Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01759/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01759-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General of the State of Arizona
Respondent
Pedro Chairez
Petitioner
Charles L Ryan
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Pedro Chairez,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, Attorney General of the 

State of Arizona,

Respondents.

No. CV-13-01759-PHX-PGR

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about August 21, 2013. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 19) on April 28, 2014. Petitioner docketed 

a reply (Doc. 20) to the answer to his petition on May 27, 2014.

I Procedural History

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned May 27, 2009, charged 

Petitioner and two co-defendants with one count of participating in a criminal street gang, 

a class 2 felony (Count 1), one count of conspiracy to commit the crime of participating 

in a criminal street gang, a class 2 felony (Count 2), one count of money laundering in the 

second degree, a class 3 felony (Count 3), and one count of conspiracy to commit money 

laundering in the second degree, a class 3 felony (Count 4), alleging the crimes occurred 

on or about December 1, 2008. See Answer, Exh. A. A settlement conference in the 

matter was conducted on September 25, 2009. See id., Exh. E. A settlement conference 

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was conducted on October 2, 2009, at which time a plea agreement was offered to 

Petitioner and Petitioner was given a “Donald” advisory. Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner was initially represented by appointed counsel; on December 2, 2009, 

Petitioner filed a motion to proceed “in all further proceedings pro per.” Id., Exhs. C & 

H.. The state trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to proceed without counsel

and explained to Petitioner the consequences of representing himself, including his 

responsibilities in the case, and that he would be held to the “same standard” as an 

attorney. Id., Exh. J & HHH. Petitioner signed a waiver of counsel form, and averred

that the form was explained to him and that he had read the form completely before 

signing the form. Id., Exhs. I &t HHH, at 6. At that time, the state trial court explained 

to Petitioner that he faced “well over 70 years in prison” if convicted on all four charges

in the indictment. Id., Exh. HHH, at 8–11. The trial court also informed Petitioner that

he could “change [his] mind” and request counsel “at any time.” Id., Exh. HHH at 12–13.

The trial court then found that Petitioner had “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

desired to waive the right to representation by an attorney and to represent himself” and 

the court accepted Petitioner’s waiver of counsel. Id., Exh. HHH at 14. The court also 

appointed Petitioner advisory counsel. Id., Ext. HHH at 14–15.

On January 21, 2010, pursuant to a written plea agreement (see id., Exh. Q), 

Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of participating in a criminal street gang (Counts 1 

and 2, as amended). Id., Exh. III. In exchange for Petitioner pleading guilty to these two 

amended charges, the state agreed to dismiss Counts 3 and 4, and agreed not to allege two 

sentencing enhancements, and agreed to not file further “money laundering, participating 

in a street gang, or promoting prison contraband charges out of the search warrant 

CWT342.” Id., Exh. Q & Exh. III at 8. The parties stipulated to a 16-year prison 

sentence pursuant to Petitioner’s guilty plea on Count 1, which sentence was to run 

consecutively to his prison sentence in another case. The parties also agreed that, upon 

his release from incarceration after serving the sentence imposed on Count 1, Petitioner

would be placed on supervised probation as his sentence for Count 2.

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Petitioner agreed to the factual basis for the guilty pleas provided by the 

prosecutor, that, inter alia, on specific dates in March and April of 2009 he directed 

another individual to further the objectives of the Mexican Mafia . Id., Exh. III at 12–14. 

After finding that Petitioner had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled guilty and 

that there was “a factual basis for” the guilty pleas, the trial court accepted and entered 

the guilty pleas. Id., Exh. III at 14–15.

On April 8, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion in the state trial court seeking to 

withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that (1) there was an insufficient factual basis for the 

plea; (2) the plea was invalid because he was “legally and factually innocent”; (3) he was 

misinformed about the elements of the crime; (4) he misunderstood his right to withdraw 

from the plea; and (5) he did not understand the nature of the charges against him. Id., 

Exh. U. The trial court ordered that a transcript be prepared for the change-of-plea 

hearing, and ordered the state to file a response. Id., Exh. V. The state trial court held 

oral argument on the motion to withdraw Petitioner’s guilty plea on May 7, 2010. Id., 

Exh. JJJ at 3. Petitioner argued that the indictment only gave a range of dates, December 

2008 to May 2009, and that he did not receive notice of the specific offense dates until he 

pleaded guilty. Id., Exh. JJJ at 3–4. Petitioner argued that there was an insufficient 

factual basis for his plea. Id., Exh. JJJ at 3-4. After hearing argument from both parties, 

the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to withdraw from the plea agreement, stating:

I believe that there is a factual basis. I did the hearing. And I think 

you’re confusing legal arguments that you may have read in case law with 

other things. And it’s not my job to explain it to you, and I’m not going to, 

so it is denied.

I don’t find any manifest injustice. I find that factual basis as laid out 

in the Plea Agreement hearing fit[s] the crime that you pled – crimes that 

you pled guilty to, and I believe both plea agreements mention things like 

“as amended,” which means that the State can amend what it is that they’re 

alleging that you did. And you agreed to it.

You pled guilty. You engaged in a colloquy with me. I asked you a 

lot of questions. You were very definite. I observed your demeanor. I 

remember you. Because I’ve done so many of these cases and other 

settlement conferences, I remember hearing about the facts. Although I 

didn’t participate in your settlement conference, I did participate as a 

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settlement Judge on the other defendants, and so I’m familiar with the facts 

of the case.

Based on your demeanor in court, the way you answered my 

questions, there’s no doubt in my mind you knew what you were doing. So 

your motion is denied.

Id., Exh. JJJ at 12.

The trial court imposed the stipulated sentence in the plea agreement, i.e., a term 

of 16 years imprisonment for Count 1, and suspended imposition of a sentence for Count 

2, and ordered a seven-year supervised probation term to begin upon release for Count 1. 

Id., Exh. JJJ at 14–15

Petitioner took a timely “of-right” appeal of his convictions and sentences 

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. AA. Petitioner was 

appointed counsel to represent him in these proceedings. Id., Exh. BB. On February 11, 

2011, Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a notice avowing that he had reviewed the 

record and correspondence from Petitioner and was “unable to find any claims for relief 

to raise in post-conviction relief proceedings.” Id., Exhs. FF & GG. Petitioner filed a pro 

per brief in his Rule 32 action on March 18, 2011, asserting :

1. The state trial court should have permitted Petitioner to withdraw from the plea 

agreement pursuant to Rule 17.5.

2. The plea agreement violated the “Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment for insufficient factual basis and failure to state a proscribed offense under 

A.R.S. § 13–2321.”

3. The “factual basis given by the state fails to state a crime and lacks the criminal 

intent as proscribed by A.R.S. 13–2321.”

4. “Conspiracy to participate in criminal street gang cannot be elevated to actual 

participation in a street gang based on exact same grand jury evidence.”

5. The “trial court should [have] allowed [Petitioner] to withdraw guilty plea to 

resolve insufficiency of indictment.”

6. The “guilty plea was invalid” because Petitioner “did not understand the nature 

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of the charges and the charge lacked the requisite criminal intent as proscribed in A.R.S. 

§ 13–2321.”

7. Petitioner’s advisory counsel provided ineffective assistance.

8. The “trial court erred in allowing state’s response to defendant’s motion to 

withdraw.”

Id., Exhs. HH & II.

In a decision entered July 21, 2011, the state trial court summarily dismissed 

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action, stating, “The Court agrees with the arguments set forth in the 

State’s Response. The Court specifically finds that there are no colorable claims for 

ineffective assistance of advisory counsel under both prongs of the Strickland test. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 671, 687 (1984).” Id., Exh. OO. 

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals. In a 

memorandum decision issued June 17, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted 

review but denied relief. Id., Exh. WW. The appellate court determined: (1) the trial 

court properly went through the plea colloquy and determined the plea was knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily made; (2) there was a sufficient factual basis for each plea, 

and it supported the intent element under the requisite criminal statute, AR.S. § 13–

2321(A)(1); (3) Petitioner did not establish that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea.; (4) the trial “court properly could and 

did make a threshold determination that Petitioner’s contention he did not understand the 

nature of the charges to which he was entering guilty pleas was not credible”; and (5) 

Petitioner had waived any arguments relating to the legal sufficiency of the indictment 

and the amendment of the charges by entering guilty pleas, and by not objecting to the 

indictment before pleading guilty. Id., Exh. WW. The appellate court specifically 

rejected Petitioner’s argument that there was an insufficient factual basis for finding him 

guilty because, it concluded the Arizona Mexican Mafia obtained a financial benefit from 

the acts, establishing an element of the relevant Arizona statute as a matter of state law. 

Id., Exh. WW at 7. The appellate court further specifically found that Petitioner’s acts 

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established the requisite intent. Id., Exh. WW at 7-8.

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review on 

March 21, 2014. Id., Exh. FFF. 

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts:

1. He was denied his rights “pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the 

[Fourteenth] Amendment, specifically only a voluntarily and intelligent guilty plea is 

constitutionally valid.”

2. “Petitioner’s guilty plea was involuntary under the Due Process Clause for a 

lack of criminal intent, under Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637.”

3. “Under the Due Process Clause, the State cannot convict a defendant for 

conduct that its criminal statute does not prohibit. Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 121 S. 

Ct. 712.”

4. “Petitioner, under the Sixth Amendment was never informed of the nature of the 

charges made against him so as to permit adequate preparation of a defense.”

Respondents argue:

Grounds 3 and 4 from the habeas petition are procedurally defaulted 

without excuse, Grounds 3 and 4 are not cognizable upon habeas review, 

and Chairez waived the claim in Ground 4 when he pleaded guilty. Further, 

all four grounds lack merit. Therefore, this Court should dismiss the 

petition with prejudice.

***

All of Chairez’s claims lack merit. Further, this Court should not even 

review the merits of Grounds 3 and 4 because they are not cognizable upon 

habeas review, and Chairez waived the claim in Ground 4 when he pleaded 

guilty. Accordingly, this Court should deny these claims and dismiss them 

with prejudice.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief on the merits of a claim 

which has been exhausted in the state courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 

842, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30, 111 S. 

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Ct. 2546, 2554–55 (1991). To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner 

must afford the state the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly 

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. See, 

e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose 

v..Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital cases 

arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the 

habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on direct 

appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz. 

2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona 

for purposes of exhausting a habeas claim in the context of a conviction resulting in a 

non-capital sentence).

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the exhaustion requirement, the 

petitioner must present “both the operative facts and the legal principles that control each 

claim to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 2001). See

also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the 

Supreme Court reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states the 

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 

124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal 

habeas claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a specific federal 

constitutional right, as opposed to violation of a state law or a state procedural rule, the 

federal habeas claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541 U.S. 

at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.

In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements, a petitioner must present to the state 

courts the “substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court. Picard v. 

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513–14 (1971); Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d

1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to present the 

substance of his claim to the state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional 

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guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the petitioner to relief. See Scott v. Schriro, 

567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 

2007). Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution” to fairly present a claim to the state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277–78, 92 

S. Ct. at 512–13, they must do more than present the facts necessary to support the 

federal claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still has 

the right to raise the claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still available to the 

petitioner at the time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the 

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in the state courts. See

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92–93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the 

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is 

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 

548 U.S. at 92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never presented a federal habeas 

claim in state court and is now barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, 

including rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 

351–52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did present 

a claim to the state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of the claim 

because the petitioner failed to follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594–95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

727–28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553–57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002). “If a 

prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating a state procedural rule which would 

constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may not raise the 

claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence.’” 

Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

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In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts in either a direct 

appeal or on collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an 

attempt to return to state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow 

category of claims for which a successive Rule 32 action is permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(a) & (b) (successive petitions are limited to claims of being held in 

custody beyond sentence expiration, newly-discovered material facts, requests for 

delayed appeal, significant change in the law retroactively applicable that would probably 

overturn conviction or sentence, and actual innocence); Spreitz v. Ryan, 617 F. Supp. 2d 

887, 899–900 (D. Ariz. 2009) (describing Arizona’s preclusion rule).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, 

and the preclusion of claims bar Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to 

exhaust any unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but 

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly presented to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals in his Rule 32 action. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 

2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding 

the waiver and procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal convictions are 

adequate and independent state grounds for affirming a conviction and denying federal 

habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931–32 

(9th Cir. 1998).

B. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner establishes cause for their procedural default and prejudice arising from that 

default. “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural default of the claim 

and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See

Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong of this 

test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that some objective factor external to the 

defense impeded his compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v. 

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th 

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Cir. 1998); Martinez–Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish 

prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). 

See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415–16 (9th Cir. 1998). Generally, a 

petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is not cause to excuse procedural default. See, e.g., 

Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged constitutional 

error worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his criminal 

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617; Correll, 137 

F.3d at 1415–16. Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the 

alleged constitutional violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have been 

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 

2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and 

prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine the 

existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 

U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

C. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is required if the 

petitioner demonstrates review of the merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393, 124 S. Ct. 

1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485–86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in 

the conviction of one who is factually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485–86, 106 S. 

Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual 

innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him guilty of the offenses 

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charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 

832, 842–43 (9th Cir. 2001).

D. Adequate and independent state-law basis

To constitute an adequate and independent state procedural ground sufficient to 

support a state court’s finding of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, 

consistently applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s purported 

default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2001). A state rule is 

considered consistently applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in the 

“vast majority of cases.” Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 

417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1221 n. 6 (1989). Additionally, for the proffered state 

procedural bar to preclude the consideration of a habeas claim “the state court must 

actually have relied on the procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of 

the case.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638–39 (1985). 

See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261–62, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989).

“[A] procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on 

either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a 

judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a 

state procedural bar.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, [ ].... Sanders 

v. Cotton, 398 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) (where the state appellate 

court’s discussion of waiver is intertwined with its merits analysis, the state 

court’s decision does not rest on an independent and adequate state law 

ground) ....

Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (some internal citations and 

quotations omitted). See also Scott, 567 F.3d at 581–82.

E. Standard of review of exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court decision was an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque, 

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555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits was 

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 

1376, 1390 (2012), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law of United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a set of 

facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 

1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 

(2004); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 785 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 

2766 (2013). 

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 

(2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010). However, 

the state court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 

only if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 

766, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785. An unreasonable 

application of law is different from an incorrect one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; 

Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one 

and does not permit a court to grant relief simply because the state court might have 

incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 

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F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th 

Cir. 2010).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by 

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller–El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240–41, 125 S. 

Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 

(2003); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 763 n.1; Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th 

Cir. 2010); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881; Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2006). The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate 

court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 

U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304–05 (1982). Additionally, the United States 

Supreme Court has held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on the merits in the state 

courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court 

that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 

(2011).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953–54, 127 S. Ct. 

2842, 2858–59 (2007); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785-86; Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 

790, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2011).

F. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner contends he was denied his rights “pursuant to the Due Process 

Clause of the [Fourteenth] Amendment, specifically only a voluntarily and 

intelligent guilty plea is constitutionally valid.”

At the change-of-plea hearing, the state trial court confirmed, inter alia, that 

Petitioner had read the plea agreement and discussed it with his advisory counsel before 

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he signed it. When asked whether he understood the agreement, Petitioner replied, 

“Completely.” Answer, Exh. III at 5.

At the change-of-plea hearing the state then provided the following factual basis 

for Petitioner’s guilty pleas:

On or about March 22nd, 2009, Mr. Chairez directed another to perform 

acts which would benefit the Arizona Mexican Mafia. The person he was 

directing would then come back into Maricopa County as an accomplice

and a conspirator and further that directive, which would then benefit the 

Mexican Mafia, specifically giving money or gathering money for the 

Arizona Mexican Mafia.

Id., Exh. III at 13.

At the hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court made a 

credibility determination that Petitioner’s claim he had no notice of the charges was not 

credible, especially in light of his statements at the change-of-plea hearing, and the 

Arizona Court of Appeals properly relied on this credibility determination. Id., Exh. WW

at 9–10, Exh. JJJ at 12.

In his state Rule 32 action seeking post-conviction relief, Petitioner alleged his 

guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. In a memorandum decision issued June 17, 

2013, affirming the state trial court’s decision denying relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Arizona Court of Appeals determined, inter alia, that 

the trial court properly went through the plea colloquy and determined the plea was 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, that there was a sufficient factual basis 

for each plea and it supported the intent element under the requisite criminal statute, i.e., 

Arizona Revised Statutes § 13–2321(A)(1), and that the trial “court properly could and 

did make a threshold determination that Petitioner’s contention he did not understand the 

nature of the charges to which he was entering guilty pleas was not credible. Id., Exh. 

WW. 

The state courts’ credibility determination regarding the knowing and voluntary 

nature of Petitioner’s guilty plea are presumed to be correct. Accordingly, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals’ rejection of Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

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application of clearly established federal law because, as a factual matter, Petitioner had 

notice of the charges against him when he pleaded guilty and the pleas were knowing and 

voluntary. 

Federal habeas courts are bound by a state court’s determinations regarding the 

application of state law, see Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S. Ct. 602, 603-04 

(2005), and must presume the state court’s factual findings are correct absent clear and 

convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1). A state court's 

factual finding that a plea was voluntary and knowing is entitled to a presumption of 

correctness by a federal habeas court. See Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 982 (9th 

Cir.2004); Cunningham v. Diesslin, 92 F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir.1996). Factual findings 

of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by a federal habeas court 

only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing evidence. See Miller–

El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240–41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Anderson v. Terhune, 

467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006); Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner's contemporaneous statements regarding his understanding of the plea 

agreement carry substantial weight in determining if his entry of a guilty plea was 

knowing and voluntary. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629 

(1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The 

subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to 

summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly 

incredible”); United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir.1991) (reaching this 

holding in a section 2255 case); Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir.1986)

Restucci v. Spencer, 249 F. Supp. 2d 33, 45 (D. Mass. 2003) (collecting cases so 

holding). 

Petitioner presents no clear and convincing evidence that his guilty plea was not 

knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, the state courts’ decision regarding this issue is 

entitled to deference and Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of this claim.

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2. Petitioner contends his guilty plea was involuntary and violated his right to 

due process of law because of “a lack of criminal intent, under Henderson v. 

Morgan, 426 U.S. 637.”1

Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was involuntary because he did not have 

notice that the crime of participating in a criminal street gang required the “intent to 

promote or further the criminal objectives of the criminal street gang.” Petitioner 

maintains that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision rejecting this claim was contrary to 

and an unreasonable application of established federal law.

In his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his Rule 32 action, 

Petitioner asserted that he was not informed about the intent element of Arizona Revised 

Statutes § 13–2321 and that this failure rendered his guilty plea involuntary. See Answer, 

Exh. SS at 11–14. In his Rule 32 action Petitioner also challenged sufficiency of the 

factual basis for his guilty plea, arguing that the proffered factual basis did not show he 

had the requisite criminal intent to commit the crime. Id., Exh. SS at 8–16. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals rejected these claims, finding the extended record supported the 

inference that Petitioner had the requisite intent “‘to promote or further the criminal 

objectives of the criminal street gang.’” Id., Exh. WW at 7–8.

The Arizona state courts have previously distinguished Henderson, cited by 

Petitioner in support of his argument that a lack of knowledge regarding the requisite 

level of intent regarding the crime at issue, from the facts presented in cases similar to 

this matter:

These facts distinguish this case from Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 

96 S.Ct. 2253, [] (1976), on which [the defendant] relies. There, the 

defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder without any “indication 

that the nature of the offense had ever been discussed with [him].” Id. at 

642–43, 96 S.Ct. 2253. No one informed the defendant that intent, an 

element that he explicitly denied, was required for the charged offense. Id.

 

1 Holding that, where neither defense counsel nor the trial court explained to the petitioner that 

an intent to cause the death of his victim was an element of the offense of second-degree murder 

and the petitioner made no factual statement or admission necessarily implying that he had such 

intent, the petitioner’s plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder was involuntary.

96 S.Ct. 2253 (1976).

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at 643, 96 S.Ct. 2253.

 Here, in contrast, [the defendant’s] attorney avowed, and [the defendant] 

acknowledged, that she had discussed the charges and the consequences of 

pleading guilty with [the defendant], who did not dispute the factual basis 

of his plea or whether the required mens rea was sufficiently established. 

The trial court had no obligation to advise [the defendant] of each specific 

element of his crimes “[a]bsent the unique circumstances of Henderson v. 

Morgan.” State v. Devine, 114 Ariz. 574, 575, 562 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1977); 

cf. State v. Ovante, 231 Ariz. 180, 185 ¶ 17, 291 P.3d 974, 979 (2013) 

(“The trial court was not required to explain the distinction between first 

and second degree murder and was free to accept the guilty plea if it was 

satisfied that the record established premeditation.”).

Arizona v. Rose, 231 Ariz. 500, 505-06, 297 P.3d 906, 911 12 (2013).

The record in this matter reflects that Petitioner’s guilty plea was based on real 

notice of the true nature of the charges against him, including the requisite element of 

intent. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 436, 103 S. Ct. 843, 852 (1983). 

Accordingly, the state courts’ determination that Petitioner’s guilty plea was knowing and 

voluntary because Petitioner had adequate notice of the true nature of the charges against 

him, including the necessary element of intent, was not clearly contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of federal law.

3. Petitioner asserts his convictions and sentences must be reversed, arguing 

that “[u]nder the Due Process Clause, the State cannot convict a defendant for 

conduct that its criminal statute does not prohibit. Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 121 

S. Ct. 712.”

Petitioner argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea was insufficient, and, 

therefore, that the state did not meet its burden of proving Petitioner was guilty of the 

offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, citing Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 121 S. Ct. 712, 

(2001),2Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979), and In re Winship, 397 

 

2

“We have held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

forbids a State to convict a person of a crime without proving the elements of that crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228-29, 121 S. Ct. 712, 714 

(2001).

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U.S. 358 (1970). Petitioner contends that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment forbids a State to convict a person of a crime without proving the elements 

of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Doc. 1 at 8 (internal quotations and citation 

omitted).

Respondent maintains that Petitioner procedurally defaulted this claim in the state 

courts.

In Ground 3, Chairez argues that “[u]nder the due process clause, the State 

cannot convict a defendant for conduct that its criminal statute does not 

prohibit” and cites Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001). (Dkt. #1, at 8.) He 

appears to argue that the factual basis supplied by the prosecutor was 

insufficient to prove Chairez committed the crimes of participating in a 

criminal street gang, and this violated his right under the Fourteenth 

Amendment to have the State prove the elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. In his PCR petition and his petition to review to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, Chairez argued that the factual basis provided by 

the State did not properly allege a violation of A.R.S. § 13–2321(A)(1). 

(Exhibit II, at 9–14; Exhibit SS, at 14–17.) It was not until Chairez’s 

amended petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, however, that 

he provided the federal basis for the claim that he now presents in his 

habeas petition. (Exhibit DDD, at 1–4.)

A petitioner must present to the state courts the “substantial equivalent” of the 

claim presented in federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513–

14 (1971); Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Full and fair 

presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the state courts, 

including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts that 

entitle the petitioner to relief. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir.2009); 

Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). Although a habeas petitioner need 

not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to the state 

courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277–78, 92 S. Ct. at 512–13, they must do more than present 

the facts necessary to support the federal claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 

103 S. Ct. 276, 277, (1982). A claim is only “fairly present[ed]” when a petitioner 

“clearly state[s] the federal basis and federal nature of the claim, along with relevant 

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facts.” Cooper v. Nevan, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011).

Petitioner presented the substance of this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals in 

his Rule 32 action. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that there was a sufficient 

factual basis for each of Petitioner’s guilty pleas, and the factual The Arizona Court of 

Appeals did not discuss the claim as presenting a violation of Petitioner’s federal 

constitutional rights.

Because the state court’s determination of state law, i.e., that there was an 

adequate factual basis for finding Petitioner guilty of each crime of conviction, is binding 

on the federal court, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the merits of this claim, 

regardless of any failure to fairly present the claim to the state courts as presenting an 

issue of federal constitutional law.

A claim that a defendant’s federal right to due process was violated, based on 

insufficiency of the evidence, can only succeed when, viewing all the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Brown, 

558 U.S. 120, 130 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2010); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. 

When undertaking habeas review of a state court decision rejecting a claim of 

insufficiency of the evidence, the Court’s inquiry is very limited; the Court may ask only 

whether the state court’s decision was contrary to or reflected an unreasonable 

application of Jackson to the facts of a particular case. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 

1262, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, “[a]fter AEDPA, we apply the standards of 

Jackson with an additional layer of deference” to state court findings. Juan H. v. Allen, 

408 F.3d at 1274.

Insufficient evidence claims are reviewed by looking at the elements of the offense 

under state law and, in determining whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, 

federal courts are bound by a state court's interpretation of state law. See Emery v. Clark, 

643 F.3d 1210, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2011). Additionally, circumstantial evidence and 

inferences drawn from it are sufficient to sustain a conviction. See, e.g., Walters v. 

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Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). Having thoroughly reviewed all of the 

pleadings in this matter and the portions of the record presented to the Court, the 

Magistrate Judge concludes that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying 

Petitioner’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence was not contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of federal law. See Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 959–60

(9th Cir. 2004). Compare Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d 1099, 1102–04 (9th Cir. 2005).

4. “Petitioner, under the Sixth Amendment was never informed of the nature 

of the charges made against him so as to permit adequate preparation of a defense.”

Respondents assert Petitioner procedurally defaulted this claim and that the claim 

was waived by Petitioner’s guilty plea:

 In Ground 4, Chairez argues that he was “never informed of the nature 

and cause of the charges made against him so as to present adequate 

defense” in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. (Dkt. #1, at 9.) In his 

PCR petition and his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

he challenged the voluntariness of guilty plea based on his allegation that 

he “did not understand the nature of the charges.” (Exhibit II, at 17–19; 

Exhibit SS, at 11–14.) This is the claim Chairez presents in Ground 1 of 

his habeas petition. (Dkt. #1, at 6.) In his amended petition for review to 

the Arizona Supreme Court, Chairez presented the claim he now presents 

in Ground 4 for the first time to the state courts. (Exhibit DDD, at 4–5.) 

Chairez admitted in the amended petition that he had only partially raised 

this claim before and was now making it a stand-alone constitutional 

claim.

The Court may deny this federal habeas claim as being non-cognizable. A federal 

habeas claim based on the alleged deprivation of a constitutional right, which violation is 

alleged to have occurred prior to the entry of his guilty plea, and any claim predicated on 

such a violation. is waived when the petitioner entered his guilty plea. See Blackledge v. 

Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 2103 (1974)3; Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 

 

3

“[A] person complaining of such ‘antecedent constitutional violations,’ Id., 411 U.S. at 266, 93 

S.Ct. at 1607, is limited in a federal habeas corpus proceeding to attacks on the voluntary and 

intelligent nature of the guilty plea, through proof that the advice received from counsel was not 

‘within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’ See McMann, supra, 

397 U.S. at 771, 90 S.Ct. at 1449. “

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267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973); Becker v. Nebraska, 435 F.2d 157 (8th Cir.1970);

Ralbovsky v. Kane, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1152–53 (C.D. Cal. 2005).

III Conclusion

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the merits of his first, second, 

and third claims for relief. The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying relief on 

Petitioner’s claims for relief was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application 

of established federal law. Petitioner waived his fourth claim for federal habeas relief 

because he waived this claim by pleading guilty.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Chairez’ Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should 

be denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

Dated this 11th day of June, 2014.

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