Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03053/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03053-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Doe

Anthony J. Gantt
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 16, 1998 Decided March 10, 

1998

Released April 7, 1998

No. 97-3053

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Anthony J. Gantt, a/k/a Fats,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cr00317-02)

William B. Moffitt argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

John L. Brownlee, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee, with whom Mary Lou Leary, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John R. Fisher, Thomas

C. Black and William J. O'Malley, Assistant U.S. Attorneys,

were on the brief.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Wald and Rogers, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: In February 1997, a jury convicted

Anthony J. Gantt ("appellant" or "defendant") of two criminal

counts related to the possession and distribution of cocaine.

Gantt's representation prior to and during trial was marked

by confusion. In the weeks leading up to the trial, he grew

dissatisfied with the performance of his attorney, (hereinafter

"Attorney X"), and Attorney X withdrew from the case in

favor of another attorney. It was then discovered that

Attorney X, during the time he represented Gantt, simultaneously represented another man (hereinafter "John Doe")

who--apparently without Attorney X's knowledge--had been

questioned by prosecutors in connection with Gantt's case.

Meanwhile, Gantt's new attorney moved to continue the trial

for 30 days, because he needed to rethink his trial strategy

after learning that Gantt had made incriminating statements

during a "debriefing" session with the Government earlier in

the proceedings. The District Court granted a two-day continuance.

Gantt now raises three challenges to his conviction, claiming that: (1) Attorney X rendered ineffective assistance because of a conflict of interest; (2) the District Court erred in

refusing the 30-day continuance; and, (3) the District Court

erred by allowing the jury to see, during deliberations, only

two one-hour videotapes that had been shown during trial,

rather than the full 72 hours of videotapes that were submitted into evidence. Although the handling of this case by

counsel left something to be desired, we can discern no

reversible error by the District Court. Accordingly, appellant's conviction is affirmed.

I. Background

A.The Offense

The offense leading to the trial in this case occurred on

February 1, 1995. The evidence offered by the Government

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to prove the offense was largely uncontested, because appellant presented no testimony at trial. The facts were as

follows.

On February 1, 1995, Gantt and another man, Olden Minnick, drove to a retail store located in the Northwest section

of the District of Columbia. At the time, the store was

subject to extensive electronic and physical surveillance by

agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA

agents"). After Gantt and Minnick parked and entered the

store, a DEA agent established that the car in which Minnick

and Gantt arrived was registered to Minnick. Gantt and

Minnick eventually emerged from the store, with Gantt carrying a white plastic bag. The two got in the car and drove

away, with Minnick at the wheel. DEA agents followed and

called for additional help.

The car carrying Minnick and Gantt stopped at a traffic

light near 16th Street and Columbia Road, and officers from

the Metropolitan Police Department quickly pulled in front of

and behind the car. An officer who approached the passenger side of the car saw Gantt sit upright and stare straight

ahead. When the officer shined his flashlight on Gantt and

tapped the window, Gantt did not respond. Another officer

approached the driver's side of the car. Both officers then

heard the automatic door locks "click" down. After apparent

communication between Minnick and Gantt, the car drove

over a concrete island and sped away. During the ensuing

chase by the police, Minnick threw a bag containing several

blocks of cocaine out of the driver's side window. Minnick

and Gantt succeeded in evading the police. The police did not

arrest Gantt until November 5, 1996, at which time he was

charged with conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 846, and possession with

the intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii).

B.Pre-Trial Proceedings

The facts pertaining to the pre-trial proceedings implicating Gantt were not in dispute before the District Court, see

Hearing Tr. (4/25/97) at 56-57 (adopting chronology of events

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set forth in Government's Opposition To Defendant's Motion

For a New Trial, Crim. No. 96-317-02(JR) (filed Apr. 24,

1997) ("Government's April 1997 Motion")), and for the most

part are not in dispute on appeal. The undisputed record

shows that John Doe, who was represented by Attorney X,

was questioned by prosecutors about the Gantt case in the

spring or summer of 1996. Subsequently, Doe signed a plea

agreement in connection with charges then pending against

him; he was then called to testify before a grand jury.

Attorney X was unaware that Doe had been questioned by

prosecutors about the Gantt matter.

Following an indictment filed on September 17, 1996, police

officers arrested Gantt on November 5, 1996. At Gantt's

presentment, a colleague of Attorney X appeared on behalf of

the defendant, stating that he was standing in for Attorney X.

Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") Richard Edwards, who had been handling the investigation of the events

that took place on February 1, 1995 (hereinafter "February

1995 incident"), attended the presentment. However, Edwards failed to recognize--as did apparently every other

AUSA who had contact with Doe and Gantt--that a potential

conflict of interest resulted from Attorney X's simultaneous

representation of Doe and Gantt.

The parties provide conflicting accounts as to when Attorney X entered his first formal appearance on behalf of Gantt.

According to Gantt, Attorney X appeared at a status conference on November 25, 1996, at which trial was set for

February 3, 1997. See Appellant's Br. at 7. According to the

Government, Attorney X first appeared at a status conference

on January 3, 1997, at which the February trial date was

confirmed. See Government Br. at 9; Government's April

1997 Motion, at 5. Attorney X claims that he saw Gantt at

the D.C. Jail during the week of November 16-22, 1996, "to

finalize representation arrangements as well as to advise

defendant of the best legal course of action to take."

Ex Parte Motion for CJA Appointment, Crim. No.

96-317-02(JRR) (filed Jan. 22, 1997), at 2. Following his

discussions with Gantt, Attorney X says that he arranged for

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defendant to be debriefed and had a second colleague accompany Gantt to the debriefing. See id.

In any event, the parties apparently agree that the second

colleague of Attorney X represented Gantt at a status hearing

on November 15, 1996. Around that time, the second colleague told AUSA Edwards that Gantt was interested in

pleading guilty in the case and cooperating with the Government. Subsequently, on November 27, 1996, the second

colleague and Gantt attended a Government debriefing,

where Gantt, after signing a letter stating that his remarks

could be introduced at trial for cross-examination purposes,

discussed the February 1995 incident and spoke of other drug

dealers in the area and of the assistance he could provide.

AUSA Edwards was not present at the November 27 debriefing.

With the second colleague still representing Gantt, the

parties reached a tentative arrangement to enter into a plea

agreement. However, at the request of Attorney X, AUSA

Edwards did not seek actual entry of the plea until after

January 1, 1997. The court released Gantt on personal

recognizance on December 11.

As it turned out, Gantt never entered a guilty plea. During

the three weeks after the January 3, 1997, status conference,

Gantt, by his own account, "became dissatisfied" with Attorney X and sought the services of another lawyer, Antoini

Jones. Appellant's Br. at 3, 8. During the week of January

12, 1997, Attorney X informed AUSA Edwards that he was

going to withdraw from the case in favor of Jones. On

January 22, 1991, Attorney X moved to withdraw as Gantt's

counsel "based upon irreconcilable differences," stating that

defendant had "refused counsel's advice concerning a plea

offer made by the government." Motion to Withdraw as

Counsel of Record, Crim. No. 96-317-02(JRR) ("Motion to

Withdraw"). At a hearing held the same day, Jones entered

an appearance on behalf of Gantt and informed the court that

he was replacing Attorney X. At that hearing, Jones informed the court that he would be ready for trial on February 3, 1997. See Hearing Tr. (1/31/97) at 2.

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On January 27, 1997, Attorney X sent a letter to AUSA

Edwards stating that he had just learned of Doe's involvement in the case. Attorney X stated that no one from the

United States Attorney's Office had told him that Doe had

been questioned in connection with Gantt's case, and that he

had just learned of it a few days earlier when Doe himself

told him for the first time. Attorney X further stated that he

had never been present during any debriefing of Doe where

Gantt was discussed, nor did he know that Doe had been

called to testify before a grand jury. Attorney X asserted

that he was unaware of the conflict issue at the time he was

advising Gantt concerning the plea offer and trial options.

On January 31, 1996, Jones moved for a 30-day continuance because he had just learned of Gantt's debriefing by the

Government on November 27, 1996. Jones claimed that he

would now have to "regroup and come up with another trial

strategy." Hearing Tr. (1/31/97) at 5-6. The District Court,

noting that moving back the trial date would cause substantial

scheduling problems, granted Gantt a two-day continuance.

See id. at 13-14.

C.Trial and Post-Trial Proceedings

On February 5, 1997, a jury trial commenced. The Government's evidence included four video tapes from surveillance of

the store involved in the February 1995 incident; testimony

from DEA agents and from police officers who stopped and

approached the car allegedly carrying Minnick and Gantt

before it sped away; and fingerprint evidence gathered from

the wrapping of the package that was thrown from the car

during the chase. During the course of the trial, after an

evidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied Gantt's motion in

limine asking the Court to exclude for impeachment purposes

all statements by Gantt during his debriefing. Gantt then

decided not to testify. Gantt's attorney waived opening statement and offered no evidence on behalf of Gantt. The jury

convicted Gantt on February 7, 1997.

Gantt moved for a new trial, contending, inter alia, that

Attorney X's simultaneous representation of Doe and Gantt

before Jones took over Gantt's case violated the latter's right

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to a fair trial. On April 25, 1997, the District Court denied

Gantt's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to a prison

term of 135 months, an eight year period of supervised

release, and a one hundred dollar special assessment. This

appeal followed.

II. Analysis

A.The Conflict of Interest Challenge

Gantt argues on appeal, as he did to the District Court in

his motion for a new trial, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment as a

result of Attorney X's simultaneous representation of both

Doe and appellant. Because Doe was questioned by prosecutors about the Gantt case, appellant argues that Attorney

X had a conflict of interest that caused him to be ineffective

in rendering pre-trial advice to Gantt. Appellant's counsel

observes in this regard that, "[d]uring this time period, [Attorney X] arranged to have Mr. Gantt waive his Fifth

Amendment rights, make self-incriminating statements, and

attempted to convince Mr. Gantt to plead guilty." Appellant's Br. at 24.

A criminal defendant succeeds on an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment if he shows that

"an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's

performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).

A defense attorney has an "actual conflict" when he is "required to make a choice advancing [another client's] interests

to the detriment of his client's interest." United States v.

Bruce, 89 F.3d 886, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation

omitted); see also United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 252

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 635 (1997). By making the

required showing under Cuyler, a defendant avoids the more

stringent two-part test for ineffective assistance set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires

proof "(1) that counsel's performance was deficient, falling

'below an objective standard of reasonableness,' and (2) that

the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, depriving

him of a fair trial." Bruce, 89 F.3d at 893 (quoting StrickUSCA Case #97-3053 Document #343335 Filed: 04/07/1998 Page 7 of 16
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land, 466 U.S. at 687, 688). Where a defendant meets the

Cuyler test, prejudice is presumed. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 692; Thomas, 114 F.3d at 252.

Gantt cannot succeed under Cuyler for the simple reason

that Attorney X, during his representation of appellant, did

not know that prosecutors had questioned Doe about the

Gantt case. In other words, no "actual conflict" existed. The

chronology of pre-trial proceedings provided by the Government, and relied upon by the District Court without challenge

from appellant, see Hearing Tr. (4/25/97) at 56-57, shows that

Attorney X never knowingly chose between advancing Doe's

interests and advancing those of Gantt. It was only after

Attorney X ceased his representation of Gantt that Doe

informed Attorney X that he had been questioned about

Gantt's case. Government's counsel--most notably AUSA

Edwards--failed to make the connection that Attorney X

represented both Doe and Gantt until Attorney X wrote to

him with that information. Thus, even if Attorney X advised

Gantt to be debriefed by the Government or plead guilty, he

did so without knowing of any possible connection between

Gantt and Doe. Under these circumstances, Attorney X did

not face an "actual conflict," so he did not render ineffective

assistance on that ground. See United States v. Hopkins, 43

F.3d at 1116, 1117 (6th Cir. 1995) ("A conflict is hypothetical

where, as here, the attorney does not in fact know of the

conflict from the dual representation.").

Furthermore, on the record at hand, Gantt cannot show

that any alleged conflict "adversely affected" Attorney X's

performance. That element of the Cuyler test requires Gantt

to demonstrate that the conflict had "some negative effect

upon his defense (defined as 'an actual lapse in representation')." United States v. Shark, 51 F.3d 1072, 1076 (D.C. Cir.

1995) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50). Here, appellant

makes no serious argument that Attorney X (or any other

attorneys in his place) would have acted differently on Gantt's

behalf had he (or they) known about Doe's involvement at an

earlier stage in the proceedings. In other words, appellant

fails to articulate a strategy that would have been employed

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by a defense counsel upon learning of Doe's involvement that

was not followed in this case.

Gantt contends that, "had Mr. [Attorney X] promptly notified the district court of his conflict, the district court would

have had no choice but to remove him as Mr. Gantt's counsel

due to the conflict." Appellant's Br. at 29. Appellant does

not make clear the implications of this hypothesis. Surely,

the mere fact that another attorney would have taken over

the case does not demonstrate that Attorney X was deficient

in representing Gantt. We might take appellant to mean that

another attorney in place of Attorney X would have advised

Gantt to forgo the debriefings with the Government. However, we are at a loss to understand why this would have been

viewed as a good strategy. Presumably, if Gantt had declined to meet with the Government in November 1996, he

would have been free to testify on his own behalf without fear

of impeachment from the debriefing materials. However, it

is uncontested that the Government's affirmative case against

Gantt, based upon testimony of officers, fingerprint evidence,

and videotapes of the store, would have remained formidable.

Indeed, Gantt suggests nothing that he or other witnesses

might have said to refute or diminish the prosecution's case.

Moreover, during the hearing held on April 25, 1997, on

defendant's motion for a new trial, the District Court found it

"very clear" from testimony provided by Attorney X that,

before Gantt's debriefing, the defendant was primarily concerned with obtaining his release from detention prior to the

Christmas holiday and with avoiding incarceration for the

charged offenses. Hearing Tr. (4/25/97) at 53-54. Thus, it is

unsurprising that Gantt, even in hindsight, fails to articulate a

reason why Attorney X's advice that he cooperate with the

Government would have been unsound, even if the fact of

Doe's conversations with the Government had been known to

Attorney X or another attorney in his stead. Assuming,

arguendo, that another attorney might have advised Gantt

differently, the mere possibility that appellant would have

refused a debriefing in these hypothetical circumstances does

not, by itself, demonstrate that there was a "lapse of representation" in the instant case.

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To further support his contention that Gantt suffered adverse effects from Attorney X's conflict, Gantt argues that

Attorney X's actions in Gantt's case were "strongly, if not

solely, motivated by his ability to collect a fee.... [A]s far

as his ability to earn a fee, the most expedient course of

action for [Attorney X] was exactly what took place in the

instant case--allow the conflict to remain undisclosed and

advise Mr. Gantt to enter into a plea agreement so that there

will be no trial." Appellant's Br. at 29. This allegation is

either (1) an implicit assertion that Attorney X actually knew

of the conflict, which he failed to disclose so that he could

increase his fee, or (2) an alternative theory of an "actual

conflict"--i.e., that Attorney X was forced to choose between

advancing his own pecuniary interests and mounting an effective defense on behalf of Gantt. Neither claim demonstrates

an actual lapse in representation, because neither explains

why Gantt should not have agreed to the debriefing.

Furthermore, Gantt did not argue to the District Court,

nor does he make a serious argument in his briefs on appeal,

that Attorney X actually knew at some earlier stage about

Doe's involvement. Gantt presents no evidence that Attorney

X failed to disclose any knowledge of the conflict in order to

maximize his fee. Thus, we reject as unsupported the suggestion that Attorney X knew of Doe's activities at the same

time that he represented Gantt, and that Attorney X intentionally delayed informing the other parties of this information until after his representation of Gantt had ended.

We also reject the suggestion that Attorney X's desire to

maximize his fees itself constituted an "actual conflict." As a

theoretical matter, it is possible for a conflict to arise when a

criminal defendant's interests are adverse to his or her

lawyer's pecuniary interests. See Daniels v. United States,

54 F.3d 290, 294-95 (7th Cir. 1995) (remanding for evidentiary

hearing on defendant's claim that lawyer pressured defendant

into accepting plea); Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 307-08

(2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that contingency fee created an

actual conflict of interest for trial counsel). But the claim

that Attorney X attempted to maximize his fee by encouraging Gantt to plead guilty makes no sense, because Attorney X

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presumably would have earned a larger fee if, rather than

entering a guilty plea, Gantt had decided to proceed with a

trial with Attorney X as his counsel. Gantt offers nothing to

contradict the obvious.

In sum, Gantt's claim of ineffective assistance fails under

the Cuyler test, because there is no showing of an actual

conflict, nor is there any showing that any alleged conflict

adversely affected Attorney X's performance.

B.The Challenge to the Denial of 30-Day Continuance

Gantt also argues that the District Court committed reversible error in granting him only a two-day continuance for the

start of his trial, from February 3, 1997, to February 5,

rather than the requested 30-day continuance. Attorney

Jones filed the motion for the continuance on January 31,

1997--three days before the scheduled start of appellant's

trial--claiming that he needed the extra time to obtain an

expert witness and "prepare an adequate defense." Motion

for Continuance, Crim. No. 96317-02(JRR) (filed Jan. 31,

1997) ("Continuance Motion"). Jones noted in the motion

that he had not received Gantt's files from Attorney X until

January 27, 1997, at which time Jones was engaged in a trial

in an unrelated case. See id. Jones further noted that on

January 29, 1997, he was advised by Government counsel of

"crucial information that would have a major impact on

defendant's trial strategy," id.--that is, that Gantt had made

incriminating statements in the debriefing. In granting only

a two-day continuance, the District Court explained that it

simply did not have another opening on its calendar within

the next 90 days.

The Supreme Court has made clear that "[n]ot every

restriction on counsel's time or opportunity to investigate or

to consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for trial

violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel[,]"

as "judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in

scheduling trials." Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983).

In short, "[a] trial judge enjoys great discretion in ruling on a

motion for a continuance," and such rulings are reviewed only

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tion." United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 96 (D.C. Cir.

1990). Among the factors to be weighed by a court in

considering a motion for a continuance are:

the length of the requested delay; whether other continuances have been requested and granted; the balanced

convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses,

counsel, and the court; whether the requested delay is

for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to

the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a

continuance; whether the defendant has other competent

counsel prepared to try the case, including the consideration of whether the other counsel was retained as lead

or associate counsel; [and] whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to defendant's

case, and if so, whether this prejudice is of a material or

substantial nature.

United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C. Cir.

1978) (footnotes omitted); see also Poston, 902 F.2d at 97. In

deciding whether the District Court abused its discretion in

denying a request for a continuance, the appellate court must

assess "the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time

the request is denied," Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589

(1964), and remain mindful that trial judges necessarily require great latitude in scheduling trials.

On the record before us, we conclude that the District

Court acted within its discretion in denying the request for a

30-day continuance. Gantt's second defense counsel told the

Court when he took over the case on January 22, 1997, that

he was ready to go to trial. Thus, it was not unreasonable for

the trial judge to view with skepticism the reasons proffered

by defense counsel for the 30-day continuance. Moreover,

the District Court indicated it would have been greatly inconvenienced by the long continuance, in part because the Court

had relied upon defense counsel's statement of readiness

when the Court approved Jones' replacement of Attorney X

in the case. See Hearing Tr. (1/31/97) at 2, 13. Furthermore,

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ery" when he moved to withdraw as counsel; that Attorney X

indicated that, if necessary, he would be prepared to go to

trial on the original date; and that all of Attorney X's files

and discovery were available to Jones. Motion to Withdraw,

at 2. Although the Court's concern about its docket is not

dispositive of the question of whether to grant a continuance,

see Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. at 589, the trial judge could

legitimately question the reasons for delay proffered by defense counsel in light of counsel's earlier attestations of

readiness.

It is also noteworthy that Gantt's defense counsel made no

specific proffer justifying a need for more time. Counsel

suggested that his primary motivation for seeking the continuance was his finding out about the incriminating statements

made by Gantt during the November 27, 1997, debriefing,

which he claimed "totally destroy[ed] the trial strategy [he]

had prepared." Hearing Tr. (1/31/97) at 5. However, counsel

did not articulate to the District Court, nor does he demonstrate on appeal, any "identifiable prejudice" that is "material

or substantial [in] nature," Burton, 584 F.2d at 491, resulting

from the denial of the continuance. Defense counsel effectively conceded to the District Court that the "problem"

posed by the debriefing would not "get any better" with the

passage of a month. Hearing Tr. (1/31/97) at 5. Defense

counsel filed a motion in limine just before trial, seeking to

prevent the use of the debriefing statements for purposes of

impeachment during the trial, but Gantt does not now argue

that the District Court erred in denying the motion and

allowing the Government to use the debriefing material, nor

does Gantt explain how the motion in limine could have

improved with time. Moreover, as discussed above, Gantt

makes no serious argument that he would have declined to

engage in the debriefing session had it been known at the

time that Doe had been questioned by prosecutors.

Other arguments by Gantt similarly fail to show prejudice

resulting from the District Court's denial of the 30-day

continuance. In claiming in his motion for a continuance that

he wanted time to "obtain the needed expert," Continuance

Motion, defense counsel presumably was referring to his

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desire to obtain a witness in order to challenge the Government's fingerprint evidence. Gantt has renewed this argument on appeal, asserting that the Government's fingerprint

expert found only 13 points of comparison between defendant's prints and prints recovered by the Government in

connection with the February 1995 incident, where the average fingerprint has between 75 and 150 comparable characteristics. See Appellant's Br. at 10-11; Reply Br. at 5.

However, at no point in the proceedings has appellant expressly claimed that an expert witness, in light of these facts,

would testify that the Government's fingerprint evidence was

unreliable. Thus, Gantt's claim that the Government's fingerprint evidence could have been rebutted remains entirely

speculative. See Poston, 902 F.2d at 98 ("Mere assertions

regarding the utility of prospective testimony do not provide

a sufficient basis to compel a continuance" where there is no

indication that the "testimony would have been material and

favorable."). In any event, Gantt's attack on such evidence

does not account for other evidence--such as videotape evidence--demonstrating his involvement in a conspiracy, and

the fact that the drugs were tossed from Minnick's car during

the chase.

Gantt also makes passing reference on appeal, as he did

before the District Court, to the trial counsel's need for time

to "interview a government witness" prior to trial. Appellant's Br. at 21; see also Hearing Tr. (1/31/97) at 13. This

argument is unconvincing, given that Jones did not articulate

at the pretrial hearing what witness he sought to interview

and what his line of inquiry would be. See Poston, 902 F.2d

at 98. Gantt's complaint that Jones was unable to review all

of the Government's exhibits before trial, see Appellant's Br.

at 22-23; Reply Br. at 6, is likewise vague and conclusory.

Although the Government does not dispute that it waited

until January 30, 1997, to disclose certain evidence obtained

from electronic surveillance, and to request further fingerprinting of Gantt, see Continuance Motion, Gantt provides no

persuasive argument that this burden was significant in the

context of the trial.

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Gantt's counsel makes one last argument in support of

Gantt's contention that he was wrongly denied a 30-day

continuance. At oral argument, defense counsel urged that, if

the District Court had found out about Attorney X's potential

conflict before trial, the Court would have granted a longer

continuance to whomever took over Gantt's case. Thus, the

argument goes, it would be unfair to deny Gantt a new trial

simply because the trial judge did not have access to all

relevant information at the time the judge denied the longer

continuance. Indeed, we do not know whether the District

Court would have been more sympathetic to Jones' request

for a continuance if it knew that Attorney X had a conflict in

the case. Nevertheless, the possibility that the Court would

have acted differently under these circumstances does not

demonstrate that extra time would have materially benefitted

appellant. When all is said and done, we can discern no

prejudice resulting from the District Court's denial of the

continuance.

C.Challenge to District Court's Response to Jury's Video

Request

Gantt's final challenge to his conviction is his claim that the

District Court committed reversible error by allowing the

jury to view only two one-hour video tapes introduced into

evidence by the Government. At trial, the Government introduced 72 hours of video tapes--exhibits number 31 and 29--

which were taken, in part, on the evening of February 1,

1995, of the front door and window of the store visited by

Gantt and Minnick. See Trial Tr. (2/5/97) at 182. Later, the

Government introduced two "one-hour segments from the 72-

hours"--exhibits 30 and 32. Id. at 374. The Government

played the shorter tapes, exhibits 30 and 32, for the jury

during trial, see id. at 383, but did not play the longer tapes.

After the parties' closing arguments, the trial judge told the

jury that for technical reasons it would not have access to any

of the video tapes during deliberations unless the jury made a

special request. During the deliberations, the Court received

a note from the jury that said: "May we please see the video

on the small T.V." Trial Tr. (2/7/97) at 448. The trial judge

then made arrangements for the jury to view only the two

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one-hour video tapes, stating that he did not want the jury

"getting into the 72-hour versions." Id. at 454.

Because Gantt's counsel did not object to the District

Court's arrangements for the video tapes at trial, we review

for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

733-36 (1993). Under this standard, "the court is to determine: '(1) whether there is unwaived legal error, (2) whether

the error is "plain" or "obvious" under current law and (3)

whether the error was prejudicial.' " United States v. Winstead, 74 F.3d 1313, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting United

States v. Warren, 42 F.3d 647, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). We also

inquire whether the alleged error "seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."

Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (internal quotation omitted).

Gantt argues that the District Court's decision with regard

to the tapes usurped the jury's role as fact-finder and thereby

deprived appellant of his Constitutional right to trial by jury.

We disagree. The District Court's decision was neither

surprising nor problematic given the circumstances in which

the jury made its request: the jury saw only the shorter

tapes at trial; the shorter tapes were condensed from the

longer tapes; and the jury asked only that it "see the video."

In this situation, there was no requirement that the District

Court give the jury the longer tapes. Had an objection been

raised and an issue framed, suggesting either that the trial

judge had misunderstood or ignored the jury's request for the

longer tapes, or that the jury would be misled by viewing only

the shorter tapes, then a different question would be posed.

But no such question has been raised. Indeed, Gantt can

point to no prejudice that he suffered because of the jury's

failure to view the longer tapes. In short, nothing that the

trial judge did amounted to error, much less "plain error."

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, appellant's conviction is affirmed.

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