Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-01117/USCOURTS-caDC-08-01117-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Communications Commission
Respondent
National Association of Broadcasters
Petitioner
Prometheus Radio Project
Intervenor for Respondent
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Federal

Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of any

formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to

press. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 16, 2009 Decided June 5, 2009

No. 08-1117

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENTS

PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of an Order 

of the Federal Communications Commission

Jack N. Goodman argued the cause for petitioner. With him

on the briefs were Samir C. Jain, Dileep S. Srihari, Marsha J.

MacBride, Jane E. Mago, Jerianne Timmerman, and Ann West

Bobeck.

USCA Case #08-1117 Document #1183997 Filed: 06/05/2009 Page 1 of 18
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C. Grey Pash, Jr., Counsel, Federal Communications

Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the

brief were Matthew L. Berry, General Counsel, and Jacob M.

Lewis and Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General Counsel.

Nickolai G. Levin, Robert B. Nicholson, and Robert J. Wiggers,

Attorneys, entered appearances.

Andrew J. Schwartzman and Parul P. Desai were on the

brief for intervenor in support of respondent.

Before: ROGERS, GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: As part of its continuing effort to

promote low power FM (“LPFM”) radio service, the Federal

Communications Commission in 2007 amended its LPFM rules,

including announcing standards for waivers of certain

protections against interference with full-power FM stations.

Creation of a Low Power Radio Service, Third Report and

Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22

F.C.C. Rcd. 21,912 (Dec. 11, 2007) (“2007 Order”). In so

doing, the Commission purported not to harm the interests of

full-power FM stations or other Commission licensees. Id. at

21,913 ¶ 1. The National Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”)

petitions for review of three changes, each of which it contends

either reduced the protections afforded to full-power FM stations

against signal interference from LPFM stations or gave LPFM

stations primary status over full-power FM stations in particular

circumstances. In adopting these changes, the NAB contends,

the Commission violated the Radio Broadcasting Preservation

Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 632, 114 Stat. 2762,

2762A-111 (2000) (“the Preservation Act”), and the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (“APA”).

We hold that the Preservation Act did not bar the Commission

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1

 Because interference is a function of both placement on the

FM radio band and geographic distance, the geographic distance

separation requirements are strictest for radio stations on the same

channel (co-channels) and progressively weaker for stations that are

one (first-adjacent), two (second-adjacent), or three (third-adjacent)

channels apart. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.207. 

from reducing or eliminating interference protections other than

third-adjacent channel minimum distance separation

requirements, and that the NAB’s challenges under the APA are

either unripe or unpersuasive. Accordingly, we deny the

petition in part and dismiss it in part.

I.

In January 2000, the Commission adopted rules authorizing

LPFM radio service in order to “provide opportunities for new

voices to be heard.” See Creation of Low Power Radio Service,

Report and Order, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 2,205, 2,206 ¶ 1 (Jan. 27,

2000) (“2000 Order”). The LPFM stations were to be “operated

on a noncommercial educational basis,” id., with a maximum of

10 or 100 watts of power, compared to full-power stations that

operate with minimum power of 6,000 to 100,000 watts. To

prevent interference between LPFM stations and full-power

stations near each other on the FM dial, minimum distance

requirements were established for co-channel and first- and

second-adjacent channel LPFM stations but not for thirdadjacent channels. Id. at 2,206-07; see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.807

(2007).1

 The Commission found that third-adjacent channel

LPFM stations would not cause “significant new interference to

the service of existing FM stations,” and that “any small amount

of interference that may occur in individual cases would be

outweighed by the benefits of new low power FM stations.”

2000 Order at 2,246 ¶ 104. The Commission imposed minimum

distance requirements for second-adjacent channels because it

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concluded “that the risk of interference from LPFM signals . . .

may be somewhat higher” than the risk from third-adjacent

channels. Id. The Commission also required any LPFM station

causing actual interference to a subsequently authorized new or

modified full-power station to modify its facilities and to cease

operations if modifications could not prevent interference. Id.

at 2,231-32; see also 47 C.F.R § 73.809. On reconsideration it

established complaint and license modification procedures

designed to expedite the resolution of problems associated with

“any unexpected, significant 3rd adjacent channel interference

problems” caused by an LPFM station. Creation of Low Power

Radio Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order on

Reconsideration, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 19,208, 19,210 ¶ 4 (Sept. 28,

2000); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.810.

On December 21, 2000, Congress enacted the Preservation

Act, which did three things of relevance to this appeal.

Section 632(a)(1)(A) directed the Commission to amend the

LPFM rules to “prescribe minimum distance separations for

third-adjacent channels (as well as for co-channels and first- and

second-adjacent channels)” (emphasis added). Section

632(a)(2)(A) barred the Commission from “eliminat[ing] or

reduc[ing] the minimum distance separations for third-adjacent

channels required by paragraph (1)(A)” (emphasis added). And,

§ 632(b)(1) and (b)(2) required the Commission to engage an

independent testing entity to study whether harmful interference

would result if LPFM stations were not subject to third-adjacent

channel minimum distance separation requirements, and to file

a report with Congress. The Commission amended the LPFM

rules accordingly in 2001, Creation of a Low Power Radio

Service, Second Report and Order, 16 F.C.C. Rcd. 8,026 (Apr.

2, 2001), and forwarded the independent study to Congress in

2004, with a recommendation that Congress “modify the statute

to eliminate the third-adjacent channel distance separation

requirements for LPFM stations,” FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

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COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE LOW POWER

INTERFERENCE TESTING PROGRAM,PUB.L.NO.106-553(2004).

To date, Congress has not acted on that recommendation.

In December 2007, the Commission amended the LPFM

rules, pointing to “considerably” changed circumstances arising

from both “the January 2007 lifting of the freeze on the filing of

FM community of license modification proposals, and the

implementation of streamlined licensing procedures [that]

resulted in a one-time flurry of filing activity . . . .” 2007 Order

at 21,938 ¶ 63. The amendments were designed to minimize the

loss of LPFM stations and increase the number of LPFM

stations on the air without causing interference to existing fullpower service. The Commission explained that over the seven

years since it had established the LPFM service, the service had

“flourished for the most part,” but had also “encountered unique

obstacles.” Id. at 21,917 ¶ 10. Only approximately one third of

LPFM applications had been granted and although 809 stations

were operating at the time of the 2007 Order, 17 station licenses

and 95 construction permits had been cancelled due to

noncompliance with technical or procedural requirements. Id.

The NAB challenges three provisions of the amended rules,

the first two involving second-adjacent channel protections, the

third involving displacement protection for LPFM stations:

(1) The modification of the cease-operations requirement

in 47 C.F.R. § 73.809, where an LPFM station is causing

interference to a subsequently authorized new or modified

full-power FM station, to apply only to co-channels and

first-adjacent channels, not second-adjacent channels. Id.

at 21,938 ¶ 63.

(2) The interim standards for waiving minimum distance

requirements where a subsequently authorized new or

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modified full-power FM station would be short-spaced to

the LPFM station and thus cause the LPFM station to be

displaced where an alternate, fully-spaced and rulecompliant channel was unavailable to the LPFM station. Id.

at 21,939-40 ¶¶ 66-67.

(3) A rebuttable non-binding presumption favoring LPFM

stations deemed to be appropriate by the Commission

because “the public interest would be better served by a

waiver of the Commission Rule making LPFM stations

secondary to subsequently authorized full-[power FM]

stations and the dismissal of an ‘encroaching’ community

of license reallotment application when the threatened

LPFM station can demonstrate it has regularly provided at

least eight hours per day of locally originated

programming.” Id. at 21,940-41 ¶¶ 68-69.

The Commission invited comment on whether to codify the

second and third changes. Id. at 21,942-46.

II.

The NAB challenges the Commission’s statutory

interpretation and also raises objections under the APA. Upon

reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers,

the court applies the familiar two-step analysis of Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837

(1984). Under step one, where a statute “has directly spoken to

the precise question at issue,” id. at 842, the court and the

agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent

of Congress,” id. at 843. Under step two, when the statute is

silent or ambiguous regarding the specific question, the court

asks “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible

construction of the statute.” Id. Regarding the APA challenges,

the court will reverse only if the agency’s action is arbitrary or

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capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute. See FCC v. Fox

Television Stations, Inc., No. 07-582, slip op. at 9-12 (U.S. Apr.

28, 2009); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). We conclude that the NAB has

read into the Preservation Act words Congress did not enact and

that its efforts to avoid the plain text are unavailing, and further

that its APA challenges are unpersuasive or unripe.

A.

Section 632(a)(1)(A) of the Preservation Act requires the

Commission to “prescribe minimum distance separation for

third-adjacent channels (as well as for co-channels and first- and

second-adjacent channels).” By contrast, § 632(a)(2)(A) bars

the Commission from “eliminat[ing] or reduc[ing] the minimum

distance separations for third-adjacent channels required by

paragraph 1(A)” but makes no reference to other channels. The

cross-reference to § 632(a)(1)(A) is tied explicitly to “the

minimum distance separations for third-adjacent channels.” By

their clear text, § 632(a)(1) and (a)(2) are not opposite sides of

the same coin, requiring minimum distance separations for all

four categories and then banning elimination or reduction of

those. In § 632(a)(1)(A), Congress acknowledged the four

categories of minimum distance separations employed by the

Commission. In § 632(a)(2)(A), Congress restricted the

Commission’s authority to eliminate or reduce those separations

in only one category, third-adjacent channels. Under the general

presumption that an omission is intentional where Congress has

referred to something in one subsection but not in another,

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983); see also

Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452-54 (2002), the

fact that § 632(a)(1)(A) mentions all four categories but

§ 632(a)(2)(A) mentions only third-adjacent channels further

indicates that § 632(a)(2)(A) restricts the Commission’s

authority only with respect to that category. The NAB’s

reliance on the discussion of superfluity in statutory

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interpretation in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., No. 07-588,

slip op. at 8 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2009), and Corley v. United States,

No. 07-10441, slip. op. at 9-12 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2009), is misplaced.

Reading the Preservation Act in accord with its plain text does

not render § 632(a)(1)(A) superfluous because that provision

requires the Commission to establish third-adjacent channel

minimum distance separation requirements and acknowledges

that the Commission has already imposed minimum distance

requirements for the other channels. On the other hand, reading

§ 632(a)(1)(A) to prohibit the Commission from limiting

interference protections would render § 632(a)(2)(A) superfluous. The statute should be read in a manner that gives effect

to all of its provisions. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101

(2004).

The context in which Congress acted supports reading the

Preservation Act in a manner consistent with its plain text. The

NAB suggests “it would make no sense to conclude that

Congress meant to prohibit the [Commission] only from

eliminating third-adjacent protections, while leaving the

Commission free to reduce interference protections from

channels closer on the ‘dial’ that would cause even greater

interference.” Petr’s Br. at 21. However, as the Commission

points out, the “issue pressing Congress at the time” was the

absence of third-adjacent channel minimum distance separation

requirements. See Respt’s Br. at 24. Confirming that

§ 632(a)(2)(A) focused on the third-adjacent channel, Congress

directed the Commission in subsection (b) to engage an

independent testing entity to study third-adjacent channel

interference. Having prescribed a course of action for the

Commission with regard to the third-adjacent channel,

Congress’s silence in § 632(a)(2)(A) as to other channels

indicates no other restrictions were placed on the Commission’s

authority in regulating LPFM stations.

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The NAB’s evidence that Congress had a broader purpose

is, at best, of minimal persuasive force because “‘courts have no

authority to enforce [a] principl[e] gleaned solely from

legislative history that has no statutory reference point.’”

Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1994) (quoting

Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474, AFL-CIO v.

NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 ( D.C. Cir. 1987)) (emphasis deleted

and alterations made in Shannon). The NAB points to

statements in the House Commerce Committee Report, see H.R.

REP. NO. 106-567, at 8 (2000), and several statements by

Members on the House floor that the legislation was intended to

require the Commission to impose protections at least as strict

as were in existence on January 1, 2000. But the statutory text

is narrower. For example, the Report states that “LPFM stations

which are authorized under this section, but cause interference

to new or modified facilities of a full-power station, would be

required to modify their facilities or cease operations.” Id. No

such requirement appears in the Preservation Act, which does

not address signal interference protections other than minimum

distance separation. Likewise, the limitation referred to in

Congressman Tauzin’s statement that “the bill maintains

Congressional authority over any future changes made to the

interference protections that exist in the FM dial today,” 146

CONG. REC. 5,611 (2000), appears nowhere in the statute. 

Furthermore, not only do the statements in the Committee

Report on which the NAB relies lack a “statutory reference

point,” Shannon, 512 U.S. at 584, aspects of the legislative

history support reading the statute as restricting the

Commission’s authority only with respect to third-adjacent

channels. For instance, the headings of the proposed legislation

printed in the Report read “(a) Third-Adjacent Channel

Protections Required,” and “(b) Further Evaluation of Need for

Third-Adjacent Channel Protections,” H.R. REP. NO. 106-567,

at 2, and the Report’s discussion of the need for legislation

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emphasizes the Commission’s failure to provide for thirdadjacent channel protections, id. at 4. Not only did the House

Committee retreat from a bill that would have prevented the

Commission from authorizing LPFM at all, see H.R. 3439,

106th Cong. (1999), floor statements indicate that the bill passed

by the House was a “true compromise” and “allows for the

[Commission] to proceed with plans to implement a low-power

FM radio service to address the community needs of many

localities,” 146 CONG.REC. at 5,611 (statement of Rep. Tauzin);

see id. at 5,614 (statement of Rep. Pallone) (the compromise

“allows the [Commission] to move forward with the low-power

FM as long as it protects existing third-channel interference

protections”); id. at 5,612-13 (statement of Rep. Oxley). These

statements are consistent with the conclusion reflected in the

plain text that Congress did not intend to restrain the

Commission’s authority to respond to new circumstances

potentially threatening LPFM stations other than with respect to

third-adjacent channel minimum separation requirements.

 In a further attempt to avoid the plain text, the NAB

maintains it produces absurd results. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v.

EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1088-89 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In the NAB’s

view, “Congress understood that the [Commission] would have

to peel back the outmermost layer of protections before reaching

the inner layers, and the [Act]’s protection of the outer layer thus

protected the whole.” Petr’s Br. at 23. Seemingly intuitive, this

assertion is unsupported by the statutory text. Even assuming

the logic behind relaxing requirements for third-adjacent

channels before those for first- or second-adjacent channels, the

NAB has not shown that the former must precede the latter.

Although entirely eliminating the requirements for secondadjacent channels while retaining the requirements for thirdadjacent channels might fail the arbitrary and capricious test,

that is not what the Commission has done. Rather, the

Commission has simply announced limited circumstances in

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which it will waive the second-adjacent requirements. Having

addressed only the minimum distance requirements for thirdadjacent channels, Congress did not implicitly restrict the

Commission’s authority with regard to the separate but related

issue of second-adjacent channel requirements. 

In sum, Congress spoke directly to third-adjacent channel

minimum distance separation protections but was silent

regarding the Commission’s authority to reduce or eliminate

protections for other channels. Moreover, the modification of

the cease-operations requirement and the announcement of a

presumption favoring waiver of secondary status do not concern

minimum distance-separation requirements, and thus are not

covered by the text of the statute at all. The limited nature of

Congress’s direction is unsurprising because the Commission

had already imposed protections on the other channels. Other

than acknowledging those existing protections, Congress left

undisturbed the Commission’s authority to adopt regulations,

including ones to modify the second-adjacent channel distance

protection in Section 73.809 of its rules, to set standards for

waiving second-adjacent channel minimum distance

requirements in Section 73.807, or to set standards for

determining whether an LPFM station should be accorded

primary status over an encroaching full-power station. Because

Congress did not address the subjects that are the focus of the

NAB’s challenges, the Commission’s interpretation of the

Preservation Act as limiting its authority only with respect to

third-adjacent channel minimum distance requirements reflects

the plain text and the context in which Congress acted, and is

neither “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters,”

Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235,

242 (1982)), nor “contrary to common sense,” id.

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B.

The NAB’s challenges on APA grounds range from broad

assertions of arbitrariness to more technical objections. While

of varying force, none demonstrate, at least at this point, that the

NAB’s petition should be granted. Although the Commission

maintains the NAB’s contentions regarding the interim waiver

policies are not ripe, see Abbot Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,

147 (1967); Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, No. 07-1151

(D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 2009); AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.3d 692,

699-700 (D.C. Cir. 2003), whether the Commission violated the

APA’s notice and comment requirement in announcing waiver

standards and the requirement that it provide an adequate

explanation for its actions are questions of law where factual

development would not aid review. See Better Gov’t Ass’n v.

Dep’t of State, 780 F.2d 86, 92-93 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

Accordingly, these challenges are ripe, see Sabre, Inc. v. Dep’t

of Transp., 429 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Gen. Elec.

Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2002), although some

of the NAB’s other challenges are unripe. The challenges that

are ripe lack merit.

1. As regards the Commission’s weakening of secondadjacent channel interference protections under Sections 73.807

and 73.809, the NAB asserts that a “single unsupported

sentence” is the totality of the Commission’s reasoning and fails

to satisfy the APA’s requirement that the Commission provide

a reasoned explanation for the change. Petr’s Br. at 16. In that

sentence, the Commission stated: “Based on desired-toundesired (“D/U”) signal strength ratio calculations, in most

circumstances interference would be predicted to extend from

ten to two hundred meters from the LPFM station antenna.”

2007 Order at 21,939 ¶ 65. However, this sentence was only

part of the Commission’s reasoned and adequate explanation for

the change in its approach to second-adjacent channel

protections. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 07-

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582, slip op. at 10 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2009); Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 42-43.

In the 2007 Order, the Commission described the changed

circumstances that prompted it to “adjust[] the balance of the

competing priorities of interference protection and preserving

existing service.” Respt’s Br. at 41; see 2007 Order at 21,913.

The Commission explained that its staff had identified

approximately 40 LPFM stations that could be forced to cease

operations under Section 73.809 because of increases in fullpower FM station modification applications. To minimize

displacement threats from the increasing number of encroaching

full-power FM stations while minimizing the impact on fullpower stations, the Commission limited the reach of Section

73.809 to co-channels and first-adjacent channels but retained

the second-adjacent channel minimum distance requirement for

allotting LPFM stations in the first instance contained in Section

73.807. The Commission also explained that any interference

to full-power stations would be minimal because “secondadjacent channel interference to a full service station is generally

predicted to occur only in the immediate vicinity of the LPFM

station transmitter site,” and the stations could implement

“various techniques” to “substantially reduce[]” predicted

interference, 2007 Order at 21,938 ¶ 63, noting that such

techniques had already been successfully employed, see id. at ¶

62.

The Commission’s discussion of the changed circumstances

and minimal predicted interference satisfy the APA’s

requirement that an agency justify a reversal in course. As the

Supreme Court recently cautioned in Fox Television Stations,

there is “no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our

opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected

to more searching review” than when an agency adopts a policy

in the first instance. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No.

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07-582, slip op. at 10 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2009). The extent of the

Commission’s explanation distinguishes this case from

American Radio League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir.

2008), where the Commission summarily dismissed empirical

data submitted at its invitation. Moreover, the quoted

observation about predicted interference on which the NAB

focuses is, as the Commission points out, not cryptic because

“the concept of desired-to-undesired signals is basic to making

these sorts of potential interference determinations and is spelled

out in Commission rules for addressing ‘short-spaced’

situations.” Respt’s Br. at 34 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.215). 

2. The NAB challenges the Commission’s interference

finding on the ground that it is untethered to record evidence.

But the Commission’s statement about predicted interference

from second-adjacent channel LPFM stations is consistent with

its conclusion in 2000. Then the Commission concluded, upon

considering technical studies submitted by a number of

commenters including the NAB, that the risk of interference

from LPFM signals on second-adjacent channels “may be

somewhat higher” than the “small amount of interference that

may occur” from signals on third-adjacent channels. 2000 Order

at 2,246 ¶ 104. Likewise, in 2005, the Commission stated that

“it would be useful to consider whether to limit the Section

73.809 interference procedures to situations involving co- and

first-adjacent channel predicted interference, where the

predicted interference areas are substantially greater than for

second- and third-adjacent channel interference.” 2005 Further

Notice at 6,780 ¶ 38. In the 2007 Order, the Commission

concluded that “in most circumstances interference would be

predicted to extend from ten to two hundred meters from the

LPFM station antenna.” 2007 Order at 21,939 ¶ 65. This

statement reflects that the Commission’s engineering judgment

did not change, but rather the Commission reevaluated the

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competing priorities of interference protection and preserving

existing service in the face of changed circumstances. 

Moreover, one aspect of the NAB’s challenge is unripe. In

connection with the waiver standards, the Commission made the

interference prediction in the context of suggesting that

“[c]learly it will be advantageous to an LPFM applicant’s

waiver showing to propose modifications that minimize the area

of predicted interference.” 2007 Order at 21,939 ¶ 65. It is as of

yet unclear whether and how the stated interference prediction

will affect the Commission’s consideration of a particular

waiver request and such a fact-bound inquiry is best assessed in

a concrete setting. See Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523

U.S. 726, 732 (1998). Hardship is minimal at best because

NAB’s members may assert a particular claim of harm when a

waiver is sought, see AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.3d 692, 700

(D.C. Cir. 2003), and the Commission’s final action on waiver

requests is not to occur until it completes the rulemaking begun

in the 2007 Order. 

3. The NAB also contends the Commission’s adoption of

the waiver policies violates the APA notice-and-comment

requirement. (The NAB conceded at oral argument that noticeand-comment procedures are not required to establish the

Commission’s rebuttable presumption favoring waiver of

secondary status, as our precedent makes clear, see Pandhandle

Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. Econ. Regulatory Admin.,

822 F.2d 1105, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1987).) The APA exempts from

its notice-and-comment requirement “interpretative rules,

general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,

procedure, or practice.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A); see also Ctr. for

Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d

798, 807 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In determining whether an agency

has issued a statement of policy rather than a binding rule

subject to notice-and-comment, the court looks to the effects of

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the agency’s action, asking whether the agency has imposed any

rights and obligations or has left itself free to exercise discretion,

taking into account the agency’s phrasing, Ctr. for Auto Safety,

452 F.3d at 806. The court further considers: “(1) the [a]gency’s

own characterization of the action; (2) whether the action was

published in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal

Regulations; and (3) whether the action has binding effects on

private parties or on the agency,” Molycorp, Inc. v. EPA, 197

F.3d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 452

F.3d at 806-07.

Here, the Commission characterized its announcement as a

“clarification,” 2007 Order at 21,939 ¶ 64, of its waiver

standards while expressly “le[aving] itself free to exercise

discretion,” Center for Auto Safety, 452 F.3d at 806. The

standards are generalized and only take effect once the

Commission, or the Media Bureau, determines that a waiver is

in the public interest; therefore, they do not yet have a binding

effect on private parties and they do not bind the Commission to

a particular result in any case. The standards also were not

published in the Code of Federal Regulations, and the

Commission will not take final action on waiver requests until

the rulemaking begun in the 2007 Order is completed. The

NAB’s citations to cases defining waiver as a tool to be used in

narrow circumstances neither speak to the APA notice-andcomment question nor cast doubt upon the Commission’s waiver

standards, which address individualized cases and specify

prerequisites for granting a waiver as well as factors the

Commission will consider. See 2007 Order at 21,940 ¶ 67,

21,941 ¶ 69. So understood the policy “genuinely leaves the

agency . . . free to exercise discretion.” Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v.

Young, 818 F.2d 942, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Commission’s

announcement of waiver standards thus falls within the APA

exception for general statements of policy. 

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The NAB persists that although an agency typically may

promulgate de minimus exemptions to statutes it administers, see

Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 113-14 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the

Commission could not view, and has not viewed, secondadjacent protections as de minimus. However, the Commission

has authority under its rules, see 47 C.F.R. § 1.3, to waive

requirements not mandated by statute where strict compliance

would not be in the public interest, so long as it articulates

identifiable standards for exercising that authority. See

NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2008);

Ne. Cellular Tel. Co. v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1166 (D.C. Cir.

1990); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir.

1969). In announcing the waiver standards, the Commission

satisfied those conditions. The interim minimum distance

waiver policy is to apply only where implementation of a new

or modified full-power station would result in the full-power and

LPFM stations operating at less than the required minimum

distance separation and there is no alternate, fully-spaced, rulecomplaint channel available to the LPFM station. 2007 Order

at 12,939-40, ¶¶ 65-67. Where the LPFM station has been

regularly providing eight hours of daily locally originated

programming, the Commission will apply a rebuttable

presumption that the public interest favors the LPFM station

over granting the full-power station’s modification application,

id. at 21,940 ¶ 68, and the Commission retained discretion to

deny a waiver request in any event, id. at 21,941 ¶ 69.

4. Finally, the NAB’s contention that the presumption in

favor of LPFM weakens protections for full-power stations is

unavailing given the narrow scope of the Preservation Act’s

restriction on the Commission’s authority. Furthermore, the

NAB’s interpretation of the presumption’s effect — that secondadjacent channel protection no longer exists — ignores the six

factors that a full-power station may contest, 2007 Order at

21,941 ¶ 69, the rebuttable nature of the presumption, and the

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Commission’s retention of discretion to deny a waiver request

even where the LPFM station has made the required showing.

The Commission stated it intended to limit the presumption to

those LPFM stations that have “regularly provided at least eight

hours per day of locally originated programming,” 2007 Order

at 21,940 ¶ 68, and not to apply it where a full-power facility

proposes to improve service to the community covered by its

license. Id. at 21,941 ¶¶ 69-70. In suggesting that the secondary

stature of LPFM stations under the new presumption violates the

APA because the presumption is based on an unsupported

assumption that stations that provide local programming serve

the public interest, the NAB overlooks that the presumption

reflects the Commission’s view that locally originated

programming is a primary benefit of the LPFM service. See id.

at 21,922 ¶ 24. And, contrary to the NAB’s suggestion, the

presumption appears not to implicate the Commission’s

consideration of programming content as the Commission’s

reference to “locally originating programming,” id. at 21,940 ¶

68, refers under its rules to the geographic location of the

production of programming, see 47 C.F.R. § 73.872(b)(3), not

the substantive content of the programs. As there is no clear

indication that the Commission will regulate content in applying

the presumption, the challenge based on the Commission’s

regulation of content is unripe. 

Accordingly, we deny the petition in part and dismiss the

petition in part.

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