Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-18-03732/USCOURTS-ca8-18-03732-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Angelo Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 18-3026

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Lamaar Moore

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ___________________________

No. 18-3474

___________________________

 United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Kearnice C. Overton, also known as Kearnice Overton

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ___________________________

No. 18-3732

___________________________

 United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

Appellate Case: 18-3732 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/07/2020 Entry ID: 4868088
v.

Angelo Johnson

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ____________

Appeals from United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport

 ____________

 Submitted: September 27, 2019

Filed: January 7, 2020 

[Unpublished]

____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Lamaar Moore, Kearnice Overton, and Angelo Johnson pleaded guilty to

offenses related to a drug conspiracy. They challenge their sentences on appeal,

arguing that the district court1erred in calculating their offense levels under the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines). Overton also argues that he is

entitled to resentencing because the government breached the plea agreement. We

affirm.

I. Lamaar Moore

Moore pleaded guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess

with intent to distribute at least 100 kilograms of a mixture and substance containing

1The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for

the Southern District of Iowa.

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marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846, and

possession with intent to distribute less than 50 kilograms of a mixture and substance

containing marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D). 

Before sentencing, Moore objected to the presentence report’s recommendation that

his base offense level be increased by three for his aggravating role in the offense,

see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), and by two for maintaining a premises for the purpose of

manufacturing or distributing controlled substances, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). 

The district court overruled Moore’s objections and applied the enhancements. 

Moore’s total offense level was 30, his criminal history category was III, and his

Guidelines sentencing range was 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment. The district

court varied downward, imposing a 108-month sentence on the conspiracy count and

a concurrent 60-month sentence on the possession count. 

Moore argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that he had acted

as a manager or supervisor in the drug conspiracy. See United States v. Alcalde, 818

F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2016) (standard of review). Guidelines § 3B1.1(b) instructs

the district court to apply a three-level increase “[i]f the defendant was a manager or

supervisor . . . and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was

otherwise extensive.” We have said that a defendant may be subject to the

enhancement even if he managed or supervised only one participant in a single

transaction. United States v. Irlmeier, 750 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2014). A witness

testified at Moore’s sentencing hearing that he once overheard Moore direct his

girlfriend to obtain marijuana from a certain location and sell it at a certain price to

Moore’s customer. Moore acknowledgesthat his girlfriend sometimessoldmarijuana

for him when he was traveling, but he contends that he did not control her actions

because they were participantsin a joint enterprise. The district court’sfinding to the

contrary is not clearly erroneous, however, because the evidence permits a finding

that Moore managed or supervised his girlfriend with respect to at least one

transaction. 

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Moore next argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that he

maintained his residence for the purpose of distributing a controlled substance. See 

United States v. Miller, 698 F.3d 699, 705 (8th Cir. 2012) (standard of review). 

Moore shared the residence with his girlfriend. He claims that it was primarily their

family home and that there is “little evidence that the couple used the residence for

the business itself.” Moore’s Br. 11. Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(12) instructs the district

court to apply a two-level increase for “maintain[ing] a premises for the purpose of

manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” For the enhancement to apply,

drug distribution “need not be the sole purpose for which the premises was

maintained, but must be one of the defendant’s primary or principal uses for the

premises, rather than one of the defendant’s incidental or collateral uses for the

premises.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.17. We have held that the enhancement applies

“when a defendant uses the premises for the purpose of substantial drug-trafficking

activities, even if the premises was also [the] family home at the times in question.” 

Miller, 698 F.3d at 707.

2 Moore conceded that drug transactions occurred at his

residence. When the apartment was searched, officers seized nine empty one-pound

vacuum seal bags with marijuana residue, approximately two pounds of high-grade

marijuana, digital scales, and clear plastic baggies, which the district court found to

be “substantial indicia of high levels of trafficking at the home.” We conclude that

the district court did not clearly err in finding that Moore maintained hisresidence for

the purpose of distributing marijuana.

II. Kearnice Overton

 

Overton pleaded guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess

with intent to distribute 100 grams and more of a mixture and substance containing

heroin and 100 kilograms and more of a mixture and substance containing marijuana,

2Moore argues that United States v. Miller was wrongly decided, but “[i]t is a

cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.” 

Owsley v. Luebbers, 281 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). 

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in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 846, and 851. In determining

that Overton’s base offense level was 32, the presentence report attributed quantities

of heroin, marijuana, and cocaine to him. Overton objected, arguing that his plea

agreement prevented the government from presenting evidence of cocaine

distribution and that anycocaine distribution was notrelevant conduct under U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3. The district court overruled Overton’s objections and determined that his

base offense level was 32, that his total offense level was 37, that his criminal history

category was VI, and that his Guidelines sentencing range was 360 months’ to life

imprisonment. The district court varied downward and imposed a 300-month

sentence. 

Overton first argues that the district court erred in concluding that the

government did not breach the plea agreement by presenting evidence of cocaine

distribution. He claims that the government stipulated in the plea agreement that the

conspiracy involved only heroin and marijuana. We review de novo issues

concerning the interpretation and enforcement of a plea agreement. United States v.

DeWitt, 366 F.3d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 2004). “Plea agreements are contractual in

nature, and should be interpreted according to general contract principles.” Id. 

Although the plea agreement specified heroin and marijuana as types of drugs

that would be used to calculate Overton’s Guidelines sentencing range, it did not

exclude other types of drugs from that calculation. Overton admitted that the object

of the conspiracywasto “manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute

controlled substances including marijuana and heroin.” The plea agreement stated

that the advisory Guidelines sentencing range would be “based upon factors

determined to be present in the case, which include, but are not limited to . . . [t]he

type and quantity of drugs involved in the offense.” The parties did not stipulate to

Overton’s base offense level, but instead agreed “that the conspiracy involved more

than 100 grams of heroin and more than 100 kilograms of marijuana the exact amount

of drugs to be attributed to the defendant (above the amount admitted here) will be

determined by the court at the time of sentencing based upon U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.”

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Moreover, the plea agreement reserved to both parties the right to “make whatever

comment and evidentiary offer they deem appropriate at the time of sentencing . . . ,

provided that such offer or comment does not violate any other provision of this Plea

Agreement.” We conclude that the government did not violate any provision of the

plea agreement when it presented evidence that Overton distributed cocaine. See

United States v. Leach, 491 F.3d 858, 864 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the

government did not breach the plea agreement because it “did not advocate for

anything inconsistent with the stipulations of the plea agreement; it advocated for

something that was not resolved by the plea agreement”).

We disagree with Overton’s contention that our decisions in United States v.

Lara, 690 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2012), and United States v. DeWitt, 366 F.3d 667 (8th

Cir. 2004), control here. In those cases, “we held that the Government breached a

plea agreement when it stipulated to a drug quantity and corresponding base offense

level and then initiated an effort at the sentencing hearing to obtain a higher drug

quantity and base offense level.” See United States v. Noriega, 760 F.3d 908, 911

(8th Cir. 2014). In this case, the government did not stipulate to a drug type or

quantity or to a base offense level. The parties merely agreed that the conspiracy

involved at least 100 grams of heroin and 100 kilograms of marijuana—the drug

types and quantities charged in the indictment—and allowed the district court to

determine the drugs and drug quantitiesto be attributed to Overton atsentencing. See

United States v. Guardado, 863 F.3d 991, 993 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that the

government did not breach the plea agreement when it urged the district court to

sentence the defendant based on a quantity of drugs greater than the amount to which

the defendantstipulated in the factual basis statement of the plea agreement, because

the plea agreement did not specify the amount of drugs that would be used to

calculate the defendant’s sentencing range and it allowed both parties “to present at

sentencing any evidence and argument on issues not explicitly agreed to or decided

in the document”).

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Overton next arguesthat the district court erred in determining his base offense

level. He contendsthat the district court should not have included cocaine in its drug

quantity calculation because any cocaine distribution did not constitute relevant

conduct. According to Overton, the alleged cocaine distribution occurred well before

he entered into the conspiracy to distribute heroin and marijuana. Overton also

challenges the credibility of the confidential informants who told law enforcement

that Overton distributed cocaine after 2011. He notesthat law enforcement found no

cocaine or cocaine residue in any of its searches. 

The base offense level for Overton’s conspiracy conviction is based upon drug

quantity. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). “[I]n a drug distribution case, quantities and

types of drugs not specified in the count of conviction are to be included in

determining the offense level if they were part of the same course of conduct or part

of a common scheme or plan as the count of conviction”—that is, if they were part

of the defendant’s relevant conduct. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. background. Factors to

be considered in determining whether uncharged conduct is part of a common scheme

or plan include the similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity of the charged and

uncharged conduct. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(ii). We review the district court’s

relevant conduct findings for clear error. United States v. Ault, 446 F.3d 821, 823

(8th Cir. 2006).

The district court did not clearly err in finding that Overton’s cocaine

distribution was relevant conduct. Overton admitted in his plea agreement that the

conspiracy to distribute marijuana and heroin began “[s]ometime prior to October of

2013.” Law enforcement officerstestified atsentencing that confidential informants,

whom the officers found to be reliable, had purchased cocaine from Overton from

2011 to 2012 and from 2013 to early 2014. A witness testified that Overton had

supplied him with cocaine for distribution from 2011 until the witness was arrested

in 2013. The witness further testified that the conspiracy changed while he was in

prison. Upon his release in 2016, “[i]t was no longer crack cocaine and cocaine, it

was strictly marijuana.” Another witness testified that Overton had taught him how

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to cook cocaine into crack cocaine and that he had purchased cocaine from Overton

from 2009 until the witness’s arrest in 2011. The government’s evidence thus

showed that Overton’s conduct with respect to cocaine distribution and the charged

conspiracy involved some of the same participants and partly overlapped in time. The

record supportsthe court’s credibility findings, as well asitsfinding that Overton was

involved in an “ongoing criminal conspiracy to distribute narcotics,” in which the

drugs distributed “change[d] over time, but the players stayed the same.” 

III. Angelo Johnson

Johnson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess

with intent to distribute at least 100 grams of a mixture and substance containing

heroin and less than 50 kilograms of a mixture and substance containing marijuana,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 841(b)(1)(D), and 846. Johnson

was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment. In determining Johnson’s Guidelines

sentencing range, the district court found that he was responsible for distributing

more than 1 kilogram of heroin; applied a two-level increase for possession of a

firearm, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); applied a three-level increase for his role in the

offense as a manager or supervisor, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b); and denied a three-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Johnson’s total

offense level was 35, his criminal history category was IV, and his Guidelines

sentencing range was 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment. The district court varied

downward and imposed a 200-month sentence. Johnson challenges the district

court’s drug calculation, the application of the two enhancements, and the denial of

the reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

Johnson argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that he had

distributed more than one kilogram of heroin. See United States v. Harris, 908 F.3d

1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 2018) (standard of review). We disagree. One witness testified

that she purchased between one-half to one gram of heroin from Johnson every day

for two years. A second witness testified that he purchased one to two grams of

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heroin every day for two years. Using the conservative numbers, the court found that

the first witness had purchased 365 grams from Johnson and that the second had

purchased 730 grams. The government also presented evidence that Johnson

distributed other quantities of heroin. We thus conclude that the district court did not

clearly err in finding that Johnson distributed more than one kilogram of heroin. See

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5 (“Where there is no drug seizure or the amountseized does

not reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the quantity of the

controlled substance.”).

Johnson next argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that he

possessed a firearm. See United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873, 879 (8th Cir.

2010) (standard of review). Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) instructs the district court to

apply a two-level increase “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was

possessed.” This enhancement “reflects the increased danger of violence when drug

traffickers possess weapons,” and it “should be applied if the weapon was present,

unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A). At sentencing, a police sergeant testified regarding

Johnson’s arrest and the search of hisresidence.3 An informant reported thatJohnson

had been holding a gun before his arrest. A pill bottle containing heroin, crack

cocaine, and alprazolam was found in the stairwell leading to the basement. A Glock

nine-millimeter pistol with an extended magazine and two additional magazines were

recovered from the basement of Johnson’s residence. The pistol had been buried in

3The presentence report identified Johnson’s residence as being located in the

400 block of Ninth Street in Davenport, Iowa, where the firearm was found. In his

appellate reply brief, Johnson argues that the government did not prove that Johnson

lived at the Ninth Street address. The government was not required to offer evidence

that Johnson lived there, however, because Johnson did not object to the paragraph

in the presentence report identifying the Ninth Street address as his residence. See

United States v. Razo-Guerra, 534 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that in

determining whether the government has proven the facts necessary to establish a

sentencing enhancement, the district court “may accept any undisputed portion of the

[presentence report] as a finding of fact” (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A))). 

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loose dirt, and officers noticed dirt on Johnson’s pants and cobwebs in his hair when

they arrested him. Two witnesses also testified that Johnson possessed firearms

during drug deals. The evidence thus supported the findings that Johnson possessed

a firearm and that it was not “clearly improbable” that the firearm was connected with

the offense. 

Johnson contendsthat the district court clearly erred in finding that he managed

or supervised another participant in the drug conspiracy. Although he does not

dispute the evidence that his sister and an individual identified as “MellyMel”

sometimes delivered heroin after buyers placed orders with him, Johnson argues that

the government did not produce anyevidence ofsupervision, management, or control. 

A fair inference from the evidence presented is that Johnson instructed his sister and

MellyMel where to meet his customers and how much to collect from them, and we

thus conclude that the evidence issufficient to support the district court’sfinding that

Johnson acted as a manager or supervisor. See Alcalde, 818 F.3d at 794 (holding that

the district court did not err in applying a role enhancement based on evidence that

the defendant “directed the actions of two coconspirators by instructing them to

deposit drug proceeds and by instructing one of them to send photos of drug

packages”). 

Finally, Johnson argues that the district court clearly erred in denying him a

three-level decrease for accepting responsibility under Guidelines § 3E1.1. United

States v. Fischer, 551 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review). The district

court denied the decrease because Johnson challenged the amount of drugs involved,

the manner in which they were distributed, and whether he possessed a firearm. The

evidence set forth above wholly discredited Johnson’s claim that he did not possess

the Glock nine-millimeter firearm. As the district court explained, firearms “are not

peripheral to drug conspiracies and it isn’t peripheral here.” Because Johnson falsely

denied or frivolously contested relevant conduct the court determined to be

true—particularly his possession of a firearm— the district court did not err in

concluding that he acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. 

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See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(A) (“A defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously

contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a manner

inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility, but the fact that a defendant’s

challenge is unsuccessful does not necessarily establish that it was either a false

denial or frivolous . . . .”).

The judgments are affirmed.

______________________________

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