Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-04189/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-04189-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ron Glass
Defendant
Robert E. Lee
Plaintiff
Gary Loredo
Defendant
Chuck Pattillo
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT E. LEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

GARY LOREDO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-04189-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY; 

AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed by Plaintiff Robert E. 

Lee, a state prisoner currently housed at the San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”), alleging 

constitutional violations at SQSP relating to retaliatory actions against his usage of the 

administrative grievance process, including being fired from his hand sander job on July 29, 2017. 

The operative complaint is the amended complaint, in which Plaintiff alleges a cognizable First 

Amendment claim against Defendants SQSP California Prison Industry Authority (“CALPIA”) 

Plant Manager Gary Loredo, SQSP CALPIA Supervisor Ron Glass, and SQSP CALPIA Branch 

Manager Chuck Pattillo. Dkt. 11 at 2, 13.

1

 He seeks monetary damages. Id. at 5.

In an Order dated July 10, 2018, the Court screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint. See 

Dkt. 12. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff did not re-allege his claims seeking compensation 

for working at prison or alleging an equal protection violation. See Dkt. 11. Instead, Plaintiff 

amended only his retaliation claim. Therefore, in its July 10, 2018 Order, the Court found that any 

claims seeking compensation for working at prison or alleging an equal protection violation were 

deemed dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief. Dkt. 12 at 4. As for his claim of 

retaliation, Plaintiff amended his conclusory retaliation claim by specifically alleging that 

Defendants Loredo and Glass retaliated against him for filing an administrative grievance on 

December 20, 2016, and that Defendant Pattillo retaliated against him by failing to act to prevent 

 

1 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by the parties.

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the acts of retaliation by Defendants Loredo and Glass. Dkt. 11 at 4, 13-14. As mentioned above, 

the Court found that Plaintiff stated a cognizable retaliation claim. Id. The Court then directed the 

Clerk of the Court to serve the amended complaint, and it issued a briefing schedule for the served 

Defendants to file a dispositive motion. See Dkt. 12 at 6-10.

The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants’ dispositive motion. Dkt. 29. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a), as to his claim that Defendants Loredo and Pattillo retaliated against him; and (2) no 

genuine issues of material fact in dispute exist because the indisputable evidence shows

that Defendants did not retaliate against Plaintiff. Dkt. 29 at 6-7. In addition, Defendants argue

that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 7. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 30. Defendants have filed a reply to Plaintiff’s 

opposition. Dkt. 33. 

Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. Dkt. 24. Defendants 

oppose Plaintiff’s motion. Dkt. 25.

Having read and considered the papers submitted herewith, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s 

motion to compel discovery and GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

II. PRELIMINARY ISSUE - PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

Before addressing the merits of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court first 

resolves Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery.

On December 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Defendants to answer his requests 

for admissions. Dkt. 24. Defendants counter that they responded to Plaintiff’s requests for 

admissions in a timely manner, stating as follows:

Plaintiff served his requests for admissions by mail to Defendants 

Loredo and Glass on November 5, 2018. (See Quinn [Dec. 13, 2018]2

 

2 Defendants’ attorney, Deputy Attorney General Michael Quinn, has filed two different 

declarations: (1) one in support of the opposition to the motion to compel dated December 13, 

2018 (dkt. 25-1); and (2) another in support of their motion for summary judgment dated February 

12, 2019 (dkt. 29-2). The Court will cite to each declaration by referring to the date the 

declaration was filed.

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Declaration, Ex. “A.”) Because the thirty-third day after Plaintiff’s 

requests were served fell on Saturday, December 8, 2018, Defendant 

Glass and Loredo’s responses to the request for admissions were 

timely served on December 10, 2018. (See Quinn [Dec. 13, 2018] 

Declaration, Ex. “B.”) Because Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s 

requests in a timely manner, the motion to compel should be denied.

Dkt. 25 at 2 (brackets and footnote added). 

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion to compel is improper because Plaintiff failed to 

first meet and confer, in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s Local 

Rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(A) (providing that a motion to compel must include 

certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with non-disclosing 

party in an effort to secure disclosure without court action); Civ. L.R. 37-1 (same). Had Plaintiff 

met and conferred with Defendants then he would have discovered that Defendants were in the 

process of answering his requests for admissions. See Dkt. 25 at 2. In any event, the record shows 

that Defendants have since submitted responses to Plaintiff’s request for admissions. See Quinn 

[Dec. 13, 2018] Decl., Ex. B. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to compel is DENIED. Dkt. 24.

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Factual Summary3

1. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim

In its July 10, 2018 Order, the Court noted that Plaintiff provided the following time line to 

give some background on his retaliation claim, stating as follows:

In 2010, Plaintiff started having problems with his hands because of 

the sander at his job. Id. at 3. Plaintiff claims that he reported his 

problems to Defendant Loredo, who told Plaintiff that his hands 

would be “fixed.” Id. From 2010 through 2016, Plaintiff claims he 

had four surgeries, but “to no avail.” Id. Plaintiff claims that he was 

informed that “his hands could not be fixed and were fused together 

leaving permanent damage and pain.” Id. (Plaintiff claims that he is 

currently on “permanent pain medication.” Id.) On May 16, 2016, 

 

3 This Order contains a few acronyms. Here, in one place, they are:

CALPIA California Prison Industry Authority

CDCR California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

GED General Education Diploma 

PLRA Prison Litigation Reform Act

SQSP San Quentin State Prison

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Plaintiff filed a Worker’s Compensation Claim of which Defendants 

Loredo and Glass were given notice. Id. at 3-4. On December 20, 

2016, Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance requesting to receive 

“worker[’s] compensation benefits and any other be[ne]fits that [he is 

entitled to] and no retaliation.” See Dkt. 1 at 7. 

On an unknown date in 2017 (presumably before Plaintiff was fired 

on July 29, 2017), Plaintiff indicates that Defendants Loredo and 

Glass found out about his aforementioned grievance. Dkt. 11 at 4. 

Plaintiff states that Defendant Loredo “got angry and directed 

Plaintiff to clean pipes with asbestos dirt covering, [and] ordered

Plaintiff to clean paint . . . around dangerous chemical[s] in an 

attempt to make Plaintiff quit his job . . . .” Id. Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Glass “filed false documents trying to get Plaintiff fired, a 

128 chrono, stating Plaintiff left work early falsely and [Defendant 

Glass] ordered Plaintiff to clean toilets and mop floor[s] [which] is 

not his job.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that he had informed 

Defendants Loredo and Glass “numerous times” about the asbestos 

exposure from “May and June 2016-17.” Id. at 14. Finally, Plaintiff 

claims Defendant Pattillo worked with Defendants Loredo and Glass 

during the time frame at issue and “knew of a substantial risk . . . with 

regard to the asbestos exposure” and “engaged in retaliatory behavior 

against [Plaintiff] for bringing a legal civil suit action . . . .” Id. at 14. 

Thus, it seems that Plaintiff claims that Defendant Pattillo failed to 

act to prevent the acts of retaliation by Defendants Loredo and Glass. 

See id. As mentioned above, Plaintiff was ultimately discharged by 

Defendant Glass on July 29, 2017. Id. at 5.

Dkt. 12 at 4-5 (footnote omitted). As mentioned above, the Court found that, liberally construed, 

Plaintiff’s allegations satisfied the pleading requirements for a First Amendment retaliation claim 

against Defendants Loredo, Glass, and Pattillo.

2. Plaintiff’s Job Description and the CALPIA’s GED Requirement

As a hand sander at SQSP, Petitioner was responsible for smoothing surfaces of “raw 

assembled wooden products,” and operating sanding machines. Glass Decl., Ex. A. However, his 

job description included the following statement: “Your responsibilities listed below are not 

limited to these [hand sander] duties only. You will be expected to perform any additional duties 

requested, or ordered by your supervisor or staff.” Id.

In addition, CALPIA Inmate Worker Hiring Standards and Requirements provide that 

within two years of an initial CALPIA assignment, CALPIA inmate workers . . . shall be required 

to complete a General Education Diploma (“GED”) or high school diploma.” Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 

15, § 8004.1. Petitioner has acknowledged that while he took the GED, he did not pass it. Quinn

Feb. 12, 2019 Decl., Ex. B, 45:4-9; 51:7-11.

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3. Plaintiff’s Administrative Appeals

Plaintiff filed two inmate appeals from 2016 to 2017, which appears to be the time period 

during which Plaintiff complained to Defendants Loredo and Glass about the asbestos exposure.

a. Administrative Appeal Log No. SQ-17-00044 (“SQ-17-00044”)

In SQ-17-00044, which was submitted on December 20, 2016, Plaintiff stated that due to 

his assignments in CALPIA at various institutions, he needed carpal tunnel surgery on both wrists. 

Voong Decl., Ex. B. Plaintiff requested workers’ compensation benefits and any other benefits, 

“with no retaliation.” Id. On June 16, 2017, SQ-17-00044 was cancelled because “[t]he action or 

decision being appealed is not within the jurisdiction of the Department.” Id., Ex. C.

b. Administrative Appeal Log No. SQ-17-03236 (“SQ-17-03236”)

In SQ-17-03236, which was submitted on November 5, 2017, Plaintiff asserted that “he 

was fired from his job by [Defendant] Glass because [Plaintiff] did not have a [GED].” Id., Ex. D.

Plaintiff further stated that he was being retaliated against because “of his lawsuit against CDCR 

and California Prison Industry Authority.” Id. He further stated that his due process rights were 

being violated as he had not been taken to committee (prior to his firing), had no disciplinary 

problems, and had worked in CALPIA for 17 years. Id., Exs. D-E. He requested to be fully 

compensated for the hours missed after he was fired and also to be reinstated as a hand sander. Id. 

Thereafter, SQ-17-03236 was partially granted at the second level of appeal because the examiner 

found that Plaintiff should have been referred to a classification committee prior to his firing based 

upon not having a GED. Id., Ex. E. Plaintiff then appeared before the classification committee on 

November 29, 2017, during which time the Court assumes Plaintiff’s “un-assignment” was 

approved because the record shows that he did not meet the education requirement to stay in his 

assigned position pursuant to “CALPIA § 8004.1, Inmate Worker Hiring Standards and 

Requirements.” Id. SQ-17-03236 was partially denied “in that he [would] not receive any back 

pay from the day of his un-assignment and he [would] not be reassigned to [a] CALPIA job 

assignment due to that fact that he does not meet the job requirements of having a High School 

Diploma or GED. . . .” Id. On May 29, 2018, SQ-17-03236 was denied at the third level of 

appeal. Id. As to the allegation relating to not being brought before the classification committee, 

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the examiner determined that “as [Plaintiff] was not referred to committee until after he filed his 

appeal, no action can be taken to rectify this error in [relation to] [Plaintiff] not being referred to 

[a] committee timely.” Id. Furthermore, the examiner concluded that his “review [found] no 

evidence of a violation of existing policy or regulation by the institution,” that Plaintiff “ha[d] not 

submitted documentation to show he meets the education requirement to stay in his assigned 

position,” and that Plaintiff “ha[d] failed to demonstrate that staff acted inappropriately.” Id. 

B. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment 

on some or all of the claims or defenses presented in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1). “The 

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of 

establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring citation to “particular parts of materials in 

the record”). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). 

A district court may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary 

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Submitted by Defendants in support of the motion for summary judgment are Plaintiff’s 

telephonic deposition (Quinn Feb. 12, 2019 Decl., Ex. B) and all other attached exhibits (Glass 

Decl., Ex. A; Quinn Feb. 12, 2019 Decl., Ex. A; Voong Decl., Exs. A-E) as well as declarations 

from the following: Attorney Quinn (Defendants’ attorney); Defendant Glass; and Chief of the 

Office of Appeals M. Voong (dkts. 29-2 to 29-4).

As noted, Plaintiff has filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; 

however, the opposition is not verified and will not be considered because it was not signed under 

“penalty of perjury.” Dkt. 30 at 12. Because the declaration in support of the opposition (dkt. 30-

1 at 2) and the amended complaint (dkts. 1 at 5) are verified, the Court will construe them as

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opposing affidavits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, insofar as they are based on 

personal knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. 

McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995). 

C. Analysis

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him in the following ways for 

exercising his First Amendment rights, namely that: (1) Defendants Loredo and Glass retaliated 

against him for filing an administrative grievance, SQ-17-00044, on December 20, 2016; and 

(2) Defendant Pattillo retaliated against him by failing to prevent the acts of retaliation by 

Defendants Loredo and Glass.

1. Legal Framework of Retaliation Claim

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 

(2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

The prisoner must show that the type of activity he was engaged in was constitutionally 

protected, that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the alleged 

retaliatory action, and that the retaliatory action advanced no legitimate penological interest. 

Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997) (inferring retaliatory motive from 

circumstantial evidence). Retaliatory motive may be shown by the timing of the allegedlyretaliatory act and other circumstantial evidence, as well as direct evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 

F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003). However, mere speculation that defendants acted out of 

retaliation is not sufficient. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing cases) 

(affirming grant of summary judgment where there was no evidence that defendants knew about 

plaintiff’s prior lawsuit, or that defendants’ disparaging remarks were made in reference to prior 

lawsuit). 

To raise a triable issue as to motive, a plaintiff must offer evidence that the defendants 

knew about the protected speech. Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 568 (9th Cir. 2009). In 

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addition, a plaintiff must show “either direct evidence of retaliatory motive or at least one of three 

general types of circumstantial evidence [of that motive].” McCollum v. California Dept. of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Allen v. Iranon, 283 

F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002)). To survive summary judgment without direct evidence, 

therefore, a plaintiff must “present circumstantial evidence of motive, which usually includes: 

(1) proximity in time between protected speech and the alleged retaliation; (2) [that] the 

[defendant] expressed opposition to the speech; [or] (3) other evidence that the reasons proffered 

by the [defendant] for the adverse . . . action were false and pretextual.” McCollum, 647 F.3d at 

882 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2. Claim Against Defendants Loredo and Glass

Defendants argue that to the extent that Plaintiff is claiming that Defendants Loredo and 

Glass, CALPIA Plant Manager and CALPIA Supervisor respectively, retaliated against him, 

Defendants disagree and contend that the evidence is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact. 

Dkt. 29 at 15-16. Specifically, Defendants argue that no merit exists as to Plaintiff’s contention 

that Defendants Loredo and Glass retaliated against him for filing a grievance by forcing him to 

clean a variety of items, including pipes and toilets. Id. at 15. The Court agrees with Defendants. 

The record indicates that the form describing Plaintiff’s job as a “hand sander” included the 

following statement: “Your responsibilities listed below are not limited to these [hand sander] 

duties only. You will be expected to perform any additional duties requested, or ordered by your 

supervisor or staff.” Glass Decl., Ex. A. During his deposition, Plaintiff recognized that under the 

broad language in his job description, he could be ordered to “clean toilets,” “mop floors” and 

“clean[] around [his] work area.” Quinn Feb. 12, 2019 Decl., Ex. B at 39:24-40:9. Thus, because

Plaintiff could be ordered to clean pipes and toilets under his wide-ranging job description, 

Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of raising a genuine issue of fact to support his claim that 

such directives from Defendants amounted to retaliatory conduct.

Plaintiff also alleges in his amended complaint that because he used the grievance process, 

Defendant Loredo “directed/ordered Plaintiff to clean pipes with asbesto[s] dirt covering, [and] 

ordered Plaintiff to clean paint . . . around dangerous chemicals in a[n] attempt to make Plaintiff 

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quit his job in CALPIA . . . .” Dkt. 11 at 4. Defendants argue that summary judgment must also 

be granted because there is no evidence that Plaintiff was forced to clean asbestos or scape off 

pipes with lead-based paint without any protective equipment. Dkt. 29 at 15. Again, the Court 

agrees with Defendants. During Plaintiff’s deposition he specified that while he assumed that 

“dangerous chemicals” in the form of “lead-based paint” was present, he did not know if such 

harmful lead-based substances were actually present in the paint. Quinn Feb. 12, 2019 Decl., Ex.

B at 15:1-28:16. Plaintiff merely indicated at his deposition that it “would have been a 

possibility” that lead-paint was present. Id. at 28:1-14. Defendants also argue that “there is a 

similar lack of evidence regarding his claim that he was forced to clean asbestos” or that such a 

directive amounted to retaliatory conduct. Dkt. 29 at 15. Again, the Court agrees with 

Defendants. During his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he did not know when he was ordered to 

clean what he believed to be asbestos. Id. at 13:18-16:6. As with the lead paint, no evidence 

shows that he was exposed to friable asbestos, which means that it is in such a state that the

asbestos can be easily broken into small fragments to release measurable levels of asbestos fibers 

into an airborne environment. Plaintiff further confirmed that he had never obtained a sample of 

the paint or of the asbestos-like material, and he never had them tested to determine if the paint

was lead-based or if the material was friable asbestos. Id. at 16:7-23; id. at 27:13-17. During his 

deposition, Plaintiff stated that he did not have a conversation with Defendant Glass about 

asbestos concerns, and “didn’t tell Loredo nothing” with regard to the asbestos issue. Id. at 20:9-

21:1. At most, Plaintiff seems to be speculating that retaliatory conduct resulted from these 

directives made by Defendants to have him strip off paint from pipes (which may or may not 

contain lead-based paint or friable asbestos). However, mere speculation of such retaliatory 

conduct against Plaintiff is not enough to defeat summary judgment. See Wood, 753 F.3d at 904 

(“mere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient”). 

Finally, as mentioned above, CALPIA Inmate Worker Hiring Standards and Requirements 

provide that within two years of an initial CALPIA assignment, CALPIA inmate workers shall be 

required to complete a GED or show proof of a High School Diploma. Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15, 

§ 8004.1. During his deposition Plaintiff acknowledged that he had failed to fulfill that 

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requirement, as he concedes that he took the GED but failed to pass it. Quinn Feb. 12, 2019 Decl., 

Ex. B at 45:4-9; 51:7-11. Thus, Defendants argue that the reason he was dismissed from his 

CALPIA job was due to Plaintiff’s inability to obtain a GED, and not any retaliatory conduct by 

Defendants. Dkt. 29 at 16. Meanwhile, at his deposition, Plaintiff acknowledged that because he 

did not pass the GED exam, he was “not in compliance with the [CALPIA] requirements 

regarding the GED” and thus no longer eligible for employment with CALPIA. Quinn Feb. 12, 

2019 Decl., Ex. B at 51:7-11.

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of raising a genuine issue of fact to support 

his claim that Defendants Loredo’s and Glass’s aforementioned actions violated his First 

Amendment rights. Therefore, Defendants Loredo and Glass are entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against them.

3. Supervisory Claim Against Defendant Pattillo

Plaintiff claims Defendant Pattillo, the CALPIA Branch Manager or “CEO” (as Plaintiff 

refers to this Defendant’s title, see Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 7) retaliated against him by failing to prevent the 

acts of retaliation by Defendants Loredo and Glass. Dkt. 11 at 13-14. 

Defendants argue that such a claim against Defendant Pattillo “would still have to be 

dismissed, as there is no evidence that [Defendant] Pattillo engaged in any retaliatory conduct in 

this case.” Dkt. 29 at 14-15. During his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he had “never seen 

[Defendant] Pattillo” and “couldn’t even tell you who he looks like.” Quinn Feb. 12, 2019 Decl., 

Ex. B at 13:7-8. Plaintiff added that he never had any conversations with Defendant Pattillo, and 

did not “know who that is, really.” Id. at 13:7-14. 

As mentioned, Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by Defendants 

Loredo’s and Glass’s aforementioned actions of retaliation against him for filing a grievance, and 

it seems that Plaintiff attempts to link Defendant Pattillo based on the actions of his subordinates, 

Defendants Loredo and Glass. However, a defendant cannot be found liable under the theories of 

vicarious liability or respondeat superior for civil rights violations under the Civil Rights Act. 

Said differently, defendants whose personal involvement is not alleged cannot be held liable for 

the acts of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See

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Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir. 1975). Vicarious liability on the part of a 

supervisory official is not recognized as a basis for liability under the Civil Rights Act. Palmer v. 

Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993). A supervisor is liable only when he or she has 

directly participated in or proximately caused the alleged deprivation. Id. at 1437-38; see also 

Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 

167 (9th Cir. 1980). The law is clear that liability of supervisory personnel must be based on more 

than merely the right to control others. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 

694 n.58 (1978).

Here, Plaintiff has not made a causal link between Defendant Pattillo and a violation of his 

constitutional rights. Again, Plaintiff names this Defendant as the “CEO” and admits to having 

“no contact with [Defendant Pattillo],” who “works behind the scene[s].” Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 7. To the 

extent this Defendant is sued in his capacity as supervisory official under the theory of respondeat 

superior, Plaintiff fails to raise a material issue of fact against this Defendant. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s supervisory liability 

claim against Defendant Pattillo.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery is DENIED. Dkt. 24.

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

4 Dkt. 29.

3. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and close the file.

4. This Order terminates Docket No. 29.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

4 The Court’s finding that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 

on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim obviates the need to address these Defendants’ alternative 

arguments regarding an entitlement to qualified immunity and relating to Plaintiff’s failure to

exhausting his administrative remedies as to certain claims.

 August 30, 2019

Case 4:17-cv-04189-YGR Document 34 Filed 08/30/19 Page 11 of 11