Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03258/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03258-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sgt. Brown
Appellee
Dan Coody
Appellee
Fayetteville City Police Department
Appellee
Tim Helder
Appellee
Rick Hoyt
Appellee
Darren Moss
Appellee
Maurice Sanders
Appellant
Lori Shue
Appellee
Capt. Tabor
Appellee
Chris W. Weber
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3258

___________

Maurice Sanders, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Fayetteville City Police Department; *

Capt. Tabor; Tim Helder, Assistance * [UNPUBLISHED]

Chief of Police; Darren Moss, *

Patrolman; Chris W. Weber, Patrolman; *

Sgt. Brown; Dan Coody, Mayor, *

Fayetteville, Arkansas; Rick Hoyt; *

Lori Shue, Prosecutor Coordinator, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: December 8, 2005

Filed: December 13, 2005

___________

Before ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Arkansas inmate Maurice Sanders brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for

damages and other relief against the Fayetteville Police Department (FPD), its Chief

of Police, its Assistant Chief of Police, Officers Darren Moss and Chris Weber,

Sergeant Brown, Captain Tabor, the Mayor of Fayetteville, and Lori Shue, a

Appellate Case: 04-3258 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/13/2005 Entry ID: 1985245
1

The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Western District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the

Honorable Beverly Stites Jones, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western

District of Arkansas. 

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prosecutor. Mr. Sanders’s claims arise from his two arrests in 2002. The district

court1

 dismissed all of the claims prior to service except Mr. Sanders’s claims against

Sergeant Brown, and dismissed those claims without prejudice after the United States

Marshals Service was unable to locate and serve him. We affirm the district court’s

orders.

Specifically, the district court correctly concluded that Mr. Sanders could not

maintain his claims against the FPD, because it is not capable of being sued;

Ms. Shue, because of prosecutorial immunity; the Chief and Assistant Chief of Police,

and the Mayor of Fayetteville, because Mr. Sanders sought to hold them liable based

solely on their general supervisory responsibilities; and Captain Tabor, because his

purportedly inadequate investigation of Mr. Sanders’s treatment during his arrest and

detention did not deprive Mr. Sanders of “any rights, privileges, or immunities”

giving rise to a claim under section 1983. 

Further, the dismissal of Sergeant Brown was compelled by the Marshals’

inability to locate and serve him. The dismissal of Mr. Sanders’s claim that Officer

Weber threw his tools into the bed of his truck was also proper, because Mr. Sanders

did not allege any resulting loss. As to Mr. Sanders’s claim that he was improperly

denied a blood alcohol test and a breath test, the police have no constitutional duty

to provide such tests, see Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59 (1988), and we

also find no abuse of discretion in the court’s refusal to entertain Mr. Sanders’s

request for injunctive relief as to his then-pending state criminal proceedings, see

Norwood v. Dickey, 409 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (under abstention doctrine of

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts abstain from hearing cases

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involving ongoing state judicial proceeding that implicates important state interests

and affords adequate opportunity to raise federal questions). 

Finally, Mr. Sanders’s remaining claims that Officer Moss misrepresented the

working condition of his seat belts, and that Mr. Sanders’s first arrest resulted from

a racially motivated stop without reasonable suspicion, are barred by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law,

411 F.3d 427, 451-52 (3d Cir. 2005) (stop based solely on pattern and practice of

racial profiling, without any reasonable suspicion, is unlawful and evidence

discovered excludable, and thus implies conviction was improper, triggering Heck

bar); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (allegations

that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and brought unfounded criminal

charges challenge validity of conviction and are Heck-barred).

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We also deny the pending

motions on appeal.

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