Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03125/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03125-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas Taylor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 9, 2007 Decided August 14, 2007

No. 05-3125

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

THOMAS TAYLOR,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00217-01)

Richard Seligman, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Robert E. Leidenheimer, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney,

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were

Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III,

Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

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1 Several variations of the deputy’s name appear in the record. He

is variously called Hoffmaster, Hoffman, and Haufmaster.

Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Appellant Thomas Taylor challenges his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction, arguing that the

charge should have been dismissed on statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds and that in any case his trial was

contaminated by improperly admitted evidence. For reasons

detailed below, we reject his contentions and affirm his conviction.

I

On March 6, 2003, shortly before 9:00 A.M., a warrant squad

from the U.S. Marshals Service went to 722 Quincy Street,

N.W., to execute a parole warrant for Mr. Taylor. The officers

knocked on the door, and the appellant’s grandmother, Mildred

Alice Taylor, answered. Deputy Bob Haufmaster1

 said,

“Thomas Taylor.” Mrs. Taylor, who owned the house, responded “yes” and stepped aside, whereupon the officers

entered. When they again asked for the appellant, Mrs. Taylor

directed them downstairs.

While two of the officers remained with Mrs. Taylor, the rest

proceeded downstairs to search. Deputy Andrew Fang lifted a

blanket that covered a bed and peered underneath to see if Mr.

Taylor was hiding there. Instead of a person, he found what he

instantly recognized as a gun case.

The team eventually located the appellant in the basement

bathroom and arrested him. Deputy Fang then extracted the

case from beneath the bed and opened it, confirming it contained

a loaded gun.

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Shortly thereafter, Agent Jeffrey Meixner from the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives came to 722 Quincy

Street to collect the gun. Mrs. Taylor gave him permission to

look around. While downstairs, he noticed an ID and a checkbook sitting in plain view on a nightstand by the bed. He took

custody of those materials and of the weapon.

Mr. Taylor was arrested for parole violation. Two months

later, on May 27, 2003, he was indicted for possession of a

firearm and ammunition by a person convicted of a crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). For reasons not relevant to

our disposition, but apparently based at least in part on governmental negligence, Mr. Taylor was not arraigned until March 5,

2004. At that time, Mr. Taylor, through his attorney, orally

moved for dismissal based on the delay.

This motion to dismiss was reduced to writing on May 3,

2004, and filed in conjunction with a motion to suppress the

gun. Mr. Taylor argued the Speedy Trial Act—specifically 18

U.S.C. § 3161(b) and (j)—required dismissal. The court took

both motions under advisement on May 12 when the government submitted oppositions. The court denied the dismissal

motion orally on August 5, and denied the suppression motion

in writing the following day.

Meanwhile, the trial was scheduled to begin May 20 but was

delayed. Mr. Taylor offered on May 20 to “waive his right to a

speedy trial up until August 18th.” Eventually the trial was

rescheduled for August 10. That morning, Mr. Taylor moved

for reconsideration of the order denying suppression, and the

court denied the motion. The trial then began at last, and the

jury convicted Mr. Taylor two days later, on August 12.

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2Mr. Taylor’s motion to dismiss also cited 18 U.S.C. § 3161(j),

violation of which results in sanctions but not dismissal. See id.

§ 3162(b). He has not pursued this argument on appeal.

3Arguments could be made for both higher and lower levels of

deference. On one side, Mr. Taylor requests de novo review, citing

Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976 (2006). But to the extent

Zedner can be read to establish that Speedy Trial Act violations

automatically affect substantial rights, this rule applies only to failure

by a district court to make explicit findings as required by 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(8), a provision not at issue in this case. See Zedner, 126

S. Ct. at 1989–90. At the other extreme, under § 3162(a)(2), a

defendant’s failure to “move for dismissal prior to trial” constitutes

II

We consider first Mr. Taylor’s argument that his interest in

a speedy trial requires dismissal of the charges against him,

addressing his statutory and constitutional arguments in turn.

A

Before the district court, Mr. Taylor moved to dismiss based

on 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), which limits the time between arrest

and indictment.2 Mr. Taylor has however not renewed this

argument before us, and we treat it as abandoned. Instead, he

now seeks dismissal based on § 3161(c)(1), which requires a

criminal defendant’s trial to begin “within seventy days from the

. . . indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared

before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is

pending, whichever date last occurs.”

As Mr. Taylor did not make this argument below, we

review the district court’s decision not to dismiss (sua sponte) on

§ 3161(c)(1) grounds for plain error only. See Johnson v.

United States, 520 U.S. 461, 464 (1997) (citing FED.R.CRIM.P.

52(b)).3 Under that standard of review, we will correct a district

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waiver of § 3161(c) claims. It is unclear whether Mr. Taylor’s motion

to dismiss based on a separate provision suffices to avoid waiver. In

the end, however, all roads lead to Rome: As we find no error, much

less a plain error, we would affirm regardless of how we read Zedner

and § 3162.

court’s error only if (1) there is in fact an error to correct; (2) the

error is “plain”; (3) it “affects substantial rights”; and (4) it

“seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” Id. at 466–67 (alterations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

The Speedy Trial Act excludes certain periods from its

seventy-day clock, two of which are important here. First, we

exclude any “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the

filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or

other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(1)(F). If no hearing is held, this exclusion runs

through “the day the court receives all the papers it reasonably

expects to help it decide the motion.” United States v. Saro, 24

F.3d 283, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Second, once that period expires, we exclude “delay

reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days,

during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is

actually under advisement by the court.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(1)(J).

Mr. Taylor was indicted on May 27, 2003, but did not make

his first appearance before the court until March 5, 2004. The

Speedy Trial Act clock would normally start with that latter

date, but at that appearance Mr. Taylor entered an oral motion

to dismiss. We now join several of our sister circuits in holding

that exclusion under § 3161(h)(1)(F) is triggered by written and

oral motions alike. Accord, e.g., United States v. Broadwater,

151 F.3d 1359, 1361 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United

States v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 1159, 1164–65 (1st Cir. 1995);

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4The government would have us exclude August 10 based on the

motion for reconsideration Mr. Taylor entered that day. Such an

approach would effectively extend the § 3161(c)(1) limit from seventy

days to seventy-one. Suppose, for instance, a defendant is arraigned

on March 1, so that trial must begin no later than May 10, seventy

days later. Trial is instead scheduled for May 11, one day late. Prior

to May 11, there is no violation. Under the government’s proposed

rule, if the defendant moves for dismissal on May 11 on speedy trial

grounds, this excludes May 11 from the count, so that paradoxically

the trial is now timely; conversely, if the defendant does not so move,

then the seventy-day limit is waived under § 3162(a)(2). Thus, the

defendant has no way to vindicate the Speedy Trial Act guarantee of

trial within seventy days. In order to avoid a result clearly at odds

with the statute, we must ignore pretrial motions filed on the day of

the trial for Speedy Trial Act purposes; equivalently, we deem the Act

violated when dawn breaks on the seventy-first day without a trial,

regardless of what happens later that day.

United States v. Moses, 15 F.3d 774, 776 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994);

United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 130–31 (2d Cir. 1985).

Thus, we exclude March 5 through May 12, when the final

papers related to Mr. Taylor’s motions to dismiss and to

suppress were filed. We then exclude the next thirty days,

through June 11, based on § 3161(h)(1)(J). Under Zedner v.

United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1985 (2006), Mr. Taylor’s

attempted prospective waiver of his Speedy Trial Act rights on

May 20 had no effect. Therefore, we begin counting on June 12

and continue counting through August 10, the day the trial

began. See United States v. Harris, No. 05-3026, slip op. at 5

n.1 (D.C. Cir. June 22, 2007) (“[A] logical consequence of not

counting the date of indictment toward the seventy-day total is

that we must count the date of trial . . . .”).4

 That comes to sixty

days, well within § 3161(c)(1)’s seventy-day limit. Hence, there

was no Speedy Trial Act violation, and we deny Mr. Taylor’s

request that we remand with instructions to dismiss on this

ground.

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B

In the alternative, Mr. Taylor seeks dismissal of the charge

against him based on the Speedy Trial Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. We review claimed violations based on “four separate enquiries: whether delay before

trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the

criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in

due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and

whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.” Doggett v.

United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992).

As Doggett explained, “[s]imply to trigger a speedy trial

analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between

accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary

from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Id. at 651–52.

Moreover, “as the term is used in this threshold context, ‘presumptive prejudice’ does not necessarily indicate a statistical

probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which

courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the

[constitutional] enquiry.” Id. at 652 n.1. “Depending on the

nature of the charges,” the Court noted, “the lower courts have

generally found postaccusation delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches one year.” Id.

Here, the entire delay between indictment and trial barely

exceeded one year. Assuming this is sufficient to trigger the

Doggett inquiry, we must next “consider, as one factor among

several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare

minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.”

Id. at 652. This is because “the presumption that pretrial delay

has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.” Id. In this

case, because the delay only just exceeded that bare minimum,

the presumption has not “intensifie[d]” at all. Nor has Mr.

Taylor been able to establish any actual prejudice, which the

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Court identified as including “oppressive pretrial incarceration,

anxiety and concern of the accused, and the possibility that the

[accused’s] defense will be impaired by dimming memories and

loss of exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 654 (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Because “presumptive

prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim,” id. at

656, particularly in the weak form presented here, Mr. Taylor’s

claim fails.

III

Having determined dismissal is not required, we turn to Mr.

Taylor’s evidentiary arguments. He maintains the officers

violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering 722 Quincy

Street without a reasonable belief he lived there and was present;

exceeded the permissible scope of their search by looking under

his bed; improperly opened the gun case without first obtaining

a warrant; and seized various identifying materials without a

warrant.

Deputy Fang testified that fugitives had been known to

hollow out bedsprings as hiding places; thus, assuming the

officers could enter the house, looking under the bed represented

no violation, despite the fact Mr. Taylor would not have fit

under the bed absent such modifications. See Maryland v. Buie,

494 U.S. 325, 332–33 (1990). Also, Agent Meixner received

permission from Mrs. Taylor to look around, and the ID and

checkbook he seized were in plain view; therefore, absent

antecedent violations, seizure of those items was proper even if

we assume Mr. Taylor did not waive this argument. See FED.R.

CRIM. P. 12(e) (waiver); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,

134–37 (1990) (plain view); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.

164, 169–71 (1974) (consent). We now address Mr. Taylor’s

two remaining evidentiary arguments in greater detail.

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A

Since the parole warrant contained no information regarding

his residence, Mr. Taylor argues the officers had no reason to

believe he was at 722 Quincy Street and hence no authority to

enter. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980).

Other documents, such as Mr. Taylor’s inmate record, do show

the 722 Quincy Street address, but there is no evidence anyone

in the warrant squad saw those documents.

Undoubtedly, this lacuna in the evidentiary record could

easily have been filled. Mr. Taylor was a parolee. His parole

agreement necessarily contained a current address, and his

parole agent must have known where to find him. Officers

executing an arrest warrant may enter a dwelling given “reasonable belief” that the suspect lives there and is present at the time.

United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

In Thomas, we upheld a search despite “the absence of testimony about where the marshals got Thomas’ address,” as (1)

Thomas was a parolee, required to keep his current address on

file, and (2) one of the warrant officers testified Thomas’s

address had been ascertained after an “investigation.” Id.

Crucially, we took the term “investigation” to indicate “‘a

systematic official inquiry’” as opposed to “a mere hunch,

surmise, or suspicion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

But here the government failed to comply even with

Thomas’s modest requirements. With the record devoid of proof

the warrant squad arrived at 722 Quincy Street with the requisite

reasonable belief, the search was improper unless some additional information gathered at the scene, prior to the officers’

entry into the house, supported such a reasonable belief.

Specifically, the question is whether the terse exchange between

Deputy Haufmaster and Mrs. Taylor provided sufficient reason

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5During her testimony at trial, Mrs. Taylor confessed she had had

an “idea” why the officers had come to her house: Thomas had

violated his parole. Trial Tr. 48:25 to 49:9, Aug. 10, 2004 (P.M.).

to believe Mr. Taylor lived at 722 Quincy Street and was

currently present.

The colloquy at the door makes Marshal Will Kane from

“High Noon” seem garrulous. (Deputy Haufmaster: “Thomas

Taylor.” Mrs. Taylor: “Yes.” Curtain.) Nevertheless, it is

clear this brief dialogue satisfied the Payton standard. Mrs.

Taylor recognized the men at her front door as law enforcement

officers. Mot. Hr’g Tr. 6:13–16, May 12, 2004. At least one,

she says, flashed his badge. Id. at 3:18–19. She interpreted the

words, “Thomas Taylor,” as an interrogative: Is Thomas Taylor

here? She replied affirmatively.5

 After the officers entered,

Deputy Haufmaster repeated, “Thomas Taylor,” which Mrs.

Taylor again took as a query: Where is Thomas Taylor? She

responded, “He’s in the basement.”

This is sufficient for Payton and Thomas. Mrs. Taylor’s

initial response supported a reasonable belief that Thomas

Taylor lived in the house, and the early hour alone sufficed to

suggest he would be present, see Thomas, 429 F.3d at 286

(citing United States v. May, 68 F.3d 515, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1995),

and United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 319 (2d Cir. 1983)).

As it happened, Mrs. Taylor’s subsequent comment that the

appellant was in the basement reinforced the officers’ already

reasonable belief that he was present.

Undaunted, the appellant argues his case should really be

controlled by Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).

But Steagald is doubly inapposite. First, in that case, officers

searched Steagald’s home based on an arrest warrant for a

separate person, Ricky Lyons. Id. at 206. By contrast, here the

police looked for Mr. Taylor in his own home, and an arrest

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warrant alone is sufficient to authorize the entry into a person’s

home to effect his arrest. Id. at 214 n.7 (quoting Payton, 445

U.S. at 602–03). Second, Steagald involved the Fourth Amendment rights of a third-party homeowner, not those of the subject

of the arrest warrant. Id. at 212. Therefore, even if we treat

Mrs. Taylor as the sole resident of 722 Quincy Street, Steagald

limits the evidence that could be used against her, but not the

evidence that can be used against the appellant. See United

States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731–33 (1980).

Thus, Mr. Taylor’s argument on this point fails, and we

affirm the district court’s ruling: As Deputy Haufmaster’s

exchange with Mrs. Taylor at the threshold of the house

supported a reasonable belief that Mr. Taylor lived at 722

Quincy Street and was present at the time, the officers’ entry

was proper.

B

In light of our holdings above, the warrant squad properly

entered 722 Quincy Street, lifted the blanket, and seized the gun

case, which was by then in plain view. But Mr. Taylor then

argues Deputy Fang violated his Fourth Amendment rights by

opening the case without a warrant or any valid exception to the

warrant requirement.

Indeed, as a rule, even when officers may lawfully seize a

package, they must obtain a warrant before examining its

contents. See, e.g., Horton, 496 U.S. at 141 n.11; United States

v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). However, the Supreme

Court has suggested an important exception:

Not all containers and packages found by police during the

course of a search will deserve the full protection of the

Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a

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kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature

cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy

because their contents can be inferred from their outward

appearance.

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764–65 n.13 (1979) (dictum)

(emphasis added).

Sanders decided which of two principles took precedence:

the requirement that officers obtain a warrant before opening a

package, as described in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1

(1977), or the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement, as described in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132

(1925). In the footnote quoted above, the Sanders majority

suggested that with some packages, the precedence question

would be moot, as there would be no reasonable expectation of

privacy as to the contents in the first place. Addressing only

those packages that sufficiently concealed their contents,

Sanders held that the Chadwick rule took precedence. The

Court later reversed course in California v. Acevedo, overturning

Sanders with regard to the precedence order of the two rules, but

Acevedo did not address the footnote’s proposed exception. 500

U.S. 565, 579 (1991).

This court, sitting en banc, adopted the Sanders dictum as

the law of the circuit in United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159

(D.C. Cir. 1981) (Ross I). That case asked whether, under

Sanders, the “luggage rule” took precedence over the automobile exception only for large, durable containers, or for all

containers, including paper bags. The majority held that the

“unworthy container” doctrine was unworkable, and that the

Sanders dictum “indicated when the nature of the container

would justify immediate search.” Id. at 1170. Thus, under Ross

I, the privacy interest inherent in any closed container that did

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not satisfy the Sanders dictum would take precedence over the

automobile exception.

Foreshadowing Acevedo, the Supreme Court overturned

Ross I, holding that where an officer has probable cause to

search a closed container in an automobile, the officer may open

the container even without a warrant. United States v. Ross, 456

U.S. 798, 823 (1982) (Ross II). However, Ross II in no way

undercut the Sanders dictum; indeed, the Court recited that rule

in a footnote, id. at 814 n.19, and based much of its analysis on

the plurality opinion in Robbins v. California, which was limited

to “container[s] that conceal[ their] contents from plain view,”

id. at 822–23 (citing Robbins, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981) (plurality opinion)).

Thus, the Sanders exception remains the law in this circuit,

Ross II notwithstanding. We accordingly reaffirm that gun cases

and similar containers support no reasonable expectation of

privacy if their contents can be inferred from their outward

appearance. Applying this rule, we reject Mr. Taylor’s argument regarding the gun case and hence affirm the district court’s

order denying his motion to suppress the gun.

IV

For the reasons described above, the district court’s denial

of Mr. Taylor’s motions to dismiss and to suppress, as well as

Mr. Taylor’s conviction, are

Affirmed.

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WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: With 

respect to part III.B of the court’s opinion, I find the 

discussion of which rule takes “precedence” confusing, but we 

all agree that under the controlling cases the officers had 

probable cause to search and seize the gun case because, given 

the message sent by its exterior, it was contraband in plain 

view. 

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