Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03029/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03029-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shawn A. Southerland
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 26, 2007 Decided June 1, 2007

No. 06-3029

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

SHAWN A. SOUTHERLAND,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00216-01)

Rita B. Bosworth, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor,

U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III and Martin Carpenter,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit

Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Police officers stopped

appellant Shawn Southerland after they observed the front

license plate of his vehicle on the dashboard. He was

subsequently arrested after a computer check indicated that his

license had been suspended. After an inventory search of the

vehicle revealed a loaded handgun, he was charged with illegal

possession of the handgun. He filed a motion to suppress

evidence of the handgun, arguing that both the stop of his

vehicle and his subsequent arrest were unlawful. The district

court denied the motion. Because we conclude that the stop was

proper and probable cause existed for the arrest, we affirm.

I. Background

Early on an April evening in 2003 two Washington, D.C.,

Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) police officers

patrolling in a police vehicle in the Northeast quadrant of the

city observed a green Cadillac approaching them from the

opposite direction. The officers noticed that the front license

plate of the vehicle, issued by the State of Maryland, was placed

on the dashboard. Believing this placement of the plate to be a

violation of Maryland traffic laws, the officers stopped the

vehicle. The driver and sole occupant of the vehicle was the

appellant, Shawn Southerland. After receipt of his driver’s

license, the officers radioed the dispatcher and requested that

Southerland’s license number be run through the Washington

Area Law Enforcement System (“WALES”). The dispatcher

reported that Southerland’s license had been suspended.

Southerland was then arrested for operating a vehicle after

suspension. Following the arrest, an inventory search of the

Cadillac revealed, inter alia, a loaded .45 caliber semi-automatic

handgun. The officers charged Southerland with possessing it

illegally. Southerland filed a motion to suppress the evidence

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found at the time of his arrest, arguing that both the initial stop

of his vehicle and his subsequent arrest were unlawful. The

district court denied the motion. Southerland then entered a

conditional plea of guilty to the firearms charge and was

sentenced to 57 months in prison.

II. Discussion

A. The Stop

At the hearing on Southerland’s suppression motion the two

officers testified as to the circumstances surrounding the stop of

Southerland’s Cadillac. Both officers said that upon

encountering the Cadillac they observed a license plate on the

dashboard, but no license plate on the front bumper. The first

officer to testify stated that Southerland was stopped for “an

improperly displayed front tag,” and upon further questioning

stated that the display was improper because the tag was not “on

the front bumper” where it “has to be.” When questioned the

second officer also stated that the stop was conducted because

the front plate “was not placed on the front bumper where it was

supposed to be properly placed.” The district court, in rejecting

Southerland’s claim that the stop was unlawful, did not

specifically refer to the officers’ testimony. Rather, the court

noted that under Maryland law license plates must be

“[s]ecurely fastened” and “clearly visible.” United States v.

Southerland, Crim. No. 03-216, slip op. at 2-3 (D.D.C. Apr. 20,

2005) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 13-411(c)(2)).

Finding from the “evidence presented” to it that Southerland’s

front license plate was neither “securely fastened” nor “clearly

visible,” the court held that the plate was not displayed in

accordance with Maryland law and therefore the stop was

lawful.

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Southerland now argues that there is no evidence in the

record to support the district court’s finding that the license plate

was not securely fastened or clearly visible, asserting that the

officers’ only testimony was that the plate was on the dashboard.

He further argues that the police officers’ “subjective” belief

that a violation had occurred because the plate was not attached

to the bumper was not a reasonable basis for the stop. In support

of these arguments Southerland relies chiefly on United States

v. Hill, 131 F.3d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In that case the police

stopped Hill’s vehicle for not having a Vehicle Identification

Number (“VIN”) on its temporary tags. Events following the

stop led to Hill’s arrest for unlawful possession of a firearm.

Hill filed a motion to suppress evidence of the firearm, arguing

that the stop was unlawful. During the hearing on the motion he

produced the temporary tags which contained a VIN. The

district court stated that it could not say whether or not the tags

had a VIN at the time of the stop, but it accepted as true the

officer’s testimony that he believed that the tag did not have a

VIN, and denied the motion. On appeal, we noted that these

statements by the district court showed that it had “applied a

subjective reasonableness test to the officer’s decision to stop

Hill’s car, rather than the objective reasonableness test that is

required in such situations.” Id. at 1060. The case was

remanded for the district court to make a determination of

whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude

that the tag did not have a VIN. 

Southerland argues that similarly in his case the district

court never made any determination whether it was objectively

reasonable for the officers to determine that the plate on the

dashboard was improperly displayed. Indeed, he asserts that

under Maryland law a front license plate only needs to be

“attached” and “visible,” and the officers’ belief that the plate

was required to be placed on the bumper was subjective and

therefore not reasonable under Hill. The district court erred, he

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continues, in substituting its own conclusions, i.e., that the tag

was not “securely attached” nor “clearly visible,” for those of

the officers.

Southerland correctly states that under Hill the question to

be answered is whether it was objectively reasonable for the

officers who observed his vehicle to conclude that a traffic

violation had occurred. The observations made by the officers

leading to the stop are findings of fact for the hearing judge to

determine and we will disturb those findings only if they are

clearly erroneous. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699

(1996). But we review independently whether, acting on those

observations, it was objectively reasonable for the police to stop

Southerland’s vehicle. Id. at 696-97.

An automobile stop must not be unreasonable under the

circumstances. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810

(1996). Whether a stop is reasonable turns on whether the facts

“viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police

officer, amount to reasonable suspicion” that a traffic violation

has occurred. See Ornelas at 696. The police may initiate a

stop even if the traffic violation is a minor one. See

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (there was

“no question about the propriety” of a stop for an expired license

plate). Here, one of the officers testified that Southerland’s

Cadillac was stopped because the license plate observed on the

dashboard was “improperly displayed,” while the other officer

testified that the plate was not “properly placed.” At the same

time both officers testified to their belief that Maryland law

requires that the plate be placed on the bumper. As the

prosecution concedes, Maryland law does not mandate that front

license plates be affixed to the bumper, but the law of that state

does require that vehicles have license plates “on the front” and

that these plates be “[i]n a horizontal position” and “[s]ecurely

fastened” and “clearly visible.” MD.CODE ANN.,TRANSP.§ 13-

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411(a), (c). Maryland’s two neighboring jurisdictions, the

District of Columbia and Virginia, have similar requirements.

D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 18, § 422; VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-716. In

light of these requirements we think it objectively reasonable for

the officers to suspect that Southerland’s dashboard plate was in

violation of Maryland law, even assuming they were mistaken

that the law required display of the front plate on the bumper.

Cf. United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(upholding arrest where original ground–expired license–was

invalid but officers had probable cause to arrest for a different

offense–reckless driving). The district court’s determination

that the stop was lawful is therefore affirmed.

B. The Arrest

During the proceedings on his suppression motion

Southerland argued that the officers did not have probable cause

to arrest him for a suspended license. In support of this

argument he introduced testimony from the District of Columbia

Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), including a so-called

“5 Year Record Request” from 2004, indicating that at the time

of the arrest his license had not been suspended. The

government then introduced its own “5 Year Record Request”

from 2003 indicating that at the time of the arrest Southerland’s

license had in fact been suspended. Also at the hearing both

officers testified that a WALES check on Southerland’s license

indicated that his license had been suspended. The district court,

in determining that the arrest was proper, stated that although

there were conflicting records from the DMV, any errors were

made by the DMV and not by the police. Southerland, slip op.

at 5. Consequently, the court found that “the officer’s reliance

on the WALES report was objectively reasonable and lacked

any indicia of bad faith.” Id.

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On appeal Southerland argues in effect that the weight of

the evidence presented during the suppression hearing

establishes that the DMV’s records did not show his license was

ever suspended and consequently no probable cause existed for

his arrest. We disagree. Initially we note that the district court,

after reviewing the evidence, stated that there were “conflicting

records from the DMV” resulting in a “genuine dispute” as to

whether or not Southerland’s license was suspended at the time

of the stop. Id. But even if Southerland had definitively

established that his license was not suspended at the time of the

arrest, we would nevertheless conclude that the officers had

probable cause to arrest him.

Probable cause “must be determined objectively from the

facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time of the

arrest.” Bookhardt, 277 F.3d at 565. These facts and

circumstances must be sufficient to warrant a prudent person’s

believing that an offense has been committed. United States v.

Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Both officers testified that at the time of the stop the WALES

system reported that Southerland’s license was suspended.

WALES is a database maintained by the Metropolitan Police

Department that contains, inter alia, motor vehicle information

such as drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations. See United

States v. Hutchinson, 408 F.3d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Information from the DMV database is uploaded to the WALES

system. The district court listed as one of its “factual findings”

the indication from the WALES computer check that

Southerland’s license had been suspended. Southerland, slip op.

at 1-2. In relying on this information and arresting Southerland,

the district court also determined that the officers acted in good

faith. Id. at 5. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04

(1971) (probable cause to arrest where “officers in good faith

believed Miller was Hill and arrested him”). We conclude that

regardless of whether Southerland’s license was in fact

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suspended, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to rely

on the information received from WALES and to believe that

Southerland’s license had been suspended. See United States v.

Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 102 (1st Cir. 2006) (although defendant’s

license not suspended at time of police stop, it was objectively

reasonable for officers to believe, from information on the police

cruiser’s computer, that it was suspended). Accordingly,

probable cause existed for the arrest and we uphold the district

court’s determination that the arrest was proper.

At oral argument Southerland asserted, apparently for the

first time, that probable cause for his arrest was negated by the

so-called “fellow-officer doctrine.” See Whiteley v. Warden,

Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971). Because this

argument was raised for the first time at oral argument, it is

forfeited. See United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162, 1167-68

(D.C. Cir. 2000). In any event the argument has no merit.

Southerland’s claim appears to be that the DMV is equal to

“law enforcement,” i.e., it is a “fellow officer” of the MPD, and

therefore the error by the DMV in reporting his license to the

MPD as suspended is a law enforcement error. Under Whiteley,

evidence resulting from a search based on the fellow officer’s

erroneous information is subject to evidentiary exclusion per the

exclusionary rule, see 401 U.S. at 568-69. But in United States

v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court discussed the

exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring unlawful police

conduct. While questioning whether the rule does in fact have

a deterrent effect on police misconduct, the Court stated that the

rule “cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter

objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.” 468 U.S. at

918-19. The Supreme Court itself resolved any apparent tension

between Whiteley and Leon in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1

(1995).

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In Evans, the Court first discussed the facts of the Whiteley

decision in which the arrest, held to be illegal, had been based

on an outstanding warrant coupled with a subsequent radio

bulletin, which taken together were “insufficient to support an

independent judicial assessment of probable cause.” Id. at 12

(citing Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568). On those facts, the Whiteley

Court had concluded that “‘an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be

insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating

officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest.’” Id.

(quoting Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568). That said, the Evans Court

stated that, “Although Whiteley clearly retains relevance in

determining whether police officers have violated the Fourth

Amendment, its precedential value regarding application of the

exclusionary rule is dubious.” Id. (citation omitted). While

Whiteley had “treated identification of a Fourth Amendment

violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary

rule to evidence secured incident to that violation,” the Evans

Court made clear that “[s]ubsequent case law has rejected this

reflexive application of the exclusionary rule.” Id. (citing

Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); Leon, 468 U.S. 897;

United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)). Relying

specifically on Leon, the Evans Court held that “the issue of

exclusion is separate from whether the Fourth Amendment has

been violated, and exclusion is appropriate only if the remedial

objectives of the rule are thought most efficaciously served.” Id.

at 13-14 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, and Calandra, 414 U.S.

at 348). 

In the present case, as in Leon and Evans, there is no

deterrent function to be served. We see no reason why officers

should be deterred from relying upon the common tools of the

traffic officer in determining whether there is probable cause to

believe a driver’s license has been suspended. We offer no

opinion as to whether the DMV is “a fellow officer” for

purposes of the application of Whiteley. Our conclusion that it

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was objectively reasonable for the officers to rely on the

WALES system and arrest Southerland precludes, under Leon

and Evans, application of the exclusionary rule in this case.

III. Conclusion

We conclude that the stop of appellant was proper and

probable cause existed for his arrest. The decision of the district

court is therefore affirmed.

So ordered.

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