Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01962/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01962-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alan E. Dewoskin, P.C.
Appellee
Reynal Caldwell
Appellant
Alan E. Dewoskin
Appellee
Theresa Caldwell Lavender
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1962

___________________________

Reynal Caldwell

lllllllllllllllllllllAppellant

v.

Alan E. DeWoskin; Alan E. DeWoskin, P.C.; Theresa Caldwell Lavender

lllllllllllllllllllllAppellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: January 12, 2016

 Filed: August 5, 2016

____________

Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Reynal Caldwell (Caldwell) appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of

his ex-wife, Theresa Caldwell Lavender (Lavender), and her attorney Alan E.

DeWoskin and his law firm (DeWoskin). Caldwell also appeals the denial of his

motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude the court erred in granting

Appellate Case: 15-1962 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/05/2016 Entry ID: 4434437 
DeWoskin and Lavender summary judgment based on the Rooker–Feldman doctrine,1

we reverse and remand.2

I. Background

The facts are undisputed. DeWoskin represented Lavender in the dissolution of

her marriage to Caldwell. In the Judgment of Dissolution, filed December 3, 2009,

Caldwell was ordered to pay $2,500 per month in maintenance to Lavender, to pay

$3,000 toward a U.S. Bank credit card debt, to pay $5,544.75 in attorney’s fees to

DeWoskin, and to either pay or refinance loans on property he owned. Caldwell

appealed the decree of dissolution. 

When Caldwell failed to make payments, DeWoskin, on behalf of Lavender,

filed a motion in Missouri state court requesting the court set a hearing to determine

whether Caldwell should be held in contempt. On July 16, 2010, following a hearing,

a Judgment Order of Contempt was entered against Caldwell. He was ordered to pay

Lavender $20,000, plus 9% interest, for the monthly maintenance that had accrued

since the divorce, attorney’s fees, and other debts ordered under the Judgment of

Dissolution by August 10, 2010. On August 6, 2010, Caldwell sent two letters, one to

Lavender and one to DeWoskin, stating he would pay Lavender only $1.00 per year

until the day he died. On August 11, 2010, after Caldwell again failed to make any

payments, DeWoskin filed a motion requesting a hearing be set to determine whether

a warrant and commitment order should be issued for Caldwell based on his failure to

follow the court’s July 16 order. A hearing was set for August 24, 2010. 

1

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine derives its name from two United States

Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District

of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 

2

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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On August 17, 2010, Caldwell filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case in the

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. At the August 24, 2010,

contempt hearing in state court, both Caldwell and Lavender were represented by

counsel. DeWoskin, on behalf of Lavender, acknowledged receipt of Caldwell’s notice

of bankruptcy and requested the court rule on whether the automatic stay applied to the

state contempt proceeding. Caldwell’s attorney argued the automatic stay stopped the

state court from proceeding. The court continued the hearing to August 27, 2010, to

research the issue. After again hearing argument from Caldwell’s counsel at the

August 27 hearing, the court decided the automatic stay did not prevent it from holding

Caldwell in contempt, and so held. Caldwell was committed to the St. Louis City Jail

until he purged himself of contempt by paying the amounts set forth in the court’s

previous orders. A friend of Caldwell posted bond in the amount of $22,500—the

amount of maintenance that had accrued since December 2009—and he was released

from jail on August 28, 2010. 

On September 14, 2010, at the request of DeWoskin and Lavender, the state

court held another hearing to address Caldwell’s continued failure to pay maintenance

to Lavender as ordered in the court’s previous contempt order. The court ordered

Caldwell to pay the maintenance payment due on September 15, 2010, or face another

emergency contempt hearing within one week. Instead, on September 16, 2010,

Caldwell appealed the July 16 Judgment of Contempt to the Missouri Court of

Appeals. 

DeWoskin made additional attempts on Lavender’s behalf to collect the

maintenance due, including motions for orders to withhold Caldwell’s wages. On

November 9, 2010, friends of Caldwell posted a $25,000 appeal bond to stay collection

of the judgment for maintenance pending the outcome of the appeal of the original

decree of dissolution. On March 22, 2011, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the

decree of dissolution. On April 28, 2011, DeWoskin applied to the court for a payout

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Appellate Case: 15-1962 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/05/2016 Entry ID: 4434437 
order on the $25,000 appeal bond that had been posted on Caldwell’s behalf, which the

court issued. 

On May 17, 2011, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the Judgment of

Contempt and Commitment entered against Caldwell, finding that the district court

abused its discretion by not determining whether Caldwell had the financial ability to

make the payment necessary to purge himself of contempt before ordering him jailed

and did not make sufficient findings to support the judgment. Because the Court of

Appeals found those two points on appeal “dispositive,” it did not address Caldwell’s

final point.3

 See Caldwell v. Caldwell, 341 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). 

Caldwell’s bankruptcy case was dismissed on July 20, 2011, and the case was

closed on August 4, 2011. On January 11, 2013, Caldwell filed a complaint against

DeWoskin and Lavender in federal district court alleging they violated the automatic

stay and seeking damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(k). Caldwell alleged DeWoskin

and Lavender violated the automatic stay by requesting the state court hold Caldwell

in contempt, requesting wage withholding orders, and seeking a payout order on the

$25,000 appeal bond. The district court referred Caldwell’s claim to the bankruptcy

court on January 13, 2014. 

DeWoskin and Lavender moved to dismiss the complaint but their motion was

denied. DeWoskin and Lavender filed their answer and affirmative defenses, including

the defense of res judicata and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the

Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Caldwell moved for summary judgment on the issue of

liability. DeWoskin and Lavender resisted, again referencing the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine in their response to Caldwell’s motion. The bankruptcy court denied

3

Although the Missouri Court of Appeals did not identify what Caldwell’s

“final point” on appeal was, the parties do not dispute that it involved an appeal of the

state district court’s determination that the automatic stay did not apply to the

contempt proceedings. 

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Caldwell’s motion for summary judgment, and sua sponte granted defendants summary

judgment, concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine. The district court affirmed.

II. Discussion

Although this is an appeal from the district court, our review is of the bankruptcy

court’s decision. In re Bowles Sub Parcel A, LLC, 792 F.3d 897, 901 (8th Cir. 2015). 

Like the district court, “we review the bankruptcy court’s finding of fact for clear error

and its conclusions of law de novo.” Id. (quoting Tri-State Financial, LLC v. First

Dakota Nat’l Bank, 538 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2008)). We review the bankruptcy

court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564

F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2009). 

Caldwell first challenges the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that it lacked

jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine,

a lower federal court cannot exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over an action that

“seek[s] review of, or relief from, state court judgments.” Hageman v. Barton, 817

F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2016). The bankruptcy court concluded the doctrine applied

because, in order for Caldwell’s complaint to succeed in federal court, the court would

have to overrule the state court’s determination that the automatic stay did not apply

to the state court contempt proceedings. We conclude the bankruptcy court construed

the Rooker–Feldman doctrine too broadly. 

In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), the

Supreme Court specifically confined the Rooker–Feldman doctrine to “cases brought

by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and

rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 284. Whether the doctrine applies depends on

whether a federal plaintiff seeks relief from a state court judgment based on an

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allegedly erroneous decision by a state court—in which case the doctrine would

apply—or seeks relief from the allegedly illegal act or omission of an adverse party. 

Hageman v. Barton, 817 F.3d 611, 615 (8th Cir. 2016); see also MSK EyEs Ltd. v.

Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 546 F.3d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 2008) (rejecting

application of the doctrine in a case where appellants did not challenge the state court’s

“issuance of the judgment or seek to have that judgment overturned”).

Here, Caldwell is not “complaining of an injury caused by the state-court

judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S.

at 291. As Caldwell points out, the state court’s Judgment of Contempt was vacated

on appeal. Instead, Caldwell seeks compensation for injuries he alleges were caused

by the actions DeWoskin and Lavender took to enforce the state court’s July 2010

Judgment of Contempt after the automatic stay was in place.4

 Caldwell’s claims are

not barred by Rooker–Feldman because they challenge the actions taken by DeWoskin

and Lavender “in seeking and executing the [state contempt orders],” rather than the

state court orders themselves. See Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 965 (8th Cir.

2008). 

Accordingly, we conclude the bankruptcy court erred in holding that it was

barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine from considering Caldwell’s claims, and

reverse its grant of summary judgment. We note that “Rooker–Feldman does not

otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine,” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284,

4

Although in the bankruptcy court Caldwell also challenged the post-petition

actions taken by DeWoskin and Lavender to have his wages withheld and to have the

$25,000 appeal bond paid out to Lavender, on appeal he concedes “[t]he collection of

bond funds and the wage withholding from property of the estate may not have been

a violation of the automatic stay.” We need not address any claim based on these

actions because Caldwell makes no meaningful argument regarding these actions in

his opening brief and so these claims are waived. See Chay-Velasquez v. Ashcroft,

367 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Since there was no meaningful argument on this

claim in his opening brief, it is waived.”). 

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and we remand to the bankruptcy court to determine whether Caldwell’s claims are

precluded based on the state court’s determination that the automatic stay did not bar

its contempt proceedings.5

______________________________

5

Because the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment was based on its

conclusion it lacked jurisdiction to consider Caldwell’s claims, rather than a judgment

on the merits, we decline to address Caldwell’s appeal of the denial of his motion for

summary judgment. See Acton v. City of Columbia, Mo., 436 F.3d 969, 973 (8th Cir

2006) (“In general, denials of summary judgment are interlocutory and thus not

immediately appealable.” (quoting Helm Fin. Corp. v. MNVA R.R., Inc., 212 F.3d

1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 2000)). Caldwell also challenges the bankruptcy court’s decision

to sua sponte grant DeWoskin and Lavender summary judgment. It is not necessary

for us to address this issue on appeal since we are otherwise reversing the grant of

summary judgment. See Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynalds Metals Co., 327 F.2d

725, 729 (8th Cir. 1964) (“It is a uniform course of appellate review procedure to

decline to review questions not necessary to a decision of an appellate court.”). 

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