Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-36026/USCOURTS-ca9-12-36026-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aircraft Service International Inc
Appellee
International Brotherhood of Teamsters AFL CIO Local 117

Alex Popescu
Appellant
Jonathan Rosenblum
Appellant
Working Washington
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AIRCRAFT SERVICE INTERNATIONAL

INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF

TEAMSTERS AFL CIO LOCAL 117,

Defendant,

and

WORKING WASHINGTON; ALEX

POPESCU; JONATHAN ROSENBLUM,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 12-36026

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-01729-

JLR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 8, 2013—Seattle, Washington

Filed January 10, 2014

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith;

Dissent by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

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2 ASI V. IBT

SUMMARY*

Labor Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s issuance of a

preliminary strike injunction brought under the Railway

Labor Act against “carrier employees” of an aircraft service

provider.

The panel held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not

withdraw jurisdiction from the district court to enjoin the

strike, which grew out of a labor dispute, because the Railway

Labor Act is recognized as an exception to the NLGA’s

jurisdiction-stripping provisions.

The panel concluded that the carrier employees had an

enforceable duty under section 2 First of the RLA to

diligently strive to make and maintain agreements and settle

all disputes. The panel held that section 2 First does not

merely set forth a policy and does not apply only to unionized

carrier employees. The panel held that the employees’

decision to strike before appointing a representative and

attempting to collectively bargain under the procedures of the

RLA was a violation of their duty in section 2 First. 

Accordingly, the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction was

proper.

The panel held that the strike injunction was not

overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. Given the

district court’s reasonable finding that the balance of the

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ASI V. IBT 3

equities favored the employer because permitting the strike

would essentially shut down an airport, the panel held that

preliminarily enjoining the employees’ strike was not an

abuse of discretion.

Dissenting, Judge M. Smith wrote that the injunction

should be vacated because the employees violated no express

provision of the RLA, and before seeking an injunction, the

employer failed to satisfy the condition precedent in section

8 of the NLGA by failing first to make all reasonable effort

to settle the parties’ dispute.

COUNSEL

Dmitri Iglitzin, Schwerin Campbell Barnard Iglitzin &Lavitt,

LLP, Seattle, Washington; David P. Dean (argued), Kathy L.

Krieger, Darin M. Dalmat, and Daniel M. Rosenthal, James

& Hoffman, P.C., Washington, D.C., for DefendantsAppellants.

Douglas W. Hall, FordHarrison LLP, Washington, D.C., for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

To avoid interruptions to interstate commerce, the

Railway Labor Act treats labor relations in the national

transportation industry differently from more generally

applicable labor law. Section 152 First of the Railway Labor

Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (“section 2 First”), imposes a duty

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4 ASI V. IBT

on all carrier employees to engage in the Act’s labor dispute

resolution procedures before ceasing to perform their work.

Because the employees of Aircraft Service International are

carrier employees, they must comply with the Act. Because

they are subject to this obligation, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in issuing the strike injunction. The

injunction did not violate the employees’ or other defendants’

First Amendment rights; it furthered the important

governmental interest of regulating the economic relationship

between labor and management and was no greater than

essential to the furtherance of that interest.

Facts and Procedural History

Air Craft Service International, Inc., doing business as Air

Craft Service International Group (“ASIG”), provides air

craft services at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (“SeaTac”). As part of such services, ASIG refuels approximately

75 percent of the airplanes at Sea-Tac.

On September 14, 2012, ASIG indefinitelysuspended one

of its employees, Alex Popescu. The parties dispute the

reasons for his suspension. ASIG alleges it suspended

Popescu for “inappropriate behavior, including screaming

obscenities at his supervisor.” Popescu and other ASIG

employees counter that he was suspended “in retaliation for

his leadership on workplace safetyissues, including testifying

at a public hearing for the Seattle Port Commission.” The

Seattle Port Commission hearing was held two days prior to

his suspension and was Popescu’s second appearance before

the Commission.

After Popescu’s suspension, other ASIG employees at

Sea-Tac (“Employees”) decided to organize “a group

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ASI V. IBT 5

response” to advocate for Popescu’s reinstatement. In

organizing this response, Jonathan Rosenblum of

Working Washington

1

became heavily involved in this

employer/employee dispute. After approximately two weeks

of failed efforts to gain Popescu’s reinstatement, the

Employees decided “by an overwhelming majority” to strike

for up to eight hours on some future date.

WorkingWashington announced the Employees’ decision

to strike at an October 3, 2012 press conference, even though

no strike date was set. After the press conference, ASIG

immediately filed a complaint in the United States District

Court for the Western District of Washington against the

International Brotherhood of Teamsters’ local chapter,

Teamsters Local 117;2 Working Washington; Jonathan

Rosenblum; Alex Popescu; and unnamed ASIG employees.

In the complaint, ASIG requested a temporary restraining

1

Jonathan Rosenblum has been “a union and community organizer since

1984.” During the time of this dispute, he functioned as the Campaign

Director for Working Washington.

Working Washington describes itself as “a coalition of individuals,

neighborhood associations, immigrant groups, labor unions, civil rights

organizations, and people of faith united in support of quality jobs and a

fair economy.” Working Washington claims extensive ties to various

employee groups at Sea-Tac, including baggage handlers, passenger

service workers, ground transportation employees, taxicab drivers, cargo

handlers, and fuelers. It has organized various efforts “to advocate for

safety and respect on the job” at Sea-Tac, among other places.

Working Washington is not a labor union and has not been selected

by ASIG’s Employees to represent them.

2 Teamsters Local 117 was initially implicated in ASIG’s complaint,

though eventually the parties stipulated to its dismissal.

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order, a preliminary injunction, and a declaratory judgment

for a permanent injunction to enjoin the strike as unlawful

under the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”).

The district court issued a temporary restraining order on

October 5, 2012, prohibiting all Defendants from striking or

encouraging a strike at Sea-Tac. The order sought to

“maintain the status quo pending the outcome of a hearing to

determine whether a preliminary injunction should issue.”

After a full hearing on October 17, 2012, the district court

concluded that preliminary injunctive relief was proper,

applying the factors in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense

Counsel, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The Court issued the

following strike injunction:

Alex Popescu, Working Washington,

Jonathan Rosenblum, and John Does 1-100,

and their officers, agents, employees, and

members are hereby preliminarily enjoined

from in any manner or by any means

directing, calling, causing, authorizing,

inducing, instigating, conducting, continuing,

encouraging, or engaging in any strike, work

stoppage, sick-out, slow-down, work-to-rule

campaign, or other concerted action in

violation of the RLA which is intended to

interfere with [ASIG’s] normal operations.

(footnote omitted).

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must

establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an

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ASI V. IBT 7

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.

Reviewing the district court decision as to the first Winter

factor, the district court reasoned that the text and purposes of

the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (in

particular section 2 First), support ASIG’s position that air

carrier “employees are never permitted to strike as a first

step.” The district court also concluded the second factor was

satisfied, “because the threat of irreparable harm is largely

self-evident from the underlying facts of the case. In essence,

Defendants are threatening to shut down SeaTac Airport.” In

balancing the equities, the district court found for ASIG, as

“[a]n improperly granted injunction would . . . merely delay[]

resolution of [the Defendants’] dispute with [ASIG].” Id.

Finally, the court reasoned that the fourth Winter factor

favored ASIG: “an unlawful strike would plainly be contrary

to the public interest,” while “an injunction might prevent

commerce from being severely disrupted.”

Popescu, Rosenblum, and WorkingWashington appealed

the temporary restraining order and preliminary strike

injunction. In the appeal, they challenge the district court’s

exercise of jurisdiction over the dispute. They also contend

the breadth of the injunction violates their First Amendment

rights.

Standard of Review

“We review de novo a district court’s exercise of subject

matter jurisdiction.” Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Int’l

Bhd. of Teamsters Local 174, 203 F.3d 703, 707 (9th Cir.

2000). If we find the district court properly exercised

jurisdiction, we will “review the district court’s decision to

grant . . . a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Our

review is limited and deferential.” Sw. Voter Registration

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Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003)

(internal citations omitted). That being said, “[t]he district

court’s interpretation of the underlying legal principles . . . is

subject to de novo review.” Id. In sum, the preliminary

injunction will be upheld unless the district court “abused its

discretion or based its decision on an erroneous legal standard

or clearly erroneous findings of fact.” E.E.O.C. v. Recruit

U.S.A., Inc., 939 F.2d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 1991).

Discussion

I. The Federal District Court has Jurisdiction over this

Labor Dispute

Generally, the Norris-LaGuardia Act (“NLGA”)

withdraws jurisdiction from federal courts to enjoin strikes

“growing out of any labor dispute.” 29 U.S.C. § 104(a).

Enacted in 1932, the NLGA “was designed primarily to

protect working men in the exercise of organized, economic

power, which is vital to collective bargaining.” Bhd. of R.R.

Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40

(1957). Thus, “Congress acted to prevent the injunctions of

the federal courts from upsetting the natural interplay of the

competing economic forces of labor and capital.” Id.

However, the NLGA “does not deprive the federal court

of jurisdiction to enjoin compliance with various mandates of

the Railway Labor Act.” Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of

Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 445 (1987) (quotation

marks omitted). Though enacted six years prior to the NLGA,

the RLA has been recognized as an exception to the NLGA’s

jurisdiction stripping provisions, because Congress sought to

“channel[] the[] economic forces” the NLGA sought to

protect, “in matters dealing with railway labor, into special

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ASI V. IBT 9

processes. . . .” Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &

Ind. R. Co., 353 U.S. at 41. This channeling recognized “the

failure of voluntary machinery to resolve a large number” of

railway labor disputes “serious enough to threaten disruption

of transportation.” Id. at 40. Indeed, Congress enacted the

RLA after “decades of labor unrest that persistently revealed

the shortcomings of every legislative attempt to address the

problems.” Burlington N. R.R. Co., 481 U.S. at 444. Through

the Act, Congress sought to “protect the public from the

injuries and losses consequent upon any impairment or

interruption of interstate commerce through failures of

managers and employees to settle peaceably their

controversies.” Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601,

609 (1959) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.,

p.1).

Only ten years after its enactment, Congress “extended

[the RLA] in 1936 to cover the airline industry.” Hawaiian

Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994) (citing

45 U.S.C. §§181–188). Congress’s “general aim was to

extend to air carriers and their employees the same benefits

and obligations available and applicable in the railroad

industry.”3Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Cent. Airlines, Inc.,

372 U.S. 682, 685 (1963). This move aligned with Congress’s

longstanding concern of “minimizing interruptions in the

Nation’s transportation services by strikes and labor

disputes.” Id. at 687.

3

“The 1936 amendments made applicable to the airlines all of the

provisions of the Railway Labor Act, excepting § 3, 45 U.S.C. § 153,

dealing with the National Railroad Adjustment Board.” Int’l Ass’n of

Machinists v. Cent. Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 685 (1963). Section 3 is not

relevant to this case.

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Given this history, the RLA “cannot be appreciated apart

from the environment out of which it came and the purposes

which it was designed to serve.” Burlington N. R.R. Co.,

481 U.S. at 444. Congress explicitly stated the RLA’s

purposes in the text of the statute itself:

(1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or

to the operation of any carrier engaged

therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon

freedom of association among employees or

any denial, as a condition of employment or

otherwise, of the right of employees to join a

labor organization; (3) to provide for the

complete independence of carriers and of

employees in the matter of self-organization

to carry out the purposes of this chapter; (4) to

provide for the prompt and orderly settlement

of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules,

or working conditions; (5) to provide for the

prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes

growing out of grievances or out of the

interpretation or application of agreements

covering rates of pay, rules, or working

conditions.

45 U.S.C. § 151a. First and foremost, Congress was

concerned about preventing “any” interruptions to interstate

commerce, because of the pivotal role that railways and air

carriers play in the national economy. Id. Further, Congress

made clear its interest in “prompt and orderly” resolution of

“all” labor disputes. Id. In sum, Congress enacted the RLA to

eliminate interruptions to interstate commerce caused by

labor disputes between carriers and their employees.

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These purposes find application in section 2 First of the

RLA, wherein Congress mandated that:

It shall be the duty of all carriers, their

officers, agents, and employees to exert every

reasonable effort to make and maintain

agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and

working conditions, and to settle all disputes,

whether arising out of the application of such

agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any

interruption to commerce or to the operation

of any carrier growing out of any dispute

between the carrier and the employees

thereof.

45 U.S.C. § 152 First.

Section 2 First imposes this duty on all carrier employees.

Nothing in this section supports reading “all carriers[’] . . .

employees” to mean anything other than “all carriers’

employees.” In defining “employee” for purposes of the

RLA, section 1 Fifth confirms this was Congress’s intent:

employee means “every person in the service of a carrier . . .

who performs any work defined as that of an employee or

subordinate official.” Id. at § 151 Fifth. Considering this text,

it is an inescapable conclusion that, when the RLA references

all carrier employees, that is precisely what Congress meant.

See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 951

(9th Cir. 2009) (“The preeminent canon of statutory

interpretation requires us to presume that the legislature says

in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says

there.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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At oral argument before this panel, the Employees

conceded they were carrier employees, as defined in the

RLA. As far as section 2 First is concerned, that is the end of

the matter. They have a duty to diligently strive to make and

maintain agreements and settle all disputes. See 45 U.S.C.

§ 152 First. Striking without even attempting to appoint a

representative and collectively bargain violates this duty.

Here, the Employees have made no attempt to engage in the

RLA’s procedures—the very mechanism designed by

Congress to resolve carrier labor disputes. See Int’l Ass’n of

Machinists v. State, 367 U.S. 740, 760 (1961).

Notwithstanding the apparent clarity of this provision in

its application to all carrier employees, the Employees argue

the RLA does not provide federal jurisdiction over this

dispute, because they have no enforceable duty under

section 2 First. Instead, they first contend that section 2 First

is only a policy, not an independent obligation. Second, they

argue that, even if more than a policy, it only applies to

unionized carrier employees.4 Neither contention has merit.

The Employees first argue that section 2 First is a mere

policy mobilized only by other RLA provisions. Their

argument continues that the RLA’s other provisions only

address resolving disputes over forming collective

agreements (major disputes), interpreting such agreements

(minor disputes), and appointing a representative

(representation disputes). See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v.

Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378 (1969) (major

disputes); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind.

4 ASIG’s Employees are not unionized, and they have not selected

Working Washington, which purports to speak for them, as their union or

representative.

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R.R. Co., 353 U.S. at 33 (minor disputes); 45 U.S.C. § 152

Third, Fourth, and Ninth (representation disputes). Given

their disinterest in all of the above, they argue the RLA does

not compel them to do anything.

This argument is fatally flawed for two reasons. First, the

Chicago & North Western Court explicitly rejected this

narrow view of section 2 First previously advanced in Gen.

Comm. of Adjustment of Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs for Mo.-

Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R. Co., 320 U.S. 323, 334

(1943) [hereinafter “M-K-T”]. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v.

United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 578 (1971) (“In light of

the place of § 2 First in the scheme of the Railway Labor Act,

the legislative history of that section, and the decisions

interpreting it, the passing reference to it in the M-K-T case

cannot bear the weight which the Court of Appeals sought to

place upon it.”).5Instead of being “a mere statement of policy

or exhortation to the parties,” section 2 First “was designed

to be a legal obligation.” Id. at 577. This circuit has likewise

found that section 2 First imposes an independent, mandatory

duty enforceable by the courts. See Reg’l Airline Pilots Ass’n

v. Wings W. Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1399, 1402–03 (9th Cir.

1990); accord, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots

Ass’n, Int’l, 238 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2001) (“It is

clear that the substantive legal duty of 45 U.S.C. § 152 First,

is a ‘specific provision’ of the RLA and, moreover, is central

5 Our respected colleague’s dissent fails to recognize this. Dissent at

33–34. We are “wholly rel[ying] on the Court’s subsequent holding” in

Chicago & North Western, dissent at 34, because that Court explicitly

rejected the M-K-T Court’s interpretation ofsection 2 First upon which the

dissent so heavily relies. The Chicago & North Western Court also

confirmed that Virginian Railway Company v. System Federation No. 40,

300 U.S. 515 (1937) “considered and affirmed” that section 2 First

imposes an independent, enforceable duty. 402 U.S. at 579.

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to the purpose and functioning of the RLA.”); Int’l Ass’n of

Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 839 F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1988)

(recognizing section 2 First as an “independent duty”).

Second, section 2 First’s text also condemns the

Employees’ narrow view. All carrier employees have a

specific duty to “exert every reasonable effort to make and

maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and

working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising

out of the application of such agreements or otherwise . . . .”

45 U.S.C. § 152 First (emphasis added). Thus, carrier

employees have a clear duty to “make” agreements, not just

maintain preexisting ones. Perhaps this obligation could be

cast as reaffirming the major and minor dispute resolution

procedures for cases dealing with forming and interpreting

collective agreements, respectively. But the presence of “or

otherwise” demonstrates Congress’s intent to require labor

disputes to be settled even if they do not fit into the major or

minor resolution mechanisms. See Tabor v. Ulloa, 323 F.2d

823, 824 (9th Cir. 1963) (“[A] legislature is presumed to have

used no superfluous words.”). Further, nothing in “or

otherwise” limits its application to representation disputes

only. Rather, “or otherwise” underscores the plain language

in the obligation to “exert every reasonable effort” to “settle

all disputes.” 45 U.S.C. § 152 First.

Accordingly, section 2 First is more than a policy gloss on

the RLA’s other provisions. Section 1a sets forth the RLA’s

purposes and provides the policy. But in section 2, Congress

enumerated duties, the first of which is section 2 First, “the

heart of the Railway Labor Act.” Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v.

Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. at 377–78. Congress

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intended section 2 First to be taken at its terms as a duty. See

Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 951.

The Second Circuit extended this line of reasoning in

Summit Airlines v. Teamsters Local Union No. 295. 628 F.2d

787 (2d Cir. 1980). The airline refused to recognize a union

as their employees’ bargaining representative, and the union

tried to force recognition through economic coercion. Id. at

789. When the airline sought injunctive relief under the RLA,

the union argued that the court had no jurisdiction, because

the union had not violated any duty in the RLA. Id. In

rejecting this argument, the Second Circuit noted that

section 2 First represented a “general obligation of both the

carriers and their employees to attempt in good faith to

resolve all disputes without resort to economic coercion.” Id.

Further, it found that the representation dispute resolution

procedures of section 2 Ninth were compulsory, even though

in that case the dispute was between the carrier and the

employees rather than between competing employee

representatives. Id. at 795 n.4. In so holding, the court

reasoned that a contrary position would render sections 2

First and Ninth meaningless. See id. at 794–95. We find this

reasoning persuasive and applicable to interpreting carrier

employees’ obligations under section 2 First; a legal

obligation sufficient to channel carrier labor disputes into the

RLA’s various dispute resolution procedures. See also e.g.,In

re Nw. Airlines Corp., 483 F.3d 160, 168, 174–75 (2d Cir.

2007) (enjoining employees’ strike even though the parties’

CBA was abrogated in bankruptcy, because section 2 First is

a separate duty that “operates independently of the RLA’s

status quo provisions”).

In their second argument, the Employees contend that,

even if section 2 First represents more than a policy, it only

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applies to unionized carrier employees. This view is

inconsistent with the text of section 2 First, which applies to

“all carriers[’] . . . employees.” 45 U.S.C. § 152 First. While

the import of this conclusion is to push carrier employees

contemplating collective action into the RLA’s procedures,

such is as Congress intended.

The Supreme Court made clear that “Congress has given

the unions a clearly defined and delineated role to play in

effectuatingthe basic congressional policyof stabilizing labor

relations in the industry.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street,

367 U.S. 740, 760 (1961). “The Railway Labor Act was

passed . . . to encourage collective bargaining by [carriers]

and their employees in order to prevent, if possible, wasteful

strikes and interruptions of interstate commerce.” Detroit &

T.S.L.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148

(1969); see also Tex. & N.O.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S.

Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 565 (1930) (“[T]he major purpose of

Congress in passing the Railway Labor Act was to provide a

machinery to prevent strikes.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Further, collective bargaining has been described

as “the method of settling [carrier labor] disputes.” Int’l Ass’n

of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 760 (emphasis added).

Thus, while the RLA “does not undertake to compel

agreement between the employer and employees, . . . it does

command those preliminary steps without which no

agreement can be reached.” Virginian Ry., 300 U.S. at 548.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court and this circuit have

plumbed the depths of section 2 First. It is not meant to reach

disputes between a carrier and an individual employee. See

Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 255; Williams v. Jacksonville

Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386, 400 (1942). Similarly, section 2

First does not create a private right of action for employees

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ASI V. IBT 17

trying to force a union and carrier to comply with the RLA’s

procedures. Herring v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 894 F.2d 1020,

1022–23 (9th Cir. 1989). Congress instead meant the RLA for

collective disputes directly between the carrier and its

employees. See id. at 1022.

These decisions raise no red flags with respect to the

interpretation of section 2 First here advanced. Section 2 First

clearly applies to all carrier employees, and it imposes upon

them an obligation to “exert every reasonable effort” to make

labor agreements and settle labor disputes. The provisions of

the RLA provide the preliminary mechanism for doing so.

Failure to perceive this connection between section 2 First’s

duty and the RLA’s procedures would allow carrier

employees to leverage their critical role in interstate

commerce and exploit it in their quest for concessions. Such

would contravene the RLA’s purposes, as clearly stated in the

text. See 45 U.S.C. § 151a.

Therefore, the Employees’ decision to strike before

appointing a representative and attempting to collectively

bargain under the procedures of the RLA is a violation of

their duty in section 2 First. Instead, the Employees must

appoint a representative according to section 2 Third, Fourth,

and Ninth (if necessary).

6 With a representative, they can then

get down to settling their dispute with ASIG and shouldering

6 The dissent mischaracterizes our opinion as requiring unionization.

Dissent at 33, 36, 37. The RLA’s dispute resolution procedures can only

be navigated by party representatives. See e.g., 45 U.S.C. § 152 Second,

Fourth, Sixth. Therefore, appointing a representative is required before

carrier employees are permitted to strike. While the RLA does not require

carrier employees to form or join a labor union, it does require them to

appoint a representative before striking.

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their duty under section 2 First.7 Only if the parties properly

proceed through the applicable RLA “procedures and remain

at loggerheads, they may resort to self-help in attempting to

resolve their dispute. . . .” Burlington N. R.R. Co., 481 U.S. at

445; see also Paul M. Schmidt, Comment, Trans World

Airlines v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants:

Introducing a New Economic Weapon into the Labor Law

Arena, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1061, 1079 (1990) (“Because the

RLA was enacted out of a strong congressional concern for

‘uninterrupted commerce,’ procedural mechanisms were

inserted in the RLA to achieve that end.”).8

7 Our dissenting colleague argues that we have created an “impossible

burden” for the Employees, because (1) the National Mediation Board

declined to mediate their dispute, dissent at 37–38, and (2) appointing a

representative would be difficult, dissent at 38 n.11. However, the NMB

did not decline to mediate, because the employees were incapable of

appointing a representative. Dissent at 37. Instead, the NMB told the

Employees that it only resolves disputes between “carriers and the

designated bargaining representatives of their employees.” Thus, the

advice, that the NMB told the Employees, complies with the law as

outlined herein.

Second, the dissent’s concerns about the Employees’ ability to

appoint a representative are premature at this point in the dispute. The

employees have not attempted to appoint one. Likewise, the dissent’s

citation to the NMB opinion, dissent at 38 n.11 (citing 40 NMB No. 13),

ignores the fact that that case involved a representation dispute between

two competing representatives. Predicting such a dispute would arise ifthe

Employees attempt to appoint a representative is also premature.

8 The dissent seems to argue that if section 2 First imposes this duty, the

Employees have somehow satisfied it through seeking Rosenblum’s

reinstatement and asking the NMB to mediate their dispute. Dissent at 38.

However, given the text, purposes, and structure of the RLA, these efforts

do not satisfy their duty under section 2 First.

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Finding certain aspects of the RLA compulsory is not

unprecedented. See e.g., Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R.

& Ind. R., 353 U.S. at 39 (finding arbitration under section 3

compulsory); Summit Airlines, 628 F.2d at 794 (holding that

section 2 Ninth is compulsory). Further, the facts of this case

are distinguishable from the Fifth Circuit’s discussion in

Russell v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 714 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1983).

The Employees are not trying to deal individually with

management. Rather, their decision to strike is the epitome of

collective action. In Russell, the Fifth Circuit reversed a

decision by the National Mediation Board denying

certification to an individual as class representative of carrier

employees. Id. at 1341. The Board denied the individual’s

application, because he planned to abrogate all existing

collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 1336. In rejecting the

Board’s argument that section 2 First requires carrier

employees to engage in collective bargaining, the court noted

that the RLA “supports but does not require collective

bargaining.” Id. at 1343. Rather, “[i]f the employees do not

wish to organize, prefer to deal individually with

management . . . why, that course, is left open to them, or it

should be.” Id. (quoting H.R. 7650, House Committee on

Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 57

(1934)). In the instant case, however, the Employees are not

attempting to deal individuallywith management; they intend

to strike. When carrier employees have such an intention,

they may do so only if they have followed the RLA and

carried their duties under it. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 481 U.S.

at 445.

Further, our interpretation of the RLA does not permit

“freewheeling judicial interference in labor relations of the

sort that called forth the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the first

place.” Chicago & N.W., 402 U.S. at 583. In Chicago &

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North Western, the Supreme Court underscored the propriety

of a strike injunction where carrier employees are only “going

through the motions” in complying with the RLA’s

procedures and yet threaten a strike. 402 U.S. at 575, 578. In

such a circumstance, enjoining the strike would be “the only

practical, effective means” to enforce compliance with

section 2 First. Id. at 583.

Here, the Employees are unwilling to even “go through

the motions” under the RLA; rather, they wish not to bargain

but to strike. In so doing, they present the very situation for

which Congress enacted the RLA: carrier employees

collectively threatening a strike capable of single-handedly

interrupting interstate commerce by shutting down an airport.

See e.g., Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,

394 U.S. at 378 (A dispute that “threatens substantially to

interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive

any section of the country of essential transportation service”

is of the kind envisioned by the Act to be enjoined. (internal

quotation marks omitted)) (speaking in context of major

dispute resolution procedures). The purposes of the RLA, as

stated in the text, would be thwarted were the strike not

enjoined. See 45 U.S.C. § 151a. Indeed, the formal

procedures of the RLA were enacted to prevent this precise

interruption to interstate commerce from occurring.

Accordingly, the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction

and issuance of the strike injunction are hardly

“freewheeling”; they have the support of the RLA and

Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. See id; Chicago

& N.W., 402 U.S. at 583; Reg’l Airline Pilots Ass’n, 915 F.2d

at 1402 (Under the RLA, “the federal courts’ obligation is to

oversee the broad structure of the process and prevent major

deviations. . . .”). Simply because a group of carrier

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employees does not meet the typical unionized mold does not

mean Congress intended their strike to be above the law.

Next, Appellants argue that, if the Employees were

allowed to strike, ASIG would also be entitled to engage in

self help, i.e., through firing employees or giving and then

withdrawing concessions. But such an arrangement does not

mean the RLA’s purposes are being preserved or its text

honored. It is hard to think of a situation in this context more

harmful to interstate commerce.9 Thus, we come full circle:

in interpreting section 2 First, the RLA’s text-based purposes

illuminate its meaning. We are not second-guessing the text

with snippets of drafters’ comments. Rather, Congress chose

to express its collective intent by specifying the Act’s

purposes in its text. Thus, any ambiguity in section 2 First can

be resolved with a glance to the RLA’s stated purposes. See

Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863,

877 (9th Cir. 2001). Specifically, finding no duty under the

RLA applicable to the Employees here would offend the

9 Furthermore, commentators and courts have recognized that the RLA’s

dispute resolution process “is ‘purposely long and drawn out, based on the

hope that reason and practical considerations will provide in time an

agreement that resolves the dispute.’” Harvey R. Miller, Michele J.

Meises, Christopher Marcus, The State of the Unions in Reorganization

and Restructuring Cases, 15 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 465, 470 (2007)

(quoting Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 384 U.S. 238,

246 (1966)). “‘[D]elaying the time when the parties can resort to self-help

provides time for tempers to cool, helps create an atmosphere in which

rational bargaining can occur, and permits the forces of public opinion to

be mobilized in favor of a settlement without a strike or lockout.’” Id. at

471 (quoting Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co., 396 U.S. at 150).

Permitting an immediate strike (and consequent interruption to interstate

commerce), simply because carrier employees refuse to appoint a

bargaining representative or make a collective bargaining agreement, is

inconsistent with this aim of the RLA as well.

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purposes of eliminating interruptions to interstate commerce

and promptly settling all carrier labor disputes. It would also

be inconsistent with section 2 First’s text.

The employees contend that the dearth of cases like this

one supports their interpretation of section 2 First. However,

the fact, that neither the Supreme Court nor this circuit have

ever directly answered the question posed by the parties,

supports the result we reach. Disputes under the RLA usually

involve carrier employees who have unionized or have at

least appointed a representative. Indeed, a case like the instant

one is rare. But this is probably because carrier employees

usually unionize. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street,

367 U.S. at 750 (The “railway industry is marked . . . by a

strong and long-standing tradition of voluntary unionism on

the part of the standard rail unions.”). The rarity of disputes

like this one may also indicate that the RLA is accomplishing

its purposes by channeling labor disputes through its

procedures. The statutory text and case law confirm this was

Congress’s intent in enacting the RLA.

Finally, section Eight of the NLGA does not strip the

district court of jurisdiction. Rather, it prohibits issuing a

restraining order or injunction in favor of a:

complainant who has failed to comply with

any obligation imposed by law which is

involved in the labor dispute in question, or

who has failed to make every reasonable

effort to settle such dispute either by

negotiation or with the aid of any available

governmental machinery of mediation or

voluntary arbitration.

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29 U.S.C. § 108. Because a specific RLA duty applies in this

controversy, the NLGA does not control its resolution. See

Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n,

491 U.S. 490, 513 (1989) (District courts have “jurisdiction

and power to issue necessary injunctive orders to enforce

compliance with the requirements of the RLA

notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Burlington N. R.R. Co.,

481 U.S. at 444–45 (“In certain limited circumstances, the

Norris-LaGuardia Act does not prevent a court from

enjoining violations of [a] specific mandate of [the RLA].”).

Further, ASIG desires to resolve a dispute with its employees

the way Congress intended—through the procedures of the

RLA. Given our conclusion that the Employees have not

carried their duty under the RLA, ASIG has shirked none of

its duties. For both reasons, this provision does not alter our

conclusion.

Accordingly, we find the district court’s exercise of

jurisdiction in this case proper, because the Employees are

covered by the RLA and have a “legal obligation” with which

they have not complied. See Chicago & N.W., 402 U.S. at

577.

II. Permissibility of the Strike Injunction vis-à-vis the

First Amendment

The Employees and Working Washington contend the

strike injunction, in its breadth, violates their First

Amendment rights. In essence, they challenge the district

court’s application of the third Winter factor, balancing the

equities. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1002

(9th Cir. 2005).

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However, given our conclusion that section 2 First

imposes an obligation upon the Employees under the RLA,

the district court may enjoin certain actions as unlawful. See

Burlington N. R.R., 481 U.S. at 455. More specifically, the

Supreme Court has held that obligations imposed under

section 2 First are “enforceable by whatever appropriate

means might be developed on a case-by-case basis,”

including strike injunctions. Chicago & N.W., 402 U.S. at

577, 583. Considering Congress enacted the RLA to “avoid

any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any

carrier engaged therein,” 45 U.S.C. § 151a, and given the

district court’s reasonable finding that permitting the strike

would essentially shut down the entire Sea-Tac Airport,

enjoining the Employees’ strike was not an abuse of

discretion.

Further, we have been unable to identify any case in the

Supreme Court or any of the courts of appeal invalidating a

strike injunction (authorized under the RLA) because of First

Amendment concerns. To the contrary, the Court has

consistently found that actions inconsistent with national

labor laws are generally not protected by the First

Amendment. See e.g., Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied

Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226 (1982) (secondary boycott

illegal under the NLRA warrants no First Amendment

protection); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S.

694, 704 (1951) (“We find no indication that Congress

thought that the kind of picketing and related conduct which

was used in this case to induce or encourage a strike for an

unlawful object was any less objectionable than engaging

directly in that strike.”); accord Miller v. United Food &

Commercial Workers Union, 708 F.2d 467, 471 (9th Cir.

1983) (“Because of the government’s strong interest in

regulating the economic relationship between labor and

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ASI V. IBT 25

management, Congress may constitutionally enact measures

which impact on the speech element of picketing.”). In so

holding, the Court has surmised that “conduct designed not to

communicate but to coerce merits still less consideration

under the First Amendment.” Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n,

456 U.S. at 226.

Nevertheless, “[t]he freedom of speech and of the press

guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the

liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public

concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent

punishment.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02

(1940). Indeed, “the dissemination of information concerning

the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that

area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.”

Id. at 102.

In Miller v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union,

708 F.2d at 472, this circuit held that a district court could

enjoin informational picketing in the midst of a labor dispute,

given the mixture of speech and conduct, if the injunction

“furthers an important or substantial government interest; if

the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of

free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged

First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to

the furtherance of that interest.” The relief should “promote[]

the purposes of Congress without regard to the content of the

ideas expressed.” Id.

The speech-to-conduct ratio is lower in the context of a

strike than in informational picketing. Further, nothing in the

district court’s preliminary injunction prohibits Popescu, the

Employees, Working Washington and its members, or

Rosenblum from “discuss[ing] publicly and truthfully” the

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facts of the Employees’ labor dispute with ASIG. The strike

injunction merely prohibits the parties from striking or

encouraging a strike at Sea-Tac.

The Employees and Working Washington contend this

injunction impermissibly extends to “constitutionally

protected speech, expressive activity and association—

including, for example, rallies, public demonstrations,

consumer boycotts, banners, signs, leaflets, petitions, press

releases, news broadcasts, interviews, websites and social

media—that could be construed as promoting or encouraging

current or future group action by ASIG employees.”

However, the injunction, by its terms, fails to be as broad as

the Employees and Working Washington make it out to be.

Instead, the injunction is much more limited. Reading it

plainly, the Employees cannot strike against ASIG, and

neither they nor Working Washington may encourage as

much. Other than that, the Employees and Working

Washington mayfreelyexercise their First Amendment rights

in seeking better working conditions at ASIG and anywhere

else. “There are many ways in which [Defendants] may

express their opposition to [ASIG working conditions, etc.]

without infringing upon the rights of others.” Int’l

Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 456 U.S. at 227.

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

finding the balance of the equities favored ASIG and issuing

the strike injunction.

III. Conclusion

Because the Employees have breached their duty under

section 2 First of the RLA, the district court properly

exercised jurisdiction and enjoined the Employees’ strike.

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the

strike injunction against the Employees and Working

Washington. The district court’s judgment is therefore

AFFIRMED.

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.1 The majority concludes that

Section 2, First of the Railway Labor Act (RLA),245 U.S.C.

§ 152, First (Section 2, First), imposes an unprecedented,

amorphous duty to refrain from striking on the Airline

Services International fuellers (Fuellers), while imposing no

duty to negotiate on Airline Services International (ASIG)

before it sought the injunction at issue in this case, despite the

clear language of Section 8 of the Norris LaGuardia Act

(NLGA), 29 U.S.C. § 108. The injunction upheld by the

majority portends the reinsertion of federal courts into the

“labor injunction business,” Marine Cooks & Stewards, AFL

v. Pan. S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 (1960), in violation of the

language of the NLGA stripping federal courts of the

1 Because I believe that the injunction must be vacated for the reasons

set forth below, I express no opinion with respect to the First Amendment

analysis in the majority opinion.

2 Section 2, First reads: “It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers,

agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and

maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working

conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application

of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to

commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute

between the carrier and the employees thereof.” 45 U.S.C. § 152, First.

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authority to issue injunctions related to labor disputes in most

instances.

I. History

A. History of the NLGA

As the Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he Railway

Labor Act cannot be appreciated apart from the environment

out of which it came and the purposes which it was designed

to serve.” Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way

Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987) (internal quotations

omitted). Towards the end of the nineteenth century and the

beginning of the twentieth, the federal judiciary issued a large

number of labor injunctions. Pejorativelycalled “government

by injunction,” judicial interference in labor relations became

an issue of national importance by the end of the nineteenth

century. See 1 The Developing Labor Law 7 (John E.

Higgins, Jr. & Patrick Hardin eds., 4th ed. 2002). Nearly

every congress between 1894 and 1914 considered proposals

to restrict the judiciary’s injunctive power. See Felix

Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction 163

(New York, 1930).

Congress first attempted to strip federal courts of

jurisdiction to issue labor injunctions when it passed the

Clayton Act in 1914.3 The Supreme Court, however,

3 The Clayton Act states: “No restraining order or injunction shall be

granted by any court of the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof,

in any case between an employer and employees, or between employers

and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and

persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute

concerning terms or conditions of employment . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 52. The

Supreme Court noted over 70 years later that “[t]he language of the

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narrowly construed the Clayton Act in Duplex Printing Press

Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), and “[d]uring the

1920's, courts issued over 2,100 anti-strike decrees . . . .” 

Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor

Movement 1227 (1991). Congress, however, remained

“intent upon taking the federal courts out of the labor

injunction business,” Marine Cooks, 362 U.S. at 369, and it

passed the NLGA, which broadly stripped federal courts of

jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes, in 1934.4

“[I]n passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress described

federal labor injunctions unequivocally as abuses of judicial

power.” Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 203 F.3d 703, 709

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted). As

the Supreme Court later described it, the NLGA was an

“extraordinary step . . . necessary to remedy an extraordinary

problem.” Burlington N. R.R. Co., 481 U.S. at 437.5

Clayton Act was broad enough to encompass all peaceful strike activity.” 

Burlington N. R.R. Co., 481 U.S. at 438.

4

“No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have

jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent

injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in

a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such

restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary

to the public policy declared in this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 101.

5

I, of course, do not suggest that my colleagues in the majority bear any

resemblance to the judges criticized in connection with the passage of the

NLGA. Even though I disagree with their analysis, I acknowledge that

my colleagues hold their views in good faith, and that they are construing

the law as they understand it.

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B. History of the RLA

Congress did not intend to leave a regulatory vacuum in

place of judicial intervention in labor relations. Rather, it

sought to replace ad hoc “government by injunction” with a

means by which carriers and organized labor could amicably

settle their disputes without government intervention, and

without disrupting rail service and the national economy. 

After a number of legislative false starts, representatives of

both the railway carriers and labor unions met to draft a bill

that would be mutually satisfactory.

6 The product of their

cooperation was the RLA. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v.

Street, 367 U.S. 740, 758 (1961) (“It is accurate to say that

the railroads and the railroad unions between them wrote the

Railway Labor Act of 1926 and Congress formally enacted

their agreement.”).7

This history reveals two principles that cut against the

majority’s construction of the RLA. First, courts should be

wary of involving themselves in labor disputes in light of

Congress’s goal of “taking the federal courts out of the labor

injunction business.” Marine Cooks, 362 U.S. at 369. 

6 Unions had gained increased prominence while the railroads were

under federal control due to World War I. See Chris Hollinger, The

Railway Labor Act, ABA Section of Labor and Employment, 49 (2012). 

Due in part to unions’ increased prominence, by the time the federal

government returned the railways to private control in 1920 “about 90%

of the train and engine service employees were organized and about

three-quarters of those in the other classes.” Lloyd K. Garrison, The

National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency,

46 Yale L.J. 567, 570 (1937).

7 The RLA was extended to cover the airline industry in 1936. RLA

§ 201; 45 U.S.C. § 181.

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Second, the RLA represents a compromise between labor and

management, in which each group sacrificed some avenues

of self help in exchange for certain protections. The

majority’s opinion violates both principles.

II. Discussion

A district court “has jurisdiction and power to issue

necessary injunctive orders (to enforce compliance with the

requirements of the Railway Labor Act) notwithstanding the

provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.” Bhd. of R.R.

Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 42

(1957) (citing Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S.

768, 774 (1952)). However, “while federal courts may issue

injunctions in labor disputes to compel the parties to fulfill

their obligations under the RLA, when no such duties exist,

the Norris-LaGuardia Act controls.” Fed. Express Corp. v.

Teamster Union, Local No. 85, of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,

Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers of Am., S.F., Cal.,

617 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). In

determining whether such duties exist, “[t]he specific

provisions of the RailwayLabor Act take precedence over the

more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.” Chi.

R. & I. R. Co., 353 U.S. at 42. A review of the cases applying

these principles shows that labor injunctions in industries

covered by the RLA have been found to be appropriate in two

contexts: first, where parties fail to adhere to a specific duty

in the RLA, including a duty to participate in the RLA’s

dispute resolution procedures;8and second, where parties

8

See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. 481 U.S. at 444 (declining to uphold

a strike injunction because “[t]he RLA’s silence could just as easily

signify an intent to allow the parties to resort to whatever self-help is

legally available at the time a dispute arises”); Va. Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n

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attempt to achieve ends provided for in the RLA without

following the corresponding RLA procedures.9

Thus, the Fuellers “do not need to find a particular

provision in the RLA to justify [striking]. [Instead] [t]he

affected [carrier] must find a specific mandate of the RLA

that prohibits the [strike].” Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v.

Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 914 F.2d 53, 56 (4th Cir.

1990). Further, the RLA mandate underlying the injunction

must be both clear and unambiguous. Burlington N. R.R. Co.,

481 U.S. at 446. (“Faced with a choice between the ambiguity

in the RLA and the unambiguous mandate of the

Norris-LaGuardia Act, we choose the latter.”); See also, e.g.,

Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Int’l. Bhd. of Teamsters,

894 F.2d 36, (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that the RLA did not

impose a specific mandate on employees to refrain from

intermittent work stoppages). In light of the above, the key

question in this case is whether the RLA imposes a clear and

No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 549 (1937) (holding that an employer could be

enjoined for failing to “treat” with an elected representative as required by

Section 2, Ninth of the RLA); Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. 203 F.3d at

713 (holding that courts can issue strike injunctions where “the [RLA]

provides the procedure for resolving the dispute”).

9

See, e.g., Bhd. Of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.

Co., 373 U.S. 33, 41–42 (1963) (holding that permitting strikes aimed at

enforcing arbitration awards stemming from minor disputes would render

“meaningless” the RLA provisions that call for judicial enforcement of

such awards); Chi. R. & I. R. Co., 353 U.S. at 34 (holding that employees

could not strike to protest minor disputes, because allowing employees to

do so would render the RLA’s procedures for addressing minor disputes,

which call for arbitration, meaningless); Summit Airlines, Inc. v.

Teamsters Local Number 295, 628 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that

allowing employees to force recognition of a union by striking would

undermine provisions of the RLA concerning representation disputes).

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unambiguous duty on the Fuellers to refrain from striking. I

conclude that it does not.

A. Section 152, First Does Not Impose a Duty on the

Fuellers to Refrain from Striking

The majority purports to find a clear and unambiguous

duty in Section 2, First. No other court has ever found such

a freestanding duty in that Section. Instead, every court that

has upheld a labor injunction under the auspices of the RLA

has looked to the specific procedures and duties created by

other sections of the RLA. Furthermore, the majority’s

decision conflicts with the Supreme Court’s analysis of

Section 2, First, which clarifies that Section 2 does not

impose duties to engage in or refrain from acts not elaborated

in other sections of the RLA.

As the majority concedes, the non-unionized Fuellers are

not clearly subject to the dispute resolution procedures of the

RLA. Maj. at 16–17 (requiring the Fuellers to unionize in

order to pursue dispute resolution under the RLA). Nor are

they seeking to achieve ends envisioned in the RLA, such as

selecting a bargaining representative or negotiating a

collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Unable to locate a

specific duty in the body of the RLA, the majority is thus

compelled to base its holding on the broad aspirational

language of Section 2, First. This holding creates a third

justification for labor injunctions under the RLA that is both

unprecedented and contrary to the Supreme Court’s

understanding of Section 152, First.

In Virginian Railway, the Supreme Court observed that

“the very words of [s]ection 2, First . . . were taken from

section 301 of the Transportation Act . . . , [and] were held to

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be without legal sanction in that act.” Va. Ry. Co., 300 U.S.

at 544–45 (citing Pa. R.R. Sys. & Allied Lines Fed’n v. Pa.

R.R. Co., 267 U.S. 203, 215 (1925)). While holding that the

RLA imposed obligations on unions and employers, the Court

noted that “these words no longer stand alone and unaided by

mandatory provisions of the statute as they did when first

enacted,” because Section 2, Ninth of the RLA created

mandatory obligations on employers to treat with unions. Id.

Continuing this theme, the Supreme Court held in 1943 that

Section 2, First “merely states the policy which those other

provisions [of the RLA] buttress with more particularized

commands.” Gen. Comm. of Adjustment of Bhd. of

Locomotive Eng’rs. for Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex.

R.R. Co., 320 U.S. 323, 334 (1943) (M-K-T). In other words,

the Court held that Section 2, First is not a freestanding

obligation, but rather a command that parties to a labor

dispute undertake the specific grievance procedures detailed

in the other portions of Section 2, and in the rest of the RLA.

The majority wholly relies on the Court’s subsequent

holding that Section 2, First is “more than a mere statement

of policy or exhortation to the parties; rather, it was designed

to be a legal obligation, enforceable by whatever appropriate

means might be developed on a case-by-case basis.” Chi. &

N. W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 577

(1971). But the independent legal obligation the Court

described in Chicago and North Western was not a new

requirement, but rather a gloss on the duty, already

recognized in M-K-T, to utilize the RLA’s procedures where

applicable. Indeed, the Court explained that Section 2, First’s

duty to “exert every reasonable effort” was essentially a

requirement not to bargain in bad faith or to “go[] through the

motions with a desire not to reach an agreement.” Chicago

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ASI V. IBT 35

& N. W. Ry. Co., 402 U.S. at 578, 579 n.11.10 The Court thus

held that the duty in Section 2, First does not create new

obligations, but instead allows courts to inquire into how

diligently the respective parties have tried to satisfy their

obligations under the other provisions of the Act. See Bhd. of

Maint. of Way Emps. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 358 F.3d 453,

457–58 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme Court has considered

Section 2, First analogous to the ‘duty under the National

Labor Relations Act to bargain in good faith.’” (quoting Chi.

& N.W. Ry. Co., 402 U.S. at 574–75)). Chicago & North

Western thus instructs courts to enforce the duty to bargain in

good faith, as appropriate. It does not give courts license to

invent new duties under that Section, as the majority does

here.

The majority also ignores the fact that the Court in

Chicago & North Western instructed lower courts not to use

that decision to enlarge the scope of Section 2, First. The

Court explicitly cautioned that “great circumspection should

be used in going beyond cases involving [a] desire not to

reach an agreement, for doing so risks infringement of the

strong federal labor policy against governmental interference

with the substantive terms of collective-bargaining

agreements.” Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co., 402 U.S. at 579 n.11

(internal quotations omitted). The Court was also concerned 

that “the vagueness of the obligation under [Section] 2 First

could provide a cover for judicial interference in labor

10 The dissent framed the question presented in Chicago and North

Western as; “to what extent a District Court may inquire into collective

negotiationsin determining whether a party has complied with its statutory

duty.” Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 402 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J.,

dissenting).

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relations of the sort that spawned the Norris-LaGuardia Act

in the first place.” Id. at 583.

Because the majority cannot find a specific duty in the

dispute resolution procedures of the RLA upon which to rest

its case, it improperly relies on the preambular language in

Section 2, First to create an unprecedented, nebulous new

obligation requiring the Fuellers alone to take affirmative

action to bring its disputes with the ASIG within the ambit of

the RLA.

The majority cites a number of cases for the proposition

that “section 2 First imposes an independent, mandatory duty

enforceable by the courts.” Maj. at 13–14. I do not dispute

that Section 2, First creates an mandatory duty. This case

instead concerns the scope of that duty. Indeed, the cases

cited by the majority support reading Section 2, First as

imposing a duty to bargain in good faith under the RLA when

it applies rather than imposing a duty to unionize on

unrepresented workers. See Reg'l Airline Pilots Ass'n v.

Wings W. Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990)

(“RAPA contends that the change in pass benefits after

September 19 [when RAPA was certified as a bargaining

representative] was a violation of section 2, First and Second

because Wings West did not use the bargaining process and,

in fact, distorted the bargaining process by a pre-bargaining

reduction in benefits.”); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line

Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 238 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001)

(finding that Section 2, First imposed a duty on a union to

prevent its members from “collectively disrupt[ing] Delta's

flight operations, in contravention of the CBA . . . , by way of

a no-overtime campaign”); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &

Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

839 F.2d 809, 812–14 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that Section

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ASI V. IBT 37

2, First imposed a duty on management not to unilaterally

change working conditions pending negotiation of a CBA

with a newly certified union).

B. TheMajorityOpinion FundamentallyDisturbsthe

Balance of Interests Contemplated by the RLA

Section 2, First states that all carriers and employees have

a duty to “exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain

agreements . . . and to settle all disputes whether arising out

of the application of such agreements or otherwise . . . .” 

45 U.S.C. § 152, First. The majority concludes that this

means that the Fuellers have an obligation to unionize and

bargain collectively. This reading of Section 2, First clashes

with the plain language of the RLA, which gives employees

the “right to organize and bargain collectively through

representatives of their own choosing.” 45 U.S.C. § 152,

Fourth. Whereas the RLA simply grants employees a right

to organize, the majority imposes an obligation on the

employees to seek unwanted representation.

Furthermore, the majority’s distorted reading of

Section 2, First undermines the compromise between labor

and management inherent in the RLA itself. The majority

holds that the Fuellers may strike only after they have

appointed a representative and attempted to negotiate a CBA. 

Maj. at 17–18. The National Mediation Board (NMB),

however, concluded that the Fuellers were not a “class or

craft” capable of appointing a representative. See NMB

Letter at ECF No. 14.1 (declining to mediate the dispute

between the Fuellers and ASIG). The majority thus imposes

an impossible burden on the Fuellers: The Fuellers must

organize before they can engage in self help, but the Fuellers

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cannot organize.11 This result cannot be squared with the deal

struck by the drafters of the RLA, in which employees

forfeited their right to strike at will in return for the promise

that employers would negotiate with their designated

representatives in good faith.

Here, the Fuellers have made strenuous efforts to resolve

their differences with ASIG concerning the safety of their

working conditions, and the allegedly retaliatory suspension

of Mr. Popescu, including: asking ASIG to explain its

investigation into and suspension of Mr. Popescu; reaching

out to ASIG’s Human Resource Department; and asking the

NMB to mediate their dispute. In contrast, ASIG has

steadfastly refused to even speak with the Fuellers, either

individually, or as a group. By foreclosing the ability of the

Fuellers to negotiate, the majority’s decision leaves them with

only two options: they must either acquiesce to what they

view as unsafe working conditions and vindictive

management behavior, or they must quit.

In essence, the majority opinion relies on the following

syllogism:

11 The NMB has determined that ASIG Fleet Services Employees, which

includes the Fuellers, constitute a nationwide system. See 40 NMB No.

13 at 49. Accordingly, the Fuellers can only unionize by obtaining the

votes of 50% of ASIG’s national employees. Id. at 48–49. The majority

is thus incorrect that the Fuellers, who constitute only the service

employees at Sea-Tac, can organize to protect their interests. Even if

every member of the Fuellers seeks a representative they would not be

entitled to recognition without a national election. Id. The majority’s

decision thus imposes burdens under the RLA on a group of workers, the

Fuellers, who lack any recourse to the protections of the RLA, which are

predicated on the existence of a certified representative.

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• Major Premise: Section 2, First requires that employees

attempt to settle disputes through RLA procedures.

• Minor Premise: Although the Fuellers are not presently

subject to those procedures because they seek neither a

representative nor a CBA, the employees could take

advantage of the RLA by appointing a representative and

seeking a CBA.

• Conclusion: Because the Fuellers could take advantage of

the RLA by taking certain voluntary predicate acts,

namely unionizing, Section 2, First imposes a duty on the

Fuellers to take those predicate acts so that they can avail

themselves of the RLA. 

Requiring parties to take affirmative actions in order to

bring themselves within the RLA’s dispute resolution

procedures will, among other things, dramatically alter the

manner in which unions in industries covered by the RLA

gain recognition, as is evident in this very case.12 Because

both employers and employees are bound by the same

language in Section 2, First, the majority’s logic must apply

equally to both. 45 U.S.C. § 152, First. ASIG refuses to

negotiate with the Fuellers because they are not a duly

certified union. However, while employers are not obligated

to negotiate with representatives that are not certified by the

NMB, they may choose to do so. See Summit, 628 F.2d at

12 Presently, employers are only obligated to negotiate with

representative that have been elected by 50% of the “craft or class”

attempting to unionize pursuant to the RLA. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, Third,

Fourth, Ninth. The NMB has determined that ASIG Fleet Services

Employees, which includes the Fuellers, constitute a nationwide system. 

See 40 NMB No. 13 at 49.

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795. Thus employers, just like employees, can opt to bring

disputes within the ambit of the RLA through voluntary

predicate actions, namely by recognizing a representative that

has not been certified by the NMB. The logic of the majority

opinion then would, apparently, not only require that the

Fuellers attempt to appoint a representative, it would also

require ASIG to voluntarily recognize any resulting

representative in order to begin negotiating a CBA. 

Obviously, such a rule would dramatically alter the NMB’s

role in certifying union elections. See 45 U.S.C. § 152,

Ninth.

III. The Injunction Must Be Vacated Because ASIG

has not Complied with Section 8 of the NLGA.

Even if the majority’s one-sided construction of the RLA

could be justified, the injunction must still be vacated because

ASIG failed to comply with the requirements of Section 8 of

the NLGA before seeking that injunction. In order to obtain

a labor injunction, a complainant must not only seek to enjoin

behavior that falls within an exception to the NLGA, it must

meet the statutory requirements set out in that Act. 29 U.S.C.

§ 101 (“No court of the United States, as defined in this

chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order

or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or

growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity

with the provisions of this chapter . . . .”). Section 8 of the

NLGA states that “[n]o restraining order or injunctive relief

shall be granted to any complainant who has failed . . . to

make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by

negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental

machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 108. This principle applies even where the injunction is

aimed at enforcing compliance with a specific duty of the

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RLA. See Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc. v. Bhd. of Maint. of

Way, 497 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2007) (analyzing whether

employer had complied with Section 8 where the injunction

sought to enforce provisions of the RLA). In order to comply

with Section 8, a complainant “must also go beyond [its legal

obligations] and make all reasonable effort, at the least by the

methods specified if they are available, though none may

involve complying with any legal duty.” Bhd. Of R.R.

Trainmen Enter. Lodge, No. 27 v. Toledo P. & W. R.R.,

321 U.S. 50, 57 (1944).

The majority holds that because the Fuellers “have not

carried their duty under the RLA, ASIG has shirked none of

its duties.” Maj. at 23. In other words, the majority contends

that because the Fuellers have not sought a representative,

ASIG does not have a legal obligation to negotiate. Id.

Section 8, however, requires ASIG to take steps to resolve a

dispute even if it is not legally required to do so, prior to even

seeking an injunction. See Bhd. Of R.R. Trainmen Enter.

Lodge, No. 27, 321 U.S. at 57; Carter v. Herrin Motor

Freight Lines, 131 F.2d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1942) (“[The

NLGA] denies the equitable relief of injunction to one, who,

as plaintiff did here, standing upon his legal rights, fails to

use every reasonable effort by negotiation, mediation or

arbitration to find a common ground for composing and

settling a labor dispute.”). Interestingly, this language

mirrors the language that the majority finds so persuasive in

Section 2, First of the RLA. 45 U.S.C. § 152, First. Surely

if “every reasonable effort” requires the Fuellers to seek a

representative before they can strike, the same language in the

NLGA requires ASIG to at least make some effort to resolve

the dispute before seeking the drastic remedy of a labor

injunction. Accordingly, ASIG has not fulfilled its

obligations under Section 8 of the NLGA, the district court

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did not have jurisdiction to issue the injunction in this case,

and the injunction issued by the district court should be

vacated.

Conclusion

The majority reads the ambiguous language of Section 2,

First too broadly, while at the same time inappropriately

reading the language of NLGA Section 8 out of existence. 

Because the Fuellers have violated no express provision of

the RLA, and ASIG failed to satisfy the condition precedent

in Section 8 of the NLGA before seeking an injunction, the

district court had no jurisdiction to issue that injunction, and

it should be vacated.

I respectfully dissent.

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