Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-13-02562/USCOURTS-ca6-13-02562-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gerald Eugene Singer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1 

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 15a0051p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

GERALD EUGENE SINGER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 13-2562 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids. 

No. 1:11-cr-00257-1—Gordon J. Quist, District Judge. 

Decided and Filed: March 23, 2015 

Before: KETHLEDGE and DONALD, Circuit Judges; McCALLA, District Judge.*

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ON BRIEF: Kevin M. Schad, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cincinnati, 

Ohio, for Appellant. Michael A. MacDonald, Christopher M. O’Connor, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. 

____________________ 

AMENDED OPINION

____________________ 

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Gerald Eugene Singer appeals his 

convictions and sentence on multiple criminal charges, including mail fraud, use of fire to 

commit mail fraud, arson, tax fraud, and obstruction of the administration of the internal revenue 

laws. After a jury rendered a guilty verdict on twelve of fifteen counts, the district court 

 *

The Honorable Jon P. McCalla, United States District Judge for the Western District of Tennessee, sitting 

by designation. 

>

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No. 13-2562 United States v. Singer Page 2 

sentenced Singer to a total term of fifty-five years in prison. On appeal, Singer argues that: 

(1) the mail-fraud count of his indictment was duplicitous; (2) the district court should have 

severed the tax-fraud counts from the other charged offenses; (3) certain counts in the indictment 

were outside of the relevant statute of limitations or brought within an improper venue; and 

(4) the district court erred by imposing consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h). For the 

reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM Singer’s convictions and sentence. 

I.

The government alleged that Singer, a landlord in Muskegon, Michigan, devised an 

“arson for profit” scheme in which he acquired various properties at below-market prices, 

obtained insurance policies well exceeding the purchase prices, and then caused the destruction 

of the properties by deliberately setting fires in order to obtain insurance payments for his 

personal benefit. Singer owned or had a legal interest in numerous investment, rental, and 

commercial properties, mostly in the Muskegon area. Between 1993 and 2007, nine of Singer’s 

properties suffered significant damage from arson. A 2009 investigation by the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives uncovered numerous witnesses, including Singer’s 

tenants, who admitted at trial that Singer and his son encouraged them to set fire to various 

properties. 

The following table summarizes each of the fires charged in the indictment, as well as 

Singer’s insurance demands and ultimate payouts: 

Fire Location Purchase 

Price

Fire 

Date

Insurer Insurance 

Demand Payment

530 Elliott St. 

Grand Haven, MI 

$16,000 03/01/93 Allstate Insurance 

Co. 

$26,153 $25,903 

2809 Hoyt St. 

Muskegon Heights, MI 

$7,000 07/23/95 Michigan Millers 

Mutual Insurance 

$60,665 $60,665 

3101 8th St. 

Muskegon Heights, MI 

$6,000 08/25/96 American States 

Insurance 

$45,800 $7,500 

2820 Peck St. 

Muskegon Heights, MI 

$150,000 09/01/97 Auto Owners 

Insurance 

$325,000 $40,000 

1292 E. Broadway 

Norton Shores, MI 

$49,000 06/20/99 Hartford Insurance, 

Westport Insurance 

$657,000 $500,000 

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No. 13-2562 United States v. Singer Page 3 

Fire Location Purchase 

Price

Fire 

Date

Insurer Insurance 

Demand Payment

2340 Wood St. 

Muskegon Heights, MI 

$12,000 08/22/02 Farm Bureau General 

Insurance Co. 

$105,000 $0.001

1019 E. 35th Place 

Gary, IN 

$10,000 06/21/06 Ohio Casualty 

Insurance 

$40,405 $17,500 

250 Myrtle St. 

Muskegon, MI 

$12,151 11/09/06 Foremost Insurance $69,000 $59,196 

2608-2614 7th St. 

Muskegon Heights, MI 

$33,269 08/28/07 Farm Bureau General 

Insurance Co. 

$273,000 ($4,000)2

TOTALS $295,420 $1,602,023 $706,764

The government further alleged that Singer filed false tax returns for the years 2005 

through 2008. Specifically, the government asserted that Singer falsely reported “net operating 

losses” (“NOL”) despite his receipt of insurance payments offsetting them. An agent of the 

Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) interviewed Singer on July 18, 2011. During that interview, 

Singer told the agent that the $500,000 NOL he reported on his tax returns represented his 

financial loss arising from the 1999 fire at the 1292 E. Broadway property—a fabric store known 

as “The Fair”—in Norton Shores, Michigan. Singer never reported his receipt of $500,000 in 

insurance proceeds, which would have eliminated his NOL claims, to the IRS. Singer’s false 

NOL claims reduced his taxable income by $100,000 in 2005, $10,000 in 2006, $40,000 in 2007, 

and $30,000 in 2008. 

Finally, the government alleged that Singer corruptly endeavored to obstruct the due 

administration of the tax laws, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). Specifically, the government 

asserted and introduced evidence that Singer (1) filed false tax returns; (2) made false and 

misleading statements to IRS officials; (3) misled his tax return preparer; (4) concealed income 

from the IRS by storing it in a “safe haven” bank account; (5) concealed insurance proceeds 

 1

In a related criminal proceeding against one of Singer’s tenants, Ray Martin Haynes, Jr., the district court 

ordered Haynes to pay restitution of $106,261.83 to Farm Bureau Insurance. See United States v. Haynes, No. 1:09-

cr-00254-GJQ-1, ECF No. 21 at PageID 55 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2010). We affirmed Haynes’ sentence on appeal. 

United States v. Haynes, 579 F. App’x 473 (6th Cir. 2014). 

2

After Farm Bureau Insurance denied his claim on the 7th Street building, Singer filed a civil lawsuit in the 

Muskegon County Circuit Court. Singer later filed a voluntary stipulation of dismissal and paid $4,000 to Farm 

Bureau to compensate its legal expenses in defending the lawsuit. 

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through several “structured” individual payments of $10,000 from his attorney; and (6) caused 

multiple tenants to file false tax returns claiming first-time homebuyer credits with the IRS, 

portions of which they then paid over to Singer. 

On September 7, 2011, a grand jury in the Western District of Michigan returned a 

fourteen-count indictment against Singer. On October 6, 2011, the grand jury returned a 

superseding indictment adding a fifteenth count. Count 1 charged Singer with mail fraud related 

to the above-referenced arson scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Counts 2-7 charged 

Singer with use of fire to commit mail fraud related to the arsons at 3101 8th Street (Count 2), 

1292 E. Broadway (Count 3), 2340 Wood Street (Count 4), 1019 E. 35th Place (Count 5), 

250 Myrtle Street (Count 6), and 2608-2614 7th Street (Count 7), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 844(h). Counts 8-10 charged Singer with the arsons of 2340 Wood Street (Count 8),3

250 Myrtle Street (Count 9), and 2608-2614 7th Street (Count 10), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 844(i). Counts 11-14 charged Singer with making false statements on his tax returns, in 

violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Finally, Count 15 charged Singer with obstructing the due 

administration of the internal revenue laws, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). 

After a trial lasting more than three weeks, the jury convicted Singer of mail fraud 

(Count 1), three counts of using fire to commit mail fraud (Counts 3, 6, and 7), two counts of 

arson (Counts 9 and 10), four counts of making false statements on tax returns (Counts 11-14), 

and one count of obstructing tax administration (Count 15). The jury acquitted Singer of three 

counts of using fire to commit mail fraud (Counts 2, 4, and 5). 

On November 7, 2013, the district court sentenced Singer to a total of fifty-five years’ 

imprisonment: five-year terms on each of Counts 1, 9, and 10, and three-year terms on each of 

Counts 11-15, all to run concurrently; a ten-year term on Count 3, to run consecutively to all 

other counts; a twenty-year term on Count 6, to run consecutively to all other counts; and a 

twenty-year term on Count 7, to run consecutively to all other counts. The court rejected 

Singer’s argument that the court should not “stack” his § 844(h) sentences consecutively because 

his underlying convictions did not involve the use of explosives and because his “second or 

 3

Upon Singer’s motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a), the district court dismissed 

Count 8—the arson charge related to the 2340 Wood Street property—finding that the property was a private 

residence and not a “property used in interstate or foreign commerce” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). 

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No. 13-2562 United States v. Singer Page 5 

subsequent” § 844(h) convictions stemmed from the same prosecution as his first. In addition, 

the court ordered Singer to pay $653,140 in restitution to various insurance companies and the 

IRS and to forfeit $559,196 to the United States. 

Singer timely appealed. 

II.

We first address Singer’s claim that Count 1 of the indictment was duplicitous. We then 

address Singer’s arguments regarding misjoinder, the statute of limitations and venue, and 

sentencing under § 844(h). 

A.

Singer first argues that Count 1 of the indictment was fatally duplicitous because it 

charged numerous separate mail-fraud offenses involving distinct mailings and arsons in one 

mega-count. “An indictment is duplicitous if it sets forth separate and distinct crimes in one 

count.” United States v. Boyd, 640 F.3d 657, 665 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.

Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 415 (6th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a defendant 

asserts that an indictment is duplicitous for the first time on appeal, we apply plain-error review 

unless the defendant objected to the district court’s jury instructions. United States v. Kakos, 

483 F.3d 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2007). Because Singer did not so object, plain-error review applies 

to his duplicity challenge. Accordingly, we may overturn Singer’s conviction on Count 1 only if 

there was plain error that affected his “substantial rights.” United States v. Lloyd, 462 F.3d 510, 

514 (6th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Page, 520 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2008) 

(characterizing the plain-error standard as a “high burden”). 

A mail-fraud conviction requires proof of three elements: “(1) devising or intending to 

devise a scheme to defraud (or to perform specified fraudulent acts); (2) involving a use of the 

mails; and (3) for the purpose of executing the scheme or attempting to do so.” United States v.

Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 354 (6th Cir. 1997). Count 1 of the indictment charged that Singer 

“knowingly and unlawfully devise[d] a scheme and artifice to defraud” several insurance 

companies and other persons “of money, funds, credits and similar property rights.” The count 

described the particulars of the scheme and then listed seventeen mailings in furtherance of the 

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scheme between November 10, 2006, and May 7, 2009. We hold that the count was not 

duplicitous. 

In United States v. Robinson, we held that an indictment charging conspiracy to commit 

wire and mail fraud in the first count, and substantive wire and mail fraud in the second and third 

counts, was not duplicitous. 651 F.2d 1188, 1194-95 (6th Cir. 1981). In doing so, we approved 

the government’s decision “[t]o avoid unnecessarily complex and confusing allegations and the 

concomitant prejudice to [the defendant] of charging him with scores of substantive counts 

arising out of the same scheme” by “particulariz[ing] in one count the different acts that were 

part of the single scheme.” Id. Our sister circuits have employed similar reasoning. See, e.g., 

United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 281 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A]cts that could be charged as 

separate counts of an indictment may instead be charged in a single count if those acts could be 

characterized as part of a single continuing scheme.” (quoting United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 

1125, 1141 (2d Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Morse, 785 F.2d 

771, 774 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an indictment alleging involvement in a mail-fraud scheme 

comprised of four different investment programs could “fairly be read to charge but a single 

scheme and [was] therefore not duplicitous”). 

Even if we assumed that Count 1 of Singer’s indictment was duplicitous, however, 

duplicity is only reversible if it prejudices the defendant. See Olmeda, 461 F.3d at 281 

(“Duplicitous pleading . . . is not presumptively invalid.”). Singer argues that the duplicity of 

Count 1 prejudices him because it hinders his ability to plead a defense under the Double 

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment if the government pursues additional mail-fraud 

charges against him for the arsons referenced in Count 1. Additionally, he argues that the 

evidence at trial demonstrated the impermissibly wide scope of the conduct alleged in Count 1, 

as confirmed by the fact that the jury acquitted him of certain arsons referenced in the count. We 

reject Singer’s arguments. 

As an initial matter, we note that the proof at trial is irrelevant to the question of whether 

an indictment is duplicitous. See United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(“Our task is solely to assess whether the indictment can be read to charge only one violation in 

each count.”). Moreover, it is unclear how the government could initiate any future prosecution 

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No. 13-2562 United States v. Singer Page 7 

based on the conduct set forth in Count 1 without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. In any 

event, we have no difficulty concluding that Count 1 of the indictment acceptably charged Singer 

with a single scheme to defraud that included multiple mailings. See United States v. Robinson, 

294 F. App’x 630, 632 (2d Cir. 2008) (“It does not follow . . . from the difference of the identity 

of the recipients . . . in, and the time elapsed between, the earlier and later charged offense 

conduct, that [the defendant] was not engaged in a single continuing scheme.”); see also United 

States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 622 (6th Cir. 2005) (“It is not duplicitous to allege in one count 

that multiple means have been used to commit a single offense.”). And it is difficult to imagine 

how a single mail-fraud count—as opposed to seventeen or more—prejudiced Singer. See

United States v. Margiotta, 646 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that the placement of 

multiple mailings arising out of a mail-fraud scheme “in a single count achieves the obvious 

benefit of limiting the maximum penalties defendant may face if convicted of mail fraud and also 

avoids the unfairness of portraying the defendant to the jury as the perpetrator of 50 crimes”).

B.

Singer next argues that the district court should have severed the tax charges in the 

indictment (Counts 11-15) from the rest of the case because they were unrelated to the mailfraud and arson charges and carried a risk of spillover prejudice. Here, Singer concedes that he 

did not move for severance at the district court. But nothing in the record suggests that his 

failure to do so was intentional. Accordingly, we review his misjoinder claim for plain error. 

See United States v. Soto, --- F.3d ---, 2015 WL 1036665, at *7 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 2015) (holding 

that, under the current version of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 

effective December 1, 2014, “we do not treat the failure to file a motion as a waiver unless the 

circumstances of the case indicate that the defendant intentionally relinquished a known right”). 

Plain error exists where there is (1) an error (2) that is “clear or obvious,” (3) which “affected the 

appellant’s substantial rights,” and (4) which “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 

(2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In view of the inextricably related nature of 

Counts 11-15 and the other charges in the indictment, we find no plain error in the district court’s 

consideration of the indictment as a whole. 

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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) provides that an indictment “may charge a 

defendant in separate counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged . . . are of the same 

or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or 

constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.”4

 We construe Rule 8(a) in favor of joinder and 

evaluate whether joinder of multiple offenses was appropriate with an eye toward the four 

corners of the indictment. United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 691-92 (6th Cir. 2009). Under 

this permissive approach, “[w]hen the joined counts are logically related, and there is a large area 

of overlapping proof, joinder is appropriate.” United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 512 

(6th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wirsing, 719 F.2d 859, 863 

(6th Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Consolidating offenses that arise from the 

same or related acts saves resources [and] allows the jury to see the complete set of facts about 

the alleged criminal enterprise . . . .” 1A Charles Alan Wright & Andrew D. Leipold, Federal 

Practice and Procedure, § 143, at 35-40 (4th ed. 2008). 

Despite Singer’s assertions to the contrary, the tax charges in the indictment arose 

directly out of the alleged mail fraud and arsons. The false “net operating losses” Singer 

reported on his tax returns were part and parcel of the fraudulent arson of the fabric store known 

as “The Fair.” Similarly, the allegations in Count 15 regarding Singer’s efforts to evade the tax 

laws relate directly to the fraudulent insurance claims and arsons alleged in other portions of the 

indictment. We have long held that “tax counts can properly be joined with non-tax counts 

where it is shown that the tax offenses arose directly from the other offenses charged[.]” 

Wirsing, 719 F.2d at 864 (quoting United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1313 (11th Cir. 

1982)); see also United States v. Saadey, 393 F.3d 669, 678 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Tax and related 

counts covering the same time period and involving the same evidence are properly joined.”); 

United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1121 (6th Cir. 1985) (“It is appropriate to combine tax 

charges against one defendant with fraud charges against that same defendant . . . if the tax 

evasion charges arise directly out of the common illicit enterprise.”). This makes sense in view 

of the fact that “concealment of ill-gotten gain is an integral part of assuring the success of . . . 

 4

Rule 14(a), by contrast, vests discretion in the district court to order separate trials of counts “[i]f the 

joinder of offenses . . . in an indictment . . . appears to prejudice a defendant or the government . . . .” 

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illegal activity.” Bibby, 752 F.2d at 1121. In this case, the joinder of the tax charges and the 

mail-fraud and arson charges in a single prosecution was not plain error. 

C.

Singer’s third argument is two-pronged. First, he asserts that Count 2 is outside the 

applicable ten-year statute of limitations5 because the fire undergirding that count took place in 

April 1996—more than fifteen years before the grand jury returned the first indictment in this 

case in September 2011. Second, he argues that the government should not have charged 

Count 5 in an indictment in the Western District of Michigan because the fire undergirding that 

count took place in Gary, Indiana. Singer failed to raise these issues in the district court, so we 

review them under the plain-error standard. See United States v. Damra, 621 F.3d 474, 501 

& n.8 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that failure to raise a statute-of-limitations argument in the district 

court subjects the argument to plain-error review on appeal); United States v. Grenoble, 413 F.3d 

569, 573 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that, where a defendant does not object to a defect in venue 

that is “apparent on the face of the indictment” before trial, the objection is waived). 

Singer’s argument that the ten-year statute of limitations on Count 2 began to run in 

April 1996, when the fire occurred, misses the mark. An offense under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h) is not 

“committed” until a fire or explosive is used to commit another felony—in this case, mail fraud. 

See United States v. Beardslee, 197 F.3d 378, 385 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A] violation of 

section 844(h) is not complete until both a fire and a ‘felony which may be prosecuted in a court 

of the United States’ have occurred.”). “The statute of limitations begins to run when a crime is 

complete, that is, when each element of the crime charged has occurred.” United States v.

Grenier, 513 F.3d 632, 636 (6th Cir. 2008). As noted above, an essential element of mail fraud 

is use of the mails. Frost, 125 F.3d at 354. Count 2 alleges a mailing occurring as recently as 

April 30, 2003. That renders the count—first alleged on September 7, 2011, and restated in a 

superseding indictment a month later—well within the ten-year statute of limitations. Therefore, 

the crime alleged in Count 2 was not outside the relevant statute of limitations and no plain error 

arose from its consideration at trial. 

 5

See 18 U.S.C. § 3295 (“No person shall be prosecuted . . . under [18 U.S.C. § 844(h)] unless the 

indictment is found . . . not later than 10 years after the date on which the offense was committed.”). 

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No. 13-2562 United States v. Singer Page 10 

Singer’s venue argument also fails. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), “any offense . . . 

begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be 

inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or 

completed.” The government need only prove that venue was appropriate by a preponderance of 

the evidence. United States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 420-21 (6th Cir. 2003). That standard is 

satisfied here; Count 5 specifically alleged, and trial testimony confirmed, that Singer sent a 

mailing from Muskegon, Michigan, to Gary, Indiana, on June 30, 2006. Thus, venue in the 

Western District of Michigan was proper in this case. Cf. United States v. Parlier, 570 F. App’x 

509, 513-14 (6th Cir. 2014). 

D.

Finally, Singer argues that we must vacate his 55-year sentence because the district court 

impermissibly “stacked” his § 844(h) convictions consecutively to one another. At the district 

court, Singer argued that a “second or subsequent” conviction under § 844(h) must occur in a 

separate proceeding from one giving rise to his first § 844(h) conviction. On appeal, however, 

Singer makes a different argument: that a defendant may only be convicted of one § 844(h) 

count where the defendant is only charged with one substantive felony. Singer failed to make 

this argument at the district court, so we review for plain error. 

Singer asserts that because each of his § 844(h) convictions arises out of the same 

indictment, the sentences on those convictions must merge under the reasoning espoused in 

United States v. Sims, 975 F.2d 1225, 1235-36 (6th Cir. 1992). In Sims, we held that where an 

indictment contains only one substantive drug-trafficking offense and separate counts under 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) “for weapons which fall into more than one weapons category as defined by 

that section, the court must consolidate those section 924(c) counts, either pre- or post-trial so 

that no defendant will be convicted on more than one gun count relative to the one drug 

trafficking offense.” Id. at 1235. Consequently, we held, “defendants who have been convicted 

of section 924(c) violations involving weapons carrying different penalties must be sentenced to 

the highest applicable sentence” contemplated by the statute. Id. at 1236. 

Here, as Singer points out, he was indicted on only one stand-alone count of mail fraud. 

But each of his § 844(h) convictions was based on a different fraudulent mailing and a different 

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No. 13-2562 United States v. Singer Page 11 

fire. Thus, for each § 844(h) charge, the government had to prove that Singer committed a 

different predicate felony. Sims is therefore inapposite: in that case, the government indicted the 

defendant on two § 924(c) counts based on the same underlying drug transaction. Id. at 1230. 

We recognize that the government’s decision to charge each fire as a separate § 844(h) offense is 

arguably in conflict with its theory that the fires all were part of the same underlying scheme. 

But the government could have charged each fraud individually—indeed, Singer argues 

elsewhere that the government was required to do so. And Singer cites to no case that holds that 

the government’s decision to charge one substantive mail-fraud count instead of several 

precludes multiple convictions under § 844(h). Thus, it was not plain error for the district court 

to decline to merge Singer’s § 844(h) convictions. 

Singer’s argument that only one sentence under § 844(h) was appropriate because the 

government did not offer proof that he used explosives is equally unavailing. Singer preserved 

this argument at the district court, so we review the district court’s conclusion de novo. United 

States v. Elliott, 757 F.3d 492, 494 (6th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Thompson, 728 F.3d 

1011, 1015 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that questions of statutory interpretation related to 

§ 844(h) are reviewed de novo). Section 844(h) provides that second or subsequent convictions 

shall not “run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the 

felony in which the explosive was used or carried.” Singer asserts that the statute’s omission of 

fire and explicit mention of explosives indicates Congress’ intent to limit consecutive sentences 

to those where the defendant used an explosive. The federal courts of appeals repeatedly have 

rejected this well-worn argument. Singer acknowledges the most recent case to do so—United 

States v. Creech, 408 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2005)—but argues that its reasoning was not extensive 

and actually contravenes the plain language of § 844(h). We disagree. In Creech, the Fifth 

Circuit correctly held that the statute’s language is inclusive rather than exclusive, and that the 

statute “in no way attempts to limit the stacking provision to felonies in which explosives are 

used but explicitly merely includes such felonies.” 408 F.3d at 272-73; see also 18 U.S.C. 

§ 844(h) (“[N]or shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently 

with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the felony in which the 

explosive was used or carried.” (emphases added)). Other federal appellate courts universally 

agree. See United States v. Colvin, 353 F.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[T]he structure 

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No. 13-2562 United States v. Singer Page 12 

of [18 U.S.C. § 844(h)] suggests that Congress intended to treat fires and explosives as 

interchangeable[.]”); United States v. Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199, 1215 (10th Cir. 2001) (“It is 

irrational to view § 844(h)(1) as first explicitly linking fire and explosives for additional 

punishment when used in committing any felony then, sub silentio, delinking fire from that 

pairing for purposes of the cumulative punishment clause . . . .”); Sicurella v. United States, 

157 F.3d 177, 178-79 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (confirming that “§ 844(h)’s requirement of 

consecutive sentencing does apply to fire-related felonies”). In rejecting Singer’s argument that 

his consecutive sentences under § 844(h) were illegal, we join in the reasoning of the above-cited 

decisions. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Singer’s convictions and sentence. 

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