Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01160/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01160-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Justice
Respondent
Anthony W. Knox
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

ANTHONY W. KNOX,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Respondent

______________________

2023-1160

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-4324-20-0191-I-3.

______________________

Decided: January 6, 2025

______________________

KEVIN EDWARD BYRNES, Fluet, Tysons, VA, argued for 

petitioner. Also represented by GRACE H. WILLIAMS. 

 STEPHEN J. SMITH, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented 

by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, TARA K. HOGAN, PATRICIA M.

MCCARTHY. 

 ______________________

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, CHEN and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 KNOX v. DOJ

CHEN, Circuit Judge.

Mr. Anthony W. Knox brought reemployment and 

discrimination claims under the Uniformed Services 

Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 

U.S.C. §§ 4301–35, seeking to retroactively correct both 

when he received a within-grade pay increase and when he 

was promoted. The Merit Systems Protection Board 

(Board) granted his within-grade increase reemployment 

claim but denied his promotion claims and his withingrade increase discrimination claim. Knox v. Dep’t of Just., 

No. SF-4324-20-0191-I-3, 2022 WL 4675449, 2–3 (M.S.P.B. 

Sept. 21, 2022) (Decision).1 Mr. Knox appeals. For the 

following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and 

remand.

I.

Mr. Knox was a Special Agent with the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) from 1997 until his 

retirement in 2020. Decision at 2. He was also a member 

of the United States Air Force Reserves. Id. 

Between November 22, 2002, and November 21, 2003, 

Mr. Knox was deployed on active duty in the Air Force for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Id. at 2, 7–8. At the time of his 

deployment, Mr. Knox was a GS-12 step 2 employee. Id. at 

7–8. While he was deployed, Mr. Knox’s DEA supervisor, 

Ms. Lori Cassity, submitted a Within-Grade Increase 

Record form indicating that Mr. Knox was at an acceptable 

level of competence and that the effective date for his next 

within-grade increase would be February 23, 2003. Id. at 

8.

1 The electronic version of the decision lacks page 

numbers, so we cite to the pagination used in the decision 

at J.A. 1–26.

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KNOX v. DOJ 3

Mr. Knox returned to the DEA on November 24, 2003. 

Id. Though the government agrees that Mr. Knox was 

entitled to receive a within-grade increase to GS-12 step 3 

effective as of February 23, 2003, Appellee’s Br. 4, the 

effective date for that within-grade increase was 

incorrectly set as April 20, 2003. Decision at 8.

On March 10, 2004, Mr. Knox submitted to Ms. Cassity 

a promotion request memorandum noting that he would be 

eligible for promotion to GS-13 on April 20, 2004. Id. On 

April 1, 2004, Ms. Cassity recommended that Mr. Knox be 

promoted to GS-13 as of his date of eligibility, but the DEA

did not process the promotion request because of 

instructions to hold promotion requests due to an 

impending change of policy. Id. at 8–9.

Under the then-operative policy, there were two paths 

to promotion to GS-13. Id. at 6. First, Special Agents “may 

be considered for promotion to GS-13 after one year in 

grade if recommended by the Special Agent in Charge 

(SAC) based on the criteria established for the various 

categories of Special Agent assignments.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Second, Special Agents could “be considered for 

promotion to GS-13 after three years or more service at GS12 based on the SAC’s personal recommendation, if they 

meet [certain] criteria.” Id. (citation omitted). The policy 

stated that “[n]o promotion will be automatic, but if all the 

above criteria are met, the SAC’s personal recommendation 

will normally be accepted after review by the Position 

Review Committee.” Id. (citation omitted).

The DEA issued a Revised Promotion Policy and 

Procedures memorandum on June 15, 2004. Id. at 7. The 

new policy specified that a Special Agent may be 

noncompetitively promoted to GS-13, but such promotions 

“are neither an entitlement nor automatic.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Under that policy, promotions would “be 

approved only after a GS-12 Special Agent has been in 

grade at least one year and has demonstrated competencies 

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4 KNOX v. DOJ

to perform at the GS-13 level, and must be based on 

established criteria and demonstrated ability to 

satisfactorily perform the higher graded duties.” Id.

Mr. Knox was eventually promoted to GS-13 on April 

17, 2016. Id. at 9.2 

In January 2020, Mr. Knox filed the present appeal 

with the Board. Id. at 2. Mr. Knox brought reemployment 

and discrimination claims under USERRA. Id. Through 

each of these claims, he sought to retroactively correct both 

his within-grade increase to GS-12 step 3 to February 23, 

2003, and his promotion to GS-13 to February 2004. Id.

An Administrative Judge granted Mr. Knox’s withingrade increase reemployment claim because the DEA 

admitted that Mr. Knox should have received his withingrade increase to GS-12 step 3 effective February 23, 2003,

rather than April 20, 2003. Id. at 10–11. But the 

Administrative Judge denied Mr. Knox’s within-grade

increase discrimination claim. Id. at 11. The 

Administrative Judge found that there was no apparent 

link between Mr. Knox’s 12 months of military service and 

his 2-month delay in receiving his within-grade increase. 

Id. Mr. Knox therefore failed to show that it was more 

likely than not that the delay was based on his militaryrelated absence as opposed to a random administrative 

error. Id. at 11–12. The Administrative Judge also denied 

Mr. Knox’s promotion reemployment and discrimination 

claims. Id. at 12–16. 

For the promotion reemployment claim, Mr. Knox 

argued that he was prejudiced by the delay in his 

promotion eligibility from February 2004 to April 2004. He 

contended that this two-month delay caused his promotion 

application to be considered under the June 2004 policy, 

2 Neither the parties nor the Decision explains this 

12-year temporal gap.

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KNOX v. DOJ 5

which materially changed the promotion criteria. Id. at 12. 

Mr. Knox provided evidence that a colleague was promoted 

in March 2004, so he asserts that his application would 

have been reviewed favorably under the prior promotion 

policy if he had submitted his promotion in February 2004. 

Id. The government also admitted that Mr. Knox “should 

have been evaluated for promotion” under the pre-June 

2004 policy if Mr. Knox’s GS-13 promotion package had 

been submitted to the DEA Headquarters in February 

2004. J.A. 406.

Mr. Knox provided several types of evidence to prove 

that he would have received the promotion if he had been 

considered under the pre-June 2004 policy. First, Mr. Knox 

filed a declaration stating that he asked Ms. Cassity to 

submit his promotion package in February 2004, but she 

advised him to wait until he was eligible in April 2004. 

Decision at 13, 16. Second, Mr. Knox submitted evidence 

that his April 2004 application was supported by 

Ms. Cassity and SAC John Bott. Id. at 8; J.A. 108. Third, 

Mr. Knox also provided the below evidence showing that,

in recent years, the DEA had approved promotions for GS12 applicants with a year of step-3 service at rates often 

exceeding 98%:

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6 KNOX v. DOJ

Appellant’s Br. 10. 

The Administrative Judge denied the promotion 

reemployment claim, however, because even if Mr. Knox’s 

application had been reviewed under the pre-June 2004 

policy, “all GS-13 promotions were discretionary,” and 

therefore “eligibility for promotion does not equate to 

entitlement for promotion.” Decision at 12 (emphasis in 

original). The Administrative Judge thus concluded that

“[b]ecause the GS-13 promotion was not automatic, 

[Mr. Knox] cannot show that it was a right of employment 

to which he otherwise would have been entitled.” Id. at 13.

The Administrative Judge denied the promotion 

discrimination claim for similar reasons as those given for

the denial of the within-grade increase discrimination 

claim: The delayed within-grade increase was a mistake, 

but “there is no evidence that uniformed service played a 

role (let alone a substantial or motivating role) in causing 

that mistake, or in causing any follow-on consequences of 

that mistake, such as delaying the GS-13 promotion 

package to April 2004.” Id. at 16.

Neither party petitioned for full board review of the 

Administrative Judge’s initial decision, and thus it became 

the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113; see Adams 

v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 3 F.4th 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 

2021). Mr. Knox appeals. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

II.

Our review of Board decisions is statutorily limited. 

See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). “We must set aside any findings or 

conclusions of the Board that we determine to be 

‘(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without 

procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been 

followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.’” 

Tierney v. Dep’t of Just., 717 F.3d 1374, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 

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KNOX v. DOJ 7

2013) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)). The Board abuses its 

discretion if its decision is based on an erroneous 

conclusion of law. Santos v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space 

Admin., 990 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Factual 

findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. McGuffin 

v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 942 F.3d 1099, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 

Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 

(1938).

A.

Mr. Knox argues that the Board erred in denying his 

promotion reemployment claim. According to Mr. Knox, 

the Board applied the incorrect legal standard because it 

required Mr. Knox to prove that he was entitled to an 

“automatic” promotion. We agree that the Board applied 

the incorrect legal standard and vacate and remand for 

further proceedings on Mr. Knox’s promotion 

reemployment claim.

USERRA provides that military service members are 

entitled to a right to reemployment and other employment 

benefits after completing their military obligations. 

38 U.S.C. § 4312(a); Hayden v. Dep’t of Air Force, 812 F.3d 

1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Under the applicable 

regulations, “agencies have an obligation to consider 

employees absent on military duty for any incident or 

advantage of employment that they may have been entitled 

to had they not been absent.” 5 C.F.R. § 353.106(c). The 

regulation then lists three factors to consider when 

determining whether an employee absent on military duty 

is entitled to an advantage of employment:

(1) Considering whether the “incident or 

advantage” is one generally granted to all 

employees in that workplace and whether it was 

denied solely because of absence for military 

service;

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8 KNOX v. DOJ

(2) Considering whether the person absent on 

military duty was treated the same as if the person 

had remained at work; and

(3) Considering whether it was reasonably certain 

that the benefit would have accrued to the 

employee but for the absence for military service.

Id.; see also Hayden, 812 F.3d at 1361–62.

Here, the Board applied the incorrect legal standard to 

Mr. Knox’s claim. It concluded that Mr. Knox could not 

establish that he was entitled to a promotion “[b]ecause the 

GS-13 promotion was not automatic.” Decision at 13. But

the promotion did not have to be automatic for Mr. Knox to 

prevail. Rather, the correct question is whether Mr. Knox 

“may have been entitled to” the promotion. 5 C.F.R. 

§ 353.106(c). That determination is evaluated by 

considering the regulation’s three enumerated factors, 

including whether the promotion was “generally granted to 

all employees” and “whether it was reasonably certain that 

the benefit would have accrued.” Id.; see also Hayden, 812 

F.3d at 1361–62. We thus remand for the Board to 

reconsider Mr. Knox’s promotion reemployment claim 

under the appropriate legal standard.

In its brief, the government noted that “[i]n order to 

prevail on his USERRA reemployment claim, Mr. Knox 

was required to demonstrate that it was reasonably certain 

that he would have been promoted but for his absence for 

military service.” Appellee’s Br. 16 (quoting 5 C.F.R. 

§ 353.106(c)(3)). But then at oral argument, the 

government contended for the first time that all three 

factors under 5 C.F.R. § 353.106(c) must be satisfied. See

Oral Arg. at 16:45–18:21 (available at 

https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=23

-1160_10092024.mp3). We leave it to the Board on remand 

to determine whether it is necessary to decide this issue in 

order to resolve Mr. Knox’s promotion reemployment claim 

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KNOX v. DOJ 9

and, if so, whether all three of the regulation’s factors must 

be met and who bears the burden of proof on those factors.

B.

Mr. Knox argues that substantial evidence does not 

support the Board’s denial of his discrimination claims. We 

affirm the Board’s decision on this issue.

“A person who is a member of . . . a uniformed service 

shall not be denied . . . promotion . . . on the basis of that 

membership . . . .” 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). An employer 

violates section 4311(a) “if the person’s membership . . . in 

the uniformed services is a motivating factor in the 

employer’s action, unless the employer can prove that the 

action would have been taken in the absence of such 

membership.” Id. § 4311(c)(1). “An employee making a 

USERRA claim bears the initial burden of showing by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s military 

service was a substantial or motivating factor in the 

adverse employment action.” Sharpe v. Dep’t of Just., 916 

F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). If this 

burden is met, “the employer then has the opportunity to 

come forward with evidence to show, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, that the employer would have taken the 

adverse action anyway, for a valid reason.” Sheehan v. 

Dep’t of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that

Mr. Knox failed to prove that his “uniformed service played 

a role (let alone a substantial or motivating role) in 

causing” the delay of the effective date of his within-grade 

increase “or in causing any follow-on consequences of that 

mistake, such as delaying the GS-13 promotion package to 

April 2004.” Decision at 16. The Board noted that neither 

party established why Mr. Knox’s within-grade increase 

was delayed. Id. at 11. It also found that there was no 

apparent link between Mr. Knox’s twelve months of service 

and the two-month delay. Id. If the within-grade increase 

delay was because of his military service, then the Board

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10 KNOX v. DOJ

would have expected the delay to be twelve months as that 

would be commensurate with his time in service. Id.

Mr. Knox counters the Board’s finding by pointing to 

email correspondence that he contends shows his withingrade increase “was delayed because of confusion by agency 

employees about how to address [Mr.] Knox’s creditable 

service while he was deployed.” Appellant’s Br. 26; see also 

J.A. 1036. We decline this invitation to reweigh the 

evidence on appeal. See Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. 

Servs., 834 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016). But we also 

note that those emails are between human resources

specialists at the DEA. Confusion among human resources 

personnel plausibly supports the Board’s finding that the 

reason for the delay was administrative. If “two different, 

inconsistent [findings] may reasonably be drawn from the 

evidence in record, an agency’s decision to favor one 

[finding] over the other is the epitome of a decision that 

must be sustained upon review for substantial evidence.” 

In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

III.

Mr. Knox next contends that the Administrative Judge 

abused his discretion in several rulings related to casemanagement and discovery. We reject these arguments.

“We review the MSPB’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of 

discretion.” Sharpe, 916 F.3d at 1379. We “will not 

overturn the board on such matters unless an abuse of 

discretion is clear and is harmful.” Curtin v. Off. of Pers. 

Mgmt., 846 F.2d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “If an abuse 

of discretion did occur with respect to the discovery and 

evidentiary rulings, in order for petitioner to prevail on 

these issues he must prove that the error caused 

substantial harm or prejudice to his rights which could 

have affected the outcome of the case.” Id. at 1379. 

Mr. Knox specifically challenges three of the 

Administrative Judge’s decisions. First, the 

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KNOX v. DOJ 11

Administrative Judge denied a motion to compel because 

Mr. Knox’s counsel failed to confer about the dispute either 

via telephone or in person. J.A. 422–23. The 

Administrative Judge had previously issued an order 

requiring that motions to compel “must be accompanied by 

evidence showing that the party attorneys made efforts to 

confer about the dispute either via telephone conversation 

and/or in-person to narrow the areas of disagreement.” 

J.A. 318. That order also required the parties to file 

motions to compel within five days after the time limit for 

a response or the date of the service of objections rather 

than the ten days specified in 5 C.F.R. § 1201.73. Second, 

the Administrative Judge declined three joint requests to 

stay the proceedings due to COVID-19. J.A. 456–57; 

J.A. 467–69; J.A. 492–94. Last, during a conference call, 

the Administrative Judge discussed the government’s 

laches defense, asked about a particular document, and 

inquired about Mr. Knox’s current employer. See

J.A. 1234–43.

For the motion to compel, we need not determine 

whether the Administrative Judge abused his discretion 

because Mr. Knox failed to show how he was prejudiced. 

For example, Mr. Knox does not point to what evidence 

may have been helpful to his case or why he could not get 

that information through other discovery.

As to declining to stay the case and the Administrative 

Judge’s commentary during the conference call, Mr. Knox 

has provided neither legal authority nor a persuasive 

reason explaining why the Administrative Judge was 

required to stay the case or could not ask questions that he

deemed pertinent during the conference call. We therefore 

decline to conclude that the Administrative Judge abused 

his discretion.

IV.

Two other issues warrant discussion. First, Mr. Knox

contends that the Board abused its discretion in ruling on 

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12 KNOX v. DOJ

the government’s laches defense. Second, he asks us to 

remand the case to a different Administrative Judge. We 

need not address the merits of either of these arguments. 

The Board rejected the government’s laches argument 

except for alternatively determining that laches would 

apply to Mr. Knox’s promotion discrimination claim. See 

Decision at 16 n.2. Because we affirm the denial of the 

promotion discrimination claim irrespective of whether 

laches applies, we need not address the laches issue. 

Mr. Knox’s argument for reassigning the case to a 

different Administrative Judge on remand is limited to one 

sentence, which is not even found in the argument section 

of his brief: “Should the Federal Circuit deem this matter 

suitable for remand, [Mr.] Knox requests remand to a 

different [Administrative Judge], as the [Administrative 

Judge’s] actions in this case demonstrated [Mr.] Knox will 

not receive a fair hearing on remand.” Appellant’s Br. 7. 

Mr. Knox forfeited this argument by failing to present 

anything more than an underdeveloped, skeletal 

argument. See In re Killian, 45 F.4th 1373, 1385–86 (Fed. 

Cir. 2022) (citing SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex 

Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We also see 

nothing in the record to indicate that reassignment would 

be appropriate or necessary in this case.

V.

We have considered Mr. Knox’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we 

affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

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