Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01936/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01936-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Kobe Rainbow
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1936

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Christopher Kobe Rainbow

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

___________________________

No. 15-1937

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jordan Rainbow

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeals from United States District Court 

for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck

____________

Appellate Case: 15-1936 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/19/2016 Entry ID: 4368936 
 Submitted: December 17, 2015

 Filed: February 19, 2016

____________

Before WOLLMAN, BRIGHT, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

____________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Christopher Rainbow (Christopher) and Jordan Rainbow (Jordan) were found

guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily

injury, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 113, and 1153. On appeal, they argue that

the district court erred in admitting into evidence certifications of Indian blood and

1

in denying their requests to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses. Jordan also

argues that the district court erred in asking certain questions of a doctor who treated

the victim and that the evidence isinsufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.

I. Background

Late in the evening on April 20, 2014, two groups of friends gathered at the

Diamond Z bar in Fort Yates, North Dakota. Sophia Bear Stops (Sophia) went to the

bar with her cousins, Robyn Weddell (Robyn), Cheyenne Weddell (Cheyenne), and

Robert Weddell (Robert). While there, they spoke to Jordan, Christopher, and

Christopher’s wife, Angelica Rainbow (Angelica). When the bar closed,they decided

to go to Robyn’s trailer to continue drinking alcohol. Robyn bought a bottle of rum

and Christopher, Jordan, and Angelica bought a bottle of tequila. The two groups

drove separately to the trailer, where they sat in their cars, talked, listened to music,

and passed around the bottles of alcohol. 

The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, United StatesDistrictJudge for the District 1

of North Dakota.

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All was apparently going well until Ethan Agard (Ethan) arrived and walked

over to Cheyenne and Robert. Ethan was intoxicated, slurring his speech and

stumbling. Christopher exited his vehicle and approached Ethan. The two began

fighting almost immediately, and Ethan was soon on the ground. Cheyenne and

Robert testified that when they tried to break up the fight, they instead scuffled with

Christopher and Jordan. Christopher soon ran across the street and pulled a metal

downspout off a building. 

Cheyenne ran away when he saw Christopher coming toward him with the

downspout. Cheyenne hid in the weeds behind the trailer, and although he could not

see what happened next, he heard Sophia screaming. In the meantime, Robert was

struck with the downspout and started running down the street. When he turned and

looked back toward the trailer, he saw Christopher strike Sophia in the face with the

downspout. 

According to Robyn, she and Angelica stood on the street while the men

fought. Robyn saw Christopher run across the street and pull down the downspout. 

Thereafter, Robyn ran to the back of her trailer, where she did not go inside but

instead returned to help the screaming Sophia. 

Sophia testified that after Christopher saw her standing by the side of the

trailer, she froze. Christopher ran toward her, holding the downspout with both

hands. He struck Sophia in the face with the downspout, causing her to fall to the

ground. Sophia then saw Christopher standing above her and Jordan running toward

her. She heard Christopher say, “Let’s kill this little bitch,” whereupon both

Christopher and Jordan began beating her. When she began screaming for help, they

told her to shut up and continued to hit her. Sophia believed that Jordan had

something in his hand, but she was unable to tell what it was as she tried to block her

face and body from the blows. Sophia testified that she could feel “multiple hits at

a time” and that she “kn[ew] it was not coming from just one person.” 

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Robyn testified thatshe saw Christopher and Jordan hitting Sophia. “Chris had

that white drain pipe, and I just seen Jordan hitting her. I don’t know if he had a

weapon or not. I just seen them both really hitting her, and she was just screaming

my name.” Eventually, Robyn was able to move the blood-covered Sophia to safety. 

Robyn, Cheyenne, and another person placed Sophia in the back of Cheyenne’s

vehicle, which was covered with glass from a shattered windshield. 

Angelica had a different recollection of the assault. According to her, as

Christopher and Jordan were leaving, Cheyenne tackled Christopher from behind. 

Jordan tried to intervene, but was attacked by Robert and Ethan, with Robyn joining

in the fight. Sophia had grabbed Angelica’s hair and called for Robyn, saying,

“Bobby, let’s get this bitch.” Sophia and Angelica fell to the ground, whereupon

Robyn ran over and kicked Sophia in the head three times. Angelica testified that

Robyn looked surprised when she realized that she had kicked Sophia—not

Angelica—and that Robyn then threatened to kick Angelica. By then, according to

Angelica, the men had stopped fighting. Angelica testified that Christopher and

Jordan did not hit or otherwise injure Sophia and that Sophia’s injuries were caused

by Robyn.

Sophia was later transported by ambulance to a hospital in Bismarck, North

Dakota, where she wastreated in an emergency room during the early morning hours

of April 21, 2014. Her face was cut, she was badly bruised, and she complained of

abdominal and back pain. The lacerations on her face required nineteen stitches: 

four on her lip, six on her nose, and nine on her left nostril. In the days that followed,

Sophia experienced severe pain and remained in bed for more than one week.

Christopher and Jordan were charged with assault with intent to commit

murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, and assault resulting in serious bodily

injury. Each count charged that Christopher and Jordan “individually, and by aiding

and abetting, did assault Sophi[a] Bear Stops.” For conviction on any of the counts,

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the government was required to prove that Christopher and Jordan were Indians and

that the offense occurred within Indian country. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 

 

The emergency roomdoctor who treated Sophia testified that he had diagnosed

Sophia with a closed-head injury, which he described as “some trauma -- blunt

trauma, that the person was hit in the head or the face.” His notes indicated that

“[r]eportedly she was assaulted and hit with a solid object in the face.” At the close

of the doctor’s testimony, the district court asked him whether Sophia’s injuries were

consistent with being struck with a solid object in the face and whether his testimony

was based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty. The doctor replied yes to

both questions. Thereafter, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial,

arguing that the court had solicited inappropriate expert testimony. The district court

overruled the objection and denied the motion, stating, “Themedicalrecords reflected

that she had been struck with a solid object in the face. I simply wanted to know

whether his examination was consistent with that information.”

To establish that Christopher and Jordan were Indians and that the offense

occurred within Indian country, the government called Dwight Archambault, who is

employed by the Standing Rock Agency of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) as the

deputy superintendent for trust services. Archambault testified that Christopher and

Jordan were enrolled members ofthe Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. For enrollment, the

tribe requiresthat a person have enrolled parents and have “one-fourth StandingRock

blood.” Archambault explained that his office certifies blood quantum and presents

enrollment records to the tribe. The tribe then decides whether to enroll the

individual. Archambault’s office maintains records of tribal enrollment and of each

member’s blood quantum.

Archambault testified that he instructed an enrollment clerk to prepare two

certificates, one for Christopher and one for Jordan. The certificates were entitled

“Certified Degree of Indian Blood” and listed Christopher’s and Jordan’s names,

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dates of birth, tribal enrollment numbers, and total Sioux blood quantum. The

enrollment clerk who prepared the documents signed her name below the statement,

“I hereby certify that the above named individual is an enrolled member of the

Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.” Archambault testified that the records the enrollment

clerk used to create the certificates were kept by his office in the ordinary course of

business, that he had access to those records on a day-to-day basis, and that he could

look up the enrollment status of an individual at any given time. He explained that,

although an enrollment clerk prepared Christopher’s and Jordan’s certificates,

Archambault could have done so himself. The district court overruled Christopher’s

and Jordan’s objection to the admission of the certificates. 

Before the case was submitted to the jury, Christopher and Jordan requested

lesser-included-offense instructions. Christopher argued that Angelica’s testimony

established thatRobyn caused Sophia’s injuries. Jordan argued that the testimony did

not establish that he had a weapon and that the evidence supported an inference that

he had played only a minor role, if indeed he had been involved at all. The district

court denied the requests, stating:

[T]here is no basis in the record . . . to justify the issuance of any lesserincluded offenses on any of the three counts . . . . The gist of the

defense isthat[Christopher and Jordan] were not involved in any assault

whatsoever on Sophia Bear Stops, and I would be hard pressed to have

an instruction on the lesser-included offense based on that state of the

record.

The district court instructed the jury that to find Christopher and Jordan guilty

of any of the alleged crimes, it had to find that each defendant was “an Indian/Native

American.” The instructions defined “Indian” as a person who “has some Indian

blood” and “is recognized as an Indian by an Indian tribe and/or the federal

government.” The district court also gave an aiding-and-abetting instruction, stating

that “[a] person may also be found guilty . . . even if he personally did not do every

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act constituting the offense charged, if he aided and abetted the commission of the

offense.” 

The jury found that Christopher and Jordan were not guilty of assault with

intent to commit murder. It returned guilty verdicts on the remaining two counts,

however, finding that both Christopher and Jordan had committed assault with a

dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The district court

sentenced Christopher to 180 months’ imprisonment and Jordan to 72 months’

imprisonment.

II. Discussion

A. Admission of the Certificates of Degree of Indian Blood

Section 1153 confers federal jurisdiction to prosecute certain offenses that are

committed by an Indian within Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). The statute does

not define the term“Indian,” but the test we have applied “asks whether the defendant

(1) has some Indian blood, and (2) is recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal

government or both.” United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009)

(citing United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1846)). Whether a defendant

is an Indian “is an element of the crime that must be submitted to and decided by the

jury.” Id. at 763. During its closing argument, the government cited Archambault’s

testimony and the certificates of degree of Indian blood as evidence that Christopher

and Jordan were Indians. 

The BIA has explained that a certificate of degree of Indian blood “certifies

that an individual possesses a specified degree of Indian blood of a federally

recognized Indian tribe.” See Certificate of Degree ofIndian or Alaska NativeBlood,

65 Fed. Reg. 20775-01 (proposed Apr. 18, 2000). BIA officials issue certificates “so

that individuals may establish their eligibility for . . . programs and services based

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upon their status as American Indians.” Id.; see also Underwood v. Deputy Assistant

Sec’y–Indian Affairs, 93 Interior Dec. 13, 23 (1986) (explaining that certificates

establish eligibility for programs and services intended for Indians). Archambault

explained that there were five people in his office who could certify an individual’s

degree of Standing Rock Sioux blood: the superintendent; Archambault, who served

as the deputy superintendent; and three enrollment clerks. As indicated above, the

enrollment clerk who prepared Christopher’s and Jordan’s certificates did not testify

at trial. 

Christopher and Jordan argue that the admission of the certificates violated the

Confrontation Cause of the Sixth Amendment in light of Crawford v. Washington,

541 U.S. 36 (2004); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); and

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). They contend that the

certificates were essentially affidavits that were created to prove an element of each

offense, namely, that Christopher and Jordan were Indian. Because the certificates

were testimonial, the argument goes, Christopher and Jordan were entitled to confront

the enrollment clerk who certified to their blood quantum and tribal enrollment. The

government responds that although the certificates were prepared for trial, the

information contained therein was kept in the ordinary course of business by the

Standing Rock Agency of the BIA. According to the government, the admission of

the certificates did not run afoul of the Confrontation Clause because the certificates

were non-testimonial business records. We review the district court’s Confrontation

Clause ruling de novo. United States v. Thompson, 686 F.3d 575, 580-81 (8th Cir.

2012). 

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses

against him.” In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court explained that

“witnesses” against the accused are “those who bear testimony” and that

“‘[t]estimony,’ in turn, is typically a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the

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purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” 541 U.S. at 51 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “Where testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . the Sixth

Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior

opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. at 68. 

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that affidavits

regarding the chemical composition of a seized substance were “testimonial” and that

the laboratory analysts who certified the results were “witnesses” for purposes of the

Confrontation Clause. 557 U.S. at 310-11. The Court reasoned that “not only were

the affidavits made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness

reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial, but

under Massachusettslaw the sole purpose of the affidavits wasto provide prima facie

evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the analyzed substance.” 

Id. at 311 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at

2717 (“A document created solely for an ‘evidentiary purpose,’ Melendez-Diaz

clarified, made in aid of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial.” (quoting

Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311)). “[I]n Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the Court

extended Melendez-Diaz’s holding and determined that the person who conducts a

laboratory test—not merely a colleague knowledgeable about the testing procedures

and equipment used—must be available for cross-examination to satisfy the Sixth

Amendment’s confrontation requirement.” United States v. Williams, 720 F.3d 674,

698 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716). 

Business records are generally admissible absent confrontation, however,

“because—having been created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not

for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not

testimonial.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324. The Court in Melendez-Diaz rejected

the argument that the analysts’ affidavits were akin to business records, comparing

them instead to police reports and concluding that they were “calculated for use

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essentially in the court, not in the business.” Id. at 321 (quoting Palmer v. Hoffman,

318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943)). 

We conclude that the admission ofthe certificates did not violate Christopher’s

and Jordan’s Sixth Amendment rights. Although Archambault testified that he “had

[these particular certificates] prepared for [his] testimony,” BIA officials regularly

certify blood quantum for the purpose of establishing eligibility for federal programs

available only to Indians. Archambault explained that his office maintained the

records of tribal enrollment and of each member’s blood quantum. He could look up

an individual’s enrollment status and blood quantum at any time—that information

existed regardless of whether any crime was committed. Unlike the analysts in

Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the enrollment clerk here did not complete forensic

testing on evidence seized during a police investigation, but instead performed the

ministerial duty of preparing certificates based on information that was kept in the

ordinary course of business. An objective witness would not necessarily know that

the certificates would be used at a later trial, because certificates of degree of Indian

blood are regularly used in the administration of the BIA’s affairs. Simply put, the

enrollment clerk prepared certificates using records maintained in the ordinary course

of business by the Standing Rock Agency, and the BIA routinely issues certificates

in the administration of its affairs. Thus, the certificates were admissible as nontestimonial businessrecords. See, e.g., Williams, 720 F.3d at 699 (holding thatfinger

print cards from an arrest in a different jurisdiction were non-testimonial business

records); Thompson, 686 F.3d at 581-82 (holding that a state agency’s record of the

defendant’s reported was a non-testimonial business record); United States v.

Mashek, 606 F.3d 922, 930 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that logs of customers’

pseudoephedrine purchases were non-testimonial business records). 

Moreover, in addition to the certificates, the government elicited testimony

from Archambault that Christopher and Jordan were enrolled in the Standing Rock

Sioux Tribe. That testimony alone established that Christopher and Jordan were

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Indian for purposes of § 1153, for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe requires its

members to have at least “one-fourth Standing Rock blood.” See United States v.

Diaz, 679 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[M]embership in a tribe that will not

accept members without a certain degree of consanguinity, . . . has been held to

[prove that a person is an Indian].”); see also United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d

656, 660 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Enrollment is the common evidentiary means of

establishing Indian status . . . .”(quoting United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260,

1263 (9th Cir. 1979)). 

B. Denial of Lesser-Included-Offense Instructions

Christopher and Jordan argue that the district court abused its discretion by

refusing to submit lesser-included-offense instructionsto the jury. See United States

v. Milk, 281 F.3d 762, 768 (8th Cir. 2002) (standard of review). “[A] defendant is

entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a

jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.” 

Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973). A lesser-included-offense

instruction is warranted if: 

(1) a proper request is made; (2) the elements of the lesser offense are

identical to part of the elements of the greater offense; (3) there is some

evidence which would justify conviction of the lesser offense; (4) the

proof on the element or elements differentiating the two crimes is

sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the

defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser included

offense; and (5) there is mutuality, i.e., a charge may be demanded by

either the prosecution or the defense.

United States v. Felix, 996 F.2d 203, 207 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v.

One Star, 979 F.2d 1319, 1321 (8th Cir. 1992)). The dispute in this case centers

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around the third requirement, which we have said “is met if the jury could infer from

the evidence presented that the defendant committed the lesser offense.” Id.

Christopher and Jordan requested an instruction on simple assault, 18 U.S.C.

§ 113(a)(5), as a lesser-included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon, id.

§ 113(a)(3). As relevant here, the distinguishing factor between the two offenses is

the use of a dangerous weapon, which is required under § 113(a)(3), but not under

§ 113(a)(5). They also requested an instruction on assault by beating, striking, or

wounding, id. § 113(a)(4), as a lesser-included offense of assault resulting in serious

bodily injury, id. § 113(a)(6). The distinguishing factor between those two offenses

is whether serious bodily injury resulted, which isrequired under § 113(a)(6), but not

under § 113(a)(4). 

Christopher argues that the evidence would have permitted the jury rationally

to find that he committed simple assault and not assault with a dangerous weapon. 

He contends that the jury could have found that he merely threatened Sophia and that

he did not use the downspout in making the threat. A jury could reach that

conclusion, he says, by believing Sophia’s testimony thatChristopher said, “Let’s kill

this little bitch,” but yet finding that he had not followed through with any physical

force nor caused any serious bodily injury, and by believing Angelica’s testimony that

Christopher did not in any way harm Sophia. In reaching this conclusion, of course,

the jury also would have to reject Sophia’s, Robyn’s, and Robert’s testimony that

Christopher struck Sophia with the downspout and disregard the physical and

photographic evidence of the downspout, which was bent and splattered with blood. 

In light of this evidence, we conclude that the jury could not rationally find that

Christopher committed simple assault but was innocent of assault with a dangerous

weapon. See United States v. Sinclair, 444 F.2d 888, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“[T]here

must be some rational basis for the lesser charge; otherwise it is merely a device for

defendant to invoke the mercy-dispensing prerogative of the jury, and that is not by

itself a permissible basis to require a lesser-included offense instruction.” (footnote

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omitted)). The district court thus did not abuse its discretion by denying the lesserincluded-offense instruction.

Christopher maintains that because there was a dispute as to whether he or

Robyn caused Sophia’s facial lacerations and head injury, the evidence would have

permitted the jury rationally to find that he committed assault by beating, striking, or

wounding and not assault resulting in serious bodily injury. Christopher first argues

that a jury could find that Robyn caused Sophia’s injuries when she kicked Sophia in

the head. If the jury were to find that Robyn kicked Sophia, however, it could not

rationally find that Christopher committed the lesser-included offense of assault by

beating, striking, or wounding, for there was no evidence that both Christopher and

Robyn physically assaulted Sophia. Christopher also argues that a jury could find

that Sophia’s injuries were caused sometime after Christopher beat, struck, or

wounded Sophia. He points to evidence that Sophia fell when Robyn escorted her

toward the back of the trailer and that Sophia was placed in the back seat of a car,

which was covered with glass. This evidence does not explain the lacerations on

Sophia’s face or the blunt trauma to her head, however. Robyn explained that Sophia

did not fall on her face or head, “[t]he farthest she fell was back down to one knee,

and that’s when she’d get back up, help herself up with the other hand, and I had her

other arm.” Robyn further testified that when Sophia was placed in the car, she was

laid on her back, on top of a sweater with her head propped up by a jacket. Although

there was evidence that glass debris was found in Sophia’s hospital bed, the doctor

testified that he “assum[ed] that [debris] came from her clothing.” There was no

evidence that the glass somehow caused the cuts on Sophia’s face or the blunt trauma

to her head. Accordingly, the jury could not rationally infer from the evidence

presented that Christopher committed the lesser offense of assault by beating,

striking, or wounding, but not the greater offense of assault resulting in serious bodily

injury, and so the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the lesserincluded-offense instruction.

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Jordan argues that a jury rationally could have found that he committed the

lesser offenses, because there was some evidence that he did not use a weapon and

the jury could have distinguished his conduct from Christopher’s to find that Jordan

did not cause Sophia’s serious injuries. Jordan overlooks the fact that both counts

charged him with assaulting Sophia individually and by aiding and abetting

Christopher, a fact that we find determinative of his argument under our holding in

United States v. Felix, 996 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1993).

In Felix, the defendant was charged with assault resulting in serious bodily

injury. The victim had been attacked by a group of people: “Some members of the

mob struck him with clubs, some hit him with their bare hands, and some kicked

him.” Id. at 205. Although the defendant denied any involvement, she requested a

jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of assault by striking, beating, or

wounding. The court denied her request. It explained to the jury that the defendant

could be found guilty “even if she had not personally done all the acts constituting the

offense, if she had aided and abetted the commission of the offense.” Id. at 206. On

appeal, the defendant argued that although some of the witnesses testified that they

had seen her punch the victim, a jury could find that her punches did not cause

serious bodily harm. We rejected the argument, finding it unpersuasive because it

was based on the erroneous premise that the individuals involved in the attack were

committing separate and different assaults: 

The group attack on [the victim] constituted only one assault, that being

an assault resulting in serious bodily injury. Consequently, everyone

who took part in the attack was guilty of that offense—either as a

principal or as an aider and abetter to the offense. Everyone who

delivered a blow or a kick encouraged and aided others in the crime;

each person who struck or kicked [the victim] helped incapacitate him

so that others could deliver blows or kicks that collectively resulted in

serious bodily injury. . . . [E]ven if the jury believed that Felix had only

punched [the victim] and that her blows did not by themselves actually

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result in serious injury, she is guilty of the more serious assault as an

aider and abetter.

Id. at 207-08. So also in this case, for even if the jury believed that Jordan had only

punched Sophia, that he did not use a weapon, and that his blows did not cause

serious bodily injury, he is nonetheless guilty of the more serious crimes as an aider

and abetter of Christopher. 

In so holding, we reject Jordan’s argument that a jury rationally could have

found that he assaulted Sophia, but that he did not aid or abet Christopher. Jordan

cited United States v. Fire Thunder, 489 F.2d 938 (8th Cir. 1974), in support of his

argument, a case we find distinguishable. In Fire Thunder, three defendants were

charged with assault with dangerous weapons and assault with intent to inflict great

bodily injury. There was evidence that the first defendant struck a victim with a

guitar, that the second defendant struck the same victim with his hands and grabbed

a second victim by the neck, and that the “third defendant entered the home where the

incidents here in question occurred, carrying a piece of wood,” and assaulted the

victims. Id. at 940. The first two defendants’ cases were tried together, with the

district court refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense for either

count. We reversed and remanded: 

[A]s to the assault with dangerous weapon counts, a jury could conclude

that [the second defendant] used only his fists in striking the victim or

victims and that [the first defendant] did not wield the guitar in striking

[the victim] or that the guitar did not in fact constitute a dangerous

weapon. The jury could also find that the blows producing the serious

injuries came from the wooden club carried by the third defendant and

that neither of the appellants acted in concert with him or with each

other. 

Id. at 941. On remand in that case, the jury would have been required to resolve

several factual disputes, including whether the defendants acted alone or together. 

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The record here, however, does not permit a finding that Christopher and Jordan

committed separate assaults. Sophia testified that Jordan joined the attack after

Christopher said, “Let’s kill this little bitch.” Other than Angelica, who testified that

Jordan did nothing at all, the remaining witnesses testified that Christopher and

Jordan together beat Sophia. Accordingly, even if Jordan himself did not use a

dangerous weapon or deliver the blowsthat caused Sophia’s seriousinjuries, he aided

and abetted Christopher in committing the more serious crimes, and thus the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for lesser-included-offense

instructions. 

C. District Court’s Questioning of Emergency Room Doctor

We find no error in the district court’s questioning of the emergency room

doctor. The doctor had already testified that he had diagnosed Sophia with a closedhead injury and that such a diagnosis indicated “that the person was hit in the head

or the face.” Accordingly, when the court asked whether Sophia’s injuries were

consistent with being struck with a solid object, the doctor’s answer merely clarified

his testimony. Similarly, when the court asked whether his testimonywas based upon

a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the doctor’s affirmative answer simply

clarified that he had applied his medical training in diagnosing Sophia. We do not

view the doctor’s answers as opinion testimony that went beyond the scope of the

testimony elicited by the parties and of the information disclosed by the medical

records. See United States v. Bamberg, 478 F.3d 934, 941 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A judge

may question a witness in order to clarify testimony and to elicit necessary facts. But

a judge should not act as an advocate and ask questions merely to emphasize the

government’s proof.” (internal citations omitted)).

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D. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Jordan also argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of assault

with a dangerous weapon or assault resulting in serious bodily injuries. He reiterates

his argumentsthat the government failed to prove with admissible evidence his status

as an Indian and that he used a dangerous weapon or otherwise participated in the

assault that caused Sophia’s serious injuries. For the reasons set forth above, we

reject those arguments. 

III. Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

 ______________________________

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Appellate Case: 15-1936 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/19/2016 Entry ID: 4368936