Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03923/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03923-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of San Mateo
Defendant
Mary Ganley
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY GANLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO,

Defendant.

 NO. C06-3923 TEH 

 ORDER DENYING 

 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

 RECONSIDERATION

By Order dated January 15, 2008, the Court allowed Plaintiff Mary Ganley to move

for reconsideration of certain issues in the Court’s December 20, 2007 Order granting

summary judgment to the defendant County of San Mateo. The Court has carefully

considered the briefs and declarations filed in support of and in opposition to Plaintiff’s

motion. For the reasons set out below, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff Mary Ganley was a longtime correctional officer for the County of San

Mateo. She had permanent classified status as an employee under the County’s Civil Service

Commission Rules. For part of that time, she served as president of the Deputy Sheriff’s

Association (the union representing deputy sheriffs and correctional officers). Over the

course of her employment, she was injured numerous times, submitted multiple Workers’

Compensation claims, was on extended sick leave for nearly a year, and had several

temporary modified duty assignments. Her last temporary modified duty assignment began

on January 12, 2005.

Case 3:06-cv-03923-TEH Document 66 Filed 03/07/08 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Two physicians examined Plaintiff and found that she could do only light duty work

that would not involve altercations or “take downs.” Both gave her a permanent disability rating.

On June 6, 2005, the Human Resources Risk Manager and ADA Coordinator for San

Mateo County met with Plaintiff. They explained the doctors’ conclusions to her. They told

her that the ability to perform take downs and become involved in inmate altercations was an

essential function of the correctional officer position, and that the job could not be modified

to eliminate those functions. They gave her notice of her right to request accommodation and

offered to help her find another position in the County. They told her that Lieutenant

Victoria O’Brien would discuss with her when her last day in the temporary modified

position would be. 

On June 21, 2005, O’Brien met with Plaintiff and again explained that her temporary

modified assignment was being discontinued because the physicians’ reports indicated she

was unable to perform essential functions of the job. 

Plaintiff did not protest at either of these meetings, and in fact told O’Brien that she

planned to apply for disability retirement. 

After June 21, 2005, Plaintiff was paid using her accumulated vacation credits and

sick leave. Plaintiff’s pay status, shown on her pay stubs, was switched from “regular” to

“sick with pay.” On August 1, 2005, Plaintiff filed for disability retirement benefits, stating

under penalty of perjury that she was unable to perform the duties of a correctional officer. 

Plaintiff’s sick leave and accrued vacation time were exhausted by the end of the pay period

ending November 19, 2005. She remained on the payroll, with her time coded as “leave

without pay.” She continued to receive health benefits, and credit toward her retirement

through January, 2006. On January 14, 2006, Plaintiff received her final paycheck.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that she was deprived of

a property interest without due process of law, in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment

rights. Plaintiff also alleged that she had been deprived of her interest in employment and

retirement benefits under California Government Code § 31721 and California Labor Code §

4850 without pre-removal due process.

Case 3:06-cv-03923-TEH Document 66 Filed 03/07/08 Page 2 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Both parties moved for summary judgment. 

This Court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment and denied that of the

Plaintiff. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, December 20, 2007. The Court found that

Plaintiff clearly had a constitutionally protected property interest in her job, id. at 4-5, and in

her pay and accrued benefits, such that being placed on an involuntary illness leave would

trigger due process requirements. Id. at 5-8. The Court held that although Plaintiff had not

been terminated, id. at 8-12, she had raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she had been

involuntarily placed on leave and forced to use accrued sick and vacation benefits. 

The Court also found, however, that Plaintiff had received constitutionally adequate

procedure on the facts of her case. Id. at 15-17. She was informed in advance of the

purpose of medical examinations, there was no reason to think those examinations were

unreliable, she got notice of the doctors’ conclusions and of the fact that the County planned

to remove her from her light duty position at the June 6, 2005 meeting, and had an

opportunity to present her side of the story. Id. 

As an alternative ground for granting summary judgment on the due process claim, 

the Court found that as a past union president, Plaintiff had “reason to know” of the postdeprivation appeal and grievance procedures available to her under the MOU and Civil

Service Rules, and no reasonable jury could find otherwise. Because Plaintiff failed to make

use of those procedures, she waived any due process claim she might have had. Id. at 17-19.

The Court found that the County was not liable for failure to apply for disability

retirement on her behalf under Cal. Gov. Code § 31721 because she was not “separated” 

from employment within the meaning of the statute, and because she applied for retirement

on her own before the County’s four-month period to apply had expired. Id. at 19-20. 

Finally, it found that she had released all her Workers’ Compensation claims in a November

6, 2006 stipulation settling claims for “all injuries ... to body parts ... while in the employ of

San Mateo County.” Id. at 20. 

Case 3:06-cv-03923-TEH Document 66 Filed 03/07/08 Page 3 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 The Court rejected Plaintiff’s remaining requests for reconsideration.

4

Plaintiff moved for leave to file a Motion for Reconsideration. At the hearing on the

cross-motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff had asserted for the first time that after the

June 21, 2005 meeting, she believed she had been placed on disability leave under Labor

Code § 4850 (rather than on a leave that would drain her accumulated benefits) because the

County’s regular practice was to use accumulated leave while workers’ compensation claims

were pending, and then restore that leave once the claims are granted. The Court noted that

if Plaintiff could support this assertion, then she might be able to raise a triable issue of fact

as to whether she was on notice that the County would use her accrued benefits. Moreover,

if she had no notice that her benefits were being used, she would have had no reason to file a

grievance or appeal, so that her failure to do so would not waive a due process claim. 

January 15, 2008 Order Granting in Part and Denying In Part Plaintiff’s Request to File A

Motion for Reconsideration, January 15, 2008, at 1-3.1

 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION/ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

In support of her motion for consideration, Plaintiff submitted an additional

declaration and supporting documents. According to Plaintiff, at the June 21, 2005 meeting,

Lieutenant O’Brien told her that “[y]ou will be on paid vacation for two months and then you

will be back at work.” At that point, she believed that she “had not used a full year’s

disability leave with pay” on “each claim” she had made in the past, and therefore believed

that the two months’ “vacation” would be disability leave with pay under Labor Code §

4850. Declaration of Mary Ganley In Support of Plaintiff’s Motin for Reconsideration

(“Ganley Decl.”) ¶ 1(b). She knew of several other employees who had been placed on such

leave with pay before the effective date of their disability retirements. Id. Plaintiff states

that “I thought I would be placed on disability leave with pay for two months, retired and

returned to work on a contract basis no later than September 2005.” Id.. ¶ 1(c). She alleges

that O’Brien never told her that her accrued vacation and sick benefits would be used to pay

her. Id. ¶ 1(d). She was not informed that she could request Advanced Disability Pension

Case 3:06-cv-03923-TEH Document 66 Filed 03/07/08 Page 4 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Payments or seek a retirement date of June 23, 2005 so that her accrued benefits would not

be used. Id. ¶ 1(f).

Plaintiff declares (without other support) that “[i]n the San Mateo County Sheriff’s

Office, employees injured on the job who are unable to work are initially placed on paid sick

leave and then, once a workers’ compensation claim has been verified as an industrial injury,

all of that time is changed to disability leave with pay under Labor Code § 4850.” Id. ¶ 1(e). 

At the time, Plaintiff “anticipated being placed on disability leave with pay right away”

because “on June 22, 2005, several of [her] workers compensation claims had already been

approved.” Id. When Plaintiff’s payroll stubs showed that sick leave and vacation time were

being used, she “did not worry at first” because she just thought the County’s “processes to

convert the sick leave and vacation to disability leave with pay” were simply taking a long

time. Id. In November, 2005, she “became increasingly alarmed” that her sick leave and

vacation time were not being returned, and so requested an “accounting of disability leave

with pay.” Id. ¶ 1(g). The County gave her printouts showing four claims for which she had

been placed on such leave. One of them, No. SM 200088, showed she had received 87 days’

leave, so she believed she had sufficient leave time left over. Id.

In early December, 2005, Plaintiff filed a formal request for Disability Leave With

Pay, to run from June 22, 2005 to the date of her retirement. Id. 1(h) and Exh. E. On January

10, 2006, the request was denied, on the ground that “1 yr of DLWP met on 11/13/01, no

longer eligible.” Id.

Plaintiff further declares that she did not know she could grieve or appeal being

placed on involuntary leave and being deprived of her accrued vacation and sick leave. She

explains that her work as union president did not involve representing individual employees,

had never heard of a grievance or appeal filed for involuntary leave and resultant loss of

accrued benefits, and that in fact, Lt. O’Brien had repeatedly told her, in other contexts, that

“there was no appeal allowed for involuntary leave involving disability retirements because

the employees were not being disciplined.” Id. ¶ 2(a-d).

The County presents ample evidence that Plaintiff was not entitled to Labor Code 

Case 3:06-cv-03923-TEH Document 66 Filed 03/07/08 Page 5 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

§ 4850 benefits, and could not have been, as of June, 2005. The County’s policies provide

that after 90-day temporary disability leave is exhausted, the County will use an employee’s

sick and vacation pay if the employee is unable to work. Declaration of Janine Keller In

Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (“Keller Decl.”)

Exh. B at 2. They also provide that the hours may be refunded with workers’ compensation

benefits: “[t]he employee is charged full sick leave or vacation time on the time card; 

however, a portion of the hours are refunded by applying the amount of the workers’

compensation temporary disability benefit by the employee’s hourly pay rate at the time of

injury.” Id.

As of June 22, 2005, however, Plaintiff had no outstanding workers’ compensation

claims. She had filed three claims for Labor Code § 4850 benefits in the past. 

• Plaintiff filed Claim No. SM 20088 for a July 27, 1999 injury. She received 87

days of § 4850 benefits on this claim. (This is apparently the claim under which

Plaintiff believed she had extra leave). As of October 11, 1999, she was no

longer eligible for benefits on the claim because her physician had released her to

work. Moreover, the five-year limitation period for § 4850 benefits set out in

Labor Code § 5410 had elapsed by the time Plaintiff was placed on leave in June

2005, so she could not have been entitled to benefits under this claim in any case.

• Plaintiff filed claims SM20233 and SM210157 for two different injuries to two

parts of her body that occurred on October 28, 2000. She received the statutory

maximum of one year’s benefits on each of these claims. She was informed on

January 26, 2004 that the payments were ending on claim SM20233 and received

written notice of when benefits ran out on the other claim as well.

• Plaintiff filed Claim No. SM201388 for an injury on November 13, 2000, but that

claim was denied on October 4, 20001. 

Declaration of James Bankson In Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion

for Reconsideration (“Bankson Decl.”) ¶¶ 6-13. In short, there was no pending workers’

compensation claim for which Plaintiff could have expected to receive benefits.

Janine Keller, the County’s Human Resources Risk Manager, explained in her

declaration that the County never “automatically” pays disability leave. Keller Decl. ¶ 10. 

Disability leave is paid under Labor Code § 4850 only when the employee files a workers’

compensation claim and the claim is approved. Keller Decl. ¶ 10. The MOU, § 20.4(C),

explains that “[n]o job incurred disability leave with pay may be granted until the State

Case 3:06-cv-03923-TEH Document 66 Filed 03/07/08 Page 6 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The County argues Plaintiff is not entitled to reconsideration because she is not relying on

newly-discovered evidence, as required by either Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 59(e) or 60(b). But those rules

deal with a motion for new trial or request for relief from judgment, respectively. Plaintiff moves

for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 7-9(b)(3), on the ground of a “manifest failure by the

Court to consider material facts and dispositive legal arguments.”

7

Compensation Insurance Fund or County Workers’ Compensation Adjuster has accepted

liability on behalf of the County, or the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board has ordered

benefits to be paid.” Moreover, in order to get disability leave with pay, a employee must file

a specific form with the County requesting disability leave. Keller Decl ¶ 9 and Exh. A;

MOU § 20.4(C). That form (the one Plaintiff in fact filed in December, 2005) specifically

states that

If APPROVED, by copy of this form, your Payroll Department is requested to return

any sick leave and vacation time used during the above referenced time period to your

sick leave and vacation balance. If DENIED, the time CANNOT be restored unless

your claim is accepted at a later date.

Keller Decl. Exh. A (emphasis in original). Finally, the County also submitted Lt.

O’Brien’s testimony that she never told Plaintiff she would be on “paid vacation” for two

months and then back at work, they never discussed workers’ compensation benefits, and she

never stated or implied that Plaintiff could do contract work later. Declaration of Victoria

O’Brien In Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration

(“O’Brien Decl.”) ¶¶ 5, 7, 9. 

DISCUSSION2

Plaintiff has now raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she was aware she could

have grieved or appealed the use of her benefits. See Ganley Decl. ¶ 2(d). Accordingly, the

Court will not rely on its alternative ground for decision – that Plaintiff waived her due

process claim by failing to grieve or appeal use of her benefits – to grant summary judgment.

However, the Court’s first ground for decision – that Plaintiff received all the process

she was constitutionally due – still stands.

As this Court observed before, Plaintiff’s pay stubs provided obvious notice that she

was being paid from accrued sick and vacation time from June 21, 2005. Plaintiff’s request

Case 3:06-cv-03923-TEH Document 66 Filed 03/07/08 Page 7 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Although it does not bear on the due process question, the Court also notes the fact that in

November, 2006, Plaintiff settled all of her workers’ compensation claims, without exception – including any possible claim for benefits she said she thought would replace her accrued sick and

vacation time. 

8

for reconsideration intimated that she had a reasonable or legitimate expectation that she

would be, or was being, placed on Labor Code § 4850 leave after the June 21, 2005 meeting. 

The evidence before the Court shows that there was simply no reason for Plaintiff to believe

that the deductions from her accrued benefits were temporary and she would automatically or

definitely be receiving disability benefits under Labor Code § 4850 to make up for those

deductions. 

The County’s policies, including the request for disability leave with pay form which

she had filled out and submitted many times in the past, make it crystal clear that her hours

would be restored only if a workers’ compensation claim was approved. Plaintiff’s own

declaration in support of the motion for reconsideration so acknowledges. Ganley Decl. ¶

1(e)(“...once a workers’ compensation claim has been verified as an industrial injury, all of

that time is changed to disability leave with pay under Labor Code § 4850.”) Plaintiff may

have had a subjective belief in June, 2005 that she “would be placed on paid disability leave

under Labor Code § 4850,” Declaration of Mary Ganley in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed October 29, 2007, ¶ 5, but that expectation was in no way

legitimate, reasonable, or justified. She had no pending workers’ compensation claims. 

Even if she filed one in the future, those benefits were by no means assured: her entitlement

to benefits could be disputed, or she might be denied benefits. See, e.g., Bankson Decl. ¶ 13

(Plaintiff’s last-filed workers’ compensation claim was denied on October 4, 2001).3

 

Plaintiff was without question on notice 1) that her accrued benefits were being used

to pay her while she was off work in 2005; and 2) that they would not be refunded unless a

workers’ compensation claim was approved. 

Plaintiff now argues that the County should have given her notice that she was “not

entitled to disability leave with pay,” and that failure to do so “deprived her of the

opportunity to make intelligent choices to protect her benefits.” Plaintiff’s Motion for

Case 3:06-cv-03923-TEH Document 66 Filed 03/07/08 Page 8 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Reconsideration at 8. But the County is not obliged to tell an employee who has not applied

for benefits that she is not entitled to them. Plaintiff in essence complains that the County

didn’t warn her that she might not win a workers’ compensation claim if she filed one. That

is no deprivation of due process. 

 Plaintiff received adequate notice that her accrued benefits were being used, and, as

set out in this Court’s December 20, 2007 Order, constitutionally adequate procedure

thereafter. See December 20, 2007 Order at 15-17. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/07/08 

 THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:06-cv-03923-TEH Document 66 Filed 03/07/08 Page 9 of 9