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Parties Involved:
David Lindsay
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 14, 2010

  Decided April 16, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐3906

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DAVID LINDSAY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division

No. 2:08CR00014‐004

William T. Lawrence,

Judge.

O R D E R

David Lindsay pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute in excess of 500 grams of

methamphetamine and possessing with intent to distribute at least 5 grams of

methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and was sentenced to 204 months’

imprisonment.  In the plea agreement he waived his right to appeal his conviction and

sentence.  He filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel now seeks to withdraw

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because he cannot identify any nonfrivolous

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 09-3906 Document: 15 Filed: 04/16/2010 Pages: 2
No. 09‐3906 Page 2

argument to pursue.  Lindsay did not accept our invitation to respond to his lawyer’s

submissions, see CIR. R. 51(b), so we limit our review to the potential issues identified in

counsel’s facially adequate brief.  See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir.

2002).

Lindsay does not seek to have his guilty plea set aside, so counsel rightly omits a

discussion of the plea’s voluntariness or the plea colloquy.  See United States v. Knox, 287

F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel considers whether Lindsay could challenge the reasonableness of his

agreed‐upon sentence, but properly concludes that such a challenge would be foreclosed by

the appeal waiver.  Because the guilty plea stands, so does the waiver.  See Nunez v. United

States, 546 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2008).

Finally, counsel correctly points out that any challenge to the effectiveness of his

representation in the district court should be explored in a collateral proceeding so that a

more complete record can be developed.  See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504‐05

(2003); United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 557‐58 (7th Cir. 2005).

For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS

Lindsay’s appeal.

Case: 09-3906 Document: 15 Filed: 04/16/2010 Pages: 2