Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_08-cv-00418/USCOURTS-alsd-2_08-cv-00418-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
H&S Homes, LLC
Defendant
Horton Homes, Inc.
Defendant
Gary L. Stevens
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 Although the undersigned’s order of August 12, 2008 states that the motion to

remand will be taken under submission on August 27, 2008 and extends to plaintiff the

opportunity to file a reply by August 26, 2008 (Doc. 16), it is now determined that the Court

need not await plaintiff’s reply to rule on the pending motion in light of the defendant’s failure to

satisfy its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in

controversy in this case more likely than not exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

Given this disposition, there is no reason for this Court to address the removing defendants’

equitable estoppel argument.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

GARY L. STEVENS, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 08-0418-KD-C

H & S HOMES, L.L.C., et al., :

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause is before the Magistrate Judge for issuance of a report and

recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), on the removal petition

(Doc. 1), plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 10), and the defendants’ responses

to the remand motion (Docs. 20 & 21).1

 Upon consideration of the foregoing

pleadings, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court GRANT the

motion to remand and REMAND this case to the Circuit Court of Dallas

County, Alabama from whence it came.

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 1 of 16
2 As alleged in the complaint, Jeff Collins was a citizen of Alabama and an

employee of defendant H&S Homes, L.L.C. (Doc. 1, Exhibit A, at ¶ 2)

2

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. In April of 2007, plaintiff filed a fraud, conversion, negligence

and wantonness cause of action in the Circuit Court of Dallas County,

Alabama against the removing defendants and Jeff Collins2

 arising out of

plaintiff’s purchase of a mobile home from an H&S sales lot in Selma,

Alabama. (Doc. 1, Exhibit A, COMPLAINT) Throughout the complaint,

plaintiff requests indeterminate damages in excess of the minimum

jurisdictional limit of the Circuit Court of Dallas County, Alabama. (See id. at

4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9) The factual allegations of the complaint read as follows:

3. Prior to May, 1999, Plaintiff was in the market to

purchase a mobile home. During the course of his search,

Plaintiff visited Defendants’ sales lot in Selma, Alabama.

4. After viewing a particular mobile home

manufactured by Horton Homes, Inc., Plaintiff agreed to

purchase the home.

5. During the meeting with Defendants’ H&S

authorized agent, servant, or employee, Jeff Collins, oral

representations were made to the Plaintiff to induced him to

purchase the mobile home and pay the agreed purchase price,

$50,387.00.

6. Based on the written and oral representations

made by the Defendants’ H&S agents, servants or employees to

the Plaintiff, Plaintiff agreed to purchase the subject mobile

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 2 of 16
3

home from Defendants and signed a contract to that effect.

7. After the purchase of the mobile home, Plaintiff

learned that Defendants made certain material

misrepresentations to Plaintiff in order to induce him to

purchase the mobile home and pay the agreed price for the unit.

8. As the direct and proximate result of the

Defendants’ fraudulent, malicious, intentional and wrongful

conduct, Plaintiff has been deprived of his down payment.

Further, Plaintiff would not have purchased the mobile home

and paid the monthly payments on the home had he known the

true facts. Plaintiff has suffered damages in that he lost monies,

lost the use of monies, and has suffered mental anguish, anxiety,

and emotional distress.

9. Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to compensatory

damages which he has suffered and, in addition thereto, that he

should recover punitive damages pursuant to Alabama Code,

Section 6-11-20. Plaintiff claims that Defendants consciously or

deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness or malice

with regard to the Plaintiff as defined by Alabama Code, Section

6-11-20. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants either:

(a) Knew or should have known of the

unfitness of the agent, employee, or servant which (sic)

committed the wrongful conduct and employed him or

continued to employ him, or use his services without proper

instruction with a disregard of the rights or safety of others; or

(b) Authorized the wrongful conduct of its

agent, employee, or servant; or

(c) Ratified the wrongful conduct of its agent,

employee or servant; or

(d) The acts of the agent, servant, or employee

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 3 of 16
4

were calculated to or did benefit the Defendants.

10. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendants, H&S

acted through their duly appointed agents, servants, or

employees, which agents, servants or employees acted within

the line and scope of their agency, service of employment, or in

the alternative, Defendants adopted, confirmed and ratified all

the actions and omission[s] of its (sic) agents, servants and

employees as its (sic) own.

11. All of the events alleged herein were first

discovered within two (2) years prior to the filing of the instant

complaint.

(Id. at 2-3) 

2. In the notice of removal, filed July 17, 2008, the defendants

contend that removal is proper based on diversity of citizenship. (Doc.1, at 1)

III. Amount in Controversy

12. Mr. Stevens seeks relief from the

Defendants for alleged fraud and misrepresentations related to

his purchase of a manufactured home from an H&S sales lot

located in Selma, Alabama. Mr. Stevens also claims that the

Defendants converted furnishings and money associated with his

purchase of the home, for all of which he requests unspecified

compensatory and punitive damages for lost money, mental

anguish, anxiety and emotional distress.

13. Mr. Stevens seeks to recover damages from

Defendant Horton Homes, based on the allegation that

Defendant H&S Homes is “an alter ego or mere instrumentality

of Horton Homes, Inc.” 

14. Although the Complaint does not specify

the damages sought by the Plaintiff, it is clear for purposes of

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 4 of 16
5

removal that the claims in the Complaint exceed the $75,000.00

requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). A removing party “must

only show that the amount in controversy more likely than not

exceeds the jurisdictional requirement.” Bullock v. United

Benefit Ins. Co., 165 F.Supp.2d 1255, 1258-59 (M.D. Ala. 2001)

(DeMent, J.). Also, “[w]hen determining the jurisdictional

amount in controversy in diversity cases, punitive damages must

be considered, unless it is apparent to a legal certainty that such

cannot be recovered.” Holley Equip. Co. v. Credit Alliance

Corp., 821 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1987) . . . . Mr. Stevens

seeks punitive damages in each of the seven counts of the

Complaint. In addition, the same counsel who represent plaintiff

have represented other claimants who have asserted nearly

identical claims against Horton Homes and/or H&S in

arbitration and another state court case that have resulted in

awards and/or verdicts exceeding $400,000.00. See H&S

Homes, LLC v. John McDonald, 978 So.2d 692 (Ala. 2007)

($440,000); H&S Homes v. Christina McDonald, 910 So.2d 79

(Ala. 2004) ($500,000). Because it cannot be shown to a legal

certainty that Mr. Stevens is incapable of recovering at least

$75,000.00 for his claims, which include fraud and

misrepresentation, his punitive damages claims alone are

sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional amount required for

removal. See, e.g., Davis v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 71 F.Supp.2d

1197, 1200 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (finding, for example, that a claim

for fraud under Alabama law against an insurance company

“may very well” result in a punitive damages award that exceeds

the jurisdictional amount”). 

15. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over this

matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441 because (a) the

Complaint and available evidence satisfy the required amount in

controversy which exceeds $75,000.00 exclusive of interest and

costs; and (b) as a result of the dismissal of Defendant Collins,

this is a civil action between citizens of different States.

16. This Notice of Removal is filed within thirty days

of the plaintiff’s filing of a “Notice of Dismissal” on June 18,

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 5 of 16
3 As indicated above (see, n.1, supra), this Court need not consider and “pass on”

the defendant’s equitable estoppel argument.

6

2008. Prior to that date, this case was not removable because the

presence of Mr. Collins, as a citizen of Alabama, destroyed

diversity. Therefore, this Notice of Removal is timely under 28

U.S.C. § 1146(b).

IV. § 1446(b) One Year Limitation

17. Although the one-year limitation on the removal

of a diversity case imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) has expired,

recent decisions by several Federal Circuit and District Courts

effect an equitable estoppel under the circumstances presented

here, which preclude the application of the one-year limitation

on removal.

(Id. at 4-6 (internal citations to complaint omitted; footnote omitted)) 

3. Plaintiff filed his motion to remand on August 7, 2008. (Doc. 10)

Therein, plaintiff contends that the jurisdictional requirement for circuit courts

in Alabama is an amount in excess of $10,000 and that though he sought an

indeterminate amount in excess of $10,000, including compensatory and

punitive damages, the defendants have not carried their burden of proving by

a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy in this case

more likely than not exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. (See id.

at 1-2) In addition, plaintiff contends that this cause of action is due to be

remanded since the notice of removal was filed more than one year after the

filing of the complaint in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). (See id. at 2)3

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 6 of 16
4 Horton Homes, Inc. adds to this list an arbitrator’s June 5, 2007 award to a Mr.

William Shaner. (Doc. 20, at 3)

7

4. In opposition to the motion to remand, defendant Horton Homes,

Inc. reiterates the arguments made in the removal petition regarding the

amount in controversy, specifically with respect to amounts awarded to other

individuals represented by plaintiff’s counsel against one or both of the

removing defendants (compare Doc. 20, at 2-3 with Doc. 1, at 5),4

 and cites to

Kennedy v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 2007 WL 4287374 (M.D. Ala.) in

support of the argument that it has satisfied its “burden of demonstrating the

likely value of Mr. Stevens’ claims in this case[]”(Doc. 20, at 4). Defendant

H&S Homes, L.L.C. adopted Horton Homes’ response as its own. (See Doc.

21)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. “Any civil case filed in state court may be removed by the

defendant to federal court if the case could have been brought originally in

federal court.” Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th

Cir. 1996) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen

v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000). Federal courts may

exercise diversity jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the action is

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 7 of 16
8

between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). However,

“[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, federal

courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly. . . . Indeed, all doubts

about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.”

University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411

(11th Cir. 1999).

2. “[T]he party invoking the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden

of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting the existence

of federal jurisdiction.” McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th

Cir. 2002); see also Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287

n.4 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (“[T]he removing party bears the burden

of demonstrating federal jurisdiction.”); Tapscott, supra (“A removing

defendant has the burden of proving the existence of federal jurisdiction.”).

Therefore, in this case, the burden is on the removing defendants to establish

complete diversity, that is, the plaintiffs are all diverse from the defendant,

Triggs, supra, 154 F.3d at 1287 (citation omitted), and, in addition, to establish

by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely

than not exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement, Tapscott, supra, 77

F.3d at 1357 (“[W]e hold where a plaintiff has made an unspecified demand

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 8 of 16
9

for damages in state court, a removing defendant must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than

not exceeds the $50,000 jurisdictional requirement.”). More specifically, “the

removing defendant[s] must establish the amount in controversy by ‘[t]he

greater weight of the evidence, . . . [a] superior evidentiary weight that, though

not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still

sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather

than the other.’” Lowery, infra, 483 F.3d at 1209, quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 1220 (8th ed. 2004).

3. The removing defendants have failed to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy in this case more

likely than not exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement. This Court’s

analysis of this issue is necessarily informed by the Eleventh Circuit’s recent

decision in Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (2007), cert. denied

sub nom. Hanna Steel Corp. v. Lowery, U.S. , 128 S.Ct. 2877, 

L.Ed.2d (2008). 

[W]e conclude that the removal-remand scheme set forth in 28

U.S.C. §§ 1446(b) and 1447(c) requires that a court review the

propriety of removal on the basis of the removing documents. If

the jurisdictional amount is either stated clearly on the face of

the documents before the court, or readily deducible from them,

then the court has jurisdiction. If not, the court must remand.

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 9 of 16
10

Under this approach, jurisdiction is either evident from the

removing documents or remand is appropriate.

...

[U]nder § 1446(b), in assessing the propriety of removal, the

court considers the document received by the defendant from the

plaintiff-be it the initial complaint or a later received paper-and

determines whether that document and the notice of removal

unambiguously establish federal jurisdiction. This inquiry is at

the heart of a case, such as the one before us, in which the

plaintiffs challenge removal by filing a timely motion to remand

under § 1447(c). In assessing whether removal was proper in

such a case, the district court has before it only the limited

universe of evidence available when the motion to remand is

filed-i.e., the notice of removal and accompanying documents.

If that evidence is insufficient to establish that removal was

proper or that jurisdiction was present, neither the defendants

nor the court may speculate in an attempt to make up for the

notice’s failings. The absence of factual allegations pertinent to

the existence of jurisdiction is dispositive and, in such absence,

the existence of jurisdiction should not be divined by looking to

the stars.

...

Though the defendant in a diversity case, unlike the plaintiff,

may have no actual knowledge of the value of the claims, the

defendant is not excused from the duty to show by fact, and not

mere conclusory allegation, that federal jurisdiction exists.

Indeed, the defendant, by removing the action, has represented

to the court that the case belongs before it. Having made this

representation, the defendant is no less subject to Rule 11 than

a plaintiff who files a claim originally. Thus, a defendant that

files a notice of removal prior to receiving clear evidence that

the action satisfies the jurisdictional requirements, and then later

faces a motion to remand, is in the same position as a plaintiff

in an original action facing a motion to dismiss.

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 10 of 16
5 It is clear that the Eleventh Circuit reiterated in Holley Equipment Co. v. Credit

Alliance Corp., 821 F.2d 1531 (1987) that “[w]hen determining the jurisdictional amount in

controversy in diversity cases, punitive damages, must be considered, unless it is apparent to a

legal certainty that such cannot be recovered.” Id. at 1535 (internal citations and footnote

omitted). However, this proposition of law does not lessen the removing parties’ burden to prove

that the jurisdictional amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 nor does it otherwise shift any

burden to the plaintiff to prove the contrary. Any suggestion, implicit or otherwise, by the

removing parties that plaintiff bears a responsibility to establish to a legal certainty that he will

be incapable of recovering at least $75,000 for his claims (see Doc. 1, at 5 (“Because it cannot be

shown to a legal certainty that Mr. Stevens is incapable of recovering at least $75,000.00 for his

claims, which include fraud and misrepresentation, his punitive damages claims alone are

11

Id. at 1211, 1213-1215 & 1217 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).

4. In accordance with Lowery, therefore, this Court looks solely to

plaintiff’s complaint and the notice of removal to assess the propriety of

removal. The undersigned quickly discerns that the jurisdictional amount of

$75,000 is nowhere clearly stated on the face of the complaint. Moreover, that

amount is not clearly deducible from the complaint or the removal petition.

The removing defendants appear to make a two-pronged argument with

respect to why this Court should find that the jurisdictional amount is readily

deducible from the complaint. In the removal petition and in response to the

plaintiff’s motion to remand, Horton Homes, Inc. cites to several Alabama

cases in which plaintiff’s attorneys, who represented other claimants against

one or both of the removing defendants, have been successful in garnering

(arbitration) awards or verdicts in excess of $75,000 (Doc. 1, at ¶ 14; see also

Doc. 20, at 2-3)5

 and also cites to Kennedy v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc.,

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 11 of 16
sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional amount required for removal.”)) is REJECTED. 

12

2007 WL 4287374 (M.D. Ala.) for the proposition that the foregoing evidence

of awards and verdicts in similar cases satisfies “its burden of demonstrating

the likely value of Mr. Stevens’ claims in this case[]” (Doc. 20, at 4). As

Lowery makes clear, however, such “‘evidence’ . . . fails to support the

defendant[’s] contention that [this] [] court [has] jurisdiction over this action.”

483 F.3d at 1220. 

First, we note that this evidence regarding the value of other tort

claims was not received from the plaintiffs, but rather was

gathered from outside sources. As such, the evidence is not of

the sort contemplated by § 1446(b). Even if the defendants had

received the evidence of other suits from the plaintiffs, we

question whether such general evidence is ever of much use in

establishing the value of claims in any one particular suit.

Looking only to this evidence and the complaint, the facts

regarding other cases tell us nothing about the value of the

claims in this lawsuit. Even were we to look to evidence beyond

that contained within the notice of removal, in the present

dispute-with a record bereft of detail-we cannot possibly

ascertain how similar the current action is to those the

defendants cite.

Id. at 1220-1221 (footnote added). Thus, the Alabama cases cited by the

removing defendants are due to be rejected, cf. Siniard v. Ford Motor Co., 554

F.Supp.2d 1276, 1277 & 1279 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (“This is a product liability

case arising out of a motor vehicle accident in Alabama on April 5, 2006,

which claimed the life of a Tennessee resident citizen named Deborah S.

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 12 of 16
13

Siniard. . . . Ford acknowledged that the Complaint does not contain a specific

damage request, but noted that Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive

damages for the wrongful death of Deborah Siniard. As evidence that the claim

in this case necessarily exceeded $75,000, Ford asserted that other Alabama

courts have routinely entered wrongful death verdicts in excess of $75,000 in

product liability claims. In support of this proposition, Ford listed numerous

cases from various courts which resulted in plaintiffs’ verdicts in wrongful

death cases each of which exceeded $75,000. . . . While this Court agrees that

the precepts set forth in Lowery require the remand of this case which was

removed on nothing more than speculation about the amount in controversy,

the Court cannot agree that it has the option of ignoring Lowery until after the

mandate issues or the Supreme Court addresses that case.”); Carswell v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 2007 WL 1697003, *1 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (“Prior to Lowery,

Alabama personal injury cases and wrongful death cases with diversity of

citizenship but no ad damnum were routinely removed to federal court and

often kept there by the defendant asserting the existence of more than $75,000

in controversy and citing jury awards in excess of that amount in similar

Alabama cases. In contrast to the former practice, Lowery now requires that

the documents before the court on removal ‘unambiguously establish federal

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 13 of 16
6 The defendants nowhere concede that Stevens is entitled to an award of

compensatory or punitive damages and presumably plan to oppose plaintiff’s effort to obtain any

award in this case. Accordingly, the cases the defendants cite to this Court do not provide the

undersigned any useful information about the value of the claims in this lawsuit. All this Court

knows is that the purchase price of the subject mobile home was $50,387.00. However, this

information is not of much assistance to the Court because it is clear that the purchase price was

financed and there has been no accounting of the total amount of payments, including the down

payment, made by plaintiff.

7 The judge in the Kennedy case was Chief Judge Mark Fuller, the same judge who

later rejected in Siniard, supra, the same type of “evidence” the removing defendants in this case

want this Court to accept as establishing that they have carried their burden of proving that the

amount in controversy in this case more likely than not exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest

and costs. Moreover, it is impossible for the undersigned to believe that a case seeking

compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the alleged purchase of a “worthless” mobile

home would lead to an award of damages greater than what could be expected to be awarded in a

wrongful-death product liability action. Since Siniard rejects, as aforesaid, the type of

“evidence” the defendants ask this Court to accept, the undersigned is confident that faced with

another mobile home case like Kennedy, Chief Judge Mark Fuller, consistent with Siniard,

would reach the conclusion that this Court reaches in this case.

14

jurisdiction.’ District courts in this circuit are no longer able to ‘speculate in

an attempt to make up for the notice’s failings,’ nor are courts able to consider

‘evidence regarding the value of other tort claims.’”),6

 as is the Kennedy case

since that case failed to cite to the controlling language from Lowery.7

 The

undersigned’s rejection of the “evidence” supplied by the removing defendants

necessitates a finding by this Court that the removing defendants have failed

to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy

in this case more likely than not exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 14 of 16
8 The removing defendants rely solely on Kennedy, making no mention of Siniard,

though plaintiff cites to this case (see Doc. 10, at 2), and fail to fully appreciate the scope and

impact of Lowery with respect to the jurisdictional amount in controversy. 

15

costs.8

CONCLUSION

The removing defendants have not established by a preponderance of

the evidence that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000,

exclusive of interest and costs. Accordingly, the undersigned

RECOMMENDS that the motion to remand this case to the Circuit Court of

Dallas County, Alabama (Doc. 10) be GRANTED.

The instructions which follow the undersigned’s signature contain

important information regarding objections to the report and recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 26th day of August, 2008.

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 15 of 16
16

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to

the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the

cost of the transcript.

_s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY____________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:08-cv-00418-KD-C Document 23 Filed 08/26/08 Page 16 of 16