Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03044/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03044-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dan Kendall
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Carol Jackson, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3044

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri.

Dan Kendall, * 

* 

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 10, 2007

 Filed: February 5, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BYE and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Dan Kendall appeals his eighty-four month sentence arguing 1) the district

court1

 exceeded the scope of this court's remand, 2) the sentence is unreasonable, and

3) this court should reconsider its holding in United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967

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A panel of this court is without authority to reconsider a decision of the en

banc court. Accordingly, Kendall's third claim of error cannot be considered.

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(8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding a felony conviction for Driving While Intoxicated

(DWI) may be a crime of violence).2

 We affirm.

I

Kendall pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing equipment, chemicals,

products, and materials used to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 843(a)(6). He was originally sentenced to eighty-four months imprisonment

based on his status as a career offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1.

his career offender designation was based on a prior conviction for distribution of

methamphetamine and a prior felony conviction for DWI.

 

Kendall appealed arguing his DWI conviction did not constitute a crime of

violence. While his appeal was pending, the court decided United States v. Walker,

393 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2005), and United States v. McCall, 397 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir.

2005), which held DWI was not a crime of violence. As such, Kendall was not a

career offender and his sentence was vacated. On remand, the district court did not

apply § 4B1.1 but varied upward and imposed the same eighty-four month sentence.

 

Kendall appealed a second time and we vacated the sentence finding the extent

of the upward variance was unreasonable. United States v. Kendall, 446 F.3d 782,

785 (8th Cir. 2006) (Kendall II). Our opinion noted the court sitting en banc in United

States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006), had reversed the panel decisions in

Walker and McCall, and held felony DWI was a crime of violence if the offense

involved driving. Kendall II, 446 F.3d at 784 n.1. We further indicated there was

insufficient evidence in the record to determine whether his felony DWI conviction

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would qualify as a crime of violence, but imposed no limits on the district court's

authority to reopen the evidentiary record.

 

On remand, the district court allowed the government to introduce evidence to

prove Kendall was driving at the time of his felony DWI offense, thereby establishing

it as a crime of violence. The district court found § 4B1.1 applied and resentenced

him to eighty-four months.

II 

Kendall first argues the district court exceeded the scope of the remand when

it allowed the government to present evidence showing his felony DWI conviction

qualified as a crime of violence. The government argues the remand did not

specifically restrict the district court's ability to consider additional evidence, and

therefore, it did not exceed the scope of the remand. The government further argues

the district court was instructed to impose a reasonable sentence on remand, and in

order to do so was required to properly apply the Guidelines – including § 4B1.1. We

agree.

"In federal sentencing, more than one appeal is sometimes required." United

States v. Santonelli, 128 F.3d 1233, 1238 (8th Cir. 1997). "Repetitive hearings,

followed by additional appeals, [however] waste judicial resources and place

additional burdens on parole officers and personnel and on hardworking district and

appellate judges." Id. Specific remands should be used to eliminate the need for

additional appeals and to "avoid giving the parties additional bites of the litigation

apple." Id. at 1238-39. Accordingly, we may remand for resentencing "with

instructions to resentence the defendant on the existing record." United States v.

Dunlap, 452 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Poor Bear, 359

F.3d 1038, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2004)).

 

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Conversely, we may choose to remand "without placing any limitations on the

district court [in which case it] 'can hear any relevant evidence . . . that it could have

heard at the first hearing.'" Id. at 749-50 (quoting United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d

703, 705 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and parenthetical omitted)). Ultimately, the

scope of a remand must be determined by reference to the analysis contained in the

opinion. Santonelli, 128 F.3d at 1237. "On remand for resentencing, all issues

decided by the appellate court become the law of the case, and the sentencing court

is bound to proceed within the scope of any limitations imposed . . . by the appellate

court." United States v. Curtis, 336 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations

and citations omitted).

Here the opinion remanding for resentencing noted there was insufficient

information in the record to decide whether Kendall's DWI conviction qualified as a

crime of violence. Because the issue was not resolved by this court, the district court

was not precluded from considering it. Furthermore, the opinion concluded the

eighty-four month sentence was unreasonable and remanded for the imposition of a

reasonable sentence. In doing so, we placed no express limitations on the district

court's ability to consider evidence relevant to such a determination. We have

repeatedly held that the first step in determining a reasonable sentence is to properly

calculate the sentencing range under the Guidelines. See United States v. Haack, 403

F.3d 997, 1002-03 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 276 (2005). In order to calculate

the applicable Guideline range, the district court had to determine if § 4B1.1 was

applicable, which in turn required the district court to hear additional evidence

surrounding the circumstances of Kendall's conviction. Accordingly, the district

court's decision to reopen the record did not violate our remand. 

Next, Kendall argues the district court erred because the eighty-four month

sentence was held unreasonable by our opinion in Kendall II. Again, we disagree.

 

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Our opinion remanding for resentencing did so because the upward variance

was not justified by extraordinary circumstances. On remand, the district court did

not rely on an upward variance. Instead, it applied § 4B1.1 and sentenced Kendall

within the applicable Guideline range. On appeal, he offers nothing to suggest the

district court failed to consider a relevant factor which should have received

significant weight, gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or

otherwise committed a clear error of judgment. Haack, 403 F.3d at 1004.

III

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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