Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03181/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03181-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Derrick Crume
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3181

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa.

Derrick Crume, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 12, 2005

Filed: September 6, 2005

___________

Before ARNOLD, LAY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Derrick Crume appeals his convictions and sentence, including his special

conditions of supervised release, for knowingly receiving child pornography, see

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), and knowingly possessing child pornography, see

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). We affirm Mr. Crume's convictions, but we vacate

certain special conditions of his supervised release and remand the case for further

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Mr. Crume contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court

permitted his probation officer to describe briefly one image of child pornography

Appellate Case: 04-3181 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/06/2005 Entry ID: 1948173
-2-

found on a computer disk in his apartment. The government offered this testimony

and multiple photographs found by his probation officer as "other acts" evidence

under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Although the court initially overruled

Mr. Crume's objection that the admission of testimony describing the contents of the

computer disk violated the best evidence rule, see Fed. R. Evid. 1002, it later reversed

course and instructed the jury to disregard that portion of the officer's testimony.

Therefore, even if the evidence was not admissible, any error was cured. See United

States v. Uphoff, 232 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 2000). 

Mr. Crume also appeals his sentence. In light of the uncertainty at the time

regarding the constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, cf.Blakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the district court pronounced three sentences.

It first imposed a formal sentence of 262 months under the regime in place before

United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). It also pronounced two sentences

alternative to the formal sentence and instructed that certain actions of the Supreme

Court would trigger the imposition of those sentences: It imposed a sentence of

60 months if the Supreme Court interpreted Blakely to prohibit upward guideline

adjustments from the base offense level in the absence of a jury finding; if the

guidelines were "found unconstitutional, as a whole or in relation to this case," the

court ordered the imposition of an alternative sentence of 300 months. The order

indicates that the district court used the criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to

arrive at the 300-month sentence. The district court did not, however, pronounce an

alternative sentence that would take effect if the sentencing guidelines were declared

advisory.

The government and the defendant contend that our task here is to review the

262-month sentence. We agree. In Booker the Supreme Court expressly avoided

holding that the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional "as a whole," but

instead excised certain portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 to make the guidelines advisory,

rather than mandatory. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756-57. The guidelines also have

Appellate Case: 04-3181 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/06/2005 Entry ID: 1948173
-3-

not been held unconstitutional as applied in this case. Therefore, the condition that

would trigger the imposition of the 300-month sentence (that the guidelines be found

unconstitutional "as a whole or in relation to this case") has not been satisfied. Cf.

U.S. v. Archuleta, 412 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (8th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, Booker did

not prohibit upward adjustments from the base offense level in the absence of a jury

finding, see Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756-57, and so the condition that would trigger the

imposition of the 60-month sentence also has not been satisfied.

We must therefore review the default sentence of 262 months' imprisonment.

Although the district court committed Booker error by pronouncing this sentence

under the theory that the guidelines were mandatory, see United States v. Thompson,

403 F.3d 533, 535 (8th Cir. 2005), Mr. Crume does not contest this error. Instead he

argues that the district court erred in enhancing his offense level for obstruction of

justice, see U.S.S.G. § 3C.1.1, and in departing upward from the guidelines because

his criminal history category did not adequately reflect the seriousness of his past

criminal conduct or the likelihood that he would commit further crimes, see U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.3. We construe his arguments to be that his sentence was premised on an

erroneous calculation of the guidelines sentence including any appropriate departures

and that his overall sentence was unreasonable in light of the criteria of 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765; United States v. Shannon, 414 F.3d 921,

922-23 (8th Cir. 2005).

The district court committed no error in calculating Mr. Crume's guidelines

sentence. Mr. Crume first maintains that the district court erred by concluding that

he obstructed justice by threatening two of his fellow prisoners with harm if they

provided information to law enforcement agents. He argues that because he did not

know when he made the threat that those he threatened were cooperating witnesses

of the government, he did not obstruct justice. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; see also United

States v. Oppedahl, 998 F.2d 584, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1993). But there was evidence at

trial that when he made the threat, Mr. Crume knew that those he threatened intended

Appellate Case: 04-3181 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/06/2005 Entry ID: 1948173
-4-

to provide information to the prosecution. Indeed, a reasonable inference is that that

is why he threatened them. The district court found that Mr. Crume "did threaten [the

two fellow prisoners] while they were in Linn County Jail in an attempt to get them

not to jump his case." This factual finding is not clearly erroneous. See United States

v. Molina, 172 F.3d 1048, 1058 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 893 (1999).

Accordingly, the district court properly assessed the obstruction-of-justice

enhancement.

Mr. Crume also argues that the district court erred in departing upward for an

inadequate criminal history, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, because his criminal history

category had already been increased substantially for his prior illegal conduct of a

sexual nature. The district court's upward departure from criminal history category

IV to category VI produced a guidelines imprisonment range of 210 to 262 months,

up from a range of 168 to 210 months. "We review [a district] court's decision to

depart upward under the advisory guidelines for abuse of discretion." See Shannon,

414 F.3d at 923.

The district court provided a written statement of its reasons for the departure

in which it indicated that it was concerned about Mr. Crume's likelihood to recidivate.

The statement also indicates that the court decided to depart upward after considering

the defendant's prior convictions resulting from and related to the sexual abuse of a

child and his refusal to register as a sex offender. Mr. Crume's repeated violations of

the terms of his supervision, see United States v. Yahnke, 395 F.3d 823, 825-26 (8th

Cir. 2005), not all of which influenced his criminal history score, and his pattern of

engaging in sexual misconduct, would justify a conclusion that he would engage in

sexual abuse in the future to an extent that his criminal history does not fully capture.

Cf. United States v. Mugan, 394 F.3d 1016, 1026 (8th Cir. 2005). The district court,

therefore, did not abuse its discretion in departing upward for the purpose of

deterrence. See United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990). 

Appellate Case: 04-3181 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/06/2005 Entry ID: 1948173
-5-

After concluding that the sentence imposed, including the upward departure,

was consistent with the guidelines, we have little difficulty concluding that it was also

reasonable in light of the criteria of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Shannon, 414 F.3d at

924; cf. United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005).

Mr. Crume also takes issue with the terms of his supervised release. A

sentencing judge is afforded wide discretion when imposing terms of supervised

release, see United States v. Crose, 284 F.3d 911, 912 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam),

and we review a decision to impose special terms of supervised release for abuse of

that discretion. United States v. Weiss, 328 F.3d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 2003). But this

discretion is limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), which provides that a court may impose

only those special conditions of supervised release that satisfy three statutory

requirements. First, the special conditions must be "reasonably related" to five

matters: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's history and

characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the public from

further crimes of the defendant, and the defendant's educational, vocational, medical

or other correctional needs. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),

(a)(2)(D); United States v. Fields, 324 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 2003). Second,

the conditions must "involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably

necessary" to advance deterrence, the protection of the public from future crimes of

the defendant, and the defendant's correctional needs. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(2),

3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D). Finally, the conditions must be consistent with

any pertinent policy statements issued by the sentencing commission. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)(3). Mr. Crume argues that the conditions imposed, including those

restricting his use of computers and the Internet, prohibiting him from being in places

where minor children congregate, and restricting his contact with children under the

age of eighteen, fail to satisfy the requirements of § 3583(d).

Appellate Case: 04-3181 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/06/2005 Entry ID: 1948173
-6-

He first argues that the conditions of supervised release that completely bar his

access to computers and the Internet (without first receiving written consent from his

probation officer) represent a greater deprivation of his first amendment rights than

is reasonably necessary. Although the district court is entrusted with broad discretion

to fashion special conditions of supervised release, we are particularly reluctant to

uphold sweeping restrictions on important constitutional rights. Our decisions to

uphold similar restrictions on Internet access and computer use in United States v.

Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 2003), and Fields, 324 F.3d at 1027, were "based

largely on two considerations," Ristine, 335 F.3d at 696. One of those considerations

was that there was evidence that the defendant used his computer and the Internet to

do more than merely possess child pornography. Id. We were careful to note in

Fields, 324 F.3d at 1027, that "[a]ppellate courts have overturned conditions seen as

overly restrictive, especially in cases involving simple possession of child

pornography," but "[i]n cases where defendants used computers or the internet to

commit crimes involving greater exploitation, such restrictions have been upheld."

In Fields, the defendant used his computer and the Internet to sell subscriptions to

pornographic images, id. at 1026-27, and in Ristine, 335 F.3d at 696, the defendant

exchanged images with other Internet users and attempted to use his computer and

the Internet to arrange sexual relations with underage girls.

Although Mr. Crume has a lengthy history of grievous sexual misconduct, the

record is devoid of evidence that he has ever used his computer for anything beyond

simply possessing child pornography. We are not convinced that a broad ban from

such an important medium of communication, commerce, and information-gathering

is necessary given the absence of evidence demonstrating more serious abuses of

computers or the Internet. We are confident that the district court can impose a more

narrowly-tailored restriction on Mr. Crume's computer use through a prohibition on

accessing certain categories of websites and Internet content and can sufficiently

Appellate Case: 04-3181 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/06/2005 Entry ID: 1948173
-7-

ensure his compliance with this condition through some combination of random

searches and software that filters objectionable material. 

Mr. Crume also challenges a condition barring him "from places where minor

children under the age of 18 congregate such as residences, parks, beaches, pools,

daycare centers, playgrounds, and schools without the prior written consent of his

probation officer." He argues that this prohibition is not "reasonably related" to the

matters listed in the relevant statute because he has never engaged in sexual

misconduct in a public place. Furthermore, he asserts that it constitutes too great a

deprivation of liberty because it bars him from much of the common space of the

community and, by his reading, restricts him from all residences, whether or not

minor children live there. But in Ristine, 335 F. 3d at 696-97, we read a very similar

condition to prohibit the defendant's presence "only at those residences, parks ...

where children under the age of 18 actually congregate." So read, we held that such

a restriction, designed to limit a convict's access to children, was "sensible" and "not

overbroad." Id. We have little difficulty reaching the same conclusion here.

Finally, Mr. Crume challenges the condition of his supervised release that

prohibits him from contact with children under the age of eighteen without the written

consent of his probation officer. He contends that this restriction constitutes an

unnecessary deprivation of his liberty interest in having contact with his own

children. But children, including those of Mr. Crume, are members of the public that

the terms of supervised release seek to protect. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1), (d)(2),

3553(a)(2)(C). In fact, the daughter with whom he desires contact is the child

conceived as the result of his impregnating a fourteen-year-old girl. The presentence

investigation report reflects that this now-adult woman remains fearful of Mr. Crume

and worries that he may try to molest her daughter. 

Appellate Case: 04-3181 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/06/2005 Entry ID: 1948173
-8-

The challenged condition, moreover, does not completely prohibit Mr. Crume

from interacting with his children. He may have contact with children, including his

own, with the written consent of his probation officer. We also note that we do not

agree with the defendant that this provision prohibits him from accepting a letter

written to him by one of his children. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse

its discretion by forbidding Mr. Crume from having contact with children under the

age of eighteen absent written consent.

We affirm Mr. Crume's conviction and his 262-month prison sentence. But we

vacate special conditions of supervision two and four regarding Mr. Crume's access

to computers and the Internet and remand the case to the district court for further

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We also call the district court's

attention to its intention to vacate Mr. Crume's conviction on Count II if his

conviction on Count I was affirmed.

______________________

Appellate Case: 04-3181 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/06/2005 Entry ID: 1948173