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Parties Involved:
Derrick Corn
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 22, 2016

Decided September 22, 2016

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐3850

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DERRICK M. CORN,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 15‐CR‐58

William C. Griesbach,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Derrick Corn, a Menominee Indian, called the tribal police and reported that his

6‐month‐old daughter was not breathing normally. Officers found the child

unresponsive and having seizures. The child was rushed to the hospital and diagnosed

with multiple skull fractures caused by intentional, severe trauma. A grand jury

charged Corn with committing an assault on a reservation causing “serious” bodily

injury, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153,

113(a)(6). As part of a plea agreement, however, the government dismissed that charge

and instead allowed Corn to plead guilty to an information alleging that his assault on

the reservation caused “substantial” bodily injury to a child, a change that reduced the

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐3850    Page 2

maximum penalty to 5 years. Id. §§ 1153, 113(a)(7). Corn agreed not to challenge his

sentence on appeal except for claims asserting (1) punishment in excess of a statutory

maximum; (2) the district court’s reliance at sentencing on a constitutionally

impermissible factor; or (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. Corn was sentenced to

5 years’ imprisonment to be followed by 3 years’ supervised release.

Despite the appeal waiver, Corn filed a notice of appeal, but his newly appointed

attorney asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Corn has not accepted our invitation to comment on

counsel’s motion. See 7TH CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the

nature of the case and addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be

expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears to be thorough, we limit our

discussion to the issues she identifies. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir.

2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Corn has told counsel that he wants to challenge his guilty plea, so counsel first

evaluates the possibility of contesting the adequacy of the plea colloquy. See United

States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667,

670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). Because Corn did not move to withdraw his plea in the district

court, we would review for plain error. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59, 62–63

(2002); United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court

ensured that Corn’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary by substantially complying

with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. The court admonished Corn about the

nature of the charge, the statutory maximum penalties, the trial rights he was giving up,

the role of the sentencing guidelines, and the consequences of the appeal waiver.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b); United States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2003);

United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lovett, 844 F.2d

487, 491 (7th Cir. 1988). Corn concurred with the written factual basis in his plea

agreement and assured the court that he was satisfied with counsel’s efforts on his

behalf. Nothing about the plea colloquy suggests that Corn’s guilty plea was

involuntary.

It follows, says counsel, that Corn’s appeal waiver must be enforced. We agree

with that assessment. See United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013);

United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2011). The district court did not

rely on any impermissible factors in sentencing, and Corn’s terms of imprisonment and

supervised release are within the statutory maximum. See Dowell v. United States,

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No. 15‐3850    Page 3

694 F.3d 898, 901–02 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637

(7th Cir. 2005).  

Finally, counsel tells us that Corn has suggested “that his trial attorney was

ineffective with respect to investigating his case and presenting evidence to contradict

the government’s evidence.” But counsel properly recognizes that claims of ineffective

assistance are best raised in a collateral proceeding where an evidentiary foundation

can be developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003); United

States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2014).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

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