Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00299/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00299-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leonard Louie Ochoa
Petitioner
Sterling Price
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In an earlier action, Petitioner filed nearly the exact same petition. (Case number 1:15-cv01769 LJO JLT) It was not clear then—and it is not clear now—exactly what Petitioner’s complaints 

are though he seems to claim that he should have been released from custody in December 2014. Id. 

at 9; Doc. 1 at 1. The Court dismissed the earlier petition because Petitioner had failed to exhaust his 

state remedies. (Case number 1:15-cv-01769 LJO JLT, Doc. 7) Attached to this new petition, 

Petitioner provides a copy of a caption page for a habeas petition he filed in the California Supreme 

Court.1 (Doc. 2 at 3) Those proceedings are in their infancy, the petition having just been filed on 

 

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Petitioner fails to provide the copy of the brief he filed in the California Supreme Court. Thus, the Court has no 

information what claims he raised there nor whether he raised federal constitutional claims.

LEONARD LOUIE OCHOA,

 Petitioner,

v.

STERLING PRICE,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:16-cv-00299 JLT

ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (Doc. 2)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

DISMISS THE PETITION AS UNEXHAUSTED

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February 8, 2016.2Thus, once again, it appears the claims have not been exhausted and the Court will 

recommend the petition be DISMISSED. 

I. DISCUSSION

A. Application to proceed in forma pauperis

The Court may authorize the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “but a 

person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such person . . . possesses [and] 

that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Petitioner 

has made the showing required by §1915(a). Thus, his request to proceed in forma pauperis is

GRANTED. 

B. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition 

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The 

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after 

an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001).

C. Exhaustion

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to launch a collateral attack on his conviction 

via a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine affords comity to the state and gives the state court the initial 

opportunity to correct the alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

 

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The court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th 

Cir. 1993). The record of state court proceeding is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial 

notice may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. 

Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.); see also Colonial Penn Ins. 

Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th. Cir. 

1980). As such, the internet website for the California Courts, containing the court system’s records for filings in the 

California Supreme Court are subject to judicial notice. After reviewing the docket of the California Supreme Court, the 

Court notes that no decision has been issued in Petitioner’s habeas petition filed there and, indeed, respondent has not filed 

any response.

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731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 

1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a 

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full 

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the 

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

The petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal 

constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court 

reiterated the rule as follows:

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies 

requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the state courts in order to give the 

State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoners' federal 

rights” (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity 

to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact 

that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas 

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal 

court, but in state court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) his federal 

claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based 

on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the 

Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the 

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, 

even if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be 

decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim 

on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. 

Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the 

relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards for 

reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added), as amended by Lyons v. 

Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-5 (9th Cir. 2001).

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On the other hand, presentation of the claim is just the first step toward exhaustion. A petition 

is not exhausted unless the petitioner has no further right through any procedure arising under state

law, to raise the question presented. 28 U.S.C. § (a)(c) [“An applicant shall not be deemed to have 

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has 

the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.”] 

Here, Petitioner seems to be claiming that he should have been released from custody in 

December 2014.3 (Doc. 1 at 1) Petitioner attaches a caption page from his habeas petition newly filed 

in the California Supreme Court (Id. at 3), apparently, to demonstrate exhaustion.4 However, there is 

no decision from the California Supreme Court and, indeed, there has been no opportunity for the 

respondent to address the claims raised in that action.(See footnote 2 infra.) Thus, the petition filed in 

this Court is premature and it is wholly unexhausted.

Where none of a petitioner’s claims have been exhausted in the state courts, the Court must 

dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 

F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed petition in abeyance pending 

exhaustion of the unexhausted claims has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted 

claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Though it appears that Petitioner has presented claims to the California Supreme Court, he has 

not allowed sufficient time for that court to rule on the petition. Therefore, because Petitioner has not 

exhausted his claims for federal relief in the California Supreme Court, the Court must dismiss the 

petition. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); 

 

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Notably, in an even earlier filed civil rights complaint, Petitioner made the same claim as in both of his habeas petitions 

filed in this Court but in that action he attached a document from the California Office of Patients’ Rights which explained 

to Petitioner, “you reported that you believe you have been illegally incarcerated since 12-25-2014. As a PC 2962, you 

have been sent here to this hospital as an MDO parolee certified by the Board of Parole for psychiatric treatment as a 

condition of your parole.” (Case number 1:15-cv-01632-DLB, Doc. 1 at 7) Notably, California’s Penal Code § 2962 

requires an inmate with a severe mental disorder may be ordered, as a condition of parole, to received mental health 

treatment provided by the State Department of State Hospitals. This additional confinement may be ordered when the 

mental condition “was a cause of or an aggravating factor in the commission of a crime for which the person was sent to 

prison,” the underlying crime was one of the listed offenses, the person has received mental treatment for at least 90 days 

of the last year of incarceration and a mental health professional certifies the person remains a substantial danger to the 

physical safety of others. Id.

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Petitioner fails to provide his brief or explain what federal constitutional issues he raised in that petition. Thus, even if 

the California Supreme Court had already decided the issues raised, it still would be unclear whether the issues presented 

here are exhausted.

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Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court cannot consider a petition that 

is entirely unexhausted. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-22 (1982); Calderon, 107 F.3d at 760. 

ORDER

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to assign a United States District Judge to this case.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus be DISMISSED for lack of exhaustion.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the 

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 21

days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a 

copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within 10 days (plus three 

days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate 

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 7, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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