Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03043/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03043-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Fairfield
Defendant
Douglas James Cyr
Plaintiff
Brian Gassen
Defendant
Perry
Defendant
Nathan Strickland
Defendant
Larry Todd
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS JAMES CYR,

NO. CIV. S-09-3043 LKK/KJM

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FAIRFIELD, LARRY

TODD, Police Chief of City

of Fairfield, in his capacity

as Chief of Police for the

City of Fairfield; FAIRFIELD

POLICE OFFICERS BRIAN GASSEN,

PERRY AND NATHAN STRICKLAND,

and Does 1 to 100, inclusive,

 O R D E R

Defendants.

 /

This case involves the force used during plaintiff's arrest.

Plaintiff’s complaint names five defendants, and enumerates ten

causes of action. Defendant City of Fairfield (“City”) initially

moved to dismiss all claims against it and to strike the punitive

damages claim against it. Defendant Larry Todd, Police Chief of

City, (“Todd”) initially moved to dismiss five of the ten claims

against him, and for a more definite statement of three of the

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

These facts are taken from the allegations in the complaint 1

unless otherwise specified. The allegations are taken as true for

purposes of this motion only.

2

remaining five claims against him. Defendant police officers Brian

Gassen (“Gassen”), Joseph Perry (“Perry”), and Nathan Strickland

(“Strickland”) initially moved to dismiss five of the six claims

against them, and for a more definite statement of the remaining

claim against them. In their reply, however, defendants withdrew

their motion to dismiss as to all arguments but City’s motion to

dismiss plaintiffs’ fifth and eighth claims and Todd’s motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s ninth claim. The motion for a more definite

statement remains. Plaintiff concedes that his second cause of

action, for violation of due process under the Fifth Amendment,

third cause of action, for violation of his right against cruel or

unusual punishment, and tenth cause of action, for respondeat

superior, should be dismissed. For the reasons stated below

defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Douglas Cyr (“Cyr”) was arrested at his home on or

about October 31, 2008, by officers Gassen, Perry, and Strickland

(“arresting officer defendants”) for allegedly driving under the

influence earlier that evening. Plaintiff's Complaint for Damages

("Complaint") ¶ 10. These officers were employed by the City and

supervised by Todd. Complaint ¶¶ 5, 10. Plaintiff alleges that

arresting officer defendants and Todd, without warning or

justification, dragged plaintiff approximately 25 feet across

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

asphalt, while in handcuffs, to a police vehicle. Complaint ¶ 12.

As a result, plaintiff suffered injuries including lacerations,

deep abrasions, extensive "road rash," and psychological injuries.

Complaint ¶ 13. He was transported to the nearest hospital prior

to booking. Complaint ¶ 14.

II. STANDARD

A. Standard for a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to

Dismiss

A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion challenges a complaint's

compliance with the pleading requirements provided by the Federal

Rules. In general, these requirements are established by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8, although claims that “sound[] in” fraud or mistake must

meet the requirements provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Vess v.

Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must

contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” The complaint must give defendant

“fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(internal quotation and modification omitted). 

To meet this requirement, the complaint must be supported by

factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950

(2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a

complaint,” neither legal conclusions nor conclusory statements are

themselves sufficient, and such statements are not entitled to a

presumption of truth. Id. at 1949-50. Iqbal and Twombly therefore

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

As discussed below, the court may consider certain limited 2

evidence on a motion to dismiss. As an exception to the general

rule that non-conclusory factual allegations must be accepted as

true on a motion to dismiss, the court need not accept allegations

as true when they are contradicted by this evidence. See Mullis v.

United States Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987),

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987).

4

prescribe a two step process for evaluation of motions to dismiss.

The court first identifies the non-conclusory factual allegations,

and the court then determines whether these allegations, taken as

true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.; Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).2

“Plausibility,” as it is used in Twombly and Iqbal, does not

refer to the likelihood that a pleader will succeed in proving the

allegations. Instead, it refers to whether the non-conclusory

factual allegations, when assumed to be true, “allow[] the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A

complaint may fail to show a right to relief either by lacking a

cognizable legal theory or by lacking sufficient facts alleged

under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

The line between non-conclusory and conclusory allegations is

not always clear. Rule 8 “does not require 'detailed factual

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While Twombly was not the first

case that directed the district courts to disregard “conclusory”

allegations, the court turns to Iqbal and Twombly for indications

of the Supreme Court’s current understanding of the term. In

Twombly, the Court found the naked allegation that “defendants

'ha[d] entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to

prevent competitive entry . . . and ha[d] agreed not to compete

with one another,'” absent any supporting allegation of underlying

details, to be a conclusory statement of the elements of an antitrust claim. Id. at 1950 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551). In

contrast, the Twombly plaintiffs’ allegations of “parallel conduct”

were not conclusory, because plaintiffs had alleged specific acts

argued to constitute parallel conduct. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550-51,

556.

Twombly also illustrated the second, “plausibility” step of

the analysis by providing an example of a complaint that failed and

a complaint that satisfied this step. The complaint at issue in

Twombly failed. While the Twombly plaintiffs’ allegations regarding

parallel conduct were non-conclusory, they failed to support a

plausible claim. Id. at 566. Because parallel conduct was said to

be ordinarily expected to arise without a prohibited agreement, an

allegation of parallel conduct was insufficient to support the

inference that a prohibited agreement existed. Id. Absent such an

////

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

This judge must confess that it does not appear self- 3

evident that parallel conduct is to be expected in all

circumstances and thus would seem to require evidence. Of course,

the Supreme Court has spoken and thus this court's own uncertainty

needs only be noted, but cannot form the basis of a ruling.

6

agreement, plaintiffs were not entitled to relief. Id.3

In contrast, Twombly held that the model pleading for

negligence demonstrated the type of pleading that satisfies Rule

8. Id. at 565 n.10. This form provides “On June 1, 1936, in a

public highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts,

defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who

was then crossing said highway.” Form 9, Complaint for Negligence,

Forms App., Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. App., p 829. These

allegations adequately “'state[] . . . circumstances, occurrences,

and events in support of the claim presented.'” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556 n.3 (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1216, at 94, 95 (3d ed. 2004)). The factual allegations

that defendant drove at a certain time and hit plaintiff render

plausible the conclusion that defendant drove negligently.

B. Standard for a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) Motion for a More

Definite Statement

"If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is

so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required

to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more

definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading." Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(e). "The situations in which a Rule 12(e) motion is

appropriate are very limited." 5A Wright and Miller, Federal

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

Practice and Procedure § 1377 (1990). Furthermore, absent special

circumstances, a Rule 12(e) motion cannot be used to require the

pleader to set forth "the statutory or constitutional basis for his

claim, only the facts underlying it." McCalden v. California

Library Ass'n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990). However, "even

though a complaint is not defective for failure to designate the

statute or other provision of law violated, the judge may in his

discretion . . . require such detail as may be appropriate in the

particular case." McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir.

1996). 

C. Standard for a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) Motion to Strike

Rule 12(f) authorizes the court to order stricken from any

pleading "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter." A party may bring on a motion to strike within 20 days

after the filing of the pleading under attack. The court,

however, may make appropriate orders to strike under the rule at

any time on its own initiative. Thus, the court may consider

and grant an untimely motion to strike where it seems proper to

do so. See 5A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure: Civil 2d ' 1380.

Motions to strike are generally viewed with disfavor, and

will usually be denied unless the allegations in the pleading

have no possible relation to the controversy, and may cause

prejudice to one of the parties. See 5A C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d ' 1380; See also Hanna

v. Lane, 610 F. Supp. 32, 34 (N.D. Ill. 1985). If the court is

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

in doubt as to whether the challenged matter may raise an issue

of fact or law, the motion to strike should be denied, leaving

an assessment of the sufficiency of the allegations for

adjudication on the merits. See 5A Wright & Miller, supra, at '

1380.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss three claims to which plaintiff

does not concede dismissal is proper. These claims are

plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress and

negligence claims as to defendant City and plaintiff’s negligent

selection, training, retention, supervision, investigation, and

discipline claim as to defendant Todd.

1. Negligence and Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distress

All defendants initially moved to dismiss plaintiff's

negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress

claims under California’s Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”). However, in

defendants’ reply brief, defendants withdrew their motion as to

the individual defendants, and only seek dismissal of the claims

against City. As an initial matter, plaintiff does not bring a

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against

defendant City. Accordingly, the court does not consider this

argument. 

Plaintiff’s claim for negligence is unclear as to whether

plaintiff is bringing a claim against City. The cause of action

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

In its initial motion, Defendant City argued that it is 4

immune from plaintiff’s negligence claim under Section 815 of the

CTCA. This section provides that, except as imposed by other

statutes, “a public entity is not liable for an injury, whether

such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity

or a public employee or any other person” and “is subject to any

defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were

a private person.” Cities are public entities under the CTCA. Cal.

Gov. Code § 811.2. However, California Government Code Section

815.2(a) provides that public entities are liable for injuries

proximately caused by acts or omissions of employees acting within

the scope of their employment if the act or omission would give

rise to a cause of action against the employee. Thus, 815.2(a) is

a statute imposing respondeat superior tort liability on public

entities. Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist., 19 Cal. 4th 925,

932 (1998). Therefore, City can be held liable if Defendants Todd,

Gassen, Perry, and Strickland were acting within the scope of their

employment when they caused harm to plaintiff. So the liability of

City rests on whether the officers themselves can be held liable,

as required by Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a). 

9

does not list the defendants it seeks to hold liable as they are

listed in plaintiff’s other claims. Further, the initial

allegations specify individual actions, yet ultimately refers

generally to hold “defendants” liable. Because the court grants

plaintiff leave to amend, it does not need to decide whether

plaintiff’s claim puts City on notice as to plaintiff’s

intention to hold it liable for negligence. Plaintiff is

instructed to clarify this cause of action in the subsequent

complaint to identify (1) whether plaintiff seeks to hold City

liable, and, if so, (2) under what theory of liability plaintiff

seeks to hold City liable.4

2. Negligent Selection, Training, Retention,

Supervision, Investigation and Discipline

Defendants Todd and City initially moved to dismiss this

claim under the CTCA. However, in their reply they withdrew

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Nonetheless, the court notes that plaintiff bases this claim 5

upon negligence, but also references 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However,

liability for failure to train officers under 1983 requires

deliberate indifference to the rights of those with whom the

officers will come into contact, not mere negligence. City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). However, common

law torts for negligent supervision exist. See, e.g., Juarez v. Boy

Scouts of America, Inc., 81 Cal. App. 4th 377, 395 (2000). As such,

plaintiff is advised to clearly identify whether he brings claims

under federal law or state law when amending this claim. If he

brings claims under both theories, they should be separate causes

of action. 

10

these arguments. Defendants also assert that this claim is

insufficiently pled in that plaintiff’s allegations are

conclusory and fail to put defendants on notice of his claims.

Plaintiff concedes that some allegations in this claim are not

sufficiently pled, and seeks leave to amend. Because this court

grants plaintiff such leave, the court does not address

defendant’s remaining concern. In their reply, defendant Todd 5

also argues that plaintiff cannot state a claim for negligent

selection, training, retention, supervision, investigation and

discipline based on one act (plaintiff’s arrest). As plaintiff

will be amending this claim, and as this argument was only

raised in reply, the court declines to decide this question.

Nonetheless, the court is skeptical as to the merits of

defendant’s argument.

B. Motion for a More Definite Statement

Defendants assert several of plaintiff's claims are

impermissibly vague. Specifically, defendants seek a more

definite statement as to plaintiff’s first cause of action under

the Fourth Amendment, fourth cause of action for Monell

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

liability, sixth cause of action for battery, and seventh cause

of action for false arrest/imprisonment. No heightened pleading

standard applies to these claims. Thus, our only concern is

whether the complaint is sufficient to enable defendants to file

responsive pleadings.

1. Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and

Seizures

With regard to plaintiff’s claim under the Fourth

Amendment, defendants City and Todd object to the inclusion of

language elsewhere in the complaint that suggests the use of

excessive force. However, they do not contend that the cause of

action itself is so vague as to prevent them from responding.

All plaintiff must plead to make a definite statement of a

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights is that he was seized,

and that the seizure was unreasonable. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.

372, 381. He has done so here. The fact that the complaint

contains language elsewhere which could support additional

Fourth Amendment claims does not make the Fourth Amendment claim

that plaintiff has pled indefinite. Accordingly, there appears 

to be no basis to order plaintiff to provide a more definite

statement of this cause of action.

2. Monell Liability

With regard to plaintiff's cause of action for Monell

liability, defendants City and Todd assert that the allegations

that they had been given notice of a pattern of constitutional

violations fail to state the type of notice, when it was given,

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

and by whom. Initially, the complaint does allege that notice

was given "by and through their supervisory officials and

employees," answering the "by whom" question. With regard to

defendants’ other objections, this claim does not concern

allegations of fraud or other claims to which a heightened

pleading standard applies. Even if the court accepts that

plaintiff will ultimately need to prove the type of notice and

when it was given to prevail on his Monell cause of action,

pleading these facts is not necessary to put City on notice of

plaintiff’s claim. Here, the statement of this claim is

sufficiently definite because it alleges that defendants had

notice of ongoing violations and failed to take adequate

measures in response. A more definite statement of this cause

of action is not appropriate.

3. Battery

With regard to plaintiff's sixth cause of action for

battery, defendant Todd objects to his implicit inclusion among

those who allegedly committed the acts constituting battery

against the plaintiff and seeks a more definite statement on

those grounds. The claim for battery is ambiguous as to Todd.

Because Todd may be entitled to immunity from suit if plaintiffs

only seek to hold him liable under a theory of respondeat

superior, Cal. Gov. Code § 820.8, but would not be if plaintiffs

seek to hold him liable for his own acts, the court grants

Todd’s motion for a more definite statement as to this claim.

////

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

4. False Arrest/Imprisonment

Finally, defendants Todd, Gassen, Perry, and Strickland

argue that the seventh cause of action for false

arrest/imprisonment is vague because it is unclear whether

plaintiff is referring to the alleged dragging incident or to

something else. But as plaintiff points out in his opposition to

the motion, the dragging incident following his arrest at his

home is the only event described in his complaint. Thus,

plaintiff’s allegation of false arrest/imprisonment is not vague

and no order to provide a more definite statement of this cause

of action is proper.

C. Motion to Strike

Defendant City moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for

punitive damages against it. A municipality is immune from

punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. City of Newport v. Fact

Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Cal. Gov. Code § 818

prohibits the imposition of punitive damages against public

entities for state law claims. See McAllister v. South Coast Air

Quality Management District, 183 Cal. App. 3d 653 (1986). Cities

are public entities. Cal. Gov. Code § 811.2. Therefore, City's

motion to strike is granted insofar as plaintiff seeks punitive

damages against it. However, plaintiff's claims against City

survive insofar as they do not seek punitive damages against

City. Given that plaintiff has requested leave to amend his

complaint, plaintiff should limit any claims for punitive

damages to the individual defendants.

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motions to

dismiss, for a more definite statement, and to strike, Doc. 10,

are GRANTED IN PART.

The court DISMISSES the following claims:

1. Second Claim, for violation of due process under the

Fifth Amendment.

2. Third Claim, for violation of right against cruel and

unusual punishment.

3. Tenth Claim, for respondeat superior.

All dismissals are without prejudice. Plaintiffs are

granted twenty-one (21) days to file an amended complaint.

The court STRIKES the following claim:

1. Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, insofar as it

applies to defendant City.

The court GRANTS defendant Todd’s motion for a more

definite statement as to the following claim:

1. Sixth Claim, for battery.

Defendants’ motions are otherwise denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 9, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-03043-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/09/10 Page 14 of 14