Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03159/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03159-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Patrick Luke Brown
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed September 5, 2006 

No. 04-3159 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

V. 

KEVIN PATRICK LUKE BROWN, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 03cr00405-01) 

On Petition for Rehearing 

Before: RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion PER CURIAM. 

PER CURIAM: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) calls for a 10-

year sentence where a gun, carried or used in furtherance of 

certain offenses, is “discharged.” In our initial opinion in this 

case we held that the provision creates liability only where the 

defendant has acted intentionally, e.g., “purposely, knowingly 

or recklessly.” United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154, 158-59 

USCA Case #04-3159 Document #989636 Filed: 09/05/2006 Page 1 of 2
2

(D.C. Cir. 2006). We observed that there was “no evidence” 

that the defendant “acted purposely or knowingly,” and also 

said that his conduct with regard to the discharge could not 

“be viewed as ‘reckless.’” Id. at 159. Accordingly we 

vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing under 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (providing a 7-year sentence for instances 

in which the firearm is “brandished”). Id. at 159, 160. 

The government has petitioned for rehearing, arguing that 

we overlooked the principle that it is for the district court to 

resolve factual issues relevant to sentencing. We agree—to 

the extent of ordering a remand for the district court in the 

first instance to apply the standard that we adopted. Cf. 

United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1994). As 

we originally noted, of course, the recklessness obviously 

associated with the defendant’s commission of bank robbery, 

and his carrying and brandishing of the weapon in the course 

of the robbery, cannot suffice for a finding of the requisite 

intent to discharge under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); otherwise “the 

separate mens rea requirement for the discharge provision 

would be meaningless or virtually so.” Brown, 449 F.3d at 

159. 

The case is remanded for further consideration in light of 

the original opinion and this order. 

 So ordered. 

USCA Case #04-3159 Document #989636 Filed: 09/05/2006 Page 2 of 2