Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00899/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00899-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arthur T. Bussiere
Plaintiff
Stu Sherman
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR T. BUSSIERE,

Plaintiff,

v.

STU SHERMAN,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00899-DAD-JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(Doc. 1) 

30 DAY DEADLINE

In this action, Plaintiff alleges that, because of his medical condition, he is illegally 

housed at the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in Corcoran, California and should be 

transferred to either R.J. Donovan State Prison, or Mule Creek State Prison.1 Because his 

allegations lack specificity to state a cognizable claim, the Complaint is DISMISSED with leave 

to amend. 

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

 

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed a notice of change of address indicating that he is now residing at Mule 

Creek State Prison. (See Doc. 6.)

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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If an action is dismissed on one of these three basis, a strike is imposed 

per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed 

as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and has 

not alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed in forma 

pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015).

B. Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint

Plaintiff complains that he “was made Cocci 1” and, per policy, CDCR has 60 days to 

transfer him to RJ Donovan due to his “high risk medical” and permanent need for a wheelchair, 

but because of his wheelchair he was not transferred. Plaintiff alleges that, SATF (where he 

currently is housed) is not a “high risk prison” and that he has been endorsed to Mule Creek Level 

II high risk medical yard, but he has not been transferred there either because of being wheelchair 

bound. Plaintiff alleges that the only defendant, Warden Stu Sherman, denied his transfer, in 

violation of CDCR’s policy and his constitutional rights. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and 

transfer to RJ Donovan or Mule Creek -- both of which are able to care for inmates with high risk 

medical conditions. 

Plaintiff has not stated any cognizable claims, but may be able to correct the deficiencies 

in his pleading so as to state a cognizable claim. Thus, he is being given the pleading 

requirements, the standards for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eight 

Amendment, and leave to file a first amended complaint. 

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit 

Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and

“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

If he chooses to file a first amended complaint, Plaintiff should endeavor to make it as 

concise as possible. He should merely state which of his constitutional rights he feels were 

violated by each Defendant and its factual basis. 

2. Linkage Requirement

Under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. ' 1983), the plaintiff must demonstrate an actual 

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been 

suffered. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 

U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation 

of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, 

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participates in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 

(9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each 

named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 

Plaintiff=s federal rights. 

Plaintiff must clearly state which Defendant(s) he feels are responsible for each violation 

of his constitutional rights and their factual basis as his complaint must put each Defendant on 

notice of Plaintiff=s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th 

Cir. 2004).

3. Exhibits

Plaintiff's Complaint is comprised of 3 pages of factual allegations followed by 21 pages 

of exhibits. 

The Court is not a repository for the parties' evidence. Originals, or copies of evidence 

(i.e., prison or medical records, witness affidavits, etc.) need not be submitted until the course of 

litigation brings the evidence into question (for example, on a motion for summary judgment, at 

trial, or when requested by the Court). If Plaintiff attaches exhibits to his amended complaint, 

each exhibit must be specifically referenced. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(c). For example, Plaintiff must 

state "see Exhibit A" or something similar in order to direct the Court to the specific exhibit 

Plaintiff is referencing. Further, if the exhibit consists of more than one page, Plaintiff must 

reference the specific page of the exhibit (i.e. "See Exhibit A, page 3"). 

At this point, the submission of evidence is premature as Plaintiff is only required to state 

a prima facie claim for relief. Plaintiff is reminded that, for screening purposes, the Court must 

assume that Plaintiff’s factual allegations are true. It is unnecessary for a plaintiff to submit 

exhibits in support of the allegations in a complaint. Thus, if Plaintiff chooses to file a first 

amended complaint, he would do well to simply state the facts upon which he alleges a Defendant 

has violated his constitutional rights and refrain from submitting exhibits. 

///

///

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D. Claims for Relief

1. Eighth Amendment -- Medical Care

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must 

first Ashow a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner=s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, 

the plaintiff must show the defendants= response to the need was deliberately indifferent.@ 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)). 

The existence of a condition or injury that a reasonable doctor would find important and 

worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual=s daily activities, and the existence of chronic or substantial pain are indications of a 

serious medical need. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McGuckin v. 

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. 

v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)) (quotation marks omitted); Doty v. 

County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff provides no explanation what he 

means by his allegation that he “was made Cocci I.” It may be that Plaintiff intended to allege 

that he was diagnosed with a certain stage of Valley Fever, but this is not at all clear from his 

pleading. 

Deliberate indifference is Aa state of mind more blameworthy than negligence@ and 

Arequires >more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner=s interests or safety.=@ Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 835 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). ADeliberate indifference is a high legal standard.@ 

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004). AUnder this standard, the prison official 

must not only >be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists,= but that person >must also draw the inference.=@ Id. at 1057 (quoting 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A>If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, 

then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.=@ Id.

(quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Plaintiff has failed to allege any allegations to specifically show that any prison personnel 

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was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition. This is insufficient to state a 

cognizable Eighth Amendment violation. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). 

2. Inmate Appeals

It appears that Plaintiff’s only complaint against Warden Sherman is that he denied an 

inmate appeal Plaintiff filed requesting to be transferred. 

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due 

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action 

for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for 

which the protection is sought. "States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests 

which are protected by the Due Process Clause." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). 

Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint which 

"imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

"[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any 

substantive right upon the inmates." Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing 

Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 

850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a 

specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of 

grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 

(9th Cir. 1988). "Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the 

procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment." Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. 

Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 

Actions in reviewing prisoner's administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability 

under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. The argument that anyone who knows about a 

violation of the Constitution, and fails to cure it, has violated the Constitution himself is not 

correct. "Only persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against 

a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation. A guard 

who stands and watches while another guard beats a prisoner violates the Constitution; a guard 

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who rejects an administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not." George 

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) citing Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th 

Cir.2005); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 851-52 (7th Cir.1999); Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 

992-93 (7th Cir.1996). Thus, since he has neither a liberty interest, nor a substantive right in 

inmate appeals, Plaintiff fails, and is unable to prove the elements of a constitutional violation 

purely for the processing and/or reviewing of his inmate appeals. 

However, Plaintiff may be able to prove the elements for a claim under the Eighth 

Amendment for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs against those medical 

personnel who were involved in reviewing his inmate appeals. If Plaintiff meets his burden of 

proof as to the elements of a claim against a defendant for deliberate indifference to his serious 

medical needs, he will likely also be able to meet his burden of proof as to the elements of a claim 

against defendants with medical training if they reviewed and ruled against Plaintiff in his 

medical grievances/appeals on that same issue. However, Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that 

Warden Sherman has any medical training and/or basis upon which he should have granted 

Plaintiff’s inmate appeal and approved his transfer to another facility. 

3. Supervisory Liability

It appears that Plaintiff may have named Warden Sherman not because he was involved in 

his medical care, but merely because he holds a supervisorial position.

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their 

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be 

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief 

under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that 

would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 

promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 

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885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for 

the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In 

a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the 

term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's 

misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; each government official is only liable for his or 

her own misconduct. Id. 

A>[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a Aformulaic recitation of the

elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of ruling on a motion to 

dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch 

allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather 

because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the 

form of a factual allegation.@ Id. Thus, any allegation that supervisory personnel such as Warden 

Sherman is somehow liable because of the acts of those under his or her supervision does not 

state a cognizable claim. 

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with leave to file a first

amended complaint within thirty days. However, the Court notes that Plaintiff has filed a change 

of address indicating that he is now housed at Mule Creek State Prison. (See Doc. 7.) Thus, if 

Plaintiff no longer desires to pursue this action, he may file a notice of voluntary dismissal. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in any first amended complaint how the conditions complained 

of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The first amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named 

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some 

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Plaintiff's first amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and 

plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. 

The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies identified 

by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff 

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his first amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints).

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a first

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order or 

a notice of voluntary dismissal.

If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to obey a 

court order and for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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