Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-01336/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-01336-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tracy Anne Hoffman
Plaintiff
Michael A. Rolf C.P.A. & Co.
Defendant
Michael A. Rolf
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRACY ANNE HOFFMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL A. ROLF C.P.A. & CO., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01336-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 9

Defendants’ motion to dismiss came on for hearing before this court on May 29, 

2019. Plaintiff Tracy Anne Hoffman appeared through her counsel, Wendy Musell. 

Defendants Michael A. Rolf C.P.A. & Co. (“Rolf CPA”) and Michael A. Rolf (“Rolf”), an 

employee of Rolf CPA, appeared through their counsel, Kristen Iversen. Having read the 

papers filed by the parties and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant 

legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS defendants’ 

motion, for the following reasons. 

BACKGROUND

Rolf CPA is a public accountant and financial advisement company incorporated in 

Ohio, with its principle place of business in the same state. Dkt. 1, Compl. ¶ 5. Rolf 

resides in Kentucky. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff is a current resident of California and has lived in 

California at all times relevant to the conduct alleged in the complaint. Id. ¶ 4. 

Since at least 1996, defendants provided plaintiff with tax-related accounting 

services and, allegedly, financial services. Over the approximately 20 years that 

defendant provided those services to plaintiff, plaintiff lived in several states, including 

Ohio, Florida, and California. Id. ¶ 3. 

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In May 2008, plaintiff accepted a position with Genentech and thereafter relocated 

to San Francisco. Compl. ¶ 9. Prior to accepting that job, Rolf allegedly provided plaintiff 

with advice regarding Genentech-related compensation and benefits, including advice 

about plaintiff’s receipt of stock options. Id. ¶ 10. Rolf allegedly continued to provide 

plaintiff with financial advice throughout her employment with Genentech. Id. ¶¶ 11-23. 

Throughout that time, Rolf advised, as relevant here, that plaintiff should not sell her 

Genentech-awarded stock options, which plaintiff maintained in a UBS investment 

account. Id. 

Through early-2015, plaintiff primarily, if not exclusively, communicated with Rolf 

directly. Id. ¶¶ 24, 28. However, beginning sometime in 2015, other Rolf CPA 

employees began joining plaintiff’s calls with Rolf and, towards the end of 2015 and 

continuing into 2016, Rolf CPA employees other than Rolf returned plaintiff’s calls and 

represented to plaintiff that they were communicating with Rolf. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.

In early and mid-2015, plaintiff shared work-related concerns with Rolf, including 

the concern that her employment with Genentech may not continue. Id. ¶¶ 25, 26. In 

early 2016, plaintiff informed defendants that that concern had realized, and that she was

now in discussions with her employer about the cessation of her employment. Id. ¶ 26. 

On April 6, 2016, Genentech terminated plaintiff’s employment. Id. ¶ 26. At some point

later in 2016, plaintiff informed defendants of that fact. Id.

In October of that year, “plaintiff was notified by UBS that a sixty [ ] day exercise 

period [on plaintiff’s stock options] had started to run on April 6, 2016, expiring in June 

2016.” Id. ¶ 34. By failing to take any action on her stock options, plaintiff allegedly “lost 

investment equities in excess of $175,000.” Id. ¶¶ 34-35. 

Also in October 2016, Erik Spille, a Rolf CPA employee, informed plaintiff that Rolf 

“could no longer work with clients given serious cognitive impairments[.]” Id. ¶ 30. 

Plaintiff alleges that Spille admitted that defendants had been aware of Rolf’s illness for 

at least a couple of years, which was why other employees had become involved in 

defendants’ communications with plaintiff. Id. Further, according to the complaint, 

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though Rolf CPA employees had been trying to stay on top of Rolf’s book of business, 

“they did not really know what . . . Rolf had been doing.” Compl. ¶ 30

Based on the above facts, plaintiff asserts five causes of action, each of which is 

premised on one or both of the following theories of liability: (1) defendants failed to 

inform plaintiff that she should sell her Genentech stock options prior to the June 2016 

expiration date; and (2) defendants failed to inform plaintiff of Rolf’s deteriorating mental 

condition. See Id. ¶¶ 39-40, 47-48, 60-61, 67-69, 81.

On April 17, 2019, defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(2), arguing that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over both 

defendants.1 

In support of that motion, defendants submitted the declarations of Todd Zech, 

president of Rolf CPA, and Joan Rolf, Michael Rolf’s wife. Dkt. 9-2; Dkt. 9-3. The 

declarants attest, respectively, that Rolf CPA and Rolf have no connection with California. 

Dkt. 9-3 ¶¶ 3-4, 7; Dkt. 9-2 ¶ 2. In addition, Zech testifies that Rolf CPA “does not solicit 

or engage in business in California.” Dkt. 9-3 ¶ 4. Similarly, Zech testifies that Rolf CPA 

did not solicit plaintiff’s business while she was in California, that all services performed 

on plaintiff’s behalf were performed in Ohio, and that no Rolf CPA agent traveled to 

California to perform services for plaintiff. Id. ¶ 7. In response to this evidence, plaintiff 

submitted her own declaration, which states, as relevant here, that Rolf promoted his 

knowledge about California to plaintiff and that defendants prepared plaintiff’s federal and 

California state tax returns for the years spanning 2008 to 2016. Dkt. 17-1 ¶¶ 9, 13.

DISCUSSION

The party seeking to invoke the federal court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of 

demonstrating jurisdiction. Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015). When 

resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) on written materials, the court accepts 

 

1

In the alternative, defendants move the court to transfer this action to the Southern 

District of Ohio, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Because the court grants defendants’ 

Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, the court DENIES defendants’ § 1404 motion as MOOT. 

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uncontroverted facts in the complaint as true and resolves conflicts in affidavits in the 

plaintiff’s favor. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 

2011).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “limits the power of a 

state’s courts to exercise jurisdiction over defendants who do not consent to jurisdiction.” 

Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). Due process requires 

that the defendant “have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of 

the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe 

Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the 

“minimum contacts” analysis, a court can exercise either “general or all-purpose 

jurisdiction,” or “specific or conduct-linked jurisdiction.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 

117, 121-122 (2014).

In the absence of general jurisdiction—which neither party contends exists here—

a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant if his less-substantial contacts 

with the forum give rise to the claim or claims pending before the court—that is, if the 

cause of action “arises out of” or has a substantial connection with that activity. Hanson 

v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–53 (1958); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 

S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924-25 (2011). The specific jurisdiction inquiry “focuses on 

the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 

U.S. 277, 283-84 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a State to exercise

jurisdiction consistent with due process, that “relationship must arise out of contacts that 

the defendant himself creates with the forum state” and must be analyzed with regard “to 

the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with 

persons who reside there.” Id. at 284-85 (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

To determine whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient to 

establish specific jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit employs a three-part test:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his 

activities or consummate some transaction with the forum 

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or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he 

purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting 

activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 

defendant’s forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Morrill v. Scott Financial Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff bears the 

burden of satisfying the first two prongs. Id. If plaintiff does so, “the burden then shifts to

the defendant to present a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be 

reasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Regarding the first prong, the parties agree that the “purposeful direction test” 

applies because plaintiff’s claims sound in tort. See Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int'l, 

Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2017). The purposeful direction test itself has its own 

three part test, which requires plaintiff to show that the defendant “(1) committed an 

intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the 

defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Id. 

Because the court finds that plaintiff has not shown that defendants committed an 

intentional act expressly aimed at California, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion and 

declines to reach the remaining specific jurisdiction prongs. 

First, the court finds that plaintiff has not shown defendants committed an 

intentional act. An intentional act for purposes of the purposeful direction test is “an 

external manifestation of the actor's intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real 

world, not including any of its actual or intended results.” Wash. Shoe Co. v. A–Z 

Sporting Goods, Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, plaintiff only alleges 

omissions. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to tell her: (1) that she 

should exercise her stock options before they expire, and (2) that Rolf’s mental health 

had deteriorated. While plaintiff perhaps felt the consequences of those alleged failures 

within California, that does not convert defendants’ alleged failure to act into an 

“intentional act.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 806 (9th Cir. 

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2004) (“The result or consequence of the act is relevant, but with respect to the third part 

of the Calder test—harm suffered in the forum.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Because plaintiff has not shown that defendants committed an intentional act sufficient to 

create specific jurisdiction, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion.

Second, and independently fatal, the court finds that even if defendants’ omissions 

were intentional acts, they were not expressly aimed at California. The “express aiming” 

analysis “depends, to a significant degree, on the specific type of tort or other wrongful 

conduct at issue.” Picot, 780 F.3d at 1214. To be satisfied, the “express aiming” inquiry 

requires “something more” than “a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state.” 

A-Z Sporting, 704 F.3d at 675. In Walden v. Fiore, the Supreme Court explained that to 

comport with due process, the defendant’s relationship with the forum state “must arise 

out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum State.” 571 U.S. at 284

(emphasis in original). The contacts cannot be based on the “unilateral activity” of the 

plaintiff. Id. at 1123. Indeed, “the Supreme Court rejected [the] conclusion that 

defendants’ knowledge of [the plaintiffs’] strong forum connections, plus the foreseeable 

harm the plaintiffs suffered in the forum, comprised sufficient minimum contacts” to 

exercise specific jurisdiction. Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069-70 (discussing Walden; 

alterations in original). A defendant’s contacts must be with the forum state itself, not 

simply with persons who reside there. Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1070. 

Here, even assuming defendants committed an intentional act by failing to tell 

plaintiff to sell her stock options or by failing to tell plaintiff about Rolf’s mental health, 

neither of those actions targets California. Rather, those actions target plaintiff, who 

happens to reside in California. At most, plaintiff’s allegations show that defendants 

continued to expressly aim at plaintiff, regardless of the forum she resided in.2 That is 

not enough: The plaintiff “cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.” 

 

2

Indeed, plaintiff’s complaint and the conduct alleged therein would look nearly exactly 

the same if she happened to reside in a state other than California. That alone indicates 

that defendants only suit-related contact to California is plaintiff.

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Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. Accordingly, the court finds that defendants’ motion must be 

GRANTED for the additional reason that plaintiff has not shown that defendants’ alleged 

intentional acts, if any, expressly targeted California.

As the court finds that plaintiff has not shown that defendants purposefully directed 

their activities at the forum state—the first prong of the specific jurisdiction test—the court 

needs not reach the remaining two prongs of the test. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over 

Rolf CPA and Rolf. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED and 

plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 12, 2019

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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