Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00624/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00624-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Darryl Edwin Lang
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL EDWIN LANG,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-0624-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying an application for Child’s Insurance Benefits (“CIB”) under Title II of 

the Social Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons discussed below, the court will grant plaintiff’s 

motion for remand and deny the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

I. Background

Plaintiff, born May 15, 1963, applied on July 26, 2011 for CIB, alleging disability 

beginning April 30, 1985.

1

 Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 17, 19, 23. Plaintiff alleged he was 

unable to work due to a learning disability, emotional issues, liver problems, and hepatitis C. AT 

 

1

To be eligible for CIB, plaintiff had to establish that he had a disability before turning 22. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.350(a). Plaintiff turned 22 on May 14, 1985, two weeks after his alleged onset date. 

AT 23.

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168. In a decision dated May 23, 2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not been under a 

disability prior to May 14, 1985, the date on which he attained age 22. AT 17-23. The ALJ 

made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. Born on May 15, 1963, the claimant had not attained age 22 as of April 30, 

1985, the alleged onset date.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 30, 

1985, the alleged onset date.

3. Prior to the date the claimant attained age 22, there were no medical signs or 

laboratory findings to substantiate the existence of a medically determinable 

impairment.

4. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security 

Act, at any time prior to May 14, 1985, the date he attained age 22.

AT 19-23.

II. Issues Presented

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled prior to age 22: (1) improperly determined that the record contained no medical signs or 

laboratory findings to substantiate a finding that plaintiff had a medically determinable 

impairment prior to the date on which he attained age 22; (2) improperly considered and weighed 

the medical opinion evidence in the record; and (3) failed to obtain the testimony of a medical 

expert regarding whether plaintiff’s impairments rendered him disabled prior to age 22.

III. Legal Standards

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

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responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

IV. Analysis

A. The ALJ Erred in Determining that the Record Contained no Signs or Laboratory 

Findings to Substantiate the Existence of a Medically Determinable Impairment Prior 

to the Date on Which Plaintiff Attained Age 22

First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by determining that there was no evidence in the 

record that plaintiff had a medically determinable impairment prior to the date on which he turned 

age 22 because substantial evidence from the record did not support this finding. More 

specifically, plaintiff asserts that the mental examination results obtained by Dr. Bowerman as a 

part of her consultative examination show that plaintiff has a full scale IQ score of 68, AT 224, 

which places him in the “extremely low” range of mental functioning and indicates that plaintiff’s 

mental impairment was present prior to age 22. Plaintiff also argues that there is evidence in the 

record that plaintiff attended special education classes during his time in school, got below 

average grades, and dropped out of high school due to his learning disability, all of which indicate 

that plaintiff’s mental impairment manifested itself before he turned 22.

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With regard to the IQ score results, plaintiff acknowledges that they were obtained in 

December 2012, when plaintiff was 49 years old and roughly 27 years after he reached age 22, 

but asserts that this temporal distance between the relevant period and the examination does not 

undermine the probative value of the results because it is generally accepted that a person’s IQ 

score remains fairly constant throughout his or her life. In support of this assertion, plaintiff cites 

to a number of cases wherein various federal courts have determined that there is a rebuttable 

presumption that IQ scores attained through testing administered during adulthood are equally 

applicable to a claimant’s childhood intellectual functioning because such scores remain 

relatively stable over a person’s lifetime. Plaintiff insists that the court adopt this rebuttable 

presumption and apply it to the facts of this case to show that plaintiff’s mental impairment 

manifested itself prior to age 22.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed the rebuttable presumption that 

plaintiff urges, but a number of other circuits have addressed the issue and have held that such a 

presumption exists. See, e.g., Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1265, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2001) (IQ 

scores obtained after age 22 “create a rebuttable presumption of a fairly constant IQ throughout 

life”); Muncy v. Apfel, 247 F.3d 728, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) ((“[A] person’s IQ is presumed to 

remain stable over time in the absence of any evidence of a change in a claimant’s intellectual 

functioning.”); Luckey v. U.S. Dept. Of Health and Human Services, 890 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 

1989); Guzman v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a claimant’s IQ score

relates back and does not just reflect their intellectual functioning at the time the test is 

performed). Furthermore, a large number of district courts within the Ninth Circuit have applied 

the rebuttable presumption regarding onset of mental limitations prior to age 22. See, e.g., Vieira 

v. Colvin, 2013 WL 1195287, at *6-*7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2013) (collecting cases and adopting 

presumption that a claimant’s IQ score remains fairly constant throughout his or her life); Flores 

v. Astrue, 2013 WL 146190, at *4-*5 (C.D. Cal. Jan.11, 2013) (unpublished) (same); Woods v. 

Astrue, 2012 WL 761720, at *3-*4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2012) (adopting rebuttable presumption 

and finding that “[a]bsent some evidence of a change in cognitive ability or some other persuasive 

information to account for a change in condition relating to the plaintiff’s ability prior to age 22 

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and the date of the IQ testing, there appears to be no factual basis for concluding that the IQ 

inexplicably dropped after age 22”); Forsythe v. Astrue, 2012 WL 217751, at *7-*9 (E.D. Cal. 

Jan. 24, 2012) (unpublished) (collecting cases and adopting presumption); Schuler v. Astrue, 

2010 WL 1443892, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr.7, 2010) (unpublished) (“a valid qualifying IQ score 

obtained by the claimant after the age of 22 creates a rebuttable presumption that the claimant’s 

mental retardation began prior to the age of 22, as it is presumed that IQ scores remain relatively 

constant during a person’s lifetime.”); Jackson v. Astrue, 2008 WL 5210668, at *6-*7 (C.D. Cal. 

Dec.11, 2008) (unpublished) (“several circuits have held that valid IQ tests create a rebuttable 

presumption of a fairly constant IQ throughout a claimant’s life . . . The Court finds the reasoning 

of the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits to be persuasive.”). But see Clark v. Astrue, 2012 

WL 423635, at *5-*6 (E.D. Cal. Feb.8, 2012) (unpublished) (declining to adopt rebuttable 

presumption, “especially in a situation where there are glaring discrepancies in the IQ scores in 

the first place”); Rhein v. Astrue, 2010 WL 4877796, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010) (declining 

to adopt rebuttable presumption with regard to determining whether the claimant’s mental 

impairment met or equaled listing-level severity because it would have removed the claimant’s 

burden at step three).

The court finds those cases adopting the rebuttable presumption test persuasive and, given 

the circumstances presented by this action, finds it appropriate to apply that presumption to 

plaintiff’s IQ score here.

2

 The record does not contain any IQ scores or other test results 

regarding mental functioning that appear to conflict with the results of Dr. Bowerman’s 

examination. Furthermore, there exists evidence in the record indicating that plaintiff had subaverage intellectual functioning prior to age 22, such as evidence showing that he attended special 

 

2

The ALJ discounted Dr. Bowerman’s opinion regarding the functional impact of plaintiff’s 

mental impairments. AT 22. However, he did not contest the validity the objective medical 

results obtained from the psychological testing she conducted on plaintiff as part of her 

examination, including the IQ score results. For the reasons discussed in further detail below, the 

ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. Bowerman’s opinion were in error. Nevertheless, even had the 

ALJ properly discounted Dr. Bowerman’s opinion, such a determination would not have 

undermined the validity of plaintiff’s IQ score results, nor rebutted the general presumption that 

plaintiff’s IQ score reflected his intellectual functioning prior to age 22.

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education classes throughout his entire educational career and dropped out of high school due to 

intellectual difficulties, AT 22, 39-40, 43, 242-45, and no evidence suggesting that plaintiff 

sustained a traumatic brain injury or other injury after age 22 that would likely impair his 

intellectual capabilities. Accordingly, applying the rebuttable presumption analysis, the next 

question is whether the presumption arising from plaintiff’s valid IQ scores is rebutted by the 

evidence in the record; that is, whether substantial evidence in the record shows that the onset of 

plaintiff’s impairment was actually after age 22. See, e.g., Woods, 2012 WL 761720 at *3-*4.

The Commissioner argues that the evidence in the record showing that plaintiff abused 

alcohol and methamphetamine as an adult gives rise to a reasonable inference that such lifestyle 

choices negatively impacted his intellectual functioning after age 22. However, the ALJ did not 

provide this reasoning in support of his determination, and the court cannot consider the 

Commissioner’s post hoc rationalizations. This court reviews the adequacy of the reasons 

specified by the ALJ, not the post hoc rationalizations of the agency. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 

947 F.2d 341, 345-46 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir.

2003) (court is constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts). Moreover, the 

Commissioner’s argument regarding the impact of plaintiff’s substance abuse amounts to little 

more than speculation as the Commissioner fails to point to anything in the record indicating that 

such activities caused plaintiff’s intellectual functioning to materially diminish after he reached 

the age of 22. Accordingly, the Commissioner fails to rebut the presumption that plaintiff’s IQ 

score indicating “extremely low” intellectual functioning was indicative of plaintiff’s mental 

capabilities prior to age 22. 

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508, “[a] physical or mental impairment must be established by 

medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings.” Because it is 

presumed that plaintiff’s extremely low adult full scale IQ score indicates a severe mental 

impairment and is probative of his intellectual capacity prior to age 22, the ALJ erred in finding 

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that the record contained no medical signs or findings showing that plaintiff had medically 

determinable impairment prior to age 22.3

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff did not have any medically 

determinable impairments prior to age 22 was erroneous because it was inconsistent with the 

ALJ’s own finding that plaintiff had moderate difficulties with regard to concentration, 

persistence, or pace, which indicated that plaintiff at least had a medically determinable 

impairment. AT 20. The court agrees. Under the relevant regulations, an ALJ is required to 

address the degree of functional limitation resulting from a mental impairment only if it is 

determined that there are “pertinent symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings” showing that the 

claimant has a medically determinable mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(b) (“[W]e 

must first evaluate your pertinent symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings to determine whether 

you have a medically determinable mental impairment(s). . . . We must then rate the degree of 

functional limitation resulting from the impairment(s) . . . .”). Here the ALJ found that plaintiff 

had moderate difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace, AT 20, but ultimately 

determined that “there were no medical signs or laboratory findings to substantiate the existence 

of a medically determinable impairment” prior to the date on which plaintiff reached age 22, AT 

19. By finding that plaintiff had a moderate limitation in at least one area of mental functioning, 

the ALJ necessarily had to first find that plaintiff had a medically determinable mental 

impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(b). However, the ALJ found just the opposite in 

determining whether plaintiff had a medically determinable impairment of any kind prior to age

22. AT 19. Therefore, the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff had not been disabled prior to age 22 

because he had no medically determinable impairments despite his finding that plaintiff had 

 

3

In addition, while they are not medical signs or laboratory findings, the court also finds that the 

evidence in the record indicating that plaintiff attended special education classes and dropped out 

of high school prior to graduation due to learning difficulties provides further support for a 

finding that plaintiff suffered from a medically determinable mental impairment prior to age 22. 

See Pedro v. Astrue, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1011 (D. Or. 2011) (quoting Campbell v. Astrue, 

2011 WL 444783, *17 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2011)) (“A claimant may use circumstantial evidence to 

demonstrate adaptive functioning deficits, such as ‘attendance in special education classes, 

dropping out of high school prior to graduation, difficulties in reading, writing or math, and low 

skilled work history.’”).

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mental limitations was internally inconsistent, and therefore erroneous.

4

In sum, the ALJ’s determination that there were no medical signs or laboratory findings to 

substantiate the existence of a medically determinable impairment prior to the date on which 

plaintiff turned age 22 was not supported by substantial evidence from the record and was 

internally inconsistent with the ALJ’s own findings regarding plaintiff’s mental limitations. 

Accordingly, the ALJ committed prejudicial error in making such a determination.

B. The ALJ Committed Further Error in Assigning “Reduced Weight” to Dr. 

Bowerman’s Opinion and “Significant Weight” to the Opinions of the State Agency 

Reviewing Physicians

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ committed further error in his consideration of the medical 

evidence in the record. Specifically, he argues that the ALJ failed to give clear and convincing 

reasons for discounting Dr. Bowerman’s uncontroverted examining opinion and failed to provide 

substantial evidence in support of his assignment of greater weight to the opinions of the two nonexamining physicians in the record.

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a 

greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 

 

4

The ALJ did not specify in his decision whether he determined that plaintiff’s moderate 

limitation with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace was with respect to his mental 

functioning at the time of the hearing, or with respect to his functioning during the relevant 

period, i.e., prior to age 22. Nevertheless, the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff did not have a 

medically determinable impairment prior to age 22 would still have been erroneous in light of the 

ALJ’s findings regarding plaintiff’s mental limitations even if the ALJ intended those limitations 

to reflect plaintiff’s mental functioning at the time of the hearing because the unrebutted 

presumption that plaintiff’s adult IQ scores reflected his mental capabilities over the course of his 

lifetime indicates that the mental limitations the ALJ found plaintiff to have as an adult would 

relate back to plaintiff’s childhood mental functioning.

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and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In 

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical 

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, 

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a 

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

Here, the ALJ gave “reduced weight” to the consultative examining opinion of Dr. 

Bowerman for the following reasons:

Dr. Bowerman’s opinion is given reduced weight as it is based on a single 

examination of the claimant and there are internal inconsistencies between the 

findings upon examination, the diagnoses and the residual functional capacity 

determined to be appropriate for the claimant. Dr. Bowerman found marked 

impairment in the claimant’s memory yet he was able to report all relevant social, 

educational, legal, and medical history from memory. Similarly, Dr. Bowerman 

found marked impairment in the claimant’s attention and concentration yet also 

observed the claimant’s attention and concentration were within normal limits. 

Further, due to a lack of medical records showing treatment, it is difficult to 

ascertain the degree of impairment. Finally, despite the claimant’s allegations of 

childhood disability, the claimant’s medical records don’t begin until well after the 

age of 22 in 1985.

AT 22. Plaintiff argues that these reasons were not clear and convincing reasons for discounting 

Dr. Bowerman’s opinion supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner appears to 

concede that Dr. Bowerman’s was uncontroverted, thus requiring the ALJ to meet the more 

stringent “clear and convincing” standard in order to properly support his determination. She 

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asserts, however, that this standard was met. For the reasons discussed below, the court finds 

plaintiff’s argument persuasive. The ALJ erred in considering Dr. Bowerman’s opinion.

First, the ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Bowerman’s opinion because it was based on a 

single examination of plaintiff. While examination frequency is a proper consideration when 

weighing medical opinion evidence, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i), substantial evidence does 

not support the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Bowerman’s opinion under the circumstances 

presented in this case. Dr. Bowerman was the only physician in the record to conduct objective 

psychological testing on plaintiff and provide an opinion based on a full mental examination. AT 

221-32. Neither of the state agency reviewing physicians to whom the ALJ gave greater weight 

examined plaintiff and none of plaintiff’s treating physicians provided opinions regarding 

plaintiff’s mental functioning based on an examination.

The ALJ also erred in his reasoning that Dr. Bowerman’s opinion that plaintiff had a 

marked impairment regarding memory conflicted with her examination notes indicating that 

plaintiff was able to report all relevant social, educational, legal, and medical history from 

memory. Dr. Bowerman’s examination notes provide that plaintiff stated during the examination 

“that he has no medical conditions,” but that the “records that arrived after his appointment

[demonstrated] that [plaintiff] has hepatitis C and liver problems.” AT 221. This is contrary to 

the ALJ’s assertion that Dr. Bowerman’s notes show that plaintiff had a good memory regarding 

his medical history. Furthermore, Dr. Bowerman’s notes also reveal that plaintiff obtained scores 

in the “extremely low” range with regard to all areas of memory after undergoing a battery of 

objective memory tests. AT 225. In short, the record does not contain substantial evidence to 

support the ALJ’s reasoning that Dr. Bowerman’s examination notes were inconsistent with her 

opinion regarding plaintiff’s memory.

Similarly, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Bowerman’s 

opinion that plaintiff had a marked impairment in the areas of attention and concentration was 

undermined by her observation that plaintiff’s attention and concentration were within normal 

limits. Dr. Bowerman noted that plaintiff’s “concentration and task persistence were good,” but 

made that observation with regard to validity of the psychological test results plaintiff obtained 

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and in support of her determination that plaintiff’s results were an accurate reflection of his 

mental functioning. AT 223. Contrary to the ALJ’s reasoning, this observation did not conflict 

with her opinion that plaintiff was markedly impaired in “[h]is ability to maintain concentration, 

attention and for pacing and tracking,” AT 227 (emphasis added), and Dr. Bowerman does not 

indicate elsewhere in her examination notes that plaintiff was capable of concentrating on a 

sustained basis.

Finally, the ALJ’s last stated reason for discounting Dr. Bowerman’s opinion, that 

plaintiff’s medical records don’t begin until well after he turned age 22, was also not a clear and 

convincing reason under the circumstances presented here. As discussed above, the full scale IQ 

score Dr. Bowerman obtained indicated that plaintiff had “extremely low” intellectual functioning 

and there is a presumption that that score had been consistent throughout plaintiff’s life, including 

before he reached the age of 22. Accordingly, the fact that plaintiff’s medical records in the 

record addressing his intellectual functioning were not obtained until plaintiff was well into 

adulthood was not a clear and convincing reason for assigning reduced weight to Dr. Bowerman’s 

opinion.

Plaintiff also correctly argues that the ALJ erred in assigning greater weight to the 

opinions of the state agency non-examining physicians who opined that there was insufficient 

medical evidence in the record from the relevant period to establish childhood disability on the 

basis that they were consistent with the record as a whole. First, these opinions were developed 

before Dr. Bowerman conducted the psychological testing that indicated that plaintiff’s 

intellectual functioning was in the extremely low range. Neither of the non-examining physicians 

had an opportunity to review Dr. Bowerman’s objective clinical findings despite the fact that they 

were presumptively probative of plaintiff’s intellectual functioning during the relevant period. 

Outside of Dr. Bowerman’s uncontroverted opinion, none of the other clinical evidence in the 

record provides findings pertinent to plaintiff’s mental functioning during the relevant period. 

The reviewing physicians acknowledged this fact by noting in their opinions that there was no 

medical evidence in the record they reviewed that was relevant to the time period at issue. AT 

54-67. While their earlier opinions may have been reasonable based on the evidence available to 

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them at the time, the results regarding plaintiff’s mental functioning obtained from Dr. 

Bowerman’s examination constituted new and material evidence signifying that plaintiff was 

more functionally limited during the relevant period than what the record had previously 

indicated. Because the non-examining physicians did not review this new and material evidence, 

it was error for the ALJ to rely on their opinions to support his determination that there was no 

medical evidence in the record that plaintiff had a medically determinable impairment prior to age 

22.

C. The ALJ’s Errors Warrant Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s errors warrant remand for further administrative 

proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court agrees.

When the court finds that the ALJ committed prejudicial error, it has the discretion to 

remand or reverse and award benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Generally, if the court finds that the ALJ’s decision was erroneous or not supported by substantial 

evidence, the court must follow the “ordinary remand rule,” meaning that “the proper course, 

except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or 

explanation.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). A 

remand for an award of benefits is inappropriate where the record has not been fully developed or 

there is a need to resolve conflicts, ambiguities, or other outstanding issues. Id. at 1101.

Here, the ALJ erroneously found plaintiff not disabled prior to age 22 based on a wrongful 

determination that there were no medical signs or laboratory findings in the record to substantiate 

the existence of a medically determinable impairment. While the ALJ also briefly discussed 

whether plaintiff’s mental impairments met or equaled the requirements of Listing 12.05, finding 

that they did not, he did not continue on with his analysis to the subsequent steps of the sequential 

analysis. Accordingly, given that there is medical evidence in the record presumed to accurately 

reflect plaintiff’s mental functioning during the relevant period, i.e., plaintiff’s valid full scale IQ 

score, remand is warranted in order for the ALJ to properly consider what, if any, functional 

limitations stemmed from this presumed level of mental functioning during the relevant period. 

Furthermore, further administrative proceedings are warranted to allow the ALJ an opportunity to 

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properly consider and weigh Dr. Bowerman’s opinion regarding plaintiff’s mental functional 

limitations in light of the presumption that the psychological test results obtained through her 

examination of plaintiff relate back to plaintiff’s mental functioning during the relevant period.

On remand, the ALJ should consider the functional impact of plaintiff’s presumed level of 

mental functioning during the relevant period in light of the record as a whole. Furthermore, the 

ALJ should reconsider Dr. Bowerman’s examining opinion in light of the presumption that 

plaintiff’s full scale IQ score accurately reflected plaintiff’s intellectual abilities during the 

relevant period, and, if he chooses not to rely on that opinion, should provide clear and 

convincing reasons for discounting it, or, if the ALJ chooses to further develop the record and 

there exists conflicting opinion evidence, specific and legitimate reasons. The ALJ is free to 

develop the record in other ways, as needed.

Importantly, the court expresses no opinion regarding how the evidence should ultimately 

be weighed, and any ambiguities or inconsistencies resolved, on remand. The court also does not 

instruct the ALJ to credit any particular opinion or testimony, including the opinion of Dr. 

Bowerman. The ALJ may ultimately find that plaintiff was disabled prior to age 22, or may find 

the evidence in the record insufficient to show that plaintiff was disabled at any time during that 

period—provided that the ALJ’s determination complies with applicable legal standards and is 

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

D. Other Issues

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ committed further prejudicial error because he did not 

obtain the testimony of a medical expert regarding whether plaintiff’s impairments began prior to 

age 22. Given that remand is warranted for the reasons discussed above, the court declines to 

address this additional issue at this time. On remand, the ALJ will have an opportunity to 

reconsider the evidence in the record, and to further develop the record, if necessary, in light of 

the presumption that plaintiff’s full scale IQ score and other objective intellectual functioning test 

results in the record relate back to his intellectual functioning during the relevant period. In doing 

so, the ALJ may find it helpful, or possibly even necessary, to obtain testimony from a medical 

expert to assist him in properly determining whether plaintiff suffered a mental impairment prior 

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to age 22 that rendered him disabled within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, at this juncture, 

the court will leave it to the ALJ’s discretion to determine whether to call a medical expert to 

testify as to this topic on remand.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, this matter will be remanded under sentence four of 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) for further development of the record and for further findings addressing the 

deficiencies noted above. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13) is granted for purposes of 

further development and reconsideration of the record consistent with the court’s directions set 

forth above;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is denied; and,

3. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Dated: February 10, 2016

11 lang0624.ss.cib

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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