Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-09-04544/USCOURTS-ca4-09-04544-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nelson Omar Myrie
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-4544

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

NELSON OMAR MYRIE, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District 

Judge. (3:08-cr-00498-HEH-1) 

Submitted: December 22, 2009 Decided: January 29, 2010 

Before KING, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion. 

Timothy V. Anderson, ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, Virginia Beach, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Angela Mastandrea-Miller, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

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PER CURIAM: 

 Nelson Omar Myrie pled guilty, pursuant to a plea 

agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent 

to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base and possession 

with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, 

both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006). He was 

sentenced to 126 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be 

served concurrently. Myrie’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), contending there are 

no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the 

district court erred in denying Myrie’s motion to dismiss his 

indictment or abused its discretion in denying his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. Myrie was advised of his right to 

file a pro se supplemental brief but did not do so. The 

Government has moved to dismiss, asserting that Myrie’s appeal 

is precluded by the appeal waiver contained in Myrie’s plea 

agreement. We affirm in part and dismiss in part. 

 Whether a defendant effectively waived his right to 

appeal pursuant to a plea bargain is an issue of law that is 

reviewed de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 

(4th Cir. 2005). Where the government seeks to enforce an 

appeal waiver and the appellant does not contend that the 

government is in breach of its plea agreement, a waiver will be 

enforced if the record shows the waiver is valid and the 

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challenged issue falls within the scope of the waiver. Id. An 

appeal waiver is valid if it is “the result of a knowing and 

intelligent decision to forgo the right to appeal.” United 

States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1995) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To decide 

whether a defendant’s waiver results from a knowing and 

intelligent decision, we examine “‘the particular facts and 

circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, 

experience and conduct of the accused.’” United States v. 

Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Johnson v. 

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Generally, if the district 

court fully questions a defendant at his Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 

proceeding regarding the waiver of his right to appeal, the 

waiver is both valid and enforceable. See United States v. 

Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005). An appeal waiver 

does not preclude challenges to a sentence on the ground that it 

exceeds the statutory maximum or is based on a constitutionally 

impermissible factor like race, or claims concerning a violation 

of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in proceedings following 

the guilty plea. Id. Moreover, a defendant’s waiver of 

appellate rights cannot foreclose a colorable constitutional 

challenge to the voluntariness of the guilty plea. See United 

States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732-33 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994). 

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 Here, we find that Myrie’s waiver of his right to 

appeal was knowingly and validly entered, and neither Myrie nor 

his counsel contends otherwise. The district court engaged the 

defendant in a thorough plea colloquy, verifying, inter alia, 

that Myrie understood the proceedings, was not under the 

influence of any drugs, alcohol, or medications, was satisfied 

with his attorneys’ performances, and was actually guilty of the 

crimes to which he desired to plead guilty. The district court 

explained to Myrie the rights he was giving up by pleading 

guilty, specifically articulating that Myrie was waiving his 

right to appeal. Accordingly, as Myrie was fully questioned 

during his Rule 11 colloquy regarding his waiver, we find that 

the waiver is both valid and enforceable as to all issues within 

its scope. Additionally, because the first issue raised on 

appeal — whether the district court erred in denying Myrie’s 

motion to dismiss the indictment — clearly falls within the 

scope of Myrie’s appeal waiver, this issue is barred on appeal. 

Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss with 

regard to this issue. 

 In the second issue on appeal, Myrie contends that the 

district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea, because his attorneys’ ineffective 

assistance rendered the guilty plea involuntary. Because this 

challenge implicates both the voluntary nature of the guilty 

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plea and Myrie’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it is not 

barred by the plea agreement. Therefore, we deny the 

Government’s motion to dismiss as to this issue. 

 Nevertheless, we find this challenge to be without 

merit. We review a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 

for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 

421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). A defendant bears the burden of 

demonstrating to the district court’s satisfaction that a “fair 

and just reason” supports his request to withdraw. Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(h). In determining whether the trial court abused 

its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we 

consider six factors: 

(1) whether the defendant has offered credible 

evidence that his plea was not knowing or otherwise 

involuntary; (2) whether the defendant has credibly 

asserted his legal innocence; (3) whether there has 

been a delay between entry of the plea and filing of 

the motion; (4) whether the defendant has had close 

assistance of counsel; (5) whether withdrawal will 

cause prejudice to the government; and (6) whether 

withdrawal will inconvenience the court and waste 

judicial resources. 

Ubakanma, 215 F.3d at 424 (as articulated in United States v. 

Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991)). Although each Moore

factor must be given appropriate weight, the key in determining 

whether a motion to withdraw should be granted is whether the 

plea hearing was properly conducted under Rule 11. United 

States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995). We 

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closely scrutinize the Rule 11 colloquy and attach a strong 

presumption that the plea is final and binding if the Rule 11 

proceeding is adequate. Id.

 As explained above, the district court properly 

conducted a thorough plea colloquy in accord with Rule 11. 

Therefore, we apply a strong presumption that Myrie’s plea was 

final and binding. Additionally, Myrie has offered no evidence 

that his plea was not knowing or voluntary, Myrie enjoyed the 

close assistance of two attorneys during all phases of the 

proceedings, and Myrie has not credibly asserted his legal 

innocence, as he admitted during his plea colloquy that he 

committed the crimes he was charged with. Therefore, we find 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Myrie’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

 As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment to the extent 

that the court denied Myrie’s motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea. The remainder of Myrie’s appeal is dismissed. This court 

requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If the client requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

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withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART

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