Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-14-60236/USCOURTS-ca5-14-60236-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vivian Fuller
Appellee
Jackson State University
Appellee
John Does 1-10
Appellee
Carolyn Myers
Appellee
Lolita R. Ward
Appellant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-60236

LOLITA R. WARD, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

JACKSON STATE UNIVERSITY; DOCTOR VIVIAN FULLER, Individually; 

DOCTOR CAROLYN MYERS, Individually; JOHN DOES 1-10, 

 Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:12-CV-616

Before KING, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Lolita Ward alleges that Jackson State University and several 

of its employees (JSU) violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by firing 

her in retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. The district court granted 

summary judgment to JSU because Ward failed to show JSU knew about 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 26, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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Ward’s harassment complaint at the time it terminated her employment. We 

affirm.

I

In August 2011, JSU hired Dr. Vivian Fuller as its new athletic director. 

At that time, Ward worked as a secretary in the athletic department. Ward 

claims that shortly after Fuller arrived at JSU, Fuller began sexually 

harassing her. Ward further alleges that after she rejected Fuller’s advances, 

Fuller became hostile toward her. Fuller gave Ward notice of her termination

in October 2011.

Ward testified that prior to her termination, she contacted Georgina 

Felder, an athletic department secretary, about Fuller’s alleged harassment.

Ward testified that Felder told her that Felder had contacted Sandra Sellers, 

the head of human resources, about Ward’s concerns. This testimony is the 

only evidence in the record that any JSU official had knowledge of Ward’s 

sexual harassment complaint before Fuller terminated her employment.

Following her termination, Ward advanced her sexual harassment claim

through the proper administrative channels. After the EEOC determined it 

could not conclude that a Title VII violation had occurred, Ward filed suit in 

federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor 

of JSU. Ward now appeals.

II

“We must first review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings under an 

abuse of discretion standard. Then, with the record defined, we must review 

de novo the order granting judgment as a matter of law.”1 “A court ‘abuses its 

discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly 

1 Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 668-6 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations 

omitted).

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erroneous assessment of the evidence.’”2 “[W]e review a grant of summary 

judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court.”3 A grant 

of summary judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.”4 We construe all facts and inferences “in the light most 

favorable to the non-movant.”5

III

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is unlawful for an employer to 

retaliate against an employee for filing a sexual harassment report.6 To 

establish a prima facie retaliation claim, “a plaintiff must show that (1) she 

participated in an activity protected under the statute; (2) her employer took 

an adverse employment action against her; and (3) a causal connection exists 

between the protected activity and the adverse action.”7

That Ward satisfied the first two elements is undisputed; JSU contends

solely that Ward cannot establish causation. To establish causation, Ward

must at least demonstrate that prior to her termination, Fuller was aware of 

Ward’s sexual harassment complaint,8 because “[i]f an employer is unaware of 

2 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641, 655 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. 

Yanez Sosa, 513 F.3d 194, 200 (5th Cir.2008)).

3 Meadaa v. K.A.P. Enters., L.L.C., 756 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting EEOC 

v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

4 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

5 Id. (quoting Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2008))

(internal quotation marks omitted).

6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

7 Feist v. La., Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Attorney Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 

2013) (citation omitted).

8 Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Gee v. 

Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir.2002)) (“In determining whether an adverse employment 

action occurred, we focus on the final decisionmaker.”).

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an employee’s protected conduct at the time of the adverse employment action, 

the employer plainly could not have retaliated against the employee based on 

that conduct.”9

The district court excluded as hearsay the only evidence tending to show 

Fuller knew about Ward’s complaint at the time Fuller terminated Ward’s 

employment.10

9 Ackel v. Nat’l Commc’ns., Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Chaney 

v. New Orleans Pub. Facility Mgmt., Inc., 179 F.3d 164, 168 (5th Cir. 1999)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

10 The text of the testimony follows:

[JSU COUNSEL]: And to your knowledge, you don’t have any personal 

knowledge of Ms. Felder contacting HR to report that August 22 

incident, do you?

[WARD]: She reported the incident. I don’t know what she reported, 

but she did tell me that she had contacted Sandra Sellers through e-mail 

correspondence and everything.

. . .

[JSU COUNSEL]: And did she copy you on this alleged e-mail?

WARD]: No.

[JSU COUNSEL]: You just going [sic] by her telling you that she had emailed Sandra?

[WARD]: Yes.

. . .

[JSU COUNSEL]: What did she tell you specifically that she told 

Sandra Sellers?

[WARD]: That things were getting out of hand in the athletics 

department, that Ms. Ward is—obviously there is something going on. 

Everyone notices it, that there’s a big difference in Ms. Ward and they 

notice that something is going on with Dr. Fuller and her and before it 

gets out of hand or anyone gets hurt, they need to address it.

[JSU COUNSEL]: Now, you didn’t say in that—in what you just told 

me that Ms. Felder told you that she specifically told Sandra Sellers 

about the tongue gesture. Didn’t Ms. Felder tell you that she 

specifically reported to Sandra Sellers about an alleged tongue gesture 

by Dr. Fuller?

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Ward submits that the district court erred in raising the hearsay issue 

sua sponte. But “on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence proffered 

by the plaintiff to satisfy his burden of proof must be competent and admissible 

at trial.”11 Accordingly, “despite the lack of discussion of hearsay prior to [its] 

initial opinion,” the district court properly considered the admissibility of the 

evidence.12

The Federal Rules of Evidence define “hearsay” as “a statement that: (1) 

the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; 

and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in 

the statement.”13 In the testimony at issue, Ward stated that Felder said to

Ward that Felder had told Sellers about Ward’s allegations. Ward offers this 

statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Felder relayed 

Ward’s allegations to Sellers. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in excluding this testimony as hearsay.

Ward also argues that the testimony should be admitted pursuant to the 

invited-error doctrine because JSU reproduced the testimony in its summary 

judgment brief. Under the invited-error doctrine, “when injection of 

inadmissible evidence is attributable to the actions of the defense, the defense 

cannot later object to such ‘invited error.’”14 But JSU used the testimony solely 

to support a non-hearsay proposition: that Ward did not report her sexual 

[WARD]: She didn’t tell me that she said anything about the tongue 

gesture. She just called her and told her about the things that was going 

on over in the AAC between Ms. Ward and Dr. Fuller, the way that I 

was being treated.

11 Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (citing 

Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)).

12 Id. at 461.

13 FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(1)-(2).

14 United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 339 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting United 

States v. Raymer, 876 F.2d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1989)).

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harassment allegations to any JSU employee except Felder. Accordingly, JSU

did not inject inadmissible testimony into the proceeding,15 and therefore, the 

invited-error doctrine is inapplicable.

Finally, Ward alleges that the testimony should have been excluded from 

the definition of hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). Rule 

801(d)(2)(D) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is “offered against 

an opposing party and . . . was made by the party’s agent or employee on a 

matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed.”16

To determine if a statement falls within the scope of employment, we 

examine whether the statement relates to the employee’s duties.17 At the time 

Felder made the alleged statement, her duties were exclusively secretarial in 

nature. Her duties did not include the handling of sexual harassment 

reports.18 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

15 United States v. Watkins, 591 F.3d 780, 787 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing FED. R. EVID.

803; United States v. Enstam, 622 F.2d 857, 865 (5th Cir. 1980)) (“[W]hen evidence is offered 

for some purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted therein, it is not hearsay.”); cf.

21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 

§ 5039.2 (2d ed. 2014) (“‘[I]nvited error’ does not bar review of objection to opponent’s 

improper use of evidence elicited by appellant; e.g., appellant offers statement for nonhearsay 

purpose and opponent wants to use for the truth of the matter asserted.”).

16 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).

17 MetroplexCore, L.L.C. v. Parsons Transp., Inc., 743 F.3d 964, 978-79 (5th Cir. 2014)

(per curiam) (“Perrin was an ‘agent or employee’ of Parsons, a party to this action, and the 

parties do not dispute that Perrin was acting within the scope of her duties as Vice-President 

when she made the alleged statements. The statements would therefore be admissible as 

nonhearsay.” (citation omitted)).

18 See Staheli v. Univ. of Miss., 854 F.2d 121, 126-27 (5th Cir. 1988) (excluding the 

testimony of a professor as to an out of court statement by the university chancellor about 

why the plaintiff was denied tenure because the professor lacked authority to make tenure 

decisions); see also Kelly v. Labouisse, 364 F. App’x 895, 896 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 

(excluding the out-of-court statements of a general farm hand as to the ownership of a cow 

because he did not “maintain[] cattle records” or have an “accounting responsibility for the 

cattle”); Ramirez v. Gonzales, 225 F. App’x 203, 210 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (excluding a 

secretary’s testimony as to an out-of-court statement made by her supervisor about the 

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excluding her alleged statement because it was not made within the scope of 

her employment. Therefore, JSU is entitled to summary judgment because 

there is no admissible evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to 

causation.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

reason for the termination of the plaintiff’s employment because she “was not involved in the 

decision to terminate [the plaintiff]”).

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