Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05244/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05244-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shirley S. Chater
Appellee
Velma L. Mornes
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

VELMA L. MORNES, on behalf of 

JESSE L. NORMENT and COLECIA 

NORMENT, 

FILED 

tJnited States Co';'rt ~f Appeal& Tenth Carcuat 

JUL 31 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 95-5244 

v. 

SHIRLEY S. CRATER, Commissioner 

of Social Security Administration,* 

Defendant-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 90-C-97-M) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Paul F. McTighe, Jr., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of 

Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. 

Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, 

Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in this action. 

Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, 

in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate 

party at the time of the underlying decision. 

Appellate Case: 95-5244 Document: 01019292014 Date Filed: 07/31/1996 Page: 1 
Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney, Phil Pinnel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 

Joseph B. Liken, Acting Chief Counsel, Social Security Administration, Tina M. 

Waddell, Acting Deputy Chief Counsel, Social Security Administration, Randall 

Halford, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Social 

Security Administration, Dallas, Texas, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before EBEL, BARRETT, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff Velma Mornes, on behalf of her children, claimants Jesse L. 

Norment and Colecia Norment, appeals 1 the magistrate judge's decision affirming 

the Secretary's ruling denying her request for children's benefits under the Social 

Security Act. 2 Claimants' applications were denied both initially and on 

reconsideration. After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) also denied 

their request. On appeal, the magistrate judge concluded additional evidence 

might be relevant and ordered a remand. A second hearing was held, at which 

plaintiff and the claimants were represented by counsel. The ALJ again denied 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 1Oth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

2 The parties consented to disposition of the case by the magistrate judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Accordingly, our jurisdiction over this appeal 

derives from§ 636(c)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

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Appellate Case: 95-5244 Document: 01019292014 Date Filed: 07/31/1996 Page: 2 
benefits, finding that the claimants were not the children of the deceased and were 

not entitled to surviving children's benefits because the insured was not living 

with them and was not contributing to their support at the time of his death. On 

appeal to the district court, the magistrate judge found that there was evidence the 

children were the children of the deceased wage earner, but affirmed the ALJ's 

denial of benefits because there was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ' s 

finding the deceased was not living with or supporting the children at the time of 

his death. Plaintiff appeals this finding. 

"Our review of the district court's decision is limited to determining 

whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the 

Secretary's decision and whether the Secretary applied the proper legal standards. 

In child benefit cases, the claimant bears the burden of proving entitlement as the 

child of a deceased insured wage earner." Younger ex rel. Younger v. Shalala, 30 

F.3d 1265, 1267 (1Oth Cir. 1994)( citation omitted). 

Under the Social Security Act, the unmarried minor child of a deceased 

individual who was insured under the Act may receive survivors' benefits if he or 

she was "dependent upon such individual" prior to his death. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). 

Because claimants were unable to satisfy alternative statutory criteria for child 

survivor benefits, claimants were required to meet the criteria of 

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Appellate Case: 95-5244 Document: 01019292014 Date Filed: 07/31/1996 Page: 3 
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii), which provides that a child is deemed to be the child 

of an insured if: 

such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the 

[Secretary] to have been the mother or father of the applicant, and 

such insured individual was living with or contributing to the support 

of the applicant at the time such insured individual died. 

(Emphasis supplied). Regulations explain the requirement that the insured was 

"contributing to the support of the applicant:" 

Contributions must be made regularly and must be large enough to 

meet an important part of [the claimant's] ordinary living costs. 

Ordinary living costs are the costs for [the claimant's] food, shelter, 

routine medical care·, and similar necessities. If the insured person 

only provides gifts or donations once in a while for special purposes, 

they will not be considered contributions for [the claimant's] support. 

20 C.F .R. § 404.366(a)(2). "The purpose of the 'regular and substantial' 

regulation is to prevent the child from reaping a windfall by virtue of the death of 

a father whose contribution to the child's support would not have been as large as 

that provided by the child's survivor benefits." Bennemon ex rel. Williams v. 

Sullivan, 914 F.2d 987, 990-91 (7th Cir. 1990). 

Because the insured was not living with the children at the time of his 

death, the claimants were required to show he was contributing to their support. 

Plaintiff stated in her application for benefits that the insured was not making 

regular and substantial contributions to the claimants' support at the time of his 

death. R. Vol. II at 3 8. At the initial hearing, plaintiff did not testify or provide 

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Appellate Case: 95-5244 Document: 01019292014 Date Filed: 07/31/1996 Page: 4 
any evidence that the insured had been contributing anything to the children at the 

time of his death even though she also testified the insured was employed by 

Safeway. R. Vol. II at 24. The only evidence plaintiff presented in support of her 

assertion that the insured contributed to claimants' support was at the second 

hearing, when she testified that approximately once a month she and her children 

traveled to where the insured lived for weekend visits with the insured, as well as 

her mother and friends. She testified that during these visits the insured would let 

them stay in his apartment, bought the children food and sometimes bought them 

clothes or gave them $40 or $50. Id. at 96-99. 

We agree with the magistrate judge that the insured's contributions during 

claimants' visits "were small, and only occasional, or sporadic [and do] not 

establish that the claimant children were dependent upon the decedent for their 

support." R. Vol. I at 14. These contributions were in the nature of gifts and 

were neither regular nor large enough to cover claimants' ordinary living 

expenses. See Robinson ex rel. Virgies v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 665, 668 (8th Cir. 

1994)(holding that contributions of $4.00, $50.00, $172, and money to buy shoes 

and milk insufficient to meet the "regular and substantial" test); Jones ex rel. 

·Carr v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 647, 648 (8th Cir. 1987)(holding that bimonthly gifts of 

candy during visits was insufficient to meet the "regular and substantial" test); 

and Moretti v. Bowen, 806 F.2d 1238, 1240 (5th Cir. 1986)(holding that 

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Appellate Case: 95-5244 Document: 01019292014 Date Filed: 07/31/1996 Page: 5 
contributions of $600 and gift of a stereo, pool cue and watch worth 

approximately $300 did not constitute regular and substantial support). We 

conclude the ALJ's denial of benefits is supported by substantial evidence. 

The judgment of the magistrate judge sitting for the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

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