Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05220/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05220-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Labow
Appellant
United States Department of Justice
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 10, 2016 Decided August 5, 2016

No. 14-5220

JEFFREY LABOW,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-01256)

Jeffrey Light argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant.

John G. Interrante, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief was R. Craig 

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and SRINIVASAN, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

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SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: In 2011, appellant Jeffrey 

Labow came to learn that he had been identified as an 

anarchist extremist by an FBI agent. Labow then submitted a 

request to the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act for 

any records about himself. Although the FBI released some 

responsive records to Labow, it withheld disclosure of, or 

redacted information from, other responsive documents, citing 

various grounds. The district court upheld the FBI’s 

withholdings and redactions in full, and granted summary 

judgment in favor of the agency. We agree in some respects 

and disagree in others. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in 

part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.

Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 

“we view the facts in the light most favorable to” Labow. 

Chambers v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 568 F.3d 998, 1000 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009). In 2008, anarchists protesting against the World 

Bank and International Monetary Fund vandalized the Four 

Seasons hotel in Washington, D.C. The FBI’s Joint Terrorism 

Task Force investigated the incident. One of the targets of the 

investigation sued the government. In the course of a 

deposition in connection with that lawsuit, an FBI agent 

mentioned Jeffrey Labow as another known extremist. The 

agent refused to answer a question about whether the FBI 

maintained a file about Labow because answering might 

reveal information about ongoing law enforcement activities. 

Based on the agent’s answers in the deposition, Labow 

suspected that the FBI maintained records about him.

Labow then filed a request under the Freedom of 

Information Act (FOIA) with the FBI, seeking “files, 

correspondence, or other records concerning [him]self.” J.A. 

26. The FBI initially claimed that it had no responsive 

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records. Labow, after exhausting the administrative appeals 

process, then brought this action in district court. He later 

amended his complaint to add a request for records about a 

person named Lawrence Kuhn, another target of the FBI’s 

investigation into the Four Seasons incident. 

As Labow’s lawsuit progressed, the FBI found several 

hundred pages of records concerning Labow and more than a 

thousand pages about Kuhn. The FBI released some of these 

records to Labow. With regard to other documents, the FBI 

redacted information from them or refused to release them at 

all, invoking various statutory exemptions.

The government moved for summary judgment against 

Labow on his claims seeking disclosure of the withheld 

documents and redacted information. In his opposition, 

Labow challenged the government’s reliance on FOIA’s 

exemptions, and he also contended that the government had 

improperly relied on a statutory exclusion from FOIA’s 

coverage. After in camera review of documents submitted ex 

parte by the government, the district court rejected Labow’s 

arguments and granted the government’s summary judgment 

motion in full. Labow now appeals.

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo. Pub. Inv’rs Arbitration Bar Ass’n v. SEC, 

771 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2014). We first consider the FBI’s 

reliance on various statutory exemptions as the basis for 

redacting information from responsive documents or 

withholding their release altogether. Our review calls for 

“ascertain[ing] whether the agency has sustained its burden of 

demonstrating that the documents requested are . . . exempt 

from disclosure.” Id. (quoting ACLU v. Dep’t of Justice, 655 

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F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). We take up, in turn, each FOIA 

exemption as to which Labow raises a challenge. 

A.

We first consider the FBI’s reliance on FOIA Exemption 

3 to withhold information associated with a pen register order. 

A pen register is a device installed on a phone line to enable 

recording the phone numbers dialed on that line.

Exemption 3, in relevant part, provides that FOIA’s 

disclosure obligation “does not apply to matters that are . . . 

specifically exempted from disclosure by [another] statute,” if 

the statute “(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the 

public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the 

issue,” or “(ii) establishes particular criteria for withholding 

or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A). In this case, the FBI withheld certain 

responsive documents and information about Labow on the 

rationale that they were “specifically exempted from 

disclosure by statute,” id., i.e., the Pen Register Act, 18 

U.S.C. § 3123(d). The district court upheld the FBI’s reliance 

on the Pen Register Act under Exemption 3.

When assessing whether a statute “specifically 

exempt[s]” matters “from disclosure” for purposes of 

Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), we ask two questions: 

“Does the statute meet Exemption 3’s requirements? And 

does the information that was withheld fall within that 

statute’s coverage?” Newport Aeronautical Sales v. Dep’t of 

the Air Force, 684 F.3d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Here, we 

affirm the district court as to the first question but reverse and 

remand as to the second.

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To address the first question, we look to the terms of the 

statute invoked by the government—the Pen Register Act. 

That statute provides:

An order authorizing or approving the installation 

and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device 

shall direct that—

(1) the order be sealed until otherwise ordered by 

the court; and

(2) the person owning or leasing the line or other 

facility to which the pen register or a trap and 

trace device is attached, or applied, or who is 

obligated by the order to provide assistance to 

the applicant, not disclose the existence of the 

pen register or trap and trace device or the 

existence of the investigation to the listed 

subscriber, or to any other person, unless or 

until otherwise ordered by the court.

18 U.S.C. § 3123(d). 

That statute fits within Exemption 3 if, as noted, it either 

“(i) requires that . . . matters be withheld from the public in 

such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue” or “(ii) 

establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to 

particular types of matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(3)(A)(i)-(ii). Because the Pen Register Act satisfies 

the latter test, we need not consider the former. The statute 

identifies “particular types of matters to be withheld,” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A)(ii), in that it requires the sealing of 

“[a]n order authorizing or approving the installation and use 

of a pen register or a trap and trace device,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3123(d). That description is at least as specific as other 

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statutes which we have held adequately specify “matters to be 

withheld” for purposes of Exemption 3. 

For instance, we have held that Title III, another 

electronic surveillance statute, is a qualifying statute under 

Exemption 3 because it applies to “intercepted 

communications,” a category sufficiently “narrow and welldefined” to implicate the exemption. Lam Lek Chong v. U.S. 

Drug Enf’t Admin., 929 F.2d 729, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1991). We 

have similarly determined that “proprietary information” 

under the Tariff Act is a particular matter for purposes of 

Exemption 3. Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon v. 

ITC, 846 F.2d 1527, 1529-31 (D.C. Cir. 1988). We reached 

the same conclusion with regard to information “pertaining to 

the issuance or refusal of visas” under the Immigration and 

Nationality Act. Medina-Hincapie v. Dep’t of State, 700 F.2d 

737, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Orders authorizing the installation 

or use of a pen register likewise “refer[] to particular types of 

matters to be withheld” within the meaning of Exemption 3. 

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A)(ii).

Because the Pen Register Act is a qualifying statute under 

Exemption 3, we next ask whether that statute authorized 

withholding the particular information at issue in this case. 

See Newport Aeronautical Sales, 684 F.3d at 165. Labow 

argues that the Pen Register Act permits the government to 

withhold only a sealed pen register order itself. As a result, 

he contends, the statute does not justify withholding all 

information appearing in (or associated with) a sealed pen 

register order, even if the same information is contained in 

other responsive records beyond the order. In that event, 

Labow submits, because the Pen Register Act would not call 

for sealing the other records, Exemption 3 should not shield 

those other records from FOIA’s disclosure mandate. 

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As a general matter, we agree with Labow’s reading of 

the Pen Register Act. By its terms, the statute provides for 

sealing of a pen register order itself, not sealing of any and all 

information the order may contain even if appearing in other 

documents. See 18 U.S.C. § 3132(d)(1). Although the statute 

additionally bars disclosures by certain private parties about 

the existence of a pen register order in the absence of a court 

order allowing disclosure, id. § 3123(d)(2), that limitation 

does not apply to the government. As a result, Exemption 3 

of FOIA, as regards the Pen Register Act, primarily 

authorizes the government to withhold a responsive pen 

register order itself, not all information that may be contained 

in or associated with a pen register order. 

To the extent the statute arguably authorizes withholding 

documents other than a pen register order, we have no 

occasion to address the issue because we do not know 

whether this case involves withholding of any records beyond 

a pen register order. The FBI’s chief of records management, 

David M. Hardy, describes the withheld material as 

information “surrounding FBI [agents] making arrangements 

to set up and install a pen register and trap and trace device 

during a criminal investigation,” including the “identities and 

phone numbers of the individuals subject to pen registers in 

this case.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 73 (J.A. 93). Hardy, however, does 

not specifically say whether that information was contained in 

a pen register order itself, and whether, if so, it also appeared 

in other responsive records.

In these circumstances, we conclude that the district court 

erred in sustaining the government’s reliance on the Pen 

Register Act based solely on Hardy’s declaration. See Labow 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 66 F. Supp. 3d 104, 120 (D.D.C. 

2014). We remand for the district court to assess whether the 

specific information withheld in this case is protected by the 

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Pen Register Act. If the government withheld information 

contained exclusively in a pen register order, the information 

would necessarily fall under the Pen Register Act’s 

nondisclosure requirements and thus would be shielded under 

Exemption 3 (assuming the pen register order remains 

sealed). But if the government withheld information found in 

other responsive documents on the ground that a pen register 

order also contained the same information, the potential 

applicability of the Pen Register Statute (and hence of 

Exemption 3) would be far less clear. As it currently stands, 

we do not know whether this case involves the latter situation, 

or, if so, whether there may be some justification for 

withholding the information beyond the mere fact that it also 

appears in a pen register order.

B.

Labow next challenges the government’s withholding of 

records subpoenaed by a grand jury, also under Exemption 3. 

This court has already held that Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 6(e) is a qualifying statute under Exemption 3. 

Fund for Constitutional Gov’t v. Nat’l Archives & Records 

Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Consequently, the 

sole question before us is whether the documents withheld 

from disclosure fall within Rule 6(e).

Rule 6(e) bars disclosure of “matter[s] occurring before a 

grand jury.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e). In this case, the 

government withheld “copies of specific records provided to a 

federal grand jury in response to federal grand jury 

subpoenas” because they “could reveal the inner workings of 

a federal grand jury.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 74 (J.A. 94). The district

court found the withholding permissible because releasing the 

documents would “reveal the strategy or direction of the 

investigation.” Labow, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 121 (alterations 

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omitted) (quoting Senate of P.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 823 

F.2d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). But the court provided no 

explanation of why the records would reveal anything about 

the investigation, and without knowing more, we do not think 

they necessarily would.

Rule 6(e) does not “draw ‘a veil of secrecy . . . over all 

matters occurring in the world that happen to be investigated 

by a grand jury.’” Senate of P.R., 823 F.2d at 582 (quoting 

SEC v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 

1980) (en banc)). Instead, the “touchstone” is whether the 

information sought would reveal something about the grand 

jury’s identity, investigation, or deliberation. Id. The mere 

fact that information has been presented to the grand jury does 

not itself permit withholding. Id. at 584.

The government argues that documents subpoenaed by a 

grand jury are more revealing than documents merely 

presented to a grand jury, because they reveal the direction of 

the grand jury’s investigation. If the documents would reveal 

to the requester that they had been subpoenaed, we would 

agree. See Lopez v. Dep’t of Justice, 393 F.3d 1345, 1349-50 

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (allowing withholding of grand jury 

subpoenas). But subpoenaed documents would not 

necessarily reveal a connection to a grand jury. After all, 

Labow did not request documents related to a grand jury; he 

sought documents about particular people. The government

revealed the existence of a grand jury by withholding 

documents under Rule 6(e). 

It is possible that, had the government released the 

documents without invoking Exemption 3, Labow would 

never have known that any of the documents had been 

subpoenaed by a grand jury. Of course, it is also possible that 

the documents do somehow reveal that they were subpoenaed 

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by a grand jury. That might be the case, for instance, if the 

government’s sole copies of the documents were marked as 

grand jury exhibits, or if documents referenced the grand jury 

subpoena. On the current record, however, we do not know 

whether the documents at issue somehow necessarily evince 

their connection to a grand jury, much less do so in a manner 

that could not be dealt with through redactions. 

The government’s declaration only offers the conclusory 

statement that “[a]ny disclosure of this information would 

clearly violate the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings and 

could reveal the inner workings of a federal grand jury.” 

Hardy Decl. ¶ 74 (J.A. 94). The government later clarified 

that “documents obtained by the FBI independently of a grand 

jury were not withheld pursuant to Exemption 3,” Second 

Hardy Decl. ¶ 11 (J.A. 132), but we do not know why 

documents obtained through the grand jury’s subpoenas 

would necessarily reveal that connection. As in Senate of 

Puerto Rico, “[i]t may turn out, in this case, that most, or even 

all, of the material withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(3) 

cannot be disclosed without compromising the secrecy of a 

grand jury’s deliberations. We hold only that the defendants 

have not yet supplied the information a court must have in 

order to intelligently make that judgment.” 823 F.2d at 584. 

The mere fact the documents were subpoenaed fails to justify 

withholding under Rule 6(e). 

We therefore remand for the district court to consider 

whether the release of the documents subpoenaed by the 

grand jury would reveal something about the grand jury’s 

investigation. Of course, if the documents are now belatedly 

released, it might be apparent that they had been subpoenaed 

by a grand jury given that the potential connection with a 

grand jury is now known. That fact, however, should not bar 

disclosure. As we have previously held, the relevant question 

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is whether the documents would have revealed the inner 

workings of the grand jury had they been released in response 

to the initial FOIA request. See Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t 

of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The district 

court therefore should consider whether the documents would 

have revealed something about the workings of the grand jury 

had they been released with other requested documents.

C.

Labow also contests the FBI’s withholding of 

information provided by confidential informants under 

Exemption 7(D). That exemption protects “records or 

information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only 

to the extent that the production of such law enforcement 

records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to 

disclose the identity of a confidential source.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(7). A source counts as confidential “if the source 

provided information under an express assurance of 

confidentiality or in circumstances from which such an 

assurance could reasonably be inferred.” Williams v. FBI, 69 

F.3d 1155, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 172 (1993)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The district court permitted 

withholdings based on both express and implied assurances of 

confidentiality, Labow, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 124-25, but Labow 

appeals only the withholdings based on implied assurances. 

At this point, the government has withheld only one page of 

one document based solely on implied assurances of 

confidentiality.

“The agency invoking Exception 7(D) bears the burden 

of proving that it applies, and with respect to the FBI, it is not 

enough for the agency to claim that all sources providing 

information in the course of a criminal investigation do so on 

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a confidential basis.” Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 

1161, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2011). We consider four factors when 

assessing an implied assurance of confidentiality: “the 

character of the crime at issue, the source’s relation to the 

crime, whether the source received payment, and whether the 

source has an ongoing relationship with the law enforcement 

agency and typically communicates with the agency only at 

locations and under conditions which assure the contact will 

not be noticed.” Id. (quoting Landano, 508 U.S. at 179) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

In this case, David M. Hardy, who as noted is the FBI’s 

chief of records management, has submitted several 

declarations describing informants who provided information 

withheld from Labow. Based on those declarations, we 

conclude that the four Roth factors favor a finding of implied 

confidentiality for purposes of Exemption 7(D).

The first factor, the character of the crime, contemplates 

that sources likely expect confidentiality when they report on 

serious or violent crimes, risking retaliation. See Landano, 

508 U.S. at 179; Mays v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 234 F.3d 1324, 

1330 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Hardy’s declaration states that “[t]he 

disclosure of the identities of these sources and the 

information they provided could have disastrous 

consequences because disclosure could subject these third 

parties, as well as their families, to embarrassment, 

humiliation, and/or physical or mental harm.” Hardy Decl. 

¶ 96(a) (J.A. 109). He further explains that “sources 

providing information to the FBI about extremist activities do 

so at great peril to themselves and have faced retaliation and 

threats (including death threats) when their assistance to the 

FBI has been publicly disclosed.” Id. 

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Although Labow correctly observes that the withholdings 

at issue are contained in a document predating the incident at 

the Four Seasons, Hardy’s explanation of the risks of 

informing on anarchist groups spoke to the potential dangers 

posed by anarchist extremists in general, not solely by the 

particular individuals who planned the Four Seasons attack. 

And while Labow argues that Hardy’s explanations are too 

general and conclusory, we have credited the FBI’s 

assessment of risks faced by informants even if described in 

relatively broad strokes. In Hodge v. FBI, 703 F.3d 575, 581 

(D.C. Cir. 2013), for example, an FBI declaration stated that 

disclosure “could have disastrous consequences” and “subject 

[informants] to violent reprisals.” We found that explanation 

sufficient, and we do the same here. The government need 

not provide justifications specific to a particular group of 

offenders when inferences can reasonably be drawn from the 

type of crime committed.

The second Roth factor calls for considering the source’s 

relationship to the crime, because sources divulging nonpublic, identifying information are more “vulnerable to 

retaliation.” Mays, 234 F.3d at 1330. Here, Hardy’s 

declarations do not claim that the informants directly 

participated in the crime about which they provided 

information. But a source of course need not have personally 

participated in a crime in order to know information about it 

that could reveal her identity were the information to be 

released. In this case, Hardy explains, the informants were 

“in a position to have ready access to and/or knowledge about 

targets and others involved in extremist activities.” Hardy 

Decl. ¶ 96(a) (J.A 108). And those sources “provided specific 

detailed information that is singular in nature.” Id. That 

describes the kind of information that, if it were revealed to 

the public, could be traced to a particular source.

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With regard to the third Roth factor, all parties agree that 

the sources did not receive payment. That fact weighs against 

a finding of confidentiality, but it is not itself dispositive.

Finally, the fourth Roth factor concerns the duration of 

the source’s relationship with law enforcement and the 

manner of communication. Consistent and secretive 

communications indicate a source’s expectation of 

confidentiality. Here, we have no information about the 

sources’ manner of communication. But Hardy’s declaration 

does indicate that the sources provided information “over a 

period of time that had proven to be reliable.” Id. That factor 

thus weighs at least modestly in favor of a finding of 

confidentiality.

Considering the four factors together, we agree with the 

district court that they suggest the sources expected 

confidentiality. Although the sources were not paid, they 

provided ongoing, singular information about serious crimes. 

In those circumstances, the district court correctly sustained 

the FBI’s reliance on Exemption 7(D).

D.

Earlier in this appeal, Labow had also challenged a 

withholding under Exemption 7(A), which exempts “records 

or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” if 

disclosure “could reasonably be expected to interfere with 

enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). The 

government has now released the documents it initially 

withheld under Exemption 7(A), Appellee’s Br. 17, so that 

issue is no longer a live one. We will grant Labow’s request 

to vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 

government with regard to its use of Exemption 7(A). See 

Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. U.S. Customs Serv., 663 F.2d 

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210, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Vacatur is appropriate when a 

party moots an issue it won in a lower court, precluding 

review on appeal and preserving the lower-court opinion as 

precedent. See 13C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 3533.10.1 (3d ed. 2008). Although 

district court opinions do not establish binding precedent on 

other courts, the government has not objected to vacatur here. 

We thus grant Labow’s request.

III.

Labow’s final challenge concerns the government’s 

possible reliance on a FOIA exclusion. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c). 

Exclusions differ from exemptions in that the government 

need not affirmatively claim the former. Rather, when an 

exclusion applies, the government may “treat the records as 

not subject to the requirements” of FOIA at all, id., and can 

thus withhold the documents without comment. 

Although the government has not publicly invoked an 

exclusion in this case, Labow suspects that the government 

withheld records based on the exclusion set forth in 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(c)(1). That exclusion applies if:

a request is made which involves access to 

records described in [Exemption 7(A)] and—

(A) the investigation or proceeding involves a 

possible violation of criminal law; and

(B) there is reason to believe that (i) the 

subject of the investigation or proceeding 

is not aware of its pendency, and (ii) 

disclosure of the existence of the records 

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could reasonably be expected to interfere 

with enforcement proceedings

5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1). Exemption 7(A) in turn, as noted,

encompasses records whose production “could reasonably be 

expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” Id. 

§ 552(b)(7)(A). The two provisions together thus exclude 

records from FOIA’s disclosure mandate if production would 

interfere with enforcement proceedings and the documents

relate to a criminal investigation about which the target is

unaware.

In this case, the district court, adhering to standard FBI 

practice when confronting a challenge to the suspected use of 

the exclusion at issue here, reviewed an ex parte FBI affidavit 

in camera to determine whether the exclusion had in fact been 

applied, and, if so, whether its application was appropriate. 

Labow, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 128; see ACLU of Mich. v. FBI, 734 

F.3d 460, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2013). In rejecting Labow’s 

challenge to the suspected use of the exclusion, the district 

court said only that, “if an exclusion was in fact employed, it 

was, and continues to remain, amply justified.” Labow, 66 F. 

Supp. 3d at 128. Labow thus remains unsure of whether the 

government actually made use of the exclusion to withhold 

records. 

We review the district court’s decision to review 

evidence ex parte for abuse of discretion. See Lykins v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Justice, 725 F.2d 1455, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The 

specific question is whether the court abused its discretion by 

relying on in camera review of the ex parte affidavit rather 

than following an alternative method presented by Labow for 

addressing a challenge to the government’s possible use of a 

FOIA exclusion. While we have explained that a court should 

resort to in camera review only in limited circumstances, see

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Yeager v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 678 F.2d 315, 324 (D.C. Cir. 

1982), we find no abuse of discretion here.

Under Labow’s alternative proposal, the parties would 

first assume that an exclusion had been applied and would 

submit public briefs on whether the hypothetical reliance on 

the exclusion would be appropriate. The district court would

then issue a public opinion addressing whether the exclusion,

in theory, would be applicable in the circumstances. If the 

theoretical use of the exclusion were invalid, the court would 

then review ex parte submissions to determine whether the 

government in fact made use of the exclusion. In essence, 

Labow’s proposal inverts the approach followed by the 

district court: instead of initially assessing whether an 

exclusion in fact was used and then, if so, assessing the 

permissibility of its use, Labow would first ask whether 

reliance on the exclusion would be permissible and then, if so, 

assess whether it in fact was used. 

Labow’s suggested approach would generally enable a 

FOIA requester to learn whether the government’s use of an 

exclusion would (at least in theory) be justified in the 

circumstances. But district courts would be in the business of 

considering and deciding abstract questions about the 

theoretical applicability of a FOIA exclusion in circumstances 

in which the government might have never relied on the 

exclusion in the first place.

Two courts of appeals have rejected proposals paralleling 

Labow’s. The Sixth Circuit refused to require the same 

procedure, for reasons including the risks of revealing 

information during the briefing process. ACLU of Mich., 734 

F.3d at 470-72. The more the government turns to 

hypothetical arguments to avoid revealing any information, 

the court reasoned, the less productive the adversarial briefing 

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would be: “Open-ended hypothetical questions are not well 

suited to the litigation process.” Id. at 472. And the 

government would be “tasked with responding to [abstract] 

shots in the dark” in circumstances in which “fashioning a 

response is fraught with concerns of accidentally disclosing 

the existence or nonexistence of secret information.” Id. The 

Third Circuit later came to the same conclusion. ACLU of 

N.J. v. FBI, 733 F.3d 526, 533-35 (3d Cir. 2013). Here, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to follow 

a process rejected by those decisions and instead adhering to a 

practice endorsed by them.

We must finally review de novo whether the district court 

was wrong in finding no error in the FBI’s reliance, if any, on

an exclusion in this case. We, like the district court, have 

reviewed the government’s submissions about the exclusion 

in camera. And we, like the district court, will not comment 

on whether the FBI in fact relied on an exclusion. Instead, we

hold only that no documents have been withheld pursuant to 

any impermissible use of an exclusion.

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment in favor of the government on the 

claims under Exemption 7(D) and under the exclusion set 

forth in 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1). We reverse the grant of 

summary judgment on both challenges to withholdings under 

Exemption 3 and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. Finally, we vacate the district court’s 

opinion with regard to Exemption 7(A).

So ordered.

USCA Case #14-5220 Document #1628778 Filed: 08/05/2016 Page 18 of 18