Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03084/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Demio
Appellee
Mary Rose Oakar
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 16, 1997 Decided April 18, 1997

No. 96-3084

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLANT

v.

MARY ROSE OAKAR AND 

JOSEPH DEMIO,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cr00043-01)

Jonathan J. Rusch, Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Thomas 

J. Eicher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered appearances.

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David E. Frulla argued the cause for appellee Oakar, with 

whom Stanley M. Brand and Theodore V. Wells, Jr., were on 

the brief.

John J. Ricotta and Mark P. Herron were on the brief for 

appellee DeMio.

Before: SILBERMAN, WILLIAMS and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The United States appeals from 

the dismissal of count two of an indictment charging Mary 

Rose Oakar, a former Member of the United States House of 

Representatives, with violating the False Statement Act, 18 

U.S.C. § 1001 (1994), by failing to disclose certain personal 

liabilities in a financial disclosure form that she submitted to 

the House Clerk pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 

1978 ("Ethics Act"), 5 U.S.C. app. 4. The United States also 

appeals the striking of paragraph 17 and overt acts 20(v)-(x) 

from count four of the indictment, which charged Oakar and 

her former campaign aide, Joseph DeMio, with conspiracy to 

defraud the United States and to make and cause to be made 

false statements within the jurisdiction of the Federal Election Commission ("FEC"). We affirm the dismissal of count 

two and reverse the striking of the allegations in count four.

I.

These appeals arise out of investigations relating to the 

House Bank. On May 14, 1992, appellee Mary Rose Oakar 

submitted a disclosure statement for calendar year 1991 to 

the House Clerk pursuant to the Ethics Act. That Act 

requires government officials, including Members of Congress, to file annual disclosure statements detailing, with 

certain exceptions, their income, gifts, assets, financial liabilities and securities and commercial real estate transactions. 

See 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 102; United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 

183 (D.C. Cir. 1994). These requirements were designed to 

increase public confidence in the federal government, demonUSCA Case #96-3084 Document #266568 Filed: 04/18/1997 Page 2 of 30
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1 The President, Vice President, and other Executive Branch 

officials file their disclosure reports with the Director of the Office 

of Government Ethics. 5 U.S.C. app. 4 at § 103(b), (c). Members 

of the judiciary file their forms with the Judicial Conference. Id. at 

§ 103(h)(1)(B). Members of the Senate file their disclosure statements with the Secretary of the Senate who submits them to the 

Select Committee on Ethics of the Senate. Id. § 103(j)(2). 

2

18 U.S.C. app. 4 § 104 provides, in relevant part:

(a) The Attorney General may bring a civil action in any 

appropriate United States district court against any individual 

who knowingly and willfully falsifies or who knowingly and 

willfully fails to file or report any information that such individual is required to report pursuant to section 102. The court in 

which such action is brought may assess against such individual 

a civil penalty in any amount, not to exceed $10,000.

(b) ... [E]ach congressional ethics committee ... shall refer to the Attorney General the name of any individual which 

such ... committee has reasonable cause to believe has willfully failed to file a report or has willfully falsified or willfully 

failed to file information required to be reported.

(c) ... [A] congressional ethics committee ... may take any 

appropriate personnel or other action in accordance with applicable law or regulation against any individual failing to file a 

report or falsifying or failing to report information required to 

be reported.

strate the integrity of government officials, deter conflicts of 

interest, deter unscrupulous persons from entering public 

service, and enhance the ability of the citizenry to judge the 

performance of public officials. See S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 21-

22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4237-38. 

Although the financial disclosure requirements apply to all 

branches of the government, the task of assuring compliance 

among officials and employees of the several branches falls to 

separate entities. Members of the House of Representatives 

must file their disclosure forms with the Clerk of the House 

who, in turn, transmits them to the Committee on Standards 

of Official Conduct, which is the House Ethics Committee.15 

U.S.C. app. 4 §§ 103(h)(1)(A)(i)(I), (j)(1); see also id. § 109(1). 

If a person required to file such a report either willfully fails 

to do so or willfully falsifies information, the Ethics Committee will refer the matter to the Attorney General, who has the 

authority to bring a civil action to impose a penalty of up to 

$10,000. Id. § 104(a), (b).2In addition, the Committee may 

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take other "appropriate personnel or other action in accordance with applicable law or regulations." Id. 104(c).

On March 10, 1992, the House Ethics Committee released a 

report on its investigation into alleged irregularities at the 

House Bank. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-452 (1992). The Report 

stated that nineteen current and five former Members of 

Congress had abused their banking privileges by "repeatedly 

and routinely writing overdrafts in significant amounts." Id.

at 29. On March 27, 1992, the Attorney General appointed 

retired Judge Malcolm R. Wilkey as Special Counsel to 

conduct a preliminary investigation into the House Bank 

matter. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC, 102d Cong., 

2d Sess. (1992) at 23. Days later the House Ethics Committee published the names of the overdrawn Members, including appellee Oakar, in the Congressional Record. 138 CONG.

REC. H2241-42 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1992). Oakar was subsequently indicted for one count of conversion of public monies, 

18 U.S.C. § 641, five counts of making false statements, id.

§ 1001, and one count of conspiracy to defraud the United 

States by impairing, impeding and defeating the FEC in the 

exercise of its functions and duties, and to make and cause to 

be made false statements within the FEC's jurisdiction. Id.

§ 371. DeMio was charged only with the conspiracy.

Oakar and DeMio moved to dismiss certain counts of the 

indictment. As relevant here, Oakar argued that count two, 

alleging that her failure to disclose at least $50,000 in personal liabilities on her 1991 Ethics Act financial disclosure statement, constituted a false statement under § 1001, was barred 

after Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995), 

because the statement was submitted to the House Clerk, 

rather than to a "department" or "agency" of the Executive 

Branch. Oakar also moved to strike the allegations in paragraphs 17 and 20(v)-(x) as surplusage under FED. R. CRIM. P. 

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7(d) on the ground that they did not "amount to, or provide 

any indication of, criminal activity, but instead squarely implicate first amendment protected rights to free press and 

speech." Oakar also claimed that such "media activity" was 

exempt from the "regulatory ambit" of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455, which requires candidates for federal office to report contributions and expenditures to the FEC.

The district court granted the motion regarding counts two 

and four. As to count two, charging Oakar with making a 

false statement in violation of § 1001, the court ruled that "in 

light of the legislative history as reviewed by Hubbard,

section 1001 was not intended to apply to the statements at 

issue here." United States v. Oakar, 924 F. Supp. 232, 237-

38 (D.D.C. 1996). As to count four, the court struck the 

challenged language, but stated that the government could 

present evidence as to these allegations at trial if it appeared 

that they were "relevant to other than First Amendment 

activities." Id. at 243. The government appeals both rulings.

II.

Although the parties have not challenged the court's jurisdiction over this appeal, the court must "independently satisfy 

ourselves that it exists." Rose, 28 F.3d at 185 (quoting 

International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478, 1481 

(D.C. Cir. 1994)). The statutory basis for this appeal is 18 

U.S.C. § 3731, which provides in pertinent part:

In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall 

lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or 

order of a district court dismissing an indictment or 

information or granting a new trial after verdict or 

judgment, as to any one or more counts, except that no 

appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the 

United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.

....

The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

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3

It is unclear whether the Fifth Circuit has endorsed the 

"discrete basis" test. Compare United States v. Woolard, 981 F.2d 

756, 757 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 990 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1993) with 

United States v. Terry, 5 F.3d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1993). 

Thus, it is clear that this court has jurisdiction of the government's appeal of that portion of the district court's order 

dismissing count two. As to the portion of the order striking 

the allegations in count four, however, the jurisdictional issue 

is less clear because the district court did not dismiss that 

count in its entirety. This court has not previously addressed 

whether § 3731 provides jurisdiction over an appeal from an 

order dismissing only a portion of a count.

Most of the federal courts of appeals that have addressed 

the issue have concluded that the government may appeal an 

order striking only a portion of a count when the stricken 

allegations provide a "discrete basis for the imposition of 

criminal liability." United States v. Sanabria, 548 F.2d 1, 5 

(1st Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 54 (1978); see 

United States v. Hill, 55 F.3d 1197, 1199-1200 (6th Cir. 1995);

United States v. Levasseur, 846 F.2d 786, 788 (1st Cir.), cert. 

denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988); United States v. Tom, 787 F.2d 

65, 69 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Martin, 733 F.2d 1309, 

1310 (8th Cir. 1984)(en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Eklund v. 

United States, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1980).3

The Tenth Circuit, however, has recently rejected the "discrete basis" test, holding that "§ 3731 does not provide for an 

appeal of less than a full count of an indictment." United 

States v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 106 F.3d 345, 349 (10th Cir. 

1997).

Although the Tenth Circuit's approach is consistent with 

the usual construction of the word "count," we respectfully 

conclude that it fails to give sufficient weight to § 3731's 

command that its provisions be "liberally construed." In 

Sanabria, the Supreme Court concluded that § 3731 imposed 

"no statutory barrier to an appeal from an order dismissing 

only a portion of a count" because "Congress could hardly 

have meant appealability to depend on the initial decision of a 

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4 We express no opinion as to Oakar's contention that she was 

not required to report these activities. See infra n.13. 

prosecutor to charge in one count what could also have been 

charged in two...." 437 U.S. at 69 n.23. This interpretation 

of § 3731 requires a court to look beyond the formal division 

of an indictment into counts. Although the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, on which the Tenth Circuit relied, 

argues that "count" is a "well-known and unambiguous term 

of art" that should be given its ordinary meaning, id. at 79 

(Stevens, J., concurring), the majority of the Court endorsed 

a contrary view. Practical considerations also weigh in favor 

of the majority's construction of the term "count" because the 

Double Jeopardy Clause would prevent the government from 

appealing the district court's ruling after an acquittal. While 

Congress may not have intended to grant the government 

interlocutory review of every pretrial ruling, the weight of 

authority suggests that it did not intend to condition the 

government's right to appeal on formalities. Rather, Congress intended to "remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and allow appeals whenever the Constitution 

would permit." United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 

(1975). Consequently, we join those circuits that have permitted the government to appeal under § 3731 an order 

dismissing a portion of a count that provides a discrete basis 

for the imposition of criminal liability.

The stricken allegations in count four charged that Oakar 

and DeMio borrowed money from a third party and used part 

of the loan to publish and distribute "community newspapers" 

supporting Oakar's reelection. Although these activities are 

not criminal in themselves, Oakar's failure to report them as 

contributions and expenditures in connection with her campaign might conceivably have been charged as a separate 

substantive offense.4 Cf. United States v. Terry, 5 F.3d 874, 

876 (5th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, the government could have 

framed count four with the stricken allegations as the only 

overt acts charged, and the district court's order would then 

have effectively dismissed the entire count by deleting an 

essential element of the crime. See Levasseur, 846 F.2d at 

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5

In 1996, Congress amended § 1001 to extend its coverage to 

"any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or 

judicial branch of the Government of the United States." False 

Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292, § 2, 

110 Stat. 3459 (1996). 

789-90. Thus, we conclude that the allegations at issue here 

provide a discrete basis for the imposition of criminal liability 

against Oakar and DeMio, and that the government is entitled to appeal the order striking them.

III.

The government's challenges to the district court's order 

present, as to count two, a question of the effect of the 

Supreme Court's decision in Hubbard, overruling its longstanding interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and, as to the 

stricken portions of count four, a more mundane question 

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d).

A.

Count two. The government contends that the district 

court erred in two respects in striking count two of the 

indictment: first, because neither Hubbard nor subsequent 

decisions in this circuit have foreclosed the possibility that 

certain entities within the Legislative Branch might still be 

"agencies" for purposes of § 1001; and second, because, 

unlike other post-Hubbard cases in this circuit the indictment 

did not specify the department or agency conferring § 1001 

jurisdiction and Oakar's financial disclosure statement was 

within the jurisdiction of the Justice Department. Here the 

government looks to the Attorney General's civil enforcement 

authority under § 104 of the Ethics Act and the authority 

delegated to Special Counsel Wilkey to investigate the House 

Bank as bases of Executive Branch "jurisdiction" within the 

meaning of a 1934 amendment to § 1001.

Section 1001, as it read at the time of appellees' indictment,

5

provides:

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Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any 

department or agency of the United States knowingly 

and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up, by any trick, 

scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, 

fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or 

makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the 

same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1001 (emphasis added). For nearly forty years, 

the Supreme Court interpreted the emphasized language to 

embrace matters within the jurisdiction of any branch of the 

government, not only the Executive Branch.

In United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955), a 

former Member of Congress was charged under § 1001 for 

falsely representing to the House Disbursing Office that a 

named person was entitled to compensation as his official 

clerk. The district court had granted Bramblett's motion for 

arrest of judgment following his conviction on the ground that 

he had not falsified a material fact "within the jurisdiction of 

any department or agency of the United States" because the 

Disbursing Office was not a department or agency within the 

meaning of § 1001. See 348 U.S. at 505. The government 

appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court reviewed the origins of § 1001, noting that it was originally 

passed in conjunction with a false claims provision to punish 

monetary frauds in "any claim upon or against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer 

thereof...." See Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696 (1863). 

A 1934 amendment to the statute expanded its application to 

frauds committed by any person "in any matter within the 

jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United 

States...." See Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 996 (1934) 

("1934 Act"). Although Bramblett claimed that the addition 

of the words "department or agency" in 1934 had limited the 

coverage of § 1001 to exclude statements to the Legislative 

and Judicial Branches, the Court found nothing in the text or 

the legislative history of the 1934 Act that indicated that "the 

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6 Section 6 provides:

The term "department" means one of the executive departments ....unless the context shows that such term was intended to describe the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of 

the government.

The term "agency" includes any department, independent 

establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or 

bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the 

United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context 

shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited 

sense.

18 U.S.C. § 6. 

7 The court noted that several subsequent revisions had enacted only "housekeeping changes in language which are of no particular significance" to the interpretation of the Act. Id. at 507. 

scope of the statute was to be in any way restricted." Id. at 

507.

Noting that the district court had read the definitions of 

"department" and "agency" in 18 U.S.C. § 66to restrict the 

scope of § 1001, the Court concluded instead that:

[t]he context in which this language is used calls for an 

unrestricted interpretation. This is enforced by its legislative history. It would do violence to the purpose of 

Congress to limit the section to falsifications made to the 

executive departments. Congress could not have intended to leave frauds such as this without penalty. The 

development, scope and purpose of the section shows 

that "department" as used in this context, was meant to 

describe the executive, legislative and judicial branches 

of the Government.

Id. at 509.7 Accordingly, while noting that Bramblett's statement could arguably be considered a matter within the jurisdiction of the Treasury Department, and that the House 

Disbursing Office might arguably fall within the § 6 definition 

of agency, the Court declined to base its holding on these 

grounds, concluding that submission of a statement to any of 

the three branches of government created a basis for the 

application of § 1001. Id. at 509-10.

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8 The Justices were divided on their reasons for overruling 

Bramblett. Justice Stevens, joined by two justices, concluded that 

the development of the judicial function exception represented an 

"intervening development in the law" that justified reconsideration 

of Bramblett. 115 S. Ct. at 1764 (per Stevens, J.) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)). Additionally, Justice Stevens concluded that neither Congress nor government 

prosecutors had relied significantly on Bramblett. Justice Scalia, 

joined by one Justice, rejected the "intervening development" rationale, and viewed Bramblett as a decision with "unacceptable consequences" that the Court had not foreseen in 1949, and that could 

only be circumvented by adopting a "judicial function" exception at 

odds with the text of the statute. Id. at 1765-66 (Scalia, J., 

concurring). In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by two 

Justices, argued that the Court should have applied the rule of 

stare decisis and left Bramblett undisturbed. Id. at 1766-69 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined in the portions of 

Justice Stevens' opinion that commanded majority support, but did 

not join in either Justice Stevens' or Justice Scalia's rationale for 

departing from Bramblett.

In Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995), the 

Court overruled Bramblett, id. at 1765, and held that a 

federal court was neither a "department" nor an "agency" 

within the meaning of § 1001. Id. The occasion for the 

Court's reconsideration of Bramblett was a split in the circuits on whether a "judicial function exception" existed to 

§ 1001. That exception, first suggested in Morgan v. United 

States, 309 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962), restricted the application of § 1001 in the federal courts. Prompted by concern 

that fear of prosecutions for false statements under § 1001 

could chill zealous advocacy, the exception provided that while 

misrepresentations relating to a court's "administrative" or 

"housekeeping" functions were within the reach of § 1001, 

statements made in the course of adjudication were not. See

115 S. Ct. at 1757, 1761-62; Morgan, 309 F.2d at 237. 

Rather than eliminating the "judicial function" exception, the 

Court in Hubbard eliminated the need for the exception by 

overruling Bramblett.8

The Court began by revisiting Bramblett 's analysis of the 

legislative history of § 1001. It observed that "[i]n ordinary 

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parlance, federal courts are not described as "departments' or 

"agencies' of the Government," and that "[f]ar more common 

is the use of "department' to refer to a component of the 

Executive Branch." Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1757. The Court 

viewed "[t]his commonsense reading [to be] bolstered by the 

statutory definitions of "department' and "agency' in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 6," which are applicable to all of Title 18. Id. Finding 

nothing in the text of § 1001 or in any related legislation that 

would suggest that the presumptive definitions must yield, 

the Court concluded that Bramblett "must be acknowledged 

as a seriously flawed decision" that made "no attempt to 

reconcile its interpretation with the usual interpretation of 

"department,' " and that gave "insufficient weight to the plain 

language of §§ 6 and 1001." Id. at 1758-59.

Contrary to its holding in Bramblett, the Court now concluded that the 1934 Act did fundamentally alter the character of the false statement statute. Id. at 1754. The Court 

noted that the 1934 Act had excised references to financial 

frauds, "thereby severing the historical link with the false 

claims portion of the statute, and inserted the requirement 

that the false statement be made "in any matter within the 

jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United 

States.' " Id. at 1760. Viewing this addition as "critical for 

present purposes," the Court considered two competing inferences arising from the amendments to the statute: either 

that the addition of the "jurisdiction" requirement "impose[d] 

new words of limitationwhose ordinary meaning connotes 

the Executive Branchin an altogether reformulated statute," or that the addition "strip[ped] away the financial fraud 

requirement while not disturbing the pre-existing breadth the 

statute has enjoyed." Id. at 1760. The Court concluded that 

its adoption of the second inference in Bramblett, "though not 

completely implausible, [was] nevertheless unsound." Id. at 

1761. In the Court's words: "[t]he differences between the 

1934 Act and its predecessors are too dramatic to evidence a 

congressional intent to carry forward any features of the old 

provision." Id. at 1761. The Court noted that none of its 

opinions referred to any indication that the 1934 Act might 

apply outside the Executive Branch. Id. "In light of this 

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vacuum, it would be curious indeed if Congress truly intended 

the 1934 Act to work a dramatic alteration in the law governing misconduct in the court system or the Legislature." Id.

at 1761.

Although Hubbard only directly addressed the applicability 

of § 1001 to statements made in judicial proceedings, the 

Court signaled that its rationale would apply equally to 

statements to the Legislative Branch. Because "[c]arefully 

considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically 

dictum, generally must be treated as authoritative," Doughty 

v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 6 F.3d 856, 861 n.3 (1st 

Cir. 1993), this court cannot ignore the unmistakable import 

of Hubbard's analysis. See also Gaylor v. United States, 74 

F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1830 (1996); 

Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d 754, 757 (7th 

Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995). In revisiting 

the origins of § 1001 and the legislative history of the 1934 

Act, the Court emphasized that Congress acted at the behest 

of the Secretary of the Interior and that its purpose was to 

address "the proliferation of fraud in the newly formed 

Executive agencies," rather than misconduct in the courts or 

the Legislature. Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1761. It is clear, 

moreover, that the justices understood that the decision to 

overrule Bramblett called § 1001's applicability to the Legislative Branch into serious doubt. In concluding that overruling Bramblett would not upset substantial reliance interests 

of Congress or of prosecutors on the availability of § 1001, 

three Justices noted the availability of other statutes for 

punishment of falsifications to the courts and the legislature. 

115 S. Ct. at 1764 & n.14 (per Stevens, J.). Justice Scalia, 

concurring, noted that although Hubbard did not pose the 

issue addressed in Bramblett, namely whether § 1001 applied 

to statements to the Legislative Branch, to treat the Legislative and Judicial Branches differently under the Act would 

create a "bizarre regime" contradictory to "the statute's 

intent ... [and] in addition, all conceivable interpretations of 

the English language." 115 S. Ct. at 1766 (Scalia, J., concurring). Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in dissent 

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cess is no longer protected by § 1001." Id. at 1768 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

In the wake of Hubbard, this court has been clear that an 

entity within the Legislative Branch cannot be a "department" within the meaning of § 1001 and 18 U.S.C. § 6. 

United States v. Rostenkowski, 68 F.3d 489, 490 (D.C. Cir. 

1995), denying reh'g in 59 F.3d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United 

States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. 

denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996). The government correctly 

notes, however, that both Hubbard and this court's decisions 

leave open the possibility that the Ethics Committee might be 

an "agency." Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1759 n.5; Rostenkowski,

68 F.3d at 490. Notwithstanding this narrow opening, however, we conclude that Hubbard's rationale and method of 

analysis foreclose this construction.

In Hubbard, the Court limited the scope of § 1001 to 

departments and agencies as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 6. Given 

the Court's emphasis on a common-sense reading of those 

definitions, there is nothing to suggest that either the House 

Clerk or the House Ethics Committee is an "independent 

establishment, commission, administration, authority, board 

or bureau of the United States or [a] corporation in which the 

United States has a proprietary interest," id., as any of those 

terms are commonly used. The House Ethics Committee is a 

deliberative body composed of Members of Congress and 

vested with authority under the Ethics Act and the House 

Rules to take action against Members who fail to fulfil their 

financial disclosure obligations. 2 U.S.C. § 29d; 5 U.S.C. 

app. 4 §§ 104, 106; Rules of the House of Representatives, 

102d Cong., 2d Sess., Rule X, cl. 4(e). As such, it would not 

naturally be described by any of the terms enumerated in the 

definition of "agency" in 18 U.S.C. § 6. Indeed, the function 

of the Ethics Committee bears substantially less resemblance 

to the definition of "agency" in § 6 than does the House 

Finance Office, which was at issue in Rostenkowski, or the 

House Disbursing Office, which was at issue in Bramblett.

Statements to congressional committees were not the focus of 

Congress' concern in enacting the 1934 Act, and the definition 

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9

See also United States v. Gibson, 881 F.2d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 

1989); United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 1983); 

United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183 (8th Cir. 1983); United 

States v. Uni Oil, Inc., 646 F.2d 946, 954-55 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. 

denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982); United States v. Cartwright, 632 F.2d 

1290, 1292-93 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lewis, 587 F.2d 854 

(6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Waters, 457 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 

1972). 

in § 6 describes entities that are ordinarily found only within 

the Executive Branch.

The United States also contends, however, that even if 

Oakar's submission of her 1991 financial disclosure statement 

to the House Clerk does not confer § 1001 jurisdiction because the Ethics Committee is not a "department" or "agency," the Attorney General's authority to seek civil penalties 

for the falsification of Ethics Act filings under § 104(a), and 

Judge Wilkey's appointment as Special Counsel to investigate 

the House Bank established Executive Branch "jurisdiction" 

over Oakar's financial disclosure statement, so that she may 

still be prosecuted under § 1001. To support its contention 

that the Justice Department's authority to examine Oakar's 

disclosure statement gives rise to jurisdiction under § 1001, 

the government relies on United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 

475 (1984). In that case, the defendant was indicted for 

falsely reporting to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 

the Secret Service that his wife had been kidnapped and that 

she was involved in a plot to assassinate the President. Id. at 

476-77. The Supreme Court rejected Eighth Circuit precedent that "jurisdiction" for purposes of § 1001 required "power to make final or binding determinations," and held that 

"jurisdiction" under the statute was to be interpreted very 

broadly to exist whenever an agency or department received 

a statement on a matter within its "official, authorized functions." Id. at 477, 479. The government further points out 

that a statement may be within the jurisdiction of an entity 

covered by § 1001 even if it was originally submitted to a 

private or non-federal body. For example, in United States 

v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit 

held that § 1001 jurisdiction existed where the defendant, a 

federal prisoner being held in a state prison facility pursuant 

to a contract between the state and the United States Marshals Service, made false statements to state officials. Id.

In Davis and like cases,9the rationale for § 1001 jurisdiction 

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was that although certain responsibilities may have been 

delegated to a non-federal entity, "supervisory authority" 

over the matter remained with the federal agency. Davis, 8 

F.3d at 929.

Neither Davis nor the other cases cited by the government, 

however, involve situations in which two different branches of 

the federal government could be said to have "jurisdiction" 

over a matter. Indeed, this problem could not have arisen in 

the Bramblett era, when all branches of the government were 

treated identically for the purposes of § 1001. Under Hubbard, however, that Oakar's statements were matters within 

the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee does not mean that 

she can be prosecuted under § 1001. Thus, the question is 

whether, by granting the Attorney General authority to seek 

civil penalties for the making of false statements and to 

appoint Judge Wilkey to investigate the House Bank scandal, 

Congress intended to create Executive Branch "jurisdiction" 

within the meaning of § 1001.

In United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 

this court concluded that § 1001 permitted the Attorney 

General to prosecute a Member of Congress for false statements made in his Ethics Act disclosure forms, reasoning that 

the congressional grant of authority to the Attorney General 

to initiate civil proceedings for Ethics Act violations did not 

implicitly repeal § 1001. The court found that, under Bramblett, "[t]he House Committee with which the forms were filed 

[was] a "department' for purposes of § 1001." Id. at 943. 

Finding no "clear and manifest indication" of an intent to 

repeal § 1001 in the legislative history of the Ethics Act, id.

at 948, the court concluded that the two statutes, read 

together, produced a "natural progression" where "those who 

intentionally fail to file [Ethics Act forms] are subject only to 

the civil sanction of [§ 104], while those who lie on their forms 

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10 We express no view as to Hansen's application under the 

1996 amendments to § 1001, which effectively overrule Hubbard

and codify the holding of Bramblett.

are additionally subject to the criminal penalty of § 1001." 

Id. at 945. Because the Supreme Court and this court have 

now concluded that Congress never intended to authorize 

§ 1001 prosecutions for statements made to the Legislative 

Branch, Hansen's holding is irrelevant, since it poses the 

wrong question.10 The issue now is not whether Congress 

intended to repeal § 1001 by implication by enacting the civil 

penalty provision of § 104, but whether in enacting § 104, it 

intended to create Executive Branch "jurisdiction" where it 

would not otherwise exist. Thus, the absence of clear guidance in the legislative history, see id. at 947-48, now cuts in 

another direction, and leads to the conclusion that Congress 

did not intend to create new jurisdiction for the purposes of 

§ 1001. Rather, at least until 1996, see supra n.5, Congress 

plainly intended to vest primary authority for ensuring 

§ 1001 compliance with the congressional ethics committees 

and the other analogous entities in the other branches.

In addition, because prosecution of Oakar for making false 

statements in her 1991 financial disclosure statement would 

not further the purposes of § 1001 as interpreted in Hubbard,

the government's reliance on Rodgers is misplaced. Rodgers ' 

construction of the term "jurisdiction" in § 1001 was tied to 

preventing the "perversion of ... authorized functions" of a 

covered branch, an interest the Supreme Court found "clearly 

embraced in, and furthered by, the broad language of 

§ 1001." 466 U.S. at 481; see also United States v. Facchini,

874 F.2d 638, 642 (9th Cir.1989)(en banc). Unlike United 

States v. Tracy, __ F.3d __ (2d Cir. 1997), the instant case 

does not involve statements submitted directly to an executive 

branch department or agency. The Second Circuit in Tracy

rejected the defendant's argument that § 1001 did not apply 

to statements submitted to a United States Attorney because 

they pertained to an order issued by a judicial magistrate. 

Because "[t]he affidavits in question were not requested, filed, 

or even presented, to the court," the Second Circuit concludUSCA Case #96-3084 Document #266568 Filed: 04/18/1997 Page 17 of 30
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11Compare dissenting opinion at 3-4. According to the Final 

Report: Preliminary Inquiry of the Special Counsel to the Attorney 

General Concerning the House Banking Facility 38 (Dec. 16, 1992) 

House Members' Ethics Act filings were relied upon in the investigation only "when necessary." [Exhibit 5 to Defendant's Motion to 

Dismiss Count One, Dkt. 20 of District Court record at 38]. 

ed that "[t]he difference between this case and Hubbard,

simply put, is that defendant's false statements .... were 

designed to mislead or defraud that agency of the executive 

branch." Id. at [*4]. The government offers nothing to 

indicate that Oakar's alleged falsifications were received by, 

much less relied upon by Judge Wilkey or his investigators.11

Hence, there is no basis to conclude that the statements could 

have interfered with the work of the Executive Branch, and 

that rationale for the application of § 1001 is thus missing in 

Oakar's case. Absent danger of such perversion, "[m]ere 

access to information" by a "department" or "agency" cannot 

give rise to § 1001 jurisdiction. Facchini, 874 F.2d at 642. 

"A criminal law is not to be read expansively to include what 

is not plainly embraced within the language of the statute, 

since the purpose to apprise men [and women] of the boundaries of the prohibited action would then be defeated." Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 348-49 (1948) (citations 

omitted).

Furthermore, as Justice Stevens observed in Hubbard,

statements to the Judicial and Legislative Branches are subject to a "extensive array of statutes that already exist to 

penalize false statements," including statutes on perjury, 18 

U.S.C. § 1621; false declarations before a grand jury, id. 

§ 1623; obstruction of justice, id. § 1503; and false claims, 

id. § 287. 115 S. Ct. at 1764 & n.14 (per Stevens, J.). If the 

Attorney General's "jurisdiction" to investigate and prosecute 

such crimes were to render a statement to the courts or 

Congress a "matter within the jurisdiction of a department or 

agency" of the Executive branch, then the language of the 

1934 Act would not constitute "words of limitation," Hubbard,

115 S. Ct. at 1760, but would instead invite artful prosecutorial pleading. Because the commencement of perjury prosecutions would be the foreseeable consequence of a false stateUSCA Case #96-3084 Document #266568 Filed: 04/18/1997 Page 18 of 30
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12 The fact that Oakar's financial disclosure form stated that 

falsifications could be the subject of § 104(a) civil and § 1001 

criminal sanctions, and that the appointment of Judge Wilkey was 

announced before she submitted her form to the House Clerk 

cannot create § 1001 jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist. 

See Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 69. See also, Yermian, 468 U.S. 63. 

ment under oath, nothing in United States v. Yermian, 468 

U.S. 63 (1984), which held that the government need not 

prove a defendant's knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction 

to obtain a conviction under § 1001, would stand in the way of 

§ 1001 prosecution for any sworn statement to the judicial 

branch. Because perjury prosecutions are unquestionably 

"official, authorized functions" of the Executive Branch within 

the meaning of Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 479, there is little room

to dispute that, under the government's interpretation, this 

authority would render such prosecutions "matters within the 

jurisdiction of" the Executive for purposes of § 1001. Thus, 

rather than alleviating the "unacceptable consequences," id.

at 1765 (Scalia, J., concurring) of Bramblett's expansive interpretation of § 1001, the government's construction would 

directly contravene Hubbard by permitting prosecution for 

statements to the Judicial and Legislative Branches that the 

Court concluded were outside the intended scope of § 1001 as 

amended by the 1934 Act.

Finally, we note that the government does not suggest, nor 

can we identify, a limiting principle that would permit adoption of the government's construction of "matter within the 

jurisdiction of" without permitting § 1001 to be used as 

expansively as it was under Bramblett. See Hubbard, 115 S. 

Ct. at 1766 (Scalia, J., concurring). Were the Court's broad 

construction of "jurisdiction" in Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 479, 

sufficient to give the Justice Department § 1001 jurisdiction 

over Oakar's 1991 financial disclosure filing, it would likewise 

confer § 1001 jurisdiction over any sworn statement to the 

Judicial Branch. Due to Hubbard's eradication of the "judicial function" exception, were the government's position 

adopted, the possibility of § 1001 prosecution for courtroom 

statements would once again have the potential to inhibit 

vigorous advocacy.12 See 115 S. Ct. at 1763. For these 

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13 The district court did not address Oakar's contention that 

she was not required to report these activities under the Campaign 

Act. Id. at 242 n.19. Because our task on appeal is limited to a 

determination of whether the district court abused its discretion, we 

also do not address this issue. 

reasons, the language added by the 1934 Act, as interpreted 

in Hubbard, does not support the government's attempt to 

bring Oakar's disclosure filing within the scope of § 1001.

Accordingly, because § 1001 did not apply to Oakar's filing 

of her 1991 financial disclosure form with the House Clerk, 

we affirm the district court's dismissal of count two of the 

indictment.

B.

Count four portions. The United States also contends 

that the district court erred in striking paragraph 17 and 

overt acts 20(v) through 20(x) of count four of the indictment 

under FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(d) in the absence of finding that the 

allegations were irrelevant to the charges and prejudicial to 

appellees. As noted, the stricken allegations charged that 

Oakar and DeMio used part of a loan made in the name of a 

third party to finance the publication and distribution of 

community newspapers supporting Oakar's reelection. In 

striking these allegations, the district court ruled that they 

"allege facts which implicate the protections of the First 

Amendment," but stated that it would permit the government 

to present evidence as to these allegations at trial if it 

appeared that they were "relevant to other than First 

Amendment activities." 924 F. Supp. at 243.13

Our review of a district court's decision on a motion to 

strike surplusage from an indictment pursuant to Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 7(d), is for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Edmund, 52, F.3d 1080, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam);

United States v. Jordan, 626 F.2d 931, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 

The scope of a district court's discretion to strike material 

from an indictment is narrow, however. United States v. 

Jordan, 626 F.2d 928, 931 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1980). "Words of 

description of what is legally essential to the charge in the 

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indictment cannot be stricken as surplusage." WRIGHT,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 127, at 426. 

Material that can fairly be described as "surplus" may only be 

stricken if it is irrelevant and prejudicial. Id.; see also 

United States v. Rezaq, 908 F.Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1995);

United States v. Poindexter, 725 F.Supp. 13, 35 (D.D.C. 1989).

The district court made no finding that the stricken allegations were either irrelevant or prejudicial. Rather, the court 

stated that the allegations "allege facts which implicate protections of the First Amendment." 924 F. Supp. at 243. It is 

not entirely clear what the court meant. Oakar and DeMio 

are not being prosecuted for publication or distribution of a 

community newspaper or other campaign material. Rather, 

they are being prosecuted for a conspiracy to deceive the 

FEC as to the campaign contributions and expenditures that 

Oakar was required to report. Allegations that Oakar and 

DeMio obtained a loan to finance the publication of such 

newspapers, and failed to report that activity to the FEC are 

plainly relevant to the charged conspiracy. That individual 

allegations of the indictment may be cumulative does not 

comport with the strict test for striking surplusage under 

Rule 7(d). See Jordan, 626 F.2d at 931 n.1. Hence, we hold 

that the district court erred in striking the challenged allegations.

Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of count two of the 

indictment and reverse the striking of allegations from count 

four of the indictment, and remand the case to the district 

court.

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1Since Hubbard, Congress has amended the statute to expand its 

reach to the judicial and legislative branches, with some exceptions. 

See False Statements Accountability Act of 1996 § 2(b), Pub. L. No. 

104-292, 110 Stat. 3459 (Oct. 11, 1996). The extension of course 

does not apply to any conduct of Oakar in May 1992. 

2This formulation may understate the breadth of potential § 1001 

liability for false statements to third parties. I return below to the 

issue of intent. 

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 

in part: My colleagues carve out what is to me an inexplicable 

exception to the coverage of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Finding no 

basis for this exception, I dissent.

* * *

Count Two of the indictment charges former Representative Mary Rose Oakar with having knowingly made a false 

statement, on or about May 15, 1992, in the form of a financial 

disclosure statement filed with the Clerk of the House. In 

the statement, according to the government, Oakar omitted at 

least $50,000 of personal liabilities. At the time of the alleged 

offense, § 1001 made it criminal to make a false statement "in 

any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or 

agency of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Under 

Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995), it is clear 

that the latter phrase embraces only executive branch departments or agencies.1

It follows, therefore, indisputably, that 

the filing of the statement with the House Clerk could not, in 

itself, be criminal under § 1001.

But established precedents, not disputed by Oakar, make it 

clear that § 1001 embraces false statements made to anybody 

on earth if the maker "knew or should have known that the 

information was to be submitted to a government agency." 

United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1984).2Indeed, the cases are legion in which § 1001 liability was 

grounded on statements not made to a federal agency at all. 

These include statements made to private organizations such 

as a defense contractor, as was the case in Yermian itself 

(false statements made by an employee to a defense contracUSCA Case #96-3084 Document #266568 Filed: 04/18/1997 Page 22 of 30
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tor that in turn submitted them to the Department of Defense); an environmental group, see United States v. Oren, 

893 F.2d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 1990) (false statement made 

to a private conservation organization regarding land that at 

the time of the statement the National Park Service had 

power to and later did acquire); a private coal mine operator, 

see United States v. Gibson, 881 F.2d 318, 320-21 (6th Cir. 

1989) (false invoices submitted to contractor for costs that 

were to be passed on to the government under a cost-plus 

contract with TVA); a subsidiary of a federally insured bank, 

see United States v. Cartwright, 632 F.2d 1290, 1291 (5th Cir. 

1980) (false statements made in manipulating funds of bank's 

subsidiary); and a firm building a nuclear plant, see United 

States v. Green, 745 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1984) (test data 

submitted by paint supplier to contractor, falsely indicating 

that paint met standards of Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 

And liability has been based on false statements to state 

agencies. See United States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923 (2d Cir. 

1993) (false statements submitted by federal prisoner to 

authorities of state prison in which he was held under contract); United States v. Wright, 988 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 

1993) (false statements to a state environmental agency with 

primary enforcement responsibility for federal water quality 

standards); United States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 

1985) (false statement to state labor department in connection 

with federally funded program); but cf. United States v. 

Facchini, 874 F.2d 638, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) 

(finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative 

costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked 

power to modify payments on account of state's excess payments). And to municipalities. See United States v. Petullo, 

709 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1983) (false invoices for snow removal 

from streets of Chicago after declaration of federal disaster 

area triggered federal support).

Until the Supreme Court's decision in Hubbard, the appellate courts had no occasion to tackle the parallel issue presented herea statement given to the legislative branch but 

arguably in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive 

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3See United States v. Solarz, Crim. No. 95-93 (D.D.C., April 18, 

1995) (criminal information prepared by House Bank Task Force 

charging wife of former Congressman with two misdemeanors, 

including one count of conversion under 18 U.S.C. § 641; plea 

agreement filed same day at Dkt. 1); United States v. Carroll 

Hubbard, Jr., Crim. No. 94-0128 (D.D.C., April 5, 1994) (criminal 

information prepared charging former member of Congress with 

stealing and conversion of government property, 18 U.S.C. § 641; 

plea agreement filed same day at Dkt. 7); United States v. Carol 

Brown Hubbard, Crim. No. 94-0127 (D.D.C., April 5, 1994) (criminal information charging defendant with aiding and abetting Carroll 

Hubbard in his violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641; plea agreement filed 

same day); and United States v. Perkins, Crim. No. 94-0480 

(D.D.C., Dec. 13, 1994) (criminal information charging former member of Congress with violating bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344; 

plea agreement filed same day at Dkt. 2). [Exhibits A, E, F & C to 

Government's Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 6-7, United States v. Oakar, Crim. No. 95-0043 (D.D.C., June 30, 1995) (Dkt. 

32).] 

branch. The formerly prevailing view read "department or 

agency" as including the legislative and judicial branches, see 

United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955), and made 

such an analysis pointless. The Second Circuit has recently, 

however, upheld a § 1001 conviction for false statements 

made to an assistant United States Attorney during negotiations to settle pending litigation before a magistrate judge, 

"notwithstanding the fact that the matter may also be within 

jurisdiction of a federal court." United States v. Tracy, No. 

96-1100, slip op. at 2003 (2nd Cir. March 13, 1997). Although 

the court noted that the statements had not been "presented 

to a federal court," id. at 2004, it is not clear whether or how 

that comment may qualify the court's apparent acceptance of 

dual jurisdiction.

At the time of Oakar's filing there was a similar prospect of 

flow-through to a federal executive agency. For some time 

before the filing there had been widespread publicity about 

members' large and prolonged overdrafts at the House Bank, 

and on March 27, 1992 (six weeks before her filing), the 

Attorney General appointed former Judge Malcolm R. Wilkey 

as a special counsel to look into the possibility of crimes 

committed in connection with these overdrafts. He was not

looking into the possibility of deception in statements filed 

under the Ethics in Government Act, so far as appears, but 

into a range of substantive crimes. And he, or the prosecutors who succeeded him after he filed his report, found them. 

See United States v. Oakar, 924 F. Supp. 232, 240 (D.D.C. 

1996) (tracing succession). At least two members of Congress and the wives of two members pleaded guilty to criminal charges, including conversion of government property and 

bank fraud, in violation of §§ 641 and 1344 of Title 18.3It 

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was evidently in this pursuit that Wilkey or his successors 

came across the allegedly false Oakar statement. See uncontradicted assertion in Appellant's Brief at 22. Cf. Appellee's 

Reply Brief at 26 (asserting that implications of government's 

theory resting liability on pendency of the investigation were 

broad, but not questioning its premises). See also Final 

Report: Preliminary Inquiry of the Special Counsel to the 

Attorney General Concerning the House Banking Facility 38 

(Dec. 16, 1992) (describing investigatory methods as including 

computerized review of House Bank records, supplemented 

by review of "filings under ... the Ethics in Government Act 

to determine whether transactions were being concealed.") 

[Exhibit 5 to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count One, 

United States v. Oakar, Crim. No. 95-0043 (D.D.C., June 30, 

1995) (Dkt. 20).]

In a trial the government might not be able, in the end, to 

show that Oakar knew or ought to have known that the 

statement filed with the House Clerk would be submitted to 

the Department of Justice (in the form of special counsel 

Wilkey or his successors). But that is a matter for trial, not a 

reason for dismissing Count Two. The indictment charges 

Oakar with making a false statement "in a matter within the 

jurisdiction of an agency of the United States." The pleading 

of a crime in the statutory form normally suffices. See 

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (indictment 

can set forth offense in language of statute itself as long as 

that language clearly sets out all elements). Here the indictment adds some surplusage, saying that Oakar made the false 

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sure Statement for 1991 that omitted $50,000 in liabilities. 

On the basis of liability for statements made to private 

organizations, state agencies and municipalities, the additional 

allegations are perfectly consistent with liability under 

§ 1001.

My colleagues, however, insist that the qualified congressional grant of jurisdiction to the Attorney General to pursue 

civil penalties against members of Congress failing to file 

required statements, or filing false ones, on a reference by 

the House Ethics Committee, see § 104 of the Ethics in 

Government Act, 5 U.S.C. app., negates any coverage by 

§ 1001. To be more exact, the majority reformulates the 

question: "Thus, the question is whether, by granting the 

Attorney General authority to seek civil penalties for the 

making of false statements and to appoint Judge Wilkey to 

investigate the House Bank scandal, Congress intended to 

create Executive Branch jurisdiction within the meaning of 

§ 1001." Maj. Opin. at 16. But unless there was some other

doctrine under which false statements in the House are 

exempt from § 1001 liability (where parallel statements to a 

private organization, a state, or a municipality would be 

covered), this is pure intellectual ju-jitsu. (It also misperceives the government's theory here. The appointment of 

Judge Wilkey, evidently a simple exercise of the Attorney 

general's authority to delegate his own functions, see 28 

U.S.C. § 510, is of significance only in that it put Oakar on 

clear notice that her financial disclosures, in any form, were 

likely to come under Justice Department scrutiny.) The 

majority's real theory is evidently that § 104 of the Ethics in 

Government Act itself negates the sort of liability that would 

attach to Oakar if, as a private citizen, she made a false 

statement to another private citizen, which a federal executive 

investigation was likely to find in the course of properly 

pursuing matters within its authority.

If the claim of implicit exemption were an issue of first 

impression, it would seem weak to me. But it is not. We 

have already rejected such a reading of the Ethics in Government Act. In a decision written by then-Circuit Judge Scalia, 

United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 

we said: "There is no difficulty in applying both 18 U.S.C. 

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§ 1001 and [§ 104 of the Ethics in Government Act].... 

[T]hose who intentionally fail to file [Ethics in Government 

Act] forms are subject only to the civil sanction ... while 

those who lie on their forms are additionally subject to the 

criminal penalty of § 1001." Id.

My colleagues attempt to discount Hansen on the grounds 

that it was decided before Hubbard, in an era when, under 

controlling precedents, Congress was a "department or agency" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Maj. Op. at 17. 

But Hubbard merely removes one basis for finding the statement covered. Far from holding that Congress did not 

intend "to authorize § 1001 prosecutions for statements made 

to the Legislative Branch," Maj. Op. at 17, it simply establishes that neither the House nor its Clerk nor the House 

Ethics Committee is a "department or agency" within the 

meaning of § 1001. See United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 

658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting attempt of government to 

rest liability solely on testimony misleading a Senate Committee). Nothing in Hubbard suggests that statements to organizations not covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1001 cannot be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 if they are also on matters within 

the jurisdiction of an executive branch "department or agency." Nor did Hubbard suggest that a matter could not be 

within the jurisdiction of departments or agencies of the 

executive as well as of one (or both) of the other branches. 

Since Hansen says simply that § 104 of the Ethics in Government Act does not negate § 1001 liability, it is still good law; 

Hubbard means only that the government cannot rest on the 

notion that Congress or one of its committees is a covered 

"department or agency." Given the established cases finding 

liability even for statements made to entities other than 

covered departments or agencies, Hubbard has no effect on 

Hansen's essential point. Persons making statements to 

Congress under circumstances that would entail liability if 

made to a private organization such as General Motors remain as liable as ever. The government should have a chance 

to show that Oakar's conduct fits within these principles.

The majority suggests that failure to exempt statements 

made in a matter in the jurisdiction of the judicial and 

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legislative branches could lead to § 1001 prosecutions for 

ordinary trial perjury; because the perjurious statement 

would itself be likely to precipitate a Department of Justice 

investigation and prosecution, the perjuror would be on adequate notice under Yermian. Maj. Op. at 19. Perhaps so

but resolution would seem to turn more on such issues as how 

one defines the Justice Department's "jurisdiction," and 

whether the perjurious statement itself was "in a matter" 

within that jurisdiction, see pp. 8-9 below, than on whether 

statements in courtrooms are somehow immune from § 1001. 

Except in jurisdictions applying the judicially invented "exculpatory no" exception, false statements made in matters that 

the Justice Department already is investigating trigger 

§ 1001 liability, see, e.g., United States v. Weiner, 96 F.3d 35 

(2d Cir. 1996), even though the prosecutor might also seek an 

obstruction of justice conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1503. 

Compare United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 436-38 (4th 

Cir. 1993) (finding that false statement to FBI agent can be 

basis of obstruction of justice charge) with United States v. 

Aquilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1486 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting such a 

theory). Counts Three and Seven of the Indictment explicitly 

charge Oakar under such a theory. It is hard for me to see 

why it should make a difference that an intermediary (the 

Clerk of the House) stood between Oakar and the Department's investigative staff in regard to the statement that is 

subject of Count Two. Cf. Tracy, slip op. at 2003-04.

* * *

The 1996 amendments to § 1001, extending "department or 

agency" to encompass the legislative and judicial branches, 

see n.1 above, render the current issue a matter of history 

(except, of course, to Oakar and the government). But this 

case forces one to ponder the implications of applying § 1001 

to statements not made to a "department or agency." The 

Supreme Court made that application clear in Yermian, 

rejecting the defendant's claim that guilt required "actual 

knowledge of federal involvement." 468 U.S. at 74. The 

Court upheld a conviction based on a jury instruction that the 

defendant could be found guilty if he "knew or should have 

known that the information was to be submitted to a government agency," id. at 66-67, and left open the question of 

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whether even reasonable foreseeability was required, id. at 75 

n.14. The Court in places appeared to take the view that the 

"in any matter" clause was intended only to be sure that the 

statute was "limited to issues of federal concern." Id. at 74. 

In the modern world, that is scarcely any limit at all. Thus 

Yermian might be read to permit § 1001 to reach any 

material, knowing false statement that turns out to have a 

fortuitous federal involvementfor example, a statement that 

the IRS happens upon in the course of a tax audit, or a casual 

falsehood made in the unknown presence of a federal officer 

and somehow pertinent to his mission.

There has been some judicial resistance to Yermian. In 

one case the majority applied it faithfully, but with the 

comment that "[i]t implies no disrespect to say that Yermian

is not as firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence as McCulloch 

v. Maryland, say, or Brown v. Board of Education." United 

States v. Gibson, 881 F.3d at 323 n.2. The dissenter, on the 

basis of a head count of justices in the Yermian majority no 

longer on the Court, declared that the case was no longer 

"good law" and declined to apply it. See id. at 324-25.

Of course, the Court may ultimately resolve Yermian's 

open question in favor of a narrow construction, requiring 

evidence that the defendant should have known of the prospective federal involvement. While the Court there pointed 

to alternative language by which Congress could have explicitly preserved a requirement of intent to mislead federal 

authority, Yermian, 468 U.S. at 73, it does not follow, from 

Congress's failure to choose that language, that it intended to 

dispense with the traditional rule associated with common law 

fraud that the maker of a statement to a third party (i.e., one 

other than the actual victim) must have "intend[ed] or [have] 

reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or its 

substance communicated to the other." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 533.

The parties have not raised the issue of alternative sources 

of limits, but a couple (besides the question Yermian explicitly left open) deserve mention. The statute imposes liability 

only for a statement made "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States." 18 

U.S.C. § 1001 (emphasis added). The word "matter" sugUSCA Case #96-3084 Document #266568 Filed: 04/18/1997 Page 29 of 30
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gests a case or inquiry. It also suggests an existing matter, 

i.e., a pending oneor at least one likely to be launched as a 

foreseeable result of a false statement made to a department 

or agency. Compare United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475 

(1984) (liability for false statement to FBI setting it off on a 

pointless investigation).

Moreover, it is not clear that a person is making a statement "in any matter" if a reasonable person in his position 

would not have foreseen the statement's connection to the 

"matter." The Court in Yermian noted that Congress in its 

1934 amendment of the statute deleted the "specific intent" 

provision, which had required that the statement be made 

"for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States or 

any department thereof." Yermian, 468 U.S. at 70-74. But 

deletion of that phrase hardly compels the conclusion that 

Congress intended liability where the defendant was unaware 

of any link to a federal "matter." All agree that the catalyst 

for the change was the "hot-oil" scandal of the 1930s, which 

involved false statements that had been submitted to the 

government, and whose falsity tended to thwart its regulatory 

goals. But they had not been submitted for the purpose of 

securing payment from the federal government, and were 

thus outside the predecessor act. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 

1761. The regulatory program's efficacy depended on the 

regulated firms' submission of accurate information. There 

appears no comparable dependence on the reliability of information acquired serendipitously.

Of course these issues are not now before us. I mention 

them only to make the point that, on the one that is, the 

government's reading of the statute does not inevitably lead 

to a complete metastasis of § 1001 liability.

I agree with the court's reversal of the district court's 

striking of certain allegations from Count Four of the indictment. But because I disagree with the exclusion of § 1001 

liability, derived from the supposed effect of § 104 of the 

Ethics in Government Act, I respectfully dissent.

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