Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01066/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01066-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William B. Richardson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

Ucircd St1ltes.Cm1n <?f Apveals 

Tent11 C1;am 

APR 2 0 1990 

&.OBERT L. .HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

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Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. No. 89-1066 

WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-206) 

·Submitted on the Briefs: 

Michael J. Norton, Acting United States Attorney, and Gerald J. 

Rafferty, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Jeffrey R. Edelman and Joseph Haughain of Jeffrey R. Edelman, 

P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief J~dge, BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and 

BRIMMER, District Judge. 

* Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1066 Document: 01019627258 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 1 
BALDOCK, C1rcu1t . . d Ju ge. ** 

Defendant-appellant, William Richardson, pled guilty to 

conspiracy to pass counterfeit obligations with an intent t~ 

defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The 

district court sentenced Richardson under the sentencing 

guidelines1 to thirteen months imprisonment minus credit given him 

for 155 days he spent in federal custody pending the outcome of 

the charge. Richardson now appeals his sentence pursuant to 18 

u.s.c. § 3742(a), asserting the district court erred in (1) 

failing to accept the adjusted offense level contained in the plea 

agreement, (2) adhering to the guideline range in view of the 

iighter sentences received by other individuals involved in the 

conspiracy, and (3) calculating the credit for time he spent in 

custody prior to sentencing. Reviewing the factual determinations 

of the district court under the clearly erroneous standard and 

giving due deference to the district court's application of the 

sentencing guidelines to the facts as required by§ 3742(e), we 

affirm the conviction and sentence, but remand for a proper 

calculation of the credit due Richardson for time he spent in 

custody before commencement of his sentence. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

1 See United States Sentencing Comm'n Guidelines Manual (1989) 

[hereinafter Guidelines]. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1066 Document: 01019627258 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 2 
I • 

In the plea agreement, Richardson and the government 

stipulated that (a) under Guidelines§ 2B5.l(a), the base offense 

level for an offense involving counterfeit obligations was nine, 

(b) under Guidelines§§ 2B5.l(b)(l) & 2Fl.l(b)(l), the base 

offense should be increased two levels because more than $5,001 

but less than $10,000 was involved in the conspiracy, and (c) 

under Guidelines§ 3El.l(a), the base offense should be decreased 

two levels because Richardson assumed responsibility for his 

crime. Accordingly, Richardson and the government agreed that the 

adjusted offense level was nine. Coupled with a stipulated 

criminal history category of two for Richardson under Guidelines 

§ 4, the offense level of nine resulted in a guideline range under 

G~idelines § 5A of six to twelve months imprisonment. Based upon 

information contained in the presentence report, however, the 

district court concluded that under Guidelines§ 3Bl.l(c), two 

additional levels should be added to the offense level of nine 

because Richardson was a leader in the conspiracy. Thus, the 

guideline range increased to between ten and sixteen months 

imprisonment under Guidelines § 5A. 

In United States v. Rutter, No. 89-1015, slip op. at 13-15 

(10th Cir. March 13, 1990), we recently addressed the issue of 

whether a district court must adhere to the stipulations in a plea 

agreement in imposing sentence under the guidelines. While 

recognizing that under Guidelines § 6Bl.4, the parties may 

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Appellate Case: 89-1066 Document: 01019627258 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 3 
',, 

stipulate to facts and attendant guideline ranges, we held that 

the district court properly could decline to follow a sentence 

recommendation where the stipulated facts did not include all 

relevant conduct bearing upon the guideline range. See Guidelines 

§ 6Bl.4 ("The court is not bound by the stipulation, but may with 

the aid of the presentence report, determine the facts relevant ,to 

sentencing."); Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(e)(l)(B) (government may "make 

a recommendation for a particular sentence, with the understanding 

that such recommendation shall not be binding upon the court"). 

In this case, as in Rutter, the plea agreement acknowledged 

that the court retained the power to determine relevant facts and 

the stipulations were not binding. The stipulations are 

nonbinding because "at the time the district court accepts a plea 

agreement, all of the facts are not known to it; the presentence 

investigation and resulting report allow the court to exercise 

sentencing authority meaningfully in light of relevant facts.''· 

Rutter, slip op. at 13-14. The presentence report set forth a 

detailed factual account of the conspiracy which revealed that 

Richardson solicited numerous individuals to pass the counterfeit 

obligations for him. Although he described himself as a mere 

"mule, 112 Richardson did not contest the facts contained in the 

report, but rather admitted to the district court that the facts 

were not in dispute. Accordingly, the district court acted well 

within its authority in finding that Richardson was a leader of 

2 A "mule" is a slang term defined as "a person paid to carry or 

tranport contraband." Random House Dictionary 1261 (2d ed. unabr. 

1987). 

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Appellate Case: 89-1066 Document: 01019627258 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 4 
( 

the conspiracy within the meaning of Guidelines § 3Bl.l(c) and 

adding two levels to the stipulated offense level. 

II. 

Richardson next contends the district court violated the law 

in not departing from the guideline range because other defendants 

involved in the conspiracy received relatively lighter sentences. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (1) (sentence "imposed in violation of law" 

appealable). Specifically, Richardson notes that the printer of 

the counterfeit obligations, James Iliff, was sentenced to six 

months work release, while another coconspirator, Ronald Elston, 

was sentenced to five years probation. According to the 

presentence report, however, Iliff was convicted and sentenced in 

the Idaho federal district court and Elston was not sentenced 

under the Guidelines. We are loathe to conclude the district 

court violated the law in imposing a sentence upon Richardson 

within the appropriate guideline range where the lighter sentences 

of his coconspirators either arise out of a different court or 

from different laws. See United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973, 

979 n.7 (7th Cir. 1989) (Congress did not intend every sentence 

that a defendant contended was "greater than necessary" to be 

appealable under§ 3742(a)(l) as a violation of the law) 

To the extent Richardson claims the district court abused its 

discretion in refusing to make a downward departure from the 

guidelines, we lack jurisdiction to consider this contention. 

Those circuits which have addressed the issue uniformly agree that 

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Appellate Case: 89-1066 Document: 01019627258 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 5 
a district court's refusal to depart from the guidelines is 

nonreviewable • .!!_g_., United States v. Wickstrom, 893 F.2d 30, 33 

(3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Tucker, 892 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 

1989); United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973, 978-79 (7th Cir. 

1989); United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1554 (2d Cir.), 

cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 553 (1989); United States v. Davis, 878 

F.2d 1299, 1300 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 341 (1989). 

In 18 u.s.c. § 3742, Congress has specified four grounds on which 

a defendant may appeal a sentence. A sentence is appealable if it 

is (1) imposed in violation of law, (2) imposed as a result of an 

incorrect application of the guidelines, (3) imposed for an 

offense. for which no guidelines exists and is plainly unreasonable 

or (4) greater than the sentence specified in the applicable 

guideline range. That a district court abused its discretion in 

failing to depart from the guidelines plainly is not a basis for 

appeal. Nothing in the wording of the statute or its legislative 

history suggests that "sentences within the Guidelines should be 

reviewed because of a claim that a particular sentence is 

draconian." United States v. Guerrero, 894 F.2d 261, 267 (7th 

Cir. 1990) (sentence within the guideline range and not imposed in 

violation of law or as a result of an incorrect application of the 

guidelines should be affirmed). 

III. 

Lastly, Richardson claims he is entitled to credit for time 

he spent in custody of between 211 and 239 days, as opposed to the 

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Appellate Case: 89-1066 Document: 01019627258 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 6 
155 days the district court allowed him. Richardson was arrested 

by Denver police in early July 1988 and charged with possession of 

cocaine. The exadt date of his arrest is uncertain. When the 

possession charge against Richardson was dropped on October 5, 

1988, he was taken into federal custody on the counterfeiting 

conspiracy charge. Thus, the question is whether the district 

court erred in crediting Richardson with time held in custody only 

from October 5. 

Calculation of credit for custody prior to sentencing is 

governed by 18 u.s.c. § 3585(b): 

(b) Credit for prior custody. A defendant shall be 

given credit toward the service of a term of 

imprisonment for any time he has spent in official 

detention prior to the date the sentence commences--

( l) as a result of the offense for which the sentence 

was imposed; or 

(2) as a result of any other charge for which the 

defendant was arrested after tbe commission of the 

offense for which the sentence was imposed; 

that hai not been credited against another sentence. 

According to the indictment, the federal counterfeiting conspiracy 

to which Richardson pled guilty was ongoing as of June 23, 1988, 

at least a week before his state arrest for possession of cocaine. 

Under the plain language of§ 3585(b)(2), therefore, Richardson is 

entitled to credit for the time he spent in state custody because 

he was arrested on the possession charge "after the commission of 

the offense [conspiracy to pass counterfeit obligations] for which 

the sentence was imposed." Consequently, we order a limited 

remand to the district court for the purpose of (1) determining 

exactly when in July, 1988, Richardson was placed in state custody 

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and (2) crediting his federal sentence with the time spent in 

state custody consistent with §'3585. 

AFFIRMED and REMANDED. 

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