Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01561/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01561-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
ICCS USA Corporation
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ICCS USA CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2019-1561

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:17-cv-00108-MAB, Judge Mark A. Barnett.

______________________ 

Decided: March 11, 2020

______________________ 

ELON ABRAM POLLACK, Stein Shostak Shostak Pollack 

& O'Hara, Los Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

Also represented by MATTHEW ROSS LEVITON. 

 JAMIE SHOOKMAN, International Trade Field Office, 

Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, New York, 

NY, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

AMY RUBIN, HARDEEP KAUR JOSAN; JEANNE DAVIDSON, 

JOSEPH H. HUNT, Washington, DC; YELENA SLEPAK, Office 

of the Assistant Chief Counsel, United States Department 

of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Customs 

and Border Protection, New York, NY. 

 ______________________ 

Case: 19-1561 Document: 48 Page: 1 Filed: 03/11/2020
2 ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

Before NEWMAN, MOORE, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

CHEN, Circuit Judge.

ICCS USA Corporation (ICCS) appeals from the 

United States Court of International Trade’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government ruling that 

United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs)

lawfully issued to ICCS a notice to redeliver merchandise

that violated 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) by displaying a counterfeit certification mark. ICCS USA Corp. v. United States, 

357 F. Supp. 3d 1314 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2018). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

I. Facts 

On January 19, 2017, ICCS imported 56,616 individual 

butane gas canisters into the United States that displayed 

a “PREMIUM” brand label affixed on the outside of the 

canisters. At the time of importation, the PREMIUM 

model canisters displayed a registered certification mark 

owned by Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (UL). Customs

subsequently determined that the canisters were “counterfeit” in that they made unauthorized use of the UL certification mark. On February 23, 2017, Customs issued a 

notice ordering ICCS to redeliver the imported canisters to 

Customs’ custody pursuant to § 1526(e). ICCS redelivered 

only 29,008 of the 56,616 canisters to Customs for seizure. 

Customs issued a Notice of Penalty or Liquidated Damages 

Incurred and Demand for Payment to ICCS with respect to 

the 27,608 non-delivered canisters, and assessed damages 

against ICCS in the amount of $41,412.00. This appeal 

concerns Customs’ demand for redelivery with respect to 

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ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 3

the 27,608 canisters that were not seized by Customs.1 See

ICCS, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 1319. 

UL is an independent, not-for-profit laboratory that 

tests various products for compliance with nationally recognized safety standards and requirements. Acadia Tech., 

Inc. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1327, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 

2006); United States v. 10,510 Packaged Computer Towers, 

More or Less (Computer Towers), 152 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 

1191 (N.D. Cal. 2001). “Manufacturers submit samples of 

their products to UL for examination and testing so that 

UL may independently determine if the products meet specific standards and requirements for fire, electrical, and 

casualty hazards.” United States v. 4500 Audek Model No. 

5601 AM/FM Clock Radios (Audek Model Clock Radios), 

220 F.3d 539, 540–41 (7th Cir. 2000) (detailing UL’s requirements for labeling a product with UL’s certification 

mark). If, and when, UL finds that a manufacturer’s products comply with applicable standards, UL authorizes the 

manufacturer to affix UL’s certification mark to the products. Acadia Tech., 458 F.3d at 1329. When consumers see 

UL’s certification mark displayed on products, the UL 

mark informs consumers that they are purchasing products that have UL’s “seal of approval” and comply with 

UL’s safety standards and requirements. 3 J. Thomas 

McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:91 (5th ed. 2019) (McCarthy on Trademarks). 

ICCS is the U.S. affiliate of One Jung Can Mtf. Co. Ltd. 

(OJC), and ICCS imports butane gas canisters manufactured by OJC. J.A. 64. ICCS’s PREMIUM model canister 

1 The Court of International Trade lacks jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) to review a seizure of merchandise by Customs. H & H Wholesale Servs., Inc. v. United 

States, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1340 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1356, jurisdiction over seized merchandise lies with the district court. 

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4 ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

is a model of OJC’s MEGA-1 butane gas canister.2 UL certified the MEGA-1 canister for OJC in October 2001 after 

testing it for safety. J.A. 236–46. But as of January 19, 

2017 (the date of entry), ICCS’s PREMIUM model canister 

had not been certified. 

ICCS’s contractual relationship with UL began in October 2015, when ICCS and OJC entered into a Multiple 

Listing Services Agreement with UL. J.A. 185, 187. UL’s 

multiple listing services allow an authorized manufacturer

(which in this case is OJC) to brand and label its products 

using the multiple listee’s name (here, ICCS) so that the 

products certified by UL for OJC can be marketed by ICCS. 

J.A. 262; see ICCS, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 1317. The contract, 

made pursuant to the Multiple Listing Services Agreement, was comprised of two documents: the Multiple Listing, Recognition, Verification, and Classification Services 

Service Terms (the Service Terms) and the Global Services 

Agreement. ICCS, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 1317. Under the 

Service Terms ¶ 1, the “basic product,” which refers to 

OJC’s MEGA-1 canister, was authorized to display UL’s 

certification mark when “marked with [ICCS’s brand] label 

instead of [OJC’s brand] label.” J.A. 262; ICCS, 357 F.

Supp. 3d at 1323 n.18. 

The Service Terms authorized ICCS to display UL’s 

certification mark on any ICCS “models” that are the same 

2 At oral argument, counsel for ICCS insisted that 

PREMIUM and US BUTANE (another type of ICCS’s butane gas canister) are not “models.” Oral Arg. at 2:00–2:50, 

35:40–36:20, ICCS USA Corp. v. United States, No. 2019-

1561 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2019), http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2019-1561.mp3. 

Yet, the correspondence between ICCS, OJC, and UL, in 

addition to UL’s online directory, consistently refer to 

PREMIUM and US BUTANE as “M[ultiple ]L[isting] 

model[s].” J.A. 272–75, 376, 378 (emphasis added).

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ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 5

physical product as OJC’s MEGA-1 canister, but only after 

UL verifies that any differences between ICCS’s model and 

the MEGA-1 “basic product” are merely “superficial.” See

J.A. 264. In other words, as the Court of International 

Trade observed, new ICCS models can become authorized

to display UL’s certification mark, but only after ICCS 

makes a request and UL expressly approves ICCS’s request. ICCS, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 1324 (citing J.A. 263–64). 

UL maintained a list of authorized models for the public on 

its Online Certifications Directory. Id. at 1317; see J.A. 

376, 378. 

The ICCS models of butane gas canisters at issue in 

this case are the PREMIUM model and the US BUTANE 

model. While the PREMIUM model displayed a 

“PREMIUM” brand label, ICCS’s US BUTANE model displayed a “US BUTANE” brand label affixed on the outside 

of the canisters. Oral Arg. at 20:00–20:40. Between October 2015 and February 2017, including on the date of entry 

(January 19, 2017), only the US BUTANE model was listed 

on UL’s Online Certifications Directory under ICCS’s 

name. J.A. 376. The PREMIUM model was not listed, and 

not authorized by UL to display the certification mark, until February 8, 2017. J.A. 378. This is because ICCS did 

not make a request for UL to add the PREMIUM model to 

UL’s multiple listing services until after the date of entry

of the PREMIUM model canisters. Upon receiving that request, UL approved it and updated its online directory to 

include the PREMIUM model. 

When Customs learned that, at the time of entry, UL 

had not authorized the use of its certification mark on the 

PREMIUM model, Customs issued to ICCS the notice to 

redeliver the 56,616 PREMIUM model canisters, stating 

that ICCS was in violation of § 1526(e). J.A. 381–82. ICCS 

redelivered 29,008 of the 56,616 canisters, but failed to redeliver the remaining 27,608 canisters, presumably because they had already entered the stream of commerce. 

Appellee’s Br. at 5. 

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6 ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

II. Proceedings Below 

On April 6, 2017, ICCS filed the protest that underlies 

this action, challenging Customs’ demand for redelivery. 

J.A. 279–90; 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(4) (allowing importers to 

protest decisions by Customs as to, inter alia, “a demand 

for redelivery to customs custody under any provision of 

the customs laws”). ICCS claimed that the redelivery notice was unlawful because ICCS had a valid license with 

UL to display the UL certification mark on the PREMIUM 

model canisters. Customs then contacted UL to inquire 

about ICCS’s protest, and UL confirmed that, on the date 

of entry, the PREMIUM model canisters “were not . . . authorized to display the UL Listing Certification Marks.” 

J.A. 292–93. Customs subsequently denied ICCS’s protest, 

and this action commenced, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1581(a), in the Court of International Trade. 

ICCS filed a complaint in the Court of International 

Trade on May 11, 2017, challenging Customs’ denial of 

ICCS’s protest of Customs’ demand for redelivery. Customs communicated to ICCS that it would “stipulate this 

case if [ICCS] can provide a letter from UL stating that UL 

does not object to the retroactive use of its mark on 

‘PREMIUM’ model[] [canisters] . . . at issue in this case.” 

J.A. 408. ICCS’s counsel attempted to obtain such a letter 

from UL, and the government requested an extension of 

time for ICCS’s counsel to do so. J.A. 407–08. 

However, UL would not consent to the retroactive use 

of its certification mark. J.A. 395–98. In correspondence 

with ICCS’s counsel, UL’s representative stated, “UL certifications are not retroactive,” and therefore, the merchandise at issue “were not then and are still not authorized to 

display the UL certification marks.” J.A. 396. “UL upholds 

a strict zero-tolerance policy . . . [which] is uniformly applied and is considered reasonable and necessary in order 

to protect the integrity of UL’s [r]egistered [m]arks.” Id. 

UL denied ICCS’s request “for a waiver” because that 

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ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 7

“would allow other companies to copy the UL Mark with 

impunity, safe in the knowledge that if the merchandise is 

intercepted at U.S. Customs, that the investment could 

still be salvaged.” J.A. 397. 

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court of 

International Trade upheld Customs’ determination that 

the UL certification mark displayed on ICCS’s merchandise was counterfeit. ICCS, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 1316. The 

court concluded, based on the Service Terms and the Global 

Services Agreement, that ICCS must obtain “express authorization” from UL for each model of butane gas canister

prior to using UL’s certification mark on that model. Id. at 

1324. Based on the Service Terms ¶¶ 2, 4(b), 6(a), and 7, 

the court concluded that new models can be added to UL’s

multiple listing services only after ICCS makes a request 

to UL and UL determines that the new model is eligible 

because any differences between the new model and the 

MEGA-1 basic product are merely “superficial.” Id. Further, both the Service Terms ¶ 8 and the Global Services 

Agreement ¶ 8 expressly forbid ICCS from using UL’s certification mark “on any goods or their containers or packaging,” “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly authorized.” Id. 

The court thus concluded that ICCS’s PREMIUM model 

canisters were counterfeit because “ICCS did not have express authorization to display UL’s certification mark on 

the PREMIUM model on the date of importation, and because UL’s authorization that occurred after the date of importation was not retroactive.” Id. ICCS appeals, and we 

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

DISCUSSION

I. Counterfeit Certification Mark

In the Court of International Trade, summary judgment is available when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ct. Int’l Trade R. 

56(a). “We review the [Court of International Trade’s] 

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8 ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

grant of summary judgment without deference.” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 915 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. 

Cir. 2019). “We review the trial court’s legal conclusions de 

novo; we review questions of fact for clear error.” 

Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. United States, 540 F.3d 1324, 

1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “We review the interpretation of a 

contract—a question of law—without deference.” Id. at 

1335. 

Generally, when imported merchandise that should not 

have been admitted into U.S. commerce has been released, 

Customs “shall promptly make demand for the redelivery 

of the merchandise” to its custody. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.26, 

141.113(d). In this case, Customs issued the redelivery notice on the basis that the merchandise contained a counterfeit certification mark in violation of § 1526(e). In relevant 

part, § 1526(e) provides that any merchandise bearing a 

counterfeit mark (within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1127) 

that is imported into the United States in violation of 15 

U.S.C. § 1124 “shall be seized and, in the absence of the 

written consent of the trademark owner, forfeited for violations of the customs laws.” Section 1124 forbids the importation of merchandise that “copy or simulate” a registered 

trademark. Certification marks are covered by these provisions. See Audek Model Clock Radios, 220 F.3d at 540; 

Computer Towers, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 1196 (holding that 

§ 1124 covers certification marks). Thus, under § 1526(e), 

the government “shall . . . seize[] and . . . forfeit[]” any merchandise that is of foreign manufacture, was imported in 

violation of § 1124, and bears a counterfeit certification 

mark within the meaning of § 1127. 

The question of whether Customs properly denied 

ICCS’s protest turns on whether the PREMIUM model canisters at the time of importation displayed a “counterfeit” 

certification mark within the meaning of § 1127. Section 

1127 defines “counterfeit” as “a spurious mark which is 

identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a 

registered mark.” The parties do not dispute that the mark 

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ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 9

displayed on the PREMIUM model canisters at the time of 

importation was identical to UL’s registered certification 

mark. ICCS, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 1322. The only question, 

therefore, is whether the mark was “spurious.” 

A “spurious” mark is one that is false. See BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 

UNABRIDGED (2002); see also Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 Cong. Rec. 31673, 

31675 (1984) (“As [an earlier] Senate bill indicated, ‘spurious’ means ‘not genuine or authentic.’”). “Counterfeit certification marks falsely imply that the merchandise has 

been tested and approved for safety.” Computer Towers, 

152 F. Supp. 2d at 1197. The record shows that ICCS’s use 

of UL’s certification mark on the date of entry falsely communicated to consumers that the imported PREMIUM 

model merchandise had already passed UL’s safety standards and requirements, and that UL had already given its 

safety certification to the PREMIUM model—when that 

certification had not, in fact, happened. That is a misleading use of UL’s certification mark and renders the mark a 

“spurious” mark. 

On appeal, ICCS challenges the Court of International 

Trade’s conclusion that ICCS needed “express authorization” from UL prior to using the certification mark on new 

models that correspond to the MEGA-1 basic product. Appellant’s Br. at 21. We conclude, as did the Court of International Trade, that the relevant contract provisions 

required ICCS to obtain express authorization prior to using UL’s certification mark on new models. ICCS, 357 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1323–24. The Service Terms ¶ 8 prohibits 

ICCS from using UL’s certification mark “on any goods or 

their containers or packaging” “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly authorized by UL.” J.A. 265 (emphasis added); see 

also J.A. 310 (Global Services Agreement ¶ 8 providing 

that ICCS “ha[s] no rights in the [UL] Marks” “[e]xcept for 

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10 ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

[those] rights as specifically granted in a Service Agreement to use the Marks”). 

The Service Terms set forth a specific procedure for obtaining UL’s “express authoriz[ation]” for any new models. 

Specifically, the Service Terms ¶¶ 2, 4 require ICCS to 

make a “Multiple Listing Request[]” when it wants to 

“[a]dd . . . products . . . within an existing Multiple Listing 

Relationship.” J.A. 263–64. The Multiple Listing Request

“shall inform UL . . . in writing of the Basic Product by 

name of [OJC] . . . and identify[] . . . [the] model . . . for 

which the [Multiple Listing] Service is desired,” according 

to ¶ 4(b). J.A. 264 (emphases added). “The product(s) for 

which [Multiple Listing] Service is requested shall not differ from the Basic Product(s) other than in . . . features that 

UL . . . deems to be superficial” pursuant to ¶ 6(a). Id. (emphases added). If UL finds “the product(s) . . . to be eligible 

for M[ultiple ]L[isting] Service, UL . . . will add a Multiple 

Listing, Recognition, Verification, or Classification Correlation Sheet . . . covering the Basic Product(s) to authorize 

the manufacturer of the Basic Product(s) to use the Mark 

on the product” pursuant to ¶ 7(a). Id. 

ICCS failed to carry out this specific procedure prior to 

using UL’s certification mark on the PREMIUM model canisters in question. As of the date of entry (on January 19, 

2017), ICCS had yet to make a Multiple Listing Request to 

UL to add the PREMIUM model to UL’s multiple listing 

services, as directed by the Service Terms ¶¶ 2, 4. As a 

result, UL had not yet had an opportunity to evaluate 

whether any “differ[ences] from the Basic Product[]” were 

merely “superficial” and whether the PREMIUM model 

was “eligible . . . to use [UL’s] Mark” pursuant to Service 

Terms ¶¶ 6(a), 7(a). Therefore, we agree with the Court of 

International Trade that ICCS lacked UL’s “express authorization to display UL’s certification mark on the 

PREMIUM model on the date of importation.” ICCS, 357 

F. Supp. 3d at 1324. We likewise agree with the court’s 

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ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 11

analysis concluding that “the certification mark was spurious and, therefore, counterfeit.” Id.

Audek Model Clock Radios, cited by the Court of International Trade, is a Seventh Circuit case with analogous 

facts addressing whether the UL certification mark displayed on imported merchandise was counterfeit. 220 F.3d

at 540. That case involved the seizure and forfeiture of imported clock radios, bearing the UL certification mark, 

which had been manufactured in China, and the importer’s 

“attempt to regain possession of the . . . clock radios” from 

Customs. Id. Like ICCS, the importer in Audek Model 

Clock Radios had a valid contract with UL, which authorized affixing UL’s certification mark only on clock radios

manufactured “at the location[s] of manufacture . . . specified in the [contract].” Id. at 541. Pursuant to the original 

contract, the importer “was allowed to affix UL’s [certification] mark to [clock] radios manufactured in China” because the original contract “list[ed] the factory in China . . . 

as an authorized manufacturing location,” and the importer had “arranged and paid for UL inspections of the 

clock radios manufactured in the plant in China.” Id. The 

original contract was then “modified” to “eliminat[e] China 

as an authorized location for radio production” and to specify a factory in Chicago as the only authorized manufacturing location. Id. at 541, 543. “UL [also] ceased their 

periodic inspections of clock radios manufactured at the 

Chinese factory.” Id. at 541. After the contract was modified, the importer attempted to import clock radios manufactured in China bearing UL’s mark despite the fact it was 

no longer authorized to do so. Id. at 541–42. The Seventh 

Circuit held that the importer’s use of UL’s certification 

mark was unauthorized and that the clock radios were 

properly seized by Customs. Id. at 540. The facts and rationale in Audek Model Clock Radios are similar in relevant part to the present case. 

ICCS makes various arguments for why its usage of 

UL’s certification mark on its PREMIUM model canisters 

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12 ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

was not counterfeit. ICCS contends that the absence of 

UL’s express authorization for the PREMIUM model on the 

date of entry should not be dispositive in this case, given 

that ICCS later successfully obtained UL’s authorization. 

See Appellant’s Br. at 17, 24–25. We disagree. It is of no 

moment that, post-importation, UL approved ICCS’s request to add the PREMIUM model to UL’s multiple listing

services, because that occurred after the date of entry on 

January 19, 2017, and the counterfeiting analysis is focused on the time of importation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)

(barring the importation of goods bearing a registered U.S. 

trademark without the trademark owner’s written consent 

“at the time of making entry”); see also Audek Model Clock 

Radios, 220 F.3d at 541–43 (holding that the UL certification mark displayed on imported merchandise manufactured in China was counterfeit because, even though the 

importer’s original contract with UL authorized it to do so, 

the modified contract in force at the time of importation no 

longer allowed for manufacturing in China). 

ICCS also asserts it was reversible error for the Court 

of International Trade to not analyze likelihood of confusion by applying the DuPont factors. Appellant’s Br. at 8, 

32; Application of E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 

1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (listing thirteen factors relevant to likelihood of confusion determination). The Court 

of International Trade determined that the merchandise 

displayed a counterfeit certification mark under the proper 

legal framework. ICCS has not shown reversible error in 

the court’s counterfeiting analysis, given that it is undisputed that the PREMIUM model canisters display a mark 

that is identical to the UL certification mark. ICCS, 357 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1322. ICCS does not explain what more the 

Court of International Trade should have analyzed in this 

case once it found that ICCS used UL’s exact certification 

mark without UL’s prior approval, nor does ICCS explain 

how it was prejudiced. 

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Next, ICCS alleges that the addition of the “PREMIUM” 

brand label to the canisters was superficial, as it “did not 

materially alter the physical assembly of the product,” and 

that the PREMIUM model is the same physical product as 

the MEGA-1 basic product. Appellant’s Br. at 14–15; Oral 

Arg. at 2:40–4:10, 17:15–40. Along the same lines, ICCS 

argues that the delay in updating the multiple listing was 

a minor procedural oversight that caused no harm to UL. 

Appellant’s Br. at 11, 22, 24–25. 

ICCS’s arguments as to physical similarity between 

the PREMIUM model and other merchandise that UL had 

previously certified fail because the Service Terms dictate 

that it is UL—not ICCS—who determines whether any 

“differ[ences] from the Basic Product . . . [are] superficial.” 

See J.A. 264. The contract prohibits ICCS from unilaterally deciding to use UL’s certification mark on a new model. 

Thus, according to the contract, UL retained the right to 

police which models would be listed on its Online Certifications Directory and would receive approval to bear its certification mark. As of the date of entry, UL had not yet 

determined whether the PREMIUM model was physically 

similar to the MEGA-1 basic product because ICCS had not 

requested for UL to do so yet. 

The importer’s actions and arguments in this case raise

serious concerns about the trademark owner’s ability to 

monitor the use of its certification mark. An owner of a 

certification mark has an affirmative duty to police the use 

of its certification mark in order to protect the public’s expectation that all products sold under the certification 

mark comply with applicable safety standards and requirements. Cf. Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 

992–93 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen the owner of a trademark 

licenses the mark to others, he retains a duty to exercise 

control and supervision over the licensee’s use of the mark

. . . to protect the public’s expectation that all products sold 

under . . . [the] mark derive from a common source and are 

of like quality.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Nitro 

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14 ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1367 

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Trademark law requires that the trademark owner police the quality of the goods to which the 

mark is applied.”) (Newman, J., dissenting). Common 

sense suggests that if an importer could unilaterally choose 

to use a certification mark on new models without first obtaining consent from the trademark owner, that would significantly compromise the trademark owner’s ability to 

police the mark. See Miller, 454 F.3d at 993. 

Moreover, on the date of entry, Customs had no way of 

ascertaining whether the PREMIUM model was the same 

physical product as the MEGA-1 basic product (or the US 

BUTANE model), without UL having first made that determination. ICCS would have Customs bear the burden 

of performing UL’s inspection, comparison, and authorization for use of UL’s trademark. That is an unreasonable 

burden to place on Customs; further, it is contrary to statute. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1526(a), (e) (providing that an importer must have “written consent of the [U.S. trademark] 

owner” to import merchandise bearing that trademark 

and, if not, Customs may seize the merchandise, providing 

“noti[ce to] the owner of the trademark,” and, with the 

trademark owner’s consent “obliterate the trademark 

where feasible”). Customs, for its part, complied with all 

applicable statutes and regulations in requiring redelivery 

of ICCS’s imported merchandise in the absence of UL’s 

written consent, at importation, for use of its trademark on 

that merchandise. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 133.26 (providing 

that, if Customs determines “that merchandise which has 

been released from [Customs’] custody” may bear a counterfeit mark, Customs “shall promptly make demand for 

[its] redelivery”). 

Finally, ICCS contends that the “extreme” remedies of 

seizure and forfeiture are unreasonable in its case because 

it is an importer with a valid license agreement with UL 

rather than a “rogue actor pawning off UL’s mark.” Appellant’s Br. at 10–11. Regardless of ICCS’s intent, the law is 

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ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 15

clear that counterfeit merchandise “shall be seized and, in 

the absence of the written consent of the trademark owner,

forfeited” and may not be released by removing the offending mark or by diverting the merchandise to another nation. § 1526(e); McCarthy on Trademarks § 29:45. 

Congress contemplated protecting both trademark 

owners and consumers from circumstances such as the one 

present here. In 1996, Congress amended 19 U.S.C. § 1526 

to address concerns about the health and safety threats

posed by counterfeit merchandise to United States consumers. See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 

1996, Pub. L. No. 104–153, 110 Stat. 1386, § 2. Here, ICCS

marketed counterfeit merchandise that not only risked 

damaging UL’s reputation, but also was potentially dangerous to consumers. 

II. Other Issues

ICCS also alleges that, in denying ICCS’s protest, Customs inappropriately relied on UL’s lack of consent to the 

point of “delegat[ing] . . . its statutory duty to enforce the 

trademark laws” to UL and “render[ing] Customs an enforcement arm of private interests.” Appellant’s Br. at 27–

29. We disagree. 

Section 1526(e) expressly conditions forfeiture of the 

merchandise on “the absence of the written consent of the 

trademark owner” and states that “[u]pon seizure of such 

merchandise, [Customs] shall notify the owner of the trademark.” Thus, Customs was required by statute to contact

UL upon seizure of ICCS’s merchandise to ascertain 

whether or not UL consented to the use of its mark under 

the circumstances. See § 1526(e); see also Computer Towers, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. The record shows that Customs’ communications with UL were directed to 

investigating whether UL consented to the use of its certification mark to determine whether or not the certification 

mark displayed on the PREMIUM model canisters was 

counterfeit. See J.A. 291–302. UL possessed the best 

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16 ICCS USA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

evidence on these issues, and ICCS was free to rebut the 

evidence provided by UL. See Computer Towers, 152 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1202. 

Finally, ICCS alleges that the Court of International 

Trade committed an abuse of discretion by granting ICCS 

a limited discovery period rather than a full discovery period. Appellant’s Br. at 29–32. We review a trial court’s 

denial of a request for time to conduct additional discovery 

under Rule 56(d) for abuse of discretion. See Rosebud LMS 

Inc. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 812 F.3d 1070, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 

If a party “shows by affidavit or declaration that . . . it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition” to a motion for summary judgment, the court may “allow time . . . 

to obtain discovery.” Ct. Int’l Trade R. 56(d). The moving 

party must “state with some precision the materials [it] 

hopes to obtain with further discovery, and exactly how [it] 

expects those materials would help [it] in opposing summary judgment.” Simmons Oil Corp. v. Tesoro Petroleum 

Corp., 86 F.3d 1138, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The moving 

party “may not simply rely on vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, 

facts.” Id. Here, ICCS makes only vague assertions as to 

why additional discovery is needed. ICCS fails to specifically identify how the additional discovery would allow it 

to meet its burden in opposing summary judgment. Accordingly, ICCS has not shown that the court abused its 

discretion. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of International Trade’s grant of summary judgment to the 

government. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 19-1561 Document: 48 Page: 16 Filed: 03/11/2020