Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06406/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06406-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joann Mitcheltree
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

~nite~ ,States Qlourt of J\ppeals 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER. COLORADO 80294 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLERK June 11, 1991 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 89-6406 USA v. Mitcheltree 

Filed May 15, 1991, by Judge Bobby R. Baldock 

Attached is a new page 9 to be substituted for page 9 

TELEPHONE 

<303) 844-3157 

<FTS> 564·3157 

in the original opinion which was sent to you on May 15, 1991. 

Very truly yours, 

L. Clerk 

Enclosure 

PF:oac 

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 1 
Filed May 15, 1991 

I. Facts 

The events in this case involve MDMA, a "designer drug" 

sometimes known as "ecstasy," which did not become subject to 

federal controlled substance penalties until October 27, 1986. 

MDMA is a controlled substance analogue. As such, it produced 

effects similar to various controlled substances, but differed 

enough to fall outside the classification of existing controlled 

substances. Rec. supp. vol. VI at 871-73. The government's 

efforts to schedule MDMA as a controlled substance did not fare 

well initially. Pursuant to 21 u.s.c. § 8ll(h), the DEA sought to 

schedule temporarily MDMA as a schedule I controlled substance. 

50 Fed. Reg. 22,119 (1985). In United States v. Spain, 825 F.2d 

1426 (lOth Cir. 1987), we held that this attempted temporary 

scheduling was invalid because the DEA had not been subdelegated 

the authority8 and that an order scheduling the drug had not been 

timely issued. Id. at 1429. See also United States v. Caudle, 

828 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding MDMA temporary 

scheduling procedurally defective). A final rule placing MDMA in 

schedule I, effective November 13, 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 36,552 

(1986), was vacated for further agency consideration. Grinspoon 

v. Drug Enforcement Adm'n, 828 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1987). 

As a controlled substance analogue, MDMA was treated as a 

schedule I controlled substance as of October 27, 1986. The 

8 We later determined that neither the Attorney General nor the 

DEA had been lawfully delegated the authority for temporary 

scheduling. United States v. Widdowson, 916 F.2d 587, 591, 594 

(lOth Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court subsequently held both 

delegations lawful, contrary to our interpretation. United States 

v. Touby, No. 90-6282, (May 20, 1991) [1991 WL 79099], aff'g, 909 

F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1990). 

-9-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 2 
~ttiteb ~tates Qlourt of J\ppeals 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER. COLORADO 80294 

ROBERT L. HOECKER July 5, 1991 CLERK 

TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

(Filed May 15, 1991, by Judge Baldock) 

Re: No. 89-6406, USA v. Mitcheltree 

(Lower docket: CR-89-115-P) 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844-3157 

CFTS> 564-3157 

The opinion filed May 15, 1991, in the captioned case has 

been ordered withdrawn. 

Sincerely, 

By trick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 3 
... 

PUBLISH 

F ILBO 

United Ststt§ Coun fJf Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAV 15 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. No. 89-6406 

JoANN MITCHELTREE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 89-115-P) 

Richard M. Wintery, Special Assistant United States Attorney 

(Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney and Merri L. Hankins, 

Assistant United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Jill M. Wichlens, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, with her on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before McKAY, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

By superseding indictment, defendant-appellant JoAnn 

Mitcheltree was indicted in five of ten counts of an indictment 

charging, in pertinent part, seven defendants with various 

offenses arising out of the alleged distribution of the drug 

methylenedioxymethamphetamine or MDMA. After a jury trial, 

defendant was convicted on three counts: (1) count four, 

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 4 
introducing a misbranded drug into interstate commerce with the 

intent to mislead or defraud, 21 u.s.c. §§ 331(a) & 333(a)(2), 1 

(2) count one, conspiracy to commit this offense, 18 u.s.c. 

§ 371, 2 and (3) count ten, witness tampering, 18 u.s.c. 

1 21 u.s.c. § 333(a)(2) was formerly designated§ 333(b). 

Although the parties have cited the former designation, we cite 

the current one. 21 u.s.c. § 333 now provides: 

2 

Penalties 

(a) Violation of section 331 of this title~ second violation~ intent to defraud or mislead 

(1) Any person who violates a provision of section 

301 [21 U.S.C. § 331] shall be imprisoned for not more 

than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or both. 

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 

(1), if any person commits such a violation after a 

conviction of him under this section has become final, 

or commits such a violation with the intent to defraud 

or mislead, such person shall be imprisoned for not more 

than three years or fined not more than $10,000 or both. 

18 u.s.c. § 371 provides: 

Conspiracy to commit offense or defraud the United 

States 

If two or more persons conspire either to commit 

any offense against the United States, or to defraud the 

United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or 

for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do act 

to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be 

fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 

five years, or both. 

If, however, the offense, the commission of which 

is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, 

the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the 

maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 5 
§ 1512(b)(3). 3 Defendant was acquitted on count two, conspiracy 

to distribute a controlled substance analogue, 21 u.s.c. 

§§ 813 & 846. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count 

nine, another witness tampering count, and upon motion of the 

government that count was dismissed with prejudice. 

Counts one and four occurred before the effective date of the 

Sentencing Guidelines, and the district court sentenced defendant 

to six months imprisonment on each count. Defendant was sentenced 

in accordance with the Guidelines on count ten because the offense 

occurred after their enactment; based upon a total offense level 

of fifteen and criminal history category of II, she was sentenced 

to twenty-one months imprisonment, and to an additional 

consecutive month for committing an offense (count ten) while on 

release, 18 u.s.c. S 3147. The sentences on counts one and four 

ran concurrently with one another and with the sentence on count 

3 18 U.S.C. S 1512(b)(3) provides: 

Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant 

(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical 

force, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, 

or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct 

toward another person, with intent to--

(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to 

a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States 

of information relating to the commission or possible 

commission of a Federal offense or a violation of 

conditions of probation, parole, or release pending 

judicial proceedings; 

shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned not 

more than ten years, or both. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 6 
ten: accordingly, defendant was sentenced to a term of twenty-two 

months. 4 

Defendant was represented by retained counsel at trial. With 

one exception, appellate counsel has not pursued the points 

preserved as potential error by trial counsel: rather, appellate 

counsel pursues, under a plain error theory, claims which were not 

raised at trial. 5 Usually, an appellate court will not set aside 

a judgment based upon errors which were not brought to the 

attention of the trial court. United States v. Atkinson, 297 u.s. 

157, 159 (1936). Fairness and efficiency considerations counsel 

against noticing such errors when the opportunity to present them 

has passed. Id. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) tempers this somewhat by 

providing that "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial 

rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the 

attention of the court." Errors may be noticed for the first time 

on direct appeal "if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise 

seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

4 The district court and this court denied bail pending appeal. 

Defendant began serving her sentence on January 20, 1990. 

Subsequently, appellate counsel was appointed for her, briefing 

was completed and the case came on for oral argument in November 

1990. On December 21, 1990, the merits panel sua sponte 

reconsidered the earlier order denying bail pending appeal and 

instructed the district court to set conditions of release in 

accordance with 18 u.s.c. § 3143(b). See United States v. Daily, 

921 F.2d 994, 998 (lOth Cir. 1991) (merits panel granted bail 

pending appeal after oral argument). 

5 As a general rule, when appellate counsel rejects completely 

those errors claimed by trial counsel in favor of a different 

avenue on appeal, we must be cautious of a "tendency to seize upon 

errors which, removed from context, take on an aspect of 

seriousness which they never had below." 8B J. Moore, Moore's 

Federal Practice~ 52.03 (1991). 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 7 
judicial proceedings." Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160. This power is 

reserved for "exceptional circumstances," id., and it "is to be 

used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a 

miscarriage of justice would result." United States v. Frady, 456 

u.s. 152, 163 n.14 (1982). 

Even if error did occur, we review plain error claims against 

a backdrop of the entire record to determine whether the error was 

sufficient to "undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and 

contribute to a miscarriage of justice." United States v. Young, 

470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985). To find reversible plain error, we must be 

satisfied that the error not only affected substantial rights in a 

serious way, but also that the "error had an unfair prejudicial 

impact on the jury's deliberations." Id. at 16-17 n.14. "Only 

then would a court be able to conclude that the error undermined 

the fairness of the trial and contributed to a miscarriage of 

justice." Id. Consequently, plain error is "'both obvious and 

substantial.'" United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1254 

(lOth Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 

420 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 u.s. 904 (1978)). 

An error of constitutional significance may be "noticed more 

freely than less serious errors." See 3A c. Wright, Federal 

Practice & Procedure§ 856 at 336, 342 (1982 & 1990 Supp.); 

Jefferson, 925 F.2d at 1254. Notwithstanding, many constitutional 

errors are "not prejudicial per se." 8B J. Moore, Moore's Federal 

Practice~ 52.03 (1990). Rather, under Chapman v. California, 386 

U.S. 18, 24 (1967), many constitutional errors may be deemed 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 8 
' ' 

harmless and not reversible when a reviewing court is "able to 

declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 

See also United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469-70 (lOth 

Cir. 1990) (en bane) (discussing differing standards of review for 

nonconstitutional and constitutional claims). 6 The harmless error 

doctrine embodies the oft-stated concept that the Constitution 

only requires that a defendant receive a fair trial, not a perfect 

one, and the "virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error" 

does not impair a jury's resolution of the central inquiry in 

every criminal trial: "the factual question of the defendant's 

guilt or innocence." Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 u.s. 673, 681 

(1986). 

On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the district court 

admitted evidence concerning a surreptitiously recorded 

conversation between a government informant and the defendant, in 

violation of defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel, (2) 

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move 

for the suppression of that evidence, (3) the district court erred 

by not defining "misleading conduct" in the jury instructions 

concerning witness tampering, (4) the district court should not 

have considered defendant's witness tampering conviction as an 

offense committed while on release for purposes of enhancement 

under 18 u.s.c. S 3147, and (5) insufficient evidence supports the 

6 In habeas cases involving the sixth amendment right to 

counsel, the Court has followed the "harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt" standard in determining prejudice. Moore v. Illinois, 434 

u.s. 220, 232 (1977); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 u.s. 371, 377-78 

(1972). 

-6-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 9 
conviction on counts one and four of the indictment (the MDMA 

misbranding counts) because the government did not demonstrate an 

intent to mislead or defraud a government agency pursuant to 21 

u.s.c. § 333(a)(2). We reverse. 

As for the counts involving MDMA offenses, we agree with the 

defendant that her sixth amendment right to counsel was violated 

by the introduction of her surreptitiously taped conversation with 

the government's informant. However, we need not reach the issue 

of whether the introduction of these statements constituted plain 

error because we reverse for insufficient evidence the MDMA 

convictions (counts one and four). 

As for the witness tampering count conviction (count ten), we 

hold that evidence of the taped conversation is a product of the 

sixth amendment violation concerning the MDMA counts, 

notwithstanding that the government's purpose was to investigate 

the separate offense of witness tampering. Upon a proper 

suppression motion, the taped conversation should have been 

excluded as evidence on count ten, given the charge (contained in 

the government's bill of particulars) that defendant misled her 

pretrial services officer concerning the substance of the 

conversation. Even absent proper objection, we still must reverse 

and remand for a new trial on count ten because we cannot say that 

this constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Because we reverse and remand for a new trial on count ten, 

we do not consider defendant's arguments that the district court 

erred by (1) failing to define misleading conduct in the jury 

-7-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 10 
instructions7 and (2) enhancing her sentence under 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3147; nor do we resolve the ex post facto sentencing guideline 

problem suggested by defendant on appeal. Likewise, given our 

disposition, we need not consider defendant's claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 

Returning to MDMA counts one and four, we hold that while 

sufficient evidence exists concerning defendant's intent to 

mislead or defraud consumers, by no means does the record contain 

sufficient evidence of misleading or defrauding a government 

agency. We reject the government's assertion that, for purposes 

of 21 u.s.c. § 333(a)(2) and 18 u.s.c. § 371, an intent to defraud 

a local police department by selling misbranded drugs is a 

sufficient basis to sustain convictions of this nature. Because 

the case was submitted to the jury on either theory (misleading 

consumers or defrauding a government agency including a local 

police department) and a general verdict form was used, we cannot 

tell on which theory or theories the jury convicted. Accordingly, 

defendant's convictions on MDMA counts one and four must be 

reversed with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on 

those counts. 

7 On retrial of count ten, the district court should include 

the pertinent provisions of the statutory definition of misleading 

conduct, 18 u.s.c. § 1515(b)(3), as well as other pertinent 

definitions contained in § 1515. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 11 
' ' 

I. Facts 

The events in this case involve MDMA, a "designer drug" 

sometimes known as "ecstasy," which did not become subject to 

federal controlled substance penalties until October 27, 1986. 

MDMA is a controlled substance analogue. As such, it produced 

effects similar to various controlled substances, but differed 

enough to fall outside the classification of existing controlled 

substances. Rec. supp. vol. VI at 871-73. The government's 

efforts to schedule MDMA as a controlled substance did not fare 

well initially. Pursuant to 21 u.s.c. § 8ll(h), the DEA sought to 

schedule temporarily MDMA as a schedule I controlled substance. 

50 Fed. Reg. 22,119 (1985). In United States v. Spain, 825 F.2d 

1426 (lOth Cir. 1987), we held that this attempted temporary 

scheduling was invalid because the DEA had not been subdelegated 

the authority8 and that an order scheduling the drug had not been 

timely issued. Id. at 1429. See also United States v. Caudle, 

828 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding MDMA temporary 

scheduling procedurally defective). A final rule placing MDMA in 

schedule I, effective November 13, 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 36,552 

(1986), was vacated for further agency consideration. Grinspoon 

v. Drug Enforcement Adm'n, 828 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1987). 

As a controlled substance analogue, MDMA was treated as a 

schedule I controlled substance as of October 27, 1986. The 

8 We later determined that neither the Attorney General nor the 

DEA had been lawfully delegated the authority for temporary 

scheduling. United States v. Widdowson, 916 F.2d 587, 591, 594 

(lOth Cir. 1990); contra United States v. Touby, 909 F.2d 759 (3d 

Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 751 (1991). 

-9-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 12 
Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. 

99-570, tit. I, subtit. E, § 1202, 100 Stat. 3207-13 to 3207-14 

(Oct. 27, 1986), provided that a controlled substance analogue 

intended for human consumption would be treated as a schedule I 

controlled substance. 21 u.s.c. § 813. Effective March 23, 1988, 

however, MDMA was permanently scheduled in schedule I as a 

controlled substance. 53 Fed. Reg. 5,156 (1988). 

Defendant began using and distributing MDMA in the summer of 

1985, before it was scheduled as a controlled substance analogue. 9 

9 Leslie Lynn Ricks testified that defendant introduced Ricks 

to codefendant Samuel Raymer as a source for MDMA. Rec. supp. 

vol. Vat 724, 727. Ricks frequently called defendant to find out 

when Raymer would be in town so Ricks could purchase MDMA for 

resale. Id. at 727. 

Extensive testimony about the MDMA distribution network came 

from Kevin Volk, defendant's one-time boyfriend. He testified 

that defendant introduced him to MDMA in July 1985, telling him 

and a friend that "it was all natural, it would make you feel 

great." Rec. supp. vol. Vat 424. Volk then became a regular 

consumer and distributor. By November 1985, at Confetti's 

nightclub in Oklahoma City, Volk would take money from purchasers 

and exchange it for MDMA tablets from Raymer; Volk indicated that 

he observed defendant doing the same, selling to customers 

including informant B.J. Rizzo and Ruth House. Id. at 445-46. 

Defendant's sale of MDMA tablets at Confetti's nightclub is 

corroborated by House, who purchased MDMA from defendant, id. at 

638, and Rizzo, who purchased MDMA from defendant and Volk, and 

sometimes sold MDMA for defendant and Volk, receiving 

payment-in-kind. Id. supp. vol. VII at 1034. 

According to Volk, defendant indicated that Raymer was 

willing to expand the operation by "fronting" MDMA to her for 

distribution. Id. supp. vol. V at 448. Under this arrangement, 

Raymer, having been arrested in Texas, no longer flew to Oklahoma 

City. Id. at 449. Instead, he drove, stayed with Volk and 

defendant, and 

He [Raymer] would provide us the pills at the beginning 

of the weekend when he arrived. We would sell them 

throughout the weekend. When he got ready to leave, we 

(footnote continued to next page) 

-10-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 13 
After being indicted in 1989 for her activities in connection with 

MDMA, defendant was arraigned and eventually released on bond. In 

the order setting conditions of release, the defendant was 

directed to initial each condition which applied. One of the 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

would have to pay him for the pills sold and give him 

the remaining pills. 

Id. at 448-49, 450. According to Volk, by the end of 1985 and the 

beginning of January 1986, he and defendant sold four- to fivehundred MDMA tablets per week. Id. at 451. Raymer would bring 

the tablets in large, unmarked white containers which could hold 

about one-thousand pills and Raymer, Volk and defendant would 

transfer the tablets into smaller plastic bags. Id. at 453-54, 

456. 

In February 1986, undercover detective James Osborne, through 

an informant, arranged for the purchase of fifty tablets of MDMA 

from defendant at Confetti's nightclub. Rec. supp. vol. V at 

572-74. The detective testified that he purchased forty-nine 

tablets for $784. Id. at 575. The exchange occurred in the 

nightclub parking lot, with the informant handing the tablets to 

the detective. Id. at 575. Defendant first requested that the 

detective actually place the money in her purse. Id. The 

detective testified that he had encountered such arrangements many 

times in the covert drug trade. Drug dealers frequently deal 

through another party, not directly transferring drugs or 

accepting money from the purchaser. Defendant mistakenly thought 

that it "would not be any type of illegal activity as long as she 

did not personally hand the evidence or take the money from [an 

unknown law enforcement agent]." Id. at 577. 

By late-April 1986, Raymer left MDMA with Volk and defendant 

to distribute and collect money on Raymer's behalf. Id. at 465. 

By May 1986, Raymer arranged with defendant to send the money by 

express mail in care of Raymer's mother's trucking company. Id. 

at 467. According to Volk, defendant would obtain drafts or money 

orders at the post office in her name, and they would send them to 

Raymer. Id. at 468. 

After Raymer was arrested a second time in Texas, Volk and 

defendant lacked a supplier. Id. at 469. By August 1986, Volk 

testified that defendant had contacted Raymer, arranging for MDMA 

mailing. Id. at 469-70. During August and September 1986, 

defendant and Volk received MDMA tablets through the mail or by 

delivery from Raymer. Id. at 473-74. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 14 
conditions marked as applicable, but not initialed by the 

defendant, was a requirement that she "avoid all contact with 

persons[] who are considered either alleged victims or potential 

witnesses[]." Two lines, apparently for the purpose of naming the 

potential witnesses, were left blank. Although the defendant 

signed the order setting conditions of release, the pretrial 

services officer indicated that it was possible that defendant was 

not made aware of the condition prohibiting contact of potential 

witnesses, given that defendant did not initial. Rec. supp. val. 

VII at 1099. However, the pretrial services officer also 

testified that defendant indicated that "her attorney had advised 

her not to talk to anybody that might be a potential witness." 

Id. at 1078. See also id. at 1105. 

While released, defendant contacted her friend, B.J. Rizzo, a 

potential witness. Rizzo, a hairstylist, had been a participant 

in defendant's MDMA distribution network, being paid in-kind. 

Rizzo's father had cut defendant's hair four or five times over a 

four-year period and Rizzo had assisted by shampooing. In June 

1989, Rizzo coincidentally met defendant at the Varsity Sports 

Grill in Oklahoma City. Defendant inquired whether Rizzo had been 

contacted by Detective Randy Yarborough of the Oklahoma City 

Police Department, who had been investigating MDMA distribution in 

Oklahoma City. Rizzo replied that she had not. Rizzo also told 

defendant that she was working at a new hair styling salon about 

to have its grand opening. 

-12-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 15 
A few weeks later, Rizzo received a call from defendant while 

at the salon. According to Rizzo, defendant inquired whether she 

had heard from Detective Yarborough. Rizzo volunteered that she 

had. Defendant then scheduled a hair appointment for June 26, 

1989. Rec. supp. vol. VII at 1052. Rizzo testified that she did 

not know what to do, so she called the detective. The detective 

then contacted Richard Wintory, the prosecutor. An agreement was 

reached whereby Rizzo would secretly tape her conversation with 

defendant during the hair appointment. According to Rizzo, the 

purpose was "[t]o see if she [defendant] was going to try to 

change my testimony." Id. at 1054. 

The prosecutor advised defendant's pretrial services officer 

that defendant may have contacted a female witness. He further 

advised that someone would take the witness's statement and that 

the pretrial services officer should review, with the defendant, 

defendant's conditions of release, including the condition that 

defendant not contact potential witnesses. That review would not 

occur until after the taping of the conversation on June 26. 

The transcript of the June 26 conversation between defendant 

and Rizzo contains many personal details about the defendant that 

one might reveal to a close friend. At least eight times during 

the conversation, Rizzo, using the ruse that the detective kept 

calling her and she needed defendant's advice, encouraged 

defendant to talk about the pending MDMA charges. Defendant gave 

a variety of responses, sometimes ambiguous, and in the process 

discussed her views concerning the government's case, including 

-13-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 16 
codefendants, and whom Rizzo might implicate by her testimony. 

Concerning Rizzo's status as a witness, defendant advised Rizzo to 

make the government subpoena her. The following exchange 

occurred: 

Rizzo: I don't know. (inaudible) I really 

don't want to talk to him [the 

detective]. But I know that I have to 

otherwise I'll have to go to court and I 

don't want to go to court. 

Defendant: You will have to go to court anyway. 

Rizzo: You think they got me down there as a 

witness? 

Defendant: They got you down on a grand jury thing 

as a witness, that you witness that 

Sampson10 sold drugs. 

Tr. 6/26/89 at 3. In the course of advising Rizzo about what to 

say to the detective, defendant discussed Rizzo's potential 

testimony against codefendant Raymer and defendant. 11 In a later 

10 

11 

Sampson was the nickname of codefendant Samuel Scott Raymer. 

The following exchange occurred: 

Rizzo: 

Defendant: 

Rizzo: 

Defendant: 

Man its gonna be hard for me to testify 

against Sampson when he's right in the 

room. 

Yeah it is BJ, it's gonna be impossible 

for you to. You know what you need to 

tell them you just did 'em every now and 

then. If I were you I'd say, you don't 

even have to say you got yours from 

Sampson. 

I really didn't though. He gave me, the 

only time that he gave me drugs was the 

time that we were in Dallas. Is the only 

time JoAnn. 

Then that's what you need to tell 'em BJ. 

(footnote continued to next page) 

-14-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 17 
taped conversation, Rizzo requested further advice using the same 

ruse. Defendant suggested that she retain a lawyer and offered to 

assist with the fee. 

On July 5, 1989, defendant met with her pretrial services 

officer. The officer inquired whether defendant had been in 

contact with any potential witnesses. Initially, defendant said 

no, but when told that by the officer that the officer had 

received contrary information, defendant thought about it for a 

moment and said that she had been in contact with Rizzo. 

Prosecutor: 

Officer: 

What happened next? 

We proceeded to talk--! cannot recall 

verbatim the conversation but, in 

general, she stated that she had been in 

to see B.J. [Rizzo] recently to get her 

hair done and that in getting her hair 

done, B.J. had stated that she had not 

been contacted by anybody in law enforcement since JoAnn's [defendant's] arrest 

but that she thought she was going to be 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

Rizzo: 

Defendant: 

Rizzo: 

Defendant: 

Rizzo: 

Defendant: 

They, I never, and he gave 'em to me he 

didn't sell 'em to me. He gave 'em to 

me. 

Then that's what you need to tell 'em. 

But [. • • ] 

Where did you get 'em? Did you get most 

of your shit from (inaudible). 

Um-hmm. 

You better change that story. 

Tr. 6/26/89 at 15-16. Rizzo testified that during the inaudible 

portion, the defendant pointed to herself and said, "'From me'[?]" 

Rec. supp. vol. VIII at 1139. 

-15-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 18 
cooperating and that she probably needed 

to get an attorney. 

Rec. supp. vol. VII at 1077. According to the officer, defendant 

explained that: (1) Rizzo thought she needed an attorney; (2) 

Rizzo had been her hairdresser for the last three to five years 

and that she saw her on a regular basis; and (3) she and Rizzo did 

not discuss the case. Id. at 1078-79. Defendant inquired where 

the officer's information had come from and the officer identified 

prosecutor Wintery as the source. According to the officer, 

defendant "said 'Well, don't tell Wintery about this,' something 

to the effect, 'I'm in enough trouble,' or something, but, 'Don't 

tell Mr. Wintery about this.'" Id. at 1079-80. 

Concerning the relationship between Rizzo and defendant, the 

officer understood that Rizzo was defendant's "hairdresser of 

longstanding, that she had been seeing her on a regular basis for 

many years." Id. at 1082. This was based in part on the 

defendant's remarks at the July 5 meeting: 

Officer: After we talked for a while and she 

[defendant] was ready to leave, she--I 

told her I would be talking to her next 

week and she said, well, next time you 

see me, if my hair looks rather scraggly, 

it will be because she hadn't been to the 

hairdresser and we kind of laughed about 

that she did have pretty hair and that I 

would see her next week. 

Id. at 1080. A violation of a defendant's conditions of release 

is reported to an appropriate judicial officer by the pretrial 

services officer. The officer in this case testified that in 

deciding whether a violation occurred it would have been 

significant to her that (1) "[June 26, 1989] was the only time she 

-16-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 19 
[defendant] had gone to Ms. Rizzo to have her hair cut," and (2) 

defendant had inquired into the substance of Rizzo's testimony. 

Id. at 1083. 

Prior to trial, the government was ordered to provide 

12 defendant a bill of particulars concerning count ten. Rec. 

supp. vol. I, doc. 77, doc. 111. The government indicated that 

the federal offense involved was defendant's witness tampering 

with Rizzo and the condition of release violated was a prohibition 

on contact with government witnesses. According to the 

government, defendant engaged in several acts of misleading 

conduct or corrupt persuasion toward the pretrial services 

officer: (1) initially denying that she contacted a government 

witness; (2) after admitting the contact with Rizzo, falsely 

claiming that Rizzo had been cutting defendant's hair for five 

years; (3) indicating that no substantive discussion of the case 

had occurred; (4) not disclosing that she had advised Rizzo to 

withhold names of coconspirators who had distributed MDMA to 

12 Count ten of the superseding indictment provided: 

That on or about July S, 1989, in Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma County, within the Western District of 

Oklahoma, 

---------------JO ANN MITCHELLTREE [sic]---------------

the defendant herein, did knowingly, corruptly persuade, 

and engaged in misleading conduct or attempt to do so, 

with the intent to hinder, delay and prevent the 

communication by [pretrial services officer] Cynthia 

Cranford to a law enforcement officer or a Judge of the 

United States of information relating to the commission 

or possible commission of a federal offense, 

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, 

Section 1512(b)(3). 

-17-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 20 
Rizzo; and (5) requesting that the officer not inform the 

prosecutor of the defendant's contact with Rizzo. 

II. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 

On a plain error theory, defendant contends that her 

incriminating statements elicited by Rizzo should have been 

suppressed as violative of her sixth amendment right to counsel. 

A. 

The sixth amendment right to counsel "does not attach until 

after the initiation of formal charges." Moran v. Burbine, 475 

u.s. 412, 431 (1986); accord United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 

180, 189 (1984) ("right to counsel attaches at the initiation of 

adversary judicial criminal proceedings"); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 

u.s. 682, 689 (1972) (right to counsel attaches "at or after the 

initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings--whether by 

way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information 

or arraignment"). The right to counsel applies to pending charges 

but not to "other and different charges against the same 

defendant." Hoffa v. United States, 385 u.s. 293, 308 (1966). 

Thus, a defendant's incriminating statements concerning pending 

charges surreptitiously coaxed by the government in the absence of 

counsel may not be used in prosecuting those charges. Massiah v. 

United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). However, other 

incriminating statements pertaining to different crimes may be 

-18-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 21 
'' 

used in a subsequent trial of those crimes. Maine v. Moulton, 474 

u.s. 159, 180 n.16 (1985). Accord Moran, 475 u.s. at 431. 

Where no charges have been filed regarding the subject of 

interrogation, the sixth amendment right to counsel does not 

attach. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (1990). But 

once charges have been filed, the defendant is in a different 

position because the right to counsel has attached on those 

charges. Id. The purpose of the sixth amendment is to afford a 

defendant a "right to rely upon counsel as a 'medium' between him 

and the State." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176. The government has an 

"affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents 

the protections accorded the accused by invoking this right." Id. 

Whether a sixth amendment violation has occurred must be evaluated 

in light of this affirmative obligation. Id. The government is 

not precluded from utilizing incriminating statements obtained 

from the defendant as a result of "luck or happenstance." Id. 

Proscribed is "obtain[ing] incriminating statements by knowingly 

circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a 

confrontation between the accused and a state agent." Id. 

At the time the government elicited the statements in 

question (June 26, 1989), defendant had been indicted on count 

one, alleging a conspiracy to commit an offense against the United 

States, 18 u.s.c. § 371, and specifically introducing misbranded 

MDMA in interstate commerce with intent to mislead and defraud, 21 

u.s.c. § 333(a)(2). See Rec. supp. vol. XII, doc. 6/7/89. 

Defendant also had been indicted on count two, conspiracy to 

-19-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 22 
.. 

distribute MDMA, a controlled substance analogue, 21 u.s.c. 

§§ 813, 846. See Rec. supp. vol. XII, doc. 6/7/89. Thus, 

defendant's right to counsel had attached on the two MDMA 

conspiracy counts. It had not attached on count ten, the witness 

tampering charge. 

The government argues that a "separate offense" exception to 

the sixth amendment applies in this case. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 

2399; Moulton, 474 u.s. at 176. According to the government, the 

defendant was not immune from investigation or prosecution for 

witness tampering during the pending MDMA case, a proposition with 

which we agree. See United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 

1099, 1111-12 (11th Cir. 1990). Also, according to the 

government, the defendant has failed to establish that the 

government deliberately circumvented her right to counsel on the 

pending MDMA charges. 

The government explains that defendant "launched into further 

criminal activity while under indictment. Specifically, while on 

pretrial release, she made arrangements to visit with a government 

witness whom she had no significant contact for years, for the 

ostensible purpose of having her haircut, but only after first 

ascertaining that the witness had been contacted by law 

enforcement." Appellee's Brief at 24. According to the 

government, "the detective recognized the fact pattern - the 

defendant meant to attempt to influence the government witness and 

had in fact taken definitive steps towards implementing her 

criminal intent." Id. 

-20-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 23 
About two weeks after informant Rizzo and the defendant met 

by chance at the Varsity Sports Grill, the detective contacted 

Rizzo. Rizzo "did not want to get in any trouble," rec. supp. VII 

at 1050, so she agreed to discuss the whole case, including 

information about defendant Samuel Raymer. After being contacted 

by defendant for a hair appointment, Rizzo contacted the 

detective. The detective and the government prosecutor, Mr. 

Wintery, then cooperated in investigating the defendant's 

predisposition for witness tampering. Id. at 1076, 1093-94. 

After a series of meetings between Rizzo and the detective, Rizzo 

was wired and ready to tape the conversation. According to Rizzo 

her purpose was "[t]o see if she [defendant] was going to try to 

change my testimony." Id. at 1054. 

B. 

We have carefully reviewed the transcript, the taped 

conversation and the trial testimony. Though a confidential 

informant, Rizzo's actions must be evaluated as those of a 

government agent subject to the limitations of the sixth 

amendment. Hoffa, 385 u.s. at 311. Defendant argues that "[t]he 

statements elicited and introduced by the government amount to a 

confession by [defendant] Mitcheltree that she had engaged in a 

conspiracy to distribute MDMA." Appellant's Brief at 29 n.9. We 

think that defendant's characterization may be somewhat 

overstated, but we cannot ignore the incriminating implications of 

defendant's statements concerning her coconspirators and her own 

-21-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 24 
distribution and consumption of misbranded MDMA. See, ~' tr. 

6/26/89 at 13 ("I got it for people but I wasn't that huge [a drug 

dealer] •.•• "); at 16 ("I know I used to give you most of them 

[MDMA tablets]"; "Anything you got from me I pretty much gave 

you."); at 21 ("I was an x-freak"). Defendant's taped statements 

concerning misbranded MDMA cannot be categorized as the product of 

"luck or happenstance." Rather, during the course of the 

conversation, Rizzo asked the defendant broad, open-ended 

questions about the subject matter of the charged offenses. At 

least seven times, Rizzo sought the defendant's advice as to what 

she should say and do in connection with the investigation. See, 

~' id. at 2 ("I don't know what to say JoAnn."); ("But, I mean, 

what do you think I should say?"); at 3 ("So I don't know what to 

do."); at 7 ("Well, what do you think we should do then?"); at 16. 

Rizzo also asked about defendant's testimony and her 

knowledge of the conspiracy. See, ~' id. at 7 ("Now are you 

testifying against Sampson?"); ("Well, I need to ask you a 

question, what about the Lobaughs?"); at 8 ("Who's Lynn 

[Ricks]?"). Rizzo admitted that she elicited conversation about 

the drug trade, rec. supp. vol. VIII at 1208, and this included 

names of other coconspirators and activities highly relevant to 

the conspiracies charged. Although the government contends that 

Rizzo never pressed for details on the MDMA counts, her repeated, 

open-ended questions made it virtually certain that defendant 

would discuss the details of the pending MDMA counts. Equally 

important, the government's informant prompted defendant to 

-22-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 25 
.. 

discuss her trial strategy vis-a-vis the other alleged 

coconspirators with comments like "JoAnn, if you don't testify 

against Sampson you're gonna get thrown in jail." Id. at 13. 

Rizzo was more than a passive listener; she exercised skill 

at leading the conversation into particular topics and prompting 

particular replies. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271 

n.9 (1980). Merely because Rizzo and defendant were in a 

non-custodial setting does not bar a finding of deliberate 

elicitation. Id. at 273 n.11. Concerning the charged MDMA 

counts, we strongly believe that the government breached its 

affirmative obligation not to circumvent defendant's sixth 

amendment right to counsel. Here, the government's purpose in 

taping the conversation was to see if defendant would attempt to 

influence Rizzo's possible testimony. Rather than investigating a 

crime which had occurred, the government sought to determine 

whether defendant would commit a crime while she was being taped. 

The government is free to investigate suspected criminal activity, 

even in advance of the commission of a crime. But such 

investigation must proceed with due regard for the government's 

affirmative obligation not to defeat sixth amendment rights which 

have attached. That due regard was not present in this case: in 

an effort to lead the defendant into witness tampering, Rizzo 

inquired into the pending charges in more than a tangential way, 

-23-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 26 
. ' 

and violated the defendant's sixth amendment rights on the pending 

MDMA charges. 13 

The government also learned defendant's mistaken views 

concerning the likelihood of her conviction and the tack she 

planned to take concerning the prosecutor. See, ~' tr. 6/26/89 

at 14-15, 17, 19-20. Whether the government had legitimate 

reasons for investigating witness tampering is beside the point. 

Moulton, 474 u.s. at 180. The taped conversation reveals that the 

13 "This is not a case where •.• 'the constable blundered,' 

People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926); 

rather, it is one where the 'constable' planned an impermissible 

interference with the right to assistance of counsel." Henry, 447 

u.s. at 274-75. In this case, defendant refers us to trial 

testimony which strongly suggests that the prosecutor assisted in 

planning the events which led to the violation of defendant's 

sixth amendment right to counsel. See rec. supp. vol. VII at 

1076, 1093-94. The prosecutor responds that he was "well within 

the bounds of" ethical conduct because a separate offense was 

being investigated which occurred prior to the initiation of 

criminal proceedings. Appellee's Brief at 26 n.4. He relies upon 

United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

111 S. Ct. 152 (1990). In Ryans, we held that DR 7-104(A)(l), 

which restricts lawyer communication with a client known to be 

represented by counsel, does not apply before the initiation of 

criminal proceedings. 903 F.2d at 740. 

The prosecutor's argument ignores the June 7, 1989 indictment 

pending when the government planned these events. The defendant 

had obtained representation, as the prosecutor well knew. At 

best, the prosecutor took no steps to insure that the informant 

did not communicate with the defendant about the pending charges 

and consequently the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel 

was compromised. This is inconsistent with a prosecutor's special 

responsibility concerning a defendant's representation by counsel. 

SeeR. Prof. Conduct 3.8(b), Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 

3-A (West 1991). It also is inconsistent with R. Prof. Conduct 

4.2 which provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not 

communicate, or cause another to communicate about the subject of 

the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented 

by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has consent of 

the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." R. Prof. 

Conduct 4.2, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A (West 1991). 

-24-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 27 
government deliberately elicited statements which the defendant 

had the right not to make prior to consulting with counsel. 

Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d at 1111. 

Where proper objection has been made, statements concerning 

pending counts obtained in violation of a defendant's sixth 

amendment right to counsel are inadmissible in a trial concerning 

those counts. Moulton, 474 u.s. at 180. The government contends 

that defendants taped statements were not offered in support of 

the MDMA counts; however, the record contains no such limiting 

instruction. See rec. supp. val. VIII at 1137, 1144. Rather, the 

trial judge told the jury that the taped conversation would be 

received against defendant only. Trial counsel having failed to 

make a proper objection or seek a severance, we would next be 

required to evaluate this constitutional error on the MDMA counts 

to determine whether reversible or harmless error occurred. See 

United States v. Wade, 388 u.s. 218, 242 (1967). However, because 

we reverse the MDMA counts of conviction (counts one and four) on 

sufficiency grounds, we do not undertake that evaluation. 

c. 

Next we consider the relationship between the sixth amendment 

violation concerning the MDMA counts and the evidence relied upon 

to prove the witness tampering count conviction, count ten. 

Defendant's sixth amendment rights had not attached on count ten 

when the incriminating statements were made because she had yet to 

be indicted for witness tampering. However, she claims that any 

-25-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 28 
statements concerning count ten "were the direct result of the 

violation of [her] sixth amendment rights with respect to counts 

one and four, the MDMA charges." Appellant's Brief at 7. 

We view defendant's derivative evidence (fruit of the 

poisonous tree) claim in light of the general rule that, even 

though a defendant's right to counsel has attached for indicted 

offenses, she still may be questioned without counsel concerning 

uncharged offenses. Moran, 475 u.s. at 431. "To hold that the 

government is prohibited from investigating the defendant's 

involvement in new crimes, simply because [her] right to counsel 

has attached for a separate offense, would be essentially to 

immunize a defendant from further prosecution." Terzado-Madruqa, 

897 F.2d at 1112. The sixth amendment does not require such a 

result, indeed, the government should investigate efforts to 

derail a pending prosecution such as witness or jury tampering or 

other attempts to obstruct justice. Id. This type of 

investigation does not require that defendant's counsel be 

present, but due regard must be shown for defendant's right to 

avoid uncounseled statements, deliberately elicited by the 

government, pertaining to pending charges. Id. 

The government may violate a defendant's sixth amendment 

right to counsel when it deliberately elicits uncounseled 

statements about very closely related crimes which arise out of 

the same course of conduct as the charged offenses. People v. 

Clankie, 530 N.E.2d 448, 452 (Ill. 1988). This principle may 

apply when the government's investigation concerning a charged 

-26-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 29 
offense is incomplete for want of specific details. Id. In 

Brewer v. Williams, 430 u.s. 387 (1977), the defendant was charged 

with abduction, arraigned and confined when the police 

deliberately elicited uncounseled statements concerning the 

location of the victim's body. Id. at 390, 399-400. Thereafter, 

defendant was indicted for first degree murder; however, the Court 

determined that the sixth amendment right to counsel applied to 

the subsequent murder charge given the closely related prior 

abduction charge. Id. at 399. 

Likewise, in Moulton, the defendant had been charged with 

theft by receiving certain vehicles and automotive parts. 474 

U.S. at 162. Thereafter, his sixth amendment right to counsel on 

the pending charges was compromised during an investigation which 

pertained in part to other crimes. 474 u.s. at 162. Defendant 

was subsequently charged with burglary in relation to the same 

items; he was convicted of theft and burglary. Id. at 167. In 

announcing the rule that "incriminating statements pertaining to 

pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges," 

the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court disposition that the 

defendant's statements must be suppressed and a new trial granted 

on the charges of conviction, theft and burglary. Id. at 167-68, 

180. Thus, the Supreme Court did not permit the statements to be 

used for either offense--the theft originally charged, or the 

burglary subsequently charged. 

We believe that when a deliberate sixth amendment violation 

occurs concerning pending charges, the government may not use 

-27-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 30 
defendant's uncounseled incriminating statements at a trial of 

those or very closely related subsequent charges. See Moulton, 

474 U.S. at 180; Brewer, 430 u.s. at 398-99. Uncounseled 

incriminating statements about different uncharged offenses 

normally would be admissible at a later trial of those offenses. 

Id. n.16. Thus, when the government violates a defendant's sixth 

amendment right to counsel on pending charges in the course of 

investigating other suspected crimes, and then issues a 

superseding indictment incorporating new charges on the suspected 

crimes, a prudent course is to sever the new charges from the old 

charges. Terzado-Madruqa, 897 F.2d at 1111-12 (sixth amendment 

violation occurred on pending drug charges while government was 

investigating defendant's involvement in a murder-for-hire scheme; 

severance of new and old charges adequately protected defendant). 

Here, the MDMA counts on which the sixth amendment violation 

occurred are theoretically distinct from the witness tampering 

count. The difficulty is the somewhat unconventional manner in 

which the government sought to prove witness tampering. Certain 

statements obtained in violation of defendant's sixth amendment 

right to counsel relate directly to both the MDMA counts and the 

witness tampering count. Defendant has chosen to proceed on a 

derivative evidence theory which we now address, keeping in mind 

the scope of defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel on the 

MDMA counts. The derivative evidence doctrine is implicated if 

challenged evidence concerning the witness tampering count is 

closely related in time and subject matter to the sixth amendment 

-28-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 31 
violation, in other words, if the challenged evidence is a product 

of the earlier exploitation of the constitutional violation. See 

Hoffa, 385 u.s. at 308-09 (evidence of bribing jurors was not 

obtained through exploitation of an alleged sixth amendment 

violation concerning underlying charges; held, evidence was not 

derivative) • 

The derivative evidence doctrine has been applied in other 

sixth amendment right to counsel cases. See, ~' Nix v. 

Williams, 467 u.s. 431, 442 (1984); United States v. Wade, 388 

u.s. 218, 241-42; Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d at 1112-13. Merely 

because incriminating evidence would not have been discovered but 

for the constitutional violation does not require exclusion. Wong 

Sun v. United States, 371 u.s. 471, 487-88 (1963). Instead, the 

core issue is "'whether, granting establishment of the primary 

illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has 

been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by 

means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 

taint.'" Wong Sun, 371 u.s. at 488 (citation omitted). Three 

exceptions to the derivative evidence doctrine have developed. 

First, facts obtained as a result of a constitutional violation 

still may be used at trial if they can be proven by a lawful 

source independent of the violation. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 

United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). Second, evidence which 

would have ultimately or inevitably been discovered by lawful 

means also is admissible. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. Finally, if the 

causal connection between the constitutional violation and the 

-29-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 32 
evidence in question is so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, 

the evidence is admissible. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 

338, 341 (1939). 

D. 

Normally, we review a district court's legal determinations 

on a suppression motion de novo and its factual findings under a 

clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Soto-Ornelas, 863 

F.2d 1487, 1490 (lOth Cir. 1988). In this case, we lack a trial 

court suppression hearing developing this derivative evidence 

claim because no objection was made below. In this unusual case, 

however, a remand for further factfinding is not necessary because 

the record contains the material facts and establishes as a matter 

of law that the sixth amendment violation concerning the MDMA 

counts (the taped conversation) became a primary basis for the 

offense contained in count ten. Stated another way, the 

circumstances of the constitutional violation evolved into another 

offense. 

Count ten charged the defendant with engaging in several acts 

of misleading conduct toward Cynthia Cranford, the pretrial 

services officer (not the informant, B.J. Rizzo), with the intent 

to hinder communication by the officer concerning the commission 

of a federal offense. In other words, defendant was charged in 

count ten with misleading the officer about the nature of 

defendant's earlier conversation with Rizzo, as well as other acts 

of misleading conduct. These acts did not occur until nine days 

-30-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 33 
after the taped conversation with Rizzo, and were never mentioned, 

let alone contemplated, in the taped conversation. The taped 

conversation between Rizzo and the defendant largely concerns the 

then-pending MDMA counts. 

In its bill of particulars on count ten, the government 

charged one of the acts of defendant's corrupt persuasion and 

misleading conduct as follows: 

After admitting the contact [between defendant and 

Rizzo] the defendant did mislead [pretrial services] 

Officer Cranford as to the purpose and content of her 

discussion with Ms. Rizzo by claiming falsely ••• that 

there had been no substantive discussion of the 

defendant's pending case •.•. 

Rec. supp. vol. I, doc. 111 at 2,, 2(ii). Thus, one of the 

charges on count ten was that defendant denied having discussed 

the merits of the pending case with Rizzo, after having been 

indicted. 

The government relied upon the sixth amendment violation 

concerning the MDMA counts as part of the proof on count ten. 

See, ~' Rec. supp. vol. VII at 1083. Any doubt about the 

government's reliance is dispelled by the government's view of the 

case as outlined at closing argument. 

[A]nd finally, ladies and gentlemen, the [sic] is clear 

that she [defendant] engaged in misleading conduct with 

Officer Cynthia Cranford. She lead [sic] her to believe 

that witness Rizzo had been regularly cutting her hair 

from three to five years and that they had not 

substantively discussed the case. You heard that 

conversation, ladies and gentlemen. There is not by any 

reasonable stretch of the imagination a way you can 

characterize that conversation as not substantially 

discussing the case. You heard the evidence. 

-31-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 34 
Ladies and gentlemen, the evidence is absolutely 

unquestioned in this case. Cynthia Cranford [the 

pretrial services officer] was misled by this defendant 

and the only motive, the only motive for this defendant 

to mislead Officer Cranford was to prevent her from 

communicating the information about her contacting 

witnesses, discussing the substance of the case. That's 

the only motive. That evidence is clear. 

Rec. supp. vel. IX at 1440, 1503 (emphasis added). The 

substantive discussion of the MDMA counts between the government 

(through informant Rizzo) and the defendant was violative of 

defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. 

What the government asks us to do is to allow use of the 

uncounseled statements on the MDMA counts to prove that the 

defendant's subsequent account of those statements to the pretrial 

services officer was false. This we will not do. Plainly, the 

taped conversation, even though it was used for a slightly 

different purpose on the witness tampering count, is wholly a 

result of the sixth amendment violation on the MDMA counts. It is 

not a product of means sufficiently distinguishable so as to be 

purged of the sixth amendment violation on the MDMA counts, rather 

it is the same evidence. Thus, as far as proof on count ten, it 

is more than "closely related" in time and subject matter to the 

underlying sixth amendment violation. See Hoffa, 385 u.s. at 309. 

We acknowledge Moulton's statement that "[i]ncriminating 

statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth 

Amendment right has not yet attached, are, of course, admissible 

at a trial of those offenses." 474 U.S. at 180 n.16. Here, the 

incriminating statements pertained to both the pending offenses 

and the other crime on which the sixth amendment right had not yet 

-32-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 35 
attached. We think that the Court implied that such multi-purpose 

evidence would be excluded when it rejected a rule that the sixth 

amendment would not apply when the police undertook investigation 

of a separate crime. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 191-92 (Burger, 

C.J., dissenting). See also w. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal 

Procedure§ 6.4 at 470 (1984 & 1991 Supp.). Although the Court 

recognized that police have an incentive to discover evidence 

pertaining to both the charged and uncharged offense, it 

reaffirmed that 

In seeking evidence pertaining to pending 

charges ••• the Government's investigative powers are 

limited by the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused. 

To allow the admission of evidence obtained from the 

accused in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights 

whenever the police assert an alternative, legitimate 

reason for their surveillance invites abuse by law 

enforcement personnel in the form of fabricated 

investigations and risks the evisceration of the Sixth 

Amendment right recognized in Massiah. 

Moulton, 474 U.S. at 179-80. This emphasis on deterrence suggests 

that multi-purpose derivative evidence must be excluded in the 

trial of the uncharged offense in order to uphold the deterrence 

rationale. The derivative evidence doctrine, together with its 

exceptions, limits those cases in which exclusion is available, 

but this is clearly a case in which the government "seeks to 

maintain its right to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by 

that means which it otherwise would not have had." Silverthorne 

Lumber, 251 u.s. at 385. 

We must reverse the conviction on count ten and remand for a 

new trial because we cannot say that introduction of the 

-33-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 36 
defendant's statements (in the taped conversation) was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The proof on count ten consisted of 

the taped conversation and the testimony of two witnesses, the 

pretrial services officer and the informant. The jury could not 

reach agreement on count nine which charged the defendant with 

witness tampering vis-a-vis the informant. The jury may have 

questioned the credibility of the informant. The admissible proof 

on count ten, consisting of some testimony of the informant and 

the pretrial services officer, while sufficient, was by no means 

overwhelming. 

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Adopting the argument contained in codefendant Raymer's 

appellate brief, defendant next contends that the evidence is 

insufficient to convict her on counts one and four of the 

indictment. Trial counsel raised this point on motion for 

judgment of acquittal. Rec. vol. I, doc. 205 at 3-6; supp. vol. 

VIII at 1330. Count one charged defendant and Raymer with 

participation in conspiracy to commit an offense against the 

United States, 18 u.s.c. § 371. The underlying offense was 

introducing misbranded drugs into interstate commerce and failing 

to register and provide information and notice about the MDMA, 21 

u.s.c. § 331(a), (k) & (p), all with the intent to mislead or 

defraud, 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2). See rec. supp. vol. IX at 1360 

(conspiracy falls under "commit any offense" portion of 18 u.s.c. 

§ 371). The time period of the conspiracy was from June 1985 

-34-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 37 
until April 1987, which predated in part the valid scheduling of 

MDMA as a controlled substance or controlled substance analogue. 

The government alleged that the MDMA was misbranded because it was 

distributed in interstate commerce without labels containing 

information such as the name and place of business of the 

manufacturer, packer or distributor and the name and quantity of 

the active ingredients. 21 u.s.c. §§ 352(b), (c) & (e). 

Additionally, the government claimed that it was misbranded 

because it was health endangering and was manufactured in an 

unregistered establishment, 21 u.s.c. § 360, and because notice 

and informational requirements were not followed. 21 u.s.c. 

§§ 352(j) & (o). Count four was a substantive count charging the 

defendant and Raymer with introducing misbranded drugs into 

interstate commerce in January 1986, 21 u.s.c. § 331(a), with 

intent to mislead or defraud, 18 u.s.c. § 333(a)(2). 

We review the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the 

light most favorable to the government to determine "whether any 

rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

319 (1979) (emphasis omitted). The legal issue on this point is 

whether the government can establish a felony violation under 21 

u.s.c. § 333(a)(2) on a theory that defendant, in committing 

violations under 21 U.S.C. § 331 such as misbranding, acted "with 

the intent to mislead or defraud" natural persons or government 

agencies. The jury was instructed that for conviction a defendant 

must act "with the specific intent to mislead or defraud natural 

-35-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 38 
persons to whom the drug was sold, or government agencies." Rec. 

supp. vol. I, doc. 288, instr. 11, 27. To uphold the verdict on 

these counts, we must determine that either theory is legally 

viable. We must also find that sufficient evidence supports each 

theory. 

In making this argument, codefendant Raymer claims that the 

government did not proceed on the theory that he defrauded natural 

persons, but only government agencies. The evidence concerning 

defendant Mitcheltree, however, indicates that she acted with the 

intent to mislead or defraud at least one identified natural 

person concerning the composition of MDMA, coconspirator Kevin 

Volk. 14 Sufficient evidence indicates that defendant Mitcheltree 

14 Volk testified that in July 1985, defendant approached him 

and his roommate at Confetti's nightclub with the suggestion that 

they try some ecstasy she had obtained from Bobby Lewis. Rec. 

supp. vol. V at 423, 425. 

Volk: 

Prosecutor: 

Volk: 

Id. at 424. 

She asked if we would try this new drug 

out called ecstasy. We had not and she 

had tried to tell us that it was all 

natural, it would make you feel great, so 

on and so forth. 

The only thing she told me at this time 

is that it would make you feel great and 

that it was all natural. The ingredients 

were all natural. 

What did you understand that to mean. 

I didn't consider it to be a synthetic 

makeup of anything. It was like a lot of 

herbs and things and would give you a 

chemical reaction in your body that would 

make you feel different. 

-36-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 39 
introduced misbranded MDMA into interstate commerce while acting 

with intent to mislead or defraud natural persons as required by 

21 u.s.c. § 333(a)(2). 

The government's expert pharmacologist testified that "MDMA 

has pharmacological properties which it shares in common with two 

classes of controlled substances." Rec. supp. vol. VI at 878-79. 

Like methamphetamine and cocaine, it is a central nervous system 

stimulant. Id. In low doses, it is an hallucinogenic substance 

like marijuana: in higher doses, it produces visual hallucinations 

like LSD. Id. It has addictive properties. Even when MDMA was 

not scheduled as a controlled substance, its lawful manufacture 

would have required FDA registration. Id. at 873. As a drug, 

MDMA's lawful use in humans would have required FDA approval 

involving factors such as safety and efficacy. Id. at 874. The 

government pharmacologist testified that "the FDA did not nor does 

it now permit the manufacture or human use or importation of 

MDMA." Id. at 877. MDMA is not manufactured by any legitimate 

pharmaceutical house: rather it is manufactured clandestinely, 

solely for those "who are making it for others to abuse." Id. at 

873. 

A. 

The government may premise criminal liability under 

§ 333(a)(2) based upon an intent to mislead or defraud not only 

natural persons, but also government agencies if there is evidence 

that a defendant consciously sought to mislead drug regulatory 

-37-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 40 
authorities such as the FDA or a similar governmental agency. The 

case law from this circuit recognizes such a result. In United 

States v. Industrial Laboratories Co., 456 F.2d 908 (lOth Cir. 

1972), the defendant company and its chief chemist were convicted 

of introducing an adulterated drug into interstate commerce with 

intent to mislead and defraud. The defendants had performed 

testing for a Denver veterinary lab, which then consigned the 

tested product to a veterinary products firm in Canada. The 

Canadian firm (consignee) requested defendants to perform more 

tests in compliance with new standards set by the Canadian 

government. After agreeing with the consignor to perform the 

tests, defendants did not and represented otherwise. Two lots of 

drugs were adulterated. 

We held that the district court's instructions failed to 

state clearly that an element of the offense under§ 333(a)(2) was 

an intent to mislead or defraud. Id. at 910-11. In so holding, 

we stated: 

The jury should have been further directed that it was 

necessary for it to find that defendant knew that 

several tests had not been made, that [the individual 

defendant] intentionally misrepresented that they had, 

and that he did so for the purpose of misleading and 

defrauding the consignee and the Canadian authorities 

that such several tests had been performed. 

Id. at 910. Thus, the specific intent requirement of the statute 

could be satisfied by a showing that defendants intended to 

mislead or defraud the Canadian authorities and the Canadian 

consignee. Although the jury instruction was phrased in the 

conjunctive, "misleading and defrauding the consignee and the 

-38-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 41 
Canadian authorities," id. (emphasis added), it does not appear 

that the proof would admit one without the other. 

Thereafter, in United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., 793 

F.2d 232 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 985 (1986), we 

considered the sufficiency of the evidence on a conspiracy count 

and a substantive count involving, among other things, returning 

rejected meat to the packing company while bypassing the required 

federal meat inspection. We held that sufficient evidence 

supported the convictions. Id. at 237. Defendants consciously 

misled government meat inspectors and a government veterinarian. 

Id. at 237. In discussing a substantive count in which the meat 

was ultimately discarded, we found sufficient evidence that 

defendants "directed the illegal circumvention of federal 

inspection when the Western Grocers' shipment was returned" to the 

plant. Id. at 237-38. We also noted the correspondence between 

the Federal Meat Inspection Act provision at issue, 21 u.s.c. 

§ 676(a), and the provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 

(FDCA) at issue in this case, 21 u.s.c. § 333(a)(2). Id. at 240. 

In Cattle King Packing, one of the parties defrauded was the 

government agency charged with federal meat inspection, acting 

through federal meat inspectors and a government veterinarian. 

Cattle King Packing is consistent with Industrial Laboratories 

which recognized that the Canadian authorities involved in setting 

standards for drugs could be misled or defrauded. Although we 

have not squarely addressed the issue, the government urges us to 

follow and apply the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bradshaw, 

-39-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 42 
.. 

which held that an intent to mislead or defraud under§ 333(a)(2) 

may extend to government enforcement agencies. United States v. 

Bradshaw, 840 F.2d 871, 874-75 (11th Cir. 1988). Defendant, on 

the other hand, suggests that we follow the comments in United 

States v. Haga, 821 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 

u.s. 924 (1988), which cast some doubt as to whether an intent to 

mislead or defraud under§ 333(a)(2) may extend to government 

regulatory systems. 

We think it important to discuss what we perceive as the 

operative facts in Bradshaw. There, defendant "admitted that he 

operated an illegal wholesale drug business." Bradshaw, 840 F.2d 

at 871 (emphasis added). He sold steroids, without prescriptions, 

for body building, a use not approved by the FDA. This 

constitutes misbranding. Id. at 871 n.2. He went to great 

lengths to avoid detection, including mislabeling the packages 

containing the steroids as vitamins and "'Herbalife products.'" 

Id. at 873. He also made affirmative misrepresentations and 

omissions to the Florida state drug authorities while attempting 

to obtain a valid Florida drug wholesalers permit. Bradshaw, 840 

F.2d at 873. The government claimed that the defendant "had 

defrauded or misled both the FDA and the Florida enforcement 

agencies." Id. The jury was instructed on either theory. In 

considering defendant's conduct, the appellate court held that an 

intent to defraud under§ 333(a)(2) could extend to federal and 

state drug enforcement authorities, i.e., the FDA and the Florida 

state drug authorities. See id. at 873, 875 n.9. 

-40-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 43 
'. 

The general scheme of the Act and its legislative 

history indicate that the overriding congressional 

purpose was consumer protection--the protection of the 

public against any misbranded or adulterated food, drug, 

device, or cosmetic. When Bradshaw misled governmental 

agencies, thereby frustrating their efforts to protect 

the public, he indirectly misled and defrauded the 

public. 

Id. at 874. State drug enforcement agencies, like the Florida 

authorities who issue permits and licenses, also are involved in 

consumer protection and work closely with their federal 

counterpart, the FDA. Id. at 875 n.9. Accordingly, state drug 

agencies also may be misled or defrauded under§ 333(a)(2). Id. 

Bradshaw seems to apply when there is proof of a conscious effort 

to mislead or defraud the FDA or a state counterpart involved in 

consumer-oriented drug regulation. In Bradshaw, such proof 

involved evidence of conscious misbranding for the purpose of 

deliberately evading the FDA's restrictions concerning steroids 

and misleading the Florida state drug authorities issuing drug 

wholesaler permits. 

Defendant relies heavily upon United States v. Haga, 821 F.2d 

1036 (5th Cir. 1987), a case involving a prosecution under 18 

U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy statute) and 21 u.s.c. § 333. Haga noted 

that "the cases construing section 333[(a)(2)] have ordinarily 

been based on a seller's intent to defraud or mislead purchasers, 

and not on the theory that a defendant has defrauded or misled the 

government by evading or violating its regulatory systems." Id. 

at 1041 (footnote omitted). 15 We do not read this observation as 

15 The Haga court relied on United States v. Industrial 

(footnote continued to next page) 

-41-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 44 
~' .. 

foreclosing a prosecution on the theory that during the course of 

misbranding drugs the FDA or its state counterpart has been misled 

or defrauded by a misrepresentation or omission. 

Moreover, according to the Fifth Circuit, Haga is a variance 

case; the indictment charged a "commit any offense" conspiracy 

rather than the alternative "defraud the United States" conspiracy 

under S 371. Haga, 821 F.2d at 1043. The district court judge, 

however, found that defendant was "'guilty of the felony offense 

of conspiracy to defraud an agency of the United States, the 

FDA •••• '" Haga, 821 F.2d at 1044-45, 1043 n.14. A fatal 

variance existed between the indictment as construed by the 

appellate court and the proof at trial as reflected in the 

district court's findings. Id. at 1045; United States v. Allred, 

867 F.2d 856, 867 (5th Cir. 1989). But see United States v. 

Smith, 891 F.2d 703, 711-13 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting Haga's 

construction of S 371), amended, 906 F.2d 385, cert. denied, 111 

S. Ct. 47 (1990). 

In rejecting the government's theory of the case, however, 

the court in Haga expressed reservations concerning the validity 

of a "commit any offense" conspiracy, 18 u.s.c. § 371, which 

relies upon "distributing prescription drugs in knowing violation 

of federal and state regulatory systems and rules," 21 u.s.c. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

Laboratories Co., 456 F.2d 908 (lOth Cir. 1972), as supporting 

this proposition. Haga, 821 F.2d at 1041 n.9. As discussed 

above, Industrial Laboratories indicated that the jury should be 

instructed that the intent to defraud could run to the Canadian 

authorities involved in drug regulation. 

-42-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 45 
§ 333(a)(2), for the offense. Haga, 821 F.2d at 1044 (emphasis 

omitted) & 1044-45 n.l7. According to the court, such a theory 

would 

as a practical matter have the effect of rendering the 

"defraud and mislead" language of§ 333[(a)(2)] mere 

surplusage in the prosecution of any defendant charged 

with a conscious (and not publicly proclaimed) violation 

of section 331--only inadvertent (or publicly announced) 

violations of section 331 would be misdemeanors, because 

all conscious (and not publicly confessed) violations 

would necessarily involve a deliberate evasion of 

established regulatory systems. 

Id. We think that this criticism is tempered somewhat by the 

specific intent required in a§ 333(a)(2) prosecution. And if the 

government proceeds on this theory, there must be a demonstrated 

link between the § 331 violation and an intent to mislead or 

defraud an identifiable drug regulatory agency involved in 

consumer protection. See Cattle King Packing, 793 F.2d at 237-38; 

Industrial Laboratories, 456 F.2d at 910-11. Distributing drugs 

in knowing violation of federal and state regulatory systems and 

rules is too general. 

We believe that the specific intent requirement in 

§ 333(a)(2) requires not only proof of misbranding under§ 331, 

but also proof of an intent to mislead or defraud which is 

connected to the misbranding violation under § 331. See 

Industrial Laboratories, 456 F.2d at 910-11; United States v. 

Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1128 (8th Cir. 1990). See also United 

States v. Agnew, No. 90-1077, slip op. at 24-26 (lOth Cir. Apr. 

29, 1991) [1991 WL 64219 at 20-23] (felony conviction under 

Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 u.s.c. § 676(a) for transporting 

-43-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 46 
'... . . 

adulterated meat). Because "knowledge of the essential nature of 

the alleged fraud is a component of the intent to defraud," a 

defendant cannot act with intent to mislead or defraud under 

§ 333(a)(2) without some knowledge of the misbranding. Hiland, 

909 F.2d at 1128; Indusrial Laboratories, 456 F.2d at 910 (jury 

should have been instructed that "defendant knew that several 

tests had not been made"). 

These limitations are consistent with the Supreme Court's 

prior interpretation of the Act. In construing the predecessor of 

the 1938 Act, the Supreme Court observed that it 

was passed by Congress, under its authority to exclude 

from interstate commerce impure and adulterated food and 

drugs and to prevent the facilities of such commerce to 

be used to enable such articles to be transported 

throughout the country from their place of manufacture 

to the people who consume and use them, and it is in the 

light of the purpose and of the power exerted in its 

passage that this act must be considered and construed. 

McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 128 (1913) (construing-Food 

and Drugs Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768). See also United States v. 

Lexington Mill Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409 (1914) (identifying the 

primary purpose of misbranding and adulteration provisions 

concerning food as consumer protection). The current Act protects 

the consuming public by allowing the government to regulate the 

conditions under which drugs are manufactured and distributed and 

it requires those responsible to comply with its provisions. 

United States v. Park, 421 u.s. 658, 673 (1975). Misdemeanor 

criminal responsibility does not require "consciousness of 

wrongdoing." 21 u.s.c. § 333(a); United States v. Dotterweich, 

320 u.s. 277, 284 (1943) ("The offense is committed ••• by all 

-44-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 47 
.. 

who do have such a responsible share in the furtherance of the 

transaction which the statute outlaws, namely, to put into the 

stream of interstate commerce adulterated or misbranded drugs."); 

United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 505 F.2d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 

1974), cert. denied, 420 u.s. 990 (1975). On the other hand, 

felony criminal responsibility requires a knowing violation with 

the specific intent "to defraud or mislead," 21 U.S.C. 

§ 333(a)(2); that this may be proved with facts indicating 

knowledge of the misbranding activity and a concomitant intent to 

defraud or mislead the FDA or its state counterpart seems 

consistent with the statute's purpose as interpreted by the 

courts. 

B. 

The government contends that sufficient circumstantial 

evidence suggests that defendant conspired to violate 21 u.s.c. 

§ 331(a), (k) and (P) with the intent to mislead law enforcement 

agencies. 16 Appellee's Brief (No. 89-6362) at 37-39. In 

16 The trial testimony indicates that defendant was an integral 

part of Raymer's MDMA distribution network and may have assisted 

him in concealment of his activities. Raymer initially traveled 

via commercial airliner from Texas to Oklahoma and concealed the 

MDMA on his person. In October 1985, he was arrested in an 

undercover buy operation at Dallas Love Field, en route to 

Oklahoma City. Rec. supp. vol. IV at 232, 244. The Dallas police 

obtained search warrants and found 2,450 unlabeled MDMA tablets in 

an airport locker and in Raymer's carry on luggage. Id. at 232. 

After his arrest, Raymer purchased a new vehicle and began driving 

from Dallas to Oklahoma City because it entailed less chance of 

being caught with the contraband. Rec. supp. vol. V at 450. 

While in Oklahoma City, he stayed with Volk and defendant and 

distributed MDMA. Id. By January 1986, Raymer, Volk and 

(footnote continued to next page) 

-45-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 48 
•' '. 

particular, the government maintains that defendant and Raymer 

misbranded the MDMA with the intent to mislead and defraud local 

police departments in Dallas, Plano and Oklahoma City. Timely 

objection was made to instructing the jury on this theory. Rec. 

supp. vol. IX at 1360-61. The prosecutor told the jury, over an 

objection, that defendant Raymer "was misleading and defrauding 

while holding himself out as someone cooperating with law 

enforcement, not stopping his activity but continuing in an even 

more covert manner than flying through these commercial airlines." 

Id. at 1427. At the trial's conclusion, the trial judge expressed 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

defendant were packaging MDMA for resale. Id. at 456. 

In February 1986, defendant relied upon an informant and, 

using an alias, sold an Oklahoma City undercover narcotics officer 

forty-eight tablets of MDMA for $784. Rec. supp. vol. Vat 

571-78. In June 1986, Raymer was arrested by the Plano police 

department for his drug activities. He agreed to cooperate with 

the Plano authorities for more lenient treatment. Rec. supp. vol. 

III at 78. Defendant and Volk had to quit the MDMA business 

because Raymer was no longer making trips to Oklahoma City. Id. 

supp. vol. IV at 469. According to Volk, a few months later 

Raymer contacted defendant offering to send MDMA through the mail. 

Volk talked with Raymer about this, and Raymer explained that 

express U.S. mail was preferable because "the law states you need 

a court order to get into the U.S. mail," id. at 470, and a 

private parcel service "can open it," id. at 471. For two or 

three weeks, MDMA tablets were sent to defendant and Volk through 

the mail. Id. Thus, during September-October 1986, road trips 

and the mail facilitated the distribution. 

The distribution of MDMA frequently occurred in public 

places. Raymer confessed to the FBI that he used pagers to make 

arrangements with MDMA suppliers. Later, he would retrieve the 

drugs which had been left for him from a designated place such a 

mens' restroom at McDonalds or Burger King. Rec. supp. vol. III 

at 80. Defendant would make individual sales from the ladies' 

restroom at Confetti's nightclub. 

-46-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 49 
his view that the government's theory was somewhat far afield. 

Id. at 1362. 

Relying upon Bradshaw, however, the district court determined 

that a state or local agency could be defrauded under§ 333(a)(2), 

while acknowledging that it was "a very close legal issue." Rec. 

supp. vol. X at 5. See also id. ("Let me just say that I have 

real concern as to whether or not the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 

was intended to apply to schemes to defraud the Plano Police 

Department."). When sentencing codefendant Raymer, the district 

court recognized that the misbranding counts were 

frankly, ••• a nontraditional, perhaps innovative 

indictment by the government on conduct that was not 

squarely labeled as illegal by Congress and not dealt 

with directly by Congress until the passage of the 

Controlled Substance Analogue Act [in October 1986]. 

Almost all the cases under the misbranding theory deal 

with situations that are completely different than the 

situation we have here. I have struggled with those 

counts since the outset of the case, indeed, to the 

point that I considered dismissing them at the 

conclusion of the case and even up until today. 

Rec. supp. vol. X at 34-35. We share the district court's 

reservations about counts one and four. 

After a thorough review of this record, no rational trier of 

fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants 

(Mitcheltree and Raymer) acted to mislead or defraud a government 

agency responsible for drug safety and efficacy with the objective 

of consumer protection. Moreover, not a scintilla of evidence 

links the defendants' misbranding activities with a specific 

intent, 21 u.s.c. § 333(a)(2), to violate or defeat agency 

enforcement of the actual federal drug regulatory provisions 

-47-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 50 
. . . . . 

alleged in counts one and four of the indictment, i.e., 21 u.s.c. 

§§ 33l(a): 352(b),(c),(e),(j) & (o): 33l(k): 33l(p) & 360. See 

Hiland, 909 F.2d at 1128. This conclusion is even more apparent 

considering the type of proof (involving fraudulent conduct) which 

courts have found sufficient to uphold§ 333(a)(2) convictions. 

See, ~' United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharm., 651 F.2d 532, 

543-50 (8th Cir. 1981) (counterfeit drug operation), cert. denied, 

455 U.S. 1016 (1982): United States v. Barnett, 587 F.2d 252, 254 

n.1, 257 (5th Cir. 1979) (adulterated cottonseed meal), cert. 

denied, 441 u.s. 923 (1979). 

We are unwilling to blur the distinction between the 

misdemeanor and felony provisions of§ 333(a). The felony 

provision requires knowledge of the misbranding and proof of 

specific intent to mislead or defraud connected to the misbranding 

violation. The government's evidence suggests that local police 

departments were investigating the distribution of MDMA (as well 

as unlawful drugs) when the defendants were misbranding MDMA. But 

merely because the activities of the defendants and the police may 

have been contemporaneous does not constitute sufficient proof 

that the defendants knowingly misbranded with the specific intent 

to mislead or defraud those police departments. For us to so hold 

would be to adopt a standard which would be inconsistent with the 

misdemeanor provision of the statute, 21 u.s.c. § 333(a)(1). See 

Haga, 821 F.2d at 1044-45 n.17. 

In the alternative, nothing in the record indicates that the 

local police departments, at the times alleged in counts one and 

-48-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 51 
four, were accomplishing anything other than routine controlled 

substance investigations. No evidence even remotely suggests that 

the local investigation encompassed misbranded drugs. Indeed, 

sometime after early 1989 (when the misbranding had ceased), a 

Department of Justice official "provided significant in-depth 

consultations on the nature and framework of the indictments 

including a recommendation that the mis-branding provisions of 

Title 21 be examined for applicability to the facts in the instant 

case." Affidavit of R. Wintery, supp. vol. XII, doc. 167 at 5, 

, 12(c). Resort to this theory was necessary, at least in part, 

because MDMA was not scheduled properly at the federal level until 

October 1986. 

In the end it is not necessarily the novelty of the 

government's theory, but rather the lack of evidence to support 

it, which requires reversal of the defendant's convictions on the 

misbranding counts. We recognize that a defendant may knowingly 

misbrand with an intent to mislead or defraud a government 

authority that, for example, sets drug standards, Industrial 

Laboratories, 450 F.2d at 909, inspects drugs, cf. Cattle King 

Packing, 793 F.2d at 237, regulates the use of prescription drugs, 

Bradshaw, 840 F.2d at 872; United States v. Cerrito, 413 F.2d 

1270, 1272 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 u.s. 1004 (1970), or 

issues permits to drug wholesalers, Bradshaw, 840 F.2d at 873. 

What is missing in this case is (1) any conscious involvement by 

the defendant with a government agency involved in consumer 

protection which performs any of the above or similar functions, 

-49-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 52 
''... .. .. 

and (2) any link between conscious misbranding activity and a 

specific intent to mislead or defraud such an agency. 

It is not enough to say, as does the government, that the 

success of the venture to distribute MDMA depended upon 

misbranding without proving that the defendants misbranded with 

the intent to mislead or defraud a government agency involved in 

consumer protection of some sort. Contrary to the government's 

position, covert criminal activity involving drugs is not 

synonymous with misbranding with an intent to mislead or defraud. 

Because the jury was instructed on a theory for which insufficient 

evidence exists, we must reverse the convictions on counts one and 

four with instructions that a judgment of acquittal be entered on 

those counts. 17 See Burks v. United States, 437 u.s. 1, 18 

17 In Industrial Laboratories, we relied upon 28 u.s.c. § 2106 

and reduced the defective felony convictions under§ 333(a)(2) to 

misdemeanors under§ 333(a)(1). Industrial Laboratories, 456 F.2d 

at 911-912. See also Tinder v. United States, 345 U.S. 565, 570 

(1953). We cited with approval Allison v. United States, 409 F.2d 

445 (D.C. Cir. 1969) which discussed the limited circumstances in 

which the authority under § 2106 may be exercised: 

It must be clear (1) that the evidence adduced at trial 

fails to support one or more elements of the crime which 

appellant was convicted, (2) that such evidence 

sufficiently sustains all the elements of another 

offense, (3) that the latter is a lesser included 

offense of the former, and (4) that no undue prejudice will result to the accused. 

Allison, 409 F.2d at 450; see also United States v. Boissoneault, 

926 F.2d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1991). We note that no lesser included 

offense instructions were given in this case, unlike Boissoneault, 

926 F.2d at 235; United States v. Figueroa, 666 F.2d 1375, 1377 

(11th Cir. 1982); Industrial Laboratories, 456 F.2d at 909-10 n.3; 

DeMarrias v. United States, 453 F.2d 211, 215 (8th Cir. 1972); and 

Allison, 409 F.2d at 452; but see United States v. Cobb, 558 F.2d 

486, 489 n.S (8th Cir. 1977), nor have the parties made any 

(footnote continued to next page) 

-50-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 53 
(1978); United States v. Theodorpoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 597 (3rd 

Cir. 1989). 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

concessions on this issue, see, ~' United States v. Swiderski, 

548 F.2d 445, 452 (2d Cir. 1977); Industrial Laboratories, 456 

F.2d at 911-12; let alone addressed it. In these circumstances, 

we decline to order the district court to impose misdemeanor 

convictions on counts one and four. 

-51-

Appellate Case: 89-6406 Document: 01019295274 Date Filed: 06/11/1991 Page: 54