Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-04012/USCOURTS-ca10-95-04012-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kerry Galetka
Appellee
Robert Shawn Treff
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT SHAWN TREFF, I 

I 

Plaintiff-Appellant, I 

I 

FILED 

United States Court ot Aypcr.~ 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 1 0 1996 

v. I No. 95-4012 

I 

KERRY GALETKA, individually and as the I 

Mailroom Supervisor at the Utah State ) 

Prison, ) 

I 

Defendant-Appellee. I 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 93-CV-51 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Robert Shawn Treff, pro se. 

Brent A. Burnett, Assistant Attorney General and Jan Graham, Utah 

Attorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah, fo~ Defendant-Appellee. 

Before KELLY, SETH, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-4012 Document: 01019280449 Date Filed: 01/10/1996 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and the appellate 'record, this 

panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for 

a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 34(f} and lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Robert Shawn Treff, appearing pro se, appeals the 

district court's order adopting the magistrate judge's 

recommendation to grant summary judgment to defendant Kerry 

Galetka. We affirm. 

Mr. Treff, who was an inmate at a Utah state prison during 

the time his claims arose, filed a complaint under 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1983 alleging that his rights guaranteed by the First, Eighth 

and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when Ms. Galetka, acting 

for herself and as the prison mail room supervisor, interfered 

with his outgoing mail. Mr. Treff alleged that between October 

1990 and March 1992, sixteen pieces of mail were not processed by 

the prison mail room and consequently were never delivered to the 

addressees. After he filed three grievances, the prison grievance 

coordinator conducted an investigation by contacting at random 

three of the addressees Mr. Treff claims did not receive his 

letters. Of those, two responded that they had received the 

letters, but had not replied to Mr. Treff. The third inquiry was 

returned as undeliverable by the United States Postal Service. 

The grievance investigator concluded that the addressees of Mr. 

Treff's letters had chosen not to respond, and the investigation 

was closed. Mr. Treff maintains that the addressees, particularly 

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his children and his mother, would have responded if they had 

received his letters. 

II. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Mr. Treff claims: (1) Ms. Galetka interfered with 

his First Amendment rights generally to communicate by mail, to 

associate religiously through the mail, and to access the courts 

via mail; (2) Ms. Galetka was liable for her actions and those of 

her subordinates in failing to process his mail; (3) genuine 

issues of disputed material facts exist, precluding summary 

judgment; and (4) the district court errone.ously revoked his in 

forma pauperis status and ordered him to pay mileage and service 

fees. 

Mr. Treff also attempts to raise on appeal the issue of his 

right to communicate with his legal counsel through the mail. 

Because he did not raise that issue in the district court, we 

decline to address it here. see Rademacher v. Colorado Ass'n of 

Soil Conservation Dists. Medical Benefits Plan, 11 F.3d 1567, 1571 

(lOth Cir. 1993) (issues not argued to the district court will not 

be considered on appeal). For the same reason, we do not address 

Mr. Treff's claim that the prison grievance procedure did not meet 

minimum standards required by law. 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standard as did the district court. APPlied Genetics Int'l, 

Inc, y. First Affi~iated Sees .. Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). "Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no 

genuine dispute over a material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ry.ssillo VJ... 

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Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

record in the light most favorable to the 

Deepwater Invs .. Ltd. v. Jackson Hole S~i Corp., 

1110 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

A. Qualified Jmmunity Defense 

We view the 

nonmoving party. 

938 F.2d 1105, 

Ms. Galetka raised the defense of qualified immunity. 

Therefore, we first address the threshold legal question of 

whether Mr. T_reff has "demonstrate[d] that the defendant's actions 

violated a constitutional ... right." Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 

F.3d 1531, 1534 (lOth Cir. 1995); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 

u.s. 226, 232 (1991). "On summary judgment, the judge 

appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable 

law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an 

action occurred. If the law was clearly established, the 

immunity defense ordinarily should fail . " Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. BOO, 818-19 (1982). In a qualified immunity 

inquiry, 11 the very action in question does not have to have 

previously been held unlawful, [if] 'in the light of pre~existing 

law the unlawfulness [was] apparent.'" Albright, 51 F.3d at 1535 

(quoting Anderson y. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 

In this case, we must determine whether Ms. Galetka is 

entitled to qualified immunity from Mr. Treff's claims that she 

violated his right to access to the courts and his right to 

communicate by mail with others outside the prison. The district 

court found that Mr. Treff had produced'no evidence that Ms. 

Galetka had interfered with his court mail and denied the court 

access claim. The district court also held that Ms. Galetka was 

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entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly 

established that prisoners had a First Amendment right to have 

their outgoing mail processed for .delivery by the United States 

Postal Service, absent censorship or other restrictions on freedom 

of expression.~ 

1. Right to Access to. the Courts 

In analyzing Ms. Galetka's qualified immunity defense, we 

first conclude that a prisoner's constitutional right of access to 

the courts is clearly established. Nordgren y, Milliken, 762 F.2d 

851, 853 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 u.s. 1032 (1985). We next 

address whether Mr. Treff stated a claim for denial of access to 

the courts. To do so, he must show that any denial or delay of 

access to the court prejudiced him in pursuing litigation. Twyman 

v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 357 (lOth Cir. 1978) (denial); KincaiQ y. 

l!<lil, 969 F.2d 594, 603 (7th Cir. 1992) (delay), cert. denied, 113 

S. Ct. 1002 (1993). 

Here, Mr. Treff alleges two instances in which the prison 

mail system resulted in prejudice to his litigation: (1) he did 

not receive the magistrate judge's initial report and 

recommendation in this case, and (2) in another case, his 

objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation 

were received by the court after the due date, resulting in the 

court's refusal to consider them. Mr. Treff has not been 

prejudiced by any alleged prison mail room deficiencies in either 

instance. In the first, the court permitted him to respond to the 

magistrate judge's report, as if he had received it timely. In 

the second, if Mr. Treff's objections were mailed from the prison 

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in a timely fashion, the court should have considered them. Qulin 

v, White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (lOth Cir. 1989) (citing Houston v. 

~. 487 U.S. 266 (1988)), cert. denied, 493 u.s. 1059 (1990). 

If the court failed to do so, the problem was with the court, not 

with the prison mail room. Mr. Treff also alleges that mail to 

and from the federal district court on three occasions took four, 

seven, and nine days, but he claims no prejudice as a result of 

these delays. Therefore, Mr. Treff has not shown that the prison 

mail room denied him his constitutional right to access to the 

courts. Ms. Galetka is thus entitled to qualified immunity from 

Mr. Treff's claim that she denied him access to the courts. 

2. Right to Have Outgoing Mail Processed 

We next consider .Ms. Galetka's qualified immunity defense in 

the context of Mr. Treff's claim that a failure to process his 

mail violated his constitutional rights, He does not claim that 

his religious mail was censored because of its content. 

Therefore, we need not consider religious mail separately from 

other mail, Correspondence between a prisoner and an outsider 

implicates the guarantee of freedom of speech under the First 

Amendment and a qualified liberty interest under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Rrocunier v. Martinez, 416 u.s. 396, 408, 418 (1974). 

Tbornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989), overruled 

Martinez's standard of review for limitations placed on a 

prisoner's right to incoming mail, but Thornburgh did not overrule 

Martinez's holding pertaining to outgoing mail. The Thgrnbyrgh 

Court recognized that "[t]he implications of outgoing 

correspondence for prison security are of a categorically lesser 

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magnitude than the implications 

Thornburgh, 490 u.s. at 413. 

of incoming materials," 

Under Martinez, limitations on a prisoner's First Amendment 

rights in his outgoing mail "must further an important or 

substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of 

expression [and] . must be no greater than is necessary or 

essential to the protection of the particular governmental 

interest involved. 11 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413; see ale:o Leonard 

v, Ni~, 55 F.3d 370; 374 (8th Cir. 1995) (same). There is no 

suggestion that denying a prisoner the privilege of sending out 

any mail, or refusing to mail selected pieces of mail, was 

necessary in this case to serve "an important or substantial 

inter,est," Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413. 

A refusal to process any mail from a prisoner impermissibly 

interferes with the addressee's First and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights. see id. at 408. Accordingly, we hold that a prisoner's 

constitutional right to have his mail processed for delivery was 

clearly established at the time Mr. Treff's mail was allegedly not 

processed. .QL.. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 u.s. 555, 562-63, 565 

(1978) {on- claim alleging wrongful interference with prisoner's 

outgoing mail in 1971-1972, prison officials were entitled to 

qualified immunity defense because constitutional rights of 

prisoners to outgoing mail had not yet been announced). Although 

this right was clearly established, Mr. Treff has failed to 

demonstrate 

such right. 

that Ms. Galetka was responsible.for the violation of 

See Albright, 51 F.3d at 1533. Therefore, we affirm 

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the district court's finding that Ms. Galetka is entitled to the 

defense of qualified immunity on this issue. 

B. Failure to Establish the Elements of the C~se 

We alternatively affirm the district court's grant of 

summary judgment, ~Medina y. City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 

1493, 1495 n.l (lOth Cir. 1992) (reviewing court is free to affirm 

lower court decision on any grounds supported by record 

sufficiently to permit conclusions of law), based on Mr. Treff's 

failure to prove essential elements of his case. To withstand 

summary judgment, the nonmoving party must establish the elements 

essential to his case on which he bears the burden of proof at 

trial. Celotex Corp. y. Catrett, 477 u.s. 317, 322 (1986). "[A] 

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 

nonmoving party's. case necessarily renders all other facts 

immaterial. 11 N..._ at 323. The nonmoving party is not required to 

produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at tri.al, "but 

the content or substance of the evidence must be admissible." 

Thomas y. · International Business MacQs., 48 F. 3d 478, 485 (lOth 

Cir. 1995). Inadmissible hearsay evidence in an affidavit will 

not defeat summary judgment. Id. 

In this case, Mr. Treff, the party bringing the lawsuit, 

bears the burden of proving that his mail was not delivered, that 

Ms. Galetka was responsible for such nondelivery, and that Ms. 

Galetka acted intentionally or with deliberate indifference, ~ 

Daniels v. Willi~, 474 u.s. 327, 328 (1986); Hines v. Boothe, 

841 F.2d 623, 624 (5th Cir. 1988). The failure to establish any 

of these elements entitles Ms. Galetka to summary judgment; Mr. 

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Treff failed to establish any of the three required elements of 

his case. 

Mr. Treff maintains that if the mail had been delivered, the 

addressees would have replied. To oppose summary judgment, Mr. 

Treff proffered an affidavit from the paralegal for the prison 

contract attorneys stating that on December 30, 1992, she picked 

up a photocopy request for Mr. Treff consisting of an envelope 

that did not have a "received in mailroom11 date stamped on it, and 

the material to be photocopied was an affidavit from Kenneth 

Volker. Mr. Treff has not made clear the relevance of this 

evidence given that Kenneth Volker is not one of the sixteen 

addressees Mr. Treff claims did not receive his letter. 

Mr. Treff also submitted United States Postal service tracer 

requests for four of the sixteen pieces of mail he claims were not 

delivered. Of those four requests, two indicated the mail could 

not be located, and two indicated the addressees did not respond 

to the inquiry. The information contained in the tracer forms 

shows only that the mail could not be located, not that it was 

never submitted to the Postal Service for delivery. 

In his own affidavit, Mr. Treff stated that his letter to the 

American Jewish Congress, one of the sixteen allegedly missing 

pieces, was sent via registered mail, return receipt requested, 

but that he was not returned a receipt even though the mail room 

charged him for one. The mail tracer form indicated only that the 

addressee failed to respond to the postal inquiry, not that the 

letter was sent or that the receipt was returned. Mr. Treff also 

stated that he had asked his attorneys to send an affidavit 

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Appellate Case: 95-4012 Document: 01019280449 Date Filed: 01/10/1996 Page: 9 
stating that his letter to them was delayed, but no such affidavit 

appears in the record. Mr. Treff further claims that he sent a 

letter to his other attorney, who later told Mr. Treff that he had 

not received the letter after sixty days. Mr. Treff's statement 

of what the attorney told him is hearsay and cannot defeat summary 

judgment. Moreover, this letter was not one of the sixteen he 

claims were not delivered. 

In response to the challenge that a number of factors, other 

than the prison mail room, reasonably could have caused his mail 

not to be delivered, Mr. Treff offers only the presumption that, 

generally, the United States Postal Service delivers mail. He 

maintains that the other possible factors, such as the addressee's 

decision not to respond, intervention by a third party, loss or 

misdelivery by the Postal Service, or loss by the addressee, would 

not have kept the addressees from responding to his letters. 

Mr. Treff offered no evidence to support his main premise, 

that if his mail had been delivered, the addressees would have 

responded. He produced no affidavits from the intended recipients 

that they did not receive his mail. To the contrary, Mr. Treff 

does not dispu·te the results of the prison investigation that two 

of the addressees received his mail, but did not respond. He made 

no showing whatsoever that he had attempted to obtain affidavits 

by mail, telephone, or otherwise, from any of the sixteen 

addressees. His own belief that the addressees would have 

responded had they received his letters is not evidence. 

Because Mr. Treff failed to establish any one of the 

essential elements of his case, Ms. Galetka is entitled to summary 

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judgment. Similarly, Mr. Treff did not show that Ms. Galetka 

acted with the requisite deliberate indifference to state a claim 

under the Eighth Amendment. ~Wilson v. Seiter, 501 u.s. 294, 

303 (1991) (Eighth Amendment claim requires showing of deliberate 

indifference to prison conditions by prison officials) . The order 

granting summary judgment in favor of Ms. Galetka is affirmed. 

c. Assessment of Costs of Seryice 

We turn to Mr. Treff's claim that the district court erred in 

assessing against him the costs of serving Ms. Galetka with the 

summons and complaint. Mr. Treff admits that during the course of 

this litigation his financial condition improved sufficiently so 

that he is no longer entitled to pauper status. He concedes that 

he properly was required to pay the filing fee under the rule 

established by this court in Treff v. Bartell, 38 F.3d 1221 (lOth 

Cir. 1994} (unpublished} (affirming district court's order to pay 

filing fee due to Mr. Treff's changed financial condition). He 

claims Bartell required him to pay the court filing fee, no more 

and no less. This case, however, differs from Bartell in that 

Bartell did not address the question of a service and mileage fee. 

Mr. Treff also claims that the district court was without 

authority to enter an order directing him to pay the mileage and 

service fee of $47.50 because it was entered after the summary 

judgment order. Finally, Mr. Treff claims the costs were a 

penalty imposed to punish him for having filed a grievance against 

the district judge. 

28 u.s.c. § 1915(a) authorizes commencement and prosecution 

of a civil suit by a person unable to pay 11 Without ~repayment of 

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fees and costs.n Id. (emphasis added). Section 1915(e) permits a 

judgment for costs 11 at the conclusion of the suit or action as in 

other cases. 11 11 [A]llowing the commencement of a suit in forma 

pauperis pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1915(a) does not preclude the 

court from assessing costs at the conclusion of the suit. 11 Olson 

v. Coleman, 997 F.2d 726, 728 (lOth Cir. 1993). Costs include 

clerk and marshal fees. 28 u.s.c. § 1920; see also Jane L. v. 

Bangerte~, 61 F.3d 1505, 1517 (lOth Cir. 1995) (noting that costs 

under Fed. R. Civ: P. 54(d) include clerk and marshal fees). We 

review the district court's award of costs under both § 1915 and 

Rule 54(d) for an abuse of discretion. Denton v. Hernand~, 504 

u.s. 25, 33 (1992) (§ 1915); JaneL., 61 F.3d at 1517 (Rule 54(d)). 

Leave to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs is a 

privilege, not a right. Weaver v. Toombs, 948 F.2d 1004, 1008 

(6th Cir. 1991). Courts have the discretion to revoke that 

privilege when it no longer serves its goals. Murphy Y. Jones, 

801 F. Supp. 283, 288-89 (E.D. Mo. 1992). We have authorized the 

imposition of costs under § 1915 where the action is frivolous or 

malicious. ~~ Olson, 997 F.2d at 729; Phillips v. Carey, 638 

F.2d 207, 209 (lOth Cir.), Qert. denied, 450 U.S. 985 (1981). We 

do not apply that rule here, because neither this court nor the 

district court found Mr. Treff's claims malicious or frivolous. 

We hold that when a litigant's financial condition improves 

during the course of the litigation, the district court may 

require him or her to pay fees and costs. See Weaver, 948 F.2d at 

1014; Wiideman v. ijarper, 754 F. Supp. 808, 809 (D. Nev. 1990); 

Carter v, Telectron. Inc,, 452 F. Supp. 939, 942 (S.D. Tex. 1976). 

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we do not reach the question of a sliding scale for indigent 

litigants based on their ability to pay, see Wiideman, 754 

F. Supp. at 810-12, because Mr. Treff does not claim that he 

cannot afford to pay. We perceive no abuse of discretion or 

retaliatory motive in the district court's decision to order Mr. 

Treff to pay mileage and service costs of $47.50. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Utah is AFFIRMED. 

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