Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01156/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01156-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Salvador Galaviz-Luna
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska. Judge Kopf served as Chief Judge of the District of Nebraska until

November 30, 2004. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1156

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska.

Salvador Galaviz-Luna, also known as *

Chavo, also known as Manual Salinas, * 

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: August 26, 2004

 Filed: August 3, 2005 

___________

Before BYE, LAY, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Salvador Galaviz-Luna (Galaviz-Luna) was charged with and convicted of

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a

substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1), and 846. The district court1

 sentenced Galaviz-Luna to 235 months’

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imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, Galaviz-Luna

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him. Galaviz-Luna also

asserts the district court erred in enhancing his offense level under United States

Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.) § 3C1.1 on the basis he obstructed justice, and he

further argues his sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing

pursuant to United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

At trial, the jury heard the testimony of nine witnesses cooperating under

federal plea agreements. These nine witnesses–Lois Anthony, Rodney Sherman,

Hugo Corrales, Ross Racek, Jose Federico Guerro Vasquez, Charles Prorok, Fidel

Martinez, Jonathan Trejo, and Jackie Boersen–related similar accounts of GalavizLuna purchasing and distributing methamphetamine at various times and in various

amounts from April 1998 through January 2002. Galaviz-Luna’s counsel

characterized these adverse witnesses as drug-addicted felons seeking sentence

reductions in exchange for testifying against Galaviz-Luna. Galaviz-Luna admitted

he used methamphetamine with several of the government’s witnesses, but he denied

he ever sold methamphetamine. The jury convicted Galaviz-Luna of conspiracy to

distribute methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court found Galaviz-Luna

perjured himself with his trial testimony, and accordingly applied a two-level

obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 

Galaviz-Luna appeals his conviction, arguing “[t]he only evidence that

Mr. Galaviz-Luna was involved in drug dealing came from drug dealers who had

been caught and were seeking to feather their own nests by informing on another.”

Galaviz-Luna alternatively appeals his sentence, contending the district court erred

in enhancing his offense level by failing to address clearly each element of perjury.

Galaviz-Luna also contends the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights,

because (1) the facts supporting the sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice

were not admitted by Galaviz-Luna nor proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,

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and (2) the district court erroneously applied the sentencing guidelines in a

mandatory, rather than an advisory, fashion. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Galaviz-Luna contends there was insufficient evidence to support his

conspiracy conviction, because the evidence against him came “completely from

subjective testimony from alleged co-conspirators.” Galaviz-Luna points out that no

controlled substances, scales, or large sums of money were seized in connection with

his case. 

Galaviz-Luna faces a “high hurdle” with his argument concerning the

sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him, because the standard of review on

this issue is strict. United States v. Cook, 356 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2004). We

review “the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving

evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, and accepting all reasonable

inferences drawn from the evidence that support the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quoting

United States v. Sanders, 341 F.3d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 2003)). We reverse “only if no

reasonable jury could have found [Galaviz-Luna] guilty.” Id. The government may

prove the conspiracy with either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id.

We conclude the evidence, viewed most favorably to the jury’s verdict, was

sufficient to support Galaviz-Luna’s conviction. Several government witnesses

testified they received methamphetamine from Galaviz-Luna and then resold the

methamphetamine to other individuals. The cooperating witnesses were crossexamined as to their plea agreements and the possibility of receiving sentence

reductions in exchange for their testimony. Issues of witness credibility and motive

are for a jury to decide, see id., and Galaviz-Luna’s case does not merit deviation

from this precedent. In addition, a police officer, who inspected the patrol car in

which Galaviz-Luna had been seated, discovered a folded up dollar bill with a lightAppellate Case: 04-1156 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/03/2005 Entry ID: 1935726
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colored powdery substance inside it, which substance was later identified as

methamphetamine. Galaviz-Luna told an officer he placed the folded bill under the

car seat because he was scared. Upon questioning, Galaviz-Luna admitted the lightcolored powdery substance inside the dollar bill was “smack.” We affirm GalavizLuna’s conviction. 

B. Sentence Enhancement

Galaviz-Luna advances two arguments suggesting the district court erred in

sentencing him. First, Galaviz-Luna contends the district court clearly erred in

enhancing his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstructing justice. Second,

Galaviz-Luna raises a Sixth Amendment challenge under Booker. We will address

each argument in turn. 

1. Obstructing Justice

In his initial brief on appeal, Galaviz-Luna challenges as clear error the

application of a two-level sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. “Even

after Booker, ‘[w]e review the [interpretation and] application of the sentencing

guidelines de novo and review the district court’s factual findings for clear error.’”

United States v. Porter, 409 F.3d 910, 917-18 (8th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original)

(quoting United States v. Mathijssen, 406 F.3d 496, 498 (8th Cir. 2005)). Whether

Galaviz-Luna committed perjury and, in so doing, obstructed justice is a factual

finding, and we reverse a district court’s imposition of a sentence enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 only upon a showing of clear error. See United States v. Red Elk,

368 F.3d 1047, 1052 (8th Cir. 2004). 

“A witness commits perjury if he ‘gives false testimony concerning a material

matter with the [willful] intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of

confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.’” United States v. Thomas, 93 F.3d 479, 489

(8th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)). Before

imposing a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice, “the district court must

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review the evidence and make an independent finding of perjury by a preponderance

of the evidence, one not based solely on the jury’s disbelief of the defendant’s

testimony.” Red Elk, 368 F.3d at 1052. Given the conflict between Galaviz-Luna’s

trial testimony and the other evidence at trial, the district court found Galaviz-Luna

perjured himself, and said: 

The overwhelming trial evidence from a wide variety and diversity of

people, is that [Galaviz-Luna] was a drug dealer, and actively a drug

dealer, and took significant steps to deal drugs. And it is true that he

testified contrary to his proffer when it became obvious that if he stuck

by his proffer, he would have implicated himself in distributable

quantities. And I, therefore, overrule the objection and find that the

obstruction [of] justice enhancement is appropriately imposed here.

The district court then asked, “Do the parties require any further findings?” Both the

government and Galaviz-Luna’s counsel replied, “No.” We will not at this late date

ask the district court to make further perjury findings. 

The district court, in effect, made a specific finding of perjury, and we see no

evidence this finding was clearly erroneous. Therefore, we hold the district court did

not clearly err in assessing a two-level sentence enhancement for obstruction of

justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

2. Booker

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, Galaviz-Luna filed a

supplemental brief arguing his sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for

resentencing, because (1) the district court enhanced his sentence based on a judicial

finding that he obstructed justice by committing perjury under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and

(2) the district court sentenced him under a mandatory, rather than an advisory,

sentencing regime.

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Galaviz-Luna’s first argument, i.e., that the district court violated Booker by

enhancing his sentence based on judicial fact finding, is unavailing. The district court

found facts supporting the obstruction of justice enhancement based on a

preponderance of the evidence, but such judicial fact finding is not necessarily

unconstitutional under Booker. See United States v. Keller, No. 04-2459, 2005 WL

1558125, at *2 (8th Cir. July 5, 2005). “Nothing in Booker suggests that sentencing

judges are required to find sentence-enhancing facts beyond a reasonable doubt under

the advisory Guidelines regime.” United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 551 n.4 (8th

Cir. 2005) (en banc). Rather, as discussed below, the error is that the district court

applied its fact finding under a mandatory Guidelines system.

Because Galaviz-Luna did not object to his sentence on Sixth Amendment

grounds in the district court, we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b);

Pirani, 406 F.3d at 549-50. Under plain error review, we may not correct an error not

raised in the district court unless there is “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that

affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then

exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 550

(quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)). 

Insofar as the district court did not specifically ask and instruct the jury to find

beyond a reasonable doubt whether Galaviz-Luna committed perjury, and thus

obstructed justice, the district court’s imposition of this enhancement under a

mandatory Guidelines regime was an error that was plain under the Sixth

Amendment. See United States v. Ziesman, 409 F.3d 941, 957 (8th Cir. 2005)

(concluding “the district court committed error in applying the Guidelines in a

mandatory fashion based on judge-found facts, and the error is plain at the time of

appellate consideration”). 

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Turning to the third prong of plain-error review, we ask whether the error

affects substantial rights, which “means that the error must have been prejudicial: It

must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). “It is the defendant rather than the Government

who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” Id. To carry this

burden, Galaviz-Luna must establish “a ‘reasonable probability,’ based on the

appellate record as a whole, that but for the error he would have received a more

favorable sentence.” Pirani, 406 F.3d at 552. 

Galaviz-Luna argues his burden of demonstrating prejudice is satisfied by the

district court’s statement at sentencing: “I’m prepared to sentence the defendant at the

low end of the guidelines. . . . [T]hat’s hardly a low end, but in any event, that’s what

I’m prepared to do.” However, a sentence at the low end of the applicable Guidelines

range is not, by itself, sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a lesser sentence

in the absence of mandatory sentencing guidelines. See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 553. 

We conclude the record as a whole does not establish a reasonable probability

the district court would have imposed a more lenient sentence under an advisory

Guidelines system. In fact, the district court indicated Galaviz-Luna’s sentence

“reflect[s] the seriousness of the offense, . . . promote[s] respect for the law, . . .

provide[s] for just punishment, and . . . afford[s] deterrents.” After the court

overruled Galaviz-Luna’s objections to the obstruction of justice enhancement and

imposed the enhancement, counsel for Galaviz-Luna expressly requested the sentence

given. Because Galaviz-Luna fails to meet the third prong of the plain-error test, we

need not consider the fourth prong of plain-error review. The district court did not

plainly err in sentencing Galaviz-Luna.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Galaviz-Luna’s conviction and sentence.

______________________________

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