Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00476/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00476-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
F. Foulk
Respondent
Jesse Perez
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSE PEREZ,

Petitioner,

v.

F. FOULK,

Respondent.

No. 1:13-cv-00476-SKO HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 He contends that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process 

was violated by (1) erroneous and prejudicial jury instructions on conspiracy and the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine, and (2) an arson conviction that was not supported by substantial 

evidence. Respondent counters that the state court’s determinations that (1) the instructional 

errors constituted harmless error and (2) sufficient evidence supported the arson conviction, were

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent.

I. Factual Background

In Delano, California, in the early morning hours of July 18, 2008, Petitioner drove a 

stolen city pick-up truck; co-defendant Juan Efren Prado rode in the passenger seat. They 

 

1

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), both parties consented, in writing, to the jurisdiction of a United States 

Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment.

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 1 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

stopped at the Rodriguez residence, where brothers Carlos and Alejandro Rodriguez were 

standing near the street corner with Salvador Gandarilla and Luis Celaya.

Prado got out of the truck and asked the four men whether they were Sureño gang 

members. Celaya and the Rodriguez brothers denied gang membership, but Gandarilla, who had 

ties to the Sureños, asked, “What are you gonna do if we are Sureños?” In response, Prado 

reached into the cab of the truck, pulled out a long-barreled firearm, and shot at the men. 

Gandarilla was killed, and Carlos Rodriguez and Celaya were seriously injured.

Petitioner and Prado drove off, and abandoned the truck after setting fire to papers in the 

cab. The fire burned out quickly, and the truck sustained minor damage.

II. Procedural Background

Petitioner was charged with the following counts: (1) first degree murder of Salvador 

Gandarilla (Cal. Penal Code § 187(A)) with multiple enhancements (Cal. Penal Code 

§§ 190.2(A)(22) and 186.22(B)(1)); Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code § 707(D)(1)); (2) attempted 

murder of Carlos Rodriguez (Cal. Penal Code § 664/187(A)) with multiple enhancements (Cal. 

Penal Code §§ 187A, 186.22(B)(1), and 189; Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code § 707(D)(1)); 

(3) attempted murder of Luis Celaya (Cal. Penal Code § 664/187(A)) with multiple enhancements 

(Cal. Penal Code §§ 187A, 186.22(B)(1), and 189; Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code § 707(D)(1)); 

(4) attempted murder of Alejandro Rodriguez (Cal. Penal Code § 664/187(A)) with multiple 

enhancements (Cal. Penal Code §§ 187A, 186.22(B)(1), and 189; Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code 

§ 707(D)(1)); (5) assault of Carlos Rodriguez with a firearm (Cal. Penal Code §245(A)(2)) with 

multiple enhancements (Cal. Penal Code §186.22(B)(1); Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code 

§ 707(D)(1)); (6) assault of Luis Celaya with a firearm (Cal. Penal Code §245(A)(2)) with 

multiple enhancements (Cal. Penal Code §186.22(B)(1); Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code 

///

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 2 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

§ 707(D)(1)); (7) assault of Alejandro Rodriguez with a firearm (Cal. Penal Code §245(A)(2))

with multiple enhancements (Cal. Penal Code §186.22(B)(1); Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code 

§ 707(D)(1)); (8) taking a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent (Cal. Vehicle Code 

§ 10851(A)) with multiple enhancements (Cal. Penal Code §186.22(B)(1); Cal. Welfare and Inst. 

Code § 707(D)(1)); (9) arson (Cal. Penal Code § 451(D)) with multiple enhancements (Cal. Penal 

Code §186.22(B)(1); Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code § 707(D)(1)); (10) participation in a criminal 

street gang (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(A)) with one enhancement (Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code 

§ 707(D)(1)).2

Petitioner and Prado were tried together before a jury in Kern County Superior Court in 

April and May 2010. On May 17, 2010, the jury returned a verdict finding Petitioner guilty on all 

counts and all enhancements to be true. On July 27, 2010, the Superior Court sentenced

Petitioner to an aggregate term of life in prison without the possibility of parole plus 90 years to 

life, with a determinate sentence of 8 years and 8 months imprisonment.

On August 13, 2010, Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeals, 

Fifth Appellate District. Petitioner raised multiple issues, including the sentencing and 

sufficiency-of-the evidence issue now raised in his federal petition. In a March 7, 2012, decision, 

the appellate court corrected certain sentencing errors in the abstract of judgment, but denied all 

other issues. The court denied a petition for rehearing on April 6, 2012. On June 13, 2012, the 

California Supreme Court denied the petition for review.

Petitioner filed a petition in this Court on March 4, 2013.

III. Standard of Review of Federal Habeas Petitions

A person in custody as a result of the judgment of a state court may secure relief through a 

petition for habeas corpus if the custody violates the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

 

2 Count 10 alleged possession of a controlled substance for purposes of sale against Prado only.

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 3 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). On April 24, 1996, 

Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which 

applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed thereafter. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,

322-23 (1997). Under the statutory terms, the petition in this case is governed by AEDPA's 

provisions because Petitioner filed it after April 24, 1996.

Habeas corpus is neither a substitute for a direct appeal nor a device for federal review of 

the merits of a guilty verdict rendered in state court. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 

(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). Habeas corpus relief is intended to address only "extreme 

malfunctions" in state criminal justice proceedings. Id. Under AEDPA, a petitioner can prevail 

only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 529 

U.S. at 413.

"By its terms, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, 

subject only to the exceptions set forth in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 98 (2011). 

As a threshold matter, a federal court must first determine what constitutes "clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Lockyer, 

538 U.S. at 71. In doing so, the Court must look to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the 

Supreme Court's decisions at the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. The court must 

then consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

///

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 4 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

application of, clearly established Federal law." Id. at 72. The state court need not have cited 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent; it is sufficient that neither the reasoning nor the 

result of the state court contradicts it. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). The federal court 

must apply the presumption that state courts know and follow the law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). The petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the 

state court is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme 

Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). 

"A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. "A state court's determination that 

a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' 

on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Thus, the AEDPA standard is difficult to 

satisfy since even a strong case for relief does not demonstrate that the state court's 

determination was unreasonable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 

IV. Jury Instruction Error: Natural and Probable Consequences

In his first claim, Petitioner contends that the conspiracy instruction on the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine prejudiced the jury’s determination of Petitioner’s guilt in 

violation of his 14th Amendment right to a fair trial. In his second claim, Petitioner adds that 

the error in the jury instructions erroneously instructed the jury that it could convict him of first 

degree murder if the shooter had the requisite deliberation and premeditation. Following a 

careful review of the record as a whole and the complete jury instructions, the Court agrees with 

the California Court of Appeals that the trial court’s error in presenting the jury instruction on 

///

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 5 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

natural and probable consequences (CALCRIM 417) was harmless error and did violate any 

federal constitutional right.

A. State Law on Natural and Probable Consequences

Under California Law, a person who aids and abets a confederate in 

the commission of a criminal act is liable not only for that crime 

(the target crime), but also for any other offense (nontarget crime) 

committed by the confederate as a “natural and probable 

consequence” of the crime originally aided and abetted. To convict 

a defendant of a nontarget crime as an accomplice under the 

“natural and probable consequences” doctrine, the jury must find 

that, with knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose, and 

with the intent of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the 

commission of the target crime, the defendant aided, promoted, 

encouraged, or instigated the commission of the target crime. The 

jury must also find that the defendant’s confederate committed an 

offense other than the target crime, and that the nontarget offense 

perpetrated by the confederate was a “natural and probable 

consequence” of the target crime that the defendant assisted or 

encouraged.

People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal.4th 248, 254 (1996).

If a defendant aids the commission of a target crime, but does not intend the commission 

of a greater offense by the perpetrator, and if the ultimate offense is not the “natural and probable 

consequence” of the target crime, the defendant cannot be convicted of the perpetrator’s ultimate 

offense. People v. Hammond, 181 Cal.App.3d 463, 468-69 (1986).

[W]hen the prosecutor relies on the “natural and probable 

consequences” doctrine, the trial court must identify and describe 

the target crimes that the defendant might have assisted or 

encouraged. An instruction identifying target crimes will assist the 

jury in determining whether the crime charged was a natural and 

probable consequence of some other criminal act. And an 

instruction describing the target crimes will eliminate the risk that 

the jury will indulge in uninformed speculation with regard to what 

types of conduct are criminal.

Prettyman, 14 Cal.4th at 254.

The California Supreme Court has not required that the jury instructions identify target 

and nontarget crimes when the instructions as a whole encompass all elements of the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine. See id. at 271-72. The natural and probable consequences 

///

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 6 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

doctrine requires the jury to decide “whether the defendant (1) with knowledge of the 

confederate’s unlawful purpose; and (2) the intent of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the 

commission of any target crime(s); (3) aided, promoted, encouraged, or instigated the commission 

of the target crimes. Id. at 271. “The jury must also determine whether (4) the defendant’s 

confederate committed an offense other than the target crime(s); and whether (5) the offense 

committed by the confederate was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime(s) that 

the defendant encouraged or facilitated.” Id. 

B. The Jury Instructions on Vicarious Liability

The jury instructions on natural and probable consequences were a small part of the trial 

court’s instructions on direct and vicarious liability, including liability as an aider and abettor or 

as a member of a conspiracy:

A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways: One, he or she may 

have directly committed the crime. I will call that person the 

perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a 

perpetrator who directly committed the crime.

A person is equally guilty of the crime whether he or she committed 

it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator who committed it. 

Under some circumstances if the evidence establishes aiding and 

abetting of one crime, the person may also be found guilty of other 

crimes that have occurred during the commission of the first crime.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and 

abetting that crime, the People must prove that:

One, the perpetrator committed the crime;

Two, the defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit 

the crime;

Three, before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant 

intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime;

And, fourth, the defendant’s words or conduct did, in fact, aid and 

abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.

Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the 

perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to 

and does, in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the 

perpetrator’s commission of the crime. If all of these requirements 

are proved, the defendant does not need to actually have been 

present when the crime was committed to be guilty as the aider and 

abettor.

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 7 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

If you conclude that the defendant was present at the scene of the 

crime or failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in 

determining whether the defendant was an aider and abettor. 

However, the fact that a person is present at the scene of the crime 

does not by itself make him or her an aider or abettor.

A person who aids and abets a crime is not guilty of that crime if he 

or she withdraws before the crime is committed. To withdraw a 

person must do two things:

One, he or she must notify everyone else he or she knows is 

involved in the commission of the crime that he or she is no longer 

participating. That notification must be made early enough to 

prevent the commission of the crime.

And, two, he or she must do everything reasonably necessary and 

reasonably within—I’m going to read that over again.

Number two, he or she must do everything reasonably within his or 

her power to prevent the crime from being committed. He or she 

does not have to actually prevent the crime.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant did not withdraw. If the People have not met this 

burden, you may not find the defendant guilty under an aiding and 

abetting theory.

The People have presented evidence of a conspiracy. A member of 

a conspiracy is criminally responsible for the acts or statements of 

any other members of the conspiracy done to help [accomplish] the 

goal of the conspiracy.

To prove that a defendant was a member of the conspiracy in this 

case the People must prove that:

One, the defendant intended to agree and did agree with the other 

defendants or one or more unknown conspirators to commit 

murder, assault with a firearm, theft of a motor vehicle, and/or 

arson;

Two, at the time of the agreement the defendant and one or more of 

the other members of the conspiracy intended that one or more of 

them would commit murder, assault with a firearm, theft of a motor 

vehicle, and/or arson;

Three, one of the defendants or another unknown conspirator or 

either or any of them committed at least one of the following overt 

acts to accomplish murder, assault with a firearm, theft of a motor 

vehicle, and/or arson;

I’m going to read that over again.

Three, one of the defendants or another unknown conspirator or 

either or any of them committed at least one of the following overt 

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 8 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

acts to accomplish murder, assault with a firearm, theft of a motor 

vehicle, and/or arson;

One, a member of the conspiracy punched out the door lock of a 

City of Delano pickup truck;

Two, a member of the conspiracy removed the housing covering the 

steering column of the City of Delano pickup truck;

Three, a member of the conspiracy obtained the use of a small 

black, silver, or gray vehicle;

Four, Juan Prado obtained a 7.62 x 39 millimeter ammunition;

Fifth, Juan Prado obtained a rifle capable of firing a 7.62 x 39 

millimeter ammunition;

Sixth, Juan Perez [sic] took control of the City of Delano pickup 

truck;

Seven, Juan Prado entered the City of Delano pickup truck;

Eight, Jesse Perez drove the pickup truck from an unknown location 

to the intersection of 17th Avenue and Jefferson Street in the City of 

Delano;

Ninth, Juan Prado fired the rifle;

Tenth, Jesse Perez drove Juan Prado from the intersection of 17th

and Jefferson Street to an unknown location;

And, 11, a member of the conspiracy set a fire in the interior of the 

City of Delano pickup truck;

And fourth, at least one of these overt acts was committed in 

California.

To decide whether a defendant committed these overt acts, kindly 

consider all the evidence presented about the acts.

To decide whether a defendant and one or more of the other alleged 

members of the conspiracy intended to murder, assault with a 

firearm, theft of a motor vehicle, and/or arson, please refer to the 

separate instructions that I will give you on those crimes.

The People must prove that the members of the alleged conspiracy 

had an agreement and intent to commit murder, assault with a 

firearm, theft of a motor vehicle, and/or arson.

The People do not have to prove that any members of the alleged 

conspiracy actually met or came to a detailed or formal agreement 

to commit one or more of these crimes. An agreement may be 

inferred from conduct if you conclude that the members of the 

alleged conspiracy acted with a common purpose to commit the 

crime.

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 9 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

An overt act is an act done by one or more members of the 

conspiracy that is done to help accomplish the agreed-upon crime. 

The overt act must happen after the defendant has agreed to commit 

the crime. The overt act must be more than the act or agreeing or 

planning to commit the crime, but it does not have to be a criminal 

act itself.

You must all agree that at least one overt act was committed in 

California by at least one alleged member of the conspiracy, by you 

do not have to all agree on which overt act or acts were committed 

or who committed the overt act or acts. You must decide as to each 

defendant whether he or she was a member of the alleged 

conspiracy.

The People contend that the defendants conspired to commit one of 

the following crimes: Murder, assault with a firearm, theft of a 

motor vehicle, and/or arson.

You may not find the defendant guilty under a conspiracy theory 

unless all of you have agreed that the People have proved that the 

defendant conspired to commit at least one of these crimes and you 

all agree which crime he conspired to commit. You must also agree 

on the degree of the crime. Again, you must all agree on the 

degree, d-e-g-r-e-e, of the crime.

A member of a conspiracy does not have to personally know the 

identity or roles of all the other members. Someone who merely 

accompanies or associates with members of a conspiracy, but who 

does not intend to commit the crime, is not a member of the 

conspiracy.

Evidence that a person did an act or made a statement that helped 

accomplish the goal of the conspiracy is not enough by itself to 

prove that the person was a member of the conspiracy.

A member of a conspiracy is also criminally responsible for any act 

of any member of the conspiracy if that act is done to further the 

conspiracy and that act is a natural and probable consequence of the 

common plan or design of the conspiracy. The rule applies even if 

the act was not intended as part of the original plan. Under this rule 

a defendant who is a member of the conspiracy does not need to be 

present at the time of the act.

A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person 

would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.

In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, kindly 

consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.

A member of a conspiracy is not criminally responsible for the act 

of another member if that act does not further the common plan or 

is not a natural and probable consequence of the common plan.

///

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 10 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

To prove that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged in 

Counts 1 through 9, the People must prove that:

One, the defendant conspired to commit one of the following 

crimes: Murder, assault with a firearm, theft of a motor vehicle, 

and/or arson;

Two, a member of the conspiracy committed attempted murder to 

further a conspiracy;

And, three, attempted murder was a natural and probable 

consequence of the common plan or design of the crime that the 

defendant conspired to commit.

The defendant is not responsible for the acts of another person who 

was not a member of the conspiracy even if the acts of the other 

person helped accomplish the goal of the conspiracy.

A conspiracy member is not responsible for the acts of another—of 

other conspiracy members that are done after the goal of the 

conspiracy has been accomplished.

In deciding whether the People have proved that the defendant, 

Jesse Perez, committed any of the crimes charged, you may not 

consider any statement made out of court by Juan Prado unless the 

People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that:

One, some evidence other than the statement itself establishes that a 

conspiracy to commit a crime existed when the statement was 

made;

Two, Jesse Perez was a member of and participating in the 

conspiracy when Juan Prado made the statement;

Third, Juan Prado made the statement in order to further the goal of 

the conspiracy;

And, fourth, the statement was made before or during the time that 

defendants Juan Prado and Jesse Perez were participating in a 

conspiracy.

A statement means an oral or written expression of nonverbal 

conduct intended to be a substitute for an oral or written expression.

Proof by a preponderance of evidence is a different standard of 

proof that proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a 

preponderance of evidence if you conclude that it is more likely 

than not that the fact is true.

You may not consider statements made by a person who was not a 

member of a conspiracy—or of the conspiracy even if the 

statements help accomplish the goal of the conspiracy. You may 

not consider statements made after the goal of the conspiracy has 

been accomplished.

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 11 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

A defendant is not responsible for any acts that were done before he 

joined the conspiracy. You may consider evidence of acts or 

statements made before the defendant joined the conspiracy only to 

show the nature and goals of the conspiracy. You may not consider 

any such evidence to prove that the defendant is guilty of any 

crimes committed before he joined the conspiracy.

The defendant is not guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, assault 

with a firearm, theft of a motor vehicle, and/or arson if he withdrew 

from the alleged conspiracy before any overt act was committed.

To withdraw from a conspiracy the defendant must truly and 

affirmatively reject the conspiracy and communicate that rejection 

by word or by deed to the other members of the conspiracy known 

to the defendant. A failure to act is not sufficient alone to withdraw 

from a conspiracy.

Now, if you decide that the defendant withdrew from a conspiracy 

after an overt act was committed, the defendant is not guilty of any 

acts committed by remaining members of the conspiracy after he 

withdrew.

Reporter’s Transcript, vol. XVII, at 2885-2894 (Lodged Doc. 10).

The judge later instructed the jury of the elements of each of the charged offenses, lesserincluded offenses, and enhancements.

C. The Error in the Natural and Probable Consequences Instruction

At the time of Petitioner’s trial, the standard form of CALCRIM 417 read as follows:

To prove that the defendant is guilty of the crime[s] charged in 

Count[s] ____, the People must prove:

1. The defendant conspired to commit one of the following 

crimes:________ <insert target crime[s]>;

2. A member of the conspiracy committed _____ <insert nontarget 

offense[s]> to further the conspiracy;

AND

3. ____ <insert nontarget offense[s]> (was/were) [a] natural and 

probable consequence[s] of the common plan or design of the crime 

that defendant conspired to commit. (CALCRIM No. 417 (Summer 

2011 ed. [new Jan. 2006]), p. 209.)

Prado at *14.

Because the jury needed to determine whether the attempted murders of Carlos Rodriguez 

(count 2), Luis Celaya (count 3), and Alejandro Rodriguez (count 4) were the natural and 

probable consequences of the target offenses (counts 1 and 5-9), the instruction should have 

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 12 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

begun: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 2, 3, and 4 . . . ,” 

not “Counts 1 through 9.” The balance of the instruction was presented correctly.

D. Court of Appeals Decision3

The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court’s presentation of CALCRIM No. 417 

incorrectly expressed the law but was not prejudicial in light of the jury’s verdict that Petitioner 

acted with intent to kill. In reaching its decision, the state court acknowledged that the trial court 

first instructed the jury regarding evidence of an uncharged conspiracy, using CALCRIM No. 

416. No. 416 “defined the elements of a conspiracy, set forth various overt acts, and repeatedly 

posited that [Petitioner] conspired ‘to commit murder, assault with a firearm, theft of a motor 

vehicle and/or arson.’” People v. Prado, No. F060754 at *12-*13 (Cal.App. Mar. 7, 2012) 

(Lodged Doc. 4). 

The appellate court interpreted the actual instruction to have “informed the jury that 

[Petitioner] could be found guilty of counts 1 through 9 if attempted murder was a natural and 

probable consequence of the common plan. But the law requires that to be guilty of all the counts 

under this theory, each offense must be a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy. 

The challenged instruction was therefore not correct in law.” Prado at *15. Nonetheless, under 

California law, an appellate court cannot reverse a conviction for an instructional error unless 

“‘an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ indicates that the error resulted in a 

‘miscarriage of justice.’” Prado at 15 (quoting People v. Breverman, 19 Cal.4th 142, 178 (1998)).

The appellate court found the instructional error to have been harmless since the evidence 

as a whole overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that Petition was culpable as an aider and 

abettor and as a co-conspirator. Petitioner drove Prado in the stolen truck until they found and 

confronted four individuals concerning their gang membership. Petitioner remained at the wheel 

while Prado got out of the vehicle, shot at the four individuals, wounded two of them, killed one 

///

 

3

Because the California Supreme Court summarily denied review, the Court must "look through" the summary 

denial to the last reasoned decision, which is, in this case, the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Fifth 

Appellate District. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991).

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 13 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

of them, and got back into the truck. Petitioner then drove away. In the state court’s opinion, 

Petitioner’s intimate involvement in the crime as a whole reasonably supported the jury’s 

conclusion that Petitioner knew that the assaults, attempted murders, and murder were likely to 

occur. The court rejected Petitioner’s argument that, under the facts of this case, he could have 

been found guilty of a lesser degree of homicide that Prado.

E. Standard of Review of Jury Instruction Errors

Generally, claims of instructional error are questions of state law and are not cognizable 

on federal habeas review. “It is not the province of a federal court to reexamine state court 

determinations of state law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). “The fact 

that a jury instruction violates state law is not, by itself, a basis for federal habeas corpus relief.” 

Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006). 

To prevail in a collateral attack on state court jury instructions, a petitioner must do more

that prove that the instruction was erroneous. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). 

Instead, the petitioner must prove that the improper instruction “by itself so infected the entire 

trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Even if there 

were constitutional error, habeas relief cannot be granted absent a “substantial and injurious 

effect” on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 

A federal court’s review of a claim of instructional error is highly deferential. Masoner v. 

Thurman, 996 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1993). A reviewing court may not judge the instruction 

in isolation, but must consider the context of the entire record and of the instructions as a whole. 

Id. The mere possibility of a different verdict is too speculative to justify a finding of 

constitutional error. Henderson, 431 U.S. at 157.

Even when the trial court has made an instructional error, a habeas petitioner is only 

entitled to relief if the error “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 

(1946)). A state prisoner is not entitled to federal habeas relief unless the instructional error 

resulted in “actual prejudice.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. If the court is convinced that the error did 

///

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 14 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

not influence the jury, or had little effect, the judgment should stand. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 

U.S. 432, 437 (1995).

F. No Federal Constitutional Error

The jury instructions in this case were complete and detailed. Except for the introductory 

paragraph in CALCRIM 417, the instructions as a whole repeatedly and clearly directed the jury 

that it needed to consider murder, assault with a firearm, theft of a motor vehicle, and arson as the 

possible target offenses of the conspiracy. Part 1 of CALCRIM 417 accurately identified murder, 

assault with a firearm, theft of a motor vehicle, and arson (counts 1 and 5-9) as the possible target 

offenses of the conspiracy. Parts 2 and 3 of CALCRIM 417 accurately identified attempted 

murder (counts 2-4) as nontarget offenses. Evaluated in context, the Court cannot conclude that 

the jury was misled by the misstatement at the inception of the instruction of natural and probable 

consequences. 

Evidence presented at trial established Petitioner’s participation in the offenses. Petitioner 

drove the stolen city truck, sharing its cab with Prado and the rifle with which Prado would shoot 

the victims. In control of the vehicle, Petitioner slowed the truck as he and Prado approached the 

corner on which Gandarillo, Celaya, and the Hernandez brothers lingered. Assuming that, unlike 

an ordinary unidentified vehicle, a city truck was not a threat, the gathered men did not scatter as 

the truck approached and stopped. Petitioner stopped the truck and remained behind the wheel as 

Prado engaged the victims in conversation concerning their gang affiliation, reached into the cab 

for the rifle, and fired into the group. Petitioner waited as Prado shot at the four fleeing men and 

returned to the cab. Petitioner then left the crime scene and drove to an undisclosed location. 

The truck was found smoldering the next morning.

Having considered the record and the instructions as a whole, the Court cannot conclude 

that the state court’s determination that the jury instructions did not violate Petitioner’s 

constitutional rights was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Court is not convinced that the error 

influenced the jury’s verdict. Even if the Court were convinced that the jury could have reached a 

different verdict, it cannot conclude that the state court’s determination was contrary to or an 

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 15 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

V. Due Process: Insufficient Evidence

In his third claim, Petitioner contends that his conviction for arson should be reversed for 

insufficiency of the evidence. Respondent disagrees.

A. State Court Decision

The California Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s contention that the arson conviction 

was not supported by sufficient evidence. It applied the standard set forth in People v. Vy, 122 

Cal.App.4th 1209, 1224 (2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted):

In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a 

conviction . . ., the relevant question is whether, after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Under this standard, an appellate court 

in a criminal case . . . does not ask itself whether it believes that the 

evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Rather, the reviewing court must review the whole record in the 

light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it 

discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is 

reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable 

trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.

The court rejected Petitioner’s argument that circumstantial evidence was insufficient to 

convict him of the crime of arson. Noting that the surreptitious nature of arson generally dictates 

that it must be proven with circumstantial evidence, the court declined to require eyewitness 

testimony or other direct evidence that Petitioner and Prado set the truck on fire:

At trial, a fire department arson investigator testified that when the 

pickup truck was found some 12 hours after the shooting, it had 

staining on the window[s] caused by a slow-building hydrocarbon 

fire. A paper on a clipboard inside the vehicle had been set on fire, 

and the fire spread to the truck seat and steering wheel before going 

out from lack of oxygen in the airtight truck cab. Investigation 

ruled out that the fire was started by a flare gun. Furthermore, 

Perez and Prado were the last two people seen in the truck before 

the arson was discovered, and they certainly had a motive to 

dispose of it.

Prado at *21.4

 

4 Carlos Rodriguez was in possession of an agricultural flare gun at the time of the shooting. He testified that he was 

unsure whether or not he fired it in the course of the incident. Police testimony established that following testing, 

investigators tested the flare gun and determined that it had not been fired.

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 16 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

B. Sufficiency of Arson Evidence

To determine whether the evidence supporting a conviction is so insufficient that it 

violates the constitutional guarantee of due process of law, a court evaluating a habeas petition 

must carefully review the record to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Windham 

v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998). It must consider the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, assuming that the trier of fact weighed the evidence, resolved 

conflicting evidence, and drew reasonable inferences from the facts in the manner that most 

supports the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 

1997). 

The relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, 

but whether the trier of fact could reasonably have reached its verdict. United States v. Mares, 

940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, despite the absence of eyewitness testimony, the 

circumstantial evidence could support the conclusion that Petitioner, Prado, or a co-conspirator 

set fire to papers in the truck’s cab. Because the jury could reasonably have concluded that 

Petitioner, Prado, or a co-conspirator set the fire, Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated 

by the arson conviction.

VI. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a 

district court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a 

certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 

before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by 

the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding 

to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for 

commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the 

United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention pending 

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 17 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) 

only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issues or issues satisfy the showing required by 

paragraph (2).

If a court denies a habeas petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

"if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims 

or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Although the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate 

"something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . 

part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

Reasonable jurists would not find the Court's determination that Petitioner is not entitled 

to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed 

further. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

///

///

///

///

///

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 18 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

VII. Conclusion

The Court hereby DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk of Court is directed to 

enter judgment for the Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

Case 1:13-cv-00476-SKO Document 26 Filed 03/22/16 Page 19 of 19