Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02139/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02139-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Harry Greenspan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United States Coprt qf Appeala · Tenth Ctrcult 

JUN 0 6 1994 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 93-2139 

HARRY GREENSPAN, 

aka Alfred A. Lugo, 

aka Alfred Anthony Lugo, 

aka Alex Lugo, aka Alex Stone, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 92-508 JC) 

Peter Schoenburg, of Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom, Cron 

and Schoenburg of Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellant. 

Louis E. Valencia, Assistant United States Attorney (United States 

Attorney Larry Gomez with him on the brief), for the Appellee. 

Before EBEL and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER, District 

Judge.* 

VAN BEBBER, District Judge. 

The defendant-appellant, Harry Greenspan, appeals from the 

district court's denial of his motion to suppress physical evidence 

found in his car after a traffic stop on Interstate 25 in New 

* The Honorable G. T. van Bebber, United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 1 
Mexico. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case 

for further proceedings. 

I. FACTS 

On October 21, 1992, Harry Greenspan was stopped while driving 

north on Interstate 25 between Albuquerque and Santa Fe by two New 

Mexico State Police officers, Jimmy R. Salmon and James Montoya. 

The officers testified that they stopped Greenspan for driving 74 

miles per hour in a 65 mile-an-hour zone. 

Prior to stopping Greenspan on I-25, Officers Salmon and 

Montoya had travelled from Albuquerque to Santa Fe to obtain new 

body armor. They rode together in Officer Salmon's patrol unit. 

In Santa Fe, the officers were issued their new body armor and 

visited the state police mechanic's office to inquire about a new 

patrol unit for Officer Salmon. The officers left Albuquerque at 

approximately 2:30 p.m. While returning to Albuquerque, the 

officers decided to turn on the patrol car's radar equipment when 

they entered the Albuquerque patrol district at approximately mile 

marker 252 on I-25. They had not engaged the radar during their 

earlier drive north to Santa Fe or until this point in their return 

trip. 

Immediately after turning on the radar equipment, Officer 

Salmon, the driver and radar operator, locked on and visually 

observed defendant's northbound vehicle in the fast lane of traffic 

exceeding the posted speed limit and travelling at 74 miles per 

hour. The officers crossed the median and pulled over defendant's 

-2-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 2 
vehicle at approximately 3:30 p.m. Officer Salmon approached 

defendant's vehicle, and as he did so, the driver started to get 

out of his vehicle. Officer Salmon asked the driver to remain in 

the vehicle and then approached the driver. Officer Salmon 

testified that immediately upon the driver rolling down his window, 

he smelled a strong odor of marijuana. Officer Salmon explained to 

the driver that he had stopped him for travelling 74 in a 65 mileper-hour zone and asked for his driver's license. He observed that 

the driver was very nervous. The driver was Harry Greenspan, but 

gave his name as Alfred Lugo. 

Officer Salmon then explained to Greenspan what he was going 

to do, and returned to his patrol car to write a traffic citation. 

While writing the citation, Officer Salmon told Officer Montoya 

that he smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. 

Officer Montoya asked Officer Salmon for the name of the driver. 

Officer Salmon told Officer Montoya that the driver's name was 

Alfred Lugo. Montoya recognized the name as one that he had heard 

in the context of a previous case. 

Nearly a month before the stop of Greenspan, Officer Montoya 

had stopped a man named Michael Haigerty on a nearby stretch of 

highway, Interstate 40, for speeding. Officer Montoya discovered 

marijuana in Haigerty's car. Upon being questioned by the police, 

Haigerty named the supplier of his marijuana as a man he knew by 

the name of Alfred Lugo. Haigerty also told another New Mexico 

State Police narcotics agent, Glenn Kelsey, that Lugo drove a blue 

Mercury Marquis of late 1980's vintage. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 3 
Officers Salmon and Montoya then approached defendant's car. 

Montoya was on the passenger side of the vehicle and Salmon was on 

the driver's side. Both testified that they smelled marijuana. 

Officer Salmon explained to Greenspan his options concerning the 

speeding citation. Greenspan responded that he would mail in his 

fine. Officer Salmon then asked Greenspan if he was carrying 

anything illegal and Greenspan said "no." Officer Salmon then 

asked Greenspan for permission to search the car and its contents. 

Officers Salmon and Montoya testified that Greenspan consented. 

Officer Salmon asked Greenspan to step out of the vehicle. 

After walking to the rear of the car, Officer Salmon asked 

Greenspan for the keys to the trunk and was told they were in the 

ignition. Officer Salmon took the keys from the ignition and 

opened the trunk, where marijuana was discovered under a sheet, 

wrapped in clear plastic and placed in trash bags with baking soda 

between the bags. Upon being notified by Officer Salmon that there 

was marijuana in the trunk, Officer Montoya arrested Greenspan. A 

search of Greenspan revealed $3,600.00 in cash and two additional 

small baggies of marijuana. 

Greenspan was indicted and charged with possession with intent 

to distribute marijuana in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 841(a) (1) and 

(b) (1) (B), and filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence 

obtained during the October 21, 1992, search. A suppression 

hearing was held by the district court, at which time testimony was 

adduced concerning the New Mexico State Police policies on speeding 

violations. Officer Montoya testified that it was the state police 

-4-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 4 
policy to stop all speeders and that he consistently stops persons 

travelling nine miles over the limit. Officer Salmon testified 

that he would not issue traffic citations to persons driving in the 

"traffic flow" at speeds of 65 to 68 miles per hour. Officer 

Montoya stated that he would not stop a car going 74 miles per hour 

only if everybody in the flow of traffic was driving 75 or faster. 

Evidence was also presented concerning the specific number of 

traffic stops made by Officers Salmon and Montoya in the months 

before and after the stop of Appellant Greenspan. 

At the suppression hearing, the trial court denied defendant's 

request to rewrap the marijuana seized from his vehicle in order to 

conduct a "smell test" of the marijuana's odor. The purpose of the 

proposed experiment was to impeach the arresting officers' 

testimony concerning the strong odor of marijuana emanating from 

defendant's car at the time of the stop. 

The motion to suppress was denied by the trial court orally at 

the hearing, followed by a written order dated March 2, 1993. On 

March 8, 1993, Greenspan filed a motion for recusal of the trial 

judge based upon the judge's evidentiary rulings and in-court 

statements. It was denied. Also on March 8, 1993, Greenspan 

entered a plea of guilty to one count of possession of less than 

fifty kilograms of marijuana contrary to 21 u.s.c. §§ 84l(a) (1) and 

(b) (1) (C). The guilty plea reserved Greenspan's right to appeal 

the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. 

On April 21, 1993, the trial court sentenced Greenspan to a 

term of 51 months to be followed by supervised release for three 

-5-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 5 
years, and to pay a special assessment of $50. 00. At the 

sentencing hearing, Greenspan amended the affidavit accompanying 

his prior motion for recusal and renewed the motion based upon 

allegations that the district judge had received information 

concerning an investigation into alleged threats on the judge's 

life by Greenspan. It was denied. Greenspan filed a timely notice 

of appeal. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

In reviewing the district court's denial of a motion to 

suppress evidence, we must accept the court's factual findings 

unless they are clearly erroneous and must consider the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the government. United States v. 

Abreu, 935 F.2d 1130, 1132 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied 112 s.ct. 271 

(1991). The ultimate question of whether a search and seizure was 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law that we 

review de novo. Id. 

We review the district court's denial of the motion for 

recusal under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. 

Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 s. 

ct. 1854 (1993). The trial court's decision to exclude an in-court 

reconstruction of the circumstances of the case -- here, the socalled marijuana "smell test" -- will also be reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Wanoskia, 800 F.2d 235, 238 (lOth 

Cir. 1986). 

-6-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 6 
III. MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

Appellant Greenspan appeals the trial court's denial of his 

motion to suppress on the ground that the officers' stop of his 

vehicle was unconstitutionally pretextual. Greenspan contends that 

because of Officer Montoya's previous involvement with the arrest 

of Michael Haigerty, the officers lay in wait for Greenspan's 

vehicle, visually recognized his car from the description given by 

Haigerty, and hoped to intercept him with a load of marijuana. 

Greenspan argues that the claimed purpose of the stop of his 

vehicle for travelling nine miles per hour over the posted speed 

limit was merely a pretext for stopping him to search for drugs. 

As has often been stated by this court, "a pretextual stop 

occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop 

in order to search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, 

for an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the 

reasonable suspicion necessary to support a stop." United State v. 

Guzman, 864 F. 2d 1512, 1515 (lOth Cir. 1988) • In Guzman, this 

court adopted the following test for determining whether an 

investigatory stop is unconstitutional: "[A] court should ask 'not 

whether the officer could validly have made the stop, but whether 

under the same circumstances a reasonable officer would have made 

the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose."' 864 F.2d at 1517 

(citing United states v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 

1986)). Thus, the court's inquiry is objective, rather than a 

subjective examination of the officer's motives for making the 

stop. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 7 
If New Mexico police officers routinely stop persons traveling 

nine miles over the posted speed limit, then the stop of 

Greenspan's vehicle would not be unconstitutionally pretextual at 

its inception, even if Officers Salmon and Montoya subjectively 

hoped to find "Alfred Lugo" in the car carrying marijuana. See 

Guzman, 864 F. 2d at 1518. On the other hand, if a reasonable 

officer would not have stopped someone traveling at this speed 

absent some other reason, the stop might be deemed pretextual. 

During the hearing on the motion to suppress in this case, the 

district court heard testimony from Officers Salmon and Montoya 

regarding the New Mexico State Police policies regarding speeding 

violations as we have previously summarized. Beyond the testimony 

of Officers Salmon and Montoya concerning the policies of the New 

Mexico State Police concerning speeding violations, the record is 

silent on this issue. In United States v. Maestas, 2 F.Jd 1485, 

1491 (lOth Cir. 1993), we held that the defendant bears the burden 

of proving that a legally sufficient basis asserted as a 

justification for a search or seizure was pretextual. Thus, if 

there is a lack of evidence on the issue of the police's policies, 

defendant bears the risk. 

Here, Greenspan offered no evidence to show that a reasonable 

New Mexico State Police officer would not have stopped a person 

traveling nine miles over the posted speed limit absent some 

ulterior reason. Instead, he simply attempted to adduce evidence 

showing that the stop of the defendant was an out-of-the-ordinary 

occurrence for these particular officers. This type of evidence 

-8-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 8 
does not bear on the objective inquiry to be made in a pretextual 

stop case. We are left with only the testimony of Officers Montoya 

and Salmon concerning the New Mexico State Police policies 

regarding speeding violators. Based on this record, we conclude 

that a reasonable officer would have stopped someone traveling nine 

miles over the posted speed limit who was not within the flow of 

traffic. Greenspan has failed to meet his burden of proving that 

his stop was pretextual. We hold that the district court did not 

err in finding the stop of Greenspan constitutionally permissible. 

IV. RECUSAL 

Greenspan next argues that the trial judge erred in failing to 

recuse himself in light of circumstances that would cause a 

reasonable person to question his impartiality. See 28 u.s.c. §§ 

144 and 455 (a). In the present case, the circumstances that 

Appellant claims should have led to a recusal by the trial judge 

involve an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

into allegations that defendant had conspired to kill the trial 

judge or members of his family. The trial court was aware of the 

allegations at the sentencing hearing, and in fact expedited the 

hearing in order to "get [Greenspan] into the federal penitentiary 

system immediately, where he can be monitored more closely." 

Appellant's Appendix p. 358-59. In addition, the trial court 

refused to continue the sentencing hearing at the request of 

defendant's counsel, who had been appointed only two days before 

the expedited sentencing date. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 9 
It appears the alleged conspiracy to kill the trial judge and 

his family spanned several states and included a number of persons 

who had allegedly contributed large sums of money for the hiring of 

a "hit man." Greenspan contends that because the trial judge was 

aware of this alleged threat, a reasonable person.might question 

the judge's impartiality and the judge should have recused himself 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 455(a). He also argues that recusal is 

appropriate under 28 u.s.c. § 144, which provides for removal of a 

judge based on actual bias or prejudice. 

"Under section 455 (a), the judge is under a continuing duty to 

ask himself what a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant 

facts, would think about his impartiality." United States v. 

Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 728 (lOth Cir. 1982) (citing Roberts v. Bailar, 

625 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1980)). On the other hand, a judge has 

as much obligation not to recuse himself where there is no reason 

to do so as he does to recuse himself when the converse is true. 

City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 503 F. Supp. 

368, 370 (N.D. Ohio 1980). 

In United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993-94 (lOth Cir. 

1993), this court noted that threats or attempts to intimidate a 

judge will not ordinarily satisfy the requirements for 

disqualification under section 455 (a). Here, however, we are faced 

with a situation where a trial judge learned of an alleged 

conspiracy to assassinate him from the FBI, and the judge was told 

that the defendant he was about to sentence was involved in the 

conspiracy. Under section 455(a)'s objective standard, we must 

-10-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 10 
decide whether the judge's impartiality might reasonably have been 

questioned in this particular case. 

The court concludes that under these unique circumstances, the 

trial judge should have recused himself from sentencing Greenspan. 

The judge learned of the alleged threat from the FBI, and there is 

nothing in the record to suggest the threat was a ruse by the 

defendant in an effort to obtain a different judge. At oral 

argument, the government conceded that a reasonable person might 

have questioned the judge's impartiality in light of the judge's 

knowledge that an investigation was being conducted into alleged 

threats against him by the defendant. In a case like the present, 

where there is no inference that the threat was some kind of ploy, 

the judge should have recused himself pursuant to section 455(a) 

and allowed another judge to sentence Greenspan. Had there been 

any reason to believe that threats were made only in an attempt to 

obtain a different judge, to delay the proceedings, to harass, or 

for other vexatious or frivolous purpose, recusal would not have 

been warranted, even if the judge learned of the threats from a 

third person such as a federal agent. 

Combined with the judge's knowledge that an investigation was 

ongoing concerning alleged threats against him by defendant, the 

totality of the circumstances surrounding the sentencing hearing 

could have contributed to an appearance that the trial court was 

prejudiced against Greenspan. The trial court had accelerated the 

date of Greenspan's sentencing, for the stated reason that the 

court wanted to get Greenspan into the penitentiary system as 

-11-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 11 
quickly as possible, and the trial court refused to grant a 

continuance of the sentencing hearing even though defendant's 

counsel had been appointed only two days before the sentencing 

date. Although any one of these actions standing alone would not 

provide sufficient reason to believe a judge was biased against the 

defendant, when considered in light of the judge's knowledge of the 

alleged threats against him, these factors might provide further 

bases for questioning the court's impartiality. 

This is not to say that all death threats against a judge will 

mandate that judge's recusal under Section 455. To the contrary, 

if a death threat is communicated directly to the judge by a 

defendant, it may normally be presumed that one of the defendant's 

motivations is to obtain a recusal, particularly if he thereafter 

affirmatively seeks a recusal. As we have stated earlier, if a 

judge concludes that recusal is at least one of the defendant's 

objectives (whether or not the threat is taken seriously), then 

section 455 will not mandate recusal because that statute is not 

intended to be used as a forum shopping statute. Here, by 

contrast, the defendant did not communicate the death threat to the 

judge, nor is there any suggestion that the defendant ever intended 

the judge to learn of the threat before it was actually carried 

out. Thus, there is nothing here to suggest that the defendant was 

using the threat as a device to force a recusal. 

Similarly, if a defendant were to make multiple threats to 

successive judges or even to multiple judges on the same court, 

there might be some reason to suspect that the threats were 

-12-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 12 
intended as a recusal device. Once again, that scenario is not 

presented here as this threat was directed only at a single judge 

and there is no suggestion that the threat was intended to be 

communicated to the judge before it was carried out. 

We observed that this threat was not delivered in court or in 

connection with an official judicial proceeding involving this 

defendant. Thus, the threat is properly characterized as an 

"extrajudicial source." As such, the Supreme Court has recently 

advised that it has a higher potential for generating a situation 

where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned·than 

would be the case if the incident arose during the course of the 

proceedings themselves. Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 

(1994). 

Finally, we note what is surely obvious -- that our ruling 

today should not encourage threats against judges in order to 

obtain recusals. We have tried to state, as clearly as possible, 

that any such efforts will be futile. An uncommunicated threat 

will, by definition, not be an effective recusal device, and we 

hold. that a communicated threat may, under all of the 

circumstances, be disregarded by the judge for purposes of recusal 

if the judge concludes that recusal is one of the objectives of the 

defendant. Furthermore, threats against judges are serious crimes, 

and any such ploy would likely result in further ancillary 

prosecution against a defendant in a way that may significantly 

multiply his or her problems with the law. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 13 
The bottom line here is that this judge learned of an 

apparently genuine death threat made against him and against his 

family under circumstances that made it quite unlikely that the 

threat was intended as a device to obtain a recusal. The judge 

obviously took the threat very seriously, and chose to accelerate 

court procedures in order to reduce the risk to him and his family 

as he perceived it. Under such circumstances, it is obvious to us 

that a reasonable person could question the judge's impartiality. 

Even if this judge were one of those remarkable individuals who 

could ignore the personal implications of such a threat, the public 

reasonably could doubt his ability to do so. 

Recusal under section 455 is to be judged on the record. It 

is not a question of either the government or the defendant bearing 

a burden of proof. Rather, recusal is an action taken by the 

judge, and the judge must document the reasons for his or her 

decision so that the decision may be reviewed, if necessary, by an 

appellate court. Here, the record convinces us that the judge's 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned, and thus his recusal 

is mandated by 28 u.s.c. § 455(a). 

There are few characteristics of a judiciary more cherished 

and indispensable to justice than the characteristic of 

impartiality. Congress has mandated that justice must not only be 

impartial, but also that it must reasonably be perceived to be 

impartial. 28 u.s.c. § 455(a). As the supreme Court noted in 

Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859-60 (1988), the 

purpose of section 455(a) is "to promote public confidence in the 

-14-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 14 
integrity of the judicial process." our decision today is nothing 

more than an application of these hallowed principles to a very 

clear record. 

Our inquiry does not end with the conclusion that the trial 

judge should have recused himself under the section 455(a) 

standard. We must also assess what remedy is appropriate. In 

doing so, we must specifically consider whether the judge's 

violation of section 455(a) is harmless error that does not warrant 

setting aside Greenspan's sentence. See Liljeberg, 486 u.s. at 

862. The government urges that even if we determine that the trial 

judge violated section 455(a)'s standard, because Greenspan was 

sentenced pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and within 

the applicable guideline range, any violation of section 455(a) is 

harmless error. We disagree. The Sentencing Guidelines do provide 

a range from within which the court may sentence Greenspan, and the 

trial court chose to sentence him at the high end of the range. We 

cannot conclude the error was harmless. 

Finally, we note that although the alleged threat by the 

defendant against the trial judge might still be regarded as an 

"extrajudicial source" for purposes of recusal under section 455 (a) 

in a subsequent sentencing proceeding administered by a different 

judge, the additional factor of a second judge against whom the 

threat was not personally directed provides sufficient insulation 

so as to avoid any necessary conclusion that the second judge's 

impartiality could be reasonably questioned. We therefore remand 

the case for resentencing by a different judge. 

-15-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 15 
V. THE 11 SMELL TEST" 

Appellant's final contention on appeal is that the trial court 

erred when it refused to allow him to perform an in-court 

experiment on the marijuana that was seized from his vehicle. 

Specifically, at the suppression hearing, Greenspan asked to 

repackage the marijuana that had been seized from his vehicle and 

perform a "smell test" to see if the marijuana emitted a strong 

odor as the arresting officers testified that it did. Appellant 

claims that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny 

his request. 

The government contends that the trial court did not err in 

denying Greenspan's request because the conditions of the proposed 

experiment would have been significantly different from those 

existing at the time the arresting officers smelled the odor of 

marijuana emanating from Greenspan's car. The record indicates 

that at the time Greenspan was stopped, the marijuana was wrapped 

in three layers of plastic and had been in Greenspan's car for 

approximately twenty-four hours. The arresting officers testified 

that.there were some small tears in the marijuana's packaging when 

it was retrieved from the vehicle, and Greenspan could not remember 

whether or not such tears were present prior to the search. 

Additionally, Greenspan testified that the marijuana might have had 

a slight smell, although he denied that it emitted any strong odor. 

We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court's refusal to allow the "smell test" experiment. Whether or 

not to allow the admission of experimental evidence is within the 

-16-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 16 
. 

sound discretion of the trial court. Champeau v. Fruehauf Corp., 

814 F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir. 1987). The record does not disclose 

the details of the conditions proposed to surround defendant's 

experiment, including how the marijuana would be packaged, and 

whether it would sit in a closed car trunk for a full twenty-four 

hours before the test. It appears that the conditions surrounding 

the officers' stop of Greenspan would have been virtually 

impossible to reconstruct in court. See United States v. 

Michelena-orovio, 702 F.2d 496, 499-500 (9th Cir. 1983) (refusal to 

allow smell test of marijuana bales by jury was not abuse of 

discretion), reh'g, 719 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 

u.s. 1104 (1984); United states v. Vallejo, 541 F.2d 1164, 1165 

(5th Cir. 1976) (refusal to allow smell test of marijuana was not 

abuse of discretion). 

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED in 

part and REVERSED in part. The case is REMANDED for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

-17-

Appellate Case: 93-2139 Document: 01019289229 Date Filed: 06/06/1994 Page: 17