Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00883/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00883-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Arambulo-Sanchez
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Juan Arambulo-Sanchez, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV 08-883-PHX-SRB (HCE)

No. CR 06-381-PHX-SRB

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Movant’s pro se Motion Under 28 U.S.C. §2255 To

Vacate, Set Aside Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody (Doc. No. 1)

(hereinafter “Motion”). In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States District

Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the

undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. For the following reasons,

the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny and dismiss the Motion.

A court must conduct a hearing on a motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 “[u]nless the

motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled

to no relief, ....” 28 U.S.C. §2255(b). The Motion as well as the files and records

conclusively establish that Movant is not entitled to relief. See Shah v. United States, 878

F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1989). Consequently, no hearing is required to resolve Movant’s

Motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 3, 2006, Movant was arrested for harboring illegal aliens. On April 11, 

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2006 Movant was indicted for Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking in violation of 18

U.S.C. §1203 (Count 1); Hostage Taking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1203 (Count 2);

Harboring Illegal Aliens in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (Count 3); and

Possessing a Firearm In Connection With a Crime of Violence in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count 4). (Plaintiff/Respondent’s Response In Opposition To Motion To

Vacate, Set Aside Or Correct Sentence Pursuant To 28 U.S.C.§2255, p. 1 (Doc. No. 2))

(hereinafter “Response p.__”).

On August 28, 2006 Movant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to

Possessing a Firearm In Connection With a Crime of Violence in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count 4). (Response Ex. 3, pp.1-27 (Doc. No. 2-4)). As part of Movant’s

plea agreement, Counts 1through 3 were to be dismissed at sentencing. (Response Ex. 2

(Doc. No. 2-3, p.2)). The plea agreement set out that the offense of Possessing a Firearm In

Connection With a Crime of Violence is punishable by a maximum fine of $250,000.00;

incarceration from a mandatory minimum sentence of five years to as much as life; and a

term of supervised release of five years to follow incarceration. (Id. at p. 3). Movant and

Respondent stipulated and agreed that Movant would receive a sentence of imprisonment

between five and ten years. (Id. at p.4). If the Court concluded that any provision of the plea

agreement was inappropriate, the Court could reject the plea agreement, giving either Movant

or Respondent an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement pursuant to Rule

11(d)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id.). If the Court imposed sentence

in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, Movant waived: (1) any right to appeal

the Court’s entry of judgment against Movant; (2) any right to appeal the imposition of

sentence upon Movant under 18 U.S.C. §3742; and (3) any right to collaterally attack

Movant’s conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. (Id. at p. 5). Furthermore, the plea

agreement specifically stated:

The [Movant] acknowledges that this waiver shall result in the

dismissal of any appeal or collateral attack the [Movant] might

file challenging his conviction or sentence in this case.

(Id.).

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On November 13, 2006 the Court sentenced Movant to a term of six years of

incarceration to be followed by a term of five years of supervised release. (Response p. 2).

Judgment was entered on November 16, 2006. (Id.) Movant did not file a direct appeal and

judgment became final on December 1, 2006. (Id.) On May 7, 2008 Movant filed his pro se

Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. (Motion (Doc. Nos. 1, 1-2))

II. CLAIMS PRESENTED

A. Sixth Amendment Violation

Movant opines that defense counsel was ineffective in his representation of Movant

in that he: (1) failed to file a notice of appeal within ten days after sentence was imposed; (2)

failed to advise Movant about waiving his due process rights; (3) coerced Movant into

involuntarily signing his plea agreement not knowing nor understanding the terms and

conditions of such plea agreement. (Motion p. 5 (Doc No. 1, pp. 1, 5-6, 9, 10; Doc. No. 1-

2)).

B. Defense Counsel Did Not Argue United States v. Booker

Movant opines that defense counsel failed to argue crucial issues and laws concerning

sentencing within U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in violation of United States v. Booker, 543

U.S. 220 (2005). (Motion p.6 (Doc. No. 1, pp. 1, 10; Doc. No. 1-2). Movant essentially

argues that under Booker the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are advisory and thus defense

counsel“fail[ed] to request for sentence reduction [from] mandatory guidelines used in the

case, ....” (Motion (Doc. No. 1-2, p.10)).

C. Defense Counsel Did Not Argue Movant’s Deportable Alien Status

Movant opines that his status as a deportable alien subjects him to an increase in the

severity of his sentence; makes him ineligible for early release; and prevents him from being

housed in a minimum security facility. (Motion (Doc. No. 1, p.7)). Furthermore, such status

makes him ineligible for halfway house release; ineligible for alcohol and drug treatment;

and subjects him to deportation after completion of his sentence. (Motion (Doc. No. 1-2, p.

10)) Movant argues that his status as a deportable alien would have made available to him

a downward departure in sentencing but for his defense counsel’s ineffectiveness.

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D. Movant’s Rights Under The Vienna Convention Were Violated

Movant opines that the Mexican Consulate should have been contacted regarding

retaining effective counsel for Movant in the criminal case giving rise to the instant Motion.

(Motion (Doc. No.1, p.8)) “[A]ppointed counsel was ineffective, and the Mexican consulate

would have retain[ed] a well qualified [sic] attorney in the case if informed about the charges

the [Movant] was arrested and investigated for [sic]. (Motion (Doc. No.1-2, p. 11)).

Moreover, “ defense counsel acted in favor of the United states [sic] Government, and failed

to properly investigate the charges, even when [Movant] became a victim for failing to Pay

[sic] the $1,800 due to the Organization, and thereby ending up working as part of the service

to pay up with no other option or choice. Competent Counsel [sic] would have compel [sic]

the Government to prove the charges and allegations as outlined against [Movant], and it

would have been dismissed without doubt.” (Id.).

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. Timeliness

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), became effective

on April 24, 1996. The AEDPA established limits on the filing of motions for collateral relief

by prisoners specifically amending 28 U.S.C. §2255 to state in pertinent part:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this

section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion

created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was

prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases

on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of

due diligence.

28 U.S.C. §2255(f)(1)-(4), (emphasis added).

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Judgment of conviction was entered on November 16, 2006 when Movant was

sentenced to 72 months of imprisonment in the Bureau of Prisons. In a criminal case a

defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed within 10 days after the entry of judgment.

Fed.R.App.P. 4(b)(A)(i). Movant’s judgment became final on December 1, 2006. See

United States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001). Movant filed the instant Motion

under 28 U.S.C. §2255 on May 7, 2008: five months nine days after the AEDPA 1-year

period of limitation expired. Movant has not alleged nor is he eligible for exceptions (2), (3),

or (4) of 28 U.S.C. §2255(f). 

 "The statute of limitations contained in section 2255 is subject to equitable tolling."

United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). To establish that he is entitled

to equitable tolling, Movant must demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances beyond his

control made it impossible for him to seek relief under section 2255 on time and the

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness. Id. (citing Laws v.

Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003)). "[T]he threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling under [the] AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule."

Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Movant bears the

burden of demonstrating that equitable tolling applies. Id. Herein, Movant has not argued

that he is entitled to equitable tolling nor has he established grounds to support application

of equitable tolling to his case.

Movant’s Motion is untimely and should be dismissed. Moreover, even if the Court

were to consider Movant’s claims on the merits, Movant would not be entitled to relief as

discussed in sections III. B through E infra.

B. Movant’s Claimed Sixth Amendment Violation

1. Notice of Appeal

Movant alludes to having instructed defense counsel by phone calls and

correspondence to appeal the imposition of sentence. (Motion (Doc. No.1-2, pp.1, 7, 9, 10))

Such self-serving claim is unsupported by the record. Movant’s defense counsel, Mr.

Baltazar Iniguez, in response to Respondent’s request, submitted a signed memorandum

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stating that: (1) Movant did not, in fact, request that a notice of appeal be filed in his case;

(2) Movant waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence; and (3) in effect, as a cosignatory of the plea agreement wherein Movant waived his right to appeal his conviction

and sentence, had Movant made such a request such notice of appeal would have been filed

and defense counsel would have moved to be relieved from representing Movant and

requested that other counsel be appointed to represent Movant on appeal. (Response p. 2 &

Ex. 1 (Doc. No. 2-2)).

Based upon the record before the Court, there is no merit to Movant’s claim that

defense counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when defense counsel did

not file a notice of appeal. There is nothing before this Court, other than Movant’s bare

claim, that defense counsel was instructed to file a notice of appeal.

2. Knowing, Intelligent And Voluntary Waiver Of Rights

Prior to proceeding with Movant’s change of plea, Movant was placed under oath: 

THE COURT: Okay. At this time I’ll ask the courtroom deputy

to place you under oath.

THE CLERK: Please raise your right hand.

(Defendant sworn.)

THE COURT: You’ve just taken an oath and promised to tell

me the truth. If you lie to me or give false answers, you could be

prosecuted for perjury or making a false statement. If convicted

of one of those crimes, you could be sentenced to prison for a

time in addition to the time you receive as a result of today’s

guilty plea. Do you understand the importance of telling the

truth?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Response Ex. 3 (Doc. No. 2-4, p. 4 )) “Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong

presumption of verity.” United States v. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1986)

(citations omitted). Movant was also admonished that if at any time he did not understand

or hear the Court’s questions he was to so inform the Court so that the Court could repeat or

rephrase the question. (Id.).

The record is clear that at the change of plea proceeding Movant was asked by the

Court whether defense counsel had translated the plea agreement into Spanish and Movant

acknowledged that such had been done. (Id. at p. 6). Movant acknowledged that he

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understood defense counsel’s Spanish. (Id.) Moreover, Movant and defense counsel met six

days previously at which time the plea agreement was read to and discussed with Movant and

all his questions were answered.(Id. at pp. 10-11). The Court inquired further whether: (1)

the plea agreement had been discussed with Movant prior to his signing it to which Movant

responded “Yes”; (2) defense counsel answered all questions about the plea agreement to

which Movant responded “Yes”; and (3) there was anything in the plea agreement Movant

did not understand to which Movant responded to a reference in the factual basis which,

after clarification, Movant informed the Court that that he understood his agreement. (Id. at

pp.11-12). Movant similarly signed his plea agreement acknowledging that: (1) the plea

agreement had been read to him in Spanish; (2) Movant had carefully reviewed every part

of it with his attorney; (3) Movant understood his plea agreement; and (4) Movant agreed to

it. (Response Ex. 2 (Doc. No. 2-3, pp. 8, 9)).

The record is clear that at the change of plea proceeding Movant was advised by the

Court that if he pled guilty there would be no trial and Movant unequivocally advised the

Court that he did not want a trial. (Response, Ex. 3 (Doc.No. 2-4, p.7). The Court went on

to advise Movant of the rights that he would be relinquishing by pleading guilty: (1) the right

to maintain a not guilty plea to the original charges; (2) the right to a jury trial; (3) the right

to be represented by counsel at trial; (4) the right to be presumed innocent at trial; (5) the

right to force the government to prove the charges against Movant beyond a reasonable

doubt; (6) the right to confront witnesses; (7) the right to cross-examine witnesses; (8) the

right to present evidence; (9) the right to subpoena witnesses to testify in his defense; and

(10) the right to testify at his trial or alternatively to remain silent and such silence could not

be used against him at trial. (Id. at p. 8). Movant advised the Court that he understood the

rights explained to him and unequivocally stated that he wanted to give up those rights

because he was guilty. (Id. at p. 9). Movant similarly signed a plea agreement acknowledging

that he had discussed his case and his constitutional rights with counsel and understood that

he was relinquishing his rights by pleading guilty. (Response Ex. 2. (Doc. No. 2-3, p. 7)).

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The record is clear that at the change of plea proceeding the Court advised Movant

that under the terms of his plea agreement he agreed to: (1) give up his right to appeal his

sentence and conviction to a higher court; as well as (2) his right to collaterally attack the

validity of his conviction or the correctness of his sentence provided that the sentence was

in accord with the terms of his agreement. (Response Ex. 3) (Doc. No. 2-4, p. 9)). When

queried by the Court whether he understood he was giving up the foregoing, Movant was

equivocal as to his understanding. (Id.). The Court went on to explain to Movant that if he

had a trial and was convicted he would have the right to appeal to a higher court or to

collaterally attack the validity of the conviction or the correctness of the sentence by filing

a petition with the Court, but that he had agreed to waive those two rights in his plea

agreement. (Id. at pp.9-10). Movant, when asked whether he understood he had agreed to

relinquish such rights unequivocally stated “Yes.” (Id. at p.10). Movant similarly signed a

plea agreement acknowledging that he waived both his right to appeal his sentence and

conviction to a higher court and to file a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 collaterally

attacking the validity of his conviction or the correctness of his sentence provided that the

sentence was in accord with the terms of his plea agreement. (Response Ex. 2, (Doc. No. 2-3,

p. 5)). Moreover, in signing his plea agreement Movant acknowledged that such waiver shall

result in dismissal of any appeal or collateral attack Movant might file challenging either his

conviction or his sentence. (Id.)

Movant opines that he did not know or understand the terms and conditions of his plea

agreement. The record is clear that at the change of plea proceeding the Court informed

Movant that the terms of his agreement called for a sentence between five years to as much

as ten years and the record unequivocally indicates Movant understood this term. (Response

Ex. 3 (Doc. No. 2-4, p.17)). The record is clear that at the change of plea proceeding Movant

knew: (1) the plea agreement contained all terms agreed upon to resolve his case; (2) there

were no other promises or agreements not contained in the plea agreement inducing Movant

to plead guilty. (Id. at p. 12) Movant similarly signed the plea agreement wherein the

Government and Movant stipulated and agreed that Movant would receive a sentence of

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imprisonment between five and ten years. (Response Ex. 2 (Doc. No. 2-3, p. 4)). Moreover,

Movant and the Government stipulated and agreed that the Court had complete discretion to

depart from any otherwise applicable sentencing guideline range in order to sentence Movant

within the agreed-upon range of five to ten years. (Id.) Only if the Court concluded that the

range of five to ten years was inappropriate would Movant be allowed to withdraw his plea

of guilty pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id.). 

The record is clear that at the change of plea proceeding Movant was not under any

threats made or force used to get Movant to plead guilty. (Response Ex. 3 (Doc. No. 2-4, p.

12)). Moreover, at the change of plea proceeding Movant agreed that he had signed his plea

agreement and was pleading guilty voluntarily and of his own free will with the advice of

defense counsel. (Id.) Movant similarly signed a plea agreement wherein he acknowledged

that his plea of guilty was not the result of force, threats, assurances or promises other than

the promises contained in the plea agreement. (Response Ex. 2 (Doc. No. 2-3, pp.7-8))

Movant in that plea agreement also acknowledged that he agreed to its provisions as a

voluntary act on his part and not done at the direction or recommendation of another. (Id. at

p. 8).

The right of appeal is statutory. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).

Likewise, a petition for relief by collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. §2255 is statutory.

Consequently, a knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory right is enforceable. United

States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 942

(1992). “An express waiver of the right to appeal in a negotiated plea of guilty is valid if

knowingly and voluntarily made.” United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir.

1991)(emphasis added)(citing Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322). A waiver to petition for

relief by collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. §2255 must also be express to be valid. United

States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2000)(emphasis added). Upon oath Movant

avowed to the Court to be truthful, forthright and forthcoming in his statements to the Court.

The record is unequivocally clear that Movant in writing and orally to the Court expressly

waived both his right to appeal as well as his right to petition the Court for 28 U.S.C. §2255

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relief. The record is also unequivocally clear that Movant during the Court’s colloquy was

apprised of and knew the possible penalties he would be subject to by pleading guilty

pursuant to a plea agreement; was apprised of and knew the rights he was accorded and

would be relinquishing by pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement; and knowing this,

voluntarily entered a plea of guilty pursuant to that plea agreement intelligently waiving all

trial rights as well as his right to appeal and his right to petition for relief under 28 U.S.C.

§2255.

Movant, by written and express waiver of his right to appeal and right to petition for

relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 does not necessarily waive his right to petition under 28

U.S.C. §2255 to challenge the ineffective assistance of defense counsel. United States v.

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1156 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2005)(“...we do not decide whether even an

express waiver of all §2255 rights could be enforced to preclude an ineffective assistance

claim implicating the voluntariness of the waiver itself.”); United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d

431, 432-433 (9th Cir. 1994). “By requiring ineffective assistance arguments to be raised in

collateral proceedings, we ‘permit[] the district judge first to decide whether the claim has

merit, and second, if it does, to develop a record as to what counsel did, why it was done, and

what, if any, prejudice resulted.’” Nunez, 223 F.3d at 959.

Defense counsel’s effectiveness is examined pursuant to the doctrine set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland there are two components

to an effectiveness inquiry and Movant bears the burden of establishing both. First, Movant

must show that defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. There is a strong presumption that defense

counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see also United States v.

Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1994). Second, Movant must establish that but for

defense counsel’s unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the context of a guilty plea, “in order to satisfy the

‘prejudice’ requirement, the [Movant] must show that there is a reasonable probability that,

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but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going

to trial.” Doe v. Woodford, 508 F.3d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 2007)(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52, 59 (1985)); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 980 (9th Cir. 2004). Inquiry must not

be confined only to outcome determination but must extend to whether or not the result of

the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364,

368 (1993); Palomba, 31 F.3d at 1461. Failure to make the required showing of either

deficient performance or prejudice defeats the claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-700. The

court need not address both factors where one is lacking. Id.

There is nothing on the record that defense counsel fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness in informing Movant of the terms of his plea agreement and the rights

Movant would be relinquishing by pleading guilty. The Court’s change of plea colloquy

confirms that defense counsel in fact fully informed and educated Movant as to the terms of

his plea agreement and the rights he would be waiving. Movant knowingly, voluntarily and

intelligently waived his right to appeal and his right to petition for relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §2255. Movant failed to establish deficient performance and the Court need not

address any claims of prejudice.

C. United States v. Booker 

Movant’s opines that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to argue under the

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for downward departure based on United States v. Booker, 543

U.S. 220 (2005). Reliance on Booker is misplaced and inapplicable to Movant’s case. The

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are effectively advisory, requiring a sentencing court to consider

Guidelines ranges but permitting such court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory

concerns such those enumerated in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-246.

Movant was indicted for Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking in violation of 18

U.S.C. §1203, (Count 1); Hostage Taking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203 (Count 2);

Harboring Illegal Aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(i), (Count 3);

and Possessing a Firearm In Connection With a Crime of Violence in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§924(c)(1)(A)(i), (Count 4). (Response, p.2; CR. Doc. No. 11). 

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1

The plea agreement erroneously cites 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) as the

underlying “crime of violence.” (Response Ex. 2 (Doc. No. 2-3, p. 3)) Such section states that

it is a crime for one to: “know[] or [be] in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come

to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, transports, or moves or

attempts to transport or move such alien within the United States by means of transportation

or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law;....” 

2

The plea agreement erroneously cites 18 U.S.C. §3559(a)(3) as classifying a violation

of 18 U.S.C. §924(c), Possessing a Firearm In Connection With a Crime of Violence, as a

Class A Felony. Section 3559(a)(3) (2006) states: “An offense that is not specifically

classified by a letter grade in the section defining it, is classified if the maximum term of

imprisonment authorized is...less than twenty-five years but ten or more years, as a Class C

Felony;....”

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One convicted of the offense of Possessing a Firearm In Connection With a Crime of

Violence shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than five years. 18 U.S.C.

§924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006). Count 4 of the indictment specifically states that Movant “did

possess a firearm, that is, a rifle, during and in relation to a crime of violence, that is, Hostage

Taking[1], a felony prosecutable in a Court of the United States.” (CR. Doc. No.11 p.

3)(emphasis added). One convicted for the crime of violence of Hostage Taking “shall be

punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life....” 18 U.S.C. §1203(a)

(2006)(emphasis added). An offense wherein one can be sentenced to a life sentence is

classified as a Class A Felony.2

 18 U.S.C. §3559(a)(1)(2006). 

On August 28, 2006, after establishing a factual basis for the offense (Response Ex.

3 (Doc. No. 2-4, pp. 19-25)), Movant pled guilty (Id. at p. 26) pursuant to a plea agreement

wherein he would receive a sentence of imprisonment between five and ten years. (Response

Ex. 2 (Doc. No. 2-3, p.4)). Despite mis-citation in the plea agreement to the incorrect statutes

classifying the offense of Possessing a Firearm In Connection With a Crime of Violence as

a Class A Felony, subject to as much as a life sentence, it is clear from the plea agreement

that: (1) the parties intended that Movant was pleading guilty to a Class A Felony (Response

Ex. 2(Doc. No. 2-3, p. 2 )); and (2) the maximum sentence Movant could be subject to, but

for the plea agreement, was a life sentence. (Id. at p.3). Moreover, the record is abundantly

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clear and unequivocal that the Court advised Movant that the offense he was pleading guilty

to required Movant to serve at least five years of imprisonment and that the maximum term

of imprisonment could be life. (Id. Ex. 3 (Doc. No. 2-4, pp. 13-14)) The Court similarly

informed Movant that pursuant to the plea agreement Movant and the Government agreed

that Movant would be subject to a sentence of between five and ten years which Movant

acknowledged understanding. (Id. at p.17). Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement,

the Court explained to Movant that the Court had discretion to depart from any otherwise

applicable sentencing guideline range if the Court chose to impose a sentence within the

agreed upon range of five to ten years (Response Ex.2 (Doc. No. 2-3, p. 4)) and that any U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines recommendation did not bind the Court inasmuch as such

recommendation is but advisory which Movant acknowledged understanding after conferring

with defense counsel. (Response Ex. 3 (Doc. No. 2-4, p.17))

A defendant convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §924(c), whether or not convicted of

another crime, is subject to the guideline sentence which is the minimum term of

imprisonment required by statute. U.S.S.G. §2K2.4(b). The minimum term of incarceration

for Possessing a Firearm In Connection With a Crime of Violence is five years, i.e., the

minimum of the range Movant was subject to pursuant to his plea agreement and to which

Movant pled guilty. A sentence above the minimum term required by 18 U.S.C. §924(c) is

an upward departure from the guideline range and such may be warranted by the nature and

circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the defendant, and “the kinds

of sentence and the sentencing range established for... the applicable category of offense

committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines...issued by

the Sentencing Commission....” 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(1) and (4)(A)(ii) (2006); See U.S.S.G.

§2K2.4(b), Application Note 2(B).

On August 28, 2006, at the conclusion of Movant’s change of plea proceeding, the

Court accepted Movant’s plea of guilty. (CR. Doc. No. 67). On November 13, 2006 the Court

accepted the plea agreement entered into by Movant and imposed “a non-guideline sentence

pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. §3553" (CR. Doc. No. 84) of 72 months on Count 4 of the

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indictment, Possessing a Firearm In Connection With a Crime of Violence, a sentence well

within the range of sentence Movant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently accepted. The

record is unequivocal that Movant, by the written plea agreement and colloquy with the

Court, was subject to a range of imprisonment of a minimum of five years to a maximum of

ten years and the Court sentenced him within the agreed upon range accordingly.

D. Deportable Alien Status

Movant opines that his status as a deportable alien deprives him of a range of

rehabilitative programs available to U.S. citizens and is thus disparately harsher warranting

a downward departure in his sentence. Movant’s place and manner of confinement is under

the sole discretion of the Bureau of Prisons, and not the sentencing Court. The Ninth Circuit

has held that alien status is not a basis for different treatment in sentencing. See United States

v. Martinez-Ramos, 184 F.3d 1055, 1057-59 (9th Cir. 1999)(deportable alien status cannot be

grounds for downward departure for defendants convicted of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C.

§1326); McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 1999)(BOP’s practice of

“excluding prisoners with detainers from participating in community-based treatment

programs, and consequently from sentence reduction eligibility” does not violate equal

protection because it is “rationally related to the BOP’s legitimate interest in preventing

prisoners from fleeing detainers while participating in community treatment programs.”)

Movant’s claim for downward departure in his sentencing is meritless.

E. Vienna Convention Claims

Movant opines that his constitutional rights were violated under the Vienna

Convention in that the Mexican consulate was not contacted to provide him with competent

counsel who would have ultimately obtained a dismissal of the charges against Movant.

(Motion (Doc. No. 1-2, p.11)). After a criminal defendant pleads guilty on the advice of

counsel he is not automatically entitled to collateral relief because of a claim to the existence

of an antecedent constitutional infirmity. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973).

Arguments that seek to establish violations of the Vienna Convention as grounds for showing

the invalidity of a judgment of conviction, such as inadequate counsel, are insubstantial.

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Medellin v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 360, 361 (2008)(citing Medellin v. Texas, 552

U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1354-1355 (2008). The inquiry is the nature of the advice and the

voluntariness of the plea and, as established in III.B.2 supra, Movant pled guilty knowingly,

voluntarily and intelligently. Movant’s claim that the validity of his conviction and/or the

correctness of his sentence is undermined by an alleged antecedent violation of the Vienna

Convention is without merit. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the Motion is untimely filed, it should be dismissed. Moreover, even if the

Motion was timely, Movant’s claims are without merit.

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

dismiss Movant’s Motion Under § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence By A

Person In Federal Custody (Doc. 1) as untimely, or alternatively, deny the Motion on the

merits.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may

respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy thereof.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number:

CV 08-883-PHX-SRB / CR 06-381-PHX-SRB.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 25th day of February, 2009.

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