Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03080/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03080-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arsalan Shemirani
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 8, 2015 Decided June 12, 2015 

Reissued June 23, 2015 

No. 13-3080 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

ARSALAN SHEMIRANI, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:12-cr-00075-1) 

Tony Axam Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was A.J. 

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. 

James M. Perez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen, Jr., 

U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Chrisellen R. Kolb, and 

Courtney Spivey Urschel, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, PILLARD, Circuit Judge, 

and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

USCA Case #13-3080 Document #1559085 Filed: 06/23/2015 Page 1 of 7
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD. 

PILLARD, Circuit Judge: Arsalan Shemirani pleaded guilty 

to conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706, and to defraud 

the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371, by unlawfully exporting 

United States-origin electronics and power equipment to Iran 

via Canada and Hong Kong. On appeal, Shemirani raises two 

challenges to his sentence. First, he claims that the sentencing 

court granted a motion for downward departure from the 

recommended Sentencing Guidelines range, but that the court 

failed to calculate the departure correctly. Second, he contends 

that the sentencing court did not give the requisite 

individualized consideration to his request for a six-month 

downward departure—a departure that he argues is necessary to 

bring his sentence into line with those of defendants in similar 

circumstances convicted of similar offenses. Finding no error, 

we affirm the sentence imposed by the district court. 

I. 

The government argues that the appeal should be dismissed 

because Shemirani waived his appeal rights when he entered his 

guilty plea. The written plea agreement that Shemirani signed 

with the advice of counsel stated that he “knowingly and 

willingly” waived his right to appeal his sentence (with limited 

exceptions that nobody contends apply here). Public App. 54. 

Shemirani claims that his appeal waiver was not “knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary” and thus cannot be enforced, see 

United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009), 

but he does not seek to withdraw from any other aspect of the 

plea agreement. 

This court has acknowledged that a criminal defendant may 

by his plea agreement waive the right to appeal a sentence that 

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is “within the statutory range and imposed under fair 

procedures.” Guillen, 561 F.3d at 530. Even though such a 

waiver is anticipatory, as it necessarily regards a sentence that 

has yet to be imposed, it “is nonetheless a knowing waiver if the 

defendant is aware of and understands the risks involved in his 

decision.” Id. at 529; see In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d 59, 63 

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (reciting standard); see also United States v. 

Godoy, 706 F.3d 493, 495-96 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding appeal 

waiver unenforceable where the sentencing judge told the 

defendant that, regardless of the terms of the plea agreement, he 

could appeal “any illegal sentence”—advice that 

“mischaracterized the meaning of the waiver in a fundamental 

way”). 

To provide assurances of the informed voluntariness of a 

criminal defendant’s guilty plea and any accompanying plea 

agreement, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires 

district courts to conduct an oral, in-person colloquy with a 

defendant before accepting a plea of guilty. United States v. 

Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62 (2002). Rule 11(b)(1) specifically 

provides that “the court must address the defendant personally 

in open court” to “inform the defendant of, and determine that 

the defendant understands” each of fifteen enumerated items, 

including “the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving 

the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.” Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). The court accepting Shemirani’s plea 

accordingly was required to discuss any appeal waiver with him 

in open court and determine that he understood it. 

During Shemirani’s plea colloquy, however, the district 

court did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 11(b)(1)(N). 

Although the court advised the defendant of other rights he was 

waiving in the plea agreement, it did not tell him about and 

ensure his understanding of the appeal waiver. For its part, the 

government said nothing during the plea colloquy about the 

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appeal waiver. There is no dispute that the court failed to 

comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(N); the disagreement is over the 

effect of that deficiency in the context of this case. 

As noted above, the government urges us to enforce the 

written appeal waiver by its terms and so dismiss the appeal, 

whereas Shemirani contends that his waiver of his right to 

appeal was not knowing and voluntary, so we should address the 

substance of his appeal. Review of a claim of invalidity of an 

ostensible waiver of the right to appeal (but not the entire plea) 

raises difficult issues that are unsettled in this circuit, and as to 

which other courts take varying approaches. See, e.g., Tellado 

v. United States, 745 F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. 

Ct. 125 (2014); United States v. Tanner, 721 F.3d 1231, 1233-

34 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 412 

(5th Cir. 2011); Sotirion v. United States, 617 F.3d 27, 34-38 

(1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Frook, 616 F.3d 773, 777 (8th 

Cir. 2010); United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539-541 

(3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Smith, 618 F.3d 657, 664-65 

(7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 655-56 (7th 

Cir. 2007); United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 498-99 (6th 

Cir. 2005); United States v. Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d 794, 

797 (9th Cir. 2004). Because, as discussed below, Shemirani’s 

sentencing challenges lack merit, and because Shemirani’s 

waiver of appellate rights is not a jurisdictional issue,1

 we 

decline to decide whether he has effectively waived his right to 

appeal. 

We recognize the great care and attention the district courts 

in this circuit devote to the process of accepting criminal 

 

1 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th 

Cir. 2007); United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 

2007); United States v. Mason, 343 F.3d 893, 893 (7th Cir. 2003); 

United States v. Hines, 196 F.3d 270, 272 (1st Cir. 1999). 

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defendants’ guilty pleas. In order to assure consistent 

enforceability of waivers of rights in plea agreements, courts 

conducting plea colloquies must scrupulously adhere to the 

obligations of Rule 11. We also take this opportunity to 

emphasize that the United States Attorney’s Office would be 

well advised to develop instructions and training for its 

attorneys to make it part of their routine practice to help ensure 

that district courts fulfill each of the requirements of Rule 11, 

including Rule 11(b)(1)(N), when a defendant enters a plea. 

II. 

Turning to the merits of Shemirani’s appeal of his sentence, 

we conclude that the district court did not err in evaluating the 

first of two requests for a downward departure at issue in this 

case. 

Shemirani argues that the district court intended to grant a 

downward departure from the Guidelines range but erred by 

imposing a within-Guidelines sentence. Cf. United States v. 

Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 2009). The record 

reveals, however, that the district court did not intend to grant 

the departure motion. The court instead imposed a sentence 

within the Guidelines range, appropriately considered the 

sentencing factors set forth by 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and explained 

how and why it arrived at the specific sentence that it imposed. 

The transcript of the sentencing hearing and the court’s 

Judgment confirm the court’s reasoning. The judge heard what 

the government was requesting and its proposed methodology 

and expressed his disagreement with it. 

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III. 

Finally, we conclude that Shemirani’s request for a sixmonth departure was given adequate consideration before it was 

denied. 

Defendants are entitled to an individualized consideration 

by the sentencing judge. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

52 (2007). For that reason, and to ensure an adequate record on 

appeal, sentencing judges must explain their reasons for 

imposing a particular sentence. See Rita v. United States, 551 

U.S. 338, 356 (2007); In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188, 192 

(D.C. Cir. 2008). Moreover, courts have held that sentencing 

judges commit reversible error when they ignore a defendant’s 

non-frivolous argument for leniency. See, e.g., United States v. 

Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 362 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. 

Villegas-Miranda, 579 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Shemirani claims that his request for departure was 

summarily denied without individualized consideration pursuant 

to the sentencing judge’s categorical rule against granting the 

type of departure Shemirani sought. Such a categorical rule 

would give us pause, as it could pose a serious risk of depriving 

defendants of the individual consideration to which they are 

entitled. Here, however, the record shows that the sentencing 

judge acknowledged his authority to depart. Shemirani’s 

request was typical of prior, similar requests made by other 

defendants—the same type of request that the sentencing judge 

had rejected. Shemirani offered no argument to suggest that his 

situation differed in any individualized respect. In light of the 

way Shemirani’s request was presented, the district court’s 

consideration was adequately individualized. 

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* * * 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is affirmed. 

So ordered.

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