Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00018/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00018-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Duffy
Defendant
David Perryman
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID PERRYMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

DUFFY, Warden, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-0018 DB P

ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate 

judge. ECF No. 11. No appearances have been made by any defendants. 

Plaintiff initiated this action on January 5, 2015, and filed a first amended complaint on 

February 11, 2015. On July 24, 2015, the then-assigned magistrate judge1screened the amended 

complaint and dismissed it with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 27.

Plaintiff has since filed a second amended complaint. ECF No. 39. He has also filed 

multiple motions, including a November 3, 2015, motion to appoint guardian ad litem (ECF No. 

 

1 On November 6, 2015, this case was reassigned from then-Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd to 

Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan. ECF No. 38. On August 2, 2016, this case was reassigned 

to the undersigned. ECF No. 46. 

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36); a December 22, 2015, motion for temporary injunction and access to law library (ECF No. 

40); two “motion[s] for injunction” filed on March 10, 2016 (ECF Nos. 41, 43); a March 10, 

2016, motion for competency hearing (ECF No. 44); and lastly, a March 10, 2016, motion to 

amend (ECF No. 45). 

II. Plaintiff’s Competence

The Court turns first to plaintiff’s November 3, 2015, motion to appoint guardian ad litem 

and his March 10, 2016, motion for competency hearing. In both of these motions, plaintiff 

contends he is incompetent to proceed in this action without representation by a guardian ad 

litem. He claims that he has suffered from schizophrenia since a young age and is in a psychiatric 

program, is prescribed psychiatric medication, and is under the care of a psychiatrist or 

psychologist. His symptoms include acute paranoia, hyperactivity, and visual hallucinations. In 

support of his motions, plaintiff includes several pages from his mental health records. See ECF 

No. 42.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) requires a court to “appoint a guardian ad litem-or 

issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented 

in an action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2). “A party proceeding pro se in a civil lawsuit is entitled to a 

competency determination when substantial evidence of incompetence is presented.” Allen v. 

Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). In determining whether substantial evidence of 

incompetence is presented, the district court may consider sworn declarations from the pro se 

party or other inmates, sworn declarations or letters from treating psychiatrists or psychologists, 

and his medical history. Id. at 1152-54.

A person’s capacity to sue is measured by the standard of the law of his domicile, Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 17(b)(1), here California state law. “In California, a party is incompetent if he or she lacks 

the capacity to understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding, or is unable to assist 

counsel in the preparation of the case.” Golden Gate Way, LLC v. Stewart, 2012 WL 4482053, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012) (citing In re Jessica G., 93 Cal. App. 4th 1180, 1186 (2001); Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 372; and In re Sara D., 87 Cal. App. 4th 661, 666-67 (2001)).

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The Court accepts plaintiff’s representations that he suffers from a serious mental illness 

for which he is being treated. Notwithstanding this mental illness, the Court observes that 

plaintiff’s pleadings and motions in this case demonstrate an understanding of the nature and 

consequences of this action. They also reveal that he is able to present argument in a logical and 

clear manner, submit necessary factual and documentary in support of his motions, and cite to 

relevant legal authority. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for a competency hearing and for 

appointment of a guardian ad litem will be denied at this time.

III. Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff has filed three motions seeking temporary restraining orders. In the December 22, 

2015, “Request for Temporary Injunction – Law Library Access,” plaintiff seeks an order 

directing unspecified individuals to provide him with Priority Legal User (“PLU”) status so that 

he can access the law library for 4 hours per week instead of the 2 hours that are generally 

afforded inmates without an upcoming court deadline. In the March 10, 2016, “Request for 

Temporary Injunction Law Library,” plaintiff again seeks an order to improve his library access

throughout the pendency of this litigation. Finally, in the March 10, 2016, “Request for 

Temporary Injunction Pen Filler,” plaintiff seeks an order to be provided with 2 pen fillers per 

week instead of 1 pen filler that is currently provided.

The analysis for a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to that for a 

preliminary injunction, Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 

832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001), and “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never 

awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) 

(citation omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Id . at 20 (citations omitted). An injunction may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 

plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 22 (citation omitted).

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Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and as a preliminary matter, the court 

must have before it an actual case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 

(1983); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 

U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If the court does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no 

power to hear the matter in question. Id. Thus, “[a] federal court may issue an injunction [only] if 

it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may 

not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.” Zepeda v. United States 

Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 

65(d) (listing persons bound by injunction).

The Court takes plaintiff’s assertions seriously, but lacks jurisdiction to issue the relief 

requested. As discussed infra, the second amended complaint fails to state a claim and will be 

dismissed. As a result, there is no “actual case or controversy” before the Court. Plaintiff’s 

motions for temporary restraining orders will therefore be denied.

IV. Motion to Amend

Turning to plaintiff’s motion to amend, since he has amended once before, he must obtain 

leave of court to amend again. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 

“Rule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so 

requires.’” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). However, courts “need not grant leave to amend where the 

amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue 

delay in the litigation; or (4) is futile.” AmerisourceBergen Corp., 465 F.3d at 951. The “court’s 

discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the court has already given the 

plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint.” Fidelity Financial Corp. v. Federal Home Loan 

Bank of San Francisco, 792 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986).

Under Local Rule 137(c), “If filing a document requires leave of court, such as an 

amended complaint after the time to amend as a matter of course has expired, counsel shall attach 

the document proposed to be filed as an exhibit to moving papers seeking such leave and lodge a 

proposed order as required by these Rules.” E.D. Cal. Local Rule 137(c).

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Plaintiff seeks to amend his pleading because he is unsure of the status of this case in light 

of recent reassignments. Though Rule 15(a) embodies a liberal standard, the undersigned declines 

to grant plaintiff’s motion solely on the ground that this case has been reassigned to a new judge. 

Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to provide a proposed amended pleading pursuant to Local Rule 

137(c). Without a proposed amended complaint, the Court is unable to review plaintiff’s claims 

and therefore cannot grant his motion. See Hicks v. Hamkar, 2015 WL 1393229, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 

2015). For these reasons, the motion must be denied.

V. Screening of Second Amended Complaint

A. Screening Requirement

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Pleading Standard

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial 

plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, 

while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

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C. Plaintiff’s Allegations

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was an inmate housed at California Health 

Care Facility (“CHCF”) in Stockton, California. He names as defendants CHCF Warden B. Duffy 

and CHCF Head Librarian Doctor Cole. Both are sued in their individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized as follows:

Between August 22, 2014, and September 30, 2015, while plaintiff was housed in the 

Mental Health Administrative Segregation Unit at CHCF, his ability to access the courts was 

hampered due to the inadequacy of the CHCF law library. Specifically, he alleges that the law 

library does not have (1) any books clarifying the rules related to federal habeas corpus petitions, 

thereby preventing him from filing such actions during this time period, and (2) any information 

on how to access the state civil courts, preventing him from filing state tort claims. 

D. Discussion

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 

518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration 

or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from 

the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. 

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002).

To assert a forward-looking access claim, as plaintiff does here, the non-frivolous 

“underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint 

sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416. To state a claim, the 

plaintiff must describe this “predicate claim ... well enough to apply the ‘non-frivolous' test and to 

show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.” Id. It is not enough 

for the plaintiff merely to conclude that the claim was non-frivolous. Instead, the complaint 

should “state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) just as 

if it were being independently pursued, and a like plain statement should describe any remedy 

available under the access claim and presently unique to it.” Id. at 417-418.

Moreover, when a prisoner asserts that he was denied access to the courts and seeks a 

remedy for a lost opportunity to present a legal claim, he must show: (1) the loss of a nonCase 2:15-cv-00018-DB Document 47 Filed 10/04/16 Page 6 of 10
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frivolous or arguable underlying claim; (2) the official acts that frustrated the litigation; and (3) a 

remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit. 

Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413-14, 

overruled on other grounds, Hust v. Phillips, 555 U.S. 1150 (2009)).

“[T]he injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim.” 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Inmates do not enjoy a constitutionally protected right “to transform 

themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions 

to slip-and-fall claims.” Id. at 355. Rather, the type of legal claim protected is limited to direct 

criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions such as those brought under section 

1983 to vindicate basic constitutional rights. Id. at 354 (quotations and citations omitted). 

“Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly 

constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id. at 355 (emphasis in original).

Under this legal framework, the Court concludes that the second amended complaint fails 

to state a claim. Turning to plaintiff’s claim that the inadequate law library prevented him from 

filing state tort claims, plaintiff is informed that the First Amendment does not protect his right to 

bring just any claim before any tribunal. Rather, the type of legal claim protected is limited to 

direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions such as those brought under 

section 1983 to vindicate basic constitutional rights. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. State tort claims fall 

outside of this protection

As to plaintiff’s allegation that his ability to file and, presumably, litigate a federal habeas 

petition was frustrated by the inadequacy of the CHCF law library, this claim fails for several 

reasons. First, plaintiff is required to identify the claims he intended to raise in a federal habeas 

petition so that the Court may determine whether those claims were frivolous or arguable. He has 

not done so. Furthermore, the First Amendment’s right of access concerns only the filing of 

actions, not their litigation following the initiation of a case. Any suggestion to the contrary, 

including that the CHCF law library must include books or individuals to help inmates discover 

potential claims, has been specifically discounted in Lewis. See 518 U.S. at 353 (disclaiming the 

suggestion “that the State must enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate 

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effectively once in court.”) (emphasis in original). Finally, plaintiff’s previous federal habeas 

petitions both demonstrate his familiarity with filing such actions and undermine his claim that he 

could not file a federal petition between August 22, 2014, and September 30, 2015. See

Perryman v. Duffy, Case No. 4:15-cv-3879-YGR (N.D. Cal), filed August 25, 2015; Perryman v. 

Valensuela, Case No. 4:13-cv-0311-YGR (N.D. Cal.). 

The Court must now determine whether to allow plaintiff leave to further amend. Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its pleading only with the 

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely grant leave when 

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). When determining whether to grant leave to amend, 

courts weigh certain factors: “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of [the party 

who wishes to amend a pleading], repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] 

futility of amendment [.]” See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Although prejudice to 

the opposing party “carries the greatest weight[,]...a strong showing of any of the remaining 

Foman factors” can justify the denial of leave to amend. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, 

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Furthermore, analysis of these factors can 

overlap. For instance, a party’s “repeated failure to cure deficiencies” constitutes “a strong 

indication that the [party] has no additional facts to plead” and “that any attempt to amend would 

be futile[.]” See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 988, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (upholding dismissal of complaint with prejudice when there 

were “three iterations of [the] allegations — none of which, according to [the district] court, was 

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss”); see also Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 

F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal without leave to amend where plaintiff 

failed to correct deficiencies in complaint, where court had afforded plaintiff opportunities to do 

so, and had discussed with plaintiff the substantive problems with his claims), amended by 234 

F.3d 428, overruled on other grounds by Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 

2007); Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. # 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1997) (denial of 

leave to amend appropriate where further amendment would be futile).

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Plaintiff was previously informed that his general complaint about the inadequacy of the 

CHCF law library, rather than specific harms he has suffered due to the alleged inadequacies, are 

an insufficient basis for an access to the courts claim under § 1983. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (“[A]n 

inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library 

or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.”) Plaintiff’s failure to allege any 

new facts or circumstances suggests his inability to do so despite the identification of the 

deficiencies in his previous pleading and the Court’s citation to the relevant legal standards 

necessary to properly allege a First Amendment access to court claim. Accordingly, the Court 

finds that leave to amend would be futile. 

VI. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s November 3, 2015, motion to appoint guardian ad litem (ECF No. 36) is 

DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s December 22, 2015, motion for temporary injunction and access to law 

library (ECF No. 40) is DENIED;

3. Plaintiff’s March 10, 2016, “motion for injunction – law library” (ECF No. 41) is 

DENIED;

4. Plaintiff’s March 10, 2016, “motion for injunction – pen filler” (ECF No. 43) is 

DENIED;

5. Plaintiff’s March 10, 2016, motion for competency hearing (ECF No. 44) is DENIED;

6. Plaintiff’s March 10, 2016, motion to amend (ECF No. 45) is DENIED; 

7. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF No. 39) is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim; and

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8. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

Dated: October 3, 2016

/DLB7;perr0018.o

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