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Parties Involved:
Cyprus Emerald Resources Corporation
Petitioner
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Respondent
Secretary of Labor
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 17, 1999 Decided November 5, 1999

Nos. 98-1442 and 98-1548

Cyprus Emerald Resources Corporation,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission

and Secretary of Labor,

Respondents

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission

R. Henry Moore argued the cause for the petitioner.

Heather A. Wyman entered an appearance.

Colleen A. Geraghty, Attorney, United States Department

of Labor, argued the cause for the respondents. W. Christian Schumann, Counsel, United States Department of Labor, was on brief. Norman M. Gleichman, General Counsel,

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Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, and Robin A.

Rosenbluth, Attorney, United States Department of Labor,

entered appearances.

Before: Ginsburg, Henderson and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Section

104(d)(1) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977

(Act) provides in part:

If, upon any inspection of a coal or other mine, an

authorized representative of the Secretary [of Labor]

finds that there has been a violation of any mandatory

health or safety standard, and if he also finds that, while

the conditions created by such violation do not cause

imminent danger, such violation is of such nature as

could significantly and substantially contribute to the

cause and effect of a coal or other mine safety or health

hazard, and if he finds such violation to be caused by an

unwarrantable failure of such operator to comply with

such mandatory health or safety standards, he shall

include such finding in any citation given to the operator

under this chapter.

30 U.S.C. s 814(d)(1). Designation of a violation as "significant and substantial" under section 104(d)(1) can have significant consequences to a mine operator. See 30 U.S.C.

s 814(d), (e).1 RAG Emerald Resources Corp. (Emerald),

__________

1 If the violation is found to be both "significant and substantial"

and "caused by an unwarrantable failure of [the] operator to comply

with [the] mandatory health or safety standards," section 104(d)(1)

requires a withdrawal order for a second mandatory standard

violation caused by an "unwarrantable failure to comply" within 90

days of the first. 30 U.S.C. s 814(d)(1). Section 104(d)(2) requires

a second withdrawal order for "violations similar to those that

resulted in the issuance of the [first] withdrawal order." Id.

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formerly known as Cyprus Emerald Resources Corp., petitions for review of a Federal Mine Safety Health Review

Commission (FMSHRC, Commission) decision upholding a

finding that Emerald's violation of 30 C.F.R. s 50.11(b)

(50.11(b)) was "significant and substantial." Secretary of

Labor v. Cyprus Emerald Resources Corp., 20 F.M.S.H.R.C.

790 (1998). Emerald had challenged the finding on the

ground that the plain language of section 104(d)(1) precludes

designation of the 50.11(b) violation as "significant and substantial" because 50.11(b) is not "a mandatory health or safety

standard" as section 104(d)(1) requires.2 The Commission

determined that the statute is ambiguous on the subject and

that the Commission could therefore reasonably construe the

statutory language to permit such a finding. The Commission was wrong. Section 104(d) unambiguously authorizes a

"significant and substantial" finding for violation only of a

mandatory health or safety standard. We therefore hold that

a "significant and substantial" finding is permissible in a

citation charging violation of a mandatory safety or health

__________

s 814(d)(2). Section 104(e)(1) requires withdrawal for "any violation of a mandatory health or safety standard which could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a coal

or other mine safety or health hazard" within 90 days after the

operator has been notified of "a pattern of violations of mandatory

health or safety standards in the coal or other mine which are of

such nature as could have significantly and substantially contributed

to the cause and effect of coal or other mine health or safety

hazards." Id. s 814(e)(1). Once a section 104(e)(1) withdrawal

order issues, section 104(e)(2) requires another such order for "any

violation of a mandatory health or safety standard which could

significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a

coal or other mine health or safety hazard." Id. s 814(e)(2).

2 Mandatory safety and health standards are promulgated in

accord with the procedure set out in section 101 of the Act, 30

U.S.C. s 811 (titled "Mandatory safety and health standards").

Both the Secretary and the Commission have acknowledged that

the regulation here, 30 C.F.R. s 50.11(b), was promulgated not

under section 101 but under section 508, 30 U.S.C. s 957, the Act's

general rulemaking provision. See Secretary's Brief at 17 n.6; 20

F.M.S.H.R.C. at 799 n.10.

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standard only3 and, accordingly, grant Emerald's petition for

review.

I.

Emerald operates a coal mine and processing plant in

Greene County, Pennsylvania. Refuse from the plant is

ordinarily used to build up a nearby impoundment embankment pursuant to a disposal plan approved by the Mine

Safety and Health Administration (FMSHA) in 1983. When

road or weather conditions prevent hauling refuse to the

impoundment, Emerald takes it to a "short-haul" area closer

to the processing plant. On April 2, 1993 FMSHA received a

complaint that part of a short-haul refuse pile had collapsed

and slipped into a "slurry pond."4 An FMSHA inspector

issued an "imminent danger" withdrawal order pursuant to

section 107(a) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. s 817(a),5 and upon a

subsequent inspection issued three citations charging "significant and substantial" and "unwarrantable" violations of mandatory safety standards (30 C.F.R. ss 77.215(f), 77.215(h) and

77.1608(b)) under section 104(d)(1) for improperly construct-

__________

3 This holding was foreshadowed by language in Secretary of

Labor v. FMSHRC, 111 F.3d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See, e.g., 111

F.3d at 917 ("Congress has plainly excluded consideration of surrounding conditions that do not violate health and safety standards."). In that case, however, we did not address the precise

question raised here. We held there that the plain language of

section 104(d)(1) precludes the Commission from basing a "significant and substantial" finding on conditions that did not violate the

regulation under which the mine operator was cited. Because that

regulation was a mandatory standard, we did not consider whether

the statute permits a "significant and substantial" finding when the

violated regulation is not a mandatory standard.

4 According to the Commission, "slurry" is "the fine carbonaceous

discharge from a mine washery." 20 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 791 n.2.

5 Section 107(a) provides that, if an inspector "finds that an

imminent danger exists" at a mine, he may issue a withdrawal order

requiring the mine operator to evacuate the dangerous area until an

inspector determines the danger and the condition that caused it

have ceased. 30 U.S.C. s 817(a).

ing and using vehicles in the refuse pile. During his investigation, the inspector learned of a previous refuse pile collapse

on December 27, 1992, for which the inspector also issued

citations alleging "significant and substantial" and "unwarrantable" violations of the same standards. In addition, he

issued citations for violating two additional regulations that

are not mandatory standards: 30 C.F.R. s 50.10, for failing to

notify FMSHA of the earlier collapse, and 30 U.S.C.

s 50.11(b), for failing to investigate the collapse. The inspector designated the 50.11(b) violation as "significant and substantial."

After conducting a hearing, the administrative law judge

issued a decision dated November 29, 1995 upholding each of

Emerald's citations. Secretary of Labor v. Cyprus Emerald

Resources Corp., 17 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2086 (1995). In the deciUSCA Case #98-1548 Document #474976 Filed: 11/05/1999 Page 4 of 9
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sion, the judge specifically concluded that violation of a

regulation such as 50.11(b), which is not a mandatory standard, may be designated "significant and substantial."6 Emerald petitioned the Commission to review the judge's decision.

In a decision dated August 24, 1998 the Commission, inter

alia, upheld the Secretary's designation of the 50.11(b) violation as "significant and substantial." The three-commissioner

majority concluded that section 104 was ambiguous on the

issue and could therefore be construed to permit "significant

and substantial" designation of such a violation.7 Emerald

petitioned for review of the Commission's decision.

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6 The judge also stated, however, that because the citation was

issued under section 104(a), and not under section 104(d), the

finding was "an allegation of gravity, not an assertion of jurisdiction

to apply the sanctions of [section] 104(d)," and declined to "reach

the issue whether the sanctions of s 104(d) apply to a violation of

Part 50." 17 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2099.

7 Unlike the administrative law judge, see supra note 6, the

Commission majority undertook to "address the issue squarely

raised by the parties and consider whether the reference to mandatory health or safety standard in sections 104(d) and 104(e) precludes the Secretary from attaching the S&S designation to a

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II.

The outcome of this proceeding rests on the interpretation

of the single statutory sentence quoted above and repeated

here:

If, upon any inspection of a coal or other mine, an

authorized representative of the Secretary finds that

there has been a violation of any mandatory health or

safety standard, and if he also finds that, while the

conditions created by such violation do not cause imminent danger, such violation is of such nature as could

significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and

effect of a coal or other mine safety or health hazard, and

if he finds such violation to be caused by an unwarrantable failure of such operator to comply with such mandatory health or safety standards, he shall include such

finding in any citation given to the operator under this

chapter.

30 U.S.C. s 814(d)(1) (emphasis added). If in drafting this

provision " 'Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,' " we "must give effect to Congress's 'unambiguously expressed intent.' " Secretary of Labor v. FMSHRC,

111 F.3d 913, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Chevron USA,

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 842 (1984)). "If 'the statute is silent or ambiguous with

respect to the specific issue,' we ask whether the agency's

position rests on a 'permissible construction of the statute.' "

Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). We conclude, as

Emerald has maintained from the start, that the highlighted

portion of the quoted sentence plainly and unequivocally

conditions a "significant and substantial" finding (as well as

an "unwarrantable" one) upon an initial finding "that there

has been a violation of [a] mandatory health or safety standard." As the two dissenting Commissioners observed, "The

language of the Act is inescapable on this point." 20

F.M.S.H.R.C. at 826-27 n.1. We therefore hold that the

__________

violation of another regulatory requirement." 20 F.M.S.H.R.C. at

801.

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statute does not authorize the FMSHA to designate as "significant and substantial" a violation of a regulation such as

50.11(b) that is not a mandatory health or safety standard.

Despite the clarity of the relevant language, the Commission suggests a Chevron detour around the statute's plain

meaning. We find it impassable. The Commission asserts

that the quoted statutory language is somehow rendered

ambiguous by its reference to "any citation given to the

operator under [chapter 22 of Title 30]," that is to any citation

authorized by section 104(a). The Commission's reasoning, as

far as we can discern it, runs thus: (1) section 104(d)(1) refers

to a citation issued under section 104(a), which is the source

of the Commission's authority to issue all citations, including

those containing "significant and substantial" findings; (2)

section 104(a) treats all violations identically, whether of a

statutory provision, of a mandatory standard or of a regulation that is not a standard; (3) therefore, it is ambiguous

whether the "significant and substantial" authority in section

104(d)(1) also applies equally to all violations. The Commission's third point simply does not follow from the other two;

and, besides, it ignores the unambiguous language that the

Congress used.

The Commission has also suggested we should ignore the

statute's plain meaning because without authority to make a

"significant and substantial" finding for violation of a regulation that is not a mandatory standard, FMSHA will be unable

to enforce such regulations and the Congress's intent to

promote safety and prevent accidents will therefore be

thwarted. We find the Commission's concerns overblown.

We believe the Act provides adequate means to enforce such

regulations, including section 107(a) "imminent danger" withdrawal orders, section 104(a) citations and section 110(a) civil

penalties, see 30 U.S.C. s 820(a). If the Secretary of Labor

finds a particular practice or condition so dangerous as to

require the sanctions provided in section 104(d) and (e), she

may promulgate an appropriate mandatory standard under

section 101, 30 U.S.C. s 811, the violation of which may

properly be found "significant and substantial." Given these

alternative measures, we do not believe this is one of the

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" ' "rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute

will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions

of its drafters." ' " Davis County Solid Waste Management

v. United States EPA, 101 F.3d 1395, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.

235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,

458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))).

For the preceding reasons, we grant Emerald's petition for

review, reverse the Commission's 50.11(b) "significant and

substantial" determination and remand for appropriate administrative action.

So ordered.

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Randolph, Circuit Judge, concurring: Because "the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule

of law," Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp.,

483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987), our disposition of this case should

have begun with a citation to F.3d and there it should have

ended.

Today's majority opinion holds that under s 104(d)(1) of

the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.

s 814(d)(1), there may be "a 'significant and substantial'

finding for violation only of a mandatory health or safety

standard." Maj. op. at 3. Secretary of Labor v. FMSHRC,

111 F.3d 913, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1997), held the same:

As we read [s 104(d)(1)], the critical words are "such

violation is of such nature." A "significantly and substantially" finding may be made only after an authorized

representative has found a "violation" of mine safety and

health regulations.... By focusing the decisionmaker's

attention on "such violation" and its "nature," Congress

has plainly excluded consideration of surrounding conditions that do not violate health and safety standards.

This was not dictum. It was a necessary ground for the

decision, leading us to reject the argument that in making an

"S & S" finding, the Secretary could consider violations of

something other than a mandatory health or safety standard.

As such, Secretary of Labor v. FMSHRC should have been

treated, by the Commission and by this court, as conclusive.

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