Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01077/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kempheny Stewart
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1077

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Kempheny Stewart, *

*

Appellee. *

__________

Submitted: October 18, 2007

Filed: December 5, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. 

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Kempheny Stewart (Stewart) pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 500 grams

or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii),

and 846. Stewart’s advisory sentencing Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months’

imprisonment with a mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment.

After the government filed a motion for downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1

and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), the district court imposed a sentence of 99 months’

imprisonment. For the reasons stated below, we vacate Stewart’s sentence and

remand the case to the district court for resentencing.

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I. BACKGROUND

Neither party challenges the facts leading to Stewart’s guilty plea nor do they

dispute Stewart’s advisory sentencing Guidelines range. The only disputed issue is

whether Stewart’s sentence is reasonable. Thus, we briefly state the relevant facts for

our decision to remand this case for resentencing.

Stewart pled guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more

of methamphetamine. The unobjected-to presentence investigation report (PSR)

indicated, due to prior felony drug trafficking convictions, Stewart was a career

offender, making his total offense level 34 and his criminal history category VI.

Stewart’s advisory Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months, and his mandatory

minimum sentence was 240 months’ imprisonment. As part of his plea agreement,

Stewart cooperated with the government, and the government filed motions for a

downward reduction based on substantial assistance under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18

U.S.C. § 3553(e).

At sentencing, and based on Stewart’s substantial assistance, the government

recommended a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment, four offense levels

(approximately 30%) below the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range and 25%

below the mandatory minimum sentence. Stewart argued his sentence should be 120

months’ imprisonment. The district court reduced the sentence further and imposed

a sentence of 99 months’ imprisonment. Stewart’s sentence represented an eleven

level downward departure, more than a 60% reduction from the bottom of the

advisory Guidelines range and almost a 60% reduction from the mandatory minimum

sentence.

Arguing Stewart’s sentence reduction of eleven levels is unreasonable, the

government appeals.

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II. DISCUSSION

“When sentencing a defendant, the district court must first determine the

applicable advisory Guidelines range . . . relying upon [the defendant’s] offense level

and criminal history.” United States v. Dalton, 478 F.3d 879, 881 (8th Cir. 2007)

(Dalton II). “The district court can then decide if a traditional departure from that

advisory range is warranted, including one based upon substantial assistance motions,

by utilizing the Guidelines and the policy statements contained therein, and if so,

arrive at a final advisory Guidelines sentence.” Id. A district court is without

authority to impose a sentence below a mandatory minimum sentence unless, for

example, the government files a motion for downward reduction based on a

defendant’s substantial assistance. See United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130,

1130-31 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)). “Where a court has authority

to sentence below a statutory minimum only by virtue of a government motion under

§ 3553(e), the reduction below the statutory minimum must be based exclusively on

assistance-related considerations.” Id.; see also United States v. Peterson, No. 06-

3916, 2007 WL 3376981, at *1 (8th Cir. 2007) (Peterson II). 

“When determining the appropriate extent of a substantial-assistance downward

departure, the district court should consider the following five factors: (1) the court’s

evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s assistance, taking into

consideration the government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered; (2) the

truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided

by the defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance; (4) any injury

suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from

his assistance; [and] (5) the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance.” United States

v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005) (Dalton I) (citing U.S.S.G. §

5K1.1(a)). “These five factors are not ‘an exhaustive list,’ and the district court is not

required ‘to examine each of the listed factors in § 5K1.1 on the record and explain

exactly just what weight it gives to each in its departure decision.’” Id.

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In addition, we follow the rule that extraordinary circumstances are required to

justify extraordinary reductions from the advisory sentencing Guidelines range. See

United States v. Meyer, 452 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2006). By extraordinary

reductions we mean departures or variances “we have considered particularly large

relative to the two to four offense level adjustments generally envisioned by the

structure of the sentencing guidelines for mitigating or aggravating circumstances.”

United States v. Burns, 500 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing United

States v. Saenz, 428 F.3d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 2005)). We must conduct a

proportionality analysis. Id. at 761-62; see also Peterson II, 2007 WL 3376981, at *2.

“[O]ur extraordinary reduction/extraordinary circumstances formulation requires

circumstances of a strength proportional to the extent of the deviation from reductions

envisioned by the guidelines’s structure.” Burns, 500 F.3d at 761-62. “Extraordinary

circumstances are infrequently found and involve assistance going well beyond that

provided by other defendants.” Id. at 763.

If a defendant’s sentence is appealed, “[w]e review de novo the district court’s

interpretation and application of the Guidelines, we review for clear error the district

court’s factual findings, and we review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s

decision to depart from the appropriate Guideline range.” United States v. Peterson,

455 F.3d 834, 837 (8th Cir. 2006) (Peterson I). We have previously stated, “what the

district court is required to do is act reasonably when exercising the discretion it is

given, and we will not infer a reasoned exercise of discretion from a record that

suggests otherwise or is silent.” Dalton I, 404 F.3d at 1033.

With these precepts in mind, we find two flaws in Stewart’s sentence. First, the

district court failed to state how it arrived at a 99-month sentence. The record is silent

with respect to the district court’s evaluation of Stewart’s assistance to the

government. Thus, the record does not show a reasoned exercise of the district court’s

sentencing discretion.

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The government also argues the district court may have impermissibly blended

Stewart’s criminal history with notions of substantial assistance in imposing Stewart’s

sentence. For purposes of a substantial assistance motion, considering criminal

history would be wrong. See Peterson II, 2007 WL 3376981 at *1; Williams, 474

F.3d at 1130-31. However, from this record, we cannot discern specifically how the

district court considered Stewart’s criminal history in rendering the sentence. Thus,

we cannot conduct a meaningful review of this issue.

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Second, the record does not indicate any extraordinary circumstances in

Stewart’s assistance that could possibly justify the district court’s extraordinary

reduction of eleven levels. In the U.S.S.G § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e) motions, the

government assessed Stewart’s assistance as timely, truthful, complete, reliable, useful

to secure other guilty pleas by other co-conspirators, and instrumental in securing the

guilty plea of a person considered a “ringleader.” On the other hand, in its substantial

assistance motion, the government also states, “[t]he defendant did not engage in any

proactive assistance such as conducting a ‘controlled buy’ of narcotics or wearing a

listening device to gather evidence. While the [d]efendant agreed to testify if

requested to do so, he ultimately did not testify in any proceeding.” “A substantial

assistance reduction is judged by the degree and quality of the assistance actually

provided, not the defendant’s willingness to do more and inability to do so.” Peterson

II, 2007 WL 3376981 at *2. Stewart’s assistance, based on the government’s motion

alone, could not reasonably be characterized as sufficiently extraordinary to merit an

eleven level sentence reduction. The record also does not indicate Stewart or his

family were ever injured, in danger, or at risk. Stewart’s assistance, as related in this

record, is not extraordinary.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the district court did not indicate (1) how Stewart’s assistance was

evaluated and (2) what extraordinary circumstances could exist justifying this

extraordinary reduction of eleven levels in Stewart’s sentence, we cannot determine

the district court reasonably exercised its discretion in sentencing Stewart.1

 We,

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therefore, vacate Stewart’s sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this

opinion.

______________________________

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