Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03088/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03088-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael McCoy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 14, 2000 Decided June 23, 2000

No. 99-3088

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Michael McCoy,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00423-02)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender, and Evelina J. Norwinski,

Assistant Federal Public Defender.

Rachel A. Pierson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

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Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Gregg A. Maisel and

Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorneys,

Before: Ginsburg, Henderson and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: Michael McCoy pleaded guilty to

conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base. Prior to sentencing, however, McCoy

moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the

motion and sentenced McCoy to 262 months in prison, to be

followed by five years of supervised release. Upon appeal

McCoy contends that the district court abused its discretion

by denying his request to withdraw his plea.

We find McCoy's plea was not voluntary, and he has

presented legally cognizable defenses to the charges against

him. In addition, the Government has conceded that its

ability to prosecute him has not been prejudiced. We hold

that in these circumstances the district court abused its

discretion by denying McCoy's motion to withdraw his plea of

guilty.

I. Background

The grand jury indicted McCoy on one count of conspiracy

to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams

or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 846, and

on one count of distribution of five grams or more of cocaine

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 841 (a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(iii).

McCoy and his co-defendant, Bernard Sanders Jr., soon

began to negotiate a plea agreement with the Government,

which made the following proposal: McCoy would (1) plead

guilty to the conspiracy charge; (2) be held accountable for

between 150 and 500 grams of cocaine base; and (3) be

sentenced in accordance with the United States Sentencing

Guidelines. The Government also informed McCoy that if he

chose to proceed to trial, then the Government intended to

file an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. s 851 regarding his

previous two felony drug convictions and that, should he be

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convicted after trial, he would be sentenced as a career

offender to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. After

further negotiations with the Government yielded no better

terms, McCoy signed an agreement substantially identical to

the Government's original proposal.

Before McCoy agreed to plead guilty, his counsel had

determined that he would face from 188 to 235 months in

prison if he accepted the Government's offer. Counsel had

arrived at that conclusion by consulting the drug quantity

table in U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1(c)(3) and determining that McCoy's

base offense level would be 34; after a three point reduction

to reflect McCoy's acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G.

s 3E1.1(a) & (b), his total offense level would be 31. Although the matter is not entirely clear from the record,

counsel apparently had understood that under s 4B1.1 of the

Guidelines McCoy would be treated as a "career offender"

and therefore assigned a criminal history category of VI. See

U.S.S.G. s 4B1.1. Quite clearly, however, counsel did not

realize that s 4B1.1 also enhances the base offense level of a

career offender; because McCoy would be pleading guilty to

a crime for which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment,

see 21 U.S.C. ss 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) & 846, his base offense level

would be 37 rather than 34. See U.S.S.G. s 4B1.1. McCoy's

sentence would therefore be in the range of 262 to 327

months of imprisonment, not the 188 to 235 months predicted

by McCoy's counsel. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (table). The

miscalculation committed by McCoy's counsel had been reinforced when the prosecutor, in response to an inquiry from

counsel for McCoy, likewise had estimated the applicable

sentencing range at 188 to 235 months.

At a hearing held for the purpose of accepting McCoy's

plea, the court informed McCoy of the minimum statutory

penalty he faced but not of the maximum statutory penalty,

nor of the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines.

At the same proceeding the Government claimed that if

McCoy went to trial, it could prove the following facts:

On July 9, 1998 Sanders arranged to sell 62 grams of

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forcement Agency. That same evening McCoy met the

undercover agent, told him he did not have the full 62

grams, and sold him 44.5 grams of cocaine base. McCoy

also gave the agent a pager number to be used to

arrange future transactions. Several months later a

confidential informant for the DEA contacted Sanders to

purchase 125 grams of cocaine base. Sanders agreed to

meet the informant at a shopping mall in Maryland on

October 6, 1998; he arrived at the appointed time in a

car driven by McCoy. Upon meeting the informant,

however, Sanders was uneasy and he canceled the sale

and left with McCoy. The police followed Sanders and

McCoy for a few miles and then arrested them. Prior to

being stopped, Sanders threw from the car a bag containing 119.6 grams of cocaine base.

McCoy admitted the Government's account was true and

accurate and he accepted responsibility for between 150 and

500 grams of cocaine base. The court then accepted his plea.

It was not until after the plea hearing, when McCoy

received the presentence report, that he discovered he was

facing a higher sentencing range than his attorney and the

prosecutor had previously indicated. After realizing his mistake but still prior to sentencing, McCoy filed a motion to

withdraw his plea of guilty. He argued that an "important

element of [his] willingness to plead guilty was based on [his]

counsel's, along with the attorney for the government's, calculation of [his] total sentence." Although he remained willing

to plead to a charge with a possible sentence of from 188 to

235 months in prison, he stated that "in deliberating over the

issue of whether to forego a trial or enter into a plea

agreement, he did not contemplate the fact that he would be

submitting himself to a sentence with a minimum imposition

of 22 years and a maximum sentence of 27-1/2 years."

Because he had misunderstood the applicable sentencing

range when he entered his plea, McCoy argued, his plea had

been involuntary and hence unconstitutional. The Government opposed the motion upon the grounds that McCoy's plea

had not been involuntary and that he had not presented a

legally cognizable defense to the charges against him. The

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Government conceded, however, that the passage of time

since McCoy pleaded guilty had not "in any way prejudiced

its case."

In response, McCoy asserted his innocence and argued that

he had done so throughout the negotiations over the plea

agreement. McCoy specifically noted that he had filed a

motion challenging the undercover agent's identification of

him as the seller in the transaction that took place on July 9,

based in part upon evidence that other officers at the scene

had indicated in their surveillance notes that the seller was a

"white male," whereas McCoy is a black male. (At the

sentencing hearing the prosecutor conceded that McCoy had

consistently claimed he was unaware, when he drove Sanders

to the shopping mall, that Sanders intended to sell drugs;

according to McCoy, it was not until they left the mall that he

"was aware that a transaction either had been planned or that

that was the purpose of Mr. Sanders' trip there.")

The district court denied McCoy's motion to withdraw his

plea. The court discounted McCoy's claim of innocence because, when the court had accepted his plea, McCoy had

admitted that the Government's allegations were true and

gave as one of his reasons for pleading guilty that he had

committed the crime charged. After acknowledging the Government's concession that it would not be prejudiced by

proceeding to trial, the court also rejected McCoy's argument

that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known the

actual sentencing range to which he was exposed. The court

discounted McCoy's claimed reliance upon the range his

attorney had told him would apply if he pleaded guilty

because McCoy's plea agreement explicitly stated that he had

not been promised a specific sentence and McCoy stated

when pleading guilty that he had not been made any promise

outside of the plea agreement. Additionally, the court noted

that in his motion to withdraw McCoy had characterized his

counsel's representations about his sentencing range as "approximate." Therefore, the court concluded that McCoy's

plea had not been contingent upon a specific sentencing

range, denied his motion to withdraw the plea, and sentenced

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him to 262 months of imprisonment, to be followed by five

years of supervised release.

II. Analysis

McCoy argues upon appeal that the district court abused

its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his plea:

"Withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing is to be

liberally granted, and permitted for 'any fair and just reason.' " United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924, 929 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(e)). In reviewing the district court's denial of a motion to withdraw we focus upon

three factors: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a

viable claim of innocence; (2) whether the delay between the

guilty plea and the motion to withdraw has substantially

prejudiced the government's ability to prosecute the case;

and (3) whether the guilty plea was somehow tainted." Id.

Because the Government concedes the second factor, we

confine our analysis to the remaining two.

A. Legally Cognizable Defense

A defendant seeking to withdraw his plea of guilty "generally must make out a legally cognizable defense to the charge

against him." United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1207

(D.C. Cir. 1995). The defendant's "general denial" is not

enough; he must "affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent, for he has waived his

right to try his luck before a jury." Id.

McCoy has adequately presented cognizable defenses to

the charges against him. As recounted above, the grand jury

indicted McCoy on two counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute

and to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base; and (2) distribution of 5 grams or more of

cocaine base. The latter charge is based upon the alleged

sale of 44.5 grams of cocaine base on July 9, 1998; the

conspiracy charge is premised upon both the July sale and

the failed sale of 119.6 grams of cocaine base in October 1998.

As for the July sale, McCoy has consistently argued that

the police mistakenly identified him as the seller. This

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defense, if accepted by the jury, obviously would preclude

conviction upon the charge of distribution and would eliminate

part of the basis for the charge of conspiracy.

As for the failed transaction of October 6, McCoy maintains

that he did not know Sanders intended to sell cocaine base

and that he did not realize "something was not proper" until

the police stopped his vehicle. To convict McCoy of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. s 846 the Government must prove he had

"the specific intent to further the common unlawful objective"

of the conspiracy. United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693,

707-08 (D.C. Cir. 1995). McCoy's claim that he did not know

Sanders intended to sell cocaine base on October 6 amounts

to an assertion that he lacked the requisite intent to conspire

with Sanders. If a jury was to conclude the Government has

not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that McCoy did participate in the sale on July 9, and to accept his claim that he

lacked specific intent to conspire with Sanders on October 6,

McCoy could not be convicted of the charge of conspiracy.

Accordingly, we hold that McCoy has presented a legally

cognizable defense to each of the charges against him.

B. Involuntariness of the Plea

Prior to sentencing the "standard for allowing withdrawal

of a plea is fairly lenient when the defendant can show that

the plea was entered unconstitutionally." Taylor, 139 F.3d at

929; see Cray, 47 F.3d at 1207. McCoy contends that his

plea was entered unconstitutionally because it was based

upon legal assistance so defective as to deprive him of his

constitutional right to assistance of counsel. A plea of guilty

is constitutionally valid if and only if it "represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of

action open to the defendant." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

56 (1985); see United States v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014, 1019

(D.C. Cir. 1990). A plea based upon advice of counsel that

"falls below the level of reasonable competence such that the

defendant does not receive effective assistance," Loughery,

908 F.2d at 1019, is neither voluntary nor intelligent. See

Taylor, 139 F.3d at 929.

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In order to show that his plea was based upon constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel, the defendant must "ordinarily satisfy the two-pronged standard of Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)." Id. He must show:

(1) "that his counsel's performance 'fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness' by identifying specific 'acts or

omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the

result of reasonable professional judgment' "; and (2) " 'that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on

going to trial.' " Id. 929-30. In this context, a "reasonable

probability" is one "sufficient to undermine confidence" in the

defendant's decision to plead guilty. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694; see Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

Usually a claim of "ineffective assistance of counsel ...

require[s] an evidentiary hearing"; indeed, where the defendant did not raise the claim before the district court, our

standard practice is to remand for such a hearing. United

States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In

this case, however, "the record is so clear that remand is

unnecessary," United States v. Soto, 132 F.3d 56, 59 (D.C.

Cir. 1997); this court can confidently resolve McCoy's claim

in the first instance.

McCoy contends that his counsel's performance "fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness" because she failed

correctly to apply the career offender provisions of the Guidelines when determining the sentencing range McCoy would

face if he accepted the Government's plea agreement. His

claim finds ample support in precedent. In Gaviria one

defendant had refused to plead guilty to the charge of conspiracy to distribute narcotics because his counsel had informed him that he would be treated as a career offender

under the Guidelines and be subject to a sentence of from 360

months to life in prison. See 116 F.3d at 1512. Almost a

year earlier, however, we had held in United States v. Price,

990 F.2d 1367, 1370 (1993), that a conspiracy conviction did

not count as a predicate crime for purposes of the career

offender provisions of the Guidelines. Because the defendant's counsel failed to realize that Price precluded treating

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the defendant as a career offender, we held counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. See id.

The mistake McCoy's counsel made was even more egregious than that made in Gaviria. Whereas counsel in Gaviria had failed to find and apply a case interpreting the

Guidelines, McCoy's counsel failed to follow the formula

specified on the face of the Guidelines. Of course not every

error made in applying the Guidelines amounts to deficient

performance under the standard of Strickland but, as a sister

circuit pointed out some years ago in a case very similar to

this, "familiarity with the structure and basic content of the

Guidelines (including the definition and implications of career

offender status) has become a necessity for counsel who seek

to give effective representation." United States v. Day, 969

F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992). We therefore hold that McCoy

has demonstrated that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient.

McCoy has also satisfied the second part of the Strickland

test: He has shown a "reasonable probability" that but for his

counsel's mistake he would not have pleaded guilty. Counsel

told McCoy that by accepting the plea he would get a prison

sentence in the range from 188 to 235 months; in fact, he

faced a range of 262 to 327 months. The difference between

counsel's predicted range and McCoy's actual range--more

than six years between the respective low ends and almost

eight years between the respective high ends--is significant.

The Government argues, however, that McCoy probably

would have pleaded guilty even if he had known the actual

sentencing range he faced: he was never promised a specific

sentence prior to entering his plea, and he was facing a

mandatory life sentence if convicted after trial. But, as has

been pointed out before, a "defendant's understanding of the

maximum penalties he will face if he enters a guilty plea may

be of critical importance to the ... decision to accept the

Government's offer rather than assume the risks of a trial."

United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 840 (1993) (Buckley, J.

concurring). Although McCoy was never promised a specific

sentence if he pleaded guilty, it is undisputed that both his

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own attorney and the prosecutor in this case told him that the

applicable sentencing range would be from 188 to 235 months

and he credibly argues that he relied--understandably, we

might add--upon that information. To be sure, McCoy has

not proven he would have gone to trial had his (or the

Government's) counsel not given him incorrect information,

but he has demonstrated a "reasonable probability" that he

would have done so.

We conclude that McCoy's decision to plead guilty was not

"a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative

courses of action open to [him]." We therefore hold that his

conviction is unconstitutional.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we remand this case to the

district court with instructions to grant McCoy's motion to

withdraw his plea of guilty.

It is so ordered.

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Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree with the majority that the appellant has satisfied

the second prong of the Strickland v. Washington prejudice

test, but only barely. It seems unlikely, given the evidence

against him, the appellant would actually have chosen to risk

trial and mandatory life imprisonment rather than add 27

months to the 235 months he had already agreed to serve.

Nevertheless, the Strickland test requires only a reasonable

probability. Because the appellant has met this standard, I

concur in the majority opinion.

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