Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01869/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01869-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Trudeau
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1869

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KEVIN MARK TRUDEAU,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10 CR 886 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 24, 2015 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 5, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Kevin Trudeau spent his career 

hawking miracle cures and self-improvement systems of 

dubious efficacy. When the Federal Trade Commission sued 

him for violating consumer-protection laws, Trudeau agreed 

to a consent decree in which he promised not to misrepresent the content of his books in TV infomercials. A few years 

later, Trudeau published The Weight Loss Cure “They” Don’t 

Want You to Know About and promoted it in three infomerCase: 14-1869 Document: 50 Filed: 02/05/2016 Pages: 29
2 No. 14-1869

cials. The ads said the weight-loss protocol was “simple”

and “inexpensive,” could be completed at home, and did not 

require any food restrictions or exercise. The book, on the 

other hand, described an arduous regimen mandating prescription hormone injections and severe dietary and lifestyle 

constraints. 

The district court imposed a civil contempt sanction and 

then issued an order to show cause why Trudeau should not 

be held in criminal contempt and face a penalty of up to six 

months’ imprisonment. At Trudeau’s request the case was 

transferred to a different judge. The new judge issued an 

amended show-cause order that removed the six-month 

penalty cap. Trudeau was convicted and sentenced to ten 

years in prison.

On appeal Trudeau leaves no stone unturned. His primary argument concerns an alleged violation of the Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et. seq. More than 70 nonexcludable days elapsed between the date the government 

agreed to prosecute the first show-cause order and the 

commencement of trial under the second show-cause order.

Trudeau moved to dismiss for violation of the Act. The district judge denied this motion. He was right to do so. The 

Act applies only to crimes punishable by more than six 

months’ imprisonment. Because the first show-cause order 

capped the potential penalty at six months, the Act did not 

apply. The second show-cause order removed the cap, triggering the Act’s 70-day clock, but Trudeau’s trial began 

within the mandatory timeframe counting from that date. 

There was no Speedy Trial Act violation. 

Trudeau raises an array of other issues as well: He challenges the jury instruction on “willfulness,” the sufficiency 

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No. 14-1869 3

of the evidence, two evidentiary rulings, and the reasonableness of his sentence. These arguments, too, are meritless. 

We affirm the contempt conviction and sentence.

I. Background

Trudeau’s bag of tricks contains something to relieve almost any ailment or burden. His infomercials have peddled

products like “Biotape” (to cure severe pain); “Coral Calcium Supreme” (to cure cancer); “Howard Berg’s Mega Read” 

(to increase reading speed tenfold); and “Kevin Trudeau’s 

Mega Memory System” (to unlock photographic memory). 

Because Trudeau’s pitches are factually indefensible, the 

FTC has repeatedly pursued him for violating consumerprotection laws. To settle one of these suits, Trudeau agreed 

to the entry of a consent decree in which he promised not to 

market products without the FTC’s approval. He soon decided he wanted more leeway to write books, however, and 

in September 2004 negotiated a modified consent order that 

permitted him to star in infomercials for his books provided 

that “the infomercial for any such book ... must not misrepresent the content of the book.” Soon after, Trudeau released

a book about “natural cures” and produced a promotional 

infomercial for it. Although the consent order did not require him to do so, Trudeau sent the transcript to the FTC,

which indicated its approval. This ad aired without objection.

In 2007 Trudeau published another book, The Weight Loss 

Cure “They” Don’t Want You to Know About, which described 

a complex regimen designed to reduce hunger by “resetting” the hypothalamus. We detailed the book’s weight-loss 

system in FTC v. Trudeau (Trudeau I) 579 F.3d 754, 758–59

(7th Cir. 2009), so we provide only a summary here. The regCase: 14-1869 Document: 50 Filed: 02/05/2016 Pages: 29
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imen consists of four phases (two of which are “strongly 

recommended” but not obligatory), each with a strict list of

dietary and lifestyle dos and don’ts. For example, most or all 

of the phases—including phase 4, which lasts a lifetime—

involve abstaining from artificial sweeteners, chain restaurants, prescription and over-the-counter medication, food 

cooked in microwaves, air conditioning, and fluorescent 

lighting. Program participants are also instructed to walk an 

hour a day; eat only organic food; do liver, parasite, heavymetal, and colon cleanses; and receive colonics, which are 

enema-like procedures performed by specialists. Phase 2, 

which is mandatory and lasts between 21 and 45 days, is 

particularly arduous and requires a 500-calorie-per-day diet 

and daily injections of human chorionic gonadotropin, a 

hormone only available by prescription and not indicated for 

weight loss.

Trudeau promoted The Weight Loss Cure in three different

30-minute infomercials staged as scripted conversations between an interviewer and himself. But the protocol Trudeau 

talked about in the infomercials bore little resemblance to 

the one described in his book. In the ads he said that the 

weight-loss protocol was “very inexpensive,” could be done 

at home, and was “the easiest [weight-loss] method known 

on planet Earth.” He also represented that once the protocol

was complete, dieters could eat “everything they want, any 

time they want.” The weight-loss program described in the 

infomercials sounded too good to be true, and it was. 

Trudeau never mentioned the dietary or lifestyle restrictions, 

injections, cleanses, or colonics mandated in the book. 

The FTC took Trudeau back to court for violating the 

2004 consent order. The district court (Judge Gettleman preCase: 14-1869 Document: 50 Filed: 02/05/2016 Pages: 29
No. 14-1869 5

siding) found that the infomercials misrepresented the content of The Weight Loss Cure, despite Trudeau’s jesuitical attempts to harmonize them. Judge Gettleman held Trudeau 

in civil contempt and entered a $37.6 million judgment 

against him, an amount equal to the gross revenue from 

books sold through the infomercials. We upheld the contempt finding in Trudeau I, id. at 768, and the monetary sanction in FTC v. Trudeau (Trudeau II), 662 F.3d 947, 949–50 (7th 

Cir. 2011). 

After imposing the civil sanction, Judge Gettleman issued 

an order to show cause why Trudeau should not also be 

held in criminal contempt for the same conduct. Under this 

show-cause order, dated April 16, 2010, Trudeau faced imprisonment of not more than six months. On April 29, 2010, 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed to prosecute the case. At 

that time the prosecutor told the judge: “I think because this 

is a criminal proceeding, the Speedy Trial Act would ... apply.” She sought and received an exclusion of time that same 

day, tolling the Act’s 70-day clock. In the weeks that followed, the judge granted three subsequent requests for exclusion of time. 

Trudeau eventually asked that the criminal proceedings

be reassigned to a new judge. Judge Gettleman exercised his 

prerogative as a senior judge to have the case transferred. 

On October 19, 2010, it was reassigned to Judge Guzmán. 

Unfortunately, neither the government nor Trudeau received notice of the reassignment (or the new criminal case 

number), and the case sat idle until the parties discovered 

the oversight. A status hearing was finally held on April 7, 

2011. By that time more than 150 nonexcludable days had

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elapsed since the government agreed to prosecute Judge 

Gettleman’s show-cause order. 

At the April 7 hearing (and in subsequent briefing), Trudeau sought dismissal for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. 

The government responded that, properly understood, 

Judge Gettleman’s show-cause order was outside the scope 

of the Act. The Act applies to “any case involving a defendant charged with an offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a), and “offense” is defined as “any Federal criminal offense ... other

than a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction,” id.

§ 3172(2) (emphasis added). Federal crimes are generally 

classified based on their maximum penalty, and Class B 

misdemeanors are punishable by not more than six months’

imprisonment. Id. § 3559(a)(7). Because Judge Gettleman’s 

show-cause order capped Trudeau’s sentence at six months, 

Judge Guzmán determined that it was analogous to a 

Class B misdemeanor and therefore the Act did not apply.

At the same April 7 hearing, the government asked Judge 

Guzmán to withdraw the initial show-cause order and issue 

an amended one without the six-month cap. The prosecutor 

argued that an uncapped order would be more appropriate 

given the serious nature of the contempt and Trudeau’s history of disobeying court orders. On December 7, 2011, Judge 

Guzmán agreed to issue a new show-cause order and told 

the parties that the original order would be dismissed when 

the new one was entered. An amended, uncapped showcause order issued the next day.

The contempt charge was tried to a jury over six days beginning on November 5, 2013. The parties agree that if the 

speedy-trial clock started when Judge Guzmán entered the 

new, uncapped show-cause order, the trial commenced 

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No. 14-1869 7

within the time period required by the Act. The jury convicted Trudeau of contempt, and Judge Guzmán imposed a tenyear prison sentence, well below the guidelines range of 

235 to 293 months. 

II. Discussion

A. The Speedy Trial Act

The Speedy Trial Act requires most criminal trials to 

begin within 70 days of (1) “the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment,” or (2) “the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in 

which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Time can be excluded from the 70-day

limit for a variety of reasons. See id. § 3161(h). The primary 

remedy for a violation of the Act is dismissal of the charge,

with or without prejudice depending on the court’s evaluation of a set of statutory factors. See id. § 3162(a)(2). We review the district court’s interpretation of the Act de novo 

and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Loera, 

565 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2009). 

The parties initially disagreed about how many nonexcludable days elapsed in total, but Trudeau now accepts the 

government’s figures—214 nonexcluded days passed between April 29, 2010, when the government agreed to prosecute Judge Gettleman’s show-cause order, and December 8, 

2011, when Judge Guzmán entered the new, uncapped order. As we’ve noted, Trudeau also agrees that the Act was 

properly applied if time is counted from the date of the second order until the start of trial in November 2013. But if the 

speedy-trial clock started running back in April 2010, as 

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Trudeau contends, then the case should have been dismissed, though not necessarily with prejudice.

1. Estoppel

Trudeau contends that the government is estopped from 

arguing that the April 2010 show-cause order wasn’t subject 

to the Act because the prosecutor initially told Judge Gettleman that it was. Judicial estoppel “prevents a party from 

prevailing on an argument in an earlier matter and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in a subsequent 

matter.” Wells v. Coker, 707 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 2013). Estoppel is “an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion,” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001), so 

the decision not to apply it is reviewed for abuse of discretion, see In re Knight–Celotex, LLC, 695 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir. 

2012).1

Judge Guzmán was well within his discretion in declining to estop the government. First, the government did not 

“prevail” over Trudeau when it initially took the position 

that the Act applied to the first show-cause order. Trudeau 

held the identical view, so it makes just as much sense to say 

that Trudeau prevailed over the government. Second, Trudeau did not suffer any “unfair detriment” as a result of the 

government’s changed view. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751. 

He wasn’t disadvantaged by the government’s earlier posi-

 1 The government argues that Trudeau failed to raise this argument in 

the district court, so at most plain-error review applies. It’s true that 

Trudeau did not use the word “estoppel” before the district court, but he 

did object that “the government’s recent position is inconsistent with the 

position it repeatedly took [earlier].” That’s sufficient to preserve the issue.

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tion and never meaningfully relied on it. In fact, Judge Gettleman never explicitly held that the show-cause order was 

covered by the Act, a holding that would have been erroneous in any event, as we’ll explain in a moment. Instead, 

Judge Gettleman appears to have simply assumed—along 

with everyone else—that the Act applied and proceeded accordingly.

2. The Speedy Trial Act in the Context of Contempt 

Two distinctive features of criminal contempt complicate 

the task of directly applying the Act to contempt prosecutions. The first is that unlike other crimes, contempt can be 

charged through a court-issued show-cause order that the 

government later agrees to prosecute. The Speedy Trial Act, 

however, calculates the 70-day clock by reference to the date 

that either the “information or indictment” is made public or 

the defendant initially appears in court on “such charge,” 

whichever is later. § 3161(c)(1).

The government argued in the district court that because 

show-cause orders are not mentioned in the Act, this contempt prosecution is outside its scope. The government has 

abandoned this argument on appeal and now concedes that 

the Act can be triggered when the government accepts a

judge’s referral to prosecute an alleged contempt. The government was right to make this concession.2

 

2 In an analogous context, in Gompers v. United States, the Supreme Court 

held that criminal contempt is covered by a statute of limitations even 

though the statute in question only mentioned “the information” and 

“the indictment.” 233 U.S. 604, 611 (1914) (“What follows is a natural 

way of expressing that the proceedings must be begun within three 

years; indictment and information being the usual modes by which they 

are begun, and very likely no other having occurred to those who drew 

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The second unusual feature of criminal contempt is that 

it carries no statutorily authorized maximum punishment. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (“A court of the United States shall have 

power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, ... contempt of its authority ... .”). The Speedy Trial 

Act applies to all offenses more serious than a Class B misdemeanor—that is, offenses punishable by more than six 

months’ imprisonment—regardless of the actual sentence 

imposed. See § 3172(2). Trudeau argues that because the 

criminal contempt statute does not authorize a maximum 

penalty, Judge Gettleman’s show-cause order charged him 

with a crime punishable by up to life in prison, notwithstanding the order’s six-month penalty cap. 

This argument is hard to square with the approach the 

Supreme Court has taken in the analogous context of the 

right to trial by jury in contempt prosecutions. The Sixth 

Amendment’s jury-trial right applies if the charged crime is 

“serious” rather than “petty” (and “petty” means punishable 

by imprisonment of six months or less). See Frank v. United 

 

the law.”), overruled in part on other grounds, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 

207 (1968). Moreover, the Judicial Conference views criminal contempt

as covered by the Speedy Trial Act. See 106 F.R.D. 271, 310 (December 

1979 revision (with amendments through October 1984)) (“[T]he Committee [on the Administration of Criminal Law] is of the view that the act 

does apply to contempts ... and that the notice on which prosecution is 

based should be treated as an information for purposes of calculating the 

70-day time limit to trial.”). More broadly, the Act’s legislative history

conveys Congress’s expansive purpose of “giv[ing] real meaning to th[e]

Sixth Amendment right” to a speedy trial, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508 (1974), 

reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 7404, and there’s no question that 

contempt prosecutions are covered by the constitutional speedy-trial 

guarantee.

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States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969). In Frank a contemnor had 

been convicted after a bench trial and sentenced to probation; he contended that he was entitled to a jury trial under 

the Sixth Amendment. As Trudeau does here, the contemnor 

in Frank argued that because there is no maximum punishment for contempt, it was necessarily a “serious” crime. Id.

The Court disagreed, explaining that “Congress ... has not 

categorized contempts as ‘serious’ or ‘petty.’” Id. at 149 (citation omitted); see also Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 

(1966) (describing contempt as “an offense sui generis”).

Given the broad range of potentially contumacious behavior,

the Court held that “in prosecutions for criminal contempt 

where no maximum penalty is authorized, the severity of 

the penalty actually imposed is the best indication of the seriousness of the particular offense.” Frank, 395 U.S. at 149

(emphasis added); see also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 

(1968) (same for state-court contempt convictions). Because 

the contemnor in Frank was not sentenced to any term of 

imprisonment at all, his contempt was properly treated as a 

petty offense and the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial right was 

not implicated. Frank, 395 U.S. at 152.

As applied here, the Court’s reasoning in Frank includes 

a logical corollary: If the document initiating the contempt 

prosecution caps the sentence at six months or less, then it’s 

not necessary to wait until sentencing to know whether the 

Speedy Trial Act will apply—it won’t. Indeed, the Court said 

its post hoc analysis applies to “prosecutions for criminal 

contempt where no maximum penalty is authorized.” Id. at 149

(emphasis added). A show-cause order capping a contempt 

sentence at six months is analogous to an indictment for a 

Class B misdemeanor, which carries a maximum penalty of 

six months. Class B misdemeanors are not covered by the 

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Act. As such, neither was Judge Gettleman’s show-cause order.3

Nor did Judge Guzmán’s later, uncapped order—

effectively a new charging instrument—make Judge Gettleman’s earlier order retroactively subject to the Act. And because the trial began within 70 nonexcluded days after Judge 

Guzmán’s show-cause order, there was no Speedy Trial Act

violation. 

Trudeau insists that this result conflicts with the Act’s 

approach to reprosecutions. The Act provides that if “any 

charge contained in a complaint ... is dismissed or otherwise 

dropped” and the defendant is later reindicted for “an offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same 

criminal episode,” then the 70-day clock resets and runs 

anew from the date of the second indictment. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(d)(1); see United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587, 593

(7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Myers, 666 F.3d 402, 404–05 

(6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Napolitano, 761 F.2d 135, 137 

(2d Cir. 1985) (“Congress considered and rejected [the] suggestion that the Act’s dismissal sanction be applied to subsequent charges if they arise from the same criminal episode as 

those specified in the original complaint ... .”). This is true 

even if the dismissal remedies a violation of the Act. See, e.g.,

United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 2010). In 

 3 Two other circuits have addressed this issue and reached the same conclusion, albeit in unpublished orders. See United States v. Moncier, 

492 F. App’x 507, 510 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Richmond, 

312 F. App’x 56, 57 (9th Cir. 2009). 

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other words, the baseline rule is that a new charge gets a 

new clock.

There is, however, one notable exception to this rule. Section 3161(h) lists periods of delay that must be excluded 

from the 70-day calculation. Under § 3161(h)(5), “[i]f the information or indictment is dismissed upon motion of the attorney for the [g]overnment and thereafter a charge is filed 

against the defendant for the same offense, or any offense 

required to be joined with that offense,” the clock does not 

reset with the issuance of a second charge. (Emphasis added.) Rather, the clock runs from the date of the initial charge 

and excludes any intermediate period when no charge is 

outstanding. See United States v. Rein, 848 F.2d 777, 780 (7th 

Cir. 1988).

But this exception can’t apply when the first charge did

not itself fall under the Act. Section 3161(h) supplies a list of 

circumstances under which time must be excluded. It follows 

that if the speedy-trial clock did not start running with the 

first prosecution (because it was not covered by the Act), 

then zero nonexcluded days have accumulated before the

start of the second prosecution. “Excluded days” only exist 

by reference to the Act. Nothing in § 3161(h)(5) implies that a 

judge is permitted to look back at the first indictment and 

retroactively exclude days that could not have been excluded initially. Accordingly, where, as here, an offense covered 

by the Act is charged following one that was not covered, the 

70-day clock starts on the day that the eligible prosecution 

begins.

Trudeau tries an alternative approach, arguing that 

Judge Guzmán’s order was akin to a superseding indictment 

rather than a reindictment. A superseding indictment is isCase: 14-1869 Document: 50 Filed: 02/05/2016 Pages: 29
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sued without the initial charge first being dismissed. See 

United States v. Johnson, 680 F.3d 966, 973 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(“In sum, when a superseding indictment is filed there is only one criminal action; a reindictment results in two.” (quoting United States v. Hoslett, 998 F.2d 648, 658 (9th Cir. 1993))). 

In the Speedy Trial Act context, “a superseding indictment 

restating or correcting original charges does not restart the 

seventy-day clock.” Hemmings, 258 F.3d at 593. This follows 

logically from the fact that no charge is dismissed under

§ 3161(d)(1) when the government issues a superseding indictment, so the clock runs continuously from the date of the 

initial charge. 

Even if we treated Judge Guzmán’s order as a superseding indictment, however, there would be no Speedy Trial 

Act violation in this case. As we’ve just explained, if the Act

did not apply to the initial charge, then the superseding indictment—to which the Act does apply—doesn’t retroactively start the speedy-trial clock from the date of the initial 

charge. If the new charge triggers the Speedy Trial Act for 

the first time, the clock begins to run when the new, elevated 

charge is filed. Here, Judge Guzmán’s uncapped show-cause 

order started the speedy-trial clock for the first time.

3. Gilding

Trudeau’s final argument is that even if the Act did not 

apply to the first show-cause order, the second show-cause

order was nonetheless improper because it merely “gilded” 

the first one. This argument rests on two cases suggesting 

that “if the crimes for which a defendant is ultimately prosecuted really only gild the charge underlying his initial arrest 

and the different accusatorial dates between them are not 

reasonably explicable, the initial arrest may well mark the 

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speedy trial provision’s applicability as to prosecution for all 

the interrelated offenses.” United States v. DeTienne, 468 F.2d 

151, 155 (7th Cir. 1972); see also United States v. Juarez, 

561 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1977). Trudeau notes that nothing 

changed between the two show-cause orders other than 

identity of the presiding judge. That difference, he says, does 

not make the different prosecutorial start dates “reasonably 

explicable.”

DeTienne and Juarez both concerned the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right, not the Speedy Trial Act, which 

DeTienne in fact predated. Trudeau hasn’t raised a Sixth 

Amendment argument; he relies solely on the Act, which

provides its own detailed instructions about how reprosecutions should be handled. We’ve never applied a gilding theory in a Speedy Trial Act case, and other courts have questioned its doctrinal vitality. See, e.g., United States v. Watkins, 

339 F.3d 167, 177 (3d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. 

Williams, No. 09-CR-29, 2009 WL 1119417, at *3 (E.D. Wis. 

Apr. 27, 2009) (no gilding); United States v. Toader, 582 F.

Supp. 2d 987, 990–91 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (same). 

We see no reason to gloss the statute with a gilding doctrine, especially in a case with no evidence of bad-faith abuse 

of the Act by the government. As a general matter, the risk 

of improper evasion of the Act by the government is particularly low in a judge-initiated contempt proceeding. And because Trudeau requested that his case be transferred out of

Judge Gettleman’s court, the government can’t be accused of

judge shopping. We doubt that the gilding doctrine can ever 

overcome the terms of the Speedy Trial Act, but we are certain it does not do so here.

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B. Jury Instruction on “Willfulness” 

Trudeau’s next argument is a claim of instructional error.

He contends that the jury instruction on the elements of contempt misstated the “willfulness” element of the offense. 

“The essential elements of a finding of criminal contempt 

under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) are a lawful and reasonably specific 

order of the court and a willful violation of that order.” Doe 

v. Maywood Hous. Auth., 71 F.3d 1294, 1297 (7th Cir. 1995).

The text of § 401(3) doesn’t contain a willfulness requirement, but we, like all circuits, hold that it is a necessary element that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

In this context, “willfulness” means “a volitional act done 

by one who knows or should reasonably be aware that his 

conduct is wrongful.” United States v. Greyhound Corp., 

508 F.2d 529, 531–32 (7th Cir. 1974). The phrase “should reasonably be aware” describes the mental state of recklessness, 

meaning that the defendant was “conscious of a substantial 

risk that the prohibited events will come to pass.” United 

States v. Mottweiler, 82 F.3d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)); cf. MODEL PENAL 

CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962) (“A person acts recklessly ... when 

he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk 

that a material element exists or will result from his conduct.”). 

The government first proposed a jury instruction on willfulness,4 and Trudeau then offered several modifications

with the stated intent of making the instruction more closely 

 4 There are no model jury instructions for criminal contempt in this circuit. See FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

p.163 (2012).

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mirror Mottweiler’s definition of “recklessness.” The government agreed to the proposed modifications. The final instruction was as follows, with Trudeau’s additions in bold,

his deletions struck through, and subsequent technical edits

in brackets:

A violation of a court order is willful if it is a 

volitional act done by one who knows or 

should reasonably be aware that his conduct is 

wrongful. A person should reasonably be 

aware that his conduct is wrongful if he knows 

about is conscious of a substantial and unjustifi[able] risk that his actions the prohibited 

event will lead to a violation of the court order,

(here violation of the September [2], 200[4]

Court Order) will come to pass and he disregards that risk.

In deciding whether the defendant acted willfully, you may consider all of the evidence, including what the defendant did or said.

Trudeau informed the judge that the jury instructions were

“agreed to” as modified, and they were given to the jury 

without further modification by the court.

Trudeau now argues—for the first time on appeal—that 

recklessness isn’t sufficient to satisfy the “willfulness” element of contempt. He points out that the Supreme Court has

interpreted the “willfulness” element of certain criminal 

statutes to require the government to prove that the defendant knew that his conduct violated the law, not merely that 

the defendant was reckless with respect to the illegality of his 

actions. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 58 n.9 

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(2007) (collecting cases). He says his case “presents an excellent opportunity for the [c]ourt to revisit Greyhound” and 

overrule it.5 See 7TH CIR. R. 40(e).

Quite the contrary. “We have repeatedly held that approval of a jury instruction in the district court extinguishes 

any right to appellate review of the instruction.” United 

States v. Yu Tian Li, 615 F.3d 752, 757 (7th Cir. 2010). Trudeau 

expressly approved the willfulness instruction after offering 

modifications that were accepted in toto. He cannot now argue that the instruction was wrong. See id. (“Having proposed a jury instruction virtually identical to the instruction 

actually used by the district court, [the defendant] cannot 

now contest that instruction.”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 30(d) 

(“A party who objects to any portion of the instructions ... 

must inform the court of the specific objection ... . Failure to 

object ... precludes appellate review, except as permitted 

under [plain-error review].”).

Trudeau tries to rescue his waived argument by suggesting it was merely forfeited because any objection in the district court would have been futile in light of Greyhound’s status as binding precedent. Wrong again. Trudeau could have 

preserved a challenge to the continuing vitality of Greyhound 

even though the district court would have been bound by 

 5 The circuits are split over whether “knowledge” or “recklessness” is the 

appropriate mens rea in criminal contempt cases. Compare United States v. 

Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 281 (3d Cir. 2010) (knowledge), and United States 

v. Mourad, 289 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2002) (knowledge), with United 

States v. Iqbal, 684 F.3d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 2012) (recklessness); United 

States v. Smith, 497 F. App’x 269, 273 n.11 (4th Cir. 2012) (recklessness);

and United States v. Rapone, 131 F.3d 188, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recklessness).

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No. 14-1869 19

that decision. Cf. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) 

(considering the arguments of a petitioner who preserved 

her objection to a well-settled jury instruction by objecting to 

it even though “the trial court, correctly finding itself bound 

by Circuit precedent, denied petitioner’s request”).

In any case, Trudeau’s argument fails even if only forfeited. Forfeiture permits review for plain error, and “[a]n error 

is plain if it was (1) clear and uncontroverted at the time of 

appeal and (2) affected substantial rights, which means the 

error affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” 

United States v. DiSantis, 565 F.3d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The willfulness instruction 

was—and is—perfectly in line with controlling precedent in 

this circuit. Trudeau’s argument rests on cases interpreting 

statutory-willfulness requirements in other contexts, not the 

judicially implied willfulness requirement in criminal contempt. We have emphasized that “willful” “is a ‘word of

many meanings,’ and ‘its construction [is] often ... influenced by its context.’” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 

141 (1994) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 

(1943)) (alteration in original).

Trudeau relies on United States v. Holmes, 93 F.3d 289 (7th 

Cir. 1996), but to no avail. In Holmes the defendant failed to 

object to a jury instruction that was in line with circuit precedent. Id. at 292. After his trial but before his appeal, the Supreme Court held that a jury instruction identical to the one 

used at his trial was mistaken as a matter of law. Id. We held 

that the defendant’s forfeited objection was reviewable for 

plain error and that in light of the Court’s intervening decision invalidating an identical instruction, the plain-error 

standard was satisfied. Id. at 292–93.

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20 No. 14-1869

Here, in contrast, Trudeau can point to no authority that 

makes the willfulness instruction used at his trial plainly erroneous. We would need to exercise plenary review to overturn existing circuit precedent in the absence of an on-point 

holding of the Court.

Finally, Trudeau calls our attention to Elonis v. United 

States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), a decision issued after we heard 

oral argument in this case. Elonis held that although the federal statute criminalizing threats does not specify a mental 

state, see 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), negligence isn’t enough, Elonis, 

135 S. Ct. at 2011. The Court expressly declined to decide 

whether recklessness would have sufficed. Id. at 2013. Elonis 

does not call Greyhound into doubt.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Trudeau next challenges the sufficiency of the government’s evidence. This is always a heavy lift, and it’s especially so here. See United States v. Reed, 744 F.3d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 

2014) (“We will overturn a verdict for insufficiency of the 

evidence only if, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government, the record is devoid of evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

Trudeau’s main contention is that the government presented no “state-of-mind evidence” from which the jury 

could conclude that he willfully violated the consent order. 

He argues that without direct evidence of his mental state, 

the jury was left to choose between several equally plausible 

benign explanations for his misrepresentations. He suggests, 

for example, that the misrepresentations might have been 

attributable to the possibility that he left his glasses at home 

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No. 14-1869 21

and misread the teleprompter (while filming each of three 

infomercials?). Or the teleprompter might have been negligently loaded with an unedited version of the script (and he 

was unaware that the words he spoke bore little resemblance 

to the book he wrote?).

Setting aside the obvious implausibility of these fanciful 

explanations, the material point for our purposes is that the 

government had no obligation to present direct state-ofmind evidence. Rather, “the trier of fact is entitled to employ 

common sense in making reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 

1021–22 (7th Cir. 2002). Needless to say, the jury’s verdict is 

not called into doubt because a defendant can hypothesize

on appeal a few alternative interpretations of the evidence. 

Trudeau was free to suggest his lost-eyeglasses or dysfunctional-teleprompter theories to the jury. The only question 

now is whether the evidence was adequate to prove each element of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. We’ve previously explained that Trudeau’s The Weight Loss Cure infomercials included “blatant misrepresentations” that were 

“patently false” and “outright lie[s].” Trudeau I, 579 F.3d at 

766–68. It’s no surprise that the jury reached the same conclusion. The evidence was easily sufficient to convict.

D. Exclusion of Evidence

Trudeau also challenges the judge’s exclusion of two categories of defense evidence. We review the district court’s 

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, United States v. 

Foley, 740 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2014), and will reverse only if no reasonable person could take the judge’s position,

United States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Even then, no remedy is available unless the error affected 

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22 No. 14-1869

the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning that the average 

juror would have found the prosecution’s case significantly 

less persuasive absent the erroneous evidentiary ruling. Id.; 

see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).

1. The Natural Cures Evidence

Shortly after the 2004 consent decree took effect, Trudeau 

published a book called Natural Cures “They” Don’t Want You 

to Know About and prepared an infomercial to promote it, as 

he had for other products and pitches. As we’ve explained, 

although the consent order didn’t require the FTC’s approval, Trudeau sent the Commission a transcript of the ad. The 

Commission had no objection, though it clearly stated that 

its approval was limited to this single transcript.

At trial Trudeau sought to introduce the Natural Cures 

book and infomercial and related correspondence with the 

FTC. The ostensible purpose was to show that he relied on 

the FTC’s approval of the Natural Cures infomercial in interpreting the boundaries of the consent order’s “no misrepresentations” clause. His theory was that if he had used the 

Natural Cures infomercial as a template for The Weight Loss 

Cure ads, it would have been more likely that he acted in 

good faith—and therefore did not willfully violate the consent order—when producing the infomercials at issue in this 

case. Trudeau wanted to introduce the Natural Cures evidence even if he did not testify that he actually used the 

FTC-approved infomercial as a template.

Trudeau made essentially the same argument in his civil 

contempt appeal. There, we said: 

Nothing about the FTC’s prior approval should 

have led Trudeau to believe that he could seCase: 14-1869 Document: 50 Filed: 02/05/2016 Pages: 29
No. 14-1869 23

lectively quote his weight loss book as being 

“easy” and “simple,” while leaving out nearly 

every relevant detail about the weight loss protocol. ... The extent to which Trudeau could 

reasonably rely on the FTC’s approval of the 

Natural Cures infomercial ended when Trudeau 

began uttering false statements and quotes that 

mischaracterized the content of the Weight Loss 

Cure[] book. 

Trudeau I, 579 F.3d at 767–68. That analysis is not conclusive 

here, however, because civil and criminal contempt have different elements. Only criminal contempt requires willfulness. Thus, the issue is whether the Natural Cures evidence 

was relevant to Trudeau’s state of mind. 

The judge held that Trudeau first had to provide some 

evidence that he actually used Natural Cures as a template, 

probably through his own testimony. And even if he testified to that effect, the judge added this:

[The] template testimony is relevant only if 

there is evidence to suggest that defendant’s 

use of the FTC-approved Natural Cures infomercial was reasonable, i.e., that ... the content 

of [the Natural Cures book and infomercial] is 

so similar to that of the Weight Loss Cure book 

and infomercials that approval of one logically

includes the other. ... [I]f [such evidence] does 

[exist], and [the] defendant offers template testimony, the Natural Cures evidence may be relevant to willfulness.

(Emphases added.)

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24 No. 14-1869

The second step in the judge’s analysis is mistaken. Because the willfulness element of criminal contempt is subjective, it was error to impose an objective “reasonableness” requirement.

The first step in the analysis is a closer call. The judge required Trudeau to testify or present circumstantial evidence 

linking the Natural Cures evidence to his state of mind. It’s 

true that the state-of-mind inquiry is not a free-for-all in 

which any evidence that could possibly have influenced a defendant’s mental state is necessarily relevant; if that were the 

case, “a defendant could introduce evidence that would invite the jury to speculate a non-existent defense into existence.” United States v. Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452, 460 (4th Cir. 

2014). When a defendant offers nothing but speculation to 

link a piece of evidence to his state of mind, the evidence is 

properly excluded unless the defendant offers corroboration 

that the evidence in fact influenced his mental state. United 

States v. Kokenis, 662 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2011); see also id. 

(“Kokenis seems to be asserting that just because there may 

be evidence to show that someone could have had a goodfaith belief that he wasn’t violating the law, then he should 

be able to present such evidence to the jury. ... Without any 

connection to his state of mind, such evidence is irrelevant.”) 

(emphases added); Zayyad, 741 F.3d at 460 (“If the defendant 

wants to present a theory or belief that might have justified 

his actions, then he must present evidence that he in fact relied on that theory or belief.”); United States v. Curtis, 

782 F.2d 593, 599 (6th Cir. 1986) (“Unless there is a connection between the external facts and the defendant’s state of 

mind, the evidence of the external facts is not relevant.”). Often, but not necessarily, this corroboration comes in the form 

of the defendant’s own testimony.

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No. 14-1869 25

Whether the inferential gap between the proffered evidence and the defendant’s mental state is great enough to 

require corroboration is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry. In 

United States v. Kokenis, for example, the defendant wanted 

experts to testify about an accounting theory that he claimed 

he relied on in good faith (but mistakenly) when calculating

his taxes. See 662 F.3d at 930. Because the defendant could 

not offer any evidence that he in fact used that theory, or 

even knew about it, we held that the judge properly excluded the testimony as irrelevant. Id. In other cases we’ve held 

that evidence of this type was properly excluded when the 

link between the evidence and the defendant’s state of mind 

was too attenuated or speculative. See, e.g., United States v. 

Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 2014) (conditioning the 

admissibility of evidence of the defendant’s actions 

postarrest on his ability to link them to his mental state at 

the time of the crime); Zayyad, 741 F.3d at 460 (prohibiting 

cross-examination of witnesses about the “gray market” in 

diverted prescription drugs because the defendant had not 

shown that he knew about such markets); Curtis, 782 F.2d at 

598–60 (excluding expert testimony that an area of tax law 

was unsettled and complex in the absence of evidence that 

the defendant himself was confused or relied on the expert’s 

advice).

Although the district judge deserves significant deference 

in these determinations, we think Trudeau’s case is distinguishable from the ones we’ve just mentioned. There is no 

question that Trudeau knew about the FTC’s approval of the

Natural Cures infomercial; he was the one who asked for it. 

And there’s a logical link between that knowledge and his 

mental state: It stands to reason that Trudeau’s experience 

with Natural Cures—his first infomercial after the consent 

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26 No. 14-1869

order—would have had at least some effect on the way he 

approached The Weight Loss Cure infomercials just two years 

later. Although a defendant’s right against self-incrimination 

does not permit him to introduce evidence that would only 

be relevant in light of his testimony, see Beavers, 756 F.3d at 

1051, the admission of evidence that is independently probative of a defendant’s state of mind should not be conditioned 

on corroboration. Under the circumstances here, the basic 

relevance of the Natural Cures evidence strikes us as straightforward and should not have been conditioned on Trudeau’s

introduction of corroborating evidence.

If excluding this evidence was error, however, it was 

clearly harmless. Trudeau’s infomercials for The Weight Loss 

Cure contained gross misrepresentations. As we said in 

Trudeau I, nothing about the FTC’s approval of the Natural 

Cures infomercial gave a green light to blatant falsehoods. 

Furthermore, the large majority of misrepresentations in The 

Weight Loss Cure infomercials bore no relationship at all to 

the earlier infomercial for Natural Cures. For example, Trudeau said that The Weight Loss Cure involved no portion control (when it required extensive portion control); no food 

deprivation (when it required a strict diet); and no restrictions on what you could eat after finishing the protocol

(when it had lifetime restrictions). Trudeau doesn’t explain

how the FTC’s approval of the Natural Cures infomercial

could possibly have led him to believe that these flagrant 

and highly specific misrepresentations were acceptable. The 

likelihood that the jury would have been swayed by this evidence is vanishingly small. Substantial justice does not require reversal.

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No. 14-1869 27

2. Misinterpretation of the Consent Decree’s Terms

Trudeau also wanted to present evidence that he simply 

misinterpreted the consent decree by construing it to permit 

statements of opinion and personal experiences protected by 

the First Amendment. The judge wouldn’t allow it. That ruling was not an abuse of discretion. 

A “mistaken interpretation” defense to criminal contempt requires a degree of plausibility and at least some evidence of good faith, both of which are utterly lacking here:

To provide a defense to criminal contempt, the 

mistaken construction must be one which was 

adopted in good faith and which, given the 

background and purpose of the order, is plausible. The defendant may not avoid criminal 

contempt by “twisted interpretations” or “tortured constructions” of the provisions of the 

order.

Greyhound, 508 F.2d at 532 (quoting United States v. Gamewell, 

95 F. Supp. 9, 13 (D. Mass. 1951)); see also United States v. 

McMahon, 104 F.3d 638, 644–45 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A] person 

‘is not permitted to maintain a studied ignorance of the 

terms of a decree in order to postpone compliance and preclude a finding of contempt.’” (quoting Perfect Fit Indus. v. 

Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800, 808 (2d Cir. 1981))).

Trudeau says he thought the consent decree preserved 

his First Amendment right to make statements of opinion or 

personal experience. As we’ve explained, however, the infomercials for The Weight Loss Cure are replete with blatant 

factual misrepresentations that could not possibly be classiCase: 14-1869 Document: 50 Filed: 02/05/2016 Pages: 29
28 No. 14-1869

fied as statements of opinion or personal experience. The 

judge was right to exclude this category of defense evidence.

E. Reasonableness of Sentence

Sanctions for criminal contempt are intended to be punitive and “to vindicate the authority of the court.” United 

Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994). Trudeau’s guidelines range was 235 to 293 months, but the government recommended a below-guidelines sentence of ten

years.6 Judge Guzmán found that a within-guidelines sentence would be reasonable, but he adopted the government’s 

recommendation and imposed a ten-year sentence.

Trudeau argues that ten years is disproportionate because Judge Gettleman initially thought a six-month sentence was sufficient. He also notes that the only contempt 

sentence in this circuit longer than his involved a witness’s

refusal to testify in a terrorism prosecution. See United States 

v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 822 (7th Cir. 2009). Finally, he suggests that his offense is less blameworthy than some frauds 

because each book buyer lost “only” $29.95 (plus shipping 

and handling).

A below-guidelines sentence will almost never be unreasonable, United States v. Tahzib, 513 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 

2008), and this one certainly isn’t. Although we don’t know 

 

6 The Sentencing Commission instructs courts to use § 2B1.1, the guideline for Basic Economics Offenses, to calculate a sentencing range for

contempt arising out of a violation of a court order enjoining fraudulent 

conduct. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2J1.1 cmt. n.3, 2X5.1. The main component of 

Trudeau’s guidelines calculation was the combined $37.6 million lost by 

consumers who purchased The Weight Loss Cure book by calling the tollfree number publicized in the infomercials.

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No. 14-1869 29

the rationale for the six-month cap on the initial show-cause 

order, nothing suggests that Judge Gettleman made a preliminary calculation of the guidelines range. And it’s unsurprising that a terrorism-related contempt conviction would 

draw a higher sentence than Trudeau’s. Trudeau’s effort to 

minimize his culpability by reference to the small losses suffered by each book buyer requires no comment.

Based on the size of Trudeau’s fraud and the flagrant and 

repetitive nature of his contumacious conduct, the ten-year 

sentence—about half the bottom of the guidelines range—

was not unreasonable.

AFFIRMED.

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