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Parties Involved:
Graigory David Olson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

" 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

OCT 1 5 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. ) No. 90-2248 

) (D.C. No. CR 90-00039-01 JB) 

GRAIGORY DAVID OLSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) (D. N.M.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

Neither of the parties to this appeal have requested oral 

argument and, after examining the briefs and appellate record, 

this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. 

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

This appeal arises out of Defendant's conviction for 

violations of 18 u.s.c. § 1001 and 18 u.s.c. § 287. Defendant was 

tried by the district court without a jury for making false 

statements and for making false, fictitious or fraudulent claims 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-2248 Document: 010110090820 Date Filed: 10/15/1991 Page: 1 
in connection with filing his income tax return for the year 1989. 

On appeal, Defendant raises several issues: (1) whether Defendant 

knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial; (2) 

whether Defendant was improperly precluded from 

prior problems with the IRS; (3) whether 

judgment was supported by substantial evidence; 

testifying about 

the district court 

(4) whether the 

district court acted outside its discretion in imposing as a 

condition of supervised release that Defendant is prohibited from 

involvement in any tax protest activity or movement; and (5) 

whether jurisdictional and standing issues raised by Defendant 

against the advice of counsel constitute grounds for reversal. We 

remand the case to the district court on the issue of the 

supervised release condition, and we affirm the district court's 

judgment on all other issues. 

1. Waiver of Right to Jury Trial. 

Defendant argues that he did not knowingly and intelligently 

waive his right to be tried by a jury. We review the district 

court's acceptance of Defendant's jury waiver as knowing and 

intelligent for an abuse of discretion. Mason v. United States, 

250 F.2d 704, 705-706 (10th Cir. 1957). 

Defendant filed a document with the district court on May 25, 

1990, entitled "NOTICE and OBJECTION." R. Vol. I Doc. 9. That 

document states Defendant's intent to waive his right to a jury 

trial and to have the matter tried by the court: "Graigory David 

Olson OBJECTS to having a trial by Jury, and Graigory David Olson 

did not authorize anyone to move in his behalf for trial by jury. 

If there is a trial it will be by Judge ONLY! Trial by Court!" 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-2248 Document: 010110090820 Date Filed: 10/15/1991 Page: 2 
Id. After receiving that document, the district court held a 

hearing on June 21, 1990, during which it informed Defendant of 

his right to a jury trial and of the implications of waiving that 

right. R. Vol. III at 3-4. The district court specifically asked 

Defendant if he understood, and Defendant responded that he did 

understand. Id. Defendant appeared prose at that hearing, but 

the district court informed Defendant that stand-by counsel was 

present and available to assist Defendant, should he need 

information or assistance. Id. at 2. Defendant did not solicit 

any advice, information or assistance from stand-by counsel during 

that proceeding. 

Federal R. Crim. P. 23(a) provides that Defendant may waive a 

jury trial in writing with approval of the court and consent of 

the government. Such a waiver must be express and intelligent. 

United States v. Patton, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930). This court has 

held that a Defendant who specifically moves the court for trial 

by the court has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 

trial by jury. United States v. Hubbard, 603 F.2d 137, 142 (10th 

Cir. 1979). 1 In light of Defendant's unequivocal and specific 

written request to be tried by the court and not by a jury, and 

considering the district court's colloquy with Defendant regarding 

the consequences of such a waiver, we hold that the district court 

1 The district court in this case chose to hold an 

on-the-record colloquy informing Defendant of the differences 

between a jury trial and a bench trial and of the consequences of 

waiving a jury trial. Consequently, we do not reach the question 

of whether a district court is required, after receiving a written 

jury waiver from a defendant, to conduct a colloquy on the record 

to inform a defendant of the consequences of waiver and to 

determine a defendant's knowledge and intelligence as to those 

consequences in person. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-2248 Document: 010110090820 Date Filed: 10/15/1991 Page: 3 
did not abuse its discretion in accepting Defendant's jury waiver 

as knowing and intelligent. 2 

2. Testimony About Prior IRS Matters. 

Defendant argues that the district court erred by disallowing 

testimony by Defendant regarding prior dealings with the IRS. We 

review the district court's ruling on admission of evidence for an 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 

1301 (10th Cir. 1988). 

After reviewing the transcript, it is apparent that the 

district court was attempting to prohibit only testimony relating 

to the validity or invalidity of a prior garnishment proceeding, 

which was not an abuse of discretion. Defendant was, in fact, 

allowed to develop his defense that he did not intend to deceive 

but that he was only attempting to nullify claims against him by 

the IRS. R. Vol. III at 71-72, 77-78, 84, 89, 90. Specifically, 

Defendant was allowed to testify that he did not intend to get 

money from the Government which did not belong to him and that he 

did not intend to commit fraud. Id. at 78, 89. Further, 

Defendant testified on several occasions regarding his prior 

dealings and problems with the IRS. Id. at 68, 69, 81-82, 84. 

2 Defendant argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in accepting the waiver as knowing and intelligent 

because Defendant attempted to ask questions during the colloquy 

which the court refused to entertain. R. Vol. III at 3. 

Defendant claims that, because his questions were not answered, 

his waiver was not voluntary. We are not persuaded by that 

argument for two reasons. First, when the district court finished 

its summary of the consequences of waiver, Defendant responded 

that he understood. Id. at 4. Second, stand-by counsel was 

present and available to Defendant had he wanted to ask questions 

or indicate his ignorance of the matters being discussed. 

Defendant never availed himself of stand-by counsel's knowledge or 

advice during the proceeding. Id. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-2248 Document: 010110090820 Date Filed: 10/15/1991 Page: 4 
• The district court did not abuse its discretion when it disallowed 

testimony regarding the details and validity of a garnishment 

proceeding against Defendant. 

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence. 

Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient to support a guilty verdict by the court. "In 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we 'view the proof 

presented in the light most favorable to the government to 

ascertain if there is sufficient substantial proof, direct and 

circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom, from which a jury might find a defendant guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt.'" United States v. Zimmerman, No. 90-1255, 

1991 WL 163873 at *4 (10th Cir. Aug. 28, 1991) (quoting United 

States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1431 (10th Cir. 1990). The 

same standard of review applies to both jury trials and bench 

trials. Hubbard, 603 F.2d at 142. 

Defendant unequivocally testified several times during the 

trial that he submitted several copies of IRS form 1099 which 

indicated that he had paid certain IRS employees substantial 

amounts of money but that, in fact, he had not paid any money to 

IRS employees. R. Vol. III at 87-88, 89. Defendant attempted to 

convince the court that he believed that completing the copies of 

form 1099 with false information was the proper procedure to 

reclaim money which he contended was owed to him by the IRS. The 

district court was not persuaded by this argument, and we hold 

that there was sufficient evidence before the district court from 

which it could find Defendant guilty of the offenses charged. 

5 

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4. Condition of Supervised Release. 

In sentencing Defendant pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act 

of 1984, the district court imposed a period of supervised release 

containing a condition that "Defendant shall not become involved 

in any tax protest type activity or movement." R. Vol. I Doc. 17. 

Defendant maintains that such a condition restricts his 

constitutional rights and, consequently, is invalid. He requests 

that this court remand to the district court for clarification to 

ensure protection of his constitutional rights. 

The current statute providing for conditions of supervised 

release is 18 u.s.c. § 3583. Subsection (d) of that statute 

authorizes the court to impose discretionary conditions, provided 

that such conditions involve "no greater deprivation of liberty 

than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in§ 

3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D)." 3 

In addressing what discretionary supervised release 

conditions may be imposed by the trial court,§ 3583(d) refers to 

§ 3563, which addresses conditions of probation. In addition to 

authorizing the discretionary conditions referred to in the 

probation section, § 3583 provides that the court may impose "any 

other condition it considers to be appropriate." 18 u.s.c. § 

3583(d). Consequently, the court is afforded broad discretion in 

imposing conditions on both probation and supervised release. 

Caselaw also tells us that the sentencing court is afforded 

broad discretion when imposing probation conditions. The trial 

3 Those subsections outline the sentencing 

conduct deterrence, public protection, and 

and/or medical care, respectively. 

6 

goals of criminal 

defendant education 

Appellate Case: 90-2248 Document: 010110090820 Date Filed: 10/15/1991 Page: 6 
• 

court's judgment concerning what conditions are appropriate under 

the circumstances of the particular case should not be disturbed 

unless the court abused its discretion. United States v. 

Jalilian, 896 F.2d 447, 448 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. 

Hussong, 778 F.2d 567, 569-570 (10th Cir. 1985). Even though the 

trial court is afforded broad discretion in determining what 

conditions are appropriate for a period of probation or supervised 

release, 18 u.s.c. § 3583(d)(2) provides that conditions of 

supervised release should involve no 

liberty than is necessary to promote 

greater deprivation of 

the purposes of public 

protection, criminal conduct deterrence, and defendant education. 

Consistent with that limitation, caselaw indicates that probation 

conditions should be reasonably related to protecting the public 

and rehabilitating the defendant. United States v. Jordan, 890 

F.2d 247, 255 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 

923, 929 (10th Cir. 1982); Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 

(10th Cir. 1971). Further, even though a defendant on probation 

"forfeits much of his freedom of action and even freedom of 

expression to the extent necessary to successful rehabilitation 

and protection of the public programs," Id. at 334, when a 

probation condition restricts a constitutional right, the 

condition should be reviewed with "special scrutiny." Lawson, 670 

F.2d at 930. 

Both Lawson and Porth involved review of probation conditions 

imposed upon a convicted "tax protester," and both are helpful in 

evaluating whether the condition imposed in this case is 

unnecessarily broad and, therefore, infringes unnecessarily upon 

7 

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• 

Defendant's constitutional rights. Porth involved a situation 

where the district court imposed the following condition: 

That he abstain from circulating or distributing by mail 

or other means any tracts, materials or other 

information questioning the constitutionality of the 

Federal Reserve System and the Federal Income Tax laws, 

and that he likewise abstain from speaking or writing 

activities calling into question the constitutionality 

of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Income Tax 

laws. 

Porth, 453 F.2d at 332 n.1. On appeal, the court found that the 

sentencing judge was attempting to prevent the defendant from 

carrying out a campaign questioning the validity of the tax laws 

which would have the ultimate effect of encouraging others to 

violate the tax laws. The court recognized the validity of 

conditions which prohibit the following: violation of any public 

law, activity which induces others to violate the law, a 

continuation of campaigns designed to or having the effect of 

encouraging others to violate the law, and association with groups 

that would encourage repeated criminal conduct. Id. at 334. The 

court, however, invalidated a condition which prohibits the 

expression of opinion as to the constitutionality or validity of 

the laws in question. Id. Accordingly, the court found that the 

condition before it was vague and uncertain as to its breadth and 

remanded the case to the district court "so as to give the court 

an opportunity to reframe the conditions and to set them forth in 

more specific terms, at the same time eliminating a condition 

which would prohibit the naked expression of opinion as to 

constitutionality of the measures in question." Id. 

8 

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• 

The probation condition imposed by the court in Lawson was 

that "Defendant shall disassociate himself with any organization 

that has [as] its purpose defeating the Internal Revenue Service 

laws, including an organization known as the Wyoming Patriots and 

shall not encourage other individuals to disobey the laws of the 

United States." Lawson, 670 F.2d at 929. The Lawson court 

reviewed that condition under the Porth analysis and found that 

the condition would be valid only if it were read to prohibit 

association with organizations that advocate violation of the tax 

laws. Id. at 930. The Lawson court went on to uphold the 

condition, stating: "We construe the 

organization having as its purpose 

Revenue laws to mean only organizations 

court's reference to an 

'defeating' the Internal 

advocating disobedience, 

and so construed, the condition is valid." Id. 

In light of the foregoing authority, the condition challenged 

in this case appears vague and unnecessarily broad. The 

Government argues in its brief that it is "readily apparent that 

the trial court used the expression 'tax protest type activity or 

movement' to bar only illegal tax protester activities and 

behavior," and that "since the condition at issue here only 

prohibits illegal tax protest activity, it too is valid." 

Plaintiff's brief at 32. It may be true that the district court 

meant to deter Defendant's involvement in illegal tax protest 

activity, but those are not the words it chose. The practical 

effect of the condition imposed by the court was to prohibit any 

and all involvement in 

whether legal or not. 

any tax protest activity or movement, 

A literal reading of the condition would 

9 

Appellate Case: 90-2248 Document: 010110090820 Date Filed: 10/15/1991 Page: 9 
prohibit Defendant even from expressing his opinion as to the 

validity or constitutionality of the tax laws in a setting where 

there was no chance of the expression encouraging others to 

violate the law, a prohibition which Porth and Lawson hold to be 

invalid. 

We are confident that the district court, when it ordered as 

a condition of Defendant's supervised release that he not become 

involved in any tax protest type activity or movement, intended 

only to prohibit Defendant from involvement in illegal tax protest 

activities, tax protest activities which encouraged others to 

violate the law, or association with groups that encourage 

repeated criminal conduct. We are also confident that the 

district court did not intend to stifle Defendant's naked 

expression of his opinion as to the validity of the tax laws, 

outside of a situation where such expression is designed to or has 

the effect of encouraging others to violate the law. Literal 

reading of the condition in question, however, does not convey 

those ideas and limitations. We therefore remand this case to the 

district court so that it might review this particular condition 

and reframe it in such a way that the district court's purposes 

for imposing such a condition are accomplished without infringing 

unnecessarily on Defendant's rights, consistent with this opinion 

and prior Tenth Circuit authority. 

5. Remaining Claims. 

Defendant raises other claims in part VII of his brief 

against the advice of counsel. We have reviewed each of 

10 

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Defendant's remaining claims, and we find them to be without 

merit. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED and 

REMANDED in part. 

Entered for the Court 

Honorable David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

11 

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