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Parties Involved:
Kevin Holland
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 8, 1997 Decided July 8, 1997 

No. 96-3045

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

KEVIN HOLLAND,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

No. 96-3065

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(94cr00394-01 & 94cr00394-02)

Charles F. Daum argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant Kevin Holland.

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Adam H. Kurland, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed the briefs for appellant Andre L. Holland.

Robert D. Okun, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With him on the brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Steven D. Mellin, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Anne E. Pings and Thomas J. Tourish, 

Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: After pleading guilty to a conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, the brothers Holland

Kevin and Andrefiled motions to withdraw their pleas. 

The issues presented in these appeals center on the district 

court's rejection of those motions.

I

In 1993, three years after Andre Holland entered the drug 

business, he was caught selling crack cocaine to an undercover policeman. For his crime, the D.C. Superior Court sentenced him to 4-12 years' imprisonment, suspended the sentence and placed him on two years of supervised probation. 

Undeterred, Andre continued in the crack trade, enlisting his 

younger brother Kevin. Andre negotiated the deals. Kevin 

did deliveries. Some of the deliveries were to a government 

informant. The informant recorded his phone calls with 

Kevin and with Andre. Between August and September 

1994, Andre and Kevin sold the informant nearly 300 grams 

of crack cocaine. The police videotaped or photographed 

three of these transactions.

In October 1994, a grand jury returned a four-count indictment against the brothers, charging them with a conspiracy, 

from January 1, 1990, to October 6, 1994, to distribute crack 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and 

(b)(1)(A)(iii) (count one), and two counts of distributing 50 

grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii) (counts two and four). A third 

distribution count charged Kevin separately (count three).

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On November 30, 1995, on the eve of trial, Andre and Kevin 

accepted plea agreements offered by the government. Under 

the agreements, the brothers would plead guilty to count one 

(conspiracy). In return, the government would dismiss the 

remaining counts; stipulate that each defendant's "relevant 

conduct" for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines was limited to 150 to 500 grams of crack cocaine; and, pursuant to 

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(c), agree to a sentence of 15 years' 

imprisonment for Andre and 10 years' imprisonment for 

Kevin.

At the plea hearing, the district court announced that it 

would take the pleas but wait for presentence reports before 

pronouncing sentence. The prosecutor expressed concern 

that if sentencing were deferred, one of the brothers might 

withdraw his guilty plea, allowing the Holland who pled guilty 

to take full responsibility for the crimes at his brother's trial. 

To allay the government's concern, counsel for both Kevin 

and Andre conceded that the government would be prejudiced if the court permitted one of the defendants to withdraw his plea.

Pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, the court conducted an 

inquiry in which both Kevin and Andre stated they had been 

given adequate time and opportunity to discuss their cases 

with their attorneys, were satisfied with the assistance that 

their attorneys had provided them, and understood the rights 

they were waiving and the charge to which they were pleading guilty. The court informed them that they faced a 

mandatory minimum of ten years in prison, a maximum of life 

imprisonment, a maximum fine of $4 million, supervised release of at least five years, and a fine that would include the 

costs of imprisonment, supervised release and probation. Andre and Kevin said they understood. Defense counsel then 

discussed their understanding of the plea agreements. Andre's attorney said that if his client had been convicted after 

trial, he would have faced a sentence of 360 months to life 

imprisonment. Kevin's counsel said that if the same fate 

befell his client, the Guidelines would have dictated a sentencing "range of roughly 25 years, perhaps 26," based in part on 

Kevin's relevant conduct. Both Kevin and Andre stated that 

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1Andre's attorney admitted he had given his client erroneous 

advice about the sentence he would receive were he to go to trial 

and lose. The mistake, he said, resulted from his confusion about 

whether Andre would be classified as a career offender. He told 

the court, "I was very in some ways upset that I had told him those 

things, and that it turned out to be not quite accurate ... Mr. 

Holland is correct. I did tell him he was going to be a three-time 

loser, and it just slipped my mind." 

they understood their plea bargain and agreed with it. After 

confirming that no one had coerced either of them into 

entering their guilty pleas, and after listening to the government's summary of the evidence, the court accepted the pleas.

At Kevin's sentencing hearing in early February 1996, his 

attorney informed the court that Kevin wished to withdraw 

his guilty plea because he "maintains his innocence." Kevin 

told the court that he was "kind of pressured into taking this 

plea," and that his lawyer had not spent much time with him. 

He did not explain how he would defend against the charges, 

nor did he counter the government's reiteration that Kevin 

was both videotaped and audiotaped during the drug transactions. The court denied Kevin's motion to continue the 

sentencing hearing so that he could file a motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea, and proceeded to sentence Kevin to ten years' 

imprisonment, a $1,000 fine, and four years of supervised 

release.

Andre also attempted to withdraw his guilty plea. He sent 

a letter to the court in late February 1996, stating that he 

wanted to withdraw his plea because the presentence report 

indicated that he would be exposed to 19 years' imprisonment 

by pleading not guilty, not the 30 years to life his attorney 

had told him.1 He wrote, "[a]lso, I am innocent," although he 

did not explain the basis for that assertion. In early March 

1996, the court held a status conference. Andre expressed 

his desire to take back his guilty plea: he was pressured, he 

said, largely because he thought Kevin would benefit from 

treatment under the "safety valve" provision, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(f). He also repeated his assertion of innocence without offering anything in support. The court decided to defer 

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2The court adopted the government's arguments in opposition

that Andre's plea was taken in accord with Rule 11, that Andre had 

not advanced a legally cognizable defense to the charges against 

him, and that the government would be substantially prejudiced by 

the withdrawal of Andre's plea. 

sentencing, and allowed the government to file a written 

opposition. Andre's attorney said that he would not be filing 

anything further; he was in a "tricky situation" because 

Andre was claiming to have received erroneous legal advice. 

On April 15, the court refused to relieve Andre from his plea 

of guilty.2 Andre tried again on May 1, 1996, the date of 

sentencing. He raised ineffective assistance of counsel: his 

attorney did not intelligently advise him of the consequences 

of pleading guilty, and was "threatening, inducing, and forcing" him to plead guilty despite his professions of innocence. 

He also claimed to have entered his guilty plea as a result of 

"threats, intimidation, coercion and inducements" and he repeated his protestation of innocence. Denying the motion, 

the court sentenced Andre to 15 years' imprisonment, and 

five years' supervised release.

II

A

United States v. Hyde, 117 S. Ct. 1630, 1634 (1997), handed 

down while this appeal was pending, forecloses Andre's major 

argument. A defendant does not, as he supposes, have an 

absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea anytime before the 

court accepts the underlying plea agreement. A defendant 

cannot wipe the slate clean "simply on a lark," after he "has 

sworn in open court that he actually committed the crimes, 

after he has stated that he is pleading guilty because he is 

guilty, after the court has found a factual basis for the plea, 

and after the court has explicitly announced that it accepts 

the plea." 117 S. Ct. at 1634. 

FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e) allows the court to permit a defendant to withdraw his plea if the defendant "shows any fair 

and just reason." Andre says he made such a showinghis 

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plea was taken in violation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 because the 

district court did not know it was "wired," that is, linked to 

his brother's plea. The wiring of a plea is a "material detail" 

about which the court should be informed; such pleas "could 

be coercive, especially when family members are involved." 

United States v. Hernandez, 79 F.3d 1193, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 

1996) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Farley, 72 

F.3d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Here the district court should 

have been aware of the linkage between the pleas of Andre 

and Kevin, even though no one mentioned the word "wired." 

That the government could not abide a deal allowing one 

brother to plead guilty while the other went to trial became 

clear enough during the plea hearing. The court asked 

Andre if in any way he had been threatened or forced to 

enter his guilty plea. Andre answered no, thus signifying the 

voluntary nature of his action. A district court does not have 

to "undertake a special voluntariness inquiry when faced with 

a wired plea." Farley, 72 F.3d at 164. The Rule 11 

proceeding here sufficed.

Andre also thinks he met the "fair and just" standard by 

maintaining his innocence after he admitted guilt. But his 

claim of innocence went unsubstantiated. He says the government "pretargeted" him. Even if true, this would not 

make him any less guilty or his plea any less voluntary. See 

United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

He complains that his counsel's concessionthe government 

would be prejudiced if he were later allowed to withdraw his 

pleadenied him "his right to knowing participation in crucial aspects of the plea hearing." Brief for Andre Holland at 

26. We do not see how. Entering a plea is always a serious 

step. Almost always there is no turning back. Regardless of 

his attorney's concession, Andre must have realized as much. 

The court itself told him during the plea hearing: "if I find 

that you're voluntarily entering this plea today, you won't be 

able to withdraw it later."

Andre thinks he had an ineffective defense attorney and so 

the district court should have allowed him to plead anew. 

For his claim to succeed, the record would have to show that 

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sonableness, causing a "reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's errors, [Andre] would not have pleaded guilty and 

would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 

U.S. 52, 59 (1985). The record shows no such thing. True, 

Andre's attorney conceded prejudice. But consider the context. Andre had a favorable deal. Defense counsel thought 

things might fall apart if the court insisted on bifurcating 

acceptance of the plea and acceptance of the agreement. The 

government then might not want to run the risk of a plea 

withdrawal in the interim. The government made this argument to the court. And so Andre's lawyer offered his concession of prejudicea concession, we think, merely stating the 

obviousto keep the deal on track. This was by no stretch 

ineffective lawyering. (What we have just written applies 

equally to Kevin Holland and his attorney's identical concession.)

Nor was Andre denied effective assistance when his attorney balked at filing a response to the government's opposition 

to Andre's pro se withdrawal request. What exactly were the 

meritorious arguments the attorney could have made in Andre's favor? We are unable to identify any. Appellate 

counsel suggests none. A lawyer is not ineffective when he 

fails to file a frivolous pleading. United States v. Sayan, 968 

F.2d 55, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Wood, 879 F.2d 

927, 933-34 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

Andre's last point is this: his guilty plea is void because the 

government narrowed the time frame of the conspiracy without resubmitting the indictment to the grand jury. While the 

indictment charged a drug conspiracy from "on or about 

January 1, 1990 to on or about October 6, 1994," Andre pled 

to a conspiracy from August 1994 to October 6, 1994. The 

court had no jurisdiction to accept his plea, he contends, 

because the charge was neither returned by a grand jury nor 

prosecuted by information upon proper waiver. This argument goes nowhere. "As long as the crime and the elements 

of the offense that sustain the conviction are fully and clearly 

set out in the indictment, the right to a grand jury is not 

normally violated by the fact that the indictment alleges more 

crimes or other means of committing the same crime." Unit

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ed States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 136 (1985). In Miller, the 

government chose to prove only parts of an indictment at 

trial. Narrowing the indictment by confining the evidence 

"added nothing new to the grand jury's indictment and 

constituted no broadening." Id. at 145. So here. Paring 

down the conspiracy's time frame added no new charges to 

the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 

1343, 1355-57 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Poindexter,

719 F. Supp. 6, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1989). (That the judgment of 

conviction reflects the conspiracy period in the indictment, 

rather than the period reflected in Andre's plea, is a clerical 

error that should be corrected by motion to the district court 

pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 36.)

B

Kevin Holland also thinks he did not get effective assistance from his counsel. Kevin's lawyer supposedly did not 

spend enough time advising him of the consequences of 

pleading guilty. Kevin told the district court something quite 

different. Asked whether he had "adequate time and opportunity to discuss this case with Mr. Grimm, your attorney?," 

Kevin answered "yes." We have been given no reason to 

doubt the truth of his answer.

Kevin's attorney allegedly failed to conduct a reasonable 

investigation into an entrapment defense. What entrapment 

defense? No prejudice results from a lawyer's not looking 

into a potential defense unless it "likely would have succeeded 

at trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. We have no idea why Kevin 

thinks he was entrapped and hence no basis for determining 

that he might have persuaded a jury to buy the defense.

Yet another instance of ineffectiveness supposedly occurred 

at the plea hearing. Kevin's attorney told the court that 

"after discussions with the United States, and what they 

anticipated that the relevant conduct was," Kevin was facing 

"roughly" 25 years' imprisonment if he went to trial. The 

presentence report states that Kevin's conviction on all counts 

would have put him in a Guideline range of 151 to 188 

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3The criteria are: (1) that the defendant not have more than one 

criminal history point; (2) that he did not use or threaten violence 

or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connection with 

the offense; (3) that the offense did not result in a death or serious 

bodily injury; (4) that the defendant was not a leader or manager of 

others in the offense and was not engaged in a continuing criminal 

enterprise; and (5) that he has truthfully provided to the government all information and evidence he has concerning his offense or 

offenses "not later than the time of the sentencing hearing." 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(f). 

ney made a mistake. Matters are not so simple. The 

government points out that the probation officer failed to 

consider Kevin's relevant conduct, and that more than 2 

kilograms of cocaine base would have been attributed to 

Kevin on this basis, raising his offense level to 38 and putting 

his Guideline range at 235 to 293 months, close to what his 

attorney calculated. In accepting the plea bargain, Kevin 

avoided the risk that the government's relevant conduct 

position would prevail. Besides, the plea agreement gave 

Kevin a sentence significantly lower than even bottom of the 

range mentioned in the presentence report. It is unlikely in 

the extreme that Kevin would have chosen to go to trial if his 

attorney had told him what his Guideline range would be 

without any relevant conduct. See United States v. Horne,

987 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Two more instances of alleged ineffective assistance remain. Kevin says his attorney never told him of the safetyvalve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The provision requires 

the court to sentence a defendant "without regard to any 

statutory minimum sentence" and to "impose a sentence 

pursuant to" the Guidelines if the defendant satisfies five 

criteria.3See United States v. DeJesus-Gaul, 73 F.3d 395 

(D.C. Cir. 1996). In the first place, it is doubtful whether 

Kevin actually was in the dark about the safety valve. His 

brother informed the district court, during one of his attempts to withdraw his guilty plea, that he was pressured into 

entering his plea partly because Kevin "was told that he 

would benefit from a safety valve." In the second place, 

Kevin's purported ignorance was of something that did not 

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matter. If he had not pled guilty, the government would 

have tried him on all four counts charged in the indictment. 

If he had been convicted on all counts (which were closely 

related), his total offense level would have put him in a 

guideline range of 151 to 188 months (without considering 

relevant conduct). See Presentence Investigation Report at 

10; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 5 Pt. A. The 

bottom of that range is two years higher than the mandatory 

minimum of ten years, yet 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) is "limited to 

departures from statutory minimum sentences and does not 

authorize downward departures from the Guidelines." United States v. Gaston, 68 F.3d 1466, 1468 (2d Cir. 1995). Since 

the safety valve would not have applied, there scarcely was 

any pressing need for Kevin's attorney to educate him about 

it. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

All that remains is Kevin's complaint about his attorney's 

performance at the sentencing hearing. At Kevin's urging, 

the attorney asked the court for time to file a motion to 

withdraw Kevin's guilty plea, stating that "Mr. Holland maintains his innocence." When the court indicated that the 

motion would be frivolous, Kevin's counsel replied that "[a] 

factual predicate for this motion may not lie" and that he had 

"tried to explain that to Mr. Holland." Kevin suffered no 

harm from these remarks. His attorney made them after the 

court said "I don't see how you have a good faith basis" for 

such a motion. We do not see one either. The court took 

Kevin's plea in compliance with Rule 11. Kevin solemnly 

admitted his guilt. A stack of audio and video tapes capturing his crimes belied his later profession of innocence.

Affirmed.

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