Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07007/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07007-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Hugo
Appellant
Ricky Houston
Appellee
Harold Dean McHam
Not Party
Allen Reich
Not Party
The Excise Board of Choctaw County, Oklahoma
Not Party

Document Text:

RICKY HOUSTON, 

PUBLISH 

UHITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

. PILDO 

Umred Srattt t.:tlu~& of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAY 7 .. 1§91 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) 

) 

No. 90-7007 

ALLEN REICH, HAROLD 

THE EXCISE BOARD OF 

OKLAHOMA, 

DEAN McHAM, ) 

CHOCTAW COUNTY,) 

) 

Defendants, 

and 

) 

) 

) 

) 

THE CITY OF HUGO, OKLAHOMA, 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

···~ ··--~- ----------· ~ ·- (No. 85-256-C) ·-·-· ·----~~·-·---··-

Joe Stamper of Stamper, Otis & Burrage, Antlers, Oklahoma, 

attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Kennedy, Kennedy, Wright & Stout, Muskogee, Oklahoma, attorneys 

for Defendant-Appellant. 

Submitted on the Briefs.* 

* The parties to this appeal have indicated that oral argument 

is not desired. After examining the briefs and the appellate 

record, this three-judge panel has determined that oral argument 

would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a): lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-7007 Document: 01019292099 Date Filed: 05/07/1991 Page: 1 
Before BALDOCK, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

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The City of Hugo, Oklahoma (City) appeals from a mandamus 

order issued by the District Court directing the City and the 

Excise Board of Choctaw County, Oklahoma, to make tax levies in 

accordance with Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 151, et seq. (the 

Governmental Tort Claims Act) and Okla. Stat. tit. 62, § 365.1, et 

seq. (public finance in satisfaction of money judgments) to retire 

a judgment entered in favor of Ricky Houston (Houston) in his 

civil rights suit against Allen Reich (Reich) and Harold Dean 

McHam (McHam), former police officers of the City. 

Background 

Plaintiff Houston filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights 

complaint following an altercation he had on the evening of 

October 31, 1984, at Hugo, Oklahoma, with City police officers 

Reich and McHam. Houston complained that Reich and McHam severely 

beat him without provocation or excuse while acting as officers of 

the Police Department of the City and that they did so in 

violation of his constitutional rights. Houston also complained 

that the City had: tolerated and permitted a pattern of illegal 

beatings by its police officers; encouraged its police officers to 

believe that they could violate the rights of persons with 

impunity; and failed to properly train and instruct its officers 

so as to prevent such occurrences as suffered by Houston. Houston 

sought damages, both compensatory and punitive. 

The defendants City, Reich and McHam filed a joint answer to 

Houston's complaint. They admitted, inter alia, that at all times 

mentioned in the complaint Reich and McHam were duly appointed and 

acting police officers of the City and that Reich and McHam were 

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acting under color of law, to wit, under color of the statutes, 

ordinances, regulations, policies, customs and usages of the State 

of Oklahoma and/or the City. As an affirmative defense, the 

defendants jointly alleged that: Reich and McHam were involved in 

an investigation of a shooting death when Houston sought to 

interfere, resulting in his arrest; Houston resisted arrest and 

sought to escape and/or to retrieve a weapon with which to attack 

Reich; and the force used by Reich and McHam was necessary in 

order to accomplish Houston's arrest. Defendant Reich filed a 

counterclaim against Houston, alleging that he was subjected to an 

unwarranted and vicious attack by Houston resulting in severe 

cuts, bruises and contusions. Reich sought both compensatory and 

punitive damages. 

The trial court granted the City's 

verdict at the close of Houston's 

motion for a directed 

case. The jury returned a 

verdict in the amount of $4,800 in compensatory damages and $5,200 

in punitive damages against Reich and $1,200 in compensatory 

damages and $1,300 in punitive damages against McHam. Thereafter, 

the court entered an order granting Houston attorney's fees in the 

amount of $25,690.84 against Reich and McHam. 

Houston's efforts to collect his judgment from Reich and 

McHam were unsuccessful. Thereafter, Houston filed a motion with 

the court for a Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 69 order in aid of the 

judgment and in aid of execution, praying that the court make the 

Excise Board of Choctaw County an additional party defendant and 

direct the Excise Board and the City to make levies pursuant to 62 

Okla. Stat. 365.5 sufficient to pay the aforesaid judgments, with 

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interest. The City resisted the motion on the grounds that (a) 

the City had been eliminated as a defendant in the action by its 

motion for directed verdict, and (b) the judgment was secured 

against Reich and McHam individually. 

The district court granted Houston's motion for orders 

enforcing the judgments, finding that (a) the judgments against 

Reich and McHam were in their official capacity as police officers 

of the City while they were acting within the scope of their 

employment, (b) the court was authorized to add additional parties 

in aid of its judgment and execution thereon pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P., Rule 69(a), (c) the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims 

Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 162(0), authorizes payment of 

judgments against employees by a municipality in civil rights 

actions, (d) a governmental entity is liable for a § 1983 judgment 

against its employees or officials when the judgment results from 

the officials' acts within the scope of employment and the public 

entity had notice and an opportunity to respond, which was the 

case here, and (e) the pretrial order admits that Reich and McHam 

were acting at all relevant times as officers of the City (R., 

Vol. I, Tab 18). 

Appellate Contentions-Disposition 

On appeal, the City contends that: (1) under federal law, the 

judgment entered against the individual defendants Reich and McHam 

cannot be collected from the City because they were sued only in 

their individual, rather than official, capacities; (2) in any 

case, it is not liable under federal law for the judgment entered 

against Reich and McHam because that judgment was entered against 

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them individually, and not in their official capacities as police 

officers for the City; (3) the trial court erred in ruling that 

the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act applies; and (4) the 

trial court erred in ordering the City to pay the punitive damage 

award even if the Governmental Tort Claims Act applied and in not 

reducing the attorney fee award attributable to the punitive 

damage award. 

I. 

The City contends that, under federal law, the judgment 

entered against the individual defendants Reich and McHam cannot 

be collected from the City because they were sued only in their 

individual, rather than official, capacities. 

In Kentucky v. Graham, 473 u.s. 159 (1985), the Court 

instructed that if the complaint does not clearly indicate that 

defendants are being sued individually and/or in their official 

capacities, the determination must be made by reviewing "'the 

course of the proceedings.'" Id. at 167 n. 14, quoting Brandon v. 

Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 469 (1985). Thus instructed, we have reviewed 

the "course of proceedings" in this case in order to determine the 

basis upon which this action was initiated and litigated. We 

conclude that even though the caption of the pleadings did not 

indicate on what basis the defendants Reich and McHam were being 

sued, the pleadings, pre-trial order, and instructions make it 

clear that the suit was brought against Reich and McHam in their 

official and individual capacities. 

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The complaint filed by Houston alleged, inter alia, that the 

action was for damages, both compensatory and punitive, against 

Reich and McHam as Police Officers of the City and individually, 

and against the City, for violation of Houston's constitutional 

rights on the evening of October 31, 1984, when the defendants 

Reich and McHam, acting under color of state law, severely beat, 

assaulted and used unreasonable, excessive and deadly force in 

arresting Houston without provocation, justification or cause; and 

that the individual defendants, Reich and McHam, subjected Houston 

to these constitutional deprivations maliciously or by reckless 

disregard of his rights (R., Vol. I, Tab 1). The Complaint 

further alleged that the City was liable because it tolerated and 

permitted a pattern of illegal beatings and assaults by its police 

officers and failed to train, investigate and discipline its 

police officers. 

The defendants admitted the following paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 

of Houston's Complaint in their joint Answer: 

6. Defendants Reich and McHam at all times 

mentioned herein, were duly appointed and acting 

officers of the Police Department of the City of Hugo. 

7. At all times mentioned herein the defendants 

Reich and McHam were acting under color of law, to wit, 

under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, 

policies, customs and usages of the State of Oklahoma 

and/or the City of Hugo. 

8. The defendant 

duly incorporated under 

Oklahoma. 

Id. at Tab 2. 

City of Hugo is a municipality 

the laws of the State of 

The Pre-Trial Order recognized Houston's allegations that on 

the evening of October 31, 1984, the "individual defendants," 

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Reich and McHam, as distinguished from the municipal defendant, 

the City, while acting under color of law as police officers for 

the City, subjected Houston to constitutional deprivations. The 

Pre-Trial Order contained the following stipulation of facts: 

b> That defendants Reich and McHam were at all 

times relevant, duly appointed and acting officers of 

the Police Department of the City of Hugo. 

c> That at the time of the occurrences, the 

defendants Reich and McHam were acting under color of 

law, to wit, under color of the statutes, ordinances, 

regulations, policies, customs and .usages of the State 

of Oklahoma and/or the City of Hugo. 

Id. at Tab 4, p. 5. 

After granting the City's motion for a directed verdict, the 

court initially instructed the jury that it was not to consider 

the claims against the City in its deliberations. (R., Vol. II, p. 

148). The court then instructed that: this was a civil rights 

cause of action whereby plaintiff Houston sought money damages 

against "the defendants" for deprivation of his constitutional 

rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

Constitution "while the defendants were acting under color of 

state law;" Houston alleged that on the evening of October 31, 

1984, the defendants Reich and McHam, while acting as police 

officers for the City, assaulted and beat him without 

justification or provocation, causing him injuries; and at all 

times the defendants Reich and McHam alleged that they were acting 

in good faith in the lawful performance of their duties as police 

officers. Id. 

Further, the court instructed that acts are done under color 

of state law "[n]ot only when state officials act within the 

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bounds or limits of their lawful authority, but also when such 

officers act without and beyond the bounds of their lawful 

authority" and that "[i]n order for unlawful acts of an official 

to be done under color of any law, the unlawful acts must be done 

while the official is purporting or pretending to act in the 

performance of his official duties; that is, the unlawful facts 

[sic] must consist in an abuse or misuse of power which is 

possessed by the official only because he is an official, and the 

unlawful acts must be of a nature and be committed under such 

circumstances that they would not have occurred but for the fact 

that the person committing them was an official purporting to 

exercise his official powers." Id. at 150-51. 

The court instructed with respect to what constitutes 

reasonable or excessive force used by arresting officers in making 

an arrest, id., and that "[f]orce inspired by unwise excessive 

zeal amounting to an abuse of official power that shocks the 

conscience or by malice is sufficient to sustain a cause of action 

against the arresting officer." Id. at 152-53. The court also 

instructed that "[i]ndividual persons acting under color of law 

are not liable for damages unless they knew or reasonably should 

have known that the acts or omissions by them would violate a 

Constitutional right of plaintiff, or unless they acted or omitted 

to act with deliberate intention to cause a deprivation of 

plaintiff's Constitutional Rights," and "[i]f you find ... that 

the individual defendants ... acted or failed to act in reliance 

upon a good faith belief that their acts or omissions were lawful, 

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reasonable, and proper, then those individual defendants, or 

either of them, are not liable for damages." Id. at 155. 

The district court instructed on the elements constituting 

actual, nominal, and punitive damages. Id. at 158-60. The court 

stated that in order to award exemplary or punitive damages, the 

jury must find that the conduct of a defendant amounted to gross 

negligence and willful and wanton conduct amounting to a reckless 

disregard of the plaintiff's rights. Id. at 159. 

We are satisfied, following 

proceedings" in this case, that the 

stated both a personal-capacity 

against Reich and McHam. 

II. 

our review of "the course of 

pleadings and instructions 

and official-capacity action 

The City argues that, in any case, it 

federal law for the judgment entered 

because that judgment was entered against 

is not liable under 

against Reich and McHam 

them individually and 

not in their official capacities as police officers. We agree. 

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 u.s. 

658, 690 (1978), made it clear that local government officials 

sued under § 1983 in their official capacities are one and the 

same as the governmental entity they represent only if the local 

government would be suable in its own name, and that states are 

protected by the Eleventh Amendment while municipalities are not. 

See also McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639, 642 (lOth Cir. 1981). 

In Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 818 (lOth Cir. 1989), we 

cited to Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra, 

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to distinguish the basis of municipal liability under § 1983: 

[The Court] described municipal policy as a 'policy 

statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially 

adopted and promulgated by [a municipality's] 

officers.' It described municipal custom as 

'persistent and widespread. practices of. 

officials .... ' 

Monell recognized that municipalities could be liable under § 

1983 if the deprivation of a federally protected constitutional or 

statutory right was the result of action taken "pursuant to 

official municipal policy of some nature," and that only when the 

"execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its 

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to 

represent official policy, inflicts the injury the 

government as an entity is responsible under§ 1983." Monell, 

supra, 436 u.s. at 691, 694. 

Since Monell, the Supreme Court, in Pembaur v. City of 

Cincinnati, 475 u.s. 469 (1986), explained that a municipality 

cannot be liable under § 1983 for acts of a municipal official 

unless that official possesses final policymaking authority to 

establish municipal policy with respect to acts in question. And 

in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 u.s. 112 (1988), the court 

held that acts of an official which had been officially sanctioned 

or ordered were acts of the municipality. See also Ware v. 

Unified School Dist. No. 492, 881 F.2d 906 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

In Seibert v. Oklahoma, 867 F.2d 591 (lOth Cir. 1989), we 

held that a § 1983 suit against state officers in their individual 

capacities was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, inasmuch as 

such suits proceed on the theory that when the officers act 

unconstitutionally, they are stripped of their official or 

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representative character and are thus subjected to the 

consequences of their conduct. The affirmative defense of 

qualified (good faith) immunity is available to all governmental 

officials, including police officers in a § 1983 action. Anderson 

v. Creighton, 483 u.s. 635 (1987); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 

(1980); England v. Hendricks, 880 F.2d 281 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, u.s. ___ (1990). In such cases, the inquiry always is 

whether the conduct alleged violated clearly established statutory 

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 

In Ware v. Unified School Dist. No. 492, supra, we outlined 

the basis for municipal liability under § 1983: 

Liability under section 1983 cannot rest upon the 

doctrine of respondeat superior. See City of Canton [~ 

Harris, 109 s. Ct. 1197, 1203 (1989)]. A direct causal 

link must exist between the acts of the governing body 

sought to be held liable and the alleged constitutional 

deprivation. Id. Such a causal connection may be 

established when the governing body has delegated its 

decision-making authority to the official whose illegal 

conduct caused the harm, see Pembaur, 475 u.s. at 485, 

106 s. Ct. at 1301, or when the governing body retains 

its decision-making authority but exercises it with 

deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of 

those affected by its decisions, see City of Canton, 109 

S. Ct. at 1204-06; Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360, 368-69 

(7th Cir. 1985). 

881 F.2d at 912-13. 

And in Starrett v. Wadley, supra, an employment sexual 

harassment case brought under both Title VII and § 1983, we held 

that: 

Since Monell, the Supreme Court has explained that 

a municipality can be liable under Section 1983 for the 

acts of a municipal official only when the official 

possesses "final policymaking authority" to establish 

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municipal policy with respect to the acts in question. 

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 . (1986) ... ; City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 

112 ... (1988) . . . The Court in Pembaur and 

Praprotnik emphasized that municipal liability is 

limited to 'acts that are, properly speaking, acts "of 

the municipality" - that is, acts which the municipality 

has officially sanctioned or ordered.' Pembaur, 475 

u.s. at 480 ... ; see also Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. at 

924. 

876 F.2d at 818. 

In Specht v. Jensen, 863 F.2d 700 (lOth Cir. 1988), a suit 

brought under § 1983 to recover damages resulting from an alleged 

illegal search of plaintiffs' home, we affirmed the district 

court's grant of a directed verdict for the city of Steamboat 

Springs on the ground that "in order for inaction to provide a 

basis for a city's liability, the inaction must be deliberate 

indifference, tacit approval of an offensive act." Id. at 702. 

In Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 857 F.2d 690 (lOth 

Cir. 1988), we pointed out that in a§ 1983 suit against the city, 

its police chief and various police officers, alleging deprivation 

of equal protection in failure to provide police protection: 

It is well settled that the city may be liable for the 

plaintiff's injuries only if she can establish that her 

injuries were the result of an unconstitutional 

municipal policy or custom. City of Oklahoma Citv v. 

Tuttle, 471 u.s. 808 ... (1985); Monell, 436 u.s. at 

691 . . The policy or custom need not be formal or 

written 

857 F.2d at 695. 

In Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (lOth Cir. 1988), we 

held that a supervisor or the municipality may be liable in a § 

1983 action brought for excessive use of force by the police 

"[w]here there is essentially a complete failure to train, or 

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training that is so reckless or grossly negligent that future 

misconduct is almost inevitable." 

In the case at bar, the City was dismissed from the action 

when the district court granted its motion for directed verdict at 

the close of the plaintiff's evidence. That meant, of course, 

that the district court found that no cause had been demonstrated 

to impose liability on the City. This finding was not challenged 

by Houston. The sufficiency of the evidence to create an issue of 

fact for the jury is solely a question of law. Fed. R. Civ. P., 

Rule 50(a); Holter v. Moore And Co., 702 F.2d 854, 855 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983). A "[d]irected verdict 

is proper only when the evidence is so patently in favor of the 

moving party that a jury verdict in favor of the opposing party 

would be improper and would have to be set aside by the trial 

judge." Peterson v. Hager, 724 F.2d 851, 853-54 (lOth Cir. 1984). 

See also Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 814 F.2d 1489, 1495 (lOth 

Cir. 1987), rev'd in part on reh'g on other grounds, 847 F.2d 1436 

(lOth Cir.) (~bane), cert. denied, 488 u.s. 909 (1988); Thompson 

v. Kerr-McGee Refining Corp., 660 F.2d 1380, 1389 (lOth Cir. 

1981). Without the City in the suit, Reich and McHam were being 

sued only in their individual capacities. 

We must hold, then, that the court erred thereafter in 

entering the Order directing the City to pay and tender the 

judgments entered in this case. Once the City was dismissed from 

the action, there was no basis for assessing any § 1983 liability 

against it because Houston had failed to establish that a policy 

or custom of the City induced the officers' actions and that the 

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officers were acting in an official capacity. We point out that 

even if the City had not been dismissed, it would not have been 

liable under federal law for the punitive damages. City of 

Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 

We hold that the district court erred in ordering the City to 

pay any of the damage awards entered against Reich and McHam. 

III" 

The City contends that the district court erred in ruling 

that the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act applies because (a) 

the Act is not applicable to a civil rights action, and (b) even 

if the Act is applicable, the City cannot be liable because the 

jury found that the defendants Reich and McHam failed to act in 

reliance upon a good faith belief that their acts or omissions 

were reasonable and proper. 

The Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 

51, §§ 151 through 171, was originally enacted in 1978 as the 

Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act which this court in Childers 

v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338 (lOth Cir. 1982), 

recognized as a waiver of sovereign immunity conditioned on 

certain limitations and exceptions. In Nguyen v. State, 788 P.2d 

962 (Okla. 1990), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the scope 

of liability under the Act was limited to torts committed within 

the scope of employment where private persons or entities would be 

liable under the laws of the State of Oklahoma. In Fuller v. 

Odom, 741 P.2d 449 (Okla. 1987), the court held that the Act is 

the exclusive remedy by which an injured plaintiff may recover 

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from a governmental entity for its negligence, thereby abrogating 

any previously existing common-law right. And in Gleason v. City 

of Oklahoma City, 666 P.2d 786 (Okla. App. 1983), the Court of 

Appeals of Oklahoma held that the Act must be read broadly to 

promote the object of the Act and to further justice. 

At the time of the alleged violations, the Act provided the 

following: 

A. Political subdivision, 

requirements imposed by statute, 

or written policy shall: 

subject to 

ordinance, 

procedural 

resolution 

1. Provide a defense for any employee when liability is 

sought for any violation of property rights or any 

rights, privileges or immunities secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States when alleged 

to have been committed by the employee while acting 

within the scope of employment; and 

2. Pay or cause to be paid any judgment entered against 

any employee and/or political subdivision or settlement 

agreed to by the political subdivision entered against 

any employee; and any costs or fees, for a violation of 

property rights or any rights, privileges or immunities 

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States 

which occurred while the employee was acting within the 

scope of employment. (Emphasis supplied). 

Okla. Stat. tit 51, § 162. The Act also defined "scope of 

employment:" 

'Scope of Employment' means performance by an 

employee acting in good faith within the duties of his 

office of employment or of tasks lawfully assigned by a 

competent authority but shall not include fraud or 

corruption. (Emphasis supplied). 

Okla. Stat. tit 51, § 152(8) (1981 & Supp. 1985) (currently 

recodified at Okla. Stat. tit. 51,§ 152(9) (1981 & Supp. 1990)). 

We hold that when Reich and McHam acted on October 31, 1984, 

they acted outside the scope of their employment because the jury 

rendered punitive damages against each of them, having found, as 

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instructed, that their conduct "[a]mounted to gross negligence 

and willful and wanton conduct amounting to reckless disregard of 

plaintiff's [Houston's] rights." (R., Vol. II, p. 159). Thus, 

the trial court erred in its Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion 

for Orders Enforcing Judgment. Once the jury found that 

defendants Reich and McHam had acted willfully, wantonly and in 

reckless disregard of Houston's constitutional rights, the City 

was not liable under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act 

and Reich and McHam forfeited their immunity from liability under 

the Act. 

IV. 

City argues that because the trial court erred in ordering 

it to pay the punitive damage awards, the court also erred in not 

reducing the attorney fee award attributable to the punitive 

damage awards. City contends that "[e]ven if the City of Hugo 

under the Governmental Tort Claims Act, had some responsibility 

to pay actual damages awarded against the individual officers, 

the attorney fee award would be reduced to $13,359.23 because of 

Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 162(0), which provides that the political 

subdivision is not required to pay that portion of attorney fees 

which, by percentage of the judgment, is attributable to punitive 

damages." (Brief of City, pp. 23-4). 

We acknowledge that the City is correct in its analysis on 

this question. However, that does not end our inquiry because it 

is well established that attorney fee awards in 42 u.s.c. § 1983 

actions are governed by federal law, rather than state law. 42 

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u.s.c. § 1988 provides that in any action to enforce a provision 

of § 1983, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 

party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney fee as 

part of the costs. 

In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme 

Court held that plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties 

if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which 

achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit. 

This court has held that even though the prevailing parties be 

awarded only nominal damages of one dollar, an award of $12,500 

in attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion where the most 

important aspect of the judgment was the vindication of 

plaintiffs' civil rights. Nephew v. City of Aurora, 830 F.2d 

1547 (lOth Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 485 u.s. 976 

(1988). Because § 1988 is designed to vindicate federal 

constitutional and statutory rights, a prevailing plaintiff 

ordinarily should recover attorney's fees. Smith v. Robinson, 

468 u.s. 992, 1006 (1984). 

A civil rights plaintiff proceeding under § 1983 must allege 

and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (a) some 

person has deprived him of a federally protected right, and (b) 

the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color 

of state law, Gomez v. Toledo, 446 u.s. 635, 640 (1980), and the 

defendant has the burden of pleading affirmative defenses such as 

immunity. Id. 

We hold that after the City was dismissed from this action 

at the close of Houston's case, there was no basis in law for the 

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district court's subsequent Order directing that City and the 

Excise Board of Choctaw County, Oklahoma, levy and pay the 

judgments. Houston did not "prevail" against the City. 

Conclusion 

We reverse the district court's Order granting Houston's 

motion for orders enforcing the judgments, entered on June 10, 

1988, (seeR., Vol. I, Tab 18) and the Order of January 23, 1990, 

(id. at Tab 24) directing the City of Hugo and the Excise Board 

of Choctaw County, Oklahoma, to tax levy and pay the following: 

1. The actual damages awarded Houston from Reich in sum of 

$4,800.00 together with punitive damages in sum of $5,200.00, 

with interest at 6% per annum from September 16, 1986. 

2. The actual damages awarded Houston from McHam in sum of 

$1,200.00 together with punitive damages in sum of $1,300.00, 

with interest at 6% per annum from September 16, 1986. 

3. Court costs in the sum of $477.92 with interest at 6% 

per annum awarded Houston from Reich and McHam from November 12, 

1986. 

4. Attorney fees awarded Houston from Reich and McHam in 

sum of $25,690.84 with interest at 6% per annum from December 3, 

1986. 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

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Appellate Case: 90-7007 Document: 01019292099 Date Filed: 05/07/1991 Page: 19