Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03044/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03044-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Percy Barron
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 7, 1998 Decided June 19, 1998

No. 97-3017

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Harold Cunningham and Percy Barron,

Appellants

Consolidated with

No. 97-3044

---------

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cr00088-01)

(No. 95cr00088-02)

Stephen C. Leckar and Jonathan Zucker, appointed by the

court, argued the causes and filed the joint briefs for appellants Harold Cunningham and Percy Barron.

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Rachel Carlson Lieber, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee, with whom Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, and Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant

U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief. Elizabeth Trosman,

Mary-Patrice Brown, and Thomas C. Black, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Silberman, Circuit Judge,

and Buckley, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: Appellants raise numerous challenges to their convictions arising from a 68-count indictment

against them. Only a few of the issues raised merit our

attention here.

We reject Appellant Harold Cunningham's claim that the

District Court erred in permitting him to represent himself at

trial. The District Court's findings that Cunningham's decision to represent himself was knowing and voluntary met the

criteria specified in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975),

for determining when a defendant may exercise his constitutional right to forego his right to counsel. In particular, we

reject Cunningham's assertion that he was faced with a

"Hobson's choice" between representing himself or accepting

inadequate counsel. The record indicates that the District

Judge assured herself that Cunningham's attorney was adequately prepared for trial and made every reasonable effort

to reassure Cunningham regarding his counsel's competence

and preparedness in response to Cunningham's expressed

concerns about his trial counsel. Where a defendant's complaints against counsel plainly lack merit, a court cannot allow

itself to be manipulated into granting a continuance and

appointing new counsel just to placate a defendant threatening to represent himself.

Appellant Percy Barron argues that the inadvertent submission of unadmitted evidence to the jury during its deliberations constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment, requiring a reversal of all the convictions against him. The

Government responds that, although the alleged error was

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constitutional, there was overwhelming, untainted evidence

sufficient to support Barron's convictions, so the error should

be deemed harmless. Recent Supreme Court cases, as well

as cases from this circuit, have clarified that harmless error

review of constitutional errors calls for an inquiry as to

whether the Government has shown beyond a reasonable

doubt that the error at issue did not have an effect on the

verdict, not merely whether, absent the error, a reasonable

jury could nevertheless have reached a guilty verdict. Applying this standard, we find that the Government has failed

to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error at issue

did not affect the jury's verdicts pertaining to the charges

arising from the Sun Ray Market shootings. Accordingly,

we reverse Barron's convictions arising from that incident.

However, applying the same standard, we decline to reverse

the convictions of Barron that were unrelated to the Sun

Ray Market shootings.

In addition, we hold that several of Appellants' convictions

should have been merged for sentencing purposes. Each

Appellant's two convictions for armed robbery arising out of

the Sammy's Liquor Store incident should merge into one,

since Appellants robbed only the liquor store and not its

employees. Also, each Appellant's armed robbery convictions

should merge with their felony murder convictions where the

indictment specified the armed robberies as the predicate for

the felony murder counts. In addition, all eight of Cunningham's convictions under 18 U.S.C. s 922(g) should be merged

into one, since the jury was never instructed that, to convict

on each section 922(g) charge separately, it must find that the

weapons were separately acquired or stored.

I. Background

A. The Indictment

On April 13, 1995, Appellants Harold Cunningham and

Percy Barron, together with codefendant Billy Richardson,

were charged, pursuant to both federal and District of Columbia law in a 68-count indictment, with a series of armed

robberies, assaults, and murders committed over a 139-day

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period in the summer of 1993. The indictment charged

Appellants with Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization ("RICO") counts for operating and conspiring to operate

a criminal enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1962(c)

(counts 1-2) and with separate charges relating to several of

the predicate racketeering acts (counts 3-68). The predicate

acts arise from fifteen separate incidents alleged in the

indictment: (1) the Sibley Plaza armed robbery; (2) the

Discount Carpet armed robbery; (3) the IBEX Club assaults;

(4) the Marvin Thomas assault; (5) the armed robbery of

Officer Barnes; (6) the Annapolis armed robbery; (7) the

Sammy's Liquor armed robbery; (8) the assault on Officer

Hasenpusch; (9) the Horace and Dickie's armed robbery;

(10) the attempted U-Haul armed robbery; (11) the Fair

Liquor murders and robberies; (12) the Tyrone Holland

murder; (13) the Sun Ray Market shootings; (14) the Marvin

Thomas murder; and (15) the assault on Officer McDowell.

The indictment charged Cunningham with various offenses

arising from all fifteen of the alleged incidents; Barron was

charged with specific offenses arising from all the incidents

except for the assault of Officer McDowell. In addition,

Appellants were charged with various gun possession offenses.

B.Cunningham's Election to Represent Himself

Robert Tucker, of the Federal Public Defender's office

("FPD"), represented Cunningham from the time of Appellant's arraignment until early April 1996. The record indicates that Cunningham became dissatisfied with Tucker's

representation after reading a newspaper article about the

offenses with which he was charged. Apparently, Cunningham interpreted this article as insinuating that Tucker believed Cunningham to be guilty of the charges alleged. See

Tr. 4/26/96 at 7.

In an effort to placate Cunningham, the FPD replaced

Tucker with Gregory Spencer. Prior to his appointment,

Spencer had served as co-counsel to Tucker, first entering an

appearance on March 6, 1996. At a status hearing on April

26, 1996, shortly before trial was then scheduled to begin,

Cunningham expressed concern that Spencer would simply be

picking up from where Tucker had left off, and stated that he

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did not want to be represented by anyone from FPD. Id. at

8. In response to questioning by the court, Spencer confirmed that he had fully examined Cunningham's file and

conferred with Cunningham. He also stated that he felt he

could make his own strategic decisions in the case, but that

his ability to take an entirely new approach to the case would

be "handicapped, to some degree" by the fact that most of the

initial case preparation had been completed before he became

involved in the case. Id. at 9-10.

The court denied Cunningham's request for a change of

counsel, stating that it had "no reason to doubt the competen[ce], the zealousness, the seriousness or the belief of Mr.

Spencer in the merits of his client's case." Id. at 12-13. The

court also explained that the newspaper article about which

Cunningham had complained could not be fairly read as an

indication that Tucker believed Cunningham was guilty of the

crimes alleged. Rather, the article had simply quoted Tucker's motion to dismiss the case which, in turn, had summarized the Government's allegations against Cunningham. Id.

at 10-12. The court said the motion to dismiss was "vigorously written, ... extensively researched, and raised every

argument that I can imagine could have been raised." Id. at

12.

At this point, Cunningham asserted that, if his request for

new counsel were to be denied, he would rather represent

himself. Id. at 13. The trial judge warned Cunningham that

this was a risky decision, detailed for him some of the

rigorous trial procedures he would be expected to follow, and

admonished him to think carefully and consult with his family

before making such a grave decision. Id. at 119-23. At a

pretrial hearing a few days later, the trial judge conducted a

more detailed explanation of the demands of the criminal trial

process, inquired into Cunningham's understanding of such

requirements, and repeatedly warned him against proceeding

pro se. Tr. 4/30/96 at 45-60. Cunningham asserted that he

understood "the seriousness of the case." Id. at 59. The

trial judge briefly addressed the issue at a May 6, 1996

hearing, reiterating her faith in Spencer's ability to zealously

represent Cunningham, based upon his performance in the

case thus far and the time available for further preparation

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prior to trial. Tr. 5/6/96 at 26-27. Finally, on May 21, 1996,

the court permitted Cunningham to represent himself, appointing Spencer as stand-by counsel, making the resources

of the FPD available to Cunningham, and advising Cunningham that he could change his mind about representation at

any time. Tr. 5/21/96 at 10-12, 65. On May 29, 1996, after

Cunningham again reasserted his decision to represent himself, the court made specific findings on the record that,

based upon her long discussions with Cunningham and his

active participation thus far, Cunningham had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Tr. 5/29/96

at 38-39.

C.Trial and Verdicts

Trial commenced on June 3, 1996 and concluded on July 30,

1996.

After several days of deliberations, the jury returned partial verdicts as to each defendant on August 9, 1996, and then

resumed deliberations. On August 15, 1996, the jury returned verdicts on several of the remaining counts. The jury

acquitted Cunningham on all charges relating to the armed

robbery of Officer Barnes (counts 28-30) and the Horace &

Dickie's armed robbery (counts 39-45). The jury acquitted

Barron on all charges relating to the Sibley Plaza armed

robbery (counts 3-5, 8). Although the jury found both Cunningham and Barron guilty of the assault and gun possession

charges arising from the Sun Ray incident (counts 56-61), it

could not reach a verdict on the count charging Appellants

with first-degree murder of Anthony Johnson at the Sun Ray

Market (count 55). In addition, the jury was unable to reach

a verdict on the RICO charges (counts 1-2). The jury

convicted Appellants of the remaining counts charged against

them. The court declared a mistrial as to the Anthony

Johnson murder and RICO charges and entered judgments of

acquittal and conviction consistent with the jury's verdicts.

D.The Inadvertent Submission to the Jury of Unredacted

911 Tapes

Appellants were charged with murdering Anthony Johnson

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ing a shooting inside the Sun Ray Market on September 20,

1993 (counts 55-57). Various gun possession changes also

arose from this incident (counts 58-61). Romeo Williams was

called by the prosecution to offer eye-witness testimony incriminating Appellants for these charges. Williams testified

that three young men ran from the Sun Ray Market following

the shooting, that one was tall and light-skinned and another

was shorter and dark-skinned (descriptions which accord with

Cunningham and Barron, respectively), and that the shorter,

dark-skinned man was wearing a black "hoodie" and black

cut-off jean shorts and carrying a chrome gun. These descriptions match the clothing Barron was wearing at the time

of his arrest hours after the Sun Ray incident and the

chrome-plated Iberia pistol used in the shooting. Williams

testified further that the two men described drove off in a

maroon Nisson Maxima, a description which matches the

vehicle Appellants were driving when apprehended following

the Sun Ray incident. He further testified that he pulled up

to the side of the vehicle to look at the two men, followed

them for some way, and recorded the car's license plate

number, but that he broke off the chase and called 911 when

he grew concerned that they may have realized that he was

following them. See Tr. 6/26/96 p.m. at 40-43, 47-57.

Williams' credibility as a witness was seriously called into

question by Appellants' efforts to impeach him. With

Williams testimony in doubt, the Government sought and was

granted leave by the trial judge to play Williams' 911 call in

open court in order to rehabilitate his testimony regarding

the incident. Williams' 911 call was consistent with his

testimony at trial. See Transcript of Unredacted Tape, attached to Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's

Motion for a New Trial as Exhibit A, reprinted in Record

Material for Appellee ("R.M.") at 65-66 ("Unredacted Tape,

R.M. at ___"). The portion of the 911 tapes containing

Williams' call was admitted into evidence, and a redacted tape

recording containing only that call was supposed to go to the

jury.

The jury ultimately convicted Appellants of the assault and

weapon possession charges arising from the Sun Ray incident, but was unable to reach a verdict on the Anthony

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Johnson murder. After the jury had rendered its verdicts

and the court had declared a mistrial as to the remaining

counts, the court permitted Government and defense counsel

to meet with the jurors. During that meeting, several jurors

mentioned that, during their deliberations, they had been

provided with an unredacted 911 tape, which included the

unadmitted 911 calls of eight other people as well as police

radio transmissions related to the same event, in addition to

Williams' 911 call.

Upon learning of the jurors' exposure to this extrinsic

evidence, Barron moved for a new trial, pursuant to Fed. R.

Crim. P. Rule 33, on the ground that his Sixth Amendment

right to confront all witnesses against him had been violated

in that the jurors effectively heard the testimony of eight

additional government witnesses whom he did not have the

opportunity to confront or cross-examine at trial. Barron

argued that this error was a "structural defect" automatically

requiring a new trial. Alternatively, Barron argued that,

even under the harmless error standard, the error required a

new trial. He contended that the error could not be deemed

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given that the unredacted tape contained various eyewitness descriptions that corroborated Williams' otherwise suspect testimony, and that the

prosecution had failed to provide any other witnesses offering

eyewitness testimony implicating Barron in the Sun Ray

shootings. Barron argued further that the statements on the

unredacted tapes not only connected Barron to the Sun Ray

charges but also, indirectly, to the remainder of the charges

against Barron, based on the modus operandi argued by the

prosecution and ballistic evidence gathered from the Sun Ray

incident.

The Government conceded that the inadvertent submission

of the unredacted tapes to the jury was constitutional error,

but argued that this error was harmless and, therefore, did

not warrant reversal of any of Barron's convictions. The

District Court held that the error did not constitute a structural defect and was harmless and, accordingly, denied Barron's motion. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, United

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States v. Barron, Crim. No. 95-88-02 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 1997)

("Mem.Op.").

II. Analysis

On appeal, Appellants challenge their convictions on numerous grounds. We have considered all of Appellants'

claims and find most of them to lack merit. Only two of

Appellants' challenges to their convictions warrant discussion

here: Cunningham's claim that the District Court erred in

permitting him to represent himself and Barron's claim that

the inadvertent submission to the jury of the unredacted 911

tapes renders his convictions invalid. In addition, we address

Appellants' claims that various of their convictions should

have been merged for sentencing purposes.

A.The District Court Did Not Err in Permitting Cunningham to Represent Himself

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to represent

himself at trial. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806

(1975). To be valid, the defendant's election to waive his

right to counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Id. at 835. To say that such an election must be "intelligent"

does not mean that it must be perceived as reasonable or

wise, for, in setting out this standard, the Court recognized

that "it is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions

defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than

by their own unskilled efforts." Id. at 834.

To ensure that a choice for self-representation is knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary, a court must apprise the defendant

of the "dangers and disadvantages" entailed by such a decision "so that the record will establish that he knows what he

is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Id. at 835

(internal quotations and citation omitted). In United States

v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1987), this court gave shape

to this requirement. In Brown, a case with complexity and

numerosity of counts similar to Cunningham's, several of the

defendants claimed on appeal that the trial court erred in

allowing them to represent themselves. 823 F.2d at 599.

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This Court denied their claim, finding that the trial court had

engaged in a full discussion with the defendants regarding the

risks of self-representation.

The record discloses that the trial court engaged in a full

discussion with the appellants regarding the dangers of

self-representation. The judge informed the appellants

of the seriousness of the charges against them, warned

them that he could not assist them in their defense, told

them that he would have to conduct the trial in accord

with the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure, and stated that "it is a distinct handicap to be

engaged in a serious criminal matter without any legal

training or background and without the active assistance

of a trained lawyer." In addition, the judge asked the

appellants many times whether they understood his comments and whether they had any questions.

Id. (internal citation omitted). In approving this "model" of

discourse, the Brown court emphasized that "[n]either case

law nor common sense" requires the court to address in detail

every possible difficulty a defendant might encounter. Id.

The extensive colloquy between the District Court and

Cunningham regarding his decision to represent himself

clearly meets the standard set forth in Brown. This colloquy

took place over the course of several days. On each occasion,

Judge Kessler sternly warned Cunningham of the dangers

and disadvantages of proceeding pro se and urged him to take

more time to reconsider his decision. See Gov't Br. at 17-20

(quoting relevant portions of transcript).

Cunningham argues on appeal that, given his IQ of 68, he

was unable to make an informed, knowing, and voluntary

decision to represent himself. Throughout the pretrial proceedings relating to Cunningham's self-representation, however, the trial judge made it clear that she found Cunningham

to be a highly intelligent person. See Gov't Br. 19-20 n.27

and citations to transcript therein. Although a reviewing

court decides de novo whether the record demonstrates a

knowing, intelligent waiver of a defendant's right to counsel,

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"whether the defendant misunderstood what the court said,

despite defendant's unambiguous answers indicating comprehension, is a pure question of fact which depends primarily on

the demeanor, conduct, and intonations of the defendant" and,

thus, is reviewed for clear error. See Virgin Islands v.

Charles, 72 F.3d 401, 404 (3d Cir. 1995). Cunningham points

to nothing in the record indicating that the trial court's

findings regarding his intelligence were clearly erroneous.

In addition, Cunningham argues that his decision to represent himself was not a voluntary decision because he was

faced with a "Hobson's Choice" between accepting appointed

counsel whom he felt was not prepared for trial and representing himself. Where, as here, a Faretta election appears

grounded in dissatisfaction with counsel, the trial court must

evaluate the defendant's objections to ensure that the selfrepresentation election is voluntary. It is clear that the trial

court adequately did so here. Cunningham never offered any

specific concerns about Spencer or the FPD other than the

newspaper article which had caused him to doubt the loyalties

of Tucker, his first FPD lawyer, and Spencer's "handicap" in

utilizing groundwork which had already been completed by

Tucker. Prior to accepting Cunningham's Faretta election,

Judge Kessler explained that Cunningham's complaints about

Tucker based on the newspaper article were not well-founded.

See Tr. 4/26/96 10-12. More importantly, she found Spencer

to be a competent and zealous advocate, based upon his

performance during the early stages of the case as well as his

responses to the court's inquiries, and repeatedly assured

Cunningham of her confidence in Spencer. See id. at 10-13;

Tr. 4/30/96 at 60 (judge did not "think for one minute that

[Spencer] is just picking up a file"); Tr. 5/6/96 at 26 ("There

is not a shred of evidence before this court that [Spencer]

would be ineffective."). Where a defendant's complaints of

his counsel's inadequacy plainly lack merit, a court cannot

allow itself to be manipulated into granting a continuance and

appointing new counsel just to placate a defendant threatening to represent himself. Accord United States v. Salemo, 61

F.3d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1995).

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B.Inadvertent Submission to the Jury of the Unredacted

911 Tapes

1. Cunningham's Claims were not Preserved for Appeal

On appeal, Cunningham seeks to join Barron's appeal on

the issue of the inadvertent submission of the unredacted 911

tapes, arguing that this error influenced the jury's verdicts

against him as well as against Barron. As an initial matter,

we find that Cunningham's claims pertaining to the 911 tapes

are not properly before this court.

Cunningham asserts that the District Court's standing

order deemed Cunningham to have joined in Barron's motion

for a new trial and that, by sentencing Cunningham before

deciding that motion, the trial judge in effect denied the

motion as to Cunningham. The standing order to which

Cunningham refers, entitled "Standing Order Governing Procedures in Criminal Trial" provides that "any objection, motion or other application for relief made by any defense

counsel orally or in writing shall be deemed to be adopted and

joined in by every other defendant, respectively, without

announcement by counsel to that effect, and the rulings of the

Court shall be deemed applicable to each defendant unless

otherwise stated at the time the ruling is made." See Cunningham's Supp. Br., App. at 4. It is not clear that this

standing order was intended to apply to post-trial motions as

well as objections raised during the course of trial. Compare

United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1521 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(applying clear error standard of review for all defendants

where at least one defendant objected during trial). The

record provides no indication that Cunningham ever argued

to the District Court that the 911 tapes also prejudiced him,

and the District Court construed Barron's motion for a new

trial as applying to Barron alone and did not make any

findings or judgment regarding the effect of the error on

Cunningham. See Mem. Op. at 1-6.

Moreover, although Cunningham appealed his convictions

prior to the District Court's denial of Barron's motion for a

new trial, he failed to file a separate notice of appeal after the

post-trial motion foundered. Cunningham's reliance on United States v. Baird, 29 F.3d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1994), in support of

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his contention that a separate notice of appeal was unnecessary, is misplaced. In Baird, this court simply clarified that

the filing of a post-trial motion does not nullify a notice of

appeal filed prior to its resolution nor bar review of errors

that had been properly preserved independently of the posttrial motion. Id. at 649 & n.1. Contrary to Cunningham's

suggestion, Baird does not stand for the proposition that a

timely-filed notice of appeal automatically includes appeal of a

subsequently-denied post-trial motion. Indeed, the Baird

court declined to hear the appellant's claims pertaining to the

denial of his post-trial motion in light of his failure to timely

appeal from the denial of the motion, notwithstanding his

earlier-filed notice of appeal. See id. at 655.

2. Standard of Review

The inadvertent submission of the unredacted 911 tapes to

the jury violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause,

in that it effectively provided to the jury testimony of eight

other witnesses without allowing the defendants to confront

or cross-examine these witnesses at trial. See Turner v.

Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965). Whether this constitutional error requires reversal of Barron's convictions is

governed by the harmless error standard of review. See

Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230-32 (1973) (admission of out-of-court statement of a nontestifying codefendant

in violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause

subject to harmless error review). See also United States v.

Treadwell, 760 F.2d 327, 339-42 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (applying

harmless error review where appellant claimed she was entitled to a new trial because a document that had not been

offered into evidence had been sent to the deliberating jury

inadvertently).

Barron contends that the inadvertent submission to the

jury of the unredacted tapes is a structural error requiring

automatic reversal of his convictions, relying on United States

v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442 (9th Cir. 1996). We disagree. The

type of error at issue here can "be quantitatively assessed in

the context of the evidence presented in order to determine

whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt," Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991),

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and is not one which affects "[t]he entire conduct of the trial

from beginning to end." Id. at 309.

This holding is not inconsistent with those of the Ninth

Circuit. In Noushfar, the Ninth Circuit construed the trial

judge's provision to the deliberating jury of fourteen highlyincriminating taped conversations between defendants and

undercover police officers which had never been played in

court as a "structural error" requiring automatic reversal of

the defendants' convictions. See 78 F.3d at 1445. However,

the Ninth Circuit later limited this holding in Eslaminia v.

White, 136 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 1998), a case more closely

resembling the instant case. In Eslaminia, a tape recording

of a police interview with the defendant was admitted into

evidence and provided to the jury during its deliberations.

Id. at 1236-37. Following the verdict, defense lawyers

learned that the jury had also listened to the reverse side of

the tape, which contained comments made by the defendant's

brother, also recorded during an interview with a police

officer. The brother's comments had not been admitted into

evidence, and the brother did not testify at trial. Id. at 1237.

The Ninth Circuit held that this error violated the Sixth

Amendment Confrontation Clause. Id. The defendant, relying on Noushfar, argued that this was a structural error

requiring automatic reversal. Id. at 1237 n.1. The Ninth

Circuit distinguished Noushfar and applied the harmless

error standard, noting that "jury consideration of taped comments by [ ] non-testifying part[ies] raises discrete evidentiary issues that the court may clearly identify and analyze, and

is similar to other commonly-recognized trial errors." Id.

We agree with the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Eslaminia.

Under the applicable harmless error standard, a constitutional error is harmless and does not require reversal only if

the Government can show "beyond a reasonable doubt that

the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict

obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

Recent Supreme Court cases, as well as cases from this

circuit, have clarified that harmless error review calls for an

inquiry as to whether the Government has shown beyond a

reasonable doubt that the error at issue did not have an effect

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on the verdict, not merely whether, absent the error, a

reasonable jury could nevertheless have reached a guilty

verdict. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)

(harmless error inquiry "is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have

been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error");

United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(distinguishing harmless error test from mere sufficiency-ofthe-evidence test), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1271 (1997); see

also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)

("The [harmless error] inquiry cannot be merely whether

there was enough [evidence] to support the result, apart from

the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so,

whether the error itself had substantial influence."); see

generally Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not

Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?,

70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1167 (1995) (analyzing case law on harmless error review and distinguishing "effect on the verdict"

inquiry from "guilt-based" inquiry). Where there is uncertainty as to the effect on the verdict, the error cannot be

deemed harmless; rather, the court must treat the error as

having affected the verdict. See O'Neal v. McAninch, 513

U.S. 432, 435-36 (1995); Smart, 98 F.3d at 1391-92; United

States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Resting appellate review of constitutional trial errors on a

guilt-based inquiry into whether, even absent the error, a

reasonable jury might have nevertheless reached a guilty

verdict based upon the lawful evidence before it would be

"inconsistent with the constitutional framework of our system" which "grants criminal defendants the right to have

juries, not appellate courts, render judgments of guilt or

innocence." Edwards, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1192. As the

Supreme Court explained in Sullivan v. Louisiana, "to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never rendered--no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might

be--would violate the jury-trial guarantee." 508 U.S. at 279.

See also Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 763-64.

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3.Barron's Convictions Arising from the Sun Ray Market Incident

Barron claims that allowing the jury to hear the unredacted

tape was not harmless error because the extrinsic evidence on

the 911 tapes corroborated and bolstered the testimony of

Romeo Williams who, Barron points out, was an unreliable

witness. Given the centrality of Williams' otherwise-suspect

testimony to the Government's case against Barron for the

Sun Ray charges, Barron contends, the Government cannot

show beyond a reasonable doubt that the unredacted tape did

not influence the jury's verdicts with regard to these charges.

Barron notes that the unadmitted 911 calls and police radio

transmissions regarding on-the-scene witness interviews conclusively established that, contrary to Barron's defense, two

shooters ran from the Sun Ray Market shooting, and that one

of them, a young man closely resembling Barron, had carried

a gun similar to the chrome-plated Iberia pistol fired at Sun

Ray. See Unredacted Tape, R.M. 57-73.

The Government offers three arguments in response.

First, the Government contends that the error was harmless

because the jurors may not have listened to the tape until

after they had rendered their verdicts on the Sun Ray

Market counts. In support of this contention, the Government offers an affidavit provided by an FBI Special Agent

who had participated in the jury debriefing session at which

the error initially was discovered. See Affidavit of Special

Agent Vincent Lisi, reprinted in Gov't Supp. Br., App. 2.

However, as the District Court noted, neither the statements of the jurors at the post-trial debriefing session nor

that of Agent Lisi have been subject to cross-examination,

and thus the court declined to rely on them in ruling on the

motion. See Mem. Op. at 4 n.2. For the same reason, we

also decline to base our ruling on the Lisi Affidavit. Instead,

because the parties agree that the jurors were in possession

of the unredacted tape since the commencement of their

deliberations, we assume, absent any compelling evidence to

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the contrary, that they listened to it prior to rendering their

verdicts on the Sun Ray charges.

Second, the Government argues that the error was harmless because Williams' testimony was sufficiently bolstered by

Williams' own 911 call--the portion of the 911 tapes that was

played in open court and properly made available during jury

deliberations. The Government claims Williams' testimony

was also bolstered by his notation of the get-away vehicle's

license number, and that the extrinsic evidence on the unredacted tape had very little, if any, bolstering effect on

Williams' testimony. This argument tracks the District

Court's determination that although, following defense counsel's efforts to impeach Williams, the jury may have had good

reason to doubt Williams' general credibility, "his testimony

on the narrow issue relevant to whether Mr. Barron participated in the Sun Ray Market incident was straightforward

and credible." Mem. Op. at 4-5.

It is for the jury, not the court, to evaluate witness

credibility. The prosecution and the District Court acknowledge that Williams' general credibility was doubtful, but

endorse his testimony pertaining to the Sun Ray incident on

the basis of its consistency with his properly-admitted 911

call. However, Williams' 911 call was only admitted because

Williams' testimony was in dire need of rehabilitation. Given

the vulnerability of Williams' testimony in the absence of the

911 tapes and the way in which the extrinsic evidence on the

unredacted tapes bolstered Williams' testimony, we cannot

find beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence did

not influence the jury to accept Williams' testimony rather

than reject it, and that its acceptance of Williams' testimony

did not, in turn, affect its verdicts convicting Barron on the

Sun Ray charges.

Finally, the Government argues that, even assuming that

the jury would have rejected Williams' testimony absent the

error, the error must nevertheless be deemed harmless in

light of what it describes as overwhelming, untainted evidence

implicating Barron for the Sun Ray charges. However, the

Government is unable to highlight any eyewitness testimony

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implicating Barron for the Sun Ray shootings equivalent to

that of Williams and unidentified callers on the 911 tapes.

Rather, the Government highlights the following evidence

implicating Barron for the Sun Ray charges: motive evidence

regarding Appellants' ongoing "beef" with Anthony Johnson

and his organization, the Madness Connection; witness testimony that Barron, with gun in waistband, made a statement

that afternoon that he and Cunningham had to "take care of

something;" witness testimony that Cunningham called the

next day and told witness that they had to "get" the Madness

Connection; Barron's admission to a cellmate of involvement

in the Sun Ray shooting; Barron's letter to a friend, written

while incarcerated solely on Sun Ray charges, stating his

concern that one of the government's star witnesses was

cooperating with authorities and discussing ways to prevent

her from doing so. See Gov't Supp. Br. at 6 n.5 and record

citations therein. In addition, Barron was apprehended following the Sun Ray incident. At the time of his arrest,

Barron possessed a Glock rifle, and ballistics evidence showed

that the Glock was fired at Sun Ray Market. The Government also argues that Barron's defense--that it was merely

coincidental that he was with Cunningham and in possession

of the Glock hours after the shooting--is highly suspect.

It is not inconceivable that the jury could have convicted

Barron on the Sun Ray counts even if it had never heard the

unredacted 911 tapes and rejected Williams' testimony.

However, even if we find the untainted evidence against

Barron to be overwhelming, we could not find the error

harmless for this reason. Rather, we must determine whether the error affected the jury's verdict.

Relying on our decision in Smart, the Government attempts to equate the applicable effect-on-the-verdict inquiry

with an overwhelming evidence inquiry. Although, in Smart,

we stated that if "the lawful evidence against the defendant is

overwhelming and the trial error is not a fundamental one,

the error should be deemed harmless," 98 F.3d at 1391, we

also emphasized that "the harmless error test we apply here

is not a mere sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry." Id. In

deeming the error at issue in Smart harmless, we emphasized

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that "[t]he totality of properly admitted evidence [against the

defendant] was weighty and not at all ambiguous," that

"[m]oreover, there was a virtual absence of exculpatory evidence," and that "[m]ost importantly, it [was] excruciatingly

clear that the jury did not believe [the defendant's] story."

Id. at 1390-91. We further emphasized that where "the

evidence presented at trial is ambiguous, even a relatively

minor error requires reversal." Id. at 1391-92; see also

O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 437 ("[W]here the record is so evenly

balanced that a conscientious judge is in grave doubt as to the

harmlessness of an error," the judge cannot find the error to

be harmless.).

Thus, although "[o]f course, in deciding whether an error

has had a substantial influence on the jury, a reviewing court

cannot help but look at the totality of lawful evidence presented at trial," Smart, 98 F.3d at 1391 (citing Kotteakos, 328 U.S.

at 763-64), Smart makes it clear that the appropriate inquiry

is an effect-on-the-verdict test and not a guilt-based test:

"[I]n a case where the evidence at trial is conflicting or

ambiguous, the danger that an error will affect the jury's

verdict is almost always substantial." Id. at 1392 (emphasis

added). See also id. ("[I]f the other evidence presented in

this case had been even slightly ambiguous, we would be

required to reverse Smart's conviction.") (emphasis added).

Indeed, even where erroneously admitted evidence is apparently cumulative of lawful evidence, if it is "at least debatable" that the erroneously admitted evidence "tipped the

scales" towards a guilty verdict, a reviewing court should not

deem the error harmless. Pryce, 938 F.2d at 1349-50. This

is consistent with the rule that a constitutional error will not

be deemed harmless unless the Government shows "beyond a

reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

Where the evidence is even slightly ambiguous or conflicting,

or where the error at issue may otherwise have tipped the

scales towards a guilty verdict, the Government is unable to

make such a showing, and the verdict must be reversed.

We find that the evidence against Barron for the Sun Ray

shootings, absent Williams' testimony as bolstered by the 911

tapes, is not free from ambiguity. As Barron argues, Romeo

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Williams' eyewitness testimony was central to the Government's case against Barron for the Sun Ray charges. Although the jury arguably could have found Barron guilty even

absent the error, the remaining evidence implicating Barron

for the Sun Ray shootings is not so overwhelming as to

compel us to conclude that the error did not affect the jury's

verdict. Therefore, we reverse the jury's verdicts finding

Barron guilty for the following charges arising from the Sun

Ray incident: assaulting Bernice Douglas (count 56), assaulting Nefertari McCree (count 57), and possessing a firearm

during a crime of violence (count 60). Count 61, charging

Barron with possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial

number, also arose from the Sun Ray incident. However,

this charge arose solely from Barron's arrest following the

incident; Williams' testimony and other information on the

911 tapes had no bearing on this charge. Accordingly, we do

not reverse this conviction.

4. Barron's Remaining Convictions

Barron argues further that the erroneously admitted 911

tapes render all of his convictions invalid, not just those

arising from the Sun Ray incident. We disagree.

The Government bears the burden of showing beyond a

reasonable doubt that the error at issue did not contribute to

the non-Sun Ray convictions. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

In an effort to make this showing, the Government emphasizes that the 911 tapes came in accidentally in relation to the

Sun Ray incident and did not pertain to any of the non-Sun

Ray charges. In addition, the Government highlights eyewitness identifications and other evidence implicating Barron for

the other charges on which he was convicted.

Barron fails to argue that the untainted evidence implicating him in the non-Sun Ray charges was ambiguous, nor does

he highlight any specific exculpatory evidence exonerating

him on the other charges. Rather, Barron offers two theories

linking the taint of the error at issue to all of the charges

against him. First, he argues that ballistics evidence links all

of the charges together, and, thus, if the jury were to find

Barron guilty for the Sun Ray shootings, the weapons used at

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Sun Ray link him to the other incidents as well. Second, he

argues that the prosecution's trial theory emphasized that

Cunningham and Barron were together engaged in a series of

armed robberies, assaults, and murders throughout the summer in question, and that a finding that Barron joined Cunningham in the Sun Ray shootings supports this modus

operandi theory. In essence, Barron argues that the jury's

finding against Barron for the Sun Ray charges, in the

context of the prosecution's overall theory of the case, served

as additional evidence against Barron for the remaining

charges. Thus, Barron argues, if we assume that, absent the

inadvertent admission of the unredacted tapes, the jury would

have acquitted Barron of the Sun Ray shootings, the error

must be deemed to taint all of the convictions against Barron.

We are unable to find that the error affected the non-Sun

Ray verdicts, in light of the Government's showings and

Barron's failure to highlight any specific evidence conflicting

with the evidence against him or to otherwise argue that the

Government's case against Barron for the non-Sun Ray

charges was somehow ambiguous. Cf. Smart, 98 F.3d at

1390-92 (finding error harmless where evidence against defendant was unambiguous, there was a virtual absence of

exculpatory evidence, and it was "excruciatingly clear" that

the jury did not believe the defense story; but stating that if

the evidence had been ambiguous or conflicting, the harmless

error standard would require reversal of even a relatively

minor error).

Barron's claim that the information contained in the 911

tapes indirectly tainted the jury's non-Sun Ray verdicts is

best construed as an argument that the error tipped the

balance towards guilty verdicts on the non-Sun Ray charges.

However, whether the Sun Ray verdicts might be construed

as cumulative evidence against Barron with regard to the

remaining charges in light of the on-going enterprise theories

argued at trial is not dispositive under the applicable effecton-the-verdict test. Rather, we must examine the trial record

as a whole in order to determine whether the error at issue

influenced this jury to find Barron guilty of the non-Sun Ray

charges.

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Although the prosecution apparently tried to use ballistics

evidence and modus operandi arguments to tie the Appellants together and to each of the incidents alleged, the jury

did not appear to be swayed by these on-going enterprise

theories. Significantly, although the jury convicted both Appellants for the vast majority of the charges arising from the

fifteen alleged racketeering incidents, it did not convict on the

RICO charges. In addition, the jury acquitted Cunningham

but convicted Barron of charges relating to the armed robbery of Officer Barnes and the Horace and Dickie's armed

robbery, and acquitted Barron but convicted Cunningham of

the charges relating to the Sibley Plaza armed robbery, even

though Appellants were charged as having committed these

crimes jointly. It appears plain that, contrary to Barron's

arguments regarding the influence of the prosecution's ongoing enterprise theories, the jury was able to sift and sort

through the evidence pertaining to each incident in order to

determine Appellants' respective guilt for each charge alleged. Thus, we find Barron's argument that the inadvertent

submission to the jury of the unredacted 911 tapes tipped the

balance towards guilty verdicts on the non-Sun Ray charges

unpersuasive. Accordingly, we decline to reverse Barron's

non-Sun Ray convictions.

C.Merger of Various Convictions for Sentencing Purposes

1. Merger of Various D.C. Offenses

As the Government concedes, each Appellant's two convictions for armed robbery arising out of the Sammy's Liquor

incident (counts 31-32) should merge into one, since Appellants robbed only the liquor store and not its employees. See

United States v. Canty, 469 F.2d 114, 126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1972)

(four tellers, but only one bank, robbed; only one conviction).

In addition, as the Government concedes, each Appellant's

armed robbery convictions arising from the Fair Liquor

incident (counts 47-49) should merge with their felony murder convictions (counts 50-51), because the indictment specified the armed robberies as the predicate for the felony

murder counts. See Catlett v. United States, 545 A.2d 1202,

1219 (D.C. 1988).

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2. Merger of Section 922(g) Charges

All eight of Cunningham's convictions under 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g) (counts 7, 17, 22, 26, 38, 54, 59, 67) should be merged

into one. Contrary to the Government's suggestion, this is

not merely a sentencing issue. Rather, the issue turns on

whether the jury found all of the elements necessary to

convict Cunningham for eight separate 922(g) charges.

When a felon possesses multiple weapons, only one offense

is committed, unless the weapons are stored or acquired at

different times or places. In other words, where there is

more than one charge under section 922(g), separate acquisition and storage of the weapons is an element of the crimes

charged. Although the language of section 922(g) does not

expressly require a finding of separate acquisition and storage in order to convict a defendant for multiple 922(g)

charges where the possession of multiple weapons is alleged,

courts have read this element into section 922(g). See United

States v. Szalkiewicz, 944 F.2d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing

United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 294 (10th Cir. 1983)

and United States v. Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239, 245 (3d Cir.

1982)).

Uncertainty as to the unit of prosecution intended by

Congress in section 922(g) exists because of the use of the

ambiguous word "any" in defining the crime. 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g) ("It shall be unlawful for [a convicted felon] . . . to

receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or

transported in interstate or foreign commerce.") (emphasis

added). As the Tenth Circuit explained in Valentine, judicial

construction of such statutes is guided by the Supreme

Court's decision in Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955).

See 706 F.2d at 292-94. In Bell, the Court held that only one

offense under the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. s 2421, occurred

where the defendant transported two women across state

lines on the same trip and in the same vehicle. See 349 U.S.

at 82-83; see also 18 U.S.C. s 2421 (making it a felony to

transport in interstate commerce "any woman or girl for the

purpose of protitution . . . .") (emphasis added). The Court

explained that Congress "has no difficulty in expressing" its

will "when it has the will . . . of defining what it desires to

make the unit of prosecution and, more particularly, to make

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each stick in a faggot a single criminal unit. When Congress

leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an

undeclared will, the ambiguity should be decided in favor of

lenity." Bell, 349 U.S. at 83; see also Valentine, 706 F.2d at

293 & n.10 ("When a convicted felon simultaneously possesses

two guns, . . . the definition of the offense . . . as possession of

any firearm permits both the conclusion that only one offense

has been committed and the conclusion that two seperate

crimes have occurred.") (citing Bell and listing cases in which

circuits have held section 922 to require a finding of seperate

acquisition and storage in order to uphold multiple weapon

possessions convictions).

Whether the weapons were separately acquired or stored is

a question of fact for the jury, not a question of law for the

court. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995)

(because materiality is an element of a violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 1001, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that a

conviction thereof rest on a jury finding of materiality);

United States v. Dale, No. 97-3023, slip op. at 4 (D.C. Cir.

Apr. 14, 1998). In this case, the jury was never instructed to

find that the weapons were separately acquired or stored in

order to convict on each section 922(g) charge, and thus these

convictions must merge into one.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, we reverse Barron's

convictions on counts 56, 57, and 60. Appellants raised

several other challenges to their convictions, all of which have

been considered by this court and found to lack merit.

Therefore, the District Court judgment is affirmed with regard to the remaining convictions.

However, as explained above, various of Appellants' convictions should have been merged for sentencing purposes.

Accordingly, we remand to the sentencing court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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