Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-01555/USCOURTS-ca3-14-01555-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pennsylvania State Police
Appellee
Tony Reaves
Appellant

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 14-1555

______________

TONY REAVES,

Appellant

v.

PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE

______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 1-09-cv-02549)

Honorable Christopher C. Conner, District Judge

______________

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 12, 2014

BEFORE: VANASKIE, GREENBERG, and COWEN, Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 8, 2015)

______________

OPINION * 

______________

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

____________________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7

 does not constitute binding precedent.

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/08/2015
2

Plaintiff, Tony Reaves, claims that his former employer, the Pennsylvania State 

Police (“PSP”), dismissed him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 

(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., in retaliation for Reaves having made complaints 

of racial discrimination. PSP made a motion for summary judgment, which the District 

Court granted as it concluded that Reaves could not establish that there was a causal 

connection between his complaints and his subsequent dismissal. Reaves has appealed, 

but we agree with the Court’s conclusion and therefore will affirm its order for summary 

judgment entered on February 6, 2014.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Reaves, who is African American, graduated from the Pennsylvania State Police 

Academy in April 2006, and became a probationary PSP trooper. The PSP probationary 

trooper program enables supervisors to make a comprehensive in-depth evaluation of a 

new trooper. The program includes periodic written evaluations of the probationary 

trooper’s on-the-job conduct, as well as a general investigation (GI) report compiled near 

the end of the probationary period. The GI report is a review of the trooper’s 

performance and includes a recommendation of whether PSP should retain the trooper.

When Reaves graduated from the academy, PSP assigned him to Troop J 

Lancaster, Avondale Station, where his immediate supervisor was Corporal Erin Magee, 

his station commander was Lieutenant Sheldon Sneed, and his troop commander was 

Captain John Laufer. Magee’s notes from that period state that in May 2006, Reaves was 

stopped by a trooper from a different station for speeding and that in August 2006, he 

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/08/2015
3

was stopped by a trooper from yet another station for a minor traffic violation. During 

that period, Magee counseled Reaves that he had acted unprofessionally in relation to an 

incident involving radio etiquette and that he needed to improve his reputation among 

coworkers and the public.

In September 2006, Magee prepared Reaves’s first probationary evaluation, which 

rated him as “satisfactory” in nine categories and “borderline – needs improvement” in 

six. Magee noted that Reaves, at times, had “displayed a certain arrogance or lack of 

respect towards co-workers” and had “not always used good tact whil[e] interacting with 

his co-workers and supervisors.” App. 1236, 1245.

Magee prepared Reaves’s second evaluation in November 2006, rating him as 

“satisfactory” in twelve categories and “borderline – needs improvement” in three. 

Magee noted improvement in Reaves’s sensitivity and tact towards others but stated that 

he still needed to improve in this area.

Later that month, Corporal Steven Ranck replaced Magee as Reaves’s immediate 

supervisor. Ranck prepared Reaves’s third evaluation in January 2007, rating him as 

“satisfactory” in fourteen categories and “borderline – needs improvement” only in the 

category of job knowledge. Ranck opined that Reaves had made the necessary 

improvements with respect to his attitude and deportment towards others.

On January 23, 2007, Ranck prepared a GI report in which he recommended that 

PSP retain Reaves. Most of the persons interviewed for the report, including some who 

identified certain problems with Reaves’s attitude and reports, recommended retaining 

Reaves. One officer, however, did not recommend retaining Reaves, describing him as 

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/08/2015
4

“so aggressive that he suffers from tunnel vision and makes poor decisions while on the 

road,” and stating that Reaves “has also displayed poor acceptance of criticism and a lack 

of respect for supervisors.” App. 1383.

Sneed likewise recommended retaining Reaves, but, after reviewing the GI report 

and Sneed’s supplemental report, Laufer recommended that PSP extend his probationary 

period for six months. On March 14, 2007, the Probationary Trooper Review Panel 

(“PTRP”) considered Laufer’s recommendation and similarly concluded that Reaves’s 

probation should be extended. The PTRP emphasized the problems identified regarding 

Reaves’s attitude and reports, as well as the fact that Reaves had been stopped for traffic

violations on two separate occasions.1 On March 26, the Probationary Trooper 

Administrative Review Panel (“PTARP”) agreed that PSP should extend Reaves’s 

probationary period.2 PSP notified Reaves of its decision, and Reaves’s then acting 

station commander informed him that his attitude and demeanor toward others would be 

“monitored closely” during the ensuing six-month extension period. App. 622, 1224-25.

Reaves believed he was being discriminated against due to his race when PSP 

extended his probationary term. Accordingly, on April 12, 2007, he contacted Lieutenant 

Martin Henry of PSP’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office, and complained of his 

treatment. He contacted Henry ten more times through August of that year. In looking 

into Reaves’s complaints, Henry spoke with both Sneed and Laufer.

 

1 All of the traffic stops that we describe in this opinion took place while Reaves was off 

duty, driving a private vehicle.

2 The PTRP and PTARP consist of senior officers.

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/08/2015
5

Meanwhile, Ranck prepared Reaves’s fourth probationary evaluation on March 7, 

2007, rating him as satisfactory in all categories, including attitude. Ranck prepared 

Reaves’s fifth evaluation that May, again rating him as satisfactory in all categories.

On July 21, 2007, PSP troopers stopped Reaves again, this time for speeding and 

passing a state police car on the right. Given Reaves’s history of traffic stops, and after 

consultation with Laufer, Sneed initiated a formal investigation into this incident. Sneed 

also directed Ranck to look into the details of Reaves’s previous traffic stops and to run 

an offline registration search of Reaves’s vehicle to determine if he had been involved in 

any other traffic stops.

The investigation led Reaves to complain to Ranck in August 2007 that he 

believed he was being treated differently than other troopers. Thereafter, Reaves also 

made both verbal and written complaints of discrimination to Sneed, who forwarded 

Reaves’s complaint to Laufer.

While investigating the July 2007 traffic stop, Ranck learned of an incident from 

November 2006 in which Reaves allegedly acted “nasty, demanding and very arrogant” 

toward a sergeant. App. 104. Additionally, the offline registration search of Reaves’s 

vehicle revealed that the license plate on Reaves’s truck, which was registered to his 

grandfather, had been run 29 times since Reaves started at the police academy.

As required due to the extension of Reaves’s probation, Ranck began preparing a 

second GI report. The report included information about the July 2007 traffic stop and 

the November 2006 incident between Reaves and the sergeant. A majority of the 

individuals interviewed still recommended retaining Reaves, but some now made 

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/08/2015
6

contrary recommendations. Several officers noted a decline in the quality of Reaves’s 

reports. Magee, now a sergeant, also stated that Reaves’s demeanor remained a problem. 

Ranck concluded that Reaves should not be retained. He expressed concern that

Reaves’s off-duty conduct in relation to the repeated traffic stops showed a poor attitude: 

“I believe that if Trooper Reaves is willing to behave poorly off duty while under the 

scrutiny of probation, the problems will only continue and possibly increase once his 

probation has ended. I feel that Trooper Reaves’ off duty behavior will jeopardize the 

Department’s image.” App. 1440.

On August 17, 2007, Sneed reviewed the GI report and prepared his own report 

recommending that PSP not retain Reaves. Sneed stated that despite repeated discussions 

with Reaves regarding the need to improve his demeanor, Reaves continued to speak to 

people in an arrogant manner. Between August 24 and September 13, Ranck prepared 

three supplements to the GI report. These supplements provided further information 

regarding the two traffic stops during Reaves’s initial probationary period, Ranck’s 

offline registration search and follow-up investigation, and an additional traffic stop on 

March 12, 2007.

On September 13, Laufer reviewed Reaves’s GI reports and supplements, and 

issued a recommendation that PSP not retain Reaves. Laufer stated that despite some 

improvement in areas previously identified as problematic, Reaves’s attitude and his own 

conformance to the law remained concerns. Laufer emphasized the multiple traffic stops 

and the lack of respect for the PSP and Pennsylvania law that these incidents reflected, 

and concluded that this “pattern of conduct” while on probation indicated serious 

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/08/2015
7

behavioral and attitudinal issues. App. 1420. The area commander for Reaves’s troop, 

the PTRP, and the PTARP each agreed with the recommendation to dismiss Reaves. The 

PSP commissioner signed off on this decision on October 2, and Sneed notified Reaves 

of his dismissal two days later.

For record-keeping purposes, Ranck prepared Reaves’s sixth probationary 

evaluation, which Ranck signed on October 3. Ranck rated Reaves’s attitude as 

“unsatisfactory.” In discussing Reaves’s attitude, Ranck wrote: “Trooper Reaves has also 

recently displayed a negative attitude towards the Department. He has advised me that 

h[e] feels that there is a double standard used regarding him and that he gets [Bureau of 

Professional Responsibility complaints] for his actions and others get nothing for the 

same thing or worse. However when asked to supply specific instances so that I could 

look into such things he has been unable/unwilling to provide specifics.” App. 1324. 

Given that Ranck did not sign this evaluation until after the commissioner consented to

Reaves’s dismissal, the evaluation did not play a role in the decision to dismiss Reaves.

Reaves sued PSP in the District Court, asserting claims of race discrimination and 

retaliation, both in violation of Title VII. PSP moved for summary judgment on both 

causes of action. Initially, the Court, adopting in part and rejecting in part a report and 

recommendation from a magistrate judge, granted the motion with respect to the 

discrimination claim but denied it with respect to the retaliation claim. See Reaves v. Pa. 

State Police, No. 1:09-CV-2549, 2012 WL 4970225, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2012). In 

that opinion, however, the Court did not address whether Reaves could show that there 

was a causal connection between his complaints of differential treatment and his 

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/08/2015
8

subsequent dismissal to support a claim of retaliation. PSP moved for reconsideration 

based on the causation issue, and the Court granted the motion for reconsideration and 

granted summary judgment for PSP. See Reaves v. Pa. State Police, No. 1:09-CV-2549, 

2014 WL 486741, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2014). Reaves then filed this appeal limited to 

his retaliation claim.

III.STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction over Reaves’s Title VII claims pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have appellate jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

On an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, we exercise plenary 

review and apply the same standard as the district court. See Budhun v. Reading Hosp. 

& Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 2014). To warrant summary judgment, the 

movant must show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In applying 

this standard, we view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 

and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.” Spence v. ESAB Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 

216 (3d Cir. 2010). However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support 

of the [nonmovant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the 

jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986).

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/08/2015
9

IV.DISCUSSION

Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for complaining 

about certain unlawful employment practices, including discrimination on the basis of 

race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. We consider claims of retaliation like the one at issue 

here, where there is not direct evidence of retaliation, using the three-step burden-shifting 

framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 

(1973). See McKenna v. City of Phila., 649 F.3d 171, 178 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Moore v. 

City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006). Under this framework, the plaintiff first 

must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of retaliation; the 

burden of production of evidence then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, 

non-retaliatory reason for taking the adverse action against the plaintiff; finally, the 

burden rebounds to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

proffered reason constitutes a pretext for retaliation. See Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 

497 F.3d 286, 300-01 (3d Cir. 2007); Moore, 461 F.3d at 342. But the plaintiff always 

has the ultimate burden of persuasion. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 

U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he 

engaged in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse action 

against the plaintiff either after or contemporaneously with the protected activity; and (3) 

a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. See

Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2008); 

Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 2007). The District Court held, and the 

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/08/2015
10

parties do not dispute, that Reaves satisfied the first two elements of his prima facie case 

based on his complaints of differential treatment to Henry, Ranck, and Sneed, and his 

subsequent dismissal from PSP. The District Court concluded, however, that Reaves 

could not establish that there was a causal connection between his complaints and his 

dismissal. We agree with this conclusion.

Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the plaintiff’s participation in a 

protected activity constituted a but-for cause of the employer’s adverse action. See Univ. 

of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); LeBoon v. Lancaster 

Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 n.8 (3d Cir. 2007); Woodson v. Scott Paper 

Co., 109 F.3d 913, 935 (3d Cir. 1997). We consider “a broad array of evidence” in 

determining whether the plaintiff can show the requisite causal link. LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 

232 (quoting Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 284 (3d Cir. 2000)). Such 

evidence may include a temporal proximity between the protected activity and the 

adverse action, antagonistic behavior on the part of the employer, inconsistencies in the 

employer’s articulated reasons for taking the adverse action, or any other evidence that 

supports an inference of retaliatory animus. See id. at 232-33; Abramson v. William 

Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2001); Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280-81.

However, “[a]n employee cannot easily establish a causal connection between his 

protected activity and the alleged retaliation when he has received significant negative 

evaluations before engaging in the protected activity.” Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 

194 (3d Cir. 2014). In Ross, we held that an employee could not establish a causal link 

between his protected activity and his ultimate termination, where the reasons that the 

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/08/2015
11

employer contemporaneously gave for the termination were deficiencies that it had 

identified in performance evaluations even prior to the employee’s protected activity. 

See id.; see also LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 233-34 (affirming summary judgment because 

employee could not show prima facie causation based on tense relationship with her 

supervisor where this tense relationship predated employee’s protected activity); Shaner 

v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 504-05 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that negative performance 

evaluation after employee’s protected activity did not support causal link so as to survive 

a summary judgment motion where earlier evaluations contained similar criticisms).

Here, the reasons PSP gave for dismissing Reaves matched its reasons for 

extending his probation prior to his complaints of discrimination. In both instances, PSP 

emphasized problems with Reaves’s attitude, reports, and off-duty conduct, including his 

traffic stops. Reaves points to certain of his supervisors’ evaluations as evidence that he 

had resolved his attitudinal issues before his dismissal, but most of the evidence he cites 

predated his probation extension and therefore does not support an inference that Reaves 

had remedied the problems that led to the extension of his probation. Similarly, although 

Ranck rated Reaves as having a “satisfactory” attitude in his first two probation 

evaluations after Laufer first recommended the probation extension, these evaluations do 

not establish that there was improvement on Reaves’s part as Ranck gave him the same 

rating in his last evaluation before Laufer’s recommendation. See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 

F.3d 759, 767 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 

F.2d 509, 533 (3d Cir. 1992)) (noting that relevant decisionmakers often disagree about 

an employee’s qualifications and that such disagreement does not evidence 

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/08/2015
12

discriminatory intent). Furthermore, these evaluations preceded Reaves’s July 2007 

traffic stop, after which Ranck learned of the more extensive problems with Reaves’s 

attitude and off-duty conduct.

Reaves contends that the increased scrutiny and investigation that uncovered these 

more extensive problems resulted from retaliatory animus, but he does not present 

adequate evidence to support this claim. As Reaves acknowledges, PSP informed him at 

the time it extended his probation that he would be “monitored closely” during the 

ensuing period. Appellant’s br. 15. PSP initiated its investigation into Reaves’s off-duty 

conduct only after learning of his involvement in a third off-duty traffic stop during his 

probationary period. Reaves provides no evidence that such an investigation was unusual 

for a trooper who continued to have problems with off-duty conduct after PSP extended 

his probation in part because of such conduct. The only evidence of retaliatory animus 

that Reaves identifies is that in his last probationary evaluation, Ranck cited Reaves’s 

complaints of differential treatment as one of the examples of his unsatisfactory attitude. 

However, this isolated comment, signed after PSP already had finalized its decision to 

dismiss Reaves, does not by itself constitute sufficient evidence of a retaliatory motive 

for Reaves to survive the motion for summary judgment. See Estate of Oliva ex rel. 

McHugh v. New Jersey, 604 F.3d 788, 799 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment 

for employer and declaring that commander’s comment, after twice transferring plaintiff, 

that he was “pissed” at plaintiff for making certain statements did not provide adequate 

“foundation on which a reasonable factfinder could predicate a finding that the transfers 

were in retaliation for” plaintiff’s earlier complaints); Woodson, 109 F.3d at 921-22 

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/08/2015
13

(noting that suggestion by employer’s director of human resources that plaintiff drop his 

equal employment opportunity suits would not alone suffice to establish prima facie 

causal link); Ezold, 983 F.2d at 545 (“Stray remarks by non-decisionmakers or by 

decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight . . . .”).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of PSP entered on February 6, 2014.

Case: 14-1555 Document: 003111842282 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/08/2015