Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06077/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roy W. Collins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

( 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

December 19, 1990 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 90-6077, United States v. Collins 

Attached is a corrected copy of page 3 in the abovecaptioned opinion authored by Judge Baldock. This was previously 

left out in error with the correction letter and opinion sent out 

December 17, 1990. 

Attachment 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

By: 

Shannon K. Sullivan 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 1 
previous year and did not expect to owe any taxes in the present 

year. Consequently, although he was not eligible to claim exempt 

status, none of defendant's wages were withheld between 1982 and 

1984, with one exception. 1 Defendant earned taxable income of 

$48,271 in 1982, $35,359 in 1983 and $49,080 in 1984; his 

estimated tax liability for those years was $17,862, $10,170 and 

$15,784 respectively. Between 1982 and 1984, defendant failed to 

file a tax return and paid no federal income taxes. 

At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury 

on defendant's good faith defense: 

1 

Instruction No. 26 

GOOD FAITH OF THE ACCUSED 

[B]oth the offenses charged in the indictment and the 

lesser included offenses require proof of the accused's 

willfulness as an essential element •... If the 

accused's actions or failure to act was the result of a 

good faith misunderstanding as the requirements of the 

law, then the actions or failure to act were not "willful." 

An accused's disagreement with the law or his own belief 

the law should be held to be unconstitutional--no matter 

how earnestly he holds those beliefs--is not a good 

faith misunderstanding of the law. On the other hand, 

the accused may hold beliefs concerning his duties under 

the law which, although not reasonable, are held in good 

faith. Such a good faith belief is a defense to the 

charges in the indictment as well as lesser included 

offenses. 

[I]f the defendant held a good faith belief that the law 

did not apply to him, he would not have acted willfully 

as he is charged. This is so whether or not the 

In 1983, the government withheld from defendant's wages a 

$525 penalty and $201 in taxes. Rec. vol. IV at 61-62. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 2 
I 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

December 17, 1990 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 90-6077, United States v. Collins 

Attached is a corrected copy of the above-captioned 

opinion authored by Judge Baldock. This opinion has been modified 

at page 3. In the paragraph which begins with "An accused's 

disagreement .•• "the last sentence has been revised to include 

the language "a defense to the" charges in the indictment as well 

as lesser included offenses. 

PF/sks 

Enclosure 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

By: ~Mi~ 

trick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 3 
PUBLISH 

FILED NOVEMBER 27, 1990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Fi\ c--6 

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vs. 

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) 

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) 

) 

) 

No. 90-6077 

ROY W. COLLINS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-89-45-A) 

Robert G. Mccampbell, Assistant United States Attorney, (Timothy 

D. Leonard, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Susan M. Otto, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant Roy Collins was convicted by a jury on 

three counts of federal income tax evasion, 26 u.s.c. § 7201. He 

now appeals arguing that the district court improperly instructed 

the jury on the issue of good faith and violated his sixth 

amendment right to counsel by revoking the pro hac vice admission 

Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 4 
of his privately retained attorney. Our jurisdiction over this 

direct criminal appeal arises under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. We affirm. 

I. Good Faith. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 708 (10th 

Cir. 1990), we summarize the facts as follows. Defendant, a 

fifty-seven-year-old aircraft structural designer, filed federal 

income tax returns and paid taxes from the time he began working 

until 1979. At that time, defendant claims to have become 

convinced that he was not obligated to pay taxes. Defendant 

purportedly believed that labor constitutes property which, when 

exchanged for wages, produces no net gain subject to taxation as 

"income." At other times, defendant claimed that he was not a 

"person" under the Internal Revenue Code and argued he was not 

subject to taxation because he had not entered into a regulatory 

relationship with the United States. Defendant acknowledged that 

he developed these views after attending several meetings with 

like-minded individuals, but denied being a tax protester. 

Defendant testified that he "disagreed with the philosophy" of the 

IRS concerning what constituted income, rec. vol.Vat 186, and 

felt that he was not obligated to pay taxes until he received a 

satisfactory explanation from the IRS concerning his legal 

beliefs, id. at 233. 

While employed at CDI Corp. between 1982 and 1984, defendant 

stated on his W-4 forms that he had not owed any taxes in the 

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previous year and did not expect to owe any taxes· in the present 

year. Consequently, although he was not eligible to claim exempt 

status, none of defendant's wages were withheld between 1982 and 

1984, with one exception. 1 Defendant earned taxable income of 

$48,271 in 1982, $35,359 in 1983 and $49,080 in 1984; his 

estimated tax liability for those years was $17,862, $10,170 and 

$15,784 respectively. Between 1982 and 1984, defendant failed to 

file a tax return and paid no federal income taxes. 

At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury 

on defendant's good faith defense: 

1 

Instruction No. 26 

GOOD FAITH OF THE ACCUSED 

[B]oth the offenses charged in the indictment and the 

lesser included offenses require proof of the accused's 

willfulness as an essential element •.•• If the 

accused's actions or failure to act was the result of a 

good faith misunderstanding as the requirements of the 

law, then the actions or failure to act were not "willful• II 

An accused's disagreement with the law or his own belief 

the law should be held to be unconstitutional--no matter 

how earnestly he holds those beliefs--is not a good 

faith misunderstanding of the law. On the other hand, 

the accused may hold beliefs concerning his duties under 

the law which, although not reasonable, are held in good 

faith. Such a good faith belief is the charges in the 

indictment as well as lesser included offenses. 

[I]f the defendant held a good faith belief that the law 

did not apply to him, he would not have acted willfully 

as he is charged. This is so whether or not the 

In 1983, the government withheld from defendant's wages a 

$525 penalty and $201 in taxes. Rec. vol. IV at 61-62. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 6 
defendant's belief was reasonable. However, if you 

regard his belief as being highly unreasonable, you may 

consider this along with all other evidence on the 

question of whether his belief was indeed genuine or 

merely feigned or made-up •. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 99 (emphasis in original). Defendant argues 

that this instruction confused the jury by improperly focusing its 

inquiry on the objective reasonableness of defendant's belief 

instead of whether such belief was genuine. We review jury 

instructions as a whole to determine whether the instruction in 

question accurately stated the governing law and provided the jury 

with an ample understanding of the applicable issues and legal 

standards. United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 791 (10th Cir. 

1990). 

A good faith misunderstanding of the duty to pay income taxes 

can negate the willfulness element of tax evasion charge, "and 

'[t]he misunderstanding need not have a reasonable basis to 

provide a defense.'" United States v. Harting, 879 F.2d 765, 767 

(10th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Hairston, 819 F.2d 971, 

972 (10th Cir. 1987)); but see States v. Cheek, 882 F.2d 1263, 

1270 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting subjective reasonableness standard 

followed by other circuits in favor of objective reasonableness 

standard), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1108 (1990). However, 

"although not itself the standard by which to evaluate good faith, 

the reasonableness of a good-faith defense is a factor which the 

jury may properly consider in determining whether a defendant's 

asserted beliefs are genuinely held." United States v. Mann, 884 

F.2d 532, 537 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989). In the instant case, the 

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district court explained to the jury that, although defendant's 

subjective belief that he was not obligated to pay taxes did not 

have to be reasonable to effectuate a valid good faith defense, 

the objective reasonableness of defendant's belief could be 

considered, along with other evidence, in determining whether his 

subjective belief was genuine. We find the court's instruction 

unambiguous and fully consistent with our holdings in Mann and 

Harting. 

II. Right to Counsel. 

Attorney Jeffrey A. Dickstein made his first appearance on 

defendant's behalf on April 17, 1989 after being admitted pro hac 

vice by the district court. 2 Defendant apparently retained 

2 Dickstein's reputation preceded him. Admitted to practice 

law in California in 1976, Dickstein currently limits his practice 

to matters relating to federal individual income tax. Dickstein 

has practiced pro hac vice throughout the country in often 

rancorous proceedings before various federal district courts. In 

Donnell v. United States, No. A84-416 Civil, unpub. order (D. 

Alaska Jan. 16, 1986), the district court revoked Dickstein's pro 

hac vice admission after local counsel declined to assume 

responsibility for Dickstein's pleadings. While defending an 

individual on federal criminal tax evasion charges in Washington, 

Dickstein impugned the integrity of the district court during 

trial. See United States v. Summet, 862 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 

1988). The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's formal 

censure of Dickstein as well as its prospective denial of pro hac 

vice status. Id. at 786-87. Based upon Dickstein's conduct in 

Summet, the Nevada federal district court denied his application 

for admission pro hac vice in Nutter v. United States, No. CV-88-

17-PMB, unpub. order (D. Nev. Jan. 21, 1988). Following that 

court's denial, Dickstein remained in the courtroom and continued 

to disrupt the proceedings, disregarding the court's frequent 

admonitions that he remain silent. After repeated outbursts, the 

district court was obliged to order Dickstein removed from the 

courtroom by a United States marshal. Id. at 3 n.3. In Roat v. 

Commissioner, 847 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1988), Dickstein raised a 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Dickstein because counsel agreed with defendant's views on the 

invalidity of federal income tax laws. Rec. vol. IV at 15. 

Dickstein's obstreperous attitude was first illustrated by his 

entry of appearance which informed the court that his association 

with local counsel in compliance with local rules was "under 

duress." Rec. vol. I, doc. 17. On May 1, 1989, Dickstein filed 

ten pretrial motions. The first filing was an 84-page motion to 

dismiss, lavishly larded with citations to the Declaration of 

Independence, colonial history and a plethora of nineteenth 

century Supreme Court cases. Rec. vol. IX, doc. 21. Dickstein 

argued that federal criminal jurisdiction only encompasses acts 

committed within the District of Columbia, on the high seas or on 

federal property; consequently the district court lacked 

jurisdiction over defendant. 3 Id. at 15, 80. Dickstein also 

argued that federal income taxes must be direct and apportioned to 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

series of frivolous arguments challenging the authority of the IRS 

and the jurisdiction of the Tax Court. The Ninth Circuit rejected 

Dickstein's contentions stating: "we publish this opinion in part 

to warn future appellants that the arguments we have rejected here 

have no place in this court." Id. at 1384. 

3 Dickstein explained: 

The allegation that certain acts were committed within 

the Western District of Oklahoma .•• is 

insufficient .•.. [I]t is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that Guthrie, Oklahoma has been ceded to 

the United States by the State of Oklahoma, and that in 

the absence of such a showing, Defendant is entitled to 

have the indictment against him dismissed. 

Rec. vol. IX, doc. 21 at 82. Dickstein advanced virtually identical arguments in United States v. Jump, 88-CR-003-E (N.D. Okla. 

Mar. 24, 1988) and United States v. Reeves, No. CR87-00027-01-P(J) 

(W.D. Ky. Apr 25, 1988). See rec. vol. X, doc 51, ex. J & L. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 9 
survive constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 37, 81. While 

acknowledging the "alleged ratification" of the sixteenth 

amendment, id. at 48, he insisted that the amendment only 

authorizes an income tax within the District of Columbia and the 

territorial possessions of the United States. Id. at 48-49. 

Finally, Dickstein questioned whether defendant was an 

"individual" subject to taxation under the Internal Revenue Code. 4 

Dickstein's second motion to dismiss argued that because the 

1040 forms that defendant failed to file were not affixed with 

expiration dates, the indictment should be dismissed pursuant to 

the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-20. Rec. vol. IX, 

doc. 25. Dickstein's third motion sought to strike as surplusage 

language in the indictment alleging that defendant failed to file 

income tax returns or pay income tax to the IRS. Rec. vol. IX, 

doc. 24. His fourth motion sought to suppress all evidence 

obtained by a third-party summons issued by an IRS special agent. 

Rec. vol. IX, doc. 27. 

4 According to Dickstein: 

Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code 

state that the income tax is imposed on the taxable 

income of an "individual;" other than this, there is no 

other or further description in the same Code which 

defines or describes that "individual." There must be 

somewhere or someplace a legal description of that 

"individual" because otherwise every "individual" in the 

entire world would fall within this class. It is known 

that "individuals" in other countries having absolutely 

no connection with the United States can't possibly be 

the "individuals" described in the Code, but the Code 

itself contains no such limitation which statutorily 

excluded "individuals" in other parts of the world. 

Rec. vol. IX, doc. 21 at 47. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 10 
Dickstein also filed on defendant's behalf a motion in limine 

seeking suppression of several items of evidence, including 

admissions defendant made to an IRS Special Agent. Rec. vol. IX, 

doc 30. In addition, he filed a motion for bill of particulars, 

rec. vol. IX, doc. 22, a motion for oral voir dire, rec. vol. IX, 

doc. 28, a motion to dismiss the indictment for grand jury abuse, 

rec. vol. IX, doc. 23, a motion for disclosure for exculpatory 

evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), rec. 

vol. IX, doc 29, and a motion for Jencks Act material, rec. vol. 

IX, doc. 26. 

The district court denied each of defendant's pretrial 

motions. Rec. vol. X, doc. 46. Thereafter, stating that "the 

defense motions evince a tactic of obfuscation and waste," the 

court issued an order to show cause why Dickstein's pro hac vice 

admission should not be revoked. Rec. vol. I, doc. 40 at 1. 

Dickstein responded with a written motion reiterating the legal 

positions advanced in his previous motions and arguing that the 

district judge should recuse himself. 5 After considering 

Dickstein's motion and the government's response,

6 the district 

5 Dickstein opined: 

So long as Judge Alley and other federal judges consider 

themselves subject to the federal income tax, their 

belief system that "if I have to pay so do you" 

eliminates any possibility of any Defendant receiving a 

fair trial. 

Rec. vol. x, doc. 48 at 8 n.2. 

6 Appended to the government's response to the district court's 

show cause order were transcripts and orders reflecting 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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court revoked Dickstein's admission pro hac vice and removed him 

from the case. Rec. vol. I, doc. 52. The court explained: 

The pleadings filed by Attorney Dickstein in this case 

signal the Court that permitting his future 

participation will obscure the issues, engulf the case 

with frivolity, and deflect the proceedings from their 

object--the orderly determination whether defendant has 

broken the law or not. Just as a court need not suffer 

the testimony of a purported expert witness that the 

moon is made of green cheese, it need not suffer the 

serving-up of legal swill by Attorney Dickstein in this 

case. This is so even if defendant, who recites his 

approval of Attorney Dickstein's pleadings, likes the 

recipe. 

Id. at 2. In a supplemental order, the district court found that 

Dickstein violated Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct by 

raising frivolous arguments before the court and failing to cite 

contrary authority. Rec. vol. I, doc. 57 at 6-9. In light of 

those violations, the court held "that the interests in the fair 

and proper administration of justice . outweigh [defendant's] 

interest in representation by the counsel of his choice." Id. at 

10. Dickstein unsuccessfully petitioned this court for a writ of 

mandamus, Dickstein v. Collins & Alley, No. 89-6225, unpub. order 

(10th Cir. Oct. 10, 1989), whereupon the federal public defender 

was substituted as defense counsel. 

A. 

The sixth amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the Assistance of 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

Dickstein's obstreperous conduct before other federal district 

courts. See rec. vol. X, doc. 51. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 12 
Counsel for his defense." U. s. Const. am. VI. "·It is hardly 

necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a 

defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel 

of his own choice." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). 7 

The right to retain counsel of choice stems from a defendant's 

right to decide what kind of defense he wishes to present. 8 

United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1502 (10th Cir. 1988). 

"Attorneys are not fungible;" often "the most important decision a 

defendant makes in shaping his defense is his selection of an 

attorney." United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 

1979); Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1502. When a defendant is financially 

able to retain counsel, the choice of counsel rests in his hands, 

not in the hands of the state. United States v. Richardson, 894 

F.2d 492, 496 (1st Cir. 1990); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 

280 (6th Cir. 1985). A defendant's right to retain counsel of his 

choice therefore represents "'a right of constitutional 

7 See also Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954) ("a 

defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to employ and 

consult with counsel; otherwise the right to be heard by counsel 

would be of little worth"); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 

75 (1942) ("[defendant] wished the benefit of the undivided 

assistance of counsel of his own choice. We think that such a 

desire on the part of an accused should be respected."). 

8 A defendant's right to secure counsel of his choice is 

cognizable only insofar as defendant is able to retain counsel 

with private funds. An indigent defendant must be provided with 

counsel at state expense, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-

44 (1963), and appointed counsel are held to the same standard of 

competence as retained counsel, United States v. Gipson, 693 F.2d 

109, 111 n.1 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1216 (1983). 

However, "an indigent defendant does not have a right to choose 

appointed counsel." United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th 

Cir. 1988). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 13 
dimension,'" United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070 {2d 

Cir. 1982) {quoting United States v. Wisniewski, 478 F.2d 274, 285 

{2d Cir. 1973)), the denial of which may rise to the level of a 

const{tutional violation, Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 592 

(11th Cir.) {en bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984); Wilson, 

761 F.2d at 278-79. When a court unreasonably or arbitrarily 

interferes with an accused right to retain counsel of his choice, 

a conviction attained under such circumstances cannot stand, 

irrespective of whether the defendant has been prejudiced. United 

States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1990); Fuller v. 

Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 606 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. 

Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1402 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 153 

(1988); United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 818 {1st 

Cir. 1987); Wilson, 761 F.2d at 281. However, a defendant's right 

to retain counsel of his choice is not absolute and "may not 'be 

insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure 

in courts of justice, and deprive such courts of the exercise of 

their inherent powers to control the same.'" United States v. 

Gipson, 693 F.2d 109, 111 {10th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States 

v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 

U.S. 1069 {1979)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1216 (1983); United 

States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 564 {10th Cir. 1987). 

[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one's 

preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth 

Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to 

guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal 

defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will 

inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. 

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Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); ~ Morris v. 

Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983) (no sixth amendment right to 

"meaningful" attorney-client relationship); United States v. 

Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 166 (10th Cir.) (no sixth amendment right 

to counsel who agree with defendants' views on the invalidity of 

the tax laws), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); Richardson, 894 

F.2d at 498 (court may refuse to allow defendant to substitute 

counsel on the morning of trial); Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d at 

816 (defendants' right to retain counsel of his choice "cannot be 

manipulated to delay proceedings or hamper the prosecution"). A 

defendant's choice of retained counsel must be respected "unless 

it would unreasonably delay proceedings or burden the court with 

retained counsel who was incompetent or unwilling to abide.by 

court rules and ethical guidelines," Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d at 

818, and "should be deprived only where such drastic action is 

necessary to further some overriding social or ethical interest," 

United States Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 

459 U.S. 906 (1982). Courts must therefore balance a defendant's 

constitutional right to retain counsel of his choice against the 

need to maintain the highest standards of professional 

responsibility, the public's confidence in the integrity of the 

judicial process and the orderly administration of justice. 

Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1503; Weninger, 624 F.2d at 166; Fuller, 868 

F.2d at 607; Wheat, 813 F.2d at 1402; Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 

at 816; Wilson, 761 F.2d at 280; Cunningham, 672 F.2d at 1070. 

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B. 

Before reaching the merits of defendant's sixth amendment 

claim, we address the effect of Dickstein's pro hac vice 

admission. Although the admission of attorneys pro hac vice is 

committed to the discretion of the district courts, denial of 

admission pro hac vice in criminal cases implicates the 

t ·t t· 1 . ht t 1 f h. 9 

cons i u iona rig o counse o c oice. P anzar ct· 1-Al varez v. 

United States, 879 F.2d 975, 980 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 

110 S. Ct. 1140 (1990); Fuller, 868 F.2d at 607; Panzardi Alvarez, 

816 F.2d at 816. A district court may deny admission pro hac vice 

to a defendant's counsel of choice when that attorney is unable to 

provide the defendant with competent representation. See,~, 

United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 848-49 (1st Cir. 1989) 

(counsel had not been in a courtroom for over twenty-five years 

and lacked knowledge of defendant's case). Courts also may 

consider an attorney's ethical fitness before granting a motion to 

proceed pro hac vice. Panzardi-Alvarez, 879 F.2d at 980 (denial 

of pro hac vice status appropriate where attorney previously 

violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c) and harassed judge outside 

chambers), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1140 (1990); Thomas v. 

Cassidy, 249 F.2d 91, 92 (4th Cir. 1957) (denial of pro hac vice 

9 The Supreme Court has rejected attorneys' claims that a 

state's denial of admission pro hac vice violates their rights 

under the Privilege and Immunities Clauses and the fourteenth 

amendment. See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 

274 (1985); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979). The Court has not 

addressed, however, whether such a denial violates defendants' 

rights under the sixth amendment. See Leis, 439 U.S. at 442 n.4; 

Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 1989). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 16 
admission based upon "unlawyerlike conduct" justifiable), cert. 

denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958). However, district courts must 

articulate reasonable grounds for denying pro hac vice admission 

to defendant's chosen counsel; mechanistic application of rules 

limiting such appearances is improper. Fuller, 868 F.2d at 611; 

see Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d at 817 (simple numerical limitation 

of pro hac vice appearances violated defendant's right to retain 

counsel of choice where there was no record that allowing such 

admissions would have inhibited the fair and orderly 

administration of justice). 

Attorneys admitted pro hac vice are held to the same 

professional responsibilities and ethical standards as regular 

counsel. Once admitted, pro hac vice counsel cannot be 

disqualified under standards and procedures any different or more 

stringent than those imposed upon regular members of the district 

court bar. Kirkland v. National Mortgage Network, 884 F.2d 1367, 

1371 (11th Cir. 1981); Kohler v. Richardson-Merrell, 737 F.2d 

1038, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Although district courts need not 

conduct a full-scale hearing every time an attorney's pro hac vice 

admission is revoked, counsel must be provided with notice and an 

opportunity to respond. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 302, 303 

(3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Cooper, 675 F. Supp. 753, 758 

(D.R.I. 1987). 

Here, the district court satisfied defendant'slO right to 

10 Defendant argues that, in revoking Dickstein's pro hac vice 

status, the district court failed to follow W.D. Okla. R. 4(J) 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 17 
procedural due process by providing notice and an opportunity to 

show cause why his counsel's admission pro hac vice should not be 

revoked. However, the district court indicated that Dickstein 

could be removed from the case more readily than a regular member 

of the bar. 11 Dickstein's conduct before the district court was 

subject to the same standard of professionalism as regular bar 

members. His behavior before other courts provided ample grounds 

to scrutinize his application for pro hac vice admission. 

However, because the district court in exercise of its discretion 

admitted Dickstein pro hac vice, the court's subsequent revocation 

of such status must be evaluated as though it had disqualified a 

regular member of the Western District of Oklahoma bar. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

governing attorney disciplinary procedures. We need not address 

this argument because defendant lacks standing to argue that 

Dickstein's rights to procedural due process were violated. 

11 The district court stated: 

The relationship between a court and a regular member of 

its own bar is in part defined by the system of 

discipline applied within that bar. An attorney pro hac 

vice is more a stranger to the court, subject to 

discipline but not in the same way or in the same extent 

as a regular member of the court's bar. This is why 

discretion is afforded over pro hac vice admission, 

notwithstanding the recognized preference to permit a 

defendant to be represented by counsel of his choice. 

Rec. vol. I, doc 52 at 1-2. 

-15-

Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 18 
c. 

"Federal Courts have an independent interest in ensuring that 

criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the 

profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who 

observe them." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160. When a district court 

finds that counsel has a conflict of interest, real or potential, 

it retains "substantial latitude" to disqualify counsel, even 

where a defendant consents to representation. Id. at 163. 

Moreover, an attorney may be dismissed for pursuing frivolous 

theories, even if he acts on the behest of the defendant. See 

United States v. Masat, 896 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1990). 

Violation of accepted rules of professional conduct which result 

in the "erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the bar 

and of the legal system" also may justify disqualification of 

defendant's chosen counsel. Hobson, 672 F.2d at 828; see,~, 

United States v. Walton, 703 F.2d 75, 77 (S.D. Fla. 1988) 

(disqualification of defense attorney warranted on strength of 

codefendant's allegation that attorney was prepared to use false 

testimony). However, 

acts which appear to violate the ABA Code or other 

accepted standards of legal ethics do not confer upon 

the trial court unfettered discretion to disqualify the 

attorney selected by a party ..•. An attorney may be 

disqualified only when there is "a reasonable 

possibility that some specifically identifiable 

impropriety" actually occurred and, in light of the 

interest underlying the standards of ethics, the social 

need for ethical practice outweighs the party's right to 

counsel of his choice. 

Kitchen, 592 F.2d at 903 (quoting Woods v. Clovington County Bank, 

537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976)); United States v. Castellano, 610 F. 

-16-

Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 19 
Supp. 1137, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Finally, an attorney's 

misconduct in open court may sufficiently impede the orderly 

administration of justice to supersede a defendant's sixth 

amendment right to retain counsel of his choice. See United 

States v. Dintz, 538 F.2d 1214, 1220-21 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane) 

(counsel expelled from courtroom after he ignored the court's 

instructions not to interject personal opinion into his opening 

statement and advanced factual allegations lacking evidentiary 

foundation; no sixth amendment violation); Ross v. Reda, 510 F.2d 

1172, 1173 (6th Cir.) (denial of attorney's request to proceed pro 

hac vice did not violate defendant's right to counsel of choice 

where attorney refused to limit out-of-court statements about the 

case), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 892 (1975). 

When a district court disqualifies defendant's counsel of 

choice, it must make findings on the record stating the rationale 

for its action. Laura, 607 F.2d at 60. The appropriate standard 

of review for attorney disqualification depends upon the nature 

and timing of the district court's determination. A court's 

factual findings concerning the disqualification of an attorney, 

particularly findings concerning counsel's motivation and state of 

mind, are reviewed for clear error. Nationalist Movement v. City 

of Cumming, 913 F.2d 885, 895 (11th Cir. 1990). When the 

offending conduct takes place in open court, the district court 

must make an immediate decision whether the attorney's continued 

participation in the case will jeopardize the integrity of the 

proceeding. A disqualification decision rendered under such 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 20 
circumstances is "so closely linked to the trial judge's 

responsibility to supervise the conduct of the case before him" 

that it is "properly reviewed under the abuse of discretion 

standard." Norton v. Tallahassee Memorial Hospital, 700 F.2d 617, 

619 (11th Cir. 1983); see,~, City of Cumming, 913 F.2d at 895 

(revocation of pro hac vice admission for courtroom misconduct 

reviewed for abuse of discretion); Dintz, 532 F.2d at 1219 

(disqualification of defense counsel for making inappropriate 

remarks to jury reviewed for abuse of discretion). However, "'in 

/ 

disqualification cases . where the facts are not in dispute, 

District Courts enjoy no particular functional advantage over 

appellate courts in their formulation and application of ethical 

norms.'" United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 

1983) (quoting Woods, 537 F.2d at 810); City of Cumming, 913 F.2d 

at 895; see United States v. Hughes, 817 F.2d 268, 270 n.1 (5th 

Cir.) (disqualification of defense counsel for conflict of 

interest reviewed for simple error), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 858 

(1987); Novo Terapeutisk v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, 607 

F.2d 186, 198 (7th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Miller, 624 

F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1980) (determination of whether 

attorney's conduct violated ABA disciplinary rule "'leaves little 

leeway for the exercise of discretion.'") (quoting American Roller 

Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982, 985 n.3 (3d Cir. 1975)); butTM 

Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 622 F.2d 386, 397 (8th Cir. 1980) 

(disqualification of attorneys for violation of Code of 

Professional Responsibility reviewed for abuse of discretion). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 21 
Moreover, in cases implicating a criminal defendant's sixth 

amendment right to counsel "'the abuse of discretion standard is 

simply too deferential where such a fundamental constitutional 

right is affected.'" Snyder, 707 F.2d at 144 (quoting Hobson, 672 

F.2d at 827); City of Cumming, 913 F.2d at 895 (where 

disqualification raises sixth amendment questions, district 

court's decision "subject to careful examination by the appellate 

court."); but see United States v. DeFazio, 899 F.2d 626, 629 (7th 

Cir. 1990) (abuse of discretion standard governs review of defense 

attorney disqualification). 

Here, the district court found that Dickstein's conduct 

violated Rules 3.1 and 3.3 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional 

Conduct and concluded that defendant's sixth amendment right to 

retain counsel of his choice was outweighed by the public's 

interest in the fair and orderly administration of justice. The 

court did not arrive at these conclusions based upon Dickstein's 

conduct in open court; it disqualified Dickstein on the basis of 

his pleadings. In analyzing these pleadings against applicable 

ethical and constitutional standards, the district court enjoyed 

no functional advantage which would militate against plenary 

review. We therefore review de novo the district court's 

revocation of Dickstein's admission pro hac vice and his resulting 

disqualification from further participation in the case. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 22 
D. 

Although all ten of the pretrial motions Dickstein filed in 

the instant case were denied, such denial does not necessarily 

render those motions frivolous. Many of Dickstein's motions were 

entirely routine and appropriate,~, the discovery motions, the 

motion for a bill of particulars and the portion of the 

suppression motion that sought exclusion of defendant's statements 

to the IRS. However, merely because several of Dickstein's 

motions fell within the bounds of acceptable advocacy does not 

salvage those motions that entirely departed from that standard. 

We therefore consider Dickstein's motion to dismiss for ·lack of 

jurisdiction, his motion to dismiss for violation of the Paperwork 

Reduction Act, his motion to strike and to suppress results of the 

third party summons . 

.L. Jurisdiction 

Dickstein's motion to dismiss advanced the hackneyed tax 

protester refrain that federal criminal jurisdiction only extends 

to the District of Columbia, United States territorial possessions 

and ceded territories. Dickstein's memorandum blithely ignored 18 

u.s.c. § 3231 which explicitly vests federal district courts with 

jurisdiction over "all offenses against the laws of the United 

States." Dickstein also conveniently ignored article I, section 

8 of the United States Constitution which empowers Congress to 

create, define and punish crimes, irrespective of where they are 

committed. See United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 

393 (1798) (Chase, J.). Article I, section 8 and the sixteenth 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 23 
amendment also empower Congress to create and provide for the 

administration of an income tax; the statute under which defendant 

was charged and convicted, 28 u.s.c. § 7201, plainly falls within 

that authority. Efforts to argue that federal jurisdiction does 

not encompass prosecutions for federal tax evasion have been 

rejected as either "silly" or "frivolous" by a myriad of courts 

throughout the nation. See,~, United States v. Dawes, 874 

F.2d 746, 750 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 284 (1989), 

overruled on other grounds, 895 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990); United 

States v. Tedder, 787 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir. 1986); United 

States v. Amon, 669 F.2d 1351, 1355 (10th Cir. 1981); United 

States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 259 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 444 

U.S. 917 (1979); Cheek, 882 F.2d at 1270; United States v. Ward, 

833 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 

(1988); United States v. Koliboski, 732 F.2d 1328, 1329-30 (7th 

Cir. 1984); United States v. Evens, 717 F.2d 1334, 1334 (11th Cir. 

1983); United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 (1983); United States v. Spurgeon, 671 

F.2d 1198, 1199 (8th Cir. 1982); O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 

193, 196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 673 (1931). In the 

face of this uniform authority, it defies credulity to argue that 

the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the 

government's case against defendant. 

Dickstein's argument that the sixteenth amendment does not 

authorize a direct, non-apportioned tax on United States citizens 

similarly is devoid of any arguable basis in law. Indeed, the 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 24 
Ninth Circuit recently noted "the patent absurdity and frivolity 

of such a proposition." In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547, 548 (9th 

Cir. 1989). For seventy-five years, the Supreme Court has 

recognized that the sixteenth amendment authorizes a direct nonapportioned tax upon United States citizens throughout the nation, 

not just in federal enclaves, see Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 

240 U.S. 1, 12-19 (1916); efforts to argue otherwise have been 

sanctioned as frivolous, see,~, Becraft, 885 F.2d at 549 (Fed. 

R. App. P. 38 sanctions for raising frivolous sixteenth amendment 

argument in petition for rehearing); Lovell v. United States, 755 

F.2d 517, 519-20 (7th Cir. 1984) (Fed. R. App. P. 38 sanctions 

imposed on prose litigants raising frivolous sixteenth amendment 

contentions). Dickstein's contention that defendant was· not an 

"individual" under the Internal Revenue Code also is frivolous. 

See Dawes, 874 F.2d at 750-51; United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 

934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Rice, 659 F.2d 524, 528 

(5th Cir. Unit A 1981). His disregard of governing legal 

precedent is further portrayed by his reference to the "alleged 

ratification" of the sixteenth amendment in the face of uniform 

contrary authority. See,~, Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 

236, 241 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43, 46-

47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827 (1988); United States v. 

Stahl, 792 F.2d 1438, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 

U.S. 1036 (1987); Sisk v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 58, 60-61 (6th 

Cir. 1986); see generally United States v. Stillhammer, 706 F.2d 

1072, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 1983). Argument reflecting such 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 25 
contemptuous disregard for established legal authority has no 

place within this circuit. 

£!.. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-20, requires 

that federal agencies submit all "information collection requests" 

to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) for 

review, 44 U.S.C. § 3507. "Typical information collection 

requests include tax forms, 12 medicare forms, financial loan 

applications, job applications, questioners, compliance reports 

and tax or business records." Dole v. United Steelworkers, 110 s. 

Ct. 929, 933 (1990). Once the 0MB director approves the 

information collection requires, he must assign it a control 

number. 44 u.s.c. § 3504. An agency shall not conduct or sponsor 

the collection of information unless the information collection 

request has been submitted to and approved by the Director, 44 

U.S.C. § 3507(a), and shall not engage in a collection of 

12 In United States v. Tedder, 787 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir. 

1986), this court held that tax forms were not information collection requests subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act because the 

filing of income tax returns was obligatory. This holding is 

superseded by the Supreme Court's analysis in Dole v. United 

Steelworkers, 110 S. Ct. 929, 933 (1990), which included federal 

income tax forms within the category of information collection 

requests under the Act. Dole would also appear to call into 

question the holdings in Snyder v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. 

Ind. 1984) and Cameron v. IRS, 593 F. Supp. 1540 (N.D. Ind. 1984), 

aff'd, 773 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1985), both of which held the 

Paperwork Reduction Act inapplicable to IRS forms. However, Dole 

does not contravene our recent holding in Lonsdale v. United · 

States, No. 90-2113, slip op. at 9 (10th Cir. Nov. __ , 1990) that 

IRS summonses do not constitute information requests under the Act 

because they are issued in the course of an investigation 

directed against a specific individual or entity. See 44 U.S.C. 

§ 3518(c) (1) (~)(ii). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 26 
information without obtaining from the Director a·control number 

to be displayed upon the information collection request, 44 u.s.c. 

§ 3507(F). Moreover, 

no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to 

maintain or provide information to any agency if the 

information collection request involved was made after 

December 31, 1981, and does not display a current 

control number assigned by the Director, or fails to 

state that such request is not subject to this chapter. 

44 u.s.c. § 3512. See,~, United States v. Smith, 866 F.2d 

1092, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1989) (prosecution for failure to file a 

Plan of Operations with the Forest Service barred under§ 3512 of 

the Act because the filing requirement was imposed pursuant to an 

information collection request which lacked an 0MB control 

number). 

Dickstein did not contend that the W-4 forms at issue in the 

case violated the Paperwork Reduction Act. He further conceded 

that the IRS 1040 forms at issue all contained 0MB control 

numbers. 13 He argued, however, that because the forms did not 

13 In United States v. Weiss, Nos. 89-1434, 89-1444, slip op. at 

6492-96 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 1990), the Second Circuit held that the 

Paperwork Reduction Act did not preclude prosecution for filing 

false medicare and Medicaid claims, despite the fact that the 

forms in question did not contain 0MB control numbers. 

Distinguishing Smith, where defendants were prosecuted for failure 

to file a Plan of Operations with the Forest Service, the Second 

Circuit reasoned that the Act "'only protects a person from penalties for failing to file information. It does not protect one who 

files information which is false.'" Id. at 6496 (quoting Funk, 

The Paperwork Reduction Act: Paperwork Reduction Meets 

Administrative Law, 24 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 77 n.411 (1987)) 

(emphasis in original). We recognize that because defendant was 

charged with tax evasion and not failure to file tax returns, he 

technically was not being prosecuted for failure to provide 

information. Had defendant's tax evasion been effectuated through 

the filing of falsified tax returns, Weiss would dictate that no 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 27 
contain expiration dates, they did not comply with the Act. While 

acknowledging that there is no explicit requirement in the statute 

that information collection requests contain expiration dates, 

Dickstein pointed to oblique language in the legislative history 

of the Act suggesting that expiration dates are required. See S. 

Rep. No. 96-930, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 

U.S. Code Gong. & Admin. News 6241, 6242. We agree with the 

district court that this isolated language in the Senate Report 

does not outweigh plain statutory language indicating that 

expiration dates are not required along with an 0MB control 

number. However we cannot say that Dickstein lacked an arguable 

legal basis to argue to the contrary. See Lonsdale v. United 

States, No. 90-2113, slip op. at 15 (10th Cir. Nov. __ , 1990) 

(coverage of Paperwork Reduction Act is not sufficiently wellsettled to warrant sanctions for frivolous appeal). On the other 

hand, the IRS 1040 forms at issue in the present case were 

explicitly designated as either "1982," "1983," or "1984" tax 

14 returns with their effective dates of coverage clearly denoted. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

Paperwork Reduction Defense would be available to him. But 

because the provision of information in 1040 forms is inexorably 

linked to the statutory requirement to pay taxes, and defendant 

failed to file such forms, the Paperwork Reduction Act was applicable to such conduct. 

14 For example, the 1982 1040 form submitted in support of 

Dickstein's motion to dismiss read: 

1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1982 

For the year January 1-December 31, 1982 or other year 

beginning _____ , 1982, ending _____ , 19_. 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 28 
See rec. vol. IX, doc. 25. Assuming, arguendo, that the Paperwork 

Reduction Act mandates that all federal forms contain expiration 

dates, this requirement plainly would be satisfied by the dates 

provided on the 1040 forms at issue. Dickstein thus lacked any 

arguable basis in fact or law to argue that the noncompliance of 

the 1040 forms which defendant failed to file did not comply with 

the Paperwork Reduction Act: his argument is legally frivolous. 

See Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989) (defining 

legal frivolousness). 

~ Motion to Strike 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) empowers district 

courts to "strike surplusage from the indictment or information." 

Acting in its discretion, a district court may strike as 

surplusage allegations not relevant to the charge at issue and 

inflammatory and prejudicial to the defendant. United States v. 

Figueroa, 900 F.2d 1211, 1218 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 

3228 (1990); United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 544 (9th Cir. 

1983); United States v. Kemper, 503 F.2d 327, 329 (6th Cir. 1974), 

cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975); 1. C. Wright, Federal Practice 

and Procedure: Criminal, § 127 at 426 (2d ed. 1982); see generally 

Bary v. United States, 292 F.2d 53, 55-56 (10th Cir. 1961) (in 

Smith Act prosecution, court properly withdrew from consideration 

portion of indictment making reference to the Communist Party). 

However, language in the indictment or information describing the 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

See rec. vol. IX, doc. 25. The 1983 and 1984 1040 forms 

followed the same format. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 29 
essential elements of the crime alleged is not surplusage and 

cannot be stricken under Rule 7(d). Wright§ 127 at 426; see 

Callanan v. United States, 881 F.2d 229, 236 (6th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1816 (1990); United States v. Behenna, 

552 F.2d 573, 576 n.5 (4th Cir. 1977). 

Dickstein filed a motion pursuant to Rule 7(d) to strike as 

surplusage language in the indictment alleging that defendant 

failed to pay income taxes. See rec. vol. IX, doc. 24. The 

elements of tax evasion are: 1) willfulness, 2) existence of a 

tax deficiency and 3) an affirmative act constituting an evasion 

or attempted evasion of the tax. Sansone v. United States, 380 

U.S. 343, 351 (1965); United States v. Samara, 643, F.2d 701, 703 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981). Defendant's 

failure to pay or withhold taxes is an allegation necessary for 

the establishment of a tax deficiency, an essential element for 

the offense of tax evasion. At best, Dickstein's motion to strike 

one of the prima facia elements from the indictment constituted 

gross ignorance. Under this scenario, the district court properly 

could conclude that Dickstein was unable to provide defendant with 

competent representation. Just as the court in Campbell found 

that defendant could not receive competent representation from a 

lawyer who had not tried a case in twenty-five years and knew 

nothing about defendant's case, 874 F.2d at 848-49, so too could 

the district court below conclude that a defendant charged with 

tax evasion could not receive effective assistance of counsel from 

an attorney who did not know that failure to pay taxes was an 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 30 
element of the crime. Conversely, if Dickstein knew that failure 

to pay taxes was an essential element of tax evasion and 

nevertheless moved to strike such allegations as surplusage, his 

motion constituted a material misrepresentation of the law. 

h Motion to Suppress Third Party Summons 

Dickstein filed a motion on defendant's behalf seeking 

suppression of all evidence obtained by a third-party summons 

issued by an IRS Special Agent to the First National Bank of 

Guthrie, Oklahoma. Dickstein argued that such a summons required 

authorization of an IRS Group Manager; because it was issued by a 

Special Agent, the summons was invalid. He relied upon IRS 

Delegation Order No. 4 (Rev. 15), 49 Fed. Reg. 13,946 (1984), 

which restricted the issuance of summonses in criminal 

investigations to Assistant Division Chiefs, Branch Chiefs and 

Group Managers. The district court rejected Dickstein's argument, 

pointing out that the cited regulation had been superseded by a 

new regulation which added Special Agents to the category of IRS 

officials authorized to issue third-party summonses. See 

Delegation Order No. 4 (Rev. 17), IR Manual 1229 (May 12, 1986); 

Hatcher v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 218, 220-221 (M.D. Pa. 

1990) (IRS Special Agents have authority to issue third-party 

summonses). 

Standing alone, the inadvertent citation to superseded 

authority, while professionally wanting, does not constitute 

misconduct warranting disqualification. However, prior to his 

involvement in this case, Dickstein advanced the same argument 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 31 
concerning the third-party summons while defending a similar tax 

evasion case in the Western District of Kentucky. See rec. vol. 

X, doc 51, ex. G. The government's response to Dickstein's 

suppression motion in the prior case explicitly pointed out that 

the delegation order on which Dickstein relied had been superseded 

by subsequent authority. Id., ex. H. Thus, in the instant case, 

Dickstein directed the court's attention to legal authority with 

constructive knowledge that such authority had been superseded. 

As discussed below, the failure to disclose known dispositive 

contrary authority precluded Dickstein from providing competent 

and ethical representation to defendant. 

D. 

District courts retain the discretion to adopt local rules 

necessary for the conduct of their business. Frazier v. Heebe, 

482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987); 28 u.s.c. § 1654. The federal district 

court for the Western District of Oklahoma has adopted the 

Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct as the ethical guidelines 

governing its practitioners. See W.D. Okla. R. 4(J)(4)(b). Rule 

3.3(a)(3) of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct requires 

attorneys to disclose contrary authority to the court when 

advancing a legal argument. 15 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, ch. 1, 

15 The Comment to Rule 3.3 explains: 

Legal argument based upon a knowingly false 

representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the 

tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a 

disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 32 
app. 3-A (Supp. 1990); see City of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma Tax 

Comm'n, 789 P.2d 1287, 1298-99 (Okla. 1990) (Opala, J., 

dissenting). Dickstein violated Rule 3.3 by misrepresenting to 

the court the law of federal criminal jurisdiction in flagrant 

disregard for controlling constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authority. He did not advance a good faith argument why twohundred years of federalist jurisprudence should be abandoned; 

rather, he sought to indulge the court in the fantasy that the 

arguments he was advancing actually comprised the law of the land. 

Dickstein also violated Rule 3.3 by citing legal authority 

concerning third party IRS summonses with constructive knowledge 

that such authority had been superseded. In addition, Dickstein's 

motion to strike language from the indictment detailing the essential elements of the charged offense constituted a material 

misrepresentation of governing legal principles. Such brazen 

subversion of legal argument has no place in the courts of this 

circuit. 

Rule 3.3 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct 

provides: 

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or 

assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a 

basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes 

a good faith argument for an extension, modification or 

reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

the existence of pertinent legal authorities .... The 

underlying concept is that legal argument is a 

discussion seeking to determine the legal premises 

proper applicable to the case. · 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A (Supp. 1990). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 33 
a criminal proceeding • . . may nevertheless· so defend 

the proceeding as to require that every element of the 

case be established. 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A (Supp. 1990). Under Rule 

3.3, a frivolous action is one where "the client desires to have 

the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or 

maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is unable either to 

make a good faith argument on the merits of the action. II 

Id., comment. Dickstein's motion to dismiss for violation of the 

Paperwork Reduction Act was utterly lacking in any arguable basis 

in law or fact as was his contention that defendant was not an 

"individual" under the Internal Revenue Code. The only possible 

purpose behind these motions was to harass the prosecution and the 

court. Dickstein therefore violated Rule 3.1 by advancing a 

frivolous argument before the district court. 

In evaluating the merits of Dickstein's pleadings, we remain 

mindful that defense attorneys must, of necessity advance 

unpopular arguments in the course of fulfilling their ethical 

obligation to zealously represent their client's interests. See 

Oklahoma Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 

5, ch. 1, app. 3-A (Supp. 1990). 16 However, the sixth amendment 

16 The comment to Oklahoma Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 

provides in part: 

A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client 

despite opposition, obstruction or personal 

inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever 

lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a 

client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with 

commitment and dedication to the interests of the client 

and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 34 
does not encompass a defendant's effort to transform judicial 

proceedings into a forum for the advancement of political, 

economic or social views and the obfuscation of the legal and 

factual questions at issue. A criminal trial is, first and 

foremost, a vehicle for the structured discovery of truth. 

Advocacy which contravenes the truth-seeking function of the 

criminal trial and deliberately misrepresents the legal authority 

governing the proceeding has no place in a court of law. See 

Lonsdale, slip op. at 15-18 (imposing sanctions on prose 

litigants advancing frivolous arguments concerning inapplicability 

of tax laws); Casper v. Commissioner, 805 F.2d 902, 905 (10th 

Cir., 1986) (same); Miller, 868 F.2d at 241-42 (same). By 

advancing arguments "not warranted by existing law or a good faith 

argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing 

law," Casper, 805 F.2d at 905, Dickstein transformed legal 

argument from an intellectual process aimed at the derivation of 

the correct legal principle to a to a carnival of frivolity aimed 

at disseminating defendant's political views. When combined with 

Dickstein's past reputation for hijacking judicial proceedings 

onto his tax protester bandwagon, the district court legitimately 

concluded that Dickstein's disregard for governing ethical 

principles would continue throughout the case, robbing the trial 

of its elementary truth-seeking purpose and depriving defendant of 

the effective assistance of counsel. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A (Supp. 1990). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6077 Document: 01019956431 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 35 
"Those who use the tools of the legal profession to 

prostitute its high standards of ethical and moral conduct serve 

only to destroy the admirable goals and aims of our criminal 

justice system." United States v. Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774, 781 

(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981). While the 

power to disqualify an attorney from a case "is one which ought to 

be exercised with great caution," it is "incidental to all courts, 

and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the 

respectability of the profession." Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 

Wheat) 529, 529-30 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.). In this case, the 

district court correctly balanced defendant's right to retain 

counsel of his choice against society's need for the orderly 

administration of justice and the ethical practice of law. We 

hold that the court acted properly to maintain the integrity of 

the proceeding by discharging defendant's counsel of choice from 

further participation in the case. 

AFFIRMED. 

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