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Parties Involved:
Kenner Fitzgerald Jackson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30844

c/w No. 09-30980

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

KENNER FITZGERALD JACKSON,

Defendant–Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:09-CR-16-1

USDC No. 5:09-CR-17-1

Before GARZA, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kenner Fitzgerald Jackson appeals from the district court’s decision to

revoke his supervised release and sentence him to a 24-month prison term,

which was the statutory maximum and the effective guidelines sentence. At the

revocation hearing, Jackson, proceeding pro se, stipulated that he violated the

terms of his supervised release without admitting the truth of the underlying

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 24, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 09-30844

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allegations—that he illegally possessed and distributed Xanax. He now argues

that his decision to represent himself pro se at the revocation hearing was not

knowing and voluntary because, he contends, he did not know what he was doing

at the hearing and because the district court failed to verify that he was not

under the influence of drugs. Furthermore, he asserts that the sentence he

received after revocation is too harsh, arguing that the court should have

permitted him to serve out his sentence in a halfway house or through a workrelease program.

A defendant does not have a constitutional right to represent himself at

a revocation hearing; allowing a defendant to proceed pro se is in the discretion

of the district court. United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 650 (5th Cir. 2006);

see FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b). Accordingly, a waiver of the right to counsel in the

revocation context need not meet the formal requirements of the Sixth

Amendment. Hodges, 460 F.3d at 648. Nonetheless, the waiver must be

knowing and voluntary, as gleaned through a colloquy with the district court,

the totality of the circumstances, or both. Id. at 648.

During its colloquy with Jackson, the district court clearly articulated the

benefits of counsel and warned Jackson of the pitfalls of proceeding pro se, thus

ensuring that Jackson’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. The court told

Jackson that a specially trained and experienced attorney would better

represent Jackson and explained that Jackson was not as familiar with

revocation proceedings as he needed to be to represent himself effectively.

Jackson agreed with the court’s assessment. The court advised that it would be

unwise for Jackson to represent himself. Jackson confirmed that he indeed

wished to proceed pro se and asserted that the decision was entirely voluntary.

Even if the colloquy alone was insufficient, the totality of the

circumstances reveals that Jackson was well aware of the consequences of his

choice and that he was not coerced into making his decision. See id. at 652.

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Along with the court’s admonition that self-representation was not in Jackson’s

best interest and Jackson’s confirmation that his decision was voluntary,

Jackson was able to explain to the court both the charges that were the bases of

the revocation request and the sentence he faced. Furthermore, the court

advised Jackson of procedures relevant to the hearing. Cf. id. at 652-53.

Jackson argues that it should have been evident to the court that he did

not “know what he was doing” at the hearing; however, nothing requires that a

defendant have a full command of procedure or be in the best possible position

to understand the implications of his arguments before he can knowingly waive

his right to counsel. In any event, Jackson had a sufficient grasp of the

proceedings. When the court discovered that he lacked knowledge of relevant

revocation procedures, it clearly explained them and confirmed that Jackson

understood them before the court allowed him to represent himself. Jackson

also contends that he did not understand the ramifications of his stipulation to

the revocation charge, but the record shows that Jackson carefully considered

whether and how to stipulate, conferring with standby counsel and seeking

clarification from the district court about the effect that a stipulation would have

on his state-court proceeding.

Though the district court did not ask Jackson whether he was under the

influence of drugs before allowing him to proceed pro se, there is no evidence

that Jackson was impaired in any way. He engaged in a thoughtful colloquy

with the judge, was able to articulate the charges and penalties he was facing,

was responsive to questions, conferred with standby counsel, asked relevant

questions where necessary, and successfully stipulated to the revocation without

admitting guilt for the underlying offense. Tellingly, Jackson does not assert in

this court that he, in fact, was under the influence of drugs during the hearing.

As for Jackson’s sentence, he did not object at the hearing, and so our

review is for plain error. See United States v. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 256, 259 (5th

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Cir. 2009). The court expressed concern that the time Jackson already spent in

a halfway house did not keep him from continuing to engage in drug-related

criminal conduct. It was not plainly erroneous for the court to determine that,

in Jackson’s case, a 24-month prison sentence was the most appropriate

punishment.

Jackson also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion requesting

modification of his sentence and the denial of his motion for reconsideration.

However, the district court did not have authority to modify Jackson’s sentence;

thus, it was without jurisdiction to entertain the request and did not err in

denying the motion for reconsideration. See United States v. Early, 27 F.3d 140,

141-42 (5th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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