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Parties Involved:
Roland Hylton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 8, 2002 Decided June 28, 2002

No. 01-3097

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Roland Hylton,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(97cr0376)

Luther L. Hajek, appointed by the court, argued the cause

for appellant. With him on the briefs was Douglas J. Behr,

appointed by the court.

Suzanne Grealy Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman, and Mary A. Snow, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Edwards and Tatel, Circuit Judges, and

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

Silberman.

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge: Roland Hylton appeals

from the district court's entry of judgment and denial of his

motion for a new trial based on claimed ineffective assistance

of counsel. We agree with Hylton that he is entitled to a new

trial.

I.

This case has a rather twisted procedural history, although

the basic facts are straightforward. Hylton appeals from his

conviction for conspiring to smuggle cocaine in from Jamaica

using young women as couriers. On May 2, 1996, Hylton was

arrested at BWI airport while waiting to pick up one of the

couriers, who was stopped by customs agents after they

discovered cocaine in the heel of her shoe. He was released

later that evening after the customs agents seized some

physical evidence such as cash and obtained several statements from him. Appellant was again arrested and then

indicted on four counts on October 9, 1997. A few days later,

on the advice of his then-attorney Jane Norman, Hylton

participated in debriefings with Assistant United States Attorney Stephan Best, United States Customs officials, and

police detectives. Before the debriefing, and after speaking

with his attorney, Hylton signed a "Debriefing Agreement,"

which provided in relevant part:

(1) First, except for paragraphs two and three below, no

statements made by or other information provided by

your client during the 'off-the-record' debriefings will be

used directly against your client in any criminal proceeding.

(2) Second, the government may make derivative use of

and may pursue any investigative leads suggested by any

statements made by or other information provided by

your client. (This provision is necessary in order to

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eliminate the necessity for a Kastigar hearing at which

the government would have to prove that the evidence it

would introduce at trial is not tainted by any statements

made by or other information provided by your client.)[1]

Hylton gave the government a range of general information

as to how he imported drugs from Jamaica as well as more

specific information concerning his relationship with his coconspirator Adrian Wright.

Approximately a month before his scheduled trial in April

1998, Hylton filed a motion before Judge Urbina to exclude

evidence derived from his debriefing. Because her involvement in the debriefing sessions required her to testify, Ms.

Norman stopped representing Hylton and the court appointed her law partner. After it became apparent that he would

have the same conflict, the court appointed Thomas Abbenante. The Judge determined that, although Hylton's statements were voluntary, his waiver of his Fifth Amendment

rights was not a "knowing and intelligent" act. (Hylton

claimed that his participation was based on his understanding

that he would be released.) The government did not appeal

from that finding. Both parties, and Judge Urbina, then

proceeded on the Debriefing Agreement's assumption that

Kastigar would govern; Hylton would be entitled to a hearing at which the government would have the burden of

showing that none of the evidence it wished to present was

derived from Hylton's debriefing. The hearing was avoided,

however, because counsel stipulated that the government had

independent knowledge of several proposed witnesses but not

one of the drug couriers, Cynthia White, whom the government then agreed not to call. The assistant U.S. attorney

__________

1 By "Kastigar," the Debriefing Agreement was referring to

United States v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), in which the

Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the federal immunity statute. The Court held that to be constitutional, the statute

must afford protection commensurate with that of the Fifth Amendment; therefore, the government must demonstrate that it has

made neither direct nor indirect use of immunized statements, but

it does not need to confer the broader transactional immunity.

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also indicated that prior to Hylton's debriefing he had not

known of Adrian Wright's involvement, but since Wright's

whereabouts were unknown and the government did not

intend to call him no formal stipulation as to him was entered.

The trial did not go well for the government. The jury

found Hylton not guilty of several counts and the jurors hung

as to the remainder. The government proceeded to a second

trial before Judge Penn. Much of the testimony was the

same2 but, as emphasized by appellant, one significant addition was the testimony of the very Adrian Wright who was

the subject of discussion before the first trial. Wright, who

before the second trial had pleaded guilty to importing narcotics and entered into a cooperation agreement with the

government, testified that he and Hylton had imported between five and fifteen kilos of cocaine in an eleven-month

period using young women such as Cynthia White as couriers.

Hylton's counsel, Abbenante, did not challenge Wright's testimony. The jury found Hylton guilty of both remaining

counts.

After the verdict, a newly appointed counsel moved for a

new trial on several grounds including the ineffective assistance of counsel. Hylton claimed Abbenante's major lapse

was his failure to object to Wright's testimony since the

assistant U.S. attorney had conceded that he did not know of

Wright until Hylton's debriefing. At a hearing, the government produced a customs agent who introduced two investigative reports he had drafted prior to Hylton's debriefing

which referred to Wright, and Abbenante testified that he did

not raise the Kastigar issue because he thought one of the

couriers had "given up" Wright prior to the debriefing.

But Hylton's new counsel proffered a witness

who would testify that Wright had agreed to cooperate only

after he was confronted with Hylton's debriefing statements

because he felt betrayed and that he had no choice. For

reasons not apparent, the witness did not testify, and Judge

Penn found that Kastigar was not violated because the gov-

__________

2 Jessica Rhones, another drug courier, testified for the first

time at the second trial.

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ernment had in fact been aware of Wright's role prior to

Hylton's debriefing and consequently counsel had not been

ineffective in failing to object to Wright's testimony on Kastigar grounds.

II.

Hylton presents us with two issues. He claims that the

police lacked probable cause to arrest him on May 2, 1996,

and therefore evidence thus obtained (his statements and the

cash) should be suppressed, and secondly that his counsel at

the second trial was ineffective.3

The first claim is, to be charitable, insubstantial. It is

undisputed that custom agents arrested the courier Janice

Thompson at BWI after finding cocaine in the heels of her

shoes and that she identified and physically pointed out

Hylton as the person who was to pick her up at the airport.

Observing this identification, Hylton immediately left the

airport and went to his car. Confronted by an agent, he

refused to provide identification. That is easily probable

cause to arrest appellant. See Kayode v. United States, 254

F.3d 204, 209-10 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

The second claim, by contrast, persuades us; we think

appellant did not enjoy effective counsel. We made clear in

United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

(North I), opinion withdrawn and superseded in part, 920

F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (North II), that the government has

a significant burden when it seeks to prosecute a defendant

who has given immunized testimony.4 It must demonstrate

that witnesses who testified against the defendant were not

__________

3 He also claims a right to a new trial based on perjury of a

government witness. Since we grant a new trial it is unnecessary

to consider this claim.

4 Although the government did not invoke the federal immunity

statute, as discussed in more detail below, we are nonetheless

guided by the decisions in Kastigar and North. The reasoning in

Kastigar is not confined to cases arising under that statute. United

States v. Kilroy, 27 F.3d 679, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

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influenced--"shaped, altered, or affected"--by that information. North II, 920 F.2d at 943; North I, 910 F.2d at 861. It

seems to us rather obvious, under Kastigar and North, that if

Hylton's statements were a cause of Wright's decision to

plead and testify against Hylton, Wright's testimony was

impermissible even if the government had prior knowledge of

Wright's role.

In determining whether Hylton makes out his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel by raising Abbenante's failure to make a Kastigar objection to Wright's testimony we

follow the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which obliges a defendant to demonstrate that his "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive

[him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."

We agree with Hylton that Abbenante's failure to raise

Kastigar with respect to Wright was simply inexcusable.

The post-trial hearing reveals that Abbenante's decision was

not a tactical one but instead rested on a misunderstanding of

Kastigar. Even if persons in the government "knew" about

Wright and that knowledge was sufficient to offset the assistant U.S. attorney's admission, the government was obliged to

demonstrate that it made no derivative use of Hylton's debriefing statements. And Hylton claims that the government

used the debriefing statements to coerce or induce Wright to

testify.

It is true that Wright, at trial, testified that he was

cooperating because he regretted his previous actions and

was hoping to move forward with his life. But Wright was

never asked about the effect of Hylton's debriefing statements on his decision. Indeed, even if Abbenante had considered challenging Wright's testimony on that basis he could

not have done so on cross-examination without alerting the

jury to those very statements of the defendant. This point

neatly illustrates that the Kastigar hearing and the examination of witnesses at trial have two entirely different functions.

At trial both counsel are concentrating on the substance of

the witnesses' testimony, but at a Kastigar hearing the focus

is more narrow, not whether the witness is generally telling

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the truth but, instead, was he or she influenced by the

immunized testimony. Such a hearing obviously must take

place outside the jury's presence. In sum, Wright's testimony was undoubtedly damaging to Hylton. Putting the government to its burden to show that Wright was not influenced

to testify by exposure to Hylton's debriefing statement was,

so to speak, a freebie; it cost the defense nothing and the

possible benefit--the exclusion of Wright's testimony--was

undoubtedly significant.

There remains the question, how significant? Was Hylton

prejudiced? Hylton relies heavily on the fact that he was not

convicted in the first trial, which is relevant although not

dispositive. Compare United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d

1305, 1311 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2000), with id. at 1313 (Silberman,

J., dissenting). When assessing prejudice, we look to the full

record. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985);

United States v. Davis, 974 F.2d 182, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Here, the record discloses that Wright's testimony was an

integral part of the government's presentation: although the

theory of the case did not change from the first to the second

trial, Wright's testimony significantly improved the clarity

and strength of that presentation. It was thus imperative for

counsel to have done all that he could have to prevent that

testimony and Hylton's counsel overlooked the most obvious

technique.

The government, presumably realizing the depth of Kastigar water in which it is floundering seeks both indirectly and

directly to avoid Kastigar altogether. The government's

brief appears to challenge Judge Urbina's finding that Hylton's initial waiver was not knowing and intelligent by emphasizing Hylton's educational background. That is simply out of

bounds; the government never appealed that ruling, which it

could have done prior to trial, and it is much too late to do so

now.

The government's more direct--and sophisticated--effort

to escape the Kastigar framework is its argument that Kastigar should not apply to this case because Hylton's statement

was unquestionably voluntary whereas Kastigar was a ruling

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prompted by legislation compelling witnesses to testify upon

a grant of use immunity. It is the government's contention

that in a situation such as this one, even if the waiver was not

a knowing one, appellant is not entitled to the full Kastigar

protection against derivative use. Instead, he should be

treated as he would be if his statements came without the

required Miranda warning. Under those circumstances, his

own statement may not be used against him but derivative

use is not barred. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307

(1985).5

This is a very interesting argument, but it also comes too

late to be considered. Recall that both parties operated

under the assumption at the pre-trial proceedings before the

first trial that after Judge Urbina ruled that appellant's

consent to the debriefing was invalid Kastigar governed, and

it was in that context that stipulations were made to avoid a

Kastigar hearing. Again, the government did not appeal

Judge Urbina's ruling. So under those circumstances Kastigar's applicability became the law of the case. Cf. Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 F.2d

243, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (A "legal decision made at one stage

of litigation, unchallenged in a subsequent appeal when the

opportunity to do so existed, becomes the law of the case for

future stages of the same litigation, and the parties are

deemed to have waived the right to challenge that decision at

a later time."). Moreover, the government never even suggested this theory before Judge Penn at the post-second-trial

hearing, as counsel conceded at oral argument.

The government claims nevertheless that we are entitled to

affirm the district judge's denial of the post-trial motion on

any ground--including one never even suggested to Judge

Penn or Judge Urbina. That is not the law. For decades, we

__________

5 As a variation on this argument, the government also attempts to cast this case as a failed attempt at plea bargaining and

therefore that Kastigar should not apply. In support, the government points to Kilroy, 27 F.3d 679, in which we concluded that

Kastigar did apply. In any event, this variation as well comes too

late.

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have emphasized that "an argument not made in the lower

tribunal is deemed forfeited and will not be entertained

absent 'exceptional circumstances.' " Flynn v. Comm'r of

Internal Revenue Service, 269 F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (quoting Marymount Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 19 F.3d

658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). The government does not contend

that any of those circumstances are present here. To be

sure, we have affirmed on a ground that neither the government nor the district court "relied" on, United States v.

Garrett, 720 F.2d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1983), but that does not

mean that the argument was presented wholly fresh. The

government's reliance on United States v. Garces, 133 F.3d

70, 74-76 (D.C. Cir. 1998), is also misplaced. There we

simply explained that our reasoning "differ[ed] in detail from

that of the trial court and from the theories pressed by the

government," which did not suggest that the government has

a license to present entirely new arguments on appeal. Finally, the government's reliance on United States v. Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1995), in which the Second

Circuit decided a standing issue not previously raised, is

silly--standing goes to our jurisdiction and we have an independent obligation to determine whether a party has standing.

Abbenante's decision not to raise the Kastigar issue with

respect to Wright's testimony did not fall within the wide

range of effective counsel. And that error so tainted the trial

as to render suspect its outcome. We therefore reverse the

district court's decision to deny Hylton's motion for a new

trial and remand for a new trial.

So ordered.

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