Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07115/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07115-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Swanks
Appellee
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 29, 1999 Decided June 18, 1999

No. 98-7115

Michael Swanks,

Appellee

v.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv02421)

Lisa D. Fentress argued the cause for appellant. With her

on the briefs were Cheryl C. Burke, Robert J. Kniaz and

Gerard J. Stief.

Woodley B. Osborne argued the cause and filed the brief

for appellee.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Wald and Rogers, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: In Swanks v. WMATA, 116 F.3d

582, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Swanks I"), the court held that

receipt of disability benefits under the Social Security Act, see

42 U.S.C. s 423 (1994), did not bar recovery under the

Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. s 12101

(1994), et seq., and remanded the case to the district court for

a jury to determine whether the Washington Metropolitan

Area Transit Authority ("WMATA") had discriminated

against Michael Swanks. See 116 F.3d at 587-88. Thereafter a jury found for WMATA on Swanks' claim that WMATA

had failed to accommodate his request for additional exercise,

and for Swanks on the question of whether WMATA had

fired him because of his disability. On appeal, WMATA

contends that Swanks failed to show that he remained qualified for his position as a special police officer once his

commission as a special police officer under District of Columbia law expired, and that he had been discriminated against

because of his disability. Inasmuch as the only question

before this court is whether, absent an error of law by the

district court, no reasonable juror could find that WMATA

discriminated against Swanks because of his disability, and

there was no legal error and ample evidence on which the

jury could reasonably find discrimination, we affirm.1

I.

Michael Swanks suffers from a congenital condition known

as spina bifida, which affects his urinary tract and leads to

__________

1 On April 8, 1999, the court denied WMATA's motion to postpone

oral argument in view of the Supreme Court's grant of a petition for

writ of certiorari in Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp.,

120 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1997). See 119 S. Ct. 39 (1998). The

Supreme Court has since decided Cleveland and its disposition has

no bearing on the issue before this court. See Cleveland v. Policy

Management Sys. Corp., No. 97-1008, 1999 WL 320795 (May 24,

1999).

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incontinence and infections. At the time he was hired in 1989

by WMATA as a special police officer, Swanks informed an

interviewer and a WMATA examining physician of his condition. He initially worked at locations in the District of

Columbia, Virginia, and Maryland, but his work site "stabilized" in 1991 when he began working at the West Falls

Church METRO stop in Virginia. Viewing the evidence most

favorably to Swanks, as we must, see Boodoo v. Cary, 21 F.3d

1157, 1159, 1161-62 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Anderson v. Group

Hospitalization, Inc., 820 F.2d 465, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1987),

Swanks missed work a few more days than allowed as a

result of his condition and provided doctor's certificates regarding his absences.2 His performance reviews described

him as generally effective and competent, but one noted that

his "unscheduled absences ... indicate[ ] a lack of stability

which has affected his leadership." In June 1991, he received

a letter warning him that "further unscheduled absence could

lead to more severe disciplinary action." The following

month he provided WMATA with a letter from his doctor

explaining that he had spina bifida and that it affected his

urinary tract; a few days later, he provided a doctor's statement describing the symptoms as fever, vomiting, diarrhea,

nausea, frequent urination, and lower back pain--many of the

reasons that Swanks had described when taking sick leave.

In addition, Swanks testified that he discussed his symptoms

with his WMATA supervisors and doctors. Yet in late 1992,

when he asked if he could get either more exercise to

accommodate these symptoms or a transfer, Darryl Rice, the

captain of WMATA's special police officers, told him that

WMATA's tight financial situation made that impossible and

that "[t]he best thing for [Swanks] to do was resign and go

in[to] the construction field."

In September 1992, as part of a system-wide spot check, a

supervisor asked to see Swanks' special police commission.

__________

2 Swanks testified that he used his sick leave only when he was

sick, using twelve days in 1989-90, 18 days in 1990-91, and 22 days

in 1991-92. Swanks also testified that he used annual leave for

vacation and to care for his wife when she was sick.

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Swanks stated that it was in his wallet, which he had left the

day before with his brother-in-law. Upon retrieving the

wallet, however, he discovered that the commission was missing and went to the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department for

a replacement. He was unaware before then that his commission had expired over a year earlier. Captain Rice subsequently recommended that Swanks be dismissed for not

having his commission and for lying about having lost it when

WMATA asked if he had it. In October, Swanks was dismissed from his job. When his wife telephoned to ask why

her husband was being fired, Captain Rice told her that the

termination was due to her husband's absences and not the

expiration of the "gun permit." Swanks filed suit under the

ADA, alleging that WMATA failed to provide reasonable

accommodation for his disability and that it discharged him

because of his disability.

II.

Although the court reviews de novo the denial of WMATA's

motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative,

for a new trial, see Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d

748, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1996), it is long settled that "the jury's

verdict will withstand challenge unless the evidence and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so

one-sided that reasonable men and women could not disagree

on the verdict." Id. at 753. Because the evidence presented

by the plaintiff must be "significantly probative," rather than

"merely colorable," Siegel v. Mazda Motor Corp., 878 F.2d

435, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1989), "the question for us is not whether

there was some evidence, but whether, in terms of the actual

quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability,

there was sufficient evidence upon which a jury could properly base a verdict for the [plaintiff]." Id. (quotation marks

omitted). In other words, if there was no error of law by the

district court in allowing issues to be represented to the jury,

the remaining question is whether no reasonable juror could

find that WMATA had fired Swanks for a discriminatory

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reason. See Anderson, 820 F.2d at 472-73; cf. Milone v.

WMATA, 91 F.3d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

A.

Under the now familiar three-part protocol established in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973),

and further elaborated upon in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981), and St.

Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993), the

plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.

The employer then bears the burden to produce evidence of a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. See Aka v.

Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(in banc). If the employer can meet this burden of production,

the focus of proceedings at trial ... will be on whether

the jury could infer discrimination from the combination

of the plaintiff's prima facie case; (2) any evidence the

plaintiff presents to attack the employer's proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of

discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff (such

as independent evidence of discriminatory statements or

attitudes on the part of the employer) or any contrary

evidence that may be available to the employer (such as

evidence of a strong track record in equal opportunity

employment).

Id. at 1289. The plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of

persuasion, to demonstrate that he was in fact the victim of

intentional discrimination. See id. at 1290.

To sustain a claim under the ADA, Swanks must prove that

he had a disability within the meaning of the ADA, that he

was "qualified" for the position with or without a reasonable

accommodation, and that he suffered an adverse employment

action because of his disability. See Kiel v. Select Artificials,

Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1999); Martinson v.

Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683, 686 (4th Cir. 1997); White

v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1995). On

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appeal, WMATA contends that Swanks was unqualified for

his position and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case

of discrimination. It further contends that the evidence demonstrated that WMATA terminated Swanks for legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons, specifically that "he did not have

a valid police commission and he lied about the status of the

license."

The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because

of the disability ... in regard to ... discharge of employees

... and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. s 12112(a) (1994) (emphasis added). The

Act defines a "qualified individual" as a person "with a

disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation,

can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." Id. s 12111(8). It

further provides that "consideration shall be given to the

employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description

before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this

description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job." Id.; cf. Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529

(D.C. Cir. 1994).

Whether an individual is "qualified" for a job may at times

present a pure question of law to be resolved by the court,

but it may also, as in this case, be a question of fact that must

be resolved by a fact-finder at trial. Thus, for example, in

Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998),

the Seventh Circuit concluded that a factual dispute existed

as to whether an employer required a certain type of employee to have a commercial driver's license and consequently, the

employer "may not obtain summary judgment by declaring it

has a policy when [the employee] may have evidence that [the

employer] follows the policy [of requiring commercial licenses] selectively." Id. at 632; see also Griffith v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 383-84 (6th Cir. 1998). The issue

of qualification in the instant case involved a similar factual

dispute.

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WMATA contends that the district court erred in denying

its motion for judgment as a matter of law because the

evidence showed that possessing a special police commission

is a requirement for Swanks' position and that Swanks was

therefore not qualified because he had allowed his commission

to expire. The special police officer commission, WMATA

contends, is "tantamount to a professional licence and ...

without this license there is no authority to act in the capacity

of special police officer." In WMATA's view, the job description combined with Captain Rice's testimony "made it clear

that an essential requirement of the job of special police

officer was the maintenance and possession of a special police

commission." Specifically, Captain Rice testified that the

special commission was required of all special police, including those stationed in Virginia or Maryland, because "we

work out of the District of Columbia," which requires the

license and which covers 90 to 95 percent of Metro locations.3

He also testified that if the D.C. Metropolitan Police discover

a special officer operating without a commission in the District, WMATA and the officer can be fined.4

The difficulty with WMATA's position is twofold. First,

WMATA's personnel description of the special police officer

job states that an individual only need have the "[a]bility to

obtain and maintain a Special Police Commission." The

"minimum qualifications and experience" include only that the

applicant have graduated from high school (or received an

__________

3 See D.C. Code Ann. s 4-114 (1994) (conferring authority on the

Mayor to appoint special police officers).

4 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 6A, ss 1101.2, 1104.2, 1108.1 (1988).

Section 1104.2 of Title 6A provides that:

Each special police officer appointed under the provisions of

D.C. Code s 4-114 (1981), shall, within twenty-four (24) hours

after the expiration or revocation of his or her commission ...

deliver to the Chief of Police his or her badge, commission, or

other emblem of authority, and upon his or her failure so to do,

he or she shall, upon conviction thereof in the Superior Court

for the District of Columbia, be punished by a fine or [sic] not

more than three hundred dollars ($300).

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equivalent certificate), and be at least 21 years old and a

United States citizen (or have an equivalent combination of

education and experience); there is no mention of the commission. If after obtaining the commission, the officer allows

it to expire, official WMATA policy provides that expiration

"will result in your not being permitted to work until the job

position requirement is met;" it does not provide for automatic discharge. Second, Swanks testified that in practice

WMATA only required that he have the ability to maintain

the commission. When he initially informed a supervisor that

he had lost his commission, he testified that he was informed

that he "did not need a gun permit to work in the State of

Virginia" and that he was to report to work. Similarly, when

it later was clear his commission had expired, he was told that

he would be on leave until he renewed it. This evidence of

WMATA's practice was supported by Captain Rice's testimony describing how new employees would apply for the commission after being hired and that the application process

could last four to eight months.

The district court, therefore, properly denied WMATA's

motion for judgment as a matter of law in light of evidence

making qualification an issue of fact. Based upon the evidence, a reasonable juror could find that possessing the

commission was not a prerequisite to being hired, and that

new employees simply had to possess the ability to obtain

such a commission, and hence the jury had sufficient evidence

to find that Swanks was a "qualified individual" with a

disability under the ADA.

B.

The question remains whether WMATA presented a nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Swanks and if so,

whether Swanks presented evidence upon which a reasonable

juror could rely to conclude that WMATA's true motivation

for firing him was discriminatory. Our standard of review

here is deferential: a jury's verdict may be overturned only if

no reasonable juror could find that WMATA discriminated

against Swanks. Anderson, 820 F.2d at 472-73. The court

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considers all of the evidence that the jury had before it, not

only Swanks' prima facie case but also his evidence that he

was fired for his absences rather than his lack of a special

commission. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289.

The evidence before the jury as to WMATA's true reason

for terminating Swanks was conflicting. On the one hand,

Captain Rice testified, and his memorandum recommending

Swanks' dismissal stated, that the cause for Swanks' discharge was the expiration of the special commission and

Swanks' alleged fabrications when WMATA asked to see his

commission. On the other hand, Swanks testified that he was

unaware that his commission, which he believed he had lost,

had expired.5 Furthermore, his wife's testimony, that Captain Rice had told her that her husband's absences, rather

than the "gun permit," was the reason for his discharge, was

bolstered by evidence that WMATA had threatened disciplinary action because of his absences and had been unreceptive

to his attempts, with doctor's statements, to explain how his

condition caused these absences.6

The issue of witness credibility "is quintessentially one for

the finder of fact," Aka, 156 F.3d at 1299; see also Baert, 149

F.3d at 633, and the medical evidence permitted a reasonable

juror to find that Swanks' absences were due to his disability.

A reasonable juror could find that WMATA, being unwilling

to tolerate an employee with repeated absences, decided to

apply its special commission requirement more strictly than it

__________

5 Although Swanks maintains that WMATA presented "no evidence of untruthfulness," Captain Rice's October 1992 memorandum stated that "Officer Swanks' inability to provide a copy of his

D.C. Special Police Commission and his subsequent story of his

"brother-in-law" taking his wallet only emphasises [sic] that he: a)

was aware that his commission was invalid; [and] b) wanted to have

time to get to MPD [Metropolitan Police Department] to obtain a

renewal," and further, that Swanks admitted to MPD Detective

Owens that he was aware his commission had expired "but only

after he was confronted with the information."

6 This evidence contradicts WMATA's statement in its brief that

it "had no way of knowing that Mr. Swanks' excessive absenteeism

was a result of his spina bifida occulta."

normally would to remove Swanks because of his disability.

In that sense, WMATA's contention that this case is about

applying the same rules to persons with disabilities as those

without is somewhat ironic inasmuch as the jury apparently

accepted Swanks' position that WMATA applied its commission requirement inconsistently as an excuse to discharge

him, applying a harsher rule, rather than the same rule, to

Swanks because of his disability.7

To the extent that WMATA contends for the first time in

its reply brief, and at oral argument, that even if Swanks

could show that he was fired for excessive absenteeism,

regular attendance at work is an "essential function" of his

job, its argument comes too late.8 See Chedwick v. Nash, 151

__________

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7 Citing Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991),

WMATA contends that it would be irrational for it to hire Swanks

knowing of his disability only to fire him because of that same

condition. This argument is specious, however for, unlike the facts

in Proud, different individuals hired Swanks in 1989 (i.e. thenLieutenant Kielbiewicz) than fired him several years later in 1992

(i.e. Captain Rice, Inspector Robert Zaza, and Chief of WMATA

Police Burton Morrow). Furthermore, Proud was an age discrimination case. Age is a fixed variable; here it is possible that

WMATA may not fully have appreciated the amount of absenteeism

that would be required for Swank's disability, or that his condition

could have worsened over time, requiring greater absenteeism. Cf.

id. at 797-98; Waldron v. SL Indus., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir.

1995).

8 WMATA's regulations provide that a special police officer "must

be dependable, regular in attendance and never absent from work

without making advance arrangements with the sergeant, except in

the case of illness or extreme emergency." Def.'s Ex. 7, p 10

(Protective Services Bureau Rules & Regulations for Special Police

Officers). They also define "unsatisfactory attendance" as "unscheduled absences so frequent as to indicate that the employee is

undependable." Id. p 24. Captain Rice testified that special police

officers accrue 3.75 hours of sick leave and 3.75 hours of annual

leave every two weeks, in addition to federal holidays. Over the

course of approximately 26 pay-periods an officer would therefore

annually accrue 97.5 hours of sick leave. Although Captain Rice

testified that officers accrue approximately 10 to 11 days of sick

F.3d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1998). At trial, WMATA only

argued that Swanks was unqualified for his position, not that

he was fired because of abuse of his sick leave. Trial Tr. at

87:1-4 (Apr. 9, 1998). Abuse of sick leave as the reason for

dismissal would contradict both Captain Rice's testimony and

his memorandum recommending Swanks' dismissal for failure

to have a valid commission and lying about it. Moreover,

during closing arguments, WMATA disavowed any connection

between Swanks' absences and its decision to terminate him.

In that light, "if the only explanations set forth [by the

employer] in the record have been rebutted, the jury is

permitted to search for others, and may in appropriate circumstances draw an inference of discrimination." Aka, 156

F.3d at 1292. The jury need not adopt a potentially nondiscriminatory explanation that the employer itself has attempted to discredit.9

Finally, WMATA contends in its reply brief that even if it

"had full knowledge that Mr. Swanks' absenteeism was

__________

leave per year, with a tour of duty lasting 7.5 hours, the number of

sick days would equal 13 (97.5 divided by 7.5). By that calculation,

Swanks used less than the full annual amount of sick leave during

his first year and exceeded that amount by five days in his second

year and nine days in his third year.

9 WMATA's reliance on Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir.

1994), is to no avail. Carr was a summary judgment case; by

contrast our review of the jury's verdict is not de novo, and

WMATA did not present evidence, in response to Swanks' prima

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facie case, that he was fired for excessive absenteeism. Carr's

excessive absenteeism theory could have been applicable had

WMATA presented such evidence; a jury then might have concluded that his absences were so "prolonged, frequent, and unpredictable" as to make him unqualified to perform the essential functions

of a time-sensitive job. Id. at 530; cf. Carpenter v. Federal Nat'l

Mortgage Ass'n, 165 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999). However,

WMATA would still have to show in the instant case that no

reasonable juror could have found that discrimination, rather than

lack of qualification or undue hardship, was the true motivation for

Swanks' discharge. See generally Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186-

87 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Anderson, 820 F.2d at 472.

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caused by his disability, there can be no finding of discrimination because the jury found against Mr. Swanks on the

accommodation issue [claim]." Because Swanks had no opportunity to respond to this contention in his brief, the court

need not consider it. See Herbert v. National Academy of

Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Even if the

contention were facially appealing, Swanks' accommodation

request was to be allowed more exercise at work and more

sick leave as a way to ward off some of the symptoms of his

condition that caused his absences.10 Finding against him on

that claim, a juror could still reasonably find that WMATA

fired Swanks because of his disability in violation of the ADA.

As the court recognized in Aka, a reasonable accommodation

claim "is not subject to analysis under McDonnell-Douglas,

but has its own specialized legal standards." 156 F.3d at

1288.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

__________

10 Although in Swanks I the court characterized this claim as a

request for more exercise, see Swanks, 116 F.3d at 583, during

rebuttal closing argument, Swanks' counsel stated that Swanks also

wanted more sick leave as an accommodation.

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