Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01834/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01834-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Emil Earl Little Dog
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1834

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of South Dakota.

Emil Earl Little Dog, * 

* 

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: November 17, 2004

Filed: January 25, 2005

___________

Before SMITH, BEAM, and BENTON Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Emil Earl Little Dog was indicted on four counts of aggravated sexual abuse,

two counts of sexual contact, and one count of obstruction of justice. Little Dog was

found guilty on all but one of the sexual contact counts. He was sentenced1

 to 360

months’ imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a special assessment of

$600. Little Dog seeks reversal of his conviction based upon five alleged district

court errors. We affirm.

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At trial, the jury acquitted Little Dog of the charges related to KRL. The facts

underlying that charge will not be recounted.

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I. Background

Three minor females, siblings of Little Dog's wife, Justine Grindstone, made

allegations of sexual abuse against Little Dog. Grindstone’s mother, Patricia Red

Legs, had twelve children. South Dakota social services removed the children from

the Red Legs' custody due to the parents' chronic alcoholism. Tribal social services,

for some period of time, placed the girls, nine-year old MRL, fourteen-year old LRL,

and seven-year old KRL,2

 with Little Dog and Grindstone at their home at Old Bear

Soldier Housing.

MRL claimed that Little Dog sexually abused her “more times than she could

count.” According to MRL, the first penetration occurred in Little Dog’s bedroom

when she was about ten years old. She indicated other similar incidents followed, in

the bedroom, in Little Dog’s car and truck, and in remote, rural areas near the

Messiah Church. MRL identified some of these areas with photographs provided by

F.B.I. Special Agent Kelly Kenser.

MRL testified that the abuse occurred often and usually while Grindstone was

away from home. The abuse did not cease after MRL moved to another relative's

home because Little Dog would pick her up and continue to take her to remote areas.

MRL was so traumatized by the abuse that she attempted suicide to escape from Little

Dog. After her first interview with Kenser, MRL routinely wet the bed, something she

had never done before. MRL also testified that while placed at New Beginnings

adolescent treatment facility, she feared Little Dog would find and harm her so she

began to sleep on the couch near the staff room. MRL ran away from New

Beginnings to avoid having to testify in court when she learned Little Dog would be

present.

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Little Dog was placed in a cell with Richard Red Fox who had two younger

sisters in the New Beginnings residence with MRL. Little Dog asked Red Fox to

write a letter to his sisters that would help him. Red Fox declined but agreed to pass

a letter to his sisters if Little Dog wrote one, which Little Dog did. At trial, Little Dog

admitted that he intended the letter to instruct Red Fox’s sisters to tell authorities that

MRL told the sisters she hated Grindstone and Little Dog, and that MRL had lied

about the sexual allegations. Little Dog claimed that although he wrote the letter, he

did not intend or instruct Red Fox to give it to his sisters. Red Fox admitted he wrote

a letter to his sisters to accompany Little Dog’s letter. This letter advised his sisters

not to acquiesce to Little Dog’s request, but to stick to their story in court. 

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Medical evidence in the case was inconclusive. Dr. Richard Kaplan, former

Medical Director at the Center on Child Abuse at the Children’s Hospital in Sioux

Falls, South Dakota, testified that MRL’s gynecological examination was normal. He

indicated that a normal vaginal finding was not unusual in sexual assault cases.

The evidence regarding Little Dog's abuse of LRL came from two other of her

sisters, VYB and MRL2. The girls recalled that the morning after a night of heavy

drinking at Little Dog’s residence, they observed Little Dog standing over LRL while

her pants were pulled down to her knees. At the time, LRL was unconscious from

excessive drinking. VYB claimed she saw Little Dog put his fingers inside of LRL’s

vagina or anus and move them. MRL2 recalled the events a bit differently but also

described seeing Little Dog with his fingers inside LRL's vagina and recalled that

LRL was unconscious at the time. LRL testified that she had no recollection of the

event. 

Little Dog was initially charged with three counts of aggravated sexual abuse

and one count of sexual contact. A first superseding indictment was filed, adding an

obstruction of justice charge based upon evidence that Little Dog attempted to

influence the perception of MRL's allegations through a cellmate3

 who had indirect

contact with MRL. A second superseding indictment was later filed, adding an

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The applicable portion of Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) states:

The indictment . . . may charge a defendant in separate counts with two

or more offenses if the offenses charged . . . are of the same or similar

character or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected

with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. 

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additional count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and one count of sexual

contact. Before trial, Little Dog made a motion to compel a gynecological exam of

MRL. The trial court denied the motion.

 On the morning of the second day of the trial, the district court discovered it

had failed to swear in the jury. With counsel in chambers, the court said “the jury

selection process yesterday was something I have not seen previously in the almost

nine years I’ve been on the bench . . . . With all the extra commotion going on in the

courtroom yesterday of course we had to take a recess and I neglected to have the jury

sworn. The panel was sworn but the 13 members were not sworn.” The district court,

upon reviewing relevant case law, determined that it was error not to swear in the jury

following voir dire. However, the court found that the error was harmless. The district

court then informed counsel that it would swear in the jury. Little Dog moved for a

mistrial, the motion was denied. 

Little Dog filed a motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) to sever the obstruction

of justice charge from the sexually related charges.4

 The district court denied this

motion. Little Dog renewed this motion at the close of the government’s case-in-chief

and at the close of all the evidence, but each time it was denied. Little Dog was found

guilty on all but one count of sexual contact involving KRL. He filed a motion for

judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. The district court

denied both motions. The district court sentenced Little Dog to 360 months’

imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $600. 

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Little Dog claims that because the district court instructed the jury that to

convict, the government had to prove Little Dog engaged in sexual contact with LRL

between July 2, 2001, and July 23, 2002, the sexual contact must have occurred

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On appeal, Little Dog argues that the district court committed five reversible

errors including: (1) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal based on

insufficient evidence; (2) failing to swear in the jury until after opening statements;

(3) denying his motion to sever his obstruction of justice count from his sexual abuse

counts; (4) refusing to permit his medical expert to conduct a gynecological

examination; and (5) refusing to instruct the jury that the crime of obstruction of

justice requires specific intent.

II. Discussion

A. Little Dog’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 

Based on Insufficient Evidence

Little Dog contends that "this case is one of those rare ones where the evidence

presented by the government with regard to sexual abuse and sexual contact was

insufficient for a jury to conclude [Little Dog] was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."

Little Dog bases this contention upon various inconsistencies and credibility concerns

with the girls' accounts. However, as we have often noted, it is properly the province

of a jury to resolve matters of witness credibility. United States v. Cole, 380 F.3d 422,

425 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Enriquez, 201 F.3d 1072, 1074 (8th Cir.

2000). Our role is to determine whether a rational jury would have no choice but to

reasonably doubt the existence of an element of a crime charged. United States v.

Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 950 (8th Cir. 1999). This is not such a case. The record facts

indicate the jury properly considered and weighed the evidence and even acquitted

Little Dog on one of the charges. MRL, LRL, VYB and MRL2 gave accounts that,

if believed, would establish a sufficient factual basis for Little Dog's conviction. The

inconsistencies pointed out by Little Dog do not make it unreasonable for a jury to

find him guilty of the charges on the evidence presented.5

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during this time period. Consequently, Little Dog contends his conviction must be

reversed because the evidence only showed sexual abuse during 2000. Little Dog is

incorrect. For an analogous situation, see United States v. Joyner, 539 F.2d 1162,

2264–65 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding a variance between the date in the indictment and

the proof is not fatal if proof shows the acts charged were committed on a date within

the statute of limitations and prior to the return date of the indictment). Here, the

district court instructed the jury that the evidence had to establish beyond a

reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed on a date or dates near the alleged

dates. Little Dog also argues that jury instruction fifteen made the date of the offense

an element of the crime, therefore making it difficult for him to prepare his defense.

For good reason, the district court rejected this claim. See United States v. Stuckey,

220 F.3d 976, 982 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the date of the offense is not an

element of the charge).

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B. Failure to Swear in the Jury Until After Opening Statements

Little Dog contends that the failure to properly swear in the jury should result

in a mistrial or, at the very least, striking the testimony of witnesses who testified

prior to the swearing-in. This issue raises a question of law which we review de novo.

Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040

(1989). We find no merit in Little Dog’s argument.

As the district court acknowledged, it was error not to administer the oath to

the jurors before the beginning of the trial. The swearing-in of a jury is important

because at that point jeopardy attaches. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978). In the

absence of prejudice caused by the delay in administering the oath, the error is

harmless. Cooper v. Campbell, 597 F.2d 628 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 852

(1979) (determining that no prejudice was shown by the delay); United States v.

Hopkins, 458 F.2d 1353, 1354 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that no prejudice was shown

by the delayed swearing in of the jury); United States v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1358

(6th Cir. 1984) (determining that a defendant’s rights were not violated by the district

court’s failure to administer the oath following voir dire). Little Dog cites only

unpersuasive, non-analogous state law cases to support his view that the district court

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was obligated to declare a mistrial. Little Dog fails to prove the district court’s error

prejudiced his defense. 

C. Little Dog’s Motion to Sever His Obstruction of Justice Count 

From His Sexual Abuse Counts

Little Dog argues that joinder of the obstruction charge under Fed. R. Crim. P.

8(a) was improper because that charge was not based on the same act or transaction

as the other counts, nor was it connected with, or part of a common scheme or plan.

Alternatively, Little Dog indicates that even if joinder is proper, the district court

should have severed because he established prejudice under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. We

review a decision to join counts de novo. United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 981

(8th Cir. 1999). Little Dog is incorrect.

Broad interpretation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) is encouraged for the efficient

administration of justice. Haggard v. United States, 369 F.2d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1966)

(decided in context of multiple defendants joined in the same indictment). We have

recognized that:

Prejudice may result from a possibility that the jury might use evidence

of one crime to infer guilt on the other or that the jury might cumulate

the evidence to find guilt if the crimes were considered separately. On

the other hand, a defendant does not suffer any undue prejudice by a

joint trial if the evidence is such that one crime would be probative and

admissible at the defendant’s separate trial of the other crime.

United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 981-82 (8th Cir. 1996). 

Little Dog’s obstruction charge is connected to, and interrelated with the sexual

abuse charges. If the district court had severed the charges, evidence of Little Dog’s

attempt to tamper with or influence witnesses would have been admissible in his

sexual abuse trial to show criminal intent and state of mind. In a separate trial for

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obstruction, evidence of Little Dog’s sexual abuse of MRL would be required to show

his motive for seeking to influence Red Legs' sisters into giving false testimony about

MRL. Therefore, the "evidence is such that one crime would be probative and

admissible at the defendant’s separate trial of the other crime." Id.; see also United

States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 465 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that the district court

properly denied severance because the same proof of the smuggling conspiracies

would have been required in separate trials). 

To avoid prejudice, the district court can always grant severance. Haggard, 369

F.2d at 973. A denial to sever is only reversed if the defendant can show severe

prejudice. United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 982 (8th Cir. 1999). "Severe prejudice

occurs when a defendant is deprived of an appreciable chance for an acquittal, a

chance that [the defendant] would have had in a severed trial." United States v.

Koskela, 86 F.3d 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1996). Little Dog contends he was prejudiced

because he did not want to testify to the obstruction charge but did want to testify to

the sexual charges. That is not enough to require severance. In United States v.

Jardan, 552 F2d 216, 220 (8th Cir. 1977), we denied a motion to sever as speculative

when the defendant indicated his defense to count one was stronger than for count

two. We cited Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968), with approval:

[N]o need for a severance exists until the defendant makes a convincing

showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one

count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other. In making

such a showing, it is essential that the defendant present enough

information—regarding the nature of the testimony he wishes to give on

one count and his reasons for not wishing to testify on the other—to

satisfy the court that the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it

intelligently to weigh the considerations of economy and expedition in

judicial administration against the defendant’s interest in having a free

choice with respect to testifying.

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Id. at 977 (internal quotations omitted); see also Closs v. Leapley, 18 F.3d 574, 578

(8th Cir. 1994) (holding prejudice sufficient to require separate trials where a

defendant wants to testify in one but not the other may be established only by a

persuasive and detailed showing regarding the testimony that the defendant would

give on the one count he wishes severed and the reason why he cannot testify on the

other counts). Little Dog failed to provide the trial judge sufficient information that

he had important testimony to give on the sexual abuse offense but a strong need to

refrain from testifying on the obstruction count. On this record, we are also

unconvinced.

D. Refusing to Permit Little Dog’s Medical Expert to Conduct a 

Gynecological Examination of MRL

Little Dog argues that his expert medical witness, Dr. Scott Berry, should have

been permitted to conduct a gynecological exam of MRL in order to enhance Dr.

Berry’s credibility with the jury. Little Dog also argues that in refusing to grant his

expert an opportunity to examine MRL, the district court denied him a fair trial. We

review the denial of a motion to compel examination of a child for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Summer, 119 F.3d 658, 663 (8th Cir. 1997). The

defendant must convince the court that expert services are necessary to present an

adequate defense. United States v. Sailer, 552 F.2d 213, 215 (8th Cir. 1977). We find

no abuse of discretion. 

Little Dog's arguments are insufficient to prove an additional exam was

necessary for him to present an adequate defense. The record contained gynecological

examination data for MRL consistent with Little Dog's defense. The examination was

normal. Dr. Berry was provided with a tape of MRL's medical examination and

agreed with the conclusion. We see no unfairness to Little Dog in not requiring MRL

to submit to an additional physical examination to confirm what one exam had

already shown—that the child showed no evidence of physical injury. Dr. Berry's

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credibility is unaffected in a case such as this, where there is no controversy about the

ultimate medical results. The district court's ruling did not deny Little Dog a fair trial.

E. Refusal to Instruct the Jury that the Crime of Obstruction of 

Justice Requires Specific Intent

Finally, Little Dog contends that the district court erred in not instructing the

jury that obstruction of justice requires specific intent. We review the district court

instructions in their entirety. Failure to give a requested instruction is not erroneous

if the court’s charge, as a whole, correctly instructs the jury on the applicable law.

United States v. Mitchell, 463 F.2d 187, 191 (8th Cir. 1972). We will reverse only if

the error affected the substantial rights of the parties. Jones v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 723,

734 (8th Cir. 2003). We hold Little Dog’s substantial rights were unaffected by the

district court's refusal to give the specific instruction he requested.

Little Dog correctly notes that the charge of obstruction of justice requires a

jury instruction on specific intent. However, the instruction given by the district court

in this case did so. The court gave Jury Instruction Eighteen which provides:

INSTRUCTION NO. 18

3. That by urging, suggesting, or instructing Tessie and Trish Red Fox

to give false or misleading testimony at his upcoming trial, the

defendant corruptly endeavored to obstruct the due administration of

justice. 

As used above and in this case, the word endeavored means to

knowingly and intentionally try to obtain testimony which the defendant

would have known would be materially false, his idea being to hinder

or obstruct the prosecution of the federal case pending against him. 

(emphasis added). Little Dog argues that although he admitted participating in the

preparation of the letter, he denied ever intending or knowing that it would actually

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be delivered. Reviewing the district court’s actual jury charge, we hold that it

correctly instructed the jury on the law.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.

____________________________

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