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Parties Involved:
Robert Kelly Bishop
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff/Appellee, 

. FILJiD 

Urntcd SttHt:s 0:iun of Appeals 

'f enth Ch:t!it 

uov 2 J 1989. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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) 

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No. 88-2757 

v. 

ROBERT KELLY BISHOP 

Defendant/Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-88-149-T) 

William P. Earley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant. 

Leslie M. Kaestner, Assistant United States Attorney (William S. 

Price, United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and H. Lee 

Schmidt, Assistant United States Attorney, were on the brief) for 

Plaintiff/Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK, MCWILLIAMS and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2757 Document: 010110135887 Date Filed: 11/20/1989 Page: 1 
Defendant was convicted after a jury trial in the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma of two 

counts of bank robbery under 18 u.s.c. § 2113(a). On appeal, 

defendant argues that the district court improperly denied his 

motions to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an allegedly 

deficient warrant, to grant a new trial because of the 

prosecution's tardy disclosure of impeachment evidence, and to 

acquit for insufficient evidence. We affirm the district court's 

orders denying each of these motions. 

BACKGROUND 

On June 1, 1988, the Mercantile Bank of Moore, Oklahoma, was 

robb~d by~ man who used a note claiming he possessed a gun. Kim 

Jolly, the teller from whom the money was taken, described the 

perpetrator as a white male, wearing a maroon sweater, 

approximately twenty-five years of age, weighing one hundred 

forty pounds, with brownish-blond collar length hair and a razorstubble beard growth. 

On June 6, 1988, F.B.I. agents investigating the robbery were 

notified by an Oklahoma City police detective of an anonymous 

phone call concerning the robbery. According to the officer, the 

informant had told him that the "white male" who had robbed the 

bank in Moore was residing with a woman named Karen. Although the 

informant did not know Karen's last name, he told the officer 

Karen's phone number and place of employment. The informant did 

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not state the basis of his knowledge. 

The F.B.I. agents confirmed the information supplied by the 

informant. The agents traced the phone number to apartment Cl, 

7910 Northwest Twenty-First Street, Oklahoma City. The apartment 

manager confirmed that this was the address of a Karen Barber who 

worked at the restaurant indicated by the informant. 

On June 6, 1988, two service repairmen who had entered 

apartment Cl to repair the plumbing told the F.B.I. agents that a 

white male with beard stubble and collar-length, brownish-blond 

hair weighing about one hundred forty pounds was staying in the 

apartment where Karen Barber resided. The next day, a resident of 

another apartment in the building confirmed that a man matching 

the description given by the repairmen had been staying in Karen 

Barber's apartment. 

On June 8, 1988, on the basis of those facts, the agent in 

charge sought and obtained a warrant authorizing a search of Karen. 

Barber's apartment and automobile. Also on that day, but before 

the agents executed the search warrant, the Capitol Federal 

Savings Bank of Yukon, Oklahoma, was robbed by a man matching the 

description of the Meicantile Bank robber. 

On the afternoon of June 8, 1988, the F.B.I. agents entered 

Karen Barber's apartment while defendant was there. The agents 

searched the apartment and the automobile as authorized by the 

warrant. In the bathroom; the agents discovered a "wad" of money 

closely corresponding in denominations and amount to the money 

taken during the second robbery. The agents also found a black 

shirt matching the description of the one worn by the robber of 

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the Capitol Federal Bank. Defendant was arrested and taken into 

custody. 

On June 21, 1988, defendant was charged with both of the 

robberies in a two-count indictment under 18 u.s.c. § 2113(a). 

On the basis of eyewitness identifications and other evidence, 

defendant was convicted by a jury of both counts of robbery. 

Defendant was sentenced to serve two concurrent twenty-year 

sentences. Defendant now appeals the district court's rrilings 

denying his motions to suppress evidence; to declare a mistrial, 

and to acquit for insufficient evidence. 

1. Motion to Suppresi Evidence Obtained by the Search Warrant 

A. Probable Cause for the Warrant. 

Defendant contends that there was not probable cause to issue 

the warrant to search Karen Barber's apartment and automobile 

because none of the facts supplied by the anonymous informant 

(other than the conclusory statement that the "white male" staying 

with Karen was the robber) were addressed to defendant's 

culpability nor was any basis provided to establish the 

reliability of the informant's conclusion that defendant was the 

person who had robbed the Mercantile Bank. Defendant argues that 

the F.B.I. agents' independent corroboration of many of the facts 

that were supplied by the informant did not bolster the, 

probability of discovering incriminating evidence through the 

search authorized by the warrant because they were not facts 

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disclosing special knowledge on the part of the informant relating 

to the crime, and because this informant had not previously proven 

himself reliable. 

We begin our analysis of defendant's claims "recognizing that 

a magistrate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid 

great deference by reviewing courts.'" United States v. Martinez, 

764 F.2d 744, 746 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 

U.S. 213, 236 (1983)). On appeal, this court need only satisfy 

itself "that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ..• 

conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed." Id. (quoting Gates, 

462 U.S. at 238-39). The determination of whether there was a 

substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed must be 

based on the ''totality-of-the-circumstances." Gates, 462 U.S. at 

238. 

The Supreme Court determined the type of information that an 

anonymous informant must supply in order to form the basis for 

probable cause in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In 

Gates, an anonymous letter was sent to the Bloomingdale, Illinois, 

Police Department describing the manner in which a Mr. and Mrs. 

Gates purchased illegal drugs in Florida and transported them back 

to Illinois. Id. at 225. The anonymous letter predicted that the 

Gates couple would engage in further smuggling. Id. As the 

letter predicted, Mr. Gates flew to Florida and drove home the 

next day with his wife who had driven to Miami ahead of him. Id. 

at 226. A warrant was obtained to search the Gates household, and 

large quantities of drugs were discovered. Id. at 226-27. 

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The Supreme Court agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court 

that, because the anonymous letter provided no indication of the 

author 1 s reliability or the basis for his speculation, standing 

alone the letter was an insufficient basis for establishing 

probable cause. Id. at 227. However, the Court went on to find 

that other considerations sufficiently augmented the credibility 

of the letter to validate the search warrant. First, the Court 

pointed to Mr. Gates' brief stay in Florida, a known source of 

illegal drugs. Id. at 243. Second, the Court held that the 

anonymous informant's accurate prediction of the Gateses' method 

of operation sufficiently established the veracity and reliability 

of the informant. Id. at 244. Finally, the Court held that the 

anonymous informant's dis~losure of the Gateses' future actions 

established a basis upon which a magistrate "could properly 

conclude that it was not unlikely that he also had access to 

reliable information of the Gateses' alleged illegal activities." 

Id. at 245. 

The amount of corroborating evidence presented to the 

magistrate in Gates in conjunction with the anonymous tip there 

was greater than that presented in this case because the 

informant here did not predict any future activity of defendant. 

Moreover, unlike the anonymous letter at issue in Gates, the 

substance of the anonymous tip in this case demonstrated no 

special knowledge of the crime. Finally, the informant in this 

case, as in Gates, had not previously pr.oven himself reliable. See 

Gates, 462 U.S. at 242 n.12 (discussing the significance of an 

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informant's proven reliability in Draper v. United States, 358 

U.S. 307 (1959)). 

An examination of the Tenth Circuit's application of Gates 

makes clear that when this court upheld search warrants in the 

past, it has typically been presented with a greater showing of 

probable cause than that which satisfied the district court below. 

In United States v. Rutherford, 824 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1987), 

this court held that there was probable cause for a warrant to 

search the car of a defendant based upon allegations that he had 

visited a house that was under surveillance for narcotics sales, 

emerged with a bag, and then sped away when approached by a police 

car. Id. at 835. In Rutherford, the basis of the surveillance of 

the house was an anonymous tip by an informant who claimed his 

daughter had visited the house and viewed large quantities of 

illegal drugs. Id. 1 This court held that the anonymous tip 

(which demonstrated sufficient factual knowledge of the contents 

of the house), combined with the defendant's actions after leaving 

the house, added up to probable cause validating the warrant to 

search the defendant's automobile for drugs. Id. 

Similarly, in United States v. Martinez, 764 F.2d 744 (10th 

Cir. 1985), this court affirmed the validity of a search warrant 

where an anonymous phone caller demonstrated great familiarity 

with the defendant's drug smuggling activity. In Martinez, the 

informant predicted precisely when Martinez would be arriving ~n 

Oklahoma City with a kilo of cocaine concealed in a brown or blue 

1 The affidavit in support of the search warrant also stated that 

prior to the anonymous tip the police officers had received 

information that the house contained. quantities of narcotics. Id. 

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suitcase on a flight from Miami, Florida, having begun his travel 

in Venezuela. Id. at 745. The informant thus knew the details of 

defendant's travel plans from Venezuela to Oklahoma City through 

Miami, as well as his age, physical description, residence, 

automobile make and luggage type. Id. at 746. These "innocent 

facts'' and the pr~dicted travel were corroborated by the agents' 

investigation and surveillance. Id. Those facts, together with 

the corroboration by the igents, formed the basis of the search 

warrant. Id. As in Gates and Draper, the anonymous informant 

demonstrated prophetic accuracy in predicting the defendant's 

actions. 

In this case, there were no predictions concerning the 

defendantis future activity. The anonymous informant did not 

disclose the basis for his belief that defendant had robbed the 

bank. The informant had not established a track record of 

supplying accurate information. None of the information disclosed 

by the informant, and confirmed by the agents, was of the type 

unavailable to one without special knowledge of the criminal 

activity. If the information supplied by the anonymous informant 

were the only basis for the warrant, then it would lack probable 

cause. 

The descriptions of the defendant given by the repairmen and 

by Karen Barber's neighbor which corresponded to that of the 

Mercantile Bank robber given by the bank tellers (which were 

contained in the sworn a£fidavit), make the probable cause 

determination a much closer question. That corroboration 

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distinguishes this affidavit from the wholly conclusory "bare 

bones" affidavits condemned in Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. 

However, resolution of whether there was probable cause 

supporting the warrant is not necessary to our decision affirming 

the district court's denial of defendant's suppression motion 

because, as discussed below, the agents' conduct clearly falls 

within the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule. 

See United States v. Cook, 854 F.2d 371, 372 (10th Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, U.S. , 109 s. Ct. 788 (1989) (reversing the 

granting of a motion to suppress under the good faith exception to 

the exclusionary rule by assuming, without expressly holding, that 

the warrant there lacked·a probable cause basis). Therefore, we 

do not decide whether the facts in the affidavit established 

probable cause for the warrant. 

B. Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 

In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme 

Court decided that the policies of deterring police misconduct 

that supported the exclusionary rule required that there be an 

exception allowing admission of evidence obtained pursuant to an 

invalid search warrant where "an officer acting with objective 

good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or 

magistrate and acted within its scope." Id. at 920. Thus, this 

court's "inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable 

question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have 

known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's 

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authorization." Id. at 922 n.23. This determination is to be 

made taking into account "all of the circumstances," id., and 

assuming that the executing agents "have a reasonable knowledge of 

what the law prohibits." Id. at 920 n.20 • 

. We agree with the district court's alternative ruling that 

the F.B.I. agents in this case acted in good faith. The agents 

exercised diligence in confirming as much of the information 

supplied by the anonymous informant as possible. In addition, the 

agents conducted several interviews to confirm that a man 

matching the description of the robber of the Mercantile Bank was 

staying in Karen Barber's apartment. The agents presented that 

evidence to the magistrate and obtained a warrant not "devoid of 

factual support." See United States v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 

1133 (10th Cir. 1985). A warrant based upon the information 

supplied here to the magistrate would not have been recognized by 

a reasonably well-trained officer as illegal. 

The affidavit contained enough facts that an officer could 

have reasonably concluded that there was probable cause to believe 

that evidence of the Mercantile Bank robbery would be discovered 

in Karen Barber's apartment and automobile. That is especially 

clear, "remember[ing] that the knowledge and understanding of law 

enforcement officers and their appreciation for constitμtional 

intricacies are not to be judged by the standards applicable to 

lawyers." Id. 

However, under Leon, our inquiry does not end with a 

determination that the agents relied on the warrant in objective 

good faith. The Leon Court went on to articulate four situations 

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in which the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would 

not apply. 

First, evidence must still be suppressed "if the magistrate 

or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an 

affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was 

false except for his reckless disregard for the truth." Leon, 468 

U.S. at 923. Second, the exception does not apply "where the 

issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role." Id. 

Third, the exception does not apply where it would be impossible 

for an officer to manifest "objective good faith in relying on a 

warrant based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable 

cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 

unreasonable.'" Id. (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 

610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). "Finally, ••• 

a warrant may be so facially deficient--i.e., in failing to 

particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized 

--that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be 

valid." Id. 

Defendant does not assert that the agents knew of, or 

recklessly disregarded, any falsity in the information supplied to 

the magistrate, nor indeed was it alleged that any of the supplied 

information was false. Defendant neither contends that the 

magistrate acted improperly, nor that the warrant failed to 

identify the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. 

However, defendant does argue that the agents' reliance on 

the warrant is not within Leon's good faith exception because the 

affidavit underlying the warrant lacks any information crediting 

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the informant's veracity or reliability. Although this infirmity 

is not without significance to our probable cause inquiry, it does 

not convert this into "a warrant based on an affidavit 'so lacking 

in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 

existence entirely unreasonable."' Id. (quoting Brown v. 

Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in 

part)). 

That reliance on an informant of unproven reliability does 

not preclude a finding of the agents' good faith is demonstrated 

by the facts of Leon itself. In Leon, an informant told the 

police that he had witnessed the defendants sell illegal narcotics 

from their residence. Id. at 901. The officers conducted an 

extensive investigation, witnessing persons with known drug 

involvement leave defendants' residence with small packages. Id. 

at 901-02. The Supreme Court held that the officers could 

reasonably have believed the facts supporting the warrant 

established probable cause to suspect the defendants' residence 

contained evidence of illegal activity. Id. at 926. 

Admittedly, the subsequent surveillance by the officers in 

Leon revealed ongoing suspicious activity where no such continuing 

behavior was observed here. But the very nature of the crime 

charged against.this defendant would not necessarily cause an 

agent here to expect to see continuing suspicious activity. In 

any event, like the officers in Leon, the agents here presented 

the magistrate with as much factual corroboration of the 

informant's statements as a thorough investigation allowed. The 

agents confirmed that a woman named Karen resided in the apartment 

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matching the phone number offered by the informant. By 

interviewing two repairmen and a resident of a nearby apartment, 

the agents also corroborated the informant's statements that a 

white male matching the description of the Mercantile Bank robber 

was staying in Karen's apartment. On the basis of that 

information, the magistrate determined there was probable cause 

sufficient to issue the warrant. As Leon makes clear, "[i]n the 

ordinary case, an officer can not be expected to question the 

magistrate's probable cause determination." Id. at 921. 

Therefore, we hold that the agents' reliance on the warrant was 

objectively reasonable and that "the extreme sanction of exclusion 

is inappropriate in this case. As the Court made clear in Leon, 

the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct 

rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates." 

United States v. Cook, 854 F.2d 371, 374 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. 

denied, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989). 

2. The Prosecution's Delinquent Disclosure of.Brady Material 

Defendant also argues that the district court improperly 

denied his motion for a new trial based upon alleged prejudice 

caused by the government's failure to disclose requested 

impeachment evidence until trial had begun. The information at 

issue is the prosecution's knowledge that the robbed teller from 

the Mercantile Bank had identified a person other than the 

defendant in a photographic line-up conducted shortly after the 

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defendant was arrested. The prosecution concedes that it was 

obligated to disclose the.teller's ~dentification under Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court ruled that no 

Brady violation occurred because the defense learned of, and 

utilized, the teller's earlier identification in the presentation 

of its case-in -chief. We review the district court's ruling de 

novo. See United States v. Kennedy, 869 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 

1989). 

Brady requires that the prosecution turn over material 

evidence favorable to a defendant when she or he requests it. 

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. However, the Supreme Court clarified the 

reach of Brady in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, (1976), 

where it stated that the rule applies only to those situations 

where the defendant discovers "after trial, ••• information 

which had been k~own to the prosecution but unknown to the 

defense." Id. at 103. 

Although the Supreme Court has not squarely confronted the 

issue, this court has previously concluded "that Brady is not 

violated when the Brady material is available to defendants during 

trial." United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154, 158 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1088 (1982). See United States v. George, 

778 F.2d 556, 561 (10th ~ir. 1985); United States v. Alberico, 604 

F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979). 

The reasoning behind that approach to disclosure of Brady 

information is based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in United 

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). In Agurs, the Court 

announced that ~he standard for evaluating the materiality of a 

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Brady violation is whether presentation of the evidence would have 

given rise to "a reasonable doubt [of guilt] that did not 

otherwise exist" if it had been available at trial. Id. at 112. 

This court has stated that the implication of this language is 

that where, as here, the evidence was actually presented at trial, 

application of an Agurs standard would be "nonsensical'' because 

the evidence was actually available for use at trial. Alberico, 

604 F.2d at 1319. 

In the present case, the identification by the bank teller 

was disclosed to the defense during the trial. The defense called 

the investigating agent as its final witness and elicited the 

information about the teller's identification of one ·other than 

the defendant as the robber. The defense·made a tactical decision 

not to recall the teller, evidently feeling that to do so would 

bolster the significance of her testimony. The·jury was fully 

aware of the teller's failure to identify the defendant in the 

photo line-up. Defendant's claim that cross-examining the teller 

was somehow made tactically impossible by the delayed disclosure 

does not rise to the level of.a Brady violation. See United States 

v. Warhop, 732 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1984) (no due process 

violation where defendant made a tactical decision not to utilize 

Brady evidence disclosed mid-trial). 

Moreover, to the extent that a materiality inquiry under 

Agurs is feasible in a situation where defendant was in receipt of 

Brady materials during trial, we do not believe that earlier 

disclosure of the information would have given rise to a 

reasonable doubt-that did not otherwise exist. Therefore, we 

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affirm the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a new 

trial. 

3. Defendant's Motion For Acquittal 

Defendant's final argument is that the district court 

improperly denied his motion to acquit for insufficient evidence. 

Our review of a denial of a motion to acquit for insufficient 

evidence is limited to determining whether "any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.'' Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) 

(emphasis in original). In addition, this court "must consider, 

in a light most favorable to the Government, all direct and 

.circumstantial evidence and the inferences that may reasonably be 

drawn from that evidence." United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 

1428, 1455 (10th Cir. 1987). 

In this case, the government must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant took property in the 

possession of an F.D.I.C. insured bank by intimidation. See 18 

u.s.c. § 2113(a), (f). Considering the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the government, the jury could have fairly found the 

following facts beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence 

presented at trial. 

Defendant was identified at trial as the man who robbed the 

Mercantile Bank on June 1, 1988, by both the teller from whom 

money was taken, as well as an observing teller. A resident of an 

-apartment near the Mercantile Bank also identified defendant as 

the person she saw fleeing the Mercantile Bank on the morning of 

June 1, 1988. 

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Defendant sold a tan colored Pontiac T-1000 on either June 3, 

or June 4, 1988. A photograph of that automobile was identified 

as similar to the car used in the robbery of the Mercantile Bank 

by the same witness who identified the defendant as the man she 

saw fleeing the Mercantile Bank. 

A teller at the Capitol Savings Bank testified that her 

station was robbed on the morning of June 8, 1988, by a man with a 

note claiming to have a gun. She identified the defendant in 

court as the perpetrator. 

Two F.B.I. agents testified that, when they went to search 

the apartment where defendant was staying on•the afternoon of June 

8, 1988, they asked defendant if he knew the whereabouts of Karen 

Barber, the resident of the apartment. Before being informed of 

the purpose of their inquiry, defendant responded that Karen was 

"not involved._" 

The agents also testified that after they had begun their 

search of the apartment and informed defendant that he was a 

suspect in. the bank robberies, he indicated that the "money's in 

the bathroom",. even though none of the agents had disclosed they 

were searching for money. The amount and denominations of the 

currency discovered in the bathroom was close to that taken from 

the Capitol Savings Bank on the morning of the search. A black 

shirt was discovered in the apartment. The teller from the 

Capitol Savings Bank testified that the shirt looked like the 

shirt worn by the man who robbed her window at the Capitol Savings 

Bank on June 8, 1988. 

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The vice-presidents of both the Mercantile and Capitol 

Savings Banks testified to the amounts taken from their respective 

institutions. They also testified that both banks were F.D.I.C.-

insured. 

On the basis of the above evidence, and the inferences which 

can be fairly drawn, we have no difficulty concluding that a 

review of the evidence in a light most favorable to the government 

confirms that a reasona~le trier of fact could have found the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the 

district court's denial of defendant's motion to acquit is 

affirmed. 

CONCLUSION 

We affirm·the denial of defendant's motion to suppress 

without deciding whether there was probable cause to issue the 

warrant in this case. The district court correctly ruled that the 

agents relied on the warrant in good faith. We further hold that 

the prosecution's late delivery of Brady material did not violate 

defendant's due process rights because the information was 

received in time for defendant to use the information adequately 

at trial. we affirm the district court's denial of defendant's 

motion for acquittal~ 

As a final matter, we remand for resentencing. Although the 

crimes for which the defendant was convicted occurred after the 

Federal Sentencing Guidelines took effect, the sentencing judge 

did not use the guidelines, having earlier ruled in an unrelated 

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case that they were unconstitutional. In the interim period 

between defendant's sentencing and this appeal the Supreme Court 

affirmed the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines in 

United States v. Mistretta, U.S. , 109 s. Ct. 647, L. Ed. 

(1989). Therefore, because the district court judge did not 

impose an alternative sentence pursuant to the Sentencing 

Guidelines to be imposed, we agree with the defendant and the 

government that the case should be remanded for resentencing 

pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. 

The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED and this case 

is REMANDED for resentencing: 

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