Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-14668/USCOURTS-ca11-15-14668-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maryann Brothers
Appellant
Commissioner of Social Security
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-14668

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cv-00108-CAR-MSH

MARYANN BROTHERS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

________________________

(April 26, 2016)

Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

USCA11 Case: 15-14668 Date Filed: 04/26/2016 Page: 1 of 3
2

Maryann Brothers appeals the judgment that affirmed the denial of her 

application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income from 

the Social Security Administration. 41 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Brothers

argues that the administrative law judge failed to account for her limitations in 

timely completing tasks and responding appropriately to supervisors in the 

hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert and in the assessment of 

Brothers’s residual functional capacity. We affirm.

The administrative law judge accounted for Brothers’s limitations. The 

administrative law judge gave “great weight” to the findings of Dr. David S. 

Bailey, a psychologist, that Brothers could understand and complete basic 

instructions and had extreme limitations in interacting with the public, coworkers, 

and supervisors. And the administrative law judge gave great weight to the 

findings of Dr. Clifford Guarnaccia, a state psychologist, that Brothers had “some 

limitation in understanding and remembering detailed instructions, [yet could] 

sustain attention for two-hour periods” to “complete tasks” with occasional 

reminders by a supervisor with whom Brothers might “develop interpersonal 

problems” but could “maintain basic social interactions.” See Sharfarz v. Bowen, 

825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987). Based on this evidence, the administrative law 

judge found that Brothers could “work only where no production rate or pace is 

USCA11 Case: 15-14668 Date Filed: 04/26/2016 Page: 2 of 3
3

required[,] can perform only simple routine tasks, and can work where only 

occasional interaction with the public and co-workers is required.”

The administrative law judge also included those limitations in the 

hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert. See Winschel v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011). The administrative law judge was 

not required to refer to supervisors when the residual functional capacity 

assessment and the hypothetical question included a restriction on Brothers’s social 

interaction in the workplace. And the administrative law judge was not required to

“specifically refer to every piece of evidence . . . [when his] decision [reveals]. . . 

that [he] considered [Brothers’s] medical condition as a whole.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 

395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).

We AFFIRM the judgment in favor of the Commissioner.

USCA11 Case: 15-14668 Date Filed: 04/26/2016 Page: 3 of 3