Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-01351/USCOURTS-ca4-07-01351-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Raleigh
Appellee
Dennis Green
Appellant
Jane Perlov
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DENNIS GREEN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF RALEIGH; JANE PERLOV,  No. 07-1351

individually and in her official

capacity as Chief of Police for the

City of Raleigh,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.

Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge.

(5:05-cv-00102-BO)

Argued: January 29, 2008

Decided: April 16, 2008

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in

which Judge Traxler and Judge Duncan joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Nathan W. Kellum, ALLIANCE DEFENSE FUND,

Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Dorothy K. Leapley, Deputy

City Attorney for the City of Raleigh, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jonathan A. Scruggs, ALLIANCE

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DEFENSE FUND, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Thomas A.

McCormick, City Attorney for the City of Raleigh, Raleigh, North

Carolina, for Appellees. 

OPINION

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge: 

This appeal involves challenges to the constitutionality of city ordinances requiring those who wish to picket on public ways to provide

the city with prior notice of this intent and comply with certain

restrictions while picketing. The district court held that the ordinances

do not violate the First Amendment. We affirm. 

I.

On August 23, 2003, Dennis Green and at least ten others met outside the RBC Center in Raleigh, North Carolina (the "City"). The

group distributed flyers to attendees of a Promise Keepers event, carried signs, and picketed in the parking lot adjacent to the Center. After

approximately an hour, an off-duty police officer working security

requested that Green and his companions leave the area. The officer

explained that the Center and attached parking areas were private

property and that the group could be cited for trespass violations. 

The group moved to a grassy right-of-way along a public street

near the Center and resumed picketing. Upon learning of its relocation, the officer contacted the police department to ask if the group

had notified the City of its intent to picket and been issued a receipt

of this notice. 

When the officer learned that the group had neither notified the

City nor obtained a receipt of notice, he explained to the group that

picketing without a receipt violated the City’s ordinances and that

refusal to leave the area could result in citations and fines as well the

confiscation of signs. Green and his group left the area. 

On February 10, 2005, Green filed this action, seeking injunctive

and declaratory relief, actual and/or nominal damages, and attorney’s

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fees against the City and its Chief of Police, Jane Perlov, in both her

individual and official capacities. Green alleges that certain portions

of the City ordinances violate his First Amendment rights to free

speech and peaceable assembly. Specifically, Green alleges in his

complaint, inter alia, that the City ordinances effective at the time of

his picketing in 2003 unconstitutionally required picketers to provide

the police department with notice of their intent to picket (the "notice

requirement") and to submit information regarding the name of the

organization demonstrating, the time and location of the event, and

the name of the individual designated to carry the receipt of notice

(collectively, the "disclosure requirement"). Raleigh, N.C., City Code

§§ 12-1056, 12-1057(g) (2003). Green also challenges provisions that

restricted picketers to signs of no larger than two feet (the "sign-size

requirement") and that required picketers to remain on the outermost

part of the sidewalk (the "outermost sidewalk requirement"). § 12-

1057(b), (e) (2003).

In March 2006, the City revised and liberalized the picketing ordinances by eliminating the notice requirement for groups of fewer than

ten picketers (the "small-group exception"), allowing anonymous

picketing by any group (with only the name of the individual holding

the receipt of notice required), and enlarging the allowable sign size.

Raleigh, N.C., City Code §§ 12-1056(b), 12-1057(b) (2006).1

Although Green did not file an amended complaint challenging the

new ordinances, he maintained (and continues to maintain on appeal)

that the amended ordinances offended his right to free speech "in the

same manner" as the original ones, and he also challenges the smallgroup exception added in the amended ordinance. The City does not

contend that Green’s failure to amend his complaint bars consideration of his challenges to the amended ordinances. Accordingly, we

treat his challenges to the amended ordinances "in all respects as if

raised in the pleadings." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). 

After discovery, the district court dismissed Green’s claims against

Chief Perlov, holding that the claims against her in her official capacity were indistinguishable from the claims against the Raleigh Police

Department and that she was entitled to qualified immunity for the

1We reproduce the original and revised ordinances in their entirety in

an appendix to this opinion. 

GREEN v. CITY OF RALEIGH 3

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claims against her in her individual capacity. Green does not appeal

these rulings. The district court then granted the City’s motions for

summary judgment on Green’s remaining claims. 

On appeal, Green challenges both the original and amended ordinances. He argues that provisions in the original ordinances were

unconstitutional as-applied to his conduct on August 23, 2003; he has

abandoned any facial challenge to the original ordinances by failing

to raise this claim in his opening brief. See United States v. Al-Hamdi,

356 F.3d 564, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004). However, Green does raise

both facial and as-applied challenges to the amended ordinances. 

II.

We first consider preliminary questions as to Green’s standing and

the possible mootness of some of his challenges. We review de novo

the district court’s holdings on these questions. White Tail Park, Inc.

v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 2005). 

A.

1.

Green contends that the district court erred in holding that he

lacked standing to bring as-applied challenges to the outermost sidewalk and disclosure requirements as well as to the absence of a smallgroup exception. Neither Green nor the City disputes that Green does

have standing to mount as-applied challenges to the notice and signsize requirements.

With respect to the outermost sidewalk requirement, we agree with

the district court that Green does lack standing to bring an as-applied

challenge. Green was never ordered to remain on the outermost sidewalk because, in fact, there was no sidewalk where Green’s group

chose to picket. After leaving the RBC Center, Green and the other

picketers moved onto the grassy right-of-way along a public road.

Police never asked Green or others to move to any section of the

right-of-way and indeed never referred to this requirement at any

point. Thus, the City never applied this requirement to Green’s conduct. 

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We believe the district court did, however, err in holding that

Green lacked standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the disclosure requirement. Although Green did not comply with the requirement that he reveal his identity to the City, indisputably a security

officer told Green’s group that failure to submit a notice of intent to

picket would violate the City ordinances. Green could not have

obtained a receipt entitling him to picket unless he informed the City

of "[t]he name, if any, of the organization or group sponsoring or proposing to picket," "[t]he name of the person and organization giving

notice of intent to picket," and "[t]he person or persons to be in charge

of the activity and who will accompany it and carry any receipt of

notice at all times." § 12-1056(b)(1), (4), (6) (2003). Mandating

Green’s possession of a receipt of notice hence also mandated his

conformance with the ordinance’s disclosure requirement. "The Constitution can hardly be thought to deny to one subjected to the

restraints of such an ordinance the right to attack its constitutionality,

because he has not yielded to its demands." Shuttlesworth v. City of

Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, Green possesses standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the disclosure requirement. 

The district court also erred when it held that Green lacked standing to challenge the original ordinances as they were applied to his

group of eleven or more persons on August 23, 2003. The district

court reasoned that because the original ordinances contained no

small-group exception, the exception could not have been applied to

Green. But Green challenges the absence of a small-group exception

in the original ordinances. That is, Green maintains that because the

original ordinances contained no exception for small groups, the ordinances were unconstitutionally applied to his group on August 23,

2003. Clearly Green has standing to bring this as-applied challenge

to the original ordinances. 

2.

The City argues that the district court erred in holding that Green

has standing to assert a facial challenge to the amended picketing

ordinances. According to the City, the amended ordinances cannot be

challenged for facial overbreadth unless they are "substantially overbroad." 

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As the district court explained, the City’s argument confuses standing with a final determination of overbreadth on the merits. Green’s

overbreadth challenge will fail if he cannot adequately demonstrate

that a challenged provision "reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982). But "[a] plaintiff’s

standing to bring a case does not depend upon his ultimate success on

the merits underlying his case," because otherwise "‘every unsuccessful plaintiff will have lacked standing in the first place.’" Covenant

Media of S.C., LLC v. City of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 429 (4th

Cir. 2007) (quoting White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 461). 

The district court thus did not err in holding that Green possesses

standing to mount a facial challenge to the amended ordinances. 

B.

Having resolved the standing issues, we address the City’s mootness contention. The City maintains that the district court erred when

it held that Green’s as-applied challenges to the original ordinances

survived their amendment. Substantial amendment to a statute or ordinance may moot a challenge to the original law when "there is no

practical likelihood" that the regulation will be reenacted in its original form. See Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2006).

But a challenge survives if the amended ordinances are "sufficiently

similar . . . that it is permissible to say that the challenged conduct

continues." Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v.

City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 662 & n.3 (1993); see also Nutritional Health Alliance v. Shalala, 144 F.3d 220, 227 n.13 (2d Cir.

1998); Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1548 (8th Cir. 1996).

The amendments to the picketing ordinances here do not moot

Green’s as-applied challenges to the original ordinances. The notice,

sign-size, and disclosure requirements in the new ordinances are "sufficiently similar" to the equivalent provisions in the original ordinances "that it is permissible to say that the challenged conduct

continues." Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U.S. at 662 & n.3.

Moreover, the addition of a small-group exception does not moot

Green’s as-applied challenge to the original ordinances’ application to

a group of his size. Given that Raleigh’s amended ordinances exempt

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groups of fewer than ten individuals, and Green’s group was perhaps

as small as eleven people, we believe that the underlying "case or

controversy" — namely, whether Raleigh’s original ordinances could

constitutionally be applied to groups of such size — survives the

amendment. Accordingly, the City’s mootness argument fails.

III.

We turn now to the merits of Green’s challenges. In doing so, of

course, we bear in mind that, with respect to the original ordinances,

Green has preserved no facial challenge and has no standing to challenge the outermost sidewalk provision that they contained. Therefore, to the extent that we consider the constitutionality of the original

ordinances, we do so only in the context of Green’s as-applied challenges to their notice, disclosure, and sign-size requirements, as well

as his challenge to their application to a group the size of his. 

"An ordinance that requires individuals or groups to obtain a permit

before engaging in protected speech is a prior restraint on speech."

Cox v. City of Charleston, 416 F.3d 281, 284 (4th Cir. 2005). However, as the Supreme Court has explained, even a prior restraint can

survive constitutional challenge, provided that it is a content-neutral

time, place, and manner regulation that satisfies certain constitutional

requirements. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123,

130 (1992); see also Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322

(2002). To withstand constitutional scrutiny, such a regulation must:

(1) "be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,"

Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130; (2) "leave open ample alternatives

for communication," id.; and (3) contain "narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority," id. at 131 (quoting

Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150-51). "To be narrowly tailored, an ordinance ‘need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of’

effectuating the relevant interests . . . but it may not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.’" City of Charleston, 416 F.3d at 284 (quoting Ward

v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798, 799 (1989)). 

A.

We begin by addressing whether the various provisions of the

Raleigh ordinances satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement. 

GREEN v. CITY OF RALEIGH 7

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1.

Green first attacks the notice requirement in both the original and

amended ordinances as insufficiently tailored to further significant

governmental interests. We have consistently recognized that a city

has a "legitimate interest in maintaining the safety, order, and accessibility of its streets and sidewalks." City of Charleston, 416 F.3d at

284. The notice requirement clearly furthers this interest by permitting the Raleigh Police Department to allocate resources and assign

officers to the site of a protest in order to protect the safety, order, and

First Amendment rights of both demonstrators and bystanders. Thus,

our inquiry is whether the notice requirement "burden[s] substantially

more speech than is necessary to further" that legitimate interest. Id.

(quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).

It clearly does not. Unlike most picketing ordinances deemed

unconstitutional, see, e.g., Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130-33, Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150-51, Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,

271-72 (1951), the City’s notice requirement does not extend to

municipal officials any discretion to grant, deny, or set conditions on

permission to demonstrate. Designated City officials must grant a

receipt of notice "immediately" to an individual notifying them he

intends to picket; the official lacks any discretion to deny such a

receipt. See § 12-1056(d) (2003); § 12-1056(d) (2006). Furthermore,

demonstrators may notify City officials of an intent to picket at any

time — in-person, by telephone, or by facsimile — without providing

advance notice, undertaking a lengthy application process, or paying

fees or other costs. Given these minimal impositions, we cannot hold

that the notice requirement burdens substantially more speech than

necessary to further the City’s interest in protecting law enforcement

officers, motorists, pedestrians, the picketers themselves, and those

accessing businesses near the site of a demonstration. See City of

Charleston, 416 F.3d at 284; see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 801-02.

2.

Next, Green asserts that both the original and amended picketing

ordinances are not narrowly tailored because by requiring would-be

demonstrators to divulge their identities, the ordinances eliminate

demonstrators’ right to speak anonymously in public. See § 12-

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1056(b)(1), (4), (6) (2003); § 12-1056(b)(1), (4), (6) (2006). Certainly, forced public revelation can discourage proponents of controversial viewpoints from speaking by exposing them to harassment or

retaliation for the content of their speech. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197-201 (1999). Speech can

also be chilled when an individual whose speech relies on anonymity

is forced to reveal his identity as a pre-condition to expression. See

Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton,

536 U.S. 150, 166-67 (2002); see also Buckley, 525 U.S. at 199. 

However, the City ordinances mandate an extremely limited form

of self-identification that occurs only when submitting the notice of

intent to picket and not at the moment of actual speech. The original

ordinances required picketers to identify the sponsoring group (if

any), the person giving notice to the City, and the name of the person

carrying the receipt of notice. The amended ordinances require disclosure of even less information — just the name of the person who will

carry the receipt of notice. § 12-1056(b)(1), (4), (6) (2003); § 12-

1056(b)(1), (4), (6) (2006). 

These provisions are undoubtedly narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests. The amended disclosure requirement

provides the City with a straightforward way to verify compliance

with the notice requirement, which we have already held to be narrowly tailored. Without the name of the individual bearing the receipt,

it might be difficult for a single police officer to confirm that a receipt

has been issued; indeed, for larger groups, it might prove practically

impossible to establish that no one present possesses the required

receipt, in effect, rendering the notice requirement a nullity. Moreover, the additional disclosure requirements in the original ordinances

satisfy similar practical exigencies in issuing and verifying the notice

requirement. Knowing who has submitted notice could clearly aid the

City in issuing the receipt, especially by mail or over the telephone;

likewise, knowing the name of the organization permits police to

approach the correct group when searching for the person bearing the

receipt. The limited disclosure required here also furthers the City’s

significant interest in assuring financial accountability for damages

caused by users of public property. See Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. at

322. 

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Notably, both the original and amended ordinances significantly

differ from the types of disclosure provisions invalidated by the

Supreme Court. See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 198-99; Village of Stratton,

536 U.S. at 154-55, 164-69. Unlike those provisions, Raleigh’s ordinances require neither "face-to-face" identification at the moment of

public speech nor the identification of each individual engaged in

speech. Furthermore, rather than simply furthering a general interest

in crime and fraud prevention as those provisions did, the Raleigh

ordinances are closely tied to the pragmatic necessities of regulating

demonstrations on public thoroughfares. 

The disclosure requirements at issue here impose a very modest

burden on the prospective picketers’ asserted right to remain anonymous and are narrowly tailored to serve Raleigh’s significant governmental interests. 

3.

Green also contends that the outermost sidewalk provision in the

amended ordinance is not narrowly tailored. § 12-1057(d) (2006). But

Chief Perlov testified, without contradiction, that the City instituted

the outermost sidewalk requirement to prevent picketers from "block-

[ing] the entrance to a building or people’s egress into or out of the

building." The Supreme Court has upheld a similar statute that prohibited picketing "in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably

interfere with free ingress or egress to and from any public premises."

Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 612 n.1, 617 (1968). Such a provision imposes no burden on speech. As the Johnson Court explained,

such a provision "does not abridge constitutional liberty," since

obstructing pedestrian access to city or state facilities "bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to . . . distribute information or opinion." Id. at 617 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cox v.

Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965).

4.

Green further claims that the sign-size restrictions in the original

and amended ordinances are insufficiently tailored to further a significant governmental interest. The original sign-size provision limited

demonstrators to two-foot signs; the amended provision expands the

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permissible size to three feet. § 12-1057(b) (2003); § 12-1057(b)

(2006). 

Green incorrectly asserts that the City has failed to demonstrate

that the restrictions promote governmental interests in traffic and

police safety. In fact, the record contains uncontroverted evidence

regarding the traffic and safety interests supporting these restrictions,

including the testimony of Chief Perlov and Bruce Friedman, a traffic

engineer with thirty-three years experience. Mr. Friedman explained

that sign-size limitations further safety objectives by reducing possible obstruction "of official traffic control devices (such as roadside

signs and pedestal-mounted vehicular or pedestrian signal indications)

that are necessary to regulate, warn, or guide road users within the

public right-of-way." See also Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d

629, 641 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding a three-foot sign restriction, holding that it was narrowly tailored to serve the city’s legitimate governmental interest in traffic safety); but see Edwards v. City of Coeur

d’Alene, 262 F.3d 856, 864 (9th Cir. 2001) (invalidating an ordinance

that prohibited protestors from carrying signs affixed to any type of

support, holding that the restriction was not narrowly tailored to the

city’s legitimate interest in safety when the city offered no empirical

evidence supporting ordinance).2 We find these justifications persuasive and conclude that the sign-size requirements do not substantially

burden speech. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. 

5.

Finally, Green challenges the small-group exception, asserting that

it too is not narrowly tailored to further the City’s significant interests.

See §§ 12-1056(b), 12-1057(f) (2006). 

2Nor are we convinced by Green’s argument that the City’s revision

of the sign-size limitation to allow for slightly larger signs evinces a concession by the City that the original regulation violated the Constitution.

Rather, we agree with the City that it must be given a "‘reasonable

opportunity to experiment with solutions,’" and the mere fact of experimentation alone does not render the amended ordinances constitutionally

suspect. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425,

439 (2002) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.

41, 52 (1986)). 

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In City of Charleston, we noted the need for a small-group exception in an ordinance regulating "assemblies, parades, processions and

exhibitions." 416 F.3d at 284-87, 288. We held that the lack of any

such exception in a city ordinance rendered that ordinance facially

unconstitutional because the city failed to establish the necessity for

burdening expression by small groups of demonstrators. Our sister

circuits have similarly held that picketing and demonstration regulations must include exceptions for small groups in order to be narrowly

tailored. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. City of

Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600, 608 (6th Cir. 2005); Grossman v. City of

Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1994); Cmty. for Creative

Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see

also Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450

F.3d 1022, 1039-1043 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Because the above cases concerned ordinances without any smallgroup exception, they provide little guidance on the question raised

here — how many persons must a municipality exempt from the general picketing regulations to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement.

Indeed, in City of Charleston we declined "to announce a numerical

floor below which a permit requirement cannot apply," finding that

"[t]he relevant legislative body . . . is the proper forum for balancing

the multitude of factors to be considered in determining how to keep

the streets and sidewalks of a city safe, orderly, and accessible in a

manner consistent with the First Amendment." 416 F.3d at 286. With

these principles in mind, we consider the ordinances at issue here. 

i.

With respect to the amended ordinances, the "relevant legislative

body," the City, has determined that an exception for fewer than ten

persons suffices and has proffered numerous governmental interests

in support of this determination. The City has explained that, as the

state capitol, Raleigh has historically been the site of public demonstrations despite being a comparatively small city. Often these demonstrations involve opposing groups that insist on simultaneously

appearing on the same sidewalks in order to offer competing viewpoints to the public. The City must ensure that even during such demonstrations each set of protestors can exercise its First Amendment

rights without impinging on the rights of others and that potentially

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heated speech by rival groups does not go beyond mere words. During simultaneous uses of limited public space, the City must also

ensure that protesters do not spill into the city streets and impede traffic or render it impossible for pedestrians to use the sidewalks or to

enter or exit buildings. In order for the City to meet these objectives,

a small-group exception must anticipate such overlapping uses of

public space in a relatively confined area, thereby supporting a more

modest numerical exception than might otherwise be the case. See

Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. at 322 (noting the legitimate governmental

interest in ordinances designed "to coordinate multiple uses of limited

space"). 

Moreover, as the City has emphasized, its ordinances regulate only

sidewalks and other public ways, rather than parks or more capacious

public fora designed to accommodate larger groups. See City of Santa

Monica, 450 F.3d at 1042 (noting the distinct governmental interests

implicated in "streets and sidewalks," in contrast to "public open

spaces" like parks). Sidewalks and rights-of-ways are not only typically smaller and more narrow than parks, but groups of picketers also

more easily disrupt the everyday use of sidewalks by pedestrians —

for instance, forcing foot traffic into the streets if the sidewalk is

blocked — while even moderately-sized groups in a park are unlikely

to disrupt the activities of others. 

Furthermore, any remaining reservations we might retain as to the

size of the Raleigh small-group exception are allayed by the broader

statutory context of the exception. As noted above, the City ordinances do not contain the additional restrictions present in most other

municipal regulations of public demonstrations. For example, in

Douglas v. Brownell, the Eighth Circuit noted in dicta that since the

challenged ordinance required five days’ advance notice and invested

broad discretion with the Chief of Police, limiting the small-group

exception to fewer than ten persons "compound[ed]" the court’s concerns with other unconstitutional restrictions in the ordinance. 88 F.3d

1511, 1523-24 (8th Cir. 1996). In contrast, Raleigh ordinances do not

contain unconstitutional restrictions that are "compound[ed]" by the

small group exception. Cf. City of Charleston, 416 F.3d at 284-87,

288-90 (invalidating ordinance that contained no small group exception and required seventy-two hours advance notice and permitted

city officials discretion to deny the application); City of Dearborn,

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418 F.3d at 603, 608 (invalidating ordinance that contained no small

group exception and required thirty days’ advance notice and permitted City Council discretion to deny the application); Grossman, 33

F.3d at 1204-08 (invalidating ordinance that contained no small group

exception and required seven days’ advance notice and permitted

officials discretion to deny application). 

Given the City’s well-considered justification for the size of the

small group exception and the relatively slight burden imposed by

Raleigh’s ordinances as a whole, we believe the small-group exception complies with the narrow tailoring requirement. 

ii.

Green also asserts that the failure of the original City ordinances

to contain a small-group exception rendered them unconstitutional as

applied to his group on August 23, 2003. Given our holding that

Raleigh can constitutionally apply the amended picketing ordinances

to groups of ten or more, however, we must similarly conclude that

the City could constitutionally apply the original ordinances to

Green’s eleven to thirteen member group. Although the City has modified the original ordinances in a variety of ways, the most significant

factors for purposes of this analysis are identical in the original and

amended ordinances. The important governmental interests supporting the ordinances as well as the most critical aspects of the ordinances — the lack of any advance notice and the absence of any

discretionary official authority — remain the same in the original and

amended versions of the ordinances. Thus, the original ordinances

were constitutionally applied to Green’s group on August 23, 2003.3

3Although we hold that the original City ordinances were constitutionally applied to Green’s group of eleven to thirteen people on August 23,

2003, we recognize that the original ordinances would almost certainly

be deemed unconstitutional on their face for lack of any exception for

small groups. However, as noted above, Green has abandoned this facial

challenge by failing to assert it in his opening brief. 

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B.

We turn to Green’s claims that the ordinances do not leave open

ample alternatives for communication. See Forsyth County, 505 U.S.

at 130. An ordinance will not fail for lack of adequate alternatives as

long as it provides avenues for "the more general dissemination of a

message." Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482-84 (1988) (upholding

ban on picketing "directed at a single residence" where alternatives

included "[g]eneral marching through residential neighborhoods, . . .

walking a route in front of an entire block of houses," going door-todoor, distributing literature through the mails, or contacting residents

by telephone). 

Raleigh’s ordinances certainly allow suitable alternative channels

of communication. They do not require individuals or groups of fewer

than ten to comply with either the notice or disclosure requirements.

Members of such groups may engage in completely spontaneous and

anonymous communication, including direct speech and leafletting.

Furthermore, the outermost sidewalk, sign-size, and notice requirements impose only modest restrictions on larger groups, still permitting them to disseminate their message. Green contends that the signsize requirement precludes his ability to communicate effectively with

certain automobile passengers. But such a difficulty does not in any

serious way prevent "the more general dissemination" of Green’s

message. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483. Although a given size restriction

might be so extreme as to prohibit effective public speech, the

Raleigh ordinances do not present such a situation. 

C.

Finally, Green contends that the picketing ordinances do not contain "narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing

authority." See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131 (quoting Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150-51). 

Of course, picketing regulations do not withstand constitutional

scrutiny if they invest licensing officials with "virtually unbridled and

absolute power" to deny permission to demonstrate publically, see

Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150-51, or otherwise arbitrarily impose de

facto burdens on public speech. But, as we have emphasized above,

GREEN v. CITY OF RALEIGH 15

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Raleigh’s ordinances do not do this. Rather, they set forth clear

requirements regulating picketing and extend to City officials no discretion to prohibit picketing that complies with these requirements. 

Relying on deposition testimony of various city officials providing

slightly different understandings of the term "picketing," Green contends that this term provides no definitive standard. The Supreme

Court, however, has explicitly rejected such a contention. See Hill v.

Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 721-22 (2000) (explaining, in part, that

"[t]he regulation of . . . expressive activities," such as "picketing" or

"demonstrating," is clear and, "by definition, does not cover social,

random, or other everyday communications" and citing to Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary for the plain meaning of "demonstrate" and "picket"). The Court has declined to use such "hypertechnical theories as to what the statute covers" as a basis for holding a

regulation unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 732-33. The operative

terms in the ordinances at issue here are clear and do not confer an

unconstitutional discretion on government officials. 

Notably, Green fails to cite any example of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of the ordinances or interpretation of the term "picketing." Green’s mere conjecture about potentially arbitrary or

discriminatory enforcement scenarios dooms his claim. "[S]peculation

about possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before the

Court will not support a facial attack on a statute when it is surely

valid ‘in the vast majority of its intended applications.’" Hill, 530

U.S. at 733 (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 23 (1960)).

Discriminatory enforcement decisions "must be dealt with if and

when a pattern of unlawful favoritism appears." Chi. Park Dist., 534

U.S. at 325. Therefore, should the City begin to enforce its ordinances

in a discriminatory manner, Green may challenge that enforcement.

Until this occurs, however, Green has failed to demonstrate that the

ordinances are unconstitutional. 

IV.

To summarize, we conclude that Green’s challenges to Raleigh’s

picketing ordinances fail.4 Accordingly, the judgment of the district

court is 

4Green also claims that the notice requirements violate his right to

peaceable assembly. He relies heavily on Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.

16 GREEN v. CITY OF RALEIGH

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AFFIRMED.

516 (1945), but that case concerned a content-based statute requiring

labor union organizers to register with the state before soliciting members. The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to assemble in

public places, including "streets, sidewalks, and parks," is "[s]ubject to

the traditional time, place, and manner restrictions." See Richmond

Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1980). Therefore,

for the same reasons Green’s free speech challenges do not succeed,

Green’s peaceable assembly claim must also fail. 

GREEN v. CITY OF RALEIGH 17

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APPENDIX

Raleigh, N.C., City Code §§ 12-1055 - 12-1057 (2003)

Sec. 12-1055. Picketing Defined

The terms picket, pickets and picketing as used herein are deemed to

include "demonstrators," persons participating in vigils and any action

primarily promoting or objecting to a policy upon those portions of

the public ways not used primarily for vehicular parking and moving

traffic and not constituting a parade.

Sec. 12-1056. Picketing Permitted; Notice of Intent and Receipt

Required.

Peaceful picketing shall be permitted in the City provided the same

is done under the following conditions:

(a) No picketing shall be conducted on the public ways of this City

and no person shall participate in the same unless notice of

intent to picket has been given to the Chief of Police or his designated representative, and unless a receipt of such notice has

been issued.

(b) Notice of intent to picket shall be given in writing and shall contain the following information.

(1) The name, if any, of the organization or group sponsoring or proposing to picket;

(2) The location or locations in the City where the pickets

propose to assemble and demonstrate;

(3) The date or dates on which the picketing is to occur;

(4) The name of the person and organization giving notice

of intent to picket; 

(5) Whether or not persons below the age of eighteen (18)

years are expected to participate; and

18 GREEN v. CITY OF RALEIGH

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(6) The person or persons to be in charge of the activity

and who will accompany it and carry any receipt of

notice at all times.

(c) It is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or

about the residence or dwelling of any individual.

(d) Upon the giving of notice of intent to picket, properly completed

as hereinabove set out, the designated officer shall immediately

issue a receipt of notice. The receipt shall contain all information stated in the notice. Notice shall be given by the holder of

a receipt of notice to the Chief of Police or his designated representative immediately upon the cessation of such picketing for

a period of twenty-four (24) hours or more. Before resumption

of picketing interrupted for any such period, a new notice shall

be given and a new receipt issued.

Sec. 12-1057. Standards of Conduct for Picketing Activities

(a) Picketing shall be conducted only on portions of the public ways

not used primarily for vehicular parking or moving traffic.

(b) Pickets may carry written or printed placards or signs not

exceeding twenty-four (24) inches promoting the objective for

which picketing is done provided the words used would not tend

to incite violence.

(c) Pickets must, if marching, march in a single file, not abreast, and

may not march closer than fifteen (15) Feet, except in passing

one another. Pickets not marching shall remain at least fifteen

(15) feet apart.

(d) If pickets promoting different objectives, causes, actions or policies desire to use a sidewalk that is already used for picketing,

the Chief of Police or his designated agents shall allot a number

of pickets promoting each objective, to use such sidewalk, on an

equitable basis, proportionate to the number of objectives being

promoted.

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(e) Pickets shall be restricted to the use of the outermost half of the

sidewalk or other public way nearest the street and shall not at

any time nor in any way obstruct, interfere with, or block: persons entering or exiting from vehicles; persons crossing streets

or otherwise using the public way; the entrance or exit to any

building or access to property abutting the street or sidewalk; or

pedestrian or vehicular traffic.

(f) No person observing, engaging in, or assisting in picketing shall

bring to or allow to remain in the immediate area of picketing

any vicious animal.

(g) It shall be unlawful for anyone to picket without filing a notice

as required herein or without being issued a receipt of such

notice.

(h) The provisions of §§ 12-1055 through 12-1057 are mandatory

and not merely directory, and failure to comply with the provisions of these sections is hereby declared to be unlawful and

punishable as provided by law.

Raleigh, N.C., City Code §§ 12-1055 - 12-1057 (2006)

Sec. 12-1055. Picketing Defined

The terms picket, pickets and picketing as used herein are deemed to

include "demonstrators," persons participating in vigils and any action

primarily promoting or objecting to a policy upon those portions of

the public ways not used primarily for vehicular parking and moving

traffic and not constituting a parade.

Sec. 12-1056. Picketing Permitted; Notice of Intent and Receipt

Required.

Peaceful picketing shall be permitted in the City provided the same

is done under the following conditions:

(a) No picketing shall be conducted on the public ways of this City

and no person shall participate in the same unless notice of

20 GREEN v. CITY OF RALEIGH

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intent to picket has been given to the Chief of Police or his designated representative, and unless a receipt of such notice has

been issued.

(b) A group of ten or more persons shall give notice of intent to

picket in writing and the notice given shall contain the following

information. A group of fewer than ten persons may give written

notice of intent to picket but is not required to do so.

(1) The name, if any, of the organization or group sponsoring or proposing to picket unless the group indicates

that it intends to picket anonymously, in which case no

name is required;

(2) The location or locations in the City where the pickets

propose to assemble and demonstrate;

(3) The date or dates on which the picketing is to occur;

(4) The name of the person and organization giving notice of intent

to picket unless the person or organization indicates that it

intends to picket anonymously, in which case no name is

required; 

(5) Whether or not persons below the age of eighteen (18) years are

expected to participate; and

(6) The person or persons to be in charge of the activity and who

will accompany it and carry any receipt of notice at all times.

(c) It is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or

about the residence or dwelling of any individual.

(d) Upon the giving of notice of intent to picket, properly completed

as hereinabove set out, the designated officer shall immediately

issue a receipt of notice. The receipt shall contain all information stated in the notice. Notice shall be given by the holder of

a receipt of notice to the Chief of Police or his designated representative immediately upon the cessation of such picketing for

GREEN v. CITY OF RALEIGH 21

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a period of twenty-four (24) hours or more. Before resumption

of picketing interrupted for any such period, a new notice shall

be given and a new receipt issued.

Sec. 12-1057. Standards of Conduct for Picketing Activities

(a) Picketing shall be conducted only on portions of the public ways

not used primarily for vehicular parking or moving traffic.

(b) Pickets may carry written or printed placards or signs not

exceeding thirty-six (36) inches provided the words used would

not tend to incite violence.

(c) If pickets promoting different objectives, causes, actions or policies desire to use a sidewalk that is already used for picketing,

the Chief of Police or the Chief’s designated agents shall allot

a number of pickets promoting each objective, to use such sidewalk, on an equitable basis, proportionate to the number of

objectives being promoted.

(d) Pickets shall be restricted to the use of the outermost half of the

sidewalk or other public way nearest the street and shall not at

any time nor in any way obstruct, interfere with, or block: persons entering or exiting from vehicles; persons crossing streets

or otherwise using the public way; the entrance or exit to any

building or access to property abutting the street or sidewalk; or

pedestrian or vehicular traffic.

(e) No person observing, engaging in, or assisting in picketing shall

bring to or allow to remain in the immediate area of picketing

any vicious animal.

(f) It shall be unlawful for a group of ten or more persons to picket

without filing a notice as required herein.

(g) The provisions of §§ 12-1055 through 12-1057 are mandatory

and not merely directory, and failure to comply with the provisions of these sections is hereby declared to be unlawful and

punishable as provided by law. 

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