Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01256/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01256-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Billy Lee Jarvis
Appellee
Local 435 Delivery Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers
Not Party
Nobel/Sysco Food Services Company
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

BILLY LEE JARVIS, ) 

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} 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. 

Plaintiff-Appellant/ 

Cross/Appellee, 

NOBEL/SYSCO FOOD SERVICES COMPANY, ) 

and 

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant, 

LOCAL 435 DELIVERY DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

} 

) 

) 

) 

un1J'sJJ,eottJ1pp,a1, Tenth Circuit 

APPEALS 

FEB 12 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 91-1225 

91-1256 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D. C. 90-S- 1314) 

David L. Smith, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant/CrossAppellee. 

Theodore Olsen (James E. Hautzinger and Andrew W. Volin on the 

briefs) of Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado, for DefendantAppellee/Cross-Appellant Nobel/Sysco Food Services Company. 

Eugene A. Duran, General Counsel, Delivery Drivers, Warehousemen 

and Helpers, Local Union No. 435 , Denver, Colorado, for DefendantAppellee Local 435. 

Before McKAY , Chief Judge, SETH and BRORBY, Circuit Judges 

McKAY, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-1256 Document: 010110170345 Date Filed: 02/12/1993 Page: 1 
Plaintiff, Billy Lee Jarvis, was employed by Defendant Nobel/ 

Sysco Food Service Company and was a member of Defendant Delivery 

Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 435 . On 

September 21, 1988, he took a leave of absence from Nobel because 

of a work-related injury to his left wrist. He returned to work 

under medical restrictions on August 21, 1989, but was asked to 

leave within three hours. On September 22, 1989, Nobel terminated 

his employment pursuant to a provision in the collective bargaining agreement limiting leaves of absence to twelve months. 

Plaintiff presented a grievance through the Union claiming 

that his brief return on August 21 began a new twelve-month leave 

of absence period under the collective bargaining agreement. 

After several months, the Union informed him in writing that his 

grievance would not be processed. The letter also noted that the 

Union did not believe he had a valid claim against Nobel. 

Plaintiff then filed suit against both Nobel and the Union. 

Against Nobel, Plaintiff claimed (1) breach of the collective bargaining agreement in violation of§ 301 of the Labor-Management 

Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988); (2) handicap discrimination in violation of the Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-301 et 

.§filL. (1988); and (3) retaliatory discharge in violation of 

Colorado case law. Against the Union, he claimed (1) breach of 

the duty of fair representation in violation of§ 301, and (2) 

aiding and abetting Nobel's handicap discrimination. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-1256 Document: 010110170345 Date Filed: 02/12/1993 Page: 2 
After answering the complaint, Nobel and the Union both 

sought to dismiss the case. Nobel moved for summary judgment, 

while the Union moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 

The district court converted the Union' s motion to dismiss into a 

motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment as to 

everything except the state retaliatory discharge claim. Having 

dismissed all the federal claims, the district court declined to 

exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim. 

Plaintiff appealed, and Nobel cross-appealed. 1 

We affirm. 

I 

The first issue presented is the propriety of granting summary judgment to Nobel and the Union on the§ 301 claim. The 

plaintiff's burden in these cases was laid out by the Supreme 

Court in Local No. 391 v. Terry. 110 s. Ct . 1339 (1990) . 

Because most collective-bargaining agreements accord 

finality to grievance or arbitration procedures established by the collective-bargaining agreement, an 

employee normally cannot bring a§ 301 action against an 

employer unless he can show that the union breached its 

duty of fair representation in its handling of his 

grievance. Whether the employee sues both the labor 

union and the employer or only one of those entities, he 

must prove the same two facts to recover money damages: 

that the employer's action violated the terms of the 

collective-bargaining agreement and that the union 

breached its duty of fair representation. 

Id. at 1344 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has also held 

1 Since neither party presents any issues on appeal regarding the dismissal of the handicap discrimination claim, we do not consider it. 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-1256 Document: 010110170345 Date Filed: 02/12/1993 Page: 3 
that a duty of fair representation (DFR) claim must show that the 

union's "conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit 

is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, 

386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). 

As Nobel pointed out in its motion for summary judgment, 

Plaintiff presented no evidence showing that the Union breached 

its duty of fair representation. Accordingly, the district court 

granted summary judgment to both Nobel and the Union. 

A 

Plaintiff asserts that he was unable to meet the motion for 

summary judgment because he was not given an opportunity to conduct discovery. In support of this contention, he filed an 

affidavit in the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) 

stating his inability to meet Nobel's summary judgment motion 

without further discovery. 2 Thus, he claims, the court erred in 

dismissing his complaint without giving him a fair chance to 

respond. 

Plaintiff's 56(f) affidavit (the relevant portion of which is 

set out below), 3 however, was deficient in two key ways . First, 

2 Rule 56(f) provides that a court may decline a motion for 

summary judgment if "a party opposing the motion ... cannot for 

reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the 

party's opposition." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). 

3 [T]he Plaintiff cannot present by affidavit facts 

essential to justify his opposition to the Motion 

because essential facts are exclusively in the knowledge and control of the opposing party .... 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-1256 Document: 010110170345 Date Filed: 02/12/1993 Page: 4 
it merely states in conclusory tenns that he is unable to obtain 

the information and that he could conduct discovery if given more 

time . This is inadequate. While we agree that 56(f) affidavits 

"should be treated liberally unless dilatory or lacking in merit," 

Patty Precision v. Brown & Shar_pe Mfg. Co ., 742 F. 2d 1260, 1264 

(10th Cir. 1984), our cases have established that this kind of 

conclusory affidavit is insufficient. 

[A] mere assertion "that the evidence supporting a 

[party' s] allegation is in the hands of the [opposing 

party] is insufficient to justify a denial of a motion 

for summary judgment under Rule 56(f) . " Rather, the 

party filing the affidavit must show how additional time 

will enable him to rebut movant's allegations of no genuine issue of fact. 

Id. (citations omitted).4 

Secondly, and more importantly, both the 56 (f) affidavit and 

Plaintiff's personal affidavit are entirely focused on the circumstances of his dismissal from the company. Neither document makes 

any reference to the conduct of the Union other than to note that 

the grievance was withdrawn. Given Plaintiff's burden of proving 

the elements of a DFR breach, he could not avoid summary judgment 

Additional time will enable the Pl aintiff to take 

depositions and conduct other discovery regarding 

Defendant Nobel/Sysco' s reasons for terminating the 

Plaintiff from his employment. 

(Appellant's App. at 22 . ) 

4 At oral argument, Jarvis's counsel claimed that the holding 

of Patty Precision is no longer good law because of the Supreme 

Court's intervening statement that the requirements for summary 

judgment are "qualified by Rule 56(f) ' s provision that summary 

judgment 0e refused where the nonrnoving party has not had the 

opportunity to discover information that is essential to his 

opposition. " Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 u.s. 242, 250 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-1256 Document: 010110170345 Date Filed: 02/12/1993 Page: 5 
under Rule 56(f) without detailing by affidavit the evidence he 

expected to discover regarding the Union's decision not to pursue 

h . . 5 is grievance. 

B 

Plaintiff also claims that, without regard to his 56(f) 

affidavit, Nobel is not entitled to summary judgment on this 

record. Primarily, he claims that under Celotex Co;r:p. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317 (1986), Nobel's motion is insufficient because it 

failed to present any evidentiary materials in support of Nobel's 

contention that the Union did not commit a DFR breach. 

This argument is without merit. The question addressed in 

Celotex was whether the failure to present any evidentiary materials necessarily dooms a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff 

claims that Celotex answered in the affirmative. In fact, the 

Supreme Court unequivocally rejected this position, stating that 

n.5 (1986). On the contrary, this footnote was merely a notation 

that Anderson did not alter the traditional provisions of Rule 

56 (f) • 

Counsel also claimed at oral argument that this standard 

makes it impossible to prove labor claims such as this, where the 

knowledge of the basis for dismissing the grievance is known only 

to a hostile party. This argument misses the point. When a 

plaintiff has no evidence whatsoever that his union committed a 

DFR breach, but merely suspects that he could find such evidence 

if given a chance, he is not entitled to pursue such a fishing 

expedition in federal court . 

5 In supplemental authority presented to the district court 

after the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff 

argues that he is not required to prove a DFR breach if "his 

attempts to exhaust contractual remedies were rendered futile by 

the concerted handicap discrimination between the Company and the 

Union alleged in ... his complaint." (Appellant's Opening Br. 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-1256 Document: 010110170345 Date Filed: 02/12/1993 Page: 6 
it "find[s] no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the 

moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar 

materials negating the opponent's claim." .Is;L_ at 323 . 

II 

Plaintiff claims that the entry of summary judgment in favor 

of the Union was unfair because he did not receive adequate notice 

that the Union's motion to dismiss had been converted into a 

motion for summary judgment. Ordinarily, we would give such a 

claim extremely close scrutiny, as "[t]he notice of conversion of 

a Rule 12 motion to a Rule 56 motion and the consequences of a 

failure to notify are serious business." Prospero Assocs. v. 

Burroughs Corp. , 714 F.2d 1022, 1020 (10th Cir. 1983) (McKay, J., 

dissenting) . However, under the facts of this case, we affirm. 

Initially, we note that Plaintiff had an opportunity to 

object to the conversion of the Rule 12 motion to a Rule 56 

motion . At the beginning of hearing on the motions to dismiss, 

the court stated, "[The Union] has filed a motion to dismiss . . . 

which I assume we will treat as a summary judgment since it was 

at 11.) He cites Glover v. St . Louis - San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 

U.S. 324 (1969) and Varra v. Dillon Cos •. 615 F. 2d 1315 (10th Cir. 

1980) . 

The cases cited do not support his argument . They are proce- dural cases that merely state that under certain circumstances, 

plaintiffs are not required to pursue every aspect of the grievance process prior to filing suit. Neither defendant, however, 

has claimed that Plaintiff's suit is unripe because of failure to 

exhaust contractual remedies. These cases are entirely inappli- cable to the need to prove a DFR breach. 

7 

Appellate Case: 91-1256 Document: 010110170345 Date Filed: 02/12/1993 Page: 7 
filed subsequent to the actual complaint." (Appellant's App. at 

230.) If this assumption was incorrect, it was the duty of 

Plaintiff's counsel to request more time to respond to the conversion. No such request was made. 

This issue is controlled by Prospero, supra, which has very 

similar facts. In both cases the opposing party had actual notice 

that the Rule 12 motion was being converted to a Rule 56 motion, 

and in both cases the opposing party failed to object. In one 

crucial way, this case is clearer than Prospero--exactly the same 

issue was properly raised in a summary judgment motion by a codefendant and was explicitly discussed in the codefendant's brief. 

Thus, Plaintiff may not be heard to complain that he did not 

receive "an adequate opportunity to respond to [a] new issue." 

Prospero, 714 F.2d at 1028 (McKay, J., dissenting). In fact, having affirmed as to Nobel, were we to reverse as to the Union, nonmutual collateral estoppel would likely provide a second basis for 

a grant of summary judgment. We therefore find no error. 

III 

Plaintiff further claims that the district court abused its 

discretion by declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the 

remaining state retaliatory discharge claim against Nobel. The 

record reveals that the district court dismissed all the federal 

claims before trial. 

had been conducted. 

Further, the record shows that no discovery 

The only activity relevant to the retaliatory 

discharge claim was the district court's denial of Nobel's motion 

8 

Appellate Case: 91-1256 Document: 010110170345 Date Filed: 02/12/1993 Page: 8 
for summary judgment on federal preemption grounds. Under such 

circumstances, the district court's dismissal of the state claims 

was not an abuse of discretion. 6 

IV 

In the district court, Nobel moved for summary judgment on 

the retaliatory discharge claim on the basis of preemption by§ 

301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 u.s.c. § 185 

(1988). After the district court denied this motion, but granted 

summary judgment on all other claims, Plaintiff attempted to pursue discovery for this claim. Nobel then filed a motion asking 

the district court to decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction 

over this sole remaining state law claim. The district court 

granted this motion. 

Nobel now seeks to cross- appeal from the denial cf its earlier motion for summary judgment on preclusion grounds. Nobel 

asks that this court reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the retaliatory discharge claim with prejudice . Essentially, 

it argues that while it was the party moving for dismissal without 

prejudice, it retains its right to appeal the district court's 

ruling on the prior summary judgment motion. 

6 Because we affirm the dismissal of this claim, we do not 

reach the discovery issues relating to it that Plaintiff presents. 

9 

Appellate Case: 91-1256 Document: 010110170345 Date Filed: 02/12/1993 Page: 9 
A 

As an initial matter, we must consider our jurisdiction over 

this appeal. The posture of this cross-appeal is a bit unusual, 

as Nobel has prevailed both in the district court and on the primary appeal. This fact does not, however, bar Nobel from pursuing 

its appeal. 

While it is the general rule that a party cannot appeal 

from a judgment in his favor, the rule is not absolute, 

and where a judgment gives the successful party only 

part of that which he seeks and denies him the balance, 

with the result that injustice has been done him, he may 

appeal from the entire judgment . 

Automobile Ins. Co. v. Barnes-Manley Wet Wash Laundry Co., 168 

F.2d 381 , 386 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S . 859 (1948). 

In addition, Nobel did not waive this issue by subsequently 

moving to dismiss without prejudice on jurisdictional grounds. 

Nobel had already requested a dismissal with prejudice, which the 

district court had denied . Nobel was now facing the possibility 

of a long and costly litigation on the remaining issue, which it 

might avoid through the jurisdictional dismissal . Having failed 

to achieve its ultimate goal , it was entitled to take what they 

could and appeal . "A party may accept what is securely his and 

appeal seeking more. " Kuba v. Ristow Trucking Co. , 811 F . 2d 1053, 

1055 (7th Cir. 1987). 

This view of our jurisdiction is supported by Deposit 

Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326 (1980) , in which the 

Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff who fully prevailed on the 

merits of his suit to appeal the denial of class certification. 

10 

Appellate Case: 91-1256 Document: 010110170345 Date Filed: 02/12/1993 Page: 10 
While acknowledging the general rule that "only a party aggrieved 

by a judgment or order of a district court may exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom," id. at 333, the Court stated: 

"In an appropriate case, appeal may be permitted from an adverse 

ruling collateral to the judgment on the merits at the behest of 

the party who has prevailed on the merits, so long as that party 

retains a stake in the appeal satisfying the requirements of Art . 

III." ML. at 333-34. The Court cited Electrical Fittings Cor_p. 

v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939), in which the defendant 

who prevailed on a patent infringement suit on the grounds of noninfringement was nonetheless entitled to appeal a determination 

that the patent was valid. Roper, 445 U.S. at 334-35. The Roper 

Court concluded that if a successful appeal would alter either 

litigation costs, as in Roper itself, or the future application of 

issue preclusion, as in Electrical Fittings. the personal stake 

requirement of Article III was met. Roper, 445 U.S. at 336-37. 

In this case, a successful appeal by Nobel would eliminate 

any possible re-filing of the retaliatory discharge claim in state 

court. As avoiding a state court suit would substantially reduce 

Nobel's future litigation costs, we find that Nobel has the requisite stake in this appeal. 

Nobel also has a valid stake in the preclusive effects of the 

trial court's decision. Because the preemption issue was raised 

and determined on motions for summary judgment, and because the 

trial court's ruling was essential to its decision to dismiss 

11 

Appellate Case: 91-1256 Document: 010110170345 Date Filed: 02/12/1993 Page: 11 
without prejudice on jurisdiction grounds rather than with prejudice on the merits, the requirements of issue preclusion are met. 

See Ten Mile Indus. Park v. Western Plains Serv. Cor:p., 810 F.2d 

1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1987); Restatement (Second} of Judgments§ 

27 cmts. d & j (1982) . The fact that this issue involves the 

application of legal principles to a given set of facts does not 

block issue preclusion. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 

147, 162-63 (1979) (stating that issue preclusion applies toquestions of law unless they "involv[e] unrelated subject matter"); 

Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 27 (referring to "an issue of 

fact or law"); id. § 27, reporter's note at 264 ("the Section is 

now applicable to questions of law and law application as well as 

questions of fact"); 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4425 at 243 ("Preclusion generally is appropriate if both the first and second action involve application of 

the same principles of law to an historic fact setting that was 

complete by the time of the first adjudication."). 

Pell v. Azar Nut Co., 711 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1983), is also 

not to the contrary. In that case, we dismissed the appeal of a 

defendant who, like Nobel, was aggrieved by a dismissal without 

prejudice. The trial court, however, had explicitly "refuse[d] to 

decide" the merits of the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 

Id. at 950 (quoting the record in that case). As such, the defendant presented "an issue not passed upon below," which appellate 

courts generally will not consider. Singleton v . Wulff, 428 U.S. 

106, 120 (1976) ; Pell, 711 F . 2d at 950 . In contrast, the district 

12 

Appellate Case: 91-1256 Document: 010110170345 Date Filed: 02/12/1993 Page: 12 
court in the present case ruled upon Nobel's motion, so~ is 

not on point. 

We conclude that when a district court denies sununa.ry judgment on the merits, and then exercises its discretion to decline 

pendent jurisdiction, the moving party is "a party aggrieved by a 

judgment," Roper, 445 U.S. at 333, and has an appeal as of right 

on the merits of the denial of sununa.ry judgment. 7 

B 

The issue of preemption of retaliatory discharge cases is 

controlled by Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef. Inc,, 486 

U.S. 399 (1988), in which the Supreme Court found no preemption. 

In Lingle. a worker brought a retaliatory discharge claim after 

his employer, accusing him of filing a false workers compensation 

7 Great American Audio com, v. Metacom. Inc., 938 F.2d 16, 19 

(2d Cir. 1991), and Armotek Industries. Inc. v, Employers Insurance Co., 952 F.2d 756, 759 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991), are not to the 

contrary. Both cases merely state that when a prevailing party 

urges an alternate ground in support of the judgment that the 

trial court rejected, it may argue that as appellee and not as 

cross-appellant. The parties cross-appealing in these cases were 

not asking that the judgment itself be altered in any way, only 

that the reasoning underlying it be altered. Thus, their crossappeals were dismissed. 

The denial of a cross-appeal to the parties in those cases is 

not inconsistent with allowing Nobel's cross-appeal. An affirmance that did not address their arguments did not expose those 

appellees to increased litigation costs, because the judgment 

would not change. Similarly, they did not face the risk of future 

issue preclusion, because, given their complete victories below, 

any conclusions of the trial court adverse to their interests necessarily were not essential to the judgment. 

13 

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claim, fired him pursuant to a "just cause" provision of the collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court stated: 

[The elements of retaliatory discharge under Illinois 

law] pertain[] to the conduct of the employee and the 

conduct and motivation of the employer. Neither of the 

elements requires a court to interpret any term of a 

collective-bargaining agreement. To defend against a 

retaliatory discharge claim, an employer must show that 

it had a nonretaliatory reason for the discharge; this 

purely factual inquiry likewise does not turn on the 

meaning of any provision of a collective-bargaining 

agreement. Thus, the state-law remedy in this case is 

"independent" of the collective-bargaining agreement in 

the sense of "independent" that matters for§ 301 preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim 

does not require construing the collective-bargaining 

agreement. 

Id. at 407 (citations omitted). 

The Court, however, did not foreclose the possibility that 

some retaliatory discharge claims may be preempted, as in some 

instances adjudication of the claims may require interpretation of 

the collective-bargaining agreement. Id. at 408 -10. Indeed, 

research has revealed two cases where unusual facts or law did 

lead to preemption in retaliatory discharge cases. Doran v. 

Thermatex Cor:p., No. C88-873Y, 1989 U. S . Dist . Lexis 16312, at 

*10, 1989 WL 163700, at *3 (N. D. Ohio July 31, 1989) (preemption 

does not apply because the complaint, while citing retaliatory 

discharge, was "based upon the claim that the employer engaged in 

an erroneous interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement,") cited in Marshall v. TRW. Inc . , 900 F . 2d 1517, 1522 (10th 

Cir. 1990); Magerer v. John Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525, 529 (1st 

Cir. 1990) (Massachusetts retaliatory discharge law specifically 

14 

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deferred to the terms of the applicable CBA}. 

In every other case we have found, however, including 

Marshall, supra; Davies v. American Airlines. 971 F.2d 463 (10th 

Cir. 1992) (interpreting the Railway Labor Act under Lingle}; and 

Lathrop v. Entenmann's. Inc., 770 P.2d 1367 (Colo. ct. App. 1989), 

the courts have not found preemption. The essential reason was 

expressed in Davies, applying Oklahoma law: 

The gravamen of [this] action is that American's actual 

or primary motivation in firing [the plaintiff], irrespective of any "just cause" it may have had under the 

CBA, was to stop his unionizing activity. Thus, we 

hold, pursuant to Lingle and Marshall, that Davies' ... action does not require interpretation of the CBA 

and is therefore not preempted . ... 

Davies, 971 F.2d at 466. So long as the state law cause of action 

is concerned not with the employer's contractual right to discharge the employee, but rather with its motives in exercising 

that right, the CBA is not relevant and preemption does not apply. 

This situation is present under Colorado law. The tort of 

retaliatory discharge evolved as an exception to the historic 

right of employers to terminate employees at will. MartinMarietta Cor;p. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 104-05 (Colo. 1992). The 

purpose of these actions was to override the contractual rights of 

the employer, whatever they may be, when the employer's motive in 

exercising those rights "contravenes a clear mandate of public 

policy." ~ at 107 (quoting Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 

P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984)). Thus, in a retaliatory discharge 

suit under Colorado law, the employer's contractual rights are not 

15 

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relevant, because any such rights give way to the employee's statutory right to be free from retaliation. Plaintiff's retaliatory 

discharge claim is therefore not preempted by§ 301. 

Attempting to escape from this rule, Nobel argues that the 

CBA did not allow it to fire Plaintiff--it required the termination of his employment. Therefore, Nobel states, "Nobel's nonretaliatory explanation for Jarvis' termination requires an interpretation of the [CBA] ." {Br. of Nobel at 38-39.) We disagree . 

Rather, we view Nobel's non-retaliatory explanation of Plaintiff's 

termination as merely their interpretation of the CBA. So long as 

this interpretation was made in good faith and actually motivated 

Nobel's actions, they present a good defense without regard to the 

correctness of the interpretation. Assuming without deciding that 

Plaintiff has sufficient evidence of a retaliatory motive to 

present a genuine issue for trial, Nobel's contention that it was 

motivated by its understanding of the CBA is a factual matter for 

the jury, not a legal interpretation of the CBA, which remains in 

the province of a labor arbitrator. 

Nobel's argument is not substantially different from that 

rejected in Davies, where the defendant argued that it dismissed 

the plaintiff pursuant to a "just cause" provision of the CBA. We 

stated in that case that "[elven if the employee violated the 

employer's rules, giving the employer 'just cause' to discharge 

him, the question is whether the employer's motivation for the 

discharge was the rule violation or retaliation for an activity 

16 

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protected by the retaliatory discharge law." Davies, 971 F.2d at 

466. Similarly, the question in the present case is whether the 

employer's motivation for the discharge was its understanding of 

the CBA or retaliation. In neither case is the correctness of the 

employer's interpretation of the CBA at issue. 

We conclude that the retaliatory discharge claim does not 

require interpretation of the CBA, and is therefore not preempted 

by§ 301. 

We AFFIRM. 

17 

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