Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01191/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01191-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
ArcelorMittal Atlantique et Lorraine
Appellant
ArcelorMittal France
Appellant
Arcelormittal USA LLC
Appellant
Severstal Dearborn LLC
Appellee
Wheeling-Nisshin Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ARCELORMITTAL FRANCE, ARCELORMITTAL 

ATLANTIQUE ET LORRAINE, ARCELORMITTAL 

USA LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

AK STEEL CORPORATION, SEVERSTAL 

DEARBORN, INC., WHEELING-NISSHIN INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2014-1189

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 1:10-CV-00050, Judge Sue L. 

Robinson.

-------------------------------------------------------------

ARCELORMITTAL FRANCE, ARCELORMITTAL 

ATLANTIQUE ET LORRAINE, ARCELORMITTAL 

USA LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

AK STEEL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

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2 ARCELORMITTAL FRANCE v. AK STEEL CORPORATION

2014-1190

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 1:13-CV-00685, Judge Sue L. 

Robinson.

-------------------------------------------------------------

ARCELORMITTAL FRANCE, ARCELORMITTAL 

ATLANTIQUE ET LORRAINE, ARCELORMITTAL 

USA LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

SEVERSTAL DEARBORN LLC, 

WHEELING-NISSHIN INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2014-1191

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 1:13-CV-00686, Judge Sue L. 

Robinson.

______________________ 

Decided: May 12, 2015

______________________ 

CONSTANTINE L. TRELA, JR., Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by DAVID T. PRITIKIN; RACHEL HEATHER TOWNSEND,

Washington, DC; JEFFREY B. BOVE, Wilmington, DE.

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ARCELORMITTAL FRANCE v. AK STEEL CORPORATION 3

CHRISTOPHER NEIL SIPES, Covington & Burling LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees. Defendant-appellee AK Steel Corporation also represented 

by JEFFREY HOWARD LERNER, RODERICK R. MCKELVIE. 

Defendants-appellees Severstal Dearborn, Inc., WheelingNisshin Inc. represented by RICHARD WILLIAM HOFFMANN, 

DAVID J. SIMONELLI, Reising Ethington PC, Troy, MI. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

HUGHES, Circuit Judge.

ArcelorMittal appeals from the decisions of the United 

States District Court for the District of Delaware granting 

summary judgment that U.S. Patent No. RE44,153E (the 

RE153 patent) is invalid because certain claims were 

broadened after two years of issuance in violation of 35 

U.S.C. § 251.1 Because the district court was bound by 

our construction of the original claims and the reissue 

claims broadened that construction, we affirm the district 

court’s finding that claims 1 through 23 of the RE153 

patent are invalid under § 251. However, because newly

added claims 24 and 25 were not broadened during reissue, we reverse-in-part and remand for further proceedings.

I 

The RE153 patent is a reissue of U.S. Patent No. 

6,296,805 (the ’805 patent), which we previously reviewed 

in ArcelorMittal France v. AK Steel Corp., 700 F.3d 1314 

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (ArcelorMittal I). The ’805 and RE153

1 This case is governed by the statutory provisions 

in effect before the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 

Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), because Appellants filed the RE153 patent before March 16, 2013. 

 

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patents share a specification and have identical lone 

independent claims directed toward a specific type of steel 

sheet that has “a very high mechanical resistance” after 

thermal treatment. See ’805 patent col. 4. l. 64–col. 5 l. 

15; RE153 patent col. 5 ll. 8–25. 

On January 22, 2010, ArcelorMittal filed suit against

AK Steel Corp., Severstal Dearborn, Inc., and WheelingNisshin Inc., alleging infringement of the ’805 patent. 

The district court construed the phrase “a very high 

mechanical resistance” as limited to steel with a tensile 

strength greater than 1500 MPa. ArcelorMittal France v. 

AK Steel Corp., 755 F. Supp. 2d 542, 549 (D. Del. 2010). 

After a jury found the ’805 patent not infringed and 

invalid as anticipated and obvious, ArcelorMittal appealed. On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s construction of “a very high mechanical resistance,” but 

reversed and remanded on other grounds. ArcelorMittal I, 700 F.3d at 1321–23, 1326. 

While its first appeal was pending, ArcelorMittal

prosecuted an application for reissue of the ’805 patent to 

correct the district court’s construction of “very high 

mechanical resistance.” This application issued on April 

16, 2013 as the RE153 patent and added a number of 

dependent claims, including: claim 23, which recites “[t]he 

coated steel sheet of claim 1, wherein said mechanical 

resistance is in excess of 1000 MPa”; claim 24, which 

confines claim 1 to the construction we affirmed in ArcelorMittal I by claiming “[t]he coated steel sheet of claim 1, 

wherein said mechanical resistance is in excess of 1500 

MPa”; and claim 25, which depends on and further limits 

claim 24. RE153 patent col. 6 ll. 50–55. 

On remand, ArcelorMittal amended its complaint to 

substitute the now-surrendered ’805 patent for the RE153

patent (the Remand Action). ArcelorMittal also filed new 

suits for patent infringement against AK Steel (the 685 

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ARCELORMITTAL FRANCE v. AK STEEL CORPORATION 5

Action) and Severstal Dearborn and Wheeling-Nisshin

(the 686 Action), alleging new acts of infringement of the 

RE153 patent.2 Appellees moved for summary judgment 

in the Remand Action, arguing claims 1 through 23 of the 

RE153 patent were invalid because they were impermissibly broadened in the reissue proceedings. The district 

court granted the motion and applied its ruling across all 

three actions, invalidating claims 1 through 23 of the 

RE153 patent and sua sponte invalidating claims 24 and 

25. ArcelorMittal appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

II 

We review the grant or denial of summary judgment 

under the law of the regional circuit. Microstrategy, Inc. 

v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

The Third Circuit reviews the grant or denial of summary 

judgment de novo. Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 

F.3d 1007, 1013 (3d Cir. 2008). Whether amendments 

made during reissue enlarge the scope of the claim, and 

therefore violate § 251, is a matter of claim construction, 

which we review de novo, while giving deference to subsidiary factual determinations. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. 

Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 840–41 (2015); see also N. 

Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 

1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

On appeal, ArcelorMittal argues the RE153 claims are 

no broader than the original ’805 claims because the 

2 These cases are: ArcelorMittal France, ArcelorMittal Atlantique et Lorraine, and ArcelorMittal USA LLC v. 

AK Steel Corp., Civ. No. 1:13-CV-00685 (D. Del), and 

ArcelorMittal France, ArcelorMittal Atlantique et Lorraine, and ArcelorMittal USA LLC v. Severstal Dearborn 

LLC and Wheeling-Nisshin, Civ. No. 1:13-CV-00686 (D. 

Del).

 

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successful prosecution of the RE153 patent demonstrates 

the Patent Office’s belief that the term “very high mechanical resistance” in the ’805 patent was broader than 

we had construed it to be. ArcelorMittal also argues the 

district court erred by invalidating all claims of the 

RE153 patent, including those that were not broadened. 

Because the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibited the 

district court from revisiting the construction of “very 

high mechanical resistance” in the ’805 patent, we agree 

that claims 1 through 23 were impermissibly broadened 

in violation of § 251. But we find that the district court 

erred by invalidating claims 24 and 25, which were not 

broadened. Accordingly, we affirm-in-part, reverse-inpart, and remand for further proceedings.

A 

The law-of-the-case doctrine “posits that when a court 

decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue 

to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the 

same case.” Banks v. U.S., 741 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 

2014) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating 

Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815–16 (1988)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “The mandate rule, encompassed by the 

broader law-of-the-case doctrine, dictates that ‘an inferior 

court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court.’” Id. (quoting Briggs v. 

Pa. R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948)); see also Bankers 

Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d 

Cir. 1985).

Under the mandate rule and the broader law-of-thecase doctrine, a court may only deviate from a decision in 

a prior appeal if “extraordinary circumstances” exist. 

Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Magnesium Elektron, 123 

F.3d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1997). But “such departures are 

rare.” Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 383 F.3d 

1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). ArceCase: 14-1191 Document: 18-2 Page: 6 Filed: 05/12/2015
ARCELORMITTAL FRANCE v. AK STEEL CORPORATION 7

lorMittal argues that the Patent Office’s reissue of the 

RE153 patent is “new evidence” sufficient to constitute 

“extraordinary circumstances” to deviate from our clear 

mandate and construction of “very high mechanical 

resistance” in claim 1.

The “new evidence” exception permits courts to reconsider a previously decided issue in limited circumstances. 

“This exception . . . makes sense because when the record 

contains new evidence, ‘the question has not really been 

decided earlier and is posed for the first time.’” Hamilton 

v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 787 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Bridge 

v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 981 F.2d 97, 103 (3d Cir. 1992)). 

“But this is so only if the new evidence differs materially 

from the evidence of record when the issue was first 

decided and if it provides less support for that decision.” 

Id. That is not the case here.

The successful prosecution of the RE153 patent is not 

“new evidence” sufficient to trigger the extraordinary 

circumstances exception to the mandate rule and the lawof-the-case doctrine. Permitting a reissue patent to 

disturb a previous claim construction of the original 

claims would turn the validity analysis under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 251 on its head. The basic inquiry under § 251 requires 

comparing the scope of the claims of the reissue patent to 

the scope of the original claims to determine if the reissue 

patent “contains within its scope any conceivable apparatus or process which would not have infringed the 

original patent.” Tillotson, Ltd. v. Walbro Corp., 831 F.2d 

1033, 1037 n.2, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1987). If the reissue claim 

itself could be used to redefine the scope of the original 

claim, this comparison would be meaningless. 

Moreover, we have soundly rejected ArcelorMittal’s 

argument in the similar context of determining whether a 

reexamined patent was improperly broadened during 

prosecution. See Anderson v. Int’l Eng’g & Mfg, Inc., 160 

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F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also 35 U.S.C. § 305. 

In Anderson, we rejected the argument that changes to a 

claim during reexamination “simply clarified the scope of 

the claim as originally granted” and that “the claims have 

always encompassed” the broader meaning that resulted 

from the reexamination. Anderson, 160 F.3d at 1349. In 

doing so, we explained that “[t]he ultimate question of 

construction is not whether [the original] specification 

could have supported claims of the scope he now attributes to original claim 1 [i.e., the scope of the reissue 

claim]—although that would be a factor in determining 

the correct claim construction. The question is whether, 

objectively viewed, the original claims were, in fact and 

law, generic [i.e., as broad] as Anderson asserts.” Id. 

Thus, the dispositive question is whether the original 

claim has the meaning sought by ArcelorMittal for the 

reissue claims—not what the original claim means in 

light of the reissue claims. See id. at 1347. And we have 

already determined the proper scope of claim 1 of the ’805 

patent in ArcelorMittal I. 

Under certain circumstances, the prosecution history 

of reissue or reexamination proceedings may be relevant 

to determine the scope of an original claim. See, e.g.,

Howes v. Med. Components, Inc., 814 F.2d 638, 645 (Fed. 

Cir. 1987) (finding that disclaimers made during a copending reissue prosecution to overcome prior art rejections were relevant to narrow the interpretation of a 

disputed term for infringement purposes); E.I. Du Pont de 

Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 

1439 (Fed. Cir. 1988). But we have never found that such 

reissue prosecution history is relevant to whether an 

applicant broadened the scope of an original claim in the 

§ 251 analysis. Nor could we, since such a finding would 

run contrary to the plain language and purpose of § 251.

Moreover, the prosecution history of a reissue claim 

can certainly be relevant to determine the scope of the

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ARCELORMITTAL FRANCE v. AK STEEL CORPORATION 9

reissue claim, and it is entirely possible that the prosecution history includes disavowals of claim scope that could 

preserve the reissue claim in the face of an apparent 

broadening. See, e.g., Tillotson, 831 F.2d at 1037. But 

that is not the case here. The only relevant change is the 

addition of a dependent claim which has the practical 

effect of expanding the scope of claim 1 to cover claim 

scope expressly rejected by a previous claim construction 

ruling, and ArcelorMittal makes no argument that the 

reissue claims are otherwise narrowed. To permit latergenerated reissue prosecution history to inform the scope

of the very same claim limitation from the original patent 

would run afoul of the basic inquiry laid out in Anderson 

and Tillotson. 

Accordingly, the prosecution history of the reissue patent here is not “new evidence” of the scope of the original 

claims for the purposes of the § 251 inquiry. Under the 

law-of-the-case doctrine, therefore, the district court was 

bound by this court’s prior construction of the original 

claims, which ArcelorMittal concedes was narrower than 

the scope of the reissue claims. Based on this prior construction, the district court correctly found that claims 1

through 23 of the reissue patent impermissibly broadened 

the original claims and are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 251. 

B 

Having found claims 1 through 23 invalid under 

§ 251, we must next determine the fate of claims 24 and 

25, which both parties agree have the same scope as claim 

1 of the ’805 patent—that is, they were not broadened on 

reissue. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the 

district court improperly focused on whether the patent

had been improperly broadened, instead of undertaking a 

claim-by-claim analysis as required by statute and our 

precedent. 

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We begin with the plain language of the relevant 

statutes. Section 251 provides that “[n]o reissued patent 

shall be granted enlarging the scope of the claims of the 

original patent unless applied for within two years from 

the grant of the original patent” and a reissue patent may 

only be issued absent “deceptive intention” by the applicant. 35 U.S.C. § 251.

Section 282 provides, in relevant part: “[e]ach claim of 

a patent . . . shall be presumed valid independently of the 

validity of other claims[.]” Id. § 282. And “[i]nvalidity of 

the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with 

any requirement of [35 U.S.C. §§ 100 et seq.] or 251” 

“shall be [a] defense[] in any action involving the validity 

of infringement of a patent . . . .” Id.

Section 282 plainly states that a patent’s claims are 

presumed valid independent of one another. And § 282

uses the same language to reference § 251 as it does 

§§ 100 et seq., which we have long held to only apply on a 

claim-by-claim basis. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (listing “[i]nvalidity 

of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified 

in [35 U.S.C. §§ 100 et seq.]” as a defense); see, e.g., Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., a Div. of DEC Int’l, 740 F.2d 

1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (reversing a decision invalidating an entire patent based solely on the ground that 

some claims were invalid as obvious). Compare 35 U.S.C. 

§ 251 (“No reissued patent shall be granted . . . .”), with

id. § 102 (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . .”), and id. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained . . . .”). Moreover, the plain language of § 253 

confirms that “[w]henever, without any deceptive intention, a claim of a patent is invalid the remaining claims 

shall not thereby be rendered invalid.” 

Additionally, we have previously rejected the argument that a defective reissue application invalidates not 

only newly added reissue claims, but also original claims 

carried over from the original application. HewlettCase: 14-1191 Document: 18-2 Page: 10 Filed: 05/12/2015
ARCELORMITTAL FRANCE v. AK STEEL CORPORATION 11

Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1566

(Fed. Cir. 1989). There, we were presented with a stronger case for invalidating the entirety of a reissue patent 

than the case before us, but declined to do so. We found 

newly added reissue claims invalid due to a defective 

reissue declaration, but declined to invalidate the original 

claims that were carried over in the reissue application 

despite a perception that the improper reissue application 

“infected” the entirety of the reissue patent. Id. at 1566–

67.3

In rejecting the argument that the entire reissue patent should be held invalid, we explained that “[t]here is 

no disagreement with the long-standing proposition that 

invalidation of a new claim (added during reissue) on 

prior art does not invalidate the other claims.” Id. at 1566 

(citation omitted). “Nor could there be any disagreement, 

for the patent statute provides: ‘Whenever, without any 

deceptive intention, a claim of a patent is invalid the 

remaining claims shall not thereby be rendered invalid.’” 

Id. at 1566–67 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1982)). We noted 

that § 253 alone “offers little guidance, however, because 

the invalidity resulting from a defective reissue application may be viewed as affecting the entire patent and not 

merely any particular claim.” Id. However, we nevertheless “[found] support for upholding carry-over claims in 

Gage v. Herring. There, the Supreme Court expressed its 

view that the inadequacy of the ground for reissuing a 

patent did not ‘impair the validity of the original claim 

which is repeated and separately stated in the reissued 

patent.’” Id. (quoting Gage v. Herring, 107 U.S. 640, 646 

(1883)) (citations omitted). 

3 Here, there is no allegation or evidence that ArcelorMittal acted with deceptive intent or submitted a 

defective reissue application. Thus, we cannot say that 

the entire reissue application is tainted.

 

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While claims 24 and 25 are not identical to the claims 

of the ’805 patent since they identify the specific level 

“1500 MPa” as being the level of “mechanical resistance” 

rather than referring to “very high mechanical resistance,” they nevertheless “repeat[ ] and separately 

state[ ]” the scope of claim 1 of the ’805 patent as construed by the district court and later affirmed by this 

court. Appellees concede as much, and we are not persuaded to conclude otherwise. Appellee’s Br. 42 (“Indeed, 

the only claims of the RE153 patent that were not themselves broadened were two dependent claims . . . .”). And, 

while we are mindful of the concerns over ArcelorMittal’s 

attempts to modify the district court’s claim construction 

through the reissue process, we are not persuaded that 

these policy concerns demand we part from our precedent. 

Accordingly, we find the district court erred in invalidating claims 24 and 25 of the RE153 patent.

III

We conclude that the district court was bound by our 

construction of claim 1 of the ’805 patent and that the 

RE153 patent does not constitute new evidence sufficient 

to meet the “extraordinary circumstances” exception to 

the mandate rule. The district court properly concluded 

that claims 1 through 23 of the RE153 patent were improperly broadened under § 251 and therefore invalid. 

However, the district court erred in invalidating claims 24 

and 25, which the parties concede maintain the same 

scope as the original claims. Because the district court’s 

summary judgment orders invalidated the entire RE153

patent, we decline the Appellees’ invitation to reach the 

merits, and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion and our mandate in ArcelorMittal I. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, AND 

REMANDED

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