Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01156/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01156-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shirdena M. Twymon
Appellant
Wells Fargo & Company
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1156

___________

Shirdena M. Twymon, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Wells Fargo & Company, doing *

business as Wells Fargo Home *

Mortgage, Inc., *

*

Defendant-Appellee. *

*

___________

Submitted: June 15, 2006

 Filed: September 12, 2006

___________

Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Shirdena M. Twymon appeals from the district court’s1

 grant of summary

judgment in favor of Wells Fargo & Company, doing business as Wells Fargo Home

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As in many employment discrimination cases, there are a number of factual

disputes. Wells Fargo denies many of the incidents alleged and statements attributed

to Wells Fargo employees. However, since this comes to us on a grant of summary

judgment, we assume the truth of the plaintiff’s properly supported allegations for

purposes of our analysis. “We review ‘the record in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party,’” Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 413 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Gilmore v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2003)),“drawing all

reasonable inferences, without resort to speculation, in favor of the non-moving

party.” Johnson v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 424 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2005). 

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Mortgage, Inc., (Wells Fargo) on her race-based employment discrimination and

retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e

to 2000e-17, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, Iowa Code ch. 216. We affirm.

I. Background2

Wells Fargo recruited and hired Twymon, an African-American, in July 2000

as the Director of Organizational Performance Reporting & Measurement in West Des

Moines, Iowa. Twymon’s duties at Wells Fargo included responsibility for the

performance management system, employee development consulting, statistical

measures, and all activities related to organizational performance and organizational

change. Twymon was initially supervised by Laura Gillund, Senior Vice President

of Human Resources, whose office was in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Janel Cerwick,

a human resources professional based in West Des Moines, later assumed supervisory

responsibilities over Twymon. On November 30, 2001, Wells Fargo fired Twymon,

citing violation of Wells Fargo’s Electronic Communication Use System Policy

(computer policy) as the reason for termination. Twymon alleges racial animus and

retaliation were the real reasons for her termination.

Twymon’s alleged violation of Wells Fargo’s computer policy came to the

attention of Cerwick in November 2001. An employee informed Cerwick that

Twymon was using her work computer to assist a co-worker with his master’s thesis

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and complained, generally, about Twymon’s excessive personal computer and Internet

use. Wells Fargo’s computer policy states that “[a]ll company electronic

communication systems and/or equipment are the company’s property [and are] to be

used to facilitate the business of the company.” The policy prohibits “[e]xcessive or

inappropriate personal use of the company’s electronic communication systems and/or

equipment” and warns violations of the policy “may subject [an employee] to

corrective action, which may include termination of employment.” The policy also

prohibits “viewing, storing, downloading, or forwarding pornographic images or other

perceived obscene, racist, or harassing materials” and “sending electronic mail that is

obscene, racist, harassing, violent, or otherwise offensive.” 

On November 20, 2001, as a result of the employee complaint, Cerwick

requested an audit of Twymon’s computer hard drive and began investigating her

Internet and e-mail usage. On November 26, 2001, Cerwick received the initial results

of the audit, which showed that Twymon had visited hundreds of non-work-related

Internet sites. Some time later (the record is unclear as to when), Twymon’s computer

hard drive was found to contain images of nude and partially nude males, as well as

close-up views of male genitalia. In addition, Twymon was found to have received

an inappropriate image via her work e-mail and to have forwarded the e-mail to her

personal e-mail account. Wells Fargo deemed Twymon’s alleged actions to be in

gross violation of the computer policy and terminated Twymon’s employment on

November 30, 2001. 

Twymon denies she violated the Wells Fargo computer policy and alleges that

her dismissal was, instead, motivated by racial animus and in retaliation for

complaints she made about racial discrimination. As for her alleged violation of the

computer policy, Twymon admits to some personal use of the Internet, but denies

accessing the vast majority of hundreds of sites she reportedly visited. As a rationale

as to why the audit, which documented Web traffic from the unique IP address

registered to Twymon’s computer, revealed such usage, Twymon claims that any

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employee with a swipe card could have accessed her computer. Wells Fargo contests

this claim, noting the Wells Fargo computer system requires each employee to log on

using a unique user name, confidential password, and assigned IP address, a procedure

Twymon acknowledges. 

Although she denies much of the personal Internet use attributed to her,

Twymon claims she had permission from Gillund to use her work computer for

personal use as Twymon’s personal computer was damaged during her relocation to

the Des Moines area. Gillund acknowledges giving Twymon permission for “limited

personal use” of her work computer as a “temporary accommodation” after her

difficult move, but states that after issues related to Twymon’s move were resolved,

Twymon did not ask for permission for continued personal use. Gillund asserts

Twymon received notice regarding the computer policy at least twice during her time

with Wells Fargo and signed an acknowledgment indicating she read and understood

the policy. Twymon also complains that white employees used their work computers

for personal reasons during work hours without any consequences. There is no

evidence in the record about the computer habits of other employees, and Wells Fargo

states it consistently administers corrective action for violations of the computer

policy.

Twymon does not deny her computer hard drive contained photographs of

naked men and other inappropriate material, but she denies responsibility for the

images. She claims she received two inappropriate e-mails from another Wells Fargo

employee and complained to Phil Hall, Director of Employee Relations and an

African-American, about the communications and images. 

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The district court correctly noted the evidence submitted by Twymon in

support of her claims included inadmissable hearsay. Because we cannot consider

inadmissible evidence in rendering our opinion, Twymon’s factual allegations

supported only by inadmissible hearsay evidence are largely excluded from the

recitation of facts. See Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 723 (8th Cir. 2003)

(stating “[t]here are limits on what kinds of evidence a judge may consider in

reviewing a motion for summary judgment, and inadmissible evidence . . . cannot be

used to defeat such a motion” and therefore ignoring such evidence).

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Twymon alleges her experience at Wells Fargo prior to her alleged misuse of

the computer system demonstrates she was subject to racial discrimination and

retaliation and not actually terminated for computer policy violations.3

 

Twymon was recruited for the Wells Fargo position by an independent

executive recruiter. Twymon’s recruiting process included a series of interviews, one

directly with Gillund. Although Twymon acknowledges that Gillund was “cordial and

professional” during her recruitment, Twymon perceived Gillund as “unsupportive,

disinterested, distant, [and] cold” from the beginning of her employment. Twymon

believed Gillund had not wanted her hired. Twymon claims Gillund did not provide

Twymon with the mentorship or guidance that Gillund provided to her white

subordinates. Twymon does not provide any specific examples of white employees

receiving mentoring from Gillund, but states that Barb Rodriguez, a white employee

who worked in Minneapolis, received more attention from Gillund, and Twymon

notes she perceived a “marked difference” between how Rodriguez’s work and her

own were facilitated by Gillund. 

As Twymon’s employment continued she felt that Gillund favored her white

employees. She alleges a double standard existed for white and non-white employees.

For example, Twymon alleges that Gillund allowed Caucasian employees, including

Rodriguez, to work flexible hours. In contrast, Twymon states she was generally

denied the opportunity for a flexible schedule, although she was permitted to

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telecommute for a week when her mother was ill. Gillund denies Rodriquez worked

flexible hours. Nothing in the record reflects the work hours of other employees. 

Twymon recalls other incidents she claims demonstrate Gillund’s favoritism

towards white employees. For example, Twymon alleges Gillund made disparaging

remarks about an employee of Polynesian descent. Twymon also recounts an incident

where a human resources manager of unknown race allegedly yelled at her. Twymon

states she responded by telling the manager she did not wish to be treated in that

manner, and Gillund reprimanded Twymon for her response. Gillund allegedly told

Twymon, “you don’t know your place.” In contrast, Twymon alleges that a white

employee yelled and spoke disrespectfully to Gillund in a meeting and received no

reprimand. 

Twymon also complains generally of “rude, condescending, [and] unpleasant”

treatment by her co-workers, but does not cite any specific examples. She notes that

she reported the boorish behavior to Gillund, who Twymon claims responded by

instructing her to learn how to deal with temperamental people. Twymon alleges that

she was consistently directed “to be accommodating and nice,” while, in contrast, her

white colleagues were consistently allowed to behave badly. 

Twymon alleges that some of her co-workers did not approve of her dating

white men and so they embarked upon a “campaign” to find her a suitable – meaning

black – man. Twymon claims she informed Gillund of these efforts, but that Gillund

stated she didn’t see any problem. Twymon also alleges that Gillund reprimanded her

for being rude when Twymon corrected a white co-worker’s pronunciation of her

name, but that when a white co-worker corrected Twymon when Twymon

mispronounced a name, no such reproach was given. 

Twymon also claims that Hall and Cerwick made discriminatory statements to

her. Twymon alleges that, at some point – no exact date is given – Hall explained to

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her that “intelligence and outspokenness in black employees is not welcomed” and

that “qualities that would make a Caucasian a golden child, being aggressive and

intelligent and outspoken and a go-getter, would do exactly the reverse to a person of

color.” Twymon alleges that Hall advised her to develop a deferential persona, as “a

good black” that “would be accepted by the Caucasians at Wells Fargo,” in addition

to the person who she really was (“an intelligent, outspoken, professional black

female”). Twymon alleges she responded by asking if she should “act[] like an Uncle

Tom” and states that Hall replied in the affirmative. Twymon claims she reported this

incident, either to people inside or outside of Wells Fargo, but she does not state when

or to whom such a report was made. 

Twymon alleges Cerwick said she was not “Midwest nice,” a phrase she also

attributes to Gillund. Twymon further alleges that Cerwick treated her differently than

white employees. Twymon recounts an instance where she was reprimanded for

making a decision contrary to the views of her Caucasian co-workers. 

 

During her tenure at Wells Fargo, Twymon was subject to performance

evaluations. In February 2001, Twymon received her first performance appraisal.

Overall, Twymon was positively rated, but the appraisal noted areas in which

Twymon fell short. Gillund commented on Twymon’s errors on a recent project, her

need to improve her ability to define process timeliness, and her need to improve on

following projects through to completion. Twymon alleges that an earlier version of

the appraisal included inappropriate references to her values and her personal behavior

and that Gillund admitted she did not include such comments on white employees’

evaluations. Gillund denies this accusation; the record does not include this alleged

draft of the review. Gillund contends she continued to express concerns about

Twymon’s work throughout the year. 

In September 2001, Twymon participated in a conference call that included

Brad Blackwell, Vice President of Pacific Markets in California. During the

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conference call, Blackwell discussed recruiting more minority home mortgage

consultants in California. During this discussion, Blackwell admittedly made a

statement to the effect, “We can’t send white guys into east L.A. to sell mortgages to

these people. You’ve got to send one of their own kind.” Twymon viewed these

comments as disparaging towards blacks and Hispanics. Twymon states she

responded by informing Blackwell she was a member of the group he was discussing

and that she was offended. Twymon felt Blackwell then reacted in a defensive and

angry manner, so she left the conference call and returned with Hall, who she hoped

would mediate the conflict. After the conference call, Hall investigated the incident.

He determined that Blackwell did not behave inappropriately, while Twymon’s

behavior was inappropriate. 

Twymon also complained to Gillund about the conference call. Twymon

alleges that Gillund reprimanded her for her behavior on the Blackwell conference call

and demanded Twymon apologize. Twymon further asserts that Gillund stated that

part of Twymon’s job included assisting white Wells Fargo employees in

understanding black people. 

Twymon’s mid-year performance review commenced in October 2001. Gillund

noted positive aspects of Twymon’s performance in the review, but listed facets that

needed improvement and characterized Twymon as “below expectations” in some

areas. In particular, Gillund recounted that various human resources personnel had

provided disconcerting feedback regarding Twymon’s behavior, including her

behavior during the Blackwell conference call. Gillund noted Twymon should work

on defining deadlines and following through on projects. Twymon was specifically

asked to ensure attendance and timeliness at meetings. And, the report instructed

Twymon not to take work issues or discussions personally. 

On November 6, 2001, Twymon, Gillund, and Cerwick met to discuss

Twymon’s performance. Gillund allegedly expressed continuing concerns about

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Twymon’s performance. Wells Fargo provided Twymon with the option of continuing

her employment with a Performance Improvement Plan or separating from Wells

Fargo under terms provided in a Departure Agreement. Twymon alleges that she

asked Gillund if she was attempting to get rid of Twymon, and Gillund responded in

the affirmative. 

Twymon declined to resign and sign the Departure Agreement and instead

entered into a Performance Improvement Plan. The Performance Improvement Plan

was revised a number of times. Twymon alleges the revisions were made to make it

more difficult for her to meet requirements; Gillund and Cerwick claim the changes

were made at Twymon’s request to clarify the document. The Performance

Improvement Plan did not change Twymon’s job responsibilities or reduce her

compensation. The Plan made it clear that Twymon could be terminated if she failed

to make satisfactory progress on the goals outlined in the Performance Improvement

Plan. 

Cerwick was informed of Twymon’s alleged computer abuse while Twymon

was working under the Performance Improvement Plan. Twymon was terminated for

violating the computer policy on November 30, 2001. Following Tywmon’s

termination, a white male was hired to perform some of her duties, while the

remainder of her job responsibilities were distributed to existing Wells Fargo

employees. 

Some months after her termination, Twymon contacted Hall and asked him to

review her termination. Twymon told Hall she believed she was wrongfully

terminated because she complained about racist behavior at Wells Fargo. Hall

forwarded Twymon’s request to George Innus, a member of Wells Fargo’s Employee

Relations Group. Innus investigated Twymon’s termination and concluded that

Twymon was not terminated on the basis of her race. He sent Twymon a letter

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reiterating that her termination was based upon her excessive and inappropriate use

of the Internet and e-mail, as explained to her at the time of her termination. 

Twymon filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission and the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. Both agencies

notified Twymon of her right to sue, and Twymon filed suit alleging that her

termination was a result of racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal

and state law.

The district court granted Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment. The

district court reasoned that Twymon failed to establish either direct evidence of race

discrimination or a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and, even if she had

provided evidence supporting an inference of discrimination, Wells Fargo produced

a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination that Twymon did not

demonstrate to be pretextual. Likewise, the district court held that Twymon failed to

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, and, even if she had, Twymon failed to

show that Wells Fargo’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory grounds for her

termination were, in fact, a pretext. 

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Canady v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 440 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is

appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

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As the district court noted, federal interpretation of Title VII guides the

application of the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965. Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc.,

672 N.W.2d 800, 803 (Iowa 2003). Thus, our analysis regarding Twymon’s Title VII

claims addresses the claims brought under Iowa law, and a separate discussion is

unnecessary. 

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III. Discussion

A. Racial Discrimination

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) makes it an unlawful

employment practice for an employer to “discharge any individual . . . because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

The Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 likewise prohibits race-based employment

discrimination. Iowa Code ch. 216.4

 A plaintiff may establish a violation of Title

VII’s prohibition against race-based termination through either direct or indirect

evidence. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270-79 (1989) (O’Connor,

J., concurring). Twymon asserts she presented sufficient evidence of both kinds to

avoid summary judgment. We disagree. 

1. Direct Evidence

Twymon first contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment

on her employment discrimination claim primarily because statements made by

Gillund and Hall constitute direct evidence of unlawful racial discrimination. We

disagree. Direct evidence is evidence that establishes “a specific link between the

[alleged] discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a

finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the

employer’s decision.” Putman v. Unity Health Sys., 348 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir.

2003) (quotations omitted) (alteration in original). “‘[D]irect evidence’ does not

include ‘stray remarks in the workplace,’ ‘statements by nondecisionmakers,’ or

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5

We note these phrases are materially different from the historically racially

disparaging but facially-neutral term “boy” recently deemed potentially probative of

racial animus in Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1195, 1197 (2006). 

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‘statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself.’” Browning

v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277). 

First, many of the statements Twymon attributes to Gillund and proffers as

direct evidence of discrimination are, in fact, facially race-neutral. Facially raceneutral statements, without more, do not demonstrate racial animus on the part of the

speaker. See Putman, 348 F.3d at 735 (noting that statements that plaintiff was not

“humble enough” and was “too prideful” were facially race-neutral and were not

direct evidence of discrimination). Twymon asks this court to extrapolate racial

animus from statements such as “you don’t know your place” and “Midwest nice,”

without providing any factual support or context for such speculation.5

 While we are

required to make all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party in

considering summary judgment, we do so without resort to speculation. See Hitt v.

Harsco Corp., 356 F.3d 920, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Second, while both Gillund and Hall were involved in the decision to terminate

Twymon, none of the statements Twymon attributes to them were related to the

decisional process itself. Hall’s alleged “Uncle Tom” statements, while racially

offensive and misguided, were apparently made in the context of attempting to

preserve and promote Twymon’s career at Wells Fargo, not in relation to deciding to

terminate Twymon. Similarly, none of the statements Twymon attributes to Gillund

were made during the decisional process accompanying Wells Fargo’s termination of

Twymon. These remarks were stray comments, despite the fact that they were made

by decisionmakers. See Saulsberry v. St. Mary’s Univ. of Minn., 318 F.3d 862, 867-

68 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that “an isolated, stray comment unrelated to the decisional

process” is not direct evidence of discrimination, even if made by a decisionmaker).

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In addition to her claims about the comments by Gillund and Hall, Twymon

raises additional arguments in support of her claim of direct evidence of

discrimination. None of these arguments have merit and are therefore not addressed

here. Thus, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Twymon failed to

produce direct evidence of racial discrimination.

2. Indirect Evidence of Discrimination

In the alternative, Twymon contends the district court erred in granting

summary judgment on her employment discrimination claim because she presented

indirect evidence of unlawful racial discrimination. We disagree. We apply the

framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03

(1973), to assess Twymon’s claim based upon indirect evidence of discrimination.

“Under this framework, a Title VII plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a

prima facie case of discrimination.” Elmahdi v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 339 F.3d

645, 656 (8th Cir. 2003). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that:

(1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting the employer’s

legitimate job expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)

similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently.

Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 413 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2005). If a prima facie case is

established, a “burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing the plaintiff.” Johnson v. Ready

Mixed Concrete Co., 424 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2005). If the employer makes such

a showing, the plaintiff must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence

that the stated non-discriminatory rationale was a mere pretext for discrimination. St.

Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-16 (1993). 

We assume, without deciding, that Twymon established a prima facie case of

discrimination. However, we agree with the district court that Wells Fargo articulated

a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for Twymon’s termination: gross violation

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6

While the record is unclear as to when the objectionable images were found on

Twymon's hard drive, the evidence that was unquestionably available at the time of

her dismissal provided sufficient grounds for the conclusion that Twymon violated

Wells Fargo's computer policy. 

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of the company’s computer policy. We have consistently held that violating a

company policy is a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for terminating an

employee. See, e.g., Putman, 348 F.3d at 736. Wells Fargo offered evidence that

Twymon violated its computer policy, which forbids excessive personal use of the

Internet and e-mail, as well as the receipt, storage, or dissemination of obscene

materials. “This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no

credibility assessment.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,

142 (2000) (quotation omitted). The evidence proffered, including a log of websites

accessed from Twymon’s assigned IP address and images of nude and partially-nude

males recovered from her computer hard drive,6

 establishes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Twymon’s termination. 

Our consideration, then, is whether Twymon proved by a preponderance of the

evidence that the stated reason for her termination was pretext. To prove pretext, a

plaintiff must both discredit an employer’s asserted reason for termination and show

that the circumstances permit drawing the reasonable inference that the real reason for

terminating the plaintiff was her race. Johnson v. AT&T Corp., 422 F.3d 756, 763

(8th Cir. 2005). After a careful review of the record, we conclude that Twymon did

not meet her burden.

Twymon failed to produce admissible evidence debunking the asserted rationale

for her termination. Twymon attacks the stated reason for her firing with

unsubstantiated speculation that someone else could have accessed her computer. She

puts forth no evidence regarding this assertion and, in fact, acknowledges the

protocols in place to identify individual computer users on the Wells Fargo system.

Further, even if we were to consider Twymon’s bare assertion that someone else could

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have accessed her computer, Twymon still would have to demonstrate that Wells

Fargo terminated her improperly. A proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for termination need not, in the end, be correct if the employer honestly believed the

asserted grounds at the time of the termination. See id. at 762 (explaining that the

consideration in evaluating pretext is whether the employer honestly believed the

employee violated the company's code of conduct, not whether the employer was

factually correct in its conclusion). Twymon does not assert that Wells Fargo did not

honestly believe she was accountable for violations of the computer policy when they

fired her for those violations. Cf. Mershon v. St. Louis Univ., 422 F.3d 1069, 1074-75

(8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that, even assuming the underlying reason for the adverse

action was false, the plaintiff failed in rebutting the proffered non-discriminatory

reason because he presented no evidence from which to conclude the defendant knew

or even suspected its falsity). As such, her assertion of possible access to her

computer by other employees does nothing to support her claim of pretext.

Twymon also failed to offer evidence raising an inference that her termination

was truly racially motivated. Contrasting the treatment of similarly situated

employees outside of the protected class with the employee’s treatment is one way to

point towards a race-based motivation. See Putman, 348 F.3d at 736 (“A common

way of proving pretext is to show that similarly situated employees were more

favorably treated.”). In this context, similarly situated employees would be those who

also violated Wells Fargo’s computer policy. Twymon failed to offer any admissible

evidence regarding Wells Fargo’s treatment of such employees. Further, none of the

other evidence submitted in support of her claim of racial discrimination is sufficient

to raise an inference of a discriminatory motive in her dismissal. 

After a careful review of the record, we conclude that Twymon cannot

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Wells Fargo’s asserted nondiscriminatory rationale for her termination is pretext. Accordingly, the district

court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed. 

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B. Retaliation

Title VII also makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an

employee “because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment

practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Twymon claims she was the

victim of discriminatory retaliation after she complained about comments she

perceived to be racially derogatory made during the September 2001 conference call

with Brad Blackwell. She contends the district court erred in granting summary

judgment on her retaliation claim. We disagree. 

When no direct evidence of discriminatory retaliation is asserted, as is the case

at hand, the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies. Kasper v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co.,

425 F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 2005). First, the plaintiff must put forth a prima facie case

of retaliation. Eliserio v. United Steelworkers of Am. Local 310, 398 F.3d 1071, 1078

(8th Cir. 2005). “To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination, a

plaintiff must show: (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) an adverse

employment action occurred; and (3) a causal connection existed between

participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Buettner

v. Arch Coal Sales Co., 216 F.3d 707, 713-14 (8th Cir. 2000). Second, if the plaintiff

puts forth a prima facie case, the employer may rebut the resulting presumption of

discrimination by articulating a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse

employment action. Eliserio, 398 F.3d at 1078. Finally, if the employer proffers a

race-neutral rationale, the plaintiff may attempt to refute the asserted reason as mere

pretext. Id. 

Our analysis of Twymon’s retaliation claim mirrors that of our consideration

of her racial discrimination claim. We assume, without deciding, that Twymon

established a prima facie case of retaliation. Again we note that Wells Fargo produced

a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for her termination. And we conclude, for

the reasons articulated above, that Twymon failed to demonstrate the asserted

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rationale was pretext for retaliation. As such, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment as to Twymon’s retaliation claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

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Appellate Case: 06-1156 Page: 17 Date Filed: 09/12/2006 Entry ID: 2088215