Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00164/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00164-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edilberto Rodriguez-Vega
Petitioner
USA
Respondent

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Edilberto Rodriguez-Vega,

Movant, 

v. 

USA, 

Respondent.

No. CV-15-00164-TUC-BPV

(No. 14-24387PO-BPV) 

ORDER 

 

 Pending before the Court is Movant’s pro se Motion Under 28 U.S.C. '2255 to 

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1). 

Respondent has filed a Response (Doc. 4). For the following reasons, the Court denies 

the Motion and dismisses this action. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 On April 1, 2014, Movant was charged by criminal complaint with illegal reentry 

in violation of 8 U.S.C. ' 1326(a),(b)(1), a felony, (Count One) and illegal entry in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. '1325, a misdemeanor (Count Two). (Doc. 1) filed in United 

States v. Edilberto Rodriguez-Vega, No. 14-24387PO-BPV (“No. 14-24387PO-BPV”)). 

On April 1, 2014, with the assistance of counsel, Movant executed a plea agreement 

pleading guilty to the misdemeanor charge of illegal entry in exchange for, inter alia,

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dismissal of the felony charge and a stipulated sentence of 150 days of imprisonment. 

(Plea Agreement (Doc. 1-1) filed in No. 14-24387PO-BPV). At the change of plea 

proceeding, Movant acknowledged that he is a citizen of Honduras, he had entered the 

United States illegally and on or about March 30, 2014, he was found at or near Green 

Valley, Arizona, and also that on or about March 20, 2014, he entered the United States 

at or near Sasabe, Arizona, at a time and place other than as designated by Immigration 

Officers of the United States. (Id.). Movant was sentenced to 150 days of imprisonment 

with credit for time served, as stipulated in the Plea Agreement. (Judgment (Doc. 1, p.2) 

filed in No. 14-24387PO-BPV); see also Plea Agreement (Doc. 1-1, p. 2) filed in 14-

24387PO-BPV (the sentence “will commence at the time of plea and sentencing.”)). 

 The docket also reflects that on August 26, 2014, Movant was arrested pursuant to 

a warrant on charges of violation of conditions of supervised release relating to a 

conviction in the Western District of Texas in which he was sentenced to 21 months of 

imprisonment followed by 3 years of supervised release. (See Doc. 1, filed in United 

States v. Edilberto Rodriguez-Vega, No. 14-150-mj-DTF (D. Ariz.) (supervised release 

commenced on March 14, 2013)). On August 27, 2014, Movant was committed to the 

Western District of Texas. (Doc. 4, filed in No. 14-150-mj-DTF). On November 5, 

2014, the Honorable Alia Moses, District Judge for the Western District of Texas, found 

that Movant violated the terms of supervised release and committed Movant to the 

custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons for a term of 18 months, “to run consecutive to 

Docket No. 14-24387M – District of Arizona, Tucson, Division, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. '

3583(e)(3).” (Doc. 39 filed in United States v. Edilberto Rodriguez-Vega, CR 11-

1370(1)-AM (W.D. Tex.)). 

 Although it appears that Movant has already served the 150 days imposed by this 

Court in No. 14-24387PO-BPV, he may challenge that sentence so long as he is still in 

custody under a sentence running consecutive to that sentence. Cf. Garlotte v. Fordice,

515 U.S. 39, 47 (1995) (habeas petitioner subject to consecutive sentences may challenge 

conviction for sentence already served so long as he is still in custody under sentence 

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consecutive to that challenged); United States v. Hillary, 106 F.3d 1170, 1172 (4th Cir. 

1997) (applying Garlotte in context of '2255 motion). 

II. DISCUSSION

 Movant raises three grounds for relief before this Court. In Ground One, he raises 

a duress defense to the charges against him. In Ground Two, Movant alleges that he was 

denied due process by immigration officials during expedited removal proceedings. In 

Ground Three, Movant alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment during the change of plea proceeding. 

A. SUMMARY DISMISSAL

 A motion filed pursuant to '2255 collaterally attacking a sentence, should be 

presented to the court which imposed the allegedly improper sentence. 28 U.S.C. ' 2255; 

Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Section 2255(a) authorizes 

the district court to “vacate, set aside or correct” a sentence of a federal prisoner that 

“was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2255(a). Under § 2255, a district court must grant a hearing to determine the validity of a 

petition unless it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of 

prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief. United States v. Blaylock, 

20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994); Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 

Proceedings for the United States District Courts. “Merely conclusory statements in a § 

2255 motion are not enough to require a hearing.” United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 

941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993). As set forth below, the record supports the conclusion that 

summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted because Movant has waived his right to 

file a ' 2255 motion. 

B. WAIVER

 In his Plea Agreement, Movant agreed, in pertinent part, to 

waive[]: (1) any right to appeal the Court’s entry of judgment against 

defendant; (2) any right to appeal the imposition of sentence upon defendant under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 (sentence 

appeals); and (3) any right to collaterally attack defendant’s conviction and sentence under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack. If the defendant files a notice of appeal or habeas petition, 

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notwithstanding this agreement, defendant agrees that this case shall, upon motion of the government, be remanded to the district court to determine 

whether the defendant is in breach of this agreement and, if so, to permit the government to withdraw from the plea agreement. 

(Plea Agreement (Doc. 1-1, p.2 at &6), filed in No. 14-24387PO-BPV). Although there 

are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights[,]” United States v. GonzalezFlores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir.2005), “[a] defendant’s waiver of his appellate 

rights is enforceable if (1) the language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on 

the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.” United States 

v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir.2011) (citation omitted). 

 Plea agreements are contractual in nature and their plain language will generally 

be enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. 

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir.2005) (a waiver of appellate rights is enforceable 

if the language of the waiver encompasses the right to appeal on the grounds raised and 

the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made), overruled on other grounds by United 

States v. Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc); see also United States v. 

Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994) (a defendant may waive the statutory right to 

bring a '2255 action challenging the length of his sentence). However, “[t]he scope of a 

section 2255 waiver may be subject to potential limitations.” Bahena de Sotela v. United 

States, 2014 WL 923790, *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2014). For example, the waiver may not 

apply to preclude appeal if the sentence imposed was not in accordance with the 

negotiated plea agreement, see United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th 

Cir. 1990), if the district court failed to comply with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, see United States v. Myers, 804 F.3d. 1246 (9th Cir. 2015), if the 

waiver itself was involuntary or if ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver 

involuntary, see Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864-71 (9th Cir. 2005); Pruitt, 32 F.3d 

at 433; United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Jeronimo,

398 F.3d at 1156 n.4 (declining to hold that a waiver of all statutory rights included 

claims implicating the voluntariness of the waiver). 

 Here, Movant’s plea agreement included an express waiver of his right to 

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collaterally attack his sentence under '2255. Movant’s claims for relief alleged in 

Grounds One and Two of his motion, on their face, do not specifically challenge the 

voluntariness of the waiver, nor does he argue that the sentence imposed was not the 

sentence negotiated in the plea agreement. Movant’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel alleged in Ground Three is predicated on the “pressure” he felt to sign the plea 

agreement, and “psychological pressure” that prevented him from speaking about his fear 

of returning to Honduras. (Motion, (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5) filed in Edilberto Rodriguez-Vega v. 

United States, CV 15-164-TUC-BPV)). Movant claims that defense “counsel was not 

aware of his psychological condition and did not care of his sufferings and the wants and 

needs to stay in this country[]”, and he makes the general assertion that defense counsel 

failed to inform him about “his rights” in court and in United States. (Id. at p. 5). 

 Generally, the waiver of the right to file for relief under '2255 in a plea agreement 

precludes the movant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel not pertaining to the 

voluntariness of the waiver. See Ramirez-Valdez v. United States, 2005 WL 2416361, *2 

(D.Ariz. Sept. 21, 2005) (waiver of right to file for relief under '2255 in plea agreement 

precluded movant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing because 

his claim did not pertain to the voluntariness of the waiver). During the change-of-plea 

proceeding, the Court first informed the defendants appearing before the Court, including 

Movant, that if during the hearing he wished to speak to his lawyer or wished the Court to 

explain something in more detail, to please stand and the Court would accommodate his 

needs. The Court explained the possible punishment under both counts of the Complaint 

and the terms of the plea agreement including that in exchange for dismissal of the felony 

charge, Movant, would: enter a guilty plea to the lesser offense; agree to a specified 

sentence; and waive his right to appeal. The Court also advised that Movant’s conviction 

could be used to increase the penalty in any future case and could be used to formally 

deport him from the United States. The Court informed Movant that he had the right to 

enter a plea of not guilty and to request a separate, individual, felony jury trial on the 

greater charge. The Court went on to explain that at the jury trial, Movant would be 

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represented by his lawyer and he could force the government to bring witnesses into court 

to testify in his presence and to be cross-examined by his attorney, and he could call any 

witnesses favorable to his case who were within the subpoena power of the court. 

Further, Movant had the right to remain silent during trial and the jury would be 

instructed that they could not hold his silence against him. The Court then advised that 

that if Movant had any questions or wished to reject the plea agreement he should stand. 

Movant did not stand. Thereafter, the Court asked Movant whether he understood the 

rights and consequences and whether he waived them and entered a plea of guilty 

knowing he would be sentenced to 150 days, to which Movant answered in the 

affirmative. Movant then admitted the factual basis for his guilty plea. 

 It is well-settled that “[i]n assessing the voluntariness of the plea, statements made 

by a criminal defendant contemporaneously with his plea should be accorded great 

weight.” Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Blackledge v. 

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977)); see also United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 

(9th 1991) (stating in '2255 case: “We attach substantial weight to contemporaneous onthe-record statements in assessing the voluntariness of pleas.”). Thus, Movant’s 

contemporaneous statements regarding his understanding of the plea agreement carry 

substantial weight in determining that his entry of a guilty plea, including waiver of his 

right to appeal, was knowing and voluntary. The Court not only provided Movant with 

an explanation of the plea agreement, the rights he was giving up including is right to 

appeal, and his rights should he decide to go to trial, but the Court also provided Movant 

with the opportunity to ask questions of the Court and his counsel, which Movant chose 

not to do. Instead, Movant assented to, inter alia, waive his rights and enter a plea of 

guilty to the lesser of the two charges against him. 

 Movant does not allege that counsel failed to discuss the plea agreement, 

including the waiver of his right to appeal, with him or that counsel failed to discuss his 

options should he choose not to accept the plea. Further, when the Court expressly gave 

Movant the opportunity to ask questions of the Court or to further confer with counsel, 

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Movant did not indicate he wished to do either. Instead, he agreed to waive his rights and 

accept the plea agreement in exchange for dismissal of the more serious felony charge 

which exposed him to a greater punishment. “Solemn declarations in open court carry a 

strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations 

unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the 

face of the record are wholly incredible.” Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74. The record 

reflects that Movant was adequately informed of the consequences of his plea, including 

his waiver of the right to appeal. Movant’s conclusory allegations do not undermine the 

record. Because Movant was adequately informed of the consequences of his plea, 

Movant’s guilty plea, including waiver of his rights, was voluntary and knowing. See

United States v. Guesar, 2009 WL 2259714, *4 (July 27, 2009) (citing Boykin v. 

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969)). Consequently, the Court finds that Movant 

waived his right to seek relief under '2255 and the Motion is subject to summary 

dismissal. 

III. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, 

 IT IS ORDERED that Movant’s Motion under 28 U.S.C. ' 2255 to Vacate, Set 

Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1 in CV 15-164-TUCBPV and Doc. 4 in 14-24387PO-BPV) is DENIED and the civil action opened in 

connection with that motion is DISMISSED. 

 Dated this 11th day of December, 2015. 

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