Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50608/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50608-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Steven Boyle Yamashiro
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

STEVEN BOYLE YAMASHIRO,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50608

D.C. No.

2:11-CR-217-

ODW-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 9, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed June 12, 2015

Before: Barry G. Silverman, Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges,

and Robert Holmes Bell, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Bell;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Bea

* The Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for wire fraud and money

laundering, vacated the sentence, and remanded for

resentencing before a different judge.

The panel held that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment

right to counsel was violated by the district court’s decision

to proceed with victim allocution in the absence of trial

counsel during a portion of the defendant’s critical sentencing

stage. The panel held that the denial of counsel was structural

error, that the error was complete when the right to counsel

was denied, and that no additional showing of prejudice was

required.

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his

guilty plea.

The panel concluded that reassignment to a different

judge for resentencing is advisable to preserve the appearance

of justice because the trial court committed structural error by

proceeding with victim allocution while defense counsel was

not present, and because the victim’s statements were highly

significant in the judge’s sentencing consideration.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Bea

agreed with the majority that the denial of the defendant’s

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO 3

motion to withdraw his guilty plea should be affirmed, but

disagreed that the district court committed plain error when

it permitted one victim to allocute without the defendant’s

preferred counsel present.

COUNSEL

Sean K. Kennedy, Federal Public Defender, and Gail Ivens,

DeputyFederal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

André Birotte, Jr., United States Attorney, Robert E. Dugdale

and Jamie A. Lang, Assistant United States Attorneys, Los

Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

BELL, District Judge:

Steven Yamashiro appeals his conviction and sentence for

wire fraud and money laundering. We affirm his conviction,

but vacate his sentence as a result of structural error and

remand for resentencing before a different judge.

I. Factual Background

From December 2005 to December 2007, Steven

Yamashiro, a registered investment advisor and securities

agent, engaged in a scheme to defraud his clients. The

scheme involved more than ten victims and more than $3.5

million. Yamashiro was charged with eight counts of wire

fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, two counts of money

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4 UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO

laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, and two asset

forfeiture claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(C) and

982. On December 27, 2011, Yamashiro pleaded guilty to

two counts of wire fraud (Counts 1 & 6) and one count of

money laundering (Count 10). Yamashiro waived any right

to appeal his convictions, except a claim based on an

involuntary plea. He also waived his right to appeal a

sentence of 78 months or less.

The Probation Office calculated a total offense level of 26

and a criminal history category of I, resulting in a Sentencing

Guidelines range of 63–78 months of imprisonment. The

Probation Office recommended a low-end sentence of 63

months.

On September 17, 2012, the dayscheduled for sentencing,

Yamashiro requested a substitution of counsel. The district

court granted the motion, set a new date for sentencing, and

released Yamashiro’s original counsel from further

representation. Although Yamashiro’s newly substituted

counsel had not yet arrived in court, the court agreed to listen

to allocution from the victim witnesses who were in

attendance so that their travel to court would not be in vain. 

The court requested Yamashiro’s original counsel who had

just been released to stay for the victim allocution until

Yamashiro’s newly substituted counsel arrived, but advised

him that he did not have to do anything.

Glenn Hale, the first victim witness, described his

relationship of trust with Yamashiro, and the devastating

consequences the fraud had on his life. He requested that the

court impose the maximum penalty. After Hale completed

his allocution, Yamashiro’s new counsel arrived in court and

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UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO 5

was present during the allocution of the next five victim

witnesses.

Three months later, at the start of the second phase of the

sentencing hearing, the district court denied defense counsel’s

letter request for withdrawal of the plea. The court heard

additional allocution from victim witnesses, and then

sentenced Yamashiro to 63 months on each of the three

counts, to run consecutively, for a total sentence of 189

months in prison and restitution of $3,911,457.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III. Discussion

A. Denial of Counsel

Yamashiro contends that the district court committed

plain error when it allowed victim allocution to proceed

without counsel present. Yamashiro did not object to this

alleged error before the trial court. Accordingly, we review

for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, (1993), the

United States Supreme Court identified four steps or prongs

to plain-error review under Rule 52(b). Id. at 732–36. We

have summarized the Olano test as follows:

(1) there must be an error or defect . . . that

has not been . . . affirmatively waived by the

appellant (2) the legal error must be clear or

obvious, rather than subject to reasonable

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6 UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO

dispute; (3) the error must have affected the

appellant’s substantial rights; and (4) if the

above three prongs are satisfied, the court of

appeals has the discretion to remedy the error

. . . if the error seriously affects the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.

United States v. Mageno, 762 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

The alleged error in this case concerns the denial of the

right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel

attaches at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution. Hovey

v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United

States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)). “A critical stage

is any ‘stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights

of a criminal accused may be affected.’” Id. (quoting Mempa

v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967)). It has long been

understood that sentencing is a “critical stage” at which a

defendant is entitled to counsel. United States v. Leonti,

326 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Gardner v.

Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)); see also Mempa,

389 U.S. at 136-37 (holding that a deferred sentencing

hearing is a critical stage despite the limited discretion

afforded the sentencing judge).

While conceding that sentencing is a critical phase and

that victim Hale’s allocution occurred during a sentencing

hearing, the government nevertheless contends that victim

allocution is not a critical stage because crime victims have

a nearly unfettered right to be heard at sentencing under the

Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”), 18 U.S.C.

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UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO 7

§ 3771(a)(4), and are not subject to cross-examination or

other “trial-like confrontations.”

“[T]he essence of a ‘critical stage’ is not its formal

resemblance to a trial, but the adversary nature of the

proceeding, combined with the possibility that a defendant

will be prejudiced in some significant way by the absence of

counsel.” Leonti, 326 F.3d at 1117. The CVRA provides

victims the right to be heard at sentencings. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3771(a)(4). Among the purposes of the CVRA is to make

victims “full participants” in the sentencing process and to

“ensure that the district court doesn’t discount the impact of

the crime on the victims.” Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court,

435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006). Victim allocution

provides the court with information it may use in sentencing

the defendant. Because the victim statements may influence

the resulting sentence, substantial rights of the defendant may

be affected. Victim allocution is thus part of the adversarial

sentencing procedure.

There is also a possibility of significant prejudice if

counsel is not present to hear what was said, how it was said,

and how it was received by the court. This case provides a

particularly clear illustration of the critical nature of victim

allocution. Hale’s testimony was compelling, and the trial

court readily acknowledged that he was influenced by the

victims’ allocution because it increased his understanding of

the human impact of Yamashiro’s conduct.

Yamashiro’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was

violated by the court’s decision to proceed with victim

allocution in the absence of trial counsel during a portion of

Yamashiro’s critical sentencing stage. The denial of counsel

is error that is not subject to reasonable dispute, and

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8 UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO

Yamashiro did not affirmatively waive his right to counsel at

this critical stage. Accordingly, this clear and obvious error

satisfies the first two prongs of the Olano plain-error test.

The government argues that even if the proceeding

violated Yamashiro’s right to counsel, any violation was

trivial, and amounts to harmless error in light of the fact that

only one victim spoke, his allocution was not subject to crossexamination, his statement was recorded, and he appeared

again at the continuation of Yamashiro’s sentencing.

Most trial errors are subject to harmless-error analysis. 

However, certain errors fall within the class of “structural

defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism” that “defy

analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.” Arizona v.

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991). “[T]he Sixth

Amendment right to counsel is among those ‘constitutional

rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be

treated as harmless error.’” United States v. Hamilton,

391 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.5 (1967)). “[T]he absence of

counsel during a critical stage of a criminal proceeding is

precisely the type of ‘structural defect’ to which no

harmless-error analysis can be applied.” 391 F.3d at 1070

(citation omitted).

Yamashiro was not represented by anyone when the

allocution phase of his sentencing proceeding began. His

counsel had been dismissed, and his new counsel had not yet

arrived. We have held that the denial of the right to counsel

at sentencing is structural error. Robinson v. Ignacio,

360 F.3d 1044, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Because of the

fundamental importance of the right to counsel [at

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UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO 9

sentencing], Robinson need not prove prejudice and a

harmless error analysis is not required.”).1

We conclude that the denial of counsel during a portion

of the allocution phase of the sentencing proceeding was

structural error, that the error was complete when the right to

counsel was denied, and that no additional showing of

prejudice was required.

In most cases, the requirement of the plain error test that

an error “affect substantial rights” means that the error must

have been prejudicial, i.e., that it must have affected the

outcome of the district court proceedings. United States v.

Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014). The

requirement is different, however, in cases where there has

been a finding of structural error because “a finding of

structural error satisfies the third prong of the Olano plainerror test.” United States v. Recio, 371 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th

Cir. 2004). We accordingly conclude that the error affected

Yamashiro’s substantial rights. We are also satisfied that the

denial of counsel seriously affected the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Accordingly,

Yamashiro’s sentence will be vacated and the case will be

remanded for resentencing. Because we are vacating

Yamashiro’s sentence for structural error, we do not reach the

question of whether the sentence was procedurally and/or

substantively unreasonable.

1

In United States v. Walters, 309 F.3d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 2002), we held

denial of counsel of choice at sentencing was not structural error and was

subject to harmless error analysis. 309 F.3d at 592–93. Walters is

distinguishable because it involved denial of counsel “of choice,” rather

than denial of counsel altogether.

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10 UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO

B. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

Yamashiro contends that the district court abused its

discretion by failing to rule on his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea. He accordingly requests that his conviction be

reversed and remanded for consideration of the motion.

Contrary to Yamashiro’s argument, the district court did

deny his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Denial of that

motion was not error. “The decision whether to permit the

withdrawal of a plea ‘is solely within the discretion of the

district court.’” United States v. Showalter, 569 F.3d 1150,

1154 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Nostratis,

321 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 2003)). Accordingly, we

review a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a

guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Ensminger, 567 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 2009). Under this

standard, we review the district court’s findings of fact for

clear error. United States v. McTiernan, 546 F.3d 1160, 1166

(9th Cir. 2008).

A defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty before

sentencing if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason

for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). 

Although the defendant has the burden of demonstrating a

fair and just reason, United States v. Davis, 428 F.3d 802, 805

(9th Cir. 2005), the “fair and just” standard is applied

liberally. United States v. Bonilla, 637 F.3d 980, 983 (9th

Cir. 2011). “Fair and just” reasons for withdrawal include

inadequate Rule 11 plea colloquies, newly discovered

evidence, intervening circumstances, or any other reason for

withdrawing the plea that did not exist when the defendant

entered his plea. McTiernan, 546 F.3d at 1167 (citing Davis,

428 F.3d at 805). Erroneous or inadequate legal advice may

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UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO 11

also constitute a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a plea. 

Bonilla, 637 F.3d at 983 (citing McTiernan, 546 F.3d at

1167). A defendant who moves to withdraw a guilty plea “is

not required to show that he would not have pled, but only

that the proper legal advice of which he was deprived ‘could

have at least plausibly motivated a reasonable person in [the

defendant’s] position not to have pled guilty.’” Bonilla,

637 F.3d at 983 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 401 F.3d

1008, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2005)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Yamashiro’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Yamashiro’s testimony during the plea hearing directly

contradicted his contention that he did not enter his plea

voluntarily and knowingly. “Statements made by a defendant

during a guilty plea hearing carry a strong presumption of

veracity in subsequent proceedings attacking the plea.” 

United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Yamashiro has not presented evidence to rebut the

presumption that his statements at his plea were voluntary,

nor has he presented evidence to suggest that it was plausible

that he would have chosen to go to trial had he been given

proper legal advice. Moreover, Yamashiro did not raise the

issue of the voluntariness of his plea until almost a year after

his plea, on the eve of sentencing. Yamashiro did not meet

his burden of demonstrating a fair and just reason for

withdrawing his plea. Accordingly, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Yamashiro’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea.

C. Reassignment

Yamashiro requests that on remand his case be reassigned

to a different district judge for resentencing.

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12 UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO

“‘Although we generally remand for resentencing to the

original district judge, we remand to a different judge if there

are unusual circumstances.’” United States v. Rivera,

682 F.3d 1223, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States

v. Quach, 302 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002)). To

determine whether there are unusual circumstances that

would warrant reassignment, we consider the following three

factors:

(1) whether the original judge would

reasonably be expected upon remand to have

substantial difficulty in putting out of his or

her mind previously expressed views or

findings determined to be erroneous or based

on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether

reassignment is advisable to preserve the

appearance of justice, and (3) whether

reassignment would entail waste and

duplication out of proportion to any gain in

preserving appearance of fairness.

Id. (quoting Quach, 302 F.3d at 1103). “The first two of

these factors are of equal importance, and a finding of one of

them would support a remand to a different judge.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The “unusual

circumstances” standard “does not require a showing of

‘actual bias on the part of the judge who first heard the

case.’” Krechman v. Cnty. of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1111

(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mendez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino,

540 F.3d 1109, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008)).

Because the trial court committed structural error by

proceeding with victim allocution while defense counsel was

not present, and because the victim’s statements were highly

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UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO 13

significant in the judge’s sentencing consideration,

reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of

justice. See United States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1448

(9th Cir. 1996) (remanding with instructions to reassign the

case where reversal was based on structural error). In United

States v. Mikaelian, 168 F.3d 380 (9th Cir. 1999), we held

that reassignment to a different judge on remand for

sentencing was advisable where the original judge reviewed

in camera documents which could be relevant to sentencing

arguments. Id. at 388. Here, as in Mikaelian, the district

judge may have a difficult time putting out of his mind victim

allocution that came in when defense counsel was not present. 

Second, the appearance of justice would be served by having

another judge, who has not heard the victim allocution that

came in while defendant was not represented, conduct the

resentencing. Third, although reassignment will entail some

duplication of effort, this case did not go to trial and

accordingly does not present a new judge with a voluminous

trial record to review. See id.

Because of the unusual circumstances in this case, we will

remand with instructions that this case be reassigned to a

different judge for resentencing.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm Yamashiro’s conviction, vacate his sentence

for structural error, and remand with instructions that this

case be reassigned to a different judge for resentencing.

CONVICTIONAFFIRMED,SENTENCEVACATED

and REMANDED.

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14 UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO

BEA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that we should affirm the district

court’s decision to deny Steven Yamashiro’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. But I disagree that the district court

committed “plain error” when it permitted one victim to

allocute without Yamashiro’s preferred counsel present.

The standard of review matters. We must apply plainerror review when, as here, there was no objection lodged in

the district court to the claimed error. See Puckett v. United

States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). The Supreme Court has

explained the plain-error standard is a “limitation on appellate

authority” that permits reversal in a small set of

circumstances where the defendant forfeits his right to contest

the district court’s decision but that forfeiture is excused on

appeal. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–33

(1993). The rule is meant to correct “only ‘particularly

egregious errors’ . . . solely in those circumstances in which

a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” United

States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (citations omitted). 

For the life of me, I cannot see how the absence of counsel

for a single victim’s allocution rises to that level, especially

when counsel had three months either to review a transcript

of the allocution or to move to strike the allocution prior to

sentencing.

I.

We “cannot properly evaluate a case [under plain-error

review] except by viewing such a claim against the entire

record.” Young, 470 U.S. at 16. In that regard, we are not

supposed “to extract from episodes in isolation abstract

questions of evidence and procedure. To turn a criminal trial

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UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO 15

into a quest for error no more promotes the ends of justice

than to acquiesce in low standards of criminal prosecution.” 

Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 202

(1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). For those reasons, a full

recitation of the facts is necessary.

Yamashiro pleaded guilty in December 2011 to two

counts of wire fraud and one count of money laundering

arising out of his sham investment scheme. At the

commencement of the sentencing hearing on September 17,

2012, Yamashiro’s counsel, Mark Hathaway, for the first

time notified the court that Yamashiro no longer wanted

Hathaway to represent him.1 Hathaway presented the court

with a proposed consent order to substitute Jack Conway as

Yamashiro’s defense counsel. The district court expressed

frustration with the lateness of the request to substitute

counsel, it coming nine months after Yamashiro pleaded

guilty and on the day of sentencing; further, the Court noted

that several victims had travelled to the sentencing hearing

specificallyto allocute. The district judge found Yamashiro’s

request was a “delaying tactic” that was “solely for the

purpose of creating a continuance and causing inconvenience

to the parties, to the victims, and to the court.” Hathaway

notified the district judge that Conway was absent because he

was at a hearing at another courthouse. The district judge

stated he would continue the hearing for 30 days.

Before court adjourned, the prosecutor asked if the

victims could allocute. The district judge agreed: “I do not

want this to be a wasted trip for any of the victims. Let’s do

this. I would like to hear from as many as wish to speak.” 

1 Notwithstanding Yamashiro and his new counsel, Jack Conway, had

consented to the substitution a week earlier.

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16 UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO

The district judge then excused Hathaway. After the

government noted it may be improper to permit the victims to

allocute without counsel present, the district court decided in

an “exercise of caution” to have Hathaway remain with

Yamashiro during the allocutions. The district judge told

Hathaway, “You don’t have to do anything. I just want to

have a full house here while we listen to the victims.” The

first victim, Glenn Hale, took the stand and explained how

Yamashiro duped him and his wife into investing with

Yamashiro, the effect the lost investments had on his life and

marriage, and his wish that Yamashiro be imprisoned. 

Conway arrived after Hale’s allocution. The district court

then excused Hathaway, who conferred with Conway off the

record before exiting the courtroom. Conway did not seek a

recess for purposes of conferring with his client, Yamashiro,

with respect to Hale’s allocution. Conway did not ask for a

read-back of Hale’s allocution. The remaining victims

allocuted with Conway present. However, instead of

sentencing Yamashiro, the district court continued the

sentencing hearing to give Conway the opportunity to get up

to speed on the case.

The continued sentencing hearing was ultimately held

three months later. During that time, Conway could have

ordered and reviewed a transcript of Hale’s allocution, though

apparently he did not do so.2 At the sentencing hearing, Hale

allocuted again, though his allocution was shorter, and he

repeated his wish that Yamashiro be imprisoned for his

crimes. At the end of the hearing, the district judge sentenced

Yamashiro to 189 months imprisonment.

 

2 During oral argument, Yamashiro’s appellate counsel stated Conway

could have obtained a transcript of Hale’s allocution but did not do so.

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UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO 17

II.

Neither Hathaway nor Conway ever filed a motion to

strike Hale’s first allocution or otherwise objected to that

allocution. We therefore review for plain error. Puckett,

556 U.S. at 135. That review has four prongs. “First, there

must be an error or defect.” Id. “Second, the legal error must

be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable

dispute.” Id. “Third, the error must have affected the

appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case

means he must demonstrate that it ‘affected the outcome of

the district court proceedings.’” Id. (citation omitted).3

“Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the

court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the

error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the

error ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (emphasis in

original) (citation omitted).

The majority flatly states that Yamashiro satisfies the

fourth element in a single line: “We are also satisfied that the

denial of counsel seriously affected the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” I cannot agree

for several reasons. To start, it is not even clear the district

court denied Yamashiro his right to counsel during Hale’s

allocution because Hathaway remained with Yamashiro

during that allocution. To that end, the district court found

3 We have held the third prong is similar to the harmless-error analysis

and is satisfied when, as here, the alleged error is structural. See United

States v. Collins, 684 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f the plain error

was a structural one, the existence of prejudice is generally presumed.”);

Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining the

deprivation of counsel at sentencing is structural error).

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18 UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO

Yamashiro’s request to change counsel from Hathaway to

Conway was a “delaying tactic” that was “solely for the

purpose of creating a continuance and causing an

inconvenience to the parties, to the victims and to the court.” 

Because of that finding, it is likely the district court would

not have erred if it denied Yamashiro’s request for new

counsel and proceeded immediately to sentencing with

Hathaway as counsel. “The Sixth Amendment grants

criminal defendants a qualified constitutional right to hire

counsel of their choice but the right is qualified in that it may

be abridged to serve some ‘compelling purpose.’” United

States v. Walters, 309 F.3d 589, 592 (9th Cir. 2002)

(emphasis added). A defendant’s exercise of the right cannot

“unduly hinder the fair, efficient and orderly administration

of justice.” Id.; see also United States v. Maness, 566 F.3d

894, 896 (9th Cir. 2009) (exercising the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel cannot have the “purpose of delay.”). Had

the district court denied Yamashiro’s request, he simply

would have prevented Yamashiro from “unduly hinder[ing]

the fair, efficient and orderly administration of justice,”

which is a valid reason for denying such a request. Walters,

309 F.3d at 592; see also United States v. D’Amore, 56 F.3d

1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] compelling purpose may be

found when granting the motion would lead to a delay in the

proceedings and the Government’s interest in the prompt and

efficient administration of justice outweighs the defendant’s

need for new counsel to adequately defend himself.”),

overruled on other grounds by United States v. Garrett,

179 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

Unfortunately, the record is unclear on whether the

district court granted Yamashiro’s motion immediately, and

relieved Hathaway permanently, or waited to grant the

motion and to relieve Hathaway until Conway arrived. The

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UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO 19

district judge stated, “I have the substitution, and I will sign

it. I am going to relieve [Hathaway] as counsel of record.” 

The district judge then relieved Hathaway. But in his next

breath the judge asked Hathaway to remain so there was a

“full house here while we listen to the victims.” And

Hathaway stayed with Yamashiro during Hale’s allocution. 

The district court excused Hathaway only after Conway

arrived. At that point, the district judge reiterated that he

wanted counsel with Yamashiro during each allocution: “I

have already relieved Mr. Hathaway, but we are hearing from

the various victims of your new client’s numerous schemes. 

And I wanted in an exercise of an abundance of caution, I

wanted counsel to be seated with him.” Conway responded,

“Yes, of course,” after which the judge told Hathaway he

could leave. The better course would have been for the

district court either to deny or grant Yamashiro’s motion or

otherwise make clear whether Hathaway was acting as

Yamashiro’s counsel until Conway arrived. The district

judge’s statements instead (unintentionally) obfuscated the

issue. In any event, it is undisputed that Hathaway was

present and able to observe Hale’s allocution, which

undercuts the argument that the error “seriously affects the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.”4 Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (citation omitted).

Further, there is nothing Conway could have done to alter

Hale’s allocution had he been present because defense

4 The district judge did tell Hathaway, “You don’t have to do anything.” 

But the court’s statement was likely a recognition that defense counsel has

no meaningful role to play while a victim allocutes, as I explain below,

rather than a formal statement that Hathaway was not to continue serving

as Yamashiro’s counsel. Indeed, when Conway arrived, the district court

likewise instructed him to “sit and listen.”

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counsel has virtually no role to play during victim

allocutions. The Crimes’ Victim Rights Act (“CVRA”) gives

victims the “right to be reasonably heard at any public

proceeding in the district court involving . . . sentencing.” 

Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D. Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1016

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4)). A “district

court must hear from the victims, if they choose to speak”

because the “CVRA gives victims the right to confront every

defendant who has wronged them.” Id. at 1016–17 (emphasis

added). The CVRA does not limit the substance of victims’

allocutions, and even grants victims the right to file a

mandamus action against the district court to enforce their

right to be heard. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). The

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure likewise require that any

victim who wishes to allocute be given the opportunity to do

so. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(B) (“Before imposing sentence,

the court must address any victim of the crime who is present

at sentencing and must permit the victim to be reasonably

heard.”). And all information is relevant to sentencing: “No

limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the

background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of

an offense which a court of the United States may receive and

consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate

sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661. For these reasons, Hale’s

allocution proceeded in exactly the same way as it would

have had Conway been present.

Finally, though Conwaymissed Hale’s allocution, he had

plenty of time to learn the substance of that allocution prior

to sentencing. After the remaining victims allocuted in

Conway’s presence, the district court continued the

sentencing, which ultimately occurred three months later. 

During that delay, Conway could have ordered and reviewed

a transcript of Hale’s allocution and incorporated its

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UNITED STATES V. YAMASHIRO 21

substance into his sentencing argument. True, Conway lost

the opportunity to be present for Hale’s allocution; he could

not consult with Yamashiro during the allocution or observe

the effect, if any, Hale’s allocution may have had on the

district judge. But that is no different than when a victim

chooses to submit victim-impact letters instead of appearing

in person. See United States v. Burkholder, 590 F.3d 1071,

1075 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining a victim can be heard by

“submitting a written impact statement describing the effects

of a defendant’s crime.”). Conway’s absence during Hale’s

first allocution is similar to counsel’s absence when the judge

reads letters from victims in chambers. And, in any event,

Conway could have learned of Hale’s demeanor and the

district judge’s reaction to Hale’s allocution by speaking with

Hathaway. If Conway could not reach Hathaway, Conway,

of course, could have moved to strike Hale’s allocution

entirely; he never did.5

 

5

 I note that in similar circumstances we have found there was no error

at all. See United States v. Rice, 776 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2015). In Rice,

the district court appointed the defendant, Shawn Rice, counsel at his

arraignment, but Rice requested to represent himself, as was his right

under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 1023. The district court refused to

conduct a Faretta hearing that day, and did not conduct the Faretta

hearing and grant Rice’s motion to proceed pro se until four months later. 

Id. at 1023–24. In the interim, Rice filed several pro se motions the

district court struck because of a local rule that prohibits pro se filings

from represented parties. Id. at 1024. After the district court granted

Rice’s request to proceed pro se, the district court permitted Rice to refile

his previouslystrickenmotions andRice represented himselfthrough trial. 

Id. On appeal, the panel explained “the district court should have taken

up the self-representation request more expeditiously.” Id. at 1025. But

the panel found “no Sixth Amendment violation in this record as a whole”

because the “district court reset the game clock [at the Faretta hearing],

placing Rice in the same situation as would have obtained had the [] judge

granted the Faretta motion at the . . . arraignment.” Id.

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III.

In view of the facts of this case, I cannot see how the

alleged error “‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Puckett, 556 U.S.

at 135 (citation omitted). Yamashiro attempted to delay

proceedings, had an attorney with him during the allocution,

and his new attorney had the opportunity to review that

allocution prior to sentencing. The error, to the extent there

was one, does not meet the standard for reversal under plainerror review. At the very least, this is not a case where we

should exercise our discretion to remedy the error below. Id.

I do not mean to imply the deprivation of counsel is a

minor violation; it isn’t minor. But we should correct errors

on plain-error review “solely in those circumstances in which

a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” Young,

470 U.S. at 15 (citations omitted). This is no such case.

I respectfully dissent.

Though not directly on point, the rule in Rice is relevant here. 

Yamashiro contends his right to counsel was violated at the first hearing

because Hale allocuted without Conway present. But the district judge

continued the hearing, which permitted Conway to review Hale’s

allocution before the judge sentenced Yamashiro. Then, Hale allocuted

a second time, this time before Conway. Conway was therefore able to

incorporate Hale’s first allocution into his sentencing argument just as if

he were present at that allocution. In effect, the “district court reset the

game clock”; Yamashiro was placed “in the same situation as would have

obtained had” the court waited for Conway to arrive prior to Hale’s first

allocution. Rice, 776 F.3d at 1026.

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