Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-98-02549/USCOURTS-ca8-98-02549-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Billie Jerome Allen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

__________

No. 98-2549

__________

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Billie Jerome Allen,

Appellant.

__________

No. 98-2984

__________

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Norris G. Holder,

Appellant.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Appeals from the United States

District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

________________

Submitted: January 10, 2000

 Filed: April 12, 2001 (corrected 5/7/01)

________________

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
1The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

2The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

2

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and MELLOY,1

District Judge. 

________________

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

On March 17, 1997, security guard Richard Heflin was killed during an armed

robbery of the Lindell Bank & Trust in St. Louis (Forest Park), Missouri. Billie Jerome

Allen and Norris G. Holder were charged and convicted in separate jury trials for

violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(a) and (e) (1994) (armed robbery by force or violence

in which a killing occurs) (Count I) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1) and (j)(1) (1994 and

Supp. II 1996) (carrying or using a firearm during a crime of violence and committing

murder) (Count II). Allen was sentenced to life in prison on Count I and received a

sentence of death on Count II. Holder received sentences of death for both Counts I

and II. In these direct appeals, Allen and Holder raise numerous challenges to the

constitutionality of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, they allege that the district

court2 committed several errors during jury voir dire, trial, and sentencing, and they

raise various other statutory and constitutional challenges to their convictions and

sentences. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm Allen's and Holder's convictions

and sentences.

I. Background

Holder was a regular customer of the Lindell Bank & Trust. Five hundred

dollars was automatically deposited to his account each month from a legal settlement

Holder obtained after losing the lower portion of one leg in a train accident, and every

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
3

month Holder withdrew that five hundred dollars. On March 13, 1997, four days

before the date of the armed robbery, Holder brought Allen along with him for his

monthly withdrawal of funds. Allen and Holder were also seen together on several

other occasions during the ten days leading up to the armed robbery. Together they

watched the movies "Heat" and "Set It Off" which depicted assault-style takeover

armed bank robberies similar in many details to the manner in which they later robbed

the Lindell Bank & Trust. In preparation for the armed robbery, Holder supplied or

obtained a Russian SKS semiautomatic assault rifle, a Chinese SKS semiautomatic

assault rifle, a twelve-gauge shotgun, approximately two hundred rounds of ammunition

consisting mostly of military style hollow point ammunition for the two SKS rifles, and

a bulletproof vest which he wore. The night before the armed robbery two vans were

stolen for use as the first two getaway vehicles after the robbery (Holder's mother's car

was to be used as the third, and last, getaway vehicle).

On the day of the armed robbery, March 17, 1997, Allen and Holder parked the

first getaway van on the street just outside the bank. Wearing dark ski masks and

armed with the semiautomatic rifles--Allen with the Chinese SKS loaded with 11

rounds, and Holder with the Russian SKS loaded with 37 rounds and each carrying

extra rounds of the hollow point ammunition--they rushed into the bank. The first man

to enter immediately began firing shots at security guard Heflin, and during the course

of the robbery Holder jumped over the tellers' counter and retrieved money from the

tellers' drawers. The ballistics evidence showed that both rifles were discharged during

the robbery and a total of sixteen shots were fired inside the bank, at least eight of

which hit security guard Heflin who died shortly thereafter. Eleven of the shots came

from the Chinese SKS rifle, three came from the Russian SKS rifle, and the remaining

two could have come from either rifle. After the armed robbery, which lasted only a

few minutes, Allen and Holder returned to the getaway van and sped off down the

highway.

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
4

Several witnesses spotted the two men exiting the bank and returning to the van.

Bank customer William Green, after hearing gunshots while at the drive-up teller

window, dialed 911 and followed the van onto the highway. He continued following

the van as it sped down the highway and into Forest Park. As the van entered the park,

Green saw it burst into flames. Prior to the armed robbery, the suspects had soaked the

van with gasoline so that it would be easier to destroy the evidence once they reached

their second getaway vehicle. The van apparently started on fire when one of the

suspects flicked a cigarette lighter. After the van started on fire, the van's passenger--

Allen--jumped out and ran into a wooded area. The other occupant, Holder, was on

fire and two park workers helped to extinguish the flames. A police officer arrived on

the scene simultaneously and arrested Holder.

Allen, meanwhile, was spotted soon after he left the van on the opposite side of

the wooded area by city forestry employee Bobby Harris. After making up a story

about why the hair on his head was burned, Allen convinced Harris and another

forestry employee to give him a ride to the nearest Metrolink station. Harris later

identified Allen in a lineup and at trial. Allen was arrested early the next morning at

his girlfriend's apartment, the same apartment where he and Holder had stayed the night

before the bank robbery and had together watched the movie "Set It Off."

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
3

In addition to sixteen explicit statutory aggravating factors for homicide, the

FDPA also allows the presentation to the jury of nonstatutory aggravating factors. See

18 U.S.C. § 3592 (c) (Supp. II 1996) ("The jury . . . may consider whether any other

aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists.").

5

II. Analysis

Allen and Holder allege numerous constitutional, statutory, and procedural

violations as grounds for relief from each of their respective convictions and sentences.

We separately address each defendant's claims. 

A. Billie Jerome Allen

1. Facial Constitutional Challenges

Allen raises a host of facial constitutional challenges, based on the Eighth

Amendment and Article I of the Constitution, to the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994

(hereinafter "FDPA"). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (1994). We review claims of

constitutional error and issues of statutory construction de novo. See Hamilton v.

Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1552 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 874 (1996).

a. Nonstatutory Aggravating Factors

Allen argues that the use of nonstatutory aggravating factors, which the FDPA

explicitly allows,3 fails to adequately limit and guide the sentencing discretion of the

jury in violation of various Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Eighth

Amendment. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990) (explaining that a

sentencing body's discretion must be suitably directed and limited, by clear and

objective standards that provide specific and detailed guidance, so as to minimize the

risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action and to make rationally reviewable the

process for imposing a death sentence) (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428

(1980), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)). We disagree with Allen's

underlying premise that the purpose of the nonstatutory aggravating factors under the

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
6

FDPA is to limit and guide a jury's discretion in determining who is eligible to receive

a sentence of death. The statutorily defined aggravating circumstances are those which

channel the sentencer's discretion because they are the circumstances which make a

defendant eligible for the death penalty. See Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774.

The primary purpose of the nonstatutory aggravating factors, as opposed to the

listed statutory aggravating factors which do fulfill the role of limiting and guiding a

jury's discretion in making the eligibility decision, is to allow for the individualized

determination of whether a death sentence is justified for a particular defendant; that

is, they help to inform the selection decision. As the Supreme Court has explained, 

[o]ur capital punishment cases under the Eighth Amendment address two

different aspects of the capital decision-making process: the eligibility

decision and the selection decision. . . . To render a defendant eligible .

. . the trier of fact must . . . find one 'aggravating circumstance' . . . . We

have imposed a separate requirement for the selection decision, where the

sentencer determines whether a defendant eligible for the death penalty

should in fact receive that sentence. What is important at the selection

stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of

the individual and the circumstances of the crime.

Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-72 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). The

Supreme Court has also stated the following:

Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating circumstances play a

constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition:

they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. But

the Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possible

aggravating factors in the process of selecting, from among that class,

those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death.

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
7

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983). The framework of the FDPA passes

constitutional muster because it does not allow imposition of the death penalty unless

the jury first finds at least one statutory aggravating circumstance.

The jury . . . shall return special findings identifying any aggravating

factor or factors set forth in section 3592 found to exist and any other

aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under subsection

(a) found to exist. . . . If no aggravating factor set forth in section 3592 is

found to exist, the court shall impose a sentence other than death . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3593(d). If no listed statutory aggravator is unanimously found by the jury,

no sentence of death can be imposed. We therefore find no constitutional infirmity with

the FDPA's permitting the prosecution to propose nonstatutory aggravating factors to

fit the particular circumstances of a crime and to assist the jury in determining whether

the death penalty should be imposed upon a defendant already determined to be eligible

for that ultimate punishment. 

Allen also argues that the FDPA impermissibly delegates legislative power to

government prosecutors by allowing them the discretion to propose nonstatutory

aggravating factors to a capital sentencing jury. Congress may not delegate its

legislative power to another Branch, but it may seek assistance from another Branch

so long as Congress legislates "an intelligible principle to which the person or body

authorized to exercise the delegated authority is directed to conform." Mistretta v.

United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (upholding the United States Sentencing

Guidelines). See id. at 390 (pointing out that the federal "sentencing function long has

been a peculiarly shared responsibility" rather than "the exclusive constitutional

province of any one Branch" and finding no unconstitutional delegation of legislative

power). As the Fifth Circuit has pointed out, there are at least four limitations on a

prosecutor's discretion with respect to nonstatutory aggravating factors. See United

States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 239-40 (5th Cir. 1998), aff'd, 527 U.S. 373 (1999). A

jury must find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor before it can

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
4See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.").

5Although the Supreme Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120

S. Ct. 2348 (2000), may call into question whether statutory aggravating factors, which

are designed to meet the Supreme Court's requirement under the Eighth Amendment

to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, should be considered "increases in

punishment," we do not think that nonstatutory aggravating factors under the FDPA can

8

even consider proposed nonstatutory factors, a prosecutor can only argue those

nonstatutory aggravating factors for which the defendant has been given prior notice,

a nonstatutory aggravating factor itself must conform with due process jurisprudence,

and a district judge is required to screen out any irrelevant and unduly prejudicial

information a prosecutor may try to introduce to the jury in order to prove a

nonstatutory aggravating factor. Id. at 240. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that these

limitations provide intelligible principles which constrain a prosecutor's discretion such

that the delegation is not unconstitutional. United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003

(8th Cir. 2000) (holding that "the prosecutor's authority to define nonstatutory

aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress's legislative power"); See

also United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 895 (4th Cir. 1996)(holding that any

delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was

in fact any delegation), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253 (1997); United States v. McCullah,

76 F.3d 1087, 1106-07 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213 (1997).

Finally, Allen argues that the FDPA's allowance of nonstatutory aggravating

factors violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.4 We reject

Allen's argument, however, because the statutes under which he was convicted make

clear that a sentence of death is authorized, and nonstatutory aggravating factors are not

used to determine eligibility for the death penalty. Thus, proposing nonstatutory

aggravating factors to the jury does not in any way alter the definition of the underlying

crime for which Allen was convicted, nor does it increase the punishment to which

Allen is subjected.5

 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)(finding that

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
ever be viewed as subjecting a defendant to increased punishment because they only

come into play during the jury's selection, as opposed to its eligibility, determination.

9

aggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses); Lewis, 497 U.S. at

782 (1990) (finding that aggravating circumstances are not elements of any offense).

b. Use of "Information"

Allen argues that because the FDPA allows the introduction during the

sentencing phase of "information" rather than only "evidence," a jury's sentencing

decision under the FDPA is inherently unreliable in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

We reject this claim. The FDPA allows either party to introduce any "information"

relevant to an aggravating or mitigating factor, regardless of its admissibility under the

federal rules of evidence, but provides that the information "may be excluded if its

probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the

issues, or misleading the jury." 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). Thus, not only does the statute

protect a defendant from both irrelevant information and overly prejudicial information,

the relaxed evidentiary standard also works to a defendant's advantage in helping to

prove mitigating factors and to disprove aggravating factors. Allen's reliance on

California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987), which used the term "evidence"

rather than "information" in its opinion, is misplaced because the distinction between

evidence and information was not at issue. We therefore reject Allen's facial challenge

to the FDPA's relaxed evidentiary standard during sentencing. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at

204 ("We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as

possible when it makes the sentencing decision."); Jones, 132 F.3d at 242 (holding that

"the [FDPA's] relaxed evidentiary standard does not impair the reliability or relevance

of information at capital sentencing hearings, but helps to accomplish the individualized

sentencing required by the [C]onstitution").

c. Appellate Review

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
6See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1) ("The court of appeals shall address all

substantive and procedural issues raised on the appeal of a sentence of death, and shall

consider whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,

prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and whether the evidence supports the special

finding of the existence of an aggravating factor required to be considered under section

3592."); § 3593(f) (requiring each juror, if the death penalty is imposed, to sign a

statement saying that consideration of "race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or

sex of the defendant or any victim was not involved in reaching his or her individual

decision").

10

Allen claims that the FDPA is unconstitutional because it lacks proportionality

review. Allen argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Gregg mandates

proportionality review whenever a death penalty statute allows the consideration of

nonstatutory aggravating factors in the final sentencing decision. We disagree with

Allen's reading of the Supreme Court's holding in Gregg. See Pulley v. Harris, 465

U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984) (holding that although proportionality review is an additional

safeguard against arbitrarily imposed death sentences, neither precedent [including

Gregg] nor the Eighth Amendment mandates proportionality review in every case). As

the Supreme Court held in McCleskey v. Kemp, "[w]here the statutory procedures

adequately channel the sentencer's discretion, such proportionality review is not

constitutionally required." 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987). We hold that the FDPA has

sufficient safeguards--notably the requirements that a jury find beyond a reasonable

doubt the existence of one statutory aggravating factor and at least one of four requisite

levels of specific intent on the part of a defendant, not to mention various other

procedural protections6--such that proportionality review is not required in order for the

FDPA to pass constitutional muster.

We also reject Allen's argument that the absence of mandatory, automatic

appellate review somehow violates the Eighth Amendment because it is incompatible

with the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society. Even if this challenge

to the FDPA is a valid argument under the Eighth Amendment, which we highly doubt,

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
11

Allen lacks standing to raise this challenge because he has taken advantage of appellate

review and thus can show no actual harm in the FDPA's requirement that a defendant

must initiate appellate review.

d. Scope of FDPA

Allen argues that the "remarkable breadth" of the FDPA fails to narrow

genuinely the class of persons eligible for execution and fails to channel adequately a

sentencing jury's discretion. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 877. We agree with the Fifth

Circuit that, under the Constitution, the FDPA adequately narrows the class of persons

eligible for the death penalty and sufficiently channels a jury's sentencing discretion.

See Jones 132 F.3d at 248-49 (finding that the FDPA narrows a jury's sentencing

discretion by first requiring that a defendant had the requisite intent and second that at

least one statutory aggravating factor is present). Moreover, the FDPA limits the class

of persons eligible for the death penalty even before the jury considers intent and

aggravating circumstances by authorizing the death penalty only for certain federal

crimes. In short, how broadly or how narrowly the death penalty should be applied as

punishment, if at all, is essentially a political choice left to the people's elected

representatives in the legislative and executive branches, and we find none of the

Eighth Amendment's limitations on that legislative choice facially applicable to the

FDPA. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (ruling that the death

penalty for rape is grossly disproportionate and excessive and thus cruel and unusual

punishment); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (prohibiting the death

penalty where it is greatly disproportionate to a defendant's culpability). We therefore

reject Allen's argument that the FDPA authorizes a sentence of death for too many

federal crimes. In particular, with respect to this case, murder is a crime for which the

death penalty has long been deemed appropriate. 

2. Fifth Amendment Challenges

a. Indictment Clause

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 11 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
7See U.S. Const., amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . .

.").

12

The FDPA requires the government to file with the court, and to serve on the

defendant, a notice of intent to seek the death penalty "a reasonable time before the trial

or before acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty." 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). This

notice of intent must include a statement that the government believes the

circumstances of the case justify imposing a sentence of death and that if the jury finds

the defendant guilty the government will seek a sentence of death. Id. The notice must

also set forth any aggravating factors the government intends to use as justification for

a sentence of death. Id. There is no allegation that the government's properly and

timely filed notice of intent in this case has failed to meet the FDPA's statutory notice

requirements. Instead, Allen directly challenges the adequacy of the FDPA under the

Constitution. 

Allen specifically argues that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Fifth

Amendment's Indictment Clause7 because the FDPA fails to require that the decision

to seek the death penalty, just like the decision to charge a defendant with a federal

offense, be routed through the Grand Jury. Allen also argues that the government's

failure to allege in his indictment both the mental culpability factor from § 3591(a) and

the aggravating factors from § 3592(c) upon which it relied during sentencing as the

justification for imposing a death sentence constitutes constitutional error in light of the

Supreme Court's recent rulings in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), and

Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (2000). We respectfully disagree.

First, we reject Allen's argument that his case did not become a capital case (as

referred to in the Fifth Amendment) until the notice of intent was actually filed. We

hold that the original indictment returned by the Grand Jury sufficiently alleged a

capital offense against Allen upon which he could be tried and, if convicted, could be

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
13

sentenced to death. The penalties listed for the offenses in the indictment against Allen

are "death or life imprisonment" for Count I and "death or by imprisonment for any

term of years or for life" for Count II. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1994) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(j) (Supp. II 1996), respectively. Allen's attempted reliance on Stirone v. United

States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960), which held that once an indictment is returned,

charges may not be broadened later except through the Grand Jury, is misplaced. The

reasoning of Stirone is not implicated and does not control the outcome of this case

because the original indictment sufficiently charged an offense which expressly subjects

a convicted defendant to a maximum punishment of death. Because both § 2113(e) and

§ 924(j) specifically authorize the death penalty as punishment for any defendant found

guilty of the listed offense, the Fifth Amendment's Indictment Clause is satisfied.

Congress is free to pass, and may even be required to pass under the Eighth

Amendment, additional protections for a capital defendant prior to the actual imposition

of a death sentence, as it did by requiring notice of intent to seek the death penalty

along with notice of any proposed aggravating factors a reasonable time before trial.

But these protections do not increase the maximum sentence set forth in each of the

statutes for the specific offenses alleged in the indictment and thus do not amount to

separate elements that must be alleged in the indictment. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at

2362-63;Jones, 526 U.S. at 251. In short, even if Allen is correct that under the FDPA

and the Eighth Amendment the charged offenses could not be prosecuted as capital

crimes until the notice was filed along with the proposed aggravating factors, we

conclude that the original indictment nevertheless sufficiently alleged a capital crime

as required by the Fifth Amendment's Indictment Clause.

For similar reasons, we also reject Allen's contention that aggravating factors and

mental culpability factors must be alleged in an indictment in order to satisfy the Fifth

Amendment. A defendant is entitled to "'a jury determination that he is guilty of every

element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Apprendi,

120 S. Ct. at 2356 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)). Also,

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
14

"under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial

guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that

increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted

to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6. We

note initially that the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury and the Fifth

Amendment's due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt have been

satisfied as to the mental culpability factors and the aggravating factors at issue here.

We need only examine whether the Fifth Amendment's indictment requirements have

been met. 

 We begin by determining whether the mental culpability factors and statutory

aggravating factors are elements of the underlying offense, because as already noted,

every element of an offense must be charged in an indictment to satisfy the Fifth

Amendment. The structure of the two statutes indicates that neither factor is an

element of the offense of conviction. The two factors are listed in entirely different

sections of the United States Code. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(e) and 924(j) (setting

forth the underlying criminal offenses) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591(a) and 3592(c) (setting

forth the FDPA's sentencing procedures and requirements). Thus, it is clear from the

plain language of the various statutes that Congress did not make the mental culpability

factors or the statutory aggravating factors elements of the underlying offense.

The next question, then, is whether the mental culpability factors and statutory

aggravating factors are deemed elements of the crime by virtue of being facts which are

the basis for increasing the maximum punishment. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-

63 (holding that any fact, other than fact of prior convictions, which increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and

proven beyond a reasonable doubt); id. at 2368 (explaining that "every fact that is by

law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment (in contrast with a fact that mitigates

punishment)" is an element of the crime or aggravated crime) (Thomas and Scalia, JJ.,

concurring). We think that when read in the context of the Supreme Court's decisions

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 14 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
15

interpreting the Eighth Amendment in death cases over the past two decades, these two

features of the FDPA are properly characterized as sentencing protections that shield

a defendant from automatically receiving the statutorily authorized death sentence. The

underlying crimes of conviction expose a convicted defendant to either death or a life

sentence. In each case, death is the first punishment authorized by each statute. Under

the FDPA, if a jury cannot agree unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt that a

convicted defendant acted with one of the four listed mental culpability states, then a

defendant's maximum sentence is limited to life in prison. Similarly, if the jury cannot

agree unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt that the convicted defendant's actions

fit the definition of at least one of the listed statutory aggravating factors, then a

defendant's sentence is limited to life in prison. Finally, if the jury cannot agree

unanimously that the aggravating factors sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors

such that a sentence of death is justified, then the defendant's sentence is limited to life

in prison.

Allen argues that each of the above jury determinations should be viewed as

elements that increase the maximum penalty by assuming that a life sentence is the

initial baseline from which the jury's sentencing determinations under the FDPA are

viewed. We reject this interpretation because the statutes at issue expressly authorize

a maximum penalty of death and the sentencing factors of mental culpability and

aggravating circumstances do not increase the sentencing range but rather provide the

particularized standards for choosing which of the alternative available sentences

should be imposed. Making a defendant automatically eligible for the death penalty

absent these types of protective requirements is prohibited by Eighth Amendment

jurisprudence. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2380 (noting that a legislature may not

provide by statute that a person is death eligible automatically upon conviction because

in the area of capital punishment, the Court has "imposed special constraints on a

legislature's ability to determine what facts shall lead to what punishment--we have

restricted the legislature's ability to define crimes") (Thomas and Scalia, JJ.,

concurring). The fact-finding barrier that exists between a jury verdict that a defendant

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
8See U.S. Const., amend. V ("No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal

case to be a witness against himself . . . .").

16

is guilty of a capital crime for which one punishment is known to be death and a court's

ability to impose that capital punishment, id., acts to protect the defendant from an

automatic death sentence. Because of the unique context of this scheme, and because

the statutes of conviction authorize a penalty of death, we hold that failure to allege the

mental culpability and statutory aggravating factors in a capital defendant's original

indictment does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Indictment Clause. SeeWalton, 497

U.S. at 648 (explaining that aggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or

offenses but rather are "'standards to guide the making of the choice between the

alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment'") (quoting Poland v. Arizona, 476

U.S. 147, 156 (1986)).

b. Refusal To Suppress Confession

Allen argues that the district court erred in refusing to suppress the confession

he gave to police on the morning of his arrest. Allen's primary assertion is that officers

made no effort to comply with his request for counsel, and thus any statements made

to the police after his request, including his confession, should have been suppressed

because they were coerced in violation of the Fifth Amendment.8 The government

counters that Allen's admission was voluntarily made after a knowing and intelligent

waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. We first briefly recite the facts surrounding

Allen's arrest, interrogation, and confession, based on the magistrate judge's findings

which were adopted by the district court. (See Allen App., Vol. I at 114-80, 192-93.)

Allen was arrested at approximately 2:00 a.m. on the morning following the day

of the bank robbery and was read his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 479 (1966). Around 3:00 a.m. Allen was placed in an interrogation room,

handcuffed to the table, advised again of his Miranda rights, and treated for his burns

and injuries. Sometime between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m., an FBI agent began

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 16 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
17

questioning Allen after advising him, for the third time that morning, of his Miranda

rights. Allen agreed to provide blood, hair, and saliva samples and then asked for

counsel to be appointed to assist him. At that point, the questioning immediately

ended. Allen was offered food and drink, which he declined, and officers fulfilled

Allen's request for a towel for his eyes and that the lights be turned off. At

approximately 8:00 a.m., a detective reminded Allen of his agreement earlier that

morning to provide the blood, hair, and saliva samples, and asked Allen if, in light of

his request for counsel, he still wished to provide the samples. Allen agreed to provide

the samples and verified his decision in writing. Around 10:00 a.m., a detective asked

Allen if he was willing to appear in a lineup. After being informed of his right to have

counsel present at the lineup, Allen agreed to appear in the lineup without the presence

of counsel. After the lineup was finished, detectives informed Allen of the results of

the lineup--that three out of four eyewitnesses placed him at the scene of the crime the

previous day--at which point Allen asked to speak with Lieutenant Henderson, an

officer Allen knew from an earlier case. Prior to confessing to Henderson, Allen was

reminded of his earlier request for counsel and again advised of his Miranda rights.

Allen stated that he understood his right to counsel and that he wanted to talk to

Henderson without counsel present. Allen then set up the ground rules for the

discussion, including no written or signed statements and no video or tape recording,

and then confessed to participating in the previous day's armed bank robbery.

On appeal, Allen does not challenge the district court's factual findings but rather

the legal conclusion to be drawn from the facts, which we review de novo. See United

States v. Looking, 156 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 1998). There is no doubt that Allen

asserted his right to counsel shortly after custodial interrogation began and that counsel

was not present at the time of his confession. Thus, we must decide whether Allen

validly waived his previously invoked right to counsel.

Waivers of counsel must be voluntary and must constitute a knowing and

intelligent relinquishment of a known right. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 17 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
18

482 (1981). This requires consideration of the particular facts and circumstances

surrounding each case. Id. Under the Fifth Amendment, once an individual expresses

a desire to deal with the police through counsel, the authorities may not subject him to

further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused

validly waives his right by initiating further communication with the police. Id. at 484-

85. Interrogation includes express questioning or its functional equivalent, and the

Supreme Court has further defined functional equivalent as "any words or actions on

the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that

the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from

the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). Determining

whether particular statements or practices amount to interrogation depends on the

circumstances of each case, particularly whether the statements are objectively and

reasonably likely to result in incriminating responses by the suspect, as well as the

nature of the police statements and the context in which they are given. See United

States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 202-03 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 988 (1992).

See also United States v. Jackson, 189 F.3d 502, 510-11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 528

U.S. 979 (1999). 

We turn now to the particular circumstances surrounding Allen's request for

counsel, alleged waiver, and confession. First, although Allen had earlier invoked his

right to counsel, we hold that informing Allen of the results of the lineup did not amount

to the functional equivalent of interrogation for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. It

was a simple description of the status of the ongoing investigation which, according to

the government, is a routine practice for suspects in custody in this particular

jurisdiction. More importantly, it was not designed to, nor was it reasonably likely to,

elicit an incriminating response from Allen. This was a statement of fact and not a plea

to conscience. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 294-95, 302-03. Rather, the officer simply

described the results of the lineup, unaccompanied by any threats or other compelling

pressure. See Payne, 954 F.2d at 202 (stating that "mere declaratory descriptions of

incriminating evidence do not invariably constitute interrogation"). Informing a suspect

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 18 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
19

that he has been identified in a lineup contributes to the intelligent exercise of his

judgment and may likely make firm his resolve to refuse to talk to the police without

counsel. Id. Moreover, keeping a suspect informed of the progress of the investigation

and the status of the charges against him should be encouraged rather than discouraged,

so long as the communication is truthful, and is not designed, nor is it likely to elicit,

an incriminating response. On these facts, therefore, we conclude that the officer's

statement to Allen explaining the results of the lineup did not constitute interrogation.

After resolving the interrogation issue, we have little difficulty determining that

Allen's subsequent self-initiated request to speak to Lieutenant Henderson amounted

to a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Allen clearly initiated the request to speak

with Lieutenant Henderson and knew full well his right to counsel and the

consequences of foregoing that right. He had been informed of his right on prior,

unrelated occasions and had indicated that he understood them. In addition to being

given Miranda warnings four times earlier that morning and actually invoking his right

to counsel after one of the warnings (which is strong evidence that Allen understood

his rights), Allen was reminded of his request for counsel and given another explanation

of his Fifth Amendment rights just prior to his confession. Moreover, Allen even set

up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of

his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given,

and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's

motion to suppress the confession. See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th

Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of

counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality

of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and

intelligent), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 587 (2000). See also United States v. Williams,

136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding admissible suspect's statement to police

after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed

without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 19 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
9See U.S. Const., amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same

offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").

20

were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and

validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003 (1999).

Finally, the fact that officers did not find counsel for Allen immediately after his

request does not automatically result in a violation of his right to counsel. The officers

scrupulously honored his right to remain silent and his invocation of the right to counsel

by not interrogating him after he invoked these rights until Allen volunteered his

confession. Miranda condemns the use of psychological ploys and staged lineups as

attempts to elicit a confession, but not all statements obtained by the police are the

product of interrogations. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 299. The length of time that elapses

between a request for counsel and when counsel is actually supplied is simply one

factor among many to be considered when determining whether a suspect's waiver was

voluntarily given, and we disagree with Allen that the approximately seven hours that

elapsed between his request for counsel and his voluntary confession, when viewed in

light of all the facts that took place early that morning, resulted in an involuntary or

improperly coerced confession under the Fifth Amendment. See United States v.

McClinton, 982 F.2d 278, 282 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining that "[t]he appropriate test

for determining the voluntariness of a confession is whether, in light of the totality of

the circumstances, pressures exerted upon the suspect have overborne his will")

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

c. Double Jeopardy

Allen argues that his multiple sentences of life in prison and the death penalty for

the same underlying offense violate his right to be free from double jeopardy.9 Allen

waived this issue by failing to preserve it for appeal, however, because he did not raise

this argument in the district court prior to trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) (requiring

that defenses and objections based on defects in an indictment be raised before trial or

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 20 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
21

they are waived); United States v. Prescott, 42 F.3d 1165, 1167 (8th Cir. 1994)

(holding that failure to raise pretrial objection to alleged duplicitous counts in the

indictment constitutes waiver of the defense); United States v. Shephard, 4 F.3d 647,

650 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) requires that challenges

based on multiplicitous counts in an indictment and related double-jeopardy problems

be raised before trial or they are waived). Reviewing for plain error, we find none. See

United States v. Sickinger, 179 F.3d 1091, 1092-93 (8th Cir. 1999) (reviewing a double

jeopardy claim for plain error even though it was not raised in the district court); United

States v. Jackson, 155 F.3d 942, 947 (8th Cir. 1998) (same). 

In a single trial where separate and consecutive sentences are imposed for the

same underlying circumstances, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent

a sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than a legislature intended. See

Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983). In the present case then, imposition of

multiple punishments for the same underlying circumstances does not violate the

Constitution as long as Congress intended it. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S.

333, 344 (1981). Thus, we first consider whether the two statutes under which Allen

was convicted and sentenced prohibit the same offense, and if so, whether there is a

clear indication that Congress in fact intended multiple punishments for that offense.

See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 367. If the offenses are not the same, and absent clear contrary

legislative intent, there is no double jeopardy violation. See id.

The Supreme Court has consistently used the test from Blockburger v. United

States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), as the initial starting point for determining legislative

intent. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 345 n.3 (explaining that "the established test for

determining whether two offenses are the 'same offense' is the rule set forth in

Blockburger"). Under Blockburger, "where the same act or transaction constitutes a

violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine

whether there are two offenses or one, is whether each provision requires proof of a

fact which the other does not." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 21 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
22

Examining the two statutes at issue, it is clear from the face of 18 U.S.C. §§

2113(a) and (e) (Count I) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and (j)(1) (Count II) that Count

II requires proof of two facts which Count I does not--namely, that a firearm was used

or carried during the commission of a violent crime and that a murder occurred by use

of the firearm. The more difficult question is whether Count I requires proof of a

different fact than Count II. It is not exactly clear how predicate offenses are to be

treated for purposes of Blockburger. There is some indication from the Supreme Court

that Blockburger is simply a rule of statutory construction which is neither intended nor

designed to apply to the particular facts of a case. See Iannelli v. United States, 420

U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975) (explaining that if each offense requires proof of a fact the

other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied notwithstanding a substantial overlap

in the proof offered to establish the crimes); Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (finding that

although both sections of the narcotics statute were violated by one sale, two offenses

were committed because each section required proof of a fact the other did not).

Looking solely at the elements of the offenses at issue here, Count I arguably is not the

same offense as Count II because Count II does not require proof of a taking of bank

property by force or violence or intimidation, but rather only proof of some underlying

crime of violence which could be armed robbery or any other violent felony.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court has applied Blockburger by considering

the nature of the underlying felony in a felony-murder indictment rather than based only

on the elements of the statutes at issue. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684,

694-95(1980) (finding that rape and killing in the course of a rape did not pass muster

under the Blockburger test because rape was a lesser included offense). Under this

interpretation of Blockburger, predicate offenses which form the basis of other statutory

offenses would always fail the Blockburger test. In the present case, the underlying

bank robbery satisfies the "crime of violence" element of §§ 924(c) and (j). By

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 22 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
10The government argues that because Count I requires proof of a killing and

Count II requires proof of murder pursuant to § 1111(a), each offense really does

require proof of an additional fact that the other does not. We reject the argument,

however, because proof of a murder under Count II necessarily requires proof of a

killing as required by Count I.

23

definition, therefore, there is no fact that must be proved in § 2113 that is different from

the elements required to be proved for conviction under §§ 924(c) and (j).10

In light of these conflicting views of how to apply the Blockburger test to two

statutes where one can be a predicate offense for the other, we think it best to err on

the side of leniency by finding that the Blockburger test has not been satisfied.

However, we still must consider the ultimately dispositive question of whether

Congress clearly intended to impose cumulative sentences for simultaneous violations

of each of the statutes. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368 (reasoning that simply because

two criminal statutes may proscribe the same conduct under the Blockburger test does

not mean double jeopardy precludes cumulative punishment because courts cannot

negate clearly expressed legislative intent).

We have repeatedly held that multiple prosecutions and cumulative sentences for

bank robbery under § 2113 and for using a firearm pursuant to § 924(c) are clearly

intended by Congress and thus permissible. See, e.g., United States v. McQuiston, 998

F.2d 627, 629 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding defendant's sentence of 300 months for four

armed robberies in violation of § 2113 and an additional four consecutive sentences of

120 months each for violating § 924(c) during the course of each of those robberies).

Section 924(c) explicitly states that its punishment is to be imposed "in addition to the

punishment provided for such crime of violence." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994). See

also id. ("nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run

concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the crime

of violence . . . in which the firearm was used or carried"). This language leaves no

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 23 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
24

doubt that Congress intended to impose multiple, cumulative punishments under §

924(c). 

Allen argues that § 924(j) should be construed independently of § 924(c) because

it does not contain the same "in addition to" language, the legislative history suggests

Congress only intended to authorize the death penalty for violation of § 924(j) if the

death penalty was not already authorized for the underlying violent offense, and any

ambiguity must be resolved in favor of a defendant based on the rule of lenity. We

respectfully reject Allen's contentions. First, § 924(j) expressly incorporates § 924(c)

and requires a violation of § 924(c) prior to imposition of the penalties set forth in §

924(j). Thus, § 924(j) cannot be read independently from the context of the punishment

scheme set out in § 924(c). Although § 924(j) does not explicitly contain the same

express mandatory cumulative punishment language as found in § 924(c), it

incorporates § 924(c) by reference without disclaiming the cumulative punishment

scheme which is so clearly set out in § 924(c). 

Second, when read in context of the criminal scheme set forth in § 924(c), we

think § 924(j) is fairly interpreted as an additional aggravating punishment for the

scheme already set out in § 924(c). We reach this conclusion because of § 924(j)'s

explicit reference to § 924(c) and because each subsection of the statute is designed for

the same purpose--to impose steeper penalties on those criminals who use firearms

when engaging in crimes of violence. Moreover, Allen's proposed interpretation of §

924(j) would lead to the odd result that a defendant convicted under § 924(c) is subject

to an additional consecutive sentence only in situations that do not result in a death

caused by use of the firearm. We think it unlikely that Congress, which clearly

intended to impose additional cumulative punishments for using firearms during violent

crimes in cases where no murder occurs, would turn around and not intend to impose

cumulative punishments in cases where there are actual murder victims. 

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 24 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
25

Third, §§ 2113(a) and (e) and §§ 924(c) and (j) were clearly designed for

different purposes: the armed robbery statute was designed to punish those who take

money from banks by force or violence, whatever the means, and the firearm statute

was designed to punish those who use or carry firearms during violent crimes, whatever

the underlying crime.

We therefore conclude, notwithstanding our assumption of the likely failure of

the two statutes to pass the Blockburger test, that Congress fully and clearly intended

to permit cumulative punishments for violations of § 2113 and § 924(j). See United

States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 864 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that Congress intended

to allow multiple punishments for RICO conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the

underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the

Blockburger test). We also reject Allen's proposed reliance on the rule of lenity because

Congress's intent is quite clear and not ambiguous. Based on the foregoing reasons, the

district court did not commit plain error under the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy

protections by submitting Counts I and II to the jury or by imposing separate sentences

after Allen's conviction on each count.

Allen also argues that his double exposure to a sentence of death for one

underlying crime unduly emphasized the death penalty to the jury and impermissibly

skewed the deliberative process in favor of a death sentence in violation of the Eighth

Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fifth

Amendment's due process right to a fair trial. We again respectfully disagree. Even

if Allen's argument is a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment, a matter which we

do not reach, we find that Allen has not shown that the scales of justice were skewed

in favor of a death sentence. The jury instructions did not unduly emphasize the death

sentence option over life in prison, and the instructions made it clear to the jury that

they were supposed to evaluate each charged count separately and independently.

Given that the jury returned different sentences under each count, there is little doubt

the jury followed its instructions. Allen speculates that the reason the jury returned a

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 25 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
26

sentence of death on Count II was that the jury must have been so overwhelmed by

having to make two separate weighings of all the mitigating and aggravating

circumstances such that the mitigation evidence must not have survived the second

weighing. A more plausible and principled explanation for the jury's decision on Count

II is that the evidence shows that Allen was far more culpable for the firearm count than

the armed bank robbery count. The jury most likely found that Allen was primarily

responsible for firing the shots that killed Richard Heflin, and, given Holder's leadership

in planning, preparing, and instigating the bank robbery, that Allen was less culpable

for committing the bank robbery. Thus, we find little evidence to support Allen's

contention that the submission of two separate death-versus-life-in-prison decisions to

the jury violated Allen's constitutional rights. See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 153

F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding Timothy McVeigh's eleven sentences of

death as a result of his conduct and convictions for the bombing of the Oklahoma City

federal building), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1007 (1999).

3. Alleged Trial and Sentencing Errors

Allen asserts that the district court committed numerous errors during the trial,

each of which allegedly warrants this court granting him a new trial or a new

sentencing. We address each of his contentions in order, and as explained below,

conclude that none of the asserted district court errors entitle Allen to a new trial or a

new sentencing.

a. Denial of Continuance

Allen asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying Allen's

motion for a continuance of the trial after Allen's mitigation expert quit ten days prior

to trial with little of his work done. The facts are as follows. The government filed its

notice of intent to seek the death penalty on August 8, 1997. Defense counsel hired a

mitigation expert in early September. On October 15, Allen's case was set for trial on

February 9, 1998. On January 12, 1998, the original mitigation expert informed

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 26 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
27

defense counsel that he could not fulfill his obligations. Defense counsel hired a new

mitigation expert on January 15 who started working on Allen's mitigation defense on

January 16. Allen filed his motion for continuance on January 29, requesting that the

trial be delayed for 120 days in order to prepare adequately the mitigation evidence for

use during sentencing. The district court denied the motion for a continuance on the

grounds that substantial work had been completed on Allen's mitigation defense and

that sufficient time remained to finish preparations. Jury selection began on February

9, trial commenced on February 17, the sentencing began on March 2, and Allen

presented his mitigation evidence from March 3 to March 6. 

We review rulings on requests for continuances under the following standard:

District courts are afforded broad discretion when ruling on requests for

continuances. Continuances generally are not favored and should be

granted only when the party requesting one has shown a compelling

reason. We will reverse a district court's decision to deny a motion for

continuance only if the court abused its discretion and the moving party

was prejudiced by the denial.

United States v. Cotroneo, 89 F.3d 510, 514 (8th Cir.)(citations omitted), cert. denied,

519 U.S. 1018 (1996). "Abuse of discretion is determined by looking at the particular

circumstances of the case." United States v. Ware, 890 F.2d 1008, 1010 (8th Cir.

1989) (citing Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)). Our review of the

circumstances of this case convinces us that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Allen's request for a continuance.

The replacement mitigation expert had worked on Allen's case for two weeks

prior to the continuance request, and at the time the motion for the continuance was

filed he had over four weeks left to prepare Allen's sentencing defense. In addition, the

defense never renewed its motion for a continuance at the start of the penalty phase.

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 27 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
28

Thus, the evidence supports the district court's finding that the defense had sufficient

time to prepare an adequate mitigation defense.

Furthermore, the defendant has failed to show any specific prejudice resulting

from the denial of his request for a continuance. Allen's mitigation evidence consisted

of three days of testimony, totaling over nine hundred pages of transcript, and involved

thirty-six witnesses testifying on Allen's behalf in support of four statutory mitigating

factors and twenty-two nonstatutory mitigating factors. Allen does not point to any

specific mitigation evidence that he was deprived of presenting to the jury due to the

district court's denial of his request for a continuance. See Walls v. Bowersox, 151

F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1071 (1999). In fact, on the basis

of the evidence presented, the jurors were able to identify three additional mitigating

factors which they considered during deliberations. 

Allen argues general prejudice on the basis that there was not overwhelming

evidence in support of the jury's decision to sentence Allen to death on Count II, given

the jury's decision not to impose a sentence of death on Count I. We disagree. There

was overwhelming evidence that Allen was responsible for firing all or at least most of

the shots that killed the security guard, which is more than enough to support the jury's

finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors thus warranting

a sentence of death. We therefore need not address the question of whether Allen had

a compelling reason for requesting a continuance of the trial (no explanation was ever

given for the delay in discovering the nonperformance of the original mitigation expert),

because we find neither an abuse of discretion by the district court nor any prejudice

as a result.

b. Failure to Disclose Upcoming Inconsistent Testimony

Allen argues, based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that his due

process rights to a fair trial were violated by the government's failure to disclose that

two government eyewitnesses--Betty Thompson and William Green--would testify at

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 28 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
29

trial inconsistently with previous statements attributed to them as contained in FBI

reports, and that the district court therefore abused its discretion in denying Allen's

motion for a mistrial or to strike some of the witnesses' testimony. We will affirm a

district court's decision denying a request for a mistrial unless we find "an abuse of

discretion resulting in clear prejudice" to the defendant. United States v. Rhodenizer,

106 F.3d 222, 225 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). See United States v.

Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Ryan, 153

F.3d 708, 711 (8th Cir. 1998)(applying the same standard to denial of motion for new

trial based on Brady violation allegations), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1064 (1999). In

order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that the government

suppressed exculpatory evidence material either to guilt or punishment. See Ryan, 153

F.3d at 711.

Evidence is material under Brady if there is a reasonable probability that,

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. However,

materiality is not established through the mere possibility that the

suppressed evidence might have influenced the jury.

Id. at 712 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

We agree with the district court that there has been no Brady violation. First, the

witnesses' expected trial testimony was not Brady evidence because the witnesses

testified at trial and the defense was provided with the necessary impeachment

evidence (in this case the FBI reports). See United States v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363,

1368 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that Brady is not violated by a delay in disclosing evidence

so long as the evidence is disclosed during trial). Second, Allen has not shown that the

change in testimony satisfies the element of materiality. The statements of witnesses

Thompson and Green were inconsistent only as to the issue of whether the driver or the

passenger was carrying the bag of money as the two defendants reentered the van after

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 29 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
30

the robbery. Whether Holder or Allen carried the bag, however, has almost no

probative value as to whether Allen was guilty of the charged offenses, and has only

some probative value as to who actually shot Heflin, which was relevant to the jury's

sentencing decision. Moreover, the other evidence convincingly showed that Allen

actually did most of the shooting. In short, our confidence in the jury's verdict as a

result of any delayed disclosure of the negligibly exculpatory information is not at all

undermined, because earlier disclosure of the information would have had no effect on

the outcome of the jury's verdict.

Nor do we find any clear prejudice. The prosecutor expressly stated during

opening argument that witness Green was going to testify that the driver was carrying

the bag, which was contrary to Green's statement to the FBI. (See Trial Tr., Vol. VI

at 52 ("A few moments later [Mr. Green] saw two men run to the van, the driver

carrying a bag, both men carrying what looked to him to be long-barreled weapons.").)

Given that there is little doubt that Holder was the driver of the van, the prosecutor's

remarks during his opening statement alerted defense counsel to the inconsistency

between witness Green's prior statements and his expected trial testimony. Moreover,

defense counsel had the necessary impeachment material--the FBI reports--and we

agree with the district court that defense counsel did a very effective job of using the

inconsistencies to impeach the credibility and accuracy of Green's trial testimony. (See

Trial Tr., Vol. VIII at 198.) Thus, not only did defense counsel have notice of the

inconsistency between Green's statements to the FBI and his testimony at trial, but

counsel also had and effectively used the FBI report during cross-examination to

impeach Green's testimony. Finally, defense counsel never asked for a continuance to

deal with Green's allegedly surprising and prejudicial change in testimony, and never

even raised an objection at the time Thompson's change in testimony was discovered.

Based on these circumstances, we do not find any clear prejudice to Allen. We

therefore reject Allen's contention that the district court abused its discretion in denying

Allen's request for a mistrial because there was no Brady violation by the government

and there was no clear prejudice to Allen.

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 30 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
11The procedure is described by all counsel in the record as erecting "a Chinese

wall" between the prosecution's guilt phase trial team and the Assistant United States

Attorney who was designated to receive the psychiatric reports.

31

c. Court-Ordered Psychiatric Examination

Allen asserts that the district court erred in ordering him to undergo a psychiatric

examination by a government-selected psychiatrist without a full protective order and

in allowing a prosecutor to violate the terms of the court's partial protective order. We

find no constitutional error and therefore reject both claims.

There is no doubt that a district court has the authority to order a defendant who

states that he will use evidence from his own psychiatric examination in the penalty

phase of a trial to undergo a psychiatric examination by a government-selected

psychiatrist before the start of the penalty phase. See United States v. Webster, 162

F.3d 308, 338-40 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a district court possesses the inherent

power to order a psychiatric examination based on 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), which requires

that the government be given a "fair opportunity" to rebut any of defendant's mitigating

evidence, and Fed.R.Crim.P. 12, which allows a court-ordered psychiatric examination

during similar circumstances in the guilt phase of trials), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 829

(1999). See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 466 n.10, 472 (1981) (leaving open

the possibility, without deciding it, that a defendant can be precluded from using

psychiatric evidence during the penalty phase if he does not also consent to a

prosecution-selected psychiatrist). The government must be able to put on a fair

rebuttal to a defendant's mitigation evidence during sentencing. Here, the district court

allowed one assistant prosecutor to begin evaluating the results of the government's

psychiatric examination prior to the sentencing phase under an order to not divulge any

of the results to the rest of the prosecution team until after the completion of the guilt

phase.11 This partial protective order is legally and constitutionally sufficient because,

as explained by the Fifth Circuit, a defendant is adequately protected under the

Constitution from impermissible early introduction of the fruits of a government

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 31 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
32

psychiatric examination under a scheme wherein the defendant has the burden of

producing some evidence of taint, and the government has the ultimate burden of

persuading the court that the evidence is not tainted. United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d

381, 399 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969)),

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.

Martinez-Salizar, 528 U.S. 304, 317 (2000). Additional prophylactic safeguards

beyond this evidentiary framework, such as the sealing of exam results until after the

completion of the guilt phase, as the court did in United States v. Beckford, 962 F.

Supp. 748, 761 (E.D. Va. 1997), may avoid later litigation but are not constitutionally

required. See Hall, 152 F.3d at 399. We therefore decline to adopt any such rigid

prophylactic rule in the name of the Constitution and leave the matter to the discretion

of district courts, subject only to our review for abuse of discretion, which we do not

find present in this case.

As for Allen's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, after a careful review of

the record we find neither a breach of the district court's protective order nor any

prejudice to Allen during the guilt phase had the prosecutor's comments been a breach.

The government requested that the entire prosecution team be allowed to review the

results of the court-ordered psychiatrist's interview with Allen before the end of the trial

so that they could begin researching possible defenses Allen might raise. The Assistant

United States Attorney (AUSA) designated to receive the results of the court-ordered

psychiatrist's interview with Allen made the following statement in open court, without

the jury present, in response to Allen's assertion that the results should continue to be

excluded from the entire prosecution team because they might be used against him

during the guilt phase of the trial:

There really isn't anything in any of these reports that would prejudice the

defendant if the prosecution team was made aware of them prior to the

beginning of the penalty phase. In fact, Mr. Allen does not seem to

discuss the offense or wasn't even asked about the offense with either one

of the physicians that were chosen by the defense and there was no

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 32 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
33

discussion of it with the court-appointed psychiatrist beyond Mr. Allen's

maintaining that he wasn't there, so there isn't anything in these reports

that could be exploited in the guilt phase of any type that I can see.

(Trial Tr., Vol. X at 2-3.)

Allen argues that the AUSA's disclosure, in the presence of other members of the

prosecution team, of Allen's statement to the government psychiatrist that Allen was not

present at the armed bank robbery is a violation of the court's protective order and a

structural defect in the trial. We disagree. While the defense did express the view that

the Chinese wall had been breached, it did not raise a formal objection at the time the

comment was made, and the district court's failure to take any action sua sponte in

response to the comment or to the allegation that its order had been violated, makes

clear that it did not consider it to be a violation of the order. We see no violation either

because the defendant had denied being present at the armed robbery as early as July

25, 1997, in his Notice of Intent to Rely Upon Defense of Alibis, so the prosecution

team was already on notice from Allen himself that Allen might argue an "I wasn't

there" defense. Thus, the AUSA's disclosure had little, if any, impact on the

prosecution's presentation of evidence, and for that reason, even if the AUSA's

disclosure was a technical violation of the court's protective order, Allen was certainly

not prejudiced by the disclosure.

We also reject Allen's assertion that the disclosure effectively precluded or

"chilled" him from exercising his right to testify at trial because he was afraid that all

of the examination results had been disclosed to the entire prosecution team. The

defendant could have taken the stand and still have protected his Fifth Amendment

rights by alleging specific violations of the court's protective order if the government

appeared to be improperly using information from the psychiatric examination. The

decision was made to forego this protection, and on appeal Allen points to no specific

improper uses of the results or contents of the psychiatric examination during the guilt

phase of the trial. We therefore hold that the AUSA's disclosure does not, as Allen

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 33 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
34

argues, rise to the level of a structural error (which he argues requires no showing of

prejudice), nor do we find any abuse of discretion by the district court or prejudice to

Allen with respect to the court-ordered psychiatric examination and partial protective

order.

d. Improper Prosecutorial Statements

Allen argues that government prosecutors made improper and prejudicial

statements during the penalty phase which rendered the jury's sentencing decision

fundamentally unfair. Specifically, Allen points to three allegedly improper statements:

(1) a direct reference to Allen as a "murderous dog" during closing arguments; (2) a

statement saying "don't let him down there dribbling basketballs on Richard Heflin's

grave" during closing arguments; and (3) a question to one of Allen's witnesses about

whether the blue color of his clothing signified his association with any gang. Allen

argues that, given the fact that he is an African-American, each of these statements was

designed to appeal to racial fears and prejudices of jury members in order to secure a

death sentence, and that it did have this improper effect.

Our standard of review is as follows:

We afford the district court broad discretion in controlling closing

arguments, overturning the lower court only when it clearly abuses its

discretion. We examine prosecutorial remarks to determine, first, whether

the remarks were in fact improper, and if so, whether, in the context of the

entire trial, the remarks prejudicially affected [the defendant's] substantial

rights, so as to deprive [him] of a fair trial.

United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). See also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) ("[I]t is

not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even universally

condemned. The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected

the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.")

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 34 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
12The mitigator submitted by Allen to the jury read as follows: "Despite growing

up in a neighborhood that was surrounded by gang factions, and losing several close

friends to gang violence, Billie Allen was known as a likeable, gentle, lighthearted

person. The offenses for which he has been convicted are inconsistent with his prior

behavior. He was not considered aggressive or violent." (Allen's App. at 405.)

35

We first address whether the prosecutor's statements were in fact improper.

Given the context surrounding the statements, we are convinced that neither the

basketball comment nor the gang reference was improper. The basketball reference

was made after several of Allen's own mitigation witnesses, such as his middle school

basketball coach and relatives, testified that Allen enjoyed playing basketball, and

therefore later reference to it by the prosecution was not improper. (See, e.g., Trial Tr.,

Vol. XV at 130, 167.) The gang affiliation question came up during cross-examination

of one of Allen's witnesses in the context of determining, as alleged in one of the

mitigating factors, whether Allen was a "follower." The prosecutor's questions were

directed at discovering whether either Allen or the witness or both were ever involved

in gang activity, and we find nothing wrong with the questions because they were

relevant to and in response to the mitigating factors presented by Allen, which indicated

he grew up surrounded by gang factions. Furthermore, in the circumstances of this

case, we find that the prosecutor's statements--both the basketball comment and the

gang affiliation questions--were not intended nor did they have the effect of appealing

to racial fears or to any prejudices of the jurors.

The characterization of Allen as a "murderous dog" presents a closer question.

The comment was made in response to one of Allen's proposed nonstatutory mitigating

factors, which portrayed Allen as a "likeable, gentle, lighthearted person" who "was not

considered aggressive or violent."12 (Allen's App. at 405.) During closing argument,

moreover, Allen's counsel made the assertion that the prosecution "[c]ouldn't find a

single person to say [Allen] was violent." (Trial Tr., Vol. XIX at 77.) In rebuttal

closing argument, the prosecutor responded as follows:

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 35 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
13See U.S. Const., amend. V ("No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law . . . .").

36

How about the mitigator that you're going to see on that verdict form that

this defendant is a gentle, lighthearted, likable person? He's "considered"

those things, okay? That's important. It says he's considered kind, gentle,

and lighthearted. He's not considered violent or aggressive. Richard

Heflin didn't think this guy with the mask, armed for war, armed to kill,

was kind, lighthearted, or gentle. He thought he was a murderous dog

coming in there to kill people for money. That's what Richard Heflin

thought. And remember when you are back there deliberating, the last

thing Richard Heflin ever saw was these two come in and start blazing at

him, blow him down – and the terrible irony is he survived Vietnam,

survived Vietnam, managed to live through having to fight people with

guns just like that, and he's killed at High Point in St. Louis City on St.

Patrick's day, that is a terrible irony.

(Trial Tr., Vol. XIX at 105-06.) Although we find no improper appeal to racial fears

or prejudice in the above statement, we do find that the reference to Allen as being a

"murderous dog" is inappropriate and improper. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 179-80

(finding it improper to characterize the defendant as an "animal").

We will not, however, reverse a sentence on the basis of improper prosecutorial

statements unless those statements are prejudicial enough to deprive a defendant of his

constitutional rights to a fair penalty phase hearing. At the outset, we reject Allen's

contention that in a capital case there is greater protection under the Fifth Amendment's

Due Process Clause13 for a fair penalty phase hearing than there is for a fair trial. In

determining whether Allen has received a fair penalty phase hearing, we therefore

adopt the same standard set out by the Supreme Court and this court in determining

whether a defendant has received a fair trial under the Constitution despite improper

prosecutorial comments during trial. See, e.g., Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (holding that

"[t]he relevant question is whether the prosecutor's comments so infected the trial with

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process"); Cannon, 88

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 36 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
37

F.3d at 1502 (outlining a three-factor test to help determine, in the context of the trial

as a whole, whether a defendant has been deprived of a fair trial, including the

cumulative effect of any misconduct, the strength of the properly admitted evidence of

guilt, and any remedial actions taken by the trial court).

Although we find that the prosecutor's reference to Allen as a "murderous dog"

was improper, we have little difficulty in deciding that in this case Allen was not

deprived of his constitutional right to a fair sentencing. First, the comment was made

only once and did not manipulate or misstate the evidence. See Mack v. Caspari, 92

F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding despite numerous references to the defendant as

a "killer" that the entire trial was not so fundamentally unfair as to amount to a

deprivation of due process, in part because the prosecutor's statements did not

manipulate or misstate the evidence), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1109 (1997). Although it

is possible that one isolated comment can result in the denial of a defendant's due

process right to a fair trial or sentencing, the lack of any cumulative effect of more than

one improper comment is certainly a strong indication that the sentencing was not

fundamentally unfair. Second, the evidence is essentially overwhelming that Allen fired

the shots from the Chinese SKS that killed Richard Heflin, which helps explain why the

jury imposed a death sentence for the firearm conviction and a life sentence for Allen's

armed robbery conviction (the evidence shows that Holder was primarily responsible

for initiating and planning the armed robbery). Thus, if the prosecutor's improper

statement was as emotionally prejudicial as Allen claims, we think it likely that the jury

would have returned a sentence of death on both counts, so the fact that the jury

returned a sentence of life in prison for the armed robbery conviction is strong evidence

that its decisions were not based on passion. Third, the trial court was not called upon

to take any curative actions because the defendant never objected to the remark, and

the experienced trial judge did not intervene sua sponte, a decision we do not find to

be error of any kind. The court did instruct the jury to make its decision based only on

the evidence and that statements by the lawyers were not evidence. This is sufficient

in the absence of an objection. Id. at 643-44. 

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 37 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
38

We also reject Allen's argument that the murderous dog reference, in

combination with telling the story through the eyes of the victim, makes the statement

unduly prejudicial. No undue prejudice arises from reminding the jury to consider the

murder victim's perspective where the defendant has asserted a gentle spirit and

accused the government of being unable to produce any witness to testify that the

defendant was violent. For these reasons, we conclude that Allen's penalty phase was

not unfairly prejudiced by the prosecutor's "murderous dog" reference, and therefore

he was not denied his due process right to a fair sentencing. See Darden, 477 U.S. at

180-81 (finding during habeas review of a death penalty conviction that the defendant

was not deprived of his right to a fair trial despite the prosecutor's references to the

defendant as an "animal" that "shouldn't be out of his cell unless he has a leash on

him"); Kellogg v. Skon, 176 F.3d 447, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding in criminal

sexual abuse case that defendant did not receive a fundamentally unfair trial even

though the prosecutor referred to him as a "monster," "sexual deviant," and "liar");

Pollard v. Delo, 28 F.3d 887, 890 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that repeated references to

the defendant as a "predator" were not so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a

fair trial).

e. Victim Impact Evidence

Allen argues that the district court erred in overruling his motion to limit the

quantity of victim impact evidence introduced by the government during the sentencing

phase, and that this decision ultimately led to a violation of his Eighth Amendment

rights because the government was allowed to present too much victim impact

evidence. We normally review evidentiary decisions under an abuse of discretion

standard. See United States v. Martin, 180 F.3d 965, 966 (8th Cir. 1999). In this case,

however, Allen failed to raise an objection to any of the victim impact testimony.

Although Allen filed a motion to limit the government's evidence before any of it was

introduced, in denying the motion the district court made it quite clear that it would be

necessary to raise objections later in order to preserve the issue for appeal. The district

court stated the following:

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 38 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
39

The parties will note that motions in limine are advisory only, that is

orders in limine are advisory only. The parties will be required to make

appropriate objections or offers of proof at the proper time during the trial

to protect their respective positions. . . . The Court will consider victim

impact [testimony] as it is presented. I have no way of knowing at this

time precisely what it will be. Parties understand the statutory scheme

which provides for the impact testimony and also the body of concept of

cases dealing on that subject and neither -- and the government should not

go beyond the bounds of either the statute or the case law.

(Trial Tr., Vol. XIV at 34-36.) 

Due to Allen's failure to raise any objections during the sentencing phase to the

victim impact testimony, we review Allen's claim for plain error. Thus, Allen

must therefore show that the error was plain, meaning clear or obvious;

and [that] the error affected [his] substantial rights, which requires a

showing that the error was prejudicial and affected the trial's outcome.

Even clear errors will only matter if a miscarriage of justice would

otherwise result that might seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of the judicial proceedings.

United States v. Tulk, 171 F.3d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 733-35 (1993)) (alterations in original) (internal quotations and citations

omitted).

First, it is clear from both the FDPA and Supreme Court precedent that the

government is allowed to present and a jury is allowed to consider victim impact

evidence in reaching its sentencing decision in a capital case. The FDPA provides for

the submission of aggravating factors that may concern "the effect of the offense on the

victim and the victim's family, and may include oral testimony, a victim impact

statement" identifying the victim and the loss suffered by the victim and the victim's

family, "and any other relevant information." 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(2). Likewise, the

Supreme Court has ruled that the Eighth Amendment "permits capital sentencing juries

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 39 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
40

to consider evidence relating to the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional

impact of the murder on the victim's family in deciding whether an eligible defendant

should receive a death sentence." Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 395 (1999)

(citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830-31

(explaining that the Eighth Amendment does not bar a jury from considering "the full

extent of the harm caused by the crime, including its impact on the victim's family and

community" or from seeing "a quick glimpse of the life petitioner chose to extinguish

to remind the jury that the person whose life was taken was a unique human being," and

further explaining that a defendant may still seek relief under the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment "[i]f, in a particular case, a witness' testimony or a

prosecutor's remark so infects the sentencing proceeding as to render it fundamentally

unfair")(internal quotations and citations omitted)(O'Connor, J., concurring). 

Second, there is little, if any, danger of undue prejudice due to victim impact

evidence under the FDPA if a jury, as in this case, fails to even find the existence of the

victim-impact aggravating factor. (See Trial Tr., Vol. XIX at 123, 132.) This is

because the FDPA prohibits a jury from considering, in the final weighing of

aggravating and mitigating circumstances, any aggravating factor which the jury did not

find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d), (e). The

instructions to the jury were clear on this point, and unless a jury disregards its

instructions, which we do not and cannot presume, there can be no prejudice. See

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325 n.9 (1985)("[a]bsent [] extraordinary situations,

however, we adhere to the crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of

trial by jury that jurors carefully follow instructions"); United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d

1134, 1144 (8th Cir. 1996).

Third, although the jury did not find the existence of the victim-impact

aggravating factor, which is strong evidence of and in most cases will be sufficient to

make a ruling of no undue prejudice, we will nevertheless consider the possibility that

the evidence may have been so prejudicial as to violate the Due Process Clause. Our

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 40 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
41

review of the record, however, convinces us that no such violation occurred. The

government's evidence of victim impact consisted of testimony from eleven witnesses,

including Richard Heflin's mother, one sister, one brother, two bank coworkers, one

former coworker, his former wife (and mother of his three sons), each of his three sons,

and his widow (who had married Heflin approximately seven months prior to his

death). The testimony from these witnesses lasted less than a day and took up only

eighty-eight pages of transcript. In comparison, the entire penalty phase transcript

takes up over seventeen hundred pages, and the testimony from Allen's penalty phase

witnesses took up over nine hundred pages. Furthermore, Allen could have objected

to any specific testimony that he thought was unduly prejudicial, and he could have

raised an objection if he believed the amount of testimony had become unduly

prejudicial. For tactical reasons, such objections could have been lodged at a side bar

conference outside of the jury's hearing. No objections were raised, however, and on

appeal Allen makes no allegations that any specific testimony was unduly prejudicial.

Our own review of the record convinces us that neither the amount nor the scope and

nature of the victim-impact testimony was unduly prejudicial.

For all of the above stated reasons, we find that the district court did not commit

any error, much less plain error, in its decision to deny Allen's motion in limine at the

outset of the sentencing hearing and later to permit all of the government's victim

impact evidence to come into the record without objection.

f. Death Penalty Selection Instructions

Allen argues that the district court erred in failing to submit to the jury his

tendered "mercy instruction" which would have informed the jury that they never are

required to impose a sentence of death. "When reviewing a challenge to the jury

instructions, we recognize that the district court has wide discretion in formulating the

instructions and [we] will affirm if the entire charge to the jury, when read as a whole,

fairly and adequately contains the law applicable to the case." United States v. Phelps,

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 41 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
42

168 F.3d 1048, 1057 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Casas, 999 F.2d 1225,

1230 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1078 (1994)).

Our review of the instructions given to the jury convinces us that the district

court committed no error in fairly and adequately presenting the applicable law. The

relevant portions of the district court's instructions to the jury were as follows:

Again, whether or not the circumstances in this case justify a sentence of

death is a decision that the law leaves entirely to you. . . . If you

unanimously conclude that the aggravating factor or factors found to exist

sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to

justify a sentence of death . . . you shall record your determination that

death is justified in Section 6A of the special verdict form for each count

of the indictment.

(Instr. No. 8, Trial Tr., Vol. XIX at 37-38.) The district court also instructed the jury

that, "[a]t the end of your deliberations, if you determine that Billie Jerome Allen

should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without possibility of release, the

Court is required to impose that sentence." (Instr. No. 9, id. at 39.)

We think these instructions accurately explain the jury's role in sentencing under

the FDPA, which reads as follows:

[T]he defendant . . . shall be sentenced to death if, after consideration of

the factors set forth in section 3592 [delineating possible aggravating and

mitigating circumstances] in the course of a hearing held pursuant to

section 3593, it is determined that imposition of a sentence of death is

justified . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2) (emphasis added). In § 3593, entitled "Special hearing to

determine whether a sentence of death is justified," the FDPA states the following: 

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 42 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
14We also note, and reject, Allen's assertion that the legislative history supports

his interpretation of the statute. At most, the legislative history shows that language

both expressly requiring that a mercy instruction be given and language expressly

prohibiting a mercy instruction from being given was proposed and then deleted, for

whatever reasons, from the final version of the FDPA passed by Congress and signed

by the President. We are thus left to interpret, as best we can, the proper meaning of

the FDPA that was actually enacted into law.

43

[T]he jury . . . shall consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors

found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors

found to exist to justify a sentence of death . . . . Based upon this

consideration, the jury by unanimous vote . . . shall recommend whether

the defendant should be sentenced to death, to life imprisonment without

possibility of release or some other lesser sentence.

18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (emphasis added). Based upon the plain language of the statute,

once a jury makes a final, unanimous determination that a sentence of death is justified,

then the FDPA requires its imposition. See 18 U.S.C. § 3594 (requiring that once a

recommendation of death or life imprisonment is made, "the court shall sentence the

defendant accordingly").

Allen argues that the language in § 3593(e) requires a jury to make two

decisions--first, whether a sentence of death is justified and second, whether a sentence

of death should actually be imposed. Although § 3593(e) could lend itself to this

interpretation when read in isolation, we reject this interpretation as inconsistent with

the Act as a whole.14 See Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 900 (8th Cir.

1999) (noting that we apply common sense meaning to the text of statutes and interpret

provisions "in a manner logically consistent with the Act as a whole"). Allen's twodecision interpretation of § 3593(e) would allow the jurors to disregard a unanimous

determination that a sentence of death is justified. We conclude that such an

interpretation contradicts the language of § 3591(a)(2), stating that a defendant shall

be sentenced to death if the fact finder determines that a sentence of death is justified

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 43 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
44

after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. To consistently

harmonize the two sections, we must read § 3593(e) as specifying the jury's options

within this framework. We already know from § 3591(a)(2) that a unanimous finding

that death is justified requires a recommendation of a death sentence. The jury's

remaining options, then (life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other

lesser sentence), are only valid options for the jury to recommend if the balancing

process favors the mitigating factors and does not justify a sentence of death.

Thus, we read the requirement in § 3593(e) that the jury recommend by

unanimous vote the sentence to be imposed to be a procedural mechanism to record the

jury's findings, first on the question of whether a death sentence is justified, and if not,

then on whether the sentence should be life in prison or some other sentence imposed

by the court. We do not read § 3593(e) as requiring from the jury a second, substantive

determination regarding a sentence of death once it decides that a sentence of death is

indeed justified.

In another context, the Controlled Substances Act, Congress clearly has provided

that the jury "regardless of its findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating

factors, is never required to impose a death sentence." 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (requiring

the jury to be instructed in this manner). This language would explicitly allow the jury

to make the second, substantive determination that Allen seeks. No similar language

exists in the FDPA, however, and we are not permitted to legislate this language into

the Act ourselves, particularly in light of the contrary language explained above which

already exists in the FDPA.

Under the FDPA, the jury exercises complete discretion in its determination of

whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. The jury was informed

that whether or not the circumstances justify a sentence of death was a decision left

entirely to them. Mercy is not precluded from entering into the balance of whether the

aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The FDPA merely

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 44 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
45

precludes the jurors from arbitrarily disregarding its unanimous determination that a

sentence of death is justified. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1993)

(explaining that "'it would be very difficult to reconcile a rule allowing the fate of a

defendant to turn on the vagaries of particular jurors' emotional sensitivities with our

longstanding recognition that, above all, capital sentencing must be reliable, accurate,

and nonarbitrary'") (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990)); Saffle, 494

U.S. at 493 (stating that the government "must not cut off full and fair consideration of

mitigating evidence; but it need not grant the jury the choice to make the sentencing

decision according to its own whims or caprice"). Congress is free to pass a statute

which confines arguments of mercy to the jury's consideration of mitigating

circumstances and in its final determination of whether the aggravating factors

"sufficiently outweigh" the mitigating factors. We also note that Allen was not

prohibited from urging the jury to be merciful in its deliberations and in its

consideration of asserted mitigating factors. The district court stated as follows:

There will be no ruling by the Court that mercy is a factor that cannot be

considered. Certainly jury nullification cannot be argued nor any

argument permitted beyond a statutory scheme. So there's no doubt about

it, the defense will not be precluded from arguing that the jury may be

merciful in its deliberations.

(Trial Tr., Vol. XIX at 22-23.) For these reasons, we conclude that the instructions

given in this case adequately state the law and that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by rejecting Allen's proposed mercy instruction.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1), we have addressed all of the substantive

and procedural issues raised by Billie Jerome Allen's appeal from the sentence of death.

We have also considered whether his sentence of death was imposed under the

influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and conclude that it was

not so imposed. We further have carefully considered whether the evidence supports

the jury's special findings of the existence of the aggravating factors, both statutory and

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 45 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
15See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1994) ("Whoever, in committing any offense defined

in this section [bank robbery by force or violence] or in avoiding or attempting to avoid

apprehension . . . kills any person . . . shall . . . be punished by death or life

imprisonment.").

16Instruction No. 15 required a showing that (1) the defendant took money from

the bank, (2) by force and violence or intimidation, (3) that the money was federally

insured, and (4) that "in committing this offense, the defendant, or a person aided and

46

nonstatutory, which the jury found to exist, and we conclude that the evidence is more

than sufficient to support the jury's special findings.

B. Norris G. Holder

1. Jury Instructions and Specific Intent

Holder argues that jury instructions No. 15 and No. 19 failed to require a finding

by the jury that Holder had a specific intent, or mens rea, to kill, and therefore each of

his convictions is invalid. We apply the same standard of review to Holder's

instructional error claims as we just applied to Allen's death penalty selection

instruction error claim. See Phelps, 168 F.3d at 1057 (citing Casas, 999 F.2d at 1230).

We turn first to Holder's conviction for bank robbery in which a killing occurs.15

We agree with the Sixth Circuit that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) is

sufficient to reject Holder's challenge. "Because the plain language of [18 U.S.C. §

2113(e)] says simply 'kills,' and not 'intentionally kills' or 'murders,' the settled

principles of construction direct us to conclude that [Congress] did not intend to add

an additional scienter requirement to the killing component of the crime." United States

v. Poindexter, 44 F.3d 406, 409 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1132 (1995). Thus,

a conviction under § 2113(e) for armed robbery in which a killing occurs does not

require an additional finding of specific intent to kill. Instead, the statute is like

common law felony murder, and we find no error in the district court's instructions to

the jury.16

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 46 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
abetted by the defendant, killed Richard Heflin." (Holder's App. at 63).

17See 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (Supp. II 1996) (stating "[a] person who, in the course

of a violation of subsection (c) [crime of violence], causes the death of a person through

use of a firearm, shall (1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 1111), be

punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life"). 

47

Holder's reliance on this court's decision in United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d

1360 (8th Cir. 1974), is misplaced. In Delay, the defendant argued that his conviction

under § 2113(e) was invalid because the government had failed to prove specific intent

to kill in order to avoid apprehension for bank robbery, but the court found that there

was sufficient evidence of that intent. See id. at 1362-64. The real issue presented in

Delay was whether there was sufficient evidence to show that the killing was done after

committing the bank robbery in order to avoid being apprehended, which was an

element of the offense. Although the court assumed for purposes of that appeal that

specific intent to kill was actually an element of the crime under § 2113(e), the issue

was not before the court and was never actually decided. In any event, Delay does not

control the outcome in this case because Holder was convicted of killing while

committing the offense, not in an attempt to avoid apprehension. Thus, Delay does not

bar us from holding, in accordance with the plain language of the statute and the Sixth

Circuit's ruling in Poindexter, that specific intent to kill is not a separate element of the

offense under § 2113(e). As in common law felony murder, the intent to kill is supplied

by the fact that the killing occurred during the violent commission of the robbery

offense itself. See Schad v. United States, 501 U.S. 624, 640 (1991) (noting that

"intent to kill and the intent to commit a felony were alternative aspects of the single

concept of 'malice aforethought'" at common law).

Next, we turn to Holder's conviction for using a firearm to cause another person's

death during a crime of violence.17 Holder argues that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §

924(j) requires a jury finding of specific intent to kill. The statute uses the term

"murder," rather than "killing," and specifically refers to § 1111 for the definition of

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 47 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
18See Instruction No. 19, Holder's App. at 65 ("Four, the killing of Richard Heflin

was murder in the perpetration of a robbery. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human

being with malice aforethought . . . . Killing is done with 'malice aforethought' if it

results from the perpetration of a bank robbery in which the defendant was aware of

a serious risk of death attending his conduct.").

48

murder, which states that "[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice

aforethought." Thus, a conviction under § 924(j) requires a finding of malice

aforethought by the jury. The district court's instruction to the jury required a finding

of malice aforethought,18 but Holder argues that the district court's definition was

inadequate. For several reasons, we reject Holder's challenge to the § 924(j)

instruction.

First and foremost, the requirement of "malice aforethought" has been satisfied.

We agree with the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of § 1111(a) in a case such as this one

that "[f]irst degree murder is defined as including any murder which is either

premeditated or committed in the perpetration of any of the listed felonies, which

include robbery." See United States v. Sides, 944 F.2d 1554, 1557 (10th Cir.), cert.

denied, 502 U.S. 989 (1991). Thus, a conviction under § 924(j), pursuant to § 1111(a),

is valid under well-established felony murder principles by a finding that the defendant

intended to commit the robbery and that a killing occurred in the course of that robbery.

See, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 159 F.3d 480, 485 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[M]alice

aforethought is a term of art which has several definitions, including, in the felony

murder context, proof of commission of the specified felony. . . . In the typical case of

felony murder, there is no malice in fact with respect to the homicide; the malice is

supplied by the law.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); United States v.

Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir. 1998)("The statute [§ 1111(a)] does not

require any proof of intent other than that [d]efendant intended to commit the

underlying felony and that the killing was committed in the course of that felony."),

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1167 (1999); United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1159-60

(9th Cir. 1994) (noting that a "conviction for felony murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 48 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
49

requires the commission of an enumerated felony with the requisite mens rea for the

underlying offense . . . under a felony murder charge the commission of the underlying

offense substitutes for malice aforethought"), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132 (1995).

Even assuming the felony murder rationale is inadequate by itself to support a

conviction under § 924(j), we think the requirement in the instructions that the jury find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Holder was aware of a serious risk of death attending

the armed robbery is sufficient to uphold the conviction.

We have addressed the issue as follows:

Malice does not require proof of a subjective intent to kill. Malice may

be established by evidence of conduct which is reckless and wanton, and

a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care, of such a nature that

a jury is warranted in inferring that defendant was aware of a serious risk

of death or serious bodily harm.

United States v. Black Elk, 579 F.2d 49, 51 (8th Cir. 1978) (internal quotations and

citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Finally, assuming specific intent is required for a conviction under either §

2113(e) or § 924(j) or both, we find that any error in the district court's instructions was

harmless. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1999) (holding that failure to

submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis); id.

at 35 ("The failure of the court to instruct the jury properly--whether by omitting an

element of the offense or by so misdescribing it that it is effectively removed from the

jury's consideration--can be harmless, if the elements of guilt that the jury did find

necessarily embraced the one omitted or misdescribed.") (Scalia, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part). We find any error to be harmless because the court's aiding and

abetting instructions on each count of conviction supply the necessary specific intent

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 49 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
19Instructions No. 16 and No. 20 provided as follows: 

Defendant may also be found guilty of the crime of bank robbery in which

a killing occurs as charged in Count I even if he personally did not do

every act constituting the offense charged, if he aided and abetted the

commission of the bank robbery in which a killing occurred. In order to

have aided and abetted the commission of this crime defendant must: (1)

have known the bank robbery was being committed or going to be

committed; and (2) have knowingly and intentionally acted in some way

for the purpose of causing, encouraging, or aiding the commission of the

bank robbery and in the course of such bank robbery, Richard Heflin was

killed; and (3) have been aware of a serious risk of death attending his

conduct.

In order to have aided and abetted the commission of this crime defendant

must: (1) have known that the offense of using or carrying a firearm

during and in relation to a bank robbery was being committed or going to

be committed; and (2) have intentionally acted in some way for the

purpose of causing, encouraging, or aiding the commission of using or

carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a bank robbery and that

Richard Heflin was murdered in the perpetration of that robbery; and (3)

have been aware of a serious risk of death attending his conduct.

(Holder's App. at 64 and 66, respectively.)

50

as a matter of law, and in any case the instructions require an explicit finding of specific

intent.19

Under the aiding and abetting rationale, in other words, Allen's actions

"necessarily embraced" the specific intent element. See Nguyen, 155 F.3d at 1226

(finding sufficient evidence to convict defendant of aiding and abetting murder under

§ 924(j) based solely on the fact that the defendant intended to commit the underlying

felony, the victim was killed during the commission of that felony, and the defendant

aided and abetted that killing). In the alternative, specific intent can be supplied by a

finding that Holder was "aware of a serious risk of death attending his conduct."

(Instruction Nos. 16 and 20, supra, n.19.)

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 50 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
51

Thus, even if, as Holder argues, the aiding and abetting instructions improperly

failed to require a finding that Holder intended to aid and abet each element of the

offense, including the fact that a killing took place, we find that the aiding and abetting

instructions were adequate. See Nguyen, 155 F.3d at 1226 ("The government did not

need to show that [d]efendant had any specific intent to kill . . . the government also

presented sufficient evidence that [d]efendant aided and abetted the killing. . . ."). We

acknowledge the fact that some courts require a showing that a defendant knowingly

and intentionally aided and abetted the commission of the aggravating element of the

offense. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held the following:

To be convicted as an aider and abettor, the defendant must have

knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the principals in each

essential element of the crime. . . . To sustain a § 2113(d) conviction for

an aider and abettor in this circuit, the government must show that the

defendant aided and abetted the principal both in the act of bank robbery

and in the principal's use of a dangerous weapon or device during the act.

United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1196, 1197 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal

quotations omitted). This test would require proof of an intention to kill on the part of

an aider and abettor accused of a § 2113(e) violation. Even under the more stringent

test adopted by the Ninth Circuit, however, we think the instructions here were

adequate because they required a finding that Holder was "aware of a serious risk of

death attending his conduct," and as explained below, there is more than sufficient

evidence to support this finding.

2. Aggravating Factors

Holder challenges the district court's interpretation of, and the constitutionality

of, one statutory aggravating factor--"grave risk of death"--and three nonstatutory

aggravating factors--"conduct substantially greater in degree than definition of crimes,"

"future dangerousness," and "other criminal acts." We review challenges to the

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 51 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
52

constitutionality of a particular aggravating factor and the district court's interpretation

of a statutory aggravating factor de novo. See Ross v. Ward, 165 F.3d 793, 800 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 887 (1999); United States v. Whiting, 165 F.3d 631, 633

(8th Cir. 1999) (reviewing district court's interpretation of federal statutes de novo).

For constitutional challenges based on vagueness, however, review is quite deferential

because we must rely on the "basic principle that a factor is not unconstitutional if it has

some commonsense core of meaning that criminal juries should be capable of

understanding." Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

Holder also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the first two

aggravating factors listed above. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence

is whether, when viewing the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom in the

light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could have found the

aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979); Tipton, 90 F.3d at 896 (applying Jackson standard to aggravating factor

insufficiency of the evidence claims); McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1107 (same).

As we have previously explained, there are two different inquiries in the capital

decision-making process under the FDPA and the Eighth Amendment: the eligibility

decision and the selection decision. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971. To be eligible for

the death penalty, a trier of fact must find at least one aggravating circumstance, which

must be sufficiently narrow that it would not apply to everyone convicted of a murder,

and it must not be unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 972. Once a defendant is

determined to be eligible for the death penalty, the next consideration is an

individualized determination of whether, based on the character of the individual and

the circumstances of the crime, the eligible defendant should receive a sentence of

death. Id.

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 52 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
20See 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (c)(5) ("Grave Risk of Death To Additional Persons.--

The defendant, in the commission of the offense, or in escaping apprehension for the

violation of the offense, knowingly created a grave risk of death to 1 or more persons

in addition to the victim of the offense.").

53

We begin with Holder's claim that the "grave risk of death" statutory aggravating

factor20 was unconstitutionally vague and encompassed too large a class of defendants.

The district court instructed the jury that "grave risk of death" meant "a significant and

considerable possibility under the circumstances that existed at that time that another

person could be killed." (Govt.'s App. at 52-53.) We find no error in the district court's

presentation of this aggravating factor to the jury. "Possibility" adequately defines

"risk" and "significant and considerable" adequately defines "grave" such that the jury

was capable of understanding the commonsense core meaning of the statutory

aggravating factor. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973. Thus, there is no constitutional

vagueness problem. Furthermore, we find that this aggravating factor as interpreted by

the district court sufficiently narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death

penalty. If no person besides the victim and any codefendants are put at risk of death,

or if the risk is not a "significant and considerable possibility," then a defendant would

not be eligible for the death penalty. Thus, this aggravating factor complies with the

Eighth Amendment. See Ross, 165 F.3d at 800 (citing Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d

1343, 1360 (10th Cir. 1994)).

We also reject Holder's claims that there is insufficient evidence to support a

finding of this factor and that the jury impermissibly relied on an aiding and abetting

principle based on Allen's conduct rather than only Holder's conduct to find the

existence of this factor. Our review of the record convinces us that there is sufficient

evidence, independent of Allen's actions, for a rational juror to find Holder guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of creating a grave risk of death to one or more persons.

Holder was primarily responsible for planning the robbery and was solely responsible

for procuring the two semiautomatic rifles, bulletproof vest, and the hollow-point

ammunition actually used during the robbery, not to mention the shotgun for use during

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 53 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
21Holder challenges two of the nonstatutory aggravating circumstances as being

overbroad. Because we have already established the existence of a valid statutory

aggravator, making Holder eligible for the death penalty, the nonstatutory aggravators

bear only on the individualized selection process. The nonstatutory aggravating factors

here clearly directed the jury to the individual circumstances of the case and they

therefore do not offend the Constitution on the basis of being overbroad. See Jones,

527 U.S. at 401-02 ("We have not, however, specifically considered what it means for

a [nonstatutory] factor to be overbroad when it is important only for selection purposes

. . . . So long as [nonstatutory aggravating factors] are used to direct the jury to the

individual circumstances of the case . . . we do not think that they [are] overbroad in

a way that offend[s] the Constitution.") (Thomas, J., writing for four Justices). We

therefore reject Holder's inadequate narrowing challenges to the nonstatutory

aggravating factors.

54

the getaway. Even more importantly, the evidence, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the government, supports a finding that Holder actually discharged the

Russian SKS rifle five times inside the bank during the robbery with numerous bank

employees and customers present. (See Trial Tr., Vol. V at 127-47.) Thus, we find

sufficient evidence of Holder's conduct to support the jury's finding of this statutory

aggravating factor.

We turn then to the first of Holder's challenges to his nonstatutory aggravating

factors.21 The jury found that Holder's "conduct in committing the offense was

substantially greater in degree than that described in the definition of the crime, apart

from the statutory aggravating factors." (Holder's App. at 94.) Holder argues that this

factor is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree. The "substantially greater in degree"

language, combined with the district court's submission to the jury of the statutory

elements of each offense to which Holder was convicted, provided the jury a sufficient

common-sense core meaning of the aggravating factor that it was capable of

understanding and applying. The relative seriousness of a crime is a factor that is

routinely taken into account by sentencing courts. See, e.g., United States Sentencing

Guidelines, § 5K2.0 (allowing an upward departure "if the factor is present to a degree

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 54 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
55

substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense")(emphasis

added). We therefore find no vagueness problems with this aggravating factor.

As for the sufficiency of the evidence in support of this factor, our review of the

record convinces us that the circumstances of the killing in this case were enough for

a jury to find that the conduct of Holder (and his aider and abettor Allen) was

substantially greater in degree than the definition of the crime. There were three

firearms involved including two semiautomatic rifles; Holder and Allen had

approximately two hundred rounds of ammunition, most of which was hollow point

ammunition designed to inflict more serious wounds than regular ammunition; sixteen

shots were fired inside the bank and at least three bank employees besides Heflin were

almost hit; Holder was well aware that security guard Heflin would be at the bank in

uniform and carrying a weapon during the time of the armed robbery, and Heflin was

shot at least eight times; and two vehicles were stolen for use as getaway vehicles, one

of which started on fire while containing live rounds of ammunition. In sum, there is

sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding.

Finally we turn to the two remaining nonstatutory aggravating factors--future

dangerousness and other criminal acts--challenged by Holder. He asserts that each

factor is independently at odds with the FDPA and the Constitution, and that there was

insufficient evidence to support a finding of either factor. Holder also argues that,

taken together, the factors are duplicative and therefore impermissibly skewed the jury's

decision to impose a death sentence.

We begin with the future dangerousness nonstatutory aggravating factor. First,

there is little danger of duplication with the statutory aggravating factors because future

dangerousness is nowhere mentioned in the list of sixteen statutory aggravating factors

for homicide. See FDPA, 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (c) (1994 and Supp. II 1996). Second,

given the broad language of the FDPA as to the allowance of nonstatutory aggravating

factors, there is no reason under the FDPA why future dangerousness cannot be

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 55 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
56

presented to the jury. See id. § 3592 (c) ("the jury . . . may consider whether any other

aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists"). Furthermore, we have little

doubt that future dangerousness to society and to prison officials and other inmates

during incarceration is relevant to the jury's final determination of whether a death

sentence should be imposed. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1002-03 (1983)

(holding that a state may consider and rely upon a defendant's future dangerousness in

its decision to seek a death sentence). 

Holder's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina

is misplaced. See 512 U.S. 154, 178 (1994) (holding that when a state asserts future

dangerousness as grounds for imposing a death sentence, due process requires that a

defendant be entitled to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring in judgment). Simmons does not hold that future dangerousness is irrelevant

to a jury's final sentencing decision, but rather narrowly holds that the jury must be

informed that there is no possibility of parole if future dangerousness is presented as

an aggravating factor. The jury in this case was properly informed of Holder's

ineligibility for parole. (See Govt.'s App. at 67.) A defendant in prison for life is still

a risk to prison officials and to other inmates, and even though a life sentence without

the possibility of parole greatly reduces the future danger to society from that particular

defendant, there is still a chance that the defendant might escape from prison or receive

a pardon or commutation of sentence. The evidence here showed extraordinary

planning and little remorse on the part of Holder. Holder argues that the government

asserted only that he would be a danger to society but not that he would be a danger

in prison. Because the jury was informed of his ineligibility for parole, we find no basis

for drawing such a distinction. (See also Trial Tr., Vol. XII at 176 (arguing specifically

during closing argument that Holder would be a danger to prison guards).) For these

reasons, we find no statutory or constitutional problems with arguing to a capital

sentencing jury the nonstatutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness in support

of a death sentence. 

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 56 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
57

We turn next to Holder's challenges to the "other criminal acts" nonstatutory

aggravating factor. Holder first contends that because six of the sixteen statutory

aggravating factors listed in §3592 (c) of the FDPA are based on prior criminal acts,

the FDPA precludes using prior criminal acts as a nonstatutory aggravating factor. We

disagree. As noted previously, the FDPA specifically allows "any other aggravating

factor for which notice has been given." 18 U.S.C. §3592 (c). In addition, the use of

criminal history in sentencing has long been an accepted practice, even in the death

penalty context. See, e.g., Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 976 (upholding use of prior criminal

activity sentencing factor); Zant, 462 U.S. at 888 (stating that "[n]othing in the United

States Constitution prohibits a trial judge from instructing a jury that it would be

appropriate to take account of a defendant's prior criminal record in making its

sentencing determination"). "Both a backward-looking and a forward-looking inquiry

are a permissible part of the sentencing process . . . ." Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 977.

Furthermore, Holder points to no authoritative federal precedent in support of his

assertion that use of this factor violates the Constitution. In fact, the Supreme Court

has noted that sentencing courts have "considered a defendant's past criminal behavior,

even if no conviction resulted from that behavior." Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S.

738, 747 (1994) (stating that the Court has upheld the constitutionality of considering

unadjudicated criminal behavior in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)). See

also Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that although the

Court has subsequently called into doubt some of the logic of Williams, the Court has

not called into doubt the essence of its holding that unadjudicated crimes may

constitutionally be considered in imposing a death sentence), cert. denied, 517 U.S.

1235 (1996); Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1464-65 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513

U.S. 1161 (1995); Williams v. Lynaugh, 814 F.2d 205, 207-08 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

484 U.S. 935 (1987).

We disagree with Holder's assertion that the Supreme Court's decision in

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) controls this issue. In Johnson, the Court

reversed a death sentence in which a prior assault conviction was used as an

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 57 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
58

aggravating circumstance, but crucial to the decision was the fact that the prior

conviction for assault had been overturned and no evidence relating to the assault itself

had been introduced as evidence in the death sentence case, only the document

establishing a conviction, which had been subsequently reversed. Id. at 585. The

Supreme Court's decision in Johnson simply does not apply to the situation at hand.

Holder also argues that the other criminal acts factor improperly duplicates the

future dangerousness factor. As a general legal proposition, there is strong support for

Holder's argument that aggravating factors that duplicate each other can impermissibly

skew a jury in favor of imposing a death sentence. See Jones, 132 F.3d at 250-51

("'double counting of aggravating factors, especially under a weighing scheme, has a

tendency to skew the weighing process and creates a risk that the death sentence will

be imposed arbitrarily and thus, unconstitutionally'") (quoting McCullah, 76 F.3d at

1111); Tipton, 90 F.3d at 899 (agreeing with the Tenth Circuit in McCullah that double

counting of aggravating factors is constitutional error, but finding that the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). But see Jones, 527 U.S. at 398 ("We have never

before held that aggravating factors could be duplicative so as to render them

constitutionally invalid, nor have we passed on the "double counting" theory . . . . What

we have said is that the weighing process may be impermissibly skewed if the

sentencing jury considers an invalid factor.")(Thomas, J., writing for four Justices). We

need not reach the legal issue of whether duplication requires reversal of a death

sentence, or whether duplication error in this case is harmless, because we find that

there is no duplication of aggravating factors in this case. Although some of the

evidence of prior criminal conduct can support a finding of future dangerousness, we

think the factors themselves and the evidence used to support the finding of each factor

in this case were sufficiently different that there is no duplication problem. The prior

criminal conduct factor focused on the past and was supported by past criminal acts,

while the future dangerousness factor focused on the future and was supported by

evidence of Holder's poor performance during probation, his refusal to go through a

turnaround program, and his lack of remorse. Under these circumstances, we find no

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 58 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
59

error in the district court's submission of each of these nonstatutory aggravating factors

to the jury.

3. Jury Voir Dire

The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial includes the right to trial by an

impartial jury. See Pruett v. Norris, 153 F.3d 579, 584 (8th Cir. 1998). "Our review

of whether [a] district judge conducted voir dire in a way that protected [a defendant's]

Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury is limited to an abuse of discretion."

United States v. Granados, 117 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing United States

v. Spaar, 748 F.2d 1249, 1253 (8th Cir. 1984)). See also United States v. Blum, 65

F.3d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a district court's refusal to strike jurors

for cause should only be reversed if the defendant demonstrates actual prejudice), cert.

denied, 516 U.S. 1097 (1996).

On the day the district court began jury selection for Holder's trial, the Allen jury

reached a decision as to Allen's sentence. During the lunch recess for Holder's jury

selection, the district court received the Allen jury's sentencing decision. Audience

members in the Allen courtroom reacted to the verdict with a loud, emotional outburst

which included screams and crying. Several members of the Holder venire panel, some

of whom were in the hallway outside the Allen courtroom and others of whom were in

the nearby Holder courtroom, heard this emotional reaction. The district court was

immediately informed of the exposure and took several remedial actions, including

general voir dire questions, a general instruction reminding jurors to avoid and

disregard anything seen or heard outside the courtroom, and specific individual voir

dire questioning about the emotional outbursts. Three jurors and two alternates were

ultimately selected from this subpanel. Holder argues that the district court abused its

discretion in failing to strike for cause the entire panel and in failing to strike individual

jurors who had heard the emotional outbursts. 

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 59 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
60

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's handling of voir dire with

respect to the emotional outburst from the Allen courtroom.

Whenever it appears during the course of a trial that the members of the

jury may have been exposed to publicity which is adverse to the

defendant, the trial judge must make an initial determination as to whether

the publicity creates a danger of substantial prejudice to the accused. If

the trial judge determines that it does, the jurors should then be polled

individually to determine whether they have in fact been exposed to the

prejudicial information. If any jurors have been so exposed, the trial

judge must ascertain the extent and effect of the infection, and what

measures, including the possible declaration of a mistrial, must be taken

to protect the rights of the accused.

United States v. Dixon, 913 F.2d 1305, 1314 (8th Cir. 1990). To begin with, there was

no abuse of discretion in deciding not to strike the entire subpanel. In the

circumstances of this case, the emotional outbursts from the nearby courtroom did not

present a significant possibility of prejudice to Holder. Nineteen members of the

subpanel said they did not hear anything from the nearby courtroom, and of the fourteen

subpanel members who said they heard the outbursts, most were not sure what caused

the outburst. In other words, it was not clear that the emotional outbursts were caused

by the sentence handed down to Allen, as opposed to some other defendant or losing

party, and even if some of the subpanel members attributed the reaction to Allen's case,

it was not clear whether the reaction was due to the jury's imposition of a death

sentence or due to a failure by the jury to impose a death sentence. Thus, the emotional

outburst was ambiguous, and combined with the district court's questioning during

general voir dire and instructions to disregard anything learned about the Allen verdicts,

the district court was well within its discretion in denying Holder's motion to strike the

entire subpanel.

We are also convinced that the district court's individual voir dire questioning

and procedures were sufficient to uncover any prejudice from the incident. Every

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 60 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
61

subpanel member who was seated as a juror in this case was specifically questioned

about the incident out of the presence of the other members. Defense counsel agreed

to the questions asked of the subpanel members and had the opportunity to ask followup questions, and the district judge excused every juror who knew that Allen had been

given a sentence of death. Holder has also fallen short of proving sufficient prejudice

or even a sufficient likelihood that the district court's voir dire questioning and

procedures were inadequate to discover possible prejudice. Furthermore, even if some

of the jurors assumed, based on the emotional outburst, that the death penalty had been

imposed on Allen, they are not necessarily automatically disqualified for cause as long

as they can lay aside any impressions or opinions and render a verdict based on the

evidence presented in court. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1975).

In sum, the questions posed to Jurors 309 and 322 and others by the district court and

the jurors' replies to those questions convince us that Holder has failed to show either

any actual prejudice or insufficient voir dire procedures. We are therefore confident

that Holder was convicted and sentenced by a jury that met the fairness and impartiality

standards required under the Sixth Amendment.

Holder also argues that the district court abused its discretion in failing to strike

for cause a subpanel of twenty jurors who were exposed to Juror 310's comments

regarding the inadequacy of life in prison as punishment. The following exchange

occurred during voir dire:

Defense Counsel: Are there any of you who do not believe that a life

imprisonment without the possibility of release sentence is punishment?

You probably all heard people say, "Prison's too good for him. It's not

punishment." Anyone feel that way? Sending someone to prison for the

rest of his life is not punishment? Yes, sir. 310?

Juror 310: 310. Having been in many of these institutions for work --

Defense Counsel: Clarify that.

Juror [310]: I talked to the guards. And the guards say, ["]You know,

these guys got it made. They've got paid cable TV, and the wors[t] that

they can do -- ["]

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 61 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
62

(Trial Tr., Mar. 13, 1998, at 101-02.) Juror 310 was cut off at that point by the district

judge and a sidebar conference was held. The district judge denied defense counsel's

motion that the entire subpanel be discharged, and suggested that any further questions

for Juror 310 on this issue be asked outside the presence of the other jurors. Defense

counsel insisted that further questioning in front of the entire subpanel was necessary

to minimize possible prejudice to the other jurors by discrediting the basis for Juror

310's statement. The following exchange then occurred:

Defense Counsel: You told us, sir, that, as part of your employment . . .

sometimes you're called to go into penitentiaries and assist inmates with

their health concerns?

Juror 310: About three times a month and in several prisons and jails

throughout the United States, yes.

Defense Counsel: And you said about three times a month?

Juror 310: Three times, yeah. I travel about two, three days a week;

three times a month.

Defense Counsel: Okay. Let me just ask –

Juror 310: We provide health care to those inmates. Yes.

Defense Counsel: Have you been in every prison across the United

States?

Juror 310: No. Just probably about 100 or so.

Defense Counsel: Have you had an opportunity yourself to observe the

conditions and day-to-day living in the cells and modules of the inmates?

Juror 310: Yes, I have.

Defense Counsel: And your conclusions on what you have heard has

been from other guards that you've talked to at the prison?

Juror 310: Oh, no. There's things that I see. And I realize that somebody

who is, let's say –

Court: Wait a minute. Let's end it there. If you want to talk privately, we

will [take] it up.

(Id. at 103-04.) Of the twenty potential jurors on the subpanel who heard these

comments, eight ultimately sat on Holder's jury. Juror 310 was later struck for cause

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 62 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
63

and did not sit on the jury. Holder argues that all twenty of the potential jurors should

have been dismissed for cause.

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to strike the entire

subpanel of jurors after hearing the above comments by Juror 310. Initially, the district

court properly cut short Juror 310's comments, at which point the only comment

subpanel members had heard was that some prisoners have free cable television. Given

that an average juror has likely already heard statements like this before outside the

courtroom, and given that every other juror indicated by their silence that life in prison

did constitute punishment, the potential prejudice to Holder based on this lone comment

is so attenuated that there is no doubt that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in rejecting Holder's request to dismiss the entire subpanel. The additional questioning

by Holder's own attorney may have backfired, as it may have strengthened Juror 310's

credibility by showing the substantial personal experience which formed the basis of

his opinions, but these additional statements do not come close to establishing a basis

for sufficient prejudice to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the district court. We

therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to any

of its voir dire decisions.

4. Autopsy Photographs

Holder challenges the admissibility of four graphic autopsy photographs. With

respect to autopsy photographs under Federal Rule of Evidence 403,

[a] trial court has discretion to admit a relevant photograph unless it is so

gruesome or inflammatory that its prejudicial impact substantially

outweighs its probative value. A district court has broad discretion when

ruling on the admissibility of evidence. We will not reverse the district

court's decision regarding the admissibility of evidence absent a clear

abuse of discretion.

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 63 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
64

United States v. Hester, 140 F.3d 753, 759 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

As required by Rule 403, the district court weighed the probative value of the

victim autopsy photographs against the possibility of unfair prejudice to Holder. The

district court performed a separate Rule 403 analysis for each of the four challenged

photographs as they were entered into evidence and found that the probative value of

each photograph outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice. The district court

specifically found that the photographs were needed to refresh the recollection of the

medical examiner as he testified; that the one-dimensional diagram was not adequate

to show the trajectory of the bullets, the exact location of entry and exit wounds, or the

extent of the injuries; that not admitting the photographs would confuse the jury; and

that the photographs were not a waste of time or a needless presentation of cumulative

evidence. 

Having examined the photographs, we agree with the district court that the

autopsy photographs had substantial probative value because they showed the entry

angles of the bullets, the locations of each wound, and the extent of the injuries caused

by the hollow point bullets. The photographs were therefore an important aid to the

witness and the jury in determining the relative positions of the victim and the shooters

as each shot was fired, which was a key issue during the trial directly impacting on the

culpability of each defendant. The photographs were also probative of intent--another

aspect of each defendant's culpability--by showing the extent of damage caused by the

choice of using hollow point ammunition during the robbery. The probative value of

these photographs is confirmed by the fact that the jury specifically requested the

photographs during its sentencing deliberations. Moreover, the autopsy photographs,

which depict each individual wound rather than the entire body of the victim, are not

unfairly prejudicial. As this court explained in United States v. Davidson, "[t]hough

graphic, the autopsy photographs were less gruesome than [] crime scene photos, and

they helped explain the testimony of [the doctor] who performed the autopsy." 122 F.3d

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 64 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
65

531, 538 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1034 (1997), and 523 U.S. 1033

(1998). For these reasons, in addition to the reasons set forth by the district court, we

find no abuse of discretion, let alone any clear abuse of discretion, in the district court's

decision to admit the four autopsy photographs showing the victim's gunshot wounds.

5. Restitution

Finally, Holder argues that the district court erred as a matter of law by holding

that proceeds from his settlement from a past lawsuit could be garnished in order to

satisfy the court's judgment that restitution be paid to the family of Mr. Heflin, Lindell

Bank &Trust, and other victims. Holder asserts that state law, not federal law,

determines whether property can be attached, and that Missouri law is clear that the

terms of a settlement contract determine whether that settlement can be attached by

creditors. The government counters that this court is without jurisdiction to hear

Holder's challenges to the restitution order because Holder waived his right to appeal

by failing to participate in the restitution phase of his sentencing, by failing to file a

separate notice of appeal from the restitution order, and because the restitution order

is an independent civil matter that is not part of the criminal proceedings against

Holder. The government also argues that the district court's decision was correct on

the merits because although state law determines whether a property interest exists,

federal law determines whether and how that property interest can be attached.

First, we agree with Holder that this court has jurisdiction to hear this challenge

to the district court's restitution order. The restitution order is a criminal monetary

penalty which is part of the criminal proceeding against Holder, and thus is not a

parallel civil action. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3556, 3663, 3663A, and 3664 (Supp. II 1996).

Second, the notice of appeal challenging Holder's conviction and sentence did not

divest the district court of jurisdiction to clarify its restitution order as additional

information was discovered, and thus Holder need not file a separate appeal from the

clarified restitution order. Third, the government does not cite any persuasive authority

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 65 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
66

in support of its claim that Holder's failure to participate in the restitution phase of his

sentencing amounts to a waiver of his right to contest the legality of the court's final

restitution judgment. For these reasons, we have jurisdiction to address the merits of

Holder's challenge to the court's restitution order.

In these circumstances, we think the legal principles are clear that state law

determines whether a property interest exists in the first instance, but federal law

determines whether and how that property may be attached. "Once it has been

determined that state law creates sufficient interests in the taxpayer to satisfy the

requirements of the federal tax lien provision, state law is inoperative to prevent the

attachment of liens created by federal statutes in favor of the United States." Drye v.

United States, 528 U.S. 49, 52 (1999) (citing United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56-57

(1958)); see id. at 61 (holding that the right to disclaim property under state law does

not defeat a federal tax lien because the taxpayer exercised control over the disposition

of the property). There is little doubt under Missouri law that Holder has a property

interest--in fact, the sole property interest--in the remaining proceeds from the

settlement. Thus, federal law determines whether that property can now be attached

to satisfy a federal order for restitution, and it is clear from the statutory provisions

cited by the district court that Holder's settlement proceeds can be attached. See 18

U.S.C. § 3664(n) (Supp. II, 1996) (stating that a person ordered to pay restitution shall

be required to apply the value of any "inheritance, settlement, or other judgment" to any

restitution still owed); 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (Supp. II, 1996) (treating an order of

restitution under § 3664 as if it were a tax lien enforceable under the Internal Revenue

Code). Holder had a property interest in the settlement proceeds under state law, the

property can be attached by a federal tax lien, and thus we find no error in the district

court's order garnishing Holder's settlement proceeds in order to pay restitution to the

victims. 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1), we have addressed all of the substantive

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 66 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
67

 and procedural issues raised by Norris G. Holder's appeal from the sentences of death.

We have also considered whether his sentences of death were imposed under the

influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and conclude that they

were not so imposed. We further have carefully considered whether the evidence

supports the jury's special findings of the existence of the aggravating factors, both

statutory and nonstatutory, which the jury found to exist, and we conclude that the

evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury's special findings.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Billie Jerome Allen's conviction and life sentence for

violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) and his conviction and sentence of death for violating 18

U.S.C. § 924(j)(1) are hereby affirmed, and Norris G. Holder's convictions and

sentences of death for violating both 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1),

as well as the district court's order requiring Holder to pay restitution to the victims, are

also affirmed.

The judgments of the district court are affirmed. 

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. 

A.

 I believe Mr. Allen's confession is inadmissible. The facts are undisputed. Mr.

Allen was arrested at approximately 2:00 a.m. on a Tuesday and brought to a police

interrogation room. At approximately 4:00 a.m., he requested the appointment of

counsel. Questioning stopped, but no attempts were made at that point to secure

counsel. Given the hour, I cannot say that this was unreasonable.

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 67 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
68

Mr. Allen was kept in the interrogation room handcuffed to a table for the

remainder of the early morning. At approximately 8:00 a.m., the police asked Mr.

Allen if, in light of his request for counsel, he was still willing to provide blood, hair,

and saliva samples, as he had previously indicated he would, and he agreed. By 9:00

a.m., or certainly by 10:00 a.m., it should have been feasible to take the steps necessary

to honor Mr. Allen's request for counsel. This was not done. 

 Instead, at approximately 10:10 a.m., the police approached Mr. Allen again and

asked him to participate in a lineup. The police reminded Mr. Allen of his previous

request for counsel. Mr. Allen agreed to participate in the lineup without the presence

of counsel. After the lineup, the police informed Mr. Allen that three out of four

witnesses had placed him at the scene of the crime. Mr. Allen then stated that he

wanted to talk to a police officer he knew, even though counsel had not been obtained.

Mr. Allen then proceeded to confess to this police officer.

These facts can lead to only one conclusion: Mr. Allen's request for counsel was

not honored. As the Court explains, once an individual expresses a desire to deal with

the police only through counsel, the police may not further interrogate the defendant

"until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates

further communication, exchanges, or conversation with the police." Edwards v.

Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). The purpose of this "stringent" rule is to ensure

that officials "scrupulously honor" the right of an accused in custody, who has

requested the assistance of counsel, to have all interrogation cease until an attorney is

present. James v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 990, 992 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from

denial of certiorari). 

Interrogation in this context includes "any words or actions . . . (other than those

normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant." Rhode Island v. Innis,

446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). If, after the right to counsel has been invoked, the police

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 68 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
69

do "initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel (assuming there has been no break

in custody), the suspect's statements are presumed involuntary and therefore

inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver

and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards." McNeil

v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991). 

I agree with the proposition for which the Court cites United States v. Payne,

954 F.2d 199, 203 (8th Cir. 1992): After a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, not

all statements by the police regarding the nature of the evidence against him constitute

a forbidden interrogation as a matter of law. Rather, the circumstances of each case

must be examined. In Payne, for example, the suspect told the arresting agents that he

wished to consult with counsel. He spoke with his attorney by telephone, and told the

agents he would consult with counsel in person before speaking with them. When

processing was complete, he was transported by car to another location. During the

ride, an agent in the car received a call that a handgun had been found at the suspect's

residence. The agent told this to the suspect, who then stated that he had the gun for

protection. Noting that Mr. Payne was not subjected to "compelling influences,

psychological ploys, or direct questioning," the Court held that the suspect's statement

was admissible. 

The situation in the present case is different. Mr. Allen's request for counsel was

ignored beyond the time of day when it was feasible to secure counsel for him. The

police reinitiated contact with Mr. Allen several times before any attempt was made to

honor his request for counsel. The request that he participate in a lineup and the

statement that three out of four witnesses had identified him occurred after Mr. Allen

had been chained to a table in the interrogation room for seven hours - and five hours

after he asked for counsel. It seems apparent that the police were hoping Mr. Allen

would weaken, which is exactly what occurred. 

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 69 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
70

The Court focuses its inquiry on whether the statement by the police to Mr. Allen

that witnesses had identified him in the lineup constituted an "interrogation." The

Court makes no mention in its analysis of the request by the police that Mr. Allen

participate in a lineup without the presence of counsel. As stated above, this request

was initiated by the police hours after Mr. Allen had requested counsel. I believe it is

clear that this request was impermissible under Edwards. Cf. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462

U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) (suggestion by police that suspect take a polygraph

examination and statement by examiner that he did not believe suspect did not violate

Edwards because suspect, and not the police, had initiated further conversation about

the investigation after he had requested counsel). 

The two cases from our Circuit relied upon by the Court, United States v.

Williams, 136 F.3d 547 (8th Cir. 1998), and Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413 (8th Cir.

2000), offer no support for its position, and actually undermine it. In Williams, the

Court assumed that an officer's statement that the defendant had been identified in a

lineup was an "interrogation." However, because the defendant had not previously

asserted any of his Miranda rights, his statement after this "interrogation" that he

wanted to talk was not coerced, and his subsequent statements were admissible. 136

F.3d at 553. Here there is no dispute that Mr. Allen had invoked his right to counsel.

 

In Holman, we also assumed that a police officer's visit to the defendant's cell

without contacting the defendant's attorney, to inform the defendant that his girlfriend

had confessed, would be an improper custodial interrogation. The defendant's

confession obtained the next day, however, was held to be admissible because of the

lapse in time from the impermissible interrogation to the confession. During this time,

the defendant had a chance to speak to his stepfather who urged him to wait until his

attorney could be contacted and to sleep on it. 212 F.3d at 417-20. Even under those

facts, the Court found the question to be close, and one of the Judges dissented. Id. at

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 70 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
71

421-22. Here, of course, there was no lapse of time between the police telling Mr.

Allen that he had been identified in the lineup and his confession. 

Mr. Allen's right to counsel was not "scrupulously honored." His confession

was tainted by unconstitutional conduct and was inadmissible. Although other

evidence linked Mr. Allen to the crime, the admission of his confession was not

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, he is entitled to a new trial. I

would reverse. 

B.

I also dissent with regard to Mr. Holder's convictions and sentences. I believe

that the Court errs in its conclusion with regard to the jury instructions on Count I ,

charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e). This section provides, "[w]hoever, in

committing [a bank robbery] . . . kills a person . . . shall . . . be punished by death or

life imprisonment." Under the instructions in Mr. Holder's case, the jury was permitted

to find him guilty not just as a principal, but also as an aider and abettor. The Court

holds that a conviction as an aider and abettor under this statute does not require a

finding of specific intent to aid and abet the killing, but only of specific intent to aid and

abet the robbery. Ante at 47. 

I believe the position taken by the Ninth Circuit on this issue is the correct one.

An accomplice charged under § 2113(e) must aid and abet the principal both in the

bank robbery and in the killing. "It is not enough for the jury to find that the defendant

aided and abetted a bank robbery in which a killing occurred." United States v. Jones,

678 F.2d 102, 106 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th

Cir. 1994) (same reasoning applied to § 2113(d) - armed assault during commission of

a bank robbery); United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 1974) (same);

see also United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting United

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 71 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
72

States v. Short with approval and applying it to a charge of aiding and abetting the

possession of drugs with the intent to distribute). 

This position is strengthened by Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1220-

21 (1999), which establishes beyond argument that the relevant factor in § 2113(e) of

a killing is an essential element of the offense of which Mr. Holder was convicted. Our

own Model Criminal Jury Instructions also support Mr. Holder's argument. The model

instruction for bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), which is comparable

to § 2113(e) except that it applies to an armed assault during the robbery rather than

a killing, lists the assault as a separate element of the offense which the defendant must

commit. I believe the clear implication is that intent is required for this element as well

as for the first element - the robbery.

 

Because this is a death-penalty case, other, even more compelling, principles

mandate that Mr. Holder's sentences on both Counts I and II must be reversed. Before

a defendant can be sentenced to death, the Eighth Amendment requires that he be guilty

of a certain degree of culpable conduct. Fairchild v. Norris, 21 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir.

1994). In the context of felony murder, the Supreme Court held that "major

participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human

life, is sufficient to satisfy the . . . culpability requirement." Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.

137, 158 (1987).

The jury instructions in Mr. Holder's case fall short of this standard. The

instructions on Count I did not require the finding of any mental state with regard to the

killing. With regard to Count II, the jury was instructed that "[k]illing is done with

'malice aforethought' if it results from the perpetration of a bank robbery in which the

defendant was aware of the serious risk of death attending his conduct." "Aware of

serious risk of death" is a less stringent standard than "reckless indifference to human

life." Being aware of a serious risk attending one's conduct is gross negligence at best.

We know that gross negligence does not rise to the level of reckless disregard or

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 72 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439
73

indifference in tort law. See Hunter v. Namanny 219 F.3d 825, 833 (8th Cir. 2000).

These standards should certainly not be seen as equivalent in the context of deathpenalty jurisprudence. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand with directions that

Mr. Holder's death sentence be changed to life in prison without parole.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

Appellate Case: 98-2549 Page: 73 Date Filed: 04/12/2001 Entry ID: 1381439