Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01065/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01065-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC
Intervenor for Respondent
NetCoalition
Petitioner
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
Petitioner
Securities and Exchange Commission
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 13, 2012 Decided April 30, 2013

No. 10-1421

NETCOALITION AND SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL 

MARKETS ASSOCIATION,

PETITIONERS

v.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

RESPONDENT

NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with 10-1422, 11-1001, 11-1065

On Petitions for Review of Orders of 

the Securities & Exchange Commission

Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for the petitioners. 

Dennis C. Hensley, Kevin J. Campion, Eric D. McArthur, 

Roger D. Blanc, John R. Oller, Jeffrey B. Korn and Norman 

P. Ostrove were on brief.

Mark R. Pennington, Assistant General Counsel, 

Securities and Exchange Commission, argued the cause for 

USCA Case #11-1065 Document #1433289 Filed: 04/30/2013 Page 1 of 22
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the respondent. Michael A. Conley, Deputy General Counsel, 

and Jacob H. Stillman, Solicitor, were on brief. Luis de la 

Torre, Senior Litigation Counsel, entered an appearance.

Eugene Scalia argued the cause for the intervenors. Amir 

C. Tayrani, Ryan J. Watson and Douglas W. Henkin were on 

brief.

Before: HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge 

HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: In 2010, 

three securities exchanges, NASDAQ, NASDAQ OMX 

PHLX (PHLX) and NYSE Arca—the intervenors in this 

case—filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC 

or Commission) proposed changes to their fee-setting rules 

for the acquisition of certain proprietary market data. Two 

trade associations, NetCoalition and the Securities Industry 

and Financial Markets Association (collectively the

petitioners), requested the Commission to suspend the rules 

pursuant to its authority under section 19(b)(3)(C) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. 

§ 78s(b)(3)(C) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011), contending that they

are unlawful under NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010) (NetCoalition I). When the SEC failed to do so,

the petitioners sought review in this Court. Concluding that 

the Congress’s recent overhaul of the Exchange Act dubbed 

the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 

Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (Dodd-Frank

Act), ousts us of jurisdiction, we dismiss the petitions. 

USCA Case #11-1065 Document #1433289 Filed: 04/30/2013 Page 2 of 22
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I

In NetCoalition I, we reviewed a Commission order 

approving intervenor NYSE Arca’s change to one of its

market data fee rules. Concluding that the order was arbitrary 

and capricious because the Commission’s reasoning was 

deficient, we vacated and remanded it to the Commission for 

further approval proceedings. NetCoalition I, 615 F.3d at 544. 

But the Congress intervened. Responding to the national 

financial downturn affecting the securities markets in 2008, 

the Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act. Before that Act, 

the Exchange Act required the Commission to approve a 

change in market data fee rules before such change became 

effective. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2006). The Commission 

approved such a change only if, after notice and comment, it 

found that the “proposed rule change [was] consistent with 

the requirements of the” Exchange Act. Id. § 78s(b)(2). The 

Dodd-Frank Act, however, abandoned the approval

requirement. Changes to rules setting fees for market data

now “take effect upon filing with the Commission.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 78s(b)(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). The Commission 

retains the authority to suspend a rule change “if it appears to 

the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate 

to the public interest, for the protection of investors, or 

otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of” the Exchange 

Act. Dodd-Frank Act § 916(c)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1835 

(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(C) (2006 & Supp. IV 

2011)). A suspension triggers the requirement for notice-andcomment approval proceedings. Id. § 916(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 

at 1835 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(C) (2006 & Supp. 

IV 2011)).

After our remand in NetCoalition I, the three intervenors 

filed with the Commission changes to certain rules

establishing fees for various market data products. Before 

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proceeding to the specific rule changes at issue in this case, 

we briefly lay out the relevant statutory framework. 

A. 

As national securities exchanges, the intervenors are selfregulatory organizations (SROs). See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26)

(2006) (defining SROs). They therefore “have ‘a duty to 

promulgate and enforce rules governing the conduct of [their] 

members,’ under the oversight of the SEC.” Standard Inv. 

Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 560 F.3d 

118, 119 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 

Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Silver v. N.Y. 

Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 352–53 (1963) (discussing SRO’s

duty of self-regulation). Exchanges must file their rules with 

the SEC and ensure compliance therewith. See 15 U.S.C. 

§ 78f(b)(1) (2006). Section 6 of the Exchange Act requires 

that the rules of national securities exchanges, inter alia, 

“provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, 

and other charges among its members and issuers and other 

persons using its facilities”; “promote just and equitable 

principles of trade”; and do not “permit unfair discrimination 

between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers” or “impose 

any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate 

in furtherance of the purposes of” the Exchange Act. 15 

U.S.C. § 78f(b)(4), (5), (8) (2006). 

Section 11A imposes additional requirements for rules 

setting fees for the acquisition of market data. Added to the 

Exchange Act in 1975, section 11A sets out “to facilitate the 

establishment of a national market system for securities,” 

Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-29 § 7(a)(2), 

89 Stat. 97, 112 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2) (2006)),

and, inter alia, “to link securities markets nation-wide in 

order to distribute market data economically and equally and 

to promote fair competition among all market participants.” 

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NetCoalition I, 615 F.3d at 528. To ensure the wide

availability and equitable dissemination of market data, 

section 11A requires exclusive processors of proprietary 

market data such as the intervenors, see 15 U.S.C. 

§ 78c(a)(22)(B) (2006) (defining exclusive processors), to 

distribute that data on terms that are “fair and reasonable” and 

“not unreasonably discriminatory.” Id. § 78k-1(c)(1)(C), (D) 

(2006).

Pursuant to its section 11A mandate, Bradford Nat’l 

Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1978), 

the Commission has promulgated a series of regulations 

ensuring the wide availability and dissemination of market 

data. It has established two categories of data—core and noncore. See Order Setting Aside Action by Delegated Authority 

and Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to NYSE 

Arca Data, Release No. 34-59039, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,770, 

74,779 (Dec. 9, 2008) (NYSE Arca Order). Core data, which 

“form the heart of the national market system,” Regulation 

NMS, Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,503 

(June 29, 2005) (quotation marks omitted), is reported by the 

exchanges to data processors, which then consolidate it into a 

single stream of data for each NMS stock. 17 C.F.R. 

§§ 242.601–.603. Because the SEC requires exchanges to 

provide this data, the SEC has determined that fees charged 

for core data “need to be tied to some type of cost-based 

standard in order to preclude excessive profits if fees are too 

high or underfunding or subsidization if fees are too low.” 

Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, 

Release No. 34-42208, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613, 70,627 (Dec. 17, 

1999). 

All other market data falls into the non-core category. 

The SEC does not require exchanges to provide specific noncore data but instead allows market forces to determine which 

non-core data are provided. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 

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37,567 (The Commission “will allow market forces, rather 

than regulatory requirements, to determine what, if any, 

additional quotations . . . are displayed to investors.”). The 

requirements of sections 6 and 11A apply to fees charged for 

core and non-core data alike. See NYSE Arca Order, 73 Fed. 

Reg. at 74,779.

B.

The petitioners seek review of four changes to SRO rules

charging fees for non-core market data products. In No. 10-

1421 and No. 11-1065, PHLX filed changes to the rules 

governing fees imposed for two of its options market data 

products. Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of 

Proposed Rule Change Relating to Fees for the PHOTO 

Historical Data Product, Release No. 34-63351, 75 Fed. Reg. 

73,140, 73,140 (Nov. 29, 2010) (PHOTO Historical 

Proposal); Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of 

Proposed Rule Change by NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. 

Relating to Market Data Feeds, Release No. 34-62887, 75 

Fed. Reg. 57,092, 57,092 (Sept. 17, 2010) (PHOTO 

Proposal). In No. 10-1422, NASDAQ filed a rule change 

altering the fee structure for its TotalView market data 

product. Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of 

Proposed Rule Change to Modify Rule 7019, Release No. 34-

62907, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,314, 57,314–315 (Sept. 20, 2010) 

(TotalView Proposal). And in No. 11-1001, NYSE Arca filed 

a rule change with the SEC on November 1, 2010, pursuant to 

which it charges fees for its ArcaBook market data product. 

Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed 

Rule Change by NYSE Arca, Inc. Relating to Fees for NYSE 

Arca Depth-of-Book Data, Release No. 34-63291, 75 Fed 

Reg. 70,311, 70,312 (Nov. 17, 2010) (ArcaBook Proposal). 

Although the petitioners and the intervenors debate at 

length the merits of the proposed rules changes, the SEC 

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declines to take a position on the merits, asserting instead that 

this court lacks jurisdiction to review the petitions. Its refusal 

to join the merits issue is well-taken. The SEC conducted no 

proceeding and created no administrative record documenting

its decision-making process or explaining its reasoning. If we 

have jurisdiction, therefore, well-established norms of judicial 

review require us to remand the petitions to the Commission 

to create a record and issue a judicially reviewable order. Fla. 

Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (“If 

the record before the agency does not support the agency 

action, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or 

if the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged 

agency action on the basis of the record before it, the proper 

course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the 

agency for additional investigation or explanation.”); see also 

Tex Tin Corp. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1321, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 

(per curiam) (“Where the agency has failed to exercise its 

expertise or to explain the path that it has taken, we have no 

choice but to remand for a reasoned explanation . . . .”). We 

therefore turn to the critical question of jurisdiction. 

II

A.

Both the SEC and the intervenors contend that we lack 

authority to review the petitions. First, they argue that the 

SEC’s failure to suspend is not a “final order” under the 

Exchange Act’s direct review provision, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 78y(a)(1). Second, they argue that even if the SEC’s failure 

to suspend is a final order, the Congress precluded our review 

thereof when it amended section 19(b)(3)(C) of the Exchange 

Act. Third, they argue that even if we disagree with the

foregoing, the Congress has committed the question of when 

to suspend a proposed rule change exclusively to the 

Commission’s discretion such that the petitions are 

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nonjusticiable under the APA. See Hi-Tech Furnace Sys., Inc. 

v. FCC, 224 F.3d 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (5 U.S.C. 

§ 701(a)(2) places narrow category of agency action 

“committed to agency discretion by law” outside scope of 

judicial review). Finally, the intervenors alone contend that 

the petitioners failed to raise their objections to the TotalView 

Proposal before the Commission and we therefore lack 

jurisdiction to review that petition. See KPMG, LLP v. SEC, 

289 F.3d 109, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Exchange Act section 

25(c)(1)’s administrative exhaustion requirement is 

jurisdictional). 

The petitioners counter that we have jurisdiction. First, 

they contend that in this Circuit, agency inaction having the 

same effect on parties’ rights as a final order can constitute a 

final order. Second, they concede that section 19(b)(3)(C) 

removes from judicial review an SEC order suspending a rule 

change but nonetheless argue that the ouster extends only to a 

suspension order and not to a failure to suspend. Finally, they 

argue that the suspension decision is mandatory under certain 

circumstances such that the Congress has not placed the 

suspension decision solely within the Commission’s 

discretion. 

“[A] federal court has leeway ‘to choose among threshold 

grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.’ ” 

Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 

422, 431 (2007) (quoting Rhurgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 

526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)). Moreover, “[i]n our circuit it is a 

venerable practice, and one frequently observed, to assume 

arguendo the answer to one question in order to resolve a 

given case by answering another and equally dispositive one.” 

Earle v. District of Columbia, 707 F.3d 299, 304 (D.C. Cir. 

2012) (quotation marks and alterations omitted; brackets 

added). Assuming without deciding that the petitioners 

correctly characterize the Commission’s failure to suspend as 

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a final order under section 25(a)(1), we nonetheless conclude 

that amended section 19(b)(3)(C) withdraws our jurisdiction 

to review such failure. We therefore decline to reach any 

other justiciability or jurisdictional question presented by 

these petitions. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 

370, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[F]ederal courts may choose any 

ground to deny jurisdiction . . . .), aff’d sub nom. District of 

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 

B.

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides the 

standard of review for agency orders, see Wonsover v. SEC, 

205 F.3d 408, 412–13 (D.C. Cir. 2000), but it “is not a 

jurisdiction-conferring statute.” Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 

178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Jurisdiction to review an agency 

action requires “ ‘[t]wo things[:] The Constitution must have 

given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of 

Congress must have supplied it.’ ” Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of 

Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868)) 

(citation, emphasis and brackets omitted). And unless the 

Congress has, as here, expressly supplied the courts of 

appeals with jurisdiction to review agency action directly, an

APA challenge falls within the general federal question 

jurisdiction of the district court and must be brought there ab 

initio. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 777 & n.3 (1983);

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478, 1481 (D.C. 

Cir. 1994).

Our constitutional jurisdiction is not in doubt. On behalf 

of their members, the petitioners assert a financial injury 

allegedly caused by the SEC’s inaction which could be 

remediated if the SEC were to suspend the fee rules. Article 

III thus poses no bar to our jurisdiction. See Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (laying 

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out three requirements of Article III standing); Hunt v. Wash. 

State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) 

(setting out requirements of associational standing); see also

Miss. Valley Gas Co. v. FERC, 68 F.3d 503, 508 (D.C. Cir. 

1995) (Article III standing plain if agency action affects rates 

petitioner will pay). The question is whether the Congress 

has empowered us to review the SEC’s inaction. 

The Exchange Act contains a direct review provision, to 

wit: “A person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission 

entered pursuant to this chapter may obtain review of the 

order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in 

which he resides or has his principal place of business, or for 

the District of Columbia Circuit . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1)

(2006). An appellate court’s jurisdiction under a direct

review statute is strictly limited to the agency action(s)

included therein. See Nat’l Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. FTC, 670

F.3d 268, 270 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Public Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l 

Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007); see also Bath County v. Amy, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 

244, 247–48 (1871) (“It must be considered as settled that the 

Circuit Courts of the United States . . . . are creatures of 

statute, and they have only so much of the judicial power of 

the United States as the acts of Congress have conferred upon 

them.”). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction under section

25(a)(1) to review only “final order[s]” of the SEC. Indep. 

Broker-Dealers’ Trade Ass’n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132, 143 (D.C. 

Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971).

The jurisdictional question turns on our construction of 

amended section 19(b)(3)(C). Although we accord no 

deference to the executive branch in construing our 

jurisdiction, Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

the Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 478 (D.C. Cir.), modified on denial 

of petition for reh’g, 270 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 2001), we bear 

in mind the presumption favoring judicial review of agency 

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action. See Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 

U.S. 667, 671–72 (1986); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United 

States, 632 F.3d 1272, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Although the 

Congress is authorized to preclude judicial review of agency 

action, Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 

(1984), we assume that the Congress has not done so absent 

“clear and convincing evidence of a contrary legislative 

intent.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) 

(quotation marks omitted). 

C.

We begin, as we must, with the text of the statute. See 

Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 

U.S. 246, 252 (2004) (“Statutory construction must begin 

with the language employed by Congress and the assumption 

that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately 

expresses the legislative purpose.” (quotation marks 

omitted)); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 

469, 475 (1992). Section 19(b)(3)(C), as amended by the 

Dodd-Frank Act, provides in relevant part: 

At any time within the 60-day period beginning on the 

date of filing of such a proposed rule change in 

accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1), the 

Commission summarily may temporarily suspend the 

change in the rules of the self-regulatory organization 

made thereby, if it appears to the Commission that 

such action is necessary or appropriate in the public 

interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in 

furtherance of the purposes of [the Exchange Act]. If 

the Commission takes such action, the Commission 

shall institute proceedings under paragraph (2)(B) to 

determine whether the proposed rule should be 

approved or disapproved. Commission action pursuant 

to this subparagraph shall not affect the validity or 

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force of the rule change during the period it was in 

effect and shall not be reviewable under section 

[25(a)] nor deemed to be “final agency action” for 

purposes of [the APA].

15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(C) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). The 

language makes clear that the Congress has withdrawn our 

authority under section 25(a)(1) to review “Commission 

action pursuant to this subparagraph” and the parties agree 

that “Commission action” includes at least the summary and 

temporary suspension of a rule change. They disagree, 

however, on whether “Commission action” also includes the 

failure to suspend. 

The petitioners first argue that, because the SEC’s failure 

to suspend constitutes a “final order” embodying the SEC’s 

conclusion that none of the three conditions meriting 

suspension is present, failure to suspend is reviewable under 

section 25(a)(1). Second, although they contend that failure 

to suspend constitutes a final order, they nonetheless argue 

that it does not constitute “Commission action pursuant to this 

subparagraph” because the references to “action” in the 

provision address only a suspension and not a failure to 

suspend. Deploying the ancient canon expressio unius est 

exclusio alterius, the petitioners argue that section 19(b)(3)(C) 

prohibits review of a suspension order only and therefore, by 

negative implication, leaves review of a failure to suspend

unaffected.

Assuming arguendo that we agree with the first prong of 

their argument, we reject their construction of “Commission 

action pursuant to this subparagraph.” The two previous 

references to “action” refer only to suspension because those 

references are qualified by the adjective “such.” “Such”

modifies its subject by reference to what has already been 

said. 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 101–02 (2d ed. 1989)

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(“Of the character, degree, or extent described, referred to, or 

implied in what has been said.”). The only action earlier

described is “suspend,” so “such action” must refer to 

suspension. 

Moreover, the context in which the first two references to

“action” appear also confirms that they refer only to 

suspension. See Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine 

Div., Avco Corp. v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. 

Implement Workers of Am., Int’l Union, 523 U.S. 653, 657 

(1998) (“It is a ‘fundamental principle of statutory 

construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning 

of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be 

drawn from the context in which it is used.’ ” (quoting Deal v. 

United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993))). “[A]ction” first 

appears in the clause: “the Commission summarily may 

temporarily suspend the change in the rules . . . if it appears to 

the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate 

in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or 

otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.” 15 

U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(C) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). It would 

strain credulity to read this provision as setting forth anything 

other than the circumstances under which the Commission 

may suspend a rule change. Similarly, to read “action” in the 

clause “[i]f the Commission takes such action, the 

Commission shall institute proceedings under paragraph 

(2)(B) to determine whether the proposed rule should be 

approved or disapproved,” id., to refer both to suspension and 

to failure to suspend would require the SEC to “institute 

proceedings” for every proposed rule change, confounding the 

Congress’s express intent that a rule become effective “upon 

filing with the Commission.” Id. § 78s(b)(3)(A).

The final reference to “action” in the provision does not, 

however, refer only to suspension. Granted, principles of 

statutory construction require us to construe “identical words 

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used in different parts of the same statute . . . to have the same 

meaning.” IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005). But 

“the natural presumption that identical words used in different

parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning is 

not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in 

the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to 

warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different

parts of the act with different intent.” Envtl. Def. v. Duke 

Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (quotation marks and 

ellipsis omitted). “[A]ction” appearing in the last sentence of 

the provision, unlike the two earlier instances, is unmodified 

by “such.” It is modified only by the requirement that the 

action taken by the Commission be “pursuant to” section 

19(b)(3)(C). To read “Commission action pursuant to this 

subparagraph” as applying only to a suspension would be to 

ignore the Congress’s decision to leave “Commission action”

otherwise unmodified in the last sentence of the

subparagraph. This we cannot do. See Russello v. United 

States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress includes 

particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 

another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 

Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 

inclusion or exclusion.” (quotation marks and brackets 

omitted)); see also Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am.

v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 823 F.2d 608, 618 (D.C. Cir. 

1987); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER,

SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.25, at 430–31

(7th ed. 2007). Instead, we assume that the Congress’s 

decision not to modify “Commission action” so as to indicate

that the phrase is limited to suspension was intentional and 

apply the jurisdictional bar of section 19(b)(3)(C) to any

Commission decision thereunder. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. 

Postal Regulatory Comm’n, 599 F.3d 705, 709 (D.C. Cir. 

2010) (where limitation appearing in one part of a statute is 

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not present in another, “its absence creates a negative 

implication—that no limitation was intended”).

The petitioners raise two counterarguments. First, they 

note the provision declares that “Commission action pursuant 

to this subparagraph shall not affect the validity or force of the 

rule change during the period it was in effect.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 78s(b)(3)(C) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (emphasis added). 

Because a failure to suspend could not affect the validity of a 

rule change, they argue that “Commission action pursuant to 

this subparagraph” must refer only to suspension. Construing 

“Commission action” to include suspension and failure to 

suspend, they argue, would read the phrase “to mean one 

thing in the first clause of the sentence and another in the 

second.” Br. of Pet’rs 23. We disagree. The language

following “Commission action pursuant to this subparagraph” 

governs all Commission action. That certain subsequent 

language may apply only to certain types of actions and not to

others does not permit us to imply the very limitation the 

Congress expressly excluded. 

The petitioners next argue that “background principles of 

administrative law” support the conclusion that “Commission 

action pursuant to this subparagraph” refers only to 

suspension. Id. at 24. They argue that under the APA finality 

test, a suspension order under section 19(b)(3)(C) is “ ‘merely 

tentative or interlocutory in nature’ ” and is therefore not 

final. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 

(1997)). A failure to suspend, however, represents the 

Commission’s final “statement,” as it were, on the 

permissibility of the rule change and is therefore subject to 

review. But the petitioners’ “background principles,” even if 

correct, do not apply here. “[A] final order need not 

necessarily be the very last order.” Isbrandtsen Co. v. United 

States, 211 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 

Japan-Atl. & Gulf Conference v. United States, 347 U.S. 990 

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(1954). Courts often review agency orders issued pending 

further proceedings especially where, as here, the agency’s 

action/inaction could not be challenged in any subsequent 

proceeding.

1 See, e.g., Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1372 

(2012); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 

589 n.8, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. 

Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Moreover, the 

petitioners’ proposed reading of the statute would render the 

review provisions of section 19(b)(3)(C) a mere superfluity, 

simply repetitive of the review provisions of section 25(a)(1) 

and the APA. We cannot adopt such an interpretation. See 

Asiana Airlines v. FAA, 134 F.3d 393, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 

(“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation requires us to 

construe a statute ‘so that no provision is rendered inoperative 

or superfluous, void or insignificant.’ ” (quoting C.F. 

Commc’ns Corp. v. FCC, 128 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 

1997))).2

 

 1 Moreover, if background principles have any relevance, they 

cut against the petitioners’ argument. Although courts review 

agency inaction, they do so only under limited circumstances. See 

Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 62–64 (2004) 

(under APA, agency inaction is subject to judicial review only if it 

is discrete and agency was mandated to act). A statute authorizing 

the review of agency inaction while withholding review of agency 

action would be an odd duck indeed. Cf. Sprint Nextel Corp. v. 

FCC, 508 F.3d 1129, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (petition was “deemed 

granted” by virtue of agency inaction, which inaction was 

unreviewable). The Congress could enact such a review scheme 

but we will not infer such a scheme from this text. 

2 Having determined that non-suspension must also be 

“Commission action” under section 19(b)(3)(C), we easily conclude 

that it is likewise action “pursuant to” section 19(b)(3)(C), to the 

extent it constitutes reviewable agency action at all. The asserted

duty to suspend emanates from the statute and so too the conditions 

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The plain text of section 19(b)(3)(C) is, to us, “clear and 

convincing evidence” of the Congress’s intent to preclude 

review of a rule change at the filing stage. Block, 467 U.S. at 

350–51 (quotation marks omitted); Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at

141 (quotation marks omitted); cf. Council for Urological 

Interests v. Sebelius, 668 F.3d 704, 709 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 

(Congress may use, inter alia, “specific language” to indicate 

its intent to foreclose review). The language is “not 

ambiguous in any sense relevant here; and this court simply is 

not at liberty to displace, or to improve upon, the 

jurisdictional choices of Congress.” Five Flags Pipe Line Co. 

v. Dep’t of Transp., 854 F.2d 1438, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 

Although the text of section 19(b)(3)(C) is clear, our 

view is bolstered by the availability of judicial review down 

the road. Consistent with the presumption of judicial review 

of agency action, we have long allowed the availability of 

other avenues of review to affect our assessment of our 

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Amador Cnty., Cal. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 

373, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (permitting judicial review where 

“[n]othing in [the statute] actually creates an alternative 

mechanism for compliance with the law”); Ukiah Adventist 

Hosp. v. FTC, 981 F.2d 543, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (denying 

judicial review where such denial “will not foreclose all 

judicial review” (emphasis in original)), cert. denied, 510 

U.S. 825 (1993); NLRB Union v. FLRA, 834 F.2d 191, 197 

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (permitting judicial review as “the only 

remaining path to judicial consideration of the substantive 

 

allegedly requiring suspension. The conclusion that a rule satisfies 

the requirements of section 19(b)(3)(C) must therefore also emanate 

from that statute. Indeed, the petitioners point us to no other

supporting authority therefor. A non-suspension decision is thus 

“Commission action pursuant to” section 19(b)(3)(C) and we lack 

authority to review it.

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validity” of agency regulations). Section 19(b)(3)(C) 

provides that “[a]ny proposed rule change of a self-regulatory 

organization which has taken effect [upon filing] may be 

enforced by such organization to the extent it is not 

inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the rules and 

regulations thereunder, and applicable Federal and State law.” 

15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(C) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). As the 

language makes clear, SROs cannot enforce fee rules against 

their members if those rules are “inconsistent” with the 

requirements of the Exchange Act, including sections 6 and 

11A. The language also suggests that judicial review, if 

available, is to occur at the enforcement stage. 

The SEC maintains that section 19(d) of the Exchange 

Act provides for review at the enforcement stage. That 

section authorizes the Commission, “on its own motion, or 

upon application by any person aggrieved,” to review an SRO 

action that denies any person “access to services offered by” 

the SRO. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(1), (2) (2006); see also Nat’l 

Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 806 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005) (explaining section 19(d) review procedure). 

Section 19(f), in relevant part, requires the Commission to

review an SRO rule challenged under section 19(d) to ensure 

that it is “consistent with the purposes of this chapter” and 

does not “impose[]any burden on competition not necessary 

or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.”

15 U.S.C. § 78s(f) (2006); see also Fog Cutter Capital Group

Inc. v. SEC, 474 F.3d 822, 825 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (explaining 

SEC standard of review under section 19(f)). The 

Commission contends that the section 19(f) standard is 

identical to that applied both in NetCoalition I and in ordinary 

approval proceedings under section 19(b)(2)(C). Compare 15 

U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (2006) (“The Commission shall approve a 

proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization if it 

finds that such proposed rule change is consistent with the 

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requirements of this chapter and the rules and regulations 

thereunder applicable to such organization.”), with 15 U.S.C.

§ 78s(b)(2)(C)(i) (Supp. IV 2011) (same). If the standard is 

not met, the Commission must “by order, set aside the action 

of the self-regulatory organization and . . . grant such person 

access to services offered by the self-regulatory organization 

or member thereof.” 15 U.S.C. § 78s(f) (2006). 

The Commission contends that, together, sections 19(d) 

and (f) permit “a party that is aggrieved by the fees at issue 

[to] challenge them as not consistent with the Exchange Act, 

including for not being ‘fair and reasonable.’ ” Br. of Resp’t 

46. In support of its position, it cites In re Bloomberg, L.P., 

Release No. 34-49076, 2004 WL 67566 (Jan. 14, 2004). In 

that Commission proceeding, a member of petitioner 

NetCoalition—Bloomberg, L.P.—challenged an SRO rule 

change limiting the member’s ability to display market data. 

Id. at *2. The Commission agreed with Bloomberg, declaring

that the SRO failed to obtain Commission approval for the 

rule as required by the Exchange Act and ordered that the rule 

be set aside. Id. at *6. 

Moreover, a party aggrieved by the Commission’s 

disposition of a section 19(d) petition undoubtedly may obtain 

judicial review of that disposition in the court of appeals. Katz 

v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1156, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2011); In re Series 7 

Broker Qualification Exam Scoring Litig., 548 F.3d 110, 112 

(D.C. Cir. 2008). Accordingly, if unreasonable fees constitute 

a denial of “access to services” under section 19(d), we have 

authority to review such fees. In light of In re Bloomberg and 

the Commission’s brief in this court, we take the Commission 

at its word, to wit, that it will make the section 19(d) process 

available to parties seeking review of unreasonable fees 

charged for market data, thereby opening the gate to our 

review. 

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D.

Our analysis speaks of section 19(b)(3)(C)’s preclusion

of review as “jurisdictional.” The Supreme Court has “tried 

in recent cases to bring some discipline to the use of [that] 

term.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 

1197, 1202 (2011). The description can be determinative

because “a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be 

expanded to account for the parties’ litigation conduct; a 

claim-processing rule, on the other hand, even if unalterable 

on a party’s application, can nonetheless be forfeited if the 

party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.” 

Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004). “Accordingly, 

the term ‘jurisdictional’ properly applies only to 

‘prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter 

jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)’ 

implicating that authority.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 

130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010) (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 

455)). 

We make clear that section 19(b)(3)(C) imposes a 

jurisdictional bar to our review of the Commission’s decision 

not to suspend a proposed rule change. We have long viewed

section 25(a)(1) as jurisdictional. Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501, 

505 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 643 

(D.C. Cir. 1974) (“Our authority to directly review 

Commission action springs solely from Section [25](a) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which confines our 

jurisdiction to orders issued by the Commission.” (quotation 

marks and alterations omitted)); see also Bowles v. Russell, 

551 U.S. 205, 210–11 (2007) (emphasizing importance of 

previous judicial construction in determining whether statute 

is jurisdictional). Although section 19(b)(3)(C) does not 

explicitly speak of “jurisdiction,” it does so impliedly by 

placing both suspension and non-suspension outside the grant 

of jurisdiction contained in section 25(a)(1). We are therefore 

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confident that section 19(b)(3)(C) “rank[s] . . . as 

jurisdictional” under the “readily administrable bright line” 

test announced in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 

(2006). 

III

Finally, and alternatively, the petitioners ask us to 

construe their petitions for review as petitions for mandamus

relief. We have authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1651(a), to issue a writ of mandamus “to effectuate or 

prevent the frustration of orders previously issued.” Potomac 

Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 

1983). We may do so either to protect our prospective

jurisdiction from unreasonable agency delay, Telecomm. 

Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 76 (D.C. Cir. 

1984), or “to correct any misconception of [our] mandate by a 

lower court or administrative agency subject to [our]

authority,” Office of Consumers’ Counsel v. FERC, 826 F.2d 

1136, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The petitioners ask 

us to issue a writ because “[t]he Commission’s refusal to 

suspend the rule changes flouts this Court’s mandate in 

NetCoalition [I].” Br. of Pet’rs 38. 

“The remedy of mandamus is reserved for extraordinary 

circumstances in which the petitioner demonstrates that his 

right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable . . . .” 

Byrd v. Reno, 180 F.3d 298, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per 

curiam). The petitioners cannot clear this high hurdle. We 

held in NetCoalition I that there must be evidence that 

competition will in fact constrain pricing for market data 

before the Commission approves a fee charged for market 

data premised on a competitive pricing model. See 

NetCoalition I, 615 F.3d at 543–44. But the Congress has 

since jettisoned the requirement that the Commission approve 

the type of rule changes under review in NetCoalition I and, 

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thus, the NetCoalition I mandate no longer applies at this 

stage of the SRO rulemaking process. That is not to say that 

we accept the Commission’s contention that the holding in

NetCoalition I is moot. It remains a controlling statement of 

the law as to what sections 6 and 11A of the Exchange Act

require of SRO fees. Because the Commission is no longer 

required to approve an SRO’s fee rule before it becomes 

effective, however, NetCoalition I is, to that extent, 

inoperative. Mandamus does not lie when our precedent no 

longer, at least in part, binds. 

For the foregoing reasons we dismiss the petitions in 

docket No. 10-1421, No. 10-1422, No. 11-1001 and No. 11-

1065. 

So ordered. 

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