Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00843/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00843-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant
David Oliver
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. No.

103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

DAVID OLIVER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:08cv843-CSC

) (WO)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

COMMISSIONER OF )

SOCIAL SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

I. Introduction

The plaintiff, David Oliver (“Oliver”), applied for disability insurance benefits

pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq., and supplemental

security income benefits pursuant to Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., alleging that he was

unable to work because of a disability. His application was denied at the initial administrative

level. Oliver then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ also denied the claim. The Appeals Council

rejected a subsequent request for review. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen,

792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1631(c)(3). Based on the court’s review of the record in this case

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 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological

abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

3 McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security income case (SSI). The

same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately cited as

authority in Title XVI cases. See e.g. Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A).

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and the briefs of the parties, the court concludes that the decision of the Commissioner is due

to be affirmed.

II. Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the

person is unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than 12 months. . . . 

To make this determination,2 the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, §416.920.

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific impairments

set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1?

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not

disabled.”

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).

3

The standard of review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court

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must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial

evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence

as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of the

record which support the decision of the ALJ but instead must view the record in its entirety

and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ.

Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings . . . No similar

presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal conclusions,

including determination of the proper standards to be applied in evaluating

claims.

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. Administrative Proceedings

Oliver was 51 years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. (R. 131.) He

completed the tenth grade. (Id.) Oliver’s prior work experience includes working as a

material handler and maintenance helper. (R. 138.) Oliver alleges that he became disabled

on December 31, 2003, due to diabetes, high blood pressure, and gouty arthritis. (R. 50, 53,

132.) Following the hearing, the ALJ concluded that Oliver suffers from severe impairments

of gouty arthritis and osteoarthritis of the knees. (R. 14.) The ALJ also determined that

Oliver is unable to perform his past relevant work. (Id.) Based on the testimony of a

vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that there were a significant number of jobs existing in

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the national economy that Oliver could perform, including working as a kitchen helper,

poultry worker, and off bearer. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Oliver was not

disabled. (R. 15.)

IV. The Plaintiff’s Claims

As stated by Oliver, he presents the following issue for the court’s review:

The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed, because he

failed to satisfy his fifth-step burden of proving that Oliver was

capable of performing other work existing in significant numbers

in the national economy.

(Doc. No. 13, Pl’s Brief, p. 3.) Within his discussion of the issues, however, Oliver asserts

that the ALJ’s determination that he has the residual functional capacity to perform light work

is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ improperly relied on the opinion of

a non-examining consultant and his determination is inconsistent with the consultative

examiner’s opinion, as well as Oliver’s subjective complaints of pain. (Id., pp. 3-8.)

V. Discussion

A. Pain. Oliver claims that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate and credit his

complaints of pain when determining that he has the residual functional capacity to perform

light work. During the hearing, Oliver testified that he has pain in his hands, knees, and foot.

(R. 133.) He stated that he “can’t hardly ball up” his hands, that they “be swollen up,” and

that he has trouble gripping items. (R. 133.) He also testified that the pain along the bottom

of his foot “feels like a big old piece of wax up there,” that the pain radiates from his foot to

his knee and up his back, that he soaks his feet in Epsom salt and water, and that the pain on

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a scale from zero to ten is a seven or an eight. (R.134.) Oliver further stated that he is able

to walk no more than a block and a half, that he is able to stand for approximately two and a

half hours at a time, that he has fallen on several occasions, that he walks with a cane, and that

he frequently elevates his legs. (R. 135-37.) 

The Eleventh Circuit has established a three-part test that applies when a claimant

attempts to establish disability through his own testimony of pain or other subjective

symptoms. Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Holt v. Sullivan,

921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). This standard requires evidence of an underlying

medical condition and either (1) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the

alleged pain arising from that condition or (2) that the objectively determined medical

condition is of such severity that it can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain.

Landry, 782 F. 2d at 1553. 

The Commissioner must consider a claimant’s subjective testimony of pain if he finds

evidence of an underlying medical condition and the objectively determined medical

condition is of a severity that can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain.

Mason v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1460, 1462 (11th Cir. 1986); Landry, 782 F.2d at 1553. Thus, if

the Commissioner fails to articulate reasons for refusing to credit a claimant’s subjective pain

testimony, then the Commissioner has, as a matter of law, accepted the testimony as true.

This standard requires that the articulated reasons be supported by substantial reasons. If

there is no such support, the testimony must be accepted as true. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d

1007, 1012 (11th Cir. 1987).

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The medical evidence demonstrates that Oliver suffers from foot and knee pain. For

example, on November 30, 2005, Dr. James O. Colley, a consultative physician, found that

Oliver had “crepitus bilaterally with range of motion of the knees.” (R. 101.) He also found

that Oliver’s feet were “diffusely tender,” that he had a trace of edema on the dorsal surface

and lateral malleolus on the right foot, that he suffered pain on range of motion of the ankles

and first three toes, that a “tender tophus could be palpated on the medial aspect of both 1st

metatarsal phalangeal joints.” (Id.) Therefore, Oliver meets the first prong of the pain

standard.

However, the ALJ determined that Oliver’s testimony of disabling pain was not

credible. Specifically, the ALJ found as follows:

. . . Contrary to his allegations of weakness of the hands,

examinations have revealed full grip strength with no

abnormalities of the hands. With the exception of “trace” edema

of the feet noted during the consultative examinations,

examinations have failed to reveal any evidence of swelling. The

claimant has not stated to any treating physician nor has any

treating physician recommended that the claimant elevate his

legs; this allegation is not credible. Furthermore, the claimant

has not been prescribed a cane nor has any physician noted that

he ambulate with a cane. There is no evidence of motor

weakness. Neither the frequency in which the claimant sought

treatment nor the objective findings support his allegations of

severe pain, swelling or functional limitations.

(R. 14.)

Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s finding that the medical records

are inconsistent with Oliver’s allegations that he suffered disabling pain. The record indicates

that Oliver did not seek medical treatment for his gouty arthritis or any other impairments

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 The medical records indicate that Oliver did not receive medical treatment between January 2000

and December 2004.

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 The court notes that the ALJ incorrectly found that Oliver was not prescribed a cane. One isolated

reference in the medical records indicates that, on January 27, 2005, a physician at Montgomery Primary

Physicians assessed that Oliver had an “unsteady gait” and prescribed a cane. (R. 91.) However, on November

30, 2005, Dr. Colley noted that Oliver was not using an “assistive device.” (R. 100.) Thus, it is clear that

Oliver did not use the cane on a regular basis. Consequently, the ALJ’s error in finding that Oliver was not

prescribed a cane is harmless. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983).

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between the date he alleged he became disabled in December 2003 and the date he was last

insured on March 31, 2004.4

 In addition, medical records after March 2004 are not consistent

with Oliver’s allegations of disabling pain. For example, during visits to Montgomery

Primary Physicians on January 27, 2005, September 9, 2005, and May 4, 2007, a physician

noted that Oliver suffered from no edema.5

 (R. 90-91, 112.) On November 30, 2005, Dr.

James O. Colley conducted a consultative examination, noting that Oliver appeared to have

pain while sitting, that he could not tandem walk or do heel-to-knee movements without pain,

and that he had a “trace of edema” on the dorsal surface of the right foot and lateral malleolus,

as well as mild pain on range of motion of the ankles. (R. 100.) The consultative physician

also found that, although Oliver walked gingerly without his shoes and took short steps, he

otherwise had a normal gait and was in no acute distress. (R. 99.) Dr. Colley noted that

Oliver had good muscle bulk and tone with no atrophy, that his grip strength was 5+/5, and

that he could squat down about 40% and get back up without assistance. (R. 102.) Oliver

was diagnosed as suffering from gouty arthritis of the feet and right ankle; gouty arthritis

versus osteoarthritis of both knees; type 2 diabetes, poorly controlled secondary to poor

compliance; and hypertension, controlled. (Id.)

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In light of the medical records indicating that Oliver suffered from no more than a

“trace” of edema, that his gait was normal while wearing shoes, that he had full grip strength,

that he did not use a cane or other assistive device on a regular basis, and that he was able to

squat without assistance, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination that the objective

medical evidence does not support the severity of symptoms alleged by Oliver is supported

by substantial evidence. 

The Commissioner considered that Oliver’s condition was capable of giving rise to

some pain; however, he concluded that his condition was not so severe as to give rise to the

disabling pain as alleged. The ALJ has discretion to discredit a claimant’s subjective

complaints as long as he provides “explicit and adequate reasons for his decision.” Holt, 921

F.2d at 1223. A reviewing court will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding where

there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding. See Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d

1007, 1012 (11th Cir. 1987); MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1054 (11th Cir. 1986). The

ALJ’s reasons for discrediting Oliver’s testimony of disabling pain were both clearly

articulated and supported by substantial evidence. After a careful review of the record, the

court concludes that the Commissioner properly discounted Oliver’s testimony of pain. 

B. The Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. Oliver asserts that the ALJ’s

determination that he is capable of performing light work is not supported by substantial

evidence. Specifically, Oliver contends that the ALJ improperly credited the opinion of Dr.

William Stoneycypher, a State agency non-examining consultant, while rejecting the

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consultative examiner’s opinion regarding his limitations. Oliver asserts that he is disabled

due to pain and swelling in his feet, knees, and hands. Consequently, he contends that his

ability to walk and stand are limited and that he must sit with his legs elevated for a prolonged

period to alleviate his pain.

When discussing Oliver’s ability to perform work, the ALJ determined that Dr.

Stonecypher’s opinion that Oliver has the residual functional capacity to perform light work

was “fully supported by the record as a whole and, therefore, entitled to considerable

probative weight.” (R. 14.) The ALJ noted that his determination that Oliver is able to

perform light work is “fully supported by the objective evidence, treatment records, the

claimant’s activities, the opinion of the State Agency medical consultant, and the record as

a whole.” (Id.) 

Taken alone, the opinion of a non-examining reviewing physician does not constitute

substantial evidence to support an administrative decision. Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222,

226 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990). However, an ALJ does not err in relying on the opinion of the nonexamining physician when that opinion does not contradict an examining physician’s opinion.

Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584-85 (11th Cir. 1991). The evidence in the record

supports the ALJ’s findings regarding Oliver’s residual functional capacity to perform light

work.

In his analysis, the ALJ determined that Oliver has the residual functional capacity to

perform work at the light exertional level. The ALJ’s determination is supported by the

medical records, including the opinions of Dr. Stonecypher, a non-examining medical expert,

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as well as of Dr. Colley, the consultative examining physician. 

On December 20, 2005, Dr. Stonecypher conducted a physical residual functional

capacity assessment, specifically finding that Oliver could lift no more than 20 pounds

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, that he could stand or sit for a total about 6 hours in

an 8-hour workday, and push or pull for an unlimited amount of time. (R. 104.) As support

for his conclusion, Dr. Stonecypher stated:

Mr. Oliver is a 49 y.o. male with allegations of non-insulin

diabetes, HBP, and gouty arthritis. . . .The clmt had a NL gait and

has no problems taking his shoes and socks off. The clmt had a

NL station and NL coordination. ROM was basically NL in all

joints. The claimant did have crepitus bilat with ROM of knees,

but there was no tenderness, instability, or deformity. His feet

were diffusely tender, the rt more so than the left. Clmt had pain

on ROM of his first 3 toes and mild pain on ROM of the ankles.

Examination of the hands were NL. The clmt had good muscle

strength and there was no atrophy. Sensory exam was NL.

Impression is gouty arthritis of the feet and ankle, Type II

diabetes which is poorly controlled due to poor compliance, HTN

(controlled), and gouty arthritis versus OA of both knees. 

(R. 104-05.) 

As previously discussed, Dr. Colley found that Oliver could not tandem walk or do

heel-to-knee movements without pain, that he had a “trace of edema” on the dorsal surface

of the right foot and lateral malleolus, as well as mild pain on range of motion of the ankles.

(R. 100.) The consultative physician noted that, although Oliver walked gingerly without his

shoes and took short steps, he otherwise had a normal gait and was in no acute distress. (R.

99.) Dr. Colley also found that Oliver had good muscle bulk and tone with no atrophy, that

his grip strength was 5+/5, and that he could squat down about 40% and get back up without

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assistance. (R. 102.) The consultative physician concluded that Oliver suffered from gouty

arthritis of the feet and right ankle; gouty arthritis versus osteoarthritis of both knees; type 2

diabetes, poorly controlled secondary to poor compliance; and hypertension, controlled. (Id.)

Thus, it is clear that the non-examining consultant’s opinion does not contradict Dr.

Colley’s opinion. Furthermore, no treating or consultative physician has opined that Oliver

should not perform work. A review of the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that the ALJ

conducted a thorough analysis of the testimony and considered all of the objective medical

evidence in reaching his decision. To the extent Oliver is arguing that the ALJ should have

accepted his testimony regarding his limitations rather than the opinions of the consultative

examiner and non-examining consultant, as the court explained, the ALJ had good cause to

discount Oliver’s testimony.

Oliver also argues that the ALJ failed to reconcile medical records indicating that he

was prescribed a four-pronged cane with the non-examining physician’s determination that

he has the ability to stand or walk six hours in an eight hour day. There is one isolated

reference in the medical records occurring one month after the expiration of the relevant time

period in which a physician at Montgomery Primary Physicians noted that Oliver walked with

an “unsteady gait” and was prescribed a four-pronged cane. (R. 91.) Dr. Colley’s evaluation,

however, indicates that Oliver was not using an “assistive device” in November 2005. (R.

100.) 

To the extent Oliver asserts that the burden of establishing his residual functional

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 In his brief, Oliver cites Fisher v. Astrue, No. CA 08-0062, 2008 WL 4417325, *4 (S.D. Ala. Sept.

23, 2008), which appears to hold that the Commissioner’s fifth step burden must be supported by the residual

functional capacity assessment of a treating or examining physician. This court disagrees with the holding.

First, the decision implies that a residual functional capacity determination is a medical decision. It is not.

An ALJ has the responsibility of determining the residual functional capacity of a claimant. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1546. Second, even if the holding in Fisher were correct, the record before this court shows that the nonexamining physician’s opinion is congruent with the consultant’s opinion in this case.

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capacity falls on the Commissioner at Step Five, he is incorrect.6 A disability claimant bears

the initial burden of demonstrating an inability to return to his past work. Lucas v. Sullivan

918 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1990). After a claimant establishes some disability that prevents him

from performing his past relevant work, the burden shifts to the ALJ to demonstrate the

existence of a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can

perform. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). After the ALJ identifies

alternative work, the burden shifts to the claimant to demonstrate that he is unable to perform

those jobs. See Williams v. Barnhart, 140 Fed. Appx. 932, 936 (11th Cir. 2005). In this case,

after determining Oliver was unable to return to his past relevant work, the ALJ posed

hypothetical questions to a vocational expert to determine whether someone with the same

limitations as Oliver would be able to secure employment in the national economy. Oliver

does not challenge the hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ to the vocational expert.

Furthermore, Oliver has not overcome his burden of proving that he is unable to perform work

as a kitchen helper, poultry worker, off bearer, or other light jobs existing in the national

economy.

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination that Oliver

has the residual functional capacity to perform light work is supported by substantial

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evidence. 

VI. Conclusion

The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff is not disabled. Thus, the

court concludes that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence

and is due to be affirmed.

A separate order will be entered.

Done this 4th day of March, 2010.

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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