Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00927/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00927-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Yacub Avicenna McClendon
Petitioner
Tim Virga
Respondent

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YACUB AVICENNA McCLENDON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

TIM VIRGA, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:12-cv-00927 LJO MJS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 13]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent, Tim Virga, as warden of California State Prison

Sacramento is represented in this action by Brian G. Smiley, Esq., of the Office of the Attorney

General for the State of California.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Madera, upon being

convicted by a jury of second degree murder, assault with a semiautomatic weapon, and

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. (See LD No. 1. ) On March 3, 2008, Petitioner 1

“LD” refers to the documents lodged by Respondent in support of his motion to dismiss.

1

U.S. District Court

E. D. California -1-

Case 1:12-cv-00927-LJO-MJS Document 20 Filed 04/16/13 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was sentenced to an indeterminate state prison term of forty years to life in addition to a

determinate state prison term of twenty-nine years and eight months. (Id.)

On September 15, 2009, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed

the judgment. (LD No. 2.) Petitioner sought review before the California Supreme Court, which

was denied on December 2, 2009. (LD Nos. 3-4.)

Petitioner proceeded to file five petitions for post-conviction collateral review in the

California state courts. However, as two of the petitions were filed prior to the commencement

of the statute of limitations period, they cannot serve to statutorily toll the limitations period. 

The remaining petitions were filed as follows:

1. Madera County Superior Court

Filed: April 26, 2010 ; 2

Denied: May 7, 2010;

2. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: May 17, 2010 ;

3

Denied: July 1, 2010;

3. California Supreme Court

Filed: June 20, 2011 ; 4

Denied: November 30, 2011;

(LD Nos. 9-14.)

On June 5, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 5

in this Court. On October 19, 2012, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition as being

filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Mot. to

Under the mailbox rule, the Court deems petitions filed on the date Petitioner handed a petition to prison

2

authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614

F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Although the petition

was filed on April 28, 2010, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers the petition filed on April 26, 2010,

the date Petitioner signed the petition.

Although the petition was filed on June 8, 2010, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers the

3

petition filed on May 17, 2010, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

Although the petition was filed on June 22, 2011, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers the

4

petition filed on June 20, 2011, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

W hile Petitioner's federal petition was filed on June 7, 2012, under the mailbox rule the Court will

5

consider the petition filed on June 5, 2012, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California -2-

Case 1:12-cv-00927-LJO-MJS Document 20 Filed 04/16/13 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Dismiss, ECF No. 13.) Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion on October 29, 2012, and

Respondent filed a reply on December 6, 2012. (ECF Nos. 14, 19.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an

answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in

violation of the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th

Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state

remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural

grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp.

1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss

after the court orders a response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the

motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of the one-year

limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar

in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state

procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review

Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

B. Commencement of Limitations Period Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ

of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117

S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc),

cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997). 

U.S. District Court

E. D. California -3-

Case 1:12-cv-00927-LJO-MJS Document 20 Filed 04/16/13 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In this case, the petition was filed on June 5, 2012, and is subject to the provisions of

AEDPA. AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision

(d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review;

or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction

or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period begins running on the date that the

petitioner’s direct review became final or the date of the expiration of the time for seeking such

review. In this case, the California Supreme Court denied review on December 2, 2009. The

state appeal process became final ninety days later, on March 2, 2010, when the time for

seeking certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. U.S. Supreme Court rule 13;

Bowen v. Rowe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999). The AEDPA statute of limitations began to run

the following day, on March 3, 2010. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.

2001).

Petitioner would have one year from March 3, 2010, absent applicable tolling, in which

to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed in filing the

instant petition until June 5, 2012, over a year after the statute of limitations period expired.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California -4-

Case 1:12-cv-00927-LJO-MJS Document 20 Filed 04/16/13 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Absent the later commencement of the statute of limitations or any applicable tolling, the

instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Statute of Limitations Period During State Court Appeals

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application for

State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim

is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a

petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals

between one state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition

at the next level of the state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 216 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza,

183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). Nevertheless, state

petitions will only toll the one-year statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court

explicitly states that the post-conviction petition was timely or was filed within a reasonable

time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S.

189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or determined by the federal courts to have been

untimely in state court will not satisfy the requirements for statutory tolling. Id. 

Petitioner filed state habeas petitions beginning on April 26, 2010, in the Madera County

Superior Court and on May 17, 2010, in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District.

As of April 26, 2010, 55 days of the limitations period had elapsed. Respondent does not

challenge Petitioner's right to tolling during the pendency of the two petitions and the interval

between the filing of the petitions. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to tolling from April 26,

2010, until the date the petition filed in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

was denied on July 1, 2010. As 55 days of the limitations period had already elapsed, 310

remained as of July 1, 2010. Accordingly, the limitations period expired 310 days later on May

9, 2011. Petitioner filed another state petition over a month later on June 20, 2011. However, 6

as the petition was filed over a month after the statute of limitations period ended, it is untimely

 The time for filing expired on May 8, 2011, a Sunday. Accordingly, Petitioner was entitled to file on the

6

next business day, May 9, 2011.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California -5-

Case 1:12-cv-00927-LJO-MJS Document 20 Filed 04/16/13 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and has no tolling effect. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003) ("section

2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state

petition was filed."). Moreover, as Petitioner waited nearly a year to file his next petition, and

provides no reason for the delay, he is not entitled to interval tolling for the time between when

the petitions were filed. Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 2011). The present

petition was filed on June 5, 2012. As the petition was filed over a year after the limitation

period expired, the petition remains untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-62(2010); quoting Pace v.

DiGuglielmo. Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace,

544 U.S. at 418; Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). Petitioner claims he

is entitled to equitable tolling based on his placement in administrative segregation, prison

lockdowns, and that the law library paging system is inadequate.

1. Placement in Administrative Segregation

Petitioner claims that he was unable to timely file his petition due to his transfer

between prisons, placement in administrative segregation, and the resulting lack of access

to his legal files. Here Petitioner asserts that he did not have access to his legal materials from

June 18, 2010 until April, 2011. (Opp'n.) Petitioner has attached records indicating that he did

transfer prisons on June 18, 2010, and that during inventory, he possessed 22 legal books

and other legal paperwork. (Id., ex. A.) Petitioner also presents records reflecting that he was

placed in segregated housing on March 22, 2011, and requested personal property on April

7, 2011. (Id.) The copy of the property request is not legible, and it cannot be discerned if

Petitioner requested legal records.

Placement in administrative segregation is not extraordinary and does not warrant

equitable tolling. See Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the Ninth

Circuit has recognized that a petitioner's separation from his file and transcripts may provide

U.S. District Court

E. D. California -6-

Case 1:12-cv-00927-LJO-MJS Document 20 Filed 04/16/13 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a basis for equitable tolling. Id. (a complete lack of access to a legal file may constitute an

extraordinary circumstance); United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004)

(equitable tolling may be allowed if counsel withheld transcripts during limitations period). 

The fact that Petitioner transferred prisons and was placed in segregated custody are

not, standing alone, extraordinary incidences of prison life that would qualify for equitable

tolling. Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998. Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner was not in possession

of portions of his legal file, he has not sufficiently plead why he was unable to prepare and file

a timely petition without the records in question. See Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d

1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009). ("[Petitioner] bears the burden of showing his own diligence and

that the hardship caused by lack of access to his materials was an extraordinary circumstance

that caused him to file his petition almost a year late.") Petitioner has not met the burden of

showing that the records in question were necessary to filing his petition, and moreover that

he was diligent in attempting to obtain the records and file the petition. Id. Petitioner filed his 

petition nearly a year late, and while asserting that he lacked necessary legal files, does not

explain what the files were and how they were necessary for filing the petition. Id. (Explaining

petitioner could have taken steps, even without the necessary records, to file a basic form

habeas petition, and sought leave to amend once the records were available.) Petitioner also

asserts that the prison law library paging system made it more difficult to research his case.

Petitioner provides no evidentiary support to his assertion. The Court concludes that Petitioner

did not exercise due diligence and that his arguments regarding access to legal materials lack

merit. Therefore, equitable tolling is inappropriate.

2. Limited Access to Law Library

Petitioner also claims that prison lockdowns from December 7, 2011 to April, 2012

interfered with his access to his legal property and the law library. Such circumstances are not

extraordinary and do not warrant equitable tolling. See United States v. Van Poyck, 980

F.Supp. 1108, 1111 (C.D.Cal. 1997) (inability to secure copies of transcripts from court

reporters and lockdowns at prison lasting several days and allegedly eliminating access to law

U.S. District Court

E. D. California -7-

Case 1:12-cv-00927-LJO-MJS Document 20 Filed 04/16/13 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

library were not extraordinary circumstances and did not equitably toll one-year statute of

limitations); Atkins v. Harris, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164, 1999 WL 13719, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan.

7, 1999) ("lockdowns, restricted library access and transfers do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances sufficient to equitably toll the [AEDPA] statute of limitations. Prisoners familiar

with the routine restrictions of prison life must take such matters into account when calculating

when to file a federal [habeas] petition . . . ."); Giraldes v. Ramirez-Palmer, 1998 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 17573, 1998 WL 775085, *2 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that prison lockdowns do not

constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling).

Moreover, the lockdown in question occurred well after the limitations period expired.

His claim that the lockdown should equitably toll the limitations period is insufficient and does

not justify equitable tolling.

III. CONCLUSION

As explained above, Petitioner failed to file the instant petition for Habeas Corpus within

the one year limitation period required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Furthermore, while Petitioner

is entitled to the benefit of statutory tolling, the petition remains untimely. Moreover, Petitioner

is not entitled to equitable tolling. Based on the foregoing, this Court recommends that

Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss for

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period be

GRANTED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California.

Within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this Findings and Recommendation, any

U.S. District Court

E. D. California -8-

Case 1:12-cv-00927-LJO-MJS Document 20 Filed 04/16/13 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14)

days after service of the Objections. The Finding and Recommendation will then be submitted

to the District Court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(c). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 16, 2013 /s/Michael J. Seng 

92b0h UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

U.S. District Court

E. D. California -9-

Case 1:12-cv-00927-LJO-MJS Document 20 Filed 04/16/13 Page 9 of 9