Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06284/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06284-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Billy Ray Dolph
Appellant
James L. Saffle
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS L D 

TENTH CIRCUIT • F Jtes Co~ cif Appet.\tl 

Un1ted S Tenth Circu1t 

BILLY RAY DOLPH, 

DEC 171992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Petitioner-Appellant, Clerk 

v. 

JAMES L. SAFFLE, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

No. 92-6284 

(D.C. No. CIV-91-1680 -W) 

(W. Dist . of Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SETH and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P . 34 (a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument . 

Billy Ray Dolph (Dolph), appearing prose, appeals from the 

district court's Order which accepts the Findings and 

Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and dismisses 

his habeas corpus petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S .C. §2254. 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 1 
Dolph filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's Findings and 

Recommendation. He also filed a Motion to Quash and Dismiss, 

arguing that he had been prejudiced by the Respondent's failure to 

provide him a copy of an affidavit which the Magistrate referenced 

in his Findings and Recommendation. The court permitted Dolph to 

supplement his objections following his receipt and review of the 

affidavit. Thereafter, the district court entered its Order 

dismissing the action. 

On appeal, Dolph asserts the following grounds for habeas 

relief: (1) he was denied his Fourth Amendment right to be free 

from illegal search and seizure; (2) the trial court erroneously 

accepted a guilty plea (by stipulation) to prior felonies, 

without Dolph's knowledge and consent; (3) the state failed to 

meet its burden of proof on prior felonies used for enhancement of 

punishment; (4) the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits Dolph's 

resentencing if the state failed to provide sufficient evidence of 

prior felonies; (5) the trial court erred in failing to provide 

the jury with separate verdict forms for each alleged prior 

felony; and (6) Dolph was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 

effective assistance of counsel. 

We agree with the district court that federal habeas review 

of the Fourth Amendment claim asserted in ground one is 

foreclosed; Dolph is procedurally barred from asserting grounds 

two, three and five; 1 and, Dolph fails to demonstrate that his 

1 The record reveals that Dolph considers ground four in his 

habeas petition as a request for particular relief and not a 

proposition of error. 

-2 -

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 2 
right to effective assistance of counsel was violated as asserted 

in ground six. 

We AFFIRM the district court's Order adopting the Findings 

and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, and we 

dismiss this habeas petition substantially for the reasons set 

forth in the Magistrate's Recommendation, dated January 31, 1992, 

and the district court's Order, dated August 10, 1992, copies of 

which are attached hereto. 

AFFIRMED. 

-3-

Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 3 
Fl LED 

I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 'l'HE 

WESTERN DISTRICT or OKLAHOMA AUG 1.: 199, 

BILLY RAY DOLPH, ) 

) 

Petitioner, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

3AMES SAFFLE, Warden, ) 

) 

Respondent. ) 

~,l l!l 11 r u. r:''t "-' :-4 1~ 

CURii, U, ~. OJS T~ Gf COVIil 

ay ___ ~j~---

No. ClV- 91- 1680-W 

ORDER 92-6284 

On Januai:-y 31 1 1992, United Statea Mciqiatrcte Ju~g• Ronald L. 

Howland issued his findings in thia matter and reconuuended that the 

writ of habeas corpus ilought by petitioner l!illy Rily Dolph not 

issue ond that this action be cHsmill&&r1, He t'urther recommendedthat ~ecauae an appeal trom t~is decision would no~ be wel l taken 

~na~ any request for a certificate ot probable cause or tor loavo 

t o proce•d in forma pauperis be denied. 

The petitioner not only filed objections to the Ma9istrate 

Judge Is Findings and Recommendation but also filed • Motion to 

QU$ah and Di•mi•• wherein he argued that he had been prejudiced by 

the reBpondent's failure to serve him with a copy ot the att1dav1t 

ot trial counsel, John Pugh. Because tne Magiaerate Judge referred 

to the affidavit in his Findings ane1 Recommendation, tha court 

datarm1nad t.hat the petitioner should be permittC!ld to :t:'eceive and 

review a copy of thQ affidkvit and to aupplement hie objections, it 

he so desired, after such review, 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 4 
The pet.1 t.ioner did supplement his earlier obj Ec·t:10ns an(1 the 

court directed the respondent to respono to tnoee objections, as 

supplemented. Havinq now received these submissions as wall as 

petitioner's reply filed on June 17, 1992, and havinq reviewed the 

entire record, the Court finds 

(1) that feder~l habeas r.~view of tha pQtitioner'a claim und•r 

the tourth amendment tn th• unit•d S~at•• Cen ti~ution •• a•••rted 

in Grcund One of his Petition !or Writ ot H:aba.,a Corpua is 

fcre0loaed1 

(2) that the petitioner is pro~edurally barred under Colaman 

Y..L • ....l'hQIDl2il2U, =sg U.S.L.W, -4789 (June H, l9!H), from oaocrtin9 

Gr ounds Two, Tn.e~ And rive1 in this Action; and 

~11ngton, 

!3) that 

466 

the 

u.s. 

petiticner 

666 (1984), 

has 

to demonatr&ta 

!ailed und•r 

tnat 

~ 

he was denied 

effactlve agsi scance ot cour.saJ in v101ac1on ot ~h• s i ~t~ amenctmenL 

to the United States con9tituti on by Mr. Pugh's d~oision to enter 

into cartai~ ~tipulations. 

AQ00rdin9ly, the Court AOOF'l'S the Magistrate Judge•~ Findings 

and Recommendation iaeu•d on January Jl, 1992, DENIES the Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus and DISMISSES thi& action, The Court 

concurs with the MagiBtratl.? Judge'a .-eccmmendation thi?1t 4n appeal 

rrom this decision would net be well taken •nd thu■, o~c~INES to 

1Tha racord reveals that tha patitionar conaidara Ground Four 

in his Petition tor Writ or Habeas Corpus as a. requeiSt !or 

part1o~lar reli~f and not a proposition ct error. 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 5 
1 saue a cert 'i ficate o! i;,ro0ai.,1e cause · ant1 DENIES the petitioner 

leave to proceed on app•al 1n rorma pauper1a. 

ENTERED this / C ,;J,,,. i:tay or August., 1992. 

~~ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

ENTERED IN JUDGEMENT DOCKET ON S'~1~ -J.;L,,. 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 6 
I 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

FILED 

BILLY RAY DOLPH, 

Petitioner, 

JAN 3 11992 

ROBERT 0. DENNIS 

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

BY farr: 

DEPUTY 

V. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

CfV-91-1680-W 

JAMES SAFFLE, Warden, 

Respondent. 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

DOCKETED 

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254.1 The 

Petitioner, an Oklahoma prisoner who appears pro se, challenges his custody under a 

judgment of conviction entered on April 24, 1986, in the Oklahoma County District Court 

in Case No. CRF-85-2609 for the offense of Possession of a Controlled Dangerous 

Substance (methamphetamine) After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies. 

Petitioner was found guilty following a jury trial, and he was sentenced to a term of life 

imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Dolph v. State, No. F-86-742 

(Okl.Cr. 1990). An application for post-conviction relief, filed by Petitioner in the district 

1 This Court's records show that Petitioner filed a previous §2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus 

challenging the same conviction. The petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state court remedies. 

Dolph v. Cowley, No. CIV-87-1778-W (memorandum opinion and judgment entered February 29, 1988). 

1y\ 

1 

\ 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 7 
court on February 27, 1991, was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal. Dolph 

v. State, No. PC-91-364 (Okl.Cr. 1991). 

The petition has been referred to the undersigned in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 

§636(b)(l)(B) for the purpose of submitting findings and a recommendation for the proper 

resolution of the case. The Respondent has filed a response to the petition along with the 

relevant state court records. Petitioner has filed a "traverse." Respondent has moved to 

supplement the response with the affidavit of Petitioner's trial counsel, Mr. John Pugh, and 

the motion to supplement is granted. 

The petition asserts the following grounds for habeas relief: 

One: "Petitioner was denied his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

illegal arrest, and search and seizure." 

Two: "The trial court erroneously accepted guilty plea (by stipulation) to 

prior felonies without the knowledge and consent of Petitioner." 

Three: "The state failed to meet its burden of proof on the prior felonies 

for enhancement of punishment." 

Four: "The Double Jeopardy Clause would prohibit the resentencing of 

Petitioner if the State failed to provide sufficient eviddence (sic) of prior 

felonies at first trial." 

Five: "The trial court erred in failing to provide the jury with seperate (sic) 

verdict forms for each alleged prior felony." 

Six: "Petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 

assistance of counsel." 

Petitioner asserts that he raised the issues in Grounds One, Two, Three, and Six on 

direct appeal, and that he also raised the issues in Grounds One through Three, Five, and 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 8 
Six in his post-conviction application. Petitioner contends in his "traverse" that Ground 

Four is merely a request for particular relief and is "not a proposition of error ... 11 

The record shows that on appeal Petitioner asserted as propositions that (1) the trial 

court erred in refusing to suppress evidence seized in violation of Dolph's constitutional 

right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, (2) there was insufficient evidence 

to convict Dolph of the offense of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, (3) 

prosecutorial misconduct on cross-examination deprived Dolph of a fair trial, and ( 4) Dolph 

was denied effective assistance of counsel. 

In his post-conviction application, the record shows that Petitioner asserted as 

grounds for relief (1) trial court error in failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence 

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, (2) trial court error during sentencing where 

his defense attorney entered a stipulation as to prior convictions over Defendant's 

objection, (3) the state failed to meet its burden of proof of prior felonies to enhance 

punishment, ( 4) double jeopardy prevents resentencing where the state failed to prove 

prior convictions for enhancement of sentence, (S) trial court error in failing to provide 

verdict forms for each prior felony conviction, (6) denial of effective assistance of counsel, 

(7) trial court error in denying Defendant's demurrer to the state's evidence, and (8) 

prosecutorial misconduct on cross-examination. 

Thus, the record shows Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies as to the 

issues he raises in this habeas petition. Federal habeas review of a Fourth Amendment 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 9 
claim is not available where the petitioner was afforded full and fair litigation of the issue 

in state court. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Sanders v. Oliver, 611 F.2d 804 

(10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1980); Chavez v. Rodriguez, 540 F.2d 500 

(10th Cir. 1976). The record shows that at trial defense counsel moved to suppress the 

evidence seized at the time of Petitioner's arrest, on the ground that the evidence was 

obtained pursuant to an illegal search and seizure. A hearing was conducted outside of the 

hearing of the jury, and the motion to suppress was overruled. Petitioner presented the 

same argument on appeal. The merits of the issue were addressed by the Oklahoma Court 

of Criminal Appeals in its opinion entered in Dolph v. State, No. F-86-742 (Okl.Cr. 1990). 

Like the petitioner in Sanders v. Oliver, supra, the petitioner was given "[o]ne complete 

and unrestricted evidentiary hearing with subsequent review by the state courts of the issue 

and the facts so developed would seem to be sufficient under Stone." Sanders v. Oliver, 

supra at 808. Therefore, federal habeas review of the Fourth Amendment claim asserted 

in Ground One is foreclosed. 

Grounds Two, Three, and Five of the instant petition assert issues of trial court error 

and insufficiency of the evidence that were not raised on direct appeal. The issues were 

raised in the Petitioner's post-conviction application, but the state courts refused to review 

all of the issues presented in the post-conviction application, employing procedural rules 

barring post-conviction review of claims which have been or were not raised on direct 

appeal. The appellate court cited Grimes v. State, 512 P.2d 231, 233 (Okl.Cr. 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 10 
1973)(barring post-conviction review onresjudicata grounds of claims that were raised and 

addressed on direct appeal) and Maines v. State, 597 P .2d 7 44, 776 (Okl.Cr. 1979) (barring 

post-conviction review of claims that were not raised on direct appeal).2 The state courts 

invocation of state law that is "independent of federal law" to preclude review of these 

issues also precludes federal habeas review of the defaulted claims unless Petitioner can 

show cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of 

federal law, or a miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2565 

(1991); Gilbert v. Scott, 941 F.2d 1065, 1067 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Petitioner does not allege cause for his defaults on appeal or any prejudice resulting 

from the alleged violations, and the record creates no such inference. Petitioner does not 

rely on the miscarriage of justice exception to the cause and prejudice requirement. 

Accordingly, habeas review of the claims asserted in Grounds Two, Three, and Five of the 

Petition is foreclosed due to Petitioner's procedural default of these claims. 

2 The state courts relied on the res judicata rule in Grimes v. State, supra, declining to review the 

Petitioner's post-conviction claims that (1) the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea by stipulation 

to prior felony convictions without his knowledge and consent and (2) the state failed to meet its burden 

of proof on the prior felony convictions. The state courts found that these issues had been raised on direct 

appeal, although the record shows these issues were not presented or addressed on their merits on direct 

appeal. However, the state court would find these issues to be procedurally barred in another postconviction proceeding, because of Petitioner's failure to assert the issues on appeal. See Coleman v. 

Oklahoma, 693 P.2d 4, 5 (Okl.Cr. 1989)(post-conviction review is barred as to issues which have been or 

could have been raised on appeal). Therefore, there is a procedural default as to these issues for purposes 

of federal habeas "regardless of the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner actually presented 

his claims." Coleman v. Thompson, supra at 2557 n.1; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269-270 (1989); 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-298 (1989). 

5 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 11 
Petitioner's final claim is an allegation of constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel. The claim relates to his trial counsel's actual performance at trial and is based on 

one alleged error by counsel. Petitioner contends that his counsel should not have 

stipulated to the Petitioner's prior felony convictions without his knowledge and consent, 

and that "counsel's actions took from petitioner his right to enter his plea of choice." 

Petition, at lO(a). 

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court recognized 

that "[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 

cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 686. The standard established 

in Strickland for the judicial review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is twopronged. Under this standard, reversal of a conviction on the ground of ineffective 

assistance of counsel requires proof that (1) "counsel's representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

Id. at 688, 694. In assessing the reasonableness of counsel's conduct, the reviewing court 

must apply a strong presumption that, under the circumstances, counsel's conduct is within 

the range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. Attorney performance is also 

to be assessed considering only counsel's perspective at the time of the proceeding. Id. 

6 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 12 
Because Petitioner was charged as an habitual offender, Petitioner's trial was 

conducted in two stages, with the jury considering only the guilt or innocence issue in the 

first stage. Upon a finding of guilt, the jury then considered the issue of punishment in the 

second stage. See Okla. Stat., tit. 22, §860 (West 1981). Evide~ce of prior felony 

convictions used to support enhanced punishment is normally presented in the second stage 

of the trial. Id. Under Oklahoma law, the prosecution establishes prima facie evidence of 

identity of the defendant by introducing certified copies of judgments and sentences 

showing that a person with the identical name as the defendant's has previously been 

convicted of a felony. ll, Fogle v. Oklahoma. 700 P.2d 208, 212 (Okl.Cr. 1985). The 

trial transcript reflects the following statements were made by the prosecutor, the trial 

judge, and Petitioner's counsel at the beginning of the second stage punishment proceeding: 

MR. WINTORY: Your Honor, I've spoken with Mr. Pugh. We have 

certified Judgments and Sentences but I understand that we have a 

stipulation that the Defendant is the one and same Billy Ray Dolph who was 

convicted of the former felony convictions that are alleged in the second page 

of the Information. 

THE COURT: You so stipulate, Mr. Pugh? 

MR. PUGH: So stipulate. 

THE COURT: All right, sir. 

MR. WINTORY: With that, Your Honor, the State rests. 

THE COURT: All right. 

State v. Dolph, CRF-85-2609, Transcript of Trial Proceedings, at 50-51. 

7 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 13 
Following trial, Petitioner presented a motion for new trial. Petitioner argued the 

motion prose, and the following colloquy ensued regarding the sentencing proceeding: 

THE COURT: Now, you're also alleging, number eight here, about the fact 

that you didn't know about the enhancement allegations. Were you not 

advised that there was a page two filed? 

DEFENDANT: I was advised that there was a page two filed. When Mr. 

Wintory tells the jury, I believe defense counsel, Defendant's counsel, will 

agree talking about one and the same man. He stipulated to it; i didn't. 

MR. PUGH: I didn't stipulate to it, Billy. All I did was I was looking at you 

and you apparently think that I nodded, but I don't think the record's going 

to reflect that and I wasn't doing that. I was looking at you, you were trying 

to talk to me. 

DEFENDANT: Well, had you not -- it's my understanding had you not, then 

they would have had Court Reporter or something from these cases from 

Norman here to back it up. 

Mil. l'Ulil l: Nu, <luu't think su. 

THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything further, mr. Dolph? 

DEFENDANT: Nothing think of right now, Your Honor. 

State v. Dolph, CRF-85-2609, Transcript of Trial Proceedings, at 61-62. 

In Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir. 1979), a habeas case arising out of 

Arkansas, the Eighth Circuit found that a stipulation by defense counsel to prior convictions 

amounted to a guilty plea, because it acted to waive Cox's right to have the state prove the 

prior offenses and his right to rebut the state's evidence. Id. Thus, the appellate court 

found that "the admission into evidence of the stipulation, without inquiry into Cox's 

knowledge and consent, amounted to constitutional error." Id. Cf. Buckley v. Butler. 825 

8 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 14 
F.2d 895, 902-903 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988)(Defendant's 

admission of fact that he was same person as the identically-named individual referenced 

in the records of prior convictions does not amount to plea of guilty where sentencing 

proceeding was closely related to conviction of principle offense, counsel represented he 

had discussed the matter with the defendant, and the records of the prior convictions were 

introduced in evidence). The circuit court further found that "the error in receiving the 

stipulation was presumptively prejudicial unless the state can show that, absent the 

stipulation, it possessed at the time of trial evidence establishing at least the three prior 

convictions necessary to support Cox's sentence." Cox v. Hutto, supra. Accord, 

Government of the Virgin Islands v. George, 741 F.2d 643 (3rd Cir. 1984). 

Under Oklahoma law, it is not error to stipulate to what the testimony would have 

been regarding prior felony convictions. Williams v. State, 661 P.2d 911, 913 (Okl.Cr. 

1983); Tuckerv. State, 620 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Okl.Cr. 1980). Older Oklahoma cases held 

that where such a stipulation is "specific" enough to constitute an admission that the 

defendant is the same person who was previously convicted, the only issue remaining for 

the jury to consider is the punishment to be imposed. Smith v. State, 568 P.2d 1319, 

1320-1321 (Okl.Cr. 1977); White v. State, 520 P.2d 368, 370 (Oki.Cr. 1974). However, 

in Tucker v. State, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals appears to have retracted its earlier 

position, holding that the attorney's stipulation as to identity of the Defendant does not 

relieve the state of its burden of proving the former felony convictions. Id. 

9 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 15 
In the affidavit prepared by the Petitioner's trial attorney, Mr. Pugh avers that he 

did not initially intend to stipulate to the information regarding Petitioner's prior felony 

convictions. He avers that when the judge asked if he was indeed stipulating to the former 

convictions, the trial judge misunderstood him to have responded affirmatively when he 

was actually talking to his client. However, Mr. Pugh avers that he did not attempt to 

correct the misunderstanding because he could find no error in the "page two" of the 

Information setting forth the Petitioner's previous convictions and also because he believed 

"the longer the jury spent dwelling on his prior convictions, the longer would be his 

sentence since most of his prior convictions were far more serious in nature and indicated 

a lifetime of criminal activity . .. " 

Mr. Pugh's tactical decision to stipulate to the testimony concerning Petitioner's 

identity, made after investigation of the facts, is not unreasonable under the prevailing 

Strickland standard, in view of the circumstances known to counsel at the time of the 

stipulation. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that 

[a]lthough the record reflects confusion by the trial court and defense 

counsel as to any stipulation concerning Appellant's identity as the same as 

that on the prior judgments and sentences, we do not find that Appellant was 

prejudiced thereby. As appellant does not attack the validity of the prior 

convictions or that he is the same individual named in the judgments and 

sentences, stipulating to them is a reasonable trial strategy which we ill not 

now second guess. Appellant has failed to demonstrate, that but for 

counsel's actions, the result of the proceedings would have been different. 

Dolph v. State, No. F-86-742 (Okl.Cr. 1990). 

10 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 16 
Although this Court is not bound by the state court's findings on the ineffectiveness 

claim, see Strickland v. Washington, supra at 698 ("both the performance and prejudice 

components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact" not subject 

to the deference requirement of §2254(d)), the state court's findings accord with the 

evidence in the record. A defendant does not have the right to force defense counsel to 

present arguments counsel has professionally decided not to present. See Jones v. Barnes, 

463 U.S. 745, 751-752 (1983). Moreover, Petitioner has given no reason for counsel to 

have refused to stipulate to the identity issue. Petitioner admitted in the hearing on his 

motion for new trial that he was aware of the habitual offender charge. State v. Dolph, 

CRF-85-2609, Transcript of Trial Proceedings, at 61. And it may be presumed that Mr. 

Pugh had discussed the nature of the habitual offender charge with Petitioner. Henderson 

v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976). 

Even assuming that counsel erred in entering the stipulation on the record, the 

Petitioner has failed to show that the outcome of the sentencing proceeding would have 

been any different absent counsel's actions. The prosecutor stated that he had certified 

copies of judgments and sentences in the prior convictions. Thus, even assuming that the 

standard established in Cox v. Hutto, supra, is applicable, the prosecution possessed at the 

time of the trial the evidence necessary to support the enhanced sentence. Additionally, 

the trial court's instructions to the jury correctly set forth the state's burden of proof as to 

the alleged prior felony convictions, and the jury was instructed that Petitioner had entered 

11 

Appellate Case: 92-6284 Document: 010110152665 Date Filed: 12/17/1992 Page: 17 
a plea of not guilty to the habitual offender charge. The jury was further instructed that 

Petitioner was presumed innocent of the habitual offender charge, and that the 

presumption of innocence remained until guilt of the charge was shown beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The record also shows the jury was provided separate, alternative 

verdict forms for fixing punishment upon a verdict that Petitioner was guilty only of the 

principle offense, or was guilty of committing the principle offense after one former felony 

conviction, or was guilty of committing the principle offense after two or more former 

felony convictions. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show that Mr. Pugh rendered 

constitutionally ineffective assistance at the sentencing proceeding. 

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that judgment issue denying the writ of 

habeas corpus and dismissing the cause of action. In view of the foregoing findings, and 

because an appeal from this decision would not be well taken, the undersigned further 

recommends that a certificate of probable cause and leave to proceed on appeal in Jonna 

pauperis be denied. By law, the parties have until February / ( /-1 J.., 1992, in which to file 

an appeal/objection. Failure to appeal may result in the entry of a final judgment in 

accordance with these findings and recommendation. 

Entered this ~ day of January, 1992. 

RONALD L. HOWLAND 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

12 

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