Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01552/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01552-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Neena Biswas
Petitioner
Department of Veterans Affairs
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

NEENA BISWAS,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________

2023-1552

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DA-1221-15-0471-W-2.

______________________

Decided: January 17, 2025

______________________

STERLING DERAMUS, Sterling L. DeRamus Law Offices, 

Birmingham, AL, argued for petitioner. 

 KARA WESTERCAMP, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by 

REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR., BRIAN M. BOYNTON,

PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY. 

 ______________________

Before DYK, CHEN, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

CHEN, Circuit Judge.

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2 BISWAS v. DVA

Dr. Neena Biswas petitions for review of the decision of 

the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) denying her 

request for corrective action under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 22 U.S.C.) 

(WPA), for two personnel actions taken against her by the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Although the Board 

held that Dr. Biswas made protected disclosures under the 

WPA and that these disclosures contributed to the VA’s 

personnel actions, the Board denied relief because it determined that the VA showed it would have taken the same 

personnel actions even in the absence of Dr. Biswas’s protected disclosures. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

I.

Dr. Biswas, a United States citizen, worked as a physician at the VA’s Dallas, Texas facility (Dallas VA) within 

the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). The VA hired 

Dr. Biswas in August 2010 in a temporary appointment

under 38 U.S.C. § 7405(a)(1)(A), with a not-to-exceed date 

of July 30, 2012. See J.A. 50; J.A. 82. Originally assigned 

to Geriatrics, Dr. Biswas was later transferred to the Medicine Service, Hospitalist Section, effective January 15, 

2012. See J.A. 50; J.A. 80. On April 25, 2012, Dr. Biswas’s 

appointment was converted to a permanent appointment 

under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1) with a retroactive effective date 

of January 15, 2012. See J.A. 50; J.A. 570. Five other Dallas VA physicians were converted from temporary to permanent appointments along with Dr. Biswas.

Around April 2012, the Dallas VA advertised the position of Chief of the Hospitalist Section, which, at the time,

was held by Dr. Ignatius Oyula, a non-U.S. citizen, under 

a three-year appointment scheduled to expire later that 

year. J.A. 50. The VA was prohibited by statute from appointing a non-U.S. citizen to the position unless “the 

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BISWAS v. DVA 3

Under Secretary for Health determine[d] that it [was] not 

possible to recruit qualified citizens for the necessary services.” 38 U.S.C. § 7407(a); see id. § 7402(c) (providing that 

the VA may not appoint a non-citizen to a position listed in 

38 U.S.C. § 7401(1) “[e]xcept as provided in section 

7407(a)”). Dr. Biswas applied but was not selected for the 

position, which was given again to Dr. Oyula. J.A. 50.

In May 2012, Dr. Biswas began sending emails questioning why she was not selected for the position, including 

to a human resources (HR) Specialist, Daniel Harper, and 

to the selecting official for the position, Dr. Daniel Goodenberger, who was the Chief of the Medical Service at the 

Dallas VA. J.A. 273–75. On May 21, 2012, Dr. Biswas met 

with Dr. Goodenberger and an administrative officer, Ruth 

Kirkland, to discuss her non-selection. J.A. 77. After 

Dr. Goodenberger explained his reasons for not deeming 

Dr. Biswas qualified for the position, the meeting became 

heated, and Dr. Biswas refused to leave Dr. Goodenberger’s office until he began to call the police. Id. Later 

that day, Dr. Biswas again emailed Mr. Harper, asserting, 

among other things, that Dr. Goodenberger “openly is violating the basic principles in the hiring process in a Federal 

workplace. In addition, I have the basic and many more 

requirements, including being a US citizen and permanent 

employee . . . .” J.A. 277.

Over the next several months, Dr. Biswas sent numerous emails to VA staff, including Dr. Goodenberger,

Ms. Kirkland, Mr. Harper, Wanda Jackson (an HR supervisor), Barbara Rogers (Chief of HR Management at the 

Dallas VA), Dr. Stephen Holt (Deputy Chief of Staff and 

Acting Chief of Staff at the Dallas VA), and all Dallas VA 

hospitalists. Dr. Biswas’s emails complained about both 

the process of hiring Dr. Oyula for the Hospitalist Section 

Chief position and the scheduling practices within the hospitalist section. In more than one instance, Dr. Biswas’s

emails transcended civility. In a July 10, 2012, email that 

Dr. Biswas sent to all Dallas VA hospitalists, for example, 

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4 BISWAS v. DVA

Dr. Biswas accused Dr. Oyula of moonlighting and falsifying his work schedule and wrote that Dr. Oyula made “stupid schedules to suit himself” and was “a total failure at 

running this group.” J.A. 734. In a July 12, 2012, followup email, Dr. Biswas accused Dr. Oyula and three other 

doctors of being “the reason the rest of the group is being 

subjected to harassing schedules” and called for the nonrenewal of their appointments. Id. at 733–34. In another 

July 12, 2012, email, Dr. Biswas stated to Ms. Rogers, 

Mr. Harper, and Drs. Holt and Goodenberger, among others, that “anyone and everyone[] who is involved in re-appointing Dr[.] Oyula” and the same three other doctors “are 

betraying the US government.” J.A. 1213.

On July 13, 2012, Dr. Goodenberger responded to 

Dr. Biswas, instructing her that “complaints must ascend 

the appropriate chain of command” and “not to disseminate 

inflammatory and accusatory e-mails regarding your colleagues and superiors.” Id. On July 21, 2012, Dr. Biswas 

refused to see the patients assigned to her by Dr. Oyula until Dr. Oyula called Dr. Holt, who was able to talk her 

down. On August 6, 2012, Dr. Biswas emailed Ms. Rogers, 

Mr. Harper, Ms. Kirkland, and Drs. Goodenberger and 

Holt—in spite of Dr. Goodenberger’s July 13 email—accusing Dr. Oyula of “degrading” the program and “harassing 

citizens with nasty schedules,” while also referring to a

“scam to keep Dr[.] Oyula’s position.” J.A. 1240.

On August 7, 2012, Dr. Biswas began emailing thenSecretary of the VA, Eric Shinseki, expressing her concerns 

regarding the Hospitalist Section Chief hiring process and 

hospitalist scheduling practices. J.A. 1243. The following 

day, Ms. Kirkland sent Dr. Biswas a memorandum outlining the proper grievance and complaint procedures, which

directed staff not to contact Secretary Shinseki directly so 

as to avoid delays in the grievance process and not compromise the Secretary’s role as the VA’s ultimate decisionmaker. J.A. 1248. Dr. Biswas emailed Secretary 

Shinseki again later that same day, J.A. 1247–48, and then 

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BISWAS v. DVA 5

again on August 17, 2012, J.A. 627. On August 18, 2012, 

Dr. Goodenberger emailed Dr. Biswas, instructing her to 

stop contacting Secretary Shinseki directly and stop bringing her complaints outside her chain of command, and explaining that her emails in contravention of those 

directives were insubordination. J.A. 626.

Meanwhile, on August 10, 2012, Dr. Biswas emailed 

Drs. Oyula and Goodenberger, among others, stating that 

she would work day instead of night shifts and “tak[e] the 

appropriate number of days off to compensate for the hours 

worked.” J.A. 1250. Dr. Goodenberger responded to 

Dr. Biswas, instructing her that “you may not unilaterally 

change your work assignment.” Id. at 1249.

Not long after this series of incidents, Ms. Rogers “correct[ed]” Dr. Biswas’s appointment on September 4, 2012,

by converting it from permanent back to temporary under 

38 U.S.C. § 7405(a)(1)(A), with a not-to-exceed date of February 14, 2013 and effective retroactively to January 15, 

2012. J.A. 79. Then, on September 11, 2012, Dr. Biswas 

was informed by letter that she was being terminated, effective September 25, 2012. J.A. 60. The termination letter did not list any specific grounds, though the 

corresponding notification of personnel action stated the 

reason for removal as “[c]onduct does not reflect the necessary level required for successful government service.” 

J.A. 57–58. In an email outlining his reasons for deciding 

to terminate Dr. Biswas’s appointment, Dr. Goodenberger 

stated four separate bases: (1) insubordination for contravening an instruction to bring complaints only within

her chain of command; (2) insubordination for contravening an instruction to cease disseminating inflammatory 

and defamatory emails regarding her colleagues; (3) insubordination for refusing a patient assignment; and (4) creation of a hostile work environment. J.A. 653.

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6 BISWAS v. DVA

II.

Dr. Biswas filed an individual right of action (IRA) appeal with the Board, alleging that the VA unlawfully retaliated against her for engaging in protected whistleblowing 

by (1) converting her appointment from permanent to temporary, and (2) terminating her appointment. The administrative judge conducted a two-day hearing and issued an 

initial decision denying Dr. Biswas’s request for corrective 

action. Biswas v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. DA-1221-15-

0471-W-2, 2016 WL 6236460 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 20, 2016) (Decision).1

The initial decision found that Dr. Biswas’s May 2012 

emails regarding the VA’s process of hiring Dr. Oyula for 

the Hospitalist Section Chief position were protected disclosures under the WPA. Id. at 9. Specifically, the administrative judge found that Dr. Biswas had a reasonable 

belief that these disclosures evidenced a violation of the required priority hiring for U.S. citizens. Id. The administrative judge further found that, under the 

“knowledge/timing test,” Dr. Biswas’s protected disclosures were a contributing factor in both personnel actions 

at issue. Id. at 10–11; see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). The VA 

does not challenge these findings.

The administrative judge next considered the three factors set forth in Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 

F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999), and found that the VA

proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have 

both converted Dr. Biswas to a temporary appointment 

and terminated her appointment notwithstanding her protected disclosures. Decision at 11–24. As to the termination, the administrative judge was particularly persuaded 

1 Because the electronic version of the initial decision lacks page designations, we employ the pagination 

used in the decision at J.A. 1–29.

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BISWAS v. DVA 7

by Carr factor one: the strength of the evidence in support 

of the agency’s action. Id. at 24; see Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323. 

The Board found that Dr. Biswas engaged in “unprofessional and improper acts,” including, for example, refusing 

to see her assigned patients, threatening to take unscheduled leave, and continuing to contact Secretary Shinseki 

after being instructed not to. Decision at 21–22. Separately, the administrative judge found that “the tone and 

content of [Dr. Biswas’s] communications, including namecalling, demands for the non-renewal of colleagues’ appointments disseminated throughout the practice group, 

and accusations of a betrayal of the government, are unprofessional on their face, and provide strong support for 

the [VA’s] action.” Id. at 23.

The full Board denied Dr. Biswas’s petition for review 

and affirmed the initial decision, which became the final 

decision of the Board.2 Biswas v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 

No. DA-1221-15-0471-W-2, 2023 WL 105606, at *1

(M.S.P.B. Jan. 4, 2023). Dr. Biswas now petitions this 

court for review. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

We review decisions of the Board under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(c), which requires that the decision be affirmed unless it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 

or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 

been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 

Einboden v. Dep’t of Navy, 802 F.3d 1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 

2015) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Higgins v. Dep’t of 

2 Accordingly, we refer interchangeably to the administrative judge and the Board.

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8 BISWAS v. DVA

Veterans Affs., 955 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing reversible error. Sacco v. Dep’t of Just., 317 F.3d 1384, 

1386 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

I. Background Law

Whistleblower retaliation claims under the WPA follow

a burden-shifting framework. “Where, as here, the government does not dispute that whistleblowing contributed to 

the agency’s decision to take adverse personnel action 

against an employee, the agency must prove [by clear and 

convincing evidence] it would have taken the same action 

absent the whistleblowing.” Siler v. EPA, 908 F.3d 1291, 

1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018); 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2). We sometimes 

refer to the government’s burden as a showing of “independent causation.” Miller v. Dep’t of Just., 842 F.3d 1252, 

1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “‘Clear and convincing’ evidence has 

been described as evidence which produces in the mind of 

the trier of fact an abiding conviction that the truth of a 

factual contention is ‘highly probable.’” Id. at 1257–58 (citation omitted).

The three Carr factors are used in evaluating whether 

the agency has met its burden to demonstrate independent 

causation:

[1] the strength of the agency’s evidence in support 

of its personnel action;

[2] the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were 

involved in the decision; and

[3] any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated.

Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323. “Carr does not impose an affirmative burden on the agency to produce evidence with respect 

to each and every one of the three Carr factors to weigh 

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BISWAS v. DVA 9

them each individually in the agency’s favor.” Whitmore v. 

Dep’t of Lab., 680 F.3d 1353, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Rather, 

“[t]he factors are merely appropriate and pertinent considerations for determining whether the agency carries its 

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 

same action would have been taken absent the whistleblowing.” Id.

II. Conversion of Dr. Biswas’s Appointment

We begin with the first personnel action at issue: the 

VA’s conversion of Dr. Biswas’s appointment from permanent to temporary. Dr. Biswas contends that the Board 

erred in finding that the VA had proven that it would have 

converted Dr. Biswas’s appointment notwithstanding her 

protected disclosures.

Under the first Carr factor, the Board relied on testimony by Ms. Rogers to find that the VA presented “very 

strong evidence that its initial conversion of [Dr. Biswas’s]

status to a permanent appointment was erroneous and 

that its conversion of her status back to a temporary appointment in September 2012 was made to correct that error.” Decision at 13. The Board cited Ms. Rogers’s 

testimony that conversion of a physician’s appointment 

from temporary to permanent requires a request by the 

service chief—here, Dr. Goodenberger—and a review by 

the Professional Standards Board. See id. at 12; see also

J.A. 461–65 (VA handbook describing the Professional 

Standards Board review process). Ms. Rogers testified that

she learned from Dr. Goodenberger that he never requested the conversion to a permanent appointment and 

no Professional Standards Board had been held for the conversion. Ms. Rogers confirmed the appropriate records 

were not in Dr. Biswas’s file, and thus Dr. Biswas had not 

been legally converted to a permanent appointment in the 

first place. Accordingly, Ms. Rogers explained that

Dr. Biswas, and five other VA physicians whose 

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10 BISWAS v. DVA

appointments were erroneously converted at the same time 

as hers, were reverted to temporary appointments.

For the second Carr factor, the Board acknowledged 

that Dr. Biswas “presented some evidence of a motive to 

retaliate” by Dr. Goodenberger and Ms. Rogers. Decision

at 12. Dr. Biswas’s protected disclosures regarding illegal 

hiring practices directly implicated Dr. Goodenberger and

the HR department, which Ms. Rogers supervised. Id. On 

the other hand, having “carefully observed” the demeanor 

of Dr. Goodenberger and Ms. Rogers during the hearing, 

the administrative judge found both “to be credible in denying any retaliatory motive.” Id. at 12–13. No reason exists 

to disturb this credibility finding, which is “virtually unreviewable on appeal.” Bieber v. Dep’t of Army, 287 F.3d 

1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Holmes v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 987 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (credibility determinations “will not be disturbed unless inherently improbable, discredited by undisputed evidence, or contrary 

to physical facts” (citation omitted)). Notwithstanding the 

competing evidence, the Board appeared to weigh factor 

two slightly in Dr. Biswas’s favor.3

For the last Carr factor, the Board found that the VA 

“took similar actions with regard to the status of other physicians whose status had also been erroneously changed, 

and [Dr. Biswas] presented no evidence in support of her 

claim that the agency converted the status of the other doctors back to temporary appointments solely for the purpose 

of retaliating against her.” Decision at 13–14. The Board 

3 The Board did not expressly state whether it 

weighed factor two neutrally or in favor of one side. But, 

after conducting essentially the same analysis for this factor with respect to the VA’s removal action, the Board 

found that “there was some motive to retaliate on the part 

of relevant agency officials.” Decision at 24; see also id. 

at 20.

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BISWAS v. DVA 11

relied on Ms. Rogers’s testimony that the other physicians 

were not known to her to be whistleblowers, and the Board

noted that Mr. Harper—the HR employee who erroneously 

converted the physicians to permanent appointments—received a written admonishment for his negligence. Id. at 

13; see J.A. 182–83 at 364:1–365:5. All six physicians, including Dr. Biswas, were retroactively converted back to 

temporary appointments.

Given that Carr factors one and three weighed strongly 

in the VA’s favor, the Board found that the VA “presented 

clear and convincing evidence that it would have converted 

[Dr. Biswas’s] status to a temporary appointment absent 

[her] protected disclosures.” Decision at 13. This finding 

is supported by substantial evidence. The Board was entitled to rely on Ms. Rogers’s credible explanation of how the 

VA came to learn of, and fixed, the erroneous temporaryto-permanent conversions of Dr. Biswas and the other physicians.

Dr. Biswas argues that the VA instead reclassified 

Dr. Biswas as a temporary employee to make it easier to 

fire her. But this argument, at its base, asks us to discredit 

the testimony of Ms. Rogers and “reweigh the evidence on 

appeal, which we cannot do.” McIntosh v. Dep’t of Def., 53 

F.4th 630, 643 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Dr. Biswas additionally 

argues that the Board ignored that the VA violated the appropriate conversion procedures when it reclassified

Dr. Biswas back to a temporary appointment. Dr. Biswas 

cites no authority that the VA was required to follow such 

procedures to undo an unlawful conversion. Regardless, 

this argument does not undermine the Board’s reliance on 

Ms. Rogers’s testimony that she was simply correcting 

what she believed to be a legal nullity in the first place. 

Decision at 12–13. We thus affirm the Board’s denial of 

corrective action regarding the VA’s conversion of 

Dr. Biswas’s appointment from permanent to temporary.

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12 BISWAS v. DVA

III. Termination of Dr. Biswas’s Appointment

We turn next to the second personnel action at issue: the VA’s termination of Dr. Biswas’s appointment. 

We agree with Dr. Biswas that the VA unlawfully restricted her from making protected disclosures outside her 

chain of command and that the Board erroneously relied on

her failure to comply with that restriction as an act of insubordination that supported the VA’s personnel action. 

We conclude, however, that the Board’s error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s denial of corrective 

action as to the VA’s removal of Dr. Biswas.

A.

The WPA, as in effect prior to the amendments enacted

by the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012

(WPEA), prohibits an agency employee with the requisite 

authority from taking, failing to take, or threatening to 

take or fail to take a personnel action because of “any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which 

the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences—

(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross 

mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public 

health or safety.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (Supp. V 2011)

(emphasis added).4 In Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management, 263 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2001), we detailed the legislative history of § 2302(b)(8)(A), explaining

4 Dr. Biswas was removed shortly before the enactment of the WPEA. See WPEA, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 

Stat. 1465. We have previously declined to “decide 

whether . . . the WPEA’s ‘clarification’ of the term ‘disclosure’ applies retroactively,” Hicks v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

819 F.3d 1318, 1323 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and we need not 

do so here, as neither party has argued that the WPEA has 

any bearing on the issues before us.

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BISWAS v. DVA 13

that the WPA employed the term “any disclosure” to deliberately broaden the scope of disclosures protected by the 

predecessor version of the statute, which merely covered “a

disclosure.” Id. at 1347 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) 

(Supp. III 1979)). 

The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, in 

particular, stated that the change was intended to emphasize that an employee’s disclosures should not be protected 

“only if they are made for certain purposes or to certain 

employees.” Id. at 1347–48 (quoting S. Rep. No. 100-413, 

at 13 (1988)). Indeed, the plain language of § 2302(b)(8)(A)

does not specify to whom the disclosure must be made, in 

contrast to § 2302(b)(8)(B), which protects disclosures 

made to only particular recipients. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(b)(8)(B). In light of the language and legislative history of the WPA—as well as the WPA’s purpose “to encourage disclosures that are likely to remedy” government 

wrongdoing—we held in Huffman that § 2302(b)(8)(A) protects disclosures made to any supervisor even if that supervisor lacks actual authority to correct the reported 

wrongdoing. 263 F.3d at 1350–51; see id. at 1351 (“Any 

government employee, in a supervisory position, other than 

the wrongdoer himself, is in a position to ‘correct’ or ‘remedy’ the abuse by bringing the matter to the attention of a 

higher authority.”). 

Here, the VA’s restrictions on the channels through 

which Dr. Biswas could make disclosures of alleged government wrongdoing ran afoul of the WPA. Dr. Goodenberger—one of Dr. Biswas’s supervisors and the very 

person that Dr. Biswas had accused of wrongdoing—twice 

instructed Dr. Biswas that she may not bring her complaints to higher-level personnel outside of her direct chain 

of command. Ms. Kirkland likewise instructed Dr. Biswas 

that she may not report her concerns directly to Secretary 

Shinseki. Yet the WPA does not require a protected disclosure to be channeled through a whistleblower’s chain of 

command. Restrictions like those imposed on Dr. Biswas

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14 BISWAS v. DVA

by the VA are contrary to both the text and spirit of the 

WPA, which plainly protects “any disclosure” falling within 

the scope of the statute, regardless to whom the disclosure 

was made. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (emphasis added); see 

Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1351 (“To be consistent with the statute and its purposes, complaints to supervisors concerning 

wrongdoing by other employees or other matters within the 

scope of the WPA should be encouraged and not discouraged . . . .” (emphases added)).

Moreover, as we observed in a non-precedential decision, “[t]he WPA does not permit an agency to discipline an 

employee for disclosing protected information merely because that information has been reported outside the chain 

of command.” Detrich v. Dep’t of Navy, 251 F. App’x 679,

680–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (emphasis added). 

The deciding official for Dr. Biswas’s removal, Dr. Goodenberger, considered Dr. Biswas’s continued emails to Secretary Shinseki as a disciplinable act of insubordination. But 

“[t]he purpose of the WPA is to shield employees who are 

willing to speak out and criticize government management,” not to punish them. Greenspan v. Dep’t of Veterans 

Affs., 464 F.3d 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasis 

added). Though an agency might have good reasons for

preferring that an employee first report to lower-level supervisory personnel, a report of wrongdoing is still protected under the WPA, and may not be prohibited nor 

retaliated against, if made outside the chain of command 

or even to the head of the agency.

The VA’s errors propagated to the Board, which found 

that Dr. Biswas’s “contact[ing] [Secretary] Shinseki directly with her complaints after being instructed not to do 

so” constituted improper, insubordinate conduct weighing 

in the agency’s favor under Carr factor one. Decision at 21–

22; see also id. at 18–20. We hold that this finding was 

contrary to the law. Nevertheless, we conclude that the 

error was harmless.

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BISWAS v. DVA 15

Courts of appeals review cases “without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of 

the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 2111; see Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 

U.S. 396, 407 (2009). In conducting that review, we ask 

whether the outcome “could have been different” absent the 

Board’s error. Sistek v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 955 F.3d 

948, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Dr. Biswas has failed to establish such prejudice. See Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409 (“[T]he 

party that ‘seeks to have a judgment set aside because of 

an erroneous ruling carries the burden of showing that 

prejudice resulted.’” (citation omitted)).

In its analysis of Carr factor one, the Board laid out 

numerous pieces of evidence—apart from the continuing 

emails to Secretary Shinseki—that it found provided

“strong evidence” in support of the VA’s termination of 

Dr. Biswas. Decision at 20–23. The Board focused predominantly on Dr. Biswas’s “highly inappropriate” and “disruptive” refusal to see patients, creation of a hostile work 

environment, and “unprofessional” communications. Id.

(citation omitted). In fact, the Board’s conclusion for its 

Carr factor one analysis did not rely on the emails to Secretary Shinseki, finding that the “tone and content of 

[Dr. Biswas’s] communications including name-calling, demands for the non-renewal of colleagues’ appointments disseminated throughout the practice group, and accusations 

of a betrayal of the government, are unprofessional on their 

face, and provide strong support for the agency’s action.” 

Id. at 23. In other words, we need not speculate in this case 

what the Board would have decided absent the error of considering the emails to Secretary Shinseki because the

Board’s ultimate finding that Carr factor one weighed 

strongly in the VA’s favor was based on other incidents to 

establish that Dr. Biswas engaged in improper, 

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16 BISWAS v. DVA

unprofessional conduct.5 And for the reasons that follow, 

we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

findings. Cf. Ironburg Inventions Ltd. v. Valve Corp., 64 

F.4th 1274, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (concluding that any error in admitting testimony was harmless as substantial evidence supported the verdict of infringement even without 

considering that testimony); Munoz v. Strahm Farms, Inc., 

69 F.3d 501, 505 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Attacking only one piece 

of evidence among a wide variety of cumulative evidence 

presented in a jury trial does not provide a reasonable basis 

for reversal.”).

B.

Like with the first personnel action, Dr. Biswas contends that the Board erroneously found that the VA satisfied its burden to show it would have terminated

Dr. Biswas’s appointment notwithstanding her protected 

disclosures. We disagree.

5 We also note that Dr. Goodenberger’s “outline” of 

the four grounds for Dr. Biswas’s termination included creation of a hostile work environment and three categories of 

insubordinate conduct, just one of which was Dr. Biswas’s 

disregard of instructions to cease making protected disclosures beyond her chain of command. J.A. 653. Accordingly, in finding that Dr. Biswas’s “appointment was 

terminated due to her disruptive and insubordinate conduct and not due to her whistleblowing,” Decision at 20, the 

Board viewed Dr. Biswas’s insubordinate conduct as encompassing more than merely her disregard of those instructions. See, e.g., id. at 15 (discussing Dr. Biswas’s 

refusal to see patients as conduct considered by 

Dr. Goodenberger to be “insubordinate and disruptive to 

the service, and . . . conduct [that] led to [Dr. Biswas’s] termination”). This further supports our conclusion that the 

VA’s and the Board’s error was harmless.

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BISWAS v. DVA 17

Carr Factor One

We begin with the first Carr factor. But before we 

reach the sufficiency of the evidence weighing in favor of 

the VA’s action under this factor, we must first address 

Dr. Biswas’s argument that the VA could not carry its burden of proof because it is not permitted to support its decision based on conduct not set forth in Dr. Biswas’s 

termination letter and that letter lists no grounds for removal at all.

Dr. Biswas relies primarily on our decision in Greenspan v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 464 F.3d 1297 (Fed. 

Cir. 2006). There, we held that “[a] personnel action is reviewed on the grounds on which the agency based the action when it was taken” and “[t]he Board cannot change the 

agency’s grounds from those Noticed by the agency at the 

time of the discipline.” Id. at 1304–05. This requirement 

stems from the right to notice of the charges supporting a 

proposed adverse action, afforded to certain federal government employees by 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(1). See Brook v. Corrado, 999 F.2d 523, 526–27 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Section 7513, 

however, is applicable to only an “employee” as defined in 

5 U.S.C. § 7511, which does not apply to an individual “who 

holds a position within the Veterans Health Administration which has been excluded from the competitive service 

by or under a provision of title 38, unless such employee 

was appointed to such position under section 7401(3) of 

such title.” 5 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(10); see also United States v. 

Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (en banc). Certain title 38 employees do receive separate procedural protections before an adverse action may be taken against 

them. See 38 U.S.C. § 7461–7464. But these protections 

apply to only title 38 employees appointed to permanent

positions under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1). See id.

Dr. Biswas was a temporary employee of the VHA appointed under 38 U.S.C. § 7405(a)(1)(A), not under 

§ 7401(1). As such, she was excluded from the protections 

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18 BISWAS v. DVA

of both 5 U.S.C. § 7513 and 38 U.S.C. §§ 7461–7464. See 

J.A. 85 (VA Handbook providing that “the procedural requirements prescribed for separations . . . do not apply” for 

“involuntary separations of employees serving under 38 

U.S.C. § 7405[(a)(1)(A)]” (alteration in original)). Because 

temporary VHA employees like Dr. Biswas are not entitled 

to advance notice of the grounds for their removal, the 

usual rule that the agency may defend its action on only 

those grounds noticed is not applicable.6

Turning now to the Carr factor one evidence supporting the VA’s termination, the Board found that the VA 

“presented strong evidence in support of its action.” Decision at 20. The Board relied on evidence of numerous instances of disruptive, inappropriate, and insubordinate

conduct by Dr. Biswas. For example, the Board discussed

the July 2012 incident in which Dr. Biswas refused to see 

the patients assigned to her until Dr. Holt intervened. Id.

at 15, 21. The Board cited Dr. Holt’s testimony, in which

he explained that Dr. Biswas’s behavior was “highly inappropriate” and “argumentative” and the incident was only 

the second time in his years of leadership that he had to 

deal with a provider refusing to accept patients. Id.; J.A. 

208–10 at 449:16–450:8, 453:20–454:3, 457:6–19. Dr. Holt 

testified that it was disruptive and “unprecedented” for “an 

issue of patient care, like this, [to be] elevated to the top 

physician for a 4,000 plus person hospital.” J.A. 209 at 

456:3–13. Following the incident, Dr. Holt emailed 

Dr. Biswas to explain that the incident was “a sign of 

6 We note, too, that Dr. Biswas received informal notice on multiple occasions that the VA considered to be inappropriate and discipline-worthy much of the same 

conduct relied on by the VA and the Board in support of the 

VA’s removal action. See, e.g., J.A. 210 at 457:20–458:4;

J.A. 243 at 592:9–16; J.A. 251 at 623:22–624:3; J.A. 599; 

J.A. 626; J.A. 1213.

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BISWAS v. DVA 19

significant disruption” and “very concerning.” J.A. 599. 

And Dr. Goodenberger considered the incident to be one of 

Dr. Biswas’s acts of insubordination, namely, “refusing patient assignment.” J.A. 653.

Another incident discussed by the Board as one of 

Dr. Biswas’s “unprofessional and improper acts” was 

Dr. Biswas’s announcement to Drs. Oyula and Goodenberger in August 2012 that she would work day instead of

night shifts and “tak[e] the appropriate number of days off 

to compensate for the hours worked.” Decision at 16, 21

(quoting J.A. 1250). The Board explained that Dr. Goodenberger understood Dr. Biswas to be threatening not to

come to work as scheduled, and Dr. Biswas offered no alternative explanation for her email. Id. at 16.

Dr. Biswas argues it is undisputed that she eventually

saw her assigned patients and that she never took unscheduled or unapproved leave. But her eventual compliance on each occasion, only after counseling by her 

superiors, does not preclude the Board from considering 

her initial refusals as misconduct. Dr. Biswas also argues 

that the Board failed to consider the context of the July 

2012 incident, arguing, for example, that Dr. Oyula inequitably distributed patient assignments and lied about seeing his own patients. The Board, however, considered 

Dr. Biswas’s testimony on this point and nonetheless credited Dr. Holt’s testimony regarding the impropriety and 

disruptive nature of Dr. Biswas’s actions. See id. at 20–21. 

Even if we were to agree with Dr. Biswas that her actions 

were justified, it is not for us to substitute our judgment for 

the Board’s.

The Board additionally relied on evidence of 

Dr. Biswas’s inappropriate and inflammatory emails. 

Some of these emails extend well beyond the protected disclosures argued to the Board—i.e., “[Dr. Biswas’s] May 

2012 disclosures regarding the hiring process for the Hospitalist Section Chief [to which Dr. Oyula was appointed].” 

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20 BISWAS v. DVA

Decision at 9. The protected disclosures relate to 

Dr. Biswas’s belief that the agency failed to follow proper 

procedures in appointing Dr. Oyula (a non-citizen) without 

interviewing her (a citizen) or determining that it was not 

possible to recruit qualified citizens for the position. The 

Board explained that Dr. Biswas’s later emails—some disseminated widely—included name-calling, accused 

Dr. Oyula of moonlighting and falsifying his work schedule, and demanded that the appointments of several doctors not be renewed. See id. at 16–18, 21–23. Two of those 

doctors complained to Dr. Goodenberger about 

Dr. Biswas’s emails, reporting that they found her comments to be inappropriate, discriminatory, and hostile. As 

just one example, in an email sent to all Dallas VA hospitalists, Dr. Biswas called Dr. Oyula a “total failure at running this group” and stated that his scheduling decisions 

were “stupid.” Id. at 21 (quoting J.A. 734). The Board 

found that Dr. Biswas’s emails were “disruptive to the 

work environment” and “unprofessional on their face,” thus 

providing “strong support for the agency’s action.” Id. at 

20, 23.

To be sure, some of Dr. Biswas’s emails relate to her 

protected whistleblower disclosures. For instance, 

Dr. Biswas stated that Dr. Oyula’s reappointment was a 

“scam,” J.A. 1240, 1243, and those involved in that decision 

were “betraying the US government,” id. at 1213. But we 

have previously explained that “wrongful or disruptive conduct is not shielded by the presence of a protected disclosure.” Greenspan, 464 F.3d at 1305. In other words, the

fact that Dr. Biswas’s emails contain or relate to her protected disclosures does not preclude the unprofessional and 

disruptive “character or nature” of the emails from supporting the VA’s action. Kalil v. Dep’t of Agric., 479 F.3d 

821, 825 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Duggan v. Dep’t of Def., 

883 F.3d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2018) (adopting our “holdings 

to the effect that an employee may be disciplined for the 

way in which he or she communicates a protected 

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BISWAS v. DVA 21

disclosure”).7 The WPA protects Dr. Biswas from being 

punished for making protected disclosures, not for the way 

in which she chose to do so.8 Furthermore, Dr. Biswas’s 

persistence in sending inflammatory emails regarding her 

colleagues even after Dr. Goodenberger instructed her to 

cease doing so was reasonably considered as yet another

act of insubordinate conduct supporting her termination. 

See Decision at 17–18; J.A. 653.

In short, we believe that the Board’s Carr factor one 

analysis—largely divorced from its error in considering her 

whistleblowing beyond the chain of command to be an act 

of misconduct—was supported by more than ample evidence of Dr. Biswas’s unprofessional, disruptive, and insubordinate conduct.

7 We recognize that not all protected whistleblowing 

disclosures are made in a polite way. Such disclosures are

“more likely than not to be critical of management, perhaps 

highly critical.” Greenspan, 464 F.3d at 1305. As we have 

explained, “the WPA does not contemplate removal of protection when protected subject matter is stated in a blunt 

manner.” Id. at 1299. In other words, the WPA protects 

impolite whistleblowing as much as it protects polite whistleblowing. It does not, however, shield a whistleblower 

from being punished for harassment, the creation of a hostile work environment, or other improper conduct. See id.

at 1305 (“[W]rongful or disruptive conduct is not shielded 

by the presence of a protected disclosure.”).

8 Although the Board improperly considered 

Dr. Biswas’s repeated emails to Secretary Shinseki for going outside the chain of command, we note that the Board 

might have appropriately considered the character of those 

disclosures.

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22 BISWAS v. DVA

Carr Factor Two

The second Carr factor is “the existence and strength 

of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials 

who were involved in the decision.” Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323. 

The Board conducted a similar analysis under this factor

for the VA’s removal action as it did for the VA’s conversion 

action. It found both that Dr. Biswas “presented evidence 

that [Dr.] Goodenberger had some motivation to retaliate 

against her in that [Dr.] Goodenberger was directly implicated in [Dr. Biswas’s] allegations of hiring improprieties” 

and that Dr. Goodenberger credibly denied a retaliatory 

motive. Decision at 20. Despite the competing evidence, 

the Board found that this factor favors Dr. Biswas. See id.

at 24 (“[T]here was some motive to retaliate on the part of 

relevant agency officials . . . .”).

Dr. Biswas argues that “[t]he administrative judge 

failed to properly weigh evidence of retaliatory motive on 

the part of the VA officials involved in Dr. Biswas’[s] termination.” Pet’r’s Br. 29. As just explained, we view the 

Board as having weighed factor two in Dr. Biswas’s favor. 

To the extent Dr. Biswas contends that the factor should 

have been weighed even more heavily in her favor, we are

unpersuaded by her arguments.

Dr. Biswas argues, for example, that the VA’s failure 

to employ incremental discipline—by beginning with counseling or other lesser discipline before termination—is evidence of retaliatory motive that the Board did not properly 

weigh. The Board considered this argument and rejected 

it, crediting Ms. Rogers’s explanation that “it is not unusual for the agency not to attempt lesser sanctions prior to 

terminating a physician, and there is no requirement that 

it do so, particularly for a temporary employee.” Decision

at 22 n.8 (citing J.A. 179 at 351–52). Ms. Rogers’s testimony is consistent with the legal distinction between temporary and permanent VHA employees, see supra, and we 

may not reweigh the evidence. See McIntosh, 53 F.4th at

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BISWAS v. DVA 23

643. The Board’s analysis weighing the second Carr factor 

in Dr. Biswas’s favor was reasonable.

Carr Factor Three

The third Carr factor is “any evidence that the agency 

takes similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated.” Carr, 

185 F.3d at 1323. For this factor, the Board acknowledged 

evidence that “other hospitalists who complained about 

scheduling, but who did not complain about allegedly illegal hiring practices or otherwise engage in protected activities, were treated more favorably” than Dr. Biswas. 

Decision at 23. However, the Board found no evidence that 

any of those hospitalists “engaged in the full range of conduct that formed the basis of the agency’s decision to terminate [Dr. Biswas’s] appointment,” including no evidence 

that other hospitalists engaged in insubordination such as 

“refus[ing] to see patients.” Id. at 23–24. The Board further acknowledged evidence that “one or two emergency 

room physicians refused to see patients and were disciplined but not terminated”—i.e., treated more favorably 

than Dr. Biswas—but “unlike [Dr. Biswas], those physicians were permanent employees.” Id. at 24 n.9. Accordingly, the Board found “no evidence that similarly situated 

employees who were not whistleblowers were treated more 

favorably” and thus weighed the third factor neutrally. Id.

at 24.

Dr. Biswas asserts that several errors lie in the Board’s 

Carr factor three analysis, but we do not agree. Dr. Biswas 

first argues that the Board incorrectly found that she refused a patient assignment. As we have already explained, 

that Dr. Biswas ultimately complied following intervention 

by Dr. Holt does not change that she at first refused the 

patient assignment.

Dr. Biswas next argues that the Board erred in finding 

other hospitalists not similarly situated merely because 

they were permanent rather than temporary employees. 

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24 BISWAS v. DVA

As an initial matter, the Board did not rely on the difference in employment status alone but rather found “no evidence that any other hospitalist engaged in the full range 

of conduct” as Dr. Biswas. Decision at 23. Additionally, 

Dr. Biswas’s argument continues to ignore the material differences in the process due to permanent versus temporary 

employees before the VA may remove them—differences 

that Dr. Biswas herself acknowledges. See supra; Pet’r’s 

Br. 35, 37; see, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7461(a) (providing for the 

right to appeal an adverse personnel action for a § 7401(1) 

employee). Because of such differences, it was appropriate 

for the Board to consider those employees as not “otherwise 

similarly situated” for purposes of the Carr factor three 

analysis.

Finally, Dr. Biswas contends that the Board improperly placed on her the burden to demonstrate a comparator 

employee. We see no support for this argument in either 

the Board’s decision or in our precedent. “We have repeatedly stated that the agency ‘need not produce evidence with 

regard to each of the [Carr] factors, nor must each factor 

weigh in favor of the agency for it to carry its burden.’” 

Rickel v. Dep’t of the Navy, 31 F.4th 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 

2022) (cleaned up). “Indeed, the absence of any evidence 

relating to Carr factor three can effectively remove that 

factor from the analysis.” Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374. In 

this instance, the Board determined that “the evidence 

does not support a finding that hospitalists who were not 

whistleblowers were otherwise similarly situated to 

[Dr. Biswas],” and thus there was no evidence relevant to 

Carr factor three. Decision at 24; see, e.g., McIntosh, 53 

F.4th at 646 (Carr factor three was “effectively removed 

from the analysis” where no evidence pertinent to the factor was presented).

* * *

After reviewing the relevant evidence and considering

each Carr factor, the Board concluded that “[w]hile there 

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BISWAS v. DVA 25

was some motive to retaliate on the part of relevant agency 

officials, evidence of that motive is significantly outweighed by the strength of the evidence in support of the 

agency’s termination decision.” Decision at 24. Because of 

the absence of evidence relevant to factor three, the Board 

did not weigh that factor in favor of either side. Id. The 

Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence,

and it reasonably found that the VA met its burden of proving independent causation by clear and convincing evidence based on the strength of Carr factor one. See, e.g., 

Rickel, 31 F.4th at 1366 (affirming the Board’s finding that 

the agency satisfied its burden to show independent causation, “particularly when ‘considering . . . the strength of 

Carr factor one’” (quoting Robinson v. Dep’t of Veterans 

Affs., 923 F.3d 1004, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2019))).

CONCLUSION

We have considered Dr. Biswas’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. We therefore affirm the 

Board’s final decision.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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