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Parties Involved:
Keith Wayne Dennis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL -. .J 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United St~h~~~ Appealr 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

KEITH WAYNE DENNIS, 

Defendant-Appellant 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

MAY 10 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-6339 

(D.C. No. CR-92-005-W) 

(W. D. Okla. ) 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.** 

Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for 

distribution of cocaine base. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Defendant 

claims (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conviction; and (2) the sentencing court erred in applying a 

two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon during 

the conunission of the offense, U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b) (1) (Nov. 1992). 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 

From August 1991 to December 1991, the Drug Enforcement 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument . 

Appellate Case: 92-6339 Document: 010110114099 Date Filed: 05/10/1993 Page: 1 
Administration ("DEA") conducted an ongoing investigation of the 

drug distribution organization of Leson Reed and his associates, 

including Defendant, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. During the 

course of the investigation, a confidential informant, Williams, 

and an undercover police officer, Detective Bostic, purchased 

cocaine base from Reed and his associates on several occasions. 

On October 10, 1991, Williams, at the direction of DEA 

agents, telephoned Reed and arranged for the purchase of four 

ounces of cocaine base at the Strictly Neat Body Shop ("the Body 

Shop"), which the DEA had placed under video surveillance. When 

Williams and Detective Bostic arrived at the Body Shop, Reed 

indicated to them that his "home boy was on the way with the 

dope." Tr. at 14. After a short period of time, Reed pointed to 

an approaching Chevrolet Caprice and stated, "[h]ere he comes 

now." Id. Williams, who testified that he had previously seen 

the driver of the Caprice on numerous occasions, identified the 

driver as "Ki-Ki. 111 

To carry out the cocaine base transaction, Williams and 

Detective Bostic placed $4,000 on a shelf in the garage area of 

the Body Shop. Defendant approached the garage area, reached 

under his shirt, and removed a plastic bag containing 

approximately four ounces of cocaine base from his pants. 

Defendant laid the cocaine base on the shelf next to the money, 

and assisted another associate in counting the money. Shortly 

thereafter, the transaction was complete, and Williams and 

1 Defendant was subsequently identified as Ki-Ki. 

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Appellate Case: 92-6339 Document: 010110114099 Date Filed: 05/10/1993 Page: 2 
Detective Bostic left the Body Shop. 

Within one or two days of the transaction at the Body Shop, 

Detective Bostic went through investigation photographs and 

identified Ki-Ki. In February 1992, the DEA discovered that 

Defendant was Ki-Ki, and charges were filed against him. 

Defendant was arrested in California on May 12, 1992, and trial 

was held on September 28, 1992. 

At Defendant's trial, Williams and Detective Bostic testified 

and positively identified Defendant as the driver of the Chevrolet 

Caprice who delivered four ounces of cocaine base during the 

October 10, 1991 Body Shop transaction. In addition, the jury 

viewed the video tape of the drug transaction. The jury convicted 

Defendant of distribution of approximately 103.7 grams of cocaine 

base. On the following day, Defendant was sentenced to 240 months 

imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release. 

Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to 

support his conviction. Defendant argues that there was 

insufficient evidence to prove that he was the one who delivered 

the cocaine base on October 10, 1991. 

When considering a sufficiency claim, "[t]he evidence--both 

direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences 

to be drawn therefrom--is sufficient if, when taken in the light 

most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. 

Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 887 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted), 

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 437 (1992). Our review does not include 

determinations of credibility of witnesses and weight of testimony 

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Appellate Case: 92-6339 Document: 010110114099 Date Filed: 05/10/1993 Page: 3 
as this is the jury's function as trier of fact. United States v. 

Levario, 877 F.2d 1483, 1485 {10th Cir. 1989). 

In support of his evidence insufficiency claim, Defendant 

relies on numerous facts involving the circumstances of the 

cocaine transaction, the possible state of mind of Detective 

Bostic at the time of the transactions, as well as the fact that 

Defendant was not charged with the crime until more than four 

months after the transaction. All of these factors, however, go 

to the credibility of the eyewitnesses and the weight of their 

testimony. Both Williams and Detective Bostic were subjected to 

cross-examination directed at weakening their identification of 

Defendant. They both continuously reasserted their certainty that 

Defendant was the one who delivered the cocaine base to the Body 

Shop. Further, although the video tape could have been clearer, 

Detective Bostic identified Defendant in the tape. In addition, 

although Williams only knew Defendant as Ki-Ki, he had seen him on 

numerous occasions prior to the date of the transaction. 

Moreover, the delay in charging Defendant was only due to the fact 

that it took the DEA some time to link Defendant's legal name to 

his physical description, photograph, and nickname. Finally, 

Defendant presented no evidence that conflicted with the 

eyewitnesses' identifications. Viewed in the light most favorable 

to the government, we conclude that a reasonable jury could credit 

Williams' and Detective Bostic's testimony and find Defendant 

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J 

2 guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See~, United States v. 

McNeal, 865 F.2d 1173, 1174 (10th Cir. 1989) (positive 

identification by three eyewitnesses, in face of alibi evidence, 

is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction); United States v. 

Terry, 760 F.2d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 1985) (positive eyewitness 

identifications, in absence of conflicting testimony, is 

sufficient evidence to sustain convictions). 

Defendant also claims that the court erred in applying a 

two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon during 

the commission of the offense, U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b) (1) (Nov. 1992). 

In response to Defendant's objection at the sentencing hearing to 

the presentence report, the court replied that it had already 

determined in a related trial that guns were present. Based on 

this statement alone the court overruled Defendant's objection. 

For§ 2Dl.l(b) (1) to apply, the government must prove 

possession of a weapon by a preponderance of the evidence. United 

States v. Underwood, 938 F.2d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1991). We 

review the court's determination for clear error, and must reverse 

the district court if the court's finding is without factual 

support in the record. Id. "[W]e must be able to tie the court's 

sentencing decisions to a factual basis in the record to be 

assured that basis meets the proper legal standard underpinning 

the enhancement provision." United States v. Slater, 971 F.2d 

2 We find Defendant's reliance on United States v. Doe, 664 

F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1981) unpersuasive. In Doe, the undercover 

detective's identification of the defendant was severely clouded 

by an overwhelming amount of conflicting testimony. Id. at 549-50. 

Such is not the case here. 

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Appellate Case: 92-6339 Document: 010110114099 Date Filed: 05/10/1993 Page: 5 
~ 

I 

626, 633-34 (10th Cir. 1992). 

Although the district court, in making factual findings, can 

use reliable evidence from a codefendant's trial, United States v. 

Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 

1038 (1990), the related transcript of that trial, at a minimum, 

must be admitted in Defendant's proceeding so that Defendant has 

notice and an opportunity to rebut or explain the evidence used 

against him. See id. The court failed to do so; therefore, the 

court's determination that a§ 2Dl.1(1) (b) enhancement was 

applicable is without factual support in the record. No evidence 

was introduced during Defendant's trial or sentencing hearing that 

Defendant possessed a weapon during the transaction or that a 

codefendant's possession of a weapon was reasonably foreseeable to 

Defendant. As this is the proper legal standard for weapons 

enhancement, see United States v. McFarlane, 933 F.2d 898, 899 

(10th Cir. 1991), and Defendant properly objected, the government 

must introduce evidence on remand from which the court can make 

the factual findings necessary to conclude that, under this 

standard, the enhancement is appropriate. 

Defendant's conviction is AFFIRMED. Defendant's sentence is 

REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for resentencing. 

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Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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