Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05597/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05597-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bumbo
Defendant
Bumbo (PTY) Ltd.
Defendant
Bumbo Limited
Defendant
Target Corporation
Defendant
Wendy D. Whitson
Plaintiff

Document Text:

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DYLAN LAMM, a minor by and through his

guardian ad litem, MARY CATHERINE

DOHERTY, and KEVIN LAMM,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BUMBO, BUMBO LIMITED, BUMBO

(PTY) LTD., and TARGET CORPORATION,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

WENDY D. WHITSON, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

BUMBO, BUMBO LIMITED, BUMBO

(PTY) LTD., and TARGET CORPORATION,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. C 07-04807 MHP

No. C 07-05597 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Bumbo (Pty) Ltd.’s Motion to Set

Aside Default, Quash Service, Dismiss

for Insufficient Service and Lack of

Personal Jurisdiction, and for Sanctions

In the action numbered C 07-04807, plaintiffs Dylan Lamm et al. seek relief for personal

injuries sustained as a result of using the allegedly defective Bumbo Baby Sitter manufactured in

South Africa by defendant Bumbo (Pty) Ltd. (“Bumbo-Pty”) and sold at the retail level in the United

States by defendant Target Corporation. In the related action numbered C 07-05597, plaintiff

Wendy Whitson seeks relief for harm sustained as a result of purchasing the same allegedly

defective Bumbo Baby Sitter. Jurisdiction in both actions is based on diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 1 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Defendant Bumbo-Pty has filed a motion in the Whitson action seeking to set aside default. 

Additionally, defendant Bumbo-Pty has filed identical motions in both the Lamm and Whitson

actions, seeking to quash service and dismiss for insufficient service and lack of personal

jurisdiction. Defendant Target Corporation has appeared in this action and has not contested the

court’s jurisdiction. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the court enters the following

memorandum and order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dylan Lamm is a minor child whose mother and father are plaintiffs Mary Catherine

Doherty and Kevin Lamm. Petition for Removal, Exh. A ¶¶ 1–2 (hereinafter “Lamm Complaint”). 

Dylan’s parents received the Bumbo Baby Sitter as a baby shower gift from their friend plaintiff

Wendy Whitson who purchased the product from a Target store in Sonoma County, California. Id. ¶

11; Whitson Complaint ¶¶ 10, 22; See also Supplemental Declaration of Fietz in Support of Motion

to Relate Cases ¶ 2. Dylan, then a six month old infant, was placed into the Bumbo Baby Sitter by

his father Kevin. Lamm Complaint ¶ 12. While seated in the Sitter on top of a table, Dylan fell over

and out of the Sitter, striking his head and other parts of his body on the ground. Id.; see also Joint

CMC Statement at 1:27. 

Dylan and his parents filed a complaint on August 16, 2007 asserting causes of action for

strict product liability, negligence, wrongful infliction of emotional distress, and violations of

California Business of Professions Code section 17200. See Lamm Complaint. Whitson filed a

separate class action complaint on November 2, 2007 asserting causes of action for violation of state

consumer protection laws, breach of express and implied warranties, and unjust enrichment. See

Whitson Complaint. All plaintiffs are residents of Sonoma County, California. Lamm Complaint ¶

1; Whitson Complaint ¶ 10. 

I. Facts Related to Personal Jurisdiction

Defendant Bumbo-Pty is a South African company that manufactures a product known as the

Bumbo Baby Sitter, an infant seat. Johnston Dec., Exh. E, Buitendach Dec. ¶ 2. Bumbo-Pty is a

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 2 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

private company organized under the laws of South Africa and has its principal place of business in

Pretoria, South Africa. Id. ¶ 4. Bumbo-Pty does not have corporate offices, warehouses,

manufacturing plants, bank accounts, or business licenses in the United States, nor does it have

employees, officers or directors who reside in the United States. Id. ¶¶ 7–13. Moreover, Bumbo-Pty

has never conducted any board meetings or paid any taxes in the United States. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. The

Bumbo Baby Sitter is manufactured and assembled entirely in Bumbo-Pty’s one and only

manufacturing plant in Pretoria, South Africa. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 

Bubmo-Pty attests that it “does not maintain a sales force in the . . . United States” and “does

not now advertise and never has advertised in the . . . United States.” Id. ¶¶ 18–19. Bumbo-Pty’s

website www.bumbo.co.za, however, describes the company as a “worldwide” exporter of the

Bumbo Baby Sitter and lists as one of its “major” United States customers defendant Target

Corporation. Fietz Dec., Exh. D, “Company Profile.” 

Having viewed this website on March 10, 2008, the court takes judicial notice of the fact that

the “Sales and Marketing Opportunities” section of the website states, “We are seeking reliable and

progressive Retailers with the proven ability to promote, sell, stock and serve our products. . . . As

our Retailers, we will support you with the highest quality merchandise, outstanding promotional

programs, and continuous technical training.” 

Bumbo-Pty’s website also states that it has been granted patent application number

6,626,487 by the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id. Having viewed this patent dated

September 30, 2003, the court takes judicial notice of the fact that the inventor is listed as Johan

Nicolaas Buitendach, the owner of defendant Bumbo-Pty. See Johnston Dec., Exh. E, Buitendach

Dec. ¶ 1. The patent discloses an invention for a “Baby Chair” that provides a “solution” to the

“problem with small or young babies which can not sit up without assistance or not sit up safely.” 

Bumbo-Pty’s website also touts various awards and accreditations the Bumbo Baby Sitter

has received from entities in the United States. Fietz Dec., Exh. D, “Company Profile.” Awards

include the National Parenting Seal of Approval in 2005, iParenting Media Awards in 2003,

iParenting Hot Awards in 2003, Top 10 Coolest Products in 2005 by the Chicago Sun Times, and

TTT Toy Tested Mark of Excellence in 2004. Id. Accreditations include one from Bureau Veritas

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 3 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

which according to Bumbo-Pty’s website, has tested the Bumbo Baby Sitter according to U.S.

Consumer Safety Regulations. Id. 

In response to the present litigation, the United States Consumer Product and Safety

Commission instituted a voluntary recall of the Bumbo Baby Sitter in October 2007. Fietz Dec.,

Exh. D, “Urgent News Flash.” The products were temporarily removed from store shelves and

Bumbo-Pty altered the content and placement of the warning labels and changed some of the images

on the product packaging. Id. 

II. Facts Related to Service of Process

Plaintiffs have made several attempts to serve process on defendant Bumbo-Pty and the other

defendants “Bumbo” and “Bumbo Limited.” On November 16, 2007, plaintiffs in the Whitson

action purported to serve “Bumbo” by delivering the summons and complaint to “Dione Buchanon,

as Owner for Bumbo,” at the address 12248 Fm 1485, Conroe, TX 77306. See C 07-05597, Docket

Entry 5, Affidavit of Service filed December 11, 2007. Having failed to appear within the proper

time limit, default was entered as to “Bumbo” on December 27, 2007. See C 07-05597, Docket

Entry 8. Also on December 27, 2007, plaintiffs in the Lamm action purported to serve “Bumbo

Limited” by delivering the summons and complaint to “Mark Buchanan, as Owner for Bumbo

Limited,” also at the same address 12248 Fm 1485, Conroe, Texas 77306. See C 07-04807, Docket

Entry 15, Affidavit of Service filed January 7, 2008. 

According to Bumbo-Pty, however, both “Bumbo” and “Bumbo Limited” are non-existent

legal entities. Moreover, Bumbo-Pty asserts that the Conroe, Texas company that received the

summons and complaint in both the Lamm and Whitson actions is actually a company named

Wartburg Enterprises, Inc. (“Wartburg”), a distributor of the Bumbo Baby Sitter in Texas. Johnston

Dec., Exh. E, Buitendach Dec. ¶ 22. Bumbo-Pty states further that it and Wartburg are separate

companies and do not share common shareholders, officers, directors, employees or offices, and

Wartburg and its officers are not authorized by Bumbo-Pty to accept service of process on behalf of

Bumbo-Pty. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. 

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 4 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

According to the Lamm and Whitson plaintiffs, however, “the relationship of the Texas

entity to Bumbo-Pty is not what Bumbo represents it to be.” Lamm Opp. filed February 12, 2008 at

3. Plaintiffs state that as a result of the Lamm action, the United States Consumer Product Safety

Commission issued a nationwide voluntary recall of the Bumbo Baby Sitter in October 2007. Id. at

4. A website, www.bumbosafety.com, was created to provide information about the recall. Fietz

Dec., Exh. B. Every page of the website lists contact information for an entity named “Bumbo

International,” and the address listed is the same address as the Conroe, Texas entity which

defendant claims is Wartburg Enterprises. Moreover, the www.bumbosafety.com website states that

the Bumbo Baby Sitter is “[d]esigned and manufactured by Bumbo International,” and the website is

directly linked to another website with the address www.bumboseat.com. This linked website,

www.bumboseat.com, markets and sells the Bumbo Baby Sitter directly to consumers and lists

under its contact information the same physical Conroe, Texas address which defendant claims is the

address of Wartburg Enterprises. 

 On January 25, 2008, plaintiffs in both the Lamm and Whitson actions purported to serve

defendant Bumbo-Pty by personally delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to “Antoinette

Wagenaar, as agent for [Bumbo-Pty]” at the address 212 Hardy Muller Street, Rosslyn, Gauteng,

South Africa. See C 07-04807, Docket Entry 37, Affidavit of Service filed February 11, 2008; C 07-

05597, Docket Entry 35, Affidavit of Service filed February 11, 2008. 

Antoinette Wagenaar is a director of Bumbo-Pty and is employed at Bumbo-Pty’s corporate

headquarters and registered office at the 212 Hardy Muller Street address in South Africa. Johnston

Dec., Exh. E, Wagenaar Dec. ¶¶ 1, 5. On January 25, 2008, Wagenaar was informed that an

unknown person was in the reception area attempting to deliver a package. Id. ¶ 6. Without

identifying himself and without stating that he was a Sheriff, the unknown person handed Wagenaar

a package but did not explain the nature and contents of the package. Id. ¶¶ 8–10. Wagenaar was

handed the package, but did not sign any documentation for the unknown person acknowledging that

she had received the package. Id. ¶ 7. 

The affidavits of service filed with the court on February 11, 2008 in both the Lamm and

Whitson actions list an individual named Neil Thuynsma who attests that he personally delivered the

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 5 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

summons and complaint to Antoinette Wagenaar in South Africa. See C 07-04807, Docket Entry

37; C 07-05597, Docket Entry 35. Neil Thuynsma lists his address as 65 Park Lane, 1 Sandton

Close, Block B, 2nd Floor, Sandown, (South Africa). Id. Defendants believe that this address is the

address of SABMiller, a brewery located near Bumbo-Pty’s corporate office where Antoinette

Wagenaar was served, and that Neil Thuynsma is an employee of SABMiller. Johnston Dec., Exhs.

B & C. 

DISCUSSION

I. Rule 12(b)(2)—Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Defendant Bumbo-Pty moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(2). The general rule is that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is

proper if it is permitted by a long-arm statute and if the exercise of that jurisdiction does not violate

federal due process. Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Where, as

here in this diversity action, there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, the

district court applies the law of the state in which the district court sits. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

4(k)(1)(A); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Because California’s long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal due process

requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the same. 

Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1320; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (“A court of this state may exercise

jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States”). 

A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant consistent with due process only if he or

she has “certain minimum contacts” with the relevant forum “such that the maintenance of the suit

does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

“Unless a defendant’s contacts with a forum are so substantial, continuous, and systematic

that the defendant can be deemed to be ‘present’ in that forum for all purposes, a forum may

exercise only ‘specific’ jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction based on the relationship between the

defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 6 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, Bumbo-Pty has no offices,

warehouses, manufacturing plants, bank accounts, officers, employees, or other business contacts in

California. Moreover, the Bumbo Baby Sitter is manufactured and assembled entirely in BumboPty’s one and only manufacturing plant in South Africa, where it also maintains its corporate offices.

Plaintiff concedes that there are insufficient contacts to support general personal jurisdiction. Only

specific jurisdiction is at issue.

The Ninth Circuit analyzes specific jurisdiction according to a three-prong test: (1) the nonresident defendant must purposefully direct his activities at the forum state or purposefully avail

himself of the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum state, (2) the claim must be one

which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities, and (3) the exercise of

personal jurisdiction must be reasonable. Id. at 1205–1206 (citing Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin

Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

Where a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, the

plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate. Schwarzenegger, 374

F.3d at 800. Where, as here, the motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary

hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts. Id. Moreover, in

the context of specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of

the three-part test and if the plaintiff succeeds, the burden then shifts to the defendant to “‘present a

compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. at 802. While the

plaintiff cannot rely solely on the complaint to establish personal jurisdiction, the court must take

uncontroverted allegations as true and resolve conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’

affidavits in favor of the plaintiff. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94

F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996). 

A. Purposeful Availment and Purposeful Direction

In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), a products

liability case like this one, the Supreme Court was unanimous in determining that the exercise of

personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable and unfair. Id. at 113–116. The court split, however,

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 7 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

over the degree and character of minimum contacts required to find purposeful direction and

availment under a stream of commerce theory. The split in Asahi is well-known and has been

thoroughly explicated by other courts. See Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939,

944–945 (4th Cir. 1994); Pennzoil Products Co. v. Colelli & Associates, Inc., 149 F.3d 197,

204–205 (3rd Cir. 1998). Here, a brief summary will suffice. 

Four justices led by Justice Brennan concluded that when a defendant places a product into a

“regular and anticipated” stream of commerce and is aware that the product is or may be directed

into the forum state, the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116–117. 

Four justices led by Justice O’Connor concluded that mere awareness was insufficient and that a

showing of some additional conduct is required to satisfy due process. Justice O’Connor stated:

The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act

of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. Additional conduct of

the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum

State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum State,

advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to

customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has

agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State. But a defendant’s awareness

that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does

not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream of commerce into an

act purposefully directed toward the forum State. 

Id. at 112. The ninth justice, Justice Stevens, concluded that because the Court was unanimous in

determining that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable and unfair, it was unnecessary to

examine the minimum contacts or articulate a “purposeful direction” test. Id. at 121–122. Even

assuming arguendo that a test ought to be formulated and applied, Justice Stevens reasoned that

placing a product into the stream of commerce may rise to the level of purposeful availment

depending on “the volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the components.” Id. at 122. 

 Four years after Asahi was decided, this court in 1991 recognized that “the question of what

constitutes purposeful availment under a stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction is still

open.” Seltzer Sister Bottling Co., Inc. v. Source Perrier, S.A., 1991 WL 279273 at *6 (N.D. Cal.

1991) (Patel, J.) (exercising personal jurisdiction over defendant because facts were sufficient to

meet either the O’Connor or Brennan Asahi tests). Today—over twenty years after Asahi was

decided—this still appears to be an open question in the Ninth Circuit1. 

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 8 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

The Ninth Circuit commented on Asahi shortly after it was decided. Shute v. Carnival

Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). In Shute,

a cruise ship passenger brought suit against a cruise line seeking damages for injuries sustained in a

slip and fall. Id. at 379. The court determined that the defendant cruise line purposefully availed

itself of the forum state because “[i]t advertised in the local media, promoted its cruises through

brochures sent to travel agents in that state, . . . paid a commission on sales of cruises in that state,

[and] conducted promotional seminars in [the state] designed to increase its sales to [state]

residents.” Id. at 382. The facts presented in Shute were sufficient to meet Justice O’Connor’s more

stringent purposeful availment standard. The court, therefore, did not reach the question of whether,

under Justice Brennan’s standard, the cruise line’s “knowledge that ticket sales were being made to

Washington residents [was], in itself,” sufficient to establish purposeful availment. Id. at 382 n.3.

Notably, the Ninth Circuit in Shute was silent as to the continuing viability of Hedrick v.

Daiko Shoji Co., Ltd., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983), a products liability case predating Asahi. In

Asahi, Justice Brennan cited the Ninth Circuit’s Hedrick case as support for the proposition that

“most courts and commentators have found that jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product

into the stream of commerce is consistent with the Due Process Clause, and have not required a

showing of additional conduct.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117. The Hedrick case involved an injured

longshoreman who sued a Japanese manufacturer of a defective wire-rope splice used to secure a

ship’s boom. Id. at 1356. The wire-rope splices were used on ocean-going vessels serving United

States ports, including the ports of the forum state of Oregon where the longshoreman was injured. 

Id. at 1358–1359. The district court ruled that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the Japanese

splice manufacturer, but the Ninth Circuit reversed stating that “[a] manufacturer or supplier of a

defective product who knew or should have known that a product would enter the stream of

commerce can be subjected, consistently with due process, to a forum state’s long-arm jurisdiction

and be sued in the forum where the injury occurred.” Id. at 1358. 

 In Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit

recognized that Hedrick was disapproved by Justice O’Connor in her plurality opinion in Asahi. Id.

at 271. The Ninth Circuit, however, fell short of expressly overruling Hedrick stating instead that “if

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 9 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

[Justice O’Connor’s] portion of Asahi is the law, then Hedrick is no longer the law of this circuit.” 

Id. (emphasis added). In Omeluk, a seaman brought suit against a Norwegian company which

repaired and refurbished the vessel on which the seaman was injured when a grate fell onto the deck. 

Id. at 268–269. In affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant in

Omeluk, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Hedrick on its facts, noting that the plaintiff in Omeluk,

unlike the plaintiff in Hedrick, was injured in the Bering Sea in international waters off Alaska, far

away from the forum state of Washington. Id. at 271, 269. Moreover, the court found it significant

that the defendant was a “custom refurbisher,” rather than a “manufacturer of a large quantity of

fungible goods.” Id.

In the absence of clear direction from the Ninth Circuit on what constitutes purposeful

availment under a stream of commerce theory, district courts in this circuit have taken different

approaches. Some courts have continued to rely on Hedrick. See e.g., Pacific Fisheries Corp. v.

Power Transmission Products, Inc., 2000 WL 1670917 at *5–6 (D. Hawaii 2000) (Mollway, J.)

(relying on Hedrick to hold that defendant who subleased an ammonia tank to plaintiff, knowing that

it would end up in Hawaii, purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the forum

state). Others have cited approvingly to Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion requiring additional

conduct beyond mere awareness. See e.g., VCS Samoa Packing Co. v. Blue Continent Products, 83

F.Supp. 2d 1151, 1154–1155 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (Keep, J.) (citing to Justice O’Connor’s plurality

opinion approvingly and concluding that the exercise of jurisdiction would offend due process

because “plaintiff initiated contact with defendant in South Africa for the purpose of purchasing tuna

for delivery to American Samoa”) (second emphasis added). Other courts have taken an agnostic

approach and have applied both Justice O’Connor’s and Justice Brennan’s tests. See e.g., Brewer v.

Dodson Aviation, 2006 WL 2252835 at *4 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (Zilly, J.) (exercising jurisdiction

over defendant that, under Justice Brennan’s test, placed an allegedly defective air pump into the

broad stream of commerce and, under Justice O’Connor’s test, advertised, provided customer

service, and made direct and indirect sales of air pumps in the forum state). 

To date, the Ninth Circuit has yet to definitively overrule Hedrick, and as already discussed,

some district courts have continued to rely on that case. Yet, from time to time, the Ninth Circuit

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 10 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

has cited to language from Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion with unambiguous approval. See

Holland America Line Inc. v. Wartsila North America, Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 459–460 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act purposefully

directed toward a forum state”). Thus, it appears that what constitutes purposeful availment and/or

direction under a stream of commerce theory is still an open question in the Ninth Circuit, or at least

is still somewhat unsettled. 

For purposes of deciding the present motion, this court need not resolve these unsettled

issues. Following the example of the Second, Third and Federal Circuits (see infra, n.1), this court,

as it did previously in the Selzter case, will apply both the O’Connor and Brennan tests. This is not

the unique case where the facts are sufficient to find purposeful availment under Justice Brennan’s

test, but insufficient to find purposeful availment under Justice O’Connor’s more stringent test. To

the contrary, the facts of this case show that defendant Bumbo-Pty was not only aware that its

products would reach the forum state of California, but also acted with the intent and purpose to

serve the state. Although the parties have not had the opportunity to conduct discovery and neither

party has requested an evidentiary hearing, plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence beyond the

allegations in their complaint to establish a prima facie case for the court’s exercise of personal

jurisdiction over defendant Bumbo-Pty. 

Under Justice Brennan’s standard, Bumbo-Pty has placed a product into a “regular and

anticipated” stream of commerce and is aware that its product is sold in the United States including

in California. Although the record contains no evidence that Bumbo-Pty makes direct sales to

customers in the United States, the record reflects that Bumbo-Pty has a relationship with defendant

Target Corporation to distribute and sell the product in Target’s United States retail stores. BumboPty’s website states that Target is one of its “major” United States customers, and Target

Corporation’s website states that it has approximately 1,500 stores in 47 states, including over 200

stores in California. The Whitson plaintiff in fact purchased the Bumbo Baby Sitter from a Target

store in Sonoma County, California and gifted the Sitter to the Lamm plaintiffs. When the United

States Consumer Product Safety Commission initiated a voluntary recall of the Bumbo seat in

October 2007, its website reported that about 1 million units had been sold in the United States since

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 11 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

August 2003, although the website did not provide a separate statistic for the number of units sold in

California alone. Bumbo-Pty cannot plausibly claim, and does not in fact claim, that it is unaware

that its product is being marketed and sold in California. As such, the possibility of a lawsuit arising

from the product cannot come as a surprise. Moreover, by placing a product in the stream of

commerce, Bumbo-Pty has benefitted economically from the retail sale of the product in California,

and in turn, has also benefitted from the state’s laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity. 

 Under Justice O’Connor’s standard, there is additional evidence that Bumbo-Pty has acted

with the intent and purpose to serve customers in the United States including customers in

California. Bumbo-Pty’s relationship with Target is not fortuitous. Rather, it has made deliberate

overtures to retailers such as Target, advertising on its website that it is a “worldwide” exporter of

the Bumbo Baby Sitter, that it “seek[s] reliable and progressive Retailers with the proven ability to

promote, sell, stock and serve our products,” and that it “will support [the Retailers] with the highest

quality merchandise, outstanding promotional programs, and continuous technical training.” The

parties have not yet engaged in discovery, and the record does not contain any evidence of a contract

between Bumbo-Pty and Target. The exact terms of the relationship between Bumbo-Pty and

Target, including how the relationship may have been initially created and how it is currently

maintained, are therefore unknown. It is clear, nevertheless, that Bumbo-Pty has purposefully

sought out, availed itself of, and benefitted from an established distribution channel created by

Target and designed to direct products to customers in the United States and California. 

Moreover, following the voluntary recall of the Bumbo Baby Sitter in October 2007, BumboPty took affirmative steps to alter the content and placement of its warning label and to alter the

images on the product packaging. These steps, although inadmissible to demonstrate Bumbo-Pty’s

underlying tort liability, see Fed. R. Evid. Rule 407 (evidence of subsequent remedial measures not

admissible to prove negligence or product defect), are admissible and probative to show intent and

purpose to respond to customer complaints and to maintain the marketability of its product in the

United States and California. 

Further discovery may call into question the significance of these facts, and the court may

revisit the issue of personal jurisdiction at a later date. At this juncture, however, plaintiffs have met

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 12 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

their burden to establish a prima facie case that defendant has purposefully directed its products at

the forum state and has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the laws of the

state. 

B. Arising Out Of

 Under the second prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis, a plaintiff must establish that its

claim arises out of or relates to the defendants’ forum-related activities. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v.

Augusta Nat., Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000). In order to satisfy the requirement, the

plaintiff must show that “but for” the defendants’ forum-related conduct, the injury would not have

occurred. Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001). The contacts must

also be “sufficiently related to the underlying causes of action” and “have some degree of proximate

causation to be considered for purposes of jurisdiction.” Doe v. American Nat’l Red Cross, 112

F.3d 1048, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 1997).

Here, the claims brought by both the Lamm and Whitson plaintiffs arise from Bumbo-Pty’s

forum-related activities. Bumbo-Pty has manufactured the Bumbo Baby Sitter with knowledge,

intent and purpose to sell it in California. Lamm asserts product liability claims seeking damages

for injuries sustained as a result of using the Sitter, while Whitson asserts claims for breach of

contract arising from her purchase of the Sitter. But for Bumbo-Pty’s invention and manufacture of

the Sitter, and Bubmo-Pty’s purposeful direction of the Sitter into California, the injuries and harm

to the Lamm and Whitson plaintiffs would not have occurred.

C. Reasonableness

The third and final prong of the specific jurisdiction test requires a balancing of various

factors to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Bancroft & Masters, Inc.,

223 F.3d at 1088 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985)). To

determine reasonableness, the court must consider (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful

interjection into the forum state, (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum state, (3)

the extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state, (4) the forum state’s interest

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 13 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

in adjudicating the dispute, (5) the most efficient resolution of the controversy, (6) the importance of

the forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief, and (7) the existence of an

alternative forum. Id.

A balancing of all these factors demonstrates that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over

defendant is fair and reasonable. As already discussed above, defendant has purposefully interjected

its products into the forum state. Having sold over 1 million units of the Sitter in the United States

over a four year period, the extent of defendant’s purposeful interjection is not minimal. It is likely

that a significant number of units were sold in California. The burden on Bumbo-Pty of defending

in the forum state is mitigated insofar as Bumbo-Pty has previous experience with the United States

legal system, having successfully prosecuted a patent for the Sitter before the United States Patent

and Trademark Office. Defendants, who bear the burden of making a “compelling showing” that the

exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable, have not raised any issues regarding the extent of

conflict with South Africa. Moreover, California’s interest in adjudicating the dispute is great. 

Unlike Asahi, where the Supreme Court was unanimous in concluding that the exercise of

jurisdiction would be unreasonable because the only action remaining was a suit for indemnification

between a Taiwanese tire manufacturer and a Japanese valve manufacturer, the Lamm and Whitson

actions are tort and contract suits brought by a California residents injured in California by a product

purchased in California. Finally, while South Africa may provide an alternative forum for resolution

of this dispute, it would not provide for the most efficient resolution of the controversy given that

other defendants such as Target may not be subject to jurisdiction there and given that it would place

a greater burden on the plaintiffs. 

D. Conclusion

Bumbo-Pty has invented, patented, manufactured, and placed a product into the stream of

commerce with not only awareness that those products would reach California, but with the intent

and purpose to serve the California market. As such, Bumbo-Pty has purposefully directed activities

toward the forum state and has also purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the

laws of the forum state. The claims asserted by the Lamm and Whitson plaintiffs arise from

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 14 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

defendant’s conduct of directing the Bumbo Baby Sitter into California retail markets. Moreover,

the exercise of jurisdiction over Bumbo-Pty is fair and reasonable. In sum, the court concludes that

the exercise of specific jurisdiction over defendant Bumbo-Pty is proper because it is permitted by

California’s long-arm statute and comports with constitutional standards of due process. Defendant

Bumbo-Pty’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is DENIED. 

II. Rule 12(b)(5)—Insufficient Service of Process

Defendant Bumbo-Pty moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 12(b)(5)

to dismiss for insufficient service of process. Once service is challenged, plaintiff bears the burden

of establishing that service was valid under FRCP Rule 4. Brockmeyer v. May, 383F.3d 798, 801

(9th Cir. 2004). When granting a Rule 12(b)(5) motion, federal courts have broad discretion to

dismiss the action or to retain the case but quash the service that has been made on the defendant. 

See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1354, 348. Service generally will

be quashed and the action preserved in those situations in which there is a reasonable prospect that

the plaintiff ultimately will be able to serve the defendant properly. Id.; see also Stevens v. Security

Pacific Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir.1976); Montalbano v. Easco Hand Tools, Inc., 766

F.2d 737, 740 (2nd Cir. 1985). 

Bumbo-Pty’s moving papers discuss the November and December service attempts directed

toward the Conroe, Texas entity that Bumbo-Pty asserts is “Wartburg Enterprises.” These

November and December service attempts were directed towards defendants ostensibly identified in

the caption as “Bumbo” and “Bumbo Limited.” Bumbo-Pty attests that the Conroe, Texas entity is a

separate entity from Bumbo-Pty in South Africa and the two entities do not share common

shareholders, officers, directors, employees, or offices. Moreover, the Conroe, Texas entity is not

authorized by Bumbo-Pty to accept service of process on behalf of Bumbo-Pty. 

Accordingly, the court concludes that because the Conroe, Texas entity is separate and

distinct from Bumbo-Pty, service upon the Texas entity is insufficient to effect service upon BumboPty. For the same reason, the court also concludes that Bumbo-Pty lacks standing to challenge or

quash the November and December service attempts on the Texas entity. As such, the court’s

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 15 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

following discussion pertains only to the January service attempt upon Bumbo-Pty in South Africa. 

FRCP Rule 4(h)(2) provides that service upon a foreign corporation, “at a place not within

any judicial district of the United States,” shall be effected “in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f)

for serving an individual, except personal delivery under (f)(2)(C)(i).” In turn, FRCP Rule 4(f)

states:

Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual—other than a minor, an

incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed—may be served at a

place not within any judicial district of the United States:

(1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to

give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the

Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents;

(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement

allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is reasonably

calculated to give notice:

(A) as prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that country in

an action in its courts of general jurisdiction;

(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory or letter

of request; or

(C) unless prohibited by the foreign country's law, by:

(i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the

individual personally; or

(ii) using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the

individual and that requires a signed receipt; or

(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders.

Here, plaintiffs’ attempted service upon defendant Bumbo-Pty, a South African

corporation, by personally delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to defendant’s director

at defendant’s corporate headquarters in South Africa. As will be seen, no part of Rule 4(f)

authorizes service upon a foreign corporation by this method of personal delivery. 

The parties are in agreement that many parts of Rule 4(f) are inapplicable. South Africa is

not a signatory to any international agreement and therefore, FRCP Rule 4(f)(1) is inapplicable. 

This court has not issued a letter rogatory or letter of request seeking the assistance of a South

Africa tribunal and thus, FRCP Rule 4(f)(2)(B) is also inapplicable. Notice was not sent by the

clerk of the court using a form of mail requiring a signed receipt and therefore, FRCP Rule

4(f)(2)(C)(ii) is inapplicable. Finally, because plaintiffs did not obtain prior court approval before

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 16 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

attempting service in the manner conducted, FRCP Rule 4(f)(3) is also inapplicable. See

Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 806 (without prior court approval for an alternative method of serving

process, Rule 4(f)(3) is of no help to plaintiffs).

The parties agree that under FRCP Rule 4(f)(2)(A), service may be effected “as prescribed”

by the laws of South Africa, but disagree as to whether plaintiffs have in fact complied with those

laws. Defendant has provided the court with a document entitled “Uniform Rules of Court, Rules

Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Several Provincial and Local Divisions of the

High Court of South Africa.” Johnston Dec., Exh. D. Plaintiff does not dispute that this document

provides the relevant rules for service in actions in South African courts of general jurisdiction. 

Within this document, Rule 4(1)(a) states “[s]ervice of any process of the court directed to

the sheriff and subject to the provisions of paragraph (aA) any document initiating application

proceedings shall be effected by the sheriff in one or other of the following manners: [setting forth

a variety of methods to effect service, for example, in the case of a corporation, by delivering a

copy to a responsible employee at its registered office].” Id. at 1 (emphasis added). Defendants

argue that Rule 4(1)(a) requires a sheriff to effect service. Because the individual that delivered

the summons and complaint to Bumbo-Pty’s corporate offices in South Africa was not a sheriff,

defendants argue that plaintiffs have not served process “as prescribed” by South African laws. 

In response, plaintiffs direct the court to examine Rule 4(1)(d) stating, “[i]t shall be the

duty of the sheriff or other person serving the process or documents to explain the nature and

contents thereof to the person upon whom service is being effected . . .” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiffs argue that based on this language, service of process is not the exclusive domain of the

sheriff, but may also be performed by other persons. Therefore, plaintiffs argue, the fact that the

individual who delivered the summons and complaint to Bumbo-Pty’s corporate headquarters was

not a sheriff, does not imply that service has not been effected as prescribed by South African law. 

The court notes, however, that use of the phrase “or other person” in Rule 4(1)(d) appears

to refer to “the party” as used in Rule 4(1)(aA). The preface to Rule 4(1)(a) states explicitly that

service effected by the sheriff is “subject to the provisions of paragraph (aA).” Id. at 1. In turn,

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 17 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

paragraph (aA) states, “[w]here the person to be served with any document initiating application

proceedings is already represented by an attorney of record, such document may be served upon

such attorney by the party initiating such proceedings.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). Paragraph

(aA), therefore, appears to create an exception to the general rule requiring service to be effected

by a sheriff and allows service by a party upon an attorney of record. Contrary to plaintiff’s

interpretation, the use of the phrase “or other person” in paragraph (d) does not refer to any person

who is not a sheriff, but appears to refer specifically to “the party initiating such proceedings” as

used in paragraph (aA). 

The court concludes that with respect to FRCP Rule 4(f)(2)(A), plaintiffs have not met

their burden to demonstrate that service was effected by a method “as prescribed by the foreign

country’s laws.” Plaintiffs have not met their burden because South African laws appear to require

service to be effected by a sheriff, with an exception for service by a party upon an attorney of

record. Here, the individual that delivered the summons and complaint to Bumbo-Pty’s director at

the corporate headquarters in South Africa was neither a sheriff nor a party. Moreover, even

assuming arguendo, that the South African rules can be interpreted to allow a party to appoint an

agent to effect service, plaintiff has offered no evidence that the person served, Antoinette

Wagennar, is an attorney, much less an attorney of record. 

The final provision of FRCP Rule 4(f) that remains to be considered is paragraph (2)(C)(i),

which allows “deliver[y] [of] a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual

personally.” Prior to amendment in 1993, former Rule 4(i)(1)(C) permitted service on an

individual in a foreign country to be made by personal delivery and upon a corporation,

partnership, or association by delivery to an officer, or managing or general agent of the

organization. See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1134, 327–328; see

also 151 F.R.D. 441, 462–463. 

The current Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(i), effective as a result of the 1993 amendment, continues to

provide for personal delivery upon an individual in a foreign country, but the provision referring to

service by delivery to a corporate officer abroad has been removed.2 Id. The current Rule 4(h)(2)

states that service upon a foreign corporation may be achieved in any manner prescribed by Rule

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 18 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

4(f), except personal delivery under (f)(2)(C)(i). One commentator has interpreted the current rule

as “no longer permitt[ing]” personal delivery on a corporate officer abroad. See Wright & Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1134, 328. Another commentator has interpreted the

current rule to mean only that “if personal delivery to [a corporate officer or agent] outside the

country is to be used, it [must] find authorization outside clause (C)(i).” See 151 F.R.D. at 463. 

Under either interpretation, the manner of service performed in this case is not authorized by Rule

4(f) because Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(i) is inapplicable, and as the court has already discussed, personal

delivery in the manner conducted here is not authorized by any clause outside Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(i). 

In sum, the court concludes that plaintiffs have not met their burden to demonstrate that

service of process was valid under any applicable provision of Rule 4(f). Accordingly,

defendant’s Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process is GRANTED. As

a remedy, defendant asks the court to both quash the service that has been made on it as well as

dismiss the claims against it. However, the court finds that there is a reasonable prospect that the

plaintiff will ultimately be able to serve the defendant properly. In its discretion, the court

QUASHES the January 25, 2008 service attempt and the accompanying affidavits of service filed

with the court on February 11, 2008 (C 07-04807, Docket Entry 37; C 07-05597, Docket Entry

35). Plaintiffs are ORDERED to perfect service upon defendant Bumbo-Pty, in accordance with

FRCP Rules 4(h) and 4(f), within 30 days of the date of this order. 

As a final matter, plaintiffs request that the court, in the event it grants defendant’s Rule

12(b)(5) motion, “fashion its own manner of effective service pursuant to FRCP Rule 4(f)(3).” 

Lamm Opp. Filed March 3, 2008 at 2–3. Rule 4(f)(3) allows a court to order service of process in

foreign countries by any means likely to impart notice, “even in contravention of the laws of the

foreign country,” as long as not prohibited by an international agreement. Rio Properties, Inc. v.

Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002). Rule 4(f)(3) “is an equal means of

effecting service of process under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” and a plaintiff “need not

have attempted every permissible means of service of process before petitioning the court for

alternative relief.” Id. at 1016. The decision whether to allow alternative methods of serving

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 19 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

process under Rule 4(f)(3) is committed to the “sound discretion of the district court” which may

determine “when the particularities and necessities of a given case require alternatives.” Id. 

Plaintiffs request that the court enter an order “that service be effected by personal delivery

at the defendant’s primary place of business,” and then “find that service has indeed been effected”

pursuant to the court’s order. Id. Plaintiffs request this remedy “so that the Court and the parties

hereto can move forward with this litigation.” Id. As the court has already explained, however,

Rule 4(f)(3) is of “no use” to plaintiffs because plaintiffs must have obtained “prior court

approval” for their proposed alternative method of serving process. Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 806. 

Rule 4(f)(3) cannot be used to seek ex-post ratification of a prior ineffective attempt at service of

process. 

Moreover, plaintiffs’ desire “to move forward with this litigation” is insufficient

justification for the court to authorize alternative means of service. Unlike the case in Rio

Properties where the plaintiff had made multiple unsuccessful attempts to locate an “elusive

international defendant, striving to evade service of process,” Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1013,

1016, in this case, the physical location of defendant in South Africa is well-known to plaintiffs

and there is no indication that defendant is trying to evade service. The particularities and

necessities of this case currently do not require this court to order alternative methods of service of

process. 

III. Set Aside Default

Bumbo-Pty has also moved to set aside default entered on December 27, 2007 against

defendant “Bumbo.” On November 17, 2007, the Whitson plaintiffs served the Conroe, Texas

entity believing that it was “Bumbo,” when in fact according to defendants, the entity is Wartburg

Enterprises. As the court has already explained, because Bumbo-Pty and the Texas entity are

separate companies, Bumbo-Pty does not have standing to challenge the service of process upon

the Texas entity, and likewise, does not have standing to set aside the default judgment as to the

Texas entity. Accordingly, the court DENIES Bumbo-Pty’s motion to set aside the December 27,

2007 default. 

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 20 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

IV. Sanctions

Bumbo-Pty requests sanctions in the amount of $10,716 for plaintiff’s efforts to “‘back

door’ Bumbo-Pty into this lawsuit by attempting ineffective, sloppy and improper service on nonexistent entities on multiple occasions and then forcing defendant to spend time and money filing

motions to quash/dismiss.” Def.’s Reply Filed in Lamm action on February 25, 2008 at 1–2. The

court understands that because of plaintiff’s multiple attempts to serve process on each of the

Bumbo-related entities in this case, defendant may have found it necessary to respond in turn. 

However, the court also notes that defendant has inundated the court and the plaintiffs with

substantially similar amended versions of their briefs. See C 07-05597, Docket Entries 9 and 20;

C 07-04807, Docket Entries 23 and 31. Having found that no circumstances warrant the

imposition of sanctions, the court DENIES defendant’s motion. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Bumbo-Pty’s (1) motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction; (2) motion to set aside default entered on December 27, 2007 as to

defendant “Bumbo” in the Whitson action; and (3) motion for sanctions. 

The court GRANTS Bumbo-Pty’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process,

QUASHES the January 25, 2008 service attempt on Bumbo-Pty in South Africa, and ORDERS

plaintiffs to perfect service upon defendant Bumbo-Pty, in accordance with FRCP Rules 4(h) and

4(f), within 30 days of the date of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2008 ______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 21 of 22
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

1. Among the six circuits that have expressly adopted one of the two Asahi approaches, there is

disagreement. The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have followed Justice Brennan’s “stream of

commerce” approach. See Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 419–20 (5th

Cir. 1993); Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 946–948 (7th Cir. 1992); Barone v. Rich

Brothers Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 613–615 (8th Cir. 1994).

In contrast, the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have followed Justice O’Connor’s “stream of

commerce plus” approach. See Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 682–83 (1st Cir.

1992); Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 944–46 (4th Cir. 1994); Bridgeport

Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publishing, 327 F.3d 472, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2003).

The Second, Third, and Federal Circuits have refused to express a preference for one

approach over another. See Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 244–45 (2d Cir. 1999);

Pennzoil Products Co. v. Colelli & Associates, Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 207 n.11 (3rd Cir. 1998);

Commissariat A L’Energie Atomique v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 395 F.3d 1315, 1322 n.7,

1323–1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

The Eleventh Circuit has expressed some ambivalence. It has issued opinions both

embracing Justice O’Connor’s standard and declining to adopt either standard. Compare Vermeulen

v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1547–48 (11th Cir. 1993) with Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d

1510, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990). 

2. Under the current rule, a foreign corporation may be served by personal delivery upon an

officer or agent within a judicial district of the United States under Rule 4(h)(1). 

ENDNOTES

Case 3:07-cv-05597-MHP Document 63 Filed 05/14/08 Page 22 of 22