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Parties Involved:
Fortuna Enterprises, LP
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Unite Here Local 11
Intervenor for Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 13, 2011 Decided December 9, 2011

No. 10-1272

FORTUNA ENTERPRISES, LP,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

UNITE HERE LOCAL 11,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 10-1298

On Petitions for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order of the National Labor Relations

Board

Stephen R. Lueke argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner. 

Kira Dellinger Vol, Attorney, National Labor Relations

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief

were John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda

Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Jill A. Griffin,

Supervisory Attorney. 

USCA Case #10-1272 Document #1346749 Filed: 12/09/2011 Page 1 of 15
2

Eric B. Myers was on the brief for intervenor Unite Here

Local 11. Richard G. McCracken entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG1 and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: This is a petition for

review of a National Labor Relations Board order finding

Fortuna Enterprises, L.P., in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) & (3). The

Board cross-petitions for enforcement. Unite Here, Local 11, a

labor union, has intervened. Fortuna operates the Los Angeles

Airport Hilton Hotel and Towers. The case turns on whether

Hilton disciplined its employees for engaging in activities

protected by § 7 of the Act, id. § 157.

On May 10, 2006, Hilton suspended Sergio Reyes pending

an investigation into whether he had stolen property from a hotel

guest. Reyes supported an ongoing union organizing campaign

at the Hilton led by Unite Here. When other employees learned

of Reyes’ suspension, they decided to meet the next morning in

the staff-only cafeteria to speak about the matter with Hilton’s

general manager Grant Coonley or Tom Cook, the food and

beverage director. 

On the morning of May 11 at 8:00 a.m., seventy to one

hundred employees gathered in the cafeteria. Hilton supervisors

learned of the gathering and its purpose a short time later.

1

 As of the date the opinion was published, Judge Ginsburg

had taken senior status.

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Housekeeping director Anna Samayoa addressed the employees

on three separate occasions between 8:15 and 9:00 a.m. The

first time, she announced that they needed to return to work if

they were not on break; the second time, that they needed to

return to work or clock out and go home; and the third time, that

individuals who failed to choose one of those options would be

suspended. A handful of employees returned to work. The rest

insisted on staying put until they met with Coonley or Cook.

Supervisors suspended the holdouts at 9:00 a.m. and informed

them that anyone who did not promptly leave the premises

would be considered a trespasser. Undeterred, the suspended

employees remained in the cafeteria and repeated their demand

for a meeting.

The standoff persisted for roughly ninety more minutes,

during which time the employees became increasingly frustrated

with the lack of a management response. A delegation of

employees told company officials that the group wanted to

return to work. Management declined the offer, citing the

suspensions. Out of options and faced with the arrival of a

police officer, the employees left the cafeteria at approximately

10:30 a.m. All told, seventy-seven protesters were suspended

for five days each, due to their “[i]nsubordination” and “[f]ailure

to follow instructions.”

The suspensions left Hilton shorthanded for the remainder

of the day. Management called in temporary workers; even so,

some of Hilton’s operations were adversely affected. For

instance, Cook had to recruit staff from Hilton’s accounting and

sales offices to bus tables in the guest café, which converted to

buffet-style service due to the staff shortage. In addition, the

housekeeping division was unable to clean all of the hotel’s

guest rooms, which were 99.9% occupied at the time.

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Three weeks later, on June 3, a second incident resulted in

more disciplinary actions. On that date, a union – the California

Teachers Association – held a meeting in the hotel’s

international ballroom. The Association invited two of Hilton’s

employees, Isabel Brentner and Patricia Simmons, to speak to its

members about the May 11 work stoppage. Brentner and

Simmons did so during their lunch breaks. When management

learned of this, it issued each of them a written warning for

violating Hilton’s facilities use policy, which prohibits on-duty

employees from entering the hotel’s public areas without

authorization. Three other Hilton employees, Lilia Magallon,

Juana Salinas, and Joanna Gomez, received similar warnings

after management determined that they had also attended the

meeting. Although these employees denied entering the

ballroom, video footage taken by a nearby security camera

showed each of them disappearing from view near its entrance

for brief periods as they cleaned an adjacent lobby area.

The Board’s general counsel issued a complaint based on

the May 11 suspensions, the June 3 warnings, and several other

incidents. An Administrative Law Judge found the May 11

suspensions unlawful under § 8(a)(1) because the employees

were engaged in concerted action for the “mutual aid or

protection” of Reyes, their co-worker, and were thus protected

by § 7 of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 157. After considering the

factors mentioned in Quietflex Manufacturing Co., 344 N.L.R.B.

1055 (2005), the ALJ concluded that the employees’

organizational interests outweighed Hilton’s property rights. 

The ALJ also found that the June 3 warnings violated § 8(a)(1)

and (3), for two reasons. First, the warnings resulted from

Hilton’s disparate application of its facilities use policy to

employees who Hilton knew had engaged in union activity.

Second, Hilton’s investigation was inadequate, and thus

pretextual, inasmuch as Hilton made no attempt to interview the

employees before disciplining them.

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The Board affirmed the ALJ’s rulings, findings, and

conclusions, subject to several minor modifications. Fortuna

Enters., L.P., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 2010 NLRB LEXIS 280

(Aug. 24, 2010).2 With respect to the May 11 gathering, the

Board explained that “the length of the work stoppage in the

cafeteria and the potential for interference with the provision of

[hotel] services” made the § 8(a)(1) question a “close” one. 

2009 NLRB LEXIS 136, at *4 n.8. But “the unrepresented

employees did not lose the protection of the Act, particularly

when [Hilton’s] officials failed to make it clear that the

employees would not be able to meet with senior management

at that time and would have alternative opportunities to present

their concerns.” Id. at *4 & n.8; see also 2010 NLRB LEXIS

280, at *3 n.3 (converting Member Schaumber’s position in the

2009 decision into the Board’s holding). As to Hilton’s policy

regarding employees in public areas, the Board found that Hilton

“disparately applied” the policy “to the employees and used

th[e] policy as a pretext to discipline known union supporters

who did not even violate the rule.” 2009 NLRB LEXIS 136, at

*3 & n.5; see also 2010 NLRB LEXIS 280, at *3 n.3. This

conclusion obviated the need to pass on the ALJ’s alternative

ruling that the warnings violated § 8(a)(1) and (3) because

Hilton’s investigation was inadequate. 2009 NLRB LEXIS 136,

at *3 n.5.

2

 This decision reinstated and incorporated by reference two

earlier Board decisions, both of which were issued by a two-member

Board. See 354 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 2009 NLRB LEXIS 335 (Oct. 29,

2009); 354 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 2009 NLRB LEXIS 136 (Apr. 30, 2009). 

The Supreme Court’s decision in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB,

130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010), invalidated those decisions. See id. at 2644-

45. Because a three-member panel issued the Board’s decision under

review, the decision complies with New Process Steel. See id. 

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I

Section 7 of the Act grants employees “the right to

self-organization . . . and to engage in other concerted activities

for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection . . ..” 29 U.S.C.

§ 157. Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employers from “interfer[ing]

with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in the exercise of”

those rights. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).

On-the-job work stoppages may qualify as concerted

economic pressure entitled to protection under § 7. Quietflex,

344 N.L.R.B. at 1056; see also Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v.

NLRB, 965 F.2d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing NLRB v. Wash.

Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 15 (1962)). But the protection is not

absolute because on-site work stoppages trench upon employers’

private property rights. See Quietflex, 344 N.L.R.B. at 1056

(citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976)). The

Board’s task is to accommodate these competing interests,

preserving each “with as little destruction of one as is consistent

with the maintenance of the other.” Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 521

(quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112

(1956)). The proper resolution in a given case “depend[s] on the

nature and strength of the respective § 7 rights and private

property rights” involved. Id. at 522.

In Quietflex the Board offered a list of factors it had

“considered” in previous cases “in determining which party’s

rights should prevail in the context of an on-site work stoppage

. . ..” 344 N.L.R.B. at 1056-57. 3

 The Board did not quantify

3

 The Quietflex factors are: (1) the reason the employees have

stopped working; (2) whether the work stoppage was peaceful; (3)

whether the work stoppage interfered with production, or deprived the

employer access to its property; (4) whether employees had adequate

opportunity to present grievances to management; (5) whether

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the particular weight of any factor and several of them appear to

overlap. See id. at 1056; cf. PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d

786, 797 (D.C. Cir. 2004). For instance, determining “whether

the work stoppage was peaceful” may often involve the same

considerations as “whether the employees attempted to seize the

employer’s property.” See Quietflex, 344 N.L.R.B. at 1056-57.

And the seizure question may amount to the same thing as

whether the employees “deprived the employer of access to its

property.” Id. Although the sort of multi-factor balancing “test”

suggested in Quietflex may be incapable of predictable

application, see Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 833,

834-38 (7th Cir. 1999), we shall assume its validity.

Hilton asks us to set aside the order with respect to the May

11 suspensions on the ground that the Board’s assessment of

nine of the ten Quietflex factors was flawed. This court must of

course uphold the Board’s ruling so long as its legal

determinations are not arbitrary or capricious and its factual

findings are supported by substantial evidence. E.I. du Pont de

Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 489 F.3d 1310, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

As to the first Quietflex factor – why the employees stopped

working – the Board determined that the employees occupied

the cafeteria to express support for co-worker Sergio Reyes, and

to ensure that Hilton would not unfairly target other union

supporters for discipline. Hilton claims that the occupation was

unprotected because it was intended only to seek information,

employees were given any warning that they must leave the premises

or face discharge; (6) the duration of the work stoppage; (7) whether

employees were represented or had an established grievance

procedure; (8) whether employees remained on the premises beyond

their shift; (9) whether the employees attempted to seize the

employer’s property; and (10) the reason for which the employees

were ultimately discharged. 344 N.L.R.B. at 1056-57. 

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and thus did not grow out of a bona fide labor dispute. See Ne.

Beverage Corp. v. NLRB, 554 F.3d 133, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2009)

(“Section 7 and the relevant cases thereunder do not protect

employees who leave work to seek information from their union

or their employer.”). This contention fails to appreciate the

nature of the employees’ grievance. Unlike the employees in

Northeast Beverage, the Hilton employees did not leave work to

duplicate a request for information their union had already made

regarding the employer’s future plans. See id. at 135-36.

Instead, they gathered to express their shared concern about

discrimination against union supporters.4

 The subject of their

concern falls within the Act’s definition of a “labor dispute,”

which includes “any controversy concerning terms, tenure or

conditions of employment,” 29 U.S.C. § 152(9), or at least the

Board was entitled to so find. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pepsi-Cola

Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc., 449 F.2d 824, 830 n.5 (5th Cir.

1971); see also 29 U.S.C. § 157 (guaranteeing employees the

right “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of .

. . mutual aid or protection”).

With two exceptions, there is nothing to the balance of

Hilton’s arguments against the Board’s application of the

Quietflex factors. The exceptions are the Board’s treatment of

factor (3) – “whether the work stoppage interfered with

production,” and factors (4) and (7) – “whether employees had

adequate opportunity to present grievances to management” or

access to “an established grievance procedure.” Quietflex, 344

N.L.R.B. at 1057.

4

 The Northeast Beverage employees were represented by a

union actively bargaining on their behalf. See 554 F.3d at 135. Here,

by contrast, the employees were not represented by a union or engaged

in ongoing talks with Hilton. This distinction is meaningful insofar as

unrepresented employees are entitled to some leeway to “speak for

themselves as best they [can].” Wash. Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 14. 

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In mentioning interference with production, Quietflex

dropped a footnote stating: “It is not considered an interference

of production where the employees do no more than withhold

their own services.” Id. at 1057 n.6. We are not quite sure what

to make of this. Suppose all fifty employees on an assembly

line walked off the job. Or suppose only half of them walked

off but this was enough to require shutting down the line. 

According to the Board’s footnote, in neither instance would

there have been an interference with production – a conclusion

at odds with reality. Furthermore, the point of this Quietflex

factor is unclear. Some protected activities exert economic

pressure on the employer by interfering with production. A

strike is the prime example. See Div. 1287, Amalgamated Ass’n

of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. of Am. v. Missouri,

374 U.S. 74, 80-82 (1963); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373

U.S. 221, 234 (1963). An on-site work stoppage is a form of

strike. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 142(2) (defining a strike as “any strike

or other concerted stoppage of work by employees”), 163

(protecting “the right to strike”). We do not know whether the

Board in Quietflex meant to suggest that if the stoppage exerted

economic pressure – that is, if it interfered with production or

the provision of services – this would render the activity less

protected. We do know that a majority of the Board in this case

at least acknowledged that the work stoppage had “the potential

for interference with the provision of services,” 2010 NLRB

LEXIS 280, at *3 n.3; 2009 NLRB LEXIS 136, at *4 n.8, even

though the participating employees did “no more than withhold

their own services,” Quietflex, 344 N.L.R.B. at 1057 n.6. The

record also shows that the work stoppage did disrupt some of

Hilton’s operations.

In any event, it does not appear that the interference-withproduction factor played a significant role in the Board’s ruling

against Hilton. The apparently decisive consideration related to

Hilton’s handling of employee grievances. See 2009 NLRB

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LEXIS 136, at *4 n.8. In this regard, the Board stated that

management never told the employees gathered in the cafeteria

that the two senior officials they wanted to talk with were not

available, or that the employees would have other opportunities

to present their concerns. Id. In so holding the Board adopted

the ALJ’s determination that the complaint procedure Hilton had

in place “addressed only individual complaints and not group

grievances like the one presented in the instant case.” 2009

NLRB LEXIS 136, at *1-2, 50.

 The record does support the finding that Hilton officials

suspended the employees without notifying them that a meeting

with senior managers was not immediately possible or offering

a future opportunity to meet. But those omissions are much less

significant if Hilton employees had access to an established

procedure for handling “group grievances.” The Board found

that they did not. Hilton responds that it did have such a

procedure in place, that it was widely known and often used, and

that management therefore had no obligation to inform the

employees in the cafeteria that it would hear and consider their

concerns in the future. We agree.

Grievance procedures provide an orderly means for

resolving employee concerns and thus promote the Act’s goal of

achieving “industrial peace and stability.” Auciello Iron Works,

Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 785 (1996). For this reason, the

availability of a grievance procedure cuts against the

justification for protecting on-the-job work stoppages. See, e.g.,

Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 445, 451-52 (4th Cir.

1969); Cambro Mfg. Co., 312 N.L.R.B. 634, 636 (1993). Hilton

had an “open door” policy to handle employee complaints. The

Board acknowledged the policy, but then erred in finding it

inadequate on the ground that the policy did not deal with group

grievances. That finding is at odds with the text of the policy,

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which is in no way limited to individual complaints.5

 And it is

contrary to Hilton’s longstanding implementation of the “open

door” policy. The record demonstrates that Hilton managers

addressed group grievances relating to hotel equipment,

employee uniforms, working conditions, and other matters on

numerous occasions. To the extent the Board’s decision rests on

its comparison of Hilton’s “open door” policy to the one at issue

in HMY Roomstore, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 963 (2005), the analogy

fails. The Roomstore policy, unlike Hilton’s, was “used to

resolve individual problems and not group complaints.” Id. at

963 n.2. The Board’s grievance procedure finding therefore is

not supported by substantial evidence.

As we have said, the Board never quantified the weight to

be given to any one of the Quietflex factors. In this case, we

know only that the Board emphasized the absence of a group

grievance procedure in its decision and that its finding to this

effect was in error. We therefore grant the petition for review

5

 The policy states:

Hilton Los Angeles Airport is proudly committed to

maintaining an open door policy. Any discrimination

or recrimination against a team member for

presenting an issue, problem or complaint is

prohibited. 

A team member should always attempt to work out

problems with his/her immediate supervisor. If the

issue or problem remains unresolved, the team

member can seek assistance from his/her department

manager, the Director of Human Resources and the

General Manager.

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with respect to the Board’s assessment of the May 11 protest

and remand this issue for reconsideration by the Board.6

II

Section 8(a)(3) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice

for an employer to “discourage membership in any labor

organization” by “discriminat[ing] in regard to . . . any term or

condition of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). To prove a

§ 8(a)(3) violation, the Board must first demonstrate that antiunion animus motivated the employer to take an adverse

employment action. See Tasty Baking Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d

114, 125-26 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The employer’s motive may be

inferred from knowledge of an employee’s union activities,

expressions of hostility towards the union, the timing of the

adverse action, or other circumstantial evidence of like kind. 

Id.; see also Waterbury Hotel Mgmt., LLC v. NLRB, 314 F.3d

645, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “If the Board succeeds” in making

out a prima facie case, “the employer still can successfully

mount an affirmative defense by showing that it would have

taken the same action in the absence of anti-union

considerations.” Sierra Realty Corp. v. NLRB, 82 F.3d 494, 495

(D.C. Cir. 1996); see NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S.

393, 399-404 (1983) (approving the burden-shifting test adopted

in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980)).

6

 This outcome also requires us to set aside and remand the

Board’s separate ruling that Rogelio de la Rosa violated § 8(a)(1)

when he threatened to suspend Fidel Andrade for participating in the

May 11 work stoppage. 2009 NLRB LEXIS 136, at *4, 29-30. The

Board held that de la Rosa’s threat was unlawful because the work

stoppage was protected by § 7. If it was not protected, the threat was

lawful.

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There is no question that the warnings issued to Brentner,

Simmons, Magallon, Salinas, and Gomez adversely affected the

terms or conditions of their employment. It is also clear that, as

Hilton stipulated, management knew each of the employees had

engaged in union activities. Hilton claims, however, that there

is no evidence that it knew the employees had engaged in

protected activity on June 3 and that there is no evidence to

show that their participation in the May 11 protest motivated the

company to issue the warnings. See 2009 NLRB LEXIS 136, at

*61-62 (ALJ’s findings to same effect). Hilton’s points are

accurate, but inconsequential. In most circumstances, § 8(a)(3)

liability cannot arise unless the employer knows of an

employee’s union activities. Davis Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB,

2 F.3d 1162, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1993). But there is no requirement

that those activities occur on the same day the adverse

employment action is taken. Hilton’s stipulation that it knew

generally of the employees’ union activities fully satisfied this

standard. Therefore, the Board met its burden under § 8(a)(3) so

long as substantial evidence supports its finding that anti-union

animus played a role in Hilton’s decision to issue the warnings.

The record provides ample support for the Board’s finding. 

Sue Trobaugh, Hilton’s human resources director, testified that

she knew about, but chose not to investigate, other violations of

the facilities use policy. According to Trobaugh, maintenance

staff complained that other employees were using public

restrooms near the hotel lobby. This created extra cleanup work

and contravened the facilities use policy, which required on-duty

employees to use restrooms located in the hotel’s non-public

areas. Although Trobaugh was aware of these violations, she

decided that they were not “an investigative matter” and thus

made no effort to pursue them. Hilton’s selective enforcement

of the policy against Brentner, Simmons, Magallon, Salinas, and

Gomez, but not against other, equally culpable employees, not

only justifies the Board’s inference of anti-union animus, but

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also forecloses any argument that Hilton “would have taken the

same action in the absence of the unlawful motive.” Tasty

Baking Co., 254 F.3d at 126-28; see also Waterbury, 314 F.3d

at 653; U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 388-89 (2006),

enforced, 255 F. App’x. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

For these reasons, we enforce the portion of the Board’s

order finding that Hilton violated § 8(a)(1) and (3)7 by issuing

warnings to Brentner, Simmons, Magallon, Salinas, and Gomez.

III

In addition to its rulings on the May 11 suspensions and the

June 3 warnings, the Board also held that Hilton committed a

number of other § 8(a)(1) violations. See 2009 NLRB LEXIS

335, at *1-3; 2009 NLRB LEXIS 136, at *1-5. Hilton maintains

that the Board erred in doing so, but confines its argument to a

short footnote. As a result, we will not consider Hilton’s

objections. See Comm’r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6, 12 (D.C. Cir.

2011). The Board is entitled to summary enforcement of these

additional, effectively uncontested rulings. Flying Food Grp.,

Inc. v. NLRB, 471 F.3d 178, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2006).8

7

 Conduct that violates any of the more specific prohibitions

of § 8, including § 8(a)(3), also interferes with employees’ § 7 rights

and thus violates § 8(a)(1) derivatively. See Metro. Edison Co. v.

NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 698 n.4 (1983); ROBERT A. GORMAN &

MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION

AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 150 (2d ed. 2004). 

8

 For the sake of clarity, these findings are that Hilton

managers unlawfully (1) interrogated employee Ricardo Molina; (2)

threatened employees Antonio Campos and Beatrice Reyes; (3) barred

various employees from wearing union insignia; (4) warned employee

Nathalie Contreras for protesting customer harassment of other

employees; and (5) pushed Campos away from co-workers who were

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The same is true of the Board’s rulings regarding threats

made by managers Chriss Draper and Anna Samayoa towards

union-affiliated employees. Hilton contends that the Board

erred by “declining to rule” on these incidents, despite the ALJ’s

conclusion that each gave rise to a § 8(a)(1) violation. Although

some cases have suggested that § 10(c) of the Act requires the

Board to resolve every charge that is presented to it, see Oil,

Chem. & Atomic Workers Local Union No. 6-418 v. NLRB, 711

F.2d 348, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Int’l Union, United Auto.,

Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. NLRB, 427 F.2d

1330, 1331-32 (6th Cir. 1970), any omission on the Board’s part

was harmless in this instance, see Tasty Baking Co., 254 F.3d at

123. The Board determined that resolving the threat claims

“would be cumulative and would not materially affect the

remedy.” 2009 NLRB LEXIS 136, at *4 n.6. That conclusion

is entitled to substantial deference, see Petrochem Insulation,

Inc. v. NLRB, 240 F.3d 26, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and is

reasonable given the already sweeping nature of the remedial

orders, see 2009 NLRB LEXIS 335, at *3-4, 10-12; 2009 NLRB

LEXIS 136, at *7-8, 83-87. 

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is granted

in part and denied in part. The cross-petition for enforcement is

likewise granted in part and denied in part. The case is

remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

So ordered.

engaged in protected activity. 

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