Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01052/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01052-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
3S Business Corp.
Appellant
AdvanSoft International, Inc.
Not party
Allied Informatics Inc.
Not party
IT Division Inc.
Appellant
ITServe Alliance, Inc.
Not party
Kollasoft Inc.
Appellant
Lucid Technologies Inc.
Appellant
RapidIT Inc.
Appellant
Saxon Global, Inc.
Appellant
SmartWorks, LLC
Appellant
TechStar Consulting Services Inc.
Not party
United States
Appellee
VLink Inc.
Appellant
iTech US, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC., ADVANSOFT 

INTERNATIONAL, INC., ALLIED INFORMATICS 

INC., TECHSTAR CONSULTING SERVICES INC.,

Plaintiffs

ITECH US, INC., SMARTWORKS, LLC, SAXON 

GLOBAL, INC., KOLLASOFT INC., 3S BUSINESS 

CORP., VLINK INC., LUCID TECHNOLOGIES INC., 

IT DIVISION INC., DBA APEIRO TECHS, RAPIDIT 

INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2023-1052

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:21-cv-01190-RTH, Judge Ryan T. Holte.

______________________

Decided: December 10, 2024

______________________

BRAD BANIAS, Banias Law LLC, Charleston, SC, 

argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by 

JONATHAN WASDEN, Wasden Law, Burke, VA.

Case: 23-1052 Document: 49 Page: 1 Filed: 12/10/2024
2 ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US

 VINCENT DE PAUL PHILLIPS, JR., Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. 

Also represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE 

HOSFORD, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.

______________________

Before CHEN, STOLL, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.

STOLL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs seek a refund on the H-1B petitions they filed 

on behalf of their foreign national employees already 

admitted to and physically present in the United States 

under another nonimmigrant classification.1 This appeal 

concerns whether Plaintiffs are entitled to this refund.

Plaintiffs appeal the decision of the United States 

Court of Federal Claims granting the Government’s crossmotion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue that the 

language “an application for admission as a nonimmigrant 

under section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. [§] 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)) [(“H1B”)], including an application for an extension of such 

status” excludes applications filed under that same 

statutory section to change the status of a nonimmigrant 

who is already in the United States—a so-called change of 

status petition. Appellants’ Br. 7–8 (emphasis omitted). 

We disagree and thus affirm the trial court’s decision.

BACKGROUND

I

The United States offers many different types of visas. 

This case involves H-1B visas awarded to 

1 We recognize that some parties are listed as 

Plaintiffs and others as Plaintiffs-Appellants. We use 

Plaintiffs for simplicity.

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ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US 3

nonimmigrants—persons who are not citizens or nationals 

of the United States—who are sponsored by employers to 

work temporarily in qualified specialty occupations. See

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). Under the H-1B program, 

the employer requests a grant of H-1B status on behalf of 

the nonimmigrant by filing a Form I-129 petition with the 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Service 

(USCIS). See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(1); 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(a)(1), 

214.2(h)(2)(i)(A). These requests can be made for 

nonimmigrants located inside or outside of the United 

States.

Relevant to this appeal are three types of Form I-129 

petitions: (1) initial grant petitions, (2) change of status

petitions, and (3) extension petitions. As the name implies, 

initial grant petitions refer to any petition where an

employer requests on behalf of the nonimmigrant an initial

grant of H-1B status. This petition typically involves a 

nonimmigrant currently residing outside of the United 

States who will then move to the United States to work

temporarily in a qualified position once H-1B status is 

granted. However, initial grant petitions also include 

situations where the nonimmigrant already resides inside 

of the United States but is placed under H-1B status for 

the first time. These are change of status petitions. A 

change of status petition refers to when an employer 

requests on behalf of the nonimmigrant a change of status 

from another nonimmigrant classification to classification 

under H-1B. Because change of status petitions grant a 

nonimmigrant H-1B status for the first time, they are a 

sub-category of initial grant petitions. Finally, extension 

petitions request an extension of a nonimmigrant’s already 

obtained H-1B status. These extension petitions, like 

change of status petitions, involve nonimmigrants already 

inside the United States.

When the nonimmigrant resides outside the United 

States and USCIS approves the H-1B petition, the 

nonimmigrant is then generally required to obtain an HCase: 23-1052 Document: 49 Page: 3 Filed: 12/10/2024
4 ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US

1B visa from a United States consulate to enter through a 

port of entry and request “admission” into the United 

States as an H-1B nonimmigrant. See 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1201(a)(1)(B), 1202(c); 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.53(a)(2), 

41.101(a). The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 

8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., refers to this process as making an 

“application for admission”:

The term “application for admission” has reference 

to the application for admission into the United 

States and not to the application for the issuance of 

an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa.

Id. § 1101(a)(4). And the INA defines the term “admission”:

The terms “admission” and “admitted” mean, with 

respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into 

the United States after inspection and 

authorization by an immigration officer.

Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

Along with filing the petition, employers must pay all 

requisite fees. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). These requisite fees 

include a filing fee and a fraud prevention and detection fee 

(the “Fraud Fee”). The Fraud Fee is required with initial 

grant petitions, which includes change of status petitions, 

as well as employers seeking authorization for an H-1B 

nonimmigrant to change employers. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1184(c)(12)(A)(i)–(ii). Separately, if the employer 

qualifies as a 50/50 employer,

2 then Congress has 

2 “50/50 employers” refers to entities employing over 

50 employees with over half comprising nonimmigrant 

workers in H-1B or L-1 status. See Act of Aug. 13, 2010, 

Pub. L. No. 111-230, § 402(b), 124 Stat. 2485, 2487 (2010); 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-

113, § 402(g), 129 Stat. 2242, 3006 (2015). Plaintiffs here 

are 50/50 employers.

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ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US 5

mandated that “the combined filing fee and [Fraud Fee]” is 

“increased by $4,000” (the “enhanced fee”) under Public 

Law No. 114-113 (“2015 Enhanced Fee Statute”). Under an 

earlier statute, Congress mandated that the filing fee and 

Fraud Fee were increased by $2,000 for 50/50 employers 

through Public Law No. 111-230 (the “2010 Enhanced Fee 

Statute,” and collectively, the “Enhanced Fee Statutes”).

The 2010 Enhanced Fee Statute increased, for 50/50 

employers, the filing fee and Fraud Fee required to be 

submitted with an H-1B “application for admission”:

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act 

or any other provision of law, during the period 

beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act 

and ending on September 30, 2014, the filing fee 

and fraud prevention and detection fee required to 

be submitted with an application for admission as 

a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) 

of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)) shall be increased by $2,000 

for applicants that employ 50 or more employees in 

the United States if more than 50 percent of the 

applicant’s employees are such nonimmigrants or 

nonimmigrants described in section 101(a)(15)(L) 

of such Act.

Pub. L. No. 111-230, § 402(b) (emphasis added). In 2015, 

Congress extended the timeframe for collecting the 

enhanced fee under the 2010 Enhanced Fee Statute and 

simultaneously increased that fee to $4,000:

(b) Temporary H-1b Visa Fee Increase--

Notwithstanding section 281 of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1351) or any other 

provision of law, during the period beginning on the 

date of the enactment of this section and ending on 

September 30, 2025, the combined filing fee and 

fraud prevention and detection fee required to be 

submitted with an application for admission as a 

Case: 23-1052 Document: 49 Page: 5 Filed: 12/10/2024
6 ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US

nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)), including an application for 

an extension of such status, shall be increased by 

$4,000 for applicants that employ 50 or more 

employees in the United States if more than 50 

percent of the applicant’s employees are such 

nonimmigrants or nonimmigrants described in 

section 101(a)(15)(L) of such Act.

Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 402(g) (annotated to show 2015 

amendments).

II

In January 2020, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 

The case was subsequently transferred to the United 

States Court of Federal Claims in April 2021. Once in the 

Court of Federal Claims, Plaintiffs filed an amended 

complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and order 

compelling the United States to return the fees that USCIS 

unlawfully exacted in violation of the Enhanced Fee 

Statutes. In September 2021, Plaintiffs filed a motion for 

summary judgment, arguing that USCIS violated the 

terms of the Enhanced Fee Statutes by exacting enhanced

fees from 50/50 employers filing change of status petitions,

which, Plaintiffs contend, are not “application for 

admission.” In response, the Government filed a crossmotion for summary judgment, arguing that Congress 

intended to apply the enhanced fees to all H-1B petitions

subject to the Fraud Fee, including change of status 

petitions.

The Court of Federal Claims denied Plaintiffs’ motion 

for summary judgment and granted the Government’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court found 

that “[w]hen the statutory definitions of ‘application for 

admission’ and ‘admission’ are used, the result is 

incongruous with the text’s imposition of an increased fee, 

Case: 23-1052 Document: 49 Page: 6 Filed: 12/10/2024
ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US 7

and the statutory definitions, therefore, must not apply to 

the [Enhanced Fee] Statutes.” ITServe All., Inc. v. United 

States, 161 Fed. Cl. 276, 300 (2022). As such, the trial court 

looked to “[t]he plain language,” which in its view, 

“suggests ‘application’ can mean ‘petition,’ as stated in 

8 C.F.R § 1.2, and ‘admission’ can mean ‘status,’ as an H-1B 

nonimmigrant.” Id. The trial court also found that the 

statutory structure of the Enhanced Fee Statutes “supports

USCIS’s authority to impose the increased fee on change of 

status petitions because those petitions are already subject 

to the fraud fee.” Id. Based on this interpretation, the trial 

court concluded that the Government was entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law and accordingly granted the 

Government’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

“[A]n illegal exaction occurs . . . when the ‘plaintiff has 

paid money over to the Government . . . and seeks return 

of all or part of that sum’ that was ‘improperly paid, 

exacted, or taken from the claimant in contravention of the 

Constitution, a statute, or a regulation.’” Boeing Co. 

v. United States, 968 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2020) 

(quoting Virgin Islands Port Auth. v. United States, 

922 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). We review a grant of

summary judgment by the United States Court of Federal 

Claims de novo. Anderson v. United States, 23 F.4th 1357, 

1361 (Fed. Cir. 2022). We also review the trial court’s 

statutory interpretation de novo. Lambro v. United States,

90 F.4th 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2024).

“In statutory construction, we begin with the language 

of the statute.” Kingdomware Techs. v. United States, 

579 U.S. 162, 171 (2016) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “[W]e are not guided by a single sentence 

or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the 

whole law, and to its object and policy.” Dole v. United 

Case: 23-1052 Document: 49 Page: 7 Filed: 12/10/2024
8 ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US

Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990) (quoting 

Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)). If the 

statutory language provides a clear answer, the inquiry 

ends there. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 

438 (1999). “Beyond the statute’s text, [the traditional 

tools of statutory construction] include the statute’s 

structure, canons of statutory construction, and legislative 

history.” Timex V.I., Inc. v. United States, 157 F.3d 879, 

882 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

We are tasked with a narrow question in this 

appeal: whether the statutory language “an application for 

admission as a nonimmigrant under [H-1B], including an 

application for an extension of such status,”

Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 402(g), excludes change of status

petitions. We hold that this phrase does not exclude change 

of status petitions. Because a strict application of the 

statutory definitions for “application for admission” and 

“admission” would contradict the phrase “including an 

application for extension of such status” and thus render 

this language meaningless, we hold the ordinary meaning 

of “application for admission as a nonimmigrant under [H1B], including an application for an extension of such 

status” applies. And the ordinary meaning of this phrase 

does not exclude change of status petitions. This

interpretation of the statute also accords with agency 

practice, the backdrop against which Congress legislated.

I

Starting with the text of the statute, the enhanced fee 

is “required to be submitted with an application for 

admission as a nonimmigrant under [H-1B], including an 

application for an extension of such status.” 

Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 402(b). Here, the INA defines the 

terms “application for admission” and “admission.”

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(4), (a)(13)(A). And, as Plaintiffs argue,

“[w]hen a statute includes an explicit definition, we must 

follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s 

Case: 23-1052 Document: 49 Page: 8 Filed: 12/10/2024
ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US 9

ordinary meaning.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 

(2000); see also Appellants’ Br. 19–24. As such, we look to 

the statutory definitions.

The phrase “application for admission” refers to “the 

application for admission into the United States,” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(4), and the term “admission” itself means “with 

respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the 

United States after inspection and authorization by an 

immigration officer.” Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Plaintiffs assert

that, read with both definitions in the statute, the phrase

“application for admission” refers to the applications for 

physical entry of the nonimmigrant into the United States 

from outside the United States. See Appellants’ Br. 19–21. 

They explain that because change of status petitions

involve only nonimmigrants already inside the United 

States who do not need to present themselves for inspection 

into the United States, it follows that change of status

petitions are not subject to the enhanced fees under the 

Enhanced Fee Statutes. See Appellants’ Br. 21–22. 

Plaintiffs’ interpretation, however, does not square with 

the fact that Congress further included in the 2015 

Enhanced Fee Statute “application[s] for an extension of 

[H1-B] status”—applications that, like change of status 

petitions, are granted only for nonimmigrants already 

inside the United States who have H1-B status. See

Pub. L. No. 114-113; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(15)(i), (ii)(B). In 

fact, Plaintiffs’ proposed construction results in a 

contradiction. It cannot be that Congress relied on a strict 

application of the statutory definitions to limit the 

collection of the enhanced fees only to “applications for 

admission” from nonimmigrants outside of the United 

States when Congress simultaneously set forth that the 

collection of the enhanced fees also applies to “applications 

for extension of such status” for nonimmigrants already in 

the United States. A correct interpretation must give 

meaning to the entire clause.

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10 ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US

“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’

that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed 

that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word 

shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” TRW Inc. 

v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan 

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). To resolve the 

contradiction triggered by Plaintiffs’ proposed 

construction, we would have to read “including an 

application for an extension of such status” to mean 

“including an application for an extension of such status 

only when the nonimmigrant is not in the United States at 

the time of the application.” We decline to read in this 

condition without an express statement to that effect from 

Congress. It is “our duty to refrain from reading a phrase 

into the statute when Congress has left it out.” Keene Corp. 

v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993). “[W]ere we to 

adopt [Plaintiffs’] construction of the statute,” the express 

inclusion of applications for an extension would be 

rendered “void, or insignificant.” Duncan, 533 U.S. at 174. 

As such, “an application for admission” cannot limit the 

universe of applications to those only involving 

nonimmigrants outside the United States. We therefore 

reject Plaintiffs’ strict adherence to the statutory 

definitions.

II

Without the benefit of applicable statutory definitions, 

we return to resolve the ordinary meaning of the 

phrase: “an application for admission as a nonimmigrant 

under [H-1B], including an application for an extension of 

such status.” See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 228 (2012)

(“[W]here the [statutorily defined] meaning would cause a 

provision to contradict another provision, whereas the 

normal meaning of the word would harmonize the two, the 

normal meaning should be applied.”). We understand this 

phrase to include initial grant petitions, which include 

change of status petitions, and extension petitions—

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ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US 11

regardless of whether the nonimmigrant is located inside 

or outside of the United States. First, we address 

“application for admission” before turning to the amended 

language “including an application for an extension of such 

status.”

With respect to “application for admission,” we look to 

the general definitions of “application” and “admission” to 

aid our understanding of their ordinary meaning. The 

general definition for “application” as a noun includes

“request” or “petition.” Application, MerriamWebster.com, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/application. And “admission” is 

defined as “the right or permission to join or enter a place, 

a group, etc.” Admission, Merriam-Webster.com,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/admission. 

As such, the ordinary meaning for an “application for 

admission” is a request or petition for the right to join or 

enter a group. Nothing from this ordinary meaning

requires, let alone connotes, the inside-outside of the 

United States distinction that Plaintiffs necessarily rely on 

to exclude change of status petitions.

Moreover, this ordinary meaning for “application for 

admission” is consistent with long-standing USCIS 

practice governed by the statute. In the unique context of 

this case, the “application” is the Form I-129 petition, 

which employers file on behalf of their nonimmigrant 

employee to request a grant of H-1B status, i.e., the right 

to enter a group of H-1B status holders. In truth, each 

party in this case seems to understand “application for 

admission” to refer to the Form I-129 petition. Both 

Plaintiffs and the Government repeatedly refer to the Form 

I-129 petition filed by employers with USCIS to request a 

grant of H-1B status for their nonimmigrant employee 

when discussing the “application for admission.” See, e.g., 

Appellants’ Br. 5–6, 21, 35–36 (“The employer specifically 

notifies USCIS of its request to have the foreign national 

physically enter the United States by checking the 

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12 ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US

appropriate box on USCIS’s standard Form I-129.”); 

Appellee’s Br. 5–9 (explaining that the employer files a 

Form I-129 petition with USCIS, on behalf of the 

nonimmigrant identified in the petition, and is required to 

pay the enhanced fees when it files the Form I-129 

petition), 24–25 (“Employers file petitions with USCIS on 

Form I-129, as we explained above. The question is 

therefore whether the word ‘application’ as used in the text 

should be construed as a petition to correspond with the 

Form I-129 petitions filed by employers. The answer is 

that it must . . . .”). Moreover, employers complete the 

Form I-129 for all H-1B petitions, including change of 

status petitions, regardless of whether the nonimmigrant 

is inside or outside of the United States. Applicants simply 

check different boxes for the type of petition being filed. 

J.A. 75, 128; Appellants’ Br. 36–37, Appellee’s Br. 42. With 

this practice in mind, we continue to see no reason to 

exclude change of status petitions from the ordinary 

meaning of “application for admission.”

More persuasive to our understanding of the ordinary 

meaning for “application for admission” is Congress’s

insertion of “including applications for an extension of such 

status” in the 2015 Enhanced Fee Statute. This 

amendment bolsters our understanding of the statute in 

two respects. First, the word “including” follows 

“application for admission as a nonimmigrant under [H1B]” and introduces a non-exhaustive list of applications 

for admission that are subject to the enhanced fee. Because 

Congress specified a non-exhaustive list of applications for 

admission that are subject to the enhanced fee, we 

understand “application for admission” to be the umbrella 

term that refers to all petitions for H-1B status. Second, 

this amendment precludes Plaintiffs’ inside-outside of the 

United States argument. The non-exhaustive list of 

“applications for admission” includes at least “applications 

for an extension of [H1-B] status,” i.e., extension petitions. 

And extension petitions involve nonimmigrants who are 

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ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US 13

already inside the United States; they do not involve 

physical admission. Thus, the “fee required to be 

submitted with an application for admission” cannot turn 

on physical admission into the United States and limit the 

universe of petitions to those involving only 

nonimmigrants outside of the United States. Like 

extension petitions, change of status petitions involve only 

nonimmigrants inside of the United States. Based on 

Congress’s amendment, we fail to see why change of status

petitions should be excluded from the universe of petitions 

covered by the Enhanced Fee Statutes. Instead, it appears 

Congress intended to collect the enhanced fees regardless 

of whether the nonimmigrant’s physical location is inside 

or outside of the United States.

Finally, “[w]hen Congress used the materially same 

language in [the statute], it presumptively was aware of 

the longstanding [administrative] interpretation of the 

phrase and intended for it to retain its established 

meaning.” Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 

584 U.S. 709, 721–22 (2018) (first citing Lorillard v. Pons, 

434 U.S. 575, 580–81 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be 

aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a

statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts 

a statute without change . . . .”), and then citing Bragdon 

v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (“When administrative 

and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an 

existing statutory provision, repetition of the same 

language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, 

the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial 

interpretations as well.”)).

Here, it is evident from the 2015 amendment itself that

Congress was aware of the USCIS practice to collect fees 

on petitions for H-1B status because Congress directly 

legislated that the enhanced fee applied to extension

petitions. Indeed, the 2015 amendment added extension

petitions under the umbrella of “application for admission,” 

to which the increased fee applies. See U.S. Citizenship 

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14 ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US

and Immigration Services Fee Schedule and Changes to 

Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request 

Requirements, 84 Fed. Reg. 62280, 62322 (Nov. 14, 2019) 

(explaining that USCIS applied the 2010 increased fee “to 

petitions for an initial grant of status or requesting a 

change of employer, but not to extension petitions filed by

the same employer on behalf of the same employee.”). And 

to add extension petitions under the umbrella of

“application for admission,” Congress would need to know 

the petitions to which the enhanced fee originally applied. 

This original group of petitions included initial grant 

petitions, which include change of status petitions. This

suggests Congress likely knew of the USCIS practice to 

collect fees on change of status petitions. Yet Congress still 

re-enacted the statute without altering the phrase 

“application for admission,” suggesting that Congress was 

aware the enhanced fee would apply to change of status

petitions in accordance with the USCIS practice. If 

Congress disagreed with how the statute was being 

applied, it could have changed the language of the statute, 

and it did not. Cf. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580–81.

For the reasons above, we conclude that the most 

reasonable interpretation of the statute does not exclude 

change of status petitions from the language “an 

application for admission as a nonimmigrant under [H-1B], 

including an application for an extension of such status.” 

We therefore find the Enhanced Fee Statutes authorize 

USCIS to collect the enhanced fees from employers filing 

change of status petitions on behalf of their nonimmigrant 

employees already inside the United States under another 

status. Plaintiffs’ illegal exaction claim thus fails as a 

matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant 

of summary judgment in favor of the Government.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons stated above, 

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ITSERVE ALLIANCE, INC. v. US 15

we affirm the trial court’s grant of the Government’s crossmotion for summary judgment.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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