Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05145/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05145-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shirley S. Chater
Appellee
Suhiyr Saleem
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SUIDYR SALEEM, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

. FILED 

iJDJted States Court ot Appeals Tenth Circuit 

JUN 12 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. No. 95-5145 

SI-ITRLEY S. CRATER, Commissioner of 

Social Security, • 

Defendant-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTiffiRN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 93-C-806-K) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Paul F. McTighe, Jr., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney, Phil Pinnell, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Joseph B. Liken, Acting Chief Counsel, Tina M. Waddell, Acting Deputy Chief Counsel, 

Randall Halford, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security 

Administration, Dallas, Texas, for Defendant-Appellee. 

* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of 

Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human 

Services, as the defendant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner 

for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she 

was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision. 

Appellate Case: 95-5145 Document: 01019756237 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 1 
Before ANDERSON,· LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Suhiyr Saleem appeals from an order of the district court affinning the Secretary's 

decision denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 1 Ms. Saleem filed 

for SSI on September 20, 1989. She alleged disability due to arthritis, headaches, back 

problems, and nerves. Her requests were denied initially and on reconsideration. Following 

a de novo hearing on August 28, 1990, an administrative law judge (ALJ) detennined that 

she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act The Appeals Council 

reversed and remanded to the ALJ for further evaluation of Ms. Saleem's substance abuse 

disorder. The ALJ held a second hearing on October 23, 1992. After this hearing, he again 

determined that Ms. Saleem was not disabled The Appeals Council denied review, and 

Ms. Saleem filed suit in district court. The district court affirmed the Secretary's decision, 

and she appealed to this court. 

We review the Secretary's decision to determine whether the factual findings are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole and whether the cm:rect 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has detennined 

Wtanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument 

See Fed R App. P. 34 (f) and lOth Cir. R 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted 

without oral argument 

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Appellate Case: 95-5145 Document: 01019756237 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 2 
legal standards were applied. Andrade v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 985 F.2d 

1045, 1047 (lOth Cir. 1993). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Fowler v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 1451, 

1453 (lOth Cir. 1989)(quotation omitted). 

The Secretary has established a five-step evaluation process pursuant to the Social 

Security Act for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. 

~ :Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (lOth Cir. 1988)(discussing five-step . disability test). When the analysis reaches step five, the Secretary bears the burden of 

showing that a claimant retains the capacity to perform other work and that such work exists 

in the national economy. Id. at 751. 

Here, the ALJ found that Ms. Saleem had no past relevant work. Reaching step five, 

he found, however, that she retained the residual functional capacity to perform the full range 

of light work, reduced by her need to avoid climbing, heights, moving machinery, and 

driving automotive equipment. He then applied the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 

20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rule 202.20 (the grids) as a framework, considered 

testimony from a vocational expert, and concluded that Ms. Saleem was not disabled. 

Ms. Saleem challenges the ALfs decision that her personality disorder and substance 

abuse disorder did not meet a listed impairment. She also contends that the ALJ failed to 

evaluate properly her nonexertional impairments: pain, and addiction to and side effects of 

prescription drugs. We agree that the ALJ failed to evaluate properly Ms. Saleem's pain. 

This failure is closely tied to his evaluation of her substance addiction. 

Appellate Case: 95-5145 Document: 01019756237 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 3 
Drug addiction is a nonexertional impairment. Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 577, 580 

(lOth Cir. 1984). In order to establish disability based on drug addiction, a claimant must 

prove both that she has lost the ability to control her use of the drug, and that her addiction, 

either alone or in combination with her other impairments, precludes her from engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. cr. Coleman v. Chater, 58 F.3d 577, 579 (lOth Cir. 

1995)(alcoholism); Soc. Sec. R. 82-60. 

The Appeals Council remanded this case to the ALJ to detennine whether Ms. Saleem 

could control her intake of her prescription medications. He employed a consulting 

psychologist, psychiatrist, and neurologist, all of whom opined that Ms. Saleem was 

addicted to her medications. The ALJ apparently concluded that although Ms. Saleem was 

addicted to her prescription painkillers and anti-anxiety medications, her addiction did not 

prevent her from performing substantial gainful employment. 

Initially, we note that the evidence supports the ALJ's determination that although 

Ms. Saleem suffered from substance abuse, her addiction did not meet the criteria for 

"substance addiction disorder" contained in 20 C.F.R § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.09. In 

order to meet the required severity for listing 12.09, a claimant must satisfy at least one of 

the factors listed in section 12.09(A-I). Ms. Saleem's only claim to satisfy one of these 

2 The ALJ' s decision is less than ideally clear on this point. He expressed some 

doubt about whether Ms. Saleem was addicted but apparently concluded that she was. The 

medical evidence clearly demonstrated Ms. Saleem's addiction, and a conclusion that Ms. 

Saleem was ru.rt addicted to her medications would not have been supported by substantial 

evidence. 

Appellate Case: 95-5145 Document: 01019756237 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 4 
requirements lies with her "hysterical personality disorder" diagnosed by Dr. Gordon, the 

consulting psychologist ~section 12.09(D). 

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ' s conclusion that Ms. Saleem does not meet 

the requirements for a personality disorder under listing 12.08. Assuming (as the ALJ did) 

that "hysterical personality disorder" meets the "Part A" criteria of listing 12.08, the ALJ 

correctly found that it fails to meet the severity criteria of 12.08(B). 

Ms. Saleem's addiction, however, is relevant to her complaint of disabling pain. She 

· testified at the 1992 hearing that her pain keeps her from sleeping, requires her to curtail her 

daily activities and to spend most of the day in bed, and has made her dependent on her 

prescription medications. The ALJ evaluated Ms. Saleem's allegations of pain using the 

criteria set forth in L:una v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 165-66 (lOth Cir. 1987), and concluded 

that her allegations were not credible. 

In rejecting Ms. Saleem's allegations of disabling pain, the ALJ relied on the 

statement of Dr. Andelman, her treating physician, that Ms. Saleem's pain is under control 

by medication. In evaluating her pain, however, the ALJ was required to consider the side 

effects of Ms. Saleem's use of this medication. ~ i.d. The ALJ noted the consultants' 

findings that she was addicted to her medications, but gave short shrift to their stronglyexpressed concerns about the addiction. He concentrated instead on findings that the' side 

effects of the medications themselves would not prevent Ms. Saleem from working. 

The ALJ ignored Dr. Andehnan' s statement that Ms. Saleem suffers from severe pain 

without her medications, i.d. at 388, and Ms. Saleem's statement that she cannot function 

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Appellate Case: 95-5145 Document: 01019756237 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 5 
without them, id.. at 168. He did not analyze Dr. Goldman's statement that Ms. Saleem 

should not be on these medications and that she needs psychiatric treatment for her substance 

addiction and her pain syndrome, id. at 142, or Dr. Goodman's statements that further 

evaluation of her use of these medications was needed, and that their hann might outweigh 

the benefit she received from them, id. at 397. The net result of the ALJ's decision is that 

Ms. Saleem is to return to work, addicted, because her drug abuse will keep her from feeling 

severe pam. 

It is Congressional policy that the social security laws not be applied to perpetuate 

drug addiction. ~ 142 Cong. Rec. S3114-02, S3119 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996)(statement 

of Sen. Roth). This policy is reflected in decisions of the Eighth Circuit that a claimant is 

not considered free from disabling pain because he does not take medications to which he 

fears becoming addicted, see Dover v. Bow~ 784 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1986), and of the 

Seventh Circuit that a claimant need not take medications to which he has a reasonable fear 

of becoming addicted, even if such medications could relieve his pain and make him able to 

work & Dray v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 10 F.3d 1306, 1313 (7th Cir. 1993); Stith v. 

U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd, 902 F.2d 1284, 1287 (7th Cir. 1990). We now hold that the 

converse also is true: the ALJ cannot discredit a claimant's assertions of disabling pain by 

relying on her use of medicines to which the medical evidence clearly indicates she is 

addicted, and which she should have long ago stopped taking, but which presently provide 

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Appellate Case: 95-5145 Document: 01019756237 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 6 
adequate pam relief. Dr. Andelman's statement, on which the ALJ relied/ that 

Ms. Saleem's pain is "effectively controlled by medicines," Appellant's App. Vol. IT at 52 

(emphasis added), is clearly unsupported by the medical evidence; addiction is not "effective 

control" of pain. 

4 

On remand, the Secretary may again decide that Ms. Saleem's allegations of disabling 

pain are not credible. However, he must provide legitimate reasons for this conclusion. We 

therefore REVERSE and RElv.IAND this case to the district court with instructions to further 

remand it to the Secretary for the limited purpose of properly evaluating Ms. Saleem's 

complaint of disabling pain, and to determine whether her pain, properly considered in 

3 The AI.J quoted Dr. Andelman's statement in the concluding paragraph of his 

pain analysis. We cannot determine how much weight he gave to the statement He did cite 

other reasons why he believed Ms. Saleem was not credible. However, most of these other 

reasons rest on observations and/or test results which were obtained while Ms. Saleem was 

medicated. The ALJ did not provide a sufficiently supported rationale for rejecting 

Ms. Saleem, s allegations of pain even if she stopped taking the medication to which she is 

addicted, or if she were taking some other medication. The only statement in the record on 

that point apparently is Dr. Andelman' s opinion that her pain would be severe, absent the 

medication. 

4 The ALJ also made another finding in support of his pain analysis which lacks 

substantial evidence. He determined that Ms. Saleem had "no anatomical problem based on 

normal myelogram, CT scan, and EMG reports in the file." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 51. 

This assessment ignores the statements of Dr. Bowler, Ms. Saleem's treating physician. He 

diagnosed Ms. Saleem with a left 15, Sl radiculopathy based upon the EMG. Id. at 311. 

Statements to the contrary by a consulting neurologist, ~ ill.. at 141, do not excuse the ALJ 

from either accepting, or supplying a proper reason for rejecting, Dr. Bowler's diagnosis. 

~Reyes v. Brown, 845 F.2d 242, 244-45 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

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Appellate Case: 95-5145 Document: 01019756237 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 7 
conjunction with her other impainnents, both exertional and nonexertional, allows her to 

perform substantial gainful employment. We further encourage the Secretary to expedite 

her resolution of this seven-year-old claim. 

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