Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-50168/USCOURTS-ca5-15-50168-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paula Cook
Appellant
Micah P. Cooksey
Appellant
Mark Harken
Appellant
MPC Data and Communications, Incorporated
Appellant
Montgomery Chandler, Incorporated
Appellant
NXT Properties, Incorporated
Appellant
Leslie L. Pettijohn
Appellee
Lynn Rowell
Appellant
Shonda Townsley
Appellant
Townsley Designs, L.L.C.
Appellant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-50168

LYNN ROWELL, doing business as Beaumont Greenery; MICAH P. 

COOKSEY; MPC DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS, INCORPORATED; 

MARK HARKEN; NXT PROPERTIES, INCORPORATED; PAULA COOK; 

MONTGOMERY CHANDLER, INCORPORATED; SHONDA TOWNSLEY; 

TOWNSLEY DESIGNS, L.L.C., 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

LESLIE L. PETTIJOHN, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the 

Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner of the State of Texas, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

For this challenge to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure 

to state a claim) dismissal, upholding Texas’ Anti-Surcharge Law, Tex. Fin. 

Code § 339.001, at issue is whether the law’s proscribing merchants’ imposing 

surcharges for credit-card purchases constitutes a First Amendment violation. 

In contending the law violates free-speech rights, a group of Texas merchants 

claim the law: penalizes them for characterizing pricing as a “surcharge”, 

while at the same time not prohibiting a “discount” for non-credit-card 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 2, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

2

transactions; and is unconstitutionally vague. The Texas Office of Consumer 

Credit Commissioner counters the law is instead a permissible economicpricing regulation that does not implicate the First Amendment. AFFIRMED. 

I.

Texas’ law forbids merchants from charging an extra fee to consumers

who pay with a credit card. It was enacted to address how the “swipe fee” of 

two to three percent of the purchase price, which credit-card issuers charge 

merchants for each transaction paid with a credit card, is passed on from the 

merchant to the consumer.

There is a substantial federal-law backdrop to the challenged Texas law. 

For over a decade prior to its enactment, Congress had been regulating 

surcharges and discounts related to credit cards. In 1974, Congress amended 

the Truth in Lending Act to prohibit credit-card companies from contracting 

against discounts for non-credit-card transactions. Fair Credit Billing Act, 

Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. III, § 306, 88 Stat. 1500, 1515 (1974) (codified at 15 

U.S.C. § 1666f(a)) (“the card issuer may not, by contract, or otherwise, prohibit 

any . . . seller from offering a discount to a cardholder to induce the cardholder 

to pay by cash, check, or similar means rather than use a credit card”). 

Before the amendment, credit-card companies’ contracts with merchants

regularly prohibited their either offering discounts for non-credit-card 

transactions, or imposing surcharges for credit-card transactions. The 

merchants and credit-card companies contracted to offer the same price for an 

item for all consumers, regardless of the manner in which they paid, and 

despite the “swipe fee” merchants incurred for credit-card transactions. 

Two years later, while the authorization of discounts remained, Congress

banned merchants’ use of surcharges, by again amending the Truth in Lending 

Act. Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3, 90 Stat. 197 (1976) (“No seller in any sales 

transaction may impose a surcharge on a cardholder who elects to use a credit 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

3

card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.”). At the same time, 

Congress clarified the distinction between “surcharge” and “discount”, by 

defining them according to their ordinary meaning: a “discount” is “a reduction 

made from the regular price”; a “surcharge”, “any means of increasing the 

regular price to a cardholder which is not imposed upon customers paying by 

cash, check, or similar means”. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(q)–(r)).

When Congress extended the statute in 1981, it defined “regular price”

to further distinguish between “surcharge” and “discount”: 

[T]he tag or posted price charged for the property or 

service if a single price is tagged or posted, or the price 

charged for the property or service when payment is 

made by use of . . . a credit card if either (1) no price is 

tagged or posted, or (2) two prices are tagged or posted, 

one of which is charged when payment is made by use 

of a . . . credit card and the other when payment is 

made by use of cash, check, or similar means.

Cash Discount Act, Pub. L. No. 97-25, § 102, 95 Stat. 144 (1981) (codified at 15 

U.S.C. § 1602(y)).

The federal ban on surcharges was renewed twice before being allowed 

to expire in 1984, in the face of continued criticism from consumer advocates 

and the Federal Reserve Board. See Financial Institutions Regulatory &

Interest Rate Control Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1501, 92 Stat. 3641, 3713

(1978); Cash Discount Act, Pub. L. No. 97-25, § 201, 95 Stat. 144 (1981); Cash 

Discount Act, 1981: Hearings on S. 414 Before Senate Banking Comm., 97th 

Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (18 Feb. 1981). On the other hand, and of significance here, 

the authorization for discounts remained. Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 

93-495, tit. III, § 306, 88 Stat. 1500, 1515 (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1666f(a)). 

Upon the lapse of the federal anti-surcharge law in 1984, credit-card 

companies began reviving anti-surcharge clauses in their contracts with 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

4

merchants. Similarly, States, including Texas, began enacting anti-surcharge 

legislation. Its 1985 anti-surcharge law provides: “In a sale of goods or 

services, a seller may not impose a surcharge on a buyer who uses a credit card 

for an extension of credit instead of cash, a check, or a similar means of 

payment”. S.B. 1353, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 443, § 1, Tex. Gen. Laws 1578, 

1578 (Tex. 1985) (codified at Tex. Fin. Code § 339.001(a)). The law does not

ban, nor does it mention, discounts. Other States also adopted anti-surcharge

legislation. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1748.1(a), held unconstitutional by

Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199 (E.D. Cal.), appeal docketed, 

No. 15-15873 (9th Cir. 30 Apr. 2015); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 5-2-212; Conn. Gen. 

Stat. § 42-133ff; Fla. Stat. § 501.0117, held unconstitutional by Dana’s R.R. 

Supply v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 807 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.), reh’g denied (11th Cir. 

13 Jan. 2016); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 16a-2-403; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140D, 

§ 28A(a)(1)–(2); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 9-A, § 8-509; Miss. Code Ann. § 31-7-9(d) 

(applying only to state-issued credit cards); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 518; Okla. 

Stat. tit. 14A, § 2-211; Utah Code Ann. § 13-38a-302 (2013), repealed by § 63I1-213 (2014). 

Beginning in 2005, antitrust actions against credit-card companies

challenged anti-surcharge prohibitions in their merchant contracts; the 

litigation resulted in Visa, Mastercard, and American Express’ removing those

provisions in 2013. As a result, state laws were the only proscription against 

merchants’ imposing a surcharge, leading to more litigation, including this 

action. 

This challenge to Texas’ law was filed in March 2014. The district court 

dismissed it for failure to state a claim, and denied a preliminary injunction.

Rowell v. Pettijohn, No. A-14-CA-190-LY (W.D. Tex. 4 Feb. 2015). 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

5

II.

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is reviewed de novo. Hines v. Alldredge, 783 

F.3d 197, 200–01 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 534 (mem.) (2015). The

dismissal will be affirmed “when the plaintiff has not alleged enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face or has failed to raise its right 

to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations 

in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)”. Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 

F.3d 322, 330 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 506 

(5th Cir. 2012)).

The merchants claim the surcharge prohibition “ban[s] one disfavored 

way of truthfully describing lawful conduct, [and] is a content-based speech 

restriction”. In other words, they maintain the law is not a permissible

economic regulation, but instead requires them to convey their prices in a 

certain way: as “less” than the regular price, rather than “more” when paid 

with a credit card, although, they contend, mathematically, the result is the 

same. Additionally, the merchants assert they cannot advertise two prices

(dual pricing—a higher price for credit, and a lower price for cash, check, or 

similar means of payment (cash)) for fear of inadvertently describing the price 

for credit-card transactions as “higher” than the regular price, and thereby 

violating Texas’ law. Based on that fear, they state their prices are higher for 

all their customers, regardless of whether they pay by credit card or cash. The 

merchants concede, however, that dual pricing is legal under Texas’ law. They 

also assert the law is unconstitutionally vague because the distinction between 

a surcharge and a discount is purely semantic, and difficult to abide by in 

practice.

In response, the Commissioner contends the law does not restrict how a 

merchant may convey price to the consumer, but rather is a permissible

economic regulation under Texas’ police power. She maintains the law 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

6

prevents merchants from imposing surcharges on consumers who pay with 

credit cards—nothing more. Any impact on speech as a result of the law, the 

Commissioner claims, is merely incidental to the ban against credit-card 

surcharges, and does not implicate the First Amendment. Additionally, the 

Commissioner asserts the law limits consumer confusion and protects from the 

potential for windfall profits merchants could collect by imposing surcharges 

for credit-card transactions that are higher than the concomitant credit-card 

“swipe fees”. 

A.

Before addressing Texas’ law, it is helpful to consider the circuit split 

resulting from our sister circuits’ recently ruling on state anti-surcharge bans. 

1.

The second circuit upheld New York’s anti-surcharge law, reversing the 

district court. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118 (2d 

Cir.), amending and superseding 803 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015). Conversely, the 

eleventh circuit held Florida’s anti-surcharge law violated merchants’ First 

Amendment free-speech rights. Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1235. 

a.

The second circuit held New York’s law was a legal economic regulation 

that did not implicate the First Amendment. Expressions, 808 F.3d at 122. 

That law provided in relevant part: “No seller in any sales transaction may 

impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of 

payment by cash, check, or similar means.” Id. at 124; N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 

§ 518. In challenging the law, merchants claimed, inter alia, it violated the 

First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Expressions, 808 F.3d at 121–22. 

They asserted they wanted to assess a single price for their goods and services, 

and charge an additional “surcharge” to credit-card customers in order to offset 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

7

credit-card companies’ “swipe fees”, but feared that such a pricing scheme 

would be prohibited by the anti-surcharge law. Id. at 126, 128–29. 

The district court, inter alia, permanently enjoined enforcement of the 

law, stating it “burden[ed] speech by drawing the line between prohibited 

surcharges and permissible discounts based on words and labels, rather than 

economic realities”. Id. at 127 (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). The court additionally determined the law was void for vagueness 

because it “turn[ed] on the labels that sellers use to describe their prices”. Id.

In reversing, the second circuit held the law “does not violate the First 

Amendment as applied to single-sticker-price sellers”. Id. at 130, 141. The 

court stated “that prices, although necessarily communicated through 

language, do not rank as ‘speech’ within the meaning of the First Amendment”. 

Id. at 130. It further clarified: “[The law] does not prohibit sellers from 

referring to credit-cash price differentials as credit-card surcharges, or from 

engaging in advocacy related to credit-card surcharges; it simply prohibits 

imposing credit-card surcharges. . . . [The law] regulates conduct, not speech”. 

Id. at 131 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for 

Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006)).

With regard to the merchants’ assertion the law applied to sellers who 

use pricing schemes outside of “single-sticker” prices, such as “dual-pricing” 

(again, posting one price for credit-card users, and another for those who use 

cash), the court abstained from reaching the merits of the issue under Railroad 

Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., because doing so implicated an unsettled 

state-law question: whether the law prohibits pricing schemes other than 

“single sticker”. Id. at 135–37 (citing Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).

The court also reversed the district court’s holding the law is 

unconstitutionally vague, ruling it “has a core meaning that can be reasonably 

understood: sellers who post single sticker prices for their goods and services 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

8

may not charge credit-card customers an additional amount above the sticker 

price that is not also charged to cash customers”. Id. at 142 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

b.

By contrast, in Dana’s Railroad Supply, the eleventh circuit struck down

Florida’s anti-surcharge law, holding it regulated the content of merchants’ 

speech, in violation of the First Amendment. 807 F.3d at 1239. The Florida 

law provided, in relevant part: “A seller . . . may not impose a surcharge on 

the buyer . . . for electing to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, 

or similar means . . . . This section does not apply to the offering of a discount 

for the purpose of inducing payment by cash, check, or other means not 

involving the use of a credit card”. Id. at 1242; Fla. Stat. § 501.0117.

In determining the law did not regulate economic conduct, the court 

ruled it targeted “expression alone”, and “there is no real-world difference 

between [a surcharge and discount]”. Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1245. 

The court held the statute, therefore, restricted the content of merchants’ 

speech: the manner in which they could describe their pricing scheme. Id.

The court then assumed, arguendo, the law implicated commercialspeech content, and analyzed it under the more lenient Central Hudson

intermediate-scrutiny standard. Id. at 1246, 1249; Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. 

Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (describing the four-pronged 

test for commercial speech). Under that standard, “restrictions directed at 

commerce or conduct may be upheld—assuming they further a substantial 

government interest and are narrowly tailored—even if they impose incidental 

burdens on speech”. Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1246 (alterations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

In holding the law “founder[ed] at every step” of the commercial-speech 

analysis, the court “struggle[d] to identify a plausible governmental interest 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

9

that would be served by the no-surcharge law”. Id. at 1249. It held that,

although “[the law] purports to regulate commercial behavior, [it] has the sole 

effect of banning merchants from uttering the word surcharge”, a violation of 

the First Amendment. Id. at 1251 (emphasis in original).

2.

a.

As discussed infra, violation of Texas’ law can result in a penalty’s being 

imposed in a civil action. Although none of the merchants at hand have been 

challenged in that manner for violating Texas’ law, their claims are ripe for 

review. As in the actions before the second and eleventh circuits, the 

merchants in this action adequately expressed “they were presently chilled 

from implementing their preferred pricing scheme, and . . . had standing based 

on a credible fear [Texas’ law] would be enforced against them”. Expressions, 

808 F.3d at 127; see also Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1241.

b.

“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local 

economies under their police powers”. Howard v. City of Garland, 917 F.2d 

898, 901 (5th Cir. 1990) (alterations omitted) (quoting City of New Orleans v. 

Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (discrimination claim)); see also Am. Real 

Estate Inst., Inc. v. Ala. Real Estate Comm’n, 605 F.2d 931, 933 (5th Cir. 1979). 

“[A] state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed 

to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to 

its purpose”. Nebbia v. People of N.Y., 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (upholding law 

setting prices for milk); see also Munn v. People of State of Ill., 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 

113, 125 (1876) (“In their exercise [of these powers] it has been customary . . .

in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, 

hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, & c., and in so doing to fix 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

10

a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations 

furnished, and articles sold.”). 

Toward that end, “the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions 

directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech”. 

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011). In that regard, our 

court has held merchants may not “bootstrap themselves into the heightened 

scrutiny of the First Amendment simply by infusing the prohibited conduct 

with some element of speech”. Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 264 

F.3d 493, 506 (5th Cir. 2001) (prohibition of direct sale of automobiles from 

manufacturer to consumer did not implicate First Amendment). 

Reviewing the parties’ claims de novo, and in the light of the States’ 

broad authority to regulate economic conduct, we hold Texas’ law regulates 

conduct, not speech, and, therefore, does not implicate the First Amendment. 

Instead, the law ensures only that merchants do not impose an additional

charge above the regular price for customers paying with credit cards. Again, 

it states: “In a sale of goods or services, a seller may not impose a surcharge 

on a buyer who uses a credit card for an extension of credit instead of cash, a 

check, or a similar means of payment”. Tex. Fin. Code § 339.001(a). Along

that line, the second circuit’s reasoning in upholding New York’s antisurcharge law is persuasive. Expressions, 808 F.3d at 127–35.

i.

The text of Texas’ law provides the first indication that it regulates 

conduct, not speech. See Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1242–43. The Texas, 

like the New York, law does not define “surcharge”, nor does it address 

“discounts” or any other pricing schemes beyond imposing surcharges for 

credit-card transactions. Tex. Fin. Code § 339.001(a); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 

§ 518. Therefore, we understand the statutory terms according to their 

ordinary meaning. E.g., United States v. Transocean Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 10 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

11

767 F.3d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 2014). Pursuant to a plain reading of the Texas

law, it bans surcharges, and is otherwise completely silent regarding other 

forms of pricing. Tex. Fin. Code § 339.001(a). Therefore, similar to New 

York’s law, Texas’ does not forbid merchants from charging cash customers a 

different price than that charged to credit-card customers. Expressions, 808 

F.3d at 130–31. 

Instead, as the second circuit held in Expressions for New York’s law, 

Texas’ “forbids charging credit-card customers an additional amount above the 

regular price that is not also charged to cash customers, but it permits offering 

cash customers a discount below the regular price that is not also offered to 

credit-card customers”. Id. at 128 (emphasis in original). In other words, a 

plain reading of the statute indicates that a “surcharge” is not the same as a 

“discount”, contrary to the merchants’ assertions. While a merchant may have 

the same ultimate economic result if it applies the same amount in the form of 

a credit-card surcharge that it would otherwise apply as a cash discount, the 

law does not require that. 

On the contrary, as the parties concede, Texas’ law allows a merchant to 

discount and dual-price as it wishes; these amounts are not required to be the 

amount of the “swipe fees” the merchants maintain are at issue. As the second 

circuit persuasively noted:

[T]he central flaw in [the merchants’] argument [] is 

their bewildering persistence in equating the actual 

imposition of a credit-card surcharge (i.e., a seller’s 

choice to charge an additional amount above the 

sticker price to its credit-card customers) with the 

words that speakers of English have chosen to describe 

that pricing scheme . . . . But Plaintiffs are simply 

wrong. What [the New York law] regulates—all that 

it regulates—is the difference between a seller’s 

sticker price and the ultimate price that it charges to 

credit-card customers. A seller imposing a surcharge 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

12

(an additional amount above its sticker price) on 

credit-card customers could choose to “characterize” 

that additional charge as whatever it wants, but that 

would not change the fact that it would be violating 

[the New York law].

Expressions, 808 F.3d at 131–32 (emphasis added). 

This understanding of the anti-surcharge law fits neatly within the 

lapsed federal version of the law, from which the state anti-surcharge laws 

arose, and the federal statutory definition of surcharge: “an additional amount 

above the seller’s regular price”. See id. at 132; 15 U.S.C. § 1602(r); Pub. L. 

No. 94-222, 90 Stat. 197 (1976). Precisely what the merchants maintain they 

are prevented from “characterizing” is what is prohibited economic conduct

under the law: imposing surcharges.

“Fifth Circuit law is crystal clear that when, as here, the language of a 

statute is unambiguous, this Court has no need to and will not defer to 

extrinsic aids or legislative history.” Hamilton v. United Healthcare of La., 

Inc., 310 F.3d 385, 392 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Guilzon v. Comm’r of Internal 

Revenue, 985 F.2d 819, 823 n.11 (5th Cir. 1993)). On the other hand, the 

legislative history of the Texas law, discussed supra, illuminates the law’s

simply forbidding merchants’ imposing credit-card surcharges. The bill’s 

sponsor noted the law was intended to ban surcharges, or “an added cost over 

and above the regularly marked price on goods and services”. Hearings on Tex. 

H.B. 1558 Before the House Comm. on Fin. Insts., 69th Leg. R.S. (22 Apr. 1985). 

Furthermore, he stated that, “until the federal government places a permanent 

ban on [credit-card surcharges], I believe it is in our best interest to protect the 

consumer”. Id. His statements reflect the Texas legislators’ intent in enacting 

the law: to prohibit additional costs above the “normal” price, in the interest 

of the consumer. If the Texas legislature had wished to also ban discounts, it

could have done so. 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

13

In sum, the merchants’ assertion Texas’ law regulates what they say, 

rather than what they do, is unavailing. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 60 (holding

a law requiring schools to “afford equal access to military recruiters” regulates 

“conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools must do . . . not what they 

may or may not say.” (emphasis in original)).

ii.

Consequently, Texas’ law concerns pricing regulation; and, again, as the 

second circuit noted: “[P]rices, although necessarily communicated through 

language, do not rank as ‘speech’ within the meaning of the First Amendment”. 

Expressions, 808 F.3d at 130. The court continued: “This principle is 

illustrated most vividly by the fact that price-control laws, which necessarily 

prevent sellers from communicating certain (illegal) prices, have never been 

thought to implicate the First Amendment”. Id. A State’s authority to regulate 

the “prices to be charged for the products or commodities [a business] sells”, 

Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537, does not implicate the First Amendment. Expressions,

808 F.3d at 130–31 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 

504–08 (1996) (plurality opinion); accord id. at 524 (Thomas, J., concurring in 

part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 

the judgment); Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Providence, 731 

F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding prohibition on discounts for tobacco 

products by coupons and multi-packs regulated economic conduct)). The 

States’ power extends beyond price ceilings and floors to having the authority 

to set “regular” versus “excessive” or “unreasonable” price restrictions. See, e.g.,

O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257–58 (1931) 

(upholding prohibition of “unreasonable” insurance commissions).

And, “[i]f prohibiting certain prices does not implicate the First 

Amendment, it follows that prohibiting certain relationships between prices 

also does not implicate” it. Expressions, 808 F.3d at 131. Based on the plain 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

14

language of Texas’ law, simply imposing credit-card surcharges is prohibited; 

as the Commissioner points out, the merchants are not prevented from

“informing customers about the cost of credit, encouraging them to use cash, 

or expressing views on pricing policy more generally”. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. 

at 62. 

Furthermore, simply speaking about the prices regulated by Texas’ law 

does not transform it into a content-based speech restriction; the speech is 

merely incidental to the regulated economic conduct. See Ford Motor, 264 F.3d 

at 506. In Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin, for example, our court held 

the regulation requiring restaurant owners to verbally request that smokers 

extinguish their cigarettes or leave the premises did not implicate the First 

Amendment. 522 F.3d 533, 549–50 (5th Cir. 2008). The owners’ speech was

incidental to the no-smoking law, and was not protected commercial speech. 

Id. at 550. Similarly, any speech regarding surcharges or discounts is 

incidental to Texas’ ban on imposing credit-card surcharges.

Unlike in Expressions, the merchants in this action do not claim Texas’ 

law forbids a dual-pricing scheme. Therefore, we have no reason, as the second 

circuit did, to abstain under Pullman. 312 U.S. 496; see also, e.g., Nationwide 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. of State Bar of Tex., 283 

F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]here must be an uncertain issue of state law 

that is ‘fairly susceptible’ to an interpretation that would render it unnecessary 

for us to decide the federal constitutional questions in a case.”). 

Indeed, the second circuit’s decision to abstain pursuant to Pullman

arose under circumstances distinguishable from those at issue here. In 

Expressions, as discussed supra, the court first held the New York antisurcharge law did not implicate the First Amendment in the context of 

applying either a discount or a surcharge to “single-sticker-price schemes”. 808 

F.3d at 135. It then questioned whether the law could be applied in the dual-

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 14 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

15

pricing context, when the law did not address any other pricing scheme but the 

ban on credit-card surcharges. Id. at 135–38. The merchants in that action 

maintained the law prevented them from engaging in any kind of dual pricing. 

Id. at 135. Here, on the other hand, the parties concede dual pricing is allowed; 

the merchants simply object to their inability to characterize price differentials 

as a “surcharge”, juxtaposed with a “discount”. 

Moreover, the eleventh circuit’s holding the Florida anti-surcharge law 

regulated speech and not conduct, thereby implicating the First Amendment, 

is unavailing for Texas’ law. As stated supra, that court characterized a 

surcharge as a “negative discount”, and stated there was “no real-world 

difference” between the two. Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1245. (The 

Florida law expressly excluded “discounts” from the restriction, while New 

York’s and Texas’ laws are silent regarding pricing schemes other than 

applying surcharges. Compare Fla. Stat. § 501.0117(1)–(2) with N.Y. Gen. Bus. 

Law § 518 and Tex. Fin. Code § 339.001(a).) Additionally, it compared the 

pricing regulation to a law banning “half-empty” beverages, while allowing 

those that are “half-full”. 807 F.3d at 1245 (emphasis omitted). The eleventh 

circuit’s distinguishing between a “surcharge” and a “discount” overlooks

differences in the economic activity, and that the anti-surcharge law solely 

bans application of additional fees above the normal price and nothing more. 

Therefore, the end result of a discount does not always equal a surcharge. 

B.

“A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it does not give a ‘person of 

ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.’” 

Groome Res. Ltd., L.L.C. v. Par. of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 217 (5th Cir. 2000) 

(quoting United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 683 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). For obvious reasons, a

civil law “is subject to a less strict vagueness test” than a criminal law. Vill. of 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

16

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99

(1982); Groome, 234 F.3d at 217. 

Under Texas administrative law, the Commissioner may seek civil 

penalties against a merchant who violates Texas’ anti-surcharge law. See 7 

Tex. Admin. Code § 4.104 (discussing service of notice for civil action); Tex. Fin. 

Code § 339.001(c)–(d) (giving the Finance Commission of Texas exclusive 

authority to enforce and adopt rules relating to § 339.001). As the merchants 

concede, in civil actions, a law is void for vagueness only if its “terms [are] so 

vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all or [are] 

substantially incomprehensible”. Ford Motor, 264 F.3d at 507–08 (alterations, 

citations, and internal quotations marks omitted).

Largely for the reasons discussed supra, Texas’ law is not 

unconstitutionally vague. The law has a “core meaning that can reasonably be 

understood”. Expressions, 808 F.3d at 142. And, as stated, words are given 

their ordinary meaning unless defined otherwise in the statute. Hamilton, 310 

F.3d at 391–92. A plain reading of Texas’ law shows it forbids a merchant from 

imposing an extra charge for a purchase with a credit card, and is completely 

silent as to any other form of pricing. Tex. Fin. Code § 339.001(a). 

Moreover, “a federal court must construe a state statute to avoid a 

constitutional problem if the statute is ‘susceptible of such a construction’”. 

Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1253 (Carnes, C.J., dissenting) (alterations 

omitted) (quoting S. Utah Mines & Smelters v. Beaver Cty., 262 U.S. 325, 331

(1923)). Here, even if there is any vagueness in the Texas statute, it can be 

construed to eliminate that vagueness. Expressions, 808 F.3d at 144 (citing 

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 403–04 (2010) and United States v. 

Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997)). By reading the statute to mean what it 

states, merchants cannot charge an extra fee in transactions paid with a credit 

card; therefore, the largely hypothetical scenarios in which the merchants 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

17

complain of vagueness are eliminated. Moreover, as stated supra and as the 

parties concede, the law does not prohibit merchants from advertising two 

prices.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 17 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

18

JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Five Texas merchants, the plaintiffs in this case, allege that they wish 

to post two prices for the goods and services that they offer: one price that will 

apply if the customer pays in cash, another that will apply if the customer pays 

by credit card. They wish to tell their customers that the difference between 

these two prices is a “surcharge” for using a credit card, rather than a 

“discount” for using cash. The merchants claim that they have not instituted 

such a pricing practice because they fear that they will be held liable under the 

Texas Anti-Surcharge Law, not for charging less for cash purchases than for 

credit, but rather for describing the difference between the two prices as a 

“surcharge” instead of as a “discount.”1 They complain that this restriction on 

their characterization of the price difference is an unconstitutional violation of 

their First Amendment rights. 

As the majority explains, a surcharge is “an additional amount above the 

seller’s regular price.” Op. at 15. The State asserts that “Texas’s AntiSurcharge Law regulates a pricing practice—i.e., surcharging credit-card 

customers—not information about a lawful transaction.” And in affirming the 

district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, the panel 

majority characterizes the Anti-Surcharge Law as an economic regulation 

because it “solely bans application of additional fees above the normal price 

and nothing more.” Id. But the State concedes, and the panel majority 

recognizes, that “dual-pricing schemes” of the sort described by the merchants 

are allowed under the statute, and thus the merchants may legally post a 

 

1 As the majority opinion states, the Texas Anti-Surcharge Law, in pertinent part, 

provides: “In a sale of goods or services, a seller may not impose a surcharge on a buyer who 

uses a credit card for an extension of credit instead of cash, a check, or a similar means of 

payment.”

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 18 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

19

higher credit-card price and a lower cash price for the same item. A merchant 

who describes the difference between these prices as a surcharge is not 

assessing “additional” fees above a “regular” price; he is only characterizing a 

perfectly legal price differential in a chosen way. If he violates the AntiSurcharge Law it is because of the content of his speech, not because of the 

nature of his conduct. 

Perhaps inadvertently, the panel majority admits that the AntiSurcharge Law does not only regulate economic conduct but, when applied to 

dual-pricing schemes, prohibits the use of words to convey a particular 

message. Distinguishing this case from Expressions Hair Design v. 

Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 137 (2d Cir. 2015), where it was “far from clear” 

that New York’s anti-surcharge law applied to dual-pricing schemes, the 

majority writes: “Here, on the other hand, the parties concede dual pricing is 

allowed; the merchants simply object to their inability to characterize price 

differentials as a ‘surcharge’, juxtaposed with a ‘discount’,” op. at 15. The 

majority does not—and, I suggest, cannot—explain how a law that affects 

merchants’ ability to characterize legal price differentials as “surcharges” 

rather than as “discounts” is not a content-based restriction on speech subject 

to First Amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Care, Inc., 131 

S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011) (“An individual’s right to speak is implicated when 

information he or she possesses is subjected to ‘restraints on the way in which 

the information might be used’ or disseminated.”) (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. 

Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984)).

In fact, although the Second Circuit in Expressions declined to discuss 

the effect that Section 518, New York’s anti-surcharge law, might have on dual 

pricing schemes, the court’s opinion illuminates the critical distinction—elided 

by the panel majority—between the regulation of pricing and the regulation of 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 19 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

20

the speech used to describe it. The court determined that Section 518 does not 

violate the First Amendment as applied to single-sticker-price schemes, where 

merchants “post only a single price for their goods and services and charge 

more than that price to credit-card purchasers.” 808 F.3d at 128. The court 

emphasized that “Section 518 does not prohibit all differentials between the 

price ultimately charged to cash customers and the price ultimately charged to 

credit-card customers,” id., and that “[b]y its terms, Section 518 does not 

prohibit sellers from referring to credit-cash price differentials as credit-card 

surcharges, or from engaging in advocacy related to credit-card surcharges,”

id. at 131. Instead, the court explained: 

What Section 518 regulates—all that it regulates—is the 

difference between a seller’s sticker price and the ultimate price 

that it charges to credit-card customers. A seller imposing a 

surcharge (an additional amount above its sticker price) on creditcard customers could choose to “characterize” that additional 

charge as whatever it wants, but that would not change the fact 

that it would be violating Section 518. Conversely, a seller offering 

a discount (a reduction from its sticker price) to cash customers 

could choose to “characterize” that reduction as whatever it wants 

(including as a “credit-card surcharge”), but that would not change 

the fact that the seller would not be violating Section 518. 

Id. at 132 (emphasis added). In other words, part of what made the New 

York law a purely economic regulation was the fact that, although it restricted 

merchants’ ability to set their prices as they wished, it did not restrict their 

ability to describe their prices or discuss the reasoning underlying the prices. 

If the credit card fee increased the price of a $100 item by $2, the merchant 

had to include that $2 in the single sticker price in order to pass the cost to the 

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 20 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

21

customer—but he could tell the customer that she could avoid the $2 “credit 

card surcharge” by paying in cash. 

As applied to dual-pricing schemes, the Texas law does not regulate the 

difference between prices; the State admits that the law permits merchants to 

post a cash price and a higher credit price for the same item. All that it 

regulates is what merchants can tell customers about their prices. I cannot 

see how such a restriction can avoid First Amendment scrutiny. Nor can I see 

how such a restriction can survive it. Under Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 

v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), the State 

must present evidence to establish that the statute “directly advances” a 

“substantial” government interest and “is not more extensive than is necessary 

to serve that interest.”2 See also Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667-68. The State has 

asserted that “the law effectively sets the maximum price for credit-card 

purchases as the posted price, while also restricting merchants’ ability to 

obtain windfall profits and limiting consumer confusion.” But if Texas truly 

wanted to “set[] the maximum price for credit-card purchases” and “restrict 

merchants’ ability to obtain windfall profits,” it could pass a law tying creditcard surcharges to swipe fees. Such a law would also standardize surcharges, 

eliminating the risk of consumer confusion and allowing consumers to 

effectively compare prices. Instead, the State has prohibited merchants from 

justifying their maximum prices to their customers by preventing them from 

 

2 The first prong of Central Hudson functions to permit regulation of speech that is 

either misleading or related to unlawful activity. Here, the State cannot claim that the 

speech at issue is misleading; the merchants simply want to truthfully explain the effect of 

credit card processing fees. And the State cannot argue that the speech relates to unlawful 

activity without employing the most flagrant tautological reasoning: the speech only “relates 

to unlawful activity” in the sense that, under the statute, the speech itself renders the conduct 

unlawful.

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 21 Date Filed: 03/02/2016
No. 15-50168

22

characterizing the differential between cash and credit prices as a surcharge. 

Even if the State can show that its interest in enacting the law is substantial 

and that the law directly advances that interest, the restriction therefore 

falters on the final Central Hudson prong. See 447 U.S. at 565 (“The regulatory 

technique may extend only as far as the interest it serves.”).

By permitting merchants from describing the difference between cash 

and credit prices as a “discount” while prohibiting them from describing it as 

a “surcharge,” the Texas Anti-Surcharge Law makes the legality of a price 

differential turn on the language used to describe it. This is not a regulation 

of pricing or of other economic activity, but regulation of protected commercial 

speech, and one that I believe cannot survive First Amendment scrutiny. For 

these reasons, contrary to the majority, I conclude that the defendants’ motion 

to dismiss should have been denied, that the enforcement of the Texas AntiSurcharge Law should have been preliminarily enjoined, and that the case 

should be remanded for further proceedings. Accordingly, I respectfully 

dissent.

 Case: 15-50168 Document: 00513404295 Page: 22 Date Filed: 03/02/2016