Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01541/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01541-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Veterans Affairs
Respondent
Tiffany Potter
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

TIFFANY POTTER,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________

2019-1541

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DE-1221-18-0165-W-1.

______________________

Decided: February 13, 2020

______________________

A. MARQUES PITRE, Pitre & Associates, LLC, Washington, DC, argued for petitioner. 

 AMANDA TANTUM, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by 

JOSEPH H. HUNT, CLAUDIA BURKE, ROBERT EDWARD 

KIRSCHMAN, JR. 

______________________

Before PROST, Chief Judge, MOORE and HUGHES,

Circuit Judges.

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2 POTTER v. DVA

PROST, Chief Judge.

Tiffany Potter petitions for review of a decision by the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB” or “Board”) denying corrective action in her claim filed under the Whistleblower Protection Act. For the reasons explained below, we 

affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. 

I

In 2014, the Phoenix VA Health Care System (“Phoenix 

DVA” or “agency”) where Ms. Potter worked was in the 

midst of a patient care crisis that had resulted in an investigation by the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General (“OIG”). Beginning around that same

time, Ms. Potter alleges she engaged in five whistleblowing 

activities at the Phoenix DVA by making four protected disclosures and by cooperating with OIG. 

Ms. Potter made her first alleged disclosure in May 

2014, when she sent an email to her supervisor, Dr. Robbi 

Venditti, regarding significant cancellations and delays in 

appointments for urology patients. See J.A. 237. Ms. Potter’s second alleged disclosure was on July 10, 2014, when 

she sent an email to agency personnel regarding psychotherapy patients who, despite urgent need, were not being 

treated or referred to a private community partner. See

J.A. 238. Later that same day, Ms. Potter forwarded her 

July 10 email to Dr. Venditti and copied, among others, the 

Phoenix DVA Chief of Staff Dr. Darren Deering. Dr. Deering replied that evening. J.A. 238–42. 

On August 8, 2014, Ms. Potter made her third alleged 

disclosure when she emailed OIG employee Katrina Young,

reporting concerns related to medical providers not receiving important information. J.A. 249–52; see also J.A. 243–

48. A couple of weeks later, on August 20, 2014, Ms. Young 

sent an email to Ms. Potter requesting that Ms. Potter call 

her. J.A. 253. Ms. Potter states that this email was related 

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POTTER v. DVA 3

to a fourth whistleblowing activity, namely, cooperation 

with OIG. 

In December 2016, Ms. Potter made her fifth and final 

alleged whistleblowing disclosure by filing a complaint 

with OIG. Ms. Potter’s complaint is not available in the 

record, but an email acknowledging OIG’s receipt of the 

complaint confirms that it was filed. See J.A. 257–58. 

Ms. Potter also alleges that her whistleblowing activity 

contributed to four reprisals by the Phoenix DVA.

Throughout most of the period that Ms. Potter engaged 

in the alleged whistleblowing activities just described, Ms. 

Potter was employed as a Nurse III working in the Purchased Care department with the title “Nurse Manager.” 

See J.A. 302. Then in December 2014, during reorganization of the Phoenix DVA, Ms. Potter’s title was changed to 

“Chief Nurse Manager.” J.A. 303. In March 2015, however, Ms. Potter’s title was changed back to “Nurse Manager.” See J.A. 304. Ms. Potter alleges that the change in 

title from “Chief Nurse Manager” to “Nurse Manager” 

amounts to a demotion and the agency’s first reprisal. The 

Phoenix DVA, in contrast, states that the title changes 

were the consequences of unrelated organizational changes

occurring within the agency

Ms. Potter alleges that the agency’s second reprisal occurred in November 2015 when Dr. Deering withdrew a 

posted vacancy for a Chief Nurse IV position titled “Registered Nurse, Chief Nurse Administrative Medicine Service.” Though Ms. Potter had applied for the position, the 

Phoenix DVA failed to fill the vacancy. 

According to Ms. Potter, the agency’s third alleged reprisal then occurred in January 2017 when the medical 

center director, RimaAnn Nelson, signed a detail notice, detailing Ms. Potter to “unclassified duties.” J.A. 260–62. 

Ms. Nelson testified that most of those duties were being 

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4 POTTER v. DVA

reassigned from another employee that did not have the 

expertise to complete them, whereas Ms. Potter did. 

Finally, Ms. Potter alleges that in early 2017, conditions at the Phoenix DVA forced her “involuntary resignation,” constituting the agency’s fourth and final reprisal.

Ms. Potter testified that she began looking for transfer opportunities “at the end of 2016,” J.A. 118, and in March 

2017, she informed Ms. Nelson that she was accepting an 

offer for a Staff Nurse position at the VA Northern California Health Care System beginning in April 2017, see J.A. 

315, 318.

Following her transfer, Ms. Potter filed a whistleblower 

reprisal complaint at the Office of Special Counsel. That 

complaint ultimately resulted in an individual right of action appeal to the MSPB. 

II

During the proceedings before the MSPB, the administrative judge determined that the Board had jurisdiction 

over five nonfrivolous allegations of protected disclosures, 

complaints, or activity by Ms. Potter: (1) the May 2014 

email; (2) the July 10, 2014 email; (3) the August 8, 2014 

email; (4) the August 20, 2014 cooperation with OIG; and 

(5) the December 2016 complaint.1 

1 To the extent that, on appeal, Ms. Potter alleges 

she made additional whistleblowing disclosures that the 

administrative judge failed to consider, we conclude that 

such disclosures are not properly before us. Even if Ms. 

Potter could identify an error in the administrative judge’s 

jurisdictional order limiting jurisdiction to five allegations 

of whistleblowing activity, the record shows that before the 

Board—despite having the opportunity to do so—Ms. Potter failed to challenge the jurisdictional determination on 

the basis of her having allegedly made additional whistleblowing disclosures. See J.A. 390, 397–99. It is therefore 

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The administrative judge also determined that the 

Board had jurisdiction over four alleged reprisals by the 

Phoenix DVA: (1) the March 2015 title change from Chief 

Nurse to Nurse Manager; (2) the November 2015 failure to 

hire a Chief Nurse IV; (3) the January 2017 unclassified 

duties detail; and (4) the March 2017 “involuntary resignation.” 

Following a hearing on the merits, the administrative 

judge concluded that Ms. Potter had established that four 

of the five alleged whistleblowing disclosures and activities, i.e., all disclosures except the August 20, 2014 cooperation with OIG, constituted “protected” disclosures within 

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and § 2302(b)(9). Potter v. Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, No. DE-1221-18-0165-W-1, slip op. at 6–

11 (M.S.B.P. Dec. 13, 2018) (“Decision”). The administrative judge then determined that according to the 

knowledge-timing test of 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1), Ms. Potter 

had only met her burden of showing that these protected 

disclosures contributed to the first alleged reprisal, i.e., the 

March 2015 title change. Id. at 10–27. In other words, the 

administrative judge found that Ms. Potter had shown only 

one prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal. The administrative judge ultimately denied corrective action for this 

prima facie case because the government met its burden to 

show that the Phoenix DVA would have taken the same 

action even if Ms. Potter had not made the protected disclosures. Id. at 27–32.

not proper for this court to review that jurisdictional order 

in the first instance on appeal. See, e.g., Wallace v. Dep’t of 

the Air Force, 879 F.2d 829, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[O]bjections to the proceedings of an administrative agency [must]

be made while it has an opportunity for correction in order 

to raise issues reviewable by the courts.”). 

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6 POTTER v. DVA

The administrative judge’s initial decision became the 

final decision of the Board. Ms. Potter now petitions for 

review. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

III

On review to this court, a final decision of the Board 

will be set aside only if the decision is: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, 

rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported 

by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).

A

Ms. Potter first challenges the administrative judge’s 

conclusion that she did not establish a prima facie case of 

whistleblower reprisal with respect to the agency’s November 2015 failure to hire a Chief Nurse IV. On appeal, the 

parties agree that the administrative judge’s fact finding 

related to this alleged reprisal is not supported by substantial evidence. More particularly, the parties agree that the 

administrative judge incorrectly found that Dr. Deering did 

not have knowledge of Ms. Potter’s second protected disclosure, i.e., her July 10, 2014 email. See Decision, at 15–16; 

see Petitioner’s Br. 20; Respondent’s Br. 38–39. The administrative judge relied on this erroneous fact finding in 

determining that Ms. Potter had not satisfied the 

knowledge-timing test under 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1) for the 

November 2015 failure to hire. See Decision, at 15–16. 

Therefore, the administrative judge concluded that Ms. 

Potter had failed to establish a prima facie case of whistleblowing reprisal for the November 2015 failure to hire. Id.

at 14–22. 

Because we agree with the parties that the record 

clearly shows that Dr. Deering not only had knowledge of 

Ms. Potter’s email, but also that he responded to it, 

J.A. 238–42; see also Decision, at 8, we determine that the 

administrative judge’s fact finding is not supported by 

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POTTER v. DVA 7

substantial evidence. We therefore vacate the administrative judge’s determination that Ms. Potter did not make a 

prima facie case that her whistleblowing was a contributing factor to the agency’s November 2015 nonselection of 

her for Chief Nurse IV and remand to the Board. 

On remand, the Board should consider whether, in 

view of Dr. Deering’s knowledge of Ms. Potter’s July 10, 

2014 email, Ms. Potter presented evidence sufficient to satisfy the knowledge-timing test, or if Ms. Potter otherwise 

presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate a prima facie 

case of whistleblower reprisal. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). If 

the Board finds such a prima facie case, then the Board 

should additionally consider whether the government can 

meet its burden of showing that it would have taken the 

same November 2015 personnel action regardless of 

Ms. Potter’s protected disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1);

see also Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. 

Cir. 1999). 

Despite agreeing that the administrative judge erred 

in analyzing Dr. Deering’s knowledge of the July 10, 2014 

email, the government argues that remand is not required. 

The government concedes that when the record is properly 

considered, Ms. Potter has “likely” established a prima facie case. Respondent’s Br. 38–39. The government then 

urges us to find in the first instance, that even if Ms. Potter 

has established a prima facie case, the agency would have 

nevertheless taken the November 2015 personnel action 

regardless of Ms. Potter’s protected disclosure. Id. 37–42.

We decline to engage in such fact finding on appeal.

The government argues that our decision in McCarthy 

v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 809 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 

2016), permits us to rely on the administrative judge’s fact 

finding to resolve this appeal. See Respondent’s Br. 40. 

More particularly, the government quotes McCarthy’s

statement that this court may “affirm the agency on 

grounds other than those relied upon in rendering its 

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8 POTTER v. DVA

decision, when upholding the agency’s decision does not depend upon making a determination of fact not previously 

made by the agency.” McCarthy, 809 F.3d at 1373 (quoting 

In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).

Contrary to the government’s suggestion, McCarthy

does not endorse appellate fact finding in this case. In 

McCarthy we considered whether the MSPB correctly denied a motion to reopen. McCarthy, 809 F.3d at 1373. 

Though the Board had not explained its bases for denying 

the motion, on appeal, we concluded that we were able to 

identify sufficient legal bases, which did not require additional fact finding, to affirm the Board’s denial. Id. at 

1373–75. Critically, therefore, the central question in 

McCarthy was a question of law that was based on undisputed facts. This case in contrast, as the government 

agrees, involves a question of fact that the administrative 

judge never considered—namely, whether the agency 

would have taken the same November 2015 personnel action absent the second protected disclosure. See Oral Arg. 

at 17:41–59, No. 19-1541, 

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings?title=potter&field_case_number_value=19-1541&field_date

_value2%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=; see also id. at 

18:00–37. 

Moreover, we do not agree with the government that 

the administrative judge’s fact finding related to whether 

Ms. Potter established a prima facie case was sufficient to 

resolve the present question. The administrative judge’s 

fact finding considered whether, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, Ms. Potter had shown that her protected disclosure contributed to the agency’s alleged reprisal. It does 

not resolve the separate question of whether, by clear and 

convincing evidence, the agency established that it would 

have taken the November 2015 personnel action regardless 

of Ms. Potter’s second protected disclosure. Accordingly, 

unlike in McCarthy, we may not resolve the outstanding 

question with respect to the November 2015 failure to hire.

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POTTER v. DVA 9

B

Ms. Potter also challenges the administrative judge’s 

determination that she is not entitled to corrective action 

with respect to the first alleged reprisal (the March 2015 

title change), despite having established a prima facie case,

because the agency met its burden of proving that it would 

have taken the same personnel action regardless of Ms. 

Potter’s protected disclosures. And Ms. Potter separately 

challenges the administrative judge’s determination that

she failed to establish a prima facie case of whistleblower 

reprisal with respect to the third and fourth alleged reprisals (respectively, the January 2017 unclassified duties detail and the March 2017 “involuntary resignation”). 

We conclude that the administrative judge’s decision as 

to these three reprisals is in accordance with the law and 

is supported by substantial evidence. We have considered 

Ms. Potter’s other arguments but find them unpersuasive. 

Therefore, with respect to the first, third, and fourth alleged reprisals, we affirm the administrative judge’s decision. 

CONCLUSION

In sum, we vacate only the portion of the Board’s decision related to the November 2015 failure to hire and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART,

AND REMANDED

COSTS

The parties shall bear their own costs.

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