Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01279/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01279-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ruben Garnica
Petitioner
J. Hartley
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN GARNICA,

Petitioner,

v.

J. HARTLEY,

Respondent.

 /

1:10-CV-01279 GSA HC

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE CASE

ORDER DECLINING ISSUANCE OF

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He has consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation for his 1979 conviction of murder. He is serving a sentence of seven years to life. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 6, 2010, in the

Sacramento Division of this Court. By order dated July 19, 2010, the case was transferred to the

Fresno Division and received in this Court. In this petition, Petitioner alleges a retroactive

change in the law caused by the implementation of California’s Proposition 9 on November 4,

2008, exposes him to a longer sentence in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the

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Constitution. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Summary Dismissal

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides in pertinent part:

If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the

clerk to notify the petitioner. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ

of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. A petition for habeas corpus should not

be dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can be

pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9 Cir. 1971). th

B. Challenge to Proposition 9 as Ex Post Facto Violation Not Ripe for Review

On November 4, 2008, the California voters approved Proposition 9 (entitled Victims’

Rights in Parole Proceedings), which amended California Penal Code section 3041.5. Petitioner

claims that the implementation of Proposition 9 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because it

exposes him to a significant risk that his sentence will be lengthened. 

In this case, Petitioner fails to demonstrate injury by the passage of Proposition 9. He

claims the amendments will cause him to be deprived of good-time credits and work-time

credits. Petitioner’s claims are speculative and not ripe for review. The Supreme Court has

stated that the basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine "is to prevent the courts, through premature

adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." Thomas v. Union Carbide

Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985). The court’s role is “neither to issue

advisory opinions nor to declare rights in hypothetical cases, but to adjudicate live cases or

controversies consistent with the powers granted the judiciary in Article III of the Constitution.”

Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com'n, 220 F.3d 1134, (9th Cir.2000). Ripeness becomes an

issue when a case is anchored in future events that may not occur as anticipated, or at all. Pacific

Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 200-01

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(1983); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689 (1981).

Good conduct credits are earned during a period of incarceration. For prisoners serving a

term of years-to-life-with-possibility-of-parole, good conduct credits are relevant to the

determination of a prisoner’s minimum eligible parole date, or “MEPD.” Cal. Code Regs.

§§ 2000(b)(3), (b)(67). Once a prisoner reaches his MEPD, as Petitioner has in this case, good

conduct credits are not awarded until parole is actually granted by the parole board. See

Cal.Code. Regs. tit. 15 §§ 2282-2289, 2403, 2410, 2411. Accordingly, in this case Petitioner has

not yet been denied good conduct credits, and it is not known if he will, provided he is even

granted parole. Since the claims are speculative and not ripe for review, the petition must be

dismissed.

Petitioner also claims the passage of Proposition 9 has modified Cal. Penal Code

§§ 3041(a)-(b) so as to render Petitioner’s sentence a death sentence. This argument is without

merit. Cal. Penal Code §§ 3041(a)-(b) have not been modified to change Petitioner’s sentence to

death. Petitioner remains eligible for parole pursuant to those statutes. Per § 3041(b), the Board

of Prison Terms “shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current

convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or

offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual.” Even if parole is repeatedly denied ultimately resulting in a

term of life in prison, provided those denials are constitutional, Petitioner cannot complain

because life was the maximum sentence he was given. People v. Wingo, 14 Cal.3d 169 (1975)

(In California, when a prisoner receives an indeterminate sentence, the “indeterminate sentence is

in legal effect a sentence for the maximum term, subject only to the ameliorative power of the

[parole authority] to set a lesser term.” ); see also In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061 (2005). 

Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed. 

C. Certificate of Appealability

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a

district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003). The controlling statute in determining

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whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

 (a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court 

of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

 (b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial 

a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the 

validity of such person’s detention pending removal proceedings.

 (c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from–

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which 

specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of

appealability “if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1034; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must

demonstrate “something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on

his . . . part.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1040.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court hereby DECLINES to

issue a certificate of appealability.

///

///

///

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///

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED;

2) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the case; and

3) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 4, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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