Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_11-cv-00529/USCOURTS-almd-3_11-cv-00529-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Phenix City, Alabama
Defendant
Beverly Mills
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

BEVERLY MILLS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 3:11cv529-MHT

) (WO)

CITY OF PHENIX CITY, )

ALABAMA, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Beverly Mills brings this lawsuit charging

that defendant City of Phenix City, Alabama terminated

her employment in violation of her due-process rights (as

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, as enforced

through 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and discriminated against her

on the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17. Mills also asserts a

state-law defamation claim. Jurisdiction is proper

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), 42 U.S.C.

Case 3:11-cv-00529-MHT-WC Document 37 Filed 07/16/12 Page 1 of 27
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2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (state

law). 

The city now moves for summary judgment. For the

reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that

party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Here, Mills is the nonmoving party.

II. BACKGROUND

After 30 years in the banking industry and a brief

retirement, Mills began working for Phenix City in

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January 2003. She was hired as an office manager in the

city’s utilities department. Her responsibilities

included numerous administrative tasks, processing

payroll, and authorizing employee reimbursements. 

The city divides its employees into ‘classified’ and

‘unclassified’ positions. Its merit-system rules “apply

to all positions in the Merit System except those in the

Unclassified Service.” City Rules (Doc. No. 13-6) at 2.

The rules further state that, “Provisions with respect to

General Provisions, Position Classification Plan,

Compensation Plan, Attendance and Leave Regulations and

Employee Relations apply to full-time employees in the

Unclassified Service except elected officials, members of

the advisory boards, commissions and committees.” Id. at

2-3. Per the rules, only classified employees are

entitled to a hearing. 

It is undisputed that, at the time of hiring, Mills’s

office-manager position was ‘classified’ under the city’s

merit-system rules. At that time, unclassified employees

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included, amongst others, the city manager, aides to the

city manager, the city clerk, the city attorney,

department directors, and temporary employees. But, on

February, 15, 2005, the city council passed ordinance

number 2005-02, which added office managers to the list

of unclassified positions. According to the city, this

ordinance transferred Mills to the unclassified service,

notwithstanding the fact that she had been hired as a

classified employee.

Mills’s disciplinary troubles began in October 2007

when she was given a verbal warning and counseling for

permitting a subordinate employee to handle payroll.

Verbal Warning Form (Doc. No. 13-1) at 1. The city

states that only Mills and Utilities Director Greg Glass

were authorized to process payroll. Mills responds that

Glass had directed her to let the subordinate employee

handle the payroll. It is undisputed that only Mills was

written up for insubordination for this incident.

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1. The record and briefing contain three different

first names for Truitt: Trevor, Travor, and Travis. The

court uses the first name ‘Trevor’ because it is the most

frequently used name and appears on the city’s official

documents.

5

In August 2009, Mills received two disciplinaries.

In one incident, she altered the time cards of Trevor

Truitt in violation of city policy.1

 She contends that

Truitt had been taking only 20 minutes of his allotted

30-minute lunch break and that she altered the time cards

to prevent him from making a claim for unpaid overtime.

According to Mills, the alteration of time cards was a

common occurrence in the city’s utilities department.

Mills received an eight-hour suspension for the time-card

alterations. Written Warning Form (Doc. No. 13-2) at 1.

Around the same time, Mills was again written up,

this time for insubordination for a separate incident.

She had been advised by City Manager Wallace Hunter that,

if any issue arose during Utilities Director Steve

Smith’s extended absence, she should contact Hunter.

When employee Charles Woody approached Mills about

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2. Mills received a fourth reprimand in April 2010

for forwarding a chain email about coping with grief

shortly after her husband died. She was suspended for 40

hours for this violation. Written Warning Form (Doc. No.

13-4) at 1. She concedes that she violated the city’s

prohibition against sending chain emails. Opposition

Brief (Doc. No. 20-1) at 4.

6

another employee’s absence from a training program, Mills

and Woody called Smith on his cell phone to ask for help.

Mills states that Smith had instructed her to call him if

a problem arose. Nonetheless, Mills was disciplined for

ignoring Hunter’s command and received an eight-hour

suspension. Written Warning Form (Doc. No. 13-3) at 1.2

The city terminated Mills on July 14, 2010, after she

had approved fraudulent purchase orders submitted by

Truitt. A city investigation had revealed that Truitt

and finance-department employee Sylvia Suttle were

romantically involved and had conspired to defraud the

city. Truitt submitted false reimbursement requests for

expenses such as air fresheners, foot powder, and car

repairs. Mills approved these requests in her role as

office manager. According to the city, Mills’s actions

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were negligent and merited termination in light of her

prior reprimands. Mills responds that none of the

purchases raised red flags; that she processed 75 to 80

pay requests daily; and that her supervisor (Smith) was

equally responsible for approving Truitt’s requests.

During the course of the fraud investigation, Mills

was interviewed by the police but never charged with a

crime. The story also garnered local media attention.

Mills has submitted affidavits from members of her

community detailing the rumors surrounding her

termination. 

After Mills was fired, Smith gathered all the

utilities-department employees and informed them of

Truitt and Suttle’s affair and fraudulent scheme. Smith

commented that Mills had been fired for authorizing the

improper reimbursement charges. According to an

affidavit submitted by utilities-department employee

Marcy Williams, Smith’s speech left the impression that

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Mills had been part of Truitt and Suttle’s conspiracy.

Williams Affidavit (Doc. No. 19-6) at 2.

Mills sought an administrative hearing before the

city’s personnel-review board and appeared at a meeting

of the city council. The review board and city council

refused to hear Mills’s appeal on the ground that she was

an unclassified employee outside the city’s merit-system

rules. This lawsuit followed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Due Process

Mills makes two separate claims under the Due Process

Clause as enforced through § 1983. First, she contends

that her right to ‘procedural’ due process was violated

by the city when it fired her without a hearing. Second

and relatedly, Mills asserts a ‘stigma-plus’ claim: that

the city defamed her when it terminated her and failed to

provide an avenue to clear her name.

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1. Procedural Due Process

Mills claims that she had a property interest in her

job and that the city violated that interest when it

terminated her. The court rejects this claim for two

reasons. First, this claim is abandoned or waived, for,

while it was presented in her complaint, it was not

addressed in her summary-judgment brief. Resolution

Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir.

1995) (“grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied

upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned”). Second,

as will now be explained, this claim lacks merits.

 A public employee is entitled to procedural due

process if she has a property interest in her position.

Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343-47 (1976). A property

interest exists if an employee has “an individual

entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be

removed except ‘for cause.’” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush

Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982). The Supreme Court has

instructed that “‘property’ interests subject to

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procedural due process protection are not limited by a

few rigid, technical forms. Rather, ‘property’ denotes

a broad range of interests that are secured by ‘existing

rules or understandings.’” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.

593, 601 (1972) (quoting Board of Regents of State

Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). Of course,

a unilateral expectation of continued employment is

insufficient to trigger due-process protections. Bishop,

426 U.S. at 345-47. 

The parties dispute whether Mills had a property

interest in her employment. Mills believes that the

city’s classification system is unclear and that the

rules and disciplinary procedures used by the city

created a property right in her employment.

The court notes at the outset that Alabama has

jealously guarded its status as an “at will” employment

state. See, e.g., Ex parte Amoco Fabrics and Fiber Co.,

729 So. 2d 336, 339 (Ala. 1998) (“The bedrock principle

of Alabama employment law is that, in the absence of a

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contract providing otherwise, employment in this state is

at-will, terminable at the will of either party. Under

this doctrine, an employee may be discharged for any

reason, good or bad, or even for no reason at all.”).

Therefore, governmental employees in Alabama do not

acquire a property interest in their employment as long

as they remain in the terminable-at-will realm.

The city’s 2005 ordinance clearly transferred the

office-manager position from the classified to

unclassified service. 2005 Ordinance (Doc. No. 13-7) at

1. As such, there is no ambiguity as to the designation

of the office-manager position and Mills was not a

classified employee entitled to a hearing. 

To be sure, an employee need not have an explicit

contract to move into the realm of for-cause employment.

Alabama cases establish that, in certain circumstances,

an employee handbook may vest property rights in

employment. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., v. Campbell, 512 So.

2d 725, 735 (Ala. 1987) (holding that “the language

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contained in a handbook can be sufficient to constitute

an offer to create a binding unilateral contract”). But

these cases are inapposite when the handbook expressly

avows that it does not create a property interest in

employment. Id. at 734 (commenting that “if the employer

does not wish the policies contained in an employee

handbook to be construed as an offer for a unilateral

contract, he is free to so state in the handbook”).

Whether employee handbooks or other employee rules

constitute a binding contract is a question of law to be

decided by the court. Campisi v. Scoles Cadillac, Inc.,

611 So.2d 296, 298-99 (Ala. 1992).

Here, the city’s rules unequivocally state that they

do not create a property interest: “The city reserves the

right to change or depart from the Merit System Rules and

Regulations. Nothing in these Rules and Regulations

shall be construed as an employment contract between any

individual and the city covering any term or condition of

employment.” Merit System Rules (City’s Exhibit 1) at

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12. Courts construing Alabama law have held similar

“language prevents the handbook from supporting a

contract of employment other than for at-will

employment.” Nicholson v. City of Daphne, 2009 WL

4667382, *6 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 25, 2009) (Steele, J.). See

also Hoffman-LaRoche, 512 So. 2d at 734 (providing as an

example of at-will employment: “[t]his Handbook and the

policies contained herein do not in any way constitute,

and should not be construed as a contract of employment

between the employer and the employee, or a promise of

employment”). Thus, Mills cannot point to the city’s

merit-system rules to establish a property right in her

employment.

Mills refers to language in her termination letter

and three of the disciplinaries as the source of her

right to a hearing. When she was fired, Mills was asked

to sign beneath the following paragraph:

“I further acknowledge I have been

informed of my right to appeal the

disciplinary action taken against me to

the Appeals Board or the Personnel

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Review Board. My request must be

submitted in writing to the Personnel

Director within three (3) working days

for the Appeal Board and within ten (10)

working days for the Personnel Review

Board. Probationary employees are not

entitled to a Personnel Review Board

Hearing as stated in Section 15.011 of

the Merit System Rules and Regulation.”

Termination Letter (Doc. No. 13-5) at 3. 

This argument is unavailing for two reasons. First,

as discussed above, the city’s rules-–which define the

disciplinary procedures–-cannot form the basis for a

property right because the city included a disavowal

clause in its handbook. Second, it is axiomatic that

“‘property’ cannot be defined by the procedures provided

for its deprivation.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). One cannot

“construct a property interest out of procedural timber

.... ‘The categories of substance and procedure are

distinct.’” Bunger v. University of Oklahoma Bd. of

Regents, 95 F.3d 987, 990-991 (10th Cir. 1996). Thus,

the city’s “promise that it would follow certain

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procedural steps in considering [Mills’s termination] did

not beget a property interest in [it].” Id. at 991. As

such, Mills cannot rely on a boilerplate procedural

instruction in a disciplinary form as the basis for a

property right when none otherwise exists.

Alternatively, Mills contends in both his complaint

and summary-judgment brief that the city violated her

due-process right when it reclassified her position in

2005 and, thus, that the city could not terminate her

without a hearing in 2010. Here, the distinction between

an executive and legislative act is of paramount

importance. As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

explained:

“Executive acts characteristically apply

to a limited number of persons (and

often to only one person); executive

acts typically arise from the

ministerial or administrative activities

of members of the executive branch. The

most common examples are employment

terminations. ...

“Legislative acts, on the other hand,

generally apply to a larger segment

of--if not all of--society; laws and

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3. Finally, Mills claims that she was ‘grandfathered’

into the classified service. Mills’s contention

(continued...)

16

broad-ranging executive regulations are

the most common examples. The analysis,

and the substantive/procedural

distinction discussed above, that is

appropriate for executive acts is

inappropriate for legislative acts. For

instance, only when addressing

legislative acts has the Supreme Court

mandated that states must demonstrate

that they are violating private

interests only as necessary to promote

state interests.”

McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994)

(en banc) (citations omitted). The 2005 reclassification

was a legislative act: the city council passed an

ordinance transferring an entire group of employees from

the classified to unclassified service. There was no

individualized consideration. Mills’s argument that the

city could not reclassify office managers is not

cognizable as a procedural due-process claim. She may

bring a procedural due process violation for only the

paradigmatic executive act at issue in this case-–her

termination.3

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(...continued)

misinterprets Alabama case law. She relies on cases

where Alabama law explicitly ‘grandfathered’ in certain

employees. Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366, 1368 (11th

Cir. 1985) (discussing the ‘grandfathering’ process). No

such grandfather clause exists in this case.

17

2. Stigma-Plus

Mills also raises a ‘stigma-plus’ claim.

Specifically, she alleges that the city defamed her and

failed to provide a hearing to clear her name. A public

employee seeking to establish a stigma-plus claim must

prove that: “(1) a false statement (2) of a stigmatizing

nature (3) attending a governmental employee's discharge

(4) was made public (5) by the governmental employer (6)

without a meaningful opportunity for employee name

clearing.” Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 F.3d

1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). A stigma-plus claim

“requires the plaintiff to show both a valid defamation

claim (the stigma) and the violation of some more

tangible interest (the plus).” Rehberg v. Paulk, 611

F.3d 828, 852 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

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4. The court notes that there must be a ‘plus’ in a

stigma-plus case. See Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 852 (“The

‘stigma-plus’ test requires not only allegations stating

a common-law defamation claim, but also an additional

constitutional injury, tied to a previously recognized

constitutional property or liberty interest, flowing from

the defamation.”). The court has concluded that Mills

lacks a property interest in her employment, see supra

Section III.A.1. As such, Mills can prevail only if she

had a liberty interest in her employment. Because the

court concludes that there is no ‘stigma,’ it declines to

address whether a public employee can have a liberty

interest in continued employment when a property interest

does not exist.

18

Mills’s stigma-plus claim must fail because she

cannot prove defamation.4

 To establish a defamation

claim, Mills must show “‘[1] that the defendant was at

least negligent [2] in publishing [3] a false and

defamatory statement to another [4] concerning the

plaintiff, [5] which is either actionable without having

to prove special harm (actionable per se) or actionable

upon allegations and proof of special harm (actionable

per quod).’” Ex Parte Crawford Broadcasting, 904 So. 2d

221, 225 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Delta Health Group, Inc. v.

Stafford, 887 So. 2d 887, 891 (Ala. 2004)).

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“Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim.”

S.B. v. Saint James School, 959 So. 2d 72, 100 (Ala.

2006). The First Amendment compels a defense of truth to

defamation claims, lest state tort law “interfere with

the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.”

Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52

(1988). However, “there is no constitutional value in

false statements of fact.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,

418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (emphasis added). 

The question, then, is whether Smith uttered a false

statement of fact when he announced Mills’s termination.

Mills provides the following account of the city’s

defamatory speech:

“On or about July 14, 2010, Stephen

Smith met with all of the employees of

the utilities department. He told us

that Beverly Mills and two other

employees (Trevor and Sylvia) had been

fired. He said that Trevor and Sylvia

had been having an affair. He said that

Sylvia had been helping her boyfriend

Trevor to hide improper reimbursement

charges. Smith said that Beverly was

fired for signing invoices that should

not have been signed. In this meeting,

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Mr. Smith lumped Beverly Mills together

with Trevor and Sylvia, giving the false

impression that Beverly was part of

their scheme to steal from the City.”

Williams Affidavit (Doc. No. 19-6) at 2 (emphasis added).

Nothing in Williams’s affidavit evidences that a

false statement was made. Mills was terminated by the

city for her negligent approval of Truitt and Suttle’s

fraudulent scheme and Smith’s speech reflects that fact.

Williams’s account of Smith’s speech places a far greater

emphasis on the involvement between Truitt and Suttle;

Mills is referenced with regards to only her approval of

the reimbursements, not the fraud itself. Thus,

Williams’s “false impression” of Smith’s speech is not

synonymous with a ‘false fact.’

Additionally, Mills cites to a local newspaper

article--that neither mentions her by name nor contains

any false statement–-and affidavits from friends who have

heard rumors about why she was terminated. A rumor

mill’s insinuations that Mills was actively and knowingly

involved in the fraudulent scheme does not transform

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5. Mills also asserted a state-law defamation claim.

She has conceded that summary judgment is due to be

granted on this claim. See infra Section III.C. 

It could be argued that, because the stigma-plus test

requires proof of “a common-law defamation claim,”

Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 852, Mills’s concession defeats her

stigma-plus claim as well.

21

Smith’s statement into a falsehood. Because the city did

not state a falsehood, Mills’s stigma-plus claim must

fail.5

B. Gender Discrimination

A gender-discrimination claim brought under Title VII

is governed by the familiar burden-shifting analysis of

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff has

the initial burden of establishing a prima-facie case of

unlawful employment discrimination by a preponderance of

evidence. Id. at 802. If the plaintiff establishes a

prima-facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant

to rebut the presumption by articulating a legitimate,

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non-discriminatory reason for its employment action. The

defendant has the burden of production, not of

persuasion, and thus need not convince the court that the

reason advanced actually motivated its action. Id.

Once the defendant satisfies this burden, “the

presumption of discrimination is eliminated and the

plaintiff has the opportunity to come forward with

evidence, including the previously produced evidence

establishing the prima-facie case, sufficient to permit

a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons

given by the [defendant] were not the real reasons for

the adverse employment decision.” Chapman v. AI

Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a

plaintiff must show that a defendant’s proffered

explanation is a mere pretext for discriminatory conduct.

To establish a prima-facie case of discriminatory

discipline, Mills must show that: (1) she belongs to a

protected class; (2) she was subjected to adverse job

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6. Mills does not contend that the chain-letter

(continued...)

23

action; and (3) her employer treated similarly situated

employees outside her protected classification more

favorably. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th

Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

The city contends that the three pre-termination

disciplinaries are not tangible-employment actions

cognizable under Title VII. In Burlington Industries v.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the Supreme Court explained

that a “tangible employment action constitutes a

significant change in employment status, such as hiring,

firing, failing to promote, reassignment with

significantly different responsibilities, or a decision

causing a significant change in benefits.” Id. at 761.

Although context specific, a “tangible employment action

in most cases inflicts direct economic harm.” Id. at

762. 

Here, Mills was suspended without pay on two relevant

occasions prior to her termination.6

 “While a suspension

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(...continued)

disciplinary was discriminatory. As such, the court

omits it from the discussion of Mills’s Title VII claim.

24

is not the most severe punishment, it still qualifies as

a tangible-employment action” because there is direct

economic harm. Adams v. City of Montgomery, 2012 WL

1414979, *6 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2012) (Thompson, J.).

Moreover, because the city’s progressive disciplinary

policy factored in the three contested disciplinaries

into the termination decision, each of them is actionable

to that extent. Id.

The city fares better on its next arguments. The

city argues that Mills has failed to identify a valid

comparator. “To make a comparison of the plaintiff’s

treatment to that of [male] employees, the plaintiff must

show that [s]he and the employees were similarly situated

in all relevant respects.” Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562

(emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit requires that

“the quantity and quality of the comparator's misconduct

be nearly identical to prevent courts from

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7. Mills also claims that Woody was not punished for

his role in the phone call to Smith in contravention of

Hunter’s directive. But Mills clearly states that she

and Mitchell were informed of Hunter’s order, not Woody.

See Mills Deposition (Doc. No. 19-16) at 13.

second-guessing employers' reasonable decisions and

confusing apples with oranges.” Maniccia v. Brown, 171

F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). 

For the October 2007 reprimand, the August 2009

insubordination suspension, and the July 2010

termination, Mills cites her immediate supervisors, Glass

and Smith, as comparators.7

 Of course, a supervisor is

not “similarly situated” to a subordinate employee. As

to the time-card suspension, Mills submits that other

employees regularly edited time cards and were not

suspended. Mills, however, has not presented evidence

that another office manager altered time cards and that

the same supervisor knew and failed to punish this

person. As such, Mills cannot establish a prima-facie

case of discriminatory discipline. Moreover, Mills has

not presented evidence that any male employee had a

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26

history of rules violations similar to hers but was not

terminated.

In addition to the lack of a comparator, Mills has

not produced any evidence of pretext. While Mills may

dispute the fairness and severity of the disciplinaries,

she does not dispute that her behavior occurred. Rather,

she submits that her actions was excusable because her

immediate supervisor authorized it or engaged in similar

behavior (in contradiction to his supervisor’s

pronouncements and/or city rules). Mills listened to her

immediate supervisor, not the chain-of-command. As such,

the city’s leadership had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for disciplining Mills: she

violated work rules by ignoring city rules and the direct

orders of her higher-ranking supervisors. 

C. Defamation

In her opposition brief, Mills concedes that summary

judgment should be granted on her defamation claim

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because “she has been unable to produce sufficient

evidence to show actual malice by the City.” Opposition

Brief (Doc. No. 20-1) at 20. As such, the court will

grant defendant City of Phenix City’s motion for summary

judgment as to this claim. 

* * *

An appropriate summary judgment in favor of Phenix

City and against Mills will be entered.

DONE, this the 16th day of July, 2012.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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