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Parties Involved:
James N. Barber
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

, 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 93-4096 

JAMES N. BARBER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF trrAH 

D.C. No. 92-CR-180-B 

Submitted on the briefs.1 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of 

Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah; and Patrick J. Schneider, Special 

Assistant United States Attorney, Phoenix, Arizona, on the brief 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Edward K. Brass, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before ANDERSON, McKAY and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

James N. Barber was indicted and convicted for forging the 

signature of a judge of the United States Court of Claims, in 

violation of 18 u.s.c. § 505. Mr. Barber appeals his conviction 

1 After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 93-4096 Document: 01019286932 Date Filed: 11/07/1994 Page: 1 
and his sentence arguing the jury instructions 

to defraud were incomplete and erroneous, 

failed to abide by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and 

concerning intent 

the district court 

the district court 

erred in imposing a vindictive sentence and harsher sentence after 

trial than had been imposed during the initial guilty plea. We 

affirm the conviction and the sentence. 

BACKGROUND 

Mr. Barber, an attorney, agreed to represent George Caine in 

a civil lawsuit that Mr. Caine had initiated previously with a 

different attorney. Mr. Caine gave M~. Barber a $5,000 retainer. 

Due to Mr. Barber's failure to prosecute the case, the lawsuit was 

dismissed in 1988. However, Mr. Barber represented to Mr. Caine 

the lawsuit was continuing to proceed slowly. In 1991, Mr. Barber 

informed Mr. Caine the lawsuit had recently been dismissed and 

gave Mr. Caine documents bearing a forged signature of the 

presiding judge, Chief Judge Smith of the Court of Claims. 

Upon learning the lawsuit had been dismissed, Mr. Caine 

desired to initiate an appeal. Mr. Caine called the judge's 

chambers to inquire about the timing for filing a notice of appeal 

and learned the lawsuit had been dismissed three years earlier. 

Mr. Caine told the judicial clerk the case had just recently been 

dismissed and that Mr. Caine had an order signed by the judge 

dismissing the suit on April 14, 1991. The clerk asked Mr. Caine 

to fax all purported court orders to the court so they could 

inspect the documents. After reviewing the documents, the court 

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contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

After Mr. Barber was indicted, he entered into a plea 

agreement with the government. However, upon Mr. Barber's plea of 

guilt, the district court imposed a sentence greater than the 

sentence contained in the plea agreement. In response to this 

more severe sentence, Mr. Barber moved for resentencing or 

alternatively to withdraw his plea. The judge ordered the guilty 

plea stricken and set the matter for trial. After the jury 

conviction, the judge sentenced Mr. Barber to a harsher sentence 

than had originally been imposed as a result of the guilty plea. 

I 

Mr. Barber, on appeal, first challenges the jury 

instructions. Section 505 of 18 U.S.C. states it is a crime to 

"forge[] the signature of any judge for the purpose of 

authenticating any proceeding or document knowing such 

signature ... to be false or counterfeit." It is accepted in 

other circuits that this forgery statute necessarily includes the 

element of intent to defraud. See United States v. London, 714 

F.2d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bertrand, 596 

F.2d 150, 151 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. pyer, 546 F.2d 

1313, 1316 (7th Cir. 1976). Mr. Barber proposed the instructions 

to the jury include the following language: 

To act with an "intent to defraud" means to act 

with the intent to deceive or to cheat, ordinarily for 

the purpose of either causing some financial loss to 

another or for the purpose of bringing about some 

financial gain to one's self. 

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.. :. 

I 

The jury instructions given on intent to defraud defined the 

phrase as follows: "To act with 'intent to defraud' means to act 

with intent to deceive or to cheat someone." Therefore, the 

district court included intent to defraud as an element of the 

offense and defined it. Mr. Barber claims this shortened jury 

instruction is prejudicial error, as intent to defraud requires 

financial gain. 

Mr. Barber fails to state in his brief whether he raised an 

objection to the jury instruction and where in the record any 

objection can be found. See lOth Cir. R. 28.2{d). Therefore, 

although Mr. Barber offered an alternative jury instruction, we 

assume no objection was raised to the proffered jury instructions, 

and we apply a plain error standard of review. United States v. 

Smith, 13 F.3d 1421, 1424 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 

209 {1994); Fed. R. Crim. P. 30 & 52(b). The plain error standard 

of review requires us to consider whether the defendant was denied 

the right to a fair and impartial trial . United States v. Ures-tiHernandez, 968 F.2d 1042, 1046 {lOth Cir. 1992). "To constitute 

plain error, the district court's error must have been both 

'obvious and substantial.'" United States v. Brown, 996 F.2d 

1049, 1053 {lOth Cir. 1993) {quoting United States v. Mitcheltree, 

940 F.2d 1329, 1333-34 {lOth Cir. 1991)). 

The additional phrase Mr. Barber proposed, "ordinarily for 

the purpose of ... causing some financial loss," is qualitative 

and adds no substantive change to the jury instruction. Neither 

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Mr. Barber's definition of intent to defraud nor the trial court's 

definition necessarily requires financial gain or loss. As such, 

plain error has not been shown since the tendered instruction is 

substantively identical to Mr. Barber's proposed instruction. 

Mr. Barber argues financial loss or gain is a required 

element of 18 u.s.c. § 505; however, he has failed to demonstrate 

this requirement. Section 505 itself does not mention financial 

gain or loss, nor does it even mention "intent to defraud." Of 

the cases Mr. Barber relies on to argue financial gain is a 

requirement of § 505, each postulates intent to defraud as part of 

the forgery crime. However, none of the cases explicitly requires 

financial gain or loss. Mr. Barber argues the requirement can be 

inferred because in the only reported case in which the government 

attempted to prosecute someone for using the forged signature of a 

judge for a purpose other than financial fraud, the trial court 

acquitted the defendant and the acquittal was affirmed on appeal. 

See Dyer, 546 F.2d 1313. However, Mr. Barber himself admits the 

judgment of acquittal in Dyer was affirmed on "technical grounds," 

specifically the lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1316. Mr. Barber 

relies on a footnote in Dyer stating § 505 requires fraudulent 

intent and stating the terms counterfeit and forged are not 

synonymous. See id. at 1315 n.3. This footnote, although clearly 

requiring proof of fraudulent intent, does not require financial 

loss or gain to constitute a violation of § 505. 

There is no reported Tenth Circuit or United States Supreme 

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Court case concerning the construction of 18 U.S.C. § 505; 

therefore, there is no clear rule that the Tenth Circuit requires 

financial gain or loss to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 505. Also, no case from another circuit explicitly requires 

financial gain or loss to establish fraudulent intent, although 

all of the reported § 505 convictions in the other circuits did 

involve financial gain or loss. See London, 714 F.2d 1558 (an 

attorney used a photocopy of a judge's signature to forge a 

document requiring the clients to pay money that would be held by 

the attorney); Bertrand, 596 F.2d 150 (§ 505 would be violated by 

an attorney who forged a judge's signature in an effort to falsely 

induce the clients to reimburse the attorney for a court filing 

fee) . 

A common sense and common definition of fraudulent intent 

demands the perpetrator act for personal benefit or to deprive the 

other person of something. That something need not be money. 

See, e.g., Blacks Law Dictionary 381 (6th ed. 1990) ("Intent to 

defraud means an intention to deceive another person, and to 

induce such other person, in reliance upon such deception, to 

assume, create, transfer, alter or terminate a right, obligation 

or power with reference to property"); Devitt et al, Federal Jury 

Practice and Instructions, 4th ed., § 16.07 ("To act with 

'fraudulent intent' means to act knowingly and with the intention 

or the purpose to deceive or to cheat. A 'fraudulent intent' is 

accompanied, ordinarily, by a desire or a purpose to bring about 

some gain or benefit to oneself or some other person or by a 

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desire or a purpose to cause some loss to some person."). We find 

no error with the jury instructions. As such, there was no 

obvious and substantial error in the jury instructions by the 

district court. Failure to include in the jury instruction on 

intent to defraud the additional phrase, "ordinarily for the 

purpose of either causing some financial loss to another or for 

the purpose of bringing about some financial gain to one's self," 

is not plain error. 

It is not necessary to our decision to decide the meaning of 

intent to defraud or even to decide whether intent to defraud is 

an element of the crime under § 505. Therefore, we need not 

decide these issues now. Today our holding is simply that the 

district court did not commit plain error in the instructions 

given to the jury. 

II 

Mr. Barber also claims the district court erred in failing to 

grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal. We review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government. If there 

is evidence from which the jury could reasonably find Mr. Barber 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we uphold the denial of a motion 

for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Frank, 901 F.2d 846, 

848 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Mr. Barber claims he is entitled to an acquittal because 

there is insufficient evidence of his fraudulent intent. He 

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argues fraudulent intent was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 

because the jury was not required to find intent to cause 

financial loss or gain and there existed no evidence showing Mr. 

Barber caused his client a financial loss. 

We reject Mr. Barber's argument. The jury was required to 

make a finding that Mr. Barber intended to defraud his client by 

forging the signature of the judge. The record reveals the 

evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Mr. 

Barber had such intent: Mr. Barber accepted a retainer to 

represent Mr. Caine; Mr. Barber lied to Mr. Caine about the status 

of Mr. Caine's lawsuit; and Mr. Barber created false court 

documents and signed the judge's name on these documents. This is 

sufficient evidence to show Mr. Barber intended to deceive Mr. 

Caine. The evidence also satisfies each element explicitly 

included in § 505: Mr. Barber signed the name of a judge to 

authenticate a document, knowing the signature to be false. The 

district court did not err in refusing to grant Mr. Barber's 

motion for a judgment of acquittal. 

III 

Mr. Barber claims on appeal the district court violated Fed. 

R. Crim. P. ll(e) (4) by failing to inform Mr. Barber, before 

initially accepting his guilty plea, that the court was not going 

to adopt the sentence in the plea agreement. Rule 11 mandates the 

court advise the parties of the court's intentions and give the 

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defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea.2 

The district court, in open court on Mr. Barber's motion, 

informed the parties the court would not accept the plea agreement 

and therefore struck Mr. Barber's guilty plea. The judge 

satisfied Rule 11 by advising the parties of the court's rejection 

of the plea agreement and by allowing the defendant to withdraw 

the plea. The district court judge did comply with Rule 11 by 

granting Mr. Barber's request to withdraw the plea. The judge 

satisfied Rule 11. 

Mr. Barber also argues that if his conviction is upheld, he 

must be sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement, which was 

rejected by the district court. Mr. Barber cites no authority for 

this argument. Rule 11(e} (2} clearly states the court is free to 

accept or reject a plea agreement. Here, the district court 

rejected the plea agreement, and Mr. Barber was tried by a jury. 

A defendant has no absolute right to have his plea agreement 

accepted. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971}. 

Accordingly, we reject Mr. Barber's arguments regarding 

sentencing. 

2 If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court 

shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, 

advise the defendant personally in open court that 

the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the 

defendant the opportunity to then withdraw the plea. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e} (4}. 

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IV 

Mr. Barber alleges the court retaliated against him by 

imposing a more severe sentence following the jury trial than it 

had imposed when Mr. Barber pled guilty.3 Mr. Barber claims this 

retaliation was in response to his withdrawal of his guilty plea. 

However, Mr. Barber has failed to show evidence of retaliation. 

According to the trial and sentencing record, the post-trial 

sentence was more severe than the sentence entered after the plea 

because the court initially gave Mr. Barber a two-point reduction 

for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to USSG §3El.l upon his 

guilty plea. After Mr. Barber rescinded his plea and the case 

went to trial, the sentencing judge determined Mr. Barber was no 

longer eligible for a two-point reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility. 

Normally, "[w]e review the acceptance of responsibility 

determination as a question of fact under the clearly erroneous 

standard." United States v. Ross, 920 F.2d 1530, 1537 (lOth Cir. 

19 9 0) . The court determined by Mr. Barber's withdrawal of his 

guilty plea that he had not accepted responsibility for the crime 

for which he was charged. However, Mr. Barber does not explicitly 

challenge the court's factual determination, he only claims 

retaliation. We find no merit to his argument. 

3 At the time of the guilty plea, the judge imposed a sentence 

of three months in prison, three years of supervised release, and 

three months of home detention. After the jury trial, the judge 

entered a total offense level of eleven rather than nine, 

resulting in a sentence of ten months in prison, three years of 

supervised release, and restitution payments. 

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~ 

l 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the conviction and the sentence. 

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