Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15700/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15700-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
Appellee
Arthur Herbert
Appellee
B. Todd Jones
Appellee
Loretta E. Lynch
Appellee
United States of America
Appellee
S. Rowan Wilson
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

S. ROWAN WILSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH,

Attorney General;

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,

TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND

EXPLOSIVES; B. TODD

JONES, as Acting Director

of U.S. Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms and Explosives;

ARTHUR HERBERT, as

Assistant Director of U.S.

Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, Firearms and

Explosives; and UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-15700

D.C. No.

2:11-CV-01679-GMN-PAL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Gloria M. Navarro, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 21, 2016

San Francisco, California

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2 WILSON V. LYNCH

Filed August 31, 2016

Before: Susan P. Graber and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit

Judges, and Jed S. Rakoff,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Rakoff

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a

complaint challenging the federal statutes, regulations, and

guidance that prevented plaintiff from buying a gun because

she possesses a Nevada medical marijuana registry card. 

The panel preliminarily held that plaintiff lacked standing

to challenge 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which criminalizes

possession or receipt of a firearm by an unlawful drug user or

a person addicted to a controlled substance. Plaintiff had not

alleged that she was an unlawful drug user or that she was

addicted to any controlled substance. Nor had she alleged that

she possessed or received a firearm. The panel further held

that plaintiff’s remaining claims were not moot because she

represented that she has routinely renewed her registry card.

*

 The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge for

the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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WILSON V. LYNCH 3

The panel held that plaintiff’s Second Amendment claims

did not fall within the direct scope of United States v. Dugan,

657 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2011), which held that the Second

Amendment does not protect the rights of unlawful drug users

to bear arms. Taking plaintiff’s allegations in her first

amended complaint as true – that she chose not to use

medical marijuana – the panel concluded that plaintiff was

not actually an unlawful drug user.

The panel held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R.

§ 478.11, and the Open Letter issued by the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to federal

firearms licensees, which prevented plaintiff from purchasing

a firearm, directly burdened plaintiff’s core Second

Amendment right to possess a firearm. Applying

intermediate scrutiny, the panel nevertheless held that the fit

between the challenged provisions and the Government’s

substantial interest of violence prevention was reasonable,

and therefore the district court did not err by dismissing the

Second Amendment claim.

The panel rejected plaintiff’s claims that the challenged

laws and Open Letter violated the First Amendment. The

panel held that any burden the Government’s anti-marijuana

and anti-gun-violence efforts placed on plaintiff’s expressive

conduct was incidental, and that the Open Letter survived

intermediate scrutiny.

The panel held that the challenged laws and Open Letter

neither violated plaintiff’s procedural due process rights

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

nor violated the Equal Protection Clause as incorporated

into the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiff did not have a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in simultaneously

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4 WILSON V. LYNCH

holding a registry card and purchasing a firearm, nor was she

a part of suspect or quasi-suspect class. 

Finally, rejecting the claim brought under the

Administrative Procedure Act, the panel agreed with the

district court that the Open Letter was a textbook

interpretative rule and that it was exempt from the Act’s

notice-and-comment procedures.

COUNSEL

Charles C. Rainey (argued) and Jennifer J. Hurley, Rainey

Legal Group PLLC, Las Vegas, Nevada, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Abby C. Wright (argued) and Michael S. Raab, Attorneys,

Appellate Staff; Daniel G. Bogden, United States Attorney;

Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

RAKOFF, Senior District Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant S. Rowan Wilson acquired a Nevada

medical marijuana registry card. She then sought to purchase

a firearm, but the firearms dealer knew that Wilson held a

registry card. Consistent with a letter issued by the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”), the

dealer refused to sell Wilson a firearm because of her registry

card. Wilson sued, challenging the federal statutes,

regulations, and guidance that prevented her from buying a

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WILSON V. LYNCH 5

gun. The district court dismissed Wilson’s complaint, and

Wilson appealed. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I controlled

substance under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.

§ 812. As a Schedule I controlled substance, marijuana, under

federal law, is deemed to have “no currentlyaccepted medical

use in treatment[, and] [t]here is a lack of accepted safety for

use of the . . . substance under medical supervision.” Id.

§ 812(b)(1)(B) & (C).1

This, however, is not the view of the State of Nevada.

Although Nevada law criminalizes the possession of

marijuana, see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 453.336(4), Nevada’s

Constitution was amended in 2000 to provide for medical

marijuana use, see Nev. Const. art. IV, § 38. Under a

statutory scheme enacted pursuant to this constitutional

amendment, a holder of a valid marijuana registration ID card

(a “registry card”) is exempt from state prosecution for

marijuana-related crimes. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 453A.200. To

acquire a registry card, an applicant must provide

documentation from an attending physician affirming that the

applicant has a chronic or debilitating medical condition, that

the medical use of marijuana may mitigate the symptoms of

the condition, and that the physician has explained to the

1 As we recently observed: “The [Controlled Substances Act] prohibits

the manufacture, distribution, and possession of marijuana. Anyone in any

state who possesses, distributes, or manufactures marijuana for medical or

recreational purposes (or attempts or conspires to do so) is committing a

federal crime.” United States v. McIntosh, No. 15-10117, 2016 WL

4363168, at *11 n.5 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2016).

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6 WILSON V. LYNCH

applicant the risks and benefits of the medical use of

marijuana. Id. §453A.210(2)(a)(1)–(3).Cardholders must also

comply with certain ongoing requirements, including

limitations on the amount of marijuana they have at one time,

id. § 453A.200(3)(b), as well as the requirement that they

“[e]ngage in . . . the medical use of marijuana in accordance

with the provisions of this chapter as justified to mitigate the

symptoms or effects of a person’s chronic or debilitating

medical condition,” id. § 453A.200(3)(a). A registry card is

valid for one year and may be renewed annually by

submitting updated written documentation from a physician.

Id. §§ 453A.220(5), 453A.230(1)(b).

Turning to federal firearms provisions, under 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(3) no person “who is an unlawful user of or addicted

to any controlled substance” may “possess . . . or . . . receive

any firearm or ammunition.” In addition, it is unlawful for

“any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or

ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable

cause to believe that such person . . . is an unlawful user of or

addicted to any controlled substance.” Id. § 922(d)(3).

The ATF has promulgated regulations implementing

§ 922 and defining a person “who is an unlawful user of or

addicted to any controlled substance.” See 27 C.F.R.

§ 478.11. The ATF has also developed Form 4473, which

confirms eligibility for gun ownership under § 922.

Prospective purchasers of firearms fill out Form 4473 when

they seek to buy a firearm. Form 4473 includes Question

11.e., which asks “Are you an unlawful user of, or addicted

to, marijuana or any depressant, stimulant, narcotic drug, or

any other controlled substance?” See Firearms Transaction

Record Part I - Over-the-Counter (“Form 4473”),

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WILSON V. LYNCH 7

https://www.atf.gov/file/61446/download. If the answer is

“yes,” the putative transaction is prohibited.

On September 21, 2011, the ATF issued an “Open Letter

to All Federal Firearms Licensees” (the “Open Letter”) that

stated the following:

[A]ny person who uses or is addicted to

marijuana, regardless of whether his or her

State has passed legislation authorizing

marijuana use for medicinal purposes, is an

unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled

substance, and is prohibited by Federal law

from possessing firearms or ammunition.

Such persons should answer “yes” to question

11.e. on ATF Form 4473 . . . and you may not

transfer firearms or ammunition to them.

Further, if you are aware that the potential

transferee is in possession of a card

authorizing the possession and use of

marijuana under State law, then you have

“reasonable cause to believe” that the person

is an unlawful user of a controlled substance.

As such, you may not transfer firearms or

ammunition to the person, even if the person

answered “no” to question 11.e. on ATF Form

4473.

Open Letter to all Federal Firearms Licensees dated Sept. 21,

2011, https://www.atf.gov/files/press/releases/2011/09/092

611-atf-open-letter-to-all-ffls-marijuana-for-medicinalpurposes.pdf.

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8 WILSON V. LYNCH

It was against this regulatory and statutory context that

appellant Wilson, on May 12, 2011, was issued a marijuana

registry card by the State of Nevada. A few months later, on

October 4, 2011, Wilson sought to purchase a firearm from

Custom Firearms & Gunsmithing in the small community of

Moundhouse, Nevada. As Wilson began to fill out Form

4473, the owner of the store, Frederick Hauser, stopped her

from completing Question 11.e, which asked whether Wilson

was an unlawful user of a controlled substance. Hauser

explained that, because (as Hauser alreadyknew) Wilson held

a marijuana registry card, Wilson was deemed an unlawful

user of a controlled substance and therefore someone to

whom he could not sell a firearm without jeopardizing his

federal firearms license. Wilson handed Hauser Form 4473

with Question 11.e. left blank. Hauser, who had received the

ATF Open Letter three days earlier, nonetheless refused to

sell her a firearm. Wilson alleges that Hauser’s refusal to sell

her a firearm was a direct consequence of Hauser’s receipt of

the Open Letter.

On October 18, 2011, Wilson filed the present action

against the Government and, on December 17, 2012, filed a

First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”). Wilson asserted five

causes of action: (1) violation of the Second Amendment,

(2) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth

Amendment, (3) violation of the procedural Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment, (4) violation of the

substantive Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and

(5) violation of the First Amendment. Wilson sought

declarations that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and (d)(3), as well as

all derivative regulations, such as 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the

Open Letter, were unconstitutional. Wilson also sought a

permanent injunction barring enforcement of § 922(g)(3) and

(d)(3), all derivative regulations, and the Open Letter. Finally,

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WILSON V. LYNCH 9

Wilson sought compensatory and punitive damages, costs,

fees, and expenses.

On January 31, 2013, the Government filed a motion to

dismiss the FAC. In her opposition to Defendants’ motion to

dismiss, Wilson asserted that the Open Letter also violated

the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). On March 11,

2014, the district court granted the Government’s motion to

dismiss the FAC. The district court also denied Wilson leave

to amend the FAC to raise an APA claim, concluding that

amendment would be futile. Wilson timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for

failure to state a claim, and we review for abuse of discretion

the denial of leave to amend. Dougherty v. City of Covina,

654 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2011). We review de novo all

constitutional rulings. Fournier v. Sebelius, 718 F.3d 1110,

1117 (9th Cir. 2013).

A.

As a preliminary matter, we address two jurisdictional

issues:

First, as appellant’s counsel conceded at oral argument,

Wilson lacks standing to challenge 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).2

2 Neither party challenged the district court’s determination that Wilson

had standing, but we have an independent obligation “to examine

jurisdictional issues such as standing [sua sponte].” B.C. v. Plumas

Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1999). We review

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10 WILSON V. LYNCH

Standing requires, among other elements, a “concrete and

particularized” injury that is “actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v Defs. of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 922(g)(3) criminalizes possession or receipt of a

firearm by a unlawful drug user or a person addicted to a

controlled substance. Wilson has not alleged that she is an

unlawful drug user or that she is addicted to any controlled

substance. Nor has she alleged that she possessed or received

a firearm. Accordingly, Wilson has not alleged that

§ 922(g)(3) has injured her in any way. For the same reasons,

she also has not shown a “genuine threat of imminent

prosecution” under § 922(g)(3), as is generally required of

plaintiffs raising pre-enforcement challenges to criminal

statutes outside the First Amendment context. San Diego Cty.

Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.

1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we

affirm on the ground of lack of standing the district court’s

dismissal of Wilson’s claims concerning § 922(g)(3).

Wilson does have standing, however, to raise her

remaining claims challenging 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3),

27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open Letter. Wilson alleges that

§ 922(d)(3)’s ban on sales of firearms to individuals whom

sellers have reasonable cause to believe are drug users, along

with the regulations and guidance implementing this ban,

prevented her from purchasing a firearm. These allegations

are sufficient to satisfy the injury requirement.

Second, contrary to the Government’s suggestion,

Wilson’s remaining claims are not moot. We review the

questions of standing de novo. La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake

Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010).

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WILSON V. LYNCH 11

mootness of a case de novo. Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742,

745 (9th Cir. 2003). The Government’s concern is that

because Wilson has not renewed her registry card throughout

her appeal, she is no longer injured by 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3),

27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open Letter. Although the FAC

discusses only the registry card issued in May 2011, which

expired in 2012, Wilson represents that she has routinely

renewed her card. The Government has not challenged the

accuracy of this representation. Because Wilson has appealed

from a granted motion to dismiss and her representation

simply updates the allegation in the FAC that she has a

current registry card, we accept it as true for purposes of her

appeal. Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975).

B.

Wilson’s first constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open Letter

purportedly rests on the Second Amendment. Specifically,

Wilson claims that these provisions unconstitutionallyburden

her individual right to bear arms. See District of Columbia v.

Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). The district court

concluded, however, that Wilson’s Second Amendment

challenge failed under our decision in United States v. Dugan,

657 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2011). In Dugan, we held that the

Second Amendment does not protect the rights of unlawful

drug users to bear arms, id. at 999–1000, in the same way that

it does not protect the rights of “felons and the mentally ill,”

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. The Government argues that if

the Second Amendment does not protect the rights of

unlawful drug users to bear arms, it must not protect any

possible rights of unlawful drug users to purchase firearms or

of firearm dealers to sell to unlawful drug users. Therefore,

were Wilson an unlawful drug user, she would be beyond the

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12 WILSON V. LYNCH

reach of the Second Amendment, and her claims would fail

categorically.

However, taking Wilson’s allegations as true, as we must

on an appeal from a motion to dismiss, Usher v. City of Los

Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987), she is not

actually an unlawful drug user. Instead, she alleges that,

although she obtained a registry card, she chose not to use

medical marijuana for various reasons, such as the difficulties

of acquiring medical marijuana in Nevada, as well as a desire

to make a political statement.3 Regardless of her motivations,

we agree that Wilson’s claims do not fall under the direct

scope of Dugan.

4

This does not mean that her Second Amendment claim

succeeds. We have adopted a two-step inquiry to determine

whether a law violates the Second Amendment. We ask

(1) “whether the challenged law burdens conduct protected by

the Second Amendment and (2) if so . . . apply an appropriate

level of scrutiny.” United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127,

1136 (9th Cir. 2013). Following this approach, we apply

3 Wilson argues that, in light of the active political movements to

decriminalize the use of marijuana in some states, her stance as a nonusing registry cardholder allows her to express her support for marijuana

legalization in a particularly meaningful way.

4 Dugan does, however, dispose of Wilson’s Second Amendment claims

against 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open Letter to

the extent that they are facial, as distinct from as-applied, challenges.

Under Dugan, there is no question that § 922(d)(3) could be enforced

constitutionally, pursuant to 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 and the Open Letter,

against a dealer who knowingly sold a firearm to a registry cardholder

who was actively using marijuana.

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WILSON V. LYNCH 13

intermediate scrutiny and uphold 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3),

27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open Letter.

i. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11,

and the Open Letter Burden Protected Conduct

At Chovan’s first step, we ask “whether the challenged

law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment,

based on a historical understanding of the scope of the

[Second Amendment] right, or whether the challenged law

falls within a well-defined and narrowly limited category of

prohibitions that have been historicallyunprotected.” Jackson

v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th

Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

With respect to Wilson, this inquiry is straightforward:

because Wilson insists that she is not an unlawful drug user,

a convicted felon, or a mentally-ill person, she is not a person

historically prohibited from possessing firearms under the

Second Amendment. Accordingly, by preventing Wilson

from purchasing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R.

§ 478.11, and the Open Letter directly burden her core

Second Amendment right to possess a firearm, and we

proceed to Chovan’s second step.

ii. Which Level of Scrutiny Applies to 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open Letter

The appropriate level of scrutiny for laws that burden

conduct protected by the Second Amendment “depend[s] on

(1) how close the law comes to the core of the Second

Amendment right and (2) the severity of the law’s burden on

the right.” Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (citing Ezell v. City of

Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Application of the first prong is

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14 WILSON V. LYNCH

guided by “Heller’s holding that the Second Amendment has

‘the core lawful purpose of self-defense,’ and that ‘whatever

else it leaves to future evaluation, [the Second Amendment]

surely elevates above all other interests the right of lawabiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth

and home.’” Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961 (alteration in original)

(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 630, 635). Here, as previously

stated, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the

Open Letter burden the core of Wilson’s Second Amendment

right because they prevent her from purchasing a firearm

under certain circumstances and thereby impede her right to

use arms to defend her “hearth and home.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

With respect to the second prong of the second Chovan

step,

laws which regulate only the mannerin which

persons may exercise their Second

Amendment rights are less burdensome than

those which bar firearm possession

completely. Similarly, firearm regulations

which leave open alternative channels for selfdefense are less likely to place a severe

burden on the Second Amendment right than

those which do not.

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The

burden on Wilson’s core Second Amendment right is not

severe. Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and

the Open Letter bar only the sale of firearms to Wilson–not

her possession of firearms. Wilson could have amassed legal

firearms before acquiring a registry card, and 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open Letter would

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WILSON V. LYNCH 15

not impede her right to keep her firearms or to use them to

protect herself and her home. In addition, Wilson could

acquire firearms and exercise her right to self-defense at any

time by surrendering her registry card, thereby demonstrating

to a firearms dealer that there is no reasonable cause to

believe she is an unlawful drug user.

Because 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and

the Open Letter do not place a severe burden on Wilson’s

core right to defend herself with firearms, we apply

intermediate scrutiny to determine whether these laws and

guidance pass constitutional muster.

iii. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. 478.11, and the Open Letter

Intermediate scrutiny “require[s] (1) the government’s

stated objective to be significant, substantial, or important;

and (2) a reasonable fit between the challenged regulation and

the asserted objective.” Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Wilson concedes that the

Government had a substantial interest in enacting § 922(d)(3)

to prevent gun violence.5 However, she argues that the fit

between 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 and the Open Letter, on the one

hand, and violence prevention, on the other, is not reasonable

because 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 and the Open Letter deprive so

5 Wilson also argues that the purpose of the Open Letter was to crush the

medical marijuana movement. On its face, the Open Letter serves no such

purpose, and Wilson has not substantiated her suspicions with any facts.

In addition, if the Government had wished to oppose the medical

marijuana movement, it would not have needed the Open Letter–it would

have needed merely to enforce existing federal statutes as then interpreted.

See 21 U.S.C. § 812. (But see footnote 7, infra.)

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16 WILSON V. LYNCH

many non-violent people, such as Wilson, who hold registry

cards for political reasons, oftheir Second Amendment rights.

The Government argues that empirical data and

legislative determinations support a strong link between drug

use and violence. As to the first, studies and surveys relied on

in similar cases suggest a significant link between drug use,

including marijuana use, and violence. See United States v.

Carter, 750 F.3d 462, 466–69 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing and

discussing four studies and two government surveys); United

States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2010) (per

curiam) (citing all but one of the studies and surveys in

Carter, plus one additional study). While it would have been

helpful for the Government to provide the studies in this case,

Wilson has not challenged their methodology. We therefore

have no occasion to evaluate the reliability of the studies and

surveys, and instead accept them as probative.

Moreover, legislative determinations also support the link

between drug use and violence. In particular, Congress

enacted 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which bars unlawful drug

users from possessing firearms, “to keep firearms out of the

hands of presumptively risky people.” Dickerson v. New

Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 n.6 (1983).6It is beyond

dispute that illegal drug users, including marijuana users, are

likely as a consequence of that use to experience altered or

impaired mental states that affect their judgment and that can

lead to irrational or unpredictable behavior. See Carter,

750 F.3d at 469–70. They are also more likely to have

negative interactions with law enforcement officers because

6 A majority of states have enacted similar restrictions on possession of

firearms by habitual illegal drug users. See Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683–84

(citing twenty-six state statutes and a District of Columbia statute).

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WILSON V. LYNCH 17

they engage in criminal activity. Id. Finally, they frequently

make their purchases through black market sources who

themselves frequently resort to violence.

It may be argued that medical marijuana users are less

likely to commit violent crimes, as they often suffer from

debilitating illnesses, for which marijuana may be an

effective palliative. They also may be less likely than other

illegal drug users to interact with law enforcement officers or

make purchases through illicit channels.7 But those

hypotheses are not sufficient to overcome Congress’s

reasonable conclusion that the use of such drugs raises the

risk of irrational or unpredictable behavior with which gun

use should not be associated.

By citing to the link between unlawful drug users and

violence in this case, however, the Government incorrectly

conflates registry cardholders with unlawful drug users.

While these two categories of people overlap, they are not

identical. The Government’s showings of the link between

drug use and violence would be sufficient were we applying

intermediate scrutiny to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which bars

unlawful drug users from possessing firearms. But Wilson

flatly maintains that she is not an unlawful drug user and is

instead challenging a set of laws that bar non-drug users from

purchasing firearms if there is only reasonable cause to

believe that they are unlawful drug users, for instance, if they

hold a registry card. Wilson correctly points out that the

7

See McIntosh, 2016 WL 4363168, at *9–10 (holding that the United

States Department of Justice is prohibited under a congressional

appropriations rider from prosecuting individuals who are engaged in

conduct permitted by state medical marijuana laws and who fully comply

with such laws).

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degree of fit between these laws and the ultimate aim of

preventing gun violence is not as tight as the fit with laws like

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which affect only illegal drug users.

Nonetheless, the degree of fit between 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open Letter and the

aim of preventing gun violence is still reasonable, which is

sufficient to survive intermediate scrutiny. The connection

between these laws and that aim requires only one additional

logical step: individualswho firearms dealers have reasonable

cause to believe are illegal drug users are more likely actually

to be illegal drug users (who, in turn, are more likely to be

involved with violent crimes). With respect to marijuana

registry cards, there may be some small population of

individuals who–although obtaining a marijuana registry card

for medicinal purposes–instead hold marijuana registry cards

only for expressive purposes. But it is eminently reasonable

for federal regulators to assume that a registry cardholder is

much more likely to be a marijuana user than an individual

who does not hold a registry card.

Because the degree of fit between 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3),

27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open Letter and their purpose of

preventing gun violence is reasonable but not airtight, these

laws will sometimes burden–albeit minimally and only

incidentally–the Second Amendment rights of individuals

who are reasonably, but erroneously, suspected of being

unlawful drug users. However, the Constitution tolerates

these modest collateral burdens in various contexts, and does

so here as well. For instance, the Fourth Amendment allows

an officer to burden an individual’s right to be free from

searches when the officer has “reason to believe” the person

is armed and dangerous, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27

(1968), a standard comparable to the “reasonable cause to

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WILSON V. LYNCH 19

believe” standard of § 922(d). Moreover, as previously noted,

there are various ways for individuals in Wilson’s position to

minimize or eliminate altogether the burdens that 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open Letter place on

their Second Amendment rights. Accordingly, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open Letter survive

intermediate scrutiny, and the district court did not err in

dismissing Wilson’s Second Amendment claims.

C.

Wilson also claims that 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R.

§ 478.11, and the Open Letter violate the First Amendment.

Wilson’s claim fails under long-standing First Amendment

precedents.

i. Whether Wilson’s Conduct is Protected by the First

Amendment

We apply a two-pronged test, known as the Spence test,

to determine when conduct contains sufficient elements of

communication to fall within the scope of the First

Amendment. First, we ask whether the “intent to convey a

particularized message was present.” Texas v. Johnson,

491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington,

418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam)). Second, we ask

whether “the likelihood was great that the message would be

understood by those who viewed it.” Id. (quoting Spence,

418 U.S. at 410–11).

Wilson argues that her acquisition of a registry card

qualifies as expressive conduct protected by the First

Amendment. She allegedly intended to convey a

particularized message in support of medical use of marijuana

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20 WILSON V. LYNCH

and argues that in the midst of a hotly contested debate over

the legalization of marijuana, viewers of the card would

understand this message. The Government does not dispute

that Wilson’s acquisition of a registry card passes the Spence

test, and we agree that, in the peculiar circumstances alleged,

Wilson’s acquisition of a registry card falls within the scope

of conduct protected by the First Amendment. However,

other actions that could give a firearms dealer reasonable

cause to believe that Wilson, or another individual, was an

unlawful drug user do not necessarily pass the Spence test and

are not necessarily expressive. For that reason, Wilson’s First

Amendment claim rests only on her acquisition of a registry

card.

ii. The Appropriate Level of Scrutiny

Courts apply strict scrutiny to laws that “proscribe

particular conduct because it has expressive elements.”

Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406. “A law directed at the

communicative nature of conduct must, like a law directed at

speech itself, be justified by the substantial showing of need

that the First Amendment requires.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). But intermediate scrutiny applies when a law

is directed at the non-communicative portion of conduct that

contains both communicative and non-communicative

elements: “[W]hen ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are

combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently

important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech

element can justifyincidental limitations on FirstAmendment

freedoms.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376

(1968).

Wilson argues that strict scrutiny must apply because the

Open Letter was allegedly part of a campaign by the

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WILSON V. LYNCH 21

Government to crush the medical marijuana movement. She

points to news reports that discuss a “crackdown” by the

Government on state medical marijuana systems. As noted

earlier, this hypothesis seems unlikely; all the federal

government would have needed to do to “crush” the medical

marijuana movement would have been to enforce the federal

laws prohibiting marijuana possession as then interpreted,8

for the laws, as noted earlier, do not permit a medical

exception. However, even accepting Wilson’s allegations as

true, they do not demonstrate that the Government targeted

Wilson’s expressive conduct of acquiring a registry card.

They demonstrate only that the Government moved to

enforce valid federal criminal statutes against the

unauthorized acquisition or transfer of firearms by those who

illegally use controlled substances. The production,

distribution, and use of medical marijuana are not protected

by the First Amendment, and efforts by the Government to

impede–or even eliminate altogether–the production,

distribution, and use of medical marijuana are not evidence of

any conspiracy against free speech. Likewise, the

Government’s efforts to reduce gun violence through

18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open

Letter are not directed at the expressive portion of Wilson’s

acquisition of a registry card. Accordingly, any burden the

Government’s anti-marijuana and anti-gun-violence efforts

place on Wilson’s expressive conduct is incidental, and the

less searching O’Brien standard applies here.

8 Of course, Congress would have to restore funding for the prosecution

of marijuana offenses before the federal government could enforce the

laws prohibiting possession. See McIntosh, 2016 WL 4363168, at *11 &

n.5

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22 WILSON V. LYNCH

iii. Applying the O’Brien Standard

Under O’Brien,

a government regulation is sufficiently

justified [1] if it is within the constitutional

power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an

important or substantial governmental

interest; [3] if the governmental interest is

unrelated to the suppression of free

expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction

on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no

greater than is essential to the furtherance of

that interest.

O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The Open Letter satisfies each of

these conditions.

With respect to the first O’Brien condition, Wilson argues

that the Open Letter is analogous to the Subversive Activities

Control Act of 1950, which barred anymember of designated

Communist groups from employment in defense facilities and

which the Supreme Court held violated the First Amendment

in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). But Robel and

its discussion of the freedom of association is irrelevant to the

question whether the Government may constitutionally

regulate the sale and possession of firearms. It may indeed do

so, and so the Open Letter meets the first O’Brien condition.

With respect to the second O’Brien condition, although

Wilson concedes that preventing violent crime is an

important interest, she argues that the Government has failed

to show that the Open Letter furthers this interest. She points

out that the Government has failed to marshal any evidence

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WILSON V. LYNCH 23

of the efficacy of the Open Letter in reducing gun violence,

despite its being in effect since 2011. But the Government is

not required to make such a specific showing in this context.

Instead, our discussion of Wilson’s Second Amendment

claim suffices to show that the Open Letter furthers the aim

of preventing gun violence. Registry cardholders are more

likely to be marijuana users, and illegal drug users, including

marijuana users, are more likely to be involved in violent

crimes. See Carter, 750 F.3d at 466–69; Yancey, 621 F.3d at

683–84. Accordingly, preventing those individuals who

firearm dealers know have registry cards from acquiring

firearms furthers the Government’s interest in preventing gun

violence.

With respect to the third O’Brien condition, Wilson again

argues that the purpose of the Open Letter was the

suppression of support for medical marijuana. As discussed

above, neither the Government’s efforts to reduce gun

violence nor its efforts to curtail marijuana use are related to

the suppression of free expression.

With respect to the fourth O’Brien condition, Wilson

argues that the incidental effect of the Open Letter on her

First Amendment rights is greater than is essential to reduce

gun violence. In particular, she argues that the Open Letter

places her on the horns of a constitutional dilemma: she must

either surrender her Second Amendment right to possess a

firearm or her First Amendment right to express her support

for medical marijuana use. Wilson faces no such dilemma.

The Open Letter burdens only a single form of expression in

support of medical marijuana use–the holding of a registry

card. Otherwise, Wilson may advocate vigorously and as

publicly as she wishes for medical marijuana use while

possessing firearms. Moreover, the burden that the Open

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24 WILSON V. LYNCH

Letter does place on this single form of expression is

minimal. As explained above, Wilson may purchase firearms

before acquiring or after surrendering a registry card. As a

practical matter, Wilson is not caught in any dilemma, and

the Open Letter’s incidental effect on her First Amendment

rights is no greater than necessary to reduce gun violence.

Because the Open Letter satisfies each of the O’Brien

conditions, it survives intermediate scrutiny, and the district

court did not err in dismissing Wilson’s First Amendment

claims.

D.

Wilson also raises Fifth Amendment claims against

18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open

Letter. In particular, she argues that the Open Letter violates

her procedural due process rights protected by the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and violates the

Equal Protection Clause as incorporated into the Fifth

Amendment.9 These claims fail.

To begin with, Wilson’s procedural due process rights

have not been violated. “A procedural due process claim has

9 Wilson also raised substantive due process claims in the district court,

but she addresses their dismissal in conclusory fashion on appeal, arguing

only that she stated a substantive due process claim because of her

fundamental right to choose a course of medical treatment. This argument

is foreclosed by our decision in Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th

Cir. 2007) (“[F]ederal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use

medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate

excruciating pain and human suffering.”). Accordingly, the district court

did not err in dismissing Wilson’s substantive due process claim or in

denying her leave to amend it.

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WILSON V. LYNCH 25

two distinct elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally

protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of

adequate procedural protections.” Brewster v. Bd. of Educ.,

149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998). Wilson argues that

18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the Open

Letter deprive her of her liberty interest in simultaneously

carrying a registry card and purchasing a firearm. She

contends that this deprivation occurs without any

process–only a determination that she holds a registry card.

However, Wilson does not have a constitutionally protected

liberty interest in simultaneously holding a registry card and

purchasing a firearm. Moreover, she has failed to state a

procedural due process claim, and the district court did not err

in dismissing her claim.

Likewise, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and

the Open Letter do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

“The first step in equal protection analysis is to identify the

state’s classification of groups. . . . The next step in equal

protection analysis would be to determine the level of

scrutiny.” Country Classic Dairies, Inc. v. Mont., Dep’t of

Commerce Milk Control Bureau, 847 F.2d 593, 596 (9th Cir.

1988). “[E]qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of

a legislative classification only when the classification

impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental

right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect

class.” Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976)

(per curiam) (footnote omitted).

Wilson argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R.

§ 478.11, and the Open Letter disadvantage several groups,

including registry cardholders versus users of medical

marijuana in states where registry cards are not required. She

also argues that she is being treated differently from other

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26 WILSON V. LYNCH

persons with similar medical conditions who have pursued

other methods of treatment. None of these groups, however,

is a suspect or quasi-suspect class. In addition, as discussed

above, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the

Open Letter do not impermissibly interfere with the exercise

of anyfundamental rights, includingWilson’s right to possess

firearms. Accordingly, we apply rational basis scrutiny.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and the

Open Letter survive rational basis scrutiny because they are

reasonably related to reducing gun violence, as explained

above. Accordingly, the district court did not err in

dismissing Wilson’s Fifth Amendment claims.

E.

Wilson also claims that the Open Letter violated the APA.

Wilson did not plead a specific cause of action for violations

of the APA in the FAC,10and the district court denied her

leave to amend to do so, concluding that any such amendment

would be futile. Wilson argues that the Open Letter violated

the APA because it is a legislative rule that must go through

notice-and-comment procedures under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) &

(c) but did not.

10 Wilson argues that, although she did not set out her APA claim as

formally as her other claims, she nonetheless adequately pleaded a

violation of the APA under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)’s notice

pleading standard. We do not reach this issue because Wilson’s APA

claim fails regardless of whether it was properly pleaded under Rule 8(a).

In other words, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Wilson leave to correct any deficiency in her pleading of her APA claim

because any such amendments would be futile.

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WILSON V. LYNCH 27

Title 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) exempts “interpretative

rules” and “general statements of policy” from the noticeand-comment requirement of agency rulemaking. The

Supreme Court has described interpretive rules as materials

“issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s

construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.”

Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)

(internal quotation marks omitted). We have stated that

“interpretive rules merely explain, but do not add to, the

substantive law that already exists in the form of a statute or

legislative rule. Legislative rules, on the other hand, create

rights, impose obligations, or effect a change in existing law

pursuant to authority delegated by Congress.” Hemp Indus.

Ass’n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation

omitted). Specifically, we have identified three circumstances

when a rule has the “force of law” and is therefore legislative:

“(1) when, in the absence of the rule, there would not be an

adequate legislative basis for enforcement action; (2) when

the agency has explicitly invoked its general legislative

authority; or (3) when the rule effectively amends a prior

legislative rule.” Id. (citing Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety

& Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).

The first two Hemp Industries categories do not apply

here: 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3) provides an adequate legislative

basis for enforcement action even without the Open Letter,

and the ATF did not explicitly invoke any legislative

authority when it published the Open Letter.

Wilson argues that the Open Letter falls into the third

Hemp Industries category because it effectively amended

27 C.F.R. § 478.11. Specifically, she argues that the Open

Letter impermissibly expands 27 C.F.R. § 478.11’s definition

of an “unlawful user” of illegal drugs to include registry

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28 WILSON V. LYNCH

cardholders who use marijuana. Section 478.11 defines an

unlawful user as “any person who is a current user of a

controlled substance in a manner other than as prescribed by

a licensed physician.” Wilson contends that, because a

medical recommendation must be obtained to receive a

marijuana registry card, a holder of a registry card who uses

marijuana has not used a controlled substance in a manner

other than as prescribed by a licensed physician. This is

incorrect as a matter of federal law. Under 21 U.S.C. § 812,

marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance, meaning

that–as far as Congress is concerned–marijuana “has no

currently accepted medical use in treatment[, and] there is a

lack of accepted safety for use of the . . . substance under

medical supervision.” 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B) & (C). No

physician may legally prescribe marijuana as a matter of

federal law, and no user of medical marijuana is using it “as

prescribed by a licensed physician” within the meaning of

27 C.F.R. § 478.11.

Wilson also characterizes the Open Letter as making a

blanket assertion that any individual with a registry card is a

marijuana user. According to Wilson, this blanket assertion

is made without any investigation or due process, and is

therefore unlike the illustrations provided in 27 C.F.R.

§ 478.11 that assist others in determining when someone can

reasonably be determined as using a “controlled substance in

a manner other than as prescribed by a licensed physician.”11

11 Wilson points to the following instances identified in 27 C.F.R.

§ 478.11 as examples of conduct or behavior that may raise an inference

of current use of a controlled substance:

a conviction for use or possession of a controlled

substance within the past year; multiple arrests for such

offenses within the past 5 years if the most recent arrest

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WILSON V. LYNCH 29

However, the Open Letter does not make a blanket assertion

that all registry card users are marijuana users, it simply

clarifies that a firearms dealer has “reasonable cause to

believe” an individual is an unlawful user if she holds a

registry card. This inference falls well within the scope of

27 C.F.R. § 478.11, which states that “[a]n inference of

current use may be drawn from evidence of a recent use or

possession of a controlled substance or a pattern of use or

possession that reasonably covers the present time.” A

marijuana registry card is circumstantial evidence, although

by no means dispositive evidence, of recent use or possession

of marijuana. Moreover, it is immaterial that registry cards

are different from the illustrations mentioned in 27 C.F.R.

§ 478.11 that may raise an inference of unlawful drug use.

Helpful examples in regulations need not be exhaustive.

Indeed, that is one reason agencies publish guidance like the

Open Letter–to provide additional examples that “explain, but

do not add to, the substantive law that already exists in the

form of a statute or legislative rule.” Hemp Indus., 333 F.3d

at 1087. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the

Open Letter is “textbook interpretative” and that it was

exempt from notice-and-comment procedures under 5 U.S.C.

§ 553(b)(3)(A). The district court did not err in dismissing

Wilson’s APA claim, to the extent it was pleaded, or in

denying Wilson leave to amend her complaint to expand her

APA claim.

occurred within the past year; or persons found through

a drug test to use a controlled substance unlawfully,

provided that the test was administered within the past

year.

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30 WILSON V. LYNCH

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is

AFFIRMED.

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