Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-16-01584/USCOURTS-ca3-16-01584-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Susan Berrier
Non-Participating
Corizon Health Inc
Non-Participating
M. H. Diggs
Non-Participating
Michael J. Herbik
Non-Participating
Rhonda House
Non-Participating
Shawn Kephart
Non-Participating
Jason Kokinda
Appellant
Christopher H. Oppman
Non-Participating
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
Non-Participating
Prison Health Services Correctional Care Inc
Non-Participating
Prison Health Services Inc
Non-Participating
Patricia Stover
Non-Participating

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 16-1584

___________

JASON KOKINDA,

 Appellant 

v.

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; M. H. DIGGS, 

(official/personal capacity); CHRISTOPHER H. OPPMAN, MBA, MHA 

(official/personal capacity); PRISON HEALTH SERVICES INC, (official/personal 

capacity); PATRICIA STOVER, (official/personal capacity); CORIZON HEALTH INC, 

(official/personal capacity); PRISON HEALTH SERVICES CORRECTIONAL CARE 

INC, (official/personal capacity); RHONDA HOUSE, (official/personal capacity); 

SHAWN KEPHART, DSCS (official/personal capacity); JANE DOE #2, Doctor 

(official/personal capacity); JANE DOE #4, Doctor (official/personal capacity); JANE 

DOE #6, Dietician (official/personal capacity); JOHN DOE #2, chca (official/personal 

capacity); JOHN DOE #4, (acting CHCA at time) (official/personal capacity); SUSAN 

BERRIER, (acting CHCA at time) (official/personal capacity); JANE DOE #1, 

(official/personal capacity); JANE DOE #3, Nurse (official/personal capacity); JANE 

DOE #5, Nurse (official/personal capacity), JOHN DOE #1, DSCS (official/personal 

capacity); JOHN DOE #3, (acting DSCS at time) (official/personal capacity); 

JOHN DOE #5 (acting DSCS at time) (official/personal capacity); MICHAEL J. 

HERBIK, (Medical Director)(official/personal capacity); JOHN DOE #7, (Medical 

Director) (official/personal capacity); JOHN DOE #6 (Medical Director) 

(official/personal capacity)

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(W.D. Pa. No. 2:15-cv-01593)

District Court Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 16, 2016

Case: 16-1584 Document: 003112430000 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/07/2016
2

Before: VANASKIE, SCIRICA and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Filed: October 7, 2016)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Jason Kokinda appeals the sua sponte dismissal of his civil rights lawsuit. We 

will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Kokinda, formerly a Pennsylvania prisoner, was housed at three prisons—SCIGraterford, SCI-Camp Hill, and SCI-Fayette. After his release, he filed a civil rights 

lawsuit against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), three corporate 

prison-medical-services providers, and numerous employees of the DOC or the prisonservices providers, in their official and individual capacities, claiming that they fed him a 

diet that contained soy despite knowing that he was allergic to it, which caused various 

maladies. 

Because Kokinda was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Magistrate Judge 

screened his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Magistrate Judge 

recommended dismissing—as improperly joined under Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure—any claims involving events at SCI-Graterford and SCI-Camp Hill

because those claims did not arise from the same occurrence, or series of occurrences, or 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 16-1584 Document: 003112430000 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/07/2016
3

share common questions of fact, as the claims stemming from the events at SCI-Fayette, 

the only facility located within the jurisdictional territory of the Western District of 

Pennsylvania, where the case was filed.

1

 In addition, the Magistrate Judge concluded that 

the SCI-Fayette claims must also be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) the Eleventh 

Amendment barred Kokinda’s claims against the DOC and any of the individual 

Defendants in their official capacities; (2) Kokinda failed to state a claim under Title II of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act2; and (3) Kokinda failed to state a claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1985(3) and § 1986 because he did not allege discrimination on account of his 

race or any other class-wide ground for animus.3

The Magistrate Judge’s report, however, did not address Kokinda’s 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 claims against the three corporate prison-medical-services providers or the 

Defendants sued in their individual capacities, alleging that the events at SCI-Fayette

violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Nevertheless, the 

Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing Kokinda’s entire complaint but allowing 

leave to amend to cure the noted deficiencies.4 The District Court adopted the Magistrate 

 

1 Kokinda v. Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 2:15-cv-1593, 2016 WL 695819, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 

Jan. 13, 2016). 

2 Kokinda does not challenge the dismissal of his ADA claim on appeal, and thus we will 

not address it here. See Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 202–03 (3d 

Cir. 2004).

3 Kokinda, 2016 WL 695819, at *3–6; see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S 88, 102 

(1971); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (establishing liability for persons who knew of and could have 

prevented the wrongs outlined in § 1985, but failed to do so). 

4

Id. at *6.

Case: 16-1584 Document: 003112430000 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/07/2016
4

Judge’s recommendation, over Kokinda’s objections, and dismissed the entire complaint

without prejudice, with leave to file an amended complaint. 

Kokinda now appeals. We have jurisdiction over his appeal under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291.

5

 Our review of the District Court’s order severing parties for failure to satisfy the 

joinder requirements of Rule 20 is for an abuse of discretion,6and our review of the 

District Court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim is 

plenary.7 

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Kokinda improperly 

joined the claims related to the events at SCI-Graterford and SCI-Camp Hill with his 

claims related to the events at SCI-Fayette. A plaintiff may join defendants in an action 

if the plaintiff (1) asserts a right to relief arising from the same transaction or occurrence, 

and (2) his action will involve any question of law or fact common to all the defendants.8 

Kokinda did allege that each Defendant violated his constitutional rights in an identical 

way; thus questions of law, such as whether Kokinda could state an Eighth Amendment 

claim, may be common to all Defendants. However, as the District Court reasoned, 

Kokinda has not alleged that each Defendant was part of the same occurrence or series of 

 

5

“Generally, an order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final nor 

appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting the 

cause of action.” Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per 

curiam). However, where, as here, the plaintiff declares his intention to “stand on the 

complaint,” the dismissal order becomes final and appealable. Id. at 952. 

6 Hagan v Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2009).

7 Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 

8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)–(B). 

Case: 16-1584 Document: 003112430000 Page: 4 Date Filed: 10/07/2016
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occurrences, or that common questions of fact exist. Rather, Kokinda alleged that he was 

housed at the three separate institutions at separate times, and that different officials at 

each prison independently violated his civil rights in the same way. “Simply committing 

the same type of violation in the same way does not link defendants together for the 

purposes of joinder.”9 Therefore, the District Court did not err in dismissing the 

improperly joined claims from this lawsuit. 

The District Court was also correct to conclude that the Eleventh Amendment 

barred Kokinda’s claims against the DOC and its employees in their official capacities,

10

and that Kokinda’s ADA claims fail because the ADA prohibits disability-based 

discrimination, “not inadequate treatment for the disability.”11 Finally, we agree that 

Kokinda failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986. While Kokinda did 

allege that he was deprived of equal protection of the law due to the prison staff’s 

“invidious discrimination against those with food allergies,”12 the Court is not convinced 

that having such food allergies constitutes a class within the meaning of § 1985(3).13 In 

 

9 AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-1058, 752 F.3d 990, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-30, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 WL 

4915551, *3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011)). 

10 See Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002)

(“[T]he Eleventh Amendment . . . has been interpreted to render states—and, by 

extension, state agencies and departments and officials when the state is the real party in 

interest—generally immune from suit by private parties in federal court.”); Lavia v. Pa. 

Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000). 

11 Kokinda, 2016 WL 695819, at *4 (quoting Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 

1101, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010)).

12 Compl. ¶ 39. 

13 Cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993) (rejecting a 

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any event, the Court need not address that issue because Kokinda defeated his own claim 

when he alleged elsewhere in the Complaint that the defendants failed to give him a soyfree diet, not due to invidious discrimination, but in order to “save a few bucks.”14

 

However, the District Court erred in dismissing Kokinda’s entire complaint 

without discussing the viability of his § 1983 claims against the private medical services 

providers and the individuals sued in their individual capacities, relating to the events at 

SCI-Fayette. We read his complaint to assert at the very least a conditions-ofconfinement claim against two groups of Defendants. First, Kokinda’s complaint alleged 

that the conditions of his confinement at SCI-Fayette—namely, that the individual

officials there knowingly fed him a diet that contained soy despite knowing that he was 

allergic to it—violated his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights.15 

Second, Kokinda alleged that the corporate medical-services providers adopted a policy

to feed him, and other inmates, a diet containing soy despite knowing that he was allergic 

to it.

16

 We will vacate the sua sponte dismissal of this claim against these two groups of 

Defendants and remand for the District Court to address Kokinda’s allegations in the first 

 

class of “women seeking abortion” because “[w]hatever may be the precise meaning of a 

‘class’ for purposes of Griffin’s speculative extension of 1985(3) beyond race, the term 

unquestionably connotes something more than a group of individuals who share a desire 

to engage in conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors”); Farber v. City of Paterson, 

440 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting political affiliation as a protected class, 

noting that only “African-Americans, women, and the mentally retarded” have been so 

far recognized by this Circuit as classes within the meaning of § 1985). 

14 Compl. ¶¶ 20, 50. 

15 Id. ¶¶ 20, 37, 39; see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994).

16 Compl. ¶ 46; see also Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 690, 690–91 (1978); 

Case: 16-1584 Document: 003112430000 Page: 6 Date Filed: 10/07/2016
7

instance. We express no opinion as to the merit of these allegations. In all other respects, 

we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 

Accordingly, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004).

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