Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02189/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02189-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Santana Meraz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAN~ - 19S5 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Cierk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)· 

v. No. 88-2189 

SANTANA MERAZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D. C. No. CR-88-172) 

(D. N.M.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before*¥>GAN and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and ALLEY, District 

Judge. 

Santana Meraz appeals the judgment entered on his convictions 

of various criminal offenses: conspiracy to possess with intent 

to distribute more than 500 grams but less- than five kilograms of 

cocaine in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846; possession with intent to 

distribute more than 500 grams but less than five kilograms or 

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l); distribution of 

more than 500 grams but less than five kilograms of cocaine in 

* 

be 

for 

res 

** 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

The Honorable Wayne E. Alley, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2189 Document: 01019958684 Date Filed: 01/04/1990 Page: 1 
" 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(B)(ii); the employment of a 

person under eighteen years of age to violate specified portions 

of 21 U.S.C. § 841 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 845b(a)(l); and 

possession of a firearm by an alien in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(5) and 18 u.s.c. 924(b). 1 Meraz contends the evidence 

was insufficient on each count. We affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

On February 11, 1988, federal law enforcement agents in New 

Mexico arrested Meraz, Alonzo Miranda-Hernandez (Alonzo), Victor 

Miranda-Hernandez (Victor), an unnamed juvenile, and Raymond 

Andrew Baca, after a fruitful investigation which began in 

California. Three days before the arrest, a special agent (the 

SA) working undercover with the Drug Enforcement Agency receiyed a 

telephone call from Baca. Baca asked him if he was interested in 

1 The amended judgment varies from the indictment and the verdict 

form. The amended judgment recites Meraz was convicted of the 

following offenses: 

Conspiracy, in violation of 21 USC§ 846, as alleged in 

Count I; Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine, 

in violation of 21 USC 84l(a)(l) & Distributing Cocaine, 

in violation of 21 USC 841(6)(l)(B)(ii), as alleged in 

Count II; Employment of a Person Under 18 Years of Age, 

in violation of 21 USC 845b(a)(l), as alleged in Count 

II; Aiding & Abetting, in violation of 18 USC 2, as 

alleged in Count II; and Carrying and Using a Firearm 

During a Drug Trafficking Crime, in violation of 18 USC 

924(c)(l), as alleged in Count VIII of the Indictment. 

We believe the judgment is in error in reciting that Meraz was 

convicted of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l), carrying and using a firearm 

during a drug trafficking crime. The verdict form indicates the 

jury found Meraz guilty, among other offenses, of "the offense of 

Alien Illegally and Unlawfully in the United States Possessing a 

Firearm in and Affecting Commerce as charged in Count VIII of the 

Indictment." (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(S) and _924(b). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2189 Document: 01019958684 Date Filed: 01/04/1990 Page: 2 
buyin_g a kilogram of cocaine. The SA responded affirmatively, and 

the two negotiated a price of $28,000 per kilogram. When the SA 

asked Baca if he could supply two kilograms of cocaine, Baca 

replied that he could, but would have to talk to his source. 

On February 9, 1988, Baca telephoned the SA. Baca stated 

that the cocaine was ready and the total price would be $54,000. 

The SA and Baca agreed that the deal would take place in Socorro, 

New Mexico, on February 11, 1988. On February 11, 1988, the SA 

telephoned Baca, who returned the call. Baca stated that he would 

be using an older model Marquis and gave a description of his 

clothing. At approximately 2:15 in the afternoon, as agreed, the 

SA met Baca at the McDonald's parking lot in Socorro, New Mexico. 

Baca told the SA everything was ready and that the cocaine was on 

its way from Albuquerque. Two other special agents working with 

the SA showed Baca $54,000.00 in government funds. Baca told the 

SA that when "his people'' arrived in Socorro, they would drive to 

the Safeway parking lot and pull up the hood of a car as if having 

automobile problems. Baca further instructed the SA that he was 

to pull up next to that car and that they would show him the 

cocaine. After instructing the SA, Baca left the McDonald's 

parking lot. He returned approximately one hour later. 

When Baca returned to McDonald's, he told the SA that 

everything was ready. As instructed, the SA followed Baca to the 

Safeway parking lot. At the Safeway parking lot, Baca pulled his 

brown Marquis alongside a green and white Ford Thunderbird. As 

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• 

Browning was in the nightstand drawer. The next morning she took 

it to Louisiana Auto Care and put it in his desk. 

Meraz' sole3 contention on appeal is that the evidence at 

trial was insufficient to support the convictions. Appellant's 

Brief at 1. In such a case the standard of review is clear: 

When the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

criminal conviction is challenged, we must view all the 

evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light 

most favorable to the government. In conducting our 

review, we '[do] not consider the credibility of 

witnesses or weigh conflicting evidence.' The evidence 

is considered sufficient if 'any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 

United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 673 (10th Cir. 1989) 

(citations omitted). This standard of review applies to each of 

Meraz' arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. 

The record contains ample evidence to support the charges of 

conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute and distribution 

of cocaine. Although Meraz contends the evidence establishes "a 

mere suspicion" of guilt of conspiracy, the record contains 

evid~nce that Baca identified Meraz to the SA as his (Baca's) 

source and that Meraz participated in the planning and execution 

of the charged cocaine offenses. Even though Meraz had an 

explanation for his actions, the government's evidence, if 

believed by the jury, supports the convictions. Under the 

3 Within 

erred in 

on simple 

statement 

the sufficiency argument, Meraz also argues the court 

refusing to give the jury a lesser included instruction 

possession. Meraz did not include this issue in his 

of the issues. 

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• 

standard reiterated in Cardall, we are not persuaded that any 

error lies herein. 

Meraz also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in 

support of the charged violation of knowingly and intentionally 

employing, hiring, using, persuading, inducing or enticing a 

juvenile to violate the specified provisions of 21 u.s.c. 

§ 845(b)(a)(l). "There is no evidence at all that [the juvenile] 

violated any drug laws .... If it was not shown that [the 

juvenile] violated any drug laws, it is difficult to conceive how 

Meraz could be convicted of enticing him to violate those laws." 

Appellant's Brief at 19-20. The record, however, supports the 

government's position that Meraz used the juvenile at least as a 

driver knowingly participating in the scheme to sell cocaine. As 

stated above, the evidence reveals that the juvenile was present 

at Geiger's apartment the night before the transaction, and that 

the parties used cocaine and discussed the details regarding the 

plan for the next day. On the day of the buy, the juvenile 

dropped off Meraz at Geiger's apartment. He was driving the brown 

Ma~quis. Further, he was in the motel room when an incoming call 

was received at approximately the same time Meraz was making a 

call from the Safeway . public phone booth. At the time of his 

arrest, he was driving the red Mazda that Baca had driven to 

Socorro. 4 The evidence thus supports the charge that Meraz 

4 Because the closing arguments of counsel were not transcribed, 

we do not refer to their constructions of the evidence. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2189 Document: 01019958684 Date Filed: 01/04/1990 Page: 5 
' knowingly used the juvenile to violate the law as an aider and 

abetter in the commission of the charged offense. 

Meraz also argues there was insufficient evidence that he 

possessed a firearm. Appellant's Brief at 20. Count VII of the 

Indictment charges that on or about the 11th day of February, 

1988, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Meraz, an alien illegally and 

unlawfully in the United States, knowingly possessed a firearm, a 

Browning Arms, 9mm. semi-automatic pistol. Meraz argues the 

evidence was insufficient to support the conviction on this count 

because he did not exercise dominion and control over the weapon. 

on February 11 and therefore there was inadequate evidence of 

possession. Geiger testified that on the evening before the deal 

in Socorro, Meraz' .9mm Browning was in her nightstand drawer. 

The next morning she took it to Louisiana Auto Care and put it in 

his desk. Meraz, on the other hand, testified that he sold Geiger 

the firearm when he sold the business to her. 

In our view, the evidence of possession was sufficient for 

two reasons. First, regardless of ownership, the evidence of 

actual possession on February 10 was complete and sufficient 

through the testimony of Geiger. The court instructed the jury: 

"It is sufficient if the evidence in the case establishes beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the offense was committed on a date 

reasonably 

established 

near the date alleged." Second, the evidence 

constructive possession under the court's Instruction 

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Appellate Case: 88-2189 Document: 01019958684 Date Filed: 01/04/1990 Page: 6 
No. 20 5 on the date charged, February 11, 1988. Consequently, we 

are not persuaded by Meraz' contentions that the evidence of 

possession of the firearm was insufficient. 

Meraz also argues the trial court erred in refusing to 

instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple 

possession of cocaine. Appellant's Brief at 17. This argument is 

wholly without merit. Fitzgerald v. United States, 719 F.2d 1069, 

1071 (10th Cir. 1983), establishes four tests for determining when 

instruction on a lesser included offense is appropriate: (1) a 

proper request must be made; (2) the lesser included offense must 

consist of some but not all of the elements of the offense 

charged; (3) the element differentiating the two offenses must be 

a matter in dispute; and (4) a jury could rationally convict the 

5 The law recognizes two kinds of possession: actual 

possession and constructive possession. A person who 

knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a 

given time, is then in actual possession of it. 

A person who, although not in actual possession, 

knowingly has both the power and the . intention, at a 

given time, to exercise dominion or control over a 

thing, either directly or through another person or 

persons, is then in constructive possession of it. 

The law recognizes also that possession may be sole 

or joint. If one person alone has actual or 

constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. 

If two or more persons share actual or constructive 

possession of a thing, possession is joint. 

You may find that the element of possession as that 

term is used in these instructions is present if you 

find beyond reasonable doubt that the Defendant had 

actual or constructive possession, either alone or 

jointly with others. 

Meraz does not claim error in the instruction itself, and we see 

no basis for a plain error reversal. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2189 Document: 01019958684 Date Filed: 01/04/1990 Page: 7 
defendant of the lesser offense and acquit of the greater offense. 

The Fitzgerald court also noted that "there should be some 

evidence which tends to support simple possession." Id. at 1072. 

Given the value of the cocaine in this case ($54,000), and the 

testimony of Geiger and the SA, the evidence does not "support 

simple possession." The trial judge correctly denied the lesser 

included offense instruction. See Fed. R. Crim P. Jl(c); Keeble 

v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973); United States v. 

Young, 862 F.2d 815, 820 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. 

Johnson, 734 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir. 1984). 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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