Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-01194/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-01194-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cotton On USA, Inc.
Defendant
Fernando Gastelum
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FERNANDO GASTELUM,

Plaintiff,

v.

COTTON ON USA, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:22-cv-01194-JLT-SAB

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 

SHOW CAUSE RE SUPPLEMENTAL 

JURISDICTION 

DEADLINE: TWENTY-ONE DAYS

On September 21, 2022, Plaintiff Fernando Gastelum, proceeding pro se, filed a

Complaint against Defendant Cotton On USA, Inc. (ECF No. 1.) The Complaint asserts claims 

under: (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.; (2) the 

California Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–53; and (3) the 

California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54–54.3. (Id.) Plaintiff is seeking both 

injunctive relief and monetary damages. On December 19, 2022, Defendant filed an answer. 

(ECF No. 6.) 

Based upon the recent Ninth Circuit opinion in Vo v. Choi, the Court shall require

Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 

2022) (holding the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in a joint 

Unruh Act and ADA case).

Case 1:22-cv-01194-SAB Document 11 Filed 02/01/23 Page 1 of 6
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In an action over which a district court possesses original jurisdiction, that court “shall 

have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action 

within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 

III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Even if supplemental jurisdiction 

exists, however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Such discretion may be exercised “[d]epending on a host of factors” 

including “the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the 

character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims.” 

See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997).

Unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act permits the recovery of monetary damages, in the form of 

actual and treble damages, at a statutory minimum of at least $4,000.00 per violation. Cal. Civ. 

Code § 52(a); Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007). After passage of the 

ADA in 1990, the Unruh Civil Rights Act and California Disabled Persons Act were amended to 

provide that a violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Pickern 

v. Best W. Timber Cove Lodge Marina Resort, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Cal. 

Civ. Code § 54.1(d) (“A violation of the right of an individual under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . also constitutes a violation of this section.”); Rodriguez v. Barrita, 

Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (stating same as to California Disabled Persons 

Act). 

More recently, California, in response to the resulting substantial volume of claims 

asserted under the Unruh Act and the concern that high-frequency litigants may be using the 

statute to obtain monetary relief for themselves without accompanying adjustments to locations 

to assure accessibility to others, enacted filing restrictions designed to address that concern. See

Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2021). These heightened pleading 

requirements apply to actions alleging a “[c]onstruction-related accessibility claim,” which 

California law defines as “any civil claim in a civil action with respect to a place of public 

accommodation, including but not limited to, a claim brought under Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55, 

based wholly or in part on an alleged violation of any construction-related accessibility 

Case 1:22-cv-01194-SAB Document 11 Filed 02/01/23 Page 2 of 6
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standard.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1).

Moreover, California imposes additional limitations on “high-frequency litigants,” 

defined as: “A plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints alleging a construction-related 

accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing of the current 

complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 

425.55(b)(1). The definition of “high-frequency litigant” also extends to attorneys. See Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(2). “High-frequency litigants” are subject to a special filing fee and 

further heightened pleading requirements. See Cal. Gov. Code § 70616.5; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 

425.50(a)(4)(A). By enacting restrictions on the filing of construction-related accessibility 

claims, California has expressed a desire to limit the financial burdens California’s businesses 

may face for claims for statutory damages under the Unruh Act. See Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 

at 1206-07, 1212. 

The Ninth Circuit has also expressed “concerns about comity and fairness” by permitting 

plaintiffs to circumvent “California’s procedural requirements.” Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th at 1171. 

Plaintiffs who file these actions in federal court evade these limits and pursue state law damages 

in a manner inconsistent with the state law’s requirements, as the Ninth Circuit has observed:

As the district court recognized, the recent confluence of several 

California-law rules have combined to create a highly unusual 

systemic impact on ADA-based Unruh Act cases that clearly 

threatens to have a significant adverse impact on federal-state 

comity. Congress crafted the ADA so that the only remedy 

available in private suits is prospective injunctive relief, and 

damages are only available in suits that the Government elects to 

bring. See supra at 1205–06 & 1206 n.1. As it is entitled to do, 

California chose a different route—it created, in the Unruh Act, a 

state law cause of action that relies dispositively on the ADA's 

substantive rules but that expands the remedies available in a 

private action. Not only are “actual damages” available, but also an 

additional award of up to treble damages, and the total monetary 

award may not be less than $4,000 per occasion. See CAL. CIV. 

CODE § 52(a); id. § 55.56(a), (f). In response to the resulting 

substantial volume of claims asserted under the Unruh Act, and the 

concern that high-frequency litigants may be using the statute to 

obtain monetary relief for themselves without accompanying 

adjustments to locations to assure accessibility to others, California 

chose not to reform the underlying cause of action but instead to 

impose filing restrictions designed to address that concern. 

Because these procedural restrictions apparently have not been 

applied in federal court, see supra at 1207–08, the consequence of 

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these various laws, taken together, was to make it very unattractive 

to file such Unruh Act suits in state court but very attractive to file 

them in federal court. Given that the Unruh Act borrows the 

ADA’s substantive standards as the predicate for its cause of 

action, a federal forum is readily available simply by pairing the 

Unruh Act claim with a companion ADA claim for injunctive 

relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As the statistics cited by the district 

court demonstrate,5the apparent result has been a wholesale 

shifting of Unruh Act/ADA cases into the U.S. District Court for 

the Central District of California (and perhaps the other California 

federal courts as well).

Arroyo v. Rojas, 19 F.4th at 1211–12.1 The Court notes the growing trend amongst California 

district courts to consider the state procedural requirements in ADA cases (similar to the instant 

matter) as a basis for declining to exert supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s Unruh and 

other state law claims. See, e.g., Brooke v. Tides Hosp. LLC, No. 8:21-cv-00755-JLS-JDE 

(C.D. Cal. Jun. 4, 2021) (order to show cause why the court should not decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim); Marquez v. KBMS Hosp. Corp., 492 

F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“The Court finds that this case presents ‘exceptional 

circumstances’ and that ‘there are compelling reasons’ for declining to exercise jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff's Unruh Act claim . . . Most significantly, California has established a detailed statutory 

scheme regarding construction-related accessibility complaints for damages, and it deserves the 

opportunity to enforce that scheme.”); Dalfio v. Simco-Robinson, LLC, No. 21-CV-647-MMA 

(DEB), 2021 WL 5178525, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2021) (granting motion to dismiss and 

declining to exercise jurisdiction over Unruh Act Claim). According to the filings with this 

Court, Plaintiff appears to be a high-frequency litigant.

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 The Court notes that in consideration of judicial economy, convenience, fairness to litigants, and comity, the Ninth 

Circuit in Arroyo found that because a motion for summary judgment was already adjudicated and the court had 

ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the ADA claim, “[f]rom the perspective of judicial economy and convenience, it 

makes no sense to decline jurisdiction, as the district court did, over a pendent state law claim that that court has 

effectively already decided.” 19 F.4th at 1214. 

2

 This appears to be one of more than sixteen cases Plaintiff has initiated, in the Eastern District in 2022. See, e.g., 

Gastelum v. Veer Hosp. LLC, No. 1:22-cv-00112-DAD-BAK; Gastelum v. Easiness LP, No. 1:22-cv-00166-DADBAK; Gastelum v. Tilly’s, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-00178-ADA-CDB; Gastelum v. Penney OpCo, LLC, No. 1:22-cv00179-AWI-EPG; Gastelum v. Tractor Supply Co., No. 1:22-cv-00209-JLT-SAB; Gastelum v. Petco Animal 

Supplies Stores, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-00792-BAM; Gastelum v. Five Below, Inc., 1:22-cv-00825-AWI-SAB; Gastelum 

v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-01173-ADA-CDB; Gastelum v. Shop Q, Inc., 1:22-cv-01176-EPG; 

Gastelum v. Macy’s Inc., No. 2:22-cv-00065-KJM-DB; Gastelum v. Penney OpCo, LLC, No. 2:22-cv-00283-KJMAC; Gastelum v. Arbor Lodging Partners, LLC, 2:22-cv-01689-TLN-KJN. 

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As a final note, based on the parties’ filings, it is unclear whether both parties have 

consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. To consent or decline to magistrate judge 

jurisdiction, a party may sign and file the consent form available on the Court’s website, at: 

hhttp://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/index.cfm/forms/civil/. Parties may consent, decline or 

withhold consent without any adverse consequences. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff show cause, in writing, no later than twenty-one days of entry of this 

order, as to why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and California Disabled Persons Act

claim;

2. Within such response, Plaintiff shall identify the amount of statutory damages 

Plaintiff seeks to recover, and provide a declaration or declarations, signed under 

penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if 

Plaintiff is a “high-frequency litigant”; 

3. Within fourteen days of the service of Plaintiff’s filing in response to this order, 

Defendant may file a response to Plaintiff’s filing; 

4. Failure to respond may result in a recommendation to dismiss the entire action 

without prejudice, Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (stating that dismissal is warranted “[i]f 

the plaintiff fails to ... comply with ... a court order”); Hells Canyon Pres. 

Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005); Local Rue l10; 

5. Further, an inadequate response will result in the Court recommending that 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim be declined and that 

the Unruh claim be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); and 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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6. The parties are directed to file consent or declination of consent forms if they 

wish to signify their intent to consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 1, 2023 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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