Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02817/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02817-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stan Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

( PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 88-2817 

) 

STAN SMITH, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FI LED 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circu.fr 

NOV - J 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of New Mexico 

D.C. No. 88-244-JB 

Steve Kotz, Assistant United States Attorney, (William L. Lutz, 

United States Attorney; and Paula G. Burnett, Assistant United 

States Attorney, with him on the brief) Albuquerque,. New Mexico, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

William D. Fry, Assistant Federal Defender, Las Cruces, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2817 Document: 010110063789 Date Filed: 11/03/1989 Page: 1 
Petitioner Stan Smith appeals from his conviction of bank 

robbery in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2113. Mr. Smith contends that 

the trial court erred by not giving a cautionary jury instruction 

regarding the testimony of John Heller, a paid informant and 

rebuttal witness •. After reviewing the trial record, we conclude 

that even if rejection of the defendant's instruction was 

erroneous, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 

because of the substantial evidence identifying Mr. Smith as the 

bank robber. Therefore, we affirm Mr. Smith's conviction. Mr. 

Smith also appeals the sentence imposed by the lower court which 

departed upward from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Because 

the trial judge did not give adequate reasons on the record for 

departing from the Guidelines, we vacate 

resentencing. 1 

I. 

and remand for 

On March 14, 1988, a man robbed the First National Bank in 

Las Cruces, New Mexico. After stealing a car from a nearby 

parking lot one-half hour prior to the robbery, the robber, 

dressed in a coat and tie and disguised by a hat covering most of 

his forehead, dark glasses, and a moustache, entered the bank and 

held a pellet gun to a customer's head. He ordered the tellers to 

put their money in a bag that he was carrying, then left the bank, 

1Mr. Smith appeals the sentence imposed by the district court 

because he did not receive notice of the grounds for departure and 

the departure was unreasonable. Because the trial court did not 

provide an adequate explanation on the record for its departure 

from the Guidelines, we remand for resentencing and do not reach. 

the notice or reasonableness issues. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2817 Document: 010110063789 Date Filed: 11/03/1989 Page: 2 
went into the parking lot, and drove off in the stolen car. The 

only issue in dispute at trial was the identity of the man who 

robbed the bank. 

At trial, two of 

identified Mr. Smith 

the tellers present in the bank lobby 

as the robber. In a bandit identification 

form, one teller described the bank robber as a man of Mr. Smith's 

age. She also picked out Mr. Smith in a photo array provided by 

the police and identified Mr. Smith in court as the robber. 

Another teller provided a computer sketch of the robber, picked 

out Mr. Smith from the photo array, and identified Mr. Smith in 

court. The bank customer who was threatened by the robber, but 

did not see his face, testified about his general appearance; 

however, she was unable to identify Mr. Smith. The woman whose 

car was stolen and used in the bank robbery provided a computer 

sketch of the man who stole the car, picked out Mr. Smith from the 

photo array, and identified Mr. Smith in court as the man who 

stole her car. In addition, a police officer who was acquainted 

with Mr. Smith identified him from the photo array and as the man 

in surveillance photos taken during the bank robbery. A tool 

salesperson, who had known Mr. Smith for three years, also 

testified that Mr. Smith was the man in the bank surveillance 

photos and described the appearance of Mr. Smith on the day of the 

bank robbery. 

For the defense, two other bank tellers who were present in 

the bank lobby submitted bandit identification forms with 

descriptions that varied from those given by the prosecution 

witnesses. In addition, one of these tellers testified that she 

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Appellate Case: 88-2817 Document: 010110063789 Date Filed: 11/03/1989 Page: 3 
was unable to identify the robber from the photo array. A teller, 

who was in the bank vault and not present in the bank lobby during 

the robbery, identified Mr. Smith because he had been in the bank 

on several occasions prior to the robbery. Another person also 

said Mr. Smith had been in the bank on prior occasions with his 

son. Mr. Smith's former wife testified that although there was a 

strong resemblance, Mr. Smith was not the man in the bank 

surveillance photo. 

As a rebuttal witness, the government called John Heller, Mr. 

Smith's next door neighbor, who provided information during the 

police investigation as a paid informant under the Crime Stoppers 

program. Mr. Heller testified that on the day before the robbery 

Mr. Smith told him he intended to rob a bank and his plan included 

stealing a car, dressing up, wearing a fake moustache or mask, 

using a pellet gun, and leaving town. On surrebuttal, Mr. Smith's 

former wife testified that Mr. Smith and Mr. Heller did not have 

an amiable relationship, and two weeks before the robbery the two 

men engaged in a pushing match lasting two or three minutes. 

During the instructions conference, defense counsel requested 

that the court give a cautionary instruction for the evaluation of 

testimony of paid informants. Although the government did not 

object and the trial judge indicated that he would give the 

instruction, the "paid informer instruction" was not given. 

Instead, the court gave another proposed defense instruction which 

concerned identification testimony. 

Mr. Smith filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that 

the court's failure to give a paid informer instruction deprived 

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Appellate Case: 88-2817 Document: 010110063789 Date Filed: 11/03/1989 Page: 4 
him of a fair trial. The court denied the motion, finding that 

the paid informer instruction was "clearly duplicative" and 

counsel's request for the paid informer instruction was correctly 

denied because of its untimely submission and because the jury had 

been properly and adequately instructed. 

At the sentencing hearing, the court departed upward from the 

Sentencing Guidelines and sentenced Mr. Smith to eighty-four 

months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised 

release. 2 The district court explained its decision to depart 

from the Sentencing Guidelines recommended sentence by stating: 

"The Court in arriving at an appropriate sentence takes judicial 

notice of the force and violence used by the defendant in 

committing the offense, which justifies an upward departure from 

the guidelines." No other explanation or justification was given 

for departure from the Guidelines. 

II. 

A harmless error analysis is the threshold standard for 

evaluation of the district court's failure to give the cautionary 

jury instruction requested by Mr. Smith. Chapman v. California, 

386 U.S. 18 (1967); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986). "It is 

2This sentence was imposed as an alternative sentence by the trial 

court which reiterated its holding that the Sentencing Guidelines 

were unconstitutional and sentenced Smith to 15 years of 

imprisonment under the law prior to the effective date of the 

Sentencing Reform Act. Subsequent to the court's pronouncement 

of Mr. Smith's sentence, the United States Supreme Court found the 

Sentencing Guidelines to be constitutional. Mistretta v. United 

States, U.S. , 109 s. Ct. 647 (1989). Therefore, Mr. 

Smith's alternative sentence imposed un9er the Sentencing 

Guidelines is operative. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2817 Document: 010110063789 Date Filed: 11/03/1989 Page: 5 
the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a 

whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most 

constitutional violationse" United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 

499, 510 (1983). 

In assessing whether the failure to give the jury instruction 

was harmless error, this court must look at the whole record. 

Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 1389 (10th Cir. 1989). In doing 

so, we must determine whether we can "declare a belief that 

[failure to give an informer instruction] was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt." Coleman, 869 F.2d at 1389 (citing Chapman, 386 

U.S. at 24). 

Based upon a review of the entire record, we conclude that 

the district court's failure to give the informer instruction was 

harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 At trial, there was 

substantial evidence other than the testimony of Mr. Heller which 

identified Mr. Smith as the robber. Three witnesses provided 

descriptions, picked out Mr. Smith from a photo array, and 

identified him in court. In addition, two witnesses identified 

Mr. Smith as the man in bank surveillance photographs taken during 

the robbery. Although defense witnesses created doubt about the 

identification of Mr. Smith, the government's case was so strong 

that the verdict could not have been affected by the trial court's 

failure to give the defendant's requested instruction. 

3Because the lack of an informer instruction was harmless error, 

we do not need to reach whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to give the pro~osed informer instruction. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2817 Document: 010110063789 Date Filed: 11/03/1989 Page: 6 
III. 

This court reviews sentences imposed under the Sentencing 

Guidelines according to the statutory standard provided by the 

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and codified at 18 u.s.c. S 3742. 

Section 3742(e) provides, in relevant part: 

(e) Consideration.--Upon review of the record, the 

court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence--

(1) was imposed in violation of law; 

(2) was imposed as a result of an 

incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; 

(3) is outside the applicable guideline 

range, and is unreasonable, having regard 

for--

(A) the 

considered in 

as set forth in 

title; and 

factors to be 

imposing a sentence, 

chapter 227 of this 

(B) the reasons for the 

imposition of the particular 

sentence, as stated by the district 

court pursuant to the provisions of 

section 3553(c); or 

(4) was imposed for an offense for which 

there is no applicable sentencing guideline 

and is plainly unreasonable. 

While we must give "due deference to the district court's 

application of the guidelines to the facts," 18 u.s.c. S 3742(e), 

we review the application of the guidelines fully for errors of 

law. United States v. Otero, 868 F.2d 1412, 1414 (5th Cir. 1989). 

This case presents the question of what findings are required 

when a district judge decides to depart from the sentencing range 

provided by the Sentencing Guidelines. Departure is allowed when 

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Appellate Case: 88-2817 Document: 010110063789 Date Filed: 11/03/1989 Page: 7 
"the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating 

circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 

consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 

guidelines •• II 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b). The statute sets out 

specific procedures that the sentencing court must follow when it 

departs from range. The appropriate part of the statute requires: 

The court, at the tjme of sentencing, shall state in 

open court the reasons for its imposition of the 

particular sentence, and, if the sentence--

(2) is not of the kind, or is outside 

the range, described in subsection (a)(4), tne 

specific reason for the imposition of a 

sentence different from that described. 

18 u.s.c. S 3553(c) (emphasis added). In this case, the brief 

statement made by the district court at sentencing does not 

satisfy this requirement. 

A general recitation is an insufficient statement of the 

reasons required by S 3553(c). See United States v. Wells, 878 

F.2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1989). Specificity of reason is mandated by 

the statute; therefore, the sentencing court's statement that it 

took "judicial notice of the force and violence used by the 

defendant 1' adds nothing for review because the offense of which 

the defendant was convicted subsumes acts of "force and violence." 

More importantly, the guidelines themselves assess additional 

points for possession or use of a weapon, physical injury, and 

unlawful restraint. United States Sentencing Comm'n, Federal 

Sentencing Manual § 2B3.1 (1988). Thus, although we assume the 

court believed the defendant's acts were beyond the norm for the 

offense as set out in the guidelines, without the court's 

-aAppellate Case: 88-2817 Document: 010110063789 Date Filed: 11/03/1989 Page: 8 
enumeration of the factors upon which that belief was predicated, 

we simply are left to speculation. 

Additionally, the district court failed to indicate whether 

it found the Sentencing Commission inadequately considered those 

factors in formulating the guidelines. Such a finding is a 

condition precedent to imposition of a sentence above the 

guideline range. See United States v. Michel, 876 F.2d 784 (9th 

Cir. 1989). 

Without particularization by the trial court of its reasons 

for an enhanced sentence, this court cannot engage in the kind of 

meaningful review intended by§ 3742 of the Sentencing Reform Act, 

which provides that a sentence should be set aside by this court 

if it departs unreasonably from the Guidelines' recommended 

sentence. 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e). The requirement that the district 

judge articulate specific reasons for any departure from the 

recommended sentence reflects the intent of Congress to do away 

with the uncertainties and the disparities in sentencing which 

resuited from earlier systems where judges had broad discretion. 

See Mistretta v. United States, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 647, 651 

(1989). To permit review in the context of this purpose, trial 

courts must set forth those incidents or circumstances which 

prompt them to impose greater punishment than the standards 

contemplate. See Wells, 878 F.2d at 1233. 

Accordingly, the sentence is VACATED and the case is REMANDED 

for resentencing of the defendant in accordance with the 

principles set forth in this opinion. 

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