Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03047/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brandon Laureys
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 10, 2011 Decided August 19, 2011

No. 10-3047

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

BRANDON LAUREYS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cr-00106)

Stephen C. Leckar, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, 

Julieanne Himelstein, and Amy H. Zubrensky, Assistant U.S. 

Attorneys.

Before: HENDERSON, BROWN and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges.

USCA Case #10-3047 Document #1325067 Filed: 08/19/2011 Page 1 of 33
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Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

PER CURIAM: Brandon Laureys appeals his conviction for

attempted enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) 

and for traveling across state lines with intent to engage in 

illicit sexual conduct under § 2423(b). Laureys argues that the 

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his 

trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment. Laureys also challenges the 

conditions of supervised release the district court imposed at 

sentencing. We reject Laureys’s challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence and to the conditions of supervised release. We 

remand for an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance 

claim.

I

The present case arises from Laureys’s online 

communication in 2008 with Detective Timothy Palchak, who 

was impersonating a child molester with access to a minor.

Unfortunately, this was not Laureys’s first encounter with 

Palchak.

Laureys first communicated with Palchak in 2006, in a 

Yahoo chat room. Palchak was posing as a twelve-year-old girl

home alone. Laureys—then 20 years old—drove to an address 

provided by the “girl” and was promptly arrested. Laureys pled 

guilty to enticement of a minor under D.C. law, and was 

sentenced to 36 months with all but 8 months suspended. 

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Laureys was out on probation when the events relevant to 

this case took place. In November 2008, Palchak—this time 

playing the part of an adult male—nabbed Laureys again.

Palchak’s alter ego, “Jim,” employing the username 

“DaughterLover_Maryland,” advertised on an “Incest Forum 

Meeting Place” at IncestTaboo.com that he was a 38-year-old 

white male “into no limit fun.” His advertisement bore the 

warning “Discreet only.” The next day Laureys responded to 

Jim’s advertisement via Yahoo private message. After 

exchanging their “stats” (age, sex, and location), the men 

started discussing their sexual interest in young girls. When 

“Jim” asked “what ages are your fav[orites]?” Laureys 

responded, “9–11 or 12 maybe . . . maybe 8. maybe 13 . . . [I]

can[’]t pick. . . . love [th]em all lol.”[1

 1 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (defining “lol,” 

“the initial letters of laughing out loud,” as an interjection used 

“[o]riginally and chiefly in the language of electronic 

communications . . . to draw attention to a joke or humorous 

statement, or to express amusement”), http://www.oed.com/view/ 

Entry/291168 (last visited August 8, 2011).

]

When Laureys learned 

that Jim’s girlfriend frequently brought her nine-year-old 

daughter over to Jim’s place and that Jim had been “messing 

around” with the girl, Laureys expressed excitement, requested 

photos of the girl, and ultimately asked to be invited over to 

“help with the little girl.” Laureys assured Jim he would “make 

sure she wants to do it,” and offered to “watch her an[d] [Jim] 

[un]til she feels more comfortable.” When Jim said he “would 

love to see her with another” man, Laureys replied 

enthusiastically that he “would def[initely] be all about that,” 

adding that he would “teach her to take two at once.” After Jim 

electronically sent a girl’s picture to Laureys during the chat, 

Laureys expressed excitement, told Jim “you . . . NEED to let 

me hang out with her[,] man,” and asked him in explicit terms

about his sexual conduct with the girl depicted in the 

photograph.

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In the course of this conversation, Laureys and “Jim” 

arranged to meet each other. Jim initially suggested “get[ting] 

a beer first to make sure we are comfortable[,] then hav[ing] 

fun at my [place].” Instead, Laureys proposed meeting at Jim’s 

home “if you got anything fun we could watch or something 

while we’re there.” Eventually, the men arranged to meet each 

other at an address near Jim’s apartment, and Jim asked 

Laureys to call him.

During a gap of more than two minutes in the 

time-stamped chat transcript, Laureys called Jim. Laureys and 

Palchak agree there was no mention of the girl during the 

unrecorded phone call. Laureys testified at trial that in the 

phone call he reassured Jim he was discreet and said “I just 

want a quick blow job and go. My girlfriend doesn’t even 

know that I still mess with guys.” According to Laureys, Jim 

responded, “Okay, we’re on the same page.” Palchak testified, 

however, that during the phone call, Jim asked Laureys if he 

was discreet, the men exchanged physical descriptions again, 

and Laureys described the car he would be driving.

The men quickly ended their chat, and Laureys left in his 

car to meet Jim. When he reached the address Jim had 

provided, Laureys was arrested.

At trial, Laureys testified in his own defense, and Palchak 

testified for the prosecution. At the close of all the evidence, 

Laureys moved for a judgment of acquittal, and the district 

court denied the motion.

The jury convicted on all counts. The district court 

sentenced Laureys to ten years (the mandatory minimum) 

under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) for enticement of a minor, five

years (concurrent) under § 2423(b) for traveling in interstate 

commerce to engage in illicit sexual conduct, and an additional 

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10 years (consecutive) as required by § 2260A for committing 

these crimes as a registered sex offender. Laureys raised no 

objection to the sentence or to the terms of supervised release 

the district court imposed at sentencing.

II

Laureys argues the Government’s evidence was 

insufficient to prove his intent to persuade a minor to engage in

sexual activity under § 2422(b) and to prove his intent to 

engage in sexual conduct with a minor under § 2423(b). “We 

review a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of 

acquittal de novo, considering the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government and determining whether, so read, 

it is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find all of the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Kayode, 254 F.3d 204, 212 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 

(alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Harrington, 108 

F.3d 1460, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). The evidence in this case

may be susceptible of more than one interpretation, but we 

cannot say it was insufficient for the jury to find the necessary 

intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

A

Laureys devotes just two pages in each of his briefs to the 

sufficiency of the evidence. His only argument against both 

counts is that the evidence does not prove his intent to have sex 

with a minor. According to Laureys, the transcript of his chat 

shows he only wanted a quick and legal liaison with “Jim.” 

Laureys’s references to the fictional girl were, he says, pure 

fantasy. Laureys points to certain turns of phrase, such as 

“down low,” “discreet,” and “perv out” that he says are 

consistent with his intent to engage in same-sex intercourse 

with an adult male, but not an underage girl. Even if we were to 

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accept the connotations Laureys attributes to these phrases, and 

which he argued to the jury, we would have no basis for 

reversing the jury’s conviction. The rest of the evidence, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, 

permitted the jury reasonably to find Laureys meant what he 

said, whether or not he also intended to have sex with Jim.

Laureys is a self-described “bisexual . . . sexual addict” 

with a “sexual attraction to children” that he expects to “live 

with the rest of [his] life.” Tr. 5/26/2010, at 316, 373. Laureys 

admits he intended to have sex with a fictitious 

twelve-year-old girl in 2006, id. at 318, and he responded to 

DaughterLover_Maryland’s advertisement on a website that 

he admitted to frequenting “as part of [his] sexual attraction” to 

little girls, id. at 365—a website Detective Palchak described 

as a meeting place for persons seeking sex with children. Tr. 

5/25/2010, at 144. Laureys chatted in explicit terms about 

sexual conduct with a particular nine-year-old girl Jim said 

frequented his apartment. Laureys asked for pictures of the girl 

and pleaded with Jim, “you . . . NEED to let me hang out with 

her[,] man.” Laureys then arranged to meet Jim at his 

apartment. Viewed together, this evidence was more than 

sufficient to support the jury’s findings that Laureys attempted 

to persuade Jim to grant him sexual access to a child and then 

travelled to the District for the purpose of engaging in sexual 

conduct with her.

Judge Brown’s dissent raises two additional arguments

concerning a jury instruction pertaining to § 2422(b) and the 

evidence required for a conviction under § 2423(b). We 

address each in turn.

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B

The dissent objects sua sponte to the district court’s 

instruction that the jury could convict under § 2422(b) if the 

Government proved Laureys knowingly attempted to persuade 

an adult to arrange for a child to engage in sexual activity. 

According to the dissent, § 2422(b) requires intent to persuade 

the minor herself, not an adult intermediary. That statute 

provides,

Whoever, using . . . any . . . means of interstate 

. . . commerce . . . knowingly persuades, 

induces, entices, or coerces any individual who 

has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage 

in prostitution or any sexual activity for which 

any person can be charged with a criminal 

offense, or attempts to do so, shall be . . . 

imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. 

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

We need not wade into this question of statutory 

interpretation because Laureys has not raised it. 2

 2 As the Government’s brief notes, Laureys “does not dispute 

that the statute is violated where a defendant communicates with an 

adult with access to the minor rather than directly with the minor.” 

Appellee’s Br. at 30 n.16. Indeed, Laureys’s counsel declined Judge 

Brown’s invitation at oral argument to make an issue of the 

instruction. Oral Arg. 11:48–12:45.

Laureys 

asked “Jim” in no uncertain terms to grant him access to the 

girl Jim claimed to be molesting, and that is the theory under 

which the jury convicted him. It is not our duty to sift the trial 

record for novel arguments a defendant could have made but 

did not. See Potter v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542, 553 

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (Williams, J., concurring) (“[J]udges ‘are not 

like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs’ or the record.” 

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(quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 

1991))). Moreover, the instruction at issue was proposed 

jointly by the defense and the prosecution, Dist. Ct. Docket No. 

30, at 4–5, and “[i]f a defendant invites error by the district 

court, he is ‘barred from complaining about it on appeal.’” 

United States v. Ginyard, 215 F.3d 83, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 

(quoting United States v. Harrison, 103 F.3d 986, 992 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997)).

Even if Laureys had properly challenged on appeal the 

district court’s formulation of the requisite intent, our review 

would be for plain error because he did not object to the jury 

instructions at trial. See United States v. Bryant, 523 F.3d 349, 

353 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Under that standard, Laureys would have 

to establish “(1) a legal error that was (2) plain (a term that is 

synonymous with clear or obvious), and that (3) affected his 

substantial rights.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations 

omitted). “Even if these three conditions are met, we will 

correct a plain error as a matter of discretion only if the error 

seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” Id. at 353–54 (quotation marks and 

alterations omitted).

Laureys cannot make the basic threshold showing of plain 

error. “Generally an error is plain if it contradicts circuit or 

Supreme Court precedent.” In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 

851 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The district court’s instructions 

contradicted no precedents of this Court or the Supreme Court. 

Rarely do we find an error to be plain where “this court has not 

ruled on the question.” United States v. Thomas, 896 F.2d 589, 

591 (D.C. Cir. 1990). As the dissent has aptly pointed out in 

another context, “issues of first impression present plain error 

only when they tread upon ‘a well-established constitutional or 

legal principle.’” United States v. Burroughs, 613 F.3d 233, 

248 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., dissenting) (quoting United 

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States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 

Even if the dissent’s interpretation of § 2422(b) is correct—a 

question we need not consider—we can hardly say it is 

“well-established.” To the contrary, every circuit to consider 

the issue has concluded a defendant can violate § 2422(b) by 

communicating with an adult intermediary rather than a child 

or someone believed to be a child. See United States v. Berk, 

No. 09-2472, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15501, at *19 (1st Cir. 

July 27, 2011); United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293, 1299 

(11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Douglas, 626 F.3d 161, 

164–65 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 

160–62 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Spurlock, 495 F.3d 

1011, 1013–14 (8th Cir. 2007). Under the law of those circuits, 

“inducing” a minor to engage in sexual activity does not 

necessarily require direct communication with the minor; a 

minor’s “assent might be obtained, for example, by persuading 

a minor’s adult guardian to lead a child to participate in sexual 

activity.” Douglas, 626 F.3d at 164; see, e.g., United States v. 

Lee, 603 F.3d 904, 913 (11th Cir. 2010); Nestor, 574 F.3d at 

162 n.4. We do not have to determine these courts are correct 

to determine their view of the law is not plainly erroneous.

C

According to Judge Brown, we should also reverse 

Laureys’s conviction under § 2423(b) because the evidence is 

insufficient to prove Laureys believed he was going to meet a 

child at Jim’s apartment. The statute provides that “[a] person 

who travels in interstate commerce . . . for the purpose of 

engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall 

be . . . imprisoned not more than 30 years.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2423(b). The dissent observes that, in response to a question, 

Palchak admitted there was no implication in the chat that the 

girl would be present at the initial meeting with Jim. Op. of 

Brown, J., at 14. Even so, the jury reasonably found Laureys’s 

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trip to meet Jim was for the purpose of engaging in illicit 

sexual conduct with a minor. Reading the chat transcript in the 

light most favorable to the Government, it supports a 

reasonable inference that Jim would grant Laureys’s request to 

let him “hang out” with the girl, if an initial meeting between 

him and Jim was satisfactory. To that end, Jim suggested, 

“maybe we could get a beer first to make sure we are 

comfortable [and] then have fun at my [place].” Likewise, 

Laureys blocked his cell phone number “[just] [un]til we 

actually talk or [whatever].” A jury could reasonably conclude 

that this maneuvering was in anticipation of the intended 

sexual conduct with a minor.

III

Laureys claims he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel because his trial lawyer failed to call some potential 

witnesses to testify in his defense. Specifically, Laureys says 

his lawyer should have secured the testimony of Laureys’s 

psychologist and two men with whom Laureys had engaged in 

sex-oriented online chats. This testimony, Laureys argues, 

would have proven he lacked the requisite intent for each of his 

convictions.

In order to succeed on a Sixth Amendment 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show two things: (1) that 

counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) 

that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense. To establish deficiency, he must show 

his counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness. To 

establish prejudice, he must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.

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United States v. Anderson, 632 F.3d 1264, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 

2011) (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted).

When a colorable claim of ineffective assistance is made 

for the first time on direct appeal, this Court generally will 

remand the claim for an evidentiary hearing “unless the trial 

record alone conclusively shows that the defendant either is or 

is not entitled to relief.” United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 

909–10 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). Applying 

that standard, we remand Laureys’s ineffective assistance 

claims for analysis by the district court in the first instance.

IV

The district court sentenced Laureys to a ten-year term of 

supervised release following imprisonment. Laureys 

challenges the conditions of supervised release that prohibit 

him, without the probation office’s prior approval, from 

loitering in arcades and parks, among other places where 

children congregate; possessing “any type of camera or video 

recording device”; and “patroniz[ing] any place where 

pornography or erotica can be accessed.” Laureys also 

challenges the requirements that he keep a log of all internet 

addresses he accesses and that he consent to disclosure to his 

employer of the computer-related restrictions.

A sentencing court has discretion to impose any condition 

of supervised release that is “reasonably related” to “the nature 

and circumstances of the offense”; “the history and 

characteristics of the defendant”; the deterrence of criminal 

conduct; the protection of the public from the defendant; and 

the effective provision of educational, vocational, medical, or 

correctional services to the defendant; provided the condition 

is consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines and “involves no 

greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.” 18 

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U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3553(a); see United States v. Burroughs, 

613 F.3d 233, 239–40 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

Because Laureys did not object at sentencing to the

conditions of his supervised release, our review is for plain

error. See Burroughs, 613 F.3d at 240. On plain error review, 

we will vacate a condition of supervised release only if it is 

“plainly out of sync with the statutory goals enumerated in 

§ 3553(a).” Id. Under that standard, each of Laureys’s 

challenges must fail.

His challenges to the restrictions on loitering in arcades 

and parks and on possessing a camera are foreclosed by United 

States v. Love, a child pornography case with similar facts to 

Laureys’s, in which we upheld the same conditions on plain 

error review. 593 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing United 

States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Especially 

in light of Laureys’s requests for photographs of his 

child-victims, we cannot conclude these conditions are 

“plainly out of sync” with “the nature and circumstances of the 

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 

18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3553(a)(1), and with the need “to 

protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” id.

§ 3553(a)(2)(C).

For the same reason, Laureys cannot succeed in his

challenge to the ban on patronizing any place where 

pornography can be accessed. In United States v. Sullivan, we 

dismissed as “meritless” a challenge to the same condition by a 

defendant convicted of possessing child pornography. 451 

F.3d at 887, 896. Although Laureys’s crimes are different, 

some studies have found a connection between pornography 

and sex crimes, see Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 199–201 

(D.C. Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Sebastian, 612 F.3d 

47, 52 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting a possible “link between 

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recidivism of sexual offenders and exposure to pornography”). 

Moreover, Laureys’s suggestion to Jim that they meet at his 

place “if you got anything fun we could watch” supports a 

reasonable inference that pornography is relevant to Laureys’s 

attempted predations. A condition of supervised release that 

limits Laureys’s access to pornography is thus not “plainly out 

of sync” with the § 3553(a) factors. Contrary to Laureys’s 

interpretation of our decision in Love, that case does not 

compel a different result. We vacated the condition in Love, 

because it appeared only in the written judgment, 593 F.3d at 

11, and “the written judgment form is a nullity to the extent it

conflicts with the previously pronounced sentence,” id. at 9 

(quoting United States v. Booker, 436 F.3d 238, 245 (D.C. Cir. 

2006)). In the absence of any precedent “that is even arguably 

inconsistent” with the application of that condition to a child 

predator, Laureys cannot show that the district court plainly 

erred. Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 896.

Finally, the computer-related conditions of supervised 

release are not plainly erroneous. For good reason, Laureys

does not challenge the most restrictive of these—a total ban on 

the possession or use of a computer with internet access 

without prior approval from the probation office. We upheld 

the same condition on review for abuse of discretion in Love. 

593 F.3d at 12. Because the defendant in that case had also 

“solicited sex with Palchak’s fictitious daughter” online, we 

concluded the broad restriction on internet access “[was] 

properly tailored to the circumstances of the offense and [the 

defendant’s] background, and it [was] reasonably necessary to 

deter future misconduct and to protect children.” Id. The more 

limited restrictions Laureys does challenge come nowhere 

close to plain error. We vacated a similar log-keeping 

requirement in United States v. Burroughs, because 

“Burroughs did not use a computer to facilitate his crimes.” 

613 F.3d at 242. But Laureys did. In the offenses underlying 

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both the present case and his 2006 conviction, Laureys used 

the internet to facilitate criminal sexual conduct with minors. 

That Laureys will need the probation office’s permission to use 

the internet is likely relevant to an employer’s decision to hire 

him. So too are the requirements that he log his internet access 

and that he “submit to periodic unannounced examinations of 

. . . any computer accessed by him”—a condition Laureys does 

not appeal. “We see no reason why potential employers should 

not be made aware of [these] fact[s].” Burroughs, 613 F.3d at 

246.

V

For the foregoing reasons, we reject Laureys’s challenges

to his conviction and to the conditions imposed on his term

supervised release, but we remand for an evidentiary hearing 

on whether his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

So ordered.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part

and dissenting in part:

“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal

defendant must show . . . that his lawyer made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed . . .

by the Sixth Amendment, and that . . . there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” United

States v. Kelly, 552 F.3d 824, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (ellipses in

original; internal quotation marks omitted). I respectfully

dissent from the remand for an evidentiary hearing on the sixth

amendment claim because I believe the “trial record alone

conclusively shows” the representation provided to Laureys was

not deficient and he suffered no prejudice. See Per Curiam

Opinion at 11 (quoting United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908,

909–10 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).

Laureys contends that his trial counsel was ineffective by,

inter alia, not calling Frederick Berlin, a professor at Johns

Hopkins University School of Medicine and founder of a sexual

disorders clinic there, to testify at trial. The record indicates,

however, that Berlin had not finished his evaluation of Laureys

and was not prepared to testify at the time of the trial. At a

status conference on June 25, 2009, Laureys’s trial counsel

informed the court that he was trying to arrange for a

psychosexual evaluation of Laureys. Gov’t App. Tab 10. At

subsequent status and pretrial conferences held over eight

months—from August 10, 2009 to April 7, 2010—Laureys’s

trial counsel repeatedly informed the court that Berlin had not

completed his evaluation of Laureys. Gov’t App. Tabs 11-14.

At the April 7, 2010 conference, trial counsel informed the court

that Berlin would not complete his evaluation until August 2010. 

The court then determined the trial could be delayed no longer

and ordered trial counsel to produce, within ten days, a letter,

affidavit or other writing from Berlin assuring the court of his

testimony in support of the defense’s theory. Gov’t App. Tab

14. The case proceeded to trial when trial counsel failed to do

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so. That Laureys’s trial counsel did not call an expert witness

who, according to the record, was not prepared to testify hardly

renders his representation deficient. That Laureys’s trial counsel

sought to use Berlin’s testimony for a purpose different from the

use his appellate counsel would have made of it does not change

the fact that, according to the record, Berlin never completed his

evaluation of Laureys and was not prepared to testify. In his

reply brief, Laureys asserts that “Dr. Berlin has confirmed to us

that he believed Mr. Laureys is suffering from paraphilia; that he

formed that opinion before trial . . . and that he would have

testified to that effect,” Reply Br. 14, but Laureys provides

nothing—such as an affidavit from Berlin—to support his

assertion.

Even assuming arguendo that the failure to call Berlin to

testify was deficient, there is no “reasonable probability that,

[had Berlin testified], the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Kelly, 552 F.3d at 829. On appeal, Laureys

claims that Berlin would have opined that Laureys is a

paraphiliac and would have explained that a paraphiliac is

someone who suffers from “ ‘recurrent, intense sexually

arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally

involving 1) nonhuman objects, 2) the suffering or humiliation

of oneself or one’s partner, or 3) children or other nonconsenting

persons, that occur over a period of at least 6 months . . . [and

that] cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social,

occupational, or other important areas of functioning .’ ” United

States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2010) (ellipsis and

alteration in Carta) (quoting Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic

& Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 522-23 (4th ed.

2000)); see Appellant’s Br. 43 n.116. In addition to explaining

paraphilia, Laureys contends Berlin would have testified that a

“paraphiliac can suffer from pedophilia and yet maintain sexual

relations with adults.” Id. at 43. Finally, according to Laureys,

Berlin would have testified that paraphiliacs have a tendency to

use the internet “to engage in wildly inappropriate remarks” and

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“to engage in fantastic sexual discussions with anonymous

correspondents.” Id. at 44-45.

I cannot fathom how Berlin’s proposed testimony could

have possibly aided Laureys’s case. A description of paraphilia

would have simply emphasized Laureys’s “ ‘recurrent, intense

sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally

involving . . . children or other nonconsenting persons.’ ” Carta,

592 F.3d at 38 (quoting Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic &

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 522-23 (4th ed. 2000)).

Nothing in the quoted description of paraphilia from the

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders suggests

an inclination toward homosexuality. Nor is there any reason to

believe Berlin’s testimony that a paraphiliac can suffer from

pedophilia but maintain sexual relations with adults would have

helped Laureys’s case. Nothing in Berlin’s purported testimony

calls into question the jury’s conclusion that Laureys intended

to have sexual relations with the 9-year-old girl. That Berlin’s

testimony might have led the jury to conclude that Laureys also

intended to have sexual relations with Jim P does not create “a

reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Kelly, 552 F.3d at 829 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Finally, Berlin’s testimony about the

internet tendencies of paraphiliacs would have strengthened the

Government’s—not Laureys’s—case because Laureys went well

beyond using the internet to make inappropriate remarks or

engage in fantastic sexual discussions with anonymous

correspondents. He took the significant further step of arranging

to meet Jim P—and, a reasonable jury could conclude, the 9-

year-old girl—and driving to the location Jim P gave him.

Finally, and crucially, any marginal benefit Laureys might

have derived from Berlin’s testimony could never, in my view,

erase the irremediable damage Laureys did through his own

testimony. I believe there is no reasonable probability that

Berlin’s proposed testimony—as weak as it is—would have led

USCA Case #10-3047 Document #1325067 Filed: 08/19/2011 Page 17 of 33
4

any reasonable juror who heard Laureys’s disturbing and

graphic testimony to acquit him. By testifying, Laureys was

truly the author of his own misfortune.

USCA Case #10-3047 Document #1325067 Filed: 08/19/2011 Page 18 of 33
BROWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: The district 

court instructed a jury to convict Brandon Laureys of 

attempted enticement of a child if the Government proved 

Laureys tried to persuade an adult to grant him access to a 

minor. The district court also allowed the jury to convict 

Laureys of crossing state lines to engage in sexual conduct 

with a minor, absent any evidence Laureys expected the 

fictitious child to be present at his destination. Because the

jury instruction was plainly erroneous and the evidence 

insufficient as a matter of law, I would reverse Laureys’s 

convictions and his twenty-year prison sentence.1

I

Count One of the indictment charged Laureys with using 

the internet in an attempt to persuade a minor to engage in 

criminal sexual activity. The statute under which he was 

convicted provides,

Whoever, using . . . any . . . means of interstate 

. . . commerce . . . knowingly persuades, 

induces, entices, or coerces any individual who 

has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage 

 1 Although I would not reach Laureys’s ineffective assistance 

claim or his challenges to the conditions of supervised release, 

Judge Henderson’s partial dissent means my vote is necessary to 

decide the ineffective assistance claim. Because I agree with the 

lead opinion’s statement of the law on that point, I join that portion 

of the opinion to break the tie and remand for an evidentiary 

hearing on Laureys’s ineffective assistance claim. See generally 

David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against Tidewater: A 

Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743, 745 

(1992) (arguing issue-by-issue voting is more consistent than 

outcome voting “with an appellate court’s role of providing 

guidance to lower courts and the community as a whole as to the 

legal consequences of specific actions”).

USCA Case #10-3047 Document #1325067 Filed: 08/19/2011 Page 19 of 33
2

in . . . any sexual activity for which any person 

can be charged with a criminal offense, or 

attempts to do so, shall be . . . imprisoned not 

less than 10 years or for life. 

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Each verb of the statutory actus reus

(“persuades, induces, entices, or coerces”) has a person as its 

object, and the statutory text leaves no doubt but that the

personal object must be a minor. 

The district court nevertheless instructed the jury to 

convict Laureys under § 2422(b) if he “intended to persuade 

an adult to cause a minor to engage in unlawful sexual 

activity.” Dist. Ct. Docket No. 52, at 15–16 (emphasis added). 

The district court emphasized that “[d]irect communication 

with a child is unnecessary,” because “[t]he government must 

only prove that the defendant believed that he was 

communicating with someone who could arrange for the child 

to engage in unlawful sexual activity.” Id. at 15. These jury 

instructions thwart the plain meaning of § 2422(b) by 

replacing the statutory object (“any individual who has not 

attained the age of 18 years”) with its opposite (“an adult”).

On appeal, Laureys argues § 2422(b) requires intent to 

persuade a minor, Appellant’s Br. at 36, but he does not 

directly confront the erroneous jury instruction. Nor did he

object to it in the district court. As the court explains, we do 

not ordinarily consider legal arguments that are forfeited in 

the district court and on appeal. Maj. Op. at 7–8. But this is 

not an ordinary case of forfeiture. Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 52(b) provides, “[a] plain error that affects 

substantial rights may be considered even though it was not 

brought to the court’s attention.” We invoke Rule 52(b), for 

example, “when the weakness of the evidence against 

defendant indicates that a serious injustice was done.” United 

States v. Rhodes, 886 F.2d 375, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting 

USCA Case #10-3047 Document #1325067 Filed: 08/19/2011 Page 20 of 33
3

United States v. Baker, 693 F.2d 183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 

Thus, “even though an issue was not raised either at trial or 

on appeal,” if it “is one which affects substantial rights and 

seriously affects the fairness of the judicial proceedings, then 

we should reverse [the defendant’s] conviction on our own 

motion.” Id. Under that standard, I would reverse Laureys’s

conviction for enticement of a minor, as it was based on a 

plainly erroneous jury instruction. See United States v. Alston, 

551 F.2d 315, 320 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“Failure on the part 

of a trial court in a criminal case to instruct on all essential 

questions of law involved in the case, whether requested or 

not would clearly affect substantial rights within the meaning 

of Rule 52(b).” (quotation marks omitted)). That Laureys’s 

trial counsel shares responsibility with the Government for 

proposing an erroneous instruction does not mean we must

close our eyes to the district court’s plain error. See United 

States v. Wiggins, 530 F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 

(noting that plain error review is appropriate even where the 

defendant’s trial counsel “specifically requested and 

approved” the challenged jury instruction).

The court does not attempt to defend the district court’s 

statement of the law on the merits, and there is no dispute 

that—if it is erroneous—the district court’s jury instruction 

was prejudicial.2

 2 Had the jury been correctly instructed, it could not 

reasonably have found Laureys guilty under § 2242(b). Even if 

Laureys intended at some point in the future to entice the fictitious 

child herself, there is no evidence Laureys intended to use a facility

of interstate commerce to do so. Cf. United States v. Spurlock, 495 

F.3d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 2007) (“We conclude that Spurlock 

intended to entice minor girls to have sex with him, and that his 

conversations with their purported mother were a substantial step 

toward that end.”); id. at 1012 (“Detective Wilson, posing as [their 

The court disagrees only with my conclusion 

that any error was plain. Maj. Op. at 8–9.

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4

It is an open question in this circuit whether § 2422(b) 

permits a conviction for persuasion of an adult. I say it is an 

open question only in the sense that we have never addressed 

it; the plain meaning of the statute leaves no room for doubt 

about the answer. Section 2422(b) is unambiguously directed 

at persuasion of a minor. Under these circumstances, the lack

of controlling precedent does not save the jury instruction 

from plain error. “Even absent binding case law, . . . an error 

can be plain if it violates an absolutely clear legal norm, for 

example, because of the clarity of a statutory provision.” In re 

Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quotation 

marks omitted); see also United States v. Burroughs, 613 F.3d 

233, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The lack of case law squarely on 

point does ‘militate against’ finding plain error, but it is not 

dispositive.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

The court cites out-of-circuit precedent in an effort to 

prove any error in the district court’s instruction was not 

plain. I am not persuaded. Only one circuit court has ever 

held § 2422(b) criminalizes the attempt to persuade an adult

to cause a child to engage in sexual conduct. See United 

States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004). That 

precedent is on weak footing. The Murrell panel mistakenly 

assumed § 2422(b) penalizes any attempt to solicit sex with a 

minor. See id. at 1287. A subsequent panel of the same court 

hinted Murrell’s analysis was based on a misreading of the 

statute. United States v. Lee, 603 F.3d 904, 916 (11th Cir. 

2010). Returning to the statute’s plain meaning, the Lee panel

held that “the government must prove that the defendant 

intended to cause assent on the part of the minor.” Id. at 914; 

 

mother,] pretended to allow the girls to chat directly with 

Spurlock.”). And there is no evidence Laureys attempted to entice 

the fictitious girl through his online communication with “Jim.” Cf. 

id. at 1014 (“[Spurlock] admitted at trial that he ‘tried to persuade 

those two girls through their mother to engage in sexual acts.’”).

USCA Case #10-3047 Document #1325067 Filed: 08/19/2011 Page 22 of 33
5

accord United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th 

Cir. 2011). Without explicitly overturning Murrell, Lee 

charitably construed “[t]he holding of Murrell” to be “that a 

reasonable jury could have found that Murrell attempted to 

‘induce’ a minor to engage in sexual activity with him 

because he ‘attempted to stimulate or cause the minor to 

engage in sexual activity with him.’” Lee, 603 F.3d at 916 

(quoting Murrell, 368 F.3d at 1287).

The other courts that have affirmed convictions under 

§ 2422(b) based on a defendant’s communication with an 

adult have followed the reasoning of Lee, not Murrell. That 

is, they have required proof the defendant attempted to cause 

assent on the part of a minor, not the adult intermediary. In 

each of these cases, the defendant’s communication with an 

adult was either a vehicle through which the defendant 

attempted to obtain the child’s assent,3

 3 See United States v. Berk, No. 09-2472, 2011 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 15501, at *18, 19–20 (1st Cir. July 27, 2011) (“Section 

2422(b) criminalizes an intentional attempt to achieve a mental 

state—a minor’s assent . . . . The trial court could easily have found 

that the explicit communications with a person whom Berk thought 

was the father of a 12-year old girl about ‘renting her out,’ along 

with the concomitant request to see what the girl thought of the 

idea, were part of an attempt to achieve the requisite mental state in 

the minor.”); United States v. Douglas, 626 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 

2010) (“[T]he statute criminalizes obtaining or attempting to obtain 

a minor’s assent to unlawful sexual activity. Such assent might be 

obtained, for example, by persuading a minor’s adult guardian to 

lead a child to participate in sexual activity.” (citation omitted)); 

Spurlock, 495 F.3d at 1014; see also United States v. Nestor, 574 

F.3d 159, 162 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009) (suggesting in dicta that criminal 

persuasion may not require direct communication with a minor 

because “[s]exual predators can and do . . . attempt to persuade 

children to engage in sexual activity through the victim’s parents or 

guardians”).

or a substantial step 

USCA Case #10-3047 Document #1325067 Filed: 08/19/2011 Page 23 of 33
6

toward persuasive communication with the child herself.4 

Laureys’s case does not require us to decide whether these 

courts were right to hold the requisite attempt to persuade a 

minor may be proven exclusively by communication with an 

adult. All of these courts agree § 2422(b) requires an attempt 

to bend the child-victim’s will. They offer no support 

therefore to the district court’s jury instruction, which 

permitted a conviction for persuading an adult, absent any 

effort to win the child’s assent. Only the discredited Murrell 

opinion took the view that attempting to persuade an adult to 

cause a child to engage in sexual conduct, without more, 

satisfies the elements of § 2422(b).

More to the point, the errors of other courts do not 

immunize the district court’s jury instruction on plain error 

review.

[W]e have recognized that a division of 

authority on a given point may provide cause 

to question the plainness of an error, but we

did so in cases lacking the kind of clear 

statutory language at issue here. Moreover, 

[this court has] not hesitated to deem an error 

involving clear language plain, even when 

another circuit considered the provision 

ambiguous enough to defeat a finding of plain 

error.

In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851–52 (D.C. Cir. 2009)

(citations omitted). In In re Sealed Case, we explicitly 

rejected “the government’s view [that] [a] circuit split on [the 

 4 See United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2009) 

(“He took substantial steps calculated to put him into direct contact 

with a child so that he could carry out his clear intent to persuade, 

induce, entice, or coerce the child to engage in sexual activity.”); 

Spurlock, 495 F.3d at 1014.

USCA Case #10-3047 Document #1325067 Filed: 08/19/2011 Page 24 of 33
7

relevant] issue necessarily means that the error could not have 

been plain.” Id. at 851. We found plain error in the district 

court’s treatment of rehabilitation as justifying a longer prison 

term despite precedent from the Eighth and Ninth Circuits

supporting the district court’s decision. See id. at 848–51. 

Here, as in In re Sealed Case, the relevant statute “speaks 

with absolute clarity” on the subject of the district court’s 

decision, id. at 851, so the contrary view of one out-of-circuit 

case does not save the jury instruction from plain error.

In Murrell, the Eleventh Circuit held that “[b]y 

negotiating with the purported father of a minor, [the 

defendant] attempted to stimulate or cause the minor to 

engage in sexual activity with him” and therefore his 

“conduct fits squarely within the definition of ‘induce.’” 368 

F.3d at 1287. The Eleventh Circuit noted that “induce” could 

mean either “‘to lead or move by influence or persuasion; to 

prevail upon,’ or alternatively, ‘to stimulate the occurrence of; 

cause.’” Id. (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 

ENGLISH LANGUAGE 671 (1981)). The Murrell panel decided 

Congress must have intended the second definition, because 

the first was “essentially synonymous with the word 

‘persuade’” and would make that word in the statute 

superfluous. Id. On this view, the Government need not prove 

the defendant tried to win a child’s assent; an attempt to 

persuade the child’s guardian will suffice. See id.

As the district court correctly observed, “there is no 

equivalent of Murrell in this circuit.” Tr. 5/26/2010, at 286. 

Despite its concern about “[t]he way [§ 2422(b)’s] language 

has to be parsed and chopped and sliced and diced in order to 

make everything fit,” id., the district court allowed Laureys to 

be convicted under Murrell’s plainly erroneous interpretation. 

We should reject Murrell’s flawed reading of § 2422(b) for 

four reasons. 

USCA Case #10-3047 Document #1325067 Filed: 08/19/2011 Page 25 of 33
8

First, the second definition of “induce” (“to stimulate the 

occurrence of; cause”) is incompatible with that word’s 

statutory context. In § 2422(b), the verb “induce” has a person 

as its object—“any individual who has not attained the age of 

18 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). But “induce” only means 

“cause” when its object is inanimate. See OXFORD ENGLISH 

DICTIONARY ONLINE, “induce,” def. 4(a) (listing examples), 

http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/94758 (last visited August 9, 

2011). For example, one can induce a chemical reaction or 

induce labor without bringing about a person’s assent. By 

contrast, when “induce” is used with a personal object, it has 

the first meaning. See id. def. 1 (“To lead (a person), by 

persuasion or some influence or motive that acts upon the 

will, to (into, unto) some action, condition, belief, etc.; to lead 

on, move, influence, prevail upon (any one) to do

something.”). For example, one does not induce a person to 

donate to a charity by forcibly seizing her money, but by 

convincing her that it is the right thing to do.

Second, the word “induce,” in its first definition, is not 

“essentially synonymous with the word ‘persuade,’” as the 

Murrell court said it was. 368 F.3d at 1287. The word 

“persuade” suggests the use of reason, but the word “induce,” 

though it can bear that meaning, may signify any force, such 

as trickery, that acts upon the will. For example, one may 

induce a person to donate to one charity by convincing her 

that she is donating to another. Moreover, Congress often 

uses multiple words with overlapping meaning to capture a 

broad swath of conduct. That the most sensible definition of 

“induce” overlaps with “persuade” and “coerce” does not 

render it superfluous. Cf. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 

103, 120–21 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since iteration is 

obviously afoot in the relevant passage, there is no 

justification for extruding an unnatural meaning out of 

‘falsely made’ simply in order to avoid iteration. The entire 

USCA Case #10-3047 Document #1325067 Filed: 08/19/2011 Page 26 of 33
9

phrase ‘falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited’ is selfevidently not a listing of differing and precisely calibrated 

terms, but a collection of near synonyms which describes the 

product of the general crime of forgery.”).

Third, the statutory history of § 2422(b) confirms that 

“induce” does not mean simply “cause,” but involves an act 

directed at bending the will of another person—here, a minor. 

The modern enticement statute traces its origin to the Mann 

Act of 1910, which used “induce” and “cause” in the same 

sentence.

[A]ny person who shall knowingly persuade, 

induce, entice, or coerce any woman or girl 

under the age of eighteen years from any State 

. . . to any other State . . . , with the purpose 

and intent to induce or coerce her . . . to 

engage in prostitution or debauchery, or any 

other immoral practice, and shall in 

furtherance of such purpose knowingly induce

or cause her to go and to be carried or 

transported as a passenger in interstate 

commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a 

felony . . . .

White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, § 4, 36 Stat. 825, 

826 (1910) (emphasis added). If “induce” meant the same 

thing as “cause,” then Congress would not have used these 

words in the alternative in the phrase “induce or cause.” That 

phrase suggests that when “induce” is used elsewhere in the 

statute, it does not simply mean “cause,” but instead has in 

common with “persuade,” “entice,” and “coerce” an element 

of mental force. See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. 

FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The canon of 

statutory construction noscitur a sociis, i.e., a word is known 

by the company it keeps[,] is often wisely applied where a 

USCA Case #10-3047 Document #1325067 Filed: 08/19/2011 Page 27 of 33
10

word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid giving 

unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” (quotation 

marks omitted)); see, e.g., Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 

1319, 1323–24 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying the canon to one 

statutory term in a series of six related words).

Finally, the Murrell court reasoned that the “efficacy of 

§ 2422(b) would be eviscerated if a defendant could 

circumvent the statute simply by employing an intermediary 

to carry out his intended objective.” 368 F.3d at 1287. Not so. 

Congress very well could have decided that child victims are 

more vulnerable to online persuasion, inducement, 

enticement, and coercion than their adult guardians. The most 

sensible interpretation of subsection (b) is that Congress 

targeted the enticement of minors for that very reason. 

Congress has already provided a penalty for soliciting a child 

under age sixteen for sex crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 2425. And 

other provisions penalize transporting “any individual” for 

sex crimes, id. § 2421, persuading “any individual” to travel 

for sex crimes, id. § 2422(a), transporting a minor for sex 

crimes, id. at § 2423(a), arranging such transportation, id. 

§ 2423(d), traveling with the intent to engage in illicit sexual 

conduct, id. § 2423(b), engaging in the illicit sex act itself, id.

§§ 2241–44, 2423(c), and attempting or conspiring to do so, 

id. at 2423(e). Clearly, Congress has not left prosecutors 

powerless against child predators who do not entice their 

victims on the internet. Section 2422(b) is unique in targeting 

efforts to overbear the wills of children online. We have every 

reason to presume Congress meant what it said. Congress has 

not been reticent to amend § 2422(b), and each successive 

amendment has made the statute more punitive. See United 

States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2007).5

 5 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 

§ 508, 110 Stat. 56, 137 (adding subsection (b) to § 2422 and 

establishing a maximum imprisonment term of ten years); 

If

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11

Congress wishes to expand § 2422(b) to penalize persuading 

an adult to grant sexual access to a child, Congress does not 

need our help rewriting the statute.

II

Count Two of the indictment charged Laureys with 

driving from Maryland to the District of Columbia “for the 

purpose of engaging in . . . illicit sexual conduct,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2423(b); namely, a sex act with a minor. Before denying 

Laureys’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, Judge 

Robertson commented with admirable forthrightness on the 

weakness of the Government’s case:

As for the interstate travel with intent count, 

. . . if I were a juror, I would probably find a 

reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant 

thought there was going to be a girl in that 

apartment or not . . . . But I think it’s a jury 

question, and I’m just making this record of 

my own concern about this statute and its razor 

thin application to the facts of this case in case 

the jury convicts and another court wants to 

look at it.

 

Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. 

No. 105-314, § 102, 112 Stat. 2974, 2975–76 (increasing the 

maximum term to fifteen years); Prosecutorial Remedies and Other 

Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. 

L. No. 108-21, § 103(a)(2)(B) & (b)(2)(A), 117 Stat. 650, 652, 653 

(2003) (increasing the maximum term to thirty years and adding a 

five-year mandatory minimum); Adam Walsh Child Protection and 

Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 203, 120 Stat. 587, 613 

(increasing the maximum term to life and increasing the mandatory 

minimum to ten years).

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12

Tr. 5/26/2010, at 287. Because Laureys moved for a judgment 

of acquittal, the district court’s hesitant finding about the 

sufficiency of the evidence is entitled to no deference. 

Reviewing de novo, and viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the government, I would reverse Laureys’s 

conviction.

“The crime of attempt . . . consists of (1) an intent to do 

an act or to bring about certain consequences which would in 

law amount to a crime; and (2) an act in furtherance of that 

intent which . . . goes beyond mere preparation.” United 

States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(quoting 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,

SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 18 (1986)). Assuming that 

Laureys believed the girl existed, that Laureys believed Jim 

would allow him to engage in sexual conduct with her, and 

that Laureys intended to do so at his earliest opportunity, the 

Government still failed to show Laureys took a substantial 

step toward the commission of that crime.

A substantial step is one that manifests “a true 

commitment toward completing the crime” and 

“demonstrat[es] that the crime will take place unless 

interrupted by independent circumstances.” United States v. 

Hofus, 598 F.3d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks 

omitted); see also United States v. Ramirez, 348 F.3d 1175, 

1180 (10th Cir. 2003) (“A substantial step is an appreciable 

fragment of a crime and an action of such substantiality that, 

unless frustrated, the crime would have occurred. The step 

must be strongly corroborative of the firmness of the 

defendant’s criminal intent and must unequivocally mark the 

defendant’s acts as criminal.” (quoting United States v. Smith, 

264 F.3d 1012, 1016 (10th Cir. 2001)); United States v. 

Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 640 (6th Cir. 2000) (“It must be 

necessary to the consummation of the crime and be of such a 

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13

nature that a reasonable observer, viewing it in context could 

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that it was undertaken in 

accordance with a design to violate the statute.” (quoting 

United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 987–88 (2d Cir. 

1980)). As the district court put it to the jury, a substantial 

step is part of a “course of conduct planned to culminate in 

the commission of the crime.” Dist. Ct. Docket No. 52, at 16; 

accord United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 107 

(2007); United States v. Duran, 96 F.3d 1495, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 

1996).

“Important to a substantial-step assessment is an 

understanding of the underlying conduct proscribed by the 

crime being attempted.” United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 

127, 148 (2d Cir. 2011). Here, the underlying conduct is 

interstate travel for the purpose of sexual conduct with a 

minor. Driving to the address Jim provided would be a 

substantial step toward the commission of that conduct only if 

Laureys intended that drive to culminate in sex with a minor. 

If § 2423(b) proscribed interstate travel with 

the mere abstract intent to engage in sexual 

activity with a minor at some undetermined 

point in the future, this would be a more 

difficult case. . . . By requiring that the 

interstate travel be ‘for the purpose of’ 

engaging in illicit sexual activity, Congress has 

narrowed the scope of the law to exclude mere 

preparation, thought or fantasy; the statute 

only applies when the travel is a necessary step 

in the commission of a crime.

United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006).

The evidence is insufficient as a matter of law, because it 

cannot possibly prove Laureys intended to have sex with 

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14

anyone but Jim during the relevant trip. Even if Laureys 

entertained some hope that he might have sex with a child in 

the future, his drive to meet with Jim was at best “mere 

preparation” for a future crime. See United States v. Bolden, 

514 F.2d 1301, 1307 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“‘[C]asing’ [a]

store preparatory to a later attempt to rob” would be “mere 

preparation” for the robbery, not “an indictable attempt.”).

There is no evidence whatsoever that Laureys was 

driving to the District to have sex with a child. Detective 

Palchak admitted there was “no implication anywhere that the 

girl [was] going to be at this setup meeting” at Jim’s place.

Tr. 5/25/2010, at 215. Jim said only that his girlfriend “comes 

over a lot” and that he had been “messing around” with her 

nine-year-old daughter. Indeed, the chat was remarkably 

silent about Jim’s ability and intent to procure the victim. 

Laureys was focused instead on arranging a meeting between 

him and Jim. Unlike Laureys’s very practical arrangements to 

meet Jim, his lewd statements about the fictitious girl were 

never more than hypothetical. Merely proposing illegal sexual 

conduct at some unspecified point in the future is not a 

substantial step toward its commission. See United States v. 

Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2008). After 

planning their meeting at Jim’s apartment, and for the last ten 

minutes of the chat, neither he nor Laureys ever mentioned 

the fictitious girl again. Instead, Laureys asked Jim, “you got 

anything fun we could watch or something while we’re 

there[?]” Detective Palchak admitted Laureys did not bring up 

the girl during their phone calls. See Tr. 5/25/2010, at 175–76, 

223. 

The most likely interpretation of this evidence is that 

Laureys assumed the girl—if she even existed—would not be 

present at this meeting. Laureys’s assumption was reasonable, 

since Detective Palchak’s statements as “Jim” were consistent 

USCA Case #10-3047 Document #1325067 Filed: 08/19/2011 Page 32 of 33
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with a sexual liaison between two men, not a prelude to child 

molestation. He invited Laureys to “get a beer first to make 

sure we are comfortable then have fun at my [place].” And he 

described himself physically: “I’m a white dude about 6 foot 

190 [¶] 38 [¶] you[?]” Any reasonable juror would have 

entertained grave doubts about Laureys’s intent to engage in 

sexual conduct with a real child upon his arrival in the 

District.

III

This is a disturbing case. Laureys’s chat with Detective 

Palchak and his testimony at trial demonstrate moral 

depravity, but they do not meet the Government’s burden to 

prove the requisite criminal intent. I would reverse Laureys’s 

convictions. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

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