Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02122/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02122-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ford Motor Company
Appellee
TMC Fuel Injection System, LLC
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TMC FUEL INJECTION SYSTEM, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-2122

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania in No. 2:12-cv-04971-NS, 

Senior Judge Norma L. Shapiro.

______________________ 

Decided: March 27, 2017

______________________ 

JOHN F. WARD, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, New 

York, NY, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented 

by DAVID LINDENBAUM. 

EUGENE ALEXIS SOKOLOFF, Hogan Lovells US LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by JESSICA LYNN ELLSWORTH; FRANK A.

ANGILERI, MARC LORELLI, Brooks Kushman PC, Southfield, MI.

______________________ 

Case: 16-2122 Document: 45-2 Page: 1 Filed: 03/27/2017
2 TMC FUEL INJECTION SYSTEM, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

Before PROST, Chief Judge, WALLACH and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

PROST, Chief Judge. 

TMC Fuel Injection System, LLC (“TMC”) appeals the 

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement. 

The district court based its decision on an application of 

prosecution history disclaimer. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

TMC filed this infringement suit against Ford Motor 

Co. (“Ford”) in 2012, alleging that fuel injection systems 

in Ford’s vehicles infringe claims 38 and 40 (“the asserted 

claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,318,414 (“’414 patent”).

I 

The ’414 patent relates to a fuel injection system for 

supplying fuel to engines, such as in automobiles. ’414 

patent col. 1 ll. 7–8. Pressurized fuel is generally delivered from a fuel tank to fuel injectors, along a main fuel 

supply line, by the action of a fuel pump. Id. at col. 2 ll. 

12–16. The fuel injectors spray fuel mist into the engine, 

and when that fuel is ignited by sparkplugs, it combusts 

and powers the engine. Id. at col. 2 ll. 15–20. Prior art

fuel injection systems would return excess fuel to the fuel 

tank whenever the engine used less fuel (such as when an 

automobile was idling). Id. at col. 3 ll. 54–57. But that 

fuel would be heated by the warmth of the engine before 

returning to the fuel tank, which was not desirable. Id. at 

col. 4 ll. 57–60, col. 5 ll. 16–22. Another problem with the 

prior art was that there was a lag in response time when 

trying to adjust the amount of fuel delivered based on the 

amount of fuel required by the engine. Id. at col. 3 ll. 45–

47.

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TMC FUEL INJECTION SYSTEM, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 3

By using components that allow the fuel system to 

switch quickly between two different pressure levels, the 

’414 patent discloses “the capability to instantly increase 

fuel supply to an engine on-demand instead of waiting for 

the system to stabilize . . . [and to] deliver[] much less fuel 

to keep the engine running when idle to save fuel.” Id. at 

col. 4 ll. 1–5; see also id. at col. 6 l. 59–col. 7 l. 7. The 

asserted claims have preambles that describe the use of a 

fuel recirculation loop “to minimize [or eliminate] the need 

of a hot fuel return line and a low pressure regulator.”1 

Id. at col. 17 ll. 15–18, 46–48 (emphasis added). Both 

asserted claims also recite, among other limitations, a 

“fuel return path” with a “flow constraint” for stabilizing

fuel pressure. Id. at col. 17 ll. 28–33, 58–65. 

II

While the underlying case was pending, Ford successfully petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

(“Board”) for inter partes review (“IPR”) of the asserted 

claims. The district court stayed the litigation, including 

a then-pending motion for summary judgment of noninfringement, until the resolution of the IPR proceedings. 

In a consolidated final written decision the Board held 

that Ford had not carried its burden of showing that the 

asserted claims are unpatentable as anticipated or obvious. The Board concluded, in relevant part, that several 

of the asserted prior art references failed to disclose a fuel 

return path with “flow constraint” because those references used pressure regulators, whereas “the prosecution 

history states an express disclaimer of pressure regulators” from the ’414 patent’s “flow constraint” limitation. 

 

1 Asserted claim 38 recites “minimize or eliminate,” 

whereas asserted claim 40 only recites “minimize.” Besides noting this difference, TMC does not distinguish 

between the asserted claims on appeal. 

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4 TMC FUEL INJECTION SYSTEM, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

J.A. 1875 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court then invited the parties to supplement their 

briefing on Ford’s summary judgment motion in view of 

the Board’s IPR decision. 

The district court’s summary judgment decision followed in the Board’s footsteps. The court held that during 

prosecution, “TMC repeatedly, unequivocally stated its 

system does not use a pressure regulator and distinguished its invention from prior art using a pressure 

regulator.” TMC Fuel Injection Sys., LLC v. Ford Motor 

Co., No. 12-4971, 2016 WL 7155793, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 

20, 2016). Although Ford had pressed the prosecution 

disclaimer theory without success before in the litigation, 

the court explained that it had not previously considered 

the prosecution history. Id.

The district court therefore amended its claim construction “to exclude pressure regulators of any type from 

the system.” Id. It also granted summary judgment of 

noninfringement because the parties did not dispute that 

Ford’s accused systems included a pressure regulator. Id. 

TMC appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION

The only issue on appeal is whether the prosecution 

history of the ’414 patent demonstrates that all pressure 

regulators were disclaimed from the fuel systems of the

asserted claims. There is no dispute that if such broad 

prosecution disclaimer attaches, then Ford would not 

infringe the asserted claims. 

Prosecution history disclaimer applies when a patentee makes statements during prosecution that would cause 

“a competitor [to] reasonably conclude that the applicant 

clearly and unmistakably limited” the scope of its claims. 

Uship Intellectual Props., LLC v. United States, 714 F.3d 

1311, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “[T]he doctrine of prosecution 

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TMC FUEL INJECTION SYSTEM, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 5

disclaimer attaches and narrows the ordinary meaning of 

the claim congruent with the scope of the surrender.” 

Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 

(Fed. Cir. 2003). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we look to the law of the regional circuit, and the 

Third Circuit applies de novo review. Microsoft Corp. v. 

GeoTag, Inc., 817 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing

Third Circuit law). We also review de novo a claim construction that is based, as it is here, on the intrinsic 

evidence. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. 

Ct. 831, 841–42 (2015). 

The parties do not dispute that the claimed “flow constraint,” which provides fixed resistance, excludes the use 

of a “pressure regulator,” which provides variable resistance. Rather, they dispute whether during prosecution TMC disclaimed pressure regulators more broadly—

from the fuel system as a whole, and not just from the 

flow constraint portion. TMC argues that any disclaimer 

of pressure regulators was limited to the system’s flow 

constraint, while Ford contends that there was a categorical disclaimer of pressure regulators from the entire 

system. 

TMC supports its position with statements that the 

Board made in its IPR decision.2 But as TMC acknowl-

 

2 To be sure, we disagree with TMC’s contention 

that the Board only found a disclaimer of pressure regulators from the flow constraint. The Board did not so cabin 

its discussion. It “conclude[d] that the prosecution history 

states an express disclaimer of ‘pressure regulators and 

incremental regulation means of any type from the system’” and then “applie[d]” this disclaimer to the flow 

constraint limitation. J.A. 1785 (emphasis added) (quoting the prosecution history). One of the administrative 

patent judges wrote separately to address an argument 

that was raised during the oral hearing in the IPR. 

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6 TMC FUEL INJECTION SYSTEM, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

edges, “[w]hether prosecution history disclaimer applies is 

a legal question this court reviews de novo.” Ecolab, Inc. 

v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see

Appellant’s Opening Br. 22 (same); Oral Argument 4:44–

5:56, available at

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/2016-

2122.mp3 (same). Accordingly, that is the standard we 

apply here.3

We turn, instead, to the prosecution history of the 

’414 patent. During prosecution, the examiner issued a

final rejection of all pending claims, after which TMC filed 

a response stating that the claimed “invention takes a 

completely different approach” from prior art fuel systems, J.A. 327, and that “[t]he Application does not use [a] 

pressure regulator or pressure relief valve,” J.A. 336. The 

examiner again rejected all of the pending claims—

including claims with the preamble language about 

“minimiz[ing]” the need for pressure regulators—in an 

advisory action. On appeal to the then-existing Board of 

Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”), TMC distinguished the prior art by reiterating that the claimed 

“invention is not directed to pressure regulators. . . . In 

this case, every cited reference has at least one pressure 

regulator.” J.A. 533. TMC further stated, in no uncertain 

terms, that the claimed invention “eliminate[es] pressure 

regulators and incremental regulation means of any type 

from the system,” and explained that “no regulator of any 

kind is used by the Appellant in the system nor needs to 

be used at anytime.” J.A. 502 (emphases added). It made 

this express disavowal repeatedly in its BPAI appeal 

brief. See, e.g., J.A. 545 (“Appellant’s system does not use 

 

3 TMC attempts to discount the Board’s IPR decision by trying to raise a due process defect. Because we 

are not reviewing that decision here, we do not reach that 

issue.

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TMC FUEL INJECTION SYSTEM, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 7

pressure regulators.”); J.A. 546 (“The Appellant’s system 

does not use pressure regulator [sic], but depends on the 

recirculation loop and flow constraint element to obtain 

pressure at the pre-set level.”); J.A. 548 (“[TMC’s] teaching does not use any pressure regulator or pressure 

regulating element.”). Persuaded by these arguments, the 

examiner withdrew his rejections. 

TMC’s prosecution statements, particularly the ones 

made during the BPAI appeal, unequivocally disavow the 

use of pressure regulators from the entire fuel system. 

TMC made those statements to traverse the examiner’s 

rejections, and the examiner withdrew his rejections 

directly in response to the representation in TMC’s BPAI 

appeal brief. It is immaterial whether or not TMC needed 

to make such a broad disclaimer in order to traverse the 

prior art because “the scope of surrender is not limited to 

what is absolutely necessary to avoid a prior art reference; patentees may surrender more than necessary.” 

Tech. Props. Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., – F.3d –, 2017 WL

836597, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 3, 2017). “When this happens, we hold patentees to the actual arguments made, 

not the arguments that could have been made.” Id.

TMC submits that the claim language of the ’414 patent demonstrates that any disclaimer was limited because the claims themselves clearly contemplate the

presence of pressure regulators in a fuel system. It points 

to the preambles of the asserted claims, which provide the 

option of “minimiz[ing],” rather than necessarily eliminating, the use of pressure regulators. Appellant’s Opening 

Br. 26. It also points to several unasserted claims of the 

’414 patent that allegedly reference the possibility of 

including a pressure regulator. But the language of those

claims does not affect the scope of the prosecution disclaimer in this case. TMC’s statements in the prosecution 

history clearly and unmistakably disavowed pressure 

regulators from the claimed systems. “[T]he doctrine of 

prosecution disclaimer attaches and narrows the ordinary 

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8 TMC FUEL INJECTION SYSTEM, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

meaning of the claim congruent with the scope of the 

surrender.” Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d at 1324. Therefore, 

even if there is claim language that might have otherwise

left open the option of using pressure regulators in the 

claimed fuel systems, TMC’s statements during prosecution definitively closed that door. This is precisely the 

point of prosecution disclaimer.

In the alternative, TMC argues that any disclaimer of 

pressure regulators only applies to a particular type of 

pressure regulator—a three-port valve—based on how 

pressure regulators were purportedly defined during 

prosecution. Having reviewed the prosecution history, we 

decline to limit the type of pressure regulator disclaimed. 

TMC relies on a single statement from the prosecution 

history that refers to three-port valves, but that statement was made before the numerous categorical disavowals made during the BPAI appeal. As noted above, the 

’414 patent claims were eventually allowed after a disavowal of pressure regulators “of any type from the system.” J.A. 502 (emphasis added); see also id. (“[N]o 

regulator of any kind is used by the Applicant in the 

system nor needs to be used at anytime.”). This disavowal

was unambiguous and was not directed to any particular 

type of valve.

Therefore, on the basis of prosecution disclaimer, the 

asserted claims exclude the use of any pressure regulator 

from the fuel system.

CONCLUSION

There is no dispute that Ford’s accused products cannot infringe in light of our determination of prosecution 

disclaimer. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment of noninfringement is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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