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Parties Involved:
Attorney General, State of Florida
Appellee
Anthony Hollis
Appellant
Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-10935

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 6:11-cv-01977-RBD-DAB

ANTHONY HOLLIS, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

 versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Respondents-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(October 8, 2015)

Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Anthony Hollis, a Florida prisoner, appeals through counsel the district 

court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. A certificate of appealability (“COA”) was granted on the following 

issue: “whether Hollis’s trial counsel was ineffective in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment for failing to locate the ATM photographs prior to trial.” On appeal, 

Hollis argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover certain 

inculpatory ATM photographs, and that he was prejudiced because he would have 

accepted the state’s eight-year pre-trial plea offer had he known about the photos. 

He contends that the district court improperly focused its prejudice analysis on the 

purported fairness of the trial and other post-plea considerations, rather than on the 

pre-trial plea negotiation context.

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a habeas petition under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Maharaj v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 304 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th 

Cir. 2002). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law 

and fact that we also review de novo. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th 

Cir. 2010).

As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) prohibits federal courts from granting habeas 

relief on claims previously adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state 

court decision (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

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clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, or 

(2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A 

state court decision involves an unreasonable application of federal law when the 

state court identifies the correct Supreme Court precedent but unreasonably applies 

that legal rule to the facts of the particular case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

413, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1524, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 

(delivering the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Part II). 

A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be 

correct, unless rebutted by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1). Although the Supreme Court has not defined the precise relationship 

between § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1), it has noted that “a state-court factual 

determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would 

have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 

__, __, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15, 187 L. Ed. 2d 348 (2013) (quotation omitted). 

Under Strickland,

1 a movant demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel 

by showing that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. 

Johnson v. Sec’y, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 928 (11th Cir. 2011). Under the first prong 

 1 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

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of Strickland, performance is deficient when it falls below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and is “outside the wide range of professionally competent 

assistance.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

Under the prejudice prong of Strickland, the petitioner must show a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. __, __, 132 S. 

Ct. 1376, 1384, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012). In the context of pleas, the prejudice 

requirement focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance 

affected the outcome of the plea process. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. 

Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985). A petitioner may demonstrate prejudice by 

showing the loss of the plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction on 

more serious charges or the imposition of a more severe sentence. Lafler, 566 U.S. 

at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1387. A habeas petitioner must carry his burden on both 

Strickland prongs to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Bishop v. 

Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1254 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 67 

(2014). A court need not address both prongs if the defendant has made an 

insufficient showing on one. Id.

When viewing a Strickland claim through the lens of § 2254(d)’s 

unreasonableness standard, the pivotal question is whether the state court’s 

application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable. Harrington v. Richter,

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562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011). This Court has 

stated that this “double deference” standard is “doubly difficult” for petitioners to 

overcome, and it will therefore be a “rare case” in which an ineffective-assistance 

claim denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in a federal habeas 

proceeding. Gissendaner v. Seabolt, 735 F.3d 1311, 1323 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(alternation and quotation omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 159 (2014).

Here, the district court found that, even assuming that counsel was deficient 

for failing to discover the photographs prior to trial, Hollis failed to demonstrate 

prejudice under the second prong of Strickland. We agree with the district court’s 

determination that the state court did not unreasonably apply federal law. 

Although Hollis did not know about the ATM photographs, he rejected the state’s 

plea offers despite knowing that the state had substantial evidence against him. 

Hollis did not allege that he was unaware of the strong evidence that the state 

eventually presented at trial, including several witnesses who gave strong evidence 

of his guilt, and even evidence of Hollis’ fingerprints on the fraudulently-obtained 

checks. Therefore, given the relative weakness of the “fuzzy” ATM photographs 

compared to the state’s other substantial evidence, Hollis did not demonstrate a 

reasonable probability that he would have accepted a plea offer had he known 

about the ATM photographs prior to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 

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370. And Hollis certainly did not establish that the state court’s decision was an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. 

AFFIRMED.

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