2007); Martinez v. Tipton, 2009 WL 4809873 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2009). Nothing in the 

Court’s analysis suggests any reason to depart from this long-standing position. 

V. CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court will DENY with prejudice the petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. Moreover, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. A state prisoner seeking a 

writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, and 

an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-336 

(2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 

U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, 

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit 

in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a 

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged 

with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's 

detention pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not 

be taken to the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention

complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or 

issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denied a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

when a petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2). To make a substantial showing, the petitioner must establish that “reasonable jurists could 

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further’.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).

In the present case, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right to justify the issuance of a certificate of appealability. Reasonable 

jurists would not find the Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus 

relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. 

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ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), is DENIED with prejudice;

2. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file;

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 10, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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