Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-06-04363/USCOURTS-ca4-06-04363-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hassan Richard Miller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4363

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

HASSAN RICHARD MILLER, a/k/a Ernest Danielle

Smith,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District

Judge. (0:97-cr-726-CMC-1)

Submitted: October 17, 2007 Decided: February 15, 2008

Before TRAXLER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per

curiam opinion.

Jack B. Swerling, LAW OFFICES OF JACK B. SWERLING, Columbia, South

Carolina, for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States

Attorney, Kevin F. McDonald, Assistant United States Attorney,

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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The “official victim” enhancement was amended, effective

November 1, 2004, providing now for a six-level, versus a threelevel, enhancement. See USSG App. C, Amend. 663; USSG § 3A1.2(c)

(2004).

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PER CURIAM:

Hassan Richard Miller pled guilty in 2003 to possession

with intent to distribute crack cocaine and was originally

sentenced to 262 months imprisonment. Miller appealed, claiming

that his sentence violated United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220

(2005), and United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir.

2005). This court agreed and vacated Miller’s sentence for

resentencing consistent with those opinions. 

On remand, the district court conducted a resentencing

hearing and determined that Miller’s total offense level remained

at 36, which included a three-level enhancement for assaulting a

police officer under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG)

§ 3A1.2(b) (2002).1 With a criminal history category IV, Miller’s

resulting guideline range remained at 262-327 months imprisonment.

After Miller’s attorney argued for a sentence below his original

262-month sentence, the district court stated:

I agree it is a lengthy prison sentence. I considered

that. I just don’t see any circumstances that warrant a

different sentence than the sentence I imposed then. I

gave him ten years concurrent, which is pretty generous.

And even though it is a long sentence, although he has a

long sentence, it could have been a lot longer.

So, pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,

it is the judgment of the court that [Miller] is hereby

committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be

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imprisoned for a term of 262 months; 120 months of which

is to run concurrently with the undischarged term of

imprisonment that you are now serving under the

provisions of 5G1.3C. 

Miller noted a timely appeal. 

Miller first argues that the district court clearly erred

in finding that he committed an aggravated assault on a law

enforcement officer warranting an enhancement under USSG

§ 3A1.2(b). We review the district court’s factual finding on this

issue for clear error. United States v. Harrison, 272 F.3d 220,

223 (4th Cir. 2001). 

At the time of Miller’s original sentencing, USSG

§ 3A1.2(b) provided for a three-level enhancement if “during the

course of the offense or immediate flight therefrom, the defendant

. . . , knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that a person

was a law enforcement or corrections officer, assaulted such

officer in a manner creating a substantial risk of serious bodily

injury.” Application Note 4(A) further provided that this section

“applies in circumstances tantamount to aggravated assault . . .

against a law enforcement officer.” The evidence established that,

at the time of his arrest, Miller threw a juice bottle (which he

had just purchased from a convenience store) at one of the

arresting officers and hit him in the head. Regardless of the

extent of the officer’s actual injury, we find that the district

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Indeed, while the evidence of the injuries suffered by the

officer who Miller assaulted is somewhat sparse--no doubt at least

in part because he had died prior to Miller’s sentencing--another

officer testified in a related proceeding that the victim officer

was left with a scar that remained visible long after the incident.

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court did not clearly err in finding that the enhancement applied

because there was a substantial risk of serious injury.2

Next, Miller argues that the sentence imposed is

unreasonable because, inter alia, the district court failed to

consider the requisite factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)

(West 2000 & Supp. 2007). We find insufficient evidence in the

record to show Miller is in error.

This court reviews a district court’s sentence for

reasonableness. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546-47. “Consistent with the

remedial scheme set forth in Booker, a district court shall first

calculate (after making the appropriate findings of fact) the range

prescribed by the guidelines.” Id. at 546. Next, the district

court must consider this range in conjunction with other relevant

factors under the guidelines and § 3553(a) and impose a sentence.

Id. The sentence must be “within the statutorily prescribed range

and . . . reasonable.” Id. at 546-47 (citations omitted). “[A]

sentence within the proper advisory Guidelines range is

presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339,

341 (4th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Rita v. United

States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007) (upholding application of

rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to within-guidelines

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sentence). “[A] defendant can only rebut the presumption by

demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured

against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda,

445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3044 (2007).

A post-Booker sentence may be unreasonable for procedural

or substantive reasons. “A sentence may be procedurally

unreasonable, for example, if the district court provides an

inadequate statement of reasons or fails to make a necessary

factual finding.” United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434

(4th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054

(2006). While a district court must consider the various factors

listed in § 3553(a) and explain its sentence, it need not

“robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection” or

“explicitly discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the record.”

Johnson, 445 F.3d at 345. “This is particularly the case when the

district court imposes a sentence within the applicable Guidelines

range.” Id. (citation omitted).

However, “a district court’s explanation should provide

some indication (1) that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors

with respect to the particular defendant; and (2) that it has also

considered the potentially meritorious arguments raised by both

parties about sentencing.” Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 380

(citations omitted). “[I]n determining whether there has been an

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We note that the district court sentenced Miller prior to our

decisions in Johnson and Montes-Pineda, and thus did not have the

benefit of the guidance provided by those cases. We further note

that the district court is free on remand to impose the same

sentence or a different one; nothing in this opinion should be read

to suggest that we have formed any view regarding the appropriate

outcome of Miller’s resentencing.

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adequate explanation, [the court does] not evaluate a court’s

sentencing statements in a vacuum.” Id. at 381. Rather, “[t]he

context surrounding a district court’s explanation may imbue it

with enough content for [the court] to evaluate both whether the

court considered the § 3553(a) factors and whether it did so

properly.” Id.

On the record before us, we are unable to discern whether

the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors or whether it

did so properly. Accordingly, we vacate Miller’s sentence and

remand for resentencing in order to allow the district court to

articulate its reasons in imposing sentence.3

 We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

 VACATED IN PART,

 AND REMANDED

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