Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-17620/USCOURTS-ca9-13-17620-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
K. Berkler
Appellee
E. W. Fischer
Appellee
Edward Terran Furnace
Appellant
G. Giurbino
Appellee
R. S. Marquez
Appellee
R. L. Martinez
Appellee
M. Valdez
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD TERRAN FURNACE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

G. GIURBINO; K. BERKLER; R. S.

MARQUEZ; E. W. FISCHER; M.

VALDEZ, Institutional Gang

Investigator at Salinas Valley

State Prison; R. L. MARTINEZ,

Lt., Institutional Gang

Investigator at Salinas Valley

State Prison,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-17620

D.C. No.

5:12-cv-00873-LHK

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 9, 2015

San Francisco, California

Filed September 29, 2016

Before: Alex Kozinski, Jay S. Bybee,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bybee

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2 FURNACE V. GIURBINO

SUMMARY*

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal, on

preclusion grounds, of a California state prisoner’s 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action, alleging that prison officials wrongfully

classified him as a gang member in retaliation for filing a

previous § 1983 suit against the defendants’ colleagues.

Prior to filing this § 1983 suit, the prisoner filed a habeas

petition in California state court, alleging that his gang

classification and placement in secured housing violated his

federal constitutional rights, which was denied.

The panel held that California claim preclusion law

governed whether, in light of his earlier state habeas petition,

the prisoner’s § 1983 claims could be brought in federal

court. The panel rejected the prisoner’s claim that the

“primary rights” that were allegedly violated in his § 1983

suit were distinct from the primary right he sought to

vindicate in his habeas action in California state court. The

panel concluded that the same primary right – the prisoner’s

right to be free from unlawful gang validation and placement

in the segregated housing unit – was at issue in both suits. 

The panel also rejected the prisoner’s argument that the

identity of the parties was different between this § 1983

action and his prior habeas action.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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FURNACE V. GIURBINO 3

The panel declined the prison officials’ request to assess

a strike, based on the district court’s dismissal of this case,

against the prisoner under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

COUNSEL

Rajeev Muttreja (argued), Jones Day New York, New York;

Glen Nager, Jones Day, Washington, D.C.; for PlaintiffAppellant.

Jose A. Zelidon-Zepeda (argued), Deputy Attorney General;

Thomas S. Patterson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General;

Jonathan L. Wolff, Senior Assistant Attorney General;

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney

General, San Francisco, California; for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Edward Furnace is a prisoner at Salinas Valley State

Prison. Furnace alleges the Appellees wrongfully classified

him as a gang member in retaliation for filing a § 1983 suit

against the defendants’ colleagues. After Furnace filed a

habeas petition, California courts rejected his claims on the

ground that there was sufficient evidence to support the gang

validation. Furnace then filed the present action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment

rights, based on violation of the First Amendment and the

Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed his suit

on claim preclusion grounds. We affirm.

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I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

In 2006 Furnace filed a § 1983 suit against eleven Salinas

Valley Prison officials (none of whom is involved in this suit)

for allegedly denying him visitation rights and other

privileges. These defendants filed a motion to dismiss in

2008, which was denied. Furnace alleges that shortly after

that, R.L. Martinez and M. Valdez, gang investigators at

Salinas Valley, were “ordered to validate [Furnace] as a

prison gang member to intimidate and retaliate against him”

for filing the earlier suit. The decision to classify Furnace as

a member of the Black Guerilla Family (BGF) was based on

prison officials finding in Furnace’s cell the contact

information of a validated BGF gang member as well as

books, a CD, and a newspaper article relating to BGF.

Furnace filed an internal administrative appeal, claiming

that the classification lacked evidence, was retaliatory, and

was racially motivated. While the appeal was pending, K.

Berkler, R.S. Marquez, and E.W. Fischer, also gang experts

at Salinas Valley, again classified Furnace as a gang member. 

His internal administrative appeals were denied, and he was

placed in the prison’s secured housing unit (SHU).

Furnace then filed a pro se habeas petition in California

Superior Court. He named D. Adams (the prison warden),

R.L. Martinez, Valdez, Berkler, R.S. Marquez, and Fischer as

respondents (and others not involved in this appeal). He

alleged that his gang classification and placement in secured

housing lacked sufficient evidence, that it was done to

“intimidate and retaliate against” Furnace for filing the earlier

suit, and that it violated his federal constitutional rights to

free speech, equal protection of the law, and due process. 

Furnace sought to be removed from secured housing and to

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FURNACE V. GIURBINO 5

have his record cleared of any allegation that he was gang

affiliated.

The Superior Court denied Furnace’s petition on the

ground that there was sufficient evidence to support the gang

validation, without directly addressing whether the

classification was retaliatory or racially discriminatory. 

Furnace filed another habeas petition in the California Court

of Appeal, making the same allegations. The court denied his

petition, holding, first, that there was sufficient evidence to

support the validation and, second, that the validation did not

violate his First Amendment rights. The court denied

rehearing, and the California Supreme Court summarily

denied review.

In February 2012, Furnace filed this § 1983 suit in federal

district court. Furnace named as defendants Berkler,

Marquez, Fischer, R.L. Martinez, and Valdez, plus G.

Giurbino (collectively, “Appellees”), who allegedly

supervised the other Appellees. Furnace’s complaint alleged

that his classification was illegal and retaliatory in violation

of his First Amendment rights, and a violation of his right to

equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Furnace asked for declaratory relief, money

damages, as well as injunctive relief “to release him from the

security housing unit” and to “expunge his prison file” of any

allegation that he is associated with BGF.

The district court granted the Appellees’ motion to

dismiss on the ground that Furnace’s suit was barred by claim

preclusion. The court concluded that “both the state action

and the instant one arise out of the same incident and involve

the same actors allegedly performing the same act of

initiating gang validation procedures and ultimately

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6 FURNACE V. GIURBINO

validating [Furnace] as an active gang member without

proper procedural protections.” Because Furnace sought “to

vindicate the same primary right in federal court as he [had]

previously in state court,” his claim was precluded. Furnace

timely appealed. On appeal, Appellees ask us to assess a

strike against Furnace under the Prison Litigation Reform Act

for having filed a duplicative suit.1

II. ANALYSIS

This appeal raises two main issues. First, Furnace

contends that the district court erred in dismissing his First

Amendment and equal protection claims under California

claim preclusion principles. Second, the Appellees ask us to

assess a “strike” against Furnace under the Prison Litigation

Reform Act. We affirm the district court and decline to

assess a strike against Furnace.

A. Claim Preclusion

Under the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,

federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to state

court judgments, including “reasoned” habeas judgments, as

the rendering state court would. Gonzales v. Cal. Dep’t of

Corr., 739 F.3d 1226, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Migra

v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81

(1984)). Accordingly, California claim preclusion law

1 We review de novo a dismissal on res judicata grounds,

Manufactured Home Communities Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022,

1025 (9th Cir. 2005), as well as the district court’s interpretation of the

Prison Litigation Reform Act, Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th

Cir. 2005).

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FURNACE V. GIURBINO 7

governs whether, in light of his earlier state habeas petition,

Furnace’s § 1983 claims may be brought in federal court.

In California, “[c]laim preclusion arises if a second suit

involves: (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same

parties [or parties in privity with them] (3) after a final

judgment on the merits in the first suit.” DKN Holdings LLC

v. Faerber, 352 P.3d 378, 386 (Cal. 2015) (citing Mycogen

Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 51 P.3d 297, 301 (Cal. 2002)). 

Furnace makes two arguments in response to the Defendants’

claim preclusion defense. First, he argues that the “primary

rights” that were violated here are distinct from the primary

right he sought to vindicate in his habeas action in California

state courts. Second, he argues that the identity of the parties

is different between the two suits. We address each argument

in turn.

1. Primary Rights

California courts, unlike federal courts, do not determine

whether two suits involve the same cause of action by

applying the “same transaction or occurrence” or “common

nucleus of operative facts” test. Instead, California courts

will hold that two suits involve the same cause of action when

they involve the same “primary right.” Brodheim v. Cry,

584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009). Under this theory “a

‘cause of action’ is comprised of a ‘primary right’ of the

plaintiff, a corresponding ‘primary duty’ of the defendant,

and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of

that duty.” Mycogen, 51 P.3d at 306. “The most salient

characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: the

violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single

cause of action.” Id. Thus, in California, “if two actions

involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong

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8 FURNACE V. GIURBINO

by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake even

if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of

recovery,seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts

supporting recovery.” San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v.

San Diego City Emps. Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir.

2009) (quoting Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 197 Cal. Rptr.

612, 614 (Ct. App. 1983)). “The critical focus of primary

rights analysis is the harm suffered.” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at

1268 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

California’s primaryrights theorycan be complicated, and we

have cautioned against wielding the “primary right brush . . .

too carelessly” and noted the possibility that “different

primary rights may be violated by the same wrongful

conduct” under certain circumstances. San Diego Police

Officers’ Ass’n, 568 F.3d at 734 (internal quotation marks

omitted). But in this case, we have circuit precedent on point

that requires us to affirm.

The facts of Gonzales v. California Department of

Corrections will sound familiar. There, Gonzales was

validated as a gang member and placed in the SHU. 739 F.3d

at 1229. After exhausting his administrative remedies, and a

series of state habeas proceedings, he filed a § 1983 suit

alleging that “(1) the gang validation violated his rights to

free speech and association under the First Amendment;

(2) the validation regulations were applied in a racially

discriminatory manner; (3) he was classified as a gang

member as retaliation . . . ; [and] (4) his validation . . .

violated his due process rights.” Id. The district court

dismissed the suit on claim preclusion grounds. Id. at 1230.

On appeal, Gonzales argued “that his retaliation, First

Amendment, and Equal Protection claims [were] not

precluded,” because those claims arose under “a distinct

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FURNACE V. GIURBINO 9

primary right,” from his earlier due process claim. Id. at

1233 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, he

argued that his earlier inadequate evidence/due process claim

was “procedural” while his First Amendment and Equal

Protection Clause arguments were “inherently substantive,”

and he pointed to our decision in Brodheim as having

recognized a procedural/substantive divide. Id. We noted

that in Brodheim, the two harms—one substantive, one

procedural—were distinct because “[t]hey were caused at

different times, by different acts, and by different actors.” Id.

(quoting Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1268–69). By contrast,

Gonzales was “challenging the same actions by the same

group of officials at the same time that resulted in the same

harm.” Id. at 1234. Accordingly, the procedural/substantive

distinction for identifying a distinct primary right was of no

use, because whether a party alleges “a different remedy or

asserts a different legal theory . . . is irrelevant under

California claim preclusion doctrine.” Id. Since Gonzales’s

claims would be barred in California’s courts under

California’s claim preclusion doctrine, they were barred in

federal courts under the Full Faith and Credit statute. Id. at

1230.

Gonzales requires that we affirm. Furnace challenges

“the same actions by the same group of officials at the same

time that resulted in the same harm.” Id. at 1234. In his state

court action, Furnace raised a due process claim, challenging

the evidentiary basis of his gang validation and SHU

placement. He also claimed that the validation and SHU

placement were retaliatory, racially motivated, and violated

his First Amendment rights. And, like the plaintiff in

Gonzales, Furnace attempts to argue that the primary right he

sought to vindicate in the state proceedings is somehow

distinct from the rights he now seeks to vindicate. But, as the

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10 FURNACE V. GIURBINO

California Supreme Court has made clear, a plaintiff’s

primary right is the “right to be free from the particular injury

suffered” and “must therefore be distinguished from the legal

theory on which liability for that injury is premised.” 

Mycogen, 51 P.3d at 306–07. At heart, Furnace has always

complained about the same alleged injury: his gang validation

and SHU placement. He has come up with numerous legal

theories as to why it was unlawful—lack of evidence,

retaliation, and racial discrimination—but it does not change

the primary right he seeks to vindicate, and Gonzales makes

that point clear. See Gonzales, 739 F.3d at 1233 (the

plaintiff’s “primary right was his protected liberty interest in

remaining free from SHU placement” and the “harm

suffered” was his “gang validation and indeterminate SHU

detention”).2

Furnace raises two principal arguments in an effort to get

around our holding in Gonzales. First, he argues that a claim

challenging the sufficiency of the gang evidence is

qualitatively different from a claim that the gang

classification was the result of retaliation for the exercise of

2 Furnace claims that in Gonzales we said that the parties’ “dispute

[was] in defining the primary duty,” Gonzales, 739 F.3d at 1233, and that

he is disputing his primary right, not the Appellees’ duty. This argument

is unavailing. Rights and duties are correlative—they do not exist

independent of each other. The possession of a right necessarily implies

the existence of a duty; conversely, to say that a party has a duty means

that someone is possessed of a right. As California has explained, “a

‘cause of action’ is comprised of a ‘primary right’ of the plaintiff, a

corresponding ‘primary duty’ of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the

defendant constituting a breach of that duty.” Mycogen, 51 P.3d at 306

(emphasis added)). Here, as in Gonzales, Furnace’s primary right is the

right not to be unlawfully determined to be a gang member and placed in

the SHU; and it “correspond[s]” to the Appellees’ duty not to unlawfully

label an inmate a gang member and place him in the SHU.

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FURNACE V. GIURBINO 11

First Amendment rights or was raciallymotivated in violation

of the Equal Protection Clause. Second, he argues that he

maymaintain this suit for damages because he could not have

obtained damages in his prior habeas action. Furnace’s points

are technically correct; but, in the context of California’s

primary rights doctrine, both are irrelevant.

First, we recognize that Furnace’s sufficiency-of-theevidence claim, which he raised in his state habeas

proceedings, and his retaliation and racial discrimination

claims, which he raises here, are distinct claims. But they are

both part and parcel of the same primary right—Furnace’s

right not to be wrongfully placed in the SHU. They are

alternative arguments for accomplishing the same result—his

release from the SHU. The primary rights doctrine under

California claim preclusion forecloses Furnace’s abilityto file

separate suits challenging the same wrong.

Second, it is also true, but again irrelevant, that Furnace

could not have obtained damages through habeas. Habeas, by

its very nature, is an action to challenge “the fact or length of

custody” for which the remedy is release from custody, Wolff

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974); it is not an action in

damages, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973). 

We know of no reason, however, that Furnace could not have

brought his § 1983 action instead of his state habeas action,

see Shoemaker v. Harris, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 84 (Ct. App.

2013), or, even better, joined his habeas and § 1983 actions

to seek alternative forms of relief,3 Cal. Penal Code

3 We offer no definitive opinion whether, under California law,

Furnace could, in fact, have brought both an action in habeas and a § 1983

law in the same suit, nor do we offer any opinion whether Furnace could

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12 FURNACE V. GIURBINO

§ 1473(d) (“[The state habeas statute] shall not be construed

. . . as precluding the use of any other remedies.”). And

therein lies the problem. Having lost his habeas case,

Furnace has made a new run at the officials through § 1983. 

The U.S. Supreme Court has held, and the California courts

have agreed, that § 1983 suits cannot be used to collaterally

attack the validity of a conviction. Thus, “the . . . principle

that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for

challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments

applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the

plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or

confinement.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994);

see also Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269,

273 (Ct. App. 2002) (“[The] requirement [that a plaintiff can

pursue relief under § 1983 only after obtaining habeas relief]

avoids a collateral attack on the conviction and relitigation of

issues of probable cause and guilt, and protects the strong

judicial policy against inconsistent resolutions.”). The Heck

principle means that “a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87.

Heck is not directly on point here, but the principle will

help us focus in this case. Heck prohibits the use of § 1983

to attack the validity of a conviction, because a recovery in

the damages action would necessarily imply that the

conviction was wrongfully obtained. The judgment of

conviction and the judgment for damages would be

have decided to forego his habeas action and bring only a § 1983 suit. 

What we hold is that he cannot bring them seriatim.

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FURNACE V. GIURBINO 13

inconsistent, and there would be no means to reconcile the

two. Like the Heck principle, one reason for California’s

primary right doctrine is to avoid piecemeal litigation and the

possibility of inconsistent judgments. See, e.g., People v.

Barragan, 83 P.3d 480, 494 (Cal. 2004) (“[T]he purposes of

the res judicata doctrine include preventing inconsistent

judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial

system . . . .” (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted)). Furnace has already challenged his placement in

the SHU in habeas and lost; he cannot now challenge his

placementthrough § 1983without collaterallyattacking—and

thereby rendering inconsistent—the judgment denying him

habeas relief. If he were successful on his § 1983 claim

against the officials who put him in the SHU, it would

necessarily be inconsistent with the judgment that he was not

entitled to habeas relief.

For example, were he to prevail here, Furnace would be

entitled to damages for the time he has been wrongfully

placed in the SHU and, in fact, he might be entitled to

damages on a continuing basis if he were left in the SHU. 

The Appellees would be in the untenable position that

California courts have said he is lawfully housed in the SHU,

while the federal courts would have concluded that he is

unlawfully housed in the SHU. Following the California

judgment, the warden might have a duty by virtue of his

office to keep him in the SHU, while after the federal

judgment, the warden (and others) would be personally liable

for damages if they keep him there. The two judgments

would be irreconcilable. It is of no consequence that § 1983

is a different remedy from habeas; both are means of

challenging the lawfulness of his placement. The primary

rights doctrine prevents such inconsistent judgments by

requiring a party to bring all of his claims—as many causes

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14 FURNACE V. GIURBINO

of action, or theories of recovery, or remedies as he has—in

a single suit. See Mycogen, 51 P.3d at 302 (“Res judicata

precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single cause of

action or relitigation of the same cause of action on a

different legal theory or for different relief.” (emphasis

added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 307 (“The

primary right must also be distinguished from the remedy

sought: The violation of one primary right constitutes a single

cause of action, though it may entitle the injured party to

many forms of relief, and the relief is not to be confounded

with the cause of action, one not being determinative of the

other.” (second emphasis added) (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Eichman, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 614 (“[I]f two actions

involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong

by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake even

if in the second suit the plaintiff . . . seeks different forms of

relief . . . .” (emphasis added)). The district court correctly

held that in these circumstances, Furnace’s “retaliation, First

Amendment, and Equal Protection claims” involved the same

“primary right” at issue in the Furnace’s earlier state habeas

proceeding. Gonzales, 739 F.3d at 1233–34.4

4 We recognize that some California appellate cases lend support to

Furnace’s claim that the ability to be free from retaliation and/or

discrimination might be a distinct primary right from the substantive

outcome of an adverse administrative decision, see Agarwal v. Johnson,

603 P.2d 58, 72 (Cal. 1979) (holding that Title VII claim was distinct

primary right from defamation and intentional infliction of emotional

distress claims under state law); Henderson v. Newport-Mesa Unified Sch.

Dist., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222, 226, 237–40 (Ct. App. 2013) (claim that

teacher was not properly given “first priority” in hiring under state statute

arose under distinct primary right from discrimination claim); George v.

Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 431, 438–41 (Ct.

App. 2009) (ALJ’s retaliation claim arose under distinct primary right

from wrongful suspension claim), and that some cases might suggest that

the availabilityof differing remedies would counsel against the application

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FURNACE V. GIURBINO 15

We hold that the same primary right—Furnace’s right to

be free from unlawful gang validation and placement in the

SHU—was at issue in both suits.

2. Identity of Parties

As we suggested above, Furnace’s suit involves

“challenging the same actions by the same group of officials

at the same time that resulted in the same harm.” Id. at 1234

(emphasis added). Furnace asserts that the defendants in this

suit are different from the defendants in his state habeas suit. 

And Appellees counter that California claim preclusion only

requires identity of the party against whom preclusion is

sought. Neither party is entirely correct on these points,

though we ultimately conclude that the requisite identity of

parties is met.

Appellees rely solely on California issue preclusion case

law to sustain the proposition that only the party against

whom preclusion is sought need be the same in both suits. 

See, e.g., Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Cal.

1990). California’s claim preclusion case law—which has

distinct requirements—prevents relitigation “between the

same parties or partiesin privitywith them.” DKN Holdings,

352 P.3d at 386 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks

omitted). That said, we cannot agree with Furnace that “the

defendants in this action were not defendants in Furnace’s

of claim preclusion, see Shoemaker v. Harris, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 84 &

n.13; Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 323

(Ct. App. 1994); Roberts v. Redlich, 244 P.2d 933, 935 (Cal. Dist. Ct.

App. 1952). These decisions all arose in very different contexts, predate

our decision in Gonzales, and do not, in any event, shake our confidence

that Gonzales was rightly decided.

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16 FURNACE V. GIURBINO

state habeas proceeding.” At the time of his state habeas

petition, he named the then-warden, D. Adams, “et al.” as

respondents. He made numerous references to “prison

officials” throughout the petition, and most importantly, he

specifically named “R.L. Martinez,” “M. Valdez,” “Keri

Berkler,” “R.S. Marquez,” and “Everett W. Fischer” as

respondents.5

Accordingly, because Furnace’s suit involves “(1) the

same cause of action (2) between the same parties [or parties

in privity with them] (3) after a final judgment on the merits

in the first suit,” we affirm.6 DKN Holdings, 352 P.3d at 386.

B. PLRA Strike

The Appellees ask us to assess a strike against Furnace

under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C.

5 The only current defendant not named was Giurbino, a party who

was nonetheless in privity with the other officials due to his supervisory

relationship in the prison system. DKN Holdings, 352 P.3d at 389 (noting

that privity is found where “separate defendants’ interests” are “closely

align[ed]” like “between a corporation and its employees, a general

contractor and subcontractors, an association of securities dealers and

member agents, and among alleged coconspirators” (emphasis added)

(citations omitted)).

6 Alternatively, the Appellees argue that Furnace failed to state a

retaliation claim because his placement in the SHU was supported under

the “some evidence” standard. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

455 (1985). Because we affirm the district court on claim preclusion

grounds, we decline to address the Appellees’ argument, as well as

Furnace’s response, that a retaliation claim can survive a motion to

dismiss in the face of “some evidence” supporting a SHU placement. See

Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003); Hines v. Gomez,

108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997).

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FURNACE V. GIURBINO 17

§ 1915(g). Under § 1915(g), a prisoner can lose the ability to

file suits in forma pauperis (IFP) if he “has, on 3 or more

prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility,

brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that

was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 

Appellees assert that since this suit “duplicates claims

brought in an earlier action” it is “malicious” within the

meaning of the PLRA. See Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994

(5th Cir. 1993). The Appellees therefore want us to deem the

district court’s dismissal as Furnace’s first “strike.”

The question of whether Furnace’s dismissal in this case

was frivolous, malicious, or dismissed for failure to state a

claim is not germane at this point. Generally, “district courts

do not issue these strikes one by one, in their orders of

judgment,” because nothing in the PLRA requires them to do

so. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005)

(internal quotation marks omitted). And by extension,

nothing in the PLRA requires us to do so at this time.

Typically it is not until a defendant “challenge[s] a prisonerplaintiff’s IFP status,” id. at 1120, that a backwards-looking

inquiry is done to assess whether “on 3 or more occasions,”

the prisoner-plaintiff’s suit was “dismissed on the grounds

that it [wa]s frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Accordingly, we decline the Appellees’ request to assess a

strike.7

7 We do note our skepticism, however, of labeling Furnace’s suit

“malicious” merely because of its repetitiveness. The fact that Furnace

had a good faith argument that his claims were not barred by California

claim preclusion weighs against finding Furnace’s suit “malicious” or

“frivolous.”

 Case: 13-17620, 09/29/2016, ID: 10141413, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 17 of 18
18 FURNACE V. GIURBINO

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 13-17620, 09/29/2016, ID: 10141413, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 18 of 18