Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03108/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03108-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John F. Fordley
Plaintiff
William Muniz
Defendant
Paul Shleffar
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN F. FORDLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM MUNIZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-03108-DMR (PR)

ORDER OF PARTIAL 

DISMISSAL AND SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”),1

has filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials at 

SVSP have refused to provide him with a Kosher diet that accommodates his Jewish religious 

beliefs in violation of his constitutional rights. He also alleges that he was denied a Kosher diet 

while he was previously incarcerated at the California Institute for Men (“CIM”) in Chino and the 

California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) in Corcoran. Lastly, Plaintiff 

alleges that prison officials have “lost [his] property on 3 different occasions and [have] refused to 

reinburst [sic] [him] for lost property.” Dkt. 1 at 5.2 

 

1

Plaintiff has informed the court that he is scheduled to be transferred to another prison. Dkt. 4 at 

1. However, to date, Plaintiff has not yet notified the court as to whether the transfer has occurred. 

The court notes that if Plaintiff is transferred to another prison, then it is possible that his claims of 

injunctive relief may become moot. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995)

(When an inmate is transferred to another prison and there is no reasonable expectation nor 

demonstrated probability that he will again be subjected to the prison conditions from which he 

seeks injunctive relief, the claims for injunctive should be dismissed as moot.). However, such a 

determination cannot be made until Plaintiff’s transfer has taken place.

2

Page number citations refer to those assigned by the court’s electronic case management filing 

system and not those assigned by Plaintiff.

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Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Id. at 4. Therefore, this matter has 

been assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. 

In his complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants: California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Jewish Chaplain Paul Shleffar; SVSP Warden William

Muniz; CIM Jewish Chaplain F. Hadjadj; and CSATF Warden Stu Sherman. Plaintiff only seeks 

injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiff requests to be issued a Kosher diet and to be reimbursed 

for his lost property. 

His motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted in a separate written 

Order. 

Venue is proper because certain events giving rise to the claims are alleged to have 

occurred at SVSP, which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). However, 

any claims against prison staff at CIM or CSATF must be brought in the proper venue, which is 

the Eastern District of California, where the both CIM and CSATF are located. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391(b) (venue is proper in the district in which (1) any defendant resides, if all of the 

defendants reside in the same state, (2) the district in which a substantial part of the events or 

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of 

the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no 

district in which the action may otherwise be brought). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against CIM 

and CSATF employees—including Defendants Hadjadj and Sherman—are DISMISSED without 

prejudice to Plaintiff asserting them in a complaint filed in the proper venue. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1406 (court may dismiss or transfer claims where venue is improper).

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se

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pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

II. LEGAL CLAIMS

A. First Amendment Claim

Plaintiff claims that he is Jewish and that he has been denied the appropriate Kosher diet at 

SVSP.

Inmates “have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health 

that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 

1987). Allegations that prison officials refuse to provide a healthy diet conforming to sincere 

religious beliefs states a cognizable claim under section 1983 of denial of the right to exercise 

religious practices and beliefs. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (Jewish inmate 

claiming denial of kosher diet), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1192 (1994); McElyea, 833 F.2d at 198 

(same); Moorish Science Temple, Inc. v. Smith, 693 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1982) (Muslim inmate 

claiming denial of proper religious diet).

Plaintiff states that Defendants Shleffar and Muniz are responsible for denying him Kosher 

meals at SVSP. This claim is sufficient to proceed against these Defendants.

B. Claim Relating to Property Loss

To the extent Plaintiff claims that prison employees at SVSP intentionally or negligently 

lost his personal property, that claim is DISMISSED. Neither the intentional nor negligent 

deprivation or destruction of an inmate’s property states a claim under section 1983 if the 

deprivation was random and unauthorized. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) 

(intentional destruction of inmate’s property); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-44 (1981) 

(state employee negligently lost prisoner’s hobby kit), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels 

v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). The availability of an adequate state post-deprivation 

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remedy, e.g., a state tort action, precludes relief because it provides sufficient procedural due 

process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990) (where state cannot foresee, and 

therefore provide meaningful hearing prior to, deprivation statutory provision for post-deprivation 

hearing or common law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation satisfies due process). California 

law provides such an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 

816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against CIM and CSATF employees—including Defendants 

Hadjadj and Sherman—are DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff asserting them in a 

complaint filed in the proper venue, as explained above. 

2. Plaintiff's complaint states a cognizable First Amendment claim against Defendants 

Shleffar and Muniz. 

3. Plaintiff’s claim involving the loss of his personal property is DISMISSED for 

failure to state a claim for relief.

4. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 

Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint 

and all attachments thereto (dkt. 1), a Magistrate Judge jurisdiction consent form, and a copy of 

this Order to the following Defendants: CDCR Jewish Chaplain Paul Shleffar and SVSP 

Warden William L. Muniz.

The Clerk shall also mail a copy of the complaint and a copy of this Order to the State 

Attorney General’s Office in San Francisco. Additionally, the Clerk shall mail a copy of this 

Order to Plaintiff.

5. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. 

Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the court, on 

behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons, fail to do so, they will be required to bear the 

cost of such service unless good cause be shown for their failure to sign and return the waiver 

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form. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date 

that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be required 

to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for waiver 

was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of 

summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked to read the statement set forth at the foot of the 

waiver form that more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of 

service of the summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before 

Defendants have been personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the date on 

which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days from the date the waiver form is filed, 

whichever is later. Defendants shall also respond to the Notice of Assignment of Prisoner 

Case to a United States Magistrate Judge for Trial by filing a consent/declination form on 

the date the Answer is due. 

6. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. The following briefing schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date their answer is due, Defendants 

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion must be 

supported by adequate factual documentation, must conform in all respects to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56, and must include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from 

the events at issue. A motion for summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand3notice 

so that Plaintiff will have fair, timely and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to 

oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out 

in Rand must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A motion to dismiss 

for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies must be accompanied by a similar notice. 

However, the court notes that under the new law of the circuit, in the rare event that a failure to 

exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, Defendants may move for dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6) as opposed to the previous practice of moving under an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. 

 

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Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that failure to exhaust available administrative 

remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), should be raised by a 

defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Otherwise if a failure to exhaust is not clear on 

the face of the complaint, Defendants must produce evidence proving failure to exhaust in a 

motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff shows a failure to exhaust, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment 

under Rule 56. Id. But if material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied and the 

district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id. at 

1168.

If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 

they shall so inform the court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. All papers 

filed with the court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the court 

and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the date on which 

Defendants’ motion is filed. 

c. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you 

must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must 

be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact—that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradicts the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

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If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand, 154 

F.3d at 962-63.

Plaintiff also is advised that—in the rare event that Defendants argue that the failure to 

exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint—a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available 

administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end your case, albeit without 

prejudice. To avoid dismissal, you have the right to present any evidence to show that you did 

exhaust your available administrative remedies before coming to federal court. Such evidence 

may include: (1) declarations, which are statements signed under penalty of perjury by you or 

others who have personal knowledge of relevant matters; (2) authenticated documents—

documents accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and why they are 

authentic, or other sworn papers such as answers to interrogatories or depositions; (3) statements 

in your complaint insofar as they were made under penalty of perjury and they show that you have 

personal knowledge of the matters state therein. As mentioned above, in considering a motion to 

dismiss for failure to exhaust under Rule 12(b)(6) or failure to exhaust in a summary judgment 

motion under Rule 56, the district judge may hold a preliminary proceeding and decide disputed 

issues of fact with regard to this portion of the case. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168.

(The notices above do not excuse Defendants’ obligation to serve similar notices again 

concurrently with motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies and 

motions for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 935.)

d. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after the 

date Plaintiff’s opposition is filed.

e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the court so orders at a later date.

7. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Leave of the court pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to depose 

Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

8. All communications by Plaintiff with the court must be served on Defendants or 

their counsel, once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to them.

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9. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court 

informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 

while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 

address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 

directed to the pro se party by the court has been returned to the court as not deliverable, and 

(2) the court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 

se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 

10. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. 

Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the 

deadline sought to be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 20, 2016

______________________________________

DONNA M. RYU

United States Magistrate Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN F. FORDLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM MUNIZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:15-cv-03108-DMR 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on January 20, 2016, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the Order of Partial 

Dismissal and Service, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the 

person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said 

copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

John F. Fordley ID: A56507

Salinas Valley State Prison

P.O. Box 1050

Soledad, CA 93960-1050 

Dated: January 20, 2016

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Ivy Lerma Garcia, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable DONNA M. RYU

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