Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03137/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03137-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Respondent
Robert Michael Miller
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROBERT MICHAEL MILLER,

Petitioner

v.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-3137

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-3330-13-0504-I-1. 

______________________ 

Decided: April 8, 2016 

______________________ 

ROBERT MICHAEL MILLER, Fairfax, VA, pro se.

MARTIN M. TOMLINSON, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., 

STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, O’MALLEY, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

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2 MILLER v. FDIC

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Robert M. Miller appeals the decision of the Merit 

Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board) denying his

request for relief under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act (VEOA) resulting from his non-selection for a 

vacancy advertised by the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation (FDIC). We affirm the Board’s decision.1

BACKGROUND

Mr. Miller served on active duty from June 2003 until 

July 21, 2007. He has a Veteran’s Administration disability rating of 60 percent. Since 2008, Mr. Miller has been 

employed as an Economic Analyst in the FDIC’s Division 

of Research in San Francisco. He was hired at the GS-9 

level and has risen to the GS-12 level.

On September 7, 2012 the FDIC posted vacancy announcements for a CG-13 Financial Economist position in 

Washington, D.C. The FDIC posted two vacancy announcements, the first open to all U.S. citizens and the 

second for status candidates. Mr. Miller submitted applications under both hiring procedures. 

Mr. Miller was one of three applicants selected for an 

interview. Mr. Kupiec, the selecting official, and two 

other senior FDIC employees participated in the interviews. Each interviewer rated each candidate’s answers

to three questions on bank failure prediction models as 

Outstanding, Good, or Inadequate. On the first question, 

all three interviewers rated Mr. Miller’s response as 

“Good.” On the second question, two interviewers rated 

his answer as “Inadequate” and one interviewer rated his 

answer as “Good.” On the third question, two interviewers rated his answer as “Inadequate” and one interviewer 

1 Miller v. FDIC, No. DC-3330-13-0505-I-1, 2014 

WL 5304936 (MSPB. Apr. 17, 2014) (MSPB Op.). 

 

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MILLER v. FDIC 3

rated his answer as “Outstanding.” The other two candidates also received some “Inadequate” ratings. No candidate was selected, and the vacancy was cancelled.

Mr. Miller was notified that no one had been chosen 

for the Financial Economist position. He then filed a 

complaint with the Department of Labor, stating that the 

FDIC had cancelled the vacancy in bad faith to avoid 

hiring a veteran or having to request a “pass over” from 

the Office of Personnel Management. The Department of 

Labor denied Mr. Miller’s claim, finding no evidence to 

support the charge of violation of his veterans’ preference 

rights.

Mr. Miller appealed to the MSPB, alleging violation of 

the VEOA based on bad faith in the cancellation of the 

position. He cited Willingham v. Department of the Navy, 

118 M.S.P.R. 21 (2012), in which the Board held that “bad 

faith in deciding to cancel a vacancy may be a factor in 

determining if a cancellation affects a veteran’s right to 

compete.” Id. at 31. He also alleged reprisal and discriminatory practices.

The administrative judge (AJ) dismissed Mr. Miller’s 

appeal for lack of MSPB jurisdiction. The AJ found that 

the charge of bad faith in cancellation of the position did 

not raise a non-frivolous allegation of violation of veterans’ preference, and thus the Board lacked jurisdiction. 

The AJ also found the allegation of bad faith to be unsupported. 

The full Board found that the MSPB had jurisdiction

over the VEOA claim, but found no violation of the VEOA. 

The Board held that the allegation of non-selection for the 

Senior Financial Economist position in violation of veterans’ preference rights was sufficient to confer jurisdiction 

over a VEOA appeal. However, the Board held that Mr. 

Miller had not established a violation of his veterans’ 

preference rights.

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4 MILLER v. FDIC

Specifically, the Board found that the FDIC “conducted a thorough, structured interview of each of the candidates” and “none of the interviewees possessed the 

requisite skills and knowledge for the position.” MSPB 

Op. at *3. An agency is “not required to hire a preference 

eligible veteran, if . . . it does not believe that the candidate is qualified or possessed the necessary experience.” 

Id. (citing Abell v. Dep’t of the Navy, 343 F.3d 1378, 1384 

(Fed. Cir. 2003)).

Mr. Miller appeals. 

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s decision to ascertain whether it 

was (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 

otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without following the procedures required by law; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see 

Barrett v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 309 F.3d 781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 

2002). Factual findings of the Board are sustained unless 

they are not supported by substantial evidence. See 

Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. 

Cir. 1998).

The Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 (VPA), Pub. L. 

No. 359, ch. 287, 58 Stat. 390, established the principle of 

veterans’ preference, whereby preference eligible veterans 

receive certain advantages when seeking federal employment. The VPA is codified in scattered sections of Title 5 

of the U.S. Code. See, e.g., Lazaro v. Dep’t of Veterans 

Affairs, 666 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing 

some of the statutes and regulations enacted to provide 

veterans with their preference rights); Joseph v. FTC, 505 

F.3d 1380, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (same). The VEOA 

provides preference eligible veterans with an administrative challenge for an agency hiring decision violating a 

veteran’s rights under a statute or regulation relating to 

veterans’ preference. 5 U.S.C. § 3330a.

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MILLER v. FDIC 5

“Federal agencies generally use two types of selection 

to fill vacancies: (1) the open ‘competitive examination’ 

process and (2) the ‘merit promotion’ process.” Joseph, 

505 F.3d at 1381 (citations omitted). The competitive 

examination process is typically open to the public. 5 

C.F.R. § 332.101. The merit promotion process is used 

when the position is to be internally filled by a current 

agency employee or a “status” applicant, such as a preference eligible veteran. Id. § 335.103(b)(1). Veterans receive certain advantages under both processes, but the 

advantages differ. 

In merit promotion procedures, preference eligible 

veterans receive the ability to apply for vacancy announcements otherwise open only to current agency 

employees. Veterans “may not be denied the opportunity 

to compete for vacant positions for which the agency 

making the announcement will accept applications from 

individuals outside its own workforce under merit promotion procedures.” 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1). When applying 

under merit promotion procedures, we have held that a 

preference eligible veteran does not receive any additional 

advantage beyond the ability to apply. Joseph, 505 F.3d 

at 1383 (“All that [5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1)] entitles veterans 

to is ‘the opportunity to compete for vacant positions’ to be 

filled . . . .”). An agency may accept applications under 

both procedures and retains “the discretion to fill a vacant 

position by any authorized method.” Id. at 1384 (citations 

omitted).

Although he does not explicitly invoke 5 U.S.C. 

§ 3304(f)(1), Mr. Miller applied under merit promotion 

procedures and all of his cited authority interprets 5 

U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) (“Preference eligibles or veterans . . .

may not be denied the opportunity to compete for vacant 

positions for which the agency making the announcement 

will accept applications from individuals outside its own 

workforce under merit promotion procedures.”) (emphasis 

added).

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6 MILLER v. FDIC

On appeal, Mr. Miller argues that the Board erred by 

ruling as a matter of law that the FDIC did not violate his 

right to compete by cancelling the Financial Economist 

position. He contends that the Board abused its discretion in ruling on his VEOA petition although discovery 

was not complete. He states that he had raised plausible 

bad faith rationales for the cancellation of the position, 

and was denied the opportunity to rebut the declaration of 

Mr. Kupiec, the selecting official. He argues that the 

Board incorrectly applied the “no genuine issue of material fact” standard when evaluating the merits of his case.

Non-selection for a position is not an appealable action unless certain statutory violations are at issue, such 

as veterans’ preference or whistleblower retaliation. The 

Board may “determine whether an agency has violated a 

statutory or regulatory provision relating to veteran 

preference.” Ruffin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 89 M.S.P.R. 396 

¶¶ 12–13 (MSPB. Aug. 29, 2001). This court has explained that such violation requires a relation between 

the agency’s action and a veteran’s preference rights. 

Lazaro, 666 F.3d at 1320. When an agency acts under 

merit promotion procedures, a preference eligible veteran 

is not entitled any additional veterans’ preference. Joseph, 505 F.3d at 1383–84; see also Abell v. Dep’t of Navy, 

343 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that while

the VEOA ensures the right to compete, “the VEOA did 

not ensure that his application would be successful”).

Precedent has established that the opportunity to 

compete, as required by 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1), is satisfied 

by participation in the selection process on the same 

grounds as other candidates. Joseph, 505 F.3d at 1384 

(“The fact that he was not selected does not mean that he 

did not have a full ‘opportunity to compete’; it means only 

that, after such competition, he was not selected.”). Here, 

Mr. Miller filed his application and was one of three 

applicants interviewed. The fact that he was not hired 

does not mean that he was denied the opportunity to 

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MILLER v. FDIC 7

compete, merely that “after such competition, he was not 

selected.” Id.

The Board held that there was no evidence that the 

FDIC’s cancellation of the vacancy violated a statute or 

regulation relating to veterans’ preference, or was otherwise related to Mr. Miller’s veteran’s status or rights. 

“The VEOA does not enable veterans to be considered for 

positions for which they are not qualified.” Lazaro, 666 

F.3d at 1319. Moreover, “an agency may cancel a vacancy 

announcement for any reason that is not contrary to law.” 

Abell, 343 F.3d at 1383–84.

The record contains substantial evidence to support 

the FDIC’s position and the Board’s finding that the 

cancellation of the vacancy was predicated on a lack of 

appropriately qualified candidates. Mr. Miller states that 

his non-selection was due to a series of lawsuits he pursued against the FDIC and personal animus by supervisors within the FDIC. The Board ruled that non-selection 

due to personal animus or reprisal for lawsuits, even if 

substantiated, does not establish a violation of veteran’s 

preference rights, and did not override the agency’s right 

to cancel the vacancy announcement.

Mr. Miller argues that he should have been permitted 

to raise discrimination and retaliation as affirmative 

defenses or as evidence of bad faith on the part of the 

agency. The Board found that the asserted discrimination 

and retaliation were not related to Mr. Miller’s veteran 

status. This finding is supported, for there was no evidence of any relation between the asserted discrimination 

and retaliation and Mr. Miller’s veteran’s preference 

rights. Furthermore, nothing in the record suggests that 

additional discovery would change this result because Mr. 

Miller had the opportunity to compete and did compete, 

and the FDIC was not required to fill the position. See 

Abell, 343. F.3d at 1384. Although Mr. Miller criticizes 

the Board’s failure to strike evidence of his litigiousness 

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8 MILLER v. FDIC

and ongoing grievances, Mr. Miller did not move before 

the AJ to strike this evidence, and he has not shown that 

it would change the outcome of this case.

We discern no reversible error in the Board’s ruling 

that VEOA violation was not shown.

AFFIRMED

No costs.

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