Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02122/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02122-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William D. Ludlow
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

V. 

WILLIAM D. LUDLOW, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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FILL D 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

APPEALS 

APR 2 7 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

No . 92-2122 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. CR-91-593-JC) 

William D. Fry, Assistant Federal Public Defender (R Morgan Lyman, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, on the brief), Las Cruces, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Kelly Burnham, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Don J. Svet, United 

States Attorney, and Charles L. Barth, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on 

the brief), District of New Mexico, Las Cruces, New Mexico, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, MOORE, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Chief Judge. 

In this criminal action, William D. Ludlow appeals the denial 

of his moti on to suppress evidence that was seized at a Border 

Patrol checkpoint he attempted to travel through. 

Appellate Case: 92-2122 Document: 010110220139 Date Filed: 04/27/1993 Page: 1 
At 8:40 p.m. on October 29, 1992, Mr. Ludlow drove a Datsun 

280-Z into the primary inspection area of a permanent Border 

Patrol checkpoint west of Las Cruces, New Mexico . The Border 

Patrol agent noticed that the driver's side window was only partially lowered. When the agent asked Mr. Ludlow to lower the window further so he could speak with him and be heard, Mr. Ludlow 

lowered the window further but did not lower it completely. The 

agent was suspicious because on prior occasions he had encountered 

motorists who avoided rolling down windows to prevent Border 

Patrol agents from smelling contraband contained within the 

vehicle. 

After identifying himself as an immigration officer, the 

agent questioned Mr. Ludlow about his citizenship. The agent 

noticed perspiration on Mr. Ludlow's upper lip and noted that he 

acted confused and nervous. The agent also noticed three suitcases in the car and was informed by Mr. Ludlow that they were 

his. 

The vehicle bore Texas license plates. As a result, the 

agent bel ieved Mr. Ludlow was from Texas and was curious about his 

nervous and confused reactions because in his experience, most 

residents o f Texas are familiar with the Border Patrol and i t s 

activities. 

The agent asked Mr. Ludlow who owned the car and was informed 

that it belonged t o a friend. When the agent asked for the car's 

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Appellate Case: 92-2122 Document: 010110220139 Date Filed: 04/27/1993 Page: 2 
registration, he noted that Mr. Ludlow l ooked for the registration 

but appeared to be just going through the motions rather than 

actually concentrating on finding it. When Mr. Ludlow could n ot 

find the registration, the agent referred him to the secondary 

inspection area to "run a check on the vehicle and also t o inquire 

for further questioning as to the nervousness that he was displaying." {Tr. at 10.) 

At the secondary inspection area , Mr. Ludlow stated sev eral 

times that there could be nothing wrong with the car because its 

owner was a California state worker. Because the agent believed 

that either the car was stolen or that there was something illegal 

in the suitcases, he informed Mr. Ludlow that he would be running 

a check on the car and asked permission to search the suitcases. 

Mr. Ludlow consented. 

Mr. Ludlow again asserted that nothing could be wrong with 

the car because a state worker owned it. The agent asked permission for a dog to inspect the car. Mr. Ludlow consented and then 

disc laimed ownership of two of the suitcases in the car. After a 

dog a l erted to the presence of contraband in the car, agents examine d the sui tcase s and dis covered approximately sixty pounds of 

marijuana. 

The district court denied Mr. Ludlow's motion to suppress on 

Fourt h Ame ndme nt grounds, and Mr. Ludlow e ntered a conditional 

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Appellate Case: 92-2122 Document: 010110220139 Date Filed: 04/27/1993 Page: 3 
plea of guilty, reserving the right to bring this appeal. 

Mr. Ludlow asserts his detention was unlawful in this case 

and argues the evidence seized should be suppressed as "fruit of 

the poisonous tree," citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 

471 (1963). More specifically, he contends that the Border Patrol 

agent did not have the necessary reasonable suspicion to refer him 

to the secondary inspection area and that the referral was carried 

out for an improper purpose, namely requesting consent to search 

the suitcases. 

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that" [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 

and seizures, shall not be violated. II As we have previously noted, "The Fourth Amendment is not a guarantee against all 

searches and seizure, but only against unreasonable searches and 

seizures." United States v . Espinosa, 782 F . 2d 888, 890 (10th 

Cir. 1986) . 

In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976 ) , the 

Supreme Court examined the reasonableness of seizures at permanent 

Border Patrol checkpoints, balancing the government's need to 

enforce customs and immigration laws against the intrusion on 

motorists passing through the checkpoints. 

We note ... the substantiality of the public interest 

in the practice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints . . . These checkpoints are located 

on important highways; in their absence such highways 

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Appellate Case: 92-2122 Document: 010110220139 Date Filed: 04/27/1993 Page: 4 
would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into 

the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend 

many smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the 

lure of such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries forces others onto less efficient roads that are 

less heavily traveled, slowing their movement and making 

them more vulnerable to deception by roving patrols. 

A requirement that stops on major routes inland 

always be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy 

to allow the particularized study of a given car that 

would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier 

of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement 

would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of 

well-disguised smuggling operations, even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly. 

While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is 

great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment 

interests is quite limited. The stop does intrude to a 

limited extent on motorists' right to "free passage 

without interruption, " Carroll v. United States, 267 

U. S . 132, 154 (1925 ) , and arguably on their right to 

personal security. But it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which "[a]ll that is required 

of the vehi cle's occupants is a response to a brief 

question or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States." 

United States v . Brignoni-Ponce, [422 U. S. 873], 880 

[ (1975 ) ]. Neither the vehicle nor its occupants are 

searched, and visual inspection of the vehicle is lim- ited to what can be seen without a search. 

Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude [as much as 

r oving patrols] on the motoring public. First, the 

potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by 

surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the 

l ocati on of the checkpoints and will not be stopped 

elsewhere. Second, checkpoint operations both appear to 

and a ctually involve less discretionary enforcement 

a ctivit y. The r e gul a rized manner in which established 

checkpo ints are ope rated is visibl e ev idence , reassuring 

t o law- abiding motorists , that the stops are duly authorized and believed t o serve the public intere st. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2122 Document: 010110220139 Date Filed: 04/27/1993 Page: 5 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-59 (other citations omitted) . 

The Court went on to hold that the stops and questioning "may 

be made in the absence of any individualized suspicion," id. at 

562, "that it is constitutional to refer motorist selectively to 

the secondary inspection area [without reasonable suspicion] , 11 

see id. at 563, and "that the Border Patrol officers must have 

wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted." Id. 

at 563-64. 

Since Martinez-Fuerte, our cases have recognized that no 

individualized suspicion is necessary to stop, question, and then 

selectively refer motorists to a secondary inspection checkpoint, 

id. at 563; United States v. Ray. 973 F.2d 840, 842 (10th Cir. 

1992); United States v. Pinedo-Montoya, 966 F.2d 591, 593-94 (10th 

Cir. 1992); United States v. Sanders, 937 F.2d 1495, 1499-1500 

(10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1213 (1992); United 

States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F . 2d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 1990) , and 

that Border Patrol agents have virtually "unlimited discretion to 

refer cars to the secondary inspection area . " Pinedo-Montoya, 966 

F.2d at 593; Sanders, 937 F.2d at 1499; Rubio-Rivera, 917 F . 2d at 

1275. 

Notwithstanding the clarity of our recent decisions spe cifically holding that no individualized suspicion is necessary to 

selectively refer motorists to secondary, it is apparent that confusion continues in this area. We perceive that the confusion 

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Appellate Case: 92-2122 Document: 010110220139 Date Filed: 04/27/1993 Page: 6 
stems from a misperception of the relationship between the proper 

scope of a routine checkpoint inquiry and the location in which 

that inquiry may take place . As our prior decisions indicate, 

Border Patrol agents have virtually unlimited discretion to sel ec1 tively refer cars to the secondary inspection area. Thus, a routine checkpoint inquiry may properly take place at a primary 

inspection area, a secondary inspection area, or both as long as 

the scope of the inquiry is appropriate .

2 

Because "[t]he principal protection of Fourth Amendment 

rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate limitations on the scope 

of the stop," Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566-67, it is important 

to review the scope of a permissible routine inquiry at a permanent Border Patrol checkpoint. Under a routine inquiry, the 

detention and questioning at a permanent checkpoint "involves only 

a brief detention," id. at 558, and neither the vehicle nor its 

occupants are searched; visual inspection of the vehicle is 

limited to what can be seen without a search. Id. at 558. Border 

Patrol agents may question occupants of a vehicle concerning 

citizenship and customs matters and ask them to explain suspicious 

1 In Ma rtinez Fuerte, the Court specifically rejected the contention that referral to secondary carried an additional element 

o f intrusiveness because of the stigmatism attached to being one 

of only a small percentage of the cars that are diverted. See id. 

at 560. 

2 As noted in Martinez-Fuerte, traffic and safety 

considerations often are related to a determination to refer a 

motorist to secondary. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560 . 

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Appellate Case: 92-2122 Document: 010110220139 Date Filed: 04/27/1993 Page: 7 
circumstances or behavior. 3 See Pinedo-Montoya, 966 F .2d at 593-

94; Sanders, 937 F . 2d at 1499; United States v. Benitez, 899 F. 2d 

995, 998 (10th Cir. 1990 ). Detention and questioning based solely 

on suspicious circumstances is warranted because of the accepted 

government policy of ensuring only authorized individuals enter 

into this country and to prevent the smuggling of contraband. 

Sanders, 937 F.2d at 1500 . 

Although the governmental needs at permanent Border Patrol 

checkpoints justify governmental intrusion unacceptable in other 

contexts, the scope of a permissible seizure and inquiry are not 

without limitation. Given the limited law enforcement role of 

Border Patrol agents with its emphasis on immigration and customs, 

questioning as to suspicious circumstances must bear "a reasonable 

relationship to [the agent's] unique duties. " Id.; see also 

United States v. Johnson, 895 F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir. 1990) 

( "detention and search beyond a routine Customs inspection may be 

undertaken only upon a reasonable suspicion standard") (emphasis 

added) . Although some deference is properly given to an agent's 

determination of relevant suspicious circumstances given their 

unique training regarding indicia of crime, a court may properly 

3 As we have explained, the Fourth Amendment does not require 

police o fficers to close their eyes to suspicious behavior. 

United States v . Johnson, 895 F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir. 1990) , 

quoting Unite d States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 

19 86) . 

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Appellate Case: 92-2122 Document: 010110220139 Date Filed: 04/27/1993 Page: 8 
intervene when "a common sense view of the totality of the circumstances" indicates the facts would not support an agent's c onclusion that suspicious circumstance warranted further questioning . 

Sanders, 937 F.2d at 1500-01 . 

Therefore, if questioning reasonably related to immigration 

and customs matters and the agent's observations indicates suspicious circumstances, further questioning as part of the routine 

permanent checkpoint inquiry is permissible as long as the duration of -the detention remains brief. If further inquiry within 

the time constraints of Martinez-Fuerte creates a reasonable suspicion that a crime is or has been committed, further investigative detention, which is outside the scope of a routine inquiry, 

may be warranted. Pinedo-Montoya. 966 F.2d at 594; Johnson, 895 

F.2d at 696 . However, in the absence of facts justifying further 

investigative detention, a motorist may not be further detained 

pursuant to a routine inquiry without consenting to such detention . 

In the instant case, the district court made the following 

findings : 

Here we have the fact that he did not roll the window 

all the way down . and that would immediately, to a 

trained Border _atrol a gent, raise the suspicion that 

there was an odor in the car that the driver did not 

want out. There's no showing that the night was cold or 

anything like that that would keep him from rolling down 

the window. When he did get a chance to look at him, he 

was perspiring under his nose . He was looking all 

around. He was generally nervous. He couldn't find the 

car r egistration. The car did not belong to him .. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2122 Document: 010110220139 Date Filed: 04/27/1993 Page: 9 
(Tr. at 27. ) 

When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the trial 

court's factual findings are to be accepted unless clearly erroneous, and the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable 

to the district court's findings. JLs:_, Benitez, 899 F.2d at 99 7. 

Applying this standard to the district court's findings, we conclude that the factual findings are not clearly erroneous. Moreover, applying these facts to the standards we have delineated 

regarding the permissible detention and questioning at a permanent 

Border Patrol checkpoint, we hold that the district court did not 

err in denying Mr . Ludlow's motion to suppress. 

The initial questioning at the primary inspection area was 

brief, lasting approximately 45 seconds. The agent's questions 

regarding Mr. Ludlow's citizenship and the ownership of the 

vehicle and its contents were entirely appropriate. 4 Together 

with his observations of Mr. Ludlow's demeanor and appearance, the 

circumstances justified the agent's conclusion that suspicious 

circumstances existed which would have warranted further detention 

and questioning as part of a routine inquiry . Likewise, we are of 

4 Questions regarding Mr. Ludlow's citizenship and the contents 

of t he vehicle were of course directly related to the Border 

Patro l agent's duties. Questions of vehicle ownership are likewise appropriate as reasonably related to the agent ' s duties for 

i d e n t ification purposes and because of the c ommon use of stolen 

v ehicles in smuggling operations. We have previously rejected the 

c ontention that an inquiry into vehicle ownership is beyond the 

scope of a p e rmissible inquiry as part of a routine inquiry. See 

Rub io-Rive ra, 917 F.2d at 1276; Johnson, 895 F.2d at 696, 698. 

1 0 

Appellate Case: 92-2122 Document: 010110220139 Date Filed: 04/27/1993 Page: 10 
the view that the circumstances would have justified an investigative detention because the agent had a reasonable suspicion that 

Mr. Ludlow had committed, or was committing, a crime. Accordingly, under either analysis it was appropriate for Mr. Ludlow's 

detention and questioning to continue. 5 

Mr. Ludlow was informed that an NCIC check of his vehicle was 

being run, and at this juncture he consented to a search of the 

suitcases. Shortly thereafter a dog alerted to the presence of 

contraband and the marijuana was discovered. 6 Under these circumstances, we hold that Mr. Ludlow's detention was not improper. 

Because Mr. Ludlow's consent to search was obtained while he was 

properly being detained, Mr. Ludlow was not entitled to have the 

mariJuana . . d 7 suppresse . Therefore, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

5 In this case, further detention and questioning happened to 

be conducted at the secondary inspection area. As previously 

noted, Border Patrol agents have virtually unlimited discretion to 

refer motorists to secondary as part of a routine inquiry as long 

as the scope of the detention is appropriate. 

6 From the time Mr. Ludlow entered the primary checkpoint to 

the time he consented to further detention by consenting to a 

search was less than two minutes. 

7 Mr. Ludlow does not dispute that he consented to a search of 

the vehicle, or that his consent was voluntary. (Appellant's Brief at 20 .) 

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