Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03326/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03326-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Rafael Vega-Rico
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3326

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the 

* District of South Dakota.

Rafael Vega-Rico, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 15, 2005

Filed: August 10, 2005 

___________

Before MURPHY, BYE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Rafael Vega-Rico ("Vega-Rico") pled guilty in the United States District Court

for the District of South Dakota1

 to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

However, Vega-Rico reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his

motion to suppress statements he made to a Department of Homeland Security

("DHS") agent. We affirm. 

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I. Background

Officer Brad Parker ("Officer Parker") of the Yankton Police Department in

South Dakota stopped a vehicle driven by Loretta Zephier ("Zephier"). Officer Parker

issued Zephier a courtesy warning for failing to signal a lefthand turn. Zephier

informed Officer Parker that her driver's license was either revoked or suspended and

that the vehicle belonged to Vega-Rico, who at the time of the stop was a passenger

in the back seat. While Officer Parker called dispatch for information regarding

Zephier's license status, Officer Jason Foote ("Officer Foote"), along with Rex, a dog

in Officer Foote's canine unit, arrived on the scene as routine backup. At the time of

Zephier's stop, Officer Foote was not involved in any drug investigation and it was

only happenstance that Officer Foote was in a canine unit. 

While Officer Parker interviewed Zephier, Officer Foote approached and

identified the three passengers in the vehicle. Officer Foote walked Rex around the

exterior of the vehicle after the passengers had exited. Rex alerted to the gas fill area

on the driver's side of the vehicle. A search of this area revealed no drugs. Officer

Foote then put Rex in his patrol vehicle and searched the interior of the vehicle,

including the glove box. When Officer Foote located nothing in the interior of the

vehicle, he retrieved Rex and put Rex in the backseat of the vehicle. Rex then went

to the front seat of the vehicle and indicated to the glove box. This time, Officer Foote

found leaves and stems of marijuana in the back corner of the glove box.

Officer Foote then asked Vega-Rico if he had anything illegal on his person.

Officer Foote arrested Vega-Rico and attempted to read Miranda rights to him in

English, but Vega-Rico could not understand them. Vega-Rico was then searched.

Officer Foote found an expired resident alien card and Vega-Rico was placed on

deportation hold.

 The Yankton Police Department advised DHS Agent Kenneth Baird ("Agent

Baird") that Vega-Rico was in their custody. Agent Baird began an investigation to

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determine Vega-Rico's alien status and also obtained booking information from the

Yankton Police Department, including Vega-Rico's fingerprints. This investigation

revealed that a person with Vega-Rico's identity had been previously deported. Agent

Baird informed the Yankton Police Department that he would be picking up VegaRico.

Agent Baird transported Vega-Rico to the Sioux Falls Immigration Office

where he was fingerprinted. Agent Baird conducted a query of the Automated

Fingerprint Identification System Database and verified that Vega-Rico had been

previously deported. Agent Baird gave Vega-Rico Miranda warnings in Spanish,

which Vega-Rico understood. Vega-Rico agreed to speak with Agent Baird, and in

a fifteen-minute interview, also conducted in Spanish, revealed his date and place of

birth and the names of his parents. Vega-Rico also admitted to two prior deportations,

two criminal convictions, and his failure to receive permission to return to the United

States. Agent Baird did not reveal to Vega-Rico the information he had on file

regarding the deportations prior to or during the interview.

Vega-Rico brought motions to suppress the evidence obtained from the vehicle

stop and, most relevant to this appeal, his post-Miranda statements to Agent Baird.

The magistrate judge denied the motions. The district court reversed in part, and held

that the search of Vega-Rico's vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment because Rex

was not sufficiently reliable for drug detection. The district court then suppressed all

evidence, except Vega-Rico's post-Miranda statements to Agent Baird. The district

court held that his statements to Agent Baird were sufficiently an act of free will to

purge the primary taint of the Fourth Amendment violation. Vega-Rico now timely

appeals the denial of the motion to suppress his statements to Agent Baird.

II. Discussion

We review the motion to suppress de novo, but review the district court's

factual findings in deciding the motion for clear error. United States v. Yousif, 308

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F.3d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 2002). Evidence that is the "fruit" of an illegal search or

seizure is not admissible, and "[t]he exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the

indirect as the direct products of such invasions." Wong Sun v. United States, 371

U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963). "Verbal statements obtained as a result of a Fourth

Amendment violation are as much subject to the exclusionary rule as are items of

physical evidence discovered during an illegal search." Yousif, 308 F.3d at 832

(citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485 ("the Fourth Amendment may protect against the

overhearing of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional seizure of

'papers and effects'")). Therefore, "[s]tatements that result from an illegal detention

are not admissible." United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 384 F.3d 562, 565 (8th

Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1164 (8th Cir. 1994)). To

break the causal chain between an illegal arrest and a statement given later, the

statement must be "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint." Ramos,

42 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486). 

"The giving of Miranda warnings, followed by the making of a voluntary

statement, does not, in and of itself, mandate a statement's admissibility." Ramos, 42

F.3d at 1164 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975). "Instead, to decide

whether a confession is the product of a free will, [we] consider Miranda warnings,

the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening

circumstances, and particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct."

Hernandez-Hernandez, 384 F.3d at 565; see also Brown, 422 U.S. at 602. The denial

of a motion to suppress must be affirmed "unless the decision is unsupported by

substantial evidence, is based on an erroneous view of the applicable law, or in light

of the entire record, we are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has

been made." Hernandez-Hernandez, 384 F.3d at 564–65. Vega-Rico contends the

government failed to carry its burden to show his statements to Agent Baird were the

result of an act of free will.

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This case tracks the facts of Hernandez-Hernandez, where defendant was

arrested after he revealed during a traffic violation that he was working during his

immigration status. Id. at 564. Defendant was then transferred to the custody of

Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") agents. Id. After being given Miranda

warnings and signing an advice of rights form, defendant admitted to INS agents that

"he had been deported six or seven months earlier, and had reentered the United States

illegally a couple of months later." Id. The district court denied defendant's motion to

suppress the statements after it had been determined that defendant was illegally

detained. Id. We affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, reasoning that

the INS questioning was conducted five days after the initial questioning

. . . and there is no evidence Hernandez-Hernandez was questioned or

coerced during those five days in jail. Further, the INS questioning was

conducted at the INS office, not at the scene of the first round of

questioning, and was conducted by an INS agent who had no

involvement in the earlier questioning. Finally, the INS agent did not

treat his questioning as continuous with the earlier questioning during the

traffic stop. The different methods and distant timing of the

interrogations do not indicate intentional, calculated conduct by the

authorities.

Id. at 566. 

In this case, Vega-Rico's post-Miranda statements were made four days after

the Fourth Amendment violation occurred. The interview was conducted in a different

city by an agent from a separate law enforcement agency, and neither agent nor agency

had any involvement in the initial Fourth Amendment violation. The interview was

conducted for purposes unrelated to the circumstances surrounding the Fourth

Amendment violation. In addition, the official misconduct in this case—reliance on

an unreliable drug-snffing dog—was not flagrant. While Vega-Rico incorrectly

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argues that the statements would only be free of taint if they were made after he was

released and then voluntarily returned to the DHS, relevant precedent says otherwise.

See Hernandez-Hernandez, 384 F.3d at 564–67.

Vega-Rico also argues that Hernandez-Hernandez was decided under the Fifth

Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. We disagree, as

Hernandez-Hernandez relied upon Ramos and Yousif, which analyzed the

admissibility of Hernandez-Hernandez's statements under the test set forth in Wong

Sun and Brown, all of which were cited by Vega-Rico in support of his motion to

suppress. We affirm the district court's denial of Vega-Rico's motion to suppress his

statements to Agent Baird.

BYE, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concede that United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 384 F.3d 562 (8th Cir.

2004) controls the outcome of the present case, but I write separately to voice my

disagreement with its holding. Initially, something must be said in regards to the

court’s confusing analysis in Hernandez-Hernandez. The court began by classifying

the issue as one involving an illegal detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 565. The court then, after acknowledging the district court’s application of

factors relevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis (Ramos factors), id., proceeded to

analyze the case as one controlled by the Fifth Amendment, id. at 565-67 (discussing

the Fifth Amendment cases of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) and Missouri v.

Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004)). The court completed its discussion by inexplicably

concluding factors seemingly relevant to the Fourth Amendment intervened between

the unwarned questioning (i.e., a Fifth Amendment Miranda issue) and the subsequent

postwarning statements. Id. at 567.

This confusing analysis prompted Vega-Rico to argue Hernandez-Hernandez

was decided under the Fifth Amendment’s exclusionary rule rather than the Fourth

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Admittedly, certain statements within the opinion cause me to question my

view. Particularly, the court’s reference in the concluding paragraph to unwarned

questioning, rather than an illegal detention, as the event which triggered the need to

purge the taint. Unwarned questioning is, of course, not a violation of the Fourth

Amendment, but a violation of the Miranda warnings designed to protect Fifth

Amendment rights. This reference to unwarned questioning was also preceded by a

discussion of Fifth Amendment case law and by a statement on how the Seibert

factors were similar to the Ramos factors. Id. at 566. Thus, I think it conceivable that

the court’s analysis was a Fifth Amendment voluntariness inquiry which looked

similar to, but was not, a Fourth Amendment analysis under Ramos. 

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Amendment’s. If Vega-Rico is correct, Hernandez-Hernandez would not be

controlling or persuasive because the Fourth Amendment requires a broader

application of the exclusionary rule and a more exacting standard to purge the taint of

a violation. United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1094-95 (8th Cir. 2005). My

careful reading of the opinion, however, does not support Vega-Rico’s position. In

my view, Hernandez-Hernandez was an illegal detention case.2

 Although the court in

Hernandez-Hernandez did not explain clearly why or how the defendant was illegally

detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it presumably occurred when the

trooper exceeded the scope of the traffic stop. Id. at 564. The unwarned statements

made to the trooper and later to the border patrol agent were fruits of this

unconstitutionally prolonged traffic stop. On appeal, the government apparently

conceded, and rightfully so, the inadmissability of these statements, which were made

contemporaneously to the initial illegal detention and without the prophylactic

warnings of Miranda. The government, however, did not concede the inadmissability

of postwarning statements made five days after the initial illegal detention to a

different border patrol agent at his INS office. 

Without this concession, the court held the five-day delay between the initial

illegality and the postwarning statement, along with the change in interrogating

location and personnel were sufficient intervening circumstances to purge the taint of

the initial illegality. Id. at 567. This holding has served to whittle away important

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constitutional protections by ignoring a key constitutional fact and by expanding the

definition of intervening circumstances to include unilateral acts of law enforcement.

The court’s holding first whittled away important constitutional protections by

overlooking the fact that the five-day interval between the Fourth Amendment

violation and the postwarning statements was spent in custody. Id. at 564. This

prolonged five-day period of incarceration cuts against the confession being of free

will and constitutes a more serious violation than the initial illegal seizure. Dunaway

v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 220 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). In fact, “where no

intervening circumstances are present, a long and illegal detention may in itself impel

the defendant to confess.” People v. White, 512 N.E.2d 677, 688 (Ill. 1987). During

this five-day period of isolation, Hernandez-Hernandez had little or no contact with

anyone other than law enforcement. This isolation and other jailhouse conditions are

less than ideal for the rational decision-making processes required to decide

voluntarily and intelligently whether to confess. Cf. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707,

712 (1967). Thus, without an intervening circumstance, a court must assume the

confession was, at least in part, prompted by these less than ideal jailhouse conditions.

Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., concurring).

The court then further whittled away important constitutional protections by

expanding the definition of intervening circumstances to include unilateral acts of law

enforcement. Prior to Hernandez-Hernandez I can find no other court which held

unilateral acts of law enforcement to be intervening circumstances. See, e.g., Taylor

v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 692-93 (1982) (rejecting an arrest warrant obtained by law

enforcement ex parte as an intervening circumstance). All other intervening

circumstance cases focus on the conduct of the suspect as in Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963), or the on the actions of a neutral party such as the

judiciary as in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972). Despite the

government’s contention otherwise, the INS agent’s actions in seizing HernandezHernandez and transporting him to another location for additional investigatory

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interrogation did not purge the taint of the initial constitutional violation, but

exasperated it. In other words, the perpetrators of an illegal search or seizure tagging

off to an agent from a different law enforcement agency is not an intervening

circumstance, not an act of free will sufficient to purge the taint of an initial Fourth

Amendment violation. White, 512 N.E.2d at 689. This is practically black letter law.

See 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment

§ 11.4(b), at 298 (4th ed. 2004). Thus, even in the absence of flagrant official

misconduct, the government’s failure to show an intervening act of free will on the

part of Hernandez-Hernandez required suppression of his postwarning statements

which were proximately caused by the Fourth Amendment violation. But, even

though I disagree with its holding, I find Hernandez-Hernandez indistinguishable from

the present case. I therefore reluctantly concur in the judgment of the majority.

______________________________

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