Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02084/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Penny Jillean Christenson
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2084

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa.

Penny Jillean Christenson, *

*

Appellee. * 

___________

Submitted: November 16, 2004

Filed: April 13, 2005

___________

Before SMITH, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

The United States appeals the sentence of Penny J. Christenson, arguing that

the district court1

 abused its discretion by departing downward 75 percent for

"substantial assistance." Jurisdiction being proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) and 28

U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

Christenson was indicted for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846.

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She pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. At sentencing, Christenson faced

a 240-month mandatory minimum sentence. Absent it, her sentencing range was 135

to 168 months. The government, in its sole discretion, moved for a downward

departure based on Christenson's substantial assistance in investigating and

prosecuting others. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The government

recommended a 10 percent departure, to 216 months. Defense counsel proposed a 40

percent departure, to 144 months. The district court sentenced Christenson to 60

months in prison.

While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory. See United States v. Booker, 125

S. Ct. 738, 756-57 (2005). The guideline range "no longer dictates the final

sentencing result but instead is an important factor that the sentencing court is to

consider along with the factors contained in § 3553(a) in reaching the sentencing

result." United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005), citing

Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65. A sentencing court must consider the guidelines,

determine the applicable range, but may depart from the suggested guideline range.

United States v. Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at *7 (5th Cir. Mar. 4, 2005). Sentences

are reviewed for unreasonableness. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765-66. The standard

guiding unreasonableness is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id.

First, this court considers the advisory guidelines, under which substantial

assistance departures are constrained by U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Melendez v. United

States, 518 U.S. 120, 129 (1996). Section 5K1.1 provides:

Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided

substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another

person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the

guidelines.

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(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for

reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to,

consideration of the following:

(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of

the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the

government's evaluation of the assistance rendered;

(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any

information or testimony provided by the defendant;

(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;

(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the

defendant or his family resulting from his assistance;

(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.

At sentencing, the government explained that Christenson immediately

admitted her involvement, was indicted and began to cooperate, debriefed, gave

corroborative testimony before the grand jury for the indictment of one defendant,

and tried to work actively for a controlled buy of methamphetamine. Defense counsel

added: "she did give some information about a house on Ingleside which did lead to

– which we believe led to some arrests and at least the police officers watching that

house."

The judge announced the sentence. The government objected to the extent of

the departure in light of her cooperation. The judge stated, "Okay. Well, I made my

decision based on my evaluation of the 5K factors, so anything further?" The

government responded, "No, Your Honor."

The government argues that the district court owed deference to its

recommended 10 percent departure. True, the commentary to section 5K1.1 directs

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that "substantial weight" be given to the government's evaluation of the extent of the

assistance. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, cmt. n.3. The sentencing court must give serious

consideration to the government's evaluation, but it is certainly not controlling.

United States v. Pizano, No. 04-1348, at 8 (8th Cir. 2005). The court determines the

appropriate reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a); United States v. Castellanos, 904

F.2d 1490, 1497 (11th Cir. 1990).

The government made Christenson eligible for a substantial assistance

departure and – in its sole discretion – opened the door to the departure. The record

indicates that the district court seriously considered the government's

recommendation before arriving at its own evaluation of the significance and

usefulness of Christenson's assistance. To depart, a court must have "reasons" that

shall be "stated." See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a). In this case, the

court stated that it evaluated the section 5K1.1 factors. This is not a case where the

court considered irrelevant factors. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, cmt. background.

Thus, considering the advisory guidelines, the district court arrived at a 60-

month sentence, which this court reviews for unreasonableness. Important in this

case are the "characteristics of the defendant." See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). As

discussed, Christenson cooperated sufficiently that the government opened the door

to the lighter sentence it now appeals. In light of her cooperation, it is not

unreasonable to conclude five years in prison reflects a serious offense, promotes

respect for the law, provides just punishment, deters criminal conduct, and protects

the public from further crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C). By the section

3553(a) factors, Christenson's 60-month sentence is not unreasonable.

Christenson's sentence is distinguishable from the sentences reversed in United

States v. Dalton, No. 04-1361 (8th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Haack, No. 04-

1594 (8th Cir. 2005). Like Christenson, Dalton debriefed and testified before a grand

jury. However, Dalton's cooperation clearly ended when she absconded while on

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pretrial release. Dalton, No. 04-1361, at 5. And the district court did not explain on

the record that it evaluated the section 5K1.1 factors. Id.

Unlike Christenson, the defendant in Haack did not attempt to work actively

for a controlled drug buy, or give grand jury testimony. See Haack, No. 04-1594, at

14-15. Further, the sentencing judge there made comments indicating it "departed,

at least in part, based upon the improper factor of dissatisfaction with the sentencing

guidelines, and not solely on the defendant's cooperation." Id. at 15. Here, there are

no such comments.

The sentence is affirmed.

_____________________________

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