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Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Schoolman Transportation System, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 21, 1997 Decided May 6, 1997

No. 96-1330

SCHOOLMAN TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., D/B/A CLASSIC COACH,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Martin Gringer argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

petitioner.

David A. Seid, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, 

argued the cause for respondent, with whom Linda R. Sher,

Associate General Counsel, and Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy

Associate General Counsel, were on the brief. Frederick L. 

Cornnell, Attorney, entered an appearance.

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Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and WILLIAMS, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: This case arises from a union 

representation election involving the employees of Schoolman 

Transportation System, Inc. ("Schoolman"). Several ballots 

were challenged during the election, putting into question the 

eligibility of certain employees to vote. After ruling on the 

challenges, the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") 

determined that Local 804 of the International Brotherhood 

of Teamsters ("Union") had won the election by a vote of 20 

to 18. The Board certified the Union as the collective bargaining representative, but Schoolman refused to bargain. 

The Board then found that Schoolman's refusal to bargain 

constituted an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(1) and 

(5) of the National Labor Relations Act ("Act"), 29 U.S.C. 

§ 158(a)(1), (5) (1994).

In this petition for review, Schoolman argues that the 

Board abused its discretion in resolving issues over eligibility 

to vote. We find no merit in Schoolman's arguments. The 

Board held that the Stipulated Election Agreement, which 

only included "full time and regular part time" employees, did 

not include "casual" employees. This finding was consistent 

with the Board's longstanding policy of excluding "casual" 

employees unless specifically included. Finding casual employees ineligible to vote, the Board sustained the Union's 

challenge to the ballot cast by Roger Kai, a casual worker. 

Schoolman now claims that, because Kai was excluded, other 

employees who also may have been "casual" (but whose 

ballots were not challenged) should have been excluded. 

Schoolman's argument is specious: if the employer wanted to 

oppose the inclusion of casual employees, it was required to 

object before the ballots were counted. Schoolman found 

nothing objectionable to the belatedly disputed ballots until 

after discovering that it had lost the election.

Having determined that the Board did not abuse its discretion in excluding Kai, we need not address Schoolman's 

challenge to the status of Daniel Mullen, a dispatcher. The 

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final vote was 20 to 18 in favor of the Union, so Mullen's 

status is immaterial because his vote could not have affected 

the outcome. We also reject Schoolman's argument that, 

because Mullen was excluded, all dispatchers should have 

been excluded; again, if Schoolman had wanted to object to 

these other employees, it was required to do so before the 

ballots were counted.

Accordingly, we deny Schoolman's petition for review and 

grant the Board's cross-application for enforcement.

I. BACKGROUND

Schoolman operates a charter bus service in Bohemia, New 

York. Roger Kai worked only occasionally at Schoolman, 

logging a mere nine days in 1992. From mid-July 1992 

through mid-February 1993, Kai did not work a single day at 

Schoolman. For most of this time, he worked at another job 

out of state.

On December 21, 1992, the Union filed a representation 

petition with the Board seeking certification as the collective 

bargaining representative. On January 11, 1993, the Union 

and Schoolman entered into a Stipulated Election Agreement, 

approved by the Board's Regional Director, stating that the 

unit included "[a]ll full time and regular part time bus drivers, mechanics, dispatchers and assistant dispatchers" and 

excluded "[a]ll office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act." See Stipulated Election Agreement, reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 3.

On February 9 and 11, 1993, an election was held in which 

19 employees voted in favor of union representation and 17 

voted against. Four additional ballots were challenged, either by the Union or the Board Agent; Schoolman, however, 

did not challenge any ballots. Two of the challenged ballots 

were those of Roger Kai and Daniel Mullen: the Union 

challenged Kai's ballot on the ground that he was not a 

regular employee, and Mullen's ballot on the ground that he 

was a supervisor. The two other challenged ballots were 

eventually counted, with one vote for the Union and one vote 

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against, bringing the vote totals to 20 to 18 in favor of union 

representation.

On June 10, 1993, the Board's Acting Regional Director 

recommended sustaining the Union's challenge to Kai's ballot:

[I]t has always been the Board's policy to exclude casual 

employees from the unit, absent a specific agreement to 

include them. The unit in the instant case was restricted 

to full time and regular part time bus drivers. I therefore recommend that the challenge to Roger Kai's ballot 

be sustained.

Report on Objections and Challenges at 12, reprinted in J.A. 

19. He further recommended a hearing on, among other 

matters, the challenge to Mullen's ballot. The Board adopted 

the Acting Regional Director's findings and recommendations.

In February and March 1994, an administrative law judge 

("ALJ") held a hearing on, inter alia, the challenge to Mullen's ballot. On May 15, 1995, the ALJ issued a decision. He 

recommended that the Board sustain the Union's challenge to 

Mullen's ballot because Mullen's interests were aligned with 

management and because he was a supervisor. On November 22, 1995, the Board issued a Decision, Order, and Direction adopting the ALJ's findings and recommendations. 

In affirming the ALJ's finding that Mullen was ineligible to 

vote, the Board concluded that Mullen's "interests are aligned 

with those of management and that he does not share a 

community of interest with unit employees." Schoolman 

Transp. Sys., Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. No. 96, at 1 n.1 (1995), 

reprinted in J.A. 121 n.1. With Kai's and Mullen's ballots 

excluded, the final vote was 20 to 18 in favor of union 

representation.

On January 10, 1996, the Union was certified as the employees' bargaining agent. Schoolman, however, refused to 

bargain, and the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge. 

On March 22, 1996, the Regional Director, on behalf of the 

General Counsel, issued an unfair labor practice complaint 

alleging that Schoolman had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) 

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of the National Labor Relations Act by its refusal to bargain. 

Thereafter, the General Counsel filed a motion for summary 

judgment and a motion to transfer the proceeding to the 

Board. On June 26, 1996, the Board transferred the proceeding to itself.

On August 16, 1996, the Board issued a Decision and Order 

granting the General Counsel's motion for summary judgment and finding that Schoolman's refusal to bargain violated 

sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The Board's Order 

required Schoolman to cease and desist from the unfair labor 

practices and to bargain with the Union collectively on request.

II. ANALYSIS

In this petition for review, Schoolman does not contest that 

it failed to bargain with the Union. Instead, it argues that 

the Board abused its discretion in determining which ballots 

to count in the election. Schoolman's arguments border on 

being frivolous.

First, the Board did not abuse its discretion in sustaining 

the objection to Roger Kai's ballot. The Stipulated Election 

Agreement stated that only "full time and regular part time" 

employees were to be included in the unit. Stipulated Election Agreement, reprinted in J.A. 3. Kai had not worked at 

Schoolman for the seven months before the election, and had 

only worked a total of nine days in the year before the 

election. In excluding Roger Kai as a "casual" employee, the 

Board construed the agreement consistent with its longstanding policy to exclude casual employees unless they are specifically included. See, e.g., Delta Gas, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 391, 

397 (1987); Mariposa Press, 273 N.L.R.B. 528, 530 n.12 

(1984). In so doing, it did not abuse its discretion.

Schoolman counters that company officials meant to include 

casual employees in the agreement, and that the Board 

abused its discretion by failing to grant a hearing on this 

question. This argument is based on the absurd suggestion 

that a party to an agreement may enforce something other 

than what is written if it had something else in mind, even 

when there is no meaningful extrinsic evidence supporting the 

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1 Under Board procedure, a party is permitted to make multiple objections, but then withdraw selected ones. As a result, a 

party effectively has the right to file contingent objections. This 

option was open to Schoolman in the present case; nonetheless, 

Schoolman failed to file such objections. 

alleged contrary intention. Schoolman's contention fails upon 

recitation, for it is so obviously misguided. There is no case 

authority of which we are aware, either in administrative law 

or in general contract law, that supports this bizarre claim.

Second, we reject Schoolman's argument that, because Kai 

was excluded, other employees that Schoolman now alleges 

were "casual" should also have been excluded. It is well 

established that a party must challenge voter eligibility prior 

to the actual casting of ballots. See NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co.,

329 U.S. 324, 331-33 (1946). This is true even if the voter 

would have been ineligible if a timely challenge had been 

made. See id. at 331 ("The fact that cutting off the right to 

challenge conceivably may result in the counting of some 

ineligible votes is thought to be far outweighed by the dangers attendant upon the allowance of indiscriminate challenges after the election."). If Schoolman had wanted to 

object to other allegedly casual employees, it should have 

made these objections before the election.1

Having determined that the Board did not abuse its discretion in excluding Kai, we need not address the status of 

Daniel Mullen. Because the vote was 20 to 18 in favor of the 

Union, and because the Board did not abuse its discretion in 

excluding Kai, Mullen's status is immaterial because his vote 

could not have affected the outcome. In addition, for the 

reasons stated above, we reject Schoolman's argument that 

all dispatchers should have been excluded because Mullen 

was excluded; if Schoolman had wanted to object to other 

dispatchers, it should have done so before the election. See 

A.J. Tower, 329 U.S. at 331-33.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we deny Schoolman's petition for review and 

grant the Board's cross-application for enforcement.

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