Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05383/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05383-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
$6,976,934.65
Appellee
Soulbury Limited
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 20, 2008 Decided January 27, 2009 

No. 07-5383 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

$6,976,934.65, PLUS INTEREST DEPOSITED INTO ROYAL BANK 

OF SCOTLAND INTERNATIONAL, ACCOUNT NUMBER 

2029-56141070, HELD IN THE NAME OF SOULBURY LIMITED,

AND PROPERTY TRACEABLE THERETO, 

APPELLEE

SOULBURY LIMITED, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 03cv02540) 

Juan Chardiet argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the briefs was Daniel M. Press. 

 

Robert Stapleton, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was A. J. 

de Kluiver, Attorney. 

USCA Case #07-5383 Document #1161262 Filed: 01/27/2009 Page 1 of 19
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Before: GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: This case is an appeal of an in 

rem action brought by the United States seeking the civil 

forfeiture of $6,976,934.65 plus interest on the ground that it 

was involved in or is traceable to a scheme to launder money 

earned through an unlawful offshore Internet gambling 

enterprise. The district court invoked the fugitive 

disentitlement statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2466 (Supp. V 2005), to 

grant summary judgment to the government against a claim to 

the money filed by appellant Soulbury Limited, a British 

Virgin Islands corporation. The court determined that the 

company’s majority shareholder, William Scott, was evading 

prosecution in two criminal cases related to the civil forfeiture 

action by remaining outside the United States. Because we 

conclude there is a genuine issue of fact whether the 

disentitlement statute applies to Scott, we reverse. 

I. 

 William Scott is a former U.S. citizen currently living 

abroad. According to the government, beginning in 1997 and 

continuing through 2002, Scott and an associate named 

Jessica Davis operated a network of offshore Internet 

gambling sites from the Caribbean that catered primarily to 

U.S. residents. Hundreds of millions of dollars in bets placed 

on sporting events flowed from the United States to the 

Caribbean through these sites. 

 In March 1998, the United States filed a criminal 

complaint in the Southern District of New York charging 

Scott and Davis with conspiracy to violate the Wire Act, 18 

USCA Case #07-5383 Document #1161262 Filed: 01/27/2009 Page 2 of 19
3 

U.S.C. § 1084 (2000), by soliciting and accepting sports 

wagers from U.S. gamblers through the Internet. The court 

issued a warrant for Scott’s arrest, but he was not in the 

country. Although living abroad, Scott was aware of the 

criminal proceedings. He appeared in an episode of the 

Canadian television newsmagazine the fifth estate, broadcast 

in 2001, about the rise of Internet gambling. The report 

featured Scott’s operation of several gambling websites and 

mentioned the pending criminal charges against him. When 

the reporter interviewing him stated that there was a warrant 

out for his arrest, Scott responded, “No, . . . no . . . well you 

can call it warrant. There is a criminal complaint. Complaint. 

I have not been indicted. It’s a complaint. Which means, yes, 

if I would go to the U.S., I would probably be arrested.” the 

fifth estate: The Big Gamble (CBC television broadcast Oct. 

31, 2001). 

While Scott and Davis remained abroad, the conspiracy 

complaint grew stale, but the United States continued its 

pursuit of the two. The government contends that Scott 

funneled the proceeds of his unlawful gambling enterprise 

from Caribbean bank accounts through American bank 

accounts and into an account at the Royal Bank of Scotland 

International (RBSI) opened by Scott and held in the name of 

Soulbury. At Scott’s direction, RBSI later transferred 

$10,000,000 from the account to an investment company 

controlled by the bank, which invested the money in bonds, 

insurance funds, and mutual funds held for the benefit of 

Soulbury in the name of Rock Nominees Limited, Account 

No. A92. 

On December 15, 2003, the government filed this in rem 

action in the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia, seeking civil forfeiture of $6,976,934.65 plus 

interest. The complaint alleged that the res was subject to 

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forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) as property 

involved in or traceable to money laundering transactions. 

The district court issued a warrant for in rem arrest of the 

funds. Although the forfeitable funds were being held in the 

Rock Nominees account in the Bailiwick of Guernsey, an 

island dependency of the United Kingdom located off the 

coast of France, seizure was possible under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 981(k). That statute provides that forfeitable funds on 

deposit at a foreign financial institution that has an eligible 

interbank account in the United States “shall be deemed to 

have been deposited into the interbank account in the United 

States, and any . . . arrest warrant in rem regarding the funds 

may be served on the covered financial institution, and funds 

in the interbank account . . . may be restrained, seized, or 

arrested.” Id. On December 17, 2003, the United States served 

the arrest warrant on Harris Bank International in New York 

and seized the funds from RBSI’s interbank account with that 

institution. 

Soulbury filed a claim in this action on March 1, 2004, 

asserting an interest and right in the seized funds and 

demanding restitution from the government. As required by 

18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(B), Soulbury also filed an answer to the 

government’s complaint, denying that the funds were linked 

to any illegal activity or to Scott and asserting twelve 

affirmative defenses, including improper venue and failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On the 

government’s motion and over Soulbury’s opposition, the 

district court stayed the forfeiture action on May 28, 2004, in 

light of ongoing related grand jury investigations in the 

District of Columbia. Those investigations led to a federal 

indictment of Scott, Davis, and Soulbury on moneylaundering and other charges related to Internet gambling 

operations. The district court also issued a warrant for Scott’s 

arrest. Although the indictment and warrant issued on April 7, 

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2005, the district court kept them under seal for over a year 

based on the government’s belief that Davis might enter the 

country voluntarily. When it became apparent that Davis 

would not, the government asked the court to unseal the 

indictment and lift the stay in the civil forfeiture case. The 

court lifted the stay on March 24, 2006, and unsealed the 

indictment on May 16, 2006. 

 Soulbury then filed a motion to dismiss the forfeiture 

case, again asserting improper venue and failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. On the same day, the 

government moved to strike Soulbury’s claim and answer 

based on 28 U.S.C. § 2466, the fugitive disentitlement statute. 

The district court denied both motions but instructed the 

parties to conduct limited discovery into whether Scott owned 

or controlled Soulbury. Only then could the court determine 

whether Soulbury’s claim could be barred by the fugitive 

disentitlement statute. 

Soulbury initially refused to respond to the government’s 

discovery requests but ultimately stipulated that Scott is its 

majority shareholder. The United States then filed a motion 

for summary judgment. Soulbury opposed the motion, again 

making its arguments in favor of dismissal and also arguing 

that the fugitive disentitlement statute violates due process. 

In an opinion issued on November 8, 2007, the district 

court concluded that the requirements of § 2466 were met and 

that Soulbury could not press its claim to the seized funds. 

The court determined that applying the statute in this case was 

a proper exercise of its discretion. It rejected Soulbury’s due 

process argument, noting that Soulbury would be free to 

assert a claim to the funds if Scott submitted to the criminal 

jurisdiction of the federal courts. The court also rejected 

Soulbury’s argument that it must rule first on the affirmative 

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defenses, holding that the disentitlement statute barred 

Soulbury from asserting any challenge to the seizure. The 

court dismissed Soulbury’s claim, granted summary judgment 

in favor of the United States, and ordered that the funds be 

condemned as forfeited. 

Soulbury appeals. We review the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as 

the district court. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 

432 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

II. 

Although the fugitive disentitlement statute is relatively 

new, it codifies and extends a well-established common law 

doctrine. Fugitive disentitlement first developed as a way for 

courts to dismiss appeals in criminal cases by defendants who 

had escaped custody after filing the appeal and were evading 

the jurisdiction of the court. Dismissal was an exercise of the 

court’s inherent power “to refuse to hear a criminal case in 

error, unless the convicted party . . . is where he can be made 

to respond to any judgment [the court] may render.” Smith v. 

United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876); see also Molinaro v. 

New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970). 

Some courts extended the doctrine to civil cases, 

including civil forfeiture actions. Unlike its original 

application in which the prosecution being evaded and the 

appeal being dismissed were part of the same case, in the civil 

context courts could dismiss a claim based on the fugitive’s 

evasion of a related, but separate, criminal proceeding. See, 

e.g., United States v. $45,940, 739 F.2d 792, 798 (2d Cir. 

1984) (affirming dismissal of claim to funds forfeited under 

customs statute by Canadian citizen who refused to face 

related U.S. criminal charges); Doyle v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 

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668 F.2d 1365, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (affirming dismissal of 

FOIA request related to criminal sentence that appellant was 

evading by remaining in Panama). Other courts refused to 

extend the disentitlement doctrine beyond its original 

application. See, e.g., United States v. $40,877.59, 32 F.3d 

1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that there would be a 

“real injustice” in permitting the government to confiscate 

property “[b]y simply alleging in the complaint that the 

claimant is a fugitive and the property is related to the alleged 

crime from which he has fled”). 

 The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in Degen v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996). The Court explained that, 

as an exercise of courts’ “inherent authority to protect their 

proceedings and judgments,” id. at 823, disentitlement must 

be “a reasonable response to the problems and needs that 

provoke it,” id. at 823–24. The Court held that disentitlement 

of claims in civil forfeiture actions was a disproportionate 

response to the problem of permitting a fugitive from criminal 

justice to litigate a related civil proceeding. None of the 

government’s asserted concerns—risk of delay, inability to 

enforce the forfeiture judgment, use of civil discovery to gain 

an improper advantage in the criminal matter, preserving the 

dignity of the court, and deterring flight from criminal 

prosecution—provided sufficient justification for the 

extraordinary remedy of dismissing an otherwise valid claim. 

See id. at 828. As a court-made rule, fugitive disentitlement 

could not be applied in civil cases. The Court noted, however, 

that it “need not, and d[id] not, intimate a view on whether 

enforcement of a disentitlement rule under proper authority 

would violate due process.” Id.

 Congress seized this opening when it enacted the Civil 

Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 

106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2001). Section 14 of CAFRA created 

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the fugitive disentitlement statute, which provides, as 

amended: 

(a) A judicial officer may disallow a person from using 

the resources of the courts of the United States in 

furtherance of a claim in any related civil forfeiture 

action or a claim in third party proceedings in any related 

criminal forfeiture action upon a finding that such 

person— 

 (1) after notice or knowledge of the fact that a 

warrant or process has been issued for his apprehension, 

in order to avoid criminal prosecution— 

 (A) purposely leaves the jurisdiction of the 

United States; 

 (B) declines to enter or reenter the United States 

to submit to its jurisdiction; or 

 (C) otherwise evades the jurisdiction of the court 

in which a criminal case is pending against the person; 

and 

 (2) is not confined or held in custody in any other 

jurisdiction for commission of criminal conduct in that 

jurisdiction. 

(b) Subsection (a) may be applied to a claim filed by a 

corporation if any majority shareholder, or individual 

filing the claim on behalf of the corporation is a person to 

whom subsection (a) applies. 

28 U.S.C. § 2466. 

 Only one court of appeals thus far has reviewed a district 

court’s application of § 2466. In Collazos v. United States, 

368 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit distilled the 

statutory requirements for disentitlement into a five-element 

test: (1) a warrant or similar process has issued in a criminal 

USCA Case #07-5383 Document #1161262 Filed: 01/27/2009 Page 8 of 19
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case for the claimant’s apprehension; (2) the claimant had 

notice or knowledge of the warrant or process; (3) the 

criminal case is related to the forfeiture action; (4) the 

claimant is not confined or otherwise held in custody in 

another jurisdiction; and (5) the claimant has deliberately 

avoided criminal prosecution by leaving the United States, 

declining to enter or reenter the country, or otherwise evading 

the criminal court’s jurisdiction. See id. at 198. These five 

elements track the statutory requirements, and we adopt the 

same test. 

 Because Soulbury does not dispute that Scott is its 

majority shareholder, the district court correctly asked 

whether Scott “is a person to whom [§ 2466(a)] applies,” as 

§ 2466(b) requires. Furthermore, Soulbury admits that the 

first and fourth elements of the Collazos test are satisfied: a 

warrant has issued for Scott’s arrest and Scott is not confined 

in another jurisdiction. But Soulbury argues that the district 

court incorrectly granted summary judgment as to the other 

three elements. The question, therefore, is whether Soulbury 

raised a genuine issue of material fact as to any of those three 

elements. We address each element in turn. 

A. 

 Section 2466(a) requires not only that a warrant or 

similar process have issued, but also that the alleged fugitive 

have “notice or knowledge” of that fact. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2466(a)(1). The district court concluded that this 

requirement was satisfied because “either Mr. Scott or his 

agents had actual knowledge that he was subject to arrest in 

the United States.” United States v. $6,976,934.65, 520 F. 

Supp. 2d 188, 192 n.4 (D.D.C. 2007). 

USCA Case #07-5383 Document #1161262 Filed: 01/27/2009 Page 9 of 19
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 The district court based this conclusion in part on the fact 

that Soulbury’s attorneys, who had represented that they were 

able to convey messages to Scott, necessarily knew about 

both outstanding warrants—one issued in New York in 1998 

and one in D.C. in 2005—by virtue of their litigation of the 

civil forfeiture action. (The forfeiture complaint described 

both warrants.) The court appears to have relied on the wellestablished principle that a person is “considered to have 

‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the 

attorney.’” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 

(1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879)). But 

Soulbury’s attorneys did not represent Scott; indeed, they 

expressly disavowed representation of Scott to the 

government. Scott therefore cannot be charged with notice 

through them. 

 The district court relied heavily on the fact that Scott is 

the majority shareholder of Soulbury, explaining that it was 

therefore appropriate to “impute Soulbury’s knowledge of the 

outstanding warrants to Mr. Scott.” $6,976,934.65, 520 F. 

Supp. 2d at 192 n.4. But Scott’s status as majority shareholder 

does not necessarily make him a client of the corporation’s 

attorneys. Shareholders, even majority shareholders, are not 

ordinarily deemed the “clients” of the corporation’s lawyers. 

See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see 

also D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 1.13, cmts. 1–2 

(explaining that although an organization can act only through 

its constituents, “that does not mean . . . that constituents of an 

organizational client are the clients of the lawyer”); 

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 96 cmt. b (2000) (“By representing the organization, a 

lawyer does not thereby also form a client-lawyer relationship 

with all or any individuals . . . who have an ownership or 

other beneficial interest in it . . . .”). Although the particular 

facts of a case may suggest that attribution of a lawyer-client 

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relationship with a majority shareholder is appropriate, see

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS,

supra, § 14 cmt. f, the district court made no such factual 

finding in this case, and we see nothing in the record to 

support that conclusion. 

 Nor can Soulbury’s knowledge be imputed to Scott on 

the principle that notice to an agent is imputed to the 

principal. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 

(2006). Soulbury is not an agent of Scott unless the law of the 

British Virgin Islands, under which Soulbury is incorporated, 

so dictates. See id. § 3.05 cmt. b (corporation’s capacity to act 

as agent “is a function of the law through which the 

[corporation] has legal personality”). Neither the parties nor 

the district court has offered any reason to think that, under 

British Virgin Islands law, Soulbury is acting as an agent of 

Scott. And although Scott, as majority shareholder, may in 

some circumstances be an agent of Soulbury, “[n]otice of 

facts that a principal knows . . . is not imputed downward to 

an agent.” Id. § 5.03 cmt. g. In short, we can discern no basis 

for the district court’s imputation of Soulbury’s notice of the 

outstanding warrants to Scott. 

 The evidence of Scott’s notice or knowledge of the 

warrants includes the media coverage cited by the district 

court and Scott’s acknowledgement during his televised 

interview in 2001 that “if I would go to the U.S., I would 

probably be arrested.” the fifth estate: The Big Gamble, supra. 

The government argues that this evidence shows notice of the 

warrants based on the “totality of the circumstances.” Br. of 

Appellee at 13. Soulbury argues that such “constructive 

notice” is insufficient, and that the disentitlement statute 

requires that an alleged fugitive have “actual knowledge” that 

a warrant has issued. Br. of Appellant at 19. 

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 Soulbury is wrong that only actual knowledge will 

suffice. Section 2466(a)(1) requires “notice or knowledge,” 

and we cannot read the words “notice or” out of the statute. 

To the extent that Soulbury is arguing that “actual notice” or 

“actual knowledge” is required, we will not supply the word 

“actual” where Congress did not.1

 All the statute requires is 

knowledge of an arrest warrant’s issuance or notice—that is, 

reason to know—of that fact. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

1090 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “notice” as “knowledge of” a 

fact or “reason to know about it”). The district court therefore 

correctly explained the statutory requirement: “the claimant in 

the forfeiture case must know or have reason to know that he 

is subject to arrest in the United States.” United States v. 

$6,976,934.65, 478 F. Supp. 2d 30, 39 (D.D.C. 2007). Under 

this standard, Scott undoubtedly had sufficient notice of the 

1998 warrant. During his televised interview, Scott 

acknowledged that a criminal complaint had been filed 

against him and that he would likely be arrested if he entered 

the United States. Soulbury offered nothing to cast doubt on 

this evidence that Scott knew or had reason to know he was 

subject to arrest. 

 Scott’s 2001 statement tells us nothing, however, about 

his notice or knowledge of the 2005 warrant issued by the 

D.C. district court. The only evidence offered by the 

government to show Scott was on notice is an Antiguan 

newspaper article from 2006 citing the recently unsealed D.C. 

indictment of Scott, Davis, and Soulbury. The district court 

relied on this article as evidence that news of the criminal 

charges had reached the government of Antigua, the nation 

 

1

 This conclusion is reinforced by the existence of statutes 

demonstrating that when Congress means to require “actual notice 

or knowledge,” it makes that requirement explicit. See 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2567 (2000); 26 U.S.C. §§ 3505, 6323, 6332 (2000). 

USCA Case #07-5383 Document #1161262 Filed: 01/27/2009 Page 12 of 19
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where Scott resides. But the article does not show that this 

news had reached Scott and, by itself, it is insufficient to 

satisfy the government’s burden to show that there is no 

dispute that Scott was on notice of the 2005 warrant for his 

arrest. 

 Nonetheless, as the district court noted, § 2466 requires 

only that a fugitive “have notice that he is subject to arrest in 

the United States. He need not have notice of all warrants for 

his arrest.” $6,976,934.65, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 39 n.7. Scott’s 

notice of the 1998 warrant’s issuance satisfies the second 

element of the Collazos test.2

B.

 The third element of the Collazos test asks whether the 

civil forfeiture action is “related” to the criminal prosecution 

being evaded. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a). To determine whether 

the 1998 and 2005 prosecutions are related to this forfeiture 

action, the district court applied a standard found in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 981(g)(4). Section 981(g) permits a court to stay a civil 

forfeiture proceeding when “civil discovery will adversely 

affect . . . the prosecution of a related criminal case.” Id.

§ 981(g)(1). The statute defines the term “related criminal 

case” for the purpose of deciding whether a stay is necessary. 

It instructs a court making that decision to “consider the 

degree of similarity between the parties, witnesses, facts, and 

circumstances involved in the two proceedings.” Id.

 

2

 As discussed in Part II.C, infra, Scott may no longer be subject to 

prosecution on the 1998 criminal complaint because the statute of 

limitations has run, and there is a genuine question whether that 

statute is tolled. But the statute of limitations does not apply to the 

warrant, and we have no other reason to think the warrant is no 

longer valid. Because Scott has notice of an outstanding warrant for 

his arrest, this element of § 2466 is satisfied. 

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§ 981(g)(4). Applying this standard, the district court 

concluded that both the 1998 and 2005 prosecutions were 

“related” to the civil forfeiture action. 

 Neither the district court nor the parties considered that 

this standard may not apply to the disentitlement statute. But 

subsection (g)(4) states that its definition applies only “[i]n 

this subsection.” Id. It does not offer a generally applicable 

definition of “relation” between criminal and civil forfeiture 

cases. Moreover, the elements of § 981(g)(4)’s definition—

similarity of parties, witnesses, facts, and circumstances—are 

tailored to suit the specific discovery concerns addressed by 

that provision. Although the effect of civil discovery on a 

related criminal prosecution is a concern that informs fugitive 

disentitlement, see Degen, 517 U.S. at 826, the statute 

addresses other concerns as well. 

 We think a better standard to govern the “related” 

element of § 2466 is found in the statute that provides for civil 

forfeiture of property related to a criminal prosecution. That 

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1), specifies the circumstances in 

which the government may bring a civil forfeiture action to 

recover property related to a crime. The natural reading of 

“related” in the fugitive disentitlement statute is that the civil 

forfeiture action must be one in which the government is 

proceeding under § 981(a)(1) to recover property “involved 

in,” “derived from,” “traceable to,” “obtained []by,” or “used 

to facilitate” a crime for which the defendant is evading 

prosecution. Id. In other words, the question is whether the 

facts that underlie the prosecution being evaded also form the 

basis for the forfeiture action. 

 Applying that test, both the 1998 and 2005 prosecutions 

of Scott are unquestionably “related” to this forfeiture action. 

The 1998 criminal complaint charged Scott with conspiracy to 

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violate the Wire Act by “us[ing] a wire communication 

facility for the transmission in interstate and foreign 

commerce of bets and wagers on sporting events and contests, 

and for the transmission of a wire communication which 

entitled the recipient to receive money and credit as a result of 

bets and wagers.” J.A. at 119. The charge was based on 

Scott’s operation of an Internet sports betting service called 

World Wide Tele-Sports from 1997 to 1998. The 2005 

indictment included the same charge against Scott and the 

other defendants, and also charged them with international 

money laundering. The civil forfeiture complaint, brought 

pursuant to § 981(a)(1)(A), is based on, inter alia, charges of 

international money laundering with intent to promote a 

specified unlawful activity. The “specified unlawful activity” 

being promoted is the Wire Act violation alleged in the 1998 

criminal complaint. 

Soulbury has not raised a genuine issue of material fact 

as to the relation between the two criminal prosecutions and 

this civil forfeiture case. Thus, although the district court 

applied the wrong standard in making its determination, it 

correctly granted summary judgment as to this element of the 

Collazos test. See Washburn v. Lavoie, 437 F.3d 84, 89 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006) (noting that “an appellate court may affirm a grant 

of summary judgment on a ground not relied upon by the 

lower court”). 

C. 

 The fifth and final question under the Collazos test is 

whether Scott remains outside the United States “in order to 

avoid criminal prosecution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1). The 

disentitlement statute sets out three specific ways in which 

this inquiry can be satisfied: if the claimant “purposely leaves 

the jurisdiction of the United States”; “declines to enter or 

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reenter the United States to submit to its jurisdiction”; or 

“otherwise evades the jurisdiction of the court in which a 

criminal case is pending against the person.” Id.

§ 2466(a)(1)(A)–(C). The district court determined that 

Scott’s “constructive flight”—that is, his failure to reenter the 

United States to face the pending criminal charges—brought 

him within the second prong of this element. Alternatively, 

the court found the third prong satisfied because Scott has 

“otherwise evaded” the criminal jurisdiction of the United 

States by renouncing his U.S. citizenship and adopting 

Antiguan citizenship in what the court speculated was an 

attempt to avoid extradition. 

 As Soulbury argues, however, the district court erred in 

concluding that the statute does not require the government to 

show “that avoiding prosecution is the reason Scott has failed 

to enter the United States and has otherwise evaded its 

jurisdiction,” $6,976,934.65, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 41. The plain 

language of § 2466 mandates this showing by requiring that, 

under any of the three ways in which the government can 

prove evasion of jurisdiction, that evasion must have been “in 

order to avoid criminal prosecution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1) 

(emphasis added). Thus, under the second prong, mere notice 

or knowledge of an outstanding warrant, coupled with a 

refusal to enter the United States, does not satisfy the statute.3

The alleged fugitive must have “declined to enter or reenter” 

the country in order to avoid prosecution. Id. § 2466(a)(1)(B). 

Likewise, under the third prong, Scott’s renunciation of his 

U.S. citizenship is insufficient without some evidence that he 

took this action to avoid extradition. 

 

3

 Although it did not directly address the question, the Second 

Circuit appears to have reached this conclusion as well, noting that 

disentitlement is proper for fugitives who “learned that their arrests 

were sought and who then refused to return to the United States in 

order to avoid prosecution.” Collazos, 368 F.3d at 199. 

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 Soulbury alleges, and the government does not dispute, 

that Scott voluntarily left the United States in 1992, long 

before either the 1998 or the 2005 criminal prosecution. The 

government has not satisfied its burden on summary judgment 

to show that Scott remains outside the United States in order 

to avoid the pending criminal charges. The only evidence that 

speaks to Scott’s intent is the video of his 2001 appearance on 

the fifth estate. In that video, Scott acknowledges the pending 

criminal complaint and that he would likely be arrested if he 

returned to the United States. But as Soulbury points out, the 

video also suggests that Scott did not wish to reenter the 

United States regardless of any pending criminal charges. 

Scott told the reporter interviewing him: “I don’t mind not 

going back to the States. There are a few of us that are . . . that 

are under the same restrictions that would like to go back to 

the States. Myself, that’s fine.” the fifth estate: The Big 

Gamble, supra. The district court made no finding as to what, 

if anything, this comment reveals about Scott’s reasons for 

remaining outside the United States. But a court considering 

summary judgment must draw “all reasonable evidentiary 

inferences” in favor of the nonmoving party. Toney v. 

Bergland, 645 F.2d 1063, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Under this 

standard, Scott’s statement is sufficient to raise a genuine 

issue of fact whether he declined to reenter the country in 

order to avoid criminal prosecution under the 1998 or 2005 

charges. 

This is particularly so with regard to the 1998 charges, 

because it is not clear that Scott could still be indicted based 

on the complaint filed in the Southern District of New York. 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), “no person shall be 

prosecuted . . . for any [noncapital] offense . . . unless the 

indictment is found or the information is instituted within five 

years next [sic] after such offense shall have been 

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18 

committed.” The complaint charged Scott with criminal 

conduct continuing through March 18, 1998. No indictment 

issued on the complaint by March 18, 2003, nor has any 

indictment issued since. Despite the five-year statute of 

limitations, Scott might still be subject to prosecution on the 

1998 charges. Another statute provides that “[n]o statute of 

limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from justice.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3290. But Second Circuit law, which applies to the 

complaint, requires a showing of intent to prove flight from 

justice under § 3290. See Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 486 F.2d 442, 

444 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that “the government must show 

an intent to flee from prosecution or arrest before the statute 

of limitations is tolled”). Scott’s 2001 statements to the fifth 

estate reporter are the only evidence of his intent, and there is 

a genuine dispute as to the conclusions to be drawn from 

them. 

Moreover, as discussed in Part II.A, supra, the 

government has not yet shown that Scott had notice of the 

2005 warrant. Without notice of that warrant or the attendant 

criminal proceedings, it is difficult to say that Scott’s purpose 

for remaining outside the country was to avoid criminal 

prosecution in the D.C. court. 

In light of the factual dispute regarding Scott’s intent to 

avoid criminal prosecution, the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment on the applicability of the fugitive 

disentitlement statute to Soulbury through Scott. 

III. 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. 

Under the correct interpretation of the fugitive disentitlement 

statute, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Scott 

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is a person to whom the statute applies and therefore whether 

Soulbury’s claim can be dismissed under the statute. Because 

we reverse on this ground, we need not consider Soulbury’s 

alternative arguments that the district court should have 

considered its affirmative defenses of improper venue and 

failure to state a claim before dismissing on disentitlement 

grounds, or that the application of the disentitlement statute to 

Soulbury violates due process.4

 We remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered.

 

4

 Nor need we address the challenge to the statute’s 

constitutionality under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 

Amendment, which Soulbury waived by failing to raise it in its 

opening brief. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wash. v. EPA, 86 F.3d 

1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that “issues not raised until 

the reply brief are waived”). 

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