Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00132/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00132-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fresno County Jail
Defendant
LaTonia Jones
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LATONIA JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRESNO COUNTY JAIL,

Defendant.

CASE No. 1:16-cv-00132-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH 

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

CLAIM

(ECF No. 10)

DISMISSAL COUNTS AS A STRIKE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

CLERK TO TERMINATE ALL PENDING 

MOTIONS AND CLOSE CASE

Plaintiff is a County Jail inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 

civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 4.) She has 

consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 5.) No other parties have appeared 

in the action.

Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and she was given 

leave to amend. (ECF No. 6.) Her first amended complaint is before the Court for 

screening.

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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

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that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is an inmate serving a four year term at the Fresno County Jail. She 

names as defendants (1) the Fresno County Jail Administration Staff, (2) the Sheriff’s 

Department, and (3) Sheriff Mims. 

Aside from the inclusion of additional defendants, Plaintiff’s allegations are 

repeated verbatim from her first amended complaint and may be summarized essentially 

as follows.

There is mildew, black mold, and rust in the shower and living area of the jail.

According to Plaintiff, the jail is 100 years old and has been condemned three times. The 

Sheriff’s Department knows that the conditions in the jail are unsafe and unhealthy but 

continues to house inmates there. As a result of the living conditions, Plaintiff has black 

and red spots all over her body. Medical staff has been unable to identify the spots and 

has referred Plaintiff to a specialist. Plaintiff must undergo breathing treatments three to 

six times per month. She uses an inhaler twice a day and has high blood pressure.

Plaintiff alleges that these conditions violate her Eighth Amendment right to be 

free from cruel and unusual punishment. She seeks “medical help,” money damages, 

and to be moved to a different jail facility.

IV. ANALYSIS

The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment protects 

prisoners from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

832 (1994); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

395 n.10 (1989). Under the Eighth Amendment, a conditions of confinement claim has 

both an objective and a subjective component. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “First, the 

deprivation alleged must be . . . sufficiently serious,” and must “result in the denial of the 

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. “[E]xtreme deprivations are required 

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to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Second, the 

prison official must have acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of 

serious harm to the inmate. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “Mere negligence is not sufficient 

to establish liability.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Rather, a 

plaintiff must set forth facts to show that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an 

excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, “the official 

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

In order to proceed against the Jail or the Sheriff’s Department on allegations of 

cruel and unusual punishment, Plaintiff must allege that “a deliberate policy, custom, or 

practice . . . was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation . . . suffered.” 

Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007); City of Canton, Ohio, 

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Under this route, the plaintiff must satisfy traditional 

§ 1983 requirements and show that “the municipality acted with ‘the state of mind 

required to prove the underlying violation.’” Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175,

1187 (2002) (quoting Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 404 

(1994)). Here, that standard is deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 834 (1994). 

Alternatively, municipal liability may be imposed where the local government unit’s 

omission led to the constitutional violation by its employee. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1186. 

Under this route to municipal liability, the “plaintiff must show that the municipality’s 

deliberate indifference led to its omission and that the omission caused the employee to 

commit the constitutional violation.” Id. This kind of deliberate indifference is found when 

the need to remedy the omission is so obvious, and the failure to act so likely to result in 

the violation of rights, that the municipality reasonably can be said to have been 

deliberately indifferent when it failed to act. Id. at 1195.

Plaintiff’s allegation that she is housed in an area with unsanitary conditions that 

have affected her health is a sufficiently serious deprivation to state a conditions of 

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confinement claim. The Ninth Circuit has determined that “subjection of a prisoner to lack 

of sanitation that is severe or prolonged can constitute an infliction of pain within the 

meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (holding an inmate must demonstrate that the sanitary limitations imposed on 

him or her were more than temporary), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 75 F.3d 448 

(9th Cir.1995). 

However, Plaintiff fails to allege deliberate indifference. Although Plaintiff now 

names Sheriff Mims and unspecified Jail “Administration Staff” as defendants, she does 

not allege any facts regarding these defendants. She therefore has not pled that any 

particular person knew of, but disregarded, a substantial risk to her health or safety 

caused by the unsanitary conditions. And, Plaintiff’s claims against the Fresno County 

Jail and Fresno County Sheriff’s Department fail for the reasons stated in the Court’s 

prior screening order. Plaintiff appears to allege that the Jail and/or Sheriff’s Department 

has a policy of housing female inmates at a particular institution. However, she has not 

alleged facts to show that municipal policy makers know that this policy will expose 

inmates to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation 

that the Sheriff’s Department knows that the conditions are unsafe and unhealthy is 

insufficient, as is Plaintiff’s allegation that the jail at one time was condemned. 

Plaintiff twice has been advised of these legal standards and of the deficiencies in 

her complaints but has failed to cure them. Further leave to amend would be futile and 

will be denied.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. She 

previously was advised of pleading deficiencies and afforded the opportunity to correct 

them. She failed to do so. Any further leave to amend reasonably appears futile and will

be denied. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The action is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim;

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2. Dismissal counts as a strike pursuant to the “three strikes” provision set 

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

3. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending motions and close the 

case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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