Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03123/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03123-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cortez Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH • 4 FILED 

UoaUd States Court of Aj)pcals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 0 7 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerlt 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff- Appellee, 

v. 

CORTEZ SMITH, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 94-3123 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D. C. No. 93-CR-20089) 

ON THE BRIEFS: 

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, and Vicki Mandell-King, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, District of Colorado 

and Wyoming, Denver, Colorado, for the appellant. 

Randall K. Rathbun, United States Attorney, and James E. Flory, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Kansas City, Kansas, for the 

appellee. 

Before Tacha, Coffin,* and Lucero. 

• Honorable Frank M. Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for 

the First Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-3123 Document: 01019276535 Date Filed: 02/07/1996 Page: 1 
Tacha, Circuit Judge. 

A jury convicted Cortez Smith of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. At 

sentencing, the district court imposed a two-level sentence enhancement for obstruction 

of justice based on testimony it considered to be perjured. The court then sentenced 

Smith to 100 months imprisonment, four years of supervised release, and a $5000 fine. 

Smith appeals that sentence, claiming that the district court erred in ( 1) failing to make an 

adequate finding of perjury, (2) imposing the enhancement without sufficient evidence of 

perjury, and (3) basing Smith's sentence on improper considerations. We exercise 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conclude that the district court's perjury 

finding was inadequate and therefore we remand for further findings. 

Background 

Cortez Smith and his friend, Antoin Tyler, flew from Kansas City to Los Angeles. 

Smith returned to Kansas City by bus. On the day Smith returned, police officers were 

monitoring the Kansas City bus terminal as part of a drug interdiction program. The 

officers had been watching two men in a gold car moving to different locations in the 

parking lot. The officers then observed Smith get off the bus carrying a small plastic 

cooler and get into the gold car. The car exited the parking lot at a high rate of speed, and 

one of the officers followed. After observing the gold car speeding and driving 

-2-

Appellate Case: 94-3123 Document: 01019276535 Date Filed: 02/07/1996 Page: 2 
erratically, the officer summoned a marked patrol car to conduct a traffic stop. 

When the officer in the marked patrol car turned on his red lights and siren, the 

driver of the gold car refused to stop and, instead, increased his speed. The gold car 

eventually stopped and its three occupants jumped out and fled on foot. The officers 

apprehended Smith and the driver, Tyler; the third man in the car escaped. 

The officers returned to the gold car and saw an open container of wine in the 

small cooler that Smith had with him when he got off the bus. One of the officers seized 

the wine and cooler and, as he was dumping water out of the cooler, noticed that the 

cooler's liner was exposed. Upon closer inspection, the officer found that portions of the 

foam liner had been removed and that cellophane packages of white powder had been 

secreted between the liner and the shell of the cooler. Laboratory analysis subsequently 

revealed that the powder contained cocaine. 

Smith testified in his own defense at trial. He recounted his career as a musician 

and how he first met Tyler when Tyler came to one of Smith's performances. Smith also 

testified that Tyler wanted to help launch Smith's music career by putting him in contact 

with some of Tyler's acquaintances in the music industry in Los Angeles. To that end, 

Smith testified, they flew to Los Angeles. Smith said that he returned to Kansas City by 

bus because he wanted to see the country and because the flight to Los Angeles, his first 

experience flying, was unpleasant. Smith also said that Tyler gave him the cooler for the 

bus trip. 

- 3-

Appellate Case: 94-3123 Document: 01019276535 Date Filed: 02/07/1996 Page: 3 
Smith further testified that the packages of white powder were not in the cooler 

when he got off the bus, claiming instead that Tyler had put them into the cooler after 

Smith got into the car. Smith testified that while the car was stopped at a stoplight, Tyler 

grabbed some packages from under the front seat and concealed them between the liner 

and the shell of the cooler. Smith's testimony as to what transpired within the car was not 

contradicted by any other witness. The police officers testified that they could not see 

what happened in the car. The two other men in the gold car did not testify: Tyler was 

killed in an unrelated incident before trial and the third man in the car was never 

apprehended. 

The jury, however, did not believe Smith's version of the events and convicted 

him of possession with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(l). The 

applicable base offense level under the federal sentencing guidelines was 26 which, given 

Smith's criminal history, translated into a guideline range of70 to 87 months. At 

sentencing, however, the district court increased Smith's base offense level two levels for 

obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G.§ 3C1.1, premised upon what the court 

considered perjured testimony. With the two-level enhancement, the guideline range 

increased to 87 to 108 months. The district court sentenced Smith to 100 months 

imprisonment, and Smith appeals. 

The District Court's Finding 

- 4-

Appellate Case: 94-3123 Document: 01019276535 Date Filed: 02/07/1996 Page: 4 
Smith first contends that the district court made an inadequate finding of perjury. 

A finding of perjury in support of a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice must 

contain two components. First, the finding must encompass all of the factual predicates 

of perjury. United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111, 1117 (1993). Second, the finding 

must specifically identify the perjured testimony. United States v. Arias-Santos, 39 F.3d 

1070, 1077 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1156 (1995). Smith argues that the 

finding in this case is deficient in both respects. 

The factual predicates of perjury are that a witness ( 1) gives false testimony under 

oath (2) concerning a material matter (3) with willful intent to provide false testimony, 

rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. Id. at 1116; United States 

v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1573 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2628 (1995). While "it 

is preferable for a district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a 

separate and clear finding," it is sufficient if"the court makes a finding of an obstruction 

or impediment of justice that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of 

perjury." Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1117. 

The finding found sufficient (though not preferred) in Dunnigan read as follows: 

The court finds that the defendant was untruthful at trial with 

respect to material matters in this case. [B ]y virtue of her failure 

to give truthful testimony on material matters that were designed 

to substantially affect the outcome of the case, the court 

concludes that the false testimony at trial warrants an upward 

adjustment by two levels. 

- 5 -

Appellate Case: 94-3123 Document: 01019276535 Date Filed: 02/07/1996 Page: 5 
Id. (emphasis and brackets in original). This finding contains each of the factual 

predicates of perjury: the defendant was ( 1) "untruthful" at trial (2) with respect to 

"material matters" and (3) the untruthfulness was "designed" to substantially affect the 

outcome of the case. The district court's finding at Smith's sentencing read as follows: 

[T]he Court finds ... that ... no enhancement should be imposed 

on the defendant because he stood trial. He has a constitutional 

right to trial. But he does not have a constitutional right to 

commit perjury .... I heard all of the testimony at the trial and I 

do not believe that the defendant's testimony was true. I believe 

it was false and I conclude and I find that he committed perjury at 

trial. And, therefore, the two-level enhancement for obstruction 

of justice is appropriate. And that's going to be the findings of 

the court. 

This finding does not set out the requisite predicates of perjury. Specifically, the district 

court did not find that Smith was untruthful about a material matter nor that he willfully 

intended to provide false testimony. In Massey, we held that a district court's finding that 

the defendant's testimony was merely "false" was insufficient because "[m]issing from 

the district court's findings are the necessary findings on materiality and willfulness." 48 

F.3d at 1573. The district court's finding in this case is similarly deficient. 

The second required element of a district court's finding of perjury is that it must 

identify the perjured statement. Massey, 48 F.3d at 1573; Arias-Santos, 39 F.3d at 1077. 

The court need not recite the perjured testimony verbatim, but it at least must describe the 

testimony in substance "so that when we review the transcript we can evaluate the 

Dunnigan findings of the elements of perjury against an identified line of questions and 

- 6-

Appellate Case: 94-3123 Document: 01019276535 Date Filed: 02/07/1996 Page: 6 
answers without having simply to speculate on what the district court might have believed 

was the perjurious testimony." Massey, 48 F.3d at 1574. 

The district court's finding in this case does not identify which portion of Smith's 

testimony it considered to be perjured. The government argues that meaningful appellate 

review is still possible because the scope of disputed testimony is narrow. They argue 

that because the only disputed testimony concerns whether there was cocaine in the 

cooler when Smith departed the bus, the district court was clearly referring to that 

testimony when it made its finding. The government's argument, however, begs the 

question: we need to know what testimony the district court considered perjured in order 

to evaluate whether it concerned a material matter. Further, because there was no finding 

of materiality, we cannot assume that the district court only considered testimony on 

material matters when it made its finding. Thus, the district court's finding was deficient 

both because it did not contain all of the factual predicates of perjury and because it did 

not specifically identify what testimony it considered perjured. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Smith's second contention on appeal is that the evidence of perjury was 

insufficient to support a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. He assumes for 

the sake of argument that the district court found that the perjured testimony was his 

testimony concerning the events in the car. If that assumption is correct, Smith argues, 

- 7-

Appellate Case: 94-3123 Document: 01019276535 Date Filed: 02/07/1996 Page: 7 
the district court's finding was based upon insufficient evidence because Smith was the 

only witness to provide testimony as to what transpired in the car. Smith maintains that 

the Tenth Circuit has never upheld a finding of perjury for the purposes of sentence 

enhancement supported only by circumstantial evidence. In order to evaluate whether 

there was sufficient evidence of perjury, however, we first need to know what testimony 

the district court found to be perjured. Thus we do not reach this claim. 

Basis for Sentence 

Smith's final contention is that the district court determined his sentence on an 

improper basis. At sentencing, Smith exercised his right of allocution. After Smith's 

comments, the court stated that while it had "seriously considered" sentencing Smith at 

the bottom of the guideline range of 87 to 108 months, it had changed its mind after 

hearing Smith's comments. Instead, the court sentenced Smith to 100 months. 

Smith first maintains that the district court's decision was improper because the 

court failed to state a reason for the sentence. The district court, however, stated, "In 

determining the sentence to be imposed, I've taken into consideration the serious nature 

of the instant offense and the sentencing objectives of punishment, deterrence and 

incapacitation." While the court did not specifically state its reason for imposing a 

sentence at a particular point within the sentencing range, it was not required to do so 

because the span of the range did not exceed 24 months. 18 U.S.C.§ 3553(c). Thus the 

- 8-

Appellate Case: 94-3123 Document: 01019276535 Date Filed: 02/07/1996 Page: 8 
stated reasons were adequate. 

Smith also argues that because the district court failed to state a reason for the 

sentence, the court may have imposed its sentence for improper reasons. We will not 

review the reasons underlying a district court's decision to impose a sentence at a 

particular point within the proper guideline range other than for facial illegality, improper 

calculations, or clearly erroneous fact findings. United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 1478, 

1481 (lOth Cir. 1990). Smith maintains that the court may have improperly (1) punished 

him for exercising his right of allocution at sentencing, (2) punished him for making a 

record of his dissatisfaction with his attorney, and (3) impermissibly double counted by 

imposing a higher sentence because it thought Smith was a liar. These allegations are 

nothing more than speculation, and in any case do not rise to the level of facial illegality, 

improper calculation, or clearly erroneous fact findings. We, therefore, decline to review 

these claims. 

Conclusion 

In sum, we REMAND to the district court for further findings in accordance with 

this opinion. Upon remand, if the court again determines that enhancement is appropriate 

under § 3C 1.1, it must indicate what specific testimony it finds to be untrue and how that 

testimony concerns a material matter designed to substantially affect the outcome of the 

case. We do not reach the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence of perjury to 

- 9-

Appellate Case: 94-3123 Document: 01019276535 Date Filed: 02/07/1996 Page: 9 
support the enhancement. We AFFIRM on all other issues. 

- 10-

Appellate Case: 94-3123 Document: 01019276535 Date Filed: 02/07/1996 Page: 10