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Parties Involved:
Antwan C. Delaney
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 6, 2011 Decided July 15, 2011

No. 10-3062

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ANTWAN C. DELANEY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cr-00217)

Adam H. Kurland, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

John P. Gidez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Elizabeth Trosman, and

John P. Dominguez, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: ROGERS, TATEL, and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #10-3062 Document #1318811 Filed: 07/15/2011 Page 1 of 14
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Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Following the denial of his motion

to suppress evidence seized from his car, Antwan Delaney

entered a conditional plea to unlawful possession of a firearm

and ammunition by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),

possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(D), and possession of a firearm during a

drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). On appeal, he

challenges the district court’s finding that he consented to the

search of his car, and the district court’s refusal at sentencing to

consider all of the proffered facts concerning his relevant history

and characteristics, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Delaney fails to

show that the district court’s credibility finding with regard to

the police officers’ testimony that he gave consent was based on

“‘exceedingly improbable testimony’” and thus clearly

erroneous, United States v. Mapp, 476 F.3d 1012, 1017 (D.C.

Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Adamson, 441 F.3d 513,

519 (7th Cir. 2006)). A review of the record indicates that the

inconsistencies between the suppression testimony and one of

the officers’ prior statements were not so glaring — if, indeed,

they were inconsistencies at all — as to render incredible the

officers’ testimony that Delaney consented to the search of his

car. Nor did apparent violations of departmental protocols

unrelated to Delaney’s consent so undermine the officers’

credibility that it was clear error for the district court to credit

their testimony regarding Delaney’s consent.

A remand for resentencing, however, is required, see United

States v. Ayers, 428 F.3d 312, 315–16 (D.C. Cir. 2005), because

the district court must take into account all relevant facts related

to a defendant’s “history and characteristics,” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(1). The sentencing record reflects that the district

court appears to have “misunderstood its sentencing authority”

to consider certain proffered facts, United States v. Mouling, 557

USCA Case #10-3062 Document #1318811 Filed: 07/15/2011 Page 2 of 14
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F.3d 658, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2009), even though the government

agrees Delaney properly requested the court do so. 

I.

At 2:40 a.m. on July 11, 2009, two Metropolitan Police

Department (“MPD”) officers responded to a report of potential

domestic violence on the 500 block of D Street S.E. A female

motorist had reported a confrontation with her boyfriend and

worried that he might be headed to her home on D Street,

possibly to retrieve a sawed off shotgun. When Officers Gomez

and O’Donnell arrived at that location, they saw Delaney

standing in the street with other officers, in general proximity to

a Mercury Sable 4-door sedan. Delaney consented to a

pat-down, which revealed no weapons.

Officer Gomez testified before the grand jury1

 that as other

police units were departing, “we decided to further investigate

the man with the shotgun call,” and “[w]e asked Mr. Delaney if

the vehicle, if the blue Mercury Sable was his vehicle,” to which

Delaney replied that it was. Grand Jury Hr’g Tr. 7. When

asked, “Now you asked Mr. Delaney if you could search his

vehicle?”, Officer Gomez responded: “Correct.” Then: “And he

responded what?” “He didn’t have a problem with it.” Id. at

7–8. According to Officer Gomez, Delaney was not in

handcuffs, but rather “[h]e was just standing there talking to us.” 

Id. at 8. The prosecutor asked Officer Gomez “what was the

tone of voice you used” in asking consent to search the car, and

1

 Officer Gomez’s grand jury testimony was apparently made

available to Delaney’s counsel in the district court and became part of

the public record in the district court. See FED.R.CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(A)

& 6(e)(2)(B); Appellee’s Br. 23 n.17. Delaney has included three

relevant pages of the grand jury testimony as part of the public record

in this court. 

USCA Case #10-3062 Document #1318811 Filed: 07/15/2011 Page 3 of 14
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Officer Gomez responded, “Same tone I’m using now, just a

casual conversation tone.” Id. But at the subsequent

suppression hearing, both Officers O’Donnell and Gomez

testified that it was Officer O’Donnell, not Officer Gomez, who

had asked and received Delaney’s consent to search the car. 

Neither officer recalled the precise words Delaney used, but

Officer O’Donnell recalled that they were to the effect of:

“‘[T]hat’s fine, you can go ahead.’” Tr. Feb. 24, 2010, at 25. 

Officer Gomez recalled that Delaney stated “almost

emphatically that he didn’t have a problem with us looking

through the vehicle.” Id. at 82. Both officers testified that as

they moved toward the car Delaney began to “weep” or “cry.” 

Id. at 14, 72. 

Notably, both officers initially spoke of the exchange with

Delaney as though they were a single unit: Officer O’Donnell,

before clarifying that he was the one who asked the questions,

testified that “myself and Officer Gomez asked [Delaney] if this

was his car,” and that “we further asked if he had a problem if

we took a look to make sure there were no firearms inside of the

vehicle.” Id. at 13. Similarly, Officer Gomez testified that

when they arrived at the scene, “We asked — we being

myself — ” before being interrupted and asked to answer only

on his own behalf. Id. at 70–71. But Officer Gomez continued

to respond in the same vein, stating that Delaney gave “us

permission to look into the vehicle,” that “[i]mmediately after

asking for permission, Mr. Delaney advised us that he didn’t

have a problem with us looking through the vehicle,” and that at

that point “[w]e began to walk to the vehicle.” Id. at 71–72. 

Officer Gomez was again corrected, and thereafter answered in

the first person singular, and on cross-examination he explained

that it was Officer O’Donnell who had asked the questions.

Officer Gomez further testified at the suppression hearing

that after obtaining Delaney’s consent, Officer O’Donnell went

USCA Case #10-3062 Document #1318811 Filed: 07/15/2011 Page 4 of 14
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to the driver’s door while Officer Gomez shined his flashlight

through the tinted window of the right rear door and saw a

“large rectangular box” that was open on the end facing him,

and he saw the “stock” or “butt” of a rifle protruding from this

end. Id. at 72–73. Officer O’Donnell testified he was in the

process of opening the driver’s door when he heard Officer

Gomez give a numeric code prompting Officer O’Donnell to put

Delaney, who was standing with two officers, in handcuffs. 

Officer Gomez entered the car, placed the box on the hood of

the car, and removed a semi-automatic rifle with a scope as well

as ammunition clips, loose ammunition, and four small bags of

marijuana (packaged, Delaney concedes, “in a manner indicative

of commercial distribution,” Appellant’s Br. 5). Officer Gomez

laid the items out on the hood of the car but did not photograph

them, an apparent violation of internal MPD protocol for crime

scene processing of weapons; another protocol was apparently

violated when the firearms were not kept in place until a crime

scene specialist arrived. Officer O’Donnell testified that he

called for a crime scene unit to process the weapon, and after

that was done he placed it on the Sixth District property book.

Delaney was indicted on three counts: being a felon in

possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), possession with

intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) &

(b)(1)(D), and possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking

offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He moved to suppress the

evidence seized from his car on the ground that he did not

consent to the search and that there was no probable cause

justifying the search absent consent. The district court credited

the officers’ testimony notwithstanding Gomez’s allegedly

inconsistent grand jury hearing testimony and the apparent

protocol violations. Accordingly, the district court concluded

that Delaney consented to the car search and denied the motion

to suppress.

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Subsequently, Delaney entered into a conditional plea

agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

11(a)(2), preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. 

In the agreement, Delaney acknowledged his understanding that

the government did not intend to file a motion for a downward

departure and likewise agreed “not to seek a downward

departure for any reason from the otherwise applicable guideline

range.” The district court imposed a sentence of 106 months,

representing the very bottom end of the Sentencing Guidelines

range and the sentence the government agreed to recommend

pursuant to the plea agreement.

II.

Valid consent constitutes an exception to the general

requirement of the Fourth Amendment of a warrant supported

by probable cause. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.

218, 219 (1973). Delaney challenges the district court’s finding

that he consented to the search of his car that turned up the

firearm and drugs that formed the basis for his convictions. As

this finding was based on the district court’s assessment of the

credibility of Officers O’Donnell and Gomez, our review is for

clear error, recognizing that the district court’s credibility

determination is “‘entitled to the greatest deference from this

court on appeal.’” United States v. Broadie, 452 F.3d 875, 880

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Hart, 324 F.3d 740,

747 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d

985, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

Relying on the principle that reversal is warranted when a

district court credits “exceedingly improbable testimony,”

United States v. Mapp, 476 F.3d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(quoting United States v. Adamson, 441 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir.

2006)), Delaney focuses on what he asserts is the government’s

failure to establish “consistent evidence on the fundamental

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issue as to which officer actually obtained the alleged consent,” 

Appellant’s Br. 15. He maintains that the purportedly

inconsistent testimony “concerned the sole core issue of the

case, an issue so fundamental that any incongruity or

inconsistency must be deemed fatal.” Id. at 8. He also points to

other irregularities, such as the officers’ procedural failures to

document the search and to inventory the rifle. The premise of

his main argument is flawed, however. 

Specifically, Delaney contends that the “diametrically

inconsistent testimony” by Officer Gomez on the question of

who — himself or his partner, Officer O’Donnell — sought

Delaney’s consent for the search “exposes such a fundamental

inconsistency that [it] must result in the legal conclusion of

insufficient evidence to establish consent as a matter of law.” 

Id. at 11–12. But this record does not reveal any major

inconsistency. All Delaney can point to are the moments in the

grand jury hearing where Officer Gomez is asked, “You asked

Mr. Delaney if you could search his vehicle?” and Officer

Gomez responds, “Correct,” Grand Jury Hr’g Tr. 7, and where,

when asked about the tone of voice “you” used, Officer Gomez

responds that it was the “[s]ame tone I’m using now.” Id. at 8.

As the government notes, the excerpt of Officer Gomez’s grand

jury testimony is replete with references to “we” and “us,”

including his response to the question “And what did you do?” 

Id. (emphasis added). Further, the suppression hearing

testimony reflects that Officers O’Donnell and Gomez, as

partners, tended to describe their actions in the plural “we” even

when the action must by its nature have been singular, such as

in asking Delaney for consent. Because a fair reading of Officer

Gomez’s grand jury testimony indicates that he was generally

answering the questions on behalf of himself and his partner,

Officer O’Donnell, it need not be read as inconsistent with the

suppression hearing testimony in view of the context and the

inherent ambiguity of the pronoun “you” as to numerosity. 

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Delaney’s emphasis on the government’s failure to establish

with “consistent evidence” which officer obtained the alleged

consent, Appellant’s Br. 15, thus lacks force. 

Delaney also identifies another alleged discrepancy and

contends it, too, is so significant as to undermine the officers’

accounts to the point of implausibility. He maintains that the

officers offered inconsistent testimony on whether the box

containing the shotgun and drugs was observed from the “rear”

or the “back” window of his car. Officer Gomez said he did not

distinguish between the terms “back” and “rear,” a claim

Delaney deems incredible on appeal. Delaney states that the

“back” window is the large window that spans the rear of the

car, whereas the “rear” windows are the two windows on the

sides of the rear section of a car. See Appellant’s Br. 13. But

Officer Gomez’s grand jury testimony indicates that he used the

terms interchangeably, referring to the “back rear passenger

compartment of the vehicle,” Grand Jury Hr’g Tr. 9, just as in

his suppression hearing testimony, suggesting that when he

referred during Delaney’s detention hearing to a “back” window

he was referring to the same window but simply failed to add the

word “passenger.”

Delaney further contends that the violations of protocols set

forth in an MPD General Order — moving the shotgun to the

hood of the car before a crime scene technician arrived, and

failing to photograph the items before removing them from the

car and also from the car’s hood — “fundamentally undermine

the officers’ credibility” and “so undermined the evidence

collection procedures so as to make corroboration of the

government’s version of events impossible.” Appellant’s Br.

14–15. Although there are cases where an officer’s credibility

is so impugned as to require exclusion of his testimony, in those

cases the problems with the officer’s account are numerous and

bear directly on the contested issue. See, e.g., United States v.

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Henderson, 463 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 2006). The district court

could reasonably conclude that the policy violations alleged here

are collateral to the consent issue and simply do not undermine

the credibility of the officers’ account of Delaney’s consent to

the vehicle search.

The issues identified by Delaney, then, do not render the

accounts of his consent to search his car so “exceedingly

improbable” that the district court clearly erred. Mapp, 476 F.3d

at 1017; see also United States v. Johnson, 519 F.3d 478, 482

(D.C. Cir. 2008). This is neither a case in which empirical

evidence contradicts the testimony heard by the district court (as

in Henderson, 463 F.3d at 44), nor a case in which there is such

clear contradiction between the witnesses as would demonstrate

clear error to credit either or both witnesses’ testimony. The

district court acknowledged Delaney’s suggestion that it should

be very skeptical of the officers’ testimony in view of Officer

Gomez’s grand jury and preliminary hearing testimony2

 and the

protocol violations. But upon noting that the more important

protocol instructed that the firearm be left in place, the district

court concluded that “[d]espite the dents in the government’s

presentation,” the court had “no reason to doubt the testimony

. . . by both of the[] officers, that Mr. Delaney gave consent to

search the car.” Tr. Feb. 25, 2010, at 73. In the district court’s

words: “The testimony is very clear as to what they said under

oath.” Id. Moreover, unlike this court, the district court had the

opportunity to assess the officers’ credibility during the

suppression hearing. For these reasons we conclude that

Delaney has not met his heavy burden to show the district

2

 In the district court, Delaney also mentioned a separate D.C.

Superior Court detention hearing in which Officer Gomez referred to

the “back” window without the qualifications “rear” or “passenger.” 

See Tr. Feb. 25, 2010, at 9. This transcript is not part of the record on

appeal and we therefore do not consider it.

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court’s credibility determination was clearly erroneous. See

Broadie, 452 F.3d at 880.3

III.

Delaney’s other challenge is persuasive. He does not

dispute the substantive reasonableness of the sentence he

received. Rather, he presents the purely legal question whether

“the district court misunderstood its sentencing authority,”

United States v. Mouling, 557 F.3d 658, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

Section 3553(a) requires courts to take into account relevant

facts related to a defendant’s history and characteristics. Other

circuits have referenced such matters as a defendant’s criminal

history (or lack thereof), United States v. Panice, 598 F.3d 426,

443 (7th Cir. 2010); age, United States v. Hernandez, 604 F.3d

48, 53–54 (2d Cir. 2010); efforts at rehabilitation, id.; and any

efforts to cooperate with the government, United States v.

Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 882

(2006). Indeed, “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the

information concerning the background, character, and conduct

of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United

States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an

appropriate sentence,” 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see United States v.

Anderson, 632 F.3d 1264, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing 18

U.S.C. § 3661; United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972)). 

 A review of the authorities Delaney cites, including our own, as

well as the sealed sentencing hearing, reveals that Delaney has

3

 The court does not reach the government’s alternative

argument, raised only in a footnote, see Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne,

530 F.3d 991, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Bush v. District of

Columbia, 595 F.3d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2010), that this court should

affirm because the weapon was visible in “plain view” from the rear

passenger side window. 

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made “some record showing,” Mouling, 557 F.3d at 668, that

“leaves us in doubt as to whether the court considered [all] the

. . . sentencing factors in § 3553(a), Ayers, 428 F.3d at 315. 

[REDACTED: 

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 END]

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction with

regard to Delaney’s challenge to the denial of his motion to

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suppress and we vacate the sentence and remand the case to the

district court for resentencing. See Ayers, 428 F.3d at 315–16.

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