Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07075/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07075-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee
Roberto Sanchez-Navarro
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROBERTO SANCHEZ-NAVARRO,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7075

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 12-1645, Judge William A. Moorman.

______________________ 

Decided: January 14, 2016

______________________ 

 DEANNE LYNN BONNER SIMPSON, Bonner Di Salvo 

PLLC, Detroit, MI, argued for claimant-appellant.

 JOSEPH ASHMAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented 

by SCOTT D. AUSTIN, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

BENJAMIN C. MIZER; BRANDON A. JONAS, Y. KEN LEE, 

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2 SANCHEZ-NAVARRO v. MCDONALD

Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, DYK, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

Roberto Sanchez-Navarro appeals from a remand order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the 

“Veterans Court”). See Sanchez-Navarro v. McDonald, 

No. 12-1645, 2015 WL 1037719 (Vet. App. Mar. 11, 2015). 

For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal. 

BACKGROUND

This case is before us for the second time. The facts 

have largely been set forth in our first opinion, SanchezNavarro v. McDonald, 774 F.3d 1380, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 

2014). We recount below only those facts most relevant to 

this appeal. 

 Sanchez-Navarro served in the U.S. Army from May 

1958 to March 1960, with a portion of that time spent in 

Korea near the demilitarized zone. In September 2005, 

Sanchez-Navarro filed a claim for service connection for 

post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). In support of 

that claim, he submitted a letter from a Department of 

Veterans Affairs (“VA”) therapist diagnosing him with 

PTSD. 

While Sanchez-Navarro’s PTSD claim was before the 

Veterans Court for the first time, the VA amended the 

relevant regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). It added a

provision that modified the evidentiary standard for 

claimants seeking PTSD benefits based on a veteran’s

fear of hostile military or terrorist activity. See 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.304(f)(3). Specifically, the added section provides: “the 

veteran’s lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor” if “a VA psychiatrist or psychologist” “confirms that the claimed stressor 

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SANCHEZ-NAVARRO v. MCDONALD 3

is adequate to support a [PTSD] diagnosis” and if “the 

stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran’s service.” Id. 

The Veterans Court accordingly remanded SanchezNavarro’s claim to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (the 

“Board”) in light of the amended regulation. The Board

then sustained its earlier denial, and Sanchez-Navarro’s 

claim returned to the Veterans Court a second time. 

The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s denial, first 

finding that the VA was not required to provide SanchezNavarro with a medical examination by a VA psychiatrist 

or psychologist under 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d), the duty-toassist statute, because “the evidence was insufficient to 

corroborate the occurrence of claimed events.” SanchezNavarro v. Shinseki, No. 12-1645, 2013 WL 5496825, at 

*6 (Vet. App. Oct. 4, 2013). Then, in light of the additional finding that Sanchez-Navarro only had a PTSD diagnosis from a VA therapist, not a psychiatrist or psychologist, 

the Veterans Court found that § 3.304(f)(3) did not apply, 

and thus that Sanchez-Navarro’s lay testimony could not 

establish the occurrence of any claimed in-service stressor. Sanchez-Navarro appealed to this court.

On appeal, we vacated and remanded. We held that 

the “consistent with the places, types, and circumstances 

of the veteran’s service” language from § 3.304(f) informs

the VA’s duty to assist under § 5103A. Accordingly, we 

stated:

On remand, the Veterans Court should determine 

whether Sanchez-Navarro’s “claimed stressor[s 

are] consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran’s service.” If so, then 

Sanchez-Navarro is entitled to a medical examination by a VA psychiatrist or psychologist. If the 

VA psychiatrist or psychologist concludes that 

“the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of [PTSD] and that the veteran’s sympCase: 15-7075 Document: 28-2 Page: 3 Filed: 01/14/2016
4 SANCHEZ-NAVARRO v. MCDONALD

toms are related to the claimed stressor,” the 

Board must determine whether the government 

has established “clear and convincing evidence to 

the contrary.” In the absence of such clear and 

convincing evidence to the contrary, the veteran’s 

lay testimony alone is sufficient to establish the 

occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 

Sanchez-Navarro, 774 F.3d at 1384–85 (internal citations 

omitted). 

On remand, the Veterans Court held that “the determination the Federal Circuit directs this Court to make is 

a factual determination that the Board must make in the 

first instance.” Sanchez-Navarro, 2015 WL 1037719, at 

*2. It accordingly remanded to the Board for a determination whether Sanchez-Navarro’s alleged stressors are 

consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of his 

service. Id. at *3. Sanchez-Navarro has appealed from 

that remand order and now seeks to invoke our jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). 

DISCUSSION

The scope of our review in an appeal from a Veterans 

Court decision is limited by statute. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). 

That proscription does not recite a finality requirement,

see Williams v. Principi, 275 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 

2002), but we have nevertheless held that we ordinarily 

lack jurisdiction over non-final decisions of the Veterans 

Court, such as remands, id. at 1363–64; Winn v. Brown, 

110 F.3d 56, 57 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Travelstead v. Derwinski, 

978 F.2d 1244, 1247–49 (Fed. Cir. 1992). That requirement avoids “piecemeal appellate review without precluding later appellate review of the legal issue or any other 

determination made on a complete administrative record.” 

Cabot Corp. v. United States, 788 F.2d 1539, 1543 (Fed. 

Cir. 1986). 

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SANCHEZ-NAVARRO v. MCDONALD 5

We have carved out a narrow exception to that general requirement, however, and will only review a remand 

order from the Veterans Court if three conditions are met: 

(1) there must have been a clear and final decision 

of a legal issue that (a) is separate from the remand proceedings, (b) will directly govern the remand proceedings, or (c) if reversed by this court, 

would render the remand proceedings unnecessary; (2) the resolution of the legal issues must 

adversely affect the party seeking review; and, 

(3) there must be a substantial risk that the decision would not survive a remand, i.e., that the remand proceeding may moot the issue. 

Williams, 275 F.3d at 1364. 

Sanchez-Navarro argues that the exception to finality 

applies here because the Veterans Court rendered a clear 

and final legal decision—namely, that consistency between the veteran’s claimed in-service stressors and the

places, types, and circumstances of his service is a question of fact—that would likely become moot after remand.

We disagree. The remand order in this case does not 

satisfy all three Williams criteria. First, the decision that 

any “consistency” determination is a question of fact has 

not adversely affected Sanchez-Navarro. Indeed, he can 

still obtain relief on his PTSD claim and submit additional evidence and argument to the Board on remand. Cf.

Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001)

(reviewing a remand order that precluded the veteran 

from relying on certain evidence, where it was clear that 

the remand would not grant the veteran the relief he 

sought). 

Second, there is no substantial risk that we would be 

unable to review the alleged legal error at a later time. 

Sanchez-Navarro can appeal from any adverse ruling by 

the Board and argue that the remand was improper or 

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that the consistency determination was decided wrongly

as a matter of fact. Cf. Dambach v. Gober, 223 F.3d 1376, 

1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reviewing a remand order because 

it “alter[ed] the evidentiary burdens” on remand and 

likely made the legal issue unreviewable on appeal from a 

final order denying relief). 

To the extent Sanchez-Navarro argues that a remand 

would be futile, we rejected that argument in Williams. 

See 275 F.3d at 1365 (“Williams’s basic contention here is 

that remand proceedings are unnecessary and burdensome, but that does not render the interim decision of the 

Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims final for purposes of 

our review.”). Moreover, in this case, even if the Veterans 

Court were to conclude that Sanchez-Navarro’s claimed 

stressors are consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of his service, it would still need to remand to 

the Board for a medical examination and a determination 

“whether the government has established ‘clear and 

convincing evidence’” that his claimed stressor is inadequate to support his PTSD diagnosis. See SanchezNavarro, 774 F.3d at 1384–85. It cannot be the case that 

Sanchez-Navarro is entitled to an intermediate appeal for 

an alleged legal error, one that we can certainly review 

after a final decision, when a remand is still necessary to 

establish a claim for benefits. Thus, Sanchez-Navarro has 

not met the requirements for an exception to the general 

rule that remands to the Board are not final decisions. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered the remaining arguments, but 

conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing 

reasons, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

DISMISSED

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