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Parties Involved:
Dan W. Thompson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

DAN w. THOMPSON, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FILED 

Uflired SratH Coutr of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUL 13 19QO 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

89-6180 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-88-264-W) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Gary E. Payne, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

William S. Price, United States Attorney for the Western District 

of Oklahoma, and Thomas M. Gannon, Attorney, Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

This case involves an appeal from the district court's denial 

of defendant's motion for a new trial. 

Appellate Case: 89-6180 Document: 01019550115 Date Filed: 07/13/1990 Page: 1 
I. FACTS 

Defendant is one of three co-defendants who allegedly 

defrauded the government in real estate purchases financed with 

mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration. These 

defendants were found guilty by jury verdict and were subsequently 

sentenced to twenty-eight concurrent, two-year prison sentences. 

After this case was submitted to the jury--but before any 

jury verdict--a newspaper article about the case was published in 

the business section of the Saturday Oklahoman & Times. 1 The 

article discussed a previous agreement to plead guilty signed by 

~efendant Thompson. The guilty plea was withdrawn before trial 

and was not admissible in the trial court because the defendant's 

motion in limine, to exclude any mention of plea negotiations, had 

been granted. On Monday, before the jury reconvened, defendant's 

counsel requested that the jury be individually voir dired to 

determine whether any of the jurors had been exposed to the 

article. The written motion contained allegations that two jurors 

had been observed reading the Daily Oklahoman at the courthouse 

during the week of trial. One other juror was observed reading 

the Wall Street Journal throughout the week of trial. Therefore, 

it was assumed that he would be likely to read the business section of the Saturday Oklahoman & Times. On Monday after the 

article was published, the trial court inquired whether anything 

had occurred during the weekend that might affect the jurors' 

l The Saturday Oklahoman & Times is the Saturday version of the 

Daily Oklahoman. The Daily Oklahoman is the major daily newspaper 

in Oklahoma City. 

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ability to be fair and impartial. But, unlike earlier occasions, 

the court refused to ask the more specific question whether the 

jurors had read anything about the case. When no juror responded 

to the court's inquiries, the trial judge allowed them to continue 

deliberations. After allowing defendant's counsel to make his 

record, the trial judge denied the motion. 

When the jury verdict of guilty was returned, counsel for the 

defendant renewed his motion to voir dire the jury. The government opposed the motion. The trial court denied the renewed 

request stating: 

The Court will deny the request that it make individual 

inquiry based upon the fact that the Court has 

repeatedly admonished and instructed the jurors not to 

read or listen to anything contained in the news media 

with regard to this case. 

And after each recess, it has inquired of the jury 

panel as a whole whether anything might have occurred 

that would in any way influence their ability to 

continue to serve and no indications have been given by 

any of the jurors. 

The Court will not presume that they have in any 

way disregarded the Court's instructions not to read the 

news media, absent some indications to the contrary. 

Record, supp. 1, vol. 4, at 1204. 2 Defendant later filed posttrial motions including a request for a new trial pursuant to Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 33. All post-trial motions were denied by the trial 

court and this appeal followed. Essentially, the defendant claims 

that a new trial is necessary because the trial court erred in 

2 Everything said to the jury relating to this subject together 

with the time it was said is contained in the Appendix attached to 

this opinion. 

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expressly refusing to voir dire the jury on their exposure to the 

news article. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The district court's decision on a new trial motion is 

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States 

v. Mcintyre, 836 F.2d 467, 472 (lOth Cir. 1987). In addition, the 

standard of review for the trial court's treatment of allegations 

of jury bias is abuse of discretion. "In responding to allegations of juror bias that arise during a trial, the trial court's 

decision as to how to proceed will not be reversed except for an 

abuse of discretion." United States v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385, 

1390 (lOth Cir. 1986). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, a 

trial court's decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate 

court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made 

a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible 

choice in the circumstances." United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 

1161, 1164 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

III. RIGHT TO VOIR DIRE THE JURY REGARDING PREJUDICE 

Defendant claims that the denial of his motion to voir dire 

the jurors individually constitutes reversible error and a new 

trial should be granted as a matter of law. We agree with the 

defendant that the article containing information concerning a 

prior plea agreement signed by Mr. Thompson was highly prejudicial. After the publication of the prejudicial information, the 

trial court's questions to the jurors were: 

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Let me inquire, before you begin your deliberations, has 

anything occurred during the weekend that would in any 

way affect your ability to continue to serve as fair and 

impartial jurors in this case? . . . Is there any matter 

that you would wish to call to the Court's attention as 

perhaps bearing upon your ability to continue to serve 

as fair and impartial jurors? 

Record, supp. l, vol. 4, at 1202. Under the circumstances of the 

prejudicial article being called to the courts attention and the 

allegations that several jurors were previously observed reading 

the Daily Oklahoman, we conclude that the trial court's general 

inquiry as to prejudice was not sufficient to satisfy counsel's 

reasonable request that the jury be asked specifically about the 

newspaper story. At a minimum the court had a duty to ask whether 

the jurors had read the article concerning this case. 

The facts of this case are essentially indistinguishable from 

a prior case by this court that we find controlling. In Mares v. 

United States, 383 F.2d 805 (lOth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 394 

U.S. 963 (1969), a newspaper article printed under a bold headline 

concerning defendant's withdrawn plea of guilty and a confession 

which had been excluded was published during a trial in which 

there was no sequestration of jurors. Upon learning of the 

article, defense counsel called the article immediately to the 

attention of the court and moved for a mistrial. The court denied 

the motion. Defense counsel again requested a mistrial and a 

questioning of the jury concerning their knowledge of the article 

once the guilty verdict was returned. The court refused both 

motions. On appeal the government argued that the jurors were 

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carefully admonished on their responsibility to refrain from exposure to publicity occurring during the trial. Nevertheless, we 

concluded "that the failure of the trial court to ascertain 

whether any of the jurors had been exposed to the prejudicial 

article makes a new trial imperative." Mares, 383 F.2d at 809. 

The facts of Mares are nearly identical to the present case. 

In both cases a newspaper article containing prejudicial information that had been excluded from the trial was published during 

the trial while the jurors were not sequestered. In Mares the 

article was preceded by a bold headline, but there was no evidence 

that any juror had actually read the newspaper. In the present 

case the article was preceded by a headline, appeared on the front 

page of the bu~iness section, and there was some evidence that the 

jurors may have been exposed to it. In both cases the judge 

refused to question the jurors concerning their knowledge of the 

articles. The fact that the article in Mares included a withdrawn 

guilty plea and a confession--while the article in this case discussed only a withdrawn guilty plea--goes only to the degree of 

prejudice, not necessarily to the requirement for voir dire. We 

have already concluded that the article in this case was extremely 

prejudicial. Thus we hold, in accordance with Mares, that the 

failure of the trial judge to inquire of the jurors concerning 

their knowledge of the article was an abuse of discretion. 

Other cases relied on by the government are distinguishable. 

In United States v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385 (lOth Cir. 1986), we 

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upheld a trial court's refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing 

to inquire about the facts behind a relationship between a juror 

and two government witnesses. However, Bradshaw did not involve 

highly prejudicial evidence provided to a juror during trial. 

Bradshaw involved information that could have, and probably should 

have, been discovered and discussed during voir dire. The test in 

such a case is more lenient than in the case of prejudicial information which may have be~n received by the jurors during trial. 

The government urges us to apply United States v. Greschner, 

802 F.2d 373 (lOth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 u.s. 908 (1987), 

where we refused to reverse a trial judge who held that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary under facts very similar to the 

present case. In Greschner, a newspaper article containing prejudicial information, including the criminal records of the defendants, was published during trial. The trial court refused to 

grant a mistrial or to voir dire the jury concerning the article. 

We affirmed. The important factual difference between Greschner 

and this case, as well as Mares, is that in Greschner the matters 

contained in the newspaper article had already been admitted into 

evidence. In fact, the Greschner court explicitly distinguished 

Mares on this ground. Id. at 380-81 & n.6. 

In Greschner we stated that "we will presume that jurors 

remain 'true to their oath and . conscientiously observe the 

instructions and admonitions of the court''' absent evidence to the 

contrary. Greschner, 802 F.2d at 381 (citations omitted). In 

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addition to the factual differences between this case and 

Greschner, we note that we cited the same principle outlined in 

Greschner in our Mares opinion. Mares, 383 F.2d at 808-09. However, in Mares we concluded that 11 [t]he nature of the article was 

such that the trial court should have immediately ascertained 

whether any jurors had been exposed to it. 11 Id. at 809. In the 

present case and in Mares, the reason for the lack of specific 

evidence concerning the juror's connection with the newspaper 

article was the trial court's failure to question the jurors about 

their exposure. In this case, defendant's motion to voir dire the 

jury contained allegations that jurors were seen reading the same 

newspaper that eventually carried the article during the week of 

trial. While the jurors had not been forbidden to read all newspapers--only accounts of the trial--here the reading of the same 

paper and the highly prejudicial nature of the article make the 

case for specific voir dire of the jury even stronger than the 

holding in Mares. At a minimum the trial court should have 

inquired generally whether any jurors read the article about this 

trial which was published during the weekend recess. 

Finally, we note that our holding is supported by our recent 

case, United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040 (lOth Cir. 1988), 

cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1349 (1989). In Hornung, we explained 

that "[w]hen a trial court is apprised of the fact that an extrinsic influence may have tainted the trial, the proper remedy is a 

hearing to determine the circumstances of the improper contact and 

the extent of the prejudice, if any, to the defendant." Id. at 

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1045 (citations omitted}. Thus, we hold that on the facts of this 

case, where general newspaper reading was observed and information 

contained in a newspaper article was highly prejudicial, it was an 

abuse of discretion not to inquire whether any jurors were exposed 

to the article. In light of this error, we must presume that the 

jurors actually read the article and that it constituted 

prejudice. 

In a similar situation we presumed in Mares that at least one 

person was aware of the information in the article, and we concluded that a new trial must be held because of the lack of an 

evidentiary hearing. Mares, 383 F.2d at 809. The article in 

Mares contained information about the defendant's withdrawn plea 

of guilty and a prior confession that had been excluded by the 

trial court. These two pieces of information went straight to the 

issue of guilt, that was the question before the jury. Although 

the Mares court did not discuss the actual impact of this information on the jury, given the nature of the article it would have 

been impossible to hold that it was beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the information did not contribute to the verdict. 

As in Mares, the information in the article in this case was 

highly prejudicial and concerned the issue of guilt--the only 

question before the jury. In this case, a four-column article 

containing accurate factual information concerning the trial proceedings was headlined in bold lettering by the language "Son Says 

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He Made Payments for Father." On the previous day Mr. Thompson's 

son had testified before the jury. The article also contained a 

reference to Mr. Thompson's prior plea agreement. The entire sentence reads: "Dan Thompson's attorney, Stephen Jones of Enid, 

told U.S. District Judge Lee R. West on Thursday that the minister 

and his son had both signed agreements to plead guilty in the case 

last year while being represented by another attorney.'' Saturday 

Oklahoman & Times, March 4, 1989, at 23, col. 2. We hold that 

under the facts of this case it was an abuse of discretion for the 

trial court not to voir dire the jury concerning the challenged 

article. 

IV. HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS 

We next briefly consider whether the trial court's error was 

harmless. Our recent case, United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 

1040 (lOth Ci r . 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1349 (1989), 

clearly outlines the harmless error doctrine for improper jury 

contacts. In Hornung we held that once a presumption of prejudice 

arises "the burden rests heavily upon the Government to e s tablish, 

aft er notice to and hearing o f the defendant, that such contact 

with the juror was harmless to the defendant." Id. at 1044 (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954)). We further held: "The court 'should assess the "poss ibility of prejudice" by reviewing the entire record, analyzing the substance of 

the extrinsic evidence, and comparing it to that information of 

which the jurors wer e properl y aware.'" Hornung, 848 F.2d at 10 45 

( c i t ing Uni ted States v. Weiss, 7 52 F .2d 777 , 7 8 3 ( 2nd Cir.), 

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cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985)). In applying harmless error 

analysis, we must ask ourselves whether we can "declare a belief 

that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman 

v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Specifically, the Supreme 

Court has held as a general rule that an error is harmless if the 

beneficiary of the error can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

it did not contribute to the verdict. Id. 

In order to convict defendant of the crimes charged in the 

indictment in this case, the government was required to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not make any down 

payments or earnest money deposits on the properties involved as 

required by government regulations. Record, supp. l, vol. l, at 

131-32. The government stated that their "evidence will prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that no such [down] payments were made 

by Mr. Thompson." Id. at 143. However, at trial the defendant's 

son testified that he paid the down payments and the earnest money 

deposits for defendant, through a jointly held corporation, on all 

the properties named in the indictment. Record, supp. l, vol. 4, 

at 1097. Defendant testified that he was informed his son had 

taken care of the down payment and earnest money. Id. at 1104-05. 

The remaining evidence of guilt produced by the government is not 

so overwhelming as to make defendant's testimony inherently 

unbelievable. Thus, it was the jury's province to weigh the credibility of the evidence and testimony. After reviewing the 

record, we cannot find that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's presumed knowledge of the prior plea of 

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guilty did not enter into the jury's evaluation of the conflicting 

testimony. Thus, the government has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the newspaper article did not contribute to the 

verdict. 

V. CONCLUSION 

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in not 

inquiring of the jury, upon request, to determine the jury's exposure to a highly prejudicial newspaper article. Because we do not 

find the error to be harmless, we must REVERSE and REMAND for a 

new trial. 

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. THOMPSON - No. 89-6180 

APPENDIX 

TRIAL COURT'S RECORDED ADMONITIONS TO THE JURY 

I. Monday, February 27, 1989 

Jury Sworn 

"Certainly you should not permit anyone to discuss it (the 

case) with you or in your presence, and that includes your other 

fellow jurors. Don't discuss this case, even among yourselves, 

until you retire to the jury room at the completion of the case to 

begin your deliberations. 

Don't read or listen to anything in the news media about this 

case •••• " Record, supp. 1, vol. 1, at 126-27. 

Pre-Recess 

"I want to remind you again of my previous admonition that 

you are not to discuss this case, even among yourselves. You are 

not to permit anyone to discuss it with you or in your presence. 

If anyone attempts to do so, please report that, upon your return 

to the courtroom, to me." Record, supp. 1, vol. 1, at 153. 

Pre-Recess 

"I remind you again of my previous admonition not to discuss 

this case." Record, supp. 1, vol. 1, at 204. 

Closing 

"I will remind you again of my previous admonitions that you 

should not discuss this case with anyone. Don't read or listen to 

anything that might be contained in the media or television with 

regard to this matter, or on the radio. 

If there's anything in the newspaper, your family can retain 

that, if they wish to do so, until after this trial is over and 

then you can read about whatever comments there are. But don't 

discuss it with your family members; don't discuss it among yourselves." Record, supp. 1, vol. 1, at 270-71. 

II. Tuesday, February 28, 1989 

Opening 

"May I inquire if 

would prevent you from 

jurors in this case?" 

1, vol. 2, at 272. 

Pre-Recess 

anything occurred during the recess that 

continuing to serve as fair and impartial 

(No response from the jury.) Record, supp. 

''I remind you of my previous admonitions." Record, supp. 1, 

vo 1. 2, at 3 3 2 . 

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Pre-Recess 

"I remind you not to discuss this case and I also remind you 

of my previous admonitions." Record, supp. l, vol. 2, at 393. 

Pre-Recess 

"I remind you of my previous admonitions not to discuss the 

case." Record, supp. l, vol. 2, at 445. 

Closing 

"I cas~." remind you of my previous admonitions not to discuss the 

Record, supp. l, val. 2, at 525. 

III. Wednesday, March 1, 1989 

Opening 

''May I inquire if anything occurred during the recess that 

would prevent any of you from serving as a fair and impartial 

juror? 

Have you read or heard anything in the news media with regard 

to this matter during the recess?" (No response from the jury). 

Record, supp. l, vol. 3, at 532. 

Pre-Recess 

"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I remind you of my previous admonition not to discuss this case." Record, supp. 1, val. 

3, at 594. 

Pre-Recess 

"Ladies and gentlemen, I want to remind you of my previous 

admonition not to discuss this case; not to read or listen to any 

reports with regard to this case, except what you hear in the 

courtroom." Record, supp. l, val. 3, at 644. 

Post-Recess 

"May I inquire if anything occurred during the recess that 

would prevent any of you from continuing to serve as fair and 

impartial jurors in this case?" (No response from jurors). 

Record, supp. l, val. 3, at 644. 

Pre-Recess 

"I will remind you of you [sic] my previous admonition not to 

discuss the case." Record, supp. l, val. 3, at 709. 

Closing 

"I again remind you of my previous admonition not to discuss 

the case." Record, supp. l, val. 3, at 800. 

IV. Thursday, March 2, 1989 

Opening 

"May I inquire if anything occurred during the recess, did 

you read or hear anything about this case from anyone outside the 

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courtroom that would in any way impair or influence your ability 

to be a fair and impartial juror in this case?" (No response from 

the jury.) Record, supp. 1, vol. 4, at 808. 

Pre-Recess 

"I will remind you of my previous admonitions not to discuss 

the case." Record, supp. 1, vol. 4, at 874. 

Pre-Recess 

"I'll remind you of my previous admonition not to discuss the 

case." Record, supp. l, vol. 4, at 907. 

Post-Recess 

"May I inquire if anything occurred which you observed or 

read or heard of that would in any way impact or affect your ability to continue to serve as fair and impartial jurors in this case 

during the recess? 

Do any of you wish to call anything to the Court's attention 

in that regard?" (No response from the jury.) Record, supp. l, 

vol. 4, at 938-40. 

Closing 

"I remind you, again, of my previous admonition not to discuss this case .... " Record, supp. l, vol. 4, at 1027-28. 

V. Friday, March 3, 1989 

Opening 

''May I inquire if anything occurred during the recess which 

would in any way affect or influence your ability to continue to 

serve as fair and impartial jurors in this case? 

(No response from the jurors). 

I gather not. 

Have any of you read or heard anything with regard to the 

proceedings in this trial during the recess? 

(No response from the jury). 

I gather not." Record, supp. l, vol. 4, at 1030. 

Pre-Recess 

"I remind you again of my previous admonitions not to discuss 

the case." Record, supp. 1, val. 4, at 1135. 

Post-Recess 

"May I inquire if anything occurred during the recess that 

would prevent any of you from continuing to serve as fair and 

impartial jurors or that you wish to call to the Court's attention 

as bearing on your ability to serve as fair and impartial jurors?" 

(No response from the jury.) Record, supp. l, vol. 4, at 1136. 

Pre-Recess 

"I'll remind you of my previous admonition not to discuss the 

case." Record, supp. 1, vol. 4, at 1194. 

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VI. Monday, March 6, 1989 

Pre-deliberation 

"Let me inquire, before you being your deliberations, has 

anything occurred during the weekend that would in any way affect 

your ability to continue to serve as fair and impartial jurors in 

this case? 

(No response from the jury.) 

Is there any matter that you would wish to call to the 

Court's attention as perhaps bearing upon your ability to continue 

to serve as fair and impartial jurors?" 

(No response from the jury.) Record, supp. 1, vol . 4, at 

1202. 

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