Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04667/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04667-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Defendant
Susan Mae Polk
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUSAN MAE POLK,

Plaintiff,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-4667-PJH 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Before the court is the motion of plaintiff Susan Mae Polk for relief from judgment 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Having read plaintiff’s papers and 

carefully considered her arguments and the relevant legal authority, the court hereby 

DENIES the motion.

Rule 60(b) “provides for extraordinary relief and may be invoked only upon a 

showing of exceptional circumstances.” Harris v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 2014 WL 

4129342, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014); see also Harvest v. Castro, 5e31 F.3d 737, 749 

(9th Cir. 2008). Rule 60(b) provides that “[o]n motion and on just terms, the court may 

relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding,” 

based on (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 

evidence; (3) fraud or misrepresentation by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; 

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; or (6) any other ground that 

justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

Here, plaintiff does not specify the subsection of Rule 60(b) under which she 

seeks relief. She does not assert newly discovered evidence, fraud, or void or satisfied 

Case 4:14-cv-04667-PJH Document 72 Filed 02/02/16 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

judgment. Thus, subsections (b)(2) through (b)(5) are not applicable. Nor is subsection 

(b)(6) applicable. A motion under Rule 60(b)(6) must be based on grounds not covered 

by subsections (b)(1) through (b)(5). Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528-29 (2005). 

“Judgments are not often set aside under Rule 60(b)(6).” Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & 

Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006). This provision is used sparingly as an 

equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice where circumstances beyond the party’s 

control prevented him/her from taking action in a timely manner to avert or correct an 

erroneous judgment. Fantasyland Video, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 996, 

1005 (9th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 

1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff has argued no such circumstances here. 

That leaves subsection (b)(1). Under Rule 60(b)(1), the court has discretion to 

correct a judgment for mistake or inadvertence, either on the part of counsel or the court 

itself. See Fidelity Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp. 387 F3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 

2004). Here, none of the arguments plaintiff makes in her motion support reconsideration 

of the court’s ruling on summary judgment and entry of judgment in favor of defendant. 

First, some of the points plaintiff makes in her motion are simply efforts to reargue 

her prior summary judgment motion or her opposition to defendant FBI’s motion. “It is not 

the proper function of a Rule 60(b) motion to reargue matters that have already been 

litigated.” Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 304 F.Supp.2d 1174, 1178 (D. Ariz.

2003). A district court does not abuse its discretion by denying a Rule 60(b) motion 

where the movant merely reargues issues raised previously. See Am. Ironworks & 

Erectors Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Here, for example, plaintiff contends that the court "overlooked" the FBI's 

"admission" in its answer and affirmative defenses that the requested file "496768RB1" 

exists; and that the court "overlooked" the fact that plaintiff did not style her FOIA request 

as a FOIPA request. Plaintiff made both these arguments in the prior summary judgment 

motions, and the court did in fact address the issues, though perhaps not in the manner 

plaintiff wanted. 

Case 4:14-cv-04667-PJH Document 72 Filed 02/02/16 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Second, several assertions made by plaintiff in this motion are simply not true. For 

example, she claims that she submitted FOIA requests in 2011, 2013, and 2014; but the 

court previously noted that she had presented evidence of only a single request in June 

2013. Similarly, plaintiff’s contention that the court was wrong in finding that the FBI did 

not receive her June 2013 FOIA request until it was served with the complaint in the 

present action, because the FBI “ignored” her June 27, 2014 FOIA request (referring to 

the motion for injunctive relief she filed in her federal habeas case), is without merit for 

the reasons explained in the January 7, 2016 order. Plaintiff also claims that the court 

erred in finding that she had asserted the requested file "496768RB1" was part of an 

"active investigation," but the court notes that plaintiff argued in her motion that she 

"discovered that there was an active investigation by the FBI associated with my name" 

when she obtained access to the Contra Costa "Bail Study."

Third, other arguments made by plaintiff are incorrect as a matter of law. She 

contends that the fact that she disputes the FBI's claim that there is no FBI file with the 

number "496768RB1" is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact. However, as the court 

indicated in the January 7, 2016 order, plaintiff's belief that the reference to "496768RB1" 

is a reference to an FBI investigation of her is "unsupported." Absent evidence sufficient 

to raise a question as to whether such a file existed, plaintiff cannot show – in the face of 

the FBI's evidence that there is no investigative file – that the existence of the file is 

"disputed." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-56 (1986).

Plaintiff also asserts that the court's description of the excerpt of the Contra Costa 

"Bail Study" as "unauthenticated" was error. In her motion for summary judgment, 

plaintiff stated that "Exhibit A is a true copy of the page from the Bail Study, redacted to 

conceal my date of birth and driver's license number, filed by the county in People v. 

Polk, supra, in 2003." Exhibit A to plaintiff's declaration in support of her motion for 

summary judgment consists of three pages. None of the pages states that they are 

portions of a “Bail Study.”

Case 4:14-cv-04667-PJH Document 72 Filed 02/02/16 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The first page (marked with a page number "6" at the bottom) is headed 

"Attachment" and plaintiff's name appears in the upper right corner. It bears a fax 

transmission header, which appears to show transmission from “WC Superior Court” on 

September 30, 2003, as page 15 of 16. This page includes entries for "Aliases" (blank); 

"DOB" (redacted"); "CII" ("A22656611"); "DMV" (redacted); "CDC" ("none"); "FBI" 

("496768RB1"); and "CYA" ("none"). Under "DMV History" is written "The defendant has 

a valid California driver license." It is the reference to “496768RB1” on this page that 

provides the sole basis for plaintiff’s claim that the FBI at some point investigated her. 

The second page (marked with a page number "5" at the bottom) also includes 

plaintiff’s name in the upper right corner. It bears a fax transmission header, which 

appears to show transmission from “WC Superior Court” on September 30, 2003, as 

page 14 of 16. It has entries for "Failures to Appear" ("Criminal: none"); "Traffic" ("none"); 

and "Defendant's record" ("The defendant has no criminal record"). Underneath this is 

the statement "Respectfully Submitted, Steven L. Bautista, County Probation Officer;" 

which is followed by signatures reading "Shirley Osborne, Deputy Probation Officer, Adult 

Division, Martinez;" and "Approved by John R. [Indecipherable] for Nancy Valencia, Unit 

Supervisor." At the bottom are the notations "Dictated: 9/18/03" and "Typed: 9/18/03," 

followed by the line "Read and considered" with an indecipherable signature notated 

"Judge."

The third page is entitled "Clerk's Certification of Transcript," and purports to be a 

certification from Deputy Clerk Beverly Masinas of the Contra Costa Superior Court, that 

the “foregoing Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal consist[s] of pages 1 through 4568, inclusive,” 

and that it is “a full, true and correct copy of the Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal in case 

number: 031668-7, In re People v. Susan Polk,” filed in the Clerk’s Office “on the 

respective dates endorsed thereon and now remaining on file herein.” The certification is 

signed (“Beverly Masinas”) and dated March 4, 2008. This page does not refer to the 

“Bail Study,” and does not include a fax transmission header suggesting it might have 

been transmitted with the other two pages from the Superior Court.

Case 4:14-cv-04667-PJH Document 72 Filed 02/02/16 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

“Authentication” is a special aspect of relevancy, concerned with establishing the 

genuineness of evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) (authentication is a “condition precedent 

to admissibility,” and this condition is satisfied by “evidence sufficient to support a finding 

that the matter in question is what its proponent claims”). The general requirement that 

documents be authenticated through personal knowledge when submitted in a summary 

judgment motion “is limited to situations where exhibits are introduced by being attached 

to an affidavit” of a person whose personal knowledge is essential to establish the 

document is what it purports to be – that it is authentic. Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 

764, 778 n.24 (9th Cir. 2002). Where documents are otherwise submitted to the court, 

and where personal knowledge is not relied upon to authenticate the document, the 

district court must consider alternative means of authentication under Federal Rules of 

Evidence 901(b)(4). Id. at 777-78. 

Thus, public records may under certain circumstances be self-authenticating, 

which means they need no extrinsic foundation. Id. That is, public records may be 

authenticated by means of, e.g., a clerk’s certification. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)(2), (4). 

Here, however, while plaintiff claims the document is self-authenticating based on the 

attached “Clerk’s Certification of Transcript,” there is nothing in the two pages preceding 

the certification to indicate that they are part of a “Bail Study,” and absolutely nothing to 

connect the certification to the document itself. Moreover, even were the alleged “Bail 

Study” properly authenticated, it would still not constitute evidence sufficient to raise a 

triable issue in this case, as stated in the prior order. 

The court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish any ground for relief from 

judgment. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2016

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:14-cv-04667-PJH Document 72 Filed 02/02/16 Page 5 of 5