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Parties Involved:
Louis W. Sullivan
Appellee
Virginia Wilkerson
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

VIRGINIA WILKERSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of 

the Department of Health and Human 

Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 91-6199 

No. CIV-88-1445-W) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

FIL~ D 

United St.ates Co~rt~f Appeals Tenth Circuit 

FEB 19 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument . 

Plaintiff-appellant Virginia Wilkerson appeals from a 

district court judgment affirming the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services' denial of Plaintiff's applications for social 

security disability insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-6199 Document: 010110226099 Date Filed: 02/19/1992 Page: 1 
and 423, and for supplemental security income benefits under 42 

U.S.C. § 1381a. On appeal Plaintiff argues that the Secretary's 

finding that she was not disabled because she had a transferable 

skill is not supported by substantial evidence and that the 

Secretary erred in relying on vocational testimony to support a 

finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. We disagree and affirm. 

Plaintiff applied for benefits in June 1986. She claimed 

that she became unable to work on March 15, 1986, because she 

could not stand on her feet, having had surgery on one foot; her 

right arm and shoulder were stiff; she had high blood pressure; 

and her spine had deteriorated. The applications were denied on 

initial consideration and on reconsideration . 

Plaintiff requested and was 

administrative law judge (ALJ). 

afforded a 

The ALJ 

hearing 

denied 

before an 

Plaintiff's 

applications, finding that she was not disabled as defined in the 

Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's 

request for review. Consequently, the ALJ's decision stood as the 

final decision of the Secretary. 

Plaintiff commenced this action to review the Secretary's 

decision. At the Secretary's request, the case was remanded to 

the Secretary to obtain additional testimony concerning 

Plaintiff's pain complaints and to evaluate all factors relevant 

to her complaints pursuant to Luna v . Bowen, 834 F.2d 161 (10th 

Cir. 1987). 

A supplemental hearing was held, and the ALJ again found that 

Plaintiff was not disabled . The Appeals Council adopted the ALJ's 

findings and conclusions. The district court affirmed. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-6199 Document: 010110226099 Date Filed: 02/19/1992 Page: 2 
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must meet the 

insured status requirements, be less than sixty-five years old, 

and be under a disability. 1 The term "disability" means 

[I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful 

activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected 

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months; 

An individual shall be determined to be under a 

disability only if his physical or mental impairment or 

impairments are of such severity that he is not only 

unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering 

his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in 

the national economy .... 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1) (A), (2). 

The claimant has the burden of proving he is disabled. "Once 

the claimant has established a disability, the burden shifts to 

the Secretary to show that the claimant retains the ability to do 

other work activity and that jobs the claimant could perform exist 

in the national economy." Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th 

Cir. 1989). The Secretary meets this burden if his decision is 

supported by substantial evidence. 

802, 804 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 

On appeal, we determine whether substantial evidence in the 

record supports the Secretary's decision. Brown v. Bowen, 801 

F.2d 361, 362 (10th Cir. 1986). We may not weigh the evidence or 

substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Id. "Substantial 

evidence is more than a scintilla; it is such relevant evidence as 

1 The only qualification at issue 

Plaintiff is under a disability. 

3 

in this case is whether 

Appellate Case: 91-6199 Document: 010110226099 Date Filed: 02/19/1992 Page: 3 
a reasonable mind might deem adequate to support a conclusion." 

To determine whether a claimant is under a disability, the 

Secretary applies a five-step process. 20 C.F . R. §§ 404.1520, 

416.920 (1991). See Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 

1988)(supplemental security income). Applying the five-step 

process the ALJ found in his second decision that 1) Plaintiff was 

not performing substantial gainful activity (step one); 2) 

Plaintiff had a severe impairment (step two); 3) Plaintiff did not 

have any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, 

App. I (step three); and 4) Plaintiff was unable to perform her 

past relevant work (step four). These findings are not at issue. 

Step five provides, 

If you cannot do any work you have done in the past 

because you have a severe impairment(s) , we will 

consider your residual functional capacity and your age, 

education, and past work experience to see if you can do 

other work. If you cannot, we will find you disabled . 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404 . 1520(f)(l) and 416.920(f)(l) (1991). The 

Secretary frequently meets the step-five burden of showing that a 

claimant retains the capacity to perform work and that the work 

exists in the national economy by relying on the MedicalVocational Guidelines, "the grids," 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, 

App. 2 (1991). Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir. 1987) . 

The grids cannot be used when a nonexertional impairment such as 

pain limits a claimant's ability to perform a range of work, 

however. Id. at 513. When a claimant suffers from both 

exertional and nonexertional impairments, the grids are first 

applied to determine whether the claimant is disabled due to the 

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Appellate Case: 91-6199 Document: 010110226099 Date Filed: 02/19/1992 Page: 4 
exertional impairments alone. If the claimant is not so disabled, 

a second determination must be made using the grids as a framework 

for considering how much the claimant's work capacity is further 

diminished in terms of any types of jobs that 

contraindicated by the nonexertional limitations. Id. 

would be 

Under Table 2 of the grids, 20 C.F . R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 

2 (1991), the ALJ found in his second decision that 1) Plaintiff 

was of advanced age; 2) she had a high school education and some 

college; 3) her previous work experience was skilled or 

semiskilled; and 4) her skills, specifically dealing with people, 

supervisory skills, attention to detail, hand/eye coordination, 

recordkeeping, and operating a two-way radio, were transferable. 2 

These findings directed a conclusion of "not disabled." The only 

fact distinguishing a conclusion of "not disabled" from a 

conclusion of "disabled" on Table 2, given Plaintiff's 

characteristics, was that she had transferable skills. The ALJ 

then used the grids as a framework to determine that there were a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff 

could perform, such as ward clerk, medical records clerk, two-way 

radio dispatcher, and parking lot cashier. 

Plaintiff argues that she did not acquire the skill of 

recordkeeping at her previous positions as home health provider, 

cardex clerk, or warehouse secretary, because recordkeeping 

comprised only a small part of her duties and involved only 

reading and writing, which are not "skills." 

2 The district court concluded that only recordkeeping could be 

considered a "skill." The Secretary does not challenge this 

ruling on appeal. 

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Plaintiff testified that as a home health aide, she recorded 

vital signs such as blood pressure and pulse on a regular basis. 

She listed "keep vital signs" and "record and give medications" as 

duties of her position as home health aide. Appellant's App. at 

87, 113. The appeal record does not bear out her contention that 

recordkeeping comprised only a small portion of her duties. 

Plaintiff's duties as a cardex clerk included keeping a file 

up to date as to all the incoming and outgoing parts to know what 

to reorder. Id. at 49, 85a. Plaintiff contends this task, as 

well as her recordkeeping duties as a home health aide, involved 

nothing more than reading and writing, which is not a skill. See 

Ingle v. Heckler, 763 F.2d 169, 170 (4th Cir. 1985). 

A "skill" is defined as "knowledge of a work activity which 

requires the exercise of significant judgment that goes beyond the 

carrying out of simple job duties and is acquired through 

performance of an occupation which is above the unskilled level 

(requires more than 30 days to learn) .... " s.s.R. 82-41 

(West's Soc. Sec. Rptg. Serv. Admin. Rulings 1975-82 (1983)) at 

848. Recordkeeping is a skill, Ingle, 763 F.2d at 170, yet broken 

down into its components recordkeeping is no more than reading and 

writing. What makes these activities a skill is the exercise of 

significant judgment. The Secretary could have found that 

Plaintiff exercised significant judgment in keeping records as a 

home health aide and a cardex clerk. 

Plaintiff argues that there was no evidence that she 

performed any recordkeeping in her position as warehouse 

secretary. Plaintiff claimed that as a warehouse secretary she 

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Appellate Case: 91-6199 Document: 010110226099 Date Filed: 02/19/1992 Page: 6 
was in charge of all office procedures. 

duties included making a list for truck 

She testified that her 

drivers who delivered 

furniture to customers, contacting the customers to let them know 

what day their furniture was going to be delivered, keeping in 

contact with the trucks to see where they were, writing out orders 

to have furniture picked up and repaired, filing, ordering parts 

to fix furniture, making arrangements for outside furniture 

repair, making the service department aware when parts arrived, 

and processing receiving reports. Appellant's App. at 50-51, 

86-87. While Plaintiff did not specifically testify that she kept 

records as a warehouse secretary, it is a reasonable inference 

that her various job responsibilities would involve some 

recordkeeping. 

Plaintiff argues that even if she acquired recordkeeping 

skills at her positions as home health aide, cardex clerk, and 

warehouse secretary, these skills were not transferable. A 

claimant is considered to have transferable skills "when the 

skilled or semi-skilled work activities you did in past work can 

be used to meet the requirements of skilled or semi-skilled work 

activities of other jobs or kinds of work. This depends largely 

on the similarity of occupationally significant work activities 

among different jobs." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(d)(l), 416.968(d)(l) 

(1991). Transferability of skills involves "applying work skills 

which a person has demonstrated in vocationally relevant past jobs 

to meet the requirements of other skilled or semiskilled jobs." 

S.S.R. 82-41 (West's Soc. Sec . Rptg. Serv. Admin. Rulings 1975-82 

(1983)) at 849. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6199 Document: 010110226099 Date Filed: 02/19/1992 Page: 7 
Substantial evidence supports the Secretary's finding that 

Plaintiff's recordkeeping skill was transferable . A vocational 

expert testified that Plaintiff's recordkeeping skill could be 

transferred to the position of ward clerk, which is at the low end 

of semi-skilled occupations and involves copying information; or 

medical records clerk, which is a semi-skilled job requiring only 

slightly more skill than ward clerk and involving compiling and 

verifying records as opposed to simply copying information. 

Appellant's App. at 114. 

evidence from which 

This testimony provides substantial 

the Secretary could have found that 

Plaintiff's skill was transferable. 

Plaintiff finally contends that because the "grids" should 

have directed a finding that she is disabled, the Secretary erred 

in relying on vocational testimony to find that Plaintiff was not 

disabled. In light of our previous discussion, we conclude this 

contention is without merit . 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

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