Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01317/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01317-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amerijet International, Inc.
Petitioner
John S. Pistole
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 27, 2014 Decided June 13, 2014 

No. 13-1176 

AMERIJET INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

PETITIONER

v. 

JOHN S. PISTOLE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, 

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 13-1317, 14-1008 

On Petitions for Review of an Agency Decision 

of the Transportation Security Administration 

Joan M. Canny argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

petitioner. 

Sharon Swingle, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for respondent. With her on the briefs were 

Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C. 

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Jeffrey E. Sandberg, 

Attorney. 

USCA Case #13-1317 Document #1497408 Filed: 06/13/2014 Page 1 of 18
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Before: BROWN and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS. 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: These consolidated 

petitions concern proposed alternatives to security procedures 

mandated by the Transportation Security Administration 

(“TSA”) and call on us to consider how much TSA must 

explain itself when it denies an aircraft operator’s application 

for such alternate security procedures. 

In two letters to TSA, Petitioner Amerijet International, 

Inc. (“Amerijet”) requested alternative cargo screening 

procedures at various foreign airports it services. TSA largely 

denied its requests, first in a letter sent in May 2013, then in a 

videoconference held in November 2013, and, lastly, in a 

letter sent in January 2014. Amerijet filed three petitions for 

review in this court challenging these three denials. Amerijet 

argues that TSA’s denials fail for want of reasoned 

decisionmaking because TSA offered “no explanation” and 

failed to identify “facts or other support” for its decisions. Br. 

of Pet’r at 40. Amerijet also contends that TSA’s actions 

resulted in a violation of Amerijet’s right to equal protection 

of the law. Id. at 47-48. 

Even under a highly deferential standard of review, 

TSA’s denials were arbitrary and capricious as to most of 

Amerijet’s requests. The record indicates that TSA failed to 

adequately explain most of its denials. And by saying too 

little, TSA has provided “no basis upon which we [can] 

conclude that [its denials were] the product of reasoned 

decisionmaking.” Tourus Records, Inc. v. DEA, 259 F.3d 731, 

737 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Because we have no meaningful basis 

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upon which to evaluate TSA’s decisionmaking, the “proper 

course . . . is to remand to the agency for additional 

investigation or explanation.” Fla. Power & Light Co. v. 

Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). 

 Our decision to remand excludes two issues that have 

been raised by Amerijet on appeal. First, in one of its 

requests, Amerijet sought an alternative procedure that 

included removing a TSA requirement that the shipper not 

tender the cargo “at the aircraft operator’s facility.” TSA 

granted this request only for perishable products and only for 

those products tendered at one particular location, not at all 

foreign locations as Amerijet requested. TSA explained that it 

did not have sufficient information about the Amerijet 

locations at issue to make the determination required by its 

regulations. TSA invited Amerijet to submit additional 

information, which agency officials did not receive before 

denying Amerijet’s request. In these circumstances, the 

agency’s action survives arbitrary and capricious review. 

Second, Amerijet sought to amend training protocols set 

forth in an alternate procedure that TSA had approved in 

2011. This alternate procedure expired in October 2013 

during the pendency of Amerijet’s request to amend it. 

Nothing remains at stake in a dispute over a proposed 

amendment to a document that no longer has legal effect. And 

with nothing at stake, we have no power to resolve the 

dispute. “Because the exercise of judicial power under Article 

III depends upon the existence of a case or controversy, a 

federal court may not . . . decide questions that do not affect 

the rights of parties properly before it.” EDWARDS, ELLIOTT &

LEVY, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 134 (2d ed. 2013) 

(citing North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)). We 

therefore dismiss as moot Amerijet’s request to amend 

training protocols. 

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Because we are remanding this case for further 

consideration by TSA, Amerijet’s equal protection claim is 

presently unripe for review. We therefore dismiss this claim 

without prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Regulatory Framework 

Congress has charged TSA with safeguarding the 

country’s civil aviation security. See 49 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1). 

This responsibility includes regulating the security of allcargo flights. By statute, TSA administers a system “to 

screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of all cargo 

that is to be transported in all-cargo aircraft.” Id. § 44901(f). 

Two tools TSA uses to protect the airways are security 

programs and security directives. In its security programs, 

TSA requires all-cargo aircraft operators like Amerijet to 

develop what is called a Full All-Cargo Aircraft Operator 

Standard Security Program. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.101(h)-(i), 

1544.103, 1544.105. Each aircraft operator’s security program 

must meet certain safety standards and be approved by TSA. 

Id. § 1544.103(a). And TSA requires that an aircraft operator 

implement the procedures “described in its security program 

to prevent or deter the carriage of . . . any unauthorized 

explosives, incendiaries, and other destructive substances or 

items in cargo onboard an aircraft.” Id. § 1544.205(a). 

On top of these security programs, TSA issues security 

directives. Security directives set forth mandatory security 

measures that, in TSA’s judgment, are “necessary to respond 

to a threat assessment or to a specific threat against civil 

aviation.” Id. § 1544.305(a). Aircraft operators generally must 

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implement the security measures prescribed by a security 

directive. Id. § 1544.305(a)-(c). 

TSA regulations allow aircraft operators to seek 

adjustments to their security programs. Such adjustments, 

however, must be approved by TSA, and approval is 

conditioned on TSA’s determining that “safety and the public 

interest will allow [the amendment], and [that] the proposed 

amendment provides the level of security required under this 

part.” Id. § 1544.105(b)(3). 

Aircraft operators can also request alternative measures 

to those mandated in a TSA security directive. TSA 

regulations provide that, “[i]n the event that the aircraft 

operator is unable to implement the measures in the Security 

Directive, the aircraft operator must submit proposed 

alternative measures and the basis for submitting the 

alternative measures to TSA for approval. . . . The aircraft 

operator must implement any alternative measures approved 

by TSA.” Id. § 1544.305(d). 

B. Agency Proceedings and Amerijet’s Petitions 

Amerijet is a shipping company that operates all-cargo 

aircraft to transport cargo from international locations to the 

United States. Amerijet has a TSA-approved security 

program, although the measures outlined therein are generally 

not at issue here. This dispute arises from the procedures 

mandated in a TSA security directive. 

 

 In 2011, TSA issued Security Directive No. 1544-11-04 

(the “Directive”) in response to an October 2010 incident in 

which “terrorists concealed explosives in cargo bound for the 

United States.” Directive at 1, reprinted in Joint Appendix 

(“J.A.”) 1. Reauthorized annually since its issuance, the 

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Directive requires specific screening procedures for certain 

categories of U.S.-bound cargo. These procedures are more 

stringent than those mandated by an aircraft operators’ regular 

security program. For some categories of cargo, the Directive 

simply requires that aircraft operators follow their normal 

screening procedures. We need not go into more detail than 

this because the specifics are immaterial to our decision and 

would likely succumb to redaction in any event. 

 Shortly after the Directive issued, Amerijet sought – and 

TSA approved – an alternative procedure for screening cargo. 

See Security Directive Alternative Procedures at 1, reprinted 

in J.A. 10. TSA permitted Amerijet to use an enhanced 

physical search in lieu of the Directive’s screening 

requirements at locations where the “inability to screen cargo 

with Explosives Trace Detection . . . would prevent the 

aircraft operator from transporting the cargo.” Id. The 

approved alternative procedure included a requirement that 

Amerijet train its screeners in a manner detailed by TSA’s 

order. Id. at 3-4. TSA’s approval of this alternative expired in 

October 2013, while Amerijet’s request to amend the 

alternative training procedures was pending. As explained 

above, the dispute over this matter is now moot. 

 Amerijet’s 2011 request for alternative procedures was 

not its last. In 2012, Amerijet discovered that compliance with 

the Directive was infeasible at certain locations even with the 

“physical search” accommodation that TSA had approved. 

Amerijet concluded this after it learned, in connection with a 

TSA enforcement proceeding against it, that TSA interpreted 

some of the Directive’s provisions differently than it did. 

Amerijet therefore requested additional modifications to the 

procedures required in the Directive, first in February 2013 

and then in August 2013. See Application for Alternate 

Procedures, Feb. 8, 2013, reprinted in J.A. 34-39 (“February 

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Application”); Application for Alternate Procedures, Aug. 9, 

2013, reprinted in Supplemental Joint Appendix (“S.J.A.”) 

59-63 (“August Application”); see also 49 C.F.R. 

§ 1544.305(d). These requests form the basis of the present 

dispute. 

In its February Application, Amerijet requested four 

alternative procedures. February Application at 1-2. Here 

again, we need not discuss specifics. Suffice it to say that the 

four requests sought to broaden the categories of cargo 

exempted from the Directive’s specific screening procedures. 

After a conference with TSA officials in March 2013, 

Amerijet supplemented and clarified its four proposals. 

Supplementation and Clarification of Application for 

Alternate Procedures at 1, reprinted in J.A. 42. 

 In May 2013, TSA denied all four proposals in a short 

letter. Letter from Walter Craig to Richard Carpenter & Joan 

Canny (May 6, 2013), reprinted in J.A. 54-55 (“May Letter”). 

The letter states that, “[b]ased on a comprehensive review of 

the proposed [alternative procedures], the request is hereby 

denied.” Id. at 1. It then states that the “basis for this denial is 

that TSA has determined that the procedures contained in the 

[proposal] are based on Amerijet’s interpretation of [the 

Directive].” Id. The only other statement in the letter that is 

colorably responsive to Amerijet’s application is TSA’s 

assertion that one of the proposals, which concerned 

perishable commodities, was “not in the best interest of safety 

and the public interest” and did not “provide the level of 

security required under 49 C.F.R. Section 1544.205(a), (b), 

and (f).” Id. Amerijet timely petitioned for review of the May 

Letter, which is before the court as Petition No. 13-1176. 

 With its petition pending before this court, Amerijet 

submitted its August Application to TSA. Amerijet sought 

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TSA’s approval of three alternate procedures and asked for 

clarification concerning certain screening requirements. 

August Application at 1. Two of its proposals sought to alter 

the Directive’s requirements. Id. at 2-3. The third sought to 

alter the training protocols required in the alternate procedure 

TSA had approved in 2011. Id. at 3-5. 

 On November 4, 2013, TSA officials held a 

videoconference with representatives of Amerijet. TSA 

offered a counterproposal for one of the three alternative 

procedures Amerijet requested. And a TSA official said that 

Amerijet should consider its August Application denied 

except with respect to the counterproposal. See Pet’r’s 

Supplemental Br. at 8-9. Amerijet sought review of this oral 

denial, filing Petition No. 13-1317. In the meantime, Amerijet 

and TSA reached an agreement concerning TSA’s 

counterproposal, which led to TSA approving in December 

2013 a set of alternative procedures for perishable 

commodities at one of the foreign airports serviced by 

Amerijet. 

In January 2014, TSA issued a “final decision” denying 

the remaining requests for alternate procedures in the August 

Application. Letter from Joni M. Millan to Richard Carpenter 

(Jan. 14, 2014), reprinted in S.J.A. 79-83 (“January Letter”). 

Amerijet filed a third petition for review, Petition No. 14-

1008, challenging the January Letter. 

The court has consolidated the three petitions for review. 

 

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction and Finality 

Amerijet’s petition for review was properly filed under 

the Federal Aviation Act, which provides in pertinent part that 

“a person disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued 

[under the Act] . . . may apply for review of the order by 

filing a petition” in this court. 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). Amerijet 

undoubtedly has a substantial interest in whether TSA 

approves or denies its request for alternate procedures, and the 

agency does not contest this. 

Nonetheless, judicial review is “restricted to review of 

final agency orders” so as to “avoid premature intervention in 

the administrative process.” CSI Aviation Servs., Inc. v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Transp., 637 F.3d 408, 411 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Agency action is “final” when it (1) 

marks “the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking 

process,” and (2) is one in which “rights or obligations have 

been determined” or “from which legal consequences will 

flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Amerijet’s first and third petitions for review (Nos. 

13-1176 and 14-1008) challenge final agency action in the 

form of TSA’s May Letter and January Letter. These letters 

have “legal consequences” and were the “consummation” of 

TSA’s consideration of Amerijet’s requests. Amerijet’s 

second petition (No. 13-1317) is another matter. It challenges 

TSA’s oral denial delivered in a November 2013 

videoconference. The oral denial was, quite obviously, a 

tentative conclusion and not the “consummation” of TSA’s 

decisionmaking, which came two months later in the January 

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Letter. Amerijet’s second petition is therefore not properly 

subject to review by this court. 

B. The Standard of Review 

 We recently explained the applicable standard of review 

in a related context in Suburban Air Freight, Inc. v. TSA, 716 

F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2013): 

Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, we 

must uphold TSA’s decisions unless they are “arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law,” or unsupported by “substantial 

evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c); see 

Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. TSA, 588 F.3d 1116, 1120 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009). In addition, “[w]e must give substantial 

deference to [the] agency’s interpretation of its own 

regulations.” Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 

512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). . . . [W]e should afford similar 

deference to TSA’s interpretation of [a security 

program]. . . . [W]e believe [security programs] are 

analogous to other formal, standardized, agencyapproved documents with respect to which we afford 

agencies deference. Just as we defer to the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission’s and the Federal 

Communications Commission’s interpretations of tariffs, 

see e.g., FPL Energy Marcus Hook, L.P. v. FERC, 430 

F.3d 441, 446 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Global NAPs, Inc. v. 

FCC, 247 F.3d 252, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (FCC), for 

example, so too must we defer to TSA’s reasonable 

interpretation of a [security program]. 

Id. at 681-82. The same principles are in play here with 

respect to TSA security directives and agency decisions to 

grant or deny alternative procedures. And in applying this 

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standard of review, we remain mindful that, because Congress 

has entrusted TSA with broad authority over “civil aviation 

security,” 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(d)(1), (f)(10), (l)(1), 44901(f), it 

is “TSA’s job – not [an airline’s] or ours – to strike a balance 

between convenience and security.” Suburban Air, 716 F.3d 

at 683. 

 Nevertheless, even pursuant to this deferential standard 

of review, an agency must articulate an explanation for its 

action. We have explained that a “fundamental requirement of 

administrative law is that an agency set forth its reasons for 

decision; an agency’s failure to do so constitutes arbitrary and 

capricious agency action.” Tourus Records, 259 F.3d at 737 

(internal quotation marks omitted). This basic principle, 

codified in 5 U.S.C. § 555(e), is indispensable to sound 

judicial review. See id.; 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (requiring that an 

agency provide an interested party with a “brief statement of 

the grounds for denial” of the party’s request except “in 

affirming a prior denial or when the denial is selfexplanatory”). At bottom, an agency must explain “why it 

chose to do what it did.” Tourus Records, 259 F.3d at 737 

(quoting Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on 

Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE 

L.J. 199, 222). And to this end, conclusory statements will not 

do; an “agency’s statement must be one of reasoning.” Butte 

Cnty., Cal. v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

C. TSA’s Denials of Amerijet’s Requests

We now turn to the merits of Amerijet’s first and third 

petitions for review. 

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1. May Letter 

TSA’s May Letter failed to explain why it denied the 

proposals in Amerijet’s February Application. TSA ignored 

one of Amerijet’s four requests entirely, and, with respect to 

two of the other requests, it simply restated the rules from 

which Amerijet sought exceptions. May Letter at 1 (bullet 

points (1) and (2)). Restating a rule from which an exception 

is sought explains nothing about why the agency denied the 

exception; it begs the question. And TSA’s fourth denial is no 

better. TSA merely parroted the language of the standard, 

stating that “TSA has determined that exclusions from 

physical screening for special types of cargo . . . are not in the 

best interest of safety and the public interest . . . [and] do not 

provide the level of security required under [the regulations].” 

Id.; see also 49 C.F.R. § 1544.105(b)(3). This response, like 

the letter at issue in Tourus Records, is “not a statement of 

reasoning, but of conclusion.” 259 F.3d at 737. It is arbitrary 

because it says nothing about “why” TSA made the 

determination. See id. Simply put, the May Letter had “all the 

explanatory power of the reply of Bart[le]by the Scrivener to 

his employer: ‘I would prefer not to.’” Butte Cnty., 613 F.3d 

at 195 (quoting HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY, THE 

SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET 10 (Dover 1990) 

(1853)). TSA must say more. 

 At oral argument, TSA contended that because Amerijet 

sought discretionary exceptions from the Directive, Amerijet 

bore “some burden to make a showing” that its alternatives 

provided commensurate security. Oral Arg. Tape at 35:43 

(Mar. 27, 2014). This is a sensible position in the abstract. 

Indeed, it seems reasonable and consistent with the 

regulations for TSA to require an aircraft operator requesting 

alternate measures to offer some explanation of why, in its 

view, the requested alternative would be equally safe and to 

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provide supporting evidence (to the extent such evidence is in 

the operator’s possession). See 49 C.F.R. § 1544.305(d) 

(requiring aircraft operator to offer “the basis for submitting 

the alternative measures”). The problem with this argument, 

however, is that TSA did not articulate its denial on such 

terms. Under well-established law, we evaluate an agency’s 

contemporaneous explanation for its actions and not 

“appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations.” Tourus 

Records, 259 F.3d at 738 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

TSA’s denials are not “self-explanatory,” see id. at 737 

(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 555(e)), and, therefore, the agency did not 

afford Amerijet the “grounds for denial” to which it was 

entitled, 5 U.S.C. § 555(e). And this court is left to evaluate 

the reasons offered by TSA, which are insufficient. 

2. January Letter 

 Whether the January Letter adequately explained why 

TSA denied the requests in the August Application presents a 

closer question. As explained above, one of the requests that 

TSA denied is now moot. That leaves two requests, which we 

consider in turn. 

 The first request concerned a requirement in the Directive 

relating to the “Customs-Trade Partnership Against 

Terrorism” (“C-TPAT”) program, which is a voluntary 

partnership between the private sector and U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection. When certain other conditions are met, the 

Directive exempts cargo from additional screening 

requirements so long as the shipper is certified under the 

C-TPAT program. Directive at 4. Because Amerijet believed 

that the other conditions were “adequate to establish the 

consignor as known to Amerijet” and “based upon a 

reasonable risk assessment” for the foreign airports it 

services, Amerijet requested that this C-TPAT condition be 

USCA Case #13-1317 Document #1497408 Filed: 06/13/2014 Page 13 of 18
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“removed.” August Application at 3. TSA denied the request, 

stating that eliminating the C-TPAT certification requirement 

would not “provide a level of security commensurate with the 

other screening options provided by the [Directive]” and 

“would not be in the best interest of aviation security.” 

January Letter at 3. TSA then listed three reasons why the 

“C-TPAT certification requirement is important.” Id. 

This response is an improvement on the purported 

explanation TSA offered in its May Letter, but it falls short of 

reasoned decisionmaking. Though TSA does not explicitly 

connect the dots in its explanation, this shortcoming is not 

itself fatal. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“We will 

. . . uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s 

path may reasonably be discerned.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). By listing three ways in which the C-TPAT 

certification is important, TSA appears to explain that, 

because the C-TPAT requirement is useful, removing it 

entirely would not provide commensurate security. But this 

explanation does not address the main thrust of Amerijet’s 

request – i.e., that, in the locations serviced by Amerijet, the 

other conditions in Section II.C.1 of the Directive ensure 

adequate security and render the C-TPAT requirement 

unnecessary based “upon a reasonable risk assessment” of the 

areas at issue. August Application at 3. Given the impetus of 

Amerijet’s request, listing the general worth of the C-TPAT 

requirement is programmatic boilerplate rather than reasoned 

explanation. We simply cannot tell if TSA considered 

whether, in the areas Amerijet services, the C-TPAT program 

affords security beyond that provided by the other conditions 

in Section II.C.1 of the Directive. Put another way, we cannot 

discern if TSA considered the substance of Amerijet’s request 

and, if so, what reasons it had for denying it. 

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In its second request, Amerijet asked for two 

modifications to Section II.C.2 of the Directive. This 

provision exempts cargo from the Directive’s screening 

requirements when the aircraft operator accepts the cargo 

from a direct shipper with an established “business 

relationship with the aircraft operator” and the cargo is not 

tendered “at the aircraft operator’s facility.” Directive at 4. 

Amerijet sought (1) to eliminate the requirement that the 

cargo not be tendered “at the aircraft operator’s facility,” and 

(2) to alter another condition in Section II.C.2. August 

Application at 3. TSA granted this request but only for 

perishable products and only for those products tendered at 

one particular location, not at all foreign locations as Amerijet 

requested. January Letter at 3-4. TSA explained that “local 

government security procedures, business practices and 

commodities . . . vary by location. . . . To ensure that safety 

and the public interest will allow the requested procedures 

. . . , TSA must review requests on a location-by-location 

basis and Amerijet must provide supporting information on a 

location-by-location basis. TSA is sufficiently aware of 

security practices within [the country where it granted the 

alternate procedures] and Amerijet’s security capabilities 

within [that country] to implement the requested [procedures 

there]. Such is not the case in other locations where Amerijet 

operates.” Id. at 4. 

 TSA’s response passes muster. It is adequately explained, 

consistent with the regulations, and reasonable. As TSA 

interprets the regulations, it may approve a request for 

alternative procedures only if the “alternative measures 

provide a commensurate level of security and are consistent 

with the public interest.” Supplemental Br. for Resp’t at 10; 

see also Br. for Resp’t at 30 (“TSA ‘may’ approve a proposed 

security program amendment where the ‘designated official 

determines that safety and the public interest will allow it’ and 

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where the proposed amendment ‘provides the level of security 

required under this part.’” (quoting 49 C.F.R. 

§ 1544.105(b)(3)). TSA determined that it did not have 

adequate information about other Amerijet locations to make 

the determination required by the regulations. It therefore 

elected for a phased approach, approving the request as to one 

location and inviting Amerijet to submit additional 

information as to other locations. (We note that it appears 

from the record that Amerijet planned to submit the requested 

information as part of a separate administrative request. See 

Letter from Rosa Fernandez to Joni M. Millan (Dec. 2, 2013) 

at 1, reprinted in S.J.A. 69.) 

D. The Appropriate Remedy

 The Supreme Court has made clear that when an 

agency’s explanation does not permit a court to evaluate the 

agency’s action, “the proper course, except in rare 

circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional 

investigation or explanation.” Lorion, 470 U.S. at 744. So it is 

here. Neither party has identified a rare circumstance that 

would justify departing from the “usual remedy” of a remand. 

Tourus Records, 259 F.3d at 737. 

We are not in a position to assess Amerijet’s equal 

protection claim because, as noted above, we have no 

meaningful basis upon which to evaluate TSA’s denials of 

Amerijet’s requests. Amerijet’s equal protection claim is 

premised on TSA denying its requests for alternate 

procedures, together with an allegation that TSA allowed a 

competitor to use these same procedures. There is no way to 

weigh the viability of Amerijet’s equal protection claim 

without a clear understanding of the agency’s position with 

respect to the disputed denials. And with our remand of this 

case, the possibility remains that TSA may reconsider its prior 

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denials or offer adequate explanations for the agency’s 

actions, either of which may moot Amerijet’s equal protection 

claim. 

In these circumstances, we find Amerijet’s equal 

protection claim unripe for review. “[I]f a claim challenging 

final agency action is not concrete, it may be unfit for judicial 

review without regard to whether the complaining party has 

standing to pursue the claim.” Marcum v. Salazar, 694 F.3d 

123, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting EDWARDS & ELLIOTT,

FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 119 (2007)). The courts 

look to “both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and 

the hardship to the parties of withholding court 

consideration.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 

(1967). The “fitness” of the issue for judicial review turns on 

whether a court’s consideration of the case “would benefit 

from further factual development” and “whether judicial 

intervention would inappropriately interfere with further 

administrative action.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra 

Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998). The ripeness doctrine thus 

protects “the agency’s interest in crystallizing its policy 

before that policy is subjected to judicial review and the 

court’s interests in avoiding unnecessary adjudication and in 

deciding issues in a concrete setting.” Eagle–Picher Indus., 

Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985). These are 

particularly salient considerations in this case because the 

matters in dispute involve sensitive security issues. And it is 

also noteworthy that Amerijet does not contend that it will 

suffer any “hardship” if its equal protection claim is dismissed 

without prejudice pending further consideration by TSA on 

remand. See Marcum, 694 F.3d at 130. Therefore, it would be 

inappropriate for this court to consider the constitutionality of 

TSA’s denials without affording the agency an opportunity to 

more fully address Amerijet’s requests. 

USCA Case #13-1317 Document #1497408 Filed: 06/13/2014 Page 17 of 18
18 

III. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, we dismiss Petition No. 

13-1317, grant Petition No. 13-1176, and grant in part and 

deny in part Petition No. 14-1008. TSA’s denials of 

Amerijet’s requests for alternate security procedures are 

hereby remanded for further consideration, with the exception 

of the agency’s partial denial of Requested Alternate 

Procedure 2, see S.J.A. 61, which was adequately explained, 

and its denial of Requested Alternate Procedure 3, see id., 

which is now moot. Amerijet’s equal protection claim is 

dismissed without prejudice as unripe. 

So ordered.

USCA Case #13-1317 Document #1497408 Filed: 06/13/2014 Page 18 of 18