Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00022/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00022-24/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leticia Tyshalle Marie Reed
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

LETICIA TYSHALLE MARIE REED,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cr-00022-DJC

ORDER

Defendant has filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 33 and a Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Rule 

29(c). For the reasons stated below, both motions are denied.

BACKGROUND

On January 24, 2019, an indictment was filed against Defendant Leticia Tyshalle 

Marie Reed charging her with six counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 287. (ECF No. 1.) 

Defendant was accused of making and presenting false claims for payment of tax 

refunds to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). (Id. at 1.) Beginning on October 16, 

2023, the Court held a five-day jury trial of Defendant Reed on these charges. (See

ECF No. 106.)

At trial, the Government sought to establish that Defendant had submitted six 

tax returns that contained inaccurate and fabricated information on behalf of four 

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individuals. Specifically, the government alleged that Defendant had submitted false 

claims to the IRS in the preparation and submission of the 2013 and 2014 tax returns

for E.S., the 2013 and 2014 tax returns for S.E., the 2013 tax return for L.A., and the 

2013 tax return for J.M.

At the close of the Government’s case-in-chief, Defendant made a Rule 29 

motion and the Court reserved any ruling on that motion. (ECF No. 111.) Following 

their deliberations, the Jury returned a verdict, finding Defendant Reed guilty on all 

counts. (ECF No. 116.) Defendant now files a motion for a new trial and renews the 

motion made at trial, requesting that the Court enter judgment acquitting the 

Defendant. (Pl’s Mot. (ECF No. 129).)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the Court 

“must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is 

insufficient to sustain a conviction.” A party may make a motion under subsection (a) 

of Rule 29 after the close of the Government’s case-in-chief or at the close of evidence. 

A motion may be renewed under subsection (c)(1) within 14 days of a guilty verdict, 

though a prior motion is not required. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. A Rule 29 Motion for 

Judgment of Acquittal is reviewed under a “sufficiency-of-evidence” standard which 

requires that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government 

“allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010). First,

the reviewing court must “consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution” and, second, the court must determine “whether this 

evidence, so viewed, is adequate to allow ‘any rational trier of fact [to find] the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Nevils, 

598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979)) (emphasis in original).

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II. Motion for a New Trial

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a), the Court may, on Defendant’s 

motion, “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so 

requires.” The power for the Court to grant a new trial is “much broader than its 

power to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal.” United States v. Kellington, 217 

F.3d 1084, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000). However, a court may grant such a motion only in 

exceptional cases where “[it] concludes that, despite the abstract sufficiency of the 

evidence to sustain the verdict, the evidence preponderates sufficiently heavily 

against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred . . . .” 

United States v. A. Lanoy Alston, D.M.D., P.C., 974 F.2d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1992); see 

United States v. Pimentel, 654 F.2d 538, 545 (9th Cir. 1981). In considering such a 

motion “[t]he district court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the verdict; it may weigh the evidence and in so doing evaluate for itself the credibility 

of the witnesses.” Kellington, 217 F.3d at 1095.

DISCUSSION

Both of Defendant Reed’s motions are predicated on the same basis. 

Specifically, Defendant argues that the Government failed to prove that it was 

Defendant who submitted the tax returns at issue in the indictment. (Pl’s Mot. at 2.) 

Defendant contends that the Government did not present “direct evidence of 

[Defendant] sitting in front of the device from which the claim was filed.” (Id.) Instead, 

the Government sought to prove Defendant Reed’s involvement through “cookies, IP 

addresses and Ms. Reed’s filed tax forms to connect her to the fraudulent claims that 

were submitted.” (Id.) Defendant also claims that Tax Hawk, which was used to file 

the returns in question, had “security issues” that permitted the creation of accounts 

without email verification. (Id.)

Defendant’s arguments are insufficient to warrant acquittal under Rule 29 or a 

new trial under Rule 33. At trial, the Government presented testimony from 

Defendant’s alleged clients whose tax returns were at issue. (10/17/23 Trial Tr. (ECF 

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No. 126) at 12–53 (testimony of L.A.), 110–159 (testimony of E.S.), 160–190 (testimony 

of J.M.); 10/18/23 Trial Tr. (ECF No. 126-1) at 4–12 (testimony of J.M. cont.); 10/20/23

Trial Tr. (ECF No. 126-2) at 12–41 (testimony of S.E.).) Those witnesses testified about 

their communications and meetings with Defendant in which they discussed 

Defendant preparing and submitting their tax return(s). (See e.g., 10/17/23 Trial Tr. at 

17–23 (testimony of L.A. about meetings and interactions with Defendant about 

Defendant preparing L.A.’s tax returns), 116–119 (testimony of E.S. about meetings 

and interactions with Defendant about Defendant preparing E.S.’s tax returns), 166–

170 (testimony of J.M about meetings and interactions with Defendant about 

Defendant preparing J.M.’s tax returns); 10/20/23 Trial Tr. at 18–20 (testimony of S.E.

about meetings and interactions with Defendant about Defendant preparing S.E.’s tax 

returns).)

The Government also presented evidence that Defendant had submitted the 

tax returns by providing testimony from Kirk Kimber, General Counsel for TaxHawk, 

and Oliver France, Store Leader for Apple, Inc. as well as documentary evidence in 

connection with the testimony of each. (10/18/23 Trial Tr. at 12-74 (testimony of Kirk 

Kimber, including discussion of Gov’t Ex. 11A, 11B, 11C, 11D, 12A, and 12B), 75–90 

(testimony of Oliver France, including discussion of Gov’t Ex. 29A, 29B, 29C, 29D, 29E, 

and 29F).) Mr. Kimber testified that the tax returns at issue, as well as Defendant’s 

personal tax returns, were submitted to the IRS via TaxHawk’s website, 

FreeTaxUSA.com. (10/18/23 Trial Tr. at 47–54.) He further testified that each of these 

tax returns was submitted from a computer with one of two IP addresses. (Id. at 44:9–

18; 54:19–23; see also Trial Tr. at 47:15–49:12, 50:3–51:5, 51:15–24, 52:10–16, 52:19–

53:15, 53:17–22, 52:9–24) Mr. France’s testimony connected both of these IP 

addresses to Defendant’s “Apple ID” account. (10/18/23 Trial Tr. at 80:12–81:5,

81:17–20, 83:8–25, 84:17–85:21, 87:2–10.) Mr. Kimber also testified that the tax

returns at issue and Defendant’s personal returns had been submitted from one of 

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two “Machine IDs” which is a number assigned to a specific computer using browser 

cookies. (Id. at 44:9–16; 59:17–60:9; see 10/20/23 Trial Tr. at 84:23–85:10.)

To further support that Defendant had personally submitted the tax returns in 

question, the Government presented testimony from Special Agent (“SA”) Kevin Tighe 

who testified that S.E.’s 2013 and 2014 tax returns as well as E.S.’s 2014 tax return had

listed the email “Ltyshalle1976@gmail.com” on the return. (10/20/23 Trial Tr. at 50:7–

52:9; 64:17-66:8.) Special Agent Tighe also provided testimony linking Defendant to 

this email account via the phone number used to register it and the usage of that 

email address for other accounts records associated with Defendant. (Id. at 52:10–

60:10; 66:13–68:5.) Special Agent Tighe further testified that Defendant had received 

a refund on her personal tax returns for 2013 and 2014 that had been deposited into a 

prepaid debit card which was held by Defendant and had “ltyshalle@aol.com” as an 

associated email address. (Id. at 70:24–74:20.) The “ltyshalle@aol.com” email was 

also allegedly the recovery email listed for the “Ltyshalle1976@gmail.com” email 

account. (Id. at 70:19–22.) Testimony from Special Agent Tighe, as well as testimony 

from J.M. and documentary evidence presented by the government, supported that 

prepaid debit cards were registered using the “ltyshalle@aol.com” email and that 

those debit cards were used to receive refunds from J.M.’s 2013 tax return (10/17/23 

Trial Tr. at 176:10–178:5;10/20/23 Trial Tr. at 74:1–77:4) and L.A.’s 2013 tax return 

(10/17/23 Trial Tr. at 28:610/20/23 Trial Tr. at 77:12–78:22).

In her motion, Defendant contends that the Government failed to present any 

testimony that placed her in control of the computer when the returns were 

submitted. Defendant argues that, as a result, the evidence presented is insufficient to 

satisfy the first element of each of the charges: that Defendant made or presented a 

claim to the United States or a department or agency of the United States. (Pl’s Mot. at 

2;) see 18 U.S.C. § 287. Defendant does not contend that the Government failed to 

prove any other elements of the charges. 

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Taking the testimony above as true, the Government presented more than 

sufficient circumstantial evidence that Defendant filed the tax returns at issue. The 

testimony of multiple witnesses who allegedly spoke with Defendant about preparing 

their tax returns established that Defendant had agreed to prepare these returns for 

each of the witnesses. This is further corroborated by the exhibits and testimony of 

Mr. Kimber and Mr. France, who provide circumstantial evidence that Defendant 

submitted those returns by establishing that the six tax returns at issue and 

Defendant’s own tax returns were submitted from one of two IP addresses, that 

Defendant’s Apple ID was connected with both of those IP addresses, and that each of 

the witnesses’ tax returns and Defendant’s personal tax return were submitted from a 

device bearing the same Machine ID. The association of Defendant’s email addresses 

with the tax returns in question, both directly and via the registration of prepaid debit 

cards, also supports that Defendant prepared and submitted these returns. Though 

these latter points may only be circumstantial evidence that Defendant herself 

submitted the tax returns, it is well established that there is no difference between 

direct and circumstantial evidence in the eyes of the jury. See United States v. Nelson, 

419 F.2d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969) (“[C]ircumstantial and testimonial evidence are 

indistinguishable so far as the jury's fact-finding function is concerned, all that is to be 

required of the jury is that it weigh all of the evidence, direct or circumstantial, against 

the standard of reasonable doubt.”). The testimony elicited by Defendant from Mr. 

Kimber about the lack of email verification procedures used by TaxHawk at that time 

does not undercut the significant amount of other evidence presented from which a 

jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was responsible for 

submitting the tax returns in question.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational 

trier of fact could find that the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Defendant herself made or presented false claims to the IRS. Nevils, 598 F.3d at 

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1164. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of 

Acquittal.

Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 

also lacks merit. While the Court has broader power to grant a motion under Rule 33 

than under Rule 29 and need not view facts in the light most favorable to the 

Government, the motion for new trial is only granted in exceptional circumstances 

where despite the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court finds that “the evidence 

preponderates sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of 

justice may have occurred . . . .” A. Lanoy Alston, D.M.D., P.C., 974 F.2d at 1211; see 

Pimentel, 654 F.2d at 545. The Court finds that this case does not present such 

exceptional circumstances. Though Defendant presents motions for a new trial and 

for acquittal, both are made on the grounds that “the Government failed to prove that 

she was the person who submitted the claims charged in the indictment.” (Pl’s Mot. at 

2.) The evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to serve as the basis for a 

conviction. The Government presented ample evidence for a rational trier of fact to 

find Defendant had made or presented false claims to the IRS and the jury’s verdict is 

consistent with that. Nothing about the evidence presented at trial preponderates 

against the jury’s verdict and the Court has no current indication that a serious 

miscarriage of justice may have occurred. As such, the Court denies Defendant’s 

Motion for New Trial.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion 

for New Trial and Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (ECF No. 120) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 15, 2024 

Hon. Daniel J. Calabretta

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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