Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-07058/USCOURTS-ca10-89-07058-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frank Dennis Felix
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

III THE UNITED STATES COURT OP APP£ALSu . p l L ~ 0 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT oned S:ate$ eotm; f)f AtJI'ftk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

FRANK DENNIS FELIX, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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renth Circuit 

I!"E:! 2 8 fl§f 

ROBERT L. HOECKeR 

Clerk 

No. 89-7058 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D. C. No. 89-16-CR) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

John Raley, United States Attorney, and Paul G. Hess, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Muskogee, Oklahoma, for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Scott M. Anderson, Dallas, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and ANDERSON, Circuit 

Judges. 

BOLLONAY, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 1 
In No. 89-7058, defendant Felix appeals his conviction in the 

United States District Court, Eastern District of Oklahoma, on 

various counts of a multi-count indictment charging him, inter 

alia, with conspiracy, manufacture, and possession with intent to 

distribute methamphetamine. He alleges that this conviction 

forced him to "run the gauntlet" again following a previous 

conviction in the United States District Court, Western District 

of Missouri, for a single count of attempt-to-manufacture 

methamphetamine, in violation of the protections afforded by the 

Double Jeopardy Clause as recently construed in Grady v. Corbin, 

u.s. __ , 110 s.ct. 2084 (1990). We agree that Felix has 

shown that his conviction on several counts in the Oklahoma trial 

entailed impermissible successive prosecutions for conduct 

underlying his Missouri conviction, and therefore we reverse his 

conviction on particular counts as enumerated below. 

I 

Defendant Felix was convicted following a jury trial in the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma for violations of 21 u.s.c. §§ 846 

and 841(a)(1) ("the Oklahoma trial"). 1 He had previously been 

1 

On February 16, 1989, Felix was named in an eleven count 

indictment. The specific charges against Felix were as follows: 

Count 1 charged Felix and others with conspiring to knowingly 

and intentionally manufacture methamphetamine/amphetamine; to 

knowingly and intentionally possess the same with intent to 

distribute; and to knowingly and intentionally distribute the 

same drug. This conspiracy was alleged to have occurred from on 

or about May 1, 1987, continuously to on or about August 31, 1987, 

in the Eastern District of Oklahoma and elsewhere; 

Count 2 charged Felix and others with unlawfully, knowingly 

and intentionally manufacturing methamphetamine on or about July 

13, 1987, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma; 

Count 3 alleged that Felix and others possessed with intent 

to distribute five and a quarter pounds of methamphetamine on or 

about July 13, 1987; 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 2 
convicted in the Western District of Missouri on a single count of 

attempt-to-manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 

§§ 84l(a)(l) and 846, ("the Missouri trial"). 2 Both convictions 

arose from the following course of conduct and events: 

Sometime in the Spring of 1987, a meeting (or meetings) 

between defendant Felix and unindicted co-conspirator Paul Roach 

resulted in an agreement whereby Felix would provide financing and 

other support to Roach, in exchange for Roach's instruction and 

assistance in "cooking" methamphetamine. A laboratory for the 

(Footnote continued): 

Count 4 charged that Felix and others on or about July 13, 

1987, knowingly and intentionally possessed approximately four 

gallons of methamphetamine oil with intent to manufacture 

methamphetamine~ 

Count 5 alleged that Felix and others on July 13, 1987, 

manufactured phenylacetone~ 

Count 6 alleged that Felix and codefendant Pinter from on or 

about June 1, 1987 to on or about July 13, 1987, in the Eastern 

District of Oklahoma, maintained and/or made available a place and 

enclosure for manufacturing methamphetamine/amphetamine; 

Count 9 alleged that on or about June 21, 1987, in the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma and elsewhere, Felix traveled in 

interstate commerce from Texas to the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

and elsewhere with intent to promote, etc. the manufacture of 

methamphetamine /amphetamine; and thereafter attempted to promote, 

etc. the management, establishment, etc. of the manufacture of 

methamphetamine/amphetamine; 

Count 10 charged that on or about July 13, 1987, in the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma and elsewhere, Felix willfully 

traveled in interstate commerce from Texas to the Eastern District 

of Oklahoma and elsewhere with with intent to promote, etc. the 

promotion, or carrying on manufacture by traveling from Texas to 

the Eastern District of Oklahoma, and thereafter attempted to 

promote, etc. the promotion, etc. the manufacture of 

methamphetamine. 

Defendant Felix was convicted on all these counts and 

received lengthy sentences. 

2 

The single count Missouri indictment, dated September 15, 

1987, charged Felix with attempting to manufacture 

methamphetamine from on or about August 26, 1987, to on or about 

August 31, 1987, in the Western District of Missouri and 

elsewhere. Felix' conviction on this single count conviction was 

affirmed by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Felix, 867 F.2d 

1068 (8th Cir. 1989). 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 3 
illegal enterprise was established in mobile trailers parked on an 

oil lease near Beggs, Oklahoma. 

Felix and Roach obtained the chemicals and equipment for the 

Beggs lab in Tulsa, from George Dwinnells, a DEA confidential 

informant operating out of Tulsa Scientific, a chemical company. 

As a result of information provide d by Dwinnells, the DEA seized 

the unattended Beggs lab on July 13, 1987, while a "cook" was in 

progress. Seized at the site were methamphetamine oil, illegal 

precursor chemicals, manufacturing equipment, and other evidence, 

some of which inculpated Felix. 

Shortly thereafter, Felix phoned Dwinnells and arranged a 

meeting in a Tulsa bar. At the bar, under the observation of DEA 

agents, Felix ordered more chemicals and equipment from Dwinnells, 

secured by a $7,500 down payment. At Felix' behest, Dwinnells 

transported the newly purchased chemicals and equipment by trailer 

to a hotel in Joplin, Missouri. Under t he watchful eyes of the 

DEA, tipped off by Dwinnells, a controlled transfer of the trailer 

and its contents to Felix occurred. He was arrested shortly 

thereafter. 

Felix was tried before a jury on the attempt-to-manufacture 

charge in Springfield, Missouri on November 30, 1987 and 

convicted. Before his April 1989 Oklahoma jury trial, Felix 

moved to dismiss the instant indictment on double jeopardy grounds 

arising from the Missouri conviction. See Defe ndant Felix' Plea 

of Double Jeopardy and Motion To Dismiss The Indi ctment, TR. Vol 

I, Tab 2. The trial judge in the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

denied Felix' motion by Order, dated March 20, 1989, holding: 

The § 846 offense in 

to Manufacture, in the 

. . . None of the 

this indictment is 

Eastern District 

other substantive 

4 

for Conspiracy 

of Oklahoma. 

counts charge 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 4 
Attempting To Manufacture, and they are all alleged to 

have occurred in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The 

court finds t he offenses herein are separate and 

distinct from defendant ' s conviction i n Missouri, and 

his double jeopardy argument is without merit. 

TR. Vol. I, Tab 24, at 9 (emphasis in original). 

II 

On appeal, Felix raises only one issue -- that he was 

subjected to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment, 

specifically the guarantee against being twice put on trial for 

the same offense. He premises this claim of error on the denial 

of his motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds. For 

reasons given below, we are convinced that the Double Jeopardy 

Clause as interpreted recently in Grady v. Corbin, u.s. 

-----' 110 s.ct. 2094 (1990) 1 requires the reversal of most of 

Felix' convictions. The trial judge did not have the benefit of 

that recent opinion. 

The Double Jeopardy Clause affords three guarantees: "It 

protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after 

acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same 

offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple 

punishments for t he same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 

U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted). Moreover, "it has long 

been understood that separate statutory crimes need not be 

identical -- either in constituent elements or in actual 

proof -- in order to be the same within the meaning of the 

constitutional prohibition." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 

(1977). It is the second protection that Felix relies upon, 

namely, that he not be forced to undergo successive prosecutions 

for the same conduct. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 5 
General double jeopardy analysis earlier focused on the 

so-called traditional "Blockburger test" which states that: 

[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation 

of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied 

to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is 

whether each prov~s~on requires proof of a fact which the 

other does not. 

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The focus 

of that test is on the elements of the crimes, and "[i]f each 

requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger 

test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the 

proof offered to establish the crimes." Ianelli v. United States, 

420 u.s. 770, 785 n.l7 (1975) (citation omitted). 

Recently, two significant opinions from the Supreme Court 

have shaped the double jeopardy analysis first, Dowling v. 

United States, u.s. _____ , 110 S.Ct. 668 (1990), decided 

January 10, and second, the Grady case decided on May 29, 1990. 

Grady in particular makes clear that the Double Jeopardy Clause 

protections extend beyond the limitations expressed in the much 

earlier Blockburger test. 

In Dowling, the defendant had been convicted of bank robbery 

in part on the basis of testimony of Mrs. Henry. Although she was 

not involved in the bank incident itself, her testimony supported 

the government's modus operandi evidence and established a link 

between Dowling and an alleged accomplice at the bank. There the 

bank robber had worn a mask and carried a small pistol. Mrs. 

Henry testified that during a burglary attempt at her home two 

weeks earlier, she had unmasked a man that she said was Dowling. 

The man she struggled with was similarly, although not 

identically, masked and armed as the bank robber. In a previous 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 6 
trial for burglary where Mrs. Henry testified as an eyewitness, 

Dowling had been acquitted. 

The Court rejected a claim that the Double 

and the Due Process Clause barred the use 

testimony at the bank robbery trial in light 

J e opardy Clause 

of Mrs. Henry's 

of the earlier 

acquittal. Writing for the majority, Justice White made clear 

that "The issue is the inadmissibility of Henry's testimony." The 

majority rejected Dowling's reliance on the double jeopardy 

principles established in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 u.s. 436 (1970), 

because in the Dowling case, the pri or acquittal "did not 

determine an ultimate issue in the prese nt case." 

Dowling's holding rests on two basic reasons. First, there 

was a lower standard of proof applicable to the use of Ms. Henry's 

modus operandi evidence than in the first trial involving Dowling. 

A jury might reasonably conclude that Dowling was the masked man 

who entered Mrs. Henry's home and gave Rule 404(b) application to 

the evi dence, even if it did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Dowling committed the crimes charged in the first trial. 

Second, the Court deemed the evidence admissible because Dowling 

had not demonstrated that his acquittal in his first tri al 

represented a jury determination that he was not one of the men 

who entered Mrs. He nry's home sufficient to justify application of 

Ashe's collateral estoppel protection. 110 s.ct. at 674. Dowling 

had actually not d i sputed his identity and instead argued that he 

was merely in Mrs. 

individual in the 

determination of an 

Ashe. 

Henry's 

house. 

issue 

home to retrieve money from an 

Thus, there was not the sharp 

in favor of Dowling as there was in 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 7 
Grady v. Corbin is a Double Jeopardy Clause application of 

much broader scope. In Grady, defendant Corbin, who had been 

drinking, drove his car across the center line and struck two 

oncoming vehicles, killing one person 

Although the assistant district attorney 

and 

had 

injuring 

responded 

another. 

to the 

accident and started an investigation, nevertheless, Corbin was 

issued two uniform traffic tickets for misdemeanor driving while 

intoxicated ("DWI") and failing to keep right of the median. 

Despite the investigation, Corbin's trial on the traffic tickets 

proceeded unimpeded. When the traffic court case was called, the 

prosecuting attorney was unaware that a death was involved and 

failed to object to the imposition of a minimal sentence after 

Corbin pled guilty. 

Two months later, a grand jury indicted Corbin for reckless 

manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent 

homicide, third degree assault, and DWI. In the bill of 

particulars, the three acts pled to establish the homicide and 

assault charges were (1) intoxicated driving, (2) failing to keep 

right of the median, and (3) driving too fast for weather and road 

conditions. Corbin's motion to dismiss the indictment on double 

jeopardy grounds was rejected, and he sought a writ of prohibition 

to bar prosecution on all counts. The Appellate Division denied 

the writ, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed. The DWI 

count was found barred by the state constitution, and the 

manslaughter counts were found to violate Blockburqer, as DWI was 

deemed a lesser included offense under state law. The remaining 

homicide and assault counts were barred on Fifth Amendment 

grounds, and were the sole subject of the Supreme Court's review. 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 8 
The Court barred Corbin's prosecution, using a two-step, 

double jeopardy analysis. The first step is the traditional 

analysis: 

To determine whether a subsequent prosecution is barred 

by the Double Jeopardy Clause, a court must first apply 

the traditional Blockburger test. If application of 

that test reveals that the offenses have identical 

statutory elements or that one is a lesser included 

offense of the other, then the inquiry must cease, and 

the subsequent prosecution is barred. 

Grady at 2090 (citing Brown). The Court noted, however, that the 

"Blockburger test is not the only standard for determining whether 

successive prosecutions impermissibly involve the same offense." 

110 S.Ct. at 2092 (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-167 

n.6 (1977)). The Grady opinion clearly defined a second step to 

the double jeopardy analysis: 

Thus, a subsequent prosecution must do more than merely 

survive the Blockburqer test. As we suggested in 

[Illinois v. VitaleJ, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars 

any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to 

establish an essential element of an offense charged in 

that prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an 

offense for which the defendant has already bee n 

prosecuted. This is not an "actual evidence" or "same 

evidence" test. The critical inquiry is what conduct 

the state will prove, not the evidence the state will 

use to prove that conduct. As we have held, the 

presence of specific evidence in one trial does not 

forever prevent the government from introducing that 

same evidence in a subsequent proceeding. See Dowling 

v. United States, 493 u.s. I 110 s.ct. 668, 107 

L.Ed.2d 708 (1990)." 

110 S.Ct. at 2093.3 

3 

Like Grady, this circuit has also relied on the reasoning in 

Vitale to expand double jeopardy analysis beyond the four corners 

of Blockburger's facts. See United States v. Genser, 710 F.2d 

1426, 1428-31 (lOth Cir. 1983) (reversing the defendant's 

conviction on double jeopardy grounds because the successively 

prosecuted charges of "distribution" and "dispensation" both 

required proof of "knowing or intentional delivery of a controlled 

substance"). Genser itself calls for the reversal of convictions 

as outlined below. 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 9 
As yet, few appellate courts have construed Grady, 4 but its 

intended breadth is obvious from its language. The Third Circuit 

has said that "the language employed by the [Grady] Court in its 

formulation of the 'same conduct' test could be interpreted as 

extending double jeopardy protection to all situations where the 

government intends again to prove conduct constituting an offense 

subject to an earlier conviction. •• United States v. Pungitore, 

910 F.2d 1084, 1110 (3d Cir. 1990). The Third Circuit, however, 

declined to adopt that stance believing that '[t]he double 

jeopardy analysis in Brown and Grady, . . , cannot easily be 

transposed to the RICO context[.]" Id . We note, however, that 

the Third Circuit's analysis stems from an approach to double 

jeopardy issues that this circuit has already rejected, and is 

th . . 5 us ~nappos~te. 

4 

See, ~, United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 

1990) (limiting Grady to "single act " crimes); United States v. 

Esposito, 912 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1990){same); United States v. 

Russo, 906 F.2d 77 (2nd Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reversing the 

defendant's conviction of obstructing justice under Grady where 

the conviction followed a previous aquittal for RICO conspiracy 

using the identical obstruction charge as a predicate offense). 

5 

The Third Circuit's approach bifurcates those cases which 

involve multiple criminal acts falling within a single statutory 

scheme (i.e. , CCE or RICO) from what may be deemed "single act " 

cases. See, ~, Pungitore at 1110-11. Under this approach, 

Garrett v. United States, 471 u.s. 773 (1985) (holding that 

conviction of both CCE and the underlying predicate offense does 

not violate double jeopardy) controls the former, and Grady 

controls only the latter. This Court, however, has already 

rejected adoption of different rules based on the ability to 

distinguish a series of events from a single event in the double 

jeopardy context. See ~, United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 

1280, 1292-93 (lOth Cir. 1988) (refusing to adopt the Ninth 

Circuit's "single act" rule on consecutive sentences because of 

the "difficulty in ascertaining what is and what is not a single 

course of conduct"). Moreover, the Third Circuit's view is 

predicated on statutory delineation of separable acts. We are 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 10 
We are in accord with the more recent application of Grady in 

United States v. Calderone and Catalano, Nos. 90-1122, 90-1123 

(2nd Cir. Oct. 24, 1990). There the Second Circuit reversed the 

district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss the 

indictment on double jeopardy grounds, one judge dissenting. At 

their first trial, Calderone and Catalano had been granted a 

directed verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence 

against them in an international, multi-drug smuggling conspiracy 

trial. Immediately after the directed verdict, the government 

filed a new indictment against them. The second indictment 

charged a narrower conspiracy to distribute heroin in New York 

City, along with 24 counts of telephone use to facilitate the 

crimes, and 3 counts of distribution. This "smaller" conspiracy 

overlapped the earlier one as to time and some overt acts. 

The Calderone court held that "the 'same conduct' test 

announced in Grady bars prosecution of all counts of the 

indictment." Slip op. at 7072. The court, as we do, found the 

scope of Grady to be of some breadth: "the 'same conduct' test 

announced in Grady applies to all double jeopardy claims arising 

in the context of successive prosecutions." Slip op. at 7075. 

More importantly, Calderone rejected the same argument advanced 

(Footnote continued): 

mindful , however, of the Supreme Court's statement in Brown v. 

Ohio that: "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile 

guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple 

expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or 

spatial units." Brown, 432 U.S. at 161. Thus, consistency with 

Savaiano, at a minimum, justifies our departure from the Third 

Circuit's approach. 

Conversely, even within the Third Circuit's framework, Grady 

still controls here. A federal drug conspiracy charge does not 

require proof of overt acts. Thus, this type of conspiracy is 

inherently the "single act" sort of crime which the Third Circuit 

finds controlled by Grady. See Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1110-11. 

11 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 11 
by the government here, namely, that the evidence presented at 

both trials was not used to prove the same conduct because the 

conduct proven was a distinct conspiratorial agreement. Se e 

Appellee's brief at 16-17. As explained in Calderone: 

[T]he "agreement" in nearly all conspiracy prosecutions 

is not proved directly, such as by the testimony of 

conspirators that "we agree to sell narcotics." Rather, 

the "agreement" is simply alleged, and to prove its 

existence the government presents evidence of the 

conspirator's conduct -- what they said and did -- and 

asks the jury to infer from this conduct that the 

criminal agreement has been established. The conduct in 

most conspiracy cases ... is the focus of the case . Under Grady, this conduct may not be prosecuted a second 

time in order to establish an "agreement" that differs 

from the first crime only in that the indictment happens 

to describe it differently. 

Slip op. at 7075-76. The government, then, cannot avoid the 

strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause merely by indicting and 

convicting Felix on statutorily distinct charges. 

As shown below, the fact that Felix' two trials constitute 

successive prosecutions arising from virtually the same conduct 

involving the same actors and overlapping time frames signals the 

need to apply the Grady double jeopardy analysis. A court should 

carefully apply double jeopardy analysis where a defendant's 

constitutional rights are threatened by prosecutors who have the 

opportunity to draft indictments in which they can allege 

apparently separate criminal conduct. See Calderone, slip op. 90-

1122, 1123 at 7076, 7077 (Newman, J., concurring). 

Considering, as we must, the proper application of both Grady 

and Dowling, we are persuaded that Grady lays down the principle 

which applies with special force here. Dowling and Grady are not 

contradictory and we can, and must, give full application to both 

holdings. Dowling concerned, as noted, the admissibility of 

12 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 12 
evidence in conformity with the collateral estoppel principle of 

Ashe6

; Grady concerned the protection afforded by the Double 

J e opardy Clause from successive prosecutions for the same conduct 

which is violative of criminal statutes. It is this latter 

protection under the Clause which is implicated here and this 

causes us to focus mainly on the teaching of Grady. We now turn 

to the facts of the instant case which we will consider under 

these principles. 

III 

Consideration of the record of the Oklahoma trial and the 

evidence summarized by the Eighth Circuit in the Missouri trial 

shows significant duplication of the conduct proved to establish 

the Missouri offense and most of the Oklahoma convictions. 

Evidence as to such conduct comes from the testimony of the 

following witnesses, presented at both trials: Paul Roach 

(Government Witness); George Dwinnells (DEA Confidential 

Informant); John Coonce (DEA agent); and Carolyn Ruybal (DEA 

chemist). Se e generally Felix, 867 F.2d at 1070-71; TR. Vol. V, 

317-76, 475-82; TR. Vol. VI, 792-93; TR. Vol. VII, 898, 912. 

The Eighth Circuit described the conduct found sufficient to 

convict Felix of the attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, in 

part, as follows: 

6 

With regard to the first element (criminal intent], 

evidence was presented that Felix actively learned to 

cook methamphetamine, toward that end supplied his 

The only link between the two crimes in Dowling was the fact 

that the defendant had allegedly been identified at the time of 

both of the crimes as similarly garbed. There was no same act or 

conduct at issue in the two prosecutions f or which Dowling could 

be criminally convicted. Rather, Dowling was charged with 

separate crimes, arising out of separate conduct. 

13 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 13 
instructor with methamphetamine-making chemicals and 

equipment, and eventually made methamphetamine at a lab 

near Beggs, Oklahoma. . • . Evidence further showed 

that Felix subsequently ordered enough chemicals and 

equipment to make several kilos of methamphetamine and 

that, upon receipt of the items, he planned to produce 

the drug at a lab of his own. Concerning the second 

element of attempt [a substantial step toward commission 

of the substantive attempt offense], the 

Government's evidence showed that, after learning how to 

make methamphetamine, Felix ordered the necessary 

chemicals and equipment, had a trailer full of the 

chemicals and equipment delivered to him, and paid 

$7,500 for the delivered goods •.. 

Felix, 867 F.2d at 1071 (citation omitted). 

In the subsequent prosecution in Oklahoma, a number of the 

counts in the indictment were based on proof of the same conduct. 

As to Count 1, the conspiracy charge, the duplication was 

extensive, contrary to Grady. In both trials it was proven that 

Felix met with Roach and agreed to furnish him chemicals and 

equipment so that under Roach's tutelage, methamphetamine could be 

produced. See Felix, 867 F.2d at 1070; and here, TR. Vol. V, 

317, 337-39, 341, 357, 373-76. Furthermore, it was proven at both 

trials that Felix met Dwinnells in a Tulsa bar, informed him of 

the Beggs lab bust, and gave him a $7,500 down payment with an 

order for chemicals and equipment to manufacture methamphetamine . 

Felix later called to increase his order, and instructed Dwinne1ls 

to deliver the chemicals and equipment to him in Joplin, Missouri. 

Felix then met Dwinnells in Joplin and took possession of the 

goods. See Felix, 867 F.2d at 1070-71 and n.4; and here, TR. 

Vol. V, 475-82; TR. Vol. VI, 792-93. This conduct was alleged in 

Overt Acts 17 and 18 of the Oklahoma conspiracy charge, Count 1, 

and was used to show that Felix had conspired to manufacture 

14 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 14 
methamphetamine in the 7 Oklahoma case. Previously in Missouri, 

however, the identical conduct established both the intent and 

"substantial step" elements of the attempt to manufacture 

methamphetamine charge. 

In fact, the government's response below to Felix' motion to 

dismiss on double jeopardy grounds makes clear the violation of 

the Grady principles: 

7 

The possession of chemicals and equipment necessary to 

the manufacture of methamphetamine, overt acts 17 and 18 

in the present indictment, was the activity leading to 

defendant's convict ion for attempted manufacture in the 

Western District of Missouri. 

We are mindful that 21 u.s.c. § 846 does not require proof of 

an overt act in the prosecution of a drug conspiracy. That does 

not mean, however, that we should disregard the conduct 

represented by the overt acts pled in the instant Oklahoma 

indictment. The proof of such conduct as is alleged in the overt 

acts in the Oklahoma case tended to show the criminal agreement 

for the conspiracy charged in Oklahoma, and thus was a significant 

part of the proof in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Some of 

the acts occurred elsewhere, but that was contemplated by the 

Oklahoma indictment which alleged in Count 1 a conspiracy in the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma "and elsewhere" from on or about May 

1, 1987, continuously to on or about August 1 , 1987 . 

The conduct alleged as the overt acts was before the Oklahoma 

trial jury as the very "actions in furtherance of that 

conspiracy,"~ TR. Vol. VII, 1001. Furthermore the government's 

closing argument expressly emphasized the relevance of the conduct 

described in overt acts 17 and 18 to the jury's determination of 

guilt. See id. at 1002, 1018. And DEA chemist Ruybal, who 

testified in both trials, conceded that the physical evidence 

admitted here included "the identical exhibits introduced at [the 

Missouri] proceeding[.]" Id. at 912. The indictment was read to 

the jury at the beginning of trial and f urnished to the jury with 

the instructions. VII R. 1070. Thus, Felix' conduct as to the 

purchase of chemicals and equipment in the Tulsa bar and the 

delivery of the same in Joplin, Missouri, was proven and argued in 

the successive trials as a basis for the successive convictions. 

This circumstance is similar to that discussed by Judge 

Newman in his concurring opinion in United States v. Calderone and 

Catalano, 917 F.2d at ____ . In Calderone, Judge Newman said that 

the government was contending that the defendant "committed these 

[overt ] acts in furthernce of the Adamita conspiracy and that 

these acts showed their participation in that conspiracy." 

15 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 15 
Government Response below, p.2 (emphasis added). 

In addition to the overlap in the conduct giving rise to the 

successive prosecutions, the two offenses did not involve distinct 

persons, places, or times. Both prosecutions focused on Felix and 

Roach as the actors. Both prosecutions presented evidence of acts 

occurring outside the borders of the respective states in which 

the trials took place. The instant indictment alleged that the 

conspiracy took place in the "Eastern District of Oklahoma and 

elsewhere." United States v. Felix, Indictment No. 89-16-CR 

(emphasis added). Similarly, the indictment alleged that one of 

the means of the conspiracy was to manufacture drugs for 

distribution in the "Eastern District of Oklahoma and elsewhere." 

Id. (emphasis added). Overt act No. 18 alleged that on August 31, 

1987, Felix, "while at a location in Missouri, possessed chemicals 

and equipment necessary in the manufacture of methamphetamine." 

Finally, the relevant time frames of the two indictments also 

overlap. The Missouri prosecution was premised on conduct that 

occurred from the spring of 1987 to August 31, 1987. Felix, 867 

F.2d at 1070. The Oklahoma prosecution was premised on conduct 

that occurred from "about" May 1, 1987 to August 31, 1987 (Count 

1); and on July 13, 1987 (Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5). 

Accordingly, under the clear principle pronounced in Grady 

against successive prosecutions for the same conduct, we hold that 

the successive prosecution of Felix in Oklahoma for the same 

conduct for which he was previously convicted in Missouri violated 

the Double Jeopardy Clause. Thus the Count 1 conspiracy 

conviction of Felix in the instant case cannot stand. 

16 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 16 
As to the substantive offenses charged in Counts 2 through 5, 

in both trials it was proven that Roach and Felix bought chemicals 

and equipment from Dwinnells at Tulsa Scientific for the purpose 

of manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine. See Fel ix, 867 

F.2d at 1070-71; and here, TR .. Vol. v, 346-48, 356. They used 

these chemicals and equipment to create precursor chemicals (~, 

methamphetamine oil and phenylacetone), which in turn were 

subsequently used to generate methamphetamine at the Beggs, 

Oklahoma lab. Felix, 867 F.2d at 1070-71; and here, TR .. Vol. 

v, 346-48, 354-56, 360-62, 367-68, 370-71. This conduct served to 

establish the intent element of the attempt to manufacture 

methamphetamine in the Missouri trial; it also served as factual 

support for Felix' convictions in Oklahoma of possessing precursor 

chemicals (Counts 4 and 5), and manufacturing and possessing with 

intent to distribute methamphetamine (Counts 2 and 3). Hence, 

Felix' conviction on these Counts must also be reversed. 

Likewise Count 6 of the Oklahoma indictment clearly was a 

successive prosecution for conduct that was the subject of the 

Missouri prosecution. Count 6 here charged that from on or about 

June 1, 1987, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, Felix and codefendant Pinter maintained and/or made available a place and 

enclosure for manufacturing methamphetamine/amphetamine. Proof 

during the Oklahoma trial included Roach's testimony that he knew 

Felix in about May 1987, V R. 316; that in Texas Felix discussed 

finding a place to set up "the lab," id. at 337; Felix said he 

wanted Roach to take some of the glassware to Okmulgee, Oklahoma; 

Roach met a man named B. J. (codefendant Pinter) there and they 

went to a location near Beggs, Oklahoma (which is in Okmulgee, 

17 

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 17 
County), id. at 344; Felix showed up and they discussed the 

glassware, id. at 346-47; Felix and Roach went to Tulsa and 

bought glassware, id. at 347-48; after Father's Day, Felix and 

Roach had conversations at the lab site and Felix and Roach "just 

kind of worked together on [throwing away trash at the lab site]." 

Id. at 368. Dennis [Felix] paid Roach $4,000 cash for Roach's 

part of the lab work; they did 4, 5 or maybe 6 cooks. Id. at 

370. 

This proof offered to support Count 6 of the Oklahoma 

indictment was close to that outlined in the Eighth Circuit Felix 

opinion on Roach's testimony that Felix furnished Roach 

methamphetamine-making chemicals during the Spring of 1987; that 

he and Felix bought chemicals and equipment in Tulsa and 

eventually cooked methamphetamine in a trailer near Beggs; and 

that on July 13, 1987, officers seized the trailer near Beggs. 

Felix, 867 F.2d at 1070. The evidence of this conduct was 

identified by the Eighth Circuit as presented in connection with 

the essential elements of the attempt to manufacture 

methamphetamine prosecution in the Missouri federal case: (1) an 

intent to engage in the criminal conduct; and (2) conduct 

constituting a "substantial step" toward the substantive offense, 

strongly corroborating the actor's criminal intent. Felix, 867 

F.2d at 1071. The subsequent Oklahoma trial on such evidence of 

knowingly maintaining a place for manufacturing the controlled 

substance (see allegations of Count 6, note 1, supra) thus 

subjected Felix to a successive trial for the same conduct, 

contrary to Grady. Thus the Count 6 conviction also cannot stand. 

18 

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We conclude, however, that the defendant Felix has not shown 

grounds for disturbing his convictions and sentences on Counts 9 

and 10. The defendant bears the burden of proving a double 

jeopardy claim. United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 665 (lOth 

Cir. 1989). Count 9 charged interstate travel on or about June 

21, 1987 from Texas to the Eastern District of Oklahoma and 

elsewhere with intent to promote, etc., the management, etc., of 

manufacture of methamphetamine/amphetamine. Count 10 made similar 

allegations of interstate travel on or about July 13, 1987, from 

Texas to the Eastern District of Oklahoma and elsewhere with the 

intent to promote, etc., the same unlawful conduct. The closest 

that the conduct outlined in the Eighth Circuit Felix opinion gets 

to the conduct charged in the instant Counts 9 and 10 is presented 

by an allegation that on July 13, 1987, law enforcement officers 

seized the trailer near Beggs, Oklahoma; that Felix instructed 

Dwinnells to delive r chemicals and equipment to the Joplin, 

Missouri Holiday Inn; that Felix and Dwinnells met at that motel 

where Felix had rented a room; and that a controlled delivery was 

arranged to be made in Joplin on August 31, 1987. 867 F.2d at 

1070-71. 

We cannot agree that the double jeopardy claim was 

established as to the Count 9 and 10 convictions and sentences, 

which was a burden the defendant Felix had to carry. 8 

8 

At first glance, the rerna~n~ng counts: 9 and 10 (interstate 

travel to promote manufacturing) seem akin to the telephone counts 

also barred in Calderone. Arguably, they also "allege[] as an 

element the facilitation of the conspiracy charged in count one." 

Slip op. at 7086 (Newman, J., concurring). We are not, however, 

inclined to go so far on the record before this Court. 

19 

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In sum, we conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 

Fifth Amendment barred defendant Felix' successive prosecution on 

Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Oklahoma indictment and his 

convictions, sentences, and special $50 assessments on those 

Counts are REVERSED. His convictions on Counts 9 and 10 need not 

be disturbed and are AFFIRMED; however, the case is remanded for 

re-sentencing on said Counts 9 and 10. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

20 

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89-7058, United States of America v. Frank Dennis Felix 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I respectfully dissent. 

Frank Dennis Felix was convicted in the United States 

District Court for the Western District of Missouri of attempting 

to manufacture methamphetamine. See United States v. Felix, 867 

F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming the conviction). But 

nothing in the Double Jeopardy Clause, or the Supreme Court 

jurisprudence interpreting that provision, barred Felix's 

subsequent prosecution in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma for geographically and temporally 

separate acts that violated federal drug laws. In holding that 

the Double Jeopardy Clause requires reversal of six of Felix's 

drug convictions, the majority overlooks the plain language of the 

Supreme Court's recent holding in Grady v. Corbin, 110 s.ct. 2084 

{1990), and adopts a dangerously broad interpretation of the 

Double Jeopardy Clause. 

I. The Grady Rule 

The majority relies upon the Supreme Court's recent decision 

in Grady v. Cor bin, 110 S.Ct. 2084 (1990). This reliance is 

misplaced. The majority opinion mischaracterizes Grady's rule. 

The majority refers to a bar against: ••significant duplication of 

conduct proved," Proposed Majority Opinion at 13, "counts in the 

indictment ••. based on proof of the same conduct," id. at 14, 

and "successive trial[s] for the same conduct." Id. at 18. The 

majority similarly cites "the clear principle pronounced in Grady 

against successive prosecutions for the same conduct." Id. at 16. 

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The Grady Court, however, did not establish a "same conduct" 

rule. 1 By its plain language, Grady only bars subsequent prosecutions 

in which the government, to establish an essential 

element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will 

prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the 

defendant has already been prosecuted. 

Grady v. Corbin, 110 S.Ct. at 2093 (emphasis added). This 

language comprises several crucial elements, none of which the 

majority discusses or applies because it lumps them together into 

a "same conduct" test. The majority further confuses the matter 

by switching, with no explanation, to a comparison of the evidence 

presented at each trial, an approach explicitly rejected by Grady. 

110 s.ct. at 2093. 

Under Grady's plain language, the proper approach begins by 

identifying the conduct sought to be proved in the instant 

prosecution, as set forth in the indictment. Once that is 

ascertained, two important questions must be answered: (1) is 

this conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant 

has already been prosecuted? and (2) is it being proven to 

establish an essential element of the offense for which the 

defendant is being prosecuted? The Grady rule bars the instant 

1 The majority begins its double jeopardy analysis on the wrong 

foot when it equates the term "same offense" found in North 

Carolina v. Pearce, 395 u.s. 711, 717 (1969), with "same conduct." 

Proposed Majority Opinion at 5. Although both the Second Circuit, 

United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (1990), and the Third 

Circuit, United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (1990), also 

style the Grady rule as the "same conduct" test, they do not apply 

the majority's simplified analysis to the facts of those cases. 

As the majority opinion evidences, this characterization risks 

misapplication of the rule because it suggests that the Double 

Jeopardy Clause analysis entails a simple comparison between any 

conduct that the government seeks to prove in two prosecutions. 

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prosecution only if the answer to both questions is affirmative. 

There are important sub-parts to each of the two questions. Under 

the first question, for example, the conduct may not "constitute 

an offense. " Or, even if it does constitute an offense, it may 

not have been an offense "for which the defendant had already been 

prosecuted." Under the second question, it may be that the 

conduct does not "establish" an essential element, or it may 

establish an element that is not "essential." 

It is not for this court to re-write Grady's rule. We must 

give meaning to each of its elements. When that is done, the rule 

does not bar Felix's prosecution in Oklahoma. 

II. Counts 2 through 6 

The majority reverses Felix's convictions on Counts 2 through 

6. The stated rationale is that much of Felix's conduct serving 

as the basis for these Oklahoma convictions had been introduced 

into evidence at Felix's trial in Missouri. 

But the Grady rule does not bar subsequent proof of all 

conduct introduced into evidence in a previous trial. Grady only 

bars the prosecution in a subsequent trial from proving "conduct 

that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already 

been prosecuted." Grady v. Corbin, 110 S.Ct. at 2093. As the 

rule suggests, the conduct alleged in the subsequent prosecution 

in Grady constituted separately cognizable offenses for which 

Corbin had already been prosecuted. 2 

2 Those separately cognizable offenses were 1) driving while 

intoxicated, and 2) failing to keep right of the median. Grady v. 

Corbin, 110 s.ct. at 2088, 2094. 

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In contrast, Felix had never been prosecuted for the conduct 

alleged in Counts 2 through 6 of the Oklahoma prosecution. Each 

of those counts was based on Felix's conduct on or before July 13, 

1987, in establishing and operating the methamphetamine lab in 

Beggs, Oklahoma. R. Vol. I at Tab 1. In the Missouri trial, 

however, Felix had only been prosecuted for his conduct "[f]rom on 

or about August 26, 1987, to on or about August 31, 1987," over a 

month after the July 13 DEA seizure of the Beggs lab. Missouri 

Indictment, R. Supp. Vol. II at 1. 

Evidence regarding Felix's involvement with the Beggs lab was 

admitted in the Missouri trial under Rule 404(b) of the Federal 

Rules of Evidence3 as "highly probative of Felix's knowledge and 

intent." United States v. Felix, 867 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 

1989). In its instructions to the jury, the District Court in 

Missouri emphasized that Felix was not being prosecuted for the 

earlier Oklahoma acts: 

You have heard evidence that the defendant previously committed a crime similar to the one charged in 

this case. You may not use this evidence to decide 

whether the defendant carried out the physical acts 

involved in the crime charged here. However, if you are 

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, by other evidence, 

that the defendant did carry out the physical acts 

i nvolved in the crime charged here, then you may 

consider this evidence only on the question of motive, 

opportunity, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or 

absence of mistake. 

United States v. Felix, 867 F . 2d at 1074-75 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 

404(b)) (emphasis added). 

3 Fed. R. Evid 404(b) provides, in pertinent part: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is .•. admissible . as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence or mistake or accident." 

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It is clear that Felix was not prosecuted in the Missouri 

case for the conduct that the government proved with respect to 

Counts 2 through 6 of the Oklahoma prosecution. Introducing 

404(b) evidence of a prior bad act is not prosecution for that 

act. United States v. Van Cleave, 599 F.2d 954, 957 (lOth Cir. 

1979) (evidence of conduct for which the defendant had already 

been prosecuted "was not introduced for the purpose of retrying 

[him;] it was introduced to prove motive and intent in connection 

with ••• the charge for which he was then on trial"). As the 

Supreme Court explained in Grad~, 

The critical inquiry is what conduct the State will 

prove, not the evidence the State will use to prove that 

conduct. As we have held, the presentation of specific 

evidence in one trial does not forever prevent the 

government from introducing the same evidence in a 

subsequent proceeding. See Dowling v. United States, 

493 u.s.- (1990). 

Grad~ v. Corbin, 110 S.Ct. at 2093. 

In holding that Grady mandates the reversal of Counts 2 

through 6, the majority goes far beyond what the Supreme Court 

intended. First, the majority seems to require what the Supreme 

Court explicitly rejected: "that all charges against a defendant 

growing out of a single criminal transaction be tried in one 

proceeding." Grady v. Corbin, 110 S.Ct. at 2094, n.lS (quoting 

Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), 

reh'g denied, 110 S.Ct. 12 (1989)). Even this "same transaction" 

test, however, would not bar Felix's Oklahoma prosecution for 

Counts 2 through 6. His involvement in manufacturing 

methamphetamine at the lab in Beggs, Oklahoma, was temporally and 

geographically separate from his subsequent attempt to manufacture 

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methamphetamine in Missouri, which occurred over a month after the 

Beggs lab was raided. In no sense were these events "a single 

criminal transaction." Id. 4 

Second, the majority's interpretation of Grady effectively 

eviscerates Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The majority equates the 

introduction of 404(b) prior bad act evidence with prosecution for 

the bad acts. If that were the case, prosecutors could never 

introduce 404(b) evidence in situations where the defendant had 

already been prosecuted for the bad act without violating the 

Double Jeopardy Clause. Moreover, if Rule 404(b) evidence were 

allowed (because the conduct had not been prosecuted), it could 

never be introduced again without violating the Double Jeopardy 

Clause. It is inconceivable that the Grady Court, without any 

such indication, would limit so drastically the application of 

Rule 404 (b). 

Actually, the Supreme Court implicitly rejected such an incongruous interpretation of Rule 404(b) in Dowling v. United 

States, 110 s.ct. 668 (1990). 5 At Dowling's trial for robbing a 

4 The majority obfuscates the delineation between Felix's 

involvement in the Beggs laboratory and his subsequent attempt to 

set up another laboratory by describing the facts as a "course of 

conduct and events." Proposed Majority Opinion at 3. One could 

characterize a lifetime criminal's entire career in this fashion, 

but it would not mean the government, under the Double Jeopardy 

Clause, could only prosecute him once. 

5 While the dissenters in Grady express their opinion that the 

decision is inconsistent with Dowling, ~ 110 S.Ct. at 2095-96 

(O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2102 (Scalia, J., with whom 

Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J., join, dissenting), the Grady 

majority gives no such indication. In fact, the opinion cites to 

Dowling for the proposition that "the presentation of specific 

evidence in one trial does not forever prevent the government from 

introducing that same evidence in a subsequent proceeding." Grady 

v. Corbin, 110 s.ct. at 2093. Given this citation, and, "in the 

-6-

Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 26 
bank while wearing a ski mask and carrying a small pistol, a witness testified that a similarly masked and armed man broke into 

her home about two weeks after the bank robbery, that a struggle 

ensued, and that she unmasked the intruder, whom she identified as 

Dowling. The government offered this 404(b) evidence in order to 

strengthen its identification of Dowling as the bank robber. 

Dowling v. United States, 110 s.ct. at 670. The residential 

burglary was an offense for which Dowling had already been 

prosecuted and acquitted. But the Supreme Cou~ held that 

introducing the 404(b) testimony did not violate the Double 

Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 672-73. 6 

In short, nothing in Supreme Court's Double Jeopardy 

jurisprudence supports the reversal of Felix's convictions on 

Counts 2 through 6. 

face of the challenge raised in the dissents, [Grady] should be 

read, if at all possible, not to overrule Dowling." United States 

v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717, 724 (2d Cir. 1990) (Newman, J., 

concurring). 

6 The majority attempts to distinguish Dowling by suggesting 

that it only involved a question regarding the admissibility of 

evidence. The evidentiary question, however, was whether 

admission under Rule 404(b) of Dowling's prior bad act, for which 

he had already been tried and acquitted, violated the Double 

Jeopardy Clause. 

In holding that it did not, the Court pointed to one of the 

many differences between introducing 404(b) evidence of a bad act 

and prosecution for that act: Rule 404(b) evidence is governed by 

a lesser standard of proof. Dowling v. United States, 110 s.ct. at 

672-73. The standard for Rule 404{b), recently reaffirmed in 

Huddleston v. United States, 485 u.s. 681, 689 (1988), is whether 

"the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that 

the defendant was an actor." This is obviously far less exacting 

than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applicable to the 

actual offense. 

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III. Count 1: Conspiracy 

The majority further demonstrates a disregard for the plain 

language of Grady's rule in reversing Felix's conviction on the 

conspiracy count. The stated rationale is that the conspiracy 

count was premised on conduct for which Felix had been previously 

prosecuted in Missouri. Proposed Majority Opinion at 16. But 

this is neither a correct statement nor a correct application of 

Grady's rule. It bears repeating that Grady's rule only bars 

situations in which the prosecution, 

to establish an essential element of an offense charged 

in that prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes 

an offense for which the defendant had already been 

prosecuted. 

Grady v. Corbin, 110 S.Ct. at 2093. In reversing the conspiracy 

count, the majority does not once cite to or apply this actual 

language. As a result, the majority overlooks both of its crucial 

elements. 

A. 

As with Counts 2 through 6, the conduct in question here does 

not "constitute an offense for which the defendant has already 

been prosecuted." Grady v. Corbin, 110 S .Ct. at 2093. 

Here, too, the majority mistakenly focuses on the overlap of 

evidence presented at each trial. See Proposed Majority Opinion 

at 13-15. This approach blurs the distinction described in Grady 

between previously prosecuted conduct and evidence used to prove 

that conduct. The majority opinion, for example, states "The Missouri prosecution was premised on conduct that occurred from the 

spring of 1987 to August 31, 1987." Proposed Majority Opinion at 

16. To support this statement, it cites to the Eighth Circuit's 

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review of the Missouri conviction. The cited text, however, is 

the Eighth Circuit's discussion of the evidence admitted at trial 

(including the Rule 404(b) evidence discussed above in Section 

II). See United States v. Felix, 867 F.2d at 1070. As 

demonstrated above, the indictment reveals that Felix was only 

prosecuted for conduct committed "[f]rom on or about August 26, 

1987, to on or about August 31, 1987 •• II R. Supp. Vol. II at 

1. Felix had not already been prosecuted for his conduct prior to 

August 26. 

The more difficult question is raised by the two overt acts 

alleged in Count 1 that did occur between August 26 and 31, 1987. 

Two of the eighteen overt acts alleged in this conspiracy count 

were: 

17. On August 26, 1987, FRANK DENNIS FELIX, while in 

Tulsa, Oklahoma, provided money for the purchase of 

chemicals and equipment necessary in the manufacture of 

methamphetamine. 

18. On August 31, 1987, FRANK DENNIS FELIX, while at a 

location in Missouri, possessed chemicals and equipment 

necessary in the manufacture of methamphetamine. 

R. Vol. I, Tab 1 at 3-5. 

Whether these acts constitute the offense for which Felix had 

been prosecuted in Missouri depends on how far one is willing to 

expand the meaning of the word "offense." Felix was prosecuted 

for attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. R. Supp. Vol. II at 

1. The attempt offense consists of two elements: 

(1) an intent to engage in criminal conduct, and (2) 

conduct constituting a "substantial step" towards the 

commission of the substantive offense which strongly 

corroborates the actor's criminal intent. 

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United States v. Felix, 867 F.2d at 1071 (quoting United States v. 

Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1982)). Overt acts 17 and 18 

of the Oklahoma indictment do not constitute the attempt offense. 

At most, the two acts constitute the second element of the attempt 

offense: the "substantial step" towards commission of the 

substantive crime. 

The Second Circuit has interpreted the word "offense" 

broadly. It has held that Grady bars the subsequent prosecution 

from proving "conduct constituting the entirety of a previously 

prosecuted offense (as in Grady), or the entirety of an element of 

such an offense, or the entirety of an element of a distinct 

component of such an offense." United States v. Calderone, 917 

F.2d 717, 725 (2d Cir. 1990) {Newman, J., concurring). However, 

in the absence of any indication from the Supreme Court that it 

intended such a liberal interpretation of the word "offense," I 

would not adopt such an expansive holding. Applying Grady's plain 

language, the two overt acts do not constitute the attempt offense 

for which Felix was already prosecuted in Missouri. 

B. 

Moreover, proof of the two overt acts at issue did not 

"establish an essential element" of the offense for which Felix 

was being prosecuted. Count 1 charged Felix and three other 

individuals with conspiring to manufacture, possess with intent to 

distribute, and distribute methamphetamine. R. Vol. I, Tab 1 at 

1-2. The essential elements of conspiracy are as follows: 

The essence of the crime of conspiracy is an agreement 

to violate the law. The evidence •.• need only 

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Appellate Case: 89-7058 Document: 01019726468 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 30 
establish the existence of a conspiracy and that a 

defendant knowingly contributed his efforts in furtherance thereof. 

United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1293 (lOth Cir. 1988) 

(citations omitted) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 

836 (1988). "[A]n overt act is not a necessary element of 

conspiracy under the federal drug enforcement statutes." rd. at 

1294 (emphasis added). 

One position, then, would be that since overt acts are not an 

essential element of the conspiracy offense, Grady does not bar 

their introduction. But such a conclusion does not fully apply 

Grady's plain language. It is arguable that the two overt acts, 

while not themselves an essential element, were introduced by the 

prosecution to establish an essential element: the agreement to 

violate the drug laws. Indeed, although "[t]he essence of the 

crime of conspiracy is an agreement to violate the law[,] •• 

[t]he nature of the offense of conspiracy with its attendant 

aspects of secrecy, often requires that elements of the crime be 

established by circumstantial evidence." Id. at 1293. 

Careful scrutiny, however, reveals that the overt acts at 

issue here did not meaningfully "establish" an essential element 

of the conspiracy. The indictment reveals that the crux of the 

Oklahoma conspiracy concerned the conspirators' activities surrounding the Beggs lab. The two overt acts encompass Felix's illegal activity after the government seized the Beggs lab. Nothing 

in the evidence links any of Felix's co-conspirators to his 

subsequent attempt to manufacture methamphetamine in Missouri. In 

other words, the two overt acts do not "establish" an agreement 

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between Felix and his co-conspirators in Oklahoma, nor do they 

"establish" any contribution to the Oklahoma conspiracy. 7 

The majority incorrectly relies on United States v. Calderone 

to support its reversal of the conspiracy conviction. See 

Proposed Majority Opinion at 11. Examination of the three 

opinions filed in that case reveals that the Calderone panel would 

not have reversed Felix's conviction on this count. Judge Newman, 

in his concurring opinion, explicitly rejected the interpretation 

of "establish" that the majority in this case adopts. 

[W]e are obliged to apply Grady in a way that gives the 

"element" component significance. That means barring 

the second prosecution only when the conduct previously 

prosecuted is to be used to "establish" the element of 

the second crime, which I think must mean "constitute 

the entirety of" the element. If Grady is read more 

broadly, that is, if the second prosecution is barred 

whenever the previously prosecuted conduct is to be used 

only as evidence of an element of the second offense, 

then we would almost be applying a "same evidence" test. 

[It is] more likely that the Supreme Court expected 

Grady to apply only when the conduct prosecuted at the 

first trial is or may constitute the entirety of an 

element of the offense at the second trial. 

United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d at 724 (footnote omitted) 

(emphasis in original). 8 Judge Newman corre ctly adopte d this 

7 Obviously, the contours of what conduct "establishes" an 

essential element will have to be determined by courts applying 

Grady's rule. I do not dispute that some line-drawing will 

eventually be necessary. This, however, does not present a close 

case. In no sense did the two overt acts at issue "establish" the 

conspiracy, or any of its essential elements. 

8 It is clear that Judge Miner, in dissent, not only agrees 

with this interpretation of "establish," but also holds to the 

literal language of the rest of the Grady rule. Id. at 726-29 

(Miner, J., dissenting). Judge Pratt, who wrote the opinion of 

the court, does not explicitly address the "establish" element of 

Grady. He repeatedly emphasizes his concern, however, that the 

two prosecutions in that case--which were both for drug 

conspiracies--were prosecutions for the same offense disguised 

only by different descriptions of the requisite conspiracy 

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position in order not to conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling. Id. at 724. 

In addition, the majority attempts to distinguish the Third 

Circuit's interpretation of Grady in United States v. Pungitore, 

910 F.2d 1084, 1109 (3d Cir. 1990). The majority adopts the 

interpretation of Grady that the Pungitore court specifically 

rejected. This is justified, we are told, because the Third 

Circuit's approach is based upon a "bifurcation" of the Double 

Jeopardy analysis that the Tenth Circuit has already rejected. 

See Proposed Majority Opinion at 10. 

In reality, the Third Circuit's treatment of Grady is less 

about "bifurcation" than it is about how far Grady's rule should 

be extended beyond its reasoning. The Pungitore court's 

reluctance to apply Grady "expansively," id. at 1110, was based on 

an examination of Grady, its precedential roots, and another 

Supreme Court case. And our supposed "rejection" of Pungitore's 

approach, United States v . Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280 (lOth Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 488 u.s. 836 (1988), is a pre-Grady case that 

confirms the permissibility, under the Double Jeopardy Clause of 

agreement. Id. at 721 ( 11 this conduct may not be prosecuted a 

second time in order to establish an 'agreement' that differs from 

the first crime only in that the indictment happens to describe it 

differently"). Here, not only are the substantive offenses 

different, they also contemplate different times, places, and 

actors. 

The Second Circuit has subsequently expanded Calderone beyond 

the limitations of Judge Newman's concurrence. In United States 

v. Gambino, 920 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990), the panel abandoned any 

analysis of the "establish" element. Id. at 1112. To the extent 

Gambino declines to correctly apply this and other elements of the 

Grady rule, I find the decision incorrect. 

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prosecuting a defendant for both attempt and conspiracy offenses 

arising from the same conduct. 

The question in Pungitore was whether the Grady rule barred a 

successive prosecution for a compound-complex felony when the 

defendant had already been prosecuted for one of the predicate 

offenses. United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1109. The 

Third Circuit noted that both Grady and the cases upon which it 

relied for its reasoning, Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980) 

and Brown v. Ohio, 432 u.s. 161 (1977), involved a "discrete 

criminal event." Id. at 1110. The court also noted that the Brown 

Court, much like the Grady Court, was concerned with the practice 

of avoiding the Double Jeopardy Clause by "the simple expedient of 

dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial 

units." Id. (quoting and adding emphasis to Brown v. Ohio, 432 

u.s. at 169). 

The Third Circuit recognized, however, that some crimes are 

"made up of 'a series of temporal or spatial units,'" id., and 

that the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett v. United States, 471 

u.s. 773 (1985), reh'q denied, 473 u.s. 927 (1985), was "more 

closely analagous" to the question before them. In Garrett, the 

Supreme Court held that a continuous criminal enterprise (CCE) 

offense and its predicate offenses are separately punishable, and 

that "prosecution for a CCE offense after an earlier prosecution 

for a predicate offense is constitutional under the Double 

Jeopardy Clause." Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. at 786. 

Although decided before Grady, Garrett distinguished Grady's 

predecessor, Brown v. Ohio, as involving a "single course of 

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conduct--driving a stolen car." Id. at 787. That single act had 

supported prosecutions of a defendant for both joyriding and 

theft. This was unacceptable because "(e]very moment of his 

conduct was as relevant to the joyriding charge as it was to the 

auto theft charge," Id. Conversely, the CCE offense before the 

Garrett Court "spanned 5! years and several states," while the 

predicate offense indictment specified only several days within a 

two month period. United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1111. 

The Garrett Court cautioned against "ready transposition" of the 

"principles of double jeopardy from the classically simple situation presented in Brown to the multilayered conduct, both as to 

time and to place, involved in this case." Garrett v. United 

States, 471 u.s. at 789. 

The Third Circuit concluded that "Grady, which finds its 

roots in 'single transaction' cases such as Brown, is no more applicable in the instant circumstances than Brown was in Garrett." 

United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1111. This holding was 

not based upon "an approach to double jeopardy issues that this 

circuit has already rejected," as the majority claims. Proposed 

Majority Opinion at 10. To the contrary, the Third Circuit's 

holding was based upon the Supreme Court's de cision in Garrett. 

And, as the Third Circuit noted, nothing in Grady indicates an 

intention to overrule Garrett. 9 United States v. Pungitore, 910 

F.2d at 1111 n.29. 

9 The Third Circuit also applied Garrett in United States v. 

Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 63-65 (1990) (rejecting a Double Jeopardy 

challenge to prosecution for predicate acts after the RICO 

prosecution and discussing both Garrett and Grady at length). 

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The Tenth Circuit case that the majority cites--United States 

v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280 (lOth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 

u.s. 836 (1988)--does not reject the approach of either Garrett or 

Pungitore. In Savaiano, we held that "separate sentences may be 

imposed for dual convictions of conspiracy and attempt under [21 

u.s.c. §] 846," id. at 1293, regardless of whether the underlying 

conduct could be characterized as "a single act, course of 

conduct, or transaction." Id. at 1292 (citing with disapproval 

United States v. Touw, 769 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1985)). We 

refused to categorize the underlying conduct because its category 

was irrelevant: "Once conspiracy and attempt are identified as 

separate crimes, separate punishment follows, just as separate 

punishment may be imposed for convictions on conspiracy and the 

completed crime." rd. at 1293 . 10 Thus, if it rejects anything, 

Savaiano rejects the interpretation that the majority adopts 

today. 

The majority could learn from the Third Circuit's reluctance 

to extend Grady beyond its roots. The reasoning behind Garrett 

similarly applies to prosecutions for conspiracy. Like compoundcomplex felonies, conspiracy often involves "multilayered conduct, 

both as to time and to place. "11 Garrett v. United States, 471 

10 While we further commented that the Ninth Circuit's 

categorization approach guaranteed additional litigation and 

provided little guidance to the parties or the district courts, 

United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d at 1293, this dicta did not 

constitute our ratio decidendi, and was limited to the narrow 

issue before us in Savaiano. At any rate, we were (and are) not 

in a position to "reject" the Supreme Court precedent embodied in 

Garrett. 

11 Here , Felix's Oklahoma conspiracy indic tment spanned four 

months, while the prior Missouri attempt indictment confined 

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u.s. at 789. The majority's position would prohibit any 

temporally separate prosecutions for attempt and conspiracy with 

12 overlapping evidentiary support. I do not believe that either 

Congress or the Supreme Court intended such a result, particularly 

in the area of drug offenses. 

In sum, when each of its elements is applied, the Grady rule 

does not warrant reversal of Felix's conviction on Count 1. 

Applying Grady's plain language, conduct constituting the offense 

for which Felix was prosecuted, i.e., conduct constituting an attempt to manufacture methamphetamine between August 26 and 31, 

1987, was not proven in Felix's Oklahoma prosecution to establish 

an essential element of the conspiracy charge. 

CONCLUSION 

The majority adopts an interpretation of Grady so expansive 

that it casts a shadow over a great part of accepted criminal law 

and procedure. There is no indication in Grady that the Supreme 

Court intended such a result. 

Examination of Grady's actual holding reveals that it stands 

for a relatively narrow proposition: prosecutors may not, to 

establish an essential element of a charge, attempt to prove 

conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has 

already been prosecuted. This squares with Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), 

itself to acts committed within a six-day period. 

12 Moreover, in rejecting Pungitore's analysis, the majority's 

interpretation of Grady risks stifling prosecution of all complex, 

continuing criminal offenses. 

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Dowling, Garrett, and the rest of our jurisprudence. The 

majority's holding does not. 

I am mindful of the abuses of successive prosecution that the 

Double Jeopardy Clause is intended to prevent. The State must 

"not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual 

for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 

expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing 

state of anxiety and insecurity." Grady v. Corbin, 110 S.Ct. at 

2091 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 u.s. 184, 187 (1957)). 

But the Oklahoma prosecution was in no way an attempt to reconvict Felix for the same offense, or even the same conduct. The 

"ordeal" Felix underwent was the natural result of committing a 

series of separate federal drug offenses during the summer of 

1987. 

Accordingly, I dissent. The judgment of the district court 

should be Affirmed. 

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