Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03084/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Peter Zagorski
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 26, 2015 Decided December 1, 2015 

No. 12-3084 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

PETER ZAGORSKI, ALSO KNOWN AS PIOTR ZAGORSKI, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:11-cr-00351) 

Jonathan S. Jeffress, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was A.J. 

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. 

James A. Ewing, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and 

Elizabeth Trosman, Elizabeth H. Danello, and David B. Kent, 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS and 

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judges. 

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: Peter Zagorski appeals 

the sentence he received after pleading guilty to distributing 

child pornography. Zagorski argues that the district court 

miscalculated the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range by 

erroneously applying two provisions: a cross-reference to the 

guideline governing production of child pornography, 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c)(1) (the “cross-reference”), and a twolevel enhancement for using a computer to “solicit 

participation with a minor” in the production or live 

transmission of child pornography, id. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) (the 

“computer enhancement”). We find no error and affirm. 

* * * 

In October 2011 Zagorski began corresponding via 

internet chat with a man who claimed to have control over a 

12-year-old girl. Unbeknownst to Zagorski, the man was an 

undercover police detective named Timothy Palchak. After 

learning that Zagorski had videos of child pornography, 

Palchak proposed a trade: a live “webcam” show featuring 

Palchak and the purported minor in exchange for Zagorski’s 

child pornography. Zagorski agreed. 

Over the course of approximately three weeks, Zagorski 

repeatedly expressed interest in the webcam show and 

discussed sending child pornography to Palchak as payment. 

Zagorski told Palchak that he wanted the child to appear nude 

or “wear a skirt and lift[] it few times” on webcam. Joint 

Appendix (“J.A.”) 70. He sent Palchak a total of six videos of 

child pornography, including three on the day Palchak 

proposed the trade. On one occasion, Zagorski spoke with the 

purported minor—impersonated by an FBI agent—on the 

telephone. 

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Zagorski was arrested and charged with one count of 

distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252(a)(2), and one count of attempted coercion and 

enticement of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). 

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Zagorski pleaded guilty to the 

§ 2252(a)(2) count and the § 2422(b) count was dismissed at 

sentencing. In calculating the applicable Guidelines range, 

the district court applied the cross-reference and the computer 

enhancement based on Zagorski’s efforts to procure the 

webcam show. Although the resulting calculation yielded an 

advisory sentence of 240 months (the statutory maximum 

term) based on an offense level of 39 and a criminal history 

category of I, the court sentenced Zagorski to 99 months in 

prison. The court also imposed a 120-month term of 

supervised release and a $100 special assessment. 

At stake here is whether Zagorski is subject to a 

Guidelines offense level of 37 (with a corresponding advisory 

sentence of 210-240 months—actually a range of 210-262 

months capped by the statutory maximum) or, as the district 

court found, of 39 (with a corresponding advisory sentence of 

240 months—similarly a range, 262-327 months, capped by 

the statutory maximum). The guideline that usually governs 

Zagorski’s offense of conviction is Guidelines § 2G2.2 (the 

pornography “distribution guideline”), which with its 

applicable “offense characteristics” and other adjustments 

yields an offense level of 37. The challenged cross-reference, 

if it applies, reroutes the offense level calculation from the 

distribution guideline to Guidelines § 2G2.1 (the pornography 

“production guideline”), which provides for a higher base 

offense level but generally fewer enhancements—but those 

few include the challenged computer enhancement. Under the 

production guideline Zagorski’s total offense level is 37 if the 

computer enhancement does not apply, 39 if it does. 

Accordingly, to affirm we must conclude both that Zagorski 

was subject to the production guideline (by virtue of the crossUSCA Case #12-3084 Document #1585955 Filed: 12/01/2015 Page 3 of 7
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reference) and that the computer enhancement was correctly 

applied. We address each in turn. 

Cross-reference. Guidelines § 2G2.2(c)(1) directs the 

sentencing judge to apply § 2G2.1 if, as relevant here, “the 

offense involved causing . . . a minor to engage in sexually 

explicit conduct for the purpose of . . . transmitting a live 

visual depiction of such conduct.” The commentary says that 

the cross reference “is to be construed broadly.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 2G2.2 Application Note 5 (2011). 

We assume without deciding two propositions that 

Zagorski has not challenged: first, that the activity in which 

Zagorski expected the purported minor to engage on webcam 

qualifies as “sexually explicit conduct,” and, second, that the 

cross-reference encompasses attempts. Under these 

assumptions, the district court did not err in finding that 

Zagorski’s conduct implicated the cross-reference: By 

offering to send pornographic videos in exchange for a live, 

sexually explicit webcam performance by a 12-year-old girl, 

Zagorski demonstrated his intent to “caus[e] . . . a minor to 

engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of . . . 

transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct.” And by 

actually sending such videos to the minor’s purported 

custodian, Zagorski took a “substantial step” toward causing 

this result. See United States v. Hite, 769 F.3d 1154, 1162 

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (defining “attempt” as a “substantial step” 

coupled with “the requisite criminal intent” (citation 

omitted)). Although of course Palchak’s actions were causes 

of the events that transpired, that doesn’t exclude a causal role 

for Zagorski. 

 Relying on Hite, Zagorski argues that his actions did not 

amount to an attempt to “entice” or “persuade” the purported 

minor to participate in the webcam show. He points out that 

Palchak presented the minor as ready and willing to engage in 

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sexual activity—and that, as a result, he never had to take any 

steps to “transform or overcome” her will. Hite, 769 F.3d at 

1161. But Hite’s insistence that there be evidence that the 

defendant sought to “transform or overcome the will of a 

minor,” id., rested on verbs in 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)—

“persuade,” “induce,” “entice,” “coerce”—that are more 

demanding than “cause,” which is among the verbs in 

Guidelines § 2G2.2(c)(1). See also United States v. Laureys, 

653 F.3d 27, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Brown, J., dissenting on an 

issue the majority did not reach) (identifying cases reading 

§ 2422(b) to require “an attempt to bend the child-victim’s 

will”). Here, under the usual meaning of the word “cause,” 

see, e.g., United States v. Whitesell, 314 F.3d 1251, 1255 

(11th Cir. 2002), Zagorski attempted to cause a minor to 

engage in particular conduct by bartering with her purported 

custodian. 

 Computer Enhancement. An affirmative finding under 

Guidelines § 2G2.2(c)(1) potentially triggers Guidelines 

§ 2G2.1(b)(6)(B), providing as follows: 

If, for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material 

or for the purpose of transmitting such material live, the 

offense involved . . . the use of a computer or an 

interactive computer service to (i) persuade, induce, 

entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, a minor to 

engage in sexually explicit conduct, or to otherwise 

solicit participation by a minor in such conduct; or (ii) 

solicit participation with a minor in sexually explicit 

conduct, increase by 2 levels. 

The commentary explains that this provision can be triggered 

by the use of a computer to communicate “with a person who 

exercises custody, care, or supervisory control of the minor.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1 Application Note 4(B). 

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 In applying this provision, the district court relied in part 

on a phone call between Zagorski and the minor. In his 

opening brief Zagorski argues that the phone was not a 

“computer” as required by this guideline. See U.S.S.G.

§ 2G2.1 Application Note 1 (adopting the definition of 

“computer” in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)); 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1030(e)(1) (the term “computer” includes “an electronic . . . 

or other high speed data processing device performing logical, 

arithmetic, or storage functions” but not “an automated 

typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or 

other similar device”). Two circuits have said that a cell 

phone is a computer within the meaning of this provision, 

United States v. Mathis, 767 F.3d 1264, 1283 (11th Cir. 

2014); United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902-03 (8th 

Cir. 2011), but the government has not contested Zagorski’s 

assertion, and we disregard the phone call as potential support 

for applying the enhancement. 

But even without the call Zagorski’s computer activities 

are sufficient. The Second Circuit has quite reasonably 

interpreted the oddly worded subsection (ii)—“solicit 

participation with a minor in sexually explicit conduct”—as 

“addressing a situation in which one person solicits another 

person to engage in sexual activities with a minor.” United 

States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 68 (2d Cir. 2009). Here Zagorski 

repeatedly broached the subject of the webcam show in his 

online chats with Palchak, offered child pornography as 

payment for the show, and in fact sent Palchak six 

pornographic videos via the internet. In doing so, Zagorski 

used a computer in the way contemplated by the guideline. 

 Zagorski argues that his conduct cannot amount to 

solicitation because Palchak initially proposed the webcam 

exchange. Not so: an initial offer does not preclude 

subsequent solicitation by the offeree. Contrary to Zagorski’s 

contention, his conduct was not purely “reactive” (Appellant’s 

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Br. 40); on several occasions, he proactively inquired about 

the webcam show and offered to send (and in fact did send) 

child pornography in order to assure that the show would go 

on. See, e.g., J.A. 73 (“so when we gonna do cam”); J.A. 80 

(“when u ready to do cam i send u that [video]”); J.A. 85 

(“how about cam”); J.A. 87 (“i make u a deal if u give me 

good cam i tell where u can get porn from i just found out 

today”). 

 At oral argument, Zagorski’s counsel suggested that the 

computer enhancement is not implicated because Zagorski did 

not expect Palchak to engage in sex with the purported minor 

as part of the webcam performance. But the relevant inquiry 

is whether Palchak was solicited to “participat[e]” with the 

purported minor in “sexually explicit conduct,” not sex. We 

noted at the outset that Zagorski hasn’t disputed the 

government’s position that the proposed webcam behavior of 

the minor qualified as “sexually explicit conduct.” There is 

also no dispute that Zagorski expected Palchak to appear on 

webcam with the minor. Taken together, these facts support a 

finding that he solicited Palchak to “participat[e] with a minor 

in sexually explicit conduct.” 

 * * * 

The judgment of the district court is 

 Affirmed. 

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