Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02738/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02738-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ruben Rodriguez-Pando
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

F ILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Stat.ea Court of Appea]s 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 2 G 1988 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JUAN LUJAN-MIRANDA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 86-2737 

(D.N.M.) 

(D.C. No. 86-220) 

Before*McKAY and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and ALLEY, District 

Judge. 

Juan Lujan-Miranda appeals his conviction for violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l), possession with intent to distribute cocaine 

in excess of one kilogram. 

On July 9, 1986, Officers Frisk and Denton, each in separate 

patrol cars, were traveling west on County Road 21 in southwestern 

New Mexico. They had been informed that narcotics were being 

transported by airplane to that vicinity and were looking for 

evidence of aircraft landings. At approximately 10:00 a.m., they 

observed a red pickup truck followed closely by a blue pickup 

truck approaching them. Officer Frisk testified that the blue 

p i ckup was weaving erratically between the shoulder and the middle 

of the road. Suspecting an intoxicated driver, Officer Frisk 

* Honorable Wayne E. Alley, United States District Judge for 

the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 86-2738 Document: 010110028277 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 1 
turned around to follow the blue pickup. 1 This action prompted 

the driver of the red pickup to substantially increase his speed. 

Officer Denton, who had also turned around, activated his 

emergency equipment, passed Officer Frisk and the blue pickup, and 

pursued the red pickup. As he passed the blue truck, Officer 

Denton noticed that it contained a number of packages which he 

thought were drugs. He continued to pursue the red truck at a 

high rate of speed -- he testified that at one point his 

speedometer registered 100 miles per hour. 

Lujan finally stopped shortly after turning onto a side road. 

He seemed nervous and appeared to be intoxicated. Officer Denton 

requested permission to search the vehicle and found a pair of 

binoculars and a set of reflectors with dirt-encrusted footings. 

He believed that these items had been used to land a plane. 

Meanwhile, Officer Frisk had stopped the blue pickup. When 

the driver of that truck reached for a gun, Officer Frisk radioed 

Officer Denton for help. At this point Denton asked Lujan to 

accompany him back to the blue pickup. A search of that vehicle 

revealed over 1100 pounds of cocaine. 

After both men had been arrested, officers obtained search 

warrants to get urine samples for drug testing. 

Lujan raises several issues on appeal. First he argues that 

he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney 

did not ask the court to hold separate trials for Lujan and his 

1 Lujan's codefendant, Ruben Rodriguez-Pando, was driving the 

blue pickup. We deal with his appeal of his conviction on the 

same charge in a separate opinion. United States~ RodriguezPando, No. 86-2738, slip opinion (10th Cir. February 26, 1988). 

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codefendant, Pando, and also because the attorney did not 

"discover and present" certain alibi evidence. Second, he 

contends that all evidence seized subsequent to the initial stop 

should have been suppressed. Finally, he argues that the court 

erroneously admitted the results of the urinalysis at trial. In 

this regard, he attacks the validity of the warrant used to obtain 

the sample; he also claims that the prejudicial impact of the 

evidence outweighed its probative value. 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

To succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

Lujan must demonstrate that "counsel made errors so serious that 

counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and that "the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

The record reveals that counsel was aware of the potential 

problems posed by the joint trial and brought them to the 

attention of the court on the first day of trial suggesting that 

severance might become necessary. Although he did not formally 

move for severance, he continued to voice concerns throughout the 

trial. We find no error "so serious as to deprive the defendant 

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. 

Counsel's decision not to present certain witnesses is a 

trial strategy decision which Lujan has not shown to be an error 

so serious as to deprive him of the effective assistance of 

counsel. Even if counsel was not aware of the alibi evidence, we 

cannot say that his performance was constitutionally inadequate. 

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The record reveals that counsel was fully prepared for trial and 

presented a substantial defense on behalf of his client. He 

exercised the skill, judgment, and diligence of a reasonably 

competent defense attorney. 

Suppression of Evidence 

Lujan's next contention is that all evidence seized 

subsequent to the initial stop should have been suppressed. He 

argues that the stops of both his and Pando's trucks were 

improper. 

We hold that the initial stops of both vehicles were based on 

articulable suspicion and were therefore justified. United States 

~ Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1573 (1985). The district court found 

that Pando's truck ''was moving from side to side and left the 

paved portion of the road once in a while. It also weaved over 

the center of the road." Erratic driving of this nature justified 

the officer's belief that Pando was driving while intoxicated and 

made the investigative stop proper. Lujan attempted to elude the 

officers. The district court found that he "was traveling at a 

high rate of speed." This provided sufficient basis for the 

investigative stop of Lujan. 

Urinalysis 

Finally, Lujan raises several objections to the use of the 

urinalysis results at trial. He argues first that the affidavit 

used to obtain the search warrant was insufficient to establish 

probable cause. The affidavit stated: 

[Lujan was] [d]riving a vehicle in which a twenty dollar 

bill believed to containe [sic] cocaine residue was 

found lying beside where vehicle had been parked. 

Subject showed signes [sic] of withdrawal from 

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intoxicating substances. 

condition. 

Red watery eyes, stuporous 

We hold that these facts were ''sufficient to allow a neutral 

magistrate to reasonably conclude that probable cause" existed. 

United States~ Marcello, 570 F.2d 324, 325 (10th Cir. 1978). 

Lujan next asserts that the facts listed in the indictment 

were erroneous and that in relying on these facts the magistrate 

"did not exercise independent judgment.'' In particular, Lujan 

argues that "red, watery eyes, and [a] stuporous condition" are 

not symptoms of cocaine use or withdrawal. Before Lujan may 

attack the veracity of the facts in the indictment, he must make a 

"substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly 

and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was 

included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit," and the 

allegedly false statement must be "necessary to the finding of 

probable cause." Franks~ Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). 

Lujan has not made a substantial showing that the affidavit 

contained intentionally false statements. Indeed, an expert for 

the defense testified that "bloodshot'' eyes are sometimes an 

indication of cocaine intoxication. 

Lujan raises two more issues regarding the urinalysis. He 

argues that the urinalysis evidence was tainted because the 

initial stop was unlawful. We have already held that the stop was 

valid. Finally, Lujan claims that the prejudicial impact of the 

evidence outweighed its probative value. "A trial court has broad 

discretion to determine whether the probative value of evidence 

outweighs the risk of prejudice." United States v. Primrose, 718 

F.2d 1484, 1492 (10th Cir. 1983). We cannot say that the district 

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court abused its discretion by holding the evidence admissible. 

Lujan's defense was that he was not involved with Pando nor the 

cocaine. His own use of cocaine at the relevant time casts doubt 

on this story and is therefore probative. Lujan argues, however, 

that any probative value is vitiated by the lack of reliability 

inherent in the tests used. The question of how much weight 

should be given to this evidence was properly left to the jury. 

See United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 1979). 

AFFIRMED. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

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