Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02170/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02170-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Ellis
Plaintiff
S. Peery
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT ELLIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. PEERY,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-02170-JSC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 

U.S.C. ' 1983 claiming that an attorney negligently failed to raise two claims on appeal of 

Plaintiff’s state court conviction.

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 His application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted in a 

separate order. For the reasons explained below, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was convicted in 1998 of first-degree murder. His conviction was affirmed on 

appeal in 2001. The California Court of Appeal denied a habeas petition in 2006. In 2012, the 

Alameda County Superior Court denied a habeas petition based on three procedural defects: (1) 

Plaintiff had not raised his claims on direct appeal, (2) there was excessive delay in filing the 

petition; and (3) the petition was successive. 

Petitioner’s first federal habeas petition was denied in 2003, and his multiple efforts to file 

a successive federal habeas petition in this court were denied between 2009 and 2013. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b). In 2013 and 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 

denied Petitioner’s application for authorization to file a successive federal petition. See id. 

 

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Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. 1 at 4.) 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.

§ 1915A(b). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to 

state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to 

provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to 

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. Pro se pleadings must be liberally 

construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

LEGAL CLAIMS

The initial problem with Plaintiff’s complaint is that he names the wrong defendant. He 

names the Warden of his prison as a Defendant, but his claims are against the attorney who 

represented him in his appeal of his state court criminal judgment, Stephen B. Bedrick. This 

mistake could easily be corrected by amendment, so the Court addresses his claims as if Mr. 

Bedrick were the named defendant. 

Plaintiff claims that Mr. Bedrick was negligent because he failed to raise two claims on 

appeal. According to Plaintiff, this rendered the claims procedurally barred from review by the 

state and federal courts. He seeks 21 million dollars in damages, and to have counsel appointed to 

investigate “this matter.” (Compl. at 3.) 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988). Claims of negligence by an attorney are not based on federal law and so are not 

cognizable under Section 1983. See Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 13445 (9th Cir. 1981)

(claims of legal malpractice not cognizable in federal court). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that 

Mr. Bedrick was negligent, even when liberally construed, is not cognizable. 

Moreover, even if Plaintiff could amend his complaint to assert a violation of his federal 

constitutional right to due process, which guarantees effective assistance of counsel on appeal of a

state court criminal judgment, see Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985), his claims would 

still not be cognizable because Mr. Bedrick is not a state actor. Defendants in state court 

prosecutions cannot generally sue their lawyers under Section 1983 for mistakes in their 

representation. A public defender does not act under color of state law, an essential element of an 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions, such as entering 

pleas, making motions, objecting at trial, cross-examining witnesses, and making closing 

arguments. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981); cf. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 

81, 84 (2009) (state court erred in ranking assigned counsel essentially as state actors for purposes 

of evaluating speedy trial claim). A private attorney representing a defendant or appellant also is 

not a state actor. See Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th 

Cir. 2003). From the exhibits, it appears that Mr. Bedrick is a private attorney who was either 

hired or assigned to represent Plaintiff in his criminal appeal. In either case, Plaintiff’s allegations 

against him fall squarely within the scope of work that Polk County has determined is not 

actionable under Section 1983, namely alleged errors in the representation of Plaintiff in his state 

court criminal proceedings. For this reason, such claims may not proceed. 

In addition, the claims against Mr. Bedrick for damages are also barred by Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck, a plaintiff cannot bring a civil rights action for 

damages for a wrongful conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose 

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, unless that conviction or sentence 

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already has been determined to be wrongful. See id. at 486-87. A conviction or sentence may be 

determined to be wrongful by, for example, being reversed on appeal or being set aside when a 

state or federal court issues a writ of habeas corpus. See id. The Heck rule also prevents a person 

from bringing an action that -- even if it does not directly challenge the conviction or other 

decision -- would necessarily imply that the conviction or other decision was invalid. Id. at 487. 

The Heck rule bars Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Mr. Bedrick because success on those 

claims would call into question the validity of Plaintiff’s state court judgment. See 

generally Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

claim requires showing of deficient performance and prejudice, i.e., but for counsel's failure "he 

would have prevailed on his appeal"). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel on appeal must be dismissed without leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION

The complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff bringing his claims in a 

federal habeas proceeding if he receives the authorization from the Court of Appeals for filing a 

second or successive federal habeas petition. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2015

________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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