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Parties Involved:
Lyman Cray
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 19, 1994 Decided February 24, 1995

No. 93-3222

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LYMAN CRAY, A/K/A LYNN WARD CAREY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(93cr0008-01)

Mary E. Davis argued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief was Thomas Abbenante,

appointed by the court.

G. Michael Lennon, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on

the brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas C. Black and

Cherry Marie Destura, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before SILBERMAN, GINSBURG, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Lyman Cray pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute cocaine base, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and possession of a firearm during a

drug-trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Prior to sentencing, Cray moved to

withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that his codefendant had coerced him into accepting the plea

bargain. After an evidentiary hearing, the learned district court denied Cray's motion and sentenced

him to 10 years' incarceration to be followed by three years of supervised release.

Cray now appealsthe denial of his motion to withdraw his guiltyplea. Primarily because Cray

has not shown that his plea was entered in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, we

affirm.

I. Background

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Lyman Cray, John Whitaker, and Steven Bridgeforth were originally charged with various

drug and firearmoffensesin an 11-count indictment. Before their scheduled trial Whitaker pled guilty

to two ofthe counts and agreed to testify against his codefendants. Bridgeforth and Cray then agreed

to plead guilty on the same terms. When Bridgeforth and Cray appeared before the court to enter

their guilty pleas, however, Cray's attorney told the judge that Cray had just changed his mind and

decided to go to trial. The Government was then granted a short recess in order to prepare its case

against Cray, which would now include Bridgeforth's testimony.

At some point during the recess, Bridgeforth and Cray were left together in a holding cell.

After the recess, Cray's attorney informed the court that Cray had again reconsidered his position and

would plead guilty after all. When Cray had entered his plea, the court advised him as required by

FederalRule ofCriminalProcedure 11(c), inquired into the voluntariness of his plea, pursuant to Rule

11(d), accepted the plea, and adjudged the defendant guilty of the two offenses charged in the

superseding information.

During the Rule 11 colloquy, Cray admitted to each element of the crimes charged, fully

agreed with the Government's proffer of evidence, and was advised of his possible sentence. When

the court specifically said: "You're not going to be able to take [your plea] back after today. Do you

understand that?" Cray answered: "Yes, I do understand that." When asked: "Has anyone forced,

threatened, or coerced you in any way into making a guilty plea here this afternoon?" Cray

responded: "No, sir." To the question: "Are you entering your pleas of guilty to each of these

crimes knowingly, freely, and voluntarily, of your own free will, because you are in fact guilty, and

for no other reason?" Cray said: "Yes, I am."

Nevertheless, some two-and-a-half months later but still prior to his sentencing, Cray came

before the district court asking to withdraw his plea of guilty. This time Cray said that in pleading

guilty "I just went along with my codefendant without really thinking about the consequences for

myself." His attorney explained further: "Basically, as I understand it, he's saying that when the

attorneys were not present, it was the pressure that was being placed upon him by his codefendant

in this case that led him to go along with this."

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The district court held a two-day hearing on Cray's motion to withdraw his plea. Cray

testified that Bridgeforth tried to convince him to accept the plea bargain so that Bridgeforth would

not have to testify against him, and therefore be labeled a "snitch" in prison. Cray admitted that

Bridgeforth had neither threatened nor physically intimidated him, but he maintained that he had pled

only because Bridgeforth had pressured him to do so. ("I've never turned my back on you, so you've

got to help me and not turn your back on me.") For his part, Bridgeforth denied having threatened,

intimidated, or coerced Cray in any way. He testified that Cray told him he had decided to go to trial,

and that Bridgeforth had simply replied: "Well, that's your right. You fight. I'm trying to take a

cop." Cray also testified that he had told his probation officer that he was guilty of only "some" of

the offense behavior charged, though in response to questions from the court he acknowledged that

he had made that statement with regard to the original 11-count indictment rather than the two-count

information to which he ultimately pled guilty.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Cray's motion. The court found that Cray

had not made an adequate assertion of his innocence of the charges against him. In addition,

specifically crediting Bridgeforth'stestimony and finding Cray'sstatementsfalse, the court found that

Cray's claim that Bridgeforth had intimidated or coerced him into pleading guilty was false, and

therefore concluded that Cray's guilty plea was knowing, free, and voluntary, and was taken in full

compliance with Rule 11. Finally, the court found that the delay between Cray's guilty plea and the

filing of his motion would substantially prejudice the Government's ability to prosecute the case.

On appeal, Cray argues against the district court's conclusion that his plea was knowing and

voluntary, essentially asking us to find that the district court abused its discretion in crediting

Bridgeforth's testimony over his own. He also argues that the statement he made to his probation

officer to the effect that he was guilty of only "some" of the offense behavior alleged in the original

indictment showsthat he maintained hisinnocence before the district court. Finally, he contends that

the Government would not have been unduly prejudiced by a belated trial. As set out below, we

conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cray's motion.

II. Analysis

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Under FederalRule of Criminal Procedure 32(d), the district court may in its discretion grant

a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before sentence is imposed "upon a showing by the

defendant of any fair and just reason." See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927)

("on timely application, the court will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained

or given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence"). At the same time, however, "a guilty plea is a

grave and solemn act ... accepted only with care and discernment," Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.

742, 748 (1970); the district court is therefore required to set it aside only for good cause shown.

Indeed, we have long held that a district court'sruling in thissituation should be reversed only for an

abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 13 F.2d 298, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1926);

Tomlinson v. United States, 93 F.2d 652, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1937). Not surprisingly, therefore, reversal

is "uncommon." United States v. McKoy, 645 F.2d 1037, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Although the standard has long been the same, the particular inquiry we undertake in order

to determine whether a district court has abused its discretion to deny withdrawal of a guilty plea has

not been consistent over the years. Prior to 1975, this court generally upheld the denial of a motion

to withdraw a guilty plea aslong asthe defendant had made the plea knowingly and voluntarily. See,

e.g., Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Judge Wright undertook a more

thorough analysis, however, in United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 211 (1975) (en banc)

(affirming convictions of "foot soldiers of the Watergate Break-in"). The defendants in Barker

sought to withdraw their guilty pleas on the ground that they had entered the pleas under the

erroneous belief that they were engaged in a "secret, confidential, and sensitive national security

operation," which they had felt constrained not to disclose. Id. at 216.

In Barker the court required that a Rule 32 movant make out a credible claim of legal

innocence as a threshold matter: "If the movant's factual contentions, when accepted as true, make

out no legally cognizable defense to the charges, he has not effectively denied his culpability, and his

withdrawal motion need not be granted." Id. at 220. As the court noted, however, "were mere

assertion of legal innocence always a sufficient condition for withdrawal, withdrawal would

effectively be an automatic right," id. at 221, which would eviscerate the rule. Therefore, in addition

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to requiring that a defendant who would withdraw his plea make out a legally cognizable defense, the

court required him to give a good reason "why the defenses now presented were not put forward at

the time of original pleading." Barker, 514 F.2d at 221. The key to this inquiry is whether the plea

was entered in accordance with Rule 11. If the plea is defective under Rule 11, then withdrawal

"should almost always be permitted"; but if the plea was properly accepted, then "withdrawal is not

an automatic right and more substantial reasons for delay must generally be asserted." Id. Finally,

the court considered the prejudice that the Government would suffer were it belatedly forced to try

the case: "The movant's reasons must meet exceptionally high standards where the delay between

the plea and the withdrawalmotion hassubstantiallyprejudiced the Government's abilityto prosecute

the case." Id. at 222.

In 1983, Rule 32(d) was amended to take its current form,specifically incorporating "the "fair

and just' standard which the federal courts, relying upon dictum in Kercheval v. United States, 274

U.S. 220 (1927), [had] consistently applied to presentence motions" to withdraw guilty pleas. FED.

R. CRIM. P. 32(d), Advisory Committee's Note (1983). The Advisory Committee specifically

endorsed our holding in Barker that a district court's exercise of discretion to deny a motion to

withdraw a plea should be reviewed byconsidering whether the defendant has asserted a legaldefense

to the charge and, more importantly, whether a defendant hasshown a defect in the taking of his plea.

Especially in light of "the great care with which pleas are taken under [the then-recently] revised Rule

11," the Committee concluded, "there is no occasion to inquire into the matter of prejudice [to the

Government] unlessthe defendant first shows a good reason for being allowed to withdraw his plea."

The Committee squarely rejected the contrary approach illustrated by United States v. Savage, 561

F.2d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 1977) (where Government would not be prejudiced defendant may withdraw

plea notwithstanding absence of Rule 11 violation).

Read together, Barker and Rule 32 set out three factors to consider in order to establish

whether the district court abused its discretion when it refused to allow the defendant to withdraw

his plea of guilty. First, a defendant generally must make out a legally cognizable defense to the

charge against him. Second, and most important, the defendant must show either an error in the

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taking of his plea or some "more substantial" reason he failed to press his case rather than plead

guilty. Finally, if those two factors warrant, the court may then inquire whether the Government

would have been substantially prejudiced by the delay in going to trial. (Delay subsequent to the

district court's denial of his motion would not ordinarily be chargeable to the defendant.)

We have often considered the three Barker factors as if they were all simply to be balanced

against one another in each case. See United States v. Ford, 993 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (allowing

withdrawalwhere there wasRule 11 error, defendant asserted innocence, and Government would not

have been prejudiced); United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying withdrawal

where no Rule 11 error and no assertion of innocence, although Government would not have been

prejudiced); United States v. Watley, 987 F.2d 841 (1993) (allowing withdrawal where there was

Rule 11 error and Government would not have been prejudiced, without considering whether

defendant adequately asserted a legally cognizable defense); United States v. Abreu, 964 F.2d 16

(D.C. Cir. 1992) (denying withdrawal because no Rule 11 error, although defendant asserted defense

and Government would not have been prejudiced); United States v. Mathis, 963 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir.

1992) (denying withdrawal where defendant neither made out violation of Rule 11 nor asserted his

innocence, although Government would not have been prejudiced). Indeed, apart from emphasizing

that the regularity of the Rule 11 proceedings is the "most important[ ]" factor, see, e.g., Horne, 987

F.2d at 837 (quoting Mathis, 963 F.2d at 410), we have not adhered to any more structured inquiry.

In fact, however, none of our cases would have been decided differently if the only inquiry

undertaken were whether the defendant's guilty plea was taken in compliance with Rule 11. On the

one hand, we have never held that a district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea where the defendant failed to show some defect in the taking of his plea under

Rule 11. See, e.g., Abreu, 964 F.2d at 19 ("The district court retains some discretion to deny a

withdrawal motion, even when the defendant asserts a plausible legal defense and the Government

had suffered no prejudice"). On the other hand, where the defendant has shown his plea was taken

in violation of Rule 11, we have never hesitated to correct the error. See, e.g., Watley, 987 F.2d at

848 (reversing denial on ground that plea was not made voluntarily where all participants including

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district court were mistaken about mandatory minimum sentence).

Further, bearing in mind that the exceptional case may raise an exceptional concern, see

generally Barker, 514 F.2d at 223 ("[y]ou do not assemble a case of this kind for trial twice")

(quoting United States v. Lombardozzi, 436 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1971)), we note that prejudice to the

Government has never been a determinative factor in our decision to affirm the district court's

decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. As noted above, even where there would have

been no such prejudice we have never held that a district court has abused its discretion unless one

of the first two factors warranted reversal. See, e.g., Abreu, 964 F.2d 16; Mathis, 963 F.2d 399;

Watley, 987 F.2d 841. Likewise, in the cases where a defendant has shown some error in the taking

of his plea, alleged prejudice to the Government has never prevented us from correcting the district

court's error. See, e.g., Ford, 993 F.2d 249; Watley, 987 F.2d 841. While it may indeed be difficult

to assemble some cases twice, we find it hard to envision the case in which a defendant could be

denied an opportunity to go to trial because he had earlier entered a defective (e.g., involuntary)

guilty plea.

Therefore, we will likely achieve greater economy and perhaps also clarity if we begin our

analysis in such cases by assessing whether the defendant's plea was taken in compliance with Rule

11. If we determine that there was no error in the taking of the defendant's plea, we will be extremely

reluctant to reverse the district court, even if the defendant makes out a legally cognizable defense

to the charges against him. That is, a defendant who fails to show some error under Rule 11 has to

shoulder an extremely heavy burden if he is ultimately to prevail.

Thismore structured inquiryfocusing first on the most important, indeed, the determinative

factor in all our decisions to datewill both conserve the resources of the bench and provide better

guidance to the bar, and we adopt it today as the presumptive framework for analyzing a district

court's denial of a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Rule 32(d). It will conserve

resources because the court will not need exhaustively to examine all three issues in every case. As

a result, our decisions will inform the bar of what is required to make out each element on appeal,

without confusing matters by implying that there are simple trade-offsto be made among them. This

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sequential inquirywill properly focusthe efforts of defense counsel and the Government upon the key

issue raised by the appeal of an order denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea: Has a defendant

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to meet the charges brought against him?

We note that our framework for reviewing a denial of a presentence motion to withdraw a

guilty plea is not intended to fetter the sound exercise of discretion by the district court. See Horne,

987 F.2d at 839 (Buckley, J., concurring) ("[I]t is not our task to determine whether a guilty plea

should have been denied; it is to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in denying

it"). As we have noted, the precise import of the "fair and just" standard of Rule 32(d) "lies buried

in the unreported actions of federal trial judges." Barker, 514 F.2d at 220.

With this more structured approach in hand, we quite readily conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Cray's motion to withdraw his plea. Cray's claim that his plea

was defective under Rule 11 because he was coerced by Bridgeforth does not warrant our reversing

the district court's decision. There is simply no room in this record for doubt that Cray's guilty plea

was attended by all the required proceduralsafeguards. Indeed, the court conducted a textbook Rule

11 inquiry, taking pains to insure that the defendant's submissions were knowing and voluntary. At

the evidentiary hearing, Cray's own attorney stated: 

I am not in any way asserting that the court did not conduct a proper Rule 11 inquiry.

That's not our issue, and I'll submit on that issue, because the inquiry is in full

compliance with the Federal Rules and I'm not asserting that. 

Furthermore, because Cray's claim that he pled under duress from Bridgeforth, if true, would not

necessarily appear on the face on the plea colloquy, the district court properly conducted an

evidentiary hearing. After listening to the testimony of both defendants, the district court credited

Bridgeforth's testimony and found Cray's assertions false. On appeal, Cray's claim comes down to

a challenge to this credibility finding, but he offers no reason for us to tamper with it. See United

States v. Lloyd, 868 F.2d 447, 451 (1989) (factual findings underlying conclusion defendant

voluntarily consented to search upheld unless clearly erroneous).

We see no reason to tarry long over Cray's claim that he adequately asserted his innocence

before the district court, for Cray's claim of innocence falls well short of presenting a legally

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cognizable defense to the charges to which he pled guilty. In fact, Cray's claim barely amounts to a

denial of, let alone a defense to, those charges. Cray points to a conversation with his probation

officer, which was reflected in his presentence investigation report as follows: "[Cray] advised that

while he is guilty of some of the offense behavior, he is not guilty of all he is charged with." In

response to questions from the court, Cray acknowledged that he had made this statement with

reference to the original 11-count indictment, not to the two-count superseding information to which

he ultimately pled guilty. Even if we take the statement as an assertion of his innocence of the

charges to which he ultimately pled guilty, however, it comes up short. A defendant appealing the

denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea, unlike a defendant who has not first pled guilty, must

do more than make a general denial in order to put the Government to its proof; he must

affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent, see Barker, 514 F.2d

at 226 n.17, for he has waived hisright simply to try hisluck before a jury. Cray's claim falls far short

of what we require before finding that a district court that committed no error under Rule 11

nevertheless abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

We do not, therefore, reach Cray's arguments concerning the lack of prejudice to the

Government. It is enough that the district court judge did not abuse its discretion in finding that Cray

entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty and that Cray failed to make out a legally cognizable

defense to the charges against him.

III. Conclusion

The district court's denial of Cray's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and Cray's resulting

conviction, are in all respects

Affirmed.

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