Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00869/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00869-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arlene B. Black
Defendant
Gordon R. England
Defendant
Bryan L. Hill
Plaintiff
Tamara G. Morrison
Defendant

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRYAN L. HILL, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

GORDON R. ENGLAND, SECRETARY, )

UNITED STATES NAVY, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-869 REC/TAG

ORDER STRIKING PLAINTIFF’S

SUR-REPLY BRIEF (Doc. 14), 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION

TO DISMISS, AND DIRECTING

PARTIES TO PROCEED BEFORE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE GOLDNER FOR

CONSOLIDATION

On November 7, 2005, the court heard defendant's motion to

dismiss. 

Plaintiff, Bryan L. Hill, proceeding in pro per, has filed a

Complaint for Damages, naming as defendants Gordon R. England,

Secretary of the United States Navy; Tamara G. Morrison, alleged

to be an attorney employed as the EEO Complaints Manager and EEO

Agency Representative for the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons

Division; and Arlene B. Black, alleged to be employed as the

Deputy Equal Employment Opportunity Officer for the Naval Air

Case 1:05-cv-00869-REC -TAG Document 16 Filed 11/09/05 Page 1 of 9
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Warfare Center Weapons Division. The Complaint alleges two

causes of action. The First Cause of Action alleges a failure to

accommodate plaintiff’s disability and discrimination on the

basis of plaintiff’s disability in violation of Section 501 of

the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791. The Second Cause of

Action alleges retaliation in violation of Section 704(a) of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a).

A. Filing of Sur-Reply Brief.

Plaintiff filed a filed a sur-reply brief on October 31,

2005 in response to the reply in support of the motion to dismiss

filed by the United States. Plaintiff did not request leave of

court to do so. A sur-reply brief is not authorized by Rule 78-

230, Local Rules of Practice, or by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. As explained in Fedrick v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC,

366 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1197 (N.D.Ga. 2005):

Although the Court may in its discretion

allow the filing of a surreply, this

discretion should be exercised in favor of

allowing a surreply only where a valid reason

for such additional briefing exists, such as

where the movant raises new arguments in its

reply brief.

Here, the United States’ reply brief does not raise new arguments

- it merely reiterates the grounds for dismissal asserted in its

opening brief. It is apparent from the sur-reply brief that

plaintiff is merely posing the same or additional arguments in

opposition to the motion to dismiss. Therefore, the court will

not consider the sur-reply brief in resolving the motion to

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dismiss and hereby strikes it. 

Furthermore, plaintiff is warned that his pro per status

does not excuse his failure to comply with the Local Rules of

Practice and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to

comply with the Local Rules of Practice, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and any orders of this court may result in the

imposition of sanctions, including the striking of improperly

filed pleadings, monetary sanctions and dismissal.

B. Motion to Dismiss.

The action presently before the court is the third such

action filed by plaintiff. The first action filed by plaintiff

is Hill v. Secretary of the Navy, No. CV-F-03-6903 REC/TAG (Hill

I). The second action is Hill v. Secretary of the Navy, No. CVF-04-5598 REC/TAG (Hill II). Hill I and Hill II have been

consolidated, the appropriate case number being No. CV-F-03-6903

(hereinafter Consolidated Hill Action). The consolidated Hill

action is now proceeding pursuant to a Second Amended Complaint

filed on January 19, 2005. As will be discussed infra, defendant

moves to dismiss certain allegations and the First Cause of

Action of the instant complaint as duplicative of allegations in

the Consolidated Hill Action. From the court’s review of the two

actions, the allegations of both actions arise out of and relate

to plaintiff’s claims that he was discriminated against in his

employment because of his age, disability, perceived disability,

and because he was a whistleblower and in retaliation for the

filing and prosecution by him of several EEO complaints while

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employed at the Weapons Division at the China Lake facility of

the Naval Air Warfare Center. The Consolidated Hill Action was

filed after plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies under

Title VII while the instant complaint was filed after plaintiff

exhausted his administrative remedies before the Merit Systems

Protection Board and the EEOC.

1. Dismissal of Defendants Morrison and Black.

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint to the extent that

it names Morrison and Black as defendants.

The motion to dismiss is granted on this ground. The only

proper defendant in civil actions under Title VII and the

Rehabilitation Act is the “head of the department, agency, or

unit, as appropriate ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); 29 U.S.C. §

794a(a)(1). See also Carlson v. Veneman, 2002 WL 413807

(N.D.Cal. 2002):

... When a federal employee asserts a claim

under Title VII, that statute is exclusive of

any other remedy against not only the federal

government, but also against individual

federal employees alleged to have

participated in the discrimination ... The

purpose of Title VII was to create ‘an

exclusive, preemptive administrative and

judicial scheme for the redress of federal

employment discrimination.’ ... For this

reason, a plaintiff may not ‘bootstrap’

additional causes of action against the

United States, the agency, or individual

employees onto his Title VII complaint.

Although plaintiff argues that dismissal of Morrison and

Black is not required because of allegations that they were not

acting within the scope of their duties and responsibilities,

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such contention does not negate the fact that the only proper

defendant under the causes of action alleged in the Complaint is

the Secretary of the Navy. Equally meritless is plaintiff’s

contention that Morrison should not be dismissed as a defendant

in this action because of she no longer works for the Navy and

plaintiff has not been able to locate her for service of process. 

Plaintiff contends that Morrison should not be dismissed until

counsel for defendant advises him of Morrison’s current

whereabouts. The issue of service of process is not germane to

the legal conclusion that Morrison is not a proper defendant to

the causes of action alleged in the Complaint.

Therefore, this action is dismissed against defendants Black

and Morrison.

2. Allegations Concerning Handling of EEO Complaints.

Defendant also moves to dismiss allegations concerning the

handling of plaintiff’s EEO complaints by Navy personnel,

including personnel employed by the Naval Air Warfare Center

Weapons Division. 

Defendants are entitled to dismissal of these allegations to

the extent that plaintiff intends them to constitute violations

of Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act. 

29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(8) provides in pertinent part:

(a) Prior to a request for a hearing in case,

the agency shall dismiss an entire complaint:

...

(8) That alleges dissatisfaction with the

processing of a previously filed complaint

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....

“Title VII ‘does not create an independent cause of action for

the mishandling of an employee’s discrimination complaints.’”

Nelson v. Greenspan, 163 F.Supp.2d 12, 18 (D.D.C. 2001), quoting

Young v. Sullivan, 733 F.Supp. 131, 132 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 946

F.2d 1568 (D.C.Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 918 (1992). 

See also Ashcroft v. Bolden, 2005 WL 1903567 (D.D.C. 2005):

Finally, plaintiff’s claims relating to the

processing of his administrative claim before

the EEOC must also be DISMISSED because

plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the EEO

administrative process does not provide the

basis for either a separate EEO claim or a

federal claim of discrimination ... The

‘right’ to be free of discrimination is

‘wholly preserved, even if the EEOC errs in

its processing of the charge, by the right of

a trial de novo.’ ....

Accord Daloian v. Veneman, 2005 WL 2219270 (E.D.Cal. 2005):

It is well established that Congress has not

authorized - either expressly or impliedly,

either in Title VII or elsewhere - ‘a cause

of action directly against the EEOC for

misprocessing of claims asserted against

third party employers.’ ... Instead, Congress

has provided the ability to pursue de novo

judicial proceedings with the EEOC’s handling

of their charge. ....

In Mayes v. Potter, 2003 WL 23220738 (W.D. Mich. 2003), the

district court held:

Plaintiff contends that these cases are

inapposite because Plaintiff is not suing the

EEOC, but his employer. The Court does not

find this distinction material. In cases

involving claims against federal agencies,

the agency itself is required to conduct the

EEO investigation in lieu of the EEOC ...

Thus, in failure to investigate cases, the

agency stands in the same position as the

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EEOC. Plaintiff’s remedy, when he was

unhappy with the processing of his

administrative claim, was to file a lawsuit

challenging the agency’s decision. ‘[A]n

employee ... if aggrieved by the final

disposition of his complaint, or by the

failure to take final action on his

complaint, may file a civil action.’ 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d). Plaintiff does not

have a separate claim against the agency for

failure to investigate and Plaintiff cannot

resurrect a claim he failed to pursue in a

timely fashion by recasting it as a failure

to investigate claim.

Plaintiff opposes this section of the motion to dismiss by

relying on Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Management

Directive 110 as negating defendants’ claim that 29 C.F.R. §

1614.107(a)(8) “does not allow the inclusion of claims concerning

the conduct of Defendant’s Equal Employment Opportunity process

into an existing Equal Employment Opportunity Complaint.” 

Plaintiff also attempts to distinguish some of the cases relied

upon by defendants, contending that the facts are different or

that the cases preceded Directive 110, which was issued in 1999. 

In addition, plaintiff argues that the alleged actions of the

various EEO officers at his place of employment can establish

that plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment. 

Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition to this aspect of the

motion to dismiss are without merit. Nowhere does Directive 110

authorize a claim under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act for

the mishandling of an EEO complaint. Furthermore, as noted

supra, a number of the cases upon which defendants rely were

issued after 1999. Finally, whatever factual distinctions may

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The court, of course, is expressing no opinion as the 1

admissibility of any such evidence in this case. 

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exist in some of the cases cited by defendants, it nonetheless

remains the law that an independent claim based on the

mishandling of an EEO complaint cannot be stated under Title VII

or the Rehabilitation Act. Of course, evidence of the

mishandling of an EEO complaint might be admissible evidence of

an employer’s discriminatory motive in the allegedly adverse

employment action and might be admissible evidence establishing a

hostile work environment. However, plaintiff cannot rely on the 1

allegations of mishandling of his EEO complaints by employees of

the defendant as constituting, of itself, a violation of Title

VII or the Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, to the extent that the

Complaint intends to so allege, the contested allegations do not

state a claim upon which relief can be granted and are dismissed

on that ground. 

3. Duplicative Allegations.

Defendants move to dismiss certain allegations of the

Complaint in this action and the First Cause of Action in this

Complaint, contending that they are duplicative of allegations in

the consolidated Hill action’s Second Amended Complaint. 

The court has reviewed the allegations and the cause of

action described by defendants. They are to a large extent

duplicative of allegations and causes of action in the

consolidated Hill action. Although plaintiff argues that the

issues and facts of the two actions are not identical, they are

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At oral argument, the parties expressed concern that 2

consolidation of this action with the Consolidated Hill Action

could result in delay of the final resolution of the Consolidated

Hill Action, especially since defendant has already deposed

plaintiff in connection with the allegations of the Consolidated

Hill Action. Defendant intimated that consolidation of all three

actions might be sought after resolution of anticipated dispositive

motions in the Consolidated Hill Action. The court’s order above

refers to the allegations and the cause of action that duplicates

those in the Consolidated Hill Action. However, the court also

instructs the parties to bring before Magistrate Judge Goldner

consolidation of all three actions.

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extremely similar. However, rather than dismissing the

allegations on this ground, the court concludes that the better

resolution will be consolidation of the duplicative allegations

with the allegations in the Consolidated Hill Action. Therefore,

the court orders the parties to go before Magistrate Judge

Goldner for further proceedings concerning consolidation of the

duplicative allegations and the First Cause of Action with the

Consolidated Hill Action.2

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Plaintiff’s sur-reply brief (doc. 14) is stricken.

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and

denied in part.

3. The parties are ordered to go before Magistrate Judge

Goldner for further proceedings regarding consolidation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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