Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02964/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02964-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pedro Andrade-Diaz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED 

v. 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

STATES OF AMERICA, } 

} 

Plaintiff-Appellee, } 

} Nos. 

} 

FI LED 

Uaited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth C:fr-<71,;. 

SEP 21 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

88-2964 

89-2013 

} ( D. C. No. 87-227-JB} 

PEDRO ANDRADE-DIAZ, } ( D • New Mexico} 

} 

Defendant-Appellant. } 

) 

} 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, } 

) 

v. ) 

) 

HERIBERTO CEBALLOS-LEYVA, ) 

} 

Defendant-Appellant. } 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2964 Document: 01019973969 Date Filed: 09/21/1989 Page: 1 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellants Andrade-Diaz and Ceballos-Leyva appeal from an 

order of the district court denying their prose motion for a corrected sentence or in the alternative to dismiss pursuant to the 

former Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1 We 

affirm the term of imprisonment imposed on both Andrade-Diaz and 

Ceballos-Leyva; however, because we find that the district court 

erred in imposing terms of supervised release on each of the appellants, we vacate the terms of supervised release and remand to 

the district court for resentencing appellants to terms of special 

parole to follow the existing terms of imprisonment. 

I. FACTS 

In June 1987, a federal grand jury charged appellants with 

one count each of possession with intent to distribute more than 

500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 84l(a)(l) and 

84l(b)(l)(B); and one count each of possession with intent to 

distribute more than 100 grams of heroin in violation of those 

same statutes. On August 10, 1987 appellants each filed a waiver 

of indictment and pled guilty to a one-count information which 

charged that they "knowingly and intentionally did possess with 

the intent to distribute an amount of cocaine, a Schedule II 

narcotic drug controlled substance •.• in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

1 Rule 35 was amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 

1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 215(b), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 

News (98 Stat.) 1987, 2015-16. However, these amendments do not 

apply to offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987. 

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§ 84l(a)(l), 21 u.s.c. § 84l(b)(l)(C), and 18 u.s.c. § 2." On 

September 25, 1987 Andrade-Diaz was sentenced to four years 

imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. 

Ceballos-Leyva was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, followed 

by four years of supervised release. 

After unsuccessful attempts to have the sentences reduced, 

appellants both filed motions pursuant to the former Rule 35(a) of 

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to correct an illegal 

sentence, or in the alternative, a motion to dismiss. In support 

of their motion, appellants submitted two identical lengthy, inarticulate discourses generally addressing various aspects of the 

history and recent changes to section 84l(b). As a result of the 

imprecision of their argument, the exact basis for appellants' 

challenge to the sentences cannot be readily discerned from the 

pleadings to the district court. Both appellants did, however, 

allege that: 

The Attorney for the Government ... knowing[ly] 

mislead (sic) the Federal Grand Jury into returning an 

indictment against movent (sic), which ••• was illegal, in that ... [t]he charges returned against 

movent (sic) in count l (Title 21, U.S.C., section 

84l[a][l] and 841 [b][l][C] ... ) are amended statutes, 

that are included in Pub. L. 98-473 • which has an 

effective date of November 1, 1987, six [6] months after 

movents (sic) arrest. 

R. Vol. I, at 12. Contrary to this allegation, the indictment did not in fact cite 21 u.s.c. § 84l(b)(l)(C) as appellants 

appear to contend. Likewise, 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l) was not 

materially changed by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 

the amendment to which they refer. The district court denied the 

motions as not well taken. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2964 Document: 01019973969 Date Filed: 09/21/1989 Page: 3 
On appeal, appellants apparently contend that the sentence 

imposed is illegal in that the statute under which they were 

sentenced had not become effective on May 20, 1987, the day the 

offense was committed, or September 25, 1987, the day of the 

sentencing. Although they attempt to raise several other 

constitutional and statutory claims for relief, appellants' argument is almost entirely confused and incomprehensible; their assertions are either irrelevant in that they attack statutes other 

than those under which they were sentenced, or they fail to 

articulate any cognizable legal challenge to those statutes. We 

therefore limit our discussion to the legality of the sentences 

under the applicable statutes in effect at the time the crime was 

committed. 

II. DISCUSSION 

We review the legality of a criminal sentence for plain error 

regardless of whether or not the illegality was properly identified and objected to below. See United States v. Vance, 868 F.2d 

1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1989) ("Because the imposition of an illegal 

sentence would constitute plain error, we assume ... that the 

objection was preserved for review by this court."); Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 52(b) (plain errors noticed although not brought to the attention of the court). The sentences imposed on appellants were illegal, and constitute plain error; therefore, we address this 

issue despite any inadequacy of the pleadings. 

In order to address the legality of appellants' sentences, we 

review briefly the history of the penalty provisions of 18 U.S.C. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2964 Document: 01019973969 Date Filed: 09/21/1989 Page: 4 
§ 841. Prior to 1984, section 84l(b)(l)(A) provided for the 

imposition of a term of imprisonment of up to fifteen years, a 

fine of up to $25,000, and a mandatory term of special parole of 

at least three years for a first time offense involving possession 

with intent to distribute any quantity of narcotic drug. See 21 

U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(A) (1981). The punishment for possession with 

intent to distribute a non-narcotic drug included imprisonment up 

to five years followed by at least two years special parole. See 

21 U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(B) (1981). 

On October 12, 1984, Congress amended section 84l(b) by 

deleting any references therein to imposition of special parole 

terms. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 

§ 224(a), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (98 Stat.) 1987, 

2030. These changes were initially to become effective on 

November 1, 1986 but Congress later extended the effective date to 

November 1, 1987. Sentencing Reform Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. 

L. No. 99-217, § 4, 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (99 Stat.) 

1728. 

The Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, 

Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 502(1), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 

(98 Stat.) 2068, further modified section 84l(b) by adding a "new'' 

§ 84l(b)(l)(A) which created penalties for offenses involving 

certain minimum quantities of specified substances and redesignating the previous subsections 84l(b)(l)(A) and (B) as subsections 

84l(b)(l)(B) and (C) respectively. The redesignated subsections 

were also changed to eliminate any distinctions based on a drug 

being narcotic or not; as modified, subsection 84l(b)(l)(C) 

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applied to offenses involving "less than 50 kilograms of 

marihuana, 10 kilograms of hashish, or one kilogram of hashish oil 

... " or any controlled substance in schedule III. The 

Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. 

No. 98-473, § 502(1), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (98 

Stat.) 2068. These changes, unlike the amendments relating to 

special parole terms, became effective immediately upon the Act's 

enactment date, October 12, 1984. See,~, United States v. 

Ward, 696 F. Supp. 247, 248 (W.D. Tex. 1988). 

In 1986, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 

which again modified section 84l(b) by substantially increasing 

penalties for drug related offenses, and by "striking out 'special 

parole term' each place it appears and inserting 'term of supervised release' in lieu thereof." Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 

Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1004(a), 1005(a)(2), 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & 

Admin. News (100 Stat.) 3207, 3207-06. The effective date of 

these changes, including the provisions for supervised release was 

November 1, 1987 -- the same date upon which 18 U.S.C. § 3583, 

announcing supervised release standards, became effective. Id.; 

see United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 860 (4th Cir. 1988) 

("Terms of supervised release may not be imposed ... for offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987."); United States v. De 

Los Reyes, 842 F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1988) (district court erred 

by imposing a term of supervised release for an offense committed 

before November 1, 1987); United States v. Byrd, 837 F.2d 179, 180 

(5th Cir. 1988) (statutory provisions for a term of supervised 

release do not become effective until November 1, 1987); United 

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States v. Smith, 840 F.2d 886, 890 (11th Cir. 1988} ("[C]lear 

congressional intent indicates that 'supervised release' is tied 

to a November 1, 1987 date."}. 

Turning to the sentences imposed on appellants, it is clear 

from the information that each appellant pled guilty to possession 

with the intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of cocaine, 

a controlled substance listed in schedule II. The information 

erroneously cited 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b}(l}(C} as the penalty provision applicable to appellants' illegal conduct. That subsection, 

as it was in effect at the time, dealt only with violations 

involving marijuana and other controlled substances not including 

cocaine. The penalty for appellants' violation is clearly covered 

by 21 u.s.c. § 84l(b}(l}(B} as it had been modified by The 

Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. 

No. 98-473, § 502(1}, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (98 

Stat.) 2068. 2 

The incorrect citation contained in the information is harmless error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c}(3} ("Error in the citation 

• shall not be ground for ... reversal of a conviction if 

the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to the 

defendant's prejudice.). Indeed, the code section for the penalty 

2 . The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 

§§ 1004(a), 1005(a)(2}, 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (100 

Stat.) 3207, 3207-06, modified section 84l(b} yet again by 

redesignating § 84l(b)(l)(B) as§ 84l(b)(l)(C) and creating new 

minimum penalties for offenses involving certain specified 

quantities of drugs under§ 84l(b)(l)(A} and (B). As already 

noted, the changes effected by the 1986 amendments did not become 

effective until November 1, 1987. Therefore, the correct penalty 

provision for appellants' crime, committed prior to November 1, 

1987 was the former 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(B). 

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provision need not necessarily be cited in an indictment or 

information for it to support a conviction and sentence. Webb v. 

United States, 369 F.2d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1966)("As a matter of 

good practice, the indictment should refer to the number of the 

penalty section ... " but ''that the indictment does not 

specifically cite the number of the penalty section is not 

fatal."). Likewise, a miscitation in the information does not 

render the resulting sentence illegal. See Tanksley v. United 

States, 321 F.2d 647, 648-49 (8th Cir. 1963) ("Nor does the 

miscitation make illegal the sentence imposed. .") (quoting 

Davis v. United States, 279 F.2d 576, 578 (4th Cir. 1960); United 

States v. Barnes, 313 F.2d 325, 327 (6th Cir. 1963) (no grounds 

for correction of sentence where indictment cited a nonexistent 

statute due to a clerical error). Appellants in this case can not 

show any prejudice by the erroneous citation in the information; 

therefore, appellants are not entitled to any relief based on the 

incorrect citation. 

The penalty applicable to appellant's violation was clearly 

authorized by the former 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(B) which provided 

for a term of imprisonment of not more than 15 years followed by a 

mandatory special parole term of at least three years. See 21 

U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(A) (1981) (modified and redesignated as 21 

U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(B) by The Controlled Substances Penalties 

Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 502(1), 1984 U.S. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News (98 Stat.) 2068.) The terms of imprisonment imposed on Andrade-Diaz and Ceballos-Leyva consisted of four 

and seven years respectively. These terms of imprisonment are 

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. . 

clearly legal under the appropriate penalty provision in effect at 

the time the crimes were committed, and we affirm those portions 

of the sentences. 

At the time of appellants' sentencing, however, the "supervised release" provisions of the "new" sections 84l(b)(l)(B) and 

(C) had not yet become effective. Prior to November 1, 1987, the 

original statutory language which provided for mandatory special 

parole terms remained in force. In light of the above discussion, 

it is clear that a term of special parole was mandated by the applicable sentencing provisions in effect in May 1987, the time the 

offenses were committed. United States v. Posner, 865 F.2d 654, 

600 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. De Los Reyes, 842 F.2d at 

757-58. The district court therefore erred in imposing the term 

of supervised release for these crimes. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the sentences 

imposed by the district court with the sole exception of the term 

of supervised release following the term of incarceration. We 

conclude that that portion of the sentence was improper. Accordingly, we vacate the terms of supervised release and remand to the 

district court for imposition of a special parole term pursuant to 

21 u.s.c. § 84l(b) (1982). The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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