Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01006/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David James Baker
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

- 1'' f L liD 

PUBLISH 

United Stliltet' Cot..:tc of Apper.tls 

Tench Circuit · 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

JAN l o 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 89-1006 

DAVID JAMES BAKER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-204) 

James R. Allison, Assistant United States Attorney (Michael J. 

Norton, Acting United States Attorney, with him on the brief), 

Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Mark D. Eibert, Assistant Federal 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Public Defender (Michael G. 

with him on the brief), Denver, 

Before LOGAN, SETH, and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Defendant appeals from his conviction on one count of 

manufacturing methamphetamine and one count of possession of the 

Appellate Case: 89-1006 Document: 01019297299 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 1 
precursor P2P with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, both in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l), and also seeks review of the 

sentences subsequently imposed by the district court thereon. The 

primary issue presented on this appeal concerns the denial of 

defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search 

within Indian country authorized and conducted solely by state 

authorities. Because we decide that the motion should have been 

granted, and the district court's failure to so rule cannot, on 

the record before us, be characterized 

defendant's conviction without 

as harmless, 

reaching the 

analytically independent issues raised herein. 

we reverse 

additional, 

On September 13, 1989, deputy sheriff James Ezzell, an 

investigator with the La Plata County Sheriff's Department, 

applied foi and obtained a warrant from the District Court of La 

Plata County, Colorado, to search the residence and outbuildings 

of a parcel of property recently rented by defendant. At no point 

during the pertinent events, from application for the warrant 

through its execution, were federal officers in any way involved 

in the proceedings. Ultimately, however, evidence of illegal 

activity recovered during the search was made available to federal 

authorities, who utilized the evidence, over objection, in 

obtaining defendant's conviction below. 

Defendant contends that the search warrant was void as beyond 

the issuing state court's jurisdiction pursuant to 18 u.s.c. 

§§ 1151-1153, because it purports to authorize a search for 

evidence of criminal activity on property rented by an enrolled 

member of the Southern Ute Tribe and located within the exterior 

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Appellate Case: 89-1006 Document: 01019297299 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 2 
boundaries of Southern Ute tribal lands. Since it is undisputed 

that defendant's property was located within Indian country and 

Colorado has never obtained an extension of its jurisdiction to 

include such lands, we must agree with defendant that the La Plata 

County District Court acted beyond its authority in issuing the 

search warrant for evidence of suspected criminal activity on 

defendant's property. See United States v. Burnett, 777 F.2d 593, 

596 (lOth Cir. 1985)(expressly noting "agreement with analysis and 

conclusion" in State v. Burnett, 671 P.2d 1165, 1166-68 (Okla. 

Crim. App. 1983), which held that state criminal jurisdiction over 

Indian country is precluded unless state has previously manifested 

by affirmative political action its intent to assume jurisdiction 

pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § l32l(a)), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1106 

(1986): Langley v. Ryder, 778 F.2d· 1092, 1095-96 (5th Cir. 

l985)(once land is determined to be Indian country, state criminal 

jurisdiction is preempted on subjects relating to Indians, tribes, 

and their property, absent the consent of Congress to such 

jurisdiction): see, ~' Bartlett v. Solem, 691 F.2d 420, 421 

(8th Cir. 1982)(en banc)(affirming grant of habeas corpus petition 

·on ground that state lacked jurisdiction to prosecute tribal 

member for offense committed within Indian country), aff'd, 465 

U.S. 463, 467 n.8 (l984)(noting exclusive federal and tribal 

criminal jurisdiction under §§ 1152, 1153): see also 

Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. Oklahoma, 618 F.2d 665, 668 (lOth Cir. 

l980)("States have no authority over Indians in Indian country 

unless it is expressly conferred by Congress"). 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-1006 Document: 01019297299 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 3 
The government argues against application of the general 

exclusion of state jurisdiction over Indian country on two 

grounds. First, the government maintains that this case falls 

within the exception to exclusive federal and tribal jurisdiction 

established in United States v. McBratney, 104 u.s. 621 (1881). 

Subsequent case law, however, has for some time quite clearly 

limited the McBratney exception to crimes committed ~ non-Indians 

against non-Indians, see, ~, United States v. Antelope, 430 

U.S. 641, 643 n.2, 648 n.9 (1977); Williams v. United States, 327 

U.S. 711, 714-15 n.lO (1946); Donnelly v. United States, 228 u.s. 

243, 271-72 (1913), and the government failed to establish· either 

of these conjunctive factual predicates below. 1 Second, the 

government invokes Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, which provides for state 

court issuance of a federal search warrant "upon request of a 

federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the 

government." Because the quoted condition in Rule 41 was not 

satisfied and the search was not otherwise "federal in character," 

see generally United States v. Bookout, 810 F.2d 965, 967 (lOth 

Cir. 1987); United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1325 (lOth 

1 Since neither the search warrant nor the underlying affidavit 

identifies or describes a single non-Indian suspect in connection 

with the criminal activity on defendant's property, we do not 

decide whether an Indian's property within Indian country may be 

searched on state authority for evidence of a non-Indian's 

so-called "victimless crime." See generally Solem, 465 U.S. at 

465 n.2 (stating, in dicta, that "state jurisdiction is limited to 

crimes ·by non-Indians against non-Indians ..• and victimless 

crimes by non-Indians"); R. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over 

Indian Lands: A Journey through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. 

L. Rev. 503, 529-30 (1976); D. Getches, D. Rosenfelt & C. 

Wilkinson, Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law at 388 

(1979). 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-1006 Document: 01019297299 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 4 
Cir. 1979), the rule cannot serve to transform the illegal state 

search warrant into a legal federal one. 

Accordingly, we hold that the search of defendant's property 

was not authorized by a valid warrant. Since the government does 

not argue that the constitutionality of the search may be upheld 

on some alternative basis, the evidence obtained through the 

search was not admissible in defendant's federal prosecution, 

absent the availability of an exception to the exclusionary rule. 

See United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (lOth Cir. 

1989}(citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960} for 

settled rule that evidence obtained by state officers in violation 

of fourth amendment strictures is inadmissible in a federal 

criminal trial}. 

The government contends that the exception established in 

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984} and Massachusetts v. 

Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984}, permitting admission of evidence 

obtained pursuant to a 

officer(s} who obtained 

defective search warrant so long as the 

and executed the warrant acted in 

objective good faith, is applicable here and justifies admission 

of the evidence seized on defendant's premises. Defendant 

presents a two-level argument in response. First, defendant 

argues, Leon and Sheppard are not pertinent where, as here, the 

constitutional infirmity does not arise from either a defect in 

the warrant or the lack of probable cause, but rather from the 

issuing court's lack of jurisdiction to authorize the search in 

the first instance. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-1006 Document: 01019297299 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 5 
Although it is true, as defendant emphasizes, that Leon and 

Sheppard have been held inapplicable to most warrantless searches, 

see, ~' United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 44-45 (lst Cir. 

1989) and authorities cited therein, the case at bar, involving a 

warrant but one that was essentially void ab initio, appears to 

fall somewhere between the two poles 

defective-warrant and absent-warrant cases. 

occupied by the 

Neither party has 

cited any authority on point either for or against application of 

Leon and Sheppard to this situation,2 and we have found little. 

2 At oral argument, defense counsel raised the contention that 

the underscored reference to jurisdictional authority in the 

following excerpt from Sheppard reflects the Supreme Court's 

intention to exclude, as a class, all jurisdictionally invalid 

searches from the potential scope of the good faith exception: 

[W]e refuse to rule that an officer is required to 

disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and 

by action, that the [initially inadequate but judicially 

corrected] warrant he possesses authorized him to 

conduct the search he has requested. In Massachusetts, 

as in most jurisdictions, the determinations of a judge 

acting within his jurisdiction, even if erroneous, are 

valid and binding until they·are set aside under some 

recognized procedure. Streeter v. City of Worcester, 

336 Mass. 469, 472, 146 N.E.2d 514, 517 (1957): Moll v. 

Township of Wakefield, 274 Mass. 505, 507, 175 N.E. 81, 

82 (1931). If an officer is required to accept at face 

value the judge's conclusion that a warrant form is 

invalid, there is little reason why he should be 

expected to disregard assurances that everything is all 

right, especially when he has alerted the judge to the 

potential problems. · 

Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989-90 (emphasis added and footnote 

omitted). However, the analytical context of this reference to 

jurisdiction shows that the Court was not at all· concerned with, 

much less anticipating and resolving, the issue that is our 

immediate concern. Indeed, the theoretical applicability of Leon, 

disputed by defendant here, was one of the accepted premises with 

which the Sheppard Court began its reasoning several pages prior 

to the passage relied upon by defendant. See id. at 987-88 

("Having already decided [in Leon] that the exclusionary rule 

should not be applied when the officer ••. acted in objectively 

(Continued on next page.) 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-1006 Document: 01019297299 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 6 
See ~C~o~mm~o~n~w~e~a~l~t~h~~v~.--~S~h~e~l~t~o~n, 766 S.W.2d 628, 629-30 (Ky. 

l989)(reading Leon as applicable only to "technically deficient'' 

warrants and stating, "[w]e do not believe that Leon would be 

applicable [in context of jurisdictionally invalid warrant] were 

we otherwise inclined to follow its precedent"); id. at 630-31 

(Gant, J. dissenting)(reading Leon as applicable to invalid 

warrants generally and arguing that, based on the deterrence 

considerations underlying the exclusionary rule and its good faith 

exception, the latter should be available in cases where the 

issuing court's jurisdiction is called into question); State v. 

Brady, 388 N. W. 2d 151, 156-57 (Wis. 1986)(Abrahamson, J. 

concurring)(maintaining that "this is not an appropriate case for 

deciding whether this court should adopt the Leon good faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule," precisely because "[i]t is 

not clear whether Leon and Sheppard apply . . . to cases such as 

(Continued from last page.) 

reasonable reliance on [an invalid] warrant ... , the sole issue 

before us in this case is whether the officers reasonably believed 

that the -search they conducted was authorized by a valid 

warrant"). Thus, far from isolating and ruling on the threshold 

matter of the potential availability of the good faith exception 

by reference to the jurisdictional authority of the warrantissuing judge, the Court was already well into the second step of 

the analysis and concerned with providing the rationale for its 

holding that the officers had, in fact, acted in good faith. The 

last sentence in the quoted paragraph makes it fairly clear that 

the "valid and binding" status of the state judge's conclusion 

regarding the adequacy of the revised warrant (which status was 

dependent upon the proper exercise of his jurisdictional 

authority) was noted to buttress the Court's determination 

regarding the objective reliability of the assurances given to the 

officers executing the warrant, not to explain why the Court was 

evaluating the reasonableness of the officers' reliant conduct in 

the first place. We discern no basis for reading into the quoted 

passage an uncharacteristically indirect announcement of a 

categorical limitation on the scope of the good faith exception. 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-1006 Document: 01019297299 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 7 
this one in which the magistrate has no authority whatsoever to 

issue the warrant"). While we acknowledge this issue that the 

parties have engaged, we do not purport to resolve it, as it is 

unnecessary to our disposition of this appeal. For even assuming 

the pertinence of Leon and Sheppard here, we agree with 

defendant's second line of argument that the government has not, 

in any event, satisfied the standard these cases impose. See 

generally, ~, Brady, 388 N.W.2d 151, 156 (majority similarly 

electing not to resolve issue of Leon's applicability where 

requisite objective good faith lacking in any event). 

Entitlement to the exception established in Leon and Sheppard 

depends on the objective good faith of the officer(s) applying for 

and executing the warrant. Thus, evidence obtained through an 

improper search will be excluded only if, under the objective 

circumstances presented to the officer(s) in question, "a 

reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search 

was illegal despite the ma~istrate's authorization." Malley v. 

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986), quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 

n.23; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 u.s. 635, 641 

(1987)(objective good faith determination encompasses information 

possesse~ by the particular officer(s) engaged in the challenged 

search). Here, the affidavit submitted by deputy sheriff Ezzell 

to obtain the search warrant shows that Ezzell knew the two 

crucial facts undermining the state court's authority to issue the 

warrant: "To the best of your Affiant's knowledge, •.. the 

property is located within the exterior boundaries of the Southern 

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Appellate Case: 89-1006 Document: 01019297299 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 8 
Ute Indian Tribe [and] [t]he individual renting the 

property, David Baker, is a registered member of the Southern Ute 

Indian Tribe." Indeed, the affidavit itself reflects Ezzell's 

existing doubts concerning the state court's authority, noting 

that "the actual criminal jurisdiction of this matter is unclear" 

and explaining that the state court is only being approached 

. "[s]ince the Federal magistrate is unavailable." In light of the 

clearly established nature of the state's jurisdictional 

limitations in Indian country already discussed, and Ezzell's 

knowledge of the operative, objective facts, we cannot say 

Ezzell's conduct in nevertheless applying for and executing the 

search warrant is what should be expected of a reasonably 

well-trained officer with nine years experience in a county 

incorporating Indian lands. 

The government seeks to avoid this adverse conclusion by 

raising three points, none of which we find persuasive. First of 

all, the government emphasizes that Ezzell's affidavit also shows 

he knew the land rented by defendant was owned by a non-Indian 

residing in New Mexico. This fact, the government contends, 

raised sufficient doubt regarding the Indian character of the 

searched property to justify Ezzell's procurement of the warrant. 

Nearly thirty years ago, however, the Supreme Court recognized 

that the issue whether private property owned by non-Indians but 

situated within the boundaries of an Indian reservation is still 

"Indian country" for jurisdictional purposes had been ''squarely 

put to rest [in favor of inclusion] by congressional enactment of 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-1006 Document: 01019297299 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 9 
the currently prevailing definition of Indian country in § 1151 

to include 'all land within the limits of any Indian reservation 

under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, 

notwithstanding the issuance of any patent I H Seymour v. 

' Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1962). Indeed, some three 

years before the search of defendant's property, the Colorado 

Court of Appeals specifically relied on Seymour to reject the 

argument that a parcel of Southern Ute Reservation land had lost 

its Indian country status through conveyance to a non-Indian. See 

People v. Luna, 683 P.2d 362, 365 (Colo. App. 1984)(reversing 

Indian defendants' state controlled-substances conviction for lack 

of jurisdiction). Consequently, Ezzell's knowledge of the 

private, non-Indian ownership of the property rented by defendant 

does not alter our evaluation regarding the reasonableness of his 

conduct. 

Next, the government suggests that we sanction Ezzell's 

conduct becatise he apprised the state court of both the relevant 

facts and his own doubts concerning state criminal jurisdiction 

and only proceeded with the search after the court issued the 

warrant notwithstanding the problem outlined in his affidavit. 

However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that, while more 

expertise in this regard may be expected of a judicial official, 

where, as we have already held here, a reasonably well-trained law 

enforcement officer should himself have been aware that a proposed 

search would be illegal, a judicial official's concurrence in the 

improper activity does not serve to bring it within the rule of 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-1006 Document: 01019297299 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 10 
Leon and Sheppard. 3 See Malley, 475 u.s. at 345-46 and n.9; see 

also Coen v. Runner, 854 F.2d 374, 377 (lOth Cir. 1988); United 

States v. Burzynski Cancer Research Inst., 819 F.2d 1301, 1309 

(5th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 s. Ct. 1026 (1988). 

Finally, the government discusses Ezzell's generally prudent 

conduct of the investigation in defendant's case at some length, 

particularly his efforts to contact a federal magistrate for a 

search warrant prior to his resort to the state court, in order to 

bolster its claim that Ezzell acted in good faith. Defendant 

responds in kind with an extensive list of alternative courses of 

action open to but neglected by Ezzell, in order to undercut the 

government's claim. All of this is scarcely relevant to the issue 

at hand. We are concerned with the officer's decision to seek and 

execute a state warrant to search defendant's property in the face 

3 This is not to say that reliance on the assurance implicit in 

the issuance of a warrant should not be considered in the initial 

determination regarding the law enforcement officer's judgment in 

any particular case. See United States v. Cook, 854 F.2d 371, 

372-73 (lOth Cir. 1988)(evaluating objective good faith under Leon 

in terms of reasonableness of officer's reliance on search warrant 

issued by state court judge), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989). 

However, since we hold that officer Ezzell clearly should have 

known, before and after he obtained the warrant, that the search 

reviewed here would be illegal, we need not and do not decide 

precisely what favorable weight may be given to an officer's 

reliance on a judicial official's opinion regarding the uncertain 

propriety of a particular contemplated search. Compare, ~' 

United States v. Martin, 833 F.2d 752, 755 (8th Cir. 1987)(citing 

Malley only for proposition that officer "may not rely entirely on 

the magistrate's finding of probable cause") with id. at 756-57 

(Lay, C.J. concurring)(disagreeing with "great we1ght""""attached by 

majority to magistrate's finding that probable cause had been 

established, and concluding that magistrate's issuance of warrant 

is "irrelevant to the question of the officer's good faith") with 

Mart·in v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, 812 F.2d 1425, 1434 

n.20 (D.C. Cir.)(magistrate's determination should carry "some 

weight" in inquiry regarding officer's good faith), op. vacated 

~' 817 F.2d 144, op. reinstated on rec. by, 824 F.2d 1240 

(1987) (en bane). 

11 

Appellate Case: 89-1006 Document: 01019297299 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 11 
of clearly established law recognizing that such a warrant would 

be beyond the jurisdiction of the state court. The officer's 

general conduct of the investigation and his initial attempt to 

contact an appropriate federal official cannot make his eventual 

resort to an unauthorized state tribunal reasonable. 

The judgment of conviction entered by the United States 

District Court for the District of Colorado is REVERSED. 

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