Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01973/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01973-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Imran Chaudhri
Appellant
Stephen O. Lemay
Appellant
Michael Matas
Appellant
Timothy P. Omernick
Appellant
Charles J. Pisula
Appellant
Marcel Van Os
Appellant
Richard Williamson
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IN RE: STEPHEN O. LEMAY, MICHAEL MATAS, 

TIMOTHY P. OMERNICK, RICHARD WILLIAMSON, 

IMRAN CHAUDHRI, CHARLES J. PISULA, 

MARCEL VAN OS,

Appellants

______________________ 

2015-1973

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 11/968,067.

______________________ 

Decided: September 19, 2016

______________________ 

MARK S. DAVIES, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for appellants. Also represented 

by E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, MARC SHAPIRO, SARAH M.

STERNLIEB, New York, NY; DONALD E. DAYBELL, Irvine, 

CA; CATHY C. SHYONG, Menlo Park, CA; BRIAN B. HO, 

PETER J. YIM, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, 

CA. 

PHILIP J. WARRICK, Office of the Solicitor, United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, 

argued for appellee Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by 

THOMAS W. KRAUSE, BRIAN RACILLA. 

______________________ 

Case: 15-1973 Document: 48-2 Page: 1 Filed: 09/19/2016
2 IN RE: LEMAY

Before NEWMAN, MOORE, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge WALLACH. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge MOORE. 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellants Stephen O. Lemay and others (collectively, 

“Lemay” or “Appellants”), inventors at Apple Inc.,1 appeal 

the Final Written Decision of the United States Patent 

and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) Patent Trial and 

Appeal Board (“PTAB”), which affirmed in part an examiner’s rejection of all claims of U.S. Patent Application 

Publication No. 2008/0320391 (the “Lemay application”). 

We reverse. 

BACKGROUND

Appellants are the named inventors of the Lemay application, which is generally directed to a method of 

streaming online videos to a portable device. The application contains six independent claims (1, 2, 29, and 31–33) 

that each recite, among other things, a touch screen and a 

graphical user interface that displays “a first list of information about online video items.” See, e.g., J.A. 985

(claim 1). Representative2 claim 1 recites:

 

1 Apple Inc. is the real party in interest. 2 As will be explained more fully below, a claim is 

considered representative when the arguments presented 

in support of that claim before the PTAB apply to other 

claims grouped with the representative claim, and all 

claims argued with a representative claim rise and fall 

based on the representative claim. See 37 C.F.R. 

§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2012) (“For each ground of rejection 

applying to two or more claims, the claims may be argued . . . as a group (all claims subject to the ground of 

rejection rise and fall together) . . . .” (emphasis added)).

Case: 15-1973 Document: 48-2 Page: 2 Filed: 09/19/2016
IN RE: LEMAY 3

A method, comprising: 

at a portable electronic device with a touch screen 

display: 

displaying, on the touch screen display of the 

portable electronic device, a first list of information about online video items in a plurality of 

lists of information about online video items; 

displaying, on the touch screen display of the 

portable electronic device, a plurality of icons corresponding to at least some of the plurality of lists 

of information about online video items; 

in response to detecting a moving finger gesture on 

the first list of information about online video 

items, scrolling the first list of information about 

online video items on the touch screen display of 

the portable electronic device; 

in response to detecting a tap gesture on a first 

portion of a row in the first list of information 

about online video items, wherein the row contains information about a particular online video 

item: 

initiating a request for the particular online video 

item from a remote computer, receiving the particular online video item, and playing the particular online video item; 

in response to detecting a finger gesture on a second portion of the row in the first list of information about online video items, wherein the 

second portion of the row is different from the first 

portion of the row, displaying, on the touch screen 

display of the portable electronic device, additional information about the particular online video 

item; and 

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4 IN RE: LEMAY

in response to detecting a finger gesture on a respective icon in the plurality of icons, displaying, 

on the touch screen display of the portable electronic device, a corresponding list of information

about online video items. 

J.A. 15–16 (emphases added).3 

A USPTO examiner rejected claims 1–33 as obvious 

over various combinations of U.S. Patent No. 7,739,271 

(“Cook”) and U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 

2007/0024646 (“Saarinen”).4 The PTAB affirmed the 

rejections of claims 1–9 and 12–33, but reversed the 

rejections of claims 10–11. Lemay appeals the PTAB’s 

decision as to claims 1–9 and 12–33. This court has 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012).

 

3 Since filing the Lemay application in December 

2008, claims 1–33 have been amended on multiple occasions. See J.A. 11–14 (PTAB Docket Sheet listing the 

parties’ filings, including those related to amendments), 

500, 510–11 (Lemay’s comments regarding amendments). 

For ease of reference, the court refers to the amended 

claims as argued before the PTAB. See J.A. 15–23 (Appendix providing amended claims that “will replace all 

prior versions, and listings, of claims in the application”). 

4 The USPTO also referenced U.S. Patent Application Publication Nos. 2007/0229465 (“Sakai”) and 

2007/0064619 (“Bettis”) as prior art, but Sakai and Bettis 

are not central to this appeal. 

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IN RE: LEMAY 5

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review and Legal Standard for Obviousness

The USPTO may not issue a patent “if the differences 

between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 

prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole 

would have been obvious at the time the invention was 

made to a person having ordinary skill in the [relevant] 

art . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).5 “The [USPTO] bears 

the initial burden of showing a prima facie case of obviousness.” In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 

2014) (citation omitted). The ultimate determination of 

obviousness is a question of law, but that determination is 

based on underlying factual findings. See In re Gartside, 

203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The underlying 

factual findings include (1) “the scope and content of the 

prior art,” (2) “differences between the prior art and the 

claims at issue,” (3) “the level of ordinary skill in the 

pertinent art,” and (4) the presence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness, such as “commercial success, 

long felt but unsolved needs, [and] failure of others.” 

Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 

(1966). If “a prima facie case of obviousness is made, the 

burden then shifts to the applicant to come forward with 

evidence and/or argument supporting patentability.” 

Gianelli, 739 F.3d at 1379 (citation omitted). 

We review the PTAB’s factual determinations for substantial evidence and its legal determinations de novo. 

 

5 Congress amended § 103 when it enacted the 

Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”). Pub. L. No. 

112-29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011). However, because the Lemay application was filed before March 16, 

2013, the pre-AIA § 103 applies. See id. § 3(n)(1), 125 

Stat. at 293.

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6 IN RE: LEMAY

Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1316. “Substantial evidence is 

something less than the weight of the evidence but more 

than a mere scintilla of evidence.” In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 

1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). It is “‘such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

II. No Substantial Evidence Supports the PTAB’s Determination that Cook and Saarinen Teach the Subject 

Elements of Claim 1

The PTAB found that certain elements of claim 1 of 

the Lemay application would have been obvious over Cook

and Saarinen. See J.A. 5–6. When no substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s findings, we may reverse its

findings without remanding the matter. See, e.g., Arendi 

S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., No. 2015-2073, 2016 WL 4205964, 

at *9 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 2016) (reversing the PTAB’s 

determination that adding a search for phone numbers to 

a text recognition program would have been obvious 

because the PTAB’s decision was “conclusory and unsupported by substantial evidence”); Giannelli, 739 F.3d at 

1380 (reversing affirmance of examiner’s rejection where 

the PTAB’s analysis “contained no explanation why or 

how a person having ordinary skill in the art would 

modify” the prior art to arrive at the claimed invention). 

The instant appeal warrants reversal.

Lemay argues that no evidence demonstrates that 

Cook and Saarinen teach the three disputed elements of 

claim 1. Although the USPTO attempts to identify record 

evidence in support of the PTAB’s findings,6 its argu-

 

6 In its Final Written Decision, the PTAB adopted 

the examiner’s findings as to claim 1, see J.A. 6–7 (“We 

find that the evidence of record supports the [e]xaminer’s 

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IN RE: LEMAY 7

ments are unpersuasive. We agree with Lemay that no 

substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s findings as to

two of these three elements in claim 1, but we find that 

Lemay waived its arguments as to the third. We discuss 

each in turn.

A. No Substantial Evidence Supports the PTAB’s Finding 

that Cook and Saarinen Teach an Icon and “A Corresponding List of Information”

First, Lemay asserts that Cook does not teach the element recited in the final clause of claim 1, which requires that “in response to detecting a finger gesture on a 

respective icon in the plurality of icons, displaying, on the 

touch screen display of the portable electronic device, a 

corresponding list of information about online video 

items.” J.A. 16 (emphases added). Lemay explains that 

this clause can be understood by reference to Figure 5A of 

the Lemay application, which is reproduced below: 

 

finding th[at] Saarinen’s touch screen and finger gestures 

(see, e.g., Saarinen ¶¶ 37, 43), combined with Cook’s icons 

and plurality of lists of information (see [J.A. 867 (Cook 

fig.3B)]), renders obvious the disputed [elements] of claim 

1.”), and the USPTO has overstated the examiner’s findings in its brief. Although we refer to the USPTO’s supporting arguments, we review the examiner’s findings as 

adopted by the PTAB. 

Case: 15-1973 Document: 48-2 Page: 7 Filed: 09/19/2016
8 IN RE: LEMAY

J.A. 959 (Lemay application fig.5A). Figure 5A illustrates 

a touch screen display that allows users to click on the 

bottom row of icons to generate a list of “featured,” “most 

viewed,” or “bookmark[ed]” video titles. J.A. 959. 

According to Lemay, those categories (i.e., “featured,” 

“most viewed,” “bookmark[ed],” etc.) represent the “plurality of icons” recited in claim 1 of the Lemay application. 

J.A. 16. For example, when a user taps a finger on the 

“most viewed” category, the screen will display “a list of 

‘most viewed’ video titles along with other information 

about each online video item.” Appellants’ Br. 23. The 

resulting list of video items can be seen in Figure 5A as 

“Pokemon theme music,” “SNL—Digital Short,” etc. See

J.A. 959 (Lemay application fig.5A). The tapping of the 

user’s finger and the resulting display of video titles and 

associated information illustrate, according to Lemay, the 

two elements of (1) “a finger gesture on a respective icon 

Case: 15-1973 Document: 48-2 Page: 8 Filed: 09/19/2016
IN RE: LEMAY 9

in the plurality of icons” and (2) “a corresponding list of 

information about online video items,” respectively. J.A. 

16, 959. 

The USPTO argues that substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s finding that Cook teaches these elements (in combination with Saarinen, which teaches a 

touch screen and finger gestures). The PTAB adopted the 

examiner’s finding that Cook teaches user queries entered 

into an Internet search engine, J.A. 671, which generates

“a listing of album covers and links to listen to a music 

sample from three different albums,” J.A. 874. In support, the USPTO contends that a user may click any of 

Cook’s “Listen!” icons (i.e., “links to listen,” J.A. 874),

which it says correspond to Lemay application claim 1’s 

“plurality of icons.” Upon clicking one of these icons (i.e., 

“a finger gesture on a respective icon in the plurality of 

icons,” J.A. 959), a media player appears that “displays 

various lists of information corresponding to the selected 

media sample” (i.e., “a corresponding list of information,” 

J.A. 959). Appellee’s Br. 25–26; see J.A. 671–72, 676

(examiner’s findings that the media samples are “a corresponding list of information”). According to the USPTO, 

the “list of information about online video items” corresponds to the icon clicked by the user and comprises the 

album “tracks,” along with other information. See Appellee’s Br. 26; see also J.A. 672 (examiner’s finding that 

songs can be “video items”). 

The USPTO’s reasoning is flawed. The final clause of 

claim 1 in the Lemay application recites “in response to 

detecting a finger contact on a respective icon in the

plurality of icons, displaying . . . a corresponding list of 

information about online video items.” J.A. 16 (emphases 

added). The claim earlier provides the antecedent basis 

for “the plurality of icons” and their corresponding lists of 

information when it recites (1) “displaying . . . a first list 

of information about online video items in a plurality of 

lists of information about online video items” and 

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10 IN RE: LEMAY

(2) “displaying . . . a plurality of icons corresponding to at 

least some of the plurality of lists of information about 

online video items.” J.A. 15 (emphases added). The 

USPTO argues that 

each of the three album covers and “Listen!” links 

represent icons, and each list of information about 

the online media sample—album title (e.g.[,] “I 

Wanna Be With You”), artist name (e.g., “Mandy 

Moore”), release date (e.g., “May 9, 2000”), and 

price (e.g., “$12.99”)—corresponds to those icons. 

Appellee’s Br. 22 (emphases added). However, if the “list 

of information” corresponding to an icon is represented by 

album titles, artist names, and release dates generated as 

the results of the search query, the same list cannot also 

be represented elsewhere as a list of track titles. These 

are different lists. 

For these reasons, we conclude that no substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s finding that Cook, in combination with Saarinen, discloses clicking an icon to produce 

the recited “corresponding” list of information. 

B. No Substantial Evidence Supports the PTAB’s Finding 

that Cook and Saarinen Teach a “First List of Information 

About Online Video Items”

The first clause of claim 1 recites “displaying . . . a 

first list of information about online video items in a 

plurality of lists of information about online video items.” 

J.A. 15 (emphasis added). Lemay asserts that the use of 

the word “items” indicates that “the first list of information must be about multiple online video items.” 

Appellants’ Br. 25. The USPTO states that Lemay’s 

argument “misses the mark” because the “sample(s)” 

illustrated in Cook Figure 3B are the “items” referred to 

in claim 1, and the “list of information” corresponding to 

these items is the list of search results illustrated in 

Figure 3B. Appellee’s Br. 32 (emphasis omitted). 

Case: 15-1973 Document: 48-2 Page: 10 Filed: 09/19/2016
IN RE: LEMAY 11

The USPTO’s position regarding “items” contradicts

its position regarding “lists of information.” Earlier in its 

brief, the USPTO contends that each of the three sets of 

title, artist, and price information identified in Cook 

Figure 3B is one of the “lists of information.” See, e.g., 

Appellee’s Br. 22–23 (where the USPTO “borrow[s] the 

annotations from [Lemay’s] brief,” but omits the rectangular annotation boxes surrounding the names of the 

“items”). Comparing Lemay’s brief to the USPTO’s reveals this discrepancy: 

Compare Appellants’ Br. 20 (left, reproducing and annotating a portion of J.A. 867 (Cook fig.3B)), with Appellee’s 

Br. 23 (right, reproducing and annotating a portion of J.A. 

867 (Cook fig.3B)). As can be seen from these illustrations, Lemay’s annotated version of Cook Figure 3B 

contains rectangles around “Mandy More,” “I Wanna Be 

With You,” and “Now That’s What I Call Music! 4,” i.e., 

around the “items” referred to in the claim. Appellants’ 

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12 IN RE: LEMAY

Br. 20. In contrast, the USPTO’s version omits these

rectangles, noting that “the green boxes [i.e., the larger

rectangles surrounding the title, artist, and price information] indicate the ‘plurality of lists of information.’” 

Appellee’s Br. 23. According to the USPTO, each of the 

three sets of title, artist, and price information is one of 

the “lists of information.” Id. at 22–23. The USPTO 

confirms this understanding when it states that 

“Cook . . . explains that the results display includes a 

listing of information that correlates to each album cover: 

the price of the album and ‘other purchasing information.’” Id. at 24 (emphases added) (quoting J.A. 874). 

The USPTO’s reasoning is internally inconsistent. If 

each of the three sets of title, artist, and price information 

constitutes one of the “lists of information,” it cannot also 

be correct that the search results as a whole (i.e., “Mandy 

More,” “I Wanna Be With You,” and “Now That’s What I 

Call Music! 4”) constitute one of the lists. And, if each of 

the three sets of title, artist, and price information constitutes one of the lists of information, then each such list 

corresponds only to a single item (i.e., the “particular 

online video item,” J.A. 15, that is played when a user 

clicks the “Listen!” link), rather than multiple “online 

video items.” J.A. 15 (emphasis added). 

For these reasons, the court concludes that no substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s conclusion that 

Cook Figure 3B discloses “displaying . . . a first list of 

information about online video items in a plurality of lists 

of information about online video items.” J.A. 15 (emphasis added). 

C. Lemay Waived its Arguments as to Dual Functionality

Although the term “dual functionality” does not appear anywhere in the Lemay application, claim 1 recites 

the following two steps:

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IN RE: LEMAY 13

[(1)] in response to detecting a tap gesture on a 

first portion of a row in the first list of information 

about online video items, wherein the row contains information about a particular online video 

item: 

. . . 

playing the particular online video item; 

[(2)] in response to detecting a finger gesture on a 

second portion of the row in the first list of information about online video items, wherein the second portion of the row is different from the first 

portion of the row, displaying, on the touch screen 

display of the portable electronic device, additional information about the particular online video 

item . . . . 

J.A. 15 (emphases added). Lemay contends that these 

limitations establish the dual functionality element, 

which is illustrated in Figure 5A of the Lemay application. Appellants’ Br. 28 (reproducing and annotating a 

portion of J.A. 959 (Lemay application fig.5A)). 

However, the court need not address these arguments. Because Lemay did not raise this issue before the 

PTAB, the PTAB did not make any findings on this issue. 

The court cannot decide questions of fact in the first 

instance when reviewing the PTAB’s decisions. Therefore, Lemay’s arguments as to claim 1 are waived. See, 

e.g., In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010) (declining to consider new anticipation argument not raised before the PTAB); In re Watts, 354 F.3d 

1362, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding patent holder 

waived new argument on the scope of the prior art never 

raised to the PTAB). Therefore, the court need not consider whether Cook discloses the dual functionality element of claim 1 of the Lemay application. 

Case: 15-1973 Document: 48-2 Page: 13 Filed: 09/19/2016
14 IN RE: LEMAY

III. No Substantial Evidence Supports the PTAB’s Obviousness Determination as to Claims 2–3, 5–8, 12–22, and 

24–33

As to claims 2–3, 5–8, 12–22, and 24–33,7 claim 1 is 

representative. A claim is considered representative 

when it is not separately argued before the PTAB, see 37 

C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“For each ground of rejection 

applying to two or more claims, the claims may be argued . . . as a group (all claims subject to the ground of 

rejection rise and fall together) . . . .” (emphasis added)), 

and claims that “are not separately argued . . . all stand 

or fall together,” In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1376 (Fed. 

Cir. 1983). 

In their opening brief before the PTAB, Lemay

grouped claims 2–3, 5–8, 12–22, and 24–33 together and 

presented arguments applicable to this group. See J.A. 

711–20 (Appellants’ Brief to the PTAB); see also J.A. 760–

67 (Appellants’ Reply Brief to the PTAB grouping claims 

in the same manner, with the exception of including claim 

4 in the sections on claims 1–3, 5–8, 12–22, and 24–33). 

As a result, the PTAB determined that “Appellants have 

not presented separate patentability arguments for pending claims 2–3, 5–8, 12–22, and 24–33 or have reiterated 

substantially the same patentability arguments as those 

previously discussed for claim 1,” and thus sustained the 

examiner’s rejection of these claims on the same grounds 

as claim 1. J.A. 7 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)). 

In the present appeal, the parties continue to agree 

that claim 1 is representative. See Appellants’ Br. 7 n.6 

(“Because the parties and the PTAB treated claim 1 as a 

representative claim, this brief does so as well.”); Appel-

 

7 Because the PTAB reversed the examiner’s rejections of claims 10 and 11, they are not at issue in this 

appeal. See generally Appellants’ Br. 41–56. 

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IN RE: LEMAY 15

lee’s Br. 1, 3, 5, 18–19, 21, 40 (repeatedly referring to 

“representative claim 1”). Therefore, claims 2–3, 5–8, 12–

22, and 24–33 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. 

§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv); Kaslow, 707 F.2d at 1376. Because claim 

1 would not have been obvious, we reverse as to claims 2–

3, 5–8, 12–22, and 24–33 as well. 

IV. No Substantial Evidence Supports the PTAB’s Obviousness Determinations as to Dependent Claims 4, 9, and 23

Lemay provided separate arguments for dependent 

claims 4, 9, and 23 before the PTAB, see J.A. 720–22

(claims 4 and 9), 768–71 (claim 9), 773–74 (claim 23), and 

the PTAB provided separate reasoning for its affirmance 

of the examiner’s rejection of these claims, see J.A. 7–9. 

Before this court, Lemay continues to separately argue 

these claims. See Appellants’ Br. 48–54. However, the 

court need not address these separate arguments because 

these claims depend from nonobvious claims. 

It is true that dependent claims may either stand or 

fall when the associated independent claim is invalidated

as obvious. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“[D]ependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even 

though dependent upon an invalid claim.”); Scanner 

Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp. N.V., 528 F.3d 

1365, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting the “black letter law 

that a finding of invalidity of an independent claim does 

not determine the validity of claims that depend from it”

(citation omitted)). But this does not mean that dependent claims that are not themselves inherently nonobvious

may either stand or fall when, as here, the associated 

independent claim is determined to be nonobvious. To the 

contrary, “dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious . . . .” In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 

1992); see Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 

520 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[I]f claim 1 is not 

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16 IN RE: LEMAY

obvious then claims 6–8 also cannot be obvious because 

they all depend from a nonobvious claim.” (citation omitted)); In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 

(“Dependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if 

the independent claim from which they depend are nonobvious.” (citations omitted)); Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2143.03 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) (“If an 

independent claim is nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. [§] 103, 

then any claim depending therefrom is nonobvious.”

(citation omitted)).

Claims 4, 9, and 23 depend from claims that this court 

determined to be nonobvious, i.e., claims 2 and 3. See J.A. 

17 (where claims 4 and 9 depend from “[t]he method of 

claim 2”), 19 (where claim 23 depends from “[t]he method 

of claim 3”). Therefore, claims 4, 9, and 23 also are nonobvious. See Ortho-McNeil, 520 F.3d at 1365.

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. For these reasons, the 

decision of the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board is

REVERSED

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IN RE: STEPHEN O. LEMAY, MICHAEL MATAS,

TIMOTHY P. OMERNICK, RICHARD WILLIAMSON, 

IMRAN CHAUDHRI, CHARLES J. PISULA, 

MARCEL VAN OS,

Appellants

______________________ 

2015-1973

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 

11/968,067.

______________________ 

MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The majority holds that the Patent Trial and Appeal 

Board’s (“Board”) findings regarding the scope and content of the prior art are not supported by substantial 

evidence and reverses the Board’s obviousness determination as to every disputed claim. I would affirm the 

Board’s rejection of claims 1–8 and 12–33, but would 

reverse on claim 9.

I. Claim 1 

Respectfully, substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s finding that Cook and Saarinen disclose the 

disputed limitations of claim 1. 

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2 IN RE: LEMAY

The majority opinion concludes that there is not substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that Cook 

discloses an “icon” and “a corresponding list of information.” See Majority Op. at 6–10. This implicates two of 

the three limitations disputed by Lemay: 

displaying, on the touch screen display of the 

portable electronic device, a plurality of icons corresponding to at least some of the plurality of lists 

of information about online video items; 

. . .

in response to detecting a finger gesture on a respective icon in the plurality of icons, displaying, 

on the touch screen display of the portable electronic device, a corresponding list of information

about online video items. 

J.A. 15–16 (emphases added).

For the first limitation, “a plurality of icons corresponding to at least some of the plurality of lists of information,” the examiner cited Cook’s disclosure at column 6 

lines 33–39, which describes a search result display 

depicted in Figure 3B of Cook. J.A. 626. For the second 

limitation, displaying “a corresponding list of information” 

after detecting “a finger gesture on a respective icon in 

the plurality of icons,” the examiner cited a different 

portion of Cook at column 8 lines 37–49, which describes 

the branded player depicted in Figure 5 of Cook. J.A. 627.

The majority states, and I agree, that “a plurality of 

icons” recited in the first limitation provides antecedent 

basis for and thus must be the same as “the plurality of 

icons” recited in the second limitation. Majority Op. at 9–

10. And I do not read the PTO’s brief to dispute this 

issue. What the PTO does argue is that the first limitation’s “plurality of lists of information” does not provide 

antecedent basis for “a corresponding list of information.” 

Appellee’s Br. 29–30. I agree and therefore cannot join

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IN RE: LEMAY 3

the majority’s opinion holding that the Board’s findings 

are not supported by substantial evidence because the 

Board relies on “different lists” disclosed in Cook to satisfy each limitation. See Majority Op. at 10. 

The first limitation recites “at least some of the plurality of lists of information about online video items.” 

The second limitation recites “a corresponding list of 

information about online video items.” I cannot agree 

with the majority that these must be the same lists of 

information for three reasons. First, there is no antecedent basis to support limiting “a corresponding list” to one 

of the “plurality of lists.” Second, the limitations themselves use different words to describe the two different 

lists of information. See CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000) (holding there is a presumption that when 

different words are used to describe different elements 

they have different meanings). That both limitations 

refer to lists of information “about online video items” 

does not mean the limitations are referring to the same 

lists. Finally, during prosecution, the PTO gives terms 

their broadest reasonable construction. Viewing these 

terms under the broadest reasonable interpretation, I 

cannot say that “a corresponding list” must be identical to 

“the plurality of lists.” 

In short, the claim’s “plurality of lists of information 

about online video items” is a different element from the 

same claim’s “a corresponding list of information about 

online video items.” The majority errs when it requires 

them to be “the same list.” Majority Op. at 10. Understanding claim 1 in this way, I would hold there is substantial evidence to support the examiner’s finding, 

adopted by the Board, that these limitations are disclosed 

in Cook. See J.A. 626–27.

For similar reasons, I would also hold that substantial 

evidence supports the Board’s finding that the third 

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4 IN RE: LEMAY

limitation, “a first list of information about online video 

items in a plurality of lists of information about online 

video items,” is disclosed in Cook. Under the broadest 

reasonable interpretation, I think the majority is again 

mistaken in requiring that “a first list of information” look 

the same as “a plurality of lists of information.” 

II. Claim 9 

While I disagree with the majority regarding claim 1, 

which is representative of claims 2–8 and 12–33, I would 

not affirm the Board on claim 9. Claim 9 recites “a configuration icon that when activated initiates the display of 

a user interface for configuring which icons . . . are displayed with the first list of information.” J.A. 17. In its 

rejection, the examiner cited Cook at column 8 lines 37–

60, which describes Cook’s branded player depicted in 

Figure 5 and a “call-to-action” function. J.A. 629. The 

Board adopted the examiner’s finding that “Cook describes editing operations for a playlist, as well as a 

function with an interface that directs the user to take 

actions.” J.A. 8. The portion of Cook disclosing customizing playlists does not involve customizing or configuring 

the display of icons in any way. See J.A. 875 (Cook 

at 8:37–49). Even if the “call-to-action” function could be 

interpreted to reconfigure the display of media product 

icons, as the PTO argues, Appellee’s Br. 54–55, this 

function occurs within the branded player, apart from the 

“icons . . . displayed with the first list of information.” See 

J.A. 869 (Cook at Fig. 5); 875 (Cook at 8:50–60). Because 

the Board’s finding that Cook discloses claim 9’s “a configuration icon that when activated initiates the display of 

a user interface for configuring [] icons” is not supported 

by substantial evidence, I would reverse the Board’s 

decision that claim 9 would have been obvious over Cook. 

Case: 15-1973 Document: 48-2 Page: 20 Filed: 09/19/2016