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Parties Involved:
Melissa Vasquez Guardado
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12954

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MELISSA VASQUEZ GUARDADO, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cr-00145-ECM-SMD-2

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12954

Before BRANCH,GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Melissa Guardado appeals her conviction for possession with 

intent to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin. First, she 

argues that the district court erred in denying her Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 29 motions for judgment of acquittal (“Rule 29 

motions”) because the government provided insufficient evidence 

to show that she knowingly and intentionally possessed heroin 

with the intent to distribute it. Second, she argues that the district 

court abused its discretion in denying the admission of “potentially 

exculpatory” WhatsApp text messages—which were in Spanish—

between her codefendant and the government’s testifying witness, 

L.S. (a minor), despite her proffer of the contents and parties of the 

messages.

I. Motion for Acquittal

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and 

the denial of a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. 

United States v. Beach, 80 F.4th 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2023). We will 

uphold the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that 

the evidence establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. United States v. Holmes, 814 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2016). 

“We will not overturn a jury’s verdict if there is any reasonable construction of the evidence that would have allowed the jury to find 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. 

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23-12954 Opinion of the Court 3

Clay, 832 F.3d 1259, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). In other words, we will reverse a conviction based on insufficient evidence only if no reasonable trier of fact could have found 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. 

Williams, 865 F.3d 1328, 1337 (11th Cir. 2017). We must sustain a 

verdict where “there is a reasonable basis in the record for it.” 

United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation 

marks omitted). 

We view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable 

to the government. Clay, 832 F.3d at 1293. The evidence need not 

exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence in order for a 

reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the 

jury is free to choose among alternative, reasonable interpretations 

of the evidence. Beach, 80 F.4th at 1255-56. The test for sufficiency 

of evidence is the same regardless of whether the evidence is direct 

or circumstantial, with no distinction in the weight given to each. 

United States v. Guevara, 894 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2018). But 

where “the government relies on circumstantial evidence, reasonable inferences, not mere speculation, must support the conviction.” United States v. Mendez, 528 F.3d 811, 814 (11th Cir. 2008). 

In prosecuting under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the government 

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: 

(1) knowingly; (2) possessed a controlled substance; and (3) with 

intent to distribute it. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); United States v. Camacho, 

233 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000). “To prove guilt under a theory 

of aiding and abetting, the [g]overnment must prove: (1) the 

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12954

substantive offense was committed by someone; (2) the defendant 

committed an act which contributed to and furthered the offense; 

and (3) the defendant intended to aid in its commission.” Id. However, as “guilty knowledge can rarely be established directly, . . . a 

jury may infer knowledge and criminal intent from circumstantial 

evidence alone.” United States v. Morley, 99 F.4th 1328, 1339 (11th 

Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted). While knowledge requirements may be case-specific, “a jury can infer knowledge using certain guideposts, such as whether a defendant was instrumental to a 

plan’s success, had ample opportunities to discover the critical fact, 

and was in frequent contact with someone who knew that fact.” 

Id. at 1340 (quotation marks omitted). In addition, a defendant’s 

intent to distribute a controlled substance “may be inferred from a 

variety of factors, including whether the government seized a large 

quantity of controlled substances.” United States v. Cruickshank, 837 

F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2016).

Here, the district court did not err in denying Guardado’s 

Rule 29 motions because, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

government, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly possessed the

heroin with intent to distribute it. See Clay, 832 F.3d at 1293; Holmes, 

814 F.3d at 1250. First, Guardado and L.S. both testified that, upon 

arriving at the Waffle House, Guardado exited the vehicle, retrieved the bag, and reentered the vehicle. Guardado also testified 

that, while retrieving the bag from the individual in the Waffle 

House parking lot, she confirmed she was “coming from Fidelia’s” 

vehicle and left without asking any questions. Aside from 

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23-12954 Opinion of the Court 5

Guardado’s testimony, there was no evidence that Villanueva asked 

Guardado to retrieve the bag. Second, the evidence demonstrated 

that the bag stayed in her possession throughout the trip, as: (1) 

Deputy Sutley testified that he discovered the blue pillowcase underneath a blanket near the back seat floorboard; (2) Guardado and 

L.S. confirmed that Guardado stayed in the back seat during the 

trip; (3) Guardado and L.S. acknowledged that Guardado used the 

blanket during the trip; (4) Guardado confirmed she had the blanket during the traffic stop; (5) the government admitted videos and 

screenshots showing Guardado using the blanket and sitting in the 

back seat of the vehicle. Third, the evidence showed that 

Guardado exhibited abnormal behavior during the traffic stop and 

the search of the vehicle, including her initial unwillingness to 

“look at [Deputy Sutley] or engage [him] in any way.” In addition, 

Agent de Stefano testified that, upon questioning Guardado “about 

the drugs found in the car,” she “became defensive” and started 

“raising her voice.” Fourth, Deputies Sutley and Burch testified 

that, upon removing the blue pillowcase from the vehicle, Villanueva and Guardado “locked eyes” and exchanged an expression 

of “shock” and “despair,” to which Guardado did not object. Fifth, 

Deputy Burch testified that, in his experience with drug traffic 

stops, “sometimes [there is] somebody that works directly with a 

handler” and that receives phone calls during traffic stops, but also 

confirmed that “just because one person is receiving phone calls . . 

. [does not] mean anything else about the other person [who is] not 

receiving phone calls.” Moreover, Deputy Sutley and Agent de 

Stefano testified that individuals transporting drugs preferred to 

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-12954

bring other people with them to lower suspicion with law enforcement and bolster their “cover story.” To the extent that Guardado 

argues that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that she 

aided and abetted Villanueva in the offense, her argument fails in 

light of the language provided in the jury instructions and verdict 

form, which permitted the jury to find that she was the principal. 

In addition, the jury was permitted to consider circumstantial evidence of Guardado’s knowledge of the heroin and other “guideposts,” including that Guardado had opportunities to discover the 

critical fact that she retrieved and kept six kilograms of heroin beside her for several hours and that she was in “frequent contact 

with someone who knew that fact”—namely, Villanueva. Morley, 

99 F.4th at 1339 40. Finally, Guardado’s intent to distribute the heroin could be inferred from the “large quantity of controlled substances” that the government seized, namely, the six kilograms of 

heroin. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d at 1189. Thus, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict, the government provided sufficient 

evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Guardado knowingly possessed the heroin with the intent to distribute it. Clay, 832 

F.3d at 1293. 

II. Admissibility of Evidence

“We typically review a district court’s decisions regarding 

the admissibility of evidence . . . for abuse of discretion.” United 

States v. Hawkins, 934 F.3d 1251, 1264 (11th Cir. 2019). A district 

court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, 

employs improper procedures in reaching its determination, makes 

clearly erroneous findings of facts, or commits a clear error of 

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23-12954 Opinion of the Court 7

judgment. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911-12 (11th Cir. 

2021). However, “even an abuse of discretion will not warrant reversal where the resulting error was harmless.” United States v. Barton, 909 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2018). Moreover, we “will not 

overturn an evidentiary ruling and order a new trial unless the objecting party has shown a substantial prejudicial effect from the ruling.” Id. at 1330-31 (quotation marks omitted). “Substantial prejudice goes to the outcome of the trial,” and, “where an error had no 

substantial influence on the outcome, and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict, reversal is not warranted.” 

Id. at 1331 (quotation marks omitted). 

Generally, “[h]earsay is a statement, other than one made by 

a declarant while testifying at trial, offered in evidence to prove the 

truth of the matter asserted.” United States v. Kent, 93 F.4th 1213, 

1218 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted); 

Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the WhatsApp messages between her codefendant and L.S., because: (1) the messages were in Spanish; (2) Guardado failed to provide a sufficient factual basis for the court to assess the contents of 

the messages against the hearsay and relevancy objections raised 

by the government; (3) Guardado’s proffer as to the contents of the 

messages was called into doubt by the government; and (4) 

Guardado failed to provide an official translation or translated transcript to dispel the hearsay, relevancy, and translation concerns 

raised by the government. However, even assuming that the court 

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-12954

abused its discretion in not admitting the text messages, any error 

was harmless in light of the court permitting Guardado to develop 

the content of the messages through the testimony of L.S., who 

was a party to the conversation. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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