Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-15175/USCOURTS-ca9-13-15175-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Dump Truck Owners Association
Appellant
James Goldstene
Appellee
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Appellee
Mary D. Nichols
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS 

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARY D. NICHOLS, Chairperson of 

the California Air Resources Board; 

JAMES GOLDSTENE, Executive 

Officer of the California Air 

Resources Board, 

Defendants-Appellees,

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE 

COUNCIL, INC.,

Intervenor-Defendant–Appellee.

No. 13-15175

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-00384-

MCE-GGH

ORDER AND 

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Chief District Judge, Presiding

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2 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

Submitted February 9, 2015∗

San Francisco, California

Filed March 3, 2015

Amended April 27, 2015

Before: John T. Noonan, Senior Circuit Judge, Barry G. 

Silverman, Circuit Judge, and Paul C. Huck, Senior District 

Judge.**

Opinion by Judge Huck

SUMMARY***

Environmental Law

The panel affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction of a federal preemption challenge to a 

∗ The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

** The Honorable Paul C. Huck, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 3

California environmental regulation addressing diesel 

trucks.

The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that the 

Environmental Protection Agency’s approval of the 

regulation as part of California’s state implementation plan 

divested the district court of jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1) 

of the Clean Air Act. The panel concluded that the suit, as a 

practical matter, challenged the state implementation plan 

itself. Because the court of appeals has exclusive 

jurisdiction over such challenges pursuant to § 307(b)(1), the 

district court lacked jurisdiction.

COUNSEL

Patrick J. Whalen, Law Offices of Brooks Ellison, 

Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Nicholas Stern, Deputy Attorney General for the State of 

California, Sacramento, California, for DefendantsAppellees.

Melissa Lin Perrella, David Pettit, and Morgan Wyenn, 

Natural Resources Defense Council, Santa Monica, 

California, for Intervenor-Defendant–Appellee.

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4 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

ORDER

The opinion filed on March 3, 2015, and published at 778 

F.3d 1119, is hereby amended as follows:

On page 1132, the following text should be placed in a 

new footnote inserted after the words <is the Truck

Association’s own doing.>:

We also note that although 28 U.S.C. § 1631 

provides for transfer of cases when the 

original court lacked jurisdiction, but the 

transferee court would have had jurisdiction 

at the time the complaint was filed, this 

statute does not apply here. At the time the 

Truck Association filed its complaint, this 

court did not have jurisdiction over the case, 

because the EPA had not yet approved the 

Regulation as part of California’s SIP. Only 

when the EPA later took final action in 

approving the Regulation as part of 

California’s SIP well after the complaint was 

filed did this court gain jurisdiction pursuant 

to § 307(b)(1). Because we would not have 

been able to exercise jurisdiction on the date 

the case was filed in the district court, which 

is one of the requirements of § 1631, we 

could not have transferred the case to this 

court under that statute.

With this amendment, the petition for panel rehearing is 

denied. Judge Silverman voted to deny the petition for 

rehearing en banc and Judges Noonan and Huck so 

recommend. The full court has been advised of the petition 

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 5

for rehearing en banc and no judge of the court has requested 

a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. 

P. 35.

Appellees’ petition for rehearing and petition for 

rehearing en banc are DENIED. No further petitions for 

rehearing or rehearing en banc will be entertained.

OPINION

HUCK, Senior District Judge:

The California Dump Truck Owners Association (Truck 

Association) appeals the dismissal of its federal preemption 

challenge to a California environmental regulation.1

 At 

issue is whether the Environmental Protection Agency’s 

(EPA) approval of the regulation as part of California’s state 

implementation plan (SIP) divested the district court of

subject matter jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air 

Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). That section vests 

federal circuit courts of appeals with exclusive jurisdiction 

over petitions challenging the EPA’s approval of a SIP. The 

Truck Association’s suit, as a practical matter, challenges the 

SIP itself, and this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such 

challenges pursuant to § 307(b)(1). Accordingly, we affirm 

1 The Truck Association is a trade association representing construction 

trucking companies operating in California.

 

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the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.2

I. Background

The CAA creates a partnership between the federal 

government and the states to combat air pollution. Natural 

Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 770 F.3d 

1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 2014). Under the CAA, the EPA must 

prescribe national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) 

for certain air pollutants, and each state is responsible for 

implementing those standards within its borders. 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 7409–10. Specifically, each state must adopt, and submit 

for the EPA’s approval, a SIP that provides for the 

“implementation, maintenance, and enforcement” of the 

NAAQS. Id. § 7410(a)(1). While a state has considerable 

discretion in formulating its SIP, the SIP must include 

“enforceable emission limitations” and control measures and 

“a program to provide for the enforcement” of such 

measures. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A), (C). It must further provide 

“necessary assurances” that the state has “adequate 

personnel, funding, and authority” to carry out the SIP, and 

is not prohibited from doing so by “any provision of Federal 

or State law.” Id. § 7410(a)(2)(E). Once approved by the 

EPA, a SIP becomes federal law and must be carried out by 

the state. Safe Air for Everyone v. EPA, 488 F.3d 1088, 1091 

2 The district court also dismissed the Truck Association’s complaint for 

the alternative reason that the EPA is a necessary and indispensable party 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. However, because we have 

determined that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we need not, and, therefore, do not 

reach this alternative basis for dismissal.

 

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 7

(9th Cir. 2007); Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. 

Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 366 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A state’s SIP evolves as the state proposes, and the EPA 

approves, revisions to account for new NAAQS and 

emissions reduction technologies. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7410(a)(2)(H). Approved SIPs may be enforced “by either 

the State, the EPA, or via citizen suits.” Bayview, 366 F.3d 

at 695.

In 2008, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) 

adopted the Truck and Bus Regulation (Regulation), Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 13, § 2025, for incorporation into 

California’s SIP.3 The Regulation helps California meet the 

EPA’s NAAQS for fine particulate matter (PM) and ozone. 

Broadly speaking, it requires heavy-duty diesel trucks, 

whose emissions contribute significantly to PM and ozone 

pollution, to be upgraded with pollution filters and loweremission engines. The Regulation took effect on January 1, 

2012.

In April 2011, the Truck Association filed an amended 

complaint in district court to enjoin enforcement of the 

Regulation. It claimed that, under the Supremacy Clause of 

the United States Constitution, the Regulation was 

preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration 

Authorization Act (FAAAA), which prohibits states from 

enacting regulations “related to a price, route, or service of 

3 The full title of the Truck and Bus Regulation is a “Regulation to 

Reduce Emissions of Diesel Particulate Matter, Oxides of Nitrogen and 

Other Criteria Pollutants, from In-Use Heavy-Duty Diesel-Fueled 

Vehicles.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 2025.

 

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any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of 

property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The Truck Association 

alleged that its motor carrier members would have to 

increase prices and alter their routes and services to offset 

the costs of complying with the Regulation. The Truck 

Association sought a declaration that the FAAAA preempted 

the Regulation and an injunction against its enforcement by 

CARB. The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 

(NRDC) intervened on CARB’s behalf.

In November 2011, the Truck Association filed a motion 

for summary judgment as well as a motion for preliminary 

injunction to enjoin enforcement of the Regulation until 

dispositive motions could be decided. The following month, 

the NRDC filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The 

district court denied the Truck Association’s motion for 

preliminary injunction and took the motions for summary

judgment under submission.

Throughout this time, the Regulation had progressed 

through the EPA’s SIP approval process. In May 2011, a 

month after the Truck Association filed its amended 

complaint, CARB submitted the Regulation to the EPA.4

 In 

July 2011, the EPA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking 

announcing its intention to approve the Regulation. 

Proposed Rule, Approval and Promulgation of 

Implementation Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 40652 (proposed July 

11, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). In the notice, 

the EPA concluded that the Regulation complied with the 

4 The Regulation as submitted to the EPA included certain amendments 

that were adopted by CARB in 2011.

 

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 9

CAA. In particular, the EPA noted that CARB had authority 

under California law to implement the Regulation, and that 

the EPA knew of “no obstacle under Federal or State law” to 

its implementation. Id. at 40658. The EPA further found 

that CARB had adequate personnel and funding to enforce 

the Regulation and that CARB’s proposed enforcement 

mechanisms were likely to be effective. Id. at 40659. The 

EPA provided thirty days for the public to comment on its 

proposed approval of the Regulation. Neither the Truck 

Association nor any other individual or group commented on 

the proposed rule. Final Rule, Approval and Promulgation 

of Implementations Plans, 77 Fed. Reg. 20308, 20312 (Apr. 

4, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). On April 4, 

2012, the EPA took final action approving the Regulation as 

part of California’s SIP. In its notice of this action, the EPA 

reaffirmed its prior conclusion that the Regulation complied 

with the substantive and procedural requirements of the 

CAA. Id. at 20311, 20313. The final rule took effect on 

May 4, 2012, and the Regulation was incorporated into 

California’s SIP in the Code of Federal Regulations. 40 

C.F.R. § 52.220(410) (incorporating by reference the 

Regulation, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 2025).

On May 24, 2012, while the parties’ summary judgment 

motions remained pending, the NRDC filed a notice of 

supplemental authority informing the district court of the 

EPA’s approval of the Regulation as part of California’s SIP. 

At the court’s request, the parties submitted briefing on 

whether the EPA’s action affected the posture of the case. 

On December 19, 2012, the court dismissed the suit, finding 

that it no longer had subject matter jurisdiction under 

§ 307(b)(1) of the CAA. It further found that, even if it 

retained jurisdiction, dismissal was proper under Federal 

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Rule of Civil Procedure 19 because the EPA was a necessary 

and indispensable party. The Truck Association appealed 

both grounds for the district court’s dismissal.

Shortly after filing this appeal, the Truck Association 

separately filed a petition in this Court under § 307(b)(1) and 

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

seeking review of the EPA’s approval of the Regulation. 

Petition for Review, Cal. Constr. Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 

No. 13-70562 (9th Cir. 2013). We dismissed the petition as 

untimely because it was not filed within sixty days of the 

EPA’s notice of final rule, as required by § 307(b)(1). Order, 

Cal. Constr. Trucking Ass’n, No. 13-70562. The Truck 

Association also filed a petition with the EPA requesting 

reconsideration of its approval of the Regulation.

II. Analysis

We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Carolina Cas. 

Ins. Co. v. Team Equip., Inc., 741 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 

2014).

Section 307(b)(1) of the CAA states:

A petition for review of the [EPA] 

Administrator’s action in approving or 

promulgating any implementation plan . . . or 

any other final action of the Administrator 

under this chapter . . . which is locally or 

regionally applicable may be filed only in the 

United States Court of Appeals for the 

appropriate circuit.

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 11

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). As a result, 

“invalidation of an EPA-approved SIP may only occur in the 

federal appellate courts on direct appeal from the 

Administrator’s decision.” United States v. Ford Motor Co., 

814 F.2d 1099, 1103 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Sierra Club v. 

Ind.-Ky. Elec. Corp., 716 F.2d 1145, 1152 (7th Cir. 1983) 

(“Once a plan is adopted by the state and it withstands any 

subsequent procedural challenge, then § 7607(b)(1) 

provides that invalidation may occur only in the federal 

appellate courts.”).

The Truck Association, however, argues that it is not 

challenging the SIP, or the EPA’s approval thereof. It claims 

that its suit, which it filed before the EPA’s final action 

approving the Regulation as part of California’s SIP, 

challenges only the state Regulation, which is distinct from 

the federal SIP. The Truck Association contends that 

invalidating the Regulation would render it unenforceable by 

CARB, but “would not prohibit enforcement of the SIP” by 

the EPA and private citizens. Truck Association members 

would still purportedly benefit from the Regulation’s 

invalidation because of the “enormous difference in the 

enforcement mechanisms between the state regulation and 

the federalized SIP.” Specifically, the Truck Association 

points out that under the CAA, citizen suits may not be 

commenced without first providing the alleged violator with 

sixty days’ notice.5

 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1). By contrast, no 

5 The Truck Association does not discuss whether a similar grace period 

exists before the EPA can take enforcement action. However, it appears 

that the EPA must wait at least thirty days before taking action to enforce 

 

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such limitation is placed on CARB’s enforcement of the 

Regulation. Under California’s Health and Safety Code, 

violators are liable for civil penalties of up to $1,000 per day 

as well as criminal sanctions, with each day of violation 

constituting a separate offense. Cal. Health & Safety Code 

§§ 39674, 42400. Were the Regulation nullified, violators 

would have sixty days to take corrective action, saving them 

from potentially $60,000 in penalties and sixty criminal 

offenses. And, “[a]s a practical matter,” the Truck 

Association contends, most of its members would not have 

to comply with the SIP for “months or years” until their 

noncompliance was discovered by someone willing to 

pursue the “relatively cumbersome” process of bringing a 

citizen suit. The Truck Association concludes that, because 

it is challenging only the Regulation and not the SIP, 

§ 307(b)(1) does not apply.6

 For the reasons discussed 

herein, we disagree.

a SIP. See Luminant Generation Co., LLC v. EPA, 757 F.3d 439, 442 

(5th Cir. 2014) (“After giving notice and waiting thirty days, the EPA 

may ‘issue an order,’ ‘issue an administrative penalty’ after a formal 

administrative hearing, or ‘bring a civil action.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7413 (a)(1))).

6 In its opening brief, the Truck Association argues at length that an 

approved SIP does not have the “force and effect of federal law,” and 

instead may simply be enforced by the EPA in federal court. This 

argument, for which the Truck Association cites no case law, is based on 

the fact that the CAA provision providing for federal enforcement does 

not contain the language “force and effect of federal law.” 42 U.S.C. § 

7413. This is insufficient to disturb our precedent, which has 

consistently recognized that an approved SIP is federal law. See, e.g., 

Safe Air, 488 F.3d at 1091; Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. S. Coast 

 

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 13

A. Scope of § 307(b)(1)

The Truck Association relies heavily on the fact that its 

complaint, on its face, does not challenge an EPA action or 

California’s SIP. However, jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1) is 

not established solely by the allegations on the face of a 

complaint; instead, § 307(b)(1) “channels review of final 

EPA action exclusively to the courts of appeals, regardless 

of how the grounds for review are framed.” Virginia v. 

United States, 74 F.3d 517, 523 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis 

added). Thus, § 307(b)(1) has been applied to claims that 

effectively, if not facially, challenged an EPA final action.

In Virginia v. United States, for example, the Fourth 

Circuit held that § 307(b)(1) applied to Virginia’s claim that 

provisions of the CAA were “unconstitutional on their face.” 

Virginia, 74 F.3d at 522. After the EPA took final action 

Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 651 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011); El Comité 

Para El Bienestar de Earlimart v. Warmerdam, 539 F.3d 1062, 1066 

(9th Cir. 2008). We are joined in this view by other circuits. See, e.g., 

GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 516 (3rd Cir. 2013) (“If the 

EPA approves the SIPs, they become enforceable as federal law.”); US 

Magnesium, LLC v. EPA, 690 F.3d 1157, 1159 (10th Cir. 2012) 

(“Approved SIPs are enforceable as federal law . . . .”); Her Majesty the 

Queen in Right of the Province of Ont. v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 

335 (6th Cir. 1989) (“If a state implementation plan (‘SIP’) is approved 

by the EPA, its requirements become federal law and are fully 

enforceable in federal court.”). Furthermore, the Truck Association’s 

ultimate point appears to be that even after EPA approval, there remains 

“a state regulation on the books that is subject to preemption,” a point 

that Appellees do not contest, and that is not relevant to the question of 

jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1).

 

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finding deficiencies in Virginia’s pollution programs, 

Virginia filed suit in district court alleging that the CAA 

sanctions that would be triggered by the EPA’s actions were 

unconstitutional. Virginia sought an injunction preventing 

the EPA from enforcing those sanctions. The district court 

dismissed Virginia’s suit under § 307(b)(1), and the Fourth 

Circuit affirmed. The Fourth Circuit explained that “the 

practical objective of the complaint [was] to nullify final 

actions of EPA,” and held that Virginia could not 

“circumvent direct review in the circuit court” by “framing 

its complaint as a constitutional challenge to the CAA.” Id.

at 522–23 (emphasis added).7

7 In its Reply brief, the Truck Association argues that Virginia’s holding 

was subsequently limited in North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee 

Valley Authority, 549 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D.N.C. 2008). Apart from the 

fact that a district court cannot “limit” the holding of a court of appeals 

decision, the Truck Association’s reliance on this case, which ultimately 

favors Appellees, is misguided. North Carolina had filed a public 

nuisance suit against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) based on 

emissions from TVA’s power plants located in Tennessee, Alabama, and 

Kentucky. Id. at 727. North Carolina had separately filed a petition with 

the EPA under the CAA seeking emissions reductions from TVA’s 

power plants in thirteen states. The district court found that the two 

actions could proceed simultaneously because North Carolina’s public 

nuisance suit was brought on different grounds than its EPA petition. Id. 

at 734. The court distinguished Virginia, finding no indication that North 

Carolina’s “practical objective” was to “‘nullify’ the EPA’s final action.” 

Id. Following a bench trial, TVA was found liable and appealed. As 

noted in CARB’s citation of supplemental authorities, the Fourth Circuit 

reversed the district court’s judgment. Among other reasons, the court 

explained that preemption considerations disfavored litigation such as 

North Carolina’s suit, as it amounted to “‘nothing more than a collateral 

attack’” on the system created by the CAA and “risk[ed] results that lack 

 

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The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 

Missouri v. United States, 109 F.3d 440 (8th Cir. 1997). 

There, Missouri challenged the constitutionality of the 

CAA’s sanctions scheme after the EPA found Missouri to be 

noncompliant with the CAA. The Eighth Circuit held that 

§ 307(b)(1) applied to Missouri’s suit, stating:

While it is true that Missouri’s complaint 

questions the constitutionality of the overall 

sanctions scheme of the CAA, this challenge 

is not separate and apart from EPA action. . . .

Those sanctions flow directly from EPA 

action, originating in EPA’s declaring the St. 

Louis area an “ozone nonattainment area.”

Id. at 442.

In New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 666 F.2d 

30 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit found § 307(b)(1) to 

apply to a common law nuisance suit. The plaintiff had sued 

a lighting company for burning high-sulfur oil, conduct the 

EPA had approved as a variance to New York’s SIP. Id. at 

31–32 & n.1. The Second Circuit found the nuisance claim 

was “in effect, an attack upon the validity of the EPAapproved variance,” and held that “[a]ll claims against the 

validity of performance standards approved by final decision 

both clarity and legitimacy.” North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. 

Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 301 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Palumbo v. 

Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 1993)). Thus, not only 

does North Carolina not cabin Virginia, it in fact favors Appellees by 

discouraging litigation that seeks to “scuttle the extensive system of antipollution mandates that promote clean air in this country.” Id. at 298.

 

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of the Administrator must be addressed to the courts of 

appeals on direct appeal.” Id. at 33 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

Finally, in Benning v. Browner, No. Civ.A. 97-CV-7058, 

1998 WL 717436 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1998), the court applied 

the reasoning of Virginia and Missouri to a suit alleging that 

a regulation incorporated into Pennsylvania’s SIP violated 

the Equal Protection Clause. The court found the plaintiffs 

were “essentially challenging the appropriateness of the 

EPA Administrator’s action in approving a regulation they 

believe to be unconstitutional.” Id. at *3. It concluded that 

the plaintiffs’ “practical objective [was] to nullify the EPA’s 

final action,” and dismissed the suit under § 307(b)(1).

These cases demonstrate that a claim need not be framed 

as a challenge to the EPA for § 307(b)(1) to apply. Instead, 

§ 307(b)(1)’s scope extends to claims that, as a practical 

matter, challenge an EPA final action, including its approval 

of a SIP.8

 As explained below, we find that the Truck 

8 To some extent, this Court’s decision in Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc. v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 651 F.3d 

1066 (9th Cir. 2011), also supports the proposition that § 307(b)(1) looks 

beyond the face of a complaint. There, the EPA had approved the SIP 

for the South Coast Air Basin. The SIP included a program that allowed 

new sources of pollution to obtain emissions offset credits from the 

South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD), which 

implemented the SIP. Id. at 1069. In approving the SIP, the EPA had 

found that SCAQMD’s credits complied with the CAA. Id. at 1070–71. 

Several years later, the NRDC filed suit in district court alleging that the 

credits did not comply with the CAA. The district court dismissed the 

claim under § 307(b)(1). Id. at 1069. On appeal, the NRDC argued that 

 

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Association’s suit, as a practical matter, challenges the 

EPA’s approval of a provision of California’s SIP.

B. The Truck Association’s Suit

The Truck Association seeks to enjoin CARB from 

enforcing the Regulation, which the Association alleges is 

preempted by federal law. However, the EPA’s approval of 

the Regulation made it part of California’s SIP, and the SIP’s 

effectiveness depends largely on its enforcement by the 

state. Enjoining enforcement of the Regulation by CARB 

would effectively nullify that provision of California’s SIP. 

Furthermore, in alleging that the Regulation is preempted,

the Truck Association is also effectively challenging the 

EPA’s determination that federal law does not prohibit the 

Regulation. Thus, while the Truck Association had no 

“secret intent” of challenging the EPA when it filed suit, and 

it does not now seek to prohibit the EPA’s enforcement of 

the SIP, the practical, and therefore legal, effect of the Truck 

Association’s suit is to challenge both the EPA and the SIP.

1. Challenge to CARB’s Enforcement of the SIP

While the Truck Association asserts that “[t]he validity 

of the SIP is not at issue,” its suit, if successful, would 

it was “not challenging the EPA’s approval of the SIP, but rather 

SCAQMD’s implementation of the SIP.” Id. at 1071. We rejected that 

argument, explaining that “because the EPA issued rules that not only 

approved the SIP but also indicated that the credits . . . comply with [the 

CAA], the NRDC is effectively seeking review of the EPA’s decision.” 

Id. Thus, SCAQMD also favors applying § 307(b)(1) based on the 

practical objective of a claim.

 

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effectively eviscerate the SIP by precluding its enforcement 

by CARB. As we have previously observed, “[t]he [CAA] 

places much of its enforcement burden on the states, which 

are required to submit SIPs that show how states will attain 

the standards for major air pollutants.” El Comité Para El 

Bienestar de Earlimart v. Warmerdam, 539 F.3d 1062, 1066 

(9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also Safe Air, 488 F.3d 

at 1092 (“[T]he CAA establishes a system heavily dependent 

upon state participation.”); Ford, 814 F.2d at 1102 (“[T]he 

Clean Air Act contemplates very significant participation in 

air pollution control by state air pollution control agencies 

. . . .”). Thus, a SIP must contain “enforceable” emissions 

limitations and assurances that the state has sufficient 

authority and resources to carry out the SIP. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7410(a)(2)(A), (E).

Indeed, the EPA approved the Regulation in part because 

it concluded that CARB could effectively enforce it. The 

EPA stated:

CARB intends to conduct enforcement of the 

. . . Regulation . . . similarly to enforcement 

of CARB’s commercial vehicle and school 

bus idling regulations. CARB’s enforcement 

staff intends to use the inspection and audit 

methods that they have developed during the 

many years of experience enforcing the 

Heavy-Duty Vehicle Inspection Program 

(adopted into law in 1988) and the Periodic 

Smoke Inspection Program (adopted into law 

in 1990).

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 19

CARB indicates that enforcement 

activities will include inspections at border 

crossings, California Highway Patrol (CHP) 

weigh stations, fleet facilities, and randomly 

selected roadside locations and audits of 

records. . . . These activities could result in 

corrective actions and substantial civil 

penalties for non-compliance with the 

regulations. . . . 

We recognize the general effectiveness of 

CARB’s motor vehicle enforcement program 

and expect CARB’s approach to 

enforcement of the . . . [R]egulation[], as 

described above, to be equally effective . . . .

76 Fed. Reg. 40659 (emphasis added). Clearly, the SIP’s 

effectiveness in attaining the EPA’s NAAQS is directly tied 

to its enforceability by CARB, and would be vitiated if such 

enforcement were enjoined.

Furthermore, the Truck Association’s assertion that it is 

not challenging the SIP is belied by its acknowledgment that 

the invalidation of the state Regulation that it desires would 

make the SIP’s enforcement more difficult, and that such 

circumstances would be beneficial to its members. While 

touting the continued viability of the SIP via EPA actions 

and citizen suits, the Truck Association readily admits that 

such enforcement will be largely ineffective, with SIP 

violations likely to go undetected for months if not years. 

Thus, if successful, the Truck Association’s suit would 

severely undermine the SIP’s ability to achieve federal air 

quality standards. Because the Truck Association’s practical 

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20 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

objective is to dismantle the SIP’s primary enforcement 

apparatus, its suit is subject to § 307(b)(1) and must be 

brought in this Court.9

The Truck Association argues that there is some 

precedent for a non-appellate court repealing a state 

regulation that is incorporated into a SIP. The Truck 

Association points to Sierra Club v. Indiana-Kentucky 

Electric Corp., 716 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1983), where the 

Seventh Circuit considered the enforceability of a SIP 

provision whose underlying state regulation had been 

invalidated in state court on state law procedural grounds. 

Id. at 1146. An Indiana court had found the SIP provision 

invalid because the “state officer who presided over the 

hearing [on the regulation] had failed to submit written 

9 In addition to having the practical effect of nullifying the SIP, the Truck 

Association’s suit arguably seeks to literally repeal a portion of the SIP. 

California’s SIP, codified at 40 C.F.R. § 52.220, does not set forth the 

requirements of the Regulation; instead, it incorporates the Regulation 

“by reference.” Id. § 52.220(410). Thus, if the Regulation were 

repealed, there would arguably be nothing for the SIP to incorporate. 

Indeed, it could be persuasively argued that the repeal of a state 

regulation necessarily repeals part of the corresponding SIP, as a SIP is 

composed of state regulations. As explained by the EPA in its notice of 

final rule:

[I]n reviewing SIP submissions, EPA’s role is to 

approve State choices, provided that they meet the 

criteria of the Clean Air Act. Accordingly, this 

proposed action merely approves State law as meeting 

Federal requirements and does not impose additional 

requirements beyond those imposed by State law.

77 Fed. Reg. at 20313.

 

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findings to the Indiana Environmental Management Board,” 

as required by Indiana law. Id. at 1147. The Seventh Circuit 

held that, in light of the state court’s ruling, the SIP provision 

was not enforceable, reasoning:

Because administrative actions taken without 

substantial compliance with applicable 

procedures are invalid, it is as if Indiana 

never submitted [the state regulation]. Since 

a valid [regulation] was never submitted, 

EPA’s adoption of [the regulation] cannot be 

given effect since EPA approved a provision 

which was invalid when submitted to the 

agency.

Id. at 1148.

Even if we were to agree with the Seventh Circuit that a 

SIP provision may be invalidated in state court on state 

procedural grounds, this would not help the Truck 

Association, whose suit does not raise a state law procedural 

challenge. And, as explained by the Seventh Circuit, “[o]nce 

a plan is adopted by the state and it withstands any 

subsequent procedural challenge, then § 7607(b)(1) [CAA 

§ 307(b)(1)] provides that invalidation may occur only in the 

federal appellate courts.” Id. at 1152. Thus, if anything, 

Sierra Club supports the application of § 307(b)(1) to the 

Truck Association’s suit.

United States v. Ford Motor Co., 814 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 

1987), similarly acknowledged the very limited 

circumstances in which a SIP may be invalidated by a state

court. There, the EPA had sued Ford in district court for 

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violations of Michigan’s SIP, and Ford subsequently filed 

suit in Michigan state court to enjoin state environmental 

agencies from enforcing the SIP. Ford and the state agencies 

negotiated a consent judgment purporting to vacate the SIP, 

and Ford sought to use the consent judgment to defeat the 

EPA’s enforcement action. Id. at 1101. The Sixth Circuit 

held that the consent judgment did not preclude EPA’s 

enforcement of the SIP because “revisions of State 

Implementation Plans are ineffective until approved by 

EPA,” and “invalidation of an EPA-approved SIP may only 

occur in the federal appellate courts” under § 307(b)(1). Id.

at 1102–03. The Sixth Circuit distinguished Sierra Club, 

noting that Ford’s challenge to the SIP was not based on 

procedural grounds. Id. at 1103.

The Sixth Circuit did not address whether the consent 

judgment could preclude enforcement of the SIP by state 

agencies. If it could, Ford would arguably support the Truck 

Association’s assertion that a non-appellate court may 

render a SIP unenforceable by the state. However, the court 

in Ford was not confronted with this question. To the extent 

that any inferences can be drawn from the opinion, they 

would favor Appellees, as the Sixth Circuit stated, 

“invalidation of a SIP on technical grounds by a state court 

. . . . cannot be given effect.” Id. at 1103 (emphasis added). 

Presumably, this admonition applied to both the EPA and the 

state agencies. Thus, Sierra Club and Ford do not detract 

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 23

from the analysis supporting this Court’s exclusive 

jurisdiction over the Truck Association’s claim.10

2. Challenge to the EPA’s Legal 

Determination 

It is also clear that jurisdiction for the Truck 

Association’s claim exists exclusively under § 307(b)(1) 

because the Truck Association’s preemption claim 

effectively challenges the EPA’s legal determination that 

federal law does not prohibit the Regulation. When the EPA 

proposed approving the Regulation, it explicitly stated that 

it knew of “no obstacle under Federal or State law in 

CARB’s ability to implement” the Regulation. 76 Fed. Reg. 

at 40658. The EPA reiterated this conclusion in its final 

approval, finding that the state had provided adequate 

10 The parties cite New Mexico Environmental Improvement Division v. 

Thomas, 789 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that “[w]hen 

the approved SIP contains an element that is invalidated by virtue of state 

law, adoption by the EPA is also invalidated.” Id. at 833. This decision, 

however, is of limited help to either side. In New Mexico, a state 

regulation approved into New Mexico’s SIP was subsequently 

invalidated by New Mexico’s Supreme Court for violating a state law 

prohibiting counties from requiring vehicle registrations. Id. at 828 & 

n.1. The issue before the court was whether the EPA reasonably 

concluded that New Mexico had failed to submit a valid SIP. In its 

deferential agency review, the Tenth Circuit found that the EPA acted 

reasonably, noting that Sierra Club lent support for the EPA’s theory that 

when a state submits a SIP that is invalid under state law, it “is as if the 

state had not submitted a SIP” at all.” Id. at 833. The court had no 

occasion to consider whether New Mexico’s Supreme Court had 

jurisdiction to invalidate the state regulation.

 

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assurances that it was not prohibited from carrying out the 

Regulation by “any provision of Federal or State law.” 

77 Fed. Reg. 20311, 20313. In alleging that the Regulation 

violates the Supremacy Clause because it is preempted by 

the FAAAA, the Truck Association effectively challenges 

the validity of the EPA’s determination. See New England 

Legal Found., 666 F.2d at 33. Under § 307(b)(1), such a 

challenge must be brought in this Court. See Virginia, 

74 F.3d at 523 (explaining that appellate courts’ exclusive 

jurisdiction extends to “‘legal issues pertaining to final 

[actions]—whether or not those issues arise from the statutes 

that authorized the agency action in the first place’”) 

(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Palumbo 

v. Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir.1993)). 11

In sum, the practical objective of the Truck Association’s 

preemption suit is to nullify the SIP and challenge the EPA’s 

legal determination regarding its validity. Thus, it is the type 

of action to which § 307(b)(1) applies. Although this case is 

somewhat unique, in that the EPA approved the SIP after the 

Truck Association filed suit, subsequent EPA action can 

divest a district court of jurisdiction. See City of Seabrook 

v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1371, 1373 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Even if we 

assume . . . that the district court had jurisdiction of 

plaintiffs’ claim . . . the publication of the ‘final rule’ clearly 

left the district court without jurisdiction of the claim [under 

11 Admittedly, it is not clear from the EPA’s public notices whether it 

specifically considered preemption under the FAAAA. To the extent 

that it did not, this is at least somewhat attributable to the Truck 

Association’s failure to comment on the EPA’s proposed rule. In any 

event, the Truck Association effectively challenges the EPA’s broader 

conclusion that the Regulation complies with federal law.

 

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§ 307(b)(1)].”); see also Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. 

Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2012) (explaining that 

respondents’ Supremacy Clause challenges to state 

regulations were in a “different posture” after federal agency 

approved the regulations, potentially requiring respondents 

to instead seek review of agency action). Furthermore, the 

Truck Association provides no persuasive reason why 

§ 307(b)(1) cannot apply to a regulation that was adopted to 

be incorporated into a state’s SIP, simply because suit was 

filed prior to the EPA’s final action. Indeed, policy 

considerations underlying the CAA mandate this precise 

result.

C. Policy and Fairness Considerations

In establishing the CAA’s jurisdictional scheme, 

“Congress wanted speedy review of EPA rules and final 

actions in a single court,” thereby avoiding “duplicative or 

piecemeal litigation, and the risk of contradictory decisions.” 

Virginia, 74 F.3d at 525 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted); see also Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 

U.S. 578, 593 (1980) (“The most obvious advantage of direct 

review by a court of appeals is the time saved compared to 

review by a district court, followed by a second review on 

appeal.”). Allowing the Truck Association’s suit to proceed 

in district court would undermine these policy objectives. 

The district court’s decision on whether the Regulation is 

preempted would be subject to appeal, during which time the 

enforceability of the SIP would be in limbo. This would 

frustrate Congress’s goal of having prompt and final review 

of decisions regarding SIPs. Moreover, even if the Truck 

Association successfully enjoined enforcement of the 

Regulation by CARB, a separate suit would be required to 

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26 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

enjoin enforcement by the EPA and private citizens, 

potentially resulting in re-litigation of the same issues in 

multiple courts, with the concomitant risk of conflicting 

decisions. Indeed, the Truck Association admitted to the 

district court that it “may challenge the approval of the SIP 

. . . in a different forum . . . on similar or different grounds,” 

and it subsequently did bring such other challenges.12 

Applying § 307(b)(1) to the Truck Association’s suit avoids 

these outcomes and furthers the goals underlying the CAA’s 

judicial review system.

The Supreme Court’s analysis in Douglas v. Independent 

Living Center of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 

(2012) supports this conclusion. In Douglas, Medicaid 

providers and beneficiaries brought suit under the 

Supremacy Clause alleging that California’s Medicaid 

statutes conflicted with, and were preempted by, federal 

Medicaid law. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 

the federal agency responsible for administering the 

Medicaid program approved the state statutes, having 

determined that they complied with federal law. Id. at 1208–

09. The Supreme Court found that as a result of the agency’s 

approval, the case was “now in a different posture” and “may 

require respondents now to proceed by seeking review of the 

agency determination under the Administrative Procedure 

Act rather than in an action against California under the 

12 After the district court dismissed its suit, the Truck Association filed a 

petition in this Court under § 307(b)(1), seeking review of the EPA’s 

approval of the Regulation. Although we dismissed that suit as untimely, 

thereby mitigating the risk of conflicting decisions, allowing the Truck 

Association’s district court suit to proceed would create precedent for 

such piecemeal litigation.

 

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Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 1210 (citation omitted). Among 

the Court’s considerations was that:

[T]o allow a Supremacy Clause action to 

proceed once the agency has reached a 

decision threatens potential inconsistency or 

confusion.

. . . 

. . . Indeed, to permit a difference in result 

[depending upon whether the case proceeds 

in a Supremacy Clause action rather than 

under the APA] would subject the States to 

conflicting interpretations of federal law by 

several different courts (and the agency), 

thereby threatening to defeat the uniformity 

that Congress intended by centralizing 

administration of the federal program in the 

agency and to make superfluous or to 

undermine traditional APA review. If the two 

kinds of actions should reach the same result, 

the Supremacy Clause challenge is at best 

redundant. And to permit the continuation of 

the action in that form would seem to be 

inefficient, for the agency is not a participant 

in the pending litigation below, litigation that 

will decide whether the agency-approved 

state rates violate the federal statute.

Id. at 1210–11 (citation omitted). Similarly, here, the EPA’s 

approval of the Regulation has changed the posture of the 

case, such that a different avenue of judicial review is 

appropriate to avoid potentially conflicting decisions on the 

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28 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

underlying question of whether the Regulation is preempted 

by the FAAAA. Moreover, proceeding under § 307(b)(1) is 

preferable because the EPA would be a party to litigation 

that would decide whether a regulation it approved violates 

federal law.

The Truck Association correctly notes that the instant 

case differs from Douglas in that the EPA does not 

administer the FAAAA. Thus, the EPA’s determination that 

the Regulation does not conflict with federal law may not be 

the “kind of legal question that ordinarily calls for APA 

review,” because it does not fall within the EPA’s expertise. 

Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1210. Nevertheless, the congressional 

interests in uniformity and finality discussed in Douglas

apply here with equal force, and are better served by 

requiring challenges such as the Truck Association’s to be 

heard in this Court.

Finally, the Truck Association argues that applying 

§ 307(b)(1) to its suit would be unfair and leave it with no 

forum in which to pursue its claim. The Truck Association 

points out that when it filed suit, jurisdiction in this Court 

was unavailable because the EPA had not taken final action 

on the Regulation. Requiring the Truck Association to wait

for final action would mean that it could not enjoin the 

Regulation from taking effect, thereby imposing heavy costs 

on its members, as the EPA did not approve the Regulation 

until several months after it became effective. Furthermore, 

the Truck Association argues, dismissing its suit on 

jurisdictional grounds would unfairly penalize it for the 

district court’s delay in rendering a decision. According to 

the Truck Association, had the court adjudicated the case 

promptly, “judgment likely would have predated the EPA 

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 29

action.” Lastly, though not raised by the Truck Association, 

the district court’s dismissal of the Association’s suit eight 

months after the EPA’s final action arguably prejudiced the 

Association because by then, the sixty-day window in which 

it could seek review in this Court under § 307(b)(1) had 

closed, leaving the Association with no court in which to 

bring its claim.

These arguments, though somewhat sympathetic, are 

ultimately unpersuasive. The Truck Association is mistaken 

that § 307(b)(1)’s application would deny it a forum in which 

to enjoin the Regulation’s implementation. The Truck 

Association properly sought such relief in the district court, 

and indeed that court considered and ruled upon its motion 

for a preliminary injunction. The Truck Association may be 

correct that it would not have been subject to § 307(b)(1) had 

the district court reached an earlier disposition on its 

preemption claim. However, nothing inhibited the Truck 

Association from timely pursuing that claim in this Court 

after the EPA approved the Regulation in April 2012. The 

fact that it did not, and is now time-barred from doing so, is 

the Truck Association’s own doing.13

13 We also note that although 28 U.S.C. § 1631 provides for transfer of 

cases when the original court lacked jurisdiction, but the transferee court 

would have had jurisdiction at the time the complaint was filed, this 

statute does not apply here. At the time the Truck Association filed its 

complaint, this court did not have jurisdiction over the case, because the 

EPA had not yet approved the Regulation as part of California’s SIP. 

Only when the EPA later took final action in approving the Regulation 

as part of California’s SIP well after the complaint was filed did this 

court gain jurisdiction pursuant to § 307(b)(1). Because we would not 

 

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30 CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS

Moreover, any unfairness to the Truck Association is 

further mitigated by the fact that it was on notice, from the 

Regulation’s inception, that the Regulation was intended to 

be incorporated into California’s SIP. When CARB first 

proposed adopting the Regulation, it issued a public notice 

explaining that “[t]he [CAA] requires U.S. EPA to establish

NAAQS for pollutants,” that “Federal law mandates the 

development of State Implementation Plans documenting 

the actions the state will take to attain the federal air quality 

standards,” that CARB’s “SIP submittals to U.S. EPA . . . 

adopted 2014 reduction commitments for both [ozone] and 

PM[],” and that “the proposed regulation would provide the 

necessary emissions reductions by the mandatory deadlines 

for meeting the NAAQS for PM[] and ozone.”14 After 

CARB submitted the Regulation to the EPA, and several 

months before it was to take effect, the EPA issued a public 

notice proposing to approve the Regulation and inviting 

comments on its proposal. Thus, from multiple sources, the 

Truck Association was on notice that it could have 

participated in the administrative approval process by 

have been able to exercise jurisdiction on the date the case was filed in 

the district court, which is one of the requirements of § 1631, we could 

not have transferred the case to this court under that statute.

14 James N. Goldstene, Cal. Air Res. Bd., Notice of Public Hearing to 

Consider the Adoption of a Proposed Regulation to Reduce Emissions 

from In-Use On-Road Diesel Vehicles, and Amendments to the 

Regulations for In-Use Off Road Vehicles, Drayage Trucks, Municipality 

and Utility Vehicles, Mobile Cargo Handling Equipment, Portable 

Engines and Equipment, Heavy duty Engines and Vehicle Exhaust 

Emissions Standards and Test Procedures and Commercial Motor 

Vehicle Idling 3–5 (2008), available at www.arb.ca.gov/

regact/2008/truckbus08/tbnotice.pdf.

 

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CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS V. NICHOLS 31

submitting comments to the EPA. However, it chose not to 

do so. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the 

Truck Association has been unfairly prejudiced.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under CAA 

§ 307(b)(1).

AFFIRMED.

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