Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02468/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02468-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard B. Ives
Respondent
Kevin Corbett McClure
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN CORBETT McCLURE,

Petitioner, No. CIV 08-2468 KJM 

vs.

RICHARD B. IVES, 

Respondent. ORDER

 /

Petitioner is a federal prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He alleges that the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has

refused to consider him for its substance abuse/early release program solely because of his

commitment offense, which he argues is arbitrary and capricious. Respondent has filed a motion

to dismiss, alleging that the action is not ripe and that petitioner lacks standing. Both parties

have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction.

I. Background

In 2003, petitioner was convicted of conspiring to possess methamphetamine,

cocaine and ecstasy with the intent to distribute and/or manufacture and to distribute the drugs, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 & 841(a)(1), and of using a firearm during and in relation to a drug

trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He was sentenced to a total term of

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 The court takes judicial notice of records of the United States District Court for the 1

District of Idaho. Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007).

 The release date also may be confirmed by visiting the BOP’s website at 2 www.bop.gov.

 The court relies on page numbers assigned by its ECF system. 3

 Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008). 4

2

180 months. Motion to Dismiss (MTD), Ex. 1; United States v. Kevin Corbett McClure,

1:02CR00079-02 (District of Idaho), Docket No. 844 (judgment). His projected release date is 1

April 21, 2015. MTD, Ex. 1.2

On April 14, 2008, petitioner submitted an “Inmate Request To Staff,” asking for

“re-assessment of my eligibility for early release for successful completion of RDAP [Residential

Drug Abuse Program].” Pet. at 14. BOP personnel replied that his request to participate in 3

RDAP would be forwarded to the Drug Treatment Specialist and that the “application will

include a file review consistent with the standards for early release eligibility outlined in

Arrington.” Id. At the bottom of the form, the “DTS” [Drug Treatment Specialist] wrote 4

“please reapply for RDAP when you become 36 months from your release date.” Id. Petitioner

alleges, however, that he was told he would not be eligible for early release because of his

firearm conviction. Id. at 6. 

Petitioner pursued administrative remedies. On June 13, 2008, respondent

replied:

According to Program Statement 5162.04, Categorization of

Offenses, Page 3, “Other policies or programs, such as early

release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3621(e), indicate that an inmate

could be denied the benefits of such program if he or she was

convicted of an offense listed in either Section 6 or 7.” Arrington

invalidated one of the Bureau’s federal regulations prescribing the

criteria for the RDAP early release eligibility, specifically 28 CFR

550.58 (a)( vi) (B) (2000). That regulation requires that inmates

whose current offense ‘involved the carrying, possession, or use of

a firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives” not be eligible

for RDAP early release. The violation of 18 USC 924(c), is

included in Section 6 on page 4 of Program Statement 5162.04, as

a crime of violence in all cases. Staff decision-making per

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Program Statement 5162.04, Section 6, was not addressed in

Arrington and remains unchanged. As a result, an inmate who is

denied RDAP early release eligibility under Section 6 remains

ineligible for reasons unrelated to Arrington. 

Pet. at 10. 

Petitioner appealed this determination. The Regional Director of BOP responded,

in pertinent part:

In order to be considered for an 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) early release,

you must first be determined as qualified for the RDAP. That

decision has not yet been made. Thus, at this time any official

determination of your provisional eligibility for 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3621(e) early release would be premature.

Bureau of Prisons staff have suggested that you would not be

eligible for 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) early release consideration

pending successful completion of the RDAP, based on your instant

offense. However, this determination cannot be considered official

until completion of the Eligibility Interview.

Id. at 8. 

II. Analysis

A. Background

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), BOP “shall make available appropriate substance

abuse treatment for each prisoner the Bureau determines has a treatable condition of substance

addiction or abuse.” Under § 3621(e)(1)(C), BOP must provide residential substance abuse

treatment for prisoners “based on an eligible prisoner’s proximity to release date.” To encourage

inmates to enroll in drug treatment, the statute also provides that “[t]he period a prisoner

convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment

program may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such reduction may not be more than one

year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). 

Because the statute itself does not define “nonviolent offense” for purposes of its

early release program, the Bureau of Prisons has adopted and refined its own definition; both the

definition itself and the process of defining the term have been the subject of considerable

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 None of the Arrington petitioners had been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 5

§ 924(c)(1). Id. at 1112 n.4. 

4

litigation. In several regulations and program statements, BOP sought to exclude inmates whose

commitment offenses involved the use of firearms from consideration for early release. See

Gardner v. Grandolsky, 585 F.3d 786, 789-91 (3d Cir. 2009) (surveying history); Williams v.

Clark, 52 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1147-50 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (same). As part of this evolution, the

Supreme Court considered BOP’s discretion in categorizing certain offenses as crimes of

violence based on pre-conviction conduct. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001). The Court

concluded that BOP “may categorically exclude prisoners based on their preconviction conduct”

and found a 1997 interim regulation, which excluded prisoners whose drug offenses included the

use of a firearm, to be a permissible exercise of BOP’s discretion. Id. at 242-43. 

In Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit

considered the BOP regulation, which became final in 2000, through the lens of the

Administrative Procedures Act and determined that its adoption had not complied with

appropriate procedures. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found that the 2000 regulation

categorically excluding prisoners with convictions involving firearms was invalid. Id. at 1114.5

Petitioner relies on Arrington to argue that he should be entitled to consideration for early

release, claiming that BOP refuses “to look at my individual circumstances as set forth in

3621(e).” Pet. at 3. In this respect, petitioner’s position does not acknowledge the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Warren v. Crabtree, 185 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 1999), finding that BOP may

classify all § 924(c) offenses as crimes of violence for the purposes of sentence reduction. 

Respondent does not address the merits of petitioner’s claim, but rather argues

that the claim is not ripe and that petitioner lacks standing because he has not even completed the

RDAP, a prerequisite for any consideration of early release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2) (“the

period a prisoner . . . remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program may

be reduced. . . .”). Respondent has supported this contention by providing copies of BOP’s

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Program Statements from BOP’s website, which are proper subjects of judicial review. United

States v. Thornton, 511 F.3d 1221, 1229 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008) (judicial notice taken of BOP policy

statement); Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 926-27 (7th Cir. 2003) (taking judicial notice of

information on official government website). He has provided the current program statements,

effective March 16, 2009, but has not given the court the administrative materials in effect at the

time petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies. MTD, App. 2. 

According to the current version of the program statements, an inmate must meet

three criteria to be admitted into the RDAP: he must have a verifiable substance abuse problem,

he must sign an agreement acknowledging program responsibility, and he must be able to

complete all three components of the program before release. Psychology Treatment Programs

Statement P5330.11, § 2.5.1(b); see also 28 CFR § 550.53(b). 

If verifying documentation is found or produced, and only then,

inmates who volunteer for the RDAP will be personally

interviewed by the DAPC [Drug Abuse Program Coordinator]. 

Interviews will be conducted based on the inmate’s proximity to

release, ordinarily no less than 24 months from release. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

On the basis of the clinical interview, the DAPC may conclude that

the inmate either does or does not have a diagnosis of a substance

abuse disorder. In some instances, the DAPC may find the inmate

does not have a diagnosis, even if there is substantiating

documentation.

Id. § 2.5.9; 28 CFR § 550.53(e). These provisions do not appear to differ greatly from the prior

version of the statement cited to petitioner in response to his April 2008 request. Pet. at 14. 

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This court has no jurisdiction to review claims unless they are ripe. United

States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has explained, the

basic rationale [of the ripeness doctrine] is to prevent the courts,

through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling

themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies,

and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an

administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a

concrete way by the challenging parties.

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). In assessing whether a

determination is ripe for review, a court must consider whether delaying the review would cause

hardship to petitioner, whether a decision would interfere with administrative action, and whether

further factual development would assist the court. Ohio Forestry Association, Inc. v. Sierra

Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998). A claim is not ripe “if it involves contingent future events that

may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” Streich, 560 F.3d at 931 (quoting

Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985)).

The requirement that a party have "standing" to bring an action is part of the

case-or-controversy provisions of Article III of the Constitution. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). There are three elements:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact–an invasion

of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between

the injury and the conduct complained of–the injury has to be fairly

. . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not

. . . th[e] result [of] independent action of some third party not

before the court. Third it must be likely as opposed to merely

speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision.

Id. (internal quotations & citations omitted). 

The two doctrines are related: “ripeness can be characterized as standing on a

timeline” and often “coincides squarely with standing’s injury in fact prong.” Thomas v.

Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). To have

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standing, a party must demonstrate a realistic danger that he will suffer some injury as the result

of the operation of the challenged statute or regulation. Id. at 1139. 

Petitioner cannot satisfy the jurisprudential prerequisites to this action. He alleges

the BOP has determined he is ineligible for the RDAP early release program because of his

conviction. At this point, however, petitioner has not shown he would otherwise be accepted

into RDAP. In fact, he has not alleged or otherwise demonstrated that he has a substance abuse

disorder that would qualify him for entry into the program. Because there is nothing in the

record suggesting petitioner could be admitted to the RDAP and because the determination of

RDAP eligibility will not take place until he is closer to his release date, he has not shown that

the challenged regulation is the cause of any injury. Aguilar v. Woodring, 2008 WL 4375757

(C.D. Cal. 2008) (petitioner cannot challenge regulations concerning halfway house placement

when he was not yet entitled to an evaluation for placement); compare Serrato v. Clark, 486 F.3d

560 (9th Cir. 2007) (petitioner had standing to challenge discontinuation of boot camp program

when there was no dispute she was eligible for the program); Birth v. Crabtree, 996 F.Supp. 1014

(D. Oregon 1998) (petitioner’s claim was ripe even though he had not yet completed drug

treatment when BOP issued a prospective determination of his eligibility for release).

In his opposition to respondent’s motion, petitioner argues that the results of any

eligibility interview will be a foregone conclusion based on his § 924(c) conviction. He has not

demonstrated, however, that this conviction will have a bearing on the evaluation for RDAP

participation as opposed to his eligibility for early release. Because he has not shown he has

been rejected from the RDAP because of his conviction and that he is otherwise eligible for

RDAP, he has not demonstrated injury in fact. 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that respondent’s motion to dismiss (docket

No. 13) is granted. 

DATED: February 25, 2010.

 

mccl2468.mtd

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