Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-15-00582/USCOURTS-ca2-15-00582-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rommel Ricardo Collymore
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

15‐582

Collymore v. Lynch

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

______________              

August Term, 2015

(Argued: June 15, 2016     Decided: July 8, 2016)

Docket No. 15‐582

____________              

ROMMEL RICARDO COLLYMORE,  

Petitioner,

–v.–  

LORETTA E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General,

Respondent.

______________

Before:

STRAUB, WESLEY, and LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

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______________

Petitioner Rommel Ricardo Collymore seeks review of a

January 30, 2015 order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

affirming a decision of an immigration judge that found

Collymore removable as an alien pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for a prior conviction under 35 Pa. Stat. Ann.

§ 780‐113(a)(30) (1997), which related to a federal controlled

substance. Applying the categorical approach, we conclude that

Collymore’s conviction under the Pennsylvania statute, as it

stood in 1997, is a controlled substance offense and DISMISS

the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction to review the

removability order.  

______________

LEMAY DIAZ and ADINO BARBARITO, Law Students

(Jonathan Romberg, Esq.; Christopher Capitanelli and Angelo

Cerimele, Law Students, on the brief), Seton Hall University

School of Law Center for Social Justice, Newark, NJ, for

Petitioner.

1  

JASON WISECUP, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration

Litigation, Civil Division (Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy

Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and John W.

Blakeley, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, on

the brief), United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.,

for Respondent.            

 

1 The law students appeared pursuant to Local Rule 46.1(e). We wish

to express our gratitude to the Seton Hall University School of Law

Center for Social Justice for its pro bono legal representation and able

handling of this matter.  

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______________

WESLEY, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Rommel Ricardo Collymore, a native and

citizen of Barbados, and lawful permanent resident of the United

States, seeks review of a January 30, 2015 final order of the Board

of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming a September 23, 2014

decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”), which denied

Collymore’s application for cancellation of removal. See In re

Rommel Ricardo Collymore, No. A041 730 196, 2015 WL 1208086

(B.I.A. Jan. 30, 2015), aff’g No. A041 730 196 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City

Sept. 23, 2014). Collymore was found deportable under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) on the basis of a prior conviction in 1997

under Title 35 of the Pennsylvania Controlled Substance, Drug,

Device and Cosmetic Act § 780‐113(a)(30) (1997), which was

determined to be a conviction that “relat[ed] to a [federal]

controlled substance.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

Collymore’s petition challenges that determination. For the

reasons set forth below, we DISMISS the petition.   

BACKGROUND

Collymore received lawful permanent‐resident status in

the United States in April 1989. On December 8, 1997, Collymore

was convicted of a violation of 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780‐113(a)(30)

(1997)2 in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County,

Pennsylvania. On August 7, 2008, upon his return from a trip to

Barbados, Collymore applied for admission as a returning lawful

permanent resident. Thereafter, on August 3, 2010, the

 

2 This statute was amended on January 24, 2000. Each reference

hereinafter to § 780‐113(a)(30) refers to the 1997 version of the statute

under which Collymore was convicted.  

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Department of Homeland Security served Collymore with a

Notice to Appear in immigration proceedings, charging him

with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) as an alien

convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) as an alien convicted of a controlled

substance offense.   

During the removal proceeding, Collymore admitted the

factual allegations concerning his criminal conviction but

deferred to the IJ as to removability. On the basis of Collymore’s

admissions, the IJ sustained both charges, and Collymore

immediately sought cancellation of removal as a lawful

permanent resident. The IJ denied Collymore’s application for

relief but afforded him additional time to pursue post‐conviction

relief in Pennsylvania state court related to his 1997 conviction.3

Collymore subsequently moved to terminate the removal

proceedings on the basis that his conviction did not render him

removable because his conviction was not categorically a

controlled substance offense or a crime involving moral

turpitude.   

Thereafter, the IJ denied Collymore’s motion to terminate

and ordered him removed to Barbados. Specifically, the IJ

determined that § 780‐113(a)(30)—the statute under which

Collymore was convicted—was not categorically a crime related

to a federal controlled substance because, in the IJ’s view, the

Pennsylvania statute proscribed conduct that would not

necessarily constitute a controlled substance offense under

federal law. The IJ then relied on a Third Circuit decision, United

States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2014), to conclude that the

 

3 According to Collymore, his motion to vacate his 1997 conviction

remains pending in Pennsylvania state court.   

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Pennsylvania statute was divisible and employed the modified

categorical approach, in which it examined Collymore’s record

of conviction to determine whether his conviction was for a

controlled substance offense recognized by federal law. The IJ

observed, based on a docket transcript certified by the

Pennsylvania state court, that Collymore’s conviction related to

cocaine, which is listed as a controlled substance under the

Controlled Substances Act’s (“CSA”) schedules of controlled

substances. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1997).4 Accordingly, the IJ

concluded that Collymore was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), and further inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) because an offense involving the possession

of a controlled substance necessarily constituted a crime

involving moral turpitude.   

Collymore appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ’s

decision and dismissed the appeal. Like the IJ, the BIA

determined that Collymore’s conviction under 35 Pa. Stat. Ann.

§ 780‐113(a)(30) was not a categorical match to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), but that the Pennsylvania statute was

divisible under Abbott. Like the IJ, the BIA found that the record

reflected that Collymore’s conviction involved cocaine, a federal

controlled substance, and that he was consequently removable

under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), but the BIA did not reach the

question of whether Collymore’s conviction also qualified as a

crime involving moral turpitude subject to removability under

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).   

 

4 The federal controlled substances schedules were amended on July 9,

2012. Each reference hereinafter to § 812 refers to the 1997 version of

the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of Collymore’s

conviction.  

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Collymore filed a timely petition for review in this Court,

challenging the determination of the BIA that a conviction under

35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780‐113(a)(30) (1997) constitutes a violation of

a law relating to a federal controlled substance for purposes of

removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Because we

conclude that it does, we dismiss the petition.   

DISCUSSION

“Any alien who at any time after admission has been

convicted of a violation of . . . any law . . . of a State, . . . relating

to a controlled substance . . . is deportable” upon order of the

Attorney General of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

Although we lack jurisdiction to review “any final order of

removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having

committed a [federal controlled substance] offense,” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(C), “[w]e retain jurisdiction . . . to review the legal

question . . . whether a conviction underlying an order of

removal, or the denial of relief from an order of removal,

constitutes a[] [controlled substance offense],” Higgins v. Holder,

677 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). “The inquiry

determines our jurisdiction: [i]f [Collymore’s] conviction is a[]

[controlled substance offense], we must dismiss the petition for

lack of jurisdiction; if not, we may exercise jurisdiction and

vacate the order of removal.” Oouch v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., 633 F.3d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 2011). Thus, “the jurisdictional

issue merges with the merits, and we are therefore required to

consider [Collymore’s] substantive argument”: that his

Pennsylvania conviction is not a controlled substance offense

under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Higgins,

677 F.3d at 100.   

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I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

In assessing whether a conviction under 35 Pa. Stat. Ann.

§ 780‐113(a)(30) constitutes a controlled substance offense, “we

use a categorical approach that looks to the elements of the penal

statute rather than the particulars of the alien’s conduct.” Oouch,

633 F.3d at 122.  In doing so, we must determine “whether ‘every

set of facts violating [the state] statute’ satisfies the criteria for

removability” under the INA, mindful that “only the minimum

criminal conduct necessary for a conviction is relevant.” Id.

(quoting Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 2004)). If,

however, the Pennsylvania criminal statute is “divisible” into

qualifying and non‐qualifying removable offenses, we proceed

“under a modified categorical approach to ascertain which class

of criminal act furnished the basis for the defendant’s

conviction.” Id. Where the statute is neither categorical nor

divisible, though, “our inquiry is complete.” Id.  

II. COLLYMORE’S CONVICTION IS CATEGORICALLY A

CONVICTION FOR A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE OFFENSE5

On appeal, the parties maintain, as they did before the

agency below, that Collymore’s 1997 conviction under § 780‐

113(a)(30) does not categorically constitute a controlled

substance offense because the Pennsylvania statute under which

Collymore was convicted is not a categorical match to the

grounds of removability under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). That is,

according to the parties, the IJ and BIA properly declined to

apply the categorical approach because, in their view, some of

the substances covered by the Pennsylvania law do not

 

5 Because “the BIA has no interpretive responsibility over a state

criminal statute, we review de novo its interpretation” of 35 Pa. Stat.

Ann. § 780‐113(a)(30) (1997). See Oouch, 633 F.3d at 122.  

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necessarily appear in the federal schedules of controlled

substances. In their view, this means that the Pennsylvania

statute criminalizes controlled substances that do not qualify as

bases for removability under the INA, thereby precluding

removability under the categorical approach.  

We disagree; the crime for which Collymore was

convicted in 1997 under § 780‐113(a)(30) is categorically a federal

controlled substance offense for purposes of the INA, resulting

in Collymore’s removability.  

The 1997 version of the Pennsylvania statute in question

prohibits the following acts:  

Except as authorized by this act, the

manufacture, delivery, or possession with

intent to manufacture or deliver, a

controlled substance by a person not

registered under this act, or a practitioner

not registered or licensed by the appropriate

State board, or knowingly creating,

delivering or possessing with intent to

deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.

35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780‐113(a)(30). As noted, the INA treats as

deportable “any alien convicted of . . . a violation of . . . any law

. . . of a State . . . relating to a controlled substance” as defined by

the CSA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  The CSA makes it  

unlawful for any person knowingly or

intentionally—(1) to manufacture,

distribute, or dispense, or possess with

intent to manufacture, distribute, or

dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) to

create, distribute, or dispense, or possess

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with intent to distribute or dispense, a

counterfeit substance.

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)–(2).  

Federal and Pennsylvania law confer similar meaning to

the terms “counterfeit substance” (as used by the CSA) and

“counterfeit controlled substance” (as used in the Pennsylvania

statute). The CSA defines the term “controlled substance” to

mean “a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor,

included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V” of the federal schedules of

controlled substances, id. § 802(6), and describes a “counterfeit

substance” as  

a controlled substance which, or the

container or labeling of which, without

authorization, bears the trademark, trade

name, or other identifying mark, imprint,

number, or device, or any likeness thereof,

of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser

other than the person or persons who in fact

manufactured, distributed, or dispensed

such substance and which thereby falsely

purports or is represented to be the product

of, or to have been distributed by, such

other manufacturer, distributor, or

dispenser,

id. § 802(7). Although Pennsylvania law provides no definition

for the term “counterfeit controlled substance,” it does contain

separate definitions for the terms “counterfeit” and “controlled

substance.” It defines the term “controlled substance” to mean

“a drug, substance, or immediate precursor” listed in the

Pennsylvania schedules of controlled substances and defines the

term “counterfeit” to mean

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a controlled substance, other drug, device or

cosmetic which, or the container or labeling

of which, without authorization, bears the

trademark, trade name, or other identifying

mark, imprint, number, or device, or any

likeness thereof, of a manufacturer,

distributor, or dispenser other than the

person or persons who in fact

manufactured, distributed, or dispensed

such substance and which thereby is falsely

purported or represented to be the product

of, or to have been distributed by, such

other manufacturer, distributor, or

dispenser.

35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780‐102. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusion

that, because the Pennsylvania law also covered conduct

involving “other drug[s]” and “cosmetic[s]” that were not

necessarily prohibited federally by the CSA, id., the

Pennsylvania statute was broader than its federal counterpart

and, as such, a conviction under § 780‐113(a)(30) did not

categorically constitute a crime relating to a federal controlled

substance. That interpretation of the statute, however, is at odds

with our duty to consider the most natural reading of the text

and the context of the statute. See Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d

293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009).  

“[W]hen construing the plain text of a statutory

enactment, we do not construe each phrase literally or in

isolation. Rather, we attempt to ascertain how a reasonable

reader would understand the statutory text, considered as a

whole.” Id. When the terms “counterfeit” and “controlled

substance” are taken in isolation (as advocated by the IJ and

BIA), the Pennsylvania statute’s definition of the term

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“counterfeit controlled substance” might be read more broadly.

Under the most natural reading of these terms taken together,

however, in the context of § 780‐113(a)(30), the term

“counterfeit” modifies the term “controlled substance,” such that

a “counterfeit controlled substance” encompasses only a

controlled substance that, consistent with the definition, is

mislabeled, such that it falsely purports or represents to be the

product of a manufacturer, distributer, or dispenser other than

the person or persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or

dispensed such substance. See 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780‐102.  

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has reached the same

conclusion regarding the range of conduct proscribed by § 780‐

113(a)(30). See Commonwealth v. Mohamud, 15 A.3d 80, 89 & n.23

(Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (“A counterfeit controlled substance is

defined in the Act as a controlled substance that is mislabeled

such that [it] falsely purports to [be] the product of a

manufacturer other than the manufacturer who created it.”

(citing 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780‐102)). This reading makes sense

given that the focus of § 780‐113(a)(30) is on controlled

substances, not on substances that the Pennsylvania legislature

has declined to criminalize under the Pennsylvania controlled

substances schedules. Thus, the text of the Pennsylvania statute

does not suggest that it might cast a wider net than that of the

CSA.  

Moreover, a comparison of the Pennsylvania and federal

controlled substances schedules in effect in 1997, at the time of

Collymore’s conviction, cf. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980,

1987–88 (2015) (explaining that we are to compare the drug

schedules that were enacted “[a]t the time of [the petitioner’s]

conviction”), reveals that the Pennsylvania schedules are not

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broader than the federal schedules, as they criminalize the same

substances.6 Compare 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780‐104, with 21 U.S.C.

§ 812. That is, the 1997 version of the Pennsylvania statute under

which Collymore was convicted is not categorically broader than

the federal definition because all of the substances proscribed by

the Pennsylvania law are also listed in the federal schedules of

controlled substances in 21 U.S.C. § 802. Indeed, the Third

Circuit has previously observed the same in a similar case under

the INA. See Clarke v. Ashcroft, 100 F. App’x 884, 886 (3d Cir.

2004) (“The BIA found that all the illicit substances covered by

the Pennsylvania statute are listed in the schedule of controlled

substances in 21 U.S.C. § 802. It follows that any substance [the

petitioner] was convicted of delivering under the Pennsylvania

statute necessarily constitutes a violation of the Federal

Controlled Substance Act referenced in INA § 241(a)(2)(B)(i).”).  

Notably, neither the IJ nor BIA took note of the Third

Circuit’s decision in Clarke. Rather, they relied instead on a more

recent decision from the Third Circuit in United States v. Abbott,

748 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2014), for the proposition that the

categorical approach does not apply to § 780‐113(a)(30). But

Abbott is readily distinguishable from the facts presently before

 

6 In urging us that the Pennsylvania controlled substance schedules are

broader than the federal schedules, Collymore argues that the

Pennsylvania schedules list substances, such as peyote and salvia

divinorum, that were not listed in the federal schedules. A review of

the 1997 Pennsylvania and federal controlled substances schedules,

however, reveals that neither statute prohibited salvia divinorum,

compare 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780‐104, with 21 U.S.C. § 812, and both

prohibited peyote, compare 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780‐104(iii)(11), with

21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(12).  Indeed, in a post‐argument letter to this Court,

Collymore conceded this point.   

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us. Abbott involved a criminal sentencing appeal where the Third

Circuit was tasked with determining whether § 780‐113(a)(30)

was divisible under the modified categorical approach for

purposes of determining whether convictions under the

Pennsylvania statute qualified as predicate offenses under the

Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). See

748 F.3d at 156. Critical to that inquiry was the type of controlled

substance at issue because the prescribed range of penalties

imposed for violations of § 780‐113(a)(30) varied based on its

character. The identity of the drug involved in a defendant’s

conviction under the Pennsylvania statute, the Abbott Court

determined, was therefore an element of the crime that had to be

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 159. Accordingly, the

Third Circuit concluded that the statute included several

alternative elements and was therefore divisible.7 Id.  

Unlike Abbott, however, the length of sentence in a

criminal defendant’s prior conviction has no bearing on the

inquiry presently before us in an immigration removal

proceeding. Moreover, Abbott concerned an assessment of the

defendant’s prior conviction against the ACCA, and therefore

lends no support to Collymore’s case because it did not involve a

comparison between § 780‐114(a)(30) and the CSA. The relevant

question before us is whether the Pennsylvania and federal

controlled substance and counterfeit controlled substance

definitions categorically proscribe the same controlled

substances. We have no difficulty in concluding that they do.  

 

7 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mathis v. United States, No.

15‐6092, 2016 WL 3434400, at *8 (U.S. June 23, 2016), does not purport

to overrule or alter Abbott, nor does it have any bearing on the

Pennsylvania statute at issue in this case.  

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Because we hold that Collymore’s conviction under § 780‐

113(a)(30) was categorically a controlled substance offense under

the INA at the time of his conviction in 1997, we need not reach

the question of divisibility or apply a modified categorical

approach in our analysis. See Costa v. Holder, 611 F.3d 110, 115

(2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments

and find them to be without merit. Because a conviction under

35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780‐113(a)(30) (1997) is categorically a

conviction under a law relating to a federal controlled substance

under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), we lack jurisdiction to review

the removability order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Accordingly,

the petition for review is DISMISSED.  

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