Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02124/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02124-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Casey Quesada
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Coμrt (?f Ap;>cnb Tent'h C1rcu1t 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CASEY QUESADA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT• 

SE? 0 4 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-2124 

(D.C. No. CR 90-15 JC) 

(D. N.M.) 

Before MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER, District 

Judge.•• 

This is an appeal following a one-day jury trial which 

resulted in defendant Casey Quesada's conviction for possession of 

over 500 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute. 21 u.s.c. 

§§ 841(a) (1), 841(b){l) (B). Defendant Quesada raises three issues 

on appeal dealing with the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury 

instructions given by the district court. We find no error and 

affirm. 

The events giving rise to this case began on August 9, 1989, 

when a package arrived at the United Parcel Service ("UPS") 

•This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for the purposes of establishing the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 • 

.. The Honorable G. T. Van Bebber, United States District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-2124 Document: 010110089473 Date Filed: 09/04/1991 Page: 1 
receiving complex in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The package had been 

sent "next day air" and was addressed to Casey Quesada at a post 

office box in Albuquerque. UPS does not deliver to post office 

boxes, so the package was sent to the "bad address slide." 

Attempts were made by UPS employees to find a street address and/or 

telephone number for Mr. Quesada. Finally, pursuant to standard 

company procedures and in accordance with the priority delivery 

policy, Kimberly Young, a UPS employee, opened the package to 

determine whether it contained an invoice with a street address for 

Mr. Quesada. 

Upon opening the package, Ms. Young discovered a large ziplock bag filled with a white, powdery substance. She contacted her 

supervisor, Rudy Reyes, who took the package to the UPS Loss 

Prevention Office. Two Loss Prevention investigators examined the 

contents of the package and contacted the Albuquerque Police 

Department. Three narcotics officers then met at the UPS Loss 

Prevention Office and examined the package. Officer Mike Dwyer 

performed a field test and found that the package contained 997.2 

grams of cocaine. The officers' then waited at UPS to see if 

someone would claim the package. At 6:00 p.m., that evening, after 

the customer counter closed, the officers took the cocaine with 

them and locked it in the police headquarters narcotics safe. 

The next morning, the police decided to substitute a package 

of sugar for the cocaine and to effect a controlled delivery of the 

package. A small amount of cocaine (approximately .05 grams) was 

also placed in a cellophane wrapper and hidden beneath a layer of 

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✓ 

styrofoam in the bottom of the package. The police then took the 

doctored package back to the UPS office and waited for someone to 

claim it. A short while later, Mr. Quesada arrived at UPS and 

presented the rental receipt for his post office box to Mr. Reyes 

with the eleven-digit UPS tracking number for the package written 

on the back. At the direction of the police, Reyes handed the 

package over to Mr. Quesada. 

The police followed Mr. Quesada as he drove away, but 

eventually lost him. However, Officer Dwyer had already subpoenaed 

the telephone company for Mr. Quesada's home address, so the police 

drove to Quesada's apartment complex. There, they found Mr. 

Quesada in his car driving towards the apartment complex exit. The 

police stopped the car and Mr. Quesada was placed under arrest and 

advised of his rights. Mr. Quesada then gave written permission to 

search both his car and his apartment. The police found the opened 

UPS package in the trunk of Quesada's car. The sugar had been 

removed, but the small amount of hidden cocaine was still intact. 

In the trunk of the car, the police also found a package containing 

121.52 grams of cocaine as well as other plastic wrappings, rubber 

gloves, and zip-lock bags containing cocaine residue. In Quesada's 

apartment, the police found the sugar, various package wrappings 

and other drug paraphernalia, $34,960 in cash, as well as 4.29 

grams of cocaine. 

At the close of the government's case, Mr. Quesada moved for 

a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the government had 

failed to establish that he had been in possession of an amount of 

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cocaine greater than 500 grams. The court denied the motion, 

ruling that sufficient evidence of constructive possession existed 

to send the case to the jury. (R. Vol. I at 151-53.) 

On appeal, Mr. Quesada argues that the district court erred in 

denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the 

government's evidence failed to show actual or constructive 

possession of the cocaine contained in the UPS shipment. He 

contends that because the police had already confiscated the 997.2 

grams of cocaine prior to his arrival at the UPS office, he cannot 

be convicted for actual or constructive possession of that cocaine. 

In determining the sufficiency of the government's evidence of 

actual or constructive possession, the court is required to 

evaluate the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the 

light most favorable to the government. If any reasonable jury 

could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond 

a reasonable doubt from the evidence so viewed, the court must 

affirm the judgment. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979). 

From the record before us, we conclude that the jury could 

reasonably have found that Mr. Quesada had actual possession of the 

.OS grams of cocaine hidden in the controlled-delivery package. 

Defendant argues that he cannot be convicted for possession of the 

.OS grams of cocaine because he was not aware that it was hidden in 

the doctored package and therefore, he did not have the requisite 

intent to distribute the cocaine. However, the evidence of other 

drug dealer paraphernalia found in Mr. Quesada's car and apartment 

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is sufficient to prove that Mr. Quesada had the requisite intent to 

distribute. Furthermore, the jury could reasonably have found that 

Mr. Quesada had constructive possession of the full 997.2 grams of 

cocaine because he had the eleven-digit tracking number which 

permitted him to claim, and thus exercise dominion and control 

over, the original package. Thus, we find that there was 

sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction and we affirm 

the district court's denial of the motion for judgment of 

acquittal. 

Mr. Quesada next contends that the district court erred in 

instructing the jury on actual and constructive possession since 

these theories were not supported by the evidence. (R. Vol. I, 

doc. 33, Instruction No. 13.) Because defendant made no objection 

to this instruction at the time of trial, the issue may be raised 

on appeal only under plain error standards. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); 

United States v. Simmonds, 931 F.2d 685, 687 {10th Cir. 1991); 

United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 643 {10th Cir. 1983), cert. 

denied, 465 U.S. 1005 {1984). The defendant cannot, as he argues, 

preserve his objection to an instruction simply by relying on his 

motion for judgment of acquittal. As discussed above, we conclude 

that there was sufficient evidence to support either a finding of 

actual or constructive possession and thus the court did not commit 

plain error in instructing the jury on both theories of possession. 

Finally, defendant argues that the trial court's instruction 

on possession (Instruction No. 13) constructively amended the 

indictment and that certain evidence presented at trial created a 

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• prejudicial variance between the indictment and the facts as proven 

at trial. 

A constructive amendment of the indictment occurs when the 

jury instructions effectively broaden the charges contained in the 

indictment. See United States v. Phillips, 869 F.2d 1361, 1364 

(10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1989). Substantial 

deviation of the instructions from an indictment violates the 

defendant's right under the Fifth Amendment to be tried only on 

charges presented in a grand jury indictment. United States v. 

Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1477 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 

U.S. 1004 (1989). However, since instructions necessarily deviate 

somewhat from an indictment, instructions will be found invalid 

only if their deviation from the indictment infringes on a 

defendant's rights. Id. 

Likewise, a variance occurs when the facts proved at trial 

differ from those alleged in the indictment, and becomes reversible 

error only if the facts established in trial materially diverge 

from facts in the indictment and the defendant suffers substantial 

prejudice. United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111, 1114 (11th 

Cir. 1990). 

The indictment charges that "on or about the 9th day of 

August, 1989," defendant possessed with intent to distribute "more 

than 500 grams" of cocaine. (R. Vol. I, doc. 1.) Defendant 

contends that the phrase "on or about" August 9, 1989, in the 

indictment and the phrase "actual or constructive possession, 

either alone or jointly with others" in Instruction No. 13 could 

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have led the jury to conclude that defendant constructively 

possessed the original contents of the UPS package prior to its 

shipment from San Diego on August 8, 1989, by virtue of his 

relationship with the sender. 

An indictment is to be interpreted in a practical, common 

sense fashion. Phillips, 869 F.2d at 1364. When, as in this case, 

a defendant fails to object to the instructions or the indictment 

at trial, the indictment is liberally construed in favor of 

validity. United States v. Freeman, 813 F.2d 303, 304 (10th Cir. 

1987). Again, since there was no objection at trial, reversal is 

not justified unless the district court's instruction constituted 

plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); Phillips, 869 F.2d at 1365. 

Based on these standards, we cannot conclude that the trial court's 

instruction broadened the charge against the defendant beyond that 

set out in the indictment. 

A common sense interpretation of the indictment is that "on or 

about" August 9, 1989, refers to the receipt of the UPS shipment of 

cocaine and not to events occurring before its shipment. The 

record shows that the indictment fairly informed Quesada of the 

charges against which he was required to defend and that he was 

aware that he could be convicted for either actual or constructive 

possession of the cocaine. The government's theory of constructive 

possession focused on defendant's constructive possession of the 

UPS package after it had been confiscated by the police and sugar 

substituted for all but .05 grams of the cocaine. 

never argued or suggested a joint venture 

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The prosecution 

as a theory of 

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.. 

• constructive possession. As stated above, we have found that the 

trial court did not commit reversible error by instructing the jury 

on both actual and constructive possession. In addition, we 

conclude that the court's instruction on constructive possession 

did not constitute a constructive amendment of the indictment. 

Finally, defendant argues that the introduction of evidence of 

the 125.81 grams of cocaine found in his car and apartment at the 

time of his arrest created a risk that he was convicted for 

possession of this cocaine rather than for possession of the 997.2 

grams of cocaine found in the UPS shipment. Although a limiting 

instruction instructing the jury as to the proper use to be made of 

this evidence would have been preferable, we find that the facts 

established at trial did not materially diverge from the indictment 

and that the defendant was not substantially prejudiced by the 

introduction of this evidence. Evidence of the 125.81 grams of 

cocaine was used along with evidence of other drug paraphernalia 

found in defendant's car and apartment to show that defendant had 

the requisite intent to distribute the cocaine found in the UPS 

shipment. The government never argued or suggested that defendant 

should be convicted for possession of the 125.81 grams of cocaine 

and the record does not support the claim that the jury based their 

verdict upon this evidence. Therefore, we conclude that the trial 

court did not err in admitting this evidence. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the court 

G. T. Van Bebber 

District Judge 

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