Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02011/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02011-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bill Lee Scott
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

OFFICE OF THE CLERK. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth.Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

May 1.4 t 1990 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 89-2011, United States v. Scott 

The court's opinion is corrected to delete the words 

"cert. den. 474 U.S. 837 (1985)" following the citation to United 

States V:-contento-Pacheco, 723 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1984) on 

page six, paragraph 2, line 9. The opinion was filed April 20, 

1990. 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

Pat ick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 89-2011 Document: 01019627228 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

BILL LEE SCOTT, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant.) 

'? l t }":; 1~·, l ~ ~ ''" v 

United Srnr.~11 {;\-!4¥-t uf Ar.peals Tenth r; ... -,,i• APPEALS . ~·· . ~ -

APR 2 0 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-2011 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 88-031-JB) 

Larry Gomez, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico (William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, with him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Paul J. Kennedy, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorney for DefendantAppellant. 

Before SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and SEAY,* District 

Judge. 

SEAY, District Judge 

*Honorable Frank H. Seay, Chief Judge, United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellant, Bill Lee Scott, was found guilty by a jury and 

convicted of one count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine 

in violation of 21 u.s.c. §846 and 18 u.s.c. §2, and one count of 

1 

Appellate Case: 89-2011 Document: 01019627228 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 2 
manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of 21 u.s.c. §841(a) (1), 

and 18 u.s.c. §2. 1 Scott appeals his convictions contending that 

he was denied a fair trial when the district court refused to 

instruct the jury on the defense of coercion. 2 We disagree, and 

therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. 

I. 

Between the middle of August 1987, and the early part of 

January 1988, Scott made approximately six trips to Scientific 

Chemical, a chemical supply company in Humble, Texas. Scott made 

these trips at the request of codefendant Mark Morrow. 3 These trips 

resulted in Scott purchasing various quantities of precursor 

chemicals and laboratory paraphernalia from Scientific Chemical. 

Some trips resulted in Scott taking possession of the i terns 

purchased, other trips resulted in the items being shipped to 

designated points to be picked up and delivered at a future date. 

These chemicals and laboratory i terns were purchased to supply 

methamphetamine laboratories operated by Morrow in New Mexico with 

Scott was acquitted of one count of possession with 

intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U. s. c. 

§ 8 41 (a) ( 1) and 18 u • s • c . § 2 • 

2 We note that Scott personally filed a request for 

appointment on new counsel to replace his attorney, Paul J. 

Kennedy, for alleged misrepresentation, misconduct, and neglect on 

the part of Mr. Kennedy. Our review of the record reveals that Mr. 

Kennedy quite adequately presented the issues by way of briefing 

and that he presented a capable oral argument. 

3 At the time of trial, Morrow had not been apprehended. 

2 

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the assistance of Silas Rivera and codefendants George Tannehill, 

Jerry Stokes, and Robert Stokes. 

Scott first became acquainted with Morrow when Morrow helped 

him move from Portales, New Mexico, to Truth of Consequences, New 

Mexico, in late July or early August 1987. See rec., vol. III, at 

352. Shortly thereafter, Morrow became aware that Scott was going 

to Houston, Texas, to sell some mercury and Morrow asked Scott if 

he could pick up some items from Scientific Chemical. Id. at 352-

55. Scott made the trip to Scientific Chemical and purchased the 

items Morrow requested. Id. at 357. Scott subsequently made 

approximately five other trips to Scientific Chemical at Morrow's 

request to purchase various quantities of precursor chemicals and 

assorted labware. Rec., Vol. II, at 62, 66-70, 74, and 83-90. 

During the course of one trip on August 31, 1987, Scott was stopped 

by Drug Enforcement Administration agents after he had purchased 

chemicals from Scientific Chemical. Id. at 18-20. The agents 

seized the chemicals Scott had purchased as well as $10,800 in U.S. 

currency and a fully loaded . 38 Smith and Wesson. Id. at 22-24 and 

29-31. Scott was not arrested at that time. Id. at 15-47. Scott, 

however, was subsequently indicted along with the codef endants 

after the seizure of large quantities of methamphetamine and 

precursor chemicals from a laboratory site in Portales in January 

1988. 

At trial Scott claimed that his purchase of the chemicals and 

3 

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labware on behalf of Morrow was the result of a well-established 

fear that Morrow would kill him or members of his family if he did 

not act as Morrow had directed. Scott further claimed that he did 

not have any reasonable opportunity to escape the harm threatened 

by Morrow. To support this defense of coercion Scott testified on 

his own behalf as to the nature and circumstances of the threats. 

Scott testified that approximately one month after the August 31, 

1987, trip Morrow called him at his home in Truth or Consequences 

and talked him into a meeting in Houston to "get that straightened 

out". Rec., Vol. III, at 366. It was Scott's contention that 

Morrow might not have believed that the money and chemicals had 

been seized and that Morrow might have thought that he had merely 

kept the money. Id. at 366-68. 

After the trip to Houston and Scientific Chemical to confirm 

Scott's story about the seizure of the chemicals and cash, Morrow 

contacted Scott at Scott's daughter's house in Portales to have 

Scott make another trip to Scientific Chemical to make another 

purchase. Id. at 371. After Scott declined to make another trip, 

Morrow responded by stating that Scott would not want something to 

happen to his daughter or her house. Id. Scott thereafter made 

the trip for Morrow. Id. at 372. 

Approximately one week later, Morrow again came by Scott's 

daughter's house and wanted Scott to make another trip. Id. At 

some point during this discussion they decided to go for a ride in 

4 

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separate vehicles. Id. at 372-73. After travelling some distance, 

they both stopped their vehicles and pulled off to the side of the 

road. Id. Morrow pulled out a machine gun and two banana clips 

and emptied the clips at bottles and rocks. Id. at 373. Morrow 

stated "you wouldn't want to be in front of that thing would you?" 

and "you wouldn't want any of your family in front of that, would 

you?" Id. Scott responded negatively to Morrow's statements and 

thereafter made another trip to Scientific Chemical for Morrow. 

Id. On another occasion, Scott testified that Morrow threatened 

him by stating that he had better haul the chemicals if he knew 

what was good for him. Id. at 414. 

Scott testified that Morrow not only knew his adult daughter 

living in Portales, but that he knew his wife and another daughter 

who were living in Truth or Consequences and that Morrow had been 

to the residence in Truth or Consequences. Id. Scott testified 

that he made these trips for Morrow because he feared for the 

safety of his family in light of the confrontations he had with 

Morrow. Id. at 374. Scott stated he had no doubt that Morrow 

would have carried out his threats. Id. Scott was aware of 

information linking Morrow to various murders. Id. at 419. Scott 

further testified that he did not go to the police with any of this 

information concerning Morrow because he had gone to them before 

on other matters and they did nothing. Id. Further, Scott 

believed that Morrow had been paying a DEA agent in Lubbock, Texas, 

for information regarding investigations. Id. at 378-79. 

5 

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on cross-examination Scott testified that all of Morrow's 

threats were verbal, Id. at 418; that he saw Morrow only a few 

times between August 1987 and January 1988, Id. at 416; that he had 

an acquaintance by the name of Bill King who was a retired 

California Highway Patrolman living in Truth or Consequences, Id. 

at 390; and that he could have found a law enforcement official to 

whom he could have reported the actions of Morrow, Id. at 421. 

II. 

A coercion or duress defense requires the establishment of 

three elements: (1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily 

injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried 

out, and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened 

harm. Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935); 

Barton v. United States, 407 F.2d 1155, 1157 (10th Cir. 1969); 

United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 543, 545 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978); United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 

F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985). 

Scott proffered a coercion instruction to the district court in 

conformity with the above elements. Scott, citing Barton and 

Contento-Pachon, contended that the testimony before the court 

concerning coercion was sufficient to raise an issue for the jury 

and that a coercion instruction should be given. The district 

court found that Scott had failed to meet his threshold burden as 

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to all three elements of a coercion defense. Accordingly, the 

district court refused to give an instruction on the defense of 

coercion. 

Scott contends that the district court committed reversible 

error by subs ti tu ting its j udgrnent as to the weight of his coercion 

defense rather than allowing the jury to decide the issue. Scott 

maintains that he presented sufficient evidence to place in issue 

the defense of coercion and that it was error for the district 

court to usurp the role of the jury in weighing the evidence. We 

disagree and find that the district court acted properly in 

requiring Scott to satisfy a threshold showing of a coercion 

defense, and in finding the evidence insufficient to warrant the 

giving of a coercion instruction. In doing so, we find the 

evidence clearly lacking as to the third element for a coercion 

defense - absence of any reasonable opportunity to escape the 

threatened harm. 

Only after a defendant has properly raised a coercion defense 

is he entitled to an instruction requiring the prosecution to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting under coercion 

when he performed the act or acts charged. United States v. 

Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469, 1477 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing United States 

v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 412-13 (1980)). The evidence introduced 

must be sufficient as to all elements of the coercion defense 

before the court will instruct the jury as to such defense. 

7 

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Bailey, 444 U.S. at 415. If the evidence is lacking as to any 

element of the coercion defense the trial court may properly 

disallow the defense as a matter of law and refuse to instruct the 

jury as to coercion. Id. at 415-16. Consequently, a defendant who 

fails to present sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of 

fact concerning the absence of any reasonable opportunity to escape 

the threatened harm is not entitled to an instruction on the 

defense of coercion. See Shannon, 76 F.2d at 493 (refusal to give 

coercion instruction proper, where evidence established that 

defendants had full opportunity to cease their participation in the 

crime and seek assistance from law enforcement officials) ; United 

States v. Charmley, 764 F.2d 675, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1985) (failure 

to submit coercion defense to jury not error where defendant failed 

to demonstrate the absence of any reasonable opportunity to escape 

under circumstances where he was not under restraint or 

surveillance at the time of the alleged coercion). 

The evidence in this case as to Scott's ability to escape the 

threatened harm wholly failed to approach the level necessary for 

the giving of a coercion instruction. Scott's involvement with 

Morrow covered a period of time in excess of one hundred twentyf i ve days.o, Scott's personal contact with Morrow was extremely 

limited during this time. Scott had countless opportunities to 

contact law enforcement authorities or escape the perceived threats 

by Morrow during this time. Scott made no attempt to contact law 

enforcement officials regarding Morrow's activities. In fact, 

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Scott even failed to take advantage of his acquaintance, King, a 

retired law enforcement official, to seek his assistance in 

connection with Morrow's threats and activities. Scott's failure 

to avail himself of the readily accessible alternative of 

contacting law enforcement officials is persuasive evidence of the 

hollow nature of Scott's claimed coercion defense. See United 

States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 1982) (defendant 

failed to establish an inability to escape threatened harm when he 

failed to avail himself of the simple remedy of calling the 

police). Clearly, the record establishes that Scott had at his 

disposal a reasonable legal alternative to undertaking the acts on 

behalf of Morrow. 

Also, this case is unlike the situations that existed in 

Contento-Pachon and Barton, cases relied upon by Scott which 

warranted instructions on the defense of coercion. In ContentoPachon, a possession with intent to distribute case under 

§84l(a) (1), the defendant was in frequent contact with the person 

making the threats and was informed that he would be under constant 

surveillance throughout his activities. The Ninth circuit in 

Contento-Pachon, noting defendant's fear of corrupt police in 

Bogota, Columbia, found that the defendant had met his burden as 

to the escapability issue. Here, the record establishes nothing 

more than an amorphous belief by Scott that police would not act 

upon information he would provide them. This belief that police 

officials were indifferent to defendant's requests was neither 

9 

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substantiated by the evidence nor defined as to its scope and 

coverage. In fact, Scott testified that on one occasion the police 

responded to his call and took a statement from him regarding an 

altercation he had with a former business associate. Rec., Vol. 

III, at 433-35. In Barton, a false loan application case, the 

defendant's husband was the person making the threats and he 

initially accompanied her to the credit union while she made the 

application and later, when she picked up the check. In contrast 

to the husband's physical presence in Barton, Morrow did not 

accompany Scott when he made the purchases nor was there any 

evidence that Scott was under surveillance by Morrow. 4 In fact, 

Scott's contact with Morrow was limited and he admitted he saw 

Morrow only a few times during the course of his involvement on 

behalf of Morrow between August 1987 and January 1988. Based on 

all of these circumstances, the district court was correct in 

finding that Scott had failed to establish that he had no 

reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm by Morrow. 

III. 

In conclusion, we find that Scott failed to present sufficient 

evidence to establish that he had no reasonable opportunity to 

4 Scott's activities, however, were under surveillance by law 

enforcement officials. See Rec., Vol. II, at 190, 194 and Rec., 

Vol. III, at 226-27, 234-39. 

10 

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I 

escape the harm threatened by Morrow. Accordingly, the district 

court properly refused to instruct the jury as to the defense of 

coercion. We affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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