Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-15-06499/USCOURTS-ca4-15-06499-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6499

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LARRY JOHNSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. 

(1:07-cr-00153-RDB-1; 1:15-cv-00536-RDB)

Submitted: September 17, 2015 Decided: November 5, 2015

Before WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. Debra Lynn Dwyer, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM: 

Larry Johnson appeals from the district court’s order 

dismissing as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion his 

self-styled motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b). We vacate the district court’s order and remand 

for further proceedings. 

“[A] Rule 60(b) motion in a habeas proceeding that attacks 

‘the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on 

the merits’ is not a true Rule 60(b) motion, but rather a 

successive habeas [application]” and is subject to the 

preauthorization requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2012) 

for successive applications. United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 

392, 397 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 

524, 531-32 (2005)). By contrast, a “Rule 60(b) motion that 

challenges ‘some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas 

proceedings’ . . . is a true Rule 60(b) motion, and is not 

subject to the preauthorization requirement.” Id. (quoting 

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531-32). Where, however, a motion 

“‘presents claims subject to the requirements for successive 

applications as well as claims cognizable under Rule 60(b),’” 

such a motion is a mixed Rule 60(b)/§ 2255 motion. See id. at 

400 (quoting United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 207 (4th 

Cir. 2003)). 

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In his motion for relief from judgment, Johnson asserted a 

perceived defect in his § 2255 proceeding, and he raised 

challenges to his conviction and sentence. Accordingly, the 

motion was a mixed Rule 60(b)/§ 2255 motion. See McRae, 793

F.3d 400; Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.4 (holding that a movant 

files a true Rule 60(b) motion “when he . . . asserts that a 

previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in 

error”); Winestock, 340 F.3d at 207 (stating that “a motion 

directly attacking the prisoner’s conviction or sentence will 

usually amount to a successive application”). 

The district court did not afford Johnson the opportunity 

to elect between deleting his successive § 2255 claims from his 

motion or having his entire motion treated as a successive 

§ 2255 motion. See McRae, 793 F.3d at 400 (“This Court has 

made clear that ‘[w]hen [a] motion presents claims subject to 

the requirements for successive applications as well as claims 

cognizable under Rule 60(b), the district court should afford 

the applicant an opportunity to elect between deleting the 

improper claims or having the entire motion treated as a 

successive application.’” (quoting Winestock, 340 F.3d at 207)). 

We therefore vacate the district court’s order and remand for 

further proceedings. 

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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

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