Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-19-08043/USCOURTS-ca10-19-08043-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barbara Campbell
Not Party
Joe Campbell
Appellee
John and Jane Does
Appellee
Tri County Telephone Association, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

TRI COUNTY TELEPHONE 

ASSOCIATION, INC., a Wyoming 

corporation, 

 Plaintiff Counter Defendant –

 Appellant,

v.

JOE CAMPBELL, an individual; JOHN 

AND JANE DOES 1-10, 

 Defendants Counterclaimants –

 Appellees,

and

BARBARA CAMPBELL, an individual, 

 Defendant Counterclaimant.

No. 19-8043

(D.C. No. 2:17-CV-00089-NDF)

(D. Wyo.)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

Before LUCERO, HOLMES, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

This matter is before the court on the jurisdictional show cause orders it issued on 

January 7, 2020 and January 22, 2020 and the responses of Tri County Telephone 

Association to those orders. Upon consideration of these materials, the district court 

docket, and the applicable law, the court dismisses this appeal for the reasons set forth 

below.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 13, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 19-8043 Document: 010110303989 Date Filed: 02/13/2020 Page: 1
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In the case underlying this appeal, Tri County Telephone Association sued its 

former director, Joe Campbell, his wife, and John and Jane Does 1-10 for

misappropriation of trade secrets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 

(Count I); intentional or tortious interference with Tri County’s contract and business 

expectancies (Counts II-IV); violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1030(a)(2)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) (Counts V-VI); breach of a non-disclosure 

agreement (Count VII); and conversion of a company-issued computer (Count VIII).

The parties stipulated to the voluntary dismissal with prejudice of defendant 

Barbara Campbell [ECF No. 115], and the district court dismissed Tri County Telephone 

Association’s claims against her and her counterclaims against it with prejudice [ECF 

No. 116]. The district court also dismissed Tri County’s federal claims against Joe 

Campbell [ECF Nos. 14, 59, 140] and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Tri County’s state claims against Mr. Campbell [ECF No. 140].

The district court order granting the stipulated dismissal of Mrs. Campbell’s 

counterclaims, however, specifically stated that “[t]his order does not affect . . . 

Defendant Joe Campbell’s remaining counterclaims in any manner,” [ECF No. 116], nor 

does the district court’s summary judgment order or entry of judgment address Mr.

Campbell’s counterclaims. [See, e.g., ECF No. 140 (declining to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over “[Tri County]’s state-based claims” against Mr. Campbell); ECF 

No. 141 (stating that Tri County “shall take nothing and Defendant, Joe Campbell is 

entitled to judgment in his favor on all claims asserted against them [sic] by Plaintiff”)]. 

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“A party generally may not take an appeal under § 1291 until there has been a 

decision by the district court that ends the litigation on the merits.” Heimann v. Snead, 

133 F.3d 767, 769 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A dismissal without prejudice of the remaining claims in a multi-claim action does not 

constitute a final, appealable judgment. Id. (holding that judgment was not final where 

remaining counterclaims were dismissed without prejudice); cf. Schmier v. McDonald’s 

LLC, 569 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that a voluntary dismissal with

prejudice operates as a final adjudication on the merits). 

At the time the district court entered its judgment, Mr. Campbell had not 

dismissed his counterclaims against Tri County, nor had the district court otherwise 

disposed of those claims. Accordingly, this court issued a jurisdictional show cause order, 

questioning the finality of the district court’s judgment and thus of appellate jurisdiction.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also Albright v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th 

Cir. 1995).

Following issuance of the show cause order, Tri County filed a response to which 

it attached a Stipulation Acknowledging Dismissal of Counterclaims Without Prejudice, 

which stipulation the parties filed with the district court to “acknowledge, stipulate and 

agree that the counterclaims pled by Joe Campbell . . . were dismissed in that action 

without prejudice.” 

This court then issued a second jurisdictional show cause order on the basis that 

“[p]arties may not confer appellate jurisdiction upon [this court] by obtaining a voluntary 

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dismissal without prejudice of some claims so that others may be appealed.” Heimann, 

133 F.3d at 769. 

Tri County responded to the second show cause order—not by obtaining a 

dismissal of the counterclaims “with prejudice” or seeking certification under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 54(b)—but instead arguing that: (1) Mr. Campbell voluntarily dismissed his 

counterclaims without prejudice on his erroneous belief that the claims were premature 

and that his voluntary dismissal is determinative of those counterclaims; (2) the dismissal 

of Mr. Campbell’s counterclaims without prejudice is “untethered” to the district court 

rulings underlying this appeal and to the appeal itself; and (3) Tri County’s appeal is thus 

proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The argument misunderstands the effect of a dismissal 

without prejudice. See Cook v. Rocky Mtn. Bank, 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992) 

(“Because . . . two claims for relief were dismissed without prejudice, [plaintiff] remains 

free to file another complaint raising those same claims.”). The argument is thus 

insufficient to overcome this court’s “general rule . . . that a party cannot obtain appellate 

jurisdiction where the district court has dismissed at least one claim without prejudice 

because the case has not been fully disposed of in the lower court.” Jackson v. Volvo 

Trucks N. Am., Inc., 462 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006).

The district court did not adjudicate Mr. Campbell’s counterclaims but, rather, Mr. 

Campbell dismissed those claims without prejudice. “Whether the claims which remain 

viable belong to Plaintiffs or Defendants makes little difference when one considers the 

very purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b),” “[t]he plain language of [which] equates 

counterclaims with all other claims.” See Heimann, 133 F.3d at 769. Because the district 

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court disposed of Tri County’s federal claims on the merits but did not adjudicate Mr. 

Campbell’s counterclaims, “the court disposed of ‘fewer than all the claims’ on the 

merits.” See id. Accordingly, the district court’s orders disposing of Tri County’s federal 

claims against Mr. Campbell are not yet final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 

this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Tri County’s appeal. See id.

The court grants the parties’ respective motions to file volumes 2 and 3 of the 

appendix and volumes 2 through 16 of the supplemental appendix under seal. 

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Entered for the Court

CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk

by: Lisa A. Lee

 Counsel to the Clerk

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