Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-03359/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-03359-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
P.D. Brazelton
Respondent
Albert P. Jaquez
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT P. JAQUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

P.D. BRAZELTON,

Respondent.

Case No. 12-cv-03359-JD 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Re: Dkt. No. 28

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent 

filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and lodged exhibits 

with the Court. Petitioner filed a traverse. The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

A jury found petitioner and his codefendant, Eric Ardoin, guilty of first degree murder. 

People v. Ardoin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 102, 108 (2011); Resp. Ex. 8. The California Court of Appeal 

affirmed the judgment in a published opinion on June 3, 2011. Id.

1

 On September 14, 2011, the 

California Supreme Court denied a petition for review. Resp. Exs. 9, 10.

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the crime as follows:

The victim, Rodney Tom, was found dead by San Francisco police 

officers in an upstairs bedroom of his home at 674 Goettingen Street 

in San Francisco about 8:00 on the evening of July 10, 2003. He 

 

1 A portion of the California Court of Appeal’s ruling was unpublished and is part of the lodged 

documents. Resp. Ex. 8.

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was lying on the floor, with his head near a corner of the room. A 

long wire ligature was wrapped tightly around his left wrist, and a 

large pool of blood was visible on the carpet under his head and 

neck. Additional “cast-off blood” was found near the body on the 

carpet, low along the wall and on the door. The pattern of the 

“blood spatter” indicated that the blows or other events “causing the 

cast off” occurred “very low near the floor or below two feet.” 

Credit cards and other papers were strewn on the bed. Prescription 

pill vials were observed around the nightstands in the bedroom and 

in a nightstand drawer. A yellow nylon rope and newspaper were 

collected from the stairs leading from the entryway to the bedroom. 

Cash in the amount of $600 was discovered in a gold Mercedes 

parked in the garage. No drugs were found on the premises. Nor did 

the officers observe any signs of forced entry into the residence.

Tom sustained “multiple traumatic” sharp force and blunt force

injuries, most of them superficial or at least not immediately lifethreatening, that were inflicted over “many minutes or hours.” The

primary and ultimately fatal slash wound was to the victim's neck,

which severed his carotid artery and produced the “rapid

exsanguination” of blood that caused his death. The presence of

the ligature restraint and infliction of numerous wounds was

“consistent with multiple individuals inflicting these injuries” on the

victim, and indicated that he was struggling during the attack. The

coroner estimated that Tom had been “dead for a few to several 

hours, but probably less than a day” before his body was discovered.

Toxicology reports revealed that not long before Tom's death he had

ingested valium, methamphetamine, morphine, and cocaine, in

amounts that did not cause his death. Tracks of needle marks on

his arms and legs were evidence of “skin popping” that indicated

habitual ingestion of drugs with the use of a needle. He also suffered

from pulmonary emphysema and “poor circulation to the lower

extremities” that caused him “difficulty moving around.” He was

“chronically ill” and in a “weakened state” that impaired his ability 

to resist an attack.

Fingernail clippings were taken from the victim. “[R]eddish

material” discovered on the inside and outside of one of the 

fingernail clippings tested positive for blood. Expert testimony was

received that the genetic material might have been deposited under

Tom's fingernail if he scratched the killer with his hands while

“resisting the assault.” A DNA test of the blood and other “debris” 

taken from one of the fingernail samples identified defendant Ardoin 

“as a source of the minor profile."

The primary witness for the prosecution was Rebecca Burgos, who

was the wife of defendant Jaquez when the murder was committed.

Burgos admittedly has been a drug addict essentially all of her life,

and continued to be a drug addict both when the murder occurred

and when she testified at trial. She suffered prior convictions for

robbery and assault with a deadly weapon in 1987, and possession 

of a controlled substance while in custody in 1993.

Burgos testified that she became acquainted with the victim in 2001,

and thereafter regularly purchased heroin from him. Tom, in turn,

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introduced Burgos to Jaquez in February of 2003, and they were

married a month later. They began living in the downstairs “inlaw apartment” of Tom's residence on Goettingen Street in late

February of 2003. Burgos and Jaquez did not pay rent for the

apartment. Rather, their agreement with Tom called for them to pay

the utilities for the entire residence, “buy food,” and do some

cooking. Burgos described their ongoing relationship with Tom as

“good.” She testified that she viewed Tom “like a father” figure.

Tom was a drug dealer who often had “a whole lot of drugs” in his

residence. He also kept a .22–caliber revolver inside a sock in his

tackle box. Jaquez sold drugs “for himself” and for Tom. Burgos

weighed, packaged and sometimes delivered cocaine and heroin.

Tom obtained his drugs from a supplier, a Hispanic male, every

week or every two weeks. When the supplier was scheduled to

appear at Tom's residence, he directed Burgos and Jaquez to “stay

downstairs.” Tom would then knock on the floor to let them know 

when the supplier had left.

Burgos became acquainted with defendant Ardoin in 2003. By

March of 2003 and thereafter, Burgos saw Ardoin quite 

frequently, when she and Jaquez visited his residence on Charter Oak

Avenue to socialize or bring him drugs for his customers. Burgos

testified that Ardoin would typically page Jaquez when he “had

customers that wanted to purchase drugs.” She and Jaquez would

then take the drugs “to his house.” They also often used heroin and

crack cocaine with Ardoin and his girlfriend Michelle Reese.

By July of 2003, Burgos quit her job as an X-ray technician, and

Jaquez worked only infrequently. They used “a lot of drugs” daily,

and as a consequence were “broke.” They failed to pay the bills for

the residence, so in June of 2003 Tom told them to move out by 

August 1st. As a result, their relationship with Tom became strained 

and “edgy.”

Burgos was aware that on July 9, 2003, Tom received a large

delivery of drugs from his supplier. After the supplier left, Burgos 

observed the drugs in Tom's tackle box and on the kitchen table. 

That evening, Jaquez and Burgos visited the home of friends on

Palou Avenue to get “high.” After “a few more stops” they

returned home to the “in-law” unit at Tom's residence. Two to four 

hours later Jaquez left without telling Burgos where he was going. 

Later still, Tom called Burgos on the intercom to tell her to “come

upstairs” to his bedroom to receive a call from Jaquez. Around 2:00

a.m., Jaquez called and told Burgos that Tom “was going to give

[her] something,” meaning drugs, “to give to him.” Jaquez also asked

her to get Tom “something to eat.”

Burgos agreed and left the house, only to return a few minutes later

because she “forgot to get the drugs” from Tom. She parked her car

in the driveway and walked through the open gate to the front door,

which atypically was not locked. Burgos saw Ardoin standing in

front of their in-law apartment, looking up the stairs toward Tom's

residence. Suddenly, Burgos was grabbed from behind in the

entryway, thrown to the ground on her stomach, and “hogtied” with

her hands bound to her ankles with a rope. She did not see the

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person who restrained her. Burgos struggled, and heard a voice

which she recognized as that of Jaquez tell her to “get down” and

“just stay still.” After she was restrained, Burgos also saw Ardoin

“go up the stairs” with a “Halloween Jason mask” on his face.

From upstairs Burgos heard pounding, banging, scuffling and odd

“snapping” noises. She also heard Tom repeatedly say, “I don't

have anything.” Burgos yelled to Tom: “Rodney, if you have

anything, please give it to him, please give it to him.” She 

continued to hear banging, and Tom stated, “There, now go.” After

Tom yelled, “Here they come,” and banged his foot, “it got quiet.”

Ardoin then came down the stairs with Tom's “tackle box that he

kept his drugs in.” He stepped over Burgos, walked out of the front 

door, and left.

Burgos struggled to release her arms from the rope and untie her

ankles. She went up the stairs to “check on” Tom in his bedroom. 

Tom was lying on his stomach with a piece of carpet over his head. 

Burgos approached Tom and noticed “a slash in his throat” and “a

lot” of blood under his head. She “panicked,” grabbed Tom's cell

phone and ran out of the room. She called Ardoin's number, but his 

girlfriend Reese said Jaquez “wasn't there.”

As Burgos sat on the floor of Tom's residence, Jaquez called. When

Burgos answered he asked, “What's up?” Burgos, still in a panicked

state, screamed that Tom was dead and Ardoin had killed him. She

asked Jaquez to get her out of there, and he agreed to do so. When

Jaquez arrived at the house he said, “Come on, let's go,” and they

proceeded to the in-law apartment. Burgos was still “freaked out,”

crying, and continued to yell “Rodney is dead.” Jaquez implored

Burgos to “calm down.” He told her, “I didn't know this was going 

to happen.”

They drove to Ardoin's house, where Burgos noticed Tom's tackle

box. Ardoin was “separating the dope” stolen from Tom and 

dividing it among the three of them. Burgos testified that Jaquez

took her share of the drugs. Ardoin suggested that Burgos call the

police with a concocted story that she had been robbed. Burgos

“didn't know what to do.” She was “freaked out” that her friend 

Tom had been killed and “afraid of going to jail.”

After an hour Burgos and Jaquez left Ardoin's house. They decided

that they “were going to go to Florida.” After a few “drug 

transactions” they went to a Howard Johnson's hotel early in the

morning. Jaquez left the hotel while Burgos slept until the 

afternoon. She and Jaquez then left the hotel in an old brown car that

belonged to a friend, Preston Ely. They discussed a plan to “cover up

Rodney's murder” whereby Burgos would be restrained and “thrown

in McLaren Park.” She would then “get loose” and contact the

police with a false report that she had been “robbed” and deposited in

the park by the men who “killed Rodney.”

Burgos and Jaquez proceeded to a drug store, where Jaquez

purchased duct tape. From there, they drove to McLaren Park, 

where Burgos was placed on her stomach by Jaquez, with her wrists,

feet and mouth taped. Jaquez then hid the drugs elsewhere in the

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park. Burgos fell asleep, and awoke near dark. She loosened the

duct tape and hopped to the street. A woman picked her up, the tape 

was removed from her mouth, and she was taken to a pay phone to 

call the police.

The police arrived in response to her call and took Burgos to the

Ingleside station. She was interviewed, and photographs were taken

of her with tape on her wrists. Burgos fabricated a tale that two

Black men and a woman had appeared at Tom's house, robbed and

killed him “for his drugs,” restrained and kidnapped her, then left her

in the park. She added false descriptions of the suspects.

Ardoin was arrested for Tom's murder at his brother's residence on

May 11, 2004, following the discovery of his DNA in a sample

taken from one of the victim's fingernails. On July 11, 2004, both

Jaquez and Burgos were arrested pursuant to a warrant served at a

residence occupied by Rolley Hill and Christina Matthews at 1087

Palou Avenue in San Francisco. Various narcotics worth a

“considerable amount” of money, including heroin, crack cocaine,

methamphetamine, and prescription pill bottles that appeared to

correspond to those found in Tom's house, along with crack pipes, a

scale, plastic packaging material, and a “methadone card” with

“Burgos photo and name on it” were seized from a bedroom in the

house. Jaquez and Burgos were subsequently charged with 

possession of narcotics for sale.

Even after Burgos was arrested for Tom's murder and was

confronted with considerable doubt cast upon her account of the 

crime—in the form of a receipt from the Howard Johnson's hotel

when she was supposedly restrained in McLaren Park—she 

continued to give essentially the same fictitious story during

subsequent interviews and in her testimony at a hearing in the 

present case. Burgos claimed that she repeatedly lied to protect her

husband Jaquez and herself, and because she “didn't want to tell on

anybody.”

About six months before trial, Burgos decided to “tell the truth about

what happened” after Jaquez repeatedly lied to her and refused to

come forward and “say what they did” to protect her. She also

received a threatening letter from Jaquez while she was incarcerated

in county jail. Burgos denied that she assisted in any way with the

killing of Tom by Ardoin and Jaquez. She acknowledged that her

plea bargain, in which she agreed to plead guilty to being an

accessory after the fact, was an appropriate disposition for her 

actions.

The prosecution presented additional evidence in an effort to

indirectly corroborate Burgos's testimony. Jia Zhang, a Luxor 

taxicab driver testified that he picked up two Hispanic men in their

“mid–40's” on Charter Oak Avenue, near the 101 Freeway, at 4:31

a.m. Three minutes later he dropped them off at the intersection of

Dwight Street and Girard Street, two short blocks from Goettingen

Street. In August of 2003, the police exhibited a photo lineup to

Zhang. He made a “50/50” identification of Ardoin's photo as one of

the men in his cab that morning. Zhang was not able to make an

identification of Jaquez in another photo lineup.

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Maritza Santiago, the mother of Jaquez's two sons, testified that

she was “romantically involved” with Jaquez in the early 1990's.

In July of 2003, Jaquez continued to visit her house at 391

Bridgeview Drive in San Francisco regularly to “see his kids.”

Jaquez appeared at her house two or three days before Tom was

killed. He was “broke,” hungry, and appeared “stressed out.” Jaquez 

told Santiago that “it was a big mistake” for him to be involved with 

Burgos.

Jaquez's son Eric testified that on July 9, 2003, Jaquez appeared at

the house on Bridgeview Drive about 8:00 p.m. During the course

of their conversation, Eric asked if Jaquez had “a couple of dollars,”

but Jaquez said “he didn't have it.” In response to Jaquez's request 

Eric loaned him a cell phone.

Eric's cousin, Juan Henry Pena, also lived in Santiago's Bridgeview

Drive residence in July of 2003. Pena testified that on the afternoon

of July 9, 2003, Jaquez came by the house to borrow his cell phone.

Pena met Jaquez in Silver Terrace Park the next afternoon; Jaquez

seemed “nervous.” He returned the cell phone to Pena, along with

a pager. Jaquez told Pena that “he went home ... looking for his

wife and that when he got there, the house was a mess.” He saw

Tom “on the floor with a bunch of blood around him,” and he 

“didn't know what to do.” Later the same afternoon, Pena gave 

Jaquez a ride. They drove past Tom's house at 674 Goettingen

Street where Jaquez lived with Burgos. Police cars were parked

outside the house. Pena drove Jaquez to the Franciscan Motel on 

Third Street.

Preston Ely, known to his friends as “Stevie,” was acquainted with

defendants and saw both of them frequently in July of 2003, usually

about “drugs.” Ely often lived in his half-ton van that he parked

“off of Third Street,” near Jamestown Avenue, in the Bayview

District. Ely acknowledged that he used and sold drugs. Ely testified

that between 10:00 and 11:00 on the morning of July 10, 2003,

Jaquez, whom he knew as “Beto,” arrived unexpectedly and asked

to “trade cars.” Ely agreed, and exchanged his brown Ford Granada

for Jaquez's Mitsubishi van. Ely also agreed to loan Jaquez his cell

phone in exchange for speed and crack cocaine.

Later that evening Jaquez visited Ely in his room at the Franciscan

Motel on Third Street. Jaquez complained that Ely's Ford Granada

“ran out of gas” in McLaren Park, and Jaquez left it there. Jaquez

told Ely that he had seen his landlord, a “Chinese dude” who lived

upstairs from him, “lying there with his throat cut.” Jaquez stated

that he was “having problems getting drugs” from Tom, and was

“being put out” of his residence for failing to pay rent. Jaquez

received phone calls while he was at Ely's motel room. He became

“very upset,” and “started crying.” In reference to the “Chinese

dude getting killed,” Jaquez told Ely, “I didn't do it, it wasn't me. It

wasn't supposed to happen.” Jaquez also mentioned that he had

placed duct tape on a woman in McLaren Park and “that he was 

going to call the police” to “come get her and use that as an alibi.”

After their conversation in the motel room, Jaquez and Ely drove to

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McLaren Park in the Mitsubishi to “find the drugs” Jaquez and

Burgos had previously concealed there. Jaquez left the car to

search in the park, but did not return with anything. They drove

back to the Franciscan Motel. On the way they fortuitously

encountered Burgos on the street, and she joined them. Later still,

the three of them returned to the same place in the park, where

Burgos promptly found the hidden drugs. They went back to the

motel room and ingested drugs before Jaquez and Burgos left. Ely

testified that in the motel room Burgos was “hollering” and “bossing 

around” people, particularly Jaquez.

Ely further testified that about eight months before trial he received

a call from Jaquez, who told him to “stay out of it, he got the case

beat, to stay out of it.” Jaquez sounded “serious,” and Ely felt

“threatened.” Ely entered the witness protection program in

December of 2006. He was relocated by the prosecution, and

received both a “living place” and expenses from the State of 

California.

The prosecution also presented evidence of records of calls made

with the telephones owned, borrowed, or used by defendants on or 

near the date of the murder. The records revealed numerous calls 

between them on July 10, 2003. Ardoin testified in his defense at

trial that he and Jaquez were “very close” friends for many years.

He met Burgos just after she married Jaquez in 2003. Ardoin 

considered Burgos to be aggressive, pushy, manipulative, and not 

entirely honest.

Ardoin acknowledged that he was a drug addict, who not only used

cocaine, crack, heroin and methamphetamine regularly, but also sold

drugs “every day.” He and Jaquez often used drugs together.

Ardoin was also acquainted with Tom as a supplier of heroin, who 

dealt larger amounts of drugs than he did. Ardoin bought drugs from 

Tom occasionally.

According to Ardoin, Tom visited Ardoin's residence on Charter Oak

Avenue the afternoon before Tom was killed. Tom brought with him

a half ounce of “new heroin.” Ardoin sought to explain the DNA

evidence by testifying that Tom injected him with heroin, and in the

process drops of blood ran down his arm. After testing the heroin

and determining that it “was good,” Ardoin bought a quarter ounce 

from Tom.

About 4:00 a.m. on July 10, 2003, Jaquez called to tell Ardoin that

“he was coming over” to his house. They intended to “buy some

coke together.” While Ardoin and Tom were in the shed, Burgos

called, “hollering and screaming” that she “needed to talk to her

husband.” After a brief telephone conversation with Burgos,

Jaquez's expression changed “in a bad way.” He was anxious and

angry. Jaquez asked Ardoin to accompany him to his house.

Ardoin agreed, although he expressed that he was “walking with a 

cane” at the time and could not offer much assistance.

Jaquez and Ardoin took a cab to a residence near Brussels Street

and Dwight Street. Jaquez “went up the stairs to the house” while

Ardoin waited on the street. Within 30 seconds Jaquez returned and

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told Ardoin to “hurry up” and follow him up the hill to the Tom's

house on Goettingen Street. As Ardoin reached Jaquez's green

Mitsubishi, he noticed Jaquez coming out of a gate into the house,

followed by Burgos. Burgos was disheveled, with her hair “messed

up,” and was carrying a tackle box by the handle. She was 

“hollering and screaming” at Jaquez, who was carrying a plastic 

garbage bag with something inside it.

They all got in the Mitsubishi to drive to Ardoin's house. Ardoin

asked, “What's happening?” Burgos yelled at him, “Rodney's dead.” 

Jaquez then “slammed on the brake” and looked at Burgos in 

“shock.” When they reached Ardoin's house, Burgos said 

“something” to Ardoin with an “angry and wild” look which he

took as a threat. Ardoin testified that he did not see Jaquez again 

until “2004 in court,” although he spoke to him on the telephone a 

week or so after the murder. They did not “talk about what

happened.” Ardoin helped Burgos move her belongings out of the

Goettingen Street residence “a couple of days later,” and continued 

to take drugs and socialize with her.

Ardoin denied that he went into Tom's house the day of the murder

or assisted anyone with the robbery and murder of Tom. He 

conceded that he lied in interviews with the police, to protect

Jaquez and Burgos. Ardoin also agreed that the presence of his 

DNA under the victim's fingernails was “important in this case,”

and he had “no idea how that happened.” Ardoin speculated that

blood reached the victim's fingernails during the intravenous 

injection of heroin the day before the murder.

People v. Ardoin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 102, 108-16 (2011) (footnotes omitted).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first 

prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first 

clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

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[the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the 

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under 

the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the 

Supreme Court's decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's 

case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be 

“objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will 

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. 

Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, in conducting its analysis, the federal 

court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings, and the petitioner bears the 

burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the "last reasoned decision" of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to 

consider the petitioner's claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Nunnemaker at 

801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in 

excluding impeachment evidence against a witness; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct 

when he commented on petitioner’s failure to testify; and (3) cumulative error.

I. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

Petitioner argues that the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of the facts and 

circumstances underlying Burgos's past convictions violated his right to confrontation, and his due 

process rights to present a defense and to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

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Pet. at A-5, A-6.

Background of Claim

The California Court of Appeal summarized the factual background of this claim as follows:

Prior to trial Jaquez moved to present as impeachment evidence of 

prior acts by Burgos that reflected on her “dishonesty and tendencies 

towards acts of violence and moral turpitude,” which included the 

circumstances of her 1988 convictions for robbery and assault with a 

deadly weapon: That Burgos approached the victim, solicited for an 

act of prostitution, and directed him to drive his vehicle to a “dead 

end,” where she produced a handgun and ordered him to give her his 

wallet, money, and keys; as Burgos’s codefendant, Payne, 

approached the rear of the vehicle, her attention was diverted 

momentarily, whereupon the victim grabbed the gun, which fired a 

shot through the driver’s side window; after Payne then stabbed the 

victim several times in the neck and chest, he and Burgos both “fled 

the scene.” Burgos entered a guilty plea to charges of robbery and 

assault with a deadly weapon after a charge of attempted murder 

was dismissed. She offered a different version of the incident in her 

statement to the police, in which she denied that Payne had any 

“involvement” in the crimes, although she did not testify on behalf 

of Payne at his trial, and made “statements to the judge inculpating” 

Payne during an in-chambers hearing on a motion for acquittal of 

the attempted murder charge under section 1118.1.

At a hearing on the motion the defense also asked to offer evidence 

that while Burgos was incarcerated awaiting trial in the present case 

she attempted through her boyfriend Dennis Torres and her attorney 

to have drugs delivered to her in county jail. The effort was 

unsuccessful and did not result in charges, but Burgos was 

subsequently convicted for possession of heroin in jail based on a 

separate incident. Jaquez argued that the evidence was admissible 

under Evidence Code section 788 to demonstrate Burgos’s “moral 

depravity,” dishonesty, manipulation of others, and propensity to 

acts of violence.

The trial court granted the motion to impeach Burgos with evidence 

of the fact of her 1988 robbery and assault with a deadly weapon 

conviction, and with the 2006 conviction for possession of drugs in 

San Francisco County Jail, but excluded evidence of the particular 

circumstances of the offenses and her statements related to the 

offenses. The “conduct concerning conspiracy to smuggle drugs in 

San Francisco County Jail” through Burgos’s boyfriend and attorney 

was also excluded.

Adroin, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 117-18.

A. Legal Standard

i. Confrontation Clause

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides the accused in criminal cases 

the right to "be confronted with witnesses against him." U.S. Const. Amend. VI. The federal 

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confrontation right applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 

380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).

The ultimate goal of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a 

procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 

It commands not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: 

by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. Id.; see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 

(1974) (noting a primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of crossexamination). Nevertheless, the Confrontation Clause does not prevent a trial judge from 

imposing reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns of harassment, prejudice, 

confusion of issues, witness safety or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). The Confrontation Clause guarantees an 

opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever 

way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 

(1985) (per curiam); see, e.g., Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(Confrontation Clause does not require that prosecutor disclose evidence that will help defense 

effectively cross-examine a prosecution witness), rev'd and remanded on other grounds by, 525 

U.S. 141, 147 (1998).

Confrontation Clause claims are subject to harmless error analysis. United States v. 

Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231, 1235 

(9th Cir. 2005). For purposes of federal habeas corpus review, the standard applicable to 

Confrontation Clause violations is whether the inadmissible evidence had an actual and prejudicial 

effect upon the jury. See Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Brecht 

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).

ii. Right to Present a Defense

Whether grounded in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of compulsory process or in the 

more general Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process, “the Constitution 

guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Holmes 

v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 

(1986)); see California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (due process); Chambers v. 

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Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (compulsory process).

The admission of extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a witness’ conduct to impeach 

the witness’ credibility may, however, confuse the jury, unfairly embarrass the victim, surprise the 

prosecution and/or unduly prolong the trial. No Supreme Court decision “clearly establishes that 

the exclusion of such evidence for such reasons in a particular case violates the Constitution.” 

Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1994 (2013) (also rejecting Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that 

Supreme Court cases clearly establish that the Constitution requires a case-by-case balancing of 

interests before state evidentiary rule can be enforced). A violation of the right to present a 

defense merits habeas relief only if the error was likely to have had a substantial and injurious 

effect on the verdict. See Lunbery v. Hornbeak, 605 F.3d 754, 762 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Brecht, 

507 U.S. at 637-38).

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal set forth the relevant state law on the admission of 

evidence and denied this claim:

While we do not discount the probative value of evidence that 

Burgos engaged in violent acts, manipulation, and deceit, we

conclude that under the circumstances presented here the trial court 

at least acted within its discretion in precluding further defense 

cross-examination. First and foremost, the defense had both the 

opportunity and the evidentiary substance to thoroughly challenge 

Burgos's credibility without the excluded evidence. Not only did the 

fact of the prior convictions and her admitted use of a firearm during 

the robbery and assault offenses adequately indicate her violent 

nature and moral indigence, but her character and testimony were 

thoroughly challenged with withering and successful attacks on 

many other levels. She was effectively portrayed as an inveterate 

drug addict who admittedly sold drugs and “went to great lengths” 

to have others bring drugs to her in jail. She admitted and the 

prosecutor conceded that she lied incessantly to the police and to 

others to further her perceived interests. Testimony was received 

from others that Burgos was manipulative, controlling, and subject 

to unruly outbursts. Burgos admitted as much. During closing 

argument defense counsel stressed her dishonesty, repeated and

elaborate fabrications, and palpable moral deficiencies. Further, the 

extent to which the jury accepted Burgos's testimony was clearly not 

attributable to the inability of the defense to attack her character or 

inherent lack of credibility—which effectively occurred—but rather 

to the corroboration of her version of the murder, particularly by the 

DNA evidence and Ely's consistent testimony. Thus, while the 

excluded impeachment evidence may have augmented the showing

that Burgos lacked credibility it was cumulative, and, in our view, 

would not have produced a perceptibly different impression of her 

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credibility. 

. . . 

We do not suggest that the probative value of the excluded collateral 

acts evidence was inconsequential, but we agree with the trial court 

that it was outweighed by the confusion of issues and considerable 

amount of time required to present it. Candidly, the defense had 

already spent itself on what can be characterized as an assaultive 

cross-examination of Burgos. Had the evidence been admitted, the 

trial would have digressed into a lengthy dispute over the collateral 

matters related to the facts of Burgos's 1988 convictions, the 

truthfulness of her statements in that criminal proceeding, and her 

attempt to use her boyfriend and unwitting attorney to obtain drugs 

in jail. “‘[T]he latitude [Evidence Code] section 352 allows for 

exclusion of impeachment evidence in individual cases is broad. 

The statute empowers courts to prevent criminal trials from 

degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral 

credibility issues.’ [Citation.]” “‘[T]he discretion to be exercised is 

that of the trial court, not that of the reviewing court,’” and even if 

we may have ruled otherwise in the first instance we cannot reverse 

a decision that is supported by the record. We discern no abuse of 

the trial court's discretion in the evidentiary ruling and no violation 

of defendants' rights to confront and cross-examine Burgos at trial. 

Adroin, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 121-23 (citations omitted).

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court opinion was an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court authority with respect to either the Confrontation Clause or the right 

to present a defense. For the same reasons given by the California Court of Appeal, the Court 

agrees that the impeachment evidence petitioner sought to elicit from Burgos on crossexamination was cumulative and thus would not have produced a perceptibly or significantly 

different impression of her credibility. Moreover, the exclusion of extrinsic impeachment 

evidence for the reasons provided by the state court is not contrary to clearly established Supreme 

Court precedent. See Jackson, 133 S. Ct. at 1994.

Even assuming the trial court erred by not allowing in all of the impeachment evidence, the 

error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on petitioner's verdict to warrant habeas relief. 

Burgos's credibility was thoroughly impeached at trial. Specifically, evidence was introduced that 

she had been a drug addict her "entire life," including the day of her trial testimony, RT at 1418; 

that she had prior convictions for robbery and assault with a deadly weapon, and two prior 

convictions for possession of a controlled substance in a jail or prison, RT at 1419-20; that she had 

originally been facing a sentence of seventy-five years to life for murder in connection with Tom's 

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death but had received a sentence of six years as an accessory after the fact in exchange for her 

testimony against petitioner, RT at 1479-86; that she had told a phony story about Tom's death to 

the police in order to cover up the identity of Tom's assailants, RT at 1584-89; and that she was 

controlling, manipulative, and dishonest, RT at 2541-45. The additional evidence that petitioner 

argues should have been allowed would have been cumulative of the evidence already admitted. 

Accordingly, the state court's decision to exclude evidence of the facts and circumstances 

underlying Burgos's past convictions did not have a substantial and injurious effect on petitioner's 

verdict, and petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Petitioner next argues that the prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment right not to testify 

by impermissibly commenting three separate times on his failure to testify during closing 

argument.

Background of Claim

During closing argument, the prosecutor summarized the evidence that had been presented 

at trial and stated that he had the burden of proof. RT at 2707-12. After discussing the 

prosecution evidence, the prosecutor listed the defense evidence:

From the defense side, from the defense side, we had two days of 

testimony. Mr. Wise [codefendant Ardoin's attorney] produced 

some doctors. A methadone drug counselor, a DNA witness, Mr. 

Taylor, and of course, Mr. Ardoin himself.

As to the defense side on [petitioner] -- as to [petitioner], there was 

no defense evidence.

RT 2711-12.2

During closing argument, petitioner’s trial counsel noted that the codefendant testified in 

his own defense to explain why there was evidence of his DNA under the fingernail of the victim. 

RT at 2797. Petitioner’s trial counsel then stated with respect to the codefendant’s testimony:

That is his testimony, his statement, delivered here in court on his 

own behalf, not on behalf of [petitioner].

[Petitioner’s] defense, I respectfully say to [codefendant] Mr. 

 

2

Petitioner’s trial counsel interrupted and asked to approach the bench. RT at 2712. There was an 

unreported bench discussion, and the prosecutor continued with his argument. Id.

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Ardoin and his counsel and to you, neither adopts it or approves.

It did not merit my cross-examination of it.

It adds nothing of value to the government’s case against my client, 

[petitioner].

Whether it is credible or not is up to you.

The testimony of [codefendant] Mr. Ardoin.

RT at 2797. 

Later, petitioner’s trial counsel conceded that petitioner had possession of the victim’s 

stolen drugs after the murder. RT at 2834, 2838. Petitioner’s trial counsel also argued that based 

on Burgos’s testimony, the jury could conclude that a reasonable interpretation of this evidence 

was that petitioner was covering up for Burgos’s involvement. RT at 2840. 

In the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, he showed the jury a chart entitled "Circumstantial 

Evidence Rule." RT 2967. Summarizing the rule, the prosecutor said, "If there are two possible 

interpretations of circumstantial evidence, one is reasonable, the other is not reasonable, you must 

accept the reasonable, reject the unreasonable." RT at 2967. The prosecutor then proceeded to 

apply the rule to the facts of the case, asking the jury, "If all of the following things I say to you, 

members of the jury, are substantially true in this case, is it reasonable, is it reasonable to conclude 

that these defendants are not guilty?” RT at 2967. In applying the rule, the prosecutor raised the 

following points:

Number four, [petitioner] has no innocent explanation about being 

with, as Mr. Gaines [petitioner’s attorney] is not stupid, had to 

concede, being with, in the possession of Rodney's drugs on Palou 

Street the next day. No innocent explanation.

RT at 2968. 

The prosecutor continued his discussion of the “Circumstantial Evidence Rule” and stated, 

“Number six, there is no innocent explanation regarding the taping up and in the park; haven't 

heard anything about that.” RT at 2969.

Petitioner’s trial counsel objected to the two comments made during the prosecution’s 

rebuttal. RT at 3010-14. The prosecutor responded that he was not commenting on petitioner’s 

silence, rather he was referring to trial counsel’s failure to provide a reasonable interpretation of 

the evidence. RT at 3014-16. The trial court did not declare a mistrial, finding that it was a fair 

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interpretation that the prosecutor’s comments were attributed to the evidence presented and not to

petitioner’s failure to testify. RT at 3017. 

A. Legal Standard

Where a prosecutor on his own initiative asks the jury to draw an adverse inference from a 

defendant's silence, or to treat the defendant's silence as substantive evidence of guilt, the 

defendant's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated. See Griffin v. California, 

380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). While it is proper for the prosecution to address the defense arguments, 

a comment is impermissible if it is manifestly intended to call attention to the defendant's failure 

to testify, or is of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a 

comment on the failure to testify. See Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation 

omitted).

However, such commentary by the prosecutor requires reversal only if "(1) the 

commentary is extensive; (2) an inference of guilt from silence is stressed to the jury as a basis for 

the conviction; and (3) where there is evidence that could have supported acquittal." Jeffries v. 

Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also United States v. 

Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir.), amended, 416 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(holding that comment on the defense’s failure to explain introduced testimony or evidence does 

not infringe on defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights). “A prosecutor may, consistent with due 

process, ask a jury to convict based on the defendant's failure to present evidence supporting the 

defense theory.” Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005); see also United 

States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1998) (prosecutor did not shift the burden 

of proof in commenting on defendant's failure to produce evidence). Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit 

has recognized, “a prosecutor may comment on the absence of evidence even when such evidence 

was available, but inadmissible, so long as there is sufficient evidence to support the prosecutor's 

version of events.” Menendez, 422 F.3d at 1034.

Even when a prosecutor's comments violate Griffin, harmless error analysis applies. 

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967). Thus, habeas relief is unavailable unless the 

error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht 

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v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993). “[C]ourts will not reverse when the prosecutorial 

comment is a single, isolated incident, does not stress an inference of guilt from silence as a basis 

of conviction, and is followed by curative instructions.” Lincoln, 807 F.2d at 809. When the 

comment is limited and could not have affected the verdict, Griffin error is harmless even where 

there was no curative instruction. Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 913 (9th Cir. 2006).

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal discussed Griffin and related state law, and then rejected 

petitioner's claim:

We conclude that the prosecutor’s argument falls into the category 

of fair commentary on the evidence, not impermissible references to 

Jaquez’s assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination. The 

first comment was merely a summation of the state of the evidence 

presented by the parties, and accurately pointed out that Jaquez did 

not present any evidence in his defense. The remaining two 

comments during rebuttal argument were made in response to 

defense counsel’s closing argument. The allusion to Jaquez’s

unexplained possession of Tom’s drugs after the murder was in 

reference to defense counsel’s argument that the “after the fact” joint 

possession of narcotics with Burgos “does not prove that he is liable 

for the murder of Rodney Tom beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rather 

than contest Burgos’s testimony that they shared Tom’s drugs, the 

defense acknowledged the drug possession but discounted its value 

in proving that Jaquez participated in the murder. The prosecutor 

then merely commented on the failure of the defense to explain the 

drug possession; he did not intimate that Jaquez’s failure to testify 

indicated his guilt. (People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th 287, 373.) 

As for the prosecutor’s statement that the evidence did not include 

any “innocent explanation regarding the taping up and in the park,” 

taken in context the focus again was upon the failure of the defense 

to present argument on the matter, not the lack of testimony from 

Jaquez. In contrast to Griffin and People v. Medina (1995) 11 

Cal.4th 694, 755–756 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2], the defense 

could have offered an explanation, without testimony from Jaquez, 

for the evidence that Burgos was duct-taped in McLaren Park in a 

conspiratorial effort to cast suspicion away from defendants. We are 

not persuaded that the jury was reasonably likely to view “the 

prosecutor’s statement as an invitation to draw an impermissible 

inference of guilt from defendant’s failure to testify.” (People v. 

Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 977.) The prosecutor’s comments

merely reflected the existing state of the evidence and argument.

(People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1229 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 

702, 842 P.2d 1].) No Griffin error occurred.

Resp. Ex. 8 at 21-22 (emphases in original).

The state court's determination that the prosecutor's comments did not constitute Griffin

error was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court 

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precedent.3 The prosecutor's comments were not "manifestly intended to call attention to the 

defendant's failure to testify," nor were they "of such a character that the jury would naturally and 

necessarily take [them] to be a comment on the failure to testify." See Lincoln, 807 F.2d at 809; 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974) (“[A] court should not lightly infer that a 

prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting 

through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging 

interpretations.") The present case is thus unlike Griffin, where the prosecutor repeatedly stressed 

that the petitioner would have known what had happened to the victim and explicitly mentioned 

the petitioner's failure to take the stand. 380 U.S. at 610-11.

In this case, the comments were from a few isolated incidents of the closing argument and 

did not stress an inference of guilt based on petitioner’s silence. See Lincoln at 809. Petitioner 

conceded the first statement was not an error, and the second and third comments were in rebuttal 

to specific points of evidence raised by petitioner’s trial counsel in his closing argument. 

Petitioner’s trial counsel attempted to explain why petitioner was in possession of the victim’s 

drugs and why Burgos faked her own kidnapping. It was reasonable for the California Court of 

Appeal to conclude that the prosecutor was not commenting on petitioner’s silence, but rather on 

trial counsel’s attempts to explain away the incriminating evidence. See, e.g., Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986) (a prosecutor’s remarks on rebuttal “must be evaluated in 

light of the defense argument that preceded it . . . .”). The state court’s denial of this claim was not 

objectively unreasonable, and, even assuming there was an error, petitioner has failed to show that 

it had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. This claim is denied.

III. CUMULATIVE ERROR

Petitioner contends that the cumulative errors from the claims above rendered the trial 

fundamentally unfair.

A. Legal Standard

In some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, 

 

3

Petitioner himself concedes, as did appellate counsel on direct review, that the prosecutor's first 

comment "passes muster under the rule that a prosecutor may comment on a total lack of 

evidence." Pet. at B-2. 

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the cumulative effect of several errors may still prejudice a defendant so much that his conviction 

must be overturned. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing 

conviction where multiple constitutional errors hindered defendant’s efforts to challenge every 

important element of proof offered by prosecution). Cumulative error is more likely to be found 

prejudicial when the government's case is weak. See id.; see, e.g., Thomas v Hubbard, 273 F.3d. 

1164, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the only substantial evidence implicating the defendant 

was the uncorroborated testimony of a person who had both a motive and an opportunity to 

commit the crime), overruled on other grounds by Payton v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 815, 829 n.11 

(9th Cir. 2002). However, where there is no single constitutional error existing, nothing can 

accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th 

Cir. 2011). Similarly, there can be no cumulative error when there has not been more than one 

error. United States v. Solorio, 669 F.3d 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2012).

B. Analysis

This claim was not addressed by the California Court of Appeal, and the California 

Supreme court denied it without a reasoned opinion. When presented with a state-court decision 

that is unaccompanied by a rationale for its conclusions, a federal court must conduct an 

independent review of the record to determine whether the state-court decision is objectively 

unreasonable. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was not unreasonable. This Court has 

not found any constitutional errors, let alone multiple errors that cumulatively could allow for 

reversal. Even assuming it was an error to deny certain impeachment evidence or that the 

prosecutor erred in his closing arguments, these errors were not so prejudicial as to warrant habeas 

relief. This claim is denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability "only if the applicant has made a 

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substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). "Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000). Here, petitioner has not made such a showing for any of the claims. A 

certificate of appealability is denied.

CONCLUSION

1. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A 

Certificate of Appealability is DENIED.

2. Petitioner’s motion for confirmation (Docket No. 28) is DENIED.

3. The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2015

______________________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT P. JAQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

P.D. BRAZELTON,

Defendant.

Case No. 12-cv-03359-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on 3/26/2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said 

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing 

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle 

located in the Clerk's office.

Albert P. Jaquez ID: G-26111

Pleasant Valley State Prison

P.O. Box 8500

Coalinga, CA 93210-8500 

Dated: 3/26/2015

Richard W. Wieking

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

Case 3:12-cv-03359-JD Document 29 Filed 03/26/15 Page 21 of 21