Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02501/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02501-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gonzalo Tellez-Sanchez
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gonzalo Tellez-Sanchez, )

)

Plaintiff, ) CIV 13-02501 PHX NVW (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

United States of America, ) 

) 

 Defendant. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

On December 6, 2013, Plaintiff Gonzalo Tellez-Sanchez,

who is confined in the Giles W. Dalby Correctional Facility,

filed a pro se Motion for Return of Property pursuant to Rule

41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Doc. 1) and an

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In his Motion for

Return of Property, Plaintiff seeks the return of his cell

phone, which was seized when he was arrested. He claims his

phone is not contraband and is not subject to forfeiture. 

In an order entered February 5, 2014, the Court noted

that, when a motion for return of property under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 41(g) is filed and no criminal proceedings

are pending, the motion is properly treated as a civil complaint

and is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See

Doc. 9. In the order at Doc. 9 the Court ordered Defendant to

Case 2:13-cv-02501-NVW-MEA Document 14 Filed 06/12/14 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -2-

respond to the motion. Defendant filed a response in opposition

to the motion on May 8, 2014. See Doc. 13. Plaintiff has not

docketed a reply to the response to his motion.

Rule 41(g), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

Motion to Return Property. A person aggrieved

by an unlawful search and seizure of property

or by the deprivation of property may move

for the property’s return. The motion must be

filed in the district where the property was

seized. The court must receive evidence on

any factual issue necessary to decide the

motion. If it grants the motion, the court

must return the property to the movant, but

may impose reasonable conditions to protect

access to the property and its use in later

proceedings.

The government’s duty to return seized property has

repeatedly been emphasized by the courts.

 Prior decisions of this court have made

clear that the party from whom materials are

seized in the course of a criminal

investigation retains a protectible property

interest in the seized materials. “(T)he

Government’s right to seize and retain

certain evidence for use at trial,” we have

said, “‘does not in itself entitle the State

to its retention’ after trial,....” United

States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1347 (D.C.

Cir. 1979), quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387

U.S. 294, 307-08, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1650 []

(1967).

 Rather, as we have declared, “it is

fundamental to the integrity of the criminal

justice process that property involved in the

proceeding, against which no Government claim

lies, be returned promptly to its rightful

owner.” United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d

1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Lawful seizure

of the property, of itself, may affect the

timing of the return, but never the owner’s

right to eventual return. “(T)he district

court, once its need for the property has

terminated, has both the jurisdiction and the

duty to return the...property...regardless

and independently of the validity or

Case 2:13-cv-02501-NVW-MEA Document 14 Filed 06/12/14 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -3-

invalidity of the underlying search and

seizure.” Wilson, 540 F.2d at 1103-04.

United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1980)

(some internal citations omitted).

A Rule 41(g) movant who asserts a post-conviction claim

for the return of seized property must first demonstrate that he

has a possessory interest in the property. See, e.g., United

States v. Howell, 425 F.3d 971, 974 (11th Cir. 2005). The

government bears the burden of establishing the movant is not

entitled to relief. See, e.g., United States v. Chambers, 192

F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1999). The government may rebut the

movant’s allegations with evidence that “‘it has a legitimate

reason to retain the property,’” that it does not possess the

property, or that the property has been destroyed. United

States v. Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001),

quoting Chambers, 192 F.3d at 377.

In response to the motion Defendant avers:

 In his motion, Plaintiff asserted that a

cell phone was seized from him by officers

from the United States Border Patrol (Doc.

1). Plaintiff further asserted that the

seized cell phone was not contraband and

therefore not subject to forfeiture.

Plaintiff moves the Court for the return of

his cell phone.

***

 Plaintiff was arrested by a United States

Border Patrol agent shortly after midnight on

April 8, 2013, as an undocumented alien being

unlawfully present in the United States, and

he was processed for prosecution at the

United States Border Patrol station in

Wellton, Arizona. (Ex. 1). On April 9, 2013,

Plaintiff was charged by complaint with the

offense of Re-entry of a Removed Alien in

violation of Title 8, United States Code,

Case 2:13-cv-02501-NVW-MEA Document 14 Filed 06/12/14 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -4-

Sections 1326(a) and (b)(1). The plaintiff

pled guilty to the charge and he was

sentenced to thirty (30) months imprisonment

to thirty (30) months imprisonment on August

19, 2013. (Doc. 20 in CR-13-00623-SRB). 

***

 When an undocumented alien is processed for

prosecution by the United States Border

Patrol, their personal property is received,

documented, and stored. After an alien’s

personal property has been collected for

storage, the alien verifies the contents of

the storage bag and then initials the

property receipt form. When the Plaintiff was

arrested on April 8, 2013, his personal

property was received, documented, and stored

in one clear “plastic bag” by United States

Border Patrol personnel in Wellton. (Ex. 2).

 A review of the property receipt form shows

the initials G.T.S. (Gonzalo Tellez-Sanchez)

in section 20, indicating that Plaintiff

verified the contents of the clear plastic

bag before it was placed into storage. The

contents of the clear plastic bag were not

itemized; therefore, it is possible a cell

phone was contained within the bag. 

On April 12, 2013, a representative from the

Mexican Consulate’s office in Yuma, Arizona,

requested Plaintiff’s property. (Ex. 3). It

appears Plaintiff’s property was turned over

to the Mexican Consulate on April 16, 2013.

(Ex. 3). Additionally, section 21

(Acceptance/Chain of Custody) of Plaintiff’s

property receipt form reflects that a

representative from the Mexican Consulate’s

office signed for “alien property” on or

about April 16, 2013. (Ex. 2). Based on the

available documents, it appears the

Plaintiff’s personal property contained

within the plastic bag, including any cell

phone, was turned over to a representative of

the Mexican Consulate’s office on April 16,

2013. On May 7, 2014, a Mexican Consulate

representative sent an email in response to

an inquiry regarding the whereabouts of

Plaintiff’s property. In the email, consular

representatives confirmed a cell phone and a

battery were sent to a recipient designated

by the Plaintiff. (Ex. 4). Based on the above

information, it is more likely than not that

the Plaintiff’s cell phone was turned over to

officials from the Mexican Consulate’s

Case 2:13-cv-02501-NVW-MEA Document 14 Filed 06/12/14 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 See also United States. v. Bailey, 407 Fed. App. 74, 75,

2011 WL 101731, at *1 (8th Cir.) (collecting cases).

-5-

office, and is no longer in the possession of

the United States Border Patrol.

Doc. 13 (emphasis added).

Defendant has provided some evidentiary proof

accounting for the seized property. See United States v.

Cardona, 897 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining that

“the Government, in order to defeat a motion for the return of

seized property, must provide some evidentiary proof accounting

for the property seized”). Plaintiff has provided no reply to

the assertion that, as a matter of fact, Defendant is no longer

in possession of the phone. Because Defendant attests that the

subject property is no longer in its possession, the Court is

unable to order the return of the property and, to the extent

the motion seeks an order requiring Defendant to provide the

phone to Plaintiff, the motion is moot. Compare Chambers, 192

F.3d at 376-78 (noting that no evidence was offered or taken in

that matter and that, in order to refute the movant’s request

for return of property, “[t]he government must do more than

state, without documentary support, that it no longer possesses

the property at issue”).1

The Court is also without power to compel the

government to issue money damages with respect to the phone.

See, e.g., Ordonez v. United States, 680 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir.

2012); Diaz v. United States, 517 F.3d 608, 611 (2d Cir. 2008)

Case 2:13-cv-02501-NVW-MEA Document 14 Filed 06/12/14 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -6-

(holding “[a] district court can order the return of property

that is in the hands of the government” in equitable actions

brought for the return of property after the conclusion of

criminal proceedings, but that a district court does not have

the authority to “order the United States to pay money damages

when, for whatever reason, property is not available for Rule

41(g) return.”(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the complaint, a motion pursuant

to Rule 41(g), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, be denied

and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

Case 2:13-cv-02501-NVW-MEA Document 14 Filed 06/12/14 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -7-

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 12th day of June, 2014.

Case 2:13-cv-02501-NVW-MEA Document 14 Filed 06/12/14 Page 7 of 7