Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-15175/USCOURTS-ca9-13-15175-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Dump Truck Owners Association
Appellant
James Goldstene
Appellee
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Appellee
Mary D. Nichols
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS 

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARY D. NICHOLS, Chairperson of 

the California Air Resources Board; 

JAMES GOLDSTENE, Executive 

Officer of the California Air 

Resources Board, 

Defendants-Appellees,

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE 

COUNCIL, INC.,

Intervenor-Defendant–Appellee.

No. 13-15175

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-00384-

MCE-GGH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Chief District Judge, Presiding

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2 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

Submitted February 9, 2015∗

San Francisco, California

Filed March 3, 2015

Before: John T. Noonan, Senior Circuit Judge, Barry G. 

Silverman, Circuit Judge, and Paul C. Huck, Senior District 

Judge.**

Opinion by Judge Huck

SUMMARY***

Environmental Law

The panel affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction of a federal preemption challenge to a 

California environmental regulation addressing diesel 

trucks.

The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that the 

Environmental Protection Agency’s approval of the 

 

∗ The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

** The Honorable Paul C. Huck, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 3

regulation as part of California’s state implementation plan 

divested the district court of jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1) 

of the Clean Air Act. The panel concluded that the suit, as 

a practical matter, challenged the state implementation plan 

itself. Because the court of appeals has exclusive 

jurisdiction over such challenges pursuant to § 307(b)(1), 

the district court lacked jurisdiction.

COUNSEL

Patrick J. Whalen, Law Offices of Brooks Ellison, 

Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Nicholas Stern, Deputy Attorney General for the State of 

California, Sacramento, California, for DefendantsAppellees.

Melissa Lin Perrella, David Pettit, and Morgan Wyenn, 

Natural Resources Defense Council, Santa Monica, 

California, for Intervenor-Defendant–Appellee.

OPINION

HUCK, Senior District Judge

The California Dump Truck Owners Association 

(Truck Association) appeals the dismissal of its federal 

preemption challenge to a California environmental 

regulation.1 At issue is whether the Environmental 

 

1 The Truck Association is a trade association representing construction 

trucking companies operating in California.

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4 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

Protection Agency’s (EPA) approval of the regulation as 

part of California’s state implementation plan (SIP) 

divested the district court of subject matter jurisdiction 

under § 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7607(b)(1). That section vests federal circuit courts of 

appeals with exclusive jurisdiction over petitions 

challenging the EPA’s approval of a SIP. The Truck 

Association’s suit, as a practical matter, challenges the SIP 

itself, and this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such 

challenges pursuant to § 307(b)(1). Accordingly, we affirm 

the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.2

I. Background

The CAA creates a partnership between the federal 

government and the states to combat air pollution. Natural 

Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 770 F.3d 

1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 2014). Under the CAA, the EPA must 

prescribe national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) 

for certain air pollutants, and each state is responsible for 

implementing those standards within its borders. 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 7409–10. Specifically, each state must adopt, and 

submit for the EPA’s approval, a SIP that provides for the 

“implementation, maintenance, and enforcement” of the 

NAAQS. Id. § 7410(a)(1). While a state has considerable 

discretion in formulating its SIP, the SIP must include 

“enforceable emission limitations” and control measures 

and “a program to provide for the enforcement” of such 

 

2 The district court also dismissed the Truck Association’s complaint 

for the alternative reason that the EPA is a necessary and indispensable

party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. However, because we 

have determined that the district court properly dismissed the complaint 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we need not, and, therefore, do 

not reach this alternative basis for dismissal.

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 5

measures. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A), (C). It must further provide 

“necessary assurances” that the state has “adequate 

personnel, funding, and authority” to carry out the SIP, and 

is not prohibited from doing so by “any provision of 

Federal or State law.” Id. § 7410(a)(2)(E). Once approved 

by the EPA, a SIP becomes federal law and must be carried 

out by the state. Safe Air for Everyone v. EPA, 488 F.3d 

1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2007); Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. 

Advocates v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 366 F.3d 692, 695 

(9th Cir. 2004). A state’s SIP evolves as the state proposes, 

and the EPA approves, revisions to account for new 

NAAQS and emissions reduction technologies. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7410(a)(2)(H). Approved SIPs may be enforced “by 

either the State, the EPA, or via citizen suits.” Bayview, 

366 F.3d at 695.

In 2008, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) 

adopted the Truck and Bus Regulation (Regulation), Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 13, § 2025, for incorporation into 

California’s SIP.3

 The Regulation helps California meet 

the EPA’s NAAQS for fine particulate matter (PM) and 

ozone. Broadly speaking, it requires heavy-duty diesel 

trucks, whose emissions contribute significantly to PM and 

ozone pollution, to be upgraded with pollution filters and 

lower-emission engines. The Regulation took effect on 

January 1, 2012.

In April 2011, the Truck Association filed an amended 

complaint in district court to enjoin enforcement of the 

Regulation. It claimed that, under the Supremacy Clause of 

 

3 The full title of the Truck and Bus Regulation is a “Regulation to 

Reduce Emissions of Diesel Particulate Matter, Oxides of Nitrogen and 

Other Criteria Pollutants, from In-Use Heavy-Duty Diesel-Fueled 

Vehicles.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 2025.

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6 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

the United States Constitution, the Regulation was 

preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration 

Authorization Act (FAAAA), which prohibits states from 

enacting regulations “related to a price, route, or service of 

any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of 

property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The Truck 

Association alleged that its motor carrier members would 

have to increase prices and alter their routes and services to 

offset the costs of complying with the Regulation. The 

Truck Association sought a declaration that the FAAAA 

preempted the Regulation and an injunction against its 

enforcement by CARB. The Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc. (NRDC) intervened on CARB’s behalf.

In November 2011, the Truck Association filed a 

motion for summary judgment as well as a motion for 

preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the 

Regulation until dispositive motions could be decided. The 

following month, the NRDC filed a cross-motion for 

summary judgment. The district court denied the Truck 

Association’s motion for preliminary injunction and took 

the motions for summary judgment under submission.

Throughout this time, the Regulation had progressed 

through the EPA’s SIP approval process. In May 2011, a 

month after the Truck Association filed its amended 

complaint, CARB submitted the Regulation to the EPA.4

 

In July 2011, the EPA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking announcing its intention to approve the 

Regulation. Proposed Rule, Approval and Promulgation of 

Implementation Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 40652 (proposed July 

11, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). In the notice, 

 

4 The Regulation as submitted to the EPA included certain amendments 

that were adopted by CARB in 2011.

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 7

the EPA concluded that the Regulation complied with the 

CAA. In particular, the EPA noted that CARB had

authority under California law to implement the 

Regulation, and that the EPA knew of “no obstacle under 

Federal or State law” to its implementation. Id. at 40658. 

The EPA further found that CARB had adequate personnel 

and funding to enforce the Regulation and that CARB’s 

proposed enforcement mechanisms were likely to be 

effective. Id. at 40659. The EPA provided thirty days for 

the public to comment on its proposed approval of the 

Regulation. Neither the Truck Association nor any other 

individual or group commented on the proposed rule. Final 

Rule, Approval and Promulgation of Implementations 

Plans, 77 Fed. Reg. 20308, 20312 (Apr. 4, 2012) (to be 

codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). On April 4, 2012, the EPA 

took final action approving the Regulation as part of 

California’s SIP. In its notice of this action, the EPA 

reaffirmed its prior conclusion that the Regulation 

complied with the substantive and procedural requirements 

of the CAA. Id. at 20311, 20313. The final rule took effect 

on May 4, 2012, and the Regulation was incorporated into 

California’s SIP in the Code of Federal Regulations. 40 

C.F.R. § 52.220(410) (incorporating by reference the 

Regulation, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 2025).

On May 24, 2012, while the parties’ summary judgment 

motions remained pending, the NRDC filed a notice of 

supplemental authority informing the district court of the 

EPA’s approval of the Regulation as part of California’s 

SIP. At the court’s request, the parties submitted briefing 

on whether the EPA’s action affected the posture of the 

case. On December 19, 2012, the court dismissed the suit, 

finding that it no longer had subject matter jurisdiction 

under § 307(b)(1) of the CAA. It further found that, even if 

it retained jurisdiction, dismissal was proper under Federal 

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8 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

Rule of Civil Procedure 19 because the EPA was a 

necessary and indispensable party. The Truck Association 

appealed both grounds for the district court’s dismissal.

Shortly after filing this appeal, the Truck Association 

separately filed a petition in this Court under § 307(b)(1) 

and Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, seeking review of the EPA’s approval of the 

Regulation. Petition for Review, Cal. Constr. Trucking 

Ass’n v. EPA, No. 13-70562 (9th Cir. 2013). We dismissed 

the petition as untimely because it was not filed within 

sixty days of the EPA’s notice of final rule, as required by 

§ 307(b)(1). Order, Cal. Constr. Trucking Ass’n, No. 13-

70562. The Truck Association also filed a petition with the 

EPA requesting reconsideration of its approval of the 

Regulation.

II. Analysis

We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Carolina 

Cas. Ins. Co. v. Team Equip., Inc., 741 F.3d 1082, 1086 

(9th Cir. 2014).

Section 307(b)(1) of the CAA states:

A petition for review of the [EPA] 

Administrator’s action in approving or 

promulgating any implementation plan . . . 

or any other final action of the 

Administrator under this chapter . . . which 

is locally or regionally applicable may be 

filed only in the United States Court of 

Appeals for the appropriate circuit.

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 9

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). As a result, 

“invalidation of an EPA-approved SIP may only occur in 

the federal appellate courts on direct appeal from the 

Administrator’s decision.” United States v. Ford Motor 

Co., 814 F.2d 1099, 1103 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Sierra 

Club v. Ind.-Ky. Elec. Corp., 716 F.2d 1145, 1152 (7th Cir. 

1983) (“Once a plan is adopted by the state and it 

withstands any subsequent procedural challenge, then 

§ 7607(b)(1) provides that invalidation may occur only in 

the federal appellate courts.”).

The Truck Association, however, argues that it is not 

challenging the SIP, or the EPA’s approval thereof. It 

claims that its suit, which it filed before the EPA’s final 

action approving the Regulation as part of California’s SIP, 

challenges only the state Regulation, which is distinct from 

the federal SIP. The Truck Association contends that 

invalidating the Regulation would render it unenforceable 

by CARB, but “would not prohibit enforcement of the SIP” 

by the EPA and private citizens. Truck Association 

members would still purportedly benefit from the 

Regulation’s invalidation because of the “enormous 

difference in the enforcement mechanisms between the 

state regulation and the federalized SIP.” Specifically, the 

Truck Association points out that under the CAA, citizen 

suits may not be commenced without first providing the 

alleged violator with sixty days’ notice.5

 42 U.S.C. 

 

5 The Truck Association does not discuss whether a similar grace 

period exists before the EPA can take enforcement action. However, it 

appears that the EPA must wait at least thirty days before taking action 

to enforce a SIP. See Luminant Generation Co., LLC v. EPA, 757 F.3d 

439, 442 (5th Cir. 2014) (“After giving notice and waiting thirty days, 

the EPA may ‘issue an order,’ ‘issue an administrative penalty’ after a 

formal administrative hearing, or ‘bring a civil action.’” (quoting 42 

U.S.C. § 7413 (a)(1))).

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§ 7604(b)(1). By contrast, no such limitation is placed on 

CARB’s enforcement of the Regulation. Under 

California’s Health and Safety Code, violators are liable for 

civil penalties of up to $1,000 per day as well as criminal 

sanctions, with each day of violation constituting a separate 

offense. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 39674, 42400. 

Were the Regulation nullified, violators would have sixty 

days to take corrective action, saving them from potentially 

$60,000 in penalties and sixty criminal offenses. And, 

“[a]s a practical matter,” the Truck Association contends, 

most of its members would not have to comply with the 

SIP for “months or years” until their noncompliance was 

discovered by someone willing to pursue the “relatively 

cumbersome” process of bringing a citizen suit. The Truck 

Association concludes that, because it is challenging only 

the Regulation and not the SIP, § 307(b)(1) does not 

apply.6

 For the reasons discussed herein, we disagree.

 

6 In its opening brief, the Truck Association argues at length that an 

approved SIP does not have the “force and effect of federal law,” and 

instead may simply be enforced by the EPA in federal court. This 

argument, for which the Truck Association cites no case law, is based 

on the fact that the CAA provision providing for federal enforcement 

does not contain the language “force and effect of federal law.” 42 

U.S.C. § 7413. This is insufficient to disturb our precedent, which has 

consistently recognized that an approved SIP is federal law. See, e.g., 

Safe Air, 488 F.3d at 1091; Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. S. Coast 

Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 651 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011); El 

Comité Para El Bienestar de Earlimart v. Warmerdam, 539 F.3d 1062, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2008). We are joined in this view by other circuits. See, 

e.g., GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 516 (3rd Cir. 2013) 

(“If the EPA approves the SIPs, they become enforceable as federal 

law.”); US Magnesium, LLC v. EPA, 690 F.3d 1157, 1159 (10th Cir. 

2012) (“Approved SIPs are enforceable as federal law . . . .”); Her 

Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ont. v. City of Detroit, 

874 F.2d 332, 335 (6th Cir. 1989) (“If a state implementation plan 

(‘SIP’) is approved by the EPA, its requirements become federal law 

and are fully enforceable in federal court.”). Furthermore, the Truck 

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 11

A. Scope of § 307(b)(1)

The Truck Association relies heavily on the fact that its 

complaint, on its face, does not challenge an EPA action or 

California’s SIP. However, jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1) 

is not established solely by the allegations on the face of a 

complaint; instead, § 307(b)(1) “channels review of final 

EPA action exclusively to the courts of appeals, regardless 

of how the grounds for review are framed.” Virginia v. 

United States, 74 F.3d 517, 523 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis 

added). Thus, § 307(b)(1) has been applied to claims that 

effectively, if not facially, challenged an EPA final action.

In Virginia v. United States, for example, the Fourth 

Circuit held that § 307(b)(1) applied to Virginia’s claim 

that provisions of the CAA were “unconstitutional on their 

face.” Virginia, 74 F.3d at 522. After the EPA took final 

action finding deficiencies in Virginia’s pollution 

programs, Virginia filed suit in district court alleging that 

the CAA sanctions that would be triggered by the EPA’s 

actions were unconstitutional. Virginia sought an 

injunction preventing the EPA from enforcing those 

sanctions. The district court dismissed Virginia’s suit 

under § 307(b)(1), and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The 

Fourth Circuit explained that “the practical objective of the 

complaint [was] to nullify final actions of EPA,” and held 

that Virginia could not “circumvent direct review in the 

 

Association’s ultimate point appears to be that even after EPA 

approval, there remains “a state regulation on the books that is subject 

to preemption,” a point that Appellees do not contest, and that is not 

relevant to the question of jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1).

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12 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

circuit court” by “framing its complaint as a constitutional 

challenge to the CAA.” Id. at 522–23 (emphasis added).7

The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 

Missouri v. United States, 109 F.3d 440 (8th Cir. 1997). 

There, Missouri challenged the constitutionality of the 

CAA’s sanctions scheme after the EPA found Missouri to 

be noncompliant with the CAA. The Eighth Circuit held 

that § 307(b)(1) applied to Missouri’s suit, stating:

 

7 In its Reply brief, the Truck Association argues that Virginia’s 

holding was subsequently limited in North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. 

Tennessee Valley Authority, 549 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D.N.C. 2008). 

Apart from the fact that a district court cannot “limit” the holding of a 

court of appeals decision, the Truck Association’s reliance on this case, 

which ultimately favors Appellees, is misguided. North Carolina had 

filed a public nuisance suit against the Tennessee Valley Authority 

(TVA) based on emissions from TVA’s power plants located in 

Tennessee, Alabama, and Kentucky. Id. at 727. North Carolina had 

separately filed a petition with the EPA under the CAA seeking 

emissions reductions from TVA’s power plants in thirteen states. The 

district court found that the two actions could proceed simultaneously 

because North Carolina’s public nuisance suit was brought on different 

grounds than its EPA petition. Id. at 734. The court distinguished 

Virginia, finding no indication that North Carolina’s “practical 

objective” was to “‘nullify’ the EPA’s final action.” Id. Following a 

bench trial, TVA was found liable and appealed. As noted in CARB’s 

citation of supplemental authorities, the Fourth Circuit reversed the 

district court’s judgment. Among other reasons, the court explained 

that preemption considerations disfavored litigation such as North 

Carolina’s suit, as it amounted to “‘nothing more than a collateral 

attack’” on the system created by the CAA and “risk[ed] results that 

lack both clarity and legitimacy.” North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. 

Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 301 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Palumbo v. Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 1993)). 

Thus, not only does North Carolina not cabin Virginia, it in fact favors 

Appellees by discouraging litigation that seeks to “scuttle the extensive 

system of anti-pollution mandates that promote clean air in this 

country.” Id. at 298.

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 13

While it is true that Missouri’s complaint 

questions the constitutionality of the overall 

sanctions scheme of the CAA, this challenge 

is not separate and apart from EPA 

action. . . . Those sanctions flow directly 

from EPA action, originating in EPA’s

declaring the St. Louis area an “ozone 

nonattainment area.”

Id. at 442.

In New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 666 F.2d 

30 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit found § 307(b)(1) to 

apply to a common law nuisance suit. The plaintiff had 

sued a lighting company for burning high-sulfur oil, 

conduct the EPA had approved as a variance to New 

York’s SIP. Id. at 31–32 & n.1. The Second Circuit found 

the nuisance claim was “in effect, an attack upon the 

validity of the EPA-approved variance,” and held that “[a]ll 

claims against the validity of performance standards 

approved by final decision of the Administrator must be 

addressed to the courts of appeals on direct appeal.” Id. at 

33 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Finally, in Benning v. Browner, No. Civ.A. 97-CV7058, 1998 WL 717436 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1998), the court 

applied the reasoning of Virginia and Missouri to a suit 

alleging that a regulation incorporated into Pennsylvania’s 

SIP violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court found 

the plaintiffs were “essentially challenging the 

appropriateness of the EPA Administrator’s action in 

approving a regulation they believe to be unconstitutional.” 

Id. at *3. It concluded that the plaintiffs’ “practical 

objective [was] to nullify the EPA’s final action,” and 

dismissed the suit under § 307(b)(1).

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These cases demonstrate that a claim need not be 

framed as a challenge to the EPA for § 307(b)(1) to apply. 

Instead, § 307(b)(1)’s scope extends to claims that, as a 

practical matter, challenge an EPA final action, including 

its approval of a SIP.8 As explained below, we find that the 

Truck Association’s suit, as a practical matter, challenges 

the EPA’s approval of a provision of California’s SIP.

B. The Truck Association’s Suit

The Truck Association seeks to enjoin CARB from 

enforcing the Regulation, which the Association alleges is 

preempted by federal law. However, the EPA’s approval 

of the Regulation made it part of California’s SIP, and the 

SIP’s effectiveness depends largely on its enforcement by 

the state. Enjoining enforcement of the Regulation by 

CARB would effectively nullify that provision of 

 

8 To some extent, this Court’s decision in Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc. v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 651 

F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2011), also supports the proposition that 

§ 307(b)(1) looks beyond the face of a complaint. There, the EPA had 

approved the SIP for the South Coast Air Basin. The SIP included a 

program that allowed new sources of pollution to obtain emissions 

offset credits from the South Coast Air Quality Management District 

(SCAQMD), which implemented the SIP. Id. at 1069. In approving 

the SIP, the EPA had found that SCAQMD’s credits complied with the 

CAA. Id. at 1070–71. Several years later, the NRDC filed suit in 

district court alleging that the credits did not comply with the CAA. 

The district court dismissed the claim under § 307(b)(1). Id. at 1069. 

On appeal, the NRDC argued that it was “not challenging the EPA’s 

approval of the SIP, but rather SCAQMD’s implementation of the 

SIP.” Id. at 1071. We rejected that argument, explaining that “because 

the EPA issued rules that not only approved the SIP but also indicated 

that the credits . . . comply with [the CAA], the NRDC is effectively 

seeking review of the EPA’s decision.” Id. Thus, SCAQMD also

favors applying § 307(b)(1) based on the practical objective of a claim.

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 15

California’s SIP. Furthermore, in alleging that the 

Regulation is preempted, the Truck Association is also 

effectively challenging the EPA’s determination that 

federal law does not prohibit the Regulation. Thus, while 

the Truck Association had no “secret intent” of challenging 

the EPA when it filed suit, and it does not now seek to 

prohibit the EPA’s enforcement of the SIP, the practical, 

and therefore legal, effect of the Truck Association’s suit is 

to challenge both the EPA and the SIP.

1. Challenge to CARB’s Enforcement of the SIP

While the Truck Association asserts that “[t]he validity 

of the SIP is not at issue,” its suit, if successful, would 

effectively eviscerate the SIP by precluding its enforcement 

by CARB. As we have previously observed, “[t]he [CAA] 

places much of its enforcement burden on the states, which 

are required to submit SIPs that show how states will attain 

the standards for major air pollutants.” El Comité Para El 

Bienestar de Earlimart v. Warmerdam, 539 F.3d 1062, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also Safe Air, 

488 F.3d at 1092 (“[T]he CAA establishes a system heavily 

dependent upon state participation.”); Ford, 814 F.2d at 

1102 (“[T]he Clean Air Act contemplates very significant 

participation in air pollution control by state air pollution 

control agencies . . . .”). Thus, a SIP must contain 

“enforceable” emissions limitations and assurances that the 

state has sufficient authority and resources to carry out the 

SIP. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A), (E).

Indeed, the EPA approved the Regulation in part 

because it concluded that CARB could effectively enforce 

it. The EPA stated:

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16 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

CARB intends to conduct enforcement of 

the . . . Regulation . . . similarly to 

enforcement of CARB’s commercial vehicle 

and school bus idling regulations. CARB’s 

enforcement staff intends to use the 

inspection and audit methods that they have 

developed during the many years of 

experience enforcing the Heavy-Duty 

Vehicle Inspection Program (adopted into 

law in 1988) and the Periodic Smoke 

Inspection Program (adopted into law in 

1990).

CARB indicates that enforcement 

activities will include inspections at border 

crossings, California Highway Patrol (CHP) 

weigh stations, fleet facilities, and randomly 

selected roadside locations and audits of 

records. . . . These activities could result in 

corrective actions and substantial civil 

penalties for non-compliance with the 

regulations. . . . 

We recognize the general effectiveness 

of CARB’s motor vehicle enforcement 

program and expect CARB’s approach to 

enforcement of the . . . [R]egulation[], as 

described above, to be equally effective

. . . .

76 Fed. Reg. 40659 (emphasis added). Clearly, the SIP’s 

effectiveness in attaining the EPA’s NAAQS is directly tied 

to its enforceability by CARB, and would be vitiated if 

such enforcement were enjoined.

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 17

Furthermore, the Truck Association’s assertion that it is 

not challenging the SIP is belied by its acknowledgment 

that the invalidation of the state Regulation that it desires 

would make the SIP’s enforcement more difficult, and that 

such circumstances would be beneficial to its members. 

While touting the continued viability of the SIP via EPA 

actions and citizen suits, the Truck Association readily 

admits that such enforcement will be largely ineffective, 

with SIP violations likely to go undetected for months if 

not years. Thus, if successful, the Truck Association’s suit 

would severely undermine the SIP’s ability to achieve 

federal air quality standards. Because the Truck 

Association’s practical objective is to dismantle the SIP’s 

primary enforcement apparatus, its suit is subject to 

§ 307(b)(1) and must be brought in this Court.9

The Truck Association argues that there is some 

precedent for a non-appellate court repealing a state 

 

9 In addition to having the practical effect of nullifying the SIP, the 

Truck Association’s suit arguably seeks to literally repeal a portion of 

the SIP. California’s SIP, codified at 40 C.F.R. § 52.220, does not set 

forth the requirements of the Regulation; instead, it incorporates the 

Regulation “by reference.” Id. § 52.220(410). Thus, if the Regulation 

were repealed, there would arguably be nothing for the SIP to 

incorporate. Indeed, it could be persuasively argued that the repeal of a 

state regulation necessarily repeals part of the corresponding SIP, as a 

SIP is composed of state regulations. As explained by the EPA in its 

notice of final rule:

[I]n reviewing SIP submissions, EPA’s role is to 

approve State choices, provided that they meet the 

criteria of the Clean Air Act. Accordingly, this 

proposed action merely approves State law as 

meeting Federal requirements and does not impose 

additional requirements beyond those imposed by 

State law.

77 Fed. Reg. at 20313.

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regulation that is incorporated into a SIP. The Truck 

Association points to Sierra Club v. Indiana-Kentucky 

Electric Corp., 716 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1983), where the 

Seventh Circuit considered the enforceability of a SIP 

provision whose underlying state regulation had been 

invalidated in state court on state law procedural grounds. 

Id. at 1146. An Indiana court had found the SIP provision 

invalid because the “state officer who presided over the 

hearing [on the regulation] had failed to submit written 

findings to the Indiana Environmental Management 

Board,” as required by Indiana law. Id. at 1147. The 

Seventh Circuit held that, in light of the state court’s ruling, 

the SIP provision was not enforceable, reasoning:

Because administrative actions taken 

without substantial compliance with 

applicable procedures are invalid, it is as if 

Indiana never submitted [the state 

regulation]. Since a valid [regulation] was 

never submitted, EPA’s adoption of [the 

regulation] cannot be given effect since EPA 

approved a provision which was invalid 

when submitted to the agency.

Id. at 1148.

Even if we were to agree with the Seventh Circuit that a 

SIP provision may be invalidated in state court on state 

procedural grounds, this would not help the Truck 

Association, whose suit does not raise a state law 

procedural challenge. And, as explained by the Seventh 

Circuit, “[o]nce a plan is adopted by the state and it 

withstands any subsequent procedural challenge, then 

§ 7607(b)(1) [CAA § 307(b)(1)] provides that invalidation 

may occur only in the federal appellate courts.” Id. at 

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 19

1152. Thus, if anything, Sierra Club supports the 

application of § 307(b)(1) to the Truck Association’s suit.

United States v. Ford Motor Co., 814 F.2d 1099 (6th 

Cir. 1987), similarly acknowledged the very limited 

circumstances in which a SIP may be invalidated by a state 

court. There, the EPA had sued Ford in district court for 

violations of Michigan’s SIP, and Ford subsequently filed 

suit in Michigan state court to enjoin state environmental 

agencies from enforcing the SIP. Ford and the state 

agencies negotiated a consent judgment purporting to 

vacate the SIP, and Ford sought to use the consent 

judgment to defeat the EPA’s enforcement action. Id. at 

1101. The Sixth Circuit held that the consent judgment did 

not preclude EPA’s enforcement of the SIP because 

“revisions of State Implementation Plans are ineffective 

until approved by EPA,” and “invalidation of an EPAapproved SIP may only occur in the federal appellate 

courts” under § 307(b)(1). Id. at 1102–03. The Sixth 

Circuit distinguished Sierra Club, noting that Ford’s 

challenge to the SIP was not based on procedural grounds. 

Id. at 1103.

The Sixth Circuit did not address whether the consent 

judgment could preclude enforcement of the SIP by state 

agencies. If it could, Ford would arguably support the 

Truck Association’s assertion that a non-appellate court 

may render a SIP unenforceable by the state. However, the 

court in Ford was not confronted with this question. To the 

extent that any inferences can be drawn from the opinion, 

they would favor Appellees, as the Sixth Circuit stated, 

“invalidation of a SIP on technical grounds by a state court 

. . . . cannot be given effect.” Id. at 1103 (emphasis added). 

Presumably, this admonition applied to both the EPA and 

the state agencies. Thus, Sierra Club and Ford do not 

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20 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

detract from the analysis supporting this Court’s exclusive 

jurisdiction over the Truck Association’s claim.10

2. Challenge to the EPA’s Legal 

Determination 

It is also clear that jurisdiction for the Truck 

Association’s claim exists exclusively under § 307(b)(1) 

because the Truck Association’s preemption claim 

effectively challenges the EPA’s legal determination that 

federal law does not prohibit the Regulation. When the 

EPA proposed approving the Regulation, it explicitly stated 

that it knew of “no obstacle under Federal or State law in 

CARB’s ability to implement” the Regulation. 76 Fed. 

Reg. at 40658. The EPA reiterated this conclusion in its 

final approval, finding that the state had provided adequate 

assurances that it was not prohibited from carrying out the 

Regulation by “any provision of Federal or State law.” 

77 Fed. Reg. 20311, 20313. In alleging that the Regulation 

violates the Supremacy Clause because it is preempted by 

 

10 The parties cite New Mexico Environmental Improvement Division v. 

Thomas, 789 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that 

“[w]hen the approved SIP contains an element that is invalidated by 

virtue of state law, adoption by the EPA is also invalidated.” Id. at 833. 

This decision, however, is of limited help to either side. In New 

Mexico, a state regulation approved into New Mexico’s SIP was 

subsequently invalidated by New Mexico’s Supreme Court for 

violating a state law prohibiting counties from requiring vehicle 

registrations. Id. at 828 & n.1. The issue before the court was whether 

the EPA reasonably concluded that New Mexico had failed to submit a 

valid SIP. In its deferential agency review, the Tenth Circuit found that 

the EPA acted reasonably, noting that Sierra Club lent support for the 

EPA’s theory that when a state submits a SIP that is invalid under state 

law, it “is as if the state had not submitted a SIP” at all.” Id. at 833. 

The court had no occasion to consider whether New Mexico’s Supreme 

Court had jurisdiction to invalidate the state regulation.

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 21

the FAAAA, the Truck Association effectively challenges 

the validity of the EPA’s determination. See New England 

Legal Found., 666 F.2d at 33. Under § 307(b)(1), such a 

challenge must be brought in this Court. See Virginia, 

74 F.3d at 523 (explaining that appellate courts’ exclusive 

jurisdiction extends to “‘legal issues pertaining to final 

[actions]—whether or not those issues arise from the 

statutes that authorized the agency action in the first 

place’”) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 

Palumbo v. Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 161 (4th 

Cir.1993)).

11

In sum, the practical objective of the Truck 

Association’s preemption suit is to nullify the SIP and 

challenge the EPA’s legal determination regarding its 

validity. Thus, it is the type of action to which § 307(b)(1) 

applies. Although this case is somewhat unique, in that the 

EPA approved the SIP after the Truck Association filed 

suit, subsequent EPA action can divest a district court of 

jurisdiction. See City of Seabrook v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1371, 

1373 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Even if we assume . . . that the 

district court had jurisdiction of plaintiffs’ claim . . . the 

publication of the ‘final rule’ clearly left the district court 

without jurisdiction of the claim [under § 307(b)(1)].”); see 

also Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. 

Ct. 1204, 1210 (2012) (explaining that respondents’ 

Supremacy Clause challenges to state regulations were in a 

“different posture” after federal agency approved the 

 

11 Admittedly, it is not clear from the EPA’s public notices whether it 

specifically considered preemption under the FAAAA. To the extent 

that it did not, this is at least somewhat attributable to the Truck 

Association’s failure to comment on the EPA’s proposed rule. In any 

event, the Truck Association effectively challenges the EPA’s broader 

conclusion that the Regulation complies with federal law.

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22 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

regulations, potentially requiring respondents to instead 

seek review of agency action). Furthermore, the Truck 

Association provides no persuasive reason why § 307(b)(1) 

cannot apply to a regulation that was adopted to be 

incorporated into a state’s SIP, simply because suit was 

filed prior to the EPA’s final action. Indeed, policy 

considerations underlying the CAA mandate this precise 

result.

C. Policy and Fairness Considerations

In establishing the CAA’s jurisdictional scheme, 

“Congress wanted speedy review of EPA rules and final 

actions in a single court,” thereby avoiding “duplicative or 

piecemeal litigation, and the risk of contradictory 

decisions.” Virginia, 74 F.3d at 525 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); see also Harrison v. PPG 

Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 593 (1980) (“The most obvious 

advantage of direct review by a court of appeals is the time 

saved compared to review by a district court, followed by a 

second review on appeal.”). Allowing the Truck 

Association’s suit to proceed in district court would 

undermine these policy objectives. The district court’s 

decision on whether the Regulation is preempted would be 

subject to appeal, during which time the enforceability of 

the SIP would be in limbo. This would frustrate 

Congress’s goal of having prompt and final review of 

decisions regarding SIPs. Moreover, even if the Truck 

Association successfully enjoined enforcement of the 

Regulation by CARB, a separate suit would be required to 

enjoin enforcement by the EPA and private citizens, 

potentially resulting in re-litigation of the same issues in 

multiple courts, with the concomitant risk of conflicting 

decisions. Indeed, the Truck Association admitted to the 

district court that it “may challenge the approval of the SIP 

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 23

. . . in a different forum . . . on similar or different 

grounds,” and it subsequently did bring such other 

challenges.

12 Applying § 307(b)(1) to the Truck 

Association’s suit avoids these outcomes and furthers the 

goals underlying the CAA’s judicial review system.

The Supreme Court’s analysis in Douglas v. 

Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc., 

132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) supports this conclusion. In 

Douglas, Medicaid providers and beneficiaries brought suit 

under the Supremacy Clause alleging that California’s 

Medicaid statutes conflicted with, and were preempted by, 

federal Medicaid law. After the Supreme Court granted 

certiorari, the federal agency responsible for administering 

the Medicaid program approved the state statutes, having 

determined that they complied with federal law. Id. at 

1208–09. The Supreme Court found that as a result of the

agency’s approval, the case was “now in a different 

posture” and “may require respondents now to proceed by 

seeking review of the agency determination under the 

Administrative Procedure Act rather than in an action 

against California under the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 

1210 (citation omitted). Among the Court’s considerations 

was that:

[T]o allow a Supremacy Clause action to 

proceed once the agency has reached a 

 

12 After the district court dismissed its suit, the Truck Association filed 

a petition in this Court under § 307(b)(1), seeking review of the EPA’s 

approval of the Regulation. Although we dismissed that suit as 

untimely, thereby mitigating the risk of conflicting decisions, allowing 

the Truck Association’s district court suit to proceed would create 

precedent for such piecemeal litigation.

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24 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

decision threatens potential inconsistency or 

confusion.

. . . 

. . . Indeed, to permit a difference in result 

[depending upon whether the case proceeds 

in a Supremacy Clause action rather than 

under the APA] would subject the States to 

conflicting interpretations of federal law by 

several different courts (and the agency), 

thereby threatening to defeat the uniformity 

that Congress intended by centralizing 

administration of the federal program in the 

agency and to make superfluous or to 

undermine traditional APA review. If the 

two kinds of actions should reach the same 

result, the Supremacy Clause challenge is at 

best redundant. And to permit the 

continuation of the action in that form would 

seem to be inefficient, for the agency is not a 

participant in the pending litigation below, 

litigation that will decide whether the 

agency-approved state rates violate the 

federal statute.

Id. at 1210–11 (citation omitted). Similarly, here, the 

EPA’s approval of the Regulation has changed the posture 

of the case, such that a different avenue of judicial review 

is appropriate to avoid potentially conflicting decisions on 

the underlying question of whether the Regulation is 

preempted by the FAAAA. Moreover, proceeding under 

§ 307(b)(1) is preferable because the EPA would be a party 

to litigation that would decide whether a regulation it 

approved violates federal law.

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 25

The Truck Association correctly notes that the instant 

case differs from Douglas in that the EPA does not 

administer the FAAAA. Thus, the EPA’s determination 

that the Regulation does not conflict with federal law may 

not be the “kind of legal question that ordinarily calls for 

APA review,” because it does not fall within the EPA’s 

expertise. Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1210. Nevertheless, the 

congressional interests in uniformity and finality discussed 

in Douglas apply here with equal force, and are better 

served by requiring challenges such as the Truck 

Association’s to be heard in this Court.

Finally, the Truck Association argues that applying 

§ 307(b)(1) to its suit would be unfair and leave it with no 

forum in which to pursue its claim. The Truck Association 

points out that when it filed suit, jurisdiction in this Court 

was unavailable because the EPA had not taken final action 

on the Regulation. Requiring the Truck Association to wait

for final action would mean that it could not enjoin the 

Regulation from taking effect, thereby imposing heavy 

costs on its members, as the EPA did not approve the 

Regulation until several months after it became effective. 

Furthermore, the Truck Association argues, dismissing its 

suit on jurisdictional grounds would unfairly penalize it for 

the district court’s delay in rendering a decision. 

According to the Truck Association, had the court 

adjudicated the case promptly, “judgment likely would 

have predated the EPA action.” Lastly, though not raised 

by the Truck Association, the district court’s dismissal of 

the Association’s suit eight months after the EPA’s final 

action arguably prejudiced the Association because by then, 

the sixty-day window in which it could seek review in this 

Court under § 307(b)(1) had closed, leaving the 

Association with no court in which to bring its claim.

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26 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

These arguments, though somewhat sympathetic, are 

ultimately unpersuasive. The Truck Association is 

mistaken that § 307(b)(1)’s application would deny it a 

forum in which to enjoin the Regulation’s implementation. 

The Truck Association properly sought such relief in the 

district court, and indeed that court considered and ruled 

upon its motion for a preliminary injunction. The Truck 

Association may be correct that it would not have been 

subject to § 307(b)(1) had the district court reached an 

earlier disposition on its preemption claim. However, 

nothing inhibited the Truck Association from timely 

pursuing that claim in this Court after the EPA approved 

the Regulation in April 2012. The fact that it did not, and 

is now time-barred from doing so, is the Truck 

Association’s own doing.

Moreover, any unfairness to the Truck Association is 

further mitigated by the fact that it was on notice, from the 

Regulation’s inception, that the Regulation was intended to 

be incorporated into California’s SIP. When CARB first 

proposed adopting the Regulation, it issued a public notice 

explaining that “[t]he [CAA] requires U.S. EPA to establish 

NAAQS for pollutants,” that “Federal law mandates the 

development of State Implementation Plans documenting 

the actions the state will take to attain the federal air quality 

standards,” that CARB’s “SIP submittals to U.S. EPA . . . 

adopted 2014 reduction commitments for both [ozone] and 

PM[],” and that “the proposed regulation would provide the 

necessary emissions reductions by the mandatory deadlines 

for meeting the NAAQS for PM[] and ozone.”13 After 

 

13 James N. Goldstene, Cal. Air Res. Bd., Notice of Public Hearing to 

Consider the Adoption of a Proposed Regulation to Reduce Emissions 

from In-Use On-Road Diesel Vehicles, and Amendments to the 

Regulations for In-Use Off Road Vehicles, Drayage Trucks, 

Municipality and Utility Vehicles, Mobile Cargo Handling Equipment, 

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 27

CARB submitted the Regulation to the EPA, and several 

months before it was to take effect, the EPA issued a public 

notice proposing to approve the Regulation and inviting 

comments on its proposal. Thus, from multiple sources, the 

Truck Association was on notice that it could have 

participated in the administrative approval process by 

submitting comments to the EPA. However, it chose not to 

do so. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the 

Truck Association has been unfairly prejudiced.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under CAA 

§ 307(b)(1).

AFFIRMED.

 

Portable Engines and Equipment, Heavy duty Engines and Vehicle 

Exhaust Emissions Standards and Test Procedures and Commercial 

Motor Vehicle Idling 3–5 (2008), available at www.arb.ca.gov/

regact/2008/truckbus08/tbnotice.pdf.

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