Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-08-03990/USCOURTS-ca8-08-03990-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Appellee
Quet Sledge
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-3990

___________

Quet Sledge, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

Michael J. Astrue, *

Social Security Commissioner, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: January 21, 2010

Filed: February 5, 2010

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Quet Sledge appeals the district court’s1

 order affirming the denial of disability

insurance benefits. Sledge alleged disability since January 2005 from degenerative

joint disease, anxiety, and a bipolar disorder. After a September 2007 hearing, where

Sledge was counseled, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Sledge had

engaged in substantial gainful activity until at least March 31, 2005; that her combined

physical and mental impairments were severe, but alone or combined, they did not

Appellate Case: 08-3990 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2010 Entry ID: 3631763
-2-

meet or equal the requirements of any listing; that her subjective complaints were not

entirely credible; and that based on a vocational expert’s response to the ALJ’s

hypothetical, Sledge’s mental residual functional capacity (RFC) and physical RFC

did not preclude her past relevant work as a data-entry worker, and further, she could

perform specified unskilled sedentary jobs existing in substantial numbers. The

Appeals Council denied review, and the district court summarily affirmed. Following

de novo review of the record, see Davidson v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 838, 841-42 (8th Cir.

2009), we affirm.

Contrary to Sledge’s primary assertions of error, we conclude that the ALJ gave

good reasons for discounting the low global-assessment-of-functioning ratings of

Sledge’s treating mental health providers. See Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 937

(8th Cir. 2006) (ALJ may elect in certain circumstances not to give controlling weight

to treating physician’s opinion, as record must be evaluated as whole; for treating

physician’s opinion to have controlling weight, it must be supported by medically

acceptable diagnostic techniques and not be inconsistent with other substantial

evidence in case record; physician’s own inconsistency may diminish or eliminate

weight accorded to his opinion). We also conclude that the ALJ’s mental RFC

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See

Davidson, 578 F.3d at 844 (ALJ should determine RFC based on all relevant

evidence, including medical records, observations of treating physicians and others,

and claimant’s own description of her limitations). We reject as meritless Sledge’s

other arguments for reversal. Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 08-3990 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/05/2010 Entry ID: 3631763