Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00285/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00285-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
C. B.
Plaintiff
City of Sonora
Defendant
Mace McIntosh
Defendant
Hal Prock
Defendant
Karen Sinclair
Defendant
Sonora School District
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

C.B., a minor, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

SONORA SCHOOL DISTRICT, )

et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

)

)

No. CV-F-09-285 OWW/DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING

DEFENDANTS' CITY OF SONORA,

CHIEF OF POLICE MACE

McINTOSH AND OFFICER HAL

PROCK'S MOTION TO DISMISS

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

(Doc. 58)

Before the Court is the motion of Defendants City of Sonora,

Chief of Police Mace McIntosh and Officer Hal Prock’s motion to

dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and for a more

definite statement. 

1

Plaintiff filed the FAC pursuant to the Memorandum Decision

filed on September 22, 2009 (“September 22 Memorandum Decision”).

As “Facts Common to All Causes of Action,” the FAC alleges:

Plaintiff and Defendants Sonora School District and Karen 1

Sinclair have settled this action.

1

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 1 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9) In the 2007-2208 school year, minor C.B.

was enrolled as a 6 grade student at Sonora th

Elementary School in the Sonora School

District.

10) C.B. suffers from disabilities, namely a

mood disorder and attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder ... At all times

relevant to the complaint, SONORA SCHOOL

DISTRICT knew of C.B.’s disabilities and had

in fact placed C.B. on an Individualized

Education Plan and section 504 plan.

11) C.B.’s IEP and section 504 plans at

Sonora Elementary School included specific

behavioral interventions to be followed in

the event that C.B. ‘shut down’ or became

unresponsive to school staff due to his mood

disorder. A ‘shut down’ meant that C.B.

would simply freeze in place and not do

anything. He would remain calm during ‘shut

downs’ and typically would not speak. C.B.

would never make any movements that were

aggressive or physically threatening in any

way during a ‘shut down.’ He would typically

cross his arms and keep his head down or just

stand still.

...

13) On or about September 29, 2008, C.B.

allegedly experienced an episodes [sic] in

which he ‘shut down’ and became unresponsive

to school staff. C.B. allegedly sat down on

a bench in the fenced in playground and

folded his arms across his chest and lowered

his head so as to not make eye contact with

anyone. The staff at Sonora Elementary

School failed to follow C.B.’s IEP and

section 504 plan for behavioral intervention

and failed to contact C.B.’s parents or

designated relatives or friends to assist

with C.B.

14) Due to C.B.’s disabilities and despite

the plans put in place to accommodate these

disabilities, KAREN SINCLAIR, a specialist

employed by Sonora Elementary School,

threatened C.B. that if he did not do as she

instructed, she would call the police. 

SINCLAIR did in fact instruct a school

2

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 2 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

receptionist to call the City of Sonora

Police Department for intervention with an

out of control juvenile.

15) On or about September 29, 2008, Chief of

Police MACE MCINTOSH, Officer HAL PROCK, and

Officer Bowly responded to Sonora Elementary

School to respond to the report of the ‘out

of control’ juvenile who was allegedly

causing a disturbance at the school.

16) Upon locating C.B. on the school grounds,

the police officers observed C.B. to be an

eleven year old student, who was not acting

in any disruptive nor unruly manner but

rather sitting quietly on a playground bench

with his head down. One or more of the

officers made contact with C.B. and found him

to be calm and cooperative. C.B. did not act

agitated in any way. None of the officers

observed any conduct on the part of C.B.

which gave them probable cause to take C.B.

into custody nor which gave them any reason

to believe that C.B. posed a threat to the

safety of anyone. When Officer Hal Prock

asked C.B. to stand up from the bench, C.B.

complied with the Officer’s instruction.

17) Despite the fact that C.B. posed no

threat to anyone and despite the fact there

was no probable cause to take C.B. into

custody, Chief of Police MACE MCINTOSH

directed Officer HAL PROCK to handcuff C.B. 

At the time the officers decided to handcuff

the eleven year old, he was located in a

fenced in playground with only one means of

exit. Also, the eleven year old Plaintiff

was surrounded by the officers and at least

two other adults. A Sonora School District

staff member who was present asked the

officers if it was really necessary to

handcuff an eleven year old.

18) The Chief of Police told the Sonora

School District staff member that it was

protocol to handcuff the eleven year old C.B.

even though the Sonora Police Department’s

Handcuff Policy 354 clearly states ‘Juveniles

under 14 years of age generally will not be

handcuffed unless their acts have amounted to

a dangerous felony or whey they are of a

3

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 3 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

state of mind which suggests a reasonable

probability of their desire to escape, injure

themselves, the officer or to destroy

property.’ In addition, Sonora Police

Department Handcuff Policy 354 clearly states

that handcuffing is a discretionary procedure

and that ‘the arresting officer should

consider the circumstances leading to the

arrest, the attitude of the arrested person, 

and the age, sex, and health of the person

before handcuffing.’

19) Despite the fact that the officers

observed that Plaintiff was calm and

cooperative and, despite the fact that

Plaintiff was in an enclosed area and

surrounded by at least four adults, the

officers forcibly handcuffed Plaintiff while

he was on the playground. Officer Prock

tightly handcuffed Plaintiff thereby causing

his wrists to be hurt and injured. Officer

Prock then left Plaintiff C.B. standing with

his hands handcuffed tightly behind his back

on the playground while he went to pull a

police car around closer to the side of the

school building. Officer Prock left the

eleven year old Plaintiff in handcuffs (in

full view of the public) even though at least

three adults including the Chief of Police

remained with C.B. in the playground area.

20) Officer Hal Prock then placed the

Plaintiff child, who was still tightly

handcuffed, in the backseat of a City of

Sonora police car. The police car was

equipped with all usual safety equipment,

including a grate between the front and back

seats and locking back doors which could not

be opened by the back seat passenger (in this

case an eleven year old child).

21) Officer Hal Prock kept Plaintiff in

handcuffs in the back seat of the police

vehicle for a half an hour drive to

Jamestown, California, where he left the

child in the custody of his uncle, Mark [sic]

Banks. During the trip to Jamestown, Officer

Hal Prock told Plaintiff C.B. he had been a

police officer for eleven years and had never

had to handcuff an eleven year old for doing

nothing.

4

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 4 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

...

23) Sonora Elementary School gave the City of

Sonora police officers a packet of contact

information for Plaintiff C.B.’s parents and

Uncle, Matt [sic] Banks. At no time did the

referenced City of Sonora employees have the

permission of C.B. nor his parents to

transport C.B. or to cause C.B. to be

transported by anyone other that C.B.’s

parents and emergency contacts. In fact,

when Officer Prock called C.B.’s Uncle, Matt

[sic] Banks, the uncle informed Officer Prock

that the School had an established protocol

for dealing with any situations involving

C.B. and that the protocol was not being

followed.

The FAC alleges causes of action for false imprisonment (Second

Cause of Action), battery (Third Cause of Action), intentional

infliction of emotional distress (Fourth Cause of Action) ,

excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Eighth Cause of

Action), and Monell liability (Ninth Cause of Action).

Defendants move to dismiss these causes of action for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Alternatively, Defendants move for a more definite statement.

A. MOTION TO DISMISS.

1. Governing Standards.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9 Cir.2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) th

where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the

complaint presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead

essential facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a th

5

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 5 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences

from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). However, th

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they

are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock,

Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). “A district court th

should grant a motion to dismiss if plaintiffs have not pled

‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Williams ex rel. Tabiu v. Gerber Products Co., 523 F.3d

934, 938 (9 Cir.2008), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley,

th

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “‘Factual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Id. 

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.” Bell Atlantic, id. at 555. A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,’

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully, Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that

are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops

6

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 6 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___

U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court explained:

Two working principles underlie our decision

in Twombley. First, the tenet that a court

must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitations fo

the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice

... Rule 8 marks a notable and generous

departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era, but it does

not unlock the doors of discovery for a

plaintiff armed with nothing more than

conclusions. Second, only a complaint that

states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss ... Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief

will ... be a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense ... But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]’ - ‘that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ....

In keeping with these principles, a court

considering a motion to dismiss can choose to

begin by identifying pleadings that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. While

legal conclusions can provide the framework

of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.

 Immunities and other affirmative defenses may be upheld on

a motion to dismiss only when they are established on the face of

the complaint. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th

Cir.1999); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th

7

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 7 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Cir. 1980) When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may

consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached

to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the

complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of

which the court takes judicial notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc, 146

F.3d 699, 705-706 (9 Cir.1988). th

2. Qualified Immunity.

Defendants move to dismiss the Eighth Cause of Action on the

ground that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity from liability for damages under Section 1983. 

The Eighth Cause of Action, after incorporating all

preceding allegations, alleges that Defendants McIntosh and Prock

“subjected Plaintiff to unreasonable seizure of his person

without reasonable or probable cause,” “wrongfully caused

Plaintiff to be restrained, arrested, confined and/or detained,

which amounted to a seizure of Plaintiff’s person,”

“intentionally effected this seizure of Plaintiff by use of

unlawful and excessive force against him, a minor child at the

time,” that the “force used by Defendant officers against

Plaintiff was not objectively reasonable under the

circumstances,” and that Plaintiff was physically and emotionally

harmed thereby.

Qualified immunity serves to shield government officials

“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

8

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 8 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In Pearson v. Callahan,

___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009), the Supreme Court summarized

the purpose of qualified immunity:

Qualified immunity balances two important

interests-the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and

liability when they perform their duties

reasonably. The protection of qualified

immunity applies regardless of whether the

government official's error is “a mistake of

law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on

mixed questions of law and fact.” Groh v.

Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,

dissenting) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438

U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (noting that qualified

immunity covers “mere mistakes in judgment,

whether the mistake is one of fact or one of

law”)).

Because qualified immunity is “an immunity

from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability ... it is effectively lost if a

case is erroneously permitted to go to

trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,

526 (1985) (emphasis deleted). Indeed, we

have made clear that the “driving force”

behind creation of the qualified immunity

doctrine was a desire to ensure that

“‘insubstantial claims’ against government

officials [will] be resolved prior to

discovery.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 640, n. 2 (1987). Accordingly, “we

repeatedly have stressed the importance of

resolving immunity questions at the earliest

possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per

curiam).

Deciding qualified immunity normally entails a two-step analysis.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). First, “taken in the

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the

facts alleged show the officers’ conduct violated a

9

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 9 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). If the court determines that the conduct did not violate

a constitutional right, the inquiry is over and the officer is

entitled to qualified immunity. However, if the court determines

that the conduct did violate a constitutional right, Saucier’s

second prong requires the court to determine whether, at the time

of the violation, the constitutional right was “clearly

established.” Id. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it

would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. This

inquiry is wholly objective and is undertaken in light of the

totality of the specific factual circumstances of each case. Id.

at 201. Even if the violated right is clearly established,

Saucier recognized that, in certain situations, it may be

difficult for a police officer to determine how to apply the

relevant legal doctrine to the particular circumstances he faces. 

If an officer makes a mistake in applying the relevant legal

doctrine, he is not precluded from claiming qualified immunity so

long as the mistake is reasonable. If “the officer’s mistake as

to what the law requires is reasonable, ... the officer is

entitled to the immunity defense.” Id. at 205. In Pearson, the

Supreme Court ruled that “while the sequence set forth [in

Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as

mandatory.” Pearson, id. at 818. “The judges of the district

courts and the courts of appeal should be permitted to exercise

10

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 10 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the

qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of

the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. In

Brosseau v. Haugan, 543 U.S. 194 (2004), the Supreme Court

reiterated:

Qualified immunity shields an officer from

suit when she makes a decision that, even if

constitutionally deficient, reasonably

misapprehends the law governing the

circumstances she confronted. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S., at 206 (qualified immunity

operates ‘to protect officers from the

sometimes “hazy border between excessive and

acceptable force”’). Because the focus is on

whether the officer had fair notice that her

conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is

judged against the backdrop of the law at the

time of the conduct. If the law at that time

did not clearly establish that the officer’s

conduct would violate the Constitution, the

officer should not be subject to liability

or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation.

It is important to emphasize that this

inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad

general proposition.’ Id., at 201. As we

previously said in this very context:

‘[T]here is no doubt that Graham v.

Connor, supra, clearly establishes

the general proposition that use of

force is contrary to the Fourth

Amendment if it is excessive under

objective standards of

reasonableness. Yet, that is not

enough. Rather, we emphasized in

Anderson [v. Creighton] “that the

right the official is alleged to

have violated must have been

‘clearly established’ in a more

particularized, and hence more

relevant, sense: The contours of

the right must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable officer

would understand that what he is

11

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 11 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

doing violates that right.’ ... 

The relevant, dispositive inquiry

in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it

would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he

confronted.’ ... 

The Court of Appeals acknowledged this

statement of law, but then proceeded to find

fair warning in the general tests set out in

Graham and Garner ... In so doing, it was

mistaken. Graham and Garner, following the

lead of the Fourth Amendment’s text, are cast

at a high level of generality. See Graham v.

Connor, supra, at 396 (‘”[T]he test of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is

not capable of precise definition or

mechanical application”’). Of course, in an

obvious case, these standards can ‘clearly

establish’ the answer, even without a body of

relevant case law.’

543 U.S. at 198-199. However, as explained in Wilkins v. City of

Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 956 (9 Cir.2003), cert. denied sub nom. th

Scarrot v. Wilkins, 543 U.S. 811 (2004):

Where the officers’ entitlement to qualified

immunity depends on the resolution of

disputed issues of fact in their favor, and

against the non-moving party, summary

judgment is not appropriate. See Saucier,

533 U.S. at 216 ... (Ginsberg, J.,

concurring)(‘Of course, if an excessive force

claim turns on which of two conflicting

stories best captures what happened on the

street, Graham will not permit summary

judgment in favor of the defendant 

official.’). 

Defendants argue that this action should be dismissed before

discovery in order to preclude expenditure of significant time

and money:

The Supreme Court holds that qualified

immunity is designed to prevent exactly that. 

12

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 12 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Even premised upon the skeletal and selective

facts proffered by plaintiff in its [sic]

Amended Complaint, defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity. In the interest of

justice and in furtherance of the explicit

intent of the United States Supreme Court

this Court should dismiss this matter at this

juncture.

Defendants argue that qualified immunity has been

established in connection with the detention and handcuffing of

Plaintiff and his transportation by Officer Prock in the police

vehicle to Plaintiff’s uncle’s home. 

Defendants argue that Officer Prock’s conduct in handcuffing

Plaintiff was objectively reasonable under the circumstances

because Officer Prock was summoned to the school and informed

that Plaintiff was “disruptive” and “out of control”:

In contrast, had the juvenile not been

handcuffed and proceeded to injure himself in

the police car or while otherwise in custody,

Officer Prock would now presumably face

whether such hypothesized conduct was

reasonable in light of the fact that Prock

was informed that the juvenile was ‘out of

control’ and ‘disruptive.’ 

Defendants further argue that, even if Officer Prock’s conduct

was not reasonable, he is entitled to qualified immunity because

his conduct would have been the result of mistaken judgment made

in good faith and not a knowing violation of the law:

In the absence of legal authority holding

that an officer may not lawfully handcuff a

detainee in this situation, defendants are

entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s

Complaint. Officer Prock made an objectively

reasonable decision to handcuff the

plaintiff. Officer Prock knew plaintiff had

been out of control and disruptive at school,

and his disruptive misconduct was of the

13

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 13 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

magnitude where it had become necessary for

the school to call the police to remove him.

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants had a right to

come to the school to investigate the report of an allegedly “out

of control” and “disruptive” student. However, after Defendants

arrived at the school, Plaintiff argues that the decision to

handcuff Plaintiff violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights

because, based on the allegations of the FAC, Plaintiff was no

longer acting in an out of control or disruptive manner. 

Plaintiff relies on Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d

1295 (11 Cir.2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 956 (2007), as th

authority for his position. 

In Bostic, an elementary school student brought a Section

1983 action against a deputy sheriff who served as a school

resource officer (SRO), the sheriff, and others, arising from the

detention and handcuffing of the student during a physical

education class. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District

Court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the

ground of qualified immunity. In Bostic, a p.e. coach believed

that Gray was not doing jumping jacks with the class; when Gray

failed to comply with the coach’s order that she do so, the coach

told her to come to the wall; when Gray did so, she allegedly

told the coach that she punch or hit the coach; although Gray

denied that she stated she would punch or hit the coach, she did

not dispute that she would do something physical to the coach. 

Deputy Bostic witnessed the exchange between the coach and Gray. 

14

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 14 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Deputy Bostic escorted Gray from the gym, told Gray to turn

around and placed her in handcuffs. Gray stood with the

handcuffs on for five minutes. On appeal, the student, Gray,

argued that Deputy Bostic used excessive force in detaining her

because he lacked a right to detain her at all. 458 F.3d at

1304. The Eleventh Circuit applied the reasonableness standard

articulated in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-342

(1985), to school seizures by law enforcement officers:

In T.L.O., the Supreme Court recognized that

the substantial need to maintain discipline

in the classroom and foster a positive

learning environment ‘requires some

modification of the level of illicit activity

needed to justify a search’ in the public

school setting.’ T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 ...

To that end, the Supreme Court concluded that

‘the accommodation of the privacy interests

of schoolchildren with the substantial need

of teachers and administrators for freedom to

maintain order in the schools does not

require strict adherence to the requirement

that searches be based on probable cause.’ 

Id. at 341 ... Instead, under T.L.O.’s

reasonableness standard, ‘the legality of a

search of a student should depend simply on

the reasonableness, under all the

circumstances, of the search.’ Id. Under

the T.L.O. standard, the reasonableness of

the search is evaluated using a two-step

inquiry: ‘first, one must consider “whether

the ... action was justified at its

inception”; second, one must determine

whether the search as actually conducted “was

reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified interference in

the first place.”’ Id. at 341 ... The T.L.O.

standard mirrors the standard announced in

Terry v. Ohio governing the reasonableness of

investigatory stops. See Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 20 ... (1988). 

The Eleventh Circuit ruled that, because Deputy Bostic witnessed

15

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 15 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Gray’s threat in a school setting, stopping Gray to question her

about her conduct was reasonable. Id. at 1305. The Eleventh

Circuit then ruled:

Turning to T.L.O.’s second prong, we must

consider whether Deputy Bostic’s subsequent

handcuffing of Gray ‘was reasonably related

to the scope of the circumstances which

justified the intervention in the first

place.’ T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 314 ... ‘[A

seizure] will be permissible in its scope

when the measures adopted are reasonably

related to the objectives of the [seizure]

and not excessively intrusive in light of the

age and sex of the student and the nature of

the infraction.’ Id. at 342... After

stopping Gray, Deputy Bostic not only

questioned her, but also handcuffed her for

not less than five minutes. Thus, the

question under the second prong is whether

the handcuffing of nine-year-old Gray was

reasonably related to the scope of the

circumstances which justified Deputy Bostic’s

initial interference and was not excessively

intrusive.

By his own admission, Deputy Bostic did not

handcuff Gray to effect an arrest of Gray. 

Rather, his handcuffing of Gray was during an

investigatory stop. Nonetheless, during an

investigatory stop, an officer can still

handcuff a detainee when the officer

reasonably believes that the detainee

presents a potential threat to safety ....

The problem in this case for Deputy Bostic is

that, at the time Deputy Bostic handcuffed

Gray, there was no indication of a potential

threat to anyone’s safety. The incident was

over, and Gray, after making the comment, had

promptly complied with her teachers’

instructions, coming to the gym wall and then

to Coach Horton when told to do so. There is

no evidence that Gray was gesturing or

engaging in any further disruptive behavior. 

Rather, Gray had cooperated with her teachers

and did not pose a threat to anyone’s safety. 

In fact, Coach Horton had insisted that she

would handle the matter, but Deputy Bostic

16

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 16 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

still intervened. Deputy Bostic does not

even claim that he handcuffed Gray to protect

his or anyone’s safety. Rather, Deputy

Bostic candidly admitted that he handcuffed

Gray to persuade her to get rid of her

disrespectful attitude and to impress upon

her the serious nature of committing crimes. 

In effect, Deputy Bostic’s handcuffing of

Gray was his attempt to punish Gray in order

to change her behavior in the future.

Thus, Deputy Bostic’s handcuffing Gray was

not reasonably related to the scope of the

circumstances that justified the initial

investigatory stop. Rather, the handcuffing

was excessively intrusive given Gray’s young

age and the fact that it was not done to

protect anyone’s safety. Therefore, the

handcuffing of Gray violated Gray’s Fourth

Amendment rights.

458 F.3d at 1305-1306. The Eleventh Circuit then addressed

whether Deputy Bostic’s violation of Gray’s Fourth Amendment

rights violated a clearly established constitutional right:

It is well settled that, under the Fourth

Amendment, ‘[t]he scope of a detention must

be carefully tailored to its underlying

justification’ and that the ‘investigatory

methods employed [during a detention] should

be the least intrusive means reasonably

available to verify or dispel the officer’s

suspicion in a short period of time.’ Florida

v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 ... (1983). As

we have already discussed, this Court has

long concluded that it is reasonable for

officers to use handcuffs to protect

themselves during an investigative detention

... However, Gray does not cite and we cannot

locate a case addressing before today when it

may be reasonable to use handcuffs in an

investigatory stop absent a safety rationale. 

Thus, no factually similar pre-existing case

law put Deputy Bostic on notice that his use

of handcuffs to discipline Gray was

objectively unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment.

However, our inquiry does not end here. Even

17

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 17 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

in the absence of factually similar case law,

an official can have fair warning that his

conduct is unconstitutional when the

constitutional violation is obvious,

sometimes referred to as ‘obvious clarity’

cases. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.

250, 271 ... (1997)(‘[A] general

constitutional rule already identified in the

decisional law may apply with obvious clarity

to the specific conduct in question, even

though the very action in question has [not]

been previously held unlawful.’ ...).

The Fourth Amendment’s general prescription

against ‘unreasonable’ seizures seldom puts

officers on notice that certain conduct is

unlawful under precise circumstances ...

Nonetheless, on rare occasions we have

concluded that general Fourth Amendment

principles make the constitutional violation

obvious ... In these cases, the officer’s

conduct at issue lay ‘so obviously at the

very core of what the Fourth Amendment

prohibits that the unlawfulness of the

conduct was readily apparent to [him]

notwithstanding the lack of [fact-specific]

case law.’ ... Put another way, the officer’s

conduct in these cases was ‘well beyond the

“hazy border” that sometimes separates lawful

conduct from unlawful conduct,’ such that

every objectively reasonable officer would

have known that the conduct was unlawful ....

We likewise conclude that Deputy Bostic’s

conduct in handcuffing Gray, a compliant,

nine-year-old girl for the sole purpose of

punishing her was an obvious violation of

Gray’s Fourth Amendment rights. After making

the comment, Gray had complied with her

teachers’ and Deputy Bostic’s instructions. 

Indeed, one of the teachers had informed

Deputy Bostic that she would handle the

matter. In addition, Deputy Bostic’s purpose

in handcuffing Gray was not to pursue an

investigation to confirm or dispel his

suspicions that Gray had committed a

misdemeanor. Rather, Deputy Bostic’s purpose

in handcuffing Gray was simply to punish her

and teach her a lesson. Every reasonable

officer would have known that handcuffing a

compliant nine-year-old for purely punitive

18

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 18 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

reasons is unreasonable. We emphasize that

the Court is not saying that the use of

handcuffs during an investigatory stop of a

nine-year-old is always unreasonable, but

just unreasonable under the particular facts

of this case.

458 F.3d at 1307.

Plaintiff asserts that two facts which raise the level of

intrusiveness of an investigatory seizure are the use of

handcuffs and the detention of a suspect in a police vehicle,

citing Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 836-840 (6th

Cir.2005).

In Bennett, African-American bicycle riders who were stopped

by police brought a Section 1983 action alleging Fourth Amendment

violations. The Sixth Circuit addressed qualified immunity from

liability when the youths were handcuffed and detained in the

back of the police car during the Terry stop:

A Terry stop cannot be excessively intrusive

and must be reasonably related in scope and

duration to the purposes of the investigation

... ‘When establishing that a detention,

which was not supported by probable cause,

was reasonable, the government must

demonstrate that the detention and

investigative methods used were reasonable

under the circumstances.’ ... The ‘scope of

the intrusion permitted’ in the course of a

Terry stop ‘will vary ... with the particular

facts and circumstances of each case,’ but in

all cases the ‘detention must be temporary

and last no longer than is necessary’ and

‘the investigative methods employed should be

the least intrusive means reasonably

available to verify or dispel the officer’s

suspicion in a short period of time.’ ....

‘The use of handcuffs is the use of force,

and such force must be objectively reasonable

under the circumstances.’ ... Consequently,

19

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 19 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

this Court has held that ‘[d]uring a Terry

stop, officers may draw their weapons or use

handcuffs ‘so long as circumstances warrant

that precaution.’ ....

With this principle applied to the facts of

this incident, we easily conclude that

handcuffing the youths violated their Fourth

Amendment rights. We previously concluded

that the pat-down searches of the youths

violated their Fourth Amendment rights

because the officers had no reasonable belief

that the youths were armed and dangerous. In

any event, the officers did conduct pat-down

searches, and uncovered no weapons or

anything else to warrant further concern for

their safety. That makes it truly remarkable

(not in a good way) that the officers then

handcuffed the youths. In addition to the

fact that the officers had no reasonable

belief that the youths were armed and

dangerous, they have alleged no facts that

would indicate that the youths attempted to

flee or do anything else that would warrant

this use of force. In sum, we see no

circumstances here warranting the use of

handcuffs as a precaution for officer safety

or otherwise and therefore conclude that the

use of handcuffs during this Terry stop

violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment

rights. 

Plaintiff also cites Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839,

(9 Cir.2007). In Tekle, a team of twenty-three federal law th

enforcement agents executed search and arrest warrants for

Tekle’s parents, suspected of narcotics trafficking and taxrelated offenses. When the officers executed the warrants, the

mother told the officers that her eleven-year-old son was in the

garage. When the officers opened the garage, the officers told

Tekle to put his hands up. Tekle did not realize the officers

were addressing him and turned to run into the house. The

officers again told Tekle to turn around with his hands up. 

20

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 20 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Tekle turned around and started walking out of the garage with

his hands up. One of the officers told Tekle to get on the

ground, so he lay face down on the driveway. The officer held a

gun to Tekle’s head, searched him and handcuffed him. The

officer lifted Tekle from behind by the chain of the handcuffs

and took him out to the sidewalk, where Tekle sat, still

handcuffed, until his father was brought out of the house,

approximately fifteen minutes later. After the father was

brought out, the officers removed the handcuffs from Tekle. On

the issue of qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit ruled:

Tekle was barefoot, unarmed, clad in shorts

and a t-shirt, and appeared to be

approximately twelve years old. He was

alone, and there were twenty-three armed

officers. He as not resisting the officers

but was lying face down on the ground with

his arms stretched in front of him. 

Moreover, the officers had already searched

Tekle and ‘uncovered no weapons or anything

else to warrant further concern for their

safety.’ Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410

F.3d 810, 837 (6 Cir.2005). Yet Tekle th

remained handcuffed for fifteen to twenty

more minutes, and an officer allegedly lifted

him from behind by the chain of the

handcuffs. We conclude that a reasonable

jury could find that the officers’ use of

handcuffs rendered Tekle’s detention

unreasonable. Cf. id. (concluding that the

use of handcuffs during a stop pursuant to

Terry v. Ohio ... violated the Fourth

Amendment rights of the plaintiffs, described

as ‘youths,’ because the officers had

conducted pat-down searches and uncovered no

weapons and the officers had no reason to

believe the youths were dangerous or would

flee). We accordingly turn to whether it

would be clear to a reasonable officer that

his conduct was unlawful in light of existing

law ...

21

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 21 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

We stated in Meredith that, as of July 10,

1998, ‘it was not clearly established in this

(or any other) circuit that simply

handcuffing a person and detaining her in

handcuffs during a search for evidence would

violate her Fourth Amendment rights.’ 

Meredith, 342 F.3d at 1063. None of the

plaintiffs in Meredith, however, as an

eleven-year-old child.

Moreover, in Franklin, we stated that

detentions of children raise particular

concerns that must be assessed with other

circumstances. Franklin, 31 F.3d at 876. 

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in McDonald,

relying in part on the fact that the

plaintiff was a child, was decided in 1992. 

See McDonald, 966 F.2d at 295; see also

Ikerd, 101 F.3d at 435 (a Fifth Circuit case

decided in 1996) also involving the use of

excessive force against a child); Baker, 50

F.3d at 1193 (a Third Circuit case, deciding

in 1995 that the use of guns and handcuffs

during a twenty-five minute detention of

seventeen and fifteen-year old children

supported a finding that their constitutional

rights were violated.). The totality of the

circumstances supports the conclusion that

not only was Tekle’s detention unreasonable,

but a reasonable officer would have known

that an eleven-year-old child who was

unarmed, barefoot, vastly outnumbered, and

was not resisting arrest or attempting to

flee should not have been kept in handcuffs

for fifteen to twenty additional minutes.

511 F.3d at 850. 

Defendants argue that Tekle is not controlling because there

“is no claim that Officer Prock prolonged the detention, or that

he did anything except place the plaintiff in handcuffs and

transport him in a police vehicle to his uncle.” 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ attempted distinction of

Tekle is without merit: “It is 9 Circuit law that the need for th

force must be weighed against the force used, and minor children

22

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 22 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

who are cooperating with and outnumbered by police pose, at best,

a minimal need for force.” 

Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the alleged

violations of the Fourth Amendment based on the handcuffing of

Plaintiff and transporting him while handcuffed to his uncle’s

home. According to the allegations of the FAC, Plaintiff became

unresponsive to school staff, sat down on a bench in the school

playground, folded his arms on his chest, and refused to make eye

contact. Although the FAC alleges that the police were told by

school staff that Plaintiff was an “‘out of control’ juvenile who

was ... causing a disturbance at the school,” when the officers

arrived, Plaintiff was allegedly sitting on the bench with his

head down. The FAC alleges that when the officers made contact

with Plaintiff, he was calm and cooperative and complied with

instructions to stand up from the bench. It is alleged that

Plaintiff was surrounded by three police officers and two other

adults and that, when asked why Plaintiff was being handcuffed,

the Chief of Police responded that it was protocol to do so. 

There is nothing in these allegations allowing an inference that

Plaintiff posed a danger to anyone or that Plaintiff would flee

the school. The FAC alleges that Defendants were provided with

Plaintiff’s contact information in his IEP. Given these

allegations and the case authority cited above, it is arguable

that the handcuffing of Plaintiff violated his Fourth Amendment

rights and, at the time of the violation, the constitutional

right was clearly established. 

23

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 23 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Eighth Cause of Action on

the basis of qualified immunity from liability is DENIED.

3. Monell Liability.

Defendants move to dismiss the Ninth Cause of Action against

Defendant City of Sonora for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. 

After incorporating all preceding allegations, the Ninth

Cause of Action alleges:

80) Defendant CITY OF SONORA, through and by

its police department, maintained a practice

which resulted in the section 1983 excessive

force damages alleged above in cause of

action eight against CHIEF OF POLICE MACE

MCINTOSH and OFFICER HAL PROCK.

81) Despite the fact the Sonora Police

Department written Handcuffing Policy 354

counsels against handcuffing children who are

under the age of 14, the CITY OF SONORA

Police Department maintained a practice of

violating this written policy and handcuffing

all persons detained, whether or not arrested

for any crime, regardless of their age and

regardless of the circumstances. CHIEF OF

POLICE MACE MCINTOSH was one city official

responsible for maintaining this practice and

so recited the above practice when explaining

to SONORA SCHOOL DISTRICT personnel why C.B.

must be handcuffed.

82) Defendant CITY OF SONORA exhibited

deliberate indifference to the constitutional

rights of minors in maintaining such a

practice, which was contrary to their written

policy. Defendant CITY OF SONORA knew or

should have known that maintaining such a

practice was in violation of well-established

constitutional rights of minors to be treated

with special care by police officers. The

City’s policy, practice, rule or regulation

did directly result in the violation of

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

24

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 24 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

83) The acts of Defendants, as alleged

herein, were malicious and oppressive and

justify the imposition of damages against the

CITY OF SONORA under Monell as well as the

imposition of substantial exemplary damages

against the CITY OF SONORA.

Local government entities and local government officials

acting in their official capacity can be sued for monetary,

declaratory, or injunctive relief, but only if the allegedly

unconstitutional actions took place pursuant to some “policy

statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body's officers....” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Alternatively, if no formal

policy exists, plaintiffs may point to “customs and usages” of

the local government entity. Id. A local government entity

cannot be held liable simply because it employs someone who has

acted unlawfully. Id. at 694. See also Haugen, 351 F.3d at 393

(“Municipalities cannot be held liable under a traditional

respondeat superior theory. Rather, they may be held liable only

when "action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature

caused a constitutional tort.... [T]o establish municipal

liability, a plaintiff must prove the existence of an

unconstitutional municipal policy.”). 

To prevail in a civil rights claim against a local

government under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part

test: 

(1) The local government official(s) must have

intentionally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights;

25

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 25 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

(2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and

may not be an isolated incident; and

(3) There must be a link between the specific policy or

custom to the plaintiff’s injury.

Id. at 690-92. There are a number of ways to prove a policy or

custom of a municipality. A plaintiff may show (1) “a

longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard

operating procedure’ of the local government entity;” (2) “the

decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final

policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy in the area of decision;” or (3) “the

official with final policymaking authority either delegated that

authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.” 

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a municipal policy “may be

inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated

constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers

were not discharged or reprimanded.” Id. 

A municipality may still be liable under Monell for a single

incident where: (1) the person causing the violation has “final

policymaking authority;” (2) the “final policymaker” “ratified” a

subordinate’s actions; or (3) the “final policymaker” acted with

deliberate indifference to a subordinate’s constitutional

violations. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 1999).

While Plaintiff concedes that written Handcuffing Policy

does not state that all detainees must be handcuffed, the FAC

alleges that the Chief of Police maintained a practice and custom

26

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 26 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

of ignoring the written policy and requiring all detainees,

regardless of the circumstances, to be handcuffed. Plaintiff

cites Rendon v. City of Fresno, 2007 WL 2302340 at *4 (E.D.Cal.,

Aug. 8, 2007):

A local government entity cannot be held

liable under § 1983 simply because it employs

someone who acted unlawfully. Instead, it is

when ‘execution of a government’s policy or

custom, whether made by its law-makers or by

those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said

to represent official policy,’ inflicts the

injury that the government as an entity is

responsible. Ulrich v. City & County of San

Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9 Cir.2002) th

(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694)). ‘A

single decision by a municipal policymaker

may be sufficient to trigger section 1983

liability under Monell, even though the

decision is not intended to govern future

situations.’ Haughn v. Brosseau, 351 F.3d

372 (9 Cir.2003) (quoting Gillette v. th

Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9 Cir.1992) th

(citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475

U.S. 469, 480-81 ... (1986)). The local

government will be found responsible if it

can be established that ‘the individual who

committed the constitutional tort was an

official with final policymaking authority

and that the challenged action itself was an

act of official governmental policy.’ 

Sepatis v. City & County of San Francisco,

217 F.Supp.2d 992, 1005 (D.Cal.2002).

Defendant City of Sonora’s motion to dismiss the Ninth Cause

of Action is DENIED. The allegations of the FAC suffice to state

a claim for Monell liability. Whether Plaintiff can prove Monell

liability depends on the facts, which must be resolved at summary

judgment or trial.

4. Second Cause of Action for False Imprisonment.

Defendants move to dismiss the Second Cause of Action for

27

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 27 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

false imprisonment for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. 

“The elements of a tortious claim of false imprisonment are:

(1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2)

without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of

time, however brief.” Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80

Cal.App.4th 485, 496 (2000). Defendants contend that dismissal

is required because “the officers were acting reasonably and with

lawful privilege of protecting the public peace and order and are

immune from suit.” Defendants cite Billington v. Smith, 292

F.3d 1177, 1188-1189 (9 Cir.2002), a case involving deadly th

force under Section 1983, that “even though the officers might

have had ‘less intrusive means available to them,’ and perhaps

under departmental guidelines should have ‘developed a tactical

plan’ instead of attempting an immediate seizure, police officers

‘need not avail themselves of the least intrusive means of

responding’ and need only act ‘within that range of conduct we

identify as reasonable.’” Defendants cite Knapps v. City of

Oakland, 647 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1166 (N.D.Cal.2009):

Although the amount of force Officer Cardoza

used excessive, Plaintiff has not shown that

it is improper for officers to handcuff a

battery suspect. The use of handcuffs can

typically be justified on safety concerns.

Defendants assert that they are entitled to immunity pursuant to

California Government Code § 821.6, which provides that a public

employee is immune from liability for injuries caused by instituting

or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceedings, even if the

28

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 28 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

employee acts maliciously and without probable cause. 

Whether Defendants were acting reasonably and with lawful

privilege is a question of fact which cannot be resolved in a

motion to dismiss. In addition, California denies immunity to

police officers who use excessive force in arresting a suspect. 

Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9 Cir.2002), th

citing Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal.3d 202, 215 (1991). 

Public employees are not entitled to immunity in suits for false

arrest or false imprisonment. Id., citing California Government 

Code § 820.4. Because the Defendant Officers may not be entitled

to immunity, the City of Sonora is not entitled to immunity. 

Id., citing California Government Code § 815.2. Defendants

reference to Section 821.6 makes no sense in the context of this

action because the FAC does not allege that Defendants instituted

or prosecuted any judicial or administrative proceedings.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Cause of Action for

false imprisonment is DENIED.

5. Third Cause of Action for Battery.

Defendants move to dismiss the Third Cause of Action for

battery for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

As explained in Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal.App.4th 516,

526-527 (2009):

The elements of civil battery are: (1)

defendant intentionally performed an act that

resulted in a harmful or offensive contact

with the plaintiff’s person; (2) plaintiff

did not consent to the contact; and (3) the

29

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 29 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

harmful or offensive contact caused injury,

damage, loss or harm to plaintiff ....

An officer ‘”may use reasonable force to make

an arrest, prevent escape or overcome

resistance, and need not desist in the face

of resistence.”’ ... ‘”Unlike private

citizens, police officers act under color of

law to protect the public interest. They are

charged with acting affirmatively and using

force as part of their duties, because ‘the

right to make an arrest or investigatory stop

necessarily carries with it the right to use

some degree of physical coercion or threat

thereof to effect it.’ ...”’ ... ‘”[Police

officers] are, in short, not similarly

situated to the ordinary battery defendant

and need not be treated the same. In these

cases, then, ‘ ... the defendant police

officer is in the exercise of the privilege

of protecting the public peace and order

[and] he is entitled to the even greater use

of force than might be in the same

circumstances required for self-defense.’

...”’ ....

A state law battery claim is a counterpart to

a federal claim of excessive use of force. 

In both, a plaintiff must prove that the

peace officer’s use of force was

unreasonable.

Defendants reiterate that the officers, in good faith, acted

in an objectively reasonable manner and, therefore, the Third

Cause of Action should be dismissed. Defendants refer to the

allegations that the City of Sonora has a written handcuff

policy, which is a discretionary procedure and that the officers

only arrived at the school based on information from school

officials, including a specialist, that Plaintiff was out of

control. Defendants argue:

Restraining a minor plaintiff, who had been

reportedly ‘out of control’ before they

arrived, pursuant to a discretionary policy

30

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 30 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

vesting them with the power to do so, and

delivering the minor to a relative’s home is

clearly not unreasonable.

For the reasons already stated, Defendants’ contentions

raise factual issues, especially given the allegation that the

Chief of Police stated that he was handcuffing Plaintiff because

of protocol and not because of any concern for safety or flight. 

Defendants rely on California Government Code § 820.2 in

arguing that Defendants are entitled to immunity. Section 820.2

provides:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a

public employee is not liable for an injury

resulting from his act or omission where the

act or omission was the result of the

exercise of the discretion vested in him,

whether or not such discretion be abused.

Defendants, relying on Section 820.2, move to dismiss the Third 

Cause of Action on the ground that government officials are not

personally liable for their discretionary acts within the scope

of their authority, even where it is alleged that their conduct

was malicious. 

In Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal.4th 972 (1995), the

California Supreme Court, citing Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782

(1968), ruled:

... Johnson concluded, a ‘workable

definition’ of immune discretionary acts

draws the line between ‘planning’ and

‘operational’ functions of government. 

(Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 793, 794.) 

Immunity is reserved for those ‘basic policy

decisions [which have] ... been [expressly]

committed to coordinate branches of

government,’ and as to which judicial

interference would thus be ‘unseemly.’ (Id.

31

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 31 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

at p. 793 ....) Such ‘areas of quasilegislative policy-making ... are

sufficiently sensitive’ (id. at p. 794) to

call for judicial abstention from

interference that ‘might even in the first

instance affect the coordinate body’s

decision-making process’ (id. at p. 793).

On the other hand, said Johnson, there is no

basis for immunizing lower-level, or

‘ministerial,’ decisions that merely

implement a basic policy already formulated. 

(Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 796.) 

Moreover, we cautioned, immunity applies only

to deliberate and considered policy

decisions, in which a ‘[conscious] balancing

[of] risks and advantages ... took place. 

The fact that an employee normally engages in

“discretionary activity” is irrelevant if, in

a given case, the employee did not render a

considered decision ....’ (Id. at p. 795, fn.

8).

Recognizing that ‘it is not a tort for

government to govern’ ..., our subsequent

cases have carefully preserved the

distinction between policy and operational

judgments. Thus, we have rejected claims of

immunity for a bus driver’s decision not to

intervene in one passenger’s violent assault

against another ..., a college district’s

failure to warn of known crime dangers in a

student parking lot ..., a county clerk’s

libelous statements during a newspaper

interview about official matters ...,

university therapists’ failure to warn a

patient’s homicide victim of the patient’s

prior threats to kill her ..., and a police

officer’s negligent conduct of a traffic

investigation once undertaken ....

On the other hand, we have concluded that the

discretionary act statute does immunize

officials and agencies against claims that

they unreasonably delayed regulations under

which a murdered security guard might have

qualified himself to carry a defensive

firearm ... or negligently released a violent

juvenile offender into his mother’s custody.

10 Cal.4th at 981-982.

32

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 32 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Here, the decision to handcuff Plaintiff cannot be viewed as

a basic policy decision, but rather it must be viewed as a

ministerial decision implementing a basic policy already

formulated. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Third Cause of Action for

battery is DENIED.

6. Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction

of Emotional Distress.

Defendants move to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action for

intentional infliction of emotional distress for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.

After incorporating all preceding allegations, the Fourth

Cause of Action alleges:

51) Defendants HAL PROCK, MACE MCINTOSH and

the CITY OF SONORA, via respondeat superior

liability, engaged in conduct including, but

not limited to battery and false imprisonment

of Plaintiff, a minor with disabilities who

was susceptible to infliction of emotional

distress.

52) Defendants’ conduct was extreme and

outrageous, and was intended to cause

PLAINTIFF severe emotional distress and/or

was done in conscious disregard of the

possibility of causing such distress.

53) Defendants spoke to PLAINTIFF C.B. before

detaining and handcuffing him and knew that

C.B. was calm and cooperative and had obeyed

Officer Prock’s instructions to stand up from

the playground bench. The officers never

observed Plaintiff C.B. acting agitated in

any way during their entire contact with

Plaintiff C.B. Defendants knew that the

Sonora Police Department’s Handcuff Policy

counseled against handcuffing C.B. as he was

under the age of 14 and in a clam [sic] state

33

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 33 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

of mind. Officer Prock admitted to C.B. in

the ride to Jamestown, California that he had

been a police officer for eleven years and

never had to handcuff an eleven year old for

doing nothing. The officers knew that how

they were treating the calm and cooperative

eleven year old Plaintiff C.B. was wrong and

excessive.

Under California law, the elements of a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and

outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,

emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or

extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous

conduct. Hergenroeder v. Travelers Property Cas. Ins. Co., 249

F.R.D. 595, 620 (E.D.Cal.2008). Conduct to be outrageous must be

so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a

civilized community. Id.

Defendants argue that the FAC does not allege extreme or

outrageous conduct: 

These officers ensured the safety of a child

who they were informed was ‘out of control’

and ‘disruptive.’ The only alleged conduct

of the officers is that plaintiff was

handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle.

Defendants further argue that the FAC does not allege severe

emotional distress. “Severe emotional distress means ‘”emotional

distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no

reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to

endure it.’”“ Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th

34

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 34 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

965, 1004 (1993). Defendants argue:

Plaintiff was handcuffed and driven in a

police car for approximately half of an hour

and released to his uncle. This does not

constitute emotional distress that a

reasonable person in a civilized society

should not be expected to endure.

As discussed above, it is questionable that Defendants

handcuffed Plaintiff for his own safety. The allegations of the

FAC are that Plaintiff was handcuffed at the direction of the

Chief of Police pursuant to a protocol, which is not supported by

the alleged written Handcuffing Policy. Further, the allegations

are that Defendants ignored Plaintiff’s IEP after they were

advised of it and instead of contacting family members to come to

the school, removed Plaintiff from the school in a police

vehicle. Whether this conduct is “outrageous” and caused “severe

emotional distress” is a question of fact. The Fourth Cause of

Action sufficiently alleges a claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress. 

Defendants also move to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action

on the ground that the officers are immune from liability

pursuant to California Government Code §§ 821.6 and 820.2. 

Defendants cite Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 200 Cal.App.3d 1426

(1988). In Kemmerer, a civil service employee brought suit

against the county and individual county officials based on

disciplinary proceedings instituted against him and his discharge

arising out of those proceedings. One of the causes of action

was for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In finding

35

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 35 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

immunity under Section 820.2, the Kemmerer Court held:

We have no doubt that this analysis leads

inevitably to the conclusion in the case at

bench that the decision of Kelley and

Velasquez to institute disciplinary

proceedings against Kemmerer was a policy

decision involving the exercise of discretion

entitling them to immunity under Government

Code section 820.2. The decision whether or

not to initiate discipline proceedings and

what discipline to impose is placed initially

on the department head and the decision is

entirely within his discretion. The decision

involves the exercise of analysis and

judgment as to what is just and proper under

the circumstances and is not purely a

ministerial act.

Kemmerer, 200 Cal.App.3d at 1437.

However, as discussed above, the California Supreme Court’s

decision in Caldwell v. Montoya appears to apply a different

standard than that applied in Kemmerer. Defendants’ decision to

handcuff Plaintiff and take him to his uncle in a police car

cannot be viewed as a basic policy decision, but rather it must

be viewed as a ministerial decision implementing a basic policy

already formulated. Defendants reference to Section 821.6 makes

no sense in the context of this action because the FAC does not

allege that Defendants instituted or prosecuted any judicial or

administrative proceedings. 

Defendants motion to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action is

DENIED.

7. Punitive Damages.

The FAC prays for exemplary damages against the City of

Sonora on each of the causes of action alleged against the City. 

36

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 36 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Although not asserted by Defendants as a ground for dismissal of

the FAC, a municipality entity is immune from punitive damages

under Section 1983. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453

U.S. 247, 271 (1981). California Government Code § 818 provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a

public entity is not liable for damages

awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code

or other damages imposed primarily for the

sake of example and by way of punishing the

defendant.

Because Defendants did not move for dismissal of the prayers

for punitive damages against the City, the Court does not dismiss

these allegations sua sponte. However, Plaintiff is advised to

revise the requested relief in his scheduling and pretrial

statements. 

C. Motion for More Definite Statement.

1. Governing Standards.

“Under the liberal pleading standards, ‘pleadings in federal

courts are only required to fairly notify the opposing party of

the nature of the claim.’” City of South Pasadena v. Slater, 56

F.Supp.2d 1095, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(e) provides:

If a pleading to which a responsive pleading

is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a

party cannot reasonably be required to frame

a responsive pleading, the party may move for

a more definite statement before interposing

a responsive pleading. The motion shall

point out the defects complained of and the

details desired. If the motion is granted

and the order of the court is not obeyed

within 10 days after notice of the order or

within such other time as the court may fix,

the court may strike the pleading to which

37

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 37 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

the motion was directed or make such order as

it deems just.

A Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement must be

considered in light of Rule 8’s liberal pleading standards in

federal court. See, e.g., Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F.Supp 1450,

1461 (C.D. Cal. 1996).

A Rule 12(e) motion is proper only if the complaint is so

indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain the nature of the

claim being asserted, i.e., so vague that the defendant cannot

begin to frame a response. See Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros.

Stores, Inc., 525 F.Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981). The Court

must deny the motion if the complaint is specific enough to

notify defendant of the substance of the claim being asserted. 

See Bureerong, 922 F.Supp. at 1461; see also San Bernardino Pub.

Employees Ass’n v. Stout, 946 F.Supp. 790, 804 (C.D. Cal. 1996)

(“A motion for a more definite statement is used to attack

unintelligibility, not mere lack of detail, and a complaint is

sufficient if it is specific enough to apprise the defendant of

the substance of the claim asserted against him or her.”).

The Court may also deny the motion if the detail sought by a

motion for more definite statement is obtainable through

discovery. See Davidson v. Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist., 48

F.Supp.2d 1225, 1227 (C.D. Cal. 1998). “Thus, the class of

pleadings that are appropriate subjects for a motion under Rule

12(e) is quite small—the pleading must be sufficiently

intelligible for the court to be able to make out one or more

38

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 38 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

potentially viable legal theories on which the claimant might

proceed, but it must not be so vague or ambiguous that the

opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good

faith or without prejudice to himself.” Charles Alan Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed.) §1376.

Whether to grant a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite

statement lies within the wide discretion of the district court. 

See id. §1377. However, “[m]otions for more definite statement

are viewed with disfavor, and are rarely granted.” William W.

Schwarzer, A. Wallace Tashima, and James M. Wagstaffe, Federal

Civil Procedure Before Trial §9:351 (2000).

2. Merits of Motion.

Defendants move for a more definite statement, asserting

that the FAC alleges that Defendants were malicious, oppressive,

fraudulent and acted in bad faith, but sets forth no specific

facts to support these allegations, thereby necessitating a more

definite statement. Defendants rely on Crawford-El v. Britton,

523 U.S. 574 (1998). 

In Crawford-El, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff

bringing a constitutional action against government officials for

damages, for which an official’s improper motive is a necessary

element, need not adduce clear and convincing evidence of

improper motive in order to defeat an official’s motion for

summary judgment. The Supreme Court then stated:

Though we have rejected the Court of Appeals’

solution, we are aware of the potential

problem that troubled the court. It is

39

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 39 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

therefore appropriate to add a few words on

some of the existing procedures available to

federal trial judges in handling claims that

involve examination of an official’s state of

mind.

When a plaintiff files a complaint against a

public official alleging a claim that

requires proof of wrongful motive, the trial

court must exercise its discretion in a way

that protects the substance of the qualified

immunity defense. It must exercise its

discretion so that officials are not

subjected to unnecessary and burdensome

discovery or trial proceedings. The district

judge has two primary options prior to

permitting any discovery at all. First, the

court may order a reply to the defendant’s or

a third party’s answer under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 7(a), or grant the

defendant’s motion for a more definite

statement under Rule 12(e). Thus, the court

may insist that a plaintiff ‘put forward

specific, nonconclusory factual allegations’

that establish improper motive causing

cognizable injury in order to survive a

prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary

judgment ... This option exists even if the

official chooses not to plead the affirmative

defense of qualified immunity. Second, if

the defendant does plead the immunity

defense, the district court should resolve

that threshold question before permitting

discovery ... To do so, the court must

determine whether, assuming the truth of the

plaintiff’s allegations, the official’s

conduct violated clearly established law. 

Because the former option of demanding more

specific allegations of intent places no

burden on the defendant-official, the

district judge may choose that alternative

before resolving the immunity question, which

sometimes requires complicated analysis of

legal issues.

523 U.S. at 597-598. 

Plaintiff responds that the standard for the alleged Fourth

Amendment violations is one of objective reasonableness. See

40

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 40 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

discussion supra. Therefore, a more definite statement is not

required. 

Given the standards set forth above, Defendants’ motion for

more definite statement is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended

Complaint and for more definite statement is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s counsel shall prepare and lodge a form of

order consistent with this Memorandum Decision within five (5)

court days following service of this Memorandum Decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 8, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

41

Case 1:09-cv-00285-AWI-SMS Document 70 Filed 03/08/10 Page 41 of 41