Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01374/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01374-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Cahill
Plaintiff
Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation District
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD CAHILL,

Plaintiff,

v.

GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE, HIGHWAY 

AND TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-01374-JCS 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 33

I. INTRODUCTION

This admiralty case arises from an incident in which Plaintiff Richard Cahill, a deckhand, 

fell from the deck of the ferry Golden Gate, which was owned and operated by Defendant Golden 

Gate Bridge, Highway, & Transportation District (the ―District‖). Cahill brings claims for 

unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence, and the District moves for summary judgment on both 

claims. The Court held a hearing on March 11, 2016. For the reasons discussed below, although 

the evidentiary record is somewhat thin, the Court holds that a rational jury could find in Cahill‘s 

favor. The District‘s Motion is therefore DENIED.1

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff Richard Cahill first worked as a deckhand for on the District‘s ferries in the 

1970s. Cahill Dep. 15:24−16:3.

2

 At the time of the accident in 2014, Cahill had worked full time 

as a deckhand for the District for about twelve years, and had served on all of the District‘s ferries 

and routes. Id. 17:8−24. He was familiar with the Golden Gate and comfortable working on it, 

 

1

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all 

purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

2

Excerpts of Cahill‘s deposition appear in the record as Exhibit A to the declaration of David 

Russo (dkt. 33-1) and Exhibit 2 to the declaration of Lia Marks (dkt. 37).

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including working from the stern deckhand position. Id. 20:14−18, 21:21−22:2.

The afternoon of June 17, 2014, Cahill was involved in an accident on the Golden Gate. 

Id. 18:4−9, 20:21−22; Russo Decl. Ex. D (security video of the accident). Cahill was working the 

stern position as the ferry approached the dock of the Larkspur terminal. Cahill Dep. 21:18−20, 

22:21−25. Cahill‘s role required him to use a long hook to catch a hanging dock line and pull it 

toward the ferry, and then to place an eye at the end of the line around a cleat in an open chock—

an opening in the guardrail—near the stern of the ferry. Id. 23:23−26:4. He had performed the 

same docking evolution3at Larkspur in the past, id. 21:21−22:2, and he testified at his deposition 

that on June 17, 2014 he performed the evolution the same way he normally did, id. 33:6−9, 

34:18−22. The manner in which the ferry docked that day was different, however, in that the 

water was ―kind of rough‖ where it would usually be calm and the captain brought the ferry in 

bow-first, rather than parallel to the dock. Id. 36:2−8. Another deckhand attached a dock line at 

the bow so that the stern of the ferry ―could swing back in.‖ Id. 37:12−15. Cahill could tell what 

maneuver the captain was executing, but he did not think about whether the ferry would hit the 

dock harder than usual and did not do anything different to prepare for the docking evolution. Id.

37:19−38:8, 38:12−17. The stern ―came back in pretty good and bumped the dock‖—according to 

Cahill, ―[a] lot harder‖ than usual. Id. 35:15−21, 37:15−16. Cahill, focusing on the dock line and 

walking backwards to try to catch it, fell overboard through the open chock when the stern 

bumped the dock. Id. 36:10−12, 46:22−25.

Video of the accident taken by a security camera on the Golden Gate shows Cahill 

standing forward of the open chock as the ferry approaches the dock at a not-quite-parallel angle.

Russo Decl. Ex. D. Cahill extends a boat hook toward the hanging dock line. Id. As the ferry 

comes to a stop, Cahill takes a few steps towards the stern of the vessel to align himself with the 

hanging dock line, which results in him standing at the open chock. Id. When the ferry stops 

moving forward, the stern appears to be too far from the dock for Cahill to reach the dock line 

with his hook. Id. The stern then swings toward the dock. Id. Cahill falls overboard through the 

 

3

In the jargon of the industry, the term ―evolution‖ refers to a procedure or maneuver—e.g., 

docking and tying up the Golden Gate to the Larkspur dock.

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open chock and disappears from view as the ferry appears to rebound from the dock. Id.

Defendants also submit a video, taken by defense counsel, of another deckhand on the 

Golden Gate performing the same evolution at a later date. Russo Decl. ¶¶ 3−4 & Ex. B. This 

video is shot from a different angle than the security footage, so it is difficult to compare the two 

precisely, but it appears to show the ferry approaching the Larkspur dock more slowly and at a 

more parallel angle than on the day of the accident. See id. Ex. B. Like Cahill, the deckhand 

begins from a position slightly forward of the open chock, but then walks forward rather than aft 

to grab the dock line with his hook. Id. He only walks aft to the chock after he has the dock line 

in his hand, and he then loops it over the cleat in the chock. Id. There is no indication of the ferry 

swinging toward or rebounding from the dock. Id. Cahill agreed at his deposition that this video 

shows how the stern deckhand‘s docking evolution should normally be performed. Cahill Dep. 

48:4−13.

When asked at his deposition whether various factors were at fault, Cahill testified as 

follows:

Q. Do you believe -- and I am just asking your belief -- do you 

believe that the captain was at fault for your accident?

A. No.

Q. Do you believe that the actions of any other deckhand were at 

fault for your accident?

A. No.

Q. Do you believe that something about the ferry itself was at fault 

for your accident?

A. No.

[. . .]

Q. Is it your belief that what is at fault for the accident is the rougher 

water which caused the ferry to have to come in at more of an angle?

[. . .]

THE WITNESS: Yes.

Id. 51:9−52:2.4 Cahill later clarified that he believed the width of the open chock—which was 

 

4 Cahill‘s attorney objected to this line of questioning as calling for expert opinions from a 

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wider than on other ferries operated by the District—contributed to the accident, and that he would 

not have fallen overboard if it had been narrower. Id. 59:8−15, 60:12−21. He apparently did not 

understand defense counsel‘s question regarding whether ―something about the ferry itself‖ was at 

fault to encompass the width of the chock. Id. 60:12−24. A rope or chain that can be fastened 

across the open chock was not in place at the time of the accident, but Cahill does not believe that 

it would have prevented him from falling overboard even if it had been. Id. 40:5−17.

A ―Ferry Division Report of Accident or Illness‖ prepared by Captain Richard Fiero on the 

day of the accident indicates that Cahill received treatment from paramedics and was transported 

from the ferry terminal in an ambulance. Marks Decl. Ex. 1. Fiero‘s report includes the following 

description of the incident: ―Hit back of head, bruised ribs. While grabbing stern line boat 

bumped float causing Mr. Cahill to lose his balance and fall through chock onto lower float.‖ Id. 

The open chock on the Golden Gate has not changed in the time that Cahill was familiar 

with the vessel. Id. 52:17−23. Before the accident, Cahill never fell through the open chock, 

never came close to falling through the open chock, and never complained to anyone about the 

open chock. Id. He never suggested that the District make the chock on the Golden Gate 

narrower, nor had he heard anyone else make that suggestion. Id. 62:23−63:5. Captain Robert 

Ketchum, the supervising vessel master for the District‘s Ferry Division at the time of the accident 

and a seventeen year veteran of the District, stated in his declaration that he has ―never heard of 

any deckhand falling through an open chock onboard the M/V GOLDEN GATE or other ferries 

with the same configuration,‖ or ―of any deckhand voicing concern regarding the open chock 

configuration or the docking evolution that Mr. Cahill was performing,‖ including in monthly 

deckhand safety meetings. Ketchum Decl. ¶¶ 6−7.

B. Captain Sweeney’s Report

Cahill submits a report by expert witness Captain Katharine A. Sweeney, an experienced 

mariner, maritime safety auditor, and incident investigator. Marks Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. 3; see also id.

¶ 6 & Ex. 5 (CV).

 

layperson. Cahill Dep. 51:19−20.

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According to Sweeney, the ferry captain‘s ―actions . . . in docking the vessel caused the 

Mr. Cahill‘s [sic] injury,‖ based on ―[t]he vessel‘s fast approach coupled with the too great of an 

angle/distance away from the dock.‖ Id. Ex. 3 at 1. Based on a comparison of the security video 

with the District‘s video of the normal docking evolution, Sweeney concludes that the ferry 

approached the dock two to three times faster in the security footage. Id. She also notes that the 

ferry‘s approach on the day of the accident required Cahill to move out of position in a way that 

the deckhand in the other video did not. Id.

Next, Sweeney states that the Golden Gate was not in compliance with Coast Guard 

regulations regarding guard rails or bulwarks, specifically 46 C.F.R. § 177.900. Id. She also 

states that the custom in the industry calls for using three chains across the top, middle, and 

bottom of any openings in bulwarks, whereas the Golden Gate had only one chain or rope that 

could be fastened across the open chock. Id. at 1−2.

Third, Sweeney concludes that the District‘s training policies for deckhands are inadequate 

because, while the District requires new deckhands to receive ―hands-on‖ training from senior 

deckhands, it does not specify the content of such training. Id. at 2.

Fourth, Sweeney states that the District failed to follow a manual for safe line handling 

issued by the Passenger Vessel Association (―PVA‖), an industry group of which the District is a 

member. Id. According to Sweeney, the PVA‘s manual notes that line handling can be among the 

most dangerous jobs on a vessel if done incorrectly, and calls for dock lines to be passed to the 

deckhand by a crew member stationed on the dock. Id. Sweeney concludes that the District‘s 

practice of deckhands catching lines from the vessel is more dangerous than the recommended 

practice. Id.

Finally, Sweeney notes that the District ―did not have any system in place to empower its 

workers to ask questions or to speak up if they thought something was unsafe,‖ and concludes that

―[h]ad a stop work policy been in place . . . Mr. Cahill would have been empowered and could 

have spoke up and told the captain it was unsafe to get the line.‖ Id. at 3.

C. Garrison Incident

Plaintiff‘s counsel Lia Marks‘s declaration includes a paragraph stating that another 

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deckhand, James Garrison, previously fell overboard from the stern of a similar ferry while 

docking at Larkspur. Marks Decl. ¶ 7. Marks‘s knowledge of that incident is based on her 

representation of Garrison in a lawsuit against the District. Id. There is no indication that Marks 

had firsthand knowledge of Garrison‘s accident. See id. The Court therefore disregards that 

paragraph as hearsay.5

D. Procedural History and Parties’ Arguments

Cahill brought this action on March 25, 2015. The parties are currently engaged in 

discovery, with fact discovery to close on April 5, 2016 and expert discovery to close on May 6, 

2016. Order Continuing Discovery Dates (dkt. 41). Trial is scheduled for June of this year. Case 

Mgmt. Scheduling Order (dkt. 25).

The District filed its present Motion for Summary Judgment on January 15, 2016. See 

generally Mot. (dkt. 33). Apparently based on Cahill‘s deposition testimony that he did not 

believe the ferry captain was responsible for his injury, the District‘s Motion addresses negligence 

only based on the conditions of the vessel, and does not address negligent operation. See id. at 

2−8. The District contends that Cahill cannot recover for negligence because the District had no

notice of any unsafe condition. Id. at 7. The District also argues that Cahill cannot recover based 

on negligence or unseaworthiness because his injury was caused solely by his own negligence. Id.

at 8, 10−11.

Cahill responds in his Opposition that violations of two Coast Guard regulations establish 

both negligence and unseaworthiness per se: 33 C.F.R. § 83.06, which requires that vessels be 

operated at safe speeds such that they can avoid collision, and 46 C.F.R. § 42.15-75(d), which 

requires guardrails in certain circumstances on certain vessels. Opp‘n (dkt. 36) at 4−5, 10−12. 

According to Cahill, these per se violations eliminate any need to show that the District had notice 

of unsafe conditions, bar any defense of contributory or comparative negligence, and require the 

 

5 Defense counsel David Russo, whose firm represented the District in Garrison‘s lawsuit, 

disputes Marks‘s account of that incident. Reply at 9 & n.4. But Russo does not even offer a 

declaration on the subject, instead simply asserting in Cahill‘s reply brief that Marks is incorrect, 

without citation to evidence. Id. Arguments contained in legal briefs are not evidence, but 

because there is no admissible evidence to support Marks‘s contention in the first place, the 

District‘s failure to present evidence in response is irrelevant.

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Court to assume that the violations caused Cahill‘s injury. Id. at 5−6, 7−8, 9−10. Cahill also 

argues that the District had notice of risk based on the incident of Garrison falling overboard. Id.

at 7.

In its Reply, the District argues that Captain Sweeney‘s report is inadmissible because it is 

not a sworn declaration and not supported by specific facts. Reply (dkt. 38) at 2−3, 5. The 

District contends that Cahill‘s per se theories should be barred because he did not explicitly plead 

them in the Complaint. Id. at 3−4. It also argues that the per se theories of liability fail on the 

merits for a number of reasons, including but not limited to: (1) regulations calling for an exercise 

of judgment cannot form a basis for per se liability; (2) the regulations were not intended to 

prevent the type of harm that occurred; (3) the guardrail regulation cited in Cahill‘s Opposition 

does not apply to vessels that voyage exclusively in United States waters; (4) another guardrail 

regulation cited in Sweeney‘s report does not apply to vessels that carry more than 150 

passengers; (5) the PVA line handling manual cited in Sweeney‘s report is not a regulation and 

does not say what Sweeney says it does;6and (6) the facts of the case and the regulations Cahill 

relies on do not give rise to a presumption of causation. Id. at 5−9. The District disputes Cahill‘s 

characterization of the prior Garrison incident, and refers to the arguments in its Motion that there 

is no evidence of negligence or unseaworthiness. Id. at 9−10.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment on a claim or defense is appropriate ―if the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).7 Once the movant has made this showing, the burden then shifts to 

the party opposing summary judgment to designate ―specific facts showing there is a genuine 

issue for trial.‖ Id. ―[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . 

implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the 

 

6 Other than Captain Sweeney‘s explanation of it, neither party has presented any evidence of 

what the line handling manual actually says. 

7

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to admiralty proceedings unless inconsistent with 

the supplemental rules for admiralty proceedings. Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. A(2).

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merits.‖ Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). On summary judgment, the 

court draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 

372, 378 (2007), but where a rational trier of fact could not find for the non-moving party based 

on the record as a whole, there is no ―genuine issue for trial‖ and summary judgment is 

appropriate. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

Because the District is the party moving for summary judgment, the Court draws all 

reasonable inferences in Cahill‘s favor for the purpose of this Order. 

B. Objection to Captain Sweeney’s Report as Unsworn

The District objected to the use of Captain Sweeney‘s report on the basis that it is not a 

sworn declaration or affidavit, and therefore could not properly be considered on a motion for 

summary judgment. Reply at 2−3. The District is correct that unsworn expert reports ―do not 

qualify as affidavits or otherwise admissible evidence for purposes of Rule 56.‖ Smith v. City of 

Oakland, No. C-05-4045 EMC, 2007 WL 2288328, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2007) (citation 

omitted). The same is true of Sweeney‘s CV, which purports to demonstrate her experience in the 

industry but, like the report, is not itself a sworn declaration. See Marks Decl. Ex. 5. Cahill‘s 

counsel Lia Marks submitted her own sworn declaration attaching both documents, but there is no 

indication that Marks has personal knowledge of the contents of Sweeney‘s expert report or CV. 

See generally Marks Decl.

The problem can be remedied. ― ̳[S]ubsequent verification or reaffirmation of an unsworn 

expert‘s report, either by affidavit or deposition, allows the court to consider the unsworn expert‘s 

report on a motion for summary judgment.‘‖ Volterra Semiconductor Corp. v. Primarion, Inc., 

796 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Maytag Corp. v. Electrolux Home Prods., 

Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1064 (N.D. Iowa 2006)). In the circumstances of this case, it would 

not serve the purposes of Rule 56 to grant summary judgment on the basis of a procedural mistake 

by Cahill‘s counsel without providing an opportunity to remedy the defect, when it was apparent 

from the record that Cahill could likely do so. The Court therefore granted Cahill leave to file a 

sworn declaration by Sweeney endorsing Sweeney‘s earlier report and CV, and Cahill has now 

done so. Sweeney Decl. (dkt. 43). The District‘s objection is overruled.

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C. Unseaworthiness Claim

1. Legal Standard for Unseaworthiness

―A shipowner has an absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy ship. A seaworthy ship is one 

reasonably fit for its intended use. The shipowner‘s actual or constructive knowledge of an 

unseaworthy condition is not essential to its liability.‖ Ribitzki v. Canmar Reading & Bates, Ltd. 

P’ship, 111 F.3d 658, 664 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 

549–50 (1960)) (citations omitted). Although a seaman is ―not entitled to a perfect work space,‖ 

the ship cannot be unreasonably defective. See id. at 665; see also Am. Seafoods Co. v. Nowak, 

2002 A.M.C. 1659, 2002 WL 31262107, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (―The standard is not absolute 

perfection, but reasonable fitness for the intended service.‖ (citing Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas 

Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971))). In order to bring a claim based on unseaworthy equipment, a 

plaintiff ―must establish: (1) the warranty of seaworthiness extended to him and his duties; (2) his 

injury was caused by a piece of the ship‘s equipment or an appurtenant appliance; (3) the 

equipment used was not reasonably fit for its intended use; and (4) the unseaworthy condition 

proximately caused his injuries.‖ Id. at 664.

―[T]he warranty of seaworthiness extends to the crew as well as the ship and . . . the owner 

warrants that the crew, although not necessarily competent to meet all contingencies is equal in 

disposition and seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling.‖ Peterson v. United States, 224 

F.2d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1955) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2. A Rational Jury Could Find That the Golden Gate Was Unseaworthy

Cahill, who had worked on all of the District‘s ferries, testified at his deposition that the 

open chock he fell through on the Golden Gate was wider than the chocks on any other ferry in the 

District‘s fleet. Cahill Dep. 17:17−20, 59:8−15.8 Cahill also testified that he does not believe he 

would have fallen overboard if the chock had been narrower. Cahill Dep. 60:15−21. There is 

nothing in the record to indicate any reason why the chock would need to be as wide as it is.

 

8 Cahill‘s Opposition does not meaningfully address his testimony regarding the width of the 

open chock. The Court ―has no independent duty  ̳to scour the record in search of a genuine issue 

of triable fact,‘‖ Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), 

but having found evidence establishing such an issue, the Court declines to turn a blind eye to it. 

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Taking that evidence into account, as well as common knowledge that the decks of ferries 

can be unstable depending on maneuvers and sea conditions, a rational jury could conclude that 

the open chock on the Golden Gate was not ―reasonably fit for its intended use‖ because its width 

created an unnecessary risk of crewmembers falling overboard. See Ribitzki, 111 F.3d at 664. The 

apparent lack of other accidents related to the chock, and lack of seamen raising concerns about its 

safety, may tend to support the District‘s view that the vessel was seaworthy, but it does not bar 

Cahill‘s claim as a matter of law, and it is not the Court‘s role to weigh countervailing evidence on 

a motion for summary judgment. 

Turning to the remaining elements of an unseaworthiness claim, a jury could conclude that 

the width of the chock proximately caused Cahill‘s injury, and there is no dispute that the warranty 

of seaworthiness extended to Cahill or that the chock is ―a piece of the ship‘s equipment.‖ See id. 

The District asserts that Cahill was negligent in stepping aft toward the open chock, and 

argues that such negligence bars Cahill‘s unseaworthiness claim. Reply at 9−10. The cases the 

District cites are inapposite. In Burdett v. Matson, the court granted summary judgment for an 

employer where the unseaworthiness claim was based on a coworker having left a piece of 

equipment in a precarious position from which it fell and injured the plaintiff. Burdett, 2015 

A.M.C. 431, 2015 WL 419694, at *4−5 (D. Haw. Jan. 30, 2015). The court held that ―a single, 

isolated negligent act‖ of a coworker does not constitute ―a condition of the ship,‖ and thus cannot 

support an unseaworthiness claim. Id. at *5. In Keel v. Greenville Mid-Steam Services, the Fifth 

Circuit affirmed a district court‘s decision that a plaintiff could not base an unseaworthiness claim 

on a condition that he himself created, where his negligence was ―one hundred percent‖ to blame. 

Keel, 321 F.2d 903, 903−04 (5th Cir. 1963). In contrast to both cases, the width of the open chock 

on the Golden Gate was neither an isolated act of negligence by a coworker nor a condition that 

Cahill himself created. Whether Cahill was negligent in stepping toward the chock, and the 

percentage of fault attributable to any such negligence, are questions that require a factfinder to 

weigh the evidence and cannot be resolve on the present motion. See Burdett, 2015 WL 419694, 

at *5 (―Maritime law has long applied the rule of comparative fault in a seaman‘s unseaworthiness 

action against a shipowner.‖ (citing Knight v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc ., 154 F.3d 1042, 1047 

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(9th Cir. 1998))).

The District‘s Motion is therefore DENIED as to Cahill‘s unseaworthiness claim. Because 

the issue of the width of the open chock is sufficient for this claim to survive summary judgment, 

the Court need not address whether other conditions of the Golden Gate on the day of the accident 

could also support an unseaworthiness claim.

D. Jones Act Negligence Claim

1. Legal Standard for Jones Act Negligence

―The elements of a Jones Act negligence claim are: duty, breach, notice and causation.‖ 

Ribitzki v. Canmar Reading & Bates, Ltd. P’ship, 111 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 1997). The Jones 

Act incorporates the standard of negligence applicable to railroad employers under the FELA, and 

―the general congressional intent was to provide liberal recovery for injured workers.‖ See 

Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958). 

As stated in a widely-cited opinion by the Fifth Circuit, ―nothing in the text or structure of 

the FELA–Jones Act legislation suggests that the standard of care to be attributed to either an 

employer or an employee is anything different than ordinary prudence under the circumstances.‖ 

Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Fashauer 

v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 57 F.3d 1269, 1283 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also 9th Cir. 

Model Jury Instruction 7.3 (―Negligence under the Jones Act is the failure to use reasonable 

care.‖). An employer‘s duty includes ―provid[ing] the seaman with a safe place to work.‖ 

Ribitzki, 111 F.3d at 662.

The causation standard, however, is lower than that applicable to an ordinary negligence 

claim. A plaintiff must show only that ―employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, 

in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.‖ Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 

U.S. 500, 506 (1957). This is ―often described as a featherweight causation standard.‖ Ribitzki, 

111 F.3d at 664; see also id. at 662 n.3. Nevertheless, ―plaintiffs still must demonstrate some 

causal connection between a defendant‘s negligence and their injuries.‖ Claar v. Burlington N. 

R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1994).

The notice element applies where the alleged negligence is based on an unsafe 

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workplace—such a claim requires that ―the employer or its agents either knew or should have 

known of the dangerous condition.‖ Ribitzki, 111 F.3d at 663. The Court is not aware of cases 

applying a notice requirement where a claim is based on negligent conduct rather than negligently

unsafe conditions.

2. A Rational Jury Could Find That the District Was Negligent

Cahill argues that his negligence claim should be allowed to proceed because, among other 

reasons, the District‘s purported violation of a Coast Guard regulation requiring vessels to operate 

at safe speeds constitutes negligence per se. Opp‘n at 4−5. In its Reply, the District raises a 

number of arguments why the Court should reject Cahill‘s per se theory, including that it was not 

pled in the Complaint, that Cahill‘s injury was not the type the regulation is intended to prevent,

and that ―general regulations like [the safe speed regulation] that require the  ̳exercise of one‘s 

practical judgment‘ do not give rise to negligence per se.‖ Reply at 3−5 (quoting Wilson v. 

Maersk Line, Ltd., No. 05 Civ. 6246 (LMM), 2007 WL 3085436, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 

2007)).9 The Court need not resolve the contours of a potential per se claim, because if there is 

evidence on which a jury could find that the Golden Gate approached the dock at an unsafe speed, 

the failure to operate at a safe speed could support a negligence claim even in the absence of a 

specific regulation.

There can be no dispute that the ferry captain10 had a duty to operate the vessel in a 

reasonable manner. The question, then, is whether he breached that duty by approaching the 

Larkspur dock at an unsafe speed or angle—or more precisely, whether there is evidence in the 

record from which a rational jury could reach that conclusion. By far the most significant 

evidence in the District‘s favor is Cahill‘s own deposition testimony that he did not believe the 

captain was at fault. Cahill Dep. 51:9−12. Weighing against that is Captain Sweeney‘s 

conclusion that ―[t]he vessel‘s fast approach coupled with the too great of an angle/distance away 

 

9

The Reply slightly misquotes Wilson, which uses the phrase ―one‘s best practical judgment.‖ 

Wilson, 2007 WL 3085436, at *2 (emphasis added). The omission is not material.

10 Although not addressed in the parties‘ briefs, the doctrine of respondeat superior applies in 

Jones Act cases, and the District can therefore be held liable for negligence of the ferry captain. 

See Beech v. Hercules Drilling Co., 691 F.3d 566, 571 (5th Cir. 2012).

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from the dock made it hazardous for a deckhand to effectively make fast a mooring line,‖ and her 

characterization of the approach as ―unsafe and non-standard.‖ Marks Decl. Ex. 3 at 1. The 

videos of both the accident and the normal docking procedure provide additional evidence of what 

happened on the day of the accident and how it compares to the normal procedure. See Russo 

Decl. Exs. B, D.

The District objects that Sweeney‘s report does not identify sufficient ―specific facts‖ to be 

admissible as an expert opinion. Reply at 5 (citing Guidroz-Brault v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 

825, 831 (9th Cir. 2001)). While the District is correct that Sweeney‘s report is sparse when it 

comes to details, the case the District cites makes clear that the issue is not whether ―the 

underlying factual details [are] disclosed in the affidavit,‖ but rather ―the existence of underlying 

facts [in the record] which could support the opinions,‖ and whether the report identifies some 

factual basis. Guidroz-Brault, 254 F.3d at 831−32. The record contains, and Sweeney‘s report 

explicitly discusses, videos that both parties agree show how the docking evolution normally 

works and how it happened on the day of the accident. Russo Decl. Exs. B, D. Sweeney has 

extensive experience operating commercial vessels. Marks Decl. Ex. 5. The Court cannot say as a 

matter of law that someone with Sweeney‘s background could not reach an informed opinion 

regarding the safety of the approach to the Larkspur dock based on the videos. That the opinion 

does not give a numerical value for how fast the ferry was going or what would be a safe speed, 

see Reply at 5, is an issue of weight rather than admissibility.

Based on the record as a whole—including but not limited to Captain Sweeney‘s expert 

opinion, the two videos, and Cahill‘s testimony that the ferry bumped the dock significantly harder 

than usual, see Cahill Dep. 35:15−21—a rational jury could find that the ferry captain, and 

vicariously the District, breached his duty of care by approaching the Larkspur dock too quickly 

and from a wider-than-usual angle. A jury could also find that such negligence played at least ―the 

slightest‖ part in causing Cahill‘s injury, satisfying the ―featherweight causation standard‖ 

applicable to Jones Act claims. See Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506; Ribitzki, 111 F.3d at 664. The 

District‘s Motion is therefore DENIED as to Cahill‘s Jones Act negligence claim.

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E. Arguments Not Reached

The parties‘ briefs raise several arguments not addressed in detail in this Order. Cahill‘s 

Opposition includes arguments for per se negligence or unseaworthiness that were not addressed 

in the District‘s Motion, apparently because the District was not aware that Cahill intended to 

pursue those theories. In response, the District‘s Reply contends that Cahill cannot recover on 

those theories for a number of reasons, including that Cahill did not plead them in the Complaint, 

that the regulations Cahill invokes cannot support negligence per se, and that certain regulations 

are not applicable to the Golden Gate based on its size and capacity or based on the waters on 

which it travels.

11 Although the Court does not assign blame exclusively to either party, the result 

of how the briefing unfolded is that a number of potentially significant issues were not raised until 

the Reply, and thus were never addressed by Cahill. That posture is not conducive to the Court 

rendering an informed decision on the issues presented. Because Cahill may proceed on both his 

unseaworthiness and negligence claims for the reasons stated above, the Court declines to reach 

the remaining arguments.

The briefing here suggests a failure of communication between the parties. Should this 

case proceed to trial, this Order is without prejudice to the District raising any issues not reached 

herein through motions in limine. The parties are strongly encouraged to meet and confer to

determine whether any such issues can be resolved without motions practice and to ensure that any 

motions that are ultimately necessary will efficiently address both parties‘ arguments. If Cahill 

determines that amendments to his Complaint are warranted in order to pursue per se theories of 

liability—an issue the Court expresses no opinion on in this Order—and the parties are not able to 

stipulate to such amendments, Cahill may move for leave to amend the Complaint no later than 

two weeks from the date of this Order, and the District may oppose that motion. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the District‘s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 

If Cahill decides that he wishes to amend his Complaint to explicitly plead per se theories of 

 

11 The Court notes that neither party has presented any evidence regarding the Golden Gate‘s 

size, capacity, or range of travel.

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liability, he may move for leave to do so no later than two weeks from the date of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2016

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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