Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01704/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01704-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Alfano
Plaintiff
Nicole Alfano
Plaintiff
BRP Inc.
Defendant
BRP US Inc.
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICOLE ALFANO and MICHAEL 

ALFANO,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

BRP Inc. and BRP US Inc., and 

DOES 1 through 50 inclusive,

 Defendants.

______________________________/

Case No. 2:08-cv-1704-JAM-DAD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS‟ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants BRP Inc. 

and BRP US Inc.‟s (“BRP” or “Defendants”) motion for summary 

adjudication pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

(Doc. # 75). Plaintiffs Nicole and Michael Alfano (“Plaintiffs”)

oppose the motion. (Doc. # 101). A hearing on this motion was 

held on June 2, 2010.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is a products liability action arising from a personal 

watercraft incident that occurred on September 15, 2007 on New 

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Bullards Bar Reservoir in Yuba County, California. Plaintiff, 

Nicole Alfano, was riding as a passenger on-board a 2005 BRP 

Sea-Doo GXT personal watercraft (the “PWC”) operated by the PWC 

owner, Jill Smith. After Jill Smith accelerated the PWC, 

Plaintiff lost her grip on the seat strap, fell off the rear of 

the PWC and into the water at or near the location of the PWC‟s 

propulsion jet nozzle (“jet nozzle”) and sustained severe 

internal injuries. Plaintiffs‟ claims against BRP are for strict 

and negligent product liability based on the design of the 

subject PWC and failure to warn.

In the instant motion, Defendants BRP Inc. and BRP US Inc.

seek summary adjudication on Plaintiffs‟ claims of strict and 

negligent product liability based on failure to warn. (Doc. # 

75). Plaintiffs oppose the motion. (Doc. # 101).

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment or summary adjudication is proper “if the 

pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and 

any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Because the purpose of 

summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually 

unsupported claims or defenses,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986), “[i]f summary judgment is not rendered 

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on the whole action, the court should, to the extent 

practicable, determine what material facts are not genuinely at 

issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). 

If the moving party meets its burden, the burden of production 

then shifts so that “the non-moving party must set forth, by 

affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, „specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.‟” T.W. Elec. 

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass‟n, 809 F.2d 626, 

630 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The Court 

must view the facts and draw inferences in the manner most 

favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, 

Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).

A “scintilla of evidence” is insufficient to support the 

non-moving party‟s position; “there must be evidence on which 

the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Accordingly, this Court applies to 

either a defendant‟s or plaintiff‟s motion for summary judgment 

essentially the same standard as for a motion for directed 

verdict, which is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient 

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so 

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one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. 

at 251-52.

B. Failure to Warn

To find a manufacturer liable for failing to warn, a 

plaintiff must prove the manufacturer‟s failure to warn was the 

proximate cause of the plaintiff‟s injuries. Conte v. Wyeth 

Inc., 168 Cal.App.4th 89, 112 (Cal. 1st DCA 2009). A 

manufacturer of a product can only be liable for those injuries 

proximately caused by breach of its duty to communicate adequate 

product warnings. Carlin v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 4th 1104, 

1110 (Cal. 4th 1996).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not and cannot put 

forth admissible evidence to satisfy their burden of proof on 

the essential element of causation to their strict and negligent 

product liability failure to warn claims. The PWC involved in 

this case contains warnings, both on-board the subject PWC and 

within the Operator‟s Guide, that all users must wear protective 

clothing, namely a wet suit or equivalent clothing, to prevent 

severe internal injuries resulting from falling in to the water 

at or near the location of the jet nozzle. Plaintiff testified 

in her deposition that she noticed, but did not read, BRP‟s onproduct warning label.

Defendants contend that Nicole Alfano‟s (“Nicole”) 

testimony that she would have acted a certain way or heeded to 

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the warning had the warning label been adequate is inadmissible 

as it is too speculative and self-serving pursuant to Federal 

Rules of Evidence Sections 602 and 701. See Nevada Power Co. v. 

Monsanto Company, 891 F.Supp. 1406 (9th Cir. 1995). Also, BRP 

argues that the fact that Nicole Alfano saw the warning label 

and did not read it, even though she admitted that “nothing 

prevented her from reading it,” precludes a finding of proximate 

cause as Nicole did not intend to read or rely on the warning. 

Plaintiffs contend that the very nature of the label‟s 

inadequacy is what caused Nicole to ignore the warning. Had the 

warning label been adequate, Nicole would have looked at it. 

Plaintiffs assert that BRP knows that users do not heed its 

warning to wear protective clothing and therefore BRP had a duty 

to provide a short and plain warning to consumers. Plaintiffs 

assert it is unreasonable to expect consumers to read and 

process such a lengthy message as was containing on the subject 

PWC. Thus, Plaintiffs argue a genuine issue of fact exists as to 

whether the label‟s inadequacy is what caused Nicole to ignore 

it. Herrera v. Louisville Ladder Group, LLC, 2009 WL 3849705 at 

*3-4. The Herrera case however, does not address whether the 

Plaintiff can testify as to whether a different warning would 

have altered her conduct. Rather, the only issue before the 

Court in Herrera was the adequacy of the warning.

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Here, it is undisputed that Nicole Alfano did not read the 

PWC warning. Although Plaintiffs argue that the label‟s 

inadequacy is what caused Nicole Alfano to ignore the warning, 

Plaintiffs have offered no admissible evidence which creates the 

existence of a material factual dispute concerning causation. 

Normally, undisputed evidence that a plaintiff failed to read 

instructions or warnings which were provided with the product is 

sufficient to entitle the defendant to judgment as a matter of 

law. See Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659, 661 (9th 

Cir.2004). California law requires proof that “the inadequacy or 

absence of the warning was a substantial cause of the 

plaintiff‟s injury.” Plummer v. Lederle Laboratories, Div. of 

American Cyanamid Co., 819 F.2d 349, 358 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1987); 

see Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 6 Cal. 4th 539 (Cal.1993)(requiring 

“causal connection between the representations or omissions that 

accompanied the product and plaintiff‟s injury”). California, 

unlike some other states, has not adopted a rebuttable 

presumption that a person would have heeded an adequate warning. 

See Motus, 196 F.Supp.2d at 991-95. As such, the Plaintiff bears 

the burden of proving through affirmative evidence that the 

inadequate warning was the proximate cause of her injuries.

Here, even assuming Plaintiffs‟ argument that a jury could 

find inadequacy of the warning, Plaintiffs are unable to 

establish that an adequate warning would have altered Nicole 

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Alfano‟s conduct. The Court finds that Nicole‟s testimony that 

she would have acted a certain way or heeded to the warning had 

it been adequate is inadmissible as it is too speculative and 

self-serving pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence Sections 602 

and 701. See Nevada Power Co. v. Monsanto Company, 891 F. Supp. 

1406 (9th Cir. 1995)(the court held that plaintiff‟s testimony 

that he would have not have used the equipment at all had he 

known more fully of the dangers was too speculative and selfserving). In the absence of any other supporting evidence or 

facts on the issue of causation, the Court concludes that

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate there exists a genuine 

issue of material fact on the causation issue, which is an 

essential element to their claims for both strict and negligent 

product liability for failure to warn. Accordingly, Plaintiffs‟ 

strict and negligent failure to warn claims fail as a matter of 

law.

III. ORDER

For the above reasons, Defendants BRP Inc. and BRP US

Inc.‟s motion for summary adjudication on Plaintiffs‟ strict and 

negligent product liability failure to warn claims is hereby 

GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 3, 2010

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