Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01278/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01278-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary Ames
Appellee
Chris Coles
Appellee
Robert Hawk
Appellee
Richard McCormick
Appellee
Terry W. Mobley
Appellant
Dan Sutherland
Appellee
US West Communications, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

TERRY W. MOBLEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

RICHARD McCORMICK, C.E.O. of U S 

West, Inc.; GARY AMES, President 

of US West Communications, Inc.; 

CHRIS COLES; ROBERT HAWK; DAN 

SUTHERLAND; U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, 

INC., a Colorado Corporation, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

.F:II;.ED U ruted i3tates ut.tud of .AppgJa Tenth Circuit · · 

NOV f 4 JVPI 

No. 94-1278 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 94-F-905) 

Terry W. Mobley, on the brief pro se. 

Jerry R. Atencio, Englewood, Colorado, on 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before TACHA, BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

the brief for 

Appellate Case: 94-1278 Document: 01019299953 Date Filed: 11/14/1994 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Terry Mobley, a pro se litigant, appeals the decision of the 

district court dismissing his race discrimination lawsuit. Our 

jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we reverse and 

remand. 

Mr. Mobley initially filed a lawsuit in Colorado State Court 

complaining of various forms of racial discrimination under Title 

VII. After the case was removed to federal court in January 1993 

(No. 93-F-126), various disputes arose over discovery issues and 

over the relationship between Mr. Mobley and his counsel. A 

hearing was thereafter held before a magistrate judge who, on 

November 10, 1993, recommended that the case be dismissed without 

prejudice pursuant to Rule 37(b) (2) (C) based on the plaintiff's 

willful and repeated noncompliance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and orders of court. The magistrate judge also 

recommended that if the matter were to be refiled, Mr. Mobley 

must: (1) be represented by counsel; (2) prepay his counsel; and 

(3) pay all amounts previously owed by Mr. Mobley to his attorneys 

and the defendant. The district court adopted the recommendation 

in its entirety. 

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In March 1994, Mr. Mobley filed the present complaint in 

federal court (No. 94-F-905) without complying with the conditions 

imposed at the time of the dismissal of the first complaint. On 

May 12, 1994, the district court, pursuant to a motion filed by 

defendants, dismissed the second action with prejudice under Rule 

12(b) (6), reasoning that Mr. Mobley's failure to comply with the 

conditions of the court's earlier order dismissing the first law 

suit was tantamount to a failure to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted. 

On appeal, Mr. Mobley raises eight issues. Seven of the 

issues he appeals relate to the trial court's dismissal of the 

first action. The eighth issue is phrased in general terms, 

merely alleging "Plaintiff no[w] comes before the Court to appeal 

the district court's order, dated May 12, 1994." 

A. 

With respect to the seven issues relating to the district 

court's dismissal of the first lawsuit, we must make the threshold 

determination of whether those issues are properly before us on 

appeal. Specifically, we must decide whether the district court's 

order dismissing the first action without prejudice constituted an 

appealable final order. If so, then we have no jurisdiction to 

review those claims because Mr. Mobley's notice of appeal is 

untimely under Rule 4(a). See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 

486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988) (timely filing of a notice of appeal is 

"mandatory and jurisdictional"). If, however, the district 

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court's order was interlocutory in nature and nonappealable, then 

we may review those claims. 

Precedent establishes the rule that in determining whether an 

order of dismissal is appealable, we must examine whether the 

district court dismissed the complaint or the action. See Petty 

v. Manpower, Inc., 591 F.2d 615, 617 (lOth Cir. 1979). A 

dismissal of the complaint is ordinarily a non-final, 

nonappealable order (since amendment would generally be 

available), see Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 511 F.2d 1033 

(lOth Cir. 1975), while a dismissal of the entire action is 

ordinarily final. 

In Petty, we stated the focus must necessarily be on "the 

district court's intent in issuing its order." Petty, 591 F.2d 

at 617. In that case, the district court dismissed a pro se civil 

rights complaint without prejudice as a sanction under Rule 4l(b). 

We concluded the district court intended to dismiss the action, 

rather than simply the complaint, and therefore, found the order 

appealable. Id. In the present case, the district court 

dismissed Mr. Mobley's entire case, albeit without prejudice, as a 

Rule 37(b) (2) sanction. Although the dismissal was without 

prejudice, we believe the district court's clear intent was to 

dismiss the entire case and to permit Mr. Mobley to file a new 

action only upon compliance with certain conditions. Accordingly, 

we believe the district court's order dismissing the first action 

was an appealable final judgment. Mr. Mobley's failure to file a 

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timely notice of appeal relative to that action means we are 

without jurisdiction to consider the claims relating to that 

action. Accordingly, we consider only whether the district court 

properly dismissed Mr. Mobley's second action for noncompliance 

with the terms of the initial dismissal order. 

B. 

It is important to understand the nature of the district 

court's order dismissing this action. We cannot agree with the 

district court's determination that this complaint should have 

been dismissed under Rule 12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim. 

The nature of a Rule 12(b) (6) motion tests the sufficiency of the 

allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking 

those allegations as true. See Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 

997 (lOth Cir. 1991). Mr. Mobley's complaint, which we construe 

liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), is 

clearly sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b) (6) motion. 

Rather, the avowed basis for the district court's decision to 

dismiss this action was that the "Plaintiff has failed to abide by 

the Order [dismissing the first lawsuit]." See Order of May 12, 

1994, at 1. Thus, the district court's rationale for dismissing 

this lawsuit was noncompliance with the conditions of the 

dismissal of the first lawsuit. This is, in substance, an 

involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b)l and not a dismissal 

1 Rule 41(b) vests the district courts with discretion to 

dismiss an action "[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 

to comply with ... any order of court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 

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for failure to state a claim. Therefore, we will not elevate form 

over substance and we will treat the order of dismissal as a Rule 

4l(b} involuntary dismissal. We review the imposition of 

sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. Cf. National 

Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 

(1976} (per curiam} (Rule 37(b} (2} sanctions reviewed for abuse of 

discretion}; accord M.E.N. Co. v. Control Fluidics, Inc., 834 F.2d 

869, 872 (lOth Cir. 1987}. 

In Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916 (lOth Cir. 1992}, we 

affirmed a district court's imposition of an order dismissing the 

plaintiff's complaint with prejudice as a sanction under Rule 

37 (b) (2} (C). We first reaffirmed our statement in Meade v. 

Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512 (lOth Cir. 1988}, that "[b]ecause dismissal 

with prejudice 'defeats altogether a litigant's right to access to 

the courts,' it should be used as a 'weapon of last, rather than 

first, resort.'" Id. at 1520 n.6 (citations and internal 

quotations omitted} . We then stated that a trial court 

considering Rule 37 sanctions "should ordinarily" consider various 

criteria "on the record" prior to dismissing a complaint. 

Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 921. These criteria include: "(1} the 

degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2} the amount of 

interference with the judicial process; ... (3} the culpability of 

the litigant; (4) whether the court warned the party in advance 

that dismissal of the action would be a likely sanction for 

noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions." Id. 

(internal citations omitted) . 

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Although Ehrenhaus dealt with sanctions for misconduct under 

Rule 37 relative to the discovery process, we cited the five 

criteria set out in that decision with approval in Jones v. 

Thompson, 996 F.2d 261, 264 (lOth Cir. 1993). Jones involved a 

district court's order dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint with 

prejudice "for noncompliance with court orders." Id. at 262. The 

decision in that case relied upon three different rules of civil 

procedure: Rule 16(f), Rule 37(b) (2) and Rule 41(b). Id. at 264. 

Jones' partial reliance on Rule 41(b), coupled with the fact that 

we see no principled distinction between sanctions imposed for 

discovery violations and sanctions imposed for noncompliance with 

other orders, leads us to conclude that Rule 41(b) involuntary 

dismissals should be determined by reference to the Ehrenhaus 

criteria. 

Unfortunately, the record on appeal contains no indication 

the trial court considered these criteria.2 The short, threeparagraph order merely recites Mr. Mobley failed to comply with 

the conditions contained in the order dismissing the original suit 

and concluded this case should be dismissed. The actions of the 

district court were simply not consonant with the dictates of 

Jones and Ehrenhaus. The trial court's failure to evaluate and 

2 At most, the district court considered two of these criteria, 

namely, Mr. Mobley's culpability and whether he was on notice that 

dismissal was a potential sanction. No mention was made as to any 

countervailing considerations, such as the degree of actual 

prejudice to the defendants and the efficacy of lesser sanctions, 

nor was there a finding as to the interference vel non with the 

judicial process as a whole. 

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weigh these relevant factors prohibits this court from engaging in 

any meaningful review of the trial court's decision. Accordingly, 

we must hold this failure amounts to an abuse of discretion. 

Moreover, due to the severity of the sanction actually imposed, we 

are particularly concerned with the trial court's failure to 

consider whether a lesser sanction would be appropriate in order 

to achieve the purposes behind sanctioning a recalcitrant 

litigant. See Jones, 996 F.2d at 265 ("[D]ismissal is a severe 

sanction and is not ordinarily warranted if lesser sanctions would 

be effective."). 

We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and 

remand this case for such other and further action as may be just 

and proper in accordance with this opinion. In so doing, we 

intimate no opinion as to what the decision of the trial court 

should be on remand. All we hold here is that the present state 

of the record does not permit us to make an informed decision of 

whether the trial court adequately considered the criteria 

relevant to deciding the appropriate sanction in this case, and if 

so, whether the decision was within the broad zone of permissible 

discretionary rulings vested in the district court. 

We recognize pro se litigants place great burdens on the 

judicial system. Nevertheless, all litigants have a right to have 

their cases decided under the applicable law which, in this case, 

is embodied in Jones and Ehrenhaus. The crux of the holdings in 

those cases is trial courts should not dismiss cases without first 

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• 

considering all significant aspects of the decision to dismiss. 

Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's order imposing the 

sanction of dismissal with prejudice and we REMAND the case for 

further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. 

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