Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03108/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03108-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roger Holleman
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
United States Postal Service
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROGER HOLLEMAN,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3108

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-0752-14-0629-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: October 7, 2015

______________________ 

 ROGER HOLLEMAN, Kannapolis, NC, pro se.

 CALVIN M. MORROW, Office of the General Counsel, 

Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for 

respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, CLEVENGER, and O’MALLEY, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 HOLLEMAN v. MSPB

PER CURIAM. 

Roger Holleman (“Holleman”) appeals from the final 

decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“the 

Board”) dismissing his appeal from the United States 

Postal Service’s (“the agency”) removal decision as moot 

after the agency rescinded its removal action. Holleman 

v. United States Postal Serv., No. DC-0752-14-0629-I-1, 

2015 MSPB LEXIS 850 (Feb. 2, 2015) (“Final Decision”). 

Because we agree with the Board’s determination that the 

removal appeal is moot, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Holleman began working for the Postal Service on October 29, 1994, and was employed as a city carrier at the 

Concord Post Office in Concord, North Carolina. On 

January 17, 2010, Holleman was arrested on criminal 

charges, including several felonies. Final Decision, 2015 

MSPB LEXIS 850, at *1. After the agency received notice 

of the arrest from its Inspection Service, agency officials 

met with Holleman and several witnesses. Id. The 

agency subsequently issued a notice of proposed indefinite 

suspension and placed Holleman in an off-duty with pay 

status. Respondent’s Appendix (“R.A.”) 13. Holleman 

responded to the agency’s notice.

By letter dated March 24, 2010, the agency placed 

Holleman on indefinite suspension pending resolution of 

the criminal charges against him. In that letter, the 

agency explained the background facts giving rise to the 

suspension, including that Holleman was arrested for 

taking indecent liberties with a child, intimidating a 

witness, and sexual battery. Id. The agency also explained that it had considered Holleman’s responses to 

the proposed suspension, but found that they were insufficient to warrant mitigating the action proposed. Specifically, the agency stated that “[e]mployees that are 

charged with felonious crimes, especially crimes against 

children, cannot be allowed to remain on duty at the 

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HOLLEMAN v. MSPB 3

Postal Service.” R.A. 14. Finally, the agency explained 

that Holleman would be suspended in non-pay, non-duty 

status until the charges against him were adjudicated. 

R.A. 15-16. Though the letter notified Holleman of his 

right to appeal his indefinite suspension to the Board, it is 

undisputed that he declined to do so.

On October 22, 2013, Holleman was convicted of felony offenses and sentenced to a lengthy incarceration term 

with a projected release date in 2026. R.A. 17. In February 2014, the agency issued a notice proposing to remove 

Holleman from the Postal Service on charges of: 

(1) continuous absence without official leave; and 

(2) failure to follow instructions. R.A. 19. By letter dated 

April 3, 2014, the agency removed Holleman based on his 

unavailability for work beginning on June 21, 2013 and 

his failure to follow instructions “to provide acceptable 

documentation regarding [his] incapacity from duty 

during that period.” R.A. 19. In that letter, the agency 

explained that it had considered several factors in reaching its decision, including Holleman’s “years of service 

and overall performance record in light of the proposed 

charges.” R.A. 21. 

Holleman appealed the removal decision to the Board 

on April 21, 2014. In his appeal, Holleman explained that 

his absence from work was due to the agency’s decision to 

place him on leave without pay. R.A. 23. Holleman 

further indicated that he was unable perform his duties 

because the agency barred him from entering postal 

property. Id. According to Holleman, courts dismissed 

the charges against him involving his stepdaughter, and 

he had only one remaining charge against him. Id. 

Holleman also argued that he was treated more harshly 

than other Postal Service employees charged with similar 

offenses. Holleman requested back pay from the beginning of his suspension until March 2013, which was when 

he alleged that the charges against him were dismissed. 

R.A. 26. 

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On May 9, 2014, the agency sent Holleman a letter 

rescinding its removal decision. Therein, the agency 

explained that it was not returning Holleman to work, but 

was instead putting him “in the status quo ante, that is, in 

the same position [he] was in . . . i.e., indefinite suspension.” Final Decision, 2015 MSPB LEXIS 850, at *2. The 

agency subsequently moved to dismiss Holleman’s appeal 

to the Board as moot.

The administrative judge (“AJ”) issued an order to 

show cause with respect to mootness. In particular, the 

order directed the agency to submit the requisite evidence 

and argument showing that it had provided Holleman all 

of the relief “he could have received if the matter had been 

adjudicated and he had prevailed.” R.A. 32. It also 

directed Holleman to respond by setting forth with specificity what relief he believed he was entitled to receive. 

In its response, the agency argued that Holleman received all of the relief he could have obtained because the 

rescission placed him in the same position he was in prior 

to receiving the notice of removal. The agency also argued 

that Holleman was not eligible for back pay because it 

was his own criminal misconduct that made him unavailable for work. R.A. 36. And, because Holleman was 

incarcerated in 2013 with a projected release date in 

2026, he “will continue to not be ready, willing and able to 

work.” Id. 

Holleman responded that all of the charges against 

him that gave rise to his indefinite suspension and removal were “dismissed by the courts of North Carolina.” 

R.A. 37. He also stated that he was treated unfairly 

because there were other carriers with the Postal Service 

who were convicted sex offenders, but were allowed to 

remain on the job. Because he was not convicted on 

criminal charges until October 2013, Holleman asserted 

that he was entitled to back pay from March 23, 2010 

until October 23, 2013. R.A. 38. In a separate response, 

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HOLLEMAN v. MSPB 5

Holleman stated that “all the charges that agency removed me under, were dismissed or dropped by the North 

Carolina court system.” R.A. 41. In particular, Holleman 

alleged that the witness intimidation charge was dropped 

in 2014. Although Holleman acknowledged that he was 

convicted on other charges “not related to [his] removal 

charges,” he reiterated that, prior to his conviction and 

incarceration, he was willing and ready to come back to 

work. R.A. 42. 

On February 2, 2015, the AJ issued an initial decision 

dismissing Holleman’s appeal as moot. First, the AJ

found that Holleman was “responsible for the actions 

which led to his arrest, indefinite suspension, and ultimate incarceration, not the agency.” Final Decision, 2015 

MSPB LEXIS 850, at *6. The AJ further found it irrelevant that Holleman “may have been exonerated of two of 

the three charges which served as the basis for the agency’s indefinite suspension,” because he was convicted of a 

crime in October 2013, and remains incarcerated. Id. 

And, because Holleman was incarcerated by the effective 

date of his removal—April 3, 2014—he was not entitled to 

back pay. Id. at *7. In particular, the AJ explained that, 

due to his criminal misconduct and incarceration, Holleman could not satisfy the requirement for back pay that 

he be ready and able to work. Id. Because Holleman “has 

no further cognizable interest in the outcome of the appeal,” the AJ dismissed it as moot. Id. 

Holleman did not petition the Board to review the 

AJ’s initial decision and it became the final decision of the 

Board. Holleman timely appealed to this court, and we 

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

DISCUSSION 

Our jurisdiction to review Board decisions is limited. 

By statute, we must affirm the Board’s decision unless it 

is: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained withCase: 15-3108 Document: 18-2 Page: 5 Filed: 10/07/2015
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out procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 

been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Whether the Board has jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal is a question of law, which 

we review de novo. Johnston v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 518 

F.3d 905, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The petitioner bears the 

burden of establishing the Board’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Fields v. Dep’t of Justice, 452 

F.3d 1297, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

The Board’s jurisdiction is “determined by the nature 

of an agency’s action at the time an appeal is filed with 

the Board.” Fernandez v. Dep’t of Justice, 105 M.S.P.R. 

443, 446 (2007). “An agency’s unilateral modification of 

its adverse action after an appeal has been filed cannot 

divest the Board of jurisdiction unless the appellant 

consents to such divesture or unless the agency completely rescinds the action being appealed.” Haskins v. Dep’t of 

the Navy, 106 M.S.P.R. 616, 623 (2007). We have recognized that, where “an appealable action is canceled or 

rescinded by an agency, any appeal from that action 

becomes moot.” Cooper v. Dep’t of the Navy, 108 F.3d 324, 

326 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Dismissal of an appeal as moot is a 

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Haskins, 106 M.S.P.R. 

at 624. 

For an appeal to be deemed moot, “the employee must 

have received all of the relief that he could have received 

if the matter had been adjudicated and he had prevailed.” 

Fernandez, 105 M.S.P.R. at 446 (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). Stated differently, the employee “must be returned to the status quo ante and not left in 

a worse position because of the cancellation than he would 

have been in if the matter had been adjudicated.” Harris 

v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 96 M.S.P.R. 193, 195-96 (2004). 

The Board has explained that “return to the status quo 

ante requires return, with back pay, to a position of the 

same grade, pay, status, and tenure as the one occupied 

before the agency’s action.” Id. at 196.

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HOLLEMAN v. MSPB 7

Holleman’s primary argument on appeal is that he is 

entitled to receive back pay from March 2010 until his 

incarceration on different charges in October 2013. 

Specifically, Holleman claims that he “was not found 

guilty of any of the charges that the Postal Service removed me under in March 2010.” Petitioner’s Informal 

Br. 1. Holleman was not removed in March 2010, however. Instead, he was indefinitely suspended and placed on 

“non-pay, non-duty status” effective March 24, 2010. R.A. 

15-16. It is undisputed that Holleman did not appeal the 

agency’s decision placing him on indefinite suspension, 

and any attempts to do so now are untimely. In any 

event, as discussed below, we agree with the Board that 

Holleman is not entitled to receive back pay.1 

As a preference eligible veteran, Holleman’s claim for 

back pay must comport with the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 5596(b)(1). See Campbell v. United States Postal Serv., 

75 M.S.P.R. 273, 277 (1997) (“The Board has held that the 

1 Holleman also argues that he was “not given due 

process” because he “was not treated the same as other 

carriers were treated.” Petitioner’s Informal Br. 2. This 

argument is without merit. “The essential requirements 

of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 

532, 546 (1985). The record indicates that the agency 

gave Holleman notice of the charges against him and an 

opportunity to respond. Holleman did, in fact, file responses to each of the agency’s actions. And, on this 

record, the Board did not err in declining to consider the 

circumstances of other individuals. See Kohl v. United 

States Postal Serv., 115 F. App’x 49, 52 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 

(“Unevenness of a penalty as compared to other employees is only relevant where the disparate treatment leads 

to a conclusion of willful discrimination.” (citing Facer v. 

Dep’t of the Air Force, 836 F.2d 535, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1988))).

 

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8 HOLLEMAN v. MSPB

right of a U.S. Postal Service preference eligible to receive 

back pay and benefits must accord with the Back Pay Act, 

5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1).”). The Act provides that back pay is 

available to an employee “who, on the basis of a timely 

appeal or an administrative determination . . . is found by 

appropriate authority under applicable law . . . to have 

been affected by an unjustified or unwarranted personnel 

action . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1). As noted, an employee 

“is not restored to the status quo ante where he does not 

receive all the back pay to which he is entitled.” Gillespie 

v. Dep’t of Defense, 90 M.S.P.R. 327, 331 (2001). 

Holleman appeals from the agency’s April 2014 decision removing him based on his unavailability for work. 

It is undisputed that the removal action stemmed from 

charges of: (1) continuous absence without official leave; 

and (2) failure to follow instructions. Final Decision, 2015 

MSPB LEXIS 850, at *5. As the AJ explained, if this 

matter had been adjudicated and Holleman prevailed, “he 

would have been entitled to receive back pay for the 

period from the effective date of his removal to the date of 

the reversal.” Id. The AJ found that the effective date of 

Holleman’s removal from the agency was April 3, 2014, 

and that, by then, Holleman had already been incarcerated for several months due to his own criminal misconduct. Id. at *7. Because his incarceration made him 

unavailable for work, the AJ concluded that the agency 

was not obligated to give him back pay during that time. 

Id. We agree, and Holleman does not challenge this 

determination on appeal. See Petitioner’s Informal Br. 2 

(“I have never asked to be paid while I have been incarcerated on different charges.”); see also Winslow v. Dep’t of 

the Navy, 46 M.S.P.R. 246, 250 (1990) (“[T]he appellant is 

not entitled to back pay for the period of his incarceration.”).

Holleman seems to suggest that, because he allegedly 

was not convicted of the charges the agency relied upon in 

suspending him, he is entitled to back pay for the period 

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HOLLEMAN v. MSPB 9

of his indefinite suspension prior to his incarceration. We 

disagree. An agency is entitled to suspend an employee 

when it has reasonable cause to believe that employee 

committed a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment 

could be imposed. Rhodes, 487 F.3d at 1380. Given 

Holleman’s arrest on criminal charges, including felonies, 

the agency found this requirement satisfied. Final Decision, 2015 MSPB LEXIS 850, at *6. That Holleman may 

not have been convicted on the precise charges that led to 

his indefinite suspension is irrelevant. The fact remains 

that Holleman was convicted in October 2013 of a felony 

sexual offense. R.A. 17. Thus, his ultimate conviction 

related to the same category of crimes the agency felt 

justified his suspension in the first instance. 

Even if Holleman was exonerated of the charges the 

agency relied upon in suspending him, he is not entitled 

to back pay for the period of his suspension.2 As noted, 

the Back Pay Act authorizes compensation only for ac2 Holleman submits for the first time on appeal a 

document from a North Carolina court dated August 5, 

2014, which appears to show dismissal of Holleman’s 

witness intimidation charge. The precise nature of the 

dismissal is unclear. We do not consider on appeal documents that were not part of the record before the Board. 

See Turman-Kent v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 657 F.3d 1280, 

1283 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Because those items were not 

presented to the Board, they are not part of the record on 

appeal and are not properly before us.”); Oshiver v. Office 

of Pers. Mgmt., 896 F.2d 540, 542 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“We 

will not consider the new evidence contained in the supplemental papers because that evidence was not presented to the Board.”). Even if we were to consider it, 

however, Holleman is not entitled to relief because the 

agency’s decision to indefinitely suspend him was not 

unjustified or unwarranted. 

 

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10 HOLLEMAN v. MSPB

tions that are found by “an appropriate authority” to be 

“unjustified or unwarranted.” 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1). 

Holleman did not appeal his indefinite suspension and did 

not argue that it was an unjustified or unwarranted

action in the first instance. Where, as here, the agency 

had reasonable cause to indefinitely suspend an employee, that employee is not entitled to back pay for the period 

of the suspension. See Wiemers v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

792 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (concluding that 

“reversal of the petitioner’s conviction did not entitle him 

to back pay for any part of the period of suspension”); see 

also Payne v. United States Postal Serv., 69 M.S.P.R. 503, 

509 n.* (1996) (“[A] validly initiated indefinite suspension 

is not an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action 

prior to dismissal of the indictment or acquittal and thus 

does not generate entitlement to back pay.”); Shaffer v. 

Def. Logistics Agency, 35 M.S.P.R. 664, 667-68 (1987) 

(“”[W]here an employee’s indefinite suspension based on 

an indictment is proper when effected, he is not entitled 

to back pay for the period of the suspension, regardless of 

the outcome of the criminal charges.”). 

On this record, because Holleman is not entitled to receive any back pay, the agency’s decision rescinding his 

removal and placing him on “non-pay, non-duty” status 

returned him to the status quo ante. See Harris, 96 

M.S.P.R. at 490-91. As such, there was no further relief 

the Board could grant in this appeal. Final Decision, 

2015 MSPB LEXIS 850 at *7 (finding that Holleman “has 

no further cognizable interest in the outcome of the appeal”); see also Moore v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 109 

M.S.P.R. 386, 389 (2008) (noting that an appeal is rendered moot where “it is impossible for the Board to grant 

any further effectual relief”). Accordingly, we agree with 

the Board that Holleman’s appeal was rendered moot and 

thus dismissal was appropriate. 

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HOLLEMAN v. MSPB 11

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and because we find Holleman’s remaining arguments are without merit, we 

affirm the Board’s final decision. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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