Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_17-cv-00087/USCOURTS-caed-1_17-cv-00087-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
DOE 1 through 10
Defendant
Dr. Contreras
Defendant
Dr. Ebinosa
Defendant
Dr. Jacques
Defendant
Dr. Libby
Defendant
Dr. Rasheed
Defendant
Dr. Trevino
Defendant
Ms. Ponse Deleon
Defendant
Richard Risher
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD RISHER,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. LIBBY; DR. EBINOSA; DR. 

RASHEED; DR. JACQUES; DR. 

CONTRERAS; DR. TREVINO; MS. 

PONSE DELEON; DOE 1 THROUGH 

10,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-03128-WQH-KSC

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IFP; 

(2) DISMISSING DEFENDANT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM; 

AND

(3) TRANSFERRING CIVIL 

ACTION FOR LACK OF PROPER 

VENUE TO THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 84(b), 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) AND 28 U.S.C. §

1406(a)

Richard Risher (“Plaintiff”), who is currently housed at the Substance Abuse 

Treatment Facility (“SATF”) located in Corcoran, California, has filed a civil action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1.) In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. No. 2.)

/ / / 

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if a prisoner, like Plaintiff, is 

granted leave to proceed IFP, he remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments,” 

see Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether his 

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 

281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the 

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the sixmonth period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution 

having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, 

and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2).

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 2013, must pay 

an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, 

District Court Misc. Fee Schedule) (eff. May 1, 2013). However, the additional $50 administrative fee 

is waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust 

account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2. Andrews, 

398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account statement, which

shows that he has a current available balance of zero. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

(providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action 

or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no 

assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 

850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of 

a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds 

available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and 

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 

balance of the filing fees mandated will be collected by the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court 

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint also requires a 

pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

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“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Claims against Defendant Libby

Plaintiff raises Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claims mainly against 

Defendants who are alleged to be medical personnel at Plaintiff’s current place of 

incarceration. (See Compl. 2-3.) The only allegations pertaining to Defendant Libby 

include factual allegations that he performed surgery on Plaintiff related to his diagnosis 

of glaucoma. (Id. at 10.) He further alleges that Dr. Libby “gave ‘specific and direct 

post-surgical orders and instructions’” to prison medical staff at SATF. (Id.) There are 

no allegations or claims that Defendant Libby violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

right to adequate medical care or played any role in Plaintiff’s medical treatment 

following his discharge and return to SATF.

/ / / 

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Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no specific factual allegations as to what Defendant 

Libby did, or failed to do, to violate his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(noting that FED. R. CIV. P. 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for 

relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (citation omitted). In fact, Plaintiff appears to claim 

that the alleged constitutional violations are the failure to follow the directives given by 

Defendant Libby. 

This is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. A pleading 

must include sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the [defendant is] liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, and must describe personal acts by each defendant showing a direct causal 

connection to a violation of specific constitutional rights. Maxwell v. County of San 

Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989)). “Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.” Estate 

of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). “The inquiry into 

causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each 

individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional 

deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Defendant Libby from this action for failing 

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and directs the Clerk of Court to 

terminate this Defendant from the docket.

III. Venue

Because the only named Defendant who resides in San Diego is dismissed from 

this action, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s case lacks proper venue. Venue may be raised 

by a court sua sponte where the defendant has not yet filed a responsive pleading and the 

time for doing so has not run. Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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Section 1391(b) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides, in pertinent part, that a 

“civil action may be brought in – (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if 

all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; [or] (2) a judicial 

district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim 

occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated[.]” 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Costlow, 790 F.2d at 1488. “The district court of a district in which 

is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the 

interests of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have 

been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his action occurred at the Substance 

Abuse Treatment Facility which is located in Kings County. See 28 U.S.C. § 84(b). In 

addition, no remaining Defendant is alleged to reside in San Diego or Imperial Counties. 

Therefore, the Court finds venue is proper in the Eastern District of California, pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 84(b), but not in the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 84(d).

IV. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to 

twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND 

NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

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4. DISMISSES the claims against Defendant Libby from this action for failing 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this 

Defendant from the Court’s docket.

5. The Clerk of the Court shall transfer this case for lack of proper venue, in 

the interests of justice and for the convenience of all parties, to the docket of the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of California, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 84(b), 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Dated: January 18, 2017

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