Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02749/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02749-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Omon Bridget Isiramen
Plaintiff
Yuma Regional Medical Center
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Omon Bridget Isiramen, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Yuma Regional Medical Center, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-18-02749-PHX-JAS (LCK) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and 

Statement of Facts. (Docs. 38, 39.) Plaintiff filed a response and controverting statement 

of facts (Docs. 40, 41); Defendant replied (Doc. 44). Oral argument was heard on 

December 12, 2019. (Doc. 46.) The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, 

after its independent review of the record, grant summary judgment to Defendant. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Omon Bridget Isiramen filed a Complaint on August 30, 2018, alleging 

Defendant Yuma Regional Medical Center (the “Hospital”) discriminated against her in 

the terms and conditions of her employment based on her race and national origin in 

violation of Title VII. Plaintiff alleged disparate treatment, a hostile work environment, 

and retaliation. After the close of discovery, Defendant filed a motion for summary 

judgment as to all claims. 

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. 

Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). Summary judgment is appropriate if 

the pleadings and supporting documents “show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party need 

not produce evidence of a genuine issue of material fact but may satisfy its burden by 

“pointing out . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s 

case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. Material facts are those “that might affect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A genuine 

issue exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Id.

FACTS 

 On January 23, 2017, Plaintiff began working for the Hospital as a Registered 

Nurse in the Tower 2 West medical unit. (Doc. 1 ¶ 17; Doc. 39-2, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff had 17 

years nursing experience and had worked as a charge nurse at other medical facilities. 

(Doc. 39-2, Ex. 2; Ex. 3 at 11, 13-14.) Plaintiff was qualified for the position she held, 

and her supervisor, Sarah Medrano, never had clinical concern with Plaintiff’s job 

performance. (Doc. 41-3, Ex. 3 at 11-12.) 

When Plaintiff began orientation, on January 30, 2017, her assigned preceptor was 

Edith Stanfield; they both reported to Medrano. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 4.) On February 25, 

Stanfield emailed Medrano reporting that Plaintiff commented on her superior education, 

did not follow a doctor’s directions on administering a medication, failed to follow proper 

policy for calling-in sick, and was overwhelmed when assigned four patients. (Doc. 39-2, 

Ex. 6.) At deposition, Medrano did not recall receiving a report that Plaintiff ever refused 

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to follow a doctor’s orders. (Doc. 41-3, Ex. 3 at 16.) During Plaintiff’s time at the 

Hospital, Stanfield never completed a formal write-up about Plaintiff. (Id. at 22.) 

On May 7, 2017, Jessica Sierra, Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA), reported to 

Medrano that Plaintiff declined a request to help with a patient transfer and a bed change. 

(Doc. 39-2, Ex. 7.) Plaintiff denied that she refused to help Sierra and stated that she 

would not refuse to help the CNAs because they are “all part of the team.” (Id., Ex. 15; 

Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 103.) On May 11, Robert Diaz emailed Medrano and reported that he 

had spoken to Plaintiff about the reported incident with Sierra; Plaintiff told him she felt 

like it was a hostile work environment but would not elaborate when he asked for further 

information. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 8.) Plaintiff testified that “all the time” she had 

conversations with Diaz about experiencing a hostile work environment and she gave 

reasons. (Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 103.) Medrano informed Diaz that she met with Plaintiff and 

they discussed Plaintiff’s areas of concern. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 9.) Plaintiff denied meeting 

with Medrano regarding CNA Sierra. (Doc. 41-5 at 107-08.) 

On May 23, 2017, Stanfield emailed Medrano to report issues regarding Plaintiff’s 

failure to follow policies (including with respect to administering Heparin) and staff 

complaints that Plaintiff refused to help. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 10.) Plaintiff emailed Medrano 

on May 28 to inform her that: she did not appreciate the way Stanfield spoke to her about 

Plaintiff administering the Heparin drip; she did not know how to make Stanfield stop 

“being rude or condescending”; and, she wanted to work at the Hospital “without fear of 

being relegated to the background,” which was the way she perceived she was being 

treated by Stanfield. (Id., Ex. 11.) 

On July 6, 2017, the Hospital’s House Supervisor, Amanda Tapia, emailed 

Medrano because Plaintiff had reported to her that everyone on 2 West was against her 

and that she had to be “assertive or aggressive to get her point across.” (Id., Ex. 12.) 

Plaintiff denied having that discussion with Tapia. (Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 112-13.) The 

same night, Stanfield emailed Medrano to report Plaintiff’s call to Tapia, Plaintiff 

refusing to help turn a patient when asked by a Patient Care Assistant (PCA), and 

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Plaintiff failing to call a physician as Stanfield requested. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 13.) On July 7, 

Medrano and Human Resources Business Partner Scott Barnard met with Plaintiff to 

discuss the July 5 interactions with Tapia. (Id., Ex. 14.) When asked if she wanted to 

remain on 2 West, Plaintiff said yes because she loved the unit, her patients, and her 

coworkers; however, she also reported keeping the Serenity Prayer in her locker due to 

the situation with her coworkers. (Id., Ex. 3 at 123; Exs. 14, 15.) 

 On July 14, PCA Marisol Barraza emailed her superiors that, when she asked 

Plaintiff for help, Plaintiff grabbed her tightly by the arm and told her to do it herself; she 

reported that Plaintiff had grabbed her and others by the arm at other times. (Id., Ex. 16.) 

Plaintiff denied grabbing Barraza. (Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 119.) On July 21, Stanfield 

emailed Medrano to report that she had corrected Plaintiff on June 22, after she witnessed 

her grab PCA Andrea by the upper arm, lift her out of the chair, and say, “You need to 

come with me, you can not be up here.” (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 19.) Stanfield also reported that, 

on July 9, Plaintiff asked why Stanfield had lied to Medrano but then changed the subject 

repeatedly and Stanfield did not know what she meant. (Id.) Plaintiff denies grabbing 

PCA Andrea or being corrected by Stanfield. (Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 126.) Further, Plaintiff 

testified that she approached Stanfield not about that issue but to ask how she could 

improve things. (Id.) 

 In a July 17, 2017 memo to HR, Plaintiff included the following: Medrano was 

aware of some concerns regarding PCAs and was taking step to improve things on 2 

West; Plaintiff felt she and Medrano had a constructive meeting on July 7; Stanfield was 

condescending during orientation and made unprofessional comments; Plaintiff had 

verbally expressed concerns to Medrano, who told her she could call her during the night 

but she could not follow-up on things unless Plaintiff put them in writing; and Stanfield 

had advised her that if Stanfield received a complaint she had to forward it to Medrano. 

(Doc. 39-2, Ex. 15.) Plaintiff did not claim discrimination based on race or national origin 

in the July 17 memo. (Id.; Doc. 39-2, Ex. 3 at 125.) On July 18, Medrano and Randal 

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Etzler, Director of HR Operations, met with Plaintiff regarding her memo. (Doc. 39-2, 

Ex. 18.) 

 On July 21, 2017, Plaintiff came to believe that Stanfield had spread a rumor that 

Plaintiff had lost her nursing license due to a DUI, and she discussed the rumor with 

coworkers. (Id., Ex. 3 at 37-38; Doc. 1 ¶¶ 23-24.) On July 25, Plaintiff submitted a 

document to HR titled, “Formal Harassment Complaint to HR against Edith.” (Doc. 39-2, 

Ex. 20.) In the complaint, Plaintiff stated that Stanfield had spread false rumors about her, 

coordinated with other employees to disrespect her, and harassed her by writing emails to 

Medrano and instigating other employees to do the same. (Id.) Plaintiff did not allege in 

the complaint that Stanfield’s or others’ actions were based on her race or national 

original. (Id.; Doc. 39-2, Ex. 3 at 129.) Plaintiff testified that, when she prepared the 

written complaints, she tried to be thorough, but they did not include everything. (Doc. 

39-2, Ex. 3 at 84-85.) 

In a July 26 meeting with Med West Observation Director Celia Renteria, 

Stanfield denied spreading rumors about Plaintiff related to DUI or drug charges. (Id., 

Ex. 21.) Human Resources Business Partner Laura Wisniewski spoke with Plaintiff on 

July 28 and reported that she and Stanfield were assigned to opposite shifts in the shortterm, a follow-up meeting with Medrano was set for August 9, and Plaintiff was notified 

of people to contact if she experienced problems. (Id., Ex. 22.) Plaintiff testified that her 

assigned shifts with Stanfield did not change. (Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 134.) 

Wisniewski, Medrano, and the Clinical Nurse Educator met with Plaintiff on 

August 9. (Doc. 39-2, Exs. 23, 24; Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 135.) On August 15, Plaintiff 

requested a response to her complaint. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 24.) Human Resources Director 

Howard Bycroft issued a response on August 24 asking for further clarification of the 

allegations and supporting facts. (Id., Ex. 25.) Bycroft noted that Plaintiff had been 

unwilling to provide details on who told her about the rumor or any facts tying the rumor 

to Stanfield; Bycroft invited Plaintiff to meet again to discuss specific information to 

further the investigation. (Id.) Plaintiff never provided the Hospital further information. 

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(Id., Ex. 23 ¶ 7.) At deposition, Plaintiff testified that only one person (Olivia Simon, a 

monitor tech) informed her that Stanfield was telling employees that Plaintiff had a DUI 

and had previously lost her license; Plaintiff told Simon that information was not true. 

(Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 33-34.) Plaintiff refused to tell Human Resources that Simon had 

provided that information to her because she did not want Simon to get into trouble. 

(Doc. 39-2, Ex. 3 at 133.) Ernestine Stokes, a Hospital employee, also heard from Simon 

that Stanfield had run a background check on Plaintiff and discovered a DUI. (Doc. 41-4, 

Ex. 4 at 7, 22.) At deposition, Plaintiff denied ever having a DUI or being arrested. (Doc. 

41-3, Ex. 3 at 28.) 

 In a declaration, Wisniewski stated that HR and Medrano repeatedly asked 

Plaintiff for specific facts to support her allegations against Stanfield, but Plaintiff never 

provided details. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 23 ¶ 6.) On January 20, 2018, Plaintiff wrote to 

Wisniewski. (Id., Ex. 27.) Plaintiff acknowledged Bycroft’s August letter and stated that 

she did not know if she was supposed to respond to it. (Id.) Plaintiff asked for a meeting 

and re-opening of the investigation. (Id.) Wisniewski responded with another copy of 

Bycroft’s letter and stated that, for an investigation to occur, Plaintiff would need to 

provide specific names, dates, times, and locations. (Id.) Wisniewski again asked Plaintiff 

to confirm her willingness to share such details, which Plaintiff never did. (Id.; Doc. 39-

2, Ex. 23 ¶ 8; Doc. 39-2, Ex. 3 at 139-40.) 

 On May 27, 2018, PCA Dianna Goodwin emailed Stanfield about an interaction 

with Plaintiff on May 25. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 28.) Goodwin reported that Plaintiff yelled at 

her, grabbed her by the arm, and shoved her into another room. (Id.) Stanfield forwarded 

the email to Medrano and Renteria (id.); she also sent them a separate email, in which she 

stated that she witnessed Plaintiff grab Goodwin and push her into the pantry (Doc. 39-2, 

Ex. 31). Goodwin reported the incident to the Yuma Police Department. (Id., Ex. 29 at 

17; Ex. 30.) Plaintiff denied that she grabbed Goodwin’s arm. (Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 50; 

Doc. 39-2, Ex. 30.) Stokes testified that Plaintiff called her after the police were notified 

by Goodwin, and Plaintiff denied that the incident occurred. (Doc. 41-4, Ex. 4 at 30.) 

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The Hospital placed Plaintiff on Investigatory Leave on May 29; Plaintiff refused 

to sign the leave documentation. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 33.) Plaintiff wrote on the leave form 

that Stanfield had been trying to get her terminated by spreading false rumors about her 

and “I feel I am being discriminated against because HR and Sarah [Medrano] are aware 

Eddie [Stanfield] have been making up false allegations against me.” (Id.) On May 29 

and 30, Barnard conducted a Workplace Violence Investigation regarding the incident in 

which he interviewed Goodwin, Plaintiff, and Lillian Jackson (a possible witness). (Id., 

Ex. 34.) On June 6, Plaintiff called Wisniewski and stated that she was requesting a 

meeting with Medrano and would like to have counsel present. (Id., Ex. 37.) On June 20, 

the Hospital issued a Corrective Action to Plaintiff. (Id., Ex. 38.) As required by the 

Corrective Action, Plaintiff submitted a written plan that she would follow the Hospital’s 

core value of respect, follow all policies (“as I have always done”), and expected to be 

protected. (Id., Exs. 38, 39.) 

Plaintiff testified at deposition that Stanfield forced Goodwin to report that 

Plaintiff had grabbed her. (Id., Ex. 3 at 44.) Her proof for that assertion was that she had 

worked well with Goodwin, it was Stanfield’s nature, and previously Stanfield had tried 

unsuccessfully to get a different CNA to make a report against Plaintiff. (Id. at 44-46.) 

She also testified that Stanfield instigated other employees against her out of a need “to 

satisfy her ego.” (Id. at 39.) Plaintiff testified that, after the police involvement, she found 

work unbearable because HR had not handled the situation and Stanfield was getting 

away with harassing her. (Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 95.) Stanfield testified that she did not get 

along very well with Plaintiff, but she did not recall treating Plaintiff different than other 

nurses.1

 (Doc. 41-1, Ex. 1 at 17-18, 28.) 

 On June 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC 

against the Hospital based on race, national origin, and retaliation. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 40.) In 

 1

 At deposition, counsel asked Stanfield, “Did you treat Bridget any different than you treat the other nurses?” Stanfield answered, “Not that I recall.” (Doc. 41-1, Ex. 1 at 

28.) Plaintiff represented this answer as Stanfield not denying that she treated Plaintiff differently. (Doc. 41 at 27 ¶ 3.) 

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the Charge, Plaintiff alleged that the ongoing harassment by Stanfield and others and the 

unfounded Corrective Action were based on her race and national origin. (Id.) On 

October 14, 2018, Plaintiff transferred to a different unit at the Hospital based on her 

determination that patient safety was compromised working with Stanfield, because 

Plaintiff’s statements about patient needs were not being believed.2

 (Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 

174-75, 179.) 

On the EEOC Intake Questionnaire, Plaintiff left blank the request to describe 

other similarly situated people and how they were treated. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 41.) Plaintiff 

testified that Medrano treated non-African-American employees better than she treated 

African-American employees because Medrano did not respond to her concerns and, 

when there was a situation, she did not call Plaintiff in to discuss it; with non-AfricanAmericans, Medrano listened to them and was more cordial. (Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 63-64, 

88-90.) Plaintiff testified that the Hospital refused to do anything about her complaints 

because she was black, and there is evidence they did the same to another person. (Id. at 

67.) Also, Plaintiff testified that, because she was black, the Hospital would have 

terminated her if she behaved in the way Stanfield had behaved. (Id. at 140-41.) 

Stokes stated that Medrano treated Plaintiff differently than other nurses, which 

was based on her having heard from Simon that Medrano had staff watching Plaintiff. 

(Doc. 41-4, Ex. 4 at 18.) Stokes described Stanfield as a “troublemaker throughout the 

Hospital,” who was disrespectful to other employees. (Id. at 20-21.) Plaintiff testified that 

Stanfield was condescending and rude to everyone, that was her nature. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 3 

at 57-58, 61-62, 87-88.) Plaintiff also testified that Stanfield treated her the way she did 

because she is black, and her evidence was that “[s]he did it to me and I’m black.” (Doc. 

41-5, Ex. 5 at 60.) Plaintiff stated that Stanfield targeted people that were black, including 

Plaintiff and an employee named India, and treated them differently than other people. 

 2

 On January 18, 2019, Plaintiff was issued a Corrective Action for arriving late on January 10, and for not calling or showing up for a January 14 shift. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 44.) The Hospital terminated Plaintiff on February 15, 2019, based on additional violations of 

the Hospital’s scheduling and leave policies. (Id., Ex. 45.) Plaintiff has not alleged these actions by the Hospital were unlawful. 

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(Id. at 62, 86.) India left the Hospital voluntarily, she was not terminated. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 

46 at 23.) 

Plaintiff alleges that, sometime during her employment, in a room only accessible 

to nurses, Plaintiff saw a page taped to the wall which told the story of how slaves were 

involved in the origins of a song titled “Dixieland.” Plaintiff alleges she believed this 

page was meant to be aimed at her national origin as an African from Nigeria. (Doc. 1 

¶ 21; Doc. 39-2, Ex. 3 at 70-72; Doc. 39-2, Ex. 43.) Plaintiff reported the sign to the 

charge nurse, who promptly removed it. (Doc. 39-2, Ex. 3 at 71-72.) During deposition, 

Plaintiff stated, “Well, at the Hospital they put racist comments like ‘nigger go home’ and 

‘slaves that walk on the plantation,’ they post it on the wall.” (Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 58.) 

DISCUSSION 

An employer is prohibited from discriminating against an employee based on race 

or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Plaintiff has alleged three forms of 

discrimination in violation of Title VII, disparate treatment, hostile work environment, 

and retaliation. 

Disparate Treatment 

A disparate treatment claim is one in which an individual is treated less favorably 

than others similarly situated to her based on a prohibited criterion, such as race or 

national origin. Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(quoting Gay v. Waiters’ and Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 694 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 

1982)). The following burden-shifting framework governs Plaintiff’s disparate treatment 

case: 

the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the 

plaintiff succeeds in doing so, then the burden shifts to the defendant to 

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory conduct. If the defendant provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason is a pretext for discrimination. 

Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2003). 

A prima facie case requires the plaintiff to offer evidence that “give[s] rise to an 

inference of unlawful discrimination.” Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124 F.3d 1145, 

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1148 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Texas Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 

253 (1981)). The proof necessary at summary judgment is minimal, a preponderance of 

the evidence is not required. Id. (quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th 

Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff may establish her prima facie case through evidence of unlawful 

discrimination or by the presumption that arises if she establishes the McDonell Douglas

factors. Cordova, 124 F.3d at 1148. Plaintiff has argued that she can establish a prima 

facie case under either approach. 

McDonnell Douglas 

The McDonnell Douglas framework requires that Plaintiff establish: “(1) she 

belongs to a protected class, (2) she was performing according to her employer’s 

legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) other 

employees with qualifications similar to her own were treated more favorably.” Godwin 

v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended (Aug. 11, 1998). 

There is no dispute that Plaintiff’s race and national origin satisfy the first requirement. 

Regardless of whether Plaintiff could satisfy the second and third requirements, Plaintiff 

failed to establish the fourth factor. 

The Court must examine whether employees with qualifications similar to Plaintiff 

were treated more favorably than she was treated. Plaintiff relies upon her own testimony 

that Stanfield treated her less favorably than nurses that were not black or Nigerian; and, 

that the Hospital subjected her to an unfounded investigation into the allegation that she 

grabbed the arm of another employee. “Appropriate comparators would be other 

employees outside [Plaintiff’s] protected class who have dealt with the same supervisor, 

have been subject to the same standards, and engage in the same conduct without any 

mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.’” Kent v. City of Tucson, No. CV 09-0280-

TUC-FRZ, 2011 WL 7637263, at *9 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2011), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1067958 (Mar. 29, 2012) (quoting Clark v. Runyon, 

218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000)). 

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Plaintiff did not identify other similarly situated nurses that Stanfield treated more 

favorably. She presented only general evidence that Stanfield was, by nature, 

condescending and disrespectful to other employees. Although Plaintiff testified that 

Stanfield’s treatment of her was based on her race, she has no supporting evidence. She 

testified that Stanfield also “targeted” a black employee named India, but she did not 

explain how India was treated or how those circumstances were similar to Plaintiff. 

Critically, she did not identify similarly situated employees that Stanfield treated better 

than Plaintiff. 

At oral argument, counsel argued Stanfield was similarly situated and treated more 

favorably than Plaintiff by the Hospital. He argued that Stanfield was a known 

troublemaker but was not disciplined for her behavior, while Plaintiff was given a 

Corrective Action. Plaintiff testified that, if she had behaved similarly to Stanfield, she 

would have been terminated based on her race. Plaintiff did not, however, identify a 

black employee that was disciplined for behaving similarly to Stanfield. The only 

evidence of complaints against Stanfield, reported to a supervisor, were those lodged by 

Plaintiff. With respect to the complaints they made against one another, no disciplinary 

action was taken against either one of them. Thus, Plaintiff was not treated less favorably 

than Stanfield for comparable alleged conduct. Stanfield was not similarly situated in that 

she was not accused of assault on a fellow employee. Plaintiff did not identify other 

similarly situated nurses that were treated more favorably with respect to a reported 

assault. 

Plaintiff suggests that Medrano treated non-African nurses more favorably in that 

she was more responsive to their concerns but with her they failed to address her 

complaints about Stanfield. Although Plaintiff testified that the Hospital refused to 

address her complaints because she was black (and treated another unidentified black 

employee similarly), she has no evidence beyond her conclusory testimony. See 

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (refusing to find 

a “genuine issue” where the only evidence presented is “uncorroborated and self-serving” 

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testimony) (citing Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir.1996)). 

Finally, Stokes testified that Medrano had staff watching Plaintiff, but that limited 

evidence does not suggest similarly situated employees were treated differently. 

Ultimately, Plaintiff failed to identify any person or group of similarly situated people 

that received more favorable treatment from the Hospital. 

 Evidence of Discrimination 

A plaintiff may establish a prima facie disparate treatment claim by offering direct 

evidence of intentional discrimination or “evidence that indicates that ‘it is more likely 

than not’ that the employer’s actions were based on unlawful considerations.” Jauregui, 

852 F.2d at 1134 (quoting Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir.1981));

Cordova, 124 F.3d at 1148. In support of her disparate treatment claim, Plaintiff cites: her 

own testimony that Stanfield treated her less favorably than nurses that were not black or 

Nigerian; the fact that she was subjected to an unfounded investigation into the allegation 

that she grabbed the arm of another employee; Stanfield admitted that she did not get 

along with Plaintiff and treated her differently; and Stanfield repeatedly emailed 

supervisors regarding Plaintiff. (Doc. 40 at 5.) 

 As discussed above, Plaintiff did not identify any similarly situated individuals 

that Stanfield treated more favorably than she treated Plaintiff. The fact that Plaintiff and 

Stanfield did not get along is immaterial, without more. Stanfield testified that she had no 

recollection of treating Plaintiff differently. (See supra note 1.) Stanfield’s emails to 

Medrano were about Plaintiff’s performance on the job. Nothing in Stanfield’s reports 

about Plaintiff nor the Hospital’s response to those emails suggested they were based on 

unlawful considerations. Prior to Goodwin’s report of an assault, the Hospital’s only 

response to employee emails regarding Plaintiff’s conduct was to meet with her to 

discuss them. She was not disciplined. 

 With respect to Goodwin’s report that Plaintiff assaulted her, Plaintiff alleges the 

investigation was unfounded. The Hospital’s decision to investigate an employee report 

that Plaintiff grabbed and shoved her does not imply racial animus. The Hospital 

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interviewed the people involved and those identified as possible witnesses. Goodwin and 

Stanfield’s reports were consistent. Additionally, the Hospital had received two prior 

reports of Plaintiff grabbing other employees by the arm. Despite Plaintiff’s denial, it was 

reasonable for the Hospital to conclude that Plaintiff had violated the Hospital’s 

workplace violence policy. And, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the Hospital did 

not honestly believe Plaintiff had violated its policies. See Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1063 

(finding no pretext because employer “honestly believed” the basis for terminating the 

plaintiff, therefore, action was not motivated by a discriminatory reason). Plaintiff fails to 

identify any action by the Hospital in responding to Goodwin’s report that suggests its 

actions were based on the improper consideration of her race or national origin. 

 Disparate Treatment Conclusion 

 Plaintiff has failed to establish an inference of unlawful discrimination by 

Defendant. Because Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case of disparate 

treatment, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

Hostile Work Environment 

To establish a hostile work environment, Plaintiff must establish that she was 

subjected to unwelcome conduct based on her race or national origin, and that the 

“conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of . . . employment 

and create an abusive work environment.” Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 

(9th Cir. 2003) (“teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents” are not sufficient). 

To the extent the harassment is conducted by a supervisor, the employer bears vicarious 

liability. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001). 

However, when the harassment is performed by a co-worker, the employer is only liable 

if it knew or should have known about the harassment and did not take adequate remedial 

measures to halt the harassment. Id. 

As evidence of a hostile work environment Plaintiff relies upon Stanfield’s 

repeated issues with Plaintiff’s employment as evidenced by Stanfield’s emails sent on 

February 25, 2017, May 23, 2017, July 6 and 21, 2017, and May 27 and 28, 2018; 

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Stanfield’s admission that she did not get along with Plaintiff and treated her differently; 

Stanfield being a known problem, who treated others disrespectfully; Plaintiff’s 

complaints to Defendant about Stanfield’s treatment; and Plaintiff feeling compelled to 

transfer as a result of the conduct. (Doc. 40 at 7.) 

The critical question for Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim is whether 

Stanfield’s conduct was based on Plaintiff’s race or national origin. There is evidence that 

Stanfield was rude and disrespectful to Plaintiff and other employees, but the evidence 

indicates she treated everyone that way regardless of race or national origin. Similarly, 

Stanfield’s admission that she did not get along with Plaintiff, without more, does not 

correlate to Plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. Plaintiff alleges that Stanfield 

admitted treating Plaintiff differently; in fact, Stanfield stated that she had no recollection 

of treating Plaintiff differently. (See supra note 1.) None of Stanfield’s emails mention or 

imply they were based on Plaintiff’s race or national origin. A co-worker’s comments 

about performance, without evidence that they are based on race, are insufficient to 

establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII. See Surrell v. Cal. Water 

Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2008); Amobi v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, No. 2:10-

CV-01561 JWS, 2011 WL 308466, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2011) (finding performancerelated disparagement and unfounded reprimands failed to establish a hostile work 

environment based on race); Selby v. Phoenix Symphony, No. 2:07-CV-1254-HRH, 2009 

WL 10708570, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2009) (granting summary judgment on ADEA 

claim because verbal abuse and unfavorable performance reviews did not mention 

Plaintiff’s age). Plaintiff’s conclusory statements about the motivation for Stanfield’s 

conduct or the fact that Plaintiff was a member of a protected class are insufficient. 

The fact that Plaintiff complained to the Hospital about Stanfield is only relevant 

if she was being harassed based on her membership in a protected class. Plaintiff has 

failed to establish a genuine issue of fact on that point. This finding is underscored by the 

fact that Plaintiff’s complaints to her superiors at the Hospital never stated or implied that 

Stanfield’s harassment was based on Plaintiff’s race or national origin. 

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 In her brief and at oral argument, Plaintiff contended there was a racially hostile 

atmosphere at the Hospital. However, her evidence to support that allegation is very thin. 

Plaintiff observed one sign that she found improper, which was removed when reported. 

She testified that unspecified people posted racist statements, but she did not identify the 

frequency of these postings, where they were located, or whether she even witnessed 

them. These limited occurrences are insufficient by themselves to establish severe and 

pervasive conduct amounting to a hostile work environment. See Manatt, 339 F.3d at 

798-99. Additionally, there is no evidence Plaintiff reported more than the one sign to a 

Hospital supervisor or that the Hospital should have been aware of them. At argument, 

counsel conceded that Plaintiff had not reported any other racist commentary at the 

Hospital. 

 Plaintiff has presented insufficient evidence of a hostile work environment. 

Because there is no genuine issue of fact, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on 

this claim. 

Retaliation 

 Plaintiff alleges she engaged in protected activity and was retaliated against for 

doing so. It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee “because he 

has opposed any practice” made unlawful by Title VII, including bringing an EEOC 

charge. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a retaliation claim, plaintiff must show 

that she engaged in a protected activity, she was subjected to an adverse employment 

decision, and the adverse action was causally linked to her protected activity. See 

Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1064. 

The protected activity alleged by Plaintiff was making internal complaints about 

Stanfield’s conduct and filing an EEOC charge. Plaintiff alleges that the Hospital 

retaliated with the Corrective Action, treating Plaintiff less favorably than other similarly 

situated employees, and Plaintiff felt compelled to transfer to another unit due to 

Stanfield’s continued harassment. 

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 In complaining to the Hospital about Stanfield’s conduct, Plaintiff never 

mentioned that she believed the harassment was motivated by racial or national origin 

discrimination. Because Plaintiff was not opposing conduct deemed unlawful under Title 

VII, Plaintiff’s internal complaints were not protected activity under Title VII. See 

Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411–12 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissing 

retaliation claim based on opposition to employer conduct based on personal reasons not 

racial discrimination); Amobi, 2011 WL 308466, at *5 (dismissing retaliation claim in 

absence of allegation that plaintiff complained to defendants that she was being 

discriminated against based on her race or national origin); Ahuvia v. Wyndham Vacation 

Resorts, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1192–93 (D. Haw. 2013) (finding complaints of 

favoritism not a protected activity and collecting relevant cases). Additionally, because 

the Corrective Action was imposed almost a year after Plaintiff’s internal complaints, the 

timing does not raise an inference of causation. See Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1065. 

 In contrast, there is no question that Plaintiff’s filing of an EEOC charge was 

protected activity. See Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff’s 

EEOC Charge, however, was filed after the Hospital imposed the Corrective Action 

related to the Goodwin incident. Therefore, the Corrective Action could not have been 

retaliation for the filing of the Charge. The remaining allegations are that Defendant 

treated her less favorably than non-African, non-Nigerian employees, and her transfer. As 

discussed above, there is no evidence that Plaintiff was treated less favorably than other 

similarly situated employees that were outside her protected class. Additionally, “an 

employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee 

from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all 

employees experience.” See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 

(2006) (citing B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 669 (3d 

ed.1996) (noting that “courts have held that personality conflicts at work that generate 

antipathy” and “‘snubbing’ by supervisors and co-workers” are not actionable under 

§ 704(a))). 

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 Finally, the Court reviews Plaintiff’s “compelled” transfer. Title VII retaliation 

claims may be based on a broad range of adverse employment actions, beyond those that 

may be used to substantiate a disparate treatment claim. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 

67-68. “[A]n allegedly retaliatory action is subject to challenge so long as the plaintiff 

can show that ‘a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially 

adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker 

from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Id. at 68 (quoting Campbell v. 

Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 892 F.3d 1005, 1021 (9th Cir. 2018)). A lateral transfer may qualify 

when it is dictated by the employer. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir. 

2000) (citing Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (evaluating 

transfers of duties and undeserved performance evaluations)); St. John v. Employ. Dev. 

Dept., 642 F.2d 273, 274 (9th Cir. 1981) (evaluating a lateral transfer). But, Plaintiff has 

not cited any law to support her assertion that a voluntary transfer qualifies as an adverse 

employment action. 

Plaintiff testified that, in September 2018, the Hospital gave her the choice to 

transfer to Tower 5 or stay on 2 West, and she decided to stay on 2 West at that time. 

(Doc. 41-5, Ex. 5 at 173.) She subsequently chose to make the transfer. (Id. at 173, 175.) 

Because Defendant did not impose the transfer, there was no action by the Hospital 

(adverse or otherwise). There is no reason to believe a reasonable worker would not 

report discrimination because of a voluntary transfer. 

 Plaintiff has not established that she was subjected to an adverse employment 

action for filing her EEOC Charge. Because there is not a genuine issue of fact, 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

enter an order GRANTING Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38). 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

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Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the District 

Court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

Dated this 19th day of December, 2019. 

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