Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01995/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01995-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Clark Kelso
Defendant
J. Lewis
Defendant
E. Tootell
Defendant
Michael Jerome Williams
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL JEROME WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ELENA TOOTELL, M.D., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01995-DMR (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”), has 

filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to his safety and medical needs. Plaintiff has consented to magistrate 

judge jurisdiction. Dkt. 1 at 11. Therefore, this matter has been assigned to the undersigned 

Magistrate Judge. Dkts. 5, 6.

His motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted in a separate written 

Order. 

Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the claims are alleged to have occurred at 

SQSP, which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

In his complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants: SQSP Chief Medical 

Executive Elena Tootell, M.D.; SQSP Deputy Director of Policy and Risk Management Services 

J. Lewis; and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Receiver J. 

Clark Kelso. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and declaratory relief.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff claims that he suffers from a “brain injury” that resulted from when he was “hit 

twice in the head with a metal baseball bat during a prison riot” on October 11, 2011, while he was 

housed at a “California out-of state prison.” Dkt. 1 at 3-4. Plaintiff was then “sent back to 

Case 4:15-cv-01995-DMR Document 9 Filed 10/09/15 Page 1 of 10
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

California,” and he was housed at Centinela State Prison where he was “given a Comprehensive 

Accommodation Chrono [(“chrono”)] stating that [he is] to be housed in a ground floor cell on the 

bottom bunk.” Id. at 4. Due to his brain injury, Plaintiff claims that he has “problems walking 

down the stairs inside the housing unit and that [his] balance being off and the dizzy spells [are]

ongoing.” Id. at 4. 

Plaintiff claims that he was transferred to SQSP on December 12, 2012 and issued a 

chrono that he “was to be housed on the first, second or third tier, and on the bottom bunk.” Id. 

He claims he was housed on a “ground floor cell already [and he] would not be moved to an upper 

tier cell.” Id. 

Because chronos are only good for one year, Plaintiff claims that on October 15, 2013, his 

primary care physician submitted a request to renew his chrono for a bottom bunk and lower tier 

cell. Id. On October 17, 2013, Defendant Tootell denied the request. Id. Plaintiff filed a 602 

inmate appeal, and Defendant Tootell partially granted at the second level of review because his 

previous chrono had been approved on January 10, 2013, and was still valid because the year-long 

time frame had not expired. Id. at 4-5. Before Plaintiff pursued his 602 appeal to the third level of 

review, he was given a three-month chrono in January of 2014, stating that he was “to be housed 

on the lower tier and on the bottom bunk.” Id. at 5. On April 11, 2014, Defendant Lewis denied 

Plaintiff’s 602 appeal at the third and final level of review upon finding that “no intervention at the 

Director’s Level of Review [was] necessary as [Plaintiff’s] medical condition has been evaluated 

and [he was] receiving treatment deemed medically necessary.” Id.; Dkt. 1-5 at 3, 10-11, 13-14.

When his three-month chrono expired, Plaintiff claims that on April 14, 2014, he “went 

before the Chrono Committee” to be evaluated for a “lower bunk chrono.” Dkt. 1 at 5. On April 

24, 2014, Plaintiff received the committee’s decision stating that he “did not meet the criteria for a 

lower bunk.” Id. Plaintiff filed another 602 appeal; however, the appeal was denied on all three 

levels. Id. 

After his aforementioned 602 appeal was denied on all levels, Plaintiff wrote to the Prison 

Law Office “seeking help for [his] medical issue.” Id. at 8. On May 12, 2014, the Prison Law 

Office “sent [Defendant] Kelso a letter raising the medical issue [Plaintiff] was having with the 

Case 4:15-cv-01995-DMR Document 9 Filed 10/09/15 Page 2 of 10
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

chronos being denied.” Id.; Dkt. 1-9 at 2. There is nothing in the record showing that Defendant 

Kelso responded to the May 12, 2014 letter.

On July 2, 2014, Plaintiff was moved from the first tier to the fourth tier because he did not 

have a lower tier chrono. Dkt. 1 at 6.

On July 3, 2014, Plaintiff “fell down the stairs from the third tier to the second tier due to 

[his] equilibrium being off and becoming dizzy, and [his] left leg twisting out.” Id. He adds that 

“[d]uring the fall . . . [he] struck the back of his head on the stairs, [he] injured [his] lower back, 

[his] right hand and the front of his right foot.” Id. Plaintiff was treated for his injuries from the 

fall. Id. On July 10, 2014, Plaintiff was given a lower tier chrono that was “good for only a year.” 

Id. Plaintiff claims his request for a permanent lower tier, bottom bunk chrono was denied. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

II. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE CLAIMS

A. Safety Needs

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” imposes a duty 

on prison officials to, among other things, “‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of 

the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 

Case 4:15-cv-01995-DMR Document 9 Filed 10/09/15 Page 3 of 10
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two 

requirements are met: (1) the deprivation is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison 

official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

The test for deliberate indifference is the same as criminal recklessness, i.e., the official must 

actually know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate safety. See id. at 837. The official 

“must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. Neither negligence nor gross 

negligence constitutes deliberate indifference. See id. at 835-36 & n.4; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 

Liberally construed, the complaint states a claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s 

safety needs against Defendant Tootell stemming from her denial of Plaintiff’s bottom bunk, 

lower tier chrono, which Plaintiff claims proximately caused his July 3, 2014 fall. Plaintiff claims 

that Defendants Lewis and Kelso were aware of Defendant Tootell’s failure to grant Plaintiff’s 

chrono, but they failed to act to remedy this problem. Dkt. 1 at 7-8. Therefore, the complaint also 

states a deliberate indifference to safety claim against Defendants Lewis and Kelso.

B. Medical Needs

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, 

WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Jones v. 

Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves 

an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of 

the defendant’s response to that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. A “serious” medical 

need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or 

the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104). 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a substantial 

risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

Case 4:15-cv-01995-DMR Document 9 Filed 10/09/15 Page 4 of 10
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

As mentioned above, Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a brain injury. Dkt. 1 at 3. 

Plaintiff claims that his requests for a bottom bunk, lower tier chrono were denied by Defendant 

Tootell, and that Defendants Lewis and Kelso were aware of his need for such chronos but they 

did nothing to “curb the denials of the needed medical chronos.” Id. at 9. Because Plaintiff was 

denied such chronos, he “suffered further injury” due to the July 3, 2014 fall. Id. Plaintiff also 

claims that he suffers “physical and emotional pain and injury.” Id.

Liberally construed, the complaint states cognizable Eighth Amendment claims against 

Defendants Tootell, Lewis and Kelso for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical 

needs. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff complaint states cognizable claims of deliberate indifference to his safety 

and medical needs against Defendants Tootell, Lewis and Kelso.

2. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 

Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint 

and all attachments thereto (dkt. 1), a Magistrate Judge jurisdiction consent form, and a copy of 

this Order to: the following Defendants at SQSP: Chief Medical Executive Elena Tootell, M.D.

and Deputy Director of Policy and Risk Management Services J. Lewis; as well the following 

Defendant at CDCR in Sacramento: Receiver J. Clark Kelso.

The Clerk shall also mail a copy of the complaint and a copy of this Order to the State 

Attorney General’s Office in San Francisco. Additionally, the Clerk shall mail a copy of this 

Order to Plaintiff.

3. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. 

Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the court, on 

behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons, fail to do so, they will be required to bear the 

cost of such service unless good cause be shown for their failure to sign and return the waiver 

form. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date 

Case 4:15-cv-01995-DMR Document 9 Filed 10/09/15 Page 5 of 10
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be required 

to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for waiver 

was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of 

summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked to read the statement set forth at the foot of the 

waiver form that more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of 

service of the summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before 

Defendants have been personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the date on 

which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days from the date the waiver form is filed, 

whichever is later. Defendants shall also respond to the Notice of Assignment of Prisoner 

Case to a United States Magistrate Judge for Trial by filing a consent/declination form on 

the date the Answer is due. 

4. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. The following briefing schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date their answer is due, Defendants 

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion must be 

supported by adequate factual documentation, must conform in all respects to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56, and must include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from 

the events at issue. A motion for summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand1notice 

so that Plaintiff will have fair, timely and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to 

oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out 

in Rand must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A motion to dismiss 

for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies must be accompanied by a similar notice. 

However, the court notes that under the new law of the circuit, in the rare event that a failure to 

exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, Defendants may move for dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6) as opposed to the previous practice of moving under an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. 

Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 

 

1

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998).

Case 4:15-cv-01995-DMR Document 9 Filed 10/09/15 Page 6 of 10
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that failure to exhaust available administrative 

remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), should be raised by a 

defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Otherwise if a failure to exhaust is not clear on 

the face of the complaint, Defendants must produce evidence proving failure to exhaust in a 

motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff shows a failure to exhaust, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment 

under Rule 56. Id. But if material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied and the 

district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id. at 

1168.

If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 

they shall so inform the court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. All papers 

filed with the court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the court 

and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the date on which 

Defendants’ motion is filed. 

c. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you 

must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must 

be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact—that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradicts the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand, 154 

Case 4:15-cv-01995-DMR Document 9 Filed 10/09/15 Page 7 of 10
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

F.3d at 962-63.

Plaintiff also is advised that—in the rare event that Defendants argue that the failure to 

exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint—a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available 

administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end your case, albeit without 

prejudice. To avoid dismissal, you have the right to present any evidence to show that you did 

exhaust your available administrative remedies before coming to federal court. Such evidence 

may include: (1) declarations, which are statements signed under penalty of perjury by you or 

others who have personal knowledge of relevant matters; (2) authenticated documents—

documents accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and why they are 

authentic, or other sworn papers such as answers to interrogatories or depositions; (3) statements 

in your complaint insofar as they were made under penalty of perjury and they show that you have 

personal knowledge of the matters state therein. As mentioned above, in considering a motion to 

dismiss for failure to exhaust under Rule 12(b)(6) or failure to exhaust in a summary judgment 

motion under Rule 56, the district judge may hold a preliminary proceeding and decide disputed 

issues of fact with regard to this portion of the case. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168.

(The notices above do not excuse Defendants’ obligation to serve similar notices again 

concurrently with motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies and 

motions for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 935.)

d. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after the 

date Plaintiff’s opposition is filed.

e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the court so orders at a later date.

5. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Leave of the court pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to depose 

Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

6. All communications by Plaintiff with the court must be served on Defendants or 

their counsel, once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to them.

7. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court 

Case 4:15-cv-01995-DMR Document 9 Filed 10/09/15 Page 8 of 10
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 

while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 

address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 

directed to the pro se party by the court has been returned to the court as not deliverable, and 

(2) the court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 

se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 

8. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. 

Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the 

deadline sought to be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 9, 2015

______________________________________

DONNA M. RYU

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:15-cv-01995-DMR Document 9 Filed 10/09/15 Page 9 of 10
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL JEROME WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

E. TOOTELL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:15-cv-01995-DMR 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on October 9, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Michael Jerome Williams

T-30101

San Quentin State Prison

1 Main Street

San Quentin, CA 94974 

Dated: October 9, 2015

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Ivy Lerma Garcia, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable DONNA M. RYU

Case 4:15-cv-01995-DMR Document 9 Filed 10/09/15 Page 10 of 10