Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03532/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03532-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Lawrence Edward Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3532

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Lawrence Edward Williams

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: June 11, 2015

 Filed: August 7, 2015

____________

Before GRUENDER, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Lawrence Williams was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon. See

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). A jury found Williams guilty, and the district court sentenced 1

him to 66 months’ imprisonment. Williams appeals his conviction. We affirm.

The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the

1

Eastern District of Missouri. 

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I.

On January 26, 2013, Officer Jennifer Hendricks of the St. Louis Metropolitan

Police Department was driving her patrol car when its license plate recognition

(“LPR”) system gave an alert about a nearby car. The LPR system scans the license

plates of cars that are within range of cameras mounted on the patrol car and can

generate an alert if a scanned car is connected to a wanted person. 

The alert showed Officer Hendricks that a man named Otis Hicks was

associated with a nearby car and was wanted by the St. Louis County Police

Department, a department that neighbors Hendricks’s, for first-degree domestic

assault. The alert also said that Hicks may be armed and dangerous. The LPR alert

did not explain how or when Hicks was associated with the car. 

After pulling the car over, Officer Hendricks approached the driver’s side and

saw two men inside. She asked the driver for his license, which identified him as Otis

Hicks. Officer Hendricks then waited for a second police officer to arrive. Upon

arrival, Officer David Christensen asked the passenger, Williams, to get out of the car

and present identification. According to Officer Christensen, Williams patted his

waistband two times while getting out of the car and Williams’s hands were shaking

uncontrollably as he retrieved his identification. Officer Christensen handcuffed

Williams and conducted a pat-down search for weapons. Officer Christensen felt

what he recognized to be a firearm and removed a handgun from Williams’s

waistband. After finding the handgun, Officer Christensen found a bag containing

“a dark rock-like substance” in Williams’s pocket that was later identified as heroin. 

A federal grand jury indicted Lawrence Williams for one count of possessing

a firearm as a felon. Before trial, Williams moved to suppress the handgun and

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heroin. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony from

2

Officers Hendricks and Christensen. The magistrate judge recommended the denial

of Williams’s motions. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s relevant

proposed factual findings and rulings.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the Government notified

Williams that it would introduce his prior firearm-possession convictions at trial. 

Williams submitted two motionsin limine thatsought to exclude his 2002 conviction

for possessing a firearm as a felon, his 1995 conviction for unlawful possession of a

concealable firearm and unlawful use of a firearm, and his earlier conviction of firstdegree robbery. Williams also moved to exclude the heroin. The district court denied

Williams’s motions to exclude the heroin and the 2002 and 1995 convictions. 

However, the court excluded the earlier robbery conviction because of, among other

reasons, “the age, when it was completed, the similarity of the offenses, and the fact

that we will already have two others that will be introduced into evidence.”

At trial, Williams’s counsel attempted to cross-examine Officer Hendricks

about her motivation for testifying that Williams had actual possession of the

handgun. After Williams’s counsel asked Officer Hendricks if she had been

frustrated with prosecutors’ past decisions regarding whether to bring firearm

charges, the Government objected, and the following colloquy took place at sidebar:

Counsel: Judge, it’s my good faith belief that the police

officers in the city of St. Louis sometimes

decide to charge somebody with a gun that

they found in the car even though the gun was

not found on the person, and that the person

that they decide to charge is the person in the

car that has the worst record.

The Honorable Terry I. Adelman, United States Magistrate Judge for the

2

Eastern District of Missouri, now retired. 

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Court: Have you got some evidence of this that you

are going to present here?

Counsel: No, I want to ask her.

Court: Do you have some evidence of that fact that

you are prepared to present to me?

Counsel: No. 

After the Government argued that this had “nothing to do with the facts of this case,”

the court asked Williams’s counsel about the foundation for this line of questions:

Court: I am just going to tell you, [Counsel], absent

some evidence to support some good faith

belief that that occurs or occurred here, I will

not permit you to go down that road.

Counsel: Well, may I tell the Court that my good faith

belief is based on talking to a retired police

officer about this case?

Court: No. If you want to bring that police officer in

to testify here, then I will take his proffer and

we can go from there.

Counsel: All right. 

Court: But I will not permit you on the record that

we have here to suggest that with respect to

this witness. 

After Officer Hendricks finished testifying, Officer Christensen took the stand. 

Before cross-examining Officer Christensen, Williams’s counsel asked the court if

he would be barred from pursuing the same line of questions:

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Counsel: I assume [the Government] still wants to

object and that you would make the same

ruling, that I’m not allowed at this time to go

into questions about the relationship between

the police department and the warrant office

at the [prosecutor’s office].

Court: Not for the purpose and based upon the record

that you have made today, correct. 

After the witnesses testified, the court gave limiting instructions to the jury on

how it should consider the evidence of Williams’s 2002 and 1995 convictions. The

jury found Williams guilty. 

II.

A.

Williams first argues that Officer Hendricks lacked reasonable suspicion to

stop the car. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); Brendlin v.

California, 551 U.S. 249, 255-57 (2007). According to Williams, because Officer

Hendricks lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car, the handgun and heroin were

fruits of an illegal stop and should have been suppressed. See generally Wong Sun

3

v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal

conclusions de novo. United States v. Farnell, 701 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 2012). 

“The Fourth Amendment permits an investigative stop of a vehicle if officers have

a reasonable suspicion the vehicle or its occupants are involved in criminal activity.” 

Williams’s Fourth Amendment argument only challenges Officer Hendricks’s 3

initial stop of the car. Because Williams does not challenge the propriety of the

subsequent searches, we need not address those issues. 

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United States v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2007). If police have reasonable

suspicion, they “may briefly stop an individual and make reasonable inquiries aimed

at confirming or dispelling the suspicion.” United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013,

1016 (8th Cir. 2008). “Reasonable suspicion must be supported by more than a mere

hunch, but the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for

probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying the preponderance of the

evidence standard.” United States v. Roberts, 787 F.3d 1204, 1209 (8th Cir. 2015)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We consider the totality of the

circumstances when determining whether an officer has a particularized and objective

basis to suspect wrongdoing.” United States v. Robinson, 670 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir.

2012).

Officer Hendricks relied upon the notice from the LPR system that: (1) Hicks

was associated with a nearby car, (2) Hicks was wanted by the St. Louis County

Police Department for first-degree domestic assault, and (3) Hicks may have been

armed and dangerous. Williams nonetheless argues that Officer Hendricks did not

have reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop because a “police officer who

receives an alert from the LPR system has no way of knowing the extent of the

person’s relationship to the vehicle.” Williams and the Government seem to agree

that there are no reported federal decisions that have specifically dealt with the use

of an LPR system in the Fourth Amendment context. However, as we have held, “if

a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a

reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense, then reliance

on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check identification, to pose questions to

the person, or to detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further

information.” Farnell, 701 F.3d at 262 (internal alteration omitted) (quoting United

States v. Smith, 648 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir. 2011)). “Police officers may rely upon

notice from another police department that a person or vehicle is wanted in

connection with the investigation of a felony ‘when making a Terry stop, even if the

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notice omits the specific articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion.’” Smith,

648 F.3d at 659 (internal alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 391

F.3d 904, 906 (8th Cir. 2004)). 

We fail to see how the use of the LPR systemmakes any difference in this case. 

Williams does not cite any precedent holding that the mechanism through which an

officer receives notice from another department matters for Fourth Amendment

purposes. Indeed, the LPR system merely automates what could otherwise be

accomplished by checking the license-plate number against a “hot sheet” of numbers,

inputting a given number into a patrol car’s computer, or “calling in” the number to

the police station. Thus, we conclude that Officer Hendricks was entitled to “rely

upon notice from another police department,” she obtained by using a more

automated process: the LPR system. See id. at 656-60 (upholding a police officer’s

reliance on a wanted notice he discovered by performing a search on a license-plate

number). 

Williams argues further that Officer Hendricks’s stop violated the Fourth

Amendment “because she could not tell who was driving the car until after she

stopped it.” Williams asserts, without citation, that Officer Hendricks must “have

[had] some idea at least that there [was] a black male driving the car” before making

the traffic stop. Officer Hendrickstestified thatshe was unable to see who wasinside

the car until after she stopped it. Common sense dictates that police officers will

often be unable to confirm the race or gender of a driver before initiating a traffic

stop. Accordingly, we fail to see how Officer Hendricks’s decision to briefly stop the

car and check the driver’s identification was an unreasonable seizure in violation of

the Fourth Amendment merely because she initially could not identify the driver’s

race or gender. See Farnell, 701 F.3d at 262. 

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Williams concedes that Hicks was “perhaps associated with the car” but

nonetheless argues that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because Officer

Hendricks “had no information of the time frame of when Hicks had been associated

with the car.” But our precedent makes clear that “officers may rely upon notice from

another police department that a person or vehicle is wanted in connection with the

investigation of a felony ‘when making a Terry stop, even if the notice omits the

specific articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion.” Smith, 648 F.3d at 659

(internal alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 391 F.3d at 906). 

Accordingly, this argument is without merit.4

B.

Williams next argues that the district court abused its discretion when it

admitted, under Rule 404(b), evidence that Williams had twice been convicted of

illegal firearm possession. “We review the district court’s admission of evidence of

past crimes under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for abuse of discretion, and we

will not reverse unless the evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was

introduced solely to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.” 

United States v. Bassett, 762 F.3d 681, 687 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal alteration

Williams’s opening brief notes that Hicks “was not the registered owner of the

4

car” and his reply brief suggests that “the police only had information ‘associating’

[Hicks] with driving a particular car once upon a time.” To the extent that this could

be construed as attempting to argue that the St. Louis County Police Department had

an insufficient factual basis to link Hicks to the car initially, we will not consider it

as it was not properly developed by Williams. Williams’s opening brief does not

develop this argument and does not provide any case law in support. See Fed. R.

App. P. 28(a)(8); Christensen v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 481 F.3d 1085, 1098 n.7

(8th Cir. 2007). And while Williams’s reply brief arguably comes closer to making

this argument, as a general rule we do not entertain arguments that are first raised in

a reply brief. See Bearden v. Lemon, 475 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2007).

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omitted) (quoting United States v. Banks, 706 F.3d 901, 906 (8th Cir. 2013)). Rule

404(b) is “one of inclusion, such that evidence offered for permissible purposes is

presumed admissible absent a contrary determination.” United States v. Wilson, 619

F.3d 787, 791 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Littlewind, 595 F.3d 876, 881

(8th Cir. 2010)). 

We employ a four-part test to determine whether a district court abused its

discretion in admitting 404(b) evidence. United States v. Robinson, 639 F.3d 489,

494 (8th Cir. 2011). Evidence is properly admitted under Rule 404(b) if “(1) it is

relevant to a material issue; (2) it is similar in kind and not overly remote in time to

the crime charged; (3) it is supported by sufficient evidence; and (4) its potential

prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative value.” Id. (quoting United

States v. Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 847 (8th Cir. 2002)). “The requirement to balance

probative value and prejudice is found in [Federal Rule of Evidence] 403,” United

States v. Cook, 454 F.3d 938, 941 (8th Cir. 2006), which providesin relevant part that

“[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by [the] danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Williams argues that the

evidence of his former firearm-possession convictions was improperly admitted

because (1) the evidence was irrelevant, (2) the evidence was not similar in kind and

was overly remote in time, and (3) the potential prejudice outweighed the probative

value. We disagree and address each in turn. 

As a general rule, “[e]vidence that a defendant possessed a firearm on a

previous occasion is relevant to show knowledge and intent.” United States v.

Walker, 470 F.3d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 2006). Williams first contends that the

evidence of his prior firearm-possession convictions was not relevant as

“[k]nowledge and intent were not issues” in the case because the Government’s

theory involved only actual possession. Williams cites United States v. Caldwell in

support of his argument. 760 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2014). Caldwell explained that

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because “the Government proceeded solely on a theory of actual possession, we hold

that [the defendant’s] knowledge was not at issue in the case.” Id. at 279. While

Williams’s argument may be supported by Caldwell, it isforeclosed by our precedent. 

“Knowing possession of a firearm is an element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and

[Williams] placed his knowledge of the firearm’s presence at the scene on his person

at issue by pleading not guilty to the crime and requiring the government to prove his

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” See United States v. Oaks, 606 F.3d 530, 539 (8th

Cir. 2010). And we have held that the defendant places his knowledge and intent at

issue by pleading not guilty even when the prosecution proceeds solely on an actual

possession theory. United States v. Halk, 634 F.3d 482, 485-87 (8th Cir. 2011)

(holding that previous firearm possessions were relevant to defendant’s knowledge

and intent to possess a firearm where police saw defendant holding and discarding a

gun).

Williams next argues that the evidence of his prior firearm-possession

convictions fails the second part of our 404(b) test because the crimes were not

“similar in kind” and were “overly remote in time to the crime charged.” See

Robinson, 639 F.3d at 494. On the issue of similarity, our test merely requires that

the prior acts are “sufficiently similar to support an inference of criminal intent.” 

Walker, 470 F.3d at 1275 (quoting United States v. Strong, 415 F.3d 902, 905 (8th

Cir. 2005)). As such, we have no trouble concluding that the district court did not

abuse its discretion when it concluded that Williams’s prior illegal possessions of

firearms were sufficiently similar to his instant illegal possession of a firearm. See

id.

As to temporalremoteness, Williams notes that the firearm-possession offenses

each occurred more than 10 years before he was arrested for the instant offense. We

determine if a crime is too remote in time to be admissible under Rule 404(b) by

applying a reasonablenessstandard that evaluates the facts and circumstances of each

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case. Id. “[T]here is no specific number of years beyond which prior bad acts are no

longer relevant to the issue of intent.” Id. (quoting United States v. Shoffner, 71

F.3d 1429, 1432 (8th Cir. 1995)). Here, the district court permitted the Government

to introduce evidence of Williams’s 2002 and 1995 firearm-possession convictions

but held that his earlier robbery conviction was inadmissible. Williams’s two

firearm-possession offenses were committed in February 2001 and April 1994,

respectively, and he was arrested for the instant crime on January 26, 2013. Thus, the

two prior offenses were more than 11 and 18 years old. We have upheld the

admission of a crime committed more than 20 years before the offense at issue. 

United States v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833, 835-37 (8th Cir. 2002); see also Halk, 634

F.3d at 484, 487-88 (upholding the admission of a crime that took place

approximately 19 years before the instant § 922(g)(1) offense). Moreover, because

Williams was incarcerated for such a significant amount of time—approximately 12

of the 18 years since his 1995 conviction—“the total number of years separating the

prior offense[s] and the charged offense did not ‘significantly diminish the

probativeness of the evidence.’” Walker, 470 F.3d at 1275 (quoting United States v.

Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 894 (8th Cir. 2005)). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of

discretion in the district court’s 404(b) remoteness analysis. See id.

Williams’s final argument regarding the admissibility of his prior firearmpossession convictions is that the probative value is substantially outweighed by the

prejudicial effect. “Though all Rule 404(b) evidence isinherently prejudicial, the test

under Rule 403 is whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice.” Cook, 454 F.3d at 941. “We give great deference to a

district court’s application of the Rule 403 balancing test.” United States v. Lupino,

301 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2002). Here, the district court carefully balanced the

probative value against any unfair prejudicial effect and excluded evidence of

Williams’s earlier robbery conviction in part to limit any potential unfair prejudice. 

The district court also gave a limiting instruction to mitigate the risk of any unfair

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prejudice. The court told the jury to consider the previous convictions “to help . . .

decide intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake,” but instructed them that while

“the defendant may have committed similar acts in the past, this is not evidence that

he committed such an act in this case.” We have “been reluctant to find that the

evidence was unfairly prejudicial when the district court gave an appropriate limiting

instruction.” United States v. Kent, 531 F.3d 642, 651 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting

United States v. Loveless, 139 F.3d 587, 593 (8th Cir. 1998)). In light of the district

court’s careful analysis and appropriate limiting instruction, we cannot conclude that

the court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence of Williams’s previous

firearm-possession convictions. See id.

C.

Williams’s third argument is that the district court violated his Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation by prohibiting his counsel from cross-examining

Officers Hendricks and Christensen about their alleged motivation to testify falsely

that Williams had a handgun on his person. “We review evidentiary rulings regarding

the scope of a cross examination for abuse of discretion, but where the Confrontation

Clause is implicated, we consider the matter de novo.” United States v. Kenyon, 481

F.3d 1054, 1063 (8thCir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). TheConfrontation Clause

“guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination

that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”

United States v. Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 938 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States

v. Jasso, 701 F.3d 314, 316 (8th Cir. 2012)), cert. denied, 574 U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct.

1019 (2015). Accordingly, “a district court may impose reasonable limits on crossexamination based on concerns about prejudice or confusion of the issues.” Id.

(internal alteration omitted) (quoting Jasso, 701 F.3d at 317). A district court has

wide latitude to impose such reasonable limits on cross-examination. Id. We will not

reverse a court’s decision to limit cross-examination “unless there has been a clear

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abuse of discretion and a showing of prejudice to the defendant.” United States v.

Petters, 663 F.3d 375, 382 (8th Cir. 2011). 

Williams’s assertion that “the district court completely foreclosed crossexamination about the motive, interest, and bias of the police officers” grossly

misconstruesthe district court’s ruling. After defense counsel attempted to imply that

police officers sometimes decide to charge a felon with actual firearm possession

based on his record, the court explained that, without a foundation to support a goodfaith belief that this had occurred, the defense could not continue with those

questions. And after prohibiting this line of questions on the record as it then stood,

the court offered the defense the opportunity to present a witness on the matter. 

Rather than accept the invitation to lay a proper foundation, Williams’s counsel chose

not to pursue the matter further. 

The district court’s implicit concern wasthat thisline of questions would “waft

an unwarranted innuendo into the jury box” that there was some evidence that the

officers were lying. United States v. Tucker, 533 F.3d 711, 714 (8th Cir. 2008)

(quoting United States v. Beeks, 224 F.3d 741, 746 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also United

States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 514 (1stCir. 2011) (“[A] district court may properly

limit cross-examination on inherently speculative theories of bias, where the

defendant is unable to lay a proper evidentiary foundation.” (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Vives, 475 F.3d 48, 53-54 (1st Cir.

2007)). Williams had no good-faith basis to believe that the officers had planted a

handgun in this case and offered only a purported conversation with “a retired police

officer” as a basis for the belief that such a practice occurred generally. We conclude

that the district court was well within its wide latitude of discretion when it required

Williams to first lay a proper evidentiary foundation before implying that Officers

Hendricks and Christensen had planted a handgun on Williams and perjured

themselves. See United States v. Tolliver, 665 F.2d 1005, 1008 (11th Cir. 1982) (per

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curiam). The district court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion and was not

inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause. See Kenyon, 481 F.3d at 1064.

D.

Finally, Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion by

admitting the heroin into evidence. See United States v. Brooks, 715 F.3d 1069, 1076

(8th Cir. 2013). Williams argues that the heroin was extrinsic to his possession of the

handgun as a felon and thus that the district court should have conducted a Rule

404(b) analysis. Rule 404(b) “applies to the admission of wrongful-act evidence that

is extrinsic to the charged offense; the rule does not prevent admission of other

wrongful conduct that is intrinsic to the charged offense.” Id. (quoting United States

v. Ruiz-Chavez, 612 F.3d 983, 988 (8th Cir. 2010)). Wrongful-conduct evidence is

intrinsic “when it is offered for the purpose of providing the context in which the

charged crime occurred. Such evidence is admitted because the other crime evidence

completes the story or provides a total picture of the charged crime.” Id. (quoting

Ruiz-Chavez, 612 F.3d at 988).

The district court explained that the heroin was “part of the events here and is

important for an understanding of why the defendant was arrested. And I believe . . .

it is also relevant to the issue of knowledge and intent to possess the firearm.” We

agree. According to Officer Christensen, the heroin was discovered in the same

sequence of events asthe handgun. And the heroin’s presence explains why Williams

may have been carrying the handgun. See United States v. Vincent, 316 F. App’x

275, 278 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (explaining that “the drug evidence, though

uncharged, was intrinsic to the firearm conviction as the drugs and firearm were

found together during the same criminal episode”). 

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Williams also argues that the district court abused its discretion by not

excluding the heroin because its probative value wassubstantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; Brooks, 715 F.3d at 1076. The

heroin was probative of Williams’s knowledge and intent to possess the handgun. 

See United States v. White, 356 F.3d 865, 870 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that “drugrelated evidence was related to [the defendant’s] firearm possession” because of the

connection between drug dealing and firearms). And we see nothing in the record

that suggests this probativeness was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the

heroin was admissible. See Brooks, 715 F.3d at 1076. 

III.

We affirm.

BEAM, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 

______________________________

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