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Parties Involved:
Melvin Ray Rodgers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

.JI" 2 6 1989 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) 

v. ) No. 88-1061 

) 

BURL ALLEN PEVETO, JR. ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) No. 88-1113 

MELVIN RAY RODGERS, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant, ) 

} 

and ) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

} 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

} 

v. ) No. 88-1116 

) 

CARL EUGENE HINES,- } 

a/k/a GENO HINES } 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 87-52-CR) 

Don Ed Payne, Payne and Welch, Hugo, Oklahoma, for DefendantAppellant Burl Allen Peveto, Jr. 

Julian K. Fite, Muskogee, Oklahoma (Betty Outhier Williams, 

Muskogee, Oklahoma, was also on the brief) for Defendant-Appellant 

Melvin Ray Rodgers 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 1 
Stephen J. Greubel, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant Carl Eugene Hines 

Paul G. Hess, Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District 

of Oklahoma, Muskogee, Oklahoma (Roger Hilfiger, United States 

Attorney, Eastern District of Oklahoma, Muskogee, Oklahoma, was 

also on the brief) for ;Flaintiff-Appellee 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BRORBY, Circuit Judge, and SAFFELS, 

District Judge* 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

These three appeals were companioned for argument. Defendant 

Carl Eugene Hines (Hines) appeals his five count conviction for 

violating and conspiring to violate narcotics laws and for 

traveling in interstate commerce to promote narcotics 

manufacturing. Defendant Burl Allen Peveto, Jr., (Peveto) appeals 

his one count conspiracy conviction. We affirm their convictions 

and sentences. Defendant Melvin Ray Rodgers (Rodgers) appeals his 

four count conviction for violating and conspiring to violate 

narcotics laws, arguing in part that co-defendant Hines presented 

an antagonistic and mutually exclusive defense and that the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever. We 

agree and because Rogers was denied a fair trial, we reverse his 

conviction and remand for a new trial. 

*The Honorable Dale E. Saffels, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. · 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 2 
I 

Factual Background 

On June 24, 1987 special Drug Enforcement Administration 

(D.E.A.) agents stopped a man named Gilbert Glasgow (Glasgow). 

While under surveillance Glasgow had purchased some laboratory 

equipment for Hines. Glasgow R. 5-7. The equipment included a 

boiling flask, separatory funnels, glass stoppers, plastic tubing, 

elbow fittings and stopcock grease. Glasgow R. 8-9. The United 

States Attorney's Office agreed not to prosecute Glasgow in return 

for his help in the investigation of Hines and Peveto, a disbarred 

lawyer. Glasgow R. 6. 

Glasgow had known Peveto and Hines for several years. 

Glasgow .R. 5. Hines introduced Rodgers to Glasgow on 

approximately June 21 or 22, 1987. Glasgow R. 5. On June 23 and 

24, 1987, Rodgers rented a room at the Winchester Inn in Moore, 

Oklahoma. III R. 167-168. Glasgow delivered the laboratory 

equipment he had purchased to Hines and Rodgers at the Winchester 

and talked with them about the equipment and whether it met their 

expectations. Glasgow R. 11, 27-30. 

A. 

Search of the Bryan County House 

The investigation continued and on August 1, 1987 a home 

located in Bryan county, which belonged to Rodgers' brother, was 

searched. III R. 23-24. There was no furniture in the home, but 

numerous laboratory supplies were found, including beakers, 

flasks, a large crockpot containing amber colored liquid, an 

eggwhip attached to a rubber hose, a bottle of hydrogenchloride 

gas, rubber tubbing, and acetone. III R. 37-39. There was a 

dense fog in the house and a "very strong odor of ether." III R. 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 3 
23-24. A three foot by four foot mirror was found in the bathroom 

with a large amount of white powdery substance on it, later 

determined to be amphetamine. III R. 39, 80-82. Round paper 

filters were found near the mirror, ·along with a triple beam 

scale, and some packaged amphetamine. III R. 39. Fourteen pounds 

of amphetamine were found and enough amphetamine oil to 

manufacture another 30 pounds. 1 III R. 84-85. Glasgow said that 

some of the laboratory equipment at the house was equipment he had 

purchased for Hines. Glasgow R. 8-10. 

Two loaded handguns were also found in the Bryan county home. 

III R. 48-49. Rodgers, Hines' wife, and co-defendant John 

Williams were arrested and taken into custody. III R. 24-25. 

Hines was found hiding in the attic and was also arrested and 

taken into custody. III R. 25-26, 54-55. 

B. 

Search of Bines' and Peveto's Apartments 

According to Hines' trial testimony, he and Peveto moved from 

Sherman, Texas to some apartments in Irving, Texas in July of 

1987. V R. 478. Hines told Glasgow on July 7, 1987 that he 

wanted to purchase some apartments for dope houses. Glasgow R. 

35-36. When talking with Glasgow about who would assist in the 

purchase of the houses Hines ''wrote the word 'lawyer' on a piece 

of paper and pointed behind him." Glasgow R. 39. Glasgow knew 

that Peveto was a lawyer and thought Hines was referring to 

Peveto. Glasgow R. 39. Glasgow had talked with Hines before 

1 

There was testimony that the defendants were in the powdering 

stage of the manufacturing process, where the amphetamine oil is 

changed into powder. III R. 66. And there was testimony that the 

various laboratory equipment found could be used for powdering 

out. III R. 84. 

4 

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moving to Irving. Glasgow R. 40. And when Hines moved to Irving 

he gave Glasgow both his and Peveto's new telephone numbers. 

Glasgow R. 37-38. 

On August 5, 1987, Peveto's apartment was searched and Peveto 

was arrested. 2 A van registered to Hines' son, and seen earlier 

the same day at Hines' apartment, was found in Peveto's locked 

garage. IV R. 281-282. Precursor chemicals3 were found inside 

the van. III R. 177-180. D.E.A. chemist Goldstein testified that 

120 pounds of amphetamines could have been manufactured with the 

chemicals found in the van. IV·R. 332. There was evidence that 

the ether found in the van was similar to that found in the Bryan 

county ·home. II R. 58. A traffic citation issued to Peveto was 

found. IV R. 315. A set of triple beam scales, a set of electric 

scales, a minuscule amount of amphetamine, a number of bottles, 

and some stickers were also found in Peveto's apartment. III R. 

130, 180; IV R. 315-316. 

On the same day Hines' apartment was searched. 4 A receipt 

for the chemicals matching those found in the van at Peveto's 

ap~rtment and costing $6,888.18 was found. IV R. 262-263. 

2 

Facts relating to the manner of the search are set forth 

below in part II A. (i). 

3 

A precursor chemical is a chemical which, when mixed with 

another chemical, makes a compound such as phenylacetone. 

Phenylacetone can then be used to manufacture amphetamine. III R. 

322. The van contained boxes of chemicals and containers of 

ether. III R. 178-179. 

4 

The apartment was occupied on the day of the search by Hines' 

son and his family. 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 5 
Approximately one thousand small bottles were found in the garage, 

along with some stickers. IV R. 237. 

Rodgers, Hines, Peveto, and Williams were charged in a seven 

count indictment. Williams alone was charged in count five with 

possession of cocaine; the jury acquitted him of that charge and 

all other charges. Rodgers was charged with knowingly and 

intentionally manufacturing amphetamine/methamphetamine in count 

one; possession with intent to distribute amphetamine/ 

methamphetamine in count two; possession of amphetamine oil with 

intent to manufacture amphetamines in count three; and conspiracy 

to manufacture and distribute amphetamine/methamphetamine from May 

29, 1987 to August 5, 1987 in count four, violations of 21 o.s.c § 

84l(a)(l) (1982), 18 U •. s.c. S 2 (1982) and 21 u.s.c. § 846 (1982). 

Hines was charged in those same four counts, and in addition, was 

charged in count six with traveling in interstate commerce. with 

the intent to promote narcotics manufacturing, a violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 1952 (1982) and 18 u.s.c. S 2 (1982). He was also 

charged in count seven with the knowing and intentional possession 

of a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 o.s.c. 

§ 922(g)(l)(l982) and 18 u.s.c. § 2 (1982). Peveto was charged 

only with conspiracy. 

c. 

Hines' Defense 

Hines presented his defense first. To Rodgers' surprise, he 

put on evidence to show that he was working as a government agent. 

Revere Christophe, an employee of the Harrison County Sheriff's 

office, was introduced to Hines in 1984 or 1985 by Clifford Lee, a 

detective with the Oklahoma City Police Department. IV R. 375. 

Christophe talked to Hines about his desire to work as an agent 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 6 
and Hines in fact assisted in narcotics investigations. IV R. 

375. Charles Lugo, supervisor for intelligence of the Drug 

Enforcement Administration in the Department of Justice, Los 

Angeles Division, said that Hines worked as a informant in a 

heroin trafficking investigation in the Dallas area in 1985. IV 

R. 394. And Special F.B.I. agent Michael Miller testified that he 

met with Hines and Lee in March of 1987 to discuss the possibility 

of Hines becoming an informant and said they specifically 

discussed information regarding Peveto. IV R. 400-402. 

Hines said ·that he was working to set up drug dealers for 

Lee, so that he could be approved as an informant. IV R. 443-446. 

He said that he "came in contact with Mr. Peveto'' and that he had 

a woman named Jo Jo Butler buy narcotics from Rodgers. IV R. 445-

446. He said that he became acquainted with Rodgers and Peveto 

"so [he] could build a foundation to turn into the parole board to 

do the next case on." IV R. 449. Hines admitted buying glassware 

and chemicals, but said it was all part of his work as an 

informant. IV R. 448-457. 

D. 

Rodgers' Defense 

Rodgers was last to put on his defense. He had lived in the 

home owned by his brother in Bryan county, but had returned the 

home to his brother just weeks before the search. V R. 559-560. 

He said that on the day of the search he had gone to the house to 

pick up some appliances and furniture. V R. 542. A car which he 

had sold Hines earlier was at the house, so he knew Hines was 

there. V R. 543.· He said that after he had entered the house, 

Hines would not let him leave so that he was there when the house 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 7 
was searched. V R. 544-545. He saw the weapons and said he was 

afraid to leave against Hines' will. V R. 544-545. 

Rodgers' attorney objected strenuously when Hines elicited 

testimony supporting his defense. IV R. 445. See also IV R. 403-

404. The trial court overruled the objection, refusing to grant a 

severance. IV R. 445. Rodgers had no record of previous felony 

or misdeameanor convictions. V R. 539. The only evidence that he 

was involved in prior narcotics dealing was presented through 

Hines' testimony in support of his defense. IV R. 446. And 

Hines' attorney relied in closing argument upon the testimony 

regarding Rodgers' drug involvement to strengthen Hines' defense. 

V R. 603. 

E. 

Peveto's Defense 

Peveto put on no defense evidence individually. His counsel 

attempted to develop by cross-examination of other witnesses the 

lack of Peveto's involvement in the alleged conspiracy, the only 

charge against him. 

F. 

The Jury's Verdict 

At the close of the government's case, the court granted 

Hines' motion for judgment of acquittal as to count seven. The 

jury acquitted Williams of all charges. Rodgers, Hines and Peveto 

were found guilty on all remaining counts. Each defendant filed a 

timely notice of appeal. Many arguments are raised on appeal. We 

turn first to Peveto's arguments regarding various evidentiary 

rulings which if well taken, will have a substantial effect on 

arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 8 
II. 

Analysis 

A. 

Evidentiary matters 

Peveto raises three evidentiary issues: the trial court's 

denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress, the admission of 

informant Glasgow's testimony under the co-conspirator exception 

to the hearsay rule, and the admission of a traffic ticket found 

in his apartment during the search. 

(i) 

Denial of Peveto's Motion to Suppress 

Peveto's apartment was searched on August 5, 1987. Among the 

items found were a small plastic vial containing a miniscule 

amount of amphetamine, chemicals obtained from a van parked in 

Peveto's garage, a traffic citation issued to Peveto, a set of 

triple beam scales, and a set of electric scales. 

Peveto filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, arguing that the 

affidavit supporting the warrant was not sufficient to establish 

probable cause. I R. 13. After a hearing, the trial court denied 

the motion. The court held that affiant Rande Matteson, a special 

D.E.A. agent, had sufficiently observed and verified the acts 

performed by the confidential informant to establish reliability, 

and had alleged sufficient facts in the affidavit to establish a 

fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be 

found in Peveto's apartment, in accordance with Illinois v. Gates, 

462 U.S. 213, 238-239 (1983). IR. 29. 

In Gates, the Supreme Court held that a magistrate should 

consider the totality of the circumstances when determining 

whether probable cause ~xists to issue a search warrant: 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 9 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to 

make a practical, common-sense decision whether, 

given all the circumstances set forth in the 

affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and 

"basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay 

information, there is a fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in 

a particular place. 

Id. at 238. We have noted that a magistrate's determination of 

probable cause should be paid "great deference." United States v. 

Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1508 (10th Cir. 1988). Our duty is simply to 

ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding 

that probable cause existed. United States v. Martinez, 764 F.2d 

744, 746 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-239). 

Here, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding 

that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant. As the 

trial court found, agent Matteson testified in his affidavit: (1) 

that Peveto was a disbarred lawyer without an identifiable 

occupation; (2) that Peveto was an associate of Hines, the primary 

suspect in the D.E.A.'s investigation; (3) that Hines and Peveto 

lived in the same apartment complex in Sherman, Texas before they 

both moved to the Irving, Texas complex; (4) that Peveto had 

driven a van owned by Hines' son; (5) that informant Glasgow was 

told by Hines that "the lawyer" could conceal the ownership of 

dope houses and that Glasgow believed Hines was referring to 

Peveto; (6) that the affiant had seen a Lincoln registered to 

Barbara Peveto near Hines' apartment; (7) that Hines' address 

book, fbund during the August 1, 1987 search, contained several 

telephone numbers for Peveto; and (8) that Peveto had been 

investigated on three occasions since 1984 for possible controlled 

substance violations. I R. 29. See also I R. 13, Exh.· B. While 

10 

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any one of these circumstances might by itself be insufficient to 

establish probable cause, we conclude that considering the 

"totality-of-the-circumstances," see Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 

U.S. 727, 732-733 (1984)(Per Curiam), the magistrate had a 

substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. 

Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-239. 

Peveto also argues that the officers who searched his 

apartment failed to announce their authority and purpose before 

entering, in violation of 18 U.s.c. § 3109 (1982). 5 "If the 

record clearly establishes the defendants' contention that the 

executing officers failed to announce their authority and purpose 

before forcibly entering the dwelling, and that no exigent 

circumstances were shown, the evidence must be suppressed as the 

fruit of an unlawful search." United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 

381, 383 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Sabbath v. United States, 391 

U.S. 585, 586, 589 (1968)). There is a presumption of government 

propriety, however, and the defendant bears the burden to 

establish a prima facie case by putting on some evidence that 

§ 3109 has been violated. United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 

949 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978). 

5 

Section 3109 provides: 

The officer· may break open any outer or inner door 

or window of a house, or any part of a house, or 

anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after 

notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused 

admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a 

person aiding him in the execution of the warrant. 

11 

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There is some question whether Peveto properly raised the 

issue below, a prerequisite to arguing the issue ·on appeal. 6 

Assuming the issue was not waived, we think Peveto failed to 

establish a prima facie case that S 3109 was violated. The only 

evidence presented on this issue was agent Matteson's testimony 

that the execution of the search warrant was turned over to the 

Irving, Texas Police Department and that they may have entered by 

kicking the door in. II R. 85. Matteson was not present and 

could not say whether they knocked or otherwise announced their 

presence before entering. II R. 85. When Peveto raised the issue 

at trial, the trial judge held that there was "no evidence of 

excessive force in executirig the warrant at the suppression. 

hearing" and announced that the motion had been denied. IV R. 

232. 

We accept the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly 

erroneous when reviewing the denial ·of a motion to suppress, 

considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government. Ruminer, 786 F.2d at 383. See also United States v. 

Remigio, 767 F.2d 730, 732-733 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 

6 

Peveto's pre-trial motion to suppress does not cite to 

S 3109, although it does generally state that the "warrant was 

served and executed with excessive and unnecessary force and 

violence • • " I R. 13. When the issue was raised again at 

trial, the trial judge stated that the issue had not been raised 

prior to trial, or at least not raised specifically, and indicated 

his conclusion that the issue had been waived. III R. 205-206. 

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure presumes 

that motions to suppress under Rule 12(b)(3) which are not raised 

prior to trial have been waived. See United States v. White, 766 

F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1985); United-states v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 

202 (10th Cir. 1980). Because we think it clear that Peveto 

failed to establish a prima facie case that S 3109 was violated, 

we do not ground our affirmance of the trial court's denial of the 

motion to suppress on waiver. · 12 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 12 
U.S. 1009 (1985). Here, there is no evidence to establish the 

defendant's contention "that the executing officers failed to 

announce their authority and purpose before forcibly entering the 

dwelling" and that is the kind of evidence which is required to 

demonstrate a violation of § 3109. See Ruminer, 786 F.2d at 383. 

Accordingly, we find no error in the denial of Peveto's motion to 

suppress. 

(ii) 

Admission of Co-conspirator Testimony 

Peveto argues that the trial court erred in admitting 

Glasgow's testimony of a conversation with co-defendant Hines on 

July 7, 1987. Glasgow recounted a conversation in which Hines 

said that "he wanted to purchase some apartment buildings to be 

used for dope houses," ~Glasgow R. 36, and that ownership of 

the properties "could be concealed," see Glasgow R. 36, whereupon 

Hines "wrote the word 'lawyer' on a piece of paper and pointed 

behind him." Glasgow R. 39. Glasgow knew that Peveto was a 

lawyer and he knew that Peveto lived in the same apartment complex 

with Hines, the compl~x where this conversation took place. 

Glasgow R. 39. Over strenuous objection by Peveto, the trial 

court admitted the testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2)(E),7 

7 

Fed. R. Evia. 801 provides, in pertinent part that: 

(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement 

is not hearsay if -- • • • 

(2) Admission by party opponent. The 

statement is offered against a party and is 

. . (E) a Statement 

during the course 

conspiracy. 

by a 

and 

13 

coconspirator of a party 

in furtherance of the 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 13 
stating that: 

Well, as thin as it is, I find that the 

Government has shown by substantial independent 

evidence that it is more likely than not that a 

conspiracy existed, and that this man who's on the 

witness stand now, and all these defendants were 

members of the conspiracy. And so long as it's on 

the 23rd or 24th that the statements were made 

during the course of the conspiracy, and I presume 

there [sic] are in the furtherance of the object of 

the conspiracy or.you wouldn't be presenting them, 

and I so find. 

Glasgow R. 24. This finding was made before Glasgow offered 

Hines' testimony at issue and after five witnesses had testified, 

including Dondi Albritton. 

Albritton, an A.T.F. agent, said that Peveto and Hines lived 

·in the same apartment complex in Sherman, Texas before moving to 

Irving, Texas. III R. 121-123. He also identified both Hines and 

Peveto and said that he had assisted in searching both apartme_nts 

and that he found a ·set of triple beam scales in Peveto's 

apartment. III R. 123, 130. It was at this point that Glasgow 

testified. III R. 163. Before the hearsay objection was 

interposed, Glasgow had identified Peveto and had testified about 

Glasgow's purchase of laboratory equipment and the meeting with 

Hines and Rodgers at the Winchester. 

Hearsay statements of a co-conspirator are properly admitted 

pursuant to Rule 80l(d)(2)(E) if, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, the trial court finds that: (1) a conspiracy existed; 

( 2 ) the declarant and the defendant were members of the 

conspiracy; and (3) the hearsay statements were made in the course 

and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Esch, 832 

F.2d 531, 537 (10th Cir.·· 1987), cert. denied, 108 s.ct. 1299 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 14 
(1988); United States v. Hernandez, 829 F.2d 988, 993 (10th Cir. 

1987), cert. denied, 108 s.ct. 1486 (1988). The court may examine 

the hearsay statement sought to be admitted, along with 

independent evidence, in making a preliminary factual 

determination that a conspiracy existed for purposes .of Rule 

80l(d)(2)(E). Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2782 

(1987). We review findings made which premise the admission of 

hearsay statements under the clearly erroneous standard. United 

States v. Smith, 833 F.2d 213, 221-222 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Peveto does not challenge the trial court's finding that 

Hines'. statement was made in the course of the conspiracy. Nor 

does he challenge the trial court's finding that the statement was 

made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Statements "intended to 

promote the conspiratorial objectives" are made in furtherance of 

the conspiracy as are statements "identifying a fellow 

coconspirator." Smith, 833 F.2d at 219 (quoting United States v. 

Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1986) and United States v. 

Handy, 668 F.2d 407, 408 (8th Cir. 1982)). Instead, he argues 

that the evidence was "insufficient to establish that [he] had 

entered into a conspiracy with any of the co-defendants." 

Principal Brief of Defendant-Apellant Peveto, p. 18. 

The evidence which the trial court had before it showed that 

Peveto had been associated with Hines. They lived in the same 

apartment complex in Sherman, Texas and moved to the same complex 

in Irving, Texas. Agent Albritton testified that he found a 

triple beam scale during the search of Pev~to's apartment. And 

State Trooper Randy Moore, see III R. 22, investigator Gary 

.McCain, see III R. 34, chemist Richard Dill, see III R. 68, and 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 15 
chemist Reanae Ham, see III R. 106, had previously testified about 

the search of the Bryan County house and the laboratory equipment 

and narcotics evidence found there. Furthermore, the statement at 

issue -- that ownership of dope houses could be concealed by a 

lawyer whom Glasgow understood to be Peveto may also be 

considered in determining whether the government demonstrated by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Peveto was a member of the 

conspiracy. Bourjaily, 107 s.ct. at 2782.8 

8 

Peveto's argument that the statement at issue cannot be 

considered in making the Rule 80l(d)(2)(E) determination because 

the trial court did not consider it is without merit. In view of 

the Court's holding in Bourjaily regarding consideration of the 

statement itself, and the breadth of the trial record that may 

support findings under Rule 80l(d)(2)(E), we reject Peveto's 

argument. See Hernandez, 829 F.2d at 993-995 (the co-conspirator 

statement may be conditionally admitted and connected up by 

subsequent evidence). 

In reaching the conclusion that the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting Glasgow's testimony, the dissent overlooks 

some highly significant evidence which connects Peveto to the 

Bryan County house and which may be considered in reviewing the 

80l(d)(2)(E) determination. While the dissent acknowledges the 

significance of the chemicals found in the van in Peveto's locked 

garage, it fails to acknowledge the testimony that those chemicals 

were "similar to the chemicals that were found in Oklahoma.'' II 

R. 58. And while the van belonged to Hines' son, the traffic 

citation .issued to Peveto and found in Peveto's apartment showed 

Peveto's connection to the van. We also note that triple beam 

scales were found in Peveto's apartment and in the Bryan County 

house. Moreover, bottles and stickers of the same kind were found 

at Peveto's and Hines' apartments. There was also testimony that 

Hines had given Glasgow both his and Peveto's telephone numbers 

after their move to Irving, Texas. See part II. B., infra . . As the dissent acknowledges, the co-conspirator statement may 

be connected up by this subsequent evidence. Hernandez, 829 F.2d 

at 993-995. And we view this evidence as a whole and not in its 

isolated parts. Cf. Bailey v. United States, 410 F.2d 1209, 1215-

1216 (10th Cir.--1969)(evidence connecting defendant to a crime, 

viewed cumulatively, was adequate to support an inference of 

participation). Considering the evidence reviewed above, the long 

term association of Hines and Peveto, and the hearsay statement 

itself, we do not think the trial court's finding that Peveto was 

a member of the conspiracy was clearly erroneous. The trial court 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

16 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 16 
Given all this evidence, we do not think that the trial 

court's finding thai the government demonstrated by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Peveto was a member of the 

conspiracy was clearly erroneous. The admission of Glasgow's 

testimony under 80l(d)(2)(E) was not error.· 

(iii) 

Admission of Peveto's Traffic Ticket 

Over Peveto's objection that it was hearsay evidence and that 

its admission deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to 

confront witnesses, the trial court admitted a traffic ticket 

found during the search of Peveto's apartment. IV R. 252. The 

ticket tied Peveto to the van (which contained the precursor 

chemicals) found in his garage on the day of the search. The 

government offered the ticket to show that Peveto had driven the 

van and therefore had some control over it. 9 The court admitted 

the ticket, after determining that it was hearsay, reasoning that 

it had sufficient reliability for admission. IV R. 252. 

(Footnote continued): 

was within its discretion to admit the Glasgow testimony under 

Rule 80l(d}(2}(E). Hernandez, 829 F.2d at 995 (reviewing the 

admission of co-conspirator testimony for an abuse of discretion). 

9 

When asked by the court to explain the purpose of the 

ticket's admission, counsel for the government stated: 

Your Honor, it [the ticket] was found in Mr. 

Peveto's bedroom. The van was also found in Mr. 

Peveto's locked garage. We would say they are both 

tied in, in that the ticket or summons for a 

traffic violation relates to the van. It also 

relates to the address given as shown on it. I 

think that it speaks for itself as to whether or 

not it's reliable. 

IV R. 251-252. 

17 

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We uphold the admission of the traffic ticket for reasons not 

articulated by the trial court. "An out-of-court statement is 

hearsay only if it is offered for its truth." United States v. 

Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 514 (10th Ciri 1984) (orders or 

· instructions by one person to another admitted to show that they 

occurred rather than to prove their truth held not hearsay). 

Evidence which is offered as circumstantial evidence of a 

conspiracy and not to prove the truth of the facts asserted is not 

hearsay evidence.lo See Fed. R. Evid. 80l(c); United States v. 

Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036, 1038-1040 (10th Cir. 1988) (affirming 

admission of a notebook listing defendant's home and business 

phone numbers offered as circumstantial evidence of conspiracy). 

See also United States v. Canieso, 470 F.2d 1224, 1232-1233 (2nd 

Cir. 1972) (affirming the admission of a letter which "dovetailed'' 

with other evidence, circumstantially giving rise to indirect 

inferences, but not as assertions to prove the truth of the 

matters asserted therein). 

Here, the van which contained the chemicals was found in 

Peveto's locked garage and the traffic ticket was found in 

Peveto's bedroom. The government introduced the ticket not to 

prove the truth of any matters asserted on it, but to tie Peveto 

10 

Rule 80l(c) includes "within the hearsay concept only those 

statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 

[footnote omitted]. Only then are hearsay dangers present." 4 J. 

Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence,, 80l(c)[Ol] at 801-67 

(1989). See also 6 Wigmore, Evidence S 1766 at 177-178 (3d ed. 

1940) and McCormick, Evidence § 246 at 584 (2d ed. 1972) ("Hearsay 

evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence of a statement 

made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to 

show the truth of the matter asserted therein, and thus resting 

for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court 

asserter."). 

18 

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to the van. IV R. 251-252. No reference to the truth of the 

matters asserted on the ticket (i.e., the nature of the traffic 

violation) was made by the government either during its 

examination of witnesses or during closing argument. See e.g. 

United States v. Hernandez, 750 F.2d 1256, 1257-1259 (5th Cir. 

1985)(prosecutor's argument relevant in determining whether 

evidence was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted). 

The existence of the ticket, not its assertions, was the point of 

its admission. It helped to show circumstanially Peveto's 

connection to the van. We find no error in its admission. 

B. 

Failure to Prove a Single Conspiracy 

Each of the defendants argue that the government failed to 

prove a single conspiracy and instead offered proof either of 

multiple conspiracies or of various uncharged acts. Count four of 

the indictment alleges a single conspiracy between all four codefendants to "manufacture, possess with intent to destribute, and 

possess with intent to manufacture amphetamine/methamphetamine •• 

II I R. 2. 

In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 771-774 (1946) 

the Court held that the defendants' substantial rights were 

violated where the government charged only one conspiracy, but 

presented proof of multiple conspiracies. See also United States 

v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1254-1257 (10th Cir. 1973). The Court 

recognized that guilt "remains individual and personal, even as 

respects conspiracies." Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 772. The 

defendant has a "right not to be tried en masse for the 

conglomeration of distinct and separate offenses committed by 

others •••• " Id. at 775. 

19 

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We emphasize initially that "whether the evidence was 

sufficient to establish a single conspiracy is a question of fact 

for the jury to decide. [footnote omitted]" United States v. 

Record, No. 88-1405, slip op. at 7 (10th Cir. April 28, 1989) 

(citing United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 581 (10th Cir. 

1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985)). To find "a •ingle 

conspiracy, the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the alleged coconspirators possessed a common, illicit 

goa1.11ll Dickey, 736 F.2d at 582 (citing United States v. 

Peterson, 611 F.2d 1313, 1326-1327 (10th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 

447 U.S. 905 (1980)). Proof of separate transactions does not 

necessarily establish multiple conspiracies. Id. Rather, it must 

be determined "whether such activities constituted essential and 

integral steps toward the realization of a common, illicit goal." 

United States v. Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 799-800 (10th Cir. 1980) 

(citing Peterson, 611 F.2d at 1326-1327)). 

Before examining the evidence, we note that we must consider 

all the evidence, "both direct and circumstantial, in the light 

most favorable to the government, drawing reasonable inferences 

and making credibility choices in support of the jury's verdict." 

11 

Having instructed the jury that it must find each essential 

element of the conspiracy proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

court instructed the jury that: 

V R. 651. 

To establish proof that a conspiracy existed 

you must find from the evidence that the members in 

some way or manner, or through some contrivance, 

expressly or unexpressly, came to a mutual 

understanding or agreement to try to accomplish a 

common and unlawful plan. The consequence of which 

if carried out would be unlawful. 

20 

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Record, Slip op. at 8. It "is not the function of this Court to 

weigh conflicting evidence or consider the credibility of 

witnesses." Peterson, 611 F.2d at 1317. 

The evidence in this case admittedly demonstrated a number of 

separate transactions or occurrences and the government concedes 

that much of the evidence was circumstantial. 12 There was 

evidence regarding Glasgow's purchase of laboratory equipment for 

Hines and delivery of the same to aines and Rodgers at the 

Winchester Hotel, along with evidence of their conversation about 

whether the equipment met their expectations. Glasgow R. 27-30. 

There was evidence of a previous conversation between Glasgow and 

Hines on July 7, 1987, at which time Hines told Glasgow that he 

wanted to purchase some apartment buildings for dope houses and 

stated that ownership of the properties could be concealed, 

12 

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to show unity of 

purpose, common design, and agreement in a conspiracy prosecution, 

United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986), and the court so instructed 

the jury: 

The Government is not required 

conspiracy by direct testimony 

Ordinarily, such a conspiracy can be 

inferences drawn from relevant 

circumstantial evidence. 

• 0 • 

to prove a 

or evidence. 

proved only by 

and competent 

The law allows you, as members of the jury, to 

infer the existence of a conspiracy from things 

actually done, taking into consideration all the 

facts and circumstances surrounding the 

conduct of the parties who are charged with the 

conspiracy. 

V R. 651-652. None of the defendants objected to this 

instruction. See V R. 666-667. 

21 

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whereupon he wrote the word lawyer on a piece of paper and pointed 

behind himself, suggesting to Glasgow that Peveto could conceal 

ownership of the dope houses. Glasgow R. 35-39. There was also 

abundant evidence regarding the search of the Bryan County house 

on August 1, 1987, where laboratory equipment, various supplies 

and amphetamine were found, and where Hines, Rodgers and Williams 

were arrested. 

We think it clear that the jury could reasonably find from 

these transactions and occurrences "essential and integral steps 

toward the realization of a common, illicit goal." Brewer, 630 

F.2d at 799. See also Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 

(1947). There was no furniture in the Bryan County house, but 

numerous supplies were found, including glassware, along with the 

narcotics. The jury was certainly entitled to infer that the 

Bryan County house was the type of dope house Hines was referring 

to in his conversation with Glasgow. 

The search of Peveto's apartment is more troublesome, but we 

conclude that this evidence is also competent circumstantial proof 

of a single conspiracy. There was testimony that the ether found 

in the van in Peveto's locked garage was "similar to the chemicals 

that were found in Oklahoma." II R. 58. There was testimony that 

the precursor chemicals found in the van could have been used to 

manufacture 120 pounds of amphetamine. IV R. 332. And there was 

testimony that Hines had given Glasgow both his and Peveto's 

telephone numbers after their move to Irving, Texas. We think 

this evidence, along with the scales found in Peveto's apartment, 

the traffic ticket associating Peveto with the van, the trace 

amount of amphetamine, the bottles and stickers, the long term 

22 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 22 
relationship between Peveto and Hines, and the conversation where 

Hines suggested to Glasgow that Peveto could conceal ownership of 

dope houses, is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the 

jury could reasonably conclude that Peveto had possession of the 

precursor chemicals and that such possession was an "essential and 

integral step toward the realization of a common, illicit goal, 

the manufacturing of amphetamine." Brewer, 630 F.2d at 799. See 

also Peterson, 611 F.2d 1326-1327 (separate transactions or 

occurrences do not necessarily suggest multiple conspiracies). 

Similarly, the evidence relating to the search of Hines' 

apartment was competent circumstantial proof of a single 

conspiracy. Hines was the main figure in the conspiracy. A 

receipt was found at his apartment matching the chemicals found in 

the van in Peveto's garage, as well as approximately 1000 small 

bottles, with labels. IV R. 262, 237. 

Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the government, see Record, slip op. at 8, we conclude that the 

jury was entitled to find, as it did, that the 

established a single conspiracy. 

evidence 

c. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support 

Peveto's Conspiracy Conviction 

Peveto argues strenuously not only that the evidence was 

insufficient to establish a single conspiracy, but also that it 

was insufficient to establish his involvement.13 It should be 

13 

Peveto cites testimony that Glasgow did not recall Peveto's 

name being mentioned, that Glasgow never had a conversation with 

Peveto during the course of the conspiracy and never saw Peveto, 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

23 

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remembered here chat Peveto was charged only with conspiracy. It 

is true, as Peveto argues, that his association with Hines is not 

enough to support his conviction. United States v. Austin, 786 

F.2d 986, 988 (10th Cir. 1986). And the government cannot prov~ 

conspiracy only by presenting evidence that places Peveto in a 

"climate of activity that reeks of something foul." Id. (quoting 

United States v. Jackson, 700 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1983)). 

"The essence of the crime of conspiracy is an agreement to 

commit an unlawful act." United States v. Dumas, 688 F.2d 84, 86 

(10th Cir. 1982). Although the agreement may be inferred from the 

facts and circumstances of the case and need not take any 

particular form there must be a meeting of the minds and the 

defendant must possess at least the degree of criminal intent 

necessary for the substantive offense itself •14 Id. See also 

Austin, 786 F.2d at 988. A defendant lacks the requisite criminal 

(Footnote continued): 

and that Glasgow had no reason to believe that Peveto was involved 

in any agreement to manufacture amphetamine. Glasgow R. 66-68. 

Glasgow's testimony is relevant circumstantial evidence, as Peveto 

argues, and the jury was of course free to consider it. But it is 

not dispositive. The jury was properly instructed to consider all 

the evidence, not just this t~stimony in isolation, in determining 

whether Peveto was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We similarly 

review all the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of 

fact could find Peveto guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Austin, 

786 F.2d at 988. 

14 

As noted earlier count four charged a conspiracy to 

"manufacture, possess with intent to distribute, and possess with 

intent to manufacture amphetamine/methamphetamine •••• " I R. 

1. The court correctly instructed the jury that it would have to 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that "the particular defendant 

whose guilt or innocence is being considered knowingly and 

willfully became a member of the conspiracy." V R. 650. The 

court also instructed the jury that to "participate knowingly and 

willfully means to participate voluntarily and understandingly and 

with a specific intent to do some act the law forbids •••. " V 

R. 652 (emphasis added). 

24 

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intent if he "does not know the conspiracy's objective," Dumas, 

688 F.2d at 86, and the government must show the defendant's 

knowledge and agreement to commit an unlawful act by clear, 

unequivocal evidence. Id. See also Austin, 786 F.2d at 988. 

Viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable to the 

Government to determine whether any rational trier of fact could 

find [Peveto] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," Austin, 786 F.2d 

at 988, we conclude that the evidence, summarized in Section II B. 

above, although circumstantial, is sufficient evidence from which 

the jury could reasonably conclude that Peveto knew of the 

conspiracy's objective, agreed to cooperate, and possessed the 

requisite criminal intent. 15 While there is a lack of direct 

evidence, we cannot say that reasonable minds could not conclude 

from the evidence presented that Peveto was guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1431 

(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986). 

D. 

Denial of Rodger's Motion to Sever 

Rodgers does not argue on appeal that he and his codefendants were improperly joined under Fed. R. Crim. P. B(b). 16 

15 

The dissent argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

in admitting Glasgow's testimony regarding his conversation with 

Hines and that without this testimony the eviden~e was 

insufficient to show that Peveto conspired with Hines and Rodgers. 

For reasons stated previously, see footnote 8, supra, we do not 

think the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Glasgow's 

testimony. From Glasgow's testimony and the other circumstantial 

evidence tying Peveto to the conspiracy, the jury could properly 

find Peveto guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

16 

In pertinent part, Rule 8 provides: 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

25 

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He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

his motion to sever under Fed R. Crim. P. 14. 17 The Supreme Court 

has emphasized that trial courts have "a continuing duty at all 

stages of the trial to grant a severance if prejudice does 

appear." Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516 (1960). 

Rodgers objected strenuously to Hines' defense and along with 

Peveto, requested severance.18 The trial court overruled the 

objection. IV R. 445. 

(Footnote continued): 

(b) Joinder of Defendants. Two or more defendants 

may be charged in the same indictment or information if 

they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 

transaction or in the same series of acts or 

transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such 

defendants may be charged in one or more counts together 

or separately and all of the defendants need not be 

charged in each count. 

"It is axiomatic that defendants may be charged jointly in the 

same indictment where they are alleged to have participated in the 

same act or series of transactions." Petersen, 611 F.2d at 1331. 

Courts generally adhere to the principle that "those indicted 

together, especially co-conspirators, should be tried together." 

8 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ,, 14.05, p. 14-48 (2 ed. 1989). 

17 

18 

In pertinent part, Rule 14 provides: 

Rule 14. Relief from Prejudicial Joinder 

If it appears that a defendant or the government is 

prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in 

an indictment or information or by such joinder for 

trial together, the court may order an election or 

separate trials of counts, grant a severance of 

defendants or provide whatever other relief justice 

requires. 

In compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(5) Rodgers filed a 

pre-trial motion to sever counts five through seven. I R. 7. The 

trial court denied that motion. I R. 29. In the course of the 

testimony supporting Hines' defense Rodgers objected and again 

requested severance. IV R. 445 (incorporating Peveto's objection 

and earlier request for severance). See also IV R. 402-404 

(Peveto's request for severance). 

26 

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· We review the trial court's denial of the motion to sever for 

an abuse of discretion.· United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 

1231 (10th Cir. 1988). In determining the merits of a motion to 

sever, the trial court must "weigh the prejudice to a particular 

defendant caused by joinder against the obviously important 

considerations of economy and expedition in judicial 

administration." Petersen, 611 F.2d at 1331. It is not enough 

for Rodgers to show that severance would have increased his 

chances of acquittal. Hayes, 861 F.2d at 1231-1232. He must make 

a "strong showing of prejudice." United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 

531, 537 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 s.ct. 1299 (1988). 

He must show that failure to sever resulted in the denial of his 

right to a fair trial. Peterson, 611 F.2d at 1331 (citing United 

States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1256 (10th Cir. 1974)). 

Severance may be necessary when defenses are "so antagonistic 

that they are mutually exclusive." Esch, 832 F.2d at 538 (citing 

United States v. Burrell, 720 F.2d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1983)). 

A mere conflict of theories or one defendant's attempt to cast 

blame on another does not require severance. United States v. 

McClure, 734 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1984). Rather, the conflict 

between co-defendants "must be so intense that there is a danger 

the jury will unjustifiably infer from the conflict alone that 

both defendants are guilty." Esch, 832 F.2q at 538 (citing United 

States v. Swingler, 758 F.2d 477, 495 (10th Cir. 1985)). The 

defendant must demonstrate that the acceptance of one party's 

defense would tend to preclude the acquittal of the other, or that 

the guilt of one defendant tends to establish the innocence of the 

other. United States v. Smith, 788 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 

27 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 27 
1986). See also Swingler, 758 F.2d at 494-496. When mutually 

exclusive defenses are presented there is a chance that the jury 

will infer from the conflict the guilt of both parties. United 

States v. Wal ton, 552 F. 2d 135.4, 1361 (10th Cir. 1977) , cert. 

denied, 431 U.S. 959 (1977). 

Hines' defense (that he was in the process of becoming an 

informant and was setting up drug dealers when the Bryan county 

house was searched) necessitated a showing that Rodgers was a drug 

dealer and the evidence which he put on tended to show just that. 

Hines testified that he had a woman named Jo Jo Butler purchase 

narcotics from Rodgers. IV R. 446. And he said that he became 

acquainted with Rodgers so that he could "build a foundation to 

turn into the parole board to do the next case on." IV R. 449. 

Rodgers had no criminal record. V R. 539. This was the only 

evidence at trial of any criminal behavior on Rodgers' part. We 

view Hines' testimony that Rodgers was at the .Bryan county house 

as a drug dealer as enormously prejudicial, given the charges 

Rodgers' faced and his defense (that he was at the house to pick 

up furniture and appliances and was held agaist his will). 

Hines' defense was not only prejudicial to Rodgers, but was 

also mutually exclusive. Rodgers painted himself as innocent too, 

being held against his will by Hines. If the jury believed that 

Hines was laying the groundwork as an informant and that Rodgers 

was a dealer (as Hines said) and was at the house in that 

capacity, then it would necessarily have to disbelieve Rodger's 

defense -- that he had gone to the house to pick up some furniture 

and appliances and was being held against his will by Hines. V R. 

542-545. The jury's acceptance of Hines' defense would "tend to 

28 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 28 
preclude the acquittal of [Rodgers]." Smith, 788 F.2d at 668. We 

are convinced that the defenses were so antagonistic that they 

were mutually exclusive. Esch, 832 F.2d at 538. 

We have noted that the danger that a defendant may be denied 

a fair trial when confronted with an antagonistic defense is 

exacerbated when one defendant admits some or all the elements of 

the charge. Swinger, 758 F.2d at 494 (quoting United States v. 

Roberts, 583 F.2d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 

U.S. 1080 (1979)). Here, Hines admitted buying the glassware and 

the chemicals, claiming it was all part of his work as an 

informant. IV .R. 448-450. He said that he talked with Glasgow 

about buying dope houses with the intent of distributing narcotics 

and he said that "they" {his co-defendants) were ''producing 

amphetamine powder." IV R. 454-455. His admissions directly 

supported the government's c~arges. See United States v. 

Romanello, 726 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1984)(defenses are mutually 

exclusive where the core of one defense is the guilt of another 

defendant). 

Given Hines' unexpected defense, the jury must surely have 

been confused when Rodgers asserted that he was being held against 

his will be Hines. If the jury believed Hines (that he was 

setting up drug dealers), it had to disbelieve Rodgers ,(that he 

was being held against his will). As it turned out the jury found 

both Hines and Rodgers guilty, apparently rejecting both defenses. 

As we have noted, when antagonistic defenses are presented, there 

is a chance that the jury will find from the conflict the guilt of 

both parties. Walton, 552 F.2d at 1361. We are persuaded that 

Rodgers made a "strong showing of prejudice," see Esch, 832 F.2d 

29 

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at 537, and demonstrated as he must, that he was denied a fair 

trial. Petersen, 611 F.2d at 1331. This is a paradigm case of 

prejudice. Denial of severance to afford· a fair trial was 

prejudicial error. 

E. 

Denial of Hines' Motion for Mistrial 

Count seven of the indictment charged Hines with knowingly 

and intentionally possessing a firearm as a felon, a violation of 

18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(l) (1982) and 18 u.s.c. S 2 (1982). The trial 

court sustained Hines' motion for judgment of acquittal as to 

count seven reasoning that "there is absolutely no evidence in 

this Court's opinion which would link the defendant with the 

firearm sufficient that a reasonable person • might find the 

accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." IV R. 363. Hines then 

moved for a mistrial arguing that when "count 7 was charged and 

the indictment was read to the jury it obviously contained 

language concerning him being a prior felon. Now that that's been 

let out and the jury has heard that, I asked that the case be 

mistried." IV R. 363. 19 

19 

Hines emphasizes that he attempted to avoid this situation by 

filing a motion for severance of count seven. I R. 16, 17. In 

that motion, he argued that proof of his prior conviction, a 

necessary element of proof as to count seven, would be 

inadmissible and irrelevant as to the other counts and would 

prejudice him. The trial court denied that motion, I R. 29, and 

we do not think its denial was an abuse of discretion. See Hayes, 

861 F.2d at 1231; Petersen, 611 F.2d at 1331 (in determining the 

merits of a motion to sever, the trial court must weigh the 

prejudice to a particular defendant caused by a joinder against 

the obviously important considerations of economy and expedition 

in judicial administration). 

30 

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Hines argues that failure to grant the mistrial forced him 

into the untenable positi6n of having to take the stand to explain 

away the convictions referred to in the indictment, or of having 

to remain silent, thereby allowing the jurors to speculate as to 

why he did not take the stand. Hines argues that he was 

effectively forced to abandon his Fifth Amendment right to remain 

silent. 

The government emphasizes that the court specifically 

instructed the jury in its preliminary instructions "that an 

indictment is the method of getting this matter into court and is 

no inference of guilt of any of the defendants as to any of the 

crimea with which they are charged." III R. 29. The court 

further instructed the jury, in its final instructions, that it 

had: 

dismissed count seven of the indictment which was read 

to you when y·ou were sworn in as jurors in. this case. 

Therefore you will not consider the guilt or innocence 

of the defendant Carl Eugene Hines as to count seven of 

the indictment, or the evidence eertaining to that count 

in your deliberations and determinations. 

V R. 646. (emphasis added). And the court again advised the jury 

that the indictment was not evidence. V R. 646. 

Where evidence is later ruled inadmissible, a cautionary 

instruction is ordinarily sufficient to cure any alleged prejudice 

to the defendant and declaring a mistrial is only appropriate 

where a cautionary instruction is unlikely to cure the prejudicial 

effect of an error. United States v. Charmley, 764 F.2d 675, 677 

(9th Cir. 1985). We think the court's careful instructions to the 

jury, in the circumstances of this case, sufficiently protected 

31 

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Hines' right to a fair triai.20 The only reference to Hines' 

prior record was a stipulation entered into between him and the 

government, see I R. 44, and references made by Hines himself 

after· the court had granted his motion for judgment of acquittal 

as to count seven. IV R. 435-436. The government did not elicit 

testimony regarding the defendant's convictions and did not rely 

on those convictions in its closing argument. 

We review the district court's denial of the motion for 

mistrial for an abuse of discretion. See Tolman, 826 F.2d at 974 

(citing Mares v. United States, 409 F.2d 1083 (10th Cir. 1968), 

cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963 (1969)). Given the court's cautionary 

instructions and given the fact that Hines testified about his 

prior convictions after the court had granted his motion for 

judgment of acquittal as to count seven, we hold that the court 

dld not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. 

20 

In United States v. Tolman, 826 F.2d 971, 973-974 (10th Cir. 

1987), the prosecutor informed the jury during his opening remarks 

that the government would submit fingerprint evidence. The 

promised evidence was not produ7ed. The defendant argued that the 

initial expectation created in the jury's mind that such 

compelling evidence would be introduced tainted its perception of 

the other evidence. Id. at 973. Noting that the court had 

instructed the jury~-that opening remarks are not considered as 

evidence, we held that the impact of the prosecutor's statements 

did not so prejudice the defendant that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. Id. at 973-974. 

Similarly, in United States v •. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207, 1212 (5th 

Cir. 1986), the court held that where the jury was instructed to 

disregard inadmissible testimony (testimony about an instance when 

several people obtained marijuana out of the defendant's car and 

when the defendant was arrested for possession of marijuana) it 

was not error for the trial court not to order a mistrial sua 

.sponte. 

32 

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F. 

Denial of Hines' Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 

As to Count Six, the Travel Act Count 

Hines was charged in count six of the indictment with 

willfully and knowingly traveling in interstate commerce with the 

intent to "promote, manage, establish, carry on or facilitate the 

promotion, managemnet, establishment, or carrying on of an 

unlawful activity to-wit: manufacture of amphetamine/ 

methamphetamine," in violation of the Travel Act, 18 u.s.c. § 1952 

(1982) 21 and in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2 (1982). 22 At the close 

21 

22 

In pertin~nt part, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 provides: 

(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign 

commerce or uses any facility in interstate or 

foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent 

to - (3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, 

carry on, or facilitate the promotion, 

management, establishment, or carrying on, of 

any unlawful activity, 

and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any 

of the acts specified in subparagraphs •.• (3), 

shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned 

for not more than five years, or both. 

(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity'' 

means (l) any business enterprise involving ..• 

narcotics or controlled substances • • • . 

Title 18 u.s.c. S 2 provides: 

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United 

States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces 

or procures its commission, is punishable as a 

principal. 

(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be d9ne 

which if directly performed by him or another would 

be an offense against the United States, is 

punishable as a principal. 

33 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 33 
of the government's case, defendant Hines moved for judgment of 

acquittal as to count six, arguing as he does here, that the 

evidence was insufficient to show interstate travel and that the 

government failed to establish the existence 

enterprise within the meaning of the Travel Act. 

The trial court denied Hines' motion. 

of a 

IV R. 

business 

338-339. 

Our standard of review "is the same as the trial court's in 

ruling on the motion" for judgment of acquittal "in the first 

instance." United States v. Miles, 772 F.2d 613, 615 (10th Cir. 

1985). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government. If there is "substantial evidence from which a jury 

might properly find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," 

United States v. White, 673 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir. 1982), we 

uphold the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. 

A Travel Act violation must be supported by proof that a 

defendant: (1) traveled or used facilities in interstate commerce; 

(2) with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on or 

facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying 

on of a prohibited activity; and (3) thereafter attempted to or 

did in fact engage in one of the proscribed activities. See 

United States v. Davis, 780 F.2d 838, 843-844 (10th Cir. 1985); 

United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1434-1435 (10th Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986). Hines' argument that 

there was no evidence of interstate travel for the purpose of 

carrying on the various illegal activities is unpersuasive. There 

is evidence here that Hines traveled across state lines. He had 

an apartment in Irving, Texas (in which a receipt for the 

chemicals matching those found in the van at Peveto's apartment 

34 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 34 
was found, along with 1,000 small bottles and some labels) and was 

arrested in Bryan County, Oklahoma (where evidence of narcotics 

and narcotics manufacturing was found). Hines also financed and 

directed the purchase of glassware by Glasgow. Glasgow R. 7-8, 

25. He gave Glasgow telephone numbers so that Glasgow could 

contact both Hines and Peveto in Texas. And Glasgow in fact 

traveled to Texas and talked with Hines. Glasgow R. 32, 37-38. 

Interstate travel need not be "essential to the illegal 

scheme as long as it makes the illegal objective 'less difficult' 

to accomplish." United States v. Barbieri, 614 F.2d 715, 718 

(10th Cir. 1980). It is true that no federal crime is committed 

when interstate travel is incidental to the illegal scheme or 

unrelated to any criminal objective. Id. Here, however, the jury 

could reasonably infer, from the evidence found at the Bryan 

County house and from the evidence found both in Peveto's and 

Hines' apartments in Texas, that interstate travel made the 

manufacturing of narcotics "less difficult" to accomplish. 

Moreover, there is substantial evidence in the record that Hines 

directed Glasgow's interstate travel. See Kendall, 766 F.2d at 

1434. Glasgow purchased glassware at Hines' direction in Oklahoma 

and traveled to Texas to talk with Hines, where he received 

telephone n~mbers for both Hines and Peveto. The jury could 

reasonably conclude from this evidence that Hines "knew he was 

causing or aiding and abetting interstate travel." Id. (citing 

United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976), 

cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976)). 

We are also unpersuaded that the evidence was insufficient to 

show that interstate travel was undertaken to facilitate a 

35 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 35 
business enterprise involving narcotics or controlled substances. 

The unlawful activity the Travel Act is intended to prohibit, when 

the underlying offense involves narcotics or controlled 

substances, is a business enterprise. We define the term business 

enterprise to mean "a continuous course of conduct rather than a 

sporadic casual involvement in the proscribed activity." United 

States v. Rinke, 778 F.2d 581, 586 (10th .Cir. 1985) (quoting 

Kendall, 766 F.2d at 1434). Here, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient to show a 

continuous course of conduct rather than sporadic casual 

involvement in the manufacturing of amphetamine and 

methamphetamine. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, we conclude there is substantial evidence from which a 

jury could properly find Hines guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 

violating the Travel Act or aiding and abetting in its violation. 

Accordingly, there was no error in the denial of Hines' motion for 

judgment of acquittal as to count six of the indictment. 

G. 

The Government's Failure to Comply With Discovery Order 

Defendant Hines' last argument is particularly disturbing. 

The government failed to provide important evidence until the day 

of trial, in clear violation of discovery orders. As a sanction, 

the court granted a two week continuance. Hines argues on appeal 

that the court abused its discretion in not imposing the more 

severe sanction of dismissal of the indictment or exclusion of the 

evidence in question. 

36 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 36 
Hines was arraigned on September 29, 1987 and the court set a 

trial date of November 2, 1987. Hines' attorney was notified by 

the Assistant United States Attorney on September 30, 1987 that 

various discovery materials would not be made available for one 

week. I R. 6. Hines' attorney then filed a motion for extension 

of time within which to file pre-trial motions. The court had set 

October 6, 1987 as the due date for pre-trial motions. The court 

granted Hines' request for additional time to file pre-trial 

motions. 

By October 9, the new deadline for pre-trial motions, Hines 

had ~till not recei~ed the discovery material. On October 13 

Hines filed a number of additional discovery motions arid requested 

additional time to .file pre-trial motions. On October 18 a 

"RECRIPROCAL MEMORANDUM OF DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO RULE 16 FEDERAL 

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE" was entered into between the 

Assistant United States Attorney and Hines' attorney. I R. 24. 

The memorandum essentially provides that the parties should 

cooperate in providing discovery material under Fed. R. Crim. 

Proc. 16, including material under the Jencks Act and Brady v. 

Maryl~nd, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

On October 21 the court entered an order granting in part and 

denying in part the various discovery motions filed by Hines, 

stating that "strict and good faith compliance by the government 

of the requirements of Brady and this order in all respects is 

hereby expressly directed." I R. 29. On October 22 the 

government provided some of the materials and informed Hines' 

attorney that other discoverable evidence was in the possession of 

law enforcement agents in Oklahoma City and Dallas. On October 23 

37 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 37 
Hines' attorney traveled to Oklahoma City and reviewed some 

evidence made available by Drug Enforcement Administration agents 

in Oklahoma City. He was again advised that not all discoverable 

items were present and that additional evidence remained in 

Dallas. During the following week Hines' attorney made several 

inquiries of the Assistant United States Attorney concerning the 

evidence in Dallas and was advised that the evidence would be made 

available shortly. 

On November 2, the day of trial, a significant amount of 

discovery material was made available to the defendants for the 

first time. III R. 4-24. 23 Expressing concern over the late 

disclosure of the evidence, the court stated: 

You all [the United States Attorney's office] 

more or less have an open file policy, the only 

thing is you just don't put anything in your files. 

And it appears that the defendants are having to 

get things as best they can, and here at the last 

minute. If they are prejudiced by it, why, I'll 

just have to take some action which you may not 

like. 

III R. 19-20. A jury was then selected. III R. 24-82. After 

reviewing the newly provided evidence defendants Williams and 

Hines filed motions requesting dismissal of the indictment or 

exclusion of the evidence. 

The court held a hearing on this motion on November 4, prior 

to the beginning of the jury trial. At that time, a list of the 

evidence provided to defense counsel for the first time on 

23 

Citations to volumes three and four of the record in this 

section of the order refer to the hearings held on October 2 and 

4, 1987, respectively. 

38 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 38 
November 2 was made available to the court. That evidence 

included, among other things, a box of photographs, two pistols, a 

significant number of assorted papers, handwritten notes, 

approximately 20 .additional· assorted photos, a notebook, a 

telephone listening device, a box of assorted bottles, labels, two 

baggies of amphetamines, a vial of clear liquid, gram scales, two 

razor blades, a syringe, a bottle of capsules, another box of 

records, two homemade bombs, photographs of twenty-five gallons of 

formic acid and sixteen cans of ether, miscellaneous narcotic 

paraphernalia, and other items far too numerous to mention here~ 

See IV R. 20-31, 41-51. 

When asked by the court to explain the late production of 

these materials, the Assistant United States Attorney conceded 

that the defendants were entitled to the material. IV R. 38-39. 

He stated, however, that the material was provided as soon as it 

was received by him and explained that he had trouble obtaining 

the material from the D.E.A. Agent. IV R. 64-65. The government 

attorney said that he understood the cases which "state that when 

it's in possession of the agents it's in possession of the 

prosecutors for the government." IV R. 64. He conceded that 

other means could have been employed to insure timely disclosure. 

Throughout the hearing on November 4 the court expressed 

great concern over the late disclosure of the evidence. The judge 

stated that he would have been "overwhelmed by all this material 

being presented, and [that the conduct of the United States 

Attorney's office was] certainly contrary to the intention the 

rules and the law and everything that you can find that is read to 

have this amount of material turned over at the last minute to try 

39 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 39 
to have a lawyer, professional person, try to represent their 

client in a matter so serious • ti . . . IV R. 67-68. The judge 

stated that "considering my past experience, I'm not at all 

surprised [by the conduct of the United States Attorney's Office] 

ti . . . Id. at 68. The judge had previously stated that "there 

has over a substantial period of time, nearly since I have been 

here, but at least with the present administration of the United 

States Attorney's office [been] a pattern of conduct or misconduct 

of not presenting evidence until very late, many times during the 

trial • ti . . . IV R. 17-18. The judge concluded: "I want to 

inform you [that this practice] is going to change 

instanter." IV R. 68. We consider the trial judge's comments and 

reprimand of the government fully justified. 

As a remedy for the government's misconduct, the court 

granted a continuance of the trial to November 16, 1987. IV R. 

70. The court concluded that the interest of justice would not be 

"served well by the dismissal of such a serious matter, because of 

some misdeeds of the Government." IV R. 68. The court considered 

excluding the evidence produced on November 2, but decided against 

that remedy. IV R. 69. 

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure give trial courts 

broad discretion in imposing sanctions on a party who fails to 

comply with a discovery order: 

If at any time during the course of the proceedings 

it is brought to the attention of the court that a 

party has failed to comply with this rule, the 

court may order such party to permit the discovery 

or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the 

party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 

it may enter such other order as it deems just 

under the circumstances. The court may specify the 

time, place and manner of making the discovery and 

40 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 40 
inspection and may prescribe such 

conditions as are just. 

terms and 

Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 16(d)(2). See United States Wicker, 848 F.2d 

1059, 1060 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Fernandez, 780 F.2d 

1573, 1576 (11th Cir. 1986). The district court's exercise of 

discretion is governed by several factors: 

When the government fails to comply with a 

discovery order, the factors the district court 

should consider in determining if a sanction is 

appropriate are (1) the reasons the government 

delayed producing the requested materials, 

including whether or not the government acted in 

bad faith when it failed to comply with the 

discovery order; (2) the extent of prejudice to the 

defendant as a result of the government's delay; 

and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice 

with a continuance. United States v. EucedaHernandez, 768 F.2d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 1985); 

Fernandez, 780 F.2d at 1576. 

Wicker, 848 F.2d at 1061. If a sanction is imposed, it should be 

the "least severe sanction that will accomplish • prompt and 

full compliance with the court's discovery orders." Id. at 1060 

(quoting Fernandez, 780 F.2d at 1576). Cf. Bank Of Nova Scotia v. 

United States, 108 s.ct. 2369 (1988)(holding that as a general 

rule - a district court exceeds its supervisory power in dismissing 

an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct not prejudicial to the 

defendant and noting that many errors may be remedied by means 

other than dismissal). "A continuance may normally be the most 

desirable remedy for the government's failure to comply with a 

discovery order." Wicker, 848 F.2d at 1062. 

The trial court was presented with an extremely difficult 

situation. The record reflects that the court carefully 

considered the relevant factors before ordering the continuance. 

The judge noted that "[it is] my duty and responsibility to see 

41 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 41 
tha~ [the defendants] do receive a fair trial." IV R. 69. We 

hold that it was not an abuse of discretion to order the less 

extreme sanction of continuance. And there being no showing of 

prejudice after that relief was granted, this claim of error does 

not call for reversal. 

III. 

We AFFIRM the convictions of Hines and Peveto. Rodgers' 

conviction is REVERSED and as to him the case is REMANDED for a 

new trial. 

42 

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.... 

Nos. 88-1061, 88-1113, & 88-1116 

United States of America v. Burl Allen Peveto, Jr., and United 

States of America v. Melvin Ray Rodgers, and United States of 

Arner.i ca v. Carl Eugene Hines 

SAFFELS, District Judge,* concurring in part and dissenting in· 

part. 

The majority opinion in this case relies on the following evidence of a conspiracy between defendant Peveto and his 

co-defendants to justify admission of an out-of-court statement 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 80l(d)(2)(E). 

1. Peveto and his co-defendant Hines 1 i ved in the 

same apartment complex in Sherman, Texas~ 

2. Peveto and Hines moved at the same time to the 

same apartment complex in Irving, Texas. 

3. An A. T. F. agent found a triple-beam scale (commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine) during his 

search of Peveto's apartment. 

4. Investigators found various laboratory equipmentand narcotics evidence in their search of the Bryan County house. 

S. Hines told Glasgow that "he wanted to purchase 

some apartment buildings to be used for dope houses, 11 and that 

ownership of the properties "could be concealed 11 ; Hines then 

"wrote the word 'lawyer' on a piece of paper" and pointed in the 

direction of Peveto's apartment. 

The majority has determined that the trial court did 

not err in finding that this evidence established defendant 

Peveto was a member of the conspiracy charged. 

*The Honorable Dale E. Saffels, United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 43 
Because of the secretive nature of the crime of conspiracy, the evidence of that conspiracy will usually be largely 

circumstantial. See United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 754, 

756-57 (10th Cir. 1987). However, the court must guard against 

"pi ling inference upon inference" in order to find that a conspiracy exists. United States v. Butler, 494 F. 2d 1246, 1252 

(10th Cir. 1974) (quoting Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 

U.S. 703, 711 (1943)) "[M]ere suspicion or insinuation of guilt 

of conspiracy" is not sufficient to support a finding that a 

conspiracy exists. United States v. McMahon, 562 F~ 2d 1192, 

1197 (10th Cir. 1977). In order to establish that a defendant 

was a member oft.he conspiracy, the prosecution must show by 

direct or circumstantial evidence that the d.efendant possessed 

the requisite criminal intent. "'The defendant lacks the requisite criminal intent if he does not know the conspiracy's objective,' and this knowledge must be shown by clear, unequivocal 

evidence." United States v. Dumas, 688 F. 2d 84, 86 (10th Cir. 

1982) (quoting Direct Sales Co~, 319 U.S. at 711). 

The evidence presented at trial, and relied upon by the 

majority, fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 

that a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine existed between 

Peveto and his co-defendants. The lab equipment and other narcotics evidence seized in the Bryan County search provided a 

strong inference that Peveto's co-defendants, Hines and Rodgers, 

were involved in the manufacture of methamphetamines. However, 

there was no evidence seized in that search which would tie 

Peveto to that plan. The fact that the chemicals seized in both 

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Appellate Case: 88-1113 Document: 01019743045 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 44 
searches were similar proves nothing; without some indication 

that the defendants might have used some unique method of manufacturing methamphetamine, one can assume that anyone planning 

to manufacture that substance would use similar chemicals. 

Further, the triple-beam scale found in Peveto's apartment is 

again strong evidence that Peveto was involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine. However, he was not charged with 

manufacturing methamohetami ne; rather, he was only charged with 

participating in t'he plan with Rodgers and Hines to manufacture 

methamphetamine. The scale found in his apartment does not tie 

him to the Hines/Rodgers plan. It is simply a standard piece of 

equipment for anyone manufacturing methamphetamine. 

The inadequacy of those two pieces of evidence leaves 

us only with the "long term association" between Peveto and 

Hines, and the hearsay statement itself. Of course, the hearsay 

statement sought to be introduced may be considered in determining whether the defendant was part of the conspiracy. BourjailY 

v. United St ates , 4 8 3 U. S ~ 1 71 , 1 81 ( 1 9 8 7) • But when the only 

evidence of participation in the conspiracy, other than that 

hearsay statement, is an "association" with the co-conspirators,* 

it seems the evidence of conspiracy is wholly insufficient to 

*/Hines at one point also gave Glasgow Peveto's phone numbers 

and he told Glasgow he could be reached there~ The majority 

says this is further evidence of the conspiracy. It is instead 

only further evidence of the "long term association" between 

Peveto and Hines. Even if it provides some minor, circumstantial evidence of conspiracy, there is still a complete lack 

of direct or circumstantial evidence indicating Peveto had the 

requisite criminal intent to join his long term associate ln his 

manufacturing operation. See infra discussion at p.4. 

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satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 80l(d)(2)(E). The "association" with the conspirators only raises a "mere suspicion or 

insinuation of guilt of conspiracv." McMahon, 562 F. 2d at 

1197. It appears the majority has "pil[ed] inference upon 

inference," and has concluded without basis that a conspiracy 

existed between Peveto and his co-defendants. Butler, 494 F. 2d 

at 1252. The "association" between Peveto and Hines is of 

littl!e evidentiary value when that "association" is the only 

independent evidence of participation in a conspiracv. We are 

only left, then, with the hear say s ta temen t itself. Thus, the 

effect of the majority's opinion is to allow the hearsay to 

s tan~ al·one as evidence of a conspiracy, and to abrogate the 

requirements of Rule 80l(d)(2)(E). This is contrary to the 

intent of the Rule. 

Further, the evidence of conspiracy relied upon by the 

majority completely fails, directly or circumstantially, to 

indicate intent on the part of Peveto to participate in Hines 

and Rodgers' conspiracy. There must be some direct or c ircums tant ial evidence which clearly and unequivocally indicates the 

requisite criminal intent. Dumas, 688 F.2d at 86. Here we have 

no indication of any action taken by Peveto from which we might 

infer he intended to· conspire with Hines and Rodgers~ 

Even if we were to consider the other evidence admitted 

against Peveto at trial, this evidence would still be insufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Peveto 

participated in a conspiracy with Hines and Rodgers to manufacture methamphetamine. The strange st evidence against Peveto 

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was discovered in a van in his locked garage. The van was owned 

by defendant Hines' son. There was also evidence that the van 

was seen earlier at the apartment owned by defendant Hines, but 

rented and occupied by Hines' son. When investigators searched 

Hines' son's apartment, they found a receipt for the chemicals 

discovered in the van in Peveto's garage. A traffic ticket 

found in the search of Peveto' s apartment tied Peveto to the 

van. All of this evidence would be more than sufficient to 

charge and convict Peveto of conspiring with Hines' son to manufacture methamphetamine. But the record is devoid of any ev i -

dence which would indicate that the operation of Hines' son and 

Peveto was tied to that of defendants Hines and Rodgers. 

Because it is felt that the district court clearly 

erred when it determined the ~overnment had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Peveto was a participant in the 

charged conspiracy, I would dissent from that portion of the 

majority's opinion which upheld the district court's admission 

of the co-conspirator statement. Further, since the evidence is 

insufficient, without the hearsay statement, to show that Peveto 

was a participant in Hines and Rodgers' conspiracy, I would 

reverse and remand with instructions to direct a judgment of 

acquit ta 1 in fa var of defendant Peveto. In all other re spec ts, 

I concur with the majority's opinion . 

• 

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