Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_15-cv-00806/USCOURTS-alnd-5_15-cv-00806-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Veterans Affairs
Defendant
Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Defendant
Floyd L. Williamson
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

FLOYD L. WILLIAMSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

SECRETARY OF VETERAN 

AFFAIRS and DEPARTMENT OF 

VETERAN AFFAIRS,

Defendants.

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Civil Action Number

5:15-cv-00806-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Floyd L. Williamson, a United States Marine Corps veteran, is one of the 

many veterans who is dissatisfied with the medical treatment provided to him by 

the Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”). As a result Mr. Williamson 

maintains that the VA has failed to comply with 38 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., 38 C.F.R.

§ 1 et seq., 31 C.F.R. § 17, and 31 U.S.C. § 3716. Specifically, Mr. Williamson 

alleges that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs has improperly administered his 

treatment and claims by improperly: using an administrative offset process with 

respect to his medical care, maintaining his service medical and dental records, 

managing his oncology care, administering medical co-payments, administering

his travel reimbursement claims, classifying his medical care, and administering

FILED

 2015 Oct-13 PM 03:34

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:15-cv-00806-AKK Document 11 Filed 10/13/15 Page 1 of 11
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his disability claims. Doc. 1. Mr. Williamson also alleges violations of due process. 

Id. The VA moves to dismiss this complaint, and to the extent any claims survive, 

for summary judgment. Doc. 5. The motion is fully briefed, docs. 9 and 10, and 

ripe for review. For the reasons stated more fully below, in particular, because Mr. 

Williamson has failed to use the VA’s internal complaint procedures, the Motion to 

Dismiss is GRANTED.

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Mr. Williamson served in the United States Marine Corps from May 1968 

until his honorable discharge in May 1974. During his service, Mr. Williamson 

was exposed to several toxic substances including Agent Orange, experimental 

dental fillings, and contaminated groundwater at Camp Lejeune. In May 2006, Mr. 

Williamson applied to the VA unsuccessfully for service-connected dental care.

Six years later, Mr. Williamson was diagnosed with prostate cancer. He entered 

active treatment for his cancer managed by the VA in July 2012 and accumulated

co-pays until he completed treatment in January 2013. At that point, Mr. 

Williamson filed a claim for disability with the VA, in which he included all of his 

 1 The motion is set forth as a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Because the 

motion is not supported by a submission of evidence, the court construes the motion as one to dismiss 

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3), which require that a court 

dismiss the action if it determines at any time it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 

2 For the purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the plaintiff’s allegations are presumed true. As 

such, the facts are taken from the Plaintiff’s Complaint, doc. 1. 

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medical bills from his cancer treatment, travel expenses connected to his cancer 

treatment, and the previously rejected dental claim from 2006. Doc. 1 at 9. On 

March 23, 2014, the VA issued Mr. Williamson a disability package for the six 

month period following the end of his cancer treatment (February 2013 through 

July 31, 2013) that rated Mr. Williamson at 0% disability effective August 1, 2013.

The VA made no decision on the claim for travel costs reimbursement. The VA’s 

finding meant, however, that Mr. Williamson was obligated to pay the co-pays that 

are at issue in this litigation. Almost two years later, Mr. Williamson filed five new 

applications for disability and health care for his service related issues and a formal 

protest of the zero disability rating he received in 2013 for the prostate cancer and 

other side effects. On April 15, 2015, Mr. Williamson received a letter from the 

Department of the Treasury informing him that it intended to reduce his social 

security payment to collect the delinquent debt he owed to the VA for the unpaid 

co-pays. 

Mr. Williamson contends that his illnesses are service related and that the 

VA is required to pay for all co-pays relating to his cancer treatments, his servicerelated dental work, and to reimburse his travel to and from medical appointments. 

Mr. Williamson also alleges that the VA is not permitted to authorize the Treasury 

Department to withhold his social security benefits without following the proper 

procedures. In his demands for relief, he asks the court to halt the Treasury’s debt 

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collection from his social security benefits, and to have the VA reclassify his 

disability rating for both his cancer treatments and dental work, and to reconcile or 

waive the outstanding medical debts and unpaid co-pays. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Article III courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and can only hear claims

for which they are authorized to do so. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 

America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 

(1973). Therefore, they are “obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction

sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.” Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 

964, 975 (11th Cir. 2005); 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Where a court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction, “the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Morrison 

v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2000). The burden of establishing 

jurisdiction, then, rests on the pleader who must “affirmatively allege facts 

demonstrating the existence of jurisdiction and include ‘a short plain statement of 

the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends.’” Taylor v. Appleton, 30 

F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994).

A motion to dismiss filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) may be based upon 

either a facial or factual challenge to the complaint. McElmurray v. Consolidated 

Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond Cty, 501 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2007). Where the 

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challenge is facial, the court must merely “see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently 

alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint 

are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 

1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). On a facial challenge, the district court has the power 

to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on “(1) the complaint alone; (2) 

the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the 

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the courts resolution of 

undisputed facts.” Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981). By 

contrast, where the challenge is factual, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction 

is considered irrespective of the pleadings, “and matters outside the pleadings, such 

as testimony and affidavits are considered.” Id. (citing Menchaca v. Chrysler 

Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)).

III. ANALYSIS

Relevant here, the motion to dismiss is based on the VA’s contentions that 

this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear these claims. Doc. 5. In a 

nutshell, the VA argues that the gravamen of Mr. Williamson’s complaint concerns 

his opposition to the denial of benefits under a program administered by the VA

and therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claims. The 

court agrees with the VA. 

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Where a party challenges subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff, in this 

case Mr. Williamson, bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. 

Majd-Pour v. Georgiana Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 724 F.2d 901, 902 (11th Cir. 1984). To 

do so, Mr. Williamson must assert facts that “affirmatively and plausibly suggest 

that the pleader has the right he claims (here, the right to jurisdiction), rather than 

facts that are merely consistent with such a right.” Stalley v. Catholic Health 

Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544 (2007)). Mr. Williamson cannot meet his burden in this case.

In 1988, Congress passed the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, with the intent 

of creating “an opportunity for veterans to challenge VA benefits decisions, but 

also to assign exclusive jurisdiction over their claims to a centralized system 

comprised of the BVA [Board of Veterans Appeals], the newly established CVA

[Court of Veterans Appeals], and the federal circuit.” Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 

965, 972 (6th Cir. 1997). The statute explicitly reserves to the Secretary of 

Veterans Affairs the exclusive authority to “decide all questions of law and fact 

necessary to a decision by the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of 

benefits by the Secretary to veterans [...].” 38 U.S.C. § 511; see also, Price v. 

United States., 228 F.3d 420 (D.C. Cir. 2000). For those like Mr. Williamson who 

seek to challenge a decision made by the VA, the statute specifically outlines the

appeals process: a claimant must first appeal any action to the Board of Veteran 

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Appeals, 38 U.S.C. § 7104, then to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans 

Claims, § 7252, and ultimately the Federal Circuit3

, § 7251. Significantly, none of 

these appeal steps involves this court. In fact, it is well established that 38 U.S.C. §

511 precludes judicial review of determination of VA benefits outside of the 

aforementioned structure. 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) (“[T]he decision of the Secretary [...] 

may not be reviewed [...] by any court.”); Slater v. United States., 175 F. App’x 

300, 305 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We have no jurisdiction over any decision of law 

or fact necessary to the provision of benefits by the Secretary to veterans or the 

dependents or survivors of benefits.”); Anderson v. Veterans Administration, 559 

F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1977); Karmatzis v. Hamilton, 553 F. App’x 617, 618 (7th Cir. 

2014) (“The circuits unanimously agree that the VJRA divests the federal courts of 

jurisdiction to review lawsuits challenging individual veteran’s benefits 

decisions.”); Shaw v. Hood, No. 7:14-cv-00389, 2014 WL 5148493, at *2 (N.D. 

Ala. October 14, 2014)(“In general, review of decision made in the context of an 

individual veteran’s VA proceedings are beyond the jurisdiction of federal courts 

outside the review scheme established by the [Veterans Judicial Review 

Act].”)(internal citations omitted); Bell v. United States, No. 1:12-cv-75-MHTWC, 2012 WL 1599272, at *2 (M.D. Ala. April 13, 2012); Reeves v. Veterans 

Admin., No. 12-0006-KD-N, 2012 WL 2064505, at *4 (S.D. Ala. May 22, 2012).

 3 Because Mr. Williamson is pro se and may not be familiar with these terms, the court adds that it is a

district court in the Eleventh Circuit (comprised of federal courts in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida) and 

that the Federal Circuit is based in Washington, D.C.

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Consequently, for an action taken by the VA to fall under judicial review

outside of the process defined by Congress, a plaintiff must present a challenge to

the constitutionality of an Act of Congress or an agency rule that would fall under 

the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 552. See, e.g., Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988); 

Devine v. Cleland, 616 F. 2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Guardianship and 

Conservatorship of Blunt, 358 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D.N.D. 2005). However, it is the 

substance of the claims not the style that determines whether a court has 

jurisdiction as “the statutory bar to judicial review may not be circumvented by 

characterizing what are in essence challenges to VA benefits determinations in 

constitutional terms.” Cheves v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 

1246 (M.D. Fla. 2002); Zuspann v. Brown, 60 F.3d 1156 (5th Cir. 1995); see also, 

Pappanikoloaou v. Adm’r of Veterans Admin., 762 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1985).

Here, Mr. Williamson has alleged various administrative and due process

claims concerning the VA’s processing of his disability claims. However, the 

purported violation of due process centers simply on his dissatisfaction with the 

way the VA has handled his medical claims. In fact, although he couches his 

claims in constitutional language, it is clear that Mr. Williamson is simply seeking 

the receipt of benefits. Indeed, he wants this court to find that the Secretary erred in 

its classification of his illnesses and determination of his benefits award, and his

demands for relief include reversing denials of benefits, reclassifying his status, 

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and reviewing the amounts of his co-pay. Doc. 1 at 28–34. Unfortunately for Mr. 

Williamson, because the essence of these demands is clearly for the court to review 

and reverse determinations of benefits made by the VA, his case is outside of this 

court’s jurisdiction. See, 38 U.S.C. § 511; Vietnam Veterans of America v. 

Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Congress has divested other federal 

courts of authority to review certain decisions relating to benefits. [...] Congress, 

moreover, specified that challenges to VA regulations may only be brought in the 

Federal Circuit.”).

In rejecting Mr. Williamson’s lawsuit, the court states that Mr. Williamson 

is correct that 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) requires a reviewing court to compel agency 

action where the agency unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed that action. 

This provision does not help Mr. Williamson, however, because § 706 applies to 

agency actions for which “there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. §

704. In contrast, decisions made by the VA may be subject to judicial review, 

specifically the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the Federal Circuit.

38 U.S.C. § 7261; see also, Reeves, 2012 WL 2064505 at *3 (“The CVA has the 

authority to issue writs [....], and to ‘compel action of the secretary unlawfully 

withheld or delayed.’”); Beamon, 125 F.3d at 974 (“Whether these procedures 

cause unlawful or unconstitutional delays in the administration of veterans benefits 

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are questions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the BVA, the CVA, and the Court 

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”).

The court is mindful that Mr. Williamson is a pro se plaintiff and as such is 

held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines 

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, [...], and a pro se complaint, 

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (internal citations omitted). However, his 

complaint fails to show any plausible legal authority upon which this court can 

determine that it has the authority to review VA determinations of benefits and 

thereby exercise jurisdiction over his claims. In fact, as Mr. Williamson notes in 

his complaint, the only Article III court that can review appeals from the VA is the 

Federal Circuit. Doc. 1 at 26. Ultimately, Congress has vested jurisdiction for 

judicial review of VA decisions exclusively with the United States Court of 

Appeals for Veterans Claims and the Federal Circuit. Hall v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, 85 F.3d 532, 534 (11th Cir. 1996); Slater v. U.S. Dep’t of Veteran 

Affairs, No. 6:08-cv-160-Orl-22GJK, 2008 WL 977225, at *4 (M.D. Fla. April 9, 

2008) (“[...] judicial scrutiny is available as set forth in the VJRA or exclusively in 

the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.”). Mr. Williamson, therefore, is free to 

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pursue his claims with these courts. He simply cannot do so in this court which

does not have jurisdiction to hear them.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Mr. Williamson’s claims are 

DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A dismissal for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction is “not a judgment on the merits and is entered without 

prejudice.” Stalley ex rel. U.S. v Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 

1229, 1231 (11th Cir. 2008). A separate order in accordance with the memorandum 

of decision with be entered. 

DONE the 13th day of October, 2015.

 

_________________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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