Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01592/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01592-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joshua N. Bowser
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHRISTIAN J. MILLER, FRANK JORDAN, AND 

JOSHUA N. BOWSER,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:12-cr-00102-TWP-DML — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 10, 2015 — DECIDED MARCH 31, 2015

____________________

Before POSNER, MANION, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge. Joshua Bowser, Christian Miller, 

and Frank Jordan were convicted as part of a large-scale

prosecution of people associated with the Indianapolis 

Chapter of the Outlaws Motorcycle Club. For those not 

familiar with the Club, it was founded in 1935 in the 

Chicagoland area as group of motorcycle enthusiasts, and its 

website now boasts chapters all over the world. See Outlaws 

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2 Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592

History, http://www.outlawsmcworld.com/history.htm (last 

visited Mar. 23, 2015). The Club, or at least some of its 

members, have had a spotty history of compliance with 

criminal laws. See Outlaws Motorcycle Club, Wikipedia, 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outlaws_Motorcycle_Club (last 

visited Mar. 23, 2015). On appeal, the defendants challenge 

various aspects of their convictions and sentences. We 

remand in regard to a single issue related to a condition of 

Bowser’s supervised release, a point on which the 

government confesses error. In all other respects, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Following an extensive FBI investigation, in July 2012, a 

grand jury in Indianapolis returned an indictment against 42 

people associated with the Outlaws, including Bowser. 

Miller and Jordan were added to the case later, along with 

seven others. Ultimately, a Second Superseding Indictment 

charged a total of 51 people with 49 criminal offenses. 

Nearly all of the accused pleaded guilty to all the charges 

against them. Bowser, Miller, and Jordan did not.

On September 5, 2013, Bowser pleaded guilty to ten 

crimes, including wire fraud, extortion, witness tampering, 

and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, but he pleaded nolo 

contendere to an eleventh charge for violating the Racketeer 

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (“RICO”), 18 

U.S.C. § 1962(c). In accepting Bowser’s plea, the district court 

noted that pleading nolo contendere allowed Bowser to 

refuse to admit that the Outlaws acted as a criminal 

organization and thus maintain his membership in the

group. But the court decided that this concern was 

outweighed by the time and expense saved by avoiding trial. 

At sentencing, however, the court denied Bowser a 

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Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 3

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 

3E1.1, noting his nolo contendere plea and his refusal to 

admit that the Outlaws were a criminal enterprise or to 

accept that others conspired with him. Bowser nonetheless 

received a prison sentence of 180 months, well below the 

calculated guidelines imprisonment range of 235 to 293 

months.

Meanwhile, on September 24, 2013, Miller proceeded to a 

jury trial on allegations of racketeering. Miller’s defense 

focused on arguing that the government could not prove the 

robberies that it had charged as the predicate acts necessary 

for finding him guilty of a “pattern” of racketeering under 

§ 1962(c). In particular, Miller argued that an incident where 

he confronted another Outlaws member, Bryan Glaze, about 

stealing from the Outlaws was not actually a robbery 

because Glaze knew what would happen as a result of him 

having stolen from the Outlaws. 

According to testimony at trial, Miller confronted Glaze 

at the Outlaws clubhouse because Glaze had stolen from the 

Club while performing his duties of ordering and collecting 

money from other members for Outlaws merchandise. 

During the confrontation, Miller pushed Glaze, and another 

Outlaws member pointed a gun at Glaze and told him they 

were not “fucking around.” Miller then demanded that 

Glaze turn over his jewelry and clothing with the Outlaws 

insignia. Altogether approximately 17 Outlaws were present. 

One of those present was asked at trial if Glaze turned over 

the items voluntarily or by threat of force and responded, 

“Oh, by threat.” The Outlaws also took Glaze’s personal 

items, including a television, stored in the Club’s 

bunkhouse, though Glaze said they did so “without [his] 

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4 Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592

knowledge.” As described by an eyewitness, this meant that 

the Outlaws went and removed the property while Glaze 

was confined to a chair and “couldn’t move.” Bowser then 

summoned a tattoo artist to cover up Glaze’s Outlaws 

tattoos. Glaze said that the other Outlaws “made it clear if 

[he] didn’t cooperate with them, [he] probably wouldn’t 

have walked out of there.” The jury found Miller guilty of 

racketeering, and the district court sentenced him to 60 

months’ imprisonment.

Lastly, on November 4, 2013, Jordan went to trial for 

conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and 

unlawful use of a communication facility, id. § 843(b). His 

trial lasted three days, during which the jury heard 

testimony from numerous law enforcement officers involved 

in investigating his illegal activities and from two of his codefendants, Hector Nava-Arredondo (“Nava”) and James 

Stonebraker. According to the trial testimony, Nava sold 

cocaine at Sidewinders, a bar in Indianapolis where Jordan 

was a bouncer, in exchange for providing cocaine to the 

bar’s owner. (Sidewinders might be described as an Outlaws 

hangout.) Both Jordan and Stonebraker sold drugs that Nava 

provided to them. The FBI became aware of Jordan’s 

potential involvement in drug distribution after wiretapping 

Nava’s telephone as part of the larger Outlaws investigation. 

The government also played the jury several recordings 

of intercepted telephone conversations between Jordan and 

Nava. Before the recordings were played, Nava testified that 

Jordan would typically call him when “he needed drugs to 

sell to a client, a customer that he had.” The government 

then played a recording in which Nava asked Jordan, “You 

want some?,” and Jordan responded, “Yep, they just called 

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Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 5

me.” Nava explained that he understood Jordan to be 

referring to his customer wanting drugs. The government 

also played a call in which Jordan told Nava that he 

“need[ed] another biscuit,” which Nava understood to mean 

that Jordan needed 3.5 more grams, also known as an “eight 

ball,” of cocaine. There was also a phone call where Jordan 

told Nava that someone—who Nava understood to be 

Jordan’s customer—was on his way, and Nava told Jordan 

to bring money and meet him on the street.

Nava testified that, based on these conversations, he 

believed that he had an agreement with Jordan to provide 

Jordan with cocaine for Jordan to distribute to Jordan’s 

customers. Nava explained that he provided Jordan with an 

eight ball of cocaine once per week—at a cost of $140 each—

for approximately six months, until Nava’s arrest in 2012. 

(An FBI agent explained that, during the investigation in this 

case, the street value of an eight ball of cocaine was 

approximately $150, and that the typical dosage of cocaine is 

“less than a gram, maybe a 16th of a gram.”) Jordan usually 

paid cash, Nava said, but Nava also fronted him cocaine on 

two or three occasions. Nava also explained that he 

frequently fronted cocaine to another person, Abraham 

Flores, who would also sometimes give cocaine to Jordan to 

resell. Nava said that he occasionally shared the proceeds of 

his drug sales with Jordan. On cross-examination, Nava 

indicated that he did not care whether Jordan resold the 

cocaine or used it himself.

During Stonebraker’s testimony, he explained that he 

began purchasing cocaine at Sidewinders in 2010 after 

Bowser took him to the bar and asked the owner to 

introduce him to a cocaine supplier. Initially, Stonebraker 

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6 Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592

and Bowser bought drugs from Flores, and Stonebraker 

would receive an eight ball two or three times per week. 

After two months, however, Stonebraker began dealing 

instead with Nava and purchased a quarter to a full ounce 

from him three to four times per week for roughly a year 

and a half. Stonebraker used cocaine himself and sold it to 

others, particularly members of the Outlaws. While waiting 

for Nava, Stonebraker said that he witnessed other people 

come to Sidewinders and buy cocaine from Jordan. This 

happened once or twice per weekend, with Jordan typically 

selling small quantities of cocaine (from .1 to 1 gram) that he 

would parcel off from a larger quantity he kept in a baggie. 

According to Stonebraker, Nava introduced Stonebraker to 

Jordan because they both bought cocaine from Nava, and 

Nava told Stonebraker that he could get cocaine from Flores 

or Jordan if Nava was unavailable. Stonebraker added that, 

on two or three occasions, he saw Jordan buy cocaine from 

Flores, who told Stonebraker that he was Jordan’s primary 

cocaine source, though Jordan also received drugs from 

Nava.

The jury found Jordan guilty of distributing cocaine and 

also specifically found him accountable for distributing 500 

or more grams of the drug. After trial, Jordan moved for 

acquittal, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, on the basis that the 

government had presented insufficient evidence to sustain 

his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. In 

denying the motion, the district court emphasized that Nava 

had testified that he fronted Jordan cocaine two or three 

times and had agreed with Jordan that Jordan would resell 

drugs. The court also cited Nava’s testimony that over the 

course of six months Jordan frequently bought cocaine from 

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Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 7

him to resell, and Stonebraker’s testimony that he was told 

he could buy drugs from Jordan if Nava was unavailable.

At sentencing, the district court concluded, over Jordan’s 

objection, that he had a prior felony drug conviction, giving 

rise to a mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(B). The court then imposed the minimum prison 

term of 120 months. 

II. DISCUSSION

Bowser, Miller, and Jordan consolidated their appellate 

briefing. Because the bulk of the issues raised in these briefs 

relate to Jordan, we begin there.

A. Jordan

Jordan first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his conviction for conspiracy to distribute 

cocaine. Where, as here, a defendant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence by moving for acquittal after trial, 

we will uphold the jury’s verdict if, viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier 

of fact finder could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Molton, 743 

F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Torres-Chavez, 

744 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 2014). We have referred to this 

standard as “a nearly insurmountable hurdle,” recognizing 

that we will reverse “only when the record contains no 

evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the 

jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” TorresChavez, 744 F.3d at 993 (quotation and alteration omitted); 

accord United States v. Domnenko, 763 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 

2014).

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8 Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592

Looking to the elements of conspiracy, the Supreme 

Court “has repeatedly said that the essence of a conspiracy is 

‘an agreement to commit an unlawful act.’” United States v. 

Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274 (2003) (quoting Iannelli v. 

United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975)). But as Jordan 

emphasizes, although the “drug sale is itself an agreement,” 

that sale “cannot also count as the agreement needed to find 

conspiracy.” United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 998 (7th 

Cir. 2013). Thus, “when the alleged co-conspirators are in a 

buyer-seller relationship, ‘we have cautioned against 

conflating the underlying buy-sell agreement with the drugdistribution agreement that is alleged to form the basis of the 

charged conspiracy.’” United States v. Villasenor, 664 F.3d 673, 

679 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 

749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010)). Rather, in these situations, “‘the 

government must offer evidence establishing an agreement 

to distribute drugs that is distinct from evidence of the 

agreement to complete the underlying drug deals.’” United 

States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2013)

(quoting United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 286 (7th Cir. 

2011)). In other words, to convict Jordan of conspiracy to 

distribute cocaine, the government needed to show that he 

“‘knowingly agreed—either implicitly or explicitly—with 

someone else to distribute drugs.’” Villasenor, 664 F.3d at 679

(quoting Johnson, 592 F.3d at 754).

The district court appropriately summarized this case 

law for the jury using the buyer–seller instruction from 

pattern jury instructions developed by a committee 

appointed by this court. See Committee on Federal Criminal 

Jury Instructions for the Seventh Circuit, Pattern Criminal 

Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 5.10(A) (2012), 

available at

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Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 9

http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_crimina

l_jury_instr.pdf. According to that instruction, “a buyer and 

seller of cocaine do not enter into a conspiracy to possess 

cocaine with intent to distribute simply because the buyer 

resells cocaine to others, even if the seller knows that the 

buyer intends to resell the cocaine.” Id. at 73. Instead, “the 

government must prove that the buyer and seller had the 

joint criminal objective of distributing cocaine to others.” Id.; 

see Brown, 726 F.3d at 997–1004 (discussing the reasoning 

behind the current pattern instruction).

Jordan insists that the government failed to meet its 

burden because it did not show that his dealings with Nava 

went beyond the relationship of a buyer and seller. He 

acknowledges that Nava interpreted their phone calls as an 

agreement for Jordan to resell the drugs, and that this 

relationship persisted for roughly six months, with Nava 

sometimes fronting Jordan cocaine, or sharing the proceeds 

of his drug sales with him. But he points to our admonition 

in Brown, 726 F.3d at 999, that transactions “exhibiting 

frequency, regularity, and standardization, do not evince the 

substantial relationship entailed in a conspiracy.” 

See also United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2008)

(warning against the notion that wholesale purchases of 

cocaine are per se proof of conspiracy). In Brown we also 

acknowledged that, although it is “generally 

uncontroversial” that “if a person buys drugs in large 

quantities (too great for personal consumption), on a 

frequent basis, on credit, then an inference of conspiracy 

legitimately follows,” it is “[l]ess clear ... what combinations 

of those three characteristics—a credit arrangement, a large 

quantity, and frequent sales—are sufficient.” 726 F.3d at 

1000. Jordan emphasizes that he purchased only 3.5 grams of 

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10 Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592

cocaine per week—an amount he maintains is consistent 

with personal use—and that there were only as many as 

three sales on credit. 

Although we have not always been clear on what factors 

point to the existence of a conspiracy, we have stressed the 

need to “not lose sight of the larger picture—deciding 

whether the jury reasonably discerned an agreement to 

further trafficking of drugs.” Id. at 1002. And here, as the 

district court emphasized, Nava testified that, based on his 

telephone conversations with Jordan, he understood that he 

had a relationship with Jordan that went beyond that of 

buyer and seller and included an agreement for Jordan to 

further distribute the drugs Nava provided. 

Jordan asserts that his conversations with Nava could be 

interpreted differently, but Nava’s interpretation was not 

only reasonable but bolstered by additional evidence at trial. 

Stonebraker testified, for example, that he witnessed Jordan 

selling cocaine at Sidewinders, and that Nava told 

Stonebraker that Jordan received cocaine from him and that 

Stonebraker could get cocaine from Jordan if Nava was 

unavailable. Additionally, although Jordan maintains that 

buying cocaine at a rate of 3.5 grams weekly is consistent 

with personal use, according to the testifying FBI agent, that 

quantity, even spread over the course of a week, would be at 

the high end of the typical dosage for a single user. 

Moreover, there was evidence that Nava was not Jordan’s 

only supplier. We are persuaded that the trial evidence, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was 

sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Jordan guilty of 

conspiracy. See United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 364 (7th 

Cir. 2008) (upholding conspiracy conviction when recorded 

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Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 11

conversations implied that buyer and seller had worked 

together and a jury could infer that seller extended credit to 

buyer); United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 350–51 (7th Cir. 

1993) (en banc) (upholding conspiracy conviction based on 

testimony from buyer that seller agreed to sell him drugs for 

the buyer’s customer). 

Jordan next seeks to undermine the government’s 

questioning of Stonebraker and Nava at trial, arguing that 

the prosecutor asked improper leading questions. In 

particular, he challenges this question to Stonebraker: 

“Going to the point where Hector Nava introduced you to 

Frank Jordan, yes or no, did Mr. Nava make any statements 

to you about people you could go to to get cocaine from, 

other than Mr. Jordan?” (Jordan quotes the end of this 

question as “other than Mr. [Nava],” asserting that the 

transcript’s use of “Jordan” is a misprint. In context, “Nava” 

might make more sense, but our resolution of this issue does 

not require us to settle this difference.) Stonebraker 

answered, “yes,” and then named Jordan and Flores as 

people he could get cocaine from if Nava was unavailable. 

Jordan asserts that this was the only testimony indicating 

that Nava’s customers could buy drugs from Jordan in 

Nava’s absence.

We review the court’s treatment of leading questions for 

abuse of discretion, see United States v. O’Brien, 618 F.2d 1234, 

1242 (7th Cir. 1980), and see none here. A question is leading 

if “phrased in such a way as to hint at the answer the 

witness should give.” United States v. Cephus, 684 F.3d 703, 

707 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, however, the question was 

ambiguous enough that we cannot say that trial judge 

abused her discretion in allowing it. Moreover, although 

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12 Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592

leading questions “should not be used on direct examination 

except as necessary to develop the witness’s testimony,” 

Fed. R. Evid. 611(c), “[t]here is no blanket prohibition of such 

questions,” and they are permissible if “used with friendly 

witnesses to move direct examination along rather than to 

elicit testimony damaging to the opposing party that the 

witness might not have given in response to a neutral 

question.” Cephus, 684 F.3d at 707. Jordan has not convinced 

us that Stonebraker or Nava would have testified any 

differently if presented with unambiguously neutral 

questions.

Jordan also challenges the district court’s decision to bar 

questions about Stonebraker’s 1974 felony conviction for 

heroin possession. As part of the Outlaws prosecution, 

Stonebraker pleaded guilty to multiple drug-distribution 

charges and received a 30-month sentence. But if convicted 

in an Indiana state court, Jordan argues, Stonebraker would 

have faced a mandatory 20-year sentence because of the 

earlier state felony. Jordan thus wanted to use testimony 

about the conviction to suggest Stonebraker was biased and 

argues that the decision barring this testimony deprived him 

of his Sixth Amendment right to confront Stonebraker. 

We disagree. Jordan relies on United States v. Martin, 618

F.3d 705, 727–29 (7th Cir. 2010), which held that it was error 

to preclude cross-examination about a witness’s 

involvement in a pending, unrelated murder investigation, 

and Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 676–80 (1986), 

which held that it was error to preclude questions about the 

dismissal of a witness’s unrelated criminal charge being 

dropped in exchange for his testimony. But both Martin and 

Van Arsdall involved situations where there was evidence 

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Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 13

that the witnesses at issue had been recently investigated by 

state officials, while here there is no indication that state 

officials considered charging Stonebraker. Rather, as the 

government notes, Stonebraker testified that he cooperated 

in hopes that it would help with the federal charges against 

him. Jordan gives no persuasive reason to believe that the 

probative value of testimony about Stonebraker’s nearly 40-

year-old conviction would substantially outweigh its 

prejudicial effect, as required for admission under Federal 

Rule of Evidence 609(b)(1). The district court thus properly 

excluded testimony about the prior conviction.

In regard to his sentence, Jordan argues that the 

government failed to prove that he was convicted of a prior 

drug felony for purposes of the 10-year mandatory 

minimum under § 841(b)(1)(B). Under existing precedent, 

the existence of a prior felony conviction is considered a 

sentencing factor that may be determined by a judge. United 

States v. Zuniga, 767 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2014); United 

States v. Boswell, 772 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2014). When a 

defendant challenges the existence of a prior conviction, as 

Jordan did, the government must prove it beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(1); United States v. 

Arreola-Castillo, 539 F.3d 700, 704–05 (7th Cir. 2008). We 

review for clear error the factual determinations the district 

court makes in the course of concluding that the evidence is 

sufficient. Arreola-Castillo, 539 F.3d at 703.

The government presented three pieces of evidence to 

prove the existence of Jordan’s earlier conviction. First, the 

government submitted a certified copy of a court record 

from Marion County, Indiana, showing that a person with 

the name Frank Jordan was convicted of cocaine possession 

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14 Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592

in 2007. The government also submitted a computer printout 

from Marion County’s records system listing the same case 

number, along with Jordan’s name, and a social security 

number and birth date matching those given in Jordan’s 

presentence report in this case. Finally, the government 

provided a police report related to the state conviction 

showing the charge, Jordan’s name, and the birth date listed 

in the court’s record system. 

Jordan argues that this evidence was insufficient, noting 

that the documents contain hearsay and that the presentence 

report contains two possible birthdays. He also points to 

United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 144–45 (4th Cir. 2009), 

which held that court records related to an earlier conviction 

did not suffice to link a defendant to that conviction, even 

though the documents contained the defendant’s name and 

a partially redacted social security number and birthday. See 

also United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 835–36 (10th Cir. 

1999) (holding that proof of earlier convictions under 

defendant’s aliases not sufficient). Jordan argues that the 

court here should have required the government to produce 

photographs or fingerprint analysis establishing that he was 

the same Frank Jordan that committed the prior felony.

This argument is unpersuasive. First, as Jordan 

acknowledges, the rules of evidence are inapplicable to 

sentencing hearings, Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3), so the use of 

hearsay evidence here did not amount to reversible error, 

see United States v. Sewell, No. 14-1384, 2015 WL 1087750, at 

*9 (7th Cir. Mar. 13, 2015) (“District courts may rely 

on hearsay testimony in formulating an 

appropriate sentence, ‘provided that the information has 

sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable 

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Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 15

accuracy.’” (quoting United States v. Clark, 538 F.3d 803, 813–

14 (7th Cir. 2008))). Furthermore, in both Kellam and Green, 

unlike here, there were discrepancies between the names on 

the documents related to the earlier convictions and the case 

at hand. And critically, neither case involved the matching of 

full social security numbers. Jordan had the presentence 

report listing his social security number in advance of 

sentencing and never objected to it as incorrect. We thus see 

no need for the government to have produced photographs 

or fingerprints related to the seven-year-old prior conviction, 

especially since Jordan proffered nothing to refute the 

government’s evidence. Accordingly, the district court 

properly accepted the government’s evidence as proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Jordan had a prior felony 

drug conviction. 

B. Miller

Miller raises only one argument: that the government 

failed to prove that the incident where he and others 

expelled Glaze from the Outlaws amounted to a robbery. 

The government charged Miller with violating 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1962(c), which makes it “unlawful for any person 

employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, 

or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 

commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in 

the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 

racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” The 

showing of a pattern of racketeering activity “requires at 

least two acts of racketeering activity,” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), 

and those acts can include robberies chargeable under state 

law, id. § 1961(1); United States v. Genova, 333 F.3d 750, 757 

(7th Cir. 2003). (Miller does not challenge on appeal the 

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16 Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592

government’s proof of a second predicate act—another 

robbery committed a month before the robbery at issue.) 

Under Indiana law, a person commits robbery when he 

knowingly or intentionally takes property from another 

person by threatening use of force, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(1), 

and is liable for the offense even if he aided or induced its 

commission, id. § 35-41-2-4. 

Miller argues that he and his fellow Outlaws did not 

commit robbery because, in his view, their demanding that 

Glaze turn over Outlaws items was separate from any 

displays of force. Miller also argues that this divestment of 

property was expected as part of removal from the Club. 

Miller admits, however, that “there was certainly overlap 

between the force used on Glaze and the taking of 

property,” and according to an eyewitness, Glaze turned 

over his items not voluntarily, but “by threat.” The Outlaws 

present also removed Glaze’s personal items while he was 

confined to a chair and, Glaze testified, “made it clear if [he] 

didn’t cooperate with them, [he] probably wouldn’t have 

walked out of there.” We thus conclude that the displays of 

force against Glaze were part of the same event as the taking 

of his property and, construing the facts in the light most 

favorable to the government, constituted a chargeable 

offense of robbery under Indiana law.

C. Bowser

Bowser challenges only his sentence, first arguing that 

the district court erred by relying on the nature of his plea of 

nolo contendere to the RICO charge (Count 1 of the Second 

Superseding Indictment) to deny him a sentencing reduction 

for acceptance of responsibility. A plea of nolo contendere, 

Bowser notes, “admit[s] every essential element of the 

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Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 17

offense that is well pleaded in the charge” and thus “is 

tantamount to an admission of guilt for the purposes of the 

case.” Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421, 426 (1961) (quotation 

and alterations omitted). Bowser emphasizes that he pleaded 

guilty to ten underlying offenses and contends that the court 

applied a per se rule that a nolo contendere plea precludes 

the acceptance reduction—a rule, he says, that no circuit has 

adopted. He argues that the court instead should have 

addressed the factors listed in U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.1, and 

considered how he saved judicial resources by avoiding 

trial.

Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), a district court is to provide a 

two-level reduction in a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the 

defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility 

for his offense.” The court here explained its reasons for 

denying the reduction as follows:

[W]hile Mr. Bowser has admitted his guilt to 

the underlying acts involved in Count 1, 

because he neither admits nor disputes his 

guilt in Count 1 through his nolo contendere 

plea, ... he’s not taken responsibility or 

accepted responsibility for his actions. 

Mr. Bowser has not admitted that the Outlaws 

Motorcycle Club was a criminal enterprise. He 

will not admit and accept responsibility for the 

fact that others did conspire with him. He just 

says others in general. So the Court is not 

going to give the two level.

Bowser argues that everything in this explanation is 

simply a restatement of the nature of his nolo contendere 

plea. But we disagree. In our view, the court went beyond 

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18 Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592

relying solely on the nature of Bowser’s plea by citing 

specific facts about how he refused to acknowledge the 

Outlaws as a criminal organization or identify his coconspirators. Bowser insists that his actions can be explained 

by the fact that he views the Outlaws as his family, and as 

the district court explained in accepting his plea, 

acknowledging the Outlaws as criminal would likely lead to 

his expulsion. 

But because the district court evaluated the facts 

surrounding Bowser’s plea and made specific observations 

about his refusal to acknowledge his association with a 

criminal organization, we are not persuaded that the court 

committed reversible error in denying Bowser the reduction 

for acceptance of responsibility. Even a defendant who 

pleads guilty “is not entitled to an adjustment under 

[§ 3E1.1] as a matter of right.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3; 

see United States v. Dachman, 743 F.3d 254, 259 (7th Cir. 2014); 

United States v. Panice, 598 F.3d 426, 435 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Rather, the sentencing judge is given discretion to make 

factual findings about the defendant’s credibility and 

conduct, and we review those findings for clear error, giving 

“great deference to the sentencing judge because [she] is in a 

‘unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of 

responsibility.’” Dachman, 743 F.3d at 260 (quoting United 

States v. Frykholm, 267 F.3d 604, 610 (7th Cir. 2001)). “The 

findings of the trial judge in sentencing will only be reversed 

if the decision lacks any foundation or the court is ‘left with 

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.’” United States v. Seidling, 737 F.3d 1155, 1162 

(7th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Souffront, 338 F.3d 

809, 832 (7th Cir. 2003)). Even considering Bowser’s 

motivation for pleading as he did, we are not convinced that 

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Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 19

the court clearly erred in finding he had not accepted 

responsibility for purposes of § 3E1.1. 

This analysis is in line with our approach recently in 

Dachman, 743 F.3d at 261 n.2, in which we declined to decide 

whether a nolo contendere plea alone precludes a finding of 

acceptance of responsibility when “other facts were more 

than sufficient to justify the district court’s denial of 

acceptance of responsibility.” As the government notes, it 

also conforms with the approach of other circuits, which 

have upheld the denial of the § 3E1.1 sentencing reduction to 

defendants entering similar pleas when the trial court relied 

on additional facts beyond the nature of the plea. 

See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 751 F.3d 123, 125, 127 (3d Cir. 

2014) (upholding denial of acceptance reduction even 

though “a nolo contendere plea does not automatically 

preclude a district court from granting such a reduction”); 

United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176, 181 (5th Cir. 1994)

(upholding denial of acceptance reduction and noting that 

Alford plea was relevant, but not a disqualifying factor, for 

applying the reduction). 

Moreover, although Bowser emphasizes that he 

prevented the expense of trial, we have rejected the 

argument that a defendant is “entitled to the reduction 

because his nolo contendere plea saved the government and 

district court the time and expense of a long and 

complicated trial.” United States v. Boyle, 10 F.3d 485, 490 (7th 

Cir. 2010). It is true that one of the underlying purposes for 

the sentencing reduction under § 3E1.1 “is to reduce the 

burdens of trial to prosecutors, judges, victims, jurors, and 

witnesses by inducing defendants to plead guilty.” United 

States v. Gonzalez, 608 F.3d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 2010). But 

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20 Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592

because the reduction serves many other purposes—“the 

societal interest in crime reduction, restitution, 

rehabilitation, early withdrawal from criminal activity and 

withdrawal of criminals from positions of trust and 

responsibility”—adopting a rule mandating the reduction 

solely for avoiding the costs of trial “would ignore these 

other purposes and emasculate the Guideline.” Boyle, 10 F.3d 

at 490.

Bowser also argues that the district court erred in 

imposing a condition of supervised release authorizing 

suspicionless searches of his person, home, and effects. The 

government confesses error, acknowledging that United 

States v. Farmer, 755 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2014), concluded 

that a condition of release authorizing suspicionless searches 

is improper when the court does not connect that condition 

to the underlying offense. Here, the court said only that the 

search condition was imposed based on “the nature of the 

instant offense,” without elaborating. Given the brevity of 

the court’s comment, we accept the government’s confession 

of error.

We have considered the additional arguments presented 

in the appellants’ briefs, including Jordan’s arguments 

regarding his right to a speedy trial and inaccuracies in 

Stonebraker’s testimony about Stonebraker’s drug use, but 

we do not believe that these arguments warrant discussion 

beyond that of the district court in its rulings on those issues. 

Accordingly, the judgments against Jordan, Miller, and 

Bowser are AFFIRMED, with the exception that Bowser’s case 

is REMANDED to the district court for further consideration of 

the term of his supervised release authorizing suspicionless 

searches.

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