Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00249/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00249-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stephanie Clendenin
Defendant
Allan Fletcher
Plaintiff
Brandon Price
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALLAN FLETCHER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CLENDENIN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-cv-00249-AWI-BAM (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN 

CLAIMS 

(ECF No. 11)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Allan Fletcher (“Plaintiff”) is a civil detainee appearing pro se and informa 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individuals detained pursuant to 

California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6600 et seq. are civil detainees are not prisoners 

within the meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 

(9th Cir. 2000). The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and was granted leave to amend. 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on April 25, 2022, is before the court for screening.

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 

or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 

true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 

is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at Coalinga State Hospital in Coalinga, CA, where the events 

in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Stephanie 

Clendenin, Director of Department of State Hospitals (“DSH”), and (2) Brandon Price, Executive 

Director as DSH-Coalinga. Both Defendants are sued in their official capacities.

Plaintiff alleges Due Process violations. Defendants Clendenin and Price subjected 

Plaintiff to unnecessary institutionalization amounting to impermissible punishment by denying 

him access to state mandated sex offender treatment. They have failed to provide less restrictive 

alternatives for enrollment and completion in treatment. By denying treatment Plaintiff has been 

denied adequate, timely and meaningful means to his right to trial. Defendants have hindered his 

opportunity for release and reintegration into the community.

Defendants are responsible for the health and safety of DSH-Coaling patient population to 

receive care and treatment. In 2011, Plaintiff was transferred for care and treatment to DSHCoalinga where Plaintiff enrolled in sex offender treatment program (SOTP). Plaintiff advanced 

through the modules and was poised to advance to Module 3 in early 2020 when Covid-19 

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pandemic emerged. The Governor ordered, by Executive Order N-35-3030, Defendant Clendenin

to provide continued and uninterrupted care and treatment for mental health patients. Contrary to 

orders, Clendenin drastically reduced treatment options and barred Plaintiff from moving freely

through the facility by establishing “modified programming.” This programming was 

implemented by Defendant Price and resulted in Plaintiff being restricted to his home unit with 

negligible access to law library, postal service, copying, canteen, education and other restrictions.

Neither Clendenin nor Price have indicated when Plaintiff can enroll in offense specific

treatment programs. They are not psychologists or psychiatrists or have other training to make 

this decision. Plaintiff’s treatment plan consists of three components: SOPT, individual therapy,

and offense specific adjunct groups. Administrative guidelines by DSH prescribed SOTP as the 

primary treatment regime. Plaintiff had been participating, pre-pandemic ,and had been 

encouraged by progress in one-on-one therapy with SOTP license facilitators. Plaintiff can no 

longer advance due to the suspension of treatment programs by Clendenin and Price.

Eventually, groups of SOTP were reinstated but with drastically decreased requests to 

once a week and reduced class time. Treatment staff have been reassigned to other units or left 

the facility under the direct authorization of Defendant Price. Plaintiff’s unit is being 

understaffed which has interrupted the continuity of his treatment progress, reducing the rapport

and trust with new facilitators. Groups are held in small rooms which are crowded, poorly 

ventilated and no social distancing. Groups are not focused and do not follow the program

workbooks. There’s no structured syllabus, homework or participant presentations.

Plaintiff’s adjunct treatment groups have not been convened since March 2020.

DSH chief psychologist Dr. Fulton proposed to resume treatment and provide patients 

with access to adjunct groups and other treatments. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants’ own 

collaborative decisions were to negate the facilitator’s approach to providing a restored adjunct 

treatment plan as their mandate requires.” Plaintiff also proposed his own ideas and concerns for 

resuming treatment, such as video conferences, hold therapies in auditorium rooms. etc. 

Defendant Clendenin and Price did not respond to Dr. Fulton’s or Plaintiff’s suggestions. 

Plaintiff’s normal 2-hour/twice weekly session have been suspended. 

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Defendants have failed to provide the necessary and proper means to treat Plaintiff as 

statutorily mandated. Clendenin and Price have suspended Plaintiff’s treatment plan and have

violated his due process rights for a meaningful progress that is necessary and proper for him to 

advance to trial. Their acts have deprived Plaintiff of his ability to marshal evidence of his 

treatment progress and potential cure to demonstrate to state evaluators to determine if Plaintiff 

continues to meet the Sexually Violent Predator criteria. Plaintiff alleges that he has been 

deprived of his liberty interest as he has now been institutionalized for a decade and two years 

have been lost.

Due to the changes in the SVPA, Plaintiff no longer has the right to a trial (and potential 

release) every two years, which has been increased to an “indefinite term” of commitment. 

Plaintiff has a single opportunity to present a defense of his documented treatment progress, but 

Defendants have placed impassable obstacles on him. Defendants knew or should have known 

they have deprived Plaintiff for two years of the ability to develop an evidentiary record of his 

treatment progress. Judges and DA’s ask about adjunct group treatment which Clendenin and 

Price have suspended. Plaintiff cannot document critical benchmarks associated with a decrease 

in his risk of recidivism. Plaintiff believes that DSH facilitators, Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation and various county jails are providing SOTP treatment and adjunct groups to 

Plaintiff’s criminal counterparts. Absent adequate treatment, Plaintiff could be held indefinitely 

as a result of the alleged mental disorder. Defendants are using Plaintiff’s condition of 

confinement for the forbidden purpose of punishment which does not meet the minimal standards 

of treatment and structured protocol. Plaintiff alleges he has been subjected to punitive 

confinement.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaration of rights, that treatment groups be reinstated, that 

Defendants provide a minimum of 7.5 hours of core group therapy per week for 90 minutes per 

session, that sessions be consistent with professional standards and fully staffed with properly 

trained and licensed clinical staff.

Plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief and injunctive relief against the Defendants in their 

official capacities.

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III. Discussion

A. Due Process - Conditions of Confinement

To state a claim that the conditions of his confinement violate his due process rights under 

the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff must allege facts showing the conditions amount to 

“punishment.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 

457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982) (requiring civil detainees be given “more considerate treatment” 

than criminal detainees). Punitive conditions of confinement are those that are either expressly 

intended to punish or those that are “excessive in relation to the alternative purpose [for 

confinement].” Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 

441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)). “Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more 

considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of 

confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22, 102 S. Ct. 

2452, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1982). A civilly committed individual's right to constitutionally adequate 

conditions is protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Id. at 315. To determine whether these substantive due process rights have been 

violated, the Court must balance the individual's “liberty interests against the relevant state 

interests.” Id. at 320-21. The proper standard in determining whether a condition or restriction is 

constitutional for a civilly committed individual is whether “professional judgment in fact was 

exercised,” rather than the “deliberate indifference” standard used for Eighth Amendment cruel 

and unusual punishment claims brought by prisoners. Id. at 312 n.11, 322. “[D]ecisions made by 

the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of correctness,” and “liability may be 

imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted 

professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible 

actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 323-24. The Ninth Circuit has 

analyzed such conditions of confinement claims under an objective deliberate indifference 

standard. See Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (adopting 

objective deliberate indifference standard based on Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 

(2015), to evaluate failure to protect claim brought by pretrial detainee). That standard demands 

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that:

(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which 

the plaintiff was confined;

(2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm;

(3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even 

though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 

involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and

(4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.

Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071.

To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a conditions of confinement claim, that claim fails. 

Plaintiff does not allege factual support for such a claim, other than groups were held in a small 

room with no social distancing and that he was limited in his movement around the facility. For

instance, Plaintiff does not allege how often these meetings occurred or if he was harmed from 

close confinement. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to attribute any specific conduct to these Defendants, 

other than that they were supervisors. Supervisor liability is insufficient to state a cognizable 

claim against these defendants. As Plaintiff was previously informed, he must allege sufficient 

factual support for his claim. Plaintiff failed to cure this deficiency.

B. Due Process - Failure to Provide Mental Health Treatment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide mental treatment for two years due to 

their policies eliminating treatment. “[T]he due process clause includes a substantive component 

which guards against arbitrary and capricious government action, even when the decision to take 

that action is made through procedures that are in themselves constitutionally adequate.” 

Halverson v. Skagit Cty., 42 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended on denial of reh'g (Feb. 

9, 1995) (quoting Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407 (9th 

Cir.1989). States are required “to provide civilly-committed persons with access to mental health 

treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured and released,” and to provide “more 

considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of 

confinement are designed to punish.” Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) 

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(citations omitted). Although the state enjoys wide latitude in developing treatment regimens, the 

courts may take action when there is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment 

or when there has been no exercise of professional judgment at all. Id. A person committed based 

on mental incapacity has a due process right to receive “such individual treatment as will give 

[him] a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his ... mental condition ... because, absent 

treatment, [he] could be held indefinitely as a result of [his] mental illness.” Ohlinger v. Watson,

652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted). Thus, a person committed based on 

mental incapacity has a due process right to receive “such individual treatment as will give [him] 

a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his ... mental condition ... because, absent 

treatment, [he] could be held indefinitely as a result of [his] mental illness.” Ohlinger, 652 F.2d at 

778 (internal citations omitted).

Although civilly detained persons must be afforded more considerate treatment and 

conditions of confinement than convicted defendants, where specific standards are lacking, courts 

may look to decisions defining the constitutional rights of prisoners to establish a floor for the 

constitutional rights of persons detained under a civil commitment scheme, Padilla v. Yoo, 678 

F.3d 748, 759 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2007), 

vacated and remanded on other grounds by 556 U.S. 1256 (2009), and may borrow Eighth 

Amendment standards to do so, Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Redman v. 

County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by 511 

U.S. 825 (1994). But the conditions under which civil detainees are held cannot be harsher than 

those under which prisoners are detained except where the statute itself creates a relevant 

difference. Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 989 n.7.

The Due Process Clause requires that the nature and duration of the civil commitment 

must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed. Jones v. 

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004). However, civilly detained individuals can be subject to 

restrictions that have a legitimate, non-punitive government purpose and that do not appear to be 

excessive in relation to that purpose. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). “A reasonable 

relationship between the governmental interest and the challenged restriction does not require an 

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exact fit, nor does it require showing a ‘least restrictive alternative.’ ” Valdez v. Rosenbalm, 302 

F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The only question is whether the defendants 

might reasonably have thought that the policy would advance its interests. Id. Jones v. Blanas, 

393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2004)(“due process requires that the conditions and duration of 

confinement ... bear some reasonable relation to the purposes for which persons are committed.”)

Liberally construing the allegations, Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for failure to treat 

Plaintiff under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause, which requires states to provide 

civilly-committed persons with access to mental health treatment that gives them a realistic 

opportunity to be cured and released. Taking Plaintiff's factual allegations as true, Plaintiff has 

already remained civilly committed for years and for two years has had minimal to no treatment

due to the policy of Defendant Clendenin and Price. To prove liability for an action or policy, the 

plaintiff “must...demonstrate that his deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom 

established by a...policymaker possessed with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. 

Spokane County Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir.2010). Supervisory liability may also 

exist without any personal participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the 

policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the 

constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825 (1970). Absent a treatment plan and treatment, Plaintiff is left without an opportunity to 

cure or improve his mental illness and no prospect of ever being released. These facts constitute

injury stemming from Defendants' alleged policy of failure to treat Plaintiff.

C. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all similarly situated people 

equally. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 

L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). This does not mean, however, that all prisoners must receive identical 

treatment and resources. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2 (1972); Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 

873, 880 (9th Cir. 1993); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 568–69 (9th Cir. 1987).

“To prevail on an Equal Protection claim brought under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts 

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plausibly showing that ‘ “the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against 

[them] based upon membership in a protected class,’ ” (citing see Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 

425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005)) (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th 

Cir. 2001)), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a 

rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agr., 553 

U.S. 591, 601-02, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (2008); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 

120 S.Ct. 1073 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North

Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable equal protection claim. Plaintiff does not allege that 

he was discriminated against because of his membership in any protected class. He also does not 

allege factual support that he was intentionally treated differently than other similarly situated 

inmates without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Plaintiff has not provided 

any factual support for this claim. Plaintiff has failed to cure this deficiency.

D. Injunctive Relief

Injunctive relief, whether temporary or permanent, is an “extraordinary remedy, never 

awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 

L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely 

to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). The Court does not have jurisdiction to order injunctive relief which 

would require directing parties not before the Court to take action. Zepeda v. United States 

Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir.1985) (“A federal court may 

issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction 

over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.”); City 

of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in 

considering a injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, 

it have before it an actual case or controversy.) In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should allege 

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the type of injunctive relief requested. The injunctive relief Plaintiff is seeking may go beyond 

what would be allowed as it must be narrowly tailored to address the violations of the rights at 

issue in this action and is too ambiguous and vague. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. 

Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1988). Therefore, the Court cannot grant broad 

requests for relief or requests based on the possibility of an injury.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on April 

25, 2022, states a cognizable claim against Defendant Stephanie Clendenin, Director of 

Department of State Hospitals and Brandon Price, Executive Director as DSH-Coalinga for 

failure to treat Plaintiff under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause due to their policy. 

However, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any other cognizable claims for relief. Despite being 

provided the relevant pleading and legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure deficiencies. 

Therefore, leave to amend should not be granted.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed April 25, 2022, (ECF No. 

11), against Defendant Stephanie Clendenin, Director of Department of State Hospitals

and Brandon Price, Executive Director as DSH-Coalinga for failure to treat Plaintiff

under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause due to their official policy; and

2. All other claims be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state claims upon which relief 

may be granted.

* * *

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that the failure to file objections within the specified 

///

///

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time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 

appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 14, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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