Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05158/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05158-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lloyd Michael Reid
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FILED 

Uaited St:am C®t~ of Appeals 

Tenth Cirtuit 

AUG 2 0 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

vs. 

LLOYD 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) No. 89-5158 

) 

MICHAEL REID, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-33-01-C) 

Jack Marwood Short, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

James L. Swartz, Assistant United States Attorney (Tony M. Graham, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District 

Judge.* 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant Lloyd Michael Reid was convicted of 

conspiracy to distribute cocaine and maintain a place for drug 

distribution. 21 u.s.c. § 846. He appeals, claiming that 1) the 

indictment should have been dismissed because the grand jury was 

* The Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior United States 

District Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-5158 Document: 01019381097 Date Filed: 08/20/1990 Page: 1 
not apprised of the complete criminal record of the government's 

lead witness, 2) the indictment should have been dismissed or a 

motion for new trial granted because the government's lead witness 

testified to an absence of an agreement, contrary to the 

government's earlier representation of potential favorable 

treatment, and 3) the district court misapplied the sentencing 

guidelines in imposing a 200 month sentence when it decided upon 

a) the quantity of drugs involved, b) an upward adjustment for 

obstruction of justice, c) an upward adjustment concerning the 

defendant's role in the offense, and d) the defendant's criminal 

history category. We affirm. 

Viewing the record in this case in the light most favorable 

to the government, we summarize the facts. Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 u.s. 307, 324 (1979). The government's lead witness, Rhonda 

Grimmett, was approached by codefendant Ronald Noble about letting 

defendant Reid sell cocaine in her apartment. Grimmett then met 

with Noble, Reid and codefendant Patrick Willis. Reid and 

Grimmett reached an agreement whereby Reid would use Grimmett's 

apartment for crack cocaine distribution in exchange for cash and 

drugs that she could resell. Defendant Reid made arrangements 

with drug suppliers (Irving Profitt and Alvin Clemmons) and had 

Ronald Noble contact Reid's customers to inform them of the new 

location. Patrick Willis served as Reid's bodyguard. Grimmett, 

Reid, Noble and Willis were armed during the three week life of 

this venture, in which one-hundred customers per day purchased 

crack cocaine. Grimmett estimated that approximately one ounce 

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per day of cocaine was converted into rock crack. As much as 

$2,500 per day was realized. 

I. 

Defendant first argues that the indictment should have been 

dismissed because the grand jury was not apprised of the complete 

criminal record of Rhonda Grimmett. An FBI agent who appeared 

before the grand jury indicated that Grimmett pled guilty and was 

sentenced to twenty years in state court for her role in this drug 

distribution scheme. Defendant suggests that the government was 

under a duty to establish before the grand jury that Grimmett was 

a reliable witness. Defendant maintains that the government 

should have investigated and fully disclosed Grimmett's numerous 

felony convictions and other nefarious activities. According to 

the defendant, the fifth amendment indictment clause incorporates 

all of the prerequisites of the fourth amendment warrant clause 

and this means that a full criminal history of a witness must be 

presented to the grand jury to enable it to evaluate the 

reliability of the evidence provided. 1 

Thirty-four years ago, the Supreme Court squarely rejected 

the notion that the Court in its supervisory capacity should 

1 Neither counsel for the defendant nor counsel for the 

government cited any Supreme Court authority on appeal, save 

defendant's letter containing cites to supplemental authority. 

While the failure to discuss Supreme Court authority is 

understandable when the Court has not spoken to an issue, we 

remind counsel that the Supreme Court is the primary source of 

decisional law in our federal system. As inferior federal courts, 

both the court of appeals and the district court turn first to the 

decisions of the Supreme Court. 

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"establish a rule permitting defendants to challenge indictments 

on the grounds that they are not supported by adequate evidence." 

Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956). Defendant's 

argument that the fifth amendment somehow incorporates a 

reliability test under the fourth amendment is flawed in two 

respects. First, under the fourth amendment, whether probable 

cause to issue a warrant exists depends upon the totality of the 

circumstances; reliability of an informant is one of several 

factors which may inform a probable cause determination. Illinois 

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 238 (1983). Second, the Supreme 

Court has determined that evidence obtained in violation of the 

fourth amendment and suppressed may nonetheless be used by a grand 

jury. United States v. Calandra, 414 u.s. 338, 354-55 (1974). 

In this circuit, we have adopted a rule that "although a 

prosecutor need not present all conceivably exculpatory evidence 

to the grand jury, it must present evidence that clearly negates 

guilt." United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 727 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 482 u.s. 918 (1987). Under this rule, "[t]he 

prosecutor is not obliged to ferret out and present every bit of 

potentially exculpatory evidence. But when substantial 

exculpatory evidence is discovered in the course of an 

investigation, it must be revealed to the grand jury." Id. at 728 

(emphasis in original). This court has affirmed a trial court's 

dismissal of an indictment without prejudice when the government 

withheld substantially exculpatory evidence and the government's 

conduct prejudiced the defendant. See United States v. Williams, 

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899 F.2d 898, 903-04 (lOth Cir. 1990) (applying Bank of Nova 

Scotia v. United States, 487 u.s. 250, 263-64 (1988)). 

Although impeachment evidence can constitute exculpatory 

evidence entitled to juror consideration, Davis v. Alaska, 415 

U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974); United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 

1443 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1829 (1990), this 

case is readily distinguishable from Williams. At trial, the 

defendant sought to impeach witness Grimmet with her lengthy 

criminal history. See Williams, 899 F.2d at 903, n.l (recognizing 

that some omissions before the grand jury can be cured at trial); 

Page, 808 F.2d at 727 (jury was informed of lack authenticity of 

certain evidence and the evidence would not have affected grand 

jury's probable cause determination). Moreover, Grimmet's 

complete criminal record is not evidence which would have negated 

defendant's guilt. See Page, 808 F.2d at 727. The grand jury was 

apprised of her most relevant conviction, the one resulting from 

the events in question. We conclude that defendant cannot meet 

the difficult burden of showing that the government's failure to 

disclose Grimmett's complete criminal history had any affect on 

the grand jury's decision to indict. See Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 

U.S. at 263. Rather, requiring the government to produce and 

disclose such history after it had already disclosed the current 

conviction would be to announce an approach requiring "the 

prosecutor to ferret out and present every bit of potentially 

exculpatory evidence" to the grand jury, a standard condemned in 

Page. 808 F.2d at 728. 

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II. 

Defendant next contends that the indictment should have been 

dismissed or a motion for new trial should have been granted 

because Rhonda Grimmett testified to an absence of an agreement 

between herself and the government. In May 1989, the government 

informed the defendant of its assurances to Grimmett that her 

cooperation would be made known to her sentencing judge in state 

court. At trial in June 1989, Grimmet testified that no agreement 

had been made with the government for her testimony. The 

government stressed this fact in its closing argument. 

When the government has reached an agreement with a principal 

witness in exchange for her testimony, the government has a 

responsibility to inform the defendant of that fact. Giglio v. 

United States, 405 u.s. 150, 154 (1972). If the witness denies 

such an agreement, and the government allows it to go uncorrected, 

a defendant may be denied due process. Napue v. Illinois, 360 

u.s. 264, 269-70 (1959). Here, however, the district court made a 

finding that although the government initially indicated an 

agreement, the state court sentencing judge was never contacted on 

Grimmett's behalf. Rec. supp. val. I at 4. Defendant has offered 

no evidence to undercut this finding. 

Defendant suggests that he was denied a fair trial because 

his trial strategy was destroyed. According to the defendant, he 

had planned to discredit Grimmett's testimony based upon her 

agreement with the government, but ended up strengthening her 

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credibility on cross-examination when she denied that she expected 

the government to intercede on her behalf after her testimony. 

See rec. val. II at 37-38. Defendant also contends that, had he 

known of the changed circumstances, he might have inquired of the 

Oklahoma Department of Corrections as to whether Grimmett's 

federal cooperation would reduce her state sentence. 

Having indicated an agreement, the government should have 

disclosed the lack of an agreement to the defense in advance of 

trial. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(c) (government has a continuing 

duty to disclose discoverable information). However, the failure 

to do so in this case is not reversible error. Although the 

defendant claims his trial strategy was destroyed, we agree with 

the district judge that the defendant suffered no prejudice. Rec. 

supp. val. I at 6-8. Defense counsel thoroughly questioned 

Grimmett about her numerous convictions and prior bad acts. He 

had knowledge that Grimmett would deny the presence of any 

agreement on cross-examination because she had done so forcefully 

on direct. Thus, counsel made a knowing and tactical choice to 

press the point and the fact that he did not like the answer he 

received should not affect our judgment. We are in agreement with 

the trial judge's observations that defense counsel would have 

asked the question regardless of the government's representation 

and defendant was not prejudiced by the government's tardy 

disclosure of the lack of an agreement. Defendant's 

representation that he might have pursued further investigation of 

Grimmett had he known about the lack of an agreement is wholly 

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speculative and, in the complete absence of a showing of 

prejudice, need not be considered. 

III. 

Defendant next claims that the district court misapplied the 

Sentencing Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Comm'n, 

Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1989). At the district court, the 

government bears the burden of proof for sentence increases while 

the defendant bears the burden of proof for sentence decreases. 

United States v. Kirk, 894 F.2d 1162, 1164 (lOth Cir. 1990) . We 

review the district court's findings of fact which support its 

application of the Guidelines under the clearly erroneous 

standard. 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e); United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 

1558, 1560 (lOth Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-7490 

(May 15, 1990). The district court's resolution of contested 

legal issues is reviewed de DQYQ· Id. 

A. 

Defendant first objects to the district court's determination 

of the quantity of drugs involved. The presentence report relied 

upon Grimmett's testimony that for twenty-one days, at least one 

ounce of cocaine was processed into rock crack and sold for a 

total of 595.35 grams of cocaine. 2 Defendant's base offense level 

was 26, which is appropriate when greater than or equal to 500 

2 One ounce equals 28.35 grams. u.s.s.G., Measurement 

Conversion Table at 2.50 (Nov. 1989); Rutter, 897 F.2d at 1560 

n.l. Thus, 21 ounces times 28.35 grams equals 595.35 grams. 

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grams but less than 2,000 grams of cocaine are involved in the 

conspiracy. See u.s.s.G. §§ 201.4(a); 20l.l(a)(3) & (c) (drug 

quantity table). 

The district court could consider the entire quantity of 

cocaine sold during the three weeks the conspiracy operated at 

Grimmett's apartment. Section 201.4 of the Guidelines provides 

that "[i]f a defendant is convicted of a 

conspiracy . . • involving a controlled substance, the offense 

level shall be the same as if the object of the 

conspiracy . . • had been completed. " Here, the defendant was 

convicted only of a conspiracy count, but all drug transactions 

relied upon by the district court had been completed. 

When several defendants are convicted of conspiracy, the 

relevant conduct for purposes of sentencing "is not necessarily 

the same for every participant." u.s.s.G. § 1Bl.3 comment. (n.l) 

(referenced in id. § 201.4 comment. (n.l)). "Where it is 

established that the conduct was neither within the scope of the 

defendant's agreement, nor was reasonably foreseeable in 

connection with the criminal activity the defendant agreed to 

jointly undertake, such conduct is not included in establishing 

the defendant's offense level ...• " Id. Thus, a defendant is 

accountable for drug quantities associated with a conspiracy 

provided that such quantities were within the scope of, and 

reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the criminal activity 

he jointly agreed to undertake with his coconspirators. u.s.s.G. 

§ 1Bl.3, comment. (n.l). (illus. e). Here, the entire quantity of 

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cocaine purchased for resale and then sold from Grimmett's 

apartment was within the scope of and reasonably foreseeable in 

connection with, defendant's agreement with his coconspirators. 

Determining the entire quantity of cocaine is slightly more 

difficult. 

Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does 

not reflect the scale of the offense, the sentencing 

judge shall approximate the quantity of the controlled 

substance. In making this determination, the judge may 

consider, for example, the price generally obtained for 

the controlled substance, financial or other records, 

similar transactions in controlled substances by the 

defendant, and the size or capability of any laboratory 

involved. 

u.s.s.G. § 2D1.4, comment. (n.2); see also id. § 2D1.1 comment. 

(n.12). Drugs are bought and sold in secrecy. Drug dealers do 

not obey the law, much less generally accepted accounting 

principles which would dictate detailed financial and other 

records. Though it would be helpful to determine the quantities 

involved, few, if any, drug dealers make use of source documents 

reflecting the inflow and outflow of their inventory. In the 

absence of a seized quantity, we are left with reconstructions by 

DEA agents and others concerning the quantities involved. Given 

several plausible estimates as to replicated quantities, the 

quantity determined by the district court must rest upon a 

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Walton, Nos. 

89-1862, 1864, 1882, 1883, 1884, slip op. at ___ (6th Cir. July 

18, 1990) [1990 WL 98614]. 

The district court determined that the quantity contained in 

the presentence report was a "reasonably accurate" replication of 

Appellate Case: 89-5158 Document: 01019381097 Date Filed: 08/20/1990 Page: 10 
the amount sold by this drug enterprise. Defendant argues that a 

better estimation would have been 100-199 grams. According to the 

defendant, the district court should have begun its estimate with 

the 10.86 grams of crack cocaine seized from the defendant and 

then added three one-half ounce quantities (42.525 grams) which 

defendant purchased from a supplier, Alvin Clemmons. Again, 

according to the defendant, given this figure of 53.385 grams, the 

district court should have then added an amount to arrive at a 

total of between 100-199 grams. 

In estimating the quantity of cocaine involved in this drug 

conspiracy, the district court should consider evidence concerning 

inflows and outflows of drug inventory. See u.s.s.G. § 201.1, 

comment. (n.6) ("Where there are multiple transactions ••. or 

multiple drug types, the quantities of drugs are to be added."); 

see also id. (n.12). Essentially, defendant is suggesting that we 

look at the amount seized plus amounts he purchased from his 

suppliers (inflows) and add some arbitrary amount. The district 

court focused solely on the amount of cocaine sold by the 

defendant (outflows). Neither approach is correct. 

Defendant's method presents several problems. Clemmons 

testified that he made seven to nine different sales of varying 

quantities to defendant and, at a minimum, he sold defendant 

106.05 grams of cocaine and perhaps as much as 138.075 grams. See 

rec. val. II at 60-63. Thus, adding the amount seized to these 

quantities, we would start with a quantity of between 116.91 and 

148.935 grams. But, Clemmons was not defendantis only supplier. 

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Defendant's suggestion that we merely cap the amount involved at 

199 grams also ignores the amount sold from Grimmett's apartment. 

The defendant's method must be rejected as incomplete and 

arbitrary. 

The district court's method of estimation, calculating the 

amount of cocaine sold by the defendant and others during the 

course of the conspiracy, does not consider the record evidence 

concerning the amount of cocaine seized from the defendant plus 

the amount the defendant purchased. See u.s.s.G. § 201.1, 

comment. (n.6). Although the district court's method of 

determining the amount sold was an acceptable approach which finds 

support in the record testimony, it is incomplete absent some 

reason to disregard the evidence concerning the amount seized from 

the defendant and the amounts purchased by him. This error does 

not affect the sentence, however, because even adding the maximum 

amount which the evidence indicates was seized and purchased for 

resale by the defendant to the district court's finding of the 

amount sold during the course of the conspiracy does not change 

the defendant's base offense leve1. 3 On remand, the district 

3 The district court found that 595.35 grams were sold 

resulting in a base offense level of 26. The maximum amount which 

the record supports as being seized from and purchased for resale 

by the defendant is 148.935 grams. Adding the amount seized, 

purchased for resale and sold results in a total of 744.285 grams, 

which is well within the 500 but less than 2,000 gram quantity 

which would result in a base offense level of 26. 

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court shall append its amended findings concerning the quantity to 

the presentence report. 4 

B. 

The district court made a two-level upward adjustment for 

5 obstruction of justice. u.s.s.G. § 3Cl.l. A non-exclusive list 

of conduct which may provide a basis for applying § 3Cl.l includes 

"threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully attempting to 

influence a co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or 

indirectly." u.s.s.G. § 3Cl.l conunent. (n.l(d)). The district 

court relied upon a statement in the presentence report that the 

probation officer had reviewed an affidavit by a BATF agent which 

reportedly contained an inmate's statement that the defendant had 

threatened two trial witnesses over a four to five day period 

b t t . t• 6 su sequen o conv1c 1on. The defendant allegedly stated "that 

4 We note that the presentence report does not include an 

attachment containing the findings on disputed matters as required 

by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D). On remand, the district court 

should perform this ministerial task. United States v. Wach, No. 

89-4097, slip op. at 7-8 (lOth Cir. Jul. 13, 1990) [1990 WL 

95945]. 

5 U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 provides: 

Willfully Obstructing or Impeding Proceedings 

If the defendant willfully impeded or obstructed, or 

attempted to impede or obstruct the administration of 

justice during the investigation or prosecution of the 

instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 

6 Threatening a witness before the witness testifies and prior 

to conviction and sentencing plainly is within the scope of 

§ 3C1.1. United States v. Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1253-54 (5th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 554 (1989). Threatening a witness 

after the witness testifies and subsequent to conviction, but 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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he had put a 'hit' on [two of the witnesses who testified against 

him] and that when he was released, he was going to take care of 

it. " Rec. supp •. vol. I I, addendum at 2 . According to the 

presentence report, the inmate contacted one of the witnesses, who 

in turn contacted the government. The government then 

investigated and provided the affidavit to the probation office. 

Defendant denies the statement, claims that it lacks any indicia 

of reliability and notes that he was unable to cross-examine the 

inmate. 

The statement at issue is plainly multiple hearsay. 7 

Recognizing that a defendant has a due process right not to be 

sentenced on the basis of materially incorrect information, United 

States v. Tucker, 404 u.s. 443, 447 (1972), we have held that some 

minimal indication of reliability must accompany a hearsay 

statement, other than mere allegation, before it may be relied 

upon in sentencing. United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 

1181 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 3302 (1990); see also 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

prior to sentencing, also is within the scope of § 3Cl.l, which 

applies "during the investigation or prosecution of the instant 

offense." u.s.s.G. § 3Cl.1; see United States v. Lee, 899 F.2d 15 

(6th Cir. 1990) (unpublished text of decision available on 

Westlaw) ("the language 'during the investigation or prosecution 

of the instant offense' does not exclude the time period after 

entry of a plea but before sentencing"). 

7 Four statements are involved: (a) the probation officer 

stated (b) that the BATF agent stated (c) that the inmate stated 

(d) that the defendant stated that he would get revenge. Even 

assuming statement (c) incorporating (d) constitutes an admission 

by the defendant under Fed. R. 80l(d)(2)(a), statements (a) and 

(b) are hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(B), 805; 4 J. Weinstein 

& M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, ,I 805[01] (1988 & 1990 Supp.). 

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u.s.s.G. § 6A1.3, comment. (backg'd) (reliable hearsay may be 

considered). But no sixth amendment right of confrontation 

applies at sentencing when the district court considers evidence 

from sources that are unavailable for the defendant to 

cross-examine. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1180-81. 

In determining relevant facts, the district court may 

consider affidavits. u.s.s.G. § 6A1.3, comment. (backg'd). 

Out-of-court statements from unidentified informants also may be 

considered, provided good reason exists for not revealing the 

identity of the informant and the statements may be corroborated 

otherwise. Id. (citing United States v. Fatica, 579 F.2d 707, 713 

(2d Cir. 1977)). Applying these standards, the challenged 

statement has sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered. 

The informant was aware of the witnesses by name which suggests a 

likelihood that defendant was the source of the threat. See 

United States v. Penson, 893 F.2d 996, 998 (8th Cir. 1990). The 

informant contacted not the government, but one of the threatened 

witnesses. Only when the witness complained to the government did 

the government become involved. The statement is also consistent 

with the defendant's total denial of involvement in drug 

distribution given overwhelming evidence to the contrary; 

according to the defendant, he came to Tulsa to start a "rap 

music" group. See u.s.s.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4) ("Conduct 

resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Willfully Obstructing 

or Impeding Proceedings) ordinarily indicates that the defendant 

has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct."). 

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c. 

Defendant next challenges a four-level upward adjustment 

under § 3Bl.l(a) for an aggravating role in the offense. u.s.s.G. 

§ 3Bl.1(a). The defendant contends that only four participants 

were involved and that § 3Bl.l(a) is inapplicable. That section 

provides: "If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a 

criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was 

otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels." u.s.s.G. § 3B1.1(a). 

The district court relied upon the presentence report which 

suggested that more than five persons were involved because two of 

the defendant's suppliers, (Clemmons and Profitt) should be 

counted, as well as an estimated daily one-hundred customers who 

purchased cocaine from the defendant. The presentence report goes 

too far. 

To determine the number of participants involved in the 

offense we are cognizant that a participant "is a person who is 

criminally responsible for commission of the offense, but need not 

have been convicted." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 comment. (n.l). The 

defendant is included among the participants in the offense. 

United States v. Barbontin, No. 86-5622, slip op. at ___ (5th Cir. 

July 24, 1990) [1990 WL 102823]; United States v. Preakos, No. 

90-1055, slip op. at ___ (1st Cir. Jun. 21, 1990) [1990 WL 83458]. 

Key determinants of the applicability of § 3B1.1 are control or 

organization: "the defendant must have exercised some degree of 

control over others involved in the commission of the offense or 

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he must have been responsible for organizing others for the 

purpose of carrying out the crime. This requirement is implicit 

in the terms 'organizer, leader, manager and supervisor,' each of 

which suggests the presence of underlings or subordinates." 

United States v. Fuller, 897 F.2d 1217, 1220 (1st Cir. 1990); 

accord u.s.s.G. 3Bl.l comment. (n.3). We recently have held that 

the defendant's role is considered only in relation to the offense 

of conviction, we do not look at all relevant conduct. United 

States v. Petit, 903 F.2d 1336, 1341 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Here, the offense of conviction encompasses all of the drug 

distribution activities within the course of the conspiracy, the 

retail portion being conducted at Grimmett's house. The record 

establishes that the defendant recruited Grimmett, and controlled 

her along with Willis and Noble. Thus, including defendant, at 

least four persons are participants in the offense. 

We next turn to whether defendant's two identified suppliers 

and one-hundred unidentified customers should be counted as 

participants under § 3Bl.l. Section 3Bl.l attempts to apportion 

relative responsibility when an offense involves multiple 

participants. U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l, comment. (backg'd). In most 

organizations, responsibility means accountability. We have held 

that pursuant to § 3Bl.l(c) "the defendant's supervisory or 

managerial status is not sufficiently proved by indicating a mere 

buyer/seller relationship between the defendant and the alleged 

group or network participants." United States v. Mays, 902 F.2d 

1501, 1503 (lOth Cir. 1990) [No. 89-6123, slip op. at 5 (filed May 

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7, 1990 and amended Aug. 2, 1990)]. A fortiori a defendant's 

status as an organizer or leader is not sufficiently proven merely 

by showing that defendant purchased drugs from a supplier or sold 

drugs to a customer for his personal use. Before a supplier or 

customer for personal use may be deemed to have been a 

"controlled" participant under § 3Bl. 1 (a) , 8 the government must 

prove at least an interdependence between the defendant and the 

supplier or customer that would support an inference that the 

supplier or customer for personal use is answerable to the 

defendant. Merely because a crime is extensive (several purchases 

and sales of drugs) does not automatically mean that a defendant 

organizes or leads his suppliers or his customers who buy for 

personal use. See United States v. Weidner, 703 F. Supp. 1350, 

1355 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (cited in Mays, 902 F.2d at 1503), aff'd, 

885 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1989). 

Applying this test to the facts, we hold that the government 

has not shown that defendant organized or led five or more 

participants, based upon the partial record designated on appeal. 

Regarding the two suppliers, we have adequate information to 

evaluate the defendant's relationship vis-a-vis supplier Clemmons, 

but very little information concerning supplier Profitt. As 

8 Although a participant is defined as one "criminally 

responsible for the commission of the offense" u.s.s.G. § 3B1.1, 

comment. (n.1), and more than one leader or organizer of a 

criminal association may exist, id. at (n.3), we believe that 

application of § 3B1.1(a) requires some control, directly or 

indirectly, by the defendant over the five participants if the 

criminal activity is not "otherwise extensive." See u.s.s.G. 

§ 3Bl.l(a). 

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noted, Clemmons testified that he made seven to nine different 

sales of varying quantities to defendant. He knew the defendant 

only for a short period of time, having become acquainted with him 

when the defendant requested cocaine for his distribution. See 

rec. val. II at 60. Clemmons assumed that the defendant was 

reselling the cocaine. Id. at 63. Although the defendant 

presumably called Clemmons to order cocaine on more than one 

occasion, the record is silent as to any type of interdependence 

between Clemmons and the defendant which would justify an 

inference that the defendant somehow exercised control over 

Clemmons. Clemmons testified that he had sold cocaine for two 

years prior to his involvement with the defendant. The other 

supplier, Profitt, apparently worked for Clemmons and no evidence 

suggests that defendant controlled Profitt. Nor can the 

government successfully assert that the defendant organized or led 

his one-hundred customers as participants. The customers are 

completely unidentified and, without more, such a result is 

foreclosed by our recent decision in Mays. 

Absent five controlled participants, § 3Bl.1(a) may still 

apply if the criminal activity is "otherwise extensive." u.s.s.G. 

§ 3B1.1(a). The district court stressed that the defendant was 

most culpable, led an extensive criminal organization, and likely 

would not have stopped until detection or the participants' desire 

for wealth was satisfied. Rec. val. VI at 11. The application 

note indicates that "[i)n assessing whether an organization is 

'otherwise extensive,' all persons involved during the course of 

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the entire offense are to be considered." u.s.s.G. § 3Bl.l(a) 

(n.2). Thus, persons involved in the offense, other than 

controlled participants, may be considered. In illustrating what 

the term "otherwise extensive" means, the application note further 

provides "a fraud that involved only three participants but used 

the unknowing services of many outsiders could be considered 

extensive." Id. Likewise, we hold that a drug conspiracy which 

involved the defendant and three subordinates (four participants 

directly or indirectly controlled by the defendant), and relied 

upon the knowing services of at least two drug suppliers to supply 

hundreds of customers over a three-week period likewise could be 

considered extensive. Although we agree with the defendant that 

only four controlled participants were involved, we hold that this 

defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that 

was extensive under§ 3B1.1(a). 

D. 

Defendant next disputes his criminal history computation. In 

June 1986, while a juvenile, defendant was sentenced to community 

placement for his cocaine possession and distribution activities, 

not to exceed five-years. He was placed in Camp Kilpatrick for 

thirty-four weeks and was released on supervised probation in 

February 1987. The instant offense occurred in January 1989. 

Defendant does not dispute the two-level score for a "juvenile 

sentence of confinement of at least sixty days" where "the 

defendant was released from such confinement within five years of 

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his commencement of the instant offense." u.s.s.G. §§ 4Al.l(b) & 

4A1.2(d)(2)(A). Rather, he questions an additional two-points for 

committing the instant offense within two years after his release. 

Id. § 4Al.l(e). 

According to the defendant, he should have been released in 

November 1986, but stayed at Camp Kilpatrick to finish the 

basketball season as team captain. The presentence report 

indicates that when a juvenile is confined at Camp Kilpatrick, the 

juvenile and the institution develop a case plan and contract. 

Rec. supp. val. II, addendum at 3. A point system is used in 

which a juvenile may acquire points and move up his release date. 

Id. Those participating in sports tend to acquire points more 

rapidly, but as a condition of sports participation, a juvenile 

must agree to complete the sports program, even if sufficient 

points are acquired prior to the end of the season. Id. at 3-4. 

The district court determined that nothing in the guidelines 

permitted him to consider an earlier possible release. Rec. val. 

VI at 12. We resolve this point on the ground stated in the 

presentence report, namely, the defendant was required to complete 

the sports season as a condition of his participation in the 

camp--it was not a voluntary arrangement. Accordingly, defendant 

was released in February 1987 and committed the instant offense 

within two years of that time. 

The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED and the case is 

REMANDED so the district court may attach its findings concerning 

disputed matters to the presentence report. 

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