Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-14-08090/USCOURTS-ca10-14-08090-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brook Bahnson
Appellee
Campbell County Memorial Hospital
Appellee
George Dunlap
Appellee
Joe Hallock
Appellee
Sara Hartsaw
Appellee
Harvey Jackson
Appellee
Alan L. Mitchell
Appellee
Robert Morasko
Appellee
Monica Morman
Appellant
Nancy Tarver
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

MONICA MORMAN, M.D., an individual, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CAMPBELL COUNTY MEMORIAL 

HOSPITAL; ROBERT MORASKO; 

SARA HARTSAW, M.D.; NANCY 

TARVER; HARVEY JACKSON; JOE 

HALLOCK; ALAN L. MITCHELL, M.D.; 

GEORGE DUNLAP; BROOK 

BAHNSON, in their individual and official 

capacities, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 14-8090 

(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-00243-ABJ) 

(D. Wyo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Dr. Monica Morman is a board-certified orthopedic surgeon at Campbell 

County Memorial Hospital (CCMH) in Gillette, Wyoming. She contends that CCMH 

discriminated against her based on her gender by providing better facilities, 

compensation, assistance, equipment, and advertising to its three male orthopedic 

surgeons. Dr. Morman’s sole claim is that the defendants, as state actors, violated her 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

December 2, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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equal-protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. She seeks redress for that 

violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed Dr. Morman’s lawsuit 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and, alternatively, dismissed on qualified-immunity 

grounds the claim against CCMH’s board members and Robert Morasko (CCMH’s 

Chief Executive Officer) in their individual capacities. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm on both grounds. 

First, Dr. Morman has not pleaded a plausible gender-discrimination claim because, 

even accepting her facts as true, she and her three male colleagues were not similarly 

situated. CCMH employed the three male orthopedic surgeons as part of a multimillion-dollar purchase of the surgeons’ Powder River Orthopedics & Spine, P.C. 

(PROS) business, including the surgeons’ building, equipment, and practice. By 

contrast, CCMH employed Dr. Morman solely for her skill and experience. And 

second, the board members and Morasko are entitled to qualified immunity in their 

individual capacities because Dr. Morman has failed to show any clearly established 

law that would have put the defendants on notice that their acquisition terms would 

violate the Equal Protection Clause. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Facts1

Dr. Morman is a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, specializing in hand, 

wrist, and shoulder surgeries. She graduated from medical school in 1997. During the 

next eight years, she completed an orthopedic-surgery residency, became boardeligible under the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery’s standards, became 

board-certified for Orthopaedic Surgery under those same standards, completed a 

hand-surgery fellowship, and received her Certification of Additional Qualification in 

Hand Surgery. 

For five years after her hand-surgery fellowship, from 2003 to 2008, Dr. 

Morman worked at PROS in Gillette, Wyoming. During this time, four other 

orthopedic surgeons owned PROS: Drs. Nathan Simpson, Hans Kioschos, John Dunn, 

and Gerald Baker. In 2008, Dr. Morman left PROS for a one-year fellowship at 

Massachusetts General Hospital. In 2009, after completing the fellowship, Dr. 

Morman returned to Gillette, Wyoming, and began working at CCMH, directly 

competing with PROS for clientele. Dr. Morman’s contract with CCMH entitled her 

to both an annual base salary of $550,000 and biannual bonus payments based on her 

productivity. As bonus payments, Dr. Morman was entitled to 55% of all gross 

collections that CCMH received for her services in excess of $500,000 during each 

 1

 In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we must “accept[] all 

well-[pleaded] facts as true and view[] them in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.” Barnes v. Harris, 783 F.3d 1185, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2015). As we discuss 

later, we distinguish well-pleaded facts from legal conclusions. 

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six-month bonus period. In earning her salary and bonuses, Dr. Morman felt hindered 

by CCMH’s management of her practice. She argues that the hospital’s policies 

placed her at a competitive disadvantage to nearby privately employed orthopedic 

surgeons, including those at PROS. In December 2011, she renegotiated her contract 

terms, getting a higher base pay of $58,333.34 per month plus $4,166.67 per month 

to be on call ($62,500 per month or $750,000 annually) in exchange for an increased 

revenue threshold before earning bonuses. Her base pay, however, was subject to 

reduction if collections from her professional services fell below certain threshold 

amounts. If she failed to meet those specified targets, her base salary for the next six 

months would be reduced to $45,833.33 plus $4,166.67 for call coverage. 

 In June 2012, CCMH agreed to a multi-million-dollar deal to purchase PROS 

(including the building, equipment, and practice) from its three remaining owners 

(Drs. Simpson, Kioschos, and Dunn), as well as to employ them at CCMH.2

 The 

district court explained that the different employment terms resulted from the great 

disparity in what the PROS male surgeons brought to the negotiating table as 

compared to what Dr. Morman had brought. 

 2

 As part of the deal, CCMH also purchased various assets from Bone & Joint 

Radiology, LLC for $4,000,000. These assets included: “[t]he digital x-ray 

equipment, MRI equipment and assumption of the lease, good will and blue sky, 

inventory, including supplies and stock in trade as of closing, furniture, fixtures, 

computer software and hardware used in connection with [Bone & Joint] Radiology’s 

operations, medical records, patient charts, progress notes, reports and similar 

records.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 180. PROS owned Bone & Joint Radiology, so 

PROS’s three owners benefited from the asset sale. 

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B. Procedural History 

 In October 2013, Dr. Morman filed her federal lawsuit, asserting a single claim 

against CCMH, its CEO, and its board members. The claim is one for gender-based 

discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 

support of her claim, she alleged that the defendants treated her differently from the 

male orthopedic surgeons (who had owned PROS) by providing her with lessfavorable pay and terms and conditions of employment. Specifically, in her 

complaint, Dr. Morman identified six ways in which the defendants had 

discriminated against her based on gender: 

 CCMH allowed the PROS surgeons to continue operating under the name 

“Powder River Orthopedics & Spine.” In contrast, although Dr. Morman’s 

orthopedic clinic at CCMH was originally called “Orthopaedic Specialists of 

Wyoming—a CCMH Clinic,” CCMH, soon after she began work, changed the 

name to “Campbell County Clinic—Orthopedics.” In Dr. Morman’s view, the 

name “County Clinic” put her at a competitive disadvantage by conveying an 

image of “free clinics for the indigent” and “substandard care.” Appellant’s 

App. vol. 1 at 14. 

 CCMH funded PROS’s existing advertising campaign, which was more 

aggressive than the advertising for Dr. Morman’s clinic. 

 CCMH purchased the building that had previously housed the PROS surgeons’ 

private orthopedic practice and allowed them to continue practicing out of it, 

providing them with a superior office space to Dr. Morman’s. She argued that 

her office was insufficient for her practice and that the inadequate space 

resulted in inefficiencies and disorganization. 

 CCMH allowed the PROS surgeons to hire and fire their own staff and to 

manage their own billing. CCMH also paid them a management fee to run the 

practice. By contrast, Dr. Morman argued that CCMH disallowed her from 

managing her clinic, kept her from hiring or firing staff, did not provide her 

onsite billing, and denied her a full-time office manager for her practice.

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 CCMH did not provide Dr. Morman with onsite radiology equipment, but 

CCMH purchased the PROS surgeons’ radiology equipment and allowed them 

to continue to maintain radiology services onsite. 

 CCMH allowed the PROS surgeons to maintain their ownership in an outside 

imaging and surgery center, but it kept Dr. Morman from establishing an 

ownership interest in any center competing with CCMH. 

Dr. Morman claimed that these facts demonstrate CCMH discriminated against her 

based on gender. She alleged in her complaint that she has been employed by CCMH 

longer and “is more highly qualified than [the PROS surgeons] because, unlike the 

three male doctors, she has completed both a hand surgery fellowship and a shoulder 

surgery fellowship.” Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 23. Accordingly, she contended that 

the differential treatment “was performed knowingly, intentionally and maliciously to 

deprive Dr. Morman of her rights under the United States Constitution.” Id.

 In response, the defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, asserting 

that Dr. Morman had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After 

full briefing, the district court granted the motion. It concluded that the PROS 

surgeons and Dr. Morman were not similarly situated, defeating her equal-protection 

claim. It noted that CCMH had hired the PROS surgeons as part of negotiations to 

purchase their private practice, putting the PROS surgeons in a dissimilar (and 

stronger) bargaining position than Dr. Morman. Because of this difference, the 

district court concluded that the parties were not similarly situated and that Dr. 

Morman had failed to plead a plausible claim for relief. Alternatively, the district 

court held that the board members and Morasko were entitled to qualified immunity 

in their individual capacities.

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II. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Dr. Morman contends that the district court erred by dismissing her 

claim. She argues that the district court “exceeded its authority when it weighed the 

evidence and made a factual determination as to whether Dr. Morman was similarly 

situated to her male peers.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 27. She also asserts that the 

district court applied the incorrect legal standard, arguing that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) 

requires her to provide only a short and plain statement of a plausible claim to give 

the defendants notice of the nature of the claim and grounds upon which it rested.3

She argues that she did just that. Further, she contends that the district court erred in 

granting qualified immunity to the board members and Morasko in their individual 

capacities because the differential treatment “violated her clearly established 

constitutional right to be free from gender discrimination in the workforce.” Id. at 28. 

We disagree with both arguments.4

 3

 Rule 8(a) provides: 

A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and 

plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the 

court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional 

support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, 

which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief. 

4

 The board members and Morasko also argued at the district court and on 

appeal that they are protected by absolute legislative immunity. Because of our 

conclusions on the other issues, we need not address this claim. 

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A. Standard of Review 

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal granted under Rule 12(b)(6). 

Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). But 

as we do so, Dr. Morman argues that we need ask only if she satisfied the liberal 

pleading standard of Rule 8(a). She’s right. But she is mistaken as to what Rule 8(a) 

requires. The Supreme Court has recently devoted considerable attention to clarifying 

the standard used to evaluate a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. In her argument, Dr. 

Morman ignores these recent developments in the pleading standard as announced in 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662 (2009). 

In Twombly, the Supreme Court clarified the relationship between Rules 8(a) 

and 12(b)(6). The Court explained that, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A plaintiff must “nudge[] [her] claims across the line from 

conceivable to plausible.” Id. Mere “labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Id. at 555. 

The Court expanded upon this in Iqbal. There, examining the effect of a 

complaint’s legal conclusions, the Court explained that “the tenet that a court must 

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678. As the Court noted, “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure 

from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock 

the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id.

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at 678–79. We assume the veracity of well-pleaded facts, but we must “then 

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. 

“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to 

dismiss.” Id. 

Together, these cases offer a “refined standard” for us to consider when 

evaluating dismissals. Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th 

Cir. 2011). Where a complaint contains allegations that are “so general that they 

encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not 

nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Robbins v. 

Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570). What this means in any given case will depend entirely on the nature of the 

claims and the context in which they arose. See Kan. Penn Gaming, 656 F.3d at 1215 

(“The nature and specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will 

vary based on context.”). As the Supreme Court has explained, we must draw upon 

our “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, though a 

plaintiff need not meet the outdated and ill-informed requirements of code-pleading, 

a court must find some plausible claim for a complaint to survive a motion to 

dismiss. Id. at 678–79. 

So where does that leave us? In Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188 

(10th Cir. 2012), we explained that “[w]hile the 12(b)(6) standard does not require 

that [a plaintiff] establish a prima facie case in her complaint, the elements of each 

alleged cause of action help to determine whether [she] has set forth a plausible 

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claim.” Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192. Accordingly, to assess whether Dr. Morman’s 

complaint is “plausible” and thus survives the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, “we start by discussing the elements a plaintiff must prove to establish a 

claim for discrimination.” Id. 

B. Dr. Morman’s Gender-Discrimination Claim 

As a threshold matter, we must determine the nature of Dr. Morman’s sole 

claim—a gender-based equal-protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 

short, she supports this claim by contending that CCMH and the individual 

defendants failed to provide her with the same employment benefits provided to the 

three PROS male orthopedic surgeons later employed by CCMH. As she did in the 

district court, Dr. Morman rests her claim not on disparate impact, but on disparate 

treatment. Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination, while disparate impact 

involves “practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a 

disproportionately adverse effect on [the protected class].” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 

U.S. 557, 577 (2009). 

In her complaint, Dr. Morman alleges that all “conduct was performed 

knowingly, intentionally and maliciously to deprive Dr. Morman of her rights under 

the United States Constitution.” Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 23. She also claims that 

“the acts of the individual defendants alleged in this Complaint constituted an official 

policy or custom of CCMH and/or deliberate indifference on the part of CCMH.” Id.

But, as the district court determined, Dr. Morman’s allegation that the defendants 

acted under a custom or policy is a legal conclusion unsupported by any of her 

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factual allegations. The Supreme Court explained in Iqbal that “a court considering a 

motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are 

no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 556 U.S. at 

679. We therefore agree with the district court that we need not accept this allegation 

as true. She also abandoned the policy argument when she failed to argue it in 

response to the motion to dismiss, and she does not assert this argument on appeal. 

Thus, like the district court, we will evaluate her claim within the disparate-treatment 

framework.

To prove an equal-protection claim based on disparate treatment, a plaintiff 

must provide either direct evidence of discrimination or prevail under the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972).5

Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192. Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first prove a 

prima facie case of discrimination. Id. If she does so, then the burden “shifts to the 

defendant to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 

employment action.” Id. If the defendant provides such a reason, “the burden then 

shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff’s protected status was a 

determinative factor in the employment decision or that the employer’s explanation is 

pretext.” Id. 

 5

 “[T]he elements of a plaintiff’s case are the same, based on the disparate 

treatment elements outlined in McDonnell Douglas, whether that case is brought 

under §§ 1981 or 1983 or Title VII.” Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 

1162 (10th Cir. 1991); see Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 450 (10th Cir. 

1995) (stating that a city can be held liable for any impermissible employment 

decisions under either §§ 1981 or 1983). 

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We must pause here, though, to ask what this means in the procedural posture 

of this case: a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), the Supreme Court 

explained that McDonnell Douglas’s prima facie case is “an evidentiary standard, not 

a pleading requirement.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510. As the Court made clear, the 

standards for employment discrimination set forth in McDonnell Douglas simply do 

not “apply to the pleading standard that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a 

motion to dismiss.” Id. at 511. Still, Twombly and Iqbal require that a plaintiff allege 

a plausible claim. Despite what Dr. Morman suggests, we can evaluate her claim’s 

plausibility only by considering the prima facie case of discrimination that she would 

need to prove in court. In pleading a discrimination claim, she need not set forth a 

prima facie case for discrimination. But she must allege facts that make such a claim 

at least plausible. 

Thus, to evaluate whether her complaint survives a motion to dismiss, absent 

direct evidence of discrimination, we examine the first step of the McDonnell 

Douglas framework: the elements Dr. Morman would need to establish to prove a 

prima-facie case of gender discrimination. See Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192. That is the 

only way to assess if her claim is, in fact, plausible. Dr. Morman must have pleaded a 

plausible claim of gender discrimination to survive dismissal. The inferences offered 

by the McDonnell Douglas framework assist judges in resolving motions to dismiss 

by providing an analytical framework to sift through the facts alleged. Messina v. 

Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990). Although the 

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burden-shifting framework is only an evidentiary standard, we must recognize that 

“the McDonnell Douglas framework should not be applied in a manner that renders it 

nothing more than an empty pleading formula, allowing every allegation of employer 

discrimination to get to a jury.” Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1173 

(10th Cir. 2007); see id. (evaluating the standard in the context of a motion for 

summary judgment). 

What Dr. Morman needed to plead to state a plausible claim of discrimination 

depends on the nature of the claim she filed. Here, Dr. Morman’s sole claim is 

premised on the Equal Protection Clause, which requires that no state “deny to any 

person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 

§ 1. This constitutional guarantee “prohibits state and local governments from 

treating similarly situated persons differently.” Rector v. City & Cty. of Denver, 348 

F.3d 935, 949 (10th Cir. 2003). The fundamental guarantee is that “all persons 

similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 

473 U.S 432, 439 (1985). 

The prima-facie case required to support a claim of intentional discrimination 

under the Equal Protection Clause varies based on the context and nature of the facts. 

Indeed, “[t]he Supreme Court recognized in McDonnell Douglas that the articulation 

of a plaintiff’s prima facie case may well vary, depending on the context of the claim 

and the nature of the adverse employment action alleged.” Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 

1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13); see 

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) (explaining that 

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McDonnell Douglas created a flexible standard for plaintiffs to show a prima facie 

case of discrimination that may be modified to fit the facts of a case). “[T]he 

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to equal-protection claims in 

the employment context.” Ney v. City of Hoisington, 264 F. App’x 678, 684 (10th 

Cir. 2008) (unpublished). 

Because there are varying standards based on the particular facts of any given 

discrimination case, the parties dispute which elements should apply here.6

 But we 

need not decide the specific elements Dr. Morman would need to prove to succeed at 

trial. Under any standard, to prevail on an equal-protection claim, she would need to 

show that she was treated differently than similarly situated employees—in other 

words, she needed to be similarly situated to the male orthopedic surgeons. See 

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (explaining that a plaintiff 

must show that she was “intentionally treated differently from others similarly 

situated”). In any employment-discrimination case, the ultimate issue and “central 

focus of the inquiry . . . is always whether the employer is treating some people less 

favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 

 6

 On the one hand, in her response to the motion to dismiss, Dr. Morman urged 

the court to apply the standard from E.E.O.C. v. PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790 (10th 

Cir. 2007): “[A] prima facie case of discrimination must consist of evidence that 

(1) the victim belongs to a protected class; (2) the victim suffered an adverse 

employment action; and (3) the challenged action took place under circumstances 

giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” PVNF, 487 F.3d at 800. On the other 

hand, the defendants turn to Orr v. City of Albuquerque, 417 F.3d 1144 (10th Cir. 

2005), which required a plaintiff to prove “(1) membership in a protected class, (2) 

adverse employment action, and (3) disparate treatment among similarly situated 

employees.” Orr, 417 F.3d at 1149. The district court applied the latter. 

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Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Thus, to survive the motion to dismiss, Dr. Morman needed to plead a 

plausible claim that she was similarly situated to the male orthopedic surgeons. That 

she has failed to do. 

Accepting all of Dr. Morman’s allegations as true, we readily can see that she 

hasn’t pleaded a plausible claim that she was similarly situated to the PROS surgeons 

“in all material respects.” Kan. Penn Gaming, 656 F.3d at 1217 (emphasis added). 

Gender alone is insufficient without considering other factors, such as the contrasting 

circumstances in which Dr. Morman and the PROS surgeons became CCMH 

employees. 

In September 2009, CCMH employed Dr. Morman after she returned from her 

Massachusetts fellowship. In May 2012, by contrast, CCMH hired the PROS 

surgeons as part of CCMH’s multi-million-dollar purchase of their ongoing practice, 

building, and equipment. Thus, CCMH hired Dr. Morman as a qualified surgeon who 

just had returned to Gillette, but hired the PROS surgeons as part of a multi-milliondollar transaction in which they sold their established orthopedic surgery and 

radiology practices to CCMH. 

Simply put, the facts Dr. Morman alleged in her complaint show her 

dissimilarity from the PROS surgeons. She did not offer anything approaching the 

level of assets, staff, building, patient base, equipment, or years of building a local 

and regional reputation as had the PROS surgeons. Her education and skill cannot 

justify a legal rule requiring that, before acquiring PROS and hiring its owners, 

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CCMH must elevate Dr. Morman’s employment conditions to those offered to the 

PROS surgeons. Nor can it justify a rule requiring that it must condition its purchase 

of PROS upon its three surgeons receiving the same pay and employment conditions 

as it had hired Dr. Morman. Simply put, the Equal Protection Clause provides no 

such relief here. 

Dr. Morman incorrectly contends that the district court engaged in 

impermissible fact-finding in dismissing her claim. In fact, the district court did no 

more than faithfully accept her factual allegations as true and evaluate those facts 

within the disparate-treatment framework. It examined the consideration paid for the 

PROS practice, the negotiated management agreement, and the services that the 

PROS surgeons provided. When it looked at these facts alleged in her complaint, the 

district court concluded—and we agree—that the PROS surgeons “brought many 

things to the bargaining table when they were hired that [Dr. Morman] simply did 

not.” Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 347. As the district court explained, all of the issues 

that form the bases of Dr. Morman’s claim—the clinic name; employee hiring, 

staffing, and management; the office space; radiology services; and marketing 

campaigns—“are things [the PROS surgeons] brought to the table when they entered 

into the agreements with CCMH three years after [Dr. Morman] was hired.” Id.

As Dr. Morman acknowledges, to prevail she must plausibly allege that the 

differential treatment is “on account of being a member of a protected class.” 

Appellant’s Opening Br. 37. The Fourteenth Amendment provides “equal laws,” but 

it does not guarantee “equal results.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 

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273 (1979). Here, given the difference in what Dr. Morman and the PROS physicians 

brought to CCMH, Dr. Morman has not pleaded a plausible claim for gender 

discrimination. Her facts, accepted as true, show only that the hospital’s negotiations 

with different parties resulted in different outcomes—the PROS surgeons had far 

more to offer CCMH when they negotiated their terms of employment. Because Dr. 

Morman has failed to allege a plausible claim that she was treated differently than 

similarly situated employees, we hold that the district court properly dismissed her 

discrimination claim. 

C. Qualified Immunity 

Dr. Morman also argues that the district court improperly held that CCMH’s 

board members and Morasko were entitled to qualified immunity in their individual 

capacities. We disagree. 

We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant qualified immunity. 

Harman v. Pollock, 446 F.3d 1069, 1077 (10th Cir. 2006). We evaluate a Rule 

12(b)(6) dismissal based on qualified immunity under a two-part test that asks: 

(1) whether the plaintiff’s constitutional right was violated, and (2) whether that right 

was clearly established at the time it was violated. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 

223, 232 (2009). Under Pearson, we have discretion to address either prong first “in 

light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. at 236. In this case, we 

begin—and end—with the second prong. 

For a right to be clearly established, “there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth 

Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other 

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courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Fogarty v. Gallegos, 

523 F.3d 1147, 1161 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We 

acknowledge that “[t]he plaintiff is not required to show, however, that the very act 

in question previously was held unlawful . . . to establish an absence of qualified 

immunity.” Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Defendants must make “reasonable applications of the 

prevailing law to their own circumstances.” Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 

(10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Dr. Morman contends that she has identified clearly established law 

supporting her view that CCMH and the individual defendants violated her equalprotection rights by employing the PROS male surgeons on terms more favorable 

than those she agreed to for herself. Broadly she asserts that any public official would 

know that gender discrimination is unlawful. She argues that “precedent from both 

the Supreme Court and this Court should have made it clear to any person in the 

defendants’ position that it would have been unlawful to treat Dr. Morman differently 

from her male colleagues in the manner described in the Complaint based on her 

[gender].” Appellant’s Opening Br. 54–55. 

Despite her argument that the law was clearly established, Dr. Morman fails to 

meet her burden. She references “precedent from both the Supreme Court and this 

Court,” but fails to offer anything more than general principles of law to support her 

claim. Id. at 54. The issue here is not whether Dr. Morman had a right to be free from 

gender discrimination in the workplace—there is no dispute about that. Instead, the 

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question is whether clearly established law required CCMH to employ the PROS 

surgeons on the same terms as Dr. Morman when entering a multi-million dollar 

acquisition of their longtime local and regional practice, building, and equipment. Dr. 

Morman would have to plausibly allege that the defendants as reasonable officials 

would understand that their actions would violate her equal-protection rights. See 

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). 

Here, Dr. Morman has not cited a single case that would support her position 

that the law demands equal results when an employer negotiates an employment 

contract with differently situated employees. Instead, she merely cites Feeney, 442 

U.S. at 273, and City of Cleburne, 472 U.S. at 439, for general principles of equalprotection jurisprudence. Because Dr. Morman offers nothing more than “a broad 

general proposition,” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007) (en 

banc) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)), we conclude that Dr. 

Morman failed to show that the individual defendants violated clearly established 

law. Thus, we hold that qualified immunity protects the defendant board members 

and Morasko from suit and liability in their individual capacities. We therefore affirm 

the district court. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Because Dr. Morman failed to state a plausible claim for relief and qualified 

immunity shields the defendant board members and Morasko from liability in their 

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individual capacities, we affirm the district court on all grounds. 

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge 

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