Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02190/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02190-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fort Smith Police Department
Defendant
Brent Jackson
Plaintiff
John Joplin
Defendant
Lockhart
Defendant
Marschewski
Defendant
Sebastian County Adult Detention Center
Defendant
Steve Tabor
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

BRENT JACKSON PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-2190 

DETECTIVE LOCKHART, Fort

Smith Police Department; JOHN JOPLIN, 

Public Defender’s Office; STEVE 

TABOR, Prosecuting Attorney; 

SEBASTIAN COUNTY ADULT

DETENTION CENTER; and JAMES 

MARSCHEWSKI, Judge, Sebastian 

County Circuit Court DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Brent Jackson, filed this civil rights action on November 7, 2006. He proceeds

pro se and in forma pauperis. The case is before the undersigned for a determination of whether

service of process should issue. 

BACKGROUND

Jackson contends his constitutional rights were, and are, being violated in a number of

ways in connection with his prosecution on criminal charges. Jackson states he heard the police

were looking for him. Jackson asked a friend to give him a ride downtown. On the way, a police

officer pulled the car over and Jackson was taken in for questioning by Detective Lockhart.

Jackson indicates he was hassled and verbally threatened. Jackson indicates he made a

statement and has been locked up every since on criminal charges. Jackson indicates he wrote

to the Judge to prove his innocence but has received no response.

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DISCUSSION

Jackson’s claims are subject to dismissal. First, James Marschewski, a Sebastian County

Circuit Judge, is immune from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed.

2d 9 (1991)("Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of

damages."). See also Duty v. City of Springdale, 42 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 1994). "Judges

performing judicial functions enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability." Robinson v.

Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because

the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978). 

Judicial immunity is overcome in two situations: (1) if the challenged act is non-judicial;

and (2) if the action, although judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. It is clear that neither situation applies here.

In the past, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief “have been permitted under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against judges acting in their official capacity.” Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court

of Com. of Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Mass. 2000), aff’d without op., 248 F.3d 1127 (1st

Cir. 2000)(citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1984)). 

“However, in 1996 Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act (“FCIA”), Pub. L. No.

104-317, Title III § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853, which legislatively reversed Pulliam in several

important respects.” Nollet, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 210. As amended by the FCIA, §1983 now

precludes injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

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judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Jackson does not allege that either of these prerequisites for injunctive relief are met. See

e.g., Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999)(holding injunctive relief against a

quasi-judicial official is barred if the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a declaratory decree

or the unavailability of declaratory relief); Fox v. Lee, 99 F. Supp. 2d 573, 575-576 (E.D. Pa.

2000)(claim for injunctive relief dismissed where plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege that either

of the prerequisites to injunctive relief were met); Ackermann v. Doyle, 43 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273

(E.D. N.Y. 1999)(dismissing action against judicial officers because plaintiff failed to allege that

a declaratory decree was violated or the declaratory relief was unavailable). Thus, to the extent

Jackson seeks injunctive relief his claims are subject to dismissal.

Furthermore, to be entitled to equitable relief, “plaintiff must show that he has an

inadequate remedy at law and a serious risk of irreparable harm.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy

Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1987)(citations omitted). Equitable

relief is not appropriate where an adequate remedy under state law exists. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at

542 & n. 22, 104 S. Ct. at 1981 & n. 22. See also Sterling v. Calvin , 874 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir.

1989). An adequate remedy at law exists when the acts of the judicial officer can be reviewed

on appeal or by extraordinary writ. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1392 (citation omitted). See also Nelson

v. Com, 1997 WL 793060, 2 (E.D. Pa. 1997)(appellate review of conviction provides plaintiff

an adequate remedy under state law). See also J&M Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Hampton, 347 Ark.

126, 60 S.W.3d 481 (2001)(discussing when a writ of prohibition is appropriate). 

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Second, Stephen Tabor, a prosecuting attorney, is immune from suit. The United States

Supreme Court, in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S. Ct. 984, 995, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128

(1976), established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case." Id., 424 U.S.

at 427. This immunity extends to all acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase

of the criminal process.” Id., 424 U.S. at 430. See also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,

113 S. Ct. 2606, 2615, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993)(Prosecutor acting as an advocate for the state

in a criminal prosecution is entitled to absolute immunity while a prosecutor acting in an

investigatory or administrative capacity is only entitled to qualified immunity). Based on the

allegations of the complaint, it is clear Tabor is entitled to absolute immunity. See also

Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996)(County prosecutors were entitled to

absolute immunity from suit).

To the extent Jackson’s complaint seeks injunctive relief, we find the claim not

cognizable. While the Supreme Court has not held that this immunity insulates prosecutors from

declaratory or injunctive relief, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed.

2d 565 (1984), a plaintiff must show some substantial likelihood that the past conduct alleged

to be illegal will recur. Jackson can make no such showing here. Further, injunctive relief is not

appropriate where an adequate remedy under state law exists. Id., 466 U.S. at 542 & n.22. See

also Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975). 

Third, the claim against John Joplin, a public defender, is subject to dismissal. To state

a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant, while acting under color of state

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law, deprived him of a federal right. In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S. Ct.

445, 70 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a public defender does not act under

color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to indigent

defendants in state criminal proceedings. Thus, when the claim is merely that the public

defender failed to adequately represent the client in his criminal proceedings, it does not state a

cognizable claim under § 1983. See also Gilbert v. Corcoran, 530 F.2d 820 (8th Cir.

1976)(conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do not state a claim against

public defenders under § 1983).

Fourth, to the extent Jackson intends to bring a malicious prosecution claim, the claim

fails. It has been “uniformly held that malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under §

1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury.” Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d

753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001). Similarly, a cause of action for defamation is not cognizable under §

1983. Loftin v. United States, 72 F.3d 133 (8th Cir. 1995); Miner v. Brackney, 719 F.2d 954, 955

(8th Cir. 1983).

Fifth, to the extent Jackson challenges actions taken by the state courts, those claims fail.

“[T]he United States Supreme Court alone has jurisdiction to review state court decisions. [T]he

lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider federal claimsthat would vitiate

an underlying state court judgment.” Johnson v. City of Shorewood, Minnesota, 360 F.3d 810,

818 (8th Cir. 2004)(citations omitted).

Sixth, the Sebastian County Adult Detention Center is subject to dismissal. The

detention center is a building and not a person or a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983. See

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e.g., Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992)(“[s]heriff’s departments and police

departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit”); Powell v. Cook County

Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1993)(jail not subject to suit); Marsden v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 856 F. Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)(“jail is not an entity that is amenable to suit”);

In re Scott County Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1163 n. 1 (D. Minn. 1987)(sheriff’s

department is not a legal entity subject to suit), aff’d, Myers v. Scott County, 863 F.2d 1017 (8th

Cir. 1989).

Finally, Jackson’s claims that he has been falsely arrested, improperly charged, and

falsely incarcerated are subject to dismissal. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct.

2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages for "allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid" is not cognizable until "the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a

federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87. 

The rationale of Heck has been applied to § 1983 complaints filed while the criminal

charges are pending. See e.g., Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996). In Smith, the

Third Circuit stated:

We find that [the Heck] concerns apply equally to claims that, if successful,

would necessarily imply the invalidity of a future conviction on a pending

criminal charge. A claim by a defendant in an ongoing criminal prosecution

which necessarily challenges the legality of a future conviction on a pending

criminal charge lies at the intersection of the federal habeas corpus statute and the

Civil Rights Act of 1871. If such a claim could proceed while criminal

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proceedings are ongoing, there would be a potential for inconsistent

determinations in the civil and criminal cases and the criminal defendant would

be able to collaterally attack the prosecution in a civil suit. In terms of the

conflicts which Heck sought to avoid, there is no difference between a conviction

which is outstanding at the time the civil rights action is instituted and a potential

conviction on a pending charge that may be entered at some point thereafter.

Smith, 87 F.3d at 113. 

Clearly, Heck bars Jackson’s false imprisonment claims. To the extent Heck would not

bar Jackson’s claims stemming from the currently pending charges, abstention is appropriate.

"In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), the Supreme

Court advanced the position that federal courts should refrain from interfering with pending state

judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." Harmon v. City of Kansas City, 197

F.3d 321, 325 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1038, 120 S. Ct. 1534, 146 L. Ed. 2d 348

(2000). Abstention under Younger "is warranted if the action complained of constitutes the basis

of an ongoing state judicial proceeding, the proceedings implicate important state interests, and

an adequate opportunity exists in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." Id.

(citing Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1996)).

Here, Jackson indicates the criminal charges are currently pending. To allow Jackson’s

claims to proceed at this point would require this court to interfere in ongoing state criminal

proceedings, and this court will not do so absent extraordinary circumstances. No such

circumstances exist here and abstention as to these claims are appropriate. 

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CONCLUSION

I therefore recommend dismissal of the case on the grounds the claims are frivolous, are

asserted against individuals immune from suit, or are not cognizable under § 1983. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)(IFP action, or any portion thereof, may be dismissed on such grounds at

any time). To the extent the claims stemming from the currently pending charges are not barred

by Heck, abstention under Younger is appropriate. 

Jackson has ten days from receipt of this report and recommendation in which to

file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. Jackson is

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 5th day of December 2006.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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