Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03209/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03209-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Peter J. Agoranos
Petitioner
Department of Justice
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PETER J. AGORANOS,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-3209

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CH-0432-11-0182-B-1, CH-1221-11-0466-B1.

______________________ 

Decided: February 9, 2015

______________________ 

PETER J. AGORANOS, Gilberts, IL, pro se.

KARA WESTERCAMP, Commercial Litigation Branch 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

ELIZABETH ANNE SPECK, JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., ALLISON KIDD-MILLER. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, O’MALLEY, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

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2 AGORANOS v. DOJ

PER CURIAM. 

Peter J. Agoranos (“Agoranos”) appeals the decision of 

the Merit System Protection Board (“Board”) affirming his 

removal from the position of Intelligence Research Specialist with the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA” 

or “agency”) and denying his Individual Right of Action 

(“IRA”) appeal requesting corrective action under the 

Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (2012) 

(“WPA”). Because we find that substantial evidence 

supports the Board’s conclusion that the DEA demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Agoranos 

would have been removed even if he had not made a 

disclosure protected by the WPA, we affirm. 

I.

A.

Agoranos served as an Intelligence Research Specialist for the DEA’s Chicago Field Division from November 4, 

2001 until his removal on November 9, 2010. Agoranos 

began working under the supervision of Group Supervisor 

Lynette Georgevich. His initial job performance ratings 

were “acceptable,” but by 2003 his evaluation identified a 

need for performance improvement and coworkers had 

entered complaints regarding the quality of Agoranos’s 

work product and interpersonal skills. Georgevich consequently issued a written notice on January 27, 2004, 

informing Agoranos that he needed to improve his work 

product. In response, Agoranos filed a grievance against 

Georgevich. 

Although Agoranos’s interactions with coworkers continued to be strained in 2005, Georgevich again gave 

Agoranos an acceptable rating for his job performance. In 

2006, Agoranos’s performance declined once more. After 

another complaint by Agoranos against Georgevich, 

Georgevich felt she could no longer effectively manage 

Agoranos, and the DEA reassigned Agoranos to Field 

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AGORANOS v. DOJ 3

Intelligence Manager Patrick O’Dea in October 2006. 

Agoranos’s performance continued to wane, meriting a 

“less than acceptable level” by 2007. Special Agent in 

Charge Gary Olenkiewicz also “strongly recommended” 

that Agoranos seek a psychological exam in June 2007. 

Because of the low performance rating, O’Dea issued a 

performance expectations memorandum outlining Agoranos’s job expectations, but Agoranos failed to meet those 

expectations due to, inter alia, poor writing, inadequate 

reports, and inaccurate information. O’Dea thus denied 

Agoranos a within-grade pay increase in 2008 because of 

his inability to perform at acceptable levels, and gave him 

an “unacceptable” performance rating on his 2008 evaluation. From July 2007 to June 2009, Agoranos also requested reassignment to vacant Intelligence Research 

Specialist positions thirty-one times—the DEA rejected 

all of his requests. 

After his 2008 evaluation, the DEA placed Agoranos 

on a performance improvement plan (“PIP”) under the 

supervision of Group Supervisor Kevin Quinlan. Quinlan 

met with Agoranos weekly, but Agoranos still failed to 

consistently correct writing deficiencies, such as reporting 

inaccuracies, grammar, and formatting. Based on the PIP

results, on May 6, 2009, O’Dea recommended that Agoranos be removed from his position as an Intelligence Research Specialist. The DEA issued a notice of proposed 

removal on January 7, 2010, requesting Agoranos’s removal due to his alleged failure to achieve acceptable 

performance in Critical Element 1 – Technical Competence/Results and Critical Element 2 – Communications. 

Special Agent James Reed acted as the deciding official in 

Agoranos’s removal.

Agoranos claims to have made a series of disclosures 

from 2004 through 2007 that are the crux of this appeal. 

Agoranos asserts that he informed Georgevich in March 

2004 that a coworker had solicited $10 from other employees to enter into a pool to guess when another 

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4 AGORANOS v. DOJ

coworker would have a baby. Agoranos also claims to 

have informed Georgevich in May 2005 that he overheard 

a special agent and two task work officers discussing the 

possibility of using time spent performing surveillance 

work to also look for vacant lots to build custom homes. 

Finally, it is undisputed that, in February 2007, Agoranos 

reported to supervisor Timothy McCormick that he observed DEA employees selling betting squares for an 

office pool for the upcoming Super Bowl. Resident Agent 

in Charge Mark Giuffre and Diversion Group Supervisor 

James Portner investigated the accusations, and eventually reprimanded one employee. 

Special Agent Reed testified that he reviewed all materials associated with Agoranos’s notice of proposed 

removal, including those materials relating to Agoranos’s 

claim that he had made whistleblower disclosures, and 

concluded that removal was warranted. Special Agent 

Reed also testified that he spoke with an attorney at the 

Chief Counsel’s office during his investigation, and reviewed Agoranos’s entire personnel file, even though it 

was not part of the proposed removal record. The DEA 

officially removed Agoranos on November 9, 2010.

B.

Agoranos filed two separate challenges related to his 

removal. He first submitted a whistleblower complaint 

with the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) on October 15, 

2010. Agoranos alleged that his three whistleblower 

disclosures led to eight personnel actions: (1) October 

2006 reassignment to a different supervisor; (2) June 

2007 recommendation that Agoranos receive a psychological evaluation; (3) July 2007 through June 2009 failure to 

select Agoranos for thirty-one open Intelligence Research 

Specialist positions; (4) 2007 and 2008 assignment of 

unacceptable performance ratings; (5) 2008 denial of 

within-grade pay increase; (6) February 2009 placement 

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AGORANOS v. DOJ 5

on a PIP; (7) January 2010 issuance of a notice of proposed removal; and (8) November 2010 removal.

OSC reviewed Agoranos’s complaint, but concluded 

that there were no reasonable grounds to find that the 

DEA took any action due to a prohibited personnel practice. OSC found that, for the March 2004 disclosure, 

there was no significant adverse action close in time to 

the disclosure, and for the May 2005 disclosure, Agoranos 

had no firsthand evidence that the employees at issue had 

taken any impermissible actions. For the February 2007 

disclosure, OSC found that coworkers made hostile comments to Agoranos and ostracized him due to the disclosure, leading Agoranos to seek mental health treatment, 

but also found that he would be unlikely to be successful 

in alleging retaliatory action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) 

because he could not prove that the disclosure was a 

contributing factor in subsequent adverse personnel 

actions. Because OSC declined to further investigate his 

complaint, Agoranos filed an IRA appeal requesting 

corrective action with the Board on April 8, 2011.

On November 29, 2010, Agoranos separately appealed 

to the Board, challenging his removal under Chapter 43 of 

Title 5 of the United States Code. An administrative 

judge (“AJ”) consolidated Agoranos’s separate appeals by 

dismissing the Chapter 43 removal action, and reviewing 

the propriety of his removal as part of his IRA request for 

corrective action. Agoranos v. Dep’t of Justice, No. CH0432-11-0182-I-1, 2011 MSPB LEXIS 3259 (M.S.P.B. May 

23, 2011). By dismissing the Chapter 43 removal action, 

the AJ also declined to hear Agoranos’s due process and 

procedural error affirmative defenses to his removal. The 

AJ then denied Agoranos’s appeal on the merits in an 

initial decision issued on March 1, 2012. Agoranos v. 

Dep’t of Justice, No. CH-1221-11-0466-W-1, 2012 MSPB 

LEXIS 1123 (M.S.P.B. March 1, 2012) (“Initial AJ Decision”). 

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The AJ first determined that Agoranos failed to prove 

by preponderant evidence that he made qualifying disclosures, in March 2004 regarding the baby-betting pool, or 

in May 2005, regarding the private construction contract 

work. Id. at *3–6. For the February 2007 Super Bowl 

betting pool disclosure, the AJ found that Agoranos 

proved by preponderant evidence that he made a viable 

whistleblowing disclosure. Id. at *7–8. The AJ concluded, 

however, that Agoranos failed to prove that the Super 

Bowl disclosure was a contributing factor in the 2006 

reassignment under the “knowledge/timing test.” Id. at 

*8–9 (citing Carey v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 93 M.S.P.R. 

676, 681 (2003)). For the 2007 recommendation that 

Agoranos receive a psychological examination, the AJ 

concluded that Agoranos had established that the disclosure was a contributing factor, but “[t]he appellant lost no 

pay or benefits as a result of the personnel action, and 

effective relief cannot be granted to return the appellant 

to the status quo ante.” Id. at *9–10. 

As for the other, “performance-related” personnel actions, the AJ found the requirements of the 

knowledge/timing test were satisfied because the actions 

“occurred within a relatively short time after the appellant’s Super Bowl betting disclosure” and all officials, 

with the exception of Quinlan, knew of the disclosure. Id.

at *10–16. Though he concluded that Agoranos had met 

his burden to prove his 2007 disclosure was a contributing 

factor to those performance-related actions, the AJ found 

that the agency had shown “by clear or convincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel actions

notwithstanding the appellant’s disclosure.” Id. at *16–

22. The AJ concluded that there was extensive evidence 

demonstrating Agoranos’s unacceptable performance, the 

2007 disclosure presented no motive for retaliation, and 

the agency took similar actions against similarly-situated 

employees. Id. at *17–19. The AJ thus denied Agoranos’s 

request for corrective action.

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Agoranos filed a petition for review with the Board, 

and the Board affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-part the 

initial decision. Agoranos v. Dep’t of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 

498 (2013) (“Initial Board Decision”). As an initial matter, the Board reviewed the AJ’s decision to: (1) dismiss 

the removal action, (2) hear the challenge to the removal 

action as part of the IRA request for corrective action, and 

(3) decline to hear Agoranos’s affirmative defenses to 

removal of denial of due process and harmful procedural 

error. Id. at ¶¶13–18. The Board concluded that the DEA 

removed Agoranos without notifying him of the effect of 

his election to pursue corrective action with the OSC 

rather than to pursue a direct appeal to the Board. Id. at 

¶17. Because Agoranos’s filing of his OSC complaint “did 

not constitute a valid, informed election,” the Board found 

that Agoranos could still assert his denial of due process 

and harmful procedural error defenses to his removal. Id. 

The Board, accordingly, reopened Agoranos’s removal 

appeal for further adjudication by the AJ. Id.

The Board then analyzed the merits of the AJ’s findings regarding Agoranos’s protected disclosure. First, the 

Board concluded that Agoranos failed to provide a reasoned basis to disturb the AJ’s findings regarding the 

alleged 2004 and 2005 disclosures. Id. at ¶19. The Board 

then affirmed the AJ’s contributing factor conclusion for 

the performance-related actions, but vacated the AJ’s 

conclusions regarding the lateral transfer requests. Id. at 

¶¶20–26. In particular, the Board agreed that, though 

some of the performance-related actions were taken more 

than two years after the Super Bowl disclosure, the 

“performance-based actions . . . form one continuous chain 

. . . or in other words a continuum.” Id. at ¶¶22–23. With 

regards to the lateral transfers, the Board remanded, 

directing the AJ to “look beyond the knowledge-timing 

test” to determine if there was any taint on those decisions caused by the Super Bowl disclosure even though 

the transferring official testified that he was unaware of 

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any disclosures by Agoranos. Id. at ¶¶24–25. Finally, the 

Board directed the AJ to reconsider his analysis of the 

agency’s burden to show that it would have taken the 

same actions against Agoranos absent the protected 

disclosure. Based on our decision in Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the Board 

concluded that the AJ had failed to properly consider the 

countervailing evidence presented by Agoranos. Id. at 

¶¶27–33.

On remand, the AJ affirmed the agency’s removal action and again denied Agoranos’s request for corrective 

action. Agoranos v. Dep’t of Justice, No. CH-1221-11-

0466-W-1, 2013 MSPB LEXIS 5091 (M.S.P.B. Sept. 23, 

2013) (“Remand Decision”). In reviewing the DEA’s 

removal action, the AJ first determined that the agency 

met its initial burden to show by substantial evidence 

that the agency used valid performance standards to 

analyze Agoranos’s work. Id. at *3–4. The AJ concluded 

that the agency’s allegations of unacceptable performance 

were sufficiently supported by both testimonial and 

documentary evidence, and that “a reasonable person 

might conclude the appellant was afforded a reasonable 

opportunity to improve his performance to an acceptable 

level.” Id. at *12–14. The AJ then analyzed Agoranos’s 

affirmative defenses that the DEA violated his due process rights and committed procedural errors by using 

Special Agent Reed as the deciding official in his removal 

proceeding. Id. at *14–19. Agoranos claimed that Special 

Agent Reed impermissibly participated in prior investigations relating to this case, that Special Agent Reed engaged in ex parte conversations with an employee at the 

Office of Chief Counsel regarding this case, and that 

Special Agent Reed secretly reviewed Agoranos’s personnel file. Id. at *14. The AJ concluded that there was no 

due process violation caused by these ex parte communications because Special Agent Reed did not consider any 

new or material evidence that would have prejudiced his 

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AGORANOS v. DOJ 9

decision-making. Id. at *14–18. As for the claim of 

harmful procedural error, the AJ found nothing in the ex 

parte communications that led Special Agent Reed to 

reach a different conclusion than he would have reached 

in the absence of the communications. Id. at *18–19.

The AJ then reviewed the request for corrective action 

under the WPA. The AJ adopted all of the findings and 

determinations from the Initial AJ Decision that had been

affirmed by the Board. Id. at *20. For the contributing 

factor analysis of the lateral transfer requests, the AJ 

reviewed the “totality of circumstances” and concluded 

that, even though O’Dea provided information to the 

deciding official, O’Dea’s disclosures did not taint the 

transfer request process because, according to the deciding official, only employees with superior performance 

ratings typically receive the requested transfers. Id. at 

*21–23. Agoranos’s history of substandard performance 

ratings thus made his selection highly unlikely. Id. The 

AJ then reanalyzed, under Whitmore, if the agency had 

shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would 

have taken the same actions against Agoranos absent the 

protected disclosure. Id. at *24–34. Explicitly applying 

the factors identified by our court in Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999), the AJ 

again concluded that “[t]here is overwhelming evidence, 

consisting of documents and testimony, that supports the 

agency’s determination [that] the appellant was not 

performing at an acceptable level.” Id. at *30. The AJ 

also found that the agency’s action was consistent with its 

treatment of another, similarly-situated employee who 

had not made a protected disclosure, even though that 

employee resigned before the agency could remove her. 

Id. at *32–33. And finally, the AJ found there was little 

motive for the agency to retaliate, as the disclosure at 

issue was “relatively minor.” Id. at *33. 

Agoranos again sought review by the Board. Agoranos v. Dep’t of Justice, 121 M.S.P.R. 382 (2014) (“Final 

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10 AGORANOS v. DOJ

Board Decision”). Agoranos did not appeal the AJ’s 

findings that the agency proved its performance standards were valid and that the agency gave Agoranos a 

reasonable opportunity to improve; and, regardless, the 

Board found sufficient evidence supporting the AJ’s 

decision on these matters. Id. at 382 n.3. The Board then 

gave significant weight to the AJ’s review of the evidence 

regarding the impact of the ex parte communications on 

Special Agent Reed’s ability to make an impartial decision, and found no error in the AJ’s finding that there was

no due process violation. Id. at 382. The Board also 

concluded that Agoranos failed to meet his burden of 

showing that any of the ex parte communications introduced “new and material evidence” or provided “undue 

pressure” on Special Agent Reed. Id. Finally, the Board 

determined that the AJ appropriately considered all facts 

and properly applied the law in denying the request for 

corrective action. Id. 

Agoranos timely appealed to this Court, and we have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

II.

Our review of the Board’s decisions is limited by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We only set aside the Board’s 

actions, findings, or conclusions that are:

(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law;

(2) obtained without procedures required by law, 

rule, or regulation having been followed; or

(3) unsupported by substantial evidence . . . . 

Id. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” McLaughlin v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 353 

F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

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AGORANOS v. DOJ 

11

The WPA prevents agencies from taking adverse personnel actions against employees in response to protected 

disclosures made by the employees. The Act states, in 

relevant part, that:

(b) Any employee who has authority to take, direct 

others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority— 

(8) take or fail to take, or threaten to take 

or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant for employment because of— 

(A) any disclosure of information 

by an employee or applicant which 

the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences— 

(i) any violation (other 

than a violation of this section) of any law, rule, or 

regulation, or

(ii) gross mismanagement, 

a gross waste of funds, an 

abuse of authority, or a 

substantial and specific 

danger to public health or 

safety;

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). 

The agency must first prove, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, its case for the employee’s removal. 

Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1367 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56). 

The burden then shifts to the employee to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he or she made a 

protected disclosure, as described in 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(b)(8)(A), that after the disclosure he or she was 

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12 AGORANOS v. DOJ

subject to an adverse personnel action, and that the 

protected disclosure was a “contributing factor” to the 

adverse personnel action. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. 

§ 1221(e)(1). If the employee meets his or her burden 

regarding the protected disclosure, the agency can then 

attempt to rebut the employee’s claim by presenting clear 

and convincing evidence “that it would have taken the 

same personnel action even in the absence of [the protected] disclosure.” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2). 

In assessing whether the agency has shown by clear 

and convincing evidence “that it would have taken the 

same personnel action even in the absence of [the protected] disclosure,” we have highlighted three non-exclusive 

factors as particularly relevant: (1) “the strength of the 

agency’s evidence in support of its personnel action;” (2) 

“the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on 

the part of the agency officials who were involved in the 

decision;” and (3) “any evidence that the agency takes 

similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated.” Carr, 

185 F.3d at 1323. In Whitmore, we elaborated on the socalled Carr factors, stating that “[e]vidence only clearly 

and convincingly supports a conclusion when it does so in 

the aggregate considering all the pertinent evidence in 

the record, and despite the evidence that fairly detracts 

from that conclusion.” 680 F.3d at 1368. Thus, the Board 

must “provide an in depth review and full discussion of 

the facts to explain its reasoning,” including consideration 

of countervailing evidence presented by the employee. Id.

at 1368, 1371.

When assessing a WPA challenge to a removal decision, the Board must also consider any due process or

procedural challenges an employee asserts as affirmative 

defenses. In Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Co., 179 

F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999), we held that “[t]he 

introduction of new and material information by means of 

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13

mines the public employee’s constitutional due process 

guarantee of notice . . . and the opportunity to respond.” 

There is, however, no due process violation unless the 

deciding official “considers new and material information” 

due to the ex parte communication. Id. at 1377. Thus, the 

key inquiry is “whether the ex parte communication is so 

substantial and so likely to cause prejudice that no employee can fairly be required to be subjected to a deprivation of property under such circumstances.” Id.; see also 

Ward v. U.S. Postal Serv., 634 F.3d 1274, 1279–80 (Fed. 

Cir. 2011) (applying Stone to ex parte communications 

related to either a removal charge or a penalty determination). Factors relevant to determining if “new and useful 

information” is introduced through ex parte communications include: (1) “whether the ex parte communication 

introduces ‘cumulative’ information or new information; 

(2) whether the employee knew of the communication and 

had a chance to respond; and (3) whether the ex parte

communication resulted in undue pressure upon the 

deciding official to rule in a particular manner.” Young v. 

Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 706 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013) (citing Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377). 

We have recognized that “a deciding official’s having 

background knowledge of an employee’s prior work history or performance record” “only raises due process or 

procedural concerns where that knowledge is the basis for 

the deciding official’s determinations on . . . the merits of 

the underlying charge . . . .” Norris v. Sec. & Exch. 

Comm’n, 675 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

III.

A.

Mirroring his arguments to the Board, Agoranos 

claims that Special Agent Reed’s ex parte communications 

violated his procedural due process rights and constitute 

harmful error under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2). Agoranos 

argues that Special Agent Reed admitted that he had ex 

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parte communications with the DEA’s counsel and reviewed materials not in the record or the notice of proposed removal, thus denying Agoranos the 

constitutionally-required notice necessary to properly 

respond to the claims against him. He argues, further, 

that the information Special Agent Reed received through 

these ex parte communications is not in the record, and

should be considered “new and material evidence” because 

the DEA, and not Agoranos, prevented that information 

from being disclosed. Agoranos also states that, had he 

known that Special Agent Reed had in-depth prior involvement in investigations of Agoranos, he would have 

requested that Special Agent Reed be recused as the 

deciding official. And finally, with regards to both the 

affirmative defenses to his removal and the IRA request 

for corrective action, Agoranos argues that the AJ “ignored the facts, changed the facts, and ignored the law.” 

In particular, Agoranos claims that his writing style 

remained the same from when he was hired in 2001 until 

his removal in 2010, but his work product only became 

inadequate after he made the protective disclosures.

In response, the government argues that substantial 

evidence in the record supports the DEA’s decision to 

remove Agoranos and the AJ’s finding that the DEA 

would have removed Agoranos regardless of the disclosure. According to the government, Agoranos failed two 

critical elements of his job duties as an Intelligence Research Specialist, despite the DEA’s efforts to help him 

improve, thus justifying his removal. This evidence, it 

contends, sufficiently allows the agency to meet its burden

to show that it would have removed Agoranos due to his 

subpar work product, regardless of his Super Bowl disclosure. The government also argues that the AJ appropriately applied the Carr factors—overwhelming evidence 

demonstrates a history of concern about Agoranos’s work; 

the disclosure was considered to be relatively minor 

among supervisors, mitigating any motive to retaliate; 

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15

and the agency treated a similarly-situated, nonwhistleblower employee the same as Agoranos. The 

government also contends that the AJ and the Board 

applied the correct law in determining that Special Agent 

Reed’s ex parte communications neither reveal “new and 

material information” nor placed “undue pressure” on 

Special Agent Reed to reach a specific conclusion. And, 

finally, the government argues that the AJ did not commit harmful procedural error under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56 as 

Agoranos failed to present any evidence demonstrating 

that the ex parte communications influenced Special 

Agent Reed’s decision-making.

B.

On appeal, Agoranos has not challenged the AJ’s conclusions regarding the alleged 2004 disclosure, the alleged 

2005 disclosure, or the DEA’s showings that its performance standards were valid, and that it gave Agoranos a 

reasonable opportunity to improve. We, thus, only review 

Agoranos’s affirmative defenses to his removal, and the 

Board’s analysis of the Super Bowl disclosure under the 

burden-shifting framework of the WPA.

We agree with the government’s arguments and do 

not find that the AJ’s or the Board’s decisions were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with law” or “unsupported by substantial 

evidence.” First,1 with regards to the DEA’s denial of 

Agoranos’s thirty-one requests for transfer to open Intelli1 The government does not challenge the Board’s 

determination that Agoranos met his burden to show that 

his disclosure was a contributing factor to the performance-related actions. For his part, Agoranos does not 

challenge the Board’s determination that Agoranos failed 

to establish that the recommendation that Agoranos 

receive a psychological evaluation caused remedial harm. 

 

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gence Research Specialist positions, the Board did not err 

in its analysis. Even though the deciding official for the 

transfer decisions had no direct knowledge of Agoranos’s 

disclosures, the Board appropriately required the AJ to 

“look beyond the knowledge-timing test” to determine if 

any statements made by O’Dea to the deciding official 

could have tainted the decision-making process for the 

transfer requests. The AJ determined that such transfers 

were usually granted only to employees with superior 

performance ratings. Given Agoranos’s documented 

history of average or substandard performance ratings, 

the AJ concluded that it would have been unlikely for 

Agoranos to receive those transfers regardless of his 

disclosures. Considering the depth of the AJ’s analysis of 

the facts and appropriate application of the law, we find 

his decision to be supported by substantial evidence.

For the five performance-related personnel actions, 

we agree with the Board that substantial evidence supports the AJ’s determination that the DEA would have 

taken these same personnel actions regardless of the 

Super Bowl disclosure. The AJ, on remand, performed an 

extensive analysis of Agoranos’s work history, applying 

the Carr factors and considering all facts, including the 

countervailing evidence presented by Agoranos, as required by Whitmore. The AJ described the extensive 

documentary and testimonial evidence of Agoranos’s 

subpar work performance and interpersonal communication skills, leading the AJ to conclude there was “overwhelming evidence” supporting the personnel actions. 

The AJ then appropriately identified that the disclosure 

was for a minor infraction that supervisors did not consider substantial. Although Agoranos’s coworkers purportedly harassed and ostracized Agoranos because of the 

disclosure, and even though one person was reprimanded 

for the Super Bowl pool, the DEA presented unrebutted 

testimony that the supervisors did not consider the disclosure as something sufficiently serious to give rise to a 

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17

motive to retaliate. And, finally, the AJ correctly considered agency actions against similarly-situated employees. 

Agoranos argued that a similarly-situated employee was 

merely transferred, and not terminated, due to performance declines. The AJ, however, correctly found that 

that employee was not similarly situated—the employee 

had a long history of satisfactory performance with only a 

recent decline, and the transfer was made for the convenience of the employee’s commute. The AJ did, however, 

point to a different employee with a similar history of 

unsatisfactory performance over an extended time who 

would have been removed by the agency if she had not 

resigned first. As the Board concluded, Agoranos has not 

shown any error in the AJ’s analysis. Mere disagreements with the AJ’s factfinding are insufficient. Agoranos 

urges us to reweigh the evidence presented to the Board 

and reach a different conclusion, but “re-weigh[ing] conflicting evidence . . . is not our function.” Bieber v. Dep’t of 

Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

Finally, we find that the AJ and the Board correctly 

rejected Agoranos’s affirmative defenses based on Special 

Agent Reed’s ex parte communications. Special Agent 

Reed’s prior participation in investigations of Agoranos 

and his review of Agoranos’s personnel file are troubling. 

But as we have previously stated, the mere knowledge of 

an employee’s “work history or performance record” does 

not constitute harmful procedural error or a due process 

violation unless that knowledge influences the deciding 

official’s determination. See Norris, 675 F.3d at 1354. 

Special Agent Reed testified that he “had no recollection” 

of any contact with Agoranos or his role in investigations 

of Agoranos. Special Agent Reed also stated that he 

reviewed Agoranos’s personnel file “just to get a semblance of where Agoranos has been, what Agoranos’s 

previous background [was].” He further testified that he 

spoke with an attorney at the Chief Counsel’s office for 

only five minutes specifically to obtain “clarification” 

Case: 14-3209 Document: 16-2 Page: 17 Filed: 02/09/2015
18 AGORANOS v. DOJ

about an issue in the case. Special Agent Reed explained 

that he made the removal determination based entirely 

on the performance issues identified in the notice of 

proposed review. The AJ found Special Agent Reed’s 

testimony to be credible, and the AJ’s credibility determinations are “virtually unreviewable.” Hambsch v. Dep’t of 

Treasury, 796 F.2d 430, 436 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Agoranos, 

who has the burden to prove his affirmative defenses, 

Frey v. Department of Labor, 359 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. 

Cir. 2004), has thus failed to demonstrate that Special 

Agent Reed considered “new and material information” 

due to his ex parte communications “so substantial and so 

likely to cause prejudice that no employee can fairly be 

required to be subjected to [such] a deprivation.” Stone, 

179 F.3d at 1377. And, similarly, we conclude that Agoranos has failed to prove harmful procedural error as he 

has not shown that Special Agent Reed’s ex parte communications influenced his decision-making in any manner 

or led Special Agent Reed to reach a different conclusion 

than he would have reached in the absence of the ex parte 

communications. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(3).

IV.

Substantial evidence supports the AJ’s and Board’s 

determinations that the DEA proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the specified 

personnel actions against Agoranos even if Agoranos had 

not made the protected disclosure about the Super Bowl 

betting pool. Substantial evidence also supports the AJ’s 

and Board’s conclusions that Agoranos failed to prove 

either a due process violation or harmful procedural error. 

We therefore affirm the Board’s decisions to uphold the 

personnel actions taken against Agoranos and deny his 

request for corrective action under the WPA.

AFFIRMED

Case: 14-3209 Document: 16-2 Page: 18 Filed: 02/09/2015