Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17371/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17371-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adobe Systems, Inc.
Appellant
Joshua Christenson
Appellee
Software Publishers Association

Software Surplus, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ADOBE SYSTEMS INC.,

Plaintiff-CounterDefendant–Appellant,

v.

JOSHUA CHRISTENSON, an

individual, DBA

www.softwaresurplus.com;

SOFTWARE SURPLUS, INC.,

Defendants-CounterClaimants–Appellees,

v.

SOFTWARE PUBLISHERS

ASSOCIATION, DBA Software

Information Industry Association,

Third-Party-Defendant.

No. 12-17371

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-00422-

LRH-GWF

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 29, 2015—University of Arizona, Rogers College

of Law, Tucson, Arizona

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2 ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON

Filed December 30, 2015

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

SUMMARY*

Copyright

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment in a

copyright infringement case, the panel held that, while the

copyright holder bears the ultimate burden of establishing

infringement, the party raising a first sale defense bears an

initial burden with respect to the defense.

The first sale doctrine provides that, once a copy of a

work is lawfully sold or transferred, the new owner has the

right to sell or otherwise dispose of that copy without the

copyright owner’s permission. Adobe Systems, Inc., claimed

infringement of its software. The panel held that Adobe

established its registered copyrights in the software, and the

defendant carried his burden of showing that he lawfully

acquired genuine copies. Adobe, however, failed to produce

license agreements or other evidence to show that it retained

title to the software when the copies were first transferred. 

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in excluding evidence purporting to document the

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON 3

licenses, and general testimony and generic licensing

templates were insufficient to meet Adobe’s burden.

The panel held that the nominative fair use defense barred

Adobe’s trademark infringement claim.

COUNSEL

J. Andrew Coombs (argued) and Annie S. Wang, Glendale,

California, for Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant–Appellant.

Lisa A. Rasmussen (argued), Las Vegas, Nevada, for

Defendants-Counter-Claimants–Appellees.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal, which arises in the context of software

licenses, requires us to address the burden of proof applicable

to the first sale defense to a copyright infringement claim. 

Although a copyright holder enjoys broad privileges

protecting the exclusive right to distribute a work, the first

sale doctrine serves as an important exception to that right. 

Under this doctrine, once a copy of a work is lawfully sold or

transferred, the new owner has the right “to sell or otherwise

dispose of” that copy without the copyright owner’s

permission. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). Of course, the defense is

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4 ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON

contingent on rightful ownership. The old adage “possession

is nine-tenths of the law” has no traction under § 109(a).1

This appeal stems from a messy copyright dispute

between Adobe Systems, Inc. and Joshua Christenson and his

software company, Software Surplus, Inc. (“SSI” or

“Software Surplus”).2

In the district court, litigation of this

case was punctuated by discovery disputes, sanctions, and

multiple rulings on the admissibility and exclusion of

evidence. The importance of these factors, which the parties

emphasize on appeal, is diminished bythe central issue—who

bears the burden of proving the first sale defense in a

software licensing dispute. While the copyright holder bears

the ultimate burden of establishing copyright infringement,

the party raising a first sale defense bears an initial burden

with respect to the defense. At the summary judgment stage,

this burden is discharged by producing evidence sufficient for

a jury to find that the alleged infringer lawfully acquired

ownership of genuine copies of the copyrighted software. 

Once this initial burden is satisfied, the burden shifts back to

the copyright owner to establish the absence of a first sale,

because of a licensing or other non-ownership-transferring

arrangement when the copy first changed hands.

The district court correctly held that Adobe established its

registered copyrights in the disputed software and that

1 The origin of the adage, sometimes stated as “possession is nine points

of the law,” is in some dispute, but it can be traced to Thomas Draxe’s

1616 Bibliotheca Scholastica Instructissima. See Oxford Dictionary of

Proverbs 245 (Jennifer Speake ed., 2003).

2 Software Surplus, Inc. is now defunct, so we use “Christenson” to refer

collectively to the defendants–appellees.

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ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON 5

Christenson carried his burden of showing that he lawfully

acquired genuine copies of Adobe’s software, but that Adobe

failed to produce the purported license agreements or other

evidence to document that it retained title to the software

when the copies were first transferred. We affirm the district

court’s dismissal of both the copyright and trademark claims.

BACKGROUND

In October 2009, Adobe filed this lawsuit against

Christenson. The factual basis for Adobe’s claims was

simple: on his website, Christenson sold Adobe software—

which he purchased from a third-party distributor—without

Adobe’s authorization, allegedly infringing Adobe’s

copyrights and trademarks in the process. Christenson

asserted numerous defenses, including the first sale defense

to the copyright claim. He also filed a counterclaim against

Adobe and a third-party complaint against the Software

Information Industry Association (“SIIA”) for defamation,

disparagement, and more, on the basis that SIIA issued a

press release about this case stating that Christenson and his

company “sold infringing copies, including counterfeit

versions” and “swindled” consumers.

The following chronologyhelps explain whyneither party

completely closed the loop on proof. The case began as many

do: The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge

to set discovery and dispositive motions deadlines. A

protracted series of discovery exchanges and disputes

eventually overlapped with briefing on cross-motions for

summary judgment, and the case then departed somewhat

from the expected course.

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6 ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON

Adobe, with SIIA, moved for partial summary judgment

on liability for the copyright and trademark claims and for

summary judgment on the counterclaims and third-party

claims pertaining to the press release. On the copyright

claim, Adobe argued that the first sale defense did not apply

because Adobe only licenses and does not sell its software. 

For support, Adobe relied on a declaration to that effect by its

Anti-Piracy Enforcement Manager, Chris Stickle. Stickle

generally described different ways that Adobe licenses

software, such as by limiting copies to academic users or

distributing copies bundled with hardware under restrictive

terms, the latter being known as Original Equipment

Manufacturer (“OEM”) products. Other evidence submitted

by Adobe included a list of specific copyrights, a list of

Adobe product licenses that had been produced by

Christenson, excerpts of Christenson’s deposition in which he

acknowledged that he sold academic and OEM software,

screenshots of the Software Surplus website stating that it

sold academic and OEM software, and customer returns and

complaints in which customers complained that they had

received software licensed for academic use from Christenson

despite having understood that they had purchased software

appropriate for non-academic users. Regarding the trademark

claim, Adobe also argued that Christenson should be liable

for false advertising, although as the district court later

pointed out, Adobe’s complaint did not include this claim.

Christenson, in turn, moved for summary judgment on the

copyright and trademark claims. In response to the copyright

claim, Christenson argued that only Adobe had access to the

terms of its contracts with the original recipients of the copies

at issue; Christenson, as a downstream distributor, did not

have this information. He thus urged the court to place the

burden on Adobe “to disprove the first sale doctrine.” With

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ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON 7

this burden in mind, Christenson asserted that Adobe could

not disprove that a first sale occurred because Adobe was

unable to point to the terms of any actual contract. 

Christenson also offered evidence of his purchase of copies

of Adobe software from third parties. Christenson raised a

nominative fair use defense to the trademark claim, arguing

that he used Adobe’s trademark only to refer to Adobe’s

genuine goods.

The scope of what the court could consider in deciding

the cross-motions for summary judgment proved a persistent

point of dispute between the parties. After the parties filed

their summary judgment motions, Christenson filed a motion

to preclude Adobe from relying on contracts, licenses, or

agreements that Adobe failed to disclose under Rule 26(a). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a). The magistrate judge granted this

request and precluded Adobe from using or introducing such

documents—except for those that had been produced by

Christenson. Christenson then asked the district court to

strike any excluded documents and related assertions from

Adobe’s already ripe motion for summary judgment.

The district court decided the motion to strike and

motions for summary judgment in one order. Ruling for

Christenson on the copyright claim, the court stated that it

was “uncontroverted that Defendants lawfully purchased

genuine copies of Adobe software from third-party suppliers

before reselling those copies.” Reasoning that the burden

shifted to Adobe to produce evidence that “it merely licenses

and does not sell” the relevant software, the court noted that

Adobe would be unable to do so because it was precluded

from offering any licenses—the actual terms of which were

central to summary judgment.

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8 ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON

The court granted Christenson’s motion to strike a license

template because the document had not been disclosed by

Adobe or produced by Christenson. Other evidence was

precluded because the court determined that an actual

contract was required to prove whether Adobe’s transactions

resulted in a license as opposed to a sale. “[I]n the absence of

those writings,” the court foreclosed Adobe’s declarants from

testifying “to prove the terms and legal effect of Adobe’s

licensing agreements.”

Christenson also prevailed on the trademark claim. The

court credited his nominative fair use defense because he

used the trademarks to refer to the trademarked goods

themselves. The court rejected Adobe’s false advertising

theory because it was not included in the complaint.

Finally, the court denied Adobe’s motion for summary

judgment on the counterclaims related to the press release. 

The court then stayed the surviving counterclaims and entered

judgment in Christenson’s favor on the copyright and

trademark infringement claims pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 54(b), resulting in a final, appealable order.

ANALYSIS

I. COPYRIGHT CLAIM

A. PRIMA FACIECASEOFCOPYRIGHTINFRINGEMENT

To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, Adobe

must prove ownership of a valid copyright and violation by

Christenson, the alleged infringer, of at least one of the

exclusive rights conferred by the Copyright Act. UMG

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ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON 9

Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir.

2011).

Adobe claims that it holds copyrights in a long list of

different versions of familiar software titles, such as “Adobe

Photoshop CS3 for Windows and Macintosh,” “Adobe

Photoshop CS3 Extended for Windows and Macintosh,”

“Adobe Photoshop CS4,” and “Adobe Photoshop CS4

Extended.” Each new version reflects the result of revisions

and additions to the underlying source code of the initial

program. As proof of ownership, Adobe submitted the

certificates of registration and the registration numbers for

each listed title. Christenson does not dispute that the Adobe

products he bought and sold are on Adobe’s list or that the

listed titles are subject to copyright protection. Adobe thus

established ownership of valid copyrights of a long list of

computer software. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (“[T]he

certificate of a registration made before or within five years

after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie

evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts

stated in the certificate.”).

The Copyright Act confers several exclusive rights on

copyright owners, including the right of distribution. 

17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (granting a right “to distribute copies . . .

of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer

of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”). No factual

dispute exists that, through the Software Surplus website,

Christenson sold copies of Adobe’s copyrighted works

without authorization from Adobe. Christenson did not

establish any difference between the software titles listed by

Adobe, shown in screenshots of the Software Surplus

website, and those that he sold. Adobe easily established a

prima facie case of copyright infringement.

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10 ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON

B. THE FIRST SALE DEFENSE

In the face of an otherwise slam dunk copyright violation,

Christenson asserts that his conduct fell within an exception

to Adobe’s distribution rights under § 106—the first sale

doctrine. Under the Copyright Act, this affirmative defense

provides that “the owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully

made under this title, or any person authorized by such

owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright

owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that

copy . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). The practical effect of this

language is to significantly circumscribe a copyright owner’s

exclusive distribution right “only to the first sale of the

copyrighted work” because “once the copyright owner places

a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he

has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its

distribution.” Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research

Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 141, 152 (1998); see also Vernor v.

Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A]

copyright owner’s exclusive distribution right is exhausted

after the owner’s first sale of a particular copy of the

copyrighted work.”). Before answering the question left open

in Augusto of who bears the burden of proof as to this

defense, it is important to understand the contours of the term

“sale.”3See Augusto, 628 F.3d at 1178.

3 Augusto arose from a dispute over the distribution of compact discs

which ultimately ended up on eBay. In addressing an infringement claim

against the eBay seller, the court wrote: “While it is an open question as

to whether the plaintiff or defendant bears the burden of proving the

applicability of the first sale defense . . . we need not reach the issue in

this case.” Augusto, 628 F.3d at 1175, 1178.

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ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON 11

In digital copyright cases, the distinction between a “sale”

and a “license” has become central. But this distinction did

not arise with the advent of computer software. As early as

1908, the Supreme Court recognized that a sale creates a

defense to a copyright claim while a license does not. See

Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).4

Bobbs-Merrill held the copyright to the novel The Castaway

and sued Macy& Company for copyright infringement. Each

copy of the book had a notice on the title page that the retail

price was one dollar and “a sale at a less price will be treated

as an infringement of the copyright.” Id. at 341. Macy

purchased copies of the book at a discount and intended to

sell them for less than a dollar. The Court held that BobbsMerrill did not have a right to control future sales of Macy’s

copies because a copyright owner “who has sold a

copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted with all

right to control the sale of it.” Id. at 350 (emphasis added).

Shortly after the Bobbs-Merrill decision, Congress

codified the first sale doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1909. 

In this initial statutory iteration, the first sale rule did not

explicitly require the defendant to own the copy at issue:

That the copyright is distinct from the

property in the material object copyrighted,

and the sale or conveyance, by gift or

otherwise, of the material object shall not of

 

4 Although the Supreme Court initially discussed the first sale doctrine

in 1908, the doctrine can be traced to Pope v. Curll, an eighteenth-century

English case. (1741) 2 Atk. 342. Pope centered on a dispute over letters

written by Alexander Pope. The decision distinguished between

ownership of the paper on which the letters were written and Pope’s

exclusive right of publication.

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12 ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON

itself constitute a transfer of the copyright, nor

shall the assignment of the copyright

constitute a transfer of the title to the material

object; but nothing in this Act shall be deemed

to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of

any copy of a copyrighted work the

possession of which has been lawfully

obtained.

17 U.S.C. § 41 (1909).

Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1976 and revised

the first sale defense. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). Unlike its

predecessor, the amended statute explicitly required that a

defendant raising a first sale defense own the copy at issue. 

Id. (limiting the first sale defense to “the owner of a particular

copy” (emphasis added)). The first sale defense did “not . . .

extend to any person who has acquired possession of the copy

. . . from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan, or

otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it.” Id. at

§ 109(d). The legislative history confirms that Congress

intended to “restate[] and confirm[] the principle that, where

the copyright owner has transferred ownership of a particular

copy . . . of a work, the person to whom the copy . . . is

transferred is entitled to dispose of it by sale, rental, or any

other means.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976) (emphasis

added), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693.

The Supreme Court first analyzed § 109(a) in Quality

King. Distinguishing between the owner of a copy and a nonowner, such as a licensee, the Court emphasized that

“because the protection afforded by § 109(a) is available only

to the ‘owner’ of a lawfully made copy (or someone

authorized by the owner), the first sale doctrine would not

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ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON 13

provide a defense to . . . any nonowner such as a bailee, a

licensee, a consignee, or one whose possession of the copy

was unlawful.” 523 U.S. at 146–47. In other words, to claim

the benefits of the first sale defense, the holder of the copy

must actually hold title.

Section 109(a)’s focus on ownership takes on a special

significance in the digital context. In a world where licensing

agreements are “ubiquitous,” “license agreements, rather than

sales, have become the predominate form of the transfer of

rights to use copyrighted software material.” Apple, Inc. v.

Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2011). In

practice, because “the first sale doctrine does not apply to a

licensee,” id., licensing arrangements enable software

companies to restrict initial licensees of software from selling

their licensed copies of the software to downstream users.

Broadlyconstrued, the licensing exception in the software

context could swallow the statutory first sale defense. We

have recognized, however, that some purported software

licensing agreements may actually create a sale. See Vernor,

621 F.3d at 1111; Augusto, 628 F.3d at 1180. To determine

whether there is a legitimate license, we examine whether

“the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a

license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer

the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.” 

Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111. Where these factors aren’t

satisfied, the upshot is that the copyright holder has sold its

software to the user, and the user can assert the first sale

defense. See Augusto, 628 F.3d at 1180–81.

In the software copyright context, a dispute about the first

sale defense raises several questions: First, which party—the

copyright holder or the party asserting the defense—bears the

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14 ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON

initial burden of showing ownership through lawful

acquisition? Second, what does it take to discharge that

burden? And finally, which party bears the burden of proving

or disproving a license versus a sale? General principles of

evidence, coupled with the statute and the legislative history,

provide the answer.

The burden of proof for an affirmative defense to a civil

claim generally falls on the party asserting the defense. This

same principle holds true in copyright. See 3 Melville B.

Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 12.11[F]

(2009) (“[A]s a matter of definition, the defendant bears the

burden of proof as to all affirmative defenses . . . .”). For

example, in claiming the fair use defense to copyright

infringement, it is the proponent’s burden to come forward

with favorable evidence about relevant markets to establish

“the effect of the [challenged] use upon the potential market

for or value of the copyrighted work.” Campbell v.

Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590–94 & n.20 (1994). 

Another key example is found in the Digital Millenium

Copyright Act, also referred to as the DMCA, 17 U.S.C.

§ 512. The DMCA’s safe harbor provisions exempt Internet

service providers from copyright liability under discrete

statutory provisions; proponents who seek the safe harbor

bear “the burden of establishing that [they] meet[] the

statutory requirements.” Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v.

Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1039 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Balvage v.

Ryderwood Improvement & Serv. Ass’n, Inc., 642 F.3d 765,

776 (9th Cir. 2011)).

The rule is no different for the first sale defense. Under

§ 109(a), the party asserting the first sale defense bears the

initial burden of satisfying the statutory requirements. Thus,

that party must show ownership through lawful acquisition.

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ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON 15

What does this mean in practical terms? In the context of

a summary judgment motion in a software case, it simply

means that the party asserting a first sale defense must come

forward with evidence sufficient for a jury to find lawful

acquisition of title, through purchase or otherwise, to genuine

copies of the copyrighted software. To the extent that the

copyright holder claims that the alleged infringer could not

acquire title or ownership because the software was never

sold, only licensed, the burden shifts back to the copyright

holder to establish such a license or the absence of a sale.

This burden-shifting construct makes sense. The

copyright holder is in a superior position to produce

documentation of any license and, without the burden shift,

the first sale defense would require a proponent to prove a

negative, i.e., that the software was not licensed. See 3

Nimmer § 12.11(E) (“It is submitted that in a civil action . . .

the burden of proving the absence of a first sale should be on

the plaintiff . . . . [T]he result . . . appears justified in that it

involves ‘a matter uniquely within the knowledge of the

plaintiff.’” (citing Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F.

Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ill. 1975))).

This approach accords with the legislative history and

with our general precedent that fairness dictates that a litigant

ought not have the burden of proof with respect to facts

particularly within the knowledge of the opposing party. Just

as it would be unfair for a copyright holder to be burdened

with proving that a downstream holder of a copy did not

acquire the copy lawfully, so too it would be unfair to impose

the burden of proving the lack of a sale on the proponent of

the first sale defense. As the House Report acknowledges, it

is an “established legal principle that the burden of proof

should not be placed upon a litigant to establish facts

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16 ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON

particularly within the knowledge of his adversary.” H.R.

Rep. 94-1476, at 81; see United States v. N.Y., New Haven &

Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 (1957) (“The

ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not

place the burden upon a litigant of establishing facts

peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary.”);

2 McCormick on Evid. § 337 (7th ed.) (2013) (“A doctrine

often repeated by the courts is that where the facts with

regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party,

that party has the burden of proving the issue.”). Finally, we

note that a downstream possessor, who may be many times

removed from any initial claimed license, is hardly in a

position to prove either a negative—the absence of a

license—or the unknown—the terms of the multiple transfers

of the software.

With this framework in mind, we turn to the specifics of

this case. As the district court held, it was uncontroverted

that Christenson “lawfully purchased genuine copies of

Adobe software from third-party suppliers before reselling

those copies.” Christenson offered invoices to document his

purchases of legitimate Adobe software from various

suppliers. Nothing on those invoices suggests that he was

other than a legitimate purchaser of the software. According

to Christenson’s sworn statement, “[n]either [he] nor SSI

have a contract with any of the suppliers that supplied SSI

with software. . . . SSI asked them if they could supply SSI

with a product at an acceptable price, and if they could,

payment was negotiated.” This claim is consistent with

Christenson’s inability to produce something more than

invoices from his suppliers: He cannot produce records that

do not exist. Christenson discharged his burden with respect

to the first sale defense.

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ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON 17

Adobe, of course, argues that Christenson could not have

legitimately purchased the software because Adobe always

licenses, and does not sell, copies of its software. On this

point, the burden shifts back to Adobe to prove the existence

and terms of a license. In an ordinary case, Adobe would

produce specific license agreements and we would

benchmark those agreements against the Vernor factors to

determine whether there was a legitimate license at the outset,

as well as whether downstream customers were “bound by a

restrictive license agreement” such that they are “not entitled

to the first sale doctrine.” Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1113.

Asking Adobe to produce the license agreements, which

would include any terms or restrictions, is not a difficult

burden—Adobe is the original source of the software, claims

to control distribution of the software, and holds the

copyrights to the software. As Adobe noted in the district

court: “Adobe and Adobe alone knows the parties with whom

it contracts.” That categorical statement says it all—the

license/ contract information is uniquely within Adobe’s

knowledge.

Adobe’s problem is that it did not produce those licenses

or document the terms of contracts with specific parties. 

Because of the state of discovery at the time of the summary

judgment motions, the district court excluded virtually all of

Adobe’s late-offered evidence of licenses. Adobe challenges

this ruling in its appeal. The district court and magistrate

judge had a long history with the parties and their discovery

efforts. After a careful examination of the rather tortured

discovery process, we conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in granting Christenson’s motion to strike

and excluding evidence purporting to document the licenses. 

See Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2014)

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18 ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON

(“Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.”);

El Pollo Loco, Inc. v. Hashim, 316 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir.

2003) (“We review the district court’s ruling on a motion to

strike for an abuse of discretion.”).

Adobe’s effort to substitute general testimony and generic

licensing templates in lieu of the actual licensing agreements

does not withstand scrutiny under Vernor. Under Vernor, the

precise terms of any agreement matter as to whether it is an

agreement to license or to sell; the title of the agreement is

not dispositive. And here, in the end, there is no admissible

evidence that Adobe “significantly restrict[ed] the user’s

ability to transfer the software” at issue here. Vernor,

621 F.3d at 1111. We thus affirm the district court’s order

granting summary judgment in favor of Christenson and

against Adobe on the copyright claim.5

II. TRADEMARK CLAIM

Adobe’s primary problem on the trademark claim is that

it confuses the claim that it made—trademark

infringement—with the claim it wishes it had made—unfair

competition, or false advertising. Although in summary

judgment pleadings Adobe belatedly cast its infringement

claim as one for false advertising under § 43(a) of the

Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 441, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, the

district court rejected the argument because Adobe failed to

plead such a false advertising claim in its complaint. The

5 Adobe also originally argued that the first sale defense does not apply

to copies made abroad. This distinction is no longer relevant because the

Supreme Court has since held that the first sale doctrine applies with equal

force to goods made and sold abroad. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &

Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1358 (2013).

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ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON 19

district court properly analyzed this claim under the

nominative fair use defense to a trademark infringement

claim instead of under the unfair competition rubric.

To prove trademark infringement, “a trademark holder

must show that the defendant’s use of its trademark ‘is likely

to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.’” 

Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand

Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)). The “core element of trademark

infringement” is “[p]rotecting against a likelihood of

confusion,” which helps to “ensur[e] that owners of

trademarks can benefit from the goodwill associated with

their marks” and “that consumers can distinguish among

competing producers.” Id. (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns v.

W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999);

Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901

(9th Cir. 2002)).

We have long recognized that nominative fair use is a

defense to a trademark claim. See New Kids on the Block v.

News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306–08 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The doctrine protects a defendant “where the use of the

trademark does not attempt to capitalize on consumer

confusion or to appropriate the cachet of one product for a

different one.” Id. at 308. The defense may be invoked

“where a defendant uses the mark to refer to the trademarked

good itself.” Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari,

610 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010). This principle

recognizes the proposition that “[t]rademark law generally

does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark

even though such sale is without the mark owner’s consent.” 

Am. Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Oregon Breakers Inc., 406 F.3d

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20 ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON

577, 585 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit

Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1510 (9th Cir. 1987)).

In a nominative fair use case, the concern is avoiding

confusion over whether the speaker is endorsed or sponsored

by the trademark holder. To that end, the Toyota test replaces

the usual Sleekcraft test as the proper measure of consumer

confusion when a defendant uses the mark to refer to the

trademarked good itself. Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at

1182 (citing Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139,

1151 (9th Cir. 2002)); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d

341 (9th Cir. 1979). Under the Toyota test, we ask “whether

(1) the product was ‘readily identifiable’ without use of the

mark; (2) defendant used more of the mark than necessary; or

(3) defendant falsely suggested he was sponsored or endorsed

by the trademark holder.” Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at

1175–76 (quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d

796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Rather than argue the Toyota factors, Adobe presses the

argument that Christenson engaged in a “bait and switch”

tactic of selling Adobe products licensed as academic or

OEM products by describing them as “full” or “retail”

versions, misleading consumers as to which version they

would receive. Here lies the confusion: this theory maps to

a claim for false advertising or unfair competition under § 43

of the Lanham Act, not trademark infringement under

15 U.S.C. § 1114. Adobe does not argue that the marks did

not truthfully label genuine Adobe products as such. Nor

does it assert that “Adobe Acrobat Pro” and the same product

when under an academic or OEM license, correspond to

different marks than Christenson used on the Software

Surplus website, to render Christenson’s use untruthful. 

Adobe’s major gripe was with the sales themselves, which it

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ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. V. CHRISTENSON 21

attacked via its copyright claim. The bottom line is that

Christenson’s nominal use of the marks was to identify the

products themselves and not to “inspire a mistaken belief on

the part of consumers that the speaker is sponsored or

endorsed by the trademark holder.” Toyota Motor Sales,

610 F.3d at 1176. We therefore affirm as to this claim.

AFFIRMED.

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