Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_16-cv-00764/USCOURTS-alnd-2_16-cv-00764-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mike Hale
Defendant
Eric Shawn Mickle
Plaintiff

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ERIC SHAWN MICKLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SHERIFF MIKE HALE, 

Defendant.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

Case No.: 2:16-cv-764-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

This case is before the court on Defendant Sheriff Mike Hale’s Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. # 3), filed May 10, 2016. Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to 

respond to the Motion, but has not done so.1 Accordingly, the Motion is ripe for decision, and 

after careful review, the court concludes it is due to be granted. 

II. Background Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his Complaint seeking relief for violations of his civil rights under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. # 1, Ex. 1). Defendant Hale responded by filing this motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. # 3).2

 “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

questions the legal sufficiency of a complaint; therefore, in assessing the merit of a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion, the court must assume that all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true.” 

Mays v. United States Postal Service, 928 F. Supp. 1552, 1557-58 (M.D. Ala. 1996). Thus, for 

 1 (See Doc. # 5 (June 6, 2016 Order)). 

2 Although Plaintiff’s Complaint lists certain fictitious defendants, none were ever served. Moreover, as a 

general matter, fictitious party pleading is not permitted in federal court. Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 

(11th Cir. 2010). Therefore, Defendant Hale is the sole Defendant in this case.

FILED

 2016 Jul-05 AM 11:55

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:16-cv-00764-RDP Document 7 Filed 07/05/16 Page 1 of 8
2

the purpose of resolving the Motion, the court treats the following facts alleged in the Complaint 

as true.

Plaintiff was arrested and brought to the Jefferson County Jail on February 26, 2014, 

pending several charges. (Doc. # 1, Ex. 1). At the time of his arrest, Plaintiff suffered from 

Type I diabetes and informed the jail personnel of his condition. (Id.). Throughout his time at 

the jail, Plaintiff was given his insulin medication in an inconsistent and ineffective manner. 

(Id.). Over the Plaintiff’s protestations, he was fed a diet high in sugar and starch. (Id.). 

Without effective medication and with an improper diet, by the time he was released from the 

Jefferson County Jail, Plaintiff could no longer walk without the assistance of a walker. (Id.). 

Plaintiff claims he is still unable to walk without assistance. (Id.). 

Plaintiff thereafter filed this lawsuit, seeking compensatory and punitive damages from 

the jail personnel for deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. #1, Ex. 1). 

Although, Plaintiff asserts a respondeat superior cause of action against Defendant Sheriff Mike 

Hale (“Sheriff Hale”), he does not specify whether he has sued Sheriff Hale in his official or 

individual capacity, or both. (Id.). Sheriff Hale argues that, regardless, the claims against him 

should be dismissed on sovereign immunity and qualified immunity grounds. (Doc. # 3). 

III. Standard of Review

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleaser is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

However, the complaint must include enough facts “to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that 

contain nothing more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not 

meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon “labels and 

Case 2:16-cv-00764-RDP Document 7 Filed 07/05/16 Page 2 of 8
3

conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]” without supporting factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555, 557. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts view the allegations in the 

complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. Intl. Univ., 495 F.3d 

1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although “[t]he 

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” the complaint must demonstrate 

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A plausible claim for 

relief requires “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 

evidence” to support the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “1) eliminate any allegations in the 

complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-pleaded factual 

allegations, ‘assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 

entitlement to relief.’” Kivisto v. Miller, Candield, Paddock & Stone, PLC, 413 Fed. Appx. 136, 

138 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Am. Dental Assn. v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 

2010)). That task is context specific and, to survive the motion, the allegations must permit the 

court based on its “judicial experience and common sense . . . to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Further, “courts may infer from the 

factual allegations in the complaint ‘obvious alternative explanation[s],’ which suggest lawful 

conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Am. Dental ,

605 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682). If the court determines that well-pleaded 

Case 2:16-cv-00764-RDP Document 7 Filed 07/05/16 Page 3 of 8
4

facts, accepted as true, do not state a claim that is plausible, the claims are due to be dismissed. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff brings this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. # 1, Ex. 1). To state a 

claim under Section 1983, Plaintiff “must allege the violation of a right secured by the 

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) 

(citations omitted). “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the 

defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made 

possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). In addition, Alabama sheriffs are state officials, and, 

thus, clothed with the authority of state law. See Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 

1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 443 (Ala. 1987)) (a court must 

“consider the laws of the state” and, according to the Supreme Court of Alabama, “a sheriff is an 

executive officer of the state of Alabama”). 

A. Sheriff Hale Enjoys Eleventh Amendment Immunity as to Any Money Damages 

Claims Asserted Against Him in his Official Capacity

The Eleventh Amendment insulates a state from suit in federal courts unless the state 

either consents to suit or waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & 

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984). “Lawsuits against a state official in his or her 

official capacity are suits against the state when ‘the state is the real, substantial party in 

interest.’” Carr, 916 F.2d at 1524 (quoting Halderman, 465 U.S. at 101). Thus, “[a] state official 

may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment 

immunity . . . or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity.” Lancaster v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 

Case 2:16-cv-00764-RDP Document 7 Filed 07/05/16 Page 4 of 8
5

116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). “Alabama has not waived its 

Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . and Congress has not abrogated Alabama’s immunity.” Id.

(internal citations omitted). 

Sheriff Hale, as an Alabama sheriff (i.e., a state official), has sovereign immunity under 

the Eleventh Amendment with respect to money damages claims brought against him in his 

official capacity. See Carr, 916 F.2d at 1525. Thus, Sheriff Hale has immunity with respect to 

any of Plaintiff’s money damage claims asserted against him in his official capacity because they 

are really claims against the state of Alabama. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“Suits 

against state officials in their official capacity . . . should be treated as suits against the State.”). 

The court, therefore, concludes that any claims for money damages against Sheriff Hale in his 

official capacity are due to be dismissed.

B. Sheriff Hale Enjoys Qualified Immunity as to Any Federal Law Claims for 

Money Damages Asserted Against Him in his Individual Capacity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Accordingly, “[a]t the 

motion to dismiss state in the litigation, ‘the qualified immunity inquiry and the Rule 12(b)(6) 

standard become intertwined.’” Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 760 (11tthh Cir. 2010) 

(citation omitted). To be sure, “[b]ecause qualified immunity is ‘an immunity from suit rather 

than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively lost is a case is erroneously permitted to go to 

trial.’” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) 

(changes in Pearson).

Case 2:16-cv-00764-RDP Document 7 Filed 07/05/16 Page 5 of 8
6

Qualified immunity “protects government officials performing discretionary functions 

from the burdens of civil trials and from liability.” Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 

1282 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). An official loses qualified immunity when his 

conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 

730, 739 (2002). However, the standard is “broad enough to cover some mistaken judgment, and 

it shields from liability all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 

Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1167 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Montoute v. Carr, 144 

F.3d 181, 184 (11th Cir. 1997)).

Sheriff Hale has the initial burden of proving that he was acting within the scope of his 

discretionary authority in order to be eligible for qualified immunity. Holloman ex rel. 

Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Storck v. City of Coral 

Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1314 (2003)). Discretionary authority exists if Sheriff Hale was (1)

performing a legitimate job-related function (2) through means within his power to utilize. 

Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1266. In other words, a “defendant must have been performing a function 

that, but for the alleged constitutional infirmity, would have fallen with his legitimate job 

description.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

If Sheriff Hale makes this initial showing, the burden shifts and Plaintiff must 

demonstrate that Sheriff Hale is not entitled to qualified immunity. Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1264. 

Here, the United States Supreme Court has mandated a two-step sequence to determine whether 

an official such as Sheriff Hale is entitled to qualified immunity, and a district court has 

discretion to determine in what order to address each part. Keating, 598 F.3d at 762 (citing 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 236). The court must decide whether the facts alleged by Plaintiff 

make out a violation of a constitutional right. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. Additionally, the court 

Case 2:16-cv-00764-RDP Document 7 Filed 07/05/16 Page 6 of 8
7

must decide whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged 

misconduct by Sheriff Hale. Id. Sheriff Hale is not entitled to qualified immunity if Plaintiff can 

prevail as to both parts of the test.

Plaintiff’s claim revolves around his treatment (or lack thereof) by Jefferson County Jail 

personnel. (See Doc. #1, Ex. 1). Plaintiff alleges a cause of action against Sheriff Hale under 

respondeat superior for failure to properly train and supervise the jail officers. (Id.). Supervising 

county jails and officers providing medical treatment for those held therein are clearly within the 

line and scope of Sheriff Hale’s authorized duties. See Ala. Code. § 14-6-1 (“The sheriff has the 

legal custody and charge of the jail in his or her county and all prisoners committed thereto.... 

The sheriff may employ persons to carry out his or her duty to operate the jail and supervise the 

inmates housed therein for whose acts he or she is civilly responsible.”); see also § 14-6-19 

(“Necessary clothing and bedding must be furnished by the sheriff or jailer... and also necessary 

medicines and medical attention to those who are sick or injured, when they are unable to 

provide them for themselves.”). Thus, Sheriff Hale has met his initial burden of showing that he 

is entitled to assert qualified immunity in response to Plaintiff’s claims. 

Because Sheriff Hale has established he acted within a scope of discretionary authority, 

Plaintiff must demonstrate that Sheriff Hale is not entitled to qualified immunity. Holloman, 370 

F.3d at 1264. Plaintiff has not met his burden. First, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that 

suggest Sheriff Hale was present during the jailing of Plaintiff, that Sheriff Hale was aware of 

Plaintiff’s time at the jail, or that the jailer’s training was in any way insufficient. (See Doc. # 1, 

Ex. 1). Second, Sheriff Hale cannot be held liable merely on the basis of respondeat superior. 

Weaver v. Mobile Cty., 228 Fed. Appx. 883, 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Marsh v. Butler Cty., 

Case 2:16-cv-00764-RDP Document 7 Filed 07/05/16 Page 7 of 8
8

268 F.3d 1014, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001)) (“It is well-established that a ‘Sheriff can have no 

respondeat superior liability for a section 1983 claim.’”).

To be sure, while “[s]upervisory officials are not liable under section 1983 on the basis of 

respondeat superior or vicarious liability,” they may nonetheless be liable “when there is a causal 

connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional 

deprivation.” Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396-97 (11th Cir. 1994) (citations 

omitted). That is, “[s]upervisory liability occurs either when the supervisor personally 

participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is [some other] causal 

connection.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). But, as explained above, 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that Sheriff Hale personally participated in or knew of

Plaintiff’s mistreatment, or had insufficiently trained the county jailers. (See Doc. # 1, Ex. 1). 

Thus, the only conceivable basis for Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Hale is mere supervisor 

liability; however, such a claim cannot stand in a Section 1983 suit. See Brown, 906 F.2d at 671; 

Weaver, 228 Fed. Appx. at 886. Accordingly, Sheriff Hale is entitled to qualified immunity 

against any federal claims asserted against him in his individual capacity, and any such claims 

are due to be dismissed.

V. Conclusion

For these reasons, the court concludes that Defendant Sheriff Mike Hale’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. # 3) is due to be granted and Sheriff Hale is due to be dismissed from this case. A 

separate order shall be entered. 

DONE and ORDERED this July 5, 2016.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:16-cv-00764-RDP Document 7 Filed 07/05/16 Page 8 of 8