Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03045/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03045-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Ray Hicks
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

United States Court or Appeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

BRIAN L. MILLER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MICHAEL RAY HICKS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH cmcurr 

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MAY 20 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95-3039 

No. 95-3045 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-10058) 

No. 95-3039 submitted on the briefs. 

Randall K Rathbun, United States Attorney, and D. Blair Watson, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee in No. 95-3039. 

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, and Jenine Jensen, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant in No. 95-3039. 

D. Blair Watson (Randall K Rathbun, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Assistant 

United States Attorney, Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff: Appellee in No. 95-3045. 

Appellate Case: 95-3045 Document: 01019277513 Date Filed: 05/20/1996 Page: 1 
Timothy J. Henry (David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Assistant Public 

Defender, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant in No. 95-3045. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Circuit Judge, and BRORBY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

A jury convicted defendants Brian Lee Miller and Michael Ray Hicks of one count of 

possession with intent to distnoute methamphetamine (18 U.S. C.§ 2 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(aX1)); one 

count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana (18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)); 

and one count of using or carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. 

§ 924( c)( 1) ). The jury also convicted Mr. Miller of one count of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm (18 U.S. C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2)) and convicted Mr. Hicks of one count of interstate 

transportation of a stolen vehicle (18 U.S. C. § 2313). Mr. Miller and Mr. Hicks now challenge their 

convictions, and Mr. Hicks also challenges his sentence. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 18 

U.S. C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and vacate Mr. Miller's convictions for using or carrying a 

firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S. C. § 924(c)(1)) and being a felon in possession 

of a firearm (18 U.S. C. §§ 922(g) and 924(aX2)), and remand his case for resentencing in light of our 

decision to vacate these convictions. In addition, we reverse Mr. Hicks's conviction for using or 

carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, vacate his sentence for that offense, and 

remand for a new trial. We affirm in all other respects. 

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I 

On March 8, 1994, Mr. Hicks was driving a 1991 Ford Aerostar east on U.S. Highway 54 

in Clark County, Kansas, with Mr. Miller in the front passenger seat beside him The van had 

Missouri license plates. At 3:11p.m, Kansas Highway Patrol Officer Tom Kennedy determined, by 

using radar, that Mr. Hicks was going 66 miles-per-hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone. Trooper 

Kennedy turned on his lights and stopped the van for speeding. While Trooper Kennedy was pulling 

the van over, he noticed Mr. Hicks and Mr. Miller ''both started talking back and forth to each other" 

and had "wonied look[s]." After they reached the side of the road, Trooper Kennedy walked to the 

driver side of the van, told Mr. Hicks he had stopped him for speeding and asked him for a driver's 

license, registration, and proof of insurance. Mr. Hicks said he had proof of insurance and 

registration, and looked through his wallet and then the glove compartment, but was unable to 

produce either. Mr. Hicks did, however, produce a valid Kansas driver's license. Trooper Kennedy 

asked Mr. Hicks who he bought the van from, but Mr. Hicks did not give the person's name. Given 

the combination of the Missouri license plates, the Kansas driver's license, and Mr. Hicks's statement 

he had bought the car in California, Trooper Kennedy concluded "probably maybe [Mr. Hicks] stole 

the vehicle." 

Between three and five minutes after he stopped the van, Trooper Kennedy asked Mr. Hicks 

to step out and walk back to the patrol car. Trooper Kennedy then put Mr. Hicks in the back seat 

of the patrol car and again asked him where his registration and insurance documents were. Mr. 

Hicks again looked in his wallet and said he could not find them Mr. Hicks appeared nervous while 

he was in the patrol car. When Trooper Kennedy asked Mr. Hicks who owned the van, Mr. Hicks 

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told him he had just bought it, but that the license plates actually belonged to a 197 6 Dodge pickup 

truck he owned, and that he planned to register the van when he reached his destination in Kansas. 

When Trooper Kennedy asked Mr. Hicks where he was going, Mr. Hicks said he was traveling from 

Oxnard, California, to lola, Kansas, to see his ex-wife, bring a present to his daughter, and help Mr. 

Miller find a job. He also asked Mr. Hicks how long he had known Mr. Miller, and Mr. Hicks said 

"a long time," and that they had gone to school together. While Mr. Hicks was in the patrol car, 

Trooper Kennedy checked his license plates and driver's license with the dispatcher. The license 

plates were current. The registration check on the license plates came back "no record on file," so 

Trooper Kennedy went back to the van to check the vehicle identification number (VIN). 

When Trooper Kennedy returned to the van, he copied the VIN from the driver side 

dootjamb. The VIN was also on the dashboard, but it was not visible through the windshield because 

there was a magazine covering it. Trooper Kennedy did not return immediately to his patrol car to 

check the VIN, but instead put his hands on the driver seat, leaned into the van, and asked Mr. Miller, 

who was still in the passenger seat, where he and Mr. Hicks were going. Mr. Miller told Trooper 

Kennedy he was traveling from Ventura, California, which is near Oxnard, California. Trooper 

Kennedy later testified he questioned Mr. Miller because Mr. Hicks seemed "nervous." 

One or two minutes later, at 3:23p.m, while he was still leaning into the van and talking to 

Mr. Miller, Trooper Kennedy looked into the ashtray in the center of the dashboard and found a 

wooden pipe. He recognized it as a drug pipe. Trooper Kennedy did not have to move anything in 

order to see the pipe. He then returned to his patrol car and asked Mr. Hicks if it was his pipe. Mr. 

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Hicks admitted it was. Trooper Kennedy placed Mr. Hicks and Mr. Miller under arrest for possession 

of drug paraphernalia in violation of Kansas law and called for backup. Trooper Kennedy also called 

the VIN into the dispatcher, but it is unclear whether he did so before or after he arrested Mr. Hicks 

and Mr. Miller. After his backup anived, Trooper Kennedy learned from the dispatcher that the van 

was stolen. Mr. Miller, Mr. Hicks, and the van were then taken into custody and brought to the 

sherift's station. Trooper Kennedy later performed an inventory search of the van. Among other 

things, he discovered marijuana, methamphetamine, a glass drug pipe, a loaded Smith & Wesson ninemillimeter semi-automatic handgun, a loaded Multon .380 automatic handgun, zip-lock baggies, and 

a scale. 

Mr. Hicks moved to suppress the evidence Trooper Kennedy found in the van, but the district 

court denied his motion on the grounds that Mr. Hicks lacked standing to object to the search of the 

van because he did not have lawful possession of it, and that the length of his detention in the back 

of the patrol car was reasonable. After a two-day trial, a jury convicted Mr. Hicks and Mr. Miller 

on all counts, except that it found Mr. Miller not guilty of interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle. 

The district court sentenced both Mr. Hicks and Mr. Miller to sixty months imprisonment for their 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l), to run consecutively with their sentences for the remaining 

offenses, yielding an aggregate term of imprisonment of248 months for Mr. Hicks and 322 months 

for Mr. Miller. This appeal followed. 

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IT. Guilt Issues 

A. Suppression of Evidence 

Prior to trial, both Mr. Hicks and Mr. Miller moved to suppress the evidence found in the van 

on the grounds that both the search and the duration of the detention were unreasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment. Mr. Miller later withdrew his motion, but Mr. Hicks did not. The district court 

held a hearing and denied Mr. Hicks's motion on several grounds in a written order. Mr. Hicks now 

challenges that decision. He first contends the district court erred when it concluded he lacked 

standing to challenge the search of the van on Fourth Amendment grounds. "On appeal from the 

denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's 

ruling, and will uphold the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous." United 

States v. Marchant, 55 F.3d 509, 512 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 260 (1995). "The 

questions of standing and the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment are questions 

oflaw subject to de novo review." United States v. Betancur, 24 F.3d 73, 76 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

The issue of standing is "'invariably intertwined' with substantive Fourth Amendment analysis." 

Betancur, 24 F.3d at 76. In deciding whether a defendant has standing, "the inquiry focuses on 

whether there has been a violation ofthe Fourth Amendment rights ofthe particular defendant who 

is seeking to exclude the evidence." ld To show that a particular search violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights, the defendant must prove he "has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy 

in the area searched and [that] that expectation is one society would recognize as objectively 

reasonable." Id; see also Marchant, 55 F.3d at 512-13; United States v. Benitez-Arreguin, 973 F.2d 

823, 827 (lOth Cir. 1992). The mere fact an individual has physical possession of a vehicle does not 

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necessarily give that person a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. United States v. Arango, 912 

F.2d 441, 444 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 924 (1991). Rather, he has no reasonable 

expectation of privacy unless he proves he had lawful ownership or possession of the vehicle at the 

time of the search. Betancur, 24 F.3d at 76-77; Arango, 912 F.2d at 445-446; United States v. 

Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

It is undisputed that the van was stolen from an automobile dealership in Oxnard, California, 

approximately three months before Trooper Kennedy stopped Mr. Hicks in Kansas. Mr. Hicks 

nevertheless contends the district court erred when it found he was not in "lawful possession" of the 

van. According to Mr. Hicks, the district court should have relied on his testimony that he did not 

steal the van, that he did not know the van was stolen until after his arrest, and· that he purchased it 

for $1,600 from one Richard Holiday in Oxnard, California, a few days before Trooper Kennedy 

stopped him. We disagree. Mr. Hicks did not produce any documentary proof of ownership or 

lawful possession, nor did he support his position by introducing testimony from Mr. Holiday or any 

other witness. The only evidence he introduced in support of his position was his own testimony 

during the suppression hearing. The district court was free to weigh Mr. Hicks's testimony together 

with the other evidence introduced at the suppression hearing in reaching its decision. It was also free 

to evaluate Mr. Hicks's credibility and to disregard his testimony if it found his credibility to be 

lacking. That is precisely what the district court did in this case. It specifically found Mr. Hicks's 

"explanation regarding his acquisition of the van was not credible." 

In light of the evidence introduced during the suppression hearing, the district court's 

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credibility determination was by no means clear error. See United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 

1409 (lOth Cir. 1992) (credibility determination at suppression hearing reviewed for clear error). 

Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed in a comparable context that when a case rests entirely on 

oral testimony, the district court's credibility determinations, "if not internally inconsistent, can 

virtually never be clear error." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). As 

noted above, Mr. Hicks admits the van was stolen from an automobile dealership in Oxnard, 

California, approximately three months before Trooper Kennedy stopped him in Kansas. Despite 

Trooper Kennedy's request, Mr. Hicks was unable to produce proof of registration. Mr. Hicks was 

also unable to produce the individual from whom he supposedly purchased the van. In light of this 

evidence, we find no fault with the district court's ultimate finding Mr. Hicks was not in lawful 

possession of the van and that he lacked standing to object to the search. 

Next, Mr. Hicks concedes Trooper Kennedy acted reasonably when he stopped the van for 

speeding, but contends "[t]he extended detention and search went well beyond the scope of the initial 

stop of the van, and was not supported by the evidence." According to Mr. Hicks, at the time 

Trooper Kennedy instructed him to walk back to his patrol car, "[n]o reasonable or articulable 

suspicion existed ... to suspect any illegal activity, and [Trooper] Kennedy was only entitled to limit 

his detention to determine whether Hicks was the true owner of the van, or lawfully in possession of 

it" by going to the van, copying the VIN, returning to his patrol car, and radioing this dispatcher to 

determine who owned the van. Therefore, Mr. Hicks contends, any evidence Trooper Kennedy 

obtained after he exceeded the lawful purpose of the detention was fruit of the poisonous tree and 

should have been suppressed. 

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Ahhough Mr. Hicks lacks standing to object to the search of the van, he has standing to object 

to his detention. Betancur, 24 F. 3d at 77; Arango, 912 F.2d at 446. If a detention was illegal, 

evidence obtained as a result of that illegal detention must be excluded to the extent it was fruit of 

the poisonous tree. Id We have no difficulty concluding Trooper Kennedy acted reasonably up to 

and including the point when he obtained the VIN. The initial questioning while Mr. Hicks was in 

the car presents no Fourth Amendment problem. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 

(lOth Cir. 1988) ("An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and 

vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation"), overruled on other grounds, United 

States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (lOth Cir. 1995) (en banc),petitionfor cert.ftled(No. 

95-8121) (Mar. 1, 1996). If the driver produces a valid license and proof he is entitled to operate the 

vehicle, he "must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to ·further delay by police 

for additional questioning." ld Trooper Kennedy asked Mr. Hicks for proof of registration, but Mr. 

Hicks could not comply. At this point, Trooper Kennedy had reasonable suspicion the van might be 

stolen, whichjustifiedfurtherinvestigation. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 879 (lOth Cir. 

1994) (citing cases illustrating, as a "defining characteristic of our traffic stop jurisprudence," that "a 

defendant's lack of a valid registration, license, bill of sale, or some other indicia of proof to lawfully 

operate and possess the vehicle in question [gives] rise to objectively reasonable suspicion that the 

vehicle may be stolen."). It was also reasonable for Trooper Kennedy to order Mr. Hicks out of the 

van, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-11 (1977) (per curiam), and, in light of his 

reasonable suspicion, to briefly detain Mr. Hicks in the back of the patrol car while he completed his 

investigation. Assuming for the sake of discussion that Mr. Hicks has standing to object to Trooper 

Kennedy's minimal "search" of the driver side door to obtain the VIN, we have no trouble concluding 

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Trooper Kennedy acted reasonably when he did so. A driver who has committed a traffic violation 

does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicle's VIN, even if it is not in plain view. 

New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1986). If the VIN is visible from outside the vehicle, the 

officer cannot enter the vehicle to read it. Id at 119. If the VIN is not visible and the driver is inside, 

the officer must ask the driver to remove any obstruction and allow him to see the VIN. Id at 115. 

It: as in this case, the VIN on the dashboard is covered and the driver is not in the vehicle, the officer 

may open the door to read the VIN on the dootjamb, just as Trooper Kennedy did, he may ask the 

passenger to remove the obstruction, or he may reach into the vehicle to remove any obstruction 

covering the VIN on the dashboard. I d at 118-19. 

Once Trooper Kennedy lawfully obtained the VIN, it became inevitable he would discover 

the van was stolen, which in tum would give him probable cause to arrest Mr. Hicks and Mr. Miller, 

impound the van and perform an inventory search. Therefore, even if we accept Mr. Hicks's position 

for the sake of argument, it is simply irrelevant whether Trooper Kennedy deviated from his lawful 

pwpose when he leaned into the van, questioned Mr. Miller, and discovered the wooden drug pipe. 

"[I]f evidence seized unlawfully would have been inevitably discovered in a subsequent inventory 

search, such evidence would be admissible." Ibarra, 955 F.2d at 1410; see also United States v. 

Horn, 970 F.2d 728, 732 (lOth Cir. 1992). The district court was therefore correct to deny Mr. 

Hicks's motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the van. 

B. Jury Instructions 

Mr. Hicks contends the district court's jury instructions inadequately defined the "beyond a 

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reasonable doubt" standard of proof: thereby violating his Fifth Amendment right to due process and 

his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. See Victor v. Nebraska,_ U.S.___,___, 114 S. Ct. 

1239, 1243 (1994); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, ___, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993). The 

sufficiency of a district court's reasonable doubt jury instruction is a question of law we review de 

novo. United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 980 (lOth Cir. 1995). The district court gave the 

following jury instruction: 

A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt based on reason and common sense and 

arising from the state of the evidence. It is rarely possible to prove anything to an 

absolute certainty, but at the same time, a defendant is not to be convicted on mere 

suspicion or conjecture. You are instructed that a reasonable doubt is a doubt that 

would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the graver and more important 

transactions oflife. 

A reasonable doubt may arise not only from the evidence produced, but also 

from the lack of evidence. Since the burden is always on the prosecution to prove the 

accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of the crime 

charged, a defendant has the right to rely upon failure of the prosecution to establish 

such proof. A defendant may also rely upon evidence brought out on crossexamination of witnesses for the prosecution. The law does not impose upon a 

defendant the burden or duty of producing any evidence. 

Before his case went to the jury, Mr. Hicks objected to the first two sentences of the instruction on 

the ground they merely define the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof as lying somewhere 

between "mere suspicion" and "absolute certainty." Mr. Hicks correctly notes there are several 

standards of proof lying between these two extremes, including the probable cause, preponderance 

of the evidence, clear and convincing, and beyond a reasonable doubt standards. Because the 

instruction fails adequately to pinpoint the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard's position on this 

broad continuum, Mr. Hicks contends the jury was left without sufficient guidance regarding the 

meaning of that standard of proof: and his convictions on all counts should therefore be reversed. 

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"[T]rial courts retain considerable latitude in instructing juries on reasonable doubt." Conway, 

73 F.3d at 980. "[11he Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor 

requires them to do so as a matter of course." Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243. Rather, "so long as the 

court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt ... the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the 

jury of the government's burden of proof" !d. We will reverse only if the jury instructions, taken as 

a 'Whole, do not convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. I d To decide whether the jury 

instructions adequately convey the concept of reasonable doubt, we must determine whether "there 

is a reasonable likelihood that the jwy understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof 

insufficient to meet" the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Id In doing so, 

we must ... be mindful of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to defin·e the term in 

great detail or to characterize precisely what sort of doubt must be reasonable. As an 

abstraction the concept of reasonable doubt is not susceptible to description by terms 

with sharply defined, concrete meanings. Resort must be to wording or language, the 

meaning of which will necessarily be colored by the experience of each individual. 

Thus while the term itself is common and readily associated by most individuals with 

our criminal justice system, it is unlikely that two persons would supply the same 

characterization of its meaning. 

United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1144 (lOth Cir. 1974). 

The jury instruction the district court gave in this case, taken as a whole, is constitutionally 

sufficient. The first paragraph of the instruction is virtually identical to the reasonable doubt 

instruction we reviewed in Pepe, which provided: 

"A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense and 

arising from the state of the evidence. It is rarely possible to prove anything to an 

absolute certainty. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is· established if the evidence is 

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such as a reasonably prudent man would be willing to rely and act upon in the most 

important of his own affairs. A defendant is not to be convicted on mere suspicion 

or conjecture. 11 

ld at 1143. We concluded inPepe that the instruction as a whole was "adequate to apprise the jury 

of both the reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of innocence," and was not plainly 

erroneous. ld. at 1144. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 11repeatedly approved11 the definition 

of a reasonable doubt as "a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act," Victor, 

114 S. Ct. at 1250, and we have specifically endorsed it as well. United States v. Barrera-Gonzales, 

952 F.2d 1269, 1271, 1273 (lOth Cir. 1992); United States v. Leaphart, 513 F.2d 747, 749 (lOth Cir. 

1975); Pepe, 501 F.2d at 1144. By adding this phrase as a gloss to the words "reasonable doubt," 

the district court provided the jury with 11 a common-sense benchmark for just how substantial such 

a doubt must be." Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250. Finally, both the First and Seventh Circuits have held 

instructions defining reasonable doubt as a "fair doubt based upon reason and common sense" pass 

constitutional muster, United States v. Campbell, 61 F.3d 976, 980-81 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 

_ S. Ct.__, 1996 WL 137903 (1996); United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (7th Cir. 

1988), and we agree with our sister Circuits on this point. 

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Both at the close of the government's case in chief and at the close of all the evidence, Mr. 

Hicks and Mr. Miller moved for judgments of acquittal on all counts pursuant to Fed. R Crim. P. 

2 9( a), but the district court denied their motions. They now renew their contention that the 

government presented insufficient evidence to support their convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 

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we review the record de novo, and ask only whether, taking the evidence -- both 

direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom -- in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could 

find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to conclude the 

evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a conviction, we must find 

that no reasonable juror could have reached the disputed verdict. 

United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1126 (lOth Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Williamson, 

53 F.3d 1500, 1514 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 218 (1995)). "'To the extent that the 

evidence conflicts, we accept the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence and its assessment of the 

credibilityofwitnesses."' ld. (quoting United States v. Sapp, 53 F.3d 1100, 1103 (lOth Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996)). 

1. Constructive Possession of Drugs and Firearms 

Both Mr. Hicks and Mr. Miller contend there was insufficient evidence to support their 

convictions for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine (18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. 

§ 84l(a)(l)) and possession with intent to distribute marijuana (18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. 

§ 84l(aXl)). Mr. Miller also contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 

being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) & 924(a)(2)). They rely primarily on 

our decisions holding that if two or more individuals jointly occupy a premises, here the van, the 

government must present direct or circumstantial evidence individually linking them to the contraband 

in order to prove constructive possession. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (lOth 

Cir. 1994) ("In cases of joint occupancy, where the government seeks to prove constructive 

possession by circumstantial evidence, it must present evidence to show some connection or nexus 

between the defendant and the firearm or other contraband."). They also rely on our precedents 

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holding a reasonable jury cannot find a defendant constructively possessed contraband unless the 

government "proves, through direct or circumstantial evidence knowing 'ownership, dominion or 

control over the [contraband] and the premises where the [contraband is] found."' United States v. 

Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 869 (lOth Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 888 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 964 (1992)). 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the trial evidence showed the 

following: Trooper Kennedy found Government's Exhibit 3, a blue glove containing 1.5 grams of 

marijuana, under the driver's seat within easy reach. He also found Government's Exhibit 2, a wooden 

drug pipe with marijuana residue, in an open ashtray built into the center of the van's dashboard. Mr. 

Hicks admitted the wooden pipe was his. Trooper Kennedy also found Government's Exlnoit 4, a 

glass drug pipe with methamphetamine residue, under the carpet behind the passenger seat. Trooper 

Kennedy found Government's Exhibit 5, a blue bag with a zipper, in the rear of the van on the 

passenger side. Government's Exhibit 5 contained Government's Exhibits SA, 5B, 5C, and 5F, 

packages containing 387.3, 226.3, 42.6, and 117.9 grams of methamphetamine, respectively. 

Government's Exhibit 5 also contained Government's Exhibit 5D, 224.6 grams of marijuana, and 

Government's Exhibit 5E, a loaded Smith & Wesson Model459 nine-millimeter semi-automatic 

handgun. The firearm was at the very bottom of Government's Exhibit 5, with a towel placed over 

it, and the drugs on top of the towel. 

Trooper Kennedy also found a large black bag containing the following: Government's 

Exlnoit 10, a loaded Multon .380 caliber automatic handgun, Government's Exlnoit 8, the box that 

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the Multon came in (the gun was not inside the box), Government's Exhibit 11, a check made out to 

Mr. Hicks, Government's Exhibit 7, Mr. Hicks's income tax returns, Government's Exhibit 12, a set 

of scales with methamphetamine residue, a small spoon, and some zip-lock baggies inside a small 

Harley-Davidson bag, Government's Exlnbit 6, a small black pouch containing Government's Exhibit 

6A, a red Mead notebook, and Government's Exhibit 9, a small blue spiral memo book. The black 

bag also contained clothing and a checkbook with Mr. Hicks's name on it. Trooper Kennedy 

discovered Government's Exhibit 13, a package containing 156.7 grams of marijuana, hidden under 

the right rear quarter panel of the van. 

Trooper Kennedy also found Government's Exhibit 14, a small black address book, on Mr. 

Miller's belt. The words "Brian Miller's phone book" were written in pencil on the back. A 

handwriting expert testified that the same person wrote the numerals in Government's Exhibit 6A, the 

red Mead notebook, and Government's Exhibit 14, Mr. Miller's address book. The handwriting 

expert testified, however, that a different person wrote the printing and numerals in Government's 

E:xhtbit 9, the small blue spiral memo book. The government presented another expert witness who 

testified that scales, packaging materials, including baggies and tape, and ledgers are common tools 

ofthe drug trade. He also testified two of the items found in the black bag, Government's Exhibits 

6A, the red Mead notebook, Government's Exhibit 9, the small blue spiral memo book, contained 

"drug ledger information." Regarding Government's Exhibit 9, the blue spiral memo book, the expert 

witness testified: 

[I]t appears to be divided into approximately six accounts, and it has an account 

heading at the top of each one which possibly identifies an individual or an account 

for persons. The numbers themselves, in many cases they look like or appear to be 

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possibly a running account total for an individual or persons. Some of the cases you'll 

see where it appears that the numbers are in a [descending] amount like there have 

been small amounts of payoff that have come in, then a thicker drawn line which 

might indicate there has been another front to the individual and then payoffs again. 

Like in this account here, there's 125 and then 65 and a drawn line on 60, 

which would possibly be a balance, a running balance. And that appears for six 

different accounts in this book and is followed by phone numbers. In the back, there's 

another one for Wade (phonetic), $895, $875, $825 in a [descending] sequence. 

Ester (phonetic), $330, $230, $225. Some cases, there is a dollar sign that denotes 

an actual monetary amount. In other cases, it's just a numerical order. 

Regarding Exhibit 6A, the red Mead notebook, the expert witness testified: 

It also appears to be -- this has only two pages in this particular memo book that have 

any writing on them There's one page on the back that obviously had something tom 

out where there were some amounts on it, but the two pages with visible amounts, the 

first one starts with $8,800 profit and it states on the page, "profit." Then there's 

some additions, $1,000, [$]9,000, $800, for a total of$10,800. And then underneath 

are some numbers like 4 112, 3 112, 13 112 and an "OZ" that follows, which would 

mean ounces, and then some halves again, 15 1/2, eventually a one ounce total short. 

And it's very, very common in many of the powder form substances of drugs, 

whether they be methamphetamine or cocaine and some of those types of drugs that 

they're actually dealt with, marijuana itself is also dealt with in ounce quantities. 

On the next page, there is $160 and $4,400, and this $4,400 is the double into 

the $8,800 profit by two, which are some things that we look for. 

We have no difficulty concluding the government sufficiently linked Mr. Hicks to the large 

black bag containing the Multon .380 cahoer automatic handgun, the scales, small spoon, and zip-lock 

baggies, the red Mead notebook, and the blue spiral notebook. Because the black bag contained Mr. 

Hicks's personal items, i.e., his tax return, his checkbook, and a check made out to him, it is 

reasonable to infer the black bag was his. Also, the handwriting expert testified the writing in the red 

Mead notebook matched Mr. Miller's own writing in his address book, and another expert testified 

the notebook contained drug sale records. A reasonable jury could infer from the fact that Mr. 

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Miller's drug notebook was inside Mr. Hicks's bag along with the tools of the drug trade that both 

Mr. Hicks and Mr. Miller were jointly involved in drug distribution. The fact that Mr. Hicks and Mr. 

Miller were both in constructive possession of the tools of the drug trade contained in the black bag, 

i.e., the scales, the zip-lock baggies, the red Mead notebook, and the blue spiral notebook, raises a 

reasonable inference linking them to the drugs contained in the blue bag. The fact there were traces 

of methamphetamine on the scales found in the black bag strengthens this inference. Finally, the 

wooden drug pipe with marijuana residue in the van's open ashtray, combined with Mr. Hicks's 

admission the pipe was his, links him to the small quantity of marijuana in the blue glove under his 

seat. 

We also reject Mr. Hicks's and Mr. Miller's contention we should vacate their convictions for 

possession with intent to distnbute methamphetamine (18 U.S. C. § 2 and 21 U.S. C. § 841(a)(1)) and 

possession with intent to distribute marijuana (18 U.S. C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) because 

there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding they intended to distribute the 

methamphetamine and marijuana found in the van. In order to convict a defendant of possession with 

intent to distribute illegal drugs under 18 U.S. C. § 841(a)(1), "the government must prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed [illegal drugs] with the specific intent to 

distribute." Jones, 44 F.3d at 869. As we stated above, there was sufficient evidence to allow the 

jwyto find Mr. Hicks and Mr. Miller were in constructive possession ofthe tools of the drug trade 

contained in the black bag. This evidence justifies an inference they had the specific intent to 

distnbute the methamphetamine and marijuana. 

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We conclude, however, that there is no direct or circumstantial evidence showing Mr. Miller 

had knowing ownership, dominion, or control over either of the firearms. See Jones, 44 F.3d at 869. 

We faced a similar situation in Jones. Ms. Johnson was a passenger in a vehicle being driven by her 

cousin and codefendant, Ms. Jones, from Los Angeles to Detroit. Id at 865. After they were pulled 

over in Wyoming, officers discovered 200 kilograms of cocaine in the trunk and in a black suitcase 

in the back seat. ld at 864. Both Ms. Johnson and Ms. Jones had flown one-way from Detroit to 

Los Angeles. Id at 865. Ms. Johnson's personal effects were inside another suitcase in the back seat. 

Id None ofher personal effects were inside the suitcase containing the cocaine or inside the trunk. 

ld Ms. Johnson did not have keys to the vehicle. !d. All of the cocaine was inside closed luggage, 

and there was no discernible smell. !d. at 866. We held that although a reasonable jury could 

conclude Ms. Johnson may have suspected illegal activity, no reasonable jury could have concluded 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Johnson knew of the cocaine's presence in the car. !d. at 866, 

870. We therefore vacated her convictions for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute 

(21 U.S.C.§§ 841(a)(1) & 846) and possession with intent to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) & 18 U.S.C. § 2). 

In this case, the fact the drug sale record book was in the same bag with the tools of the trade 

raises a reasonable inference he and Mr. Hicks were jointly involved in the drug distribution and links 

Mr. Miller to the drugs and drug paraphernalia in the black and blue bags. Although we can infer that 

the black bag belonged to Mr. Hicks because his personal belongings were inside, the blue bag 

contained none ofMr. Miller's belongings and the black bag did not contain sufficient belongings of 

Mr. Miller to suggest his awareness of a firearm In addition, contrary to the government's assertion, 

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any "nervousness" Mr. Miller may have shown when Trooper Kennedy pulled the van over would 

have been quite understandable given that he was aware of the drugs contained in the two bags; it 

does not specifically show that he knew about the firearms. The only real difference between Jones 

and this case is that there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Mr. 

Miller was aware of and involved in part of Mr. Hicks's illegal activity, namely, the transportation and 

distnl>ution of drugs. For a jury to conclude Mr. Miller was aware ofthe firearms, however, it would 

have to draw yet another inference: that because Mr. Miller was aware the bags contained drugs and 

drug paraphernalia, he also must have known they contained firearms. While it is true, at least as a 

general principle, that drugs and guns often go together, see United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 

983,990 (lOth Cir. 1993) ("Drug traffickers may carry weapons to protect their merchandise, their 

cash receipts, and to intimidate prospective purchasers."), we do not believe this general principle, 

standing alone, would allow a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Miller was aware 

there were firearms in either of the bags, without evidence that one or both of the bags belonged to 

him, that he packed either or both of the bags, or any other evidence individually linking him to the 

firearms. Accordingly, Mr. Miller's convictions and sentences for using or carrying a firearm in 

relation to a drug trafficking crime and being a felon in possession of a firearm must be vacated. 1 

2. Convictions for "Using" or "Carrying" a Firearm 

Mr. Hicks contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for using or 

carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 924( c)( 1 ), in light 

1 In light or our conclusion, we have no occasion to consider Mr. Miller's other challenges to these 

convictions. 

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of the Supreme Cowt's decision in Bailey v. United States,_ U.S.__, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995). In 

Bailey, the Supreme Court held that " [ t] o sustain a conviction under the 'use' prong of§ 924( c X 1 ), 

the Government must show that the defendant actively employed the firearm during and in -relation 

to the predicate crime." Bailey, 116 S. Ct at 509. In dicta, the Court cited examples of activities that 

constitute "active employment" and activities that do not. !d., 116 S. Ct. at 508-09. Evidence that 

the defendant brandished, displayed, bartered, fired or attempted to fire a firearm, or used it to strike 

another person, will support a jury verdict that the defendant "used" a firearm, as will evidence the 

defendant made "a reference to a firearm calculated to bring about a change in the circumstances of 

the predicate offense." !d., 116 S. Ct. at 508. However, without more, evidence of the "inert 

presence" or "storage" of a firearm "at or near the site of a drug crime or its proceeds or 

paraphernalia" will not support such a conviction, even though it may be feadily available for 

"intimidation, attack, or defense," or might "embolden or comfort the offender," unless the weapon 

is "disclosed or mentioned by the offender." !d. 

We have held that Bailey applies retroactively to cases on direct appeal on the date it was 

decided, December 6, 1995. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (lOth Cir. 1995). Here, the 

record shows Mr. Hicks merely concealed the firearms in the back of the van, which is insufficient 

to sustain a finding he "used" them within the meaning of 18 U.S. C. § 924(cX1). Bailey, 116 S. Ct. 

at 509; Wacker, 72 F. 3d at 1463. Unlike the defendants in Wacker, however, who were charged only 

with "using" firearms, Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1464 n. 8, the indictment in this case alleged Mr. Hicks 

violated 18 U.S. C. § 924{c)(1) both by "using" and by "carrying" firearms. Faced with an identical 

situation in Bailey, the Supreme Court expressed no opinion regarding the appropriate remedy, but 

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instead simply remanded the case to the Court of Appeals with directions to consider whether the 

"carry" prong ofl8 U.S. C. § 924(cXI) provided an alternative "basis for upholding the convictions." 

Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 509. We must now address this issue. 

If the substantive law allows the jury to convict a defendant for an offense, here a violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l), based on either of two alternative grounds, here that Mr. Hicks either 

"used" or "carried" the firearms, and the district court correctly instructs the jury regarding each 

ground, we must affirm the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support it under either of the 

alternative grounds, even if there is not sufficient evidence to support the conviction under one of 

them Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 58-60 (1991); United States v. Pace, 981 F.2d 1123, 

1129 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 966 (1993). This analysis does not apply in this case, 

however, because the district court instructed the jury it could find Mr. Hicks "used" the firearms 

merely by concealing them in the van and keeping them readily available for use, which is incorrect 

under Bailey. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 509; Wacker, 12 F. 3d at 1463. Because the instruction defining 

one of the two alternative grounds for conviction was legally erroneous, we must reverse the 

conviction unless we can determine with absolute certainty that the jury based its verdict on the 

ground on which it was correctly instructed. Griffin, 502 U.S. at 58-60; Pace, 981 F.2d at 1130. 

The reason for this approach is simple: "Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a 

particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law," Griffin, 502 U.S. at 59, and 

may have intended to convict the defendant on a legally invalid ground, while rejecting the evidence 

supporting the legally valid one. We may be absolutely certain that the jury did not make such an 

unwitting error U: for example, there was no evidence whatsoever to support a conviction on the 

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legally erroneous ground, Pace, 981 F.2d at 1130, or if the jury rendered a special verdict indicating 

it rejected the legally erroneous ground. 2 

Here, the jwy rendered a general verdict and there was sufficient evidence on which to base 

a finding Mr. Hicks "used" the firearms under the jury instructions the district court gave. It is 

therefore possible that the jury convicted Mr. Hicks solely because it found he "used" the firearms 

merely by concealing them in the van, which directly conflicts with Bailey, and that the jury rejected 

the government's assertion Mr. Hicks "carried" them We must therefore reverse Mr. Hicks's 

conviction under 18 U.S. C. § 924( c)( 1 ). This conclusion brings us to a more difficult question: 

whether we must order a new trial. Our recent decision in Wacker is instructive, though not 

determinative. In Wacker, we concluded, in light of Bailey, that it was beyond a doubt that there was 

insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding the defendants charged in counts 2 and 12 of the 

indictment "used" firearms, Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1464, and we emphasized that the indictment did not 

allege the defendants "carried" firearms, id at 1464 n.8. We therefore reversed these convictions 

outright without remanding for a new trial. We went on to hold, however, that it was "a closer 

question whether the government presented sufficient evidence regarding the firearm charged in 

Count 7," and that "we cannot say how a jury might decide this issue if properly instructed under the 

law as defined by Bailey." ld at 1464-65. We therefore remanded the case for a new trial on that 

2 The Third Circuit has held that even if the district court's "use" instruction was incorrect in light of 

Bailey, the conviction should nevertheless be affirmed if the jury would almost certainly have convicted under 

either the "use" or "carry" prongs, or both, had it had been properly instructed regarding the post-Bailey 

definition of those tenns. United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 1996). Because the evidence in this case 

was not sufficiently compelling, we have no occasion to consider whether the Third Circuit was correct to apply 

such a harmless error analysis. 

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count, and gave the government an opportunity to obtain a conviction under the correct legal 

standard. ld at 1465. We acknowledged that "reversal of a conviction on the grounds of insufficient 

evidence precludes retrial," id at 1465 (citing BurkS' v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)), but held 

that rule did not apply to count 7, because we reversed not for "pure insufficiency of evidence," but 

because "the legal standard under which the jury was instructed and under which the government 

presented its proof was incorrect." ld at 1465. 

In light of Wacker, therefore, we will remand for a new trial only if the jury could have 

returned a guilty verdict if properly instructed. The jury could not have returned a guilty verdict in 

this case under the "use" prong of 18 U.S. C. § 924( c)( 1 ). The record contains no evidence that Mr. 

Hicks ever even attempted to remove the firearms from the bags in which they were concealed, or 

that he mentioned their presence to anyone. As such, the evidence demonstrated nothing but the 

"inert presence" which the Supreme Court held was insufficient in Bailey. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 508. 

We must next determine whether a properly instructed jury could have returned a guilty 

verdict under the "carry" prong of 18 U. S.C. § 924( c )(1 ). 3 We defined the word "carry" for the first 

time in United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909 (1989). 

In Cardenas, we stated that "there is no evidence in the language of [18 U.S. C. § 924(c)] or its 

legislative history that Congress intended" the word "carries" to have "a different meaning than the 

legal meaning in 1968," the year the statute was enacted. !d. at 1535 (footnote omitted). We 

3 It is undisputed the jury instruction was correct under our pre-Bailey decisions. 

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examined the pre-1968 definitions of the word "carry" and concluded that "[t]he legal consensus at 

the time of enactment of§ 924( c) was that possession was a requisite element of'carrying a weapon 

in a vehicle"' but that in light of these definitions "when a motor vehicle is used, 'carrying a weapon' 

takes on a less restrictive meaning than carrying on the person. The means of carrying is the vehicle, 

itself: rather than the defendant's hands or pocket, and the requirement of possession, the exercise of 

dominion and contro~ consonant with the common legal definition of'carrying a weapon in a vehicle' 

at the time of the enactment of § 924( c), is precisely what distinguishes 'carrying' from mere 

'transportation.' " !d. at 1535-56. 

Arguably, some of our later decisions could be read as interpreting Cardenas as holding that 

a defendant cannot be convicted under the "carry" prong unless the firearm was within easy reach of 

the defendant. For example, in United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1526 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 502 U.S. 897 (1991), we affirmed a conviction under the "carry" prong where the defendant 

was the driver and there was a firearm under the driver's seat of the vehicle pointing butt-end out. 

Similarly, in United States v. Cox, 934 F.2d 1114, 1121 (lOth Cir. 1991), we affirmed a conviction 

under the "carry" prong where a firearm was found on the passenger side floorboard of a vehicle the 

defendant had been driving. Finally, in Nicholson, 983 F.2d at 990, we affirmed a conviction under 

the "carry" prong where there was a loaded firearm under the driver seat of the vehicle the defendant 

was driving. Such a narrow interpretation is supported by the facts of Cardenas. Mr. Cardenas was 

the driver of a vehicle involved in drug trafficking. Cardenas, 864 F.2d at 1530. During an inventory 

search, officers found a firearm behind a potato chip bag in an open compartment inches from the 

steering wheel and well within Mr. Cardenas's reach. !d. Similarly, we stated in Cardenas that the 

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definition of"carries" in§ 924(cX1) must be construed "consonant with the common legal definition 

of'canying in a vehicle.'" ld at 1536. The preceding page contains a parenthetical note stating that 

"carrying a concealed weapon in an automobile requires that the gun be in such proximity to make 

it immediately available for use" and another parenthetical stating evidence the firearm was "on, 

under, or behind the seat or cushion, or is between the seat and the cushion, or is on the floor, or in 

a pocket ofthe door or even in a receptacle on the running board." ld at 1535. 

One of our later cases shows, however, that this narrow reading of Cardenas is not correct. 

In United States v. Ross, 920 F.2d 1530, 1532 (lOth Cir. 1990), the defendant used his car as a base 

of operations and sometimes got the drugs he s~ld to one of his customers, Paula Belew, from the 

trunk. ld at 1536. The police discovered a firearm and drug paraphernalia in the trunk. ld We held 

"the jury could have reasonably found that Ross carried the gun with him in his car during and in 

relation to his drug distnbution activities." !d. at 1536-37. The only authority we relied on was our 

statement in Cardenas that "when a motor vehicle is used, 'carrying a weapon' takes on a less 

restrictive meaning than carrying on the person. The means of carrying is the vehicle, itself: rather 

than the defendant's hands or pocket." Cardenas, 864 F.2d at 1536. If the narrow reading of 

Cardenas were correct, and that case held that the government is required to prove that the firearm 

was in such proximity to the defendant while in the vehicle that it was immediately available for use, 

Ross would have essentially overruled, or at least disregarded, that proximity requirement. This is 

not the case. Instead, properly interpreted, Cardenas held merely that possession and transportation 

of a firearm in a vehicle constitutes carrying under § 924( c) if the firearm was in effortless reach; it 

does not stand for the proposition that possession and transportation of a firearm in a vehicle does 

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not constitute carrying under § 924( c) if the firearm was not in effortless reach. Our decision in Ross 

then supplemented Cardenas by holding the government can obtain a conviction under the "carry" 

prong even without proof the firearm was in effortless reach. 

In light of the above, our pre-Bailey cases, correctly interpreted, hold that the government 

is required to prove only that the defendant transported a firearm in a vehicle and that he had actual 

or constructive possession of the firearm while doing so. The next, and more difficult question, is 

whether Cardenas and its prodigy survive Bailey. Although the Supreme Court made it clear its 

holding in Bailey was confined to the "use" prong, it briefly contrasted the "use" and "carry" prongs 

as follows: 

We assume that Congress used two terms because it intended each term to 

have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning. While a broad reading of "use" 

undermines virtually any function for "carry," a more limited, active interpretation of 

"use" preserves a meaningful role for "carries" as an alternative basis for a charge. 

Under the interpretation we enunciate today, a firearm can be used without being 

carried, e.g., when an offender has a gun on display during a transaction, or barters 

with a firearm without handling it; and a firearm can be carried without being used, 

e.g., when an offender keeps a gun hidden in his clothing throughout a drug 

transaction. 

Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 507. Arguably, one could interpret this language as meaning that a conviction 

under the "carry" prong of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l) cannot stand absent evidence that the defendant 

physically carried a firearm on his person. However, our sister circuits have defined the "carry" prong 

more broadly in the wake of Bailey. In United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212,216 (1st Cir. 1996), 

the First Circuit declined to "determine the precise contours of the 'carry' prong," but held evidence 

that the defendant physically carried a firearm in a briefcase was sufficient to support a conviction. 

The Second Circuit has held that a driver, as custodian of the vehicle, could be convicted under the 

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"cany" prong because the firearm was within his easy reach, but that a back seat passenger could not. 

United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, _ (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 1996), 1996 WL 138522 at *8-10. The 

Sixth Circuit has held evidence that the defendant transported a firearm in a vehicle and that the 

.firearm was "within reach and immediately available for use," can provide an adequate factual basis 

for a guilty plea based on the "carry" prong. United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 13 F.3d 616, 623 (6th 

Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit has held that evidence that the defendant transported a firearm in 

a vehicle, "on his person or within his reach, available for immediate use" will support a conviction 

under the "carry" prong. United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 1996). The Ninth 

Circuit has held the government must prove only that the defendant "transported the firearm on or 

about his or her person" in such a way that it was "immediately available for use." United States v. 

Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, , No. 95-30007 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1996), 1996 WL 34822 at *3. 

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit has gone so far as to conclude a reasonable jury can convict under the 

"cany" prong based only upon evidence the defendant used a vehicle as a "drug distribution center" 

and that he knew there was a firearm in the glove compartment. United States v. Farris, 77 F. 3d 391, 

395-96 (11th Cir. 1996). 

We see nothing in Bailey that conflicts with our pre-Bailey "vehicular carrying" line of cases. 

To the extent Bailey impacts the definition of the "carry" prong at all, it held that "Congress used two 

terms [ie., "uses" and "carries"] because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous 

meaning." Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 507. Under our pre-Bailey cases, the "carry" prong applies in a great 

many situations in which the post-Bailey definition of the "use" prong would not. For example, there 

is no indication the defendants in Ross, 920 F.2d at 1532, "actively employed" the firearm found in 

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their trunks by sho\Ving them to prospective drug customers, brandishing them, threatening or 

injuring others, or otherwise, and yet we had no difficulty holding there was sufficient evidence that 

they "carried" the firearms. Furthermore, it should be noted that our pre-Bailey definition of the 

"carry" prong is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word "carry." The first definition 

provided in Webster's Third New International Dictionary 343 (1976) states as follows: "to move 

while supporting (as in a vehicle or in one's hands or arms): move an appreciable distance without 

dragging; sustain as a burden or load and bring along to another place." To accept the more narrow 

definition, we would be required to reach the obviously foolish conclusion that the dictionary 

definition necessarily assumes that the object in question is within reach of the carrier, and that if it 

is not, the individual is no longer carrying the object, but is doing something else. 

Turning specifically to the facts of this case, we must determine whether there is sufficient 

evidence to support a conviction under the "carry" prong of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) upon retrial. The 

large black bag found in the rear of the van contained a firearm as well as Mr. Hicks's income tax 

returns, a check made out to him, and a checkbook with his name on it. The evidence in the bag links 

Mr. Hicks to the firearm and supports the inference that he had knowledge of the firearm and 

therefore exercised dominion and control over it. Mr. Hicks drove the van while the firearm was 

inside and therefore he transported the firearm. Because Mr. Hicks simultaneously possessed, 

through dominion and control, and transported a firearm, we conclude that a jury could find that he 

carried the firearm. 

A conviction under § 924( c)( 1) also requires the government to prove the defendant carried 

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a firearm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking offense. To establish this nexus, there must 

be evidence that defendant "intended the weapon to be available for use during [a] drug transaction." 

Nicholson, 983 F.2d at 990 (citing United States v. Mathews, 942 F.2d 779, 783 (lOth Cir. 1991)) 

(emphasis in original). Specifically, the government must prove the defendant availed himself of the 

firearm and that the firearm "played an integral role" in a drug trafficking offense. ld The 

government can prove the firearm was readily accessible and that the defendant availed himself of it 

''by showing a close proximity between the firearm and the drugs." United States v. Ramirez, 63 F.3d 

937, 946 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

In this case, Mr. Hicks concedes that the firearm was in close proximity to the drugs. The 

black bag found in the rear of the van contained a firearm and scales with methamphetamine residue. 

The blue bag, also found in the rear of the van, contained 774.1 grams of methamphetamine. A 

package, found under the right rear quarter panel ofthe van, contained 156.7 grams of marijuana. 

From this evidence of proximity of the firearm and drugs, the jury could have found that the firearm 

was readily accesSiole and that Mr. Hicks availed himself of the firearm. As a consequence, there was 

sufficient evidence Mr. Hicks intended the weapon to be available, that he availed himself of the 

firearm, and that the firearm had an integral role in a drug trafficking offense. 

Our analysis indicates there is sufficient evidence for retrial of Mr. Hicks under 18 U.S. C. 

§ 924( c)( 1 ), carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. We therefore 

remand for a new trial on that charge. 

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3. Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Vehicle 

Finally, Mr. Hicks contends we should vacate his conviction for interstate transportation of 

a stolen vehicle (18 U.S.C. § 2313) because there was not sufficient evidence to support the jury's 

finding he knew the van was stolen. We disagree. At trial, an employee of Mike Wallace Ford in 

Oxnard, California, testified that his dealership had purchased the van as a trade-in, that on December 

6, 1993, the dealership began repairing the van to prepare it for resale, and when he arrived at the 

dealership on December 7, 1993, he discovered the van had been stolen. Trooper Kennedy stopped 

Mr. Hicks in Kansas approximately three months later, on March 8, 1994. At that time, Mr. Hicks 

admitted he began his trip in Oxnard, California, and had bought the van there. He produced no 

written proof of registration, nor did he present oral testimony to explain how he obtained the van. 

Taken together, this evidence supports an inference Mr. Hicks knew the car was stolen. 

ill. Sentencing Issues 

Mr. Hicks contends the district court erred by calculating his sentence using the guidelines 

applicable to D-methamphetamine, which yields a higher sentencing range, rather than the guidelines 

applicable to L-methamphetamine, which yields a lower sentencing range. At trial, the government 

called Gerald Palomino, a forensic scientist, to the stand. Mr. Palomino testified he had personally 

examined the powder seized from the van and determined it was methamphetamine. On crossexamination, Mr. Palomino admitted he had not performed any tests to determine whether the 

methamphetamine was L-methamphetamine or D-methamphetamine. Despite the apparent lack of 

information, the probation department calculated Mr. Hicks's base offense level using the guideline 

provisions applicable to D-methamphetamine in his presentence report. In response to Mr. Hicks's 

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objection, the probation department added an addendum to the presentence report. It acknowledged 

our holding in United States v. Lande, 40 F.3d 329, 331 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 

1988 (1995), that if a defendant objects to the presentence report on the ground it erred by 

calculating his sentence on the basis ofD-methamphetamine, " [a ]t the sentencing hearing, the burden 

rests on the government to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the type and quantity of 

methamphetamine involved in the offense." Both the Probation Department and the government 

stated the government would present evidence at the sentencing hearing showing the 

methamphetamine was D-type. 

During the sentencing hearing, the government admitted that it was aware of Mr. Hicks's 

objection to his presentence report, and that it bore the burden of proving the methamphetamine was 

D-type. The government stated it had submitted the methamphetamine to a lab approximately ten 

days before the sentencing hearing, that as of the date of the sentencing hearing the lab had not yet 

tested the methamphetamine, and that it was the government's fault the test results were not yet 

available, because it had failed to telephone the lab to make sure the report would be submitted in a 

timely fashion. The government also acknowledged its understanding the distinction between D- and 

L-type methamphetamine "makes a difference of five or six years as to each defendant on which way 

it goes," took "full blame" for its oversight, and requested a continuance. Mr. Hicks objected to the 

granting of a continuance to allow the government to obtain a lab report, primarily because the 

government was placed on notice ofhis objection to the presentence report at least two weeks before 

the hearing and had ample time to obtain a lab report. Mr. Hicks instead asked the district court to 

sentence him on the basis of the evidence then before it, and decline to sentence him using the 

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guidelines applicable to D-type methamphetamine on the ground the government had failed to meet 

its burden of proof 

The district court admonished the government, but granted a continuance until1:00 p.m. that 

day, a delay of approximately three hours. At approximately 1:00 p.m., the government presented 

a notarized affidavit from Mr. Palomino that it had received by fax at 12:58 p.m. that day. The 

affidavit, in its entirety, stated as follows: 

I, Gerald Palomino, solemnly affirm, under penalty of petjury that I am a 

Forensic Chemist for the Kansas Bureau oflnvestigation and have been so employed 

for over two (2) years. 

I have testified numerous times as an expert in court [sic] of the State of 

Kansas and of the United States of America. I have testified in the case of United 

States of America v. Hicks and Miller, No. 94-10058-01, 02. 

In addition to my identification of Exhibits 5A, 5B, 5C and 5F as being 

methamphetamine, I have also determined that the methamphetamine is in fact dmethamphetamine in the following amounts and purity: 

5A 387.2 grams 90% purity 

5B 117.9 grams 89% purity 

5C 226.3 grams 69% purity 

5F 42.6 grams 69% purity 

Mr. Hicks objected to the admission of the affidavit because it was difficult to read, because 

he could not cross-examine Mr. Palomino or otherwise impeach the accuracy of the affidavit, because 

the government failed to provide the information contained in the affidavit in a timely fashion despite 

having ample opportunity to do so, which made it impossible for him to prepare a meaningful 

response, and because the affidavit lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to support a finding. The 

district court stated it was within its "total discretion" to order the continuance and admit the 

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affidavit, admitted the affidavit into evidence, and overruled Mr. Hicks's objection to the presentence 

report. 

The district court was correct that it was within its discretion to grant or deny the 

government's request for a continuance of the sentencing hearing, United States v. Nelson, 54 F.3d 

1540, 1546 (lOth Cir. 199S), and whether to admit Mr. Palomino's affidavit into evidence. United 

States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1073 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, llS S. Ct. 1387 & 1806 (1995). 

Mr. Hicks urges us to conclude the district court abused its discretion for the reasons he offered 

during the sentencing hearing and remand for resentencing. We decline to do so for two reasons. 

First and foremost, we find no abuse of discretion. Second, even if we were to agree, for the sake 

of argument, that the district court abused its discretion both when it ordered the continuance and 

when it admitted Mr. Palomino's affidavit, there is no indication that Mr. Hicks suffered prejudice. 

The grounds Mr. Hicks states he would have asserted to impeach the affidavit are flimsy at best. His 

primary contention is that the quantity and purity calculations in the affidavit do not correspond to 

the trial evidence. The trial evidence showed the following: 

SA 387.3 grams 90% purity 

5B 226.3 grams 69% purity 

5C 42.6 grams 69% purity 

SF 117.9 grams 89% purity 

This evidence shows only that Mr. Palomino's affidavit misdescribed exhibit 5B as exhibit 5C, exhibit 

5C as exhibit SF, and exhibit SF as exlnbit 5B. The listed quantities and purities are identical, except 

that the trail evidence showed Government's Exhibit SA was .1 gram less than indicated in Mr. 

Palomino's affidavit. Even if Mr. Hicks had demonstrated this minute inconsistency at the sentencing 

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hearing, it would have had no impact on his sentence, because the district court would merely have 

corrected the error. Also, in light of Mr. Palomino's affidavit, the district court's finding the 

methamphetamine was D-type was not clear error. 

IV 

For the reasons stated, Mr. Miller's convictions for violating using or carrying a firearm in 

relation to a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S. C. § 924(c)(1)) and being a felon in possession of a 

firearm (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2)) are VACATED and his case is REMANDED for 

resentencing in light of our decision to vacate certain of his convictions. Mr. Hicks's conviction for 

using or canying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime is REVERSED, his sentence for that 

offense is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for a new trial on that offense. The convictions 

and sentences are AFFIRMED in all other respects. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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